RULE ON RECALLING WITNESSES

After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the
witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant or
withhold leave in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require.

In the exercise of its discretion, upon motion, the court may allow the recall
of a witness, “as the interests of justice may require.” However, this prerogative
should not be used into diluting the discretionary power into a ministerial one. The
ruling in the case of People v. Rivera1 is illustrative of this point:

[O]bviously that discretion may not be exercised in a vacuum, as it were,

entirely, isolated from a particular set of attendant circumstances. The discretion
to recall a witness is not properly invoked or exercisable by an applicant’s mere
general statement that there is a need to recall a witness “in the interest of justice,”
or “in order to afford a party full opportunity to present his case,” or that, as here,
“there seems to be many points and questions that should have been asked” in the
earlier interrogation. To regard expressed generalities such as these as sufficient
ground for recall of witnesses would make the recall of witness no longer
discretionary but ministerial. Something more than the bare assertion of the need
to propound additional questions is essential before the Court’s discretion may
rightfully be exercised to grant or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory
showing of some concrete, substantial ground for the recall. There must be a
satisfactory showing on the movant’s part, for instance, that particularly identified
material points were not covered in the cross-examination, or that particularly
described vital documents were not presented to the witness whose recall is
prayed for, or that the cross-examination was conducted in so inept a manner as to
result in a virtual absence thereof. Absent such particulars, to repeat, there would
be no foundation for a trial court to authorize the recall of any witness.

However, where such examination has not been concluded, or if the recall of
the witness was expressly reserved by a party with the approval of the court, then
his recall is a matter of right.2

LEADING AND MISLEADING QUESTIONS

A question which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining
party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:

(a) On cross examination;

1 G.R. No. 98376 (1991).

2 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, p. 848, 9th Rev. Ed. (2005).
 (b) On preliminary matters;

(c) When there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible

answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender
years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;

(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or

(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or

managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a
partnership or association which is an adverse party.

A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to
by the witness, or contrary to that which he has previously stated. It is not allowed.

Leading questions

Leading questions are those that directly suggest the desired answer to the
witness. They may simply direct the witness to say “Yes” like, “You were
surprised, weren’t you?” or instead may contain such suggestive detail that the
witness will merely incorporate it into his answer, for example, “Tell us whether or
not you were enraged when you saw the defendant with your wife?” The test is not
whether or not the question can be answered “Yes” or “No.” As such, it is
generally improper to ask leading questions on direct or redirect examination; after
all, the witness is supposed to be testifying, not the lawyer.

“In the giving of evidence suggestion plays a most important part. The
simple fact of questioning a witness, of pressing him to answer, enormously
increases the risk of errors in his evidence. The form of the question also
influences the value of the reply that is made to it. Let us suppose, for instance, that
some persons are questioned about the color of a certain dog. The replies are likely
to be much more correct if we ask the witnesses, “What is (was) the color of the
dog?” than if we were to say to them, “Was the dog white, or was it brown?” The
question will be positively suggestive if we ask, “Was the dog white?” … [a]
leading question propounded to a witness may, by creating an inference in his
mind, cause him to testify in accordance with the suggestion conveyed by the
question; his answer may be “rather an echo to the question” than a genuine
recollection of events ...”3
3 People v. Limbo, G.R. No. L-24810 (1926).
 Leading questions are allowed (in fact, preferred) in cross-examination.
Also, leading questions are also allowed in direct-examination (and re-direct)
regarding preliminary matters — those that do not have a direct bearing on the
outcome of the case, such as the witness’ personal circumstances and details, and
those facts that are undisputed, such as questions and answers in cross-examination
during re-direct. Further, leading questions are allowed, with leave of court, in
examining witnesses under the conditions laid down in paragraph (c) of this rule,
such as when the witness suffers from some incapacity in testifying though such
incapacity does not disqualify him or her in becoming a witness. In People v. Dela
Cruz,4 the grant of leave to the prosecution was validated in propounding leading
questions in the direct examination of “a woman whose capacity to give consent to
a sexual union is diminished, if not totally lacking.” In this case, the court held:

The trial court did not err in allowing leading questions to be propounded
to Jonalyn. It is usual and proper for the court to permit leading questions in
conducting the examination of a witness who is immature; aged and infirm; in bad
physical condition; uneducated; ignorant of, or unaccustomed to, court
proceedings; inexperienced; unsophisticated; feeble-minded; of sluggish mental
equipment; confused and agitated; terrified; timid or embarrassed while on the
stand; lacking in comprehension of questions asked or slow to understand; deaf
and dumb; or unable to speak or understand the English language or only
imperfectly familiar therewith.

In the same wise, in the case of People v. Santos,5 the Supreme Court ruled
that it is proper to allow the prosecution to ask leading questions to a child witness.

While the rule is that leading questions are not allowed in direct
examination, Section 10 (c) of Rule 132 allows leading questions to be asked of a
witness who is a child of tender years, especially when said witness has difficulty
giving an intelligible answer, as when the latter has not reached that level of
education necessary to grasp the simple meaning of a question, moreso its
underlying gravity. This exception is now embodied in Section 20 of the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000. Under
Section 4 thereof, a “child witness” is any person who at the time of giving
testimony is below the age of 18 years. In the present case, when AAA testified
on direct examination on December 6, 2000, she was only 14 years old and her
level of education was that of a third grader. Moreover, she was being made to
relive a harrowing experience where she lost her youth in the hands of a family
friend and neighbor. Certainly, AAA was a witness of tender age of whom
leading questions were properly asked.

4 G.R. No. 135022 (2002).

5 G.R. No. 171452 (2008).
 The case of People v. Daganio6 is illustrative on this point:

The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in

exercising control over the questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled
out in our Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which took effect on
December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to
ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level
of the child, (3) to protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and
(4) avoid waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child
are allowed if the same will further the interests of justice.

Leading questions are likewise allowed in the examination of a “hostile

witness” — who is antagonistic to the party calling them and, being unwilling to
tell the truth, may have to be “cross-examined” by the party.

Section 13 of Rule 1327 provides that “[a] witness may be considered as

unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate showing of his
adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into
calling him to the witness stand.

The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an

adverse party, may be impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if
he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character.
He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such
cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief.”

In Gomez v. Gomez-Samson,8 the Supreme Court held: “A witness may be

considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate
showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having
misled the party into calling him to the witness stand. The unwilling or hostile
witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached by
the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse
party, except by evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and
cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on
the subject matter of his examination-in-chief. This rule is based on the theory that
a person who produces a witness vouches for him as being worthy of credit, and
that a direct attack upon the veracity of the witness would enable the party to

6 425 Phil. 186, 193 (2002)

7 As amended by A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC.
8 G.R. No. 156284 (2007).
destroy the witness, if he spoke against him, and to make him a good witness, if he
spoke for him, with the means in his hands of destroying his credit, if he spoke
against him. Be that as it may, even if Jose Sebastian had been declared by the
court as an unwilling or hostile witness, the third paragraph of Section 12 as quoted
above, in relation to Section 1175[75] of the same Rule, only allows the party
calling the witness to impeach such witness by contradictory evidence or by prior
inconsistent statements, and never by evidence of his bad character.”

Under the same line of reasoning as that of allowing leading questions to a

hostile witness, leading questions are likewise allowable in the examination of an
adverse party (or any of his or her alter ego) as a witness.

In the classic case of Suarez v. Judge Tengco,9 penned by Justice J.B.L.

Reyes, the Supreme Court held: “Except in criminal cases, there is no rule
prohibiting a party litigant from utilizing his adversary as witness. As a matter of
fact, Section 83 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a party to
call an adverse party to the witness stand and interrogate him. This rule is, of
course, subject to the constitutional injunction not to compel any person to testify
against himself. But it is established that the privilege against self-incrimination
must be invoked at the proper time, and the proper time to invoke it is when a
question calling for a[n] [in]criminating answer is propounded. This has to be so,
because before a question is asked there would be no way of telling whether the
information to be elicited from the witness is self- incriminating or not. As stated
in Jones on Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), ‘a person who has been summoned
to testify ‘cannot decline to appear, nor can he decline to be sworn as a witness and
no claim of privilege can be made until a question calling for a criminating answer
is asked; at that time, and, generally speaking, at that time only, the claim of
privilege may properly be interposed.’ ”

Misleading questions

A misleading question uses logic in such a way that it deliberately causes

someone to reach an incorrect conclusion. It uses a predicate that is false or one
that is not yet on record. Misleading questions are often in the form of complex
questions where the question is phrased in such a way as to presuppose the truth of
a false or baseless conclusion buried in that question. In the examination of
witnesses, misleading questions are prohibited.

IMPEACHING WITNESSES
9 G.R. No. L-17113 (1961).
The following are the rules for impeaching witnesses:

Section 11. Impeachment of adverse party’s witness. — A witness may be

impeached by the party against whom he or she was called, by contradictory
evidence, by evidence that his or her general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad, or by evidence that he or she has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present, testimony, but not by evidence of particular
wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or
the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense.

Section 12. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of a crime — For the

purpose of impeaching a witness, evidence that he or she has been convicted by
final judgment of a crime shall be admitted if (a) the crime is punishable by a
penalty in excess of one (1) year; or (b) the crime involved moral turpitude
regardless of the penalty.
However, evidence of a conviction is not admissible if the conviction has
been subject of an amnesty or annulment of the conviction.

Section 13. Party may not impeach his own witness. — Except with
respect to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party
producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.

A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by

the court upon adequate showing of his or her adverse interest, unjustified
reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to the witness
stand.

The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an

adverse party, may be impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if
he or she had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his or her
bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse
party, but such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his
examination-in-chief.

Section 14. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent

statements. — Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he or she has
made at other times statements inconsistent with his or her present testimony, the
statements must be related to him or her, with the circumstances of the times and
places and the persons present, and he or she must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they
must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him or her concerning
them.
 Section 15. Evidence of good character of witness. — Evidence of the
good character of a witness is not admissible until such character has been
impeached.

A party can impeach the adverse party’s witness by:

(a) contradictory evidence;

(b) evidence of prior inconsistent statements;

(c) evidence of bad character; and

(d) evidence of bias, interest, prejudice or incompetence.

A party can impeach his own witness only by:

(a) evidence contradictory to his testimony; or

(b) evidence of prior inconsistent statements.

However, in the case of hostile witnesses, adverse party witnesses or

involuntary witnesses, they can also be impeached by other modes of
impeachment, aside from contradictory statements and prior inconsistent
statements made by them.

Contradictory evidence refers to other testimony of the same witness, or

other evidence presented by him in the same case, but not the testimony of another
witness. Prior inconsistent statements refer to statements, oral or documentary,
made by the witness sought to be impeached on occasions other than the trial in
which he is testifying.

In People v. Benie Mon,10 the Supreme Court citing People v. Amon11 held:
“The Court has held that ‘[s]elf-contradictions and inconsistencies on a very
material and substantial matter seriously erode the credibility of a witness.”
For evidence to be believed “must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but must be credible in itself’ — such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.
There is no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our

10 G.R. No. 235778 (2018).

11 218 Phil. 355 (1984)
knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to
the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance.”

In People v. Sinampan, et al.,12 the Supreme Court held that: “It has been
held that previous inconsistent statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the
credibility of a witness unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies
and he was then given the opportunity to explain them. The rationale for the rule
was amply discussed by this court in the relatively recent case of People v. de
Guzman,13 thus:

The rule which requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid before

introducing evidence of inconsistent statements of a witness is founded upon
common sense and is essential to protect the character of a witness. His memory is
refreshed by the necessary inquiries, which enables him to explain the statements
referred to, and to show that they were made under a mistake, or that there was no
discrepancy between them and his testimony.

It would be unjust to complainant at this stage to be declared an incredible

witness as a result of the unauthorized procedure adopted by the appellant. It is
evidentiarilly proscribed to discredit a witness on the basis of the purportedly prior
inconsistent statements which were not called to the attention of that witness
during the trial, although the same are supposedly contained in a document which
was merely offered and admitted in its entirety without the requisite specifications.

Through such a somewhat underhanded recourse, a party can expediently

offer in evidence at the trial the whole document containing allegedly variant
statements and then point out much later on appeal the supposed contradictory
statements which were not specified, intentionally or otherwise, in the same trial.
That sub silencio gambit would necessarily deprive a witness of the chance to
explain the seeming divergencies, which is the paramount consideration of the rule
mandating the laying of the proper predicate.”

The Supreme Court in People v. De Guzman,14 ruled that in order to impeach

a witness through ‘prior inconsistent statements,’ the witness should be given the
opportunity to explain the inconsistency. In said decision, the Supreme Court
ruled: “It is universally accepted that a witness cannot he impeached by evidence
of contradictory or prior inconsistent statements until the proper foundation or
12 G.R. No. 126781 (2000).
13 288 SCRA 346, 354-355 (1998).
14 G.R. No. 122740 (1988).
predicate has been duly laid by the party against whom said witness was called.
The American rule on laying the predicate is embodied in Rule 132 of our own
Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent

statements. — Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made
at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements
must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the
persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if
so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to
the witness before any question is put to him concerning them. 15

Although the whole record of the testimony of complainant at the

preliminary examination was offered in evidence by the defense and admitted by
the trial court, complainant cannot now be discredited through any of her
extrajudicial statements which were not brought to her attention during the trial.
Thus, it has been held that granting arguendo the alleged contradictions, previous
statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of a witness unless
his attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he was then given an
opportunity to explain them.”

As a rule, “[a] witness may be discredited by evidence attacking his general

reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity.”16
Section 15 of Rule 132 must be read together with Section 54 of Rule 130.17

Exclusion and separation of witnesses

The court motu proprio, or upon motion, shall order witnesses excluded so
they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses.18

In Design Sources v. Eristingcol,19 the Supreme Court explained the

rationalé of this rule: “Excluding future witnesses from the courtroom at the time
another witness is testifying, or ordering that these witnesses be kept separate from
one another, is primarily to prevent them from conversing with one another. The
purpose is to ensure that the witnesses testify to the truth by preventing them from
being influenced by the testimonies of the others. In other words, this measure is

15 Now Section 14, per amendments introduced by A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC.

16 Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, G.R. No. 132164 (2004).
17 As amended by AM No. 19-08-15-SC
18 Section 15, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
19 G.R. No. 193966 (2014).
meant to prevent connivance or collusion among witnesses. The efficacy of
excluding or separating witnesses has long been recognized as a means of
discouraging fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion.”

This rule does not authorize the exclusion of a party to the case, whether a
natural person or a duly designated representative of a juridical person party to the
case; a person who is essential to the presentation of the party’s cause (such as an
interpreter, translator, expert, and the like); and those authorized by statute to be
present.

“REVIVAL OF PRESENT
MEMORY” AND “REVIVAL OF
PAST RECOLLECTION”

A witness may be allowed to refresh his or her memory respecting a fact, by

anything written or recorded by himself or herself or under his or her direction at
the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time
when the fact was fresh in his or her memory and knew that the same was correctly
written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be produced and
may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross examine the
witness upon it, and may read it in evidence.20

In this situation, the witness remembers the event he is testifying to but

perhaps for the sake of stating details and accuracy, he or she wishes to refer to his
or her notes having made the entries in his notes or other document himself or
herself (or caused the making of the entries or execution of the document), while
the matter subject of his testimony was still fresh in his or her memory. Thus upon
leave of court, said witness may be allowed to read the document he wrote or
recorded or caused to be written or recorded in court as part of his or her
testimony, subject to the condition only that the adverse party be given an
opportunity to inspect said writing or recording. This is called “Revival of Present
Memory.”

So, also, a witness may testify from such writing or record, though he retain
no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or
record correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be
received with caution.21

20 First sentence of Section 16, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
21 Second sentence of Section 16, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
 In this scenario, the witness does not remember the facts involved in the
matter in issue and needs to resort to reading the writing or record to testify on the
matter in issue. Although admissible, this kind of testimony is given lesser weight
than that described in the first sentence of Section 16, Rule 132. This on the other
hand, is called “Revival of Past Recollection.”

The writings or notes used either to revive the present memory or revive the
past recollection of the witness have no evidentiary value in themselves, as the
same are not evidence. The Supreme Court in the case of Borromeo v. Court of
Appeals,22 explained thus: “The extensive and repeated arguments of the parties
relative to the issue of whether or not self-serving statements may be admitted in
evidence as parts of the res gestae are very interesting and illuminating, but we feel
they are rather off tangent. The notes supposedly prepared by witness Alcantara
during the transaction between her father and the Aznars do not partake at all of the
nature of hearsay evidence. If anything, they constitute memoranda contemplated
in Section 10 or Rule 132 which provides:

Section 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A witness may be

allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or
under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter,
or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the
same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such case the writing must be
produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses,
cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness
may testify from such a writing, though he retain no recollection of the particular
facts, if he is able to swear that the writing correctly stated the transaction when
made; but such evidence must be received with caution.

As may be observed, this provision applies only when it is shown

beforehand that there is need to refresh the memory of the witness, which is not the
case here. Nowhere in the record is there any indication that Alcantara needed
during her testimony the aid of any memorandum in respect to the matters
contained in the notes in dispute. Besides, under the above witness does not
constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the
witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other
words, where the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has
been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is
not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not
be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be
more credible just because he support his open-court declaration with written
22 GR.No. L-31342 (1976).
statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in
dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down.
What is more, even where this requirement has been satisfied, the express
injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if
only because it is not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this
nature. This is doubly true when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise
from the admission of such evidence, which is exactly the case of Crispina
Alcantara.”

When part of transaction, writing or

record given in evidence, the
remainder, the remainder admissible.

When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in

evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the
other, and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is
given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record
necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.

Right to inspect writing

Whenever a writing is shown to a witness, it may be inspected by the

adverse party.

AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS

Classification of Documents

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either

public or private. Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last

wills and testaments;
 (c) Documents that are considered as public documents under
treaties and conventions which are in force between the
Philippines and the country of source; and

(d) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents

required by law to the entered therein.

All other writings are private.23

Writings and other documents kept as public records, those acknowledged

before persons who are authorized to administer oaths are public documents,
including notarial documents. As a rule, public documents require no preliminary
proof of authenticity and due execution before they are admitted into evidence,
except when the law or the Rules of Court require such proof. In paragraph (b) of
this rule, notarial wills and testaments are excluded from being classified as public
documents, thus in the probates thereof, still require the testimonies of the attesting
witnesses.

Similarly, while it is provided in paragraph (a) of this rule that foreign

official documents are considered as public documents, said provision must be
read in conjunction with Section 24 of Rule 132,24 which provides:

The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,

when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his or her deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody.

If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, which is a

contracting party to a treaty or convention to which the Philippines is also a party,
or considered a public document under such treaty, or convention pursuant to
paragraph (c) of section 19 of hereof, the certificate or equivalent thereof shall be
in the form prescribed by such treaty or convention subject to reciprocity granted
to public documents originating from the Philippines.

For documents originating from a foreign country which is not a

contracting party to a treaty or convention referred to in the next preceding
sentence, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
23 Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
24 As amended by A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC.
 A document that is accompanied by a certificate or its equivalent may be
presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate or its equivalent being
prima facie evidence of the due execution and genuineness of the document
involved. The certificate shall no be required when a treaty or convention between
a foreign country and the Philippines has abolished the requirement, or has
exempted the document itself from this formality.

In the case of Windvalley Shipping v. Court of Appeals,25 the Supreme Court

held:

For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following

requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal
custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a
certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his
office. The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify
the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign
country.

APOSTILLE CONVENTION

“On 14 May 2019, The Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of

Legalization for Foreign Public Documents (Apostille Convention) entered into
force for the Philippines.

With the Apostille Convention, foreign public documents from Apostille-

contracting countries need not be authenticated abroad by Philippine Embassies
and Consulates General in order to be recognized and accepted in the Philippines.

In effect, Philippine public documents need not undergo diplomatic or

consular authentication in order to be used abroad in fellow Apostille-contracting
countries.

The Apostille Convention only applies if both the country where the public
document was issued and the country where the public document is to be used are
parties to the Convention.

25 G.R. No. 119602 (2000).

 The Apostille streamlines the whole authentication procedure of documents
for use abroad resulting to more convenience, less cost and processing time for the
applicants.

Before Apostille, a Philippine document to be used abroad needs a

certification by the relevant government agency or office, authentication by the
DFA, and legalization by the Embassy of the country of destination.

With the Apostille, documents will no longer require legalization by the

Foreign Embassy if the country or territory of destination is already a member of
the Apostille Convention. Once Apostillized by the DFA, the document can be
validly used in any and all Apostille Countries.

After authentication (Apostillization) by the DFA, there is no more need for

legalization by the Foreign Embassies or Consulates except for countries that have
not acceded to the Convention.

Aside from countries that have not yet acceded to the Apostille Convention,
the Philippine Apostille will not apply to Austria, Finland, Germany and Greece.
Documents from and to such countries will still require legalization by their
Embassy or Consulate in the Philippines.

The DFA Office of Consular Affairs will be the competent authority

responsible for the implementation of the Apostille Convention. The Supreme
Court plays an important role since the accession would require the amendment of
certain provisions of the Rules of Court pertaining to the use of foreign public
documents.”26

Public documents as evidence

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance

of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All
other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which
gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.27

Contents of Attestation

26 Susan De Leon, DFA now affixes ‘Apostille’ instead of ‘red ribbon’ as proof of authentication, Philippine
Information Agency Website, 4 June 2019. <https://pia.gov.ph/index.php/news/articles/1022873>
27 Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
 Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk
of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.28

Irremovability of Public Records

Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in evidence, must

not be removed from the office in which it is kept, except upon order of a court
where the inspection of the record is essential to the just determination of a
pending case.29

In order to produce public records:

a. There must be a court order to bring the same to court, such as a

subpoena duces tecum; and

b. The inspection of the record is essential to the just

determination of a pending case.

This rule, however, refers only to a public record an official copy of which
could be made available to the interested party and is admissible in evidence.

Proof of lack of record

A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official

record or by his or her deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his or her office, accompanied by
a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his or
her office contain no such record or entry.30

Proof of Notarial Documents

Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by

law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of

28 Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

29 Section 26, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
30 Section 28, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or
document involved.31

How public documents are proved

Public documents may be proved by presenting (a) the original copy; (b) an
official publication thereof; or (c) a certified true copy.

Probative Value of Public Documents

It is important to know that public documents do not enjoy uniform

probative values. The case of Republic v. Gimenez32 is illustrative on this point:
“The distinction as to the kind of public document under Rule 132, Section 19 of
the Rules of Court is material with regard to the fact the evidence proves. In
Philippine Trust Company v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., this court ruled that:

x x x [N]ot all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated:

xxx

“Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer”

include those specified as public documents under Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court and the acknowledgement, affirmation or oath, or jurat portion of
public documents under Section 19(c). Hence, under Section 23, notarized
documents are merely proof of the fact which gave rise to their execution (e.g.,
the notarized Answer to Interrogatories . . . is proof that Philtrust had been served
with Written Interrogatories), and of the date of the latter (e.g., the notarized
Answer to Interrogatories is proof that the same was executed on October 12,
1992, the date stated thereon), but is not prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. Additionally, under Section 30 of the same Rule, the acknowledgement in
notarized documents is prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or
document involved (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories is prima facie
proof that petitioner executed the same).

The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties
attending the execution of the different kinds of public instruments. Official duties
are disputably presumed to have been regularly performed. As regards affidavits,
including Answers to Interrogatories which are required to be sworn to by the
person making them, the only portion thereof executed by the person authorized
to take oaths is the jurat. The presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed therefore applies only to the latter portion, wherein the notary public
31 Section 30, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
32 G.R. No. 174673 (2016).
 merely attests that the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before him or her, on
the date mentioned thereon. Thus, even though affidavits are notarized
documents, we have ruled that affidavits, being self-serving, must be received
with caution.

Notarial Documents

Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by

law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or
document involved.33

Being duly notarized, it carries with it the presumption of regularity,

authenticity, and due execution. It has been the consistent rule that without clear,
convincing, and more than preponderant evidence to controvert, the presumption
of regularity, the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with
respect to its execution, as well as the statements and the authenticity of the
signatures thereon, stand.34

PRIVATE DOCUMENTS

Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its

due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting

of the maker; or

(c) By other evidence showing its due execution and authenticity.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is

claimed to be.35

Unlike a public document in general, in order for a private document to be

admissible, it is necessary to prove its due execution and authenticity. The party

33 Section 30, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

34 Heirs of Spouses Liwagon & Dumalagan v. Heirs of Spouses Liwagon, G.R. No. 193117 (2014).
35 Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
wishing to introduce the private document into evidence must show that the
document is not spurious, counterfeit, or a different document.

Under paragraph (b) of this rule, the due execution and authenticity of a
private document may be proved by evidence of the genuineness of the signature
or handwriting of the maker. Section 22 of Rule 132 provides the rule in proving
the genuineness of a handwriting:

The handwriting of a person may be proved:

(a) By any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such

person because he or she has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting
to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person; or

(b) By a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings

admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered,
or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.

The genuineness of handwriting may also be proved by the testimony of an

expert.36

In Lopez v. Court of Appeals,37 the Supreme Court held: “[T]here is no

inflexible rule under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that gives
priority to subscribing witnesses in the order and quality of evidence to prove a
handwriting. The rule merely enumerates the means or methods by which the
handwriting of a person may be proved, which may either be (1) by any witness
who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, and has seen the person write,
or has been writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or has
been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person;
(2) by comparison made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to
be genuine to the satisfaction of the Judge. The law makes no preference, such less
distinction among and between the different means in proving the handwriting of a
person.”

Ancient Document

36 Section 52, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

37 G.R. No. L-31494 (1978).
 Where a private document is more than 30 years old, is produced from the
custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any
alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need
be given.38

Actionable Document

Under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, when the authenticity and due
execution of a private document upon which an action or defense is founded upon
by a party has been expressly or impliedly admitted by a failure to deny the same
under oath by the adverse party, there will be no need to present evidence of due
execution and authenticity of the actionable document. However, there is no
implied admission of due execution and/or authenticity when the adverse party
does not appear to be a party to the said instrument, or when compliance with an
order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused by the party
introducing the actionable document.

Alterations in Documents

The party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and
appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in
dispute, must account for the alteration. He or she may show that the alteration was
made by another, without his or her concurrence, or was made with the consent of
the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocent made, or that the
alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he or she
fails to do that, the document shall not be admissible in evidence.39

Proof of alteration, however, is necessary for this rule to apply. In the case of
People v. Burgos,40 when a judge assumed that a diskette 41 was “altered” and
denies its admission into evidence, the Supreme Court held that: “There was
neither testimonial evidence nor any physical evidence on the diskettes themselves
which might indicate they had actually been tampered or their contents altered in
order to secure the conviction of the accused. Respondent Judge was in effect
charging the prosecution with fabricating evidence against the private respondents,
which constitutes serious misconduct and quite possibly a criminal offense. The
38 Section 21, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
39 Section 31, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
40 G.R. No. 92739 (1991).
41 A diskette is a random access, removable data storage medium that can be used with personal computers. The
term usually refers to the magnetic medium housed in a rigid plastic cartridge measuring 3.5 inches square and
about 2 mm thick.
mere fact that the diskettes had been in the possession of the prosecution does not
necessarily imply that it had altered or tampered with the evidence to suit its
prosecutorial objectives. Indeed, the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed prevails, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.”

Impeachment of Judicial Record

Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of: (a) want of

jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion between the parties, or (c)
fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings.

In Militante v. Edrosolano,42 the Supreme Court held that collusion between

the parties is a valid ground for annulment of a decision in a separate action. “The
view entertained by the lower court in its order of dismissal that an action for
annulment of judgment can be availed of only by those principally or secondarily
bound is contrary to what had been so clearly declared by this Court in the leading
case of Anuran v. Aquino, decided in 1918. It was emphatically announced therein:
“There can be no question as to the right of any person adversely affected by a
judgment to maintain an action to enjoin its enforcement and to have it declared a
nullity on the ground of fraud and collusion practiced in the very matter of
obtaining the judgment when such fraud is extrinsic or collateral to the matters
involved in the issues raised at the trial which resulted in such judgment; . . .” Such
a principle was further fortified by an observation made by this Court through
Justice Ozaeta in Garchitorena v. Sotelo.43 These are his words: “The collusive
conduct of the parties in the foreclosure suit constituted an extrinsic or collateral
fraud by reason of which the judgment rendered therein may be annulled in this
separate action.”

Seal

There shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed private documents

insofar as their admissibility as evidence is concerned.44

Documentary evidence in an unofficial language

Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as

evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid
42 G.R. No. L-27940 (1971).
43 G.R. No. L-47867 (1942).
44 Section 32, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such
translation prepared before trial.45

ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

Under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, 46 electronic documents are the

functional equivalent of paper-based documents, and ‘whenever a rule of evidence
refers to the term of writing, document, record, instrument, memorandum or any
other form of writing, such term shall be deemed to include an electronic
document.’47

Authentication

The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal

proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity.48

Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in

evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:

(a) By evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person

purported to have signed the same;

(b) By evidence that other appropriate security procedures or

devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law
for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the
document; or

(c) By other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the

satisfaction of the judge.

OFFER AND OBJECTION

Our Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal offer of
evidence. Testimonial evidence is offered “at the time [a] witness is called to
testify.” Documentary and object evidence, on the other hand, are offered “after the
presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence.’ Offer of documentary or object

45 Section 33, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

46 A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC (2001).
47 Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
48 Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
evidence is generally done orally unless permission is given by the trial court for a
written offer of evidence.

More importantly, the Rules specifically provides that evidence must be

formally offered to be considered by the court. Evidence not offered is excluded in
the determination of the case.49

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.50

Mode of Offer

Pursuant to AM No. 19-08-15-SC, the Rules of Court now provides that

‘[a]ll evidence must be offered orally.’ It is the goal of this amendment to pave the
way for a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of cases. In the old rule, Section
35 of Rule 132 provided that ‘[s]uch offer shall be done orally unless allowed by
the court to be done in writing.’ This sentence is now deleted, directing all offers of
evidence to be in oral form.51

Time of offer

1. Testimonial Evidence — The offer of the testimony of a witness in

evidence must be made at the time the witness is called to testify.

2. Documentary and Object Evidence — The offer of documentary and

object evidence shall be made after the presentation of a party’s testimonial
evidence.

Purpose of Offer

The case of Republic v. Gimenez52 is instructive: “The rule on formal offer of

evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of due process. Parties
must be given the opportunity to review the evidence submitted against them and
take the necessary actions to secure their case. Hence, any document or object that
was marked for identification is not evidence unless it was ‘formally offered and
49 Republic v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 174673 (2016).
50 Section 43, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
51 However, in cases where the documentary evidence consists of voluminous documents, and formally offering
such orally would take a long period of time, thus defeating the purpose of the Supreme Court’s policy to
expedite the proceedings, written offer of evidence may still be possible.
52 Supra, Note 293.
the opposing counsel [was] given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine
the witness called upon to prove or identify it.”

The Rules of Court provides that ‘the court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered.’ A formal offer is necessary because judges are
mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon
the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial
judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the
evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence
and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court
will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial
court.”

Contents and Necessity of Offer

The offer of evidence states the evidence being offered, its nature, and the
purpose upon which it is offered. The offer allows the court to pass judgment on
the admissibility of evidence especially if the adverse party objects to the same, as
well as its weight and sufficiency in proving the matter in issue.

In Sabay v. People,53 the Supreme court declared: “Formal offer means that
the offering party shall inform the court of the purpose of introducing its exhibits
into evidence, to assist the court in ruling on their admissibility in case the adverse
party objects. Without a formal offer of evidence, courts cannot take notice of this
evidence even if this has been previously marked and identified.”

Even if marked during the pre-trial, or even during the presentation of a

witness, with leave of court, if a reservation was made for good cause, the court
will not rule upon evidence which are not formally offered. In Heirs of Pasag v.
Spouses Parocha,54 the Supreme Court held: “Documents which may have been
identified and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or trial but which were not
formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. Neither
can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value. It must
be stressed that there is a significant distinction between identification of
documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in the course of the
pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit;
while the latter is done only when the party rests its case. The mere fact that a
53 G.R. No. 192150 (2014).
54 G.R. No. 155483 (2007).
particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it
has already been offered as part of the evidence. It must be emphasized that any
evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must
formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.”

The rule, however, admits of an exception. In the interest of substantial

justice, the Supreme Court has, on occasion, allowed the admission of evidence not
formally offered.

In People v. Napat-a55 the Supreme Court relaxed the foregoing rule and
allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial
court provided the following requirements are present, to wit: first, the same must
have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and second, the same must
have been incorporated in the records of the case.

OBJECTIONS

An objection is a formal protest raised in court during a trial or hearing to

disallow a witness’ testimony or other evidence in violation of the rules of
evidence.

Objections should be raised at the earliest opportunity. Failure to raise

objections in time may result into an implied waiver of the ground for the
objection. In Catuira v. Court of Appeals,56 the Supreme Court held: “[O]bjection
to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. x x x
The reason for requiring that evidence be formally introduced is to enable the court
to rule intelligently upon the objection to the questions which have been asked. As
a general rule, the proponent must show its relevancy, materiality and competency.
Where the proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be
inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right to object. But such right is a
mere privilege which can be waived. Necessarily, the objection must be made at
the earliest opportunity, lest silence when there is opportunity to speak may operate
as a waiver of objections.”

Timeliness of Objections

55 G.R. No. 84951 (1989).

56 G.R. No. 105813 (1994).
 Section 36 of Rule 132 provides that ‘objections to offer of evidence must
be made orally immediately after the offer is made.57

Objections to the testimony of a witness for lack of a formal offer must be

made as soon as the witness begins to testify. Objection to a question propounded
in the course of the oral examination of a witness must be made as soon as the
grounds therefore becomes reasonably apparent.58

The case of Macasiray, et al. v. People59 is enlightening as regards

objections to documentary evidence. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that:
“Objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is formally offered. In the
case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party
making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is
being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the
documentary evidence may be made.

In this case, petitioners objected to the admissibility of the documents when

they were formally offered. Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, petitioners
did not waive objection to admissibility of the said documents by their failure to
object when these were marked, identified, and then introduced during the trial.
That was not the proper time to make the objection. “Objection to the documentary
evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier.” Thus, it has
been held that the identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit
does not constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party
presenting it. Objection to the identification and marking of the document is not
equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence.
What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally
offered as an exhibit.”

In Magsino v. Magsino,60 the Supreme Court held: “In order to exclude

evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be made at the proper
time, and the grounds specified. Grounds for objections not raised at the proper
time shall be considered waived, even if the evidence was objected to on some
other ground. Thus, even on appeal, the appellate court may not consider any other
ground of objection, except those that were raised at the proper time.

57 Since offer of evidence is mandated under A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC, it necessarily follows that objections to
offer of testimony are likewise oral.
58 Section 36, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
59 G.R. No. 94736 (1998).
60 G.R. No. 205333 (2019).
 Thus, it is basic in the rule of evidence that objection to evidence must be
made after the evidence is formally offered.

In other words, objection to oral evidence must be raised at the earliest

possible time, that is after the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is
given if the objectionable issue becomes apparent only after the answer was given.
In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party
making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is
being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the
documentary evidence may be made.

Grounds for Objections

The last sentence of Section 36 of Rule 132 provides that “[t]he grounds for
the objections must be specified.”

In Spouses Tapayan v. Martinez,61 the Supreme Court reiterated: “Grounds

for objections not raised at the proper time shall be considered waived, even if the
evidence was objected to on some other ground. Thus, even on appeal, the
appellate court may not consider any other ground of objection, except those that
were raised at the proper time.”

In general, objections are raised to point out the inadmissibility of evidence.

Hence, the specific grounds for objections are anchored upon the rules of
admissibility. Therefore, objections are either grounded on a piece of evidence’s
lack of relevance, materiality, or lack of competence.

Common specific grounds for objections are:

“Leading” — On parts of witness examination where leading questions are

not allowed, a question could be objected to for being ‘leading’ or suggesting the
answer to the witness;

“Misleading” — Questions that have as its premise a fact not yet on record,
or a contrary fact to the one on record are ‘misleading.’ Usually compound
questions which assume one fact to be true while eliciting an answer for another
fact, when the assumed fact had not yet been proven, proven otherwise, or have no
basis on record;

61 G.R. No. 207786 (2017).

 “Argumentative” — A lawyer is not permitted to be argumentative with a
witness in any given trial. This means that a lawyer is not permitted to repeatedly
ask the same question of a witness, nor is the lawyer allowed to directly dispute
what the witness says in the manner of an argument. Any such questions might be
objected to on the grounds that they are argumentative;

“Asked and answered” — Once a question has been asked and answered, it
is generally not allowed for that question to be asked again. If the question is asked
again, then the opposing lawyer might object based on the grounds that the
question has been asked and answered;

“Hearsay” — A type of testimony which is related secondhand, from

questions asked or answers given outside of the court is hearsay, and thus generally
inadmissible;

“Incompetent” — If a witness is not considered to be competent for

providing answers to questions, his answers would be an opinion, which is
inadmissible. Or, when the law specifically disqualifies the witness to give
testimony on particular matters;

“Privileged” — A witness does not have to give testimony or evidence in

certain areas if that witness holds privilege of particular types;

“Immaterial” — When the testimony of the witness is does not have any
probative value, or logical relation to a matter in issue in court;

“Narration” — When the testimony of the witness is based on matters which

are not yet asked by the examiner.

There are more specific grounds in the Rules of Court as well as other laws.

Repetition of Objections

When it becomes reasonably apparent in the course of the examination of a

witness that the question being propounded are of the same class as those to which
objection has been made, whether such objection was sustained or overruled, it
shall not be necessary to repeat the objection, it being sufficient for the adverse
party to record his continuing objection to such class of questions.62

62 Section 37, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

Ruling on Objections

The ruling of the court must be given immediately after the objection is
made, unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the
question presented; but the ruling shall always be made during the trial and at such
time as will give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the
situation presented by the ruling.

The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated.

However, if the objection is based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining the
objection on one or some of them must specify the ground or grounds relied
upon.63

Striking off Testimony

The general rule that “a protest or objection against the admission of any
evidence must be made at the proper time, and that if not so made it will be
understood to have been waived. The proper time to make a protest or objection is
when, from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or
from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may
be, inferred.”64

However, “[s]hould a witness answer the question before the adverse party
had the opportunity to voice fully its objection to the same, or where a question is
not objectionable, but the answer is not responsive, or where a witness testifies
without a question being posed or testifies beyond limits set by the court, or when
a witness does a narration instead of answering the question, and such objection is
found to be meritorious, the court shall sustain the objection and order such
answer, testimony, or narration, to be stricken off the record.”65

Tender of Excluded Evidence

“[T]rial courts should permit all exhibits presented by the parties, although
not admitted, to be attached to the records so that, in case of appeal, the appellate
court may be able to examine the same and determine the propriety of their
rejection.”66

63 Section 38, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

64 Abrenica v. Gonda, et al., G.R. No. L-10100 (1916).
65 Section 39, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC.
66 Oliveros v. Oliveros, et al., G.R. No. L-12466 (1959).
 Hence “[i]f documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the
court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the
evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other
personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed
testimony.67“ The operative word “may” in this rule means that if a party wishes to
proffer excluded documentary or object evidence on appeal, he must file a motion
to allow the same, for the court-a-quo, in the exercise of its residual jurisdiction,
grant the same and attach the excluded evidence on the case record for
consideration on appeal by the higher court.

In People v. Yatco, et al.,68 the Supreme Court with Justice J.B.L. Reyes as
ponente, ruled: “In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is
most effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts where trial objections
to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The practice of excluding
evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the
form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible
for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to
know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is
no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney offering the evidence, the
court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney
that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered
that in the heat of the battle over which the presides, a judge of first instance may
possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical
connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is
erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself
embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without
returning the case for a new trial, — a step which this Court is always very loath to
take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if
the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in
much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law;
and it is duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and
material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause
is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this Court then has all the
material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.

67 Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

68 G.R. No. L-9181 (1955).