Buddhist Ethics

Author(s): David Bastow

Source: Religious Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Dec., 1969), pp. 195-206
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Rel. Stud. 5, pp. 195-206

DAVID BASTOW
Lecturer in Philosophy,Universityof Dundee

BUDDHIST ETHICS

The canonical texts of Early Buddhism describe and explain a way to achieve
a goal.What the goal is isnot immediately clear; many different descriptions
are given of it, and these descriptions can be variously interpreted. It is to
some extent easier to find out what is the way to achieve the goal; the texts
contain frequently repeated lists of stages on thisWay. The best way of
starting a consideration of the nature of the goal and itsmoral status is to
examine themost important of these lists.
The longest and most elaborate first appears in a Sutta inwhich theBuddha
is answering the question 'What are the fruits of a recluse ?'-i.e. what are
the benefits and achievements which men do or can hope for when they
take up the recluse's life? ('Recluse' is an inadequate translation of the Pali
'bhikkhu'. The Sutta is the SamaiinnaPhala Sutta, in D.I the translations I
use are (a) of the Digha Nikaya (D), Dialogues of theBuddha, translated by
T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, in the series 'SacredBooks of theBuddhists';
(b) of theMajjhima Nikaya (M), Middle Length Sayings, translated by I. B.
Horner, in the Pali Text Society Translation Series.) In answering the ques
tion about the fruits of such a life, the Buddha gives a list of benefits and
accomplishments which is repeated with only minor variations in many of
the Suttas, and which forms the basis for discussion in a great many of the
others. I shall first describe it without any general comment; and later
attempt to explain it and draw conclusions relevant to the topic of the paper.
The Buddha first describes how a householder hears the preaching of 'one
who has won the truth, ... a Blessed One, a Buddha, ... who proclaims the
truth and makes known the higher life ... in all its fulness and all its purity'
(D.I 78). He realises that he cannot lead this higher life as a householder,
and so decides to 'go forth into the homeless state'. He then 'lives self
restrained by that restraint that should be binding on a recluse' (D.I 79).
Firstly, his conduct is good. This is explained in two sections. In the first,
there is a list of abstentions-from destruction of life, taking what is not
given, unchastity, lying words, slander, rudeness of speech and frivolous
talk-each of which is expanded in a way which goes quite beyond mere
overt abstention; e.g. the paragraph about abstaining from the destruction
of life continues 'He has laid the cudgel and the sword aside, and ashamed
of roughness and full of mercy he dwells compassionate and kind to all
creatures that have life' (D.I 4). The second section ismany pages long, and

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i96 DAVID
BASTOW
contains the most elaborate and detailed accounts of the various kinds of
activity inappropriate for a recluse-accepting presents, attending fairs and
shows, playing games etc.; and of the various things a recluse may not do as
a means of livelihood-sorcery, soothsaying of many kinds, carrying out
sacrifices etc. A recluse who has dealt with these two sections is said to be
'master of the minor moralities', and to have the confidence which comes
from seeing no danger from any side so far as concerns one's self restraint
in conduct (D.I 79).
The next stage is 'keeping guarded the door of one's senses'. 'When [the
recluse] sees an object with his eye he is not entranced in the general appear
ance or the details of it. He sets himself to restrain that which might give
occasion for evil states, covetousness and dejection from flowing over him'
(were he unrestrained), and so with the other senses (D.I 8o). Thereby he
becomes 'mindful and self-possessed', being aware of whatever he sees and
of whatever he does, aware also of all his mental states, his feelings and his
thoughts (seeD.II 324-5). With respect to each of these aspects of himself
of which he is conscious, he 'keeps himself aware of all it really means'.
This phrase refers to the philosophical doctrines of the transience of every
thing, and of dependent origination-a variation on 'Every event has a
cause'. I shall return to these doctrines later.
Then the Bhikkhu is described as one who is content with the fewest
possessions: a robe and sufficient food to keep him alive-so that all that he
has he can takewith him in his wanderings. Thus he is able to concentrate
on putting away the Five Hindrances; hankering after theworld, the corrup
tion of the wish to injure; weakness and sloth of heart and mind; worry and
irritability; wavering and perplexity. He then experiences the gladness and
joy which result from the knowledge that one is free of these fetters. 'Being
thus at ease he is filled with a sense of peace, and in that peace his heart is
stayed' (D.I 84). The Buddha then describes the Four Meditations: that of
detachment from the world; serenity of concentration; equability-i.e.
looking on rival mental states with impartiality, imperturbability; and
finally 'the putting away of ease and pain', of elation and dejection, (being)
in a state of pure self-possession and equanimity' (D.I 86).
The recluse then applies himself to the insight that comes from knowledge
of the philosophical doctrines mentioned earlier.
There follows a description of various mystical abilities; including insight
into the hearts of men, into one's own previous lives, and the lives and re
births of all beings. This last ability gives one knowledge of the operation of
karma, the natural law whereby a man is reborn into a state determined by
his conduct in previous lives. The knowledge of karma is straightforwardly
inductive.
The final stage is that of the destruction of the Asavas, cankers, defiling
impulses, or corruptions. There are three usually mentioned-that of lust,

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 BUDDHIST ETHICS 197

with particular reference to hankering after rebirth in a sensuous world;

that of becoming, hankering after rebirth of any kind; and that of ignorance,
i.e. of the Four Noble Truths, of pain, its origin, its cessation, and the Path
that leads to its cessation. When the recluse has conquered these corruptions
'in him, thus set free, there arises the knowledge of his emancipation and he
knows "Rebirth has been destroyed. The higher life has been fulfilled.What
had to be done has been accomplished"' (D.I 93).
The question of first importance about theWay just described is,Why is
it as it is ?Why does it contain just those elements in just that order ?Answers
may be on the one hand in terms of historical processes, or on the other in
terms of some unifying thought. An explanation of the second kind, giving
a reasoned defence of the list of elements as they stand, will be, if it turns out
to be possible, what may be called a favourable interpretation, in that it
will give the list coherence. The theory now to be proposed and examined
is that the list isunified by the two concepts of self-restraint and emancipation.
Nearly all the component parts of theWay fall into one or both of the cate
gories of progressive stages of achievement on the one hand, and themeans
necessary to these achievements on the other. The latter are different kinds
of self-restraint, the former, the actual achievements, are different kinds of
emancipation, becoming free. As already quoted, theWay is introduced as
that of a recluse who 'lives self restrained by that restraint that should be
binding on a recluse'; and when the recluse has progressed through all the
stages of theWay, 'in him, thus set free, there arises the knowledge of his
emancipation'.
The first stages concern self-restraint as regards conduct in theworld, how
one behaves towards other people and oneself. Here achievement and method
of achievement are hardly separated; there are no specific instructions about
how to become honest, chaste, truthful, etc.; and the emancipation resulting
from this stage is emptily described as freedom from danger on any side as
far as regards one's self-restraint in conduct. The obvious question here is
'self-restraint fromwhat?', and this is a matter I shall have to discuss later.
The next kind of restraint is concerned not with actual conduct, but with
states of mind which are very close to conduct, the Five Hindrances; these
are hankerings and frettings, intellectual laziness and wavering. It may be
felt that the separation of these from the morality of conduct is artificial,
that unless such dispositions are manifested in action they are unreal; but
it seems that the Buddhist writers thought that even though one's conduct
was all that it should be, one's moral states could retain traces of the impulses
and weaknesses which led to wrong action. The ordering is certainly not
absolutely systematic; no clear line can be drawn between the expansion of
the abstention from killing in the first stage, '(the recluse) dwells compassion
ate and kind to all creatures that have life', and the second of theHindrances;
'Putting away the corruption of the wish to injure, he remains with a heart

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 i98 DAVID BASTOW

free from ill-temper, and purifies his mind of malevolence' (D.I 82). But
there is a general change of emphasis, or of point of view, from one's actions
and mental states as they have consequences in the world, to one's mental
states as one's own private concern.
Preceding the description of the Five Hindrances are two sections concerned
more with methods than with achievements. The recluse must be guarded
as to the doors of his senses, and mindful and self-possessed. These describe
a discipline of self-awareness, applicable to actions, but particularly directed
to the control of one's mental states. The first stage in the achievement of
mindfulness is bodily control, and in particular control of the breathing
but the control is always directed at the ends I have described, and especially
freedom from the Hindrances, unskilled mental states-i.e. those which
hinder one from the achievement of the goal. The recluse wishes to be in
complete control of all the components of his individuality; he therefore
must be conscious of all that goes on within him; no bodily movements or
mental wanderings must go unrecognised forwhat they are. The symbol of
success in these efforts is the recluse's contentment with themeanest posses
sions; the robe, and the food of themendicant.
When a recluse has destroyed theHindrances his efforts move to a higher
plane-that of the Jhdnas, meditations. This presupposes aloofness from
unskilled states of mind; the effort and the achievements are now beyond
the particular cravings and weaknesses which may survive themastery over
conduct, and are concerned with general attachment to intellect and
argument, and to such states as rapture and joy. In the state achieved in
the Fourth and final Meditation, the recluse is totally irresponsive to the
world, "'all is still", and (his) senses are completely withdrawn from the
external world' (Introduction toM.III, p. xxxi). This seems to be a trance
like state, which the recluse must leave in order to lead his daily life; but
having achieved the Fourth Meditation none of his experiences will bring
about any emotional reaction in him. He will view everything with 'pure
self-possession and equanimity, without pain and without ease'. The term
'self-restraint' seems hardly strong enough to describe efforts of this nature,
but the image of freedom from fetters, of emancipation, still seems appropriate
as an account of what has been achieved. The recluse is now in no way bound
to the demands of his senses, nor to the subtler demands of his intellect, or
any constraint to avoid whatever brings pain or dis-ease of any kind, or to
seek what brings ease or joy.
The mystical abilities are neither methods of self-restraint nor, in general,
achievements of emancipation: but rather by-products of the achievements
already reached. Some are included merely because it was thought that
some recluses did experience them, and were not thought to be specifically
Buddhist. Such abilities as that of Iddhi-'he becomes visible or invisible . . .
he penetrates up and down through solid ground, as if through water . . .',

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 BUDDHIST ETHICS I99

etc.' (D.1 88)-are included for historical reasons; non-Buddhist recluses

claimed to have them, so they were not beyond the powers of those following
the Buddhist Way, but the Buddha had no interest in them. The abilities I
mentioned earlier, though, aremore important; as I said, they provide induc
tive evidence for the theory of karma.The doctrine that the quality of one's
rebirth depends on one's conduct in this life, is not itself peculiarly Buddhist;
but the Buddha claimed, unlike other teachers, to have good 'empirical'
reasons for believing it to be true.
The final kind of knowledge ismore obviously a kind of emancipation;
from ignorance of the basic truths about the world. It is called 'knowledge
of the destruction of the defiling impulses'; and immediately consequent on
the knowledge is the achievement of the destruction itself. It may seem that
since the recluse has already reached the Fourth Meditation there is little
left to destroy; in fact what is added at this stage is a recapitulation and
extension of what has gone before, in the light of the Buddhist philosophical
theories. These theorieswere mentioned earlier in theWay, in the description
of the discipline ofmindfulness; this included seeing all one's constituent parts,
and all one's thoughts and actions, 'as they really were'; i.e. according to
true philosophical generalisations about the world. But at that stage the
recluse had to take these generalisations to some extent on trust; only at this
final stage can he see their truth for himself. The basic philosophical state
ment is that events happen because they are caused, because the appropriate
causal conditions are present: they do not, therefore, come about randomly
or casually nor by the action of fate or some supreme yet personal deity. The
Buddhist formulation of the principle is 'If this is, that comes to be; from
the arising of this, that arises; if this is not, that does not come to be; from
the stopping of this, that is stopped' (M.II 230). The formula is not inter
preted very critically; for example, the theory of karma is a notable applica
tion of it; but the idea that any kind of suffering or misfortune is due to
previous misdoings seems to imply a theory much stronger than 'Every
event has a cause'-namely every event under every description has an
explanation appropriate to that description. Thus if a tree falls on top of
me and injures me, this will need explanation not only as a case of a tree
falling, but also as a case of me being injured. It may be that the formula
could be tightened to get over these difficulties, but the Buddhist writers
did not reach such levels of sophistication. The other basic principle is
that all things are transient. This is sometimes in the laterwriting expressed
in an extreme form: 'there is no Being or not Being, only Becoming'
(Hiriyanna; Outlinesof IndianPhilosophy,p. I42). This presumably means that
the ultimate constituents of the world are not things but events. I know of
no Buddhist argument for the extreme position, except that it fits inwith the
general atomistic approach; the less extreme principle isjustified by common
sense induction; nothing that we know lasts.

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200 DAVID BASTOW

These two principles are applied in our present context to show in the
first place that there is no reason for believing in the existence of any perma
nent substratum to a man's individuality, any soul, to be reborn. Karma
therefore operates not as punishment or reward for persisting individuals,
but as the natural effect of the behaviour of one collection of constituents
on the circumstances and experiences of some future collection of constituents.
The connection between these people, or 'aggregates', is purely causal; there
is no closer identification, such as the word 'rebirth'might suggest. This is
not, though, the whole story as regards the Buddhist soul teaching and I
shall have to return to it yet again later in the paper. The second application
of the two principles is that both our dispositions and our experiences occur
for some reason, and can be altered or destroyed by altering or destroying
the conditions which bring them about. A man is therefore in the last resort
responsible for every aspect of his life-what he does, what he is, and what he
suffers. The best known summary of Buddhist teaching, the Four Noble
Truths, makes this explicit with respect to his suffering.The word is not
necessarily to be taken in a physical sense; any dis-ease is due to attachment
of some kind, and so can be eliminated by living a life such as that described
in detail above-set out in another formulation as the Fourth Truth; the
Path to the cessation of suffering is the Noble Eightfold Path; which Path
follows quite closely the Way already described. This idea that a man is
responsible for his dispositions and for his experiences has of course been
implicit throughout the whole of theWay; it had therefore to be taken on
trust by aman starting on the course of self-discipline; at the end of theWay
he is able to verify it for himself. The process of verification isnever described;
in theory it seems to have been by some kind of philosophical insight
though as I have already mentioned, common-sense justifications were
occasionally given for heuristic purposes.
The final achievement is just this freedom from the defiling impulses. The
first, that of Lusts, summarises in a schematic way the various kinds of craving
for theworld which have been faced and abandoned earlier in theWay and
adds the impulse to hanker after rebirth in thisworld. Such hankering is to be
resisted firstly because it is obviously an extension of the other cravings, but
also because it is pointless; the kind of rebirth allowed for by the Buddhist
theory of the soul makes nonsense of a man saying 'Iwish to be reborn in
such and such a state'. The second defiling impulse is that of Becomings; to
destroy this is to get rid of the desire for rebirth in any of the heavens. This
desire again is a constraint, as are all such desires, and is again a pointless
one, based on an illusion. The third defiling impulse is that of Ignorance of
the Four Noble Truths with respect to dis-ease or suffering.
A recluse who has destroyed these is an Arahat, one emancipated inmind
and heart (D.I 20I); one who has 'laid down the burden, attained his own
goal, whose fetters of becoming are utterly worn away, who is freed by perfect

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 BUDDHIST ETHICS 20I

profound knowledge' (M.I 6). Everything said about this goal of Arahatship,
with the exception of a very few pictorial similes, is by reference to the
progressive achievements of theWay. So it seems that the nature of the
goal can be described only as the emancipation resulting from the various
kinds of self-restraint. The Way and the goal are conceptually interwoven.
One considerable objection to this account should immediately be mentioned.
This is that the goal is the elimination of suffering by the only means
possible, i.e. the destruction of craving leading to victory over rebirth. On
this account the goal is claimed to be conceptually distinct from theWay;
the connection is rather causal and therefore contingent; the Buddha found
in his own experience that the only way to get rid of suffering was to pass
through the various stages of the recluse's Way. This account is the one
suggested by many of the handbooks on Buddhism. It can be answered at
several levels. The accounts of theWay in the Suttas are never introduced
as themethod to achieve freedom from rebirth; but rather as the proper way
to live the higher life, or as an account of true righteousness and truewisdom.
Freedom from rebirth is an Upanisadic goal, which the Buddha adopted,
but although it is not infrequently mentioned in the Suttas the implication
that rebirth as such can be wearisome fits too awkwardly with the Buddhist
soul theory, according to which there is no rebirth of individuals, for it to
be made the central aim of Buddhist striving. The Four Noble Truths regar
ding suffering do seem to support the theory, especially as they are placed
right at the end and therefore the summit of the recluse's achievements; but
it must be remembered that suffering or dis-ease and craving have to be
widely interpreted; craving forworldly things is only one of the Five Hin
drances, and when the fourth meditation is reached ease and dis-ease have
disappeared altogether. It seems that the Four Noble Truths can be seen
either as a statement of the minimal aims of theWay, expressed in terms
everyone can understand, or as an empty formula, tobe filled in appropriately
to the kind of fetter one is striving to get rid of.Whichever this is, the recluse
will think of the bondage to it as being, if not causing, unhappiness, just
because he wants to be but is not yet rid of it-not because of any connexion
with rebirth.
It seems then much more likely that the Buddha and his first followers
thought of theWay as a progressive revelation of the possibilities of self
restraint and the freedom resulting therefrom. To this extent the Buddhist
goal was the same as that of all recluses; self-restraint of some kind, abandon
ment of worldly pleasures and worldly desires, was common to all thosewho
'went forth' to lead the higher life. But the Buddhist would think that the
other recluses had only the vaguest idea of what self-restraint really implied;
it was for this reason that many of them were sidetracked into such useless
practices as asceticism, and self-mortification. The Buddha though saw clearly
that true self-restraint included perfect conduct, but was not exhausted

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 202 DAVID BASTOW

by this; the same principles had to be applied to mental states, and

finally to the desire which had formany been the central idea of the religious
life, that for rebirth in some more fortunate state. With regard to this last
point, it should be mentioned that one element in the confused picture of
the Buddha's attitude to the theory of the soul, is that the questions of the
nature of the soul, and whether an Arahat continued to live after death, were
among the speculative questions which theBuddha refused to answer, saying
that worrying about such things hampered one from attaining the goal. This
may well imply that the rewards of the attainment of Arahatship, if there are
any, are as irrelevant to its true nature, and as likely to confuse the issue, as
are Kant's grocer's profits to themoral worth of his action. This lofty position
is not however held consistently, as will be seen inwhat follows.

Emancipation or freedom are unsatisfactory concepts to put at the centre

of a comprehensive plan for the conduct of one's life; almost any change for
the better in a man's state can be seen as an extension of his freedom. The
term as it stands is evaluative-the change must be one for the better-but
insufficiently descriptive. What the above account of the Buddhist Way
needs, therefore, is a descriptive stiffening of the term, an explanation of why
it is just these kinds of emancipation that are to be sought. Three alternatives
suggest themselves. The first concentrates on the first stage of theWay, that
which describes the ideal of uprightness in conduct, resulting in 'freedom from
danger as far as regards self-restraint in conduct'. The suggestion is that the
emancipation here referred to is simply freedom from immorality; the self
restraint is that necessary to resist temptations towrong-doing. The kinds of
moral behaviour mentioned could be seen as selected to cover, in a schematic
fashion, thewhole field of morality. Abstention from killing is interpreted as
covering compassion, absence of malevolence-in fact the general field of
benevolence. Abstention from stealing and lying cover the field of honesty;
those rules of conduct which do not have immediate utilitarian justification.
Abstention from unchastity is representative of self-regarding morality. This
is not in anyway religiousmorality; theBuddha does not claim any originality
for it. He uses it as common ground between himself and the Brahmans when
arguing against ceremonial and sacrificial activities, and against the four-fold
class-system as determined by birth (Sonadanda Sutta, D.I I44 f.); and
between himself and the lay householder when he makes clear the duties of
a householder (Sigalovada Suttanta, D.III 173 ff.). In the Sutta in which
the Minor Moralities are first described, the fact that the Buddha is praise
worthy in that he lives according to them is seen as something that can be
recognised by non-Buddhists. So there is little doubt that the injunction of
the first stages of theWay can be described without distortion as injunctions
to restrain oneself from the commonly accepted kinds of immorality. One

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 BUDDHIST ETHICS 203

may feel that the image of self-restraint is not entirely appropriate here; is it
necessarily the case that one should have to restrain oneself from immorality ?
One answer would be that immorality is always more natural thanmorality,
in that the latter involves, through universalisation, attention to interests
other than one's own. A less subtle reaction is to limit the description of what
the recluse should avoid, to activities which are immoral because they are
pleasant-activities and experiences for which men may be said to crave.
This is interesting because it seems to provide what was lacking in the above
account, namely ameans of relating the injunctions of the first stages to those
of the later stages of theWay. Craving is then distinguished from other forms
of desire in two ways; first that cravings are desires which are the result of
external impulses-external in the sense of being foreign to a man's real
nature. The frequently-used word 'lusts'would in this case indicate their
character. The second important feature of cravings is that it is these desires
which bind one to the kind of lifewhich necessarily brings with it suffering,
grief, lamentation and despair: so, as the Four Noble Truths observe, the
only way to free oneself of suffering is to free oneself of cravings. (This may
or may not refer to rescuing oneself from the wearisome wheel of rebirth,
according to whether the picture of the wheel is thought to be compatible
with the theory of non-self If not, the Truths refer in a commonsense way
to how one can eliminate suffering in this life.) On this account the aim of
theWay is the destruction of craving, i.e. of those desires which the agent
sees as not being part of his true self; first of the simple desires of the flesh,
then as the recluse's vision of his true self becomes clearer, the desires which
defile and corrupt not his actions but his thoughts and states of mind. The
destruction of these cravings will, it is pointed out, have as a result (though
not necessarily as its purpose) the elimination of the suffering towhich they
bind us.
There is, I think, considerable truth in this account, and many texts could
be found to support it. Its weakness is that it does not tell the whole story.
In the first place it fails to do justice to the morality of conduct, already
described. I have said that this is best seen as an attempt to cover the com
monly accepted scope of morality: not without unreasonable distortion can
it be claimed that all the kinds of immorality therementioned are the result
of craving. Rough action, calumny, harsh language, frivolous talk, lying
speech, can hardly be fitted into the category of actions due to desires external
to one's true will. Similarly with the Five Hindrances; the first is certainly
hankering after the world, and its destruction is described as having 'a
heart that hankers not, and purifying one's mind of lusts' (D.I 82). But the
other Hindrances-the corruption of the wish to injure, sloth, worry and
irritability, wavering-fit best into a category wider than craving; loss
of self-control. At a higher level still, the Fourth Meditation is 'a state
of pure self-possession and equanimity, without pain and without ease'

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 204 DAVID BASTOW

not only does the recluse at this stage cease to be attracted to anything;
neither does anything repel him. Once again, self-control seems to be a
more appropriate term, and the emancipation is from lack of self-control.
This; though, only pushes the problem a stage further back; how is the
term 'self-control' to be explained. As it stands, it is as open to variety of
interpretation as 'self-restraint' or 'emancipation'. What is the self,who does
the controlling? A similar term found in the texts is 'self-mastery'; and this
means mastery over those elements which make up the individual, and which
masquerade as the self. Here we have the third attempt to spell out what
was hoped would be the unifying concept of self-restraint. This time the
explication is appropriate to the final stages of the Way, but has little
relevance to the earlier stages. All the elements of the individual person are
to be seen as of no account; 'the instructed disciple disregards material
shape, feeling, perception, dispositions, consciousness; disregarding, he is
dispassionate, through dispassion he is freed' (M.I I78). This goes even
beyond the Kantian proscription of interest and inclination as instigators
of action; reason, which in Kant's account remains, was quenched in the
Second Meditation. One cannot say that the real Self, the Pure Ego, remains,
as would be possible in theVedanta tradition, for there is no real Self. The
final emancipation is from the bondage of all that is impermanent, and
therefore not self; but since everything is impermanent, the emancipation is
absolute.
The final picture contains an incoherence which seems irreducible. The
Arahat is one who has mastered the Minor Moralities and is therefore
compassionate and kind-the Buddha himself shows himself to be compassion
ate on several occasions in his life; and in particular in the mythological
description of how he decided, on reaching Buddhahood, to live on earth in
order to preach his message to those who were in need of it (M.I 213). Yet
the goal of the recluse's Way includes the dispassionate disregard of all
feeling. To put the point in more general terms; the earlier stages of the
Way can be seen as progressive explorations of the notion of self-control
which we are familiar with, and which we may well approve of. But in the
later stages all possibility disappears of distinguishing between those actions,
thoughts, motives of which one may approve and those of which one may
disapprove-those which ought to be suppressed, and those which ought to
replace those suppressed. No recognisably human activities, mental or
physical, remain.

The final question is, how is all this related to morality. (I think it is
important to notice that this question can come only at the end of such a
relatively detailed survey of the relevant aspects of the religion concerned;
and the more one knew about the religion, the better placed one would be

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 BUDDHIST ETHICS 205

to answer the question.) The Buddha certainly recommends aWay and a

Goal to his followers, but is the recommendation a moral one, and if so, how
is it justified? To take the second question first; I have mentioned the
possibility that the real justification of theWay is that it eliminates suffering;
my conclusion was that this fails to do justice to the composition and des
cription of the stages of theWay, and to the description of the goal. It is
true and important that one who has reached the goal has eliminated
suffering; and this fact is often used to attract people to theWay, but it is
not the heart of thematter. A more promising suggestion is that theWay is
justified by the implied argument that the kinds of self control and freedom
from bondage described in the first stages have their proper extension and
culmination in the later and final stages. This thesis is importantly supported
by the Buddhist teaching about the self or soul. But it has been one of the
main purposes of my paper to argue that the assumed continuity between
the stages is seriously open to question; and even if the discontinuity is
surmountable, it is hardly sufficient to justify thewhole Way by reference to
the attractiveness of the early stages. There should be some justification of
the goal itself. The orthodox reply here would be that only when one has
reached the higher stages of achievement can one appreciate them at their
proper value; to this extent theWay must be taken on trust by the beginner.
It remains true that Buddha is notproposing a completely new and ultimate
evaluative principle; he describes the views which any man, and in particular
the recluse, will be led to if he takes his present principles seriously. These
principles would importantly include not allowing oneself to be controlled
by psychological forceswhich are in some sense external to one's real nature;
this principle may be based on or confirmed by the belief that in so doing a
man is getting at the ultimate truth about himself. This latter justification
carries over well to the later stages of theWay; the final freedom is always
coupled with knowledge of this freedom and of its significance.
This brings us to the other question, of whether these principles aremoral;
whether theWay can be described as a set of moral injunctions, and the
goal as a moral ideal. It seems in fact that little depends on such a classifi
cation, provided the principles' status is clear.
I. They presuppose the mastery of morality in the normal sense. This of
course raises the question of whether this kind of morality can be mastered,
and if not why not.
2. They are not incumbent on every man; the Buddha does not say that
it is a man's duty to undertake theWay. His attitude is rather that any
recluse who having heard the Truth follows some other kind of religious life
must be stupid or blind. Similarly a householder's life may be of profit,
but much greater and sweeter is the profit of theWay. The situation may be
similar to that in some aesthetic matters; appreciation of chamber music isnot
every man's duty, but may perhaps be expected of people of a certain type.

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206 DAVID BASTOW

3. They are concerned, unlike say utilitarianism, solely with the way
farer's own states. This suggests that the Buddha was describing the way
to the good life; the morally perfect life was certainly thought to be part of
the good life, but a part which could be disposed of before one moved to
higher things.What is perhaps the common-sense view was accepted, that
morality deals primarily with one's relations with other people, and therefore
with one's actions; but therewere thought to be goals more important than,
though not conflicting with, such morality. The question which arises here
iswhether pursuing these goals is in fact compatible with mastery of conven
tional morality. I have suggested that there may be conceptual incompati
bility; even if this is not the case, the practical difficulties of combining the
two kinds of goal may well be insurmountable.'
1 I do not deal in this paper with Buddhist teaching on the layman's morality, though this is
certainly worth discussing. The general point of view from which this paper is written is described
inmy 'The Principles of the Philosophy of Religion' (PhilosophicalQuarterly,July, I969).

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