171

CHAPTER-6

Jurisdiction, Powers and Authority of the

Central Administrative Tribunal

6.1 Defining Issues

A proper understanding of the nature, ambit and scope of
the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal
Involves an analysis of the following issues which are relevant
in the context:

(a) The jurisdictional limit of the Tribunal has been defined

in positive as well as in negative terms, by the Act. Section
14 specifies the categories of persons in respect of whom and
the subject-matters in relation to which (only), the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal extends. Negatively, section 2
excludes the operation of the Act, and consequently bars the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal in respect of certain categories
of persons specified therein. It, therefore, becomes necessary,
in the first place, to analyse the provisions of these two
sections so as to determine the jurisdictional limits of the
Tribunal vis-a-vis parties and the subject-matters.

(b) Within the limits thus defined, the Tribunal has been
vested with all the jurisdiction, powers and authority
exercisable by all courts, except the Supreme Court, before the
establishment of the Tribunal under Act . It is, therefore,
required in the second place, to examine the nature, extent
and scope of the jurisdiction, powers and authority, hitherto
exercised by the subordinate civil Courts and the High Court,

1. Section 14(1).
 172

relating to matters, now, falling within the jurisdictional

purview of the Tribunal.

(c) In respect of the matters assigned for adjudication by

2
the Tribunal, the Act excludes the jurisdiction of all courts,
except the supreme court; and an industrial tribunal, a labour
court or any other authority constituted under the industrial
Disputes Act, 19^7 or any other corresponding law. Hence, it
becomes necessary to examine the scope and effect of the
exclusionary provisions of section 28 vis-a-vis the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal and to determine the nature and
extent of jurisdiction exercisable by the Supreme Court; an
industrial Tribunal; a labour court and other authorities
excluded from the operation of the exclusionary clause.
Thus, all the above mentioned issues, relating to the
nature, extent, ambit and scope of the jurisdiction, powers and
authority of the Tribunal, may be examined in detail.

6.2 Jurisdiction of the Tribunal vis-a-vis Parties:

The following categories of civil servants fall within
the scope of jurisdiction of the Central Administrative
Tribunal -

6.21 Members of the All India Services

The nature of All-India Services is unique to the civil
service system in India. It is a legacy of the British rule and
has a long history in India. In fact, during the British

2. Section 2 8 .
 173

period there was, practically, an all-India service in every

important branch of the administration, such as, the general
administration, police, engineering, medicine, education,
forestry, agriculture, etc.3. However, between 1924-1946 these
all-India services were abolished, except, the Indian Civil
Service (ICS) and the Indian Police Service (IPS) . The Indian
Civil Service was later replaced by the Indian Administrative
5
Service .
The framers of the Indian constitution had originally no
intention of creating any all-India service. That was why the
draft constitution did not make any provision in this regard .
But, in the wake of the partition of the country and the
creation of Pakistan, the extremely unsettled conditions that
prevailed in the country necessitated creation of such
all-India services as powerful instruments for the preservation
of national unity. As a result, provisions were, finally, made
in the constitution in this regard.
Article 312 of the Constitution empowers the Parliament
to create by law one or more all-India services, common, both,
to the Union and the States but, before such an enactment is
passed it is necessary that the Council of States must have
passed a resolution supported by not less than two thirds of
the members present and voting. The council of States may pass
such resolution if it is of the opinion that it is necessary or
expedient in the national interest to create such a service.
However, under clause (2) of Article 312 it was provided that
3. For detail, see, "Report of the Royal Commission on Superior Civil Services 1n India",
U.K., Cmd 2128 (192T)
4. Sapru.R.K. Dr., Civil Service Administration In India (1985) 182.
5. The Indian Administrative Service was constituted 1n October,1946 1n pursuance of an
agreement entered Into between the Governments of India and provinces under the
Provisions of Section 263 of the Government of India Act, 1935.
6. Pyle.M.V., India's Constitution (1967) 3 6 8 .
 174

the two all-India services, namely the Indian Administrative

Service and the Indian Police Service existing at the time of
the commencement of the Constitution, shall be deemed to have
been created by Parliament by law to be enacted under this
Article.
Acting in pursuance of Article 312, as amended by the
President by the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order,
No. II of January 26, 1950^, issued under Article 379, the
provisional Parliament (consisting of a single House only)
enacted the All India Services Act, 1951. The Act provided for
regulating the conditions of service of persons appointed to
all-India services and authorised the Central Government to
make the necessary rules in consultation with the States. In
o
D.S.Garewal Vs. State of Punjab the supreme court upheld the
adaptation order, as also the validity of the Act passed by the
provisional Parliament and the rules framed by the Central
Government thereunder.
Originally, the All India Service Act provided only for
two services only, namely, the Indian Administrative Service
and the Indian Police Service. But, consequent upon the
passing of a resolution by the Council of States on December 6,
1961 , the Act was amended in 1963 to provide for the creation
of three more services in the fields of 'forestry','medicine
and health' and 'engineering'. Of these, only one, namely, the
Indian Forest Service was constituted with effect from July,
1966. It may be relevant to point here that the Administrative
7. By this order, among other adaptations, an adaptation was made 1n Article 312 which had
the effect of omitting the requirement of the resolution of the Council of States before
enacting a law relating to all-India services. The order was to remain 1n operation -
until both Houses of Parliament were duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first
session.
8. AIR 1959 S.C. 512. , ,,nt J t J , ,, ,Q,,
9. Rajya Sabha Debates, Volume XXXVI Col.1305, dated 6.12.1961.
 175

Reforms Commission of India has also advocated for the creation

of more all India services to ensure uniformly high standards
of administration in all States in key activities, to provide
for interchange of experience between States and the Centre,
and to obtain, where needed, the experience of State
administration at the decision-making levels at the Centre
The Constitution (Forty Second) Amendment Act of 19?6
provides for the creation of an All India Judicial Service
which shall not include any post inferior to that of a district
judge . The law providing for the creation of such a service
may contain provisions for the amendment of chapter VI of Part
VI relating to the State Judiciary, as may be necessary for
giving effect to the provisions of the law and no such law
shall be deemed to be an amendment of the constitution for the
12
purposes of Article 368 . However, no such law has been
enacted by the Parliament so far.

It may be noted that an all-India service is different

both, from the Union and the State services. As already
J
discussed Article 309 of the constitution provides for the
creation and regulation of the Union and* State services by laws
passed by the appropriate legislatures and, until such laws are
enacted, by the President or the Governor, respectively. The
Union and State services belong, exclusively to the respective
Governments. An All-India Service is created and regulated by
a law enacted by the Parliament under Article 312 of the
Ik
constitution . Such a service is common to both, the Union and
10. "Report on Personal Administration" (1969) 7-8.
11. Clauses (1) and (3) of Article 312.
12. Clause (4) of Article 312.
13. See, supra , p. 104.
14 Under Schedule VII, List I, Entry 70 the Parliament exercises exclusive legislative
power 1n this regard.
 176

the States, Persons recruited to All-India Services are

initially allotted different state cadres to serve under the
respective State Governments. But, at any subsequent stage
they may be posted to serve under the Central Government as
well. No State Government has the powers to make rules
IS
governing the conditions of service of such officers .
Although the State Governments do exercise a limited
administrative and disciplinary control over these officers
while they are serving under them, for, at that time they are
servant of the State Government concerned yet, these powers
are subject to the ultimate control of the Central
Government .
An officer of the All-India Service, whether serving at a
particular time, under the Centre Government or a State
Government, is, now, subject to the jurisdiction of the Central
Administrative Tribunal in respect of any dispute or
controversy relating to his recruitment or other service
matters.

6.22 Persons Belonging to the Civil Services of the Union or

Holding any Civil Posts under the Union

_ The two expressions "Civil services of the Union" and

"Civil post under the Union" are also used in Article 3 1 K D of
the constitution wherein certain procedural safeguards are laid
down, which apply in matters of punishments of way of
15. State of Jammu & Kashmir Vs. M.S.Farooql, AIR 1972 S.C. 1738.
16. Powers in this behalf are conferred on the State Government under the All India Services
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969.
17. See, e.g., D.D.Surf Vs. A.K.Barren (1976) 1 SCC 967.
 177

dismissal, removal and reduction in rank. But, neither the

Constitution of India nor the Administrative Tribunals Act, has

defined these terms. Hence, the true meaning and scope of

these two terms have to be gathered in the light of the

various pronouncements, made in this regard by the different

courts and tribunals.

It may, however, be said, at the very outset, that, these

terms include, in the first place, all the regularly

constituted civil services and posts governed by the Central

Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,

18
1967 , and specified in the Schedule. However, this

enumeration is not exhaustive for the purposes of invbking the

provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution or for

determining the ambit and scope of section lU(l) of the

Administrative Tribunals Act. While explaining the nature,

meaning and scope of the 'Civil Service of the Union', in the

context of section 14(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act,

the full Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal observed

thus:
"The expression 'civil service of the Union 1 , 1n our opinion, has very wide
amplitude. On an examination of clause (a) 1n section 14(1), we find that
the word ' d v 1 l service 1 has been emphasised 1n contradistinction to the
• term 'defence service'. The second aspect of the matters 1s that 1n the term
'civil service' both 'civil' and 'service' have not been spelt with capital
' C and capital 'S'. It, therefore, means that all those civilian employees
who are 1n the service of the Union or are rendering service to the Union
will be eligible to Invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal...."I 9

I1-. may be pointed that the cardinal word in 'civil

service', or for that matter, in 'defence service' is the

18. These Rules, made by the President under the provisions of Article 309 of the Constitu-
tion, classify the various services and posts under the Union, Into four broad groups.
19. Rehmat Ullah Khan and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, 1989 (2) SLJ 293 (CAT), at
p.302.
 178

'service*. The word 'service' as defined in section 3(p) of

'the Act' means service within or outside India. Since this
definition does not help, in any way, in the present context,
it becomes necessary to give it an ordinary dictionary meaning
signifying employment. 'Civil Service under the Union', thus,
encompasses all kinds of employment, under the administrative
control of the Central Government, whether covered under any of
the regularly constituted Civil Services or not.
Initially, there existed some doubt regarding the true
position and status of a casual employee or labour vis-a-vis
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In the light of the Supreme Court
20
observation, in the case of State of Assam Vs. Kanak Chandra ,
that a casual worker does not hold a civil post, the Tribunal,
21
in a few cases , declined to exercise jurisdiction over casual
employees on ground of lack of jurisdiction. Whereas, in
. . . other
certain . cases22 the Tribunal assumed °jurisdiction and
entertained cases relating to casual employees by ignoring the
Supreme Courts observation as merely an obiter dicta not
amounting to a binding precedent. The controversy was finally
settled when the Full Bench of the Central Administrative
Tribunal, in Rehamt Ullah's case, held •* that although a casual
24
labour (in Railways) does not hold a civil post yet , he is in
the service of the Union and hence being a member of the civil
service of the Union such a person is covered under the
provisions of section l4(l)(a) of the Act. Therefore, the
Tribunal is competent to exercise its jurisdiction over cases
20. M R 1967 5.C. 884; 886.
21. For example, see, Anurudh Singh Vs. Union of India, ATR 1988 (2) 405 (CAT);
Khageshwar Nayak Vs. Union of India, 1986 (4) SLJ 343 (CAT).
22. See, e.g., D.M.S.Employees' Union Vs. Union of India, AIR 1988 (1) 183 (CAT).
23. Supra note 19, at pp.309-310.
24. Following the Supreme Court decisions, supra note 20.
 179

relating to casual workers employed in the various departments

of the Central Government establishment and the Railways,

irrespective of the fact whether they have or have not acquired

25
J
the temporary status within the meaning of Central Civil

Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 or under any other

similar rules framed by the concerned department or

establishment

As regards the meaning of the term 'civil post under the

Union* the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative

Tribunal, after reviewing the various judicial decisions in

this regard, formulated the following tests which may be

applied for the purpose.

(i) Is the post created by the Government and may be

abolished by the Government ?

(ii) Are conditions of services of such posts prescribed,

regulated and controlled by the Government ?

(iii) Are the duties attached to the post connected with the

affairs of the State ?

(iv) Are the salary and other emoluments attached to the post
27
paid out of the Revenues of the State '?

These tests are, however, neither exhaustive nor

inflexible and it is not as if unless a post stands all the

above tests, it cannot be treated as a civil post under the

Union. The presence of one or more conditions, depending upon

25. Which entitled him to get certain pensionary and other benefits as also to be considered
for regular appointments on priority basis, depending upon nature and scope of relevant rules.
26. T h 1 s d e d s 1 o n is, however, the subject matter of a special leave petition filed before
the Supreme Court 1n Civil Appeal No.480/90-Un1on of India V s . Basant Lai (The Court's
decision 1s awaited).
27. Narender Gupta Vs. Union of India, 1986 (2) SLJ, 213 (CAT).
 180

the facts and circumstances of each case, would make a post,

office or employment as a post under the State. Yet, in any

case, there must exist the relationship of master and servant

between the State and the person concerned or in other words

28
the employer must be the State . Evidently, the word 'state',

in the present context, does not bear the wide meaning given to

it under Article 12 of the constitution. As such the employees

of any local or other authorities or of any corporation or a

29
society have been held ^ as not holding civil posts under the

Union even when such as authority, Corporation or society

constitutes 'State' within the meaning of Article 12.

Employment under the State, for the present purposes, refers

to employment under the Government, in any capacity

whatsoever. But, if in a given case the fact of Government

employment is not established, the person cannot be held as

occupying a civil post under the Union. For instance, a

licensed postal agent who is governed by a specific contract

and is paid on commission basis, has been held as not

appointed to a civil postre-
J
. He is only an agent and there does
not exist the master-servant relationship between him and the
government.

6.23 Persons Appointed to Civil Posts Connected with Defence

or Civilians in Defence Services
Broadly speaking, there are two categories of civil
servants under the Government. One class consists of those who
T&~. Ibid, at pp.217-18 (para 12).
29. N a M n d e r Gupta Vs. Union of India 1986 (2) SLJ 213 (CAT) A.K.Mukerjee Vs. Secretary,
N.C.E.R.T., 1986 (3) SLJ 114 (CAT); J.R.Purl Vs. Union of India, 1987 (2) SLJ 310 (CAT);
V.K.Singh Vs. Union of India, 1986 (1) SLJ 124 (CAT).
30. (1987) 3 ATC 719, 723 (CAT-Mad).
 181

are working on the defence side and the other is that which is

engaged on the civil side of the administration. Both the

categories of civil servants fall within the purview of the

Tribunal's jurisdiction. No doubt, the provisions of the Act

do not apply to any member of the Neval, military or defence

forces or any other armed forces of the Union J but, by virtue

of the provisions of section 14(1) persons appointed to any

civil post connected with defence or in defence service are

amendable to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In Ananda

Prakash Singhal Vs. Union of India the Central

Administrative Tribunal entertained an application filed by a

person who held the post of an engineer in the Military Farms

Branch of the Army and posted at Head Quarters, Southern

command, Pune. It was held by the Tribunal that a civilian

appointed in the defence service or to a post connected with

defence, by such appointment does not become a member of the

armed forces of the Union . However, in another case , it was

held by the Tribunal that section 14(1) of the Act does not

vest jurisdiction with regard to grievance of a member of the

defence forces (holding any post whatsoever) but, in regard to

a civilian filling a post connected with defence forces. Thus,

distinction was drawn between a civil post in defence service

and a civil post connected with defence or defence services; or

between the civilians connected with defence or defence

services and the members of defence services as such. It was

31. Section 2 ( a ) .
3-2. 1991 (1) SLJ 137 (CAT).
33. Ibid., at p.142
34. Kunju K M s h a n a n P1lla1 Vs. Union of India, 1986 (3) SLJ 194 (CAT).
 182

observed-^ by the Tribunal that if a person is to answer the

description of a civilian, in the contex't of section 14(1), he

must not himself be a member of the defence forces. Once a

person is found to be member of the defence services or of an

armed force, such a person cannot, at the same time, be a

civilian filling a post connected with defence or defence

36
services .

6.24 Persons Employed in any Local or Other Authorities

As already observed the employees of any local or other

authorities (which have their independent existence apart from

the Government) do not belong to the civil services of the

Union (or a state) nor do they hold any civil post under the

Union (or a state) and, as such, they do not the fall within
•57

the scope of jurisdiction of the Tribunals. The Act J , however,

empowers the Central Government to extend the jurisdiction of
the Central Administrative Tribunal, inter alia, to the
employees of any local or other authorities within the
territory of India or under the control of the Government of
India, provided such local or other authority is not
controlled or owned by a State Government. For this purpose the
Central Government must issue a notification specifying the
date (s) with effect from which the employees of a particular
authority shall fall within the purview of the Tribunal's
jurisdiction. The Government notification may specify
different dates in respect of different authorities-3 .
IT. Ibid., at p.211.
36. Thus, even persons holding the posts of cooks, chowkldars, laskars, barbers, carpenters,
mechanics, boot-makers, tailor,etc. 1n the defence services would not be treated as
civilians for the purposes of section 14(1)- For more details see, Infra, pp. i£<j_qg
37. Section 14(2).
38. Section 14(3).
 183

It may be observed that Article 12, which defines the

word 'state1 for the purposes of Part III of the constitution,
wherein the Fundamental Rights are set out, also uses the
expression 'all local or other authorities within the territory
of India or under the control of the Government of India'.
Therefore, the judicial decisions expounding the meaning of
these words in Article 12, will be relevant for construing the
true connotation of these words in section 14(2) of the Act.

In K.S.Ramamurthy Reddiar Vs. Chief Commissioner,

Pondichery and another-^ , it was observed by the Court that the
expression 'local or other authorities', used in Article 12,
refers to and includes two broad categories of such local or
other authorities: (a) local or other authorities within the
territory of India; (whether under the control of the
Government of India or the Government of various states and
even autonomous authorities which may not be under the control
of Government at all); and (b) local or other authorities under
the control of the Government of India, (whether situated
within or outside the territory of India).

The above interpretation given by the Supreme Court to

the expression 'local or other authorities' can validly be
adopted and applied in the context of sub-section (2) of
section 14 of the Act (subject to the exception expressly laid
down in the concluding part of the sub-section, which excludes
any local or other authorities controlled or owned by a State
Government). Thus, the powers of the Central Government to
extend the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to local or other
39. AIR 1963 S.C. 1464, at p.1468.
 184

authorities within the territory of India is confined to such

local or other authorities which are either under its control
or ownership; or are completely autonomous and independent of
any Government control. Any local or other authority which is
controlled or owned by a State Government cannot, in any case,
be brought within the jurisdiction of the Central
Administrative Tribunal.
The expressions "local authority" and "other authorities"
would bear the same meanings under the Act as have been given
to them, in the context of Article 12 of the constitution. In
the light of the Provision of Article 367 of the constitution,
which provides that the General clauses, Act, 1897 shall apply
for the interpretation of the constitution, the courts have,
ho
for purposes of Article 12, adopted the definition of the
term 'local authority' given in the Act. In section 3(3D of
the General Clauses Act the expression 'local authority1 is
defined as meaning 'a Municipal Committee, District Board, Port
Commissioner or other authority legally entitled to or
entrusted by the Government with the control or management of
a municipal or local fund'. The expression "local found" is not
defined in the General Clauses Act but, has been defined in
the Financial Handbook and the Civil Service Regulation, to
mean and include -
(a) revenues administered by bodies which, by law or rule
having the force of law, come under the control of the
Government, whether in regard to proceedings generally or to
40. R.Sarangapanl Vs. Madras Port Trust, AIR 1961 Mad. 234, at p.239.
 185

specific matters, such as the sanctioning of their budgets,

sanction to the creation or filling up particular posts or the

enactment of leave, pensions or similar rules; and

(b) The revenues of any body which may be specially notified

by the Government as such.

Thus, on the basis the definition given in the General

Clauses Act, a municipal corporation or committee, notified

4l 42 43
area committee , panchayat , port trust , etc. have been

held as local authorities within the meaning of Article 12 of

the Constitution. Obviously the expression "local authorities"

bears the same meaning in the context of section 14(2) of the

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

The expression "other authorities" has been given a very

wide meaning, in recent years, by the courts. In R.D.Shetty

44
Vs. International Airport Authority of India , it was held by
the Supreme Court that if a body is an agency or instru-
mentality of Government it would be regarded as an 'authority'
within the meaning of Article 12, irrespective of the fact
whether it is a statutory corporation, a company or even a
registered society. It is, thus, Immaterial whether an
authority is created by a statute or incorporated under a
statute. The enquiry has to be not as to how an authority (the
juristic person) is born, but, why it has been brought into
existence. The decisive factor is whether it is an agency or
instrumentality of the Government. In determining whether a
41. Mohammed Yasln Vs. Town Area Committee, AIR 1952 S.C. 118; C.F., R a s M d Ahmad Vs.
Municipal Board, Kalrana, AIR 1950 S.C. 163.
42. Aj1t Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 S.C. 856.
43. Supra note 40.
44. (1979) 3 SCC, 489.
 186

particular body is an agency or instrumentality of the

Government the court has laid down certain guidelines which may

be taken into consideration. These are: (1) total or nep.r total

state funding, (ii) existence of deep and pervasive state

control over management and policies, (iii) functional

character being government in essence, (iv) transfer of the

functions of a government department to a corporation, and (~v)

enjoying monopoly status which is either state conferred or

45
state protected .

These tests or guidelines are, however, not exhaustive

and conclusive but, illustrative only. Moreover, even amongst

these factors no one single factor can yield a satisfactory

answer. It is the aggregate or cumulative effect or these

46
various factors that is controlling

This interpretation has also been adopted by the Central

Administrative Tribunal, in the context of section 14(2) of

the Act, for the purposes of determining the scope and extent

of the powers of the Central Government in extending the

jurisdiction of the Tribunal to other authorities under the

control of the Central Government. As such, in the absence of

any Government notification to that effect, the Tribunal has

declined to exercise its jurisdiction, in cases relating to

employees of such authorities be it a corporation or a company

47
or a registered society
~4S~. Ibid, paras 14-19, see also, Ajay Hasla Vs. Khalld Mujlb, AIR 1981 S.C. 487, at p.496.
46. Ibid., para 19, at p.1642.
47. Bal Krfshan and others Vs. Kendrlya Vldhalaya Sangathan 1986 (3) SLJ 431 (CAT); A.K.
Hukerjee Vs. Secretary,N.C.E.R.T. 1986 (3) SLJ 114 (CAT); J.R.Purl Vs.Union of India,
1987 (2) SLJ 310 (CAT).
 187

In Jeet Ram Thakur Vs. Himachal Pradesh University and

48
others , it was held by the Himachal Pradesh High Court that

the poers conferred upon the Central Government under section

14(2) of the Act would also cover autonomous bodies like

universities which are situated within the territory of India,

although they may not, at all, be subject to any Government

control . In the case of such autonomous bodies it is the

Central Government, alone, which is empowered to issue a

notification, whereby they may be brought within the

jurisdictional fold of the Central Administrative Tribunal.

Similar powers enjoyed by the State Government under section

15(2) of the Act was held to be confined, inter alia, to such

'other authorities' as are owned or controlled by the State

Government concerned and not to autonomous bodies like a

-, -.4-50
university^ .

6.25 Persons Employed in any Corporation or a Society

As in the case of local and other authorities, the
Central Government is further empowered, under seotion 14(2) to
apply the provisions of the Act and thereby extend the
jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal in respect
of the employees of any corporation or a society wich is "owned
or controlled by the Government". It may be pointed that though
the word 'Government' is not qualified by the words 'Union' or
'State', but, in the light of the concluding words of this
"4T 1988 (3) SLJ 37 (H.C.). " ' ' ~
49. Ibid., at p.54.
50. Ibid., at p.56 The appeal taken by the Respondent - H.P.University against the judgement
of the High Court has been withdrawn by 1t.
 188

sub-section which restricts the exercise of powers by the

Central Government to such corporations or societies as are not

controlled or owned by a State Government, the word

'Government', in the context, must mean the Union Government.

It may, therefore, be said that the Central Government can

issue a notification, under this section, only in respect of

such corporations and societies which are controlled or owned

by it.

It may, further, be observed that the categories of

bodies included under this heading would, by and large, be

covered under the preceding heading, 6.24 relating to local or

other authorities. As already pointed, the courts have, in

recent years, given a very wide meaning to the expression

"other authorities" occuring in Article 12 of the Constitution

The same Interpretation has also been adopted by the Tribunal

for the purpose of section 14(2) of the Act. Hence, any

corporation or society which is owned or controlled by the

Government may also be said to constitute an agency or

instrumentality of the Government, and, as such, it may be

treated as 'other authority' within the meaning of section

14(2). Ownership and control by the Government are the two

chief determinants in designating any body as an agency or

instrumentality of the Government. Although, the two things

ownership and control usually go together yet, even the

presence of one or the other factor would, invariably, make a

corporation or society an agency or instrumentality of the

Government. Instances are rarely found where any corporation

 189

or a society, which is owned or controlled by the Government,

would not be held to be an agency or instrumentality of the
Government.
Finally, it may be pertinent to note here that in
pursuance of the powers conferred upon it by section 14(2) of
the Act, the Central Government has already brought eight
corporation, societies and other authorities
the within
51
jurisdictional ambit of the Central Administrative Tribunal^ .

6.3 Exceptions

Section 2 excludes the operation of the Act in respect

of certain categories of persons specified therein. As such,
no Tribunal can exercise any jurisdiction, powers and
authority over these persons. The exceptions, thus, embodied
in this section cover the three broad categories of Government
servants discussed below.

6.31 Members of Armed Forces of the Union

Clause (a) of section 2 excludes, the members of the
naval, military and air forces, and of any other armed forces
of the Union, from the operation of the Act and thereby debars
the Tribunal from exercising any jurisdiction in respect of
these persons.
It may be observed that the exceptions embodied in this
clause have been added by way of abundant cantioh only. For,

51. See, Appendix I

 190

the relevant provisions of sections lh and 15 of the Act, which

enable the Tribunals to exercise jurisdictions, cover only such
persons, as are appointed to any civil service or civil post;
or the civilians appointed to any defence service or a civil
post connected with defence. Thus, even in the absence of the
exclusionary clause (a) of section 2 of the Act, the members of
the armed forces could not be held to be subject to the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
A person is said to be a member of the naval, military or
air force if he is governed by the provisions of the Navy Act,
the Army Act or the Air Force Act, as the case may be. In
order to determine whether a person is so governed recourse may
be had to the relevant provisions of these Acts, wherein the
categories of persons governed by the Act concerned are
specified.
Difficulties may, however, arise in determining the
meaning and scope of the expression "any other'armed forces of
the Union". In Akhilesh Prasad Vs. Union Territory of
52
Mizoram while interpreting the expression "armed forces of
the Union", occuring in section 197(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973, it was observed by the Court that the
expression cannot be governed by a definition occuring
elsewhere (either in cr. P.C. or any other statute) and,
therefore, it must be given its ordinary meaning, which would
not certainly be limited to the inclusion of only military,

52. AIR 1981 S.C. 806.

 191

naval and air force of the Union. The court made a reference
to Entry 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution which clearly envisages armed forces other than
the three well-known forces of the State, namely, the military,
naval and the air forces. It was held by the court that the
expression includes not only the regularly operating force but
also a reserve force, like, The Central Reserve Police Force^ .
54
Similarly in R.Wlswan and others Vs. Union of India^ > a
question arose in regard to the expression "any force raised
and maintained in India under the authority of Central
Government", Occuring in Section 4(1) of the Army Act. Though
the Context was different, insamuch as the basic question
was about the scope and ambit or Article 33 of the
Constitution, but the observations made in the case are
relevant for the present purpose. Article 33 carves out an
exception in so far as the applicability of Fundamental-Rights
to the members of Armed Forces and the forces charged with the
maintenance of public order is concerned. In pursuance of the
powers conferred upon it under Article 33 the Parliament has
enacted, in section 20 of the Army Act, certain restrictions on
the enjoyment of Fundamental Rights by any person subject to
the said Act. By section 4(1) of the Act, the Central
Government has been authorised to apply the provisions the Act
to 'any force raised and maintained in India under the
authority of that Government'. Acting in pursuance of these
powers the Central Government applied certain provisions of
53. Ibid., at p.809
54. AIR 1983 S.C. 658.
 192

the Army Act to the members of Central Reserve Engineering

Force [for short (GREF) ] . Hence, in the present case the
question was whether GREF was a force within the meaning of
section 4(1) of the Army Act. On an analysis of the history,
composition, administration, organisation and role of GREF, it
55
was held to be an integral part of the armed forces . It is
organised on army pattern with units and sub-units and rank
structure. Though it is, undoubtedly a departmental
construction agency, but it was held to be distinct from other
construction agencies, such as the Central Public Works
Department, etc., in that it is a force intended primarily to
support the army in its operational requirement.
In Kunju Krishanan Pillai Vs. Union of India and
56
others^ the Central Administrative Tribunal was faced with the
similar question of determination of the status of a member of
the General Reserve Engineering force for the purposes of the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Precisely the issues before the
Tribunal were whether:

(1) The General Reserve Engineering Force is an "armed force

of the Union" within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the
Administration Tribunals Act, and (ii) whether the Central
Administrative Tribunal constituted under Section 4(1) of the
Act, has jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the
grievance of the petitioner who was a member of the GREF.

55. Ibid., at p.671.

56. 1986 (3) SLJ 194 (CAT).
 193

Since, on both these points there was a difference of

opinions between the two members of the Bench constituted to

hear the case, the matter was ultimately referred to and

57
decided by the chairman of the Tribunal .

K.Madhava Reddy, the Hon'ble Chairman of the Tribunal

held that in order to determine "whether such a force to which

the petitioner belongs is an armed force or not, not merely

the composition of the force but the object and purpose of

constituting the force, the nature of duties to be discharged

by the force (and not by the petitioner or for that matter by

58
any other members, individually)^ , the discipline enforced,

the tasks required to be performed, and the type of control

exercised and the rules that govern their recruitment, their

service conditions, their discipline all have to be taken into

59
account"-' . On the basis of these factors the GREF was held to

be 'an armed force of the Union' within the meaning of section

2(a) of the Act 6 0 .

The Tribunal, next observed that every person, whether

enrolled as a 'combatant' or a 'non-combatant' in such force

would, in any case, be termed as a member of the armed forces

of the Union. In coming to this conclusion, reliance was

placed on a Supreme Court decision , wherein it was held that

persons serving the army even in the capacities of cooks,

chowkidars, laskars, barbers, carpenters, mechanics,

57. As provided 1n section 26 of the Act,
58. Words In brackets, mine.
59. Supra note 56, at p.206.
60. Ibid., at p.211, d t l n g the observations of the Supreme Court (1n supra note 50) to be
of binding nature 1n this regard as well.
61. Kutllfngal Achudan Na1r and other Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1976S.C. 1179.
 194

boot-makers, tailors, etc. fall within the category of

'members of the armed forces'. Although they are non-combatants
and, in some matters, are governed by the Civil Service
Regulations, yet, they are integral part to the Armed Forces
and hence, answer the description of the "members of the armed
forces" within the contemplation of Article 33 of the
Constitution.

Though the Supreme Court (in the above mentioned case)

was dealing with the expression "armed forces" in the context
of Article 33 but, it was given a meaning not with reference to
any particular definition of that expression, for, there is no
definition of this expression either in the Constitution or the
General Clauses Act. Therefore, in the absence of any
definition of the expression "armed forces of the Union" in the
Administrative Tribunals Act, the Hon'ble Chairman of the
Central Administrative Tribunal did not see any valid reasons
not to follow the Supreme Court observations in this regard.
Accordingly, it was held that once a person is found to be a
member of an Armed Force, in any capacity whatsoever, such a
person cannot at the same time be a 'civilian filling a post
connected with defence or Defence Services'. As a result GREF
personnels, being members of the armed forces of the Union,
were held to fall outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in
view of the provisions of section 2(a) of the Act

62. Supra note 57, at p.212.

 195

Other forces held by the Tribunal to be covered under the

expression "armed forces of the Union" include: The Indo-
Tibetan Border Police , Central Industrial Security Force ,
Border Security Force , Railway Protection Force , Survey of
:ndia67. Whereas, the Delhi Police Force was held not to be an
CO
armed force within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Act

6.32 Members and Staff of the Judiciary

Article 146 of the Constitution authorises the Chief
Justice of India to make appointments of the officers and
servants of Supreme Court and also to prescribe by rules their
conditions of service. Likewise, under Article 229 the Chief
Justice of a High Court is vested with the power to make
appointments of officers and servants of the High Court and to
make rules regulating their conditions of service. The
executive has no control in respect of these matters except
that such rules, in so far as they relate to salaries,
allowances, leave or pension require the approval of the
President (in the case of the staff of the Supreme Court) and
of the Governor (in the case of the staff of the High Court).

63. Ja1 Singh Vs. Union of India 1986 (2) SLJ 286 (CAT).
64. Anand Thakur Vs. Union of India (1986) 1 ATC 366 (CAT)
65. (1987) 3 ATC 918 (CAT); (1987) 2 ATC 166 (CAT).
66. Bhola Nath Sen Vs. Union of India, 1991 (1) SLR 339 (CAT)
67. D.P.Gupta Vs. Government of India (1990) 12 ATC 181.
68. SuMnder Nath Vs. Union of India (1986) 1 ATC 656 (CAT)
 196

Having regard to the dignity of the offices of the Chief

Justice of the Supreme Court and a High Court, i"t would have
been improper and inappropriate to subject, any action taken by
them, to the Scrutiny of the Administrative Tribunals.
Therefore, section 2(c) was enacted to exclude the staff
(officers and servants) of the Supreme Court and of the High
Courts from the jurisdictional purview of the Tribunals. In
1987, by an amendment to the Act, the officers and servants of
the subordinate courts have also been, similarly, excluded from
the purview of the Tribunals' jurisdiction. It may be observed
that the exclusionary clause (c) of section 2 does not, in
express terms, include the members (Judges) of the judiciary.
Hence, for arguments sake, it may be said that these members of
the subordinate judiciary are amendable to the jurisdiction of
the Administrative Tribunals, being in civil services or
holders of civil posts under the State. But, it would be
grossly improper and inappropriate to hold so. For, the
Parliament could have never intended to subject the members of
the courts to the jurisdiction of the Tribunals, whereas the
officers and servants of such courts have been excluded from
the purview of the jurisdiction of the Tribunals.
Therefore, the various provisions of the Act, such as
sections 2(c) and 15(1), must be so construed as to exclude the
jurisdiction of the Tribunals in respect of service disputes
relating to the members of the Judiciary. The word "officers"
used in the exclusionary clause (c) of section 2 may be widely
interpreted to include judicial officers as well,or in the
 197

alternative, the expression "civil posts" and "civil

services" used in section 15(1), must be construed in a
narrower sense to exclude the members of the judicial service
of the State and the posts of Sub-Judges and District Judges.
Such constructions would be in line with the letters and spirit
of the Act as also in consonance with the scheme of Chapter-s IV
and V of Part VI of the Constitution.
It may be useful to make a reference to the observation
69
made by the Supreme Court in a case relating to the
jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal set
up under Article 371-D of the Constitution. A view was
expressed by the Court that for ensuring the independence of
the judiciary, the officers and servants of the High Court and
also the judicial officers should be kept out of the purview of
the Tribunal. With this object in mind the court held that the
undefined and flexible phrase "civil services of the State",
occurring in Article 371-D(3) of the Constitution has to be
narrowly construed so as to exclude the posts in the judicial
service of the State and of the District Judges and of officers
70
and servants of High Court' .
Though there is a basic difference in the nature of
jurisdiction of the Tribunal set-up under Article 371-D and the
Tribunals constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act,
in that an order of the former had no force proprio vigore
unless confirmed by the State Government, either expressly
69. Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh Vs. D i k s h U u l u , AIR 1979 S.C. 193.
70. Ibid., paras 62 and 78.
 198

within three months of the date on which the order was made,
or impliedly by not interfering with that order for the said
period of three months but, the rationale behind excluding the
members of the subordinate judiciary from the jurisdiction of
the A.P.Tribunal validly applies to the Tribunals constituted
under the Act of 1985.

6.33 Members of the Secretarial Staff of the Legislatures

Article 98 of the Constitution provides for a separate
secretarial staff of the each House of Parliament. The Article
empowers the Parliament to regulate the recruitment and
conditions of service of persons appointed to the secretarial
staff of either House of Parliament and until a law is made by
the Parliament, the President may, after consultation with the
Speaker of the House of People or the Chairman of the Council
of States, as the case may be, make rules regulating the same.
Likewise under Article 187,each House of the Legislature of a
State shall have a separate secretarial staff. Until provision
is made by the Legislature of the State in this behalf, the
rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of
persons appointed to the said secretarial staff may be made by
the Governor after consultation with the Speaker of the
Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council, as the case
may be.

The Secretarial staff of each House functions under the

administrative control of the Speaker or the Chairman, as the
case may be. It seems that in order to respect "the grandeur
 199

and majesty of the task which have been assigned to the

Legislatures under the Constitution" and in order to equate
these presiding officers with the Chief Justices referred to in
clause (e) of section 2, it has been considered inappropate
that the orders of the Speaker and the Chairman should be
71
subjected to the authority of the Administrative Tribunals .
Hence, Parliament has excluded the applicability of the Act to
'any person appointed to the Secretarial staff of either House
of Parliament or to the Secretarial Staff of an/y State
Legislature or a House thereof or, in the case of a Union
Territory having a Legislature, of that Legislature'.
72
As rightly observed' by Justice K.N.Goyal, from the
point of view of expediency also it is desirable that a
situation should not be allowed to arise in which a Tribunal's
order may be taken exception to by a House of Legislature. For,
while Article 121 and 211 of the Constitution provide that the
conduct of the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts
shall not be discussed in any House, no such immunity would be
enjoyed by the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and the members of the
Administrative Tribunals.
6.4 Jurisdiction vis-a-vis Subject-matter
The foregoing discussion was aimed at analysing the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal vis-a-vis parties from the point
of view of the categories of posts or services to which they
are appointed.
TT. Goyal.K.N. (J); The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (1986) 47.
72. Ibid.
 200

Next, it becomes necessary to examine the jurisdiction of

the Tribunal in relation to the subject-matters falling within
its purview. The Act speaks of the two broad categories of
subject-matters, namely, "recruitment and matters concerning
recruitment", and "conditions of service", in respect of which
the Tribunal has been empowered to exercise its jurisdiction.

6.4l Recruitment and Matters Concerning Recruitment

The jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal
extends, in the first place, in relation to 'recruitment and
matters concerning recruitment' to any service or post
73
mentioned above. The expression "recruitment and matters
concerning recruitment" refers to and signifies the entire
process of securing appointment to any post or service. It
involves a diverse variety of matters, such as, creation of a
post or service , prescribing qualifications, inviting
applications, determining mode and basis of selection of
candidates, making and approving final selection, reservation
of posts, etc. All these matters pertain to a preparatory
stage-before actual appointment and the commencement of
service. Any dispute or controversy arising at any stage of
recruitment process would fall within the purview of the
Tribunal's jurisdiction.
It may, however, be pointed that the commencement of
service does not take place immediately after the process of
73. As discussed and elaborated under the preceding headings - 6.2 and 6.3 of this Chapter.
 201

recruitment is over. Recruitment has to be followed by an

offer of appointment enabling a person to join the service or
post. Though the word 'recruitment' is commonly used in a
sense so as to include appointment as well but, strictly
speaking, the two terms are not synonymous. They bear
different connotations. As observed by the Punjab High Court
"the term 'recruitment' connotes enlistment, acceptance,
selection or approval for appointment and not actual
appointment or posting in service, while 'appointment' means an
74
actual act of posting a person to a particular office"' .
Thus, recruitment, as an act, essentially relates to the
selection or approval of candidates for appointment. But, it is
preceded by various preliminary steps aimed at this end.
Together, these constitute parts of the process, called as the
recruitment process. The completion of recruitment process does
not automatically result into appointment. Mere recruitment
does not entitle a person to be appointed to the post for which
he was considered and selected. The Government may, for any
administrative or other valid reasons, decide not to make any
appointment subsequent to recruitment. However, the action of
the Government must not be based on any extraneous considera-
tion. Even where the Government decides to make appointment in
pursuance of the recruitment, a candidate has to undergo
certain formalities before the appointment becomes effective
and the person enters the service. These pre-appointment
formalities may include, inter alia, medical examination,
74. Basant Lai Malhotra Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1969 Punj. 178, at p.181.
 202

training for a specified period, police verification regarding

the antecedents and good character of the candidate and
deposit of some money as security.
•It may be pointed that even the conduct of these
formalities, does not amount to a promise to appoint a
candidate. It is upto the employer to keep the question of
suitability of the would be employee open upto the last moment
before the appointment. A candidate may be dropped from being
considered for appointment on ground of unsuitability at any
75
stage before actual appointment" .
Evidently, the expression "recruitment and matters
concerning recruitment", in its literal sense, as explained
above, pertains to the preparatory stage of appointment. It
signifies a process which comes to an end when the selection of
candidate (s) is finally approved for appointment. Therefore,
any dispute or controversy arising at any stage during this
process would, undoubtedly, fall within the purview of the
Tribunal's jurisdiction. Problem would, however, arise in
determining the jurisdictional purview of the Tribunal in
relation to disputes and controversies arising at any stage,
subsequent to the selection of candidate (s) and prior to the
actual commencement of service. If the term "recruitment" is
construed, here in its literal sense, as explained above, such
disputes or controversies, relating to any matter, can neither
be said to be covered under the expression "recruitment and
matters concerning recruitment", and nor under the expression

75. H.R.TIndwanl Vs. Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Ahmedabad 1985 (1) SLJ 1 7 , 1 9 (Guj )
 203

"conditions of service". As such, these categories of disputes

would fall beyond the scope of jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In
order, therefore, to bring such disputes within the purview of
the Tribunal's jurisdiction and thus, to remove the anomaly,
the word "recruitment" occurring in the Act must be widely
construed so as to include appointment as well. Thus
interpreted, the expression "recruitment and matters concerning
recruitment" would comprehend all matters involved in the
process followed by the appointing authority prior to the
actual appointment. The process of recruitment, thus
understood, would immediately be followed by the commencement
of service.

6.42 Service Matters

The jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal
extends, in the next place, in relation to all service matters
of the persons appointed to any service or post mentioned in
section 14 of the Act. The expression "service matters" has
been defined in section 3(q) of the Act. According to the
provisions of this section "service matters" means all matters
relating to the conditions of service as respects -

(i) remuneration, including allowances, pensions, and other

retirement benefits;
(ii) . tenure, including confirmation, seniority, promotion,
reversion, pre-mature retirement and superannuation;
 204

(iii) leave of any kind;

(iv) disciplinary matters; and
(v) any other matter whatsoever.

It may be observed that the expression "service matters"

has been defined in terms of the conditions of service. The
main part of section 3 clearly lays down that "service matters"
in relation to a person means all matters relating to the
conditions of his service. The first four clauses of the
section shall be deemed to be covered under the expression
"conditions of service". But, these are merely illustrative
examples. Significantly, the expressions 'dismissal', 'removal'
or 'reduction in rank' are not expressly mentioned in any of
the illustrative clauses of the "conditions of service".
Similarly, termination is also not specifically mentioned.
Obviously, in the nature of the things, it is very difficult,
if not impossible, to give an exhaustive list of all matters
that can be deemed to be included in the expression
"conditions of service" and thereby falling within the purview
of 'service-matters'. It is, perhaps, because of this reason
that after giving a short list of matters with respect to the
conditions of service, section 3(q) ends with a clause, in
general terms, containing an all embracing provision. The
words "any other matter whatsoever", occurring in the last
clause (v) of section 3(q) , is wide enough to Include any
matter, not specifically mentioned in the section, which is in
any manner related to the conditions of service.
 205

It may be pointed that when the Constitution (Forty

Fourth Amendment) Bill, through which Article 323-A was
inserted, was under discussion in Parliament some members had
desired that express mention should be made of disputes
relating to dismissal, removal, reduction in rank and other
cases of termination of service and had even moved amendment in
that behalf with a view to removing all doubts' . The then,
Union Law Minister Mr. H.R.Gokhale, who was piloting the Bill,
77
however, clarified that the expression "conditions of
service" occurring in the proposed Article was comprehensive
enough to cover all types of such and other disputes and that
express mention of any particular disputes could lead to the
possibility of legal quibbling that some other types of
disputes which were not specified should be deemed not to be
covered.
In Dharam Dev Vs. Union of India and others' , it was
observed by the Delhi High Court that clause (v) cannot be read
ejusdem generis with the preceding four clauses of section
3(q). It has to be read in connection with the main clause of
section 2, which is quite comprehensive to include all matters
79
pertaining to the service conditions of the employees .
The words "all matters relating to the conditions of
service" occurring in the opening part of section 3(q) and the
words "any other matter whatsoever" used in its last clause
(v), have been held to be of very general and wide import which
76. See, Goyal.K.N. (Justice); The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1989 (1986 ED) 104.
77. Rajya Sabha debate on the Constitution (44th Amendment) Bill 1976, Part II (proceedings
for 9th to 11th November, 1976) p.490.
78. 1989 (1) SLJ 11 (H.C.)
79. Ibid., at p.13.
 206

include a diverse variety of matters, such as allotment and

Q/-j O-i

concellatlon of allotment of Government quarters , transfer ;

selection or non-selection of in-service lecturers for
82
admission to post-graduate medical courses , etc. In a
case -5 before the Ahmedabad Bench of the Tribunal, the
applicant had claimed a sum of Rs.1500/- by way of damages for
wrongful suspension. While dismissing the application, on
merit, it was held by the Tribunal that the claim for damages
on the basis of tort was not legally sustainable on the ground
that "reversion from higher post to a lower post, suspension
from duty, removal from service, etc., of any Government
8k
servant are the sovereign acts of the Government"
8*s
However, in another similar case -% the claim of the
applicant for damages for wrongful termination of services was
rejected by the Tribunal on the ground that it was not a
service matter and hence not falling within the purview of the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It was observed by the Tribunal
that under Industrial Law as well as service law applicable to
Government Servants, the Court/Tribunal is entitled to direct
reinstatement in service, payment of back wages and the like,
but a claim for damages for tort is a separate head of
liability and can be enforced only in accordance with the
provisions
80. of Jha
Shrl Radha Kant Article
Vs. Union 300
of Indiaof1989
the Constitution
(3) SLJ 367 (CAT). by filing a
81. Oharam Dev Vs. Union of India, 1989 (1) SLJ 11 (Delhi H . C . ) .
civil
82. suit in
D.J.Pophall Vs. a
Thecompetent courtMadhya Circle & others 1988 (1) SLJ 428 (CAT)
Post Master General,
83. Dr.Dhum Singh Vs. Union of India and others, 1986 (4) SLJ (CAT) 307.
84. In this context, the Tribunal relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court 1n KastuM
Lai Vs. State of U.P.. AIR 1965 S.C. 1039.
85. Shrl Radha Kant Jha Vs. Union of India and another 1989 (3) SLJ (CAT) 367.
86. Ibid., at pp.372-373; Also see, Lakshml Pannappan Vs. The Controller, VSSC, ISRO,
Trlvandrum, 1988 (1) SLJ (CAT) 449.
 207

The question as to whether a particular organisation is

an industry or not has been held, not to be a service matter
and, as such, the Tribunal is not competent to adjudicate upon
this issue '. But, where an organisation is undisputedly an
industry and its employees are, at the same time, also the
Government servants or the employees of an institution which
has been notified under section 14 of the Act, the Tribunal
would be competent to exercise its jurisdiction in relation to
matters provided for in the service rules as also the matters
oo
provided for in other laws, such as the labour laws

6.5 Nature of the Jurisdiction, Powers and Authority of the

Tribunal
89
The Act % on the one hand debars all courts, except the
Supreme Court, from exercising any jurisdiction, power and
authority in relation to matters falling within the purview of
Administrative Tribunals, and on the other hand, it vests in
the Tribunal all the jurisdiction, powers and authority
exercisable immediately before the 'appointed day' by all the
courts, except the Supreme Court. Thus, in relation to the
matters transferred to the Tribunal for its adjudication, it
(the Tribunal) has inherited all the jurisdiction powers and
authority, hitherto, exercisable by all courts. The expression
"all courts" Includes the ordinary civil courts of subordinate
judiciary as well as the High Courts but, not the Supreme
Court. ^
87. Tamil Nadu Atomic Power Employees Union Vs. Director General, G.S.O., 1987 (3) SLJ (CAT) 233.
88. A.Padma Valley and others Vs. CPWD and TELECOM; 1990 (3) SLJ (CAT) 544, 554-5.
89. Section 28 read with section 14 and 15.
 208

Therefore, for a proper understanding of the nature and

ambit of the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central
Administrative Tribunal it becomes necessary to make a brief
reference to the jurisdiction, powers and authority hitherto
exercisable by the ordinary civil courts and the High Courts,
in relation to the recruitment and service matters of persons
appointed to any service or post mentioned in section 14 of the
Act.

6.51 Jurisdiction, Powers and Authority Inherited from the

Civil Courts
The jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Civil
Courts, in recruitment and service matters, were exercised
under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and the
specific Relief Act, 1963. The main relevant provisions, in
this context, are as under.

6.511 Trial of Suits under the Civil Procedure Code

Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code confers a wide
jurisdiction on the civil courts. It empowers the courts to try
all suits of civil nature unless the cognizance of a suit is
either expressly or impliedly barred under any law. The
expression "suit of a civil nature" refers to a suit wherein
the principal question relates to the determination and
enforcement of a civil right as distinguished from political,
religious or criminal. In any case, it includes suits
relating to "recruitment and matters concerning recruitment"
 209

and the "service matters" of all such public servants which now
fall within the purview of Tribunals' jurisdiction. In view of
the provisions of sections 14,15 and 16 read with section 28 of
the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the civil Courts are
debarred from taking cognizance of any such suit which lies
within the jurisdictional ambit of the Administrative
Tribunals, and all jurisdiction, powers and authority earlier
exercised by these courts, under the provisions inter alia, of
the Civil Procedure Code have been vested in these Tribunals.

6.512 Award of Remedies under the Specific Relief Act, 1963

In addition to the legal remedies, provided under the
provisions of the relevant law in question, a civil court may,
in appropriate cases, award the equitable remedies given in the
Specific Relief Act, 1963. In cases relating to service
disputes equitable reliefs by way of injunction or declaratory
order/decree may be awarded.
The law with regard to injunction has been laid down
under sections 36 to 42 of the Act. An injunction is an order
of the court restraining a person from doing a wrongful act,
and/or directing a person to do an act which he is obliged,
under law to do. Thus, it may take a negative or positive
form. In other words, injunction may either he 'restrictive or
prohibitory', or 'mandatory' in character.
An injunction may, further, be of two kinds, namely,
temporary or perpetual. Temporary injunctions are such as are
to continue until a specified time, or until the further order
 210

of the court, and they may be granted at any stage of a

90
suit-' . They are also regulated by the provisions of the Civil
91
Procedure Code^ . A perpetual injunction is, however, granted
only after the full trial and hearing of the case, upon the
merits of the suit. The defendent is thereby parpetually
enjoined from the assertion of a right, or from the commission
of an Act, which would be contrary to the rights of the
plaintiff. Grant of perpetual injunction is, in the main,
regulated by the provisions of section 38 of the Specific
Relief Act.
Section 40 of the Specific Relief Act empowers the court
to award damages, in lieu of or in addition to injunction. But,
in relation to service disputes such a claim may not be
tenable. The claim for damages, in service matters, can be
viewed from two angles - for breach of contract of service, and
for the employer having committed a tort. In any case of
breach of contract of service arising in the relationship of
master and servant, in private employment, a suit for a
wrongful dismissal and damages may lie. But, in the case of
public employment, the court is entitled to direct reinstate-
ment in service, payment of back wages and the like, instead of
92
awarding damages^ . The claim for damages for tort is a
separate head of liability and can be enforced only in
accordance with the provisions of Article 300 of the
Constitution by filing a civil suit.
90. Section 37 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
91. See Order 39 Rule 1 of the Code.
92. Shri Jagmohan Vs. Union of India and others, 1989 (3) SLJ (CAT) 367,372; Indian Airlines
Corporation Vs. Sukhdeo Ral 1971 (1) SLR 1496; Smt. J.Tewari Vs. Smt. JawalaDevI
Vidyamandlr and others 1979 (1) SLR 514 (S.CJ; Executive Committee of Valsh Degree
College Vs. Lakshml Narayan AIR 1978 S.C. 888.
 211

Sections 3^ and 35 of the Specific Relief Act deal with

the remedy of declaratory decree. Any person entitled to any

legal character, or to any right as to property, may institute

a suit against any person denying or interested to deny, his

title to such character or right, and the court may, is its

discretion, make therein a declaration that he is so entitled.

Courts do not grant a declaration when it is futile or of no

utility. For instance, in Gulzar Ahmad Vs. U.P.Government^ , a

Police Sub-Inspector, who was dismissed by an authority

subordinate to one which appointed him, filed a suit for

declaration that his dismissal was invalid and that he

continued to be in service. But, during the pendency of the

suit, the proper authority passed orders of his dismissal.

Under these circumstances the declaration sought for was

refused. However, in another case , the dismissal of the

plaintiff was found illegal and ultra-vires. A declaration to

that effect was granted so that he would not be debarred from

seeking another employment under the Government. Though the

grant of declaration would not have enabled the plaintiff to be

reinstated to the office which he had held since it had been

abolished.

Thus, by virtue of the provisions of section 14(1) of the

Administrative Tribunals Act, the Central Administrative
Tribunal has also been vested with the similar powers to grant
equitable reliefs, in appropriate cases, as was hitherto done
by the civil courts.
93. AIR 1950 M l . 212.
94. P.N.Sarkar Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 Pat. 366.
 212

6.52 Jurisdiction, Powers and Authority Inherited from the

High Courts

In relation to service disputes, the Administrative

Tribunals have come to assume the entire jurisdiction, powers
and authority of the High Courts. A brief mention of these may
be made below.

6.521 Original Jurisdiction under the Letters Patent

By virtue of the provisions of Article 225 of the
Constitution the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay
enjoy the ordinary original jurisdiction, within the local
limits, to try and determine all suits of civil nature except
those falling within the jurisdiction of the small causes
courts. But, with the commencement of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 19^5 and the establishment of the Tribunals
under the Act, the said High Courts, stand debarred from
entertaining any suit relating to service matters now falling
within the jurisdictional purview of the Tribunals.

6.522 Writ Jurisdiction and the Power of Judicial Review

The High Courts, beside the original (and appellate)
jurisdiction in service matters, have also the Constitutional
power of judicial review and may issue appropriate orders,
directions or writs for the purpose of

(i) The enforcement of fundamental rights; or

 213

(ii) for any other purpose" .

There are two important aspects of the provisions of

Article 226 of the Constitution. In the first place, it confers
a wide jurisdiction on the High Court to issue any direction,
order or writ, including the writs in the nature of habeas
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and quo warranto.
The wide language used in this Article, thus, enables the High
Courts "to reach injustice wherever it is found" and "to mould
the relief to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements"
of a case" . In the second place, Article 226 embodies the
power of judicial review which enables the High Court to
declare an act of a legislature or an administrative action,
contrary to any provision of the Constitution, as Invalid.

In view of the provisions of section 14(1) of the Act,

petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution, relating to
recruitment and service matters, which prior to the coming into
force of the Act and establishment of the Tribunal could be
filed in the High Court, would now be filed before the Tribunal
in the shape of an application under section 19 of the Act. In
dealing with such applications the Tribunal is competent to
exercise all the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the High
Court, including those contained in Article 226 of the
97
Constitution^'.

95. Article 226.

96. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India Vs. K.S.Jagannath, (1986) 2 SCC 6 7 9 .
97. See, S.P.Sampath Kumar Vs. Union of India, AIR 1987 S.C. 386.
 214

6.53 Power to Punish for Contempt

98
The Act^ empowers the Tribunals to exercise the same
jurisdiction, powers and authority in respect of "contempt of
itself" as a High Courts has and for this purpose, the
provisions of the contempt of courts Act, 1971 has been made
applicable to the Tribunal.
It may be noticed that under Article 215 of the
Constitution every High Court is a court of record and, as
such, have all the powers of such a court including the power
to punish for its contempt. The power given under this
Article is a summary power and, therefore, the provisions of
the Criminal Procedure Code or the Indian Penal Code are not
applicable to such summary proceedings. Subject to the
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, a High Court
can deal with a contempt matter summarily and adopt its own
procedure.
The object of this power is to prevent interference with
the course of justice, to maintain the authority of law as
administered in the court, and thus, to protect public
99
interest in the purity of the administration of justice^ .
Thus, an act of wilful disobedience or violation of an order
of the court amounts to its contempt. Though the scope of
power to punish for contempt is quite large but, it is not
Invoked very frequently. As the Supreme Court has observed ,
it should be exercised "cautiously, wisely and with
98. Section 17.
99. Brahm Prakash Vs. State of U.P. AIR 1954 S.C. 10.
100. In re under Article 143, AIR 1965 S . C 745.
 215

circumspection". A fair, reasonable, temperate and legitimate

criticism of the judiciary, or of the conduct of a Judge in his

judicial capacity is permissible.

In contempt matters the Tribunal must be guided by the

general principles enunciated by the courts in this regar-d—and

be governed by the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act,

1971- However, the powers and duties of an Advocate General

under section 15 of this Act (Contempt of Courts Act) are

exerciseable, in relation to the Central Administrative

Tribunal, by the Attorney General of India or the Solicitor

General or the Additional Solicitor General

It may be pointed that the Tribunal has the jurisdiction,

powers and authority to punish "for contempt of itself" only

and not for contempt of any other court. Thus, contempt

proceedings linked with a service matter, that was pending

before the High Court on the appointed day will not stand
transferred to the Tribunal. Under section 29 of the Act what

is transferred are the cases covered by section 14 of the Act.

If any order made by the High Court in these cases is

disobeyed, the contempt proceedings can be initiated only by

the High Court . The Tribunal cannot usurp that jurisdiction

merely because the case, in which the cause of action for

contempt arose, stands transferred to it (the Tribunal).

101. Clause (b)(1) of section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

102. Ram Lai Kapoor Vs. Union of India, 1988 (4) SLR 556 ( C A T r D e l h D .
 216

6.6 Exclusion of the Jurisdiction of Courts

Section 28 of the Act, as originally enacted, provided
for the exclusion of the jurisdiction of all courts, except the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution. Thus, by implication, even the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution was
excluded in relation to the matters falling within the purview
of the Tribunals' jurisdiction. However, in the light of the
direction given by the Supreme Court, in the Sampath Kumar's
case , section 14, 15 and 28 were amended in 1986, by
deleting the reference to Article 136 thereby making it clear
that the entire jurisdiction of the Supreme Court remains
unaffected.

Curiously enough the marginal note to section 28 still

retains the reference to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
"under Article 136 of the Constitution". One may be misled to
understand, after just going through the marginal note to the
section, that section 28 merely saves the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. But, in
the main part of the section there is no mention of the words
"Article 136 of the Constitution". Obviously, the language of
section 28, in unambiguous terms, saves the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, in toto, from the operation of the exclusionary
provisions. Yet, it would be in the fitness of the things,
that the words "under Article 136 of the Constitution", which

103. (1985) 4 SCC 458. IN this case the Court directed, 1nter-al1a, that the writ petitions,
(relating to service-matters) under Article 32, pending before the Supreme Court, would
remain on the file of the Supreme Court and fresh petitions would also continue to be
filed 1n the Supreme Court.
 217

are not only superfluous but, wholly misleading, are deleted by

an amendment to the Act.

In the case of Ishvarbhai Jaganji Naik Vs. The Returning

Officer and Another , it was held by the Bombay High Court
that in the light of the provisions of section 28 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the courts are not entitled
to exercise any jurisdiction, powers and authority in relation
to service matters even where a question arises incidentally in
a proceeding which is not between employer and the employee. In
the Instant case, the petitioner had been appointed as a
lecturer in the Government College at Daman in 1966. On
3.7.1979 be served a notice seeking voluntary retirement, and
expressed his desire to contest the ensuing Parliamentary
Elections. But, the Government Intimated its inability to
accept the said notice because of the reason that his twenty
years of regular service record was not with the Government. He
filed an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal
seeking a declaration that he had voluntarily retired on and
with effect from 3.IO.1989 (i.e. on the expiration of three
months from the date of notice).

In the meantime he filed his nomination papers for

Parliamentary Elections on 3O.lO.i989, which was rejected by
the Returning Officer on the ground that he was still in
Government service. Hence, the petitioner moved the High Court
by filling the Election Petition. It may be observed that in
the meantime the election were held and the Respondent number 2

104. 1991 (1) SLJ 36 (Bom. H.C.)

 218

was declared elected to the Lok Sabha.

During the course of the trial of the case the petitioner
produced the judgement ^ of the Tribunal to the effect that he
stood voluntarily retired on 3^10.1989«
One of the issues before the High Court was: whether it
could decide the question regarding voluntary retirement which
had arisen incidentally in the present Election Petition, or
whether the decision of the Tribunal on the point was final and
decisive.
It was held by the Hon'ble Court that it was not
within its competence to decide any question relating to
service matter, whether such question arises directly or
incidentally. By reason of section 28 of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, the High Court, acting as an Election Court, was
held to be incompetent to decide whether the petitioner had
voluntary retired with effect from 3«10«1989> because it was a
service matter. The decision of the Tribunal on this point was
107
held to be decisive '.

6.6l Rationale and Validity of the Exclusion of Jurisdiction

of the Courts
It is now a well settled proposition in the area of
administrative adjudication that the legislature is competent
to oust the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts in relation
to the matters assigned for adjudication by an administrative
105. I.J.Nalk Vs. Administrator, Daman and D1u. 1991 (1) SLJ 1 (CAT - N . D e l h i ) .
106. Supra note 104, at p.45.
107. Ibid., paras 44,49 and 5 7 .
 219

adjudicatory body, by incorporating a privative or ouster

clause in the relevant Act . However, the present Act, by
incorporating a privative clause of a very wide amplitude,
excludes all courts, except the Supreme Court, from exercising
any jurisdiction, powers or authority in respect of the
specified service matters and the matters connected therewith.
In this context it is important to note that the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985 has been passed under the provisions of
Article 323-A of the Constitution which, in specific terms,
provides for the exclusion of jurisdiction, powers and
authority of all Courts except the Supreme Court under Article
136 of the Constitution. Further, the provisions of Article
323-A have been given overiding effect 9. The validity of
Article 323-A and the Act have been upheld by the Supreme
Court . While relying on the view taken by Bhagwati J. in the
Minerva Mills case that though the basic and essential
feature of judicial review cannot be dispensed with, it is
within the competence of the Parliament to create alternative
effective institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial
review , the Hon'ble Court opined that exclusion of
jurisdiction of the High Courts in the specified service
matters and vesting them in the Administrative Tribunals does
not go against the basic structure doctrine provided the
Tribunal is equally efficacious and effective as the High
Court, and it substitutes, not only in form and de jure but in
108. For a review of literature on the topic see, Jain,M.P. and Jaln.S.N., Principles of
Administrative Law (1981) 505-84.
109. Article 323-A(3) provides: "The provisions of the Article shall have effect not with
standing anything 1n any other provision of Constitution or 1n any other law for the
time being 1n force".
110. S.P.Sampath Kumar Vs. Union of India, AIR 1987 S.C. 386.
111. Minerva Mills Ltd. Vs. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625; 678.

»
 220

content and de facto, the High Court so far as the power of

judicial review over service matters is concerned
It may be observed that one of the main considerations
which impelled the Government to provide for the establishment
of Administrative Tribunals, as special forums for adjudication
of service disputes, was to relieve the courts of the heavy
workload. The statutory safeguards coupled with the
Constitutional guarantees in the form of Articles 14,16,32,136,
226,227,311 etc., led to opening the flood gates of service
litigation in the courts all over India. Shri K.P.S.Deo, the
Minister piloting the Administrative Tribunals Bill in the Lok
Sabha on 29th January, 19^5 gave the number of cases in service
matters of Government servants pending in the High Courts,
only, as 63,800113. In the light of these facts, the
exclusionary provisions of the Act ousting the jurisdiction of
the courts in the specified service matters can be justified
as necessary and appropriate. Unless exclusive jurisdiction
were conferred on the Tribunals the rationale of their
114
creation would have been rendered nugatory

6.62 Scope and Effect of the Exclusionary Provisions

In respect of the matters falling within the purview of
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal the Act excludes the
jurisdiction of all courts except, the Supreme Court and any
Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority

112. Supra note 110, at pp.395-96.

113. Quoted from Justice K.N.Goyal, supra note 76, at p.3.
114. Ibid., at p.382.
 221

constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act of 19^7 or any-

other corresponding law for the time being in force. The
expression "any other corresponding law for the time being in
force", used in section 28(b) relates only to the Industrial
Disputes Acts enacted by the State Legislatures and no other
115
labour laws . The Act not only excludes the jurisdiction of
courts but, also gives finality to the orders of the Tribunal.
It immunises such orders from any challenge in a court of law.
The Act contains no provision for appeal against an order of
the Tribunal, either from one Administrative Tribunal to
another, or to a larger Bench of the Tribunal, or to the
Courts of law except the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution. Even though the Tribunal is a substitute of the
High Court, yet, it does not possess the power under Articles
133 and 13^-A of the Constitution to grant certificate to file
an appeal before the Supreme Court

6.63 Jurisdiction Exercisable by the Supreme Court under

Article 32
Under Article 32 a person can go direct to the Supreme
Court for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Clause (2) of
the Article empowers the Supreme Court to issue directions,
orders or writs, whichever may be appropriate in the given
case. The Court has repeatedly held that the exercise of writ
jurisdiction is discretionary and it would decline to exercise
115. D.P.O.Vfe. Laxml Narayan 1988 (6) ATC 1; Union of India Vs. Sarup Chand Slngla 1989 (1)
SLJ (CAT) 491.
116. 1989 (2) SLJ 142 (CAT-Mad).
 222

this extraordinary jurisdiction on the ground, inter-alia, that

there exists an alternative remedy which is sufficiently
convenient and effective. It follows from this that although
the right of an aggrieved Government servant to approach the
Supreme Court, under Article 32(1), on a complaint of violation
of any Fundamental Right, (such as those under Article 14 and
l6) is still available to him yet, the Supreme Court may itself
decline to entertain any such writ petition and direct the
petitioner to pursue his remedy before the Tribunal first, and
then, approach the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution. There are two obvious advantages in adopting this
practice: (i) a Tribunal can go into the controversy more
comprehensively than the Supreme Court can do under Article 32;
and (ii) where the Government servant is not satisfied by the
decision of the Tribunal he can, next, go to the Supreme Court
by way of an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
However, if there exists any uncertainty on any point of law
due to a conflict of decisions amongst the various Benches of
the Tribunal, a writ petition involving such an issue may be
entertained by the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution.

6.64 Jurisdiction Exercisable by the Supreme Court under

Article 136
Article 136 of the Constitution invests the Supreme Court
with a very special and extensive discretionary appellate
jurisdiction to hear appeals from orders and determinations of
 223

Tribunals (as well as Courts). The jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court under this Article is plenary leaving a wide discretion
to the Court to define and delineate the province of its
jurisdiction. A review of cases decided by the Supreme Court
reveals that the Court's power is extraordinary and
discretionary and it would invoke it to interfere with the
findings of the Tribunals only in exceptional circumstances,
viz., when a question of law of general public importance is
involved, or there is a grave miscarriage of justice which
117
shocks the conscious of the court ' . The facts and
circumstances of each case determine whether there exists
exceptional circumstances warranting the invocation of Court's
jurisdiction under Article 136, or not. Thus, the special
leave is granted not as a matter of course but, only for good
and sufficient reasons

6.65 Jurisdiction Exercisable by an Industrial Tribunal,Labour

Court or other Authorities
By virtue of section 14 of the Act the Tribunal is vested
with the jurisdiction, powers and authorities of all Courts
(only). The jurisdiction, powers and authority of an Industrial
Tribunal, Labour Court or other authorities under the
Industrial Disputes Act (s) do not stand transferred to the
Tribunal. Further, the provisions of section 28 which exclude
the jurisdiction of Courts over matters assigned for

117. Arunachalam Vs. Sadhanathnara (1979) 2 SCC.

118. For a detailed analysis of the Courts jurisdiction see, supra note 108, at pp.540-44.
 224

adjudication by the Tribunal, make exception in favour of an

Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority set up
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 19^7 or "any other
119
corresponding law for the time being in force" .
Thus, the Act clearly saves the jurisdiction, powers and
authority of an Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other
authorities constituted under the provisions of any Industrial
Disputes Act (of the Central or a State Legislatures), to
determine or adjudicate upon the disputes, claims or
controversies arising under the provisions of the various
labour laws relating to 'workmen'. The Administrative Tribunal
cannot, therefore, act in substitution of these authorities.
But, at the same time, it would be relevant to point out that
the clause (b) of section 2, which made the Administrative
Tribunals Act inapplicable to "any person governed by the
Industrial Disputes Act, 19^7 in regard to such matters in
respect of which he is so governed", has been deleted from the
120
Act . The deletion of section 2(b) clearly implies that a
person who is a 'workman' within the meaning of the Industrial
Disputes Act would be subject to the jurisdiction, powers and
authority of the Administrative Tribunal provided he is, at the
same time, a Government Servant falling with the purview of
section 14(1) or the employee of an institution notified under
section 14(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. It,
therefore, becomes important to examine the nature and extent
119. These concluding words refer only to any Industrial Disputes Act enacted by a State
Legislature, Supra note 115.
120. By the Amendment Act of 1986.
 225

of the jurisdiction power and authority exercisable by the

Administrative Tribunal in such cases.

6.66 Nature of Jurisdiction, Powers and Authority Exercisable

by the Tribunal vis-a-vis Persons Governed by the
Industrial Disputes Act

Two fundamental questions need be analysed in this

context: (i) whether the Administrative Tribunal exercises its
jurisdiction concurrently with an Industrial Tribunal, Labour
Court or other authority, or not, and (ii) what are the powers
enjoyed by the Administrative Tribunal in awarding relief to
the aggrieved parties.
Both these issues were discussed in details by a Full
Bench of five Members of the Centre Administrative Tribunal
in the case of A.Padmavalley and others Vs. CPWD and
121
TELECOM . It was observed by the Tribunal that the combined
effect of the deletion of clause (b) to section 2, and the
introduction of clause (b) to section 28 to the Administrative
Tribunal Act, is that both the Administrative Tribunal and the
Industrial Tribunal have jurisdiction to deal with the
grievances and complaints of persons governed by the Industrial
Disputes Act provided they are, besides being 'workmen', also
the Government employees covered under section 14(1) or the
employees of any institution notified under section 14(2) of
the Administrative Tribunal Act. But the jurisdiction cannot be
regarded to be concurrent. For, the concurrent jurisdiction of
121. 1990 (3) SLJ 544 (CAT-Hyd.).
 226

Administrative Tribunal and the machinary under the Industrial

Disputes Act would not only shatter the machinary forged for
the preservation of the industrial peace but, also lead to
anomalous results, such as mentioned below.

(i) Under the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court, in

case of dismissal or removal, has got the discretion under
section 11-A to set-aside the order and direct reinstatement of
the workman on such terms and conditions if any, as it may deem
fit, or give such other relief to the worman including the
award of lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal,
as the circumstances of the case may require. Such a power is
122
not exercisable by the Administrative Tribunal . Therefore,
if one case is brought to the Labour Court and another case of
similar nature is brought before the Administrative Tribunal,
patent difference in decisions is likely to emerge.

(ii) The machinery provided for under the the Industrial

Disputes Act is not compelled to decide matters by applying
law. They have got wide powers to give awards on issues
referred to them, creating sometimes new rights to the parties.

(iii) A dispute or controversy referred to an Industrial

Tribunal or a Labour Court becomes enforceable only after
acceptance by the Government which satisfies itself whether the
award will not disturb the economic and financial order.

122. See also, Union of India Vs. Parma Nand (1989) 2 SCC 177.
 227

However, if a matter is allowed to be taken direct to the

Administrative Tribunal no such discretion would be left with
the Government.
In the light of these facts the Tribunal was right in
concluding that "the Administrative Tribunals constituted under
the Administrative Tribunals Act are not substitutes for the
authorities under the Industrial Disputes Act and hence the
Administrative Tribunal does not exercise concurrent
jurisdiction with those authorities in regard to matters
12^
covered by the Act . Therefore, an applicant seeking relief
under the provision of Industrial Disputes Act or any other
labour law, must ordinarily exhaust the remedies available
under the relevant labour law'l
Having thus concluded that the jurisdiction of the
Administrative Tribunal comes into play only after the
aggrieved party has had recourse to the machinery provided
under the Industrial Disputes Act, the next question for the
Tribunals's consideration was the nature and extent of powers
124
exercisable by it. It was observed by the Full Bench that
by virtue of section 14 of the Act jurisdiction, powers and
authority of all courts (only) stand vested in the
Administrative Tribunal. Though the term "authority" does not
occur in section 14 but, section 29 which deals with the
"transfer of pending cases" lays down that every suit or other
proceedings
123. pending
Supra note 121, at p.567. before" any court or other authority" before
124. Ibid., para 14.
 228

the date of the establishment of Administrative Tribunal, shall

stand transferred on that date to the said Tribunal. Therefore,

the expression "authority" has to be read ejusdem generis with

court. It would include only such authority which is deemed to

be a court. Thus, construed, authority is a person designate,

that is, a person who is pointed out or described as an

125
individual as opposed to a particular character . An

Industrial Tribunal constituted under section 7-A, or the

Labour Court set up under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes

Act cannot be deemed a court. Hence, cases pending before them

would not be transferred to the Administrative Tribunal. Also,

for the same reason the powers exercisable by them do not

stan'd vested in the Administrative Tribunal under the

provisions of section 14 of the Administrative Tribunal Act.

Thus, though the Administrative Tribunal can exercise its

jurisdiction in matters arising both under the service rules

framed by the Government as well as under the labour laws but,

it can do so as a substitute of the civil courts, or a High

Court. In so far as the civil courts is concerned the issue is

concluded by the Supreme Court decisions in the cases of

Premier Automobiles and Rohtas Industries . In the Rohtas

Industries case it was observed by the court that

"The Industrial Disputes Act 1s a comprehensive and self-contained code so
far as 1t speaks, and the enforcement of rights created thereby can only be
through the procedure laid therein. Neither the civil court nor any other
128
tribunal or body can award relief".
125. Ibid., The Full Bench cited 1n support, the view expressed by the Tribunal 1n Union of
India Vs. Sarupchand Slngla (1989) 9 ATC 167; 1989 (1) SLJ (CAT) 491; wherein the term
'authority' was similarly Interpreted 1n the context of section 15 of the Payment of
Wages Act.
126. Premier Automobiles Vs. Kameshwar Wadge AIR 1975 S.C. 2238.
127. Rohtas Industries Ltd. Vs. Rohtas Industries Staff Union, AIR 1976 S.C. 425.
128. Ibid., at p.435.
 229

In the similar manner the court held in the Premier

Automobiles case that

"1f an Industrial dispute related to the enforcement of a right or an

obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy open to the suitor is
1?<J
to get an adjudication under the Act".

Hence, in relation to the disputes arising under the

Industrial Disputes Act or any other enactment governing the

rights and obligations of a workman, the Administrative

Tribunal can exercise only such jurisdiction, powers and

authority as were hitherto exercised by a High Court. In other

words, as a substitute of a High Court the Administrative

Tribunal can only exercise the power of judicial review (as

done by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution)

vis-a-vis the Industrial Dispute Act and the other labour laws.

6.67 Miscellaneous Issues Regarding Jurisdiction

Doubts still exists in respect of certain matters

relating to the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of

Administrative Tribunal, as well as the extent of jurisdiction

powers and authority, if any, retained by the High Courts over

Administrative Tribunals. Some of these matters are examined

below •

129. Supra note 126, at p.2251.

 230

6.671 Does a High Court retain any Jurisdiction under Article

226 or 227 vis-a-vis Administrative Tribunals

It becomes, undlsputedly, clear from a reading of the

various provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act that a
High Court is absolutely debarred from entertaining a writ
petition and exercising any jurisdiction, powers and authority
in respect of the specified service matters which have been
entrusted for adjudication by the Tribunals. But, uncertainty
prevails over the question whether a High Court is also
precluded from entertaining a writ petition against the
Administrative Tribunal itself. The question, to be precise,
raises a set of question -* .

(i) Is a High Court empowered to issue a writ of certiorari

if the Tribunal refuses to entertain an application on the
ground that the applicant has no case on merit, or the matter
does not lie under its jurisdiction, or if the order of the
Tribunal suffers from mainfest error of law or jurisdiction ?
(li) Can a High Court issue a writ of mandamus directing the
Tribunal to entertain an application and to decide it afresh in
accordance with law ?
(iii) Can a writ of prohibition lie against the Tribunal if a
claim otherwise unentertainable due to lack of jurisdiction, is
entertained ?

130. As pointed out by Vlbhute.K. I., Administrative Tribunals and the High Court, 29 J.I.L.I.
(1987) 524, 536.
 231

(iv) can a High Court issue a writ of quo warranto against a

Chairman, Vice-Chairman, or other Members of the Tribunal when
the petitioner, whose application is pending before the
Tribunal, claims that the Tribunal is improperly constituted ?

In seeking answers to these questions, it is important to

bear in mind that under the scheme of the Act, Administrative
Tribunals have been constituted to adjudicate upon disputes
relating to the specified service matters. The High Courts are
barred from exercising jurisdiction or entertaining any such
case which involves consideration of merit of the case.
However,a distinction may validly be drawn between the power
and authority of the High Court to issue writ in specified
service-matters (under section 14,15 and 16) involving
consideration of the merits of the case and the issue of writ
against the Administrative Tribunal without going into the
merit of the service dispute.
It may be argued that in the latter category of cases the
High Courts are competent to issue appropriate writs. For
instance, where the Tribunal decides a matter in violation of
the principles of natural justice or in disregard of the
procedural norms contemplated under the Act or the rules framed
thereunder, the High Court may be said to be possessed of the
power to issue appropriate writ as it would not involve
consideration of any merit of the case before the Tribunal. The
same may be said to be true in a case of the issue of the writ
of quo warranto against the Chairman, Vice-Chairman or any
 232

Member of the Tribunal who is appointed in violation to the

mandatory provisions of the Act.
But, there may be certain borderline cases in which it
would be difficult to apply this principle. For example, a
person claiming to hold a civil post connected with defence or
in defence services may approach a High Court for the issue of
a writ to the Tribunal directing it to entertain his
application which had earlier been dismissed on ground of lack
of jurisdiction. Conversely, the Government may move the High
Court for the issue of a writ to the Tribunal restraining it
from proceeding further in the case or quashing the decision of
the case on the ground that the Tribunal wrongly assumed
jurisdiction over a person who is actually not the holder of a
civil post. In such cases, it may be argued on the one hand
that since the case does not involve consideration of merits of
the dispute relating to the service matters, the High Court
would be entitled to exercise its jurisdiction. But, on the
other hand a determination on question whether a particular
post is a civil post or not is itself a service matter and as
such outside the jurisdictional purview of the High Court.

It is submitted that with a view to avoid the possibi-

lities of the conflicts of jurisdiction and the uncertainties
and inconsistencies that may, consequently, arise in this
regard it would be safe to hold that the Administrative
Tribunals are not subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High
Court. Moreover, since an Administrative Tribunal enjoys a
status equivalent to the High Court (within the specified field)
 233

it would be inappropriate and improper to subject it to the

power of judicial control and super-intendence by the High
Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. The proper
course in such cases is to move the Supreme Court either under
Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution. This would also
be in conformity with the letters and spirit of the Act. But,
in view of the fact that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
under these Constitutional provisions of discretionary nature
and involve a lot of inconvenience, expense and delay, it is,
therefore, submitted that in cases involving jurisdictional
issues of the nature discussed above, reference to the Supreme
Court may be provided for in the Act by way of a suitable
amendment therein.

6.672 Whether the Tribunal is Bound by the Law declared by the

High Courts
It is yet a moot question as to whether a law declared by
the High Court is binding on the Tribunal or not. The Act does
not, in express terms, contain any provision to this effect.
Neither has there been any judicial pronouncement precisely on
the point. But, from the fact that the Act divests all courts,
including the High Courts (but excluding the Supreme Court) of
the jurisdiction, powers and authority in respect of the
specified service matters and invest the same in the Tribunals
whose decisions are final and cannot be called in question in
any court, including a High Court, it clearly implies that
within the area of its operation the Tribunal enjoys a status
 234

at par with a High Court. As such the decisions of the High

Courts would not constitute binding precedents for the

Tribunals though, of course, they may have great persuasive

value similar to that of the decisions of one High Court for

other High Courts.

Furthermore, it has to be borne in mind that there may

exist a conflict of decisions amongst the different High Courts

on any point of law. In such a situation it would be difficult

to apply the doctrine of precedent to the decision-making by

the Tribunal. The Central Administrative Tribunal which has its

Benches in the different parts of the country will be at a loss

to decide as to the decision of which particular High Court is

to be followed: whether the Tribunal, is bound by the decision,

if any on the point, of the Delhi High Court or it should

follow the decision of that particular High Court within whose

territional jurisdiction the particular Bench of the Tribunal,

where the case in question hasarisen, is situated. In either

case anomalies and inconstencies would arise. It would,

therefore, be not only in conformity with the provisions of the

Act but also rational to hold that the Tribunal is not bound by

the law declared by the High Courts.

6.673 Whether the Tribunal has got the Power to Examine the
Measure of Punishment
130A

In Union of India Vs. Parma Nand it was held by the

Supreme Court that the Tribunal has no power to Interfere with

the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority on the ground

130A. (1989) 2 SCC 177
 235

that it is disproportionate to the proved misconduct, when the

findings as to misconduct or misdemeanour of the delinquent
employee is supported by legal evidence. In the Court's
opinion if there was an enquiry consistent with the rules and
in accordance with the principles of natural justice, what
punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority.
However, the court was careful to point out that where the
finding of the enquiry officer are arbitrary, perverse,
mala-fide and not supported by any evidence, the Tribunal can
modify the quantum of penalty. Additionally, the court carved
out another exception when the penalty is imposed under clause
(a) of the second proviso to Article 3H(s), namely where the
punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is
imposed as a consequence of criminal conviction. If the
punishment is excessive or disproportionate to the gravity of
the offence leading to conviction, the Tribunal may remit the
matter to the disciplinary authority for consideration, or it
may by itself substitute one of the penalties specified in
clause (a). It is, however, submitted, with due respect to the
Hon'ble Court, that the propositions of law laid down in this
case are not sound and they unduly restrict the powers of the
Tribunal in this regard -* .

131. For a critical and detailed analysis of this topic, see, infra Chapter 8, pp.?76-«l
 236

6.7 Appeals/Review

It may be observed that apart from the provision of

Article 136 of the Constitution, the Act does not contemplate
any appeal against or review of the decision of an
Administrative Tribunal or a Bench thereof. But, as already
pointed, the extraordinary appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, under this provision of the Constitution is not
only discretonary in nature but, also involves inconvenience
and expense to the private parties, whereas the Government or
any other institution (the employers) may, easily have recourse
to this remedy. This puts the litigating employee in a great
disadvantageous position. Chances cannot be ruled out where an
employee is forced to defend an appeal, taken to the Supreme
Court by the Government with the oblique motive of causing
unnecessary trouble, harassment or inconvenience to him . This,
not only results in delaying justice but, may, in certain cases
amount to the very denial of justice. It is, therefore,
suggested that the Supreme Court should not, normally, grani,
leave of appeal to the Government unless, from the records of
the case intervention is felt absolutely necessary. In the next
place, it is also submitted that, with a view to serve the
interests of justice, provisions should be made in the Act
itself conferring a right of appeal on the parties, to
challenge any decision of a Bench of an Administrative Tribunal
before a larger Bench of the Tribunal, which may be constituted
for the purpose by the Chairman of the Tribunal. With a view to
 237

obviate a situation where a larger Bench of the Tribunal may

not be constituted due to insufficiency of Members, steps

should be taken under section 4(5) of the Act to provide for

the constitution of joint Benches of the cent-ral Administrative

Tribunal and a State Administrative Tribunal.