IISS

Shangri-La
Dialogue
19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE

FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT

SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

The IISS Shangri-La

Dialogue
THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT

SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

The IISS Shangri-La

Dialogue

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London | wc2r 2pg | UK

www.iiss.org

© September 2022 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Director-General and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman
Editor James Crabtree
Contributors Ben Barry, Nick Childs, Aaron Connelly, Dr Nigel-
Gould Davies, Franz-Stefan Gady, Dr Bastian Giegerich, Dr Tim
Huxley, Yuka Koshino, Dr Lynn Kuok, Ithrana Lawrence, Meia
Nouwens, Sarah Raine, Dr Ben Schreer, Kai-Lin Tay, Cherry Zheng
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the Institute.

Editorial Ben Ho and Adam Walters

Production and Design Jade Panganiban, Kelly Verity,
Loraine Winter

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Hobbs the Printers Ltd,

Hampshire.

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Contents
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Chapter 1
Keynote address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Chapter 2
First plenary session
Next steps for the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Chapter 3
Second plenary session
Managing geopolitical competition in a multipolar region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Chapter 4
Third plenary session
Developing new forms of security cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Chapter 5
Fourth plenary session
Military modernisation and new defence capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Chapter 6
Special address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Chapter 7
Simultaneous special sessions
Session 1
Climate security and green defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Session 2
Myanmar: Finding a way forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Session 3
Maritime security: From codes of conduct to crisis communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Chapter 8
Istana reception and dinner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Chapter 9
Fifth plenary session
China’s vision for regional order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Chapter 10
Sixth plenary session
Common challenges for Asia-Pacific and European defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Chapter 11
Seventh plenary session
New ideas for securing regional security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Chapter 12
The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Appendices
I. Selected digital engagement and media coverage of the 2022 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue . . . . . . . 82
II. Selected IISS publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
FOREWORD
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
held its 19th annual Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in
Singapore from 10 to 12 June 2022 after a two-year
hiatus. We are pleased to present this report summa-
rising the Dialogue’s open proceedings, which include
all of this year’s plenary and special sessions, as well
as a section detailing the discussions of our Southeast
Asian Young Leaders’ Programme (SEAYLP).
The strategic dynamic in the Asia-Pacific region
has developed over the last year in ways that natu-
rally shaped the agenda of this year’s Dialogue, which
opened with a keynote address by Japanese Prime
Minister Kishida Fumio. The proceedings then included
seven plenary sessions, providing defence ministers,
senior officials, high-ranking military figures and other
distinguished delegates with an opportunity to discuss
critical developing security issues.
The 2022 Dialogue involved 553 delegates, around
half of whom were from governments or armed forces.
A total of 37 national delegations attended, with 32
defence ministers present. On the sidelines of the
summit, many hundreds  of bilateral, trilateral, mini-
lateral and multilateral meetings among government
delegations took place, with IISS facilitating over 100
of them.
The Institute also hosted an opening ministe-
rial reception for national delegation leaders, while
organising the important SEAYLP. This provided an
opportunity for 41 young leaders from around the
region to discuss pressing security questions in specially
organised sessions, as well as playing a full part in the
Dialogue’s broader debates.
This year’s Dialogue reflected a range of regional
and global security concerns, and was set against the
backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a topic add-
ressed most directly in a special address that Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy gave virtually from Kyiv.
The SLD agenda also included a plenary session
on common challenges facing Asia-Pacific and
European defence establishments.  Elsewhere, our
agenda focused on the developing security postures
of both the United States and China; the challenges of
geopolitical competition in a multipolar region; new
forms of security cooperation; military modernisation
and new defence capabilities; and new ideas for secur-
ing regional stability.
As ever, the IISS is grateful to the Singapore gov-
ernment for its support for the SLD process. This also
includes the annual IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa
Meeting, which was convened successfully in January
2022, and which will convene once again from 15–17
January 2023.
We would like to thank in particular the following
lead commercial sponsors for their financial sup-
port for the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue: Airbus, BAE
Systems, Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon
Technologies. We also extend thanks to principal
sponsors Babcock International Group, Microsoft, and
Rolls-Royce, as well as main sponsors Asahi Shimbun,
Leonardo, Maxar Technologies and ST Engineering.
The Shangri-La Hotel generously sponsored the
Dialogue’s opening dinner.
The IISS looks forward to developing these part-
nerships, and making new ones, with the shared
aspiration of advancing regional security dialogue and
cooperation through the SLD process in the years to
come. We look forward to welcoming delegates in-per-
son to Singapore for the 20th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
from 2–4 June 2023.
Dr John Chipman CMG, 
IISS Director-General and Chief Executive
James Crabtree, 
IISS–Asia Executive Director
Foreword 5
INTRODUCTION
The 19th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue returned in 2022
following an enforced two-year absence due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. The IISS convened the first SLD
in 2002, and until 2019 ran the event each year with-
out interruption. Throughout that time, the Dialogue
provided a valuable forum where members of defence
establishments throughout the Asia-Pacific could come
together with their peers from nations elsewhere in
the world with security interests in the region, both to
discuss pressing regional issues and attempt to solve
complex security problems. The fact that the summit
was not convened in the past two years and made its
return this year all the more important. While interna-
tional diplomacy continued throughout the pandemic,
many major international meetings moved wholly or
partly online. The IISS has long believed in the central
importance of physical meetings to constructive diplo-
macy, however. We were therefore pleased that this
year’s Shangri-La Dialogue returned in its traditional
in-person format.  part of the fabric of the Asia-Pacific’s security archi-
The summit’s return was timely too, given a sharp
deterioration in the regional security situation driven
largely by rising geopolitical competition between
the US and China. This year’s Dialogue was notable
also for the prominence of discussions about Russia’s
February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and its potential
impact on the Asia-Pacific region. By convention, the
Dialogue begins with a keynote address at the Friday
evening opening dinner, and this year, Japan’s Prime
Minister Kishida Fumio was the keynote speaker.
In his remarks, Kishida summed up the concerns of
many participants, noting the risks of Russia’s actions
for the existing international order and also for Asian
security. ‘I myself have a strong sense of urgency that
Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,’ he said.
The impact of Russia’s actions was also visible in a
powerful special address delivered at the Dialogue
by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who
spoke virtually from Kyiv.
The Shangri-La Dialogue remains the only annual
meeting that aims to bring together Asia-Pacific
defence ministers with permanent heads of defence
ministries and military chiefs. Originally known
as the Asia Security Summit, the event has become
widely recognised as a valuable meeting place for
regional security leaders, as well as observers of
regional security in the business, expert and media
communities. Concurrent with the Dialogue, a paral-
lel meeting convenes intelligence chiefs from selected
regional and extra-regional states. The IISS also ran
its 5th Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme,
bringing together more than 40 mid-career profes-
sionals from around the region to play a full part in
the Dialogue programme.
Over its two-decade history, the SLD has become
tecture. It provides regional governments with a
public platform to explain their developing defence
policies and identify developing issues of security
concern. The Dialogue also allows senior regional
defence leaders to develop and enhance coopera-
tion with one another, notably through the hundreds
of bilateral and other meetings which occur on the
Dialogue’s sidelines. This year saw notable exam-
ples of such meetings, not least the first bilateral
meeting between US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin
and Chinese Ministry of National Defence Minister
Wei Fenghe. Finally, the Dialogue aims to develop
a sense of common community and focus among
leaders from regional security establishments in the
hope this might also provide space to move towards
solutions to the many challenges the region faces.
Introduction 7
Delfin Lorenzana, then-secretary of national defense, Philippines; and Dr
John Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive
Speaking in this year’s closing plenary session,
Singapore’s Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen
reflected on the place of the Dialogue for Asia-Pacific
security and the success of this year’s event. ’Some
of you have been at the Shangri-La Dialogue since
its inception in 2002,’ he told his audience. ‘I think it
would be fair to say that this one will be counted as
unforgettable and unique,’ he added.
SETTING THE AGENDA
The IISS designs the SLD as an open platform for
debate and discussion. Each year’s agenda is con-
structed to allow a fair reflection of the diversity
of views and priorities of regional security estab-
lishments. There is no single overarching theme to
the summit. Rather, the SLD agenda is constructed
around a series of individually themed plenary ses-
sions which provide invited defence ministers with
the opportunity to speak to a high-profile audi-
ence of fellow security decision-makers, experts,
business leaders and media commentators. These
themes reflect the Institute’s view of the most press-
ing emerging security challenges and themes for
the region. This year, the Dialogue’s agenda also
included three special sessions which provided the
opportunity to address and discuss in a roundtable
8 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Dr John Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive; Lloyd J.
Austin III, Secretary of Defense, US; Richard Marles, Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister for Defence, Australia; and Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for
Defence, Singapore
format more specific regional security issues. Two
themes were especially prominent during the 19th
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, namely rising Sino-US
geopolitical competition and the regional impact of
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
  Russia’s invasion was referenced from the start
of the Dialogue during Prime Minister Kishida’s key-
note address. ’As the world was still recovering from
the pandemic, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine
occurred,’ he noted. ’No country or region in the
world can shrug this off as someone else’s problem.
It is a situation that shakes the very foundations of the
international order, which every country and indi-
vidual gathered here today should regard as their own
affair.’ And during Zelenskyy ’s special address, the
Ukrainian president argued that it is ’on the battlefield
in Ukraine that the future rules of this world are being
decided along with the boundaries of the possible’.
Elsewhere, almost every plenary speech mentioned in
one form or another Russia’s actions, and this under-
lines the common concern of sustaining international
rules and order stretching from the Euro-Atlantic
to the Indo-Pacific. The SLD agenda also included a
plenary session titled ’Common Challenges For Asia-
Pacific And European Defence’.
Sino-US competition emerged as a clear theme
through many plenary speeches, notably including
those of the ministers from China and the US them-
selves. Speaking on Saturday morning, Defense
Secretary Austin laid out US priorities.  ’We seek a
region free of aggression and bullying,’ he said. ‘And
we seek a world that respects territorial integrity and
political independence, a world that expands human
rights and human dignity, and a world in which all
countries – large and small – are free to thrive and
to lawfully pursue their interests, free from coercion
and intimidation.’ The following morning, in a ses-
sion entitled ‘China’s Visions of Regional Order’,
Minister Wei responded to Austin: ’China’s develop-
ment is not a threat to others. On the contrary, it is
a big contribution to global peace and development.’
He added: ’No matter what stage of development it
reaches, China will never seek hegemony or engage
in military expansion.’ Numerous other speakers also
made reference to the challenges of managing ongo-
ing tensions between China and the US, either openly
or obliquely.
Elsewhere, the Dialogue covered a range of themes.
There was a plenary examining ways to manage geo-
political competition in a multipolar region. There
was a following session which noted that ties between
Beijing and Washington are now defined by strate-
gic competition across numerous domains, raising
concerns about potential future conflict. The wider
region is multipolar in nature, however, with middle
and smaller powers playing important roles helping
to manage and respond to this atmosphere of com-
petition. The third plenary covered new forms of
security cooperation, with a particular focus on new
relationships like the Quad, AUKUS as well as existing
regional forums such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers
Meeting Plus (ADMM+) grouping in Southeast Asia.
Discussions also focused on military modernisation
and new defence capabilities, noting the significant
wave of military modernisation underway across
the Asia-Pacific, as both China and the US invest in
improved military postures and a range of middle
powers develop new defence capabilities such as
hypersonic missiles and nuclear-powered submarines.
The Dialogue closed with a plenary examining
new ideas for securing regional stability. Given rising
security competition across the Asia-Pacific, speakers
Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary of Defense, US; Lee Jong-Sup, Minister of
National Defense, Republic of Korea; and Dr Chung Min Lee, IISS Advisory
Council Chairman and IISS Trustee
examined what might be done to decrease tensions
and manage potential flashpoints, including the
prospect of new ’guardrails’ to manage geostrategic
competition, including bilateral crisis communication
channels and cooperation on public goods, such as in
the maritime sphere.
On Saturday afternoon, IISS senior staff chaired
three special sessions delving into more specific con-
temporary security challenges. The first focused on
climate security and green defence, noting that climate
change will have a substantial impact on Asia-Pacific
security, both by exacerbating existing regional ten-
sions and creating new areas of contention, while rising
sea-levels will directly affect defence institutions, in
particular by jeopardising military facilities in coastal
or island locations. The second special session exam-
ined potential ways forward in the ongoing conflict in
Myanmar since the February 2021 coup d’état, noting
that both armed conflict and humanitarian crises have
spread to every corner of Myanmar, while ASEAN has
so far struggled to make progress in the implementation
of its Five-Point Consensus. The final special session
examined maritime security. It covered major regional
powers maintaining blue-water navies to project power
and influence. It also noted that cooperation between
maritime states remains integral to preserving regional
stability at a time of rising geopolitical competition. 
Introduction 9
HIGH-LEVEL PARTICIPATION
The 19th Shangri-La Dialogue returned in near-normal
conditions, albeit with carefully targeted COVID 19
safe-management measures to ensure the well-being
of all delegates. The summit also returned to around
the same size as in prior editions, with 553 delegates
attending, around half of whom were senior officials
and military leaders.
From its earliest days in 2002, the Dialogue has
been structured around a core group of regularly par-
ticipating nations. In 2022, of the 27 regular participant
countries represented at the Dialogue, 18 sent del-
egations led by full ministers: Australia, Bangladesh,
Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, France, Indonesia,
Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Republic
of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, the US
and Vietnam. Other high-ranking officials, including
defence chiefs and military personnel, led delega-
tions from the European Union, Germany, India, Laos,
Pakistan, Switzerland, Thailand and the United
Kingdom. Ministers from four other countries also
participated, namely Fiji, Qatar, the Netherlands and
Solomon Islands. In total, the IISS this year welcomed
representatives from ten guest governments, on top
of our regularly participating nations. The Dialogue
is also an important gathering place for international
institutions, with ASEAN, the EU, the International
Committee of the Red Cross, NATO, the Pacific Fusion
Centre, the United Nations and the Five Power
Defence Arrangements represented this year.  was pleased to have especially strong representation
Strong levels of participation from regional
defence ministers were well received in this year’s
Dialogue. The continued participation of both China
and the US was especially welcome. The US defence
secretary has spoken at every SLD since its inception.
Secretary Austin’s attendance this year demonstrated
continued US commitment both to the region in gen-
eral and the SLD process in particular. Meanwhile,
China first sent official representation to the Dialogue
in 2007, and in recent years, including 2019, had
sent a delegation led by Minister of National
Defence Wei, who is also state councillor. General
Wei’s role this year leading China’s delegation
and speaking in the fifth plenary session demon-
strated Beijing’s continued willingness to engage at
10 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
General (Retd) Prabowo Subianto, Minister of Defence, Indonesia; and
Teo Chee Hean, Senior Minister and Coordinating Minister for National
Security, Singapore
the highest level in the Shangri-La Dialogue, and
to use the event as one of Beijing’s most prominent
forums for regional diplomacy.
The 19th SLD also notably provided platforms
for a number of newly appointed ministers. We were
pleased to welcome a number of defence ministers
attending for the first time, including: Canada’s Anita
Anand; France’s Sébastien Lecornu; South Korea’s
Lee Jong-sup; Australia’s Richard Marles; and the
Netherlands’ Kajsa Ollongren. At a time of rising inter-
est in the security of the Pacific, the Dialogue this year
from smaller island nations around the Asia-Pacific,
including Maldives’ Defence Minister Mariya Ahmed
Didi; Inia Batikoto Seruiratu, Fiji’s Minister for
Defence, National Security and Policing, as well
as Minister for Rural and Maritime Development
and Disaster Management; and Anthony Veke, the
Solomon Islands’ Minister of Police, National Security
and Correctional Services.
Defence ministers and senior military leaders
around the region have long used the SLD as a venue
for private bilateral, trilateral and multilateral meet-
ings. In 2022, the Dialogue hosted many hundreds of
such gatherings in the Shangri-La Hotel, more than one
hundred of which were directly facilitated by the IISS
itself. The details of these meetings remain confidential.
Nevertheless, many of the meetings do often become
public, like the one between the US and China. Various
other significant meetings occurred during this year’s
Dialogue, including China’s meeting with defence
ministers from attending ASEAN nations. Australia’s
Marles also met with his French counterpart Lecornu,
the first time the two nations had met at that level
since disagreements over Australia’s decision to join
AUKUS in September 2021. In addition, Marles met
China’s Wei, restarting a defence dialogue at the min-
isterial level between the two nations after a number of
years of strained ties.
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue is primarily a Track-
One meeting where speaking roles are given to
government figures and whose focus remains on facil-
itating intergovernmental diplomacy. Nonetheless the
Dialogue also brings together a large number of high-
level non-government participants, including senior
business figures, leading regional experts and select
media commentators. This year, in particular, we
welcomed more than 90 expert delegates drawn from
mostly the academic and think-tank communities, as
well as 22 media delegates. Elsewhere, the SLD played
host to 200 further members of the media represent-
ing 60 news organisations from across the world.
Overall, the delegate male-to-female ratio at this year’s
Dialogue was around three to one. However, the
gender balance amongst the experts and researchers
we invited as delegates was 45% female and 55% male,
while the delegate composition of SEAYLP was split
almost exactly 50/50 between the two genders.   
LOOKING FORWARD
Speaking in the final plenary session of this year’s
Shangri-La Dialogue, IISS Director-General and Chief
Executive Dr John Chipman noted another impor-
tant theme of the event: ’Throughout this Shangri-La
Dialogue I think every single speaker in their own
ways has mentioned the importance of adherence
to a rules-based order.’ He added: ‘But there remain
questions still about how to deter their breach, how to
defend against their rupture and how to reverse the
effect of their sometimes-savage violation?’ The IISS
looks forward to discussing these and other ques-
tions as we move forward rapidly to organise the 20th
Shangri-La Dialogue, which will be held in Singapore
from 2–4 June 2023. In preparation, from 15–17
January 2023, we will also hold the 11th Shangri-La
Dialogue Sherpa Meeting, which will convene in
Singapore senior defence officials and military offi-
cers from participant countries to discuss the region’s
developing security issues and shape the agenda for
the next Dialogue.
Introduction 11
12 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La CHAPTER
Dialogue 1
19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Friday 10 June 2022, 20:00

SPEAKER
Kishida Fumio
Prime Minister of Japan
Keynote address
Introducing the keynote address, IISS Director-Gen-
eral and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman noted that
Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida Fumio could speak
with ‘unique authority’ on the links between European
and Asian security given his ‘long period of success’ as
foreign minister. As prime minister, Kishida has been
‘especially active on questions of international rela-
tions and strategy’.
Opening his address, the prime minister said that
he wanted to share his view of ‘the current severe situ-
ation facing the international community’, which is
standing ‘at a historic crossroads’, the most important
since the end of the Cold War. Kishida noted that the
COVID-19 pandemic has produced a ‘more uncer-
tain’ world. Russia’s ‘aggression against Ukraine’, he
said, is shaking ‘the very foundations’ of international
order. In the South China Sea, there is no compliance
with international law, while ‘unilateral attempts to
change the status quo by force’ continue in the East
14 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
China Sea. Other challenges include maintaining peace
and stability across the Taiwan Strait; North Korea’s
nuclear and missile activities in violation of UN Secu-
rity Council resolutions; and the ‘abductions issue’.
Noting that Japan is the world’s third-largest
economy and has ‘consistently’ sought to foster peace
and prosperity in the region since 1945, Kishida said
that it has a heavy responsibility. Japan should focus
on upholding ‘universal values’, and he is committed
to ‘realism diplomacy’ based on pragmatism. Japan
would be ‘more proactive than ever’ in the face of
international challenges. Specifically, the prime min-
ister said he would ‘advance the Kishida vision for
peace’ and strengthen Japan’s regional diplomatic and
security role through five ‘pillars’.
Addressing the first of these, Kishida said it is
imperative to ‘press forward in maintaining and
strengthening the rules-based free and open inter-
national order’ based on the rule of law, peaceful
Dr John Chipman, IISS
Director-General and
Chief Executive

resolution of disputes, non-use of force and respect for
sovereignty. He highlighted freedom of navigation,
free trade, respect for human rights and democratic
political systems as important components of such
an order. Japan, Kishida stressed, promotes the Free
and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) idea which has gained
‘broad support’ internationally. The prime minister
mentioned that the US, Australia, India, the Euro-
pean Union and several European states all share ‘a
common grand vision’ of FOIP.
Stressing that collaboration with ASEAN – with its
own Outlook on the Indo-Pacific vision – is ‘absolutely
essential’, Kishida mentioned his visits since becoming
prime minister to several Southeast Asian countries
and his wish to ‘deepen discussions’ with them on
ensuring regional peace and prosperity. Pacific Island
countries are also important, he said, as parties in real-
ising FOIP. Japan would assist them in addressing the
‘existential challenge of climate change’ as part of its
contribution to their ‘sustainable and resilient eco-
nomic development’.
Kishida emphasised FOIP cooperation being
built on ‘long-standing trust’ and not limited to
infrastructure construction – it also focuses on
developing human resources, promoting ‘autono-
mous and inclusive development’ and fostering
inclusivity. The Quad – involving Australia, India,
the US as well as Japan – is also promoting FOIP
Kishida Fumio, Prime
Minister, Japan
through large-scale infrastructure assistance and
investment. Japan is ‘beefing up’ its diplomacy in
support of enhanced FOIP cooperation, notably
through increased official development assistance.
Kishida said he would set out a FOIP ‘plan for
peace’ by early 2023, including providing patrol
vessels and enhancing maritime law-enforcement
capabilities as well as cyber and other initiatives.
Japan, he revealed, is using advanced technologies to
strengthen its maritime-security efforts. Over the next
three years, it would boost the maritime law-enforce-
ment capabilities of ‘at least 20 countries’. This would
include providing patrol vessels and developing mari-
time-transport infrastructure.
The second pillar of the prime minister’s vision
focuses on enhancing security. Kishida said that
‘Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow’. Japan is
united with the international community in impos-
ing sanctions on Russia while supporting Ukraine.
He said he would seek ‘a stable international order’
through ‘dialogue, not confrontation’, while enhanc-
ing Japan’s ‘deterrence and response capabilities’.
Kishida’s government would set out a new national-
security strategy by the end of 2022 with the intention
of fundamentally reinforcing Japan’s defence capabili-
ties and substantially increasing the defence budget.
No defence options, including ‘counter-strike capabili-
ties’, would be ruled out.
Keynote address 15
 Kishida then emphasised the importance of ‘mul-
tilayered security cooperation’. The Japan–US alliance
is the ‘linchpin’, said Kishida, adding that when US
President Joe Biden visited Japan in May 2022, Wash-
ington and Tokyo fully agreed on expanding and
deepening bilateral security and defence coopera-
tion. Kishida asserted that the Japan–US alliance has
become the cornerstone of peace and stability in not
only the Indo-Pacific but also ‘the entire world’. Japan
would also promote security cooperation with Aus-
tralia and ‘other like-minded countries’, he revealed.
Kishida noted that he is concluding negotiations
with Singapore on a defence-equipment-and-technol-
ogy transfer agreement and is continuing efforts to
establish similar arrangements with other Southeast
Asian countries. Japan has also signed a Reciprocal
Access Agreement with Australia, agreed in principle
another such arrangement with the UK, and would
seek more with counterparts in Europe and Asia. A
Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force flotilla led by
a destroyer would begin a regional cruise on 13 June
and exercise with other Indo-Pacific navies.
Moving on to the third pillar of his ‘vision for
peace’, Kishida said that Japan would do its ‘utmost’
to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. Noting
the current discussion about Russia’s potential use of
such arms and speaking as leader of ‘the only country
that has suffered the devastation of atomic bomb-
ings’, he said that the ‘threat of nuclear weapons, let
alone the use of them’ should ‘never be tolerated’. The
prime minister said that Russia’s threat of nuclear-
weapons use may have seriously damaged the
non-proliferation regime, possibly provoking further
nuclear proliferation. Japan also has ‘great concerns’
over another North Korean nuclear test. Meanwhile,
a ‘return to compliance’ with the Iran nuclear agree-
ment has not happened.
Even as the path to a nuclear-weapons-free world
has become ‘even more challenging’, Kishida said
Japan would present a roadmap on this issue with
greater transparency regarding nuclear forces as
the first step. Japan would also encourage dialogue
between the US and China on nuclear disarmament
and arms control. He noted the importance to bring
back discussions on the Nuclear Comprehensive Test
16 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Ban Treaty and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and to
maintain and strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). Japan would work to ensure a substantial out-
come to the NPT Review Conference in August 2022. It
would also establish a Group of Eminent Persons for a
World without Nuclear Weapons, which would meet
in Hiroshima during 2022. Regarding North Korea,
Kishida underscored Japan’s resolve to work closely
with the US and the Republic of Korea towards com-
plete denuclearisation.
Kishida asserted that reform of the United
Nations is urgent. Although Russia’s ‘outrageous
act’ has caused the UN to face ‘a time of trial’, the
importance that Japan attaches to the international
body remains unchanged. UN reform would not be
easy, but Japan would lead discussions on strength-
ening UN functions including reform of the Security
Council, which it would join (as a non-permanent
member) in 2023.
Finally, the prime minister discussed international
cooperation in new policy areas, including economic
security. The COVID-19 pandemic and the ‘aggression
against Ukraine’ have highlighted the need for eco-
nomic resilience. Japan has enacted Economic Security
Promotion legislation, but international cooperation is
also ‘essential’, notably through ‘frameworks of like-
minded countries’. Japan’s economic status, Kishida
said, confers responsibilities as well as benefits:
economic cooperation and financing must be ‘charac-
terised by transparency’.
Japan would promote economic cooperation based
on human security and ‘respecting the ownership of
each country’. ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific region
‘must remain the growth engine of the world, and
Japan would ‘contribute to building resilient nations’.
Concluding, Kishida stressed that the ‘vision of a
rules-based free and open international order’ that he
shared is ‘one in which we all work together’ towards
the objective of a ‘future of peace and prosperity’.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Following Prime Minister Kishida’s address, Yuka
Koshino, IISS Research Fellow for Security and Tech-
nology Policy, asked what contemporary ‘realism
Yuka Koshino, IISS Research Fellow for Security Lieutenant-General (Retd) He Lei, Chinese People’s
and Technology Policy Liberation Army
diplomacy’ would be involved in relation to China.
Kishida replied that Japan’s relations with China are
important for the region and the international com-
munity. He said that Japan had asked China to ‘act
responsibly and…build a constructive and stable rela-
tionship’. President Xi Jinping agreed with him that
China and Japan need to ‘work mutually’ to create
such relations. But Kishida also noted there are ‘many
issues pending’, and both sides need to enhance mili-
tary transparency to foster trust and confidence.
Lieutenant-General (Retd) He Lei from the Chi-
nese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) asked about
Kishida’s ‘major vision’ for the Sino-Japanese rela-
tionship. The prime minister replied that the two
countries’ bilateral relationship has a ‘major impact’
on global peace and prosperity. There are ‘complex
issues’ involving the two countries, but he and Xi have
agreed on developing a ‘constructive and stable rela-
tionship’. Communication and dialogue need to be
enhanced at all levels to build trust, Kishida observed.
Keynote address 17
18 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La CHAPTER
Dialogue 2
19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022
Next steps for the
United States’
Indo-Pacific
strategy

FIRST PLENARY SESSION

Saturday 11 June 2022, 08:35

SPEAKER
Lloyd J. Austin III
Secretary of Defense, United States
FIRST PLENARY SESSION
Next steps for the United States’
Indo-Pacific strategy
US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III began by
illustrating that the US is ‘deeply committed’ to help-
ing the world move past the COVID-19 pandemic
globally, highlighting US vaccine contributions of
more than US$19 billion worldwide since March 2020.
He further highlighted US commitment to help the
Indo-Pacific region ‘heal, recover and rebuild’.
Austin drew attention to the inaugural US–ASEAN
Special Summit held in Washington the previous
month, where US and ASEAN partners declared
commitments to principles of ‘an open, inclusive and
rules based regional architecture’. Austin added that
Quad leaders importantly echoed these principles two
weeks later. He underscored that the challenges the
region faces – from cyber and nuclear proliferation to
attempts to carve up regional spheres of influence –
require ‘shared responsibility and common action’ to
‘uphold international law’, ‘defend global norms’ and
‘oppose unilateral changes to the status quo’.
20 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Lloyd J. Austin III,
Secretary of Defense, US
Austin described US commitment to the security
and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific as ‘the core organis-
ing principle of American national security policy’. He
also stressed that the region is at the ‘heart of Ameri-
can grand strategy’ as visits from senior American
officials, including President Biden, in the previous
month exemplified. Austin observed that the princi-
ple of the Indo-Pacific as America’s ‘centre of strategic
gravity’ would be central to the forthcoming National
Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.
Austin described the Russian invasion of Ukraine as
a ‘historic crisis’ that has deep implications for the rules-
based international order and state sovereignty. He also
noted that US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific
understand the importance of the ‘rules-based inter-
national order’, and that smaller states have a ‘right to
peacefully resolve disputes with their larger neighbors’
given the amount of security assistance and humanitar-
ian aid that the Indo-Pacific has ‘rushed’ to Ukraine.

Austin stressed that the US would stand by its
partners to realise this world view in the Indo-
Pacific and strengthen security in the region, with
more than 300,000 US military members stationed
there. President Biden’s Fiscal Year 2023 included
the ‘largest investments in history to preserve the
region’s security’, such as US$6.1bn for the Pacific
Deterrence Initiative.
Austin further sought to emphasise that US secu-
rity alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific
constitute a ‘profound source of stability’ and that
Washington would ‘remain unwavering in its mutual-
defence commitments’. While integrated deterrents
in the region would continue to be focused on ‘proud
treaty allies’, the US would also seek closer ties with
India and increase defence cooperation with partners
such as Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam. In this
vein, Austin highlighted three ways where the US has
been working with regional states.
Firstly, the US has been working with allies to
ensure they have the ‘right capabilities’ to protect
their interests and defend against aggression. This
involves linking US and its allied defence-industrial
bases, integrating their supply chains and co-pro-
ducing some key technologies. Austin illustrated
that the US seeks to share research-and-development
advances with allies, citing the AUKUS alliance as
an important example for cooperation in emerging
Lloyd J. Austin III,
Secretary of Defense,
US; and Dr John
Chipman, IISS Director-
General and Chief
Executive
technology research. In addition, the Indo-Pacific
Economic Framework, recently launched by Presi-
dent Biden with 12 partners from across the region,
was referred to as a medium for developing secure
supply chains for critical technologies.
Secondly, the numerous bilateral and multilat-
eral military exercises the US conducts with regional
allies were emphasised as key means through which
common readiness and deeper interoperability are
fostered, helping to deter aggression. In particular,
Austin shared that these exercises would be expanded
to include counter-grey zone operations in coopera-
tion with the US Coast Guard, while acknowledging
the presence of US Coast Guard Commandant Admi-
ral Linda Fagan at the Shangri-La Dialogue for the
first time.
Thirdly, US efforts to deepen and develop inno-
vative means of cooperation with allies to enhance
regional security were addressed. Austin’s presence
at the ADMM+ and the Indo-Pacific Partnership for
Maritime Domain Awareness were named as relevant
examples of US efforts in driving new forms of secu-
rity cooperation in the region.
Austin sought to reassure that the US would
stand by its allies in the face of aggression. In reac-
tion to the North Korea’s ‘persistent threat’, Austin
noted that the US and the Republic of Korea will con-
tinue to strengthen their extended deterrence against
First plenary session 21
nuclear arms and ballistic missiles. Austin stressed
that the US also stands by its allies in upholding their
rights in the face of Chinese coercion over territorial
disputes, such as in the South China Sea or at the
Sino-Indian border. Expressing alarm at increasingly
aggressive PLA activity in the region that endan-
gers both US and allied forces, Austin identified the
Taiwan Strait as being an area where ‘the stakes are
especially stark’.
Austin emphasised that US policy on Taiwan,
guided by the One China policy and the Taiwan Rela-
tions Act, remains ‘unchanged and unwavering’. While
the US will continue to fulfill its self-defence capabil-
ity commitments to Taiwan and opposes unilateral
changes to the status quo, it does not support Taiwan-
ese independence. Stating that Washington does not
seek confrontation in the region, Austin stated that the
US will do its part to ‘manage tensions responsibly’,
including by ensuring ‘fully open lines of communica-
tion’ with the PLA to avoid any miscalculations.
Austin concluded by acknowledging that the
future of the Indo-Pacific is interconnected and inclu-
sive, with states working together in new and existing
regional institutions without being forced upon binary
choices. To achieve this goal, Austin called upon Indo-
Pacific states to work together and demonstrate ‘the
power of partnership’.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Delegates raised a series of questions ranging from
US response to the blockade on Ukraine grain and its
possible strategies to increase deterrence in the Taiwan
Strait, to its policy on Taiwan and the development of
advanced military technologies.
Dr John Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief
Executive, asked whether the secretary sees a role for
the military in supporting the flow of humanitarian
aid and grain in the Black Sea given that the routes are
22 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
now closed as the result of the Ukraine war. Austin
answered that while the military could add value to
the situation in the Black Sea, he would always seek
a diplomatic solution first, where he saw great effort
already being invested.
Dr Chung Min Lee, IISS Advisory Council Chairman
and IISS Trustee, asked what Korea, Japan, Australia and
New Zealand could do to augment European security
and vice versa. Austin replied that allies in the Indo-
Pacific have already been very supportive of the effort
in Europe and that there are great lessons to be learnt in
terms of future commitments in Europe and Asia.
Bonnie Glaser, Director of the Asia Program at
the German Marshall Fund, asked what steps the US
would need to take to bolster deterrence to preserve
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. To this, Austin
reiterated that the US remains committed to providing
Taiwan with the means to defend itself and high-
lighted that US policy on Taiwan remains unchanged.
Dr Lynn Kuok, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior
Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security and Co-Editor of the
Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment, asked whether
the secretary was concerned that East Asia would also
experience war as Ukraine and if so, whether such con-
cern was due to the general sense that war can occur
anywhere or due to specific concerns about autocra-
cies such as China and Russia. Austin responded that
‘anything is possible’ and reiterated the importance of
building the ‘right kinds’ of defence capabilities and
adherence to the rules-based international order.
Franz-Stefan Gady, IISS Research Fellow for
Cyber Power and Future Conflict, asked regarding
the types of game-changing technologies that Austin
had referred to and how these will impact the US force
posture in the region in the near to medium term.
Austin declined to go into detail on specific emerging
technologies, but emphasised that the US is commit-
ted to developing these alongside partners and allies
to support important military operational concepts.
Dr John Chipman, IISS Director-General and Dr Chung Min Lee, IISS Advisory Council Bonnie Glaser, Director, Asia Program, German
Chief Executive Chairman and IISS Trustee Marshall Fund

Dr Lynn Kuok, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Franz-Stefan Gady, IISS Research Fellow for Cyber
Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security and Co-Editor of the Power and Future Conflict
Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment

First plenary session 23

24 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La CHAPTER
Dialogue 3
19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022
Managing
geopolitical
competition in
a multipolar
region

SECOND PLENARY SESSION

Saturday 11 June 2022, 09:30

SPEAKERS
General (Retd) Prabowo Subianto
Minister of Defence, Indonesia
Sébastien Lecornu
Minister of the Armed Forces, France
Kishi Nobuo
Minister of Defense, Japan
SECOND PLENARY SESSION
Managing geopolitical competition
in a multipolar region
General (Retd) Prabowo
Subianto, Minister of
Defence, Indonesia
General (Retd) Prabowo Subianto, Minister of
Defence of Indonesia, began his remarks by stress-
ing that Southeast Asia is ‘the most affected by
big-power competition’ and that the sub-region has
developed over the last 40–50 years its own ‘Asian
way of resolving these challenges’ despite differences
and confrontations.
According to Prabowo, such a way ‘respect[s] all
the big powers and all the powers that need to have
their space, their rights respected’. This includes
China, which he described as a great power that has
existed for thousands of years in Asia and that has
influenced the societies in the sub-region throughout
history. Prabowo further stressed Indonesia’s his-
torical position to be non-aligned militarily. He also
remained optimistic about the future that the Indo-
nesians are ‘convinced that the leaders of China will
stand up to their responsibility with wisdom and
benevolence because it is their philosophical teaching’.
26 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Prabowo referenced the situation in Ukraine and
stated that the Russian war on Ukraine shows that
security and independence should not be taken for
granted. Thus, he declared Indonesia’s determination
to strengthen its defence. Prabowo ended his remarks
with a forward-looking note that that the Indonesians
are ‘convinced that wisdom, rationalist, common sense
will prevail’.
In his de facto inaugural address to the Indo-
Pacific, Sébastien Lecornu, Minster of the Armed
Forces of France, began his speech by stressing that
‘France is a several-times resident nation in the Pacific’
and that the France’s interests are closely interlinked
with that of the region. Before diving deeper into the
details, he also referred to Russia’s aggression against
Ukraine, and made clear his views that ‘threats against
the security of Europe are threats for the rest of the
world’. Consequently, ‘the security threat elsewhere in
the world continues to be a priority for Europe’.

According to Lecornu, there are ‘three main stakes
in the geopolitical rivalries in the Asia-Pacific area’.
Firstly, the competition between powers is increas-
ingly becoming diverse and tough with various
dimensions — economic, technological and military.
He mentioned that a Taiwan Strait crisis could have
‘devastating consequences for all, even beyond the
region’. Secondly, collective response mechanisms
have become fragile and multilateral forums have
been challenged. Thirdly, there are other security
challenges that accompany great-power competition
such as fishing, mining, climate change, natural dis-
asters and the fragility of supply chains.
As a response, Lecornu referred to France’s 2018
Indo-Pacific defence strategy and underscored its per-
manent and significant military assets in the region,
including in Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates. The
minister also pledged that France would continue to
reinforce and modernise in the Indo-Pacific, including
the Pacific Islands. In addition, Lecornu stressed that
French commitment is cooperative and he reempha-
sised French interest to join the ADMM+. He concluded
his speech by reaffirming French position that ‘the
challenges induced by the geopolitical rivalries in a
multipolar region require an inclusive and multilateral
response based first of all on the respect of the law’.
Kishi Nobuo, Minister of Defense of Japan, started
his remarks by condemning Russia’s ‘outrageous
Sébastien Lecornu,
Minster of the Armed
Forces, France
acts of aggression against Ukraine’ as ‘nothing but
a unilateral change of status quo by force’, ‘a clear
infringement of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity’, ‘serious violation of international law and
the United Nations Charter’ and a ‘grave breach of
international humanitarian law’ for its mass killing
of civilians. After that, he characterised the current
geopolitical environment as a ‘competition between
countries protecting the rules-based international
order and those attempting to change it by force’.
Kishi listed three lessons to be learnt from the
ongoing war. Firstly, he described as ‘real and present’
the security challenges posed by countries that disre-
gard the rules while possessing nuclear weapons or
developing them. Secondly, he observed the ‘steadfast
resistance’ from the invaded country and international
community’s cooperation could curtail the momen-
tum of the aggressor. Thirdly, Kishi noted distance
does not undermine collective international efforts. He
thus called for the international community to main-
tain solidarity in their efforts to support Ukraine.
He further raised several points on the applica-
tions of these lessons for the Indo-Pacific region. One
is the intensifying military activities in East Asia and
the western Pacific driven by deepening Sino-Russian
relations. Another is challenges in maritime domain
through use of force, especially in the East and South
China Seas. Kishi also underscored the importance of
Second plenary session 27
Kishi Nobuo, Minister
of Defense, Japan
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait to the stabil-
ity of Japan and the international community. Finally,
he stated that the North Korea’s missile launches are
‘totally unacceptable’.
Kishi raised several ways on how Japan is trying to
tackle these challenges as a ‘frontline’ country. One is
to ‘accelerate the fundamental reinforcement of defence
capabilities’. Another is to promote the free and open
Indo-Pacific vision to protect the rules-based order. He
also underscored the importance of cooperating with
ASEAN and reminded these countries that ‘collaborat-
ing with countries that ignore the rules can never be
mutually beneficial’. Kishi ended his remarks by call-
ing for countries to ‘strategically convey the message
that they will be working together in solidarity’ and to
strengthen their defence capabilities against any viola-
tors of the rules-based international order.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Several delegates asked about Japan’s security per-
ceptions and plans to ‘drastically reinforce’ Japan’s
defense capabilities. More specifically on nuclear chal-
lenges, Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow from the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, asked
Kishi why China would build up its nuclear capability
and ‘what the implications are for peace and security in
28 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
the Indo-Pacific and the world’. Aaron Connelly, IISS
Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian Politics and Foreign
Policy, asked what Indonesia’s ‘free and active foreign
policy’ looks like at present. Sofie Syarief, a journalist
and news producer from Kompas TV, asked how Indo-
nesia will navigate security issues concerning China
in the South China Sea and in East Asia in light of
Jakarta’s growing economic cooperation with Beijing.
There were also several questions on Europe’s rela-
tionship with the Indo-Pacific region. Cui Tiankai,
former Chinese ambassador to the US, asked if the
European countries will ‘respect and appreciate the
Asian way of solving problems’ rather than imposing
‘the NATO way or the European way’. Mentioning the
absence of the defence ministers from the UK and Ger-
many, Rym Momtaz, Senior Correspondent of Politico,
questioned the credibility of Europe’s commitment
in the region. Darshana Baruah, Fellow of the South
Asia Program of the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace, asked about the potential return of the
trilateral partnership involving India, Australia and
France. James Crabtree, IISS–Asia Executive Director,
posed a query about the prospects of a rapproche-
ment between France and Australia. Finally, Natalie
Sambhi, Executive Director of Verve Research, asked
Prabowo whether he thinks AUKUS and the Quad are
compatible with the ‘Asian way’.
Rym Momtaz, Senior Darshana Baruah, IISS Young
Correspondent, Politico Leader and Fellow, South Asia
Program, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace
Kishi made clear his views that countries with
nuclear weapons, be it Russia or others, are now
‘using them as a form of threat’ and that solid
coordination among each other to ‘deliver a uni-
fied message’ is critical. He further highlighted
the ‘need to reaffirm the ability to deter the use of
nuclear weapons’. By quoting Nelson Mandela’s
words that ‘your enemy does not necessarily be
my enemy’, Prabowo underscored the importance
of maintaining good relations with neighbouring
counties and ‘all the great powers of the world’
despite differences. He also emphasised the impor-
tance of respecting ‘national interests and the
rightful interests’ of China’ as well as the value of
Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Aaron Connelly, IISS Senior Fellow
Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for for Southeast Asian Politics and
International Peace Foreign Policy
James Crabtree, IISS–Asia Natalie Sambhi, IISS Young Leader and
Executive Director Executive Director, Verve Research
friendly cooperation to resolve differences with
neighbouring countries.
Lecornu pushed back on Cui’s comment by empha-
sising that France’s regional approaches and interests are
driven by its own populations in the South Pacific and it
is interested to work with ASEAN’s multilateral forum.
He stressed that challenges in Ukraine will not take
Pairs away from important commitments in the region.
Lecornu also asserted France and Australia are long-
time partners and neighbours of the Indo-Pacific region.
Meanwhile, Prabowo reiterated that countries should
have their own right to decide their security priorities,
but any alliances should respect the opinions and not
threaten the interests of other countries, such as China.
Sofie Syarief, journalist and news Cui Tiankai, former Chinese
producer, Kompas TV ambassador to the US
Second plenary session 29
30 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La CHAPTER
Dialogue 4
19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022
Developing new
forms of security
cooperation

THIRD PLENARY SESSION

Saturday 11 June 2022, 11:30

SPEAKERS
Dato’ Sri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein
Senior Minister of Defence, Malaysia
Richard Marles
Deputy Prime Minister; Minister
for Defence, Australia
Dr Khalid bin Mohammad Al Attiyah
Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of
State for Defence Affairs, Qatar
THIRD PLENARY SESSION
Developing new forms of
security cooperation
Dato´ Sri
Hishammuddin
Tun Hussein,
Senior Minister of
Defence, Malaysia
Dato´ Sri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, Malaysia´s
Senior Minister of Defence, opened the plenary ses-
sion by noting that the global COVID-19 pandemic
and Russia´s invasion of Ukraine have pushed ´exist-
ing arrangements and partnerships to the limit’,
´revealing gaps and vulnerabilities´ that require a
collective response.
In his view, the region faces four common secu-
rity challenges: ´an increase in transboundary crime
from border re-openings; an upsurge in online disin-
formation arising from terror groups and extremists;
the continued threat of biological warfare; and food
security that is giving rise to instability worldwide’. In
particular, food security is emerging as a major security
challenge, and it is exacerbated by the Ukraine–Russia
war. The minister warned that a ´combination of
unhappiness from two years of the pandemic and
rising food prices´ may generate a ´wave of political
instability´ in Southeast Asian countries.
32 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
For Hishammuddin, new collective solutions
are required to strengthen the regional architec-
ture in the face of these challenges. He highlighted
two main instruments: ´strengthening sub-regional
approaches´ and ´enhancing confidence and trust-
building measures’. In this context, the minister
observed that ´as groupings get too large, consensus
making to solve real-time issues has been impeded’.
There is thus value in ´engaging smaller, more tar-
geted groups that share a common threat as well as
a common understanding of the ways and means to
mitigate those challenges’. In his view, these sub-
regional cooperation initiatives laid the foundations
of wider security cooperation.
The minister referred to the Trilateral Cooperation
Arrangement Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philip-
pines forged in 2016, and noted that these nations
have agreed to incorporate Brunei into this group,
forming a ´sub-regional quad´. Hishammuddin also

mentioned that the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP)
between Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thai-
land to secure the strategic and economically crucial
waterway is a good example for such arrangements.
He announced that these four nations have agreed to
elevate the MSP to a ministerial dialogue to further
strengthen cooperation.
Richard Marles, Australia´s Deputy Prime Min-
ister and Minister for Defence, opened his remarks
by outlining the contours of his new government´s
regional security and defence policy. Stressing that
Australia would take its place in the world ´with con-
fidence’, he announced that under the leadership of
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Australia would
become a ´more engaged and responsive partner´ to
its Pacific neighbours. A ´new era of engagement with
the Pacific´ would be based on the notion that ´Pacific
security challenges need Pacific security solutions´. In
this context, Marles announced the establishment of an
‘Australian Pacific Defence School´ to train the Pacific
Island defence and security forces, fulfilling a pledge
made during the election campaign. In his speech, he
also promised increased support for Canberra´s Pacific
Maritime Security Programme.
In addition, Marles pledged to ´revitalise´ Australia´s
engagement with Southeast Asia. This would include
even closer military ties with countries in the region, the
appointment of an ASEAN special envoy and support
Richard Marles,
Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister for
Defence, Australia
for ASEAN´s outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Marles prom-
ised a ´renewed focus on climate change’, pointing out
that the ocean is being transformed into ´a source of
anxiety and threat’.
Turning to Australia´s complex relations with
China, Marles stated that Canberra values a ´produc-
tive relationship´ with Beijing. But he also noted that
Australia wants to see a region ´where the sover-
eignty of all nations, large and small, is preserved, and
where the rule of law, not the rule of power, governs
conduct between states’. He further emphasised the
responsibility for China to manage its rise, includ-
ing alleviating regional concerns regarding Beijing’s
military build-up which could trigger neighbouring
countries to seek to upgrade their defence capabili-
ties. Moreover, the minister pointed out that the fact
that China has not made clear that it does not support
Russia´s invasion of Ukraine should ´give us cause for
concern, especially given the investments it is making
now in its military power’.
Marles called for ´reassuring statecraft´ as an
essential ingredient to instil confidence that global
rules apply everywhere, including in the South China
Sea. Reassuring statecraft is also needed to ensure
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, as well as
bringing about better relations between Australia and
China. Marles pointed out that Australia´s military
alliance with the US has ´never been more important´
Third plenary session 33
Dr Khalid Bin
Mohammad Al Attiyah,
Deputy Prime Minister;
Minister of State for
Defence Affairs, Qatar
for his country and that US engagement has ´never
been more important to the stability and prosperity of
the Indo-Pacific’.
Finally, the minister used his remarks to confirm
that there would be no cuts to Australia’s defence
spending, but that the Albanese government would
continue the course to enhancing the Australian
Defence Force with capabilities such as long-range
and precision-strike weapons, offensive and defen-
sive cyber as well as area-denial systems. Marles also
stressed that the AUKUS agreement would be ´central´
to deliver Australia´s nuclear-powered submarines
and other advanced capabilities. Moreover, Australia
would further seek to strengthen defence cooperation
with Japan and India.
Dr Khalid Bin Mohammad Al Attiyah, Qatar’s
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for
Defence Affairs, welcomed this year´s Shangri-La
Dialogue as a significant opportunity to promote
face-to-face diplomacy as a means to resolve pressing
security challenges. In his view, the search for new
forms of security cooperation has to be driven by the
objective ´to unite and a protective approach to secu-
rity through collective strength building, aimed at
bettering and advancing security rather than limiting
and deterring others’ security’.
Qatar´s approach to security focuses on building
well-trained and equipped forces ready to protect its
34 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
border with a ´360-degree´ focus on security, coupled
with advancing traditional forms of security coop-
eration with allies and partners. The minister cited
intelligence sharing, interoperability, peacekeeping
initiatives, on top of training and education as areas for
such cooperation. Internationally, Dr Attiyah stressed
the need to expand and fortify global platforms that
are designed to lead to global economic, political and
social reform and advancement. He ended his remarks
by pointing out that for ´security to be sustainable and
resilient, it must be inclusive’.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Delegates asked a variety of questions ranging from
the potential for security minilateralism, the role of
AUKUS in regional security, to greater security inte-
gration between the Middle East and Asia. Anton
La Guardia, Diplomatic Editor at The Economist,
asked Hishammuddin whether his promotion of
minilateralism is compatible with other minilateral
arrangements in Asia. Major-General (Retd) Zhao
Wenhua, Dean of China’s National Defense Univer-
sity, asked Marles if AUKUS is a ´mini-NATO or an
Asia-Pacific version of NATO’. Sebastien Falletti,
China Correspondent at Le Figaro asked about the
potential for resuming Australia´s cooperation with
France in the Pacific and in the security field. Camille
Anton La Guardia, Diplomatic Editor, Major-General (Retd) Zhao Wenhua, Dean, Sebastien Falletti, China Correspondent, Le Figaro
The Economist China’s National Defense University

Lons, Research Associate at IISS–Middle East, asked
Dr Attiyah whether energy interdependence would
lead to greater political and security integration
between the Middle East and Asia.
In his response, Marles stated that AUKUS is not
a mini-NATO nor an alliance, but it is principally
about developing joint capability between Australia,
the UK and the US. He also confirmed that Austra-
lia is seeking to ´revitalise, reset, reinvigorate´ its
relationship with France to meet common security
challenges. Hishammuddin argued that multilater-
alism and minilateralism are not exclusive and that
one could have both. He also urged countries to be
´creative enough to be able to look at a situation where
there’s a common threat, of sharing of a common
sea, with a common aim to establish something more
constructive without disturbing what we have
inherited’. On the issue of greater security coopera-
tion between Asia and the Middle East, Dr Attiyah
stated that Qatar is open to being used as a ´bridge´
to close the gap in perceptions between countries of
these two regions.

Third plenary session 35

36 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La CHAPTER
Dialogue 5
19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022
Military
modernisation
and new defence
capabilities

FOURTH PLENARY SESSION

Saturday 11 June 2022, 14:45

SPEAKERS
Delfin Lorenzana
Secretary of National Defense, Philippines
General Tea Banh
Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of
National Defence, Cambodia
General Phan Văn Giang
Minister of National Defence, Vietnam
FOURTH PLENARY SESSION
Military modernisation and
new defence capabilities
Delfin Lorenzana, then-
secretary of national
defense, Philippines
Delfin Lorenzana, then-secretary of national defense
of the Philippines, opened the session by arguing that
Asia-Pacific countries are operating in the context of
major-power geopolitical competition. He suggested
defence modernisation is a response to changes in
the international security environment. While sin-
gling out deterrence as the primary goal for defence
modernisation, Lorenzana stressed that for the Phil-
ippines, improved military capabilities could also
contribute to humanitarian-assistance and disaster-
response tasks.
He pointed to technologies like artificial intelligence,
fifth-generation telecommunication technologies and
quantum computing as changing the character of
warfare, for example by enabling grey-zone strate-
gies. Given the potential impact of some of these
technologies on armed conflict, Lorenzana underlined
the importance of international efforts to regulate
their application.
38 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
He reminded the audience that defence mod-
ernisation will likely divert resources from other
government priorities such as social welfare or
economic development, but also pointed out that
technological advancement could reduce the cost of
defence modernisation. As such, the Philippines is
seeking to encourage technology transfer through co-
production or counter-trade. Lorenzana encouraged
delegates to consider defence modernisation not just
in terms of equipment and acquisitions, but to also to
focus on personnel and leadership, as well as on doc-
trine and organisational reform.
General Tea Banh, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of National Defence of Cambodia, began his
remarks by cautioning that in the context of major-
power rivalries and changes in global and regional
order, the formation of new regional alliances should
not be directed at undermining the interests of others.
He nevertheless stressed that defence modernisation

and defence capacity building are requirements for
every nation seeking to adapt and prepare for a chang-
ing international security environment.
Tea Banh argued that while the ability to defend sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity is most important, the
capability to support counter-terrorism, maritime secu-
rity, disaster relief and UN peacekeeping operations
matters too. Clarifying that Cambodia does not support
the application of sanctions as ‘it is not the right option
to solve the problem’, the minister suggested Cambodia
would use its 2022 chairmanship of the ASEAN Defence
Ministers’ Meeting to focus on dialogue and practical
cooperation on regional security challenges.
Referencing Cambodia’s Defence White Paper
released in May 2022, Tea Banh stressed the expansion
of peacekeeping capability and defence modernisation
as military-reform priorities. In this context, the minis-
ter spoke about the modernisation of Ream Naval Base,
arguing that it does not pose a threat to the security of
any nation. Tea Banh also stressed that the constitution
of the Kingdom of Cambodia does not allow for foreign
bases on its territory. However, he noted that Cambodia
‘reserves the right to receive foreign assistance in vari-
ous forms’ to ‘self-defend and ensure public order and
security within its territories’.
General Phan Văn Giang, Minister of National
Defence of Vietnam, began by pointing out that while
numerous non-traditional security challenges have
General Tea Banh,
Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of National
Defence, Cambodia
been emerging, traditional issues are still present and
have become ‘more complicated’. He thus deemed
that bolstering national defence capabilities is ‘truly
an indispensable, objective demand’ for all countries.
The minister encouraged delegates to look beyond the
purchase and production of platforms when debating
defence modernisation and pointed out five themes
which are guiding Vietnam’s effort in this regard.
Firstly, General Phang emphasised the principle
of ‘men before arms’ and suggested the need to build
armed forces around loyal and capable personnel. Sec-
ondly, he noted the importance of organisational reform
to create defence structures across permanent forces
and reserve forces that are ‘lean, neat and strong’. The
third element in Vietnam’s military modernisation is a
focus on developing doctrine suitable for contemporary
warfare accounting for technological developments.
The fourth factor, General Phang said, is the devel-
opment of a more self-reliant defence industry, and
this is a goal dependent on international cooperation
with partners. Defence industrial development would
not only support defence modernisation but also socio-
economic development. Finally, the minister noted
‘modernising weapons and military equipment’ as the
fifth element. He concluded by arguing that transpar-
ency surrounding defence modernisation plans in the
region is important to avoid misunderstanding and
the loss of trust among nations.
Fourth plenary session 39
General Phan Văn
Giang, Minister
of National
Defence, Vietnam

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
The session sparked wide-ranging questions from the
delegates centred most around Vietnam and Cambo-
dia. Aaron Connelly, IISS Senior Fellow for Southeast
Asian Politics and Foreign Policy, asked General
Phang about the lessons he learnt from his service on
Vietnam’s northern border with China. Bich Tran,
Adjunct Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies (CSIS) and PhD scholar at the University
of Antwerp, asked General Phang whether there is a
more urgent need for Vietnam to diversify its arms-
supply relationships away from Russia given the
latter’s invasion of Ukraine. Greg Austin, IISS Senior
Fellow for Cyber Power and Future Conflict, asked for
Vietnam’s view of the global landscape in cyberspace
and where Vietnam would be looking to build part-
nerships in cyberspace policy for the armed forces.
Sui-Lee Wee, Southeast Asia Bureau Chief for
the New York Times, asked Tea Banh to elaborate on
the arrangements Cambodia has with China for the
development of Ream Naval Base. Blake Herzinger,
Non-Resident Fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, sought
to clarify on the kinds of operations the People’s
Liberation Army Navy would conduct from Ream

Aaron Connelly, IISS Senior Fellow Bich Tran, IISS Young Leader; Adjunct Greg Austin, IISS Senior Fellow for Sui-Lee Wee, Southeast Asia Bureau
for Southeast Asian Politics and Fellow, CSIS; and PhD scholar, Cyber Power and Future Conflict Chief, New York Times
Foreign Policy University of Antwerp

40 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Blake Herzinger, Non-Resident May-Britt Stumbaum, Team Leader
Fellow, Pacific Forum CSIS of Asia-Pacific Security, Bundeswehr
University Munich
Naval Base. In the same vein, May-Britt Stumbaum,
Team Leader of Asia-Pacific Security at Bundeswehr
University Munich, wondered whether foreign
investments in port facilities would create tensions or
improve security, given the likely dual-use nature of
the port.
Continuing the focus on Cambodia, Chans-
ambath Bong, Deputy Director at the Centre for
Inclusive Digital Economy of the Asian Vision Insti-
tute, asked General Tea Banh whether Cambodia’s
recent efforts to recruit personnel to strengthen mis-
sile-defence capabilities were a response to regional
developments or part of a long-term defence mod-
ernisation agenda. James Hackett, Editor of The
Military Balance and IISS Senior Fellow for Defence
and Military Analysis, asked General Tea Banh to
outline other measures for defence transparency and
confidence building, beyond the release of defence
white papers.
General Phang responded by arguing that Viet-
nam’s efforts to strengthen its own defence industrial
capacities would reduce the country’s dependency on
international suppliers in the long run. He also under-
lined the need for dialogue to resolve disputes with
near neighbours and suggested that Vietnam is look-
ing at cyberspace as both a defence issue and one of
economic development.
Chansambath Bong, IISS Young James Hackett, Editor of The Military
Leader and Deputy Director, the Balance and IISS Senior Fellow for
Centre for Inclusive Digital Economy Defence and Military Analysis
of the Asian Vision Institute
General Tea Banh addressed questions by stress-
ing that Cambodia needs the capability to protect
its maritime sovereignty and that the modernisation
of Ream Naval Base seeks to support this goal. Spe-
cifically, the pier, dry dock and repair facilities will
be upgraded and there will be work undertaken to
enable the base to receive larger vessels. For these
purposes, the minister said, Cambodia has received
grant aid from China. Tea Banh also suggested that
ships from any country would be able to access Cam-
bodian facilities for emergency repairs. The minister
denied that China would have exclusive access to
the base. As for recruitment activities, Tea Banh
suggested they are driven by the requirements of
Cambodia’s defence ministry.
Lorenzana, in his response, said that for regional
countries, dealing with the increasing competi-
tion between major powers is like ‘walking on a
tightrope’, and dialogue is a key ingredient to find-
ing a modus vivendi. On the issue of diversifying
arms-supply relationships, Lorenzana pointed
out that there is now a greater number of poten-
tial suppliers to choose from, which could lead
to better value for money for importers. He consid-
ered the interoperability challenges that might arise
from buying equipment from a variety of sources
as manageable.
Fourth plenary session 41
42 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La CHAPTER
Dialogue 6
19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

SPECIAL ADDRESS
Saturday 11 June 2022, 16:00

SPEAKER
Volodymyr Zelenskyy
President of Ukraine
Special address
The IISS broke from its longstanding rule of no virtual
presentations at its in-person dialogues for a special
address by Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelen-
skyy. Introducing the speaker, IISS Director-General
and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman noted that
‘a hot head and cold heart lead to bad strategy’,
and in turn described Zelenskyy’s brand of stra-
tegic leadership as a combination of a ‘cool head
and warm heart’. Though the war in Ukraine might
appear distant from the Indo-Pacific region, ‘its
effects are now global’.
Zelenskyy opened his address by highlighting
the story of a young Singaporean designer who
sent him a t-shirt as part of her initiative to support
Ukraine. Zelenskyy used the shirt to demonstrate
both the support Ukraine has received globally
and Ukraine’s positive response to this support. He
described the present conflict as ‘the confrontation
between the possible, which we and many people in
44 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
the world need, and the impossible for which Russia
is so desperately fighting’.
Zelenskyy said that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine’s
territory has undermined confidence in ‘basic free-
dom for peace and prosperity in every corner of our
planet’. He also noted that Russia’s blockade has
transformed the Black Sea into ‘the most perilous sea
in the world’, making freedom of navigation impossi-
ble. He expressed confidence that the global audience
has the same interests in preserving freedom and inde-
pendence in their respective countries as Ukrainians
are currently defending theirs.
Zelenskyy dismissed Russia’s framing of the
war with regard to NATO and the United States as
‘assiduous’ propaganda. He said that ‘Russian lead-
ership strives to discard all the achievements of the
historical development of humankind’. He warned
of the erosion of international law, quoting Singa-
pore’s first prime minister Lee Kuan Yew, who once
Dr John Chipman, IISS
Director-General and
Chief Executive

said that ‘if big fish ate small fish and small fish ate
shrimp, we would not exist’. Zelenskyy stressed that
‘we must value what has become possible, thanks
to wise leadership in the past, thanks to the strug-
gle of many generations’. He characterised Russia
as ‘trying to bring the world back to the old times’
before international law.
Zelenskyy called for further measures to ‘break
the ability of Russia’ to carry out the maritime block-
ade so that Moscow will understand ‘its belligerent
policies will have consequences’. He warned that
without further action, the world would face food
shortages and famine, which could lead to politi-
cal chaos in many countries. Zelenskyy also called
for ‘concerted’ action to hold Russia accountable
for its killings, torture, deportations, destruction of
cities, use of prohibited weapons, as well as threats
of using chemical and nuclear weapons. As the UN
system in its current form ‘does not give equitable
representation’, Zelenskyy urged reforms that would
strengthen the international body’s ability to respond
to violations of international law.
In closing, Zelenskyy expressed gratitude for sup-
port to Ukraine, but noted that ‘our and your future(s)’
are linked. Rejecting ‘right of might’, he concluded
that ‘it is on the battlefield in Ukraine that the future
rules of this world are being decided along with the
boundaries of the possible’.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy,
President, Ukraine
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Dr Maria Shagina, IISS Diamond-Brown Research
Fellow for Economic Sanctions, Standards and Strategy,
opened by thanking the president in the Ukrainian lan-
guage. She then asked regarding the best strategy for an
international response to the global food-security crisis,
and the kind of security guarantees Ukraine would wel-
come. Zelenskyy replied that Russia’s blockade of the
Black and Azov Seas violates international law as it is
obstructing food exports to vital destinations. Ukraine
is ‘ready to communicate with the civilised world’ and
supports ‘a safe transport corridor’ to export grain,
comprising ships from Ukraine’s partners.
In relation to a Russian sea corridor, he said that
‘we do not believe Russia’, and noted options for rail
transportation through the Baltic states and Poland.
Zelenskyy said that Russia is repeating its playbook of
blocking a key resource to cause prices to skyrocket,
and then positioning itself as ‘a saviour’.
Regarding security guarantees, Zelenskyy said that
Ukraine is in negotiations with partner countries and
the G7. He said that the agreement under discussion
‘will set out the details to make sure that our people are
not afraid of living in Ukraine, and to ensure that we are
able to build a progressive system of security’. He added
that this system could be a model for other countries.
Josh Rogin, a Washington Post columnist, referred
to Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s statement
Special address 45
Dr Maria Shagina, IISS Diamond-Brown Josh Rogin, Columnist, Washington Post
Research Fellow for Economic Sanctions,
Standards and Strategy
in the keynote address that ‘Ukraine today could be
East Asia tomorrow’. He asked how Taiwan might
stand up to China as it pursues control ‘in the Rus-
sian mould’. Zelenskyy replied that ‘today’s example
of Ukraine is the example for the whole world’. He
said he supports ‘any action’ that forestalls war, stat-
ing that war does not benefit anyone, except for certain
political leaders who ‘keep growing their appetites
and their ambitions’. According to him, the world cur-
rently ‘enables’ such leaders.
Zelenskyy also called for a diplomatic resolution
so that countries in need of help would not be left ‘at
the mercy’ of another, more powerful country. He
encouraged diplomatic measures to come pre-emp-
tively, before hostilities break out and lives are lost,
and reminded the audience of the broad impacts of a
refugee crisis.
46 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Matthias Gebauer, Chief Reporter, Der Spiegel
Matthias Gebauer, Chief Reporter at Der Spiegel,
asked about the risks of overly provoking Russia, as
raised by French President Emmanuel Macron, and
whether this has affected the resolve of Zelenskyy and
Ukraine’s fighting forces. Zelenskyy responded that
going too far would mean an incursion into Russian
territory, which Ukraine has no intentions to do, since
it respects sovereignty and territorial integrity.
He also urged the audience to remember that
Ukraine is pressuring Russia because ‘this is the war
on our soil’. Sanctions and deliberations had been
needed ‘before the full-blown war started’ and ‘now,
there is no grey zone’. He said that ‘Russian leadership
cannot be comforted any longer. It is too late.’ Con-
cluding his speech, Zelenskyy argued that ‘the whole
world must put the Russian leadership in place, and
their place is on their territory’.
IISS Shangri-La CHAPTER
Dialogue 7
19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSIONS

Saturday 11 June 2022

SPECIAL SESSION 1
Climate security and green defence

SPECIAL SESSION 2
Myanmar: Finding a way forward

SPECIAL SESSION 3
Maritime security: From codes of
conduct to crisis communication
SPECIAL SESSION 1

Climate security and green defence

IISS CHAIR Opening the special session, Mariya Ahmed Didi

Dr Lynn Kuok explained that there is undeniable evidence from global
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia- conflict zones indicating that climate change is a major
Pacific Security and Co-Editor of the Asia-Pacific driver of violence and conflict. Climate security is an
Regional Security Assessment area where the stakes for Maldives are high: 99.7% of
the country is the sea and most of its islands rise barely
OPENING REMARKS three feet above the sea level. Didi added that a closer
Mariya Ahmed Didi alignment of climate advocacy and defence diplomacy
Minister of Defence, Republic of the Maldives is needed. She recommended nations that are increasing
Peeni Henare defence expenditure to ensure their new investments
Minister of Defence, New Zealand reduce carbon emissions.
Dr Tobias Lindner Peeni Henare noted that the effects of climate change
Minister of State, Federal Foreign Office, Germany, are being felt both in New Zealand and its southwest
Admiral Sir Ben Kay Pacific neighbours. He referenced the New Zealand
First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Navy, UK Defence Force’s (NZDF) valuable role in disaster
response and recovery, including in aerial-surveillance
and engineering capabilities. The NZDF’s four-pillar
approach to climate security involves: respond, adapt,
mitigate and engage. Carbon neutrality, Henare stated,
is a goal the NZDF is working towards. This will
involve reducing emissions of military vehicles, ships

48 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Mariya Ahmed Didi, Minister of Peeni Henare, Minister of Defence,
Defence, Republic of the Maldives New Zealand
and aircraft. The minister also stressed the importance
of partnerships with other militaries and countries.
Dr Tobias Lindner shared that Germany and the EU
have been intensifying political cooperation with Indo-
Pacific countries to help mitigate the effects of climate
change and increase regional resilience. He also under-
scored that support and cooperation must not create
political or economic dependencies. Referencing ‘hard
lessons’ learnt from the Ukraine war due to dependency
on Russian oil and gas, Lindner stated that energy transi-
tion to fossil-free energy has become a ‘cornerstone’ of
Germany’s security policy.
Admiral Sir Ben Kay saw climate change as an
’existential threat to all of mankind’ that exceeds
the gravity of any conflicts or crises we are facing.
He deemed the legally binding goal set by the UK
military to achieve net zero by 2050 not only a moral
requirement, but also a reputational one. There is also
Dr Tobias Lindner, Minister of State, Admiral Sir Ben Kay, First Sea Lord
Federal Foreign Office, Germany, and Chief of Naval Staff,
Royal Navy, UK
a business case for armed forces to move towards low-
carbon technologies in line with commercial trends.
Finally, Admiral Kay argued for an operational case
for green technology that reduces logistic require-
ments and dependencies, thus increasing operational
range and security.
There was a wide-ranging discussion between
panellists and audience. Topics raised included the
potential role of the UN Security Council and EU, incor-
porating climate security in national security policies,
the need for more transparency of carbon emissions
and for better articulation of the business case for green
transition by the military. Some panellists felt that the
requirement to incorporate new technologies should
see equipment having shorter life cycles, but the major-
ity opinion was that major platforms should have longer
length of service, providing opportunities to apply new
technology during major updates.
Special session 1 49
SPECIAL SESSION 2

Myanmar: Finding a way forward

CHAIR Dr Noeleen Heyzer described the worsening situation

Aaron Connelly in Myanmar as a combination of political crisis with a
IISS Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian Politics and ‘multidimensional crisis of collapsing state institutions’
Foreign Policy and highlighted the dire need for humanitarian aid.
She observed that the positions of conflicting parties
OPENING REMARKS have ‘hardened’ and highlighted the lack of a ‘miss-
Dr Noeleen Heyzer ing middle’ to resolve the crisis. Besides calling for a
Special Envoy of the Secretary General on Myanmar, regional solution including and beyond ASEAN mem-
United Nations bers and more strategic support from the international
Dato’ Sri Saifuddin Abdullah community, she emphasised the need for a Myanmar-
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia led process reflecting the will of its people and for
Pornpimol Kanchanalak building resilience at the local level.
Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Special Dato’ Sri Saifuddin Abdullah echoed Dr Heyzer’s
Representative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on observation of the worsening crisis in Myanmar. He
Myanmar, Thailand stressed that Malaysia does not recognise the junta
Derek Chollet government, but would engage them as needed. He
Counselor, US Department of State also noted the National Unity Government (NUG) and
other resistance groups are important stakeholders to
be engaged with informally. Acknowledging that the
Five-Point Consensus have not achieved much prog-
ress, Saifuddin called for a more detailed roadmap of

50 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Dr Noeleen Heyzer, Special Envoy of
the Secretary General on Myanmar,
United Nations
Dato’ Sri Saifuddin Abdullah,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia
Pornpimol Kanchanalak, Adviser Derek Chollet, Counselor, US
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Department of State
and Special Representative of
the Minister of Foreign Affairs on
Myanmar, Thailand

the consensus that includes listing the timeframe and
specific stakeholders.
Pornpimol Kanchanalak noted that ‘condem-
nations, sanction, ostracisation as well as punitive
measures have reached diminishing return’ and
emphasised that roadmap and modus operandi must
be set out for Myanmar to return to normalcy. Hence,
she opined that the new election slated by the Five-
Point Road Map to be held in August 2023 should
be taken at ‘face value’ to move the peace process
forward, despite concerns about its validity and prac-
ticality. Pornpimol also stressed the importance of the
international community to bring all stakeholders to
the dialogue table.
Derek Chollet stated that the US’ overall goal is
to foster the conditions that would end the crisis and
help Myanmar move towards an inclusive, multiparty
democracy. He noted that US efforts include intensify-
ing economic and political pressure on the junta regime
through sanctions, supporting the pro-democracy
movement and delivering humanitarian assistance
directly to the local civilians in coordination with allies
and partners. Unlike Pornpimol, Chollet opined that
the 2023 elections should be not endorsed given the
unlikelihood of the election being free and fair.
In response to the question posed regarding pos-
sible ways to increase pressure on the junta regime,
Chollet responded that the US has called for an arms
embargo but is not considering supplying weapons
to the NUG. Saifuddin proposed that another way is
to talk to parties that the junta would want to listen,
including dialogue partners of ASEAN. The panellists
also discussed the future role of the military, given that
it has lost most of the popular support in the country.
While both Heyzer and Pornpimol acknowledged the
need to engage the military, Heyzer noted signs of
local democracies forming on the ground. Moe Thuzar
from the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute also provided a
Myanmar perspective of crisis, including the role and
reach of the military.

Special session 2 51
SPECIAL SESSION 3

Maritime security: From codes of

conduct to crisis communication

CHAIR Vice Admiral Biswajit Dasgupta kicked off the discus-

Dr Euan Graham sion by observing that the UN Convention on the Law of
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia- the Sea is the foundation of the rules-based international
Pacific Security order at sea. However, he said disputes, differences of
interpretation and miscalculation can lead to crisis. While
OPENING REMARKS multiple channels of communication exist, the onus is on
Vice Admiral Biswajit Dasgupta the parties to disputes themselves to identify the best and
Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Naval quickest means to reduce risk. Governments also need to
Command, India work out crisis-communications strategies.
Alice Guitton Alice Guitton underscored the fact that the issues at
Director General, International Relations and sea are global because the maritime domain is intercon-
Strategy, Ministry of the Armed Forces, France nected but also fragile, in part due to climate change.
Rear Admiral Aaron Beng, Hybrid and proxy threats are on the rise, she said, and
Chief of Navy, Singapore these challenges affect the entire water column includ-
Admiral John Aquilino ing the seabed. National, bilateral and multilateral
Commander, Indo-Pacific Command, US approaches to protecting the maritime domain are all
applicable, she argued. In particular, codes of conduct
in waters like the South China Sea need to accord with
international law to reduce tensions.
Rear Admiral Aaron Beng pointed to some of
the regional successes in promoting good order at

52 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Vice Admiral Biswajit Dasgupta, Alice Guitton, Director General,
Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, International Relations and Strategy,
Eastern Naval Command, India Ministry of the Armed Forces, France
sea, including joint patrols, information sharing
and crisis response such as in the search for Flight
MH370. Underlying relationships and interoper-
ability are key, he argued. Admiral John Aquilino
highlighted the high-level relationships between like-
minded nations, but pointed to the aggressive actions
of China, Russia and North Korea creating, he said,
potentially the most dangerous security situation
since the Second World War. However, he said the US
continues to reach out to encourage communication.
In response to questions, Admiral Aquilino pointed
to the mechanisms that exist for communicating with
the Chinese military leadership. Other panellists
Rear Admiral Aaron Beng, Chief of Admiral John Aquilino, Commander,
Navy, Singapore Indo-Pacific Command, US
noted challenges that navies face in engaging with
paramilitary organisations. Guitton viewed presence,
information sharing and attribution as keys to coun-
tering illegal activities by paramilitary groups and
non-state actors. There was also discussion of ways to
improve submarine operational safety in the region.
Among the major trends, there was acknowledgement
of the increased number of minilateral and multilat-
eral exercises and activities as well as initiatives to
improve maritime situational awareness. The prolif-
eration of maritime information fusion centres was
noted, and Rear Admiral Beng said there is room for
further development in this area.
Special session 3 53
54 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La CHAPTER
Dialogue 8
19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022
Istana reception
and dinner
56 The Shangri-La Dialogue
 57
58 The Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La CHAPTER
Dialogue 9
19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022
China’s vision for
regional order

FIFTH PLENARY SESSION

Sunday 12 June 2022, 08:35

SPEAKERS
General Wei Fenghe
Minister of National Defense
and State Councilor, China
FIFTH PLENARY SESSION
China’s vision for regional order
General Wei Fenghe,
Minister of National
Defense and State
Councilor, China
China’s Minister of National Defense and State Coun-
cilor General Wei Fenghe opened his speech with a
stated purpose of fostering peace and stability in the
Asia-Pacific region and building friendship and coop-
eration. The world, he said, is currently facing multiple
crises rarely seen in history: from the COVID-19 pan-
demic to economic challenges and the Ukraine ‘crisis’.
To tackle these challenges, China believes that coun-
tries should: 1) strengthen solidarity and coordination
while opposing ‘exclusive blocs’; 2) uphold fairness and
justice and ‘oppose hegemony under the guise of mul-
tilateralism’; and 3) uphold the rule of law and ‘oppose
acting on one’s own’. These three points were directed
at the United States, whose Indo-Pacific strategy was
called ‘an attempt to build an exclusive small group in
the name of a free and open Indo-Pacific, to hijack coun-
tries in our region and target one specific country’.
Next, General Wei proposed that all countries
should promote mutual learning and exchange. He
60 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
emphasised that ‘the right path for a country must
fit its realities’ of culture, history, ethnicity, religion
and development models and none should be char-
acterised as superior or inferior. General Wei also
emphasised that not allowing countries to choose their
own paths equates to ‘turn[ing] away from common
values of democracy and freedom’.
General Wei then proposed how China would
play a positive role within the region and wider
global system. In particular, the Chinese government
and military would contribute to world peace and
safeguarding the international order. General Wei
raised examples of such contributions by referencing
China’s ‘strategic outcome’ in its COVID-19 response
at home and across 170 countries, including through
defence diplomacy.
Secondly, General Wei highlighted that China’s
economic growth has benefited Chinese citizens by
lifting them out of poverty, while also contributing
roughly 30% of global economic growth. Lastly, Gen-
eral Wei described the military as a ‘force for peace’
and one that is defensive in nature. China, he stated,
will ‘never seek hegemony or engage in military
expansion’. General Wei pointed to the PLA’s positive
contribution to world peace through its participation
in UN peacekeeping efforts and anti-piracy missions.
As the PLA grows, so too does its ability to add to the
‘growth of the global force for peace’.
Within the context of Chinese President Xi Jin-
ping’s Global Security Initiative, where each country
should accommodate the core interests and major
concerns of each other, General Wei outlined China’s
non-negotiable position on reunification with Taiwan.
He emphasised that ‘Taiwan is first and foremost
China’s Taiwan’ and Taiwan is ‘an internal affair of
China’s’. He also asserted that ‘China will definitely
realise its reunification’ which is ‘a historical trend that
no one and no force can stop’. While China prefers to
achieve reunification through peaceful means, it will
also resort to force if necessary.
In connection, General Wei warned against sup-
port for Taiwan independence, predominantly by the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) that is ‘attempt-
ing to change the status quo that both the mainland
and Taiwan belong to one China’. He also referred to
the DPP authorities as a ‘prong of anti-China foreign
groups that would be used and ultimately abandoned
by their masters’. If there is any attempt to secede
Taiwan from China, General Wei avowed that China
will ‘fight at all costs’ and ‘fight to the very end’. In an
attempt to draw parallels, General Wei also referred to
the US’ own civil war for its unity. He then referred to
the broader ‘foreign interference’, which he deemed is
‘doomed to failure’.
On the South China Sea, General Wei remarked
that China calls for turning it into a ‘sea of peace,
friendship and cooperation’. He claimed China and
ASEAN’s cooperation has ensured stability in the
area, and freedom of navigation is not under threat,
apart from ‘some’ foreign countries meddling. On
China–US relations, General Wei acknowledged that
bilateral relationships are at a ‘critical and crucial
juncture’. He called on the US to stop smearing and
containing China, and to stop interfering in China’s
internal affairs. He noted that both militaries should
endeavour to achieve a ‘stable bilateral relationship’
through ‘enhanc[ing] strategic trust, avoid[ing] misun-
derstanding and miscalculation, manag[ing] risks and
crisis and prevent[ing] frictions and conflicts’.
Referring to the Ukraine war as a ‘crisis’, Gen-
eral Wei questioned the real root of the crisis and its
‘mastermind’. He affirmed that China supports the
UN Charter and while respecting sovereignty and
territorial integrity of all countries, the general also
stressed the legitimate security concerns of all parties.
He stated that China does not support maximum pres-
sure or sanctions, which it thinks will exacerbate the
situation. General Wei also conveyed that China is
committed to supporting talks between Russia and
Ukraine and expressed hope that the US and NATO
will have talks with Russia to create conditions neces-
sary for an early ceasefire.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
General Wei’s speech prompted 11 questions from the
delegates, ranging from China’s military-modernisa-
tion goals and recent capability-related developments
to its policy on Taiwan and its bilateral relationship
with Russia. Meia Nouwens, IISS Senior Fellow for
Chinese Defence Policy and Military Modernisation,
asked whether General Wei could provide greater
clarity on the PLA’s 2027 benchmark, which some
analysts think is an indication of sped-up modernisa-
tion efforts. While General Wei did not clarify the 2027
goal, he did provide some new details in his answers
to questions about China’s nuclear- and missile-devel-
opment programmes.
Alastair Gale, Asia Security Correspondent and
Japan Editor of the Wall Street Journal, asked what the
purpose of the roughly 300 alleged missile silos in
Western China is, and whether these are intended to
be used to deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles.
General Wei responded that China’s nuclear capability
is for self-defence and that Beijing’s no first-use policy
remains in place. In addition, he noted that China has
equipped the PLA with the nuclear arms displayed in
the 2019 military parade. China will maintain a nuclear
force size that ensures its ability to prevent nuclear war.
Fifth plenary session 61
Alastair Gale, Asia Security Demetri Sevastopulo, US–China
Correspondent and Japan Editor, Correspondent, Financial Times
Wall Street Journal
Demetri Sevastopulo, US–China Correspondent
for the Financial Times, asked General Wei to clarify
what the weapon China tested on 27 July was and its
purpose. To this, General Wei confirmed that this was
indeed one of China’s ‘new weapons’ and asserted
that they are for ‘protecting peace and national inter-
ests of China’.
When asked about regional disputes involving
Taiwan, the South China Sea, North Korea, Vietnam
and India, General Wei again presented China as
adhering consistently to its policies and promoting
stability in the region. On Taiwan, he maintained
that ‘Taiwan is China’s Taiwan’. On the South
China Sea, he responded that a resolution should
be found only between countries in the region. On
the China–India border dispute, he noted that both
countries have had 15 rounds of corps commander-
level negotiations and would continue to work
together for peace. Regarding North Korea, General
Wei viewed that the security concerns of all parties
should be accommodated and urged countries to
62 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Taketsugu Sato, Senior National Hiroyuki Akita, Commentator,
Security Correspondent, Nikkei Asian Review
Asahi Shimbun
help Pyongyang solve its problems. On Sino-Viet-
nam ties, General Wei suggested that both countries
enjoy a ‘very good’ relationship.
Lastly, on the Ukraine war, General Wei was asked
various questions about China’s bilateral relationship
with Russia. Taketsugu Sato, Senior National Secu-
rity Correspondent from Asahi Shimbun, asked about
whether or not it would denounce Russia’s illegal inva-
sion of Ukraine. Hiroyuki Akita, Commentator for
Nikkei Asian Review, asked whether China has provided
support to Russia since the start of the conflict. On the
first point, General Wei pointed out that China, too, has
suffered food and energy crises because of the war. He
affirmed that China has ‘never’ provided any material
support to Russia since the start of the Ukraine ‘crisis’.
The general characterised China–Russia relationship
as one of partnership, not an alliance, and noted it will
continue to grow. While General Wei referred to Rus-
sia’s invasion of Ukraine as a crisis in his speech and
the first half of his question-and-answer question, he
referred to it as a ‘war’ in the second half.
IISS Shangri-La CHAPTER
Dialogue 10
19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022
Common challenges
for Asia-Pacific
and European
defence

SIXTH PLENARY SESSION

Sunday 12 June 2022, 09:30

SPEAKERS
Lee Jong-sup
Minister of National Defense, Republic of Korea
Kajsa Ollongren
Minster of Defence, Netherlands
Lord Mark Sedwill
Former Cabinet Secretary and National Security
Adviser, Cabinet Office, UK
SIXTH PLENARY SESSION
Common challenges for Asia-
Pacific and European defence
Lee Jong-sup,
Defense Minister,
Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea (ROK) Defense Minister Lee Jong-
sup focused his remarks on the denuclearisation of
North Korea and the intentions of the newly formed
South Korean government to play a responsible role
for freedom, peace and prosperity beyond the Korean
peninsula as a ‘global pivotal state’. Lee highlighted
Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programmes as one of
the major risks threatening stability in the Indo-Pacific.
He also outlined his government’s approach to
securing peace on the Korean peninsula through the
North’s denuclearisation. Should Pyongyang make
substantial progress in denuclearisation, the South
Korean government under President Yoon Suk-yeol
would pursue a ‘bold plan’ that would yield ‘ground-
breaking improvements’ for North Korea’s economy
and standard of living. In order to pursue these objec-
tives from a position of strength, Seoul would also
strengthen its own capabilities as well as its security
cooperation with allies and partners.
64 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Lee mentioned several initiatives to showcase
the ROK’s commitment to play a global role. These
include expanding security cooperation with ASEAN
member states, including on non-traditional security
threats and on defence–industry cooperation with a
view towards strengthening regional maritime-secu-
rity capabilities. The ROK would expand security
cooperation with other nations, including European
ones, on traditional and non-traditional security, as
well as expanding cooperation with security consul-
tative bodies such as the Quad. Finally, the minister
noted that the invasion of Ukraine is not justified
under any circumstances.
Kajsa Ollongren, the Minister of Defence of the
Netherlands, began by passing on the regrets of
EU High Representative Josep Borrell that COVID-
19 had forced him to cancel his appearance, noting
that she would also be delivering his key messages
in her speech. Condemning Vladimir Putin’s war

against Ukraine, Ollongren set out how the war has
connected Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Russian
aggression poses a ‘global challenge with global
ramifications’, she said. She also stated that the way
the international community responded would affect
‘not just the stability and security of Europe’, but also
the ‘future of the rules-based international order’.
Ollongren observed ‘a paradigmic shift’ has occurred
in Europe, where countries are ‘recognising global
threats using a 360-degrees approach’. The defence min-
ister also argued that the lessons European countries are
drawing from the war against Ukraine would ultimately
‘strengthen European armed forces’ and make them
‘better partners’ for security cooperation with ASEAN.
Ollongren noted that Putin’s actions have ‘woken up’ the
EU to its geopolitical role and the importance of defence
cooperation. European nations are increasing defence
budgets and have adopted the EU Strategic Compass as
their operational guide to develop the EU into a stronger
and more capable security provider.
The EU Indo-Pacific security strategy also provides
a foundation for the body to develop cooperation with
Indo-Pacific partners. Ollongren highlighted the par-
ticipation of a Dutch frigate as part of the UK Carrier
Strike Group 2021 (CSG21) deployment to the region.
In addition, she revealed that the Netherlands has
planned to send a warship to the Indo-Pacific once
every two years.
Kajsa Ollongren, Minister
of Defence, Netherlands
Lord Mark Sedwill, former cabinet secretary and
national security adviser of the UK, used his remarks to
outline how the challenges Europe and the Indo-Pacific
face are connected and therefore require collective
action. As examples, he cited the threats posed by North
Korea’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes, as
well as the geopolitical crises being caused by Russian
aggression in Ukraine through the transmission mecha-
nism of food and energy insecurity.
He argued that whilst one response to the chal-
lenges of interconnectivity could be to reverse course
and reduce interdependencies, a better option would
be to improve resilience by focusing on sound poli-
cymaking at home while strengthening national
capabilities to act collectively and effectively with
partners. Lord Sedwill explained how the UK’s Fusion
Doctrine sought to do this by applying ‘defence, dip-
lomatic, development and economic capabilities,
national capabilities’ to contribute to London’s defence
and foreign policies. He also highlighted the shift to
an ‘Allied-by-design’ concept that assumes from the
outset deployments alongside allies, as showcased in
the CSG21 tour.
Condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Lord
Sedwill argued that the important dividing line is
‘not between authoritarian and democratic states’, but
between those who accept the global rule of law, respect
the sovereignty of nations and those who do not.
Sixth plenary session 65
Lord Mark Sedwill,
former cabinet
secretary and national
security adviser, UK
He underlined the UK’s ‘persistent’ and ‘genuine’
commitment to the Indo-Pacific region because it is in
its national interest.
He also outlined the UK’s diplomatic, military and
economic engagements in the region, alongside its
institutional engagements including the Five Powers
Defence Agreement, AUKUS and the UK’s new struc-
tured dialogue with ASEAN. Lord Sedwell highlighted
technical cooperation as a new approach to indus-
trial and defence, where the UK is moving to a new
approach of ‘genuine co-design and co-production’
that includes allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
Finally, he underscored the importance of alliances
and partnerships, which he identified as something
which their adversaries do not enjoy.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
The subsequent discussion largely focused
exploring further the co-dependencies between the
Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres.
Dr Benjamin Schreer, IISS–Europe Executive Direc-
tor, questioned whether European powers needed to
reassess their responses to the China challenge. Dr
Chikako Ueki, Professor of International Relations at
Waseda University, picked up Minister Lee’s reference
to improving ROK–Japan relations and asked regard-
ing the kind of military capability that better bilateral
66 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
cooperation would deliver. Similarly, Mariko Togashi,
IISS Research Fellow for Japanese Security and Defence,
asked how ROK–Japan bilateral issues could be put aside
and how relations can be improved.
Several questions focused on the role of NATO in
the Indo-Pacific. Dr Bastian Giegerich, IISS Director of
Defence and Military Analysis, asked what NATO’s new
Strategic Concept should credibly say on the Indo-Pacific.
Senior Colonel Zhang Chi, an associate professor from
China’s National Defense University, enquired about the
ROK’s cooperation with NATO and whether the Alli-
ance’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific risked bringing
conflict to Asia or undermining ASEAN centrality.
On the Russia–Ukraine war, John Raine, IISS Senior
Adviser for Geopolitical Due Diligence, queried what
deterrence constitutes at present given the failure to
deter Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Others questioned
the future engagement of European partners in the
on Indo-Pacific. Marianne Péron-Doise, Senior Research
Fellow from France’s Institute for Strategic Research at
Military School, asked whether the EU would be able
to sustain its level of naval presence in the region
Regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile pro-
grammes, Sebastien Falletti, China Correspondent
of France’s Le Figaro, asked whether Lee’s support
for US extended nuclear deterrence includes the
possibility of the return of some US nuclear assets to
the Korean Peninsula.
Dr Benjamin Schreer, IISS–Europe Dr Chikako Ueki, Professor of
Executive Director International Relations,
Waseda University
In their responses, Ollongren and Lord Sedwill
both addressed questions on NATO. Lord Sedwill
noted how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shifted
the strategic picture in Europe to greater consider-
ation of not just deterrence but defence. Both speakers
concluded that, even as NATO remains a defensive
alliance focused on the North Atlantic theatre, Alliance
members have a global outlook that means consider-
ing global threats, and that involved working with
partners around the globe. Ollongren insisted that
European engagement in the Indo-Pacific is sustain-
able precisely because the issue at hand is the future
of the international rules-based order, and so the
dynamic is to do more, not less.
John Raine, IISS Senior Adviser for Marianne Péron-Doise, Senior
Geopolitical Due Diligence Research Fellow, France’s Institute for
Strategic Research at Military School
Dr Bastian Giegerich, IISS Director of Senior Colonel Zhang Chi,
Defence and Military Analysis Associate Professor, China’s
National Defense University
Minister Lee noted North Korean preparations for
their seventh nuclear test and ongoing efforts to deter
this. He emphasised Seoul’s commitment to denuclearis-
ing the Korean peninsula by ensuring that the costs of
possessing these weapon systems are far outweighed
by the benefits North Korea can achieve by denuclearis-
ing. It is in this spirit, he said, that ROK–Japan security
cooperation would be further developed. Lee noted that
nobody wants to see any nuclear weapons on the Korean
peninsula from any country. Looking forward to the
Indo-Pacific strategy of the new ROK government, he
said that it would focus on upholding the rules-based
international order, as well as peace, freedom and pros-
perity in the Indo-Pacific.
Sebastien Falletti, China
Correspondent, Le Figaro
Sixth plenary session 67
68 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La CHAPTER
Dialogue 11
19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022
New ideas for
securing regional
security

SEVENTH PLENARY SESSION

Sunday 12 June 2022, 11:30

SPEAKERS
Anita Anand
Minister of National Defence, Canada
Inia Batikoto Seruiratu
Minister for Defence, National Security
and Policing, Fiji
Dr Ng Eng Hen
Minister for Defence, Singapore
SIXTH PLENARY SESSION
New ideas for securing regional security
Anita Anand,
Minister of National
Defence, Canada
The final session focused on policy responses to a
wide range of regional security challenges – both
traditional geopolitical threats made more urgent by
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and non-traditional ones
like climate change.
Canadian Minister of National Defence Anita
Anand reaffirmed the centrality of responsible
engagement – underpinned by the principles of trans-
parency, open communication and adherence to rules
and norms – to Canada’s foreign policy. She set out
three ways that Canada’s Indo-Pacific policy reflects
this approach.
Firstly, Anand described Canada’s significant and
growing military presence in the region. This includes
Operation Neon which monitors UN sanctions against
North Korea, and Operation Projection which deploys
warships to conduct joint missions with allies and
partners. Operation Projection is set to return in late
2022, with HMCS Winnipeg, HMCS Vancouver and
70 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
their embarked helicopter detachments participating
in RIMPAC 2022.
Secondly, Anand characterised multilateralism as a
‘cornerstone’ of Canada’s approach to the Indo-Pacific.
The minister noted that Ottawa is deepening its mul-
tilateral engagement with the Indo-Pacific region to
maintain the rules-based order against Chinese actions
involving coercive diplomacy, cyber activity and intel-
lectual-property theft. Expressing Canada’s belief in
the centrality of ASEAN as a ‘vital forum for address-
ing regional challenges’, Anand stated that Canada has
applied to become a full Strategic Partner of ASEAN.
It has also sought membership of ADMM+, where it
could contribute, in particular, expertise in combating
climate change.
Thirdly, Anand revealed that Canada is devel-
oping an Indo-Pacific strategy to integrate its
diplomatic, military and economic activities and
advance responsible engagement. A new Indo-Pacific

Advisory Committee of private sector, civil society
and former members of government would support
preparation of the strategy. The minister concluded
by underscoring Canada’s openness to new and inno-
vative approaches to work with Indo-Pacific partners
to enhance the region’s security.
Inia Batikoto Seruiratu, the Minister of Defence,
National Security and Policing of Fiji, drew attention
to non-traditional security threats. He noted, in par-
ticular, that a series of devastating tropical cyclones
and storms have driven home the existential threat
of climate change. The minister also stated that the
COVID-19 pandemic has not only shown the centrality
of health to national and regional security, but has also
prompted the need for new partnerships and new ways
of working to counter the spread of misinformation.
Seruiratu revealed that Fiji is drafting a national
security strategy to develop a whole-of-government
approach to protect its people against a broad range
of security threats. He also stated that the country is
exploring the use of cross-agency and community
partnerships to develop new surveillance and early-
warning mechanisms. He concluded by exhorting
other countries and institutions in the region to assist
Fiji in its challenges, especially in information sharing
and capability development.
Dr Ng Eng Hen, Singapore’s Defence Minister,
noted that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a ‘geopolitical
Inia Batikoto Seruiratu,
Minister of Defence,
National Security and
Policing, Fiji
earthquake’ that raises risks to peace and stability eve-
rywhere. He noted that the impact on wheat, fuel and
metals markets is deepening existing divisions. Coun-
tries are shutting down food exports to protect their
domestic supply. Consequently, inflation and supply
shocks are jeopardising affordability of basic commod-
ities for the world’s poor. Dr Ng also cautioned that
this inward turn risks undermining responses to global
challenges such as climate change, human trafficking
and terrorism. He observed that security alliances are
hardening and defence spending is rising in Europe
and the Asia-Pacific.
Dr Ng asserted that the world is standing at a ‘poten-
tially dangerous point in our history’. He proposed two
ways to avert the disaster. Firstly, he stated that it is
important to end the war in Ukraine. A protracted war
would impose severe costs on Russia and test interna-
tional support for Ukraine. Secondly, the minister also
called upon Asian countries to follow Ukrainian Presi-
dent Zelenskyy’s advice of pre-emption and prevention
of conflict by ensuring that regional tensions do not
break out into open conflict. Dr Ng emphasised that
tensions should not be framed as part of an ideological
struggle between autocracies and democracies.
Dr Ng further noted that the Asian consensus on
the respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity
alone is not sufficient. The core issue is the interde-
pendence within the region, which he noted is far
Seventh plenary session 71
Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister
for Defence, Singapore
more ‘developed, productive and mutually benefi-
cial’ than between Russia and Europe. To this, Dr Ng
highlighted the importance of strengthening exist-
ing establishments such as the ADMM+ and enhance
engagements within and with extra-regional powers.
He noted that building confidence and strategic trust
in one another through inclusivity and multilateralism
is ‘the call of pre-emption’. Furthermore, Dr Ng sug-
gested that ADMM+ could continue to build norms
and mechanisms to de-escalate and avert conflict,
including confidence-building initiatives such as the
Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea and the Guide-
lines for Air Military Encounters.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Many questions addressed the role of external
powers in the Indo-Pacific region. Boris Ruge, Vice-
Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, asked
what European states could do to help prevent con-
flict in Asia. Dr Lynn Kuok, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security and Co-Editor
of the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment, asked
how the Russia–China joint statement of 4 February
has impacted Beijing’s influence in the region. James
Crabtree, IISS–Asia Executive Director, asked how
Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy would be distinc-
tive from those of other states. Nicholas Childs, IISS
72 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Secu-
rity, asked how Canada would balance its Pacific,
Atlantic and Arctic commitments.
Several other questions were addressed to
Seruiratu. Josh Rogin, Columnist of the Washington
Post, asked how Fiji views US–China rivalry. Dr Euan
Graham, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for
Asia-Pacific Security, asked what threats geopolitics
poses to Fiji. Darshana Baruah, Fellow of the South
Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace, asked how Fiji manages the differing
security perspectives of large and small states.
Other questions explored Singapore’s policy think-
ing. Dr Chong Ja Ian, Associate Professor of Political
Science at the National University of Singapore, asked
how Singapore is addressing disinformation. Dr Tim
Huxley, IISS–Asia Senior Adviser and its former execu-
tive director, asked what implications Russia’s war in
Ukraine hold for Singapore’s security doctrine and plan-
ning. Sofie Syarief, a journalist and news producer from
Kompas TV, asked how Singapore could help ASEAN
address problems relating to the South China Sea. Senior
Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo of the Chinese Academy of
Military Sciences asked Dr Ng to assess the role that the
Shangri-La Dialogue plays in Asia-Pacific security.
In response, Anand emphasised that Canada pri-
oritises the combating of climate change, and that
its armed forces have already addressed disasters
Josh Rogin, Columnist, Dr Euan Graham, IISS Shangri-La
Washington Post Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-
Pacific Security
emanating from this problem. The significance of Can-
ada’s Pacific trade, and of Asian diasporas in Canada,
would also shape its forthcoming Indo-Pacific strat-
egy. She noted the growing importance of defending
Arctic sovereignty, including through close coopera-
tion with the US.
Seruiratu emphasised the challenges facing a small
state manoeuvring a changing geopolitical climate. He
noted that a US–China clash would be disastrous, and
that Fiji has an interest in the development of good
relations between the two great powers. He asked
whether China’s growing influence is the result of a
vacuum created by the US, and noted that China is
now a key development partner of Fiji. Seruiratu also
emphasised that Fiji seeks long-term relationships
based on trust with all its traditional partners.
Boris Ruge, Vice-Chairman, Munich Dr Lynn Kuok, IISS Shangri-La
Security Conference Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific
Security and Co-Editor of the Asia-
Pacific Regional Security Assessment
Dr Chong Ja Ian, Associate Professor Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo,
of Political Science, National Research Fellow, Chinese Academy
University of Singapore of Military Sciences
Dr Ng responded that the most important thing
European states could do for Indo-Pacific stability is
to establish a security presence. The open policy of
Singapore’s Changi Naval Base to port visits facilitates
this. He noted that the crisis in the Black Sea could be
replicated in the South China Sea and called for the
South China Seas Code of Conduct to be finalised
quickly to avert disaster. Dr Ng also mentioned that
the Singapore Armed Forces are setting up a digital
intelligence service to tackle disinformation. He drew
attention to both the extent and limits of the Sino-
Russian relations, while observing that strategic allies
could become strategic burdens. Lastly, he pointed
out that it is for China to decide whether it is better to
participate in an open, unscripted platform that posed
many questions, or to retreat from engagement.
James Crabtree, IISS–Asia Nicholas Childs, IISS Senior Fellow for
Executive Director Naval Forces and Maritime Security
Seventh plenary Session 73
74 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
IISS Shangri-La CHAPTER
Dialogue 12
19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022
The Southeast Asian
Young Leaders’
Programme
The Southeast Asian Young
Leaders’ Programme
The first roundtable
at the fifth Southeast
Asian Young Leaders’
Programme
The fifth Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme
(SEAYLP) returned with its strongest cohort yet of aca-
demics, analysts, politicians, officials and journalists. The
27 delegates hailed from all ten ASEAN member states.
Ten additional delegates from the Australia, China, India,
Japan, Norway, the UK and the US joined the programme
as guests; and for the first time, SEAYLP featured represen-
tation from four island nations: Fiji, Papua New Guinea,
the Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste. In line with the pro-
gramme’s longstanding commitment to gender diversity,
20 of the 41 young leaders were women. SEAYLP 2022
was funded by the Australian government, the Special
Competitive Studies Project, Google Asia-Pacific and the
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
ROUNDTABLES ON REGIONAL SECURITY
The Southeast Asian Young Leaders Programme
began on the morning of Friday, 10 June with an intro-
duction to the Shangri-La Dialogue given by Dr John
76 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive.
He discussed how the SLD came about and what the
IISS has hoped to achieve in convening the Dialogue
over the past 20 years, later taking questions from
young leaders on these issues.
Over the next several hours, as the common areas
in the hotel began to hum with anticipation of the first
Dialogue since 2019, the young leaders participated
in three roundtable discussions on regional security
issues. IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for
Asia-Pacific Security and Co-Editor of the Asia-Pacific
Regional Security Assessment, Dr Lynn Kuok, mod-
erated the first discussion on the South China Sea
(SCS) disputes. Panellists from Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines and Vietnam each spoke about their
respective countries’ approaches to Chinese SCS
expansion, emphasising their political and economic
security imperatives.
Captain Dianne Despi noted that the Philippines
has sought to diversify its partnerships and pursue

more consistent naval modernisation. Vietnam’s Dr
Phan Hao Duy raised the possibility of ASEAN states
coming to a common legal position on issues of agree-
ment. Thomas Benjamin Daniel explained how
Malaysia has compartmentalised the SCS dispute from
the rest of its relations with China out of necessity. Dr
Evan Laksmana argued that Indonesia has failed to
respond to Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea as a
non-claimant state without a framework for integrating
responses across its institutions. In the open discus-
sion that followed, delegates focused on questions of
international law, the role of maritime-domain aware-
ness, and the possibility of settling disputes amongst
ASEAN member states before negotiating with China.
The second SEAYLP roundtable discussion, mod-
erated by IISS Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian
Politics and Foreign Policy Aaron Connelly, focused
on challenges to ASEAN centrality. Pich Charadine
of Cambodia outlined the political, strategic and
economic goals of ASEAN. She also raised its non-
interference dilemma and whether it can remain
relevant amidst the new regional frameworks which
do not have ASEAN at their centre, like the Quad and
the Belt and Road Initiative.
Julio Amador III of the Philippines argued that
ASEAN has not lived up to its claims to centrality, sug-
gesting that member states review the ASEAN Charter.
If the grouping does not strengthen its institutions,
The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme
A SEAYLP discussion
moderated by IISS
Shangri-La Dialogue
Senior Fellow for
Asia-Pacific Security
and Co-Editor of the
Asia-Pacific Regional
Security Assessment,
Dr Lynn Kuok
he argued, other institutions would fill the strategic
vacuum left by its shortcomings. Fuadi Pitsuwan of
Thailand defended the relevance of ASEAN central-
ity in today’s geopolitical environment and discussed
internal and external challenges. He proposed that
ASEAN nations show more ambition rather than
accepting middle-power status. Interventions from the
floor focused on the challenges of the South China Sea,
Myanmar, and great-power rivalry.
A final panel, moderated by IISS Research Fellow
for Security and Technology Yuka Koshino, consid-
ered the role of governments, businesses and other
stakeholders in managing technological competi-
tion and security standards for regional prosperity,
highlighting Southeast Asian, American and Chinese
perspectives. Tiana Desker of Singapore outlined the
perspective of small states in using existing multilat-
eral platforms to strengthen norms and national-level
governance to build norms where they do not yet exist
and noted the key role of great powers in arms control
and strategic stability.
Brandon McKee of the United States discussed tech-
nological competition in terms of ideological rivalry
between the US and China. Dr Yu Jie of China framed
technological competition in terms of opposing narra-
tives on international standards-setting and encouraged
countries to come together harmoniously. She pointed
out China’s own challenges in grappling with new
77
Tiana Desker, Director
(Strategic Futures
and Emerging
Technology), Ministry
of Defence, Singapore
technologies and the impact of China’s domestic policy
on its foreign economic and technological policy.
Ryan Rahardjo of Indonesia offered a private-
sector perspective, explaining Google’s approach of
‘responsible development’ to artificial intelligence,
including principles of social benefit, risk manage-
ment, elimination of bias, privacy and company
redlines. In the discussion that followed, delegates
focused on the question of whether Southeast Asian
states needed to make a choice between American and
Chinese technology, or if they could hedge by taking
advantage of the competition between the two.
PARTICIPATION IN PLENARY
AND SPECIAL SESSIONS
SEAYLP delegates asked some of the most impor-
tant questions fielded in the SLD plenary sessions.
Bich Tran of Vietnam asked Vietnamese Minister of
National Defence Phan Van Giang how Vietnam plans
to diversify its defence supply chain given an increas-
ing recognition amid the Ukraine war that it has relied
too heavily on Russia. She also asked Chinese Minister
of National Defense Wei Fenghe whether the People’s
Republic would commit to respecting the territorial
integrity of neighbours like Vietnam, noting that it did
not do so in the past. Chansambath Bong of Cambodia
asked Cambodian Minister of National Defence Tea
Banh about the purpose of the Royal Cambodian
78 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Armed Forces’ new missile corps, a development which
otherwise might have passed notice in the discourse.
SEAYLP delegates made important contributions to
the discussions during special sessions on the afternoon
of Saturday, 11 June. In the special session on climate
change and green defence, Pia Ranada of the Philippines
asked how the defence sector could prepare for an increas-
ing number of climate refugees. In the special session on
Myanmar, Pongkwan Sawasdipakdi asked panellists to
address the ‘elephant in the room’ – the close relationship
between the Royal Thai Army and the Myanmar armed
forces – and whether Thailand could be doing more to
persuade the Myanmar’s junta to end the crisis.
SEAYLP delegates from guest countries made
their presence known as well. Darshana Baruah of
India raised Franco-Australian tensions with French
Minister of the Armed Forces Sébastian Lecornu. In
the final plenary featuring Fijian Minister of Defence
Inia Seruiratu, Baruah noted the difference in pri-
orities between small island states focused on climate
change and great powers focused on geopolitics. She
also raised the increased presence of the Chinese
navy in the Indian Ocean in the special session on
maritime security. Natalie Sambhi of Australia asked
Indonesian Minister of Defence Prabowo Subianto
about the AUKUS partnership in light of his com-
ments about an ‘Asian Way’ of security; while Daisuke
Kawai of Japan asked Japanese Minister of Defense

Kishi Nobuo about changes to Japanese defence policy
under the new Kishida government.
ENGAGEMENTS WITH SENIOR
DEFENCE LEADERS
Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme delegates
also had the opportunity for exclusive engagements
with senior defence leaders over meals during the
Dialogue. Australian Deputy Prime Minister and
Defence Minister Richard Marles, on his first day
abroad since being sworn in three weeks earlier, joined
the delegates for lunch on Friday, 10 June, where
he spoke about the new Australian government’s
approach to the region. In the candid yet thoughtful
exchange that followed, Marles answered questions
about the Quad, the crisis in Myanmar, Australia–
Indonesia relations and Australia’s ‘redlines’ in its
relationship with China.
Lunch with Vivian Balakrishnan, Singapore’s Foreign Affairs Minister
The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme
The final roundtable
moderated by IISS
Research Fellow for
Security and Technology
Yuka Koshino
Delegates also enjoyed off-the-record discussions
with Admiral John Aquilino, the Commander of US
Indo-Pacific Command, over breakfast on the morn-
ing of Saturday, 11 June and with Singapore’s Foreign
Affairs Minister Vivian Balakrishnan over lunch on
the afternoon of Sunday, 12 June. Despite coming at
the end of a full three days of activities, interest in the
discussion with Minister Balakrishnan was high, with
nearly all delegates raising their hands when the floor
was opened to questions.
SOCIAL ENGAGEMENTS AND
NETWORKING OPPORTUNITIES
After a full day of discussions on weighty issues, on the
evening of Saturday, 11 June, SEAYLP delegates visited
the residence of the Australian High Commissioner to
Singapore, Will Hodgman, for dinner and an oppor-
tunity to carry on the day’s discussions in an informal
79
Vivian Balakrishnan,
Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Singapore
setting. Briefly interrupting the festivities, the then-
secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, Kathryn Campbell, congratu-
lated the delegates on their selection and noted that
she was particularly pleased, as a retired brigadier in
the Australian Army, to see so many young women
among them.
The bonhomie continued the following after-
noon when the delegates travelled to the residence
80 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
of the Royal Norwegian Ambassador to Singapore,
Eivind Homme, for a closing reception following the
conclusion of the Dialogue. Over the course of a beau-
tiful afternoon, the young leaders enjoyed Norwegian
food, drinks and hospitality as well as each other’s
company before beginning their journeys home—
taking with them new relationships from across the
region, and new ideas for collaboration on issues of
common concern.
IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue APPENDICES
19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

I. Selected digital
engagement and media
coverage of the 2022
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
II. Selected IISS publications
APPENDIX I
Selected digital engagement
and media coverage of the 2022
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Special Address from
Ukraine’s President,
Volodymyr Zelenskyy
The 19th Shangri-La Dialogue returned to a global audi-
ence following a two-year hiatus. Convened by the IISS,
the world’s media and key opinion formers on security
issues in the Asia-Pacific region gathered at the Dialogue in
Singapore. Together, they led the news and drove key con-
versations online, communicating to their readers, viewers
and followers the complexities, subtleties and advantages
that in-person diplomacy can provide to an increasingly
insecure region.
Digital engagement highlights
The SLD was much talked about online. Speeches and
coverage from the plenary and special sessions – and all
the events which have happened behind the scenes in
Singapore – generated over 22,000 unique mentions on
social media over the weekend the event was held. These
social conversations reached nearly one billion people,
with most of the online dialogue happening in the US,
Australia, Japan and the rest of Asia. Plenary speakers and
delegates tweeted and retweeted SLD-related content.
82 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
We leveraged our IISS YouTube channel to ensure global
audiences could watch the plenary sessions live online. In
addition, the plenary recordings have so far generated over
100,000 views. Our YouTube playlists also include expert
opinions to engage our audiences with prime IISS analysis
preceding the Shangri-La Dialogue as well as after day one
in Singapore. The most viewed videos include:
• ‘IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2022: Managing
Geopolitical Competition in a Multipolar
Region’ (nearly 50,000 views)
• ‘IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2022: China’s vision
for regional order’ (almost 24,000 views)
• ‘Special Address from Volodymyr Zelenskyy,
President, Ukraine’ (over 13,000 views)
The IISS website is a key communication channel and pro-
vided information such as speaker agendas and content
related to themes and topics of the Shangri-La Dialogue
2022. It also offers customised landing pages for both the
special sessions and the Southeast Asian Young Leaders’
Programme. Throughout the event, the website was

updated with live streams and additional information.
Transcript downloads and recordings were added on a
rolling basis and promoted via our social media channels.
The bespoke web pages were viewed over 60,000 times
during the week of SLD 2022.
The IISS website also included a link to our IISS Flickr
account with highlights from the event.
Flickr Images were updated on a rolling basis and
used by regional and international media outlets such as
Nikkei Asia.
Our social media and website activities were com-
plemented by a special pre-event podcast episode ‘It’s
Back: IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2022’, which has been
downloaded over 2,000 times globally. Guest host James
Crabtree, IISS–Asia Executive Director, was joined by col-
leagues Meia Nouwens, Senior Fellow for Chinese Defence
Policy and Military Modernisation; and Aaron Connelly,
Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian Politics and Foreign
Policy, to discuss themes and topics of the upcoming event.
• The focus of the episode’s discussion includes:
• US–China relations
• Southeast Asia and regional security
• The impact of the war in Ukraine
• Europe and the Indo-Pacific
IISS blog posts published before SLD 2022 highlighted
themes and topics of the event, and they have been viewed
over 3,000 times across regions. Some of the more popular
posts include:
US–China tensions to centre stage at the IISS
Shangri-La Dialogue 2022 by James Crabtree
Delegates are gathering in Singapore to attend the
region’s premier defence summit, which will serve as a rare
IISS Flickr account
opportunity for the United States and China to discuss a
long list of disagreements and topics of common concern.
Divisions in the Indo-Pacific over Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine by Samir Puri
Indo-Pacific governments reacted to the Russian inva-
sion of Ukraine in three ways – quickly offering opposition,
ambivalence or support – and have held fast to these posi-
tions as the war has evolved. This issue will be central to
the debates held at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, beginning
10 June, about how the Ukraine war will affect regional eco-
nomic relations and security and defence affairs.
The Ukraine war and the new meaning of security
guarantees for the Indo-Pacific by John Raine
The 2022 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue will convene on 10
June against the backdrop of a war in Europe. The conse-
quences of the war for Euro-Atlantic security have been
profound, but how – if at all – will they affect the security
architecture of the Indo-Pacific?
Media coverage highlights
The International Institute for Strategic Studies wel-
comed over 200 members of the media to the Shangri-La
Dialogue this year, representing 60 news organisations
from across the world. Their coverage appeared in Asian,
North American and European publications, reaching
hundreds of millions here in this region and the world.
Bloomberg, the Financial Times, BBC, CNBC, CNN,
NHK, Channel News Asia, Associated Press, Reuters and
many more have reacquainted the world with this vital
process of defence diplomacy. What follows is a selection
of key news articles and opinion pieces relating to events
at the Dialogue:
Selected press coverage 83
Washington Post
11 June 2022
Opinion: Zelensky calls for
international support for
Taiwan before China attacks
SINGAPORE — While appealing to Asian nations for sup-
port to fend off Russia’s invasion on Saturday, Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky said the international com-
munity should help Taiwan resist China’s aggression now,
before Beijing attacks the island democracy it claims as its
own province.
The comments risk upsetting Ukraine’s delicate balanc-
ing act with China; nevertheless, Zelensky insisted that
aggressors must be confronted wherever they emerge.
Asian countries must not wait for the crisis to act on
Taiwan’s behalf, which would be repeating the mistake
Europe made before Russian President Vladimir Putin’s
attack on Ukraine.
Zelensky’s remarks followed a video address he made to
the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual conference of Asian and
Pacific defense and diplomatic officials organized by the
London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Zelensky told the assembled dignitaries that the Ukraine
crisis was an urgent issue not just for Europe, but for Asia
as well. He warned countries sitting on the sidelines they
would soon face food, energy and economic crises unless
Putin was quickly defeated.
Following his prepared remarks, I asked Zelensky what
advice he had regarding Taiwan, which is facing a similar
(although not yet violent) campaign of economic and mili-
tary coercion from its neighbor, China. He responded that
Ukraine provides a lesson for the international community:
that it should come to the aid of countries facing aggression
before war breaks out.
“No one benefits from [war], apart from certain politi-
cal leaders who are not content with the present level of
their ambitions. Therefore, they keep growing their appe-
tites, their ambitions,” Zelensky said, without mentioning
Chinese President Xi Jinping by name. “The world enables
these leaders to grow their appetites for now, therefore we
need a diplomatic resolution to support countries that are
in need of help.”
The Ukraine example shows that once violence breaks
out, the human costs are staggering, Zelensky said, so every
effort must be made to find a diplomatic solution to avoid
outright conflict, if possible. But at the same time, he said,
the international community must intervene before ten-
sions spill over into violence to ensure a smaller country can
stand up to an aggressor.
“We must not leave them behind at the mercy of
another country which is more powerful in financial
84 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
terms, in territorial terms and in terms of equipment,”
Zelensky said. “And therefore, if there is a way out diplo-
matically, we need to use the diplomatic way. But it must
be a preemptive way, not the one that comes after the war
has started.”
Zelensky’s remarks represented the most assertive
defense of Taiwan and its right to exist that he or any
member of his government has made to date. Since the
Russian invasion began, the Ukrainian government has
been careful not to run afoul of Beijing, which Ukraine sees
as potentially both a helpful or harmful actor. China has not
condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has parroted
Russia’s propaganda blaming the West. But Beijing has
stopped short of actively supporting the Russian invasion.
The Taiwanese government has been eager to draw simi-
larities between its situation vis-a-vis China and Ukraine’s
suffering at the hands of Russia. But the Chinese govern-
ment angrily rejects any such comparison, claiming that
Taiwan is already part of China and therefore represents an
internal matter not subject to any international scrutiny.
Beijing’s sensitivity over the Taiwan issue was on full
display at the conference, where U.S. Defense Secretary
Lloyd Austin met with China’s minister of national defense,
Gen. Wei Fenghe on Friday. According to a U.S. official,
Austin confronted Wei about China’s increasing intimida-
tion of Taiwan, which threatens to upset a long-standing but
fragile status quo, and rejected China’s contention that the
Taiwan Strait is wholly owned by China.
“We’ve witnessed a steady increase in provocative
and destabilizing military activity near Taiwan. And
that includes PLA [People’s Liberation Army] aircraft
flying near Taiwan in record numbers in recent months
— and on a nearly daily basis,” Austin said in a speech
Saturday. “Maintaining peace and stability across the
Taiwan Strait isn’t just a U.S. interest. It’s a matter of
international concern.”
After Austin’s meeting with Wei, China’s defense min-
istry blamed the United States and “Taiwan independence
forces” for upsetting the status quo. Beijing also claimed
that Wei had told Austin China would not hesitate to start
a war over the issue if necessary and “smash to smither-
eens any Taiwan independence plot.” U.S. sources told
me that Wei never said those things inside his meeting
with Austin.
Despite China’s determined efforts to deny that the
Ukraine and Taiwan situations are linked, several Asian
leaders at the Singapore conference said Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine was a wake-up call for the region in terms of a pos-
sible Chinese attack on Taiwan. As Japanese Prime Minister
Fumio Kishida said while addressing the conference Friday
evening, “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.”
©Washington Post
Reprinted with permission
New York Times
15 June 2022
Opinion: The U.S. Is Losing
Its Military Edge in Asia,
and China Knows It
A Chinese fighter jet veered in front of an Australian mili-
tary surveillance aircraft over international waters in the
South China Sea last month and released metallic debris
that was sucked into the Australian plane’s engines.
No one was reported hurt in the encounter, which
Australia’s defense minister called “very dangerous,” but
it added to a string of recent incidents that demonstrate
China’s growing willingness to test the United States and
its partners in Asia militarily.
China has systematically tracked U.S. warships in the
region, its air force has staged intensifying incursions
into Taiwanese and Japanese airspace, and its coast guard
routinely harasses Philippine, Malaysian and Indonesian
vessels. In recent weeks, Chinese fighter pilots have
repeatedly buzzed Canadian military aircraft on a U.N.-
sanctioned operation — sometimes raising their middle
fingers at the Canadians.
As China’s armed forces grow in strength, sophistication
and confidence, U.S.-led military deterrence in the Indo-
Pacific is losing its bite.
Take the United States’ military presence in the region.
It has about 55,000 military personnel in Japan and 28,000
in South Korea. Several thousand more are deployed across
Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Guam. This posture
has barely changed since the 1950s. But plans to reinvig-
orate the U.S. presence have been stymied by inadequate
budgets, competing priorities and a lack of consensus in
Washington on how to deal with China.
The Pentagon has increased investments in cutting-
edge technologies like artificial intelligence, and cyber- and
space-based systems to prepare for a possible high-tech
conflict with China in the 2030s. But the balance of power
is likely to shift decidedly in China’s favor by the time they
are deployed unless the United States brings new resources
to the table soon.
President Biden this year submitted the largest defense
budget ever in dollar terms, but much of the increase will
be swallowed up by skyrocketing inflation. Mr. Biden, like
former President Donald Trump, is thus falling short of a
target of 3 percent to 5 percent real annual budget growth,
a bipartisan goal set even before the Ukraine war and often
cited as the minimum the Pentagon needs in today’s era of
great-power competition.
While the U.S. military is globally dispersed, China can
concentrate its forces on winning a future conflict in its
own neighborhood. It now has the capability. China has
the world’s largest navy and Asia’s biggest air force and an
imposing arsenal of missiles designed to deter the United
States from projecting military power into the Western
Pacific in a crisis. China’s third and most advanced aircraft
carrier is nearing completion, and other new hardware is
being developed or is already in service.
While much attention is focused on its behavior toward
Taiwan, China is building and militarizing artificial islands
in the South China Sea. It also broke ground on an expanded
naval port in Cambodia last week, which may one day pro-
vide its first military foothold in another Asian country. A
security agreement with the Solomon Islands could lead
to something similar, and Beijing is aggressively courting
other Pacific nations.
America’s military position in Asia, by contrast, has been
hampered by decades of preoccupation with Middle East
conflicts. The war in Ukraine has morphed into a long-term
$54 billion commitment and forced Mr. Biden to delay and
redraft his administration’s National Defense Strategy and
National Security Strategy — critical documents that lay out
global priorities and resource needs — as officials grapple
with how to manage China and Russia at the same time.
Mr. Biden’s team ended the lengthy and costly U.S.
involvement in Afghanistan, but that has not freed up many
resources for the Indo-Pacific. Washington must not lose
sight of the fact that China is a far greater security threat
than Russia, now and in the long term.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said “the Indo-
Pacific is at the heart of American grand strategy” during
a speech last week at the Shangri-La Dialogue defense
summit in Singapore, but he offered little in the way of new
resources or commitments.
To turn things around, the United States must prioritize
the threat from China, reinforce its military strength in Asia
and provide Australia, Japan and India more sophisticated
military and technological capabilities to bolster a strategy
of collective defense.
It should urgently expand the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative, which would direct additional spending toward
strengthening the U.S. military presence west of Hawaii by
distributing forces more widely through the region, improv-
ing logistics and air defenses, and other measures. These are
necessary to reduce exposure of U.S. forces to China’s long-
range missiles and increase the locations from which they
could operate in a crisis. But this initiative has suffered from
insufficient funding and criticism that its top priorities were
not being met.
The United States could also strengthen its military pos-
ture in the region by increasing from five to six the number
of attack submarines home-ported in Guam, expanding
maritime operations in the Pacific and deploying more
advanced fighters, warships, drones and long-range mis-
siles to the region.
Selected press coverage 85
 But all of that may still not be enough. The challenge
posed by China is becoming so great that the United States
can no longer maintain a balance of military power in Asia
by itself.
Washington took a bold first step toward sharing more
of the burden through the AUKUS agreement announced
last year, under which it will work with Britain to supply
Australia with nuclear-powered submarines and codevelop
other advanced military technologies in the interim. But
the submarines won’t enter service until the late 2030s, and
AUKUS’s other collaborative efforts will require difficult
reforms to longstanding U.S. restrictions on sharing sensi-
tive national security technology.
Washington should support Australian and Japanese
aims to build long-range missiles on home soil by shar-
ing intellectual property, provide more U.S. weaponry to
India and beef up foreign military financing in the region,
starting with a dedicated fund to boost Taiwan’s deter-
rence capabilities.
America has long neglected its defense strategy in Asia,
viewing China’s challenge as important but not urgent. The
scenes now playing out in Europe are a stark reminder of
what can happen when deterrence fails.
©New York Times
Reprinted with permission
The Economist
16 June 2022
How America tries to grapple with
China while confronting Russia
Travels with the defence secretary in quest of stronger ties
Ramrod-straight in a crisp green uniform, General Wei
Fenghe, China’s defence minister, saluted the audience
before letting rip. “We require the us side to stop smearing
and containing China. Stop interfering in China’s inter-
nal affairs…If you want confrontation, we will fight to the
end.” His fire was aimed at the lumbering figure of Lloyd
Austin, America’s defence secretary and a former general.
Mr Austin had warned the same gathering that China
was becoming “more coercive and aggressive”—militaris-
ing disputed islets in the South China Sea and provocatively
probing Taiwan’s defences. “We will fly, sail and operate
wherever international law allows,” Mr Austin insisted.
America would continue to sell arms to Taiwan, while
“maintaining our own capacity to resist any use of force or
other forms of coercion”.
The finger-jabbing worried many of those attending the
Shangri-La Dialogue on June 10th-12th, an annual talkfest
of ministers, generals and security experts in Singapore
held by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a
86 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
British think-tank. “I have a strong sense of urgency that
Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,” fretted Kishida
Fumio, Japan’s prime minister. The fact that Generals Wei
and Austin met to discuss “guardrails”—rules for encoun-
ters at sea and in the air, and hotlines—was reassuring. But
it was also evidence of how fast the rivalry is deepening.
Mr Austin regards the Indo-Pacific, from Hawaii to the
Maldives, as “the heart of American grand strategy”. It is
where the country deploys the most forces (see chart 1). But
can America credibly grapple with a rising China while also
striving to repel Russia’s aggression in Ukraine? Yes, avers
Mr Austin. “We are walking and chewing gum. We’re able
to do that because of the strong network of alliances and
partnerships that we have around the globe.” America’s
ability to attract friends is a force multiplier (see chart 2),
and ever more important as the challenges grow.
To travel with Mr Austin to Asia and Europe this month
is to glimpse America’s military might, and how it seeks to
harness the “power of partnerships”. He flew on an e4-b,
“the Doomsday plane” from which American leaders can
wage nuclear war, trailed by a c-17 transporter. Every few
hours it was refuelled in mid-air by a daisy-chain of tanker
aircraft lurking off the coasts of Alaska, Japan, Arabia
and Italy. On the ground Mr Austin met Justin Trudeau,
Canada’s prime minister, at an American-Canadian nuclear
bunker in Colorado; 20-odd ministers in Singapore; the Thai
prime minister in Bangkok; and the defence ministers of 29
NATO allies in Brussels.
Yet not all allies are equal. In Europe America can rely
on NATO, whose members are committed to defending
each other under Article 5 of the Washington treaty. In
Asia China accuses America of trying to recreate NATO—a
contention Mr Austin denies. “We do not seek a new cold
war, an Asian NATO or a region split into hostile blocs,”
he insisted. Rather, America operates with a patchwork of
security accords.
America thinks only China can challenge its global
supremacy. Yet Russia is consuming much of the country’s
attention, and billions of dollars, as America seeks to help
Ukraine and strengthen NATO. Despite Europe’s wealth, says
Eric Edelman, a former senior Pentagon official, “without the
us to organise them, Europeans cannot defend themselves”.
Defence officials justify the priority given to Ukraine
by arguing that, were Russia to succeed in taking land by
force, it would encourage other autocrats to do the same
elsewhere (eg, Taiwan). Many foreign-policy experts think
the war in Ukraine, if it results in a defeat for Russia, would
strengthen the West’s hand against China.
“Ukraine is facing a pivotal moment on the battlefield,”
said Mr Austin, announcing another $1bn in American aid,
including more artillery and longer-range missiles—though
well short of the amounts requested by Ukraine. He has
stopped talking about helping Ukraine “win”. The blurry
aim is something less—giving it “the means to deter and to
defend” itself.
American officials boast that Mr Putin’s war is strength-
ening NATO: Sweden and Finland want to join. Yet all is
not well. Turkey is blocking their accession. And allies are
drifting apart over the endgame in Ukraine.
NATO’s summit in Madrid on June 29th-30th will focus
on the threat from Russia but will keep an eye on Asia. It
will probably be attended by the leaders of Japan, South
Korea and Australia. This is not yet the “league of democra-
cies” that some have dreamed of. But as a Japanese official
puts it: “The message is that security in Europe and Asia
cannot be separated.”
Despite Mr Austin’s denial, many in America see ben-
efits in trying to recreate something like NATO in Asia
(one such body, the eight-member Southeast Asia Treaty
Organisation, was dissolved in 1977). For now, America gets
by with what might be called a “non-treaty organisation”: a
hub-and-spokes system of bilateral defence agreements with
Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand,
which do not have obligations towards each other. Japan,
the weightiest of these, is hamstrung by its tradition of paci-
fism. Taiwan, the most dangerous flashpoint, has no formal
diplomatic relations with most countries, and is excluded
from America’s many regional military exercises. “Strategic
ambiguity” prevents America from saying clearly whether
it would intervene to stop a Chinese invasion.
For want of a more coherent system, America is building
a fast-expanding set of ad hoc projects—a “networked secu-
rity architecture”, as one official puts it. The “Five Eyes”
(with Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand) share
intelligence; AUKUS (with Australia and Britain) is devel-
oping nuclear-powered submarines and other weapons;
and the Quad (with Australia, India and Japan) discusses
everything from vaccines to maritime security.
In Singapore Mr Austin prodded Japan and South Korea
to hold three-way exercises on missile defence, spurred by
North Korea’s missile tests. With Japan and Australia, he
pushed for more complex war-games and co-operation
on defence technology. The result, says Tanvi Madan of
the Brookings Institution, a think-tank in Washington, is
unusual: “It’s not hub-and-spokes. It’s not NATO. It’s a
spider’s web.”
This web may not be strong enough to contain China.
Much depends on Japan. Mr Kishida promised a “substan-
tial” rise in defence spending, though he did not commit
himself to reaching 2% of GDP, NATO’s benchmark. A law
from 2015 provides more leeway to help allies. Japan and
Australia have signed a deal allowing them to station troops
in each other’s countries. A new national-security strategy
later this year may push things further.
India, the world’s largest democracy, is the trophy in
America’s quest for stronger alliances. It is increasingly
at odds with China. Its help in controlling the Strait of
Malacca would be invaluable in any war with China. The
Quad, which has started meeting at the level of leaders,
seeks gradually to draw India in. Yet India is wary of an
alliance, and remains close to Russia, which supplies a lot
of its weapons.
Another prize is ASEAN, the ten-country South-East
Asian club. It includes fence-sitters such as Indonesia. “We
do not believe in alliances that could in the end threaten
other countries,” said Prabowo Subianto, its defence minis-
ter. Indonesia holds drills with America but does not want
to upset a “benevolent” China.
America has pursued softer forms of collaboration, such
as helping Asian governments to police their waters, not
least against Chinese illegal fishing. An American coast-
guard cutter will be deployed to the region. A Quad summit
last month promised to help Indo-Pacific countries improve
“maritime domain awareness” by sharing information
on ships at sea. A Chinese military source was scathing:
“Monitoring fishing vessels means also monitoring military
ships,” he said.
Ashley Townshend, of the Carnegie Endowment,
an American think-tank, argues that America is still not
doing enough in Asia. A mutual-defence treaty between
the closest allies—America, Australia and Japan—could
antagonise South-East Asian countries. Better to create a
joint military command between them, Mr Townshend
argues: instead of a NATO-like treaty in Asia, a small
NATO-like military structure.
The great game in Asia is in full swing. Many in
America are only dimly aware of it. On Mr Austin’s e4-b,
the screens streaming American news channels barely
noticed his globe-spanning defence diplomacy. They were
offering competing views of the Capitol-riot hearings,
guns and more. Which raises a nagging question: does an
America so polarised at home have the will to sustain its
dominance abroad?
©The Economist
Reprinted with permission
Nikkei Asia
11 June 2022
Ukraine spillover dominates
discussion at Singapore
security summit
After 2-year hiatus, Shangri-La Dialogue returns with a bang
SINGAPORE -- Bearing stars and crests on shoulders,
high-ranking military personnel decked in a spectrum of
colors -- green, gray, brown and white -- paced hurriedly
across the hallways of the sprawling Shangri-La Hotel in
Selected press coverage 87
Singapore on Saturday, skillfully navigating cordons and
checks by security personnel.
The last time the Shangri-La Dialogue took place in
person in 2019, the Quad leaders had never held a summit,
and frameworks such as AUKUS -- the new U.S., U.K.
and Australia grouping -- and the Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework -- U.S. President Joe Biden’s attempt to deepen
economic engagement in the region -- did not exist.
Hosted by the U.K.’s International Institute for Strategic
Studies, the dialogue has traditionally been a forum to dis-
cuss regional security issues in the Asia Pacific -- and an
annual platform for U.S. and China to project their views.
But the event took a new turn this year after the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. The single biggest topic on partici-
pants’ minds, whether they were from the East or the West,
was just how the Ukraine war will impact the Indo-Pacific
region. Perhaps the sense of urgency was the reason for all
the fast walking.
On Saturday, over 570 delegates including top defense
officials attended the highlight of the three-day summit:
a virtual appearance by Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelenskyy. From the capital Kyiv, the leader warned of the
spillover effects of the invasion to other regions.
“We must break the ability of Russia, and any other
country in the world, to block seas and destroy the freedom
of navigation,” Zelenskyy said in the special address.
He explained that Russia’s control of the Black and
Azov seas has blocked the ability of Ukraine, dubbed “the
breadbasket of Europe,” to export wheat supplies, and thus
contributed to a global food shortage.
Russia must know that its “belligerent policies will have
consequences for itself,” Zelenskyy said.
“If there are no such consequences ... and we are unable
to export our foodstuffs ... the world will face an acute and
severe food crisis and famine in many countries of Asia and
Africa.” He added that the war is “not only about Europe,”
but affecting everyone, “globally.”
Zelenskyy’s dire comments likely won the sympathy
of most participants. But when it comes to Russia’s inva-
sion itself, countries in the Indo-Pacific have been divided
in their responses. U.S. allies such as Japan were quick to
support various sanctions. Voices from Southeast Asian
countries, however, have been a mixed bag.
Singapore imposed its own economic sanctions on
Russia, the only country among the 10-member Association
of Southeast Asian Nations to go in tandem with the West.
Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines have condemned the
attack on Ukraine without naming Russia as the aggressor.
Vietnam opposed an April United Nations motion to boot
Russia from the Human Rights Council.
On Saturday, many regional defense chiefs touched on
the Ukraine war but some treaded carefully. Indonesia’s
Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto said the “situation in
88 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Ukraine” has shown the Southeast Asia country cannot
take its “security and independence for granted” -- without
mentioning Russia by name.
For the U.S. and China, the two heavyweights at the
dialogue, the focus was Taiwan. U.S. Secretary of Defense
Lloyd Austin said in his speech Saturday morning that the
U.S. policy on Taiwan has not changed. “Unfortunately, that
doesn’t seem to be true for the PRC,” he said, referring to
the People’s Republic of China. Austin pointed to Chinese
aircraft flying near Taiwan in record numbers.
China, for its part, attended with a huge delegation.
The Global Times, the hawkish tabloid under the auspices
of the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship newspaper the
People’s Daily, noted that the participation in the dialogue
reflected China’s confidence.
“China’s choice to send its top defense official this year
at this sensitive time shows China’s confidence and strategic
focus, as well as China’s strategic sincerity of pushing the
Asia-Pacific to integration and cooperation standing at the
crossroads,” the paper quoted Yang Xiyu, a senior research
fellow at the China Institute of International Studies, as saying.
The paper also noted that China’s message to the dia-
logue was that there are several “red lines” that the U.S.
should not cross. “It is important to note that the risks in
the Asia-Pacific region have reached a point where they
must be managed. But this can never be achieved by forcing
China to give up its core interests,” such as Taiwan, it said
in an editorial Saturday.
Security was tight at the gathering, the first in person
meeting after a two-year hiatus due to COVID-19. Outside
the hotel, steel barricades that could be raised or lowered to
manage vehicles were set up.
The hotel is a 10-minute walk up a hill from the Orchard
Road, which is a popular shopping street for tourists. It was
also the venue for the meeting between Chinese President
Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou in 2015.
Analysts and defense officials actively exchanged views
over breakfast and lunch at the hotel restaurant just out-
side the main hall. Topics included whether Xi would
order an invasion of Taiwan, what China’s takeaways from
the Ukraine war were, and just how deep China-Russia
relations are.
On Sunday, the closing day of the dialogue, Chinese
Defense Minister Wei Fenghe will deliver an address. In his
meeting with Austin on Friday, Wei said “if anyone dares to
split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military will not hesitate
to fight, and will resolutely crush any ‘Taiwan independence’
attempts to firmly safeguard national sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity at any cost,” according to the Global Times.
All eyes will be on whether he uses similar vocabulary in
his public speech.
©Nikkei Asia
Reprinted with permission
CGTN
9 June 2022
Opinion: Shangri-La Dialogue
sets up battle of competing
security visions for Asia-Pacific
The growing geopolitical rivalry between China and the
U.S. and their competing and diametrically opposite
visions for regional security in the Asia-Pacific will be at the
center stage over the next few days as Singapore hosts the
Shangri-La Dialogue on June 10-12.
The 19th edition of Asia’s high-profile defense and security
conference is returning this year as “a fully in-person event,”
after a two-year hiatus due to the COVID-19 pandemic, at a
time when the world is facing enormous security challenges.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has thrown Europe at the
center of its biggest military crisis since World War II, with its
impact felt globally, and also ending the notion that Europe
was somehow insulated from such turmoil. Meanwhile,
sporadic political and civil unrests have persisted in Africa
and South Asia while regional conflicts continue to simmer
in the Middle East.
In this backdrop, in a world gripped with many turbu-
lence, the Asia-Pacific is one region that has successfully
maintained peace and stability, despite, as one must add,
constant provocations from certain global powers that
pursue a single-minded agenda – containment of China’s
rise and growing influence in the region that they describe
as the Indo-Pacific. The rising tensions between China and
the U.S. have had many worried about this relative har-
mony in the long run.
The three-day conference, focused on maintaining peace
and security in the Asia-Pacific, will be attended by defense
ministers, military chiefs, and top-ranking military officials
from more than 40 countries across Asia, Australia, North
America, and Europe.
Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio will be deliv-
ering the keynote address on the inaugural day, which is
expected to offer an important statement on Tokyo’s chang-
ing strategic outlook, the regional repercussions of the
Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the best way to manage the
Asia-Pacific’s many pressing security challenges.
However, amid heightened interest in the China-U.S.
dynamics, all eyes this year will be on the two high-volt-
age speeches by the U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin
on June 11 and China’s State Councilor and Minister of
National Defense Wei Fenghe on June 12, in which they are
each expected to outline their nation’s respective visions for
the security of the Asia-Pacific region.
While Washington’s confrontationist Indo-Pacific strat-
egy has become the cornerstone of its security framework
in the region, China’s recently unveiled Global Security
Initiative offers a peek into Beijing’s security vision rooted
in win-win cooperation and dialogue.
In recent weeks, the U.S. has taken several measures to
signal that Washington’s long-term foreign policy goals are
focused on Asia, despite other geopolitical distractions. U.S.
President Joe Biden’s summit with Southeast Asian leaders
at the White House followed by a visit to South Korea and
Japan – his first presidential trip to Asia – last month could
be seen in this light.
Soon after, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a
vociferous speech laid out the administration’s “anti-China”
strategy, accusing Beijing of posing “the most serious long-
term challenge to the international order.”
While in Tokyo, Biden participated in the summit meeting
of Quad, or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – an informal
grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. – that is
widely viewed as a bloc aimed at containing China’s power.
Beijing sees Quad as a ploy to create an “Asian NATO” and
has described the bloc as a “small clique” that is “bent on pro-
voking confrontation.” China has also criticized Quad’s divisive
diplomacy suggesting it represents a “Cold War mentality.”
In Tokyo, Biden also launched an economic initiative
called the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in
partnership with a dozen other countries from the region
including South Korea, Japan, India, and Indonesia, but
predictably excludes China. Analysts say IPEF is Biden’s
bid to reconstruct the global supply chain without China.
All this is part of Washington’s larger Indo-Pacific strat-
egy that is hinged at creating exclusive strategic geopolitical
and geoeconomic alliances with an unsaid objective of
curbing China’s rise and influence in the region while per-
petuating the hegemonic interests of the U.S. and its allies.
It is important to note that the U.S. has also formed a mil-
itary alliance with Australia and the UK, dubbed AUKUS,
as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy.
Seen in conjunction with all the related developments,
this is certainly not the best way of promoting peace and
security in the region. Exclusive military alliances, by
definition and tacit understanding, target a third party, trig-
gering needless rivalry and an arms race that could lead to
confrontation and even conflict.
In contrast to the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy that reeks
of archaic Cold War mentality, China’s Global Security
Initiative (GSI) derives its inspiration from ancient Chinese
wisdom for solving security challenges facing humanity. It
has been conceived as an initiative for the public good as
part of China’s long-stated vision of building a “community
with a shared future for mankind”
The GSI outlines six commitments: to the vision of
common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable secu-
rity; to respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
all countries; to abiding by the purposes and principles of
the UN Charter; to taking the legitimate security concerns
Selected press coverage 89
of all countries seriously; to peacefully resolving differences
and disputes between countries through dialogue and con-
sultation; and to maintaining security in both traditional
and non-traditional domains.
The initiative also upholds true multilateralism as it is
inclusive and open to the world, welcoming the participa-
tion of all countries. The GSI has the potential to shape an
international order based on mutual respect, equality, and
mutual trust.
In many ways, the GSI could be seen as an extension,
from a security perspective, of China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) which is focused on greater global connectiv-
ity and guided by the principles of extensive consultation,
joint contribution, and shared benefits.
On the economic collaboration front, China is already
part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP), the world’s largest free trade agreement which
includes the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and
South Korea. India, which took part in the initial negotia-
tions but later decided to opt out, still has the invitation to
join the bloc at any time.
China has also applied to join the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
which currently has 11 Pacific Rim countries as its members.
The U.S. was a signatory to CPTPP’s predecessor the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) but former President Donald Trump
pulled out of the pact within days of taking office in 2017.
China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner for 13
consecutive years since 2009, while the Southeast Asian
nations’ bloc became China’s largest trading partner in 2020
and has remained so ever since.
It is clear that China is well-entrenched as a reliable eco-
nomic and security partner in the Asia-Pacific while the
recent U.S. policies are likely to foment trouble and security
challenges in the region. Between the two competing visions
for maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific, the
choice couldn’t be more obvious.
©CGTN
Reprinted with permission
Bloomberg
14 June 2022
Australia PM Plays Down China
Reset After Diplomatic Meeting
Albanese calls for Beijing to lift trade sanctions on imports.
Australia’s deputy PM met with Chinese minister in Singapore
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has down-
played the possibility of a reset in relations with the
Chinese government after a high-profile meeting between
90 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
the two countries on Sunday, saying Beijing must first lift
sanctions on a wide-range of Australian exports.
Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles met with
China’s Defence Minister Wei Fenghe in Singapore,
where both were attending the annual IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue. It was the first public meeting between
Australian and Chinese government officials in more
than two years, following a diplomatic freeze amid rap-
idly deteriorating relations.
Marles said the meeting had been a “very frank and full
exchange” but also a “critical first step” in restoring rela-
tions with Beijing.
At a press conference in Brisbane on Tuesday, Albanese
said it was “always a good thing that people have dialogue
and have discussions,” something which he said had been
“missing” under the previous Australian government.
But the new Australian leader, who was sworn into office
after winning an election on May 21, said any further warm-
ing of relations with the Chinese government would depend
on whether or not they agreed to remove trade sanctions
and barriers on Australian exports.
Following a call by then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison
in April 2020 for an international investigation into the ori-
gins of Covid-19, Australian exports including timber, coal,
meat and wine began to face difficulties entering Chinese
ports, including tariffs and long customs delays.
“They need to remove those sanctions in order to
improve relations between Australia and China,” said
Albanese. “It is China that have imposed sanctions, it is
China that has changed, and it’s China that needs to remove
those sanctions.”
©Bloomberg
Reprinted with permission
BBC
12 June
Climate change a bigger threat
than war, Fiji tells security summit
Fiji has told an Asian security summit that climate change
is a bigger threat to the Pacific than military tensions.
”Machine guns, fighter jets... are not our primary security
concern. The single greatest threat to our very existence is
climate change,” Fiji Defence Minister Inia Seruiratu said.
He was addressing a summit in Singapore which has
focused on China-US tensions and the Ukraine war.
Cyclones have repeatedly battered Fiji and other low-
lying Pacific countries.
“It threatens our very hopes and dreams of prosperity.
Human-induced, devastating climate change,” Mr Seruiratu
told the forum, called the Shangri-La Dialogue.
 Floods in Fiji caused by tropic cyclones have displaced thou-
sands of people in recent years and wrought economic havoc.
Pacific states have urged advanced industrialised nations
to do more to combat climate change.
”Waves are crashing at our doorsteps, winds are batter-
ing our homes, we are being assaulted by this enemy from
many angles,” Mr Seruiratu told delegates.
The world is now about 1.2C warmer than it was in the
19th Century - the result of humans burning fossil fuels, which
release greenhouse gases, mostly carbon dioxide (CO2).
But much attention has focused on China’s growing
challenge to Western strategic interests in the Asia-
Pacific region.
In April China signed a security pact with the Solomon
Islands, causing concern in Australia, New Zealand and
the US. The details of it were not disclosed. Besides the
Solomons, Pacific island nations have not so far reached
consensus on China’s proposal for a new regional trade and
security pact.
©BBC
Reprinted with permission
Asahi Shimbun
11 June 2022
Kishida blasts changing status
quo through use of military force
SINGAPORE--Prime Minister Fumio Kishida pledged
in a keynote speech to bolster Japan’s defense spending
due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, saying he feared a
similar scenario could easily flare in East Asia in the not-
too-distant future.
Kishida delivered his address June 10 to open the Asia
Security Summit, also known as the Shangri-La Dialogue,
organized by Britain’s International Institute for Strategic
Studies and supported by The Asahi Shimbun among other
international organizations.
Shinzo Abe in 2014 was the last Japanese prime minister
to attend the conference.
While Kishida never outright named Russia and China as
the targets of his criticism, he touched upon the Feb. 24 inva-
sion of Ukraine as well as military advances in the East China
and South China seas as “attempts to unilaterally change the
status quo through force and ignoring international law.”
Turning to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program
and recent salvo of ballistic missile launches, he labeled the
reclusive country as a “clear and serious threat” to the inter-
national community.
Kishida said the world was at a crossroads of having to
choose between protecting a rules-based international order
or returning to a world of survival of the fittest in which
forceful changing of the status quo becomes the norm.
He laid out his vision for peace consisting of five main
pillars: maintaining and strengthening a free and open
international order based on rules; strengthening national
security; working toward a world without nuclear weap-
ons; strengthening the functioning of the United Nations;
and strengthening international cooperation in such areas
as economic security.
Kishida said Japan would strengthen its ties with ASEAN
to help bring about a free and open Indo-Pacific region, call-
ing it a major goal of Japanese diplomacy. He added that he
would release a plan by spring 2023 that he hopes would
provide specifics for achieving that goal.
He also pledged about $2 billion (269 billion yen) over
a three-year period to nations in the Indo-Pacific region to
strengthen their Coast Guard activities.
Saying he harbored a strong sense of crisis that “Ukraine
might represent the East Asia of tomorrow,” Kishida
pledged to dramatically bolster defense spending over the
next five years to shore up Japan’s defense capabilities.
Kishida added that Japan would strengthen the deter-
rence and response capability of the alliance with the
United States as well as promote security cooperation with
allies such as Australia.
Excerpts from Kishida’s speech:
“Since the pandemic broke out, the world has become
even more uncertain. Amidst continuing economic disrup-
tion, we have come to recognize the importance of reliable
and secure supply chains.
“Then, as the world was still recovering from the pan-
demic, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine occurred. No
country or region in the world can shrug this off as ‘some-
one else’s problem.’
“It is a situation that shakes the very foundations of the
international order, which every country and individual
gathered here today should regard as their own affair.
“Can the rules-based international order we have built
through hard work, dialogue, and consensus be upheld
and the march of peace and prosperity continue? Or will
we return to a lawless world where rules are ignored and
broken, where unilateral changes to the status quo by force
are unchallenged and accepted, and where the strong coerce
the weak militarily or economically? That is the choice we
have to make today.
“Rules must be respected. Even if they become incon-
venient, one cannot be allowed to act as if they did not exist,
nor can one be allowed to unilaterally change them. If one
wants to change them, a new consensus must be made.
“The ramifications of Russia’s threat to use nuclear
weapons are not limited to the threat itself. The threat may
have already caused serious damage to the nuclear nonpro-
liferation regime. It may have already made it even more
difficult for countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons
to abandon their plans.
Selected press coverage 91
 “Moves to develop and possess nuclear weapons might launched ballistic missiles, including ICBM-class ones, and we
even spread further to other countries. These are among have grave concerns that yet another nuclear test is imminent.”
the various concerns that have been voiced. Even before ©Asahi Shimbun
the Ukraine crisis, North Korea frequently and repeatedly Reprinted with permission

92 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

APPENDIX II
Selected IISS publications
The Strategic Dossier series harnesses the Institute’s
technical expertise to present detailed information
on key strategic issues. Recent publications include:
IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2022 (London:
IISS, 2022).
IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2021 (London:
IISS, 2021).
IISS, Russia’s Military Modernisation: An Assessment (London:
IISS, 2020).
IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2020 (London:
IISS, 2020).
IISS, ISR & The Gulf: An Assessment (London: IISS, 2019).
IISS, Iran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East (London:
IISS, 2019).
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, the Institute’s
bimonthly journal, is a leading forum for analysis
and debate of international and strategic affairs.
Recent articles of interest include:
Nicolas Lippolis and Harry Verhoeven, ‘Politics by Default:
China and the Global Governance of Afri-can Debt’,
Survival, vol. 64, no. 3, June–July 2022, pp. 153–78.
Pierre Haroche and Martin Quencez, ‘NATO Facing China:
Responses and Adaptations’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 3, June–
July 2022, pp. 73–86.
Sharinee L. Jagtiani and Sophia Wellek, ‘In the Shadow of
Ukraine: India’s Choices and Challenges’, Survival, vol. 64,
no. 3, June–July 2022, pp. 29–48.
David C. Gompert, ‘Four Circles: Comprehending the China
Challenge’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 2, April–May 2022,
pp. 95–110.
Jeongseok Lee, ‘South Korea’s Aircraft Carrier Debate’,
Survival, vol. 64, no. 2, April–May 2022, pp. 35–44.
Samir Puri, ‘Land and Sea: The Evolving Great-power Contest
in Asia’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 1, February–March 2022,
pp. 227–36.
Nien-chung Chang-Liao, ‘Why Have Chinese Diplomats
Become So Aggressive?’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 1, February–
March 2022, pp. 179–90.
Rahul Roy-Chaudhury and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, ‘India
and US FONOPS: Oceans Apart’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 1,
February–March 2022, pp. 131–56.
Barnett R. Rubin, ‘Geography Lessons: American Decline and
the Challenge of Asia’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 1, February–
March 2022, pp. 121–30.
Selected IISS publications 93
Stacie L. Pettyjohn, ‘War With China: Five Scenarios’, Survival,
vol. 64, no. 1, February–March 2022, pp. 57–66.
Robert S. Ross, ‘China Looks at the Korean Peninsula: The
“Two Transitions”’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 6, December
2021–January 2022, pp. 129–58.
‘Forum: Back to North Korea’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 6,
December 2021–January 2022, pp. 101–25.
François Heisbourg, ‘Euro-Atlantic Security and the China
Nexus’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 6, December 2021–January
2022, pp. 45–62.
The Adelphi series is the Institute’s principal
contribution to policy-relevant, original academic
research. Books published since 2021 include:
Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward, Japan’s Effectiveness as a Geo-
Economic Actor: Navigating Great-Power Competition, Adelphi
481–483 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022).
Desmond Ball, Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Tim Huxley, C. Raja
Mohan and Brendan Taylor, Asia’s New Geopolitics: Military
Power and Regional Order, Adelphi 478–480 (Abingdon:
Routledge for the IISS, 2022).
Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle, The Responsibility
to Defend: Rethinking Germany’s Strategic Culture, Adelphi
477 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2021).
Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, French Arms Exports: The Business of
Sovereignty, Adelphi 475–-476 (Abingdon: Routledge for the
IISS, 2020).
Brendan Taylor, Dangerous Decade: Taiwan’s Security and Crisis
Management, Adelphi 470 (Abingdon: Routledge for the
IISS, 2019).
The Military Balance is the Institute’s annual
assessment of military capabilities and defence
economics worldwide. Region-by-region analyses
cover the major military and economic trends
and developments affecting security policy
and the trade in weapons and other military
equipment. Comprehensive tables portray key
data on weapons and defence economics. Defence
expenditure trends over a ten-year period are
also shown.
IISS, The Military Balance 2022 (Abingdon: Routledge for the
IISS, 2022).
The Armed Conflict Survey is the Institute’s annual review
of political, military and humanitarian trends in current
conflicts.
IISS, Armed Conflict Survey 2022 (Abingdon: Routledge for the
IISS, 2022).
94 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
Strategic Comments is the Institute’s online source of
analysis of international security and politico­
military issues. Articles on South, Southeast and
Northeast Asia published in 2021-22 include:
‘The effect of AUKUS on India’s foreign and defence policies’,
IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 28, no. 6, March 2022.
‘China’s 2021 orbital-weapon tests’, IISS Strategic Comments,
vol. 28 no. 3, February 2022.
‘Relations between China and the Arab Gulf States’, IISS
Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 38, December 2021.
‘China and strategic competition in a divided Pacific Islands
region’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 37, December
2021.
‘Rising international support for Taiwan’, IISS Strategic
Comments, vol., 27, no. 35, December 2021.
‘The economic and security implications of China’s activities
in the South China Sea’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 27,
no. 34, November 2021.
‘The arms race on the Korean Peninsula’, vol. 27, no. 30, IISS
Strategic Comments, October 2021.
‘Pakistan’s relations with the US after the fall of Kabul’, IISS
Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 25, September 2021.
‘The fraught relationship between Canada and China’, IISS
Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 26, September 2021.
‘The centenary of the Chinese Communist Party’, IISS Strategic
Comments, vol. 27, no. 20, August 2021.
‘China’s place on the NATO agenda’, IISS Strategic Comments,
vol, 27, no. 17, July 2021
‘Asia’s new generation on pro-democracy protestors’, IISS
Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 15, July 2021.
‘Trans-Tasman tensions over China’, IISS Strategic Comments,
vol. 27, no. 11. May 2021
Strategic Survey is the Institute’s annual review of
strategic developments throughout the world.
Recent sections of interest include:
‘Taiwan: a front line in the new cold war?’, Strategic Survey
2021 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2021).
‘South Korea’s foreign policy: local or global?’, Strategic
Survey 2021 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2021).
‘India-China border tensions: what are the strategic impli-
cations for the Indo-Pacific?’, Strategic Survey 2021
(Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2021).
‘The Biden Administration’s South Asia Policy: Change or
continuity?’, Strategic Survey 2021 (Abingdon: Routledge
for the IISS, 2021).
Selected press coverage 95
96 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
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Since the inception of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in 2002, this unique experiment in multilateral
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diplomacy and peace instead of conflict and confrontation.’
Major-General (Retd) Delfin Lorenzana, former secretary of national defense, the Philippines

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