Introduction

Yakubu Gowon was a Nigerian general and statesman, head of state. He seized power in 1966,

ousting the leader of an earlier military coup. Following the Biafran civil war he maintained a

policy of ‘no victor, no vanquished’ that helped to reconcile the warring factions. Yakubu

Gowon was the youngest individual to become head of state at the age of 31, assumed office

after the assassination of Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi during the July 1966 counter-coup. In later years

he himself was removed in a military coup in 1975.

The 3R’s was Introduced by the then General Yakubu Gowon after the civil war which had

engulfed the country in which many life and properties were lost. The civil war did not occur in

isolation. It was a chain reaction to what happened in the past. For instance, it is said that the

January 1966 coup was believed to have been inspired by Igbo young officers who took

advantage of the political situation in the country. They wanted to dominate the economic,

political and cultural landscape.

However, the Nigerian Civil War (6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970), also known as the Nigerian–

Biafran War or the Biafran War, was a civil war fought between Nigeria and the Republic of

Biafra, a secessionist state which had declared its independence from Nigeria in 1967.

After the war, Gowon said, "The tragic chapter of violence is just ended. We are at the dawn of

national reconciliation. Once again we have an opportunity to build a new nation. My dear

compatriots, we must pay homage to the fallen, to the heroes who have made the supreme

sacrifice that we may be able to build a nation, great in justice, fair trade, and industry. Which

brings us to the 3R’s Introduced.

The 3R’s of Yakubu Gowon

Decades after the end of the Nigerian civil war which pitched the Igbos against the combined

forces of other ethnic nationalities in the country, it would seem that the sentiments that brewed

and made the war inevitable is yet to be laid to rest. At the end of the war, the war head of state

Yakubu Gowon publicly affirmed the imperative for a strong and indivisible Nigerian state and

tried to calm frayed (Biafran) nerves that they will not be visited with repercussions of war as a

‘defeated’ people. The global applause that greeted this rather benevolent and patriotic

pronouncement had barely ended when Gowon linked the olive branch to the philosophy of ‘no

victor, no vanquished’ which he capped with an innovative plan of action anchored on the need

for ‘reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction30 known in the Nigerian parlance as the

three Rs. Many reasoned that the plausible philosophy of ‘no victor, no vanquished’ ably

supported by the policy of triple Rs would in no time heal the wounds of the 30 months civil war.

In addition to the 3Rs, the state announced a nine-point programme “to guarantee peace, stability

and progress in the country”. The nine-point programs were:

(i) reorganization of the armed forces;

(ii) the implementation of the National Development Plan and repair of the damage and

neglect of war;

(iii) the eradication of corruption;

(iv) the settlement of the question of the creation of more states;

(v) the preparation of a new constitution;

(vi) introduction of a new revenue allocation formula;

(vii) conducting a national population census;

(viii) the organization of genuinely national political parties; and

(ix) the organization of elections and installation of popularly elected governments in the states

and the centre.

The 3R’s project aimed to house internally displaced persons, shelter the homeless, feed the

hungry, re-absorb public servants and effect genuine national reconciliation. The Federal

Ministry of Finance produced a document containing the directive principles of a post-war

rehabilitation and reconstruction program in Nigeria. Among other items, it listed the following

as its guiding tenets:

1. The surviving victims of past disturbances and present military operations shall be cared for

with utmost compassion.

2. All soldiers, no matter on which side they had fought shall be rehabilitated and faithfully

employed at the end of military operations. It must be noted that one good thing about the

present emergency is that it has helped to reduce unemployment throughout the country. It would

be a mistaken policy of the worst kind to allow federal troops and rebel soldiers to go

unemployed.

3. Those whose property has been destroyed or damaged as a result of civil disturbances shall be

reasonably compensated.

4. All those who had fled from their normal places of residence or business shall be resettled and,

if possible, helped to make a new start.

5. All roads, bridges, and public buildings destroyed shall be reconstructed.

However, the Yakubu Gowon 3R’s failed to addressed most of the issues it claimed to tackled as

series of decrees that ushered in policies which did not accommodate the interest of the Igbo

people, such as unfulfilled reconstruction of the devastated Igbo land, 20 pounds flat refund

policy, indigenization decree, etc. The punitive economic disadvantages appeared to have

persisted years after the civil war. The airports from the Southeast lacked quality infrastructure

despite having very significant Igbo travelers dominating this sector.

Sadly, the enthusiasm and euphoria that followed Gowon’s announcement would seem to have

been misplaced given the wide gap between reintegration and relegation.

My contention here is that the post war Gowonian policy of three R’s was largely misleading

given the precarious and relegated conditions of the Igbo in contemporary Nigeria. The paradox

of re-integration in an environment of abysmal relegation and marginalization underscore the

depth of Igbo devaluation since the end of the war.

Conclusion

The 3Rs, as the programme is called, succeeded until the political elite group upturned the

development plan. This is what brought us to the heightened regime of corruption. After the

surrender General Gowon instituted a policy of “no victor, no vanquished.” Winning the civil

war was the high point of Gowon’s regime. His attempt to enforce his 3R program of

reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation across the country failed. While the idea was

laudable, its implementation was flawed and thus most of Nigeria, regardless of the side they

were on during the recent civil war, lost faith in Gowon and his administration. His promise to
return Nigeria back to civil rule by 1976 was broken and the rapid growth of corruption in his

administration further eroded the country’s confidence in him.