the revision apo). SUPrey trial Court forte, nm tdi By PRINCIPLES. Spo. rds —— theActmace 9) er ang eae recta r Seatoaguimenal be found 8S "sions it “08 in Paore veMatah gre "© Copyrighy f the intey 8, they ma is land, ithe ‘ "8+ , Sale sale could be de,°® Used is given, is either 2810 Section 54 (b,j PUblishe, to give jurisdiction pe COP = The Word ‘94 op - ist in See. faye carot be vena ‘offe re as 0) Theepessn eat Dy which the adverge,8Y WAY of ve trade’ and: Thergresta sq dco nat pera umn snowapaer averse advertiser sayg unis" tO be inferred primary, ‘foe sessing certain books and the wilingness to sell. can be said hee Y°UF orders withthe manent advertisementitse. In aon ifthe anyone of gra ete orsatoma a lates whos names given below” he publishes offered for sale a books could be shown t re ich are enumerated in the body of the advertisement. Foe Cacho the placa re 22, inning work, ten such inning coies are PROBLEM: Five criminal cases wi advertisement reaches. the Grin pctv cases had infringes -dged against the accused persons of A-company, Allahabad nel inal Court at Nagpur Tro seca COPytights belonging tothe B-Company, Nagpur in letion to entertain ey accused contended thatthe Criminal Court at Nagpur had no 4 ship firm in ‘lane eae filed, because the company of the accused was registered felates tothe place of suing in aed, he? also contended that Section 62 of the Copyright Act the place of suing or tnt cl proceeding, but there sno specific proviscnin thatAct regarding Schur i {he commission of criminal offence. Discuss and decide. i The . Ltd, a JointStockes id the problem are identical wth J.N. Baga and others vs. All India Reporter respondent) (Aik tone: having Branch Offices at Congress Nagar, Nagpur (Non applicant Interpretation, gave 30m 302). The Supreme Court, by applying the Golden Rule of applications. Their eat against the appellants-accused and dismissed their revision further dosent Letshib also crectd that al he ve camlans wil go backtothe a Court for According tothe law in the light of the observations made in this judgment. ¢ /Mlotipur Zamindary Co. Pvt. Ltd vs. State of Bihar (AIR 1962.SC 660) (SN) tesue: The picipal question rsisedin these appeas an peftions under Art. 32 ofthe Constitution is whether sugarcane fas win teem reen vegetables. ts treated ag areen vote & woul. be exemaiad trom the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 which exempted all vegetables from the purview OF sales tax. JUDGMENT: The Supreme Court gave judgment in favour of the State Government holding that ‘sugarcane js nota geeen vegetable. —— PRINCIPLES: (i) The word ‘vegetables’ in taxing statues isto be understood as in common parlance i.e. denoting class of vegetables which and grownin a ktchen garden orn a farm and are used for the table. If that is the meaning of the word ‘vegetables’, sugar cane cannot fall within entry 6 in the notification under Sec. 6 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, which relates to exemption of sales tax to ‘green vegetable: (ii) The words of Section 2 (c) are very wide and cover the case of a producer of sugar cane. He is a dealer and is liable to pay sales tax on the sale of sugar cane by him. PROBLEM-1; The Sales Tax Act exempted ‘groen vegetables’ from assessment to sales tax. Sale ‘of Sugar-cane was subjected to sales tax by the authority. The question was whether sugar-cane fell within the term ‘green vegetables’. Decide (Aug,, 2013, 0.0.) PROBLEM-2: Green vegetables are exempted from the levy of sales tax under the Sales Tax Act. ‘The vendor of sugar cane contents that ‘sugar cane” fais within the meaning of the term ‘Green Vegetables’ and therefore, exempted from the sales tax. Interpret (Sept., 2013, O.U,) those piag a sale or hire’ appearing in Section 51 Synonym of a ‘proposal’ within the mea Scanned with CamScanner“Th Interpretation of Status TI -F.(1). RULES OF CONSTRUC oa THE GENERAL CLAUSES ION UNDER ‘ACT, 1897 (May, 2010, 0.) 1. Discuss the scope and appicaton of the General Causes Act, 1897. (aor, 2009, 0.) (02. Explain the les of Construction ander tho General Clauses Act, 1297. . sy 122. story of the General Clauses Act. sm 3. objec of he General Clauses Act «sy 24. Importance ofthe General Clauses Act «Ny 25. importance of Unrmiy (sy 26. Importance ofthe Statute Law today rs 227. Legislation as the principal means of growth an (@8, The 1957 Act net ntendd fo coil the Rules f Interpretation, pa 2.9. Shorening of the Language, tos 110, ity ofthe General Clases Act, 1897 fai 111. Need for change of the General Clauses Ac, 1697 ‘0.12, The General Clauses Act, 1897: Is the Title change required? oy ANSWER: 1's Act, was passed HISTORY: In England, the first Interpretation Act, known as the Lord Brougham’s as far back as 1850. In 1889, the 1850 was replaced by the Interpretation Act, 1889. This 1889 Act is the source of subsequent Interpretation Acts, not only in Erigland, but also in other countries of the Commonwealth The provisions of the Lord Brougham's Act, with a few additions, were adopted in India, and enacted as the General Clauses Act, 1868 (1 of 1868). The 1868 Act was of a measure of a limited character. {twas incomplete; but in so far as the grounds covered was concemed, it worked “fairly well!” It considerably shortened the language of subsequent Central Acts, Its utlity made the Legislative Department think of making useful additions to it..A Supplementary General Clauses Act was later enacted as the General Clauses Act, 1887 (1 of 1887) tn 1889, a comprehensive and consolidating Act on the subject was enacted in England. Our General Clauses Act, 1897 is largely modelled on the England Act. Our 1897 Act consolidates the earler Auactments of 1868 and 1887, and includes a few new provisions taken from. the English Interpretation Act, 1889, The General Clauses Act, 1897 was af independence, and after emergence of the Act, 1897 is continuing, OBJECTS OF THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897 pplied to every statute enacted by the Provinces. After Constitution of india, the application of the General Clauses The Objects of the General Clauses Act are several, namely, — se 1. To shorten the language of the Central Acts; 2 Toybrovide as far as possible, for uniformity of expressions in the Central Acts by giving the definitions of a series of terms in common use; 3 Tostate 3 Pteily certain convenient rues forthe construction and interpretation of the Central Is; an 4. Te guard against slips and oversights by importing into every Act certain common form olaien which otherwise ought to be inserted expressly in every Central Act, Regulation, Ordinance, and Statutory instruments under the Central Acts, Regulations and Ordinances, i IMPORTANCE OF THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897 The General Clauses Act, 1897 makes provisions as to the const laws of all-ndia application. Its importance, therefore, in point of applies, is obvious. (sy) truction of the General Acts and ather the number. ‘of enactments to: which it Much more, however, can be said about the importance ofthis Act, which has been called the “Law of all Laws”. In so far as certainty in the application ofthe law is a desideratum (something ean needed or wanted) itself, an interpretation act to introduce certainty in the limited sphere ons t operates. A . a8 already pointed t F UNIFORMITY: One of the objects of the Act, as already pointed above, i shrine foes of statutes and to achieve, as far as possible, uniformity of expression i cach sl Scanned with CamScannerlanguage. Its im, (Hildreth's Edition tee “The language of e FoF paucity and falsity of ges 2¥ays obs, language of truth une: Often the tern indei Butfor the control ex, Nd simple. Th a free for all” af. statute law are con; Definition. crass on What Bent = 79 said n Bentham’s Theory of Legislation the G fait so far 'eneral Claus cornea 8 thy eS Act ov IMPORTANCE oF, STATUTE Law topay. Words and language in our L toward: Mis desi enacted. The statute law gin oe" lesirable, in this la the last century, that the oon ox £© emph: that th iphasize the statute possesses, though, of coun gt MEM posse the present G 1897, the number of statutes sync? ofthe k i SS, in its volume. anc et and range, the ‘i now n is lawyer's tay icone : Pes it nb ee cera poy ewes ONS also. As the ral Clauses Act, Teen "ner are thousands of Cent j lem, inMarch, 2048, the mena a thousands of Cente State has decided to repeal such useless star tes, Indian Parliament THE 1897 ACT NOT INTENDED course, implied thatthe General Claveos hee rote at ee. ATERCRSTATION: ist, of country, codifies all the Rules of Statutory Inerpretaion, ‘The socaliee Pees chet ules of interprotati are realy nthe nature of quidesnes, an are not tobe eats asthe mathemati formu. Infact, gven the defntions contained inthe Goneral Causes At (and mary ofthe General Rules of q iction which are incorporated in it) apply only where the context does not otherwise require. This shows thatthe Act Hef doesnot purport fo teat he Rus of Coneructon a aerial peratives. SHORTENING OF THE LANGUAGE: Even so, the value and utility of the General Clauses Acts considerable, because it is not only constitutes the reference book of the Judge when dealing with statutes, but serves as the draftsman's labour saving device. Itlays down the rules, which woud have been tedious to repeat in every statute, thus shortening the language of legislative enactments. ‘The importance of simplification of language should not be under-estmated. While enacting ala, spect offrts must be taken, notonlyto improve the lwin substance, butto reduce te legal completly and technicality ; : 97 has stood the ITY OF THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897: The General Clauses Act, 1 UTLITY OF THE GENE Cer ofngnge sales hasten cient te test of tie canbe no better estimory fis uty than the factthat the Cours have on considerations ours, Terfice and good conscience, thought ito extend is principles nct only fo the eubarate of equi. pe Tyo tothe private documents. The Act has aso served as a made! fx at Sales sealer pCjauses Acts. Las, the 1897 Act has been expressly applied tthe interpretation of the Censtitution by Article 367 of the Constitution. i i -reaching changes have taken place IANGE: Since the passing ofthe Act, however, far-reaching Nt ony. The SScsttutional set-up has altered completely after the altainmentfndependence, inthis cour th eglation fas been ineeasing consideaby, The rangeand vat he nee and the volume ois substantial changes inthe legislative practice, The quanity ofthe borane ance as also ‘aesumed large proportions. Some provisions of the 1897 Act have come up for legion Consideration. Afew of them have given rise to confit of views 7 son of the General Causes Act, 1697 sofarhas been undertaken. Cetin minor x agen sade in 1903 and 1936. In addition, by various Adaptation Orders, the Act was, ame Scanned with CamScanner80 The Interpretation of Statutes from time to time, amended to bring it in conformity with the Government of India Act, fa3e ane he the Constitution. However, the scope of such amendments was necessarily Lae rtihational come, when the Act completely reviewed, so as to bring it in line with the fundamental Co! changes and new trends in the legislative practice. ies, the THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897: IS TITLE CHANGE REQUIRED?: In many cone oc Acts similar to the General Clauses Act, 1807 are called as the Interpretation Acts, Howeilr ie provisions of ourAct, (whether relating to definitions and meanings of words an ea abet construction and interpretation) are, so far as may be necessary, common to every Eerie ra title “General Clauses Act” is not less appropriate than the “Interpretati net For and also because the “General Clauses Act” is in vogue for more isa Sa A ee cont be changed. In Chief Inspector of Mines vs. K.C. Tapara (AIR es 0 698). the Supretre cows held. "Whatever the General Clauses Act says, whether as regards the m regards the legal principles, has to be read into every Act to which it appl » (2) THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897 (BARE ACT) THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897 (Act No. 10 of 1897) CONTENTS \ Section Description Page No. 1. Short Title, Extent and Commencement, | .2. [Repealed 3. Definitions. 4. Application of foregoing definition to previous enactments. 4-A. Application of certain definitions to Indian Laws. 5. Coming into operation of enactments. 5A. Coming into operation of Governor General Act 6. — Effect of repeal. 6-A. Repeal of Act making textual amendment in Act or Regulation, 7. _ Revival of repealed enactments, ‘ 8. — Construction of references to repealed enactments, 9. Commencement and termination of time. 10. Computation of time. 11. Measurement of distance. Scanned with CamScannerMeaning. Definition. Classification. Etc. 2 1.£.(2). (2). THE LITERAL CONSTRUCTION / THE GRAMMATICAL CONSTRUCTION 1. Explain itera ule of constriction with case laws. 02. “The pra consid ac 803 and Senances arto be cons nto accorting othe res of grammar" — Eheidte {sone prc le fra crt nd is cy he ape Q4. “The length and detail of canara aes woo 5. “Tho cuty of the Court Sime Mt fo expound to lw a8 stands, and to have te remedy one bo rscved panto oe head. — a 1 0 eters" — legislation has undoubted reinforced the cai of kel consivtion asthe only ste rule” (07, INGREDIENTS OF RULE OF LITERAL CONSTRUCTION. = et em rt ec om o Sores ‘5. JAL. Sharma and another (1998) 1. SCC 727). =n ANSWER: MEANING: literal. (adj) = in accordance with the letter; exact; expressed in letter. The ‘Literal Construction’ is one of the Basic Rules of Interpretation of Statutes, which implies that the Courts should collect the intention of the makers of the statutes, deeds or wills from the words used in them only. Its the duty of the Courts, in construing statutes, to give effect to see the legislative intent through the words and language employed in the statute. Tho Literal Construction of a statute is to find out the true sense by making the statute its own expositor. The ‘Literal Construction’ is also called as the ‘Grammatical Construction’, The term ‘Grammatical Construction’ was used first by Salmond. ‘Salmond explains: “Interpretation is of two kinds, which may be distinguished as ‘literal’ and Jrnctional” The literal interpretation is that which regards exclusively the verbal expression of the tau it does not look beyond the litera legis (letter of law). Free interpretation. onthe other hhand, is that which departs from the letter ofthe law, nd saeks elsewhere for some oer and mere rr csctory evidence ofthe true intention ofthe legistatue. itis essential fo determine with aco\racy aoeattions which subsist between these two methods. Inalher words, we have fo determine the olative claims of the ‘letter’ and ‘spirit of the enacted law”. ‘Galmond adopted the terms ‘Grammatical Interpretation’ and ‘Logical Interpretation’. Late! the saimmetreplaced these terms by the terms ‘Literal Interpretation’ and ‘Functional Interpretation’ respectively. Maxwell explains the Literal Construction: “The fist and most elementary rule of constuction is that isto be assumed that the words and phrases of technical legislation are usod in their echnical ‘meaning if they have acquired one, and otherwise in their ordinary meaning, andthe ‘second isthat the phrases and sentences are to be construed according tothe rules of grammar. The length and detail ly reinforced the claim of literal construction as the only safe rule. ‘of modem legislation has undoubte “itthere isnothing to modify alter or quaify the language which the statute contains, it must be construed inthe ordinary and natural meaning of the words and sentences. The safer and more correct course of deeling with a question of construction is to ake the words themselves and arrive possible at their ‘meaning without, in the first instance, reference to cases.” Scanned with CamScannermerely nee ae “Text Book of Jurisprudence explained 7 soning of a Sew GB. Pater a aglish cases. Firstly, the ‘Literal Rute tha, fhe mes id be ae their 7 the instrument, suggested ne ‘Golden Rule’ that ofthe instrument, vhatever the result; Secondly, the ‘ inthe rest ol istobe. eT unless that would lead to some absurdity OF ingonsistency i] Le -sratute and the evil at ori, the ‘Mischief Rule’ which emphasizes the general po! Ivhioh twas directed.” RUCTION (SN) RULE OF LITERAL CONSTI INGREDIENTS OF RU oporaly. should not BE given rete = 4, The express language of the statute should be construe restrictive interpretation. injusti only, if language 2, The Grammatical Construction leading to absurdity or injustice 2 in re oN) ii te of such construction. (R. Rudraiah vs. State of Karnataka i uction. The Golden Rule of Interpretation is the offshoot of the Rule of Literal Constr! eqislative intent, object and cording to Salmond, the essence of the law lies in its ‘spirit’ (eaislative inter pein SG ithe statute, ete), notin letter’. Because the ‘letter’ is significant only 95 being the See eT manifestation’ ofthe intention of the legislature that underlies it, Nevertheless ina ordinary cases, the Courts must be content to accept ‘itera Tagis’ (letter of law) as the exclusive and conclusive evidence of the ‘sententia legis' (legislative intent) 5 5, Itascriptum est (Letter prevails): Its the first principle of interpretation. The Courts are not, at liberty to add to or to take from or modify the letter of the law. Therefore, they must in general take it granted that the legislature has said what it meant, and meant what it has said. 6. Salmond explains: ‘In order to determine the literary meaning of a statute the Courts make tse of various rules of interpretation. These, however, are rough principles oF guides rather one otrct rales and are nat so much the invention of the law as the application within the context ii wor ordinary common sense rules of language. For example to ascertain the ordinary meaning ofa word ina statute, the Court may look at dictionaries or scientific or other technical voetie inwhich the words are used. It must also interpret statutory words in the light of definitions provided by the statute itself, by the Interpretation Act, 1889 (England) - The General Clauses ‘Act, 1897 ( India), and by any judicial decisions on the statute in question." 7. The meaning of a word is also affected by its context, particularly in its surrounding terms used in the provision. In that occasion, the Courts evolved the special rules, i.e, ‘ejusdem generis’, ‘noscitura sociis’, etc. to recognise the actual meaning of such words used by the legislature. “When the language of the provision is plain, clear and unambiguous, only the plain meaning rule of Literal Construction is fo be adopted so as to avoid any hardship or absurdity resulting therefrom.” (State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lai (1992 Sup. (1) SCC 335)) 8. Ifthe language ofthe statute is clear and susceptible to only one meaning, it must be given effect to irrespective of the consequences. (Nelson Motis vs. Union of India (1992) 4 SCC 711)) 9. When language of the provision is Nn plain and clear court cannot enlarge the scope of the provision by interpretative process. (H.H. Sri Rama Verma vs. CIT (1991 Sup. 1 SCC 209)) . 410. Where language i , it i ything Where language is lain, ful effect must be given toi without adding or subtracting anything 41, Plain meaning must first b ir Pray meaning mustfistbe ascertained. Incase of doubt, objectof the statute and its preamble 12, : Practical and reasonable cor i 4 ns is preferred truction in consonance with clear language of the provision 4. Clear and unambiguous language of a absurdity or irrationality. (Sita Devi ve. siete vain has {0.be given effect to despite suggested - tate of Bih: 44, Plainmearing ofthe teral construction nneybe dex (1995 Sup. 1 SCC 670)) inot be unnatural and unwarranted role to words wrens parted from by either mutilating or attributing ) Scanned with CamScanner 1Te Departure VO ———Meaning. Detnion, Classifeaton. ft, Fer Departive froma seston, 6 3 only when the etiteral eonstru nn and approach tothe functional construction is allowed, interpretations “or + used in the statute give two meanings and chance of multiple mibaning of ae come Supreme Court held: “Though normally the plain ordinary grammatical ascertain the intent affords the best guide and the object of interpreting a statute is to be resorted to thee f he legislature enacting it, other methods of extracting the meaning can to keop at the rene andua® is contractor, ambiguous or leads realy fo absurd resus $0 as ’s@ and meaning.” (Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab 1994 (3) SCC 569) 46. TheLiteral Cor ‘i inithe words chee should not be followed, ifit results in manifest absurdity. Itis explained one. his more tha rome Court: ‘Tho task of interpretation of he statute isnot a mechanical intention ofthe ogtaetene es oaeing of mathematical formula. It isan attempt to discover the is at best an imper rest Tone the language used by it, keeping always in mind, that the language expect that he en stumeont fo the oxpression of actual human thoughts. ts also ale to Therefore, Court Fraipieh eae with vin prescience and perfect and unequivocal clarity. 4 to eschew literal construction ii cane result. (Oswal Agro Mills Ltd.vs. CCE (1993 Supl. (3 sce Tri8) aan 17. Where literal interpretation leads to absurd or unintended result, the language of the statute fo accord with the intention of the Parliament and to avoid absurdity. 48. Intention of the legislature should first be ti y first be ascertained from the natural used inthe provision. The Court should read the provision as itis. ee 49, The Rule of Strict Construction of the exclusi i o : io jonary provisions cannot rule of plain meaning ofthe literal construction. ~—— ee 20. When the language in the statute is plain and clear, reading intoit an addtional provision, especially in the nature of a condition precedent is not justified. 21. When the language used in the statute is quite clear and two interpretations are not possible, the Court must give effect to the words of the statute without resorting to any rule of functional interpretation. 22. Astatutory provision must be avoided. Where the plai manifestly absurd and unj Legislature or even do some violence to it so a Legislature and produce a rational construction and just result. (Bhat Ram (AIR 1985 SC 150)) 23. The literal rules of construction require the wording ofthe Act literal and grammatical meaning whatever the resull may be. IMPORTANT POINTS: A ‘Sundaram Finance Ltd. vs. NEPC India Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 479) (sn) i hire-purchase agreement with i 1EPC India Ltd.-the, respondent had entered into a Sundaram Fnapee indi Sppollant herein in respect of supply of two wind turbine oe ators under all accessories, The terms of the agreement ‘contemplated payments being made in along with 3 ate respondent. The first installment was payee of 9-9-1996 and the last was de by ents OgB In al the payment was to be made by 36 installments, The hire-purchase econtained an ‘arbitration clause’. aoe rae ent paid the first fifteen installments and thereat committed default and payment is Jed an application uls 9 of the Arbitration ‘and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the City The appellant fled 3° Praying forthe appointment of an Advocate, ‘Commissioner to take custody of Trial Court, Cher ne to the interim custody of the appellant equipment and restore the sa : terieeeass 0 main oan opporing = Canmssone eke possssen herein with the help of the police. the turin challenged the Order a the trial court before the High Court contending that as no The respondent cht ere pending and even the arbitrator had not been appointed, an application ul arbitration proceedings rg interim reli alone was not maintainable, The High Court allowed the be so construed, ifitis possible, that absurdity and mischief may in and literal interpretation of a statutory provisi m produces @ ust result, the Court might modify the language used by the 1s to achieve the obvious intention of the 1g Mai vs. Ch. Parbhu io be construed according to its 96 A 20 petion. Challenging ithe appeliant appealed to the Supreme Court. ‘The main issue was, whether an interim order can be sought from the Court even before roceedings commencement of arbitration literal cor JUDGMENT: The Supreme Court applied the litera site 1996 Act and gave judgmentin favour ofthe appe nstruction rule and interpreted Section 9 lant, setting aside the judament of the Hiah Scanned with CamScanner(iy However, wet a pany erm Seen — and binding arbitration agreement in existent ‘Giaher conteme? anvch ig preferable to the Arbitral Tribunal. S° F cedentto filing taking place between the parties. condition pre tisfied rt must be Sans Ke the matter to arbitration appellant) and B ta : osite party isn (iv) Issue of notice invoking arbitration clause Oe oeesing ‘e interim a E application uls 9 for interim order. jowever, beter pplcants intention total i lI Y Pere rn about the existence of arbitration agreement eg etween ce fnancie sre an aid fi PROBLEM: Ahire-purchase agrees Cy wind turbine generator Bp: (the borrower-respondent) in respect of wing ement conta bral : out of total 36 installments The hire-Pure NTS ciation Acts 1996 before the Oy rh hire: filed an application uls Chennai praying for the appointm: purchase machinerylequipment i assed an interim order appoin! Prthe police. Whether an interim order can be soug of arbitration proceedings? SOLUTION: Yes. An interim order ¢: srpitration proceedings. The judgment Construction Rule. The facts of the pro! India Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 479). [Note: The Arbitration and Concili for LL.B. third year’ The studentis a: nf} reement dy of A. The t gion of the turbines with the help int from the Court even before commencement mmencement of lying the Literal by the Court even before CO Ltd. vs. NEPC the Supreme Court by @PP) ical with Sundaram Finance an be granted was given by blem are identi fe subject in the new syllabus ation Act, 1996s taught as a separal ieviged to read the Bare Act of the 1996 Act fo understand well the above case- . SN B. prem Narayan Barchhiha vs. Hakimuddin Saifi (1999) © SCC 381) ASN) Brief Fats: The appellant was the owner of the house in Raipur. The {enant had been in possession fo “f 9: t u/s 12 (1)(f) of the M.P. peliant filed an eviction suit against the tenant Accommodation Control Act, 1961 stating that he had no alternative ‘r -reside! m in the city to establish a shop for his son ‘The appellant had the ‘residential ‘accommodation’. The tenant contended that ‘as the appellant had the alternative suitable ‘ residential accommodation’, the appellant was not entitled to evict him. 7 The trial Court dismissed the appellant's petition; however recorded { finding that he had.no alternative suitable ‘non-residential accommodation’. In the first appeal, the High Court gave judgment in favour of the appellant. In the second appeal, the High Court dismissed the sults on the reasoning that the landlord had fail ‘ove all the ingredients of Section 12 (1)(f) and that he failed to establish his boné fides because he had suppressed the fact that he was in possession of an alternative vacant accommodation in the same building. ee A eee JUDGMENT: Applying the rule of literal construction, the Supreme Court gave judgment in favour of the appellant. ——— aaa PRINCIPLES: (i) A plain reading of clauses (e) and (f) of Section 12 (1) of the 1961 Act makes it clear that the Act maintains a clear distinction between the accommodation let for the ‘residential purposes’ and the accommodation let for the ‘non-residential purposes’. i (ii) Clause (e) deals with ground of eviction of a tenant from acc i i : ‘ wil ;ommodation let for residential purpos ee eviction ips tenant can be sought if the landlord bona fide requires the acoommodation dential purposes for occupation as a residence for himself or for an\ is il Qo member of hi ood Tee eon person for whose benefit the acconmadation is Tages andi on has no other reasonably suit i i i ‘own in his occupation in the city or town concemed. aaah eae GA) accommodation’ of one shop. The ap Scanned with CamScannerTape fA, 4h Joe MEH Er an articl i i (arhutiaa © mentioned in the Schedule can be houses, roads ality, imposes Octroj 2 ads, etc. unde SES Octroi Tax on certai : oxide’, which is not us! ae Heading of the Schedule ft Shar used inthe construction of the Ras €d in the Construction of the h Sere nck A imposed Octroi Tax on ‘zine Position of octroi on ‘zine id '¢ houses, roads, etc. X - a dealer of ‘zinc oxide’ SOLUTION: Yes. The Munic; i oxide’. Decide. identi ae icipalit i ; . are identical with Forage & cal ue fa impose the octroi on ‘zinc oxide’. The facts of the problem applying the rule of literal eS ae Corporation of Greater Bombay.. In that case, by Municipality. ction, the Supreme Court gave judgment in favour of the This | nay Case-law may also be cited in Topic ‘Headings’.} : " +-— State of H.P. vs. J.L. Sharma and another (1998) 1 SCC 727) (SN) ba fe The respondents are the promoting officers to the Himachal Pradesh Forest Service ass Il. They filed an application before the Tribunal for a direction that the direct recruits to the Forest Service Class II were entitled to their seniority from the date of their joining after completion of the training and not from the date of their joining the training. The Tribunal by the impugned judgment having granted that relief and having held that the direct recruits would be entitléd to get pay while continuing under training, and would not get the benefit of seniority vis-a-vis the promotees. JUDGMENT: The Supreme Court gave judgment in favour of the Government applying the rule. of literal construction and held that the training period of the direct recruits shall be counted for determining the seniority in the service provided that the said direct recruit successfully completes the training and then is absorbed in the Class Il Forest Service. Scanned with CamScanner“a Sah tose prove Tt aa cslopaceand cordance with {hose provisions. The Court must striv rive to so interpret the statute as to protect nd advance the obec and purpose of the enactment. Any narrow or technical intorpretaior of the Provisions would defeat the legis/ative policy. Tho Courts must therefore keep the regisistive policy in mind in applying the provisions of the Act fo the facts of the case.” OBJECT: The object of this Mischief Rule of Interpretation is to find out the object of enact and then language permitting, choose that interpretation which achieves the object. ene ‘should et remedy to the mischief sought to be remedied and the purpose of the sf be fulfilled. INGREDIENTS OF THE HEYDON'S RULE / THE MISCHIEF RUE RuLe (SN) {THE PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION / THE REGARD TO SUBJECT AND OOF ine new f ; atu 4. When the prior law was not sufficient to suppress the mischief the legis! statutes or now provisions in the existing laws, akan ndments to : ought ame! (i) To peventthe dowry deaths and maimonal ues avlame eg. ISA athe Indian Evidence Act, vi. inserting $5,204 11 higg Rule it “spplied forthe thee inthe Evidenco Act. In such crcumslance®, A orcas ine remedy. wen wou an ston ofthe mischief and subserve the abet 6 Te iting the Gre ‘snould not Sora Tne objective ofthe Misehiet Rue = Ie er pyateromedy rom the Courts ‘escape punishments and the aggrieved person should gettne 2PProT yaw (Amendment) Act, (i) Madhura CasofAnt-Rape Criminal Amendment ‘actithe Crimi 4983, (Rete. io the IPC Notes.) {ity The Niebhaya Case — the Criminal Law (Amery 2. Mischief rules appicable when language = c2P2! capable of wider applica mont) Ac, 2013. (Refer tothe IPC Notes.) se of more than one meaning tion that the mischief which 43, The Mischief rue is to be valid and must De gaveit bith he mischief ‘4. Literal construction on reading the statute 25 ‘a whole found to be in consonance with t whi vision intended to remedy. rch the provision intended mischief to thwart which tis onstruction which advances intention of legislation, remedies th Gracted should be accepted. (Glaxo Labora C505) ais9 jon and leg 6. Mischief Rule must be applied to ascertain real naire of the provision {font Choudhury vs. sua] Jit Choudhury (AIR 1962 SC 1397) 5 ity by 1. The Courts entitled to ascertain the intention of the Legislature remove the ambigui are cota he provision ofthe salute as a whole keeping i view what woe the mischief when the corsnng I pcted and to remove wich the Legislature enacted the statute, Ht would be the Stay the Couto adopt that construction whicn would advance the object underiying the Act, itis recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that expressions used therein should ay be understood in a sense inwhich they best harmonize with the object of the statute, ser aich effectuate the object of the legislature. (New India Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. ‘Commissioner of Sales Tax AIR (1963 SC1207) ©. When two interpretations are possible, the Court must prefer that which advances the remedy ‘and suppresses the mischief as the legislative intent. 40. The object oriented interpretation should not be carried, if it ca language n , iit causes violence'to the pl language used inthe statule. Regard to subject and object should be given only when there is possibility of two int 's posebily of two Interpretations. the anguage plan and unambiguous, there is no Tories India Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer (AIR 1984 slative intent. 1. Tremecharical approach to cohstructionis altogether out of step with the modern positive Seer era run see re pote enkintion fl Lie at Lt mds (Administrator, Municipal Corporation vs. 12. The provisions should be ep Construed so as to further ends of justice and not to frustrate the 13, pa remove Ponies ‘and more particulary the social misct statutes in the context of changing social lgisiation ayn consonance wih soca goal nd peb hlefs, the Courts should i : interpret values and fill the goed lacuna in the Scanned with CamScanner"y Moaning, Detinition_Classiticati st |. Interpretatior boat, + 5 44, tnterretation should go oni be of what has been but of What may bo Thereroatimonial Fe“ ivan riser ity must be kept in mind, while interpreting the statutes. sce tn the . ret purposive Prating the statute, vz. the TADA cook harsh nd more drastic provisions Fics ts plover bovamue seus es auopted 's0 as to promote the object of the statute ar IMPORTANT POINTS? A ; # IN RE HEYDON'S CASE (1504) 3 Co, Rop. 7a: 76 ER 637) (EQ/SN) Brief Facts: This isthe first case " Ee ae cease in which the ‘Mischief Rulo of Interpretation’ has been applied Zollege had certain propertios on its 0 pester, estan properties its own name. The management had given certain lands to W any te ‘Double ise attr ieee fi Ea G. In Ehgland, in those days, this system was of Estates’. The England Parliament enacted ‘The Statute- prevent the doubling of astatae and misappropriation of the properties of ecclesiastical and religious inttutions The properties of the College were taken away by the Crown under the 31, \e previous lease: struments were can Sale tsa ose th Oo jeases and instruments were cancelled. Heydon (one of S & JUDGMENT: The Court took the guidance of the Mi : ischiof Ri i /Statute-31 and also the act of the Crown. Se a ae PRINCIPLES: (i) The object of the Parliament was fo protect the properties of ecclesiastical and religious institutions. The Statute-34 provided the remedy o protect wih that object, According to it Al leases creating the doubling of estates, ie. mischief, were held void, and which would be Saint the true meaning ofthe Act and remedy provided by the Parliament. The Court upheld the validity of cancellation of leases. “That for the sure and true interpreta arging of the Common Law) nd tion of all statutes in general (by the four things are to be discemed and Lord Coke observed penal or beneficial, restrictive or en considered: 4st: What was the Common Lat 2nd: What was the mischief and ard: What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and ‘Commonwealth? And lthz The true reason of the remedy and then the office of ot the Judges is always to make such aan sion as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy and to suppress subtle inventions coetvasions for the continuance of the mischief and PP private commodo’, and to add force and and evpsitye and remedy according tothe true intent of he makers of the Act ‘pro bono publico’.” PROBLEM: A college had certain properties on ts Oo name. The management had given certain ands toW and his son for thelr ives, oF after them to Sand G. In England, iathose days, this system was called the ‘Doubling-of reeset The England Parliament enacted ‘The Statute 31 Henry Vill to prevent the doubling of estates “and misappropriation of the properties of aclectastical and religious institutions. The frroperties ofthe College were taken away by the Crown under the Statute-3) 4, and also the previous leases and instruments were cancelled. G challenged it in the Court. ‘he Statute-31 Henry-Vill” SOLUTION: G failed. Interpretation’. The facts of the probiem fe identical wit Rep. 7a: 76 ER 637). In fact the ‘mischief Rule of Interpretat! famous as the HEYDON’S RULE B. Goriss vs. Scott i fendants were the carriers. Th sheep. The ine ofine plaintiff were arranged to stand on overboard of the ship of the carriers. During me travelling, storm orcurted ‘and washed away the sheep which were on overboard. The plain sued the defendants for ‘Compensation basing on the clause of the Carriage Act. the cartier to make the pens aarti in force at that ime, The clause (27 thus:“Itis the duty of Separating his sheep and consignce’s Sheep.” The plaintiff contended thatthe defendant had not arranged the pens on the overboard of the ship. If they would have arranged pons. his sheeps mrighthave been protected. Therefore We piainif asked the defendants topay the compensation might have bet gued thatthe animals ofthe plainif were swept away bythe heavy rain water, an act of God. for which they were not liable. jefore the Act? ‘appointed to cure the disease of the was upheld under the ‘Mischief Rule of fh IN RE HEYDON’S CASE (1584) 3 Co. ion’ is also named and become (1874 LIR. 9 Exch. 125) (SN) plaintiff engaged them to transport his 1 Henry-VII ton! Scanned with CamScanner44. Conjunctive and Disjunctive woras 4 45. Equitable Construction; 16. Same word same meaning: nt words; ; Toca subsidiary rules. | have explained th 418. Technical words; etc. onto ee Inave cnr 8. ions or short notes may DE aske it points and case-laws, ifthe ae if skeg [Note: Essay questions oy sa to write important points 2 Ot mination hal is id " . vie lps, Testi rhea Dee onthe “Subs . UR A SOCIIS THE RULE OF NOSCIT! ‘tate and itrate the noscitur a soclls Rule ‘a socils* Rule. a 0.2. Wate a note on ‘noseitur 03. Meaning of Noscitur a soci » (04 Meaning of ‘Denotation’ . 2 5. Meaning of ‘Connotation’. = Qe Anicle 184 of the Constitution = tution. 7 Article 233 ofthe Const cn ymad (AIR 1967 SC 903) . se of Assam vs, Ranga Muhamma : oe te ita Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of 1.T., Ahmedabad (1991) 4 SCC 22). a 8 Vanita Silk Mils Pvt. Ltd vB. - : 0:0 Coastal Chemicals Lid. vs. Commercial Tax Oicer, AP, and others (1999) 8 SCC 465). ™ K. Bhagirthi G Shenoy vs. K.P BaMakuraya (1999) 4 SCC 138). 2 sonecratt Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Income-tax (1999) 3 SCC 343). . ‘ ‘Semee Khan vs. Bindu Khan (1996) 7 SCC 59) is 14, Oswal Agro Mills Ltd vs. Collector, Central Excise (1993) Sup. 3 SCC 716). aa ANSWER: MEANING: Noscitur = knowing; 2 = with; Sociis = association. A word changes its meaning just like a chameleon changes its colours according to vicinities. Every word has two meanings - (i) denotation; and (ii) its connotation. ‘Denotation’ means its actual dictionary meaning. ‘Connotation’ means, the meaning adopted by its vicinity. ‘Connotation'’ is also expressed by the Latin Maxim ‘Noscitur a Sociis’. Noscitur a sociis means meaning of a word should be known from its accompanying or associating words. It also means that the meaning of a word can be gathered from the context. Scanned with CamScannerBy applying the Rute of reference to the meanings i a Soci, gar ii "Noseltur ex socio qu; ng N° WOKS associated wth gout WOrd may be ascertained by i non cogiion, himself, may be known fron, Comiiositur ex se” ' explained by the legal maxim, i ve which son's character rom his assay oT means “Ho, wh sae, rsa gal May 10 ace : ‘Speare that a words together shows that they sea tho Rule of noscitur rents, are te 4 Socii particular word is doubt or pee (02 Underst the intention of the parr , oF here a expressions ocow Who u articular exprogs on The rule of NOSctUra socisiswiderhaninerge en Ne Hen nate en generis is only an applicati 'ule of ejusdem generis specific application ofthe brome Ur @ Soils. Ejusdasy eI 8c the rue of eusdem lermaxinnesetira soc fy coe only an illustration or ‘ic Ejusdem generis.) the rules of noscitu jasdora no interpret on the face of sdom generis are ‘Not applicable, I id ambi " should be appl "uous, then only these ues shouldbe araiey «| PROBLEMIQUESTION OF LAW: To whom the term , Bxeaicicg Constitution? The House of Legislatures or the Legisatve Members tle 194 & he SOLUTION: The words ‘powers, Privileges, ete.” in Article 194 of \ , et the Constitution ae inten . provide the powers and privileges to the House of Legislatures rot the legislate Mentors . (b) Article 233 runs as follows: 7 “Art. 233. Appointment of District Judges.~ (1) Appintments of person tobe nthe posing nd pometonl tit | iudges in any State shall be made by the Govemor ofthe Stale in conslaton wih the High Gout exercngpescion, inreation to such State” In State of Assam vs. Ranga Muhammad (AIR 1987 SC 903), the Supreme Court held: “The werd J ‘posting’ is associated with the words ‘appointments’ and ‘promotions’ of the district judges. © ‘According to these associated words, the word ‘posting’ means ‘the assignment ofan appointge or on in the cadre", and not i i Therefore, ithe ‘promotee to @ position | th Government wants to transfer @ district judge, the Governor should ‘consult’ with the High Court. PROBLEMIQUESTION OF LAW: According to Article 233 (1) of the Constitution, the Governor ofa State is empowered to appoint and promote the District Judges in consultation withthe High Court. ‘Should the Governor consul the High Cour for transferring a District Judge? 1 In State of Assam vs, Ranga Muhammad (AIR 1967 SC 903), the Supreme Court 1 SOLUTION: In Sat of asa rmcra duce, te Govemorsrausconsu whe High Court IMPORTANT POINTS: ‘A Vanila Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd vs, Commissioner of LT, Ahmedabad (1991) 4 SCC-22) (SN) | 2 .ssee-appellant compary ie. Vanila Silk Mills Pvt.Ltd, purchased machinery Beet Facts: Toe oon gs7 ad gave tor hire fo another oman Wi, Jasmine Mls Pt. Lean or i cnt of Rs. 33,9007-. Jasmine company insured the machinery. Asaresult of afire which | aaa in ine premises, the machinery Was extensively damaged and became useless, The | ingurance eqmpany paid Rs. 6,32,533 0 Jasmine company. As arsuit of compromise between ! astvine company and the assessee, the Jasmine company paid entire insurance claim amount » to the assessee. unten ‘company showed the said amountinits annual income-tax return forthe assessment year 196788, “tne Income ax Officer imposed incomeax on Rs. 360,792 = [6,22,633 () Rs. 264,744] treating the same as the capital gains chargeable under Section 48 read wih Sections 2 (47). Scanned with CamScannerindepenucin vs ++ ~ sais _ urchased @ into ashes anu new tex auivr PROBLEM: Aa companys PUNT isery was burnt into ashes 3 2 ingore tan sues machinery. After some years, aid Rs. 6 0,000/-as comP: -a0,0001- as the capital gain. A mache insurance company PAR 3 99,90)- treating Re. 3,00, : peor 3) ‘issued notice to Pay in DISC ss and decide objected and challenss SS a tax T .. Vis not liable to PAY incom: 2 4991) 4 soe Gommisstoner of aati tabi inet in favour of the assessee Mie of noscitura sociis, {Ne ‘Supreme Court g ‘Ap. and others vs. Coimmercial Tax Officer, (en) ( Ven icals Ltd. Coastal Chemical goo) 8 806 465) Facts: The appell: Corporation) rchased natural gas fr manufacture © ; ) and used the same as fuel for the ager and Pee re oe sales tax authorities impo aprelant cians St entitled to the conee’ tural gas. sed the sales tax on the natura’ of tax th der Sect rate of tax {hat was provided for under 38% ) Act, 1957. ne coneess OTe ech High Court d the appellant's claim. Section 5-B (1) reads ct, f its thus: — ry dealer shall pay, in respe «Sec. 5-B. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, eve inresper F use by the Ww material, component part, sub-assembly part, 1 rotator any ater goods hi facture inside the State... material of any other goods which he intends to manu : JUDGMENT: The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the High Court, applying the rule of noscitura sociis. PRINCIPLES: The word ‘consumables’ in Sectior identical with Vanila Silk ne tecs of the proviem are identi 8 Ting ig sc 22). In -appellant. ‘om the ONGC (Oil and Natural Gas lant company Pul f paper and paper products. The ct of any sale of goods to another dealer ‘ediate part, consumables and packing n 5-B (1) in the A.P.G.S.T. Act, 1957 takes colour fram and must be read in the light of the words thal are its neighbours, namely, ‘raw materials’, ‘component part, ‘sub-assembly part’ and ‘intermediate part’. So read, itis clear that the word ‘consumables’ therein refers only to material which is utilized as an-input in the manufacturing process buts not identifiable in the final product by reason of the fact that it has got consumed therein. Itis for this reason that the ‘consumables’ have been expressly referred to in the said provision, though they would fall within the broader scope of the words ‘raw material’. Since the natural gas used by the appellant does not tend to the making of the end product, it is not a ‘consumable’. PROBLEM: A, a company, purchased natural gas from the ONGC (Oil and Natural Gas Corporation) and used the same as fuel for the manufacture of paper and paper products. The sales tax authorities imposed the sales tax onthe natural gas. A claimed that it was entitled to the concessional ais of tax ‘at was provided for under Section 5-B (1) of the A.P.G.S.T. Act, 1957. Will A company porate ie ne facts of the problem are identical with Coastal Chemicals Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Office, APL others (1999) 8 SCC 465). In that case, the Supreme Court gave judgment uur of the Commercial Tax Department, applying the rule of noscitur a sociis. SS . Me Scanned with CamScannerThe Interpretation of Statutes ing business with granite extraction and export, claimed the tax deduction HC (2)(b)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Is A entitled for the tax deduction? 112 PROBLEM: A, doi under Section 80-H Discuss and decide. SOLUTION: No. Granite is extracted from the earth. A is not entitled for the tax deduction under Section 80-HHC (2)(b)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The facts of the problem are identical with Stonecraft Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Income-tax (1999) 3 SCC 343).. In that case, the Supreme.Court gave judgment against the assessee, applying the tule of noscitur a sociis. E. samee Khan vs. Bindu Khan (1998) 7 SCC 59) (SN) Brief Facts: The appellant and the respondent were the neighbours, and were engaged in along. Grawn fight in a civil court on a small issue. The fight started at the lowest level (Munsiff Court) nd they reached the Apex Court with a side issue which emanated therefrom. ‘In the suit they had defied an Order of an interim injunction and the plaintiff in the suit moved for the punitive action against him. The trial Court ordered him to be putin prison for one month. That Order was confirmed by the appellate Court, but the High Court in revision quashed it. The Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court. Rule 2-A of Order 39 ofthe C.P.C, 1908 says: “Cons: ‘order the property of the person guilty... to be attache The respondent submitted his apology for non-obedience of Court order and also rem obstructions. JUDGMENT: The Supreme Court gave judgment: ‘We, therefore, disagree with the interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order regarding the scope of Rule 2-A of Order 39 ofthe Code. However, we are in agreement with him that in view of the subsequent actions done by "the respondent (by removing the obstruction and by tendering unconditional apology to the Court itis "not necessary to put the respondent in prison. We, therefore, dismiss this special leave petition subject fo the clarification made above regarding the legal position.” oe f PRINCIPLES: (i) The words ‘and may also’ appearing in Rule 2-A sought to be given a meaning that the course suggested thereafter in the Rule has to be resorted to as an optional additional step, a resort to which would be impermissible without complying with the first course suggested . in the Rule. The word ‘also’ has different attributes and its meaning is not to be confined to ‘furthermore’. In legalistic use, the word ‘also’ can be employed to denote other meanings as well. Jequence of disobedience or breach of injunction:— (1) Court may "d, and may also order such person to be detained in civil prison..." joved the (ii) In Black's Law Dictionary, the word ‘also’ has the following variety of meanings: “Also.— besides; as well; in addition; likewise; in like manner; similarly; too; withal: some other thing; including; further, furthermore; in the same manner; moreover; nearly the same as the word ‘and or ‘likewise’.” (iii) Since the word ‘also’ can have meanings such as ‘as well’ or likewise’, cannot those meanings | be used for understanding the scope of the trio words ‘and may also"? Those words cannot altogether be detached from the other words in the sub-rule. Here again the word ‘and’ need not necessarily be understood as denoting a conjunctive sense. Te ¥ (iv) In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, it is stated that the word ‘and’ has gen i sense, but sometimes it is by force of a context read as ‘or’. Maxwell on ipteraedeatee cece has recognised the above use to carry out the interpretation of the legislature. This has been approved by this Court in Ishwar Singh Bindra vs. State of U.P. (AIR 1968 SC 1450). The incl le of noscitur a sociis can profitably be used to construct the words ‘and may also’ in the sub-ule (v) Hence the words ‘and may also’ in Rule 2-A cannot be interpreted i step which is permissible only as additional to attachment of property aiihe Gon Seer Scanned with CamScanner“A.ponal stato sy 02. Stale the principles tetatng eee a rly and ta, or caso of ut, bon 03 Te contuctoneourany eA Bea ena ft EP hog on sae = G4. Strict construction of " Sbjct shay The ke * Penal Sattag, °° Por — Saat eh rete 8 EXIMPINS of other stains S 1, Four Ways of axwate - os Nene oe "etn OF the stict construe a “ oF eta ow 010. Third Wey —Punishment, “eieents ne tence es 0:8. Se ofA ve soon ven TON THC Pa staan a a ramana (1996) Lisi) : ce on dh VS. State of Gujarat to O21. Smedieys Ltd. vs. Breed (1874) 2 aN ER 21), mi io 2 tumatth we thee a Nw. Sivarasan @ Raghu @ sivarasa and ‘others (1997) 1 sce 6eay an. | 023. MaruRam vs. Union of india (AIR 1980 Sc 2147), bay 024. Glaxo Laboratories India Ltd, Presiai kot ee (025. Niranjan Singh K.S. Punjabi vs, itendra Bhima] Bijaya (1990) 4 sec 76), “ ss ! : 02% su Wt eg ura pe Si 027.4 Bowers va. Gloucester Corporation (1053) + aby (sw) 1 oi Per sat, oe ANSWER: INTRODUCTION: Primary the Indian Penal Code, 1860s the most importantstatute Itdefines various offences and prescribes the appropriate punishments for them, Besides the penal code, there are several other statutes, which define certain other acts asthe | ‘offences’ and also prescribe punishments for such offences, Sticly speaking these statutes are ot equal to that of the Indian Penal Code. However, they are also treated as the penal statutes. ‘The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 are the procedural laws and are applicable to the Indian Penal Code and also to other penal statutes. Examples of other statutes which contain the penal provisions are given hereunder: — (a) The Essential Commodities Act, 1955; . (b) The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1955; i (c) The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948; {d) The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; () The Environment Protection Act, 1986; uke (f)” The Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Act, 1862; , {g) The Municipality Acts; Acts; (h) The Municipal Corporation Acts; vit 1987; () Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention} Act, 1987;, n Explosives Act; etc. ? | Tees that the strict construction must be applied inthe intrprotation of I's the cardinal pri ae periods, the Kings used to impose severe punishments ica the con statutes. ore ‘and minor offences. Statute 1 Edw imposed the death penalty on apital punishme Scanned with CamScannerfnepelaton of Penal Statues and Sates of Taxation, Ele 179 Like this other sub-sections impose penalty and punishments for non-complying the provisions of this statute, ‘THIRD WAY: PUNISHMENTS: Imposing punishments is the essential ingredient of the penal: a! For the'graver offences, imprisonment (rigorous or simple) is prescribed. For the tighter offences penalty by way of cash is prescribed. For certain offences, either imprisonment or penalty or both may be prescribed. We have seen such provisions in the Indian Penal Code, 1860. (a) A steals B's car. (b) © drives the car without licence. (6) D possesses the driving licence, but crives it with rash and ‘ teang eon ‘ , but drives i wi ind negligently and causes the accident c The gravity of the punishment hall not be equal in all thes 's crim {Saul wt hat. mst be pushed fo tht unde the LPO. Cust be panisheg unde the Tale Rules, by way of monotary penalty. D's criminal act is more serious than A. Hence D is Frater ae 105 20478 ofthe IPC. Like ths tho punishment must be appropriate with the offence. to Topic “Measurement of Punishment” in the Jurisprudence SLS.] FOURTH WAY: JURISDICTION, ‘AND PROCEDURE: The criminal act must be inquired and tried b the procedure tne timinal Procedure Code, 1973 explains the jurisdiction ofthe Courts Of. This Code is not a penal statute in its entirety contains the provisions of ‘cognizance and non-cognizance' 4 ’ prosecution ana the eee cumizanee’ and also states about the ‘procedure to be followed by the Example: {rhe Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Act, 1952is nota penal statute eee aantanded for the benefit of workers. Itis a social and beneficial legislation. However, it 's certain penal provisions. The penalties are prescribed by the Legislature against the employer/owner who fails to obey the provisions of this Act. Ste 14-AB(EPFMP At Corin flece tobe cognztis~ Nailing sig snd in Gade Criminal Procedure, 1073, sneering aut ipaynen of coneatoy ta enpoerpan ‘under this Act shall be cognizable. a aa ee eee ea See. 14.AC, Cognzance and al efffences-— (1) No cut shal iak opnizanc of any olercepunishble unde is Atte Scheme, the Pension Scneme oe insurance Serene except ona teparn wring fe facie censting such offence made wi he res sarcton ofthe Call Powder ard Carmine or such cer fier as may be auered by he Cantal Govern, by neteaton nthe oil arte thie Beall by an Inspec appt under Seton Ta (2) No court inferior to that of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate ofthe Fist Clas shall ty offence under {his Act ofthe Sctieme, the Pension Schomo er the insurance Scheme. INGREDIENTS OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION IN THE PENAL STATUTES (SN) 4. tis the cardinal principe that eriminal statutes shouldbe construed strictly. Strict Construction is the general rule of construction. 2. The burden of proof lies upon the prosecution to prove the guity of the accused beyond the reasonable doubts. 3, The burden‘of proof of the criminal act is more heavily imposed in criminal cases than in cil cases. 4, Penal statutes cannot operate with retrospective effect : is ar punishment 6. inima poeiia corporalis est major qualibet pecuniaria. (The smallest corporal Minima posta corpora starr Coute aays 2 ae m Mg corporal punishment. ? innocent should nat be cape trom the punishment, but one innocents Fe en care ete able interpretations, one favouring the accused and another in hed. If there are two possit : Punished, ree a he Cout mst an tvards the accused ard acquit i. 8. Omnisinnovatio plus novitateperturbat quam utltate prodest. (Everyuncondemne person is held by the law as innocent.) her wrong. 9. One wrong cannot justify anct! ; i (mall cases involving ibusjudiciis, ot aetati et imprudentiae suecurritur. (| r in ban the age and inexperience of the wrong-doer should be taken into In omnibus poen the penal sentence, pectunt in favour of that wrong-doer.) 40. No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. 41. No person accused of any offence shal be compelled tobe witness against himself. Scanned with CamScannerFal The Interpretation of Statutes 42. Incase of two reasonable and possible constructions, one which leans in favo of accused should be preferred. 13.: If the prosecution fails to prove the guilty of the accused beyond the reasonable doubt, and to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court may give benefit of doubt to the accused, ; 414, While construing the penal statute, if any reasonable doubt or ambiguity is seen in the provision, it must be resolved in favour of the person who would be liable to the penalty. The Court must always see that the person to be perialised comes fairly and squarely within the plain words of the enactment. 15. 416. Maxwell writes: “The effect of the rule of strict construction might be summed up by saying that, Where an equivocal word or ambiguous sentence leaves a reasonable doubt of its meaning which the canons of interpretation fail fo solve, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the subject and against the legislature which has failed to explain itself. If there is no ambiguity, and the act or omission in question falls clearly within the mischief of the statute, the construction of a penal statute differs ite, if at all, from that of any other.” IMPORTANT POINTS: A. In State of A.P. vs. Nagoti Venkataramana (1996) 6 SCC 409), the Supreme Court held: “In the interpretation of penal provisions, strict construction is required to be adopted and if any real doubt arises, necessarily the reasonable benefit of doubt would be extended to the accused.” B. In S. Gopal Reddy vs. State of AP. (1996) 4 SCC 596), the Supreme Court observed: “One of the cardinal rules of interpret h al statute must be strictly construed. The Courts have, thus, to be wa iments are not allowed to influence their judgment, one way orthe 0 n golden thread passing through criminal ill proved guilty and that the guilt of an “They must carefully as: |» the place of proo ting the easy co N oF surmise or conjectures to (ety while at the same time not cies in the evidence result in _ fA decide the case in a realistic 96) 5 SCC 1) (SN) ing paddy in excess of the limit 1965. Since they had no licence e’. According to the definition any r deemed as'a dealer. The Orde _ transit would fall within the expression fs opining that mere tran, * 1 not amountto storing ‘Sporting the within the meaning Scanned with CamScannerLolerpretation of Pena Statutes and Statute of Taxation, Ete Ly .! Tt HE STRICT CONSTRUCTION IN THE PENAL STATUTES — oa ; MENS REA 1. Extn men 0a wauay tence 2, Thelin wore te say, cre can ba commas a ast aS o.oo on mee ot Pm Wh be tg — tn 5. “Mens Rea” in ty nal es os or o* a aera (08. # Rvs. Tlson (a : = eeeamee eS! : Ps 2 raster a nn om ae (AIR 1951 sc 204), eo cists cawan ts 14, Mathan KA. vs, ki 2 = 2 preinhnante 15. Santaran Sukumaran va, Kran aa = oi ent tant us t 17 Section 420 (Cheating) “ 18, "Persona * a lon at Elections" (ging. a 6 The otence ct abeimet an ednpincy be (220, Daya Bhsi Chagganbhal Thakkar YS. Sat of Gujarat (a 7 021. The aw of burden of proot in ineany Ree ms 2, The Distinction between Cu a7 ea See” Clie Hort Scion 2 tude faion = ANSWER: ; = MEANING: “Actus non facit ‘reum nisi me This maxim is popularly known as “Mens Rea’ plain words of the statute are read subject toa presumption, which may berebte sumption, whi th tule of law — that no crime can be committed unless there is mens rox" ad INTRODUCTION: Mens Rea isa well stted principle ofthe Common Law in England. in every Statutory offence, Mens Reais an essential ingredient. itis presumed that te wrong-doer di the offence with an ill intention. ‘The prosecut tion must prove the ill intention (Mens Rea) of the accused to prove the offence committed. Only in the cases where the applicability of Mens Rea is ‘excluded by the Statutes, then only it can be exempted. Oniy in few exceptional circumstances, the doctrine of Mens Rea is excluded. Some of them are-— 4. Public Nuisance; x Mens Rea means “Ill Intention”. itis sid: “The 2. Cases, which are not criminal in nature, but are prohibited in the interest of public atlarge Example: ‘The Environmental Pollution cases, deficiency of services under the Consumer Protection Laws, etc. The Indian Code does not enquire into the Mens Rea of an industrialist who negligently pollutes the environment and releases hazardous ; and noxious effluents into the : aimospterean ‘causes danger and harm to the publicat large. The manufacturer or occupier supplies goods or services and causes the injury ‘to the consumers. 3. Cases of criminal nature, but are proceedings conducted in the codes as civil proceedings and safeguard the civil rights of citizens. Statutes relating to public health, ms : This maxim has been applied to all common law crimes in England toute eect 8 scrote a se eT an 4#R. vs. PRINCE (1875 LR 2 CCR 154) (sn) Brief Facts: Honry Prince loved Annie Philips an unmarried minor atte took awayhet-vith an P tieging that A ther ofgirLteported tothe police against Henry Prince alleging th inet Se naa iter daughter, below the age of 16 years. The Police arrested rince had illegally taken peninor dauphier, Scanned with CamScanner186 The interpolation of Statutes Henry Prince and filed the criminal proceedings against him. Henry Prince was tried for having unlawlully taken away an unmarried girl below the age of 16 years, out of the lawful possession and against the will of her father / the natural guardian. ‘The accused contended that he was u the belief that she completed 18 years. He also contended that the girl herself told hi age moré than 18 years. The accused also argued that hé had no mens rea (ill intention). JUDGMENT: Jury found upon evidence that before the defendant took her away the git! had tor him that she was 18. However Jury held that the belief of accused about the age of the girl was no defence. Iwas argued that the statute did not insist on the knowledge of the accused that the gir wa under 16 as necessary for conviction, the Doctrine of Mens Rea, should nevertheless, be applied and conviction be set aside in the options of criminal intention. 16 Judges tried the case ‘and all but one unanimously held that Henry Prince was guilty of kidnapping. PRINCIPLES: A mixed question of fact and law was treated as a question of fact, if the accused was misled into an aware of fact on account of an error of law. The jury formulated certain important rules, while disposing this case:-— 1. That when an act is in itself plainly criminal, and is more severely punishable if certain circumstances co-exist, ignorance of the existence of such circumstances is no answer to a charge for the aggravated offence. 2. That where an act is prima facie innocent and proper, unless certain circumstances co-exist, then ignorance of such circumstance is an answer to the charge. 3. That the state of the defendant's mind must amount to absolute ignorance of the existence ofthe Circumstances which alters the character of the act, or to a belie in its non-existence. 4. Where an act which is in itself wrong, under certain circumstances, criminal a person who does the wrong act cannot set up as a defence that he was ignorant of the facts which turned the wrong | into a crime Where a statute makes it penal to do an act under certain circumstances, itis a question uponthe wording and object of the particular statute whether the responsibilty of ascertaining that he circumstances exist is thrown upon the person who does the act or not. In the former case his knowledge is immaterial. #R. vs. Tolson (1889 23 QBD 168) (sn) Brief Facts: The accused was tried under Section 87 of the Offences Against the Persons Act, 1861 (similar provision in India is Section 494 (Bigamy) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860) fr having committed the offence of bigamy. Under that Section, twas an offence fora married person to contract a second marriage during the life time of the husband or wife, as the case may be. In this case, Mrs, Tolson married in 1880. In 1881, Mr, Tolson deserted her and went away. She made all possible enquiries about him and ultimately came to know that her husband Mr. Tolson died in a ship accident in America; Therefore, supposing herself to be a widow, she married another man in 1887, The whole story was known tothe second husband and the marriage was not secrecy Inthe meantime, Mr. Tolson suddenly ro-appeared and prosecuted Mrs. Tolson for bigamy. Inthe trial Court, she was convicted for imprisonment on the ground that the belief in good faith and on the Teasonable facts about the death of husband was no defence to the charge of bigamy. She appealed to the Court of Appeal. The question before the Court of Appeal was whether Mrs. Tlso had guilty intention (mens rea) in committing the offence of bigamy. JUDGMENT: The Court of Appeal by majority set aside the conviction on the ground that a bom? fide bflief about the déath of the first husband at the time of second marriage was a good defence in the offence of bigamy. It also opined that the statutory limitation for the second marriage seven years was completed at the time of her second martiage and she informed the real facts © the second husband. Hence it acquitted the accused, —___-Ssela®@—¢ 8a [cL jay ge? R. vs. WHEAT AND STOCK (1921) 2 KB 119) Vatisa, (SN) used/an uneducated man handed over his case to his solicitor for obtaind divorce tom ie fret ‘wife. He believed that as soon as he handed over his case to his, soli he obtained divorce from his first wife, Believing iin good faith, he married another ai first wife prosecuted him. He pleaded that he did not know the procedure of law and he He, that he obtained the divorce and with bona fideintention he married ancine lady. The Cae ig accept his version and convicted him forthe offence for bigamy on the gare Tio, belief about the dissolution of marriage would be no defence tothe charg " divorce would be obtained from a Court of law. : Scanned with CamScannerEy ‘The Interprotation of Statutes. = 7a. The Directive Printiples set proximate goals. When itis the hopes and ast ons ete Conlin, iisthrough tese glasses the Cou. {lock ‘tan, cfexaning sale a0 TC nsution being sul goneris, where cosnitonal issues ee vision! or naar vision Tye rls which may have relevance when legislative enactment gy consi in 1977 the And amendment procaimed nda as a Socialist Repu inerproted may be mrs ptroduced info tho Preamble (0 the Constitution, The implication of The word ‘social alist, which has now become the centre ofthe hopes a 2spratong induction ore re guide and inspire al that is enshrined in the articles of the Centon, os 220 a ‘vibrant throbbing socialist welfare society’ in the place of a ‘feudal exploit leary or aril ofthe Constitution itis that the Court seeks interpret, whatever statutes | society itaional vat is sought to be questioned, the Court must stive 10 9iv® such | se fon as roma march and progress towards a Socialite emocrai® state" | 1, vs. Union of India (1989) 3 SCC 151), the Supreme Court hel: | Pe teton which ane advance the object and purpose of te leisaton should be followed ang struction which would result in reducing a provision of the Act to a dead letter or to def feat the of ep should be avoided without doing any | violence to the language. ‘end purpose of the statute! i aes : i joner & Osmania University thra University vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner 2 vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (AIR 1986 SC 463) i f the Andhra Pradesh Hi “These two appeals were directed against the judgments o igh Wit Pttion fled by the appellants heren namely theAndha Uriversiy ana he i it 3d to the two Universities by ‘Osmania University challenging the legality and validity ofthe notices issue tar Regional Provdent Fund Commissioner of AP. intimating that the Departments of Publcator and Press wherein printing presses were being run by the two Universities, were liable for coverage ar er the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and caling upon te two Universities to submit their monthiy returns and remit the amounts of contribution as required by the Act JUDGMENT: The Supreme Court cismissed wo appeals and gave judgmentin favour of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. PRINCIPLES: The Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952s a benefice piece of social welfare legislation aimed at promoting and securing the well being of the employees and the Court will not adopt a narrow interpretation which will have the effect of defeating the vey object and purpose of the Act. Once itis found that there is an establishment which is a ‘factory ‘engaged in an ‘industry’ specified in Schedule | and employing 20 or more persons, the provisions@t theAetwilgetatvaciedo fhe case anditmakes no difference tots legal poston thatthe estabishres | is run by alarger organisation which may be carrying on other additional activities falling outside. | is | Brief Facts: Court aismissing two Writ Petition CONSTRUCTION TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH OTHER PROVISIONS - THE HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION 11. Wrte note on Harmonious Constucton (22. Discuss ne nl of Harmenious Contsion 122. Werte hel olson gi he le of hemor conection inert of tates, 4. Ciscut the appl in teprating Wo eoficng Povo in he sat. ANSWER: MEANING: harmonious. (ad) = in harmony, concordant, symmetrical, Harmony. (n.) = agreement; agreeable effect of arrangement Harmonious Construction. = When two provisions in the same statute or in different statut* contain different purposes to achive, itis the duty of the Court to bring harmony between te Itis called the ‘Harmonious Construction’ ‘The rule of interpretation requires that while inteipreting two Inconsistent or, obvidusly repugnatt provisions of an Act, the Courts should make an effort to sointerpret the provisions as to harmonis® them so that the purpose of the Act may be given effect to and both the provisions may be allowes operate without rendering either of them ctiose. This is explained by the legal maxim as folov® ‘Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretendi modus.’ (To interpret and” such a way as fo harmonise laws with laws isthe best mode of interpretation.) Scanned with CamScanner20) SeProtation o INGREDIENTS OF HARMON IQS cet Sta Sasser ator 2007 4. ltisawell-known rule of i ONSTRUCTION; Fetation that aa Provision of reted 2. itis the duty of the egy, Void a possible Confit mo 2 Statute is required to be interpr Regulation, if po: 1 various provisions of a statute © hay Pi sible, and to ayer USly construe di oe ifferent provisions of any Act or Rule or 3 Qnaconspectis ofthe care jay, thesis recone ec a Begum vs. Prem cnaga so ‘ies pee Tels down the folowing principles in Sultana (i) tis the duty of the courts ioe to construe the pr ‘avoid a he; ene lORS Which appear isan Cah between two sections ofthe Act and. as to harmonise then Pear to bein conflict with ach other in such a manner. | oa a statute $2nnGt be used to defeat the other provisions TINSS l impossible to effect reconcliatn betuoes I thas to be borne in mind by Provisions in an Act, whic interpreted that, if Possible, larmonious constructior (iv) The Courts have also to ke provisions as a ‘dead letter’ ep in mind that an i or ‘useless lumber’ interpretation which reduces one of the ‘Snot harmonious construction. i used in the Section. 5 Where there appears to be inconsistency in two Sections ofthe same Act, the Principle of Harmonious Construction should be followed in avoiding a head on clash, ahead ven tos lightly assumed that what the Parliament has given with one hand, ittook away withthe, other. ‘he Provisions of one section of statute cannot be used to defeat hose of another unless t's Impossible to reconcile the same (Krishan Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan (1991 (4) SCC 268) i confi 's well & The Rule of Harmonious Construction of apparently ent tery prov i a established for upholding and giving effecttoallthe provisions as esse, tr avoiding the interpretation which may render any of them ineffective or of Singh vs. Rakha (1992) 3 SCC 55)) . 7. Harmonious construction:should in consonance with the intention of legislature, (Union of ce ee ee ae subordinate legislation aise. (Aject Singh i eto the subordina | & Harmonious construction is Crane) (4) soc 343) Singhvi vs. State of Rajasthan ( ty Tas Flowers ew the Courts should apply them to stauton rues, However fed results. (Keshav Chandra Joshi vs. Union of 8. Inapplying this rule of construction, they should avoid absurd or unintend ere is statute is possible which Wr tons omen nse Pa bi eee statute, then the Same vs. Tuva} Amrinder Singh (AIR 1688 {thers te object ofthe tate CN leads to a conflict betwe S to its words which have n mos rovison she toe apo pes ae "The Cour nite cone ng rear cot ted the court should construe it in a aeeerresry et anc ne 280 Fo 1a Hardware Stores vs. B. Mohan LaiSowcar Object of the statute ee eaningful. (Hameediia harmonious way tom (AIR 1988 SC 1060) ite distinct and separate. rotpceble er to rovers recut ‘io Rt "2 Harmonious construct "authority (Al een ee seca in effet papers © Fuation violates the words ofthe provision or 13. A statutory provision which int recs “csdttaraanteveretepoc matt ono ni Ne Policy of the Act. (Needle Led. (AIR 1981 SC 1299) Scanned with CamScannera The (ee T istency of those Provisiofiy tn ne Pr provisions of statute, apparent inconsistere ry ot Naight ofthe object ang construing harmonised and recon: (Raghbirvs. State of Haryana (AIR 1981 SC 2037)) 0 ther related statute Prose ofthe legistation In question: IMPORTANT POINTS: A Sudha Agrawal v iciFac rantwas th lanalord othe varanasi Tepe rn ene ei >] \ ial purpos Oss. The ground floor of the premises was Dena ised for the non-residential purposes, Pree roar wae bang used foF residential purpose Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) According to Section a af the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulafion of eng a tae ‘Act, 1972, a tenant m: te evicted from the leased premises, 0 act ert andor te andra proves thatthe tenant or Nis family members have a residential | building inthe same city ti it fror tant fied an appleaton fr evetion ofthe tena qh appt ed on ing are bora fie purposo 8° accomodate NaS, {iso took the plea that the son of the tenant who was ordinarily residing ca had constructed ae dential house in the city of Varanasi, The respondent denied the allega ‘The Rent Control Authority took the view that since the premises were let out to the tenant partially for the non-residential purposes residential purposes, the benefit of Explanation (to the fourth proviso of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of he ‘Act was not available tothe landlord. The Appellate Authority also cont 10th Addi, District Judge and others (1 999) 6 SCC 392) (SN) ‘ premises in dispute in Varanasi. The promises sm the premises under the 1972 Act firmed the decision of the Rent Control Authority, te landlord fled a writ petition before the High Court. Itwas dismissed JUDGMENT: The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Rent Control Authority applying the qule of harmonious construction between various provisions of the 1972 Act. PRINCIPLE! jency when a building shall be deamed to have fallen vacant. Sub-section (3) of Section 12 provides that in case of a residential building ifthe tenant of any member of his family builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant state or gets vacateda residential building in the same city, municipality, town, notified area or town area in which the | building under tenancy is situate, he shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenaney. Section 16 provides that a landlord can apply to the District Magistrate for release of the premises which has fallen or deemed to have fallen vacant if the premises are bona fide required. Thus, in cases where the premises have fallen vacant or deemed to have fallen vacant the landlord necessarily has to apply before the appropriate authority for release of the premisesin his fevour and he can get an order of release of the premises only when he satisfies the Prescribed ‘Authority in respect of his bona fide requirement for the premises. If Explanation (i) to the fourth proviso of Section 24 (1 )(a) is to be read as creating a presumption in favour of the landlord in respect of the requirement of the landlord as bona fide, in that event the said Explanation would come into conflict with Section 16 of the Act. (i) Itisa well-known rule of interpretation that a provision of a statute is required to be interpreted in such a manner which may avoid a possible conflict with various provisions of a statute. B. Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Sardar Arjun Singh Ahluwalia (1999) 8 SCC 724) Brief Facts: Arjun Singh Ahluwalia, the late assessee, was a ; . Was appointed as an employee under a" agreement dated 24-4845 vith Kalyana Mis Li, forthe years 1946-1950 ‘atindore, At , there was no income-tax in the Kingdom of Indore. There were di res and the agreement was terminated on 9-11-1948. The emy ate peer e . ployer-company di arrears of salary. Arjun Singh filed suit for recovery of arrears of salary. As perth aa eeceean amount of Rs. 10,000 was paid bet : 3-3 aaa paid between 1-4-1965 and 30-3-1966 and Rs 65,532 between 1-4-1966 and 31° The income-tax authority imposed tax on these two amounts in the hands of the assessee forth Assessment Years (‘AY’) 19¢ ti Assessment Years AY’) 1966-67 and 1967-68 respectively, Section 16 ofthe Incomesax AC+ Sec. 15, it ‘The following income shall be chargeable to income tax under the head ‘salaries’ — (@)_any salary due fro Whether i der - ‘an employer of a former employer to an assessee in the previous ¥°* (0) any salary paid or allowed to him in the previous year by or on behalf of an employer o* former employer though not due or before it became due to him; . — Scanned with CamScanneree way of penal ty as well as discnarge orders Dy bead ny. jis purel an sare oar acenpoey eee a ae Pe ered different types of situations and circumstances under whic va =a LEM: Awas working'as a foreman in the newspaper company. The management a PROBLEM tthe respondent, The question involved inthe legality and validity of he "CSE Merge eae Tespondent eninlcyes Mind algo called for the decision as to whether the said ‘discharge’ order Emounted to ‘unfair labour practice’ on the part of the management. order of penalty and tnat too of SOLUTION: In Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Shankar Prasad (1999) 6 SCC 270), the Supreme Court gave judgment in favour of the workman. 2.0. CASUS OMISSUS f Casus Omissus. {Q.1, What is meant by the Rule of Casus Omissus? Write an essay on Ri 2, Meaning and object of the Rule of Casus Omissus. (su) 3. 8S. Bolavs, B.D. Sardana ys. State of Haryana (1997) 8 SCC 622) (sy) 4, OS. Singh and another vs. Union of India and another (1986) 7 SCC 37). sy Q5. The Court cannot fill in words deliberately omitted. (sy) (6 DISTINCTIONBETWEEN WWTERPRETATIONBY SCIENCE OF LAWJURISPRUDENCE’ AND INTERPRETATION BY THE COURT, 7. Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer (1990) 3 SCC 682). (sn) 8. Mistakes in the provisions is) ANSWER: MEANING: casus omissus. - an omitted case; a point not provided for by a statute, Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. (A case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted.) Casus omissus et oblivioni datus disposition! communis juris relinquitur. (A case, omitted and consigned to oblivion, is left to the disposal of the common law.) (oblivion, = the state of being unaware or unconscious of what is happening around one.) Broom in his Legal Maxims explains the meaning and purpose of Rule of Ca issus as follows: “it is true that, when the words of a law ‘extend not to an inconvenience. oy lenariae do to those which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further than they reach, by saying itis casus omissus, and that the law intended qua frequentius accidunt. But on the other hand, itis no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to an. inconvenience seldom happenir that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it hay ei Mt seldom. A casus omissus ought not to be created by the interpretation, save in sore cose of strong necessiy. Where, however, a casus omissus does realy occur, either through Ihe rerpenence of the legislature, or on the principle quod semi aut bis existit proetereunt le, islators, ho ie is that the particular case, thus left not provided for, must be disposed of aecorving to wie of existed before such statute,” ae Ae Lal IMPORTANT POINTS: A. Due to several reasons of negligence or inefficiency, the legi : terms in the statutes. It is called ‘casus omissus’. In that cen the Courtesan es 4 Supply the word or words, which the legislature omitted. Because the basic rule is that the lav making is vested in the legislature, and interpretation is vested in the Courts. The Courts me not supposed or expected to work as the legislature, and fill in gaps in the statutes, ifthe Courts do fill in the gaps in the provisions of the statutes, and rectify the casus omissus, it means the Courts Scanned with CamScannerpe SOT TE PS Cerra pre el fi lore late even afer qe na tules to those continue 10 apply to the pers % the matter the emits even after the pre-evistng rule Shee ie lO ‘Partment (Buildi ‘the Haryana Servic: i Branch) Respectively Act, 1996 ngs and Roads Branch) (Public Health rattan eee I establishment of that State. Section oe nt ‘Orceable with retros; igation Rules shall continue to a at Act oi November, 1966”, ihe persons who wel SOLUTION: IhS.s. Bolavs, B.D. Court upheld the 1995 Act, but . Sardana vs. State of Haryana (1997) 8 SCC 522), the Supreme c. repealed these words in Section 25, ee ‘S. Singh and another vs. Union of India and another (1996) 7 SCC 37) (SN) nt ee The appellant was working as a Deputy Superintendent of Police. He | ad requisite length of service for the promotion to the higher post. Due to an adverse remark made in the Confidential report, his name was not included in the Select List of the concerned year, but his junior Ashwini Kumar was included therein. Subsequently, consequent upon expunction of the adverse remarks, his name was included in the Select List of a later year, and he was allowed to officiate against a senior post of IPS and was appointed to the IPS retrospectively w.e¥. a date subsequent to the date of inclusion of his junior in the Select List but much earlier to the date on which he started actual officiating in the Senior post. ca The appellant filed a proceeding before the Central Administrative Tribunal contending that he must have been declared as senior than Ashwini Kumar referring to the IPS (Recruitment)Rules, 1954, the IPS (Appointment by Promotion) Rules, 1954, the IPS (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955 and the IPS (Regulation of Seniority) Rules 1954. The CAT gave decision against the appellant. JUDGMENT: The Supreme Court gave judgment in favour of the appellant and set aside the decision of the.CAT. = _- ome PRINCIPLES: (i) The expression ‘officiated continuously in a senior post’ in Rule 3 (3)(b) of the Seniority Rules must be construed to mean holding a senior post on the officiating basis prior to the substantive appointment on such senior post. Since a person cannot be treated es officiating Scanned with CamScanneri gree we vires of statutory legislations: a ne Tribune tttCh creates the particular Tribunal challenged) by overlooking the Turisdiction of the Tribunal concemog 1. Whats meant by ‘non obstante clause? Discuss the problems arising out of ind finalty clauses inthe Act? ° 19 Out of ind [Also rete ‘Scriminate use of such clauses. What about “10 Tope Exclusion of Jurisdiction of Couns on ebstante clause In nterrataton of statue, Q.3. Non obstante clause (sn) ANSWER: MEANING: 2.2. Explain the effect of n Non obstante. = not despite the fact that withstanding - (aqj.) Scanned with CamScanner“no ntepetaton of Stalls mo EXAMPLES: (2), Section 38 of the seo. 38. Assignabit 2 toe cna, eid arama wer which ne wade ars i 1) ariel 7 ofthe Constitution of nai runs 8 flOS * of cera migrants to Pakistan — Neb poten, to, gated tom he ery ‘eg asin of nda ‘Trade Marks Act, 1999 runs as follows: ark. emieiny fregitres 960 an a, set the Prov rat i of te business cae ata registered or of some .ont Notwithstanding anythingin any other law “Jone of this Chapter, be assignable and srmed and in respect ether of al the goods ly of those goods or services. respect of whic standing anything n Aces 5 and 6,9 An 7 Ri oe ar tothe terior now included in pevonanres ater eas oar ina Section 38 ofthe Trad Marks Act 198 Porter i "in Article 7 are called ‘non obstante c! ” va thing in Aticles 5 and 6,in Arti a a hind 2 en fur he begirg of section o causes of secons of Such no ee inthe Rules framed under the concerned statutes. ‘bject of non obstante clause is to give overriding y ora ater ow retin in the non obstante clause, Hany sont wine between ie a ‘means the clause or section, having non obstant , per c ‘ostrueted by the other provisions of the same statute or any other law. Teepe soto carat Me er cena of arin pron of adlah Atle 7 does not confer ary rights tothe persons who had migrated to Pakistan after the fist day of March, 1847. The persons, who had migrated to Pakistan, are not the citizens of India. Hence they are not enliled to enjoy the rights conferred by the Constitution of India. This is explained by the non obstante clause of Article 7. IMPORTANT POINTS: A. In Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata (AIR 1987 SC 117), the Supreme Court observed: “Aclause beginning with the expression ‘notwithstanding anything contained’ in the Act or in some particular provision in the Act or in some particular Actor in any law for the time being in force, orin any ‘contract is more often than not appended toa section in the beginning with a view to give the enacting Part ofthe section in case of conflict and overriding effect over the provision of the Act or the contract ‘mentioned in the non obstante clause. Itis equivalent to saying that in spite of the provisions of the Act or any other Act mentioned in the non obstante clause or any contract or document mentioned the enactment following it will hve its full operation orthat the provisions embraced in the non obstante clause would not be an impediment for an operation of the enactment.” 8. M. Venugopal vs. Divisional Manager, LIC of India, Machilipatnam, A.P. and another (1984) 2 SCC 323) (sn) Brief Facts: The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has been enacted by the Parliament with the object tosolve the industrial disputes and to secure the employmentto the employees. The Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 has been enacted by the Parliament solely for the management ofthe LIC. Several provisions of the Corporation Act, 1956 including S. 48 (2)(cc), (2-A), (2-B) & (2-C) were ‘amended in by the LIC (Amendment) Act, 1981. The non obstante clause inserted in Section 48 of the Corporation Act excluded the operation of Industrial Disputes Act to the extent its provisions which are in conflct with the rules framed under Sec. 48 (2)(cc). The appellant contended that the amendments made to Corporation Act, 1856 were violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and depriving the benefit ofthe provisions of ID Acttto the LIC employees JUDGMENT: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the non obstante clause and other provisions of the Corporation Act, 1956. PRINCIPLES: The amendments introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act have clearly ‘excluded the provisions of the Industrial Disputes’ Act so far as they are in conflict with the rules framed under Sections 48 (2)(cc). The result thereof would be that termination of the service of the appellant shall not be deemed tobe a ‘retrenchment within te meaning of Section 2 (00) even if sub-section (bb) had not been introduced in the said Section. Once Section 2 (00) of the 1D Actis not attracted, there is no question of application of Section 25-F on the basis of which the termination of the service ofthe appellant can beheld tobe invall. The terion ithe serves ofthe appelet ‘od of probation is in terms of the order of appointment read with Regulation 44 of the fegaatons. hich shal ‘be deemed to be now Rules under Section 48 (2)(cc) of the Corporation Act C. Distinction between ‘Non obstante clause! vs. clause or section to have its own operational power, provision or Act. Whereas the phrase ‘subject to! ma effect over the provision or Act ‘subject to! ‘Non obstante’ clause makes he ‘and also gives overriding effect over the 1g the clause or section to yi Id to another “Scanned with CamScannerwatt Ne doctrine of efy.2t Ze © the mean tis dessa word a ie 7 of a its application i tobe em generis This doctrine wn associated with it, Tee ee sociated in the ‘ade to the context i, bled by the Court also bone the statute or the st and the setting in in a catena of cases 0 being invoked to cull out the fluor ule. Equal the doctrine or tors care fo be used or ecutive,” iment by removing ambiguity in tsuncera ree? ope is its understanding ofthe statute THE RULE Oj 11. “Specie words which F EJUSDEM GENERIS pape h precede are controlled by the rords Fiusdem Genera od by the general words which folow."— Comment inte Q2. Write a note on Ejusdem Generis Rule. vee ah Q3. Rule of ‘jusdem Generis’, Q4,. Meaning of Ejusdem generis. oe. Q5. Mirch vs. Russell (12 LRA. 125). ie Q6. (i) cow; (ii) goat; (ii) horse; (iv) dog. 2 7. Asst. Collector, Central Excise vs. Ramdev Tobacco Coinpany, Guntur (1861) 2 SCC es 8. K. Veeraswami vs. Union of india and others (1991)'8 SCC 655) om a 9. Claridge ard Company Limited vs, Collector of Central Excise, Pune (1991) 2SCC 229) a Qt. Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Shankar Prasad (1999) 6 SCC 270). (sn) ANSWER: MEANING: Ejusdem generis = of the same kind; of the same nature. Rule of Ejusdem Generis. = The rule says that where particular words are followed by general words, the general words are limited to the Same kind as the particular words. It is a well known maxim + of construction: It is more restricted than the word ‘analogous’. The rule of ejusdem generis applies where there is specific mention of a distinct category followed by general words. The specific words which precede are controlled by the general words which follow. In Mirch vs. Russell (12 L.R.A. 125), the House of Lords held: “By the application of the maxim Ejusdem generis, which is only an illustration or specific application of the broader maxim noscitura sociis, general and specific words which are capable of an analogous, meaning Being associated together take colour from each other, so that the general words are restricted 0 a sense, analogous, to the less general.” Scanned with CamScanner114 The Intorprotation of Statutes EXAMPLES: In 3rd class, the science teacher asks the student point out the animal, which does Not cope with other animals:— (i) cow; (il) goat; (il) horse; (iv) dog ae nth horse eat gross and pure vegetarians. The dog does not g Hadar Sonveaetaiaty Hance Omatinio ere Hee ‘(iv) the dog’ to the abet Question. Intis example, cow, goat and horse belong|o the same nature, i.e. Ejusdem generic and dog as a separate kind “i ives some money to his son-B and says him to go to market and buy rice, dal, Sugar, y wagetablee and ‘anything’ teeded forthe home. This phrase ‘anything’ is restricted withing “ meaning of A that it must be useful to home that too particularly for the food for the members of the family. If the son-B purchases a tape-recorder assuming himself that tape-recorder is also included in ‘anything’. It becomes wrong interpretation of the words of A. ‘Anything: must be of the ‘same kind’ such as rice, dal, sugar, vegetables, soaps, fruits, etc, This ig called the Rule of ‘Ejusdem Generis’ ‘Anything’ must be of the same kind which testator or legislature intends. The thing must not be deviated from the intention of the sayer, testator or legislature. (¢) Section 1 of the Sunday Observance Act, 1677 (England) provides that ‘no tradesman, artifice, Horkman, labourer or other person whatsoever shall do or exercise any world labour business, or work of their ordinary callings upon the Lord's Day works of necessity and charly ~“ly excepted’. The phrase ‘or other person whatsoever" in the Section is to be gamed Ejusdem generis with those which precede them so that an estate agent is not within the meaning of Section. (4) To-day in the competitive exams, the examiners have opted the ‘Ejusdem Generis’ principlein felting the question papers. Each question is set, and four, viz, (), (b), (c), (d) are given, Outet these four, only one is correct. To point out the correct one, the student applies the rule of Ejusciem Generis (of the same kind) and points the thing which dose Not reconcile with the other three. IMPORTANT POINTS: A Asst. Collector, Central Excise vs, y Ramdev Tobacco Company, Guntur (1991) 2. sco 119) (si) Brief Facts: The respondent M/s. Ramdev Tobacco Company, a sole proprietary concern, was c a licensed warehouse at Guntur. The Excis? Authorities-appeliant issued the notices to the respondent ty pay the central excise duty undet Rule 160 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 on Rs, 64,444, The respondent sent reply. The appelatt took action against the respondent after six months. The respondent fied a writ petition before the High Court contending that no action could be taken recovery, as it was time barred under Section 40 (2) of the Central Roce ‘Act, which runs # follows: i ic ther legal proceeding shall be instituted f done ;. 40. (2) No suit, prosecution or ot for anything do ai fo be andor thee after the expiration of sx months from the accrual ofthe cause of scien fom the date of the acto! complained of. Scanned with CamScanner