Practical Inference

Author(s): A. J. Kenny
Source: Analysis , Jan., 1966, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Jan., 1966), pp. 65-75
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Committee

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3326284

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 ANALYSIS 26.3 JANUARY 1966

PRACTICAL INFERENCE*

By A. J. KENNY

IT is beyond doubt that in addition to theoretical reasonin

practical reasoning. We work out, with the aid of logic, not o
is the case but also what we are to do. In practical reason
theoretical we pass from premises to conclusion. The p
perhaps, set out our desires or our duties; they set out also th
the case and the possibilities open; the conclusions are actions
of action. But what are the rules by which we pass from prem
conclusion? What are the criteria for validity in practical i
I know of no logic book which offers a formalisation of
reasoning, nor any philosopher who has set out more than frag
examples of how it should operate. What Kant said of theoretic
to this day true of practical reasoning: the work of Aristotle h
been surpassed.
We may start from a problem which must have struck many
of Aristotle. In the passage on deliberation in Nicomachean Eth
read:
We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not
deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade,
nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does any one
else deliberate about his end. They assume the end and consider how and
by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by several
means they consider by which it is most easily and best produced, while if
it is achieved by one only they consider how it will be achieved by this
and by what means this will be achieved till they come to the first cause,
which in the order of discovery is last. ... And if we come on an impossi-
bility, we give up the search, e.g. if we need money and this cannot be
got; but if a thing appears possible we try to do it.
(1112b18ff., trs. Ross)

Making use of an example which Aristotle gives in a relevant

passage of the Metaphysics, we might set out an example of such deliber-
ation as follows:

This man is to be healed

Iff his humours are balanced, he will be healed
If he is heated, his humours will be balanced
If he is rubbed, he will be heated
So I'll rub him. (1032b19)
Here the balancing of the humours is th
rubbing and heating are means to this; an
*This paper was read at the Deontic Logic Colloqu
Drafts were read at various seminars, to whose mem
Thornton-I am indebted for criticism.
65

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 66 ANALYSIS

but is in the doctor's po

was the last thing to oc
Practical reasoning of t
reasoning: it is done in t
look like a bit of deduct
then S; If Q then R; I
practical reasoning Arist
syllogisms. (It is, of cou
reasoning to be found in
ismos' in Greek is not
Perhaps the fullest such
from the De Motu Anim

I need a covering
A cloak is a covering
I need a cloak
I must make what I need
I need a cloak
I must make a cloak

And the conclusion, 'I must make a cloak', Aristotle observes, is an

action. Practical premises, he says, come in two kinds: the good and
the possible. That is, the premises of practical reasoning set out our
desires or our duties, and the possibilities which the facts of the case
leave open.
I do not know how Aristotle would have formalised the syllogism I
have just quoted. It looks like: 'A is B, C is A, so C is B; B is D, C is B,
so C is D'; but here all the premises are indefinite. According to the
doctrine of the Prior Analytics (26a29,29a7), indefinite premises are to
be treated as particulars. This would make the first half of the syllogism
'Some A is B, some C is A, some C is B'. But all syllogisms of the
form III are invalid. From two particular premises no conclusion
can be derived: if we are to get a conclusion we must take at least one of
the premises as universal. But the premise 'I need all coverings' is
absurd. 'All cloaks are coverings' is true; but the syllogism 'Some A is
B, all C is A, some C is B' is invalid (IAI in first figure). The syllogism
'Some A is B, all A is C, some C is B' is valid (IAI in third figure); but
for this we would need to read the second premise as the falsehood 'all
coverings are cloaks'. I do not see how to make Aristotle's example
valid within the rules of his own syllogistic; nor is this a defect of his
syllogistic, for considered as a theoretical syllogism the argument is
certainly invalid, as would be the precisely parallel argument:
I met an animal
An elephant is an animal
I met an elephant.

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 PRACTICAL INFERENCE 67

The argument I constructed from the M

formally invalid as a piece of theoretic
if Q then R, if P then Q, so P' commits tw
consequent.
Yet, allowing for the archaic medicine and fashion, the fragments
of practical reasoning given by Aristotle do not seem implausible. They
are appropriate verbalisations of reasons of the kind which are operative
with us when we make up our minds what to do. Perhaps the conclusion
'I need a cloak' seems too strong from the premises 'I need a covering,
and a cloak is a covering'; surely I don't really need a cloak, a pair of
trousers will do as well. We can improve Aristotle's example, for our
purposes, by substituting 'want' for 'need'. 'I want a covering, a cloak
is a covering, so I'll make a cloak' would be a perfectly natural piece of
practical reasoning. Again, a waiter may reasonably say to a dissatisfied
customer 'You wanted a steak; this is a steak; this is what you wanted'.
Contrast with this the formally similar, but clearly invalid, argument:
'You are sitting on a chair; this is a chair; this is what you are sitting on'.
The question presents itself: is there any way of rendering formally
valid practical inferences of the Aristotelian type?
Before answering this, let us consider a difficulty from a different
field. Logicians have been unable to agree what rules govern inferences
from one imperative sentence to another; they do not even agree whether
such inference is possible at all. One reason for doubt is this. If there
are rules of inference for imperatives, it is natural to expect them to be
parallel to the rules of inference in the assertoric mood. This natural
expectation can be supported by example: 'Kill the conspirators; Brutus
is a conspirator; so kill Brutus' seems as valid as 'The conspirators are
mortal, Brutus is a conspirator, so Brutus is mortal'. But it does not
seem possible to generalise this, and say that wherever 'It is the case
that q' can be inferred from 'It is the case that p' then 'Make it the case
that q' can be inferred from 'Make it the case that p'. One well known
example concerns disjunction. 'You will post the letter or you will burn
the letter' follows from 'You will post the letter'; but the inference from
'Post the letter' to 'Post the letter or burn the letter' goes against our
intuitions. An analogous difficulty arises with the existential quantifier.
The inference from 'You will vote for the Labour candidate' to 'You will
vote for somebody' is perfectly valid. Yet there seems something wrong
with the inference from 'Vote for the Labour candidate' to 'Vote for
somebody': the first exhortation has hardly been obeyed by somebody
who obeys the second by voting for the Conservative candidate.
Practical reasoning and imperative inference appear to me to be
connected: I believe that a single principle of solution will enable us to
deal with both sets of problems. Following Hare, and ultimately Frege,
I distinguish between the descriptive content of a sentence (e.g. what is

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 68 ANALYSIS

in common between the two sentences 'You will shut the door' and 'Shut
the door') and the mood-indicator of a sentence (e.g. what differentiates
these two sentences from each other). The former Hare calls the phrastic
of a sentence; the latter he now wishes to call the trofpic. An imperative
sentence and the corresponding assertoric sentence have the same
phrastic, but a different tropic. (Cf. The Language of Morals, pp. 18ff.,
where the term 'neustic' is used instead of 'tropic'.)
We must note that if the division between assertoric and imperative
sentences is to be exhaustive, assertoric sentences will have to include
many which would not normally be thought of as assertions, and
imperative sentences will have to include many which would not
commonly be called 'commands'. Suppositions and guesses will have to
be ranked with assertions; and requests and wishes must go with
commands.
This lumping together can be justified. Significant sentences of
many kinds can be regarded as containing descriptions of possible
states of affairs. Which state of affairs a particular sentence describes is
settled by the conventions governing the sense, and the context deter-
mining the reference, of the expressions contained in the sentence. Now
let us suppose that the possible state of affairs described in the sentence
does not, in fact, obtain. Do we fault the sentence, or do we fault the
facts? Do we, for instance, call the sentence false; or do we call the
state of things unsatisfactory? If the former, then we shall call the
sentence assertoric; if the latter, let us call it imperative. The distinction
may be clarified by considering the different relation of an architect's
plan, and a plan in a guidebook, to a building. If the building and the
plan do not agree, then if the plan is in a guidebook, it is the plan which
is wrong; if the plan was made by an architect, then there is a mistake
in the building. Similarly, a list of books functions differently when it is
an order and when it is an invoice; if there is a discrepancy between
books delivered and a list of books, then if the list was an order, there has
been a mistake in despatch; if the list was an invoice, the error is in the
list. Assertoric sentences are like invoices and plans in guidebooks;
imperative sentences are like orders and architects' plans.
Within imperatives we must make a further distinction, suggested
by Hofstadter and McKinsey in their article, 'The Logic of Imperatives'
(Philosophy of Science, 1939, pp. 446ff.). We must distinguish between
fiats and directives. Any sentence in the optative mood, in any tense, will
be a fiat; for instance, 'Please God he'll come', 'If only you were here',
'Would I had never been born'. A directive is a fiat for utterance to an
agent: its point is to give the agent to understand that he is to realise the
fiat. The notion of a directive is more complicated than that of a fiat.
For a fiat to be satisfied, it suffices that the state of affairs described in it

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 PRACTICAL INFERENCE 69

should obtain. But a directive cannot be satisfied unless the state of

affairs is brought about through the agency of the recipient of the
directive. Moreover, it must be brought about by him in some way
because of the utterance of the directive.
Whereas directives are commonly second-person sentences and can
be issued only in a single tense, the future, fiats can be uttered in all
tenses and persons. Some verbs, like 'can' and 'want' have no gram-
matical imperative for use in directives. But any verb which can occur
in an assertoric sentence can occur in a fiat. Fiats, unlike directives,
display a perfect parallelism with assertoric sentences. To each assertoric
sentence, there corresponds a fiat which can be analysed as having the
same phrastic as the assertoric sentence and differing from it only in the
tropic. We could read the tropics, indeed, as 'Est' and 'Fiat': I shall
write 'ep' and 'np' for Est-p and Fiat-p. (Hare, in The Language of
Morals, uses 'please' for the imperative tropic: but this goes with direc-
tives, not fiats.)
Fiats and assertoric sentences, whether written with the resources of
natural languages, or broken up artificially into phrastics and tropics, are
linguistic expressions. They have in common those properties which
belong to their phrastics. 'Ep' and 'ap' do not differ in meaning, to the
extent to which meaning is equivalent to sense plus reference and is
fixed by convention and context. They are sentences with different
moods but the same descriptive content.
Plans and projects are examples of fiats. Practical reasoning, there-
fore, by which we work out plans, and imperative inference, in which
we pass from one directive to another, can both be regarded as exemplify-
ing a single pattern of inference which leads from fiat to fiat. This
consideration, I believe, enables us to solve the difficulties from which
we started.

The germ of the solution is contained in the article 'Imperatives and

Logic' by A. Ross (Philosophy of Science 11, pp. 35ff.). Ross discusses
what he calls 'Jorgensen's dilemma': viz. what are we doing when we
infer a new command from one or more given commands? How can
there be inference where neither premises nor conclusions are either
true or false? Ross asks what values we are to give to the elements of
the logical calculus of imperatives to replace the truth-values of the
ordinary assertoric calculus. He presents three solutions.
First, he suggests that the values corresponding to truth and falsity
should be validity and invalidity. It is obvious, he says, that such inter-
pretation is possible only if these values are objective in the same way
as truth-values are: in that case, the logical deduction of B from A
would mean, he says, that B has objective validity in case A has objective
validity. But such objective validity-he argues-is mythical.
The second solution is that the logical element refers to the satis-

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 70 ANALYSIS

faction of the imperativ

'false' are 'satisfied' and 'not satisfied'. It is obvious that on this solution
there is a complete parallelism between imperative and assertoric logic:
to infer one imperative from another, he says, is to say something about
a necessary connection between the satisfaction of the imperatives in
question. But because this "logic of satisfaction" allows such inferences
as that from 'Post the letter', to 'Post the letter or burn the letter', Ross
concludes: 'Assuredly, it is surely not a logic of such content which we
have in mind in the case of the practical inferences which seem immedi-
ately evident to us. The immediate feeling of evidence does not refer
to the satisfaction of the imperatives, but rather to something like the
"validity" or the "existence" of the imperatives no matter how these
expressions are to be understood.'
Accordingly, he puts forward a third solution: 'the logical element
refers to the "subjective validity" of the imperative'. He explains this
as follows: an imperative A is said to be valid when a certain, further
defined, psychological state is present in a certain person, and to be
non-valid when no such state is present. (This may be a state of demand
in a commander, or a state of acceptance in a subject.) But this "logic of
validity" cannot itself be what is behind the intuitively valid inferences.
For the logic of validity is really the logic of the corresponding assertoric
sentences affirming the presence of the relevant psychological states.
In the logic of validity, the contradictory of ap is Nap, not aNp.
Ross concludes that neither the logic of objective validity, nor the
logic of subjective validity, nor the logic of satisfaction accords with our
intuitive ideas about imperative and practical inference. Where then do
these ideas come from? He writes:

I now advance the hypothesis that the characteristic feature of the existing
practical inferences is that they purport to bring about a combination of
the results to which the logic of satisfaction and the logic of validity may
lead respectively, namely so that the transformation rules of the logic of
satisfaction are complied with, but that relevance with regard to the
validity of the imperative is ascribed to the transformation.

He goes on to try to show that all intuitively valid practical inferences

are only pseudo-logical, the result of mixing up the logic of satisfaction
and the logic of validity. His final conclusion: 'Imperatives can be
constituent parts of genuine logical inferences, but if so, it is simply a
question of a "translation" of logical inferences concerning indicative
sentences about the psychological facts which define the "validity" of an
imperative. In these cases the inferences do not possess the character-
istics of a specific practical inference.' (He applies this conclusion to
law; judges don't really apply laws to particular cases, but make ad hoc
decisions for practical purposes.)

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 PRACTICAL INFERENCE 71

Ross's conclusion seems to me incorrect;

he has the basis of the solution of the p
inference. (1) The logic of satisfaction is i
logic of the corresponding assertoric sent
relations between the phrastics, and these
between the satisfaction of one imperative
imperative in exactly the same way as they
the truth of one assertion and the trut
satisfaction is not the only logic of imp
cerning practical inference and imperat
confusions between two different type
Ross went wrong, I think, was in his disc
The logic of validity as he describes it is n
but a logic of psychological reports (i.
ordinary assertoric logic). Now imperative
and fiats may be the expression of desi
report of a command, and the expression o
desire. 'Valid' and 'invalid', interpreted
'not commanded' would not be the anal
Ross suggests; they would be the analogue
as meaning 'desired' and 'not desired' th
'believed' and 'not believed'. Ross's logic
imperatives corresponding to the alethic lo
assertoric equivalent is not alethic logic b
the logic of reports of people's knowledge
I suggest that what we need in place o
something which we may call the logic
reasoning, I have said, can very well be lo
from one fiat to another according to rule
consists in passing from one assertoric se
rules. The point of the rules for theoretic
one never passes from true assertions to
point, then, of the rules for practical r
they designed to transmit from premise t
Fiats contain descriptions of possible stat
tion satisfies the desires expressed by t
noted, are plans and projects. We can d
projects, between those which are execu
executed. But when we are discussing the
looking for is a plan which will be satisfa
may be unsatisfactory precisely because i
but being executed and being satisfactory
things. Commonly, in discussing plans,
implement them, and try to work out wh

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 72 ANALYSIS

might implement, is m
purposes and gratify our
are looking for is satisfact
We might be inclined to
the state of affairs proje
of affairs may be satisfact
say that a plan was not s
only a plan and not yet
sists in the search for a s
satisfactory unless exe
would have to do everyth
of the things in our po
would be too late.
Obviously, satisfactoriness is a relative notion. Execution and non-
execution, like truth and falsehood, are absolute notions; an assertion is
either true or false, a command is either executed or not. But a plan is
not just either satisfactory or not satisfactory: it may be satisfactory to
some persons and not to others, satisfactory for some purposes and not
for others.
Let us suppose that we desire a certain state of affairs for its own sake,
and not as a means to any further end. Then the fiat which expresses
this desire will, obviously, be a fiat whose satisfaction will satisfy the
desire. Let us call such a fiat a goal-fiat, and say that it expresses a urfiose.
We are free to settle our purposes; but it does not depend on us which
plans are compatible with, or effective of, the achievement of our
purposes. Independently of us, certain states of affairs and certain plans
are unsatisfactory to certain purposes: viz. those which are incompatible
with the desired state of affairs. Independently also of us, any plan
whose realisation involves the actualisation of the desired state of affairs
will be satisfactoryfor that iurfose. We cannot guarantee that it will be
satisfactory to us (for it may conflict with other purposes of ours) still
less that it will be satisfactory to all other persons.
The logic of satisfactoriness consists of the rules which ensure that
in practical reasoning we never pass from a fiat which is satisfactory for
a particular purpose to a fiat which is unsatisfactory for that purpose.
These rules are satisfactoriness-preserving just as rules for assertoric
inference are truth-preserving. Trivially, every fiat is satisfactory
relative to the purpose expressed by itself.
The relationship of the logic of satisfactoriness to that of satisfaction
is this.1 Let A and B both be fiats. B may be inferred from A in the
In what follows the 'propositional variables' p, q, r are to be taken to range over un-
asserted phrastics; P, Q, R, are metalogical variables to represent expressions built up out of
p, q, r, etc., and logical constants; A, B, are metalogical variables to represent expressions
built up from the type of expression represented by P, Q, R, plus either an assertoric or
imperative tropic.

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 PRACTICAL INFERENCE 73

logic of satisfaction if and only if whe

satisfied. B may be inferred from A in th
only if when A is satisfactory to a certai
factory to that set of wishes. Rules of in
faction are satisfaction-preserving: i.e. th
passing from a satisfied fiat to an uns
precisely analogous to the truth-preservin
which are designed to prevent one passing
conclusion). Rules of inference in the log
factoriness-preserving: i.e. they are de
from a satisfactory fiat (plan) to an unsa
satisfactory relative to a certain set of w
the plan is satisfied every member of that s
the case that if A is satisfied B is satisfi
satisfactory A is satisfactory. Again, if
factory B is satisfactory, then it follows tha
'Satisfactory' in the last two sentences, o
relative to a given set of wishes or goals'.
logic of satisfactoriness is the mirror im
That is to say, whenever the logic of sat
from A to B, the logic of satisfactorines
B to A.

The logic of satisfactoriness is, in a sense, dependent on the logic of

satisfaction. This is because satisfactorinesss was defined in terms of
satisfaction: A is satisfactory relative to set G iff if A is satisfied every
member of G is satisfied. But, it seems to me, the logic of satisfactoriness,
and not the logic of satisfaction, is the principal logic of imperatives.
This is because the purpose of practical reasoning is to get done what
we want; just as the purpose of theoretical reasoning is to discover
truth. The preservation of satisfactoriness, therefore, has in practical
inference that place which the preservation of truth has in theoretical
inference. Those rules will most deserve the name 'rules of practical
inference' which will ensure that in reasoning about what to do we never
pass from a plan which will satisfy our desires to a plan which will not
satisfy them. And these rules are the rules of the logic of satisfactoriness.
It is impossible to base the logic of satisfactoriness on satisfactoriness-
tables, because satisfactoriness, unlike truth, is a relative notion. But
because of the mirror-image relationship between the logics of satis-
faction and satisfactoriness it is possible to test the validity of inferences
in the logic of satisfactoriness by appeal to truth-tables and quantifica-
tional truths. Suppose that we wish to know whether RP can be derived
from ,Q in the propositional calculus of satisfactoriness: i.e. whether,
if 5Q is satisfactory, SP is satisfactory also. The answer is that the
inference is valid iff CPQ is tautologous. For instance, you wish to know

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74 ANALYSIS

whether aKpq can be in

write CKpq Apq and tes
for this is obvious. If C
so if aP is satisfied, aQ
factory. (For if aQ is sat
of G are satisfied; if aP
all the members of G ar
predicate calculus of sat
then aP can be inferre
then aP 1- FQ in the log
Once we recognise the
are in a position to solv
inference from 'Post the
valid in this logic, and
So too, the inference fr
someone' is invalid. On
letter or burn the letter
of satisfaction, is valid i
by anyone who realises t
the letter' by burning t
contains an explicit law
to 'Vote for the Labou
anyone who obeyed the
The logic of satisfacto
appear paradoxical. For
conspirators; Brutus is
result, properly under
conspirators' has not be
'Kill Brutus' unless Brut
do not entitle us to co
there is an inference
entails ep. But surely o
window' from 'open the
command 'open the doo
the command 'open the
not directives. From t
infer the fiat 'a (openi
someone who did execu
command and satisfy th
executing the comman
annoy the commander
against the commande
broken. If this tacit des
commander's state of m

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 PRACTICAL INFERENCE 75

there is no inference in the logic of satisf

paradox here is only apparent.
In the logic of satisfactoriness, we can
In other words, the analogue of affirming
in the logic of satisfactoriness. This giv
Aristotle's example, 'He is to be heated; if
so I'll rub him', which was invalid in his ow
ence from Zxkx to Oa is valid in the logic
gives us a hint how to deal with the cloak
Aristotle's cloak syllogism in fact con
imperative setting out a goal, and one asser
the case. The rule for such mixed inferences is as follows. The assertoric
premises must be replaced by the corresponding imperative sentences:
the inference is valid in imperative logic if the goal-fiat can be derived in
assertoric logic from the conjunction of .the other premises and the
conclusion (e.g. 'ap; gCqp; so aq' is valid in practical reasoning
because 'eKCqpq' entails 'Cp'). The rationale of this is twofold. (1) In
order to begin practical reasoning one must accept the facts as they are
(e.g. one cannot reason practically about Communist China without
accepting its existence) and this corresponds to replacing the assertion
with the corresponding fiat. (2) The means chosen must be sufficient
for the goal to be reached; and this will be so when the conclusion,
conjoined with the other premises, entails the goal-premise assertorically.
The complications introduced by mixed premises make it difficult
to formalise Aristotle's examples just as they stand. But the recognition
of the logic of satisfactoriness in addition to the logic of satisfaction
provides a principle of solution for some intractable problems in the
field of imperative and practical reasoning.

Balliol College, Oxford

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