FS Studies on Iran and The Caucasus Presented to Prof. Garnik S. Asatrian on the Occasion of his 6oth Birthday Edited by Uwe Blising, Victoria Arakelova and Matthias Weinreich | With the assistance of Khachik Gevorgian BRILL LEIDEN | BOSTONLibrary of Congress Contaol Number: 201594178 This publica Latin, 9, For more information pl sax 978-00.04-20201-3 (hardback) |SEN 97#-50.08-40206-8 (e-book) nds. & De Graaf, Bull Nib, Beil Rodopi and CCopyaight as by Koninky Korine Bill wv incor Hotei Publishing _Allrights reserve. No part ofthis publication for tranamtred in ay form or by any means electronic, meh ‘without pric waten permission from [huthorizaon to photocopy items for internal or personal use Is granted by Koninkle Bil wv provided ‘that the appropriate fes are paid directyto The Copyright Clearance Center 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 10, Danvers Ma ogg, Usa Fees are subject to change roduced,ransated stored ina retrieval syster, al, photocopying, recording or otherwise, ‘This books primed on acid-ee paper TABLE OF CONTENTS: INTRODUCTION by Prof. Dr. Boghos Zekian ‘GARNIK ASATRIAN ~ A Scholar, a Master, @ Friend HISTORY AND TEXTS L Early Mediaeval Period Marco Bais ~ “Like « Flame Through the Reeds": An Iranian Image in the Buzandaran Patrautivmk! : ‘ Jost Gippert - The “Bun-Turks" in Ancient Georgia . Dan Shapira ~- On the Relative Value of Armenian Sources for the Khazar Studies: The Case of the Siege of Tbilisi . : Giusto Traina ~ Some Remarks on the Inscription of Maris, Casi ‘fs (Classical-Oriental Notes, 9) IL Late Mediaeval Period Kaveh Farrokh - The Military Campaigns of Shah Abba inasetaten and the Caucasus (16033618) . Aldo Ferar~ Persia and Prslans in Raff's Xamsay Mei tnmners Hirotake Maeda - N the ‘Third Volume of Afal a-tavarith Irdne Natchkebia ~ Unrealized Project: Rousseaus’ Plan of Franco-Persian Trade in the Context of the Indian Expedition (3807). : Roman Smbatian ~ Nadir’ Religious Policy Towards Armenians -w Information on 1 tory of the Caucasus RELIGION AND ETHNOGRAPHY Victoria Arakelova - The Song Unveiling the Hidden alae BA ade a 25 48 6 139‘The Military Campaigns of Shah Abbas I in Azerbaijan and the Caucasus (1603-1618) Kaveh Farrokh Unierity of Brith Columbia Continuing Studies Abstract “This paper provides an overiew ofthe Safavid military forces and reforms atthe time of Shah Ab: bas I (3581-4639), especially with the promotion of the new Ghulam unit ‘radional Qiaibash forces which had bought the Safevids to power 1g00-524). Other significant miliary reforms were the introduction defeating the Ottoman counteroffnsive in Averbajan (60s) ane the capture of Shamakhi 606) and Ganja (1605) Large numbers of Ar rmenians, Kurds and Azeri had been displaced from their homelands by Ssh Abbas 125 «result of huis scorched earth tates agains invading Ottoman frees in ince the recapture of Tabrie. The Safavid army had to igh ‘hich led to anew Ottoman war (6:6). The Safavid army revan and Ardabil (16i6:6:8) obliging the Ottomans to negotiate new peace treaty which af firmed all of Shah Abbas conguess since 1603 Keywords ,Qiailbash, Qoorcht, Gholam, Shahsevan, J jabadar-bash, Azerbaijan, Taba, Caucasus, Yerevan, Ganja, Shama MILITARY LEADERSHIP OF SHAH ABBAS ‘The military successes of Shah Abbas I (1587-1629) against the Ottoman Empire was largely due to a reformed Safavid military machine. The Shah was in fact to remain closely engaged in the supervision of the military affairs of the Safavid state throughout his reign. In Shah Abbas’ view *..the king must live @ and abyays move alongside his troops to be able to overcome any di be successful at amy task’ (Ravandi3g73, vol. 1: 398). Shah Abbas often joined his, (© Renae BEEN een snps in battle and displayed concern for the morale and welfare of his troops .eacetime, the Shah would inspect Isfahan's weapons factories on (Taheri 985: 155 AN OVERVIEW jelded by Shah Abbas had changed considerably from its be- gginnings in the late 15th and early 16th centuries, Many of the units end designa- tions cited below had thetr origins in reforms implemented during Shah Abbas’ reign, with a number of other reforms (i. the Gholam units) having their origins earlier during the reign of Shah Tahmasp (r. 1524-1576). Military consequences of defeat at Chaldiran The disastrous defeat of Shah Ismail (r. 1502-1524) at the battle of Chaldiran in yrced the Safavid leadership to institute significant military reform: mais successor, Tahmasp I ensured that these reforms began in earnest during his eign. Tahmasp and the Safavid military realized that the primary factors for Ottoman success at Chaldiran pertained to their superb organization, elite units (notably the Yenichert or Janissaries) and especially their firearms (muskets and cannon). ‘Vincenzo D'Alessandri (Amiri 2970: 448-449) a European visitor to Iran in 1571 has provided valuable observations into the state of Iranian armies in the later years of Tahmasp's mule. First, D'Alessandr reported Iran having been adminis- tratively divided into five regions The Safavid military had thus rational- ited Iran's defense against attacks by the Uzbeks (northeast), Ottomans (from the west and northwest), and their Crimean Tatar allies (from the north) as well as other potential enemies. Fifty Sultans were designated for the defense of these ones, with eaci Sultan in command of 500-3000 professional troops. In case of war, the Sultans would recruit additional men from their districts* With the ‘maximum number of troops assembled, the Sultans would march to a pre-desig- nated assembly area to link up with the Shah end the Royal Guards. ‘This is shown in the cae ofthe miltary leader Allah-Beg Qajar and a number of Qislbash warsons who hael been severely wounded daring an attack ageinet ane of Ganjas Oxtoman held ‘ower in 3606 (discussed letor inthis paper). Shah Abbas ordered the medical tents tending the wounded to be erected next ois own (royal) tent. The Shah would then vist the wounded twice ‘day. The Shah was accompanied by the medical taf ofthe Safavid army during these visits * Mobilization of troops began atleast wo months before the onset of battles. Mobilization or- ders would be sent by messenger artving fom the Royal Palace. According to D’Alessandri, Iran’ standing professional cavalry corps stood at 60,000 troops (ibid. which could be expanded in wartime. Iranian cavalry in battle were deseribed as resolute and highly disciplined. D’Alessandri recorded that "Persians are tall and strong... commonly use swords, lances and guns on the battlefield... Persian Musketeers use their muskets so adeptly..they will draw the sword at times of necessity..muskets are slung to the back as to not interfere with the usage of bows and swords..their horses are very well trained and they [the Ira- nians] have no need to import horses. ‘Alessandn's report suggests that the Iranians had attained sufficient proficiency in the usage of fitearms, before the arrival of the Shirley mission to Iran at the time of Shah Abbas I. The Portu- sguese had formed the major pool of firearms instructors during the reign of Tah. ; they were also occupying Iran’s Persian Gulf islands in the Straits of Hor- (Khorasani 2010: 20) Rising Iranian capabilities in firearms alongside their proficiency in close- quarter combat using traditional weapons enabled Iranian troops to successfully partake in combat against the highly resilient and well-trained Ottoman troops. ‘The professional nature of Safavid troops by Shah Abbas’ time helps explain why despite wielding superior numbers of high-quality troops and devastating fire- power, the Ottoman Empire failed to overthrow the Safavids and conquer Iran. Qoorehi ‘Tahmasp I had continued his late father’s project of forming an elite armed royal guard known as the Qoorchi (Turkic plural Qoorchilar, singular Qoorchi: original Mongolian term for ‘archer’), Being under the command of the Qoorchi-Bas {Babaie 2005: 39), these troops were recruited from among Iran's Turkmen war- rors. The latter were often from the Qizilbash clans who had assisted Shab Is- ‘mail in founding the Safavid dynasty. The Safavid royal house directly paid and armed the Qoorchi troops, who were subject to the direct orders of the king. As a result, the office of the Qoorchi-Bashi become one of the most important posts sn the Safavid state (Siagi 1989: 7; Abbasi 1956, vol. VIII royal guards for the Safavid dynasty, the Qoorchis were distinct from the regular Qizilbash units of the Safavid army.’ By the 1570s, Qoorchi forces stood at ap- proximately 4500 to 5000 men,* this then tripling to 12,000 men by the end of * Nevertheless the Qoorchi would often don the distinesivera-gore Qilbash hat in battle, “Bola (397609) ete 4390 with Matol (gg9: 658) ting 5000,reign in 1629 Saf’ 1969: 343-348; Sokat 1971: 609} Qoorchi units and infantry) were armed with a combination of muskets and tra- ditional weapons (jc. curved Shamshir swords, axes, etc.) Gholams By the second half of Tahmasp's reign, the foundations of a new elite military unit were being established. The Safavids wore bringing Caucasian Christians (Georgians, Armenians) and Circassians from the Caucasus to form the Ghollar (Turkic plural for Gholam or “slaves/servants"). Like the Ottoman practice of bringing Christian boys from Europe to be raised as Jantssaries, the Safavids im- ported the Caucasians into Iran from an early age to be raised and trained as Gholam troops. Like the Qoorehis, the Gholams were highly trained in the use of muskets (Matofi 1999: 659) and traditional weapons (Shamshir swords, spears, axes, ‘maces, and archery) (Saft 1969: 343-348). Gholam units (like the Qoorchis) could be infantry or cavalry, total hah Abbas 1 (Babaie +2005: 39) and 18,000 men at the time of Shah Abbas Tl (1642-1666) (Sita 1957).° ‘The office of Ghollar-Aghassi (Turkic: General of the Gholams) became second only to that of the Qoorchi-Bashi (Siagi 1989: 8). ‘The Caycasians who arrived into Iran's Gholam corps were very soon ab- sorbed into Iranian society. This was due to the long-standing cultural and his- torical links that have existed between Iran and the Caucasus as far back as the Sassanian era (224-651 CE) (Whittow 1996: 203-204) and even earlier into the Bronze Age. Armenia's Bagrationi clan for example had connections with Iran snokkh 2007: 54, Go, 277-278, 281) with researchers reporting a “cultural synthe- Rayfield 2000: 38; exerted a mighty Frye 1977: 19, 145; Gvakharia 199 {influence on the Caucasus right up to the Russian Invasfons in the early ith cen~ tury CE (Chardin 198g: 268, 290; Gvakbaria 1995: 241; Farmanfarmaian 2009: 20- 233 see also Andronikashuili 1966, Lang 1966). This “cultural synthesis’ occurred inespective of the Georgians’ and Armenians’ Christian faith, which may partly ‘explain why the Caucasians became such effective troops against the Ottomans. * By the time of Shah Abbas Il in 36421666, Jean Baptitse Taverner (1605689), recorde a total ‘comprehensive description of the armies of Shah Abbas 1 st 158.000 men during ‘the reign of Shah Sai /Suleman (1666-694) (Matofls9¢9: 672). Georgian influence became significant, especially from the 16th cent prominent Safavids hailed from a Georgian or part-Georgian bac many being settled in Isfahan (Roemer iggt: 272) and northern Iran (consult Na- sidze, et. al. 2008). Decline of Qisilbash and rise of Gholams ‘The Qizilbash had been instrumental in bringing Shah Ismail to power and played a mejor military role in Safavid armies. They were formidable warriors Dut highly conservative in their military doctrine. They tended to favor tradi- tional weaponry and eschewed modem firearms. Their organi on the Turcomen manner of tribal units, with their provincial military contin- gents being led by their respective khans. The Yus-Bas (Turkic: commander/ leader of one Hundred) commanded one hundred men, much like the Tofangehi musketeers. The Qizilbash Khans exerted a powerful influence in the military leadership, government and even the royal succession, Shah Ismail did elevate a number of local Iranian nobles to positions of upper leadership after the Bat le to diminish the continuing Qiailbash influence in ‘Tahmasp I (Ismail’s son and successor) worked to reduce Qizilbash influence by recruiting a large new class of Gholams into the Safavid military and civilian administration. Gholam contingents had greatly expanded in scope and im- portance by the time of Shah Abbas I. These never came to threaten or dispro- portionately influence the political processes of the Safavid state. Nevertheless, the Qizilbash were still able to mobilize up to a maximum of 60,000 troops (al- ‘most all cavalry) at the beginning of Shah Abbas’ reign in 1587 (Matofi 1998: ‘This changed with the implementation of Shah Abbas’ reforms. A numeri comparison of the numbers of Qizilbash chiefs in 1578 and i629 provides a statis- tical measure of their decline. A listing of Safavid military commanders in 1576 (last year of Tahmasp 1's rule), reports a total of m4 Amirs (military command- rs), almost all Qizilbash. This changed Abbas I's rule) where 25 out of go Amirs lis 525). By the end of Shah Abbas I's reign, Qizlibash warriors had been halved to 30,000 troops. Changes did take place in Qizilbash armaments that had traditionally been Shah Abbas’ reforms) muskets. Top level Qizilbash commanders still refused t0adopt firearms in favor of traditional fighting methods (Safi 1969: 343-348). Chardin has noted of the Qistlbash derision of firearms, viewing these as the tithesis of manliness and bravery on the battlefield (Falsafi 1965, vol. I: 375178). ‘The reduction of Qizilbash influence removed a primary obstacle for the full- scale development of firearm units in the Safavid military. Regular, Provincial and Tribal Troops and Cavalry By the time of Shah Abbas there were 20,000 regular cavalry (intended to replace the Qizilbash) and 12,000 regular infontry armed and paid by the state and under the direct command of the Shah (Matofi 999: 658). The Safavid military was able to raise very large numbers of cavalry from the country’s towns, tribal regions One of the European and provincial distri translators for could raise a maximum force of 100,000 cavalry (Siagi 989: st). ‘The cost of maintaining tribal and provincial infantry and cavalry units (which were distinct from regular Safavid standing forces) were often by the commanding Khans. By later Safavid times (ie. Safi T/Suleima: ‘was (nominally) able to call upon an impressive array of provincial contingents and local tribal forces from Kandahar (12,000), Khorasan (20,000), Gilan and Ma- zandaran (15:00), Darband and Shirvan in the Caucasus (12,000), Azerbaijan (20,000), Yerevan in Armenia (12,000), Luristan (22,000), Susa in the southwest 5,000), south of Iran and Kerman 1957: 43-48, 106-207, 137-144, |. European accounts describe regular units deploying a variety of weap- ons (Le. Shamshir curved swords, spears, archery equipment, firearms, etc.) with to augment its professional caval ley broth quick dispersal and conlescing lities at points of their own choosing during battle (ibid). Qajar tribes in particular had militarily distinguished themselves against the Ottomans throughout the Safavid dymasty.? The Shahsevan or “Friends of the Shah” was an important all-volunteer na- ‘ional force composed primarily of Azeris, Kurds, Turkmens and other tribal- provincial elements. Iranian historians trace their origins to the latter days of Shah Abbas I, numbering up to 120,000 men at that time.’ Of these 45,000 were permanent troops serving within elite contingents (Qoorchi and Gholam) and "Take * Consul 398). 0). See also synopsis by Revandi (ag73, vol I pene firearm units (Tofangchis and Toopehis). They were also instrumental in reduc- ing the influence of the Qizilbash (Babaie 2005: 28). The Shahsevan have often served as a bulwark of Iran’s defense against foreign invasion through Azerbai- Jan, as seen for example in the roth century during the Russian invasions of the ‘Caucasus and in the twentieth century when they cooperated with the Iranian army in ejecting pro-Soviet separatist milities from Iran’s northwest (Farrokh 20n:290-251). Tofaangchi ‘The Tofangchilar (Turkic plural: gunmen/musketeers, singular Tofangeki) were the formal firearm units of the Safavid military. Tofangchi units of one hundred troops were led by the Yuz-Bashi (Turkic: commander/leader of one Hundred). ‘The Tofangchis were an infantry force using horses for long distance marches and campaigns (Falsafi 1965: 177-178). Paid on a regular salary basis throughout the year, these units were expected to report to duty at times of war. Italian traveler Pietro Della Valle (2586-1652) has provided a vivid description of the Tofanghchis at the time of Shah Abbas L? Della Valle noted that the ‘Tofangchis were mainly recruited from the physically resilient Iranian-speaking peasants (Mirxand/Hedayat 1960-1961, vol. IX: 359, 438), in accordance with the advice of the Shirley brothers. Valle was especially impressed by the Tofangchis! ability to set up or leave camp at great speed without detection by the enemy. ‘The Tofangchis were noted for maintaining their weapons and uniforms in a high state of cleanliness and preparedness (see Sirdni 1957). These units, ac- cording to Valle, were among Shah Abbas’ most favorite units with the best ‘Tofangchis bailing from Iran’s northem Mazandaran province (Mircand/Heda- yat 1960-1961, vol. IX: 359, 438). Interestingly, two centuries later, Agha Moham- mad Khan (1742-1797), the first Qajar monarch, considered his Mazandarani ‘Tofangchis as being among his most trusted and capable warriors. Reporting during the reign of Shah Abbas If Jean Baptitse Tavernier (1605; 168) described the Tofangehis as having a high level accuracy and agi ‘Tavernier reports one of their exercises involving a line of ten men aiming their muskets towards a line of ten spears thrast into the ground, each with an apple placed at its top. Every apple would be accurately hit by a single shot by the ten ‘These have boon compiled by Safe (193:343-248). ~The entire deeeription ofthe armies of Shah Abbas I by Tavenier is provided by Sant (gsr: 256,218,538, 504, 5997600}corresponding ‘Tofangchis firing at a distance of one hundred paces (sce Siréni 1957). Numerical estimates of Tofangchis at the time of Shah Abbas I vary from 120,000, 50,000 and 60,000." By the time of Shah Abbas II a total of 4050,000 “Tofangchis are reported in regular service (see ibid,). Like the Safavids before him, Nader Shah Afshar would also recruit his Tofangehis from Iran’s rural peas- ant base, Jazayerchi Shah Abbas Il was the frst to introduce the Jazayerchi units. A new elite troop numbering at just 600 troops (Abbasi 956, vol. VIII: 214-236) the Jazayerchis were selected from among the most capable and resent warriors of the Iranfan mall tary. These were later increased to 2000 men (Roemer 1991: 291). The primary ‘weapon of the Jazayerchi was the Jazayer that was a larger and heavier hand- held form of musket (Matofi 999: 667). Due to its size and weight, the Jazayer had to be fired by placing it upon a tripod. The Jazayerchis were also armed. with Shamshir swords and daggers for hand to hand combat (Siagi 1989: Toopeki Militaxy personnel manning cannon units were the Toopchis with the Toopeki- Bashi (li. cannon masterfleader) in command (idem 1985: 24). Amiri (Amiri 970: priation of cannon into the Safavid army. The frst of these came from battlefield captures of Ottoman and later of Portuguese cannon. The flight of the Ottoman viewed in this context. The next source of cannon came from the factories es- tablished with the assistance of the Shirley brothers during the reign of Shah Ab- bas There were also a number of mobile workshops capable of producing can- non at military camps during campaigns. Exact statistics of the size of the Sa- {avid artillery corps cannot be provided with certainty, which most likely stood at its strongest level at the time of Shah Abbas I Itis estimated that the Safavids probably fielded a maximum of 500 cannon anillerymen (Toopchis} (Khoraseni 2010:23) Safavid cannon were often used for destroying enemy towers and walls dur- ing sieges (Matofi 1g99: 734). For battlefield protection against enemy firearms sbaie 2005: 40) and up to 12,000 reports these at 20,000 withthe Tazator © Molook (comple i) which cites “he uropeans as reporting Go;o00 and a European transaior ofthe Shiney Brothers reporting 5,000 during sieges, Toopchis often laid sandbags around their artillery nests 1702). The capture of cities and fortresses usually entailed the practice of cutting off the besieged locale from all sources of supplies. Western observers note of the Iranians’ lack of knowledge in their use of cannon in siege warfare (consult Mat thee 1999: 394-305). Despite this liability, the Iranians proved adept in engineer- ing operations and the digging of tunnels under enemy walls (Abbasi 1956, vol. ‘Vill 219-222). Excepting reforms during the reign of Shah Abbas I, the Iranians do not appear to have integrated cannon into their regular battlefield order (Matthee 1999: 394-396). ‘The office ofthe Toopcht-Bashi, which was of considerable importance during ‘Shah Abbas I's era, witnessed a steady decline by the middle of the 7th century. the artillery’ low level of efficiency and prepared- 1655 (during Shah Abbas operational cannon, financial difficulti and a relatively peaceful state of rela tions with Iran’s immediate neighbors (Matthee 1999: 395). Negative reports of lranian artillery performance continued into the reign of Shah Safi 1/Suleiman (Matofi 1999: 672). By this time the Toopchi-Bashi office had been reinstated. ‘This was in nominal command of 4ooo artillerymen (Toopehis)® but in practice that force existed mostly on paper. This was due to the consistent neglect af- forded to the artillery arm after the death of Shah Abbas J. Suleiman had con: templated reforms to the artillery arm at first, but this was abandoned (Khoras- ani 2010:21-22). Yesanchi ‘The Yesanchi were auxiliary units responsible for guarding important buildings and installations. These also cleared the streets for the passage of the Shah and his entourage. They were also involved in elaborate ceremonies for newly arrived dignitaries from important states. One such example oceuned when new am- bassadors from the Ottoman Empire, Russia end Moghul India were greeted with a highly diseiplined honor guard of up to 60,000 armed troops lined up on two sides of a road from the Shah's palace in Isfahan to the village of Dolatabad "For description of armies of Shah Safi M/Swlelman se Sri 957: 45-48, 198-107, 97344385 186,4g). The Yesanchi played a major role in ceremonies and ) (Ravandi 1973, vol celebrations following battlefield victories (Sokri 197% Flags and banners ‘The Alamdar (it. Banner/flag bearer) carried flags in battle with the Alamdar- Bashi (lit. Chieffhead banner/flag bearer) having the privilege of bearing the largest and most prestigious banners. Iranian flags and banners generally in- cluded a number of motifs including Qoranic inscriptions, the double-headed Zulfagar sword of Imam Ali, the names of past fallen warriors, and the Lion and Sun emblem (Taqzeli 1346 v 22). This is evidenced in a print in the Ga- zette de France depicting the arrival of an Iranian delegation at Versailles ac- companied by the Alamdar-Bashi in August 175. The Alamdar-Bashi carried the Iranian flag bearing the Lion and Sun emblem whose motifs may be traced to ancient (pre-Islamic) Iran's past (Nayernut 196s: 78; Khorasani 2006: 320) Jabadar-Bashi ‘The Jabadar Bashi ensured tha arsenals throughout the country were well stocked with weapons (trad 1d gunpowder) and (b) ‘was responsible for the supervision of armament production in factories (Falsafi 1965, vol. I: 412). In addition to factories, the army also had mobile field produe- tion and repair workshops to ensure that troops were consistently equipped with armaments during campaigns If defeat was imminent orifa city was about to be captured, the army would destroy any weapons production facilities that could be captured by the enemy. Military Music ‘The role of music in the ancient pre and post-Islamic Iranian armies has been discussed by MaSoun (2001: 29-75. 77-737). Safavid armies used a variety of drums, percussion instruments, and trumpets. Music was intended to build up the martial spirit of troops and to demoralize the enemy (Matofi 1999: 708). ‘MaSoun’s historical analysis notes that music and poetry were vital for the over- all morale of the peoples of the Safavid realm.” 1] weapons, firearm SIMI ABRAS' BATTLES AGAINST THE OTTOMANS IN AZERBAIJAN AND THE CAUCASUS (1603-1626) ‘The restoration of peace to Iran’s eastern marches allowed Shah Abbas and the Safavids to cast their military attention toward those territories in the Caucasus ' Consult Maoun acc: 280-458 regarding role of music during the Safavid era, and Iran’s northwest, west, and southwest that had been captured by the Otto- ‘mans (Savory 1980: 85; Matofi 1999: 646). Shah Abbas first proposed an alliance ‘with the Russians against the Ottomans which was not accepted (Pigulevskaya 1975: §1)- Russian action became confined to small-scale raids along Daghestan's borders in the northern Caucasus (Matofi 1999: 646). Shah Abbas thus had to face the mighty Ottoman military machine by himself but by this time a number of Safavid military reforms had taken effect. Shah Abbas’ advisors had cautioned ‘him on Ottoman numerical superiority over Iran's military (Savory 1980: 85). ‘A major factor inciting the Safavids’ to action was the arrival of a number of Khans from Tran’s occupied northwest regions (especially Azerbaijan) asking Shah Abbas to attack the Ottomans. Notable was the role of Ghazi Beg, the leader of the Kurds of Mal who complained of the excesses of Tabrizs Ottoman, governor and his harsh maltreatment of local citizens (Bayant 1g74:249)- A major factor favoring the Safavids was the rule of the Ottoman governor of Baghdad, ‘Uzun Ahmad who refused to send supplies to the Ottoman garrison at Nahavand in mode Ottoman garrison then resorted to pillag. ing local civilians to secure supplies (Matofi 999; 647). These actions led to at Ottoman discontent prompting many locals to request Safavid military assis- tance. Shah Abbas’ response was to storm and capture Nahavand (Savory 1980: 85). Liberation of Tabris (October 21,603) The newly reformed Iranian army deployed out of Isfahan on September 14,1603 towards Ottoman-occupied Azerbaljan in northwest Iran. Shah Abbas deceived the Ottomans by ‘offically’ declaring that he and his troops were leaving Isfahan to Tran’s northern Mazandaran’s forests to engage in a hunting expedition (Na- havandi/Bomati 1998: 148149). Jn practice, Shah Abbas had ordered Zolfaqar Khan and Amir Goneh Beg Qajar (govemors of Ardabil and Qazvin respectively), to quickly link up their forces with the Gholam corps and Qoorchian royal guards. The main army led by Shah Abbas reached Tabriz. in n days. The Ottoman Turkish ganison was una- ware of their arrival, Shah Abbas’ tactics have been described by Chardan (Ab- basi 1956 vol. Il: 419) The first step was the selection of the best troops to en- “These accounts (and those of Matof 2999: 67) are at variance to those desertbed by Savory (Goer 85-86) who makes no mention ofan advance guard slencing the Ottoman senres or the st- val of 00 troops masquerading as merchantssage in what may be characterized as a “commando” operation. This succeeded {in quietly infiltrating Tabriz to slay a number of Ottoman ser achieved with considerable stealth 2s the main Ottoman garrison remained un- aware of the infiltration of Tabriz by Safavid troops. The next stage was the arti- val to Tabriz of a group of 500 Iranian troops attired in civilian clothing posing as ‘merchants Their mission was to distract Ottoman troops from the main Safavid army now assembling just outside of Tabriz. With the Iranian “Trojan horse’ (i.e. the ‘commandos’ and the “merchants’) in place within Tabriz, Shah Abbas Jaunched his primary assault. Thanks to the earlier elimination of Ottoman sen- ties at Tabria's critical ingress points, 6000 Iranian troops stormed into the city. ‘This was coordinated with the 500 ‘mexchant” troops already in Tabriz who had also engaged in fighting against the local Ottoman garrison. After twenty days of close quarter combat in Tabriz’s streets the Ottomans sunendered (Matofl 1999: 647) on October a1, 1603 er 2008: 61; Dupuy/Dupuy 1977: 586). The liberation of Tabriz was of major importance. Tabriz is Azerbaijan's chief city and the venue where Shah Ismail had been erowned. This victory was a major morale booster for the Iranian army, which had suffered many defeats at Ottoman hands. The Ottomans paid dearly for their defeat at Tabriz. In a letter written by Shah Abbas to the Moghul emperor, Jalal e Din Mohammad Akbar (1542605), he noted that the Ottomans in Tebriz had “..200 cannon, 5000 mus. ketoers..supplies lasting for ten years and much equipment for the holding of for- tresses." (Falsafi 1965, vol. IV: 22-23). Many ex-Ottoman troops joined the Sa- favid army. This may have been partly due to Safavid troops being paid double the salary and benefits of their Ottoman counterparts at the time of Shah Abbas ‘Savory 1980:86). Local Azerbaijanis who had assisted the Iranian amy celebrated by donning their 22-gore Safavid hats, signaling their loyalty to the Iranian throne and Shi- ism. Tabriz’s citizens also took reprisals against a number of captured Ottoman who had committed offenses against civillans during the occupation Mony buildings and houses in the city had been severely damaged during the Ottoman occupation (Nahavandi/Bomati i998: 149150), with Ottoman troops having taken at will many of Tabrie’s womenfolk (Savory 2980: 86). "These had claimed to the authorities that they were awalting the anival of thete merchandice ina number of da Ottoman defeat at Yerevan (June 604) ‘The liberation of Tabriz allowed the Safavid army to recapture Nakhchevan from Ottoman troops (Roemer 1931: 267). Shah Abbas had also sent messages to the remaining Ottoman garrisons in Azerbaijan to surrender (Matofl 1999: 647-648). Many of these did evacuate but instead of marching west into the Ottoman Em- pire, these coalesced (12,000 in all) (Savory 2980: 86) in the region of Yerevan (in. Armenia) north of the Araxes River (Matofi i999: 648). The Ottomans then began. to organize their defense around three of that area's fortresses: Koozchi, Yerevan, city and Eshiq. Koozchi was the first to fall with Safavid forces entering through, its main gates. Safavid forces had taken careful precautions to not expose them- selves to the deadly musket and cannon fire of the Ottomans during this bate and the following battle of Yerevan City." The occupying Ottoman garrison at Yerevan City proved most obstinate by holding out against besieging Safavid forces for over six: months into the summer of 1604. The ground was too frozen in ‘winter to allow the Safavids to dig trenches (Savory 1980: 86). As the winter passed, Safavid sappers began to dig under the city’s walls. A number of trenches ‘were also constructed allowing the Safavids to launch a number of attacks which the Ottomans repelled. With more supplies having arrived, Safavid forces were able to launch a new ig cannon and muskets. They also burrowed un- der a number of walls to place explosives under these. The explosions destroyed ‘a number of Yerevan’s walls, allowing Iranian assault parties to pour into the for- tress (Matofi ggg: 702). This forced the Ottomans into close-quarter fighting with the Iranians. After losing 2000 of their troops in hand to hand combat in a few hours, the Ottoman garrison was forced to surrender (ibid. ‘Yerevan in June 1604 (Burton 1997: 119} was followed by Eshiq which without battle, The fall of Eshiq was a major blow against the Ottomans as this, had been a major center of their operations against the Iranians in the Caucasus. Among the most effective troops during these campaigns had been the musket cers of Tabriz (Matofi 999: 648). ‘and more powerfl ass "Monit 2003 (Iskander Beg Torkaman, 1628), vol Ik 67. It s not clear how this was imple mented, but there i mention of sing local trees and fobiage for cover.Pursuit of Ottoman Forces (1604-603) Concerned with the prospect of an Ottoman counterattack, Shah Abbas and his top commanders pursued the fleeing Ottoman forces with 20,000 troops.” The ‘commanders of these operations were Aliahverd! Khan (Beglerbegi and G nor of Fars province), Zolfaqhar Khan Gharamanlu (Beglerbegi of Azerbaij Ganjali Khan (Governor of Kerman), and Hassan Khan (Governor of Alishokr). Safavid forces finally caught up with a dangerous Ottoman force led by Cheghal Oghlu at the Battle of Ati (Matofi 1999: 648). Once again the Ottomans were de- cisively defeated with a large haul of war materiel, supplies, and important Ot- toman documents being captured from the abandoned Ottoman camps (Matoft 1999: 648-649), indicative that the Ottomans had retreated in haste. Defeat of Ottoman counteroffensive in Azerbaijan (November 6, 1605) Ottoman Sultan Ahmed organized a major counteroffensive to retake Tabriz and ‘crush the Safavid army. A very large Ottoman army of 100,000 troops (Clodfelter 12008: 61) reached Sufiyan (near Tabriz) to confront Shah Abbas lea 86) on November 6, 605 (Clodifelter 2008: vember 9, 1605 (Tucker 2010: 560). The Turks resorted to their traditional battle tactics against the Iranians. This was to first engage in a cavalry duel to draw the Iranian cavalry towards the Ottoman lines. The aim would be to bring them ‘withisi range of the powerful Ottoman cannon and musketeers (Dupuy/Dupuy 1977: 586). Ottoman tactics failed to draw the Iranian cavalry into the trap. In- stead, Shah Abbas ordered a detachment of his troops to attack the Ottomans from the rear. Shah Abbas’s tactic was intended to appear as the primary Iranian attack. The Ottomans then swung their entire force to their rear. Shah Abbas then struck with his primary force of artillery, infantry and cavaly, shattering the Ottoman army, which suffered 20,000 men killed (Clodfelter 2008: 61). This defeat finalized the Ottoman expulsion out of Azerbaijan and allowed the Ira- in army to focus on the ejection of Ottoman forces still ensconced in the Cau- Ottomans ejected from Ganja (1606) With Azerbaijan secured, Shah Abbas focused his efforts on Ganja, an important and strategic Caucasian fortress which had fallen to the Ottomans. Shah Abbas arrived at Ganja to make heavy use of trenches, siege works and cannon fire to “The operations are desoribed by Monk 2009 ([skander Beg Tovkaman, 1628), vol I: 639545, 6, 68,683,687, 697, prec ners grea ta eer subdue its Ottoman garrison. Iranian engineers succeeded in crossing Ganja's surrounding ditch to then dig out a large amount of soil from under one of its defensive walls. A large amount of chopped wood was stuffed into the excavated area and set on fire. This decisively damaged a section of Ganje’s walls, prompt- {ng the Ottoman garrison to finally surrender. ‘When Safavid forces enteted the city they obliged znames on a royal registry. The alin ofthis was to identilyc cooperated with the Ottomans during their occupation. Up to 2500 Iranian “fifth-column* collaborators were soon identified and put to death (MonSi 2003 (Iskander Beg Torkaman, 2628), vol I: 709-713). Capture of Shamakhi (June 27,1606) ‘The fall of Ganja posed a mortal threat to the Ottoman garrison at Shamakhi, capital of the Shirvan khanate. The Ottomans responded by destroying a key bridge over the Kura River in the Caucasus, but this failed to stem the arrival of Iranian forces. Safavid engineers built a pontoon bridge over the Kura River by attaching boats together with planks, a tactic used by Iranian armies since Achaemenid times (Farrokh 2007: 68-69). Other points of the Kura were made traversable by sinking many pleces of lumber into the river. The main body of Iranian troops finally crossed the Kura in late 1605 or early 1606, but lost many horses and supplies. This forced some Safavid troops to halt for the arrival of new supplies before proceeding to rejoin the main Safavid army marching ahead of ‘them to Shamakhi.” Supply shortages also delayed the march of the raain army ‘but this was ameliorated with the arrival of fresh supplies. The Safavids finally arrived at the end of the winter in early 1606 to besfege Shamalht. Th tough and obstinate fortress with very well constructed walls and towers deep surrounding ditch.” The only way that ditch could be crossed was by means of a mechanical bridge that could be retracted into Shamakhi castle during sieges. ‘The assault forces at Shamakhi were divided in two: one to its north led by Allahverdi Khan and the other to its west commanded by Shah Abbas.” Both flanks were supported by a number of important units such as the Azerbaljani and Kermani detachments. The eastem flank of Shamakhi could not be utilized © These troops had been obliged to halt in ¢ region named Karka to replenish thetr stocks be dingo Shamakh 19649) does not repertthe specific dimensions ofthe Shark ditch. account ofthe Sighting at Shamakh has been provided by Matof (999: 649-65),for the siege. This was due to heavy rains which had tumed the ground into im- passible mud. This meant that heavy equipment such as siege engines, cannon, horses and pack animals would quickly bog down and sink. The southern flank of Shamakthi was also left unmanned. The decision to leave the eastern and southern flanks proved especially hazardous as the Ottomans made sorties from those same sectors to launch dangerous raids into Safavid positions. Despite this advantage, the Ottomans failed to disrupt Safavid operations (ie. engineering ‘works and the build-up of supplies), which continued despite heavy rains. ‘The main Safavid strategy was to build a bridge across the ditch surrounding Shamakhi. To protect his engineers against the muskets and archery of Shama- Eni's defenders, Shah Abbas built a series of “mini-forts" manned by a combina- tion of musketeers, archers and infantry. Each of these was surrounded by a ditch situated at those sites where engineering crews were at work The mini- forts were also a deterrent against Ottoman hit and run attacks. Crucial was Hossein Qoli Beg Qajar’s success in bringing forward heavy siege cannon from Ganja.” The cannon were distributed to Allahverdi Khan’s north- em flank and to Shah Abbas’ westem flank. Both flanks had already prepared their artillery pits for the arriving cannon. Soon more troops led by Pir Bodagh Khan antived from Tabriz. Shah Abbas was finally ready to commence his main effort to capture Shamalth. His heavy stone-firing cannon pounded the fortress on June 27, 1608, destroying a number ofits towers and structures, Some Iranian engineers man- aged to land near the fortress and began digging underneath its walls. At this Juncture, a number of troops led by Qaracheqai Beg from Shah Abbas’ westem flank, stormed and captured one of Shamakhi’s towers. Soon Zolfaghar Khan's Azerbaijani troops forced a number of Ottoman troops defending another tower to surrender. The turning point came when 150 Safavid soldiers broke into the fortress and signaled Qarachegai Beg for assistance. As Qaracheqal Beg sent his hah Abbas ordered the entire army to converge for the final attack into fhe Ottomans lost 2000-3000 men in the first round of close quarter fighting inside the fortress. Safavid troops then succeeded in opening Shamakhi’s gates, allowing the main Safavid force to stream into Shamakhi. The conquest of Shamakhi secured the battle for the Shirvan khanate for the Safavids. "These fred cannon balls made of heavy stone which hed been transported by specially de- slened wagons e Scorched-Barth tactics (1606-1607) Despite the recent Iranian victories, the Ottomans soon recuperated from thelr losses to launch more counterattacks into rthwest and the C: Shah Abbas embarked on an expanded scorched-earth program in of the Ottoman arrival. If the Ottomans chose to invade with very they then faced the prospect of being starved out of supplies inside Iran." They would also be subjected to harassment raids by the Safavid cavalry (Abbas! 1956, vol. VIII: 9-222). If the Ottomans chose to invade with smaller armies instead, they would then risk being outnumbered by hostile Safavid forces. Shah Abbas I ordered the entire region between Tabriz in Iran's Azerbaijan province and Erzerum in eastern Anatolia to be systematically depopulated of _up to 300,000 people (Clodifelter 2002: 60) these being overwhelmingly Arment ans, Kurds and Azeris.* The uprooted peoples were mostly re-settled in Iran's interior (Izady 1992: 102). Many Kurds were sent to Khorasan with three thou- sand Armenians from Julfa in Azerbaljan being relocated to Isfahan (Roemer 19g 271). Chardin has reported on the destruction of farms and buildings and the poisoning of wells along possible Ottoman invasion routes (Abbasi 1956 vol 293-294). Shah Abbas also engaged in a number of military operations in the north of Iran, notably 2), Lahijan (1595), and Mazandaran (1596+ followed by Lar (x60-x602) (Roemer 1991: 269). This was part of his overall pols of bringing semi-autonomous provinces under the centralized power of the Sa- favid state. ge forces PEACE TREATY WITH THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1612) ‘The Ottoman army's repeated defeats obliged the Ottoman Empire to arzive at a negotiated settlement with Shah Abbas, culminating in the peace treaty of 612 ‘This forced the Ottomans to renounce their previous Iranian conquests and to recognize the validity of the old Irano-Ottoman frontiers (Ibid: 267). In diplo- matic gesture on the Ottoman’s behalf, Shah Abbas was to send an annual trib ute of 200 camels laden with sik to the Ottoman Sultan (Dupuy/Dupuy 1977: 586). “Whole cites, towns, villages and farms had their populations relocated away from the Oto rman path of advance, all buildings and food supplies were 3 iavading Ottoman aries would be preve (200 Go} notes that half ofthe Armenians died on the tek towards Isfehan.Battles in Georgia (16-7623) to engage in a number of battles in Georgia in 1614-1615 to bring the area under Iranian suzerainty (Dupuy/Dupuy 1977: 586). Iranian sources report the deaths of 7,000 Georgians during the course ofthe fighting and the rounding up of 30,000 of them a prisoners (Parial 1999: 224). The Ot- tomans, who considered Georgia within their zone of influence, mobilized for another war against Iran. Resistance in Georgia certainly continued into the 16208, as Shah Abbas an- nexed Kakhetia (1620-2621) and Meskheta (16 (Roemer 1991: 269). A rare slimpse into the operations in Meskheti has been provided by the relatively re- cent discovery of a gilded bronze winged lion, dated to 1622-26ag by the Geor- gian of Manuscripts of the Georgian Academy of Sciences This lion ‘was part of a secret directive sent by Shah Abbas to the local Safavid com- ‘ander Khosfi Khan who was encamped with his army on the valley of Marke ‘topi. The orders were for him to defeat the region's Kakhs (led by Giorgi Saaka~ ze) and then deport them (Abuladze 2000: 2)” Khorji Khan neither received the lion nor the message from Shah Abbas. These were intereepted by Saakadze who then launched a sucessful surprise attack defeat and Mil Khoi Khan at “Marktopi. Despite this suecess, Saakadze proved unable to maintain his po: against the full might of the Safavid army and retreated towards the Ottoman frontier. DBFEAT OF RENEWED OTTOMAN OFFENSIVES IN YEREVAN AND ARDABIL (3616-1638) ‘The Ottomans launched a powerful offensive into the Caucasus in 1616 (Tucker +2010: 566). Petro Delia Valle, an Halian traveler in Iran during the time of Shah Abbas, reports the Turkish invasion force standing at 200-300,000 troops (Safa 1969: 343-348). The aim of this force was to capture Yerevan defended by 60,000 “Discovered on August:4,2000 nthe Meekhot region ofthe Georgian republic © A report was submitted by Professor Tesania Abuladze tothe Intute of Manuscript of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, Thlis, Republic of Georgia In 2000. According to the Georgian me and represents a lon @syabol of Persia a the report and analysis in English by Farrokh, 2006). cadeny of Sciences examined these documents in collaboration with Profee- sors$ Jonashl and N. Berdzenishvil "The documents do not make clear where the Kardians were to be deported, but judging by past precedent, Iran would have been the moet likely destination, Iranian troops (Goodrich 186: 227). The Ottoman siege of Yerevan was a fail ture, forcing the Ottomans into a costly withdrawal in early 1617 (Clodfelter 2008: 61) Valle reports the Iranian Tofangchi musketeers as having played a key role in repelling the Ottoman assault (Safa 1969: 343-348). ‘After their defeat at Yerevan, retreating Ottoman troops suffered more losses to the bitter winter cold and constant attacks of Safavid forces (Dupuy/Dupuy 1977: 586). Despite their recent failure, the Ottomans prepared for another expe- {in 1638, This time an Ottoman army of 50,000 troops, led by Khalil Pasha, advanced towards Tabriz in Azerbaijan province (Maskar 1999: 277). as, now in Ardabil, allowed the Ottoman army to mar seize Tabriz (which had already been evacuated). This conserve his forces for the counterattack at a time and place of his choosing, ‘The Ottomans, now perceiving themselves as having the upper hand, sent ‘messages to Shah Abbas to yield al territories he had recaptured from the Otto- ‘mans since 1603. Shah Abbas refused and “ofiicially” declared that he was to set fire to Ardabil before retreating. The Ottomans marched towards Ardabil, not realizing that Shah Abbas was waiting for them with 40,000 troops. The Safavid anny sot a deadly ambush (Dupuy/Dupuy 1977: 586) and defeated the Ottomans (Clodtfelter 2008: 62) who then sued for peace. The Ottomans reaffirmed the Ira- nian conquests and agreed to reduce the annual Iranian tribute to the Sultan to just one hundred silk laden camels (ibid.). Political disarray within the Ottoman state had also contributed to their recent military defeats. BIBLIOGRAPY Abbas, M. (956), Spahndmeye Chardin (0 ¥0 Abuladze, Ts. (2000), Legentl: About a Golden Lon, Report isued for the Insitute of Manuscripts ofthe Georplan Academy of Sciences, Tis. Amir M. (1970), Safarmaye Vonesian dar I, Teban, Androl M (958) Nokon fromi Karel nob Unteteban, Tis Teen, yi. 7) Tre ner angie dre Sefer) ean 17) The Butharans: A Dynastic, Diplomatic, and Commercial History 501702, Rich- Chardin J. (2983), Voyage de Pavia fepahan I-De Paris Tif, Pas * Goodrich also reports the Ottoman force ashaving toed at 10,000 troops.afore and Armed Confit: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Jefferson NC. 1 Winged Lion of Meset: a pre. or pos Islamic Iranian Legacy in Georgia, Se- iadiges, Seudis in Honour of Professor Natela Va Farol atic English) 2 War g00988, Ondo, te Golden Age of Persia: Arabs inthe Bast, London, -A History ofall Nations fom the earkest period tothe Posen, New York and 5 Mailigan. 1 History of Perstan-Georglan Contact’, Proceedings ofthe Second Bu- oftranian Studies, 8, BG, Bragner etal, Rome ead, M. 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