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Never mind the gap: Neurophenomenology, radical enactivism, and the hard
problem of consciousness

Article · March 2016

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 Enactivism

1
2
Never Mind the Gap
column A column B column C
1
2
3
4
5
Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, 3
4
5
6
7
and the Hard Problem of Consciousness 6
7
8 8
9 Michael D. Kirchhoff • University of Wollongong, Australia • kirchhof/at/uow.edu.au 9
10 Daniel D. Hutto • University of Wollongong, Australia • ddhutto/at/uow.edu.au 10
11 11
12 12
13 > Context • Neurophenomenology, as formulated by Varela, offers an approach to the science of consciousness that 13
14 seeks to get beyond the hard problem of consciousness. There is much to admire in the practical approach to the science 14
15 of consciousness that neurophenomenology advocates. > Problem • Even so, this article argues, the metaphysical 15
16 commitments of the enterprise require a firmer foundation. The root problem is that neurophenomenology, as 16
17 classically formulated by Varela, endorses a form of non-reductionism that, despite its ambitions, assumes rather 17
18 than dissolves the hard problem of consciousness. We expose that neurophenomenology is not a natural solution to 18
19 that problem. We defend the view that whatever else neurophenomenology might achieve, it cannot close the gap 19
Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism

20 between the phenomenal and the physical if there is no such gap to close. > Method • Building on radical enactive 20
21 and embodied approaches to cognitive science that deny that the phenomenal and the physical are metaphysically 21
22 distinct, this article shows that the only way to deal properly with the hard problem is by denying the metaphysical 22
23 distinction between the physical and the phenomenal that gives the hard problem life. > Results • This article 23
24 concludes by discussing how neurophenomenology might be reformulated under the auspices of a radically enactive 24
25 and embodied account of cognition. That is, only by denying that there are two distinct phenomena – the physical 25
26 and the phenomenal – can the neurophenomenological project get on with addressing its pragmatic problems of 26
27 showing how neuroscientists may be guided by first-person data in their analysis of third-person experimental 27
28 data, and vice versa. > Implications • The topic addressed in this article is of direct value to consciousness studies 28
29 in general and specifically for the project of neurophenomenology. If the neurophenomenological project is to deal 29
30 with the hard problem, it must denude itself of its non-reductionist background assumption and embrace a strict 30
31 identity thesis. > Constructivist content • Radical enactive and embodied approaches to mind and consciousness 31
32 adopt a view of consciousness as a dynamic activity – something an organism enacts in ongoing engagement with 32
33 its environment. These approaches therefore share with constructivist approaches an action-based view of mind. 33
34 > Key words • Consciousness, radical enactivism, neurophenomenology, hard problem of consciousness. 34
35 35
36 36
302 37 37
38 Introduction in the two descriptions are distinct and ir- not metaphysically distinct and merely cor- 38
39 reducibly different. Those who take the hard relatively related; while, on other hand, it 39
40 « 1 »  According to a prevalent view, problem seriously assume that facts about must also claim that physical activity does 40
41 there is just one basic kind of reality – a phenomenal experience are neither logically not suffice, metaphysically, for phenomenal 41
42 reality that does not bifurcate into physical nor metaphysically entailed by physical facts experience.1 42
43 and mental realities. For anyone attracted – neural or extra-neural. « 3 »  Drawing on a fusion between the 43
44 to such metaphysical austerity, this raises « 2 »  Some opt for a reductive monism, continental tradition of phenomenology and 44
45 questions about how to understand the usually some form of physicalism. Meta- the sciences of mind and brain, this problem 45
46 seeming gap between the phenomenal and physical physicalism holds that the physi- 46
47 the physical. Certainly, a complete descrip- cal exhausts the phenomenal, such that the 1 | It goes without saying that there are many 47
48 tion of the physical world would not contain physical characterization of the world is varieties of reductionism and non-reductionism, 48
49 any description of phenomenal experience. privileged and leaves nothing out. The other and that our brief rendering is in no way meant to 49
50 Those who are impressed by the hard prob- popular response to the hard problem is to capture the nuances of the theoretical landscape. 50
51 lem of consciousness will think that this embrace some form of non-reductive mon- Note, also, that the way we have set things up does 51
52 incompleteness of physical descriptions has ism. But there is an inherent tension at the not presume physicalism is the only way to go 52
53 metaphysical implications (Chalmers 1996). heart of such an approach. For, on the one – what we have said is consistent with adopting 53
54 That problem seems pressing for anyone hand, non-reductive monism must claim neutral monist and dual-aspect monist accounts 54
55 who believes that the properties picked out that the phenomenal and the physical are of the mind-body relationship. 55
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 Enactivism
Never Mind the Gap Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto

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1 space is sharply articulated by Francisco must be related but distinct. In accepting enomenology apart from analytic variants 1
2 Varela in his 1996 paper, “Neurophenom- this, Varela identifies himself as a member of of non-reductionism is not its background 2
3 enology: A Methodological Remedy for the this non-reductionist camp, sharing a com- metaphysical assumptions but its particular 3
4 Hard Problem” – the locus classicus for the mon concern “for first-hand experience as strategy for explicating its non-reduction- 4
5 movement. The phenomenon of conscious- basic fact” (Varela 1996: 333). Crucially, he ism, and the specific manner in which it 5
6 ness, for Varela, cannot be accounted for by agrees, with David Chalmers (1995), that to takes experience into account (Varela 1996: 6
7 a purely third-person cognitive scientific address the hard problem adequately, “what 333). 7
8 model or theory. As Varela puts it in one of is needed […] is a form of non-reductive ex- « 8 »  Neurophenomenology, as formu- 8
9 his many contributions to this discussion: planation” (Varela 1996: 331). lated by Varela, offers an approach to the 9
10 « 6 »  What this shows is that there is a study of consciousness that seeks to tackle 10
11
12
“  My mind is still a different affair which is not
exhausted by that [physical, third-personal] de-
basic agreement between traditional non-
reductionists and neurophenomenologists
the hard problem by “gathering a research
community armed with new pragmatic
11
12
13 scription; there is a residue left, a remnant that we about the metaphysics of consciousness and tools enabling them to develop a science of 13
14 may call the experience of the mind, the sense of the need to address the problem of the ex- consciousness” (Varela 1996: 330). What is 14
15 self […]. As long as there is such a remnant in the planatory gap. Traditional analytic non-re- needed is a “systematic exploration of the 15
16 mind’s description of minds, this sense of self that ductionism and neurophenomenology, for only link between mind and consciousness 16
17 evades any descriptive net, the Mind–Body rela- example, both emphasize the irreducible na- that seems both obvious and natural: the 17
18
19
”
tion is still a problem. (Varela 1976: 66) ture of first-person phenomenal experience.
But non-reductionism implies an explana-
structure of human experience itself” (ibid,
emphasis original). As a result, neuroph-
18
19
20 « 4 »  As Varela construes the central tory gap. If we cannot directly recast expla- enomenology holds that a science of con- 20
21 problem, it is one of accounting for the phe- nations presented in the vocabulary of phe- sciousness can and should make use of both 21
22 nomenal while acknowledging the irreduc- nomenal experience to those presented in first-person subjective data – pertaining to 22
23 ible character of phenomenal experience the vocabulary of the physical sciences, then subjects’ own conscious experience – and 23
24 – the first-person, lived character of such there is a hole in our understanding how the data about the structure and function of 24
25 experience. As he stresses: physical relates to the phenomenal. The hard brain and body. In so doing, neurophenom- 25
26 problem is given life if it is assumed that enology assumes that discoveries concern- 26
27
28
“  [W]hat is missing [from reductive, physicalist
accounts] is not the coherent nature of the expla-
the presence of this epistemic gap entails a
metaphysical gap between the phenomenal
ing both kinds of data have “equal status in
demanding a full attention and respect for
27
28
29 nation but its alienation from human life. Only and the physical. To deal adequately with their specificity” (ibid: 343, emphasis add- 29
30 putting human life back in will erase that absence; the hard problem, therefore, requires closing ed). 30
31 not some ‘extra ingredient’ or profound ‘theoreti- both gaps. For non-reductionists, a straight « 9 »  There are number of challenges 31
32
33
”
cal fix’. (Varela 1996: 345) solution to the hard problem demands a re-
vealing account of just how the phenomenal
facing the neurophenomenological project
of synthesizing first-person data with exper-
32
33
34 For him, to put human life back into the mix relates to the physical, without the former imental methodologies in cognitive science. 34
35 means “expanding neuroscience to include collapsing into the latter. One problem is to determine how neuro- 35
36 original phenomenological investigations of « 7 »  In analytic circles, non-reduction- phenomenology can accommodate the fact 36
37 experience” (Thompson 2004: 383). ists try to address this issue by positing cer- that first-person reports are often confabula- 37 303
38 « 5 »  In adopting this general line, Vare- tain bridging principles or otherwise trying tory or biased (Lutz & Thompson 2003: 32; 38
39 la (1996) notes the strong affinities between to explicate how the physical and the phe- see also Nisbett & Wilson 1977). How will 39
40 the approach that he recommends and other nomenal relate to each other without reduc- neurophenomenological procedures guard 40
41 non-reductionist approaches in the analytic ing one to the another (Hutto 2000: Ch. 3). against such biases and confabulations? A 41
42 tradition of philosophy of mind – in partic- Neurophenomenology advises going a dif- possible solution would be to systematically 42
43 ular those of John Searle (1992) and Owen ferent way. It is marked out by promoting train subjects in attending to and self-regu- 43
44 Flanagan (1992). What unites these ap- a practical method of using neuroscientific lating emotions. The neurophenomenologist 44
45 proaches is that they give… data and first-personal data as complemen- has such tools ready to hand: the relevant 45
46 tary partners in the joint pursuit of a science practices “exist in phenomenology, psycho- 46
47
48
“  an explicit and central role to first-person ac-
counts and to the irreducible nature of experi-
of consciousness. Thus, according to neu-
rophenomenology, it is unnecessary to posit
therapy and contemplative meditative tra-
ditions” (Lutz & Thompson 2003: 33). Yet,
47
48
49 ence, while at the same time refusing either a du- theoretical principles in order to bridge the even if the first challenge can be dealt with, a 49
50 alistic concession or a pessimistic surrender to the gap between the phenomenal and the physi- second challenge is that any attempt to pro- 50
51
52
”
question. (Varela 1996: 333) cal. Instead it proposes concentrating on
developing a rigorous method, drawing on
duce a first-person introspective report con-
cerning an experience is likely to change the
51
52
53 Those who advocate non-reductionism in- insights from phenomenology, that shows experience itself. Neurophenomenologists 53
54 sist on the irreducibility of the phenomenal, how the physical and the phenomenal are propose that suitable training in phenom- 54
55 such that the phenomenal and the physical integrated. Therefore, what sets neuroph- enological methods can also deal with this 55
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 column A
1 latter problem by enabling properly initiated
2 subjects to become sensitive to so-called
3 phenomenal invariants, i.e., “categorical fea-
4 tures of experience that are phenomenologi-
5 cally describable both across and within the
6 various forms of lived experience” (Lutz &
7 Thompson 2003: 33).
8 « 10 »  In this article, we are not con-
9 cerned with these sorts of pragmatic chal-
10 lenges. Here we restrict our attention to the
11 challenge raised by the hard problem. Ulti-
12 mately, we disagree with the metaphysical
13 stance of non-reductionism. Nonetheless,
14 we agree with non-reductionism that there
15 is no prospect that “phenomenal descrip-
16 tions might be inferred a priori from physi-
17 cal descriptions” (Hutto & Myin 2012: 168f;
18 emphasis in the original).
19 « 11 »  In Radicalizing Enactivism, Daniel
Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism
20 Hutto and Erik Myin (2012) champion a vi-
21 sion of enactivism according to which the
22 plethora of cognitive activity of humans and
23 non-human organisms is best explained in
24 terms of and understood as dynamically un-
25 folding, situated embodied interactions and
26 engagement with environmental affordanc-
27 es. Radical embodied-enactive approaches
28 to cognition (REC, for short) thus reject the
29 familiar assumption that the best explana-
30 tion of cognition always requires positing
31 contents that are acquired and transformed
32 in order to create representations that then
33 inform and guide what an organism does or
experiences.
34
35 « 12 »  In endorsing enactivism, it is not
36 surprising that REC shares a number of the-
304 37 oretical commitments with neurophenom-
38 enology. RECers and neurophenomenolo-
39 gists alike emphasize the relational nature of
40 consciousness, rejecting representationalism
41 and neurocentricism (Hutto & Myin 2012;
42 Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991). REC de-
43 fends the idea that basic cognition and men-
44 tality, including phenomenal experience, is
45 non-contentful. Anti-representationalism is
46 a signature starting point for enactivist phi-
47 losophy of mind. If one combines this with
48 the familiar view that representations are
49 necessary for computation, then it follows
50 that an anti-representationalist science of
51 the mind is “incompatible with the compu-
52 tational theory of cognition” (Silberstein &
53 Chemero 2012: 40). Neurophenomenolo-
54 gists agree with all of this, but they especially
55 emphasize that “from a phenomenological
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Constructivist Foundations vol. 11, N°2
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standpoint conscious experience is quite at « 15 »  If our analysis is correct, whatever 1
variance with that of mental content as it fig- else neurophenomenology might achieve, it 2
ures in the Anglo-American philosophy of does nothing to close the gap between the 3
mind” (Varela 1996: 334). phenomenal and the physical, and therefore 4
« 13 »  In addition, both REC and neu- does nothing to deal with the hard prob- 5
rophenomenology assume that cognitive lem. What is the way forward on this issue? 6
processes, including consciousness, arise We argue for adopting a strict identity the- 7
in nonlinear brain-body-niche dynamics. sis, one that allows for no gap between the 8
Taking a dynamical system theoretic ap- phenomenal and the physical. Accordingly, 9
proach to the study of cognitive activity fits differences in description are just that – dif- 10
naturally with anti-representationalism. As ferent ways of describing one and the same 11
Michael Silberstein and Anthony Chemero physical-phenomenal activity. This is to 12
remind us, conceiving of cognitive systems deny that the phenomenal and the physical 13
as nonlinearly coupled organism-environ- are metaphysically distinct. Insofar as this is 14
ment systems “removes the pressure to treat correct, getting clear about these metaphysi- 15
one portion of the system as representing cal commitments provides a more secure 16
other portions of the system” (Silberstein & basis for understanding and exploring the 17
Chemero 2012: 40; emphasis original). In genuine contributions of a bona fide neuro- 18
other words, if there is only a single system phenomenology. 19
– a single system comprising neural, bod- 20
ily and worldly elements – then there is no 21
need for one part – the neural part, say – to 22
represent bodily and/or worldly aspects. The 23
same goes for phenomenal experience; it 24
does not just involve the brain but the entire a pragmatic rather than a metaphysical solution 25
organism, situated in a field of affordances to the hard problem of consciousness, and that 26
(Chemero 2009; Hutto, Kirchhoff & Myin taking this pragmatic stance sidesteps the hard 27
2014; Kirchhoff 2015a; Thompson & Varela problem of consciousness (for a treatment of this 28
2001; Thompson 2007). view of neurophenomenology, see Bitbol 2012). 29
« 14 »  Despite the many points of agree- Here is the problem with this line of thought. 30
ment between neurophenomenology and Either Varela is not doing metaphysics; or, he is 31
REC, there are reasons to question the met- engaged in a metaphysical project. If Varela is not 32
aphysical assumptions that frame the neu- doing metaphysics, then he cannot engage with 33
rophenomenological project. In particular, the hard problem of consciousness, for the hard 34
problem is a metaphysical problem. But given that
neurophenomenology’s non-reductionism, 35
Varela does engage with the hard problem, he can-
as reflected in formulations that fortify a 36
not avoid metaphysical commitments. Moreover,
schism between first- and third-person phe- 37
if Varela is not committed to any metaphysics at
nomena, tacitly accept the terms of the hard 38
all, then he cannot argue (a) that the nature of
problem in a way that makes it impossible 39
conscious experience is irreducible, and (b) that
to close the epistemic and metaphysical gaps 40
consciousness, therefore, requires a non-reduc-
in the way neurophenomenology hopes to. 41
tive explanation. In other words, Varela cannot
Unfortunately, even if neurophenomenol- offer a straight solution to the hard problem while
42
ogy provides the tools for seeing how ex- also giving a critique of its metaphysical frame-
43
periential and neuroscientific phenomena work. If Varela (or his interpreters) insists that his 44
are mutually constraining in practice, this view is a purely methodological or practical one, 45
does nothing by itself to address the hard as opposed to a metaphysical view, then he gets 46
problem. Indeed, it keeps in play the very the logic wrong. For by positing that conscious 47
distinction between the first- and third- experience is irreducible, Varela is making a 48
personal domains that the hard problem is metaphysical claim. One move (so we think) that 49
built upon.2 Varela is not allowed to make is to reframe the is- 50
sue as a practical one. This would be question beg- 51
2 |  You might think that we have mischarac- ging. It is for these reasons that we characterize 52
terized Varela’s project – especially in relation to Varela’s position as committed to the same kind of 53
the hard problem of consciousness. Some argue metaphysical framework that gives life to the hard 54
that the framework of neurophenomenology is problem in the first place. 55
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1 Overview “ (1) it is hard to work to train and stabilize a new active participant in its own right” (Varela 1
2 methods [sic] to explore experience; [and] (2) it is 1996: 344). 2
3 « 16 »  In the next section we give a brief hard to change the habits of science in order for it « 21 »  The working hypothesis of neuro- 3
4 overview of the neurophenomenological to accept that new tools are needed for the trans- phenomenology is that “[p]henomenologi- 4
5 framework, focusing on how to describe the formation of what it means to conduct research cal accounts of the structure of experience 5
6 relationship between first- and third-person on mind and for the training of succeeding gen- and their counterparts in cognitive science 6
7
8
data. We identify points of clarification and
problems for the neurophenomenological
”
erations. (Varela 1996: 347, emphases added) relate to each other through reciprocal con-
straints” (Varela 1996: 343). Consider, by
7
8
9 project of going beyond the hard problem in « 18 »  In expanding on this point, Varela way of example, a pilot study, conducted by 9
10 the subsequent section. Finally, we articulate says: Lutz and colleagues, investigating variations 10
11 an alternative to the view that first-person in subjective experience (Lutz et al. 2002). In 11
12
13
phenomenal data and third-person physi-
cal data are equal partners. That is, we shall
“  [I]nstead of finding extra ingredients to ac-
count for how consciousness emerges from mat-
the experimental task, subjects had to look
at a dot pattern with no depth cues. After a
12
13
14 articulate and defend the view that phenom- ter and brain, my proposal reframes the question period of seven seconds a change in the pat- 14
15 enal and physical data are different ways of to that of finding meaningful bridges between two tern was induced, with the subjects having 15
16 getting at features of one and the same phe- irreducible phenomenal [sic] domains. In this to press a button as soon as a 3D shape had 16
17 nomenon. Only by denying that there are specific sense neurophenomenology is a potential entirely emerged. Data was gathered both 17
18 two distinct yet complementary phenomena solution to the hard problem by casting in an en- by EEG recordings and via verbal reports 18
19
20
– the physical and the phenomenal – can the
neurophenomenological project get on with 1996: 340, emphases added)
”
tirely different light on what hard means. (Varela given after each button-pressing task. In the
experimental task, subjects were able to cat-
19
20
21 the business of addressing pragmatic prob- egorize their experiences using phenomenal 21
22 lems such as « 19 »  Despite this recasting, neurophe- categories and invariants, which they them- 22
23 a showing how neuroscientists may be nomenology is still officially targeting the selves had established and were able to suc- 23
24 guided by first-person data in their hard problem of consciousness: cessfully maintain during the training pe- 24
25 analysis of third-person experimental riod. The lesson, reported by Antoine Lutz 25
26
27
data, and
b showing how neuroscientific analysis
“  My claim is that the so-called hard problem
[…] can only be addressed productively by gather-
and Evan Thompson, is that the… 26
27
28
29
may revise and constrain phenomeno-
logical accounts of subjective experi-
ing a research community armed with new prag-
matic tools enabling them to develop a science
“  recording-session thus involved the simultane-
ous collection of first-person data (introspective/
28
29
30
31
ence.
added)
”
of consciousness. (Varela 1996: 330, emphasis retrospective verbal reports) and third-person data
(electrophysiological recordings and behavioral
30
31
32
33 Neurophenomenology: « 20 »  To meet these aims, neurophe-
measures of button-pressing reaction times).
(Lutz & Thompson 2003: 43, italics added)
” 32
33
34 A brief introduction nomenology is based on an integration of 34
35 three central elements (see e.g., Gallagher « 22 »  Another example of the need for 35
36 « 17 »  One way to interpret neurophe- & Zahavi 2008; Lutz & Thompson 2003; synthesizing neuroscientific findings with 36
37 nomenology, as classically formulated by Thompson 2004): a phenomenological investigation of the 37 305
38 Varela (1996), is that it changes the subject – a retrieving first-person data from a phe- structure of experience comes from Varela’s 38
39 viz., it is interested in addressing a different nomenological analysis of first-person (1996) – admittedly brief – discussion of at- 39
40 kind of problem than the hard problem. For experience; tention. Varela points out that attention is 40
41 Varela, the genuinely hard problem is not b exploring phenomenal experience thought to be a basic mechanism for con- 41
42 an apparent gap between the phenomenal through the lens of embodied and en- sciousness. Electrical recordings and func- 42
43 and the physical. He is interested, rather, active approaches to cognitive science, tional brain imaging have enabled neurosci- 43
44 in the practical problem of formulating the using the tools of dynamical systems entists to locate specific neuronal networks 44
45 right sort of questions that will allow one to theory; and associated with attention. This has led re- 45
46 properly integrate and analyze physical and c producing data of brain activity based searchers to posit three different attentional 46
47 phenomenal data. In other words, what is on large-scale, functional integration of networks in the brain. One involved in ori- 47
48 needed is not some theoretical insight into neurodynamics. enting to sensory stimuli; a second involved 48
49 the metaphysical glue that binds together This implies that if data acquired from phe- in activating patterns from memory; and a 49
50 the physical and the phenomenal, but rather nomenological analysis is to have equal third involved in maintaining an alert state. 50
51 a “proper, rigorous method and pragmatics” status to data gathered through empirical, On the one hand, this indicates that atten- 51
52 for the exploration of consciousness (Varela cognitive scientific means, then phenom- tional networks are distributed in the brain 52
53 1996: 347; emphasis original). Thus, for Va- enological investigations of experience can- and involve different configurations of neu- 53
54 rela, the nature of “hard” can be reformu- not simply or merely be “a convenient stop ronal activity. On the other hand, as Varela 54
55 lated in two different senses: on our way to a real explanation, but an is quick to point out, “it is clear that the ex- 55
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http://constructivist.info/11/2/302.kirchhoff
 column A
1 periential distinctions between these forms
2 of attention require detailed structural in-
3 vestigation of the varieties of ways in which
4 attention is manifest in experience” (Varela
5 1996: 342). As Varela further specifies, such
6 a “systematic study of the structures and
7 strategies of attention is still a largely unful-
8 filled task” (ibid). It is precisely this task that
9
10
would require merging the neurosciences
with phenomenological methods.
11 « 23 »  There is of course much more to
12 say about case studies illustrating a circula-
13
14
tion between first- and third-personal phe-
nomena or case studies in need of phenom-
15 enological assistance. For further detail, we
16 refer readers to Thompson & Varela (2001)
17 and Lutz & Thompson (2003). Our purpose
18 here has merely been to sketch the project
19 of neurophenomenology and point to a few
Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism
column B column C
systems. Phenomenal experience – the phe- « 27 »  These clarifications put us in 1
nomenal character of an experience – is not a position to understand the limitations 2
mentioned or captured by accounting for of the neurophenomenological approach 3
cognitive abilities and behavior in this way. with respect to the hard problem. In one 4
Thus, given the way the hard problem is set sense it is fair for Varela to insist on the 5
up, as Silberstein and Chemero observe, it “equal status” of first- and third-personal 6
follows: data. This is completely justified if we are 7
talking only about data collected by first- 8
“  [O]n the one side of the equation we have
material brains [or brain-body-environmental
person and third-person methods – e.g.,
represented facts about subjects’ reported
9
10
systems] as described by the natural sciences and experiences and brain functioning. How- 11
on the other we have qualia as described by first- ever, insofar as such data is understood to 12
person experience.
2015: 184)
” (Silberstein & Chemero track two distinct and irreducibly different
kinds of phenomena, the proposal is prob-
13
14
lematic. For, on the latter reading, it implies 15
Or, as Thomas Nagel once put the same is- the very metaphysical distinction between 16
sue, albeit in different terms: the phenomenal and the physical that fuels 17
the hard problem. If correct, this suggests 18
“  If mental processes are physical processes, that neurophenomenology is in no position 19

20 case studies. In the next section, we turn to then there is something it is like, intrinsically, to to deal with the hard problem but rather 20
21 the central aim of this article – identifying undergo certain physical processes. What it is for promotes it. There remains a problem, as 21
22
23
shortcomings with how the framework of
neurophenomenology deals with the hard
such a thing to be the case remains a mystery.
(Nagel 1979: 175)
” deep as ever, when it comes to explaining
why any subjective experience attaches to or
22
23
24 problem itself. accompanies neurodynamical activity. Any 24
25 This is what makes the hard problem so attempt to give a non-reductive explanation 25
26 hard; impossibly hard. of how these different fields of phenomena 26
27 Points of clarification « 26 »  This analysis provides the ba- relate presupposes, minimally, a distinction 27
28 and problems for sis for a second clarification. It might be between those phenomena in the first place. 28
thought that in seeking to develop a sci- If this analysis is sound, there are clear limi-
29
30
neurophenomenology ence of consciousness informed by non- tations in Varela-style neurophenomenol-
29
30
31 « 24 »  Let us start by asking: If there traditional, non-representational cognitive ogy as a means of providing any kind of 31
32 is an explanatory gap preventing a happy science, neurophenomenology has special solution to the hard problem. In this light, 32
33 marriage of subjective experience with neu- resources that help it to deal with the hard Varela’s talk of “getting beyond” the hard 33
34 roscientific data of brain activity, is it pos- problem of consciousness. Yet, on closer problem can only amount to the claim that 34
35 sible to close that gap with scrutiny, it is not at all clear how removing it would be more productive for a science of 35
36 ƒƒ disciplined training in the methods of the pillars of representationalism and com- consciousness to simply ignore it. 36
306 37 phenomenology, and putationalism could aid neurophenomenol- « 28 »  Recall that neurophenom- 37
38 ƒƒ development of a research programme ogy in dealing with the hard problem of enology’s main strategy was to address the 38
39 seeking “articulations by mutual con- consciousness. Abandoning commitments metaphysical problem by offering an illu- 39
40 straints between the field of phenomena to representationalism and computation- minating non-reductive explanation. Yet 40
41 revealed by experience and the correla- alism appears to leave the problem wholly Tim Bayne (2004) reveals why employing 41
42 tive field of phenomena established by untouched. For those who accept the hard the neurophenomenological method of re- 42
43 the cognitive sciences” (Varela 1996: problem in its traditional formulation, it ciprocal constraints gets things the wrong 43
44 347; emphasis added)? does not in any way depend on accepting way around and hence cannot deliver the 44
45 « 25 »  As a first point of clarification, a representational or computational theory promised goods. The first thing to note, 45
46 it is helpful to keep in mind the source of of mind, and hence is not at all alleviated by according to Bayne, is that the working 46
47 metaphysical problems that give rise to the the rejection of the latter. The hard problem hypothesis of neurophenomenology only 47
48 hard problem when thinking about whether of consciousness arises even for those who reflects an epistemic principle. In demand- 48
49 neurophenomenology can get us beyond it. assume that minds do not trade in informa- ing that first-person and third-person data 49
50 A foundational assumption is that cogni- tional contents or form representations of have equal status, it presses for a kind of re- 50
51 tion and behavior are exhaustively expli- the world based on such contents. As Shaun flective equilibrium that seeks a balance or 51
52 cable using the vocabulary of the cognitive Gallagher and Dan Zahavi (2008: 188) ob- coherence among a set of beliefs via mutual 52
53 sciences, whether they focus on the struc- serve, the source of the hard problem is “the adjustment. For this reason, neurophenom- 53
54 tural and functional properties of the brain very existence of subjective experience it- enology maintains that “[p]henomenologi- 54
55 or on extensive extra-neural, dynamical self.” cal accounts of the structure of experience 55
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Constructivist Foundations vol. 11, N°2


column A
1 and their counterparts in cognitive science
2 relate to each other through reciprocal con-
3 straints” (Varela 1996: 343). But, as Bayne
4 notes, pressing for such reflective equilib-
5 rium is only to promote “an epistemic prin-
6 ciple not an explanatory principle” (Bayne
7 2004: 356; emphasis original). For to “claim
8 that two sets of data ought to be brought into
9 equilibrium is to make no claims about the
10 explanatory relations between them” (ibid:
11 356). Let us assume that subjects properly
12 trained in phenomenological methods are
13 capable of accessing phenomenal invariants
14 or categories of their experience. Examples
15 of such invariants, Lutz and Thompson
16 mention, would be “transient affective state
17 or quality of attention” (Lutz & Thompson
18
19
2003: 33). According to these authors, with-
out such training, it is unlikely that sub-
20 jects would become aware of such features
21 of their experience and hence they would
22
23
be unavailable for verbal report. However,
appropriate first-personal training allows
24
25
such phenomenological reports to be made,
which, in turn, can feed into experiments
26 since neuroscientists could then take them
27 into consideration. For example, they might
28 be able to “gain access to physiological pro-
29 cesses that otherwise would remain opaque,
30 such as the variability in brain response as
31 recorded in EEG/MEG” (ibid: 33; see also
32 Lutz et al. 2002). Let us assume that some-
33 thing like this process can succeed and new
34 data can be generated, thereby pushing
35
36
along the science of consciousness.
« 29 »  Nevertheless, Bayne (2004) is
37 right that this does not take us further in the
38 direction of an explanation – hence no epis-
39
40
temic gap is closed; thus this method can
not bring us any closer to solving the hard
41 problem, metaphysically construed. The
42 difficulty is that if there is an assumed gap
43 between the phenomenal and the physical,
44
45
then the method of mutual constraints does
exactly nothing to close it. Indeed, without
46 a grounding explanation, it looks as if this
47 approach could only establish the existence
48 of certain correlations between, say, spike
49 activity and unique modes of attentional
50 quality. If this is correct, neurophenom-
51 enology leaves us wandering in the realm of
52 correlations without providing the requisite
53 kind of illuminating explanation.
54 « 30 »  Are there any other possible ave-
55 nues the neurophenomenologists might at-
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Enactivism
Never Mind the Gap Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto
column B column C
tempt to explore? We have just argued that With the exception of those adopting an 1
understanding the methodology of recipro- anti-emergentist stance, this kind of alleg- 2
cal constraints as a heuristic that respects edly weak emergence is thought to be rath- 3
the equal status of first- and third-person er innocent and ubiquitous. On the other 4
data is insufficient. What about pursuing hand, there is “global-to-local determina- 5
the idea of reciprocal causality between tion” (ibid: 419), in which macroscopic dy- 6
phenomenal consciousness and neurody- namics have an influence on the activity of 7
namics? Would that take us beyond mere microscopic neuronal ensembles. This kind 8
correlation? Thompson and Varela adopt of “top-down” causation is sometimes re- 9
this strategy. In line with the neurophenom- ferred to as strong emergence and is heav- 10
enological framework, the authors employ ily disputed – at least among philosophers. 11
the tool-kit of dynamical systems theory. Nevertheless, this form of reciprocal causa- 12
As a result of emergent features in complex, tion lies at the heart of the slaving principle 13
self-organizing systems, Thompson and Va- referred to by dynamical s ystems theorists 14
rela suggest that… (see, e.g., Kelso 1995). From these observa- 15
tions, Thompson and Varela go on to say: 16
“  one can expect there to be two-way or recipro- 17
cal relationships between neural events and con-
scious activity; and […] that the processes crucial
“  Given that the coupled dynamics of brain,
body and environment exhibit self-organization
18
19
for consciousness cut across brain-body-world and emergent processes at multiple levels […] 20
divisions, rather than being brain-bound neural it seems legitimate to conjecture that downward 21
”
events. (Thompson & Varela 2001: 418) causation occurs at multiple levels in these sys-
tems, including that of conscious cognitive acts
22
23
There is much of value in this proposal,
since it sees phenomenal consciousness as & Varela 2001: 421)
”
in relation to local neural activity. (Thompson 24
25
dynamical unfolding, involving the entire 26
organism situated in a field of environmen- This proposal encounters serious problems; 27
tal affordances. we will only focus on two. 28
« 31 »  In using the tools of dynamical « 32 »  The first problem is that, as 29
systems theory, Thompson and Varela take things stand, these conjectures do not take 30
a crucial step away from what we might call us beyond the posting of mere correlations. 31
“neo-phrenological blob-ology,” namely the Thompson and Varela highlight this. They 32
attempt to localize psychological functions write: 33
to specific brain areas. The dynamical ap- 34
proach, by contrast, emphasizes the signifi-
cance of large-scale neuronal integration.
“  Nevertheless, the available evidence so far re-
garding synchronization in the vertebrate brain is
35
36
As they state: only correlative, not causal; there is still no direct 37 307
proof that changes in [neuronal] synchrony lead 38
“ The neural counterpart of subjective experi-
ence is thus best studied not at the level of spe-
to changes in either behavior or consciousness.
(Thompson & Varela 2001: 419; emphasis added)
” 39
40
cialized circuits or classes of neurons […] but 41
through a collective neural variable that describes Evidence of self-organizing, synchronous 42
the emergence and change of patterns of large- neurodynamics does not, by itself, add up 43
”
scale integration. (Thompson & Varela 2001:
40; see also Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991)
to evidence that neurodynamics and phe-
nomenal consciousness stand in a relation
44
45
of reciprocal causation. And this simply 46
Note that emergence – according to Thomp- brings us back to square one – back to 47
son and Varela – is bi-directional. On the Bayne’s (2004) worry: noting correlations 48
one hand, there is what Thompson and Va- between two relata does nothing to show 49
rela refer to as “local-to-global determina- how one relatum explains the other, or vice 50
tion or ‘upward causation’” (Thompson & versa. 51
Varela 2001: 419). Here one would expect « 33 »  The second problem is that even if 52
to find macroscopic features arising due to neurophenomenology could get us beyond 53
a certain complexity and self-organizing mere correlation to causation, this would 54
activity of specific microscopic elements. not help their cause. As Bayne states: 55
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 column A
1
“ [W]e might note that merely establishing that
2 there are causal relations does not suffice to close
3 the explanatory gap. After all, Descartes – the ar-
4 chetypical non-naturalist – was more than will-
5 ing to think that there is causal traffic between
6 mind and matter.
7 original)
” (Byne 2004: 359; emphasis
8 « 37 »  A first step in this direction is to
9 Lutz, a proponent of neurophenomenology,
10 makes a similar point, saying: “The intro-
11 duction of reciprocal causation might be
12 perceived as a subtle expression of dualism”
13 (Lutz 2002: 150). And, of course, positing a
14 causal relation, even if this relation is taken
15 to be reciprocal, presupposes a distinction
16 between different phenomena and in so do-
17 ing assumes rather than overcomes gaps.
18 « 34 »  Given that neurophenomenol-
19 ogy is committed to correlations – and at
Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism
column B column C
distinct kinds of relata that might be con-
ceivably integrated. To make a full and con-
engaging with the book? The answer will
include, but will not be limited to, the fact
1
2
vincing case that there is simply no problem that the “book is exerting mechanical pres- 3
to solve here requires demonstrating that an sure on the portions of your fingers along 4
imagined metaphysical distinction between the surface of the book” (Chemero 2009: 5
the phenomenal and the physical is an illu-
sion of sorts (see, e.g., Papineau 2002).
144). But answering the how-question does
not answer a what-question that might be
6
7
asked: What are you experiencing in the 8
note that the mere fact that phenomenal process? You are feeling the texture of the 9
descriptions cannot be inferred or induced book and even though you are only hold- 10
from physical descriptions does not imply ing parts of the book you have expectations 11
that we are dealing with two separate and about the book’s orientation, its size, and so 12
distinct metaphysical entities. on. How the book feels to you also has to do 13
« 38 »  Non-reductive approaches to with the way you are applying finger pres- 14
consciousness are generally motivated by sure to prevent the book from slipping out 15
the fact that it seems we can coherently of your hands. This involves “working with 16
imagine the phenomenal and the physical your wrist and the rest of your arm to fight 17
coming apart. The moves are well rehearsed. gravity and keep the book in place” (Chem- 18
Nagel (1974) offers considerations about ero 2009: 145). Much more could be said 19

20 most, reciprocal causation – it assumes a what-it-is-like-to-be-a-bat to establish that about what this kind of active engagement 20
21 distinction between the phenomenal and first-person phenomenal experience must involves, but enough has been indicated 21
22 the physical that in no way bridges the ex- forever elude any purely third-person de- here to show that there is something it is 22
23 planatory or metaphysical gaps at all. Thus scription. Frank Jackson (1982) advances like to engage in the activity of handling a 23
24 we concur with Bayne as he concludes: the well-known knowledge argument that book – that kind of embodied activity has 24
25 “The gap between the events, processes and has been taken by many to establish that a distinctive phenomenal character that is 25
26 structures discovered by neuroscience and phenomenal facts cannot be deduced even determined by what one does. 26
27 the events, processes and structures open to if one had knowledge of all the relevant « 41 »  The fact that phenomenal de- 27
28 phenomenology remains as wide as ever” physical facts. Chalmers (1996) supplies scriptions neither reduce to, nor are en- 28
29 (Bayne 2004: 358). us with zombie-based conceivability argu- tailed by, physical descriptions lends no 29
30 ments that invite us to coherently conceive support to the idea that we are dealing with 30
31 RECing the hard problem two individuals that are physically identical two things rather than one thing differently 31
32 « 35 »  So far we have considered and in all relevant respects even though only described. The phenomenal might just be 32
33 rejected non-reductionist neurophenom- one of the pair is phenomenally conscious. the physical described differently – under 33
34 enological ways of potentially dealing with Assuming coherent conceivability is a guide a different guise or mode of representation. 34
35 the hard problem. In what follows, we set to metaphysical possibility, it follows that This idea lies at the heart of the “phenome- 35
36 out a quite different approach, but one that it is metaphysically possible for physically nal concept strategy,” though it differs from 36
308 37 is also in tune with enactivism, for dealing identical beings to differ with respect to be- the approach on offer here. Spelling out 37
38 with the hard problem. It is a line of thought ing phenomenally conscious. the differences requires a careful unpack- 38
39 developed and defended more thoroughly « 39 »  It is correct that one cannot de- ing of several lines of thought (see Hutto & 39
40 in Hutto & Myin (2012). duce phenomenal descriptions from physi- Myin 2012: Ch. 8). That need not distract us 40
41 « 36 »  The first thing to recognize is cal descriptions. That is what drives these here. For what matters is that RECers agree 41
42 that the hard problem is not just hard: it is imaginative exercises. But why should that with those who advance the phenomenal 42
43 impossible. Once the assumptions that give surprise or trouble us? Phenomenal expe- concept strategy in endorsing a version of 43
44 it life are in play, the problem cannot be rience, on an REC view, just is a kind or- psychophysical identity theory that rejects 44
45 put to rest. The only effective way of deal- ganismic activity. As such, it can be given a “the absolute binary distinctions that carve 45
46 ing with the hard problem is to deny, from physical description. Nevertheless, physical nature at the joints: mind/matter, inner/ 46
47 the off, “that there is a relation between the descriptions neither adequately character- outer; self/world; subjective/objective, etc.” 47
48 phenomenal and the physical that needs ize nor capture everything that can apply to (Silberstein & Chemero 2015: 186). 48
49 explaining” (Hutto & Myin 2012: 169). The phenomenal consciousness. « 42 »  Crucially, to endorse monism is 49
50 need for and possibility of such an explana- « 40 »  To illustrate: Imagine that you not endorse a non-reductive metaphysics, 50
51 tion – non-reductive or otherwise – is obvi- are currently holding a book between your and certainly not to endorse a non-reduc- 51
52 ated if we conceive of the phenomenal and hands. When your eyes are open, you see tive physicalism. Non-reductive metaphys- 52
53 the physical as being one and the same – as it. Imagine closing your eyes but still en- ics assumes that the phenomenal and the 53
54 identical. This is to deny, resolutely, that “the gaging actively with the book. We can ask physical pick out two distinct phenomena, 54
55 phenomenal” and “the physical” denote two a how-question at this stage. How are you thereby maintaining the gap between the 55
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 Enactivism
Never Mind the Gap Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto

column A column B column C

{
1 1
2 Michael D. Kirchhoff 2
3 is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Wollongong, Australia. He has a PhD from 3
4 Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia (2014). His work is primarily focused on philosophy of 4
5 mind and cognition. Specifically work on the extended mind hypothesis, the causal-constitutive 5
6 distinction, and the predictive brain hypothesis. He has also published work on non-supervenient 6
7 emergence, mechanistic explanation, and distributed agency. His current projects include a 7
8 probabilistic theory of consciousness, which is funded by the New Directions to the Study of the 8
9 Mind initiative at the University of Cambridge, and work on the life-mind continuity thesis. 9
10 10
11 11
12 12

{
13 13
14 Daniel D. Hutto 14
15 is Professor of Philosophical Psychology at the University of Wollongong and member of the 15
16 Australian Research Council College of Experts. He is best known for his radically enactive account 16
17 of basic non-representational intentionality and phenomenal experience and his narrative practice 17
18 hypothesis about what lies at the roots of our everyday social understanding. His most recent books, 18
19 include: Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy (2006), Folk Psychological Narratives (2008). He is co- 19
20 author of the award-winning Radicalizing Enactivism (2013) and editor of Narrative and Understanding 20
21 Persons (CUP, 2007) and Narrative and Folk Psychology (2009). A special yearbook, Radical 21
22 Enactivism, focusing on his philosophy of intentionality, phenomenology and narrative, was 22
23 published in 2006. He regularly speaks at conferences and expert meetings for anthropologist, 23
24 clinical psychiatrists, educationalists, narratologists, neuroscientists and psychologists. 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29
30 30
31 31
32 phenomenal and the physical. Impor- not be thought of as denoting qualitative 32
33 tantly, in going monistic, and advocating a Conclusion: Looking ahead properties of our experiences, but should be 33
34 strict identity theory, REC also sets its face understood as the character of engaging with 34
35 against a reductive physicalism of the sort « 44 »  Unlike neurophenomenology, the world in different ways. 35
36 that assumes that everything that exists can REC deals with the hard problem head on. It « 45 »  We have argued that if one wants 36
37 be fully and adequately described in the vo- does so by rejecting the putative metaphysi- to get beyond the hard problem legitimately 37 309
38 cabulary of physics – viz., in exhaustively cal distinction between the phenomenal and – even if only to leave it behind – one must 38
39 physical terms. the physical that gives it life. According to confront and defuse the underlying assump- 39
40 « 43 »  We end this section with a sober REC, phenomenal experience is just dynam- tions that make it appear as if there is meta- 40
41 reminder. Some might be tempted to object ic activity grounded in agent-environment physical gulf between the phenomenal and 41
42 that positing brute identities between the interactions. There are not two relata – the the physical. Our claim is that it is only by 42
43 physical and the phenomenal is philosophi- physical and the phenomenal, qualia and following us down our preferred path rather 43
44 cally unsatisfying. This may seem especially brain activity. We have emphasized that the than endorsing a non-reductive metaphysics 44
45 so if it is further claimed that “such iden- phenomenally charged embodied activity that neurophenomenologists can legitimate- 45
46 tities cannot, and need not, be explained” can be differently described or encountered. ly get beyond the hard problem such that 46
47 (Hutto & Myin 2012: 169). Suppose we dis- REC refuses to allow the hard problem to get they can get on with the pragmatically more 47
48 cover that George Orwell is Eric Blair. This up and running by advancing a strict identity challenging tasks of figuring out how evi- 48
49 may be an important discovery in certain theory grounded in dynamic, embodied ac- dence from neurodynamics ought to shape 49
50 contexts. It may answer some important tivity. REC takes it that the phenomenal char- and constrain more first-personal data, and 50
51 questions for us. But one question it will not acter of experiences is ultimately grounded vice versa. 51
52 answer – one that does not even make sense in interactions between experiencers and 52
53 to ask – is why it is the case that the identity features of the environment. What we expe- Received: 3 August 2016 53
54 holds. One might just as well ask why 1 is 1, rience is determined by how we engage with Accepted: 26 December 2016 54
55 or why you are you. features of the world. Phenomenality should 55
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http://constructivist.info/11/2/302.kirchhoff
 column A column B column C

Open Peer Commentaries

1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4

on David Kirchhoff and Daniel Hutto’s “Never Mind the Gap”

5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 11
12 On the Too Often brand of enactivism, provided its original « 4 »  Let us now develop the former 12
Varelian version is properly understood. points.
13
14
Overlooked Radicality « 2 »  Indeed (as we will show below),
13
14
15 of Neurophenomenology the authors make claims about conscious- On the misunderstanding 15
16 ness that unambiguously belong to objec- of Varela’s position 16
17
Michel Bitbol tivist naturalism, a class of doctrines of « 5 »  §6 confirms the above-mentioned 17
18 Archives Husserl, Paris, France which physicalism is a restrictive case. But misunderstanding by following uncritically 18
19 michel.bitbol/at/ens.fr “naturalism” is precisely the archetypal op- the conclusions found in Timothy Bayne 19
Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism

20 ponent of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenol- (2004). The authors here equate neuroph- 20
21
Elena Antonova ogy, which underpins the strong variety of enomenology with a variety of non-reduc- 21
22 neurophenomenology advocated by Varela. tionism. However, in the introduction of 22
23
The Institute of Psychiatry, Such discrepancy seriously hinders the rec- Varela’s celebrated paper of 1996, it is made 23
24 Psychology and Neuroscience, King’s ognition of Varela’s boldness in his approach clear that although neurophenomenology 24
25 College London, UK to the “hard problem.” endorses a critique of reductionism, in the 25
26
elena.antonova/at/kcl.ac.uk « 3 »  Usually, naturalists barely recog- same way as do David Chalmers or John 26
27 nize that their position is only one among Searle, it adopts no alternative naturalistic 27
28 > Upshot • We point out that the sig- several options, because they are embedded metaphysical option, unlike (say) Chalmers. 28
29 nificance of the neurophenomenologi- in a scientific culture for which the natural- The latter’s variety of naturalist metaphysics 29
30 cal approach to the “hard problem” of istic option is a matter of course (see, e.g., seeks a solution to the hard problem in 30
31 consciousness is underrated and mis- Descola 2013). The authors of the target ar- ƒƒ positing a duality between the phenom- 31
32 understood by the authors of the target ticle are no exception to this rule. As a con- enal and the physical “properties,” and 32
33 article. In its original version, neurophe- sequence, they do not appreciate the deep ƒƒ inquiring into the (alleged) law-like re- 33
34 nomenology implies nothing less than originality of Varela’s approach to the “hard lations between the two series of “prop- 34
35 a change in our own being to dispel the problem” of consciousness, that is: erties.” 35
36 mere sense that there is a problem to be ƒƒ amplifying the concept of “naturaliza- But neither of these two orientations is ad- 36
310 37 theoretically solved or dissolved. Neu- tion” to avoid the standard objectifying opted by Varela’s neurophenomenology. 37
38 rophenomenology thus turns out to be prejudice of naturalism (Vörös 2014); « 6 »  Varela did not look for an onto- 38
39 much more radical than the enactivist ƒƒ confronting the problem of conscious- logical “solution” to the hard problem (such 39
40 kind of dissolution promoted by the au- ness from a consistently phenomenolog- as Chalmers’ property dualism), for he con- 40
41 thors. ical standpoint (by taking first-person sidered that the very statement of this prob- 41
42 experience as a de facto absolute starting lem is a fundamental fallacy. Instead, Varela 42
43 « 1 »  This challenging target article point of any inquiry); prescribed what he called a “remedy” for 43
44 holds a radical enactivist position that is ƒƒ replacing the project of finding a theo- the feeling that there exists a problem to be 44
45 perfectly consonant with constructivism. retical “solution” to the hard problem, confronted. This reference to a “remedy” is 45
46 However, it systematically misconstrues the or trying to “explain” the correlation absolutely crucial to understanding Varela’s 46
47 original approach to the “hard problem” of between biological processes and con- position, but is nowhere commented on by 47
48 consciousness advocated by Francisco Vare- sciousness, with a transformed attitude, the authors. The use of the word “remedy” 48
49 la under the name “neurophenomenology.” thus dispelling the problem entirely and in the subtitle of his original paper of 1996 49
50 It is then all too easy for the authors of the making the need for any “explanation” about neurophenomenology clearly shows 50
51 article to claim that they have taken a step simply pointless. that Varela was looking (at the very least) 51
52 forward with respect to neurophenomenol- This radical attitude is rooted in the phe- for a “dissolution” of the hard problem, or 52
53 ogy. In fact, the scale of radicality should be nomenological tradition, but Varela’s ad- something even more expeditious, render- 53
54 turned upside down. Neurophenomenology vancement was to make it directly relevant ing the quest for a “solution” obsolete. The 54
55 is by far more radical and advanced than this to the world of scientific enquiry. word “remedy” echoes Wittgenstein’s “treat- 55
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Constructivist Foundations vol. 11, N°2

 Enactivism
column A
1 ment” of philosophical “illnesses.” In phi-
2 losophy, a treatment is a procedure, a shift
3 in perspective, that reveals the incorrectness
4 of the presuppositions giving rise to a per-
5 ceived “problem” and invites one to bypass
6 this problem entirely.
7 « 7 »  Thus, Varela had already endorsed
8 the authors’ claim that “the hard problem is
9 not just hard: it is impossible” (§36), since
10 he wanted to cure scholars of the belief that
11 there is anything like a problem to be solved.
12 But Varela’s remedy was much more radical
13 than the dissolution offered by the authors.
14 The authors arrive at a monistic (and natu-
15 ralistic) theory of the phenomenal and the
16 physical. They come close to a double-as-
17 pect theory (§40) and then adopt an identity
18
19
theory (§§40f). It is in the name of this fam-
ily of monistic theories that they reject the
20 dualistic presupposition implicit in the very
21 formulation of the hard problem, thereby
22
23
dissolving it. By contrast, Francisco Varela
explicitly dismissed any view of this kind
24 (not only dualistic but also monistic), as well
25 as, and crucially, any temptation to look for
26 some “theoretical fix” that would solve the
27 hard problem (Bitbol 2012). This strategy of
28 engaging with a metaphysical problem from
29 the standpoint of a non-metaphysical stance
30 is perfectly allowed, and might even prove
31 mandatory for addressing the “hard prob-
32 lem” of consciousness, in contradistinction
33 with what the authors claim in a footnote to
34 §14. Such process, codified and extensively
35 practiced by Wittgenstein, is tantamount
36 to performing a reductio ad absurdum: ten-
37 tatively positing a premise (here the meta-
38 physical formulation of the “hard problem”)
39 for the sake of showing its basic incorrect-
40 ness.
41 « 8 »  Moreover, it is inaccurate in the
42 context of Varela’s work to state (as the au-
43 thors do in §6, by endorsing the position
44 of some post-Varelian neurophenomenolo-
45 gists) that putting human life back into the
46 mix just means “expanding neuroscience to
47 include original phenomenological investi-
48 gations of experience.” Unlike most of his
49 followers, Varela considered that the injunc-
50 tion to put human life back is to be taken at
51 face value: the issue of consciousness must
52 be addressed entirely from the standpoint of
53 human lived experience, as Husserl’s phe-
54 nomenology would have it. His slogan was
55 “lived experience is where we start from and
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Radicality of Neurophenomenology Michel Bitbol & Elena Antonova
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where we all must link back to, like a guiding witnessing a crucial change in the field of 1
thread.” Accordingly, Varela did not adopt a introspection, with good reasons to regain 2
“background of metaphysical assumptions” confidence in its potential, is made very 3
(§7), since he comprehended the funda- likely by an experiment showing that, un- 4
mental error of any such assumption and der certain conditions, Nisbett and Wilson’s 5
instead ended up in putting metaphysics at negative claim is no longer valid (Petitmen- 6
rest within the phenomenological stance he gin et al. 2013). No criticism of introspec- 7
had adopted. To recapitulate, Varela’s posi- tion based on Nisbett and Wilson’s claim 8
tion cannot be rendered as either a dualist can nowadays avoid a thorough discussion 9
metaphysics, or a monist metaphysics, or of the latter paper. 10
any kind of theory, but as a non-dual and a- 11
ontological way of being. On the issue of naturalism 12
« 9 »  The reason why Varela’s approach « 11 »  The misconstrual of neurophe- 13
to the “hard problem” goes much farther nomenology as a form of naturalism starts 14
than the dissolution advocated by the au- quite early in the target article. In §26, one 15
thors of the target article should be clear by reads: 16
now. Varela does not even share the assump- 17
tion that increasing one’s understanding of
an objectified nature is enough to address
“  it is fair for Varela to insist on the ‘equal status’
of first- and third-personal data. […] However
18
19
(let alone dissolve intellectually) the hard […] the proposal […] implies the very metaphysi- 20
problem. He rather advocates an existential cal distinction between the phenomenal and the 21
mutation, inspired by the phenomenologi-
cal epochè promoted by Husserl, to dispel
physical that fuels the hard problem.
” 22
23
the sense that there is a problem to be theo- « 12 »  Actually, Varela’s methodologi- 24
retically solved or dissolved. As soon as the cal distinction between first- and third- 25
epochè is practiced, there is no such thing as personal data is by no means tantamount 26
two sets of “properties” (phenomenal and to a metaphysical distinction between the 27
physical), and not even some transcendent phenomenal and the physical. Indeed, let 28
monistic domain of which the phenomenal us consider the following remark by Varela 29
and the physical would be two aspects, but in his 1996 paper: “the usual opposition of 30
only one immanent domain of lived experi- first-person vs. third-person accounts is 31
ence from which a set of intersubjectively misleading. It makes us forget that so-called 32
common features are extracted and treated third-person, objective accounts are done by 33
as if they belonged to some “physical” inde- a community of concrete people […].” Ac- 34
pendent world. cording to Varela, there is no such thing as 35
an intrinsically third-personal domain, and 36
On the reluctance to follow the no such thing as a metaphysically distinct 37 311
neurophenomenological program “physical” set of entities. In agreement with 38
up to its ultimate consequences Husserl’s phenomenology, and as hinted 39
« 10 »  Among the consequences of Va- above, the “so-called third-person, objec- 40
rela’s existential mutation, descriptions of tive accounts” are construed by Varela as 41
first-person experiences must be taken just a byproduct of selecting particular regions 42
as seriously as descriptions and scientific of lived (first-personal) experience, for the 43
laws pertaining to public (“third-person”) sake of sharing them with “a community of 44
phenomena. By contrast, the authors con- concrete people” endowed with the same 45
vey a widespread negative prejudice against kind of experience. There is no metaphys- 46
“introspection” in §9. Like almost everyone ics, here, but only a practice of construction 47
else in the field, they base their negative of third-person knowledge out of a coor- 48
statement on a cursory reference to Rich- dination of lived experiences, and a (phe- 49
ard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson’s paper of nomenological) stance of leaning on lived 50
1977. Yet they should not ignore that there experience for any further elaboration. That 51
has been a recent revival of introspection- “neurophenomenology’s main strategy was 52
like methods, partly initiated by Varela’s to address the metaphysical problem by of- 53
neurophenomenological program (Depraz, fering an illuminating non-reductive expla- 54
Varela & Vermersch 2004). That we are nation” (§27) is thus twice wrong: 55
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 column A column B column C
1 ƒƒ neurophenomenology is foreign to the on hold the “explanandum” of the hard Not to Avoid But Legitimize: 1
project of theoretically explaining the problem (“something,” which is not
2
3 origin of the phenomenal out of the even a “thing” but a condition for any-
Why the Gap Could Be Natural 2
3
4 physical, and thing to appear), and instead relies on a For the Enactive World 4
5 ƒƒ neurophenomenology implies no meta- mere semantic sleight of hand bearing 5
6 physical commitment to some sort of on the word “phenomenal.” Diana Gasparyan 6
7 crypto-dualistic formulation of the hard By contrast, Varela’s phenomenological ap- National Research University Higher 7
8 problem. proach offers a radical and complete dis- School of Economics, NRU HSE, 8
9 « 13 »  But, unlike Varela, the authors ad- missal of the hard problem for it penetrates 9
Moscow, Russia
10 here to a metaphysical view that is less dis- in the very existential attitude which makes 10
11 tinct from non-reductive physicalism than this issue appear as a problem. Its “curative” anaid6/at/yandex.ru 11
12 claimed. Let us comment on the following strategy thus turns out to be a full success, 12
13 sentence: for it leaves nothing out of its experiential > Upshot • I show that the gap problem 13
14 account: neither the phenomenal as a whole, is of no threat to the enactivist approach; 14
15
16
“  Phenomenal experience, on a REC view, just is
a kind organismic activity. As such, it can be giv-
nor the physical construed as a system of
intersubjectively ascertained structures of
moreover, if the enactivism model is thor-
oughly thought over through extending
15
16
17 en a physical description. Nevertheless, physical experience. ontology, it may turn out that the gap 17
18 descriptions neither adequately characterize nor « 16 »  The only weakness of Varela’s should be naturally built in the whole- 18
19 capture everything that can apply to phenomenal strategy is in fact our weakness: not every- ness of the world at the level of its self- 19
Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism

20
21
”
consciousness. (§39) one is ready to perform the existential mu-
tation it requires; not everyone knows how
cognition. 20
21
22 « 14 »  The only difference between to achieve the phenomenological epochè. To « 1 »  The target article by Michael 22
23 this position and non-reductive physical- embrace Varela’s point sincerely and whole- Kirchhoff & Daniel Hutto captures very pre- 23
24 ism is to be found in the “identity” claim, heartedly requires deep personal commit- cisely the changes that have to be made in 24
25 as opposed to the allegedly aspect-dual or ment to the transformation of one’s con- the modern science about consciousness, if 25
26 property-dualist presupposition of standard scious experience and its application to all we want to break the epistemological dead- 26
27 non-reductive physicalism (§40). Similarly, life, including one’s scientific pursuits, which lock or stop spinning our wheels. Today, 27
28 the only difference between the authors’ po- not many are willing to undertake. these changes are being discussed more and 28
29 sition and old-fashioned mind-brain iden- more often. We are talking here about the 29
30 tity theory, is that the sphere of the natural Michel Bitbol is researcher at CNRS, Paris, France. global objective of overcoming the subject 30
31 world that is “identified” with consciousness He received a PhD in physics and a “habilitation” in and object dichotomy as well as the dualistic 31
32 is expanded to the organism as a whole. As philosophy. After a start in scientific research, he turned vocabulary of philosophy and science. 32
33 does every supporter of a strong variety of to philosophy, editing texts by Erwin Schrödinger and « 2 »  In the meantime, the authors tend 33
34 naturalism, the authors identify conscious- formulating a neo-Kantian philosophy of quantum to take a cautious approach. They focus on 34
35 ness with a certain fraction of the objectified mechanics. He then studied the relations between highlighting key points rather than on revo- 35
36 natural world (here, the living organism). the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mind, lutionary reforms – we should leave the ex- 36
312 37 But saying bluntly that the phenomenal is in collaboration with Francisco Varela. He recently isting state of things as it is, but we should 37
38 such and such a natural process amounts to developed a conception of consciousness inspired formulate the right attitude to it and learn 38
39 closing one’s eyes to the very meaning of the from an epistemology of first-person knowledge. to use it properly. In some way, the right at- 39
40 word “phenomenal”: “phenomenal” is the titude implies avoiding the notorious gap 40
41 adjective (in noun form) that applies to the Elena Antonova is a Lecturer in Psychology at the between the mental and physical worlds, the 41
42 non-objective, lived, experiential manifesta- Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, gap that lies at the heart of the well-known 42
43 tion. Declaring that the phenomenal is some King’s College London. Her main research interest hard problem of consciousness. Scientists 43
44 objective process of nature then neither is the neuroscience of mindfulness, specifically should keep studying consciousness, stick- 44
45 solves nor dissolves the hard problem, but structural and functional brain changes in long- ing to “how” questions, and stop fretting 45
46 changes the meaning of one of the most cru- term meditation practitioners from the Tibetan over the inefficiency of “what” questions. 46
47 cial words that enters into its formulation. Buddhist traditions of Dzogchen and Mahamudra. After all, the situation with consciousness is 47
48 She has been actively involved with the Mind and Life hardly more pitiful than the situation typical 48
49 Conclusion Institute, https://www.mindandlife.org, founded by of most (if not all) of the problems in sci- 49
50 « 15 »  To sum up, the naturalistic, iden- Francisco Varela. Antonova has a keen interest in the ence, which can be compared with a black 50
51 tity-theoretic, approach of the authors philosophy of psychiatry and the philosophy of mind. box. We can learn a lot about every aspect 51
52 ƒƒ is a weak variety of dissolution of the hard of the behavior of the box contents without 52
53 problem when compared to Varela’s; and Received: 18 January 2016 looking into the box. 53
54 ƒƒ does not satisfactorily achieve the Accepted: 17 February 2016 « 3 »  This solution may be quite satis- 54
55 sought dissolution, because it leaves factory for applied sciences, which gener- 55
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Constructivist Foundations vol. 11, N°2


column A
1 ally do not brood over fundamental matters
2 not only regarding consciousness but also
3 regarding any other objects’ studies falling
4 into their scope of studies. The question is
5 whether this solution will be suitable for
6 the philosophy of science or contemporary
7 metaphysics. It may be doubtful. In refer-
8 ence to §40, the main difference between the
9 philosopher and the scientist is that while
10 the scientist is engaging with a book (trying
11 to find out how it is going to behave in dif-
12 ferent situations), the philosopher hopes to
13 comprehend it directly (to understand what
14 it is and what constitutes its essence).
15 « 4 »  Despite these doubts, the attitude
16 offered by the above authors is still very help-
17 ful – at the very least, it can help to refine our
18 understanding of the possibilities rooted in
19 neurophenomenology, which has so far not
20 been able to overcome the gap between the
21 mind and the body to solve the mind-body
22 problem. I share the authors’ belief that once
23 the problem of the gap between the physi-
24 cal and mental worlds is voiced, we will not
25 be able to solve it without bloodshed. Good
26 solutions may be absent if the problems as-
27 sociated with the gap are recognized. The
28 division into physical and mental invariably
29 entails differentiation between the first-per-
30 son ontology and the third-person ontol-
31 ogy, the gap between which, if admitted, can
32 hardly be eliminated.
33 « 5 »  It can be illustrated by the fol-
34 lowing: Scientific research in classical epis-
35 temology is possible only for an objective
36 picture of the reality, excluding subjective
37 “points of view.” However, since the objec-
38 tiveness of the mind is to be subjective, that
39 is, the essence of the mind is the subjective
40 experience of the subject, the mind inevi-
41 tably eludes the field of vision of scientists.
42 This failure is related to the fact that knowl-
43 edge of all the physical facts that make up
44 the essence of a mind still does not allow us
45 to live through the experience of another
46 creature as our own experience while exact-
47 ly this experience is the object of research.
48 At the same time, we cannot subject it to the
49 neural correlation that accompanies this ex-
50 perience. And we have to keep in mind the
51 epistemic asymmetry of these two points of
52 view; it is one thing to experience directly
53 the taste of an orange, and something com-
54 pletely different to listen to a story about
55 what an orange tastes like. Relying on non-
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Not to Avoid But Legitimize Diana Gasparyan
column B column C
classical epistemology, neurophenomenol- « 8 »  Different monistic assumptions, 1
ogy tries to eliminate asymmetry by includ- which are not distanced from neurophe- 2
ing reports of test subjects in the research or, nomenology, are even more radical in their 3
in other words, by including the first-person attempts to eliminate the gap. From the 4
perspective in the research (as introspection outset, philosophical monism is aimed at 5
sessions). However, the problem will still be acknowledging the uniformity of everything 6
there, as my telling about the taste of the or- that exists. For example, it can be argued that 7
ange is very different from my experiencing everything is experience (Varela, Thompson 8
the taste of the orange. In other words, being & Rosch 1991) or everything is information. 9
involved in the minimum objectivization, In the history of philosophical thought, this 10
I will be presented from the third-person concept has a number of well-designed prec- 11
perspective, even to myself. If we agree that edents – first of all, models offered by Aris- 12
subjective experience will systematically slip totle, Schopenhauer and Hegel. According 13
from the theories designed to explain the to these scholars, the world, even initially, 14
link between mental and physical facts, then is neither a pure object (matter) nor a pure 15
the prospects of developing a satisfactory subject (knowledge, information, experi- 16
theory become seriously complicated. ence). These cannot exist individually and 17
« 6 »  In this respect, the most adequate on their own. Pure matter cannot exist, as 18
way of handling the unfortunate gap will if it is unshaped (unidentified), it is nothing 19
be to admit that the situation, when we run and, therefore, does not exist. Information 20
into a shortage of means of explanation, is (knowledge about what the matter is) can- 21
normal rather than ignoring this situation. not also exist without an object, as what the 22
If we are able to demonstrate that the gap knowledge is about must definitely exist. The 23
in the explanation is a natural condition of best metaphoric illustration here is a two- 24
the entire system and is initially built into it, page spread where two pages are an integral 25
such admission may be seen as the best way whole, though they “do not see” each other 26
of handling the problem. The demonstration and “do not meet with each other.” Each of 27
of the normal nature of the gap means ac- these “pages” has a gap problem. 28
tual overcoming of this gap, and it is, in its « 9 »  The most systemic concept of 29
own way, a logical solution of the mind-body philosophical monism was offered by Hegel 30
problem. What should be ignored is the (1977). The person as a bearer of knowledge 31
problematicity of the gap, not the gap itself. (experience about the world) does not come 32
The gap exists; however, it is not a problem to the world, parachuting down from some- 33
– the problem would exist if the gap was ab- where. From the very beginning, he is part of 34
sent. Thus we legitimize the problem instead this world, he appears in it following its laws. 35
of merely ignoring it. He is endowed with an amazing ability to 36
« 7 »  What should we do and what is it learn. Therefore, knowledge about the world 37 313
all about? In ontology’s avoiding dualism, must be part of the world. Apparently, the 38
it is assumed that the mental and physical entire pattern must be cyclical – the world 39
worlds are inseparably interconnected. This learns about itself through the person (his 40
model is based on the phenomenological mind). The world forms a circle – it moves 41
assumption stating that the subject and the from nonorganic to organic, to life and, 42
object exist in an inter-determining rela- eventually, to the person who discovers the 43
tionship. As the two parts mutually assume world. Thus, the consciousness of the person 44
and re-create each other, it is difficult to dis- is the consciousness of the world. The person 45
tinguish between them. This model tends to (consciousness) and the nature (matter) are 46
be accepted by neurophenomenology, ac- two sides of one sheet – the world. 47
cording to which the inward (the qualitative « 10 »  This model is consistent with what 48
dimension of self) cannot be separated from Francisco Varela implies in his concepts of 49
the outward (the physically explicated neu- “lived experience,” “emboded cognition” 50
ral states of the brain). The subjective (the (Thompson & Varela, 2001). The cognizing 51
first-person perspective) must be taken into mind and the surrounding world are insepa- 52
consideration, as objective characteristics of rable and constitute a single system. By and 53
the brain (the third-person perspective) are large, it is in line with ideas of radical enac- 54
meaningless without it. tivism, where the subject and the object have 55
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Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism
314
column A
1 a relationship of involvement. It also is very
2 similar to the concept of the world construed
3 as umwelt by Jakob von Uexküll (1921),
4 where the world is seen as an equivalence of
5 things and actions of the organism, equiva-
6 lence of life and cognition.
7 « 11 »  A similar approach is offered by
8 endophysics, a present-day science, which
9 shows to what extent reality is built by the
10 observer and is necessarily dependent on
11 the observer, on his physical characteristics
12 and conscious intentions. In this paradigm,
13 events of the world are controlled and con-
14 stituted by the observer, who, in his turn,
15 is made and controlled by the events cre-
16 ated by him. He plays a dual role of the one
17 who is observed and the one who is observ-
18 ing; therefore, endophysics often uses the
19 metaphor of interface (Rössler 1998), which
20 should be renamed as autointerface.
21 « 12 »  Let us ask another question – how
22 could each side of the whole see the entire
23 structure? We can reconstruct the existence
24 of the whole as a certain statement, but we
25 will not be able to substantiate it in a con-
26 sistent way, as in this case we should have
27 gone beyond the system, whereas we form it.
28 As long as we are part of the integral though
29 two-sided, system, we cannot perceive its
30 wholeness. We could talk about such percep-
31 tion only if we were outside the system. That
32 is what is denied in the monistic assumption
33 of enactivism.
34 « 13 »  When the gap problem is dis-
35 cussed, everyone tends to ignore the ques-
36 tion of why this gap exists. In the meantime,
37 the explanation of what causes the gap could
38 be the best solution in this situation. This ex-
39 planation, in my opinion, is a better way of
40 handling the problem than ignoring the gap.
41 The explanation helps to show that the gap is
42 naturally built into the whole of the system.
43 By using the explanation, we can say that the
44 existence of the gap proves our assumption
45 about the arrangement of the whole. In this
46 case, we can remove the word “problem”
47 from the word combination “the gap prob-
48 lem.”
49 « 14 »  In fact, the elimination of the gap
50 means total and non-controversial self-refer-
51 ence of the system within its closed selfness.
52 However, it is absolutely impossible. Whole-
53 ness cannot be found in the world, for the
54 world itself is wholeness. If we, being in the
55 world and being its part, were able to observe
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Constructivist Foundations vol. 11, N°2
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wholeness (non-controversial combination tempt to take the mirror to pieces will not 1
of the mental and physical parts), it would help us to have an understanding of the one 2
mean that we are not in the world and that we who is reflected. The system is fully and cy- 3
are outside the world. The system is always clically reflected in itself (the world), but no 4
either controversial or incomplete, if it at- (auto) dissection of the world will help us to 5
tempts to perceive itself (its arrangement) by understand the arrangement of the system. 6
using its own tools. Our own body is another « 17 »  The metaphor of light can be a 7
simple and clear example illustrating the idea good example. Let us assume that the world 8
of non-wholeness. We, being the body, can- learns about itself, lights itself (through the 9
not see it as a whole – we can see different mind of the thinking actor). What is special 10
parts and we have only inner intuition of the about spotlighting objects? The trick is that 11
integrity of our body, though this integrity is everything is seen in the light, but the light 12
never given as an object (in the third-person cannot be seen. This metaphor clearly shows 13
perspective). On a global scale, the gap prob- that if the world sees itself, it does not see 14
lem will mirror the situation with observa- how it sees. That is why we cannot find con- 15
tion of fragmentation of our own body. The sciousness in the world and we cannot find 16
world can be an integral monistic whole (no it among objects. Consciousness helps us to 17
matter whether it is experience or an infor- find the world and all objects in the world, 18
mation field), but it does not mean that it but we cannot find consciousness as an ob- 19
(represented by a scientist or a philosopher) ject. Speaking about consciousness in the 20
will be able to discover its own wholeness as world, it is not so much a gap as a blind spot 21
objective characteristics. The wholeness of (in the sense of Heinz von Foerster 2003). 22
the world cannot be found inside the world « 18 »  The aforesaid leads to the con- 23
(as an object for studying and observation). clusion that the gap problem is no threat to 24
This impossibility induces the problem of models of enactivism and neurophenom- 25
the persistent gap. The incompleteness of enology. In a way (as I summarized in my 26
our knowledge about the world seems to be commentary), the existence of the gap proves 27
a systemic shortage of knowledge, which is an ontological arrangement that is consistent 28
essential for the successful functioning of the with the models of philosophical monism, 29
system and its reproduction as an autopoi- which underlie enactivism in whole and on- 30
etic system (Luhmann 1991). tology in part. The gap problem should not 31
« 15 »  It can be explained by using the be ignored. It may be worth rethinking as an 32
following logical model. In the general form, important element of enactivism theory. 33
these problems have the form of a meta- 34
language paradox – we try to turn some- Acknowledgments 35
thing that is a tool into an object, and in The results of the project “Metaphiloso- 36
this case the naturalizing procedure cannot phy: the disciplinary boundaries of philo- 37
be fulfilled. This is connected with the fact sophical rationality,” carried out within the 38
that we try to gain access to consciousness framework of the Basic Research Program 39
through the very framework of logical cate- at the National Research University Higher 40
gories, which is the fundamental attribute of School of Economics (HSE) in 2016, are pre- 41
consciousness itself. It is not clear, however, sented in this work. 42
what the meta–description could be in this 43
case. Moreover, consciousness itself appears Diana Gasparyan has held fellowships in the 44
as the only condition for the possibility of Department of Philosophy at M. V. Lomonosov Moscow 45
operating these categories. It is impossible State University. Currently she works at the National 46
to determine consciousness by means of Research University Higher School of Economics in 47
subject–object or type–sort distinctions, not Moscow, Russia. She has a PhD and holds an Associate 48
only because it is not an object or type, nor a Professor of Philosophy position. In 2009–2010, she was 49
subject or sort, but also because conscious- a visiting Professor at Clark University (Massachusetts). 50
ness inevitably turns out to be prior to all Her webpages: http://www.hse.ru/en/org/persons/66551 51
other similar distinctions. and https://suhse.academia.edu/DianaGasparyan 52
« 16 »  It can also be explained with the 53
help of the following metaphor. If we look Received: 24 January 2016 54
in the mirror and see our reflection, our at- Accepted: 16 February 2016 55
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 Enactivism
The Gap Or Not The Gap Ximena A. González-Grandón

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1 The Gap Or Not The Varela is not very clear about his metaphys- A functionalist hard problem 1
2
Gap: Is That The ical commitments, I disagree with and an identity solution 2
3 ƒƒ their argument about the careless meta- « 5 »  Kirchhoff and Hutto’s position 3
4 Neurophenomenological physical assumptions on which the NP is strongly based on NP’s inability to ad- 4
project is supposedly based, and dress the “explanatory gap” (Chalmers
5
6
Question? ƒƒ their proffered solution. 1995). To begin with, I agree with Kirch-
5
6
7 Ximena A. González-Grandón In relation to the latter, I think that the iden- hoff and Hutto (and with Shaun Gallagher 7
8 tity thesis, as a solution, lies at the core of et al. 2015 and Tim Bayne 2004) that the 8
Institute of Philosophy and
9 brain reduction and functionalism, and call to close the gap between neurophysiol- 9
10
Complexity Sciences, Chile avoids the possibility of a genuine under- ogy and phenomenal experience reflects a 10
11 xgonzalez/at/ificc.cl standing and characterization of human liv- reductionist desire. It follows that the rem- 11
12 ing experience (González 2013). In fact, this edy proposed by Varela in his 1996 article 12
13 > Upshot • Kirchhoff and Hutto argue is precisely what explains one of the disad- fails to consider explicitly the contribution 13
14 that the metaphysical commitments of vantages of REC as an explanation of human that non-neural elements, such as bodies, 14
15 neurophenomenology, as formulated by cognition: it does not consider phenom- motor movement, affordances, social in- 15
16 Varela in 1996, endorse a form of non- enological approaches, life-mind continuity teractions, and cultural contexts, may play 16
17 reductionism, which assumes and does thesis, and self-organizing processes in its in the constitution of phenomenal experi- 17
18 not resolve the hard problem of con- radical theory (Froese 2014). ence (González 2014; Gallagher et al. 2015; 18
19 sciousness. Although I share Kirchhoff « 3 »  On the former, whereas Kirch- Froese & Di Paolo 2011). Furthermore, as 19
20 and Hutto’s conceptual concern, I dis- hoff and Hutto question the neurophe- Kirchhoff and Hutto suggest, conceiving 20
21 agree that denying the gap between the nomenological project of going beyond the problem in this way could reflect an 21
22 phenomenal and the physical, opting for the hard problem, I see an opportunity to incipient dualism, upholding that there is 22
23 an identity theory in a radical enactivism defend Varela’s metaphysical position of indeed a concrete distinction between phe- 23
24 framework, is a promising alternative to exploring alternative interpretations. Fur- nomenal experience and neurophysiology 24
25 a better understanding of human experi- thermore, Kirchhoff and Hutto’s argument (§33). 25
26 ence. puts Varela’s NP in tension with enactivist « 6 »  I consider that for the purpose 26
27 frameworks. I emphasize that Varela’s meta- of conceptual clarification, it makes more 27
28 Preliminaries physical position comes from a phenom- sense that Varela would have disputed 28
29 « 1 »  In the target article, Michael enologically and autopoietically inspired the legitimacy of framing the problem in 29
30 Kirchhoff and Daniel Hutto draw on a care- enactivist approach to embodied cognition this metaphysical way (Gallagher et al. 30
31 less aspect in metaphysical commitments that does not lead to any form of represen- 2015; González 2014). Nonetheless, this 31
32 of Francisco Varela’s neurophenomenology tationalism. I want to show that taking into idea could be interpreted as a kind of op- 32
33 (1996), which is characterized by the irre- account the mind-life continuity thesis and erationalized mind-body dualism, not a 33
34 ducible nature of first-person phenomenal phenomenological psychology approach to metaphysical one. Indeed, the dualism 34
35 experience, a form of non-reductionism human experience, rather that a pure REC of concern to Varela when proposing NP 35
36 that assumes there is a gap between the framework, gives a better understanding of was not the mind-body dualism that pro- 36
37 phenomenal and the physical. They then the NP research project and the possibility motes the explanatory gap, but rather the 37 315
38 go on to suggest that traditional analytic to improve it. dualism of mind as a scientific object ex- 38
39 philosophy and neurophenomenology « 4 »  I believe that any mind theory that plained through third-person data, versus a 39
40 (NP) share distinctions and assume the ex- does not conceive the phenomenon of life as mind in an experiencing subject explained 40
41 istence of the hard problem of conscious- essential to its metaphysical commitments is through first-person data (Varela 1976 41
42 ness. These are valuable contributions as inevitably misguided (González 2013) Phe- 1996). Rather, he focuses on a kind of phe- 42
43 they identify conceptual shortcomings in nomenal experience happens in a living or- nomenon that is already beyond this gap: 43
44 Varela’s article (1996). But Kirchhoff and ganism that is intrinsically active and chang- the phenomenon of experience in a living 44
45 Hutto’s proposal goes further when they ing every day in a complex and ontogenetic being. Therefore, what NP aims for is an 45
46 diverge from the metaphysical position of way (González 2014). The actual challenge account of the lived body that integrates 46
47 non-reductionism (§10). They argue that for NP, therefore, lies in the development of biology and phenomenology, and so goes 47
48 adopting a strict identity thesis and a radi- a formal metaphysical, epistemic, and meth- “beyond the gap” (Roy et al. 1999; Thomp- 48
49 cal enactivist framework (REC) allows for odological framework that can do justice to son 2004). Varela wrote: 49
50 no gap; the hard problem becomes a non- the conception of phenomenal experience 50
51
52
problem and this provides a better concep-
tual basis for the methodological contribu-
as embodied and self-producing under far-
from-equilibrium conditions and scaffolded
“  In all functionalistic accounts, what is missing
is not the coherent nature of the explanation but
51
52
53 tions of NP. by a sociocultural environment. Instead, its alienation from human life. Only putting hu- 53
54
55
« 2 »  Although I agree with Kirchhoff
and Hutto that throughout the 1996 article
Kirchhoff and Hutto draw on an NP with a
remaining functionalism. 1996: 345)
”
man life back in will erase that absence. (Varela 54
55
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1
2
« 7 »  When Kirchhoff and Hutto “ar-
gue for adopting a strict identity thesis, one
3 that allows for no gap between the phe-
4 nomenal and the physical” (§15), there is
5
6
little room to describe the peculiarities of
phenomenal experience and to understand
7 its living nature. Furthermore, the denial
8 of the problem through the identity the-
9 sis is useful if phenomenal experience is
10 equated with qualia, which in a functional-
11 ist framework resists a functional analysis,
12 and where the living body is equated with
13 mechanism (Gallagher et al. 2015; Thomp-
14 son 2004). Thus, if somebody wants to dif-
15 fuse the hard problem coming from this
16 viewpoint, it is a good idea to propose that
17 it is a non-problem and avoid a mechaniza-
18 tion of experience in order to reduce it to a
19 brain state, or to be a property dualist.
Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism
20
21 A phenomenal and living stance
22 « 8 »  For Kirchhoff and Hutto: “Phe-
nomenal experience, on an REC view,
23
24 just is a kind organismic activity” (§39).
25 Or directly from their REC framework:
26 “phenomenality [is] nothing but forms of
27 activities – perhaps only neural – that are
28 associated with environment-involving
29 interactions” (Hutto & Myin 2012: 169).
30 It seems that, in their proposal, there is no
31 room for phenomenology and that they
32 are following the lead of Zenon Pylyshyn
33 or Daniel Dennett when they assert that
34 phenomenology can contribute little or
35 nothing to a philosophical conceptualiza-
36 tion or genuine scientific explanation of
316 37 experience:
38
39
40
“  We can advance in our thinking about phe-
nomeno-physical identities only by (1) appro-
41 priately relaxing our explanatory demands and
42 (2) reconceiving the nature of phenomenality by
43
44 2012: 176)
”
adjusting our conceptual filters. (Hutto & Myin
45
46 « 9 »  We must not forget that if we are
47 trying to explain experience, we need to have
48 a good description of the explanandum that
49 we are aiming to explain, we cannot relax
50 our explanatory demands. It is not enough
51 for the phenomeno-physical identities to
52 say that experience is just about organismic
53 activity, because these identities also have to
54 say precisely what this explains. As Eduard
55 Marbach (1993: 9) recognized:
column A
Constructivist Foundations vol. 11, N°2
column B column C
“  we first must be provided with basic concep-
tual categories for talking about the true nature
2009; Froese & Di Paolo 2011). From this
viewpoint, living phenomenal experience
1
2
of the mental […] Such categories are supplied by consists of both mind-dependent as well 3
phenomenological reflection on conscious expe- as mind-independent aspects (Froese & Di 4
”
rience. (Marbach 1993: 9) Paolo 2011).
« 13 »  However, Kirchhoff and Hutto
5
6
« 10 »  Varela (1996) does not deal with identity thesis does not account for the 7
“[n]on-reductive metaphysics [that] as- constitution of an organism’s own perspec- 8
sumes that the phenomenal and the physi- tive and differentiation from the world. 9
cal pick out two distinct phenomena” (§42). Therefore, the organism’s biological charac- 10
Instead, he is following Edmund Husserl’s teristics, its aging and its capacities, as well 11
phenomenological psychology to investigate as the difference between the body and the 12
phenomenal experience in a non-reductive environment are lost along the way. Accord- 13
manner; that is, in a manner that respects its ingly, in their effort to avoid internalism 14
peculiarity and distinctive features: through and “the gap,” the experience of an agent’s 15
taking the first-person perspective seriously embodied mind and the environment are 16
and remaining within a pre-philosophical assumed in absolute equality. This idea is 17
attitude that stops to a transcendental phi- not endorsed by any experimental evidence 18
losophy (Zahavi 2013). Accordingly, Varela’s of human embodiment or of the life expe- 19
NP proposes that the “irreducible nature rience (Froese 2014). The living embodied 20
of conscious experience” is the “lived ex- mind (including the nervous system and the 21
perience;” it is “where we start from and rest of the organic systems) has a different 22
where we all must link back to, like a guid- complexity and self-organization that dis- 23
ing thread” (Varela 1996: 334). For Varela, tinguish it from the environment. From the 24
the living experience is always already pre- first-person perspective, the human agent 25
sumed by any commitment or theory. always perceives the world from the view- 26
« 11 »  In contrast, Kirchhoff and Hutto point of her embodied mind by its very na- 27
briefly refer to life (§4). But I think that if ture (Hutto & Myin 2012), but always with 28
REC has a genuine aim of explaining how a surplus of meaning in contrast with the 29
“the phenomenal character of experiences is environment (Varela 1992). 30
ultimately grounded in interactions between 31
experiencers and features of the environ- Overcoming the gap 32
ment” (§44), it is necessary to keep in mind « 14 »  If we stay with an identity theory, 33
an epistemology that works with this bio- the richness of phenomenal experience can 34
logical and social embodiment and makes get lost in the way. I consider that NP is a 35
allowance for a mind-life continuity thesis. fruitful research area that is likely to im- 36
« 12 »  A big part of the broad biblio- prove over time. Phenomenology might 37
graphic production of Varela tries to build contribute to a precise description of the ex- 38
on this epistemology (González 2013). The
original idea of a strong continuity of life
planandum, and also elucidates basic theo-
retical assumptions made by experimental
39
40
and mind asserts that life and mind share science (as has been developed by Gallagher 41
a common pattern of organization (Varela, et al. 2015; Petitmengin & Lachaux 2013; 42
Thompson & Rosch 1991; Thompson 2004;
Froese & DiPaolo 2011). There is a rela-
Depraz 2013). While we can go further in
the emphasis on the neural, we have to think
43
44
tional asymmetry between the active role of about a non-reductionist phenomenal expe- 45
the living embodied and autonomous agent, rience as an opportunity to grasp as much of 46
through self-organizing processes, and his the non-neural factors as possible, without 47
environment (Weber & Varela 2002; Ba- ignoring the important role of nervous sys- 48
randiaran, Di Paolo & Rohde 2009). These tem processes (Beaton 2013). For example, 49
ideas confirm a rejection of functionalism experiences involved in motor practice are 50
and representationalism in the foundation not fully determined at the brain-level or in 51
of the mind, because it coincides with an ac- the peripheral nervous system; they are me- 52
ceptance of the living nature of the embod- diated by the biological design of muscles, 53
ied human organism and its valuable sense- joints, and their prior history of activation 54
making activities (Thompson & Stapleton and coupling with the environment. They 55
column B column C
 Enactivism
Not-Quite-So Radical Enactivism Dan Lloyd

column A column B column C

1 are also mediated by the socio-cultural con- also argue persuasively that at the bottom of dum. For example, we are asked to explain 1
2 text’s normativity (González 2014). There- that slide is dualism and the foreclosure of the taste of coffee or the color of a sunset, 2
3 fore, NP should attempt to understand what all hope of addressing the “hard problem.” independent “qualia.” However perplexed 3
4 issues are involved in the human experience; I agree that a mind-matter identity theory we may be by “raw feels,” they comprise 4
5 in the physical and social environment; in preempts this impossibly hard problem, not only one sliver of the tapestry of conscious- 5
6 the specific elements of embodiment and by solving but by dissolving it. When we ness from moment-to-moment. The smell 6
7 motor practices; and in the cultural context agree that there are two descriptions of one of madeleines always occurs in a context, 7
8 (González 2014). The task that NP has to self-same entity, there is no “problem” about in which sensation activates a tower of per- 8
9 resolve is to find an experimental and phe- how the entity could be the same as itself. ceptual overlays, from concrete to abstract, 9
10 nomenological paradigm that could take all The science of consciousness accordingly all embedded in a lived awareness of time 10
11 of these components into account. seeks a translational theory, enabling us to past and future – all this is part of aware- 11
12 render phenomenology as neuroscience, ness from moment to moment. Embodied 12
13 Ximena A. González-Grandón graduated with a DPhil and vice versa. enactivism underlines the determining 13
14 in cognitive science from the National Autonomous « 2 »  Broadly speaking, “neurophe- role of the body and action in constructing 14
15 University of Mexico. She is currently a postdoctoral nomenology” could be understood as the consciousness, themes sounded by Maurice 15
16 researcher at the Institute of Philosophy and Complexity working assumption that neuroscience can Merleau-Ponty, James J. Gibson, and a cadre 16
17 Sciences. She investigates the relationship between integrate phenomenal experience into the of contemporary philosophers (Merleau- 17
18 life, mind, and learning of motor practices using natural world, most particularly that cor- Ponty 1962; Gibson 1979; Clark 2003; Noë 18
19 epistemological and methodological approaches from ner of nature described by neuroscience. 2004; Chemero 2009; Hutto & Myin 2012). 19
20 phenomenology, complexity sciences, and philosophy. Under this broad construal, it is compatible This emphasis is consistent with classical 20
21 with identity theory. However, in practice, phenomenology and a welcome break from 21
22 Received: 13 February 2016 “neurophenomenology” remains associated a long Cartesian history of disembodied 22
23 Accepted: 19 February 2016 with its first expositor, Francisco Varela (Va- egos and their mysterious relations with the 23
24 rela 1996). Varelian neurophenomenology physical world. 24
25 attempts to suspend ontological commit- « 5 »  Examples are always useful for 25
26 ments in favor of describing a research pro- keeping the polyphony of consciousness in 26
27 Not-Quite-So Radical gramme in which neither first-person nor mind. Kirchhoff and Hutto invite us to con- 27
third-person concepts are privileged. Iden- duct a quick phenomenological assay:
28
29
Enactivism tity theory affords ontological or theoretical
28
29
30 Dan Lloyd “reduction,” which in turn risks elimination “ Imagine that you are currently holding a book 30
31 of first-person data (see, e.g., Bitbol 2012). between your hands. When your eyes are open, 31
Trinity College, USA
32 Avoiding that outcome breeds commit- you see it. Imagine closing your eyes but still en- 32
33
dan.lloyd/at/trincoll.edu ments to irreducibility, putting one at the gaging actively with the book. […] What are you 33
34
35 > Upshot • Enactivism is a welcome
head of the slippery slope that Kirchhoff and
Hutto criticize.
”
experiencing in this process? (§40) 34
35
36 development in cognitive science, but « 3 »  In this commentary, I propose to « 6 »  One traditional answer suggests 36
37 its “radical” rejection of representation skirt these issues of the meaning and con- that at least part of the experience is made 37 317
38 poses problems for capturing phenome- sequences of neurophenomenology in order of representations of the book, generated by 38
39 nality. The totality of our interactions ex- to focus on the conclusions Kirchhoff and the reception of sensory input and located 39
40 ceeds our awareness, so circumscribing Hutto draw from the critique of (their in- in the brain. REC rejects all three clauses of 40
41 the activity that constitutes conscious- terpretation of) neurophenomenology. That this formulation. Cognition is not confined 41
42 ness seems to require representational critique provides support for their preferred to the brain, is not mediated by represen- 42
43 guidance. theory, “radical embodied-enactive ap- tations, and is not the stable endpoint of a 43
44 proaches to cognition” (REC). This is a logi- passive process of reception. Instead, cogni- 44
45 « 1 »  Phenomenology and neurosci- cal leap, but of course REC has been devel- tive processes are shifting configurations of 45
46 ence employ distinct vocabularies, from oped and defended elsewhere, and it is one activities involving bodies and objects. The 46
47 which follows… nothing metaphysical. Yet manifestation of the contemporary enthu- brain is still essential, but it is only one com- 47
48 language can trick us into distinctions that siasm for embodied, enactive, constructiv- ponent, and its function is more to modulate 48
49 ultimately do entail metaphysical or epis- ist theories of mind. In this commentary, I the push and pull of muscle and thing than 49
50 temic presuppositions. Michael Kirchhoff would like to join with Kirchhoff and Hutto it is to build a world model and formulate 50
51 and Daniel Hutto nicely document how in looking ahead. What are the prospects for plans to intervene in it. 51
52 programmatic statements by neurophenom- REC as an account of phenomenal experi- « 7 »  REC is an appealing picture of 52
53 enologists and philosophers of mind slide ence? cognition overall, but what are its prospects 53
54 from categorical or methodological distinc- « 4 »  Discussions of phenomenal expe- with respect to providing an identity-theo- 54
55 tions toward separate ontologies, and they rience often underestimate their explana- retic “translation” of phenomenal experi- 55
column A column B column C

http://constructivist.info/11/2/302.kirchhoff
 column A
1 ence? In §40, Kirchhoff and Hutto analyze
2 their example as follows:
3 if the engagement is constant. (For example,
4
5
“  What are you experiencing in this process?
You are feeling the texture of the book and even
6 though you are only holding parts of the book you
7 have expectations about the book’s orientation, its
8 size, and so on. How the book feels to you also has
9 to do with the way you are applying finger pres-
10 sure to prevent the book from slipping out of your
11 hands. This involves ‘working with your wrist and
12 the rest of your arm to fight gravity and keep the
13
14
”
book in place’. (Chemero 2009: 145)
15 « 8 »  REC identifies the distinctiveness
16 of the phenomenal experience with the dis-
17 tinctiveness of the activity of the moment.
18 Our precise behavior and the resultant con-
19 ditions of muscles and nerves are specific
Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism
column B column C
« 10 »  And vice versa: two states of con- preparation, or as shifting dispositions. So, 1
sciousness can have different contents even REC theorists might propose that to regard 2
the book in hand as Ulysses is to activitate 3
you take Ulysses from me and declare that
you will now hand me Being and Nothing-
Ulysses-appropriate priming and disposi-
tions to act. However, at any moment I am
4
5
ness. But you hand me Ulysses again. The primed for many possible actions, and dis- 6
REC engagement has not changed, but my posed toward a vast number of possibilities. 7
experience has.) Like the unintended side-effects of my be- 8
« 11 »  A different problem arises as we havior, these arrays of potential acts are too 9
try to circumscribe the limits of the en- numerous to crowd into the contents of con- 10
gagements that translate to conscious con- sciousness. One might reply that only some 11
tent. As I handle a tome such as Ulysses, I of the primed behaviors are Ulysses-related, 12
am building upper body strength. My REC
engagement includes this side effect, but the
but which? If our sortal actually refers to
Ulysses, then we have reintroduced repre-
13
14
contents of my conscious awareness does sentation: the relevant dispositions are those 15
not. Secondary effects proliferate from any that are about Ulysses. 16
action. For example, waving books about « 16 »  Another potential REC response 17
with my eyes closed could give rise to a va- to these problems appeals to language, as 18
riety of unintended consequences, like your a system of representations. Language is a 19

20 to holding an object of a certain weight and wonderment at my zeal for testing certain regular element of our human niche. We use 20
21 texture. Those are the proximal components theories, or the confusion experienced by words (spoken, written) as special objects 21
22 of the activity, the bodily part. But the ac- the family dog. But once again, I experi- whose “rules of engagement” fit among all 22
23 tivity is also characterized by context: To ence neither of these environmental effects. the other enactive scenarios, so embodied/ 23
24 undertake the experiment, I reached for a My enactive bodily engagements exceed the enactivated agents can piggy-back on the 24
25 copy of Ulysses. My experience of the book contents of consciousness. representational resources of language to 25
26 in hand is partly a tug on neuroreceptors, « 12 »  Even in their own description of entertain counterfactuals, past and future 26
27 partly a lifting of a certain weight, and partly the experience, Kirchhoff and Hutto raise events, negations, and the like (Lloyd 1989: 27
28 a perception of Joyce’s novel. So far, REC’s what seems to me to be a problem with anti- ch. 6). Part of conscious experience, perhaps 28
29 scope of interaction and the scope of my ex- representationalism: a large part, comprises subvocal talking to 29
30 perience coincide. ourselves. Some, but once again, not all. My 30
31
32
« 9 »  But suppose that in haste the
book I grabbed was not Ulysses but Being
“ You are feeling the texture of the book and even
though you are only holding parts of the book you
experience of handling a book is not a sotto
voce simulcast report of what I am doing.
31
32
33 and Nothingness. Nonetheless I think, mis- have expectations about the book’s orientation, its « 17 »  The embodied and enactive vision 33
34
35
takenly, that I am holding Ulysses. (We can
suppose that the two books are indiscern-
”
size, and so on. (§40) of cognition is liberating, and important for
cognitive neuroscience to incorporate. As
34
35
36 ible by touch.) REC seems clamped to ac- « 13 »  The feel here is a configuration of Kirchhoff and Hutto note, it fits well with the 36
318 37 tuality, and must declare that the content of physical energies that includes both book dynamical systems approach. Phenomenal 37
38 my experience is “holding Being and Noth- and brain. But what about the expectation? awareness is a special case where it seems 38
39 ingness.” But in the moment, my awareness This too is a configuration of physical ener- that representational content is required to 39
40 seems to me to be directed at Ulysses. The gies, but what makes this configuration an accommodate the distinction between what 40
41 felt weight and texture, etc., I will ascribe to expectation? Here it is very difficult to avoid we think we are doing and what is happen- 41
42 the wrong book, and this is a different state representational content. ing. There is nothing intrinsic to represen- 42
43 of mind from my experience of hefting the « 14 »  REC restricts the contents of tation that reopens the chasm of dualism, 43
44 book under the impression that it is Being consciousness to what actually happens. however. (Representation is compatible with 44
45 and Nothingness. To illuminate the differ- But what we think is happening and what dynamical systems theories, for example.) 45
46 ence, note that if you point out to me that is actually happening in our physical envi- We are left with a not-quite-so-radical enac- 46
47 I am not holding Ulysses, I’ll be surprised ronment often diverge. Sometimes more is tivism (NQSREC). Embodied enactivism for 47
48 and the contents of consciousness will shift happening around us than we experience; representation is not as radical as Kirchhoff 48
49 accordingly. (For example, any property I sometimes less; and sometimes what we and Hutto would like, but it may be inescap- 49
50 directly experience in connection with the think is happening is quite unlike the actual. able if phenomenology is to be fully captured 50
51 one book is now transferred to the other.) It is not clear to me how we can resolve these in the dynamic web of action. 51
52 In short, two states of consciousness can disjunctures without distinguishing what we 52
53 have the same content even when the en- think from what happens. Acknowledgement 53
54 active-embodied engagement in the world « 15 »  Inspired by REC, I could reframe I thank Sebastjan Vörös for helpful com- 54
55 has changed. expectation or misapprehension as action- ments on an earlier draft. 55
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Constructivist Foundations vol. 11, N°2

 Enactivism
Identity or Dynamic Structure? Shaun Gallagher

column A column B column C

1 Dan Lloyd is the Thomas C. Brownell Professor of be token identity? On that view, a particular system. No surprise here; no dualism either. 1
2 Philosophy and a Professor of Neuroscience at Trinity dynamical brain-body-environment state There may even be more complex recursive 2
3 College, Connecticut. He is the editor of Subjective (or process, or pattern, defined with its own changes in the dynamics of the machine 3
4 Time: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience particular history) constitutes a particular such that whatever that machine was gener- 4
5 of Temporality (2014, co-edited with Valtteri Arstila). phenomenal experience. Would we be able ating – some work function – is now entirely 5
6 Other books include Radiant Cool: A Novel Theory of to specify a type identity at any meaningful disrupted. 6
7 Consciousness (2004), an exploration of consciousness level of abstraction? Could we say that visual « 3 »  If B = brain, C = body, and E = 7
8 presented as noir detective fiction; and Simple Minds perception just is this type of dynamical pat- environment, then the end result of such 8
9 (1989), a philosophical examination of scientific tern, although (bodily and environmental) anomalous causal changes may be some 9
10 approaches to the mind and brain. His animations and components of the pattern may vary widely? form of mental illness. For example, schizo- 10
11 sonifications of brain activity have been presented in That would be a change of pattern, however, phrenic delusions of control likely involve 11
12 Boston, New York City, Great Britain, and Austria. which suggests multiple realizability, which changes in the brain, changes in bodily 12
13 is usually a defeater for type identity theo- movement and body awareness, and given 13
14 Received: 15 February 2016 ries. Such issues would need to be worked the alien sense that someone else is mov- 14
15 Accepted: 18 February 2016 out in some further detail. ing my body, changes in social environment 15
16 « 2 »  I want to look at a different issue and the way these factors are coupled. It may 16
17 that may indicate an alternative way to go. not be easy to say precisely which way the 17
18 Kirchhoff and Hutto suggest that neuro- causality runs, but as a particular dynami- 18
19 Identity or Dynamic Structure? phenomenology’s trafficking in causation cal pattern it is not bereft of causal relations 19
20 or correlation simply accepts the dualistic that in fact constitute what it is. Now if one 20
21 Shaun Gallagher assumptions that lead to thinking that there wanted to understand the precise details of 21
22 University of Memphis, USA and is a hard problem. “[N]europhenomenology how this system constitutes delusional ex- 22
23 University of Wollongong, Australia leaves us wandering in the realm of correla- perience, one would need to understand the 23
24 tions without providing the requisite kind anomalous neural dynamics, the role social 24
s.gallagher/at/memphis.edu
25 of illuminating explanation” (§29). They environment might be playing, and what 25
26 > Upshot • It is not clear what Kirchhoff also cite Antoine Lutz: “The introduction of the phenomenology (the subject’s experi- 26
27 and Hutto mean by identity when they reciprocal causation might be perceived as ence) actually is when these other factors 27
28 claim that there is no gap between the a subtle expression of dualism” (Lutz 2002: are arranged the way they are. In this case, 28
29 phenomenal and the physical. Under- 150). For Kirchhoff and Hutto, it seems to neurophenomenological psychiatry might 29
30 standing the relation between causation be constitutional identity or bust. Yet cer- be just what we need, and its explanation 30
31 and diachronic constitution, I suggest tainly there is room for both correlation and of the dynamical disruptions in this brain- 31
32 that phenomenal-physical existence is causation in a non-dualist enactivist model body-environment system would be expla- 32
33 better characterized as a dynamically ar- since correlation and causality exist in pure- nations in terms of complex correlations 33
34 ticulated form, structure, or gestalt. ly material systems. Consider a material and causal relations. Engaging in this type 34
35 system composed of three dynamically re- of neurophenomenology is not addressing 35
36 « 1 »  On the one hand, I am generally lated processual parts, B, C, and E. Changes the hard problem directly. On the one hand, 36
37 sympathetic to Michael Kirchhoff and Dan- in any one part can alter the entire system one might think that it is ignoring the hard 37 319
38 iel Hutto’s challenge to neurophenomenol- because it can alter the dynamics of the sys- problem in a way that is easily consistent 38
39 ogy. I agree that Francisco Varela’s original tem as a whole1. If B is a machine process with the enactivist view. On the other hand, 39
40 proposal to offer neurophenomenology as that starts to operate at a different speed, one might think that there is an indirect or 40
41 an answer to the hard problem, rather than for example, it can easily cause C to change implicit answer to the hard problem in such 41
42 to deconstruct it, was the wrong strategy. its behavior, and E might stop functioning an explanation. 42
43 On the other hand, I think that to propose altogether. Changes in B causally correlate « 4 »  A neurophenomenology that con- 43
44 identity theory as a resolution requires with changes in C and E, and more gener- cerns itself with correlation and causation is 44
45 some further explanation since I do not take ally in the dynamics that characterize the consistent with Kirchhoff ’s understanding 45
46 Kirchhoff and Hutto to be offering the tra- of the constitution-causality relation. 46
47 ditional Australian fare of a Place/Smart/ 1 |  Kirchhoff (2015b) cites Carl Craver and 47
48
49
Armstrong variety of identity theory. Such
theories have usually posited mental state =
William Bechtel on this: “The relation [of con- “  Constitution is an exclusively interlevel depen-
dence relation: a relation between the putative
48
49
stitution] is symmetrical precisely because the
50 brain state identities – a central-state mate- mechanism as a whole is fully constituted by the higher-level distributed cognitive process and its 50
51 rialism – whereas on the REC (i.e., radical organized activities of its parts; a change in the lower-level sub-processes and their components. 51
52 embodied-enactive approach to cognition) parts is manifest as a change in the mechanism Causation, in contrast, is a strictly intralevel de- 52
53 view, I presume, one would have to de- as a whole, and a change in the [whole] is also a pendence relation between processes and their 53
54 velop what we might call a more nuanced change in at least some of its component parts” components at a lower level from the constituted 54
55 distributed-state materialism. Would this
column A
(Craver & Bechtel 2007: 554).
column B
”
process. (Kirchhoff 2015b: 322)
column C
55

http://constructivist.info/11/2/302.kirchhoff

Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism
320
column A
1 « 5 »  Higher-order phenomena are con-
2 stituted (emerge?) from lower-order causal
3 relations. A disruption in lower-order in-
4 tralevel causality, however, will correlate
5 with changes in interlevel relations. What is
6 important, Kirchhoff argues, is that we un-
7 derstand this in dynamical terms and spe-
8 cifically in terms of diachronic constitution.
9 « 6 »  This indeed is the enactivist view.
10 Embodied mental processes (i.e., processes
11 of the embodied-enactive mind), distribut-
12 ed across different factors (neural, behavior-
13 al, environmental) at different time-scales,2
14 are constituted in a temporally integrated
15 dynamical system. The constituent elements
16 may very well be in complex, reciprocal
17 causal relations with each other, but just
18 these reciprocal causal relations make the
19 mental process what it is. On the diachronic
20 view of constitution, causality and constitu-
21 tion are not independent. Thus, an inter-
22 vention that changes the causal relations in
23 a dynamic system will also change the sys-
24 tem as a whole. In a gestalt (what Maurice
25 Merleau-Ponty (1964) called a “form” or
26 “structure”), the whole is said to add up to
27 more than the sum of its parts. In a dynami-
28 cal gestalt composed of processes that un-
29 fold over time, and characterized by recur-
30 sive reciprocal causality relations, changes
31 in any processual part will lead to changes
32 in the whole, and changes in the whole will
33 imply changes in the processual parts. In
contrast to a synchronic, compositional no-
34
35 tion of constitution, these kinds of causal
36 relations are constitutive of the phenom-
37 enon. As Kirchhoff argues, the notion of a
38
39
2 |  Kirchhoff ’s description of extended cog-
40
nition equally applies to enactive cognition: “cases
41
of EC are dynamically embedded at multiple
42
timescales: e.g., at the time-scales of lower-level
43
processes and their components – the temporal
44
dynamics of neural processes, the temporal dy-
45 namics of bodily manipulation, and the temporal
46 dynamics of cultural practices within which the
47 overall distributed process unfolds” (Kirchhoff
48 2015b: 322). Indeed, as part of his neurophenom-
49 enological program, Varela (1999) identified just
50 these specific timescales: (1) the elementary scale
51 (varying between 10 and 100 milliseconds); (2)
52 the integration scale (varying from 0.5 to 3 sec-
53 onds); (3) the narrative scale involving memory
54 (above 3 seconds). Correlations run across these
55 scales.
column A
Constructivist Foundations vol. 11, N°2
column B column C
causal-constitution fallacy, where constitu- form given by David Chalmers (1996). In a 1
tion is defined synchronically, simply does non-standard but largely convincing move, 2
not apply to the type of diachronic processes the authors claim to find a similar dualism, 3
described in dynamic patterns. leading to a similar hard problem, within 4
« 7 »  Is it metaphysical dualism to dis- the non-reductionist neurophenomenology 5
tinguish between lower-order and higher- of Francisco Varela (1996). Their proposed 6
order? No, if by lower order we mean simply resolution of the hard problem is “to deny, 7
the materially causal parts that dynamically resolutely” (§36) that the phenomenal and 8
and diachronically constitute the higher- the physical (specifically, the realm of em- 9
order whole, where a change in the dynami- bodied action) are distinct. Whilst they ac- 10
cal relations of parts involves a change in the cept that belief in such an identity can be 11
whole, and vice versa. If the material causal motivated, they deny that the identity can be 12
relations in this type of system constitute explained. Indeed, they suggest that such in- 13
experiential phenomena, is this best char- explicable identities are quite normal (§43). 14
acterized as an identity? I suggest, following The authors of the target article agree with 15
Merleau-Ponty, it is better characterized as a both Chalmers and Varela that there is “no 16
dynamically articulated form, structure, or prospect” (§10) of the success of an alterna- 17
gestalt. tive approach, in which one would attempt 18
to give a non-reductive explanation of how 19
Shaun Gallagher is the Lillian and Morrie Moss phenomenal consciousness relates to some 20
Professor of Excellence in Philosophy at the University relevant set of physical properties or pro- 21
of Memphis, and Professorial Fellow at the Faculty of cesses. The only explanation that the authors 22
Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong of the target article do offer (although they 23
(AU). He is also Honorary Professor of Philosophy at explore this issue all too briefly both here, 24
Durham University (UK), and Honorary Professor of and in Chapter 8 of Hutto and Myin 2012, 25
Health Sciences at Tromsø University (Norway). to which they refer) is the explanation of a 26
certain “illusion” that, they claim, exists in 27
Received: 12 February 2016 our thought: the illusion that their proposed 28
Accepted: 19 February 2016 identity does not hold. 29
« 2 »  My main aim in this response will 30
be to explore the key option that Kirchhoff 31
and Hutto (along with Chalmers and Varela) 32
Crossing the Explanatory rule out. That of giving a revealing explana- 33
tion of just how the phenomenal relates to
Gap by Legwork, not by Fiat the physical, without this explanation entail-
34
35
Michael Beaton ing that the former collapses into the latter. 36
However, it should become apparent that 37
University of the Basque Country,
I agree with Kirchhoff and Hutto on a lot 38
Spain • mjsbeaton/at/gmail.com in this area. Indeed, I will use exactly what 39
those authors use on the physical side of the 40
> Upshot • I strongly agree with Kirch- mind-world equation (or identity): namely, 41
hoff and Hutto that consciousness and embodied action. But I will argue that with 42
embodied action are one and the same, just a little more material (specifically, with a 43
but I disagree when they say this identity careful account of the nature of self-knowl- 44
cannot be fully explained and must sim- edge), we can offer a convincing explanation 45
ply be posited. Here I attempt to sketch of the fact that the relevant aspects of the 46
the outlines of just such an explanation. physical and the phenomenal are one and 47
the same thing, rather than just having to 48
Introduction accept an identity laid down by fiat. 49
« 1 »  The target article by Michael Kirch- 50
hoff and Daniel Hutto is a helpful contribu- Naturalisation, not reduction 51
tion to the metaphysics of consciousness. « 3 »  Kirchhoff and Hutto state that 52
It seeks to avoid the dualism that, the au- there is “no prospect” of success (§10; see 53
thors correctly argue, permanently sustains also §39) for a standard form of scientific 54
“the hard problem” of consciousness in the explanation of the place of consciousness in 55
column B column C
 Enactivism
column A
1 nature, along the lines of famous scientific
2 “reductions” such as the explanation of the
3 properties of water in terms of the proper-
4 ties of H2O molecules, or the explanation of
5 heredity in terms of DNA. In part, it seems
6 to me, this is because they share a wide-
7 spread misconception of how such scientific
8 explanations work. Indeed “reduction” is a
9 misnomer here, in that the former concepts
10 do not “collapse into” the latter, even in these
11 standard cases. The concepts of “boiling,”
12 “flowing,” “freezing,” “running in rivers,”
13 “being what the sea is made of,” etc. do not
14 “collapse into” the concept of “the bulk be-
15 haviour of H2O molecules,” because nothing
16 in the former concepts entails the latter. On
17 the other hand, there is a one-way entail-
18 ment in the other direction: once we know
19 the properties of water and the microphys-
20 ics of H2O molecules, we can make a clear
21 argument that H2O molecules must (as a
22 “conceptual necessity,”1 if you will) behave
23 in bulk as water behaves.2
24 « 4 »  There is an additional point about
25 any kind of broadly materialist naturalisa-
26 tion of consciousness that is also not clearly
27 enough and often enough emphasised. This
28 issue seems to me to hint very strongly at
29 the correct approach towards removing the
30 hard problem of consciousness without de-
31 nying the reality of our own conscious ex-
32
33
1 |  This is the so called “a priori” entailment
34
to which Hutto and Myin (2012: 175) refer. I have
35
argued (Beaton 2009a) that this philospher’s term
36
is misleading, for these explanations are not pure-
37
ly abstract and conceptual. Instead, they depend
38
on the practical skills of engagement with the
39
world that are as much required for knowledge of
40
H2O molecules as they are for knowledge of the
41
day to day behaviour of water; and they further
42
depend on the common sense ability (not formal-
43
isable, I have suggested) to see the self-evidence
44
of the connection between the two realms of phe-
45 nomena (once each realm is clearly understood).
46 2 | I simplify: 100% pure H2O does not be-
47 have exactly as normal, impure water behaves (in
48 terms of ease of super-cooling and super-heating,
49 for instance), thus the properties of H2O mol-
50 ecules alone are not sufficient to explain all the
51 properties of normal, impure water; we still can-
52 not predict all of the detailed bulk properties of
53 water in complete, numerically exact detail, start-
54 ing from the microphysics, and perhaps never will
55 be able to.
column A
Crossing the Explanatory Gap by Legwork, not by Fiat Michael Beaton
column B column C
perience. The point is this: if we are trying (actual and potential) embodied action with 1
to naturalise consciousness, we need more the first-person structure of our phenom- 2
than just a third-person description of con- enal experience (Beaton 2013). Indeed, such 3
sciousness (for instance, in terms of embod- arguments are quite typical in action-based 4
ied action) that can non-mysteriously exist accounts of consciousness (e.g., Noë 2004; 5
in the physical world; we also (and uniquely, O’Regan, Myin & Noë 2006). For these rea- 6
of course) need to make it convincing that sons, it seems to me that you can and must 7
the macrophysical story that we choose to put in the required the legwork here: you 8
give is identical to own, lived, first-person can and should make a convincing argument 9
experience. that the structure of embodied action is the 10
very same thing as the structure of phenom- 11
Legwork, not fiat enal experience. 12
« 5 »  It is at this point that Kirchhoff « 7 »  Nevertheless, there is one fur- 13
and Hutto resort to fiat (i.e., stipulation, as ther ingredient required to make such an 14
if by law), insisting that embodied action argument compelling (or, indeed, to make 15
simply is the same thing as first-person ex- any scientific or philosophical account of 16
perience. In contrast, I want to suggest that consciousness compelling), and that is an 17
if we identify consciousness with embodied explicit and careful account of the nature 18
action (and with the occurrent potential for of our first-person access to our own con- 19
such action), as the target authors and I do,3 scious states. This step is missing in most 20
then it is a mistake simply to “deny, from the enactive and non-enactive philosophy of 21
off ” that the two classes of phenomena are consciousness. I do understand that au- 22
distinct (§36). Rather, I believe we can and thors in the neurophenomenological and 23
should explain how and why first-person phenomenological traditions have said a 24
phenomenal experience is the same thing as lot about successful methods for accessing 25
embodied action. our own consciousness, but not so much 26
« 6 »  Somewhat ironically (it seems to about the nature of the first-personal access 27
me), Kirchhoff and Hutto actually begin that underlies these methods. I have argued 28
such an explanation themselves, trying to (Beaton 2009a) that such a philosophical 29
give enough detail of the embodied action account of self-knowledge or introspection 30
involved in handling a book to make it must constrain our account of conscious 31
plausible that it must be like something to properties, since, whatever these properties 32
engage in such activity (§40). I myself have are, they are something that we can and do 33
argued that there is a strong case for iden- know from the first person.4 For myself, I 34
tifying the third-person structure of our endorse Shoemaker’s account of introspec- 35
tion (Shoemaker 1996).5 Furthermore, I 36
have argued (Beaton 2009b) that it is pos- 37 321
3 |  This approach is very different from that
sible to find personal, private (but only in a 38
taken by most consciousness scientists. If pushed
relatively modest sense of “private”) prop- 39
many consciousness scientists would accept that
erties within the realm of embodied action 40
cognition is something done by whole animals
that are close enough to “qualia” to count, 41
(though many others might still locate cognition
in the brain). Unfortunately, most consciousness
and that can be known by Shoemakerian 42
scientists think consciousness itself is something
introspection. 43
that happens in some part or parts of the brain, « 8 »  If we can make it convincing that 44
under certain specified conditions. I disagree at certain properties of embodied action are 45
the outset with this key assumption. For reasons the phenomenal properties with which we 46
given in my own target article in the current is- are directly, first-personally acquainted (as 47
sue of this journal, I think that authors espousing I believe we can, using this framework), 48
action-based accounts of consciousness need not then we have not just naturalised conscious- 49
be tempted back inwards by variants of the Argu- 50
ment from Illusion; not even as regards the “mini- 4 |  For reasons that I explain in that paper, I 51
mal supervenience base” of consciousness, as do not believe that this rules out qualia in crea- 52
Hutto and Myin (2012: 158–165) apparently are tures that are too simple to introspect. 53
by their own variant, the “Argument from Shared 5 |  Though I should clarify that I disagree 54
Phenomenality.” with Shoemaker’s account of qualia. 55
column B column C
http://constructivist.info/11/2/302.kirchhoff
 column A
1 ness by fiat, as Kirchhoff and Hutto seek
2 to do. Instead, we have put in the required
3 legwork. We have argued for a convincing,
4 non-reductive naturalisation of conscious-
5 ness.
6 « 9 »  Importantly, I would disagree
7 with the target authors that there need re-
8 main any persistent, albeit illusory, sense
9 (§36) that consciousness as known from
10 the first person is distinct from the relevant
11 properties as known from the third person.
12 When we think about the correct aspects of
13 the macroscopic physical world – namely,
14 engaged embodied action – and when we
15 think about our own consciousness, and
16 about the nature of our own knowledge of
17 it, then far from there being a persistent il-
18 lusion that first-person consciousness and
19 third-person embodied action are different
Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism
column B column C
we will need to talk about modes of refer- traditional attempts to explain the place of 1
ring; about what identity means; and so on. consciousness in nature, in the manner in 2
I would argue that to engage with someone which we explain heredity in terms of DNA, 3
seriously asking such a question is already to for example. These, they state, have “no 4
have enough in common with them to begin prospect” of success (§10). 5
this discussion. « 13 »  In this commentary, I have at- 6
tempted to provide the form of explanation 7
The end of the story? that Kirchhoff and Hutto state cannot be 8
« 11 »  The account I have outlined here provided: I have attempted to explain why 9
puts norms (purposes, goals) on the physical consciousness is the same thing as embod- 10
(or more accurately, the third-personal) side ied action. Uniquely, for a scientific “reduc- 11
of the equation. However, since Kirchhoff tion” (such as water to H2O, or genes to 12
and Hutto put embodied action, rather than DNA molecules), we need two explanations 13
mere norm-free movement or “behaviour,” here, not just one. As is normal, we need a 14
on the physical side of their identity, they do convincing explanation of how the higher 15
this too. For my part, I strongly suspect that level phenomenon (in our case, embodied 16
there is difficult work still to do in show- action) can be present in a physical universe. 17
ing how norms can be a part of the physical But, uniquely in the case of consciousness, 18
world.7 I equally accept that many enactiv- we also need a convincing explanation as to 19

20 things, we can arrive at a compelling sense – ists think that the problem of the naturalisa- why the high level story we have given de- 20
21 achieved by convincing argumentation, not tion of norms is already more or less solved scribes us; our very own phenomenal expe- 21
22 by stipulation – that these two are one and by the concept of autopoiesis (Maturana and rience. 22
23 the same. Varela, 1980) and its more recent theoreti- « 14 »  I have argued that the correct 23
24 cal extensions (Di Paolo 2009). Be that as it philosophical analysis of the nature of our 24
25 On the explanation of identities may, what I hope that the approach argued access to our own mental states and process- 25
26 « 10 »  I note that the target authors wish for above shows, at the least, is that there are es (I endorse Sydney Shoemaker’s account) 26
27 to make their stipulative approach more not two separate problems: the problem of can allow us to see why and how the realm of 27
28 plausible by pointing out other example norms and the problem of consciousness. our embodied action is the very same thing 28
29 identities that they think clearly cannot be Rather, I think we can convincingly explain as the field of our own consciousness expe- 29
30 explained. For what it is worth, I do not agree why these are one and the same problem. rience. I have not just stipulated this, I have 30
31 that their examples are inexplicable, in any tried to explain it (briefly, in this commen- 31
32 relevant sense.6 For instance it seems to me Conclusion tary, and in more detail elsewhere). Thus, 32
33 that, contra Kirchhoff and Hutto (§43), we « 12 »  The target article by Kirchhoff while I agree with Kirchhoff and Hutto on 33
34 can perfectly well explain why George Or- and Hutto contains much of value, and I many things, I oppose the central claim of 34
35 well is Eric Blair: George Orwell is the pen strongly agree with their claim that con- their target article and I argue that we can 35
36 name of the main born Eric Blair; to know scious experience and embodied action are and should cross the explanatory gap by leg- 36
322 37 of him by his birth name is one valid way one and the same thing, known in different work, not by fiat. 37
38 of referring to him; to know of him by his ways. However, the central purpose of their 38
39 much better-known pen name is another; target article is to make a metaphysical claim Acknowledgment 39
40 someone could perfectly well know of him with which I disagree. Their claim is that the I gratefully acknowledge support by the 40
41 by either mode of referring without know- best way to naturalise consciousness is to Spanish Government MINECO Project, 41
42 ing the other; there are clear explanations to “deny, resolutely” (§36) that consciousness Reference FFI2014-52173-P. 42
43 be found of why authors choose pen names, and embodied action are distinct, with no 43
44 in general, and of why this author chose this further explanation of the identity between Michael Beaton has moved, academically, from physics 44
45 pen name, in particular; and so on. We can the two given or possible. They contrast this via artificial intelligence to philosophy. Having realised 45
46 even, I would suggest, again contra Kirch- identity-based approach with non-reductive (or so he thinks) that traditional artificial intelligence 46
47 hoff and Hutto (§43), explain why 1 is 1: approaches (including Varela’s neurophe- was getting something wrong, his central philosophical 47
48 nomenology), which they say (and I agree) interest has been to find a scientifically acceptable 48
49 6 | I do agree that George Orwell is Eric Blair, necessarily leave an insoluble “hard prob- naturalisation of consciousness that does not “miss 49
50 with nothing more to be said about it, if all par- lem” of consciousness. They also, more the point,” as more traditional computationalist 50
51 ties understand what identity means, know that briefly, contrast their approach with more and representationalist approaches seem to. 51
52 George Orwell and Eric Blair pick out the same 52
53 referent, and then insist on thinking entirely 7 | Indeed, for reasons which I cannot begin Received: 12 February 2016 53
54 about that unique referent and not about the dif- to go into here I am tempted towards a form of Accepted: 18 February 2016 54
55 fering means of picking it out. pan-proto-psychism about normativity. 55
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Constructivist Foundations vol. 11, N°2

 Enactivism
Down the “Preferred Path” Oliver Lukitsch & Cornell Schreiber

column A column B column C

1 Down the “Preferred for engaging practically in neurophenom- necessarily come with a phenomenal char- 1
enology. acter (Gallagher 2005). In contrast to such
2
3
Path”: Dispositional « 2 »  We generally agree with REC’s mere re-enactments, the development (or
2
3
4 Flexibility Constitutes conceptual readjustment. However, our piv- adaptation) of habits is deemed a period of 4
otal concern is that REC might do an even increased conscious awareness of one’s en-
5
6
Phenomenal Character better job of motivating phenomeno-phys- gagement. By the same token, the flexibility
5
6
7 Oliver Lukitsch ical identities by rendering phenomenality of engagement or similar notions, such as 7
8 and intentionality inseparable. In line with openness and plasticity, have been consid- 8
University of Vienna, Austria
9 the suggestion of Hutto and Erik Myin, “re- ered essential in these periods of change (cf. 9
10
oliver.lukitsch/at/univie.ac.at conceiving the nature of phenomenality by Noë 2012; Barandiaran & Di Paolo 2014; 10
11 adjusting our conceptual filters” (Hutto & Rossmanith & Reddy 2016). In such analy- 11
12 Cornell Schreiber1 Myin 2012: 176), we suggest that this might ses, however, usually no claims are made 12
13 University of Vienna, Austria be done by motivating a notion of disposi- about the phenomenal character of these 13
14
cornell.schreiber/at/univie.ac.at tional flexibility. In short, “dispositional flex- flexible and conscious engagements. With 14
15 ibility” denotes flexible modes of extensive this in mind, why not consider the possi- 15
16 > Upshot • We agree with Kirchhoff and engagement that embody the “openness” bility that objects appear to us if and only 16
17 Hutto that phenomeno-physical identi- of these engagements. Thus, in contrast to if there is a certain flexibility with respect 17
18 ties have to be motivated to approach Hutto and Myin (2012), in our view there is to one’s dispositions to act upon the object? 18
19 the hard problem of consciousness. We no separation between basic cognition (ex- Phenomeno-physical activity, and thus ba- 19
20 propose that REC will do a better job in hibiting intentionality) and basic mentality sic mentality, would not be just any sort of 20
21 motivating these identities if intention- (exhibiting intentionality and phenomenal- embodied activity but would be constituted 21
22 ality and phenomenality are considered ity) – there are only degrees of basic men- by what we might call its dispositional flex- 22
23 inseparable. We suggest that the no- tality varying with the degrees of an agent’s ibility. 23
24 tion of dispositional flexibility motivates dispositional flexibility. « 5 »  To illustrate, let us turn to the 24
25 these phenomeno-intentional identities “what”-question posed in the target article: 25
26 and opens up a practical avenue for neu- Intentionality, phenomenality, and What is it like to undergo an experience 26
27 rophenomenology. dispositional flexibility of something, such as holding a book? As 27
28 « 3 »  Some philosophers argue that Kirchhoff and Hutto point out, what you are 28
29 « 1 »  Michael Kirchhoff and Daniel intentional aspects of the mind possess in- experiencing when you are holding a book 29
30 Hutto criticize Francisco Varela for tacitly trinsic qualitative features, and vice versa can be described quite subtly as an embod- 30
31 presupposing an ontological gap between (e.g., Zahavi 2003). In other words, there is ied interaction, e.g., “the way you are apply- 31
32 phenomenal consciousness and the physi- something it is like to be in an intentional ing finger pressure to prevent the book from 32
33 cal. This implicit metaphysical commitment state. For example, Maurice Merleau-Ponty slipping out of your hands” (§40). Beyond 33
34 is brought into neurophenomenology, even (1962) rejected the possibility of distin- these quite ephemeral aspects of actual em- 34
35 though the hard problem of consciousness guishing intentionality and phenomenality. bodied interaction, we want to stress that 35
36 is tackled as a practical one; according to He rejects “any attempt to define sensation the phenomenal character of holding the 36
37 Varela, the hard problem does not require as pure impression” and holds against it, book might be captured more completely – 37 323
38 a “theoretical fix” (Varela 1996: 345). How- “quality is not an element of consciousness, if you additionally consider the ways you are 38
39 ever, Kirchhoff and Hutto hold that refram- but a property of the object” (ibid: 5). The currently disposed to handle it. 39
40 ing a metaphysical problem to a practical phenomenal character of experience is thus « 6 »  Kirchhoff and Hutto might have 40
41 one will not do, especially if a solution for nothing more than how we engage with ob- something similar in mind when they indi- 41
42 the metaphysical problem is to be found. In jects – how we enact an experience (cf. Noë cate that “[y]ou are feeling the texture of the 42
43 line with the phenomenal concept strategy 2004). REC fosters Merleau-Ponty’s spirit book and even though you are only hold- 43
44 (cf. Papineau 2002), they propose to bypass in rejecting both content and phenomenal ing parts of the book you have expectations 44
45 the hard problem in properly motivating a character conceived as qualia. Why then about the book’s orientation, its size, and so 45
46 strict phenomeno-physical identity-theory. not collapse phenomenality (construed as on [italics added]” (§40). However, in our 46
47 Kirchhoff and Hutto suggest that “[p]he- phenomeno-physical activity) with inten- view the term “expectations” is somewhat 47
48 nomenality should not be thought of as tionality (construed as teleo-physical activ- misleading here. For expectations might 48
49 denoting qualitative properties of our ex- ity) in order better to motivate phenomeno- easily be taken as a sort of knowledge of 49
50 periences, but should be understood as the physical identities? sensorimotor contingencies – an action- 50
51 character of engaging with the world in « 4 »  Let us start by considering wheth- representation of the book, implying speci- 51
52 different ways” (§44), thereby calling for a er there would be something it is like to en- fiable conditions of satisfaction. Instead we 52
53 more radical enactivist conceptual baseline gage with an object if that engagement was suggest a radical enactivist reading. 53
54 carried by habitual body schemata. Clearly, « 7 »  In line with REC, “expectation” 54
55 1 | Authors are listed in alphabetical order. these cases of habitual movements do not might also be understood as disposition, i.e., 55
column A column B column C

http://constructivist.info/11/2/302.kirchhoff
 column A
1 the mere readiness to act upon aspects of the
2 book that are relevant to you at the moment.
3 Importantly, with respect to our suggestion,
4 if your disposition is flexible, what actions
5 are relevant might change quite spontane-
6 ously and profoundly, enabling ways of
7 engagement with an object that exceed the
8 habitual. This flexibility might enable the
9 embodied agent to cope with (and adapt to)
10 the changing demands of its environment.
11 We might as well say, your dispositional
12 flexibility embodies the openness of your
13 engagement – and, as we suggest, it consti-
14 tutes its phenomeno-intentional character.
15 Thus, the specifics of your dispositional flex-
16 ibility towards the object might be what de-
17 termines the specific phenomenal character
18 of your engagement with it.
19 « 8 »  But how to determine one’s state of
Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism
column B column C
sneak peeks into the dispositional flexibility affiliated with the research group Phenomenological 1
of an agent. Psychopathology and Philosophy of Psychiatry, in the 2
« 10 »  Along these lines, Oswald Wiener Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna. 3
and colleagues (Raab & Eder 2015) observe 4
a similar phenomenon in several intro- Cornell Schreiber studied cognitive science at the 5
spective case studies on the psychology of University of Osnabrück and the University of Hawaii. 6
thought. They elaborate that our orientation He is currently doing his PhD at the University of 7
(a notion akin to what we so far have called Vienna (topic: introspective psychology of thought), 8
disposition) is merely a readiness to act affiliated with the Department of Philosophy and the 9
upon the object. In the course of changing Cognitive Science Research Platform. Furthermore, 10
dispositions, the object remains transient, he is a member of an independent research group 11
ephemeral and incessantly preliminary – in concerned with Oswald Wiener’s Denkpsychologie. 12
fact, it is never constituted. Such figurative 13
aspects of the object do not emerge as “stat- Received: 15 February 2016 14
ic” representations but merely appear in dis- Accepted: 18 February 2016 15
positional alterations. They are conceived as 16
embodying the phenomenal, quasi-sensory 17
character of an engagement. In sum, in line 18
with the observations of Wiener and col- Missing Out On the Radicalism 19

dispositional flexibility practically? Assum- leagues, we propose that there is reason to

20
21 ing there are no (action-)representations, it believe that dispositional flexibility might
of Neurophenomenology? 20
21
22 certainly will not suffice merely to inspect constitute the appearance of objects plus Katsunori Miyahara 22
23 neurophysiological activity. In line with their phenomenal character qua their ap- 23
Rikkyo University, Japan
24 Kirchhoff and Hutto’s claim of embodied pearance. 24
25 activity in general, one might suggest that kmiyahara/at/rikkyo.ac.jp 25
26 what actions are currently relevant, and can Conclusion 26
27 thus be disposed, is determined by the ever- « 11 »  We have followed Kirchhoff and > Upshot • An exegetical worry about 27
28 changing demands of the situation, how you Hutto down their “preferred path” for neu- Kirchhoff and Hutto’s exposition of 28
29 have enacted it to this point and where you rophenomenology in rejecting a non-re- neurophenomenology is pointed out. 29
30 want to go with it. Thus, as an REC-ish neu- ductive metaphysics. In line with REC, we Combining this exegetical critique with 30
31 rophenomenologist, in order to deduce an thus hold that the “phenomenal character of an examination of the “strict identity” 31
32 agent’s dispositional flexibility, your method experiences is ultimately grounded in inter- in the strict identity thesis, I argue that 32
33 of choice will be to analyze etiologically cases actions between experiencers and features there is more affinity between neu- 33
34 of extensive engagement. of the environment” (§44). However, going rophenomenology and REC than they 34
35 « 9 »  Yet, there is more evidence to be beyond REC’s original claim, we have sug- think. 35
36 collected to that end, beyond behavioral gested that intentionality might be identi- 36
324 37 or neurophysiological data. Hutto (2015) fied with phenomenality, and hence, that « 12 »  Michael Kirchhoff and Daniel 37
38 points out that your engagement with the basic cognition might be identified with ba- Hutto (K&H) advance a metaphysical pro- 38
39 book might be accompanied by so called sic mentality. We have motivated this phe- posal to diffuse the hard problem of con- 39
40 basic sensory imaginings, defined as non- nomeno-intentional identity with reference sciousness based on the radical enactive- 40
41 contentful mental images. For example, to the openness of experience. In our view, embodied approach to cognition (REC) 41
42 when holding a book, you might have basic the phenomenal character of experience is, (Hutto & Myin 2012), with whose general 42
43 imaginings of what else you could possibly more specifically, grounded in the dispo- outline I wholeheartedly agree. Both their 43
44 do with the book. Clearly, these imaginings sitional flexibility of dynamic, embodied assessment that the root of the hard prob- 44
45 can be counted as momentary expressions activity. By proposing to understand basic lem is its dualistic metaphysics and their 45
46 of your dispositional flexibility towards the imaginings as dispositional alterations, in- suggestion to dissipate it by adopting “a 46
47 book.2 Given this, such experiential data – stead of contentful mental images, we have view of consciousness as a dynamic activ- 47
48 when conceived of in terms of embodied ac- indicated an experiential avenue for neuro- ity” seem to be on the right track. The hard 48
49 tivity and not as qualia – might give valuable phenomenology to determine dispositional problem has not been the most popular top- 49
50 flexibility practically. ic among recent discussions on enactivism 50
51 2 | Notice however, as Hutto conceives of despite its popularity among philosophers 51
52 basic imaginings as non-contentful, they can only Oliver Lukitsch studied cognitive science at the of mind in general and also despite Francis- 52
53 be understood etiologically in terms of the role University of Vienna and the University of Ljubljana. He co Varela’s interest in it, most visible in his 53
54 they play in extensive engagements (Hutto 2015: is currently a PhD student (topic: embodied cognitive 1996 paper, which K&H discuss in detail. I 54
55 83–85). science and Phenomenological Psychopathology), admire their effort to bring this topic back 55
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Constructivist Foundations vol. 11, N°2

 Enactivism
Missing Out On the Radicalism of Neurophenomenology? Katsunori Miyahara
column A
1 into the context of enactivism, hoping the
2 following commentary to be useful by way
3 of becoming clearer about what an enactive
4 take on the hard problem should look like.
5 My reservation about the article is mostly
6 exegetical, but pointing it out might help
7 the authors further elaborate on their own
8 view as well.
9 « 13 »  Let us start with the exegetical
10 point. K&H make a severe assessment of
11 the neurophenomenological approach to
12 the hard problem, saying that it assumes
13 “the very metaphysical distinction between
14 the phenomenal and the physical that fuels
15 the hard problem” (§27). This assessment,
16 however, seems to conflict with Francisco
17 Varela’s own suggestion “to change the en-
18 tire framework within which the issue [of
19 the hard problem] is discussed” (Varela
20 1996: 331). In fact, not unlike K&H, Varela
21 sees the hard problem of consciousness in
22 its popular form as having its root in a fun-
23 damental misconception of the nature of
24 consciousness. The problem lies in thinking
25 of conscious experience as “some private,
26 internal event” (ibid: 339) such that when
27 it comes to consciousness, all we can have
28 about it is a set of subjective opinions. On
29 this conception, consciousness is excluded
30 from the objective world from the very be-
31 ginning, and hence it becomes extremely
32 hard, or in fact “impossibly hard” (§25), to
33 understand the relation between them.
34 « 14 »  The neurophenomenological
35 proposal is to transform the nature of the
36 problem by drawing on the method of Hus-
37 serlian phenomenology. On this method,
38 we start by turning our attention to experi-
39 ence itself as it unfolds in our everyday lives
40 (see Varela 1996: 335–338 for a more de-
41 tailed account of his take on the phenome-
42 nological method). What then becomes evi-
43 dent is that the alleged separation between
44 the realm of conscious experience and that
45 of the objective world is not as obvious as
46 one might think. On the one hand, as the
47 method allows us to generate descriptions
48 about the structure of conscious experience,
49 which are then open to “intersubjective val-
50 idation” (ibid: 339), it becomes unclear why
51 we should regard it as a private realm shut
52 out of the rest of the world. On the other
53 hand, we also come to recognize that what
54 we call “the objective world” is something
55 we become aware of through the unfold-
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ing of our conscious experience, especially phenomenoogy makes sense as “a method- 1
through the social process of generating ob- ological remedy for the hard problem” (ibid: 2
jective accounts of the world we experience, 330). Accordingly, K&H seem to overlook 3
rather than something totally separated the radicalism of neurophenomenology in 4
from the realm of consciousness. Accord- assessing it as preserving the dualistic meta- 5
ingly, Varela maintains, “consciousness in physics underlying the hard problem (§27). 6
this [phenomenological] style of examina- (In this regard, it is suggestive that, in §18, 7
tion […] [is] a realm of phenomena where they insert a “[sic]” in quoting a passage 8
subjective and objective […] emerge natu- from Varela where he talks about “two ir- 9
rally from the method applied and its con- reducible phenomenal [sic] domains.”) 10
text” (1996: 340). On this conception, sub- « 17 »  Now suppose this metaphysi- 11
jective experience and the objective world cal reading of neurophenomenology is ex- 12
are but two “phenomenal domains” (ibid.): egetically correct. Then let us next consider 13
both belonging to the total realm of phe- how far (or close) this approach to the hard 14
nomena, which is consciousness, and both problem is from K&H’s REC approach fea- 15
open to principled investigation. turing the strict identity thesis (SIT)? In 16
« 15 »  Given this new conception of some sense, the former proposes a method 17
consciousness, the hard problem is no to close the gap between the subjective and 18
longer a matter of constructing a theoreti- the objective, which constitutes the hard 19
cal connection between two metaphysi- problem, by reconceptualising its nature, 20
cally distinct realms. Rather, it is more while the latter denies the existence of this 21
about articulating the connection between gap in the first place. This may encourage 22
the two phenomenal domains of subjec- us to emphasize the difference between the 23
tive experience and objective world that is approaches, but it seems to me that there is 24
to be found right there in the unfolding of more affinity between them than might be 25
consciousness. To say that the connection expected from this initial appearance. 26
is to be found in consciousness, however, « 18 »  To see how this is the case, let us 27
is by no means to say that it is readily ac- try to be clearer on the content of SIT. What 28
knowledgeable. To think so is to fall back does it mean to say that the experiential and 29
onto the obsolete conception of conscious- the physical are strictly identical? (Note that 30
ness as a private realm. In Varela’s view, no I use the term “the experiential” for what 31
aspect of consciousness is fully transparent K&H call “the phenomenal” to avoid con- 32
to us, but at the same time, every aspect of fusion due to the fact that Varela considers 33
it, including the subjective domain, the ob- both subjective experience and the objec- 34
jective domain, and the relation between tive world as two phenomenal domains.) 35
them, is subject to principled investiga- In discussing physical reductionist theories 36
tion. Therefore, with the phenomenological of consciousness, Max Velmans character- 37 325
conception of consciousness at hand, “the ises “ontological identity” as a relation that 38
‘hardness’ and riddle [of the hard problem] “obeys Leibniz’s Law: if A is identical to B, all 39
become a research programme open for the properties of A are also properties of B 40
its exploration in an open-ended manner” and vice versa” (Velmans 2009: 45, empha- 41
(Varela 1996: 345). sis in original). Is this the identity relation 42
« 16 »  The specific method of neuro- SIT supposes to hold between the experi- 43
phenomenology for articulating the rela- ential and the physical? There are indeed 44
tion between “the structure of experience some non-trivial properties shared between 45
and their counterparts in cognitive science” subjective experience and its objective 46
(Varela1996: 343), which K&H’s exposition counterpart. For example, Shaun Gallagher 47
mostly focuses on, should be understood in indicates a common temporal structure 48
the context of this attempt to reconceptu- between consciousness and embodied ac- 49
alise consciousness and the hard problem. tion (Gallagher 2012: 107–114). It seems 50
In fact, not unlike K&H (§45), Varela’s point very difficult, if not impossible, however, 51
seems to be that it is only by adopting a new to claim that all the properties of subjective 52
metaphysics of subjective experience and experience are also properties of its objec- 53
the objective world as two phenomenal do- tive counterpart, and vice versa. To raise an 54
mains that the practical method of neuro- almost trivial example, the brain state as- 55
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column A
1 sociated to a particular episode of experi-
ence may involve a synchronous pattern of
2
3 neural activity across various neural assem-
4 blies, but it is hard to even make sense of
the claim that my experience itself involves
5
6 the same synchronous pattern of neural ac-
7 tivity. Accordingly, this does not seem to be
8 the notion of identity operative in SIT.
9 « 19 »  It is more reasonable to read SIT
10 as a form of dual aspect theory, according to
11 which the experiential and the physical are
12 two distinct aspects of one and the same ex-
13 istence, namely, “the phenomenally charged
14 embodied activity” (§44). In this view, not
15 all properties attributable to the experien-
16 tial aspect of the embodied activity are also
17 attributable to its physical aspect, and vice
18 versa. However, both experiential and phys-
19 ical properties are properties of the embod-
20 ied activity as a whole. In other words, SIT
21 can be read as concerned not with the iden-
22 tity between the experiential and the physi-
23 cal as such, but rather with the identity of
24 the subject that bears these two aspects.
25 « 20 »  On this interpretation, SIT
26 seems to invite a series of questions to be
27 answered through empirical investigations
28 (in the broad sense) into the nature of em-
29 bodied activities – or at least unless it de-
30 nies any systematic structure in the way in
31 which embodied activities involve experi-
32 ential aspects. For example, if SIT is cor-
33 rect, what is the specific difference between
34 embodied activities with an experiential
35 aspect and mere physical activities devoid
36 of it? What are the differences between em-
37 bodied activities involving different types
38 of conscious experience such as perception,
39 imagination, empathy, different kinds of
40 emotions, and so on? What are the differ-
41 ences between embodied activities with dif-
42 ferent kinds of conscious experience among
43 the same general type, such as perception
44 of material things, of images, of animals, of
45 artefacts, etc.? These are arguably legitimate
46 questions to ask even if there is no meta-
47 physical gap between the experiential and
48 the physical.
49 « 21 »  Then the affinity between the
50 neurophenomenological approach and the
51 REC approach to the hard problem is fairly
52 obvious. To pursue the kinds of questions
53 listed above, we clearly need to engage in
54 “a principled consideration of embodiment
55 as lived experience” (Varela 1996: 346). For
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example, if we want to specify the nature Authors’ Response 1
of embodied activities involving percep-
tual experiences of material things, then
Mind Never The Gap, Redux 2
3
we need to explore “what it is like to engage Michael D. Kirchhoff 4
in the activity of ” (§40) seeing something.
& Daniel D. Hutto 5
Furthermore, since the embodied activities 6
have physical aspects as well, we also need > Upshot • We respond to three main 7
to resort to third-personal, scientific meth- challenges that the commentaries have 8
ods to achieve a better understanding of raised. First, we argue that to deal suc- 9
their nature. In short, neurophenomenol- cessfully with the hard problem of con- 10
ogy provides SIT with concrete methods (or sciousness, it is not enough to posit a 11
at least their outline) to flesh out its monis- remedy by which to move beyond the 12
tic metaphysics. hard problem. Second, we argue that it 13
« 22 »  To sum up, if my interpretations makes no sense to explain identity. Yet 14
of the two approaches are correct, both this does not commit us to definitions 15
neurophenomenology and REC endorse a by fiat. The strategy we pursue here, and 16
form of monism. In these views, the subjec- in the target article, is not to explain 17
tive and the objective, the experiential and identity but to explain away the appear- 18
the physical are but two domains or two as- ance of non-identity. Finally, while we 19
pects of an identical layer of being. To be are sympathetic to Varela’s call for a par- 20
honest, these ideas remain elusive to me, adigm shift in consciousness studies, we 21
and it seems much clarification is required argue here, and in the target article, that 22
as to what it exactly means to say that these this call can only be properly successful 23
two domains emerge from a single realm if the hard problem is dismantled. 24
of phenomena or that embodied activities 25
bear both the experiential and the physical « 1 »  In the target article “Never mind 26
within them. In any case, however, the ex- the gap: Neurophenomenology, radical 27
periential and the physical seem not strictly enactivism and the hard problem of con- 28
identical in the sense of sharing the exactly sciousness,” we argued that neurophenom- 29
same set of properties. Thus the “strictly enology, as classically formulated by Varela 30
identical” in SIT should be handled with (1996), seeks to deal with the hard problem 31
care. Monistic metaphysics does not require of consciousness by advancing a non-re- 32
a strict identity between different aspects of ductive explanation of experience that in- 33
one and the same underlying existence. tegrates first- and third-person data. From 34
this, we concluded that neurophenomenol- 35
Katsunori Miyahara is a JSPS Research Fellow at ogy: 36
Rikkyo University, Tokyo. He received his PhD from the ƒƒ recognises rather than remedies the 37
University of Tokyo for his thesis, Phenomenology of hard problem of consciousness; and 38
Enaction, which explored enactive perception from ƒƒ fails to provide an adequate solution to 39
a phenomenological perspective. He has several that problem about the metaphysics of 40
publications, including the article, “Seeing other mind. 41
agents: Passive experience for seeing the other body « 2 »  In what follows, we shall respond 42
as the other’s body,” which won the Phenomenological to three main challenges that the commen- 43
Association of Japan Article Prize (2015). taries have raised, and in so doing map 44
some of the central features of our own 45
Received: 19 February 2016 approach to consciousness. The first com- 46
Accepted: 20 February 2016 plaint is that we have (somehow) miscon- 47
strued the project of neurophenomenology. 48
The second complaint is that we have said 49
too little about how, appealing to our pre- 50
ferred identity thesis, we undermine the 51
hard problem of consciousness. And finally, 52
the third complaint is that there is a deeper 53
affinity between neurophenomenology and 54
radical enactivism than we (seem to) grant. 55
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1 « 3 »  We are pleased to note that our
2 main critique of the limitations of the frame-
3 work of neurophenomenology resonates
4
5
positively with many of the commentaries.
Specifically, Michael Beaton, Shaun Gallagher,
6 Diana Gasparyan, and Oliver Lukitsch & Cornell
7 Schreiber all agree that the neurophenom-
8
9
enological framework either fails to ad-
dress the hard problem or fails to dissolve
10 it adequately. Consider, for example, what
11 Gallagher says in his commentary: “I agree
12 that Francisco Varela’s original proposal to
13 offer neurophenomenology as an answer to
14 the hard problem, rather than deconstruct
15 it, was the wrong strategy” (§1). Yet not all
16 of the commentaries share this conviction.
17 Most notably, the commentary by Michael
18 Bitbol & Elenea Antonova does not. In sharp
19 contrast to the four commentaries above,
20 Bitbol & Antonova explicitly state that the tar-
21 get article “systematically misconstrues the
22 original approach to the ‘hard problem’ […]
23 advocated by […] Varela under the name
24 ‘neurophenomenology’” (§1).
25 « 4 »  Here we look more closely at the
26 arguments provided by Bitbol & Antonova and
27 their implications. According to Bitbol & An-
28 tonova, we commit neurophenomenology
29 to non-reductionism. However, they claim,
30 even if neurophenomenology is a critique
31 of reductionist approaches to explanation,
32 neurophenomenology “adopts no alterna-
33 tive naturalistic metaphysical option” (§5).
34 Although Valera did disavow any substantial
35 metaphysics, we nevertheless find this objec-
36 tion hard to square with what Valera in fact
37 writes in places and the authors he explicitly
38 counts as allies, namely those who advance
39 non-reductive naturalistic metaphysical
40 solutions to the hard problem. Thus Varela
41 says: “The phenomenological approach starts
42 from the irreducible nature of conscious ex-
43 perience” (Varela 1996: 334). Moreover, he
44 aligns his non-reductionist approach, al-
45 beit in a modified form, with that of figures
46 such as David Chalmers (1996), John Searle
47 (1992), and Owen Flanagan (1992). He also
48 talks about getting closer to bridging the bio-
49 logical mind-experiential mind gap. In this
50 light, Varela appears to presuppose the exist-
51 ence of some type of gap that needs bridging
52 that would make logical room for the kind of
53 non-reductionist explanations he promises.
54 « 5 »  But perhaps a different reading is
55 possible. Bitbol & Antonova claim that Varela-
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style neurophenomenology does not trade « 7 »  Ximena González-Grandón complains 1
in metaphysics and thus does offer a non- that 2
reductionist straight solution to the hard 3
problem of consciousness. This is in line
with Varela’s talk of re-framing the problem
“  the identity thesis, as a solution [to the hard
problem], lies at the core of brain reduction and
4
5
rather than solving it. Focusing on those functionalism, and [so] avoids the possibility of 6
remarks, he can be read as a metaphysical a genuine understanding and characterization of 7
quietist. This would fit Bitbol & Antonova’s
claim that “Varela had already endorsed the
”
human living experience. (§2) 8
9
authors’ [Kirchhoff & Hutto’s] claim that ‘the This complaint makes undefended assump- 10
hard problem is not just hard: it is impos- tions about the character and logical implica- 11
sible’” (§7). Let us assume, for the sake of tions of our proposed identity thesis. It may 12
argument, that this reading is the one to be be natural to associate any identity claim in 13
preferred. Note that steering clear of meta- philosophy of mind with functionalism or 14
physics comes with a price. One cannot of- the mind-brain identity theory. Neverthe- 15
fer a straight solution to the hard problem of less, intellectual tendencies aside, there is no 16
consciousness. Very well. This fits with Bitbol entailment here. Mind-brain identity theory 17
& Antonova’s observation that Varela aims does not follow automatically from assuming 18
to provide a remedy for the hard problem. that the phenomenal and the physical stand 19
However, if we assess neurophenomenology in a relation of identity. The embodied ac- 20
from this angle, it can be complained that tivities that are identified with experiences in 21
it does not do nearly enough, at the right normal circumstances can be thought of as 22
level, to address the intellectual diseases that extensive and not brain-bound. It is thus per- 23
foster the belief that the hard problem is a fectly possible to endorse an identity thesis 24
genuine problem. Simply noting that first- while rejecting a neurocentric perspective. 25
and third-personal data are reciprocally Second, radical enactivism offers a defini- 26
constrained, for example, whatever its prac- tively non-functionalist vision of minds (for 27
tical value, does little to relieve the tendency a full paper treatment of this issue, see Hutto, 28
to think of these phenomena as fundamen- Kirchhoff & Myin 2014). Hence González- 29
tally distinct. Rather, successfully providing Grandón underestimates the actual range of 30
a remedy would require explaining away the philosophical possibilities and thus mischar- 31
appearance of non-identity in the sort of acterizes our approach when objecting to the 32
ways we discuss below in §8. account provided in the target article. 33
« 6 »  Although agreeing with our meta- « 8 »  Dan Lloyd raises a different but re- 34
physical considerations about the limitations lated issue. As he sees it, it is radical enactiv- 35
of neurophenomenology, Gasparyan goes on ism’s rejection of a representational theory 36
to note that there are other and perhaps more of mind that poses problems for capturing 37 327
adequate ways of “handling the unfortunate phenomenality. Lloyd suggests that our own 38
gap” (§6). She says that if the “gap in the ex- description of experience, which emphasizes 39
planation is a natural condition of the entire the importance of expectations, highlights 40
system and is initially built into it, [then] a problem for our non-representationalism. 41
[…] the normal nature of the gap means ac- This is because – he assumes – expectations 42
tual overcoming of this gap” (§6). We admit entail the existence of representational con- 43
being unsure about what the author intends tent. Certainly, we do speak of experiential 44
here. But even on a charitable reading, the expectations, as in the following case: “You 45
proposal on the table seems to be obviously are feeling the texture of the book and even 46
flawed – when taken as a way of handling the though you are only holding parts of the 47
hard problem. That is, were there nothing book you have expectations about the book’s 48
“irregular” about the (alleged) gap between orientation, its size, and so on” (§40). How- 49
the phenomenal and the physical, there ever, exactly no argument is supplied to show 50
would still be a gap. Thus, highlighting the why the brain – or an extensive brain-body- 51
naturalness of the gap between the phenom- world system – that anticipates its embed- 52
enal and the physical does nothing, in and of ding environment must do so in a way that 53
itself, to overcome the hard problem of con- entails the existence of representational con- 54
sciousness or otherwise remedy it. tent. There are serious problems in simply 55
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1 assuming a representationalist account of
2 such expectations (see, e.g., Hutto & Myin
3 2012). The enactivist framework offers a
4 positive, alternative notion of anticipation
5 that can be understood in an appropriately
6 deflated sense. That is, for any two dynami-
7 cally coupled systems – such as organism (O)
8 and environment (E) – O can be understood
9 as anticipating the dynamics of the other, E,
10 and vice versa, “when it reliably co-varies
11 with the dynamics of [E] and it is robust to
12 the noise inherent in the coupling” (Bruine-
13 berg & Rietveld 2014: 7). As such, there is no
14 necessity to think that brains or more exten-
15 sive systems that enactively anticipate their
16 environments must do so in ways that entail
17 the existence of representational contents.
18 « 9 »  The second group of challenges,
19 from Gallagher, Beaton, and Lukitsch & Sch-
20 reiber, focuses on our identity thesis. Gal-
21 lagher worries about how we unpack the
22
23
relationship between the physical and the
phenomenal. First, Gallagher thinks that our
24 identity claim fails to make room for recipro-
25 cal causal dynamics – a notion at the heart
26
27
of enactivist approaches to mind. In making
this claim, Gallagher considers the following
28 example:
29
30
31
“  a material system composed of three dynami-
cally related processual parts, B, C, and E. Changes
32 in any one part can alter the entire system because
33 it can alter the dynamics of the system as a whole.
34 If B is a machine process that starts to operate at
35 a different speed, for example, it can easily cause
36 C to change its behavior, and E might stop func-
37 tioning altogether. Changes in B causally correlate
38 with changes in C and E, and more generally in
39
40
”
the dynamics that characterize the system. (§2)
41 Note that this does not threaten our claim
42 that the phenomenal and the physical are
43
44
identical, as Gallagher intimates. To see this,
consider again that the claim we pursue in
45 the target article is that conscious experi-
46 ence – its phenomenal character – is noth-
47
48
ing over and above forms of embodied ac-
tivity. If correct, it follows that the physical
49 and the phenomenal cannot be distinct and
50 merely correlated. But this does not commit
51 us, contra Gallagher, to the additional claim
52 that the relevant embodied activities are not
53 diachronically constituted by a raft of other
54 complex processes standing in the relation of
55 continuous reciprocal causation. For radical
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column B column C
enactivism, cognitive processes are activities. it is possible to know something about one 1
They are something we do. This is entirely pendulum by investigating the other, and vise 2
consistent with our further claim that cog- versa. This is often explained by reference to 3
nitive processes and conscious experience the notion of mutual information. Yet it does 4
are a single phenomenon (see also Hutto & not follow that the two entities are identical. 5
Myin 2012; Kirchhoff 2015b; Silberstein & So it is not evident that Beaton’s proposal for 6
Chemero 2015). In other words, we can keep demonstrating the identity will work. Finally, 7
the identity claim even if dynamical changes Lukitsch & Schreiber invite us to consider our 8
in microscopic properties drive dynamical identity claim in terms of identity between 9
changes in macroscopic properties, and vice- intentionality and phenomenality. This is an 10
versa. Nothing we say about the relationship interesting suggestion but there are also rea- 11
between the phenomenal and the physical sons for thinking that these two phenomena, 12
commits us to the – admittedly non-enactiv- while normally inter-related, can come apart. 13
ist – view that macroscopic attributes are not Indeed, it is rather straightforward to show 14
diachronically constituted by microscopic that while intentionality and phenomenality 15
dynamics (cf. Kirchhoff 2015a). are inter-related, it does not follow that these 16
« 10 »  Beaton draws attention to the issue two phenomena are intrinsically related (as 17
that identity cannot simply be assumed. That with Searle’s (1992) connection principle). 18
is, one cannot simply posit identity by fiat. The reason is that while experience is phe- 19
As he says: nomenal in its character, the same is not the 20
case for intentionality (for a full treatment of 21
“  [Y]ou can and must put in the required the leg-
work here: you can and should make a convincing
this issue, see Hutto 2000).
« 11 »  Katsunori Miyahara suggests that our
22
23
argument that the structure of embodied action is view of the relationship between the phe- 24
the very same thing as the structure of phenom- nomenal and the physical is actually close 25
”
enal experience. (§6) to that of neurophenomenology and hence
they should not be conceived of as rivals. He
26
27
We agree. To make any identity claim about holds that the two accounts differ only trivi- 28
the phenomenal and the physical requires ally. Miyahara makes some insightful points. 29
one to explain away the appearances of
non-identity and demonstrate that an im-
First, like Bitbol & Antonova, he observes that
for Varela the ambition was to “change the
30
31
agined metaphysical distinction between entire framework within which the issue [of 32
the phenomenal and the physical is an illu- the hard problem] is discussed” (Varela 1996: 33
sion of sorts (Papineau 2002). That requires 331). Prima facie, at least, this is not differ- 34
additional work, but fully explaining away ent from the suggestion of the target article. 35
the illusion of non-identity would require a Second, Varela and we agree in thinking that 36
good deal more space than was available in to conceive of consciousness as “some pri- 37
the target article. Beaton notes that one way vate, internal event” (ibid: 339) is a central 38
to explain identity is to show that there is a
one-way entailment from the microscopic to
obstacle when it comes to thinking about
consciousness. On these issues, our account
39
40
the macroscopic. As he says, and Varela’s program of neurophenomenol- 41
ogy concur with one another. Moreover, 42
“ once we know the properties of water and the
microphysics of H O molecules, we can make
both approaches positively conceive of cog-
nition and by extension conscious experi-
43
44
2
a clear argument that H2O molecules must (as a ence as grounded in nonlinearly coupled 45
‘conceptual necessity,’ if you will) behave in bulk as brain-body-environment dynamics. Yet it 46
”
water behaves. (§3) is in the job that appealing to such dynam-
ics is meant to do that the two approaches
47
48
Yet even if my knowledge of H2O molecules come apart. For Varela, as Miyahara observes, 49
allows me to gain knowledge about the mac- the neurophenomenological conception of 50
roscopic properties of water, and vice versa, consciousness deals with the hard problem 51
this does not license the claim that the mi- through a research program that takes the 52
croscopic and the macroscopic properties are form of an open-ended exploration (§4). It 53
identical. To see this, consider two coupled is certainly no easy task to change a research 54
pendulums oscillating in synchrony. Here, culture, and certainly not one that rests on 55
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Combined References Michael D. Kirchhoff& Daniel D. Hutto

column A column B column C

1 deep-seated assumptions, such as those that call for a paradigm shift in consciousness sess the more pragmatic advances that Varela 1
2 drive the contemporary search for neu- studies. However, we hold that this paradigm proposes. This was our main point in the tar- 2
3 ral correlates of consciousness. No doubt shift will only be properly fruitful if the hard get article. 3
4 achieving a paradigm shift in this domain is problem is dismantled. Once that is done, it Received: 29 February 2016 4
5 a hard task. We are sympathetic to Varela’s will become possible to explore fully and as- Accepted: 3 March 2016 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
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