(Studies in Military and Strategic History) Raffi Gregorian (Auth.) - The British Army, The Gurkhas and Cold War Strategy in The Far East, 1947-1954-Palgrave Macmillan UK (2002)

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THE BRITISH ARMY, THE GURKHAS AND COLD WAR STRATEGY IN
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Stephen Hartley
THE IRISH QUESTION AS A PROBLEM IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1914–18
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JAPAN’S FIRST MODERN WAR
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KENNEDY, MACMILLAN AND THE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN DEBATE, 1961–63
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BRITAIN, MIHAILOVIC AND THE CHETNIKS, 1941–42
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The British Army, the
Gurkhas and Cold War
Strategy in the Far East,
1947–1954
Raffi Gregorian
Senior Adviser
US Department of State
Washington
USA
© Raffi Gregorian 2002
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2002 978-0-333-80148-2
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ISBN 978-1-349-42114-5 ISBN 978-0-230-28716-7 (eBook)
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Gregorian, Raffi, 1964–
The British Army, the Gurkhas and Cold War strategy in the Far East,
1947–1954 / Raffi Gregorian.
p. cm. – (Studies in military and strategic history)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-349-42114-5 (cloth)
1. Great Britain. Army – History – 20th century. 2. Great Britain –
Military policy. 3. Gurkha soldiers. 4. Cold War. 5. East Asia – Strategic
aspects. I. Title. II. Series.
UA649 .G683 2001
355’.033041’095–dc21 2001036345
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02
Contents
List of Tables ix
List of Figures x
Acknowledgements xi
Preface xiii
Glossary of Abbreviations xvi
1 Introduction 1
Sources 6
Approach 9
2 ‘Future Defence Policy’: the Far East as Strategic

Backwater, 1945–48 11
Introduction 11
Global strategy 18
From SEAC to FARELF: military strategy
in the Far East, 1945–48 24
3 National Service, the Gurkhas and the Reorganization

of the British Army, 1946–48 32
Development of the postwar British Army 33

Filling the manpower gap: the origins of the
British Army Gurkhas 36
GHQ FARELF, local forces, and the ‘Gurkha Project’ 42
Development of the Gurkha division 44
Teething pains: the Gurkhas arrive in Malaya 46
The Brigade of Gurkhas 48
Conclusion 49
4 FARELF and the Malayan Emergency, 1948–50 51
The Communist threat 52

FARELF and the British response 54
‘Ferret Force’ 58
v
vi Contents
Despatch of the ‘fire brigade’ 59

Training 61
The Gurkha Division 62
Local defense forces 63
A new C-in-C shakes things up 65
A fillip to the MCP: Communist victory in China 67
Renewed call for reinforcements 68
Conclusion 74
5 ‘To the Last Round’: the Defense of

Hong Kong, 1948–50 77
The 1946 Hong Kong defense policy 78

Rethinking Hong Kong defense policy 80
A Communist threat on the horizon 82
Colonial Office jitters 83
The garrison’s role and the reinforcement dilemma 84
Assessing the strategic implications 87
HMS Amethyst and a brigade group for Hong Kong 90
Contemplating war with China 91
Scoping the effects of suppositional reinforcements 93
The decision to defend 95
Thinking in the long term 98
Military preparations in Hong Kong 99
Thinking about Hong Kong in a global war 101
Hong Kong and British recognition
of the People’s Republic 102
Robbing Peter to pay Paul 105
Conclusion 107
6 Adapting to Reality: the Far East and Cold

War Strategy, 1950–54 109
The strategic impact of a Communist China:

the view from Whitehall 110
The view from Singapore 113
Singapore’s call for coordinated containment 114
The Colombo conference 116
ANZAM 117
Updating Far East strategy and policy 118
The Far East and the ‘global strategy and
defence policy’ of 1950 119
Contents vii
‘In light of the present situation’: updating

DO(50)45 122
The strategic reappraisal of 1952 125
The ‘Radical Review’ 128
Conclusion 133
7 Between the American Scylla and Chinese

Charybdis: Hong Kong, 1950–54 135
Hong Kong, FARELF and the Korean commitment 136

Land forces for Korea 138
Reassessing the threat 142
Strategic deception and a new policy for Hong Kong 143
The United States, Hong Kong, and the war in Korea 147
Mixed signals 148
Getting Hong Kong on the allied agenda 151
‘Indefensible’ 152
The US and Hong Kong: from deception
to commitment? 155
Five Power planning for Hong Kong 159
Reduction of the garrison 161
Conclusion 163
8 Manpower, the Strategic Reserve and the

Malayan Emergency, 1950–54 165
Malaya at the start of the Korean War 166

Malaya, colonial troops, and the new strategic reserve 167
A Federation Army 169
India, Nepal and the British Army Gurkhas 172
The Communist campaign against the British Gurkhas 175
The end of the Gurkhas? 176
Conclusion 178
9 Siam and the Commonwealth Defense of Malaya 180
Siam in relation to the defense of Malaya 181

The ‘Songkhla position’ 182
Planning begins under changing strategic assumptions 185
Plan IRONY 187
Revised force requirements 188
A change in Allied strategy and new
thinking about reinforcements 189
viii Contents
The role of deception 190

Plan RINGLET 191
Ministerial briefing 192
Reassessing the initiating triggers 193
The improving situation in Siam 194
Plan WARRIOR 196
A Commonwealth role in the defense of Malaya 198
Conclusion 200
10 Limited Liability and the Defense of

Southeast Asia, 1950–54 203
The importance of French Indochina to

British Southeast Asia 204
American aid for Indochina 205
Thinking about collective security 206
Tripartite talks 209
The effects of a possible French withdrawal in 1952 212
Five Power Staff Agency (FPSA) 214
Dien Bien Phu and the American call for
‘united action’ 215
The US request for British intervention 218
The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty 221
Conclusion 222
11 Conclusion 225
Strategic sufficiency 230
Epilogue 234
Notes 237
Select Bibliography 308

Index 323
List of Tables
1.1 Declining power’s beliefs about interacting

with adversaries 4
3.1 Strength of the armed forces, 1945–48 34
6.1 Expansion of the British Army, 1950–52 123
7.1 The radical review and the Hong Kong garrison 162
8.1 Number and source of infantry battalions
in Malaya, 1948–54 172
11.1 Actual and planned deployments of British
divisions in 1948 229
11.2 Actual and planned deployments of
British divisions in 1955 229
ix
List of Figures
1.1 London–Singapore Central Defence Organization 8

2.1 Distribution of the British Army as at
31 December 1946 13
3.1 FARELF order of battle in Malaya and Singapore,
June 1948 47
11.1 Strength of principal overseas commands, 1948–54 232
11.2 Strength of home and overseas commands, 1948–54 233
x
Acknowledgements
A work of this magnitude could not have been completed without

assistance from a variety of advisers, friends, colleagues, and officials.
Dr David Charters suggested the idea of focusing on the theater com-
mand level, while Professor Eliot Cohen supported me morally, acade-
mically, and, with the generous assistance of the Bradley Foundation,
financially as well.
I owe special thanks to the following people: Dr John Mackinlay for
his assistance in arranging interviews and access to private material;
Dr Timothy Moreman for encouragement and support as both a friend
and colleague; Major-General Julian Thompson, CB, OBE, for his help
in arranging personal interviews and access to important papers;
Brigadier Maurice Tugwell for his invaluable aid in putting me in touch
with a number of Far East Land Forces (FARELF) staff officers; Major-
General Timothy Toyne Sewell, for his help with the Staff College;
Professor Thomas Mockaitis for his feedback, suggestions, and encour-
agement; Dr Michael Dockrill for advice and personal references;
Dr Cathy Swan for her accommodation of my 1991–92 study schedule;
and Sanders Marble, who helped me conduct some last-minute
‘remote’ research at the PRO. Thanks also to my colleagues Colonel
Steve Rader, USA (Ret’d) and Bill Rosenau, both of whom provided
needed criticism and insight, and Bill for his recommendation about
Charles Kupchan’s The Vulnerability of Empire.
A number of people gave graciously of their time and privacy, espe-
cially: Lady Keightley and her son, Major-General Richard Keightley,
CB; Charles Loewen; Colonel Templer; and General Sir Walter Walker,
KCB, CBE, DSO. Library and archive staffs provided invaluable help,
and always with a pleasant disposition. Although too numerous to
mention by name, they work for the Public Records Office, the India
Office Library and Records, the National Army Museum, the Imperial
War Museum, Royal United Services Institute, the Gurkha Museum,
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, the National Archives and
Records Administration, and, of course, the SAIS library, without whose
forbearance I would not have been able to finish the work. Crown copy-
right material from the Public Record Office is reproduced by kind per-
mission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. My thanks
xi
xii Acknowledgements
to the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s
College London, for permission to use papers from the collection.
The most important backing came from my parents and my wife. To
my parents I owe the great privilege of a first-rate education. But it is to
my wife, Bernadette, to whom the greatest debt is owed. At one point
she had three jobs to ensure the continuation of my studies, and gave
of her time and emotional energy more than I can ever repay, all dur-
ing a period of painfully personal travail. I can only hope that she will
think it was worthwhile.
Preface
I initially chose to study British military strategy in the Far East from
1947 to 1954 as a means to understand the military context in
which Commonwealth forces conducted military operations against
Indonesia during the ‘Confrontation’ of 1962–66. My research revealed
that the preceding period was far more complex and informative than
I had previously understood. I was particularly struck by two things,
the first being the apparent disjunction among the ways, ends, and
means of British strategy and defense policy. The second was the evi-
dent success the British achieved in meeting their strategic objectives
in the Far East. Standard interpretations of these seemingly contradic-
tory phenomena simply discount strategic success and claim that
Britain overextended itself in terms of its reduced power after World
War II.
Postwar Britain was undoubtedly in relative decline but this had
been the case since the beginning of the twentieth century. Many
scholars have attributed its relatively poor postwar economic perfor-
mance to supposedly excessive defense spending and ‘strategic overex-
tension’. Yet as I contend in this book, such criticism is misplaced
and misses the fact that British military strategy was entirely successful
and did not constitute overextension, itself a subjective phrase
usually definable only by the presence of military defeat. In retrospect,
some economic and defense policies may have been inadvisable
and the active duty Army was indeed stretched thin by numerous
contingency operations. But such mistakes as may have been made
should not obscure the fact that by a judicious application of
military deployments and diplomacy, Britain played a major role in
the Cold War that was entirely in keeping with what Michael Howard
has called ‘traditional British strategy’. Contrary to Liddell Hart’s
polemic rendering of the ‘British way in warfare’ as being chiefly an
indirect maritime strategy combined with subsidies to continental
allies, Howard states that a ‘commitment of support to a Continental
ally in the nearest available theatre, on the largest scale that contempo-
rary resources could afford … was absolutely central’ to traditional
strategy.1
This book is about how Britain, following its traditional strategy, and
focusing on the defense of its strategic core, achieved its objectives even
xiii
xiv Preface
in the face of major challenges in the Far East, its strategic periphery. It
focuses on military strategy, and delves into air and naval strategy only as
is necessary to elucidate the main subject. My reason for this is simple:
the British Army bore the brunt of the Cold War burden and it is only by
studying its planned and actual deployments that one gets a proper
understanding of what the British government valued enough to place
‘boots on the ground’.
To those readers not overly familiar with the British military estab-
lishment, a review of a few conventions about the basic organization of
Army forces might be helpful. Unlike in the United States Army, a
British infantry regiment is more an administrative unit than a combat
one. In most, but not every, instance in this period, it consisted of only
one battalion, whereas before 1939 it usually consisted of two ‘paired’
battalions, one of which served abroad, the other at home. This was
known as the ‘Cardwell system’, after the Secretary of War that devel-
oped it in the 1870s. Cavalry, tank, and artillery regiments, on the
other hand, always consisted of a single, battalion-sized formation. In
terms of combat formations, infantry brigades normally consisted of
three infantry battalions, while a brigade ‘group’ usually denoted an
infantry brigade reinforced with field artillery, engineers, various sup-
port troops, and possibly even an armored squadron. Infantry divisions
usually consisted of three brigades, backed by an artillery brigade, an
armored regiment, and divisional support troops, including anti-aircraft
and anti-tank units. Regiments’ names were usually abbreviated and
the respective battalion placed in front; hence the 1st Battalion of the
Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders is rendered as 1 A&SH. All four of
the British Gurkha regiments were referred to as ‘rifle’ regiments, so the
2nd Gurkha Rifles is abbreviated as 2 GR. Since each of the Gurkha
regiments actually had two battalions, the battalion number precedes
the regimental number, so the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Gurkha Rifles
is rendered as 1/2 GR.
With respect to nomenclature, readers should be aware that during
this period the British usually referred to the Soviet Union and Soviets
as Russia and Russians, and Thailand and Thais as Siam and Siamese.
References to the Soviet Union are found in this text, but for the sake
of consistency and clarity, I have chosen to use only Siam and Siamese
in referring to Thailand. Also for the sake of clarity, I have decided not
to include the classification levels of the documents cited in the notes.
In almost every instance these documents were ‘Top Secret’, and the
reader can assume as much. Similarly, because the vast majority of the
cited documents came from the Public Records Office (PRO), the reader
Preface xv
can assume that a document comes from the PRO unless it specifically
refers to another repository such as Imperial War Museum (IWM),
India Office Library and Records (IOLR), National Army Museum
(NAM), Gurkha Museum (GM), Liddell-Hart Archives (LHA) or
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
Glossary of Abbreviations
ABC America–Britain–Canada global war planning program

ACFE Air Command, Far East (later renamed FEAF)
ADM Admiral; Admiralty Papers (PRO)
ALFSEA Allied Land Forces, South East Asia
ANZAM Australian–New Zealand–Malayan Command Area
ANZUK Australian–New Zealand–UK force
ANZUS Australia–New Zealand–United States Security Treaty
AVM Air Vice Marshal
AWM Australian War Memorial
BAOR British Army of the Rhine
BCOF British Commonwealth Occupation Force (Japan)
BDCC(FE) British Defence Coordination Committee (Far East)
Bde Brigade
BFHK British Forces Hong Kong
Bn Battalion
BO British Officer
BPF British Pacific Fleet
BSMB British Services Mission Burma
C-in-C Commander-in-Chief
CAB Cabinet, records of (PRO)
CAS Chief of the Air Staff
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CGS Chief of the General Staff
CIC(FE) Commanders-in-Chief Committee (Far East)
CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff
CNS Chief of the Naval Staff (First Sea Lord)
CO Colonial Office
COS Chiefs of Staff
COSC Chiefs of Staff Committee
COSSEA Chiefs of Staff to South East Asia (classified cable)
CRO Commonwealth Relations Office
CSO Chief Staff Officer
DC Cabinet Defence Committee
DEFE Defence (PRO)
DMI Director of Military Intelligence
DMO Director of Military Operations
DMT Director of Military Training
DSD Director of Staff Duties
FARELF Far East Land Forces
FEAF Far East Air Forces
FEDSEC Far East Defence Secretariat
FO Foreign Office
FOM Federation of Malaya
xvi
Glossary of Abbreviations xvii
FPSA Five Power Staff Agency

FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States (Serial publication)
FTC FARELF Training Center
GHQ General Headquarters
GM Gurkha Museum
GOC General Officer Commanding
GR Gurkha Rifles
GSO General Staff Officer
HC High Commissioner
HKLF Hong Kong Land Forces
HKVDF Hong Kong Volunteer Defense Force
HMG His/Her Majesty’s Government
HMS His/Her Majesty’s Ship
HRH His Royal Highness
Inf Infantry
IOLR India Office Library and Records
IWM Imperial War Museum
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff (US)
JIC(FE) Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East)
JPS(FE) Joint Planning Staff (Far East)
KAR King’s African Rifles
KMT Kuomintang
KOYLI King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
LEP Locally Enlisted personnel
LHA Liddell-Hart Archives
MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group (US)
MCP Malayan Communist Party
MDAP Mutual Defense Assistance Program (US)
MELF Middle East Land Forces
MGBG Major-General, Brigade of Gurkhas
MoD Ministry of Defence
MRLA Malayan Races’ Liberation Army
MSS Malayan Security Service
NAM National Army Museum
NARA National Archives and Records Administration (US)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO Non-Commissioned Officer
NNC Nepalese National Congress
NSC National Security Council
OR Other Rank (enlisted man)
ORS Operational Research Section
PHPS Post Hostilities Planning Staff
PLA Peoples’ Liberation Army
PM Prime Minister
PRO Public Records Office
RA Royal Artillery
RAAF Royal Australian Air Force
RAF Royal Air Force
RAR Royal Australian Regiment
xviii Glossary of Abbreviations
Regt Regiment
RG Record Group
RM Royal Marines
RN Royal Navy
RNZAF Royal New Zealand Air Force
RTR Royal Tank Regiment
SAS Special Air Service
SCOSC Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee
SEAC South East Asia Command
SEACDT South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty
SEACOS South East Asia to Chiefs of Staff (classified cable)
SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization
SIS Secret Intelligence Service
SOE Special Operations Executive
SSC Secretary of State for the Colonies
SSCR Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations
SSFA Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
SSW Secretary of State for War
TA Territorial Army (reserves)
UK United Kingdom
USAF United States Air Force
USSW Under-Secretary of State for War
VCIGS Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff
WO War Office
1
Introduction
In the aftermath of the most destructive war in human history, Great

Britain faced the need to develop a viable postwar military strategy in
line with both its extensive imperial commitments and enfeebled econ-
omy. Looking beyond the immediate problems posed by occupational
and other post-hostilities duties, the British defense establishment
quickly identified the Soviet Union as the central threat to the coun-
try’s security. In 1947, it crafted a long-term strategy to deal with this
threat as well as smaller ones that might arise in less strategically vital
areas of the Commonwealth. But in 1950 the British were forced to
modify this strategy, following redeployment of substantial forces
to meet contingencies in Malaya, Hong Kong, and Korea and the
emergence of Communist China. Notwithstanding their grandiose
rhetoric about being a world power, successive British governments
accepted the country’s weakened state yet still succeeded in meeting
strategic requirements both abroad and closer to home. A thorough
examination of Britain’s Cold War military strategy in the Far East from
1947 to 1954 clearly shows that it was the period and place in which
Britain’s global strategy was tested, adjusted, and proven correct. This
study will also show how British Army Gurkhas were a central element
of this strategy.
The thesis of strategic sufficiency contradicts the conventional wisdom
about British military strategy in the early Cold War. Leading scholars
such as Paul Kennedy, Philip Darby, Nicholas Tarling, and Correlli
Barnett contend that postwar Britain suffered from ‘strategic overex-
tension’, and that this overextension was to some greater or lesser
degree responsible for Britain’s precipitate economic and military
decline.1 For example, Barnett has demonstrated in a convincing fash-
ion the ways in which the Labour government of 1945–50 squandered
1
2 British Army, Gurkhas and Cold War Strategy in FE, 1947–54
Britain’s opportunity for economic recovery by its insistence on carrying

out well-meaning but fiscally irresponsible social welfare programs.2 He
also criticizes what he sees as the disconnect between British military
strategy and resources, and argues that strategic ‘overstretch’ was part
of the cause of the economic difficulties. He attributes this disconnect
to an over-inflated self-image, and the belief of government officials in
a British-led Commonwealth as a ‘third world power’ rivaling the
United States and Soviet Union.3 Indeed, contemporaneous internal
government documents contain frequent references to Britain’s pres-
tige and maintenance of its place as a world power, prima facie
evidence to support Barnett’s criticisms.
Looking just at the decline of British power in Southeast Asia, Tarling
maintains that Britain’s postwar plans for the area were ‘unrealistic’
and more reminiscent of the ‘prosperous metropolitan power’ Britain
had once been rather than the ‘impoverished’ one it had become.4
Darby is more specifically critical of the military elements of British
postwar strategy. In his study of British defense policy east of Suez, he
states that ‘successive [postwar] governments showed a deep-seated
reluctance to cut commitments or to limit the scope of the overseas
military role’.5 He further claims that for the first two postwar decades
Britain’s defense policy was ‘out of phase’ with its colonial and foreign
policies.
These widely accepted views about British strategy need to be recon-
sidered in light of recent releases of declassified documents. Barnett
and Darby, for example, simply assert that Britain was strategically
overextended around the world and therefore needed to shed commit-
ments. According to these authors, Britain was overextended because
its forces were nearly fully deployed, it maintained high expenditures
on defense, and performed poorly economically. They assume that
maintaining Britain’s many overseas commitments only postponed
inevitable retrenchment and readjustment as a purely European power.
Darby, for example, argues that once India became independent, the
entire rationale for a British military presence in the Indian Ocean rim
largely disappeared, discounting the intrinsic strategic and economic
value of Middle East oil and the dollar earnings of Malaya and Hong
Kong to a destitute Britain. Besides the obvious determinism of such
assertions, they are also somewhat facile in the way they ignore the
fact that a country’s strategy-making élites operate in the context of a
cultural, historical, geographic, economic, bureaucratic, and political
heritage which both shapes and constrains their available options.6
Moreover, both Barnett’s and Darby’s works are skewed by the period of
Introduction 3
study and lack of access to sources, respectively. By focusing on the

period up to the outbreak of the Korean War, Barnett is unable to dis-
cern the difference between post-hostilities commitments and the
structure of the planned postwar defense structure. Nor does he take
proper account of British and Allied plans in the event of war with
Russia. Darby, by writing without benefit of recently opened documents,
was unaware of the classified content of British strategy and the constant
concern of officials for limiting Britain’s overseas defense liabilities.
Neither do the critics offer any framework in which to objectively
measure Britain’s strategic adjustment. In fact, none of them, including
Paul Kennedy, can even prove a causal relationship between military
strategy and British economic decline. This is because the reasons for
the relative decline lie chiefly in the realm of government financial
policies and budgets, of which defense constituted an average of only
25 per cent during the years 1948–54.7 Clearly, what is needed is some
analytical means to assess the sufficiency of British military strategy.
In his study of the challenge of strategic adjustment for great powers,
Charles Kupchan has developed the needed analytical framework for
assessing declining and rising powers’ responses to changed circum-
stances.8 For a declining imperial power like postwar Britain, its deci-
sions to deter or accommodate adversaries in both its strategic core and
periphery depended on the extent to which élites perceived either a
low or a high ‘vulnerability’ for the metropole (see Table 1.1). For
Kupchan, low vulnerability equates to strategic sufficiency. It occurs
when ‘decision makers calculate that their own resources, in combina-
tion with those of their allies, are sufficient to cope with threats to the
metropole’.9 In conditions of perceived low vulnerability, a declining
power’s élites will engage in power balancing in the core and seek
accords and alliances in the periphery in order to facilitate retrench-
ment in the core.10 These are the circumstances Kupchan believes
lead to timely adjustment to international change. In conditions of
perceived high vulnerability, or strategic deficiency, the declining
power’s élites become overly concerned with reputation and prestige
relative to strategic and economic considerations. Consequently, they
will appease adversaries in the core while they indiscriminately defend
positions in the periphery, often with disastrous results.11 Those
who believe Britain was overextended strategically in the first two
postwar decades would no doubt view it as being in a position of high
vulnerability.
Among the case studies Kupchan uses to illustrate his analysis of
strategic adjustment are Britain’s different responses to the German
Table 1.1 Declining power’s beliefs about interacting with adversaries12
Core Periphery
Low Vulnerability (Strategic Sufficiency) Deter Accommodate

High Vulnerability (Strategic Deficiency) Accommodate Deter
threat in the pre-1914 and pre-1939 periods. Kupchan contends that in

both instances the German threat should have obliged Britain to reori-
ent its military focus on the defense of Western Europe, or Britain’s
‘strategic core’. He asserts that in the years leading up to the Great War,
Britain successfully perceived the threat from Germany and shifted
both its navy and army accordingly. Overseas garrisons were reduced to
the bare minimum, an expeditionary force prepared, and warships
released from the east through alliance with Japan. Conversely, in the
last few years before the start of World War II, Britain waited too long
to build alliances in Europe and shift its resources from preparation for
war with Japan in the ‘strategic periphery’ to war with Germany in the
strategic core.13
As this book shows, Kupchan’s analytical concept also applies to
Britain’s postwar strategic dilemma. In this period, the only real mili-
tary threat to Britain’s survival came from Soviet forces located in
Europe. The British believed that the Soviet Union was easily capable
of overrunning Western Europe and the Middle East and, once its eco-
nomic recovery was completed at the end of the second postwar five-
year plan (that is, 1956), it would probably initiate war with the West.
For the Chiefs of Staff and the Cabinet Defence Committee, the Soviet
threat manifestly required protection of the strategic core. They there-
fore crafted a strategy based upon Britain’s known weaknesses vis-à-vis
the Soviets and chose the only option they believed open to them: a
strategic bombing campaign, using weapons of mass destruction, with
a conscript-based, large reserve army designed to fight a delaying
action in Europe and the Middle East. Other than in the Middle East,
Imperial forces overseas were to be kept at the absolute minimum and
the Dominions and colonies were to be encouraged to accept responsi-
bility for local defense. Indeed, with the granting of independence to
India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon, and withdrawal from Japan,
Palestine, and Greece, Britain had eliminated a substantial number of
onerous defense commitments. Moreover, despite pretentious rhetoric
about the British-led Commonwealth being a power equal to the
United States and Soviet Union, the defense establishment in London
Introduction 5
accepted the fact that only through collective security arrangements

and the backing of American economic, military, and atomic might
could Britain hope to survive World War III. By 1949, with the signing
of the Brussels and Washington treaties, Britain had succeeded in laying
the foundations upon which a viable deterrent and defensive strategy
could be mounted.
Unfortunately, Britain’s defense orientation on the strategic core ini-
tially did not make sufficient provision for vicissitudes on the periphery.
The continuation of postwar occupation duties in Austria, Trieste, and
former Italian territories was one problem, but far more damaging were
the effects of unforeseen contingencies in the Far East. Insurrection in
Malaya and the emergence of Communist China as a military threat to
Hong Kong, Korea, and Southeast Asia caused Britain to divert a signif-
icant portion of its scarce military resources from the core to the
periphery. In fact, by tripling the number of Imperial troops in the Far
East, the British government not only expended its only combat
reserves, it also retarded the postwar reorganization of the British Army
as a force for fighting in Western Europe.
As newly released documents show, the British government was
extremely concerned about new military deployments to the Far East
in 1948–50. Contemporary strategy and defense policy papers reveal
persistent worries over the diversion of military resources to what was
supposed to be a minor theater, and the concomitant effect it had on
preparations for war with the Soviet Union. For example, when in the
spring of 1950 the need for further reinforcements for Malaya became
apparent, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal
Sir William Slim, cautioned that the campaign could ‘devolve into a
bottomless pit, devouring all our resources, and playing straight into
Russia’s hands’.14 Based in part upon suggestions from defense officials
in Singapore, the Chiefs of Staff revised their original strategy in order
to give first priority to winning the Cold War. As they reasoned, the
Communists’ employment of the ‘cold war technique’ of sabotage,
subversion, and insurrection constituted the initial preparations for
hot war, and if Britain did not meet the ‘cold war’ challenge the hot
war was as good as lost. Yet a clear focus was kept on the defense of the
core: the rearmament program of 1950–54 was directed first and fore-
most toward the defense of Western Europe, not the Middle or Far East.
Thus, although increased military requirements would remain fairly
constant until the mid-1960s, in 1950 the British were to set firm lim-
its on further Far East deployments. The number of British troops in
the Far East began to drop throughout the early 1950s, and by the end
of 1954 the number of British units assigned to FARELF was only slightly
higher than before the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency. The British
made up the deficiency with Gurkha, colonial, and Dominion troops,
evidence that earlier plans to share the burden of Commonwealth
defense finally bore fruit. Also, with the special exception of Korea, the
British refused direct military involvement in areas outside their own
dependent territories. They declined repeated American and French
requests for military intervention in Indochina precisely because they
knew they had reached their own military limits vis-à-vis the defense of
the West. Furthermore, they succeeded in covering their Far Eastern
commitments with collective security arrangements. They obtained
American assurances of military support for Hong Kong; American,
Australian, and New Zealand military guarantees for the defense of
Malaya; and American backing for a collective defense of Southeast
Asia. Together with a reduction of forces in the Middle East, the effec-
tive matching of strategy to resources in the Far East permitted Britain’s
Conservative government to commit to the stationing of a corps of
four combat divisions and a tactical air force in Germany as its contri-
bution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In sum, the
British had achieved strategic sufficiency by the beginning of 1955.
Sources
Published material on postwar British military strategy in the Far East is

scant. With the exception of a doctoral dissertation on the defense of
Malaya,15 what studies that do exist on British military strategy in the
Far East are all seriously limited in one respect or another. Darby’s
British Defence Policy East of Suez 1948–1971 was the standard work for
more than 20 years, but it only dealt with strategy in its most general
sense and has not worn well with the subsequent release of various
government documents. Richard Rosecrance’s ground-breaking work
on postwar British strategy has likewise suffered as a result of archival
releases, although it remains an important work on the subject.16 Most
other works that touch on the Far East and strategy have tended to
confine themselves either to government foreign policy or to accounts
of the Malayan campaign, the latter subject being the focus of a large
body of literature.17 Only recently have authors essayed works evaluat-
ing British strategy in the Far East. The three most notable are Karl
Hack’s chapter on ‘South East Asia and British strategy, 1944–1951,’
David Lee’s article on Australia’s role in Far East defense strategy, and
Malcolm Murfett’s book on the Royal Navy and Far East defense
Introduction 7
policy.18 All are excellent works which benefited from access to official
documents, but none address the central issue of strategic sufficiency
and the fulfillment of strategic objectives.
None of these studies addresses the pivotal role played by the British
Defence Coordination Committee, Far East (BDCC(FE)) or its members
in formulating and implementing both regional and global strategy.
This Singapore-based organization was an interlocutory body between
the operational demands of field commanders and the parameters of
global strategy established by the Chiefs of Staff and Cabinet Defence
Committees in London (see Figure 1.1). The BDCC(FE) consisted of the
three service Commanders-in-Chief (C-in-C) and the Commissioner-
General for Southeast Asia, who chaired the committee. This latter
post, held by Malcolm MacDonald from 1948 to 1955, was a unique
Imperial position with a similarly unique dual chain of command to
both the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office. Neither MacDonald
nor the BDCC(FE) had direct executive or budgetary authorities, so the
three theater commanders were left to implement the committee’s
decisions on their own.
The three commanders formed collectively the Commanders-in-
Chief Committee, Far East – the CIC(FE) – that was served by joint
planning and intelligence staffs.19 There was no overall theater com-
mander, however, as the Chiefs of Staff insisted that the wartime posi-
tion of ‘supreme’ (that is, joint) commander be abolished when the
Allies’ South East Asia Command (SEAC) disbanded in November
1946.20 Nevertheless, by dint of both personality and military responsi-
bility, the various Cs-in-C of FARELF, who served during 1948–54,
dominated military discussions in Singapore with a consequent effect
on decisions in London.21
The first FARELF C-in-C (1947–49) was General Sir Neil Ritchie, who
as a major-general was the hapless Eighth Army commander who lost
Tobruk to the Germans. He nonetheless went on to be a successful
corps commander in Normandy and Northwest Europe, and ended his
career in the prestigious position of head of the British Army Staff of
the British Joint Services Mission in Washington (1949–51). His succes-
sor, General Sir John Harding (1949–51), is arguably the most impor-
tant of the FARELF commanders and one of the British Army’s greatest
twentieth-century leaders. A successful division and corps commander
during the war, he commanded FARELF during the outbreak of the
Korean War. He then went on to command the British Army of the
Rhine (BAOR) before succeeding Field Marshal Slim as CIGS in 1952. As
he proved to be in the BDCC(FE), Harding as the head of the Army was
a dominating figure who put his FARELF experience to good use during
the denouement of the First Indochina War. Harding was followed by
General Sir Charles Keightley (1951–53), another successful wartime
commander who had been tapped to lead British Commonwealth
forces in the invasion of Japan. Following his Far East stint, Keightley
commanded Middle East Land Force (MELF) during both the Cyprus
insurgency and the Suez crisis, the latter for which he had the misfor-
tune of being made a scapegoat. The final C-in-C during the period of
the study was General Sir Charles Loewen (1953–56), a Canadian who
joined the British Army during World War I and stayed on until he
retired as Adjutant-General in 1959.
Given the importance of these commanders to the development and
implementation of British military strategy in the Far East, it seems odd
that their role has only ever been addressed in passing by other works.
Dominick Graham has observed that most scholarship on military
CABINET
DEFENCE
COMMITTEE
CHIEFS OF STAFF
COMMITTEE
JOINT PLANNING (COSC) JOINT INTELLIGENCE
STAFF COMMITTEE
(JPS) (JIC)
BDCC(FE)
CIC(FE)
JPS(FE) JIC(FE)
FAR EAST FAR EAST

FAR EAST FLEET LAND FORCES AIR FORCE
(FARELF) (FEAF)
Figure 1.1 London–Singapore Central Defence Organization

Introduction 9
activities tends to bypass the operational, or theater level, of command.

He correctly contends that this level of command provides one of the
more fruitful areas of investigation, since it is there that senior com-
manders must reconcile the functional demands of their subordinate
commanders with national level political and strategic directives.22 As
will be seen in later chapters, the C-in-C FARELF also proves to be an
important figure in the formulation of both theater and national
strategies.
Approach
With such a paucity of directly relevant secondary sources, I have

relied to a great extent on the archival material now open for study in
various British repositories. This approach had the advantage of per-
mitting deductive analysis based on empirical evidence of what the
British knew about the military situation in the Far East and the rest of
the world, what resources were available to them, and how they chose
to apply them. Archival material therefore forms the basis of research
for this study, and required the evaluation of more than 3500 files and
books held in 62 collections housed in eight different repositories and
ten different libraries. It is important to note, however, that even today
a number of files remain closed to the public, while others, theoreti-
cally open, are ‘Retained by Department under S.3(4) of the Public
Records Act’. The Ministry of Defence politely refused my application
to see some 70 ‘retained’ files on intelligence, Hong Kong and decep-
tion planning, although some were subsequently made available to me
in the Public Records Office in early 1997. To the extent possible, I sup-
plemented the archival material with interviews and correspondence
with military staff officers and field commanders. Lastly, there are the
private papers of the commanders themselves. Both the National Army
Museum and Imperial War Museum hold portions of Field Marshal
Harding’s papers, while through the good graces of the Keightley,
Loewen, and Templer families I was either permitted access to, or given
copies of, relevant documents and publications.
From these sources emerges a complex picture in which strategy was
dictated not only by the locus of various contingencies and the needs
of the strategic core, but also by the effects of manpower limitations.
Hence, the prominence of the Gurkhas of Nepal in this story, for they
provided the nucleus of Britain’s fighting forces in the Far East and had
a central role in strategic war plans. Moreover, they constituted the
only all-regular force in an army otherwise over-burdened with the

training and transport of conscript soldiers.
Chapters 2 and 3 recount the formulation of Britain’s first postwar
strategy, ‘Future Defence Policy’, its relationship to the Far East, and
the reorganization of the postwar Army as a conscript-based reserve
force. Here I address the transfer of the Gurkhas from the Indian Army
to the British Army and their intended roles in Southeast Asia and the
Middle East. Chapters 4 and 5 cover the British military response to
the Malayan Emergency, the presumed Communist Chinese threat to
Hong Kong, British reinforcements, and the effect these contingencies
had on both the Army and strategy. Chapter 6 begins with an examina-
tion of the development of the Cold War strategy and its successive iter-
ations. Chapters 7 and 8 discuss the subsequent course of events in
Malaya and Hong Kong and the impact Chinese involvement in the
Korean and Indochina wars had on British military strategy. Chapters 9
and 10 discuss the development of contingency plans to defend Malaya
in the event of Chinese aggression and British attempts to limit their
strategic liability vis-à-vis Indochina and Southeast Asia. The concluding
chapter provides an encompassing view of the material in the context
of both the thesis of strategic sufficiency and of developments in
Borneo and Vietnam in the 1960s.
2
‘Future Defence Policy’: the Far
East as Strategic Backwater,
1945–48
Introduction
Initial British postwar strategy was predicated on the assumption that

Russia was the only power that had both the capability and the intent
to threaten Britain’s survival both as a nation and as leader of the
Commonwealth. The British government believed that Russia, unless
deterred, intended to go to war with the West soon after completion of
its postwar recovery plan in 1956, and that before then the possibility
that Russia and the West could stumble into war because of ‘miscalcula-
tion’ could not be ruled out. With no firm assurance of American help in
a war with Russia prior to the Washington Treaty of 1949, the only hope
the British had of withstanding a Russian onslaught was by constructing
a Western European defense alliance. They thought that leadership of
that alliance would flow not only from Britain’s political pre-eminence
in Europe, but also from the strength it drew from the men and
resources of the Commonwealth. In pursuing this vision as the leader of
a ‘Third Power’, the Chiefs of Staff and Defence Committee pursued a
defense policy that sought to spread more of the Commonwealth
defense burden to the most advanced Dominions, itself a tacit admission
of weakness. Given certain geographical and technological realities and
the strategic predilections of the Chiefs of Staff, the British strategy for
fighting Russia relied upon on an air offensive against Soviet targets
launched from bases in Britain, the Middle East, and, if possible,
Northwest India.
The Far East did not figure into this strategy except as a source of tin,
rubber, oil, and rice. Although defense policy called for a Gurkha
infantry division to be based in Malaya, its wartime role was to fight in
the Middle East, which until 1948 the Chiefs expected to be the main
11
theater for Army operations. Locally raised forces and police in British
Southeast Asia would provide internal security and local defense against
lesser threats in the absence of the Gurkhas. With Japan vanquished
and China ostensibly an ally, the Far East was supposed to be a strategic
backwater in a global war against Russia. Communist insurrections in
Southeast Asia, the defeat of Nationalist China, and the Korean War
would change both strategy and policy. But none of this was apparent
in 1945.
Britain at war’s end

Britain emerged from World War II as ‘the world’s principal debtor
nation’.1 It had sustained its war effort through aid from Canada and
other Dominions, by selling its overseas assets, and, most importantly,
through American Lend–Lease and war loans. Yet the end of the war
brought no respite. As depicted in Figure 2.1, the combination of perma-
nent and temporary post-war military commitments was staggering,
although only a proportion of these involved the Far East. With the elec-
tion of the Labour government in July 1945, Britain’s financial health
was further burdened by ambitious and expensive social welfare pro-
grams. Within two years of its election, the government of Clement
Attlee had passed legislation nationalizing the coal, gas, electricity,
telecommunications, air, and inland transport industries. Besides promis-
ing a massive home building program, the Attlee government also passed
a law creating a ‘cradle to grave’ national insurance program as well as
one for national health insurance. In 1945, the adviser to the Treasury,
John Maynard Keynes, warned the Cabinet of the dangerous financial
situation and of the need for radical policy changes to correct it, but
Attlee’s government proved incapable of balancing available resources
against presumed vital strategic needs. The twin pursuits of what
Barnett calls ‘New Jerusalem’ and great power appears to have hastened
Britain’s decline and squandered its opportunity to re-industrialize and
compete in the postwar global economy.2
When President Truman terminated Lend–Lease on 21 August 1945,
just one week after the Japanese capitulation, Britain faced an immediate
requirement to pay dollars for numerous goods then in the pipeline from
America.3 A balance of payments gap resulted from a fourfold increase in
the cost of critical imports, while overseas investments had dropped from
£175 to £73 million since 1938. The worldwide food shortage that
existed at war’s end further drove up import prices, as did the increased
cost of various raw materials. Unfortunately, the value of British manu-
factured goods was not keeping pace with increased material costs.
Great Britain 175 000 India 58 700
Germany 133 000 Burma 11 850
Austria and Trieste 40 000 Malaya 21 400
Greece 25 000 Hong Kong 2 900
Middle East 127 750 Japan 3 000
East and West Africa 13 200
= Minor Garrison = Major Command
Figure 2.1 Distribution of the British Army as at 31 December 1946

Source: DO(46)66, Annex II, COS(46)130(O), ‘Call-Up of the Forces in the Transitional Period’, 10 May 46, CAB 131/2. All figures are estimates, and
those for Greece, Trieste, Hong Kong and Japan are based on extrapolation from other sources.
13
Keynes warned that only by raising exports by 75 per cent above pre-
war levels could the international balance of payments be righted.4 He
therefore recommended drastic reductions in overseas expenditures and
a loan of US$5 billion from the United States in order to tide over the
cost of losing Lend-Lease. The Cabinet, wishing to retain Britain’s posi-
tion as a world power while minimizing the sacrifices associated with
the measures proposed by Keynes, negotiated a loan with the United
States, but did not significantly decrease Britain’s overseas or defense
expenditures.5 When the parties completed negotiations in 1945, the
Americans agreed to loan only US$3.75 billion and insisted Britain make
its Sterling currency convertible beginning one year from Congressional
approval of the loan in July 1946.6 As the deadline for convertibility
drew near, there was a huge run on Britain’s dollar reserves (the so-called
‘convertibility crisis’) and the bulk of the American loan was soon
squandered in efforts to shore up Britain’s dollar reserves.
Both the unanticipated continuation of post-hostilities military com-
mitments and the government’s inability to control the Chiefs of Staff
and the Service departments exacerbated the balance of payments crisis.7
In its first few years of existence, the minuscule new Ministry of Defence
and its Secretary of State, Albert Alexander, proved largely incapable of
hammering out an integrated defense budget from the Services’ separate
submissions.8 Thus despite Alexander’s February 1947 guidance to draw
up a defense program within a budget of £600 million for the next
fiscal year, the Chiefs and Service ministers instead submitted programs
that came to a combined total nearer to £900 million.9 In what would
become a familiar pattern, Attlee and his Chancellors of the Exchequer
were often at odds with Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, Alexander,
and the Chiefs of Staff over such things as the speed of the reduction
of wartime forces and the general tenets of strategy, the former group
calling for reductions and retrenchment, the latter arguing for continued
world presence.10 Only after months of rancorous debate did the Cabinet
finally approve a compromise budget of £697 million.11 Yet Keynes
considered even this reduction insufficient to pay for Labour’s social and
industrial programs. Instead of dropping defense to £500 million – the
amount estimated by the wartime coalition Cabinet – defense expendi-
tures in the first two years after the war continued to run more than
three times the fiscal year 1939 level, and nearly double the fiscal year
1940 level.12
Since the government was unable to reduce its post-hostilities respon-
sibilities quickly enough to pay for its electoral promises for the new
welfare state, it had to pay a hefty price for both. The most noticeable
The Far East as Strategic Backwater 15
effect of carrying both burdens was the series of austerity measures intro-
duced from 1946. That summer the Labour Government introduced
bread rationing, a sacrifice that had not even been imposed during the
war.13 The winter of 1946/47 proved exceptionally cold, which exacer-
bated an existing fuel shortage by preventing transport of coal and
causing higher demand.14 Over the next two years, the government
further reduced food rations to a level significantly below those
of wartime.15 Petrol was rationed, as were clothes, newsprint, and
tobacco.16
Labour Government foreign policy

Because Attlee was certain that the advent of the atomic age meant
that the world faced ‘a naked choice between world cooperation and
world destruction,’ his government’s early foreign policy stressed
reliance on the United Nations as the best hope for an enduring
peace.17 But Soviet mischief in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Persia,
Korea, and elsewhere quickly persuaded the government that Russia
had returned to ‘the pure doctrine of Marx–Lenin–Stalinism’ and was
bent on confrontation with the West.18 By at least as early as April
1946, senior Foreign Office officials were convinced of what the Chiefs
of Staff had already anticipated: that the Russians had ‘launched an
offensive against Social Democracy and against [the United
Kingdom] … which they must regard as the leader of Social
Democracy’.19 Nevertheless, Attlee did not wish to unnecessarily pro-
voke Russian paranoia or the ire of Labour backbenchers and fellow-
travelers who opposed a get-tough policy against the Soviets.20 Thus,
although the government began to take a tougher diplomatic line with
the Soviets and even initiated a counter-propaganda effort,21 it was
only in response to various Russian acts of implacability that a more
forceful policy of resistance emerged.22 Although Attlee still hoped for
some level of political accommodation with Russia as late as January
1947, by the summer the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence
had accepted that the ‘only possible enemy is Russia’.23
By 1947 the Labour government directed its foreign policy toward
the opposition of Soviet imperialism by ‘building [Britain] up as THE
great European Power’ in order to win greater respect from, and
defense collaboration with, the United States.24 In the first instance
this policy required Britain to lead Western Europe toward greater
cooperation in economic and defense matters, an effort that eventually
bore fruit as the Brussels Pact and Western Union (later renamed the
Western European Union).25 Britain’s presumed source of strength as
the leader of the Third Power would be the manpower and resources of
the Commonwealth, whose members would theoretically act in strategic
concert with direction from an imperial defense establishment based in
London. Bevin’s biographer and other scholars have argued that the
Foreign Secretary pursued the notion of a Third Power only as a means
to prove to the United States that Europe was willing to defend itself
and was therefore worthy of American aid.26 In fact, at least as early
as February 1946, Bevin confided to Attlee that his intention was to pur-
sue a security arrangement ‘based upon a very close understanding
between ourselves and the Americans’.27 By the end of the year, Bevin,
with some help from the new CIGS, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery,
had succeeded in obtaining American agreement on a variety of
defense matters, the most important being combined American-British-
Canadian (ABC) long-term military planning for global war against the
Soviet Union.28 Yet it was the Soviet-backed coup in Czechoslovakia in
February 1948 that finally galvanized the entire Cabinet into resolute
action on the political, economic, military, and propaganda fronts.29
Labour Government colonial policy

In its colonial policy, the Labour Government followed through on its
long-stated aim of moving India to self-governance. Negotiations
toward that end had begun even before the war ended, and on 20
February 1947, Attlee announced June 1948 as the latest possible date
by which the British would leave India.30 As the security situation dete-
riorated and Muslim separatists led by Mohammed Jinnah insisted on
partition, the last Viceroy, Admiral Louis Mountbatten, pushed forward
the date for hand-over to August 1947. Once Britain agreed to acceler-
ated independence for the ‘jewel in the crown’, it was almost inevitable
that it would also grant early independence to Burma and Ceylon as
well. These developments worried the Chiefs of Staff. They saw access
to India’s material and human resources as strategically essential to
fighting a future war with Russia, especially since they believed that
from its northwestern air bases future long-range bombers would be
able to attack Soviet industrial areas. The Chiefs therefore saw retention
of both India and Pakistan in the Commonwealth as an important
component of strategy. Indeed, this view drove British policy to the
extent that they hastened independence in part as an attempt to win
favor with the new national governments and thereby maintain access
to the northwestern air bases.
Following the independence of India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon,
the government officially stated its colonial policy as being ‘to guide
the Colonial Territories to responsible self-government within the

Commonwealth in conditions that ensure to the people concerned
both a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression from any
quarter’.31 British long-range plans for Southeast Asia envisioned a
single dominion grouping the various Malay states, the Straits Settle-
ments (that is, Singapore, Labuan, Penang, and Malacca), Sarawak,
Brunei, and North Borneo (Sabah).32 The move toward self-government
in Southeast Asia began in 1946 with implementation of a plan to cre-
ate a ‘Malayan Union’ that denuded the Malay states’ sultans of much
of their power and gave political equality to Chinese and other ethnic
groups. This proved highly unpopular with Malay political leaders in part
because the Japanese occupiers had heightened already tense relations
between ethnic Chinese and Malays. At war’s end there were several
inter-ethnic massacres that, combined with a fear of Chinese political
domination based on the large population in Singapore, effectively
scuttled early attempts to integrate Malaya with predominately
Chinese Singapore and promote equal citizenship. In a major set-back
to their plans, Malay political resistance obliged the British in February
1948 to replace the Union with a weaker Federation, restore much of
the sultans’ sovereignty, and restrict non-ethnic Malay citizenship.
They did carry out other reforms, however. Both Sarawak and North
Borneo passed from their private rulers to the Crown in 1946 and
became formal colonies in an effort to speed up their economic, social
and political development to the extent necessary to incorporate them
eventually into a proposed dominion of Southeast Asia.33 Penang and
Malacca joined the Federation of Malaya and Singapore became a sepa-
rate Crown Colony.
Labour Government defense policy

The Labour Government’s defense policy developed in concert with its
foreign policy, namely, from initial support of the United Nations as the
guarantor of peace to a more hardboiled policy of resistance to, and
deterrence of, Soviet adventurism. Still, the Cabinet Defence Committee
debated defense policy and budgets for nearly two years before finally
agreeing on the basic tenets of strategy, policy, and force structure. Its
temporizing is not very surprising if one considers the massive political
and military revolutions underway at that time. Furthermore, the
unsettled geo-political landscape and extensive post-hostilities missions
obscured what size and shape the postwar armed forces should take. On
one thing the government and military generally agreed: that only the
United States and Russia had the power to threaten Britain. A future
war with the US was ‘unthinkable,’ but with Communist Russia it was
not only possible, but from 1956 on, it was thought probable. By that
year, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) believed Russia would have
recovered from the war and gained the necessary strategic positions
from which to launch the apocalyptic battle with Western capitalism.
World War III was not inevitable, however, as long as the West devel-
oped forces sufficient to deter the Soviets by the time they were ready
to contemplate going to war.34
If war came despite the best efforts of the Western Allies to prevent it,
the JIC thought the Russians would inevitably use ‘weapons of mass
destruction’ (that is, chemical, biological, and atomic) against the
British Isles. The Chiefs initially thought guided anti-aircraft missiles
and artillery would be sufficient protection against long-range Soviet
bombers, but once the Tizard Committee and the Chiefs of Staff Anti-
Aircraft Sub-Committee debunked that assumption, the only viable
protection against such an attack was thought to be a British deterrent
force capable of striking the Soviet heartland with its own atomic,
chemical, and biological weapons.35 Preliminary steps toward the
development of Britain’s own atomic bomb had begun in 1945, and in
January 1947 six senior ministers, including Attlee and Bevin, decided
to proceed with the manufacture of atomic weapons and a purpose-
built force of long-range strategic bombers.36 It would, however, be
some years before Britain would have sufficient stocks of atomic
weapons and the means to deliver them. Consequently, the government
also pursued a research and production program for both chemical and
biological weapons for use in a war that might occur before the nuclear
force was ready.37
Global strategy
Post-hostilities planning
Despite the haste with which the Labour Government tried to draw
down forces in the face of what it hoped would be temporary commit-
ments in places like Trieste and Austria, it nonetheless wished to avoid
the sort of military unpreparedness which preceded the just-concluded
war. There was to be no repeat of hollow forces or of appeasement to
dictators. But to what end should Britain direct its strategy, and against
what threat? At least a year before the end of the war, the Chiefs of Staff
had concluded Russia would emerge as the principal post-war threat to
the British Commonwealth. Driven by the implacable ideology of
‘Marx–Lenin–Stalinism’ and supported by a massive military build-up,
the Soviet Union had begun an ‘offensive against Social Democracy and
against [Britain]’.38 While the JIC believed the Russians unlikely to pur-
posely start a war before 1956, it also believed that the Russians probably
intended to start a war sometime thereafter. In the meantime, it was pos-
sible that war could break out inadvertently through miscalculation by
one side or the other. Whatever the case, the British government believed
that the Soviet Union would seek to create instability and use the ‘cold
war technique’ against targets of opportunity. It was upon these assump-
tions that the Chiefs of Staff based British postwar military strategy.
In the postulated war, the British believed the primary military
threat to be the ability of Russian ground forces to easily overrun weak
Allied occupation forces in Europe and Commonwealth forces in the
Middle East. Possession of Western Europe would put the Russians in a
position to bomb the British Isles with near impunity, while seizure of
the Middle East would threaten Britain’s lines of communication to
much of the Commonwealth and deny it vital oil supplies and bases
from which to launch an air offensive. There also existed a great fear of
the Russians developing a chemical or biological weapons capability
from captured German sources, and the JIC assumed that the Russians
would have their own atomic weapons by the mid-1950s. Moreover,
until the signing of the Brussels Pact in March 1948 and the North
Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, Britain in 1947 had to contemplate fighting
Russia with only Commonwealth assistance.
The Director of Plans drafted a paper based upon these assumptions
for the Chiefs’ of Staff use in a conference of Dominion prime minis-
ters.39 Entitled ‘Strategic Position of the British Commonwealth,’ the
paper established the basic tenets of British military strategy for at least
the next six years. Since Britain could not hope to stop a Russian
advance in Europe, the only means of taking offensive action against
Russia would be from the air.40 The only bases to which the British had
or might have access in war, and from which they could hit targets in
the Soviet Union, were located in the United Kingdom, the Middle
East, and Northwest India. Possession of, or access to these areas also
accorded with a self-image of the British-led Commonwealth as a
world power, capable of standing up to the Russians and thus deserv-
ing of American support. According to the Chiefs, the basis of the
Commonwealth’s strength were four main support areas ‘which con-
tain concentrations of man-power, industrial potential or sources of
food or raw material, such that they are essential to our war effort.’41
These the Chiefs of Staff identified as the United Kingdom, North and
South America, Sub-Saharan and East Africa, and Australia and New
Zealand. They assumed eventual access to the resources of the United

States, but not military assistance.42 The Chiefs did not consider the
Far East a main support area, but they did hope to eventually utilize
India as one once it became more politically stable and amenable to
such a role.43 Attlee’s acceptance of this report on January 13 con-
firmed the fundamentals of British defense strategy as the security of,
and launching an air offensive from, bases in Britain and the Middle
East, and of maintaining the sea lines of communication between
Britain and its Commonwealth support areas.44
The Chiefs were aware that the idea of main support areas might sug-
gest to some that the armed forces could afford in peacetime to with-
draw from all areas other than those deemed essential to strategy.45
This they understood had a certain logical appeal based on known
manpower shortages and the costs associated with maintaining a large
military.46 Nonetheless, the Chiefs rejected the idea of retrenchment,
for if the Commonwealth ‘move[d] out in peacetime, Russia will move
in, pursuing her policy of extending her influence by all means short of
major war [that is, ‘cold war’] to further strategic areas’. Consequently, a
‘policy of concentrating upon the defence of our main support areas
would result in adding to the Russian-controlled area and therefore to
the war-making potential at her disposal’. Specifically, the Chiefs
believed that all of Europe, northwest and northeast Africa, and the
Middle East would fall under Russian control, thereby threatening or
cutting off vital sea and air lines of communication and reducing the
industrial potential of Britain. It was therefore of paramount impor-
tance to deny these ‘hiatus’ areas to the Russians in peace, as well as to
delay their capture in war, a strategic vision which viewed control of
territory as a zero-sum game. They even viewed areas that protected
the approach to the main support areas as being of strategic impor-
tance. Thus the Middle East served as defensive depth for the African
area, as well as being a point from which to attack industrial and oil-
producing areas of the southern USSR. Southeast Asia merited only two
sentences: ‘The strategic importance of this area is considerable in
relation to the defence of both India and Australia. We should there-
fore do our utmost to preserve our position there.’ The Chiefs were
aware such an all-encompassing strategy might attract criticism of
overextension. They noted that British political influence in the areas
of strategic importance did not necessarily translate into a need for
armed forces. Effective political and economic policies might suffice in
many instances, although the Chiefs’ language was hardly encouraging
about the prospects of success.47
Alanbrooke’s strategic concept

In support of the initial draft strategy, the CIGS, Field Marshal Lord
Alanbrooke, proposed a Commonwealth defense scheme of ‘inter-linked
Defence Zones encircling the globe’.48 The zones were drawn so as to
make one Dominion responsible for the local defense of its related main
support area and adjacent strategic areas, as well as contingency plan-
ning for the zone. Each zone would have a defense committee compris-
ing the relevant Dominion’s chiefs of staff committee and political
representatives of the British government. In order to facilitate defense
coordination, Britain would exchange joint staff missions with each
Dominion, while an Imperial Chiefs of Staff Committee in London
would oversee the entirety of Commonwealth defense.49 Alanbrooke
proposed four such zones: the Middle East (with South African involve-
ment); India (comprising India, Ceylon, and Burma); South East Asia;
and a special zone for Australia and New Zealand. In response to a sug-
gestion from Attlee to merge the South East Asian and Australian zones,
the CIGS responded that the Chiefs of Staff had contemplated such a
merger but given ongoing operations in South East Asia Command,
they considered the area should be kept separate for the time being.50
Alanbrooke’s defense scheme would have gone a long way to provid-
ing relief to the British Army, as it required Dominions and colonies to
provide a much larger share of the overall defense burden. A lessened
requirement for Imperial troops to garrison overseas posts would per-
mit Britain to reduce safely the number of men in the armed forces and
to build a strategic reserve in Britain for deployment wherever needed.
British appeals fell largely on deaf ears until the Korean War spurred a
response from key countries, after which Britain began to realize
economies from a Commonwealth defense scheme.51 When the Attlee
government first presented it at the Dominion Prime Ministers’
Conference of April–May 1946, none of the Dominion representatives
was willing to conclude any definite political agreements on defense,
or to otherwise lessen Britain’s burden.52
‘Future Defence Policy’

For nearly two centuries, Britain had relied on the Indian Army to
shoulder most of its Imperial defense responsibilities east of Suez and
in parts of Africa. Thus Attlee’s announcement in February 1947 that
Britain would quit India no later than June 1948 completely upset the
calculus upon which Alanbrooke had based his 1946 Commonwealth
defense strategy. Alanbrooke later commented in his diary that
with ‘the loss of India and Burma, the keystone of the arch of our
Commonwealth Defence was lost, and our Imperial Defence crashed’.53

The future use of India’s resources for Commonwealth defense, particu-
larly her manpower, could not be assured in the political situation then
obtaining. Indeed, even the inclusion of separate Muslim and Hindu
states in the Commonwealth could not be guaranteed at that point.
Alanbrooke’s replacement as CIGS, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery,
complained bitterly that the Cabinet had not consulted the Chiefs of
Staff on this vital issue, leaving the military scrambling to pick up the
pieces of its shattered strategy.54
At the end of May the Chiefs of Staff produced a new strategy paper
entitled ‘Future Defence Policy’.55 It was an articulation and expansion
of Alanbrooke’s defence strategy, the principal tenets of which Attlee
approved in January (see above). The report was broken into two parts,
the first being ‘Commonwealth Defence Policy,’ the second on ‘The
Strategy of Commonwealth Defence’. The paper cast its gaze on the
future and largely ignored the existing, but assumed to be temporary,
post-hostilities commitments. Thus, the Chiefs’ intention was to fashion
the armed forces to suit a strategy designed to fight a possible war in
1956, not to develop strategy in terms of what was affordable in
1947.56 The Chiefs explicitly stated, however, that the ‘supreme object
of British policy is to prevent war, provided this can be done without
prejudicing our vital interests’. The report simply asserted that Britain
remained a ‘Great Power’ with military responsibilities to the Common-
wealth, the United Nations, and to herself. The Chiefs did not put
much faith in the ability of the United Nations to prevent aggression
from another great power, and therefore concluded that ‘the only
effective deterrent to a potential aggressor is tangible evidence of our
intention and ability to withstand attack and to hit back immediately’.
This would be possible only by long-range air attacks with weapons of
mass destruction launched from bases in the United Kingdom, the
Middle East, and Northwest India. The nature of new weapons and
delivery vehicles would compress time and increase the rapidity with
which Britain would require assistance from the Commonwealth and
the United States. It also meant that standing forces would have to be
kept at a much higher state of readiness. Such a stance also necessi-
tated the maintenance of forces sufficient to deter aggression and
defend national interests, as well as the maintenance of war reserves of
essential resources.
Although the British had yet to fully convince any of the Dominions
of the need for coordinated planning, wartime command, and regional
defense, the report stated that such unity was ‘essential’. The defense
relationship between Britain and the Commonwealth was symbiotic,

although the United Kingdom was the ‘keystone’ of the defense
because it had the majority of the Commonwealth’s ‘white man-power’
and the bulk of its industrial and scientific capacity.57 The implication
for the Commonwealth in this strategic vision was clear: ‘the defence of
the United Kingdom is the vital concern, not only of [its] people … but
also of each separate member of the Commonwealth’.58
The actual strategy laid down in Part Two was closely wedded to the
principles enunciated in Part One: defense of the United Kingdom and
Middle East bases to permit the immediate launching of an air offen-
sive against key Russian targets, and the maintenance of sea lines of
communication between the main support areas and Britain. Drawing
on Montgomery’s verbiage from earlier in the year, the report stated
that these three pillars ‘must stand together. The collapse of any one
of them will bring down the whole structure of Commonwealth
Strategy’.59
The Chiefs did not mention the Far East anywhere in the report
because they did not think it vital to hold it in a war with Russia.
Activities in that theater presumably would be limited and subsidiary,
perhaps eventually becoming the responsibility of Australia and New
Zealand. But in Alanbrooke’s 1946 Commonwealth defense scheme
Southeast Asia was seen as an area of strategic importance that could
affect the security of India and Australia. It therefore seems likely the
Chiefs believed that the Far East was one of the ‘areas of strategic value
to the defence of the British Commonwealth’ that they would maintain
by adopting a ‘firm attitude to further Russian territorial and ideologi-
cal expansion’.60 How and with what resources the British in Southeast
Asia could forestall Russian advances was not evident in Future
Defence Policy. Yet in many ways the allocation of resources was the
main, unanswered question facing British strategists in London and
Singapore. If Britain was to achieve economic recovery, there simply
were not enough men available to provide a deterrent force, continue
postwar military operations, and build the ready reserve forces thought
necessary to fight the Russians in 1956.
At the level of grand strategy, the government answered the resource
dilemma by its secret January 1947 decision to build atomic bombs.
The Chiefs accepted that it would be several years before the RAF
would have sufficient stocks of a successfully tested weapon.61 In the
event that war should break out in the near future, before the British
deterrent was ready, the Commonwealth would have to rely on atomic
bombardment by the United States Air Force, conducted in accordance
with ABC global war plans. To fight the land war, the regular Army was
to be almost wholly given over to the training of National Servicemen
in order to build up a reserve force of nine infantry and two armored
divisions for service in the Middle East and Europe.62 Training organiza-
tions in Germany would consist of an infantry division and brigade,
one armored brigade, and one parachute training brigade. The
only operational formations would be one infantry division and one
infantry brigade based in the Middle East, one parachute brigade
in Germany, and eventually, an Anglo-Gurkha division based in the
Far East.63
From SEAC to FARELF: military strategy in

the Far East, 1945–48
The fact that specific consideration of the British position in the Far
East and Southeast Asia was absent from the two main strategy docu-
ments of the immediate postwar period belies the fact that both
London and Singapore had indeed assessed Britain’s postwar strategic
position in the area.64 In fact, as early as February 1944 the Post
Hostilities Planning Staff (PHPS) drafted a post-war security survey of
the Far East, making the region ‘the first to be considered purely in
response to the pressure for a more systematic approach to postwar
imperial defence planning’.65 The draft PHPS paper assumed a certain
level of postwar cooperation among the five Western powers with
colonies or possessions in the area, namely, Britain, the United States,
France, Portugal, and the Netherlands. The PHPS paper identified
Japan, China, and Russia as the three most important potential aggres-
sors. The Allies would have to take appropriate measures to ensure no
revival of the Japanese threat following a peace treaty. Ostensibly an
ally, China posed little external threat unless first brought under the
control of either Japan or Russia, in which case Indochina and Formosa
took on greater strategic significance because of their proximity to
Burma, Siam, Malaya, Singapore, and Borneo.66 In March 1945,
another PHPS paper stressed the strategic importance of Indochina and
Siam to the defense of Southeast Asia, noting that should either coun-
try fall under control of a hostile power, it would have a profound
effect on the security of Malaya.67
Anticipating a postwar shortage of British manpower and a Russian
ability to simultaneously threaten both Western Europe and the
Middle East, the PHPS paper admitted that ‘the provision of adequate
forces for the Far East would become ‘difficult if not impossible’ in the
event of war with Russia.68 The PHPS believed there could be signifi-
cant internal security problems in countries that were occupied by
Japanese forces, especially Burma and Malaya.69 The British could effec-
tively mitigate these problems by raising these countries’ standards of
living, and raising indigenous forces to meet local internal security and
territorial defense requirements.70 Such units could defend against
attacks from minor powers such as Siam, thereby reducing the overall
number of British troops required in the theater and easing the
expected post-war manpower shortage.71
From the Foreign Office perspective, the ‘Far East seemed destined to
be the principal scene for a clash of interests between the Soviet Union
and the United States’.72 Russia would likely avoid a direct confronta-
tion in the area until after it had established Communist satellite states
in China and a unified Korea. And while there were no indications of
hostile intent toward either India or Southeast Asia, Russia ‘was
unlikely to neglect opportunities to stir up trouble there as well as
spread her influence by exploiting and intensifying nationalist feel-
ings’.73 But due to the British strategy of defense of the United Kingdom
and the Middle East, ‘[l]ittle more than encouragement could be offered
to the Americans in their struggle with the Russians for “control of the
body and soul” of China’.74
The British strategic view of Southeast Asia

at the beginning of 1948
Burma, Siam, and French Indochina were the countries of the greatest
strategic importance to British Southeast Asia because they guarded the
approaches to Malaya and Singapore and, more importantly, were the
principal producers of rice for India, Malaya, China, and Japan. Burma,
which opted out of the Commonwealth upon its independence in
January 1948, nonetheless remained in the Sterling currency area and
accepted a defense agreement with the United Kingdom. The treaty
gave the British access to ports and airfields and provided for a joint
British services mission to help train, equip, and administer the Burma
Armed Forces.75 Although Burma would soon be embroiled in a series
of insurrections, in early 1948 the only external threat to Burma’s
security was occasional Chinese incursions across the disputed Sino-
Burmese border. If, however, the Communists gained control of the
whole of China, ‘Chinese incursions might then receive the active
support of the USSR and Communist interference in Burma would be
facilitated’.76
In Siam, which had the only land border with Malaya and supplied
most of its rice, the former Japanese collaborator Pibul Songgram had
recently seized power from the existing pro-Western government. This
change of leadership threatened to upset British plans to train and
equip the Siamese armed forces at the same time intelligence indicated
that the Russians were trying to establish an embassy in Bangkok staffed
‘on a lavish scale’.77 Regardless of this turn of events, the strategic
importance of Siam necessitated the continuation of British efforts to
encourage ‘the establishment of a stable and friendly administration in
the country’ by political and economic means as well as military aid.78
In Indochina the French campaign against the Communist-led Viet
Minh was not going well, the French having only tenuous control over
lines of communication. It was clear to the British that only a political
solution was possible, and placed cautious hope in the French effort to
establish under the former Annamite emperor Bao Dai a friendly
autonomous government that would remain within the French
Union.79 If that effort failed, however, the British expected the Viet
Minh would eventually force the French to withdraw, a turn of events
that ‘could not but seriously affect European prestige throughout the
Far East’.80 The British were not in a position to give any direct military
assistance to the French forces in Indochina, but since it was in their
strategic interest to do so, they would do what they could politically to
support the Bao Dai project.81
When the Allies disbanded SEAC in 1946, the British chose to again
site their defense machinery in Singapore in part because they had
already located their principal regional land and air commands there.
More importantly, Singapore sits astride communications choke points
considered vital by Australia and New Zealand as well as Britain.82 The
Chiefs therefore considered it a strategic requirement to maintain
Singapore as a base for naval and air operations to control the lines of
communication. Despite the heavy emphasis on air and naval forces, the
Chiefs also thought it necessary to locate an imperial reserve force to
maintain its interests in the area and to give tangible proof to countries
like Burma and Siam that they retained the ability to support them.83
The other two major areas of the BDCC(FE)’s responsibilities were the
new colonies of Sarawak and Sabah in Borneo, and Hong Kong and
British commercial and diplomatic facilities in China. Because there
were no apparent threats to British Borneo, the BDCC(FE) was scarcely
concerned with the defense of the sparsely populated and underdevel-
oped colonies of Sarawak and Sabah. Their strategic worth was confined
to valuable but largely untapped stocks of timber, rubber and oil, and
to the airfields at Labuan and Kuching that facilitated wartime control

of the South China Sea.84
By virtue of the agreement at the Moscow conference of December
1945, the British government adopted a policy of non-involvement in
the Chinese civil war. Consequently, British defense-related activities in
China were limited to intelligence gathering, the protection of Hong
Kong, and standby arrangements for a possible evacuation of Common-
wealth nationals from the old treaty ports, especially Shanghai.85 The
Chiefs believed Hong Kong had some value as an air and sea base in
the event of war, but only if the surrounding Chinese mainland
remained in non-hostile hands. There was little threat of a major attack
by Nationalist forces, but the Chiefs feared unsettled conditions in
China caused by the civil war could lead to banditry or attacks by
Chinese warlords.86
This was the strategic milieu in which the Singapore defense machin-
ery operated. Because the report on Future Defence Policy was virtually
silent on the Far East, the Commanders-in-Chief thought there was a:
requirement for a strategic study of the importance of Malaya and

Singapore … one that is less restricted than the Chiefs’ of Staff paper,
and which can provide a basis on which the [BDCC(FE)] can make a
detailed examination of the defences necessary.87
Their resulting report was divided into two parts, ‘The Position of
Malaya in Peace’ and ‘The Position of Malaya in War.’ The first part dis-
cussed the political and economic factors affecting Southeast Asia, and
enunciated the objects of British policy in Southeast Asia as they
related to strategy. These were:
1. The maintenance and development of Commonwealth interests.

2. The development of resources in manpower and material to ensure
the maximum possible contribution to the Commonwealth in peace
and war.
3. The promotion within Commonwealth territories of economic and
social welfare and political development with a view to ultimate
self-government.
4. The promotion of peaceful and prosperous conditions in foreign as
well as Commonwealth territories.
5. The protection of British communities in foreign countries.88
The Commanders saw Malaya as the center of British Commonwealth

influence in South, Southeast, and East Asia, the only area in the Far
East other than Hong Kong with sufficient stability to have a ‘steadying
effect on recovery and the maintenance of order in the adjacent territo-
ries’.89 Singapore was a vital trade engine for the entire region, and the
rubber and tin of Malaya were industries important to local recovery. In
fact, Malayan tin and rubber were crucial dollar-earners for a bankrupt
Britain adjusting to the Bretton Woods monetary system. Known as
Britain’s ‘dollar arsenal’ because of its exports of tin and rubber to the
United States, Malaya in 1946 contributed US$118 million to the gold
and dollar reserves in London, compared to US$37 million from all
other colonies combined.90 Simply put, Britain could not afford to lose
Malaya. Unfortunately, the very factors that made Malaya and Singapore
economic and political paragons for Southeast Asia also made them a
target for Communist and other agitators.91 Communist successes else-
where, but particularly in Asia, would only serve to embolden sympa-
thizers and party members in Southeast Asia. This applied especially to
events in China and the substantial Chinese expatriate communities of
Southeast Asia, but also to possible developments in Indonesia, with
whom the Malays have a cultural and racial affinity.92
In the economic sphere, a host of actual and potential problems
existed. Malaya was a rice-dependent country, which made her security
susceptible to the vagaries of rice supplies from the traditional surplus
countries of Burma, Siam, and French Indochina. This dependency was
‘an unsatisfactory situation and could be a deciding factor in war’.93
Continuing world-wide food shortages, trade dislocation, and, in
Malaya, shortages of machinery, tools, transport, and skilled labor only
worsened the rice dependency. Political turbulence and agitation
caused by organized labor was also affecting economic development,
and was expected to continue.94
Part Two began with a recapitulation of Commonwealth strategy for
South East Asia. Simply stated, it was ‘to maintain the integrity of
Commonwealth territories and those countries with which treaties
have been affected, and to apply the full resources of the area to the
Commonwealth war effort’.95 To apply this strategy, the CIC(FE)
believed it necessary to retain control of both sea and air lines of com-
munication to the Middle East. The Commanders observed that the
means by which industries extracted vital Southeast Asian resources
were also ‘the most vulnerable to interference by political action’.
Labor, food supplies, and communications would ‘most probably form
the main objects of enemy attention’.96 To the minds of the CIC(FE), it
was necessary to ‘promote the political relations and conditions of inter-
nal security that will ensure full co-operation from each [neighboring]
country’.97 Since the geographic position of Malaya made it vulnerable

to encirclement and blockade, its defense was seen as inseparable from
that of South East Asia.
The remainder of Part Two was taken up with the CIC(FE)’s consider-
ation of Southeast Asia as both a minor and major theater of war. In
keeping with the report on Future Defence Policy, the Commanders
expected Southeast Asia to be only a minor theater in a war with Russia.
Consequently, they would be obliged to send the maximum possible
contribution of forces and resources to the Middle East. Because the
Commanders believed the main form of enemy activity in Southeast Asia
would be political warfare, they thought it acceptable to base regional
defense to the greatest possible extent on local resources.98 Nonetheless,
the Russians could be expected to conduct submarine attacks against
shipping or infrequent long-range bombing or rocket attacks on cities
and bases. And, in an appreciation eerily resonant of today’s concerns,
the Commanders considered the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons a possibility which ‘might well be accomplished [through the
locating of apparati] by clandestine means’.99
Southeast Asia might become a major theater of war if Russia gained
control over either China or Japan, and had succeeded in political sub-
version campaigns to control Siam, Indochina, the Netherlands East
Indies, and Burma. Not only would such developments inevitably lead
to a weakening of British authority in both Malaya and British Borneo,
they would also give Russia access to bases from which to directly
attack Malaya as well as to cut its supply of rice, thereby fomenting
internal instability.100 Commonwealth lines of communication would
become untenable and have to be re-routed through the Indian Ocean,
requiring ‘very considerable forces … to safeguard communications and
economic resources in South East Asia’.101 The British political and mil-
itary position in the region would be severely weakened in such a
scenario, while the strategic significance of Singapore would be
‘reduced to that of a tactical base’.102
If Malaya was indeed to serve as a strategic base and provider of
resources, its geographic position demanded a defense in depth based
on ‘an outer ring of neutral countries with strong stable govern-
ments’.103 Thus the main conclusion that the CIC(FE) drew from its
strategic appreciation was that the ‘first line of defence in South East
Asia is political preparation’ for both peace and war exigencies.104 Steps
to counter Communist subversion and expansionism, both within and
without Malaya, were absolutely essential to the strategy. So too were
efforts to promote stable governments in neighboring countries and to
create agreements with the other countries of Southeast Asia for ‘mutual
protection and defence’.105 The development of local forces on ‘an
extensive scale’ was called for, as was the building of a ‘first class mod-
ern airfield’ in Singapore that would not only assist in trade and air
travel, but also allow the future basing of heavy bomber or transport
aircraft.106 Lastly, in an appeal to halt the withdrawal of further troops,
the CIC(FE) noted that the political fickleness of the local populations
demanded resoluteness from the British. From a military point of view,
it was absolutely essential that the British demonstrate to the peoples
of Southeast Asia they intended to, and were capable of, defending
British territory in the region. ‘In this respect any further reduction of
our armed forces in the Far East could have most damaging conse-
quences of Commonwealth prestige’.107
Conclusion
Future Defence Policy was in some respects a new version of the inter-
war ‘Ten Year Rule’ in which the government based its plans on the
assumption that there would be no major war for ten years. Unlike the
Ten Year Rule, however, the new policy directed defense preparations
in anticipation of a possible war sometime after 1956. And those prepa-
rations were unmistakably directed at the defense of the strategic core
and by extension reflected an inherent acceptance of a continental
commitment.
There was always the possibility that either side could accidentally
stumble into a war in the intervening period, though, so Montgomery’s
success at initiating ABC planning for global war was of the greatest
significance for Britain. American agreement to resume its wartime
planning relationship with Britain clearly presaged its intention to
fight Soviet aggression in league with the Commonwealth almost two
years before the Washington Treaty was signed in April 1949. More
importantly, ABC planning revealed that the United States would use
its atomic weaponry against the Soviet Union, a prospect which
afforded Britain tremendous psychological and practical benefits in
terms of its own defense build-up.
The Far East did not figure into either British or Allied strategy for
global war. In the struggle for survival against the Soviet Union, Britain
had learned that it could not be strong everywhere and accordingly
focused its post-war defense resources on the building of reserve forces
in the United Kingdom in order to fight the Soviets in Europe and the
Middle East. These priorities would remain the same even after joint
war planning with the United States revealed the American intention
to bomb the eastern Soviet Union from air bases in the Ryukyu Islands.
Indeed, from the British perspective, there was no foreseeable threat
in the Far East that could not be handled by the air and naval forces
of Australia, Britain, New Zealand, and the United States on hand in
the area.
In any event, British defense officials believed the only real threat to
Southeast Asia nations would come in the form of internal instability,
not of a Soviet land attack. The problem of internal stability was seen as
a political and economic challenge that would only occasionally require
a judicious stiffening of military support from primarily local defense
forces. That the Far East was a strategic backwater was confirmed by
British war plans that directed all operationally ready Imperial units to
move from their garrison stations in Singapore, Malaya, and Hong
Kong to the Middle East in the event of war with Russia.108 But when
war came, it would not be in the form expected, and the flow of rein-
forcements would be reversed.
3
National Service, the Gurkhas
and the Reorganization of the
British Army, 1946–48
At the end of World War II, Britain needed all available manpower to
rebuild its industry and economy. The government therefore demobilized
its wartime conscripts as fast it could in consonance with post-hostilities
commitments, but its actions nonetheless left the British Army with an
acute manpower shortage. The loss of the Indian Army as an Imperial
strategic reserve only worsened the shortage. As a means of filling the
depleted ranks, the British government continued limited conscription
after the war and in 1947 approved the country’s first ever peacetime
compulsory service in an effort to build a large reserve army. Because
the first National Service intakes in 1949 would not move to the
reserve until 1950, the government realized it needed to take interim
measures to cover the Army’s immediate manpower requirements.
Government and defense officials therefore considered a variety of
options to meet short-term shortages up to 1950, the three most
prominent options of which were to raise a foreign legion, promote the
build-up of colonial forces, and transfer the Gurkhas from the Indian
to the British Army. The government quickly abandoned the foreign
legion concept and only slowly built up the colonial forces, but it
pressed ahead with the development of a Gurkha division in the
British Army. Forming Britain’s only body of all-volunteer, professional
soldiers, the Gurkhas were stationed in Malaya where they were sup-
posed to train for their intended wartime role in the Middle East.
Indian political objections to the transfer of Gurkhas to the British
Army and surprise retention of their own Gurkhas gravely affected
Britain’s ability to recruit the numbers required to man the new division.
But the British also hamstrung themselves by delaying key decisions about
which units and under what terms Gurkhas might serve in the British
Army, as well as its shoddy conduct of the transfer. The opportunity
32
National Service, Gurkhas and Army Reorganization 33
cost of this mismanagement was the loss of thousands of trained combat

veterans, demonstrated by the first ‘opt’ in which 90 per cent of per-
sonnel in most units voted for British service, versus 30 per cent which
opted in December 1947. The end result was that the Gurkha division
would not be ready for years, so when the series of Far East contingen-
cies began in 1948 the Gurkhas had to be reinforced by British and
Commonwealth units. This in turn had both short- and long-term
effects on strategy and defense policy.
Development of the postwar British Army
When the war ended in August 1945, the British were left in possession
of a greater part of the earth than any country before or since. Besides
garrisons in the various colonies and territories of the Empire–
Commonwealth, British troops at war’s end were in Germany, Austria,
Venezia Giulia (Trieste), Greece, Cyrenaica (Libya), Abyssinia, Italian
Somaliland, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Iran, Siam (Thailand), French Indochina,
and the Netherlands East Indies. In the same period, tens of thousands
of British troops were also conducting internal security duties of the
most thankless kind in Burma, India, Palestine, Greece, and Egypt. And
there was the possibility that the internal security requirements for India
might grow to require several British divisions if the negotiations
between Nehru’s Congress Party and the Attlee government broke down.
These extensive commitments were difficult enough for the Army,
but it had also to deal concomitantly with a rapid demobilization of its
wartime forces. Nearly bankrupt from the cost of six years of war, with
the public desirous of a return to normalcy, and a mandate to improve
the social welfare of the people, the newly elected Labour govern-
ment’s priority at war’s end was to rebuild Britain’s economy.
Economic reconstruction required the release of millions of skilled
workers in war industries and the armed forces to civilian industry.1
From a June 1945 level of 4 683 000 men in His Majesty’s Forces,2
Attlee’s Labour Government was able to reduce the total under arms to
2 200 000 in the space of a year.3 Further cuts brought the figure down
to about 1 427 000 at the end of 1946, with further plans to bring the
total to just 940 000 (of which the Army was 534 000) by the end of
March 1948.4 Table 3.1 shows force reductions up to 30 June 1948.
To realise these reductions and to adjust for the larger proportion of
support troops required by modern mechanized forces, the War Office in
October 1946 announced that one regular battalion from each infantry
regiment was to be placed in ‘temporary suspended animation.’5 This
Table 3.1 Strength of the armed forces, 1945–48 (as of June 30 each year)6
1945 1946 1947 1948
Army 2 931 000 1 189 000 774 000 450 000

Royal Navy 789 000 350 000 190 000 135 000
RAF 963 000 439 000 285 000 222 000
Total 4 683 000 1 978 000 1 249 000 807 000
left only one regular battalion in each regiment with the exception of
the Foot Guards and the new Parachute Regiment.7 In order to achieve
greater efficiency in manpower management and training, the War
Office also placed infantry regiments into administrative ‘groups’
among which the Army could transfer officers and men as needed.8
Finally, within each group, the War Office devised a system for rotating
a regiment’s regular and suspended battalions among home service,
foreign service, and suspended animation.9
The restructuring of the British Army was supposed to result in a
final active duty strength in 1949 of 345 000 men, or nearly twice the
size of the prewar Army. On the face of it, such a large army should
have been capable of meeting Britain’s various military and strategic
commitments. Because modern mechanised warfare required a greater
proportion of support troops and because the training and administra-
tion of National Servicemen absorbed so much of the Army’s efforts,
the reality was that the larger army was probably an appropriate size
for its various missions. For example, the mechanisation of war led to a
dramatic shift in the proportion of the combat and service arms of the
Army. The infantry component dropped from a pre-war level of 138
infantry battalions (43.6 per cent) down to 77 (21.3 per cent), while
the Royal Artillery dropped from 23.1 per cent of the Army in 1938 to
just 14.6 per cent in 1948, and armored forces from 8.1 per cent to
6 per cent.10 Just over 40 per cent of the postwar Army consisted of com-
bat units, while the proportion of men in engineer, signal, medical,
ordnance, supply, and maintenance units had more than doubled.11
Yet, as has already been mentioned, Britain’s post-hostilities commit-
ments were larger than its normal peacetime ones. Thus even if one
assumes that the 77 battalions were intended for the Army’s peacetime
commitments, the number of battalions available for internal security,
defense, or expeditionary operations was reduced from the pre-war
level by nearly one-half, although after 1947 it no longer needed to
keep nearly 50 battalions in India. One result of the drop in infantry
strength was that the Army was forced in every theater to use many of its
gunners as infantrymen.12 To make matters worse, voluntary recruitment
did not even come close to meeting expectations while an accelerated
demobilization scheme left the Army nearly 70 000 men short of
authorized strength at the end of 1946.13 Even the precedent of contin-
uing wartime call-ups and the institution of peacetime conscription
through the 1947 National Service Act did not solve the Army’s man-
power shortage. This was in part due to the strategy laid down in
‘Future Defence Policy’, which dictated that the primary purpose of
National Service was the build-up of a trained reserve of nine infantry
and two armored divisions as a force to fight Russia, not for peacetime
contingencies.14 Indeed, because National Servicemen served only
12 months ‘with the Colours’ (raised to 18 months in 1949, and to
24 months in 1950) they could not hope to fill the qualitative and
quantitative holes created by the loss of experienced war intakes. A
National Serviceman’s initial period in the Army was just adequate to
train him, a program which in itself required 14 regular army infantry
battalions to operate.15 This short period of active duty precluded the
use of National Servicemen overseas, as the sea journey out and back to
a posting – especially one in the Far East – would have left little or no
time for actual service. However, as a hedge against unexpected contin-
gencies, Montgomery garnered Cabinet assurances that the govern-
ment would increase the period of active duty should the need arise.16
The Labour Government realized this massive reorganization and
reduction of the Army meant an inevitable reduction in operational effi-
ciency until the reserve ‘Territorial Army’ (TA) could be built up. In fact,
‘His Majesty’s Government have … accepted an appreciable element of
risk in imposing upon the Services’ the rapid release of war-intakes and
an influx of large numbers of new intakes.17 The CIGS was more strident
in his appraisal of the Army’s prospects in 1947 and beyond:
We were moving towards a situation in which we would be unable

to produce an effective fighting force of any appreciable size. … The
Army would progressively deteriorate until by the 1st January 1950
more than one-third of the men in the active Army would be only
eighteen years old, and have less than one year’s service. The fight-
ing units would be heavily diluted with immature soldiers.18
In a 1948 paper on the defense of Western Europe and the British

Army’s ability to contribute to it, Montgomery noted that the Army
‘was in a parlous condition, and was in a complete state of unreadiness
and unpreparedness for war’.19 Given these postwar manpower short-

ages, there should be little confusion over how and why four regiments
of the Indian Army ended up in the British Army in 1948.
Filling the manpower gap: the origins of

the British Army Gurkhas
The projected shortfall between the Army’s strength and its operational
requirements prompted the government to consider a number of stop-
gap measures. The most obvious option was continuation of wartime
call-ups, which the War Cabinet tentatively authorized in May 1945.
One year later, the Labour Cabinet approved continuation of a modi-
fied call-up scheme until such time as it felt able to make a final deci-
sion on the size and shape of the postwar armed forces. The resulting
White Paper reflected a compromise between economic recovery and
military commitments that satisfied neither requirement.20
Seeking alternative sources of manpower, in January 1947 Attlee pro-
posed the creation of a British ‘Foreign Legion’ and expansion of colo-
nial forces.21 The Prime Minister seemed particularly interested in
using some of the 217 000 Polish soldiers then still under British com-
mand, but the War Office resisted the idea. It reported to the Defence
Committee that Poles and other Europeans in British service were
needed for the reconstruction of their own countries and that Poles
who enlisted in a British foreign legion would ‘effectively be cut off
from ever returning to their home for political reasons’ arising from
the Soviet occupation.22 Moreover, it would prove difficult to maintain
or expand a foreign legion in the event of war, and in peacetime –
when the War Office believed the main role of the British Army would
be one of ‘Imperial policing’ – the use in most cases of non-British
European manpower in such a role would be ‘objectionable’.23 As for
colonial troops, both the Colonial and War Office thought their value
was generally limited to use in areas close to their homes and by the
requirement that they be sufficiently loyal and capable of acting in aid
to the civil power.24 From the War Office point of view, ‘British troops
are undoubtedly better value for money than any foreign troops’,
although it considered that Gurkha troops should transfer to
the British Army because they offered ‘good value for money’.25
The Defence Committee adopted the War Office position opposing
the creation of a foreign legion and expansion of colonial forces, and
advocating the transfer of the Gurkhas from the Indian to the British
Army.26
Gurkhas were Nepalese hillmen who since 1815 had served under
British officers first in the army of the Honorable East India Company
and then in the British Indian Army. Not only did the British generally
regard them as fierce and efficient soldiers, but their loyalty during the
Indian Mutiny (1857–58) earned them the enduring and profound
affection of British soldiers.27 Their Mutiny service also led in the latter
part of the nineteenth century to expansion of the so-called ‘Brigade of
Gurkhas’. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Indian Army
had ten, two-battalion regiments of ‘Gurkha Rifles’. During both world
wars, the Gurkha regiments raised additional battalions, with more
than 200 000 Gurkhas serving in each conflict.28
The War Office suggestion to use Gurkhas to fill the manpower gap
was not new. In fact, the India and War Offices had already mooted the
idea of transferring the Gurkhas to British service even before the exact
nature and terms of Indian independence were known. Indeed, even
before the end of the war, the Viceroy, Field Marshal Lord Wavell, and
the C-in-C of the Indian Army, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck,
had begun a dialogue with Alanbrooke and the War Office over the
future of the Gurkhas. The War Cabinet’s India Committee had already
discussed the Gurkha issue at least as early as March 1945, and
although there was no plan as to what should be done, there was total
agreement ‘that Gurkhas should be employed in considerable numbers
[in the British Army]’.29
In May 1945, the British Government decided to take the full peace-
time Indian Army Gurkha establishment of 20 battalions into the British
Army for service in either the Middle or Far East.30 By October, Govern-
ment of India plans for the transfer had progressed to the point where
Auchinleck privately broached to the Maharaja Prime Minister of Nepal
the idea of Gurkhas serving in the British Army as a ‘strategic reserve’.31
During the same visit, the Maharaja confirmed what the British already
knew: while he was happy to allow Gurkhas to serve under British
officers, His Highness was somewhat averse to their serving under
Indian officers in a new national army of India.32
During his visit to India in December 1945, Alanbrooke discussed the
transfer of the Gurkhas to the British Army with the C-in-C.
Auchinleck stressed that any Gurkhas in Imperial service would have to
be completely independent from the old Indian Army and government;
they would in fact have to be in the form of a ‘Foreign Legion’ based on
negotiations between Britain and Nepal.33 He stressed to Alanbrooke
the advantages of retaining the Gurkhas to fill the shortage of British
troops for overseas garrisons when the Indian government’s willingness
to do so was in question, and the fact that Gurkha units cost less than
their British equivalents.34 Wavell, in a top secret letter to the Secretary of
State for India, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, backed Auchinleck’s arguments
and reiterated that ‘Gurkhas are … probably amongst the best soldiers
in the world’ and that ‘our ultimate objective must be to preserve for
the purposes of Imperial defence the very valuable asset’ of Gurkhas.35
Wavell closed by pressing Whitehall for an early and definite answer
about the employment of Gurkhas in the British Army.36
After ‘much discussion both written and oral between the India
Office, the War Office and the Treasury’, the Secretary of State for War
informed the Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for India that the
Treasury had agreed only to pay for eight permanent battalions of
Gurkhas. There was a possibility that the other 12 battalions might be
required to help form the supporting units of a possible Gurkha division,
but the Treasury had not yet sanctioned this.37 Though limited, this
plan constituted ‘sufficient ground’ for Wavell to move forward with
the Nepalese government.38
Before Wavell could take action, the new interim government of
India let Pethick-Lawrence know on 8 November that it had its own
views on Gurkhas, which included two bombshells. First, the Indians
wished to retain Gurkha battalions in the Indian National Army and that
they should be officered by Indians,39 apparently as a means of exercising
political influence in Nepal.40 Secondly, they opposed ‘the employment
of Gurkha troops by His Majesty’s Government for Imperial purposes’.41
The Indians realised this would be a point of contention and suggested
negotiations among the United Kingdom, Nepal and India. The War
Office proposed that matters of difference between the British and
Indian governments first be settled in bilateral negotiations, after
which an approach would be made to the Nepalese. The Indians agreed
to this on 16 January, but internal debate in London over the Army
budget and how many Gurkhas Britain could afford to take on delayed
British action for months.
The situation was complicated by the fact that various government
departments seemed to have different ideas about the number of
Gurkhas that would be transferred. On 5 March, Lieutenant-General Sir
Leslie Hollis, the Chief Staff Officer to the Minister of Defence, minuted
Attlee to tell him that the War Office would be taking the lead on the
negotiations with both the Indian and Nepalese governments for the
‘transfer of approximately 25 000 Gurkhas to the British Service’, or all
20 battalions.42 As Hollis told Attlee, it was ‘the intention that the
Gurkhas should be formed into what would approximate to a division
for [garrison] service in Malaya and would enable us to release a similar

number of British troops’.43 But under exactly what terms of service
this was to be achieved was not made clear.
When the matter was placed before the Defence Committee in
March 1947, Attlee was all for the transfer, especially since the ‘serious
man-power shortage in the United Kingdom at present made it most
important that every practicable method of meeting the needs of the
Armed Forces from sources other than the United Kingdom should be
adopted’.44 The only debate was over whether the length of the initial
engagement Britain offered the Gurkhas should be limited to five years,
at the end of which the final size and shape of the British Army and its
Gurkha element would have been decided. In an apparent Treasury
endorsement of the Gurkhas’ cost-effectiveness, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, not only favored taking all 25 000
Gurkhas, but he also argued against a limited, five-year engagement.
He realised longer-term employment was likely to be more attractive to
the Gurkhas and the Nepalese government. The committee agreed that
the government’s goal should be the employment of up to 25 000
Gurkhas for deployment anywhere in the world, and with ‘no suggestion
of a time-limit to their employment’.45 The committee members did not,
however, decide what the actual period of enlistment should be.
Three-way negotiations
On 18 March, the Defence Committee secretaries circulated the draft of

a War Office brief for the British delegation to the Anglo-Indian negoti-
ations on the transfer of the Gurkhas.46 The main brief called for agree-
ments which would permit HMG to recruit up to 25 000 Gurkhas, but
that four regular regiments (that is, eight battalions) should be imme-
diately enlisted and transferred to British service, the balance of the
25 000 being enlisted ‘as soon as they can be absorbed’. The British
Army Gurkhas would ‘in every sense be part of the Regular Army’, and
HMG must be ‘entirely free as to where and in what role Gurkha troops
would be employed’, regardless of any Indian objections. The brief did
not dispel the ambiguity regarding longer-term employment of
Gurkhas, but neither was there any language mentioning a five-year
initial period.47 A later expanded and amended version of the brief
found in the India Office reiterated that finances were tight and HMG
‘was not desirous of making any definite commitments regarding the
period of employment’.48 Cost-saving requirements also meant that
accommodation in Malaya would be sparse and less than what the
Gurkhas were used to in India. Again this was due in large part to the
‘short term nature of this proposal’.49 The Defence Committee discussed
and approved the brief on 3 April, at which time Montgomery stated his
belief that the Indian government ‘would acquiesce in our proposals’.50
As soon as enlistment of the first Gurkha contingent was completed,
they were to move immediately to Malaya to begin training.
The Gurkha transfer negotiations with India did not proceed
smoothly. Nehru was opposed to the idea of Gurkhas remaining in
Imperial service, as they had become unpopular with the Indian public.
Nehru’s position may also have been partly inspired by an interest in
exerting control over Nepal, a theme of Indian foreign policy begun
during the days of the East India Company.51 Attlee, at the suggestion
of Mountbatten, asked Montgomery to discuss the Gurkhas with
Nehru when the two met in late June to arrange the final departure of
British troops from India.52 Montgomery was successful, but at a price.
Despite the terms of the brief approved by the Defence Committee,
Montgomery promised Nehru the Gurkhas:
were required as a reserve for emergencies and to carry out British

commitments in the Far East. These troops would not be used locally
and certainly not against peoples’ movements for freedom. They were
not to be used at all in fact, unless war came. Malaya was a suitable
place for them to be stationed; otherwise they had nothing to do
with Malaya.53
Montgomery impressed upon Nehru that the requirement for Gurkhas

flowed from Britain’s ‘grave man-power difficulty’ and that he hoped
they would never be used for ‘any … purpose’ other than war.54 After
two days of talks, Nehru agreed in principle to the enlistment of
Gurkhas in the British Army.55
The Indian and British delegations agreed on which regiments were
to be transferred – 2, 6, 7, and 10 Gurkha Rifles – just nine days before
Indian independence.56 It now remained to negotiate the provision of
transit facilities in India as well as the conditions of service with Nepal.
No action could be taken on transfers, however, until a tripartite agree-
ment among Britain, India, and Nepal was concluded, so all Gurkha
units remained on active service in Burma and India even after inde-
pendence on 15 August, including horrific duty as part of the Punjab
Boundary Force.
Despite the fact that little specific information on the conditions and
terms of service were yet available, GHQ India nevertheless ordered a
referendum be held immediately in all regiments; the choices offered

were continuation in the Indian Army, transfer to British service, or
discharge.57 The lack of information led units to flood GHQ with so
many queries that it aborted the ‘immediate opt’ pending further infor-
mation. Still, the results from those units that did poll their members
were encouraging, with the majority of Gurkhas generally opting for
the British Army in ‘overwhelming’ numbers.58
Unfortunately for the British, the forces of disaffection and rumor
began to tell on the Gurkhas in the period between independence and
transfer.59 Many Gurkhas felt betrayed by the British because they did
not transfer the entire brigade, or at least one battalion from every regi-
ment.60 Moreover, the dwindling number of experienced British officers
and the filling of the resulting vacancies with Indian officers, contrary
to custom, undermined discipline in some units.61 The as-yet to be
published terms of service were another source of confusion. Then
there were the transportation and cultural obstacles associated with
service in Malaya as opposed to India. Still too, rumors of a possible
revolution in Nepal made most men anxious about the safety of their
families and property in Nepal. Lastly, as evidenced by the mutiny of
1/2 GR in early November 1947,62 there is some indication that Indian
agents provocateur were operating in Gurkha units. In fact, Auchinleck
and other senior officers were convinced a ‘deliberate propaganda
campaign [had] been going on for some time … to dissuade men from
opting for service under HMG’.63
India and Britain concluded the bilateral issues on the provision of
transit and recruiting facilities and rights in India in October, and
progress thereafter toward a tripartite treaty was swift, culminating in
agreement on 9 November.64 There were, however, two treaty issues
that would resurface later as problems for the British, the Nepalese
position in both instances bearing the imprint of Indian pressure. The
first was the Maharajah’s insistence that Britain and India combined
should have no more Gurkhas than that required for 20 battalions, as
Nepal too had a manpower shortage. Twenty battalions was the pre-
war level of the Gurkha Brigade, but India’s cupidinous desire for
Gurkhas, combined with Britain’s financial straits, meant India got 12
of the 20 permanent battalions.65 Worse still, Nepal also permitted
India to maintain some of the war-raised battalions on a temporary
basis ‘in view of the existing political situation in India’.66 The
Maharajah understood that this affected British planning to recruit
numbers sufficient to man an entire division (that is, up to 25 000) and
he agreed not to make a final decision on a recruiting ceiling until the
British could assess the impact such a restriction would have on their
plans. In the interim, he agreed to allow the British to recruit up to
15 000 Gurkhas (counting those men transferred from the Indian
Army). The Maharajah remained ultimately receptive to an increase to
25 000, but not until India disbanded all its war-raised battalions.67
The second issue was how the British intended to use the Gurkhas.
The British could not tolerate any restrictions on where and how they
could be employed. Nevertheless, they assured the Maharajah their
intention was to use them only as a strategic reserve for war. They said
it was unlikely that Gurkhas would be employed in an internal security
role because that was assumed to be the primary responsibility of
locally-raised forces. However, in an effort to placate Nepal, the Indians
and British undertook never to use their Gurkha troops ‘against Hindu
or any unarmed mobs’ or against other Gurkha troops. Furthermore,
the Government of Nepal reserved the right to ‘withdraw all Gurkha
troops in case Nepal is involved in any war’. The Maharajah accepted
these stipulations and the three parties signed the memorandum of
agreement on 9 November.68
With the treaty now signed, the actual business of enlisting Gurkhas
into the British Army could begin. It was not a very successful process,
as Indian political agitation, British mis-management, and continued
ambiguity of service terms persuaded many Gurkhas that the British
had sold them out. Despite objections from GHQ FARELF,69 the ‘opt’
was only offered in those regiments that had been earmarked for
British service. In the other six regiments the only two choices were to
stay in the Indian Army or be discharged without compensation.70 In
this way over 70 per cent of available trained Gurkha manpower was
placed off limits to British recruiters. Furthermore, all three regiments in
Burma slated for transfer had their second battalions in India,71 where
they were subjected to the influence of Indian propaganda.72 Not sur-
prisingly, the numbers of Gurkhas that opted for service in the British
Army were much higher in battalions stationed in Burma than those in
India.73 The overall results of the opt were dismal. As of 20 January
1948, only 124 Gurkha officers and 3 432 Gurkha ‘other ranks’ had
voted for British service.74
GHQ FARELF, local forces, and the ‘Gurkha Project’
The War Office intended to form the Gurkhas into an infantry division
that would serve as an Imperial strategic reserve. War plans called for
the division to deploy to the Middle East at the outbreak of war with
Russia.75 Its peacetime location in the Far East was more for logistical
convenience and as a reassuring presence than it was to provide a
regional defense force. In the event of war, most, if not all, of the regular
combat formations of FARELF would leave the theater for the duration
of hostilities. Since the principal military threats to British Southeast
Asia were seen in 1946–47 to be infrequent and isolated attacks by
Russian submarines or bombers, the lack of regular troops was not seen
as any great risk. A major threat would exist from the west if the
Middle East fell, or from the north, if China fell under the control of
the Russians or a resurgent Japan. In either case the threat was physically
and temporally remote and the risk of denuding FARELF acceptable.
The only proximate threat was of internal unrest, possibly intensified
by shortages of rice or other commodities, of which Communist agents
would be sure to take advantage. Imperial troops would be available as
a back-up force in peacetime, but the government generally envisioned
locally raised police and military units as the primary response force
for internal security and local defense against smaller threats.76 Indeed,
the War Office plan was to raise an entire Malayan infantry division by
1951 in order to ensure that regular British battalions could serve in
Europe and the Middle East when needed. To this end the abortive
Malayan Union government instituted the first phase of the plan by
reconstituting two battalions of the Malay Regiment at its pre-war
depot of Port Dickson on the southwest coast, while undertaking for-
mation of a third battalion in 1948.77 The CIC(FE) also thought it
desirable that volunteer (that is, part-time) forces be raised in all the
territories in their area of responsibility.78 Unlike the Malay Regiment
which only admitted ethnic Malays, enlistment in the volunteer forces
would be open to all races and would conform as closely as possible to
the skill levels of the recruiting base from which they were drawn. The
principal requirements were thought to be for anti-aircraft and coastal
defense units, but a secondary need also existed for technical and labor
units (especially in Singapore’s base facility), and a tertiary need for
interpreters and guides.79 Only regular forces would have infantry
units, which in practice meant the Malay Regiment.
In addition to the development of the Gurkha division, FARELF also
had an advisory and oversight role in conjunction with local colonial
governments to oversee the re-establishment of volunteer forces and the
re-raising of the Malay Regiment, of which it had operational control.
Although the various colonial governments were responsible for raising
and administering these local forces, continuation of wartime regula-
tions left the War Office with the burden of providing the British officers
and Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) for the Malay Regiment. As

GHQ FARELF discovered, development of the Gurkha and colonial
forces was extremely difficult and frustratingly slow; Gurkha recruiting
proved to be a bargaining chip for the new Indian government, and
obtainment of suitable officers for the Malay Regiment lacked political
backing from Whitehall until years after the declaration in 1948 of an
emergency in Malaya. The Malayan Emergency also retarded the devel-
opment of the Gurkha division, for despite British assurances that the
Gurkhas were intended only for war, the lack of local military forces
in 1948 demanded they be used for internal security operations (see
Chapter 4).
Development of the Gurkha division
The Gurkhas too were unprepared for internal security operations in

1948. The most obvious short-coming was the paltry number that opted
for service in the British Army.80 Another obstacle was Nepal’s imposi-
tion of a temporary ceiling on enlistments of 10 400 – nearly 5000 less
than what was initially permitted.81 This was caused by India’s continued
use of war-raised battalions and the loaning of a Nepalese contingent
for operations in Hyderabad.82 The British government hoped the ceil-
ing would be raised to the planned 25 000 after India demobilized the
extra battalions and the Nepalese contingent returned home. In the
meantime, the 10 400 level was absolute and included some 800 recruits,
200 boys, 240 non-combatant enrolled men (gold smiths, priests, and so
on), men away on leave in Nepal, and other non-effectives.83
The War Office recognized that this lowered ceiling would not allow
the build-up of the Gurkha division as planned. In a 3 December cable,
it told FARELF of the reduced limit, but forbade Ritchie from making
up the resulting shortfall by placing locally enlisted personnel (LEP) in
the ‘teeth’ (that is, combat) arms of the division.84 Instead, FARELF was
to scale down its plans and give priority to development of one fully
ready, mobile brigade group to be composed entirely of British and
Gurkha troops. It also suggested that the other two brigades of the divi-
sion be kept on an ‘underposted establishment’ in order to more
quickly meet the requirements for the mobile brigade group. The War
Office further stated that the worldwide shortage of administrative
support and technical troops precluded such troops being dispatched
to the Far East, but that the two Royal Artillery (RA) field regiments
already present there would be allowed to remain for the time being.85
Ritchie and his staff were stunned by the news of the lowered
Gurkha ceiling. Brigadier Redman, the FARELF Chief of Staff, told the
War Office that he was surprised to learn even that there had been an
interim limit of 15 000 when they had been led to believe the ceiling
was 25 000.86 This radically altered the planning assumption wherein a
sufficient number of Gurkhas would be available to man all adminis-
trative units of the division.87 Redman noted that FARELF might be
able to cope if it were allowed to raise sufficient administrative units
from LEP using British officers and training NCOs in the way originally
envisioned for Gurkha units.88
Further impeding a quick stand up of the Gurkha division was the
administrative discombobulation caused by an earlier than expected
departure of Indian troops stationed in Malaya. The acceleration of
Indian independence meant that FARELF plans to use Indian service
troops for a smooth transition to a peacetime footing and the accom-
modation of the new Gurkha troops, already being stretched out as a
result of financial restrictions, had to be abandoned.89 In order to
maintain the ‘essential administrative services for the Theatre’, FARELF
had to transfer men from British combat units into administrative and
support functions while it tried to speed the recruitment of LEP and
the hiring of civilian clerks and other contract workers.90 Experience
was to show, however, that the ad hoc measure of using LEP did not
pay very good dividends. The LEP could not replace British troops on a
one-for-one basis: their productivity per capita was much lower; their low
level of education meant it took longer to train them even to a lower
standard of efficiency; and they generally required more supervision.91
Ritchie’s staff completed a study on the composition of the Gurkha
division six weeks after they received the War Office telegram. The
study laid out two alternatives for organization and manpower of the
division, the main difference between the two being the extent to
which LEP would be used in divisional administrative units.92 Because
the War Office believed there was no urgent requirement for the entire
division to be ready in the near future, it refused to provide the full com-
plement of British troops requested by FARELF. Ritchie’s proposal was
therefore little more than a marker flag for planning purposes. Except for
the section about the Gurkhas. Ritchie stated in no uncertain terms
that the current manpower levels were completely unrealistic. First,
there was no Gurkha reserve to call upon on mobilization. Secondly, for
more than two-thirds of any given year Gurkha units would have
approximately 25 per cent of their men on leave in Nepal. They were
entitled to six months’ leave after every three years of service. A poor
transportation network in Nepal and the vagaries of the monsoon

restricted travel so that, in some cases, men might not be able to rejoin
their unit sooner than six months after mobilization. Thirdly, the cur-
rent training establishment and recruits in the pipeline could only
replace normal peacetime wastage, or no more than 15 per cent of total
establishment. Recruitment, transport, and training of new Gurkhas
could take more than a year – hardly suitable to keep a unit up to fight-
ing strength during a war.93 Ritchie wrote that, ‘[u]nless … very severe
limitations are to be accepted in the employment of the Gurkha divi-
sion in the first 6–12 months of a future war, the overall ceiling of
trained manpower should be increased’.94 Simply keeping Gurkha
units at lower establishment was not sufficient because of leave-loss.
The Director of Staff Duties (DSD) at the War Office responded to
Ritchie’s January 15 message a fortnight later. In his view Ritchie’s report
confirmed the War Office view that FARELF could only provide one
mobile brigade group in a ready state, and that plans for a fully mobile
division ready at all times would not be possible for some time. ‘It has
become clear to us that the expense both in money and manpower
which would be involved [in readying the whole division] will certainly
rule this out for some years to come.’95 Worse yet, ‘we shall have to
accept the fact that leave and other factors will mean that the fighting
element of this part of the Division will often be much below strength’.96
Teething pains: the Gurkhas arrive in Malaya
Whitehall’s indetermination about the composition of the Gurkha

division was not the only headache for FARELF. The condition of the
Gurkhas themselves was also of considerable concern. Most of the
optees were from the Burma-stationed battalions – 1/6, 1/7, and 1/10
GR. Following a brief period as rearguard for the final closure of HQ
Burma Command and the departures of the British governor and last
British battalion, the British Gurkhas began the move to Malaya after
Burmese independence on 4 January 1948, 1/6 GR being the last
Imperial unit to leave Burma.97 The 1/10 GR arrived in Malaya from
Rangoon on 13 January moving to temporary quarters in Kuala
Lumpur.98 The 2/10 GR, which had been in Lahore, Pakistan, at the
time of the opt, sailed from Bombay on February 28, along with what
little existed of the 1/2 and 2/2 GR, 2/6 GR, and 2/7 GR.99 The latter
four battalions disembarked at Singapore on 11 March where they were
festively greeted by military bands, a fly-over, the Governor of
Singapore, and the service commanders-in-chief (less Ritchie, who was
ill at the time);100 2/10 GR sailed on to Hong Kong.101 Along with the
British and Malay units already in Malaya, this gave FARELF the order
of battle shown below in Figure 3.1.
Although most Gurkha battalions arrived in Malaya with an average
of only 300 men,102 they at least had sufficient recruits to form train-
ing companies for each regiment.103 There were two further problems,
though. One was the loss of some 1300 (out of 4 700) trained men to
promised leave in Nepal, which further depleted the numbers of men
arriving in early 1948. The other was the loss of most of the experi-
enced Gurkha officers, NCOs, and clerks who opted for the Indian
Army. This put an even greater strain on those that remained, especially
in the training and administrative work of the battalions. Of British
officers there apparently was little shortage, as those from the six Indian
Gurkha regiments were allowed to transfer into the British Gurkhas.104
By 30 April all eight Gurkha battalions and regimental centers had
arrived in FARELF, although 2/6 GR, which was supposed to have gone
straight from India to Hong Kong, ended up disembarking in Malaya
instead.105 It was so under-strength that it had to wait in Malaya until
it received sufficient drafts of recruits before it finally moved to Hong
GHQ
FARELF
(Singapore)
MALAYA
SINGAPORE
DISTRICT
DISTRICT
(Kuala Lumpur)
II II II II
2/6 GR 2/7 GR 1/2 GR 1 DEVON
N. MALAYA C. MALAYA S. MALAYA

SUB DISTRICT SUB DISTRICT SUB DISTRICT
(Kuala Kangsar) (Seremban) (Johore Bahru)
II II II
2 KOYLI 1/7 GR 1 SEAFORTH
II II II
2/2 GR 2 MALAY 1/10 GR
II
II
1/6 GR 26 FD REGT, RA II
Infantry Battalion
II II
Artillery Battalion
1 MALAY
Figure 3.1 FARELF order of battle in Malaya and Singapore, June 1948106
Kong in December.107 In fact, all units were woefully under-strength

and heavily burdened with raw recruits awaiting training. Until HQ
British Gurkhas in India tallied the final numbers of optees and recruits
on 18 March there was concern that the Gurkhas’ original deployment
areas would have to be consolidated or, in the case of Hong Kong,
abandoned altogether.108 Alarmed by the small number of optees, the
British sped up recruiting in January and February 1948 so that recruits
‘could be sent to Malaya within a matter of weeks to build up the
strength of the badly depleted battalions’.109
The early administration of the ‘Gurkha Regiment’ was as inauspicious
as the personnel situation. There was very little in the way of suitable
accommodation and for many months (in some cases years) the
Gurkhas and their families had to live in tents.110 For the first few
months, most battalions and training center staff spent the bulk of
their time on fatigue duties on their camps, or in learning and creating
the required British Army (vs. Indian Army) records, accounts, and
other paperwork.111 Training and normal regimental duties began in
earnest only after this initial settling-in period.
The Brigade of Gurkhas112
In May 1948, Ritchie proposed combining the responsibilities of General

Officer Commanding, Malaya District (then Major-General Sir Charles
Boucher), command of 17 Gurkha Infantry Division, and administration
of the new Brigade of Gurkhas.113 The new Gurkha post would be styled
‘Major-General, Commanding the Brigade of Gurkhas’ (MGBG) and was
to be served by a headquarters staff separate from Malaya District, and
which replaced GHQ FARELF’s Gurkha Planning Staff.114 HQ, Brigade of
Gurkhas, consisted of a ‘Brigade Colonel, Brigade Major and a small
staff’ at first located in Kuala Lumpur and later in Seremban.115 As laid
down in his charter, the MGBG had a three-fold responsibility. He pro-
vided senior commanders with advice on all Gurkha matters; he was
responsible for training of all Gurkha units in Malaya; and he oversaw
the Gurkha recruiting and supply organizations.116
The MGBG charter is a significant document not only because it out-
lines the relationship between FARELF and the main fighting force under
its command but also because it reveals what was supposed to be a tem-
porary change in the division’s role from war-fighting to internal secu-
rity. In it, Ritchie tells Boucher the original intention was for 17 Gurkha
Infantry Division (as it was designated) only to be stationed in Malaya.
‘The troops required for internal security in MALAYA, SINGAPORE,
and HONG KONG were to be separate from and additional to the
Division’, which in effect would have been only a ‘lodger’ in Malaya

District.117 Manpower and financial stringency caused the War Office to
modify this plan, resulting in reduction of the division’s planned
strength. These constraints, along with delays in the expansion of the
Malay Regiment and the raising of volunteer forces, necessitated that
‘for some considerable time’ the internal security garrisons of Singapore
and Hong Kong would have to be found from 17 Gurkha Infantry
Division.118 ‘This unavoidable change in the location and employment
of the units of the future BRITISH/GURKHA Division’, wrote Ritchie,
‘necessarily alters the normal conception of the duties and responsibili-
ties of the Divisional Commander’.119 Despite this charter, there is no
indication that the Gurkhas began training for an internal security role
in the few weeks between the issuance of this document and the declara-
tion of an emergency in Malaya in June 1948.
Conclusion
British signature of the Brussels Treaty in March 1948 and creation of

the Western Union Defense Organization later that year confirmed the
Army’s new orientation as a continental force. The Army accordingly
focused its efforts on a methodical build up of 11 reserve and 6 regular
divisions for the defense of Western Europe and the Middle East begin-
ning sometime after 1956. Its reorganization was assisted by troop
withdrawals from Japan, India, Burma, and Palestine, and with the
exception of the occasional small-scale, short-duration contingencies
endemic to an imperial power, there was no immediate threat on the
strategic horizon. The overall state of Army readiness reflected this
belief, for on the eve of the Malayan Emergency, neither the British
Army nor its new Gurkha element was in any condition for major mil-
itary operations. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the
Soviet blockade of Berlin changed the threat perception, but the effect
on the Army was relatively small. In August, the Cabinet approved a
small increase in equipment purchases and stockpiles, and decided to
suspend the release of some conscripts in order to keep Army man-
power at approximately 400 000 for the next six months.120
In the Far East, which until 1947 had been garrisoned primarily by the
Indian Army, the British had succeeded in creating a surrogate – albeit
weak – force in the form of the British Brigade of Gurkhas. Internal poli-
tics and short-sighted financial concerns undercut the value of the
Gurkhas, however, as less than half of the available regiments were actu-
ally transferred from the Indian Army. Yet as the Minister of Defence
admitted to the Defence Committee in September 1947, Britain’s ‘ability
to garrison the Far East will be entirely dependent on the success of

Gurkha recruiting, which is an unknown factor’.121 War Office attempts
to preserve British units in the defense budget battles of 1946–47 led to
vacillation about the number of Gurkhas to be transferred to the British
Army. Scott argues that the War Office ‘deliberately delayed a decision
on a permanent Gurkha establishment until 1947 in order to prevent
the government from using this as a pretext for reducing the number
of British regulars in the final post-war army’.122 The politicking back-
fired, for instead of transferring the entire Brigade of Gurkhas from the
Indian Army, the British ended up with less than half of what their
plans for a Gurkha division required. FARELF was consequently forced to
lower the operational efficiency of the planned division and accept that
it could only afford to have one brigade in a state of readiness. Worse
yet, by the terms of the Tripartite Agreement, the Indians had managed
to gain de facto veto power over British Gurkha recruiting. Retention of
12 regular and 7 wartime Gurkha battalions also assured India the
same degree of suzerainty over Nepal that the British colonial govern-
ment had previously exercised. As will be shown in Chapter 8, India’s
Gurkha leverage could and did cause the British problems in later years.
The upshot of the botched Gurkha transfer was a FARELF garrison
that in 1948 was undermanned, administratively feeble, and militarily
unprepared for any but the smallest of contingencies. Nonetheless,
both theater and national appreciations of the situation in the Far East
indicated the only likely threats were small-scale internal ones. Hence,
planning for strategic quiescence in the Far East and Southeast Asia was
completely understandable. Following six years of global war, battles in
Indonesia and Indochina, the slaughter of Indian partition, the tumult
of Burma, and the heartbreak of the opt, the British Army Gurkhas
were ready for a quiet period of re-building and re-training. In his wel-
coming remarks to the Gurkhas, the Governor of Singapore expressed
his wish that they would ‘receive in peace, in this part of the world,
the rewards of your hard work and courage during the war’.123 It was
not to be. Less than three months after their arrival, the High
Commissioner of Malaya, Sir Edward Gent, in response to the murder
of three European planters by Malayan Communist guerrillas, declared
an emergency on June 18. With the beginning of the Malayan cam-
paign, FARELF went from a strategic backwater to the front-line of the
Cold War. By their fortuitous presence, the Gurkhas would help ease
the strain on the rest of the Army and assist Britain in attaining strate-
gic sufficiency.
4
FARELF and the Malayan
Emergency, 1948–50
The beginning of armed insurrection in Malaya placed an enormous

strain on the British Army, which at the time was in the midst of a major
reorganization to create Montgomery’s new citizen army. Despite the
‘parlous state’ of the Army, the government and the Chiefs of Staff
squeezed it to produce reinforcements not only for Malaya, but begin-
ning in April 1949, for Hong Kong as well. By early 1950, the Malayan
and Hong Kong contingencies had devoured all the Army’s available
combat formations.
The government clearly had to do something in response to the out-
break of insurrection in one of their most economically valuable
colonies. Initial estimates of the situation indicated that the problem
was little more than a serious outbreak of the sort of dacoity – organized
robbery – endemic to parts of Malaya, Burma, and India. That was a
familiar Imperial policing problem that could be easily handled by avail-
able police and military forces. Unfortunately, the Communist insurrec-
tion was qualitatively, quantitatively, and ideologically more formidable
a threat than mere robber gangs. It would take years before the civil
administrative apparatus of the Malayan Federation developed itself to
deal with the problem. In the interim, many of the counterinsurgency
tasks fell on the Army, and in particular, the Gurkhas. In order to make
up for the shortfalls on the civil side, reinforcements equivalent to an
entire division were diverted to Malaya over the course of the first two
years of the Emergency. Yet senior military officials in London and
Singapore did their best to limit the number of troops in Malaya in
consonance with the defensive role accorded the Far East in global
strategy.
51
The Communist threat
The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was a legal entity until the
Federation government banned it as part of emergency measures in June
1948. Its general strategy aimed to destabilize the colonial regime prior to
a Communist take-over and creation of a people’s republic.1 Prior to
1948, the Party had directed its efforts toward disrupting the economy of
Singapore through control of the trade unions, an effort that failed
because of vigorous police work. Thwarted in Singapore, the MCP in early
1948 shifted its focus to Malaya where, under the new, more militant
leadership of Chin Peng, it prepared to follow the Cominform’s new line
of opposition to Western powers.2 At a meeting in March, the party’s
Central Executive Committee approved a new policy of armed struggle.3
While its overt and known leaders went underground, the MCP began
mobilizing guerrilla regiments it had raised during the war with train-
ing and equipment from Force 136, the wartime British Special
Operations Executive (SOE) unit in the Far East. The regiments were
supposed to complete their mobilization by September, at which point
the Communists would initiate an armed general uprising in response
to an expected declaration of emergency measures.4 In the meantime,
the party’s activities would be aimed at increasing violence in the trade
unions struggle, ultimately leading to a national revolutionary war.5
Thus, by June 1948, the predominately Chinese MCP had for some
time been organizing strikes, carrying out industrial sabotage, and
assassinating Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) supporters. It is now believed
that in June 1948 the MCP’s armed forces consisted of approximately
5000 men and women, although other sources cite figures as high as
12 000.6 At the time the British believed there to be ‘up to 600 armed
gangsters and 3000 to 4000 armed guerrillas formed into small units
lurking in and operating from the concealment of the difficult jungle
country of the spine of Malaya’.7 The MCP initially called their guerrilla
forces the Malayan People’s Anti-British Army (MPABA) but renamed
them the Malayan Races’ Liberation Army (MRLA) the following year.8
The MCP’s preparations for armed struggle took place at the same time
that the Russians initiated what British intelligence believed to be a cen-
trally coordinated ‘cold war’ campaign in Europe and Asia.9 The February
Communist coup in Czechoslovakia was followed in short order by
Communist uprisings in Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia, and the Soviet
blockade of Berlin. Nevertheless, when Communist terrorists murdered
three European planters in the north Malayan district of Sungei Siput on
16 June, civil officials in Malaya were still trying to determine if they
actually had an uprising on their hands and who was behind it.10
FARELF and the Malayan Emergency, 1948–50 53
The murders finally galvanized the High Commissioner, Sir Edward

Gent, into declaring a general state of emergency on 18 June.11 Up to
that point, FARELF’s role had been limited to providing a few Imperial
troops to assist police against what was thought to be an ‘unruly element
of the KMT’ in North Perak. As much in the dark as was the government,
Ritchie claims to have had no prior warning of a Communist uprising
from the civil government.12 Indeed, he later wrote that it was ‘not
until the evening of the 22nd June 1948 that I was apprised by the civil
authorities of the conditions of unrest existing in MALAYA’.13 Despite
the fact that the Cold War was by that time well underway in Malaya,
all of the military services were surprised by the insurrection.14 Ritchie
was clearly irritated by this, having just returned from London where
he had told Montgomery that ‘Malaya could be regarded as the one
relatively stable area in an otherwise disturbed South East Asia’.15
There is little doubt that there had been an intelligence failure of large
proportions, the causes of which ranged from loss of records during the
Japanese occupation, to bureaucratic rivalry between the police Special
Branch and the colonial government’s Malayan Security Service
(MSS).16 In 1948 the only existing intelligence coordination mecha-
nism was the BDCC(FE)’s Joint Intelligence Committee, on which sat
members of both MI5 and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), but not,
apparently, members of either Special Branch or the MSS.17 The Army
had its own intelligence organization under the FARELF Director of
Military Intelligence, elements of which had reported evidence of the
impressment of young men into guerrilla units as early as May 1946.18
An additional problem was that British intelligence organs had practi-
cally no agents in the Chinese community from which the MCP drew
the bulk of its members. What little information they did have was low-
level, operational intelligence provided by Malays, Indians, and KMT
Chinese.19 Consequently, FARELF intelligence documents of 1948/49
contained no information obtained from within the MCP or its armed
forces, and very little order of battle data.20 The problems of the Far East
intelligence community were such that for nearly two years the British
had little information of the MCP’s goals, strategy, organization, or
strength.21 In 1949 Ritchie could only extrapolate that the MCP was
probably following the ‘regular technique’ of the Cold War which the
British had deduced from Communist activity in Greece, Indochina,
and China. This they discerned as a four-phased campaign beginning
with terrorism in selected areas leading to the inhabitants’ loss of
confidence in government security forces and creation of guerrilla base
areas. This activity was also intended to ‘tie down security forces in
small packets in defensive static roles, and to disrupt the economy of
the country’. It was thought phase two was an increasing level of

terrorism and the impressment of inhabitants in dominated areas into
the Communist forces. Phase three consisted of training, organizing,
and equipping newly recruited forces while simultaneously infiltrating
surrounding areas in order to disrupt them prior to further advances.
The fourth and final phase was an advance from the base areas ‘in the
form of normally organised, equipped and trained forces’.22
The MCP was known to have contact with, and receive general direc-
tion from, the Hong Kong-based South China Bureau of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP).23 Moreover, credible reports of armed and
uniformed Chinese traveling toward, and massing along, the Malayan
border with Siam only heightened British anxiety about a Communist
corridor from China to Malaya.24 The Communist party was legal in
Siam, and the government there had only limited recourse or resources
to direct against forces in the border region.25 Chinese Communists in
Siam were known to be an off-shoot of the main party in China and
were likely in touch with the MCP and other Southeast Asian Chinese
Communists. Additionally, the presence of an overly large Russian
embassy in Bangkok led to speculation of possible Soviet direction of
Communist activity in the area.26 All this intelligence led to specula-
tion that the MRLA was using southern Siam as a base area from which
to infiltrate men and weapons into Malaya.27 Given the nature of the
area’s terrain and its size, the Army’s ability to interdict this line of sup-
ply was extremely limited.
FARELF and the British response
Malcolm MacDonald’s call upon the Services to aid the civil power
caught Ritchie and FARELF unprepared for an internal security campaign.
The two most important questions facing the C-in-C were what could he
do to help, and with what resources. Theoretically, the military should
have been only supporting civil police operations, but the Malayan police
at the outset of the Emergency did not possess the necessary man-
power, training, or equipment to combat an organized Communist
guerrilla force. Hence the Army felt obliged in the beginning to ‘take
the lead in the planning and execution of operations until the civil
police [were] sufficiently strengthened to take their proper place’.28
Through the provision of training, arms, vehicles, uniforms, radios and
the men to run them, FARELF played a key role in preparing the police
to meet the threat.29
As Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, MacDonald understand-

ably feared that the main focus of Communist attack would be targets
vital to the economy of Malaya: tin mines and rubber plantations. In an
emergency meeting on 22 June, he suggested the Security Forces find a
way to provide a small guard detail for each potential target.30 Both the
police and military refused, as they did not have the manpower to do so
even for a short period of time. Based upon his assessment of Communist
and government tactics in both China and Indochina, Ritchie was con-
vinced the Security Forces had to gain the initiative immediately. If they
did not and chose instead to deploy in a defensive, relatively static man-
ner in which forces were split into small details, they would lose the
confidence of the people, lose ground to the ‘bandits’, and be faced with
a protracted, possibly losing, campaign.
Ritchie and Boucher, the GOC Malaya, therefore pressed MacDonald
to allow the Army to begin mobile operations designed to break-up and
harry Communist forces with the aim of preventing their organization
into large units. In consultation with the other members of the
BDCC(FE), Ritchie planned for a two-phased operation. The first phase
would be to restore morale throughout the country by providing pro-
tection for isolated communities and driving the MRLA back into the
jungle by joint police, Army and RAF operations.31 In addition, the
authorities posted armed guards, including partially trained troops, at
key facilities, vulnerable points, and some of the larger estates and
mines. Senior military officers met frequently with leading civilians to
keep them informed and build confidence.32 On the civil side, both the
Singapore and Federation governments established a special constabulary
and stepped up police recruiting and training, including the eventual
incorporation of members of the recently defunct Palestine Police.33
Malaya’s European community was replete with ex-service personnel,
all of whom had opinions, often voiced in the press, about how the
Army should do its job. Ritchie advised his commanders to take steps
to check such criticism, and that training be given to leaders in how to
handle public relations, for as he correctly surmised, it would become a
fixture of the Cold War.34
Ritchie’s phase two was the destruction of the ‘guerrilla and terrorist
gangs.’35 If all went well, phase one would be completed in three
months (that is, sometime in September), but some minor adjustments
of theater resources were required. To better support ground and air
operations, Air Command Far East (ACFE) required an additional three
flights of air observation aircraft and a squadron headquarters. Two of
the three British infantry battalions in theater were due to redeploy to
the UK, without replacement, beginning in October. As long as phase

one operations continued to go well, the number of troops would be
sufficient, so the loss of these two battalions at that time would be
acceptable, as long as the scheduled arrival of an armored car regiment
(4 Hussars) was pushed forward so that it arrived prior to the departure
of the first British infantry battalion.36
But what if all did not go well in phase one? ‘If Phase 1 goes badly
additional forces up to one Division may be needed for Phase 2 and we
request that preliminary action be taken to earmark the necessary troops
for this.’37 Ritchie hoped to be able to provide the Chiefs of Staff with a
more accurate forecast for phase two requirements in late July, after
phase one operations were well underway.38 Besides the political fall-out
from such a deployment, there was the larger and more practical prob-
lem that no division was available. Of those then in existence – 1
Infantry Division in the Middle East; 2 Infantry and 7 Armoured
Divisions in Germany – none was up to strength or ready for anything
other than occupation and guard duties.39 In the UK, the home army
was completely consumed by the effort to build-up the reserves.40
But what of the units under Ritchie’s command? The C-in-C initially
thought he had enough men for the job, but they certainly weren’t
trained or ready for the role. The Brigade of Gurkhas – the main source
of Army manpower in Malaya – was still in the process of re-forming and
training new recruits. In addition, Gurkha and British units in theater
were at ‘lower establishment’, which meant that they contained only
the minimum number of personnel required to form a unit. The 1st
Battalion of the Suffolk Regiment (1 Suffolk), for example, had less
than 400 men of its full complement of 840.41 The same situation
applied to the seven Gurkha battalions in Malaya. As of June 1948,
they could field a combined force of only 2800 actual trained infantry-
men out of what should have been a regular peacetime establishment
of 5040 combat soldiers.42 Furthermore, of the 2800 Gurkhas, 550 were
from the two battalions of 7 GR which at the time were undergoing
conversion from infantry to artillery.43 Clutterbuck estimates that
when the three under-strength British and two Malay Regiment battal-
ions are added to the Gurkhas, the security forces mustered only 4000
infantrymen for operations, about 1000 less than the guerrillas’ esti-
mated strength.44 The Malayan Police had nearly 10 000 men, but
because there were unavoidable regular police requirements, the
Deputy Commissioner could release no more than 1000 constables for
the guarding of rubber estates and tin mines.45
In June 1948, then, the guerrillas and Security Forces were almost of
equal size, though the former had the advantage of jungle cover to
hide their whereabouts and provide concealment for attacks.46 Here

again the want of useful intelligence was telling, for without it the
Security Forces could not employ economy of force, relying instead on
large, battalion-sized sweeps or encirclement operations. Such operations
proved successful at first, harrying as they did the guerrillas from their
camps, interdicting supplies, and forcing them to disperse into smaller
groups.47 But, as had been the case in the recently concluded Palestine
campaign, many British commanders continued to employ large-scale
operations long after their effectiveness had passed, in part because
they did not have the information they needed to better target their
efforts.48 Enemy dispersal put a premium on intelligence and required
security forces to follow a tactical doctrine based on aggressive
patrolling, which British units adopted only at a slow pace.
Ritchie’s immediate problems remained largely two-fold. The first
was the possible need for reinforcements based not upon his own
assessment, but upon repeated requests from MacDonald and the High
Commissioner. Following an exchange on the subject between
Alexander and the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones, the Chiefs
of Staff informed Ritchie on 14 July that there could be no thought of
him receiving a division as reinforcement for phase two. They had
instead earmarked only one brigade group for deployment to Malaya,
and were examining the possibility of earmarking a second.49 Both
Creech Jones and the Chiefs stressed that:
it would be far preferable to make certain that Phase I does not go

badly. In other words we want to strike hard from the start to make
sure that we are not forced [sic] with one of those lingering guerilla
campaigns which are so disheartening, and so exhausting in both
money and men. This in turn means that adequate forces should be
provided as early as possible.
As an expedient, Ritchie now sent both the 1st Battalion, Seaforth

Highlanders (1 Seaforth) and 1/2 GR from Singapore to Johore, leaving
only two companies of the 1st Battalion, the Devonshire Regiment
(1 Devon) and a volunteer coast artillery unit to deal with any trouble
in the island colony.50 Feeling exposed with so minuscule a reserve,
Ritchie at the end of July ordered the 1st Battalion, Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers (1 Inniskilling) from Hong Kong to Singapore, where they
arrived on 4 August.51 Ritchie too began to consider the need for exter-
nal reinforcement after guerrillas attacked and briefly occupied Malaya’s
only coal mine, Batu Arang, on 13 July, wrecking equipment, carrying
out assassinations and ambushes, and pilfering medical supplies and
explosives.52 In yet another indication of the shortage of trained

troops, gunners from the 26th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, acting in
an infantry role, had to support the police counter-attack.53
‘Ferret Force’
The acting High Commissioner, Sir Alec Newboult, was ‘extremely

worried’ about the morale of European planters and Chinese estate
managers.54 MacDonald was therefore quite pleased – almost relieved –
to hear about the intra-theater reinforcements. His own recent news
and tours of Malaya seemed to reveal a real shortage of troops for con-
ducting cordon and search operations and the manning of road blocks.
‘If it were possible,’ he wrote to Ritchie on 15 July, ‘to speed up the
arrival of the reinforcements which you have decided to bring here,
that would be helpful from various points of view.’55 But Ritchie had
no more troops to redeploy to Malaya.56 Should they be required, any
further reinforcements would have to come from outside the theater or
be raised from scratch in Malaya.57 Furthermore, any such troops
would be unversed in jungle warfare methods; indeed, few FARELF
troops were proficient at this style of warfare, and no unit was cur-
rently trained or efficient at it. So it was that in early July Ritchie, tak-
ing advantage of the presence of numerous Force 136 veterans in
Malaya, authorized Boucher’s creation of a secret jungle guerrilla
force.58 Called ‘Ferret Force’, Ritchie intended it only as a stop-gap
means of locating and attacking the Communist guerrillas in the jun-
gle and thereby driving them into areas where the Army and
police could destroy them.59 It was hoped the veterans’ knowledge of
the jungle and the guerrillas’ methods, gleaned from having served
with them in the war, would prove effective in locating MRLA main
force units.
While Ferret Force was still undergoing training, the guerrillas in
mid-July launched another major attack, this time aimed at the north-
ern town of Gua Masang. Having quickly taken the police station, they
held the town for five days, ambushing one of the relieving columns
before finally being driven out by ground troops and RAF Spitfires.60
MacDonald was understandably anxious about the state of affairs. The
build-up and training of the police could not possibly be effected soon
enough to make a difference. He felt the only way to maintain civilian
morale was through further military reinforcements.61 Following their
discussion two days earlier in which Ritchie had said it might be possible
to speed the arrival of 1 Inniskilling by a few days, MacDonald now
asked that this be done, as well as another request to urge the earliest
possible arrival of 4 Hussars.62 In addition, he suggested that:
We ask now for whatever additional strength you … think necessary

for reasonable ‘over insurance’. On Saturday [17 July] we decided to
postpone this decision for a week or two, until we knew more about
the enemy’s likely strength. I think the Kelantan [that is, Gua
Masang] affair should make up our minds.63
Representatives of the tin and rubber industries were also demanding

reinforcements. They had met with Newboult to assert that if the situa-
tion was not resolved in a few months’ time, they could not guarantee
to continue production. Newboult cabled this information to Creech
Jones on 14 July, who officially informed the Cabinet on the 19th.64
Despatch of the ‘fire brigade’
Based largely on the need to counter an expected September offensive

revealed in captured guerrilla documents, in late July Ritchie decided
to call for extra-theater reinforcements.65 For some unknown reason,
however, the request for reinforcements was not made formally until 9
August.66 The BDCC(FE)’s cable to the Chiefs of Staff stated that rein-
forcements were needed in order to maintain British prestige in the Far
East, civilian morale, and the economic functioning of the country. It
noted that the guerrillas would not wait for completion of the police
expansion program, and the situation in China was such that the
Hong Kong garrison would likely need to be restored to full strength by
the end of the year. FARELF had also to consider its responsibility for
evacuating British nationals from China, Burma, and India, missions
that might require at least a battalion for each operation.67 Lastly,
coups and counter-coups in Siam raised the possibility of a further
deterioration of border security. Even though ‘the situation in
Malaya … appears to be getting better’, Army forces were spread too
thin on the ground, and the continued deployment of Gurkha recruits
on guard details had effectively halted all recruit training as well as the
conversion of 7 GR to artillery.68 With such full deployment it was
impossible to give troops any rest and in time this would likely affect
their efficiency. The BDCC(FE) therefore requested the despatch of the
brigade group supposedly earmarked by the Chiefs of Staff.69
When the Chiefs of Staff met on the 11 September to discuss the
request, Montgomery made it abundantly clear that the dispatch to
Malaya of the brigade group would denude Britain of any deployable

combat formations.70 The first of three contingency ‘fire brigades’
would only be ready in September, the other two in November and
February 1949, respectively. The formation of even these units was not
assured because of other ongoing commitments. Two of the battalions
earmarked for the brigade to be ready for November were in fact in
Malaya, their return held up by the Emergency. With the current crisis
over Berlin and disturbances in the Middle East, Montgomery asked
whether the situation in Malaya really warranted the dispatch of
Britain’s only reserve force. He reiterated these concerns at the Defence
Committee meeting of 13 August, informing the members of the risks
involved in sending the Army’s only available brigade to the Far East.71
Western Europe and the Middle East were not safe and there was no
doubt the latter would require ‘any reinforcements we had … very
soon’. Yet neither of these areas was currently ‘alight’ the way Malaya
was. ‘In Malaya,’ expounded the CIGS, ‘the trouble was not only of
local origin, but was instigated by Chinese Communists and kept going
by Communist reinforcements from across the Siamese border.’ British
nationals were being killed in Malaya, while in Burma a third of the
army had gone over to the Communists, endangering British interests
there. Montgomery said the risks involved with sending the reinforce-
ments should be accepted, although there should be no illusion of
their doing anything other than stabilizing the situation. A long-term
solution would require a ‘thorough reorganisation of the internal secu-
rity forces of the Colonies in the Far East, including such measures as
the establishment of a Home Guard and reinforcement and reorganisa-
tion of the police’. He warned that the matter could not be resolved
with anything less than three, possibly four divisions, which Britain
simply had not got. Montgomery’s recommendation carried and the
committee voted to send the reinforcements.72
The War Office immediately began preparations to send the first fire
brigade. Despite the assurances a month earlier that a brigade had been
earmarked for service, 2 Guards Brigade’s constituent units only
received notification of their role after the Defence Committee meeting
on 13 August. In fact, no brigade even existed: the three battalions of
the ‘brigade’ were drawn ad hoc from under-strength Guards regiments
engaged in ceremonial duties in London and Windsor.73 It was only on
the 13 August that the formation of a brigade headquarters was even
authorized, and cross-posting up to establishment from other battal-
ions of the same regiment could begin.74 With many of its young
Guardsmen only barrack trained for London duties, 2 Guards Brigade

set sail for Singapore on 5 September.75
Training
With reinforcements on the way, Ritchie now directed his attention to

the state of training of FARELF units. Unit training had been much
hampered even before the Emergency by the post-war personnel draw-
downs, transfers to fill service support units, and the requirement to
guard the massive stores of the Singapore base.76 The shortage of
trained manpower was so acute in June 1948 that almost all Gurkha
recruits, including those who had not even learned to fire their rifles,
were posted on guard duties,77 a serious disruption to the recruits’
nine-month training program.78 The situation was no better in British
units. There the presence of new National Servicemen and young regu-
lars presented a ‘serious training problem’.79 The Guards were not
immune to the problem, for they arrived in Malaya in October 1948
with some personnel ‘quite unfit, through lack of service and training,
to go straight into operations’.80
Operations in Malayan jungle presented problems of fieldcraft that
could only be solved through specialized training. Ritchie hoped to
solve both the training and the junglecraft problems through Ferret
Force. Once its groups had achieved their initial objectives and reached
a high standard for jungle operations, the force was to be disbanded
and its members returned to their parent units to form special Ferret-
type companies in each battalion. These were intended to act as a
cadre which would spread doctrine and technique to the other com-
panies of their battalions.81 To train Ferret Force, Ritchie chose
Lieutenant-Colonel (later General Sir) Walter Walker, a Burma veteran
and perfectionist from 6 GR. Following a demonstration in August, an
impressed Ritchie ordered Walker to set up a jungle warfare school
that would train the soon-to-arrive Guards brigade.82 Walker estab-
lished the new FARELF Training Center (FTC) at Tampoi Barracks, an
abandoned lunatic asylum with accommodation for two battalions
near Johore Bahru, northwest of Singapore.83 From its inception the
FTC trained cadres from battalions arriving in theater. Two courses
were run, one for officers and another for NCOs. When a cadre’s level
of training met Walker’s approval, it then returned to its battalion
where it trained the rest of the troops using the same course material.84
Officers took back to their battalions copies of the précis which Walker
had drawn up, and in this way the ‘doctrine [was] spread and the
troops … trained’.85
The Gurkha Division
By the end of 1948, the number of guerrilla incidents had dropped and
the situation seemed to be under control. Ritchie therefore returned his
attention to the development of 17 Gurkha Division. At the end of
November he wrote two letters to the Undersecretary of State for War
inquiring about the assumptions upon which he was to base the future
development of the division. He also recommended that the size of the
permanent garrison be increased in Malaya to one division and two
brigades of the Malay Regiment and one independent brigade group in
Hong Kong.86 He asked if the division was still supposed to be an
‘Imperial Reserve Force’ for use anywhere in the world, and more
importantly, if his understanding was correct that any Gurkha units
sent out of the theater in wartime would be replaced by the TA or other
formations from outside the theater.87 Ritchie understood that the
mobilization and deployment of a TA division to the Far East would
take a minimum of six months. If 17 Gurkha Division had to await the
arrival of its relief before deploying to the Middle East, there would be
a period of six months in which the only division of all regular troops
in the British Army would not be available for operations in the
expected main theater of war.
Ritchie’s inquiry reveals a lack of knowledge on his part of JPS and
Chiefs of Staff plans for war in the near future. This ignorance is
explained by the fact that these plans were not released to the Far East,
and that the underlying planning assumptions appear to have taken
some time to be transmitted to FARELF.88 The exact reason remains
unclear but may have been tied either to a reconfiguring of plans fol-
lowing ABC planning discussions,89 recent events in the Chinese civil
war, or perhaps some concern about the security of information shared
with Australians in Singapore.90 In any event, the Chiefs’ reply of 10
January 1949, confirmed Ritchie’s understanding that the Gurkhas
would be replaced by troops from outside the theater in the event of a
future global war, but offered no details.91
Plans for a war that broke out within the next 12 months differed
from the main plan and reflected the fragmented state of the Gurkhas
as a division in name only. The JPS reported to the Chiefs of Staff that
the Gurkha Division was to remain in the Far East in the event of war
in the near future, although 2 Guards Brigade would move to the
Middle East between three to six months after the outbreak of hostili-
ties.92 None of these details was included in the 10 January letter to
Ritchie. As to clearing up the ambiguities about the Gurkha division,
the JPS informed the Chiefs of Staff that the ‘future and composition of
the division as part of our long term military force is still under
review’.93 The exigencies of Malaya and the Far East had not only upset
the original plans for the Gurkha division, they had also affected over-
all military strategy, albeit in a way the British must have thought only
temporary. Although not explicitly recognized or understood at the
time, the British had begun to create separate strategies for both ‘cold’
and ‘hot’ war.
Local defense forces
The Gurkha division could act as a strategic reserve only if the internal
security situation in Malaya was under control. British long-term strat-
egy envisioned the police and Malay Regiment being responsible for
internal security and local defense, but the MCP’s armed struggle had
waylaid this plan. Both the Malay Regiment and the police had been
shown to be numerically and operationally inadequate at the begin-
ning of the Emergency, and the planned expansion of both forces
would take time to effect. However, the Federation could not afford
further expansion, so a proposal to raise an additional battalion to
serve as a frontier force on the border with Siam went nowhere.94 Nor
was financial help to speed expansion likely to be forthcoming from
the British government. In a December 1948 meeting chaired by Attlee,
ministers agreed that colonial governments should pay for their own
internal security and local defense forces. In this way it was hoped to
lessen Britain’s share of Commonwealth defense. But as Creech Jones
pointed out in January 1949, this policy did not consider the extraordi-
nary internal security burdens imposed by the Cold War on colonial
territories. It was in the colonies that the Cold War was being fought,
even though ‘the real object of the attack’ was in fact the United
Kingdom.95 Thus he urged that expenses in certain situations, such as
in Malaya, be met from the Treasury.
As if on cue, the CIC(FE) cabled the Chiefs of Staff to request British
funding for an expansion of the Malay Regiment:
We consider the possible need to reinforce Hong Kong, together

with the situation in Malaya, makes it desirable that the higher
number of Malay Regiment battalions, i.e., a total of six, should be

raised and that the fourth battalion be raised this year.96
The Chiefs, concerned that there was no formed reserve in the Far East
available for emergencies in Hong Kong, Shanghai, Burma, or India, rec-
ommended to Alexander that steps be taken to raise the fourth battalion
immediately.97 The Colonial Office duly incorporated this recommen-
dation into a memo on internal security forces which the Chiefs subse-
quently included in an April joint report on colonial forces.98 In
March, Lieutenant-General (later Field Marshal Sir) Gerald Templer, the
VCIGS, urged the Chiefs of Staff to take immediate action to begin the
formation of the fourth battalion.99 Under the combined pressure of
the Ministry of Defence and Colonial Office, the Treasury eventually
provided the necessary funds for the regiment to begin formation of
the new battalion in July 1949, which became operational at the end
of the year.100
Throughout the first few months of 1949, Ritchie also maintained a
dialogue with the War Office over the size of the permanent garrison.
Once he learned that the conversion of 7 GR to artillery was to be termi-
nated,101 he argued that FARELF needed four British infantry battalions,
one for each of the four brigades in the division.102 ‘Experience,’ he
wrote, ‘has proved that [this] was the ideal organisation for a Brigade’
and would allow him to have one British infantry battalion in each
major FARELF area of responsibility: Hong Kong, Singapore, and North
and South Malaya.103 He thought such an arrangement ‘a sound frame-
work for the internal situation [sic] role’.104
In July 1949, the War Office agreed to his request for a total of four
British battalions.105 This would give FARELF four infantry brigades of
one British and two Gurkha battalions each, of which one brigade
would be in Hong Kong. The command would retain its existing
British artillery and armored car units, while Gurkhas would form the
division’s engineer, signals, and military police units.106 The service
troops would remain LEP with British cadres.
Whence the additional British troops would be made available is not
revealed, but it seems more than likely that an increase in the length of
active duty for National Servicemen from 12 to 18 months would be
the chief source. At the end of his tour as CIGS, Montgomery insti-
gated the extension of National Service by threatening Attlee with the
resignation of the Army Council en bloc.107 As the new CIGS, Slim
inherited the issue in November 1948. He supported Montgomery’s
and the Council’s position, and convinced Attlee that the shortfalls in
regular recruiting and continuing overseas commitments, especially in

the Far East, demanded the extension.108 Hence less than two months
before the peacetime National Service scheme was due to go into effect,
it had been radically altered from a means solely to develop a powerful
reserve army into a source of manpower for contingency operations.
While the war scare engendered by the Berlin blockade was one of the
reasons behind the extension, the difficulties surrounding the raising
and despatch of 2 Guards Brigade to Malaya had been foremost on the
minds of the Chiefs of Staff.109
A new C-in-C shakes things up
By the summer of 1949 the situation in Malaya appeared under control

to Ritchie as he prepared to leave FARELF for the British Joint Services
Mission in Washington. He felt satisfied with progress to date, believ-
ing the Security Forces had wrested the initiative away from the guerril-
las and thereby maintaining the economy at a high level.110 Guerrilla
‘incidents’ had dropped from their 1948 level, a number of ‘killer
squads’ had been eliminated, and the guerrillas appeared to be with-
drawing into the jungle as per Ritchie’s campaign plan.111 With the
arrival of 2 Guards Brigade, FARELF became the largest active service
command in the British Army. The expansion of the Malay Regiment,
the permanent assignment of 12 British and Gurkha infantry battal-
ions, and the resumption of training for the Gurkha division’s support
elements could all be counted on the plus side of the balance sheet.
True, he had grave concerns over developments in Burma, French
Indochina, and Hong Kong in particular, but with respect to Malaya
he probably felt he was leaving it in as good a state as could be expec-
ted. He was relieved in early August by Lieutenant-General Sir John
Harding.112
Having had a round of briefs from Slim and various departments in
Whitehall, the new C-in-C arrived in Singapore expecting to ‘find the
situation improving and the task of the army diminishing’.113 That he
was disabused of this assumption shortly after his arrival is clear.
Lengthy and frequent discussions with his BDCC(FE) colleagues and
tours of his command revealed that all was not well.114 He found that
the troops’ level of junglecraft and marksmanship was low, the police
were ineffective, and that the Communists were gaining more and
more control of the Malayan Chinese population. Perhaps worst of all
was his perception that there was ‘no sense of … operational urgency in
the civil administration’.115
Harding first focused on immediate administrative requirements.

Having assessed the War Office plan for the permanent garrison,
Harding sent a letter to the Undersecretary at the end of August recom-
mending changes for Hong Kong and Malaya.116 Among other things,
he proposed beginning a training roulement between units in Malaya
and Hong Kong. The weather and terrain in Hong Kong permitted con-
ventional, combined arms warfare training which would help prepare
the division for its warfighting role. Malaya would continue to afford
jungle warfare and internal security training and experience.117 In fol-
low-on discussions with the War Office, Harding’s Chief of Staff, Major-
General John Kirkman, used the issue of provision of mobilization
round-out units as the thin end of a wedge to question the validity of
moving the Gurkha division out of the theater in war.118 Reflecting
Harding’s and the FARELF staff’s thinking, Kirkman questioned
‘whether it is sound and economical’ to move the division if that move
would occur only after relief by a TA division from Britain. ‘It would
seem wasteful in shipping, and at a time when shipping is bound to be
in short supply, to bring a Division all the way out from home past the
Middle East and then move the Gurkha Division to the Middle East.’119
He pointed out that the nature of Malayan terrain and lack of training
areas would not permit the training of the Gurkha division ‘up to the
standard of normal warfare’.120 The relieving TA division would proba-
bly have had more of an opportunity to train for the Middle East than
the Gurkhas, who would likely have to be re-trained upon arrival in-
theater. Kirkman went on to warn that the presence of Gurkha troops
in the Middle East would also ‘cause complications’ for MELF because
they required special rations and hospital arrangements, interpreters,
and a separate line of communications to Malaya for personnel.
Gurkha recruits to replace war wastage would have to move from
Nepal to Malaya for initial training, and thence to the Middle East, cre-
ating a further administrative burden. And, as Ritchie had pointed out
the previous year, the current Gurkha ceiling and recruiting arrange-
ments did not provide for any immediate reinforcements or a
reserve.121 The directors of the Army General Staff discussed Kirkman’s
arguments in a meeting at the end of February.122 Apparently unfazed
by Kirkman’s arguments against redeploying the Gurkha division from
the Far East, the General Staff, with the backing of Slim, confirmed
that the ultimate goal for the division was still for it to be able to oper-
ate as an Imperial strategic reserve available anywhere overseas within
six months of mobilization day.123
A fillip to the MCP: Communist victory in China
At the end of 1949, Harding felt compelled to institute a rest and

re-training program in Malaya by which three battalions at a time were
withdrawn from the jungle. His intention was to restore morale and
raise the efficiency of units that for the most part had been on active
service without a break for over a year. This led to a drop in the number
of troops taking part in operations, and might have been acceptable
had the security situation remained the same, but it had not.124 Ever
since the end of 1949 the number of incidents had been climbing, a
trend that would accelerate in early 1950.125
The end of the decade was host to a series of regional events that had
a profound and grave effect on the counter-guerrilla campaign and the
public’s morale. Chief among these was the proclamation of the
Central People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949. Besides giving a
propaganda and morale boost to the MCP, the Communist victory in
China brought PLA troops to the border with Hong Kong, Indochina,
and Burma. It also effectively eliminated deportation of Communist
sympathizers from Malaya to China as a counter-insurgency tool.126
Yet with significant business and property interests in China, Britain
faced a pressing need to decide whether or not to recognize the new
regime. In a memorandum of 24 October 1949, Bevin had recom-
mended granting recognition primarily to safeguard substantial British
commercial interests in China.127 Because recognition would create a
‘special problem’ in Malaya’s Chinese community, the Foreign
Secretary did not wish to proceed without first hearing from military
and political officials scheduled to meet in Singapore in November.128
Most of the officials in Singapore agreed early recognition was appro-
priate.129 However, it appears that both Gurney and Harding were
opposed to the admittance of Chinese Communist consular officers,
and possibly to recognition as well.130 In fact, there was a general con-
cern about the mischief these consuls could inspire, prompting a
request to the Foreign Office for rapid expulsion of any consular offi-
cial conducting illicit activity. Moreover, the conferees suggested that
the introduction of these consuls be delayed by any feasible con-
trivance for the duration of the Emergency.131 They also believed
‘recognition of a Chinese Communist Government in China and
increased resistance to Communism in South-East Asia were not neces-
sarily incompatible’.132 Nevertheless, an extensive propaganda cam-
paign against Chinese Communism was in order, and Britain should
make ‘every effort to minimise the adverse effects of any disagreement

with the United States over recognition’.133
With this input, the Chiefs of Staff reported on 5 December that:
De jure recognition of the Chinese Communist Government is

likely, on balance, to have an adverse effect on our military position
in the Far East and South East Asia. The military disadvantages will
not be sufficient, however, to outweigh any strong political or
economic advantage which might accrue from recognition.134
Their assessment derived from the fact that in war Allied strategy in the
Far East was, with the exception of an American air offensive from
the Ryukyus, defensive.135 The ‘disadvantages’ applied primarily to the
progress of the Cold War and were thought to include the need to pro-
vide additional military assistance to Siam, Burma, and Indochina; dete-
rioration in Singapore’s security situation and the concomitant need to
reinforce it; and confrontation with Nationalist forces.136 The Chiefs
specifically warned against recognizing the Central Peoples’ Republic
before the new Bao Dai regime in Vietnam. To do so ‘might be fatal to
his administration and lead to serious difficulties for the French, possibly
resulting in their early withdrawal from Indo-China.’137 Such a course
of events would, they believed, seriously jeopardize the British position
in Malaya and Singapore (see Chapter 9).
Despite these caveats and the policy split it portended with the
United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa, the
Attlee Government moved ahead with recognition in an effort
intended in part to be in line with Indian policy in Asia.138 The effect
in Malaya was to undercut open support of the Federation government
by ethnic Chinese and led to the (not incorrect) perception that Britain
had ‘weakened their position in Malaya for the sake of Hong Kong’.139
Pro-British Chinese in Malaya believed the presence of Communist
consuls would subject their relatives in China to retaliation and they
themselves identified for assassination.140 Given these concerns,
Gurney, with the full backing of Harding and MacDonald, prevailed
upon Whitehall to deny entry to the consuls for the duration of the
Emergency.141
Renewed call for reinforcements
The prospect of Communist consuls occurred just as the MRLA com-

pleted reorganizing and retraining in preparation for a new offensive.
Harding’s earlier removal of three battalions for rest and retraining,

necessary though it may have been, unwittingly exacerbated the secu-
rity situation at the wrong time.142 The resurgence of guerrilla activity
in areas previously thought cleared by the Army revealed the existence
of a virulent guerrilla support and auxiliary infrastructure called the
Min Yuen (‘Masses’ Organization’), which preyed on the vulnerable
Chinese squatter population.143 By control and intimidation of the
squatters, guerrilla losses in men and money were often made good
after the Army moved on to another area. Although by 10 February the
Security Forces had some indication that the deterioration in security
could become ‘serious’, a BDCC(FE) memorandum a day later made no
mention of any special requirements to handle the situation.144
On the same day the BDCC(FE) circulated its memo, Gurney cabled
Creech Jones relaying startling intelligence reports: up to 1000 Chinese
Communists had landed on the southeast coast of Siam in order to
cross into Malaya.145 Furthermore, 11 staff officers of the People’s
Liberation Army had reportedly infiltrated Malaya from Siam to act as
agitators and trainers. He also passed on a report that China was rais-
ing a force of 2500 deportees for guerrilla operations in Malaya. The
accuracy and veracity of these reports is questionable, but at the time
they served to buttress earlier demands by both Gurney and Boucher
for reinforcements of as many as six infantry battalions.146 Gurney
now formally requested the BDCC(FE) consider his request for
reinforcements.147
Harding was generally opposed to reinforcements. He was convinced
that the least effective part of the counterinsurgency effort was on the
civil side, for it did little or nothing in areas cleared by his troops. He
thought some use could be made of additional troops but told the War
Office that ‘they would not pay a full dividend unless and until’ there
had been improvement in police intelligence and a speed-up of civil
measures in cleared areas, especially with regard to the resettlement of
squatters.148 Harding had also concluded that the current counterinsur-
gency set-up in Malaya had to be changed. Neither Gurney nor his
police commissioner were capable of running the show while simulta-
neously addressing their other responsibilities. He became convinced
that a single director of operations with authority over all civil, police,
and military forces in Malaya was needed in order to achieve success.149
Of this he was able to convince MacDonald, who pitched the idea to
Gurney, who in turn made a formal request to the Colonial Office.150
On 24 February, the BDCC(FE) met to discuss the need for reinforce-
ments. Still unhappy about needing reinforcements, Harding nonetheless
came to agree with Boucher’s appreciation that troops sufficient to

provide a framework for all of Malaya was needed to buy time for
implementation of necessary civil measures. The committee members
admitted that provision of more troops was not the solution to the
problem, that what was needed were civil administrative measures
based on a phased plan to take advantage of reinforcements. The civil
measures were to include the creation of the Director of Operations
post and a strengthening of Special Branch. But reinforcements of some
sort were needed to permit ‘greater military activity to keep the bandits
occupied and so permit civil measures to go ahead at a faster pace’.151
Raising a fifth and sixth battalion of the Malay Regiment would help,
but could not be accomplished in the near term. A lack of British offi-
cers and trained Malay NCOs was slowing the regiment’s expansion,
and the Treasury had not yet approved the necessary funding. The
BDCC(FE) did consider increasing aerial bombardment of suspected
guerrilla camps using existing aircraft and ordnance in the Far East, but
rejected the scheme as being unlikely to have the desired effect.
The committee realized there were few available options for obtaining
additional infantry battalions. For the benefit of the Secretaries of State
for Defence, Commonwealth Relations, and the Colonies, the BDCC(FE)
laid out the chief factors affecting the provision of Army reinforce-
ments as:
(a) No reinforcements can be expected from outside the theatre.

(b) The reinforcements in Hong Kong are not theatre troops but were
specifically allotted to their present task.
(c) Temporary moves between Hong Kong and Malaya cause serious
administrative dislocation and are costly.
(d) [Morale?] May suffer if troops who were sent to Hong Kong specifi-
cally for the defence of that place are brought to Malaya instead of
being sent home.
(e) The lack of balance between the Army at home and overseas is
causing serious damage to the build-up of the Army, its content-
ment, efficiency and recruiting. Consequently, if troops can be
spared from Hong Kong they should be from the Army’s point of
view sent home.
(f) Units and formation employed in anti-bandit operations in Malaya
are seriously handicapped in carrying out their main peacetime
task, namely preparation for war.152
As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the government had already reinforced

FARELF by sending a division to Hong Kong in the summer of 1949 as a
hedge against a possible Communist attack on the colony. The situation
in Hong Kong was stable in the spring of 1950, but all recognized the
possibility that it could change rapidly. Any forces moved to Malaya
from Hong Kong had therefore to be capable of returning at short
notice. Given the factors cited above, the limited air- and sealift
resources of the theater, and the Hong Kong commander’s expectation
that only four to five weeks’ advance notice of an assault on Hong
Kong would be forthcoming, Harding recommended 26 Gurkha
Infantry Brigade be moved from Hong Kong to Malaya, since it formed
part of the regular FARELF garrison.153 The BDCC(FE) also asked the
Chiefs of Staff to bring all infantry battalions and 4 Hussars up to
higher establishment, which would increase the manned strength of
some battalions by as much as 50 per cent.154
When the Chiefs of Staff Committee met on 1 March to discuss the
request, Slim backed all of the BDCC(FE)’s proposals – including
Harding’s idea for an operations director – although he admitted that
moving British FARELF units up to higher establishment could only be
done at the expense of other theaters.155 The rest of the committee
concurred with his proposal to put the BDCC(FE)’s recommendations
forward to the appropriate ministers.156
The Chiefs of Staff also discussed the post of Director of Operations
with Sir Alexander Maxwell, who briefed the findings of his recent trip
to Malaya to investigate police operations.157 In the presence of the
Chiefs and representatives of the Foreign and Colonial Offices,
Maxwell noted Gray’s inability to cope with both the ordinary and
extraordinary demands on the police. Slim thought a lack of ‘unity of
command’ in the Security Forces had led to ‘there [being] two cam-
paigns in Malaya, one conducted by the Army and one by the
police’.158 All present agreed Gurney needed an official to coordinate
operations. The creation of the post was included with the Chiefs’ 2
March recommendations to the Defence Committee.159 With the
approval of Attlee, the new defense minister, Emmanuel Shinwell,
along with Bevin and the new Colonial Secretary, James Griffiths, the
Defence Committee appointed Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs, a
retired Indian Army officer, as the first Director of Operations; author-
ized the transfer of 26 Gurkha Infantry Brigade; and approved the
increase to higher establishment of units in Malaya.160
The security situation continued to deteriorate, however, with major
incidents increasing by 37 per cent from February to March.161 Possibly
influenced by Briggs’ initial assessment and Boucher’s belief that he
needed another three battalions, General Harding produced a new
appreciation of the military situation on 9 April.162 In it he noted not
only the public’s fear of Communist consuls (the exclusion of which at
this point had not yet been settled) but also his belief that the consuls
would ‘constitute a substantial reinforcement for the enemy’.163 In dis-
cussing the increasing volume and effectiveness of guerrilla attacks,
Harding alluded to the intelligence reports of infiltration from Siam
and arrival of PLA staff officers to direct operations and training. The
C-in-C was also concerned about the slip in police morale and the pos-
sibility that labor strife and general disorder might erupt in Singapore,
requiring a diversion of troops from Malaya. Still, he continued to
believe more troops ‘will certainly not pay the full dividend of which
they are capable until the civil administrative follow up resources are
much stronger’. Strong civil measures were crucial to creating a climate of
confidence in which the public, especially the Chinese, would give infor-
mation to the police. Without such information ‘an enormous amount of
military effort is being necessarily absorbed on prophylactic and will o’
the wisp patrolling and jungle bashing and on air bombardments’.
Harding consequently concluded that the only means of giving the
civil and police authorities the ‘breathing space’ needed to implement
‘the decisive measures that they alone can take’ was by providing yet
another brigade. The reinforcements were in part needed because the
move to higher establishment, although authorized, would take some
time.164 He therefore recommended the BDCC(FE) take a series of steps,
chief among them being a request for ministerial authorization to move
3 Commando Brigade from Hong Kong to Malaya, movement by air of a
battalion from Britain to Hong Kong, the ear-marking of other troops for
possible reinforcement, and a fourth (higher establishment) troop for 4
Hussars.165 He also suggested that the committee ask for Treasury financ-
ing of improvements in road, air, and telephone communications, the
prioritization of the supply of British officers to the Malay Regiment,
and reconsideration by the Colonial Office of opening military service in
Malaya to the Indian and Chinese communities.166
The new Director of Operations, Lieutenant-General Sir Harold
Briggs, agreed entirely with Harding’s paper because his new plan was
predicated on the need for more troops.167 He had discerned that the
way to defeat the insurgency was by having the police eliminate the
Min Yuen while the Army destroyed the MRLA. To do this, he proposed
to methodically clear Malaya from south to north by:
(a) dominating the populated areas and building up a feeling of

complete security in them, with the object of obtaining a steady
and increasing flow of information from all sources;
(b) breaking up the Min Yuen within the populated areas;
(c) thereby isolating the bandits from their food and information
supply organisation in the populated areas;
(d) and finally destroying the bandits by forcing them to attack us
on our own ground.168
The Army’s role in the ‘Briggs Plan’ was to establish both a country-
wide framework of troops and patrol bases to help the police dominate
populated areas, as well as to provide striking forces ‘to dominate the
jungle up to about five hours’ journey from potential bandit supply
areas’.169 The Federation was to expand its police and Special Branch,
build roads to isolated population centers, and resettle the Chinese
squatters living on the jungle fringe. Civil administrative officers and
police forces would fill in areas cleared of guerrillas in order to ensure
government control, while executive committees comprised of the senior
civil, police, and Army officials at the district, state, and federal level
would provide the necessary interagency coordination to make the
plan work.170
The Cabinet’s new Malaya Committee discussed Harding’s apprecia-
tion on 19 April.171 Slim endorsed Harding’s request to move 3
Commando Brigade, but refused to allow any more troops from Britain
to go to Malaya or for them to be earmarked. Slim felt ‘it would be
wrong to strip this country of any more troops at a time when it was
most necessary to build up a strategic reserve here’. Those present,
which included the Secretaries of State for Defence, Colonies,
Commonwealth Relations, and War, agreed to the movement of the
Commandos, but ‘only on the understanding that equivalent numbers
of Police would be released from anti-bandit operations in order to
build up the civilian administration’.172
The next day the Chiefs received the BDCC(FE)’s formal request to
move the Commandos from Hong Kong.173 In order to comport with
Briggs’ plan, set to begin 1 June, the BDCC(FE) wanted the first com-
mando to arrive in Malaya no later than the end of May. Harding went
to Hong Kong to personally assess the risk entailed by the move of the
Commandos. He cabled Slim and told him he thought the risk accept-
able and that return of the brigade to Hong Kong in an emergency
should be a matter for the BDCC(FE) to decide.174
Meeting to discuss the BDCC(FE) request in light of Harding’s visit to
Hong Kong, the Chiefs of Staff agreed to move the commando brigade,
assessing the risk to Hong Kong acceptable.175 However, they vowed
that absolutely no more troops were to go to the Far East from Britain,
although the CIGS was thinking of moving an armored car regiment to
Malaya from the Middle East rather than waiting for the dispatch of a
new troop of 4 Hussars. Acting on the recommendations of Harding, the
Chiefs of Staff, and the Malaya Committee, the Prime Minister person-
ally approved the move of the Commandos and of the 13/18 Hussars
(armored cars) from the Middle East to Malaya.176
Conclusion
The Malayan Emergency could not have come at a worse time for the
British Army and FARELF. The requirement for military support in
combating the Communist insurrection in Malaya had a profound
effect on both the reorganization of the British Army and the develop-
ment of 17 Gurkha Division. At the institutional level, the Army’s
embryonic effort to create a strategic reserve in the UK of three
infantry ‘fire brigade’ groups was undercut by Far East contingencies.
The first brigade was despatched to Malaya before it had even formed.
And, as will be shown in the Chapter 5, the second and third brigade
groups were deployed six months later to Hong Kong. In both
instances, the deployments left the UK without a spare combat forma-
tion anywhere in the world, as all existing formations were engaged in
either occupation duties, on active service, or the training of National
Servicemen. The resulting manpower shortage had several effects. First,
the period of National Service with the colours was extended from 12
to 18 months so as to allow service overseas and permit the manning
of FARELF units at higher establishment. Secondly, in the Far East it
engendered a situation of robbing Peter to pay Paul by redeploying
units defending Hong Kong to support the Briggs Plan in Malaya. Yet
even that was not enough and the Defence Committee had to move an
additional armored car regiment from the Middle East to Malaya.
The British did try other means to ameliorate the manpower short-
age. The most obvious avenue of approach was to accelerate existing
plans to build up local defense forces to handle internal security opera-
tions. The Federation did manage to double the number of Malay
Regiment battalions from two to four, but further expansion was
stymied by lack of funds and suitable officers. Efforts to obtain military
assistance from Australia and New Zealand were even less fruitful. Not
only were the standing military forces of these two countries almost
nonexistent, but in the case of Australia the Labour government of
Joseph Chifley was adamantly opposed to any such support to the
British in Malaya. There was, however, a great deal of popular support
in favor of helping the British, and this was translated into action by
the Liberal-Country Party coalition government of Sir Robert Menzies,

which took office in December 1949. Although it would not be until
September 1955 that Australian ground troops would deploy to
Malaya, by May 1950 the Menzies government had approved the pro-
vision of a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) transport squadron for
service in Malaya.177
The employment of Gurkha units to fight the guerrillas was deleterious
but unavoidable. Gurkha units were so understrength at the outset of the
Emergency that FARELF was obliged to use raw recruits to guard vulnera-
ble points. For more than a year, FARELF suspended all training and can-
celled the conversion of 7 GR to artillery. Training was resumed only after
Malaya received reinforcements equivalent to a division that more than
doubled the size of the June 1948 garrison. To those in FARELF and
London who knew that war plans required the Gurkha division to fight
in the Middle East, the effect of the Gurkhas’ involvement in the Malayan
campaign was painfully apparent. By dint of their operational commit-
ment, their adumbrated training, and limitations on their recruitment,
the Gurkhas were not suitable for their intended war role. Events had
conspired to make the Gurkha division an internal security force tethered
to Malaya for the foreseeable future. JPS plans for war in the near term
recognized the fact that the Gurkha division had become a de facto Cold
War force, but for the time being both the Planners and the Chiefs main-
tained the premise that the ultimate goal of the Gurkha division was to
fight the Russians in the Middle East.
That Britain struggled to provide needed reinforcements for Malaya
and Hong Kong is obvious, but the problem was not a shortage of men
in the Army; rather, the difficulty lay in the fact that the Army was in
the midst of reorganizing itself to become a conscript-based reserve
force. Army officials had not taken sufficient care to provide an opera-
tional strategic reserve in Britain because there did not seem to be a
compelling need. Plans existed for the formation of three mobile
brigade groups as a contingency force – the so-called fire brigades – but
they were not ready when the call came. As a result, 2 Guards Brigade
had to be cobbled together at the last minute and despite initial training
deficiencies managed to perform as needed in Malaya.
During the first two years of the Emergency, all the senior military
officers responsible for the campaign – Montgomery and Slim as CIGS,
Ritchie and Harding as C-in-C FARELF – were aware of the risks associ-
ated with sending troops to the Far East from the more strategically
important areas of Western Europe and the Middle East. Their role as
brakemen on the reinforcement train is best summed-up by Slim’s
admonition to his government colleagues about sending more troops to

Malaya. In April 1950 he cautioned that the campaign could ‘devolve
into a bottomless pit, devouring all our resources, and playing straight
into Russia’s hands’.178 Each of these officers did their best to minimize
the diversion of manpower to Malaya, but Ritchie and Harding had an
especially hard time because they had not only to contend with the
demands of colonial officials such as MacDonald and Gurney, but also
with insistent demands from their operational commanders in Malaya.
5
‘To the Last Round’: the Defense
of Hong Kong, 1948–50
The advance of the Peoples’ Liberation Army into South China in 1949
posed a potential threat to Hong Kong. The British government followed
a two track approach to counter this threat. Its first move was to send
an infantry division as a deterrent against attack, which also signified
the government’s secret determination that it would go to war with
China over Hong Kong. Its second move was to seek some level of
accommodation with the Chinese Communists in order to limit its
long-term military liability to Hong Kong. The British hoped that in
according early recognition to the People’s Republic of China it could
preserve their extensive trade interests and assure the continued
economic viability of a British Hong Kong. But they also hoped that by
‘keeping a foot in the door’ they would be able to exploit any possible
Sino-Soviet split. These hopes were dashed by Chinese moves against
British and other Western businesses, but also by Britain’s own actions in
the ‘Amethyst affair’ and in its refusal to back the People’s Republic’s
assumption of the Chinese chair in the United Nations Security Council.
In terms of military strategy, the Cabinet’s 1949 decision to defend
Hong Kong even if it resulted in war was a reversal of its own policy in
which the colony was deemed indefensible in the event of an attack
‘from a major power in occupation of the mainland.’ The defense estab-
lishment justified the risks by qualifying what constituted a ‘major
attack’ in a way which did not contradict established policy. The result
was a transformation of what was a lightly defended outpost into a bas-
tion manned by the only fully operational infantry division then in the
British Army. Along with the continuing reinforcement of Malaya, the
enlargement of Hong Kong Land Forces (HKLF) grew to absorb such a
large proportion of Britain’s few available field formations that it further
retarded the reorganization of the Army and threatened to undermine
77
global strategy by the prospect of war with China. Reinforcement of

Hong Kong was not accompanied by the same sort of soul-searching
that marked the reinforcement of Malaya. Yet the reactive nature of the
reinforcement soon gave way to more sober calculations of strategic
priorities.
The 1946 Hong Kong defense policy
The Japanese capture of Hong Kong in December 1941 unmistakably

demonstrated the military vulnerability of the island colony to a hos-
tile force in possession of the surrounding Chinese mainland. In March
1946, the Chiefs of Staff acknowledged to the Defence Committee the
military vulnerability of the colony and asserted that, in terms of fixed
defenses, the colony henceforth should be regarded as an undefended
port.1 This implied that a full-scale invasion by Nationalist Chinese
troops could not be stopped, although the defense policy for Hong Kong
did not specifically address a threat from either Nationalist or
Communist forces. Instead, the main threats to the colony were seen as
those to its internal security or attacks by pirates or bands of Chinese
guerrillas. Reviving the colony’s pre-war military role and assuming away
Chinese hostility, the Chiefs of Staff nevertheless argued that Hong Kong
should again be regarded as an advanced base for air and naval opera-
tions in a Pacific war.2 In this role the reinforcements necessary to hold
the base against seaward attack would be sent only when the situation
required. Still, there was a need for some minimal defense force for the
colony. The Chiefs therefore recommended that a permanent garrison of
one infantry brigade be left in Hong Kong as protection from piracy, to
deter guerrilla incursions, support internal security operations, and
assist with the use of the colony as an air and naval base should the
need arise.3 Consequently, although the British could not and would not
defend Hong Kong from attack by a ‘major power in occupation of the
Chinese mainland’, they would continue to use it as an advanced naval
base, a fact underscored by the Admiralty’s decision to place the head-
quarters for the British Pacific Fleet not in Singapore, but in Hong Kong.4
Until Communist Chinese forces crossed the Yangtze river into South
China in mid-1949, Hong Kong’s principal military challenge was its
internal security. Unlike in Malaya and other dependent territories, how-
ever, there was no threat expected from any national liberation move-
ment, nor did the British plan to grant the colony independence. This
was due to the unique nature of Hong Kong’s economy and population.
The land frontier between the colony and China carried a flourishing
The Defense of Hong Kong, 1948–50 79
but largely illicit and unregulated trade. There was no real immigration
control on the border and people entered and left the colony more or
less as they pleased.5 Prior to the war, groups of refugees at various times
had made Hong Kong their temporary home, in each instance returning
once the cause of their flight had ended. But this phenomenon changed
after the war when the refugees chose to stay in Hong Kong rather than
return to the turmoil of the mainland. As a result, the colony’s early
postwar population sometimes grew by as much as 100 000 per month,
ultimately increasing the population from 600 000 at war’s end to
nearly 2.4 million by 1950.6 The refugee influx exacerbated the prob-
lems facing the Hong Kong Police, which in more settled periods was
the normal internal security force for the colony. Devastated by the
Japanese occupation, the police were re-established after liberation
with only 321 men, and was desperately short of senior officers.7 A
month after liberation, the military government opened a temporary
police training school that produced over 1100 hastily trained Chinese
officers over the next 18 months.8 In the interim, soldiers, sailors, air-
men, and marines acted in both police and internal security roles;
members of the Army’s Intelligence Corps alone screened up to 2000
refugees a day.9
As Hong Kong began its miraculous recovery, the Chiefs of Staff recon-
sidered the colony’s garrison in terms of the March 1946 policy. They
initially concluded that the Hong Kong garrison should be eliminated
as part of an overall effort to reduce overseas military commitments and
build up the Army at home, while the colony’s internal security prob-
lem could be met adequately by a local gendarmerie.10 Elimination of
the garrison would have been entirely in keeping with colonial defense
policy, which envisioned locally raised forces being used for internal secu-
rity and local defense, while Imperial troops would provide emergency
reserves only in peacetime, and only when conditions permitted. The
relevant plan for Hong Kong called for resurrection of the Hong Kong
Volunteer Defence Force (HKVDF), raising of a small naval auxiliary,
creation of an auxiliary fighter squadron, and development of a civil
defense force.11
The Far East Cs-in-C, along with the Governor of Hong Kong,
strongly protested the plan to eventually remove the Army garrison.12
They argued that Hong Kong’s value as a US dollar earner and as a pos-
sible operational base for the Western Pacific made it worth keeping
the garrison on a long-term basis.13 Removal of the garrison would,
they felt, send the wrong message to the Chinese government and
almost certainly invite a take-over. The Colonial Office noted that
‘Hong Kong’s economic and commercial importance is dependent upon

the existence of a stable British administration, which in turn is sup-
ported by [the] British garrison’, the withdrawal of which would lead to
serious erosion of the all-important confidence Hong Kong traders
required.14 Moreover, with the deterioration of the political and eco-
nomic situation in China, there was ‘a risk of the Central Government
losing control, with the consequent increased risk of a War Lord setting
himself up in South China’.15 Conversely, the Chinese might attempt
to destabilize the colony with a general strike as had happened
in 1921, thereby necessitating the use of the garrison in the internal
security role.16
After examining the issues and consulting with Hong Kong and
Colonial Office officials, the JPS agreed the colony needed to retain
the Army garrison authorized in March 1946, and also encouraged the
Colonial Office to revive the HKVDF. However, no new troops could be
spared for the currently understrength garrison, the point being under-
scored by the Defense Minister’s August 1947 requirement to further
reduce the Army overseas as much as possible and focus the home estab-
lishment as a training organization for the build-up of reserve forces.17
Rethinking Hong Kong defense policy
A January 1948 draft JPS study on the Far East reiterated the threats to
Hong Kong laid out in JP(47)125(Final), but added that since then the
possibility had increased ‘that the Chinese Communists may occupy
South China in some force’, in which case a threat possibly more power-
ful than warlord attacks or economic disruption was possible: attack by
Chinese Communist forces.18 While the garrison was believed suffi-
cient to handle the former two threats, a Communist attack would
require the garrison to withdraw as per policy.19
British intelligence indicated that for the present, no direct attack
on, or organized internal rising in, Hong Kong was in the interest of
either of the warring parties since both derived benefits from British
occupation and were likely to do so for some time to come.20 The
Communists were presumed not to be a threat to British business inter-
ests in Shanghai and Hong Kong because the trade that passed through
Communist hands was important to the Chinese economy.’21
The CIC(FE) considered at that time that the ‘worst case’ threat to
Hong Kong would be a ‘serious refugee problem combined with such a
scale of land and air attack as could be developed by a war-lord.’22
Based on this appreciation, the Cs-in-C developed a subsidiary report
on ‘The Forces Required to Garrison Hong Kong and to Meet the Need for
Evacuation of British Nationals from the China Coast.’23 They thought
four infantry battalions and one artillery regiment were sufficient for the
worst case threat, but that an additional brigade group should be held
at short notice to reinforce Hong Kong in case of an emergency.24 The
proposed garrison was supposed to have three infantry battalions and
an artillery regiment, while the HKVDF would supply the fourth
infantry battalion and a dual-purpose heavy anti-aircraft and coastal
artillery regiment. It was also anticipated that a need for troops to help
evacuate British nationals from Nanking and Shanghai might arise.25 If
at the time such an operation became necessary the situation in Hong
Kong was quiet, then a force of up to one battalion could be drawn
from the garrison for the evacuation mission. But if the threat to Hong
Kong had increased, then troops from elsewhere in the theater would
have to assume the evacuation mission.
This two-brigade contingency did not accord with the war strategy
in which the Gurkha division was slated to move to the Middle East,
nor was the Commanders’ appreciation framed in a wider, strategic
context. It is possible that they intended their study to serve only as
a means of preserving theater force structure at a time when forces were
undergoing a world-wide draw-down that would leave the Far East
with only four white British units. No one seemed to question what
the long-term defense policy for Hong Kong should be in the face of a
Communist victory, or how that policy would fit into existing war
plans. In the event of war with Russia, Southeast Asia was supposed to
be a minor theater, with all resources going to the main effort in the
Middle East and Europe. In global war, East Asia and the Pacific, to
include Hong Kong, fell into an area which would likely be an
American responsibility. Yet the British did not approach the
Americans at this time for help with the defense of Hong Kong. US pol-
icy towards Hong Kong favored the Nationalist position for rendition
and, in any event, the Nationalists might continue to hold South
China for some time.
In early 1948, the two British battalions then in Hong Kong were
slated for relief by the 2/10 and 2/6 GR, who were proceeding from
India by way of Singapore. The 2/6 GR, however, was so understrength
that Ritchie decided to hold them in Malaya until they could be
brought up to strength. This meant that one British battalion would
have to stay in Hong Kong and temporarily forego its incorporation
into the new Army organization at home. In addition, FARELF did not
expect the HKVDF’s infantry to be sufficiently trained before June 1949
at the earliest, while its artillery component would not be ready until
the latter half of 1950.26 The regular garrison was no better. The 2/10
GR, who arrived in March 1948, were at half strength for months, and
though required to be operationally ready by 1 January 1949, the com-
manding officer reported that the unit’s standards were low because it
had not been possible to conduct either platoon or company level train-
ing.27 Thus if the ‘worst case’ scenario developed before June 1949, the
colony would need reinforcements of up to three battalions to fill in for
the HKVDF and conduct any assigned evacuation missions.28
Based upon the Commanders’ appreciation, the Chiefs of Staff rec-
ommended the Defense Committee approve a garrison consisting of
three regular infantry battalions and an artillery regiment.29 In approv-
ing the Chiefs of Staff report, the Defence Committee was doing little
more than re-affirming its 1946 decision, although it declined to
approve a permanent garrison before an ongoing review of peacetime
forces was completed, or a better sense of possible colonial contribu-
tions to Commonwealth defense had been ascertained.30 The only major
difference between the 1946 and 1948 policies was that the new garrison
structure included a British artillery regiment, a type of unit completely
lacking from the original garrison. It was accepted without comment, as
no one present seemed to realize the novelty of its addition.31 The policy
continued to be withdrawal of the garrison in the event of attack, but
the language was now qualified subtly from ‘attack by a major power’ to
‘heavy attack by a first class power’ assumed to be Russia.32 The amplifi-
cation would later prove important, for the Defense Committee’s percep-
tion of the Chinese Communists’ military abilities would determine
whether or not Hong Kong should be defended.
A Communist threat on the horizon
June saw the murder of the planters in Malaya and Sir Edward Gent’s
proclamation of an emergency. As noted in Chapter 4, Ritchie, under
some pressure from MacDonald and reacting to brazen attacks by the
guerrillas, ordered 1 Inniskillings to move from Hong Kong to Malaya.
Ritchie thought the risk to Hong Kong by this move was acceptable,33
telling his staff he was confident that it would be a ‘long time before
SOUTH CHINA under [Dr.T. V.] SOONG disintegrates to the extent nec-
essary for [there] to be a real menace to HONG KONG across the bor-
ders of the new territory [sic]’.34 Ritchie’s confidence in the
Nationalists’ ability to stem Communist advances was misplaced.
Throughout the rest of the year the PLA first cut off and then whittled
away the Nationalist garrisons in Manchuria. By October 1948, the PLA

had invested Mukden, an important Nationalist arms depot and indus-
trial center with a garrison of over 200 000 troops. On 2 November the
garrison surrendered, leaving all of Manchuria open to the PLA, and
making a Communist victory in the civil war ‘inevitable’.35 With the
Nationalist armies collapsing before it, the PLA began its drive through
North China to the Yangtze, the climax of which was the Hsuchow
campaign of November–December 1948. The resulting battle between
roughly equal forces was a complete victory for the PLA: some 350000
of 500 000 Nationalist troops engaged were annihilated, and several
senior Nationalist officers were killed.36 Tientsin and Peking to the
north both fell the next month, leaving the Nationalist capital
Nanking open to attack. Once the PLA crossed the Yangtze in force, all
South China would be at its mercy.
Colonial Office jitters
The effect of these developments had a sobering effect on Hong Kong

officials, who as late as October 1948 were calling for Kai Tak airport to
be replaced by a new commercial one in the New Territories, despite
the fact that such an airfield would be within artillery range of the bor-
der.37 With the collapse of the Nationalist position in Manchuria and
North China, however, the Colonial Office became keen to bolster the
Hong Kong defenses. In a series of letters and telegrams, the Colonial
Office asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider additional measures to pro-
tect Hong Kong in the event that the Communists were able to mount
an effective military drive south of the Yangtze.38 Chief among its fears
was a mass influx of refugees, which for practical as well as humanitar-
ian reasons would not be rejected. But it was feared that these refugees
could be used as a cover for Communist agents and provocateurs, vari-
ous guerrilla groups, or even Nationalist troops preferring British
internment to surrender to the PLA. The British would have to screen,
house, and feed most refugees, so they needed to develop appropriate
plans to deal with the expected migration. The Communists could also
order strikes, sabotage and other forms of ‘cold war’, despite their long-
standing policy of ‘not antagonising the Hong Kong Government’. If
the disruptions were serious and in conjunction with the refugee flood,
the net effect could be to ‘paralyse the life of the Colony’. With the
actual garrison at that time consisting of only one British and one
Gurkha infantry battalion, and the HKVDF only just being reformed,
the Colonial Office argued that it was critical to get a third battalion or
even more units into the garrison. The Colonial Office also told the
Chiefs it wanted plans for the evacuation of European nationals to be
made in case the colony had to be abandoned.39
When the Chiefs discussed the situation at the end of November the
lack of any strategic reserve forces was painfully apparent.40 Because of
the Emergency, FARELF itself did not have a reserve, and the only avail-
able troops in Britain had already been sent to Malaya to take part in
operations.41 The Chiefs informed the Colonial Office of the unhappy
situation, the only palliative being Ritchie’s intention to send the 2/6 GR
to Hong Kong from Malaya in December to bring the garrison back up
to its authorized strength.42 The emergency plan to reinforce Hong
Kong with a brigade group from Malaya would of course weaken the
anti-guerrilla campaign, with all the attendant dangers such a move
posed. The Chiefs agreed that only the Far East Cs-in-C could ‘balance
the two problems and judge the right moment to reinforce Hong Kong
if it is necessary’.43 Given their inability to provide any reinforcements,
the Chiefs helpfully suggested the Hong Kong government consider
increasing the number of police and perhaps forming a type of ‘Home
Guard’.44
The Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Alexander Grantham, pointed out
that he had already been given the authority to expand the police, for
which he had asked the Colonial Office to begin recruiting European
officers, and that the reformed HKVDF in many respects already served
as a form of home guard.45 The tone of Grantham’s response to the
Colonial Office was steadying, for although he quite clearly laid out
the problems associated with a possible influx of refugees fleeing the
Communist advance, he believed ‘there is no (repeat no) need for
alarm at present’.46 Grantham thought the worst case scenario would
be for the Communists to deliberately drive a mass of refugees into
Hong Kong in order to cause chaos inside the colony. A spontaneous
refugee migration would likely be more orderly, with the refugees com-
ing by water or railway. Refugees would ‘probably not (repeat not)
come across the border in numbers as some [border crossing points] are
already controlled by Communist guerillas [sic] who would have little
difficulty in gaining control of border area without disturbing local
peasant population’.47
The garrison’s role and the reinforcement dilemma
What emerges from the Colonial Office and Hong Kong correspondence
with the Chiefs of Staff are differing visions of the role of the garrison
in the event of a mass influx of refugees. The Chiefs cautioned the

Colonial Office about the Hong Kong government assuming possible
assistance by the garrison with refugee relief as a priority:
There is no objection to [the Hong Kong governor] seeking military

assistance if the situation goes beyond control of civil administra-
tion; roles of garrison in Hong Kong are however local defence of
Colony and maintenance of law and order; and while there is no
question that garrison will give all possible assistance in emergency,
it would be dangerous to reduce it by using it for administrative
tasks connected with refugee problems and public services at a time
when its main efforts would need to be devoted to primary tasks.48
The Chiefs’ comments were rather pointed, as Grantham had said earlier
that if a large influx occurred he might require military assistance to
close the border, a task which itself would require the entire garrison.49
The Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones, took up the issue early
in the new year, strongly backing Grantham’s position on the possible
use of the entire garrison on other than local defense missions, thereby
buttressing the requirement for additional troops.50 He blasted the
CIC(FE) appreciation of December 194851 – on which Grantham had
not been consulted – saying that ‘certain of [their] suggestions and
assumptions … as to the extent to which the civilian security forces
could be able to deal with the internal security problems which might
arise, without very substantial support from the military forces, are
unwarranted’.52 The Governor, in consultation with his local defense
committee, had produced for the Colonial Office his own appreciation
and rebuttal to that of the Cs-in-C. It took exception to the
Commanders’ contention that a serious threat in the form of a refugee
influx to, and orchestrated strikes in, Hong Kong would develop only
in the third quarter of 1949, saying it was ‘imprudent to assume that
this threat could not arise within the next six months’.53 Grantham
dismissed the suggestion that the Hong Kong government raise auxil-
iary forces to assist the police in dealing with any refugee crisis. The
current Chinese members of the police could not be regarded as
‘wholly reliable in the emergencies envisaged’, so any auxiliary force
drawn from the Chinese population would be similarly suspect.54
There were not enough Europeans and Eurasians available to form
another force, as the recruitment for the HKVDF was already draining
the present pool. Once fully trained, the HKVDF would be of assistance
to the garrison, but only for a limited duration, as its mobilization
would disrupt the economic life of the colony, an act which itself
might suit Communist aims. As for the garrison, it would have its
hands full with closing the border, which for political reasons could
not be effected until a refugee crisis was imminent. The Colonial Office
therefore concluded that:
The full garrison and fully recruited and trained [HKVDF] would be
inadequate to cope with a situation in which, with civil war being
waged in the vicinity of the frontier, large bodies of armed troops of
either of the opposed forces might attempt to seek asylum in Hong
Kong, and large reinforcements would be needed.55
Whereas all concerned accepted the fact that no reinforcements out-

side the theater existed and that the planned theater reserve would
probably not be available until the end of 1949, there was a manifest
need for more regular troops in case of a crisis in Hong Kong. The
Colonial Office therefore proposed the expansion of the Malay
Regiment in order to free up Imperial troops in Malaya for reinforce-
ment of Hong Kong.56 Creech Jones appreciated the problems associ-
ated with this proposal, such as the shortage of British officers, trained
instructors, arms and equipment, and the need to make satisfactory
financial arrangements with the Government of the Federation of
Malaya, but it seemed the only viable solution. Given the lead times
necessary to implement the proposal he asked that it ‘be examined
with all urgency by all concerned’.57
Ritchie had himself proposed expansion of the Malay Regiment in
November 1948, so it was no surprise when the CIC(FE) endorsed the
Colonial Office proposal as a means of freeing the planned theater
reserve of a mobile brigade group for a possible move to Hong Kong.58
The Colonial Office, having consulted with the War Office and author-
ities in Malaya, urged the Chiefs of Staff to evaluate the Cold War
expansion of the Malay Regiment from its planned three battalions to
as many as nine.59 In this the Federation government would require
financial assistance from the British government because it could not
afford even to raise the first three additional battalions. While there
were compelling reasons inherent to the Malayan Emergency to raise
the battalions, the Colonial Office reiterated the utility to Hong Kong
of such an expansion.60 The Chiefs concurred with the proposal to
raise another three battalions,61 the necessary financial approval being
obtained in the spring of 1949. But, as expected, the shortage of offi-
cers and trained NCOs slowed the formation and training of the new
units; the 3rd battalion only became operational in January 1949, and
the new 4th battalion would not become operational until December
1949, months after the Hong Kong crisis finally came.62
Assessing the strategic implications
At the end of January 1949, the Chiefs of Staff considered the strategic
implications of Communist control of South China, with special
emphasis on Hong Kong, in light of various reports and appreciations
by the Cs-in-C, the Colonial Office, the Governor, the Foreign Office,
and the Cabinet Far Eastern (Official) Committee.63 In general, the
Chiefs of Staff sided with the Colonial Office on the inadequacy of the
garrison to meet the anticipated threats of refugees, local guerrilla
attacks, and Communist-fomented strikes, arson, murders, and terror-
ism.64 They also agreed that these combined threats were most likely to
develop in the near future, before the third quarter of the year, which
was when the CIC(FE) believed the real crisis would occur. But other
than urge the Hong Kong government to set up an organization that
would handle registration of, and rationing for, the anticipated influx
of refugees, there was little of substance the Chiefs could do to help.
Since the situation in Malaya remained tenuous, the reinforcements
already sent there (that is, 2 Guards Brigade) would have to remain for
some time until the situation improved or the Gurkha division and
Malay Regiment were finally brought up to strength. The Chiefs under-
stood Ritchie might be forced to redeploy a brigade group from Malaya
as reinforcement for the Hong Kong garrison, but it would have the
most serious repercussions on Malaya.65 Furthermore, while they
agreed with the proposal to expand the Malay Regiment, they correctly
believed ‘that the extra battalions to be raised would not be ready to
free other forces for service in Hong Kong in time to meet an emer-
gency in the next six to nine months.’66 In the meantime, the Chiefs
urged ‘all possible measures to check the [refugee] influx … forthwith’,
particularly stressing the need to reassess the erection of wire obstacles
along the frontier.67
All were in agreement that the Nationalists’ collapse was only a mat-
ter of time, the abdication of Chiang Kai-shek and continuing American
aid notwithstanding. Bevin preached short-term opportunity for British
capital and trading interests in China (valued in 1941 at at least £300
million), as the Communists could well see retention of a British Hong
Kong – through which as much as 17 per cent of China’s imports
flowed – as being in their interests.68 While Communist control over
the whole of China would undoubtedly give a moral fillip to Communist

movements throughout Asia, it would also bring Communism right up
to the borders of Indochina, India, Pakistan, and Burma, posing a
security threat to those strategically important countries as well as
nearby Siam. Bevin conjectured that the anticipated ‘economic weak-
ness of Communist-dominated China might offer an opportunity to
secure reasonable treatment for [British] interests’, but nonetheless
thought an expanded Communist presence in Asia would require coor-
dinated efforts by the Commonwealth, the United States, France,
Netherlands, Burma and Siam to contain the ‘Communist threat to all
our interests’.69 From the military perspective, the strategic position of
the Far East in Allied war plans remained defensive in nature. But as
the Chiefs of Staff pointed out:
In order to achieve maximum economy in our forces in the Far East

we require stable political and economic conditions in Allied territo-
ries in peace so that internal security commitments are reduced to a
minimum and can be met mainly with local forces. At the same
time we must maintain sufficient forces in the area to further British
interests […] since only strong action, firm direction and the visible
signs of power are likely to convince the Oriental mind.70
They perceived that Communist exploitation of national liberation

movements could lead to erosion of civil authority in other Southeast
Asian countries and create the very instability which British regional
strategy sought to avoid. Therefore, in order to present a unified and
secure front against Communist encroachments and subversion, ‘all
political means possible should be taken to make the French and Dutch
Governments reach agreement with Nationalist dissident factions’ in
their Southeast Asian colonies.71
Neither the Foreign Office nor the Chiefs of Staff strategic studies
suggested any change in the role of Hong Kong, yet pointedly missing
was any reference to its use as an advanced base, implying its potential
military role in a Pacific war was now irrelevant, and that British prestige
and the colony’s economic value provided the only rationale for a con-
tinued peacetime military presence. Official Hong Kong defense policy
remained abandonment in the face of major attack, however remote a
possibility; a refugee influx, local guerrilla attacks, and subversion were
still the primary concerns.72
January 1949 saw Tientsin and Peking fall to the Communists, Chiang
Kai-shek’s departure from official government, and the Nationalists’
appeal to the Communists for a negotiated settlement to the war. With

the fighting temporarily stopped and the opposing sides facing each
other across the Yangtze, the BDCC(FE) undertook a new appreciation
of the situation in Hong Kong, but not without first reiterating that for
the next few months ‘no troops could be spared from Malaya’.73 All
Imperial troops in the Far East were deployed on internal security
duties, leaving no formed reserve for Hong Kong or other smaller con-
tingencies, such as possible evacuation of British nationals from
Shanghai, Burma, or India.74 The implication was clear: if a Hong Kong
crisis did emerge before the end of the year, hard choices about the
security of Malaya versus that of Hong Kong would have to be made.
To that end, the VCIGS, Lieutenant-General Sir Gerald Templer, told
the Chiefs of Staff that:
at the expense of wrecking the reorganisation of the infantry, four

infantry battalions might at the present time be made available
from the U.K. in an emergency. [Additionally,] [o]ne armoured regi-
ment, one artillery regiment and Brigade headquarters might be
made available from the U.K. but provision of these units would
have a serious effect on the reorganisation and training of the Army
and would leave the United Kingdom without any form of reserve
whatsoever.75
The Chiefs clearly did not relish this idea, as just six months earlier the
government had sent the only available UK reserve to Malaya at a time
when the Soviet blockade of Berlin raised the possibility of an armed
clash with the Soviet Union – a situation that still obtained in early 1949.
Throughout March, government and military officials in London,
Singapore, and Hong Kong continued discussing prospects for contin-
ued trade with a Communist dominated China, the merits of rounding
up known Communist agents in Hong Kong, wiring the frontier, evacu-
ation plans for Shanghai, and the source of any reinforcements for the
colony’s defense and internal security.76 After re-evaluating the situation
in Malaya, Ritchie now felt he could earmark one infantry battalion for
possible reinforcement of Hong Kong, but that any additional troops
would definitely have to come from outside the theater. The War Office
could not see its way clear to dispatching the embryonic UK reserve
force as a prophylactic when contingencies in more strategically
important areas might well develop first. The War Office also dismissed
the idea of sending troops from the Middle East to Asia because it
offered no significant time advantage, even though the British could
expect as little as one month’s warning of an attack on Hong Kong and

it would take two months to get any reinforcements there by sea.77
Nevertheless, the consensus was that there would be enough time to
get any needed reinforcements from Britain to Hong Kong in time to
handle a crisis.78 The Governor of Hong Kong, the Chiefs of Staff, and
the Cs-in-C all agreed that ‘the likelihood of an organised Communist
attack on Hong Kong with a view to its rendition, or a full-scale attack
supported by Russian specialists, [are] remote possibilities that need
not be considered at present’.79
HMS Amethyst and a brigade group for Hong Kong
Everything changed on 20 April when the frigate HMS Amethyst, on its

way up the Yangtze to relieve the destroyer HMS Consort as guardship
for the British legation in Nanking, was fired upon by PLA gun batter-
ies. Severely damaged, Amethyst ran aground on a small island in the
middle of the river, where rescue attempts by Consort, the frigate HMS
Black Swan, and the cruiser HMS London were beaten off, the Royal
Navy suffering some 139 casualties, including 45 dead.80 HMS Amethyst
had the misfortune of traveling up the river on the day the
Communists’ ultimatum to the Nationalists expired and the PLA began
crossing the Yangtze in force.81
Its members having been informed of the incident, the Defence
Committee met on 21 April to discuss Alexander’s memorandum
recommending the immediate reinforcement of Hong Kong by a
brigade group from the United Kingdom and a fighter squadron from
Singapore.82 These reinforcements were in line with the suppositional
force mooted by Templer in January, but with the resumption of
the civil war and increased tension between the British and the
Communists sure to result from the Amethyst crisis, it was now time to
act. Alexander therefore asked the Defence Committee to authorize the
move of one infantry battalion and one brigade headquarters as soon
as possible (on or about 1 May) with the remainder of the brigade
group to be sent as soon as practicable thereafter.83 This would leave
the equivalent of one unformed brigade as the only reserve in Britain
for any new contingencies. The proposed reinforcements were thought
adequate to meet the anticipated threats – refugee influx, internal
unrest, and attacks by guerrilla bands – but the Committee asked the
Chiefs of Staff to prepare an up-to-date appreciation of a Communist
threat to Hong Kong. The full Cabinet endorsed these decisions the
next day.84
By 25 April all attempts to rescue the stranded Amethyst had been

exhausted and the Chiefs of Staff met to discuss the repercussions of
the crisis on Hong Kong and Shanghai. Slim said ‘the opinion that
Hong Kong could not be defended against a major power in occupa-
tion of the Chinese mainland would apply if the Chinese Communists
became an effective force on the mainland and attacked Hong Kong’.
While the recently authorized reinforcements would be capable of han-
dling lesser envisioned threats, they would not be able to stop a full-scale
Communist attack. However, Slim did not think the PLA constituted a
first-class fighting force, even though they were demonstrably better
than Nationalist troops, and therefore argued that Britain ought to
make plans to hold on against anything less than a full-scale attack
supported by Russia, and to demonstrate its intention to do so. The
rest of the Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed.85
Contemplating war with China
At a meeting a few days later, Air Marshal Sir William Elliot, the Chief
Staff Officer to the Minister of Defence, told the Chiefs of Staff that the
Prime Minister required a new appreciation of the threat to Hong Kong
as background for his upcoming statement to the House of Commons
on the decision to send the brigade group.86 Slim steered the discus-
sion, arguing that British policy should be to hold Hong Kong against
any threat other than a Russian attack, or an attack so strongly sup-
ported by Russia that it amounted in fact to the same thing.87 ‘We
should’, he said, ‘be ready to defend Hong Kong against an attack by
Communist China even if this entailed a declaration of war against the
Chinese Communist authorities’.88 Nonetheless, he thought the brigade
group reinforcement would suffice to handle anything ‘other than an
attack by a major power’. The only words of caution came from the
Director of Plans, who noted that ‘the developments in China were
forcing us to deploy our resources in a manner that did not conform to
our overall strategy. In this respect Russia’s cold war policy was being
successful’. Again, however, there was general agreement with Slim’s
views, the Committee approving the request for a new appreciation as
well as a study about how an aircraft carrier could be stationed off
Hong Kong to provide air support.89
On 29 April, the Joint Planning Staff and Joint Intelligence Committee,
with input from the Cs-in-C, produced the evaluation asked for by
the Prime Minister.90 At the time, a PLA army group had crossed the
Yangtze and another 700 000 men were marshaled to attack South
China. Nationalist forces were believed to number only 150 000, virtually
ineffective, troops.91 If the Nationalists did not conduct any meaningful
denial or demolition efforts, some 200 000 Communist troops could be
in the vicinity of Canton and Hong Kong within 25 days’ time (that is,
the end of May), backed up by 80 000 guerrillas recently reorganized
along PLA lines. Despite the number of troops available to the
Communists, not all of them could be used against Hong Kong at one
time because of ‘the narrowness and difficulties of the approaches to
the frontier defences’. The PLA might use two to three divisions sup-
ported by artillery, possibly in conjunction with sea-borne landings
using sampans, but its attack would be hampered by a lack of air cover.
The authors believed the British could defeat such an attack with only
one division, provided it was backed with adequate air support.92
But would the Communists attack? In answer to this crucial question
the Planners wrote:
Any strong Chinese Central Government is likely, in the long run, to

desire to terminate the British occupation of Hong Kong in the early
future, however, a stable British regime in Hong Kong may well be
considered to be useful to a new Communist Government, as an
economic link with the outside world. For some time, moreover, the
Communist Government, coming into power after a prolonged civil
war, is likely to be occupied with internal affairs. Unless the
Communist Government … were to be tempted by nationalist ambi-
tions, or … by the possibility of an early conquest, to risk hostilities
with the United Kingdom, it seems unlikely that they will undertake
an attack upon Hong Kong for some time. Evidence of the British
intention to resist any attack on Hong Kong would considerably
reduce the likelihood of the Communists deciding to attack the
Colony. In any case, they will probably at least make an attempt to
obtain its rendition by negotiation before resorting to force.93
The JPS feared Communist intimidation of Hong Kong could become a

test of strength like Berlin, in which case a forced withdrawal from the
colony would be an irreparable blow to British prestige throughout the
world, with particularly serious repercussions throughout the Far
East.94 A potential attack cast in this way inexorably led to Slim’s posi-
tion that Hong Kong had to be held against Chinese Communist
aggression, ‘even if Communist China declares war on Great Britain’.95
The JPS argued that such a stand did not constitute a reversal of the
March 1946 Defence Committee policy, which by its own account was
to abandon the colony ‘in war against a major power in occupation of

the Chinese mainland’.96 The phrase ‘in war’ in fact does not appear in
either the report or the minutes which set the policy in 1946.97 How
and why it came to be inserted in the report is not known, but its
importance to rationalizing an all-out commitment to defend Hong
Kong is clear: ‘We [do not] consider [China] a major power [at this
time]. We therefore consider that Hong Kong could be held, unless we
are engaged in a war with Russia’.98
The Cabinet met just before the 5 May debate on China to discuss
the Chiefs’ estimate of the forces needed to meet the current threat to
Hong Kong and the need to despatch additional reinforcements if a
major attack developed.99 Here again the case was made that ‘although
the Communist armies in China were greatly superior to former
Chinese armies, they were not likely to constitute a threat of the kind
which would develop if a major Power, such as Russia, attacked the
Colony’.100 While the Ministers understood the political need to stand
firm on Hong Kong, they were still hesitant to give the unequivocal
statement of the government’s ultimate intentions towards Hong Kong
which both Grantham and the BDCC(FE) thought necessary.101 The
Cabinet ministers ‘could not ignore the advice they had received that
Hong Kong could not be held against attack by a Major Power operat-
ing from the mainland’ and therefore wished to avoid ‘drifting into a
position in which, after pouring valuable resources … they had at the
end to withdraw with great material loss and loss of prestige’.102
Scoping the effects of suppositional reinforcements
On 12 May, the BDCC(FE) cabled the Chiefs of Staff with a new estimate
of the expected arrival of the PLA at the Hong Kong frontier. If it was
the intention of the Communists to attack Hong Kong, the leading ele-
ments of any force could be at the frontier by the end of July, although
it would not be until the end of September that they could be expected
to have positioned the two to three divisions needed to attack the
colony.103 Armed with this new estimate of the threat, the JPS drafted a
lengthy report detailing the implications of reinforcing Hong Kong.104
The report, JP(49)50(Final), concluded that the only meaningful way to
defend Hong Kong would be to hold the New Territories, for only in
that way could they obtain sufficient depth of defense, as well as
possession and use of the water reservoirs so critical to the burgeoning
population. The existing road network and terrain of the New
Territories dictated a defense based on ‘holding the ground with troops
in position rather than on observation and fire power’. Such a posture

would require strong land forces in excess of a division, backed by
naval forces and land- and sea-based air support.105 Provided these
forces were in place before any attack developed, it would be possible
to defend Hong Kong. But the planners tersely cautioned that ‘It will
be difficult to withdraw forces once committed … unless the
Communist threat is considerably reduced’.106
The implications of sending reinforcements of this magnitude to a
place which was supposed to have little strategic value were immense.
First, they would have to be at the expense of forces earmarked in the
event of an early war against Russia and the build up of the reserve
army. Providing the necessary troops would require either denuding
overseas garrisons, which were themselves ‘barely sufficient’ to support
existing foreign and colonial policy, or calling up approximately 15 000
reservists. Secondly, the redeployment of these forces would seriously
weaken Britain’s ability to meet existing commitments or to maintain
its strategic posture, since once deployed to Hong Kong there would be
little prospect of being able to withdraw them any time soon. The
ripple effects of such a decision would be just as serious, for it would be
impossible to equip a further strategic reserve of one brigade for at least
several months, while the training of National Service recruits and the
Territorial Army would be seriously disrupted.107 If the reinforcements
were drawn from overseas garrisons, then the risk of a deterioration in
security in those locales would have to be accepted until replacement
formations could be raised and deployed.
Timing was an issue too. Even if the decision to deploy was made
immediately, the first reinforcements – a brigade group plus divisional
headquarters and the balance of the armored regiment – would not
arrive until 105 days later, the rest of the division arriving only at the
end of 180 days.108 The troops would not be acclimatized and would
have a low standard of training.109 If time was of the essence, an alterna-
tive plan called for one brigade group to move from Malaya by the end
of 30 days, 3 Commando Brigade110 and a medium artillery regiment
arriving from the Middle East within 45 days, the divisional headquar-
ters and brigade group by 90 days, and the remaining, mostly adminis-
trative, troops arriving by 180 days.111 This alternative had the benefit
of getting all the combat units to Hong Kong within four months’
time, but the division could not be considered fully operational until
the arrival of support units, which would be at the end of six months.
Reinforcement of Hong Kong would also affect the timing of general
mobilization in the event of war with Russia, probably delaying it by
one or two months.112
The decision to defend
In mid-May, Malcolm MacDonald, General Ritchie, and Air Marshal Sir

Hugh Lloyd traveled to London, where they attended the Chiefs of
Staff Committee meeting at which the JPS report was discussed.113
Ritchie agreed with the scale of reinforcements needed to meet a major
attack by the Chinese, but as Slim pointed out, the first consideration
was for the Cabinet to make the political decision whether Hong Kong
would be defended ‘against all comers’ and then to announce that deci-
sion.114 Should that be decided, and he was already on the record as
saying it should be, only then could the matter of troops be addressed.
Slim did not agree with any of the courses of action suggested by the
JPS because the reinforcements called for could not be provided without
calling up the reserves, a move that would have ‘far-reaching political
and economic implications’ which militated against its adoption by
the government.115 What Slim suggested as an alternative was that, in
addition to the brigade group already en route to Hong Kong, the
Defence Committee send a divisional headquarters and one brigade
group from Britain and 3 Commando Brigade from the Middle East,
along with some of the necessary support troops.116 Ritchie said he
might be able to provide the other brigade by earmarking 2 Guards
Brigade in Malaya for movement to Hong Kong in September, at which
point he expected the situation in Malaya to have improved and the
crisis for Hong Kong to have peaked.117 These arrangements would pro-
vide a total of five brigades for Hong Kong, one less than called for in
JP(49)50, and would require calling up only 2000 men in Class A of the
reserves, not the other 13 000 Class B reservists envisioned in the JPS
report.118
At the following day’s meeting of the Cabinet’s Southeast Asia
Committee, the Chiefs of Staff distributed an aide-mémoire that encap-
sulated the situation.119 When the Prime Minister asked MacDonald to
give the committee his appreciation of the situation, he laid out the
case for defending Hong Kong as being vital to a continued British
presence in the Far East. Failure to defend would undermine the will of
countries like Burma and Siam to resist Communist aggression, and the
Chiefs of Staff had shown that ‘we could defend Hong Kong … with
our own resources, and we should therefore do so’.120 While Bevin
agreed with MacDonald on the need to defend Hong Kong, he thought
a pronouncement that the British would never leave the colony in any
circumstances would be provocative. The emphasis instead should be
on resisting aggression, and that the suggested reinforcements would
probably deter any attack. If the Chinese subsequently attacked, then
Britain would appeal to the United Nations Security Council for help
against the aggression while putting up the best resistance possible.
The Foreign Secretary felt this line of argument was much more likely
to garner the support of US public opinion, as well as Prime Minister
Nehru, ‘whose whole policy was based on resistance to aggression’.121
The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Philip Noel-Baker,
then gave a synopsis of the attitudes of key Commonwealth govern-
ments. Australian public opinion seemed strongly supportive of a
‘vigorous defence of the Colony’, but to date the Australian government
had made no official statement of support. On the other hand, the
Prime Minister of New Zealand had clearly indicated his government
would support resistance to a Communist attack.122 Canada was not
expected to render any assistance as it was approaching a general elec-
tion and public sentiment was still smarting over the débâcle that befell
Canadian troops sent to Hong Kong in December 1941.123 After further
discussion there was general support for Bevin’s suggested approach to
garnering moral and material support.124
Over the next few days the Prime Minister, his Defense Minister, and
the Colonial Secretary circulated among Cabinet ministers memoranda
detailing the Chiefs of Staff and Southeast Asia Committee positions
on the defense of Hong Kong against a Communist attack.125 The
Cabinet then met on 26 May to decide whether or not to defend Hong
Kong.126 Many of the points raised in earlier meetings were again dis-
cussed and accepted, but ministers had questions about long-term
intentions. If the proposed defensive measures remained for a very
long period of time, Hong Kong’s economy might collapse if the
Chinese imposed a land blockade and there would be no point in
defending the colony. Clearly, the long-term viability of Hong Kong
depended on whether a Communist Chinese government would
accept continuation of the British entrepôt. Since Communist acquies-
cence must be the long-term policy objective, on no account could the
British appear to make retention of the colony a point of prestige, for
‘it might become a matter of prestige for the Communists to force us to
withdraw from it’.127 There could be no provocative declaration of
holding the line against the advance of Communism, rather it would
be characterized as resistance to aggression. Yet the determination to
defend Hong Kong apparent from the scale of reinforcements being
contemplated might well prevent an attack for a period sufficiently
long enough that the Communists would themselves be induced to
continue trade, for the interruption of the normal flow of trade was
thought to be as painful for the Communists as it would be for the
British.128 A temporary interruption of trade brought on by tension or

even actual hostilities was not thought likely to have a lasting effect on
the economy, and a robust trade could be restarted much as had been
the case since the end of the war.
The Cabinet saw bargaining from a position of economic and mili-
tary strength as the best option, so it approved the reinforcements sub-
ject to several caveats. First, no public announcement would be made
about either the new policy or the additional reinforcements,
Alexander’s general statement to the House on 5 May being deemed
sufficient for the time being. Second, the form and timing of any sub-
sequent policy announcements would depend on the willingness of
Commonwealth countries and the United States to morally and mate-
rially support – or at least not obstruct – a British stand against possible
aggression and an appeal to the United Nations. Third, the Defence
Committee was to re-evaluate the despatch of a squadron of long-range
fighters from Britain and the proposal to call up Class A reservists.129
The despatch of one squadron of Hornet long-range fighters was as risky
as any of the other redeployments associated with the reinforcement of
Hong Kong. Because the move would have depleted the number of long-
range fighters in Britain by 50 per cent, the Chiefs of Staff coveted a
squadron of Australian Mustangs assigned to the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force (BCOF) in Japan.130 Discussions with Australia had not
yet advanced to the point where Britain could ask for the aircraft, which
in any event the Australians were to deny them, but New Zealand did
unilaterally offer two frigates, with the hint that more military resources
could be made available in the event of hostilities.131 On the issue of the
call-up of the reserves, Secretary of War Emanuel Shinwell revealed to the
Defence Committee that the political difficulties associated with mobiliz-
ing war veteran reservists was not worth it. Slim was inclined to agree
and it was accepted that the reinforcements would go without augmenta-
tion from the reserves, that is to say, understrength.132
By the middle of June, most of the key Dominions had replied to the
British government’s inquiries about their attitudes towards the Hong
Kong crisis. At a 22 June Cabinet meeting, Noel-Baker explained that
despite New Zealand’s ‘whole-hearted’ moral and material support, other
Commonwealth governments were ‘reluctant to commit themselves in
advance, and evidently entertained misgivings about the long-term
prospects of our position in Hong Kong’.133 Especially disappointing was
Australia’s refusal to provide any support, despite its professed interest
in that part of the world. This meant that the RAAF Mustangs from
BCOF would not be forthcoming and that the British would therefore
have to reduce their long-range fighter strength in both the United

Kingdom and in Germany, where the RAF was still heavily engaged in
the Berlin airlift. The only positive news from Australia was that it ‘would
not raise the question of Hong Kong to the [UN] Security Council with-
out first consulting’ HMG, and if Hong Kong was actually attacked the
government ‘might well adopt a different attitude’ on assistance.134
Thinking in the long term
The US attitude toward a Communist invasion of Hong Kong was a little

more difficult to ascertain. At a meeting to discuss NATO, Bevin had told
the United States Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, that Britain intended
to defend Hong Kong against aggression and, if necessary, make it a
‘Berlin of the East’.135 In response to Bevin’s inquiry about whether
America would support Britain’s policy, Acheson circumspectly asked
what Britain’s long-term policy towards the colony was. Neither the
Colonial nor Foreign Secretary were prepared to answer these questions
until their departments could conduct a thorough review of the long-
term policy for Hong Kong, a process which, in the event, took two
months.136 Thus, the overall response by other governments had not
been very encouraging, and the Cabinet accepted the fact that the British
government would have to bear the main responsibility ‘for devising
effective means of safeguarding British interests in Hong Kong’.137
While Commonwealth, Colonial, and Foreign Office officials
reviewed the long-term policy options for Hong Kong, events in China
took another dramatic turn. HMS Amethyst , which the PLA had held at
bay since 21 April, made a dramatic and risky escape down the Yangtze
on the night of 29 July and made the open sea the following day. The
captain of the ship, Lieutenant-Commander Kerans, took his chances
after he determined the ship’s position would only worsen as his supplies
dwindled and the Communist authorities continued to demand an
admission of wrongdoing. Despite the jubilation which greeted the
frigate upon its safe arrival in Hong Kong on 3 August, the incident
only served to worsen Anglo-Chinese relations.138
It was against this background that the Cabinet finally met at the
end of August to discuss the joint departmental study on a long-term
policy for Hong Kong.139 Both Bevin and Creech Jones had reached the
conclusion that while the British government had to be prepared
to discuss the future of the colony, it could only do so with a ‘friendly,
democratic and stable Government of a unified China’.140 These condi-
tions did not then obtain in China, and ‘were unlikely to exist in the
foreseeable future’.141 Until they did, they thought the government

should retain Hong Kong. Yet some ministers were so pessimistic about
the long-term prospects for Hong Kong that they argued for it to be
placed under an international regime, and that Britain should take the
initiative in this effort rather than waiting for the Chinese government
to formally demand its return.142 Bevin rebuffed this notion for a num-
ber of reasons, not the least of which was the need to maintain British
prestige in the Far East and to exclude the Soviets from any such
arrangement, but also because of the legal difficulties involved with ‘sub-
leasing’ the New Territories.143 After further discussion, the Cabinet
finally agreed to accept as an interim policy Bevin’s conditions for
entering into talks with China; the only alteration being removal of
the word ‘democratic’ so as not to preclude discussions with a
Communist Chinese government if it was in Britain’s future interest to
do so.144 The Commonwealth Relations Office thereafter sent to its
High Commissioners an outline of the new policy:
The lease of the new territories expires in 1997. It does not seem
likely that any Chinese Government will be prepared to renew lease.
Without these territories Hong Kong would be untenable and it is
therefore probable that before 1997 United Kingdom Government
of the day will have to consider status of Hong Kong. It is not possi-
ble however, some two generations in advance to lay down princi-
ples which should govern any arrangement which it may be
possible to reach with China at that time. A decision at present time
can therefore only be taken on an interim policy.145
These proved to be prophetic words, as this is essentially what happened

some 30 years later when the Thatcher government entered into negoti-
ations with China over the return of Hong Kong on 1 July 1997.146
Military preparations in Hong Kong
After some debate over the civil–military command structure in Hong

Kong, Attlee approved the creation of a joint command for British
Forces Hong Kong (BFHK), Britain’s first ever peacetime joint command.
The officer chosen for the position was Lieutenant-General Francis
Festing, one of Slim’s best division commanders in Burma and who,
following the Japanese surrender, had served as GOC, Troops Hong
Kong.147 It was an inspired choice, for Festing and Grantham got along
very well both personally and professionally, a situation which no
doubt went a long way to making what was an otherwise awkward
command arrangement a success.148 Festing’s directive was short and

simple, the thrust of it being to:
defend the British Colony of Hong Kong, which includes the Leased
[that is, New] Territories, and to assist the Governor in maintaining
internal security. You will … take such military action as you con-
sider necessary to prepare against attack and, in consultation with
the Governor, to maintain law and order. Should an attack on the
Colony develop you will take all measures necessary to defeat it and
restore the situation in the Colony.149
As General Officer C-in-C, Hong Kong, Festing was also responsible for
the development of defense plans for the colony, as well as the coordina-
tion of training for all services. Major-General Geoffrey Evans, another
one of Slim’s division commanders in Burma, was appointed GOC of the
new 40 Infantry Division, the main fighting formation in Hong Kong.150
When Headquarters, 40 Infantry Division was stood up in Hong
Kong in mid-July 1949, its immediate problem was how to defend the
colony from the time of its arrival onward. Local intelligence assess-
ments indicated that the PLA would not be able to concentrate suffi-
cient forces to attack Hong Kong until 15 October, and when it did it
would probably be assisted by Japanese and Russian advisers.151 Based on
Evans’ appreciation of the situation, Festing and he developed three
plans, each to be effective at different stages of the build-up of the divi-
sion and of the development of defense positions and lines of communi-
cation.152 Festing’s intent was to destroy all enemy forces entering the
New Territories north of the division’s rear boundary which ran from Tai
Po on Tolo Harbor west to the ponds north of Yuen Long on Deep Bay.153
Since retention of the New Territories was the only way to successfully
defend Hong Kong, the holding of certain key terrain features, mostly
high points, was vital. Consequently, Festing demanded that:
ALL [POSITIONS] WILL BE HELD TO THE LAST MAN AND LAST

ROUND.154
The main plan, DECAPITATION, called for 26 Gurkha and 27 Infantry

Brigades, each reinforced with one battalion from the 28 Infantry
Brigade and a squadron from 3 RTR, to ‘destroy all enemy penetrating
within [brigade boundaries] by vigorous offensive action’ supported by
divisional artillery, naval gunfire support, and ground attack aircraft.155
The remainder of 28 Infantry Brigade and 3 RTR would serve as a reserve
for counter attacks, although 26 and 27 Infantry Brigades were to each
keep one battalion in reserve for the same purpose. Plans CRUSHER and
DEFIANCE were basically the same as DECAPITATION, except they made provi-
sion for reinforcement by 2 Guards Brigade and a squadron of 4 Hussars
from Malaya.156 The Royal Navy, augmented by some local patrol craft,
was responsible for the security of Hong Kong’s 200-mile long sea fron-
tier, while 3 Commando Brigade was responsible for the internal security
and coastal defenses of Kowloon and Hong Kong island.
The civilian population may have been nervous about the impending
arrival of the PLA, but the morale of the troops was high. As the troops
arrived they were sent to one of 36 new camps throughout the colony,
mostly in the New Territories, where they began training, patrolling,
and digging extensive defense works at night.157 Some officers sent to
Hong Kong as part of the reinforcements in 1949 had been taken pris-
oner there by the Japanese in December 1941,158 but now the situation
was one that inspired confidence, since this time the British would
have control of the air and sea. As one officer put it: ‘we had a splendid
general and we knew what we were doing’.159
When the PLA entered Canton with little resistance on 14 October,
the British forces in Hong Kong were ready and had good intelligence
on the forces assembled in the area.160 The British thought they ‘might
be at war at any moment’, putting troops on alert and even deploying
the tanks to their fighting positions.161 Communist guerrillas occupied
the Chinese border posts and started using loudspeakers to broadcast
abusive rhetoric towards the British side,162 but the actual PLA did not
approach closer than 25 miles to the Hong Kong border.163 The
Communists eventually closed the border and suspended rail service
between Canton and Hong Kong, but not before some 18 000 refugees
crossed the frontier in that first week. The refugee flow quickly abated
and to some extent was actually reversed by the departure of a number of
Communist officials who left to take up their new posts in Kwangtung
province.164 Though there were occasional invasion scares – such
as when the Communists pushed a large number of refugees across the
border on Christmas Eve – no attack ever materialized.165 Indeed, as early
as the end of October, the Joint Intelligence Committee had deter-
mined that the Chinese Communists were not contemplating an
attack any time soon.166
Thinking about Hong Kong in a global war
As the situation began to stabilize, the new C-in-C, FARELF, General Sir
John Harding, turned his attention to the long-term theater implica-
tions of the Hong Kong situation. Harding and his CIC(FE) colleagues
realized that the decision to reinforce Hong Kong had created a de

facto Cold War strategy for the Far East that differed from the global
war strategy enshrined in the ‘Future Defence Policy’ of 1947. If war
with the Soviet Union was still expected by the middle of the 1950s,
what did that mean for FARELF in the meantime? In studying the
problem, the Cs-in-C concluded that retention of Hong Kong during a
war with Russia would depend on a number of factors that simply
could not be foreseen, such as the degree of Russian assistance to the
Chinese.167 If Russia materially assisted in an attack, then Hong Kong
would have to be regarded as an ‘insecure base’.168 The notion of Hong
Kong as an advanced base still remained, but only as one from which
to slow any Chinese advance into Indochina through air interdiction
of lines of communication.
The Commanders believed that in five years’ time a defense against
China alone would require a garrison of at least two infantry divisions
and four fighter squadrons. Clearly, most of the troops for a garrison of
two divisions could not be found from within the theater. They reasoned
that for political reasons it would be entirely unacceptable to abandon
Hong Kong in peacetime, for that was the only time its entrepôt trade
was of any value to Britain. As they told the Chiefs of Staff, the ‘essence
of the problem is to balance, from both the political and military points
of view, the disadvantages of withdrawing from Hong Kong against
the advantages of releasing the garrison for operations elsewhere’. The
Commanders argued in favor of risking the very serious damage to the
British position in the Far East that might be occasioned by a forced with-
drawal from Hong Kong in exchange for the benefits to be derived by
retaining Hong Kong in the Cold War. On this score they were guardedly
optimistic, believing it would be wrong to assume they would be unable
to hold Hong Kong in war or to regard withdrawal as inevitable.169
Hong Kong and British recognition of

the People’s Republic
On 1 October, the Chinese Communist Party declared the establish-

ment of a Central People’s Government in Peking, to which the Soviet
Union and its satellites immediately accorded de jure recognition. The
fall of Canton two weeks later effectively ended all official contact
between the British and Nationalists in China and prompted the
British Consul-General in Peking to accord virtual de facto recognition
to the new Communist regime.170 The Attlee government was now
faced with the decision as to whether or not to recognize legally the
Peking government. As Foreign Secretary, Bevin drove the debate on

the question, submitting a memorandum to the Cabinet on 24 October
arguing in favor of recognition. His principal rationale for recognition
was economic: the Communists ‘have trade to offer and we have an
immovable stake in their territory which can only be maintained by
trade’.171 He thought any British delay in recognizing the new govern-
ment would not only generate animosity but also drive the Chinese to
seek greater Soviet help. The policy of ‘keeping a foot in the door’ was
of course predicated on trade ties and the hope of taking advantage of
any Sino-Soviet split that may develop. While the Cabinet was generally
in favor of according recognition, they nonetheless accepted Bevin’s sug-
gestion that he first consult the United States and Commonwealth coun-
tries on the subject, and await the results of Malcolm MacDonald’s
November conference of regional British officials at his official resi-
dence, Bukit Serene.172
The US Secretary of State told Bevin that the US was opposed to early
recognition of the People’s Republic, though Bevin thought this had
more to do with Congressional criticism of the State Department’s han-
dling of China than it did with ‘the realities of the situation in China’.173
The US first wanted explicit assurances from the new government that
it would abide by all of China’s international obligations. Acheson
accepted the fact that Britain was disposed toward early recognition,
but asked Bevin to delay recognition as long as possible and to stagger
recognition by the Commonwealth countries.174 The French too were
opposed to precipitate recognition because they thought it would have
an adverse effect on their position in Indochina, where they had just
set up a new constitutional structure under the Emperor Bao Dai.175
They proposed to delay recognition until the Communists both gained
control over the rest of southwest China and agreed to recognize the
new Bao Dai regime.176 Commonwealth views on the issue diverged
widely, India declaring its intent to accord recognition in the latter half
of December, while the new, conservative Australian government of Sir
Robert Menzies was opposed to immediate recognition.177
The officials gathered at Bukit Serene felt the situation in Southeast
Asia demanded unconditional de jure recognition at the earliest possible
moment, but that Commonwealth efforts to contain the spread of Com-
munism in the area should be strengthened.178 The conferees also urged
the establishment of an extensive propaganda campaign to explain that
recognition was not inconsistent with opposition to Communism, and
that every effort be made to minimize the adverse effects expected from
this apparent divergence of policy with the United States.179 Grantham
himself approved of early recognition, even though it would give the

Communists an official presence in Hong Kong through inheritance of
the Chinese Republic’s office of special commissioner.180
Bevin reported to the Cabinet that, on balance, ‘recognition was
unlikely to provide any immediate panacea for British trading interests
in China and … Hong Kong, [but] it may be expected to provide the
minimum protection necessary to their continued existence’.181 The
thrust of the Foreign Office’s argument was clear: Britain should recog-
nize the People’s Republic of China in order to preserve its trading inter-
ests and keep a foot in the door in case of a Sino-Soviet split. Bevin
largely ignored the military effects of the decision, allowing only two
sentences to the Chiefs of Staff view that recognition would have ‘an
adverse effect on our military position in the Far East and South East
Asia’.182 Indeed, the Chiefs believed de jure recognition would have no
affect on the Allies’ theater strategy, which in case of hot war continued
to be largely defensive, but its effect on the Cold War was not even
mentioned.183 Both the Chiefs and the Joint Intelligence Committee
thought recognition would tend to lessen the external threat to Hong
Kong, but understood it would allow the Communists to continue to
build up their underground organization in the colony.184 For his part,
General Harding was opposed to British recognition of Communist
China. He believed that on balance the effects of recognition would
prove more hurtful than helpful, not just in Malaya, but throughout
Southeast Asia.185 Indeed, much as he predicted, the mere possibility
that Communist Chinese consuls could enter Malaya led to the demor-
alization of the local Chinese community and a deterioration in the
security situation there.186 As reported to the Cabinet, neither the
Chiefs, the High Commissioner in Malaya, nor the Governor of
Singapore felt that the eventual entry of Communist Chinese Consuls
in those colonies would sufficiently worsen the emergency situation to
the point it was worth risking alienation of the local Chinese commu-
nities, who undoubtedly would regard withholding of recognition as
an act of anti-Chinese bias by the British.187
Great Britain formally recognized the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) on 6 January 1950,188 but by April 1950 it was apparent that the
advantages anticipated by the move were not accruing. In January the
Soviets and the PRC recognized Ho Chi Minh’s self-proclaimed
Democratic Republic of Vietnam as the de jure government of what was
then the French Associated State of Vietnam, a belligerent act that pre-
saged greater Communist assistance to the Viet Minh. Further raising
Western concerns was the signing in February of a mutual assistance
treaty between China and the Soviet Union. In fact, British bilateral
relations with China actually deteriorated after recognition, in large part
because of HMG’s refusal to support the Communists’ assumption of the
Chinese seat on the UN Security Council, but also because of lingering
Chinese animosity over the Amethyst affair.189 In Peking, Communist
officials refused to meet with members of the British diplomatic mis-
sion, while throughout China they began to seize British property and
impose debilitating taxes on British and other Western businesses, forc-
ing many to close.190 Bevin observed that the ‘disappearance at so early
a stage of major British interests from the China scene is bound
adversely to affect our prestige, and to encourage the Chinese to hasten
the process’.191 Recognition also had little tangible benefit for Hong
Kong, where the government now had to concern itself with possible
air attack or port mining by irate Nationalists, and the possible capture
by the Communists of modern American weapons being delivered to
Formosa.192 And as had been feared for some time, the Communists
began to drive large numbers of refugees into Hong Kong in an appar-
ent attempt to destabilize the colony. The British reaction was to close
the frontier from their side, as they had already absorbed more refugees
than they could handle.193
Robbing Peter to pay Paul
It was during this period of increased tension that the worsening internal
security situation in Malaya created a crisis for Hong Kong. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 4, on 9 March the Defence Committee had approved
the BDCC(FE)’s recommendation to move 26 Gurkha Brigade from
Hong Kong to Malaya.194 Grantham acquiesced in the move because
MacDonald assured him that the Malayan situation was desperate
enough to require it and because it was thought four weeks’ warning of
an attack on Hong Kong would be available: enough time to return the
brigade in case of an impending Communist assault.195
But over the next six weeks, the security situation in Malaya contin-
ued to worsen to the point where a reluctant Harding asked the Chiefs
of Staff on 11 April to permit him to redeploy 3 Commando Brigade to
Malaya, send an additional infantry battalion from the UK, and shift
an armored car regiment from the Middle East in order to provide
‘breathing space’ for the Federation’s civil and police authorities.196
The BDCC(FE) buttressed Harding’s request, citing intelligence which
indicated a significant diminution of the Communist threat to Hong
Kong such that where the likelihood of Chinese ‘external intervention
in the internal situation in Hong Kong, and of external political and

economic pressure on the Colony [had diminished]. In fact we do not
anticipate an all out effort being made to stir up internal disorder for
some time’.197 But both Governor Grantham and Lieutenant-General
Robert Mansergh (Festing’s replacement)198 objected to removal of the
Commandos, whose primary mission was maintenance of internal
security in Hong Kong, a role for which they had reached a high state
of readiness. Mansergh could use Army troops for this task, but the
rapid turnover of large numbers of inexperienced National Servicemen
in the Army contingent meant ‘they could never produce such a fully
satisfactory answer’ to the internal security problem as did the Royal
Marine commandos, who enlisted on long service engagements.199 He
questioned the wisdom of moving the Commando Brigade to Malaya,
not only because it weakened the colony’s most vulnerable point –
internal security – but also because a ‘threat to Hong Kong will surely
only be made in conjunction with greater a threat to Malaya’.200
Mansergh implied that reinforcing Malaya at the expense of Hong
Kong was falling into a Chinese Communist trap. He asserted that if
Hong Kong could resist ‘from calling on Malaya in all events except a
major external plus internal attack, a better dividend will result in
FARELF generally’.201 In a protest to the Colonial Secretary, Grantham
was even more vociferous and alarmist about the planned redeploy-
ment than was Mansergh. He said the current calm in Hong Kong was
‘deceptive’, and to remove the Commandos was ‘unwise’, ‘difficult to
justify’, and a ‘fruitless risk to the Colony’s defence’.202 Grantham also
took exception to the BDCC(FE)’s contention that there would be four
to five weeks’ warning of any attack. That estimate only applied when
there were four brigades present in the colony; with the garrison
reduced by half, the PLA could attack with only one weeks’ warning.203
Throughout the month of March, HKLF had been sending situation
reports detailing the increasing presence of Russian advisers and aircraft,
but these were few in number or located very far away.204 Indeed, British
patrols revealed only about 550 Chinese troops near the frontier in early
April.205 As Mansergh told Harding, the real problem was internal secu-
rity. A JIC report in late March indicated that the degree of Communist
penetration in the colony was ‘disquieting’ and on the increase.206
The source of the BDCC(FE)’s confidence in accepting the risk of rede-
ploying almost half of the combat strength of the Hong Kong garrison
is not known, but their reasoning in SEACOS 43 implies a source of
reliable strategic intelligence to which the military and civil officials in
Hong Kong were not privy. At the end of April, Harding went to Hong
Kong to see the situation for himself and came away convinced that the
move of 3 Commando Brigade could go ahead safely.207 In an interview
nearly 40 years later, Harding said that he thought ‘the threat of a Chinese
attack on Hong Kong had … substantially diminished’ by the middle of
1950.208 Reassured by Harding’s appreciation, the Chiefs of Staff, with the
approval of the Malaya Committee and the Prime Minister, agreed to a
phased move of 3 Commando Brigade to Malaya, although no infantry
reinforcements were to be sent from Britain.209 With the loss of both 26
Gurkha and 3 Commando Brigades to Malaya, 40 Infantry Division’s abil-
ity to defend Hong Kong was now very much in question. Harding’s
threat assessment ultimately proved to be correct, but Chinese interven-
tion in the Korean War would spawn a new crisis for Hong Kong.210
Conclusion
The political decision to defend Hong Kong against possible attack

from Communist China had two startling effects on both global and
theater military strategies. First, it had a debilitating effect on the
Army’s post-war reorganization already in disarray from the deploy-
ment of 2 Guards Brigade to Malaya in 1948. The so-called Army ‘fire
brigades’ of the UK strategic reserve existed in name only, as evidenced
by the fact that units of 27 Infantry Brigade only came together for the
first time upon their arrival in Hong Kong.211 Sending nearly 25 000
troops from Britain to Hong Kong disrupted the National Service train-
ing scheme and, by extension, the build-up of the Army’s reserves, thus
retarding the development of a key warfighting component of British
strategy for war with Russia. Secondly, the reinforcement of Hong Kong
and Malaya transformed FARELF into the largest operational command
in the British Army, this at a time when Britain had committed itself to
the defense of Western Europe through the Brussels and NATO pacts
and was heavily engaged in the Berlin airlift and security duties in
West Germany. By committing in ‘peacetime’ such a large portion of
its active army to the Far East, the British had inadvertently established
twin strategies: one for cold war, and one for hot, or global, war.
In a period when most troop transporting was still done by sea, it
seems unlikely that FARELF forces could have redeployed to the Middle
East, Western Europe, or Britain in time to stave off the anticipated
Russian attack. Indeed, in July 1950 the JPS flatly stated that if the Army
was called upon to fight Russia within the next 12 months, no ‘major
British reinforcing formations will be able to reach Western Europe from
the United Kingdom before a complete Allied collapse on the Rhine’.212 If
in fact war broke out before July 1951, ‘the whole of Europe would be
overrun, and a similar position to that existing in 1940 would come
about’.213 Only in the Middle and Far East would the British have any
hope of maintaining their position, but it would not be possible to hold
Hong Kong if it was ‘seriously attacked’.214 The Army’s diffusion on
Cold War tasks, principally in Malaya and Hong Kong, meant that
training and formation of 11 Territorial Army divisions was even on
paper only at the equivalent of 4 12 divisions, while almost none of the
regular Army units had had any training for war as formations.215 The
only exceptions were an understrength infantry division in Germany,
and 40 Infantry Division in Hong Kong.216 Nevertheless, it must be
remembered that the target date for full Army readiness was still some
six years away.
The rationale behind the despatch of such large reinforcements is
questionable. There was no explicit threat to Hong Kong other than the
generally anti-Western, anti-imperialist propaganda spouted by the
Chinese Communists. On the contrary, a number of sources indicated
the CCP would continue to deal with Western businesses in China, a line
that the CIA believed, and which was the basis for Britain’s recognition
of the People’s Republic and efforts to maintain its trade interests in
the country.217 The proximate cause of the decisions to first reinforce
Hong Kong with a brigade group, then to defend the colony with a
reinforced infantry division, appears to have been the Amethyst crisis,
although this is never explicitly stated in any of the available Cabinet,
Defense Committee, or Chiefs of Staff records. The fact that the rein-
forcement of the colony was nothing more than an extremely costly
precautionary move is borne out by the redeployment of two brigades
to Malaya in the spring of 1950.
The need to send reinforcements to both Malaya and Hong Kong
revealed a weakness in the strategy laid down in Future Defence Policy.
The policy to abandon Hong Kong if attacked was shown to be too
rigid for the Cold War. Clearly, there were places which had a strategic,
political, and economic value that was distinct from, but nonetheless
related to, the requirements to fight World War III. By the beginning of
1950, the British defense establishment had come to realize that there
were two struggles going on, and that in order to prevail in hot war,
they first needed to assure success in the Cold War. With the emer-
gence of a hostile China, however, developments in the strategic
periphery were diverting Britain’s focus from the defense of the core.
Having contemplated going to war with China over Hong Kong, the
new challenge became how to limit strategic liability in the Far East.
6
Adapting to Reality: the Far East
and Cold War Strategy, 1950–54
In June 1950, after two years of the Far Eastern tail wagging the strategic
dog, the Chiefs of Staff produced a new strategic white paper that not
only recognized the new form of struggle known as ‘cold war’, it also
accorded preparations to counter it as part and parcel of preparations
for hot war. Issued 18 days before North Korea’s invasion of its south-
ern neighbor, ‘Defence Policy and Global Strategy’ called for a greater
emphasis on Asia and reconfiguration and expansion of the Regular
Army for Cold War operations. The new strategy also entailed the
development of a unified front of colonial and independent Asian
countries – supported by Britain and the United States – to contain
Chinese Communism. Thus the strategic framework for the British
government’s response to aggression in the Far East was in place before
the Korean War even started.
The new strategy would take years and several billion pounds to
implement, and even then overseas contingencies strained the British
Army to the point of breaking. In 1950, the strain was nowhere greater
than in the Far East, where internal security in Malaya continued to
deteriorate in a dramatic fashion and the concomitant need for more
troops conflicted directly with Hong Kong’s defense needs and a British
contingent in Korea. But as will be discussed in subsequent chapters,
the Korean crisis fortuitously prompted several Commonwealth coun-
tries to provide assistance in the anti-Communist crusade in Asia and
led to greater material and moral assistance from the United States,
despite Anglo-American policy disagreements over China and the
Korean War.
At the prompting of the new Churchill government, the Chiefs of
Staff in July 1952 revised their Defence Policy and Global Strategy, but
rather than being the harbinger of a revolutionary change in strategy
109
as most scholars have surmised, the release of the document in 1992

instead revealed significant similarities with its predecessor. Thus, the
Labour government’s 1950 Defence Policy and Global Strategy paper
served as the basis for the Conservative government’s strategy.
Subsequent development of the hydrogen bomb only accelerated
many of the trends first evident in the 1950 paper, including an
increased emphasis on preparations for a short global war that reduced
the significance of the Middle East as a pillar of military strategy. By
further extolling the nuclear deterrent, the Conservatives accelerated
the reorientation of the Army to Cold War operations, a process initi-
ated by the Labour government. Yet the Churchill government faced
the same quandary as its predecessor: extensive overseas commitments
that cut into funding for modernization programs. The result was to
lead to annual budgets that spent as much as 9.8 per cent of Britain’s
gross national product on defense.1
The strategic impact of a Communist China:

the view from Whitehall
‘Future Defence Policy’ had not considered the effects of a China under
Communist control or of a Cold War in its neighboring states.2 Early
post-war studies had emphasized the need to counter political and eco-
nomic instability in Southeast Asia by revitalizing area economies and
building up stable, national regimes capable of maintaining their own
internal security. What they did not envision was a virulent Communist
insurrection in Malaya or a Chinese military threat to Burma,
Indochina, and Hong Kong. Indeed, in deciding to send reinforce-
ments to Malaya and Hong Kong, the Defence Committee did not
examine whether existing strategy was inadequate or wrong. Instead, it
focused its deliberations on how the existing armed forces could pro-
vide the necessary troops and the implications such deployments had
on the execution of existing strategy.
Surprisingly, the impetus for a new strategy came not from
Whitehall, but from Singapore. In fact, at least as early as February
1948, the Far East Cs-in-C had suggested many of the tenets of a new
strategy when they considered the strategic position of Malaya and the
ramifications of a Communist advance into South China.3 They believed
that the poverty, political instability, and nationalist movements
of Southeast Asia made the region ripe for Communist subversion
and expansion, but that the remedies for these ailments were chiefly
economic and political, not military. They believed that military forces
The Far East and Cold War Strategy, 1950–54 111
could only serve as backstops for internal security and as counters to

any localized external aggression.
The Commanders realized that once the Communists controlled all
of China, the threat of Communist subversion of, or aggression
towards, frontier states would greatly increase, especially in Burma,
Indochina, and eventually, Siam. Once these states had fallen, Malaya
would be directly threatened. For these reasons they argued that coun-
tries bordering China first had to be made into prosperous, politically
stable entities capable of generating popular support and resisting
Communist encroachment. Only then could these countries contem-
plate a mutual defense pact. Such a scheme would require the British,
French, and Americans to coordinate plans to maintain the independ-
ence of places, places now deemed vital to strategic policy, including
French Indochina, Hainan, Hong Kong and Formosa.4 The Chiefs had
not previously considered these latter three islands as being ‘vital’ to
strategic policy, but when in January 1949 they assessed the general
strategic implications of possible Communist occupation of South
China, they accepted many of the Commanders’ tenets, including steps
to ensure that the Americans did not allow Formosa to fall under
Communist control.5 While the Chiefs were not overly concerned about
the military capabilities of the Chinese Communists, the potential for
Soviet access to Chinese ports and airfields did make them nervous.
Like the CIC(FE), the Chiefs of Staff were also worried about a dra-
matic increase in Communist subversive activity throughout South
and Southeast Asia, particularly in support of nationalist movements in
Indochina and Indonesia. They believed Dutch and French failure to
reach agreement with ‘Nationalist dissident factions’ was creating con-
ditions that the Communists were sure to exploit. Furthermore, because
most Asians found French and Dutch colonial policies repugnant, there
was little hope of regional cooperation against Communism until polit-
ical accommodation in Indochina and Indonesia had been achieved.
From a strategic point of view, failure on the political and economic
fronts to develop stable, popular, anti-Communist regimes in those
colonies would only serve to increase the number of Dutch and French
troops in the Far East at the expense of Western European defense.6 For
these reasons the Chiefs argued that ‘all political means possible
should be taken to make the French and Dutch Governments reach
agreement’ with the nationalists.7
But even viable political settlements in Indochina and Indonesia
would not be panaceas: if the Communists controlled South China,
‘the forces required in the area in both peace and war would [need to]
be increased’. In order to guard against this eventuality, it was essential

to take firm action immediately. Unified political action was not yet pos-
sible, but the free exchange of intelligence, which already existed among
the British, French, and Dutch, should be extended to all interested
governments, particularly among their police forces. In Malaya, the
colonial authorities needed to improve the situation there to the
extent that the civil powers could assume responsibility for internal
security on their own and release Imperial troops for their intended
role as a strategic reserve. In the strategically important rice-surplus
country of Burma, it was essential that the British Services Mission
(BSMB) be maintained both to assist the government’s efforts in the
civil war and as a hedge against any Russian military influence. In
equally important Siam, the British undertook to arm five battalions
for frontier operations and the Chiefs had asked the CIC(FE) to consider
the establishment of a military mission.8 The JPS incorporated much of
this reasoning into their subsidiary studies for Plan DOUBLEQUICK, the
British portion of HALFMOON, the 1948 Anglo-American–Canadian war
plan in case of a war with Russia in 1949.9
The March 1949 JPS study on ‘Far East Strategy and Defence Policy’
incorporated many elements of the Chiefs’ January paper and, by
extension, the earlier CIC(FE) studies.10 Divided into two sections look-
ing out to 1957, the strategy portion dealt with the eventuality of
Communist control of China, which the JPS assumed would mean
Soviet development of, and access to, bases in China. The Planners also
assumed that all Soviet and US forces would have withdrawn from
Korea and that the whole peninsula would either be under Communist
control, or occupied by the Russians in the event of war. Japan, the
Ryukyus, and the Philippines would remain in Allied or friendly hands
and from those territories the Americans would be able to launch their
nuclear-armed bomber offensive against industrial targets in the Soviet
Far East. These same countries would serve as bases for Allied control of
the sea lines of communication in the western Pacific and China seas,
a capability that would be enhanced by control of Formosa.11
The JPS discounted the ability of combined Communist forces to
pose a direct military threat to Southeast Asia. They believed land com-
munications south of the Yangtze were inadequate for an overland
advance into South-East Asia by large fully-equipped forces, while
Allied sea control would prevent any seaborne invasion. The only real
military threats would be from ‘submarine raids and sporadic air
attacks against installations, port facilities and shipping’. Serious air
attacks could only develop if Soviet air forces were established in
Burma, Siam, or French Indochina. The integrity of these countries was
‘important’ because their stability had a direct effect on the internal

security of Malaya, the East Indies, and the Indian sub-continent. But
because their defense was not vital to global strategy, the Allies could
not permit additional resources to be diverted there in war.12 In sum,
Communist control of China had no effect at all on Allied strategy for
a global war with the Soviet Union: in the Far East it would remain
defensive except for the bombing campaign.
The JPS believed the main threat in the Far East continued to be the
‘activities of Communists and dissident nationalists, particularly in
view of the spread of Communism from South China through Burma
and Siam’. This theme was the focus of the policy section, in which the
JPS argued that peacetime policy should be to weaken subversive
elements by politically and economically promoting stability so that
Imperial troops would no longer be needed for internal security. In
order for the limited number of regular forces available in both peace
and war to be used as economically as possible, it was absolutely essential
that local forces be as robust as possible.13 This meant not only
expanding the Malay Regiment to two brigades, but also for the con-
tinuation of the BSMB and reconsideration of a military mission to
Siam.14 However, with respect to local forces being raised in Japan, the
Chiefs confirmed the policy of total demilitarization set down at
Potsdam. They realized that they might have to moderate this position
in light of future developments in China and Korea, and Japan’s ability
to resist Communism, but on no account could they allow Japan’s
strategic position, substantial manpower reserves, industrial potential,
and naval and air facilities to be controlled by a hostile power.15
The view from Singapore
The Commanders’ reaction to this report was strident. They felt the JPS
had greatly underestimated the risk of a Communist advance in the Far
East ‘carried out both by force of arms and the cold war technique’,
and that by 1957 it was just as likely as not that Burma, Siam,
Indochina, and Indonesia would have fallen.16 In such an event, the
threat to British Southeast Asia of both direct attack and subversion
will have increased to such a ‘formidable’ point that the redeployment
of ‘substantial’ regular forces from other theaters would be required.17
In particular, the loss of Burma, Siam, and Indochina would not only
pose a greater danger of air attack, but the loss of the rice-exporting
countries would create food shortages with serious internal security
consequences for the rest of Southeast Asia, India, and Japan.
The Commanders were clearly concerned about the resources available

to stop the spread of Communism, something that the JPS paper
ignored and which the Chiefs had only touched on in the most super-
ficial of ways. The Commanders also took exception to the paper’s
lackadaisical attitude toward Formosa, arguing that by 1957 the Soviet
air and submarine threat would be such that retention of the island in
friendly hands, or its denial to the enemy, was a matter of urgency.18 If
no military operation to capture Formosa in war was justifiable, then it
was all that more important to assure its position in peace. They were
so unhappy with these aspects of the JPS paper that they proposed to
prepare a ‘fresh’ paper on the subject, although the idea appears to
have been shelved following face-to-face meetings between the Chiefs
and members of the BDCC(FE).19
Singapore’s call for coordinated containment
Three members of the BDCC(FE), General Ritchie, Air Marshal Lloyd,

and Malcolm MacDonald, traveled to London in the latter half of May,
1949. They proposed to discuss strategy and the impact of events in
China – where the Communists had crossed the Yangtze and were still
holding HMS Amethyst hostage – on Southeast Asia and India. All three
believed that in order to avoid diversion of resources to the Far East in
a future war, there was an ‘urgent necessity to take diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and military steps to form a firm containing ring against
Communist penetration’. In their opinion, ‘this ring must be formed by
the co-ordinated action of many countries including India, Burma, Siam,
French Indo-China and Netherlands East Indies’.20 MacDonald asked the
Chiefs of Staff Committee for more to be done to bolster Asian defense.
In particular, he was keen to develop a much closer military liaison with
French forces in Indochina following the return of Bao Dai to Vietnam
and recognition of Vietnam as an Associated State within the French
Union. While the Chiefs agreed that it might be beneficial to start a
program of officer exchanges and attendance at each other’s regional
military schools, they were adamantly against any Anglo-French mili-
tary planning for Southeast Asia. Not only was French security highly
suspect, but certain Commonwealth countries – especially India –
would object to such joint planning on political grounds. As for the
Siamese, MacDonald had discussed the issue of a military mission with
the British ambassador in Bangkok, who agreed the timing was now
right to approach Marshal Pibul on the subject.21
Communist military success in North China and the crossing of the

Yangtze had clearly served to galvanize British policy toward the
emerging reality of a Communist China. Policy-makers in both
Singapore and London picked up and expanded the themes of regional
cooperation based on economic development and political stability,
hopefully backed by American largesse. Despite the existence of Anglo-
American defense planning talks and signature of the Washington
Treaty in April 1949, the United States had not committed itself to
assist Commonwealth defense efforts in the Middle East, Africa, South,
or Southeast Asia. This presented a political challenge for the Foreign
Office, which saw American involvement in Asian security as essential
not only for intrinsic reasons, but also as a strategic rearguard that
would permit Britain, Australia, and New Zealand to reallocate scarce
capital and military resources to the vital Western European and
Middle Eastern theaters. Although future US material support to Asian
defense was seen as crucial, the British were nonetheless uneasy about
the Americans, who they saw as bumptious and politically inexperi-
enced. As a strategic partner of the United States, the British therefore
sought to position themselves as the Americans’ éminence grise. They
realized, however, that they needed to pay a strategic ante that would
prove Britain’s viability as a serious ally:
[W]e shall not secure United States assistance unless the United States
Government can be satisfied that Commonwealth countries are them-
selves prepared to make a genuine contribution: but it will be difficult
to obtain Commonwealth commitments until the Commonwealth
Governments feel that they have some reinsurance for their own
defence, by the promise of American help in case of need.22
Indeed, the need for a strategic ante had been one of the principal rea-
sons underlying Britain’s support of a Commonwealth defense con-
cept, formation of the Brussels Pact, and the creation of NATO. In the
Far East they had proven they would fight for Malaya and Hong Kong,
although to date they could do little more elsewhere in Southeast Asia
other than supply arms and training.
Sir William Strang, Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, incorporated the concept of containment and regional coopera-
tion into a policy paper on Southeast Asia approved by Bevin. In
November 1949, Strang gave a version of his paper to George Kennan,
the head of the US State Department’s Policy Planning Group, an act
that may have had substantial influence on the development of NSC

48/2, ‘The position of the United States with respect to Asia’. For their
own reasons the Americans had begun to think much more seriously
about the Far East and Southeast Asia, Acheson even going so far as to tell
the British ambassador that Asia would be the ‘principal preoccupation of
the State Department in 1950’.23
The Colombo conference
Because the British saw Indian involvement in any regional scheme as

vital to its success, and because French and Dutch colonial policies
were anathema to India and other Asian countries, the British decided
the best way to begin the development of regional cooperation would
be under the auspices of the Commonwealth, a forum through which
they could wield substantial influence without appearing to direct the
key Dominions of India, Australia, and New Zealand.24 Bevin and
MacDonald therefore proposed a conference of Commonwealth for-
eign ministers to foster economic development and cooperation in
Asian Commonwealth countries.25 In November 1949, MacDonald
held a sort of preparatory conference of British representatives in the
Far East at his residence in Bukit Serene. There the conferees discussed
the Foreign Office brief for the Commonwealth conference to be held
in Colombo, Ceylon, in January 1950.26 Although Britain intended
to be fully engaged in this conference and would seek to persuade
others to act, it was clear that Britain had reached its limit in terms of
further financial assistance to the area: American financial backing was
imperative.27
From Bevin’s perspective, the Colombo conference, held shortly after
Britain had announced de jure recognition of the People’s Republic of
China, was a resounding success. Although Prime Minister Nehru of
India was not as wary of Chinese Communism as were most other
ministers, all agreed on the need to counter Soviet expansionism. They
also agreed on the need to promote ‘political freedom and economic
betterment’ as a means of preventing Communist encroachment in
Southeast Asia.28 French policy in Indochina remained a point of con-
tention between Britain and India, with MacDonald being rather more
sanguine about the prospects of Bao Dai as a true nationalist leader
than did Nehru. Yet substantive results did emerge in garnering loan
pledges for Burma, and in the need for firm plans for the promotion of
economic development of Southeast Asia, thus laying the foundation
of regional cooperation called for by British policy.29
ANZAM
Despite the relative success of the Colombo conference, the Dominions

continued to remain lukewarm on sharing Imperial defense burdens.
The British government tried to persuade Australia and New Zealand to
commit to placing some of their forces in Southeast Asia in peacetime.
A number of circumstances confounded these efforts, not the least of
which was the fact that the Australian and New Zealand defense estab-
lishments were at the time too small to make a difference. Indeed, the
regular Australian Army numbered less than 15000 men in 1950, and its
only combat formation was in Japan as part of BCOF.30 Probably the
greatest hindrance to a greater Australian and New Zealand role
in Southeast Asia was the British themselves. They worked at cross-
purposes by trying on the one hand to garner an antipodean commit-
ment to the Middle East, while on the other they encouraged Australia
to take responsibility for Commonwealth planning for the defense of
the Australia–New Zealand–Malayan (ANZAM) area first suggested by
Alanbrooke.31
From the point of view of Singapore, the realization of an ANZAM
regional defense organization led by Australia was rife with problems.
It was politically unacceptable because the Malayans would view its
existence as evidence that the British intended to abandon their
defense responsibilities. It was practically unacceptable as well. Because
British forces in the Far East were far larger than those of Australia and
New Zealand and already had experienced planning and intelligence
staffs, it made little sense to shift such responsibilities to Melbourne.32
Whitehall was generally unconcerned about these problems because
what it really wanted was for the Australians and New Zealanders to
commit their forces to the Middle East during a global war. British
acceptance of ANZAM was thus merely a gesture designed to placate
Australian and New Zealand concerns about their maritime security. In
fact, the Australia–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS) security treaty
of September 1951 was more than just an American effort to gain
Australian and New Zealand acceptance of a ‘soft’ peace treaty with
Japan. Instead, it was an American effort to assure the two Dominions
that they could deploy their forces to the Middle East content in the
knowledge that the US would protect their northern approaches.33
Although ANZAM was a fairly moribund organization for the first few
years of its existence, it would take on new life in mid-1950s as a
Commonwealth adjunct of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO).
Updating Far East strategy and policy
The JPS updated its report on Far East strategy and defence policy in April
1950.34 The bulk of the new report was little more than a reprinting of its
March 1949 study, but the Planners did make several important addi-
tions and amplifications. First, it incorporated the fact that the ABC
planners had added Malaya and the Aleutians to the Philippines,
Ryukyus, and Japan as strategically essential places to hold in war. The
defense of these areas, along with sea and air control, would be ‘within
Allied capabilities’, which would serve to limit the principal threat in
the Far East to one of ‘Chinese Communist land forces operating over
very long and difficult land lines of communication’.35 Most important
was the realization and acceptance that in the Far East a Cold War was
raging that threatened Britain’s peacetime economy and was inducing
the British and French to divert forces away from the main theaters of
Europe and the Middle East. Having studied the existing situation, the
Planners were ‘firmly of the opinion that the battle for the defence of
South East Asia in a war with Russia has already begun’.36 British and
French forces were already stretched to the limit and it was imperative
that the Commonwealth and the United States ‘take their full share of
the burden’.37 The report reiterated previous calls for a clear, agreed
Allied policy for the area, and noted that the Colombo Conference had
generated cooperative economic action in support of this objective.38
Immediate political and military actions were still needed in order to
buy time for the economic plans to be made effective.
In the political sphere, the JPS endorsed the BDCC(FE)’s call for a
coherent Anglo-American containment policy in Southeast Asia. The
BDCC(FE) had urged HMG to ‘at once follow the United States … in
declaring that any aggression across the northern frontiers of Burma,
Siam or Indo-China or the infiltration of leaders or arms into those
countries would constitute a threat to the peace of the world’, and that
the British and American governments would respond to such aggres-
sion with whatever actions they thought appropriate.39 It also recom-
mended a ‘closer association’ between the US and Britain over action
to be taken in Southeast Asia, including preparation of plans for possi-
ble action under UN auspices, and for greater efforts to persuade India
and other friendly Asian nations to support anti-Communist efforts in
Burma, Siam, and Indochina.40
In the military sphere, the JPS called for expansion of British armament
production in order to provide aid and equipment to the beleaguered
countries of Southeast Asia.41 Endorsing the BDCC(FE) program of May
1949,42 the Planners also urged His Majesty’s Government to increase

the provision of military advice to, and collaboration with, friendly
Asian countries in order to promote friendly relations and build united
policies. This could be done by using whatever military channels were
available – such as military missions and attachés – as well as encour-
agement of foreign officers to participate in exchange programs or to
enroll in British and other Western military training schools.43 Lastly,
and also in line with earlier BDCC(FE) recommendations, the JPS urged
the Chiefs to expand intelligence-sharing with regional allies as far as
the needs of security would permit so as to increase cooperation in
dealing with ‘Communist leaders and their armed bands’.44
The Far East and the ‘global strategy and

defence policy’ of 1950
Enormous changes at the grand strategic level had occurred in the three
years since the Defence Committee approved ‘Future Defence Policy’ in
1947. On the plus side could be counted the creation of the Western
Union and NATO alliances, together with an American commitment to
the defense of Europe and the development of an Anglo-American
global strategy to fight World War III. Furthermore, throughout the first
half of 1950 the United States demonstrated a greater interest in the
fate of Southeast Asia, President Truman authorizing the allocation of
$75 million in military and other assistance to the region.45 But the
negative side was just as momentous, and not just because of the
Communist military victory in China: in August 1949 the Soviets had
tested their first atomic bomb years ahead of British and American
intelligence estimates.46 The advent of the Soviet A-bomb, in conjunc-
tion with new long-range Soviet bombers, meant that British and other
Allied air bases to be used for the planned air offensive against the
Soviet Union now were more vulnerable than they had been previ-
ously. Similarly, Soviet possession of the bomb made any OVERLORD-type
invasion of Europe almost suicidal.47 By early 1950, the Chiefs of Staff
were convinced that the British Army must stand and fight with its
allies on the European mainland in order to hold the anticipated Soviet
attack as far east of the Rhine as possible.48
Then there was the danger posed by the new ‘cold war technique’, in
which Communists combined propaganda, subversion, and military
intimidation in a way that threatened vulnerable regimes and countries
all around the world. In the Far East and Southeast Asia the Cold War
seemed everywhere to be manifest, and recently exacerbated by
Communist success in China. Having reached the borders of Burma and

Indochina, the Chinese Communists were now poised to provide arms,
equipment, and advice directly to Communist insurgents in those two
areas. British and American hopes that Mao would prove to be another
Tito were dashed by the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950, recogni-
tion by those two countries of Ho Chi Minh’s ‘Democratic Republic
of Vietnam’, and Chinese seizure of British and American properties
in Peking.
‘In light of changed circumstances’ and under a new Minister of
Defence, Emanuel Shinwell, the Chiefs of Staff in early 1950 undertook
a thorough review of the 1947 strategy.49 The Defence Committee
approved the resulting ‘Defence Policy and Global Strategy’ (DO(50)45)
on 25 May and provided a slightly modified version to US, Canadian,
Australian, and New Zealand counterparts early the following month.50
To the three pillars of British defense – defense of the United Kingdom,
the Middle East, and the sea lines of communication – the new report
added the defense of Western Europe. Also new was the promulgation
of separate but related strategies for both cold and hot war, although
the Chiefs cautioned that these could not be divided into ‘water-tight
compartments’.51 They suggested the Allies’ aim in Cold War, which
should be:
achieved if possible without real hostilities, involves first a stabilisation

of the anti-communist front in the present free world and then, as
the Western Powers become militarily less weak, the intensification
of ‘cold’ offensive measures aimed at weakening the Russian grip on
the satellite states and ultimately achieving their complete inde-
pendence of Russian control.52
They believed the Allies had to go on the offensive in the Cold War,
especially on the political and economic front, and not be overly fear-
ful of provoking war with Russia. Even if the Russians forced a war on
the Allies, then the aim in hot war would remain broadly the same as
in the Cold War, with the proviso that:
Our first preoccupation must be to ensure survival in the face of the

initial onslaught. Our ultimate military aim must be to bring the
war to the speediest possible conclusion, without Western Europe
being overrun, by bringing about the destruction of Russian military
power and the collapse of the present régime.53
Unlike its predecessor, which contended that war with Russia was
likely after 1956, the new paper expressed the Chiefs’ belief that a
shooting war was neither inevitable nor even likely, ‘provided the
Western Allies maintain their resolution and build up their military
strength’.54 Instead, the Chiefs thought the Cold War would evolve in
three phases and that for the Allies to deter a Russian attack they had to
embark on a defense build-up, for ‘Cold war policy must … be related to
military strength’.55 The first, and current phase, was one of deterrence,
in which America’s preponderance in nuclear weaponry deterred Russia
from attacking, while the West built up its strength. The second phase
would begin when the Allies’ conventional strength had reached the
point where Russia could no longer consider a successful attack on
Western Europe as a foregone conclusion. By that time Russia would
have a significant stock of atomic bombs herself, but Allied deterrent
forces would remain effective, and would possibly be augmented by
the development of effective defense against atomic attack. Should the
West fail in the second phase in convincing Russia to abandon her
plans for world domination, a third phase, in which the development
of air defenses made attack by “conventional” manned bombers’
impracticable, could return the adversaries to an era not unlike that
before the advent of strategic bombing.56 In order to prevent the rela-
tive weakening of Allied conventional forces that such a stalemate
would entail, it was imperative that the Allies develop ‘some form of
supersonic unmanned bomber or other vehicle’ for the delivery of
atomic and other weapons into the Russian heartland.57 In each phase
there would be pressure in Western countries to weaken their offensive
Cold War policy out of fear of precipitating war, but these pressures
should be resisted and any ‘Fifth Column’ groups sternly dealt with.58
Unlike Future Defence Policy, which did not even mention the Far
East, the Global Strategy report devoted an entire section to the area, in
and of itself a major change. Though the contents of the section were lit-
tle more than an updated amalgam of JPS reports on the region,59 the
Chiefs now specified that the Far East and Southeast Asia were to be pri-
ority areas in Cold War. Nevertheless, the colonies still had to develop
local security forces to handle the brunt of the fighting in a hot war, as
no diversion of resources could be made from the vital theaters of
Europe and the Middle East. The region, ‘though critically important, is
not vital to our survival in war – as was proved [in the last war]’.60
In giving priority to Cold War efforts, the Chiefs admitted that prepa-
rations along those lines would ‘result in our being in a somewhat more
difficult position at the outset of real hostilities’.61 Nonetheless, they
were convinced that unless the Cold War was successfully fought, loss
in hot war was a foregone conclusion. Consequently, they asserted that
the ‘composition, distribution and to some extent the equipment of
the British Army must be primarily conditioned by cold war responsi-

bilities’.62 Because the Cold War strategy required the British to main-
tain forces of occupation in Germany and ‘essential’ garrisons in the
Middle and Far East, it would be necessary to ‘increase the regular con-
tent of all three Services’ because the terms of National Service were not
conducive to overseas service.63 Since the principal Cold War burden
fell on the Army, the Chiefs stated that it ‘should be in a position as
soon as possible to have at [its] disposal a reserve for cold war emergen-
cies’.64 Lastly, Britain should give all material assistance possible from
existing sources to allied or friendly nations ‘actively engaged in the
cold war’, such as the French in Indochina.65
DO(50)45 had little direct impact on Britain’s de facto Far East strategy
and defense policy developed by the BDCC(FE) over the course of the
previous two years. In making the Cold War Britain’s defense priority,
however, the Chiefs were essentially admitting that their strategy was a
reaction to Communist expansionist activities, and the adoption of
their own offensive Cold War campaign could not obscure that fact. In
some respects, DO(50)45 was little more than official recognition that
unforeseen British commitments in the Far East had diffused defense
preparations for the Middle East and Western Europe. It is important to
note that the Defence Committee had concluded that the British Army
was no longer able to meet commitments using the National Service-
oriented structure conceived in 1947. Consequently, in 1949 the
Labour government had already approved a modest, but nonetheless
real, increase in defense expenditures that would support equipment
modernization and an increase in the proportion of regulars serving
overseas.66 Further increases in the defense budget would be needed to
pay for the creation of a contingency response force and the deployment
of an Army corps to Germany, as suggested by DO(50)45, and these the
Labour government was able to deliver.67 Although Parliament would
approve massive, additional funding for these and other defense pro-
grams after British troops were sent to Korea, the doctrinal foundations
for a rearmament program were actually laid and formalized nearly two
months before the start of the Korean War.
‘In light of the present situation’: updating DO(50)45
The Korean War had a catalyzing effect on the British Cold War pro-
gram. In an effort to provide the additional manpower needed to fill
new combat formations in Korea and elsewhere, in August 1950 the
Cabinet agreed to extend the period of National Service ‘with the
Colours’ from 18 months to two years.68 Retention of the unfortunate

conscripts caught by this change gradually increased the size of the
armed forces by 77 000, of which 55 000 went to the Army.69 Further
increases occurred with the government’s recall of several thousand
reservists, and in 1951, the 14 infantry battalions used in the training
of National Servicemen were released for active service by an Army
re-organization that gave the training role to reactivated regimental
depots.70 In April 1952, the Churchill government would raise eight
additional infantry battalions and see the Army rise to its highest post-
war level (see Table 6.1).71 In September 1950, with American prodding
and promises of aid, the Labour government enacted a massive rearma-
ment program calling for the expenditure of £3.7 billion over three
years, nearly a 60 per cent increase over the previous plan.72 In
January, after the Chinese openly intervened in Korea, Parliament
increased the total program to £4.7 billion, effectively doubling the
pre-war defense budget.73
Despite these dramatic increases, the strategic impact of the Korean
War was surprisingly limited. In preparation for a conference of
Commonwealth Defence Ministers in June 1951, the Chiefs of Staff
produced a version of DO(50)45 revised ‘in light of the present situa-
tion’.74 Although the main principles of DO(50)45 remained unchanged,
the Chiefs did make some adjustments to the document. As in the 1950
paper, the Chiefs expressed their belief that the Russians were unlikely
to deliberately start a total war given ‘America’s enormous lead in the
production of atomic weapons and the general scientific and industrial
superiority of the West’. Nonetheless, they could not exclude the possi-
bility that Russia would provoke a total war before the Allies completed
their rearmament programs. Thus, the ‘moment of greatest danger in
the next few years will probably be the latter half of 1952’.75 The need
for the strategic reserve called for in DO(50)45 had been given a new
impetus by Russia’s evident willingness to wage war by proxy, as in
Korea. In Europe the picture had improved to a great extent by the
implementation of NATO plans, the appointment of General
Eisenhower as Supreme Commander, and by the North Atlantic
Council’s decision in principle to re-arm West Germany.76
Table 6.1 Expansion of the British Army, 1950–5277
June 50 Sept. 50 Dec. 50 Mar. 51 June 51 Sept. 51 Dec. 51 Mar. 52 June 52
353 864 363 849 391 632 421 738 423 471 424 504 430 538 434 808 441 128
The Chinese intervention in Korea did prompt several changes in the

section on the Far East. As far as the Chiefs were concerned, the hope
that Mao would prove to be another Tito was gone. ‘[W]e must,’ they
wrote, ‘consider Chinese and Russian Communists firmly aligned and
that there is little chance in the near future of China pursuing an inde-
pendent policy’.78 Chinese Communism had to be contained, and in
order to avoid a cleavage with the United States over China, the British
should make every effort to ensure their policies agreed with one
another. The UN response to the Korean situation was ‘in accordance
with our policy of meeting communist aggression wherever it occurs’.79
The objective in Korea was to maintain sufficient military strength as
long as was necessary to achieve a political settlement, but if global war
was imminent, the policy was to immediately withdraw British troops
for redeployment to the priority theaters.80 The Chiefs also modified
their view of the Chinese threat to Malaya. Whereas the 1950 paper
reckoned the threat of a Chinese invasion ‘not likely to be very great’,81
the 1951 paper now cast the threat as ‘considerable, although it would
take time to mature’ as it would have to come overland from Indochina
and Siam.82 On the subject of a peace treaty with Japan, Britain and the
United States had agreed that it should be a ‘liberal treaty containing no
clauses prohibiting Japan from rearming or limiting the size and nature
of any armed forces which she may eventually raise’.83 The Chiefs sug-
gested the United States conclude a bilateral defense pact with Japan
immediately after completion of a peace treaty, presumably to assuage
Australian and New Zealand concerns about a rearmed Japan.84
Based on recent events in the Cold War, particularly in Korea and
Persia, the Chiefs reiterated their call for a strategic reserve, but now
admitted that ‘our strategic reserve will always be limited by the man-
power available to the services in peace’.85 Because Britain could not
afford a large strategic reserve, it was all the more important that the
one it did establish was ‘flexible’ and ‘capable of quick employment in
any part of the world’ by a ‘sufficient fleet of transport aircraft’.86 As
called for in the 1950 paper, the Ministry of Defence had taken steps to
increase the proportion of regulars in the armed forces, permitting
more servicemen to be posted overseas. But the Chiefs admitted that
they had reached the bottom of the manpower pool: ‘our commit-
ments have grown to the limit of our regular strength and will con-
tinue to grow’.87 They appealed to Commonwealth governments to
help share the burden in the Cold War by providing troops for the
Middle East, but they also set as one of their own priorities ‘measures
to increase all three services’.88
The strategic reappraisal of 1952
The high cost to the British economy of the rearmament program

proved to be intolerable to some ministers of the Labour government,
which in its waning days voted to spread the cost of the program over a
much longer period of time.89 The inflationary and balance of payments
effects of rearmament nevertheless continued, and the Conservative
government of Winston Churchill, which came to power in October
1951, struggled too with the need to balance defense requirements
against the costs of social welfare programs. In preparation for the
government’s first budget, the new Minister of Defense, Field Marshal
the Lord Alexander, asked the Chiefs of Staff ‘to re-examine the strate-
gic basis of our defence plans, so as to provide for the next two or three
years a policy upon which rearmament could proceed’.90 He told the
Chiefs to take into account the recent American build-up of atomic
weapons and strategic bombers as well as the strain on the British
economy in order to bring strategy ‘into line with what we could
afford to maintain for a long period’.91
The Chiefs initiated the strategic reappraisal with a week-long meeting
at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich from 28 April to 2 May 1952,
producing a final draft for the Defence Committee in July.92 According
to Alexander, the reduced force structure in the 1952 ‘Defence Policy
and Global Strategy’ provided a yearly savings of nearly £300 million
over the 1951 budget.93 Under the original rearmament scheme, the
size of the Army was not to be increased, but it would receive new
equipment, new housing, and a build up of material reserves.94 In the
new defense policy, the Chiefs were adamantly opposed to reducing
the size of the Army, since it ‘bears the brunt of the Cold War’.95 In
order to obtain economies from the Army’s portion of the defense
budget, however, the re-equipment program would be limited to the
active divisions, the two Territorial Army divisions earmarked for the
Middle East, and only half of the first contingent of Territorial divi-
sions slated for NATO.96 This, the Chiefs admitted, meant that Britain
would not fulfill its Lisbon conference commitments to NATO.97 As
presaged in the 1950 and 1951 papers, the new paper now advocated a
strategic reserve of one division that, less heavy equipment, could be
flown to the Far East in the space of one month, and with a spearhead
of a parachute brigade available at all times.98
The 1952 strategy paper turns out not to be the revolutionary docu-
ment many scholars have previously discerned it to be.99 What it did
do was more fully develop the notions of nuclear deterrence found in
the papers of 1950 and 1951 by placing a greater emphasis on the ability
of the United States to retaliate against Russia in such a devastating
manner as to threaten its very existence as a national power.100 The
Chiefs considered that this capability should be ‘judiciously publicised’
in such a way that it would itself serve as a deterrent. On the debit side,
the Air Defence Committee had determined that for ‘the foreseeable
future no effective defence against atomic air attack’ could be devel-
oped. Although this meant that Britain was threatened with nuclear
annihilation in the event of war, it was also true that the Russians
would be similarly vulnerable to an American attack that could ‘come
in from every point of the compass’. But the Chiefs also believed that
conventional forces in Europe were complementary to the nuclear
deterrent because they would delay any Russian attack sufficiently long
enough to prevent them from over-running the continent before they
were themselves destroyed.101 As long as the Russians were under no
illusions about the West’s intention to immediately and massively
retaliate, the threat of war would recede to the point where it was no
longer thought inevitable:
We conclude that war is unlikely provided that the Cold War is con-
ducted by the Allies in a patient, levelheaded and determined manner.
The United Kingdom must use its influence among the Allies to
ensure that this is done. The implication is that the Allies must face
the prospect of a prolonged period of Cold War waged by the
Russians, their satellites and the Chinese, with great intensity and
ingenuity.102
If war nonetheless came, its opening phase was likely to be of ‘unparal-

leled intensity’ at the end of which Russia and Britain would both
‘have suffered terrible damage’. It was possible hostilities would
continue after the opening phase, but no one could foretell what form
they would take or for what duration they would last. While the possi-
bility of a long war could not be fully discounted, Britain and other
Western countries could not afford the programs necessary to prepare
for one without damaging their economies to the extent that it would
‘present Russia with a bloodless victory gained at the sole cost of playing
upon the nerves of the Free World’.103 Instead, priority should be placed
on winning the Cold War, and on maintaining the forces necessary to
prevail in the opening phase.
Because the Allies had so far successfully stymied the Russian threat
to Europe, the adversary had redirected his efforts to Cold War in East
Asia where he was fighting by proxy. In an elaboration of the 1951

paper’s contention of Sino-Soviet solidarity, the 1952 paper stated that
‘the community of military interests of Russia and China – at any rate in
the short term – outweighs potential clashes of interest between them’.
Allied policy should nonetheless be focused on ‘stimulating’ these
clashes of interest and ‘every effort should be made to drive a wedge’
between the two countries. In terms of Cold War military commitments,
the Allies should counter ‘Russian and Chinese aggression … wherever it
may occur’. With respect to Southeast Asia, ‘militant Communism,
sponsored by Moscow, is the real enemy and China is the direct mili-
tary force behind it,’ although the latter was a ‘menace on her own
account’. The wars in Malaya and Indochina ‘have dragged on’, consti-
tuting a drain on the ability of the British and French to build up their
forces elsewhere. From the Chiefs’ point of view, ‘it would be consis-
tent that the Truman policy of containment, which has been accepted
as sound policy for Europe, should be accepted by the Allies – and
particularly by the Americans – as an equally sound policy for Asia’.
Still, there was little profit to be gained by getting involved in a war
with China as it would only serve to divert scarce military resources
needed in war for the Middle East and Europe.104 And, in a reflection
of the US–UK dialog about what should be done in the event of
Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia, the Chiefs wrote that the ‘great-
est contribution to the stability of Asia would be provided by making it
clear to the Chinese that the Allies are determined jointly to resist
Communist aggression’.105
Unlike previous postwar strategy papers, the purpose of the 1952
paper was specifically an attempt to square strategic requirements with
available resources.106 To meet this objective, the Chiefs first laid down
four priorities: (1) safeguarding of British interests in the Cold War;
(2) development of a British adjunct to the American nuclear deterrent;
(3) preparation for war in the event deterrence failed; and (4) support to
NATO.107 Britain had also to consider her own and the Commonwealth’s
world-wide commitments in assessing how to apportion its limited mili-
tary resources.108 There was no consideration given to the elimination
of commitments, only of how to meet them, preferably with equitable
burden sharing by the Commonwealth and other allies. Of the two
greatest proposed changes, the first was to build a larger proportion of
jet-engined nuclear bombers at the expense of the Army’s and Royal
Navy’s re-equipment and modernization programs. The second was to
reduce by half the size of MELF by obtaining Egyptian agreement to
maintain a base facility in the Suez Canal Zone and by garnering ‘all
possible assistance from the United States, Turkey, the Commonwealth

and the Middle East states’.109
The Chiefs also reassessed some of the long-held strategic tenets of
their Far East strategy. Although they still believed that ‘the resources
allocated to the defence of South-East Asia in war must not be allowed
to compromise more vital commitments in other theatres,’ they
nonetheless made adjustments to force allocations.110 Commonwealth
forces would be withdrawn from Korea for redeployment in the event of
global war, but those in Malaya would not, a major departure from pre-
vious strategic plans.111 The dollar earnings of Malayan rubber and tin,
enhanced by a Korean War price boom, along with its strategic position
as an ‘outer defence of Australasia,’ meant that it was ‘impossible to plan
now to remove forces from Malaya for the reinforcement of more vital
theatres elsewhere early in a war’.112 To remove British forces would
weaken both the internal and external security of Malaya, which now
could expect an attack from China several months after the start of a
war.113 This would in turn prejudice the elusive Australian commitment
to the Middle East in which the Chiefs still placed great value.114
Why the Chiefs maintained their obsession with the Middle East is
not entirely clear. Earlier British plans had called for the Gurkha division
to move to the Middle East in the event of war, which, despite an awk-
ward line of communications through Malaya to Nepal, would none-
theless have given MELF the only division of seasoned, all-regular
troops in the British Army. Since the Chiefs now believed a hot war
would be short and intense, it did not make military sense to insist on
an Australian land force contribution to the Middle East. Any such
force would take the better part of a year to raise, train, and deploy,
making it of questionable value when compared to the Gurkhas.115
Indeed, Britain’s own Middle East war plans had changed dramatically.
They would help defend it only to the extent that military operations
did not unduly hamper the defense of Western Europe. The Army’s
planned wartime contribution to the Middle East dropped to one divi-
sion, of which only one brigade would be stationed during peacetime
in Cyprus.116 Its main contribution was to be in the form of a small
number of nuclear-armed Canberra medium-range bombers.
The ‘radical review’
In July 1952, both the Defence Committee and the Cabinet endorsed
the scaled down rearmament program offered in the Defence Policy
and Global Strategy paper. But persistent concerns about the balance of
payments prompted the Cabinet to ask both the Minister of Defence and
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Richard Butler, to examine the possibil-
ity of still further cuts. On 3 October, Alexander offered a compromise
defense budget of £5.03 billion for fiscal years 1952–56 versus the original
sum of £5.48 billion put forward with the new strategy.117 He considered
this budget the absolute, bare minimum acceptable without destroying
the entire rearmament program. Butler’s retort to this budget was to give
the Cabinet a grim choice: if continued high expenditure on defense was
necessary, then Britain would have to ‘go partly over to a war economy’
with all its attendant sacrifices; otherwise, Alexander’s budget would have
to be pared by more than £100 million a year.118 The Chiefs were livid –
they felt they had gone as far as they dare in agreeing to Alexander’s
compromise. In their view, the government had only two stark alterna-
tives.119 Either it had to provide the minimum resources required to
carry out agreed policy and to support Britain’s commitments as a ‘Great
Power’, or it had to reduce national commitments to a level ‘which can
be supported by the resources for which [HMG] are prepared to pay’,
with a concomitant reduction in world status.120 The Chiefs did not
believe the second alternative was viable at all, and in this they were
supported by the Foreign Secretary’s June paper on British overseas obli-
gations, which concluded that ‘there are few ways to effect any reduc-
tions in our overseas commitments which would provide immediate
relief to our economic difficulties’.121 In the long-run they thought it
was possible that, under the aegis of collective defence organizations, the
British could transfer a greater share of the Cold War defense burden in
the Middle and Far East to the United States and certain Commonwealth
countries.122 But as Eden pointed out:
a policy of this kind will only be successful … in so far as we are able

to demonstrate that we are making the maximum effort ourselves,
and the more gradually and inconspicuously we can transfer the real
burdens from our own to American shoulders, the less damage we
shall do to our position and influence in the world.123
From this the Chiefs concluded that no further defense cuts could be
made and implied that the British people would have to temporarily
sacrifice a higher standard of living in order to meet the challenge of
the Cold War.124
In November, Butler responded to the Chiefs by pointing out that to
remain a great power Britain had first of all to have economic strength
in order to support its military strength, and that the next three years
were critical to the rebuilding of the economy.125 Competition between

the defense and export sectors kept the balance of payments in a pre-
carious position with the economy as dependent as ever upon US aid,
while high taxes stymied reinvestment in industry and meant an
increasing loss of contracts to Germany and Japan.126 Cuts would be
made from social programs, but the defense budget too had to make
sacrifices, even though in net terms it would still be far greater than in
the years before rearmament began. If the active armed forces were to
be equipped with the best weapons and kept at a level of high readi-
ness, then it would be necessary to reduce their size from the planned
level of 850 000 to something more financially sustainable.127 When all
the administration, maintenance, and civil stockpiling requirements
for defense were added to the defense budget and manpower, they took
up nearly 10 per cent of the workforce and more than one-third of total
budgetary expenditure.128 What Butler thought was needed was a fur-
ther review of defense expenditures to rationalize defense requirements
over a much longer period of time.129
At the resulting Cabinet meeting, Churchill stated that a ‘radical
review of the defence programme for subsequent years should be
undertaken against a comprehensive background of our strategy, our
overseas commitments and our financial and economic position.’
Churchill, Butler, and Alexander would conduct the ‘Radical Review’ of
the UK defence effort for the years after 1955. Work on the review
began in January 1953, but little headway was made on reducing
defense costs and commitments until June when Duncan Sandys, the
Minister of Supply, suggested approaching the problem based upon a
new assumption. Taking the tenets of the 1952 strategy paper to their
logical extreme, he suggested that only ‘those forces that contributed
in peacetime to Britain’s position as a world power and which were rel-
evant to the first six weeks of war should be maintained’.130 As a result,
Alexander informed the service ministers that they had to find savings
of £308 million for the 1955–56 program, and that priority was to be
given to those minimum forces needed for peacetime commitments
and to ‘survival’ in the initial phase of war.131
The Chiefs accepted the following assumptions upon which reduc-
tions in the Far East could be made in 1955:
(a) that the garrison in Hong Kong can be reduced to the scale
required for the maintenance of internal order;
(b) that the Communist bandit organisation in Malaya has been elim-
inated and forces there are needed only to maintain civil order;
(c) that the theatre reserve against emergencies in Indo-China and

Siam will be held in the United Kingdom and the necessary facil-
ities in the Far East for the reinforcement by air from the U.K.
would be maintained.
(d) that the war in Korea is ended and no residual Commonwealth
commitment remains.132
Under these assumptions, the Chiefs believed the savings in Army

forces from the Far East would be the rough equivalent of five brigade
groups, or:
14 infantry battalions
3 armored regiments
5 artillery regiments
1 2/3 engineer regiments
3 signal regiments
1 Special Air Service regiment133
Five of the 14 infantry battalions would come from Korea, seven from
Malaya, and two from Hong Kong. Although the Chiefs did not really
think the Malayan Emergency would be over by April 1955, if it had,
then only two brigade groups, organized and equipped for ‘active oper-
ations anywhere’, would be stationed there.134 The seven battalions of
the Malay Regiment would be responsible for the ‘maintenance of civil
order’ in Singapore and Borneo as well as in Malaya.135 The Hong Kong
garrison would be reduced to the one brigade group originally thought
to be the minimum required for internal security.136 Ironically, the
Radical Review proposed a Far East garrison that was similar to the one
initially approved in 1947.
In the event, only the assumption about Korea held, so most of the
proposed reductions were postponed indefinitely.137 It is worth noting,
however, that the Radical Review process continued on into April
1954, when an additional round was ordered in light of the revelation
that the United States had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb.138
That review, which was conducted in conjunction with a new strategic
appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff, continued to stress deterrence and
the avoidance of major war as the main aim of defense policy.139 The
Defence Committee asserted that this aim could only be achieved by
strengthening Britain’s position and influence as a world power and by
consolidating its alliance with the United States, whose superiority in
nuclear weapons for the next five years presented the West’s best hope
for averting war.140 During that period, Britain’s ‘military means to
exert influence as a world Power and to meet ‘cold-war’ commitments’

would be given priority over preparations for a major war ‘wherever
there is conflict or competing demand on limited resources’. Those
resources that could be devoted to preparations for major war would
consist only of those ‘measures which would be effective immediately
on the outbreak of war’. Consequently, the main objectives of the new
defense policy were to be:
(i) To possess the most modern means of waging war [that is, the
H-bomb], so that we may hold our place in world councils on the
issue of peace or war and play our part in deterring aggression.
(ii) To continue to play our part throughout the world in checking
the spread of Communism.
(iii) To preserve security and develop stable government in our
Colonial territories and to support our world-wide trading
interests.141
The armed forces would have to be reconfigured in line with these

objectives and a defense budget of £1.635 billion for the year 1955.142
The Royal Navy would suffer the most, losing over 12 per cent of its
manpower, most of its reserve fleet, many of its active aircraft carriers,
and its only battleship, HMS Vanguard.143 By April 1956, Army man-
power was scheduled to drop nearly 8 per cent from 435,000 men to
400,000, including disbandment of the eight infantry battalions raised
in 1952; equipment programs were to be further scaled back to provide
for two fewer regular divisions; and only two Territorial divisions
would be equipped and trained for service overseas.144 In light of
advances in the Soviet bomber fleet, the Army would virtually disband
its Anti-Aircraft Command, while the RAF medium bomber force
would remain intact and the fighter force, though slightly reduced,
would be re-equipped with all-weather/day-night aircraft equipped
with improved radar and guided weapons.145
Yet another defense review at the end of 1954 confirmed the trend in
emphasizing the importance of American and British nuclear forces
both for deterrence and war-fighting purposes. The Defence Committee
now accepted that the advent of the hydrogen bomb had made concen-
tration of British forces in Egypt and the Middle East almost pointless. A
large garrison was vulnerable to destruction by Soviet H-bombs, while
Allied use of nuclear weapons would likely contain any Soviet attack on
the Middle East to areas northeast of Iraq.146 Priority was still to be given
to meeting Cold War challenges and preparing for the initial devastating
phase of a world war. The Defence Committee also accepted the idea
that the war was likely to continue despite the devastating effect of the
initial nuclear exchange.147 This departure from the 1952 paper, in
which the Chiefs admitted they did not know if war would continue
after the first few weeks, and from the Sandys short war proposition of
1953, was prompted not only by the Admiralty’s efforts to preserve the
Royal Navy, but also by the appearance of a formidable class of Soviet
cruiser.148 In a similar vein, the concept of the Army’s contribution to
NATO as a ‘complementary deterrent’ was confirmed at the level of
four divisions.149
On the Cold War front, reduction of military commitments in
Trieste, Korea and the Middle East would finally allow the formation of
a highly-mobile strategic reserve of two divisions and a brigade group
‘which can be switched to counter the Cold War threat wherever it
may occur’.150 Basing the force in the United Kingdom would cost less
than maintaining it abroad, where additional logistical and foreign
exchange costs would otherwise be incurred.151 In the Far East, the
French defeat in Vietnam, the subsequent signing of a collective
defense treaty for Southeast Asia, and the imminent redeployment of
Commonwealth troops from Korea all gave fresh impetus to an earlier
suggestion for a strategic reserve in the Far East. While there would be
no inter-allied reserve as such, Britain would push ahead with plans to
establish a Commonwealth strategic reserve for Southeast Asia in the
form of a brigade group of Australian, New Zealand, and British
troops.152 Accordingly, 28 Commonwealth Brigade of Korean War fame
was reformed in North Malaya on 16 September 1955.153
Conclusion
With the British government’s release of key documents in the first

half of the 1990s, it is now clear that the 1950 report on ‘Defence
Policy and Global Strategy’ was a seminal paper not only in terms of its
precepts on nuclear deterrence, but also in its adoption of a Cold War
strategy giving priority to the Far East. The BDCC(FE) had a telling
influence on the articulation of this Cold War strategy, as many of
their ideas were incorporated first by the Joint Planning Staff, then the
Chiefs of Staff, and finally by the Defence Committee. All agreed that
in the event of a world war, the Far East was to remain of secondary
strategic importance, even after the emergence of a Communist China
allied with Russia appeared to challenge many of the assumptions
upon which this prioritization was originally based.
British strategy remained firmly wedded to the defense of the strategic

core, but Cold War contingencies on the periphery had to be met by
some means. Given the fact that the vast majority of troop movements
at the time were still conducted by sea,154 it was difficult to reconcile
the need for a ‘come as you are’ war to hold the Russians as far east of
the Rhine as possible when the equivalent of two and one-third divi-
sions were essentially too far away to help. The conundrum was solved
in three ways. First, most of the divisions initially intended for the
Middle East were reassigned to Western Europe. Second, the bulk of the
rearmament program was directed toward the build-up and re-equipping
of BAOR units, not those in the Middle or Far East. And third, as will
be shown in subsequent chapters, the Chiefs would succeed in limiting
British defense liabilities in the Far East at the same time the United
States, Australia, and New Zealand agreed to accept significant wartime
responsibilities for the defense of Hong Kong and Malaya.
7
Between the American Scylla and
Chinese Charybdis: Hong Kong,
1950–54
The British government confirmed its defense priorities in the Far East
when it chose to reinforce Malaya with troops from Hong Kong.
Although the Defence Committee clearly intended the Hong Kong
garrison to put up a vigorous defense of the colony against a Chinese
attack, by 1951 it was clear to officials in both London and Singapore
that improvements in Chinese military efficiency had made a successful
defense of Hong Kong impractical. The decision to send a British con-
tingent to Korea proved to be the high water mark of British military
deployments to the Far East, and it was firmly tied to wider strategic
reasons. The government’s subsequent refusal to send any more troops
to Asia led to a secret decision to abandon Hong Kong in the event of
an all-out Chinese attack. Nonetheless, it saw no reason to drop the
pretense that Britain intended to put up a resolute defense, and so
resorted to strategic and tactical deception as a means of deterring a
Chinese attack. The Australians agreed to assist in a theater-wide
deception effort, and it appears the Americans did too.
Until late 1951, US policy toward Hong Kong focused on limiting
the colony’s trade with China, but anecdotal evidence suggests that
from 1952 the US may have been involved in the deception plan. It is
equally possible that the new American interest in the defense of Hong
Kong was indeed genuine and may have flowed not only from a moral
conviction about the ‘Berlin of the East’, but also from notions of using
the colony as a base from which to attack China in the event of war in
Southeast Asia. Many of the most sensitive decisions made during the
period 1950–54 are obscured by the continued closure or excision of
certain documents, but enough circumstantial evidence and public
material is available to permit a fairly accurate rendering of Hong Kong
defense policy and its relation to military strategy in the Far East. What
135
emerges is a story of British success in grasping the opportunity presented

by the Americans’ new strategic valuation of Asia in general, and Hong
Kong in particular.
Hong Kong, FARELF and the Korean commitment
Korea was not vital to either Allied or British strategy in the Far East.
Indeed, from as early as March 1949 the JPS had assumed that Com-
munists would eventually control the entire peninsula or that Russia
would occupy it in war.1 Consequently, there was no military reason
why the British should have gotten involved in the conflict that began
when North Korean and Chinese army units crossed the 38th parallel
into South Korea on 25 June 1950.2 Nor did it seem possible that they
could, even if they wanted to. The Cold War in the Far East had very
nearly drained the British Army of all available forces. In Malaya, a
renewed MRLA offensive had prompted General Harding to redeploy
3 Commando Brigade and one infantry brigade from Hong Kong to
Malaya. With the exception of three battalions undergoing periodic
retraining in Malaya, FARELF had no troops to spare.
Thirty-six hours after the North Korean invasion, the Cabinet met to
discuss the Korean crisis and the United States response. The US
Government had already informed the British that President Truman
had ordered the US Pacific Fleet to prevent any Communist attack on
Formosa or any continuation of Nationalist air and sea operations
against mainland China.3 Truman also ordered the expediting of mili-
tary assistance to the Philippines and the three Associated States of
French Indochina, the reinforcement of US forces in the Philippines,
and the establishment of a US military mission in Indochina.4 In the
space of a day, the US had met the British objectives of protecting
Formosa and supporting anti-Communist forces in Indochina. The US
also intended to sponsor a UN Security Council resolution calling on
member states to furnish military assistance to South Korea to enable it
to repel the attack. The Cabinet instructed its UN ambassador to vote
accordingly, and then asked the Chiefs of Staff to report to the Defence
Committee on what practical military steps Britain could take in support
of this resolution.
The Chiefs rapidly concluded that the only support Britain could
give United Nations forces would be to place several warships already
in Japanese waters under US operational control. There were no RAF
units in Japan, and they were adamantly opposed to sending troops or
aircraft from operational duties in Malaya or Hong Kong.5 The Chiefs
Between the American Scylla and Chinese Charybdis 137
also stressed the desirability of other Commonwealth countries taking

action, and that earlier French requests for military equipment for the
Indochina campaigns ‘should be met to the greatest possible extent on
the easiest possible terms’.6 In reporting the Chiefs’ findings to the
Defence Committee on 28 June, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Lord Fraser,
argued that the recommended naval task force should not be permitted
to take part in US policing of the Formosa Straits out of fear that it
might provoke Chinese action against Hong Kong.7 The task force was
to be a practical demonstration of Anglo-American solidarity in sup-
port of the UN resolution only, for they realized that more than naval
and air forces would be necessary to restore the situation in Korea. If
US military actions were successful, however, Fraser believed ‘it would
have a profoundly beneficial effect on the situations in Hong Kong and
Malaya, and in fact throughout the world’.8 Clearly, Soviet intentions
were of the utmost concern, as it was possible that they might take this
opportunity to precipitate a ‘major conflict’, although there were no
indications at the time that the Soviets were contemplating any
counter measures.9 Still, it was essential to determine Russian inten-
tions, and of the implications of the Korean war on Formosa and
British interests in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.10
The resulting JPS report, JP(50)82, focused a great deal of attention
on the impact of the American policy toward Formosa and Britain’s
association with that policy.11 American naval intervention had pre-
vented the imminent invasion of Formosa by upwards of 270 000
Chinese Communist troops concentrated in and around Canton.12 The
release of these forces from their invasion role increased the potential
threat to Hong Kong, even though Chinese intentions toward the
colony remained unclear. It was possible that having lost face on the
issue of the recovery of Formosa, the Communist Chinese would accel-
erate their stated intention of ‘liberating’ Tibet, a country sufficiently
remote that Britain could do nothing to prevent such a move.13 The
Planners contended that logistical difficulties and political and racial
differences militated against any outright Chinese invasion of
Indochina, but the provision of material aid to the Communist-led
insurgencies there would undoubtedly continue.
The JPS concluded by examining the viability of sending a British
ground force contingent to Korea. With the increased threat to Hong
Kong from now idle Chinese forces in the Canton area, and the fact
that the garrison had already been reduced below the strength which
the Chiefs thought necessary to thwart external aggression, it would be
foolish to draw any troops from there. In Southeast Asia, the authors
believed that any ‘reduction of strength in Malaya would jeopardize the

success of the Briggs Plan and with it our whole position’ in the region.14
If HMG deemed the political stakes were high enough, then one infantry
battalion could be sent from Malaya, but even this contribution entailed
risks. The Planners concluded that ‘no major unit can be provided from
our forces in South East Asia and the Far East unless it can be replaced at
an early date from elsewhere’.15 The only source of manpower was one
of the three unformed and untrained brigades of the new strategic
reserve in Britain, most of whose constituent units were still operating as
training battalions for National Servicemen. As the Planners pointed out,
British, French and now American ground forces were substantially over-
committed to an area of lesser strategic importance. Therefore, to ‘reduce
our strategic reserve by one third or to weaken the efforts which we are
now making in the cold war throughout the world would be to play
straight into the Russian hands, would be fundamentally unsound and
militarily unacceptable’.16
The Defence Committee discussed these findings on 6 July, with the
Chiefs again reiterating their opposition to sending land or air forces to
Korea. The RAF and British Army were almost fully committed, and
military prudence required that what small forces were still held in
reserve be kept ready for Russian-inspired contingencies elsewhere,
notably Persia.17 Defense Minister Shinwell was particularly worried
about the effects of the US Formosa policy on China, and said that if
any troops were to move from Malaya, it should be 3 Commando
Brigade back to Hong Kong.18 In fact, in order to avoid risking a war
with China or withdrawing the garrison from the colony, the sugges-
tion was made that the Americans should be approached about a
promise of assistance to the Hong Kong garrison.19 In the end, the
Defence Committee confirmed its intention against sending land or air
forces to Korea. The Chiefs cabled General Harding with this informa-
tion the following day, warned him of a possible increased threat to
Hong Kong, and inquired whether recent events in the Far East had in
any way altered the length of time he thought necessary to send the
Commandos from Malaya to Hong Kong in an emergency.20
Land forces for Korea
As US and South Korean military fortunes flagged throughout July,

American political pressure on Britain to send land forces increased,
coming to a head in four days of talks held in Washington from
20–24 July. On the first day of the talks the Chairman of the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, told the British delegation that
land reinforcements for the UN Command in Korea were essential from
both military and political perspectives, and it was clear from other
indications that the US both valued and desired a British contribu-
tion.21 The Americans wanted to provide legitimacy to the UN sanction
for the operation, and a British contribution would not only help in its
own right, but would surely be emulated by other countries. The British
ambassador to Washington made it clear to Attlee that refusal to help
the Americans would evince a ‘deep and prolonged’ response that
‘would seriously impair’ the Anglo-American security relationship.22
The day the Washington talks concluded, the Defence Committee
again met to discuss the need to send a land force, what form that con-
tingent should take, and what its source would be. Although the Chiefs
still believed such a commitment was ‘militarily unsound’, the political
arguments in favor of it were compelling. Having decided on this course
of action, however, Slim insisted that for logistical reasons nothing less
than a brigade group should be sent, and that it should be drawn only
from forces in the United Kingdom. The Defence Committee accord-
ingly authorized the formation and deployment of 29 Independent
Infantry Brigade Group, which the entire Cabinet endorsed the follow-
ing day.23 As the Americans hoped, the change in British policy
prompted Australia and New Zealand to immediately offer land forces,
with Canada following suit shortly thereafter.24 It would, however, take
over two months to form 29 Brigade, recall the needed reservists, and
bring units up to strength before embarkation on 1 October, the
onward sea journey then taking several more weeks.25
While 29 Brigade formed in Britain, the UN military position contin-
ued to deteriorate, forcing the Americans and South Koreans to retreat
toward Pusan. On 10 August, General Douglas MacArthur, C-in-C, US
Far East Command and in charge of UN Forces, told his new British
liaison officer that the situation was desperate and that British help was
needed as early as possible in order to hold the Pusan bridgehead.26
Without immediate assistance, there would be no position from which
29 Brigade could help counter-attack. When queried about MacArthur’s
request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed that the position was tenu-
ous and that help was needed, for the US had already deployed all the
troops from its garrisons in Okinawa, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and
Panama.27 From the American point of view, even a small contribution
now would pay a greater dividend than a larger one later.28
At the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 14 August, Lord
Fraser opined that 3 Commando Brigade was optimally suited for
immediate reinforcement of Korea.29 The VCIGS, Lieutenant-General Sir

Nevil Brownjohn, disputed Fraser’s contention and said the Commandos
had no experience in fighting as a large unit or as a member of a com-
bined arms team, and had no anti-tank defenses. If anything was to be
done, it should be to leave the Commandos in Malaya and send two
infantry battalions from Hong Kong, which was just five days’ steaming
from Korea. Part of the resulting gap in Hong Kong’s defenses could be
covered by diverting the relief for one infantry battalion, due in Malaya
by early September, to Hong Kong, but even this move entailed risk. The
Chiefs agreed Brownjohn should send a personal telegram to General
Harding for his opinion as to which troops in FARELF should be made
available for Korea if it became necessary to do so.30
Harding responded with two cables. The first backed Brownjohn’s
view that the Commandos had to stay in Malaya. To remove them
would ‘seriously prejudice’ the counterinsurgency and grievously delay
fulfillment of the Briggs Plan, already progressing at a slower than hoped
for speed; the same applied to removal of any infantry battalions.31
Although 29 Infantry Brigade upon arrival in theater could be used to
cover the gaps left by any units which had been sent to Korea, acclima-
tization and jungle training requirements would delay it becoming an
effective force for at least three months. Furthermore, it was absolutely
essential that every effort be made to bring the Malayan campaign to a
speedy conclusion in order to meet global strategy objectives for the
Far East. On Hong Kong the C-in-C was substantially more sanguine
than were the Chiefs. While there was no doubt that with Russian
assistance the Chinese could ‘fairly quickly assemble a force against
Hong Kong sufficient to overpower our garrison’, there had been no
signs of any aggressive intention towards the colony. The Chinese were
availing themselves of Hong Kong’s commercial facilities, and Harding
believed that they would leave it alone for the present or at least until
they ultimately succeeded or failed in regaining Formosa. Even in that
instance Sir John thought Indochina would be a more advantageous
target to the Chinese than Hong Kong. Having weighed the situations
in Malaya and Hong Kong against each other, Harding told the VCIGS
that ‘in present circumstances I regard [the release of troops from Hong
Kong] as the lesser risk and by a good long chalk’.32
In his second cable, Harding discussed the options if the government
decided to send troops from Hong Kong. He felt quite strongly that if
any troops were to go, that they be in the form of a brigade group of
two battalions, accompanied by artillery and one squadron of tanks
from 3 RTR.33 The advantage of using Hong Kong units was that they
had all been training intensively since their arrival in the summer of
1949 and could produce a battle-worthy force far more quickly than
the brigade group being assembled in the United Kingdom.34 The risk
entailed by the departure could in part be covered by sending a
squadron each of armored cars and engineers from Malaya, retaining a
departing battalion in Malaya, and diverting its relief to Hong Kong
until a battalion from 29 Infantry Brigade could arrive in Malaya.35 If one
battalion from 29 Infantry Brigade flew out by air to Hong Kong, then
there would be no net reduction in the number of infantry battalions in
Hong Kong.36
On 17 August, the Chiefs of Staff discussed Harding’s recommenda-
tions in light of what the Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder,
the Chiefs’ representative to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported as a ‘des-
perate need of reinforcements’ by the Americans.37 Although the Chiefs
recognized that the decision to send 29 Infantry Brigade was purely
political, the need for immediate reinforcements was a military require-
ment that had to be met if at all possible.38 The VCIGS thought two
battalions and a brigade headquarters from Hong Kong should be sent
immediately, but no tanks should go because of the problems associ-
ated with maintaining the vehicles through a US supply system.39
Instead, the US agreed to provide combat and service support to the
British battalions. Brownjohn also was against sending out elements of
29 Infantry Brigade by air, stating it should be maintained as a com-
plete formation, and that once in Korea, the two battalions from Hong
Kong would be sent back.40 Bevin and Shinwell having approved the
measures recommended by the Chiefs of Staff, Attlee authorized the
move on 18 August.41
Warning orders reached Hong Kong via Singapore late in the day on
18 August for the headquarters, signal section, and two battalions of 27
Infantry Brigade to proceed to Korea on 25 August, just one week later.42
Harding chose the 1st Battalion, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders
(1 A&SH), largely composed of regular soldiers, and the 1st Battalion,
the Middlesex Regiment (1 Middlesex), consisting of over 50 per cent
National Servicemen.43 Because political authorities in London had
stipulated that no soldier under the age of 19 could go to Korea, some
250 men had to be found from among volunteers in the other four bat-
talions in Hong Kong.44 Even with this expedient each battalion was
only 600 strong, well below the war, or ‘higher establishment’, figure
of 840 all ranks. Further stress was added by the need to restructure the
battalions in such a way as to permit better integration with the US
support structure. Consequently, each battalion was reduced from four
rifle and one support company, to three rifle and one headquarters
company.45 Although no artillery would accompany the weak brigade,
Hong Kong Land Forces raised a special brigade anti-tank platoon,
equipped with 17 pounder (90 mm) guns to provide additional anti-
armor defense.46 Despite the compressed time-scale and the organiza-
tional and personnel changes, the brigade was indeed ready to sail on
Friday, 25 August.47
Both Harding and MacDonald were in Hong Kong to see off this first
British contingent for Korea.48 Harding visited each battalion at their
bases in the New Territories the day before embarkation, exhorting
them to ‘Shoot quickly, shoot straight and shoot to kill’, and continue
fighting even if they found the enemy had gotten behind them or on
their flanks.49 MacDonald too addressed the troops, telling them at
quayside that the North Koreans were Russian armed and trained, and
that this was the same enemy that also threatened both France and
Britain. ‘You will’, he said, ‘be fighting as if on the soil of France or on
the beaches of Britain. The Korean War is part of an attempt to con-
quer the world and make slaves of us all … It is up to you to show the
world the valour and unconquerable spirit of the British people’.50
Reassessing the threat
The war had understandably raised grave concerns about the military
situation in Hong Kong, where the PLA concentration in the vicinity of
the colony prompted the Joint Intelligence Committee to conclude
that there would be little or no advance warning of a Chinese attack
on the colony.51 Unfortunately, many of the key COS and JPS docu-
ments regarding the defense of Hong Kong in the immediate aftermath
of the North Korean invasion remain closed,52 possibly because they
discussed abandonment of the colony.53 What is known is that the
Chiefs of Staff tentatively approved a JPS study on the defense of Hong
Kong in a scenario where China, with the covert assistance of Russia,
launched a major attack as part of a limited war.54 The JPS thought that
in such a scenario ‘it would be very desirable to defend Hong Kong,
not only for the sake of prestige but also because the loss of Hong Kong
would gravely affect the political and economic position of the
Western Powers in the Far East and South East Asia’.55 A new apprecia-
tion of the threat, based upon what had so far been learned in Korea as
well as Russia’s agreement to supply 800 modern fighter planes to
China, indicated that previous estimates of the forces needed to defend
Hong Kong were now wrong. The Chinese could now contest control
of the air – the key to the colony’s defense – and thereby neutralize the
Hong Kong airfields and hinder the offloading of reinforcements, food-
stuffs, and supplies from ships. Furthermore, because of the limitations
of the only two existing airfields in Hong Kong, three aircraft carriers
would be needed, as well as a bomber force based in either Formosa or
the Philippines. On the ground, the JPS still accepted that because of
terrain restrictions, no more than 100 000 troops could be employed
against Hong Kong at any one time, but the Chinese now had sufficient
men in the area to permit them to maintain this level even in the face
of heavy casualties. Furthermore, experience from Korea had shown
that Russian-trained troops ‘are likely to be considerably better
equipped and more efficient than has hitherto been appreciated’. The
JPS consequently concluded that a total land force of three infantry
divisions, one tank regiment, three medium artillery regiments, three
heavy anti-aircraft regiments, and one light anti-aircraft regiment were
now needed to defend Hong Kong.56
In view of this new study, the Chiefs concluded that the defense of
Hong Kong in the depicted scenario would be ‘an extremely hazardous
operation’ given noted improvements in the Chinese air force.57
Nevertheless, if forces on the order called for by the report could be
made available, ‘the chances of successfully defending the colony
would make it worthwhile attempting’.58 Yet at the time the report was
written, the Hong Kong garrison consisted of only two understrength
infantry brigades, a tank regiment, and supporting arms.59 The report
did not discuss at all the potential sources for the other two infantry
divisions needed to defend Hong Kong. In fact, without outside help or
mobilizing several reserve divisions, there were no forces available. The
Chiefs admitted as much in a cable to Tedder in Washington.60
Strategic deception and a new policy for Hong Kong
Concurrently with the Chiefs’ study, the BDCC(FE) also re-evaluated

the position of Hong Kong in light of both the recently approved
global strategy paper and the outbreak of the Korean War. Its 29 July
report began by repeating its understanding of Hong Kong policy as it
then stood: in a general war with Russia and China, Hong Kong was
sure to fall, so all British forces there would move to Malaya to assist in
the latter’s defense. What the BDCC(FE) wished to address in its report
were the military and political considerations about the defense of
Hong Kong in a limited war. The members were particularly concerned
that the ‘Communists might be tempted to draw an analogy from
Korea and consider that a sudden attack on Hong Kong could be made
without provoking a general war’, especially since the United States
was so heavily engaged in Korea.61
The BDCC(FE) report considered what the defense policy for Hong
Kong should be for the next 18 months if global war did not break out.
In contradistinction to the Chiefs’ report, the BDCC(FE) still believed
only five brigades and supporting arms would be necessary to withstand
a Chinese attack, as long as the British maintained air superiority.62
The aircraft necessary for this level of control would, however, ‘grow
progressively as the Chinese Communist Air Force increases in size and
efficiency’.63 Because the garrison had only two brigades at that time,
three brigades would be needed to reinforce it to the required level:
two to be in position immediately with the third available to arrive
within seven days’ notice. Admittedly, FARELF did not possess the
needed forces. In an emergency it could produce one brigade, and that
only by stopping the rotational retraining program.64 But because war
training in Malaya had already been reduced to the ‘absolute mini-
mum’, this could only be done for a maximum of three months before
‘serious and far-reaching damage to the morale and efficiency of the
troops’ occurred.65 Furthermore, it would be ‘too much to expect that
we could time our moves so accurately that the Chinese attack would
take place and be finally defeated during the period we selected to have
this brigade in Hong Kong’. The Commando Brigade remained on 48
hours’ notice to move to Hong Kong, and could do so by air within
seven days, but any notion of reinforcing the colony with troops from
Malaya would seriously upset implementation of the Briggs Plan. It was
essential to Allied strategy that the situation in Malaya be resolved as
quickly as possible so as to free the maximum number of Imperial
troops for service in a global war. The conclusion drawn was obvious:
‘the Army reinforcements required in Hong Kong to withstand a serious
Chinese attack can no longer be found from within the theatre without
risking defeat in Malaya, which would be fatal to our position in the Far
East no matter what the circumstances in which it occurred’.66
Even if the necessary reinforcements could be obtained from the
Commonwealth, constant improvements in the Chinese army and air
force meant that the reinforced garrison ‘would not remain adequate
to the task for long’. The BDCC(FE) believed the point at which Hong
Kong would become indefensible would be reached sometime toward
the end of 1951.67 In other words, Chinese military strength by that
time would have made it a ‘major power’ in the sense meant by the
Defence Committee’s original Hong Kong policy.68 Because the existing
defense policy did not consider a limited war scenario, if China

launched an all-out attack on, but limited to, Hong Kong, Britain
would in theory have to withdraw its garrison, with all the attendant
grievous political and psychological effects that would have on the
anti-Communist front.69 The BDCC(FE) therefore suggested HMG
approach Australia, New Zealand, and the United States to discover
what those countries might be willing to contribute to the defense of
Hong Kong. But such an approach, even if successful, would take at least
several months to arrange, during which time the colony’s actual def-
enses would remain inadequate.70 Therefore, in accordance with the
priority given the Cold War effort in DO(50)45,71 the BDCC(FE) recom-
mended a strategic ruse:
our policy in Hong Kong should be to adjust the balance of the pres-
ent garrison to enable it to maintain our position in Hong Kong in
any circumstances other than full-scale attack by strong land and air
forces, and in the latter case to give a good account of itself and if
necessary conduct an orderly withdrawal. At the same time, we
should not give the slightest indication anywhere of this conclusion
and should offer a resolute front by vigourously pursuing all measures
which give visible signs of our firm intention to defend the Colony.72
In the political sphere this meant seeking a joint US–Commonwealth

declaration that aggression against Hong Kong would be met by the
same sort of international reaction as that given the invasion of South
Korea. Alternatively, the British government should endeavor to bring
about a general UN declaration against aggression, ‘so worded that it
cannot be doubted that it applies amongst other places to Hong Kong’.73
In the psychological sphere, the authorities should give ‘active guidance’
to Hong Kong public opinion, while in the military sphere, the
Committee recommended completion of roads and airfields needed for
defense, demonstrations by allied air forces, including heavy bombers
from airbases outside the colony (for example the Philippines), port calls
by US aircraft carriers, and ‘the maximum use of deception’.74
The use of deception in the defense of Hong Kong appears to have
been an option for some time. Earlier in the year, Prime Minister
Menzies of Australia had suggested to Attlee that there might be some
scope for special operations and deception techniques in Malaya.75
Based upon this suggestion, the Chiefs of Staff and the theater Cs-in-C
agreed that a member of the ‘London Controlling Section’ of ‘Forward
Planning’ should visit Malaya to study the possibilities for the use of
deception in the counterinsurgency campaign.76 The visiting deception

officer, Colonel H. N. H. Wild, reported that General Harding in partic-
ular, ‘who had war time experience of deception’, thought there was
‘increasing scope for deception in the widest strategic field, that is, in
support of the defence of Formosa, Hong Kong, French Indo-China
and Far Eastern strategy in general’.77 Harding and Wild agreed that a
suitably experienced officer should be appointed to the secretariat of
the BDCC(FE), where he would work closely with the Far East JPS and
JIC, as well as with ‘offensive propaganda’ organizations.78 If the offi-
cer’s work proved promising, Harding would then consider establishing
a small staff section to support implementation of any plans. Another
officer would be attached to the Police Special Branch in Kuala Lumpur
to assist directly in the counterinsurgency. The FARELF Chief of Staff,
Major-General Nigel Poett, and the High Commissioner in Malaya, Sir
Henry Gurney, approved the two candidates put forward in November
1950 – Charles Cholmondeley for the BDCC(FE) and Brigadier Michael
Calvert for Malaya Command – deception work presumably beginning
sometime just after their appointments.79
Whatever deception work Cholmondeley’s staff undertook in support
of the defense of Hong Kong is not publicly known, for the entire class
of records on post-1945 deception operations remains closed.80 The
fact that a theater deception officer was not appointed until November
1950 leads to the belief that only local deception efforts were made to
cover such moves as the departure of 27 Brigade to Korea.81 What is
known is that Harding’s interests in deception did cover Hong Kong,
and several documents released since 1996 reveal that a major effort
was directed to gain Australian, New Zealand, and American con-
nivance in a scheme to deceive the Soviets and Chinese into believing
that sizable Allied forces were earmarked for the defense of Malaya.82
The documents imply that the scheme had theater-wide application
and included Hong Kong. It certainly would be in keeping with the
thrust of the BDCC(FE) paper, which the government adopted as
British policy in early October.83
That the British forces in Hong Kong needed some sort of deception
plan was reaffirmed in November. At the end of October China began
to openly commit substantial numbers of new troops to the fighting in
Korea in response to US troops crossing the 38th parallel in September.
When the UN forces began to fall back before the Chinese onslaught,
MacArthur’s British liaison officer convinced the Chiefs of Staff that
MacArthur should be allowed to retain 27 Brigade even after 29 Brigade
went into the line.84 This meant that the Hong Kong garrison would
remain at a diminished level of one tank and four infantry battalions for
the foreseeable future.85 In keeping with the new policy and to compen-
sate for the weakened state of the garrison, Harding directed the building
of defenses and improved communications in the New Territories, while
his RAF counterpart oversaw the introduction of Vampire jet fighter-
bombers to the two squadrons based in Hong Kong.86
The United States, Hong Kong, and the war in Korea
The perceived threat to Hong Kong during the Korean War rose dramati-
cally after Chinese ‘volunteers’ were openly committed to the conflict in
November 1950, even though the British never detected any threatening
moves by the PLA in the vicinity of the colony. The perception came in
part from a wariness engendered by the factual circumstances of the gar-
rison’s weakness vis-à-vis China’s increasingly efficient army and air
force. But it also flowed from the US Government’s insistence in June
that Britain curtail Hong Kong’s trade with North Korea, and, after
November, to cease trade with Communist China.87
Although the British accepted the need to curb exports of strategic
and military goods to China, they were reluctant to end all commercial
trade for several reasons. First, because Hong Kong traded with China
for most of its comestibles, it would have to arrange massive imports to
replace Chinese foodstuffs.88 Second, trade restrictions were bound to
depress the colony’s economy, causing unemployment that in turn
could spark labor unrest and internal security problems.89 Lastly, as a
senior official of the Hong Kong government noted, if the British
agreed to embargo oil and other strategic materials to China, the
colony’s value to the Communists would largely disappear, thereby
endangering its safety, since at that point it would be little more than a
nuisance to the Chinese.90 The British government repeatedly remon-
strated with the US government about Hong Kong’s precarious posi-
tion.91 The State Department fully appreciated the dilemma, and, with
some prodding, the US granted export licensing exceptions to Hong
Kong firms that permitted them to import American goods for use only
in Hong Kong.92 The colony’s China trade and economy nonetheless
suffered severely from the introduction of US unilateral export controls
in December 1950, and more especially after the United Nations
imposed an embargo on China in May 1951.93
Hong Kong’s trade practices were a source of friction in Anglo-
American relations during the Korean War, but the colony’s perceived
strategic value to the US changed dramatically during the same period.
Before 1949, America had supported the Chinese Republic’s efforts to

regain Hong Kong through diplomatic means, but when the
Nationalists were driven from South China, the issue became largely
irrelevant. At the same time, Hong Kong had become increasingly
important to Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States as
both a signals intelligence (SIGINT) station and as a post for running
Chinese agents.94 Under the UK–USA and Commonwealth Signal
Organisation intelligence sharing agreements of 1947, the SIGINT
agencies of Britain, Australia and the US jointly operated listening
posts ‘responsible for intercepting Chinese military communications
over the southeast sector of the Chinese mainland and across the
South China Sea’.95 The Americans expressed an increasing interest in,
and support to, Hong Kong through the repeated visits of US warships
and the attachment of a US Army liaison officer to British Forces Hong
Kong.96 Indeed, Secretary of State Dean Acheson indicated in August
1949 that, while no commitments had been made to the British in the
event of a Chinese attack, any such act would be in the purview of the
United Nations Security Council, and that the US ‘would fully support
its own obligations under the [UN] Charter’.97
Mixed signals
Allied strategy for a global war with the Soviet bloc did not include the
defense of Hong Kong, which fell into the US Pacific Command’s
wartime area of responsibility. But what about in a limited war sce-
nario? As discussed above, British policy as refined in August 1950 was
to act as if they could defend the colony, fight with what they had if
attacked, and appeal to the United Nations. US policy as set forth in
NSC 73 of August 1950, was complementary:
If … aggression were directed against Hong Kong the United States

should consider furnishing relief assistance to the British and such
military assistance as may be appropriate in the light of our own
military commitments and capabilities at that time.98
Just a few days after President Truman approved NSC 73, the US
Ambassador to Britain approached Foreign Secretary Bevin with a pro-
posal for two US infantry regiments to conduct training in Hong
Kong.99 Bevin was not at all attracted to the proposal, which he
believed came on the ambassador’s own initiative, but he nonetheless
sought the views of the Chiefs of Staff and the Colonial Office.100 Slim
was in favor of the idea as a means of committing the US to the colony’s

defense in case of attack, but the Colonial Office and Foreign Office were
strongly opposed, fearing China might construe the presence of US
troops in Hong Kong as preparations for an Allied attack on China.101
With Shinwell also weighing in against the idea, the Foreign Office
refused the offer. Whether Washington had approved it is not clear, but
the outright rejection of it could be seen as a lost opportunity to explore
American interest in Hong Kong’s defense as per the BDCC(FE)’s sugges-
tion in July. In fact, despite telling the BDCC(FE) in early October that
they were considering discussing with the Americans what support
they might give Hong Kong, when the American and British chiefs of
staff met at the end of October 1950, Field Marshal Slim only reiterated
what Lord Tedder had told General Bradley in July: that ‘any attack on
Hong Kong would be an attack on British territory which would at
once be a matter for action by the United Nations’.102
The American attitude toward the defense of Hong Kong remained
non-committal, despite the policy laid down in NSC 73. Throughout
1950 and at least into 1951, US intelligence did not think a Chinese
attack on Hong Kong was likely, although it certainly believed the
Chinese capable of doing so.103 Although China’s November counter-
offensive in Korea heightened Hong Kong’s sense of insecurity, the
British nonetheless decided to continue acting as if they could and
would repulse any attack. Because keeping up the public’s morale
played a large role in the psychological war,104 the British were under-
standably miffed when in January 1951 the American Consul General
in Hong Kong ordered the evacuation of all non-essential personnel,
apparently in response to a rumor.105
In March 1951, US military interest in Hong Kong, which had first sur-
faced with the American ambassador’s proposal in August 1950, seemed
to revive. Sir Oliver Franks, the British ambassador in Washington, in a
meeting with the Chiefs of Staff on the 14th, revealed that he was being
repeatedly questioned about Britain’s position concerning Hong Kong
in the event of a Chinese communist attack.106 ‘The Americans’, he said,
‘did not appear to be fully aware of our intentions and were not clear in
their own minds what action they should take in such an eventuality.’
According to Franks, the Americans were interested in Hong Kong for
two reasons. First, it was one of several places vulnerable to Communist
Chinese expansion (Indochina was another) and the Americans wished
to prevent such expansion if they could. Second, the US Government
regarded Hong Kong ‘as an outpost of western civilisation’. Franks
believed it was necessary for the two governments to clarify to each
other their policies and expectations before an invasion actually took

place, since leaving it to the last minute could cause ‘considerable mis-
understanding’.107 The Chiefs agreed with Franks’ suggestion that the
matter be raised in future politico-military talks with the United States,
and so asked Lord Tedder in Washington to see that it was placed on the
agenda of proposed tripartite military talks on Southeast Asia with US
and French senior military officers.108 These talks were held in Singapore
from 15 to 18 May 1951, the CIC(FE) representing the British Chiefs of
Staff, but Hong Kong appears not to have made the agenda.109
The intimations of interest relayed by Franks likely came from the
State Department, for the Defense Department in the first half of 1951
was opposed to any sort of commitment to Hong Kong. It harbored
hard feelings about Hong Kong’s supposed illicit trade in strategic
goods with China, which the British did not fully restrict until June.
George C. Marshall, then Secretary of Defense, wrote to Acheson in
early April about British remonstrations on the US trade embargo with
China. In the letter he cites the Defense Department’s concern that
Chinese imports of military-related goods from non-Communist
nations ‘constitutes a direct threat to the security interests of the
United States and to the UN forces fighting in Korea’.110 He was conse-
quently loathe for the United States to associate itself with the defense
of Hong Kong:
(1) Recognizing the great importance which the United Kingdom

attaches to the maintenance and protection of the integrity of Hong
Kong, the Department of Defense is nevertheless reluctant unduly
to associate the military position of the Western world in Asia with
the retention of Hong Kong which, as your letter points [sic], is in a
precarious security position.
(2) The Department of Defense can not accept the proposition sug-
gested [by the British] that the United States, by virtue of its prevail-
ing trade practices, could be held responsible to any substantial
degree for the loss of or serious jeopardy to Hong Kong.111
As far as Marshall was concerned, because Defense Department data

belied British claims about the dire effect of US trade restrictions on
Hong Kong, he rejected what seemed to be an attempt by Britain to
obtain a quid pro quo between Hong Kong trade restrictions and
American security guarantees.112
American resistance to a Hong Kong commitment was in fact more
than just a reaction to the colony’s China trade; it was also tied to US
initiatives to move ahead with a Japanese peace treaty. After more than
five years since the Japanese surrender, the World War II Allies had yet
to even convene a treaty conference. But the Korean War bought
Japan’s future security situation into sharp relief, with the Americans
seeking a sovereign Japan – rearmed for self-defense – that would permit
the basing of US forces.113 The US realized, however, that neither
Australia nor New Zealand would accede to such a treaty unless they
were given firm security guarantees by the United States. Hence, the US
proposed to establish a ‘Pacific Defence Council’ consisting of the US,
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, which eventually
evolved into the ‘ANZUS’ Security Treaty.114 John Foster Dulles,
President Truman’s point man on the Japanese peace treaty initiative,
told Ambassador Franks that Britain and mainland Southeast Asia were
to be excluded from his proposal, presumably as a means of avoiding
embarrassing entanglement with French, Dutch, and Portuguese colo-
nial policies.115 This was only part of the reason for excluding Britain:
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, while strongly in favor of a pact between
Pacific island nations, warned that ‘under no circumstances should the
United States get into a position in which it was committed to furnish
military strength for the defense of Hong Kong’.116
Getting Hong Kong on the allied agenda
At a bilateral discussion during the November 1951 NATO ministerial

meeting in Rome, Acheson broached the subject of a declaration
threatening China with ‘Greater Sanction’ if it violated the terms of a
Korean armistice then being negotiated at Panmunjon.117 The Joint
Chiefs of Staff proposed widespread bombing of the Chinese trans-
portation infrastructure and a naval blockade as appropriate punitive
measures.118 The Foreign Secretary of the newly elected Churchill
government, Anthony Eden, wished to be supportive but was worried
that the proposed statement as worded was provocative, and could
invite attack on Hong Kong.119 The Americans claimed to be unpre-
pared to discuss the consequences of their own proposal at the Rome
meeting, but agreed to discuss the issue in Washington with the French
and British in January.120
At the Washington Tripartite meetings, Slim was at last able to inject
Hong Kong as an agenda item. In his survey of the British position in
Southeast Asia, Slim related how they initially had been confident of
defending Hong Kong against a Chinese attack, but that the efficiency
of the Chinese air and ground forces in Korea had eroded their earlier
confidence.121 Air control was the key to Hong Kong’s defense, but the
RAF could not provide it from the colony’s limited airfield resources,
which could not be expanded.122 Slim also mentioned the problems
associated with the tripling of the colony’s population, which had made
it ever more dependent on imported food from China.123 Contrary to US
expectations, however, the British did not push for any assurances about
the defense of Hong Kong. Indeed, in line with the August 1950 Hong
Kong defense policy the British delegation suggested that the Allies issue
a joint warning statement to China promising retaliation in the event
of further aggression.124 Slim proposed, and the others agreed, that
Australia and New Zealand join France, Britain, and the US in dis-
cussing what available military forces could be employed to back up
the warning.125
On 5 February, military representatives of the five powers met in
Washington as the Ad Hoc Committee to discuss the operational
requirements for conducting air and naval attacks against China. The
reporting officers agreed that among the various contingencies that
might be faced as a result of ‘post-warning’ Chinese aggression was an
attack on Hong Kong, and that in such an instance the five powers
might assist the British in the evacuation of Hong Kong.126 The British
delegation, led by Air Marshal Sir William Elliot, was against a general
blockade of the China coast, believing it would achieve little, provoke
an invasion of Hong Kong, and drive China further, and possibly irrev-
ocably, into the Soviet camp.127 According to the US representative to
the talks, Vice Admiral Arthur Davis, both Britain and France wished to
limit any Allied response to the areas of the aggression, á la Korea, and
abjure from taking wider retaliatory action.128 Davis suggested to the
Joint Chiefs that until the British and French agreed to support the US
position on a naval blockade and other items, they limit US military
action to assistance in evacuation.129 This was indeed the position
adopted in NSC 124/2 of June 1952, which called for assistance to the
British in evacuating Hong Kong, but removed the wording of NSC 73
about rendering whatever military assistance the US would be capable
of providing.130 In the meantime, the Joint Chiefs agreed only to the
‘exchange of operational planning information’.131
‘Indefensible’
No civilian or military defense official from Singapore attended either

the Tripartite Chiefs of Staff meeting in January or the Five Power Ad
Hoc Committee meeting in February. Nonetheless, before the Ad Hoc
Committee met, the CIC(FE) sent an assessment of Hong Kong defense

requirements updated in light of recent appreciations by both the
Commander of British Forces Hong Kong (BFHK), and the Joint
Intelligence Committee, Far East.132 The prognosis was dismal. The effi-
ciency of the Russian-trained and equipped Chinese army and air force
had reached the level – predicted 18 months earlier – at which the
British could no longer feasibly conceive of unilaterally defending
Hong Kong against a Chinese attack. Based upon the estimated scale of
attack, Lieutenant-General Mansergh, the BFHK commander, consid-
ered that at least three infantry divisions were now needed to defeat it,
and that substantial air and naval reinforcements were also needed to
meet greatly increased air and naval threats.133 Because the present gar-
rison had been dangerously weakened (and the JIC(FE) believed the
Chinese were well aware of this), Mansergh warned that even if all the
forces could be made available, the nature of the terrain required that
they be in position before the attack actually began.134 The length of
warning time prior to attack was therefore a key issue, but here too the
picture was bleak. BFHK’s principal source of intelligence was Chinese
agents whose reports took as long as two or three weeks to arrive; RAF
photo reconnaissance was severely constrained in both frequency and
altitude by political restrictions.135 It was possible that the British could
have less than five days’ warning of an impending attack, making
timely reinforcement by anything other than a few naval and air units
highly improbable. Furthermore, inadequate radar coverage meant that
the two airfields in Hong Kong were likely to be put temporarily out of
commission in the first stage of an attack.136 American support in the
form of bombers and fighters from outside the colony, especially car-
rier aircraft, would be absolutely essential for either the defense of, or a
covered withdrawal from, Hong Kong.137
Based on Mansergh’s sobering appreciation, the CIC(FE) concluded
that it was now time to accept the fact that Hong Kong was ‘indefensible
against a full scale attack even in limited war ’.138 They believed that a
lesser force of two infantry divisions with supporting arms and naval
and air reinforcements could fight a successful delaying action of two to
three weeks during which a decision could be made to either reinforce
or evacuate.139 But they also knew that the necessary forces could not
be found from either British or Commonwealth sources in the theater,
and that the US could not realistically be considered as a source for
any land reinforcements, because of the need to emplace them before
an attack.140 Consequently, the Commanders recommended that
‘we … attempt to prevent an attack on the Colony by persuading China
that such an attack would not be worthwhile, because of the retaliatory

action we might take against her elsewhere’.141 This, of course, was
exactly the policy line then being developed by the five powers in
Washington. As for military options, the only realistic one was imple-
mentation of the existing emergency plan – two infantry battalions from
Malaya, two ground-attack/fighter squadrons, and an aircraft carrier bat-
tle group – to support evacuation only, which they correctly believed
the Americans would support.142
In response to the CIC(FE)’s suggestion that a new defense policy for
Hong Kong was needed, the JPS examined the situation in conjunction
with the Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office.143 The
resulting report was little more than a rehash of the CIC(FE)’s letter,
but one of its recommendations raised the ire of the Chief of the Air
Staff, Sir John Slessor. The JPS suggested it examine the size of the garri-
son needed to fulfill the security roles laid down by the Defence
Committee – that is, to maintain internal security and public morale, if
attacked to inflict maximum casualties on the Chinese, and, if forced
to do so, cover an orderly evacuation – and ‘the length of time for
which the present garrison could fight a delaying action, assisted by
varying degrees of reinforcement which might be available from
within the theatre’. Slessor quipped that ‘we should stop deluding our-
selves by carrying out the [suggested] examinations’.144 He agreed with
the Commanders’ assessment of two divisions with additional air and
sea forces being the minimum necessary to fight a two- to three-week
delaying action, and that the present garrison of four battalions and
supporting arms was probably the minimum necessary for internal
security.145 Slessor accordingly recommended that:
We should tell the [BDCC(FE)] to plan (in the utmost secrecy) for
the immediate evacuation of the essential civilians as soon as
HONG KONG is attacked – and ultimately of as many troops as we
can get away, if any, after fighting as stubborn a delaying action as
they can.
We should tell the Americans in secret that that is the plan, and ask
them to plan for all the help they can give us in the evacuation and
reducing the scope of what inevitably is bound to be a disaster.146
He realized that what in essence was the abandonment of the garrison

to whatever fate the Chinese might have in store for them was ‘a very
unpleasant conclusion to have to come to’, but it was only ‘facing
facts’.147
In the Chiefs of Staff Committee discussions on the report, there was

no disagreement about Hong Kong’s prospects if attacked. The members
concurred that Hong Kong was now indefensible against a major
Chinese attack whether or not it occurred during a global war.148 They
therefore laid down that future defense planning by the BDCC(FE) for
Hong Kong would be based on three assumptions:
● Maintaining the impression that the British intended to hold Hong

Kong ‘at all costs’
● Maintaining sufficient troops in Hong Kong for internal security
● Plan to delay any overland Chinese advance long enough to permit
the orderly evacuation of civilians.149
The committee members also suggested that after the Defence Com-
mittee approved the new policy, Australia and New Zealand be infor-
med in such a way as to not ‘distract them from their Middle East
defence commitments’.150
The US and Hong Kong: from deception to commitment?
Available records do not reveal whether the Defence Committee

adopted the policy recommended by the Chiefs of Staff. The memoran-
dum that is probably the draft policy remains closed until the next
century, and Defence Committee records either approving or rejecting
a new policy are not in the Cabinet files at the Public Records Office.151
It is possible that some modification of the recommended policy may
have been made, possibly in support of a deception scheme, as there
are several references to US–UK planning discussions on Hong Kong at
the same time the BDCC(FE) was requesting approval for a theater
deception plan that involved collaboration with the United States,
Australia, and New Zealand.152 In speaking about the BDCC(FE)’s con-
cept, the Director of Forward Plans encapsulated the problem thusly:
We cannot hope in peacetime to deceive the enemy about our

deployed order of battle in the Far East; it is plain for all to see. Nor
does its existing or foreseeable real strength in conjunction with the
difficulties of time and space present any scope for misleading about
its deployment in time of war. Similar considerations preclude any
notional use of British forces from other theatres.
We must conclude that out of our own resources we cannot pro-
duce the notional order of battle which is the essential pre-requisite
for accomplishment of the aims defined above. However, if we bring
into play the forces of other countries, in particular Australia and the
United States, we then have the necessary scope for manoeuvre.153
The British had already approached the Australians – Prime Minister

Menzies himself agreeing to support the deception scheme – while
there was good reason to believe both the Americans and the New
Zealanders would also cooperate.154
Sufficient circumstantial evidence exists to suggest the Americans
may also have agreed to participate in the scheme. In May, US
Lieutenant-General Franklin M. Hart, Commanding General of the Fleet
Marine Force, Pacific paid a visit to Hong Kong with ‘a strong operations
staff’. Direct accounts of the visit have been withheld,155 but the new
BFHK commander, Lieutenant-General Terence Airey, later recounted
that Hart ‘thought that Hong Kong might be a suitable place for the
employment of up to two US Marine Divisions’,156 which (perhaps not)
coincidentally was the same number of additional divisions British
planners in Hong Kong and Singapore thought necessary to defend the
colony. A subsequent visit by the Commandant of the US Marine Corps,
General Lemuel C. Shepherd, lent further credence to this sudden
American interest in Hong Kong. Two more possible clues about either
a new policy or one based on deception arise in June. In that month
the Chiefs issued a new plan for British deployments in the event of
global war during the period 1 July to 31 December 1952. That plan,
SYCAMORE, stated that the British plan with respect to Hong Kong was
‘to resist any Chinese attack’; there is no mention of evacuation.157 The
previous plan, CINDERELLA, called for the evacuation of Hong Kong so
that its garrison forces could be redeployed to other theaters.158 The
other clue comes from remarks made in June 1952 by the C-in-C
FARELF, General Sir Charles Keightley. Keightley told his staff that at
the recent CIGS conference the ‘Far East is considered more important
than the Middle East and for some things takes priority over [the]
Rhine Army’ because Communist China was the most serious threat to
world peace at that time.159 To that end, he stated as one of FARELF’s
four principal tasks ‘Ensuring that Hong Kong is prepared for any even-
tuality of attack.’160
Feigned or not, the perception of a serious American interest in Hong
Kong was further enhanced at the end of October when Admiral
Arthur Radford, C-in-C, US Pacific Command, paid a three-day visit to
the colony. It seemed clear to Airey that Radford believed that Hong
Kong was psychologically, politically, and strategically important to
defend ‘at all costs’. Not only would its loss mean ‘the last lights would
begin to go out in Asia’, but its retention was of ‘vital importance to our
strategy in Asia’. Radford seemed pleased when Airey informed him that
Britain intended to defend the colony, and that the military situation
was far better at the time than was the case in December 1941, but Airey
admitted that three divisions were needed for a successful defense,
although ‘less troops’ would be enough to hold the colony until rein-
forcements arrived. Airey mentioned how helpful American air support
could be in attacking the Chinese airfields and gun batteries that threat-
ened Hong Kong, to which Radford was very responsive, saying he ‘felt
sure that the way could be cleared for planning’. The Admiral left Airey
with a strong impression that he was thinking of Hong Kong as a base
from which Marine divisions and air forces could operate against targets
on the China coast in the event of an ‘emergency’.161
Radford’s strategic interest in Hong Kong was subsequently reflected
in the first report of the ANZUS staff planners in November 1952,
which noted that the colony was of ‘strategic importance because it is
the only remaining beachhead in friendly hands on the mainland of
China and because it forms a useful point of contact with anti-
Communist elements in … China’.162 The ANZUS planners recognized
that the current British garrison was incapable of defeating a Chinese
attack, and that to hold Hong Kong land reinforcements would be
needed before an attack developed.163 They believed the Allies should
provide naval and air support to Hong Kong in the event of an emer-
gency, and that it should be given the necessary land reinforcements:
The defense of Hong Kong is feasible if adequate ground forces are in

place prior to an attack by the Chinese Communists, if suitable land-
based aircraft are in place to provide air defense and if an adequate
naval task force is available to assist in air defense and provide air and
gunfire support. The successful defense of Hong Kong, in addition to
having psychological advantages, would have considerable effect on
deterring Communist aggression elsewhere in Southeast Asia.164
The ANZUS planners therefore considered maintenance of Hong

Kong’s security by the introduction of the appropriate reinforcements
as one of the ‘best courses of action in the event of any Chinese
Communist aggression in Southeast Asia’.165
Not surprisingly, the Chiefs of Staff were intrigued by this new
American interest in Hong Kong, and in January 1953 asked the Foreign
Office for approval to approach the Joint Chiefs of Staff about initiating
staff talks on the colony’s defense.166 In response, Foreign Secretary
Eden admitted he did not know the views of his American counterpart,
as Dulles had only just assumed the position of Secretary of State in
the newly inaugurated Eisenhower administration. Eden suggested the
Chiefs approach their counterparts on a non-committal basis, with the
real object being ‘to discover whether the [ JCS] accepted Admiral
Radford’s thesis on Hong Kong’. Radford definitely made his Hong
Kong views known to both the State and Defense Departments, telling
the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs that the US
Government ‘should come to a firm decision that the retention of
Hong Kong in friendly hands was important to our interests and that
we should agree that we should support the British in maintaining it
before we decided to go on into any sort of blockade [of China]’.167
Radford apparently convinced the State Department, whose representa-
tive at an NSC meeting proposed ‘a clause calling for the JCS to plan
for provision of military assistance in the defense of Hong Kong’.168
The Joint Chiefs’ response to the State Department’s proposal is not
known,169 but the British appear to have been surprised when in a
mid-February visit to London, Dulles asked about British intentions
towards Hong Kong, and whether they thought the colony was defen-
sible.170 The Minister of Defense, Lord Alexander, replied that the pres-
ent garrison could hold out for up to a fortnight as long as sea control
was maintained.171 Dulles was ‘relieved’ to learn that the British
thought Hong Kong could hold out long enough for reinforcements to
get in. He then asked whether the British had been given ‘any clear
understanding of the United States attitude in the event of an attack
on Hong Kong; or if there was no such understanding, whether any
had been sought’, to which Eden and Alexander replied in the nega-
tive.172 Although there was no further discussion of Hong Kong at the
meeting, the way now seemed clear for the British to approach the
State Department for approval of non-committal staff talks.173
In preparation for their approach, the Chiefs of Staff ordered the JPS, in
conjunction with the Foreign and Colonial Offices, to draw up a study on
the relevant issues.174 The resulting report, JP(53)44(Final), recommended
proceeding with US–UK talks on Hong Kong if for no other reason than
simply to ascertain precisely what American intentions were toward
Hong Kong and the Far East. The British appeared to know that the
ANZUS Staff Planners’ report of November 1952 had implied that Hong
Kong was seen as a possible springboard for operations against China in
war, a role which might exacerbate existing differences between US and
British policies towards Chinese aggression. The JPS concluded that the
Chiefs ‘should not be deterred from holding discussions by the fear
that the Americans may demand an unacceptable [policy] price for
helping us in the defense of Hong Kong, and that in consequence we

shall have once more to bear the odium of being the restraining
ally’.175 The only outstanding question was when and how to appeal to
the Americans. After lengthy discussion, the Chiefs of Staff and
Defence Committees agreed to a general approach at the next meeting
of the Five Power Staff Agency, the new organization of American,
British, French, Australian, and New Zealand planners charged with
developing military responses to further Chinese aggression. A direct,
bilateral approach to the Americans at the next NATO meeting was
also authorized.176
Five Power planning for Hong Kong
Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Slim’s successor as CIGS, raised the
issue of bilateral talks with General Bradley at the April NATO meeting
in Paris. As anticipated, General Bradley was cool to the idea, so the
Chiefs decided to pursue the issue on the less controversial matter of
evacuation assistance at the Five Power Staff Agency meeting later in
the month.177 Representatives of the five powers convened in Pearl
Harbor from 6 to 10 April 1953, with the FARELF Chief of Staff, Major-
General E. K. G. Sixsmith, as the British representative. Most of the
agenda items concerned increasing the efficiency of existing staff
mechanisms for intelligence sharing, communications, and coordina-
tion of national plans, but several dealt with planning to determine
possible courses of action to counter further Chinese aggression in the
‘Southeast Asia Area’, which now included Hong Kong. The representa-
tives agreed to recommend to their respective chiefs of staff a range of
planning issues, among the first priority being to maintain the security
of Hong Kong ‘by the introduction of appropriate reinforcements’.178
The Chiefs accepted the various recommendations as the basis for a
further meeting of the Five Power Staff Agency, once again held in
Pearl Harbor, but this time with the C-in-C FARELF, General Sir Charles
Keightley, as the head of the British military delegation.179
At their conference in June 1953, the Five Power planners agreed that a
Hong Kong secured against Chinese attack would not only assist Allied
containment objectives, but it might well deter an attack in the first place
and provide a strategic threat to Communist lines of communication in
South China.180 Admittedly, to hold Hong Kong would require the
presence in Hong Kong on D-Day of two slightly understrength
infantry divisions and some 50 ‘high performance fighter aircraft’
requiring the construction of a new airfield.181 This was a substantially
smaller garrison than what General Mansergh had thought necessary,
but the planners nonetheless accepted the requirement, based upon

the assumption of short warning time, that ‘these forces must be a part
of the normal garrison’.182 If attacked, Hong Kong would still require a
‘considerable scale of air and naval assistance as well as ground rein-
forcements’ that, owing to the speed with which these forces must be
made available, would have to come primarily from US forces in the
region.183 The planners realized, however, that until the garrison was
increased to the recommended size, Allied assistance would have to be
restricted to air and naval delaying actions and evacuation of non-
combatants.184 In terms of offensive action against China, the report
noted that air attacks against selected targets, in conjunction with a
naval blockade, would be militarily effective, and is noteworthy by
virtue of Britain’s acceptance of a blockade’s utility without reference
to any repercussions on Hong Kong.
In their section on ‘Recommendations Relative to Courses of Action’,
the planners called for approval of the preparation of coordinated plans
for air and naval support to Hong Kong and for strengthening the
colony’s defenses by building an additional airfield, providing adequate
radar facilities, and deploying the suggested land and air reinforce-
ments.185 In anticipation of a coordinated effort, the United States was
to designate a commander for those forces that would support Hong
Kong, and that this commander-designate be directed to coordinate his
plans with BFHK.186
Keightley met with the Chiefs of Staff on 28 July to discuss the
results of the conference, asserting that the time had come to decide
whether he should plan on HMG reinforcing Hong Kong in an emer-
gency and if so in what strength, or was it ‘only prepared to say that
we would fight for Hong Kong with the resources at present available
in the Colony’.187 If the latter course was the case, then the British
should inform the Americans, because they seemed willing to provide
emergency reinforcements only if the British would reinforce the garri-
son to the minimum level needed for a strong initial defense and the
‘provision of facilities’.188 Harding refused these American ‘pre-requisites’,
saying they ‘were asking us to guarantee something which they them-
selves would be unwilling to guarantee in any other part of the world’.
The CIGS thought the best course would be to tell the Americans what
forces were then available for the defense of Hong Kong, as well as the
other forces stationed in the Far East, and say:
frankly that we had every intention of fighting to defend the

Colony with the resources available; we would do the best we could
in the light of current circumstances, but no guarantee whatsoever

could be given of any other action we might take until the situation
had been reviewed in the light of events at the time. The Americans
could not reasonably expect more than this.189
Harding’s realistic position on the British response to an attack on

Hong Kong was actually very similar to a new US policy encompassed
in NSC 148 of 6 April 1953. The ‘Statement of Policy Proposed by the
National Security Council on United States Policies in the Far East’,
called for the US not only to furnish ‘relief and evacuation assistance
to the British’, but also to consider ‘such military assistance for the
defense of Hong Kong as may be appropriate in the light of our own
commitments and capabilities at the time’.190 Harding would not have
known of the new American policy, but he nonetheless thought any
and all Anglo-American talks on Hong Kong should remain bilateral,
and that the other members of the Five Power Staff Agency should
only be told of the talks’ outcome if necessary.191
Indeed, the issue of Allied assistance to Hong Kong, which figured so
prominently in the 1953 meetings of the Five Power Staff Agency,
seems to have been completely dropped in the following year, for it
does not appear in the report of the June 1954 conference.192 In fact,
the Americans purposely excluded Hong Kong from the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty (i.e. SEATO), because Dulles understood that
‘the UK would prefer that any understanding on Hong Kong be
an informal one with us rather than included in the treaty.’193 It would
seem, then, that the US agreed informally to assist in the defense
of Hong Kong to the extent that conditions permitted it to do so, and
this is backed up by both NSC 148 and a letter from President
Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill in which the former tells the
latter that the US ‘would expect to be with [Britain]’ if Hong Kong was
in jeopardy.194
Reduction of the garrison
The Radical Review was conducted over the course of nearly a year in
the strictest secrecy, and its existence was not revealed even to British
commanders in the Far East.195 With respect to Hong Kong it con-
cluded that by 1955 the colony’s garrison should be reduced to the
level needed only to maintain internal security.196 In trying to stay
within strict budgetary and manpower ceilings dictated by the Radical
Review,197 the Chiefs felt obliged to suggest reducing the garrison

to one infantry brigade group, the minimum thought necessary to
maintain internal security. This would require the reductions given in
Table 7.1. Absent any armor support and with only minimal engineer
and artillery support, it was clear to the Chiefs that the proposed
garrison could offer only ‘token resistance’ if attacked, nor could denial
or evacuation plans be put into effect. Although the Chiefs thought
it unlikely that the Chinese would attack, if they did, the garrison
and the 23 000 civilians slated for evacuation ‘would become hostages
to fortune’.198 The Chiefs recognized that such a large reduction
in forces was bound to have an adverse effect on the morale of the
police, the public, and the business community, and might lead to a
worsening of the already serious unemployment problem caused by
the restriction of trade with China.199 Reduction to a level clearly
incapable of defending the colony might also queer American interest
in Hong Kong, which was in part predicated on the British reinforcing
the existing garrison.200 Despite these risks, the Chiefs felt com-
pelled to recommend the reduction of the garrison, ‘no matter what
adverse effects would follow’.201 Still, they thought Britain should do
what it could to mitigate anticipated problems. Because the proposed
reductions were so large that they could not be concealed, the timing
of any withdrawals would have to be deftly managed. It was hoped
their impact would be lessened by spreading them out over time
by linking them to events such as a reduction of British forces
in Korea.202
On 14 April 1954, the Defence Committee approved the reduction of
the Hong Kong garrison in ‘gradual and unobtrusive stages … to the
level required for internal security purposes’ after completion of the
Table 7.1 The radical review and the Hong Kong

garrison203
1954 Garrison 1955 Garrison

(Planned) (Proposed)
Infantry battalions 5 3
Armored regiments 1 0
Artillery regiments 5 31 1
Engineer regiments 1 31 1
3
Signal regiments 1 1
Geneva conferences on Korea and Indochina.204 For the time-being,

though, the decision had to be kept strictly secret:
If this decision became known to the United States authorities, it

would prejudice the prospects of establishing a collective defense in
South-East Asia and the Western Pacific. And if the Chinese got to
know of it, negotiation at Geneva would be even more difficult.
[Eden] hoped, therefore, that nothing would be said to indicate to
the Governor of Hong Kong, or to the military commanders in the
Far East, that a decision had already been taken to reduce the garrison
after the Geneva Conference.205
This passage clearly reveals the security concerns of a plan that

involved deceiving not only Britain’s closest ally, the United States, but
also its own officials in the Far East.206 In fact, the Colonial Office was
instructed to lie to Governor Grantham, who was to be told that the
matter would only be reviewed after the conference was completed.207
As it so happened, the decision to implement the reduction was put off
for some time. As late as November 1954, Harding told his fellow
Chiefs that ‘the present was not, perhaps, an appropriate time to make
any obvious reductions in the strength of the garrison’.208 Indeed, the
garrison would remain at two infantry brigades of two battalions each,
supported by an armored regiment and artillery, until well into the
1960s.209
Conclusion
Britain’s highest Cold War military priority in the Far East was the
defeat of the Communist insurrection in Malaya, even at the expense
of the defense of Hong Kong.210 Being able to defend the strategic core
in hot war also meant that difficult choices had to be made. Its deci-
sion to support UN-sanctioned military operations in Korea and to
honor American and UN trade sanctions against China further under-
mined Hong Kong’s security by inviting possible Chinese retaliation.
Making matters still worse was the greatly improved efficiency of the
Chinese army and air force, so evident from operations in Korea. The
threat they posed had changed the force ratio calculus for the defense
of Hong Kong so as to make it unattainable by Britain alone. Records
indicate that there was an Anglo-American dialog about the defense of
Hong Kong that resulted in American agreement to support or even
reinforce British forces in the colony. From the visits of senior US Navy
and Marine Corps officers, Chinese intelligence agents would surely have
noted America’s apparent military interest in Hong Kong, information
which probably heightened Mao’s ‘hypersensitivity’ about an American
invasion.211 Yet the Chinese never attacked, and with the exception of a
few minor border incidents, there was never any indication that they
intended to do so. This prompts the obvious question of ‘why not?’. For
one thing, the Chinese may have believed Allied warnings about open
aggression against Hong Kong which, under International Law, was con-
sidered sovereign British territory. For another, they may have considered
a British Hong Kong to be of more value to them as a trade center and
their own intelligence post than as just another port city. Lastly,
and most intriguingly, is the extent to which the Chinese may have
been deceived by deception and psychological operations, the answer
to which will only be revealed after the opening of the relevant docu-
ments in both Britain and China.
The story of Hong Kong’s defense during 1950–54 is filled with para-
doxes. Britain believed it could successfully defend Hong Kong against
China until the Korean War showed Chinese troops to be of a much
higher quality than previously appreciated. Once the British realized
they did not have the resources necessary to protect their Chinese
colony, they were forced to use strategic deception to cover their inade-
quacies. Gone, however, was all pretense of Hong Kong as an advanced
base for operations in a future Pacific war. Conversely, and at roughly
the same time, the US, ANZUS, and the Five Power Staff Agency all
came to the conclusion that Hong Kong had military value as a beach-
head on the Chinese mainland. Although the British did not fully sub-
scribe to Allied ideas of Hong Kong as base from which to attack
China, they nonetheless welcomed any Allied effort that might deter
an attack in the first place. As the secret 1954 decision to reduce the
garrison indicates, the British had accepted the fact that despite what-
ever Hong Kong’s value in the Cold War, if the Chinese ever attacked
the colony, its symbiotic economy would collapse leaving Britain with
an odious liability. Defense in global war was not worth it.
Nevertheless, what the British had achieved by the end of 1954 was
fairly impressive. They had managed to reduce the Hong Kong garrison
to one little larger than its original, pre-1949 size, and had obtained US
assurances of military support in case of attack. Together with the
departure of the last British unit from Korea at the end of the year,
the effort to limit liability in order to maintain strategic sufficiency was
beginning to pay off.
8
Manpower, the Strategic Reserve,
and the Malayan Emergency,
1950–54
In accordance with the Global Strategy and Defence Policy paper of

1950, the British Army began to change from an organization designed
principally to train reservists into a Cold War force capable of meeting
the operational exigencies of the day. For the BAOR this meant building
up a corps of three armored and one infantry division, all equipped
with the powerful new Centurion III main battle tank. Just as apparent,
if not more so, was the operational transformation of the Army in the
Far East, which in many respects had precipitated the strategic change
in the first place. The Army in Malaya was increasingly the recipient
and developer of new or experimental weapons, equipment, and tactics,
even though this meant giving the counterinsurgency priority over the
defense of Hong Kong, and with respect to helicopters, over Western
Europe as well.
Continuation of National Service meant manpower shortages contin-
ued to plague the Army even after the government embarked on its
ambitious Korean War rearmament program. An increase in recruiting of
regulars and extension of the initial obligation of National Servicemen
from 18 to 24 months allowed BAOR to bring its units up to higher
establishment and for additional administrative troops to be sent to all
theaters. Yet there was no increase in the number of combat units
deployed in Malaya and Hong Kong. Because further expansion of the
Army was not possible without going over to a wartime economy –
anathema to Conservatives and Labourites alike – the government
instead turned its efforts toward increasing the number of Gurkha and
colonial troops. Spurred by manifest Communist expansionism in
Korea, several colonies volunteered troops for service in Asia. But
because of a Communist disinformation program, British efforts to
expand the Brigade of Gurkhas were less successful. Nevertheless, by
165
limiting deployments to the Far East, the British were able to build a
new strategic reserve in the UK, which quickly became enmeshed in
the Suez Canal Zone crisis of 1951–54, a contingency that eventually
diverted 70 000 British troops.
Malaya at the start of the Korean War
Army operations in support of the Briggs Plan began just three weeks
before the start of the Korean War. Briggs used all available forces in
Malaya, and reinforcements from Hong Kong to implement his plan,
and the Defence Committee made sure no more troops were sent from
Malaya to Korea.1 The strategic objective in Malaya remained the ‘build-
ing up [of] local security forces and civil administration to a point at
which, with the minimum of external [i.e. Imperial] assistance, they can
regain control of the internal situation in Malaya’.2 This objective was
not fully achieved until the end of the 1950s, but a turning point was
reached by the end of 1951, when Briggs Plan operations began combin-
ing food denial measures with a massive resettlement program. Richard
Stubbs has argued that success in Malaya was made possible in large
part by the fortuitous boom in rubber and tin prices caused by the
Korean War. The prices boom helped pay for resettlement, government
propaganda programs, and a range of new social services, while high
wages and increased demand for labor eased the economic distress
caused by resettlement.3 Enormous increases in Malayan government
revenue also meant that the full expansion and equipping of the police
was finally achieved, permitting the police to assume full responsibility
for the static security of populated areas and thereby releasing more
Army personnel for jungle operations.4
As of July 1950, Imperial forces consisted of 16 British infantry bat-
talions (including an artillery regiment acting as infantry), three com-
mandos, and two armored car regiments – an equivalent greater than
two infantry divisions:
48 GURKHA INFANTRY BRIGADE (3 BNS)
63 GURKHA INFANTRY BRIGADE (3 BNS)
26 GURKHA INFANTRY BRIGADE (6 BNS)*
18 INFANTRY BRIGADE (2 BNS)
1 INDEPENDENT INFANTRY BATTALION
26 FIELD REGIMENT, ROYAL ARTILLERY (AS INF)
3 COMMANDO BRIGADE (3 COMMANDOS)*
13/18 HUSSARS (ARMORED CAR REGIMENT)**
4 HUSSARS (ARMORED CAR REGIMENT)5
Manpower, the Strategic Reserve, and Malaya 167
At any one time, one British, one Gurkha, and one Malay battalion were
usually undergoing a two-month period of rest and retraining.6 The only
exception to this policy was a brief period at the end of 1950 when
Briggs prevailed upon Harding to temporarily suspend retraining in
order to maximize the operational effort.7
Malaya, colonial troops, and the new strategic reserve
Because the three ‘fire brigades’ remained in the Far East, the Defence
Policy and Global Strategy paper had called for the creation of a new
UK-based strategic reserve to meet further Cold War emergencies.8 The
outbreak of war in Korea spurred the Attlee government in August 1950
to undertake a massive rearmament program that included funding for a
powerful new strategic reserve of one infantry division, one armored divi-
sion, and a parachute brigade.9 The additional manpower for this new
reserve and the Korean commitment was to be obtained in the first
instance by retaining time-expired regulars, calling up a portion of the
reserve, increasing the length of National Service from 18 months to two
years, and releasing 14 infantry battalions from training duties.10
Despite these efforts, there was still a shortage of infantry battalions, so
the War Office began examining ways in which additional British bat-
talions could be made available. One possibility was to further expand
the Malay Regiment. Another option was to use colonial units in either
the Middle East or Far East, as a number of colonial governments had
expressed their desire to contribute to Commonwealth defense in the
wake of the Korean War. For instance, in August 1950 New Zealand
proposed raising a Fijian battalion officered by New Zealanders, while
in the following month the Southern Rhodesians offered 100 volun-
teers for service in either Malaya or Korea.11
The War Office had long held the position that an increased reliance
on, or expansion of, colonial forces would only drain the Army’s very
limited financial resources without any added benefit accruing there-
from. The Colonial Office believed otherwise, and tried to convince
Ministers that the rearmament program had reduced the Army’s finan-
cial constraints and that the main problem in meeting military commit-
ments now seemed to be primarily one of manpower.12 A JPS study on
the proposed use of colonial manpower in the Cold War noted numer-
ous drawbacks. The Planners contended that in terms of efficiency,
‘colonial forces give less value for expenditure of money and material
than equivalent numbers of British troops’.13 The raising, training, and
command of new colonial forces would be hampered by the existing
shortage of officers that then plagued the British Army and that was
already retarding expansion of the Malay Regiment.14 Moreover, there
were bound to be ‘formidable’ difficulties in raising and maintaining
substantial colonial forces in overseas garrisons.15 Of relevance to the
possible service of colonial troops in Malaya, the report asserted that in
World War II, ‘African troops in Burma did not reach the standard of the
other troops engaged’ and that they were only suitable for use on guard
and administrative duties.16 In the case of Malaya, the report seemed to
endorse a BDCC(FE) request to raise two more battalions of the Malay
Regiment as the only practical means of possibly releasing Imperial units
in Malaya and ‘to enable the Gurkha division ultimately to resume its
training for war’ without unnecessary diversion to internal security
duties.17 Still, if the shortage of British manpower became an overriding
consideration, the described difficulties could be overcome and ‘there
would be a case for raising limited numbers of colonial land forces in
East and West Africa for service in the Middle East’.18
In January 1951, the Minister of Defence rejected the JPS report and
ordered a reappraisal. In the ensuing discussion of the Chiefs of Staff
Committee, the disdain with which senior Army officials regarded
African troops was clearly evident. The VCIGS (sitting in for Slim)
declared that East and West African units were of little value as front
line troops or for internal security duties and were only useful for duties
on lines of communication.19 This attitude was reflected in British plans
for the Middle East, which assigned West and East African units to
duties on lines of communication only. Brownjohn would only concede
the possibility of using African troops for support services, much as the
US Army then used blacks in its truck companies. The First Sea Lord,
Admiral Lord Fraser, disagreed with the VCIGS. He was not convinced
that the JPS had ‘adequately represented the limits of what might be
done’ with colonial troops, and did not accept the argument that a suffi-
cient number of British officers could not be found since large numbers
of officers had been available in the past for service with the old Indian
Army. In the end, the Committee agreed not to remand the study to the
JPS until it could get the views of the CIGS, who was away at the time.
Unlike his senior subordinates, Slim proved much more conducive to
the potential use of African troops, even in Malaya. He suggested devel-
oping a division each of East and West African troops, providing the
necessary increased efficiency of these troops was undertaken as a long-
term project, in which case they ‘would be able to give a good account
of themselves’.20
At Slim’s suggestion, the Defence Committee in March directed the
Colonial Office to ask the East and West African governors if ‘three
battalions of African infantry could be used in the near future for anti-
bandit and internal security duties in Malaya’.21 Later that month, the
CIGS told Harding he was likely to receive the new Fijian battalion and
a couple of African battalions as a means of releasing Imperial troops in
Malaya for the UK strategic reserve.22 The Colonial Secretary decided
against using West African battalions because of political unrest in the
area, but two battalions of the King’s African Rifles (KAR) from Kenya
and Nyasaland were eventually selected to join the Fijians in Malaya.23
The deployment of these colonial troops to Malaya was planned for
the end of 1951 into early 1952, at which point they were to relieve 3
Commando Brigade, scheduled to return to its role as theater reserve in
the Middle East no later than the beginning of 1952.24 But in October
1951, based on strong representations from Gurney, Briggs, and the
new C-in-C FARELF, General Sir Charles Keightley, the Chiefs of Staff
postponed the departure of 3 Commando Brigade to the middle of
1952 in order to engage as many troops as possible in operations com-
bining resettlement with new food denial measures.25
By the end of 1951, the despatch of the existing UK-based strategic
reserve to Egypt to quell anti-British disturbances in the Suez Canal
Zone had generated the need to raise another strategic reserve brigade.
Consequently, once the last commando left Malaya in June 1952, the
War Office would again review the situation in Malaya to see if any
more British battalions could be released in early 1953 for the strategic
reserve.26 If not, then it would have to give further consideration to
using West African battalions to free up more British battalions. As for
the need to send one of the two armored car regiments to BAOR to
beef-up an under-strength armored brigade, War Office officials, admit-
ting there was a ‘direct conflict between the needs of cold war in
Malaya and preparation for hot war in Europe’, decided the Malayan
requirement was the more urgent one and opted to keep both armored
car regiments in the Far East.27
A Federation Army
West African troops were not in fact called upon to serve in Malaya, as
the general shortage of infantry battalions was partially addressed by the
reactivation in April 1952 of the second battalions of seven regiments.
But the need to free as many British units from internal security duties
as possible still remained, and once again the most viable option was
seen as expansion of locally raised forces in Malaya. Although the War
Office had approved formation of a second brigade of the Malay
Regiment in 1949, only one new battalion was raised before expansion
was halted by financial stricture and lack of trained personnel.28 In

November 1950, the BDCC(FE) argued that the remaining two previ-
ously approved battalions (that is, 5th and 6th) were urgently needed
for the Emergency and to release Imperial troops for war training.29
With windfall revenues flowing into the Malayan treasury as a result of
the Korean War prices boom, expansion was no longer impeded by lack
of funds, rather it was the persistent, acute shortage of qualified British
officers and NCOs that was slowing progress.30 As late as November 1951
the formation of the 5th and 6th battalions was still retarded by a short-
age of 40 British officers, even though the BDCC(FE) told the Colonial
Office their provision was of the ‘greatest importance’.31 The December
1951 visit to Malaya of the new Conservative government’s Colonial
Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, eventually brought measures to relieve the
officer shortage. Making an extensive tour of the country and its
inhabitants, Lyttelton found the overall ‘situation … far worse than [he]
had imagined’.32 In his subsequent report to the Cabinet, he noted the
officer deficiency continued despite various pecuniary incentives and
special allowances for volunteers and attempts to fill the gaps through
compulsory postings from the British Army.33 The single greatest obsta-
cle to remedying the dearth of qualified officers was the tax burden
caused by continuation of War Office control, originally begun as
a temporary wartime measure.34 In May, the Defence Committee
approved recommendations by the Colonial and War Offices to resume
the pre-war practice of officer secondment on a contract basis, both to
lower the tax burden on officers and to establish in advance a system
for British officers to serve in the army of post-independence Malaya.35
The program worked and the situation began to improve steadily over
the course of the year and into 1953.36
As senior military officers in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur realized,
though, raising new battalions of only Malay troops was politically
short-sighted, as nearly half of Malaya’s population was Chinese and
Indian. According to Nadzan Haron, in 1946 Lieutenant-General Sir
Miles Dempsey, then C-in-C Allied Land Forces South East Asia, recom-
mended that the post-war Malayan armed forces be open to all races,
with the infantry organized as two Malay and one Chinese battalion.37
When the Malayan Union scheme was abandoned in early 1948, so too
was the original plan for multiracial forces. When the Chiefs of Staff
approved the formation of two brigade groups in 1949, the expansion
applied only to the ethnically homogeneous Malay Regiment.38 In
April 1950, Harding suggested first to Gurney and then to the Chiefs of
Staff that the title of the Malay Regiment be changed to the Malayan
Regiment and that it be open to Chinese recruits. ‘In my view,’ he wrote

the Chiefs, ‘local military forces as well as the police should be fully rep-
resentative of the people of the country in which they serve as they can
be made’.39 That the Chinese should be involved was particularly impor-
tant in view of their alienation from Malayan political life and their
support to the Communist insurgency, but Gurney rejected the idea
as being inflammatory to the Malays. Nevertheless, in October 1951
Slim and Keightley agreed that for political, psychological, and practical
reasons, the Malayan government should also undertake to form a
Malayan army of all arms as preparation for the colony’s independence
and to promote further assumption of its own defense responsibilities,
although they anticipated a continuing shortage of British officers.40
Keightley felt it was vital that this army should include ethnic Chinese as
a means of both expressing and gaining the Chinese community’s sup-
port of the government. Indeed, this had been one of the reasons why in
November 1950 the Federation instituted registration of all Malayans –
Malay, Chinese, Indian – for selective service in either the police or armed
forces.41 Unfortunately, thousands of young Chinese men chose to flee to
Singapore or China in order to avoid being called up.42
It was General (later Field Marshal) Sir Gerald Templer who, in the
combined posts of both High Commissioner and Director of Operations,
at last brought the notion of a racially heterogeneous force to fruition. He
announced the formation of a new multiracial Federation Regiment in an
address to the Malayan Legislative Council in March 1952, and recruiting
for the first cadre company began in May.43 Despite the applause of
Malayan legislators for this racial inclusiveness, participation by the
Chinese community in the new units fell far short of the 40 per cent
quotas.44 Nearly 18 months after recruiting began, the Federation Regi-
ment boasted only 469 men, of which 264 (56 per cent) were Malays, 134
(29 per cent) Indians and others, and only 71 (15 per cent) Chinese.45
Disappointed by low Chinese participation, Templer nevertheless forged
ahead with the formation of other Federation units, including an arm-
ored car squadron, an engineer squadron, and signal unit.46 By October
1953, he had also succeeded in creating 1 Federal Division, and raising
the 6th and 7th battalions of the Malay Regiment in November 1952 and
October 1953, respectively.47
The four-fold increase of Malayan forces from 1948 to 1954, together
with the arrival of the three colonial battalions in 1952, helped release
three British battalions – a brigade equivalent – for the strategic reserve.
By the summer of 1952, the new strategic reserve was also absorbed in
Egypt, so the Chiefs asked the C-in-C to again consider what, if any,
Table 8.1 Number and source of infantry battalions in Malaya, 1948–5448
Battalions June 48 Jan. 49 Oct. 50 Aug. 51 June 52 Jan. 53 June 54
British* 2 5 7 7 5 6 4
Gurkha 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
RM Commandos – – 3 3 1 – –
Colonial – – – – 3 3 3
Malayan – 2 4 4 5 6 7
Total** 10 15 22 22 22 23 22
Notes: * Includes an artillery regiment in infantry role; **Counts RM commando as battalion

equivalent.
British battalions or light armor he felt could be spared from FARELF in

1953.49 Keightley replied that he could accept a reduction of two
British infantry battalions after 1 April 1953, but he insisted there be
no reduction below 16 British, Gurkha, and colonial battalions either
by straight reduction or by gaps due to delayed reliefs.50 The Chiefs
subsequently agreed to maintain all existing units then in Malaya until
six months after operational deployment of the 7th Battalion of the
Malay Regiment in January 1954.51 This proved to be overly optimistic,
as Templer told the Chiefs in November 1953 that he did not see the
possibility in the near future of any overall reduction in the Malaya gar-
rison below its strength of 22 battalions.52 The problem was not so
much the remaining Communist guerrillas, who by 1953 had mostly
retreated to the jungle where the Army was hunting them down. Rather,
it was the increasing potential threat of Communist success in
Indochina and Siam, and the expected effect on internal security in
Malaya, that had come to be the principal reason behind retaining such
a large garrison.53 By June 1954, when it was hoped that one or two
British battalions could return to Britain or Germany, the BDCC(FE) was
instead informing the Chiefs of its notional requirements for reinforce-
ments in the event Chinese or local Communists gained control of
Indochina and Siam.54 Nevertheless, the development of Colonial and
local defense forces permitted a one-third reduction of Imperial units by
1954, as shown in Table 8.1.
India, Nepal, and the British Army Gurkhas
Expansion of Malayan forces and the introduction of colonial troops

did help ease the burden on Imperial forces by permitting three British
battalions to redeploy out of theater. The Gurkhas, however, were now

firmly wedded to FARELF, and they no longer had a planned role to
fight in the Middle East. Instead, their new wartime role was to defend
against a Chinese invasion of Malaya.55 In addition to releasing a few
British battalions, the increase in colonial and local defense forces had
the added benefit of permitting Gurkha battalions to resume periodic
unit training. Yet full development of 17 Gurkha Infantry Division was
still retarded by the low recruiting ceiling, still stuck at 10 400, or
nearly 15 000 less than the level agreed with Nepal in 1947. This had
ramifications not only for the operational readiness of the division, but
it also hampered redeployment of additional British battalions.
The low recruiting ceiling was a hindrance to be sure, but the very
existence of the British Army Gurkhas was predicated on favorable rela-
tions with both Nepal and – because of its influence over the mountain
kingdom – India. Either India or Nepal could have placed the entire
project in jeopardy if they chose to interfere with British Gurkha
recruitment. The loss of this all-volunteer force of seasoned jungle
fighters would be disastrous to the British position in the Far East and,
by extension, would seriously affect British garrisons in Europe and the
Middle East as well. Both the War Office and the FARELF staff section
responsible for the Gurkhas therefore viewed recent developments in
South Asia with some trepidation.
Throughout 1950 the Chinese Communist government had stated its
intention to ‘liberate’ Tibet and reestablish Chinese suzerainty over that
country. For practical and legal reasons, neither the British nor Indian
governments were willing to make any substantial effort to assist Tibet
against a Chinese invasion, the latter choosing to provide only a small
quantity of arms to the Tibetans.56 Both India and Nepal were nervous
about the presence of Chinese troops on their borders, and India was
particularly worried that Nepalese dissidents would seek Chinese assis-
tance in over-throwing Katmandu’s ancien régime.57 This India could not
countenance, so rather than drive Nepalese dissidents to China by refus-
ing to help, it appears India supported anti-government forces from
bases in the Indian provinces of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Indeed, the
Nepalese Ambassador to London told the British that what Nepal really
feared ‘was an invasion from the South rather than from the North’.58
The principal force behind the anti-regime movement was the out-
lawed Nepalese National Congress (NNC) party, which had strong ties to
the ruling Congress Party of India, and which was allied with supporters
of King Tribhuvana and other dissidents opposed to the hereditary line
of Maharajah prime ministers, the Rana family.59 India’s proxy role in
Nepalese politics concerned the Foreign Office, as the NNC was suspected
of trying to sabotage the British Gurkhas and embarrass the Maharajah
during the sensitive negotiations to increase the British recruiting ceil-
ing then still stuck at 10 400.60
In October 1950, the same month that Chinese forces entered Tibet,
General Harding asked the War Office to press the Foreign Office to
conclude an agreement with Nepal to raise the ceiling no later than
1 January 1951. While he realized that India’s continued use of the war-
raised Gurkha battalions in Kashmir did not portend a wholly satisfactory
conclusion, he was amenable to the compromise number of 13 000.61 In
either case he had to have an answer by the new year, as the vagaries of
Gurkha recruiting, dictated as they were by the monsoon, the seasons,
and difficult terrain, meant that a delay would affect the formation of
the Gurkha divisional engineer and signal regiments.62 Delay would also
adversely affect induction of recruits with long-standing family ties to
British Gurkha regiments, and by default give the Indian Army
Gurkhas the pick of the country.63 In forwarding Harding’s request
to the Foreign Office, Major-General Richard Hull, the DSD, noted that
failure to achieve the higher ceiling would mean the Army would have
to ‘accept the [Gurkha] division as a useful internal security weapon
but not available for war’.64
Harding’s push for a firm answer on a new ceiling was obviated in
November by the NNC invasion of Nepal from India. Although forces
loyal to the Maharajah were able to restore control over most of the
country by December, in January the Indians succeeded in pressuring the
Maharajah Prime Minister into allowing the King to establish a govern-
ment equally divided between Ranas and the NNC. This development,
though not fatal to British recruitment, was worrisome all the same.65
The possible overthrow of the Rana regime held several dangers for the
British Gurkhas, the most obvious one being the possibility that the
Maharajah, faced with the collapse of his government, might have
invoked the government’s ‘right to withdraw all Gurkha troops in case
Nepal is involved in war’.66 This does not appear to have become an
issue, but there was a clear concern about the effect news of the rebel-
lion would have on Gurkha troops.67 Close monitoring of the Gurkhas
revealed no cause for alarm:
Reports from Barrackpore, Hong Kong and Malaya confirm Gurkha

troops not worried by events in Nepal. All are interested in own
families but as long as incidents confined to Katmandu Valley no
important reaction likely. If unrest spreads to own villages some
disquiet and some desertion to protect own interests possible. No

evidence any strong feeling for or against Minister but Gurkhas wish
Nepal ruled by Nepalis not Indians. Some interest Tibet affairs by
Gurkhas from East Nepal.68
Continued political turmoil in Nepal meant, however, that there could

be no hope of raising the recruiting ceiling above 10 400 any time
soon, despite further pleadings by Malcolm MacDonald.69
The Communist campaign against the British Gurkhas
Throughout 1951 NNC control of the Nepalese government grew,

diminishing the prospects for an eventual rise in the Gurkha ceiling
and boding ill for the Gurkha’s continued existence in the British
Army.70 At the same time it also became clear that there was a deliber-
ate disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting the British Gurkhas,
possibly directed by Communist agents with NNC connivance.71 Indeed,
Communist agents in Nepal were trying to dissuade potential recruits
from service with the British Army in Malaya.72 The propaganda offen-
sive bore fruit in August 1952, when the Nehru government, under
intense pressure from Communist and other Indian opposition parties,
demanded Britain remove its Gurkha recruiting stations from India as
soon as possible.73
This seemed to presage the end of the British Army Gurkhas, for in
the 137-year existence of the Gurkhas, Nepal had never allowed for-
eigners – Indian or British – to recruit directly on its soil.74 The Foreign,
Colonial, and Commonwealth Relations Offices tended to take a rather
apocalyptic view of the situation, one official suggesting that because
Indian influence on Nepal to curtail British recruiting would only
increase over time, the Chiefs of Staff should examine ‘the possibility
of making ourselves independent of the Gurkha Brigade in the not
too distant future’.75 At a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee
in September, Colonial and Foreign Office officials again suggested
accepting the possible loss of the Gurkhas, and making up the resulting
manpower shortfall by pursuing a proposal to further expand the
Malay Regiment, creating a new mixed-race regiment, and forming a
Federation Army of Malaya.76 The VCIGS, Lieutenant-General Sir Nevil
Brownjohn, told the committee it was ‘out of the question to embark
at this stage on the provision of an alternative to the Gurkhas’.77 ‘It
was,’ he said, ‘vital to maintain our recruitment of Gurkhas and their
transit facilities’ in India.78 While it was clear that if Britain ‘lost the
Gurkhas, it would mean a complete review of existing strategy for South

East Asia’, the VCIGS did not accept the others’ pessimism. He thought
India alive to the ‘danger of Nepal looking elsewhere [that is to China] if
Gurkha recruitment for the British ceased.’ Brownjohn therefore pro-
posed that the relevant government departments undertake to study the
administrative, financial and diplomatic implications of shifting recruit-
ing to Nepal, something to which the others readily agreed.79 That this
was the only viable option was confirmed by the UK High Commissi-
oner’s discussion with an Indian official in which the latter admitted
that the ‘Government of India would continue to be attacked by Com-
munists, whatever the ultimate solution reached, since [the] Communist
object was to stop transit of Gurkhas altogether’.80
The end of the Gurkhas?
With pressure from the Communist disinformation campaign continu-

ing,81 the British Government accepted the fact that it would have to
establish depots in Nepal or face the loss of the Brigade of Gurkhas.
Because of Indian influence in Nepal, however, any approach to the
King would have to be mooted with Nehru first, who would have to be
told the importance of the Gurkhas to British strategy.82 Nehru did not
object to moving the British recruiting facilities, although he hypocrit-
ically said the British Gurkhas were ‘anomalous and out of date’.83
However, he did suggest to the High Commissioner that recruitment in
general should not be seen as a permanent thing, and that any agree-
ment to recruit Gurkhas in Nepal should be of a definite period of
four or five years, and subject to review at the end of that time.84
In November 1952, the Nepalese government consented to the transfer
of British recruiting facilities from India to Nepal, but on the advice of
Nehru it also demanded a fixed period of five years followed by a
review, and, more ominously, it insisted on a clause permitting cancel-
lation within that five year period ‘at twelve months’ notice’.85 To the
British, acceptance of these terms would spell disaster for the Brigade of
Gurkhas, as all confidence in British service would quickly erode and
with it the continued existence of the Brigade.86
In a 2 December paper to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the War
Office laid down what it called the minimum acceptable terms for the
continuation of the British Army Gurkhas: a seven year agreement,
subject to annual review, which would extend service by another seven
years, or, if termination was desired, seven years’ notice had to be
given.87 As Harding contended, anything less was ‘bound to lead to the
gradual collapse of the Brigade of Gurkhas’.88 The War Office therefore

adopted the position that if Nepal rejected its minimum terms, then
Britain should threaten Nepal with immediate disbandment of the British
Gurkhas. Neither the War Office nor Harding were under any illusion as
to what this meant:
The implications and repercussions to us of the loss of British

Gurkhas are obvious. We have no troops to replace them in Malaya,
where there are eight Gurkha battalions out of a total [British,
Colonial, and Malay] garrison of twenty-three, without a major
redeployment from other theatres, which would be militarily and
politically extremely serious.89
On the other hand, the consequences of disbandment were equally pre-

carious for both Nepal and India, the latter which the British believed
entirely responsible for the current crisis:
Leading Nepalese politicians admit that Gurkha recruitment provides

the principle [sic] support to [the] Nepalese economy and if ten thou-
sand British Gurkhas were disbanded and returned to their homes,
severe internal unrest would follow. India could ill afford either a
dangerously unstable Nepal or, for that matter, a serious weakening of
the anti-communist forces in South East Asia.90
The War Office admitted that the threat to disband the Gurkhas was a
‘big gamble,’ but based upon Nepal’s terms for a new agreement, ‘we are
likely anyway to lose them ultimately’.91 While all present at the meet-
ing were agreed as to the seriousness of the situation, both the Foreign
Office and Commonwealth Relations representatives argued against
threatening disbandment. The Foreign Office cautioned that ‘the
Indians might accept such a course and thereby cause us extreme embar-
rassment’.92 After some deliberation, the British government instructed
the High Commissioner in New Delhi to make ‘every possible effort’ to
secure the minimum terms from Nehru and, by extension, Nepal.93
The High Commissioner was to explain not only why the Nepalese
terms were unacceptable but also the adverse impact on progress in the
Malayan Emergency and on a new Malayan constitution, the economic
repercussions on Nepal, and that a satisfactory agreement would speed
British relinquishment of the recruiting facilities in India. He was not
to inform Nehru at this time of Harding’s threat to disband the
Gurkhas if the minimum terms were not accepted.94 While Harding
could accept an annual review of the agreement, he was adamant on

the need for seven years’ notice of termination, because he could ‘not
agree to maintain the Brigade of Gurkhas without the assurance of
having at all times at least seven clear years in front of me’.95
The High Commissioner’s discussions with Nehru in early January
1953 were not very encouraging. The Indian Prime Minister denied he
had been behind the one-year termination clause, and pointed out that
Nepal, with Communist forces across the border in Tibet, was not
desirous of unnecessarily upsetting its Chinese neighbor.96 He suggested
that the British accept Nepal’s terms and take the risk that the social
and economic value of British recruitment was the best guarantee that
an agreement would not be terminated.97 It would appear from the few
documents that have been released on this subject that in May 1953,
government ministers approved a new five-year agreement with Nepal
subject to renewal at the end of that time.98 Their acceptance may have
been based on recent changes in the Nepal government and faith that
popularity of the British service and the economic benefits derived
therefrom would, as Nehru predicted, militate against termination.99
It is not clear whether the length of prior notice for termination was
one year or five, but the British agreed to it all the same. Whatever the
case, the War Office minimum terms had not been met, but the British
Gurkhas remained in being, their effectiveness and relatively lower
cost being seen as one factor assisting a future reduction in the period
of National Service and cuts mandated by the Radical Review.100
Nevertheless, Britain’s ability to maintain its presence in the Far East
hinged on the continued existence of the Gurkhas, and that existence
had been shown to be tenuous.
Conclusion
As discussed in Chapter 6, British military strategy from 1950 made

the Cold War an Army priority. In Malaya, the objective continued to
be a rapid and successful conclusion of the Emergency so as to release
British and Gurkha units to train for their wartime roles. To achieve the
objective without further need of Imperial troops, the British sought
out alternative sources of manpower. There were serious potential
problems, however. As the Imperial strategic reserve for the Far East, 17
Gurkha Infantry Division was supposed to be available for service any-
where in the world, and in an all-out war with Russia, the Gurkhas had
been earmarked for the defense of the Middle East. Successive Cs-in-C
strove to build-up and train the Gurkha division for its appointed role,
but this arduous task was hampered by the exigencies of the Malayan
Emergency and political machinations in Nepal and India which threat-
ened the very existence of the British Army Gurkhas. The Gurkhas
survived, but their war role in the Middle East disappeared just as an
increased Chinese threat to Southeast Asia gave it a new theater role.
The extensive delays in raising the Gurkha recruiting ceiling had an
Army-wide effect, as the shortage of Gurkhas meant British infantry
and support units had continually to fill the gap. When the combined
requirements of military commitments in Malaya, Korea, Germany,
and Egypt reached their zenith towards the end of 1951 and into 1952,
the War Office reluctantly agreed to use colonial troops in an Imperial
service role. Compared with British battalions manned by National
Servicemen, the colonial battalions in Malaya did as good or better than
their British counterparts, with the result that during the last six years
of the Emergency, eight more battalions from Africa and Australasia
served in Malaya.101
Two things stand out when evaluating British efforts to limit military
liabilities in the Far East. The first is the creation of 1 Federation Division
and the Federation of Malaya Army as fulfillment of the long-standing
objective of developing local defense forces to help ease the burden on
Imperial military assets. The second is the extent to which the concept
of Commonwealth defense had emerged as a reality in the Far East. In
Korea, soldiers from Australia, Canada, India, and New Zealand fought
with the British as part of 1 Commonwealth Division, the largest mili-
tary contribution to the United Nations Command after those of the US
and South Korea. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand also contributed
naval and air forces, and South Africa even sent a fighter squadron.
These contributions may have been relatively small in and of them-
selves, but for Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, they were manifesta-
tions of substantive increases in their military establishments and of
their heightened desire to help the Allied side in the Cold War.
9
Siam and the Commonwealth
Defense of Malaya
From 1950 to 1954 the British developed a series of war plans

for Malaya predicated on the assumption that following a Communist
victory in Indochina, Siam would either succumb to Communist
subversion or Chinese invasion. Because Commonwealth troops in
Malaya were committed to Emergency operations, the British felt com-
pelled to plan a defense based on the most manageable position
available given their inadequate numbers. The Siam–Malaya border is
over 200 miles long and consists of jungle-covered mountains well-
suited to infiltration. Yet just 40 miles north of the border, the Kra
Isthmus narrows to approximately 50 miles of mostly gently rolling
plains. It was there, just to the north of the port city of Songkhla
(aka Singora), that the British decided they would defend Malaya.
The plans changed according to developments in Indochina and Siam,
but also in relation to force allocations dictated by Allied global
war plans.
Although Malaya was now accorded priority in the Cold War,
it remained of secondary importance in a global war with the Soviet
bloc. The British nevertheless developed both cold war and hot
war plans to seize the Songkhla position, but in neither case did it
appear there would be enough British forces on hand to assure success.
Relief came from three sources: the first was improvement in Siam’s
ability to resist both insurrection and invasion; the second was
the promise of American military assistance to the defense of
both Siam and Malaya; and the third was a firm commitment by
Australia to send substantial forces to defend Malaya in war and in
peace-time to contribute to a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve for
Southeast Asia.
180
Siam and the Commonwealth Defense of Malaya 181
Siam in relation to the defense of Malaya
Siam was of immense importance to Malaya both as its principal rice

supplier and as the guardian of its only land frontier.1 Britain enjoyed
friendly relations with Siam in both areas, as evidenced by joint efforts
to stem the activities of Communist guerrillas using the border area as a
base for operations in Malaya.2 Unlike Burma and Indochina, Siam was a
relatively stable and prosperous polity capable of suppressing any purely
internal subversion, but too weak to fend off a major Communist threat
that might eventually develop from either its eastern or western fron-
tiers. Its government was therefore quite desirous to obtain Western
military equipment and security guarantees as a means of ensuring its
survival, a policy which completely reversed traditional Siamese for-
eign policy of ‘bending with the wind’.3 MacDonald and Ritchie told
the Chiefs of Staff in May 1949 that the country’s new, pro-Western ori-
entation was genuine, but they realized that, as had been the case in
1941 with the Japanese, the Siamese would likely buckle to Communism
if their Burmese or Indochinese flanks fell.4 MacDonald thought what
the Siamese needed was a demonstration of British and American sup-
port sufficient to ‘stiffen the will to resist’.5 British agreement to arm
and equip five Siamese battalions was helpful, but the Commissioner-
General thought the Foreign Office should investigate the establish-
ment of a military mission, possibly in conjunction with an American
program.6 Following consultations with the British ambassador to
Siam, the CIC(FE) suggested that instead of a military mission which
might wound the amour propre of the Siamese, the British and
American military attachés in Bangkok should establish a joint com-
mittee with the Siamese military.7
The proposed British military mission to Bangkok and the joint com-
mittee failed for two reasons. First, shortages in British production of
arms and equipment prevented HMG from being able to guarantee
anything like the level of supplies needed by Siam.8 Secondly, the
Siamese government of Marshal Pibul clearly believed that not only
could the United States reliably supply the needed equipment, but that
America would prevail against Communism and protect their country
as a quid pro quo for their adherence to American policy in Southeast
Asia.9 In November 1949, the Siamese therefore declined both the
British mission and equipment sales for the five battalions,10 and
turned instead to the United States as both a military model and a
source of aid under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP).11
From a British point of view, Anglo-American efforts in Siam succeeded
in supporting a friendly and mostly stable government that openly

expressed its opposition to Communism. Siam not only recognized the
Associated States of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam in February 1950, but
it also provided ground and naval forces to the United Nations Com-
mand in Korea and was one of three Asian nations that would sign the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in September 1954.12 The
Americans were appropriately munificent, bestowing nearly $32 million
in economic aid from 1951 to 1954, and more than $82 million of
military aid from 1950 to 1953, amounts with which it was impossible
for the British to compete.13
Despite American aid, the British assessment of the Bangkok regime’s
weakness had a profound effect on their strategy. If the worst-case
scenario occurred and Indochina fell under the control of Communist
China, the British believed it was only a matter of time before the
present Siamese government would be overthrown by one willing
to accommodate Communist demands.14 The situation that would
then obtain would be outwardly similar to that of December 1941 and
Malaya would be in grave danger. As the Communists consolidated
their control of South China in early 1950 and began to increase the
amount of aid they were giving to the Viet Minh, the British were
faced with the prospect of an eventual French collapse in Indochina
that might ultimately lead to Siamese accommodation with the
Communists and a direct threat to Malaya.
The ‘Songkhla position’
Accordingly, in March 1950 the BDCC(FE) undertook the preparation of

a report on the defense of Malaya against an attack by Chinese
Communist forces during the period 1952 to 1956.15 Completed in early
August, the report contended that the best place to defend Malaya
against a Chinese invasion was in Tonkin. A Tonkin-based defense, how-
ever, would require ‘considerable’ air and land reinforcements which
could not at the time be found from Commonwealth resources.16 The
BDCC(FE) therefore recommended that HMG approach the United
States, ‘in whose strategic area Tonking [sic] lies, with a view to creating
a collective scheme within the framework of the United Nations for the
defence of South East Asia, including particularly the French and
Commonwealth Governments concerned’.17 Regardless of any success on
the idea of collective defense, the BDCC(FE) contended ‘we must as soon
as possible have a plan for the direct defence of Malaya by forces avail-
able in the country’. The border with Siam was militarily indefensible,
however, and the only ‘suitable’ position for a defense was on the Kra
Isthmus in Siam. The Committee admitted that Siam was unlikely to
agree to the establishment of a position so clearly intended only for
the defense of Malaya. Moreover, the British would need at least four
months to prepare a position in the Kra Isthmus and would require
forces on the order of two small divisions with armor, artillery, and
engineer support in addition to at least two brigades for the internal
security of Malaya.18 Provision would also have to be made for the sup-
ply of rice that otherwise would come from Siam, else it was ‘possible
that the defence of Malaya will founder for this very reason’.19 With lit-
tle likelihood of reinforcement from outside the theater and because it
could not provide all needed forces for the plan, the BDCC(FE) asked
for authorization to discuss the concept with Australia and New
Zealand.20
Two weeks after the BDCC(FE) sent its report to the Chiefs of Staff,
Malcolm MacDonald’s staff sent a complementary memorandum on
the relation of Siam to the defense of Malaya. It focused on the politi-
cal advantages and disadvantages of a British approach to the Siamese
government to gain cooperation in a Kra Isthmus defense scheme. The
paper argued against any straightforward approach to the Siamese for a
variety of reasons, not the least of which would be Siamese reticence
for a defense based on the assumption that their country would be
overrun by Communist forces. They would also be highly suspicious of
a request to defend an area in which its principal tin mines were situ-
ated and which was populated by ethnic Malays.21 Besides concerns
about Siamese leaks to the Russians, the weight of recent history had
also to be considered. First, although MacDonald believed Prime
Minister Pibul was genuinely anti-Communist, he had survived two
invasions and resumed supreme power by maintaining ‘friendly rela-
tions with the conquerors’.22 Secondly, there was the legacy of failure
left over by a similar defense scheme in 1941 – Operation MATADOR –
which was never implemented because of the political sensitivities
involved with not defending Siam on a line further north.23
The Commissioner-General’s paper echoed the BDCC(FE) report in
stating that the most effective way of obtaining Siamese support for
the Kra proposal would be as only one component of a collective effort
for the defense of all Southeast Asia. MacDonald’s office accepted that
a collective defense scheme would take time to build and that in the
interim the defense problem remained.24 Although the paper argued
that a unilateral approach to Siam on the Kra Isthmus defense was
‘dangerous’ and ‘useless’, it nonetheless recommended engaging
Prime Minister Pibul on his desire to complete a highway from

Bangkok to the Malayan border as a means of drawing on the
Singapore base in the event of war.25 A completed highway could of
course facilitate a Communist advance toward Malaya, but the idea
was to complete the road by building it north from Malaya, ostensibly
to support Siamese police operations in the border area, but really to
support British defense communications on the isthmus. The British
proposal would leave a gap in the northern end of the road which
would presumably be completed at a point sufficiently distant in time
to allow the collective defense scheme to bear fruit.26
In early September, one of MacDonald’s deputies traveled to Bangkok
to discuss the ‘Kra project’ with the British Chargé d’Affaires in
Bangkok, together with whom he attempted to ascertain – circum-
spectly – the attitude of the Pibul government on the matter. While the
Siamese supported the idea of a collective defense pact, they naturally
contemplated a defense of the whole country, not just a portion.27
With this confirmation of Siam’s political disposition, the BDCC(FE)
again asked for authorization to proceed with planning measures and
called on the Foreign Office to consider immediate assistance to the
building of the highway with priority to the section from Songkhla to
the Malayan border.28
On 18 October, the Chiefs of Staff Committee met to consider
the prospect of defending Malaya during a global war. The VCIGS,
Brownjohn, contended that even though Southeast Asia was of second-
ary strategic importance in global war, he believed that with effective
air and naval support there was no reason why Malaya could not be
defended against the Chinese given the minimum required land
forces.29 In fact, by March 1950, the British portion of the Allied plan
for global war in the near term – Plan GALLOPER – envisaged leaving the
Gurkha division in the Far East until at least six months after the start
of the war, while all other Imperial troops would leave for the Middle
East within three months.30 Thus the assumption of the BDCC(FE)’s
plan to use the forces already in theater would have to be adjusted to
the loss of 40 Infantry Division, 3 Commando Brigade, and 2 Guards
Brigade.31 The JPS did not think GALLOPER forces were sufficient to
defend against a Chinese attack expected to consist of 80 000 troops
with another 80 000 in reserve, but stated that ‘we should clearly do
the best we could with what we had on the spot and it is possible in
the event we might be successful’.32 The Planners agreed with the
BDCC(FE) that a defense could only be made from a position on the
Kra, and so endorsed the development of plans, government aid to
build the Bangkok–Malaya highway, and an approach to the Americans

on a collective defense for Southeast Asia.33 The Chiefs approved the JPS
report on 1 November, but they did ‘not agree that the long term
plan … should be based on holding the Tongking [sic] position’ as ‘this
would almost certainly cut across … other global commitments’.34
Pending ministerial approval, they authorized the BDCC(FE) to initiate
planning with Australia and New Zealand for the defense of Malaya in
both global and limited war up to the end of July 1951.35 Meanwhile, the
Chiefs undertook to consult the Americans on a collective defense plan
that would not prejudice agreed Allied global strategy for a hot war.36
In the October meeting between the American and British chiefs,
Slim told Bradley that ‘in a hot war, the defence of South East Asia
must be conducted on the Kra Isthmus, in the cold war, Indo-China
was of great importance’ because it protected the flanks of Siam and
Burma. The Americans agreed with this assessment, and pointed out
that they had recently established a mission in Indochina for the
purpose of bolstering the French Union position there. The two
allies agreed that ‘the setting up of joint US/UK missions in [Siam
and Burma] might produce good results. It was important that if these
missions were to be established, action should be taken immediately
so that their effect could be felt before Chinese communist aggression
started’.37
Planning begins under changing strategic assumptions
Ministerial consideration for the Songkhla plan languished throughout

December and January as the Cabinet focused on the crisis precipitated
by Chinese intervention in Korea.38 The Chiefs informed the BDCC(FE)
on 22 December that the CIC(FE) could proceed with notional plan-
ning for Malaya and also Borneo, but coordination with the two other
ANZAM powers would have to wait.39 In the meantime, the BDCC(FE)
undertook further study of a defensive position on the Kra Isthmus,
now given the code name ROEDEAN.40 An immediate concern was the
fact that the Chiefs’ of Staff instructions in COS(50)426 had called for a
plan in the event of war in July 1951. This greatly affected the timing
of the original BDCC(FE) concept which presupposed hostilities
between 1952 and 1956, during which period it expected the internal
security situation to have improved, further battalions of the Malay
Regiment to have become operational, and road improvements to have
been completed.41 Nevertheless, based on an appreciation by the
CIC(FE), the committee estimated that if the precipitating events
occurred in Siam, one brigade group with air and naval support could
secure the ROEDEAN position by coup de main and subsequently hold it
with only the remaining GALLOPER forces of the Gurkha division and
the Malay Regiment.42 The BDCC(FE) realized, however, that ‘the vital
factor for the success of the operation is the timing,’ especially since
the Communists would also realize from published accounts of the
1941–42 Malayan campaign that ‘the Songkhla position is the key to
the defence of Malaya’.43 Hesitation in implementing the operation
could lead to the loss of Malaya, but a gradual rather than abrupt
change of Siamese political orientation would present obvious difficul-
ties in ordering the seizure of ROEDEAN.44 Obviously, the ‘first essential
is … to have an agreed plan at the earliest possible moment [and] to
have an understanding on the circumstances in which the BDCC(FE)
could put it into operation on their [sic] own responsibility’.45
MacDonald too decided to press the case for a strong defense of
Malaya while Whitehall was still ruminating the issue. In a lengthy
telegram dated 5 January 1951, he tried to counter what he saw as a
‘tendency to underestimate [Malaya’s] importance and therefore the
degree of effort which ought to be made to hold it; and to regard it as
expendable in the sense that if it were lost we could ultimately return
here as we did after the last war’.46 This, he implied, was a chimerical
notion not only because Asians would have lost all confidence in
Britain’s ability to protect them, but because Communists ‘mould and
organise … into their system’ any area which they occupy.47 More
importantly, it was now conceivable that Malaya could be faced with a
threat from China, covertly backed by Russia, ‘while a state of nominal
peace continues in the West’. He realized that in hot war the Middle
East had priority, but he contended that the loss of Malaya to measures
conducted short of global war would have devastating effects on Allied
war strategy. If Malaya fell before the outbreak of global war, India,
Pakistan, Australia, and New Zealand would all have to reconsider their
defense priorities which in turn would weaken the eastern flank of
the Middle East. He implored the Foreign Office to support a greater
defense effort for Malaya in the Cold War, including increased provi-
sion of land and air forces.48 MacDonald concluded by suggesting that
‘the effort to defend Malay is one of the military sacrifices which may
have to be made in the interest not only of keeping alive resistance in
the Far East but of retaining the Middle East and full solidarity of [the]
Commonwealth’.49
MacDonald’s telegram to the Foreign Office appears to have had a
telling effect as it arrived at the same time that a study was being made
of a minute from Robert Scott, head of the Southeast Asia Department,

making much the same argument about strategic priorities.50 The
Foreign Office discussed both the MacDonald and Scott papers with
the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Chiefs of Staff, who were
inclined to accept giving Malaya a higher strategic priority in the Cold
War. In two cables to Singapore, the Chiefs made it clear that they
would try to elevate Malaya’s status in global war when they met with
US planners to review GALLOPER later in the year.51 Certainly by June
1952, and possibly as early as late 1951, the Anglo-American planners
had agreed to modify their global war plans to allow most land forces
in the Far East to remain in place rather than move to the Middle
East.52 Of course, this could not be known in January 1951, so plan-
ning for ROEDEAN proceeded on the basis of GALLOPER forces.
Plan IRONY
On 12 January, the Commanders-in-Chief issued a directive to their

Malayan area commanders to proceed with IRONY, the plan ‘to ensure
that organized Chinese Communist Armed Forces do not cross the
Siam/Malaya border’.53 Because the border was indefensible with the
forces available, IRONY required the British commanders:
to occupy against Siamese opposition, and to hold in the face of

Chinese Communist attack, a defensive position on the Kra Isthmus
in the area of PHATALUNG-SONGKHLA-SATUN-KANTANG-TRANG.
In view of [the] limited numbers [of British troops] … you will plan
to hold the defensive position with the minimum forces and to
undertake, with the remaining forces, offensive action against the
enemy lines of communication. At the same time you will maintain
the capability to hit and destroy any enemy who succeed in build-
ing up against the main position.54
The directive notes the possibility that the pre-emptive seizing of the
Songkhla position might deter an actual land attack but lead to a con-
sequent increase in guerrilla activities for which the commanders had
also to be prepared.55 However, from the directive’s wording and order
of battle annexes it is obvious that only GALLOPER forces would be avail-
able, clearly implying that the police and the existing four battalions of
the Malay Regiment on their own would have to handle the internal
security burden then being covered by 22 battalions. After still further
consideration of the BDCC(FE)’s original report and subsequent cables,
the Chiefs of Staff Committee finally agreed to inform the Defence

Committee of the planning concept and the need for ministerial
review and approval of the plan since ministers would be responsible
for ordering the operation if it became necessary.56
Revised force requirements
By mid-June the BDCC(FE)’s planning had progressed to the point

where several important problems with the original concept had been
identified. Still assuming a Chinese invasion in conjunction with a
global war sometime in the latter half of 1951 or early 1952, it had
become painfully apparent that the GALLOPER forces would be com-
pletely inadequate. The original concept had envisaged a threat from
1952 on, at which point the BDCC(FE) had assumed that the Malayan
insurgency would have been sufficiently quelled to release regular
forces for their war role. Although the threat still was pegged at 80 000
troops with 80 000 in reserve, subsequent study had proven the origi-
nal estimate for British forces to be wildly wrong.57 While it would still
be possible to seize the Songkhla position against light opposition with
one brigade group, no other forces would be available to meet a
Chinese attack. The forces required just for internal security would
have to be maintained at the equivalent of 23 infantry battalions and 2
armored car regiments – the current force level – whereas the required
defense forces were now estimated as being a corps of three divisions
supported by armor and artillery.58 In other words, FARELF ‘will not
have sufficient Land Forces in 1951 to maintain internal security in
Malaya and at the same time … meet the maximum external threat’.59
Moreover, because all available forces were already engaged against the
Communist guerrillas, it was not possible to begin training for war except
at the expense of the counterinsurgency. The BDCC(FE) recommended
that as the counterinsurgency campaign was a ‘vital factor in the defence
of Malaya, we consider that [war] training should not be undertaken at
the expense of the emergency operations until the external threats have
developed sufficiently to justify a revision of this policy’.60 It also
requested they ‘take note of the grave deficiencies in the armed forces
revealed in [the] paper’, and that the actual plans for the defense of
Malaya ‘should be made on the assumption that the necessary forces
will be available’.61
The problem of limited resources was evident in correspondence from
the British Minister of Defense, Emanuel Shinwell, to his Australian
counterpart, Philip McBride. Shinwell tried to reassure McBride that in
the event of a Chinese attack through Southeast Asia against Malaya

‘with the rest of the world at peace’, Britain ‘shall certainly fight to
hold the country with all available resources’.62 He admitted, however,
that problems would arise if an attack came during a ‘global hot war’.
Britain’s intention in such a scenario was to hold Malaya with all those
forces already in place, with the exception of the Commando Brigade
and ‘a small number of aircraft’.63 Besides which, the British believed
that the earliest an attack on Malaya could develop would be more than
nine months after the start of the war, assuming a Chinese invasion of
Tonkin began at the same time as Russian offensives began elsewhere.64
Any consideration of reinforcements in war would naturally depend on
the circumstances, he told McBride, but it was unwise for any more
troops to go to Malaya, as it was not strategically vital to the defense of
Australia and if lost would present no land threat.65 This was hardly
reassuring to the Australians, who no doubt had vivid memories of the
Malayan catastrophe in the previous war. In fact, Australia had already
begun to question its earlier commitment to send forces to the Middle
East in wartime. With the situation in Korea and Indochina weighing
heavily, the Australians were now considering shifting their wartime
defense effort to Southeast Asia.
A change in Allied strategy and new thinking

about reinforcements
The Chiefs of Staff did not consider the BDCC(FE)’s 1951 report on the
defense of Malaya until the end of January 1952. By that time there
had been several new intelligence appreciations of the threat to
Southeast Asia and a major change in Allied war strategy which ‘con-
sidered [it] impracticable to plan for the redeployment of land forces
from the Far East to the Middle East’.66 Furthermore, as Shinwell had
told McBride, it was now conceivable that reinforcements could be sent
to Malaya after the start of war based on the circumstances obtaining
at the time, a position possibly taken to accommodate an Australian
policy giving equal weight to sending its own expeditionary force to
either theater.67
Late in February came French reverses in Indochina which prompted
British fears about a French withdrawal. The JPS appreciation of the
effects of withdrawal once again reconfirmed Britain’s inability to assist
in the defense of either Burma or Siam any more than it currently did
with arms sales and advice.68 The Planners concluded that ‘in the
event of a French withdrawal from Indo-China in the near future our
strategy would best be implemented by taking prompt action to establish

land forces on the Songkhla position’.69 To be effective, this action
would require some level of reinforcements for Malaya. When the
Chiefs discussed the report on 11 March, they fretted about the effect the
loss of rice from Siam would have on Malaya, but as the Foreign Office
was still studying alternative sources, they came to no firm conclusion on
the issue. The report had not indicated what level of reinforcement was
needed, but whatever it would be, it ‘would almost certainly … necessi-
tate the embodiment of Territorial [that is, TA] formations’ to fill the
gaps left elsewhere by the reinforcing units.70 Mobilization was a time-
consuming process, though, so they recommended the Defence
Committee order the necessary preparations to be made ‘as soon as it
became clear the French position in Indo-China was collapsing’.71
Churchill thought ‘it was too early to assume the worst’ about the
defense of Malaya, and told the Defence Committee it would be
‘wrong to commit ourselves at this stage to preparations against [what
was only] a possible threat in the future’.72 Nevertheless, Churchill and
the rest of the committee agreed that it was prudent to commence
planning for mobilization and reinforcement, the first ministerial
action to contemplate such a move.73
The role of deception
In April came the Chiefs’ preliminary approval of the BDCC(FE)’s

deception plan for the defense of Malaya and Hong Kong, discussed in
Chapter 7. The available sources indicate that this plan assumed the
Communists were cognizant of the paucity of British troops in the Far
East and that time and distance vitiated timely reinforcement of the
two colonies from other theaters. Since the plan to seize the Songkhla
position ideally required its implementation four months before the
Communists entered Siam in part to allow potential reinforcements to
arrive, it would not be possible to reveal the plan’s existence as a
means of deterring an attack. The BDCC(FE) deception plan instead
focused on planting information that would indicate that Australia and
the United States planned to redeploy troops already in the Far East to
the defense of Malaya and Hong Kong.74 Menzies agreed to cooperate
with this scheme, and the deception staff believed the Americans were
likely to go along with it as well.75
The propinquity of the deception plan to what was actually needed
became apparent six weeks later when the JPS completed its examina-
tion of the minimum forces required to hold the Songkhla position. Its
report was critical of the BDCC(FE)’s preferred defense line – 75 miles

from the Malayan border at its closest point – as being too vulnerable
to defeat in detail, too dependent on long and tenuous lines of com-
munication, and too far from existing air bases, in addition to which it
would require a total of four divisions.76 The JPS recommended an
alternative line just to the north of Songkhla, the western end of which
(Satun) was only 20 miles from the border. This position fell within
easy range of existing airfields in Malaya and would only require three
divisions.77 On 5 June the Chiefs approved the report as the basis for a
new operational plan and sent a copy of it to the BDCC(FE) for com-
ment and coordination.78
Plan RINGLET
In July the Chiefs approved another JPS report on the forces needed to
meet an increased internal threat to Malaya if Siam, following a French
withdrawal from Tonkin or Indochina, succumbed to Communist
domination in the absence of an overland Chinese or Viet Minh attack.
That report concluded that HMG would have to authorize implemen-
tation of a contingency plan to seize the Songkhla position with one
brigade group and reinforce Malaya with one division in order to counter
the expected upsurge of guerrilla activity.79 The CIC(FE) duly drew up a
plan, code-named RINGLET, which was approved amid some encouraging
signs that the Siamese government was considering cooperation with the
British on the defense of southern Siam.80 This news prompted the British
government to consider whether it merited an approach to Pibul to gain
consent for an occupation of the Songkhla position in RINGLET conditions.
Both General Templer, then High Commissioner for the Federation
of Malaya, and General Keightley, C-in-C FARELF, separately visited Pibul
near the beginning of 1953 to gain a better sense of Siamese defense
preparedness and plans. In fact, Pibul told Templer that the situation
in Indochina had prompted him to direct his staff to study moving the
seat of government from Bangkok to Songkhla ‘should any retreat to this
area become necessary’.81 After extensive discussions in London,
Singapore, and Kuala Lumpur, the British government decided that if the
French left Indochina it should take the opportunity to gain Siamese con-
sent to RINGLET if at all possible.82 However, because timing of the opera-
tion was critical, it would in any event act immediately to take the
position.83
Plan RINGLET required two ministerial-level actions in order to be suc-
cessful. The first was a decision on short notice to execute it. For this,
Templer had urged the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, to lay the
necessary groundwork with the Cabinet.84 The second was the provi-
sion of one brigade for internal security operations and one division to
man the Songkhla position.85 Unfortunately, the Planners noted that
the UK strategic reserve of 3 Infantry Division and 16 Parachute
Brigade was fully employed in the Middle East, so in the event of a
near-term emergency only one brigade from the United Kingdom was
available; the division would have to be found from the Territorial
Army.86 In discussing these two requirements, the Defence Committee
further considered the extent to which they might be able to obtain
Siamese cooperation through the offices of the ‘American Joint Services
Mission’, which the British believed had a ‘considerable influence on
the policy of the [Siamese] armed forces and indirectly on the Siamese
Government’.87 Churchill agreed that for this reason there might be
‘considerable advantage if the President of the United States and his
military advisers were made aware of our intentions and signified their
support’.88 It was nevertheless clear that seizure of the Songkhla posi-
tion might eventually be required, and on short notice too. For that
reason, Churchill undertook to make a ‘short oral statement’ to the
Cabinet on the subject and to set up a small group of Ministers to
monitor relevant developments in anticipation of a decision.89 As for
the reinforcements, the Prime Minister thought that if the need ever
did arise, it would be far better to send 2 Infantry Division from
Germany and replace it with a TA division than to lose time by mobi-
lizing the same division and sending it to the Far East.90 The Defence
Committee concluded its meeting by authorizing release, on a personal
basis, of slightly sanitized outline versions of the IRONY and RINGLET
plans to the Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff.91
Ministerial briefing
The April 1953 Viet Minh invasion of Laos raised the anxiety of the
Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff to a considerable extent. At the end
of the month, Churchill held a special staff conference with the Chiefs
at which the CIGS gave a detailed briefing on the existing plans to
seize the Songkhla position, and the status of ongoing covert recon-
naissance.92 The British had not previously considered the loss of Laos
while the French remained in Tonkin, but those present agreed such
a development could have the same effect on the internal security
of Malaya that the other contingencies addressed. The remedy to a
Communist Siam – with the French remaining in Tonkin – was still
seizure of the Songkhla position, although RINGLET would have to be

modified to account for the changed circumstances.93 With respect to
land forces, the JPS recommended that RINGLET could be implemented
with reinforcements totaling three infantry brigade groups: one to
replace the FARELF formation used to actually seize the position; one
to maintain internal security in occupied Siam; and one to counter
expected increases in guerrilla activity in Malaya.94 Only one brigade
would be needed in the first instance, but securing that small force was
itself a problem, for there was only one brigade available in Britain at
the time and it was earmarked to reinforce the Middle East on short
notice. The only source from which a brigade could be sent to Malaya
in the immediate future was Germany, but even this would take from
six to eight weeks to arrive. If circumstances consequently required the
other two brigades, these too would come from Germany but would
require the approval of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander and the
mobilization of a TA division to take their place.95
As a hedge against diverting troops to Malaya, the JPS recommended
the Chiefs obtain ministerial approval for the British representatives to
‘mention’ the ROEDEAN position when military planners from Australia,
Britain, France, New Zealand, and the United States (the Five Power
Staff Agency, or FPSA) studied the defense of Malaya against a Chinese
invasion at their next meeting in September.96 Ministerial sanction
was not forthcoming, however, and the British, Australian, and New
Zealand planners, who probably were aware of both IRONY and RINGLET,
were placed in the ironic position of having to study the defense of
Malaya with the French and Americans, who were ignorant of the
British scheme.97 Not surprisingly, the ‘agency planners … selected vir-
tually the same position for defence [of Malaya] as that previously cho-
sen by the Chiefs of Staff’.98 Their suggested operational requirements
to defeat a Chinese attack were substantially greater than IRONY, as they
called for a total of four divisions, three aircraft carrier battle groups,
and more than 60 bombers, as well as appointment of an American
commander who would direct US naval forces protecting the east
coast.99 By December, both the Chiefs and the BDCC(FE) accepted the
Staff Agency plan as a possible outline for operations in the defense of
Malaya against Chinese attack.100
Reassessing the initiating triggers
By early 1954, the possibility of Siam eventually succumbing to Com-

munist pressure as a result of a French collapse in Indochina was about
as strong as it would be during the period 1950–54. Yet it was only in

January of that year that the Foreign Office at last began to ask the
Chiefs penetrating questions about an operation that was bound to be
seen as an act of aggression by most of the world. In an 18 January letter
to the Chiefs of Staff, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign
Office, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, decried the ambiguity that surrounded the
triggers for implementing RINGLET and requested the Chiefs to provide a
political and strategic study of RINGLET as well as what should be done to
prevent Siam falling under Communist control in the first place.101
Based on extensive consultations with the Joint Intelligence
Committee, the JPS concluded that there was little possibility the Viet
Minh would actually invade Siam.102 Rather, as had been already sur-
mised, the greatest threat would be from Communist infiltration and
subversion with the object of creating a pro-Communist Siamese gov-
ernment. Bangkok would be undoubtedly influenced by its assessment
of the relative strength of the Communists and the West, and of ‘the
price which its friendship could command from either side’.103 Con-
sequently, much would depend on the support provided by the West
and the US in particular.104
In a major departure from earlier assessments, the JPS now considered
the most likely danger to arise in the period up to the end of 1955 was
not the appearance of a Communist government in Siam, but a deci-
sion by a non-Communist Siamese Government to align its foreign
policy in concert with the general purpose of Communism in South-
East Asia.105 That would lead to increased Communist infiltration into
Malaya and the withholding of rice supplies to Malaya, Borneo, and
Hong Kong. The JPS asserted that in this scenario, the problem of
when, if ever, to order the operation was now even more difficult than
before: ‘Siam’s [possible] swing to Communism would be gradual and
it would be extremely difficult to decide the precise moment when
there could be considered to be an overland threat to Malaya’.106
Indeed, in circumstances in which Siam only appeased Communist
policies but no overland threat was evident, the Planners admitted that
it was not necessarily essential to mount RINGLET as an anti-infiltration
method.107 But development of any overland threat – regardless of the
disposition of the Bangkok government – still required immediate
enactment of RINGLET.
The improving situation in Siam
Because the political, economic, and military implications of mounting

RINGLET were so serious, the Planners supported Harding’s position that
the British aim should be to build up Siam politically, psychologically,

and economically so that the need to implement RINGLET and IRONY
plans would never arise.108 Unfortunately, British good intentions once
again hit the brick wall of limited resources. In terms of the economic
stability of Siam, the only effort Britain could undertake was the pas-
sive measure to ensure that ‘British Colonial Territories do not exploit a
temporary rice surplus’ in Siam by pushing for lower prices.109 On a
positive note, the British Ambassador to Siam, Sir Geoffrey Wallinger,
reported a general improvement in the situation in Siam.110 The Chiefs
were particularly buoyed by Wallinger’s description of the Siamese
reaction to the Viet Minh threat from Laos, against which they had
moved ground forces, police and signal units to the danger area and
permitted French aircraft to over-fly the region.111 The Ambassador
thought Siamese forces would now ‘make a serious dent in any enemy
attack’ and that the British should therefore contemplate doing more
north of the Songkhla position. But Harding remained reticent about
such a move, believing that it would be ‘extremely dangerous’ militarily
to deploy British forces further north, especially since the Americans
appeared to be ambivalent about what support they might give Siam if
it was threatened.112
New intelligence appreciations about a Siamese collapse had had
an unequivocal impact on the Chiefs’ attitude toward the Songkhla
plans. Whereas previous policy anticipated implementing IRONY or
RINGLET because Siam was assumed to fall to Communism within
a short period of time, the Chiefs now emphasized seizing the opportu-
nity to build Siamese resistance to Communist infiltration and subver-
sion. This effort was one of the underlying reasons why the British
accepted the concept of a partition of Vietnam as the lesser of possible
settlement evils at Geneva.113 The BDCC(FE) specifically advocated and
amplified this position in a note of 30 March, in which MacDonald
proposed ‘a “cushion” of internationally guaranteed border States (that
is, Laos and Cambodia with Vietnam beyond) … between Siam and
[the] Vietminh. … This should give time to encourage the development
there of a more reliable anti-Communist Government and policy’.114
On the same day Dien Bien Phu fell, the JPS produced another report
on Siam, this time on the ability of its forces to combat Communist
infiltration. The report was generally upbeat and lauded the work of
the American military mission in raising the Siamese army’s standard
of training, the biggest hindrance to the prescribed expansion of the
army being a shortage of trained officers and NCOs.115 With the bulk
of the army’s foreign training and equipping in the capable hands of
the Americans, there was little for the British to do other than give
encouragement to the Siamese.116 To this end, Wallinger’s replacement

as Ambassador to Siam, Sir Berkeley Gage, pressed General Templer to
visit the Chief of Police, General Phao, and Prime Minister Pibul prior
to his departure from the theater. Templer succeeded in building a
friendly, albeit libationary, relationship with Phao which helped build
Siamese morale at a time when Pibul was particularly ‘disturbed’ by the
fall of Dien Bien Phu.117 General Loewen, the C-in-C FARELF, visited
Siam the day after Templer’s departure, a trip marked by warm hospi-
tality and opportunities for the C-in-C to meet senior army leaders,
assess the army’s worth, and visit the northeastern provinces.118
It was during Loewen’s visit to Bangkok that the British learned of
the American ambassador’s proposal for the United States to build and
lease airbases in Siam, including one in the Songkhla area.119 This was
exciting news, for as Loewen told Harding in a cable from Bangkok,
with ‘Songkhla in our hands we in turn might be able to do something
to help stiffen the Thai army’.120 As Harding explained to his col-
leagues, ‘from a general military and strategic point of view, the estab-
lishment of US air bases in Siam would create a tremendous feeling of
confidence particularly in Siam and Malaya’.121 He appreciated that
such a development might agitate India, but he sternly suggested that
‘the half-hearted moral support of that country must be balanced
against the powerful physical military advantages of such bases.’122 As
the BDCC(FE) pointed out, the establishment of American airbases
would not only commit the US to the defense of Southeast Asia, but in
terms of British interests they could go a long way to mitigating or
even eliminating the political problems inherent with implementing
RINGLET.123 The proposal also had the merits of absolving the British of
the requirement to build the Songkhla airfield to jet fighter standards
following occupation of ROEDEAN as well as permitting preparations for
the defense of Malaya under the guise of protecting the Songkhla air-
field.124 All agreed on the need to encourage the American Chiefs to
support the proposal. Although there was a serious difference of opin-
ion over this issue between the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the one hand
and the State Department and National Security Council on the other,
by August President Eisenhower had decided in principle to approve
the building of three air bases in Siam, including one near Songkhla.125
Plan WARRIOR
By the end of June the BDCC(FE) had come to the conclusion that the
increase in American defense assistance to Siam and the probable
emergence of a Southeast Asian collective defense pact made plans

IRONY and RINGLET obsolescent.126 Indeed, these developments ‘had made
remote the likelihood of our mounting, against opposition, a purely
British operation of this sort’.127 Nevertheless, the BDCC(FE) considered
‘that in the present transitional and dangerously uncertain stage in
South East Asian affairs it is essential … that we should have ready at
hand as satisfactory a plan as possible for such an operation’.128 In early
September, the BDCC(FE) transmitted the outline of Plan WARRIOR to the
Chiefs of Staff. As MacDonald and the Commanders told the Chiefs,
they hoped that ‘as soon as possible we shall be able to begin, with the
other powers concerned, to make a plan for joint defence of Siam in
which the WARRIOR position would be the last to which allied defending
armies could retreat rather than be the first which the British forces
would occupy’.129
Plan WARRIOR resembled RINGLET in the sense that both required early
seizure of the Songkhla position against negligible opposition and with
only the forces then available in-theater. The differences between WAR-
RIOR and its predecessors were stark, however. Whereas IRONY and RINGLET
generally assumed that entry into Siam would only occur without the
Bangkok government’s permission, WARRIOR envisioned only two sce-
narios for entry into Siam, the first of which was entry with permission
of the Siamese government ‘with China not at war.’ The second sce-
nario was entry ‘in the event of armed Chinese aggression against
Siam’s northern frontier with the bulk of the Siamese armed forces sup-
porting the aggressors in obedience to a rebel Siamese Government’.130
In either situation the BDCC(FE) expected war with China could ‘very
shortly follow’, and that ‘if war breaks out between Britain and China
the United States would be in it from the outset’. Assuming a state of
war between China and Britain also implied some level of mobilization
in the United Kingdom and Australia which would result in deploy-
ment of significant land, air, and naval reinforcements for Malaya.
What the BDCC(FE) expected these reinforcements to be is not dis-
cussed in the actual outline plan, since it only covers the first 28 days
of the operation, nor does it fully address the problem of internal secu-
rity. Appendix A on ‘Operations Concurrent with WARRIOR’ simply states
that the ‘emergency in Malaya is likely to continue during operation
WARRIOR at least as high a tempo as at present’ and could limit the
forces allocated for WARRIOR.131
The Chiefs of Staff approved Plan WARRIOR on 30 October, some six
weeks after the signing of the Manila pact. They commented that WARRIOR
was more likely to be needed ‘in conditions of cold war rather than
as a result of overt Chinese action in which case we should already be

at war’.132 Nevertheless, since ‘it might be necessary to launch WARRIOR
within the next few years’ – especially after an expected 1956
Communist electoral victory in Vietnam – it was absolutely essential
to make good the deficiencies in artillery, logistics, and war stocks
noted by the BDCC(FE) in its September cover memorandum to
WARRIOR.133
A Commonwealth role in the defense of Malaya
Because of British reticence about denuding its core defense forces in

favor of the Far East, the only potential sources of relief were Australia
and New Zealand. Cognizant of a 1951 recommendation by the
BDCC(FE) to establish a Commonwealth strategic reserve, the Chiefs
believed that elements of the Australian, British, and New Zealand con-
tingents in 1 Commonwealth Division could serve as a nucleus of a
theater reserve based in Malaya or Singapore.134 Indeed, anticipating
the armistice by a month, in June the Minister of Defense, Lord
Alexander, wrote Australian Prime Minister Menzies proposing the use
of Australian troops in a Commonwealth reserve.135
The primary obstacle to a standing Commonwealth theater reserve
was Australia and New Zealand’s presumed defense commitment
to the Middle East in war. But by 1952 Australian concern about events
in Southeast Asia had forced a reevaluation which thereafter provided
for the possibility of sending the Australian expeditionary force
to Southeast Asia rather than the Middle East.136 Harding told his
fellow Chiefs in September that ‘he was convinced that … so long as
Australia saw any threat to their security developing in the Far East,
they would never agree to their forces being sent overseas other than
to assist in the defence of Malaya’.137 In addition, the Chief of the
General Staff of the New Zealand Army had told Harding that, while
New Zealand still planned in war to deploy its forces to the Middle East,
if the Australians deployed to the Far East they would have to do so as
well.138
The Chiefs decided to seek Australian agreement to the strategic
reserve by holding talks with the Australian and New Zealand chiefs of
staff when they would all be in London for the coronation of Queen
Elizabeth II.139 Preliminary talks were held in September when the
Joint Planning Staff met with their antipodean counterparts. Their
talks set the agenda and agreed positions on the future of ANZAM
command arrangements, the priority of Malaya in both hot and cold
war, and the provision of a Commonwealth strategic reserve.140 Final

discussion and agreement on these issues occurred during Field
Marshal Harding’s visit to Melbourne in October 1953.141 Harding
accepted that, while the Middle East remained of vital importance in
global war, ‘in all conditions short of global war, the Far East and
South-East Asia are accorded greater importance than the Middle
East’.142 The British Chiefs therefore wished Australia to plan for the
deployment of their expeditionary force primarily to the Malayan
area.143 Harding also succeeded in obtaining Australian commitment to
a strategic reserve contingent on the future release of troops from post-
armistice duties in Korea.144
The Menzies government did not formally agree to participate in the
strategic reserve until a whole year after Harding’s visit.145 Malcolm
MacDonald told the Chiefs he believed the presence of Australian and
New Zealand troops in Malaya could be ‘by means of careful presenta-
tion … made acceptable to Malayan leaders as long as it was manifest that
the predominate position of the United Kingdom was in no way
affected’.146 The three ANZAM governments agreed after military plan-
ning talks in December and ministerial discussions in February 1955 that
New Zealand would shift its military commitment in war of one division
from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, Australia would send a corps of
three divisions to Malaya, and both countries would send staff officers to
join the JPS(FE) and JIC(FE) in Singapore.147 As a token of its new com-
mitment to Southeast Asia, an Australian infantry battalion, field
artillery battery, and engineer troop moved to Malaya in October 1955
as part of 28 Commonwealth Brigade, Australia’s first overseas military
deployment in peacetime.148
The heightened importance accorded to the Commonwealth defense
of Malaya by the Chiefs of Staff is evident from the record of November
1954 discussions between General Loewen and Lieutenant-General Sir
Sydney Rowell, Chief of the Australian General Staff. Loewen told Rowell
that FARELF was to receive two regiments of field artillery and one light
anti-aircraft regiment in the next 18 months, and that additional units
were to be raised in Malaya.149 If WARRIOR was implemented during Cold
War, the C-in-C said it was assumed that the British would fly the per-
sonnel of one division from the United Kingdom to Malaya were they
would marry up with prepositioned equipment then being built up for
that very purpose.150 Rowell confirmed that in global war Australia
would send a corps of three divisions to Malaya, the bulk of which
would be in place in time to meet any Chinese attack.151 In Cold War,
however, Australia was likely to provide only one brigade group in
addition to those forces it may already have serving in the Common-

wealth Strategic Reserve.152 Despite the fact that both Australian and
British intelligence now predicted that in a worst case, global war, sce-
nario the Chinese could deploy 200 000 troops against Malaya, Loewen
remained sanguine. Not only did he generally discount such a possibil-
ity (as did Rowell), but in either hot or cold war he was confident that
the United States would contribute air, ground, and naval forces to the
defense of Malaya.153 The British certainly expected New Zealand to
send forces, and Loewen even told Rowell he had reason to believe that
the Philippine government might contribute land forces to the defense
of Malaya, presumably under the terms of the Manila pact.154
In December 1954, Australian, New Zealand, and British planners met
in Singapore to develop both cold and hot war plans for an ANZAM
defense of Malaya up to the end of 1956. The ANZAM planners pro-
duced four studies on the topic, in each case generally confirming the
precepts of Plan WARRIOR and the understandings reached by Loewen
and Rowell in Melbourne the previous month. The only significant
change in the Cold War plan was the addition of one infantry brigade
in the initial assault force and admission that a temporary reduction in
internal security coverage would occur during the period between the
start of the operation and the arrival of the division from Britain.155
The global war scenario was somewhat dispiriting, as the planners dis-
covered that while the ANZAM powers could provide sufficient land
forces, they would not all arrive in time.156 Moreover, there were at the
time ‘large deficiencies in [military] equipment’, a shortage by two-
thirds of the required aircraft, and grave shortcomings in the number
of both major and minor naval vessels.157 Nevertheless, in war with
China only, the ANZAM powers would be able to meet the land, air,
and naval force requirements for the defense of Malaya.158
Conclusion
Plans IRONY, RINGLET, and WARRIOR are important not so much in that they
required the abandonment of Siamese allies and the invasion of Siam.
Rather, their significance lies in the fact that the British felt so strongly
about the need to defend Malaya that they considered redeploying forces
from Korea and Hong Kong in order to assure its survival. They also
accepted redirection of Australian and New Zealand defense efforts from
the Middle to the Far East in both cold and hot war, a major departure
from the 1947 strategy.159 In and of themselves, the plans constituted a
tacit admission of British limitations in the Far East as they bespoke the
fact that Allied efforts were not initially believed capable of containing
Communist aggression and subversion in Southeast Asia.
The constant back and forth with the Chiefs of Staff on the plans to
seize the Songkhla position absorbed a great deal of the BDCC(FE)’s time
and energy, and not without some complaint.160 But how serious was
the plan, and did anyone ever believe it would be necessary? It is hard to
say with any exactitude, as none of the principals responsible for the
plans is thought to be alive. Several military assistants to the C-in-C
FARELF claimed to have had no knowledge of the plan, and seemed
altogether unconcerned at the prospect of a Communist invasion from
Siam.161 Yet events in Indochina, especially the Viet Minh invasion of
Laos, clearly caused enough concern to prompt special Cabinet briefings
and establishment of a ministerial group to monitor events. Available
Chiefs of Staff, JPS, and BDCC(FE) records repeatedly stress the necessity
of acting swiftly and without reservation in the implementation of the
plan. There was to be no repeat of the shilly-shallying that foiled
Operation MATADOR in 1941. Another indication of intent includes exper-
iments to burn a huge swath of open ground all along the Siam–Malay
frontier with the intention of foiling the guerrilla infiltration expected
with the fall of Siam.162 One unequivocal sign was the discussion and
elaborate preparations for what currency to use in those areas of Siam to
be occupied by Commonwealth forces.163 Then there were the extensive
plans for the ‘denial’ of Borneo oil and other assets in the event of
a British withdrawal.164 Lastly, the durability of the plans must also
be considered. One senior officer who served in FARELF during its
final days revealed (unofficially, of course) that plans to seize the
Songkhla position were still valid in the early 1970s. However, visible
preparations for the defense of Malaya were kept to a minimum out of
concern for the effect such activity would have on the morale of the
population.165
The lack of forces to carry out either the global war (IRONY) or cold
war (RINGLET) plans made their success a dubious prospect. Until
changes in the Commonwealth strategy for the Middle East permitted
Australia and New Zealand to plan for a wartime role in Malaya, it is
clear that Britain was not willing to provide reinforcements of more
than one division from either the UK or Germany, and this only in cir-
cumstances of a war only with China. Yet it seems highly unlikely that in
a global war the British would have risked the defense of the core in order
to send one division to the Far East. Thus their fortuitous success at steer-
ing the obliging Australians and New Zealanders into a commitment to
send their expeditionary forces to Malaya in wartime provided the

British the strategic backup they required in the Far East without any
corresponding increase in their own theater force levels. Knowledge of
the ANZAM contingency plans and agreement to form a Common-
wealth strategic reserve in Malaya are proof that by the end of 1954 the
idea of Commonwealth defense was very much alive and that it helped
Britain concentrate on the defense of the core.
10
Limited Liability and the Defense
of Southeast Asia, 1950–54
Communist victory in China presented Indochina, Siam, and Burma

with threats from both Communist-backed guerrilla movements
and invasion by Chinese forces. To meet these threats, defense officials
in London and Singapore concurrently pursued two objectives
intended to deter Communist aggression or contain it if deterrence
failed. The first objective was to provide either unilaterally or in con-
junction with the United States all possible material and training assis-
tance to Malaya’s buffer states in order to bolster their ability to resist.
The second, in keeping with British efforts to develop regional
economic and defense cooperation, was to pursue regional defense
planning as a means to commit the United States to the defense of
Southeast Asia. The British achieved these objectives by the end
of 1954. Although the Communists gained control of Tonkin after the
Geneva Conference, the role of Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam, Siam,
and Burma as buffers was thereafter theoretically guaranteed by the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty underwritten by the United
States.
Success was gained at very little cost to Britain. With the exception of
some minor material assistance, British efforts were largely confined to
non-committal military planning discussions with France, the US,
Australia, and New Zealand. Thus, despite the admitted strategic impor-
tance of Tonkin to the defense of Southeast Asia, the British actually
contributed little of substance to any of the frontline states. There
appears to have been an implicit, though clear, policy of limiting
military liability in the Far East. While the British would continue to
fulfill their obligations to Malaya, they would do little for Hong Kong,
and, apparently, even less for Indochina.
203
The importance of French Indochina

to British Southeast Asia
Japan had launched its invasion of Malaya by first occupying Tonkin,

then Annam, Cochinchina, and Cambodia, before finally landing troops
in Siam and Malaya on 8 December 1941. This experience convinced the
British that Tonkin was the key to Southeast Asia not only because it pre-
sented the easiest route from China into Siam and southern Indochina,
but also because its airfields and the important port of Haiphong facili-
tated air and sea control of the region. Both London and Singapore were
therefore concerned by French failure to reach an accord with Ho Chi
Minh’s Communist-backed Viet Minh, and the subsequent outbreak of
serious fighting between the two parties.1
The British position with respect to the war in Indochina required ‘the
establishment of a stable and friendly anti-Communist Government
which will enable the French to reduce their fighting forces, thus
making them available for employment in the European theatre’.2 The
British believed that a solution to the war depended on political rather
than military means, and that French attempts to promote an alternate
national regime under the former Annamite emperor and Japanese
collaborator, Bao Dai, offered the ‘best prospects for the reestablish-
ment of stable conditions’.3 But they were fully aware that French
delays in ratifying the March 1949 Elysée Agreement on Vietnamese
autonomy and insistence on sovereignty-debilitating caveats not only
diminished the appeal of the Bao Dai government to Vietnamese
nationalists, but also to other Asian nations such as India.4 Since any
future regional defense pact would need to include non-Communist
Asian states, the British believed it was essential that the French erase
the political stigma imposed on Vietnam by reaching agreement with
‘Nationalist dissident factions’.5
British anxiety over the situation in Tonkin grew in tandem with the
increasing likelihood of a complete Communist victory in China. As
early as the beginning of 1949, Chinese bands from Yunnan had
assisted Viet Minh attacks in northern Tonkin,6 prompting the British
to assume that Communist control of the Sino-Tonkin border would
lead to increased Chinese aid to Communist insurgencies in Vietnam,
Siam, and Burma.7 The result of such direct support could only
increase the difficulties of obtaining satisfactory political settlements in
these important frontline states.8
As discussed in Chapter 6, the British response to the threat from
Communist China was to pursue a strategy of coordinated diplomatic,
The Defense of Southeast Asia, 1950–54 205
economic, and military steps among India, Burma, Siam, French

Indochina, and the Netherlands East Indies ‘to form a firm containing
ring against further Communist penetration’.9 MacDonald admitted that
a NATO-like defense pact for Southeast Asia was politically ‘impossible’
given the unpopularity of French and Dutch colonial policies, but he
nonetheless thought that French acceptance of Vietnamese independ-
ence in the Elysée Agreement, though flawed, merited closer military
ties with the French in Indochina.10 The Chiefs opposed joint planning
with the French or any other Southeast Asian countries on security
grounds, but they did think it desirable to improve general military
liaison with the French, and so authorized General Ritchie to establish
a program of officer exchanges and visits.11
Following informal staff talks in Saigon, the Cabinet’s South East Asia
Committee decided to review the situation in Indochina in light of
recent intelligence estimates.12 It was apparent that the French military
were fully taxed in Indochina and though they could hold their present
position, there was little likelihood of a decisive military result. Both the
London and Singapore JICs agreed that the Chinese were unlikely to
invade Indochina in the next 18 months, but in the meantime they
would continue to give the Viet Minh both material and moral support.
The British concluded that ‘unless outside assistance is forthcoming,
the French may feel obliged to withdraw’.13 The Chiefs conceded that
because British forces were already fully committed in the Far East on
both land and in the air, they could only hope to boost French morale
by agreeing to a French proposal for formal staff talks. Little was
accomplished at the first staff talks held in Singapore in early July
1950, although they were useful in the sense that the British obtained
a better understanding of French requirements and concerns and laid
the foundation for regular meetings in Saigon and Singapore.14
American aid for Indochina
By August 1950 the United States had undertaken to provide a massive

aid package to French Union forces in Indochina. The aid was offered
in part because the US had by early 1950 accorded greater strategic
significance to Southeast Asia than had hitherto been the case and
because the French had implied that without such aid they might well
abandon Indochina altogether.15 The British welcomed the American
aid to Indochina, as their own production shortages limited what they
could provide to mostly ‘unwanted equipment within certain mone-
tary value limits’.16 Thus when the BDCC(FE) met with the American
Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) Mission in early August,

MacDonald and Harding did their best to persuade the Americans that
Indochina was ‘the highway to the rest of Asia’, and that it should be
given priority over Burma and other Southeast Asian countries.17 They
also conveyed their belief that the Chinese were assisting the Viet
Minh in their preparations for a major campaign in the Sino-Tonkin
border area once the dry season began in late autumn.18 If Southeast
Asia was to be held against the Communists, MacDonald told his
American guests it would depend on the assistance that the US and UK
can give to Bao Dai and the French by the latter part of 1950.19 All
agreed that French equipment – an amalgam of British, American,
German, and French weapons – was ‘not good’ and that new supplies
would be of immense help.20
Clearly, the Americans would have to, and did, provide the bulk of
the needed military assistance as the British could offer little more than
ammunition and spare parts.21 But both sides confided to the other that
the Indochina problem resulted from more than just a lack of material
resources. Besides the fact that most French forces were tied to static
garrisons, the British believed the main obstacle to a satisfactory solu-
tion in Indochina continued to be France’s failings on the political front
vis-à-vis Vietnamese desires for real independence.22 As for assistance in
the event of a possible Chinese invasion, Harding told the Americans
what he told his French counterpart, General Carpentier: ‘“Joint Plans”
was the only answer’ and that the ‘most urgent requirement was joint
staff talks with the Americans and the French’.23
Thinking about collective security
In September 1950, the French position in Tonkin deteriorated markedly

when Chinese commanded, advised, trained, and equipped Viet Minh
forces began their anticipated border campaign. By overrunning the
Foreign Legion garrison at Don Khe and decimating 4000 relieving
troops, the Viet Minh gained control of a ‘huge slice of territory’ along
the Chinese border.24 Carpentier traveled to Singapore at the end of the
month to meet the CIC(FE) and describe how Chinese support of
the Viet Minh had completely upset French strategy in Indochina, where
nearly half the French Army was now stationed.25 The British Com-
manders were concerned and sympathetic, although they candidly told
Carpentier that the solution lay in French hands:
[To] improve the military situation political action is essential in

order to extend the effective administration of the Vietnam [that is,
Bao Dai] Government. This would form the foundation not only for
the proper development of … local forces, but also, in the wider
field, for the establishment of a regional organisation for defence
against Communist aggression in the area as a whole.26
Both parties agreed that a regional organization for the coordination of

defense plans was essential to prepare for any Chinese aggression, but
that France needed to make political changes before such planning
could begin.27
Three days after Carpentier left Singapore, the BDCC(FE) cabled a
new appreciation of the Indochina situation to the Chiefs of Staff. Its
telegram emphasized the necessity of establishing a regional defense
organization as a foundation against the possibility of Chinese aggres-
sion.28 While there was ‘no imminent danger of an all-out Viet Minh
offensive’, the BDCC(FE) reckoned that increasing infiltration into
Indochina from China of military equipment and trained personnel
eventually ‘would be comparable to the outbreak [of Communist
aggression] in Korea last June’.29 Asian suspicions about French inten-
tions remained the main obstacle to collective action, however, and
Paris seemed unwilling or unable to make the necessary political
changes that would allow non-Communist nationalists to rally to the
new government. Consequently, the BDCC(FE) argued that ‘perhaps
only the United States and ourselves … can convince [the French] of
the vital importance of losing no more time in the transfer of effective
power’ to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. For maximum effect, the
committee suggested the British and Americans encourage the French
to transfer power in concert with the Associated States’ participation in
September meetings on the Colombo Plan and the conference in Pau,
France on federal arrangements in Indochina.
The BDCC(FE) explained that if the French transferred power to the
Associated States, then they can ‘only reasonably be expected to con-
tinue to expend French lives and money in the defence of Indo-China
if assured of international support in a common task of checking the
further advance of Communism’.30 As for the Viet Minh, the BDCC(FE)
believed they had to be ‘decisively defeated in battle before a final set-
tlement can be reached’ and that ‘collective military assistance within
the framework of the United Nations Charter may ultimately be the
only way of solving the military problem’. The committee urged HMG
to take action immediately ‘to ensure that the effects of collective
action in Korea are not thrown away by failure to meet, with equally
determined concerted action, the even more vital danger which now
seems to be developing in Indo-China’.31
Prompted by the urgency of the BDCC(FE)’s telegrams and a personal

appeal by MacDonald,32 the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office agreed
to support French demands for tripartite staff talks at a meeting of the
foreign ministers of the three countries in New York in September 1950.33
Now fully engaged in Asia as a result of the Korean War, American diplo-
mats agreed to the necessity for talks on joint action in the event of
Chinese intervention in Indochina.34
In preparation for the tripartite talks, the Chiefs ordered the
BDCC(FE) and the JPS to draft a set of briefs for the talks, including
one on UK policy in the event of Communist uprisings in Burma and
Siam, and another on the possibility of increasing material aid to
Indochina, Burma, and Siam.35 Judging by the tenor of the studies, it
seems clear that the British admitted to themselves that they neither
could nor would do much in the event of a Chinese invasion. At the
time, the British Army was only just beginning to build its new Cold
War strategic reserve in the UK, and the government gave no thought
to mobilizing reserve divisions or removing forces from BAOR. British
forces in Korea and Hong Kong were already at their ‘irreducible mini-
mum’ and all those in Malaya were engaged in counter-guerrilla opera-
tions.36 FARELF could provide only two infantry battalions as a token
force for operations in Siam if its government was on the verge of col-
lapse, but then only if the French remained in control of Indochina.37
As for Burma, the JPS were against the deployment of any Western
ground forces there ‘under any circumstances we can envisage’.38
Instead, only naval and minimal air support would be given.39
Given these limitations, the JPS concluded that the only feasible
approach was a preventive one in which the governments of Siam and
Burma were bolstered through the provision of military missions, advice,
and arms supplies.40 But, as the JPS stressed in another brief, increasing
the supply of weapons and equipment from the UK could only be at
the expense of British requirements for the rearmament program.41
Besides, the French and Siamese had turned down most of what little
the British could offer them out of preference for less expensive and
more plentiful American equipment.42 Any future French requests for
aircraft or the loan of an aircraft carrier would have to be rejected as it
would affect the build-up of British forces in Western Europe. The
Chiefs agreed to give high priority to any requests for army equipment
they might be able to meet, but there was no escaping the fact that the
UK was not in a position ‘to make any appreciable contribution
towards aid to Indo-China at the present time.’43 In Burma the story
was somewhat different, for there HMG had a treaty obligation to serve
as the principal arms and equipment supplier.44 All in all, though,

there was little the British could do to contribute to the defense of
Indochina, which they admitted was the key to the defense of their
own position in Malaya.
Tripartite talks
The Tripartite Talks on Southeast Asia were held in Singapore 15–18

May 1951, more than a year after the initial French request and eight
months after ministerial delegates agreed to them in New York. The
British delegation was headed by Harding, that of France by General
Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, and that of the United States by Vice
Admiral Arthur Struble, Commander of the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet.
The conferees readily agreed that ‘Tonkin is the corner-stone in the
defence of South-East Asia’ and that under de Lattre’s invigorating
leadership the French would be able to dominate the Viet Minh.45
In the event of an actual Chinese invasion of Indochina, however, de
Lattre estimated he would need four additional divisions backed by
appropriate scales of anti-aircraft artillery and air support from fighter
and bomber squadrons.46 If instead the Chinese invaded Burma,
Harding estimated that two divisions with artillery and armor support
would be needed to back Burmese resistance.47 As foreshadowed in the
JPS briefs, Harding revealed that Britain could not supply anything more
than a token force for use in Siam or Burma. Admiral Struble explained
that the US would accelerate aid to threatened countries, but it was ‘not
contemplating’ sending any troops to any of the frontline states.48 The
source of Allied reinforcements was not addressed as it was a political
and strategic question not in the purview of the conference,49 but it is
clear that without substantial military assistance from countries other
than those represented at the conference, the Allies expected Southeast
Asia to fall to a full-scale Chinese invasion.
After the conference, the JPS undertook a lengthy and detailed exam-
ination of the conference proceedings. It endorsed the BDCC(FE) sug-
gestion that to achieve unity of purpose in Southeast Asia ‘constant
political and military consultations should continue between the
United Kingdom, the United States and France’.50 While they agreed
with the Chiefs that the time was not ripe for a Southeast Asian
defense pact à la NATO, the Planners cited the recently revised report
on Defence Policy and Global Strategy to persuade the Chiefs that it
was of the ‘utmost importance to secure unity, not only of policy and
purpose but of method between the Allies in [Southeast Asia], and that
some machinery should be set up for this purpose’.51 The JPS also con-
sidered the suggestion made by de Lattre that the Allies form a theater
strategic reserve for use in Southeast Asia. The Planners backed the
BDCC(FE)’s idea of earmarking a few theater forces as the British nucleus
of an Allied strategic reserve in the Far East. But because the Chiefs
would allow only those forces in Korea to be considered for the strategic
reserve, the JPS considered it would be impossible for some time to
establish the Allied reserve.52 If at the time of a Chinese invasion prevail-
ing circumstances permitted it, the JPS thought 16 Parachute Brigade
from the UK strategic reserve could be sent to fight as infantry, ‘although
a period of preparation would be required to make it battleworthy’.53 The
main portion of the new strategic reserve, 3 Infantry Division, could not
arrive in time to help.54 The defense of Indochina was important
enough, though, that the JPS believed the Chiefs should consider, if
global war was not imminent, redeploying forces from Korea even if no
political settlement there had yet been obtained.55 The JPS concluded its
report by recommending that the three countries’ chiefs of staff should
meet to develop a tripartite military policy for Southeast Asia that could
be submitted to their respective governments.56
The Chiefs of Staff approved the JPS report at a meeting on 29 August.
Chief of the Air Staff Slessor said he thought that ‘some kind of machin-
ery which would enable us to achieve a common purpose and ensure a
community of method’ in Southeast Asia was desirable, though he had
no illusions about the political difficulties engendered by each country
having a different policy towards China and the Far East.57 He approved
of using the results of the Singapore talks as the basis for formulating a
combined strategy of the three countries. The rest of the committee
agreed and recommended to the Defence Committee that a meeting of
the combined British, French, and American chiefs of staff be proposed
at the upcoming NATO discussions in Rome.58 They also recom-
mended that part of 1 Commonwealth Division be retained after an
armistice in Korea in order to serve as part of the proposed strategic
reserve.59
Five days after the Churchill government assumed office in October
1951, the British Embassy in Washington presented the US with an
aide-mémoire proposing the tripartite chiefs of staff meeting.60 The
British wished to discuss the results of the Singapore conference and to
formulate policy and make recommendations to the respective govern-
ments on the relationship of global strategy to Chinese aggression in
Southeast Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to the talks
because they feared the British and French desired to form an Allied
command for Southeast Asia that would somehow then lead to the for-
mation of a ‘global combined chiefs of staff system’ that would limit
American freedom of action in war.61 High-level British and French
pressure on the Americans throughout November and December for
the military talks coincided with a massive Chinese build-up on the
Tonkin border, a growing call by the French public for withdrawal, and
de Lattre’s return to France as a mortally ill man.62 On 28 December,
the JCS relented and invited French and British delegations to
Washington in January to discuss the Singapore recommendations and
the general situation in Southeast Asia.63
The JPS brief for the British delegation concluded that ‘the main
object of the Tripartite discussions… should be to reach agreement on
the provision of a strategic reserve for South-East Asia’.64 The Chiefs
agreed that a theater strategic reserve was needed to back up any warn-
ing that may be delivered to China about aggression in Southeast
Asia.65 The JPS identified Allied forces currently serving in Korea and
the two and one-half US divisions in Japan as the principal source for a
reserve.66 These could be released if Japanese and Nationalist Chinese
forces relieved them, although the actual use of KMT troops in Korea
would be fraught with political difficulties and might actually provoke
a greater Communist response.67 With the exception of her two
brigade groups in Korea, Britain herself would only provide the
Commando Brigade and two infantry battalions from Malaya, and
even this small contribution would dangerously weaken the counter-
guerrilla campaign and eviscerate the emergency reinforcement plan
for Hong Kong.68
In discussing the brief, Slessor asserted that strategic priority had
now to be given to Indochina, even if it meant the loss of Hong
Kong.69 Furthermore, he thought it an acceptable risk for the next two
years to rely on the US atomic arsenal to deter a Russian attack in the
West while NATO forces in Europe redeployed to the Far East to destroy
Communist guerrillas in Indochina once and for all.70 He argued that
this would bring stability to Southeast Asia, and a long term benefit
would ultimately accrue to NATO as it would remove the ‘cause of the
continuous dissipation of British and French [forces] to South East
Asia’.71 Slim and the rest of the committee concurred with this extraor-
dinary proposal, but it is clear, though not explicitly stated, that the
Chiefs were thinking about French – not British – NATO troops rede-
ploying to the Far East. If any British troops did go to either Indochina
or Siam, they would be drawn from those units currently serving
in Korea.
The effects of a possible French withdrawal in 1952
Neither the Washington conference nor subsequent tripartite or five

power (i.e. including Australia and New Zealand) talks accomplished
anything substantive. Military options in response to possible Chinese
aggression were discussed and evaluated, and requirements for troops
and supplies drawn up. Yet no one – least of all the British – were willing
to commit in advance to supplying any troops to fight the Chinese.
Besides British reluctance to be sucked into a new commitment, the
main hindrance to an agreed course of action remained American
insistence on the ability to expand operations to include all of China.
The British and French, with established positions in the Far East,
simply did not wish to unnecessarily widen the conflict beyond the
area of aggression or to risk sparking World War III.
Events in Indochina served to underscore the Allies’ political disarray.
When at the end of February the Viet Minh forced the large French and
Muong garrison at Hoa Binh to withdraw under pressure to the defensive
line around Hanoi, it sparked speculation that the French might be con-
templating a complete withdrawal.72 The Chiefs of Staff were sufficiently
concerned by intelligence reports of French contacts with the Viet
Minh, Russians, and Chinese on a negotiated settlement that they
directed the JPS to examine the effects on British strategy in Southeast
Asia in the event of a French pull-out from either Tonkin or the whole of
Indochina.73 The report contended that even a withdrawal limited only
to Tonkin would eventually produce the same result as a complete with-
drawal: Communist control of Indochina.74 By using only ‘cold war
methods’ of political infiltration and subversion, China could also direct
additional pressure on Burma and Siam. The British could do nothing to
save either of these countries, although the US might be able to help the
latter if it provided extensive land and air forces. Moreover, the JPS
expected that once Siam was directly bordered by a Communist-domi-
nated country it ‘might well … compound with the Communists as she
did with Japan in the last war’. With Siam in league with the
Communists, the British could expect Malaya’s rice imports to be cut-off
while supplies of arms and ammunition to the Chinese Communist
guerrillas in Malaya to grow. The British would then have to deal with
increased internal unrest as the economy quickly became paralyzed and
the majority of the Chinese population became disaffected. According to
the JPS, this would leave Britain no alternative but to occupy the
Songkhla position in Southern Siam in order to prevent Communist
infiltration into Malaya or to defend it against attack.75
In what was probably Churchill’s last Defence Committee meeting as

Minister of Defence, the veteran Prime Minister opined that ‘there
were solid reasons why the French should withdraw from Indo-China
and he personally believed that they would’.76 Such a move would per-
mit the return of regular French forces to Europe and thereby increase
substantially the capability of Western European defense. He was also
far more sanguine about the effect of Indochina’s fall on Malaya, saying
‘it was questionable how far the resources of the bandits would allow
large increases of effort’.77 Furthermore, the ‘direct threat of a Chinese
Communist attack upon Malaya could only develop later, perhaps after
two years, and might never develop at all’.78
The French position in Indochina again deteriorated in October 1952
when several Viet Minh divisions assaulted isolated French garrisons in
the border region with Laos – the so-called ‘Thai country’ – and forced
their evacuation.79 In an attempt to draw off these attacks and force a
battle, the French commander, General Raoul Salan ordered the occu-
pation of Phu Doan, an important Viet Minh supply dump astride one
of the insurgents’ main supply routes. Initially a success, Operation
LORRAINE over-extended the French who, after repeated Viet Minh
ambushes of their supply columns and guerrilla attacks in the Red
River Delta, were forced in mid-November to make a fighting with-
drawal with heavy losses.80 The French managed to retain the Laotian
border outposts at Na San and Lai Chau, but they were under constant
attack. British intelligence estimated that ‘the problem of supplying
them by air, with strips under artillery fire, can be expected to become
acute, particularly when the weather deteriorates’.81 The same report
observed that if the posts fell ‘there is no military reason why the French
should not continue to hold the Delta, but repercussions on morale,
both in Indo-China and in France, would be serious’.82 Based upon their
brief for the Washington talks, the Chiefs believed the only military
solution to winning the Cold War in Indochina was for the French to
send three more divisions to the Far East and crush the Viet Minh once
and for all.83 British Colonial and Foreign Office officials meeting in
Singapore concurred with the urgent need for French reinforcements in
Indochina in order to return the military initiative to the French
Union side; otherwise French plans for gradually turning the war over
to the Vietnamese National Army would fail.84 In a cable to the Chiefs,
the BDCC(FE) reiterated the ‘vital’ need for French reinforcements of
three divisions to arrive no later than September 1953, although the
committee knew that Eden had previously thought such a move politi-
cally ‘impracticable’.85 It seems the main difficulty with Britain
formally proposing the redeployment of French divisions from Europe

to the Far East was not so much the potential objections of the French or
Americans, but the expected demand that Britain help fill the gap by
joining the European Defense Community (EDC) and sending additional
forces of her own to Europe.86
In response to the increased threat to Siam and Cambodia posed by
the Viet Minh invasion of Laos in the spring of 1953, the BDCC(FE) rec-
ommended that the French be prompted to accelerate the arrival of
General Salan’s relief, General Henri Navarre, and that reinforcements of
three divisions be sent as a matter of urgency.87 The British minister in
Saigon did not think reinforcements would make much of a difference,
however, as he believed the French forces already had ‘everything in the
way of equipment and men that was needed to overcome the Viet
Minh threat’.88 What was lacking was leadership and an offensive
spirit. Field Marshal Harding thoroughly agreed, and said the French
‘had all along adopted a defeatist attitude’, but if Britain exerted any
further political pressure on France along these lines, he suspected the
French would simply pull-out of Indochina altogether.89 For this rea-
son the best the Chiefs and the Defence Committee could do was to
advise the BDCC(FE) to ensure that the plans to seize the Songkhla
position were up to date.90
Five Power Staff Agency (FPSA)
In June 1953, military representatives from Britain, France, and the

United States were joined by officers from Australia and New Zealand
in a meeting of the FPSA, an ad hoc organization spawned from tripar-
tite and five power meetings held in 1952 to discuss military courses of
action in the event of Chinese aggression. The recommendations from
this meeting were notable because they revealed the great extent to
which the Americans had agreed to assume responsibility for an Allied
military response to Chinese aggression against Indochina or Hong
Kong. The planners called for the designation of an American com-
mander for each major contingency, since they expected the US Air
Force and Navy would provide the bulk of the reinforcements.91 This
consensus pleased the British, for through the course of the various tri-
partite and five power talks they had managed to satisfy their objective
of increased American responsibility for the defense of Southeast Asia.
Furthermore, the prospects for a regional defense organization had
improved, with Admiral Radford telling Keightley that FPSA would in
‘due course … assume responsibility for all military planning in the
area’ and that ANZUS would gradually be limited to the political field.92
What had not been solved was the problem of what to do in the event
of further Communist – vice Chinese – aggression in the area.
There was good news with respect to Malaya, too, as the FPSA plan-
ners ‘selected virtually the same position for defence as that previously
chosen by the Chiefs of Staff,’ that is, the Songkhla position on the Kra
Isthmus93 The Staff planners’ force requirements were all larger than
those in British plans, but by their recommendation of the appoint-
ment of an American commander for US forces in support of Malaya, it
is clear the Americans would provide the additional air and naval
forces.94 As for ground forces, the planners considered that the
Commonwealth countries between them could provide the troops nec-
essary to defend Malaya.
FPSA considered Burma a strategic write-off, for ‘even if Burma were
attacked in isolation its defence would not be feasible unless army rein-
forcements were deployed before the aggression took place’.95 This was
unlikely given Burma’s political instability and non-alignment policy.
All the agency planners could offer was the prospect of denying the
invaders ‘some of the benefits of their aggression’ by using special
forces to conduct destruction and denial operations and by air interdic-
tion of the attacking forces.96
Dien Bien Phu and the American call for ‘united action’
Under intense pressure from the Americans, the French had been
forced to submit a three-phased plan for defeating the Viet Minh in
1955 by a rapid expansion of the Vietnamese National Army.97 Both
the Americans and British were skeptical about what was known as the
Letourneau Plan (after the French Minister for Indochina). The BDCC(FE)
estimated that 7000 French officers and NCOs would be needed to
bring the Vietnamese forces up to strength and to facilitate the raising
of new units.98 Expecting a massive Viet Minh offensive in October,
the BDCC(FE) told the Chiefs that time did not permit a slow build-up
of the Vietnamese forces.99 The committee still thought the only
practical solution was for the deployment of three complete French
divisions, rather than denuding existing units of officers and NCOs.100
The French commander in Saigon, General Navarre, apparently felt the
same way. His plan was to launch a dry-season offensive which would
require a large mobile striking force. This he intended to create
by regrouping forces evacuated from some of the larger outlying posts
and by requesting reinforcements from the French government on the
order of two divisions.101 However, political developments in France

and the signing of the Korean armistice had made a ‘longing in France
for a similar settlement in Indochina almost uncontrollable’.102
Navarre only succeeded in obtaining half the number of forces he
requested.103
Shortly after Harding’s visit to Melbourne in October 1953, military
and political moves occurred which proved to be the denouement of
the First Indochina War. In Paris the new government of Joseph Laniel
was contemplating bilateral negotiations or an international confer-
ence to bring the war to an end, a sentiment strengthened by Ho Chi
Minh’s comments in a Swedish newspaper that he was willing to nego-
tiate given certain conditions.104 In Indochina itself, the anticipated
Viet Minh offensive was gathering strength, while in November
General Navarre ordered the capture of Dien Bien Phu. He hoped that
by seizing this small village near the Laotian border he would stunt the
Viet Minh thrust into Laos, cut its supply lines, and, hopefully, force a
battle in which French artillery and air support would destroy the bulk
of the Viet Minh’s main force. In September, December and January,
the American Secretary of State, John Dulles, issued public statements
which clearly implied US military action would be taken against China
if it invaded Indochina.105 Finally, at the end of the foreign ministers’
talks in Berlin in February 1954, Russia, Britain, France, and the United
States agreed to convene with Communist China a conference in
Geneva on a final political settlement for the wars in Korea and
Indochina.106
Before the start of the conference on 26 April, the military situation in
Tonkin changed dramatically. The Viet Minh again attacked into Laos
and redirected forces earmarked for an assault on the Red River Delta to
the French blocking position at Dien Bien Phu. The siege force gathered
strength throughout the early winter and by January 1954 the Viet Minh
had deployed three divisions together with artillery and anti-aircraft
units. By the end of January the French garrison of 13 battalions was
completely surrounded and the airfield through which came all supplies
and reinforcements was under sporadic artillery and mortar fire.107
Both General Sir Charles Loewen, Keightley’s replacement as the
C-in-C FARELF, and Malcolm MacDonald visited the French position on
separate occasions just before the first Viet Minh assault on 11 March.108
Both Britons were impressed by the strength of the French position and
the quality of its soldiers, but Loewen was disturbed by its reliance on air
supply and on the assumption that the Viet Minh would disengage once
the rains began.109 He perceived that a French success at Dien Bien Phu
could only be a defensive victory ‘which could not be followed up with

positive results’.110 Its loss, on the other hand, ‘would be a major disas-
ter of serious and widespread consequences’.111
In London, the Chiefs of Staff had the same sense of foreboding.
Harding told his colleagues at the end of March that the outcome of the
battle for Dien Bien Phu ‘would have a bearing on the political and mil-
itary situation out of all proportion to the size of the forces engaged’.112
The Chiefs still held the position that only massive French reinforce-
ments could stave off defeat and turn the tide against the Viet Minh,
but they realized that time had run out for the French. They understood
that even if France was to change its policy on reinforcements, they
could not arrive in time. Harding confided to his colleagues that the UK
‘might therefore be forced to accept that sooner or later a change would
have to be made to … present policy which might involve the accept-
ance of the loss to Communist control of some part of Indo-China’.113
Even though he considered partition as a ‘serious strategic defeat’,
Harding nonetheless considered it ‘better than losing the whole of
Indo-China, which would probably result from agreement to a [Viet
Minh-Vietnam government] coalition’.114 General Loewen’s views
matched those of Harding’s: partition would be bad, but was preferable
to a coalition, which he thought ‘too bad to contemplate’.115
Not resigned to a French defeat, on 29 March, Secretary of State
Dulles extended earlier warnings to China about invasion of Indochina
to also cover increased aid to the Viet Minh. Dulles stated that the
United States would not passively accept the Communist conquest of
Indochina and called for ‘united action’ to forestall it.116 On 4 April, the
same day the French appealed to the United States for intervention in
Indochina, President Eisenhower divulged to Churchill that the US
intended to form an ad hoc coalition of the Five Powers, the Philippines,
and Siam to check Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Eisenhower
claimed the coalition would ‘not be directed against Communist China’,
but if its action engendered a Chinese attack on Hong Kong, he assured
Churchill that ‘we would expect to be with you there’.117 The Cabinet
welcomed the proposal to form a regional defense organization, but
based upon the assumption that Dien Bien Phu would hold up through
the beginning of the rainy season, Eden argued against proceeding for-
mally and openly toward a pact before the conclusion of the Geneva
Conference. He believed to do otherwise would prejudice Indian and
other Asian opinion against a future defense pact.118
Although supportive of collective defense, the Chiefs of Staff were
against threatening China unless ‘we were prepared to implement that
threat’.119 Echoing Eden’s view that it was foolish to warn China to desist
ongoing activity – as different from a warning about future activities –
the Chiefs concluded that to force China to cease its support to the
Viet Minh would require use of atomic weapons on China with all the
attendant risks of sparking global war.120 As for action in Indochina
itself, the British simply did not have the theater resources to make any-
thing other than a token contribution. The Gurkha division was still
bogged down in counterinsurgency operations in Malaya, the UK strate-
gic reserve remained in the Suez Canal Zone, and BAOR was off limits.
Anticipating the French request for intervention, the Eisenhower
administration had already decided that US military action might be
necessary to save the situation in Indochina. This had been the cause of
Eisenhower’s letter to Churchill. But in an exploratory meeting on the
subject with Congressional leaders on 3 April, key Congressmen made it
clear to Dulles and Radford that they did not approve of unilateral
intervention and that the participation of Britain in particular would be
necessary to gain their sanction for united action.121
The US request for British intervention
Eden learned of General Navarre’s appeal for immediate US assistance

to save Dien Bien Phu when he met Dulles in late April. Dulles and
Admiral Radford, now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Eden
that unless the Allies provided air support to Dien Bien Phu, the
French position in Indochina was likely to collapse altogether. Radford
specifically asked that RAF units from either Malaya or Hong Kong be
sent immediately.122 Eden steadfastly opposed military intervention
and by so doing denied Dulles and Radford the prerequisite British
support needed for Congressional sanction of US intervention.
Subsequent tripartite discussions convinced Eden that the Americans
intended to internationalize the struggle by leading a multinational effort
in Indochina.123 Neither Churchill nor Eden accepted the American
notion that any meaningful intervention in Indochina could be
effected without deploying large numbers of ground troops, which in
any case the British simply did not have in the theater.124 After private
discussions with Churchill, Eden presented the situation to the Cabinet,
which endorsed the Foreign Secretary’s directive that Britain was ‘not
prepared to give any undertaking now, in advance of the Geneva
Conference, concerning United Kingdom military action in Indo-
China’.125 Britain would, however, join in guaranteeing any agreement
which did result from the conference and in the establishment of a
Southeast Asia collective defense pact. Only if the parties did not reach
a settlement at Geneva would the British government consider allied
action.126
Radford tried forlornly to persuade the Chiefs of Staff to support inter-
vention when they met on 26 April, the day the Geneva Conference
began. Harding’s explanation to Radford of the Chiefs’ position was a
clear reflection of his own, Loewen’s, and the BDCC(FE)’s appreciation of
the situation. The real problem, the CIGS offered, was the vital need for
the French to set up an efficient civil administration in which the
Vietnamese people could have confidence.127 Unfortunately, the Viet
Minh controlled most of the countryside and had established a well-
organized political infrastructure in areas under its control. The only
counter-strategy would be to expand outward from the limited area
under French control, a move that ‘would be a tremendous task calling
for immense resources’, especially since the Vietnamese seemed politi-
cally apathetic.128 Allied air action might delay the disintegration of
the French and Vietnamese forces, but it could not prevent it. Only an
‘all out Allied intervention’ could do this, but that would risk war with
China. Radford agreed with most of Harding’s assessment, admitting
that intervention would involve not only air support but also the build
up of substantial land forces. Yet he did not foresee either British or
American ground troops being deployed in Indochina; rather, ‘the
majority of the land forces would come from the Asian countries,
including Siam and the Philippines, who had plenty of manpower’.129
Neither did he see any great risk of Chinese intervention, which he
thought not in China’s interest and for which it seemed not to be
building-up the air forces required to do so.130
Radford also tried to assuage British fears about Hong Kong by telling
the Chiefs that if intervention in Indochina increased the risk to the
colony, that the President and JCS had agreed that the US ‘would sup-
port the United Kingdom in this connection’. Having tried the carrot,
Radford then applied the stick by warning the British of the dire conse-
quences for Malaya of a French loss in Indochina. But on this matter the
British appeared contented that they could defend Malaya, which struck
Radford as an extremely parochial position. He thought they were obliv-
ious to the effect the loss of rice would have on the non-Communist
nations of Asia, particularly Japan.131 Harding later commented that
the main difference of opinion between the Chiefs of Staff and the JCS
was over Malaya; the British thought it could be defended if Indochina
fell, whereas the Americans thought it would fall.132 Clearly, the British
had great faith in the plan to seize the Songkhla position, which the
Americans did not yet know about.133 The British position revealed not
only their reticence in provoking war with China, but also in their
refusal to send any more troops to the Far East.134
Although it should have been clear to Radford from his meeting with
the Chiefs that Britain would not intervene in Indochina, Radford
attempted to persuade Churchill. He found the Prime Minister ‘in exact
accord’ with the Chiefs of Staff even though he was fully alive to the pos-
sible consequences a French loss in Indochina would have on NATO, the
EDC, the French government, and France’s position in North Africa.135
Nevertheless, Radford assessed that Churchill was ‘presently unprepared
to participate in collective action on any matter involving commitments
of British resources or incurring any risks unless some British territory is
under imminent threat’.136 The Prime Minister was especially concerned
that war with China would cause that country to invoke the Sino-Russian
pact, which ‘might mean an assault by Hydrogen bombs’ on Britain since
it was in East Anglia that American nuclear-armed bombers were
based.137 Instead of immediate action, Churchill instead preferred to
await the outcome of the Geneva Conference and possible direct talks
with Russia and the United States.138
Eden met with the American delegate to the Geneva Conference on
the eve of the first plenary session on Indochina and the fall of Dien
Bien Phu. The two agreed to recommend to their governments that FPSA
convene to work out contingency plans to cover the outcome of the
conference, whether favorable or unfavorable.139 The concerned govern-
ments agreed to send their military representatives to Washington for a
meeting in the first week of June to undertake planning studies on pos-
sible courses of action to enable to resist further Communist aggression
or infiltration in South East Asia.140 Field Marshal Harding led the
British delegation to the conference and was accompanied by the
FARELF chief of staff.141
The eight-day conference occurred against a backdrop of a temporary
stalemate in Geneva and covered a variety of scenarios and recom-
mended courses of action. The conferees studied action in the event of
war with China, caused either by outright aggression or by interven-
tion to stop the destruction of the Viet Minh in the Delta. In either
instance, they did not think the Allies would have sufficient forces to
hold a Chinese advance and consequently recommended that they
make a line of recovery in southern Indochina, Siam, and Burma with
a final stop line constructed on the Kra Isthmus.142 They also advo-
cated immediate air attack using conventional and atomic bombs on
military targets inside China to ‘achieve a maximum and lasting
effect’.143 Although the Allies still could not agree on the probability of
global war in the event of direct hostilities with China, they did agree
that their overall strategy in the event of global war should remain
defensive in the Far East.144 They would, however, exploit the possibili-
ties for offensive action in the Far East if they presented themselves.145
The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
The Indochina problem was finally settled as the result of diplomatic

action at Geneva. On 21 July, the relevant principal parties signed
three separate agreements covering the termination of hostilities in
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Vietnam was bisected by a demilitarized
zone at the 17th parallel north of which the Viet Minh would rule
until nationwide elections scheduled for 1956. French Union forces
regrouped south of the line, while an International Commission
staffed by Canada, Poland, and India agreed to monitor the provisions
on military and other restrictions.146 Laos and Cambodia agreed to
become neutral countries, and all French and Viet Minh forces were to
leave those countries within 120 and 90 days, respectively.147 Although
the Geneva conference brought a cease-fire to Indochina, no senior
British defense official in London or Singapore believed the settlement
was anything other than a delay in the now inevitable fall of Vietnam
to Communism.148 But with the conference over, the British govern-
ment now felt able to turn its attention to the development of a
regional defense organization as a hedge against further Communist
aggression.
Despite British attempts to corral support from the Colombo powers
for the proposed pact, only Pakistan agreed to attend the treaty confer-
ence in Manila.149 Officials of the five powers, Siam, the Philippines,
and Pakistan signed the treaty on collective defense for Southeast Asia
on 8 September. In many respects, the treaty reflects the British belief
that the greatest threat to the region was not from a Chinese invasion,
but from Communist subversion and infiltration.150 It recognized that
such activities could place a great strain on an unstable and unpopular
regime. For that reason, the British pushed for the treaty to incorporate
their long-held policy that increasing ‘prosperity and material well-
being leading to political stability [is] the most effective bulwark
against Communism in South-East Asia’.151 This emphasis on internal
security and stability is reflected in Article II – which stresses counter
subversive assistance as much as it does resistance to armed attack –
and Article III – which calls for the strengthening of ‘free institutions’
and the promotion of economic progress and social development.152

The Chiefs of Staff realized, however, that time was not on the side of
the West in the building up of stable governments, police, and security
forces in threatened countries.153 Other measures were needed while
stability was being built: ‘In this connection there is also need for a
scheme of covert and unattributable operations, in association with
psychological measures, to ensure that the influence of fear is not all
on the Communist side’.154
The Manila pact, and the SEATO it spawned, went far towards fulfill-
ment of the British strategic objective of developing a regional defense
pact and committing the United States to the defense of Southeast
Asia.155 But American desire to retain freedom of action with respect to
China had resulted in an organization quite different from NATO.
There was to be no supreme commander, no dedicated forces, and no
executive body – only a consultative council.156 Even so, a year later,
Britain, Australia, and New Zealand agreed to place their forces in 28
Commonwealth Brigade at the service of SEATO. A seeming contradic-
tion of earlier British efforts to limit military involvement outside its
dependent territories, the brigade served two purposes. First, much as
British defense efforts in Europe served as the down payment needed
to engender American support for NATO, so too did the Common-
wealth brigade with respect to SEATO. In addition to its forces in
Malaya and Hong Kong, the brigade was tangible evidence that Britain
would fulfill her obligations. Secondly, and somewhat more to the
point, was that FARELF’s intention for the brigade’s primary mission
was to conduct internal security operations to support the Songkhla
position from the Siamese side of the position.157
Conclusion
From a theater perspective, 1954 was the year in which the British
achieved key strategic objectives of collective defense, American defense
commitment to Southeast Asia, and Commonwealth backing for the
defense of Malaya. As Secretary of State Dulles observed, all this had
been accomplished at very little cost to the British themselves.158 In fact,
with the exception of a small amount of material aid and participation
in military staff talks, the British had managed to keep themselves out of
the Indochina war and by virtue of its refusal to commit a token
force to the relief of Dien Bien Phu, ironically had prevented American
intervention in May 1954.
Yet why if they firmly believed that Tonkin was the cornerstone of
the defense of Southeast Asia did the British refuse to get involved? In
terms of military strategy, there are several reasons. The first two are
tied to each other: (a) the Allies could not hope to defeat China mili-
tarily unless they used atomic bombs; and (b) use of atomic bombs
would probably trigger a Soviet response that would lead to global war.
The British clearly feared that in the event such a scenario came to pass
Allied forces in the Far East would be ‘strategically misplaced’ and
unable to help defend the West.159 The fact that the Allies’ main effort
in global war was to be in Western Europe – Britain’s strategic core –
while on the defensive in the Far East permeates British documents on
the subject.
To the extent that they were willing to provide troops, they decided
that only those from within the theater could be used. The Chiefs were
willing to withdraw the contingent from Korea or possibly even lose
Hong Kong in order to provide troops to fight a Chinese invasion of
Indochina, but they were extremely reluctant to weaken Malaya for
that purpose. They agreed it ‘would be foolish to risk a complete break-
down in Malaya in order to reinforce Indo-China’.160 In any event, the
operational requirements of the Malayan Emergency precluded any-
thing other than a token force from FARELF. The UK strategic reserve
built up under the rearmament program would have been the logical
choice for an Indochina contingency, but two problems militated
against this, one practical, the other suppositional. The most obvious
problem was the fact that the government committed the UK strategic
reserve of 3 Infantry Division and 16 Parachute Brigade to the Suez
Canal Zone in order to contain the anti-British agitation that began in
October 1951; it did not return to the UK until the end of 1954, long
after the end of the Geneva conference.161 The other problem con-
cerned the possible Chinese reaction to Allied forces pouring into
Tonkin. The British were perceptive enough to realize that a jittery Mao
could misconstrue the act as a portent of an Allied intent to invade
China, thus precipitating general or even global war. This is why the
British prodded the French to send three divisions to Indochina, for
only they could do it without changing China’s sense of vulnerability.
This latter concern also applied to any thought about sending British
divisions assigned to NATO or of mobilizing and deploying TA divi-
sions. The fact that neither the Chiefs nor the Defence Committee ever
seriously considered these as viable options is further evidence that the
defense of the strategic core remained the primary concern of the
defense establishment in Whitehall.
British refusal to back allied action in Indochina was tied to new

Commonwealth defense plans and their need to limit further liabilities
in the Far East. There was one other reason as well. British officials in
both London and Singapore believed that intervention ultimately would
make no difference. They thought French strategy and tactics inappro-
priate to the Viet Minh challenge, and their policies with regard to the
sovereignty of the Associated States ill-advised and counter-productive.
Consequently, the British government had a great deal of reticence
about ‘backing a losing horse’ and thereby unnecessarily alienating
Asian opinion.
11
Conclusion
Britain’s postwar defense policy aimed at deterring the Soviet Union

from launching a global war to destroy the Western powers, and, if
deterrence failed, to prevail in the ensuing conflict. The strategy to sup-
port this policy focused British military efforts on the defense of core
strategic areas backed by a nuclear deterrent. In practical terms this
meant a strong land and air defense of Western Europe and the Middle
East with concurrent naval action to protect Commonwealth sea lines of
communication. Military action in peripheral areas such as the Far East
was to be strictly limited and carried out to the greatest extent possible
by local defense forces. The strategic offensive was to be the responsibil-
ity of the RAF, who would use a new series of purpose-built, long-range
bombers to deliver nuclear weapons against Soviet targets. To support
this strategy and to compensate for known weaknesses, the British
acted on both the political and military planes. Politically, they pur-
sued collective security agreements with friendly European and
Atlantic powers that resulted in the Western Union and NATO defense
pacts, while they appealed to the Dominions and colonies to accept a
larger share of the Commonwealth’s military burdens. Militarily, they
embarked on development of a mass reserve army based upon an
unprecedented program of peacetime conscription. For small-scale con-
tingencies arising after 1950, the British intended to use three special
infantry brigade groups (‘fire brigades’) from the United Kingdom and
theater reserve forces based in the Middle and Far East.
As we have seen, contingencies erupted much earlier than expected
and caught the British unprepared both militarily and strategically.
Clearly, the value of Malaya and Hong Kong in terms of Commonwealth
cohesion, political prestige in Asia, and as dollar earners for the British
economy required some sort of response to their respective security
225
problems. Still, the deployment of nearly two divisions’ worth of rein-

forcements in the space of 12 months does smack of ‘strategic overexten-
sion’, especially when one considers that in 1949 the Defence Committee
contemplated going to war with Communist China if it attacked Hong
Kong. As pointed out in Chapter 5, this completely contradicted the
established policy in which Hong Kong was to be undefended in case of
major attack. What the Malayan Emergency and the reinforcement of
Hong Kong demonstrated, however, was the fact that places which other-
wise had little strategic value in global war could and did have a political
and strategic value in the Cold War. This realization was the basis for the
Defence Policy and Global Strategy paper of 1950.
Defence Committee approval of the new strategy just one month
before the start of the Korean War reoriented defense priorities toward
winning the Cold War. The assumption underlying the new strategy
was that if the Allies lost the Cold War, then defeat in global war was
almost a foregone conclusion. That the British felt they could give pri-
ority to the Far East over the Middle East in the Cold War reflects their
belief that the American lead in atomic weaponry afforded them the
necessary room to maneuver. Such thinking prompted Slessor’s sugges-
tion in 1952 that the French send several divisions to Indochina to
defeat the Viet Minh once and for all.
Evident in all the postwar strategy papers is the understanding that
Britain needed American military support both to survive a war with
the Soviet Union and to protect its dependent territories in the Far East.
This reasoning also indicates the extent to which the British were
aware that they depended not only on America’s strategic bombing
capability, but also on its conventional naval, military, and air forces in
all of the main theaters – Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Far
East. As had been the case in Europe, the British realized that in order to
win American military guarantees for Asia they had to pay a strategic
ante. Britain therefore maintained Imperial forces in the Far East not
just for reasons of obligation but also as proof to the United States (and
Australia) that it was serious about the defense of Malaya and Hong
Kong. Thus, besides the compelling moral reasons to assist the
American-led United Nations effort to resist aggression in Korea,
Britain’s employment of ground forces in the Korean War was meant to
send a signal to the United States that it was a valuable and dependable
ally worthy of assistance.
Yet with the exception of Korea – where the price of non-participation
was potentially higher in alliance terms than the employment of two
British brigade groups – the British fastidiously avoided taking on any
Conclusion 227
more commitments in the Far East after 1950. Indeed, they actually
worked to minimize their existing commitments. Such an approach is
first evident in the Attlee government’s ill-fated efforts to develop a
modus vivendi with Communist China. The defense establishment
understood that a long-term, large-scale defense commitment to Hong
Kong was not in Britain’s economic or strategic interests. Hence the
reinforcement of Hong Kong was publicly portrayed as a generic pro-
phylactic against aggression, rather than a stand against Communism.
Similarly, the decision to grant de jure recognition to the People’s
Republic in January 1950 was based in part on the hope of weaning the
Chinese away from the Soviets and of creating an atmosphere con-
ducive to trade and engagement. In spite of the tension that Britain’s
China policy caused with the United States, there can be little doubt
that the British pursued a realistic approach to the issue. They had,
after all, to consider the survival of Hong Kong, which they saw no rea-
son to abandon unnecessarily. That they could be hard-nosed when
they needed to be is also clear from their stand over the admission of
Communist consuls into Malaya.
Despite initial attempts at accommodation, the rapid rise of Chinese
military power challenged the basic tenets of British military strategy
in the Far East. Once the increased effectiveness of China’s Russian-
backed forces became apparent in Korea, the British realized they could
no longer entertain the idea of fighting the Chinese over Hong Kong.
Their secret plan was to fight a delaying action long enough to permit
evacuation of the European community, while simultaneously appealing
to the United Nations for assistance. Fully aware of their local military
weakness vis-à-vis Chinese land and air forces, they developed a strategic
deception plan with the support of Australia and the United States to
deter the Chinese from attacking. In a strange case of life imitating
(deception) art, the available evidence suggests that the Americans
actually came to view Hong Kong as worth defending and agreed to
provide air and naval support, as well as possible land reinforcements.
The British government took advantage of this new position and maneu-
vered successfully to obtain secret American assurances of military
support for Hong Kong in case of attack, all without having to increase
the garrison.
Britain also succeeded in limiting military involvement in, and gar-
nering American and Commonwealth support for, the defense of
Malaya. Defense officials in Singapore were initially enthusiastic about
supporting their French neighbors and did provide some aid, but the
Chiefs of Staff and Defence Committee placed firm bars against any
major contribution to the war in Indochina. In fact, with respect to the

buffer states of Indochina, Siam, and Burma, Britain neither could nor
would provide military aid much beyond that legally required of them.
This limitation resulted partly from the government’s decision not to
divert any more industrial capacity to defense beyond that required for
the rearmament program, but it also reflected its intention not to allow
Southeast Asia to ‘devour all its resources’. Consequently, although the
British were unhappy about CIA-backed KMT guerrillas in Burma and
Siam, they were nonetheless content to allow the Americans to take
over the advisory and assistance mission to Siam and to funnel massive
amounts of financial aid and military equipment to the French Union
forces in Indochina. In the ultimate act of strategic limitation, the
British refused the American request for joint intervention in
Indochina. Even though the British effectively halted the US call for
‘united action’ in Indo-China, they were still able to take advantage of
increased American interest in Southeast Asia and procure promises of
military assistance in the defense of Malaya.
British backing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty may
seem like a major new commitment, but in effect was not. Contingency
plans reveal no British intention to employ sizable forces outside
Malaya, and while the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve had a SEATO
role, its intended area of operations was on the Kra Isthmus in support
of Plan WARRIOR. This parochialism was based upon the belief that the
partition of Vietnam merely delayed an inevitable Communist victory
and that the time it bought should be used to bolster the ability of
Siam and Burma to defeat Communist-inspired insurrections. The
British were not at all sanguine about the prospects for near-term success
in those two countries and believed that only in Malaya could a firm
line of defense be held against Chinese aggression. Both the United
States and Australia came to accept this position, which in any respect
accorded well with Australia’s defense reorientation away from the
Middle East to Southeast Asia, and resulted in the ANZAM agreements of
1954 whereby Australia and New Zealand committed to deploy an entire
corps to the defense of Malaya. The British contribution to the defense
would consist of existing FARELF forces, reinforcements of up to a divi-
sion (depending on circumstances), and the new Malayan Federation
division. To this impressive combined force the United States agreed to
provide substantial naval assistance, and in so doing helped the British
achieve a secondary goal of linking ANZAM with ANZUS.
By the end of 1954, Britain had obtained all of its principal strategic
objectives, and this is reflected in both their peacetime and planned
Conclusion 229
wartime Army deployments (see Tables 11.1 and 11.2). It had secured
defensive alliances in Western Europe (NATO), the Middle East (CENTO),
and Southeast Asia (SEATO), and succeeded in obtaining Commonwealth
military assistance to fight the Cold War in Korea and Malaya. Spurred
by British appeals for help and the threat of Communist aggression
made manifest by the Korean War, colonial defense forces in Malaya
and Africa were built up to the extent that they made significant con-
tributions to internal security both in their home territories and
Malaya. The Dominions of Australia and New Zealand agreed to accept
responsibility for the defense of Malaya in war and added a detach-
ment of ground troops to their naval and air forces supporting the
counterinsurgency campaign. In Europe, the Canadian Army deployed
a mechanized brigade group as its peacetime contribution to the
British armored corps in Germany, with the balance of a division to
follow in crisis and war. Britain herself cemented its preponderant
commitment to NATO by agreeing to station an armored corps of four
divisions in West Germany for 50 years. In war, this corps would be
joined by two TA divisions kept at high readiness, while the remaining
eight TA divisions would be used for home defense or as a second ech-
elon defense of Western Europe. The emphasis on the core is clearly
reflected in the two tables below. Even with the appearance of
Communist China as a major new military threat in the Far East, the
net effect on the British military dispositions of 1948 was an increase
in peacetime of only one brigade, one reinforced division in the event
of war with China alone, and two divisions in the event of global war.
Table 11.1 Actual and planned deployments of British divi-

sions in 1948
Western Europe Middle East Far East
Peace 2 2 1 13
War 11 4 –
Table 11.2 Actual and planned deployments of British divi-

sions in 1955
Western Europe Middle East Far East

1
Peace 4 3 1 32
1
War with China 4 3 2 23
Global war 11 1 2
This was a relatively small military price to pay, especially when one
realizes, as the Allies eventually did, that the troops stationed in the
Far East in peacetime were unlikely to arrive in the main theaters in
time to make a difference to the outcome. In any event, the increases
in the Far East were more than offset by diminution of the Middle East
commitment.
Strategic sufficiency
Defense alliances, new military backing from the Commonwealth,

reduction of the Middle East commitment, and the aegis of the
American – and eventually its own – nuclear deterrent, gave Britain the
latitude it needed to pursue its Cold War-first strategy. This strategy
was developed in response to events in the Far East, and with signifi-
cant input from British defense officials in Singapore. The principal
focus of the strategy created a sense of low vulnerability in the core
that permitted limited responses to events in the periphery. However,
this construct is slightly different from the analytical model developed
by Kupchan, which suggests that Britain should have accommodated
the adversary in the periphery (China), while acting to deter the main
adversary in the core (the Soviet Union). Britain did make an initial
attempt to accommodate China, but the effort failed due to Chinese
implacability, its intervention in Korea, and the overriding require-
ment to maintain the support of the United States. What it did instead
was to limit its strategic liability in the Far East by effectively placing a
cap on wartime deployments to the theater and by having the
Malayans, Australians, New Zealanders, and Americans assume the
main responsibility for defending Malaya during a global war with
the Soviet Union. Britain used diplomacy to cover the gap between
available resources and its commitments in the Far Eastern periphery. It
had done the same thing in the run-up to World War I by cementing
an alliance with Japan, an act of accommodation that Kupchan points
to as a case of strategic adjustment success. Still, it is important to note
that even though the British accepted an increased role in the Far East
for the Japanese in 1914 (just as it was to do in the postwar period with
the United States), it did not abandon the area altogether. During
World War I the Indian Army retained its watch and ward role for
British territories in the Far East, and even participated in the capture
of the German settlement in Tsingtao.
In the final evaluation, the British succeeded in achieving strategic
sufficiency. Even though China emerged as a major military threat
Conclusion 231
after 1949, by 1954 the net effect on British troop deployments in the
Far East was an increase of only one brigade. Nevertheless, members of
the ‘strategic overextension’ school will point to the heavy economic
burden of the defense policies that flowed from this strategy. As John
Garnett observes, such an argument is overly subjective, for the reality
is that at any point in time:
the amount of money devoted to defense reflects the priority the

government has allocated to it in competition with education,
health, social security, transport, agriculture, etc. In a sense, there-
fore, defense expenditure is determined not by economic constraints,
but by political decisions – decisions that reflect the values and prior-
ities of the electorate and the government.1
This was certainly the case with respect to Britain in the first postwar
decade. Fighting the Cold War was as much a political decision as was
the institution of a welfare state. But that is not to say that all defense-
related decisions were correct. Two issues in particular have been often
debated: the decision to pursue the independent nuclear deterrent and
delays in creating a strong Ministry of Defence and joint command
system. Both issues have been the subject of numerous works,2 and are
not within the purview of this study. Suffice it to say that a decision
against pursuing an independent deterrent might have realized savings
in expenditure on atomic weaponry and on long-range bombers. But it
could just as easily have resulted in corresponding increases in Army
budgets in order to compensate for conventional force weaknesses, or,
conversely, led to accommodation in the strategic core and abandon-
ment of the continental commitment. Likewise, arguments about cost-
savings to be gained from increased ‘jointness’ also have validity but
are difficult if not impossible to quantify.
Two issues do, however, bear on the subject of strategic sufficiency
and the impact of events in the Far East. The first was the govern-
ment’s decision to adopt National Service, which diverted a significant
portion of able-bodied men away from industry at precisely the point
at which it was most needed. It also kept the Army at a larger size –
both in terms of overall numbers and in base infrastructure but not in
active combat units – than might otherwise have been necessary with
an all-regular force with lower turnover. While temporary continuation
of the wartime draft may have been necessary to help meet post-
hostilities requirements, the object of National Service was to build a
reserve army to deter, and if necessary fight, Soviet forces on the
European continent. This program may have helped convince the

United States that Britain was serious about defense, but its practical
application was highly questionable. First, the notion that the reserve
army could be mobilized and deployed in time to fight in Europe was
based upon overly-optimistic assumptions.3 Secondly, and just as
important, was the heavy burden the training of the conscripts placed
on the Regular Army. The equivalent of nearly two divisions was
absorbed by the training establishment which produced large numbers
of young soldiers, many of whom were deemed too young to be posted
on active service overseas. The utility of the National Serviceman to
the Army’s immediate demands in places like Malaya was extremely
limited and also caused a shortage of qualified officers and non-com-
missioned officers throughout the Army. Although it was understood
as early as 1949 that Cold War contingencies required a greater propor-
tion of regulars in the active duty Army, it was not until 1957 that the
government announced its intention to abandon National Service.
The problems of a National Service program notwithstanding, was the
British Army overextended during this period? The question is hard to
answer objectively, but an examination of manpower strength data from
1948 to 1954 does provide a useful baseline for analysis. Figure 11.1
120 000
Egypt
100 000 Reinforced
(Canal Zone
Rearmament Crisis)
Begins
80 000
Hong Kong
Reinforced
60 000
Malaya
Reinforced
40 000 27 & 29
Brigades in
Korea
20 000
0
Ju r. 48
Ju . 50
Ju . 51
Se 51
M . 53
54
D . 48
M 48
D 49
M . 49
D . 50
M . 50
D . 51
M . 51
D . 52
M . 52
D . 53
Se 48
Ju r. 49
Ju . 52
Ju . 53
Ju . 54
Se 49
Se 50
Se 52
Se 53
Se 54
p.
.
p.
ne
ne
ar
ar
ne
ne
ne
ne
ne
p
ec
ec
p
ec
p
ec
p
ec
p
ec
ar
ar
ar
a
a
M
BAOR FARELF MELF
Figure 11.1 Strength of principal overseas commands, 1948–54

Conclusion 233
depicts the numerical strength of the Army’s three theater commands

from 1948 to 1955 plotted against key deployment events.4 The rise in
each theater generally tracks with the others, but is out of proportion to
the number of combat units involved because an undetermined, but
substantial, percentage of the increases derive from the post-1950 move
to higher establishment and activation of support units.
Figure 11.2 depicts the same information in relation to the strength of
the home Army.5 Collectively, the number of men in the three principal
overseas commands from 1952 to 1954 is roughly the same as that in
the UK. If one considers that both BAOR and home forces served the
defense of the core, then the proportion of the Army supporting the
defense of the core is actually quite substantial. For example, of the 431
121 people in the Army in September 1954, 295 155 (68 per cent) were
in the UK or BAOR, ostensibly serving the defense of the core. At the
same time, 55 000 were in the Far East, and 74 000 were in the Middle
East, the latter contingent being drastically reduced by the end of the
year. But the figures for the Middle and Far East are skewed by the fact
that colonial troops were included in the theater totals from 1951, so
that even if one includes the Gurkhas as part of the British Army
300 000
250 000
200 000
150 000
100 000
50 000
0
Ju . 51
Se 48
Se 49
Se 50
Se 51
Se 52
Se 53
Se 54
M 49
D . 50
D . 48
M 48
D . 49
M 50
D . 51
M 51
D . 52
M 52
D . 53
M 53
54
Ju . 48
Ju . 49
Ju . 50
Ju . 52
Ju . 53
Ju . 54
ne
ne
ne
ne
ne
ne
ne
.
p.
ar
ar
ar
ar
ar
ar
ar
ec
p
ec
p
ec
p
ec
p
ec
p
ec
M
BAOR FARELF MELF UK
Figure 11.2 Strength of home and overseas commands, 1948–54

(which they were), the number of British soldiers overseas was approxi-
mately 100 000, or less than 25 per cent of the Army. This hardly con-
stitutes overextension for an imperial army which traditionally had
approximately half its strength overseas.6
The second area for potential criticism concerns the transfer of the
Gurkhas to the British Army. As events were to show, if Britain had car-
ried out its original intention of transferring all 20 regular battalions of
the Brigade of Gurkhas from the Indian Army (as opposed to the rem-
nants of the eight that they took) the effectiveness of its main Far
Eastern force as both a theater reserve and combat force would have
been immensely greater. Based upon the results of the straw poll of
August 1947, there can be little doubt that the majority of serving
Gurkhas would have transferred to the British Army. After all, they had
sworn allegiance to the King-Emperor, not to India. With the equiva-
lent of more than two divisions’ worth of experienced jungle fighters
in Malaya, it seems unlikely the MCP would have launched its insur-
rection when it did, or that if it had, the complete Brigade of Gurkhas
would have made short work of the guerrillas. This in turn would have
meant that nearly 20 Gurkha battalions would have been available to
reinforce Hong Kong in 1949, and the consequent need to send rein-
forcements from Britain and the Middle East minimized or even elimi-
nated. Lastly, transfer of all the Gurkhas would have lessened the drain
on British manpower in the services even if National Service was
retained. With troop requirements for Malaya and Hong Kong fully
covered by the Gurkhas, there would have been no need to extend the
period of National Service ‘with the colours’ from 12 to 18, and then to
24, months. Retention of the 12-month initial obligation would have
released more able-bodied young men to the domestic work force at a
much higher rate than was actually the case. Unfortunately, the British
government acted myopically with respect to the Gurkhas, for not only
did the final ‘opt’ undercut the value of the Brigade, but acceptance of
an Indian role in the future of the Gurkhas not only subjected the
British Gurkhas to a de facto Indian veto on their future, it also gave
India enormous power over Nepal.
Epilogue
From 1962 to 1966 British Commonwealth forces fought an undeclared

war in Borneo against Indonesian attempts to destabilize the newly
formed Federation of Malaysia. British-led action in ‘Confrontation’
involved the forward deployment of nearly 17 000 Commonwealth
troops into Borneo (East Malaysia) and Brunei, with another 10 000
Conclusion 235
supporting troops in Singapore and peninsular Malaysia. The war was

fought largely with the forces already present in the theater, and
although some SAS squadrons and an additional Royal Marine com-
mando were sent, the government decided against sending an infantry
brigade from the strategic reserve in the UK.7 Australia and New Zealand
agreed to allow their infantry battalions in the Commonwealth
Strategic Reserve to serve in Borneo, and both sent SAS squadrons to
the region, while Malaysian forces also took part in operations.
Interestingly, it was the perception of an Indonesian threat – not a role
in Vietnam – that moved the Australian government to introduce con-
scription in November 1964 and more than double its defense budget.8
By the time Confrontation came to a successful conclusion in 1966,
the war in Vietnam had grown to include an increasingly large American
ground force presence. The Commonwealth Brigade continued to train
for a SEATO role operating against guerrilla bands in Thailand, and
although close attention was paid to developments in Vietnam, senior
officers generally understood that actual British involvement in that
conflict was unlikely.9 As it had in 1954, Britain again refused an
American appeal to send troops to Vietnam,10 although it did provide
jungle warfare and counterinsurgency training for South Vietnamese
soldiers at the FARELF Training Center and a British Advisory Mission
to Saigon led by Sir Robert Thompson.11
Military involvement in Vietnam after Confrontation was not a real-
istic possibility. Following a defense review in 1967, the Labour govern-
ment of Harold Wilson determined that Britain would begin
withdrawing the bulk of its troops based east of Suez in 1968, with
those in Malaysia and Singapore being withdrawn by the early 1970s.
The only military presence to remain in the Far East was a Gurkha
brigade in Hong Kong, one Gurkha battalion in Brunei, and a British
battalion group in Singapore. With this reduced commitment, the gov-
ernment set upon a major reduction of the Brigade of Gurkhas that
eventually decreased the force of 15 204 (in 1967) down to 6600 in
1971, a drop of 57 per cent. That the Gurkhas remained even as a
vestigial force within the British Army is a testament both to their
value to Britain and to senior officers’ efforts to protect them from
annihilation. For at one point at least the government considered com-
pletely removing the Gurkhas from the British Army and apparently
consulted the Americans on the possibility of transferring the Gurkhas
to American command in order to fight in Vietnam!12
The reductions east of Suez were spurred in large part by financial
difficulties, but the strategic requirement for a British presence had
largely dissipated. Malaysia and Singapore were independent countries
with no immediate threats. Australia and New Zealand sent a brigade

task force to Phuoc Tuy province in South Vietnam, and along with
Britain maintained their SEATO contributions to the Commonwealth
Brigade for several years after it was recast as the ANZUK (Australia–New
Zealand–United Kingdom) force based in Singapore. By the mid-1970s,
Britain’s remaining military presence in the Far East consisted of five
infantry battalions and supporting troops. If needed, a strategic reserve
in Britain could be employed to back up its responsibilities as part of
the Five Power Defence Arrangement with Australia, New Zealand,
Malaysia, and Singapore, but after 1967 the British focused politically,
economically, and militarily much more closely on Western Europe. By
the end of the 1960s, Britain had relinquished its largest colonial terri-
tories and the Dominions were clearly capable of their own defense.
Britain no longer needed a strategy that balanced the defense needs of
the core against those of the periphery, for with the exception of a few
far-flung outposts, there was no periphery. Strategic sufficiency in the
post-imperial era would have to be based on different criteria.
Notes
Preface
1. Basil Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (New York: Macmillan, 1933),
Chapter 1, ‘The Historical Strategy of Britain’. Liddell Hart’s treatise was writ-
ten in reaction to Britain’s costly participation on the Western Front during
the Great War; for Michael Howard’s interpretation, see ‘The British Way in
Warfare: A Reappraisal’, in The Causes of Wars, and Other Essays (Boston:
Unwin Paperbacks, 1985), p. 200.
1 Introduction
1. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); Philip
Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947 to 1968 (London: OUP for RIIA,
1973); Nicholas Tarling, The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-East Asia
(London: OUP, 1993); Correlli Barnett, The Lost Victory: British Dreams, British
Realities 1945–1950 (London: Macmillan Press–now Palgrave, 1995).
2. Barnett condensed this argument for his 1995 presentation to the RUSI. See
‘The British Illusion of World Power, 1945–1950,’ The RUSI Journal, 140:5
(1995) 57–64.
3. Michael Blackwell has studied this phenomenon using a socio-psychological
methodology. See Michael Blackwell, Clinging to Grandeur: British Attitudes
and Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the Second World War, (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1993).
4. Tarling, p. 170.
5. Darby, p. 327.
6. See John Garnett, ‘Defence Policy-Making,’ in John Baylis et al. (eds),
Contemporary Strategy, Vol. II: The Nuclear Powers, 2nd edn (London: Croom
Helm, 1987) pp. 1–27.
7. Richard Rosecrance, Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), Appendix Table 1, Defense
Expenditures, pp. 296–7. As a percentage of gross national product, the defense
budget absorbed an average of 8 per cent per year during the same period,
which includes the Korean War rearmament program, partly financed with
American aid. See Michael Dockrill, British Defence Since 1945 (New York: Basil
Blackwell, 1989), Appendix IV, United Kingdom Defence Expenditure,
1948–1979, p. 151. In comparison, the United States’ average expenditure on
defense during the same period represented 48.91 per cent of the budget and
8.78 per cent of GNP. These figures calculated from United States Bureau of the
Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970,
Bicentennial Edition (Washington, DC: GPO, 1975), Series F 1–5 (p. 224) and Y
472–487 (p. 1116).
237
238 Notes
8. Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 1994).
9. Ibid., p. 15.
10. Ibid., p. 70.
11. Ibid., pp. 69–70.
12. Ibid. Extrapolated from pp. 68–70.
13. Ibid. See chapter 3. Kupchan’s model is intended to explain strategic behavior
only when a power detects threats in both its core and periphery.
14. Note by the CIGS 20 Apr 50, DEFE 11/35, para. 7.
15. Thomas S. Kaplan, ‘In the Front Line of the Cold War: Britain, Malaya and
S. E. Asian Security, 1948–55’ PhD dissertation, Oxford, 1990.
16. Rosecrance, op. cit.
17. Besides various modern biographical studies of Prime Ministers and Foreign
Secretaries, there are a number of useful studies on British foreign policy,
most of which deal only with the Attlee government. Among the
more prominent are Ritchie Ovendale’s The English-Speaking Alliance:
Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War 1945–1951
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985) and his earlier edited volume, The
Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945–1951 (Leicester:
Leicester University Press, 1984). A valuable survey is provided by Michael
Dockrill and John W. Young (eds), British Foreign Policy 1945–56 (London:
Macmillan Press – now Palgrave, 1989). There are scores of both contempo-
rary and modern books on the Malayan Emergency of 1948–60. The
standard works remain: Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in
Malaya, 1948–1960 (London: 1975); Brig. Richard Clutterbuck, The Long,
Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam (Washington: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1966); and Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insur-
gency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam, Studies in International
Security: 10 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1972). Two recent works which
have benefited from releases of previously closed documents are John
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency,
1948–1954 (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992) and Richard Stubbs, Hearts
and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: the Malayan Emergency 1948–1960 (New York:
OUP, 1989).
18. David Lee, ‘Australia and Allied Strategy in the Far East, 1952–1957,’ The
Journal of Strategic Studies, 16:4 (1993): 511–38; Karl Hack, ‘South East Asia
and British strategy, 1944–1951,’ in British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold
War, 1945–1951, ed. Richard Aldrich (London: Routledge, 1992), 308–32;
Malcolm H. Murfett, In Jeopardy: the Royal Navy and British Far Eastern
Defence Policy 1945–1951 (Oxford: OUP, 1995).
19. Admiral Sir Denis Boyd, ‘The Services in the Far East,’ Journal of the Royal
United Services Institute, Feb. 1950, p. 43.
20. The senior political officials of the Defence Committee – the Prime
Minister, Foreign Secretary, Colonial Secretary, and the Commissioner-
General – all thought retention of a supreme commander was a good idea.
Under strident protests from the Chiefs, who argued that the trinity system
‘was better preparation for supreme command in wartime, and allowed bet-
ter attention to peace-time training of officers than did joint command’,
the politicos relented. See DO(46)24(4), 7 Aug. 46, CAB 131/1.
Notes 239
21. See Michael Carver, Harding of Petherton, Field Marshal (London: Weidenfeld
& Nicolson, 1978), p. 172. Although their Royal Navy and RAF counterparts
were competent officers, with little extant naval or air threat, their counsel
on defense matters was proportionately less important than that of the
FARELF commander. Geoffrey Hodgson, who served as an aide-de-camp to
the C-in-C from 1953 to 1954, once commented upon the fact that Admiral
Sir Charles Lambe, the C-in-C, Far East Station, sometimes drove himself to
meetings with his Army counterpart, an unheard of event in protocol-
obsessed Singapore. General Loewen’s response to this observation was to
say ‘He bloody well ought to, [he has] nothing else to do!’ Author’s interview
with Major Geoffrey Hodgson, 19 May 1995.
22. Dominick Graham, ‘Stress Lines and Gray Areas: The Utility of the
Historical Method to the Military Profession,’ in David A. Charters, Marc
Milner and J. Brent Wilson (eds), Military History and the Military Profession
(London: Praeger, 1992), pp. 148–52.
2 ‘Future Defence Policy’: the Far East as Strategic

Backwater, 1945–48
1. Ronald Hyam (ed.), The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945–1951.
Part I: High Policy and Administration, vol. 2, (London: HMSO, 1992),
‘Introduction,’ p. xlii.
2. Barnett, Lost Victory.
3. Walter L. Arnstein, Britain Yesterday and Today: 1830 to the Present 4th edn
(Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1983), p. 338.
4. Ibid., pp. 337–8.
5. Barnett, Lost Victory, pp. 41–4.
6. Ibid., pp. 77–8. The balance of payments deficit was costing US $500 million
a month.
7. See, for example, CM(47)69(2), 5 Aug. 1947, CAB 128/10.
8. Alexander had not the force of personality needed to strong-arm the Chiefs
or Service ministers. Moreover, the Service ministers retained direct legal
responsibility to Parliament for their departments’ expenditures. See
Franklyn A. Johnson, Defence by Ministry: the British Ministry of Defence
1944–1974 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980), pp. 20–6.
9. DO(47)68, 15 Sept. 1947, CAB 131/4, paras 2–7.
10. Barnett, Lost Victory, p. 6.
11. Cmd. 7327, Statement Relating to Defence, 1948 (London: HMSO, Feb. 1947).
The Royal Navy especially suffered from the ensuing cuts. For example, by
the end of 1948 there was only one cruiser, two destroyers, six frigates, and
twenty submarines in the Home Fleet; a single frigate in the Persian Gulf;
three cruisers, four destroyers, four frigates and three submarines in the
Pacific Fleet; and the only operational aircraft carrier was in the
Mediterranean with four cruisers, eleven destroyers, nine frigates, and two
submarines. See Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since
World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), pp. 30–8.
12. W. K. Hancock (ed.), Statistical Digest of the War, History of the Second World
War, United Kingdom Civil Series (London: HMSO, 1951), Table 173, p. 195.
240 Notes
13. Bread rationing was necessary because Britain had to forgo some of its wheat
allocation in order to help alleviate famine in India and near-famine in
Germany. See Hugh Thomas, John Strachey (New York: Harper & Row, 1973),
pp. 232–3 (Strachey was Minister of Food at this time, and later became
Secretary of State for War); Bernard Donoughue and G. W. Jones, Herbert
Morrison: Portrait of a Politician (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973),
pp. 382–3; Kenneth Harris, Attlee (New York: Norton, 1982), pp. 327–8.
14. Arnstein, p. 338.
15. Richard Mayne, Postwar: the Dawn of Today’s Europe. (London: Thames and
Hudson, 1983), p. 85.
16. Arnstein, p. 339.
17. Harris, p. 294.
18. Christopher Warner, ‘The Soviet Campaign Against This Country and Our
Response to It’, 2 April 1946, FO 371/56832 N6344/605/38G, para. 1.
19. Ibid., para. 28.
20. Harris, p. 300.
21. W. Scott Lucas and C. J. Morris, ‘A very British crusade: the Information
Research Department and the beginning of the Cold War’, in Richard J.
Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–1951 (New
York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 89–94.
22. Besides their subversive acts in occupied and other areas as well as their
threatening military posture, the Russians had proved to be supremely dis-
putatious at the Paris Peace Conference that concluded in September 1946.
See Alan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, vol. III, (London:
Heinemann, 1983), p. 312.
23. See Attlee to Bevin, Personal and Private, 1 December 1946, and Attlee to
Bevin, 5 January 1947, as reproduced in Ritchie Ovendale, British Defence
Policy Since 1945, (New York: MUP, 1994), pp. 32–5.
24. Sir Orme Sargent, quoted in Hyam, Labour Government, vol. I, p. xlix.
25. John Kent and John W. Young, ‘The “Western Union” Concept and UK
Defence Policy’, in Aldrich, British Intelligence, pp. 166–92. Although Bevin
was keen to establish Western Europe as a third power led by the British, no
guarantees were ever made and the concept was overtaken by the Atlantic
Alliance in July of 1948.
26. Bullock, p. 461; Lucas and Morris, ‘A very British crusade’, p. 93. A slightly
different interpretation is offered in another chapter in the same book. See
Kent and Young, pp. 166–89.
27. Bevin to Attlee, 13 February 1946, fo. 44, Def/46/3, FO 800/451.
28. Bullock, pp. 315–16; Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-
Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, KG (London: Collins, 1958),
pp. 440–3. See also General Sir William Jackson and Field Marshal the Lord
Bramall, The Chiefs: the Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff
(Washington: Brassey’s, 1992), p. 274. The resulting war plans are discussed
in detail in Steven T. Ross’s American War Plans 1945–1950 (New York:
Garland Publishing, 1988).
29. Ovendale, Foreign Policy, pp. 9–10.
30. Judith M. Brown, Modern India: the Origins of an Asian Democracy, The Short
Oxford History of the Modern World, ed. J. M. Roberts (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985), p. 350.
Notes 241
31. Hyam, Labour Government, vol. I, p. xxv.

32. Aldrich, British Intelligence, pp. 311–12.
33. The Brooke family ruled Sarawak as ‘White Rajahs’, while the British North
Borneo Company controlled Sabah. See CP(45)133, 29 August 1945, CAB
129/1, and Sarawak: CO internal note on cession to the British Crown, 27
May 1946, CO 537/1632.
34. See COS(46)239(O), 5 Oct 46, as reproduced in Appendix 6 of Julian Lewis,
Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence,
1942–1947 (London: Sherwood Press, 1988), pp. 363–9.
35. Ibid., pp. 279–83.
36. Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy
1945–1952, Vol. I, Policy Making (London: Macmillan press – now Palgrave,
1974), p. 182; on the development of the ‘V’ bombers, see Simon J. Ball, The
Bomber in British Strategy: Doctrine, Strategy, and Britain’s World Role,
1945–1960 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995) and Andrew Brookes,
V Force: the History of Britain’s Airborne Deterrent (London: Jane’s, 1982).
37. Gradon Carter, ‘Biological Warfare and Biological Defence in the United
Kingdom 1940–1979’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 137
(1992), p. 71. See Aldrich, British Intelligence, pp. 7–9. Much of the relevant
material on the chemical and biological weapons program remains closed,
although portions of the record have recently been opened at the PRO.
38. Lewis, p. 363. Lewis’s work is the single, most comprehensive study that
exists of British planning during this period, being an almost week-by-week
account of the iterative planning process from 1942 to 1947.
39. The Chiefs passed it virtually unaltered to the Defence Committee on
1 April 1946. DO(46)47, 2 April 1946, CAB 131/2; Lewis, p. 255.
40. DO(46)47, para. 16. No ‘Continental Commitment’ in the form of combat-
ready divisions was envisaged at this time. Despite the threat that would
arise from Russian domination of Western Europe, the Chiefs felt able to
offer only that ‘we should be prepared to give the countries in Western
Europe the support necessary to ensure that in peace they do not fall under
Russian influence’ (para. 18).
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., para. 15(b).
43. Ibid., paras 5–6. This assertion would change only a short time later to refer to
India as a main support area, rather than as a potential one. See Lewis, p. 266.
44. Anthony Gorst. ‘“We must cut our coat according to our cloth”: the making
of British defence policy, 1945–8’, in Aldrich, British Intelligence, p. 154;
Lewis, p. 292; Montgomery, Memoirs, pp. 435–6. See also Barnett, Lost
Victory, pp. 46–69.
45. This was a direct swipe at Attlee’s desire to rationalize Britain’s overseas
commitments. When Bevin weighed in with his complete support of the
Chiefs of Staff’s position, Attlee finally acquiesced in maintaining a British
presence in the Middle East. See DO(46)10(2), 5 Apr 1946, CAB 131/1; see
also Lewis, p. 259.
46. At war’s end, ‘[m]anpower was one of the crucial economic issues. At a time
of enormous industrial shortages the diversion of productive manpower to
the forces was directly at the expense of industrial production, the export
drive, and the balance of payments’. See Leonard V. Scott, Conscription and
242 Notes
the Attlee Governments: the Politics and Policy of National Service 1945–1951
(Oxford: OUP, 1993), p. 10.
47. DO(46)47, paras 9–12, 20–1, 23 and 26
48. Arthur Bryant, Triumph in the West (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1959),
p. 406. The initiating report was contained in DO(46)46 and discussed in
DO(46)10(2), DO(46)10(3), and DO(46)10(4), 5 April 1946, CAB 131/1.
49. DO(46)10(4); Bryant, p. 406.
50. DO(46)10(4). This was an idea which would be revisited in the years to
come and is dealt with later in this study. SEAC operations in Burma, the
Netherlands East Indies, and southern French Indochina absorbed the
equivalent of five infantry divisions.
51. However, as shown in this study, the Korean War prompted most of the
Dominions to assume a greater burden.
52. Aldrich, British Intelligence, p. 149; Johnson, p. 313. See also Lewis, pp. 267–8;
and Barnett, Lost Victory, pp. 58–9.
53. Quoted in Bryant, p. 406.
54. See COS(47)35(1), 5 March 1947, DEFE 4/2, on the difficulty of meeting
strategic needs. Montgomery replaced Alanbrooke as CIGS in June 1946.
55. This was DO(47)44, 22 May 1947, extracts of which are reproduced
in Dockrill, British Defence, Appendix I, pp. 132–8. Dockrill gives the PRO
citation as DEFE 5/4. The full text is also reproduced from a retained
Cabinet Office version in Lewis, Appendix 7, pp. 370–87; I cite from this
version.
56. DO(47)44, para. 1.
57. Ibid., paras 4–6.
58. Barnett, Lost Victory, p. 56.
59. DO(47)44, para. 36. The Chiefs added the cooperation of India as a fourth –
desirable though not essential – pillar, primarily for its use as an air offensive
base and to ensure the Russians were denied the subcontinent.
60. Ibid., para. 33(d)(v).
61. Surprisingly, although the use of atomic bombs ‘were becoming firmly
embedded’ in military plans, they ‘still had been related to strategy only in
the vaguest terms and no attempt had been made to calculate how many
atomic bombs were needed for the deterrent purposes for which they were
supposed to serve’. See Gowing, pp. 188–9.
62. Stanley Simm Baldwin, Forward Everywhere: Her Majesty’s Territorials (New
York: Brassey’s, 1994), p. 161.
63. DO(47)68, op. cit., paras 19(c) and 19(d). Gibraltar, Cyprus, Sudan, and the
West Indies would all have garrisons of one battalion each, while Malta
would have two battalions and Cyrenaica, three.
64. As Tarling notes, ‘No one document encapsulates British policy for
South-East Asia in the post-war period’ (Fall, p. 187); Darby is scathing
about the lack of analytical thought put into the strategic appraisal of
the entire British position east of Suez (for example, see pp. 20–1). Since
he did not have access to any of the planning or other relevant docu-
ments, however, his criticisms, based as they were largely on empirical
observation and supposition, have not weathered well the release of the
official record.
65. Lewis, p. 80.
Notes 243
66. Ibid., pp. 80–2, 147.

67. Ibid., p. 158.
68. Ibid., pp. 82–3. Lewis quotes from PHP(44)6(O) (2nd Prel. Draft).
69. Ibid., p. 169.
70. Ibid., p. 173; Aldrich, British Intelligence, p. 323.
71. Lewis, p. 168. This was no mean consideration, for until Indian and
Burmese independence, the COS believed that substantial numbers of
British troops might be needed if the loyalty of the Indian Army began to
waver. See Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, eds, The Transfer of
Power 1942–47, vol. VII (London: HMSO, 1977), Document 509, DO(46)68,
R/30/1/7: ff. 96–106, 12 June 1946. The Chiefs estimated that they would
need five British divisions for India, six British brigades for Burma and
Malaya, and two for Hong Kong.
72. Lewis, p. 287.
73. Ibid. Conclusions drawn from The Foreign Office Strategy Paper of
5 October 1946, circulated in COS(46)239(O)(Retained – Cabinet Office),
pp. 287–8; reproduced on pp. 363–9.
74. Ibid., p. 288.
75. Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma: a Study of the First Years of Independence,
4th edn (New York: OUP, 1967), p. 323; John H. McEnery, Epilogue in Burma
1945–1948: the Military Dimension Of British Withdrawal (Tunbridge Wells:
Spellmount , 1990), p. 116; JP(48)3(O)(Preliminary Draft), 15 Jan 48, Annex II,
Burma, IOLR L/WS/1/1075.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., Annex II, Siam.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., Annex II, French Indo-China.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. JP(47)93(2nd Revised Final), 16 Oct 47, DEFE 6/3, para. 5.
83. Ibid., para. 6.
84. JP(48)101(Final Revise), 17 March 1949, DEFE 6/6, para. 13.
85. JP(47)72(Final), 9 June 1947, DEFE 6/2.
86. JP(48)3(O)(Preliminary Draft), Annex II, Hong Kong.
87. COS(48)200, 6 Feb 48, DEFE 5/9. No time period is expressly mentioned in
the report, it being of a general nature. However, it seems safe to assume
that the report was predicated on the Chiefs’ of Staff assumption that war
with Russia would occur sometime from 1956 on.
88. Ibid., para. 4(a)–4(e).
89. Ibid., para. 5.
90. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, p. 18.
91. COS(48)200, para. 13(d) (emphasis added).
92. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia (London: OUP for RIIA, 1965),
pp. xiii–xiv.
93. COS(48)200, para. 20(e).
94. Ibid., para. 17(b). At the time the report was written, the MCP’s campaign
of labor unrest in Singapore had already been underway for some time. See
Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945–1963
(London: Faber and Faber, 1973), pp. 45–57.
244 Notes
95. COS(48)200, para. 21. This strategic aim was quite a bit narrower than the
one stated by the Joint Planning Staff just three weeks earlier in
JP(48)3(O)(Preliminary Draft).
96. COS(48)200, para. 23.
97. Ibid., para. 21
100. Ibid., paras. 30(a)–(c)
101. Ibid., para. 33. These would be proportionately greater than the forces
required by the enemy to disrupt them.
102. Ibid., para. 34(c).
103. Ibid., para. 35(c).
104. Ibid., paras. 35, 36, 38, 39.
105. Ibid., para. 41(g).
106. Ibid., paras. 41(h), 41(k). At this time there was no airfield in either
Singapore or Malaya capable of handling such aircraft.
107. Ibid., para. 41(l).
108. See JP(48)69 (Revised Final), 15 September 48, DEFE 6/6, and JP(48)
109(Final), 3 December 48, DEFE 6/7.
3 National Service, the Gurkhas, and the Reorganization

of the British Army, 1946–48
1. Scott, p. 10.
2. W. K. Hancock (ed.), Statistical Digest of the War, History of the Second World
War, United Kingdom Civil Series (London: HMSO, 1951), Table 10, p. 9.
Discrepancies in figures are caused by rounding and specification errors
about data sets. At the time there were 437 200 women in uniform too. See
also F.W. Perry, The Commonwealth Armies: Manpower and Organisation in Two
World Wars (New York: MUP, 1988), p. 75, and David Fraser, And We Shall
Shock Them: The British Army in the Second World War (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1983), p. 93.
3. Michael Carver, Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy Since 1945 (London:
Hutchinson, 1992), p. 6.
4. Cmd. 7042, Statement Relating to Defence, February 1947, p. 6; Cmd. 7327,
Statement Relating to Defence 1948, p. 3. This is roughly the size of today’s US
Army, which is neither as extensively deployed, or globally committed, as
was the British Army of the late 1940s and early 1950s.
5. The Infantry man [pseud.], ‘A New Organisation for the Infantry’, The Army
Quarterly, 53:2 (Jan. 47), p. 203.
6. Ibid.; Hancock, Statistical Digest of the War, p. 9; and Scott, Appendix 1,
p. 276.
7. Gregory Blaxland, The Regiments Depart: A History of the British Army,
1945–1970 (London: William Kimber, 1971), pp. 8–9. This, in essence, evis-
cerated the Cardwell system of paired battalions which had served the Army
since 1882.
8. Infantryman, pp. 203–4.
9. Ibid., p. 203.
Notes 245
10. Ten of the 77 battalions were Household (Foot Guards) troops, technically
not part of the infantry ‘line’. (Blaxland, pp. 9–10); Scott, Appendix 5,
p. 284; Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 118–19.
11. Scott, p. 284; Blaxland, p. 6.
12. Blaxland, p. 10.
13. Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Field Marshal 1944–1976 (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1986), p. 660.
14. Cmd. 7042, pp. 6–7; Stanley Baldwin, Forward Everywhere: Her Majesty’s
Territorials (New York: Brassey’s (UK), 1994), p. 161.
15. Blaxland, p. 13. Of the 16 other battalions stationed in the United Kingdom
in 1948, most had ‘been heavily mulcted of men in order to bring overseas
units up to strength’.
16. CM(47)35(1), 3 Apr. 47, CAB 128/9.
17. Cmd. 7042, p. 7.
18. Bernard Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery
of Alamein, K.G. (London: Collins, 1958), p. 482.
19. Ibid., p. 483.
20. Scott, pp. 46–61.
21. DO(46)1(3), 21 Jan. 46, CAB 131/1.
22. DO(46)29, 1 Mar. 46, CAB 131/2.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. DO(46)7(4), 8 Mar. 46, CAB 131/1.
27. Byron Farwell, The Gurkhas (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), pp. 14–15.
28. MoD [attrib.], The Brigade of Gurkhas, n.p., 1978, p. 4.
29. Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon (eds), The Transfer of Power 1942–7:
Constitutional Relations between Britain and India. Volume V (London: HMSO,
1974), document 346, para. 14.
30. Alanbrooke to Mosley Mayne, IO Ref CIGS/BM/23/9513, 11 May 45, IOLR
L/WS/1/1023.
31. Auchinleck to Wavell, Ref DO No. 80/V-i/II/53, 20 Nov 45, IOLR L/WS/1/1023.
32. Ibid.; Mansergh and Moon, op. cit., Volume VI (London: HMSO, 1976), doc-
ument 4, para. 17.
33. Mansergh and Moon, Volume VI, document 325, paras. 5–6.
34. Ibid., para. 6.
35. Ibid., para. 9.
37. Lawson to Arthur Henderson, 31 May 46, IOLR L/WS/1/1023.
38. Mansergh and Moon, op. cit., Volume VII, (London: HMSO, 1977), docu-
ment 467.
39. DO(47)22, 7 Mar. 47, PREM 8/537, para. 6(a). Although it had always been
the custom that only British officers would command Gurkhas (with the
help of subordinate Gurkha subalterns called Viceroy’s Commissioned
Officers, or VCOs), it was not an element of any written agreement between
Nepal and Britain. In fact, the entire basis of Gurkha recruitment into the
British Indian Army was little more than an understanding between the Raj
and Nepal (para. 2).
246 Notes
40. Lt.-Gen. Sir Francis Tuker, Gorkha: The Story of the Gurkhas of Nepal (London:
Constable, 1957), pp. 252–3.
41. DO(47)22, para. 6(b).
42. Hollis to Attlee, 5 Mar. 47, PREM 8/537. Emphasis added to draw attention to
the intention to transfer, rather than recruit, this number of Gurkhas. During
the war over 200 000 Gurkhas were enlisted into the Indian Army, serving in
44 battalions (including 24 war-raised battalions), six training battalions, and
one garrison battalion. See DO(47)22, para. 4 and Farwell, p. 85.
43. Hollis to Attlee, op. cit.
44. DO(47)8(2), 17 Mar. 47, CAB 131/5.
45. Ibid.
46. DO(47)30, 28 Mar. 47, PREM 8/537.
47. Ibid.
48. Brief … as to the Employment of Gurkha Troops Ref 0164/6649(SD2), nd,
but 1947?, IOLR L/WS/1/1024.
49. Ibid.
50. DO(47)10(1), 3 Apr 47, CAB 131/5.
51. Tuker, Gorkha, pp. 252–3; Mary Des Chene, ‘Soldiers, Sovereignty and
Silences: Gorkhas as Diplomatic Currency’, South Asia Bulletin XII, nos 1–2
(1993): 67–80, p. 73.
52. Mansergh, Moon, Blake, and Carter, eds., The Transfer of Power 1942–7,
Volume XI, (London: HMSO, 1982), Document 173, Mountbatten to Attlee,
Telegram R/3/1/147: f 75. New Delhi, 12 June 47, rec’d 13 Jun. Tele no.
1422-S; Mountbatten says CIGS (Monty) should take opportunity of his
visit to India to settle once and for all the question of the Gurkhas, which
had been languishing for some time. This was agreed as noted in a telegram
from Attlee of 18 June 47, L/WS/1/1024: f 63.
53. Shone to Attlee, No. 63, 24 June 47, 28 June 47, PREM 8/537 (emphasis
added).
54. Ibid.
55. Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 457.
56. UK HC in India to Cabinet Office, IRKU 569, 6 Aug. 47, IOLR L/WS/1/1025.
The choice was based upon two factors: those regiments that had a battal-
ion serving in Burma at the time, and a desire to be able to recruit from
both Western and Eastern Nepal.
57. Lt.-Col. H. R. K. Gibbs, Historical Records of the 6th Gurkha Rifles, Vol. II,
1919–48 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1955), p. 258; Lt.-Col. G R Stevens,
History of the 2nd King Edward VII’s Own Goorkha Rifles (The Sirmoor Rifles),
Vol. III, 1921–48 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1952), p. 310; Cross, In Gurkha
Company, p. 18. There are also several reports of Gurkha units being asked
in July to conduct unofficial referendums in order to discover the wishes of
the men. Maj.-Gen. R W L McAlister, Bugle & Kukri: The Story of the 10th
Princess Mary’s Own Gurkha Rifles, vol. II (Winchester: Regimental Trust of
the 10th Gurkha Rifles, 1984), p. 14.
58. Lt.-Gen. Sir Francis Tuker, While Memory Serves (London: Cassell, 1950), p. 636;
McAlister, p. 14; Cross, In Gurkha Company, p. 18; Gibbs, p. 258; Stevens,
p. 310.
59. Lt.-Col. J. N. Mackay, History of 7th Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Gurkha Rifles
(London: William Blackwood, 1962), p. 290; Cross, In Gurkha Company,
pp. 16–17.
Notes 247
60. Tuker, While Memory Serves, pp. 638–9.

61. In The Second Step (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1962), pp. 194–7,
Adrian Hayter of 2 GR recounts how he and his men felt about the possibil-
ity of serving under an Indian officer.
62. The most detailed account is in Brig. Gordon Richardson, Incident at Santa
Cruz on 3 Nov. 1947, 13 May 66, GM 2GR/834, but Auchinleck to COS,
270033/DSC(ARMY), 7 Nov. 47, IOLR L/WS/1/1025 also provides a good
synopsis.
63. Auchinleck to COS. This seems to have been the conventional wisdom
among British officers. See Cross, In Gurkha Company, p. 17. On another
incident, see Maj.-Gen. S. Shahid Hamid, Disastrous Twilight: A Personal
Record of the Partition in India (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1993), p. 281.
64. FARELF, 1948 Progress Report on the Gurkha Project CR/FARELF/5950/SD2,
25 Jan. 49, WO 32/12822, Darby, pp. 40–1.
65. Selby Report, 1 Apr. 50, FO 371/84281 FN 1201/23, Part I, para. 3(b). It is
worth noting that in an agreement signed two days earlier, Britain agreed to
an Indian demand that its recruitment of Gurkhas ‘shall not in any way
interfere with recruitment to the Gurkha units in the Indian Army’. See
Annex I, para. 4.
66. Ibid. This may have been a reference both to friction with the new state of
Pakistan as well as the Nizam of Hyderabad, who refused to join the new
Dominion of India. The Indians actually ended up forming an additional
Gurkha regiment consisting of those men from 2, 6, 7, and 10 GR who
opted to remain in the Indian Army. See Leo Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival
(Los Angeles: UCLA Press, 1971), p. 181.
67. FO Delegation Report, 18 Nov 47, DEFE 7/629. There would have been
about seven war-raised battalions still in existence at this time. India
retained these battalions much longer than was anticipated because of its
need for troops in settling the boundary troubles and for hostilities with
Pakistan over Kashmir. See also Selby Report, Annex I, note 3.
68. Ibid.
69. Redman to DSD, Ref 10413/CS, 25 Nov 47, IOLR L/WS/1/1026.
70. Tuker, While Memory Serves, p. 637.
71. John H. McEnery, Epilogue in Burma 1945–1948: The Military Dimension of
British Withdrawal (Tunbridge Wells: Spellmount, 1990), Annex I, p. 130.
72. Mackay, p. 290.
73. The 7 GR, for example, had only 53 men from its second battalion opt
for British service. The first battalion, which had been in Burma, had
382 opt (Mackay, p. 291); for 1/10 GR in Burma, 400 out of 750 opted,
with 2/10, serving in the Punjab Boundary Force in the Lahore area
providing a surprising 300 men for transfer, probably because they were on
the Pakistan side of the border (McAlister, pp. 16, 267–9); 1/6 GR in
Rangoon retained 330 GORs, but the 2/6 left New Delhi for Malaya with
only 3 KGOs and 113 GORs (Messenger, p. 6). I could find no published
figures for 2 GR.
74. HQ British Gurkhas India to WO, info FARELF, Ref P/32384(A), 20 Jan 48,
IOLR L/WS/1/1026. Several hundred more would make their way into
British service within a few months (see Chapter 3).
75. JP(48)131, 18 Nov 48, DEFE 6/7.
76. DO(47)37, ODC(47)10, 11 Apr 47, CAB 131/4.
248 Notes
77. See Nadzan Haron, ‘The Malay Regiment 1933–55: A Political and Social
History of a Colonial Military Establishment in Malaya’ (doctoral disserta-
tion, University of Essex, 1988), pp. 223–4. James Lunt, Imperial Sunset:
Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century, (London: Macdonald Futura, 1981),
pp. 381–2; anon. ‘The Federation Army of Malaya’, British Army Review: 4,
(Mar. 1957) 38–43.
78. CIC(FE(48)2(P), 22 Apr. 48 WO 268/7.
79. Ibid.
80. HQ British Gurkhas India to WO, op. cit. As of January, 1948, a total of
124 VCOs and 3,432 GORs had opted for service under HMG.; 12822 cites
a figure of 5,103 volunteers (optees and others), 463 ‘received from units
allocated to India’ (i.e. presumably Gurkhas who deserted the Indian Army
to join the British Gurkhas) (para. 7).
81. n.a., ‘A British Gurkha Division’, The Times, 12 Feb. 48, p. 6.
82. Ritchie, Progress Report on the Gurkha Project, para. 20.
83. WO to FARELF, no. 02268 SD2b, 3 Dec. 47, WO 32/12822.
84. LEP served in combat service support units such as the Royal Army Service
Corps, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, and the Royal Pioneer Corps.
85. WO to FARELF, 3 Dec. 47, op. cit.
86. Redman to DSD, op. cit.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Maj.-Gen. Ashton Wade, A Life on the Line (Tunbridge Wells: D. J. Costello,
1988), pp. 144–5.
90. Gen. Sir Neil M. Ritchie, Report on Operations in Malaya, June 1948 to July
1949, 6 Sep. 49, WO 106/5884 (hereafter referred to as Ritchie Report), para.
45; Brigadier D. J. Sutton (ed.), The Story of the Royal Army Service Corps and
Royal Corps of Transport, 1945–1982 (London: Leo Cooper/Secker &
Warburg, 1983), pp. 134–5.
91. Ritchie, Report, para. 45. In his autobiography (p. 145), Wade, then the GOC
Malaya District, recounts one awkward attempt to fill the manpower short-
age by enlisting Ceylonese laborers into the Royal Pioneer Corps.
92. Ritchie to USSW, CR/FARELF/1707/SD1, 23 Feb 48, WO 32/12822, para. 1.
93. Ibid., para. 6.
94. Ibid., para. 7.
95. WO to FARELF, no. 06395 SD2b, 29 Jan. 48, WO 32/12822.
96. Ibid.
97. McEnery, Epilogue in Burma, pp. 116–17, and Annex I; Cross, In Gurkha
Company, p. 20. Detailed accounts of each battalion’s locations and move-
ments can be found in the various regimental histories.
98. McAlister, p. 16.
99. ‘The Move to Malaya’, The Kukri, no. 1 (1949): 3–6; McAlister, p. 269.
100. ‘The Move to Malaya’.
101. McAlister, p. 269.
102. Cross, In Gurkha Company, p. 18.
103. Messenger cites figures from March 1948 giving 4288 optees, 2088 raw
recruits, and 108 already in recruit companies (pp. 5–6).
104. Brigadier A. E. C. Bredin, The Happy Warriors (Dorset: Blackmore Press,
1961), p. 88.
Notes 249
105. Ritchie to USSW, CR/FARELF/5950/SD2, 23 Feb 49, WO 32 12822, para. 9.

106. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, p. 8.
107. Cross, In Gurkha Company, p. 20; Messenger, p. 8.
108. Notes from Conference at HQ British Gurkhas, held at New Delhi on 6 and
7 Jan. 48, Jan. 48, GM 10GR/APPX. 1/5.
109. Ritchie to USSW, 23 Feb. 49, para. 16; E. D. Smith, Johnny Gurkha: ‘Friends
in the Hills’ (London: Leo Cooper, 1985), p. 31.
110. Ritchie to USSW, 23 Feb. 49, para. II.2.
111. Harold James and Denis Sheil-Small, A Pride of Gurkhas: 2nd King Edward VII’s
Own Goorkhas (The Sirmoor Rifles) 1948–1971 (London: Leo Cooper, 1975),
p. xiv; Mackay, p. 294; McAlister, p. 17; Cross, In Gurkha Company, p. 21.
112. The Gurkha Brigade was not a tactical formation, but an administrative one.
113. Ritchie to USSW, 23 Feb. 49. With the start of the campaign against the
Malayan Communist guerrillas, the full brunt of these simultaneous
responsibilities became near intolerable and a change was made in the
command structure.
114. MGBG Charter; McAlister, Bugle & Kukri, p. 18.
115. McAlister, p. 18;, ‘Editorial’, The Kukri, July 1951, pp. 3–4.
116. MGBG Charter, paras. 7(a)–(e), 8–10, 11.
117. Ibid., para. 1. Emphasis in original.
119. Ibid., para. 3. Emphasis in original.
120. Scott, pp. 186–91.
121. DO(47)68, 15 Sept. 47, CAB 131/4, para. 19(f).
122. Scott, p. 80.
123. Cited in Cross, In Gurkha Company, p. 22; reproduced in ‘The Move to
Malaya’, The Kukri, no. 1 (1949).
4 FARELF and the Malayan Emergency, 1948–50
1. Short, pp. 447–8.

2. See John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 46; Lesek Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy and
Southeast Asia. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), pp. 11–12; Short,
pp. 44–8. Chin Peng took control of the party in 1947, after the previous
wartime leader and British agent, Lai Tek, was discredited. See Stubbs, Hearts
and Minds, pp. 56–9 and Nigel West, The Friends: Britain’s Post-War Secret
Intelligence Operations (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988), p. 42.
4. This information was obtained from captured diaries. See Riley Sunderland,
Antiguerrilla Intelligence in Malaya, 1948–1960, Memorandum RM-4172-ISA
(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1964), p. 5.
5. Short, pp. 56–8.
6. Donald Mackay, The Domino that Stood: The Malayan Emergency 1948–1960
(Washington: Brassey’s, 1997), p. 35; Brig. E. D. Smith, Counter-Insurgency
Operations: 1, Malaya and Borneo (London: Ian Allan, 1985), pp. 7, 10;
Sunderland in Antiguerrilla Intelligence states a figure of 12 000. Although
250 Notes
based on contemporaneous intelligence sources, this may have been a

cumulative figure rather than an initial one (p. 5).
7. SEACOS 853, 26 June 48, DEFE 11/32, para. 2.
8. The MPABA was simply a rendering of the wartime Malayan Peoples’ Anti-
Japanese Army (MPAJA), which ostensibly disbanded at war’s end, but
which cached numerous weapons and retained organizational coherence
through an Ex-Comrades’ Association.
9. West, The Friends, pp. 41–2; Wade, p. 149; Ritchie, Report, para. 4; Gurney to
Creech Jones, 11 April 1949, DEFE 11/33, Appendix ‘D’. An Australian com-
munist by the name of Lawrence Sharkey is believed to have been the emis-
sary of the new strategy, having stopped in Singapore to brief MCP leaders
on the Calcutta Conference. See Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, p. 60, and
Interview of Sir Robert Thompson, IWM SR 10192/6, Transcript of
Interview, 1988, pp. 4–5.
10. A. J. Stockwell, ‘“A widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow the
government in Malaya”? The origins of the Malayan Emergency’, Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 21:3 (1993) 73–80; Short, pp. 69–75.
The briefing given by the Colonial Office to the Cabinet on 1 July 1948
makes clear British uncertainty about the scope, nature, and direction of
the disturbances. See CP(48)171, 1 Jul 48, CAB 129/28.
11. David Miller, The Communist Menace in Malaya. (New York: Praeger, 1954),
pp. 82–4.
12. Ritchie, Report, para. 8. Wade writes of sending Gurkhas to support police
operations against a ‘band of armed communists’ in North Perak, but makes
no mention of the KMT (p. 148). The only mention I can find of Gurkhas
operating at this time and location is of 2/2 GR, which simply states ‘opera-
tions against bandits’ with no indication of political affiliation (James and
Sheil-Small, A Pride of Gurkhas, p. 7). Since banditry was rife in Malaya and
North Perak was the KMT base in the country (Stubbs, p. 69), the culprits
may well not have been Communists.
13. Ritchie, Report, para. 8. It seems hard to believe that Ritchie would not have
been told that the military had been called out in aid of the civil power on
18 June.
14. Ibid. The C-in-C ACFE, Air Marshal Sir Hugh Lloyd, apparently gave the
same report of Malayan stability to the Chief of the Air Staff.
15. Ibid.
16. West, The Friends, pp. 41–3; Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, pp. 67–8; Short, pp.
77–90; Stockwell, pp. 72–9.
17. West, The Friends, p. 17. The SIS is perhaps better known by its cover name
of MI6.
18. Anthony Clayton, Forearmed: A History of the Intelligence Corps. (London:
Brassey’s, 1993), p. 207.
19. Sunderland, Antiguerrilla Intelligence, p. 8; GHQ FARELF [attrib.], ‘Commun-
ism in South-East Asia’, The Army Quarterly, 57, no. 1 October 1948 (1948),
p. 14.
20. Sunderland, Antiguerrilla Intelligence, p. 6.
21. Stockwell, p. 78.
22. Ritchie, Report, para. 9.
Notes 251
23. Gurney to Creech Jones, Appendix D; Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution,

p. 53; Stockwell Papers, Vade Mecum. The Army in the Cold War (Malaya),
1952–53, LHA Stockwell 7/3, Tab 1, para. 4.
24. Acting High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya to SSC, 10 Aug 48, DEFE
11/32.
26. See JP(48)3(O)(Preliminary Draft), op. cit., section (H); CP(49)72, CAB
129/34, ‘Siam’.
27. Gurney to Creech Jones, Appendix E.
30. Security Forces, or SF, was the term commonly used to denote all civilian
and military forces engaged in counter-guerrilla operations.
31. SEACOS 853. See also Gen. Sir Neil M Ritchie, Directive to the General Officer
Commanding Malaya District, CR/FARELF/1861/G(O), 26 Jun 48, WO 268/7.
33. CP(48)171, 1 Jul 48, CAB 129/28, paras. 15(v) and 15(vi).
35. SEACOS 853.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., emphasis added.
38. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p. 14; Cmd. 7361, Statement on Defence 1949 (London: HMSO, 1949),
para. 4.
41. Short, p. 114, n. 1.
42. Riley Sunderland, Army Operations in Malaya, 1947–1960, Memorandum RM-
4171-ISA. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1964), p. 31; Michael Dewar,
Brush Fire Wars: Minor Campaigns of the British Army since 1945. (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1984), Appendix B; Ritchie, Report, Appendix ‘A’ Order of
Battle. Units went onto ‘war establishment’ at the beginning of 1951, the
authorized strength of which was 840 officers and men. See Sunderland,
Army Operations, p. 31.
43. Ritchie, Report, Appendix ‘A.’
44. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War, p. 43.
45. Short, p. 116.
46. At the end of 1947, the situation vis-à-vis British military strength had been
even weaker than in June 1948. At that point all remaining Indian Army
troops had left and the Gurkhas would not arrive for several months more.
It is fortunate for the British that the MCP decided in favor of armed strug-
gle in March 1948, rather than six months earlier.
47. Sunderland, Army Operations, pp. 132–3.
48. Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919–1960 (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1990), pp. 162–3. For more detail on the Palestine campaign,
see David Charters, The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine,
1945–47 (London: Macmillan Press – now Palgrave, 1989), pp. 132–68.
49. COSSEA 653, 14 Jul 48, DEFE 11/32; Creech Jones to Alexander, 8 Jul 48,
DEFE 11/32.
252 Notes

51. Ibid., para. 31; Blaxland, p. 81.
52. Miller, p. 93; Short, pp. 99–100.
54. Following a row with MacDonald, and having lost the confidence of ‘all
soldiers’ according to Ritchie and Lloyd, Gent had been recalled to London
by Creech-Jones ostensibly for ‘consultations’ but in reality he had been
sacked. He died when his plane crashed as it was approaching London. It
would be several months before his eventual successor, Sir Henry Gurney,
would be sent out to replace him. See Short, pp. 114–19, and CP(48)171.
55. MacDonald to Ritchie, 15 July 48, MJM 25/9/2–3. ‘Reinforcements’ is a ref-
erence to 1 Inniskilling and 4 Hussars.
56. There were two battalions in Hong Kong, but these could not be spared.
57. The BDCC(FE) agreed in early August to expand the two existing battalions
of the Malay Regiment from three to four companies, and to raise a
third battalion for possible service on the frontier with Siam. See Ritchie,
Report, p. 19.
58. GHQ FARELF G(TRG), Lessons from Operations, ref CR/FARELF/8023/G(O),
8 Nov. 48, WO 268/9, p. 5. Sir Robert Thompson, writing some 40 years
after the fact, claims it was Boucher who approached John Davis and
Richard Broome (of Force 136) ‘and myself among others’ to form Ferret
Force. See Sir Robert Thompson, Make for the Hills: Memories of Far Eastern
Wars (London: Leo Cooper, 1989), p. 88.
59. Like Slim, Ritchie disliked ‘private armies’ such as Ferret Force, as they
tended to bleed regular units of their best men, required separate adminis-
trative channels, and could easily get out of control. For Ritchie, Ferret’s
role in raising the ‘jungle-worthiness’ of his regular troops was his primary
goal. For his feelings about private armies, see his Report, p. 10, para. 15. For
details on its organization, see Ritchie to USSW, ‘Jungle Guerilla Force’, ref.
No. CR/FARELF/5567/G(O), 18 Aug. 48, WO 268/8; FARELF, 19 Aug. 48,
WO 268/8.
60. Malcolm Postgate, Operation Firedog: Air Support in the Malayan Emergency
1948–1960 (London: HMSO, 1992), p. 60; Short, pp. 102–3.
61. MacDonald to Ritchie (ltr), 19 July 48, MJM 22/3/5–6.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. CP(48)190, op. cit.
65. Ritchie, Report, pp. 18–19.
66. BDCC(FE), SEACOS 863, 9 Aug. 48, DEFE 11/32.
67. CIC(FE), OP(X)1/2, 21 Sept. 48, WO 268/8; FARELF, Quarterly Historical
Report – G(OPS) for Period Ending 31 Dec. 48, 16 June 49, WO 268/9,
‘Evacuation of British Nationals from China,’ p. 7.
68. SEACOS 863.
69. Ibid.
70. COS(48)112(2), 11 Aug. 48, DEFE 11/32.
71. DO(48)16(3), 13 Aug. 48, CAB 131/5.
72. Ibid.
73. Julian Paget, The Story of the Guards. (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1977),
p. 244. These were 3 Grenadiers, who only four months previously had
Notes 253
returned from two and a half years in Palestine; 2 Coldstreams; and 2 Scots
Guards.
75. Ibid., p. 84; Paget, The Story of the Guards, p. 244.
76. Ritchie, Report, p. 17, para. 29.
77. See, for example, 2GR, ‘2nd King Edward VII’s Own Gurkha Rifles’, The
Kukri, no. No. 1, July 1949 (1949).
78. Sunderland, Army Operations, p. 36.
80. Ibid., p. 12, para. 20. The regimental history admits as much. See Oliver
Lindsay, Once a Grenadier: The Grenadier Guards 1945–1995 (London: Leo
Cooper, 1996), pp. 31–3.
81. Ritchie disbanded Ferret Force at the end of the year after the new school
had been established; he believed Ferret Force ‘would have become redun-
dant because the jungle training of the ordinary troops should have
improved to such an extent’ by that time. Blair Tarver, War Office, 31 Aug.
1948 WO 208/3931. By the guerrillas’ own account, Ferret Force had threat-
ened their operations because they ‘penetrate too deep into the Jungle and
stay too long.’ (FARELF to WO/MI2, 4 Sept. 48, WO 208/4103). On the
spreading of doctrine, see GHQ FARELF G(TRG), Lessons from Operations,
ref CR/FARELF/8023/G(O), 8 Nov. 48, WO 268/9; FARELF, Conference
Minutes, 28 Sept. 48, WO 268/8.
82. FARELF, Meeting held at Flagstaff House 19 Aug. 48; author’s interview of
General Sir Walter Walker, KCB, DSO (Dorset, 20 Jan. 1993); Charles Allen,
The Savage Wars of Peace: Soldiers’ Voices 1945–1989 (London: Michael
Joseph, 1990), p. 12; Tom Pocock, Fighting General: The Public & Private
Campaigns of General Sir Walter Walker (London: Collins, 1973), pp. 87–8.
83. Walker interview; GHQ FARELF, Quarterly Historical Reports, FARELF
Training Centre, Quarter Ending March 1949, WO 268/116. A few years
later the school was moved to Kota Tinggi, where it still exists today as a
Malaysian training school. The British eventually set up a new Jungle
Warfare School in Brunei. See Malaya Command, ‘Notes of a Conference
Held by GOC at Malaya District on 11 July 1950,’ WO 231/38, Appendix
‘A,’ pp. 8–9; Lt-Col. John P. Cross, Jungle Warfare: Experience and Encounters
(London: Arms & Armour Press, 1989), pp. 182–5.
84. See, for example, Richard Miers, Shoot to Kill (London: Faber and Faber, 1959),
p. 31, on the cadre and battalion training of the South Wales Borderers,
and Lt-Col. Rowland S. N. Mans, MBE, ‘The Ambush’, Marine Corps Gazette,
47 (February 1963) p. 40, on his training experience as a rifle company
commander.
85. Walker interview.
86. Ritchie to USSW, CR/FARELF/2392/SD1, 25 Nov 48, WO 32/12822; the rec-
ommendation to increase the garrison was in Ritchie to USSW, CR/FARELF/
1821/G(O) of 24 Nov 48, but that document was not in the file.
87. Ritchie to USSW, CR/FARELF/2392/SD1.
88. COS(50)100, 28 Mar 50, DEFE 5/20, was the revised near-term war plan. It
clearly stated that release to the Far East was not authorized. Judging from
minutes of COS meetings, the earlier plan, SPEEDWAY, must have been
under a similar embargo.
254 Notes
89. See Richard Aldrich and John Zametica, ‘The rise and decline of a strategic
concept: the Middle East 1945–51’, in Aldrich, British Intelligence, p. 254.
90. See the comments of J. J. Paskin in COS(48)150(1), 22 Oct 48, DEFE 4/17;
see also Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Secret intelligence for a post-war world: reshap-
ing the British intelligence community, 1944–51’, in Aldrich, British
Intelligence, pp. 37–8. Sensitive documents of the PHPS were leaked from
Australia to Moscow. The US deemed the Australian security situation so
bad as to cut off the flow of classified information to Australia in June
1948. Peter Edwards, Crises and Commitments: the Politics and Diplomacy of
Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1965 (North
Sydney: Allen & Unwin/AWM, 1992), p. 51.
91. Lambert to Ritchie, 10 Jan. 49, WO 32/12822; COS(49)6(3), 10 Jan. 49,
DEFE 4/19; Brig R. T. Ransome, CR/FARELF/1815/G(O), 28 Jan. 49, WO
268/744.
92. COS(49)6(3) and JP(48)125(Final), 5 Jan. 49, DEFE 6/7, Annex para 5(ii).
93. COS(49)6(3).
94. Short, p. 134.
95. Creech Jones to Cripps, 10 Jan. 1949, DEFE 7/413.
96. SEACOS 879, 29 Jan. 49, DEFE 11/32.
97. COS(49)15(2), 31 Jan. 49, DEFE 4/19, in which the COS discussed SEACOS
878. Price to Minister of Defence, 4 Feb. 49, DEFE 11/32.
98. COS(49)54, 12 Feb. 49, DEFE 5/13; COS(49)138, 22 Apr. 49, DEFE 5/14.
99. COS(49)85, 9 Mar. 1949, DEFE 7/413.
100. See Haron, Table 5, p. 228, and anon., ‘The Federation Army of Malaya’, p. 38.
101. It seems likely that Slim, who had commanded the 2/7 GR in the late
1930s and was ‘Colonel’ of the regiment, was responsible for the
regiment’s reconversion to infantry. See War Office DDSD(A), Loose
Minute to 0164/6709(SD2), 5 Jan. 49, WO 32/12822; Mackay, Appendix I,
pp. 324, 326.
102. Ritchie to USSW, CR/FARELF/5950/SD2, 23 Feb. 49, WO 32/12822.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. This had already been confirmed in May in War Office to FARELF, 19 May
49, WO 32/12822; Lambert to Ritchie, 6 July 1949, WO 32/12822.
106. Divisional artillery forces usually consisted of three field regiments, but
none could be spared at this time. The Army Council ruled that the third
artillery regiment would join the Division after mobilization. The Gurkha
combat support units had British officers and, in some cases, British NCOs
as well.
107. Hamilton, pp. 718–19.
108. See Ronald Lewin, Slim: The Standardbearer (Hamden, CT: Archon Books,
1976), pp. 267–8; Darby, pp. 38–9, and Cloake, p. 178. Templer was VCIGS
to both Montgomery and Slim.
109. Scott, pp. 189–218.
111. GHQ FARELF [attrib.], ‘Review of Events in the Far East’, The Army
Quarterly, 58:2 (1949).
112. Harding was not supposed to take up the post until early autumn, but
Ritchie had broken his arm in an accident which prompted Harding’s early
Notes 255
arrival. Interview of Field Marshal the Lord Harding, IWM/DSR 8736/50,

TS transcript of interview, pp. 270–1.
113. Ibid., p. 271; Carver, Harding, p. 165.
114. Harding interview, p. 274.
115. Ibid., p. 275.
116. Harding to USSW, CR/FARELF/10068/SD2, 31 Aug. 49, WO 32/12822.
117. Ibid.
118. This would have been Hull to Kirkman, MO2/BM/1339(SD2) of 22 Dec. 49,
which was missing from the correspondence file in WO 32/12822.
119. Kirkman to Hull, DO/COS/300, 31 Jan. 50, WO 32/12822.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid.
122. War Office, Minutes of a Meeting Held on 27 February, 1950 on the
Permanent Garrison – FARELF, 27 Feb. 50, WO 32/12822.
123. Ibid.
124. Harding to USSW(DMO), CR/FARELF/10719/G(O), 26 Jan. 50, DEFE 11/34.
125. Coates, Appendix A, gives detailed month-by-month statistics for the
crucial years of the Emergency; see also Short, pp. 211–17.
126. Until the PLA captured South China, the Federation government had
deported thousands of Chinese Communist sympathizers and their fami-
lies to China. The practice continued fitfully for several months after 1
October no doubt involving pay-offs to officials of the new government.
See DO(50)93, 15 Nov. 50, CAB 131/9; SEACOS 138, 10 Dec. 50, DEFE
11/42; COS(51)20(1), 26 Jan. 51, DEFE 4/39; COS(51)30(1), 12 Feb. 51,
DEFE 4/40; COS(51)69(5), 20 Apr. 51, DEFE 4/41; BDCC(FE), SEACOS 196,
19 Apr. 51, DEFE 11/44
127. CP(49)214, 24 Oct. 49, CAB 129/37. Bevin also hoped that by ‘keeping a
foot in the door’ in China, Britain would be in a position to take advan-
tage of any subsequent friction that might arise between the Russians and
the Chinese (paras 4–5); see also Bullock, p. 747.
128. CM(49)62(7), 27 Oct. 49, CAB 128/16.
129. CP(49)248, 12 Dec. 49, CAB 129/37, ‘IV.–Singapore Conference.’
130. CP(50)75, 21 Apr. 50, CAB 129/39; Short, pp. 214–15.
131. CP(49)248, para. 23.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
134. COS(49)421, 5 Dec. 49, DEFE 5/18, para. 13(a).
135. Ibid., para. 2
136. Ibid., paras 3, 5, 10, 12.
137. Ibid., paras 10, 13(c).
138. Bullock, p. 744, 747.
140. CP(50)75.
141. Short, p. 216. For the positions of the all the major players in this issue,
see CP(50)75.
142. SEACOS 24, 24 Feb. 50, DEFE 11/34, para. 1.
143. Clutterbuck, Long, Long War, pp. 55–56 and passim. It was Japanese occu-
pation forces that created the squatters problem.
144. BDCC(FE)(50)1/1, 11 Feb. 50, DEFE 5/20.
256 Notes
145. Gurney to Creech Jones, No. 127, 10 Feb. 50, DEFE 11/34.
146. Short, pp. 227–9; Carver, Harding, pp. 166–7.
147. Gurney to Creech Jones, No. 127.
148. Harding to USSW(DMO), op. cit.
149. Harding interview, pp. 279–80; Carver, Harding, p. 166.
150. Harding to Slim, 16 Feb. 50, WO 216/333. Contrary to most published
accounts, it was Harding who originally conceived the need for a Director
of Operations, not Gurney, although Gurney had to be the one to offi-
cially request such a post from the Colonial Office. See Gurney to Creech
Jones, No. 151, 23 Feb. 50, DEFE 11/34. The position was to be a civil one,
and would have operational control over all Security Forces in Malaya,
including the RAF, although the senior military commanders would have a
right of appeal to their respective Cs-in-C.
151. SEACOS 24, 24 Feb. 50, DEFE 11/34, para. 2(a).
154. Ibid., paras. 9, 13(c) and (d). On the subject of lower and higher establish-
ment, see Sunderland, Army Operations, p. 31, and Short, p. 225; in
SEACOS 24, the BDCC also reiterated an earlier request for heavy bombers
(SEACOS 19) and proposed, subject to approval by the Governor of
Hong Kong, to move a squadron of Spitfires from the island colony to
Malaya.
155. COS(50)33(2), 1 Mar. 50, DEFE 4/29.
156. COS(50)84, 2 Mar. 50, DEFE 5/20. Shinwell forwarded the report to
Defence Committee on 9 March. DO(50)14, 9 Mar. 50, CAB 131/9.
157. COS(50)33(2), 1 Mar. 50, DEFE 4/29.
158. Ibid.
159. COS(50)84.
160. DO(50)14, 9 Mar. 50, CAB 131/9. The Chiefs’ outgoing message is in
COSSEA 727, 10 Mar. 50, DEFE 11/34. Harding and Slim had corresponded
with each other about potential candidates for the new post, two of the
more prominent being Maj.-Gen. (later Gen. Sir) Richard Gale and Brig.
Fitzroy McLean. Slim appears to have chosen Briggs based largely on his
personal knowledge of the man, who had served under him during the
Burma campaign and who later commanded British Commonwealth
forces in Burma prior to independence in January 1948. Harding also knew
Briggs from the North African campaign and had ‘great confidence’ in
him. For details, see Harding to Slim, 16 Feb. 50, WO 216/333; Harding to
Slim, 24 Feb. 50, WO 216/333; Slim to Harding, 1 Mar. 50, WO 216/333.
Slim’s alternate suggestion was Sir Rob Lockhart, who had been C-in-C
India after Auchinleck. Lockhart would in fact succeed Briggs as Director of
Operations in 1951. Harding interview, p. 280; CoS FARELF to Slim, 3 Mar.
50, WO 216/333.
161. Coates, Appendix A.1.
162. See Carver, Harding, pp. 166–7, and Short, pp. 233–7. The report is in
SEC(50)7, 11 Apr. 50, in COS(50)132 of 19 Apr. 50, DEFE 5/20. Boucher left
Malaya in early March for medical leave in the UK, being replaced temporar-
ily as GOC Malaya by Maj.-Gen. Roy Urquhart of Arnhem fame. Boucher
died soon after, though, and Urquhart’s posting was made a regular tour. See
Notes 257
John Baynes, Urquhart of Arnhem: The Life of Major General R E Urquhart

(London: Brassey’s, 1993), pp. 185, 197, 204. Briggs arrived in Kuala
Lumpur on 3 April, completing his whirlwind tour and producing his
assessment a week later (Short, p. 233).
163. SEC(50)7 in COS(50)132.
164. Ibid., paras 1–2, 4, 7 and 10.
165. Ibid., para. 11. Such a move, as was the case with the move of 26 Gurkha
Infantry Brigade, would require ministerial approval and provisions for
emergency reinforcement. Harding suggested a battalion be flown direct to
Hong Kong from the United Kingdom in order to make up part of the loss
of the commandos while also demonstrating the ability to reinforce at
short notice by such a method, still novel at the time. Within FARELF, he
would move 26 Field Regiment, RA to Hong Kong, where they could
retrain as artillery after their stint as infantry in Malaya. See Chapter 5 for
the impact in Hong Kong.
166. Ibid., paras 15(a) to 15(h).
167. Gurney to SSC, No. 329, 17 Apr. 50 (as Appendix II to COS(50)132).
168. Lt.-Gen. Sir Harold Briggs, Report on the Emergency in Malaya from April,
1950 to November, 1951 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1951), p. 7.
169. Ibid., p. 7.
170. Ibid., pp. 8–9.
171. MC(50)1(2), 19 Apr. 50, DEFE 11/35.
172. Ibid.
173. SEACOS 43, 20 Apr. 50, DEFE 11/35.
174. The gist of Harding’s cable are in COS(50)66(3), 26 Apr. 50, DEFE 4/30.
175. COS(50)62(1), 21 Apr. 50, DEFE 4/30.
176. The key documents are included in DO(50)32, 29 Apr. 50, CAB 131/9.
Authorization was sent in COSSEA 736, 27 Apr. 50, DEFE 11/35.
177. See Peter Edwards, ‘The Australian Commitment to the Malayan
Emergency, 1948–1950’, Historical Studies, 22:89 (1987) 604–16, and
Edwards, Crises and Commitments, pp. 94–6; also see the relevant chapters
in Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian
Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966, Vol. V, The Official
History of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975
(St. Leonard’s, NSW: Allen & Unwin with AWM, 1996).
178. Note by the CIGS, 20 Apr. 50, DEFE 11/35, para. 7.
5 ‘To the Last Round’: the Defense of Hong Kong, 1948–50
1. DO(46)30, 1 Mar. 46, CAB 131/2.

2. Ibid.; for a description of pre-war thinking about Hong Kong, see
Christopher M. Bell, ‘Our Most Exposed Outpost’: Hong Kong and British
Far Eastern Strategy, 1921–1941,’ Journal of Military History, 60:1 (1996)
61–88.
3. DO(46)30. The Defence Committee confirmed the decision at DO(46)7(1), 8
Mar. 46, CAB 131/1. At the time there were two brigades in Hong Kong pro-
viding internal security, the police forces having not yet fully rebuilt them-
selves so soon after the occupation.
258 Notes
4. See Murfett, In Jeopardy, pp. 5–7, 18–19, 30, and DO(48)36, 8 May 48, CAB
131/6. This despite the fact that the Army (FARELF) and RAF (FEAF) coun-
terparts, as well as the CIC(FE), BDCC(FE), JPS(FE), and JIC(FE) were all
located in Singapore. Montgomery was incensed to discover this on his visit
as CIGS to the theater in 1947, and managed to persuade his colleagues on
the COSC to relocate the Navy’s principal headquarters to Singapore. See
COS(47)161(O), 11 Aug. 47, DEFE 5/5.
5. F. S. V. Donnison, British Military Administration in the Far East, 1943–46
(London: HMSO, 1956), pp. 209–10.
6. Nigel Cameron, An Illustrated History of Hong Kong (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991), pp. 280–81.
7. Ibid., p. 270; Norman Miners, ‘The Localization of the Hong Kong Police
Force, 1842–1947,’ The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,
XVIII:3 (1990) 311; see also Donnison, pp. 206–7.
8. Miners, p. 311.
9. Donnison, p. 202. Troops were also vital to the restoration and running of
essential city services. Law and order was initially the responsibility of the
naval task force which reached Hong Kong at the end of August. In mid-
September army and Royal Marine Commando units arrived to take over
(p. 206); Clayton, p. 246.
10. JP(47)80(Final), 27 June 47, DEFE 6/2.
11. ODC(47)10, 11 Apr. 1947, CAB 131/4.
12. COS(47)122(O), 9 June 47, DEFE 5/4; the Governor of Hong Kong’s
thoughts were sent to the COS in telegram 1011 of 17 June 1947, as noted
in JP(47)80(Final).
13. JP(47)80(Final).
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. This elaboration of the threat is in JP(47)125(Final), 7 Nov. 47, DEFE 6/3.
17. JP(47)80(Final). The relevant portion of the report reads as if the Joint
Planners were unaware of the contents of ODC(47)10, The Role of Colonies in
War. The Chiefs approved the JPS recommendations shortly thereafter. Refer
to COS(47)81(2), as noted in JP(47)125(O)(T. of R.), 8 Sept. 47, DEFE 6/3.
18. JP(48)3(O)(Preliminary Draft), op. cit., Annex II, section (L) ‘Hong Kong’.
19. Ibid.
20. COS(48)43(O) [CIC(FE)(48)8(P)], 23 Feb. 48, DEFE 5/10, Annex III, para. 9.
21. Ibid., para. 3(f).
22. CIC(FE)(48)8(P), para. 9 and Appendix A, para. 1.
23. Ibid., Appendix A.
24. Ibid., Appendix A, para. 4.
25. To the British, Shanghai had none of the strategic or political pretensions of
Hong Kong: its value was purely financial. The British relinquished control
over the civil administration and customs of the treaty port to the Chinese
government as per the 1943 Anglo-American agreement, and in return the
Chinese guaranteed the property and trading rights of the taipans.
See George Woodcock, The British in the Far East (New York: Atheneum,
1969), p. 234; Cmd. 6456, Treaty … for the Relinquishment of Extra-Territorial
Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters, 11 Jan 43. Though the
political position in Shanghai remained tenuous, British and other foreign
Notes 259
businesses prospered as never before. By the time of the Communist takeover

in 1949, British investment in Shanghai businesses totaled £300 000 000
(Woodcock, p. 234). The prospect of continuing these investments would be
one of the reasons underlying the British decision to recognize the
Communist government in January 1950.
26. CIC(FE)(48)8(P), Appendix A, para. 5.
27. McAlister, pp. 270–2. In June 1948 the battalion’s strength was 10 British
officers, 11 Gurkha officers, 355 Gurkha other ranks, and 184 recruits, the
training of which proved to be an enormous drain on the NCO cadre.
28. CIC(FE)(48)8(P), Appendix A, paras 8, 9. The number of battalions does not
equate with the predicted deficiencies. Presumably, there was a temporal
factor which indicated the need for rotating reliefs for troops that may be
operating on the frontier or in the internal security role.
29. DO(48)36, 8 May 48, CAB 131/6; JP(47)125(Final), Annex I. This statement
was slightly disingenuous, as Ritchie had, as previously noted, detained the
understrength 2/6 Gurkhas in Malaya. Although it was still intended for the
Hong Kong garrison, its delay meant that the return home of the 2 Buffs
was postponed, which actually placed a higher, albeit temporary, demand
on British manpower.
30. DO(48)10(2), 13 May 48, CAB 131/5.
31. The artillery first appears in discussions about the garrison in CIC(FE)(48)8(P).
My belief is that the regiment had been posted to Hong Kong as a place
holder and probably operated primarily in an infantry, internal security role,
rather than as a gunner unit. Once there, Ritchie was loathe to give it up, as is
clear from his signal to the War Office of 16 February.
32. The language first appears in JP(47)80(Final) of 27 June 47 (op. cit.) and is
derived from an appreciation by the CIC(FE). The phrase ‘heavy attack by a
first class power’ thereafter appears in both the draft report to the Defence
Committee in JP(47)125(Final) and in the final report given the committee
in DO(48)36. Bevin used the phrase in the committee meeting of 13 May,
that is, DO(48)10(2).
33. This even though there had been serious tension with China as a result of
an incident at Kowloon Walled City, in which the police were used to clear
some slums. The police ended up opening fire on some of the squatters,
killing one and wounding others. Kuomintang agitators and the local
Chinese press called for action against the British, a call answered in nearby
Canton by the burning of the British Consulate-General, an act incited by
government officials. See Sir Alexander Grantham, Via Ports (London:
1965), pp. 130–3.
34. Ritchie’s comments on the appreciation discussed in CoS FARELF to BGS
FARELF, BM/COS/1062/2, 30 July 48, WO 268/8.
35. David Rees, ‘Red Star in the East’, in War in Peace: Conventional and Guerrilla
Warfare since 1945, ed. Sir Robert Thompson (New York: Harmony Books,
1981), pp. 12–13.
36. Brig. Peter Young and Brig. Michael Calvert, A Dictionary of Battles
(1816–1976) (New York: Mayflower Books, 1977), pp. 171–2. Young states
that Hsuchow (which he calls Hwai-Hai) ‘one of the great battles of modern
history.’
37. COS(48)136, 26 Oct. 48, DEFE 5/8.
260 Notes
38. COS(48)168, 19 Nov. 48, DEFE 5/9.

39. Ibid.
40. COS(48)168(7), 24 Nov. 48, DEFE 4/18.
41. Ibid.
42. Letter from the SCOSC to the CO (COS 1992/25/11/8) of 25 Nov. 48, in
COS(48)168(7).
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. HK to CO, no. 1068, 23 Nov. 48, in Annex I to COS(48)194, 7 Dec. 48,
DEFE 5/10.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. CO to HK, no. 1242, 2 Dec. 48, in Annex II to COS(48)194.
49. HK to CO no. 1068.
50. Statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Annex to COS(49)12, 7
Jan. 49, DEFE 5/13.
51. SEACOS 872 of 15 Dec. 48, as cited in COS(49)101, 23 Mar. 49, DEFE 5/13.
52. Statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Annex and cover to
COS(49)12.
53. Ibid. The CIC(FE) responded to this particular criticism in March while
addressing comments to a related paper: ‘[We] … wish to correct the impres-
sion that [our] views that no threat to Hong Kong would develop sooner
than the third quarter of 1949.’ Rather, SEACOS 872 was meant to convey
that ‘conditions would deteriorate during the first half of 1949, thereby
bringing nearer the several threats to Hong Kong until, by the third quarter
of the year, all four threats enumerated might exist’. COS(49)101, 23 Mar. 49,
DEFE 5/13.
54. High level discussions about police recruitment do not reflect the actual
makeup of the force. While it is true that the vast majority of current and
prospective force members was Chinese, the Hong Kong police before the
war had contained a sizable Indian contingent (mostly Sikhs and Punjabis),
many of which were re-hired after liberation, as well as some Russians and
Portuguese (presumably from Macao). In 1950, the Hong Kong Police was
4680 strong, of which about 1800 were Chinese. See Sir Charles Jeffries, The
Colonial Police (London: Max Parrish, 1952), p. 83 & Appendix 1, and
Miners, pp. 311–12.
55. Statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Annex to COS(49)12.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Contents of Ritchie to USSW, CR/FARELF/1821/G(O), 24 Nov. 48 are
referred to elsewhere, but the actual document remains unlocated; SEACOS
879, 29 Jan. 49, DEFE 11/32.
59. COS(49)54, 12 Feb. 49, DEFE 5/13.
60. Ibid.
61. COS(49)29, 20 Jan. 49, DEFE 5/13 (Part 1), para. 2 (iv), COS column of
Appendix to Annex I.
62. The issue of the Malay Regiment’s expansion is discussed in Chapters
4 and 8.
Notes 261
63. COS(49)29, which drew upon COS(48)194, COS(49)12, and SEACOS 872
(op. cit.), FO(O)(48)34 and CP(48)299, 9 Dec. 48, CAB 129/31; JP(48)124
(Final), 12 Jan. 49, DEFE 6/7, and discussions in COS(49)8(4), 15 Jan. 49,
DEFE 4/19.
64. COS(49)29. Ritchie appears to have been rather more sanguine about the
situation than CO officials in London. Although he realized he had to be
able to reinforce Hong Kong with a brigade group within a month’s notice,
Ritchie told his subordinates he was ‘satisfied we could hold on in HONG
KONG’, for ‘whatever Government was in power in CHINA … would want
us to continue to run’ the colony. FARELF, Minutes of Part II of the Con-
ference Held at GHQ FARELF on 4. Jan. 49, 11 Jan. 49, WO 268/744.
65. The CIC(FE) position was more dire: the redeployment of a brigade group
from Malaya to Hong Kong ‘cannot be done until the present emergency in
Malaya ceases and even then would depend upon the retention in the
theatre of the equivalent of One Brigade held specially to meet the emer-
gency.’ See para. 2(a)(v) of the appendix to Annex I of COS(49)29.
66. COS(49)29.
67. Ibid., appendix to Annex I, para. 3.
68. CP(48)299, paras 25 and 29.
69. Ibid. Burma was not part of the Commonwealth, but India and Pakistan were.
France and the Netherlands are included because of their colonial possessions
in Indochina and Indonesia, respectively. The United States is considered
because of its position in Japan and the Philippines, and its aid to China.
70. COS(49)29, paras 3 and 12.
72. Ibid.
73. Reference to SEACOS 878, COS(49)15(2), 31 Jan. 49, DEFE 4/19.
74. Price to Minister of Defence, 4 Feb. 49, DEFE 11/32.
75. COS(49)15(2) (emphasis added).
76. CP(49)39, 4 Mar. 49, CAB 129/32; CP(49)52, 5 Mar. 49, CAB 129/33;
COS(49)34(8), 28 Feb. 49, DEFE 4/20; COS(49)34(9), 28 Feb. 49, DEFE 4/20;
COS(49)33(3), 25 Feb. 49, DEFE 4/20.
77. COS(49)34(8).
78. The delay was based on the difficulty involved with relieving troops in the
Middle East.
79. CP(49)52, para. 2.
80. Malcolm Murfett, Hostage on the Yangtze: Britain, China, and the Amethyst
Crisis of 1949 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), Appendix 1, p. 239.
The initial exchanges of fire resulted in nearly 300 deaths on both sides. See
also Malcolm Murfett, ‘A Pyrrhic Victory: HMS Amethyst and the Damage to
Anglo-Chinese Relations in 1949’, War & Society, 9:1 (1991) 123.
81. Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War Two
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 128. The senior naval officials in
the Far East were aware of the political situation but thought the Communist
crossings wouldn’t begin until the 21st, and thought the risk of relieving
Consort acceptable.
82. Murfett, Hostage, p. 65; DO(49)12(1), 21 Apr. 49, CAB 131/8. The memoran-
dum by the Minister of Defence is DO(49)32, 26 Apr. 49, CAB 131/7.
262 Notes
83. DO(49)12(1). There was a great deal of concern that young, untrained
National Servicemen would be sent abroad, a situation which ministers
thought would be hard to defend in Parliament. The committee therefore
asked the War Office to be mindful of this concern when determining the
actual composition of the brigade group. The War Office chose the 27 Inf.
Bde., which existed in name only and whose component units had never
trained together. The 1 Leicesters and brigade headquarters staff left almost
immediately. The other two infantry battalions notified to move when
shipping became available were 1 Middlesex and 1 A&SH. ‘B’ Squadron of
3 RTR, along with supporting artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and service
troops, were also alerted for the move to Hong Kong. See Blaxland, pp.
132–3, anon. ‘Reinforcements for Hongkong – ‘Elements of All Arms’ –
Government Measures’, The Times, 6 May 48, and Kenneth Macksey, The
Tanks: The History of the Royal Tank Regiment, 1945–1975 (London: Arms &
Armour Press, 1979), p. 73.
84. CM(49)30(4), 22 Apr. 49, CAB 128/15.
85. COS(49)59(1), 25 Apr. 49, DEFE 4/21.
86. COS(49)62(6), 29 Apr. 49, DEFE 4/21.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid. Emphasis added.
89. Ibid.
90. JP(49)44(Final), 29 Apr. 49, DEFE 6/8.
91. Ibid., and DMI [attrib.], Appreciation of the Situation in China, 28 Apr. 49,
WO 216/310.
92. JP(49)44(Final).
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid. (emphasis added).
96. Ibid. (emphasis added).
97. As noted above, the report was DO(46)30, and the corresponding minute
is DO(46)7(1).
98. JP(49)44(Final).
99. CM(49)32(2), 5 May 49, CAB 128/15.
100. Ibid.
101. Not only was some sort of unambiguous statement of intent required, but
the unique social and political structure of Hong Kong, which severely
limited the number of citizens thought ‘reliable’ by the government,
demanded imperial assets for defense. The British government’s irresolute
statements to date had damaged morale to the extent that trading in the
Hong Kong stock exchange was dropping off and the appeal for recruits
for the reconstituted HKVDF was ‘disappointing’. Diversion of Hong
Kong’s manpower and economic resources to its defense would be self-
defeating, for the colony’s value was economic, and not strategic. ‘The
very process of preparing Hong Kong to act as a fortress in war drains away
its life blood in peace’, cabled Grantham. See Grantham to Creech Jones,
No. 15, and Grantham to Creech Jones, No. 16, annexes to FE(O)(49)27,
11 May 49, CAB 134/287.
102. CM(49)32(2).
103. SEACOS 904 of 12 May 49, noted in JP(49)50(Final), 17 May 49, DEFE 6/9.
Notes 263
104. Ibid.; COS(49)70(3), 12 May 49, DEFE 4/21. First Sea Lord Fraser noted that
‘the normal procedure was to prepare plans and then send them to the
Cs-in-C for their comments’.
105. JP(49)50(Final), para. 15. Excluding those units already on their way to
Hong Kong. the reinforcements this entailed were: Royal Navy: one aircraft
carrier; four destroyers or frigates; one small fleet train with replenishment
carrier; Army: one infantry division (less one field regiment); one infantry
brigade; one armored regiment (less one squadron); one medium artillery
regiment; one composite AA regiment; one air observation post squadron;
one combined operations bombardment troop; one engineer regiment;
RAF: three fighter/ground attack squadrons.
106. Ibid., para. 16(c).
107. Ibid., paras. 16(c), 17, 22(b)(iii), and 22(b)(v). Because the battalions of the
strategic reserve served also as training establishments for National
Servicemen, their deployment overseas would ‘have serious repercussions
on the output of trained men’. Weekend camps and most annual camps
for the TA would have to be canceled. Because of the ruling that National
Servicemen with less than 16 weeks’ training could not be sent overseas,
any units sent from the UK would be at ‘lower establishment’ and in need
of individual reinforcement. See ibid., Annex B, paras, 15–16 and 19.
108. Ibid., para. 25.
109. Ibid., para. 25, and Annex B, para. 27(b).
110. No. 3 Commando Brigade was a Royal Marine formation and, as such,
belonged to the Admiralty, not the War Office. At full strength a ‘com-
mando’ numbered 607 all ranks, somewhat smaller than a fully-manned
Army infantry battalion. In 1949 there were three commandos in the 3
Commando Brigade. Wartime Army commandos had been disbanded by
this time. See James D. Ladd, The Royal Marines 1919–1980 (London:
Jane’s, 1981), p. 267 and Appendix 2, p. 352.
111. JP(49)50(Final), para. 25.
112. Ibid., Annex B, para. 21.
113. Air Marshal Sir Hugh Lloyd, the Air Officer Commanding, Far East, was
also present at the meeting to discuss JP(59)50(Final). On the air reinforce-
ments Lloyd agreed to the proposals about the types, numbers, and
sources of aircraft.
114. COS(49)73(1), 18 May 49, DEFE 4/21.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid. The classes referred to were developed as part of the wartime demobi-
lization scheme and constituted the only real trained reserve in the British
Army at the time, as the National Service scheme had only recently got
under way. Class A was based on age and length of service; Class B for men
employed in occupations essential to postwar economic reconstruction.
See Scott, Appendix 2, p. 278.
119. SAC(49)5(2), 19 May 49, CAB 134/669. The situation in Shanghai was
minute 1. The COS aide memoire is attached to the Hong Kong minute,
but can also be found at COS(49)183, 18 May 49, DEFE 5/14.
120. SAC(49)5(2).
264 Notes
121. Ibid.
122. The Chifley government continued to refuse to aid the British defense of
Hong Kong. New Zealand eventually placed several frigates on call to the
Royal Navy, and sent a flight of transport aircraft to Singapore to help ferry
supplies to Hong Kong. Edwards argues that the public embarrassment
caused the Chifley government by New Zealand’s actions eventually led to
Australia sending aircraft to Malaya. See Edwards, Crises and Commitments,
pp. 58–60.
123. SAC(49)5(2), amplified in CP(49)119, 24 May 49, CAB 129/35, para. 10.
For a recent examination of this unhappy episode, see Bell, pp. 61–2, 81–8.
124. SAC(49)5(2). Once again ministers sought to avoid French or Dutch coop-
eration as being counterproductive vis-à-vis Asian opinion.
125. CP(49)118, 24 May 49, CAB 129/35; CP(49)119, 24 May 49, CAB 129/35;
CP(49)120, 23 May 49, CAB 129/35.
126. CM(49)38(3), 26 May 49, CAB 128/15.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid. The Cabinet understood it was likely that the Communists would ini-
tially curtail or cut off trade with the colony, but Hong Kong’s value to the
Chinese was such that they would probably resume trade after an undeter-
mined length of time.
129. Ibid.
130. CP(49)118.
131. DO(49)15(1), 1 June 49, CAB 131/8; Edwards, Crises, pp. 58–60.
132. DO(49)15(2), 1 June 49, CAB 131/8. Unfortunately, Scott does not deal
with this episode.
133. CM(49)42(5), 23 June 49, CAB 128/15.
134. Ibid.
135. Bullock, p. 673.
136. CM(49)42(5). The resulting report was in CP(49)177, which has been with-
held. See note to Document 170, CM(49)54(2) in Ronald Hyam, ed., The
Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945–1951. Part II: Economics and
International Relations, Series A, Vol 2, (London: HMSO, 1992), p. 398.
137. CM(49)42(5).
138. In its escape the Amethyst collided with and sank a Chinese ship without
stopping to help its passengers. While trying to hit the British frigate, PLA
shore batteries sank a passenger ship as well as a cargo vessel, a tragedy
embarrassed PLA officials tried to pin on the Amethyst. For a detailed
account of the Amethyst’s escape, see Murfett, Hostage, ch. 15.
139. CM(49)54(2), 29 Aug. 1949, CAB 128/16. The report, CP(49)177, has been
withheld by the government, although its contents can be ascertained
from the discussions in this minute, as well as in CRO to UK High
Commissioners, no. 326, 7 Sept. 1949, CO 537/4805, No. 86B and
JP(49)97(Final), 14 Sept. 49, DEFE 6/10.
140. CM(49)54(2).
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid. While details are not given in the minute, they may have had in
mind the international regime that then existed in Tangier, Morocco.
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
Notes 265
145. CRO to UK High Commissioners telegram no. 326.

146. See Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London: Harper Collins, 1993),
ch. 17.
147. CP(49)134, para. 4. See Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Defeat Into Victory,
1st edn (London: Cassell, 1956), p. 465; Lyall Wilkes, Festing–Field Marshall:
A Study of ‘Front-Line Frankie’ (Sussex: Book Guild, 1991), pp. 63–6; Slim
apparently had a high regard for Festing, who he later suggested be the
first Director of Operations in Malaya. See, for example, the loose minute
by the MA to the CIGS in Harding to Slim, 16 Feb. 50, WO 216/333. Slim
was probably behind the appointment of Festing, as he was for Briggs
and Lockhart, two other officers whom he knew from his Indian Army and
Burma campaign days. Festing was later knighted and became CIGS and
Field Marshal.
148. Festing told MacDonald that he ‘would be in a mess now if he were [mili-
tary] Governor’, while Grantham ‘at last has a Service Commander in whom
he can feel great trust, and whose experience and authority in Service affairs
are very high. [Grantham] likes Festing personally, and likes his outlook on
things’. See MacDonald to Air Marshal Sir William Elliot, Personal & Private,
3 Aug. 49, MJM 22/8/5–7. Grantham himself said of Festing that ‘He infused
confidence and energy all around’ (Via Ports, p. 142).
149. COSSEA 691, 22 June 49, WO 32/13268.
150. See Slim, Defeat Into Victory, and McAlister, p. 273. At the time of his
appointment as Commanding General, 40 Inf Div, Evans was the Director
of Military Training at the War Office. See Tim Carew, Korea: The
Commonwealth at War (London: Cassell 1967), p. 29. His admiration for
Slim is evident in his 1969 work Slim as Military Commander.
151. Lt-Gen. Francis Festing, OP INSTR NO. 1 issued by Comd 40 Inf Div Ref
100/G/28/G(Ops), 31 Aug. 49, WO 268/289, Appendix A.
152. HQ 40 INF DIV, Quarterly Historical report of Headquarters, 40th Infantry
Division for the period 17 June 49 to 31 Mar. 50, May 50, WO 268/289.
There originally were four plans, but the fourth one, DELIBERATION, was later
canceled for reasons unknown.
153. This is an approximation based on my analysis of the map traces and divi-
sion boundaries given in Operational Instruction No. 1. Unfortunately, the
maps from which the traces were derived were not included in the file,
and I have instead relied on a 1:50 000 map of the Territory of Hong Kong
published by the Survey and Mapping Office, Buildings and Lands
Department, Government of Hong Kong, Series HM50CL, edition 9, 1992,
sheets 1 & 2.
154. Festing, Operational Instruction No. 1, para. 12 (emphasis in original).
155. Ibid., Appendix D, Plan DECAPITATION.
156. Ibid., Appendices E and F, Plans CRUSHER and DEFIANCE.
157. Wilkes, pp. 69–70; Festing, Operational Instruction No. 1, calls not only for
redoubts and observation posts to be built, but also for dummy positions to
confuse the enemy. To maintain security of the new positions, they were
only to be occupied on the order of General Evans. See Appendix D, Plan
DECAPITATION, para. 13.
158. Interview of Colonel Andrew M. Man, ‘The Korean War, 1950–1953’,
IWM/DSR 9537/04, transcript pp. 3–4.
266 Notes
159. Man interview, transcript p. 3. Colonel Man commanded 1 Middlesex in

both Hong Kong and Korea. This attitude obtained elsewhere: for the 2/10
Gurkhas, ‘The accent on Defence of the Colony, our new role, and the
galvanising effect of belonging to an operational Division, bursting with
energy and full of new ideas, was a tremendous fillip to morale’ (McAlister,
p. 274).
160. The British military representative in Canton, a Royal Artillery officer,
managed to escape detection by the PLA and was able to communicate in
code with the senior intelligence staff officer in Hong Kong about military
developments in the Canton region. See Brig. Thomas Haddon, “Looking
Back” (TS memoirs), c. 1991, IWM, Haddon Papers, p. 35.
161. See Interview of Brig. George Taylor, IWM SR 9205/03; the arrival of the
PLA in the border area was the only occasion on which 3 RTR ‘was required
to stow ammunition in [its tanks] in readiness for offensive action.’ See
Macksey, p. 74.
162. Grantham, pp. 149–50.
163. The Consul General at Hong Kong (Rankin) to the Secretary of State, No.
309, 3 Nov. 49, in United States. Department of State, FRUS 1949, Vol. VIII:
The Far East: China (Washington: GPO, 1978), pp. 576–7.
164. Ibid., pp. 577–78. As Rankin reported, the spirits of Hong Kong’s popula-
tion was obviously buoyed by the visit to the colony of Field Marshal Slim
at the end of October, and of the Australian statement that ‘Communist
China must agree to respect the territorial integrity of its neighbors,
‘notably Hong Kong’, as a prerequisite to recognition.’ Ibid., p. 579.
165. Haddon interview, p. 35. December was also the start of the tramway
workers strikes, which at first were thought to portend one of the several
scenarios for invasion that involved internal unrest. The JIC discounted
this possibility in early January 1950. See COS(50)3(7), 6 Jan. 50, DEFE 4/28;
for the salutary effect of deportation on labor subversives, see SEACOS 22,
14 Feb. 50, FO 371/83230.
166. COS(49)161(2), 31 Oct. 49, DEFE 4/26. A more immediate threat was the
possibility of Nationalist aircraft violating Hong Kong airspace on their
way to attack Communist shipping in the Canton area, and that the
Communists might suspect British collusion. See the minute previous to
COS(49)161(2), which is titled ‘Threat to Hong Kong’.
167. Memorandum by the CIC(FE) in COS(49)330, 7 Oct. 49, DEFE 5/16.
168. Ibid.
169. Ibid.
170. CP(49)214, 24 Oct 49, CAB 129/37, para. 8.
172. CM(49)62(7), 27 Oct. 49, CAB 128/16.
173. CP(49)214, para. 10.
174. CP(49)248, 12 Dec. 49, CAB 129/37, para. 3.
175. CP(49)214, para. 10.
176. CP(49)248, para. 4.
178. Ibid., para. 11.
179. Ibid., para. 11.
180. Ibid., para. 22.
Notes 267
181. Ibid., para. 21.

182. Ibid., para. 18.
183. COS(49)421, 5 Dec. 49, DEFE 5/18.
185. See CP(50)75, 21 Apr. 50, CAB 129/39.
186. See, for example, Harding’s comments in COS(50)58(2), 6 Apr. 50, DEFE
4/30.
187. COS(49)421, para. 11; CP(49)248, para. 23.
188. Cabinet approval came on 15 Dec. 9. See CM(49)72(3).
189. See Annex B to CP(50)73, 20 Apr. 50, CAB 129/39; Murfett, ‘A Pyrrhic
Victory’, pp. 134–5.
190. CP(50)73, paras 8–18. The Chinese authorities seized the American,
French, and Dutch military compounds in January and the British one in
April. British firms, especially in Shanghai, were heavily taxed, compelled
to buy ‘Victory Bonds’, and forced to retain all workers even though indus-
tries were idled by the Nationalist blockade. A number of firms decided to
withdraw from China as a result.
191. CP(50)73, para. 10.
192. The then expected loss of Formosa to the Communists ‘would not materi-
ally affect our strategic position in the Far East’, but Communist capture of
American tanks and high performance aircraft could increase the threat to
Hong Kong in the future, a prospect that worried the CIC(FE) to the extent
that they suggested in SEACOS 991 that the British bribe Nationalist air-
crews to sabotage their own equipment and thus prevent its use by the
Communists. See COS(49)171(5), 16 Nov. 49, DEFE 4/26, and the
appended draft report, COS 1650/8/11/9.
193. COS(50)69(1), 1 May 50, DEFE 4/30; Grantham, pp. 149, 155; the popula-
tion had grown from 600 000 at war’s end to nearly 2.4 million in 1950.
See Cameron, p. 280. Cross-border trade resumed in March 1950 with the
passage of railroad freight cars across the border (Grantham, p. 152;
Cameron, p. 294).
194. On the threat, see SEACOS 22, 14 Feb. 50, FO 371/83230; on the decision
to approve the reinforcements, see COS(50)84 in DO(50)14, 9 Mar. 50,
CAB 131/9.
195. MacDonald to Hong Kong, No. 66, 24 Feb. 50, MJM 19/7/25-26.
196. SEC(50)7 in COS(50)132, 11 Apr. 50, DEFE 5/20; Gurney and Briggs, the
new Director of Operations in Malaya, entirely agreed with the proposal.
See Gurney to SSC No. 329 of 17 Apr. 50 (Appendix II to COS(50)132).
197. SEACOS 43, 20 Apr. 50, DEFE 11/35.
198. Festing had developed a blood clot in his brain and had to return to Britain
for treatment. See Wilkes, p. 71. For details on his relief, see COS(49)143(2),
28 Sept. 49, DEFE 4/25; COS(49)144(3), 28 Sept. 49, DEFE 4/25.
199. SEACOS 43, para. 2; Grantham to SSC, No. 419, 20 Apr. 50, DEFE 11/35. I
see no reason not to accept Grantham’s assertion about marines enlisting
on long service engagement (para. ‘J’), but two histories of the
Commandos state that large numbers of National Servicemen also served
in the Commando Brigade. See Robin Neillands, By Sea and Land: The Royal
Marine Commandos, A History 1942–1982 (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1987), p. 135, for which Ladd, p. 268, was probably the source.
268 Notes
200. Comments of Lt-Gen. Mansergh transmitted in Gov HK to SSC, No. 419,

op. cit.
201. Mansergh in HK to SSC, No. 416.
202. Grantham, paras 2–4, in HK to SSC, No. 416.
203. Grantham to SSC, No. 427, 21 Apr. 50, DEFE 11/35. He does not substanti-
ate this claim.
204. For examples, see LFHK to WO, Sitrep No. 124, 1 Mar. 50, FO 371/83260
FC10112/12; SEACOS 26, 7 Mar. 50, FO 371/83230; LFHK to WO, Sitrep
No. 141, 5 Apr. 50, FO 371/83261 FC10112/31; LFHK to WO, Sitrep
No. 148, 18 Apr. 50, FO 371/83261 FC10112/37; GOC HK to WO, Sitrep No.
145, 14 Apr. 50, FO 371/83261 FC10112/31; COS(50)69(1), 1 May 50, DEFE
4/30.
205. GOC HK to WO sitrep no. 145, op. cit.
206. COS(50)50(6), 27 Mar. 50, DEFE 4/30.
207. COS(50)66(3), 26 Apr. 50, DEFE 4/30.
208. Interview of Field Marshal Harding, n.d., IWM/DSR 8736/50, transcript
p. 289.
209. COS(50)62(1), 21 Apr. 50, DEFE 4/30; DO(50)32, and MAL. C. (50)6, 29
Apr. 50, both in CAB 131/9.
210. COS(50)69(1), 1 May 50, DEFE 4/30 and GOC HK to WO, sitrep no. 159, 5
May 50, FO 371/83261 FC10112/41, which relay disturbing news of
Russian assistance to the PLA and of an apparent terror bomb campaign,
did not seem to faze Harding.
211. Brig. W. E. Underhill, The Royal Leicestershire Regiment (17th Foot): A History
of the Years 1928 to 1956 (Plymouth: Underhill Ltd., 1957), p. 247.
212. JP(50)68(Final), 15 July 50, DEFE 6/13, emphasis added.
213. Ibid.
214. Ibid. ‘Seriously’ meant Russia.
215. Ibid.; Baldwin, p. 161.
216. Ibid.
217. See facsimile of CIA, ORE 29–49, Prospects for Soviet Control of
Communist China, 15 Apr. 49, in Michael Warner, ed., The CIA Under
Harry Truman, (Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994),
p. 282; The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State, no.
1619, 27 Sept. 49, FRUS 1949, Vol. VIII, p. 539.
6 Adapting to Reality: the Far East and Cold War

Strategy, 1950–54
1. Dockrill, British Defence, Appendix IV, p. 151. By way of contrast, the Labour
government’s defense outlays in 1950 and 1951 were 6.6 per cent and
7.9 per cent of GNP, respectively.
2. DO(47)44. This paper’s relation to the Far East is discussed in Chapter 2.
3. The key documents are CIC(FE)(48)1(P), found in COS(48)200, 6 Feb. 48,
DEFE 5/9 and COS(48)43(O) [CIC(FE)(48)8(P)] 23 Feb. 48, DEFE 5/10.
4. CIC(FE)(48)8(P), paras 17, ‘Course G,’ and 18(e). The two appendices to this
report lay out in detail the strategic importance of Hainan and Formosa as
bases for air and naval forces which could interfere with or cut allied sea
Notes 269
and air lines of communication, although the Commanders’ primary inter-

est in these islands was as bases for operations against China.
5. COS(49)29, 20 Jan. 49, DEFE 5/13 (Part 1).
6. COS(49)29, para. 23.
7. Ibid., para. 12.
8. Ibid., paras 21–2, 27–8.
9. JP(48)69(Revised Final), 15 Sept. 48, DEFE 6/6. For a detailed discussion of
the HALFMOON plans, see Steven T. Ross, American War Plans 1945–1950 (New
York: Garland, 1988), pp. 89–98. The three allies had agreed to proceed with
coordinated plans at a conference in Washington in April 1948.
10. JP(48)101(Final Revise), 17 Mar. 49, DEFE 6/6. See also JP(48)124(Final), 12
Jan. 49, DEFE 6/7.
11. JP(48)101(Final Revise), Annex I, paras 6(c), 11. Although enemy control of
Formosa would increase the threat to Allied air and sea lines of communica-
tion, the Allied forces necessary to capture it would ‘not … justify the
mounting of a combined [that is, amphibious] operation … since this could
only be undertaken by the diversion of Allied forces from other and more
vital areas’.
12. Ibid., Annex I, para. 13.
13. Ibid., Annex I, paras 10(c), and Annex II, para. 2.
14. Ibid., Annex II, paras 6, 12, 18. The JPS noted that, with respect to Burma,
the BSMB was to provide no military assistance for operations against the
Karens, ‘bearing in mind that the future constitution of Burma may include
a semi-autonomous Karen state’. The accompanying footnote cites a
Cabinet decision at CM(49)15(4).
15. JP(48)101(Final Revise), Annex II, paras 32–3. At this point not even a pre-
liminary peace conference had been held.
16. COS(49)189 [J.P.S. (48) 101 (Final Revise)], 25 May 49, DEFE 5/14.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. The letter to the COS containing the comments by the CIC(FE) arrived
while Ritchie, Air Marshal Lloyd, and Malcolm MacDonald, were all in
London for various exercises and ministerial meetings.
20. SEACOS 900, 5 May 1949, FO 371/76034, F6670/1075/61G, in Ovendale,
British Defence, document 2.11, pp. 65–6.
21. COS(49)81(1), 1 June 49, DEFE 4/22.
22. DO(49)89, para. 12.
23. Ovendale, English-Speaking Alliance, p. 165; for more detail see, Ovendale’s
‘William Strang and the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee,’ in John
Zametica, ed., British Officials and British Foreign Policy 1945–50 (New York:
Leicester University Press, 1990), pp. 212–27.
24. Nicholas Tarling, ‘The United Kingdom and the Origins of the Colombo
Plan’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, XXIV:1 (1986),
pp. 20, 24.
25. Tarling, ‘Colombo Plan’, passim.; see also Bullock, ch. 20.
26. CP(49)207. It is inexplicably missing from the Cabinet files. The conference
would mark the first time ever such a Commonwealth gathering had been
held in Asia, an act significant in itself.
27. CM(49)62(8), 27 Oct. 49, CAB 128/16, discusses CP(49)207.
270 Notes
28. CP(50)18, 22 Feb. 50, CAB 129/38.

29. Ibid.
30. There were only 10 712 men in the Australian regular army in 1948, 14 958
in 1949, and 14 543 in 1950. CMF figures for the same years were, respec-
tively, 8697, 16 202, and 18 236. See T. B. Millar, Australia’s Defence, 2nd
edn (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1969), Appendix B, ‘Personnel
in the Armed Forces 1901–1968 For a more recent study of creation of the
post-war regular battalions, see Colonel David Chinn, ‘Raising a Regular
Infantry Force: Morotai, 1945–46,’ in Duty First: The Royal Australian
Regiment in Peace and War, ed. David Horner (Sydney: Allen & Unwin,
1990), pp. 1–23. A contemporary discussion of the Australian Army’s pos-
ture can be found in COS(50)77(8), 17 May 50, DEFE 4/31.
31. DO(48)79, 18 Nov. 48, CAB 131/6; DO(48)22(2), 24 Nov. 48, CAB 131/5
32. JP(49)39(S)(T of R), 16 Mar. 49 (Ref S.324), 13 Apr. 49, DEFE 6/8.
33. The treaty, which was signed in San Francisco on 1 September 1951, was
quite acceptable to the Chiefs of Staff, for they had been assured by the JCS
in their October 1950 meeting that the US was responsible for the Far East
and Southwest Pacific, and that Britain, Australia and New Zealand should
be responsible for the Middle East. Hence the entire scheme supported
British efforts to gain Australian and New Zealand defense commitments to
the Middle East. See CP(51)47, 9 Feb. 51, CAB 129/44; CM(51)13(2), 12 Feb.
51, CAB 128/19; CP(51)64, 27 Feb. 51, CAB 129/44; CM(51)16(3), 1 Mar. 51,
CAB 128/19; CM(51)19(8), 12 Mar. 51, CAB 128/19; COS(51)40, 25 Jan. 51,
DEFE 5/27.
34. JP(50)47, 4 Apr. 50, DEFE 4/31 .
35. Ibid., para. 1. With Allied sea and air control there was no external threat to
Indonesia or Borneo, but Chinese Communists posed an internal security
threat to Borneo and its oil fields. See paras 3, 12–15.
36. Ibid., para. 61. The Soviets were using ‘all means short of war’, including:
‘(a) A world-wide campaign of propaganda and subversion aimed at weak-
ening political and economic stability in all countries outside the Russian
orbit; (b) Covert support for communist minorities, whose object is to seize
power; (c) The threat of direct intervention by Russian armed forces in sup-
port of Russian policy’ (para. 7).
39. Ibid., para. 66(a).
40. Ibid., paras, 66(b) and (c).
42. SEACOS 900, op. cit.
43. JP(50)47, para. 69.
45. See the editorial note on pp. 321–3 of FRUS 1950, Vol. I (Washington: GPO,
1977); Ovendale, English-Speaking Alliance, p. 166.
46. While the USAF and RAF were still monitoring the radioactive cloud from
the bomb test, the CIA reported on 20 Sep 49 that the ‘current estimate … is
that the earliest possible date by which the USSR might be expected to pro-
duce an atomic bomb is mid-1950 and the most probable date is mid-1953’.
See facsimile document no. 56 on page 319 of Warner. See also John
Notes 271
Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, revised edn (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), pp. 143–4.
47. Colin McInnes, Hot War, Cold War: The British Army’s Way in Warfare
1945–95 (Washington: Brassey’s, 1996), p. 7.
48. On the decision to fight in Europe, see DO(50)5(1), 23 Mar. 50, CAB 131/ 8,
in Ovendale, British Defence, document no. 2.15, pp. 72–3. Earlier British
plans, such as SANDOWN, envisaged the evacuation of American and British
forces to bases in the United Kingdom and the Middle East. See, for exam-
ple, JP(48)109(Final), 3 Dec. 48, DEFE 6/7. The follow-on plan, GALLOPER,
was altered to allow for the new continental commitment – see
JP(50)68(Final), 15 July 50, DEFE 6/13. For a detailed discussion of US war
plans, see Ross, op. cit.
49. Shinwell had been Secretary of State for War until he replaced A. V. Alexander
as a result of the Cabinet reshuffle following elections in February 1950. See
Emanuel Shinwell, I’ve Lived Through it All (London: Victor Gollancz, 1973),
p. 204. Shinwell was generally more active and well-liked than his predeces-
sor, meeting on a regular basis with the COS and service ministers, enjoying
less supervision from Attlee, and greatly expanded the Ministry of Defence.
See Johnson, p. 28.
50. DO(50)45, 7 June 50, CAB 131/9. I have used the version supplied in
Appendix I to Yasamee, various documents found on pp. 411–31.
51. DO(50)45, para. 5.
52. Ibid. para. 8.
53. Ibid., para. 9.
55. Ibid., para. 6.
56. Ibid., para. 13(c).
57. Ibid., para. 13(c).
58. Ibid., paras 11, 16.
59. Reports such as JP(48)101(Final Revise), JP(48)125(Final), and JP(50)47,
discussed above. Australia and New Zealand had accepted responsibility for
‘certain aspects of defence in the Anzam [sic] area’, but the Chiefs contin-
ued to hope this would not be at the expense of reinforcements for the
Middle East. See DO(50)45, paras 36–42, and 56.
60. DO(50)45, para. 40.
63. Ibid., paras 48, 57(A.I.b)
64. Ibid., paras 52, 57(A.I.b).
65. Ibid., para. 57(A.I.b).
66. See Cmd. 7361 Statement on Defence 1949, 1949; Cmd. 7895 Statement on
Defence 1950, 1950.
67. Carver, Tightrope Walking, p. 15.
68. Efforts to increase the regular content of the services had proved more diffi-
cult, and more expensive, than previously realized. See Cmd. 8026, Increase
in the Length of Full-Time Service with the Armed Forces, 1950; Scott, p. 258.
69. Scott, p. 258
70. Cmd. 8161, Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War Relating to the Army
Estimates 1951–52, 1951, para. 9; Blaxland, pp. 211–12.
272 Notes
71. The eight battalions were resurrected second battalions from eight different
regiments. See Blaxland, p. 214.
72. Dockrill, British Defence, p. 43; percentage calculated from defense expendi-
ture for 1949 given in Appendix IV. Attlee approved an immediate increase of
£100 million, to which Alexander added a three-year program of £3.
4 billion, which Parliament increased to £3.6 billion in September, making
a total of £3.7 billion. See Carver, Tightrope, p. 16.
73. Kenneth Harris, Attlee (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982), p. 470;
Carver, Tightrope, p. 19. Such massive expenditures on defense over-heated
the economy in 1951, raising prices of raw materials and damaging Britain’s
already weakened balance of payments ledger. The program ultimately
proved untenable and was scaled-down drastically by the Conservative gov-
ernment following its election victory in October 1951 (Dockrill, British
Defence, pp. 43–4).
74. DO(51)70, 8 June 51, CAB 131/11, para. 1.
76. Ibid., para. 30; DO(51)64, 7 June 51, CAB 131/11, paras 8 and 10.
77. Abstract of Army Statistics for 1950/51, WO 384/1.
78. DO(51)70, para. 40. This contention was a contradiction of British objec-
tions to American calls for ‘Greater Sanction’ against China beginning in
October 1951. In response to American requests to back their intention to
launch widespread bombing and naval blockade against China in the event
of an armistice breach, the British recoiled, arguing that such action would
drive China irreconcilably into the Russian camp and possibly provoking an
attack on Hong Kong or even general war with the Communist bloc.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
88. Ibid., paras 53 and 63.A.I.(c).
89. Dockrill, British Defence, p. 44. The Minister of Health and several junior
ministers resigned over the program’s cost to the economy and to the gov-
ernment’s social welfare policies. See Harris, p. 478.
90. C(52)253, 22 July 52, CAB 129/54, para. 5.
91. Ibid., para. 5.
92. Grove, p. 82.
93. The version presented by the Chiefs is COS(52)361, 15 July 52, DEFE 5/40;
the actual Defence Committee document, D(52)26, CAB 131/12, was being
held by the Cabinet Office at the time of my research in London, although
it has been approved for release to the public. Alexander admitted that
inflation and the Sterling exchanges necessary for maintenance of forces
overseas, particularly in Germany, lowered the net savings closer to £200
million – see D(52)253, para. 7.
94. COS(52)361, para. 120.
Notes 273
95. Ibid., para. 124.

96. Ibid., para. 126
97. Ibid., para. 126(b).
98. Ibid., para. 127.
99. See the conclusions to John Baylis and Alan MacMillan, ‘The British
Global Strategy Paper of 1952’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 16:2 (1993)
200–6. The document was only released in 1993, and with the exception
of official historians, no scholar had actually seen the document which
had for so long been an object of intense speculation. Until Gowing, the
standard source on the paper was Rosecrance, pp. 159–81, which relied
partially on interviews and memoirs of people involved in writing the
report. Darby – as well as others since – perpetuated this version, which
inaccurately describes the paper’s structure and credits it with tenets which
in fact were first introduced in 1950. Although scholars managed to dis-
cern the main arguments of the paper, its place in the development of
strategy from 1947 could not be understood until all the relevant docu-
ments had been released. For a more detailed discussion of secondary
sources on the 1952 paper, see Baylis and Macmillan, op. cit.
100. COS(52)361, paras 9–10. The Chiefs of Staff, accompanying Churchill in
his visit to Washington in January 1952, were briefed in detail on
American atomic capabilities.
101. Ibid., paras 10, 12, and 39.
102. Ibid., para. 21.
103. Ibid., paras 13 and 32.
104. Ibid., paras 22–4, 44, 60, 63.
105. Ibid., para. 60. The form and extent of this warning of ‘Greater Sanction’
was the cause of extensive discussion between Britain and the United
States. See Chapter 7 for its effect on the security of Hong Kong. See
Chapters 9 and 10.
106. The introduction and section on economic factors (Section IX) of the
report make the economic motive for the review abundantly clear, and
Alexander’s statements in paragraph 5 of C(52)253 confirm this. The only
serious attempt to match strategy with resources had been the Harwood
Report of 1949, which the Chiefs effectively scuttled. See Barnett, Lost
Victory, pp. 88–97.
107. COS(52)361, para. 74. Attlee and a small group of ministers had approved
development of a British atomic bomb in January 1947. The first successful
test of a bomb occurred in October 1952, about four months after the
Chiefs completed their report. See Harris, pp. 288–9; Dockrill, British
Defence, pp. 25–6; the most complete account remains Gowing’s.
108. It is not clear if Alexander had given the Chiefs a target funding level as
had been the case in the Harwood Report. See C(52)253, para. 6.
109. COS(52)361, paras 78–85. At the time of the review, the Army was heavily
engaged in controlling serious anti-British disturbances in Egypt which
began in October 1951 when the Egyptian parliament abrogated the 1936
treaty. The threat to families of the garrison prompted the ‘swiftest build-
up ever achieved by the British Army in peacetime’. This enormous com-
mitment absorbed 3 Inf Div and 16 Para Bde – the entirety of the new
strategic reserve – for nearly two years until a base agreement was finally
274 Notes
signed in July 1954 and GHQ MELF was relocated to Cyprus. See Blaxland,
pp. 221–35. For a detailed examination of the Egyptian base issue, see
David Devereux, The Formulation of British Defence Policy Towards the Middle
East, 1948–56 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990),
110. COS(52)361, para. 89.
111. Ibid., para. 89.
113. The Chinese would first have to take Indochina. Ibid., para. 90.
114. Ibid., para. 76. As an indication of this commitment, Australia and New
Zealand had stationed two and one fighter squadrons, respectively, in
Malta, as part of the UK’s Middle East Air Forces (MEAF). See Millar,
Australia’s Defence, p. 49. Nevertheless, the Menzies government’s commit-
ment to the Middle East in the event of hot war continued to waver in
relation to French prospects in Indochina. See Edwards, Crises and
Commitments, p. 110.
115. Ovendale, English-Speaking Alliance, p. 128.
116. See Michael J. Cohen, Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied
Contingency Plans, 1945–1954 (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 301,
307; and Devereux, pp. 114–15, and passim.
117. C(52)316, 3 Oct. 52, CAB 129/55. The effect would be a 75 per cent cut in
the number of new tanks armed with the 120 mm gun; delay in the build-
up of the RAF’s night-fighter and bomber forces; and elimination of 40
minesweepers. Other savings were to be found by reducing targets for war
reserves of POL and other stores. See paras 9 and 10.
118. C(52)320, 3 Oct 52, CAB 129/55, paras 8 and 14.
119. D(52)45, 31 Oct 52, CAB 131/12, paras 2–6.
121. Ibid., para. 9; C(52)202, 18 June 52, CAB 129/53, para. 28.
122. C(52)202, para. 29
123. Ibid., para. 30.
124. D(52)45, para. 19.
125. C(52)393, 5 Nov 52, CAB 129/56, para. 1.
126. Ibid., paras. 2–4. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose!
127. Ibid., paras 7–8. The actual manpower level of the armed forces in 1952
was closer to 827 000. See Appendix IV to Dockrill, British Defence, p. 151.
128. C(52)393, paras 8–9.
129. Ibid., para. 10.
130. Grove, p. 91. Grove provides a singularly excellent account of the Radical
Review, albeit focused on the Royal Navy, in ch. 3.
131. Ibid., p. 91.
132. COS(53)333, 10 July 53, DEFE 5/47, Annex III.
133. Ibid., Annex III, para. 14.
134. Ibid., Annex III, paras 10 and 12.
135. Ibid., Annex III, para. 12.
136. As noted in Chapter 5, one brigade group was the garrison originally
approved by the Defence Committee in 1946. Local forces included a vol-
unteer infantry battalion and an RAF auxiliary fighter squadron (see
COS(53)333, para. 18; and David Lee, Eastward: A History of the Royal Air
Force in the Far East, 1945–1972 (London: HMSO, 1984), pp. 127–128).
Notes 275
While a return to the original garrison size might seem in order, the popu-
lation of Hong Kong had grown from approximately 600 000 in 1946 to
over 2.5 million by 1950, and the Communists had gained control of
China. Because reducing the garrison to this size was an indication that
Hong Kong could not be successfully defended if attacked, it had tremen-
dous strategic and policy implications (ch. 7).
137. Even with the Korean armistice of July 1953, the bulk of the British
contingent in Korea remained as part of 1 Commonwealth Division until
the end of 1954 (Blaxland, p. 208).
138. COS(54)116, 9 Apr. 54, DEFE 5/52. For Churchill’s reaction, Martin Gilbert,
Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VIII ‘Never Despair’ 1945–1965 (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988), pp. 772, 952ff. The Russians had
tested their own hydrogen bomb in August 1953, and also called it a
thermo-nuclear bomb.
139. The Chiefs of Staff report in the Cabinet files (C(54)249) appears not
to have been released.
140. C(54)250, 24 Jul 54, CAB 129/69, para. 3.
141. Ibid., para. 3. The Committee on Defence Policy decided on 16 June 1954,
that Britain should proceed with development and production of its own
hydrogen bomb (Carver, Tightrope, p. 36).
142. C(54)250, paras 16–18.
143. Ibid., para. 5; see also Grove, pp. 109–11.
144. C(54)250, para. 6. The 1951 rearmament program called for 11 regular
divisions, but this was never achieved. At most, 10 divisions existed on
paper in the early 1950s, of which most were widely scattered and under-
strength; for example, after August 1950, 40 Division had only five
infantry battalions in Hong Kong, while two were in Korea as part of the
UN Command, and another three battalions were in Malaya. The second
battalions of eight regiments had been re-raised in April 1952 as part of the
rearmament program (p. 214).
145. C(54)250, paras 6–9.
146. CC(54)37(3), 2 June 54, CAB 128/27; CC(54)47(2), 7 July 54, CAB 128/27.
147. D(54)43, 23 Dec. 54, CAB 131/74, paras 20 and 22(d).
148. ‘Russia has now emerged as a first-class naval Power. We can expect
that, concurrently with strategic air operations, major attacks will be
made by Soviet naval, land and amphibious forces … against Western
Europe and our sea communications.’ See D(54)43, para. 18, and Grove,
pp. 97–8, 121.
149. D(54)43, para. 7; also see CC(54)62(1), 1 Oct 54, CAB 128/27.
150. Ibid., para. 9; Cmd. 9391, Statement on Defence 1955; C(54)329, 3 Nov. 54,
CAB 129/71, para. 19.
151. C(54)329, para. 19.
152. D(54)53, para. 12; Edwards, Crises and Commitments, pp. 162–3. See also
Chapter 9.
153. H. B. Eaton, Something Extra: 28 Commonwealth Brigade 1951 to 1974
(Cambridge: Pentland Press, 1993), p. 161.
154. See Darby, pp. 34–5. This was a not inconsiderable problem, as at any one
time the Army would have between 8000 to 16 000 men in transit, the vast
majority of whom moved by sea.
276 Notes
7 Between the American Scylla and Chinese Charybdis:

Hong Kong, 1950–54
1. JP(48)101(Final Revise), op cit.

2. The Chinese Communist Fourth Field Army, consisting of ethnic Koreans
from China’s Liaotung Province, ‘comprised more than a third of the initial
attack and accounted for its overwhelming success’. See William N. Stokes,
‘Mao and MacArthur: Rethinking the Korean War,’ Foreign Service Journal,
August 1994, 30–4, p. 30. See also Memorandum from Clubb to Rusk, 30
Sept. 50, in FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p. 829.
3. CM(50)39(4), 27 June 50, CAB 128/17.
4. Ibid.
5. COS(50)96(1), 27 June 50, DEFE 4/32.
6. DO(50)48, 28 June 50, CAB 131/9.
7. This fear already had been expressed during the Cabinet meeting the day
before. See CM(50)39(4), op. cit.
8. Comments of Lord Fraser, in DO(50)11(1), 28 June 50, FO 371 FK 1015/139,
reproduced as document no. 4, in Yasamee, pp. 7–10.
9. DO(50)11(1).
10. Ibid.; see also Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War:
Volume I, A Distant Obligation (London: HMSO, 1990), pp. 48–9.
11. JP(50)82(Revised Final), 5 July 50, DEFE 6/13. On the British position
toward Formosa, see Minutes of a Meeting on 30 June 1950 to discuss
Korea, FO 371 FK 1022/59, document no. 9, Yasamee et al., DBPO, pp. 21–4.
12. JP(50)82(Revised Final), para. 12.
15. Ibid.
17. DO(50)12(1), 6 July 50, CAB 131/8, in Yasamee, no. 14, pp. 36–41.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid. There is no indication in this minute to suggest who said this.
20. COSSEA 751, 7 July 50, DEFE 11/37.
21. See Yasamee, note 2, p. 76.
22. Franks to Younger, no. 2036, 23 July 50, FO 371 FK 1022/222, in Yasamee,
no. 25, pp. 76–8.
23. DO(50)15(2), 24 July 50, CAB 131/8; CM(50)50(3), 25 July 50, CAB 128/18.
Also see Farrar-Hockley, Distant Obligation, pp. 102–4, and Callum
MacDonald, Britain and the Korean War (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 21.
24. Australia’s initial contribution was 3 RAR serving with BCOF, and later
added another RAR battalion in 1951. New Zealand raised a mostly volun-
teer artillery regiment, while Canada first sent one battalion, then an entire
brigade and an armored squadron, as well as artillery. India eventually sent
a field ambulance. In 1951 all of the Commonwealth forces were grouped
into the 1 Commonwealth Division. See Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth
Armies and the Korean War (Manchester: MUP, 1988), pp. 35, 40, and pas-
sim.; C. N. Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division, 1950–1953 (Aldershot:
Gale & Polden, 1954). Both volumes of Farrar-Hockley’s Korean War history
provide details, as do the Australian official histories, Robert O’Neill,
Notes 277
Australia in the Korean War, Vol. 1: Strategy and Diplomacy (Canberra: Australian
War Memorial, 1981) and Vol. II: Combat Operations (Canberra: Australian War
Memorial, 1985).
25. Description of the brigade’s formation can be found in Farrar-Hockley,
Distant Obligation, pp. 115–19, and in, Grey, Commonwealth Armies, pp.
37–9. On the diffused state of the ‘brigade’, see Carew, pp. 139–40. The gov-
ernment had decided to remove National Servicemen from the brigade,
which only further complicated its formation and in part necessitated the
calling up of A and B class reservists.
26. COS(50)127(1), 14 Aug. 50, DEFE 4/34; minute, Eliot to Attlee, 17 Aug. 50,
CAB 21/2281, Yasamee, no. 38, p. 108.
27. Farrar-Hockley, Distant Obligation, p. 120; Eliot to Attlee, op. cit.
28. AVM Cecil Bouchier had reported that MacArthur had said ‘a little got in
fast was better than a lot later on,’ (Farrar-Hockley, Distant, p. 119), while
General Bradley reportedly commented that ‘a platoon now would be
worth more than a company tomorrow’ (Eliot to Attlee, op. cit.)
29. First discussed at COS(50)127(1), 14 Aug. 50, DEFE 4/34. The First Sea Lord
made this contention both at COS(50)127(1), and also at COS(50)128(1), 15
Aug. 50, DEFE 4/34.
30. COS(50)128(1). In fact, the commander of US Naval forces in the Far East
had asked the Royal Navy to assist with special operations behind North
Korean lines. This request eventually led to the creation of 41 Commando,
which operated with the US Marine Corps during the war. Not to be out-
done, the War Office considered mobilizing a reserve SAS unit for duty
Korea, but the idea went nowhere. See COS(50)132(5), 18 Aug. 50, DEFE
4/35 and related minutes in DEFE 4/35 and 4/36. A few individual British
Army officers did participate in special and guerrilla operations, however.
See Ed Evanhoe, Darkmoon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War,
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), esp. pp. 103–7.
31. Harding to VCIGS, 18/CIC, 16 Aug. 50, DEFE 11/38.
32. Ibid.
33. Harding to VCIGS, 19/CIC, 16 Aug. 50, DEFE 11/38. His determination that
a brigade group of all arms should go was a strong memory nearly 40 years
after the fact. See Harding interview, pp. 288–9.
34. Harding to VCIGS, 19/CIC.
35. Ibid. 4 Hussars provided the armored cars, the engineers being 67 Gurkha
Engineer Squadron.
36. Ibid.
37. Elliot to Attlee, op. cit. The Chiefs’ representative to the JCS had an office in
the Pentagon, while the British Joint Services Mission, headed by the for-
mer C-in-C FARELF, General Sir Neil Ritchie, presumably was housed at the
British Embassy.
38. COS(50)131(2),17 Aug. 50, DEFE 4/35. The CO thought the troops should
come from Malaya and not Hong Kong, that to do otherwise would be contra-
dictory to the Hong Kong policy set forth by the BDCC(FE) in COS(50)290. In
response, the First Sea Lord pointed out that that policy had been written
under different circumstances from the ones that applied since the outbreak
of the Korean War, while the FO rep. revealed that his department’s just-
completed study of the situation reported little threat of Chinese attack.
278 Notes
39. COS(50)131(2).
40. Ibid.
41. See note 6, Elliot to Attlee, p. 111, and Harding to Robertson, No. 115, 20
Aug. 50, MJM 19/4/23.
42. With the exception of a select few officers in key command positions, the
majority of the men were not informed of Operation GRADUATE – the move
to Korea – until Monday, 21 August, leaving less than four full days to pre-
pare for embarkation. See Farrar-Hockley, Distant Obligation, p. 126, and
Carew, pp. 40–2.
43. Harding interview, p. 289; Man interview, pp. 7–8.
44. Carew, p. 43.
45. See Lt Col. G. I. Malcolm, The Argylls in Korea, 1st edn. (London: Thomas
Nelson, 1952), p. 1, and Blaxland, p. 137. The headquarters companies
absorbed from the support companies the 3 in. mortar, medium machine-
gun (Vickers 0.303 in.), and assault pioneer platoons. A special US Army
training team was flown out to Hong Kong to instruct British troops on the
use of the American 3.5 in. anti-tank rocket launcher.
47. Purposely or not, the brigade had just finished a major exercise on Friday
the 18th which had involved preparations for an operational move. See
Malcolm, Argylls, pp. 2–3.
48. Harding’s presence for the event was fortuitous, as he had informed
Brownjohn in 19/CIC (op. cit.) that he would be in Hong Kong from the
23rd on to discuss the Hong Kong defense situation with the BFHK com-
mander.
49. Carew, p. 53, and Man interview, p. 8; Harding interview, p. 289.
50. MacDonald, quoted in Carew, pp. 53–4.
51. COS(50)109(3), 14 July 50, DEFE 4/33.
52. These include: JP(50)91(Final), Defence of Hong Kong, 13 July 50, DEFE 6/14;
JP(50)92(Final), Reinforcement of Hong Kong, 19 July 50, DEFE
6/14; JP(50)110(Final), Defence of Hong Kong, 5 Sept. 50, DEFE 6/14; COS(50)
115(8), Defence of Hong Kong: Confidential Annex, 21 July 50, DEFE 4/33;
COS(50)124(4), Defence Policy for Hong Kong: Confidential Annex, 10 Aug.
50, DEFE 4/34.
53. This is based in part on my analysis of COS(50)290 [BDCC(FE) (50)3(P)
(Final)], 3 Aug. 50, DEFE 5/23.
54. Interrogations of North Korean prisoners of war had revealed that advisers
of the Russian Military Mission to North Korea, numbering between 2500
and 3000, were in the field with their protégés. See CM(50)46(2), 17 Jul 50,
CAB 128/18.
55. COS(50)269, 25 July 50, DEFE 5/22, Annex, para. 2.
56. Ibid., paras 9–10, 17, 27–9. Since 1949, a military airstrip had been built at
Sek Kong.
59. See Chapter 5.
60. COS(W)828 to Lord Tedder via BJSM, WDC, 21 July 50, FO 371/83397
FC1192/22.
61. COS(50)290.
Notes 279
62. Ibid., para. 4(a). See also Chapter 6.

63. Ibid., para. 4(a).
64. With the exception of a few months at the end of 1950, at any one time
FARELF normally had two or three battalions resting and retraining.
65. COS(50)290, para. 4.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. As discussed in Chapter 5, although the basic policy laid down in 1946
underwent subtle changes and qualifications over the subsequent four
years, the basic premise remained the same, namely, that Hong Kong was
indefensible against an attack by a major power in occupation of the
Chinese mainland.
69. In Malaya, the BDCC(FE) expected the loss of Hong Kong in the cold war to
result in the alienation of Chinese allies there, and the irretrievable loss of
the fence-sitters. COS(50)290, para. 6.
70. Ibid., paras 9, 11.
71. In the cover letter to the report, the Secretary to the BDCC(FE), B. A. Casey,
wrote that the Hong Kong aspects of DO(50)45 seemed only to apply in the
event of general war. COS(50)290 was written under the assumptions that a
‘conflict may be with China only’ and localized in the same way as Korea,
and that ‘an attack on Hong Kong will not necessarily result in implement-
ing plans for a major war (including withdrawal of forces from the Far
East)’. See Secretary, BDCC(FE), to SCOSC, Ref. 093/HK, 29 July 50, also in
COS(50)290, op. cit.
72. COS(50)290, para. 5.
73. Ibid., paras 12, 13.
74. Ibid., paras 14(a)–(f).
75. Menzies to Attlee, No. 123, 26 May 50, DEFE 11/36. See discussion at the
end of Chapter 4.
76. COSSEA 741, 2 June 50, DEFE 11/37; SEACOS 66, 21 June 50, DEFE 11/37.
There is a concluding cable, COSSEA 748 of 26 May 50, but this was not
found. See COS(50)274 and Appendix (Wild Report), 26 July 50, DEFE 5/22.
77. Wild Report, para. 3. Harding apparently had contemplated the need for
theater deception operations prior to Menzies’ suggestion. See COS(50)
118(5), 28 July 50, DEFE 4/34.
78. Wild Report, para. 3. No details are given about the relevant organization.
79. The CIC(FE) in SEACOS 66 had said that ‘they would be ready to make full
use of the theatre expert as soon as he could be conveniently provided. … The
officer approved to be FARELF deception officer in Singapore was Charles
Cholmondeley, a former RAF officer; the Malaya District deception officer
was Lt-Col. Michael Calvert, who had already served as a special assistant to
Harding and had promoted the raising of the ‘Malayan Scouts’ special force,
later renamed as 22 SAS.
80. The MoD retains all of class DEFE 28, Directorate of Forward Plans:
Registered Files. A request to the MoD’s Departmental Record Officer for
access to the papers was denied. At least 12 files are directly relevant to the
Far East, of which 2 are labeled ‘Defence of Hong Kong 1947–1950’ and
‘Defence of Hong Kong 1951–1953’.
81. See Carew, pp. 38, 42, and Man interview, p. 7.
280 Notes
82. These are: COS(52)224, 22 Apr. 52, DEFE 5/38; COS(52)409, 6 Aug. 52,
DEFE 5/40; Brownjohn to MinDef NCDB/M/10, 26 Nov. 52, DEFE 11/49.
83. Based upon the comments of Paskin and Fraser in COS(50)131(2), 17 Aug.
50, DEFE 4/35, and, more directly in COSSEA 774, 4 Oct. 50, FO 371 FC
1192/38, Yasamee, no. 61, pp. 167–9. The Chiefs also indicated they were
‘considering the possibility of obtaining American assistance’ in the event
of a Chinese attack on Hong Kong, but in any case the British government
would also appeal to the UN. See COSSEA 774, para. 9. In an August 1950
telegram (SEACOS 88), the CIC(FE) had made several requests about the
resources available for the defense of Hong Kong. Among these were
authorization ‘to plan with the Americans the operations of bomber forces
in defence of Hong Kong from Formosa or the Philippines. It was agreed
that this question should be covered in the report which the JPS were
preparing on the Defence of Hong Kong [JP(50)110]’. Unfortunately,
JP(50)110 remains closed later in the century. See COS(50)132(4), 18
Aug. 50, DEFE 4/35; JP(50)110(Final), op. cit.
84. Farrar-Hockley, Distant Obligation, pp. 290–1.
85. 28 Brigade (less one battalion) from Hong Kong relieved 27 Brigade in April
1951. Because the relief took place in Korea, the Hong Kong garrison
dropped to only two infantry battalions during a period of about six weeks!
See Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War. Volume II:
An Honourable Discharge (London: HMSO, 1995), p. 66. Appendix C
(pp. 429–34) reproduces ‘Despatch arrangements for 28th Brigade’, which is
the minutes of a meeting held in the War Office on 16 March 1951, to
‘examine the best method of relieving 27 Infantry Brigade in KOREA’. On
the relief from Hong Kong, see also Eaton, pp. 7–10.
86. Carver, Harding, p. 170; on the extension of the Kai Tak runways to make
them suitable for jet fighters, see SEACOS 62, 17 June 50, FO 371/83397
FC1192/18; No. 28 Squadron, RAF received the first Vampires in February
1951. See David Lee, Eastward: A History of the Royal Air Force in the Far East,
1945–1972 (London: HMSO, 1984), p. 123.
87. From as early as February 1949, the Truman administration had sought
British collaboration in placing export controls on trade with the
Communists. While the British agreed to control military exports, they
refused to do so for non-military exports, which were a staple of
the entrepôt trade. For a detailed account of US–UK wranglings over the
China trade, see Frank Cain, ‘The US-Led Trade Embargo on China: the
Origins of CHINCOM, 1947–52’, The JSS, 18:4 (1995) 33–54.
88. For a representative discussion of the problem, see the various documents
annexed to COS(50)440, 31 Oct. 50, DEFE 5/25.
89. See CO comments in COS(51)45(5), 9 Mar. 51, DEFE 4/40.
90. HK to SSC, No. 840, 24 July 50, FO 371/83397 FC1192/21.
91. See, for example, the letter from Bevin to Acheson, annexed to Perkins’
memorandum of conversation, 15 July 50, FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, pp. 395–9;
Memo from Thorp to Matthews, 9 Feb. 51, FRUS 1951, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp.
1899–1902; and British Embassy to Department of State, 10 May, 1951,
FRUS 1951, Vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 427–31.
92. Acheson to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, 17 Jan. 51, FRUS
1951, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 1877–8.
Notes 281
93. For a contemporary view of Hong Kong trade losses, see, for example,
the telegram from US Consul General at Hong Kong (McConaughy) to the
Secretary of State (Acheson), 1 Nov. 51, FRUS 1951, Vol. VII, Part 2,
pp. 2042–6; for a more recent, scholarly evaluation, see Cain, pp. 47–8.
True to its entrepreneurial heritage, Hong Kong used its fortuitously abun-
dant supply of refugee labor and capital to recast itself as a successful
manufacturing center. See Cameron, pp. 295–8; Grantham, pp. 167–8;
Welsh, pp. 451–3.
94. Richard J. Aldrich, ‘’The Value of Residual Empire’: Anglo-American
Intelligence Co-operation in Asia after 1945’, in Richard J. Aldrich and
Michael F. Hopkins, eds. Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in
the Post-war World (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 232–6.
95. Ibid., p. 248, and Desmond Ball, ‘Over and Out: Signals Intelligence
(Sigint) in Hong Kong’, Intelligence and National Security, 11, no. 3 (July
1996), pp. 479–81.
96. Nine US Navy ships visited Hong Kong in February 1950 alone. See
Commodore J. M. Brownfield, HK 16/64, 31 Mar. 50, ADM 1/21839. The
New York Times reported the army officer as Major William Saunders, for-
mer assistant military attaché in China in Canton. The posting was taken
as ‘evidence of the close American interest in the defense of Hong Kong
against possible Communist attack’. See Tillman Durdin, ‘U.S. Officer Joins
Hong Kong Staff’, The New York Times, 8 Sept. 49 1949, 15.
97. Harold Hinton, ‘Acheson Denies Hong Kong Pledge; Says Help Will
Depend on Events’, The New York Times, 13 Aug. 49, 1–2.
98. NSC 73/4, 25 Aug. 50, FRUS 1950, Vol. I, p. 388, para. 41.c.
99. COS(50)332, 28 Aug. 50, DEFE 5/23. A US infantry regiment is primarily a
fighting organization generally consisting of three battalions. Thus the
offer of two regiments (presumably of army infantry, the letter is not pre-
cise) would mean six US infantry battalions in Hong Kong – larger than
the current British garrison!
100. Ibid.
101. COS(50)139(7), 30 Aug. 50, DEFE 4/35. A fairly accurate estimate of the
Chinese view. See Gaddis, p. 78.
102. COS(50)447, 31 Oct. 50, DEFE 5/25. Tedder told Bradley that British forces
in Hong Kong ‘are adequate to resist internal disturbances or a small-scale
attack from without, but they are not adequate to hold off a full-scale
attack by the Chinese communists. Should such an attack occur, it would
presumably lead to an appeal to the UN, but nevertheless the [British]
would hope that the hostilities might be localized’. See Agreed
Memorandum, Summary of United States – United Kingdom Discussions
on the Present World Situation, 20–24 July, 1950, Washington, D.C., FRUS
1950, Vol VII, p. 464.
103. According to the July 1950 draft of NSC 73 (see FRUS 1950, Vol. I, p. 335) and
National Intelligence Estimate 25, 2 Aug. 51, in FRUS 1951, Vol. I, p. 123.
104. See COS(51)23(1), 2 Feb. 51, DEFE 4/39; DO(51)7(3), 2 Apr. 51, CAB
131/10.
105. According to a State Department official working in Hong Kong at the
time, the impetus was a comment made by a Chinese Communist journal-
ist to the correspondent of The New York Times that implied the Chinese
282 Notes
were preparing to invade. Author’s interview of Joseph Yager, McLean,

Virginia, September 1996. See also Sir Roger Makins, Washington to FO,
No. 51 OTP Hong Kong. Evacuation, 6 Jan. 51, CAB 21/2557. On the
British reaction, see Grantham, p. 170.
106. COS(51)48(6), 14 Mar. 51, DEFE 4/41.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid. and COS(51)197, 14 Apr. 51, DEFE 5/30.
109. The agreed report (see FRUS 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 64–71) addresses only
Southeast Asia. The report registered by the COSC (COS(51)318, 29 May
51, DEFE 5/31) is inexplicably missing from the PRO files, while the min-
utes (COS(51)319, 29 May 51, DEFE 5/31) are of little help on the subject.
110. Marshall to Acheson, 9 Apr. 51, FRUS 1951, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 1949–50.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. CP(50)221, 6 Oct. 50, CAB 129/42.
114. See Chapter 6.
115. CP(51)47, Annex, para. 3.
116. For the JCS position, see Allison to Jessup, 4 Jan. 51, FRUS 1951, Vol. VI,
Part 1, p. 133. The US Chiefs also considered Indonesia as a potential
member.
117. MacDonald, pp. 62–3. For a detailed account of the exchange, see Farrar-
Hockley, Honourable Discharge, pp. 250–60. Eden’s memoirs are too general
to be of any great help, and he blurs discussions in Paris with those in
Rome. See Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle: the Memoirs of The Rt. Hon. Sir
Anthony Eden, K.G., P.C., M.C. (London: Cassell, 1960), pp. 16–18. Likewise,
his biographer skims over the issue, focusing instead on personal friction
between Eden and Acheson. See Robert Rhodes James, Anthony Eden (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1986), pp. 352–3.
118. Memorandum of Conversation by Barnes, 28 Nov. 51, FRUS 1951, Vol. VII,
Part 1, pp. 1189–93.
119. Sir Roger Makins, the British Ambassador, raised the issue at the end of
November. See Johnson to Matthews, 21 Nov. 51, FRUS 1951, Vol. VII, Part
1, pp. 1154–6.
120. COS(51)195(3), 3 Dec. 51, DEFE 4/50.
121. COS(52)53, 22 Jan. 52, DEFE 5/36, p. 7.
122. Ibid., p. 7.
123. Ibid., p. 7.
124. The JPS brief prepared for the British delegation to the talks was changed –
apparently because of suggestions made by the FARELF Chief of Staff,
Major-General Nigel Poett, during his stop in London on his way to the
Washington meetings – to include consideration of planning with the
USAF to assist in the colony’ defense, but the British record of the meeting
(COS(52)53), makes no mention of such an appeal. On Poett’s role, see
COS(52)9(5), 18 Jan. 52, DEFE 4/51 and Nigel Poett, Pure Poett: The
Memoirs of General Sir Nigel Poett, KCB, DSO and bar (London: Leo Cooper,
1991), p. 106.
125. COS(52)53, p. 9.
126. Report by the Ad Hoc Committee on South East Asia, 5 Feb. 52, FRUS
1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 40–4.
Notes 283
127. The French also opposed a blockade of China, thinking it would be inef-
fective and provoking China into invading Indochina.
128. Davis to JCS, 5 Feb. 52, FRUS 1952, Vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 36–9.
129. Ibid, para. 12(f).
130. NSC 124/2, 25 June 52, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, p. 132.
131. In January 1951 the JCS had ordered US Pacific Command to prepare
plans on evacuation, but told the commander he could not reveal their
existence to any foreign nationals (presumably including the British). See
JCS 81939 to CINCPAC, 25 Jan. 51, File CCS 381 S.3, RG 218, Box 14,
NARA. The new instructions to collaborate with the British were in JCS
932447 to CINCPAC, 27 Feb. 52, as shown in FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII,
Part 1, p. 278. It is not clear if the exchange of evacuation plans was satis-
factory to the British. The brief for the January tripartite talks were
amended to include seeking joint planning with the US Air Force for
‘co-operation in the defence of the Colony,’ but this appears not to have
been pursued in actuality – see amendments to JP(51)223 in COS(52)2(1),
4 Jan. 52, DEFE 4/51, as well as the original, JP(51)223(Final), 3 Jan. 52,
DEFE 4/51. Elliot’s brief contained no such instructions, instead pressing
generally for air action in support of local defense efforts in Hong Kong or
Indochina. See COS(52)11(5), 22 Jan. 52, DEFE 4/51; JP(52)8(Final), 21 Jan.
52, DEFE 4/51.
132. COS(52)110, 12 Feb. 52, DEFE 5/37. It would appear from comments made
in March 1952 by CAS Slessor, that the DC approved a new policy for
Hong Kong in June of 1951 (see Note by CAS on JP(52)22(Final), which is
appended to COS(52)42(2) & JP(52)22(Final), 21 Mar. 52, DEFE 4/52.
Logged as DO(51)74 and not present in CAB 131 at the PRO, it most likely
was based on JP(50)179(Final), 5 Dec. 50, DEFE 6/15, and its successor,
JP(50)180(Final), 16 Dec. 50, DEFE 6/15. These suggested the policy of
maintaining in Hong Kong only the minimum garrison necessary to main-
tain internal security and public morale, and act as a deterrent to attack.
133. CBFHK appreciation, (annex to COS(52)110).
134. The land attack had to be held in the New Territories, as any withdrawal
from them would so severely undermine the defense as to require with-
drawal. CBFHK appreciation, para. 9.
135. CBFHK appreciation, paras 2(c), 3(a), 5. On the aerial reconnaissance
restrictions, see COS(50)143(7), 6 Sept. 50, DEFE 4/35. Mansergh’s appreci-
ation made an implied request for greater latitude to launch such missions
if he suspected a Chinese build-up for an attack, but how this played out is
not known, for all the relevant 1952 Chiefs of Staff files have been with-
held.
136. Since 1949, the British had constructed a rudimentary military airfield at
Sek Kong in the New Territories.
137. CBFHK appreciation, paras 6, 6(d), 13(a).
138. COS(52)110, letter from CIC(FE) to SCOSC, ref 094/23, 1 Feb. 52, para. 8.
Emphasis added.
140. Ibid., para. 8. The CIC(FE) cite principally political vice military reasons for
this: ‘… although American naval and air forces might be made available,
the United State commitments reinforced by the political objections,
284 Notes
precludes the deployment of United States land forces in the Colony’

(para. 7). The political objections were those of the Americans, as indicated
by paragraph 10, but it will be remembered from above that the Foreign
Office and Colonial Office both rejected the American ambassador’s offer
to have two regiments train in Hong Kong.
142. Ibid., para 10. On American support they wrote: ‘we do not believe that
they would fail to give us every assistance in their power to cover an
evacuation’.
143. JP(52)22(Final), 6 Mar. 52, DEFE 4/52.
144. Note by the CAS on JP(52)22(Final), para. 7, appendix to COS(52)42(2),
op. cit.
146. Ibid.
148. COS(52)42(2).
149. Ibid.
150. Ibid.
151. COS(52)187, 29 Mar. 52, DEFE 5/38.
152. On the US–UK discussions, see COS(52)55(2), 22 Apr. 52, DEFE 4/53;
COS(52)57(1), 25 Apr. 52, DEFE 4/53; another cryptic reference is made in
item ‘B’ on SEACOS 261 of COS(52)38(3), 11 Mar. 52, DEFE 4/52. On the
deception plan, see COS(52)224, 22 Apr. 52, DEFE 5/38.
153. COS(52)224, para. 3.
155. By reference, SEACOS 270 informed the COS about General Hart’s visit,
but no details are given, and the telegram is not in the file. See
COS(52)89(11), 23 June 52, DEFE 4/54. The Foreign Office account, FE
Dept, Visit of General Hart, CG FMF to Hong Kong, 1952, FO 371/99360
FC 1631/2G, has been retained by the department.
156. COS(52)647, 27 Nov. 52, DEFE 5/43, para. 6.
157. COS(52)324, 24 June 52, DEFE 5/40. The Hong Kong portion refers to
COS(52)54(3), the crucial part of which the MoD has retained.
158. COS(51)514, 6 Sept. 51, DEFE 5/33.
159. Keightley, ‘Talk by the Commander-in-Chief on the C.I.G.S. Conference
June 1952’, (Singapore: 1952) Keightley Papers.
160. Ibid.
161. COS(52)647. Radford’s memoirs indicate he was serious about Hong Kong.
See Admiral Arthur W. Radford, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: the Memoirs
of Admiral Arthur W. Radford (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980),
p. 294.
162. Report by the Staff Planners to the Military Representatives to the ANZUS
Council, Pearl Harbor, 25 Nov. 52, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, p. 247.
163. Ibid., pp. 247, 253.
164. Ibid., p. 253.
165. Ibid., p. 255.
166. COS(53)1(4), 1 Jan. 53, DEFE 4/59.
167. Allison-Radford memcon, 4 Feb. 53, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XIV, Part 1,
p. 143.
Notes 285
168. Gerhart to Bradley, 3 Mar. 53, RG 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Chairman’s File, General Bradley, 1949–53, Box 7, File 091 China
1953, NARA.
169. They may appear in those portions of the JCS files at the NARA which are
closed to the public, or in Admiral Radford’s CINCPAC papers at the
Navy’s Operational Archives, which are closed in their entirety. No hint is
given in any of the FRUS volumes.
170. COS(53)107, 19 Feb. 53, DEFE 5/45.
171. COS(53)107. Churchill had been both Prime Minister and Minister of
Defense for the first several months of his government, until he appointed
Field Marshal Harold Alexander, Earl of Tunis, as Defense Minister in
March 1952. See Gilbert, p. 709, n. 2.
172. COS(53)107.
173. Ibid.
174. COS(53)27(4), 24 Feb. 53, DEFE 4/60.
175. JP(53)44(Final), 12 Mar. 53, DEFE 4/61.
176. COS(53)35(4), 16 Mar. 53, DEFE 4/61; D(53)5(1), 26 Mar. 53, CAB 131/13;
COS(53)43(1), 31 Mar. 53, DEFE 4/61.
177. COS(53)209, 4 May 1953, DEFE 5/46; COS(53)59(4), 7 May 53, DEFE 4/62.
178. ‘Report of the Conference … Held at Pearl Harbor, 6–10 Apr. 1953’, n.d.
FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 303–6.
179. COS(53)238, 21 May 53, DEFE 5/46.
180. ‘Report by the Staff Planners … on the Conference Held June 15 to July 1’,
1953, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, p. 321.
181. Ibid., p. 321. The report says two infantry divisions less two battalions.
The annex with the projected forces needed was not reproduced in the
FRUS version, but JP(53)101(Final), 23 July 53, DEFE 4/64, para. 12 states
50 aircraft.
182. Report by the Staff Planners, p. 321.
183. Ibid., p. 321.
184. Ibid., p. 321.
185. Ibid., pp. 325–6. According to Admiral Radford, the BDCC(FE) had had
some reservations about the strengthening of Hong Kong’s defenses, but
what these reservations were is not apparent from Keightley’s July conver-
sation with the Chiefs of Staff. See CJCS to Wilson, 4 Dec. 53, FRUS
1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, p. 356.
186. Report by the Staff Planners, p. 325.
187. COS(53)93(5) Annex, 28 July 53, DEFE 4/64.
188. Ibid., p. 2. I believe by ‘facilities’ Keightley meant the new airfield, radar
and communications equipment called for in the planners report.
According to the JPS study of the report and other documents, the
Americans ‘were clearly most interested’ in the reinforcement option. See
JP(53)101(Final), op. cit. paras 12–13.
189. COS(53)93(5).
190. NSC 148, 6 Apr. 53, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, p. 289. This docu-
ment superseded NSC 124/2, which had restricted US assistance to Hong
Kong only to cover an evacuation. The clause in NSC 148 about further
military assistance had in fact been the policy laid down in 1950 in
NSC 73.
286 Notes
191. COS(53)93(5).
192. This is not surprising as the conference was consumed by the impending
defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu. See Report of the Five Power
Military Conference, June 54, DEFE 11/141; an extract Report of the Five-
Power Military Conference of 3–11 June 1954, Washington, 11 June 54,
appears in FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 554–63. There had been
another meeting in February, but the record of it at the PRO (COS(54)144,
5 May 54, DEFE 5/52) remains closed until the 21st century.
193. Minutes of Meeting Held in the Department of State, subj: Meeting on
Southeast Asia Pact, 24 Aug. 54, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, p. 788.
194. State to Embassy London, No. 5179, 4 Apr. 54, in FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XIII,
Part 1, pp. 1238–40. On the Eisenhower-Churchill correspondence see
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States,
1945–1992 (New York: Twayne, 1994), p. 202.
195. JP(53)103(Final), 6 Aug. 53, DEFE 11/96, para. 3.
196. COS(53)333, 10 July 53, DEFE 5/47. These assumptions were not without
critics. See, for example, COS(53)332, 9 July 53, DEFE 5/47.
197. COS(54)69, 2 Mar. 54, DEFE 5/51, para. 12.
198. COS(54)69, op. cit.
200. Ibid., para. 7. This is a reference to the plans of the Five Power Staff
Agency, which were discussed in the previous section.
201. COS(54)19(3), 19 Feb. 54, DEFE 4/68.
202. When this memorandum was presented to the Defence Committee in
March 1954, the Korean armistice had been in effect for nearly eight
months, but the British still had five infantry battalions, an armored regi-
ment, and several artillery regiments serving with 1 Commonwealth
Division in Korea. See Blaxland, p. 208.
203. Source: COS(53)333, Appendix B. There is some discrepancy over the num-
ber of infantry battalions present in the two brigades in Hong Kong in
1954. This document cites 5 as the planned number, and one published
source confirms this (Macksey, p. 85), whereas some other documents
claim only four battalions were present, as does Blaxland (p. 466). It is pos-
sible that the HKVDF may have been counted as the fifth battalion, or that
an additional battalion had been retained from Malaya.
204. Eden’s comments to the Cabinet in CC(54)29(1), 15 Apr. 54, CAB 128/27.
205. Ibid.
206. On the Cabinet’s decision to alert the force for Korea, see CC(53)36(1), 24
June 53, CAB 128/26. On the COSC discussion of the BDCC(FE)’s and
Grantham’s telegrams, as well as its own concerns, see COS(53)83(5) [SEA-
COS 345], 2 July 53, DEFE 4/64. Churchill had told Eisenhower of the
Hong Kong brigade on 24 June. See Gilbert, p. 845.
207. CC(54)29(1).
208. COS(54)114(4), 2 Nov. 54, DEFE 4/73. This even though the troops to be
released by the reduction were necessary to help in the build up of a Far
East strategic reserve. The Australians and New Zealanders agreed to
Harding’s proposal in Melbourne to establish a Commonwealth brigade
group for this purpose. The 28 Commonwealth Brigade, which had served
in Korea, was re-raised for this new role in 1955.
Notes 287
209. See Blaxland, p. 466, and McAlister, p. 112, which describes the garrison in
1956.
210. J. A. Williams, ‘Korea and the Malayan Emergency – the Strategic
Priorities’, JRUSI 118:2 (1973) 56–62.
211. Gaddis, p. 78.
8 Manpower, the Strategic Reserve, and the Malayan

Emergency, 1950–54
1. See Chapter 7 and Williams, ‘Korea and the Malayan Emergency’.

2. DO(50)45, 7 June 50, CAB 131/9, para. 56.
3. Richard Stubbs, Counter-Insurgency and the Economic factor: the Impact of the
Korean War Prices Boom on the Malayan Emergency, Occasional Paper No. 19
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974).
4. Ibid., p. 13. Government expenditure on defense, police and Emergency
requirements rose from $82 million in 1948 to $296 million in 1953, a 350
per cent increase (pp. 13–14). At the same time, the Federation of Malaya
government actually ran budget surpluses of several hundred million
dollars! (p. 12) The number of police rose from 11 000 in 1947 to 73 000 in
1952 (including 41 000 ‘Special Constables’). When the prices boom sub-
sided, the number of regulars dropped to 48 000. Nearly 250 000 Malays
served in part-time auxiliary police and home guard units. See David M.
Anderson, Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism and the Police,
1917–65 (Manchester: MUP, 1992), p. 110.
5. * From Hong Kong. 26 Gurkha Inf Bde reinforced South Johore for frame-
work operations. ** From MELF. See Army World-Wide Order of Battle as at
3 July 1950, Appendix B to DO(50)50, Situation in Korea: Note by Chiefs of
Staff, 5 July 50, CAB 131/9; Far East Land Forces order of battle in Smith,
Counter-Insurgency Operations, p. 12; and confirmatory passages on various
units in the Malaya chapters of Blaxland.
6. GSO I (Tng) GHQ, FARELF, ‘Training Organisation and Facilities in FARELF’,
para. 25, enclosure one to Colonel Robert H York, ARMLO Singapore,
Report R-92-53, ‘Training, Organization and Facilities in Malaya and
Singapore’, 8 May 53, Intelligence Document 1174136, Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, RG 319, NARA (author’s FOIA request of 31 July 1993).
7. Briggs, Report on the Emergency, Appendix ‘A’, p. 46, para. 17.
8. DO(50)45, paras 48, 52, and 57.A.I(a).
10. Cmd. 8026, Increase in the Length of Full-Time National Service with the Armed
Forces (1950); Cmd. 8161, Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War
Relating to the Army Estimates 1951–52 (1951); Farrar-Hockley, Distant
Obligation, p. 115; Blaxland, p. 211.
11. UK HC in New Zealand to CRO, No. 526, 19 Aug. 50, FO 371/84477
FZ1016/32. COS(50)335, 29 Aug. 50, DEFE 5/23. These volunteers went to
Malaya as ‘C’ Squadron, 22 SAS.
12. CO brief on Use of colonial manpower in the cold war, Jan. 1951, CO
537/5324, No. 27. For more background detail, see Colonial manpower in
the cold war, 1–15 Aug. 1950, CO 537/5324.
288 Notes
13. JP(50)170(Final), 29 Dec. 50, DEFE 6/15, paras 10 & 14(c).

14. JP(50)170(Final), para. 11. The WO anticipated a shortage of 350 majors
and captains by January 1952. See COS(51)188(5), 19 Nov. 51, DEFE 4/49.
15. JP(50)170(Final), paras 12–13, 14(d).
17. Ibid. and SEACOS 128, 22 Nov. 50, DEFE 11/42.
18. JP(50)170(Final).
19. COS(51)14(2), 18 Jan. 1951, DEFE 4/39.
20. COS(51)26(3), 7 Feb. 1951, DEFE 4/40. As Commander of 14th Army in
Burma, Slim had had two African divisions under his command. His more
positive evaluation of them was based on his experience in the Indian Army
and of the multinational complexion of his army command. See Slim,
Defeat Into Victory, pp. 165–6, 353.
21. Reference to DO(51)59, Mar. 51, in DO(51)13(1), 28 May 51, CAB 131/10;
SSC to Colonial Governors in Africa, 94004/14/51, 19 Mar. 51, DEFE 11/44.
22. FM Sir William Slim, Malaya: points arising from a discussion between CIGS
and General Harding, 8 Mar. 51, WO 216/619.
23. SSC to Colonial Governors in Africa, 94004/14/51, 27 Apr. 51, DEFE 11/44.
Uganda was a possibility for another battalion. See Gov Uganda to SSC, No.
106, 22 Mar. 51, DEFE 11/44. MacDonald had some initial trepidation
about political implications involved with deploying the Fijians, but he
changed his mind after speaking with Harding and Gurney. See MacDonald
to SSC, no. 191, 1 Sept. 50, MJM 19/7/31.
24. The First Sea Lord had asked for the redeployment in part to permit the
Royal Marines to resume training for their amphibious warfare role, some-
thing they were unable to do while on active service in Malaya. See
COS(51)228, 17 Apr. 51, DEFE 5/30; COS(51)74(3), 1 May 51, DEFE 4/42.
25. COS(51)582, 11 Oct. 51, DEFE 5/33; COS(51)168(5), 22 Oct. 51, DEFE 4/48.
Specifically, Operation WARBLER, which is discussed in Coates, p. 151.
26. The Military Implications of the Situation in Malaya, 19 Nov. 51, WO
216/450, para. 6.
27. Ibid., paras 7–10. These were charged words, as they reflected the priorities
of the Global Strategy paper.
28. Haron, p. 235.
29. SEACOS 128, 22 Nov. 50, DEFE 11/42.
30. On the prices boom, see Stubbs, op. cit. The shortages were noted in
JP(50)170(Final), 29 Dec. 50, op. cit., para. 17(b)(ii) and in Slim’s notes on
points arising from his discussion with Harding, op. cit.
31. Briggs, Report, Appendix F, ‘Combined Appreciation of the Emergency
Situation, 4th June 1951’, p. 67; C(51)26, 20 Nov. 51, CAB 129/48, Annex I,
Conclusions of the BDCC(FE). The WO was asked to consider the use of offi-
cers who had served in the Indian Army as one possible source of candidates.
But facing an overall shortage of some 350 infantry majors and captains in
1952, the WO could not agree to any further expansion of the Malay Regiment
that required more British officers. COS(51)188(5), 19 Nov. 51, DEFE 4/49.
32. Viscount Chandos, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos (London: The Bodley Head,
1962), p. 366.
33. Ibid., p. 379; C(52)16, 28 Jan. 52, CAB 129/9, paras 9–10. Also see the chap-
ter on the Malay Regiment in Lunt, especially p. 384. Of those British
Notes 289
officers then serving with the Malay Regiment, only 28 per cent were vol-
unteers, the rest being compulsorily posted from British battalions.
‘Inevitably, the officers compulsorily posted were not of the right quality’.
See D(52)6(2), 22 May 52, CAB 131/12.
34. D(52)22,16 May 52, CAB 131/12, Appendix A, paras 2–3.
35. Ibid., paras 4–5. As Lunt notes, there were no less than 214 British officers
on secondment to the Federation Army in 1966, of which 28 were colonels
and lieutenant-colonels, 90 majors, 88 captains, and 16 subalterns (p. 385).
D(52)6(2), op. cit.
36. Unfortunately, Haron’s work ‘The Malay Regiment’ not only avoids any
discussion of the shortage of British officers but also tends instead to dwell on
the flood of British Indian Army officer applications to the Malay Regiment
that came about the time of Indian independence in 1947 (see, for example,
pp. 288–90). Lunt alludes to an improvement in the officer shortage (p. 384),
but gives no numbers. Cloake recounts Templer’s involvement in getting
Lyttelton’s assistance on the matter, but merely states that he ‘got what
he wanted’ in the way of more officers (see p. 246). For some colorful
commentary on getting FARELF staff officers to serve with the Malays,
see Scott to Keightley 13 Jun 52, Keightley Papers, Miscellaneous Personal
Papers file.
37. Haron, p. 217. The author identifies Dempsey by position only; Dempsey
replaced Slim as C-in-C ALFSEA on 8 Dec. 45 and departed on 19 Apr. 46.
38. During the period of the abortive Malayan Union, the Defence Committee
had approved a plan for a Malay division. See Haron, pp. 223–5, 227–9.
39. COS(50)132, 19 Apr. 50, 11 Apr. 50, DEFE 5/20.
40. FM Sir William Slim, Notes of Talk with Gen. Keightley, 30/10/51, 30 Oct.
51, WO 216/439.
41. Ibid.; COS(51)174(5), 31 Oct. 51, DEFE 4/48; Short, p. 252.
42. At least 6000 went to Singapore, and several thousand more to China. See
Short, p. 302.
43. Cloake, p. 246.
44. Short, p. 339; the quotas called for 40 per cent Malaya, 40 per cent Chinese,
and 20 per cent Indians and other ethnic groups. See anon., ‘The Federation
Army of Malaya’, p. 38.
45. Haron, pp. 235–6. Percentages do not equal 100 per cent because of rounding.
46. COS(52)168(2), 9 Dec. 52, DEFE 4/58; SEACOS 311, 10 Mar. 53, FO
371/106999 FZ1145/6/G.; Cloake, pp. 246–7; anon. ‘The Federation Army’,
p. 38.
47. The division, with its headquarters at Taiping, was responsible for North
Malaya. See Cloake, p. 244, and anon., ‘The Federation Army’, p. 38.
48. Adapted from Sunderland, Army Operations, Fig. 2, p. 32.
49. COS(52)406, 31 July 52, DEFE 5/40; COSSEA 883, 1 Aug. 52, DEFE 11/49.
50. SEACOS 883, 23 Aug. 52, DEFE 11/49.
51. COS(52)168(2), op. cit.
52. COS(53)126(1), 10 Nov. 53, DEFE 4/66.
53. COS(54)205 [(BDCC(FE)(54)4], 23 June 54, DEFE 5/53. The problem was
first specifically addressed by the JPS in July 1952. See COS(52)404, 31 July
52, DEFE 5/40.
54. COS(54)205, op. cit.
290 Notes
55. Discussed in Chapter 10.

56. Minute from Lloyd to Dening, 2 Aug. 50, FO 371 FT 10310/14, doc. no. 32,
in Yasamee.
57. Record of Conversation with the Foreign Office, 11 March 1950, in FRUS
1950, Vol. VI, p. 50. As the hereditary prime minister, the Maharajah the
de facto head of the Nepalese government; the King was little more than a
bird in a gilded cage.
58. Ibid., p. 50.
59. Tuker, Gorkha, pp. 245–8; Leo Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1971), pp. 189–90. Rose asserts that New
Delhi’s support of the NNC was predicated on its use of non-violent means
for reforming the Nepalese government, and that it was embarrassed by
subsequent events. The NNC and the Nepal Democratic Congress (NDC)
joined forces in March 1950, whereafter the combined parties took the
name ‘National Congress.’ For the sake of continuity and to avoid confu-
sion with the Congress Party of India, I refer to the combined party as NNC.
60. The suspicions were fueled by an abusive, anonymous note to the
Maharajah written on official Brigade of Gurkha stationery and posted from
Malaya, although it was believed the letter was written in India. See
Katmandu to FO, No. 88, 11 Aug. 50, 11 Aug. 50, FO 371/84281 FN
1201/32; Falconer to Harding, letter, ref 2261/15/50, 15 Aug. 50, FO
371/84282 FN 1201/38.
61. Harding to USSW, CR/FARELF/5950/SD2, 23 Oct. 50, WO 32/14623.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Hull to Scott, ref 0164/6709(SD 2), 9 Nov. 50, FO 371/84282 FN 1201/43.
65. Girilal Jain, India Meets China in Nepal (New York: Asia Publishing House,
1959), pp. 20–1; Tuker, Gorkha, pp. 260–1; Foreign Office, ‘Gurkha Troops’,
22 Nov. 50, FO 371/84282 FN 1201/50. Although the Maharajah remained
as Prime Minister and his brother as CinC and Defense Minister, the Ranas’
rule was effectively over. In April the King abolished the hereditary pre-
miereship, and assumed most of the Maharajah’s powers; in June he ousted
the Defense Minister. Tuker, Gorkha, pp. 262–3.
66. Paragraph 8, Annexure III, Tripartite Agreement of December 1947.
67. Falconer to Harding, No. 152, 15 Nov. 50, FO 371/84282 FN 1201/45.
68. FARELF to CG SEA, 3071 AG, 20 Nov. 50, FO 371/84282 FN 1201/50.
69. DSD to CoS FARELF, 47135 SD 2b, 1 Jan. 51, WO 32/14623.; Singapore to
FO, No. 1057, 31 Dec. 50, WO 32/14623. There is a tantalizing passage in
MacDonald’s telegram which indicates some sort of British covert (diplo-
matic?) action to assist the Maharajah during the invasion: ‘… whether the
Maharajah knows it or not, he does owe us something for having extricated
him from the predicament in which he found himself a month or so ago’.
70. FO to Singapore, No. 592, 11 Oct. 51, DEFE 7/1922. In October 1951, the
King dismissed the government and with it the Maharajah Prime Minister,
Mohan Shamsher. He subsequently formed a new 12-member Cabinet,
eight of whom were from the NNC, including the new Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister, M. P. Koirala. Despite this increase in the Congress Party’s
grip on the government, the King, ‘strangely enough’, also appointed the
Maharajah’s brother and son to the Cabinet (Tuker, Gorkha, p. 264).
Notes 291
71. See Cross, In Gurkha Company, pp. 44–5, wherein the author recounts three
personal experiences of Communist-directed actions which he contends
was part of an effort to ‘draw off Gurkha soldiers from [Malaya] and to dis-
credit them as well’ (p. 44). It is not known whether the NNC had any role
in this mischief or not, but it was implicated in attempts by the ‘All Burma
Nepali Association’ to prevent British recruitment of Gurkhas discharged
from the Burma Rifles (they refused to accept Burmese nationality). See
Rangoon to FO, no. 97, 23 Dec. 50, FO 371/84282 FN 1201/54.
72. Proud to Perowne, ref 2266/17, 15 June 52, FO 371/101148 FN 1017/1(C);
Proud to Perowne, ref 2266/23, 2 Oct. 52, FO 371/101148 FN 1017/1(F).
73. COS(52)653, 2 Dec. 52, DEFE 5/43, para. 1.
74. British Indian Army recruiting traditionally was conducted at the Indian
border cantonment of Gorakhpore, volunteers either coming of their own
accord or shepherded by Gurkha pensioners. See Smith, Johnny Gurkha, pp.
26–7. For more detail on Gurkha recruiting, see Chapter 3 of Smith’s Friends
and Cross, In Gurkha Company, pp. 136–44. In the 1948–54 period,
Headquarters, British Gurkhas in India, temporarily maintained recruiting
and processing facilities in Gorakhpore and Ghum, which it later shifted to
depots at Lehra and Jalapahar on the Indian side of the Nepal border. As per
agreement with India, HQ BGI kept a transit facility at Barrackpore, outside
Calcutta, until air trooping between Nepal and Malaya was introduced in
the late 1950s. See Annexure I to the Tripartite Agreement, para. 3, op. cit.;
Annex to D(54)24, 28 May 54, CAB 131/14, paras 8–11, 14; and Colonel R.
G. Leonard, Nepal and the Gurkhas (London: HMSO, 1965), p. 135.
75. COS(52)495, 8 Sept. 52, DEFE 5/41.
76. See COS(52)495, and comments of Tahourdin (FO) and Higham (CO) in
COS(52)132(3), 18 Sept. 52, DEFE 4/56. On the Malayan army, see anon.,
‘The Federation Army of Malaya’.
77. COS(52)132(3).
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid. As the minute reads, Brownjohn’s suggestion appears as a bit of revela-
tion to the others, who appear not to have even considered this option!
80. UK HC in India (Acting) to CRO, No. 1168, 22 Sept. 52, DEFE 7/1922.
81. For an example dealing with Gurkha successes in killing Communist guer-
rillas in Malaya, see MacDonald to SSFA, info New Delhi saving HC FOM,
No. 533, 22 Sept. 52, MJM 19/7/41. and Proud to Perowne, ref 2266/23, 2
Oct. 52, FO 371/101148 FN 1017/1(F).
82. CRO to UK HC in India, No. 1754, 24 Oct. 52, DEFE 7/1922.
83. UK HC in India to CRO, No. 1386, 12 Nov. 52, DEFE 7/1922. At this time
there were approximately 20 Gurkha battalions in the Indian Army.
84. Ibid.
85. Recruitment of Gurkhas to the British Army, MO2/coll/15, 1 Dec. 52, WO
216/252, para. 3.
86. COS(52)653, para. 4.
87. Ibid., para. 7. This memorandum is the same as the 1 Dec. 52 paper in WO
216/252, op. cit. Seven years covered a Gurkha’s first four-year enlistment and
first re-enlistment of three years. British Gurkhas became eligible for a pension
after 15 years’ service, and this was the preferred term for any agreement,
although the War Office realized this was politically improbable to achieve.
292 Notes
88. COS(52)164(3), 2 Dec. 52, DEFE 4/58.

89. COS(52)653, para. 9.
92. COS(52)164(3).
93. CRO to UK HC in India, No. 2126, 23 Dec. 52, DEFE 7/1922.
94. Ibid.
95. Harding to Symon, CRO Ref CIGS/BM/45/5960/5, 11 Dec. 52, WO
216/652.
96. UK HC in India to CRO, No. 18, 8 Jan. 53, DEFE 7/1922.
97. Ibid.
98. CRO to UK HC in India, No. 681, 4 May 53, DEFE 7/1922.
99. In August 1952, the King once again dissolved the government and
appointed the old Maharajah’s brother, Kaiser Shamsher, as his principal
adviser (Tuker, Gorkha, pp. 265–6). In June of 1953, M. P. Koirala was
recalled as Prime Minister (Tuker, p. 266), but it should be noted that the
Brigade of Gurkhas liaison in Katmandu had previously reported that ‘the
Koirala brothers and other influential ministers seem to be convinced of
the usefulness of our Gurkha Brigade to Nepal; we have heard not a word
against us or our recruitment from the hills; and there is nothing that one
can see yet which will affect the Gurkhas willingness to serve with us,
nor the necessity for him to earn his living by military service abroad’.
See Proud to Perowne, ref 2266/15, 3 May 52, 3 May 52, FO 371/101148
FN 1017/1(B).
100. See Annex to D(54)24, op. cit., para. 11.
101. Besides 1 Fiji and 1 and 3 KAR, the other units were: 2 KAR; 1 N. Rhodesia
Reg; 1 Rhodesian African Rifles; 1, 2, & 3 RAR; and 1 & 2 NZ Regt. See John
Scurr, The Malayan Campaign 1948–60, (London: Osprey, 1982), p. 5. A
squadron of the New Zealand SAS replaced the Rhodesian SAS squadron in
1955. See W. D. Baker, Dare to Win: the Story of the New Zealand Special Air
Service (Nashville: Battery Press, 1987), pp. 57–67.
9 Siam and the Commonwealth Defense of Malaya
1. Section on Siam in JP(48)3(O)(Preliminary Draft), 15 Jan. 48, IOLR L/WS/

1/1075.
2. The two countries signed a border agreement in 1949 which permitted
armed police to conduct hot pursuit of insurgents into each others’ territory
given certain restrictions. The agreement was bolstered in August 1952 by
the establishment of a joint Siamese–Malay ‘Frontier Intelligence Bureau’ at
Penang, a joint Special Branch team at Songkhla in Siam, and a series of
joint Police Field Force operations which by 1954 effectively eliminated Siam
as an assured sanctuary for the MRLA. See Short, pp. 374–5.
3. R. Sean Randolph, The United States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics,
1950–1985 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California,
1986), p. 10.
4. COS(49)81(1). The CIC(FE) communicated their support for a mission to the
Chiefs in SEACOS 880. See COS(49)39(12), 9 Mar. 49, DEFE 4/20.
Notes 293
5. This was actually the term used by Bevin in a memorandum to Acheson.

See FRUS 1949, Vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1135.
6. COS(49)81(1). Military relations with the Siamese were good, especially
after implementation of a liaison arrangement to control insurgent activi-
ties on the Siam–Malay border. See JP(48)101(Final Revise), para. 18.
7. COS(49)124(2), 26 Aug. 49, DEFE 4/23.
8. JP(51)77(Final), 25 Apr. 51, DEFE 6/17; COS(51)261, 27 Apr. 51, DEFE 5/31.
9. COS(50)353, 12 Sept. 50, DEFE 5/24, paras 6–7, 13–14; Randolph, pp. 10–13.
10. COS(49)175(5), 23 Nov. 49, DEFE 4/26.
11. Siam (Thailand) received $10 million of the MDAP’s $75 million allotted in
early 1950 to assist states confronted by Communist China. For a good con-
temporary précis of Thailand’s shift to US assistance, see FRUS 1950, Vol. VI,
pp. 1529–39.
12. Ibid., esp. p. 1530.
13. Randolph, pp. 14–15, 20. The US also helped secure for Thailand the first
ever World Bank loan to a Southeast Asian nation amounting to $25.4 mil-
lion. The economic and military aid was tied to an Economic and Technical
Cooperation agreement in September 1950 and a Mutual Defense
Assistance Agreement in October 1950. The US established a Military
Advisory Assistance Group in Bangkok to supervise the distribution of
equipment and assist in the training of the Thai armed forces.
14. COS(51)261, para. 12.
15. COS(50)89 [BDCC(FE)(50)1/1], 26 Apr. 50, DEFE 11/35.
16. COS(50)307 [BDCC(FE)(50)4(P)], 19 Aug. 50, DEFE 5/23, paras 3 and 4.
17. Ibid., para. 4.
18. Ibid., paras 5–8, Annex para. 9. The available forces were the ‘Gurkha
Division plus one independent Gurkha infantry brigade and the Malay
Regiment. These formations will be considerably short of their full comple-
ment of supporting arms until the units required to make them up to estab-
lishment arrive from the United Kingdom.’
19. Ibid., Annex, Part 1, para. 27.
21. COS(50)353, 12 Sept. 50, DEFE 5/24, paras 9–10.
23. Ibid., para. 12. For a description of the earlier plan, see Hack in Aldrich,
British Intelligence, pp. 309–10, which is based in part on Chit Chung Ong’s
‘“Operation Matador” and the Outbreak of War in the Far East’, Ph D thesis,
London School of Economics, 1985.
24. COS(50)353, paras 13 and 17.
25. Ibid., paras 8, 18 and 25(a).
26. Ibid., paras 20–1. The Commissioner-General’s office also suggested offering
to conduct a general-purpose aerial photographic survey of Siam that would
be of help both to Bangkok and to the making of maps and target folders
for the British.
27. COS(50)376, 23 Sept. 50, DEFE 5/24. It emerged from the discussions that
Pibul was more concerned about the northwestern frontier with Burma
than he was about any potential threat from Indochina. He was supportive
of the idea of a ‘Pacific Pact’, but he was strongly opposed to the inclusion
of the French in any such organization.
294 Notes
28. SEACOS 101, 15 Sept. 50, DEFE 11/38.

29. COS(50)171(2), 18 Oct. 50, DEFE 4/37. Even if implemented on time,
Operation MATADOR would have failed because Japanese air and naval
supremacy in the region allowed them to use amphibious assaults to out-
flank established defense positions. The air and naval threat from
Communist China and Russia was expected to be minimal and well within
the ability of the local forces to counter it. Murfett, In Jeopardy, p. 122.
30. COS(50)100, 28 Mar. 50, DEFE 5/20, paras 74 and 75, and Appendix G1.
The land forces portion of the appendix indicates that one division (pre-
sumably 40 Inf Div in Hong Kong) and 3 Commando Brigade (in Malaya)
were to move to the Middle East by D⫹3 months, a clear indication that in
global war Hong Kong was to be abandoned.
31. Interestingly, the distribution of GALLOPER to the CIC(FE) was not authorized.
32. JP(50)114(Final Revise), 19 Oct. 50, DEFE 6/14.
33. Ibid.
34. COS(50)426, 1 Nov. 50, DEFE 5/25, paras 3 and 6.
35. Ibid. In a prescient comment, the Chiefs admitted that ‘Malaya would
assume increased importance in global strategy if her loss was likely to lead to
a considerable threat to the Australian and New Zealand Homelands. In this
event there could be little contribution of Australian and New Zealand forces
outside the ANZAM theatre.’ Annex paras 6, 19 and Appendix B, para. 2.
36. Ibid., Annex para. 13.
37. COS(50)447, 31 Oct. 50, DEFE 5/25.
38. COSSEA 795, 22 Dec. 50, DEFE 11/42, para. 4.
39. COS(50)512, 7 Dec. 50, DEFE 5/26. The main concern was that Australia
and New Zealand might shift their defense priorities from the Middle East
to Malaya and Southeast Asia. In fact, the Chiefs were upset by the fact that
Menzies insisted a delegation of Australian planners on their way to
London first stop in Singapore. The Chiefs directed the CIC(FE) to ensure
that the ‘Australian Planners did not become involved in any operational
planning [while] in Malaya.’ See COS(51)1(8), 2 Jan. 51, DEFE 4/39, and
COS(51)2(6), Defence of Malaya, 3 Jan. 51, DEFE 4/39.
40. This name first appears in SEACOS 143, 21 Dec. 50, DEFE 11/42. The code
name of the plan to occupy it was the aptly chosen IRONY, the first refer-
ence to which I have found is in JP(50)179(Final), 5 Dec. 50, DEFE 6/15.
41. SEACOS 143.
42. SEACOS 142, 18 Dec. 50, DEFE 11/42, para. 4.
43. Ibid., para. 5.
44. Ibid., para. 9.
46. Singapore to FO, No. 20, 5 Jan. 51, DEFE 11/43, para. 4.
47. Ibid., para. 6.
48. MacDonald must have been aware of a JIC(FE) estimate which detailed a
new threat from the Chinese Communist Air Force on the order of 100
fighter/ground attack and light bombers operating from Siam, possibly leav-
ened with Russian ‘volunteers’ flying jet fighters. In global war the GALLOPER
plan would leave only 16 fighter aircraft in the Far East. See SEACOS 162,
12 Jan. 51, DEFE 11/43.
Notes 295
50. Yasamee, note 2, pp. 295–6.

51. Ibid. See also COSSEA 816, 12 Feb. 51, DEFE 11/43, para. 4.
52. GALLOPER was later renamed BINNACLE. At the time of research, its successor
plan, CINDERELLA, was only available in fragments which did not reveal the
full scope of planning for the Far East. Nevertheless, a clear reference to
the fact that CINDERELLA did not call for the withdrawal of land forces is to be
found in COS(52)72, 29 Jan. 52, DEFE 5/36. The next plan, SYCAMORE, stated
that land forces should remain in Malaya in the early stages of global war.
Nevertheless, the British thought if a global war was imminent, the possibil-
ity of transferring land forces from Malaya to the Middle East might have to
be reconsidered, bearing in mind the risk to internal security in Malaya. See
COS(52)324, 24 June 52, DEFE 5/40, para. 54.
53. CIC(FE)(51)1/1(P), 12 Jan. 51, DEFE 11/43, para. 4. All planning documents
were to be marked TOP SECRET and caveated with the special code word BIGOT
(para. 36).
54. Ibid., paras 5, 6 and 25.
55. This would require careful balancing of forces, as there was also a requirement
to organise civil government of the occupied area. Ibid., paras 27 and 30(d).
56. COS(51)23(4), 2 Feb. 51, DEFE 4/39.
57. COS(51)412 [BDCC(FE)(51)3], 12 July 51, DEFE 5/32, Annex paras 2 and 10.
58. Ibid., Annex paras. 13(b) and 20(b). Enactment of GALLOPER would leave
FARELF only 18 infantry battalions.
59. Ibid., para. 2(e). There would also be grave deficiencies in air forces and
anti-aircraft defenses, although Commonwealth naval forces would be able
‘to establish [only] local maritime superiority for specific operations’ (paras.
2(a), 2(j)–2(p)).
61. Ibid., paras 3(a)–(d) (emphasis added). Since there was no way Singapore
could conduct a defense without reinforcements, there was obviously little
point in planning a defense that would surely fail. Still, this last supposition
was likely intended to give added weight to calls for more resources.
62. JP(51)120(Final), 13 Sept. 51, DEFE 6/17.
63. Ibid. This was somewhat of a distortion and in terms of the June 1951
BDCC(FE) report, decidedly misleading.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid. However, Australia could be subjected to ‘sporadic’ submarine and air
attacks.
66. This was Plan CINDERELLA. See COS(52)72, 29 Jan. 52, DEFE 5/36, Annex
paras 5–8.
67. Ibid., Annex para. 9. In fact, based upon a new ‘northern tier’ defense con-
cept, Britain had greatly diminished its own intended wartime role in the
Middle East. See Chapter 10 in Cohen, Fighting World War Three.
68. JP(52)32(Final), 7 Mar. 52, DEFE 4/52, paras 10, 11 and 20. Neither did they
think the US likely to provide forces for Siam.
70. COS(52)38(1) [JP(52)32(Final)], 11 Mar. 52, DEFE 4/52.
71. Ibid.
72. D(52)2(1), 19 Mar. 52, CAB 131/12. The committee discussed D(52)5, 14
Mar. 52, CAB 131/12, a revised draft of JP(52)32(Final).
296 Notes
73. Ibid. This interpretation is confirmed by COS(52)188, 29 Mar. 52, DEFE 5/38.
74. COS(52)224, 22 Apr. 52, DEFE 5/38.
75. Ibid.
76. The report was originally commissioned in February. See JP(52)28(O)T of R,
19 Feb. 52, CAB 21/3449. The actual report was found attached to
COS(52)77(3) [JP(52)28(Final)], 5 June 52, DEFE 4/54. See JPS Annex paras
22–3.
77. Ibid., JPS Annex paras 24–6.
78. As approved in COS(52)77(3); the COS report is at COS(52)303, 10 June 52,
DEFE 5/39.
79. COS(52)404, 31 July 52, DEFE 5/40.
80. COS(52)109(8), 29 July 52, DEFE 4/55.
81. COS(53)15, 12 Jan. 53, DEFE 5/44. Templer’s visit was completely fortuitous
and had been hastily arranged when the aircraft carrying him from London
to Singapore developed engine trouble and stopped in Bangkok for 12
hours. See Cloake, p. 299.
82. See, for example, Bennett to Scott, Ref 1215/61/52G, 30 July 52, FO
371/101184 FS1195/10/G; COS(52)168(2), 9 Dec. 52, DEFE 4/58; COS(52)713,
24 Dec. 52, DEFE 5/43.
83. COS(53)47, 23 Jan. 53, DEFE 5/44; COS(53)9(5), 20 Jan. 53, DEFE 4/59.
84. COS(52)713. Actually, the letter discussed the necessity of the Cabinet tak-
ing rapid action in either IRONY (which required four months’ preparation)
or RINGLET conditions.
85. COS(53)47, Annex paras 19 and 21.
86. Ibid., Annex paras 22–3.
87. COS(53)99, 17 Feb. 53, DEFE 5/44. Apparently a version of the report con-
sidered by the DC.
88. D(53)2(3), 11 Feb. 53, CAB 131/13. Churchill changed his mind on the
issue in May. See FO, Defence of Malaya – occupation of the Songkhla
Position – revelation to the US, 22 Apr. and 1 May 53, FO 371/106999
FZ1195/10 and 12/G. As discussed below, the British did not reveal the plan
to the Americans until the summer of 1954.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid. This was COS(53)99, approved at COS(53)9(5), 20 Jan. 53, DEFE 4/59.
92. D(53)7(4b), 29 Apr. 53, CAB 131/13; Gilbert, p. 821.
93. D(53)7(4b).
94. JP(53)79(Final), 12 May 53, DEFE 6/24, Annex para. 4. This was one brigade
less than called for by the unmodified RINGLET.
96. JP(53)101(Final), 23 July 53, DEFE 4/64.
97. COS(53)380, 6 Aug. 53, DEFE 5/48, para. 11. It is not clear if the Australian
and New Zealand planners had been briefed on the plans, but the British
representative, Maj.-Gen. Sixsmith, almost certainly did know of them.
98. JP(53)124(Final), 3 Dec. 53, DEFE 6/24, Annex I, para. 14
99. The reason for the extra division was to protect the lines of communica-
tion, with which the JPS concurred. The Staff planners assumed all ground
forces would come from the Commonwealth, as would naval forces for the
west coast and a large number of the required air forces. Ibid., Annex I paras
14, 15, and 18.
Notes 297
100. COS(53)616 [BDCC(FE)(53)5], 21 Dec. 53, DEFE 5/50.

101. COS(54)21, 19 Jan. 54, DEFE 5/51.
102. COS(54)34(3), 26 Mar. 54, as noted in COS(54)97 [JP(54)18(Revised Final)],
30 Mar. 54, DEFE 5/52.
107. Ibid., para. 9. Presumably, the British would have to reinforce internal
security units in Malaya.
108. Ibid., para. 21 and COS(54)10(5), op. cit.
110. COS(54)10(5), 26 Jan. 54, DEFE 4/68.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. COS(54)36(3), 31 Mar. 54, DEFE 4/69.
114. Malcolm MacDonald, ‘The Situation in Indo-China’, 31 Mar. 54, FO
371/112050 DF1071/155, para. 16.
115. JP(54)45(Final), 7 May 54, DEFE 6/25.
116. Select Siamese police and army officers had for years attended courses at
the FARELF Training Centre (FTC). See FTC, Quarterly Historical Report,
FARELF Training Centre, Quarter Ending March 1949, 26 May 49, WO
268/116 as one example.
117. Templer managed to clear up some lingering, but minor, problems with
the Siam–Malaya Police Agreement. See Bangkok to SEA Dept. FO (Ref:
1032/84/54), 15 May 54, and Cloake, Templer, pp. 322–3, which describes
Phao’s somewhat salacious hospitality.
118. General Sir Charles Loewen, Memoirs, Vol. 2 (Toronto: Privately Published,
1986), p. 513. The trip report can be found as an annex to ch. 53, pp. 520–3.
119. Bangkok to FO, No. 154, 13 May 1954, DEFE 11/114. See also Bangkok
to FO, No. 155, 13 May 54, DEFE 11/114. Indeed, the US Ambassador
had done so, but getting JCS approval was extremely difficult, as Adm.
Radford opposed such bases because they dissipated forces which he
thought should be directed solely against what he saw as the source of
aggression in Southeast Asia: China. See the Editorial Note on a conversa-
tion between Dulles and Robert Cutler, in FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1,
pp. 485 and 523. Eisenhower was more favorably inclined to the plan
because he thought ‘we should not lose any asset [Thailand] we don’t have
to lose’.
120. CinC FARELF to CIGS, op. cit.
121. COS(54)57(1), 18 May 54, DEFE 4/70.
122. Ibid.
123. SEACOS 393, 20 May 54, DEFE 11/114, paras 2(a) and 2(b).
124. Ibid., paras 2(d) and 2(e).
125. See the Annex to Special Report to the NSC (Tab 2), 15 July 54, and
Document 433 (Editorial Note) in FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 2,
pp. 735–6.
126. COS(54)205, 23 June 54, DEFE 5/53, para. 6; COS(54)295, 7 Sept. 54, DEFE
5/54, Annex paras 1–2.
298 Notes

131. COS(54)294, 7 Sept. 54, DEFE 5/54, Appendix A, para. 4.
132. COS(54)332, 26 Oct. 54, DEFE 5/55, para. 8.
133. Ibid., paras 6 & 21(a) and comments of the Joint Administrative Planning
Staff. The shortages were first noted in COS(54)295, op. cit.
134. COS(53)500, 7 Oct. 53, DEFE 5/49, para. 5.
135. Alexander to Menzies, 29 June 53, DEFE 13/58. Alexander had first
discussed the matter with Menzies at the June Commonwealth Prime
Ministers conference in London. See O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War,
Vol. 1, p. 345.
136. David Lee, ‘The National Security Planning and Defence Preparations of
the Menzies Government, 1950–1953’, War & Society, 10:2 (1992), pp.
129–30. This had become apparent when members of the JPS conferred
with the Australian and New Zealand planners from 24 August to 3
September. See COS(53)439, 9 Sept. 53, DEFE 5/48.
137. COS(53)105(3), 15 Sept. 53, DEFE 4/65.
138. Ibid.
139. COS(52)158(3).
140. COS(53)439, op. cit.
141. David Lee, ‘Australia and Allied Strategy in the Far East, 1952–1957’, JSS,
16:4 (1993), p. 515.
142. COS(53)501, 8 Oct. 53, DEFE 5/49, para. 7.
143. Ibid. Oddly enough, however, they still wished for New Zealand to plan
only a Middle East deployment (para. 20).
144. COS(53)130(4), 17 Nov. 53, DEFE 4/66.
145. Edwards, Crises and Commitments, p. 163.
146. COS(54)109(1), 20 Oct. 54, DEFE 4/73.
147. Edwards, Crises and Commitments, pp. 167–8; on the change in the New
Zealand effort, see COS(54)109(2), 20 Oct. 54, DEFE 4/73. On the
Australian plans to send a corps in global war and of lesser forces in a Cold
War contingency, see COS(54)393, 22 Dec. 54, DEFE 5/55, Annex I. As
Loewen told the Australians, no reinforcements would be forthcoming
from the UK in the event of global war, but up to a division might be flown
in to marry up with stockpiled equipment if the defense of Malaya was ini-
tiated in cold war circumstances (Annex I, paras 13–14). On the ANZAM
Planners discussions, see the series of planning studies in DEFE 11/55.
148. This was the first overseas deployment of Australian ground troops in
peacetime, but as mentioned in earlier chapters, Australia had committed
RAAF units to Malaya and the Middle East. See Ian McNeill, To Long Tan:
the Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950–1966 (St Leonards: Allen &
Unwin/AWM, 1993), pp. 6–7; Eaton, pp. 159–67.
149. COS(54)393, 22 Dec. 54, DEFE 5/55, Annex I, para. 13. The local units to
be raised were those of the Federation Army and possibly additional volun-
teer units from Singapore.
150. Ibid., Annex I, para. 14. Probably a reference to 3 Inf Div, the main part of
the UK strategic reserve and recently released from internal security duties
in the Middle East.
Notes 299

152. Ibid., Annex I, paras 17–18 and 26(b)(ii). At this time Australia’s regular
army had only 24 000 men, which although more than double the num-
ber it had in 1948, obviously constrained whatever contribution it could
make in peacetime. In 1954 the Australian Army also had 83 000 men in
the reserves, the source for the three division corps. See Millar, Appendix B.
153. Ibid., Annex I, para. 21. Probably an outgrowth of the Five Power talks,
SEATO, and US–UK politico-military talks – see Chapter 9.
154. Ibid., Annex I, paras 22 and 28. New Zealand was to send one division
to Malaya in hot war, and approximately a brigade group in Cold War
circumstances.
155. ANZAM Planners Study No. 3, Part I, Dec. 54, DEFE 11/55, Appendix
para. 14(b)(i), and Annexure II, para. 28.
156. Contrary to Rowell’s earlier assurances to Loewen.
157. ANZAM Planners Study No. 1, Dec. 54, DEFE 11/55, para. 17.
158. Ibid., para. 21.
159. As discussed in Chapter 6, the British became amenable to this reallocation
following developments in the Egyptian base negotiations, the develop-
ment of the hydrogen bomb, and the promise of the Baghdad Pact. See
Devereux, pp. 92–6, 191–3.
160. Buskell to Laxton, Cabinet Office, ref.: FE/TS.51/5/Plans, 24 Mar. 53, CAB
21/3449.
161. Interviews with Major Geoffrey Hodgson, Brigadier Paul Crook, Colonel
H. B. H. Waring; correspondence with Brigadier A. C. Heywood and
Colonel Kensey Comerford-Green.
162. Interview with, and letter to the author from, David F. Bayly, Chief
Scientific Adviser to C-in-C FARELF. The experiment involved trying to
burn all the foilage on an island. The tropical conditions prevented it from
being fully successful, and the idea was eventually abandoned.
163. Hillis to Twiss, ref COS 362/19/2/52, 22 Feb. 52, DEFE 11/47;
BDCC(FE)(52)5, 11 Feb. 52, DEFE 11/47.
164. See, for example: COS(51)252, 26 Apr. 51, DEFE 5/31; COS(51)381, 20 June
51, DEFE 5/32; COS(52)8 [Ref BDCC(FE)(51)8], 2 Jan. 52, DEFE 5/36;
COS(53)551, 29 Oct. 53 (Ref 109/2/C), 6 Nov. 53, DEFE 5/49.
165. Among others, discussed in, SEACOS 101, 15 Sept. 50, DEFE 11/38;
COS(53)437, 7 Sept. 53, DEFE 5/48.
10 Limited Liability and the Defense of

Southeast Asia 1950–54
1. Cmnd. 2834, Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China

Conflict 1945–1965 (London: HMSO, 1965) p. 9.
2. JP(48)101(Final Revise), op cit., para. 21; this theme is found throughout
various minutes and memoranda. For example, see FE(O)(48)8(1), 4 Dec. 48,
CAB 134/285.
3. JP(48)3(O)(Preliminary Draft), op. cit., Section J, French Indo-China.
4. C. Mary Turnbull, ‘Britain and Vietnam, 1948–1955’, War & Society, 6:2
(1988), p. 110.
300 Notes
5. COS(49)29, 20 Jan. 49, DEFE 5/13 (Part 1).

6. GHQ FARELF, ‘Review of Events in the Far East’, The Army Quarterly, 58:2
(1949), p. 145.
7. In fact, the British had presumed such a scenario since at least as early as
February 1948. See COS(48)43(O) [CIC(FE)(48)8(P)], 23 Feb. 48, DEFE 5/10.
8. COS(49)29, para. 10.
9. SEACOS 900, 5 May 49, FO 371/76034 F6670/1075/61G.
10. COS(49)81(1), 1 June 49, DEFE 4/22.
11. Ibid.
12. On the Saigon talks, see Lunn-Rockliffe to Gibbs, ref 3/Int/a. Subj:
Conference between French and British C-in-C in the Far East at SAIGON,
3 Mar. 1950. On the SAC discussion, see SAC(50)3, 31 Mar. 50, CAB 134/670.
13. Ibid., Conclusion (c).
14. COS(50)315, 22 Aug. 50, DEFE 5/23. Despite the fact that the greatest
source of Viet Minh supplies came across the border with China, the French
told the British they were ‘convinced that the main centre of organising
traffic in illegal arms to the Viet Minh is centred in Siam’ and that the
Chinese and Viet Minh were establishing a reserve supply base in
the Paracel Islands.
15. Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years 1941–1960, United
States Army in Vietnam (Washington: USACMH, 1985), pp. 98–104.
16. COS(50)95(6), 26 June 50, DEFE 4/32.
17. OCGUKSEA: Visit to Singapore of the United States Joint Defence Survey
Mission (Melby Mission), 14 Aug. 50, DEFE 11/38, p. 3
18. Ibid., p. 4.
19. Ibid., p. 4.
20. Harding told the group how he had toured the Indochina frontier in a
German Ju-52 transport aircraft manufactured in 1933 which the French
used for their ‘main bombing missions’ (ibid., p. 5). A similar experience by
an American officer is noted in Spector, p. 106.
21. COS(50)132(1), 18 Aug. 50, DEFE 4/35.
22. OCGUKSEA memorandum, op. cit., pp. 4–5.
23. Ibid., p. 6.
24. Extensive Chinese material and advisory support has long been known, but
a 1993 article provides compelling evidence that the border campaign was
actually commanded by a general of the PLA. See Qiang Zhai,
‘Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisers and the First
Vietnam War, 1950–1954’, The Journal of Military History, 57:4 (1993)
689–715. On the battle of Dong Khe and the decimation of French Union
forces from Cao Bang and That Mhe leading to the loss of Lang Son, see
Jacques Dalloz, The War in Indo-China, 1945–54, trans. Josephine Bacon
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1990), pp. 126–7 and Edgar O’Ballance, The
Indo-China War 1945–1954: a Study in Guerilla Warfare (London: Faber and
Faber, 1964), pp. 114–16.
25. COS(50)401, 6 Oct. 50, DEFE 5/24, p. 2. With Chinese arms and supplies,
the French strategy of denying all-important rice-producing areas to the
Viet Minh who had hitherto lacked supporting arms had completely
changed with the provision of Chinese arms and supplies.
Notes 301
27. Ibid., paras 18–19.

28. SEACOS 111, 2 Oct. 50, FO 371/83650 FF1193/47, para. 2.
29. Ibid., para. 3.
30. Ibid., para. 8
32. MacDonald went to London in October to put across his views to the
Foreign Office before traveling to Paris to meet with French minister to per-
suade them to transfer power to the Associate States. See Record of a
Meeting to discuss the general situation in South-East Asia and the Far East,
in Yasamee, Doc. 66, pp. 180–3. On his visit to Paris, see note 7 on p. 183
and Turnbull, p. 113.
33. The Cabinet approved the broad outlines of British policy, found in
CP(50)200, 30 Aug. 50, CAB 129/41, at CM(50)55(4), 4 Sept. 50, CAB
128/18. Bevin was surprisingly silent on Indochina, telling his French and
American counterparts that ‘he had nothing to add on the discussion of
Indochina or on other problems in Southeast Asia’. He thought that
‘Present undertakings were moving forward and there did not appear to be
anything requiring ministerial discussion.’ See SFM Min-4, FRUS 1950,
Vol. III, p. 1228. Bevin’s report to the Cabinet on the meetings (CP(50)221,
6 Oct. 50, CAB 129/42) do not even mention Southeast Asia. On the staff
talks, see the editorial note in FRUS 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 905–6. The French
had asked for tripartite staff talks since February 1950. See Memorandum
of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 16 Feb 50, FRUS 1950, Vol. VI,
pp. 730–3.
34. See Paper Presented by the Tripartite Drafting Group, Document 8 [D-6a],
and SFM Min-4, (op. cit.) in FRUS 1950, Vol. III, pp. 1173 and 1228.
35. COS(51)57(5), as noted in COS(51)197. A brief on military action in the
event of a Chinese offensive never went forward because there was no
agreed Allied policy for the defense of Southeast Asia on which to base it.
See the note on the preparatory briefs in para. 5 of JP(51)114(Final), 27 Aug.
51, DEFE 4/46.
36. COS(51)260, 27 Apr. 51, DEFE 5/31, para. 9.
41. COS(51)261, 27 Apr. 51, DEFE 5/31, para. 3.
43. Ibid., para. 15. FARELF had supplied some small arms and ammunition but
little more.
44. Ibid., para. 13. British concerns about the loyalty of some Burmese troops
and the involvement of the Burma Armed Forces commander in arms traf-
ficking led them to restrict arms supplies below requested levels.
45. COS(51)319, 29 May 51, DEFE 5/31.
46. Ibid., p. 19.
47. Ibid., p. 18.
48. Ibid., p. 16.
49. Ibid., p. 3; Conference Report on Tripartite Military Talks in FRUS 1951,
Vol. VI, Part 1, para. 42, p. 69.
302 Notes
50. JP(51)114(Final), 27 Aug. 51, DEFE 4/46, para. 9. This version was found
appended to COS(51)137(3), 29 Aug. 51, DEFE 4/46.
51. DO(51)70, 8 June 51, CAB 131/11. For more details, see Chapter 6.
JP(51)114(Final), para. 12.
52. Ibid., para. 85; on the BDCC(FE)’s recommendations made in SEACOS 230,
see COS(51)136(11), 27 Aug. 51, DEFE 4/46.
56. JP(51)114(Final), para. 13.
57. COS(51)137(3), 29 Aug. 51, DEFE 4/46.
58. Ibid.
59. DO(51)106, 15 Sept. 51, CAB 131/11. On 1 Commonwealth Div, see para. 6.
60. See narrative given in The Acting Secretary to the Secretary in Rome,
No. 55, 21 Nov. 51, in FRUS 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 115.
61. Ibid., p. 116.
62. William J Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indo-
china (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 117–18; O’Ballance,
pp. 165–6.
63. The Secretary of State to Embassy Paris, No. 3743, 29 Dec 51, FRUS 1951,
Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 130–1.
64. JP(51)223(Final), 3 Jan. 52, DEFE 4/51, appended to COS(52)2(1), 4 Jan. 52,
DEFE 4/51.
65. COS(52)2(1), p. 3.
66. JP(51)223(Final), para. 16, and Appendix on Force Availabilities for Support
of Indo-China, para. 10
67. COS(52)2(1), comments of Robert Scott, Foreign Office.
68. JP(51)223(Final), Appendix paras 6–8. ‘No other troops could arrive in
time.’
69. COS(52)2(1).
70. Ibid. In the run-up to the strategic review of 1952, Slessor asked ‘(b) Was it
not possible that the Far East had supplanted the Middle East as the ‘third
pillar’ of our strategy? (c) Were we not in danger of losing the Middle East
by way of the Far East and the Indian sub-continent? (d) During the next
two or three years, while we still held preponderance of atom bombs, might
we not be well advised to take a chance in Western Europe (where the
threat of the atom bomb was critical) and attempt to plug the whole in the
Far East (where soldiers counted for more than bombs)?’ See COS, Review of
Global Strategy, 31 Mar. 52, DEFE 32/2.
71. Ibid., and JP(51)223(Final), para. 7.
72. Spector, p. 150. The withdrawal absorbed some 20 000 French Union troops
and casualties on both sides were heavy. Fall contends that the loss of Hoa
Binh was ‘in fact almost as expensive for the French as the loss of the bor-
der posts in 1950 or the later siege of Dien Bien Phu’. See Bernard Fall, Street
Without Joy, 1994, reprint edn (Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1961), p. 60;
O’Ballance, p. 166;
73. For the source of these concerns, see D(52)5, 14 Mar. 52, CAB 131/12, paras
1–4.
74. JP(52)32(Final), 7 Mar. 52, DEFE 4/52, paras 3–6.
Notes 303
75. Ibid., paras 8, 9, 11, 13, 16, 20 and 22. For a detailed discussion of the evo-
lution of this plan, see Chapter 9.
76. D(52)2(1), 19 Mar. 52, CAB 131/12, emphasis added. At the end of March,
Churchill appointed Field Marshal Viscount Alexander of Tunis as Minister
of Defence.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. GHQ FARELF, ‘Review of Events in South-East Asia and the Far East’, The
Army Quarterly, 66:1 (1953) 17–21.
80. Fall, Street Without Joy, pp. 80–105. O’Ballance cites French casualties as
more than 1200 (p. 184).
81. COS(52)679, 12 Dec. 52, DEFE 5/43.
82. Ibid., para. 17(d).
83. Ibid.
84. Singapore to FO, No. 680, 8 Dec. 52, DEFE 11/81.
85. COS(53)21(6), 10 Feb. 53, DEFE 4/60. A few days later, the VCIGS,
Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Redman, told the committee that the COS
‘should militarily support every effort to divert French Division from
Europe to Indo-China.’ If they didn’t send the reinforcements then, they
would be even less likely to do so once the German forces had been rebuilt
in Europe. Robert Scott enumerated the political difficulties, and in the
end no action was taken by the COSC. See COS(53)27(5), 24 Feb. 53, DEFE
4/60.
86. COS(52)158(2), 18 Nov. 52, DEFE 4/57. For Eden’s ‘advice’ to the French
on what was needed, see Full Circle, pp. 83–4. On the EDC, see Klaus
Larres, ‘Reunification or Integration with the West? Britain and the Federal
Republic of Germany in the early 1950s’, in Aldrich, Intelligence, Defence
and Diplomacy, pp. 42–75, and Saki Dockrill, ‘The Evolution of Britain’s
Policy Toward a European Army 1950–54’, The Journal of Strategic Studies,
12:1 (1989).
87. SEACOS 321, 29 Apr. 53, DEFE 11/62, paras 1–2.
88. COS(53)56(3), 30 Apr. 53, DEFE 4/62.
89. Ibid.
90. COSSEA 918, 30 Apr. 53, DEFE 11/62.
91. Report of the Staff Planners on the Conference Held June 15 to 1 July
1953, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, Section V, pp. 324–7.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid., Annex I, para. 14. For a more detailed discussion of the plan and its
ramifications for the British plans, see Chapter 10.
94. Ibid., Annex I, paras 14–16.
97. Spector, pp. 170–1.
98. COS(53)75(1), 22 June 53, DEFE 4/63. This was a reference to SEACOS 342,
16 June 53, DEFE 11/406.
99. SEACOS 341, 16 June 53, DEFE 11/406.
100. COS(53)75(1); reference to SEACOS 343, 19 June 53, DEFE 11/406. The
Chief of Staff of the US Air Force also thought reinforcements of at least
two divisions were the answer. See Spector, p. 171.
304 Notes
101. O’Daniel to Radford, No. 8163/8234, 30 June 53, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol.
XIII, Part 1, pp. 624–5; GHQ FARELF, ‘Review of Events in South-East Asia
and the Far East’, The Army Quarterly, 67:1 (1953), pp. 14–15.
102. Duiker, pp. 140–1.
103. Only ten battalions were sent. See O’Ballance, pp. 197–8.
104. Dalloz, pp. 166–7.
105. Ibid., p. 163; Eden, pp. 86–7.
106. Cmnd. 2834, Documents Relating to British Involvement, p. 12 (see also
Document 13, pp. 60–5.
107. GHQ FARELF, ‘Review of Events in South-East Asia and the Far East’, The
Army Quarterly, 68:1 (1954), p. 20.
108. Loewen, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 510, and Appendix A to Chapter 54; Bernard
Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place: the Siege of Dien Bien Phu, De Capo paperback
edn (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1967), p. 109.
109. Loewen, Memoirs, p. 510, and Appendix A to Chapter 54; Turnbull, p. 116.
110. Loewen to Harding, ref DO/CIC/17, 9 Apr. 54, WO 216/865, para. 19.
111. Ibid., para. 18.
112. COS(54)36(3), 31 Mar. 54, DEFE 4/69.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. Harding to Loewen, ref CIGS/BM/50/7142, 23 Apr. 54, WO 216/865;
Loewen to Harding, op. cit., para. 13. Harding was actually a little more
sanguine about the positive effects of a French victory than was Loewen.
See Harding to Loewen, 24 Mar 54, WO 216/865.
116. Cmnd. 2834, Documents on British Involvement, Statement by Dulles to the
Overseas Press Club of America, 29 Mar. 1954, Document No. 14, p. 66.
117. State to Embassy London, No. 5179, 4 Apr. 54, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XIII,
Part 1, pp. 1238–40.
118. Geoffrey Warner, ‘Britain and the Crisis over Dien Bien Phu, April 1954:
the Failure of United Action’, in Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco-
American Relations, 1954–1955, ed. Lawrence Kaplan et al. (Wilmington:
Scholarly Resources, 1990), pp. 64–6; Eden, pp. 92–5. Eden evidently
thought India’s support of a collective defense organization was vital to its
success. However, since Indian political opinion suspected that the US was
not interested in reaching a real settlement at Geneva, it was likely to work
against an organization which it saw merely as a means of perpetuating
Western aggression against China and nationalist movements in Asia.
119. Ibid., p. 67.
120. Ibid., p. 67.
121. Duiker, pp. 160–1; Radford, pp. 398–9; Chalmers M. Roberts, ‘The Day We
Didn’t Go to War’, in Marvin E. Gettleman, ed., Viet Nam: History,
Documents, and Opinions on a Major World Crisis (New York: Fawcett, 1965),
pp. 96–101.
122. Eden, p. 102.
123. Ibid., pp. 103–4.
124. Ibid., p. 105.
125. Cmnd. 2834, Documents Relating to British Involvement, Document No. 16,
p. 67.
126. Ibid.
Notes 305
127. COS(54)47(1), 26 Apr. 54, DEFE 4/70.

128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. Ibid. In his memoirs, Radford wrote that the British Chiefs seemed ‘to
maximize the risks of expansion of the war by intervention at this time
and the requirements for ground forces to be furnished by the Western
powers to achieve victory’. See Radford, p. 408.
131. Ibid., p. 408. See also Radford to Dulles and JCS, No. 4725, 26 Apr. 54,
FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, (Part 2), pp. 1416–17.
132. COS(54)57(1), 18 May 54, DEFE 4/70.
133. The British only revealed the details of this plan when Lord Alexander
traveled to Washington in July 1954. Gilbert, p. 994.
134. COS(54)47(1). Harding hinted to Radford that one of the reasons Britain
would not contemplate involvement in Indochina was because its Cold
War strategic reserve was tied down in Egypt. Harding appealed to Radford
for help in gaining Egyptian agreement to the new basing arrangement as
a means of freeing the strategic reserve. Churchill made a similar appeal in
a letter to Eisenhower. See Churchill to Eisenhower, 21 June 54, FRUS
1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 569–70.
135. Radford, p. 408–9.
136. Ibid., p. 409.
137. Ibid., pp. 408–9; Gilbert, p. 973.
138. Radford, p. 409; Gilbert, p. 409.
139. Eden to Makins, No. 535, 12 June 54, DEFE 11/141, p. 8.
140. Report of the Five Power Military Conference, June 54, DEFE 11/141, para. 3.
141. JP(54)50(Final), 27 May 54, DEFE 11/114; Geoffrey Warner, ‘From Geneva
to Manila: British Policy toward Indochina and SEATO, May–September
1954’, in Kaplan, p. 153.
142. Ibid., paras 17–19.
143. Ibid. para. 18.
144. CIGS to VCIGS, JH 7, 9 June 54, DEFE 11/141.
145. Report of the Five Power Military Conference, para. 22.
146. Cmnd. 2834, Documents Relating to British Involvement, p. 16.
147. Ibid., pp. 14–15.
148. Turnbull, p. 119; for the COS position, see COS(54)332, 26 Oct. 54, DEFE
5/55, para. 6.
149. Warner, p. 157; this is clear from the study group’s discussions. See JSG
MC-5, 16 July 54, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 623–6.
COS(54)68(1), 8 June 54, DEFE 4/70; see also COS(54)86(3), 28 July 54,
DEFE 4/71. Joint UK-US Study Group on Southeast Asia, 17 July 54, DEFE
11/83. A published version can be found in FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1,
pp. 631–42. Eden, pp. 143–4.
150. Warner, p. 158.
151. COS(54)259, 12 Aug. 54, DEFE 5/54.
152. The treaty text is reproduced as Appendix 1 to George Modelski, ed., SEATO:
Six Studies (Canberra: F W Cheshire, 1962), pp. 289–92. Although it was New
Zealand which asked for the insertion of the economic development clause,
the idea probably originated in the UK. See Draft Southeast Asia Collective
Security Treaty, SEAP D-2, 2 Aug. 54, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, p. 689.
306 Notes
153. Harding stated on July 28 that ‘Effective internal security in [Siam, Burma,
and Indonesia] was vital’, not the creation of ‘massive armed forces’. See
COS(54)86(3).
154. COS(54)259, para. 22.
155. Darby, p. 64.
156. Warner, pp. 158–9.
157. COS(53)93(5), 28 July 53, DEFE 4/64.
158. Referring to British acceptance of partition of Vietnam, Dulles predicted,
with some accuracy, that the ‘British would seek to … get ANZUS to
guarantee a buffer north of Malaya to protect Malaya and Hongkong.
Thus cleverly, the British would be able to pass as the peacemakers and
go between for east and west, and would strengthen their ties with India
and Malaya, without any real expense by the UK.’ Memorandum
of Conversation by Robert Cutler, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1,
pp. 524–5.
159. JP(51)223(Final), 3 Jan. 52, DEFE 4/51, para. 2.
160. COS(52)2(1), 4 Jan. 52, DEFE 4/51.
161. Blaxland, pp. 221–35.
11 Conclusion
1. John Garnett, ‘Defense Policy-Making’, Contemporary Strategy II: The Nuclear

Powers, ed. John Bayliss et al. (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 10.
2. On the independent deterrent, see Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Nuclear
Weapons (London: Macmillan for RIIA, 1980); Gowing, Independence and
Deterrence; A. J. R. Groom, British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (London:
Frances Pinter, 1974); and John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: the
United States, Britain and the Military Atom (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1983). On the issue of jointness at the ministerial and theater command
level, see Michael Howard, The Central Organisation of Defence (London: RUSI,
1970), and Johnson, Defence by Ministry.
3. Scott, pp. 88–9.
4. Source for data: Abstract of Army Statistics, WO 73/175–81; WO 384/1–14.
5. Ibid.
6. From the 1870s on, the Army was theoretically evenly distributed between
home and overseas through the Cardwell system of paired battalions.
Throughout most of its life, however, there was a chronic mismatch between
the paired battalions. In periods of intense activity such as during the Punjab
frontier campaign of 1898, there were only 56 000 men at home and 78 000
abroad. See Edward M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, 1868–1902 (New York:
Manchester University Press, 1992), pp. 20–1; 62–3, 173. In 1938, the num-
ber of soldiers overseas stood at 90 634 (46 per cent) while the number at
home was 106 704. See Bond, Map 2, pp. 118–19.
7. Darby, p. 236.
8. Edwards, Crises and Commitments, p. 329.
9. Michael Carver, Out of Step: The Memoirs of Field Marshal Lord Carver (London:
Hutchinson, 1989), p. 352. Carver was appointed C-in-C FARELF in July
1966, and later became C-in-C Far East, the joint theater command.
Notes 307
10. See Ovendale, British Defence Policy, document 4.1, p. 132, which is based
upon a December 1964 diary entry of a cabinet minister.
11. On the FTC aspect, see John P. Cross, A Face Like a Chicken’s Backside: an
Unconventional Soldier in South East Asia, 1948–1971 (London: Greenhill
Books, 1996), pp. 207–28; for a first-hand account of the British Advisory
Mission to Saigon, see Sir Thompson, Make for the Hills, pp. 122–49.
12. Lt-Gen. Stanley R. Larsen and Brig. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Jr, Allied
Participation in Vietnam, Vietnam Studies (Washington: DA, 1975), pp. 22–4.
In 1966, when the government was contemplating the elimination of the
Brigade if Gurkhas over the course of three years, the Adjutant-General of
the British Army, General Sir Reginald Hewetson, approached the US Army
attaché in London with the proposal, and he forwarded the idea on to
General Westmoreland in Saigon.
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Index
ABC (American–British–Canadian) 271n59, 274n114, 294n39,

Planning, 16, 24, 30, 62, 112, 117 298n148
ACFE (Air Command Far East) see and Malaya, 6, 74–5, 134, 146, 180,
FEAF 183, 185, 189, 190, 192, 193,
Acheson, Dean, 98, 103, 116, 148, 197, 198, 199–202, 228, 229,
150, 151 264n122, 298n148
Airey, Lieutenant-General Sir and the US, 117, 151, 254n90
Terence, 156–7 see also ANZAM, ANZUK, ANZUS,
Alanbrooke, Field Marshal Lord, 21–2, Colonial and Dominion Forces,
37, 117 Five Power Ad Hoc Committee
Aleutians, 118 and FPSA
Alexander, Albert, 14, 57, 64, 90, 97,
239n8, 271n49 Bangkok, 114, 196
Alexander, Field Marshal Lord, 125, Bao Dai, 26, 103, 114, 116, 204, 206
129, 130, 158, 198, 272n93, BAOR (British Army of the Rhine), 7,
273n106, 285n171 108, 134, 156, 165, 169, 208,
Amethyst, HMS, 90–1, 98, 105, 108, 218, 232–3
114, 264n138 Barnett, Correlli, 1–3, 12
Annam, see French Indochina Batu Arang, 57
ANZAM (Australia–New Zealand– BCOF (British Commonwealth
Malayan area), 117, 185, 198, Occupation Forces), 97, 117,
200, 202, 228, 271n59, 294n35 276n24
ANZUK (Australia–New Zealand–UK BDCC(FE) (British Defense
force), 236 Coordinating Committee, Far
ANZUS (Australia–New Zealand–US East), 7, 8, 26, 55, 59, 69–73, 89,
mutual defense treaty), 117, 151, 105, 114, 118, 133, 168, 170,
157, 158, 164, 215, 228, 270n33, 258n4
306n158 and defense of Hong Kong, 89, 93,
Attlee, Clement, 12, 14–16, 18, 20–1, 105, 106, 143–6, 154–5
36, 38–9, 63, 64, 71, 74, 91, 95, and defense of Malaya, 182–6, 191,
99, 102, 139, 141, 145, 241n45, 196–8
271n49 and French Indochina, 195, 205–6,
Auchinleck, Field Marshal Sir Claude, 207–8, 213–14
37 Berlin, 216
Australia, 21, 62, 68, 102, 116, 117, blockade, 49, 52, 65, 89, 107
120, 124, 133, 214, 222, 235, Bevin, Ernest, 14, 16, 18, 67, 71,
236, 270n30, 294n35, 299n152 87, 95–6, 98–9, 103–5, 115, 116,
and Hong Kong, 96–8, 134, 135, 141, 148, 241n45, 255n127
145, 152, 155–6, 266n164 BFHK (British Forces Hong Kong), 99,
and Korean War, 139, 179, 199, 148, 153, 160
276n24 Bihar, 173
and the Middle East, 115, 117, 155, BJSM (British Joint Services Mission),
186, 189, 198, 199, 270n33, 65, 277n37
323
324 Index
Black Swan, HMS, 90 National Service, 35, 61, 64–5, 74,

Borneo, 17, 24, 26, 29, 131, 185, 194, 106, 122–3, 138,141, 165, 167,
201, 234–5, 270n35 179, 231–2, 234, 262n83,
Boucher, Major-General Sir Charles, 263n107, 267n199, 277n25
48, 55, 58, 69–70, 71, 252n58, ‘fire brigades’, 59–61, 74, 75, 89, 94,
256n162 107, 167, 225
Bouchier, AVM Cecil, 277n28 TA (Territorial Army), 35, 62, 66,
Bradley, General Omar, 139, 149, 159, 94, 108, 125, 132, 190, 192,
185, 277n28, 281n102 193, 223, 229, 263n107
Bretton Woods, 28 divisions: 1 Infantry, 56; 2 Infantry,
Briggs, Lieutenant-General Sir Harold, 56, 192; 3 Infantry, 192, 210,
71–3, 167, 169, 256n160, 223, 273n109, 298n150; 17
265n147 Gurkha Infantry, 48–9, 62–4,
British Army 128, 173, 179, 184, 186, 218;
Anti-Aircraft Command, 132 40 Infantry, 100, 107, 108, 184,
Army Council, 64, 254n106 275n144, 294n30; 7 Armored,
Cardwell system, xiv, 244n7, 306n6 56; 1 Commonwealth, 179,
structure of, xiv, 5, 24, 33–5, 49, 198, 210, 275n137, 276n24,
121–2, 123, 132, 165, 169, 208, 286n203
231–2 brigades: 2 Guards, 60–1, 62, 65, 75,
deployment of: xiv, 5, 13, 33, 56, 87, 101, 107, 184; 3
74, 84, 121–2, 228–9, 231–4, Commando, 72–3, 94, 101,
242n63, 243n71, 306n6; 105, 107, 136, 138, 139, 144,
re-structuring affected by, 70, 166, 169, 184, 263n110,
75, 89, 94, 107, 263n107 294n30; 16 Parachute, 125,
inter-theater movements of, 30, 60, 192, 210, 223, 257n165; 18
62, 74, 75, 89, 94, 105, 107, Infantry, 166; 26 Gurkha
128, 138, 140–1, 169, 172, 184, Infantry, 71, 100, 105, 107,
199, 257n165, 275n154 166, 257n165; 27 Infantry, 100,
strength/size of, 24, 33–5, 49, 123, 107, 141, 146, 262n83, 280n85;
125, 131, 132, 167, 169, 231–3, 28 Infantry, 100, 280n85; 28
272n71, 275n144, 306n6 Commonwealth, 199, 222; 29
lower/higher establishment, 44, 56, Infantry, 139–41, 146; 48
71, 74, 141, 233, 251n42, Gurkha Infantry, 166; 63
263n107 Gurkha Infantry, 166
role in global war, 24, 119, 229 regiments, armored: 3 RTR, 100,
role in cold war, 110, 121–2, 125, 140, 262n83, 266n161; 4
133, 165 Hussars, 59, 71, 72, 100, 166,
and the Far East, 30, 122, 125, 169, 277n35; 13/18 Hussars, 74, 166
231, 251n46 regiments, artillery: 44; 26 Field, 47,
and the Middle East, 122, 125 58, 166, 257n165, 259n31
and Western Europe, 122, 125, 133, regiments, infantry: Guards, 34, 60;
169, 229 Parachute, 34; Special Air
manpower shortages, 35–6, 37, 45, Service, 131, 235, 277n30,
74, 75, 124, 141, 168, 179, 279n79
241n46, 248n91, 288n31, battalions: 3 Grenadiers, 252n73;
289n36 2 Coldstreams, 253n73; 2 Scots
regular soldiers, 122, 124, 167, 232, Guards, 253n73; 2 Buffs,
267n199, 271n68 259n29; 1 Devon, 47, 57;
Index 325
British Army – continued CENTO (Central Treaty Organization),

battalions – continued 229
2 KOYLI, 47; 1 Leicesters, Ceylon, 4, 16, 21, 116
262n83; 1 Suffolk, 56; 1 Chiang Kai-shek, 87, 88
Seaforth, 47, 57; 1 A&SH, 141, Chiefs of Staff, 7, 14, 22, 57, 59, 62–3,
262n83; 1 Inniskillings, 57, 58, 68, 74, 78, 82, 84–5, 91, 104, 107,
82; 1 Middlesex, 141, 262n83, 111–13, 119, 121, 123, 125–8,
266n159; 1/2 GR, 41, 47, 46, 57; 129, 130–1, 133, 136, 138, 145,
2/2 GR, 46, 47; 1/6 GR, 46, 47, 148, 149–50, 155, 157–8, 160,
247n73; 2/6 GR, 46–7, 81, 84, 161–3, 185, 197–8, 217–19
247n73, 259n29; 1/7 GR, 46, 47, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 8, 71, 91,
247n73; 2/7 GR, 46, 47; 1/10 114, 139, 155, 168, 175, 184, 188
GR, 46, 47, 247n73; 2/10 GR, Anti-Aircraft Sub-Committee, 18
46, 47, 81–2, 247n73, 266n159; Chifley, Joseph, 74, 264n122
41 Commando RM, 277n20 Chin Peng, 52, 249n2
squadrons: 67 Gurkha Engineer, China, Republic of, 24, 25, 27, 29, 43,
277n35 53, 59, 136, 211
see also Colonial and Dominion and Hong Kong, 78, 80–3, 87, 105,
Forces, Great Britain, Global 148, 259n33, 266n166,
strategy, armed forces for and 267n192
Gurkhas see also Formosa
British Pacific Fleet, 78 China, Peoples’ Republic of
Broome, Richard, 252n58 strategic threat, 67, 88, 108, 111,
Brownjohn, Lieutenant-General Sir 112, 114, 118, 124, 127, 156,
Nevil, 140, 141, 168, 175–6, 182, 203–5, 209, 211, 219, 229,
184 294n29
Brunei, 17, 234–5, 253n83 recognition of, 67–8, 77, 102–5,
Brussels Pact, 15, 19, 49, 107, 115 108, 227, 255n127, 259n25
BSMB (British Services Mission and Hong Kong, 71, 77, 80, 87,
Burma), 25, 112, 113, 269n14 89–90, 92, 96, 99, 101, 104,
Burma, 4, 16, 21, 24, 25, 40, 46, 52, 105–7, 108, 110, 137, 140,
60, 68, 95, 112, 114, 116, 118, 142–3, 147, 151–2, 153, 162,
168, 189, 203, 205, 208–9, 215, 227, 267n192, 272n78,
220, 228, 269n14 281n102
Butler, Richard, 129–30 and Malaya, 67, 69, 72, 106, 124,
128, 180, 182, 186, 213
Calcutta Conference, 250n9 and French Indochina, 103, 104,
Calvert, Brig. Michael, 146, 110, 118, 120, 124, 137, 140,
279n79 180, 182, 204, 205, 208, 211,
Cambodia, see French Indochina 212, 219
Canada, 68, 96, 120, 139, 179, 221, and Burma, 110, 113, 118, 120,
229, 276n24 204, 212
see also Colonial and Dominion and Siam, 111, 113, 118, 124, 180,
Forces 197, 204, 212
Canton, 92, 101, 102, 137, 259n33, and Tibet, 137, 173, 174
266ns160, 166 and Viet Minh, 182, 204, 205, 206,
Carpentier, General Jean, 206–7 217–18, 220, 300ns14, 24, 25
CCP (Chinese Communist Party), 54, and Korean War, 123–4, 146, 147,
60, 102, 108 151
326 Index
China, Peoples’ Republic of – continued 33, 289n36; King’s African

PLA (Peoples’ Liberation Army), 67, Rifles, 169; Federation, 171
69, 72, 77, 82, 83, 90, 91–2, 93, battalions: 1 KAR, 292n101; 2 KAR,
98, 101, 106, 136, 137, 142, 292n101; 3 KAR, 292n101; 1 N.
147, 151, 153, 264n138, Rhodesia Regt., 292n101; 1
268n210, 276n2, 300n24 Rhodesian African Rifles,
CCAF (Chinese Communist Air 292n101; 1 RAR, 292n101;
Force), 142–3, 144, 147, 151–2, 2 RAR, 292n101; 3 RAR,
153, 294n48 276n24, 292n101; 1 NZ Regt.,
Cholmondeley, Charles, 146, 279n79 292n101; 2 NZ Regt., 292n101;
Churchill, Sir Winston, 109, 125, 130, 1 Fiji, 167, 292n101; 1 Malay,
161, 190, 192, 213, 217, 218, 220, 47; 2 Malay, 47; 5 Malay, 170;
285n171, 305n134 6 Malay, 170, 171; 7 Malay,
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 171, 172
108, 228, 270n46 African troops, 168–9, 288n20
CIC (FE) (Commanders-in-Chief, Far ‘Ferret Force’ 58, 61, 252ns58, 59,
East), 7, 8, 28, 43, 110–11, 253n81
113–14, 150, 258n4 HKVDF (Hong Kong Volunteer
and Malaya, 27, 63, 84, 145, 185 Defence Force), 79–80, 81–2,
and Hong Kong, 63, 79, 80, 84, 85, 83, 84–6, 262n101, 286n198
86, 102, 145, 150, 153–4, Rhodesian volunteers (SAS), 167,
280n83 292n101
and French Indochina, 206–7 Royal Australian Air Force, 75, 97,
and Siam, 112, 181, 197 179, 298n148
Clutterbuck, Sir Richard, 56 Royal Australian Navy, 179
Cochinchina, see French Indochina Royal Canadian Air Force, 179
‘cold war’ (as Communist technique), Royal Canadian Navy, 179
5, 53, 83, 113, 119, 120, 126, 212, Royal New Zealand Navy, 97, 179
270n36 Royal New Zealand Air Force, 179
Colombo Conference, 116, 118, 207, Royal South African Air Force, 179
221 Cominform, 52
Colonial and Dominion Forces, 4, Commonwealth Signal Organisation,
20–1, 36, 43, 63, 128, 133, 165, 148
167–8, 171–2, 179, 229, 234–5, ‘Confrontation’, 234–5
270n30, 276n24, 298n148, Consort, HMS, 90
299n152 ‘Continental Commitment’, xiii, 231,
Commonwealth Strategic Reserve 241n40, 271n48
Force, 133, 180, 198, 199, 200, Creech-Jones, Sir Arthur, 57, 59, 63,
202, 228, 235, 286n208 69, 85–6, 98, 252n54
divisions: 1 Federation, 171, 179, Cripps, Sir Stafford, 39
228; 1 Commonwealth, 179, Cyprus, 8, 128, 242n63, 274n109
198, 210, 275n137, 276n24, Cyrenaica, 242n63
286n203 Czechoslovakia, 16, 49, 52
brigades: 28 Commonwealth, 133,
199, 222, 286n208 Darby, Philip, 1–3, 6, 273n99
regiments: Malay, 43, 49, 56, 62, Davis, Vice-Admiral Arthur, USN, 152
63–4, 70, 72, 74, 86–7, 113, 131, Davis, John, 252n58
167, 168, 169–70, 172, 175, de Lattre de Tassigny, General Jean,
185–6, 187, 252n57, 288ns31, 209, 210, 211
Index 327
Defence Committee (Cabinet), 7, 8, ‘Force 136’, 52, 58, 252n58

36, 39–40, 60, 71, 78, 82, 90, 97, Formosa (Taiwan), 24, 105, 111, 112,
110, 122, 128, 131, 132, 133, 137, 114, 136, 137, 140, 143, 146,
138, 139, 154, 155, 162, 168, 170, 267n192, 268n4, 269n11, 280n83
188, 190 see also ‘China, Republic of’
Dempsey, Lieutenant-General Sir ‘Forward Planning’ (deception), 145,
Miles, 170 155
Dien Bien Phu, 195, 196, 216–18, FPSA (Five Power Staff Agency), 159,
220, 222, 302n72 161, 164, 193, 214, 220
Don Khe, 206 France, 103, 111, 114, 118, 133, 142,
Dulles, John F., 151, 158, 161, 216, 151, 152, 193, 205, 207, 212, 214,
217, 218, 222, 306n158 216, 220
Franks, Sir Oliver, 149–50, 151
East Anglia, 220 Fraser, Admiral Lord, 137, 139–40, 168
EDC (European Defense Community), French Foreign Legion, 206
214, 220 French Indochina, 24, 26, 53, 68, 111,
Eden, Sir Anthony, 129, 151, 158, 112, 113, 114, 116, 118, 120, 133,
213, 217–18, 220 146, 195, 203–24
Egypt, 127, 132, 169, 171, 273n109, Allied intervention and, 218–21,
305n134 228
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 123, 158, British policy toward, 204–7,
161, 196, 217, 218, 219, 305n134 212–13, 214, 217–18, 224,
Elizabeth II, Queen, 198 227–8
Elliot, Air Marshal Sir William, 91, defense of, 207, 209–12, 218, 220
152 Elysée Agreement, 204, 205
Evans, Major-General Geoffrey, 100, French withdrawal from, 189, 191,
265n157 205, 211, 212–13, 221
Letourneau Plan, 215
FARELF (Far East Land Forces), 7–9, Malaya and, 172, 182, 189–90,
42–5, 48, 50, 53–4, 64, 107, 140, 192–3, 201, 208, 219
156, 171–2, 188, 193, 208, 222, military assistance to, 122, 136,137,
223, 228, 232–3 185, 205–6
and training, 61, 65–7, 75, 136, Pau conference, 207
141, 167, 188, 235, 252n59, reinforcements from France for,
253ns81, 83, 258n4, 279n64 211, 213–14, 215–16, 217, 223,
composition and strength, 64, 65, 226, 303n85
71, 72, 74, 75, 81, 84, 86, 107, strategic importance of, 26, 111,
131, 136, 141, 144, 171–2, 188, 195
199, 235, 295n58 Viet Minh campaign in, 192, 204,
LEP (locally enlisted personnel), 212, 213, 215–17
43–5, 64 see also Viet Minh and China,
FEAF (Far East Air Forces), 8, 55, 147, Peoples’ Republic of and
258n4 French Indochina
Festing, Lieutenant General (later FM)
Sir Francis, 99–100, 106, Gage, Sir Berkeley, 196
265ns147, 148, 267n198 Gale, General Sir Richard, 256n160
Five Power Ad Hoc Committee, 152, Garnett, John, 231
154, 212, 214–15 Geneva Conference, 163, 195, 203,
Five Power Defense Arrangement, 236 216, 217, 218–20, 221, 223
328 Index
Gent, Sir Edward, 50, 53, 57, 82, Zones’, 21; ‘Future Defence
252n54 Policy’(1947), 22–7, 102, 200;
Germany (West), 3–4, 56, 107, 122, deterrence, 22, 23, 121, 125–6,
123, 192, 229 131, 203, 225, 230; armed
Gibraltar, 242n63 forces for, 22, 23, 80, 107,
Gowing, Margaret, 273n99 121–3, 124, 125, 130, 132, 133,
Grantham, Sir Alexander, 79, 84, 99, 134, 166, 184, 225; strategic
103–4, 105, 106, 163, 265n148 reserve forces, 37, 84, 94, 107,
Gray, Police Chief, 71 112, 122, 123, 124, 125, 131,
Great Britain: balance of payments, 133, 138, 166, 167, 169, 171,
12, 14, 125, 128–30, 272n73; 192, 208, 210, 211, 223, 225,
defense budget, 14, 50, 110, 122, 235, 236, 298n150, 305n134;
123, 125, 129–30, 132, 231, ‘broken back warfare’, 126,
237n7, 272n72, 73, 89, 93, 132–3; ‘Defence Policy and
287n4; as ‘Third Power’, 15–16, Global Strategy’ (DO(50)54),
240n25; colonial policy, 16–17, 109–10, 120–3, 125, 128, 133,
79, 132; defense policy, 17–18, 145, 165,167, 209, 226,
110, 117, 120–1, 125, 225–36; 273n99; cold v. hot war
foreign policy, 15–16, 116, 120, requirements, 62–3, 70, 80, 91,
181, 225–7; and Korean war, 93, 94, 102, 107–8, 110, 114,
138–41, 226, 277n28 118, 120, 121–2, 124, 127, 132,
Global strategy: and nuclear 169, 180, 184, 208; and
weapons, 18, 23, 110, 121, 127, rearmament, 123, 125, 127,
132, 133, 211, 225, 230, 231, 130, 165, 167, 208, 223, 228,
242n61, 273n107, 275n141; 237n7, 272ns72, 89, 93,
non-military aspects, 120, 121, 275n144; Cold War, 121, 122,
225; and containment, 127, 124, 126–7, 129, 132, 133, 163,
132; and limited liability, 134, 226; ‘Radical Review’, 128–33,
164, 203, 208, 224, 226–7, 230, 161–3, 273n106;
306n158; ‘main support areas’, Commonwealth role, 22–3, 63,
19–20, 23, 241n43; sea lines of 82, 117, 124, 127, 129, 168,
communication, 20, 23, 78, 180, 200–1, 224, 225, 230;
120, 225; air offensive, 19–20, US/Allied role, 109, 115, 127,
22–3, 68, 112, 113, 119, 126, 129, 131, 180, 225, 226, 230
128, 132, 225, 242n59; and the Far East strategy: 24–31, 110–34;
Middle East, 19–20, 23, 62, 66, ‘Far East Strategy and Defence
110, 115, 117, 120, 124, 128, Policy’, 112, 113, 117; in Cold
129, 132, 134, 156, 187, 189, War, 62–3, 88, 102, 113, 127,
199, 201, 225, 230, 241n45, 180, 185, 200, 226, 229; in hot
294n30, 295n67, 302n70; and war 62, 81, 88, 102, 113, 118,
the Far East, 20, 23, 30, 62–3, 180, 184–5, 187, 200;
66, 81, 88, 111–13, 117, 121, non-military aspects, 25, 27,
124, 130–1, 133, 156, 163, 180, 29–30, 88, 103, 110–11, 113,
187, 189, 200–1, 203, 211, 226, 116, 118, 119, 203, 221–2; lines
302n70; and Western of communication, 26, 28–9,
Europe/NATO, 115, 119, 120, 78, 112, 118, 159, 268n4,
121, 122, 126, 127, 128, 133, 269n11; and Middle East, 28,
134, 156, 211, 223, 225; and 31, 43, 62, 66, 75, 107, 118,
Korean War, 123; ‘Defence 121, 127, 128, 186–7, 189, 199,
Index 329
Great Britain: balance of payments – development of Gurkha division,

continued 42–3, 44, 45–6, 49, 62–4, 66,
Far East strategy – continued 75, 87, 168, 174, 178–9,
226, 230; importance of 254n106
Malaya, 27–9, 89, 128, 163, strength of, 46–8, 50, 56, 234, 235,
169, 180, 184, 186–7, 189, 199, 247n73, 248n80, 248n103,
223; local defense forces, 63–4, 259n27
113, 121, 179; Commonwealth ’MGBG,’ 48–9
role, 63, 96–7, 109, 114, 116, Communist subversion of, 165,
118, 128, 179, 180, 199, 200, 175–6, 291n71
222, 224, 227–8, 229; US/Allied development as artillery, 56, 59, 64,
role, 88, 109, 111–12, 118, 157, 254n101
180, 200, 201, 203, 209–11, role of, 37, 42–3, 48, 62–3, 66, 75,
214, 222, 227–8; collective 81, 128, 168, 173, 178
defense, 111–12, 114, 116, 119, reduction of, 235, 307n12
127, 200, 203, 204, 214, 217, see also British Army
218–9, 221–2, 304n118; Gurney, Sir Henry, 67–8, 69, 71,
containment, 114–15, 116, 118, 146, 169, 170–1, 252n54,
124, 127, 159, 203, 205; 256n150
deception, 145–7, 155–7, 164,
190, 227; importance of Hack, Karl, 6
Gurkhas, 176, 177, 178; Hainan, 111, 268n4
deterrence, 203, 211, 291n81; Haiphong, 204
offensive action, 220–1 Hanoi, 212
Greece, 4, 53 Harding, Lieutenant-General (later
Griffiths, James, 71 Field Marshal Lord)
Gua Masang, 58, 59 C-in-C FARELF, 7–8, 65–6, 67–8,
Gurkhas 69, 71–4, 101–2, 104, 105,
requirement for, 36, 38–9, 235, 106–7, 136, 138, 140–1, 142,
307n12 146, 147, 167, 169, 170, 174,
origins of, 36 176–8, 206, 209, 254n112,
poll (August 1947), 40–1, 234 256n160
decision on units, 38, 39, 40, 42, CIGS, 159, 160–1, 163, 192, 195,
234, 246n56, 247n65 196, 198–9, 214, 217, 219, 220,
Indian objections to, 38, 175, 234 305n134
tripartite talks/agreement, 38, 39, Haron, Nadzon, 170
40, 50 Hart, Lieutenant-General Franklin M.,
restrictions on use, 40, 42, 44, 174, USMC, 156
176 ‘Harwood Report’, 273n106
‘opt’ (December 1947), 42, 47, 50, Hawaii, 139
234, 248n80 Hewetson, General Sir Reginald,
numerical restrictions, 41–2, 44–5, 307n12
66, 173, 174–5, 179, 247n65 HKLF (Hong Kong Land Forces), 77,
basing of, 40–2, 47–8 106, 142
‘Brigade of Gurkhas’, 48, 165, Ho Chi Minh, 104, 120, 204, 206
176–7, 234, 235 Hoa Binh, 212, 302n72
recruitment of, 42, 66, 173, 174, Hodgson, Major Geoffrey, 239n21
175–6, 245n39, 291n71, 74, 87, Hollis, Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie,
292n99 38
330 Index
Hong Kong, 27, 47–9, 77–108, Hull, Major-General Richard, 174

135–64, 227, 267n193 Hyderabad, 44, 247n66
value of to UK, 79–80, 96, 102, 164,
225, 262n101 India, 16, 21, 23, 25, 40, 44, 49, 103,
Hong Kong Police, 79, 85, 257n3, 113, 114, 116, 118, 173, 179, 186,
260n54 196, 204, 205, 217, 221, 276n24
as intelligence post, 148, 266n160, and strategic value of, 16, 21,
283n135 242n59
operations against China from, 102, and Gurkhas, 37–8, 173, 175–7, 234
135, 149–50, 152, 157, 158, and Nepal, 38, 44, 50, 173–4, 176,
159–60, 164 177, 234
defense of: garrison, 64, 78–82, 83, Indian Army, 21, 168, 230, 243n71,
85, 106, 130, 131, 137, 143, 251n46
144, 146–7, 153, 161–4, and Gurkhas in, 41, 42, 44, 47, 174,
259n29, 274n136, 280n85, 234, 247ns65, 66, 67, 291n83
286n198; 1946 policy, 78–80, Indonesia, see Netherland East Indies
92, 279n68; decisions on International Commission (Vietnam),
defense, 91–3, 95–7, 102, 221
142–3, 148, 153, 203, 279n71, Iraq, 132
283n132; and effect on strategy
of, 77–8, 81, 102, 156; Japan, 4, 24, 25, 43, 49, 112, 113,
reinforcements for, 70, 77, 81, 117, 118, 124, 136, 151, 204, 211,
83–4, 89–90, 94–5, 97, 102, 219, 230
153–4, 156–8, 159–60, see also BCOF
257n165, 263n105; and JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff), 139, 141,
Malaya, 57, 59, 66, 68, 70–1, 149, 151, 152, 157–8, 185, 196,
72, 73, 82, 84, 86–7, 89, 94, 210–11, 219, 277n37
105, 135, 138, 141, 143, 144, JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee), 8,
163, 200, 261n65; internal 18, 19, 91, 101, 104, 106, 142,
security, 78–80, 83, 85, 100, 194, 205
105, 106, 131, 147, 154, 257n3, JIC(FE) (Joint Intelligence Committee,
259n31, 266n165, 281n102; Far East), 8, 53, 153, 199, 205,
deception, role of, 135, 145–7, 258n4, 294n48
155–7, 164, 190, 227; and Jinnah, Mohammed, 16
Korean War, 137, 140–2, 152, JPS (Joint Planning Staff), 8, 62–3, 75,
278ns42, 45; and trade with 80, 91–2, 93–4, 107, 112–13,
Communists during war, 147, 118–19, 121, 133, 137–8, 142–3,
150, 280n87; evacuation, 84, 154, 158–9, 167–8, 184, 190–1,
102, 145, 152, 153, 154, 155, 193, 194, 195, 198, 208, 209–10,
159, 161–2, 281n105, 283n131; 212
US assistance to, 148–9, 152, JPS(FE) (Joint Planning Staff, Far East),
153, 154, 158–61, 164, 190, 8, 199, 258n4
217, 219, 227 Johore Bahru, 57, 61
see also Colonial and Dominion
Forces, HKVDF, China, Republic Kashmir, 174
of, and Hong Kong and China, Katmandu, 173
Peoples’ Republic, and Keightley, General Sir Charles, 8, 156,
Hong Kong 159, 160, 169, 171, 191, 214,
Howard, Sir Michael, xiii 216
Index 331
Kennan, George, 115 116, 142, 175, 181, 183–4, 186,

Kennedy, Paul, 1, 3 195, 197, 199, 205, 206, 208, 216,
Kenya, 169 252n54, 265n148
see also Colonial and Dominion Maharaja of Nepal (Rana family), 37,
forces 41–2, 173, 174, 290ns59, 65,
Kerans, Lieutenant-Commander, 98 69, 70, 292n99
Keynes, John Maynard, 12, 14 Malacca, 17
Kirkman, Major-General John, 66 Malaya, Federation of, 17, 24, 25,
Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone, 194 27–8, 46, 117, 204
KMT (Kuomintang), 52, 53, 211, 228, value of, 28, 128, 186, 200, 225
250n12, 259n33 and Chinese, 67–8, 71–2, 104, 124,
Koirala, M. P., 290n70, 292n99 128, 170–1, 227, 255n126,
Korea, 25, 112, 133, 136, 138, 207, 279n69
211, 275n137, 286n203 police/Special Branch, 53, 54–6, 58,
North Korea, 136, 142, 278n54 63, 70, 71, 73, 146, 166, 171,
South Korea, 136, 138, 179 287n4, 292n2
Korean War, 109, 122–3, 128, 136–42, MSS (Malayan Security Service),
151, 179, 207, 216, 226, 229, 53
276n2 army, 170, 175, 179, 289n35,
Kota Tinggi, 253n83 298n149
Kra Isthmus, see Malaya, defense of, defense of: 180–202, 203, 219,
Songkhla position 293n26; resources for, 182–3,
Kuala Lumpur, 48, 146 186, 187, 188–9, 190–1, 192–3,
Kuching, 27 197–8, 200, 201, 215, 293n18,
Kupchan, Charles, 3, 230 296ns94, 99, 298n147; in cold
war, 187, 199; in limited war,
Labuan, 17, 27 182–4, 189, 200, 201; in global
Lai Chau, 213 war, 184–5, 187–9, 199;
Lai Tek, 249n2 collective defense, 183–5, 197,
Lambe, Admiral Sir Charles, RN, 199; lines of communication,
239n21 184–5, 191, 296n99; Songkhla
Laniel, Joseph, 216 position (ROEDEAN), 180,
Laos, see French Indochina 183, 185–7, 190–3, 196, 201,
Lee, David, 6 212, 214, 215, 219–20, 222,
Lend-Lease, 12, 14 296n97
Liddell Hart, Sir Basil, xiii see also Plans, Malayan Emergency,
Lloyd, Air Marshal Sir Hugh, 95, 114, Hong Kong, defense of, and
250n14, 252n54, 263n113 Malaya, Siam, and Malaya and
Lockhart, General Sir Rob, 256n160 French Indochina, and Malaya,
Loewen, General Sir Charles, 8, 196, China, Peoples’ Republic, and
199–200, 216–17 Malaya and United States, and
London, HMS, 90 Malaya
‘London Controlling Section’, 145 Malaya Committee (Cabinet), 73–4,
Lyttleton, Sir Oliver, 170, 192 107
Mansergh, Lieutenant-General Robert,
MacArthur, General Douglas, 139, 106
146, 277n28 Mao Tse-tung, 120, 124, 164, 223
MacDonald, Sir Malcolm, 7, 54–5, 57, Malayan Emergency, 52–76, 82, 166,
58–9, 68, 69, 82, 95, 103, 114, 177
332 Index
Malayan Emergency – continued Navarre, General Henri, 214, 215,

director of operations for, 69–71, 216, 218
256ns150, 160 Nehru, 40, 96, 116, 175, 176–8
resources for, 55–8, 63–4, 69–74, Nepal, 37, 38, 40–2, 44, 128, 173,
105, 140, 166, 169–72, 287n4 175, 176, 177, 178, 290ns59, 69,
effect on strategy of 112, 144, 70, 292n99
295n52 Nepal Democratic Congress, 290n59
and Korean War 128, 137, 140, 166, Netherlands, 24, 111, 151, 205
170, 287n4 Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia),
‘Briggs Plan’, 72–3, 138, 140, 144, 29, 52, 111, 113, 114, 205
166 New York City, 208, 209
Malta, 242n63, 274n114 New Zealand, 21, 68, 116, 117, 120,
‘Manila Pact’ see ‘SEATO’ 124, 133, 214, 222, 235, 236,
Mansergh, Lieutenant-General Sir 294n35
Robert, 153, 159, 283n135 and Middle East, 115, 117, 154,
Marshall, George C., 150 186, 198, 199, 270n33, 271n59,
Maxwell, Sir Alexander, 71 274n114, 294n39
McBride, Philip, 188–9 and Malaya, 6, 74, 134, 146, 183,
McLean, Brig. Fitzroy, 256n160 185, 192, 193, 198, 199, 200,
MCP (Malayan Communist Party), 201, 228, 299n154
52–4, 63, 67, 234, 250n9 and Hong Kong, 96–7, 134, 145,
MDAP (Mutual Defense Assistance 152, 154, 156, 264n122
Program), 119, 181–2, 206, and Korean War, 167, 179, 276n24
293n11 and the US, 117, 151
Melbourne, 117, 199, 200, 216 see also ANZAM, ANZUK, ANZUS,
MELF (Middle East Land Forces), 8, Colonial and Dominion forces,
56, 66, 127, 128, 232–3, Five Power Ad Hoc Committee
274n109 and FPSA
Menzies, Sir Robert, 75, 103, 145, 156, Newboult, Sir Alec, 58, 59
190, 198, 199, 294n39 NNC (Nepalese National Congress),
MI5, 53 173–5, 290ns59, 70, 291n71
MI6, see Secret Intelligence Service Noel-Baker, Philip, 96, 97
Montgomery, Field Marshal Bernard, NSC 73, 148–9, 152, 285n190
16, 22, 35, 39–40, 59–60, 64, NSC 124/2, 152, 285n190
258n4 NSC 148, 161, 285n190
Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis, 16 Nyasaland, 169
MRLA (Malayan Races’ Liberation
Army), 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 68, 72,
Okinawa, 139
136, 292n2
Operations: GRADUATE, 278n42,
Mukden, 83
LORRAINE, 213; MATADOR, 183, 201,
Murfett, Malcolm, 6
294n29; OVERLORD, 119
Na San, 213 Pakistan, 4, 16, 46, 186, 221, 247n66

Nanking, 81, 83 Palestine, 4, 49, 55, 57, 253n73
National Service, see British Army Panama, 139
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Panmunjon, 151
Organization), 7, 19, 107, 115, Paris,159
123, 125, 151, 159, 193, 210, 211, Pearl Harbor, 159
220, 222, 223, 225, 229 Peking, 105, 120
Index 333
Penang, 17 Rome, 151, 210

Persia, 138 Rosecrance, Richard, 6
Pethick-Lawrence, Lord, 38 Rowell, Lieutenant-General Sir
Phao, General, 196 Sydney, 199–200
Philippines, 112, 118, 136, 143, 200, Royal Marines, 106, 263n110,
219, 221, 280n83 267n199
PHPS (Post Hostilities Planning see also British Army, brigades,
Section), 24, 254n90 3 Commando
Phu Doan, 213 Royal Navy, 90, 101, 127, 132, 133,
Phuoc Tuy, 236 239n11, 263n105, 277n30
Pibul Songgram, Marshal, 26, 114, Russia, 5, 120, 216
181, 183–4, 191, 196, 293n27 central threat, 4, 17–18, 23, 25,
Plans: BINNACLE, 295n52; CINDERELLA, 275n148
156, 295n52; CRUSHER, 101; intent to attack West, 4, 15, 18–19,
DECAPITATION, 100; DEFIANCE, 101; 102, 120–1, 123, 126
DELIBERATION, 265n152; and nuclear weapons, 19, 119, 121,
DOUBLEQUICK, 112; GALLOPER, 184, 126, 132, 220, 270n46,
186, 187, 271n48, 294n48, 274n138
295ns52, 58; HALFMOON, 112; threat to Far East, 29, 52, 82, 90,
IRONY, 187–91, 192, 193, 195, 197, 106, 111, 112, 126–7, 186,
200, 201, 296ns84, 94; RINGLET, 268n210, 294n29
191–6, 197, 200, 201, 296n84; and Communist China, 102–5, 111,
SANDOWN, 271n48; SPEEDWAY, 112, 120, 124, 127, 142, 152,
253n88; SYCAMORE, 156; WARRIOR, 153, 186, 220, 255n127,
197–8, 199, 200, 228 294n48
Poett, Major-General Sir Nigel, 146, and French Indochina, 104, 212
282n124 and Korean war, 142, 278n54
Poland, 221 Ryukyus, 68, 112, 118
Port Dickson, 43
Portugal, 24, 151 Sabah, 26
Potsdam, 113 Saigon, 205, 235
Puerto Rico, 139 Salan, General Raoul, 213, 214
Punjab Boundary Force, 40, 247n73 Sandys, Duncan, 130, 133
Pusan, 139 Sarawak, 17, 26
Saunders, Major William, 281n96
Radford, Admiral Arthur, USN, 156–8, Scott, Leonard V., 50
214, 218–20, 305n134 Scott, Robert, 187
RAF (Royal Air Force), 55, 58, 98, 132, SEATO (South East Asia Treaty
136, 147, 152, 153, 225, Organization), 117, 133, 222,
263n105, 270n46 228, 229, 235, 236
Redman, Lieutenant-General Sir Seremban, 48
Harold, 303n85 Shamsher, Kaiser, 292n99
Redmond, Brigadier, 45 Shamsher, Mohan, 290n70
Rhodesia (Southern), 167 Shanghai, 27, 64, 80, 89, 258n25,
see also Colonial and Dominion 267n190
forces Sharkey, Lawrence, 250n9
Ritchie, General Sir Neil, 7, 44, 45–6, Shepherd, General Lemuel C., USMC,
48, 53, 61, 62, 64, 65, 81, 82, 86, 156
87, 89, 95, 114, 205, 252n54, Shinwell, Emanuel, 71, 97, 120, 138,
253n81, 254n112, 277n37 141, 149, 188–9, 271n49
334 Index
Siam, 24, 68, 95, 112, 118, 180–202, ‘strategic sufficiency’, 3, 164, 230–1,
203, 204, 221 236
Communist subversion, 181, 191, Struble, Vice Admiral Arthur, USN,
193, 194, 195, 208 209
and Burma, 181, 293n27 Stubbs, Richard, 166
defense of, 184, 191, 195, 197, 220, Sudan, 242n63
293n26 Suez Canal Zone, 127, 166, 169, 218,
and Malaya, 54, 60, 69, 72, 172, 223, 273n109
180–202, 292n2
and French Indochina, 180, 181, Tarling, Nicolas, 1–2
182, 195, 219, 300n14 Tedder, Air Marshal, 141, 143, 149,
military aid to, 68, 112, 113, 114, 150, 281n102
180, 181, 189, 195, 208, 228, Templer, Lieutenant-General Sir (later
293ns11, 13 Field Marshal Lord) Gerald, 64,
US air bases, 196, 297n119 89–90, 171, 172, 191–2, 196
strategic value of, 26, 181, 189 ‘Ten Year Rule’, 30
Singapore, 17, 24, 26, 27, 30, 43, 46, Thailand, see Siam
49, 52, 55, 57, 61, 68, 72, 78, Thompson, Sir Robert, 235, 252n58
131, 150, 199, 200, 205, 209, Tibet, 137, 173, 174, 178
235–6, 258n4, 295n61, 298n149 Tizard Committee, 18
SIS (Secret Intelligence Service), 53 Tonkin, see French Indochina
Sixmith, Major-General E. K. G., 159, Tribhuvana, King, 173, 174
296n97 Trieste, 133
Slessor, Air Marshal Sir John, 154, Tripartite Talks (UK–US–French), 150,
210, 211, 226 151, 152, 208, 209–12, 214, 218,
Slim, Field Marshal William, 5, 7, 64, 283n131
65, 71, 73, 75–6, 91, 95, 97, 139, Truman, Harry S, 12, 119, 127, 136,
148–9, 151, 159, 168–9, 171, 211, 148, 151, 280n87
254n101, 266n164, 288n20 Tsingtao, 230
SOE (Special Operations Executive), Turkey, 128
see Force 136
Songkhla, see Malaya, defense of, UK–USA Intelligence Agreement, 148
Songkhla position United Nations, 17, 22, 96, 97, 98,
South Africa, 21, 68 105, 118, 124, 136, 145, 147, 148,
see also Colonial and Dominion 149, 182, 207, 227, 280n83,
forces 281n102
South East Asia Collective Defense UN Command (Korea), 139, 146, 179,
Treaty, 161, 182, 197, 200, 203, 182, 275n144
221–2, 228 United States, 4, 14, 15, 17–18, 111,
Soviet Union, see Russia 115, 120, 214, 216, 237n7
Sri Lanka, see Ceylon and Far East, 115–16, 117, 118, 119,
Strang, Sir William, 115 136, 180, 185, 193, 203, 205,
‘strategic core’, 4, 5, 108, 134, 163, 208, 211, 222, 226, 270n33
201–2, 223, 225, 229, 230, 236 and Hong Kong, 81, 87, 96, 97, 98,
‘strategic deficiency’, 3 134, 135, 138, 145, 147–64,
strategic overextension, 1–2, 3, 20, 190, 217, 280n83, 281n96,
226, 231 282n124, 283n140, 285n190
strategic periphery, 4–5, 108, 134, and Malaya, 180, 190, 193, 197,
230, 236 200, 215, 228
Index 335
United States – continued Vanguard, HMS, 132

and China: 68, 87, 103, 124, 137, Viet Minh, 182, 192, 194, 195, 201,
138, 147, 149, 150, 151, 197, 204, 205, 207, 209, 212, 213–14,
212, 214, 216, 222; and ‘united 215, 216–17, 219, 220, 221, 226,
action’, 217, 218; and ‘Greater 300ns14, 24, 25
Sanction’, 151, 272n78, see also French Indochina and
273n105 China, Peoples’ Republic, and
and Japan, 124, 151 Viet Minh
and French Indochina, 136, 185, Vietnam, see French Indochina
205, 207, 214, 215, 216, 217–21 Vietnamese National Army, 213, 215
and Siam, 180, 181–2, 194, 195–6,
197, 293ns11, 13 Walker, Lieutenant-Colonel (later
and Korea, 136–7, 138–41, 144, General Sir) Walter, 61
147, 150 Wallinger, Sir Geoffrey, 195
and nuclear weapons, 110, 112, Washington, DC, 151, 152, 213, 220
121, 123, 126, 131, 220, 230, Wavell, Field Marshal Lord, 37, 38
273n100 West Indies, 242n63
Urquhart, Major-General Roy, Westmoreland, General William,
256n162 307n12
USAF (US Air Force), 23, 214, 270n46, WEU (Western European Union), 15,
282n124, 283n131 49, 225
USMC (US Marine Corps), 156, see also Brussels Pact
277n30 Wild, Colonel H. N. H., 146
US Navy, 214 Wilson, Harold, 235
US Pacific Command, 148, 283n131
US Pacific Fleet, 136 Yunnan, 204
Uttar Pradesh, 173

(Studies in Military and Strategic History) Raffi Gregorian (Auth.) - The British Army, The Gurkhas and Cold War Strategy in The Far East, 1947-1954-Palgrave Macmillan UK (2002)

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Studies in Military and Strategic History

General Editor: Michael Dockrill, Professor of Diplomatic History, King’s

Studies in Military and Strategic History

Glossary of Abbreviations xvi

2 ‘Future Defence Policy’: the Far East as Strategic

3 National Service, the Gurkhas and the Reorganization

Development of the postwar British Army 33

4 FARELF and the Malayan Emergency, 1948–50 51

The Communist threat 52

Despatch of the ‘fire brigade’ 59

5 ‘To the Last Round’: the Defense of

The 1946 Hong Kong defense policy 78

6 Adapting to Reality: the Far East and Cold

The strategic impact of a Communist China:

‘In light of the present situation’: updating

7 Between the American Scylla and Chinese

Hong Kong, FARELF and the Korean commitment 136

8 Manpower, the Strategic Reserve and the

Malaya at the start of the Korean War 166

9 Siam and the Commonwealth Defense of Malaya 180

Siam in relation to the defense of Malaya 181

The role of deception 190

10 Limited Liability and the Defense of

The importance of French Indochina to

Select Bibliography 308

1.1 Declining power’s beliefs about interacting

1.1 London–Singapore Central Defence Organization 8

A work of this magnitude could not have been completed without

ABC America–Britain–Canada global war planning program

FPSA Five Power Staff Agency

In the aftermath of the most destructive war in human history, Great

Britain’s opportunity for economic recovery by its insistence on carrying

study and lack of access to sources, respectively. By focusing on the

Table 1.1 Declining power’s beliefs about interacting with adversaries12

Low Vulnerability (Strategic Sufficiency) Deter Accommodate

threat in the pre-1914 and pre-1939 periods. Kupchan contends that in

accepted the fact that only through collective security arrangements

Published material on postwar British military strategy in the Far East is

FAR EAST FAR EAST

Figure 1.1 London–Singapore Central Defence Organization

activities tends to bypass the operational, or theater level, of command.

With such a paucity of directly relevant secondary sources, I have

only all-regular force in an army otherwise over-burdened with the

Initial British postwar strategy was predicated on the assumption that

Britain at war’s end

= Minor Garrison = Major Command

Figure 2.1 Distribution of the British Army as at 31 December 1946

Labour Government foreign policy

Labour Government colonial policy

the Colonial Territories to responsible self-government within the

Labour Government defense policy

Zealand. They assumed eventual access to the resources of the United

Alanbrooke’s strategic concept

‘Future Defence Policy’

Commonwealth Defence was lost, and our Imperial Defence crashed’.53

relationship between Britain and the Commonwealth was symbiotic,

From SEAC to FARELF: military strategy in

The British strategic view of Southeast Asia