Toward A Concept of Political Ilegitimacy

Toward a Concept of Political Illegitimacy: Bonapartist Dictatorship and Democratic Legitimacy
Author(s): Melvin Richter

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 10, No. 2 (May, 1982), pp. 185-214
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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II. TOWARD A CONCEPT OF
POLITICAL ILLEGITIMACY
Bonapartist and
Dictatorship
DemocraticLegitimacy
MELVIN RICHTER
City University
of New YorkGraduateSchool
and HunterCollege
UENTIN SKINNER in his superb recentbook made a telling

commenton how new conceptsenterpoliticaldiscourse:"The surest
sign that a societyhas enteredinto the secure possession of a new
conceptis thata newvocabularywillbe developed,intermsofwhichthe
concept can then be publiclyarticulatedand discussed."' Professor
Holmes has explainedhow and whythemoderncareer'of"legitimacy"
as a politicalconceptbegan.It becamea termcentralto thenewpolitical
vocabularydeveloped as the resultof the French Revolution,the
Terror,theriseand fallof theregimecreatedby Napoleon Bonaparte,
and theBourbonRestoration.
As an adjectiveappliedto regimes,theuse of"legitimate" entailedits
Whenfurther
opposite,"illegitimate." extendedto typesofregime,both
termshad to be understoodand qualifiedbytheirrelationships to other
conceptswithinthesame vocabulary.Of theseregimes, themostcrucial
was thenew and thennegatively chargedtypethatat firsthad no one,
generallyrecognizedname. This was theregimecreatedby Napoleon
aftera militarycoup d'etat,a seriesof plebiscitesthatenabled himto
representhimselfas the embodimentof popular sovereignty and the
nationalwill,his consequentconsolidationof powerat homethrough
perfectingthe centralizedbureaucracyestablished by the Ancien
Regime and improvedby the revolutionand, his mobilizationof
A UTHOR'S NOTE: Thisarticlewaspreparedforpresentationat theEasternRegional

Meetingof the Conference
for the Studyof Political Thought,City University
of New
POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 10 No. 2, May 1982 185-214

? 1982Sage Publications,Inc.
185
186 POLITICAL THEORY / MAY 1982
nationalenthusiasm meansfirst
through developedin therevolution.
ThatNapoleonhademerged aftertherevolution
seemedas significant
as hisownclaimtobethegenuine ofpopularsovereignty.
representative
Buthad he createda newtypeofregime?Ifso,whatmeaning didthis
havefordemocratic theory?
I
In thenineteenth century, theorigins, andimplications
nautre, ofthe
Bonapartist regime werenotmerely historical
questions.Once incorpo-
ratedwithin a newregime typeandnamed,theBonapartist experience
becamea cricualelement inseveral contested formulae phrased interms
ofthenewpoliticalvocabulary. I shallcontendthatnotonlywasthe
legitimacyofmonarchy at stakebutalso thatofdemocracy. Thiswas
becauseBonaparte's regime wasallegedbyroyalists andliberals aliketo
have been the inevitable resultof a violentrevolution based on a
Rousseauistic democratic theory ofunlimited popularsovereignty. The
new regimetype called "usurpation" by Constantand "'military
despotism" by Mme.de Staeland Saint-Simon, was oftendesignated
during theBourbonRestoration as "Bonapartism."2 Thistermwasfirst
usedin 1816.Fora timeitcouldmeaneither supporters ofNapoleonor
theregime hecreated. RatherlikecallingtheThirdReich"Hitlerism" or
carefullyconfining "Stalinism" to a descriptionoftheSovietUnionin
thatperiodwhenStalinheldpower,thechoiceoftermimpliesmuch
politically.
Suchwordsas "Caesarism," "plebiscitary
dictatorship," or
"imperialism" (thiswasthefirst meaning oftheterm) cameintogeneral
use to referto a regimetypeonlyafter1851,whenLouis Napoleon
repeatedthesequenceoftaking over,bymilitary coupd'&tat,a republic
establishedbyrevolution. Likehisunclehe soughtlegitimacy through
established
plebiscites, an empire, and lostitbymilitary defeat.3
Thenatureandmeaning ofthisregime typereceivedcarefulattention
frommanyof the most penetrating observers,practitioners, and
theoristsof politics:Marx and Engels,Tocqueville,Bagehot,Donoso
Cortes,Lorenzvon Stein,Bismarck,Burckhardt, and Max Weber.On
York GraduateCenter,April 17, 1981. Researchfor thisarticlewas madepossible by.,

a
grantfrom the PSC-CUNY ResearchAward Programof the City University of New
York.Much of the textderivesfrom workdone whiletheauthorwas a memberof the
Institutefor Advanced Study. He acknowledgeswiththanksthe indispensableaid of
both theseinstitutions.
Richter
/ILLEGITIMACY 187
what did Bonapartistdictatorshiprest?Was it the necessaryresultof

democracy,or itsperversion? Or was itonlynecessaryforsomepeoples,
as Bagehotsuggestedwas thecase withtheFrench?4Mightitbe onlya
mechanismof transitionfrompurelycharismaticto democraticlegiti-
macy,and in any case beyondjudgmentsof good or evil? This was
Weber's view.5Caesarism could also be representedas necessaryto
creatingtheconditionsof economicdevelopment.The survivorsofthe
Saint-SimoniansviewedtheSecond Empireas fulfilling theirRestora-
tionformulaof "legitimacy, sovereignty, and authority."6
"Legitimateregime"and "illegitimate regime"werepairedconcepts,
termsnot onlycontestable,but intensely contestedin everyepisodeof
thatperiodwhenrevolution, counterrevolution, restoration, and impe-
rial foundationoccurredmore than once. In this unstablecontext,
claimsthata regimewas legitimate or illegitimate could notbe a matter
ofindifference to politicalactors,whether incumbents orcontenders for
power.Norcouldtheirintellectual supporters neglectcounterclaims. To
establishconvincingreasons for supportingany regimenecessitated
disestablishingthe claim of its rivals; a positiveposition required
negatingits opponents.Thus thepoliticalvocabularyrequiredcatego-
riesbothforlegitimacy and illegitimacy.Persuasionentaileddissuasion;
dissuasionin turnentaileddenying,neutralizing, redefining, or rede-
scribingcompetingregimesand principles.In sucha situation,political
theoristshad to mastermorethantheone set of termstheythemselves
preferred.For despite theirdifferences, theycould not ignorethe
audiencesto whichtheyaddressedthemselves. Unlesspolemiciststook
notice of those conceptsfavoredby theiropponents,theycould not
successfully attackthem.
Which other concepts, in addition to those of legitimacyand
illegitimacyin regimes,were created or redefinedto formthe new
politicalvocabularycreatedbetween1789and 1830?"Revolution"took
on its modernsense;"counterrevolution" is firstrecordedin Frenchin
1790; "*autocracy" is a creationof 1794, "absolutism,"of 1796,and
"theocracy,"of 1815.I have alreadycalled attentionto theappearance
of "Bonapartism"in 1816. Chateaubriand,who was Tocqueville's
cousin,had used "liberalism"and "liberals"pejoratively in La Monar-
chie selon la Charte(1816), a piece of occasional writingwhichLouis
XVIII likened to an army division. Chateaubriandalso foundeda
journal called Le Conservateurin 1814,but "conservatisme" appeared
only in 1851,the year of Louis Napoleon's coup d'etat. "Ultra" is a
politicalclassification of theRestoration.Older wordschangedmean-
ing or took on novel politicalsignificance. "Usurpation"had been a

commonword in the moraland politicaldiscourseof the old regime.
After1789,royalistwritersaccused therepublicof havingusurpedthe
sacredrightsoftheBourbonhouse;laterNapoleon was attackedon the
samegrounds.Thus whenConstantappliedthetermto thenewformof
totaldominationperfectedby Napoleon, he was makinga significant
gesturein thedirectionofthelegitimists. But alreadyBabeufhad used
thetermto denouncetherepublicanregimeunderwhichhe lived.8The
olderregimetypesoftyranny and despotismwereincreasingly conflated
byall partiesduringthisperiod,and becamecorrespondingly vague.Yet
under the Restoration,the single most used pejorative political
categorywas thatofdespotism.9 It mostoftenmeantnothingmorethan
"absolutepower,"and was applied indiscriminately to all periodsand
places,as by Guizotin his historyof civilization,
to regimesunchecked
by regularconstitutionalrestraints.
II
Burkewas amongthefirstto combinethetheoryof legitimacy with

an attackupon democracy;to go beyondthetheoryofusurpation,as
discussedby Hume, to the assertionthata democraticregimewould
produce, not liberty,but the illegitimatepredominanceof a single
militaryleader.Burkethusperformed an immenseserviceto members
of therulingclassesand familiesbyhisReflections.As GeorgeIII said:
You have beenofuse to us all.... I knowthatthereis no Man whocalls himself

a
Gentlemanwho mustnotthinkhimselfobligedto you,foryouhavesupportedthe
cause of the Gentlemen.'0
Burkelaid down the linethatwas to be takenin reactionto all the

developmentsof the revolution.The intellectualprinciplesused to
justifythe revolutionwere increasingly identifiedand broughtunder
fire. Rational and social contractarguments,theoriesof popular
sovereignty,everything unhistoricaland unprecedented in revolution-
aryclaimswas criticizedmercilesslyand repetitivelybydefenders ofthe
old order.The importanceof habit,thegreatchainconnecting genera-
tions,thevalue of prejudice,theutilityofpassiveobedienceto political
and religiousauthority,the servicesof ancientaristocracies-allthese
themeswere the armoryof the revolution'senemies.Then weightier
counterconcepts wereintroduced:theanalogyof languageas a way of
Richter/ ILLEGITIMACY 189
condemningconstitution-making, and thenotionoflaw and cultureas

the productof a nationalspirit.
The conceptof legitimacybecame developedby royalistsafterand
not beforetherevolution.It was a newdevelopmentthatcan be better
understoodin relation to the distinctiondeveloped by Mannheim
betweentraditionalismand conservatism:
Traditionalismsignifiesa tendencyto clingto vegetativepatterns,to old waysof

lifewhichwe maywellconsideras fairlyubiquitous.... Conservatism in a certain
sensegrewout of traditionalism:indeeditis afterall primarilynothingmorethan
traditionalism
becomeconscious.Nevertheless thetwoare notsynonymous, since
traditionalism
onlytakeson itsspecificallyconservative featureswhenitbecomes
theexpressionof a verydefinite,
consistently maintainedway of lifeand thought
(whichfirstdevelopsin oppositionto the revolutionary attitude)."I
Traditionalistways of lookingat thepoliticalworldhad, of course,

come underattackin Francelongbeforetherevolution.Butthedegree
and intensityof pressureupon ancient views of monarchyand its
relationto politicalforcesreachedan altogetherunprecedented point
with the trial and executionof Louis XVI. In an importantessay,
Professor Walzer has called attentionto the symbolicfunctions
performedby cuttingoffthe head of Louis XVI "withhis crownon."
(The phraseis attributedto Cromwell).'2Walzer has emphasizedthe
processesof destroyingthesacralcharacterofthemonarchy, and hence
its legitimacy.
The void thuscreatedcould be filledby regimesresting
upon popular,republican,or democraticlegitimacy.
What followedturnedout to be even morecomplex.The Bourbon
monarchydid not end withthatexecution.In 1797,Josephde Maistre
wrotehis Considerationssur la France. Maistreinsisted:
The Bourbonfamilycannotbe reachedby thechiefsof therepublic:itexists,its

rightsare obvious; and its silencespeaks moreloudlythanany manifesto.'3
For many years Maistre and the spokesmenfor the futureLouis

XVIII seemedto be denyingrealityin theirhopesforhisrestoration to
theFrenchthrone.Yet Louis XVIII did returnas theresultoftheallied
militaryvictoryoverNapoleon in 1814,althoughhe foundlittleof the
generalenthusiasmpredictedby Maistreforthe legitimatemonarchy
of France. Even thoughLouis XVIII, far more pragmaticthan his
reactionarysupportersand theorists,issued a charterincorporating
manyrepublicanliberties,
therewas considerablesupportforNapoleon
duringthe HundredDays betweenhis returnto Francefromexileand
the defeatat Waterloo.
Royalist theoristshad always known duringtheirexile that the

republic'sprinciplesmustbe attackedrootand branch.Theyproceeded
to do so withinthe frameworkprovidedby Burke and Gentz, by
Maistreand Bonald.Theirpurposewas bothto affirm thelegitimacyof
the monarchyand to deprivethe republicand thentheempireof any
rightfulclaim to rule. To this end, Rousseau, the philosophes,the
constitution-makers of the revolution,and the defendersof popular
sovereignty wereassailedagain and again. But Royalisttheoristsfound
some of theirgroundsforclaiminglegitimacy forthe Bourbonsalone
werealso contestedby the Bonapartists.
Napoleon, afterhis unprecedented militaryvictories,establisheda
court,successfullywooed the church,and even establishedhis own
aristocracy.He also took fulladvantageof his claim to personify the
sovereignty and will of thenation.Speakingto theCorps Legislatifin
1814,Napoleon claimedto represent fullythepeople who had chosen
him:
Are you representativesof thepeople?I am; fourtimesI have beencalled bythe

nationand fourtimesI havereceivedthevotesoffivemillioncitizens;I havea title
and you do not; you are onlythedeputiesof thedepartments of the Empire.'4
Upon hisreturnto Franceduringthe100days,Napoleonclaimedthatit

was the restoredBourbonmonarchythatwas illegitimate:
"I returnto Francesummonedbythewishesof theentirenationto putan end to

the illegitimategovernment(Gouvernementillegitime)imposed upon you by
treasonand force."'I5
In response,royalisttheoriststurnedthosearguments theyhad long

used against claims to popular sovereignty and republicanself-rule
againstNapoleon.Theysaw himas heiroftherevolutionin hisattempt
to smashtheestablishedinternational orderofEurope.In manyofthese
arguments,theyfollowedtheexampleof Burke,who died in 1797.In
1790 Burkepredictedthat the revolutionwould put France into the
hands of one of its generals.His reasonsare phrasedin termsof the
subversionof past authority,withoutits replacementby any other
principle:
In theweaknessofone kindofauthority, and inthefluctuationofall,theofficers

of
anyarmywillremainmutinousand fulloffaction,untilsomepopulargeneral,who
. . . possessesthe truespiritof command,shall draw the eyes of all men upon
himself.... Butthemomentinwhichthateventshallhappen,thepersonwhoreally
commandsthe armyis your master;the master(thatis little)of yourking,the

masterof yourassembly,the masterof yourwhole republic.'6
Burkegave no name to such a situation,nor did he citeany previous

instances,despitethe Roman examples as well knownto him as to
Maistre.Ratherit was the noveltyof the situationhe stressed:
Whatstandsas government in Franceis struckoutat a heat.The designis wicked,

immoral,impious,oppressive,but it is spiritedand daring;it is systematic; it is
simplein itsprinciple;ithas unityand consistency in perfection....The stateisall
in all.... It is militaryin its principle,in its maxims,in its spirit,and in all its
movements.The statehas dominionand conquestforitssole objects:dominion
over mindsby proselytism, over bodies by arms.'7
Burke's point was that the French had rashlydeposed a mild

monarchy,which derived its legitimateauthorityfrom traditional
arrangements. Althoughimperfect, the Ancien Regime was at once
subject to checks against abuses and capable of reform.Burke
specificallyconsideredand rejectedthechargethattheAncienRegime
had beena despotism.'8Thiswas crucialto hisemphasisuponlegitimate
authority.He could not ignorethe revolutionary claim that the old
orderin Francehad to be terminated becauseofitsdespoticand hence
illegitimatecharacter.Burkewenton to assertthatjust becausethenew
regimecould not restupon a basis of traditionalauthority, itwouldbe
so unstableas to producemilitary A singlemanwouldrule
dictatorship.
by a power unchecked because any limitationwas regarded as
incompatiblewiththerevolutionary principlesof popularsovereignty.
This would lead inevitablyto a regimeorientedto dominion and
conquest.Althoughhe died twoyearsbeforeNapoleon'scoup d'etatof
the EighteenthBrumaire,Burke had predictedit by his analysis of
democracyas both inherently illegitimateand lackingtrueauthority.
Frenchroyalistwriterstook a slightlydifferent line. Maistre,with
hisdistinctiveblendofoffensive arroganceand occasionalacuity,made
an analogyanticipatingthe lateruse of "Caesarism"as the termfor
plebiscitary whenhe wrotethatProvidencealwaysdenies
dictatorship,
the people its wishto designateits own rulers.The Roman plebshad
enslaveditselfby takingup armsagainstthe aristocracy;in 1789,the
French people, already possessed of all necessaryliberty,revolted
againstthelegitimaterulers.As a result,it has beenenslaved,insulted,
exploited:
The veryattemptsof a nationto attainitsobjectsare theProvidentialmeansof

it. Thus the Roman people gave itselfmasterswhilstthinkingit was
frustrating
struggling
againstthearistocracy Caesar.Thisistheepitome
following ofallpopu-
larinsurrections
. . . peoplesas a wholeparticipate
inhistorical
movements only
likewoodand ropeusedbya workman . .. eventheirleadersareleadersonly
to inexperienced
eyes.... Thosemenwho,takentogether, seemthetyrants of
the multitudesare themselvestyrannizedby one.'9
Once again, the conclusionis that out of the people's revolutionary

effortsto freeitselffromitsancientmonarchymustcome itsenslave-
mentto a singleman. Frompopularsovereignty wouldcome another
Caesar.
Maistrecalled Napoleon's rule a batoncratie,the work of brutal
force,and wrotethatit had been divinelyordainedto preparetheway
fora Bourbonrestoration.20AfterNapoleonhad becomeconsulforlife,
Maistretook the viewthatthistoo would be useful:
LetNapoleonalone.LethimruleFrancewithhisrodofiron.... lethimmakea
majestyandimperial etc.etc.andthen... thepeople,however
highness, sillythey
willbe,will. . . say:itistruethen,
thatwemustnecessarily fallundertheruleofa
sceptreofsomekind,andobeysomemanorother, itistruethenthatequalityisa
chimera.2'
Bonald reachedsimilarconclusionsabout revolutionproducingone

man rule. He, however,made his argumenteven more explicit:
democracyby its natureis like despotism,in that it is committedto
levellingall thosedistinctions
essentialto monarchy.Democracymust
resultin thedominationof one person:"The despotismofall produces
thedespotismof a singleman."22
In short,followingBurke'slead, royalisttheoristssuch as Maistre,
Bonald, and Chateaubriandattemptedto prove that there is an
inevitableslide from revolutionarygovernmentsbased on popular
sovereigntyinto militarydominationby a single commander.He,
havingusurpedpower,setsup a farmoreabsoluteand repressive regime
thanhad existedbeforetherevolution.And he directshisnationintoa
seriesof unendingwars.
III
On the basis of Napoleon's actual record,liberaltheoristssuch as

Madame de Stael and Benjamin Constantproduced an even more
hostileand searchingattackupon Napoleon and his system.Constant
Richter
/ ILLEGITIMACY 193
was probablythefirsttodistinguish theregimeand policiesofNapoleon

fromany previousformof domination,and to insistthatthismodern
form came closer to achievingtotal control over its subjectsthan
anythingknown in the past. In his De l'Espritde Conquete et de
I'Usurpation(1814), ConstantforthefirsttimearguedthatNapoleon
could gain suchtotaldominancejust because he had usurpedpowerin
thewakeofa revolutionmadeon thetheoryofpopularsovereignty. By
comparison,despotismwas an antiquatedand staticformofdomina-
tion.Whathad occurredintheTerrorand underNapoleon was a more
activeregimethatpenetratedmoredeeplyand had a new basis forits
powerbecause of its revolutionary and democraticelements.Constant
thereforeused the term"usurpation"fordescribingthe formof rule
exercisedby Napoleon; thisexperienceproved,Constantargued,that
usurpationwas worsethandespotism.Yet he was notconcernedwith
previoustypesof usurpation,butonlythatbyan usurperwhodestroys
all ancient institutionsin order to substitutenew ones created by
himself.Generalizingfrom the example of Bonaparte, Constant
emphasizedthenewtypeofoppressionmadepossiblebydemagoguery,
propaganda,democraticslogans,mass militarymobilizationand the
breakingdown of the structures of a simplersociety.
All thesenovelresourcesmightmake usurpationappear to be not
only a novel but an irresistibleforce.This was not Constant'sview,
however.Usurpation,conquest,and despotismwereall equallyana-
chronistic.That is, all three were equally incompatiblewith the
commercialspiritand pacifismof modernsociety.Constantattributed
the Terrorto unrealizableideals formulatedby imitatorsof ancient
republicssuch as Rousseau and Mably, who did not understandthe
differences separatingancientfrommodernsocieties.The partisansof
ancientpoliticalvirtuefoundthatthesortofliberty theysoughtcouldbe
attainedonlybydespotism.And thisinvolvedthemin fatalcontradic-
tions, which produced a more thoroughcontrol of thoughtand
expression,a farmoredeliberateeffortto use thestateto terrorizeits
citizensthan had the despotismof the old regime.Napoleon took
advantageofthesenewdevices,and also profited fromthedisgustfeltby
thepopulaceat theiruse. The fearofJacobinismwasamonghisgreatest
assets.
DespotismforConstantcarriedtheovertonesofan older,morestatic
formof rule, whichsilentlyprohibitsall formsof liberty,interdicts
discussion,and demands passive obedience. But despotismat least
allows its subjectsto remainsilent;usurpation
condemnshimto speak,itpursueshimintotheintimatesanctuaryofhisthought;
and forcinghimto lieto hisconscience,seizesfromhimthelastconsolationofthe
oppressed.23
Althoughhe was whatwould be laterknownas a liberal,Constant

was profoundlyantidemocratic.Like other theoristswho were to
participatein the Bourbon Restoration,he identified democracywith
theclaimto unlimited popularsovereignty. He deniedthevalidityofthis
concepton thegroundthat"no authority on earthis unlimited, notthat
ofthepeople,thosewhoclaimto be itsrepresentatives, northatofkings,
bywhatevertitletheyrule."24 Citizenspossessindividualrightsthatmay
not be violated. Any authoritythatdoes so Constantdeclaresto be
illegitimate(illkgitime).25 Thus the sovereigntyof the people is not
unlimited,and its willcannotsufficeto legitimateanythingit wishes.
Butwhyuse theseconceptsoflegitimacy and illegitimacy as thebasis
for classifying regimesratherthan the older designationsofjust and
unjust,rightor vitiated?Therewerethreereasonsfordoingso: Thefirst
involvedtheprerequisites forparticipating in politicallifeafterthefinal
defeatof Napoleon and theestablishment oftheBourbonRestoration;
thesecond,thenegativeconsensusthatprevailedamongroyalistsand
oppositionalike in rejectingthetheoryof an unlimitedsovereignty of
the people that could be delegatedto an assembly,committee,or
individual;thethird,theacceptanceby majorschoolsof thoughtthat
theonlyadequate criteriaforjudginga regimederivedfromitsorigins.
Despite the differencesamong French Restorationtheorists-
Maistre, Bonald, Chateaubriand,Lammenais, Madame de Stael,
Constant,Guizotand Royer-Collard-mostofthemeitherparticipated
in politicallifeaftertherestoration of Louis XVIII, or hopedto affect
the policies and decisions of the governments that ruled underthe
Charte bestowedby the Bourbons. To accept the legitimacyof the
Bourbonson the basis of theirinheritedrightwas the prerequisiteof
participating in Restorationpolitics.Thus whenConstantrevisedthe
previouseditions of De l'Espritde la Conquete for publicationin
RestorationFrance,hewrotethathe recognizedtwotypesoflegitimacy:
"the first,explicit,whichderivesfroma freeelection;theother,tacit,
whichrestsupon heredity. I add thatheredityis legitimate becausethe
habits it engendersand the advantagesit procuresmake it into the
nationalpreference."26 Constant'sacceptanceof hereditary monarchy
was phrased in the language and reasoningof Hume, not that of
Maistreand Bonald. Nevertheless he rejecteddemocratictheoryas he
understoodit.
The thirdcomponentof Restorationpoliticalthoughtthatled to its

fixationupon the conceptof legitimacyand its oppositepole, illegiti-
macy,derivedfromtheresumption ofa modeofpoliticaldiscourseonce
prominentunder the Ancien Regime, but apparentlyended by the
revolution.The determination of legitimacyby historicaloriginwas
resumedbyGuizot.Of all thearguments prominent in theRestoration,
thisobsessionwithorigins(whatFranqoisFuretcalled "la hantisedes
origines")is themostdifficult to grasp.27Yet in thehandsofGuizotand
AugustinThierry,itonce again servedimportant as
politicalfunctions,
it had in the AncienRegime.
Justificationby originshad beenthemostprominentstyleofpublic
debatebywhichFrenchpoliticalarrangements had beenjustified.Such
politicalargumenthad been presentedby pseudo-or quasi-historical
discussionsabout whathad occurredas theresultoftheconquestofthe
Gauls by the Romans,and the subsequentsuccessfulinvasionby the
Franksthathad takencontrolfromtheGallo-Romansoftheterritory
knownas France.The rightsofthecrownweredefendedby theclaim
that Frenchkingshad takenoverthe imperialpowersof the Roman
Empire.The nobilityassertedconflicting constitutional claims based
upon the alleged rightsof the Frankswho had conqueredthe Gallo-
Romans. The roturiers, or nonnobles,claimedto have inheritedrights
fromthe practiceof mixedmonarchyunderCharlemagne.
This mode of argumentwas condemnedby Rousseau, who insisted
thatlegitimate titlesto rulecouldbe acquiredonlyon thebasisofreason
and right.Butthedecisiveargument againstoriginscamefromtheAbbe
Sieyes'sderisivedismissalofall suchattemptsto derivelegitimacy from
theremotehistoryoftheRoman and Frankishconquests.In hisQu'est-
ce que le TiersEtat, Sieyescontended:
(1) thatany titleof the nobilitywas meremyth

(2) thateven if therewerosome historicalbasis forthe claim,the ThirdEstate
could simplyrestorethesocialcontractthathad prevailedpriorto theFrankish
conquest
(3) thatviolentusurpationofthepeople'srightsoughtto be negatedbythefoun-
dation of a new politicalorderbased upon the social contract.28
As Francois Furethas remarked,thisamountedto a reconstitution of

the"trueorigin"ofthenation,thistimedatedas 1789,thelegalbirthof
equality.29
When Guizot, duringthe Restoration,soughtto revivethe use of
historyin politicalargument,he had to neutralizethedemocraticand
contractualposition of Sieyes. He did so by adoptinga theoryof

legitimacy at once theoretically eclecticand politicallypluralistic.Like
Constant,Guizot applied two diversecriteriafor legitimacy:either
conformity to reasonand justice,or else theacceptanceovertimeof a
regimeby a people. Guizot was, as will soon appear, pluralisticin
denyingsovereignty to any of themajorclaimants:themonarchy,the
Church,the aristocracyor the people. And he also deniedthatany of
these groups could delegate absolute power to an individual or
assembly.To do so was illegitimate. Indeedany uncheckedpowerwas
illegitimate. Again like Constant,Guizotused Napoleon Bonaparteas
one of his principalexamplesof politicalillegitimacy, one thatderived
froman absolutistapplicationofthetheoryofpopularsovereignty. This
continuing consensuscorroboratesthisarticle'smainpoint:thatduring
theRestorationa new pejorativeregimetypewas beingformed.It was
that of Bonapartism,a formof militaryusurpationhistorically novel
because it based its legitimacyupon plebiscitary approval,and hence
popular sovereignty as proclaimedduringthe FrenchRevolution.
WhenGuizotembracedthetheoryof legitimacy, he turnedit to the
politicalpurposesof the groupthatin the Restorationwas called the
doctrinaires.30 This included Royer-Collard,Barante, Broglie,and
Remusat.To its leftwas Constant,who championeda parliamentary
monarchy;to its right,the Ultrasor theocrats.Guizotwas classifiedas
center-left; thesloganwithwhichhewas to be identified, thatofthejuste
milieu,governmentby the middle class, the pays legal. During the
Restoration,the electoratecame to 90,000 voters out of a total
populationof over 26 million;in the JulyMonarchy,thenumberof
voters rose no higher than 241,000.31 Guizot was committedto
representative monarchy,but one witha small suffrage.
In his famous lecturesof 1828 on the Historyof Civilizationin
Europeand France(6 vols; 1828),Guizotboldlyrevampedthetheoryof
legitimacy in sucha wayas to maintainitas thestandardfora pluralist
theoryof justice,reason,and rightin politics.32 At the same time,he
reducedlegitimacy based on birthand inheritance, inshorttheclaimsof
boththe Bourbonlegitimists and thenobility, to simplyone elementof
"legitimatesovereignty." He subjectedtheclaimsofthechurchand the
Ultrasto a similardeflation.All thisoccurredwithinthecontextof a
philosophyof historyand a politicaltheorythatattributed equal rights
to the middle class, the Third Estate, along the lines of Sieyes's
formulation.All the elementsthat had made European civilization
unique wereentitledto some partin "legitimatesovereignty"; none of
themwas entitledto a legal and politicalmonopolyof power,forall

absolute power Guizot declared to be illegitimate,whetherby an
individual,class, thepeople,or an individualclaimingto represent the
people. Thus Guizot's versionof legitimacyentailedthe new liberal,
constitutional redefinitionofillegitimacy. For Guizot,Napoleon Bona-
parteexemplified one of theformsdemocraticillegitimacy could take.
Tocqueville, who was in the audience, later investigatedmore fully
the question of whetherdemocracyhas to lead to some formof
illegitimate regime.He repliedthatit did not,indeedthata democracy
along Americanlineswas in facttheonlyacceptablealternative to an
illegitimate plebiscitarydictatorship.
Guizot practiceda mode of writinghistorythatcombineddetailed
treatment ofremotehistorical eventswithpoliticaland socialtheoryofa
sortnotonlyapplicablein principleto his owntime,butalso phrasedas
maximsdirecting actionofone sortand interdicting alternatives.
Thus,
earlyin his lectureson Europeancivilization,Guizotfirstattemptedto
isolate its primaryelementsas theyexistedat the timeof the Roman
Empire's dissoltution: monarchy,theocracy,aristocracy,and demo-
cracy. No one of them ever succeeded in achievingthe complete
subjugationofall theothers.Buteverytheorist whohas sinceattempted
a systematicstatementof the claims for any one of thesedisparate
elements would have us believe that originallyEuropean society
belongedto italone,and thatthepoweritthenhad has beenusurpedby
the otherelements.33 Guizot identified such systemsand theirauthors:
Boulainvilliers forthearistocracy;theAbbe Dubos forthemonarchy;
theAbbe Mablyforthe"liberals,republicans, democrats,whateveryou
call them";finally,the Ultrassuchas de Maistreand Bonald and their
claims that the Church had foundedEuropean civilization,that its
missionwas sacredand itsrightdivine.34 Thusfromthebeginning ofhis
history,Guizotsoughtto establishtwo points:first,thesignificance of
politicallegitimacy as a principalelementindispensableto theprogress
of Europeancivilization;and second,thatsinceas a matterofhistorical
factno one systemeverdominatedEurope,all ofthemhavesomeright,
but onlya limitedone, to recognition in thepresent.Guizot,however,
did notrestrict himselfto historicalarguments; hethoughthecouldalso
give a definitionof legitimacyin termsof reason,justice,and right.
What is politicallegitimacy? Guizot,examiningthe four"systems"
concludes: "Evidentlynothingmore that a rightfoundedupon anti-
quity,upon duration,. . . priorityof timeis pleaded as the sourceof
right,as proofof legitimate power."35This backwardlookingjustifica-
tionassumesthatsomepublicauthority has beenmade legitimate byits

antiquity,prescription, and duration.Guizot thenposed the further
questions:Whatis thislegitimacy? Of whatis itcomposed?Whatdoes it
require?How did it findits way into European civilization?
He arguesthatall poweroriginallyowed itsexistenceat leastin part
to force:"Violencehas sulliedthebirthofall theauthorities intheworld,
whatevermayhave beentheirnatureor form."36 Howeverthisoriginis
alwaysdisclaimedbyall claimantsto authority. None ofthemwillallow
themselvesto be consideredas theoffspring of force.All governments
know thatforceis no title.As long as theyhave no otherfoundation
thanviolence,theyare entirelydestituteof right.Hence,in periodsof
conflict,each rivalclaimantcan be heardsaying:"I existedbeforeyou;
myclaim is the oldest;myclaim restsupon othergroundsthanforce;
societybelongedto me beforethisstateofviolence.... I was legitimate;
. . . my rightshave been torn from me."37The firstcharacteristic
of politicallegitimacyis "to disclaimviolenceas thesourceof author-
ity,and to associate it witha moral notion. . . ofjustice,of right,of
reason."38
Guizot specificallydenied the claims made by legitimist and mon-
archicaltheoriststhatonlymonarchyhad been regardedas legitimate.
The Italianand Swissaristocracies and democraciesand thelittlerepub-
lic of San Marinohaveconsideredthemselves legitimate,and havebeen
acknowledgedas such. Each elementof Europeancivilizationpretends
thatat thedissolutionoftheRomanEmpire,Europebelongedto italone.
"Hence we may concludethatit reallybelongedto no one of them."39
Whatis commonto all systemsofpoliticalphilosophyis theattemptto
determinewho has the rightto governsociety.Theocracy,monarchy,
and aristocracyall boast theyhave discoveredthe seat of legitimate
sovereignty; all promiseto place societyunderits rightful master.
Thus farthosewho haveattempted to establishtheirrightto absolute
power have confusedthe true originof legitimacy.Legitimacyhas
notingto do withabsolutepower,and is incompatible withthepersonal
will of any individualor group. Indeedany such claim is illegitimate.
Guizot's theory,then, is constitutionalist but not democratic.He
definesillegitimacy:
specifically
Fromthisarisesthenecessityof thelimitationofany power,whatevermaybe its

name or form;fromthisarisesthe radicalillegitimacy
(illIgitimite) of everysort
of absolute power,whatevermay be its origin,whetherconquest,inheritance or
election.40
Richter
/ ILLEGITIMACY 199
Guizot used tyranny and despotismas synonyms; bothwerewaysof

designatingan illegitimate politicalsystemdominatedby an absolute
power,uncheckedbyany institutions or constitutionaldevicessuchas
thedivisionof power.In thecourseof his work,he developeda theory
that stressedthe contributionsof what he had identifiedas the four
elementsofcivilizationinEurope.Buthealso depictedtheseelementsas
potentiallyillegitimatewhenanyoneofthemsoughttheexclusiveright
to ruleto theexclusionof all the others.
UnderLouis XIV, monarchybecameillegitimate becauseabsolute.
Louis destroyedor completed the destructionof ancient French
institutions,and took care not to replacethem;he destroyedpolitical
habits,as wellas politicalinstitutions.Therewas nothingleftin France
"either to protectthe countryfrom the illegitimateaction of the
government, or the government itselfagainstthe inevitableaction of
time."4'From this Guizot concluded that the declineof the French
crown was due to "the danger,the evil, the insurmountable vice of
absolute power".42
Yet Guizot distinguishedamong the four types of illegitimate,
absolute power held by men ratherthan exercised throughlaws,
institutionsor constitutions.Guizot declared that aristocracyas
embodiedin"feudaldespotism"hadalwaysbeenhated.Morethanonce
"religiousdespotism"and "monarchicaldespotism"had obtained"the
sanction,almost the love of the populationwhichtheygoverned.But
feudaldespotismhasalwaysbeenrepulsed,alwayshateful.It tyrannized
over the destiniesof men withoutrulingin theirhearts."43Under
religiousand monarchicaldespotism,authority is exercisedinthename
of some beliefcommonto both rulerand subjects.Feudal despotism
was the authorityof man over man; thedominationof the personal,
capriciouswill of an individual."This perhapsis the onlytyranny to
whichman, muchto his honor,neverwill submit."44
This left"democraticdespotism."Guizot reaffirmed thattheworst
formof democracywas thatbased on thedelegationofsupremepower
by the people to a representative. In his Historyof Representative
Government in Europe,Guizotdenouncedthetheoryofrepresentation.
Those individualwills who have createdthe legislativeand central
power are absorbed into it by this theory,whichhe attributedto a
misunderstanding of Rousseau. The people are said to have abdicated
theirpowerand theiragent,legislativeor executive,represents themto
thefullextentof theirinherent Guizotidentified

sovereignty. thisform
not onlywiththe Convention,but also withNapoleon Bonaparte:
This is obviously pure and unmixeddespotism,rigorouslydeduced fromthe

principlethat wills are to be representedin government.. . . 'The elect of the
sovereign':such was the declarationboth of the Conventionand of Napoleon;
hencethedestruction in power,and ofall therightsbelonging
ofall responsibility
to citizens.45
This Guizotidentified withtheclaimmadebytheRoman emperors,

who thoughtofthemselves as exercisingall thepowerabdicatedbythe
Roman people. It is themostexaggeratedand dreadfulformofpopular
Guizot remarked:
sovereignty.
Such a transformation it is easy for us to understand:we have witnessedit

ourselves;we haveseenthesovereignty fromthepeopleto thepersonof
transferred
a singleindividual;thiswas thehistoryof Napoleon. He also wasa personification
of the sovereignty
of thepeople. . . . 'Who has been elected,'he said, 'like me,by
eighteenmillionsof men?Who is, likeme,therepresentative of thepeople?'and
when,uponhiscoins,we readon one side RepubliqueFrancaise,and on theother
Napoleon Empereur,whatis thisbutan example... ofthepeoplehavingbecome
the monarch?46
StillanotheraspectofNapoleon'sillegitimacy calledforexplanation.
For Guizotfelttheneed to explainNapoleon'sextraordinary powerto
compelallegiancedespitehisillegitimacy as Guizothimselfhad defined
theterm.In a daringcomparison,GuizotclassifiedNapoleon as a great
manon thelevelofCharlemagne.47 In one ofthefirstnineteenth-century
applicationsofwhatwas to becomea majorissueinhistoriography and
politics,Guizot separatedthecareersof greatmenintotwo phases. In
the first,sucha leaderperceivesbetterthanany of his contemporaries
the greatestneeds of his societyand time,as well as how to wieldthe
powersavailable to himin sucha wayas to satisfytheseneeds.Because
of this he acquires power and glory. In short,he is regardedas a
legitimaterulerto be followed,accepted,and willinglyaided by his
subjects.
In thesecondphase,afterthereal needsofhistimeare satisfied, the
greatman refusesto stop. He aspiresto extendhis powerand activity
indefinitely,and hereegoismand illusionbegin.Althoughhis public
continuesto followhim,it soon discoversthatit is beingpulled in a
directionithas no desireto go. Now theuse offorcebeginsto furtherthe
leader's individualideas and desires.Firstcomes generaldisquietude
and uneasiness; he is still followed, but reluctantly.Next he is

complainedof; finally,he is abandoned and falls.All he had desired
perisheswithhim.
Applying this scheme to Napoleon, Guizot argued that when
Napoleon seized power, what France needed was the restorationof
orderat home,and theachievement ofsecurityagainstforeigninvasion.
This Napoleon understoodand achieved.Yet whenthiswas finished, he
proposed to himselfa thousand other projects,all of which were
arbitrary, gigantic,and foreignto thereal needsof France. For a time
theFrenchfollowedhimdespitegreatcost.The day camewhenFrance
would follow him no longer.The emperorfoundhimselfalone, his
empirevanished,and Francereturned to itspropercondition,itsnatural
tendency.48 EarlierGuizot had takena less favorableview:If boththe
revolutionand Napoleon had beennecessary,Bonapartismhad been"a
violentmethodof gettingout of the Revolution,as theRevolutionhad
been a violentmethodof gettingout of the AncienRegime."49
It is clearthatGuizotwas rathermorewillingtoforgiveNapoleonhis
use ofviolenceto seize powerthanhispretensions to hold poweron the
basis of democraticlegitimacy.For Guizot, plebiscitary dictatorship
was simplyanother form of popular sovereignty.Guizot detested
democracy,and as theprimeminister oftheJulyMonarchy,he refused
thesmallestconcessionsto a class suffragethatwouldhaveenlargedthe
narrowboundsoftheregime'ssupporters. AlfredCobban'sverdictwas:
Guizot was perhapsthemostintelligent and high-minded minister

everto preside
overtheruinofa politicalsystem.A Protestant, withall theausterity
ofa French
Huguenot, he accepted the politics of wealth and influence;a distinguished
historianwithprofoundcriticalpowers,who envisagedbehindchangingcircum-
stancesthe movementof greathistoricalforcesand theevolutionand conflictof
classes,he behavedas if he thoughthis own regimecould somehowescape from
historicalfatality.50
Afterhis fall and that of the regimehe served,Guizot retreatedinto

Englishexile. His explanationof eventsstressedthe sinisterrole of
democraticideas. In a work he chose to call De la Democratieen
France, Guizot exploded, as thoughholdingTocquevilleresponsible
for 1848: "Today's chaos hides behind one word,'democracy.'This
wordis sovereign,universal.All partiesseek to appropriateit. . .. It is
the revolutionaryand despoticidea par excellence.It is thisidea that
mustbe extirpated."'5
Guizot thusconcludedthatdemocracyas a politicaltheoryneces-
sarilyentailsunlimitedpopularsovereignty whichmaybe delegatedto
an assembly,group,or individual.This formof rulewas, in his eyes,

illegitimate,itsconsequencesfatalto libertyand individualrights.Only
hereditary monarchycombinedwithrepresentative government based
upon a minority couldmeettherequirements
suffrage oflegitimate rule.
Tocqueville,who as a youngman sat in the largeaudienceattend-
ing Guizot's lectureson the historyof European civilization,was
not unaffected by Guizot'sconceptsof politicallegitimacy and illegiti-
macy. Yet when he himselfconfronteddemocracyin its American
form,Tocquevilleconcludedthatbothintheoryand practicetheAmeri-
cans had discoveredhow to limitthe will of the people. Thus de
Tocqueville went beyond the Restorationconsensusthatdemocracy
was byitsnatureillegitimate. Indeedin De la De'mocratie en Amerique,
(Democracyin America)Tocquevilleclaimedthata democracylimited
by law, religion,and moeurs(mores)was the only legitimatealterna-
tive to Bonapartistplebiscitariandictatorship,which,like Constant
and Guizot,he regardedas illegitimate. But unlikethem,he was con-
vinced that some form of democracywas inevitable. Hereditary
monarchybelongedto the past. Tocquevilledid not regardit either
as feasibleor as a necessaryconditionfor legitimategovernment in
France.Tocqueville,then,took overthepoliticalvocabularyof legiti-
mism.Butinhisworkon America,heapplieditina waythattranscended
its semanticfieldduringthe Restoration.
Up to this point,I have tracedthe developmentof legitimacyand
illegitimacyas pairedpoliticalconceptsfromtheircounterrevolutionary
originsin Burke and Maistreto liberalbut antidemocratic applica-
tions during the Restorationby Constant and Guizot. From the
beginning,military usurpationofpowerwas definedas illegitimate and
asserted to be the necessaryoutcome of revolution.Bonapartist
plebiscitarydictatorship was thenidentified by liberalsas one possible
outcome of attemptsto achieve unlimitedpopular sovereignty (the
othertwo being the ConventionunderJacobindominationand the
Terror).Thus theconceptofBonapartism, or Caesarism,orplebiscitary
dictatorship, was takingshape in liberalthought.Tocquevilleavailed
himselfof previousliberaltheorieson the subjectwhenhe attempted
to specifythoseformsoftotaldominationthatwerepotentialdangers
for modern democracies,includingthe Americanversion.Charac-
he also added much to what had alreadybeen said. His
teristically,
contributions in Democracyin Americaand elsewherewillbe thesub-
ject of the next section.But nothinghe wrotewas more significant
thanthepairedconceptshe usedwhenheposedliberaldemocracyas the
only legitimatealternativeto Bonapartistdictatorship.Guizot had
depicteddemocracyas incompatiblewithpoliticallibertyand individ-

ual rights,and Bonapartistdictatorshipas one of the forms of
illegitimategovernmentwhich would be the inevitableoutcome of
attemptsto achievedemocracy.Tocquevilleadmittedthe dangerbut
refusedto admitthatit was inevitable.By makingthisadjustment,he
used the politicalvocabularyof Frenchliberalismin his memorable
depictionoftheUnitedStatesas a democracythatmetthespecifications
of legitimacy,definedby the standards,if not by thejudgments,of
Constantand Guizot.
IV
Althoughhe feltno less antipathythandid Constantand Guizotfor

the later phases of the revolution,for the Terror,and the Empire,
Tocquevillecame to strikingly different
conclusionsabout thepossibil-
ity of combiningdemocracywitlhliberty:popular sovereignty with
respectforindividualrights.At the verypointthathe was struggling
withthe notionof the potentialtyrannyof the majority,Tocqueville
wrote:"I regardas impiousand destestablethatmaximwhichholdsthat
in politics,themajorityof a people has therightto do anything.Yet I
place the origin of all powers in the wills of the majority.Am I
contradicting His answerresemblesthatgivenbyConstantin
myself?"52
Principesde Politique,wheresupremepoweris deniedlegitimacy, no
matterwho holds it individuallyor collectively.Tocqueville, how-
ever,divergedfromConstantwhenhe arguedthattherewas no alterna-
tiveto endowingeveryonewiththe peacefulexerciseofcertainrights.
Only in a democracycan modernmen learn to respectrights.In the
UnitedStates,ordinarymen respectrightsbecausetheypossessthem.
Theyobeylaws becausetheyvote.Onlybyparticipating in government
can men identify withit and acceptit as just.53
At theend of perhapsthesinglemostimportantchapterin Democ-
racy in America,Tocqueville stated his position on the possibility
of combininglibertywith democracy. He wished to avoid being
misunderstoodby his Frenchreaders.His book had not been written
to propose Americanlaws and moeurs as a model to be imitated
slavishlybyeverypeoplein a democracitsociety."My purposehas been
to show,usingAmericaas an example,thatlawsand above all, moeurs
can permita democraticpeople to remainfree."54
Nor was he proposingthat universalsuffrageor the grantingof

politicalrightstoall be achievedat a singlestroke.He endedthischapter
by emphasizingwhat he had alreadysaid in a numberof places:
But I thinkthatifdemocraticinstitutions are not introducedgraduallyamongus

[in France],and ifall citizensare notprovidedwiththoseideasand sentiments that
firstprepare them for libertyand then allow them to apply such ideas and
sentiments, therewill be no independenceforanyone,notthebourgeois,notthe
noble,notthepoor,nottherich,butan equal tyranny forall. And I foreseethatifin
timewe do notsucceedinestablishing thepeacefulruleofthegreatestnumber,we
shall end up sooneror laterunderthe unlimitedpowerof a singleperson.55
What is the connectionin Tocqueville'smind betweenlegitimate

ruleand Bonapartistdictatorship? He took theviewthatdemocracyin
its Americanform had very substantialmerits.But by its nature,
democracyis subjectto a numberofpotentialdangers.Wereanyone of
themto be realized,thendemocracycould turninto a formof total
dominationworse than any beforeknown,an idea Tocquevillemay
have acquired fromConstant.These dangersmustbe identifiedand
thencountered.ElsewhereI havedistinguished thethreewaysin which
Tocqueville believedthat such unprecedented losses of libertycould
occur.56Here I shall discuss only the dangerhe saw froma possible
Bonapartistdictatorship,but I shall begin with his conceptionof
legitimacy,whichhe thoughtcondemnedtheAncienRegime,and even
more, Jacobin and Bonapartistdomination.He thoughtthat both
tyranny and despotismwereold words,inadequateto carrytheweight
of a regimetype based upon the Bonapartistmodel.57Yet he was
committedto makingthisnew regimetypeadequate to hisnewscience
of politics,in termsof illegitimacy,as had the old politicalscience,
especiallyhis masterMontesquieu.
Close to the beginningof his prefaceto thefirstpartof Democracy
inAmerica,Tocquevilledefineslegitimate politicalpowerbya deliberate
contrastto illegitimatepower, a strategyessentialto Constantand
Guizot,and beforethem,Montesquieu,but rejectedby Max Weber:
Neithertheexerciseofpowernorthehabitof obediencedebases men.This occurs

onlywhenthosewhoexercisepowerregarditas illegitimate
(illegitime),
and those
who obey regardit as usurpedand oppressive.58
Monarchy had once been legitimatein this sense. But society

had beentransformed,
everywhere and itwas certainthatthefuturedid
Richter
/ ILLEGITIMACY 205
not lie withtheold regimewhichBurkemistakenly identified

withthe
onlylegitimateformof stateand society,the ancientcommonlaw of
Europe. Once the prestigeof royaltyhas disappearedin thetumultof
revolution,thekingis no longerperceivedas thefatherofthestate,but
as itsmaster.Ifrestored,he cannotmaintainhisposition.Ifstrong,heis
hated; if weak, despised."Himselffilledwithangerand fear,he sees
himselfas a strangerin his own country,and he treatshis subjects
as thoughtheywere defeatedenemies."59This was stronglanguage.
Tocqueville was denyinglegitimacyto the Bourbon Restorationhis
fatherhad servedas a prefect.He was assertingthat in the age of
equality,the onlyviable legitimateregimewas a constitutional demo-
cracyofthesortdepictedin Democracyin America.Althoughthathad
been set out in ideal form,Tocquevillefoundits essentialcharacter-
isticsto be presentand recognizableinthefunctioning, inmanyrespects
imperfect, butneverthelesslegitimategovernment whichhe had seenin
the UnitedStates.60
Democraticgovernment in the UnitedStatesis legitimate
becauseit
restsupon a consensusuniversalisand at thesame timedoes not hold
thatthewillofthepeopleis above thebasic laws. Althoughthelawsare
regardedas thecitizens'own work,theycannotbe alteredby a simple
majority.Governmental authorityis recognizedas bindingand neces-
sary,yeteverycitizenis guaranteedrights.AlthoughtheUnitedStates
was neitherbrilliantnor glorious,the majorityof its citizensenjoyed
some degreeof prosperity and livedpeacefullytogether.61
Yet Tocquevilledid not mean to affirm thatdemocracy,evenin its
Americanform,was withoutdangers.A prominentdangerwas that
formofdemocracyhe had learnedfromRestorationtheorists to regard
as illegitimate. This unacceptableformwas builtupon the beliefthat
the will of the people cannot be limitedby law, thatthe people may
delegatethat entirepower to a fewpeople or to a singleperson.In
Europe strangediscoverieshad been made during the revolution,
Terror,and Empire:it is notthepeople who are to directtheirgovern-
ments,but thosewho knowwhatis bestforthe people,"a happydis-
tinction,whichpermitsthemto act in the name of nationswithout
consultingtheircitizens,and to claim theirgratitude,whiletrampling
over them."62Tocqueville condemnsthis view, which he identifies
withthe Jacobinsand Napoleon, in termsno less vehementforbeing
ironical.He specificallyuses a regimetypehe regardsas illegitimate:"It
has beena discoveryof our timethattherecan be legitimate tyrannies
(tyrannieslegitimes)and holy injustices,providedonly that theyare
exercisedin the name of the people."63
Tocqueville had Napoleon in mind when he analyzed those con-

ditionsunderwhicha militarydictatorship could take overa modern
democracy.This was trueevenbeforehe experiencedLouis Napoleon's
coupl d'etatat firsthand. In thesecondpartof Democracy,Tocqueville
had already noted the anomalous role of the armyand the profes-
sional soldier: "Although democratic peoples, by their interests
and instincts,are naturallyinclined towards peace, nevertheless
their armies push them in the directionof war and revolution."64
Revolutions by the military,although almost never a danger in
aristocraticsocieties,are to be fearedin democracies.In aristocracies,
officersalready hold highsocial rank; in democracies,theyhave no
incomeexcepttheirpay,and no claim to prestigeotherthanmilitary
rank.The professionalsoldier'sreal loyaltyis to military, ratherthan
civilian,society.Hence he desireswar,whichmakeshimindispensable;
or else revolution, which,bytheuse oftheviolencethatis hisspecialty,
gives him the opportunityto seize power and compel the respect
otherwisedenied him.65
In this passage publishedin 1840,de Tocquevillewas generalizing
fromthecreationoftheFirstEmpirebyNapoleon.Bythetimehe wrote
l'AncienRe'gimeet la Revolution,he had retired fromhisparliamentary
and ministerial careerbecause he refusedto accept the coup d'etatof
Louis Napoleon and the establishment of the Second Empire.The
completedsectionof his classic workcontainssome mordantwords
about thefirstNapoleon and the Frenchwho, forgetting theirnewly-
gainedliberties,had wishednothingmorethanto becometheservants
of the man who made himselfinto the masterof the world.66
Napoleon had recognizedthatthe workof the FrenchRevolution
had been to completethe dominationof the centralizedbureaucracy
establishedbytheFrenchcrownduringtheold regime.Thisisall weare
toldin thesingleparagraphon theempirecontainedin thefirstvolume
oftheAncienRe'gime.Butinthedraftsand outlinesofitssecondpartde
Tocquevilledid notliveto complete,thereis a memorableanalysisofthe
firstNapoleon. Through strengthening the bureaucracyeven more,
throughtheuse of pseudo-democratic procedures,throughtheorgani-
zation of enthusiasmby nationalismand the corruptionof the
populationby the spoils of war,throughappealingto all groupswho
had benefitedfromtherevolutionbutdid notwishitto go anyfurther,
Napoleon had securedhisdominance.Bythesemeanshe had createda
worldin whicheveryoneelse had beenlevelledwhilehe toweredoverit
like a colossus and dominatedit.67
Richter
/ ILLEGITIMACY 207
Yet Tocqueville did not attemptto reduce Napoleon to a pre-

revolutionarydespot. His conquests were different fromwhat had
been done before.Napoleon was at once a soldierand a propagandist
who incorporatedin his warsthestyleoftherevolutionary armies.His
internalpoliciesbuiltupon thestrategy oftheAncienRegime,butwere
novel in theirapplicationto the situationof whichNapoleon took
advantage.The Frenchmonarchy,Tocquevillewrotein some of the
bestknownpassagesof theAncienRe'gime,had insistedupon dividing
and conqueringitspeople;ithad separatedclassesfromoneanotherand
refusedto allow any of them to participatein government.It had
appealed to narrowgroupinterest.This was the secretof Napoleon's
successas well. He had learnedwellthelessonsof despotismfromthe
old regime;he combinedthemwithdemocraticslogans and appear-
ances. Tocqueville's prematuredeath deprivedus of his analysisin
detail of Bonapartistdictatorship,but we know how importantthis
subjectwas to himfroma letterthatrevealshe wishedto do a historyof
theempirethatwould be cast in theformofMontesquieu'sConsidera-
tions.68 As for Louis Napoleon, Tocqueville provideda remarkable
assessmentof him in his Souvenirsand correspondence.He analyzed
the equivocal aspects of the Second Empire its combinationof
revolutionary and conservative
qualities-and itsappeals-demogogic,
nationalistic,but directedabove all to thosewho desiredordermore
thanliberty.He evenpredictedthatthemilitarism oftheregimewould
lead to its eventualdownfall.
Tocqueville,likethetheothertheoriststreatedhere,was attempting
to identifypotentiallinks betweendemocracyand the Bonapartist
regimetype.At stake was thelegitimacyof democracy,forifit led to
militarydictatorship,plebiscitaryand thus based on the mobilized
opinionofthenation,and permanently committed to wagingwar,then
primafacieit was to be condemned.
The works of Constantand Tocqueville dealing withthe Bona-
partistregimedeclarethisto be a qualitativelynew formof domina-
tion. Clearlyboth were continuinga traditionof politicaldiscourse
that dealth with regimesof total domination.Their purpose was
in part analytical:to identifythe distinctivethreatsto libertyin-
herentin the unprecedented styleof politicsbegunby the revolution.
Buttheywereat thesame timeseekingto destroythelegitimacy ofthe

Bonapartistregimetheywereanalyzing.That purposewas polemical;it
was also political,for it provideda positiveway of bringingout the
salientfeaturesof the type of regimetheywishedto recommendas
legitimate.
Thus those regimetypes usually, if not invariably,regardedas
illegitimate playa crucialrolein discussionsoflegitimacy.Theymaydo
so by actingas a polar oppositein a dichotomousdistinction. Butthey
haveotherfunctions as well.Itcan be arguedthateverywesternpolitical
vocabularycontainsa regimetypethatdesignatestotaldomination.It is
well to knowtherepertoire, and to be able to specifynotonlychanges
in regimetypesof thiskind,but also theirimplications.
Untiltheeighteenth century, thevitiatedformofmonarchy had been
designatedin thehistoryofpoliticalthoughtas tyranny. Thenin one of
themostsignificant books ofhisage, Montesquieureplacedtyranny by
despotismin thispairedcontrastwithmonarchy.Tyrannyhe relegated
to anothercategory,"theoverthrow of establishedpower,particularly
in a democracy."69 At the same time,Montesquieucurtlydismissed
Aristotle'streatmentof monarchy,because Aristotlehad had no
knowledgeof that varietyof monarchycharacteristicof modern
Europe. Centralto thistypewas thewillingconcessionby thekingof
powers to be shared with constitutedgroups intermediary between
crownand people. Despotismpermitted no suchgroups.Thus Montes-
quieu workedout a distinctiveset of traitsfor European monarchy.
Each of thesetraitsnot onlydid not existin despotisms,butcould be
provento be fatal to them.Conversely,despotismwas definedas a
system.Each of its characteristic aspects could be demonstratedto
violate the natureand principleof monarchy.As will soon appear,
obedienceonceformulated inthiswaycouldnothavethesamemeaning
in different formsof government.How could the formof obedience
appropriateto despotismalso be suitable to a modern European
monarchy?Since despotismwas illegitimatein Europe, its mode of
obediencehad to be illegitimate as well.
Readers of thisjournal will not be unawareof the factthatWeber
treatedlegitimacyin termsof command-obedience relationships.By
stipulativedefinition,WeberdeclaredHerrschaft (domination,domin-
ion) to be "theprobabilitythata commandwitha givenspecificcontent
willbe obeyedbya givennumberof persons."70LegitimateHerrschaft
can expectcompliance.Weberalso definesdiscipline,"the probability
that by virtueof habituationa command will receivepromptand
automaticobediencein stereotypedforms,on thepartofa givengroup

of persons."7'
Montesquieu,by contrast,treatsthe subjectof obediencewithina
chapterdevoted nominallyto despotism.It is thus that he develops
negativelywhat sort of obedienceis to be expectedin a state where
poweris moderatedand citizensfree:
In despoticstates,thenatureofgovernment demandsunconditional obedience....

accomodation,comingto terms,seekingequivalents,no
Thereis no reconciliation,
conferences,discussions, remonstrances,no considerationof proposals for
somethingdifferent frombut betterthan [what has been decided by the ruler.]
Here man is a creaturewho obeysthe will of anothercreature.72
Stated positively,Montesquieu'stheoryis that,in a freegovernment,

groupsare recognizedto have considerableautonomy,enoughso that
thereis roomforregulardiscussionbetweenthemand thegovernment
of alternativesjudged to be adverseto theirinterestsbypartiesaffected
bylegislation.Thus thegovernment prefers obediencebasedon consent
because inthiswayitis betterinformed and moreeffective inpredicting
It
the resultsof legislation. does not regarditselfas entitledto com-
pleteand passiveobedience.Groupsand individualshave theirrights,
willinglyconcededby themonarch.
I do not referto Montesquieu'streatment of obediencein orderto
claim thathis theorywas correct.My intentionis to demonstrate how
positivepositionsmaybe arguedbe reference to negativecases ortypes.
It is in fact my contentionthat many discussionsof legitimacyare
conductedin just thisway.
Anotherpointabout therelationship betweenregimetypesdesignat-
ing illegitimateformsof rule and the discussionof legitimacy:The
historyofpoliticalthoughtprovidesa traditionofnegativediscourse,a
repertory of rhetoricaltopics,a stylizedset of contrastsamongregime
types, a number of maximsto provideguidancein circumstances that
appear unprecedented. Butare theyreallynew?EdmundBurkewrotein
1790:
I do not know underwhatdescriptionto class the presentrulingauthorityin

France.It affects
to be a puredemocracy.... Untilnow,we haveseenno examples
of considerabledemocracies.The ancientswerebetteracquaintedwiththem.Not
beingwhollyunreadin theauthorswho had seen themostoftheseconstitutions,
and who had bestunderstoodthem,I cannothelpconcurringwiththeiropinion,
thatan absolutedemocracyno morethanabsolute monarchyis to be reckoned
amongthelegitimateforms ofgovernment. IfI recollectrightly,
Aristotleobserves
thata democracyhas manystrikingpointsof resemblancewitha tyranny.73
The final point I wish to make is that to apply termsof total

dominationis to call the legitimacyof governmentsinto question.
Howevercynicalabout theoriesand theirpracticaleffects, no regimeis
in practiceindifferent to being labeled as illegitimate,as a tyranny,
despotism,dictatorship, or totalitarianstate.Robespierreat theheight
ofhispowerrejectedindignantly thechargethatto use terrorwasto act
as a despot.Whenhewasarrested,hewas calleda dictator,anotherterm
he soughtto repudiate.Napoleon, it willbe recalled,publiclyasserted
thelegitimacy ofhisempire,and attempted to designatetheBourbonsas
illegitimate.Yet neitherConstantnor de Tocquevillewere wrongto
link his unendingseriesof wars to his sensethathe was regardedas
an usurperbybothhisownpeopleand theotherstatesofEurope.Thus
self-perceptionand perceptionby othersthatthe Bonapartistregime
was illegitimatehad actual effects.
Such a way of emphasizingthe significance of conceptsof illegiti-
macyfollowsfromthe methodof Montesquieuand Tocqueville.It is
excluded,and curiouslyso, fromthemethodused byperhapsthemost
influentialtheoristof modernsocialscience,Max Weber.Perhapsithas
been Weber'sexamplethathas led to the relativelack of attentionto
concepts of illegitimacyin the theoryand practiceof politics.As
ProfessorWolfgangMommsenhas argued,Weber'spoliticsas wellas
his understanding of the politicalsettingin whichhe functioned were
not unconnectedto bothhisjudgmentof Bonapartismand his lack of
interestin concepts of illegitimacy.74 For the differences between
Tocquevilleand Weberon thesepointswereindeedverygreat.
Tocqueville regardedthe Caesarism, or Bonapartistdictatorship
ofNapoleon as an illegitimateperversion ofdemocracy;Weberthought
plebiscitarydictatorshipprovided the leader-democracy(Fuhrer-
demokratie)required by the conditions of modern society as he
understoodit. Tocqueville rejectedany such sociological determin-
ismabout politicalpossibilities:Althoughhe took seriouslythedanger
that popular sovereignty, if regardedby citizensas unlimited,could
producea militarydictatorship,he did not regardthat perilas soci-
ologicallypredetermined, nor did he regarddemocracyas inherently
illegitimate.Acceptingthe constitutionalism of Montesquieu,Con-
stant,and Guizot, Tocqueville neverthelessdenied the Restoration
premisethatonlyhereditary monarchycould be legitimate.Indeed,he
argued that in a democraticage, monarchywas no longera genuine
option. There were only two alternatives:a democracyeffectively
limitedby politicaland social checks,as he, withsome trepidation,
classifiedthe United States; or else the unlimitedpower of a single
/ ILLEGITIMACY
Richter 211
person chosen by plebiscite,aftera coup d'etat, as in the case of

Napoleon. Such plebiscitarydictatorshipTocqueville regardedas
illegitimate.
On thispoint Webertook a verydifferent position.In his political
sociology,democraticlegitimacy could be createdonlyby plebiscitary
dictatorship,the specificformof charismafromwhichit originated.
That Bonapartistdictatorshiporiginatedin the seizureof power by
military violencedid not,in Weber'sview,affectitslegitimacy. Nor did
Weberregardthemanipulationofpublicopinionpriorto a plebisciteas
in any way diminishing the legitimacyof the chiefchosen by it.
Thus Tocqueville felt compelled to develop new categoriesof
illegitimaterulethatwouldapplyto thepoliticalworldtransformed by
the French Revolutionand its unexpectedoutcomes; Weber found
place within his compendious scheme neitherfor the concept of
illegitimacy,norforitsconsiderationin understanding and explaining
theactionsofthosewho,howeverself-deceived, havejudgedtheirrulers
as illegitimateand have acted accordingly.
NOTES
1. QuentinSkinner,The Foundationsof Modern Political Thoughtvol. 2 (Cam-

bridge,1978),p. 352.
2. Berke Vardar, StructureFondamentaledu VocabulaireSocial et Politiqueen
Francede 1815 d 1830 (Istanbul, 1973),p. 207.
3. Dieter Groh, "Casarismus," in 0. Brunner,W. Conze, and R. Koselleck,
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe vol. I (Stuttgart,1972) pp. 726-771.
4. WalterBagehot,"Whyan EnglishLiberalmaylook withoutdisapprovalon the
progressofImperialism in France,"inN. St. John-Stevas,ed., Bagehot'sHistoricalEssays
(New York, 1965),pp. 447452.
5. Max Weber,EconomYand SocietY,ed. G. Rothand C. Wittich, vol. 1(New York,
1968) pp. 266-269;Weber,Wirtschaft und Gesellschaftvol. I (Tiibingen,1947),pp. 155-
158.
6. George Iggers,The Cult of AuthoritY(The Hague, 1958),pp. 68-105.
7. Paul Robert,DictionnaireAlphabetiqueet Analogique de la Langue Fran'aise
(Paris, 1970).
8. CitedbyJosephde Maistrein OeuvresCompletesvol. I (Lyon,Paris,1924),p. 48.
9. Cf. Vardar,StructureFondamentale,pp. 229-231.
10. CitedinC. B. Macpherson,Burke(New York,1980),p. 3. For Humeon usurpation,
cf. "On the OriginalContract"and "Whetherthe BritishGovernmentInclinesMore to
AbsoluteMonarchy,"in C. W. Hendel,ed., David Hume's PoliticalEssaYs(New York,
1953),pp. 47-48,50, 74. Hume's textis worthcomparingto Burke's.Hume wrote:"In
realitythereis nota moreterribleeventthana totaldissolutionofgovernment, whichgives
libertyto the multitudeand makesthedetermination or choice of a newestablishment

depend upon a numberwhichnearlyapproachesto thatof the bodyof thepeople....
Everywiseman,then,wishesto see at thehead ofa powerfuland obedientarmya general
who mayspeedilyseizetheprizeand giveto thepeoplea masterwhichtheyare so unfitto
choose forthemselves.""On the OriginalContract,"p. 48.
11. Karl Mannheim,"ConservativeThought,"in Paul Kecskemeti,ed., Essai's on
Sociologyand Social Psychology(London, 1953),pp. 95, 102.
12. Michael Walzer, Regicideand Revolution(Cambridge,1974),p. 4 ff.
13. De Maistre,Oeuvres,p. 134.
14. Cited in Guy H. Dodge, BenjaminConstant'sPhilosophi'of Liberalism(Chapel
Hill, 1980),pp. 19-20.
15. Froma proclamationprintedin Bastia.Cf. Thomas Wuirtenberger, "Legitimitat,
Legalitat,"in Geschichtliclhe Grundbegriffe. (forthcoming), vol. 3 p. 16. I wishto thank
ProfessorKoselleckforsendingme an advance copy of thisarticle.
16. Edmund Burke, Reflectionson the Revolutionin France, ed. C. C. O'Brien
(Baltimore,1968),p. 342.
17. Edmund Burke,"Letterson a Regicide Peace," in R.J.S. Hoffmanand Paul
Levack,eds., Burke'sPoliticsNew York, 1949),p. 471.
18. Burke,Reflections, p. 231. The passage begins:"To hearsome menspeak of the
late monarchyof France,youwouldimaginethattheyweretalkingofPersia;... orat least
describingthebarbarousanarchicdespotismofTurkey."Amongthosemakingthecharge
thattheAncienRegimehad beena despotismwas M. de Pont,the"veryyounggentleman
at Paris," of the prefatorypage of the Reflections.Cf. Burke, Reflectionson the
Revolution,Conor CruiseO'Brien'sintroduction, p. 14.
19. Josephde Maistre,Considerationssur la France(1797) in de Maistre,Oeuvres,p.
117. Translationsfrom The Worksof Josephde Maistre,tr. Jack Lively(New York,
1971),pp. 87-88.
20. Cited in Isaiah Berlin,Againstthe Current(New York, 1980),p. 24.
21. Josephde Maistre:Madame la Baronnede P., July1802,"in Lettreset Opuscules
vol. I (Paris, 1851),pp. 12-18.Citedand translatedbyDouglas Johnson,Guizot(London,
1963),p. 43.
22. L.A. Bonald, Theoriedu Pouvoir Politique et Religieux(1796), ed. Colette
Capitan (Paris, 1966),pp. 118-120.
23. BenjaminConstant,Oeuvres,ed. AlfredRoulin (Paris, 1957),pp. 1004-1005.
24. Constant, Principesde Politique (1819), Chapter 1, "De la Souverainetedu
Peuple," in Constant,Oeuvres,p. 1071.
25. Ibid.
26. Constant,Oeuvres,p. 1581.
27. FrancoisFuret,Penserla RivolutionFrantaise(Paris, 1978),p. 14. Perhapsthe
bestworkthataddressesthisquestionis StanleyMellon, The PoliticalUsesof History
(Stanford,1958).
28. Quest-ceque le TiersEtatwas written at theendof 1788and publishedinJanuary,
1789. Furet,Penser,p. 14n.
29. Ibid., p. 15
30. For discussionsof thisgroup,see Johnson,Guizot,pp. 32-37,41-42, 161-62;the
mostcompleteworkon the subjectknownto me is Luis Diez del Corral,Doktrindrer
Liberalismnus: Guizotund sein Kreis(Neuwied,1964).The originalSpanish versionis El
LiberalismoDoctrinario(Madrid, 1956).
31. AlfredCobban, A Historylof Modern France 3 vols. (Harmondsworth,1957-

65), vol. 2, pp. 78, 98.
32. Referencesto the Frenchtextare fromF.P.G. Guizot,Histoirede la Civilisation
en Europe depuis la Chutede L'Empire Romain 8 vols. (Paris, 1882); Englishtransla-
tionsfollowthose of WilliamHazlittin F. Guizot, The Histor.y of Civilizationfromthe
Fall of the Roman Empireto the FrenchRevolution2 vols. (New York, 1892).
33. Guizot, Histoire,vol. 1, pp. 66-67;(Guizot, History,vol. 1, pp. 61-62).
34. Ibid., p. 67; (Ibid., p. 62).
35. Ibid., pp. 70-71; (Ibid., p. 63).
36. Ibid., p. 70; (Ibid., p. 64).
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Guizot, Histoire,vol. 1, p. 73; (Guizot, History,vol. 1, p. 66).
40. Ibid., p. 255; (Ibid., p. 198).
41. Ibid., p. 401; (Ibid., p. 300).
42. Ibid., p. 406; (Ibid., p. 304).
43. Ibid., p. 109; (Ibid., p. 93).
44. Ibid.
45. Guizot,Histoiredes Originesdu Gouvernement Representatif vol. 2 (Paris, 1855)
pp. 139-140;(F. Guizot,Histori'oftheOriginof Representative Government, tr.Andrew
R. Scobie [London,1852]pp. 139-140.).
46. Guizot, Histoirede la civilisationvol. 1,p. 261; (Guizot, Historyof Civilization
vol. 1, p. 202.
47. Histoirevol. 2, Ch. XX; (Historyvol. 1, ii, 398-400.)
48. Ibid.
49. Cited in Johnson,Guizot,p. 56.
50. AlfredCobban, A Historyof Modern France,vol. 2, p. 109.
51. Guizot, De la Democratieen France(Paris, 1849),pp. 9-11.
52. De la Deimocratieen Ame'rique1, i, 261. In Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres
completes.Editiondefinitivepublieesous la directionde J. P. Mayer(2 tomes;Paris,
1951). This editionis hereaftercitedas Oeuvres(M). In accordancewiththe usage of
Tocquevillescholars,thefirsttomeof De la Democratieis citedas 1,i; thesecond,as I, ii.
All translations are by MelvinRichter.This editionreprintsTocqueville'sprefaceto the
1848 printing.It is worthcomparingto Guizot's De la D!mocratieen France.
53. Ibid., 1, i, pp. 247-48,329-30.
54. Ibid., 1, i, p. 329. The chapteris called, "The PrincipalCauses that Tend to
Maintaina DemocraticRepublicin theUnitedStates."It is thesubjectofan articleI have
written in whichI compareand contrastthethree-part distinctionmadeby Montesquieu
among lois, moeurs,and maniereswithTocqueville's two-partcontrastbetweenlois
and moeurs.See "The Uses of Theory:Tocqueville'sAdaptationof Montesquieu,"in
Essays in Theoryand HistorY,ed. MelvinRichter(Cambridge,MA, 1970),pp. 74-102,
esp. 81-83,90-91.
55. Tocqueville, Oeuvres (M), I, i, p. 330. Anotherstatement:"I considerthose
blindwho thinkitpossibleto regainthemonarchy ofHenryIV orofLouis XIV.... As for
myselfI am convincedthatsoon we shall be faced with[only one choice:] democratic
libertyof thetyranny of theCaesars." 1,i, p. 329. TocquevillecitesMontesquieuon this
pointat 1,i, p. 416, wherehe refersto Considerationssur les Causes de la Grandeurdes
Romainset de leurDecadence,ChapterXV: "Thereis no authority moreabsolutethana
ruler(prince)who succeedsa republic."
56. "Modernityand its DistinctiveThreatsto Liberty:Montesquieuand Tocqueville

on New Formsof IllegitimateDomination,"in Michael Herethand JuttaHoffken, eds.,
Alexis de Tocqueville-Zur Politikin der Demokratie(Baden-Baden,1981),pp. 76-80.
57. Tocqueville,Oeuvres(M), I, ii, p; 324.
58. Ibid., I, i, p. 6, See also 1, i, p. 248.
59. Ibid., 1, i, pp. 327, 246, 415.
60. Ibid., I, i, pp. 7-8, 326-327.
61. Ibid., 1, i, pp. 412-416.
62. Ibid., 1, i, p. 413.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 1, ii, p. 273.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., II, i, p. 72.
67. Ibid., 11,ii, pp. 269-92,301, 302-328.
68. LetterfromTocquevilleto Louis de Kergolay,December 15, 1850,Oevres(M)
XIII, ii,p. 233. Tocquevillealso discussedthisprojectwithGustavede Beaumont,VIII, ii,
p. 344.
69. Montesquieu,De l'Espritdes Loix, XIV, 13, notea.
70. Max Weber,Economyand Society,vol. 1,p. 53; Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesell-
schaft,vol. 1, pp. 28-29.
71. Ibid.
72. Montesquieu,Spiritof the Laws, 111,x, tr. by Melvin Richter,The Political
Theoryof Montesquieu(Cambridgeand New York, 1977),p. 195.
73. Burke'sPolitics,p. 328. The italicsare mine.
74. WolfgangMommsen,The Age of BureaucracY(New York, 1974),pp. 83-94.
Melvin Richteris Professorof PoliticalScience at CUNY GraduateSchool and

HunterCollege.Amonghisbooks are The PoliticsofConscience,T. H. Greenand
His Age, and The PoliticalTheoryof Montesquieu.ProfessorRichteris vice-
chairmanof theConference for theStudyof PoliticalThought,
whichhe helpedto
found. He is currently a book on thehistoryof theconceptofdespotism.
writing

Toward A Concept of Political Ilegitimacy

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Toward a Concept of Political Illegitimacy: Bonapartist Dictatorship and Democratic Legitimacy

Author(s): Melvin Richter

UENTIN SKINNER in his superb recentbook made a telling

A UTHOR'S NOTE: Thisarticlewaspreparedforpresentationat theEasternRegional

POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 10 No. 2, May 1982 185-214

York GraduateCenter,April 17, 1981. Researchfor thisarticlewas madepossible by.,

what did Bonapartistdictatorshiprest?Was it the necessaryresultof

ing or took on novel politicalsignificance. "Usurpation"had been a

Burkewas amongthefirstto combinethetheoryof legitimacy with

You have beenofuse to us all.... I knowthatthereis no Man whocalls himself

Burkelaid down the linethatwas to be takenin reactionto all the

condemningconstitution-making, and thenotionoflaw and cultureas

Traditionalismsignifiesa tendencyto clingto vegetativepatterns,to old waysof

Traditionalistways of lookingat thepoliticalworldhad, of course,

The Bourbonfamilycannotbe reachedby thechiefsof therepublic:itexists,its

For many years Maistre and the spokesmenfor the futureLouis

Royalist theoristshad always known duringtheirexile that the

Are you representativesof thepeople?I am; fourtimesI have beencalled bythe

Upon hisreturnto Franceduringthe100days,Napoleonclaimedthatit

"I returnto Francesummonedbythewishesof theentirenationto putan end to

In response,royalisttheoriststurnedthosearguments theyhad long

In theweaknessofone kindofauthority, and inthefluctuationofall,theofficers

commandsthe armyis your master;the master(thatis little)of yourking,the

Burkegave no name to such a situation,nor did he citeany previous

Whatstandsas government in Franceis struckoutat a heat.The designis wicked,

Burke's point was that the French had rashlydeposed a mild

The veryattemptsof a nationto attainitsobjectsare theProvidentialmeansof

Once again, the conclusionis that out of the people's revolutionary

Bonald reachedsimilarconclusionsabout revolutionproducingone

On the basis of Napoleon's actual record,liberaltheoristssuch as

was probablythefirsttodistinguish theregimeand policiesofNapoleon

Althoughhe was whatwould be laterknownas a liberal,Constant

The thirdcomponentof Restorationpoliticalthoughtthatled to its

(1) thatany titleof the nobilitywas meremyth

As Francois Furethas remarked,thisamountedto a reconstitution of

contractualposition of Sieyes. He did so by adoptinga theoryof

themwas entitledto a legal and politicalmonopolyof power,forall

tionassumesthatsomepublicauthority has beenmade legitimate byits

Fromthisarisesthenecessityof thelimitationofany power,whatevermaybe its

Guizot used tyranny and despotismas synonyms; bothwerewaysof

thefullextentof theirinherent Guizotidentified

This is obviously pure and unmixeddespotism,rigorouslydeduced fromthe

This Guizotidentified withtheclaimmadebytheRoman emperors,

Such a transformation it is easy for us to understand:we have witnessedit

and uneasiness; he is still followed, but reluctantly.Next he is

Guizot was perhapsthemostintelligent and high-minded minister

Afterhis fall and that of the regimehe served,Guizot retreatedinto

an assembly,group,or individual.This formof rulewas, in his eyes,

depicteddemocracyas incompatiblewithpoliticallibertyand individ-

Althoughhe feltno less antipathythandid Constantand Guizotfor

Nor was he proposingthat universalsuffrageor the grantingof

But I thinkthatifdemocraticinstitutions are not introducedgraduallyamongus

What is the connectionin Tocqueville'smind betweenlegitimate

Neithertheexerciseofpowernorthehabitof obediencedebases men.This occurs

Monarchy had once been legitimatein this sense. But society

not lie withtheold regimewhichBurkemistakenly identified

Tocqueville had Napoleon in mind when he analyzed those con-

Yet Tocqueville did not attemptto reduce Napoleon to a pre-

Buttheywereat thesame timeseekingto destroythelegitimacy ofthe

automaticobediencein stereotypedforms,on thepartofa givengroup

In despoticstates,thenatureofgovernment demandsunconditional obedience....

Stated positively,Montesquieu'stheoryis that,in a freegovernment,