Law of Torts I Life Saver!

Onimisi – fluent in silence!

Hello! Well, from the time table, it is apparent that Law of Torts is the first examination, and,
obviously, the problem a whole lot of us face with the course is the superfluous cases it is
characterized with.

So, what I will do in this Life Saver is to make some sort of summary of the cases, topic-by-topic,
to make it easier to grab.

Enjoy!

MENTAL ELEMENTS IN TORTS.

 Intention to Harm.

Case. Summary/Principle.

Wilkinson v. Intention to harm is not an essential element in tort. As far as the natural
Downton consequence of such an act is something foreseeable, whether the defendant
intended it or not is generally immaterial.
And

Guille v.
Swan

 Motive.

Case. Summary/Principle.

Bradford It is the act, not the motive for the act that must be regarded. If an act is lawful,
Corpn v. it will not become illegal simply because it is done with bad motive, likewise, if
Pickles

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 an act is unlawful, it does not become lawful simply because it is done with a
And
good motive.

Allen v.
Flood

 Malice.

Case. Summary/Principle.

Hollywood Silver Fox Proof of malice could make an action for nuisance stronger and
Farm Ltd v Emmett. destroy some defences that may be available to the defendant.

And

Christie v Davey

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TORTS AND OTHER RELATED AREAS OF LAW.

Torts and Criminal Law.

 Codification: Fagbemi v Aoko, nothing is a crime if there is no written law enforceable

within the jurisdiction it is committed, making it a crime and the punishment prescribed
thereof.
 Standard of Proof: Woolmington v DPP and Bakare v. State, presumption of innocence,
until the elements of the offence have been established against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Akosa v COP, distinction between legal burden and evidential burden.
 Overlap of a Civil Case and a Criminal Case: Smith v Selwyn, if the criminal case is
felony, the civil case cannot commence until the criminal case is over or a reasonable
excuse has been shown for his not having been prosecuted. This principle in Smith v
Selwyn was abolished by the Supreme Court, per Niki Tobi, in the case of Veritas
Insurance Co Ltd v. Citi Trust Investment Ltd.

THE PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY.

 Damnum Sine Injuria: Bradford Corprn v Pickles, and Allen v. Flood.

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  Injuria Sine Damno:
o In the case of Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co Ltd, it was held that, “if the defendant places
a part of his foot on the plaintiff’s land unlawfully, it is in law as much a trespass
as if he had walked half a mile on it.”
o In Bello v A.G. Oyo State, because Nasiru’s right to appeal a decision was taken
from him by his premature execution, his heirs were entitled to claim under torts.
o In Ashby v White, a person who has a legal right to vote for a candidate of his
choice was deprived of that right. No physical damage, but there was a legal wrong,
hence, tortious liability arose.

GENERAL DEFENCES TO TORTIOUS LIABILITY.

 Volenti non fit injuria:

Generally, there are three requirements to establish the defence of volenti:

 Voluntariness: This was the basis of the decision in the cases of ICI v Shatwell and
Kirkham v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester.
 Agreement: The question in Dann v Hamilton was whether a plaintiff who accepted a lift
from a drunk driver who was obviously inebriated could be taken to have assumed the risk
of injury. It was held that volenti did not apply, unless the drunkenness was so extreme and
so glaring that accepting lift was equivalent to ‘walking on the edge of an unfenced cliff’.
In Pitts v Hunt, the agreement between the claimant and the defendant was established by
evidence that the claimant had, in fact, encouraged the defendant to speed up, despite the
two of them being drunk.
 Knowledge and Acceptance of Risk: In Smith v Baker and Sons, it was held that having
mere knowledge that there is a crane swinging over one’s head does not mean that there
has been a corresponding acceptance of the risk of the crane falling on one’s head. In Dare
v Fagbamilla and Ikomi v. Cole, the court held that mere knowledge without a
corresponding acceptance of risk is not enough.

Does the Defence of Volenti Apply to Rescue Cases?

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No, it does not apply to rescue cases if there is a real risk, as held in the cases of Chadwick v
British Railways Board and Haynes v Harwood.

It, however, applies to rescue cases if there is no real risk of harm or danger prior to the rescue act,
as held in Cutler v United Dairies (London) Ltd.

When is Consent Said to be Valid?

For consent to be valid, it must be given freely without any form of vitiating element, and it may
be exercised orally, by conduct (active or passive). This conduct may manifest apparent, willing
or consenting to wilful harm or accidental harm, like participating in sports, as decided in Condon
v Basi.

In Hegarty v Shine, it was held that mere concealment of facts is not considered to be a fraud so
as to vitiate consent.

 Contributory Negligence.

Does the Defence Operate to Absolutely Exclude Liability or to Merely Limit Liability?

The initial position at common law was that if the court finds that the plaintiff is partially to be
blamed for his attendant injuries, he receives nothing at all, as held in Butterfield v Forrester.

The modern position is that the defence is no longer a total defence, rather, a claimant will have
his damage reduced by the court in proportion to his fault, as held in the cases of Standard
Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corpn, and Platform Home Loans Ltd v
Oyston Shipways Ltd.

Cases of Contributory Negligence.

1. Reeves v Metropolitan Commissioner: Intentionally harming yourself in an instance

where the defendant has the duty of care to prevent you from harm can be contributory
negligence;
2. O’Connell v Jackson: The failure of a motorcyclist to wear a crash helmet is contributory
negligence;

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 3. Capps v Miller: The failure of a motorcyclist to fasten the chin strap of a crash helmet is
contributory negligence;
4. Owens v Brimmell: Accepting a lift in a car, knowing that the driver is drunk is
contributory negligence;
5. Donelan v Donelan: Asking a much younger inexperienced driver to drive a car when the
driver has never driven a powerful, automatic car before is contributory negligence;
6. Froom v Butcher: Not wearing a seat belt is contributory negligence;
7. Fitzgerald v Lane: Crossing a pelican crossing when the pedestrian light is red is
contributory negligence;
8. Revill v Newbery: Injured while trespassing as a result of criminal activities could be
contributory negligence.

The defence will not be available to the defendant if it is established that he has the last opportunity
to prevent the damage from happening, even though the plaintiff had been negligent, as held in
Davies v Mann.

 Ex Turpi Causa non Oritur Actio.

It was held in Ashton v Turner that one participant in a burglary could not succeed against his
fellow participant who crashed the car while driving away at high speed from the scene of the
crime. The earlier case of Pitts v Hunt is also relevant to this effect.

In Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police, the court held that getting injured
while escaping arrest is a case of ex turpi.

TRESPASS TO THE PERSON.

Which should be the Mental Element in a Tort of Trespass: Intention or Negligence?

Initially, as held in Stanley v. Powell and Fowler v. Lanning, trespass to the person is not
actionable in the absence of intention or negligence.

However, the current position, as held in Letang v. Cooper; Wilson v. Pringle, and Igbal v.
Prison Officers Association, is, where the act causing the damage is intentional, the correct cause
of action is trespass, but where the act is negligent the cause of action is in negligence.

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In Igbal v. Prison Officers Association, the Court of Appeal held that intention in trespass to
person also includes recklessness.

In Stanley v Powell, the defendant was a member of a shooting party who were hunting game.
The defendant fired his gun and a pellet hit a tree and bounced off into the eye of the beater who
was employed to drive birds to the shooting party. The court held that in the absence of intention
or negligence, the defendant was not liable to the plaintiff for battery.

 Assault.

R v St. George: There is an assault when an unloaded/toy gun is pointed at the claimant, if the
claimant does not know same to be unloaded/toy.

Innes v Wylie: A police officer standing motionless to block a doorway cannot be said to have
been liable for assault.

Smith v Supt of Woking Police Station: Looking through a person’s window late at night could
amount to an assault.

R v Barrett: Shaking of fist and advancing towards a person could amount to assault. This is still
assault even in an instance where a third party stops the defendant from hitting the claimant, as
held in Stephen v Myers.

Read v Coker, and Ansell v Thomas: An order coupled with a threat could be an assault.

Janvier v Sweeney: Mere words made through a phonecall that the claimant was wanted for
corresponding with her fiancé was held to amount to an assault.

R v Wilson: The mere words “get out knives” amounted to assault.

R v Ireland & Burston: Even silence could amount to assault, depending on the nature and
circumstance.

Tuberville v Savage: Words may negative what would have otherwise been an assault: “if it were
not assize time, I would not take such words from you.”

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Brady v Schatzel: In an action for assault, evidence that the claimant was not scared at all during
the time of the act is immaterial if it can be established that such an act (in this case, pointing a
loaded gun at the claimant) could make a reasonable person scared.

Thomas v National Union of Mine Workers: A threat that is obviously impossible of being
carried out cannot amount to assault.

 Battery.

Donnelly v Jackman: A policeman tapping a person’s shoulder in order to get his attention is a
socially acceptable contact, hence, non-actionable under battery.

Wilson v Pringle: The defendant’s act cannot be termed socially acceptable, as it was a hostile
act, since the claimant whose school bag he snatched was injured.

Livingstone v Minister of Defence: If the defendant intended to contact someone else other than
the claimant, but ended up contacting the claimant, battery could still be claimed.

R v Lynsey: Spitting on a person’s face, and throwing stone at a person is battery.

Lawal v DSP: Setting a dog to attack a person is battery.

Scott v. Shepherd: The chain of A’s causation in battery is not broken if the actions of B and C
are reasonable actions aimed at averting the danger from them.

Collins v Wilcock: Grabbing a claimant’s hand and detaining her without an arrest warrant, or
without being on duty, is battery.

Pursell v Horn: Throwing water at someone is battery.

Nash v. Sheen: Giving a different product other than the one ordered could amount to battery if
the wrong product given causes damage to the body of the claimant.

R v Day: Slitting the claimant’s clothe with a knife is assault.

Letang v Cooper: The least touching of another in anger is battery.

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  False Imprisonment.

Federal Ministry of Health v. Dascon Nigeria Ltd and Musa Namatazo v. Wright: Definition
of false imprisonment.

Dumbell v Roberts: Arresting a person without warrant or not carrying out the conditions
precedent to an arrest is false imprisonment, even if it was a detention by the security guard of a
supermarket (John Lewis & Co. Ltd v Timms).

Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd & Anor v Ajagu: Locking the door of a place (bank in this case)
while the claimant is inside, preventing him/her from leaving when he/she wishes to, is false
imprisonment.

Musa Namatazo v. Wright: One could be falsely imprisoned in an open field, not necessarily in
a four-walled environment.

Burton v Davies: Driving a motor vehicle past, and preventing a passenger from alighting at his,
destination is false imprisonment.

Onitiri v Ojomo: Judges and Magistrates acting in a purely judicial capacity cannot be liable for
false imprisonment.

Bird v Jones: For there to be false imprisonment, there must be total restraint without any
reasonable means of escape.

Warner v Riddiford: It is false imprisonment to deny a person the facility to leave a place without
lawful justification. In this case, where the claimant kept his belongings was locked, and he could
not take them and leave.

Herd v Weardale Steel, Coal & Coke Co.: It is not false imprisonment if a worker is denied
facility out of a place in an instance he has not completed his shift and does not wish to complete
same.

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Meering v Graham White Aviation Co. Ltd.: Knowledge by the plaintiff of false imprisonment
is immaterial. Even locking a door against an unconscious plaintiff is false imprisonment if he is
informed of the fact when he is awake.

Imam v Borno Native Authority: Restraint for the shortest period of time is false imprisonment
– no time limit.

Aigoro v Anebunwa: Contact and use of force is not necessary to establish false imprisonment.
Here, the policeman simply asked the claimant to follow him to the station, without using any
physical force. It amounted to false imprisonment as the claimant was not doing what he wanted
to do at that point in time.

Clarke v Davis: The policemen invited the claimant to come with them to the station, but they
assured him that he was free to decide not to come with them. Held: no false imprisonment.

Genner v Sparkes and Russen v Lucas: Mere words in the absence of any other act does not
amount to false imprisonment.

May Allah see us through!

Onimisi – fluent in silence!

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