Concepts of Equity, Fairness and Justice in Geographical Studies

Author(s): Alan M. Hay

Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1995), pp. 500-508
Published by: The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers)
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500

Concepts of equity,fairnessand justice in

geographical studies
Alan M Hay

Notions of equity,fairnessand justicefrequently appear in geographicalwriting.It

may be arguedthateightdistinctconceptsunderliethisusage, all of whichare
relevantto the studyof geographicaldistributions. Such applicationsintroduce
complicationsin termsof measurement (due to problemsof geographical
unitsand ecologicalcorrelations).
data-collection The commongeographical
operationalization justiceand minimumstandardscan
of spatialequality,territorial
be relatedto the underlying concepts.Differences in the use of the conceptsmay also
be an elementin regionaldescriptionand comparison.

key words equity fairness justice spatialequality territorial

justice

CanterburyChristChurchCollege, CanterburyCTI 1QU

revisedmanuscriptreceived 18 August 1994

The geographicalliterature makescontinuingrefer- foundation ofsocialjustice(see also Smith1995) but

ence to the conceptsof equity,fairnessand justice the mostfrequentreference of thissortis to Rawls
(EFJ)withtitleslikeSocialjusticeand thecity(Harvey (1971) who, in his Theoryofjustice,offeredsuch a
1973), Unfairlystructured cities(Badcock1984), Geog- broaderconceptualization when,accordingto Barry
raphy,inequality and society(Smith1987) and, most (1990, lxx), he:
recently,Geography and socialjustice(Smith1994).
The continuingreferenceto such conceptsreflects raisedthestakesinpolitical philosophy to quitea new
a persistent and, according to Smith (1994), level ... with a theory of the human good, a moral
that differences psychology, a theoryofthesubjectmatter (the 'basic
re-awakening concern geographical
structureof society')and the objects(the 'primary
and inequalitiesare in some sense inequitable,unfair
goods') of justice,and ... an elaboratestructure of
and unjust, and that policies and programmes in favourof a specific set of principlesof
argument
shouldbe judged on theextentto whichtheyserve justice.
to eliminateor at least reduce(ratherthanincrease
or create)such inequities. More recently,some geographicalwritinghas
Despite thiscontinuinginterest,thereremainsa followeda
postmodemrn approachto EFJin which
considerableuneasinessabout the underlyingcon-
justice is seen as a culturalor social product
cepts.Some ofthisuneasearisesfromtheview' that arising from within a particularsocio-cultural
issues of distributionalequity and fairness,and
grouping,even where the words and termsused
especiallyissuesof 'spatialequity',are second-order are shared with other groups possessing distinc-
questionswhichcan be tackledonly withina much tive of those terms.Such a relativ-
interpretations
wider analysisof society and space. Some recent ist stancecauses unease to some because it seems
geographicalwritinghas attemptedto circumvent to threaten:
this problemby adopting a universaliststance in
whichone overarchingtheoreticalpositionis used totaldeconstruction of the notionof justiceto the
to deriveand definetheconcept(or concepts)ofEFJ pointwhereit meansnothingwhatsoever, except
whichare employed.So, forexample,Smith(1994, whateverpeople at some particular momentdecide
284) identifies'some formof egalitarianism' as a theywantit to mean.(Harvey1992,595)
TransInstBr GeogrNS 20 500-508 1995
ISSN 0020-2754 ? Royal GeographicalSociety (withthe Instituteof BritishGeographers)1995

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 fairness
Equity, andjustice 501
But manywould agree thatalthough Eight key concepts

justiceand rationality take on different meanings There is a very large literature on the conceptsof
acrossspace,timeand persons,yet theexistenceof equity, fairnessand justice in the disciplinesof
everyday meanings to whichpeopledo attachimpor- philosophy,politicaltheoryand law - a literature
tance... givesthe termsa politicaland mobilizing whichhas expanded greatlyin the last threedec-
powerthancanneverbe neglected. (ibid.,598) ades (see Barry1990). In thissection,whichdraws
on the work of Barry(1990), Miller (1976) and
The purpose of this paper is to seek a middle Campbell(1973), an attemptis made to distilthis
groundin whichsome key conceptsof justiceand literature by identifying eightkeyconcepts.A fuller
equity are identifiedalong with the types of geo- definition of most of the conceptsand the sources
graphicalcontextand discoursewithinwhichthey used appearsin Trinderet al. 1991.
arise.It is therefore similarto the taskproposedby Procedural fairnessis definedas the proper ad-
Pirie(1983) and describedby Barry(1990, lxx) as herenceto therulesrelevantto a procedureand,by
extension,as the correctapplication(and thus the
trying to captureas accuratelyas possiblethevarieties uniform application)of suchrulesto all cases which
ofusagefoundin actualarguments aboutinstitutionsare alike withinthe termsof the rules in a way
andpolicies.Thisseems .. to be a taskof enduring whichis consistent, non-arbitrary and even-handed
utility. (Barry 1990; Campbell 1973). Proceduralfairness
therefore requiresthe existenceof rules(formalor
In pursuingsuch an objective,thispaper implicitly informal, explicitor implicit)whichare consistently
subscribesto a positionof contextual-value plural- applied to all individuals.There is also an impli-
ism which allows that theremay be a varietyof cation of consistency over time and space:
principlesof equity,fairnessand justice held and thatindividualswhose cases are treatedtoday will
appliedindependently but whichare oftenbrought be treated in the same way as those whose
togetherin a particularcontextby devices such as cases were treatedyesterday;and that individuals
orderingand prioritizing (e.g. Rawls 1971) or trade- whose cases are determined herewill be treatedin
off.It also impliestwo possibilities.The firstis that the same way as thosewhose cases are determined
convergencewill occur:conceptsof fairnessarising elsewhere.It therefore linksclosely to the second
fromquite different foundationsand contextsmay concept.
neverthelessappear closely similar(examplesmay Justice,as thefulfilment of legitimateexpectations,
be foundin Walzer 1983). Secondly,it is possible is closelyrelatedto butratherwiderthanprocedural
thatotherethicalvalues may also be relevantin a fairness.It argues thatpeople make decisionsand
particular contextand theytoo maybe incorporated performactions on the basis of reasonable ex-
in therankingor tradinginvolvedin specificpolicy pectationsand thatany arbitrarily imposedchanges
decisions.The positionof value pluralismis opera- in the conditionsor rules on which those ex-
tionalizedin therestof thispaperby theuse of the pectationswere based would be unjust or unfair
acronym EFJ to indicate a cluster of meanings (Campbell1973). There is no necessaryelementof
associated with equity, fairnessand justice in- interpersonal comparisonin thisconcept(itcouldbe
dependentlyof the exact word used or the exact deemed unjusteven if all individualswere to have
conceptsidentified in any specificcase. It mightbe theirexpectationsdenied or if no individualshad
arguedthatsuchan acronymis unhelpful because it previouslyhad theirexpectationsfulfilled).
obscures'real' differences betweenthe threewords. Formalequality(it is sometimesplaced in slightly
However, consulting standard dictionariesand wider categoryunderthe titleof substantivefair-
thesaurimakesit clear thatat the level of common ness) extendsthe conceptof EFJby requiringthat
usage thereis so muchoverlapthatany attemptto like benefits(or burdens)are enjoyed (or suffered)
differentiate the words in isolationis problematic. by like persons. It differsfrom the concept of
For example,TheconciseOxforddictionary ofcurrent proceduralfairnessin that rulesthemselvesmay
English(Sykes 1982) records the followingdefi- be subjectto criticism on,the
thisbasis and it may be
nitions:'Equity ... fairness;recourseto principles concluded that certainrules, however fairlyand
of justice' (p. 326) and 'Fair ... just, unbiased, consistently applied,are nevertheless unjustbecause
equitable'(p. 347). theyresultin disproportionate benefitsor burdens.

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502 AlanM Hay
On the otherhand,formalequalitydoes not neces- net outcomes distances this concept from any
sarilyhave an egalitarianimplication: thatwould be considerationof substantiveequality:
contingenton the principlesused to identifylike-
ness (Weale 1978). Formalequalityin thissense has we cannotsimply ineither
observeinequality incomes
receivedvery wide attentionin the UnitedStates' or utilities judge,on the basis of that
and thereby
alone,whether
inequality thedistribution
is inequitable
literatureon local government finance,oftenappear- or not.(Le Grand1991,66)
ing under the title of fiscal equity (see Bennett
1980). It is particularly adopted by those public- In a geographiccontextitwouldrequirethatstudies
choice theoristswho argue thatlocal tax systems
ofEFJlook behindspatialdistributions to thechoice
should 'reflectbenefits received by taxpayers' sets,constraintsand information fieldsfromwhich
(Hepple 1989, 388), althoughthatconcernis based theyarise.
moreon theargumentthatsuchtransparent pricing These fiveconceptsare ratherdifferent fromthe
will help to ensurerationalpublic choice than on
finalthree.Desertis quiteoftenused in theallocation
normativeethicalconsiderations of EFJ(see Mueller
of 'rewards' and 'punishments'.Positively,some
1989). Finally,it may be noted thatformalequality
people mightbe allowed to receivedisproportion-
is effectivelysynonymouswiththe conceptknown ate benefitbecause they are people of particular
in economicsas horizontalequity.
merit,while negatively,theremay be otherswho
Substantive equalitytakes the argumentone step lack such qualities (or indeed have undesirable
further, in that it sees equality of outcomes (net
qualities)who arejustlyasked to pay thepenaltyof
aggregatesof burdensand benefits)as the touch- a disproportionate burden(Sterba1974). Secondly,
stone of fairness(Dworkin1981). It therefore per- may be used in the sense thatEFJ
the idea of rights
mits the breachof formalequalityand procedural is upheld where individualsreceive theirentitle-
fairnessif the net outcome is more equal (less ments.Such rightsmay be defined(e.g. Hohfeld
unequal)thanwould otherwisehave been the case. 1923) either as liberty rights (the absence of
It is the clearestjustification
forpositive discrimi- encroachmenton personal freedoms)or as claim
nationpoliciesbut is also the most difficult formu- of rightsto health
rights(the positive affirmation
lationto defend(see Flew 1987). The difficultiesare
care,education,etc.).Althoughrightsconstitutean
threefold:first,inequalitiesin physical quantities
importantelementin a numberof accounts(Rawls
receivedmaybe theconsequencesof theexerciseof
(1971) uses liberty rights; Clark (1982) uses
choiceby individuals(see,forexample,Clark1983);
propertyrights),theyare not oftenused as thebasic
secondly,equality in physical quantitiesreceived argumentbecause
may neverthelessresultin unequalutilitiesbecause
different individualshave differentutilityfunctions; theyaredemandsthemselves, of
and thejustification
thirdly,as Young (1991, 18) argues, the empha- ineachcase (Barry
thedemandhasto be forthcoming
sis on distributionsimplicitlyassumes a static 1990,Iv-Ivi)
conceptionof society,whichtendsto
and because they can be shown to be socially
ignore,at the sametimethatit oftenpresupposes, determined(see Clark(1982)).
the institutionalcontextthat determinesmaterial The last concept is need:the view that certain
distributions. needs are so basic thatfailureto meet themis an
because things
injustice.It is, however,problematic
of theseissueswhichlies are most oftenneeded as a meansto an end (not as
It is partlya consideration
behind a recentformulation by Le Grand (1991, ends in themselves)and thereforeneeds must be
87), who argues thatequityis achievedif a distri- justifiedin termsof theequityor fairnessof theend
butionresultsfrom'informedindividualschoosing states(whichbringsthe argumentback to substan-
over equal choice sets'. For conveniencethis will tive equality).The empiricalstatusof need is also
be referredto as equal choice.It has some points problematicbecause the identification of needs
of similaritywith other theories: for example, appears to be highlydependentupon the position
Dworkin's(1981) emphasison equalityofresources of thosemakingthe identification (Bradshaw1972).
involves freedomof choice in the utilizationof As a result,some authorsspecifythe needs quite
those resources(see Clark 1983). On the other narrowly(those which must be met to secure
hand, its emphasis on pre-conditionsratherthan continued physical existence, for example) but

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 fairness
Equity, andjustice 503
othersdefinethembroadlyas anythingrequiredif no geographic space or differentiation between
an individualis to participatefullyin societyor in places.
thenormalopportunity range(Daniels 1985; Doyal These two argumentshave an implicationwhich
and Gough 1991). needs to be explored.Althoughall eight EFJcon-
In lookingat theseeightconcepts,it is usefulto cepts are geographicalin sense (i), because of (ii)
note fouradditionalpoints.First,equityor fairness injusticeso definedwill not necessarilyresultin
is not the only, or even the principal,moral or evidently unjust or even unequal spatial distri-
ethicalstandard(Lucas 1980). It can be argued,for butions.For example,a regionmay have gross and
example,that the value of humanlife,the preser- unjustinterpersonal or interhousehold income dif-
vation of a plant species or the preservationof a ferentialsbut if the proportionsin each income
beautifullandscapeare all ethicalissuesbut not EFJ categoryare identicalin all sub-regionsand at all
issues. Secondly, as a number of authors have scales there will be no spatial evidence of that
argued (e.g. Pirie 1983; Miller 1976), thereis no inequality.This should not, of course,exclude the
requirement to select fromthis list a single over- examinationof suchinjusticefroma fullgeographi-
archingprinciple: indeed,as Walzer(1983) suggests, cal descriptionand analysisof the characterof that
a pluralityof conceptsmay well be moreappropri- region.The keypointis thatspatialuniformity may
ate to a descriptivestudyof how generalEFJissues be observed even where therehave been serious
become apparent in particularcontexts.Thirdly, breachesof EFJ.Nevertheless, it is usefulto identify
theremay be situationsin whichmore thanone of themoredirectspatialrelevanceofeach of thethree
the conceptsis used in conjunction.For example,at concepts.
a conceptuallevel,Harvey's(1973, 116) encapsula- The idea of proceduralfairnessappears to have
tionof Rawlsiantheoryas 'a just distribution justly limitedgeographicalapplications.It does, however,
achieved'seemsto combineboth substantiveequal- arisein some circumstances. If thoseresponsiblefor
ity and formal equality (or perhaps procedural the applicationof rules (magistratesand judges
fairness).A specifichistoricalexample occurs in determining sentences,doctors deciding on treat-
the case of land rightsin Australasiaand North mentpriorities, etc.) allow prejudiceforor against
America. Here, some land rights were formally those living in a certainarea to affectdecisions,
recognizedby colonialpowersin treatiesand agree- they are clearlyin breach of proceduralfairness.
mentswhichtherebyestablishedexpectations(Cant Althoughtheymayseek to justifytheirdecisions,if
and Pawson 1992). Finally,it shouldbe noted that challenged,on the groundsthat location of resi-
thereis no directcorrespondence betweentheeight dence makesthecases unlike,sucha defencewould
conceptsand the threeterms:equity,fairnessand not be valid unless the rules specificallygave
justice.It is forthisreason thatthe threetermsare groundsforsuch differentiation. Thereis, however,
used interchangeably in thispaperor are referred to anothercase. On a largergeographicalscale,admin-
collectivelyby the acronymEFJ. istrationis necessarily sub-divided into spatial
withineach of whicha separateset of
jurisdictions
decision-makers or courtsinterprets therules.There
The geographical contextualizationof
is widespreadevidence (e.g. Blomley 1985, 1988)
eight EFJconcepts that the same rules are interpreted differentlyin
The eight conceptsintroducedin the firstsection different jurisdictions:so the requirementthat all
can now be examinedto see how theymayrelateto individualsbe treatedin the same way is breached.
geographical studies. First,however, it may be It shouldbe noted thatthe emphasishereis on the
noted that: (i) all these concepts are, in a trivial consistencynot the 'correctness'with which the
sense,geographical;and (ii) none of theseconcepts rules are applied across geographicspace and that
is essentiallygeographical.Argument(i) is based on the inconsistencywhich occurs may be either
the fact that all individualsor groups benefiting accidentalor intentional.
from(or suffering under)a particular
formof justice The idea of expectationsmay have geographical
(injustice)are residentat geographicallocations,a applicationin a similarway. Iftherulesrelatingto a
point well illustratedin the case studiespresented particulararea are changedin an arbitrary manner,
by Smith(1994). On the otherhand,argument(ii) thenall those in thatarea may suffer fromchanged
applies because each of the eight concepts could expectations.For example, if planningzones are
be definedin-animaginaryworldin whichthereis abruptlyre-defined, expectationsof peace and quiet

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504 Alan M Hay

may be sacrificedin one area or expectationsof geographicalparallelto thisformof justiceis that

being allowed to develop land or buildingsmay be this objective is achieved at all geographicallo-
sacrificedin another. cations:injusticeoccursifthisis not achieved.A less
The geographicalapplicationofformalequalityis rigiddefinition of theneed criterionacceptsthatnot
relevantwhen rules explicitly(or implicitly)dis- all needs will be met in fulland sees injusticeas
criminate betweenindividualssolelyon thebasis of arisingbecause of the differing degree to which
geographicallocation. Suppose, for example,that needs are met fromone location to another:the
the legal framework in planningonly allows those absolutecriterion thusbecomesrelativeand,as will
withina specificadministrative area to be repre- be seen below,moves towardsa conceptof formal
sentedat a planninginquiry:in such a case, those equality.
who had legitimateinterestin the case but were Le Grand's(1991) definitionof equityin termsof
excludedsolely on groundsof locationwould not equal choice sets can be given a geographical
be treatedwith formalequality.Similarly, if those formulation as follows:equitywillbe achievedifall
who live in a particulararea are excluded from membersof a population,regardlessof wherethey
compensationsolely on groundsof location,that live, have the same choice sets. This formulation
would breach formalequality.It is less clear that would presumablycover both the amountof pro-
formalequality is breachedin such a case if the vision and the uniformity of barriers(across race,
exclusionof particularareas is implicitratherthan class,income,gender,etc.) whichmightbe seen as
explicit.For example,many formsof social pro- limiting thechoiceset.Thereis,however,a problem
vision (transportnetworks,mains drainage,flood which is posed by Le Grand's own treatmentof
protection)may be beneficialto only limitedgeo- local governmentincomeand expenditure: at what
graphicalareas but are oftenfundedby taxationof level of aggregationshould the freechoice occur?
all residentsin a broaderregion(Dignan 1983). If a local governmentfreelychooses a particular
Substantiveequalityappears to be the concept patternof provision(froma set whichis equal to
most easily placed in a geographicalcontext: it thatavailableto otherlocal governments), theresult
simplystates thatdifferences betweenlocationsin is equitablebetweenlocal governments but by that
the net aggregates of burdens and benefitsare choice a local governmentmay constrain the
substantiveinequalitiesand as suchshouldbe elimi- choicesof itspopulationso thattheirchoicesetsare
nated(or at leastminimized). Individualpoliciesand more restricted thanthose of populationsin differ-
proceduresare judged solelyon theextentto which ent jurisdictions.At this point Le Grand's argu-
theymove the situationin thatdirection.It is also ments seem to converge on Buchanan's (1965)
usefulto note that such an objective is implicitly theory of clubs and on Buchanan and Tullock's
scale-free:theminimization of inequalitiesshouldbe (1969) calculusof consent.Thereis also a linkwith
evidentat all geographicalscales. Tiebout's (1956) argumentthat equalitymightbe
The geographicalapplicationof desertis more achievedifindividualsor householdshave freedom
problematic. This is mainlybecause the conceptof to choose withinwhichlocal governmentjurisdic-
desertis so closelyrelatedto themeritsor demerits tion (offering a particularbundle of public goods)
of individualsthat it is difficultto argue that they will live, though,as Clark (1983) shows, for
geographicalareas (or those who live withinthem many people there is little evidence that such
as a category)deserve speciallyfavourableor un- freedomsexist.
favourabletreatment (unlessthatis justified in terms
of some otherEFJprinciple).Similarly, it is difficult
to see a situationin which rightsare infringed
Complications in the spatial application of
EFJ concepts
simplyon the basis of geographicalcircumstances,
of
although particularinfringements rights will There are, however, some additional problems
often have implicit geographical or locational which arise when EFJ concepts are applied to
aspects and the issue of land rightsmakes the provisionwhichis made in geographicspace. Some
connectionexplicit(Cant and Pawson 1992). of these problemshave been alluded to in earlier
The conceptof need has muchwidergeographi- sections and have been examined in a similar
cal relevance but is also problematic.The strict contextby otherauthors(e.g. Bennett1980) but as
definitionof justice in this case requiresthat the they affectmore than one EFJconcept they are
identifiedneeds are met in their entirety.The examinedseparatelybelow.

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 fairness
Equity, andjustice 505
The firstproblemconcernsaccessacrossspace.This The thirdproblemhas a slightlydifferent form:it
problem arises wheneveran activityoccurs at a is oftenargued thatthe presenceof a good match
point but relates in some sense to a spatially betweenthe distribution of a clientpopulationand
dispersedpopulation (e.g. Curtis1989; Knox 1982). some element of provision may be misleadingdue
However,it is moreacuteifthegeographicalextent to the problemsof ecological correlation(Boyne
of a populationis large and is therefore most acute and Powell 1991; Hoggart 1981). For example,the
in areas of low populationdensitywith provision presenceof a high level of medicalprovisionin a
made in large units (due to economies of scale, regionwithlarge numbersof elderlypeople is not
etc.).At leastfiveof theEFJconcepts evidencethattherequirements
indivisibilities, ofEFJare beingmet
are affectedin this way: proceduralfairnesswhich because there is no guarantee that the medical
guaranteesall individualsequal access to a pro- provisionis appropriateand availableto theelderly
cedure (for example, planning inquiry or court people. WhetherEFJis viewed as formalequality,
hearing)will failif the costs of access across space substantiveequalityor the meetingof needs, the
bear more heavilyon some individuals(or groups) evidence of EFJis uncertain,an uncertainty which
thanon others;formalequalityofprovisionor equal may be resolved only by muchmore exact speci-
choice may both be negated by inequalityof ficationof boththeneeds (on theone hand)and the
mobility and thus access; the extent to which formof provision(on the other).
substantiveequality is achieved will similarlybe
constrainedby access difficulties; and the degreeto
whichneed is metis partlya functionof how easily
The operationalizationof EFJin
individualscan access the facility-making provision
for thatneed. The conclusionmustbe thatunless geography
provisionincludessome elementof compensation The precedingdiscussionhelps to clarifysome of
forthetimeand monetarycosts of travel,inequality the problemswhichgeographershave encountered
and some elementof unfairness is inescapable,and in their conceptualizationof EFJ in a spatial or
those who seek to achieve greaterEFJcan at best territorial context:spatialequality,territorialjustice
seek to minimizesuch inequalities.This has, for and minimumstandards.
example,been used to justifysmallerconstituency Spatialinequality (or its counterpart spatialequal-
populations in areas of low population density ity)appearsin most studiesto combineelementsof
(Johnston 1979). On the otherhand,it mustalso be equal choice,formalequalityand substantiveequal-
recognizedthat,while some individualsand house- ity (e.g. Smith 1987). Where spatial equality is
holdsare lockedintoremotelocations,theremaybe concernedwith the allocationof resourcesor pro-
others who have freelychosen such locations as visionor tax burdens,thecentralEFJconcernis the
partof a privilegedlifestyle and,as Le Grand(1991) fact that the population of territory X does not
stresses,are not self-evidentlyentitledto equalityof receiveas much(or is requiredto contribute more)
access. The secondproblemis closelyrelatedto the per head thanthe populationof territory Y: thisis
first:even where provisionis well-matchedto the clearlyan example of formalinequality(or if it is
populationin termsof formalequality,substantive due to some inconsistency in theapplicationofrules
equality or need, the collection of statisticsfor it mightbe seen as proceduralunfairness). If,on the
arbitrarilysized and shaped geographicalunitswill other hand, spatial equalityrefersto an outcome
oftenresult in apparentinequalitiesin provision. (e.g. life expectancyor participationin education
Suchinequalitieswillhave realimplications ifpeople aftertheage of sixteen)it can be based only on the
are preventedfromcrossingboundaries(as with conceptof substantiveequality.More importantly,
pure local goods) but if such boundarycrossingis because geographicalconceptsof spatialinequality
permitted,the apparentinequalitiesmay be much depend so much on the concept of substantive
greaterthanthe real inequalities.Such an exagger- (in)equalitytheyare open to the criticisms already
ationwillbe greatestwhenunitsof provisionserve identified.So Bennett (1989, 279) criticizesthe
populationswitha largespatialextentand whenthe moralistand Christianbases of welfarismin geog-
accountingunitsare spatiallysmall.GIS and similar raphyon the groundsthattheyseem to 'throwup
methodscan be used to identify theextentto which concernforinequalitiesofwhateverform',although
such apparentinequalitiesare merelyan artefactof this is arguably a misreadingof the Christian
the unitsand boundariesused. conceptsof economicjustice(Hay 1989).

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506 AlanM Hay
Territorial
justiceis a similaramalgamationof is thatit refersto thelevel of provisionavailableto
the threeEFJconcepts:need, formalequalityand individualsand is therefore less dependentupon the
substantive
equality.In one of thekeyreferences
on use of aggregatesforarbitrarily definedgeographi-
the concept,Davies (1968, 16) wrote: cal units.Furthermore, it can be operationalized in a
formwhichallows the establishment of a hierarchy
intheservices forwhichthemostapparent appropriate of standardsto be used to identifythe depth(not
distribution betweenindividuals
is 'to eachaccording just the spatialextent)of unmetneed and therefore
to hisneed'themostappropriate distributionbetween to establishpriorities forintervention. The minimum
areasmustbe 'to eachaccording to theneedsof the standards
approach might also be linked to Le
population ofthatarea'we cancallthelatter territorialGrand's
(1991) concept of equal choice: that the
justice.
level of minimumprovisionshouldbe sufficient to
ensurethatall individualshave the same minimum
Fromthisquotationand the literature on territorial choice sets if only for a range of services (e.g.
justice (excellently summarizedby Boyne and health) which provide for the meeting of basic
Powell 1991) it is clear that, although need is needs.
referredto, it is used as part of the argumentof It will,however,be clearfromearlierpartsof this
proportionality and,in mostapplications, it is speci- paper thatthereare otherpossible formsin which
fied very generallyby referenceto demographic the eight conceptsmay be operationalizedin free-
indicators- not in termsof specifiedneeds which standingor hybridform.It would be particularly
mustbe metifinjusticeis to be eliminated. Further- interestingto see Le Grand's concepts of equal
more,Davies' (1968) use of the words 'according choice appliedin geographicalcase studies.
to', operationalizedin the use of correlationand
regressiontechniquesby laterauthors(see Boyne
and Powell 1991), introducesthe concept that The use of EFJin geographical description
provision should be proportionateto need. It and comparison
impliesformalequalitybetweenall thosewho have
There is another applicationof EFJ concepts in
that need (they have equal chances of receiving
whichgoes beyondtheanalysis
provision)butit is not a commitment to substantive geographicalstudy
of spatial distributions. It can be argued that the
equalityfor the populationsfromwhich they are
concepts of EFJprevailingin a countryor a region
drawn.Thereare,however,two specialcases to be
are themselvespartof the geographyof thatplace
noted. First,if the allocationof provisionin every
of an invisiblelandscape)or at least an
territory to meetcertainspecifiedneeds, (albeitpart
is sufficient
important formative influence on the geographyof
it will meet the proportionality criterion impliedin
of territorial
thatplace.This approachis exemplified by thework
the Davies definition justiceas well as
of Clark and Dear (1984) which examines the
the needs criterionforjustice.Secondly,as Pinch
recurrent in the UnitedStatesin termsof
(1985) has argued, a curvilinearrelationshipin concepts
the AmericanRevolution'sattemptat
whichprovisionincreasesmorethanproportionally
to increasing need would be evidenceofan effective rewriting the constitutional order... to guarantee
commitmentto increasing substantiveequality, American legaland politicalrightsof representation
although it would not meet the usual statistical andjustice.Forall,thecentral questionin relation
to
criterion forterritorialjustice. theEnglish system wasguaranteeing theprocedures of
A further possible geographical approach, justice.(ibid.,160-4)
although it is not often identifiedas a distinct
category,is minimum standards.This involves the Furthermore, they argue that modem attemptsto
specification of certainminimum needs whichmust defineEFJin termsof individualrightsand pro-
be met if injusticeis to be avoided (it therefore ceduralfairness(e.g. by Nozick 1974) are no more
makesdirectuse of the need conceptof EFJ)but it thanre-statements of the values of earliertimes.
can also be expanded to incorporatespatial and In the same work,Clarkand Dear also note that
temporal dimensions as minimum accessibility internationaldifferences in traditionsof political
standards:itmustbe availablewithintraveldistance philosophyreflectthesehistoricaland geographical
X and with maximumdelay Y (howeverX and Y contexts (using this to explain the differences
may be measured).An advantageof thatapproach betweenEnglishand NorthAmericantraditions). A

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Equity, andjustice
fairness 507
similarpoint of internationalcontrastis evidentin Note
recent studies of transportpolicy: in the United
1. A viewheld,forexample,by Clark(1982);Harvey
Kingdomthereis evidenceof a strongemphasison (1973); Reynoldsand Shelley(1985); and Young
formalequalityand needs whichis presentat both (1990).
national and local levels (Hay and Trinder1991;
Trinderet al. 1991) but resultsfroma comparative
study of Canadian policy debates suggest a simi- References
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