Editorial Board

General Editor
Ronald L. Jackson II
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Consulting Editor
Michael A. Hogg
Claremont Graduate University

Associate Editors
Ronald C. Arnett Corey D. B. Walker
Duquesne University Brown University
Jacqueline Imani Bryant Mark Western
Chicago State University University of Queensland
James Haywood Rolling Jr.
Syracuse University

Managing Editors
Danielle L. Blaylock Celeste Grayson Seymour
Queen’s University, Belfast Duquesne University
and University of St. Andrews
Algernon Williams
Stephen Hocker University of Oxford
University of Illinois
Amanda G. McKendree
University of Notre Dame
Copyright © 2010 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Encyclopedia of identity / edited by Ronald L. Jackson.

p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4129-5153-1 (cloth : acid-free paper)
1. Identity (Philosophical concept) 2. Identity (Psychology) 3. Group identity. I. Jackson, Ronald L., 1970-

BD236.E42 2010
302.5—dc22 2010001777

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

10   11   12   13   14   10   9   8   7   6   5   4   3   2   1

Publisher: Rolf A. Janke

Assistant to the Publisher: Michele Thompson
Acquisitions Editor: Todd Armstrong
Developmental Editor: Carole Maurer
Reference Systems Manager: Leticia Gutierrez
Reference Systems Coordinator: Laura Notton
Production Editor: Carla Freeman
Copy Editors: Colleen B. Brennan, Robin Gold
Typesetter: C&M Digitals (P) Ltd.
Proofreaders: Annie Lubinsky, Sandy Zilka
Indexer: David Luljak
Cover Designer: Bryan Fishman
Marketing Manager: Amberlyn McKay
Contents
Volume 1
List of Entries   vii
Reader’s Guide   xi
About the Editors   xvii
Contributors   xxi
Introduction   xxv
Entries
A 1 G 301
B 57 H 321
C 75 I 343
D 195 L 413
E 241 M 435
F 281

Volume 2
List of Entries   vii
Reader’s Guide   xi
Entries
N 493 T 815
O 511 U 849
P 531 V 853
Q 613 W 877
R 617 X 901
S 651

Index   903
List of Entries

Absolute Poverty Collectivism/Individualism

Accommodation Colonialism
Acculturation Commodity Self
Adaptation Communication Competence
Aesthetics Communication Theory of Identity
Afrocentricity Community. See Collective/Social Identity
Age Complex Inequality
Agency Confessional Art
Anomie Conflict
Antiracism Consciousness
Archetype Consumption
Architecture, Sites, and Spaces Contact Hypothesis
Articulation Theory Corporate Identity
Artistic Development and Cognition Corrosion of Character
Ascribed Identity Cosmology. See Worldview
Asiacentricity Cosmopolitanism
Attribution Critical Race Theory
Authenticity Critical Realism
Avowal Critical Theory
Cultivation Theory
Basking in Reflected Glory Cultural Capital
Being and Identity Cultural Contracts Theory
Bilingualism Cultural Representation
Biracial Identity Cultural Studies
Birmingham School. See Cultural Studies Culture
Bisexual/Bicurious Culture, Ethnicity, and Race
Black Atlantic Culture Shock
Brachyology
Bricolage Deconstruction
Deindividuation
Children’s Art Desire and the Looking-Glass Self
Citizenship Development of Identity
Civic Identity Development of Self-Concept
Clan Identity Deviance
Class Dialect
Class Identity Diaspora
Code-Switching Difference/Différance
Cognitive Dissonance Theory Dimensions of Cultural Variability
Collective/Social Identity Discourse

vii
viii List of Entries

Diversity Identity and Reason

Double Consciousness Identity Change
Identity Diffusion
Embeddedness/Embedded Identity Identity Negotiation
Embodiment and Body Politics Identity Politics
Empire. See Colonialism Identity Salience
English as a Second Language (ESL) Identity Scripts
Enryo-Sasshi Theory Identity Uncertainty
Ethical and Cultural Relativism Idiomatic Expressions
Ethics of Identity Immediacy
Ethnicity Immigration
Ethnolinguistic Identity Theory Impression Management
Etic/Emic Indigenous. See Clan Identity
Eugenicism Individual
Eurocentricity Individual Autonomy
Evolutionary Psychology Individuation
Existentialist Identity Questions Interaction Order
Extraordinary Bodies Intercultural Personhood
Interpellation. See Identity Uncertainty
Face/Facework Intersubjectivity
Feminism. See Gender Intertextuality
Figures of Speech Intonation
First Nations Invariant Be
Forms of Address I-Other Dialectic
Framing
Frankfurt School Labeling
Fundamentalism Language
Language Development
Gay Language Loss
Gaze Language Variety in Literature
Gender Lesbian. See Sexual Minorities
Generation X and Generation Y Liberation Theology
Globalization Looking-Glass Self
Global Village
Group Identity Masking
Material Culture
Habitus Media Studies
Hegemony Mediation
Hermeneutics Memory
Historicity Mimesis
History of Religions. See Religious Identity Mind-Body Problem
Human Figure, The Mindfulness
Humanitarianism Minstrelsy
Hybridity Mirror Stage of Identity Development
Hyperreality and Simulation Mobilities
Modern Art
Id, Ego, and Superego Modernity and Postmodernity
Ideal Body, The Multiculturalism
Identification Mythologies
Identity and Democracy Myths
 List of Entries ix

Narratives Racial Disloyalty

National. See Patriotism Recognition. See Ethics of Identity; I-Other
Nationalism Dialectic
Neoliberalism Reflexive Self or Reflexivity
Nigrescence Regulatory Focus Theory
Nomadology Religious Identity
Renaissance Art
Ontological Insecurity Rhetoric
Optimal Distinctiveness Theory Rituals
Organizational Identity Role Identity
Orientalism
Other, The Sacred. See Secular Identity
Otherness, History of Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis
Satire
Passing Saturated Identity
Patriotism Scopophilia
Perceptual Filtering Secular Identity
Performativity of Gender Self
Persistence, Termination, and Memory Self-Affirmation Theory
Person Self-Assessment
Personal Identity Versus Self-Identity Self-Concept
Personality/Individual Differences Self-Consciousness
Phenomenology Self-Construal
Philosophical History of Identity Self-Discrepancy Theory
Philosophy of Identity Self-Efficacy
Philosophy of Mind Self-Enhancement Theory
Philosophy of Organization and Identity Self-Esteem
Phonological Elements of Identity Self-Image
Photographic Truth Self-Monitoring
Pidgin/Creole Self-Perception Theory
Pluralism Self-Portraits
Political Economy Self-Presentation
Political Identity Self-Schema
Political Psychology Self-Verification
Postcolonialism. See Modernity and Semantics
Postmodernity Semiotics
Postliberalism Setting
Poststructuralism. See Modernity and Sexual Identity
Postmodernity Sexual Minorities
Pragmatics Signification
Profanity and Slang Simulacra
Propaganda Social Capital
Psychology of Self and Identity Social Comparison Theory
Public Sphere Social Constructionist Approach to Personal
Identity
Queer Theory Social Constructivist Approach to Political
Identity
Race. See Culture, Ethnicity, and Race Social Economy
Race Performance Social Identity Theory
Racial Contracts Socialization
x List of Entries

Social Movements Transcendentalism

Social Realism Transnationalism
Social Stratification Theory Transworld Identity
Society and Social Identity Trickster Figure
Society of the Spectacle
Sociometer Hypothesis Uncertainty Avoidance
Sovereignty
Spectacle and the Self Values
State Identity Velvet Mafia
Status Visual Culture
Stereotypes Visuality
Stock Character Visualizing Desire
Structuration Visual Pleasure
Style/Diction Visual Politics. See Embodiment and Body
Subjectivity Politics; Extraordinary Bodies; Ideal Body, The;
Surveillance and the Panopticon Otherness, History of; Propaganda; Stereotypes
Symbolic Interactionism Voice
Symbolism Voyeurism
Syncretism
War
Tag Question Whiteness Studies
Technology White Racial Identity
Terrorism Womanism
Terror Management Theory World Systems Theory
Theory of Mind Worldview
Third Culture Building
Third World Xenophobia
Reader’s Guide

As you read through the entries, it will be helpful for you to know how to use the Reader’s Guide. In
fact, you may choose to browse the terms simply by browsing the categories within the Reader’s Guide.
The Reader’s Guide is provided to assist readers in locating articles on related topics. It classifies articles
into 15 general topical categories: Art; Class; Culture, Ethnicity, and Race; Developing Identities;
Gender, Sex, and Sexuality; Identities in Conflict; Language and Discourse; Living Ethically; Media and
Popular Culture; Nationality; Protecting Identity; Relating Across Cultures; Religion; Representations
of Identity; and Theories of Identity. Entries may be listed under more than one topic. So, for example,
if you are interested in how identities are protected, you would go to the “Protecting Identity” section
in the Reader’s Guide and then look at the list of headwords that fall within that category. You will see
entries such as Agency, Deviance, Face/Facework, Race Performance, Role Identity, Self-Consciousness,
and Self-Construal. Then, if you select one—for example, Face/Facework—you can then search for that
entry and read a detailed description of what the term means, how it relates to the category, and how it
is related to identity.

Art Class
Aesthetics Class Identity
Architecture, Sites, and Spaces Complex Inequality
Artistic Development and Cognition Consumption
Bricolage Cultural Capital
Children’s Art Globalization
Confessional Art Hegemony
Human Figure, The Immigration
Modern Art Material Culture
Modernity and Postmodernity Social Stratification Theory
Photographic Truth Status
Renaissance Art Third World
Self-Image World Systems Theory
Self-Portraits
Setting
Culture, Ethnicity, and Race
Simulacra
Social Realism Agency
Visualizing Desire Biracial Identity
Class
Class Identity
Class Code-Switching
Absolute Poverty Complex Inequality
Anomie Critical Race Theory

xi
xii Reader’s Guide

Culture Self-Enhancement Theory

Culture, Ethnicity, and Race Self-Esteem
Diaspora Self-Image
Dimensions of Cultural Variability Self-Monitoring
Diversity Self-Perception Theory
Ethnicity Self-Portraits
Group Identity Self-Presentation
Hegemony Self-Schema
Race Performance Self-Verification
Racial Contracts Socialization
Racial Disloyalty Theory of Mind
Society and Social Identity
Status
Whiteness Studies Gender, Sex, and Sexuality
White Racial Identity Bisexual/Bicurious
Xenophobia Difference/Différance
Embodiment and Body Politics
Gay
Developing Identities Gaze
Age Gender
Being and Identity Ideal Body, The
Consciousness Identity Politics
Deindividuation Performativity of Gender
Development of Identity Queer Theory
Development of Self-Concept Scopophilia
Evolutionary Psychology Sexual Identity
Extraordinary Bodies Sexual Minorities
Generation X and Generation Y Velvet Mafia
Habitus Visuality
Hybridity Visualizing Desire
Id, Ego, and Superego Voice
Individual Voyeurism
Individual Autonomy Womanism
Individuation
Intersubjectivity
Mind-Body Problem Identities in Conflict
Nigrescence Accommodation
Person Acculturation
Personal Identity Versus Self-Identity Adaptation
Philosophy of Organization and Identity Bilingualism
Reflexive Self or Reflexivity Biracial Identity
Saturated Identity Clan Identity
Self Conflict
Self-Affirmation Theory Corporate Identity
Self-Assessment Cultural Contracts Theory
Self-Concept Culture Shock
Self-Discrepancy Theory Double Consciousness
Self-Efficacy Identification
 Reader’s Guide xiii

Identity Change Semiotics

Identity Diffusion Signification
Identity Negotiation Structuration
Identity Salience Style/Diction
Identity Uncertainty Symbolism
Intercultural Personhood Tag Question
Mindfulness Trickster Figure
Mobilities
Modernity and Postmodernity
Passing Living Ethically
Perceptual Filtering Antiracism
Philosophy of Mind Corrosion of Character
Simulacra Cosmopolitanism
Ethical and Cultural Relativism
Ethics of Identity
Language and Discourse Eugenicism
Ascribed Identity Humanitarianism
Avowal Identity and Reason
Brachyology Identity Politics
Colonialism Liberation Theology
Deconstruction Myths
Dialect Narratives
Discourse Neoliberalism
English as a Second Language (ESL) Postliberalism
Ethnicity Social Movements
Etic/Emic Terror Management Theory
Figures of Speech Xenophobia
Forms of Address
Framing
Hermeneutics Media and Popular Culture
Hyperreality and Simulation Articulation Theory
Idiomatic Expressions Consciousness
Intonation Consumption
Invariant Be Critical Theory
Labeling Cultural Capital
Language Cultural Studies
Language Development Embeddedness/Embedded Identity
Language Loss Framing
Language Variety in Literature Frankfurt School
Narratives Globalization
Phonological Elements of Identity Material Culture
Pidgin/Creole Media Studies
Profanity and Slang Mediation
Public Sphere Propaganda
Rhetoric Social Capital
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis Society of the Spectacle
Satire Spectacle and the Self
Semantics Stock Character
xiv Reader’s Guide

Surveillance and the Panopticon Double Consciousness

Technology Ethical and Cultural Relativism
Values Global Village
Visual Culture Immediacy
Visual Pleasure Impression Management
I-Other Dialectic
Multiculturalism
Nationality Nomadology
Citizenship Pluralism
Civic Identity Political Psychology
Clan Identity
Collective/Social Identity
Collectivism/Individualism Religion
Culture Fundamentalism
Diaspora Liberation Theology
First Nations Modernity and Postmodernity
Historicity Mythologies
Identity and Democracy Pragmatics
Immigration Religious Identity
Memory Rituals
Nationalism Secular Identity
Patriotism Syncretism
Philosophical History of Identity Transcendentalism
Political Identity Values
Sovereignty
State Identity
Representations of Identity
Terrorism
Third World Archetype
Transnationalism Attribution
Transworld Identity Authenticity
War Basking in Reflected Glory
Worldview Bricolage
Commodity Self
Critical Realism
Protecting Identity Cultural Representation
Agency Desire and the Looking-Glass Self
Deviance Existentialist Identity Questions
Face/Facework Extraordinary Bodies
Ontological Insecurity Hyperreality and Simulation
Personality/Individual Differences Identification
Psychology of Self and Identity Identity Politics
Race Performance Intertextuality
Role Identity Looking-Glass Self
Self-Consciousness Masking
Self-Construal Material Culture
Mimesis
Minstrelsy
Relating Across Cultures Orientalism
Bilingualism Other, The
Code-Switching Philosophy of Organization and Identity
 Reader’s Guide xv

Race Performance Global Village

Self-Presentation Identity Scripts
Social Constructionist Approach to Personal Immediacy
Identity Interaction Order
Social Constructivist Approach to Political Mirror Stage of Identity Development
Identity Modernity and Postmodernity
Stereotypes Optimal Distinctiveness Theory
Subjectivity Organizational Identity
Otherness, History of
Persistence, Termination, and Memory
Theories of Identity Phenomenology
Afrocentricity Philosophy of Identity
Articulation Theory Political Economy
Asiacentricity Postliberalism
Black Atlantic Pragmatics
Cognitive Dissonance Theory Public Sphere
Communication Competence Racial Contracts
Communication Theory of Identity Regulatory Focus Theory
Contact Hypothesis Social Comparison Theory
Corporate Identity Social Economy
Critical Race Theory Social Identity Theory
Critical Realism Sociometer Hypothesis
Critical Theory Symbolic Interactionism
Cultivation Theory Terror Management Theory
Cultural Contracts Theory Theory of Mind
Enryo-Sasshi Theory Third Culture Building
Ethnolinguistic Identity Theory Uncertainty Avoidance
Eurocentricity World Systems Theory
About the Editors
General Editor
Ronald L. Jackson II is Professor of Media &
Cinema Studies, as well as Professor and Head of
the Department of African American Studies, at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Past
President and Research Fellow of the Eastern
Communication Association, as well as coeditor
(with Kent Ono) of the journal Critical Studies in
Media Communication, Jackson is one of the lead-
ing communication and identity scholars in the
nation. His research examines how theories of iden-
tity relate to intercultural and gender communica-
tion. In his teaching and research, he explores how
and why people negotiate and define themselves as
they do. In addition, Jackson’s research includes
empirical, conceptual, and critical approaches to
the study of masculinity, identity negotiation,
whiteness, and Afrocentricity. His work has
appeared in several journals, including Journal of
Black Studies, Quarterly Journal of Speech, The
International and Intercultural Communication
Annual, Journal of Communication, and
Communication Theory. He teaches intercultural
communication and is author or editor of eight
books: The Negotiation of Cultural Identity (1999);
Think About It! (2000); African American
Communication: Exploring Identity and Culture
(coauthored with Michael Hecht and Sidney Ribeau,
2003); Understanding African American Rhetoric:
Classical Origins to Contemporary Innova­tions (coed-
ited with Elaine Richardson, 2003); African
American Rhetoric(s): Interdisciplinary Perspectives
(coedited with Elaine Richardson, 2004); African
American Communication & Identities: Essential
Readings (2004); Scripting the Black Masculine
Body: Identity, Discourse, and Racial Politics in
Popular Media (2006); and African American
Pioneers in Communication Research (coauthored
xvii
with Sonya M. Brown Givens, 2006). Forthcoming
are three books, titled Cultur­ing Manhood,
Communicating Masculinity and Race, and
Masculinity in the Black Imagination. His pub-
lished theoretical work includes the development
of two paradigms coined “cultural contracts the-
ory” and the “Black masculine identity theory.”
Consulting Editor
Michael A. Hogg is Professor of Social Psychology
at Claremont Graduate University in Los Angeles
and an Honorary Professor of Social Psychology
at the University of Kent in the United Kingdom
and at the University of Queensland in Australia.
He is a Fellow of the Society for Personality and
Social Psychology, the Society for the Psychological
Study of Social Issues, the Western Psychological
Association, and the Academy of the Social
Sciences in Australia. He received his PhD from
Bristol University and has taught at Bristol
University, Macquarie University, the University
of Melbourne, the University of Queensland, and
Princeton University. He has been a Visiting
Professor at the University of California, in Los
Angeles, Santa Cruz, and Santa Barbara, and at
City University, Hong Kong. Hogg’s research on
group processes, intergroup relations, social iden-
tity, and self-conception is closely associated with
the development of social identity theory. He has
published 270 scientific books, chapters, and
articles on these topics. A former associate editor
of the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
he is foundation coeditor with Dominic Abrams
of the journal Group Processes and Intergroup
Relations and senior consultant editor for the
Sage Social Psychology Program. Current research
foci include leadership, deviance, uncertainty
reduction, extremism, and subgroup relations.
xviii About the Editors
Associate Editors
Ronald C. Arnett, Chair and Professor, Department
of Communication and Rhetorical Studies,
Duquesne University, is a philosopher of communi-
cation and has authored or coauthored more than
60 articles and 6 books and has edited 3 books. His
most recent books include Communication Ethics
Literacy: Dialogue and Difference (with Janie M.
Harden Fritz and Leeanne M. Bell, 2009) and
Dialogic Confession: Bonhoeffer’s Rhetoric of
Responsibility (2006), for which he won the 2006
Eastern Communication Association’s Everett Lee
Hunt Award. Arnett is the Executive Director of
the Pennsylvania Communication Association,
Executive Director-Elect of the Eastern Communi­
cation Association, editor-elect of the Review of
Communication, a past editor of the Journal of
Communication and Religion, and a member of
numerous editorial boards. He is a Research Fellow
and Teaching Fellow of the Eastern Communication
Association and was selected as the Centennial
Scholar of Philosophy of Communication by the
Eastern Communication Association in 2009. He has
served as President of the Religious Communication
Association and of the Pennsylvania Communication
Association.
Jacqueline Imani Bryant is Professor of English in
the English and Communications, Media Arts,
and Theater department and an affiliate faculty
member in the African American Studies depart-
ment at Chicago State University. Her research
interests include the works of late-19th- and early-
20th-century Black women writers. Her works
appear in Journal of Black Studies, College
Language Association Journal, and WarpLand: A
Journal of Black Literature and Ideas. A chapter
appears in African American Rhetoric(s), edited
by Elaine B. Richardson and Ronald L. Jackson II
(2004). Entries appear in Encyclopedia of Black
Studies, edited by Molefi Kete Asante and Ama
Mazama (2005), and Encyclopedia of African
American Women Writers, edited by Yolanda
Williams Page (2007). Bryant is author of The
Foremother Figure in Early Black Women’s
Literature (1999) and editor of Gwendolyn
Brooks’ Maud Martha: A Critical Collection
(2002) and Gwendolyn Brooks and Working
Writers (2007).
James Haywood Rolling Jr. is Chair of Art
Education and a Dual Associate Professor in Art
Education and Teaching and Leadership at
Syracuse University. Rolling earned his EdD in
art education at Teachers College, Columbia
University, and completed his MFA in studio arts
research at Syracuse University. Rolling’s schol-
arly interests include arts-based educational
research, the intersection of visual culture and
identity politics, curriculum theory, semiotics
and symbolic interaction, social justice and
community-engaged scholarship, and narrative
and poetic forms of inquiry in qualitative research.
In 2009, Rolling was elected to the board of
directors of the National Art Education
Association as Director-Elect of the Higher
Education Division. Rolling has published arti-
cles, essays, and book reviews in peer-reviewed
journals such as Qualitative Inquiry, Studies in
Art Education, The Journal of Aesthetic
Education, Journal of Curriculum Studies, and
Journal of Curriculum and Pedagogy, and serves
as a review board member of the Journal of
Cultural Research in Art Education. He is also
the author of the forthcoming book Cinderella
Story: A Scholarly Sketchbook About Race,
Identity, Barack Obama, the Human Spirit, and
Other Stuff That Matters.
Corey D. B. Walker is Associate Professor in the
Department of Africana Studies at Brown
University, where he teaches undergraduate and
graduate courses in philosophy, modern theology,
and critical theory. Walker also serves as an associ-
ate editor of Journal of the American Academy of
Religion. Prior to joining the faculty at Brown in
2006, Walker was Assistant Professor of Religious
Studies and African American Studies at the
University of Virginia (2003–2006), Director of
the Center for the Study of Local Knowledge at the
University of Virginia (2002–2003), and Visiting
Professor at the Historisches Institut at Friedrich-
Schiller-Universität Jena in Germany (2002).
Walker is the author of “A Noble Fight”: African
American Freemasonry and the Struggle for
Democracy in America (2008) and is completing a
book titled Between Transcendence and History:
An Essay on Religion and the Future(s) of
Democracy. His articles and essays in philosophy,

critical theory, religion, and politics have appeared
in such journals as Amerikastudien/American
Studies, boundary 2, Journal of the American
Academy of Religion, Political Theology, Les
Cahiers Charles V, Philosophia Africana, and West
Africa Review.
Mark Western is Professor of Sociology and Direc­
tor of the Institute for Social Science Research at
the University of Queensland, Australia. He has
previously worked at the University of Tasmania
and the Australian National University and has
been a visiting fellow at the University of
About the Editors xix
Wisconsin–Madison, the University of Manchester,
and the Institute of Education, London. Western’s
broad research interests are in social stratification
and social inequality, political sociology and
quantitative research methods. He has a number
of current research projects in these areas. Western
is on the Editorial Boards of American Sociological
Review, Journal of Sociology and Research in Social
Stratification and Mobility. He is a member of
the national Advisory Committee for the Australian
Social Science Data Archive and a former member
of its national Executive Committee.
Contributors
Mona M. Abo-Zena
Tufts University
Dominic Abrams
University of Kent at
Canterbury
Matthew Adams
University of Brighton
Tony E. Adams
Northeastern Illinois University
Ben Agger
University of Texas at
Arlington
Brenda Eatman Aghahowa
Chicago State University
Donnetrice Allison
Richard Stockton College
Harry Anastasiou
Portland State University
Beverley J. Peart Anderson
Chicago State University
Corey Anton
Grand Valley State University
Jorge A. Aquino
University of San Francisco
Jan Arminio
Shippensburg University
Pat A. Arneson
Duquesne University
Ronald C. Arnett
Duquesne University
Ahmet Atay
University of Louisville
Sarah Azaransky
University of San Diego
Maureen Baker
University of Auckland
Murali Balaji
Lincoln University
Judy Elizabeth Battaglia
Loyola Marymount University
David M. Bell
Georgia State University
Leeanne M. Bell
Stevenson University
Robert D. Benford
Southern Illinois University
Carbondale
Robert D. Blagg
Claremont Graduate University
Thomas Blank
University of Münster
Danielle L. Blaylock
Queen’s University, Belfast and
University of St. Andrews
Catherine Bliss
Brown University
Marilynn B. Brewer
University of New South Wales
Benjamin J. Broome
Arizona State University
M. Anne Brown
University of Queensland
Timothy J. Brown
West Chester University
xxi
David L. Brunsma
University of Missouri
Jacqueline Imani Bryant
Chicago State University
Samuel Burbanks IV
Cincinnati Public Schools
Michael Burns
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
Devika Chawla
Ohio University
George Cheney
University of Utah
Clifford G. Christians
University of Illinois
Geoffrey L. Cohen
University of Colorado,
Boulder
David J. Connor
Hunter College, CUNY
Melissa A. Cook
St. Vincent College
Leda M. Cooks
University of Massachusetts
Amherst
Valerie Cooper
University of Virginia
Bryan Crable
Villanova University
Andrew J. Critchfield
George Washington
University
xxii Contributors
Jim Crowther
University of Edinburgh
Dagmar Danko
Albert-Ludwigs-University
Freiburg
Maria Davidson
University of Oklahoma
Amira Millicent Davis
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
Rick Dolphijn
Utrecht University
Karen M. Douglas
University of Kent
Rachel E. Dubrofsky
University of South Florida
Taine Duncan
Duquesne University
Michael J. Emmison
University of Queensland
Lawrence R. Frey
University of Colorado at
Boulder
Janie Harden Fritz
Duquesne University
Munashe Furusa
California State University,
Dominguez Hills
V. Nzingha Gaffin
Cheyney University
Amber M. Gaffney
Claremont Graduate University
J. L. A. Garcia
Boston College
Erik Garrett
Duquesne University
Pat Gehrke
University of South Carolina
Mia Reinoso Genoni
Yale University
Cerise L. Glenn
University of North Carolina
at Greensboro
Jamie L. Goldenberg
University of South Florida
Sheryl Goodman
Ursinus College
Fiona Grant
Claremont Graduate University
Deric M. Greene
Stevenson University
Rachel A. Griffin
Southern Illinois University
Carbondale
Ruth Groff
Saint Louis University
S. Alyssa Groom
Duquesne University
Justin D. Hackett
Claremont Graduate University
Bradford ‘J’ Hall
Utah State University
Maurice L. Hall
Villanova University
Jason Hannan
Carleton University
D. Eric Harmon
Century Community and
Technical College
David Hart
Cleveland Institute of Art
Leonard C. Hawes
University of Utah
Bruce Headey
University of Melbourne
Michael L. Hecht
Pennsylvania State University
Belinda Anne Hewitt
University of Queensland
John P. Hewitt
University of Massachusetts at
Amherst
E. Tory Higgins
Columbia University
Stephen Hocker
University of Illinois
Michael A. Hogg
Claremont Graduate
University
Bradford R. Hogue
Cincinnati Public Schools
Zachary P. Hohman
Claremont Graduate
University
Annette M. Holba
Plymouth State University
Vanessa Holmes
Chicago State University
Suellen Hopfer
Pennsylvania State University
Mark C. Hopson
George Mason University
William L. Howard
Chicago State University
Li-Ching Hung
Overseas Chinese
University
Adam Hutchinson
Duquesne University
Øyvind Ihlen
BI Norwegian School of
Management
Kamesha Jackson
Chicago State University
Ronald L. Jackson II
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
Walt Jacobs
University of Minnesota
jan jagodzinski
University of Alberta
Richard Jenkins
University of Sheffield
Amber Johnson
Loyola Marymount University
Mari A. Johnson
Joliet Junior College
Alwin A. D. Jones
Sarah Lawrence College

Eura Jung
University of Southern
Mississippi
Yoshihisa Kashima
University of Melbourne
Alem Kebede
California State University,
Bakersfield
Peter M. Kellett
University of North Carolina
at Greensboro
Richard Kilminster
University of Leeds
Min-Sun Kim
University of Hawai‘i at
– Duquesne University
Manoa
Stephen P. Konieczka
University of Colorado at
Boulder
Eric Mark Kramer
University of Oklahoma
Joel Krueger
University of Copenhagen
Timothy Kuhn
University of Colorado at
Boulder
Celeste Lacroix
College of Charleston
Richard L. Lanigan
Southern Illinois
University
Tony Lindsay
Chicago State University
Lisbeth Lipari
Denison University
Bliss S. Little
Arizona State University
Vincent Lloyd
Georgia State University
Sadye L. M. Logan
University of South Carolina
Chi-Wai Lui
University of Queensland
Sheng-mei Ma
Michigan State University
Sarah Maddison
University of New
South Wales
Annette D. Madlock
Southern Connecticut State
University
Lydia Brown Magras
Chicago State University
Namrata Mahajan
Claremont Graduate
University
C. T. Maier
Josina M. Makau
California State University,
Monterey Bay
Eric Maroney
Cornell University
Daniel J. Martino
Seton Hill University
Fukumi Tanaka Matsubara
North Central College
Rod McCrea
University of Queensland
Amanda G. McKendree
University of Notre Dame
Raymie E. McKerrow
Ohio University
Rebecca S. Merkin
Baruch College, CUNY
Algis Mickunas
Ohio University
Yoshitaka Miike
University of Hawai‘i at Hilo
Michael Morgan
University of Massachusetts
Suzuko Morikawa
Chicago State University
Carlos D. Morrison
Alabama State University
Contributors xxiii
Peter Muir
Manchester Metropolitan
University
Aphrodite Désirée Navab
School of Visual Arts
James W. Neuliep
St. Norbert College
Naomi Bell O’Neil
Clarion University
Saul Ostrow
Cleveland Institute of Art
Jan Pakulski
University of Tasmania
Elizabeth A. Patton
New York University
Holly Adams Phillips
Georgia State University
Eddie Seron Pierce
Chicago State University
Margaret Jane Pitts
Old Dominion University
Kimberly Powell
Pennsylvania State University
John H. Prellwitz
University of Pittsburgh at
Greensburg
Ramsey Eric Ramsey
Barrett Honors College
David E. Rast III
Claremont Graduate
University
Outi Remes
South Hill Park Arts Centre
Rashida Restaino
Chicago State University
Jason E. Rivera
Claremont Graduate
University
Kathleen Glenister Roberts
Duquesne University
Christina Robinson
Richard J. Daley College
xxiv Contributors
Cynthia L. Robinson-Moore
University of Nebraska at
Omaha
Tacuma R. Roeback
Chicago State University
James Haywood Rolling Jr.
Syracuse University
Elesha L. Ruminski
Frostburg State University
Jeffrey J. Sallaz
University of Arizona
Shirley Samson
University of Kent
John Sawicki
Duquesne University
Christopher See
Georgia State University
Reshmi Sen
Finger Lakes Community
College
Celeste Grayson Seymour
Duquesne University
Theodore F. Sheckels
Randolph-Macon College
David K. Sherman
University of California, Santa
Barbara
Robert Shuter
Marquette University
Tina Sikka
Simon Fraser University
Jonnie Simmons-Johnson
Richard J. Daley College
Jennifer S. Simpson
University of Waterloo
Brent C. Sleasman
Gannon University
Cary Stacy Smith
Mississippi State University
Ericka C. Smith
Chicago State University
Joanne R. Smith
University of Exeter
Jonathan A. Smith
University of Queensland
Jan Georg Söffner
Zentrum für Literatur- und
Kulturforschung Berlin
Peter Springer
Universität Oldenburg
Catherine R. Squires
University of Minnesota
William J. Starosta
Howard University
Jan E. Stets
University of California,
Riverside
Jeff Stone
University of Arizona
Heather T. Stopp
Claremont Graduate University
Juliette Storr
Pennsylvania State University
Beaver
Isabel Suchanek
University of Pennsylvania
K. E. Supriya
University of Wisconsin,
Milwaukee
Robbie M. Sutton
University of Kent
Kevin Tavin
Ohio State University
Toniesha Latrice Taylor
Loyola Marymount University
Victor E. Taylor
York College of Pennsylvania
Richard H. Thames
Duquesne University
Stella Ting-Toomey
California State University,
Fullerton
Tara L. Tober
University of Virginia
Calvin L. Troup
Duquesne University
Thomas Trummer
Siemens AG
Angharad N. Valdivia
University of Illinois
Corey D. B. Walker
Brown University
Joel S. Ward
Duquesne University
Adena Washington
Chicago State University
Angela Watkins
University of Iowa
Jennifer Way
University of North Texas
Robert Westerfelhaus
College of Charleston
John Western
University of Queensland
Mark Western
University of Queensland
Crystal N. Wiggins
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
Riki Wilchins
Independent Scholar
Concetta A. Williams
Chicago State University
Ian Woodward
Griffith University
LaTiffany D. Wright
Chicago State University
Jonathan Wyatt
University of Oxford
Jewel Sophia Younge
Olive-Harvey College
Cem Zeytinoglu
East Stroudsburg University
Introduction
There is nothing more daily, sustained, and sociopo-
litically charged than our identities. The incontro-
vertible reality is that identities are the markers by
which we live. They expose how we are positioned
and perceived in society. The media industry is built
on the presumption that whatever is visually or
aurally presented to audiences will intersect so con-
siderably with their imaginations and/or understand-
ing of the world that they will be able to instantly
relate. No matter where we turn, identities rise to the
surface. Take, for example, the election of U.S.
President Barack Obama. Beyond the novelty of
having a Black man as president of the free world,
the discussion about his candidacy centered on
issues of class, race, religion, culture, gender, and
social reform. Furthermore, in every public debate
about health care reform, people have been talking
about access and affordability, that is, class identity.
In every public debate about the war in Iraq and
Afghanistan, there is talk about not only national
security but also the patriotism and dedication of the
troops. The U.S. news reports are implicitly and
explicitly talking about what it means to be American
and what it means to be free. You can look at any
platform issue and see remnants of how individuals
or groups define themselves no matter what the
country. Likewise, when we focus our lenses on pri-
vate lives, identities become most apparent. In fact,
it is in this realm that we are used to thinking about
the term identity.
We have been taught that identity refers to an
individual’s self-esteem, self-consciousness, or under-
standing of how he or she relates to the social world.
In everyday parlance, identity may even refer to
identity theft, whereby one’s credit information is
stolen and used to fraudulently purchase material
goods. It may also bring to mind genetically altered
beings via cloning. The point is that identity is a
broad term that has been used by so many people in
so many different iterations that to detail all of what
xxv
it means in one encyclopedia, no matter how many
volumes, would be impossible. As a result, what you
have before you is, by those standards a modest
undertaking, a reference work that takes a broad
comprehensive approach to identity as a socially
constructed phenomenon. The purpose of this ency-
clopedia is to offer an opportunity to everyday read-
ers to understand identity as an everyday phenomenon,
process, and dynamic that affects their lives.
As you read through the nearly 300 alphabet-
ized terms in this two-volume encyclopedia, you
will notice that many disciplinary subject areas are
represented here: religion, visual arts, cultural
studies, psychology, sociology, communication,
gender studies, philosophy, political science, litera-
ture, and linguistics. Each of these disciplines has
developed multiple perspectives on the subject of
identity. Religious studies may explain identity as
metaphysical or as that which pertains to religious
group identifications with certain doctrines.
Identity, from this disciplinary standpoint, may
also be understood through some sort of theo-
sophical framework on the close rhetorical inter-
pretation and analysis of ancient religious texts.
Of course, psychologists would take quite a differ-
ent approach. They would accent how the mind is
inextricably involved in the production and main-
tenance of self-definitions. Linguists would argue
that the word is the central feature through which
we come to learn about the self and society.
Similarly, a communication scholar might contend
that at the very moment we learn to speak, we also
begin to learn the value-laden cultural meanings of
words. So, it is not just the syntax and semantics
of words that bring meaning, but how those words
are pragmatically employed within a body of
discourse that tries to convey meaning at a par-
ticular time for a specific reason. Within all these
perspectives, identity is the centerpiece despite its
multidisciplinarity.
xxvi Introduction
Even with this broad smorgasbord of offerings,
every term related to society and identity will not
be found here; yet I think the reader will be satis-
fied with the breadth, scope, and quality of what is
presented. Identities are the landscapes of our lives.
It is with our identities that we are guided toward
understanding certain social perceptions, cultural
interpretations, personal behaviors, and global
actions. Our identities help us to see the world.
Simply put, identities are who we are. Most of
us grapple with our self-definitions and group
identifications with some frequency throughout
our lives. As we mature, we contemplate what it
means to be older, spiritually minded, career-
driven, family-oriented, money-motivated, media-
engaged, gender-identified, socially aware,
politically astute, responsible human beings and
citizens of a certain country. All of those adjectival
signifiers say something about our identities.
Beyond a mere catalogue, the Encyclopedia of
Identity seeks to explore myriad ways in which we
define ourselves in our everyday lives. The nature
of an encyclopedia is to serve as a primer that does
the extra work that a glossary has no space to do.
It helps to initiate dialogue about the essence of
terms that may or may not come with profound
controversies. Nonetheless, there is no dimension
of identity that remains uncontestable. At every
turn of the page, you will see how something as
simple as ritual or slang or photographic truth can
arouse vigorous debate. So, I will reiterate the
point that it is important for readers of this ency-
clopedia to remember that identities are socially
constructed; therefore, they are complicated by
interpretations of ethics, values, appropriateness,
and reality. Additionally, as Stuart Hall suggests,
identities are guided by past and present narra-
tives, circumstances, and experiences. How you
interpret affirmative action, global terrorism,
immigration, health care, unemployment, abor-
tion, and gun rights is dependent on what you
have learned from past interactions, news stories,
and vicarious experiences. Your own family, per-
sonal value system, or both, will likely come into
play because those values continue to shape and be
shaped by your evolving identity. There are many
metaphors and descriptive devices one might
employ to characterize identity, and yet it is clear
that as we delve deeper into what identity truly is
and means, it seems to almost defy description.
That is what makes it so compelling. It is so deeply
engrained in our lives, yet mysterious, almost
incomprehensible at times. We want to know who
we are because we believe we have to know who
we are just to survive in a social world where, as
the common maxim states, “If you stand for noth-
ing, you will fall for anything.” So, even what we
believe is enwrapped in who we say we are.
In a lecture at the University of Cincinnati, pro-
genitor of Kwanzaa and Black Studies professor
Maulana Karenga posited that there are three fun-
damental questions about identity: Who am I? Am
I who I say I am? Am I all I ought to be? It is these
three questions that encouraged me to embark on
the study of identity. These questions also are foun-
dationally tied to the Encyclopedia of Identity.
This project came to fruition through multiple
discussions with Rolf Janke about doing a hand-
book of identity. He convinced me the encyclope-
dia as a library resource and general reference
work would reach a larger audience and better
accomplish the goal of helping a broad-based read-
ership get a sense of how identity intersects with
their lives. As a critical theorist, I found the idea of
editing the Encyclopedia of Identity appealing
because we human beings are not reminded enough
about how power constrains identity development,
maintenance, and negotiation. Untutored by any
of the previously stated premises or personal biases
about the significance of power, the multidisci-
plinary, multinational team of more than 100
contributors whose work is represented in the
Encyclopedia of Identity seemed to generally agree
with these ideas, which is unspoken testimony to
the shared interpretation about how identities
function throughout the world.
To grasp the breadth of these volumes, it will
prove useful to refer to the premises upon which
the discussion of identity within the Encyclopedia
of Identity is based:
•• Identities are cocreated via interaction with
others.
•• Identities are able to shift, and they often do.
•• Identities are historically constituted.
•• Identities are both private and public.
•• Identities are ongoing and therefore are part of
our everyday lives.
•• Identities are often political in the sense that they
are affected by others’ interpretations.

•• Identities may be imposed (ascribed) or self-
selected (avowed).
•• Identities are often socially monitored.
•• Everyone has several social identities.
With these foundational premises in mind, it
should be as apparent to you as it is to me that
evidence of “identity” is all around us. It is ines-
capably a part of our daily lives. So, why not seek
to understand it better?
I invite you to read and reread the entries in this
encyclopedia. As you grow in your understanding
of identity and as your thirst for self-definition
continues, I am confident these volumes will prove
quite useful. Enjoy!
Acknowledgments
No project is ever completed without the will and
grace of our savior, so my first acknowledgment
is to God, who is the head of my life. I am also
grateful for a loving family. This encyclopedia is
dedicated to them: my wife Ricci, my daughter
Niyah, and my son Niles. I am extremely appre-
ciative of their unflinching and unconditional
love and support. A special thanks goes to the
Introduction xxvii
consulting editor, associate editors, managing
editors, and the Sage reference staff. The consult-
ing editor is Michael A. Hogg. The associate edi-
tors are Ronald C. Arnett, Jacqueline Imani
Bryant, James Haywood Rolling Jr., Corey D. B.
Walker, and Mark Western. I am privileged to
have had the opportunity to work with this
esteemed group of internationally renowned
scholars. It has also been my pleasure to work
with a very talented and dedicated group of man-
aging editors. The managing editors are Danielle
L. Blaylock, Steve Hocker, Amanda McKendree,
Celeste Grayson Seymour, and Algernon Williams.
Bringing their unique skill sets to the project, they
proved to be an absolutely invaluable resource
and awesome team! Without them, this project
simply would not be. The Sage Reference folks
were amazing. With every query, they responded
rapidly and professionally. I have worked with
many publishers, but none is classier than Sage.
Thanks to Rolf Janke, Carole Maurer, Laura
Notton, Michele Thompson, Pat Bobrowski,
Amber McKay, and the entire copyediting and
production staff who worked on this encyclope-
dia. You all were fantastic!
—Ronald L. Jackson II
 A
Absolute Poverty
Absolute poverty has come to have two quite dif-
ferent meanings. The root idea is that an individ-
ual or family is in poverty if it cannot afford the
basics of human life: food, clothing, and shelter.
But usage has bifurcated. Absolute poverty in
developing countries is assessed using very lean
standards; for example, the World Bank estimates
how many people live on less than $1.25 a day.
Absolute poverty in developed countries is usually
measured by poverty lines that are absolute only
in the sense that they are fixed rather than auto-
matically adjusted when living standards change.
The best known of these measures is the official
U.S. poverty line.
It makes no sense to discuss absolute poverty
without also referring to the alternative approach
in which relative poverty lines are used. The under-
lying idea, endorsed by most poverty researchers
in Western Europe, relates to social inclusion/
exclusion. It is held that community standards
about what it means to be poor are not fixed, but
are relative to mainstream living standards and so
rise as mainstream or average standards rise. In
addition to goods required to meet basic require-
ments, people need certain goods that, if lacking,
make them feel ashamed and, in that sense, socially
excluded from mainstream society.
Definitions of poverty, far from being value-
neutral, are hotly disputed in the political arena.
Conservative policymakers generally endorse abso-
lute definitions, if they accept the existence of
1
poverty at all in modern societies. Using an abso-
lute definition leads to the policy goal of bringing
people up to a “decent minimum” standard of liv-
ing. American liberals and European social demo-
crats, by contrast, usually favor relative definitions.
Poverty lines then rise in line with average or
median incomes, and there is an implied value
judgment that the poor should share in the fruits
of economic growth.
The history of research inquiring into absolute
poverty reflects the bifurcation of meanings. The
first major survey of poverty (Life and Labour of
the People of London, 1903) was conducted in
Britain by businessman-philanthropist Charles
Booth. Evidence was collected from school atten-
dance officers, rather than directly from the public,
with the focus being on two necessities of life:
adequate diet and housing. As mentioned earlier,
the World Bank has maintained this focus on abso-
lute necessities and extreme poverty by regular
publication of estimates of the numbers of people
worldwide who live on less than $1.25 (previously
$1) a day and less than $2 a day. The latest avail-
able figures are for 2005, when 1.4 billion people,
or 26% of the world’s population, lived on less
than $1.25 a day. The first Millenium Development
Goal is to halve the number living at this level
between 1990 and 2015.
The Nobel Laureate in economics, Amartya
Sen, conceives of absolute poverty as an absence of
freedom to exercise effective life and career choices.
In order to exercise effective choice, people need a
range of “capabilities and functionings.” Based
partly on Sen’s thinking, the United Nations now
2 Accommodation
publishes the Human Development Index, which
gives equal weight to indicators relating to per
capita income, educational development, and
health (life expectancy).
The official U.S. fixed poverty line was devel-
oped in the early 1960s by the Social Security
Administration (SSA). A poverty line was needed
in the context of the War on Poverty. The SSA
proposed a line set at 3 times the cost of the
Department of Agriculture’s Economy Food Plan.
It was observed that the typical American family
spent about one third of its budget on food, and it
was inferred that a family that had to spend more
would lack the means to buy the other necessities
of life.
The SSA measure has survived to the present
day and, adjusted for price inflation, still provides
a basis for setting payment levels for some federal
programs and grants to the states. Nevertheless, it
is widely regarded by poverty researchers as out-
dated. Recognizing this, the Joint Economic
Committee of Congress appointed a review panel
in 1992 that recommended changes based on the
view that a new poverty line should take account
of the cost of the three basics, plus some allow-
ance for increases in the average standard of liv-
ing. This proposal, never adopted, would have
involved replacing an absolute measure of poverty
with a mixed measure, combining both absolute
and relative aspects.
Important technical advances have been made
in the measurement of poverty in recent decades.
Poverty is now usually measured by sample sur-
veys. In the United States, the most important of
these include the government-run Current
Population Survey and the Survey of Income and
Program Participation. Also important is the
University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), which began in 1968 and
involves interviewing the same respondents every
year. The PSID revolutionized poverty research by
showing that, whereas some individuals and fami-
lies are long-term poor, most people who become
poor cease to be so within a year or two. However,
people who have endured at least one spell of pov-
erty are at greater risk than average of being poor
on subsequent occasions.
Historically, poverty has usually been defined
as having a low cash income. More recently,
attempts have been made to extend such measures
by cashing out the value of benefits in kind. These
include food stamps (in the United States only),
housing benefits, education, and health care. More
broadly still, it is sometimes claimed that poverty
measures should not be based on income alone but
should reflect consumption patterns and perhaps
asset holdings as well.
Issues relating to poverty tend to sink off the
political agenda during economic boom times and
then resurface during recessions. Whenever they
resurface, so does the debate between advocates of
absolute versus relative concepts of poverty.
Bruce Headey
See also Class
Further Readings
Citro, C. F., & Michael, R. T. (1995). Measuring
poverty: A new approach. Washington, DC: National
Academy Press.
Ravallion, M., & Chen, S. (2008, August). The
developing world is poorer than we thought, but no
less successful in the fight against poverty (Policy
Research Working Paper No. WPS4703). Washington,
DC: World Bank.
Sen, A. (1999). Development and freedom. New York:
Anchor Books.
Accommodation
Most dictionaries define accommodation as syn-
onymous with adjustment, or a readiness to aid or
please others. Authors Larry Samovar and Richard
Porter described accommodation as a conflict style
whereby one communicator will acquiesce to the
wishes of another and give up on his or her own
needs and goals. On the other hand, Howard Giles
developed the communication accommodation
theory—originally named speech accommodation
theory—to describe the adjustments communica-
tors make when interacting with others. The the-
ory states that in face-to-face encounters, a speaker
will often alter his or her speech to match the
other person’s speaking rate, manner, style, and
language, all of which are facets of one’s identity.
We need only consider the region where someone

was born to see clearly how these speech patterns
shift according to the regional identity and identi-
fication. Research suggests that there are various
reasons communicators make such adjustments.
In some cases, speakers are simply seeking approval
from others, whereas in other cases, speakers wish
to display solidarity with other communicators;
lastly, speakers often attempt to influence others’
opinions. However, many times there is a power
differential, age differential, or both, between
communicators. Not only do these differentials
have the potential to increase solidarity, but they
also signify the importance of self-definition as an
ordinary concern of anyone who engages in
accommodating behavior.
According to researchers Todd Sandel, Wen-Yu
Chao, and Chung-Hui Liang, when parents’ mother
tongue differs from the predominant language that
their children are learning and speaking in schools,
parents attempt to accommodate the children’s
speech styles. However, for the sake of preserving
their children’s cultural identities, parents agree
that it is also important for children to learn the
mother tongue. Conversely, other researchers con-
tend that younger speakers are more likely to
accommodate than older speakers. This may be
due to the fact that older speakers have less need
to establish their cultural identity. Additionally,
younger speakers may simply be more proficient in
nonnative tongues, such as in those situations
when English is the second language. Moreover,
when communicating, they still accommodate
older speakers out of respect and deference.
Regarding power differentials, persons of
unequal status are more likely to accommodate
speakers who have more power. This is particu-
larly salient in interactions between service work-
ers and customers. Customers are presumed to be
more powerful than workers; as such, workers
must accommodate the speaking style of their cus-
tomers. For instance, in various neighborhoods in
New York City, there are high populations of
Spanish-speaking patrons. One individual may
enter a store speaking Spanish, and the worker
may respond in Spanish. The next patron entering
the store may speak English, and that same worker
will respond in English. Researcher Laura Callahan
asserts that accommodation in such scenarios is
dependent on neighborhood and the worker’s abil-
ity to shift language. If the worker knows very little
Accommodation 3
Spanish, he or she is less likely to accommodate.
On the other hand, an important question emerges
regarding dominant groups and nondominant
groups. Research suggests that members of non-
dominant groups are more likely to accommodate
than are members of dominant groups. Mark Orbe
conducted an analysis of the communicative prac-
tices of members of nondominant groups (people
of color, women, gays/lesbians/bisexuals, persons
with disabilities, and persons of low socioeco-
nomic status) when interacting with members of
the dominant group in the United States (hetero-
sexual men of European descent) within an orga-
nizational setting. As a result of the analysis, Orbe
offered three types of accommodation. First, non-
assertive accommodation involves attempting to
change organizational policy, which is deemed
noninclusive, in a nonconfrontational manner.
This includes increasing one’s visibility and
attempting to dispel stereotypes. This occurs when
members of minority groups attempt to behave in
ways that are not perceived as “typical” of their
ingroup. Second, assertive accommodation involves
more assertive efforts to change organizational
policy by communicating openly, networking with
the ingroup, using liaisons, and educating others.
Third, aggressive accommodation involves more
direct and aggressive attempts to make change by
confronting members of the dominant group and
to gain advantage by making constant references
to oppression as a means of causing discomfort in
others—specifically, by loudly vocalizing one’s
discontent with the organizational structure and
the intention to force change. Ultimately, each of
these examines nondominant group members’
willingness to compromise their identities in set-
tings where they are clearly at a power disadvan-
tage. Findings indicate that, invariably, participants
took one of the three courses of action.
Another important issue addressed in research
on accommodation is the relationship between
language accommodation and identity. Specifically,
does a speaker compromise his or her identity
when accommodating another communicator?
Researchers Sandel, Chao, and Liang, mentioned
earlier, asked whether the ability to speak Tai-gi,
the mother tongue in Taiwan, meant someone was
more “Taiwanese.” Most of the parents who par-
ticipated in the study said no. Although they
believed in the value of teaching their children
4 Acculturation
Tai-gi, they did not believe in forcing their children
to speak Tai-gi, and although previous research
suggests that language and cultural identity are
inextricably linked, parents in this analysis make a
clear distinction between language and identity.
Within the culture, one need not speak Tai-gi regu-
larly to be Taiwanese and to display pride in the
culture. Similarly, in an analysis of upper Egyptian
migrants living in Cairo, another researcher
asserted that a group can continue to claim its dis-
tinctiveness even if all the cultural features associ-
ated with its ethnicity have changed.
Finally, researchers have examined the impact
of the electronic age on accommodation, and find-
ings have indicated that e-mail respondents tend to
accommodate to politeness of others in e-mail
interactions. Responses to e-mail messages that
include either verbal politeness cues or structural
politeness cues are significantly more polite than
responses to e-mail messages that do not include
such cues.
Overall, research suggests that speakers regu-
larly demonstrate accommodating behaviors in
interactions with others, when seeking approval,
displaying solidarity, attempting to influence
others’ opinions, or simply out of respect.
Research does not suggest, however, that com-
municators compromise their identities when
accommodating others. On the contrary, research
suggests that speakers can match the accent or
speaking style of another when interacting, yet
still maintain cultural pride.
Donnetrice Allison
See also Acculturation; Adaptation; Collective/Social
Identity; Identity Negotiation
Further Readings
Bunz, U., & Campbell, S. W. (2004). Politeness
accommodation in electronic mail. Communication
Research Reports, 21(1), 11–25.
Callahan, L. (2006). English or Spanish?! Language
accommodation in New York City service encounters.
Intercultural Pragmatics, 3(1), 29–53.
Chou, Y., & Cameron, G. T. (2005). Overcoming
ethnocentrism: The role of identity in contingent
practice of international public relations. Journal of
Public Relations Research, 17(2), 171–189.
Giles, H. (1973). Accent mobility: A model and some
data. Anthropological Linguistics, 15, 87–105.
Giles, H. (Ed.). (1977). Language, ethnicity and
intergroup relation. London: Academic Press.
McCann, R. M., Ota, H., Giles, H., & Caraker, R.
(2003). Accommodation and non-accommodation
across the lifespan: Perspectives from Thailand, Japan,
and the United States of America. Communication
Reports, 16(2), 69–91.
Miller, C. (2005). Between accommodation and
resistance: Upper Egyptian migrants in Cairo.
Linguistics, 43(5), 903–956.
Orbe, M. P. (1998). An outsider within perspective to
organizational communication: Explicating the
communicative practices of co-cultural group
members. Management Communication Quarterly,
12(2), 230–279.
Samovar, L. A., & Porter, R. E. (2004). Communication
between cultures (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Sandel, T. L., Chao, W.-Y., & Liang, C.-H. (2006).
Language shift and language accommodation across
family generations in Taiwan. Journal of Multilingual
and Multicultural Development, 27(2), 126–147.
Weyers, J. R. (1999). Spanish as an ethnic marker in
El Paso, Texas. Southwest Journal of Linguistics,
18(1), 103–116.
Acculturation
Acculturation, that is, to become part of a culture,
occurs when different cultural groups come
together, blending their cultural characteristics to
form new cultural characteristics. Acculturation
also occurs when an individual becomes immersed
in a different culture and, as a result, begins to
take on the cultural characteristics of that group.
Because identities refer to how one defines himself
or herself within the social context of culture,
acculturation is inextricably tied to identity. This
entry discusses the factors that influence the pro-
cess of acculturation.
In the 1960s, Chester Christian examined the
acculturation of bilingual children, asserting that
acculturation could be harmful to bilingual chil-
dren because the education system forces them to
choose between their native language and their
host cultural language. Christian argued that
young children have no voice when it comes to
acculturation, because they are born into a family

hearing and learning one language on a daily basis,
then they enter the school system at 4 or 5 years of
age and are expected to set aside all they learned in
favor of the host dominant language. As such,
acculturation seems to be largely based on power
and dominance. The more dominant group is usu-
ally the one exerting the most influence, whereby
the nondominant group must change to accom-
modate the dominant group and risk losing some
of its cultural characteristics.
Additional research suggests that as a person is
acculturated, he or she must unlearn old norms
associated with the original culture. In other
words, as one is acculturated into one group, one
is deculturated from another. Intercultural com-
munication scholar Fred Jandt outlined four levels
of acculturation—assimilation, integration, sepa-
ration, and marginalization—purporting that one’s
level of acculturation is largely dependent upon
cultural similarity and one’s own personality char-
acteristics. Those who assimilate into their host
culture tend to abandon their original culture,
valuing the new culture over the old culture. Those
who integrate attempt to maintain ties to both the
host culture and their original culture. Those who
separate are groups that simply live in the host
culture but segregate themselves among their own
ingroup members. They tend to live and work in
neighborhoods among their ingroup members,
such that they do not even need to learn the host
language. For instance, a Chinese immigrant who
lives in the United States but never leaves the
Chinatown area of a city is not likely to accultur-
ate successfully. Lastly, those who feel marginal-
ized do not feel acceptance within their host
culture or their original culture.
Various factors can influence a person’s process
of acculturation. The first factor is attitude.
According to Lily Arasaratnam, who examined the
experience of Sri Lankan immigrants living in
Sydney, Australia, a person’s attitude toward the
host culture, along with his or her motivation to
integrate, is a strong predictor of how that person
ultimately acculturates into the host culture. In
fact, when compared against a person’s reason for
migrating into a new culture, attitude was a much
stronger predictor. For instance, one can move
into a host culture involuntarily but maintain a
negative attitude toward that culture and, as a
result, never fully acculturate.
Acculturation 5
On the other hand, Seung-jun Moon and
Cheong Yi Park examined media effects on accul-
turation and determined that American mass
media had a significant positive impact on Korean
immigrants’ acceptance of American cultural val-
ues. In fact, American mass media cultivated such
a positive view of American culture among Korean
immigrants that many of them developed a nega-
tive view of Korean culture. This ultimately influ-
enced their desire to learn American culture and
unlearn Korean culture. Conversely, Shuang Liu
and Eric Louw examined the relationship among
print media exposure, ethnic identification, inter-
group contact and acculturation orientations of
Chinese immigrants in Australia and found that
exposure to ethnic newspapers had a negative
effect on acculturation but increased the likelihood
of separation.
A second factor that can influence acculturation
is the connection between one’s goals and motives.
For example, students with specific goals for learn-
ing English, such as to find employment or com-
plete a degree program, are often better able to
acculturate in the United States than those who
simply want to learn the language for personal
self-improvement.
A third factor influencing acculturation is the
similarity between one’s host culture and one’s
original culture. According to Jin Kim, the more
similarities there are between one’s host culture
and one’s original culture, the more likely a
migrant or sojourner will be able to successfully
acculturate. On the other hand, within an organi-
zational setting, higher-status employees are more
likely to successfully acculturate than lower-status
employees. For instance, an American who moves
to Japan to manage a company is more likely to
successfully acculturate than is a Mexican immi-
grant who moves to the United States and begins
working as a janitor.
The acculturation process varies for every indi-
vidual based on attitudes toward a host culture,
goals and motivations for entering a host culture,
status, and similarities between a host culture and
one’s original culture. The remaining question
examines the relationship between acculturation
and ethnic identity. In Liu and Louw’s analysis of
print media and acculturation, although findings
suggest that those who read their own ethnic news-
papers are less likely to acculturate, findings also
6 Adaptation
suggest that they are no more likely to have a
strong ethnic identification. In other words,
a Vietnamese immigrant who regularly reads
Vietnamese newspapers may not have any stronger
Vietnamese identification that one who does not
read those papers. However, he or she is less likely
to embrace American culture. This raises an impor-
tant question: Might there be various factors
beyond media exposure that impact immigrants’
ethnic identification? For instance, if immigrants
live in a neighborhood where they are surrounded
by ingroup members, their family actively practices
customs and norms of their original culture, and
they read ethnic papers, view ethnic television pro-
grams, and listen to ethnic music, then they might
be more likely to have strong ethnic identification
and be less likely to acculturate.
Donnetrice Allison
See also Accommodation; Bilingualism; Immigration
Further Readings
Arasaratnam, L. A. (2008). Acculturation processes of Sri
Lankan Tamil immigrants in Sydney: An ethnographic
analysis using the bidirectional model (BDM).
American Journal of Communication, 35, 57–68.
Christian, C. C., Jr. (1965). The acculturation of the
bilingual child. Modern Language Journal, 49,
160–165.
Gudykunst, W. B., & Kim, Y. Y. (2003). Communicating
with strangers: An approach to intercultural
communication (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Haviland, W. A. (2002). Cultural anthropology. Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth.
Jandt, F. E. (1995). Intercultural communication: An
introduction. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Kim, J. K. (1980). Explaining acculturation in a
communication framework: An empirical test.
Communication Monographs, 47, 155–179.
Komisarof, A. M. (2006). Facilitating positive
acculturation outcomes among American sojourners
teaching in Japanese schools. Human Communication,
9(1), 37–55.
Liu, S., & Louw, E. (2007). An examination of the
factors influencing ethnic identification and
acculturation of Chinese diasporas in Australia. China
Media Research, 3(3), 61–69.
Moon, S., & Park, C. Y. (2007). Media effects on
acculturation and biculturalism: A case study of
Korean immigrants in Los Angeles’ Koreatown. Mass
Communication and Society, 10(3), 319–343.
Rubenfeld, S., Sinclair, L., & Clement, R. (2007). Second
language learning and acculturation: The role of
motivation and goal content congruence. Canadian
Journal of Applied Linguistics, 10(3), 308–322.
Adaptation
Adaptation occurs through direct and indirect
contacts with an unfamiliar environment. The pro-
cess of adapting to a new culture is an ongoing,
interactive process between a person and his or her
environment. As a new entrant into a new culture,
one might first experience the stress of being unfa-
miliar with the environment and norms of the
environment. Over time, a person is likely to adapt
to those changes. However, with every adaptive
experience, other situations may come along that
will again cause stress. Nevertheless, through mak-
ing regular adjustments to various experiences, a
person is likely to achieve a sense of personal
growth. The process of adjusting or adapting to
one’s environment and to new circumstances is a
natural part of developing one’s own identity.
People come to know themselves better and come
to define themselves differently as they cycle
through varying adaptive experiences throughout
their lives. This entry discusses predictors and
challenges of adaptation.
According to intercultural communication
scholars Stella Ting-Toomey and Gao Ge, the basic
predictors of successful adaptation include the fol-
lowing: degree of “perceived” value similarity,
degree of nonverbal pattern similarity, degree of
verbal pattern similarity, second language compe-
tence, and private self-consciousness. The degree of
perceived value similarity is the extent to which a
sojourner perceives his or her new culture to have
values that are similar to his or her original culture.
The degree of nonverbal pattern similarity is the
degree to which a sojourner perceives the behav-
iors of people within the new culture to be similar
to those of people from his or her original culture.
Likewise, verbal pattern similarity suggests that
people of the new culture have a similar verbal
style to that of people of the original culture.
For instance, Ting-Toomey and Ge specifically

examined the adaptability of low-context individ-
uals (those who value explicit verbal communica-
tion) into high-context cultures (those who value
silence and nonverbal communication). Another
predictor suggests that a sojourner who is more
familiar with the language of a new culture is more
likely to experience positive adaptation; and
finally, a person’s confidence in his or her ability
to adapt plays a significant role in whether or not
adaptation is achieved.
Young Yun Kim’s analysis of the theory of
cross-cultural adaptation was based on an exami-
nation of American expatriates living in South
Korea. Interestingly, most of the American partici-
pants in the analysis reported positive and genuine
relationships or friendships with host nationals.
This contributed to their positive and rewarding
life experience overseas. Overall, they reported
“warm and nice treatment” and receptivity toward
Americans and meaningful relationships with local
people. On the other hand, American expatriates
expressed difficulty when it came to the verbal
behaviors of South Koreans, particularly as related
to their indirect or ambiguous communication
style and the degree of formality in the Korean
language. There were also different spatial rules in
Korean culture that the American participants
found frustrating. This may be due to the fact that,
as previously noted, there is very little verbal and
nonverbal pattern similarity between American
culture and South Korean culture. Lastly, few of
the American participants in the analysis had
become well versed in the language of their host
country; they spoke English during their entire stay
in Korea. This suggests that there is a perceived
power differential at work. In other words,
Americans who travel abroad do not often feel the
need to fully adapt to other cultures that are per-
ceived as subordinate to American culture. As
such, Americans often expect, and in many cases
receive, accommodations and preferential treat-
ment abroad. Hence, power or lack thereof also
seems to be a predictor of adaptation.
Regarding the adaptation of refugees into
American culture, there is a very different power
dynamic, particularly when it comes to female
refugees. They often experience triple marginaliza-
tion in the United States: as women, as refugees,
and as minorities. Researchers Julie Semlak, Judy
Pearson, Najla Amundson, and Anna Kudak
Adaptation 7
examined the experiences of female African refu-
gees and found that the three primary challenges
reported by female African immigrants are domes-
tic violence, changing family roles, and the lack of
a clear support network. The authors noted that
the women struggled with the perceived disparity
between their lifestyle and their perceptions of the
American lifestyle. The immigrants found many
contradictions in their lives in America, and they
believe those contradictions were a direct result of
moving to the United States. The four primary
contradictions they described included experiences
of both the positive and negative aspects of
America; being both included and excluded under
certain circumstances; being accepted by some and
rejected by others; and facing real life in America
versus the ideal life they had expected.
The process of adaptation is often dependent on
the social status of the immigrant, sojourner, refu-
gee, or expatriate. Higher-status individuals tend
to experience more positive interactions in their
host country than do lower-status individuals.
Successful adaptation is also impacted by value
similarity, verbal and nonverbal pattern similarity,
second language competence, and one’s own self-
concept. Additionally, a person’s length of stay
and motivation to adapt are also significant indica-
tors of success. For instance, a soldier who knows
that he is scheduled to be in a particular country
for only 18 months might be less motivated to
adapt to a new culture than a student who comes
to a country to further his education in a program
that takes several years to complete.
Donnetrice Allison
See also Accommodation; Acculturation; Culture Shock;
Identity Negotiation
Further Readings
Binder, S., & Tosic, J. (2005). Refugees as a particular
form of transnational migrations and social
transformations: Socioanthropological and gender
aspects. Current Sociology, 54, 607–624.
Hwa-Froelich, D. A., & Matsuoh, H. (2008). Cross-
cultural adaptation of internationally adopted Chinese
children communication and symbolic behavior
development. Communication Disorders Quarterly,
29(3), 149–165.
8 Aesthetics
Kim, Y. S. (2008). Communication experiences of
American expatriates in South Korea: A study of
cross-cultural adaptation. Human Communication,
11(4), 511–528.
Kim, Y. Y. (2001). Becoming intercultural: An integrative
theory of communication and cross-cultural
adaptation. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Semlak, J. L., Pearson, J. C., Amundson, N. G., &
Kudak, A. (2008). Navigating dialectic contradictions
experienced by female African refugees during cross-
cultural adaptation. Journal of Intercultural
Communication Research, 37(1), 43–64.
Ting-Toomey, S., & Ge, G. (1988). Intercultural
adaptation process in Japan: Perceived similarity, self-
consciousness, and language competence. World
Communication, 17(2), 193–206.
Aesthetics
As a branch of philosophy, aesthetics has tradi-
tionally dealt with beauty and taste in relation to
judgment and evaluation. In relation to art, aes-
thetics has a long history of debate—whether or
not, for example, beauty and meaning are inherent
in a work of art itself or located, instead, in the
historical context of an art object. The purpose of
art also has long been debated. The purpose of this
entry is to give a brief context for aesthetics as a
field of study and then to focus more specifically
on contemporary views of aesthetics and its rela-
tionship to identity. Identity in this context is
considered as the relationship of aesthetics to the
construction of the subject (the self). Viewed this
way, identity is constructed through an interaction
with an artwork, the artist, other viewers, and
context for the artwork. The terms subject and
subjectivity in this entry refer to identity.
Beauty, Taste, and Disinterest
As a field, aesthetics was formally developed in
the 18th century. One of the early influential theo-
rists of aesthetics was Immanuel Kant, whose
theory of beauty was comprised of four concepts:
freedom from concepts, defined as purpose; objec-
tivity, attributed to the universality of certain
experiences and thereby rendering them objective;
disinterest, an intellectual involvement with an
object of study in which an individual removes
feelings and personal experience from the encoun-
ter, thus creating no meaning beyond the object
itself and enjoyed for its own sake; and its obligato-
riness, or the ways in which this selfless disinterest
in viewing an artwork, rather than a desire to pos-
sess it, allows us to rise above passions and interests
and thus engage in an act of morality. For Kant,
subjectivity is presumed by a unity of experience
across individuals.
Philosopher David Hume, along with Kant,
advanced the notion of taste, arguing that taste
could be developed and refined through education.
But Kant further distinguished between pleasures
and beauty, the latter of which he assigned to art.
Aesthetics was therefore advanced as a value
in and of itself. The concept of taste continues
today and has been advanced by others, notably
Frank Sibley.
Aesthetics and aesthetic experience can be
viewed as both pleasurable and unpleasant.
Philosopher Edmund Burke added the concept of
sublime to the concept of beauty in the mid-18th
century, thus establishing an argument for aesthet-
ics as comprised not just of pure beauty but also of
pain, horror, and drama.
The philosophical tradition set forth by Kant’s
notion of aesthetics, as well as notions of taste and
the sublime, is evident in both modern art and
modernist philosophy of the 20th century.
Modernist philosophy emphasized form, in which
the beauty or quality of art is inherent in the art
itself and therefore evaluated without any refer-
ence to historical, social, cultural, or political
influences. Modernist art and philosophy strove
for a formal and universal language rather than
focusing on, or representing, everyday life experi-
ences or personal identity. External references to
the art were not considered when judging the value
of a work of art.
Whereas media and materials have nearly
always been hierarchically ranked in terms of their
artistic value, the concept of fine art became
aligned with the notion of aesthetic, in contrast to
applied arts, crafts, or entertainment, which
became aligned with the utilitarian or domestic.
Fine art came to be considered as objects of virtue,
beauty, and sublimity, and aesthetics became
aligned with the idea of taste that was separate,
and elevated, from other pleasurable pursuits.
During the 19th and 20th centuries, the idea of

“art for art’s sake” arose as theories of the aes-
thetic separated from moral philosophy linking art
with virtue. The concept of the artist became
aligned with these views as one who is uniquely
gifted or genius, a conduit for divine inspiration
yet schooled in a particular art form.
Postmodern and Contemporary Aesthetics
Postmodernism and contemporary art often
emphasize the critical link between meaning and
historical, social, cultural, and political influences.
Theories of aesthetics have been extended to
include objects and experiences that had typically
been ignored by modernist aesthetics. The influ-
ence of language and semiotic theory, Marxist and
neo-Marxist analyses of culture and commodity,
and postmodern theories of history that emphasize
multiple truths, origins, and narratives are but a
few of the positions that challenge the concept that
meaning and value can be determined devoid of
context. Visual culture is a concept of art inquiry
that includes the social, political, and cultural con-
text of art; extends the definition of art to include
all visual images (e.g., advertisements, comic
books, computer games); and includes theories of
viewing that challenge the notion of a disinterested
gaze (in the Kantian sense).
Theories that account for subjectivity are chal-
lenging notions of identity for both artist and
viewer. Scholars from fields such as philosophy,
feminist studies, anthropology, sociology, cultural
studies, art history, and art education have argued
for new conceptions of aesthetics that simultane-
ously advance new conceptions of subjectivity, or
identity. Many of these center on the notion of
subjectivity not as a universal experience but
rather as an intersubjective, reciprocal relationship
between people, and between people, objects, and
environment. The artist as genius, heroic, and
working alone has been called into question
through theories that advance intersubjective
encounters. It is also the case that as new art forms
emerge and as the concept of art has been chal-
lenged and expanded, theories reflecting these new
aesthetic forms have been developed. The informa-
tion age, heightened by advances in computer
technology and the advent of the Internet and the
World Wide Web, has led to heightened global
awareness and a blurring of boundaries between
Aesthetics 9
art disciplines and non-art disciplines. These issues
are explored in the next sections.
Gender, Race, and Aesthetics
Feminist theorists have questioned the popular
image of the artist and the corresponding aesthet-
ics that support such a view in order to determine
why there are so few women recognized as artists
in society. It has been argued, for example, that
the image of the artist as the lone, creative spirit
does not fit with the historical social confinement
of and restrictions on women; it has also been
argued that women were not capable of such tal-
ent. One of the major critiques of art and aesthet-
ics concerns the assumption of the male subject,
either implied through the gaze or through the
discourse surrounding art. The notion of disinter-
est, established by Kant but continued through
theories of the aesthetic attitude, has been chal-
lenged. Women, for example, have historically
been given the status of being looked at in art,
while men are the ones who look, thus construct-
ing a theory of the gaze as actively masculine. Such
theories reject the concept of disinterest and the
separation of emotions such as desire from plea-
sure. Vision, in other words, is political. Theories
of the gaze also challenge the idea that there is a
universal subject who views a work of art, particu-
larly when that subject is someone who does not
conform to the standards of viewing. Philosopher
and psychoanalyst Luce Irigaray has influenced
feminist theory in art with her view of female sub-
jectivity as it is constructed through social systems
of meaning such as language.
Feminist artists have subverted many of the aes-
thetic values that construct definitions of art and
artist, therefore challenging the very notion of art.
Many have elaborated an aesthetics of the sublime,
using disgust, shock, and ambiguity as an aes-
thetic. Examples of such artists are Karen Finley,
Jana Sterbak, and Janine Antoni.
Cultural theorists, scholars of color, and artists
are also challenging the notion of the universal
subject as well as what counts as taste, beauty,
value, and other traditional aspects of aesthetic
judgment. Many scholars write about the transfor-
mative power of aesthetics and its ability to create
alternative realities, political action, and the ability
to remake one’s identity. In her research on
10 Aesthetics
Japanese artisanship and Asian American theater,
anthropologist Dorinne Kondo describes the ways
in which aesthetics is always political: It can be
co-opted and remade in order to create identity.
Challenging the aesthetic concept of disinterested-
ness, artists and scholars seek to subvert and
undermine the universal “gaze” by exposing it as a
largely colonial, White, male subject.
Intersubjectivity, Art,
and Aesthetic Encounters
It has been suggested that the aesthetic framework
for evaluating modern and contemporary art is no
longer focused on the object itself but on the con-
text of the object and on the interaction between
object and viewer. Several theories of aesthetics
refer to notions of community, participation, con-
text, and activism. Happenings, Fluxus, and per-
formance art of the 1970s, for example, are some
of the earlier movements in art that addressed such
issues. More recently, a number of artists and arts
collectives have explored the relationship between
art and the broader social, cultural, and political
context. In this section, theories of aesthetics that
focus on collective agency, intersubjectivity, dia-
logue, and community are explored. Although
some of these contemporary theories do not
directly address the construct of identity, they nev-
ertheless have implications for theories about the
self as a viewer or as a maker of art.
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari
Two French philosophers serve as examples of
this new line of inquiry. Philosopher Gilles Deleuze
discusses the issue of representation of the indi-
vidual to an other or to a group, and of the image
to an object. Deleuze, reacting to the ideas of this
Enlightened subject, created a theory of subjectiv-
ity that was based on a multifaceted plane.
Deleuze’s concept of the fold is based on Liebniz’s
concept of the monad, elaborated in The Fold:
Leibniz and the Baroque. Deleuze saw the fold in
terms of space, movement, and time, with the
world consisting of an infinite number of folds.
Thus, people, history, and events are multifac-
eted, with subjectivity always in the process of
becoming. The subject is also always intertwined
with matter.
Philosopher and psychoanalyst Félix Guattari,
who coauthored A Thousand Plateaus with
Deleuze, also worked toward a theory of subjec-
tivity that was relational and plural, in association
with others. Aesthetics are not bound to the art
world; rather, Guattari saw it as an alternative to
scientific and rationalistic modes of thought, pro-
cedures, and knowledge. His notion of an ethico-
aesthetic paradigm defines aesthetic practices as a
fluid process of becoming. Art might also lead to
the reformation of the subject, a recasting of indi-
vidual and collective subjectivities. Art is interwo-
ven with the psyche.
The rhizomatic nature of subjectivity—a concept
advanced by both Deleuze and Guattari—comes
from the idea that the universe is entwined within
each person, which reflects the world from its own
perspective. There is a mutual relationship between
subject and world through mutual enfolding.
Deleuze and Guattari viewed modern art as chal-
lenging stereotypes and fixed ideas of identity,
directly confronting the idea of representation. The
artist is someone who creates new ways of being in
the world.
Nicolas Bourriaud and Relational Aesthetics
Relational aesthetics, developed by Nicolas
Bourriaud, offers a theory of aesthetics consisting
of judging artworks on the basis of “inter-human
relations which they represent, produce, or
prompt.” Bourriaud sought to develop an aesthet-
ics that would account for art in the 1990s, which
included artistic practices opening up through mul-
timedia and the Internet. Arguing that many artists
of the 1990s take into account social context and
human relations rather than creating artworks
independently and for private consumption,
Bourriaud saw the audience as a community in
which the meaning of art is collaboratively created.
Rather than an artwork being an encounter between
a single audience member and object, viewing as a
community is intersubjective. The relation of
which Bourriaud writes is not just between people;
it is also and often between viewer and artwork,
including the space in which the artwork appears.
He calls this the “criterion of coexistence.”
Bourriaud took into account the fact that many
artworks of the 1990s (and, indeed, the latter half
of the 20th century) considered, or were constituted

by, environmental features and their immediate
context. In contrast to artists in the 1960s, who
developed utopian ideas about social change, he
argued that artists of the 1990s were more con-
cerned with the present, immediate social issues, or
microtopias, in which artists and viewers could act
in the here and now. Among the artists he mentions
are Vanessa Beecroft, Maurizio Cattelan, Liam
Gillick, Christine Hill, Carsten Höller, Pierre
Huyghe, Jorge Pardo, Philippe Parreno, and Rirkrit
Tiravanija. Each of these artists references the
immediate social context in some way, emphasizing
its use of existing social and cultural forms (e.g., the
museum space itself) and thus inviting the viewer to
participate in some way.
Grant Kester and Dialogical Aesthetics
Bourriaud’s theory of relational aesthetics shares
a foundation with the work of other theorists who
examine community art, public art, site-specific
art, and environmental art. Dialogical aesthetics,
the theory of art critic and art historian Grant
Kester, contends that all community art is con-
cerned with facilitating dialogue and exchange.
Kester recognizes the difficulty in defining the term
community but focuses on the complex forms of
identification that exist between individuals and
larger collectives such as ethnicities, religions,
nations, and institutions.
Unlike finished artworks, which typically pro-
voke conversation postproduction, dialogue
becomes an integral part of the artwork in com-
munity and public art projects. There is an inter-
action between the artist and the participant that
escapes traditional art critique and aesthetics.
Kester argues that the view of community art as
less valued than institutional art is embedded in
the 17th and 18th centuries when the idea of
taste was relegated to an educated elite. Moreover,
community art suggests a different view of the
artist; rather than the independent, heroic artist,
a community art aesthetic suggests that an artist
is defined by openness, listening, and a willing-
ness to accept dependence and intersubjective
vulnerability in relation to the collaborator or
viewer. The artist in this model is often defined
as social reformer. Some of the artists, collec-
tives, and artworks that Kester cites as models of
collective identity and action include Toro
Aesthetics 11
Adeniran-Kane, Ala Plastica, Ernesto Noriega,
Suzanne Lacy, Littoral, Temporary Services, and
WochenKlausur.
Kester bases his model in part on Jürgen
Habermas’s concept of identity as constructed
through social and discursive interaction. Rather
than seeking generalizable or universal agreement
or judgment on a work of art, dialogical aesthet-
ics is based on local consensual knowledge and
collective action. It is also based on the idea of
intersubjective exchange. One’s sense of self is
formed through dialogue about aesthetics, and it
is also reciprocal. This mode of identity is based
on connected knowing, a term borrowed from
feminist theorists, in which participants attempt
to identify with the perspectives of others.
Identities thus maintain a provisional coherence
open to others’ experiences.
A dual tension inherent in collective or commu-
nity identity has been recognized by Kester as well
as others. On the one hand, collective identities
encourage us to break down isolation and fear of
others by promoting shared consciousness through
common experiences; on the other hand, an
abstract generality such as the nation suppresses
differences present in any collective. Art historian
Miwon Kwon critiques the idea of community as
a unified subject, arguing that artists and archi-
tects must work to convey the impossibility of
consolidation, and calls instead for a collective
praxis. She warns against any easy correspondence
between community or individual identity and
particular social issues. Instead, the artist should
strive to raise questions and make viewers uncom-
fortable with who they are.
Many other scholars have written about new
genres of art and its relationship to social change
and the larger sociocultural context. For example,
art critic Suzi Gablik develops a dialogic approach
to art making in her book, The Reenchantment
of Art.
Kimberly Powell
See also Race Performance
Further Readings
Bourriaud, N. (2002). Relational aesthetics (S. Pleasance
& F. Woods, Trans.). Dijon-Quetigny, France: Les
presses du réel.
12 Afrocentricity
Deleuze, G. (1992). The fold: Leibniz and the baroque.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Deleuze, G., & Guatarri, F. (1987). A thousand plateaus:
Capitalism and schizophrenia (B. Massumi, Trans.).
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Gablik, S. (1991). The reenchantment of art. New York:
Thames & Hudson.
Guattari, F. (1995). Chaosmosis: An ethico-aesthetic
paradigm (P. Bains & J. Pefanis, Trans.).
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Kant, I. (1987). Critique of judgment (W. S. Pluhar,
Trans.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Kester, G. (2004). Conversation pieces: Community and
communication in modern art. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Korsmeyer, C. (2004). Gender and aesthetics: An
introduction. New York: Routledge.
Mulvey, L. (1975). Visual pleasure and narrative cinema.
Screen, 16(3), 6–18.
Nochlin, L. (1971). Why have there been no great
women artists? Artnews, 69, 22–71.
Afrocentricity
Afrocentricity is the critical analysis and interpre-
tation of culture, economy, history, language,
philosophy, politics, and society from a concep-
tual, methodological, and theoretical framework
that centers Africa and privileges the agency of
Africans and persons of African descent.
Afrocentricity is a critical and reflexive response
to the production and reproduction of knowledge
that absolutely privileges the peoples, cultures,
thoughts, and experiences of Europe. After a brief
review of the origins of Afrocentricity, this entry
further defines the concept and discusses its role in
education and the social sciences.
Origins
The theory of Afrocentricity was developed by
Temple University professor Molefi Asante, who
articulated its fullest expression in his germinal
texts Afrocentricity and The Afrocentric Idea.
Although the theoretical expression of Afrocentri­
city is credited to Asante, the roots of the idea of
Afrocentricity lie within the protean strands of
Africana social and political thought, particularly
with such 19th-century figures as Edward Wilmont
Blyden, Martin Delany, Henry Highland Garnett,
and Mary Ann Shadd and such 20th-century per-
sonalities as Aimé Césaire, Cheikh Anta Diop,
Marcus Garvey, Na’im Akbar, and Maulana
Karenga. Indeed, it was none other than the intel-
lectual W. E. B. Du Bois who first used a variant
of the term Afrocentricity—Afrocentrism—in 1961
to describe the critical principle informing his
Encyclopedia Africana project.
Definition
Afrocentricity is not a single monolithic theory of
knowledge but rather constitutes a gathering space
for multiple theoretical orientations—from the
Africology of Asante to the Kemetic theories
advanced by Jacob Carruthers—that focus on
African agency, culture, history, philosophy, and
society in an effort to reconstruct a global African
identity and subjectivity.
In efforts to explain the raison d’être of
Afrocentricity, some researchers examine the his-
tory of chattel slavery in the Americas and the
processes by which Europeans marginalized and
negated the agency of Africans and the histories of
Africa. The narrative arc of this line of argument
begins with the processes by which slave masters
invalidated and deemed illegitimate the cultures,
histories, and thoughts of Africa and every vestige
of the African past that a captive African might
have tried to hold on to and maintain in the face
of captivity. The first step in this process was the
removal of Africans from their physical center, the
continent of Africa. Dislocated from Africa,
Africans were relocated to various lands in the
Americas where the process of dislocation and
decentering continued. Previously grounded or
centered in Africa, Africans were introduced to
and forced to accept a new center. African names
were replaced with European names. African spiri-
tual practices and beliefs were dislocated, and
some variants were relocated within hybridized
forms of European Christianity. African languages
were deemed inferior in relation to those of vari-
ous European colonizers and enslavers. African
values, habits, and ways of life were replaced by
the “centricity” of Europe in service to, and in sup-
port of, the imperial/colonial efforts of Europe.
Folkways, mores, and norms that were developed
from an African center and worked for sustaining

and advancing Africa and Africans were negated
and marginalized by Europeans in order to further
develop Europe and European progress. This intri-
cate and complex process had the corollary effect
of arresting Africa’s development.
Afrocentrists are involved in a reconstructive
effort that places Africans at the center in an
attempt to reconnect them with the traditions, cus-
toms, norms, and ways of life that predominated
for African people for thousands of years prior to
contact and domination by Europe. Thus,
Afrocentricity can be viewed as a form of resis-
tance to Eurocentric hegemony and domination.
What Afrocentricity is not is Eurocentrism in
reverse. Afrocentrists do not seek to impose an
African-centered worldview on other peoples or to
posit that it is the only and exclusive framework
for legitimate knowledge production. Rather,
Afrocentricity is a theory of knowledge through
which proponents seek to inform and educate
African people and, by extension, all people about
the cultures, histories, philosophies, and traditions
that Africans have and continue to produce.
Afrocentricity and Education
Afrocentricity critically informed the educational
and political philosophies of Black students at
higher educational institutions in the United States
in the latter half of the 20th century. Informed by
the modern Black freedom struggles in Africa and
throughout the Black world that emerged in the
last half of the 20th century, Black youth in the
late 1960s and 1970s began to enter college and
demand an educational curriculum that reflected
African contributions to world history and civili-
zation. Students argued that Eurocentrism served
as the guiding principle for every discipline offered
at the university. The disciplines of biology, chem-
istry, economics, history, linguistics, law, philoso-
phy, politics, and religion privileged the peoples,
cultures, and ideas of Europe. An important exam-
ple of this, the students noted, was that Pythagoras,
not the Black Egyptians from which he studied
under for 21 years, is credited with the discovery
of what is now called the Pythagorean theorem.
Although the origins of humanity lie in Africa and
the Egyptians were prolific chroniclers of history,
Herodotus is conferred the title of the “Father of
History.” Columbus is credited with the discovery
Afrocentricity 13
of America despite the presence of people there
when he arrived and despite the fact that the
Chinese and Africans had established trade with
the Americas hundreds of years before Columbus’s
voyage. These were but a few of the critical correc-
tions that Black activist college students sought to
remedy by establishing forms of African-centered
education.
This awakening of an Afrocentric conscious-
ness was also expressed beyond the confines of
higher education. In African American communi-
ties throughout the United States, parents of
Black children sought to fill in the vast blanks left
by a European-centered public education with
recourse to African-centered curricula whereby
Africans and people of African descent are treated
as the subjects of history rather than objects. In
addition to filling in the blanks, these parents
wanted a measure of control over what their chil-
dren learned and how they were socialized. Black
parents wanted a cultural grounding in their
children’s social development that was contrary
to the Eurocentric form of socialization, which
emphasized the individual, individual self-
actualization, and narrow self-interest. Black
parents advocated for a more African-centered
communal form of socialization where the group
and community are important. In 1972, the
Council of Independent Black Institutions was
formed to serve as a broad-based organization
consisting of schools dedicated to correcting the
deficiencies of existing forms of Eurocentric edu-
cation and to implementing African-centered cur-
ricula and pedagogy.
In private Black educational institutions, the
philosophy of the Nguzu Saba or Seven Principles
is used to guide and critically inform instruction.
The seven principles are unity, self-determination,
collective work and responsibility, cooperative
economics, purpose, creativity, and faith. It is the
goal of these schools to instill these principles in
students, along with the requisite knowledge devel-
oped within an African-centered educational
framework, in order to prepare Black students for
advanced education at the collegiate level and
to facilitate the development of conscious and ethi-
cally motivated people who are dedicated and com-
mitted to improving Black communities and the
African world. This serves as one of the educational
aims of Afrocentrists.
14 Afrocentricity
Afrocentricity and the Social Sciences
In the United States, social, political, and economic
power is asymmetrically distributed among racial
and ethnic groups. Arguably, these asymmetries of
power result from the history and lingering effects
of White supremacy, which was foundational to
the origins and development of the United States.
These power configurations and their resulting
social effects are the formative material that informs
the research and teaching programs of many social
scientists. In addition, the psychological problems
that result from these historic and contemporary
power arrangements also play a significant role in
forming the research agenda of social scientists.
Since the inception and formalization of the
social sciences in the modern academy, the intel-
lectual protocols of Europe have served as the
source and guiding norms informing the defini-
tions, theories, and methods of the various social
science disciplines. This situation perpetuates
European hegemony and African abnormality, as
European culture serves as the model and basis for
all social life; forms of life that deviate from these
norms are thereby deemed illegitimate and patho-
logical. Moreover, this situation has the effect of
enabling the construction of social reality that
maintains the asymmetric relations of power, posi-
tion, and privilege in favor of Whites over and
against Blacks.
Afrocentrists redefine the fields of the social sci-
ences by providing new models and conceptions of
social life and ways of human being and belonging
that relate to the historical and contemporary cen-
trality of Africa, that theorize from an agential
point of view informed by the intellectual tradi-
tions of Africa, and that facilitate the healthy
development and integration of the African and
persons of African descent. An Afrocentric social
science privileges the individual within commu-
nity. For example, healing, whether individual or
collective, is properly understood as a community
event. Therefore, the Afrocentric approach would
privilege a model of healing that is communal in
scale and scope. This does not mean that the indi-
vidual is forgotten and that the individual does not
have a part to play in his or her own wellness, but
rather the individual is not absolutely isolated and
is critically linked to a larger social and cultural
collective. This also entails that the individual is
guided in a process of reflection and conscious
awareness of how a particular issue is connected to
the histories of African denial and denigration,
choices structured in formations of dominance,
and effects that are individual and collective. In
essence, educators supporting Afrocentricity in the
social sciences attempt to restore the African self
in an integral and holistic fashion for the better-
ment of the health and well-being of the entire
African community.
The Future of Afrocentricity
Since its formal inception, Afrocentricity has had
tremendous effects on education, on various social
and civic institutions, and on cultural life in the
United States, Africa, and throughout the African
diaspora. Afrocentrists have developed robust and
complex theoretical and methodological frame-
works, and Afrocentricity now holds a dominant
position within the field of Africana Studies in
higher educational institutions throughout the
United States. Despite some setbacks as a result of
a series of public controversies in the 1980s and
1990s and internal disagreements at its main insti-
tutional home in the United States, Temple
University, Afrocentricity remains a vibrant and
contested field of knowledge. As such, it promises
to continue to make significant contributions in
the production of new knowledge anchored in
African agency and centered on and in Africa.
Corey D. B. Walker and
Samuel Burbanks IV
See also Authenticity; Black Atlantic; Collective/Social
Identity; Colonialism; Culture, Ethnicity, and Race;
Diaspora; Eurocentricity
Further Readings
Asante, M. K. (1988). Afrocentricity (2nd ed.).
Lawrenceville, NJ: Africa World Press.
Asante, M. K. (1998). The Afrocentric idea (Rev. ed.).
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Mazama, A. (Ed.). (2003). The Afrocentric paradigm.
Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
Moses, W J. (1998). Afrotopia: The roots of African
American popular history. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.

Age
Age is an independent basis for drawing social
distinctions across societies. It plays a significant
role in shaping daily practices and understandings
of oneself and of others. In everyday life, people
are divided into age categories such as children,
youth, adults, and seniors. Each of these group-
ings has its own schema of appropriate behavior
or attributes and is associated with a correspond-
ing set of social relationships with other people
and with institutions like the education system,
the labor market, and the state. The process of
human aging involves passing through a sequence
of age-based stages across the life span and social-
izing into implicit and explicit roles associated
with each of these stages. The course of transition
from one life stage to another is often marked by
social and private rites of passage.
This entry first discusses the social and cultural
constructions of age identity. Next, research
approaches to studying age identity are addressed.
The entry concludes with an examination of the
transformation of life course dynamics in modern
society.
The Social and Cultural
Constructions of Age Identity
Whereas growing up or growing old are natural
processes, the understanding of and reaction to
these processes are not. Findings of cross-cultural
research reveal that there is a great deal of varia-
tion in the way societies divide and symbolize the
life course and in the role assigned to different age
identities. The experience of being young or old
thus varies from society to society, depending on
the specific sociocultural contexts and variables
such as life expectancy, kinship patterns, or ideas
of personhood and independency.
For instance, sociologists and social historians
agree that an elaborate notion of childhood did
not exist in the Western world before the Industrial
Revolution. Children had only become a differen-
tiated social group and an object for adult inter-
vention (by parents, the church, governments) in
the 17th century. The singling out of childhood as
a separate life stage was a combined effect of a
Age 15
series of social changes, including the rise of com-
pulsory education, the emergence of the nuclear
family (employed father, nonemployed mother,
and dependent children) and advancement in tech-
nology, such as the printing press. Likewise, the
forced expulsion of older people from the labor
market through retirement, the emergence of pen-
sion and welfare payments, and the development
of professions such as medicine, nursing, and
social work over the past century have helped
establish the modern category of old age as a
period of social dependency. Although the dispa-
rate notions of childhood and old age are widely
embraced across modern societies, they remain far
from universal. Thus, the common conception of
adolescence as a stage of “storm and stress” in
Western societies is unfamiliar to many Eastern
cultures, which perceive the transition from youth
to adulthood as one continuous process. These
examples of differences in perception of the life
course indicate that age identity and experience are
fundamentally social and cultural constructs.
To illustrate the complexity of the concept of
aging, it is useful to differentiate between different
types or meanings of age:
•• Biological or physiological age refers to the
physical aging of the human body.
•• Chronological age represents the amount of time
that has passed from the date of birth.
•• Psychological age stands for age-related adaption
capacities of an individual.
•• Social age signifies norms, behavior, and
attitudes conceived as appropriate for an age
group.
The four types of age are separate but interre-
lated. Although biological processes of growing up
or older are more or less universal and provide a
context for sociopsychological development, these
processes seldom completely determine the charac-
teristics of psychological and social age. In reality,
chronological age is open to cultural interpreta-
tions. Social practices and lifestyles also have pro-
found impacts upon the process of physical
maturity as well as definition of biological goals.
Sociologists and anthropologists are particularly
interested in exploring the intersection of different
meanings of age and how age groups and identities
16 Age
are constituted over time. Answering these ques-
tions has profound implications for understanding
how age shapes the way societies are organized
and experienced.
Approaches to the Study of Age Identity
There are three broad approaches to the study of
age identity: the life course approach, the genera-
tion approach, and the social construction
approach. The life course approach has been most
influential in the social scientific study of age and
health issues over the past 20 years. Adherents of
this approach replace the idea of life cycle, which
treats aging as merely a natural or biological pro-
cess, with the concept of life course. The most
important insight of supporters of the life course
approach is their attempt to link social structure
and history to the unfolding of human lives.
Instead of focusing on characteristics of a specific
life phase, those who take the life course approach
pay attention to variations in the pathways of life
transitions and to the ways social and institutional
contexts shape the timing of a person entering a
particular stage. Life course analysts are interested
in explaining and describing people’s pathways
through major social institutions (such as educa-
tion, work, and family) and how these contexts
shape the timing and experience of significant life
events (such as getting a job, getting married, hav-
ing a child, retiring, or dealing with major periods
of illness or unemployment). These analysts take
into consideration the impacts of earlier life events
on later life experience of the individual. By
emphasizing the intersection of social history,
structure, and individual trajectory, analysts who
take the life course approach offer a comprehen-
sive account of the transformation of age identity
across the life span.
Unlike the researchers who take the life course
approach, which focuses on transition and conti-
nuity of life events, those who take the generation
approach concentrate on how different locations
in historical time set a boundary for individual
development and formation of aspiration and val-
ues. The origin of the generation approach can be
traced back to Karl Mannheim, who provided the
first systematic account of the concept of genera-
tion. Those who follow the generation approach
argue that birth cohorts (i.e., those persons born at
approximately the same period) live particular his-
torical events together and share similar experi-
ences of encounter with social institutions. These
collective experiences have the potential to shape
the outlook and practices of people in the same
birth cohort. People from different social genera-
tions thus possess distinctive worldviews. They
may act in different ways or perceive the same
situation differently. Over the past decades,
researchers taking the generation approach have
stimulated a whole series of studies on the sociopo-
litical orientation, values, and attitudes of different
historical cohorts.
Researchers taking the social construction
approach take a different route to the study of age
identity. In contrast to adherents of the life course
approach and the generation approach, who treat
the life stage and its associated attributes as tangi-
ble facts or patterns, those who support the social
construction approach conceive age identity as
something that is accomplished and maintained
through daily interaction. Representing the rich
heritage of symbolic interactionism, the social con-
struction approach entails the study of the variety
of social practices people use to articulate their
experiences of change across the life span. In addi-
tion to examining processes of how ideas like life
course are socially negotiated and constructed,
researchers who take this approach also explore
how people make sense of personal experiences
through time by drawing on ideas about the pat-
terns, rhythms, and cycles in life. From the point of
view of the social constructionists, age identities
and life course are both something people work at
in everyday life and an interpretive resource they
use to produce and interpret social realities.
Transformation of Life Course
Dynamics in Late Modernity
There is growing concern among sociologists
about the transformation of life course dynamics
under conditions of major demographic and insti-
tutional change in late modernity or postmoder-
nity (roughly the period since the last quarter of
the 20th century). One prominent characteristic of
modern society is the standardization of life events
and periods. Since the 19th century, the life course
has become increasingly standardized as a result of
the rise of institutions of government, work, and

education, which attempt, in various ways, to
regulate social behaviors. This regulation is typi-
cally linked to age. The expansion of state and
business activities and the setting up of institu-
tional timetables for life transitions helped estab-
lish a clearly differentiated life course and facilitated
the synchronization of social roles and events
across different life domains. The well-defined
divisions in modern societies between childhood,
adolescence, adulthood, and old age are embedded
within social organizations and institutional con-
nections between the state, market, and family. In
late modernity, these institutions and their link-
ages have undergone radical transformations,
which ultimately challenge the division or bound-
aries surrounding the modernist life stages.
For instance, the global expansion and penetra-
tion of mass media into family life deprive parents
of control over information from the adult world
and progressively erodes the distinction between
childhood and adulthood. The transformation of
work associated with technological development,
the decline of traditional occupations and indus-
tries and the rise of new ones, rising unemploy-
ment and the emergence of nonstandard forms of
employment such as part-time and casual work,
irregular working hours, and subcontracting all
interrupt the smooth transition to adulthood that
was organized around the movement from school
to work in most of the 20th century. In addition,
the improvement of life expectancy and health
technologies give rise to the so-called third age for
healthy persons who are able to live an indepen-
dent life after retirement. In line with the rise of a
consumer culture, age identities are increasingly
constructed around lifestyle choices and consump-
tion of goods and services rather than on relations
to institutions of education, work, and family.
This opens possibilities for especially older adults
to break out from a fixed conception of old age
that is associated with disability and detachment.
Given that radical social and economic changes
loosen the individual from ties to tradition and
familial contexts, the life course or age identity has
increasingly become what sociologist Anthony
Giddens called a reflexive project or an endeavor
for which the individual is responsible for planning
and revising continuously. Overall, the structure of
the life course in late modernity has become more
fluid, fragmented, and individualized. It has moved
Age 17
away from rigid chronological and generational
boundaries and become more open-ended. Recent
empirical studies have found evidence of disrup-
tion in times between life course transitions (edu-
cation to work, single status to partnering and
marriage or cohabitation, childbearing and child­
rearing, and so on) as well as a separation of social
roles with individuals increasingly occupying over-
lapping roles that are characteristics of distinct life
stages (e.g., single parent in education, retired
person who has repartnered, full-time student in
part-time employment). This research also sug-
gests that the timing and sequencing of transition
markers between life stages have become more
variable across many Western societies. Given the
significance of age as an important aspect of social
identity, the structuring and transformation of the
life course will remain a central focus of social
scientific inquiry.
Chi-Wai Lui
See also Class; Consumption; Culture; Modernity and
Postmodernity; Reflexive Self or Reflexivity; Social
Constructionist Approach to Personal Identity; Society
and Social Identity
Further Readings
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity: Self and
society in the late modern age. Cambridge, UK: Polity
Press.
Hockey, J., & James, A. (2003). Social identities across
the life course. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Holstein, J., & Gubrium, J. (2000). Constructing the life
course (2nd ed.). Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.
Lucy, S. (2005). The archaeology of age. In M. Díaz-
Andreu, S. Lucy, S. Babić, & D. N. Edwards, The
archaeology of identity: Approaches to gender, age,
status, ethnicity and religion (pp. 43–66). London:
Routledge.
O’Rand, A. (2004). The future of the life course: Late
modernity and life course risks. In J. Mortimer &
M. Shanahan (Eds.), Handbook of the life course
(pp. 693–701). New York: Springer.
Shanahan, M. (2000). Pathways to adulthood in
changing societies: Variability and mechanisms in life
course perspective. Annual Review of Sociology,
26, 667–692.
Vincent, J. (2005). Understanding generations: Political
economy and culture in an ageing society. British
Journal of Sociology, 56(4), 579–599.
18 Agency
Agency
The term agency refers to the extent to which indi-
viduals have the capacity to choose the action that
they take. Human agency involves the proposition
that individuals both make choices, irrespective of
how they come to make them, and enact them.
Such a proposition brings morality into play: If a
situation has arisen because of human decision
making, then those making such decisions may
legitimately be held responsible and value judg-
ments may be made in light of the actions taken.
The central debate concerning agency is the
extent to which that which is outside the individual
human being (the collective, discourse, structure,
etc.) overrides that individual’s capacity for agency.
One argument would be, for instance, that even
though someone subjectively believes or feels that
he or she is making a decision, this decision is more
accurately seen as arising out of the cultural, polit-
ical, historical, and linguistic context which the
individual inhabits. Put crudely, there is tension
between, on the one hand, the individual being
said to make choices with intentionality in light of
the freedom that he or she has, with these choices
leading to actions, and, on the other, the conten-
tion that there is no such freedom and no such
choice, but determinism and inevitability, with the
individual acting in accordance with structures,
society, and the individual’s environment.
Agency Versus Structure:
Early Contemporary Theories
Concepts of agency, culture, and structure in early
sociological theory tended toward the reductionist.
For example, seen from a traditional Marxist posi-
tion, the subject of social change—the agent—is
collective. It is collective behavior, rather than
individual behavior, that is significant. The collec-
tive creates history; human beings, as social ani-
mals, are, together, the agents of social change.
Abstract forces such as “history” or “the party”
do not. Class is the main collective that Karl Marx
refers to, and class is characterized through Marx’s
use of Ludwig Feuerbach’s idea of the species-
being having human essence, not within the indi-
vidual but in terms of action as a social being.
Marx’s subversion of the Hegelian dialectic as an
exchange between classes with different material
circumstances (dialectical materialism) rather than
between individuals with different rational con-
sciousness (a dialectic of idealism) shows a consoli-
dation of the modernist structure/agency binary.
Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser took a
subtly different view. Althusser compared being an
agent of change with being the bearer of disease:
We “carry” the agency that properly belongs not
to us as individuals but to structure. Change takes
place as a result of structure, not as a consequence
of even collective human agency.
Giddens and Structuration
Anthony Giddens, a British sociologist, addressed
this tension between structure and agency—
between Marxist and humanist perspectives
perhaps—in the development of structuration dur-
ing the late 1970s and early 1980s. Giddens pro-
posed a concept of structure (though he drew
distinctions among the generic terms social struc-
ture, structures, and structural properties) not as
form itself, not as something that physically and
observably exists, but as that which gives form and
shape to social life. For Giddens, structure is not
external to human agents but is present only
within and through the activities that an individual
undertakes. Mirroring this, he proposed that, just
as structure is not outside agency, so agency does
not belong to the individual; it is not something
that is mine but relates to the range of actions that
I undertake. He suggested, in turn, that action,
frequently repetitive and routine, simultaneously
both is governed by existing structure and serves to
generate and regenerate structure. The agent has
knowledgeability, the ability to take action that
has an impact, and action is, for Giddens, not one
momentary act but a discursive flow. Structure is
reproduced socially, and therefore what needs to
be studied are social practices, undertaken within
and across space and time (locales, as Giddens
conceptualized them: stable features that shape
localized actions). Practice, according to Giddens,
bridges structure and action; a practice is a “struc-
tured action” or “enacted structure.”
Individual actors create structure through
actions, but action also dissipates structure. Actions,
repeated and routine, create (and re-create) social prac-
tices. We recognize social practices as constructing

social institutions over time, but we also have the
capacity to reflect upon and adapt social practices.
Practices lead to structure, and therefore structure is
dependent upon individuals’ readings and meanings
of social life. Conversely, although human agency
influences and changes structure, so the limitations
inherent within structure—such as, say, class—
affect an individual’s agency and the actions that I,
as a human agent, take; the limitations within struc-
ture become regulations within practice. Yet this
suggests, in turn, that such limitations, such rules,
only continue to be present as long as I continue
to enact them; agency, in this way, loops back into
structure.
Within structuration, therefore, it is important
not to separate agency and structure. They must
be considered as two interrelated and interdepen-
dent parts of a whole. Individual human actions
and society must be seen as integrated, agency
impacting upon structure and structure constrain-
ing agency. The duality must be acknowledged.
However, it can be argued that, in Giddens’s the-
ory, although agents can modify, adapt, and, to
an extent, change structure, it is structure that is
a priori. Structure, implicitly, is there first, and
therefore structuration can be seen to be conserva-
tive: Continuity comes before change, and
existing structure is conserved within limited
developmental parameters.
Bourdieu: Habitus and Field
Pierre Bourdieu, like Giddens, sought to go beyond
the structure and agency dichotomy by critiquing
it as essentially premised upon the binary between
mind and matter. For Bourdieu, the object is
inseparable from its perception, the natural insepa-
rable from the cultural, and, correspondingly,
social structure inseparable from material features.
He termed his theory constructivist structuralism.
He conceived of structures as self-sustaining, pro-
ductive, and active forms that function outside
human agency and even proposed that structures
are more important than the subject. However, he
also noted that it is possible for the agentic subject
to go beyond structure through the conscious
choice to act. Bourdieu appropriated the term
habitus to describe how each individual, in a sense,
internalizes structure. He means not so much that
behavior is determined by habitus but that habitus
Agency 19
provides an internal context for the choices that an
individual makes and the subsequent actions the
individual takes. The original Latin term translates
as (embodied) “condition”; Bourdieu’s use of
habitus concerns our socially developed and
acquired (pre)dispositions—the deeply embedded
inclinations that we each have (through acquisi-
tion) toward views, opinions, and world outlooks
and toward bodily “habits,” such as the ways in
which we eat, stand, and carry ourselves.
Habitus is developed through encounters with
fields, the complementary concept of an objective
pattern of, in a broad sense, social relations and
relationships. Fields include art, religion, educa-
tion, and, above all, politics. The shapes and pat-
terns of fields, in theory, help to explain and
understand one person’s individual habitus.
Bourdieu is concerned, in particular, with how
those in powerful positions within any field can
dominate and influence those in less powerful
positions—how, in other words, such field posi-
tions impact upon habitus. Bourdieu frames the
concepts of habitus and field within his central
idea of cultural capital: When an individual moves
from one habitus to another, the ease of transition
is influenced by the quantity and quality of cul-
tural capital that that individual possesses or “car-
ries” with him or her. Symbolic violence is exerted
upon those with limited cultural capital, forcing
conformity, assimilation, or acquiescence. For
example, one might consider educational under-
achievement as relating to the habitus of a school
being, say, White and middle class, with children
who come from a habitus that is Black and work-
ing class having limited “cultural capital.” The
imposition of symbolic violence on the latter
means that they have to catch up culturally before
they can begin to achieve educationally.
Habitus, although developed through condi-
tioning, and notwithstanding the power of field, is
not fixed and does not determine action. It is,
instead, a generative capacity: Bourdieu insists on
the notion of the active human agent who remains
able to exercise decision making inventively within
and away from habitus, particularly where the
individual encounters a social situation that is
similar to that which produced the habitus origi-
nally. Our capacity to weigh up, and produce, say,
a fitting response to an invitation to an event or a
riposte to a joke at our expense, would be both
20 Anomie
influenced by habitus and generated through our
agentic power. Bourdieu used the metaphor of
“falling” into a practice, to suggest that we do not
exactly choose freely, but nor are we merely forced
into a particular course of action by predetermined
structural constraints. We are, in a sense, “equipped”
with a habitus, one developed through our unique
upbringing but that has strong echoes of a wider,
cultural habitus. Being equipped means that habitus
is a resource rather than a governing influence
whose rules we are obliged to follow. Equally, habi-
tus loops back from the individual agent toward the
social, from behavior to structure, because habitus
is the means through which practices—repeated
and routinized—re-create the conditions of social
structure.
Poststructural Conceptions of Agency
Poststructuralism takes on some of the same argu-
ments as feminist and queer theories, and might be
characterized by the work of those as varied as
Judith Butler, Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, and
Michel Foucault. (However, it is important to note
that such a list is problematic for poststructural-
ism: It includes some and excludes others; it
implicitly fixes theories to authors; and those
named would not necessarily describe, or have
described, themselves as poststructural.)
Poststructuralism, through its concern with lan-
guage, discourse, knowledge, subjectivity, and
power, introduces doubt to the notion of the
autonomous individual: Identity is unstable, rela-
tional, multiple, and decentered. There is no essen-
tial self, no core. Language and discourse, in
particular, are central. Discourse—a linguistic take
on Bourdieu’s field perhaps—inscribes both indi-
viduals and collectives; it embraces and it rejects; it
makes some positions available and others unavail-
able. Discourse and language are never neutral or
transparent methods of communication. For post-
structuralists, discursive practices are intertwined
with power relations and constitute both those
that employ them and those about which they
refer. The implication of such positions for agency
is that, for some poststructuralists, it is not possi-
ble to contemplate the innocent, autonomous
agent making choices unbound by the discourse
within which he or she is situated. For me to
become an agentic subject, able to choose and act,
is necessarily therefore a question of politics and
discourse.
As one—contested—example of a poststruc-
tural view of agency, Butler, a feminist poststruc-
tural theorist, suggests that norms, however
inextricably bound within discourse, are unstable
and open to resistance. Butler’s notion of perfor-
mativity suggests that if I as a subject—albeit con-
strained and by no means free—am aware of the
discourse that binds me, I can, in principle, begin
to subvert that discourse and seek to remodel my
identity accordingly. This is not, therefore, a tran-
scendental model of agency but one that acknowl-
edges the fragile, contingent possibilities open to
the discontinuous subject.
It is possible to criticize Butler’s account of
agency as, in a sense, seeking to have it both ways.
Butler’s subject is caught between the constraint of
discourse and the notion of voluntarily being able
to exercise will. Butler’s response to such criticism,
acknowledging Foucault, would be to cite the tem-
porality of subjectivity. Though entirely consti-
tuted by discursive practices and structures, those
structures, over time, can continue to be enabled
or be disrupted by the agentic subject.
Jonathan Wyatt
See also Modernity and Postmodernity
Further Readings
Bourdieu, P., and Passeron, J.-C. (1990). Reproduction in
education, society and culture (R. Nice, Trans.).
London: Sage. (Original work published 1970)
Butler, J. (1993). Bodies that matter: On the discursive
limits of sex. London: Routledge.
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: Outline
of the theory of structuration. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Anomie
The word anomie, which can be defined as the
absence of laws or norms, has ancient historical
roots. In the present entry, its history is traced from
its earliest form to the present, and in doing so, its
significance as a sociological concept and as an

explanatory variable in understanding the condi-
tions for social change and stability are considered.
The Earliest Use of the Concept
In its earliest form, anomia, it is perhaps first
found in the writings of the Sophists in ancient
Greece of the 5th century BC. These writings draw
attention to the breakdown of traditional norms
or rules of behavior in the society as well as the
attempts of philosophers and others to find sys-
tematic answers to the social problems that
resulted. The Sophists argued that the breakdown
of norms was a condition of anomia, which led to
distrust and asocial feelings at the individual level
and civil strife and war at the societal level.
Opposed to the moral relativism that character-
ized Sophistic teaching, Plato, around the same
time, also argued that anomia was undesirable;
indeed, in the world of moral absolutes to which
he adhered, he identified anomia with injustice,
anarchy, and disorder.
Anomia reemerged in the Greek Old Testament
around the 3rd century BCE as a translation for
about 20 different Hebrew words that corre-
sponded to English terms such as wickedness, evil,
sin, and iniquity. Anomia was seen as a general
moral term and the polar opposite of moral law. In
the New Testament, the meaning of the term was
extended to include unbelief and the rejection of
Christ as the son of God. It was one half of the
duality of good and evil.
Largely absent from writings in the Middle
Ages, the term was taken up again in the
Renaissance. In 17th-century England, the angli-
cized anomy was discussed in the context of legal
and religious matters. Its first use was by William
Lambarde, an Elizabethan jurist who saw anomy
as the outcome of the lack of normative standards
and the absence of shared norms, which would
result in disorder, doubt, and uncertainty.
Renaissance English theologians were also discus-
sants of the idea. Anglican thinkers argued that
reason was the source of moral activity and that
freedom of the will was the basis of morality.
Anomy resulted when the human intellect was
overcome by original sin. By the end of the
17th century, however, the concept of anomy was
disappearing from religious discourse, and it
was not until two centuries later that the moral
Anomie 21
dimension was appropriated, as anomie, by 19th-
century French social philosophers.
Early Sociological Approaches to Anomie
Credit for the first use of the term in a sociological
sense is commonly given to Émile Durkheim.
However, it has been noted by Robert Merton,
Marco Orrù, and Anthony Giddens that in his use
of the concept, Durkheim drew upon and extended
the work of the French philosopher and sociologist
Jean-Marie Guyau. Guyau saw the increasing
industrialization of social life of the 19th century
as accompanied by an increasing autonomy and
individualization of morality and moral rules as
well as a decline in traditional religion. These
changes led to increasing anomie, which was to be
considered not as an evil or an illness of modern
time but as its distinguishing quality. Whereas
many social thinkers were concerned about the
threat to the social order brought about by the
Industrial Revolution, the risk of moral anomie
was the challenge of the new era, rather than a
threat to it, Guyau claimed.
Durkheim’s view was less favorable. He
acknowledged Guyau’s use of the concept but
rejected his interpretation. Moral and religious
anomie was characteristic of modern society but
did not represent the challenge Guyau had claimed
but rather the opposite, the breakdown of all
morality. The concept of anomie was a significant
theme in two of Durkheim’s major studies: The
Division of Labour in Society and Suicide.
Underlying all Durkheim’s work was a concern
for the moral order. The moral order, the funda-
mental values and beliefs that comprised the con-
science collective, was what held society together.
In traditional societies, religion, in the form of
consensual values, was the basis of the moral order
but with the coming of the Industrial Revolution
and the emergence of modernity, the nature of the
moral order changed. Its basis was individualism:
itself a moral phenomenon. The values and beliefs
comprising moral individualism stressed the dig-
nity and worth of the human individual and
emphasized that each person should develop his or
her talents to their fullest extent.
The change from a traditional to a modern soci-
ety or from mechanical solidarity to organic soli-
darity, as Durkheim described it, was not without
22 Anomie
its problems, particularly, for example, when tra-
ditional moral forms had been dissolved but had
yet to be replaced by modern alternatives. Durkheim
cited the instance of industrial activity where the
moral bonds of traditionalism no longer existed
but where the new and more appropriate forms of
moral regulation, based on moral individualism
and institutional changes, including the division of
labor, in the economic sector had not yet come
into force. Such a situation Durkheim describes as
anomic. This association of anomie with the
breakdown of traditional normative structures
first received consideration in The Division of
Labour in Society, where Durkheim was concerned
to examine the effects of the new division of
accompanying the Industrial Revolution. Some
4 years later, in his well-known monograph
Suicide, Durkheim returns to the idea of anomie as
one of three structural causes of suicide, the other
two being egoism and altruism. In anomic sui-
cide, society’s influence in being able to control the
individual’s rising aspirations is lacking, or put-
ting it slightly differently, the conscience collective
declines in strength with a consequent lack of nor-
mative controls leading to this form of suicide. For
Durkheim, the stability of all social groups rests on
a normative consensus, which is a consensus on a
set of fundamental values by group members. The
breakdown of this consensus leads to anomie.
The Contribution of Robert Merton
and More Recent Scholars
The Americans saw things somewhat differently.
Writing in the mid-1930s, after becoming aware of
Durkheim’s work while a graduate student at
Harvard University, sociologist Robert Merton
wrote what was to be a seminal article in the
American Sociological Review. In this article, titled
“Social Structure and Anomie,” Merton makes an
initial distinction between cultural structures and
social structures: The cultural structure is the orga-
nized set of normative values governing behavior
that is common to members of a designated society
or group, whereas the social structure is the orga-
nized set of social relationships in which members
of the society or group are variously involved.
Anomie occurs when there is a disjunction between
the cultural norms and goals and the socially struc-
tured abilities of societal members to act to achieve
the goals. Merton identifies monetary success as
the core goal of American society. But monetary
success is not available to all. Those who are
socially disadvantaged may find it much more dif-
ficult to achieve than those who have access to
professional and managerial careers and good
incomes. Anomie results when the achievement of
goals is blocked by lack of access to the socially
prescribed or legitimate means—in this case, the
availability of good jobs and high incomes. Because
cultural goals are expected to be strongly held,
Merton argues such a situation may lead to the
substitution of legitimate means by other, more
deviant means, such as criminal activity.
This consideration of the relationship between
goals and means led Merton to develop a five-
category typology of modes of individual adapta-
tion. He described these as Conformity, Innovation,
Ritualism, Retreatism, and Rebellion. Conformity
is the most common mode of adaptation. This is
characterized by the acceptance of cultural goals
and the availability of the institutional means to
goal attainment. Innovation is the anomic situa-
tion in which the cultural goals are accepted but
the institutional means for goal attainment are not
available.
Ritualism involves the abandonment of cultural
goals. They are seen as impossible or too hard to
achieve, and seeking their attainment is replaced
by a slavish concentration on the institutionalized
means. In Merton’s formulation, some ritualists
conform so meticulously to the institutional rules
and are so steeped in the regulations that they
become “bureaucratic virtuosos.” Retreatism has
to do with the abandonment of both goals and
means. Cultural goals come to be rejected because
of a failure to achieve them, and the institutional
means are also rejected because although they are
still strongly adhered to, they do not provide for
goal attainment. Those displaying this mode of
adaptation are described by Merton as social devi-
ants. They include the seriously mentally ill, alco-
holics and drug addicts, the homeless, and the
severely disadvantaged. This group can be thought
of as in the society but not of it. Finally, there is
rebellion; this presupposes the rejection and
replacement of existing cultural goals and ensuring
that the means for goal attainment are more equi-
tably available to all and that structural constraints
to goal attainment do not exist.

Anomie is to a degree endemic in modern soci-
eties that are characterized by competition for the
attainment of cultural goals. As long as this com-
petition is regulated by institutional means, societ-
ies remain relatively stable; however, if there is a
breakdown of the regulatory order and a range of
illegitimate means (e.g., criminal activity) become
available, a state of anomie exists. There is, there-
fore, in modern societies what Merton describes as
a strain toward anomie. This strain exists no mat-
ter what the cultural goals are; they may be the
accumulation of personal wealth, scientific pro-
ductivity, or the acquisition of prestige and honor.
But when there is a disjunction between these cul-
tural goals and the institutionalized means for
their attainment, a strain toward anomie exists.
There is one major distinction between Durkheim’s
and Merton’s views of anomie. Durkheim sees
anomie as arising from a breakdown of the norma-
tive structure that provides for social stability,
which is a questioning of the cultural goals that
underpin the society. Merton sees the situation dif-
ferently; typically, cultural goals maintain their
legitimacy. But for certain groups within society,
the institutionalized means for goal attainment are
not available; this leads to the replacement of these
means by others. The example that is frequently
given is the disadvantaged or low socioeconomic
status groups who lack the education and work
skills necessary for economic success and so resort
to illegitimate and criminal means. This disjunction
between goals and means is the anomic situation
for Merton.
Merton has been criticized for what has been
seen as an uncritical acceptance of a set of cultural
goals that characterize American society: There is
almost universal acceptance of these goals, so the
argument goes; the problem is with the means
available for their attainment. Despite these criti-
cisms, Merton’s theory has been enormously influ-
ential, particularly in the field of criminology.
However, over the years, it has undergone certain
iterations. The first was introduced by Merton
himself. In considering the differential access to the
means of goal attainment by individuals or groups
located at different positions in the social struc-
ture, he introduced the concept of opportunity
structure. Opportunity structures are distinct from
both cultural and social structures and capture the
idea of the nature of the means available for goal
Anomie 23
attainment and, in particular, the extent to which
they are legitimate or illegitimate.
Further advances in anomie theory have
occurred in the study of crime and deviance.
Anomie perspectives have recently informed
research in fields such as delinquency, white-collar
and corporate crime, cross-national comparative
studies of homicide, organizational deviance, and
suicide. In addition, institutional anomie theory
has been introduced by Steven Messner and
Richard Rosenfeld. Messner and Rosenfeld share
with Merton an emphasis on anomic tendencies
following from a strong commitment to monetary
success goals and a lack of access to the legitimate
means of obtaining those goals, but they extend
the theory by looking at the relationship between
the neoliberal market economy and noneconomic
institutions such as the family, education, and the
polity. Briefly, their argument asserts that the
1980s, 1990s, and 2000s have seen the rise to
prominence of an unfettered economic market
and a consequent decline in importance of the
other institutions just mentioned. Specifically,
the value orientations of the market economy and
the pursuit of economic success become exagger-
ated relative to the value orientations of other
institutions. This results in the devaluation of
noneconomic institutional functions, the growing
acceptance of economic requirements by noneco-
nomic institutions, and the penetration of eco-
nomic norms into these other institutions. These
actions tend to weaken the legitimacy of the insti-
tutional means to goal attainment with a conse-
quent increased recourse to illegitimate means.
Institutional anomie theory specifies the institu-
tional arrangements that are a defining feature of
modern society and that have economic domi-
nance at their core. The dominance of economic
institutions also provides the conditions for the
emergence of anomie. Institutional anomie theory,
with its concern for the significance of cultural
goals based on free market values as well as the
range of means available for goal attainment,
links both Durkheim’s concerns about the impor-
tance of social consensus on overarching goals for
social stability and lack of consensus for anomie,
and Merton’s concerns about the significance of a
disjunction between means and goals for social
stability and anomie. The 2000s have seen a con-
tinuing interest in anomie with an entire issue of
24 Antiracism
the International Journal of Conflict and Violence
devoted to the topic.
Conclusion
It is clear that anomie occurs in a number of guises.
It can be thought of as the condition reflected in
the breakdown of the cultural structure (the nor-
mative order). As well, it can be seen as the condi-
tion reflected in the breakdown of particular social
structures, most often where a social structure is in
the process of transformation with a consequent
degree of social instability. Anomie may also be
present in a society with rigid social structures that
has enshrined unequal access to resources, facili-
ties, and goals. Given social conditions that are
characterized by increasing globalization, the col-
lapse of the free market economy internationally
and growing social inequality at both a national
and an international level, the concept of anomie
is likely to find a place both theoretically and
empirically in social science endeavors for some
time to come.
John Western
See also Modernity and Postmodernity; Society and
Social Identity
Further Readings
Carter, E. (2007). A social psychological analysis of
anomie among National Football League players.
International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 42(3),
243–270.
Merton, R. K. (1968). Social theory and social structure.
New York: Free Press.
Messner, S., & Rosenfeld, R. (1994). Crime and the
American dream. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Orrù, M. (1987). Anomie: History and meanings. Boston:
Allen & Unwin.
Powell, E. (1988). The design of discord: Studies of
anomie. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishing.
Antiracism
The term antiracism began to see broad usage in
the 1960s. Antiracism occurs in a variety of set-
tings and includes the range of practices that
challenge the use of interpersonal, institutional,
and ideological power to dominate or oppress
others based on race. Those who identify as anti-
racist often work at eliminating racism in all its
forms. This entry provides an overview of antira-
cism, an examination of multiculturalism versus
antiracism, attention to the primary components
of antiracist theory, a discussion of two primary
subfields of antiracism, and a summary of the
critiques of antiracism.
Overview
Antiracism can be defined as activities that iden-
tify, resist, and transform all forms of race-based
oppression and domination carried out by indi-
viduals and institutions. At a theoretical level,
attention to antiracism has occurred primarily
since the late 20th century. In practice, individuals
have resisted acts of systemic racial discrimination
since groups in power have used constructions of
racial difference to oppress. Recent attention to
antiracism goes beyond the recognition of racism
and calls for social change at institutional levels;
asserts the importance of interlocking systems of
oppression, including gender, race, and class; and
advocates an understanding of racism that centers
on issues of structural power and equity as opposed
to individual attitudes and beliefs. Antiracists
believe that regardless of the racial group to which
one belongs, race has a bearing on one’s experi-
ence and sense of self, on one’s identification with
various cultural groups, and on one’s access to
resources and opportunities. Antiracist theory also
asserts that widespread racial inequities at struc-
tural levels exist and that systemic practices of
privilege and discrimination that benefit Whites
and harm racial minorities are prevalent and often
invisible to the dominant racial group.
For antiracists, understandings of racism must
go beyond analyses that focus on individual beliefs
and race prejudice and attend to systems of oppres-
sion rooted in institutional forms of power. Three
types of racism are interpersonal, institutional, and
ideological. At an interpersonal level, individuals
interact with others based on prejudice, stereo-
types, and ethnocentrism, and such interactions
demonstrate a pattern of dislike and result in
harm. Institutional racism is farther-reaching and
solidifies and justifies a racialized social order in

which organizational practices and policies penal-
ize racial minorities. Ideological racism includes
cultural values and social norms that act to legiti-
mize institutional and interpersonal racism.
Although antiracists stress the primary significance
of institutional racism, they advocate acting against
racism at all three levels (individual, institutional,
and ideological), as these forms of racism are
interconnected.
Antiracism and Liberal Multiculturalism
Scholars and activists often contrast antiracism
with liberal multiculturalism, also called simply
multiculturalism. Both antiracism and multicultur-
alism are responses to how individuals with a
range of cultural identities live together. Whereas
proponents of antiracism focus largely on power
and systems of discrimination, supporters of mul-
ticulturalism emphasize the beliefs and attitudes of
individuals. Those in support of antiracism have
often accused those who support liberal multicul-
turalism of drawing attention away from issues of
power and equity. One’s identification with antira-
cism or with multiculturalism has important impli-
cations related to how one understands race and
responds to racism.
Theories and policies based on a multicultural
approach acknowledge the existence of racism. In
contrast to antiracists, multiculturalists identify
the central problem of racism as individual atti-
tudes and beliefs. For multiculturalists, when rac-
ism occurs, it is because one or more individuals
hold prejudicial attitudes, which are most often
based on a lack of knowledge. For example, a high
school science teacher may be unaware of the con-
tributions of racial minorities to science and may
misrepresent or underrepresent racial minority
contributions to science. For those who support
multiculturalism, this problem exists because of
ignorance on the part of the teacher and is best
addressed through education. In this framework,
the barriers to racial equity are located in individu-
als and not in systems. In fact, for multicultural-
ists, it is problematic to understand racism as
systemic or institutional, as this unfairly and inap-
propriately critiques laws and policies when the
problem lies with individuals themselves.
Antiracist theorists and advocates disagree with
this perspective. They assert that identifying racism
Antiracism 25
as a problem of individual attitudes ensures that
little to no attention will be paid to systemic or
institutional issues. The ideology of multicultural-
ism, antiracists claim, can serve as a strong distrac-
tion from a necessary analysis of institutional
racism. Antiracists assert that if one looks closely
at the evidence that exists related to dominant and
subordinate cultural groups across social settings,
including health care, education, criminal justice,
housing, and income, the types of privileges
enjoyed by Whites and the harms imposed on
racial minority groups are significant, persistent
over time, and embedded in institutions. Thus, it is
profoundly inadequate to address racism only at
an individual level.
In the example of the high school teacher, anti-
racists would raise areas of concern beyond edu-
cation of the individual teacher. Antiracists might
draw attention to the textbooks on which teach-
ers rely and the possibility that those textbooks
privilege Whites in science. Antiracists might also
question how standardized tests and teacher
preparation programs systematically disadvan-
tage racial minorities. For antiracists, examina-
tion of curriculum, testing, and teacher preparation
would help to illuminate how educational poli-
cies and practices harm racial minorities and
benefit Whites. Curriculum, testing, and teacher
preparation involve large, complicated processes
and are never the responsibility of one or a few
individuals, even though individuals do play a
role. However, antiracists point out that racism
also exists in institutions, and achieving equity in
this and other contexts requires attention to
power, decision-making processes, and access to
resources at a level that goes beyond the educa-
tion of individual teachers. Despite many schol-
ars’ belief in the widespread existence of
institutional racism, antiracists assert that liberal
multiculturalism continues to be the preferred
response of many, and particularly Whites, when
they learn of racism.
Antiracism: Theoretical Components
Three theoretical ideas are central to the practice
of antiracism. These include the necessity of
attention to power, an intersectional and non­
essentialist approach to race and other cultural
differences, and a focus on social change. Many
26 Antiracism
theorists also stress that the work of antiracism
rests on the effective integration of theory and
practice. Antiracism advocates are interested in
racial justice. To move from systemic racism to
racial equity requires not only theoretical contri-
butions but also changed behaviors and policies.
Further, it is important to note that theorists and
activists contribute to antiracism. Theoretical and
activist antiracist work occurs in and outside of
the academy.
Related to power, antiracists often claim that
prejudice + power = racism. This equation points
out that racism is based on the existence of preju-
dicial beliefs and the ability to act on those beliefs,
or to discriminate. To respond to the existence of
racial difference in ways that result in political,
economic, or social exclusion or exploitation
based on one’s race requires access to institutional
power. When individuals who are prejudiced can
draw on institutional and ideological power in
ways that disadvantage racial minorities, racism
can occur. For example, an individual teacher
might hold racially prejudicial or stereotypical
beliefs. When that teacher has the power to use
textbooks or require students to take standardized
tests that disadvantage racial minorities, this can
result in discriminatory acts that have broad conse-
quences. It is also useful to point out that institutional
racism, such as racially oppressive curriculum, can
occur in cases where the individual(s) with the
authority to put the curriculum into practice may
or may not hold individual race prejudice. Related
to the connection of racism and power, antiracists
emphasize the importance of careful attention to
who has power and how they are using it and to
how racialized power exists at ideological and
institutional levels.
The second component of antiracism theory
and practice is what is often called an intersec-
tional, interlocking, or multiplicative approach to
understanding cultural differences. Those who fol-
low an intersectional approach acknowledge that
systems of oppression, including racism, sexism,
classism, and heterosexism, are interconnected. In
this framework, an analysis of racism will be
strengthened if the analyst considers how classism,
sexism, heterosexism, or all of these are also oper-
ating. Antiracist theorists and practitioners view
gender, race, and class as relational. Individuals
have multiple identities, which are connected.
Supporters of an intersectional approach also
acknowledge that no one identity is always the
most important or salient.
Another aspect of an intersectional approach to
antiracism is often identified as an anti-essentialist
understanding of race. Theorists of anti-essentialism
assert that experiences related to cultural differ-
ence are socially constructed and thus shifting and
complex. There is not a set formula or script for
how racial power plays out. Anti-essentialism is
particularly important to antiracist theory in three
ways. First, scholars have asserted that a general or
universal theory of antiracism is not possible.
Antiracism is largely context dependent: Different
contexts exhibit varying expressions of racism and
thus call for a range of analyses and strategies.
Second, one’s capacity for, or commitment to,
antiracism is not determined by one’s race.
Antiracism theorists must seek to understand the
ways in which individuals of every racial group
are implicated by racism. A third aspect of anti-
essentialism is that one’s relationship to racialized
power is not fixed or one-dimensional. For exam-
ple, it is inappropriate to think of racial minorities
as predominantly “victims” or essentially “subor-
dinate.” Even as racial minorities are harmed by
racist institutions, they also resist and challenge
racist practices.
A third component of antiracism theory and
practice is a clear focus on social change. Whereas
a few antiracist theorists and activists might assert
that it is sufficient to identify or critique the prob-
lem of racism, most would claim that change is a
necessary piece of antiracism. In this sense, antira-
cism often includes identification and transforma-
tion of the problem. A focus on change highlights
a common distinction made by antiracists between
intent and consequences. Antiracists often stress
that racist acts do not require intentionality and
that racism must be analyzed and transformed in
terms of its consequences. In the example of the
high school teacher, whether or not the teacher
intended to teach science in ways that oppressed
racial minorities, the effects are what matters, and
an antiracist response is necessary. In sum, identi-
fication of racism, although part of antiracist
practice, is not its primary objective. Antiracism
theory and practice must eventually result in
change at interpersonal, institutional, and ideo-
logical levels.

Critical Race Theory
and Integrative Antiracism
Despite the relatively recent scholarly attention to
antiracism, there are distinct areas in the field.
Two theoretical directions include critical race
theory and integrative antiracism. Critical race
theory, which has its roots in legal theory, provides
a framework for understanding the significance of
race. Its starting point is an analysis of racism.
Critical race theorists assume that racism is nor-
malized, often to the point of being unseen, and
that it has profoundly harmful effects for racial
minorities. Especially relevant to antiracist theory
is the emphasis critical race theorists place on sto-
rytelling and counter-storytelling, interest conver-
gence, and critical white studies, all of which can
be considered antiracist tools. Critical race theo-
rists use storytelling and counter-storytelling as a
way of questioning what is taken for granted and
to challenge basic racist assumptions. An example
of interest convergence is when Whites allow
advances for racial minorities only when those
advantages benefit Whites’ interests. Finally, ana-
lysts in critical White studies aim to highlight the
ways in which White norms, identifications, and
priorities routinely construct Whites as racially
superior.
Integrative antiracists also provide significant
insight into antiracism efforts. Initially articulated
by George Sefa Dei, integrative antiracism pro-
vides a framework for understanding the signifi-
cance race has in people’s daily lives, particularly
related to racial minorities. There are eight compo-
nents to integrative antiracism:
1. The idea that social difference is articulated
through the intersection of identities based on
race, gender, and class
2. The relevance of lived experience as a starting
point for constructing knowledge
3. The significance of differential power and
privilege, related especially to dominant–
subordinate group interactions
4. Examination of White privilege
5. A critique of Eurocentric knowledge and the
importance of knowledge based on sources that
do not center on European/White ideas
Antiracism 27
6. Practices of inclusivity that go beyond
celebrating differences to critiquing systems of
oppression
7. A recognition that experiences of racial identity
are complex and shifting
8. A holistic approach that attends to the multiple
dimensions of people’s lives, including cultural,
social, spiritual, and political
Because integrative antiracism focuses on power,
the experiences of racial minorities, and the com-
plexity of identities, it is an important contribution
to pursuing racial justice.
Critiques of Antiracism
Antiracism theory and practice have clearly resulted
in increased attention to, and analysis of, race-
based domination and oppression. Many would
assert that in part due to antiracism scholarship
and activism, there is a heightened awareness of
the existence of racism in public discourse, even as
antiracist change remains difficult and in many
cases unattainable. There are three primary cri-
tiques of antiracist theory and practice. First,
scholars have argued that antiracism theory does
not sufficiently clarify what makes a theory antira-
cist. It is difficult to conclusively assert what theo-
retical and practice-based components of any
antiracist effort make it specifically antiracist.
Although a strength of antiracism has been its ana-
lytical adaptability, making it possible for antira-
cist critique to be relevant to a variety of contexts,
this theoretical agility has also meant that it is dif-
ficult to identify what is common to all antiracist
theory and practice. Antiracist theorists point out
that because of this lack of clarity, at broad levels,
antiracism can mean almost anything. For exam-
ple, it is possible to assume that if one is against
racism, that person is antiracist. Most antiracist
scholars and activists would disagree, asserting
that antiracism requires sustained and public work
against racism.
Related to the lack of clear identification of
what is necessary for antiracist thought to be anti-
racist, some scholars have also critiqued antira-
cism for not offering a thorough conceptual
framework that details the development and com-
ponents of antiracism. This has made it difficult
28 Antiracism
for antiracism scholars to systematically rely on
existing theoretical antiracism frameworks, and it
reduces even further the possibility of a cohesive
body of antiracist scholarship. Whereas the lack of
a clearly identified set of essential antiracist per-
spectives and body of work ensures new perspec-
tives that may be particularly innovative, it also
means that the field is not clearly tracked or
defined. A related concern in terms of conceptual
development is the critique that antiracism has not
sufficiently addressed the foundational aspects of
colonization to practices of racism. Aboriginal
scholars especially point out that antiracist theory
often underanalyzes or ignores the importance of
colonization and often separates the histories, resis-
tance, and present-day realities of Aboriginal peo-
ple from antiracism. Those who offer this critique
urge antiracist theorists and activists to take up
issues of Aboriginal sovereignty, to seriously con-
sider the significance of colonization, and to more
seriously engage Aboriginal people in antiracist
activism.
Finally, a third critique of antiracism scholar-
ship and practice is that these scholars are often
successfully oppositional yet insufficiently clear
about their ultimate objective. Antiracism theorists
are obvious about what they oppose but less atten-
tive to, or direct about, what they support. An
integral component of antiracist practice is identi-
fying what is wrong related to racialized domina-
tion and oppression. In many cases, given the level
of resistance to antiracism, identification and cri-
tique of existing forms of racism can be a pro-
foundly demanding task. Much of the focus of
antiracism work has gone toward making visible
expressions of racism that have long been obscured
to much of the population. This has resulted in
fewer articulations of what society would look like
without institutionalized racism. It is important
for antiracism theorists and practitioners to imag-
ine and construct racially equitable relationships at
individual and institutional levels and to involve a
range of people in this process.
Future Outlook
In a relatively brief amount of time, antiracism
theory and practice have been established as an
identifiable body of work known in a variety of
academic disciplines and in a range of contexts
outside of the academy. Antiracist critique can be
found related to corporations, the media, educa-
tion, politics, athletics, criminal justice, health
care, and numerous additional settings. Antiracist
activism is practiced around the world, with the
United Nations World Conference on Racism,
Racial Discrimination, and Xenophobia provid-
ing an international forum for considering antira-
cism. The need for antiracist theory and practice
promises to persist. Indeed, as scholars assert that
racism continues to deeply affect many institu-
tions and areas of social life, and in increasingly
subtle ways, many antiracist theorists and activ-
ists stress the importance of antiracism retaining
a progressive and critical stance and consciously
resisting a multicultural framework or approach.
Antiracism scholars’ early attention to power,
institutions, and social change will likely con-
tinue to set the field apart from more moderate
critiques.
Jennifer S. Simpson
See also Complex Inequality; Critical Race Theory;
Culture, Ethnicity, and Race; Identity Salience;
Stereotypes; Whiteness Studies; White Racial Identity;
Xenophobia
Further Readings
Anthias, F., & Lloyd, C. (Eds.). (2002). Rethinking anti-
racisms: From theory to practice. London: Routledge.
Bonnett, A. (2000). Anti-racism. London: Routledge.
Dei, G. J. S. (1995). Integrative anti-racism: Intersection
of race, class, and gender. Race, Gender, and Class,
2, 11–30.
Dei, G. J. S. (1996). Critical perspectives in antiracism:
An introduction. Canadian Review of Sociology and
Anthropology, 33, 247–267.
Dei, G. J. S. (2000). Recasting anti-racism and the axis of
difference: Beyond the question of theory. Race,
Gender, and Class, 7, 1–19.
Fleras, A., & Elliot, J. L. (2007). Unequal relations: An
introduction to race, ethnic and aboriginal dynamics
in Canada. Toronto, ON, Canada: Pearson Education.
Gillborn, D. (2006). Critical race theory and education:
Racism and anti-racism in educational theory and
praxis. Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of
Education, 27, 11–32.
Jones, J. M. (1997). Prejudice and racism. New York:
McGraw-Hill.

Web Sites
Anti-Racist Action Network: http://www.antiracistaction
.us/pn/index.php
Southern Poverty Law Center: http://www.splcenter.org/
index.jsp
Archetype
The word archetype denotes the original model or
standard after which later recurrences are pat-
terned. Archetypes are keys to understanding
humanity’s sense of identity as a collective group.
They can take the form of personal behavior, ritu-
als, religious practices, dreams, or literature. That
they can recur over many centuries and across
cultures has interested anthropologists, psycholo-
gists, and literary historians. The existence of
archetypes suggests a heritage shared by all of
humanity. This entry presents the conceptual
framework, literary examples, and critiques of
archetypes.
Conceptual Framework
The term archetype has its origins in mythology
and psychology. Anthropologist Sir James Frazer
found that cultures from all over the world shared
certain rituals and legends that could not be
explained by social borrowing. Analytical psy-
chologist Carl Jung argued that primordial memo-
ries, images, and other structures, shaped by
humanity’s repeated experiences, were part of
every human being’s “collective unconscious.”
The implication of Jung’s idea for individual
identity is that a person’s experiences are not
entirely unique. Jung rejects the notion that human
beings are blank slates when they are born. In his
view, most personal experience triggers archetypal
responses waiting in the unconscious mind to be
called upon. Individual experience simply “actual-
izes” the dormant archetype. Thus, an individual’s
identity is formed from a combination of both
unique and collective experience.
A school of literary criticism was formed with
the intent of examining archetypes in literature. By
examining the commonalities of these patterns, the
archetypal critic seeks a unifying impulse behind
literary productions and a way of classifying
Archetype 29
literature and, by extension, human experiences.
The most influential of these literary critics was
Northrop Frye, whose Anatomy of Criticism sought
to categorize literature by basic structures: tragedy,
comedy, irony, and romance. He connected those
modes to imagery surrounding the four seasons of
the year: comedy (spring), romance (summer), trag-
edy (autumn), and irony (winter).
Why did humanity develop such verbal sys-
tems? Frye suggests that the underlying reason was
to transform an impersonal, often hostile, natural
world into something more understandable and
palatable to human beings. For example, the story
of a hero’s triumph over a force threatening civili-
zation (embodied by a dragon, for instance) was a
powerful reassurance in times of doubt. A hero’s
defeating what threatens the community provides
for a basic need of all humanity; thus, archetypal
stories such as this stir powerful psychological
responses—fear, longing, vindication—many of
which defy logical explanation. To some literary
artists, literature takes on a mystical quality, with
the author assuming the role of prophet. The poet
T. S. Eliot, for example, felt that because arche-
types were “prelogical,” they were only perceiv-
able in the modern day by the poet, who was
uniquely qualified to reveal them to readers.
Literary Examples
Literary archetypes can take the form of plot struc-
tures, character types, images, settings, and themes.
Many earlier writers seem unaware that they are
using archetypes. Since the Romantic movement in
Western literature, however, there seems to be a
mix of unconscious and highly conscious use of
these prototypes.
Perhaps the most common of all archetypal
plots is the quest, and it is often a quest for iden-
tity. Sophocles’ play Oedipus the King relies on the
long-standing story of the tragic king’s search for who
he is. His tragedy is, in some sense, his unwilling-
ness to let go of his quest for identity; eventually
what he unearths destroys him and his family. Many
centuries later, Mark Twain’s The Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn follows the journey down the
Mississippi River of Huck and Jim, who search for
true identities, free from their marginalized status
at home. Robert Hayden’s 20th-century poem
“Middle Passage” raises Cinquez, the slave leader
30 Archetype
of a revolt aboard the slave ship Amistad, as an
exemplar of the “deathless primaveral image” of
mankind’s search for freedom. The term prima­
veral itself calls to mind a tree extending its branches
into every human being’s identity.
Another archetypal plot is the initiation.
Initiation stories focus on the point at which a
character comes of age, moving from childhood to
adulthood. Whereas many cultures celebrate this
transition with physical rituals, literary artists have
focused primarily on a psychological coming of
age, the attainment of maturity. In Nathaniel
Hawthorne’s “My Kinsman, Major Molineux,”
young Robin, a country boy, is invited by his
father’s first cousin to come to town to find a
career. When he arrives, the impatient Robin is
rebuffed repeatedly when he asks the whereabouts
of his kinsman. In his youthful naïveté, it does not
occur to him that it is Major Molineux’s name that
invokes the hostility until he is the inadvertent wit-
ness to his tar and feathering. At the end of the
story, Robin’s ironic laugh at his own expense is
indicative of the self-awareness that marks his
transition from a boy leaning on his family’s influ-
ence to a man who must learn to stand on his own
two feet.
Other coming-of-age plots can be just as cruel
in describing the sudden tearing of young charac-
ters from a comfortable dependence because of
their taking a stand for a principle that marks their
own personal identity and separates them from
their families. Sarty Snopes, in William Faulkner’s
short story “Barn Burning,” rejects his father’s
propensity to burn down the barns of employers
who displease him and warns the landowner.
Afterward, he sets out on his own, knowing he no
longer has a place in his family. Richard Wright’s
Dave Saunders, in “The Man Who Was Almost a
Man,” stubbornly insists on coming of age on his
own terms. Although his mis-aim kills his employ-
er’s mule and makes him the laughingstock of the
community, he still clings to a handgun as an
essential way into manhood. The protagonist of
Alice Munro’s story “Boys and Girls” one day
finds herself breaking with her family’s ways as she
releases a horse destined for the glue factory, much
to the irritation of her father and brother. She is
discounted as “only a girl.” She is not sure of her
motivation for opening the gate, and Munro sug-
gests that her motives are deeply rooted and, in a
sense, undiscoverable in the ancient layers of femi-
nine archetypal behaviors.
Some archetypal story lines involve larger-than-
life problems that intersect with dreams. Common
to fairy tales and fantasies, giants and witches con-
front child protagonists. This is the central prob-
lem of the Pevensie children in C. S. Lewis’s The
Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe, who must
resist the charming but evil White Witch. The fairy
tales of the Grimm brothers also regularly pit chil-
dren against the machinations of adults and super-
natural powers seemingly beyond their abilities to
defeat. Through their ingenuity, however, the chil-
dren regularly win these contests.
Another common plot structure is one in which
a person becomes separated from God, family, or
community. Such a separation from God is called
sin in the first book of the Bible. Adam and Eve’s
disobedience leads to many consequences; the
chief among them is separation from their creator.
Cain’s murder of Abel leads to his exile from his
family and God. Jonah’s disobedience leads him to
the belly of a great fish. Jesus, although sinless,
assumes the sin of humankind. Consequently, his
time on the cross is not only physically painful but
spiritually so because of his separation from God.
Some stories, such as the prodigal son of the New
Testament, focus on a pattern of separation and
then restoration following repentance.
Individual characters can also be archetypes.
For example, some alienated characters assume a
defiant posture toward the powers-that-be.
Aeschylus’s Prometheus, in the play Prometheus
Bound, defies the supreme god, Zeus. Similarly,
the Romantic movement in 19th-century Europe
and America championed such archetypal rebels
because their responses coincided with the roman-
tic tendency to challenge the conventional limits of
society. Percy Shelley wrote his own version of the
Prometheus story in “Prometheus Unbound.”
Lord Byron’s “Byronic heroes” included the bibli-
cal Cain whose frustration at having to live with
the consequences of his parents’ sin makes him
susceptible to Satan’s offer of unlimited knowl-
edge, which he hopes will make him independent
of God’s arbitrary order.
A common archetypal character is the deliv-
erer. When he first arrives in Thebes, Oedipus
frees the city from the tyranny of the Sphinx and
is consequently made king. Homer’s Odysseus,

after a 20-year sojourn to the Trojan War, arrives
home and rids it of his wife’s arrogant suitors,
who have dissipated the estate and threatened his
son’s life. Beowulf, the titular hero of the anony-
mous medieval poem, delivers a besieged kingdom
from the monstrous Grendel and his mother.
Some archetypal critics consider the heroic world
of this poem to be a psychohistory of Anglo-Saxon
culture, a key to understanding the ancestral past
that would have resonated with the ancient audi-
ence of the work. Others see Grendel and his
mother as representative of the untamed forces of
nature, which threaten any civilization’s tenuous
hold in the world, and Beowulf as the protector of
civilized order.
Another archetypal character is the scapegoat.
High priest Caiaphas rationalized that Christ
should be crucified because it was better that one
die than many. The idea of a community offering
the expedient of one sacrifice for the many has
been repeated into modern times. Tess, in Thomas
Hardy’s Tess of the D’Urbervilles, is victimized
and then executed as a way for society to expiate
its own guilt. In Light in August, William Faulkner
taps into this archetype with the orphaned Joe
Christmas, whose name and short life bear simi-
larities to Christ’s. He becomes the victim of a kind
of crucifixion in a Southern, race-obsessed envi-
ronment, where condemnation, castration, and
murder are based on the assumption of a particu-
lar racial identity without any biological proof.
Some archetypal characters are associated more
readily with comedy and irony. The trickster, for
example, recurs frequently all over the world in
story and legend. Commonly underestimated and
misjudged, this character type may comically dis-
tort the order of nature, like Puck in William
Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream.
Others upend the expected power structure, hav-
ing more success than seemingly stronger charac-
ters. Brer Rabbit, in the African American folk
tales made widely available in the Uncle Remus
collections of Joel Chandler Harris, is constantly
threatened by stronger animals such as Brer Fox
and Brer Wolf but nevertheless through his wit
survives, often at the expense of the dignity of the
stronger animals. In the 1930s, Sterling Brown
created an African American trickster character
named Slim Greer who, in a series of poems, is
able to slide in and out of a hostile White society,
Archetype 31
miraculously escaping the consequences of his
blatant irreverence for Jim Crow laws.
Many characters search for their identities dur-
ing times of crisis. It may be a coming-of-age crisis,
such as that faced by J. D. Salinger’s Holden
Caulfield of The Catcher in the Rye or Frankie
Addams of Carson McCullers’s The Member of
the Wedding. In both cases, the internal urgings
for connection find no corresponding outlet in
society as it is constituted in the modern world.
Both have to compromise their honest natures to
fit in. Other crises may result from family obliga-
tion. Shakespeare’s Hamlet is obligated to avenge
his father’s death even though he has a civilized
revulsion to murder. That his father’s ghost visits
him to urge revenge underscores the primordial
nature of the obligation of vengeance and the way
in which it trumps Hamlet’s personal inclination
to hesitate.
Besides plots and characters, archetypes exist in
literary images. For example, the image of an arch
or doorway recurs frequently in literature and
myth. Its symbolic import—of moving from one
state of being into another, from one world to
another—is used by many writers. Dante and his
guide Virgil enter hell through an arch, and printed
on it is the famous admonition for those entering
to abandon all hope. In The Last Battle, C. S.
Lewis’s adventurers enter into the heavenly after-
life of a renewed Narnia through the doorway of a
lowly stable. In modernistic plays, images pre-
sented through expressionism seek to present a
character’s unconscious mind graphically on stage.
Eugene O’Neill’s The Hairy Ape, for instance, por-
trays Yank, a coal shoveler on a steamship, as liv-
ing in a ship’s hold that exactly resembles a cage in
order to analogize his oppression in a class-bound
civilization.
Other images seem to suggest the aspiration of
the human spirit. Dante and Virgil end their hor-
rific visit to hell by climbing toward the stars in
heaven, suggestive of God’s order and dominion.
Imagery need not be associated with sight, as C. S.
Lewis reveals in The Magician’s Nephew when the
children adventurers experience firsthand the cre-
ation of Narnia. It is music that strikes them, a
beautiful harmony that accompanies Aslan the
lion as he creates. Lewis, who was a Renaissance
and medieval literary scholar, was well aware of
the theory of the music of the spheres: the idea that
32 Architecture, Sites, and Spaces
God’s creation of the universe was so harmonious
that, from a heavenly vantage point, one would
hear music as the planets revolved.
Critiques and Modifications
Objections to archetypal literary analysis derive
from the intrinsic conflict between Sigmund Freud’s
and Carl Jung’s views of the individual identity.
Freudian literary critic Daniel Hoffman, in com-
paring the two, worries that archetypes threaten to
oversimplify the individual’s experiences by cate-
gorizing and depersonalizing them. Uncomfortable
with portraits of their identities by the dominant
culture, groups who are uprooted, devalued, or
exploited often attempt to construct or reconstruct
archetypes that may have been lost either in the
diaspora or through oppression. They may seek
archetypes more in tune with their identities than,
for example, the stereotypes that may be associ-
ated with them. The slave narratives, such as those
of Frederick Douglass, Harriet Jacobs, or Booker
T. Washington, attempt to establish an African
American identity in the first person and to con-
nect it, like Cinquez’s, with a fundamental desire
for freedom that suggests an archetypal origin.
Writers about women face stereotypes that are
based on a tendency to oversimplify archetypal
images: for example, the idea that Eve was the
weaker vessel and therefore succumbed to sin in
the Garden of Eden. A tendency to create strong-
willed and discerning female characters counter-
acts that tendency. Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Hester
Prynne refuses to bow to patriarchal authority
after she is punished for adultery. In fact, she is
shown later in The Scarlet Letter founding her
own heretical philosophy of life outside the bounds
of her Puritan community. Susan Glaspell’s play
titled Trifles, later reworked into the short story
“A Jury of Her Peers,” counteracts the notion that
women’s concerns are trivial. Both show a pair of
women who have more insight into the motives of
a woman’s murder of her husband than do the
male officials who are investigating the crime.
The study of archetypes is based on a premise
that the past is contemporaneous with the present.
The continued relevance of archetypal literary
study may be due to the appeal of the idea that
humanity’s primary preoccupations are permanent
and shared throughout the ages. In archetypal
theory, our identities are at least partly created by
the common experiences of many generations.
William L. Howard
See also Collective/Social Identity; Collectivism/
Individualism; Group Identity; Myths; Psychology of
Self and Identity; Rituals; Symbolism; Trickster Figure
Further Readings
Bodkin, M. (1934). Archetypal patterns in poetry:
Psychological studies of imagination. London: Oxford
University Press.
Chase, R. (1949). The quest for myth. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press.
Frazer, J. G. (1922). The golden bough. New York:
Macmillan.
Frye, N. (1957). Anatomy of criticism. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gates, H. L. (1989). The signifying monkey: A theory of
African-American criticism. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Jung, C. G. (1981). The archetypes and the collective
unconscious. In R. F. C. Hull (Ed.) & G. Adler
(Trans.), Collected works (2nd ed., Vol. 9, Pt. 1,
pp. 3–41). Princeton, NJ: Bollingen.
Knapp, B. (1984). A Jungian approach to literature.
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Lauter, E., & Rupprecht C. S. (1985). Feminist
archetypal theory: Interdisciplinary re-visions of
Jungian thought. Knoxville: University of Tennessee
Press.
Pratt, A. (1981). Archetypal patterns in woman’s fiction.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Stevens, A. (1994). Jung: A very short introduction. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Architecture, Sites, and Spaces
Architecture, sites, and spaces are integral con-
cepts to constructions of identity and identifica-
tion. They are active, powerful, and pervasive, yet
often their effect is not noticed on a conscious level
but rather is one of subconscious perception, and
it is this very effect that renders these elements so
effective. A popular example suffices. Anyone who
has seen the television series Law & Order or who
has lived in a major metropolitan American city

has been repeatedly exposed to the neoclassical
architecture of a court building. Although one may
not consciously read these buildings, their identi-
ties are clear and present, acting upon the American
cultural psyche. Monolithic columns, symmetrical
expanses of space and architecture, an imposing
triangular pediment: These are the structures of
power and authority, where one comes to judge
and be judged, symbols of the strength of the city
and the American justice system. We recognize this
effect often without realizing the how or the why,
or even that it happens.
Likewise, seemingly empty spaces have impor-
tant identities in the cityscape, as the story of
Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc eloquently reveals.
Commissioned by the Arts-in-Architecture Program
of the U.S. General Services Administration, the
arc was installed in the Federal Plaza of New York
City in 1981. The work was a wall of steel, a curve
120 feet long and 12 feet high, that bisected the
expanse of the Federal Plaza, forcing those who
work in nearby buildings to wind their way
around it. While installed in the plaza, Tilted Arc
gave the viewer a heightened sense of his or her
identity in relation to the plaza, as well as in rela-
tion to the work itself: It made an individual per-
ceive the entirety of the environment through the
navigation of the bifurcated space. One might say
that the work was too successful: As multiple
newspaper and journal articles report, the New
Yorkers who used the plaza on a daily basis
rebelled against the work. Angry at the destruction
of their space of contemplation and unrestricted
passage in a tightly woven and overdeveloped city,
many New Yorkers called for the work to be
removed. Judge Edward Re, regional administra-
tor for the General Services Administration, led a
campaign to remove the work, in order to recreate
the identity of the plaza as a site of space. In turn,
Serra responded that the dismantling of Tilted Arc
would destroy its identity as a site-specific work.
In 1989, the work was cut into thirds and removed
to a scrap-metal yard. Arguably, many of the city’s
workers took the space of the plaza for granted
until it was disturbed and its identity as a space in
which they exist and on which they depend was
thrown into sharp relief.
Built structures, empty spaces, and the sites in
which they interact both reflect and create indi-
vidual and collective identities, existing in a potent
Architecture, Sites, and Spaces 33
nexus of community, patron, designer, and social
mores and dynamics of power. It is no surprise
that many influential modern and contemporary
figures have occupied themselves with issues of
space and place, of architecture and structures.
To name only some of the major figures: Gloria
Anzaldúa, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Gaston
Bachelard, Roland Barthes, Jean Baudrillard,
Walter Benjamin, Homi K. Bhabha, Svetlana Boym,
Judith Butler, Néstor García Canclini, Hélène Cixous,
Beatrice Colomina, Simone de Beauvoir, Gilles
Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Umberto Eco, Michel
Foucault, Coco Fusco, Diane Fuss, Henry Louis
Gates Jr., Jürgen Habermas, G. W. F. Hegel,
Martin Heidegger, bell hooks, Luce Irigaray,
Frederic Jameson, Julia Kristeva, Henri LeFebvre,
Lucy Lippard, Audre Lorde, Jean-François Lyotard,
Mary McLeod, Edward Soja, Gayatri Spivak, and
Virginia Woolf. For these thinkers, such concepts
both form the central arguments of their works
and inform the intellectual underpinnings that
drive and support them.
One of the primary issues of the built environ-
ment is that the power and the pervasiveness of the
effect of these structures and spaces, of the identity
that they communicate, can lead to the impression
that these sites are natural as opposed to historical,
constructed, and designed. Consider for instance
the Arch of Constantine, constructed in Rome by
Emperor Constantine in 312–315 CE to com-
memorate his victory over Maxentius. The trium-
phant arch form in and of itself is a potent example
of structure and space: It is a monumental sign of
victory and power, on which one’s deeds and valor
are depicted and inscribed and through which pro-
cessions may pass to bear witness to the victor’s
strength. The Arch of Constantine, as Elizabeth
Marlowe has demonstrated, is a particularly well-
placed and designed example. It was situated along
what is now known as the via Triumphalis, the
procession route of emperors entering Rome after
a victory. Beginning at the Campus Martius, the
route quite literally led one through monuments
erected by Rome’s greatest leaders, ending at the
Capitoline Hill. Constantine’s arch, therefore, is a
monument to his identity that exists in relation to
a greater civic identity, that of the city of Rome and
its leaders; to use Marlowe’s term, the arch exists
as part of a greater urban ensemble, from which
and against which it communicates its identity. As
34 Architecture, Sites, and Spaces
one moves along the route, the arch functions as a
framing device for other monuments, appropriat-
ing multiple civic and religious identities and claim-
ing them for Constantine. Emperors including
Nero, Hadrian, Commodus, and Maxentius had
sought to harness the power of the colossal statue of
the sun god Sol, located along the Via Triumphalis,
by altering the body, changing inscriptions, and
added imagery related to their reign. Constantine,
however, literally transformed the way spectators
saw the statue, so that the arch controlled which
elements were visible at which points, and literally
contained the statue within its frame. In essence,
Constantine manipulated architecture, site, and
space to control the spectator’s experience in order
to broadcast his identity as a triumphant, sacred,
and secular ruler. He created a tableau that was
understood through experience; absorbed as an
experience, the identity he had constructed was
perceived as always and already real, omnipresent,
and natural. So too today does the architecture of
the American court affect its viewers.
Ironically, when a site functions as perfectly as
possible, clearly communicating its semiotic iden-
tity, then its identity as a construction can become
obscured. The paradigmatic case of this phenom-
enon is Trecento (1300s) Italian urban planning.
For years, scholarship held that it was not until the
Renaissance of the Quattrocento (1400s) that
rational and controlled planning and architecture
came to be the rule. It was thus first seen in Filippo
Brunelleschi’s geometrically proportioned struc-
tures and his famous perspectival panels of the
Piazza della Signoria with the Palazzo Vecchio and
of the Piazza del Duomo and the Baptistery, and
codified in Leon Battista Alberti’s treatise De re
architectura (c. 1452). Indeed, a fundamental
characteristic of the identity of the Renaissance
was that it was newly rational, so that the medi-
eval, by definition, could not have been. Marvin
Trachtenberg has shown, however, that Trecento
Florentines in fact planned the urban fabric of
their monuments and spaces with great precision,
creating sites in which architecture and space—
building and piazza—functioned as a visual and
structural unit. For instance, the measurements of
the Palazzo Vecchio (then called the Palazzo della
Signoria) and of the Piazza della Signora were cal-
culated together, so that the urban planners were
able to create ideal viewing points at the very
places where the palazzo was first seen. Again,
because the perception of the building was experi-
ential and phenomenological, its constructedness
became obscured over time. In this scenario, a cor-
relative problem then arose: The successful manip-
ulation of space and place in the Trecento led to a
distortion of scholarship in which the identity of
the Quattrocento was predicated on a false con-
ceptualization. Brunelleschi was held to be the
originator of perspectival views, when in essence
he is part of a continuum that stretches back a
century: The urban planners of the Trecento cre-
ated a controlled view, and Brunelleschi recorded
and made use of it on his panels.
In essence, this scenario reveals a way in which
the identity of the site constructed by the urban
planners and the identity of the time period/
movement constructed by scholars are interrelated.
It had long been understood that the young Florentine
Commune had created the Palazzo Vecchio as a
symbol of the new government. Having triumphed
over the various noble families who had fought
for power, the Commune passed laws that limited
the height of individual family towers and built a
civic structure, the Palazzo Vecchio, with the high-
est tower in Florence. One would think that it
would be obvious that this act would be part of a
greater urban plan, yet scholarly preconceptions
of the identity of the time and the place stood in
the way. With these preconceptions dismantled,
more complete identities of other cities and spaces
can be seen. Areli Marina, for instance, has
recently shown that such urban planning is not
limited to central Italy and Tuscany (i.e., the area
of the “birthplace of the Renaissance,” Florence)
but also is found in the North, using the example
of Parma.
Similar issues are at play in the discussion of
gender and architecture. The story of Trecento
urban planning in Italy and its fortunes reveals that
there must be a precise mental space, construct, or
both, if there is to be an accurate perception of the
built identity of space and site. Intellectual and
physical structure and space are inextricably linked;
both women as people and feminism as an idea are
affected by the built space and are in need of “a
room of one’s own,” to use Virginia Woolf’s
phrase. Constantine constructed a tableau in order
to broadcast an identity of his own devising; in
contrast, women have traditionally had spaces built

for them that reflect and reinforce their societal
duties and prescribed identities. These issues are
treated in a number of essays and anthologies on
the subject; here, the scholarship contained in the
anthology Gender-Space-Architecture is consid-
ered. Scholars such as Alice Friedman have empha-
sized that both gender and architecture are
constructions of society, and they have investigated
these issues in early modern domestic architecture.
Elizabeth Grosz has hypothesized that in occupying
a space or dwelling that they did not build, or that
was built for them, women are in essence homeless.
In this argument, the construction of identity is
literally predicated on the construction of site (the
interaction of space and architecture). Debates as
to the solution and the details of the issues are rife.
Dolores Hayden asks what a nonsexist city would
look like, while Karen Franck explores the concept
that ways of knowing are themselves gendered, and
what this means for feminism and architecture.
Mary McLeod reveals the problematics of how
analyzing space and place through rubrics that rely
on a concept of “otherness,” noting that there is no
one stable “other” and thus no stable “other place”
or “other space.”
McLeod tentatively suggests that a fertile object
to explore would be Maya Lin’s Vietnam Veterans
Memorial. Lin’s monument is of utmost impor-
tance in the context of architecture, sites, and
spaces in relation to identity. Most memorials, like
the nearby Washington National Memorial, are
phallic and defined by a heavy presence, calling
out their power and identity by extending upward
into the sky, viewable from a great distance. Lin’s
memorial is liminal and experiential and marked
equally by presence and absence. From afar, it is a
gash in the ground, a wound symbolizing the
dead. The memorial itself is a slope with a sub-
stantive wall, drawing the visitor in while the wall
extends upward to the ground. The names of the
fallen mean that the dead are both absent and
present. In Lin’s memorial, a visitor experiences
the space and the place, and its identity is both
stable and individualized.
In like fashion, some of the most fruitful inqui-
ries into these identity issues focus on the liminal
and shifting centers, as the essays in Out There:
Marginalization and Contemporary Cultures dem-
onstrate. Coming from the starting point of
African American studies, bell hooks has posited
Architecture, Sites, and Spaces 35
that the margin can be seen to be a space of radical
openness; in like fashion, addressing the issue
from a postcolonial and feminist point of view,
Gayatri Spivak has shown that the center itself is
marginal. In Chicano/a studies, the issue is one of
the border or la frontera, of the space that is both
a dividing line and an indexical place of its own.
Lin’s memorial exists somewhere between archi-
tecture and site-specific art/installation, and artists
working in the medium of site-specificity are sug-
gestively exploring the interaction of space and
construct as a place of identity. In July 2004
Bombay-born artist Anish Kapoor installed the
Cloud Gate in Chicago’s Millenium Park, a work
that takes the form of an elliptical solid, made
from 110 tons of highly polished stainless steel.
The work takes its identity from the site, reflecting
the architecture and space around it, in a way that
is both distorted and accurate and which appears
different depending on the viewer’s location, the
time of day, the weather, and so forth. Mary Miss
has created a series of works in which the indoor
and the outdoor coexist, while Nina Katchadourian
explores the boundaries and overlaps between the
natural and the manmade. In works like En la
barbería, no se llora (No crying allowed in the
barbershop) of 1994, Pepón Osorio uses stereo-
typical Puerto Rican kitsch to celebrate and decon-
struct the layered identity of Puerto Ricans as
American and other. In all these works, construct,
space, and site provide the fundamental identity of
the work and ensure its variability, instability, and
malleability—its interaction with the outside iden-
tities of viewers and the city itself.
The interaction of architecture and space is
fundamentally semiotic, a creation of a construct,
space, and site which is meant to communicate a
meaning or meanings, an identity or identities, of
societies, communities, designers, patrons, spec-
tators, and cultures. Whereas the context in
which they are constructed can help us under-
stand these identities, the reverse is also true.
When we lack complete written records, explora-
tions of architecture and space can help fill in the
blanks, as is the case with ancient Mesopotamia.
Irene Winter has shown that the ways in which
ziggurats are constructed reveal that their concep-
tualization of space is very different from that of
the modern West. In this society, space was both
a void and a linear bridge, something that was
36 Articulation Theory
both empty and meant to be traversed. She found
confirmation of her observations in the written
evidence that is available: In Sumerian and
Akkadian, there is no word for “space,” that loca-
tion and direction are given via coordinates—go
from x to y. Architecture reflects and informs col-
lective and individual conceptualizations, existing
as a language both built and optical, experienced
and seen. A site, an interaction of architecture and
space, communicates its own identity and is an
agent for identification. It is for this reason that,
from Plato to Thomas More to George Orwell,
utopias and dystopias are described in terms of
architecture and language, with a utopia predi-
cated on an ideal city that is a harmony of space
and built form and on freedom of speech and edu-
cation, and a dystopia is built with repressive
language and architecture.
Mia Reinoso Genoni
See also Other, The; Renaissance Art
Further Readings
Colomina, B., & Bloomer, J. (1992). Sexuality & space.
New York: Princeton Architectural Press.
Ferguson, R., Gever, M., Minh-ha, T., & West, C. (Eds.).
(1990). Out there: Marginalization and contemporary
cultures. New York and Cambridge: New Museum of
Contemporary Art and MIT Press.
Lasansky, D. M. (2004). The Renaissance perfected:
Architecture, spectacle, and tourism in fascist Italy.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Leach, N. (1997). Rethinking architecture: A reader in
cultural theory. New York: Routledge.
Marina, A. (2006, December). Order and ideal geometry
in the Piazza del Duomo, Parma. Journal of the
Society of Architectural Historians, 65(4), 520–549.
Marlowe, E. (2006, June). Framing the sun: The Arch of
Constantine and the Roman cityscape. Art Bulletin,
88(2), 223–242.
Rendell, J., Penner, B., & Borden, I. (2000). Gender-
space-architecture: An interdisciplinary introduction.
London: Routledge.
Suderburg, E. (2000). Space, site, intervention: Situating
installation art. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.
Trachtenberg, M. (1997). Dominion of the eye:
Urbanism, art, and power in early modern Florence.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Winter, I. J. (1991). Reading concepts of space from
ancient Mesopotamian monuments. In K. Vatsyayan
(Ed.), Concepts of space: Ancient and modern
(pp. 57–73). New Delhi, India: Indira Gandhi
National Centre for Arts and Abhinav Publications.
Articulation Theory
Articulation theory is a cultural studies theory and
methodology that aims to account for the power-
ful material consequences of the ideas, principles,
and beliefs that make up ideologies. It provides an
insightful means by which to account for the ways
in which discourse and discursive formations are
able to bind people and their sense of identity
together in concrete ways. Stuart Hall, Jennifer
Daryl Slack, Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe
are the major proponents of this approach who all,
in different ways, use articulation theory to give an
explanation of the ways in which discourse shapes
the operation of dominance and power in contem-
porary society. Put simply, articulation theory can
be understood as a way of critically analyzing how
particular beliefs structure personal, political, cul-
tural, technological, and economic practices, thus
providing a means through which to challenge the
systematic erasure of nondominant and marginal-
ized ways of thinking and being.
As such, articulation theory moves the center of
analysis away from approaches rooted in Marxism
that argue, the way Antonio Gramsci and Louis
Althusser do, that culture and the dominant ways
of doing things in society (e.g., politics) are inde-
pendent from the economic base. Articulation
theorists, in contrast, argue that cultural practices
are complex, that the so-called relative autonomy
of culture from the economic base is not relative
but strong, and that the relationship between cul-
ture and the basic socioeconomic patterns of soci-
ety is constituted by struggle. In this sense,
articulation theory can be interpreted as containing
many of the principles of the newest forms of cul-
tural theory in that its proponents are committed
to studying language and social contexts in detail.
It is important to note that the objective of most
articulation theorists is to inquire into, and account
for, how discourse and discursive formations are
able to legitimate and indeed rationalize capitalist

society. Briefly, a discourse is defined as a collec-
tion of often dominant ideas, expectations, and
rules that are taken for granted, while the often-
used term discursive formation refers to the ordered
regularity between said statements, concepts, and
ideas.
This discussion of articulation theory begins
with a basic outline of the major components of
articulation theory with respect to how it has been
developed by Laclau and Mouffe. This section is
followed by a précis of articulation theory as it is
understood and deployed by Hall and Slack. Next,
a simple case study of articulation theory in prac-
tice is provided and, finally, the issue of rearticula-
tion and the primary criticisms of this approach
are delineated to round out the discussion.
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe
For Laclau and Mouffe, articulation theory is seen
as especially fruitful for the analysis of a sociocul-
tural context that they contend is caught up in a
futile debate between the political right and the left.
Their overall project is to account for the genesis
and popularity of neoliberal discourses that priori-
tize trade, freedom, and human rights in a way that
excludes marginal ways of thinking and being.
Laclau and Mouffe approach articulation the-
ory first by defining the difference between the
various elements that comprise a discursive forma-
tion (i.e., the dominant ways of talking about
things). These terms are particularly significant
because they are identical to the concepts Hall,
Slack, and Lawrence Grossberg use in their
approach to articulation theory.
The two most significant terms in Laclau and
Mouffe’s model of articulation theory are moments
and elements. They define moments as the totality
of differential positions that make up a discourse
and elements as the differences that are not articu-
lated discursively.
As such, elements can be understood as floating
signifiers that become moments when they are par-
tially fixed in a discourse. The practice of articula-
tion consists of the construction of nodal points
that partially fix meaning in a chain. Put another
way, these nodal points gather up a range of ele-
ments (which are then made into moments) and
bind them into a seemingly complete discursive
formations. It is important to note, however, that
Articulation Theory 37
for Laclau and Mouffe, a discursive formation is
entirely without cohesion as it is traditionally
understood. What they argue is that discursive for-
mations develop out of a certain kind of regularity
in dispersion. That is, discursive formations emerge
from the partial and temporary fixation of related
moments. Although this may, at first glance, seem
to be a semantic difference, it is important because
of the way in which it separates itself from the
perception that discourses do not have any under-
lying and universalizable principles.
Another important tenet of articulation theory
to keep in mind is that discourses have material
consequences. Laclau draws attention to the fact
that most accounts of discourse (including critical
discourse analysis) assume that discourses are
exclusively mental phenomena. The consequences
of this materialist assumption include the disman-
tling of the subject/object dichotomy as well as
the undermining of the belief in a unified subject/
subject position. The subject, in this context, is argued
to be dispersed within and between discourses.
Significantly, Laclau takes this basic framework
a step further and, in one of his later texts, applies
the principles of articulation to study Latin
American politics. His approach is detailed in the
case study section appearing later in this entry.
Stuart Hall
Hall’s approach to articulation and articulation
theory is not substantively different from that of
Laclau and Mouffe. However, in Hall’s work,
articulation theory is used to understand how
meaning is constructed through the lens of cultural
studies rather than radical politics. Moreover, Hall
is more interested in resolving the tension between
differing approaches to critical studies.
Hall’s particular brand of articulation theory is
explained most eloquently when he argues that a
theory of articulation allows one to understand
how ideological elements and systems come to
form an interlocking set of connections, which are
then articulated at specific conjunctures to particu-
lar subjects. That is, Hall is concerned with the
question of how a particular set of ideological ele-
ments and discursive formations come to define
how we understand our social world. Hall is clear
that these formations are tied to class positions but
not determined by them.
38 Articulation Theory
Also of note is Grossberg—another cultural
studies theorist interested in articulation theory.
Significantly, Grossberg highlights the fact that
articulations are nonnecessary and underdeter-
mined connections (a) between different elements
within ideology, (b) between ideology and social
forces, and (c) among different social groups com-
prising a social movement.
Jennifer Daryl Slack
Slack’s work on articulation arises out of a theo-
retical bias she sees in communication theory.
Slack argues that articulation theory reorganizes
the traditional sender–receiver model of communi-
cation and culturalist bias in cultural studies to one
that avoids falling into a reductionist and essential-
ist trap by focusing the study of contexts.
The objective of her work in this area, however,
is to map the genesis of articulation theory and, as
such, she does not add anything new to how
articulatory practices have been expressed by Hall,
Laclau, and Mouffe. Yet in unpacking the roots of
articulation theory through the works of Marx,
Gramsci, and Althusser, on the one hand, and
Raymond William and Richard Hoggarth, on the
other, Slack provides necessary insight into how
articulation theory developed as it has.
Case Study
The most uncomplicated way to understand how
articulation theory works in practice, particularly in
light of the highly abstract descriptions previously
given, is through a concrete case study. Let us con-
sider, in brief, two basic examples: (1) the discourse
of Latin American political hegemony, which is the
subject of Laclau’s use of articulation theory, and
(2) Hall’s account of race and racialized identity.
Slack argues that for Laclau, the process by
which the dominant classes assert hegemony in
Latin America is through the constructed linking
(into the nodal points of a discursive chain) of ele-
ments like class, nationalism, order, and unity,
which are used to neutralize opposition. Moreover,
using an articulation theory approach, he also
claims that the various elements that make up the
ideology of neoliberalism are completely arbitrary
and have been established through words, sets of
rules and conventions, and institutional structures
(i.e., moments) that try to determine reality. Laclau
states as much when he argues that it is no longer
the case that dominant classes impose their world-
view on the rest of us through force. Rather, these
classes create a kind of hegemony by articulating
competing visions in such a way that their likely
antagonisms are neutralized.
Hall makes a similar argument in relation to the
subjects of race and racism. He claims that because
racism is not present in all capitalist societies, what
needs to be made apparent is why racism has been
articulated so closely to so many capitalist social
formations. Hall concludes that the rise of a racial-
ized definition of identity can only be explained
though a discursive analysis of the various ele-
ments and moments (the economy included) that
have come to produce this particular discursive
formation.
Rearticulation
One of the most significant outcomes of articula-
tion theory for Hall, Laclau, Mouffe, and Slack is
the possibility of rearticulation. Slack in particular
dedicates a large portion of her work on articula-
tion to “mapping the context” of rearticulation,
which she claims is a fundamental part of commu-
nicative practices. She argues that because articula-
tion theory can be seen as a communicative
practice, focus must be placed on the process of
creating connections and articulations anew. It is
the job of cultural theorists, she claims, to examine
how, when, where, and under what circumstances
one might intervene to change the established
ensembles of articulated discourses.
Mouffe and Laclau also argue that because of
the incomplete character of discursive “totalities”
and the lack of fixity among fields of identities,
rearticulation is not only possible but inevitable.
Hall is similarly clear that the nonnecessary nature
of artificially sutured discourses is reversible and
consistently calls for a kind of rearticulation that
eschews essentialism and, for his purposes, reduc-
tive and racially bound social formations.
Criticism
There are several critiques of articulation theory
worth noting in this context, of which some of the
most important are discussed here. First, articulation

theory has been criticized frequently as failing to
move beyond the examination of language and,
therefore, of being overly reductionist in its range
of analysis. Second, proponents of articulation
theory have also been charged as retaining a bias
toward ideas, as they have little to say in the way
of so-called real-life structures.
It has also been claimed that the primary differ-
ences between such terms as moments and ele-
ments are significantly undertheorized by Laclau,
Mouffe, Slack, and Hall. David Howarth, for
instance, argues that not only are these terms
undertheorized, but that articulation theory in
general lacks a set of method-specific guidelines,
which, in turn, poses significant barriers for indi-
viduals using articulation theory for the purposes
of analysis.
Finally, it has been argued that the progressive
project that Laclau and Mouffe in particular offer
is simply a gussied-up reiteration of popular
democracy. This, in turn, could end up simply
legitimating the existing state and state of affairs.
Tina Sikka
See also Bricolage; Critical Theory; Cultural Studies;
Discourse; Frankfurt School; Hegemony; Political
Economy; Rhetoric
Further Readings
Angus, I. (1992). The politics of common sense:
Articulation theory and critical communication
studies. In S. Deetz (Ed.), Communication yearbook
(Vol. 15, pp. 535–570). Newbury Park: Sage.
Geras, N. (1987). Post-Marxism? New Left Review,
163, 40–82.
Grossberg, L. (1982). The ideology of communication:
Post-structuralism and the limits of communication.
Man and World, 15, 83–101.
Grossberg, L. (1986). On postmodernism and
articulation: An interview with Stuart Hall. Journal of
Communication Inquiry, 10, 45–60.
Hall, S. (1996). The problem with ideology: Marxism
without guarantees. In D. Morley & K. H. Chen
(Eds.), Stuart Hall: Critical dialogues in cultural
studies (pp. 24–45). London: Routledge.
Howarth, D. (1998). Discourse theory and political
analysis. In E. Scarbrough & E. Tanenbaum (Eds.),
Research strategies in the social sciences (pp. 268–293).
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Artistic Development and Cognition 39
Laclau, E. (1977). Politics and ideology in Marxist
theory: Capitalism, fascism, Marxism. London: Verso.
Laclau, E., & Mouffe C. (2001). Hegemony and socialist
strategy: Toward a radical democratic politics. New
York: Verso.
Martin, J. (2002). The political logic of discourse: A neo-
Gramscian view. History of European Ideas, 28,
21–31.
Middleton, R. (2002). Studying popular music. Philadelphia:
Open University Press.
Slack, J. D. (1996). The theory and method of
articulation in cultural studies. In D. Morley &
K. H. Chen (Eds.), Critical dialogues in cultural
studies (pp. 112–130). London: Routledge.
Torfing, J. (1999). New theories of discourse: Laclau,
Mouffe, and Žižek. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Artistic Development
and Cognition
Conceptions of artistic development have been
informed by a variety of fields, such as psychol-
ogy, anthropology, sociology, cultural studies,
and the interdisciplinary field of cognitive sci-
ence. A large body of research has addressed the
arts in relation to cognitive developmental stages,
revealing both developmental and cognitive fea-
tures of the artistic process and contributing to a
significant understanding of individual artistic
growth, the cognitive processes involved in the
production and perception of art, and the types
of artistic activities, styles, and practices involved
in the making of art. Multiple interpretations and
meanings about the nature of artistic develop-
ment and cognition have developed as a result of
revisiting the social, historical and cultural con-
texts of conceptions of child development and
artistry. The information in this entry is a chron-
icle of some of the significant theories and theo-
rists who have contributed, either directly or
indirectly, to theories of artistic development and
cognition. Although some of these theories do
not explicitly address identity, they nonetheless
help to situate contemporary discussions about
identity in relation to development and cognition
as well as align the more conventional discourse
of stage theories of artistic development with the
concept of identity.
40 Artistic Development and Cognition
Visual Art and Perception
Psychologist, philosopher, and critic Rudolph
Arnheim explored the cognitive basis of art. With
a background in Gestalt psychology, which empha-
sizes the perception of patterns, images, and forms
as organized wholes, Arnheim sought to apply the
principles of Gestalt psychology to the study of art.
He examined, for example, the structures of an
artwork—such as form, line, or color—and the
emotional reaction that results. He wrote about
multiple media such as painting, photography,
film, architecture, and television. His theory about
perception and art can be found in two of his well-
known books, Art and Visual Perception and
Visual Thinking, which explore the relationship
between vision and cognition and the question of
whether or not perception and thought differ.
Arnheim concluded that there was no difference:
Perception, or the taking in of sensory informa-
tion, was synonymous with thought. Thus, Arnheim
critiqued the often-employed dichotomy between
perception and reason as false. Employing the
senses (seeing, hearing, and touching, but also,
according to Arnheim, knowledge) was the way in
which people imposed order on the world. Henry
Schaeffer-Simmern’s The Unfolding of Artistic
Activity is another text that based accounts of cog-
nition on Gestalt psychology, linking changes in
children’s artistic development to changes in per-
ceptual development or learning.
Developmental Views of Cognition
The research and theories of Jean Piaget, Jerome
Bruner, Howard Gardner, and David Perkins pro-
mote a view of cognition as the construction of
meaning making, in which individuals build con-
ceptual understanding from experiences over time.
Such theories emphasize a developmental view of
cognition that is constructed by an individual in
relation to prior experiences and his or her envi-
ronment. These views also emphasize a pluralistic
view of intelligence, involving many different cog-
nitive processes. Both Gardner and Perkins have
argued that intelligence is multidimensional.
Perkins, for example, has argued for three dimen-
sions of intelligence: neural, experiential, and
reflective. Gardner, Perkins, and several of their
colleagues at Harvard Project Zero, a research
organization that has examined arts education and
human development since its inception in the
1960s, have examined the unique contributions
that the arts make in relation to thinking and
human development. Recently, Robert and Michele
Root-Bernstein identified 13 features of thinking
in their study of eminent thinkers across disci-
plines: observing; imagining, abstracting, recogniz-
ing patterns, forming patterns, analogizing, bodily
thinking, empathizing, dimensional thinking, mod-
eling, playing, transforming, and synthesizing.
Many of these operations have been identified in
other research and theories as well, but they hold
implications for those in the artistic fields.
This view of cognition as multidimensional and
situated within an interaction of mind and envi-
ronment is also found in the work of curriculum
theorists Elliot Eisner and Madeleine Grumet, who
have argued, along with Perkins and Gardner, that
the arts offer unique cognitive contributions.
Eisner has argued that the arts help us develop a
disposition toward ambiguity, attend to an envi-
ronment’s expressive features, stimulate the imagi-
nation, and present forms of and opportunities for
representation of experiences. Arthur Efland,
another art educator, has written a book titled Art
and Cognition, in which he discusses in detail the
application of cognitive theories (based signifi-
cantly in Piaget’s and Lev Vygotsky’s theories of
cognitive development).
Stage Theories of Artistic Development
Traditional notions of artistic development have
stemmed from Western notions of child develop-
ment and artistic growth. A number of theories
have focused on early childhood art and stage
theories of development, based largely on (or
indebted to) Piaget’s conception of cognitive devel-
opment. As a collective body of work, stage theo-
ries of artistic development are concerned with
linearity and universality of a hierarchical nature—
defined through a child’s increasing ability to make
“isomorphic representations” that approach realis-
tic renderings of people, objects, and perspective.
Although many of these theories do not explicitly
cover the concept of identity—indeed, identity is a
term that is somewhat recent in terms of its appli-
cation to cognitive development—the notion of the
self that the theorists describe construct a type of

predetermined, universal subjectivity in relation to
artistic development.
Precursers to Piagetian cognitive developmental
theory include Herbert Read’s Education Through
Art and Viktor Lowenfeld’s Creative and Mental
Growth. In both of these works, the authors based
their theories of artistic development on self-
expressiveness as based in Jungian and/or Freudian
theory. Rudolph Arnheim based his theory of artis-
tic development on the theories of visual percep-
tion promoted by Gestalt psychology. Lowenfeld
was one of the first art educators to propose a
series of stages that children move through, based
on his studies of children’s drawings: scribbling
(2–4 years); preschematic (4–7 years); schematic, or
concept formation (7–9 years); dawning realism
(9–11 years); and pseudo-naturalistic (11–13 years).
He also proposed that self-identification is crucial
to the creative and mental growth of children.
Lowenfeld defined self-identification as the ability
to identify with the activities with which one
engages, as well as identify with the needs of oth-
ers. Art expression is not possible without self-
identification with the experience as well as with the
medium of expression. For Lowenfeld, creativity is
not possible without the process of self-identification;
there must be identification between the child and
his or her art experience and with the art medium,
technique and procedure, subject matter, audi-
ence, and the means of expression. Most impor-
tantly, Lowenfeld connected his concerns for a
well-balanced individual with social adjustment
and individual contribution to a healthy, creative
society.
Gardner and the work of Harvard Project Zero
have closely examined children’s drawings in rela-
tion to their emotional, cognitive, and social lives,
directing attention to the artistic life of a child
rather than to the work of art as the sole basis of
analysis. Gardner and other colleagues associated
with Harvard Project Zero—Nelson Goodman,
Ellen Winner, Perkins, and Jessica Davis—were
among some of the first researchers to closely
examine the relationship between aesthetic/artistic
and cognitive development using a symbol–systems
approach. Gardner and Davis are noted for devel-
oping a theory of artistic development that is con-
nected with adult art. Many theorists, in fact, have
made comparisons between child art and adult art.
Unlike Piaget’s linear and hierarchical model of
Artistic Development and Cognition 41
development, art educator and researchers Davis
and Gardner describe a U-shaped curve of devel-
opment, in which young children produce draw-
ings similar to the work of professional artists,
whereas children in middle childhood (age 8–11)
show a decline in that ability, producing more lit-
eral works of art. In adolescence, youth emerge on
the other side of the U with more abstract repre-
sentations, similar to the work of professional art-
ists. Without persistence, training, or guidance, the
U transforms to an L-shape, in which artistic
development remains at the level of literalism.
Other stage theories include Michael Parsons’s
stages of aesthetic understanding that viewers
undergo as they encounter a work of art: favorit-
ism (age 5), beauty and realism (age 10), expres-
siveness (adolescence), style and form (young
adults), and autonomy (professionally trained
adults). These stages are based upon a Piagetian
framework in that they align with the developmen-
tal stages of sensory-motor intelligence age (0–2),
preoperational thought (age 2–7), concrete opera-
tions (age 7–11), and formal operations (11–15).
Parsons describes a stage as a cluster of ideas
rather than psychological properties of persons, in
which people use a certain consistent set of ideas
to describe a work of art.
Researchers, educators, and theorists have ques-
tioned developmental approaches to artistic devel-
opment, critiquing the universal structure of stages
and the reliance on Western developmental psy-
chology, which, critics argue, tends to decontextu-
alize children from their environment. Reviewing
the research on artistic development, Anna Kindler
and Bernard Darras surmise that stage theories of
artistic development share the following character-
istics: linearity that does not account for diversity;
a focus on realism; lack of generalizability beyond
the early years (with the exception of scribbling,
an almost universal finding that is cross-culturally
shared); and an emphasis on psychobiological
determinants. Kindler and Darras argue that these
characteristics do not include the social or cultural
contexts that might afford or constrain develop-
mental processes or the forms of art that are not
based on realism but rather on other expressive
ends, such as maps, logos, and decorative art.
They argue, along with other theorists, that chil-
dren develop “multiple repertoires” depending on
the purpose, intent, and context of a drawing, and
42 Artistic Development and Cognition
that pictorial representation is a semiotic process
interacting with the social environment.
These critiques are grounded in a sociocultural
approach to artistic development, an approach
discussed in the next section.
Sociocultural Approaches
to Artistic Development
Increasingly, art education and the fields that inform
child development have focused on larger social and
cultural aspects of artistry. Many theories of artistic
development have historically relied on the legacy
of Piaget’s developmental stage theory, which
emphasizes an individual child’s internal cognitive
formation in relation to his or her surroundings.
Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky focused on the
social development of the child and the ways in
which social interaction also represents larger cul-
tural knowledge, an interaction that Vygotsky
termed cultural mediation. Unlike Piaget’s emphasis
on universal stages, Vygotsky argued that thought
and development are specific to the culture in which
the child is situated. He also argued that cognitive
development is limited to a certain time span, which
he called the zone of proximal development, the
space between matured psychological processes and
level of development and those that are in the pro-
cess of maturing. Vygotsky also explored aesthetic
experience, emotions, the semiotic nature of psy-
chological processes, and Marxist psychology.
Contemporary researchers and theorists have
extended Vygotsky’s notion of cultural tools from
his initial focus on language and speech as tools of
social mediation to other types of cultural tools
such as art and art making. Explicit mention of
identity is made by Dorothy Holland and col-
leagues William Lachicotte, Debra Skinner, and
Carole Cain, who developed a theory of person-
hood that merges Vygotsky’s conception of semi-
otic mediation with literary theorist Mikhail
Bakhtin’s concepts of dialogism and authorship.
They argue that identities are socially organized
and reproduced through encounters in which one’s
position matters; they also are distributed across
many different fields of activity. Central to their
conceptions of identity is the concept of history-in-
person, in which identity is continually forming
through practices and activities that are culturally,
socially, and historically situated.
The concept of childhood has also been chal-
lenged. Rather than a predetermined trajectory
following universal stages, some theorists view
childhood as a cultural construction that varies
cross-culturally and across different situations.
Moreover, the art that children make for them-
selves is being reconsidered in relation to artistic
development and identity. Art educator Christine
Thompson has reviewed some of these concerns,
the research, and the theories regarding the inter-
play between children’s self-initiated art-making
activities and those that parents, teachers, and the
media supply for them.
Fields such as hermeneutics blur the distinction
between individual and the social world, in which
individuals are part of the world they perceive.
Poststructuralist approaches to child development
and identity deconstruct such concepts as child-
hood, learning, and development by viewing these
terms as ideological products of particular dis-
courses in which such concepts are constructed.
From this perspective, identity is constructed within
and through discourses and practices, and artistic
development is not so much emergent in stages as
it is constructed through certain normalized discur-
sive, cultural, and institutional practices.
Visual Culture and Postmodern Perspectives
Visual culture has become a central approach and
topic within the fields of art, art education, and art
history. As such, these fields have been signifi-
cantly influenced by poststructural and other post-
modern positions on artistic development and
identity, such as semiotic theory, feminist post-
structuralism, and cultural studies. Art educators
such as Dennis Atkinson, Arthur Efland, Christine
Thompson, and Brent and Marjorie Wilson, as
well as the previously mentioned educators, have
encouraged postmodern approaches to theories of
artistic and child development.
The Wilsons have suggested that children’s
graphic representations mirror social and cultural
conventions, learned largely by imitating the work
they observe in their everyday life. The Wilsons
emphasize the importance of popular culture in
children’s lives, noting in their cross-cultural
research (and, in many cases, the focus of their
research) children’s references to comic superhe-
roes in American culture and manga in Japanese

culture. They also note that children draw visual
narratives based on themes or issues that arise in
their own lives, thus noting the importance of
popular visual images in children’s identity. Brent
Wilson has suggested that children in Japan con-
struct a sense of national identity through their
engagement with Japanese manga. He has also sug-
gested a third pedagogical site in which students
and their teachers make connections between in-
school art activities and children’s self-initiated art
activities. Wilson maintains that this “site” holds
promise for weaving art education into children’s
personal lives.
Atkinson argues that children’s artistic develop-
ment in drawing is a semiotic practice, in which
drawing signifies other images and discourses
understood as visual images or structures rather
than as a mimetic representation of a fixed, exter-
nal object. As such, visual images and the artwork
of children can be interpreted in multiple ways
because the meaning of an object is always open to
interpretation. Similarly, Atkinson also argues that
identity itself is not fixed; rather, identity is always
fluid and changing because it is always subject to
new interpretation. He argues that in a world of
rapid change, we need to consider the ways in
which identities are formed in school within the
types of teaching and learning practices related to
the visual arts and offer opportunities for students
to explore and comment upon the world through
visual practices.
Contemporary Views of Artistic
Development and Identity in the Visual Arts
The concept of identity in the visual arts changed
with the shift from a modernist to a postmodernist
paradigm during the mid-20th century and contin-
ues to evolve. The view of identity as fluid, multi-
ple, and changing is one that has been promoted
across many different disciplinary fields, including
psychology, anthropology, sociology, and cultural
studies. One crucial thread running through con-
temporary views of cognition pertains to the rela-
tionship between semiotic mediation and agency;
that is, identities are constructed through meaning-
ful participation with others around a given activ-
ity, and as such, these activities have heuristic
value. Legitimacy and meaningful participation,
social and cultural agency and identity, and the
Artistic Development and Cognition 43
mastery and reappropriation of cultural forms and
symbols are all concepts that have been investi-
gated and theorized in relation to cognition.
The view of visual arts and their meaning has
also changed during the mid-20th century. In rela-
tion to art making and artistic development, con-
temporary theorists of art and identity argue that
there is a significant influence and interaction of
semiotics, culture, history, and politics on identity
development and the ways in which individual
identity contributes to different ways of expressing
identity through art.
Kimberly Powell
See also Aesthetics
Further Readings
Atkinson, D. (2002). Art in education: Identity in
practice. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic.
Efland, A. (2002). Art and cognition: Integrating the
visual arts in the curriculum. New York: Teachers
College Press.
Flavell, J. (1963). The developmental psychology of Jean
Piaget. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
Gardner, H. (1973). The arts and human development.
New York: Wiley.
Gardner, H. (1980). Artful scribbles: The significance of
children’s drawings. New York: Basic Books.
Kindler, A. (1997). Child development in art. Reston,
VA: National Art Education Association.
Kindler, A., & Darras, B. (1997). Development of
pictorial representation: A teleology-based model.
International Journal of Art & Design Education,
16(3), 217–222.
Kindler, A., & Darras, B. (1998). Culture and
development of pictorial repertoires. Studies in Art
Education, 39(2), 147–167.
Lowenfeld, V. (1957). Creative and mental growth
(3rd ed.). New York: Macmillan.
Piaget, J. (1963). The origins of intelligence in children
(M. Cook, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton.
(Original work published 1952)
Read, H. (1945). Education through art. New York:
Pantheon.
Tarr, P. (2003). Reflections on the image of the child:
Reproducer or creator of culture. Art Education,
56(4), 6–11.
Thompson, C. (2008). The culture of childhood and the
visual arts. In L. Bresler (Ed.), International handbook
44 Ascribed Identity
of research in art education (pp. 899–914). Dordrecht,
the Netherlands: Springer.
Vygotsky, L. (1978). Mind in society: Development of
higher psychological processes (M. Cole, V. John-
Steiner, S. Scribner, & E. Souberman, Eds.).
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Vygotsky, L. (1978). The psychology of art. Cambridge:
MIT Press. (Original work published 1925)
Wilson, B. (2000). Becoming Japanese: Manga, children’s
drawings, and the construction of national character.
Visual Arts Research, 25(2), 48–60.
Wilson, B., & Wilson, M. (1977). An iconoclastic view of
the imagery sources in the drawings of young people.
Art Education, 30(1), 4–12.
Ascribed Identity
Ralph Linton, the famed anthropologist and
author of The Study of Man and Body Ritual of
Nacirema, proposed in 1936 two sociological
concepts that became, according to Theodore
Kemper, almost universally accepted. These terms
were ascribed identity and achieved status. This
entry predominately explores the nature of ascribed
status and identity, but its importance became
significant in relation to achieved identity.
Generally, ascribed identities were aspects deter-
mined at birth over which people had little con-
trol. In Linton’s era, ascribed identities included
gender, age, caste, social class, and race. More
recent literature acknowledges other social identi-
ties as ascribed, such as disability, sexual orienta-
tion, nationality, and religion. However, current
sociologists, psychologists, educators, and others
recognize the more dynamic nature of these social
identities. They also have articulated the influence
of social construction on the members of these
groups in determining how, when, and to what
degree people were valued or oppressed.
Guiding Foundations
Ruthellen Josselson defined identity as an uncon-
scious process that unites personality and links the
individual to the social world. Though somewhat
stable and consistent, offering a reliable sense of
self and continuity linking the self with the past
and present, identity grows in assurance and
sophistication across the life span. We learn about
ourselves by connecting with the self, observing
what others reflect back to us, and by comparing
and contrasting ourselves with others. Social identi-
ties indicate who we are, who other people are,
and, receptively, who other people think we are.
What does it mean to be an American? How is it to
be a gay man? Janet Helms indicated that the con-
cepts of identity and status indicate the dynamic
interplay of processes such as cognitive and psycho-
social development. Early writings on ascription
used the term ascribed status, whereas later writ-
ings more often used the term ascribed identity.
The literature on identity indicates that
premodern-era identities were ascribed in that they
were inherited or conferred by tradition, though
rituals could alter ascribed identities. For example,
through baptism and confirmation, one could con-
vert to Catholicism. Also, through rituals, such as
completion of an apprenticeship, one becomes an
adult member of a culture. Now, identities are
considered more likely to be achieved in that iden-
tity is malleable, flexible, and connected to people’s
reflection upon their experiences, circumstances,
and events in relationship to their ability and will.
Early Notions of Ascribed Identity
Lipton differentiated ascribed identity from achieved
identity. He believed that ascribed identities were
determined at birth and individuals had little con-
trol over them, whereas achieved identities were the
result of accomplishments across the life span and
were often the result of will and perseverance.
According to Lipton and later authors, ascribed
identities served the purpose of training individuals
for their future functions in society. Sigmund Freud
wrote of an individual’s insertion into a collection,
and in so doing, the individual inherits the charac-
teristics of the group. Leaving opportunity for an
achieved identity, Anna Freud wrote that an indi-
vidual can be singled out and achieve special status
due to unpredicted circumstances.
Ascribed roles were seen as physiological fact.
Lipton, as well as Erik Erikson, Jean Piaget, and
Robert Kegan, wrote of the importance of par-
ents and society in preparing a child for his or
her future. They believed that socialization for
the future predominately came from parents or
what Erikson called childhood identifications. He

believed that through the socializing process, chil-
dren recognized their future selves in those around
them. In turn, the surrounding community recog-
nized the child as such. Erikson also noted that
society vengefully rejected an individual who does
not care to be acceptable. For example, through
one’s family, children inherited their social class
position. Kinship provided a boundary of opportu-
nity that served the purpose of the society.
Ascription ensured that children replaced their
parents in the labor market. Hence, it was not nec-
essary to create new means of replacing or training
labor. Ascribed identities provided the technical
skills that children used to contribute to the repro-
duced division of labor. In fact, this reproduction
occurred without force. Families and their children
complied willingly due to benefits such as salary
and housing.
Later Notions of Ascribed Identities
In response to the civil, women’s, and gay rights
movements, psychologists, sociologists, and educa-
tors began to study the quality of one’s adjustment
in connection to his or her membership in ascribed
groups. According to Helms, the quality of a per-
son’s adjustment was the result of personal iden-
tity, reference group identity, and ascribed identity,
not ascribed identity alone. Personal identity con-
cerned one’s feelings about oneself, and reference
group orientation refers to the extent a person
identifies with a particular group.
In 1974, Theodore Kemper acknowledged that
in a couple of instances, the connection of ascribed
identities to the division of labor makes some
sense. For example, there is consensus in American
society in support of child labor laws. It is obvious
that children should not be forced to operate heavy
machinery or lift heavy objects. The limitation of
children in the workforce is an example of having
a low-age ascribed identity. Hence, their exclusion
from the labor market is appropriate. Also, accord-
ing to Kemper, the fact that women bear children,
and men do not, influences reproductive functions.
For example, a woman could not provide a sperm
sample at a sperm bank. Also, this fact appropri-
ately provides rationale for why the ascribed iden-
tities of men and women differ in what Kemper
called their respective functions in reproduction.
However, in most other ways, Kemper decried the
Ascribed Identity 45
connection of ascribed identities to people’s capac-
ity to perform in the labor market.
Kemper pointed out the underlying foundation
in ascription was that some families and children
had more power and status than others. Status
came in the form of salary, prestige, and respect.
Kemper believed that by defining ascribed identi-
ties in such a way, power relationships were being
converted into status. Hence, the powerful were
continually given power voluntarily. This occurs
by the ways that ascribed identities are constructed
through dichotomous, polytomous, or continuous
variables. Dichotomous variables would include
gender and sexual orientation, where one end of
the polarity was deemed good (male and hetero-
sexual) and the other end of the polarity was
deemed less valuable (female and homosexual).
Kemper considered religion a polytomous vari-
able, where Protestants were deemed more accept-
able than Catholics, and both higher in acceptance
than Jews. Continuous variables would include
race, where the closer to White one appeared, the
more one was valued in society. Kemper stated
that there was little relationship between ascriptive
identity and performance capacity, except in the
distribution of power. Those with power had
greater right of access to higher status. In fact,
Kemper believed that one’s greatest power was the
ability to control the institutions of socialization
(such as education systems and mass media) to
maintain the division of labor. He maintained that
ascription continued because it benefitted those
with the most power, not those with the most
capacity. In essence, ascribed identities reduced
competition for higher-status positions at the cost
of lower-ascribed groups. They are mechanisms of
social control so that coercion is not necessary.
Also in the 1970s, research in psychology and
counseling confirmed the high incidence of early
termination of therapy by clients of color with
their White therapists. Reasons for this included
that therapists assumed ascribed identities of their
clients of color. Psychologists began to differenti-
ate between imposed ascribed identities and those
chosen. Imposed ascribed identities are those that
are assumed by White counselors and psycholo-
gists about their clients of color rather than char-
acteristics of identity that are measured. Inferences
were being made solely on physical appearance.
Literature at this time connected perceptions of
46 Asiacentricity
ascribed identities with stereotypes. A number of
psychologists of color began speculating that
ascribed identities were actually not determined by
birth. Consequently, an individual’s deliberate
affiliation and commitment with an ascribed iden-
tity began to be seen, to some degree, as a choice
(made through coercion or free will) and a result of
development. For example, a person who is Black
could identify with his or her racial group or could
choose to affiliate with White and Black groups in
order to keep one’s employment. A critical aspect
of one’s “choice” was how one felt about such an
affiliation. Was one proud, embarrassed, or indif-
ferent? Researchers began to ask about the extent
to which a client identifies with his or her racial
group. At first, these choices consisted of mutually
exclusive groups such as commitment to Black cul-
ture, White culture, neither, or both. Eventually,
researchers began to conceptualize ascribed iden-
tity as a developmental process and that such a
process might be the basis upon which treatment is
based. This became the impetus for the creation
and utilization of racial identity development theo-
ries. Consequently, the idea that identities of mutu-
ally exclusive categories are assigned to people has
lost favor in that identity is now seen as a dynamic
interplay of complex factors.
Current Uses of Ascribed Identity
Recent literature on ascribed identities has taken
several forms. First, the view of ascribed identities is
used as a lens in which to contrast self-construction
over several centuries. In addition, ascribed and
achieved identities are combined and less dichoto-
mized to explore the experience of religious iden-
tity over generations. Ascription has also recently
been used as a way to analyze organizations and
workplace loyalty. Recent research has addressed
the role of identity in meeting organizational goals
in demographically diverse settings.
Jan Arminio
See also Collective/Social Identity; Identity Negotiation
Further Readings
Cadge, W., & Davidman, L. (2006). Ascription,
choice, and the construction of religious
identities in the contemporary United States.
Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion, 45(1),
23–38.
Erikson, E. H. (1968). Identity: Youth and crisis. New
York: W. W. Norton.
Erikson, E. H. (1982). The life cycle. New York:
W. W. Norton.
Helms, J. E. (1990). The measurement of Black racial
identity attitudes. In J. E. Helms (Ed.), Black and
White racial identity: Theory, research, and practice
(pp. 33–48). Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Hogg, M. A., & Terry, D. J. (2002). Social identity
processes in organizational contexts. London:
Psychology Press.
Jenkins, R. (2003). Social identity (2nd ed.). New York:
Routledge.
Josselson, R. (1987). Finding herself. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass.
Kegan, R. (1982). The evolving self. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Kemper, T. D. (1974). On the nature and purpose of
ascription. American Sociological Review, 39,
844–853.
Linton, R. (1936). The study of man. New York:
Appleton-Century.
van Halen, C., & Janssen, J. (2004). The usage of space
in dialogical self-construction: From Dante to
cyberspace. Identity: An International Journal of
Theory and Research, 4(4), 389–405.
Willie, S. S. (2003). Acting Black. New York: Routledge.
Asiacentricity
Asiacentricity is the metatheoretical notion that
insists on placing Asian worldviews at the center
of inquiry in order to see Asian phenomena from
the standpoint of Asians as subjects and agents.
Inspired by Molefi Kete Asante’s legacy of
Afrocentricity and Paul Wong, Meera Manvi, and
Takeo Hirota Wong’s Amerasia Journal article,
“Asiacentrism and Asian American Studies?”
Yoshitaka Miike has developed the idea of
Asiacentricity and envisions an alternative research
paradigm based on the Asiacentric principle. As a
metatheoretical and methodological concept, the
definition and scope of Asiacentricity are still
evolving and expanding.
There are six dimensions of Asiacentricity that
Miike highlighted for the sake of conceptual clari-
fication after he reviewed Asante’s key constituents

of Afrocentricity. Asiacentricity is (1) an assertion
of Asians as subjects and agents, (2) the centrality of
the collective interests of Asia and Asians in the
process of knowledge production about Asia,
(3) the placement of Asian cultural values and
ideals at the center of inquiry into Asian thought
and action, (4) the groundedness in Asian histori-
cal experiences, (5) an Asian contextual orienta-
tion to data, and (6) an Asian ethical critique and
corrective of the dislocation and displacement of
Asian people and phenomena. Hence the paradigm
of Asiacentricity demands that Asian peoples or
texts be viewed as subjects and agents in their nar-
ratives; Asian interests, values, and ideals be pri-
oritized in the discourse on Asians and their
experiences; and an Asian person, document, or
phenomenon be located in the context of her or his
or its own culture and history.
It is important to note that the terms subject
and agency here signify “self-definition,” “self-
determination,” and “self-representation.” The
subject–object distinction concerns the question of
how researchers approach a person, text, and
document. Rather than scrutinizing the person,
text, and document and treating them as if they
were objects of analysis and critique, researchers
must attend genuinely to them as subjects of
voices, as they tell their own stories about their
cultural worlds. The concept of agency brings
researchers’ attention to the activeness–passiveness
distinction. It raises the question of uncovering the
activeness and actor-ness of a person or a person
in a text and document instead of its passiveness
and spectator-ness. Furthermore, the idea of cul-
tural “center” in the Asiacentric project should not
be misunderstood as the pure “essence” of an
Asian culture or Asian cultures. Although
Asiacentricity is about Asian shared identities and
collective representations, Asiacentrists have no
intention of creating one center in Asia.
Asiacentricity is not ethnocentrism. Asiacentri­
city is not a universalist position but a particuralist
stance. Asiacentricity does not present the Asian
worldview as the only universal frame of reference
and impose it on non-Asians. Asiacentric propo-
nents assert that to theorize from the vantage point
of Asians as centered is the best way to capture the
agency of Asian people and the cultural world of
Asia. They do not deny the value of other, non-
Asiacentric perspectives on Asians. Nevertheless,
Asiacentricity 47
they reject the hegemonic ideology that non-
Asiacentric theoretical standpoints are superior to
Asiacentric ones and therefore can grossly neglect
the latter in the discussion and discourse surround-
ing Asian people and phenomena.
Asiacentrists are not essentialists. Asiacentricity
does not ignore the internal diversity, hybridity,
and fluidity of Asian cultures. Asiacentricity as a
metatheory concerns itself more with how research-
ers theorize than with what they theorize.
Asiacentric researchers can debate over the content
of Asian values and ideals and yet remain commit-
ted to the metatheoretical principle of the central-
ity of Asian worldviews in their academic pursuits
about Asian thinking and behavior. To center
Asian cultures in Asiacentric investigations is not
the same as to essentialize Asianness. Some
Asiacentric scholars are often mistaken as essen-
tialists because they take intense interest in com-
monalities among Asian cultures and continuities
between Asians on the continent and Asians in the
diaspora. Asiacentrists presuppose that some com-
mon aspects of Asian cultures exist due to their
geographical closeness and subsequent intercul-
tural exchanges. Asiacentrists also believe that
there are relatively stable aspects of a culture. But
this intellectual stance does not neglect diversities
among and within Asian cultures. As a matter of
fact, Asiacentric approaches can promote most
detailed and nuanced understanding of within-
Asia cultural differences by focusing on Asiacentric
comparisons (e.g., Filipino and Thai cultures).
Moreover, taking an Asiacentric position does
not lead to immutability (defined by Asante as the
belief that there can be no change, no influence,
and no impact on cultures from outside). To be
Asian is one thing, whereas to be Asiacentric is
another. Being centric is a matter of consciousness.
Non-Asians can be Asiacentric if they develop
their Asiacentric consciousness by gaining cultur-
ally centered location through culture learning. On
the other hand, the fact that one was biologically
born as a person of Asian descent does not guaran-
tee that she or he is Asiacentric. Centrists do not
presume a direct link between biology and ideol-
ogy. However, it may be the case that an Asian
identity and cultural familiarity can foster the
Asiacentric consciousness.
Finally, Asiacentrists are neither cultural chau-
vinists nor cultural separatists. It is often assumed
48 Attribution
that, if one is Asiacentric, she or he is against other
centers. But one can be Asiacentric and also
pro-African, for example. Like Afrocentrists,
Asiacentrics are simply protesting that Eurocentric
perspectives are too narrow to account for the
richness and complexities of human, not European,
experiences, and that there are different perspec-
tives, expressed through different particularities,
based on different cultural locations. Their conten-
tion is that hearing all voices form all cultural loca-
tions is humane. Afrocentricity and Asiacentricity,
for example, can enrich each other’s culture-bound
knowledge. Both Afrocentric and Asiacentric stud-
ies about intercultural communication between
Africans and Asians can complement each other.
The Asiacentric project is a transformative
enterprise—an enterprise that is always taking new
ideas and different perspectives from as many
Asian peoples and cultures as possible  and
constantly changing the conceptual base of knowl-
edge. Asiacentricity is a way of  understanding
the commonality and complexity of the Asian
experience  through Asian languages, religious–
philosophical traditions, and historical struggles as
vital resources for theory building. Past Asiacentric
investigations on Asian identities and interactions
have concentrated on East Asian societies (i.e., the
cultures of China, Japan, and South Korea).
Previous portraits of Asia are also elite, male
centered, heterosexual oriented, urban biased, and
nationalistic. Thus, there is a great deal of room
for transformation in the extant knowledge of
Asian identities and communities.
Yoshitaka Miike
See also Afrocentricity; Eurocentricity; Multiculturalism;
Orientalism; Other, The; Pluralism; Values;
Worldview
Further Readings
Asante, M. K. (1998). The Afrocentric idea (Rev. ed.).
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Asante, M. K. (2007). An Afrocentric manifesto: Toward
an African renaissance. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Miike, Y. (2008). Advancing centricity for non-Western
scholarship: Lessons from Molefi Kete Asante’s legacy
of Afrocentricity. In A. Mazama (Ed.), Essays in
honor of an intellectual warrior, Molefi Kete Asante
(pp. 287–327). Paris: Éditions Menaibuc.
Miike, Y. (2008). Toward an alternative metatheory of
human communication: An Asiacentric vision. In
M. K. Asante, Y. Miike, & J. Yin (Eds.), The global
intercultural communication reader (pp. 57–72). New
York: Routledge.
Wong, P., Manvi, M., & Wong, T. H. (1995).
Asiacentrism and Asian American studies? Amerasia
Journal, 21(1/2), 137–147.
Yin, J. (2009). Negotiating the center: Towards an
Asiacentric feminist communication theory. Journal of
Multicultural Discourses, 4(1), 75–88.
Attribution
In social psychology, the term attribution has a
technical meaning. In the guise of attribution the-
ory, it refers to the cognitive process through
which people assign causes to events and, more
importantly, causes to what people do and say.
The relevance of attribution theory to identity is
that if we can or do attribute someone’s behavior
to an underlying personality trait or disposition,
then our interpretation can be read as having
socially assigned or ascribed one’s identity. If we
attribute our own behavior in this way, then attri-
bution may be an important path to self-knowledge
and construction of an identity for ourselves.
Attribution Theory
Attribution theory has its roots in Fritz Heider’s
view, published in 1958, that human beings are
naive or intuitive psychologists who are in the
business of understanding their social world
through a process of cause–effect analysis. That is,
people, very much like formally trained psycholo-
gists, seek to attribute causes to behavior. Clearly,
if you know the causes of behavior, then you can
anticipate behaviors and you can choose to engage
in behaviors that you know have certain outcomes.
Attribution renders the world predictable and
controllable—a place within which people can act
effectively and adaptively.
This general idea was explored most fully in the
work of Harold Kelley in the late 1960s and early
1970s. Kelley believed that people are extremely
rational in determining the causes of behavior.
They cognitively compute, much like a statistician,

the degree of covariation/correlation between a
behavior and a potential cause of the behavior in
order to decide whether the potential cause is the
actual cause or not. In determining covariation,
people draw on three sources of information: con-
sistency information, distinctiveness information,
and consensus information. In attributing causes
to behavior, people are particularly interested in
knowing whether a behavior reflects an enduring
internal property of the person (personality) or an
external property of the particular situation the
person finds himself or herself in.
This is most easily explained with an example.
Imagine that you meet someone, let’s call her Jess,
who is friendly toward you. What does her friend-
liness tell you? If she is only sometimes friendly
toward you, her behavior is low in consistency—
her friendliness is not due to you, and it does not
reflect a general tendency on her part to be friendly.
Under these circumstances, you would discount
yourself or her as a cause of her friendliness, and
you would look for other potential causes. If, how-
ever, she is always friendly toward you, then her
behavior is consistent—but further information,
on distinctiveness and consensus, is needed to
know whether the cause of the friendliness is her
personality or something about the situation she is
in (for example, with you). If she is always friendly
to you but not to anyone else, and not everyone is
friendly to you, then her behavior is high in dis-
tinctiveness and low in consensus, and you can
probably assume that she specifically likes you. If,
on the other hand, Jess is not only friendly to you
but to everyone else, and most other people are not
friendly toward you, then distinctiveness and con-
sensus are both low, and you can assume that Jess
is simply a friendly person.
Biases and Errors in Attribution
Kelley’s covariation model of attribution explains
how we attribute behaviors externally to the situa-
tion or internally to the person and therefore the
way in which, through attribution, we can ascer-
tain people’s personality: when their behavior is
consistent, distinctive, and low in consensus.
However, research quickly and cumulatively
showed that people are much less rational than
Kelley allowed. They were at best very poor naive
statisticians and psychologists—they ignored some
Attribution 49
information (for example, consensus information
is rarely considered), overweighted other informa-
tion, and were generally prey to motivated biases
and cognitive-inferential shortcomings. These
biases and errors were documented and integrated
in the book Human Inference: Strategies and
Shortcomings of Social Judgment, published in
1980 by Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross—a classic
book the shifted the emphasis of the study of social
perception away from painstaking causal inference
toward the study of largely automatic cognitive
processes.
Correspondence Bias and the
Fundamental and Ultimate Attribution Errors
Perhaps the most significant attribution bias is the
correspondence bias, or fundamental attribution
error. First described by Ross in 1977, this bias or
error is one in which people have a tendency to
overlook or underweight perfectly obvious exter-
nal causes of behavior and instead overattribute
behavior internally to a person’s personality.
People perceptually inflate the perceived corre-
spondence between people’s behavior and their
disposition to behave in that way. An example of
the correspondence bias would be the assumption
that a shop assistant is treating one rudely because
he or she is a rude person rather than because it’s
the end of a long day in which he or she had to
deal with rude customers under stressful and
unpleasant working conditions.
One explanation of correspondence bias is that
when we observe someone’s behavior, we are actu-
ally focusing our attention more on their perform-
ing the behavior than on the situation in which
they are behaving. The person and the behavior
are perceptually linked and stand out against the
background of the situation. Not surprisingly, we
perceive a stronger link (correspondence) between
the behavior and the person than between the
behavior and the situation, and thus we internally
attribute the behavior to the person’s disposition,
character, or personality. This explanation makes
sense and has empirical support: Experiments in
which people are encouraged to focus on the situ-
ation, not the person, tend to reduce or even
reverse the correspondence bias.
Another interesting explanation is that the
English language is constructed in such a way that
50 Attribution
it is usually relatively easy to describe an action and
the person performing the action in the same terms,
but it is more difficult to describe the situation in
the same way. For example, we can talk about a
kind or honest person, and a kind or honest action,
but not a kind or honest situation. The English
language may facilitate dispositional explanations.
The correspondence bias allows us to ground
people’s behavior in their personality dispositions.
As such, it helps create a stable universe in which
we believe people are predictable: They always
behave in the same way. This phenomenon is
taken further by the process of essentialism.
According to Nick Haslam and his colleagues,
essentialism refers to a process in which behavior
is not simply internally attributed but is considered
to reflect underlying and immutable, often innate,
properties of people. Essentialism works in con-
junction with correspondence bias to even more
firmly ground people’s behavior in invariant prop-
erties of the person’s personality rather than more
flexible properties of situations. Taking our rude
shop assistant example given earlier, essentialism
would further anchor the correspondence bias–
based inference that he or she is a rude person in
innate and thus invariant attributes of her inner
psychological being.
Related to correspondence bias but operating
at the level of social groups is what Thomas
Pettigrew called the ultimate attribution error in a
1979 publication. He argued that when we attri-
bute the behavior of a person who we have cate-
gorized as a member of a group we do not belong
to (an outgroup) we attribute that person’s behav-
ior differently depending on whether the behavior
is positively/desirably or negatively/undesirably
evaluated—negative outgroup behavior is disposi-
tionally attributed, and positive outgroup behav-
ior is externally attributed or explained away in
other ways that preserve our unfavorable out-
group image. The ultimate attribution error is not
so much a focus of attention effect but a moti-
vated attempt to preserve our unfavorable out-
group image.
The ultimate attribution error can be located in
the wider logic of intergroup attributions—a logic
driven by the ethnocentric desire to preserve or
promote more favorably evaluation of one’s own
group and thus social identity as an ingroup mem-
ber in comparison with relevant outgroups. People
tend to internally attribute unfavorable outgroup
and favorable ingroup behaviors and externally
attribute favorable outgroup and unfavorable
ingroup behaviors.
Adding essentialism to the mix at the intergroup
level can be particularly pernicious. It can cause
people to attribute stereotypically negative attri-
butes of outgroups to essential and immutable
personality attributes of members of that group.
For example, the stereotype of an outgroup as
being laid-back, liberal, and poorly educated
becomes more pernicious if these attributes are
considered immutable, perhaps genetically induced,
properties of the group’s members—the people
themselves are considered to have personalities
that are immutably lazy, immoral, and stupid.
Attributions for One’s Own Behavior
Attribution theory originally focused on how we
attribute other people’s behavior. However, early
work initially published in 1962 by Stanley
Schachter and Jerome Singer focused on how we
may make attributions for our own behavior and
internal states. Schachter and Singer argued that
some of the emotions we experience are influenced
by the cause we attribute to physiological arousal.
For example, arousal attributed to a charging lion
might make us feel terror, whereas arousal attrib-
uted to someone arguing against same-sex couples
having the freedom to marry might make us feel
anger or disgust. Decades of research on this attri-
bution perspective on emotions shows that many
of the stronger, more basic emotions come already
labeled because the physiological dimension is dif-
ferent for different emotions, but for weaker or
more subtle emotions, attributional labeling may
well play a role.
Daryl Bem elaborated and greatly extended this
idea in his 1972 self-perception theory. He argued
much more generally that just as we make causal
attributions for others’ behavior, we can also make
causal attributions for our own behavior. Bem
went so far as to argue that we can actually learn
who we are and gain insight into our personalities
and identity not by introspection but by making
casual attributions for our behavior.
For example, if you hear yourself voluntarily,
frequently, and in all manner of contexts arguing
in favor of environmental conservation, then there

is no plausible external situational factor to which
you can attribute this behavior—you will make an
internal attribution to your identity and the type
of person you are. You have learned about your-
self. In contrast, if you argue in favor of conserva-
tion rarely and in certain situations, then it is more
difficult to infer that you really subscribe to this
value and that it is part of your self-concept and
identity.
An intriguing implication, which has empirical
support, of this idea is that if you provide people
with an external explanation for their behavior,
they cease to view the behavior as reflecting who
they are. For example, rewarding children for
healthy eating may, paradoxically, prevent them
internalizing healthy eating as part of their self-
concept and thus remove intrinsic motivation to
eat healthily—they attribute their healthy eating
externally to rewards. Not providing a reward
will be more effective in building intrinsic moti-
vation to eat healthily as a reflection of self-
conception—there is no external cause for the
behavior, so it is internally attributed to one’s
sense of who one is. Another example: Antisocial
behavior might be controlled by rewarding peo-
ple, rather than punishing them, for behaving
antisocially.
Self-Serving Biases in Attribution
The involvement of the self in attribution processes
brings with it a host of self-serving biases that
affect the attributions we make. Self-serving biases
are largely designed to enhance or protect one’s
self-esteem. For example, people tend to attribute
internally and take credit for their successes (a self-
enhancing bias) or attribute externally and deny
responsibility for their failures (a self-protecting
bias). Self-enhancing biases are more common than
self-protecting biases, probably because people with
low self-esteem tend not to protect themselves by
attributing their failures externally; rather, they attri-
bute them internally.
One intriguing self-serving bias is self-handicapping.
This refers to a situation where people who expect to
fail or do badly on a task intentionally and publicly
make anticipatory external attributions before the
event. An example of this would be a college stu-
dent telling friends that he feels really sick or has a
dreadful hangover before taking an exam on which
Attribution 51
he is certain he will fail. Self-handicapping sets up
an external attribution for subsequent failure.
Attribution and Identity
Half a century of attribution theory and research
in social psychology has shown that people need to
understand the causes of their own and other
people’s behavior. It is important for people to be
able to know whether behavior reflects situational
demands or individual predispositions, as that
allows them to know what behavior to expect
from someone in a particular situation. Internal
attributions of your own or others’ behaviors pro-
vide insight into what type of person you or some-
one else is. Internal attributions help you construct
or identify an identity for yourself and others.
However, attribution processes are biased: We
overattribute others’ behavior to their personalities
and view it as reflecting a deep invariant and even
innate psychological essence, we attribute our own
behavior in ways that protect and enhance our
self-esteem, and we attribute outgroup behaviors
in ways that protect and promote the perceived
evaluative superiority of our own group and thus
our social identity as group members.
Michael A. Hogg
See also Collective/Social Identity; Self-Perception Theory;
Social Identity Theory
Further Readings
Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-perception theory. In
L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental
social psychology (Vol. 6, pp. 1–62). New York:
Academic Press.
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition
(2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence
bias. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 21–38.
Haslam, N., Rothschild, L., & Ernst, D. (1998).
Essentialist beliefs about social categories. British
Journal of Social Psychology, 39, 113–127.
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal
relations. New York: Wiley.
Hewstone, M. (1989). Causal attribution: From cognitive
processes to collective beliefs. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Kelley, H. H. (1973). The process of causal attribution.
American Psychologist, 28, 107–128.
52 Authenticity
Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference:
Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Trope, Y., & Gaunt, R. (2003). Attribution and person
perception. In M. A. Hogg & J. Cooper (Eds.), The
Sage handbook of social psychology (pp. 190–208).
London: Sage.
Authenticity
Authenticity refers to the quality of being genuine
and true and of holding approved authority. The
concept of authenticity touches upon three seminal
dimensions of identity: the quality of being or pos-
sessing reality, the quality of expressing truth, and
the quality of wielding valid authority. Authenticity
provides a powerful influence on the interpretations
and values we attribute to identities we encounter:
from plants and animals of the natural world to
other persons, institutions, or cultures and tradi-
tions. Authenticity first shapes our understanding
of our experience by designating that which we per-
ceive as real or genuine, as possessing being in real-
ity. This quality of authenticity adheres to the study
of existence known as ontology. This approach to
authenticity questions the very fabric of reality:
How can we verify that the information taken in
through our senses and consciousness is what exists
and is not distorted through mental illness or defi-
cits of our sensory faculties? This demarcates the
line between mental illness and its consequences,
which prevent a person from fully contributing to
society. The rise in diagnosed cases of obsessive-
compulsive disorders (in which individuals’ self-
perceptions become distorted from what is authentic
about themselves, be it their bodily appearance or
psychological fears) and what is projected to others
(what others perceive of them) illustrates this dis-
tinction. Therefore, an inauthentic perception—one
not grounded in verifiable information but in a
person’s affect or internal perception of what is
authentic in themselves—manifests itself in an
unhealthy sense of self.
Realistic Representation
Questions of authenticity arise when cultures meet
in our contemporary global village. Intercultural
interactions with difference mediated through mass
media may provide inauthentic representations of
cultures by other cultures that lack knowledge and
understanding of complex negotiations of tradition
meeting existential demands. For example, the rep-
resentations of Native Americans by many 20th-
century Hollywood films often provided inauthentic
representations of Native American tribes, lan-
guages, and traditions. With greater cultural sensi-
tivity and research, such as ethnographic studies of
Native American peoples and preservation of tribal
languages, intercultural interactions may author
more authentic representations. Perspective toward
interpretation of our perceptions greatly influences
what we accept as authentic.
In more recent discussions, authenticity has
taken on a related meaning when addressing the
information age. How can we come to trust that a
photograph or news report is telling the truth from
its perspective and is not being manipulated to
distort the interpretations of its audience for
undisclosed motives? The perception and confir-
mation of authentic existence call forth the dis-
cernment of the quality and values enacted by this
document being real. The Internet serves as a
paradigmatic example of the changing and inter-
related notions of authenticity of being and truth.
The Internet does not possess any physical charac-
teristics and is not materially grounded by loca-
tion, the qualities we attach to what exists.
However, with the advent of satellite communica-
tion and digital technologies, we can communicate
through virtual means whereby a person may cre-
ate an online identity that differs from his or her
physical being. We see a dangerous manifestation
of this with the increase in cases of child luring
through the Internet.
However, stretching of traditional notions of
authentic identity through technology brings the
ability to reap great benefits. People now have
access to authentic digital reproductions of docu-
ments that previously they may not have been
able to access due to deterioration of the source
or geographic isolation. Those who are authentic
as to who they are online have been able to com-
municate and meet others they never could have
encountered previously; this can lead to nurtur-
ing professional and romantic relationships. As
more information is collected and stored with the
aid of technological advances, the ethics of

authenticity converge with questions of ontologi-
cal characteristics of reality and real beings and
things.
Congruence of Word and Action
Questions of the truth of a person or his or her
words or actions and the reputation of a people,
nation, or organization are intertwined with the
ability to present and perceive a stable, authentic
identity. The authentic identity one can attribute
to another to claim that he or she knows that
person may be traced to conjunctions of words
and actions; does a person confirm our perception
of his or her character or ethos through a conjoin-
ing of words and actions? If so, then we may
perceive that person to be authentic and to be
trusted. If there is dissonance or divergence
between that person’s words and deeds, then that
person may be perceived as inauthentic and not
meriting our trust. The quality of truthfulness as
a component of an authentic identity relates fur-
ther to the consequences of that interpretation,
the power and authority it grants or denies that
personage or source.
Perception of Valid Authority
We explore the role of authenticity as a quality of
the perception and attribution of the power and
influence to an entity that possesses and enacts
proper authority. Examples of authentic authority
could include the ability and freedom of a judge to
settle a dispute, a surgeon to operate upon a
patient, or a parent to raise a child. We also
encounter this when we interpret the actions of
corporations, organizations, and governmental
and legal institutions through the metaphor of
transparency. Transparency discloses the degree
to which we are allowed to know and engage in
the decision-making processes within an organiza-
tion to assess decisions and inform actions. Does
a chief executive officer (CEO) of a company
explain to his or her employees the reasons behind
the decision to geographically relocate operations
and thousands of jobs from one region of a coun-
try to another? Does the CEO ask for employee
input and allow for employee representatives to
be part of this decision-making process? If so,
then we see a convergence of word and deed when
Avowal 53
the CEO claims that he or she values the workers,
because the CEO is as transparent as possible
with them in explaining a crucial decision and the
CEO allows their influence in helping to reach a
judgment. This justifies the attribution of authen-
tic authority to the CEO to make such a signifi-
cant choice as he or she acts authentically in
allowing others to participate in the decision-
making activity.
John H. Prellwitz
See also Agency; Articulation Theory; Communication
Theory of Identity; Cultural Representation; Ethics of
Identity; Hermeneutics; Language; Ontological
Insecurity; Rhetoric; Social Identity Theory
Further Readings
Arnett, R. C., & Arneson, P. (1999). Dialogic civility in a
cynical age: Community, hope, and interpersonal
relationships. Albany: SUNY Press.
Schrag, C. O. (2003). Communicative praxis and the
space of subjectivity. West Layafette, IN: Purdue
University Press.
Trilling, L. (1972). Sincerity and authenticity. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Avowal
In essence, to avow is to acknowledge openly. An
avowed identity is an identity that is acknowl-
edged openly. This entry explores the background,
actualization, and application of avowal with
regard to identity.
Background
Ruthellen Josselson defined identity as an uncon-
scious process that unites personality and links the
individual to the social world. Although one’s iden-
tity grows in assurance and sophistication across
the life span, it is somewhat stable and consistent.
People learn about themselves by connecting with
the self, observing what others reflect back about
the self, and comparing and contrasting the self
with others. Identity is the dynamic interplay
of complex processes that include development,
54 Avowal
relationships, and reflection on life circumstances
and experiences.
Many scholars have written and researched the
various components that make up identity. In
2000, Susan Jones and Marylu McEwen created a
model of multiple dimensions of identity that
include what they defined as core aspects of iden-
tity (personal attributes and characteristics) and
contextual aspects of identity (family, sociocul-
tural conditions, current experiences, career deci-
sions, and life planning). The core is more stable,
but the contextual aspects determine what of the
core is more salient at a particular time. Some
identity scholars differentiate between personal
(internal) identity and social (external) identity.
One is Larke Huang, who in 1994 created an
identity model demonstrating two intersecting
identities: personal (which is developmental and
matures over time) and social (which is attributed
by others). Huang went on to write that this social
external identity represents the interaction between
the ingroups with whom the individual identifies
(i.e., reference groups) and outgroups with whom
there is less affinity. Huang noted that the per-
sonal identity is known as an avowed identity,
and the social external identity is an ascribed
identity. Larry Samovar and Richard Porter also
wrote about ascribed and avowed identities in
1994. They wrote that individuals enact various
cultural identities over the course of a lifetime and
even in the course of a day. They believed that this
occurs through two processes: avowal and ascrip-
tion. Avowal is often defined in opposition to
ascribed or achieved identity. Avowal is how a
person perceives his or her own self and the per-
ception of what he or she shows to the outside
world. Ascription, on the other hand, is the pro-
cess by which others attribute aspects of us to us.
This process is others’ sense of us communicated
to us. Premodern-era identities were ascribed in
that they were inherited or conferred by tradition
and were influenced by stereotypes. In some cir-
cumstances, ascribed and avowed identities can be
in opposition or they can be similar. A person
may find that his or her view of self is different or
similar to society’s view of self. For example, it is
possible that a person’s sense of self is different
from the norm for that culture. In this circum-
stance, avowal encompasses the ways in which a
person diverges from the dominant culture of his
or her group.
The Actualization of
Avowal Through Interaction
Several scholars, including Michel Foucault and
Howard Giles, have written about the phenome-
non of avowal. Both Foucault and Giles acknowl-
edge that there is a connection between what is
said and identity. According to Foucault, a speaker
identifies with what is being said. By speaking, the
individual avows or, in other words, becomes tied
to intentions, thoughts, and deeds. An individual’s
identity can be transformed through a process of
spoken avowal because self-knowledge is linked to
reflective and verbal self-disclosure. More specifi-
cally, Giles measured speech or communication
markers (i.e., vocabulary, slang, posture, accent)
to analyze ethnic identity and group membership.
Language is considered an attribute in determining
one’s inclusion in a group. Giles maintained that to
enhance positive self-esteem, members of a social
group will attempt to achieve positive distinctive-
ness from members of other groups. One means to
achieve this is through language. Again, one avows
one’s identity through speech.
Applying the Concept of Avowal
Examining the process of avowal can inform educa-
tors, counselors, human resource managers, and
others in understanding complexities of self. Mark
Covaleski, Mark Dirsmith, James Heian, and Sajay
Samuel explored accounting executives’ identity in
1998 using avowal as a lens for analysis. They
explored how the profession’s expected norms dic-
tated by bureaucratic structure intersected with
individuals’ notion of self. According to these
researchers, bureaucratic structures serve as forms
of control in contemporary organizations. The
researchers analyzed how these structures influenced
the process of avowal. They found that mentoring
was complicit in transforming protégés from a pro-
fessional identity (one, according to Peter Drucker,
is self-motivating, self-directed, and self-supervising)
to a businessperson or corporate clone. Mentoring
involved tying the protégé’s and mentor’s identities
to the firm and its norms. These authors confirmed

that identity is an interplay of several factors, includ-
ing organizational disciplinary practices (that dic-
tated norms), processes of avowal (who I say I am),
and the exercise of and resistance to power.
Several authors have used avowal to better under-
stand the complex and intersecting aspects of ethnic-
ity, race, and national identity. For example, Lisa
Rogers demonstrated how the self-perceptions of a
woman from Okinawa who moved to mainland
Japan were different from how the dominant culture
saw her. She presented herself as Okinawan rather
than Japanese. This was demonstrated by her direct
speech patterns, which were different from what the
dominant culture expected and desired of her.
In 2001, Jean Kim wrote that conflict about
one’s identity exists when people perceive attri-
butes of themselves that they reject. According to
Kim, this occurs in Asian Americans when they
reject aspects of Asian culture in favor of White
dominant culture. Huang noted that this identity
conflict is manifested in a number of ways and in
varying degrees. This rejection and identity conflict
is a foundation of Kim’s Asian American identity
development theory.
Jan Arminio
See also Development of Identity; Development of Self-
Concept; Identity Scripts; Personal Identity Versus
Self-Identity
Avowal 55
Further Readings
Covaleski, M. A., Dirsmith, M. W., Heian J. B., &
Samuel, S. (1998, June). The calculated and the
avowed: Techniques of discipline and struggles over
identity in Big Six public accounting firms.
Administrative Science Quarterly. Retrieved December
19, 2008, from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_
m4035/is_n2_v43/ai_21073407
Foucault, M. (1986). History of sexuality. New York:
Vintage Books.
Giles, H., & Coupland, N. (1991). Language: Contexts
and consequences. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Huang, L. (1994). An integrative view of identity
formation: A model for Asian Americans. In
E. P. Salett & D. R. Koslow (Eds.), Race, ethnicity, and
self: Identity in multiultural perspective (pp. 43–59).
Washington, DC: National MultiCultural Institute.
Jones, S, R., & McEwen, M. K. (2000). A conceptual
model of multiple dimensions of identity. Journal of
College Student Development, 38, 376–386.
Josselson, R. (1987). Finding herself. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass.
Kim, J. (2001). Asian American identity development
theory. In C. L. Wijeyesinghe & B. W. Jackson III
(Eds.), New perspectives on racial identity
development: A theoretical and practical anthology
(pp. 67–90). New York: New York University Press.
Samovar, L. A., & Porter, R. E. (1994). Intercultural
communication: A reader (7th ed.). Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.
 B
Basking in Reflected Glory
Individuals have a plethora of strategies to main-
tain a positive self-image. These strategies may be
direct, such as the announcement of personal
accomplishments, or indirect, such as the display
of an association with another’s accomplishments.
For example, just as an athlete may boast after a
hard-won match, so too can their fans and sup-
porters as they chant, “We’re number one!”
Whereas the former represents a direct strategy to
enhance the self, the latter represents an indirect
strategy in which the individual attempts to make
cognizant the connection between the self and a
positive or successful other. Even in instances
where individuals play little or no instrumental
role in the positive outcome of the source, by
drawing on their affiliation they hope to share in
the source’s positive image. This enhancement
strategy has been labeled the inclination to bask in
reflected glory, or BIRG for short.
Overview
Basking in reflected glory is an indirect image-
maintenance strategy, where individuals attempt to
secure prestige in the eyes of another due to their
relationship with a positively evaluated other. In
1976, Robert Cialdini and colleagues conducted
three field experiments that provided empirical sup-
port for the BIRGing phenomenon. In one study,
the researchers found that undergraduate students
were more likely to wear their university’s regalia
57
after the football team experienced a win rather
than a loss. In the subsequent two studies, under-
graduate students were more likely to use the pro-
noun we to describe their football team’s success
than its failure. This tendency was most pronounced
following a threat to the participant’s self-esteem.
The researchers suggest that these findings indicate
that the tendency to BIRG is motivated by the desire
for positive self-presentation.
The theoretical foundations of the phenomenon
can be understood in reference to Fritz Heider’s
balance formulation. The theory proposes that
persons strive to maintain cognitive consistency; as
such, when two objects are perceived to be con-
nected, the evaluations of one are extended to the
other. For example, if an observer perceives a
positive relationship between an individual and a
positively evaluated source, to keep cognitive bal-
ance, the observer will evaluate the individual
positively as well. Following a victory, when the
football team was perceived as a successful source,
the students publicized their affiliation. By wearing
university regalia and by utilizing the pronoun we,
the students were accentuating their connection
with the positive image of the university’s football
team to enhance their own image.
Subsequent Research and Theorizing
The basic tenet of the BIRG strategy, that individu-
als use affiliations with others as a means of man-
aging self-image, has been extended in a variety of
ways, all consistent with the links proposed by
Heider’s balance theory.
58 Basking in Reflected Glory
Just as the positive evaluations of another can
be extended to the self, it is possible for negative
evaluations of an affiliated source to occur. For
example, in addition to basking in the success of
another, where individuals seek to increase their
connection, individuals may increase the distance
between themselves and an unsuccessful other.
When an individual is affiliated with a negatively
evaluated source, he or she may actively seek to cut
off associations with that source as a means of
self-protection. This increased distancing behavior
has been labeled cutting of reflected failure, or
CORFing for short. Studies using self-report and
behavioral measures have demonstrated that indi-
viduals will detach themselves from negatively
evaluated individuals or groups as a way to pre-
serve their own image. CORFing can thus be
understood as a protective motive, whereas
BIRGing reflects an enhancement motive.
Both BIRGing and CORFing reflect the selective
use of social distancing to manage one’s image;
however, research suggests that individuals may
not employ these tactics equally. For instance,
there are sources to which one cannot easily cut off
one’s affiliation, such as relatives or ethnic groups.
In these situations, the outcomes of the source,
both positive and negative, become the outcomes
for the individual. Additionally, individuals for
whom the relationship with the source is a core
component of their self-concept may not be so
quick to use the CORFing strategy. Researchers
have found that individuals highly identified with
political candidates and sporting teams maintain
their allegiance in the face of public failures,
whereas individuals less identified demonstrate the
protective CORFing process.
Classic BIRG studies focus on the public
announcement of one’s connection with a posi-
tively evaluated source. Individuals may also take
advantage of an obvious relationship with another
by touting the attributes of the other. For instance,
when there is a positive relationship between the
individual and the source, individuals may strive
to increase the evaluation of the source. On the
other hand, when there is a negative relationship
between the individual and the source, individuals
may act to decrease the evaluation. The motiva-
tion behind this pair of indirect self-presentation
tactics is the enhancement of interpersonal pres-
tige. Following the tenets of balance theory, this
goal may be accomplished by the positive connec-
tion with a positively evaluated source or the nega-
tive connection with a negatively evaluated source.
In a study conducted by Cialdini and Kenneth
Richardson, following an image-damaging experi-
ence, participants were found to increase the
favorability of a source with which they had a
positive association and decrease the favorability
of a source with which they had a negative asso-
ciation. In particular, the researchers found that
undergraduates experiencing a threat to the self
provided enhanced ratings of their own university
and decreased ratings of a rival university.
Conclusion
Basking in reflected glory reflects an indirect
method to manage public image, where individu-
als attempt to secure esteem from their connection
with an outside source. Original conceptualiza-
tions of the theory suggests that enhancement of
the self-image may be accomplished by increasing
one’s association with a positive other. Subsequent
research in line with the theoretical underpinnings
of the theory indicates that this indirect strategy is
considerably more varied and sophisticated than
originally considered. Enhancement of the self
may be accomplished by either accentuating the
connection with a positive other or by singing the
praises of a known association. Finally, through
this indirect process, participants may protect the
self-concept by detaching or distancing the self
from an unsuccessful other.
Danielle L. Blaylock
See also Being and Identity; Development of Identity;
Development of Self-Concept; Self-Concept;
Self-Enhancement Theory; Self-Esteem; Social Identity
Theory
Further Readings
Cialdini, R. B., Borden, R. J., Thorne, A., Walker,
M. R., Freeman, S., & Sloan, L. R. (1976). Basking in
reflected glory: Three (football) field studies. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 34(3), 366–375.
Cialdini, R. B., & Richardson, K. (1980). Two indirect
tactics of image management: Basking and blasting.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39(3),
406–415.

Synder, C. R., Lassegard, M., & Ford, C. E. (1986).
Distancing after group success and failure: Basking in
reflected glory and cutting off reflected failure. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(2), 382–388.
Being and Identity
The notion of being is principally related to the
here and now, but it is philosophically linked to
meanings human beings attach to existence. In
other words, the way we behave and act in the
world are not by happenstance. We are taught
how to be. We are imbued with meanings and
interpretations that may not predetermine our
lives but certainly affect how we interpret our
place and selves in the world. This undeniably
influences identities, because our ignorance or
awareness of being suggests something about our
cultural context, which has taught us something
about how we ought to conduct ourselves and
what we ought to identify with. That does not
mean the notion of being eschews any remnants of
the past or ignores the future, but rather “being”
offers reflection of one’s position in the world and
one’s own grappling with existence. One of the
foremost thinkers on the nature of being was
Martin Heidegger.
Heidegger is acknowledged to be not only one
of the most original philosophers of the 20th cen-
tury but also one of the most controversial. His
writings have had an immense impact and have
been discussed widely. Although his essays have
sometimes been dismissed as unintelligible and his
discourse as tortuous and cumbersome, his
thoughts have influenced a variety of diverse
areas, such as hermeneutics, Sartrean existential-
ism, Derridean deconstruction, literary criticism,
psychotherapy, theology, aesthetics, and even
environmental studies.
Heidegger was born to a provincial Catholic
family in Messkirch, in Swabia, Southern Germany,
in 1889. After commencing training as a cleric—his
first ambition was to be a Jesuit priest—he turned
to mathematics and then to philosophy, becoming
the star pupil and then the main adherent of
Edmund Husserl, founder of the school known as
phenomenology. Heidegger’s magnum opus, Sein
und Zeit (translated as Being and Time), on which
Being and Identity 59
his reputation was largely based, is dedicated to
Husserl, whose thinking the unfinished book drasti-
cally undercuts. The highly praised treatise was
published while Heidegger was teaching at Marburg
University, at a time when he had close contact with
Karl Jaspers, already a well-known figure in German
intellectual life, who was also concerned with ques-
tions of existence, self, and knowledge. Heidegger
conceived of himself and the like-minded as philo-
sophical revolutionaries, aiming to rejuvenate phi-
losophy by clearing away the methodological crisis
of academic abstraction of the previous generations.
His work, in opposition to the preoccupation with
epistemology and Kantian notions dominant at the
time—and also in contrast to Husserl, the teacher to
whom he was so indebted—was inspired more by
the pre-Socratics, Søren Kierkegaard, and Friedrich
Nietzsche. For Heidegger, what had remained
“unspoken” in the eagerness of many forerunners
to find a pure, external vantage point, must be the
most important element in unveiling what had
been lost in the effort to acquire an impartial angle,
free from conjecture, on human beings and their
surroundings.
The friendship with Jaspers survived Heidegger’s
crushing review of the latter’s Psychology of
World-Views, but later Heidegger’s engagement
with Nazism separated the two philosophers. After
having finished his habilitation thesis on Duns
Scotus’s Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in
1915, Heidegger extended the scope of his lectures
and taught courses on Greek, medieval, and
German philosophy. Using phenomenological
methods, he traced back in order to explore issues
on the foundation of meaning, knowledge, and
thinking. In contrast to Husserl, who defended his
methodology of maintaining absolute concentra-
tion on an object in order to focus on how it might
become present in our mind, the protégé took the
worldliness, finitude, and historicity of the human
predicament into account.
With the enthusiasm of his new convictions,
Heidegger attracted students from all over Europe.
Hannah Arendt, born into an established Jewish
family, started to attend Heidegger’s highly praised
orations in 1924. They became lovers for about
4 years and then were separated for almost
20 years, during which time Arendt was forced to
emigrate. She eventually became involved with
issues of political theory and philosophy in her new
60 Being and Identity
home in the United States. Heidegger, who was
married with children, kept the affair secret but
resumed the relationship in 1950. In spite of the
complexities of the liaison, they remained friends
until Arendt’s death in 1975. Heidegger died in
May 1976.
The philosopher was unimpressed by urban
mobility and technical advancements and was unaf-
fected by fancy modern movements, instead prefer-
ring to live an uneventful and self-enclosed life.
He never left his homeland region, Schwarzwald,
where he was also buried. Heidegger was deeply
attached to this well-wooded tract of country, and
every now and then it is reflected in his texts. It
was in Freiburg, the region’s capital, that he finally
replaced his mentor Husserl, being appointed to
the chair of philosophy in 1928. He became rector
of the university 5 years later, the year the Nazis
came to power, and he joined the party. This
period was a substantial exception to his otherwise
withdrawn and demonstratively quiet life. Although
the evidence of Heidegger’s anti-Semitism is equiv-
ocal, he implemented some of the Nazi program of
realignment, and his inaugural address is strewn with
the rhetoric of the new leaders, like Führerschaft
(leadership), Gefolgschaft (following), Studentenschaft
(the student body), and Volksgemeinschaft (the
national community). The extent of his involve-
ment and responsibility is still controversial; how-
ever, he was banned from teaching for 5 years after
the end of World War II.
Language
To understand Heidegger’s way of thinking, it is
helpful to take a glance at his own vocabulary. In
trying to use colloquial German, he borrows the
language’s phrasal verbs and flexible compounds
and sometimes proceeds to “inventions” that
might look like mere wordplay. For example,
Holzwege, the title of a sample of essays written in
1936 at the time of the so-called turn—a period in
which he broke away from his earlier concerns
about human existence and proceeded into a phe-
nomenological study of daily practices and the
arts—means literally “wooden paths” but is conve-
niently used metaphorically as a term for some-
thing hopeless that cannot be achieved. Heidegger
tries to reveal and regenerate the clandestine mean-
ing of a term, no matter if it is Roman of the
1st century or German of the beginning of the 20th
century. On some occasions he calls this endeavor
“deconstruction,” not to be confused with the
philosophical movement to which Jacques Derrida
and some other contemporary thinkers of both
sexes are connected. In contrast to that of Derrida,
Heidegger’s thinking engages lesser issues such as
writing, reading, and hierarchy. He questions what
we have come to understand as existence, knowl-
edge, and being.
Being and Identity
Being itself is not something about which we can
inquire, as if it occurs among other things. Being,
Heidegger says, is not an entity; instead it “deter-
mines entities as entities.” Irrespective of this, we
understand the “is” we use in speaking, although
we do not comprehend it conceptually. Heidegger
argues that any time we think or speak of any entity
at all—from a galaxy to a star, a stone, some shoes
on a painting, or even ourselves—we are already
working, albeit unconsciously, within a set of
assumptions about what is meant merely by saying
that something “is.” Whenever we understand any-
thing, we do so by grasping it in terms of our pre-
understanding, our advance feel for the object,
including its Being. Understanding, in Heidegger’s
usage, is more an ability to do something, to be
familiar with it, rather than a cognitive grasp of a
theme. According to him, the basic error commit-
ted in connection with the question of Being stems
from disregarding this dimension by what he calls
metaphysical thinking, which is a way of thinking
we come across during the history of philosophy.
This way of thinking insists on asking “What is
Being?” which is the wrong way of posing the ques-
tion of Being; instead it should have asked what
the “meaning” of Being is. For example, the pre-
understanding we have of Being would be seriously
misinterpreted by applying the “is” to the notion of
identity as it is used in the realm of logical sciences.
In fact, the ideas of identity and adequacy are
attacked compellingly, as is the division of subject
and object. Heidegger devoted a lecture to the topic
in 1957 on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of
Freiburg University. In approaching traditional
views of intellectual and scientific inquiry, he starts
his discussion, published under the title Identity
and Difference, by quizzically suggesting that the

principle of identity and nature of identity cannot
be the same, because the principle of identity pre-
maturely determines the meaning of identity. In
contrast, the nature of identity is open for interpre-
tation and therefore draws no conclusions. On
closer inspection, Heidegger’s argument reads as
follows: The assertion S equals P does not com-
pletely cover the statement, because it necessarily
comprises its contradiction. There must be a sense
in this assertion that reaches beyond its claimed
tautology. As Being is neither a logic indicator nor
an entity or a domain of entities, it cannot be the
object of one of the special and positive sciences. It
has to be ascertained differently. And this leads us
to the question of identity in its second distinction.
Dasein
Heidegger does not talk about the self. Likewise, he
rejects the background of metaphysical history; he
eschews the reconsideration of identity or the ego in
terms of the interpretation and contextualization of
the self. Instead, the core of Being and Time con-
sists of an inquiry into the very being of Dasein
(literally “being-there”), an inquiry that starts out
by examining our own existential ways of being at
the current moment. Heidegger claims that human
existence is not a matter of being an isolated “I” or
a subject set against the world. We “are” what we
“do” in the sense that our identity or being is some-
thing that comes to be defined and realized through
the course of our active lives in a concrete world. If
metaphysics traditionally saw Being as the founda-
tion of life, for Heidegger, Being is indistinguishable
from the everyday manifestation of being. From
Heidegger’s perspective, we cannot grasp Being
except by way of tangible beings and their faculty
to question themselves and the world. Dasein is the
condition entered by the being for whom Being is
an issue, because we care about our being. Heidegger
indicates that such a relationship is characterized by
concern and understanding. Our lives matter to us,
and he wants to refocus our understanding of what
it is to be a person away from reflection and self-
consciousness and toward how we live our lives. By
“care,” Heidegger does not refer to the particular
emotional phenomena of worry and devotion, but
rather to a constitutive or existential condition of
human life, which he does by conceiving under-
standing as a kind of familiar being. Understood in
Bilingualism 61
this way, Dasein is not an object or thing, but a
“happening” or a “becoming” characterized by
temporality and “historicity.” To be a person is to
envision the person to be.
Thomas Trummer
See also Civic Identity; Identification; Philosophy of
Identity; Self-Consciousness
Further Readings
Blattner, W. (2006). Heidegger’s Being and Time:
A reader’s guide. London: Continuum.
Guignon, C. B. (1993). The Cambridge companion to
Heidegger. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie &
E. Robinson, Trans.). New York: Harper & Row.
(Original work published 1927)
Heidegger, M. (1969). Identity and difference
(J. Stambaugh, Trans.). New York: Harper & Row.
(Original work published 1957)
Safranski, R. (1998). Martin Heidegger: Between good
and evil (E. Osers, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Bilingualism
Bilingualism is the ability to use, or the regular use
of, two languages with advanced proficiency and
nearly equal fluency in each language. Bilingualism
is broadly classified into simultaneous bilingual-
ism, in which a person is introduced to two lan-
guages concurrently, and sequential bilingualism,
in which a person is introduced to a second lan-
guage after having been introduced to a first lan-
guage by the nature of acquisition process.
Simultaneous bilingualism generally refers to
childhood bilingualism as a result of exposure to
two languages in roughly the same degree from
birth or very early childhood. This frequent dual-
language exposure from early age is established by
children’s sociolinguistic experiences at school
and home, including discourse practices influ-
enced by parental communication patterns and
input, and by societal language dominance.
Sequential bilingualism refers to second-language
acquisition beginning during late childhood or
62 Bilingualism
onward; the category of sequential bilingualism is
often further subdivided to distinguish between
sequential bilinguals who acquire a foreign lan-
guage as adults (called late bilingualism) and those
who acquire a second language at a relatively
young age. Given common linguistic understand-
ing of age-related limitations restrictions, second-
language acquisition at a younger age results in
superior fluency, particularly in the areas of pho-
nology, morphology, and syntax; by contrast, the
so-called age effect has suggested that adult
second-language learners may develop a more
sophisticated fluency than their younger counter-
parts as a result of a social and psychological matu-
rity that demonstrates cognitive, motivational, and
educational strengths. Multilayered variables asso-
ciated with the learning contexts of simultaneous
and sequential bilingualism include motivation,
contextual demands, age, and opportunity, though
researchers have not yet clearly established defini-
tive documentation of these factors.
Language functions as a regularized code that
embodies cultural and ethnic identity by connect-
ing users in shared culture and history of commu-
nity; for these reasons, bilingualism correlates to a
formation of individual identity with social impli-
cations. Modes of acquiring a second language,
divided into elective and circumstantial, have been
used as assessment criteria when bilingualism is
critically analyzed from a sociolinguistic perspec-
tive. Elective bilingualism refers to learning a sec-
ond language as an individual choice, whereas
circumstantial bilingualism refers to learning a
second language by imposition or as a tool of sur-
vival due to colonization, annexation, or immigra-
tion. Immigrants and colonized or enslaved peoples
acquire a second language as an accompaniment of
a new social and political reality; however, their
ethnic and cultural identities are preserved by
maintaining their first languages and heritages in
the case of circumstantial bilingualism. Their first
language in such a circumstance becomes the bond
between individuals and between individuals and
groups. Their first language serves intergroup
communications as well as facilitating the trans-
mission and the systematic recording of a group’s
ethnicity, culture, and history.
In colonial and slaveholding societies, prohibition
of the first language and imposition of the host
country’s language can be explained as a process
of “de-ethnicizing,” leading to the acculturation of
the dominant culture; and therefore, circumstan-
tial bilingualism builds ethnic self-identity because
a group’s first language essentially represents the
control of thought and the sense of the language in
precision of vocabulary and structure for a partic-
ular social context. For this reason, bilingualism
demonstrates the unity of cultural tradition as well
as a resistance against the social and political vio-
lence of various nations. Immigrants have histori-
cally used their first language as a vehicle for the
maintenance of their expression of ethnic identity,
which can be characterized less by assimilation
and acculturation than by the cultural and ethnic
cohesiveness created by a nondominant culture.
Given the reality of unequal dominance and the
power of language and language groups, bilingual-
ism constructs dual social identities through the
simultaneous association of two language groups
within a power relationship and social structure.
Acquiring a second language creates a second iden-
tity by allowing interaction not only with different
language and cultural groups, but also with groups
of different dimensions such as gender, socioeco-
nomic class, or religion. Individuals are affected by
the acceptance into, or rejection from, opportunities
for the development of a new identity as a member
of their new language group. Based on the label
society imposes on an individual, a label determined
by the power structure of language and potential
conflicts between the values of the first- and second-
language group cultures, bilinguals are often forced
to compromise and change their self-identities when
the dominant society’s expectation is different from
their own language or cultural group. Bilingualism
is, therefore, not simply a matter of language com-
petence and cognitive activity, but of negotiating a
new self-identity that is often multiple, complex,
fragmented, overlapping, and contradictory across
different social and cultural contexts.
Typical goals for developing bilingualism for
children include two-way immersion programs that
maintain full bilingual proficiency while empha-
sizing academic achievement and cross-cultural
competence and transitional bilingual education,
which allows students to acquire English while
receiving instruction in all other academic sub-
jects in their first language. For people under
the dominance and power of colonial or societal
language, the preservation and development of

fluency in a language other than the society’s
dominant language have been growing concerns in
the education systems of many societies. These
programs provide a bilingual environment that
promotes language development and academic
progress in both dominant and native languages
and expands society’s language resources and
cross-cultural understanding and appreciation.
Several studies since the 1970s suggest that stu-
dents who receive bilingual education scholasti-
cally outperform those not receiving bilingual
education. Increased metalinguistic awareness
leads to a more analytical orientation through the
development of both cognitive skills and phono-
logical awareness in two languages.
The intersection between psycholinguistic bilin-
gualism and sociolinguistic bilingualism involves
complex identity formation and society’s educa-
tion system; this juncture has been the source of
heated discussions among scholars from both the-
oretical and empirical approaches. Understanding
the power structure of language and culture, the
nature of empowerment, and the process of transi-
tion from lack of control to the acquisition of
control over one’s life and immediate environment
is key to transforming second-language acquisition
from coercive, subordinate relationships to power-
sharing and power-creating relationships, in which
the identities of bilinguals are affirmed, voiced,
and appreciated. Bilingualism and identity or
hybrid identity construction in societal power
structure remain the key debate within balanced
and/or conflict linguistic paradigms involving con-
stant change, negotiation, and complexity.
Suzuko Morikawa
See also Culture, Ethnicity, and Race; English as a
Second Language (ESL); Group Identity; Immigration;
Society and Social Identity
Further Readings
Christian, D., Howard, E., & Loeb, M. (2000).
Bilingualism for all: Two-way immersion education in
the United States. Theory Into Practice, 39, 258–266.
Hakuta, K. (1986). Mirror of language: The debate on
bilingualism. New York: Basic Books.
Valdés, G. (1992). Bilingual minorities and language
issues in writing: Toward professionwide responses to
a new challenge. Written Communication, 9, 85–136.
Biracial Identity 63
Biracial Identity
Biracial identity or multiracial identity refers to
the social, cultural, political, and psychological
accomplishment or construction of a sense of
identity among those individuals who straddle
existing (or historical) racial formations. To inves-
tigate biracial or multiracial identity is to seek to
understand the strategies, negotiations, and self-
understandings of multiracial people and the fac-
tors involved in the construction of a racial
identity. Researchers have focused on a variety of
different groups and racial combinations under
the overarching conceptual terms biracial and
multiracial—as such, generalizations and com-
parisons across studies are extremely difficult to
make. Due to the deep entrenchment of the White/
Black divide in the United States, the vast majority
of American studies have focused on identity pat-
terns among the offspring of self-identified Black
and self-identified White parents. The first decade
of the 21st century represents the fourth decade of
concerted scholarly attention to multiracial and
biracial identity formation.
Since the late 1970s, research on the racial iden-
tity of Black/White biracials has suggested that
there exist two possibilities for these individuals’
racial self-understandings: Black or biracial. Early
scholarship appears to have been based less on the
results of empirical research and more on the his-
torical and cultural norm of the “one drop rule” as
the underlying assumption. This “rule” mandated
that biracial offspring adopt a Black racial identity.
Most researchers on racial identity in the 1970s
and early 1980s were interested in understanding
how these individuals developed a Black identity.
By the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s,
the extant pathologies associated with biracial
individuals’ marginality drew the attention of a
new generation of researchers, who sought to
explain psychologically, clinically, and develop-
mentally how these individuals developed a bira-
cial identity and how they could maintain a
healthy, integrated sense of their biraciality. These
studies incorporated findings and discussions about
the racial self-understandings of biracials from
earlier research and continued the development of
a dichotomous typology of racial identity possi-
bilities for biracials: Black and biracial—this time
64 Bisexual/Bicurious
with an overt preference for the development of a
biracial identity. Such research set the parameters,
within the scholarship, of the possibilities for racial
identity among biracial people.
The 1990s brought yet another generation of
scholars interested in the lives of multiracial peo-
ple. These investigators used new analytical tools
and incorporated interdisciplinary approaches.
The work of several authors from this group began
to illuminate for us that multiracial people had
multiple understandings of their racial identities. F.
James Davis challenged us to consider the question
“Who is Black?” Maria Root convinced us that
these individuals had different negotiations and
answers to the question of how to resolve the sta-
tus of the “other.” This new work has set the tone
for research on multiracial and biracial individu-
als. Root’s work, however, represents the method-
ological limitations of the existing research (i.e.,
the exclusive use of clinical studies and small self-
selective samples) while replicating the unidirec-
tional, atheoretical, and ideologically biased work
of the 1980s. Kerry Ann Rockquemore pre­sents a
comprehensive typology that integrates the voices
of biracial individuals with a variety of classic and
contemporary identity theories. She suggests that
there are four types of racial identity options for
biracial people, including a singular identity (sin-
gular Black or White), a border identity (exclu-
sively biracial), a protean identity (sometimes
Black, sometimes White, sometimes biracial), and
a transcendent identity (no racial identity).
Previous scholarly work on multiracial identity
in the past three decades has focused primarily on
processes of racial identity formation of multira-
cial people. This body of research has highlighted
that the racial identities of multiracial people are
dynamic/agentic and structured/parameterized in a
matrix of experience—in the end they are multifac-
eted, but also somewhat predictable. Multiracial
people’s diverse racial identities are negotiated in
social interaction; founded in racialized experi-
ences; sown in familial and institutional socializa-
tion; differentially embedded within racialized
social spaces and places; tied to phenotype, appear-
ance, and skin tone; expressed through linguistic
systems and frames of racial ideology; intersection-
ally coupled with gender, class, and sexuality;
parameterized to a degree by extant systems of
classification; and dynamic across the life course in
all the variations just mentioned. After the years of
research, most researchers understand that multi-
racial identity is a constant process of “doing race”
or, its interwoven process, “doing racial identity”—
racial identity is both active and directed work.
David L. Brunsma
See also Culture, Ethnicity, and Race; Ethnicity; Self;
Social Identity Theory; Society and Social Identity
Further Readings
Brunsma, D. L. (2005). Interracial families and the racial
identification of mixed-race children: Evidence from
the early childhood longitudinal study. Social Forces,
84(2), 1129–1155.
Brunsma, D. L. (Ed.). (2006). Mixed messages:
Multiracial identities in the “color-blind” era. Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner Press.
Brunsma, D. L. (2006). Public categories, private
identities: Exploring regional differences in the biracial
experience. Social Science Research, 35(5), 555–576.
Davis, F. J. (1991). Who is Black? One nation’s
definition. University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press.
Rockquemore, K. A. (1999). Between Black and White:
Exploring the biracial experience. Race and Society,
1(2), 197–212.
Root, M. (1990). Resolving “other” status: Identity
development of biracial individuals. Women and
Therapy, 9, 185–205.
Birmingham School
See Cultural Studies
Bisexual/Bicurious
Bisexuality refers to one of four main classifications
of sexual orientation—homosexual, heterosexual,
asexual, and bisexual. The term homosexual
describes people who are sexually attracted to
members of the same sex, heterosexual describes
people attracted sexually to the opposite sex,
asexual describes those who do not experience

sexual attraction, and bisexual refers to people
who have sexual attraction to people of both
sexes. Each of these categories (with the excep-
tion of asexual) relies on sexual dualism (the belief
that there are two and only two sexes from which
two genders flow). In response to this critique,
some people who might have been defined as
bisexual in previous times have adopted the term
polysexual.
Bicurious is a term used to refer to someone
who has not taken on a bisexual identity but has
some interest or sexual desire for someone of the
same sex. It usually implies that the person in ques-
tion has had limited experience or opportunity to
explore such interests and therefore may not be
ready to adopt and commit to a bisexual identity.
Social stigma may also add to a person’s reluctance
to adopt a bisexual identity.
Although bisexuality is often stigmatized in
Western culture, there are waves of bisexual chic,
when bisexuality almost seems fashionable. The
term bisexual chic was coined in the 1970s, with
the emergence of gender ambiguous (so-called
glam rock) stars who publicly identified as bisex-
ual. However, this period of bisexual chic was
short-lived. With the emergence of the HIV/AIDS
pandemic, attitudes about bisexuals shifted dra-
matically. AIDS and HIV became inextricably
linked to homosexuality in the United States, and
bisexuals (particularly male bisexuals) were stig-
matized as vectors of disease, or a conduit through
which HIV was spread from the “gay” community
to unsuspecting heterosexuals.
What emerges from this discussion is that bisex-
uality is a contentious and contested issue. There is
ambiguity over its definition, there are questions
about the stability of bisexuality as a discrete cat-
egory throughout the life cycle, and some research-
ers and activists doubt its very existence. This
entry lays out the history of the term, paying atten-
tion to the roles that scholarship (particularly the
social sciences) has played in its codification as
well as the debates that surround it.
Bisexuality (like the three other major orienta-
tions) was first codified in the 19th century. The
first use of the term was by the German sexologist
Richard von Krafft-Ebing in Psychopathia Sexualis
in 1886. For Krafft-Ebing, bisexual was a type of
person. The term was taken up by Sigmund Freud,
who was really the first to argue that bisexuality
Bisexual/Bicurious 65
was an inherent universal condition. For Freud and
others, human beings were all constitutionally
bisexual. The popularity of psychoanalysis in the
United States arguably led to an era of bisexual
chic in the 1920s, despite the Freudian position
that with proper psychosexual development, the
healthy person would emerge heterosexual.
With the publication of the Kinsey Reports,
sexologist Alfred Kinsey reignited cultural aware-
ness of sexual orientation in general and bisexual-
ity in particular. In both volumes known as the
Kinsey Reports, Sexual Behavior in the Human
Male (1948) and Sexual Behavior in the Human
Female (1953), Kinsey argued that bisexuality was
in fact far more common than previously thought.
Kinsey further articulated a nuanced conceptual-
ization of sexual orientation with the development
of his sexual-orientation scale. The Kinsey model
is a 7-point scale, which ranges from exclusive
heterosexuality, represented as a 0 (zero) at one
extreme, and exclusive homosexuality, represented
as a 6 on the other end of the scale—bisexuality
is regarded as a 3, when a person is equally
attracted to both sexes. Depending on where the
lines are drawn on the continuum, bisexuality
becomes difficult to define. In some sense, anyone
placing themselves between 1 and 5 on the Kinsey
scale could be considered bisexual as they do not
define as either 0 (exclusively heterosexual) or
6 (exclusively heterosexual). A bisexual designa-
tion does not require a person to be equally
attracted or active with both sexes.
Kinsey’s work remains controversial. While
some criticism raises methodological concerns,
much of the criticism is aimed at his personal life
and allegations that he was bisexual. Some have
charged that his own sexual identity motivated him
to exaggerate the numbers of sexual minorities in
the United States. Whether Kinsey showed bias is a
matter of debate, but despite the attacks against
him personally, there is little debate of bias in his
studies. Arguably, the more defensible critiques of
his work focused on the volunteer effect, or volun-
teer bias, in his data. The volunteer bias posits that
people who volunteer to participate in any research
(and sex-related research in particular) differ from
the rest of the population in significant ways,
skewing any results and making it difficult to gen-
eralize the findings to the general population. This
critique is still relevant to sex research today.
66 Black Atlantic
Sexual orientation scales have been updated
since Kinsey’s time. Kinsey was a zoologist by train-
ing and was interested primarily in behavior.
Sexologists Eli Coleman and Fritz Klein added com-
ponents that attempt to measure not only sexual
behavior but also fantasy and desire. In the end,
there may be little consistency among the terms
sexual behavior, sexual identity, and sexual desire.
Just because an individual has sexual relations with
both men and women does not guarantee that said
individual will identify as bisexual. The question of
prevalence of bisexuality is a particularly vexing
issue, given the lack of congruence between identity,
behavior, and desire. Furthermore, some survey
researchers may forget that they are not measuring
who people are or what they do, but who they say
they are and what they tell the researchers they do.
On one extreme, literary scholar Marjorie Garber
argues (almost echoing Freud) that bisexuality is
widespread and that most would identify as bisex-
ual if it were not for fear, ideology, religious sanc-
tions, social prejudice, and so forth.
On the other side of the argument is the conclu-
sion reached in the article “Sexual Arousal Pat­
terns of Bisexual Men,” written by Gerulf Rieger,
Melanie L. Chivers, and J. Michael Bailey. In their
study, they measured men’s sexual arousal response
to erotic materials featuring either men or only
women. Measuring penile tumescence in 101 male
subjects exposed to erotic materials, they con-
cluded that the bisexual-identified men showed no
bisexual pattern of arousal. They concluded that
there is no evidence of the existence of male bisex-
uality. The study has been criticized for some of the
same reasons discussed earlier. There were issues
with the definition of who counted as bisexual, as
well as what arousal response pattern counted as
bisexual. Two of the subjects who displayed a
bisexual arousal pattern (defined as equally aroused
by men and women) did not identify as bisexual,
one identified as a Kinsey 1 and was thus labeled
“heterosexual,” and the other labeled himself a
Kinsey 6, or homosexual. (This suggests that iden-
tity, behavior, and desire within a person are not
always congruent.) Also troubling was the axiom
of the researchers that when a man is aroused, that
can be qualified as orientation. Thirty-three of the
subjects had no measurable arousal, according to
the instruments, but the researchers still did not
label these subjects asexual.
Bisexual activists and advocates considered this
article “biphobic”—that is, articulating a particu-
lar pattern of ignorance, fear, hatred, and disap-
proval of bisexuals and bisexuality. While much of
the stigma of bisexuality is related to homophobia
and the stigma of homosexuality, homophobia as
a term is always defined loosely. It tends to lack the
specificity of terms like bisexual oppression. There
is a widespread belief that a bisexual identity is a
“halfway house” in the coming-out process, that
bisexuals are secretly gays “hiding” behind a more
acceptable identity. Although there is some evi-
dence that some prominent gays and lesbians first
identified as bisexual, it does not follow that this is
true of all bisexual-identified people. There have
been prominent gays and lesbians who have the
opposite trajectory and revealed a bisexual identity
after coming out as gay or lesbian. This suggests
that sexual identity and identification may evolve
and develop throughout one’s life span.
Stephen Hocker
See also Gay; Gender; Identification; Identity Politics;
Performativity of Gender; Sexual Identity; Sexual
Minorities
Further Readings
Garbor, M. (1995). Vice versa: Bisexuality and the
eroticism of everyday life. New York: Simon &
Schuster.
Kinsey, A., Pomeroy, W. B., & Martin, C. E. (1948).
Sexual behavior in the human male. Philadelphia:
Saunders.
Kinsey, A., Pomeroy, W. B., Martin, C. E., & Gebhard, P.
(1953). Sexual behavior in the human female.
Philadelphia: Saunders.
Rieger, G., Chivers, M. L., & Bailey, J. M. (2005). Sexual
arousal patterns of bisexual men. Psychological
Science: A Journal of the American Psychological
Society, 16(8), 579–584.
Black Atlantic
Coined by British sociologist Paul Gilroy in his
1993 book The Black Atlantic: Modernity and
Double Consciousness, the term Black Atlantic
refers to a culture formed by the dispersion of

Africans to the Americas and the Caribbean, pri-
marily through the European-fueled extraction of
slaves. The Black Atlantic is not African or
American or Caribbean or European; rather, it is
a unique fusion of elements of each. More specifi-
cally, the Black Atlantic is a system of hybridity,
ambiguity, and tension, where those of African
descent who cannot be classified as White must
confront an as-yet unrealized politics of fulfill-
ment of promises to create a truly just society and
a politics of transfiguration to create some new
type of reality that transforms existing societal
structures. On the one hand, Black Atlantic music,
literature, dance, and other artistic expressions
hold hope that the political, economic, and social
practices and processes that once legally segre-
gated African peoples in the Americas and
Caribbean to second-class citizenship will eventu-
ally truly emancipate them; on the other hand,
these structures are the very means of continued
inequality and must be replaced with new con-
structions that undermine the foundations of the
modern world. Artists and theorists in the Black
Atlantic ask: Instead of moving toward a color-
blind society where race does not matter, perhaps
race is an essential cultural construction that can
never be universally explained to everyone’s satis-
faction. According to the Black Atlantic con-
cept, African-descended people in the Americas,
Caribbean, and Europe do not possess a stabile
fixed racial identity—for example, as Americans
versus African Americans or as British instead of
Black Britons—they must continually confront
questions about who they are in a world where
they have never been completely accepted. Such a
condition, furthermore, is not necessarily only a
negative existence; powerful community can be
created when one identifies as a member of a
group that is resilient and has thrived in the face
of hundreds of years of adversity.
Double Consciousness
and African American Authenticity
Black Atlantic identity is most closely associated
with the experiences of African Americans. In the
oft-quoted passage from The Souls of Black Folk,
W. E. B. Du Bois (1903) noted, “One ever feels his
twoness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two
thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring
Black Atlantic 67
ideals in one dark body whose dogged strength
alone keeps it from being torn asunder” (p. 3).
Throughout most of their history in the United
States, African Americans faced restrictions on
activities in all walks of life. Although citizens by
birth, African Americans were excluded from
mainstream society through formal legal restric-
tions, and through informal cultural stereotypes
and practices. As a result, by the early 20th century,
African Americans had developed a strong double
consciousness, self-awareness that is based on the
prejudices of the dominant societal group and the
discrimination they inflict, despite the presence of a
community life that is much richer than is acknowl-
edged by outsiders. Double consciousness is the
condition of being simultaneously American and
not American and having little ability to change
that reality. Due to the centrality of complex Black/
White race relations in the fabric of American soci-
ety, African Americans cannot completely obtain a
non-White racial designation over time, as was the
case with other immigrant groups initially marked
as Other (for example, Italian Americans). Double
consciousness, then, creates internal conflict because
Black Americans are pulled in two directions at the
same time and cannot unify competing cultural ele-
ments into a singular identity.
In the 21st century, African Americans are no
longer second-class citizens de jure, but double
consciousness still exists, as various enduring eco-
nomic and social inequalities leave millions of
African Americans unable to fully enter main-
stream society. The primary source of the internal
conflict has shifted, however. Although there have
always been African Americans who accepted
degrading stereotypes (and, indeed, helped Whites
disseminate them), these individuals were limited in
how much they could influence others. What
counts as appropriate thought and behavior for
Black Americans today, however, is driven more by
those within the community than by those who are
not members. Double consciousness is still a self-
awareness that is based on the perceptions of oth-
ers, but those others now look a lot more familiar.
An example of contemporary double conscious-
ness can be found in a second-season episode of
the popular television program Chappelle’s Show,
a sketch comedy show that aired on the Comedy
Central network from 2003 to 2006. In the skit
“White People Dancing,” African American comic
68 Black Atlantic
Dave Chappelle and White musician John Mayer
visit various locations to discover what type of
music and musical instruments are favored by dif-
ferent racial groups. They discover that White
people have been taught to value rock music fea-
turing electric guitars, African Americans value
hip-hop music built around drums, and Latino/as
find fast-paced electric piano music irresistible. At
the end of the skit, Chappelle and Mayer are con-
fronted by two police officers, one White and one
African American. Mayer distracts the officers by
playing rock music on his guitar. Chappelle is sur-
prised when the African American officer starts
dancing to the music along with the White officer.
Chappelle makes a face of disapproval and asks,
“Hey my man, how you know that music?” The
response: “I’m from the suburbs, man, I can’t help
it!” Here we see Chappelle’s character questioning
the African American police officer’s racial iden-
tity, implying that “real” African Americans don’t
listen to rock music. The response (“I’m from the
suburbs!”) indicated that the officer was not a
typical African American. On a related note, schol-
ars such as Elijah Anderson have investigated an
oppositional culture that has formed in some
urban African American communities, where an
authentic Blackness is predicated on rejecting prac-
tices that are designed for Whites. For example,
doing well in school is viewed as acting White and,
therefore, should be shunned.
Of course, definitions of authenticity are subject
to debate; contemporary double consciousness
entails keeping up with the shifting terrain and
defending positions when questioned by others. In
sum, Black Atlantic identity for African Americans
is increasingly policed more by other African
Americans than it is by White individuals or insti-
tutions of mainstream society, but African
Americans’ place in society remains slippery.
Black Atlantic Identity for Non-Blacks
The Black Atlantic does not only drive identity
formation of those descended from Africa; other
identities can also be influenced by the Black
Atlantic. White Americans, for instance, can eat
the other. In Black Looks: Race and Representation,
social theorist bell hooks argues that contemporary
American society depends on identifying subcul-
tures that are dangerous and then packaging and
selling elements of these subcultures to the general
public. African Americans can never be fully
American, in part, because their culture is deemed
too exotic, too wild, and too primitive. Participating
vicariously in this culture can be thrilling for some-
one who is not African American, as it provides an
escape from bland and safe mainstream culture.
According to hooks, heterosexual White men
are provided the most freedom to self-consciously
appropriate cultural products or practices of Black
culture. Chappelle provides an example in the
very first episode of Chappelle’s Show. In the skit
“Black White Supremacist,” a blind African
American was never told that he was Black, and
he grew up to write several books on White racial
superiority. At a traffic stop while being driven to
a book discussion event, the author reacts to loud
rap music from a neighboring car. “Hey,” he calls,
“Why don’t you jungle bunnies turn that music
down? You niggers make me sick!” The driver (a
White male in his early 20s) turns to his compan-
ion (who is also a young White male) and says,
“Did he just call us niggers? Awesome!!” The two
friends exchange congratulatory handshakes and
nod their heads in appreciation of perceived affir-
mation by a member of the group they idolize.
In the mid-20th century, these two young men
might have been termed White Negroes, as they
appear to fit the condition explored by Norman
Mailer in the 1957 essay “The White Negro:
Superficial Reflections on the Hipster,” where
White Americans attempted to distance themselves
from mainstream White America by befriending
Black Americans and adopting their language,
music, food, and style of dress. White Negroes were
viewed with suspicion by both Blacks and Whites,
given perceived superficial interest in Black culture.
After all, White Negroes who eat the other can
always shed adopted cultural practices and return
to the mainstream if necessary, whereas double con-
sciousness limits the options of African Americans.
The Black Atlantic and
the Global African Diaspora
Whereas the most visible elements of the Black
Atlantic are attempts by African Americans to
comment on their experiences in the United States
under conditions not of their choosing, Black
American cultural forms are increasingly subject to

creative remix and reconceptualization outside of
North America. For example, in Ghana the hiplife
musical genre fuses Black American rap music and
elements of the broader hip-hop movement with
Ghana’s highlife genre, which combines elements
from other traditions. South Africa, Nigeria, and
many other African countries are also experiencing
an expansion of hip-hop as a primary form of con-
temporary cultural expression.
The Black Atlantic is a component of a larger
global African diaspora. African-descended people,
ideas, and products are in constant motion, con-
tinually fusing with other people, ideas, and prod-
ucts. The process of exchange is vibrant and filled
with possibilities . . . and dangers. Hybrid social
and cultural forms are not always acceptable in the
places where they form; ongoing dialogue is neces-
sary for new traditions and practices to take root,
flourish, and begin the process all over again. The
Black Atlantic is the constantly evolving dialogue of
the fusion of elements from Africa, the Americas,
the Caribbean, and Europe. Future research will
link the Black Atlantic with emerging investigations
of other cross-continental cultural exchanges, such
as a “Black Pacific” that explores African, American
and Asian solidarities. The Black Atlantic, the
Black Pacific, and other new scholarly directions in
the global African diaspora provide multiple per-
spectives for critical understandings of identity.
Walt Jacobs
See also Afrocentricity; Culture, Ethnicity, and Race;
Nigrescence
Further Readings
Anderson, E. (1990). Streetwise: Race, class, and change
in an urban community. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Gilroy, P. (1993). The Black Atlantic: Modernity and
double consciousness. New York: Routledge.
hooks, b. (1992). Black looks: Race and representation.
Boston: South End Press.
Brachyology
Brachyology, or brachylogy, refers to the inten-
tional shortening of spoken or written statements
Brachyology 69
where complete understanding is still assumed on
the part of the audience or readers. Brachyology
implies familiarity on the part of the interlocutors.
This familiarity on the part of conversant can be
cited as an example of coidentification, whereby
each recognizes the other and makes assumptions
of meaning based on that familiarity.
Derived from the Greek brachylogía, meaning
“brevity of speech,” brachyology is most often
associated with ellipsis, and it is often difficult to
make a distinction between the two terms. Both
concepts draw on the connection between the syn-
tactic forms and semantic meanings of a given
correspondence, two similarities that cause diffi-
culties in parsing out the different genealogies of
the terms.
Whether ellipsis is a form of brachyology is a
form of ellipsis has been a point of contention
among philologists.  One important distinction
between the two terms is that ellipsis as a linguistic
device is more often based on the omission of a
spoken utterance or written text that relies on a
shared cultural understanding. As such, ellipsis
may be taken to draw on forms of discourse that
preexist the moment in which the statement is gen-
erated. Brachyology, on the other hand, relies on
contextual meanings in statements made  prior to
or after  a spoken or written text to support the
implied meaning of the construction. Thus, brachy-
ology is more situated to a particular context and
may not function to make similar meanings in dif-
ferent contexts. In neither case does the form pur-
posely interfere  with the listener’s or reader’s
understanding of the statement, but whereas ellip-
tical forms rely more on an assumed, prerequisite
(and potentially culturally based) understanding
on the part of the interlocutor, brachyological
forms are more localized within a given conversa-
tion or text. In instances where brachyology is
used intentionally by the author or speaker, its
formation usually relies more formally and forma-
tively on grammatical variations. Thus, brachyol-
ogy can often be detected by an analysis of verb
usage relative to its objects.
Brachyological forms are noted within the fields
of literary analysis and criticism, linguistics, bibli-
cal studies, rhetoric, communications, and philol-
ogy, particularly within the study of European
classical works in Latin and Greek. By way of
example, Paul, in I Cor. 7:21–24, is often read as
70 Brachyology
employing brachyology (or breviloquence) to have
his speeches apply to both slaves and masters, by
intentionally excluding either group as the object
of his speech.
Some examples of more common forms of
brachyology are listed here. The words appearing
in parentheses are implied in the statements.
Notice that the implied parts of the phrases signify
action in the form of a verb:
Cooking carrots and (cooking) peas in the
same pot is very unsanitary.
To (drink) wine and dine.
It is important to help those who need (to be
helped).
He changed his mind and (decided to have)
had dessert.
These examples provide some general examples of
how brachyological forms are constructed. Within
the category of  brachyology, however, there are
particular forms that account for more specific
verb and adjective  usage.  In these instances,  two
objects jointly refer to a single verb or adjec-
tive instead of repeating or separately assigning a
verb or adjective to each object. Depending on the
grammatical and syntactic relationships, each of
these brachyological forms is defined differently.
In the case of zeugma, the verb applies directly
to only one of the objects while implying another
verb that is suitable for the other object. For
instance, in the statement, “We ate coffee and
cake,” the verb ate grammatically has two objects,
coffee and cake. The unstated meaning of the
statement is, “We drank coffee and ate cake.”
Syllipsis is another case where a verb or adjective
is applied to two objects. In the instance of syllip-
sis, though, the verb is appropriate to both objects
in the statement; for example, “Run the race and
the risk.”
Zeugma and syllipsis are often conflated.
However, a distinction exists between the two
terms based on the grammatical use of the given
verb. Where the verb in syllipsis aligns grammati-
cally with both objects, zeugma intentionally
employs a verb that matches with one object and
conflicts with another.
Apokoinou is similar to zeugma, but whereas
the latter is specific to the use of a single verb for
two objects, the former is more often a word used
as a predicate object in one clause and a subject in
another. An example is “It was a car took us to
the show.”
Compendious comparison, also often catego-
rized as a form of brachyology, describes forms
where the possessor of an object (rather than the
object of possession) is used in the comparative
relationship. For example, “This computer is faster
than mine (read: faster than my computer is fast)”
or “He has on a shirt like (that of) his father’s.”
Praegnans constructio is another form of
brachyology that assumes an unstated verb form,
where the verb is used in combination with a
preposition to indicate motion, the passage of
time, and rest following the action of the verb.
Examples include “She crossed to (and was on) the
other side of the street.” “I went to (and returned
from) the store.” Where motion or action is stated,
a period of rest is implied. Alternately, praegnans
constructio can also employ a verb that indicates a
state of rest  followed by a preposition to imply
action prior to the statement. For example, the
statement “We landed at the airport” implies that
we have been in motion (on an airplane) prior to
our arrival. Another way brachyological expres-
sions use the passage of time is with dative expres-
sions that employ spoken emphasis or inflection
on a verb: “I was going to eat the last slice of pie
(but you ate it).”
The most commonly identified forms of brachy-
ology are based on the relationships between verbs
and objects. However, there are some examples of
the device that use other syntactic constructions.
Asyndeton, the intentional exclusion of conjunc-
tions in a phrase that constructs a series,  is also
considered by some philologists to be a form of
brachyology (e.g., “at home, work, and school”).
Though most often associated with ellipsis, aposi-
opesis is often associated with brachyology.
Aposiopesis is a rhetorical device that uses an
intentional breaking off of a sentence for the pur-
pose of letting the interlocutor imagine the comple-
tion, for example, “Get out of my way, or else—!”
Whether brachyology is formed grammatically or
otherwise, the implied familiarity is as an example
of coidentification—each recognizes the other and
thus makes assumptions of meaning.
Michael Burns

See also Intersubjectivity; Intertextuality; Rhetoric;
Semantics
Further Readings
Frilingos, C. (2002). Review of The Tyranny of
Resolution: I Corinthians 7:17–24 by B. R. Braxton.
Journal of Religion, 82(2), 273–274.
George, D. K. (1909). Cross-suggestion: A form of
Tacitean brachylogy. American Journal of Philology,
30(3), 310–321.
Henry, D. (1968). Review of Reading Latin Poetry by
R. A. Hornsby. Classical Philology, 63(4), 321–322.
Heslin, P. J. (2006). Review of Valerius Flaccus,
Argonautica, Book I by A. J. Kleywegt. Classical
Review, New Series, 56(2), 364–367.
Sadler, J. D. (1979). Ellipsis. Classical Journal, 74(3),
261–264.
Smith, D. P. (n.d.). A glossary of Greek grammar terms.
Retrieved January 20, 2010, from http://www
.hellenisti.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/gggt.pdf
Smyth, H. W. (1980). Greek grammar. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press. (Original work published
1920)
Sundén, K. (1904). Contributions to the study of elliptical
words in modern English. Uppsala, Sweden: Almquist
& Wiksells.
Bricolage
Bricolage is a term used across many arenas,
including anthropology, cultural studies, litera-
ture, design, music, and art, and generally refers
to the act of constructing an artifact. Claude Lévi-
Strauss originally coined the use of the terms bri-
colage and bricoleur. Lévi-Strauss is the French
anthropologist who developed structuralism and
who was to be a major influence on, for example,
Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze,
and Jacques Lacan.
The words bricolage and bricoleur are derived
from bricole, the origin of brick. The root word
means to rebound, a sense that Lévi-Strauss refers
to, proposing that the word bricoleur is always
employed to suggest movement, such as a ball
rebounding, a dog wandering, or a horse altering
from its direct course to steer clear of an obstruc-
tion. Bricolage can also be applied in understanding
Bricolage 71
identity development. This entry discusses both
Lévi-Strauss’s and Derrida’s notions of bricolage
and then discusses how the notion of bricolage has
been used toward the further understanding of how
identity is created.
Lévi-Strauss and Bricolage
Lévi-Strauss challenged the ontological basis of
binary opposition—such as between nature and
culture—arguing that the lines between them,
contrary to scientific thinking, are difficult to
define. The hypotheticodeductive take on scien-
tific investigation rests on binary logic. Lévi-
Strauss’s concern was to find a methodological,
rather than an ontological, use of binary theory in
social science; hence, bricolage. In his 1962, and
arguably most important, book, The Savage
Mind (the untranslatable original French title was
La Pensée Sauvage), he introduced the terms bri-
colage and bricoleur into cultural discourse in the
context of describing, as he saw it, the two
equally valid forms of thinking that he perceived
as being possible for the acquisition of knowl-
edge: the science of the concrete, which is mythi-
cal thought, and the science of the conceptual,
modern scientific inquiry.
The former, of which he suggests that the con-
struction of mythological narrative—storytelling—is
an example, involves bricolage insofar as the brico-
leur collects, in this instance, the components of
the myth which, in a sense, are already a given
within cultural and linguistic history and which
thereby limit the possibilities open to the brico-
leur in (re)constructing the narrative. He suggests
engineering, by contrast, as an example of the
latter—the science of the conceptual—where,
according to Lévi-Strauss, the engineer looks
beyond the given in the search of new concepts;
the engineer asks questions of the very makeup of
the cosmos, whereas the bricoleur is limited by
what is within the existing realms of discourse
and culture. The engineer works through concepts,
and the bricoleur through signs. The bricoleur—
the original French word means the highly
skilled, professional do-it-yourself craftsman—
takes materials from a variety of sources and uses
them to create an artifact that, because of how
she arranges or manipulates these materials to fit
her vision, becomes her own. The bricoleur, says
72 Bricolage
Lévi-Strauss, is therefore someone who uses the
means that are at hand, the objects and tools that
she finds available to her, those which are already
present, and, crucially, which have not been
designed or imagined with a view to the particu-
lar use to which they will be used. The bricoleur
tries by experimentation, by trial and error, to
adapt them, willing to change them, if that seems
necessary, or simultaneously to incorporate more
than one, even if their forms and their origins are
heterogeneous.
Lévi-Strauss discusses this process as involving a
dialogue with the materials and with how they are
used. In other words, the creation of an artifact is
not simply a conscious and planned application of
found “materials” (of whatever kind) for a prede-
termined outcome but a process of, in a sense, lis-
tening to and being guided by the materials
themselves, an activity that might therefore
“prompt” the bricoleur to follow a new direction.
Lévi-Strauss also argues that bricolage con-
cerns not merely the adoption and adaptation of
materials but, in so doing, the development—and
performance—of the bricoleur’s identity. The
assembling of signs and symbols conveys identifi-
cation with and difference from others.
Derrida and Bricolage
Lévi-Strauss’s distinction between the bricoleur
and the engineer, and between the sciences of the
concrete and the conceptual, suggests that the
engineer works, and the conceptual lies, outside
discourse. The French philosopher Derrida chal-
lenged this distinction, arguing that, by implica-
tion, the engineer would be the originator of
language itself, which cannot be possible.
Derrida’s view was that, given the impossibility
of originating and creating outside language, the
engineer of Lévi-Strauss is therefore a myth. For
Derrida, “reality” can only lie within text, within
discourse, and that, therefore, there is only brico-
lage. We cannot be engineers, as Lévi-Strauss
would have it, because there are no new “tools,” or
concepts, to be made outside of language, no cen-
tral, unifying position from which we can create
something that does not involve language as soon
as we begin to describe it. So, with nothing outside
of text, “nothingness” becomes important. Derrida
talked about this nothingness as being essential
absence, needed in order to free us to play with
what there is—language, text, discourse—in search
of that which is missing, or that which is too
much, or that which is inadequate in whatever
sense. To this extent, therefore, we are, for Derrida,
all bricoleurs.
Bricolage and Identity Construction
Dick Hebdige borrows the notion of bricolage
from Lévi-Strauss in order to describe the applica-
tion of appropriated objects to the development of
identity. Identity is created out of the arrangement
of those objects rather than out of their inherent
qualities. It is the composition of the items that
conveys coherence and difference. Objects and
commodities acquire fresh meaning as they are
brought together—and juxtaposed—with other,
seemingly incompatible items.
For instance, within youth subcultures, young
people take cultural images and ideas from popu-
lar music, consumer culture, and the mass media
materials and use them—in manners which their
originators did not have in mind—to suit their
own vision of reality or to represent their senses of
identity. The resulting bricolage is therefore not
merely the sum of the individual parts, used in
their entirety, but a fresh take on their reordered,
revisioned, often truncated and juxtaposed
images.
There are certain elements of bricolage that are
common to a range of media. Bricolage uses some
material, refers or alludes to others, observably
excludes others, adapts what it borrows, and
(re)arranges them.
The subculture of punk represents a classic
example of the construction of identity through
bricolage. At one level, punk was a genre of popu-
lar music, but it also contained representations of
identity and style, appropriating fetishized cloth-
ing, torn jeans and other garments, industrial wear
(e.g., boiler suits and workers’ boots), and even, in
its early stages, Nazi uniforms. The safety pin, for
example, was not a tool for attaching material but,
inserted through the nose or ear, a statement of
punk-ness. Within the present-day DJ culture, mix-
ing tracks offers a further example of bricolage
within cultural practices. Grunge, too, is a style

that involves the incorporation of items and prac-
tices that are not customarily combined.
Bricolage as identity construction (sometimes
referred to as creolization) can work across
national and other traditionally defined boundar-
ies, leading to the emergence of syncretic identi-
ties and cultures. Identity develops not in any
linear, fixed direction but across fluid, interac-
tive, and complex trajectories. Such identities are
never fully formed but are always in a process of
development.
Jonathan Wyatt
Bricolage 73
See also Aesthetics; Architecture, Sites, and Spaces;
Commodity Self; Consumption; Patriotism;
Photographic Truth
Further Readings
Derrida, J. (1980). Writing and difference (A. Bass,
Trans.). New York: Routledge.
Hebdige, D. (1979). Subculture: The meaning of style.
London: Methuen.
Lévi-Strauss, C. (1966). The savage mind (J. Weightman
& D. Weightman, Trans.). Chicago: Chicago
University Press.
 C
Children’s Art
Artists, art educators, and researchers have long
believed that art reveals much about humanity, as
visual culture is an important aspect of civiliza-
tion. Researchers such as Georges-Henri Luquet,
Viktor Lowenfeld, Jean Piaget, Howard Gardner,
and Rudolf Arnheim have long believed that chil-
dren’s drawings reflect and contribute to cognitive
and emotional development. As a result, early art
education often focused on promoting the devel-
opment of self in children. Besides the sheer plea-
sure in creating art, children’s drawings seem to
serve two primary functions. Drawing is instru-
mental in the acquisition of general knowledge
and is believed to mirror psychosocial develop-
ment. The unique nature of artistic materials
allows children to actively address their thoughts
and feelings by encouraging them to reflect and
broaden their understanding of self and their
place in the world.
Art educator Viktor Lowenfeld believed that the
U.S. educational system, which emphasizes test
performance and recalling information, does little
to encourage creative productivity, self-esteem,
and self-awareness. He believed that learning is
more than the accrual of knowledge; it involves an
understanding of how knowledge can be actually
applied. Lowenfeld argued that incorporating art
into early childhood education is important as it
addresses the shortfalls in our education system.
The experience of making art involves advanced
cognitive abilities, such as symbolic thinking and
75
psychosocial negotiation. Creating art allows chil-
dren to symbolically attempt to understand an
adult world, a symbolic process of internalizing
their environment.
Graphic Development
It has been observed that children in Western soci-
ety use similar drawing techniques and schemata
during different stages in their graphic develop-
ment. Some questions have emerged from this
observation. Do all children go through the same
artistic development? If they do, what is the theo-
retical explanation for this phenomenon? Why do
children draw? These questions turned out to be
not so easily answered due to the complicated
nature and lack of a cohesive theory of children’s
drawings.
In the early 20th century, Luquet studied his
daughter’s drawings and observed a progression
from a scribble, circle, tadpole, to a human figure.
His observations became the basis for our under-
standing of the stages of graphic development.
Lowenfeld and W. Lambert Brittain expanded on
and outlined these stages of graphic development
in children’s drawing based on Luquet’s observa-
tions and Piaget’s theory of cognitive development.
They proposed that all children pass through each
stage sequentially. These stages are the following:
first attempt at self-expression (scribble), first rep-
resentational attempt (preschematic), achievement
of a form concept (schematic), dawning realism,
pseudo-realism, the period of decision, and adoles-
cent art. This model of graphic development has
76 Children’s Art
come to be known as the classical model of artistic
development.
The assertion that these stages are universal is
controversial, according to the published litera-
ture. Researchers such as Brent Wilson and
Marjorie Wilson have argued that the classical
model of artistic development is based on a
Western, modernist view of creativity and has out-
lived its usefulness. The modernist view of artistic
development claims that learning to paint or draw
is an intrinsic process resulting from children’s
interactions and perceptions of the natural world.
The modernist assumption is that art is self-
contained and that the innate qualities of the artis-
tic media (e.g., fluidity of paint) engage the artist
and shape the artwork. This is art for art’s sake.
Any influence of cultural artistic conventions is
viewed as a contamination of the creative process
and is consequently discouraged.
The classical model is thought to be too linear
and culturally biased, as more recent cross-cultural
studies have shown that cultural influences have a
strong effect on the overall style of children’s
drawing. The belief that children’s artistic develop-
ment expands without the influence of visual cul-
ture is contradicted by studies of children in
non-Western societies. For example, researchers
Wilson and Wilson found that by 4 or 5 years old,
children from Japan and Egypt draw in noticeably
different ways as compared to children in the
United States. It seems that representation and
symbolism are ideas that children are taught
directly and indirectly by adults and other chil-
dren; thus the claim that children go through spe-
cific universal stages of art development is being
refuted by Wilson and Wilson.
Researchers’ dissatisfaction with the traditional
model has led to a shift in the field of art education
in explaining graphic development. For researchers
such as Wilson and Wilson, there is more of an
emphasis on cultural determinants of children’s
experience and how this influences and shapes
artistic growth. Young children’s drawings seem to
develop in terms of phases rather than in universal,
sequential stages. Young children seem to create art
based not on their perceptions of the natural world
but on observations of art within their culture,
instruction and encouragement from their teachers
and caregivers, and copying their peers. Thus, a
postmodern view of graphic development asserts
that art is socially constructed, and even the work
of young children is influenced by visual culture.
However, the classical model of artistic devel-
opment cannot be totally rejected. There is evi-
dence demonstrating that children intuitively draw
and paint images that seem to illustrate emotions
and that all children under the age of 4 or 5 years
appear to scribble, draw circles, and draw the
same basic tadpole figure (human figures depicted
as ovals representing the body as well as the head,
with lines emanating from the sides and bottoms).
There are several theories that explain this phe-
nomenon of children drawing incomplete human
figures. Some researchers argue that children omit
bodily features because they do not understand
how the human body is organized. Others suggest
that children do not draw what they actually per-
ceive but use a schema that is a part of their reper-
toire. Finally, some argue that children are
cognitively capable of drawing the entire human
figure but choose to draw only the necessary fea-
tures to communicate a recognizable human form.
Therefore, young children tend to draw what they
feel or think about the human figure, not what
they actually observe.
Art and Psychosocial Development
Whether children progress through universal stages
of graphic development or are primarily influenced
by their environment, all children, when given the
opportunity, enjoy drawing and painting and seem
to benefit from the experience. This has led many
experts in art education and developmental psy-
chology to study not only graphic development but
also how cognitive and psychosocial development
is fostered by creative experiences. Art is not cre-
ated in a vacuum; rather, it is shaped by the context
in which it was made. Children’s art is influenced
by, and is a part of, visual culture; consequently, it
is a social construction. A drawing created by a
child tells us something about the child’s interests,
thoughts, and feelings; something about the art
itself; as well as something about the culture in
which it was created. In other words, children’s art,
like art made by adults, mirrors the social and psy-
chological context in which it was made.
It is recognized in the literature that a child’s per-
ception of self is critical to his or her development.
Furthermore, a child’s image of self determines his

or her behavior and as a result, social functioning
is contingent on the ability to self-evaluate.
Children’s self-esteem is enhanced when they see
themselves as capable individuals, able to operate
within the complicated world in which they find
themselves. Art nurtures this process, as the act of
drawing or painting allows the child to create a
world in which he or she can explore several pos-
sibilities to arrive at an acceptable self-image or
identity. In fact, studies have found that the more
creative the child is, the more positive his or her
self-esteem and self-image tend to be. Thus, art
through the process of creativity can facilitate the
process of creating a self-image or identity. Children
finding satisfaction in self-expression leads to a
positive self-concept.
However, as Lowenfeld pointed out, art is not
possible without self-identification with the experi-
ence expressed in the art as well as with the artis-
tic materials by which it is illustrated. This is the
basis of creativity, the expression of self. The child,
just like an adult, uses artistic media to illustrate
his or her personal experiences, and because these
experiences change as the individual grows, self-
identification with art embraces the social, emo-
tional, cognitive, and psychological changes within
the child. This psychosocial growth can readily be
seen in the art of young children, as their draw-
ings and paintings often reflect their identification
with their own experiences and their experiences
with others. Creating art is important to the child
because the process provides the opportunity for
social growth.
At approximately 3 years of age, children start
to draw their first representational objects: figures
of people. When children start drawing recogniz-
able forms, they begin to truly put themselves into
their art. Children are able to create an image of
self through the drawing of the figure. These self-
portraits and portraits of friends and family are
windows into how they see themselves and oth-
ers, revealing the children’s experience of self
interacting with the world. Art becomes a vehicle
through which children’s sense of self and identity
are formed.
Beyond personal expression, art serves a social
function, communicating society’s values, beliefs,
and customs that make up the visual culture.
Drawings can provide an opportunity for children
to experiment with their growing sense of social
Children’s Art 77
consciousness. As the children’s awareness of
people grows, a large portion of their pictures
depict social activities. The development of social
awareness is reflected in drawings with the por-
trayal of home, school, and playgrounds in which
the children identify with as part of their lives.
As the children’s drawings develop, they recognize
that they are part of a physical world. They begin
to draw a groundline instead of floating objects,
framing figures and objects between the earth and
sky. Thus, children begin to understand that they
are a part of a larger world. According to Lowenfeld,
children’s self-identification with their own experi-
ences in art is one important condition for building
contacts outside themselves. To develop a greater
social consciousness, it is necessary to identify
one’s own actions, recognize responsibility for
these actions, and have some control over them.
As with children’s growing social awareness,
the complexity of their drawings increases with
their developing sense of self. At this phase in their
graphic development, children often create work
with narrative subject matter with little or no adult
direction. Most of the time, they draw themselves
or friends and family in familiar settings acting out
a story. They often model their images on their
peers’ artwork and graphic media they are exposed
to on a daily basis (e.g., cartoons, comic books,
video games). By borrowing from images they are
exposed to in popular culture and by using a
shared graphic vocabulary, children begin to relate
to others by recognizing commonalities. Children
also begin to realize that through drawing, they
can communicate with others and, consequently,
be understood by others. Children in the phase of
artistic development are less self-centered and are
beginning to grasp that their sense of self is depen-
dent on outside influences, which is the environ-
ment in which they were born.
For children, narrative themes in drawings or
paintings create an intellectually stimulating world
of make-believe. Some experts, like Brent Wilson,
believe that children are actually experimenting
with life’s themes. For example, a little girl may
draw a story depicting a princess in her castle
numerous times or a boy depicting himself as a
comic book hero, changing the outcomes or sup-
porting characters. The girl’s identification with
the princess and interactions with other characters
in her drawings can take on a larger significance,
78 Citizenship
much like the social significance attributed to fairy
tales. The child, through fantasy play, can invent
situations that enable her to learn many important
lessons, such as overcoming adversity, and under-
standing cause and effect. These are important life
lessons, as the child learns to be an autonomous
individual, making decisions to deal with life’s
challenges. By re-creating narrative themes in their
drawings, children build on their understanding of
the social and physical world and their growing
role in it. Ultimately, the child is building on her
concept of self, constructing her identity, as narra-
tion through the process of drawing increases a
child’s knowledge of self.
Elizabeth A. Patton
See also Aesthetics; Artistic Development and Cognition
Further Readings
Gardner, H. (1980). Artful scribbles: The significance of
children’s drawings. New York: Basic Books.
Golomb, C. (1992). The child’s creation of a pictorial
world. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Lowenfeld, V., & Brittain, W. L. (1987). Creative and
mental growth (8th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Wilson, B., & Wilson, M. (1987). Pictorial composition
and narrative structure: Themes and the creation of
meaning in the drawings of Egyptian and Japanese
children. Visual Arts Research, 13(2), 10–21.
Citizenship
The relationship between citizenship and identity
is both simple and complex. Simply put, one’s
identity as citizen is expressed through her or his
actions within a public space. Thus, citizenship
can be seen as an outcome or product. Actions as
simple as voting, writing a letter to the editor, run-
ning for office, attending a council meeting, or
even refusing to allow a political sign on one’s
yard may all serve as signs of citizenship—of
actively engaging in one’s community for better or
worse. In each case, an assertion is made about
one’s commitment to the community—it may be
positive or negative, it may be lauded or reviled,
but in both cases, it is clearly a statement made
about one’s views on the issues of the day.
The more complex sense of one’s identity as a
citizen, as one who enacts citizenship, can be
approached through several avenues. A focus on
race or ethnicity, for example, would reveal a very
different sense of one’s identity than a focus on
class might present. A focus on White masculinity
would not necessarily incorporate recognition of
how an African American male would express
citizenship in a quest for the presidency of the
United States. Conversely, a focus on Black mascu-
linity, and the rhetorical options available to Black
males, would create a different picture of how one
enacts citizenship. The same would be true in
thinking in terms of different classes: The wealthy
may enact citizenship through large donations of
money, attending dinners on behalf of political
candidates, and pledging support; the lower classes
may enact citizenship through volunteering time,
as paying for the dinner may not be within their
interest, even if within their means. A focus on
one’s citizenship via political action will reveal
only one facet of one’s identity; a sense of self as a
volunteer within the community is as much a part
of one’s identity as citizen as whether one is or is
not politically active. The sense of citizenship—
how should one behave or act or what one should
be as a citizen—is far from simple.
The Rhetorical Citizen
A focus on the citizen as a rhetorical agent, as one
who expresses or enacts citizenship via symbolic
means, cuts across race, sex, gender, and class
lines. It is inclusive with respect to one’s activity
within the public sphere as well—whether one is a
social activist or passive participant in the life of
the community. It allows a conception of citizen-
ship to be formulated that responds to the place
where one enacts citizenship, whether as part of
the public or, as noted later in this entry, part of a
specific counterpublic. The sense of rhetoric implied
here as “symbolic” suggests what the rhetorical
critic Kenneth Burke would endorse: Any act—
whether via words or gestures, signs, or even
dress—that invites an interpretation regarding
how that act is to be understood or taken by others
is a rhetorical expression. In this sense, Picasso’s
famous painting Guernica, painted as a response

to war, functions rhetorically as an expression of
an artist’s enactment as a “citizen of the world.”
Citizenship, as articulated earlier, is seen in and
through the actions taken by people. It is not an
inert, passive, abstract “thing.” Nor is it always
and only a positive attribute; the absence of what
one might call an obligation to enact citizenship
may itself be an expression. Refusing to vote may
be an enactment of a principle that is just as pow-
erful a statement, in its negation of a right, as actu-
ally voting. Thus, inaction, or the refusal to
participate, may be seen as an indicator of a peo-
ple’s distrust or disavowal of those seeking to be
elected to an office. The level of participation
(local, state, regional, or national) is not a deter-
mining factor. Thus, one’s identity as a citizen may
be enacted as clearly through a refusal to cast a
ballot for town mayor, where the candidates are
all perceived (rightly or wrongly) to be less than
desired, as in a refusal to vote in a presidential elec-
tion because the candidates are equally disliked.
There are two major criteria for the enactment
of citizenship. The first is the ability to enact one’s
views within the public space allotted for such
action—this means that one has the wherewithal to
get to the polls, to write a letter that is considered
publishable, to take action (or not), as one desires
in making a claim to participation. There are, obvi-
ously, restrictions placed on such action, either
through rules and protocols, or by virtue of a cul-
tural legacy that one cannot automatically ignore.
The rhetorical enactment of one’s political or social
desires is encased within a set of prior constraints
on who can say what to whom with what effect.
That one can alter the constraints, or go against the
restrictions they impose, is equally clear; the conse-
quences may be devastating. Enacting citizenship
may mean going “against the grain.”
A more critical limit is evident in the existence
of what has been termed counterpublics—those
collections of people around ideas, cultures, or
other preferences (such as gay, lesbian, bisexual,
transgendered) that are seen by many to be outside
the mainstream. They are counter to the central
public space in which social, economic, and politi-
cal actions take place. Getting the attention of the
“center” is not always an easy task. Within the
cultural space dedicated to the counterpublic’s
sense of who they are, however, one enacts citizen-
ship by virtue of one’s expression of belonging.
Citizenship 79
Members of a gay lesbian group, for example, are
no less citizens; nor is their expression of solidarity
within a counterpublic group any less valuable.
Entering the mainstream to engage ideas, whether
via a “Take Back the Night” march or some other
activity, alerts the center to their existence, as well
as to the unfinished business that remains to be
considered by all community members.
The second criterion with respect to the enact-
ment of citizenship lies in motive. Why should you
act (or not)? What are the motives for enacting
citizenship that mean something to you? When
you refuse to have a political sign on your yard, is
it because you disagree with the candidate’s views
(or party affiliation), or is it simply that such signs
are aesthetically offensive? Is the latter a nones-
sential reason—one that devalues your role as a
citizen? Are all motives equal in their relation to
your enacting citizenship? To put it on the other
side: What can one person do in terms of motivat-
ing others to act? Political candidates running for
office are well aware that enacting citizenship is
hard work; inaction for reasons of laziness, disin-
terest, and apathy are not the best reasons, though
their presence should say something to those seek-
ing to change behaviors. How do we get more
people to vote? How do we convince people that
their vote, as an enactment of what we perceive to
be their obligation as a citizen, will count? These
are critical questions, and the respective answers
will be subject to the time and place in which they
are formulated. There are no final answers to the
question “What makes a citizen a citizen?”
Communicative Democracy
Although not in any sense a final answer, the possible
expressions of citizenship can be narrowed to focus
on the role of the citizen in enacting or promoting
democracy. Borrowing Iris Marion Young’s prefer-
ence for “communicative” rather than “delibera-
tive” democracy, the ensuing discussion focuses
attention on a common view of the role of the
citizen: an actor in the public sphere who influ-
ences, by his or her action, the direction or nature
of public policies affecting the lives of citizens. The
conception of democracy invoked here is elemen-
tal: the ability of citizens to speak their minds on
matters that influence how they live. However else
one conceives of democracy, the ability to express
80 Civic Identity
one’s views is central to its enactment. The manner
in which communicative expression is organized
and presented may not be ideal, as arguing in pub-
lic places is a messy business—people do not
always “follow the rules” in behaving well in pub-
lic. Nonetheless, preserving their right to play in
the same sandbox as others is an integral part of
the creation of a communicative democracy. We
may not all get along with each other, and we may
not always express ideas in the most rational, calm,
deliberative manner. That said, we still need to live
with one another; hence, continuing the effort to
be seen as one who can be reasoned with remains
a worthy goal. That it doesn’t always work as one
hopes does not diminish the goal. The messiness of
public argument does not, in and of itself, mean we
should close off the rights of those we disagree
with to have their say. Otherwise, the possibility of
a communicative democracy is forever foreclosed,
as it limits the ability of the counterpublic to take
their place in the community as citizens.
Raymie E. McKerrow
See also Civic Identity; Ethics of Identity; Identity
Politics; Political Identity; Rhetoric
Further Readings
Asen, R., & Brouwer, D. C. (Eds.). (2001).
Counterpublics and the state. Albany: SUNY Press.
Bridges, T. (1994). The culture of citizenship: Inventing
postmodern culture. Albany: SUNY Press.
Ingram, D. (2004). Rights, democracy, and fulfillment in
the era of identity politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield.
Perrin, A. J. (2006). Citizen speak: The democratic
imagination in American life. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Warner, M. (2002). Publics and counterpublics. New
York: Zone Books.
Young, I. M. (2000). Inclusion and democracy. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Civic Identity
From informal community activities to formalized
political processes and affairs of state, civic iden-
tity involves formation and negotiation of personal
and group identities as they relate to presence,
role, and participation in public life. Civic identity
is a particularly important factor in civic engage-
ment and participation in democratic deliberation.
Rapidly expanding global communication tech-
nologies, global markets, and global political net-
works have intensified questions of civic identity
coincidentally with concerns about civic disen-
gagement and civic disenfranchisement.
Ancient Roots
Civic identity is grounded in the idea of the Greek
polis, or city-state. In democratic Athenian culture,
citizens had formal and informal privileges and
obligations to serve the polis. Civic virtue included
expectations for full cultural and political involve-
ment and focused on public duties and public
behavior. In Politics, Aristotle ties citizenship with
the power to participate in deliberating court cases
and public policy matters involved in governing the
city. Accordingly, Athenian democracy was direct
democracy; every citizen effectively could vote on
every decision. Because citizenship extended only
to males born to Athenian citizens—a privileged
minority that excluded Athenian-born women,
children, all slaves, and foreign-born residents—
the polis already included a complex set of civic
identity issues. Citizenship questions of formal and
functional involvement in public deliberation,
qualifications for inclusion, and criteria for exclu-
sion remain central to civic identity today.
Republican Rome broadened the scope of civic
identity in two ways: representation and negotia-
tion. Rome was a representative republic governed
by a senate and an assembly to which members
were elected by respective social classes. The Roman
Republic liberated civic identity from citizenship-by-
birth, expanding citizenship categories to include
freed slaves, foreign-born residents, and people
of conquered nations. Rome provided additional
avenues through which people could earn citizen-
ship through distinguished service or, in certain
cases, by purchasing their own citizenship. A sig-
nificant range of Roman subjects could aspire to a
civic identity distinct from the status into which
they were born; more people could be actively
involved in framing civic identity.
Citizens’ power to deliberate—to participate in
judicial and legislative affairs—waned with the rise

of Imperial Rome and would not see a widespread
resurgence until the end of the Middle Ages. But
basic categories and coordinates for civic identity
were established in theory and practice, grounded
in terms that expected people and groups to par-
ticipate in the formation and enactment of civic
identities that made them active participants in
civic life.
Modern Developments
The wholesale implementation of the printing
press revolutionized civic identity by democratiz-
ing literacy. Many elite ancients were literate, but
few common people could read or write. In the
early modern period, schooling common people
became a means to explore, develop, and configure
civic identity for a much broader range of people.
As Walter J. Ong explains in Orality and Literacy:
The Technologizing of the Word, the introduction
of fixed type radically reconfigured human con-
sciousness, especially by incorporating ordinary
people within the literate population. Although the
process took hundreds of years, the cultural and
political impact of literacy moved civic identity out
of the world of ideas and into the world of com-
mon human experience.
When the preamble of the Declaration of
Independence proclaimed a political philosophy of
human equality as self-evident truth, much equal-
izing had already been accomplished. Reading
publics had become self-conscious about identity—
personal, private, and civic. The Protestant
Reformation, the American Revolution, and the
French Revolution symbolize the emancipation of
common people enacting civic identity as a
dynamic, liberating practice against controlling
institutional forces.
Enlightenment ideas that informed new civic
structures asserted a form of civic identity that pos-
ited essential, transcendent individual rights.
Although not applied equitably, the ideas pro-
moted forms of civic identity that challenged tradi-
tional political and governmental arrangements of
the day. Civic identity became a process of bringing
society—particularly government—into conformity
with essential individual rights and freedoms.
People were emancipated to fashion civic identity
through the exercise of their personal rights,
through participation in public deliberation, and
Civic Identity 81
through the defense of their rights—particularly
against claims of state sovereignty.
However, other modern ideas challenged the
ground of civic identity as based on a God-given,
self-evident individuality. Modern collectivist ver-
sions of equality posited the scientific and histori-
cal necessity of civic identity as formed primarily
through economic and political power. A person’s
or group’s civic identity emerged through class
relationships and ideological power functions
ordered to create an illusion of individual, indepen-
dent civic identity while producing hegemonic civic
conformity to support existing institutional power
systems. The intersection of such competing ideas
propelled cataclysmic revolutions and civil wars of
the late 18th and 19th centuries in the United
States, France, and Russia that illustrate the pro-
found intellectual disputes about the grounds and
processes involved in civic identity. However, the
impact of modernity on civic identity would not be
fully felt until the emergence of the technologically
driven, bureaucratic welfare state of the 20th cen-
tury and the emergence of global markets.
Between the beginning of World War I and the
end of the cold war, civic identity was reforged in
terms of centralized state power in totalitarian and
democratic regimes and in terms of reactions
against such regimes of power. The advent of mass
communication corresponded with the projection
of mass cultures and the emergence of mass mar-
kets. Although the turmoil of worldwide economic
depression distinguished the world wars, each was
fought with increasingly sophisticated and deadly
military technology, leaving massive new national
and international bureaucracies in both govern-
ments and markets. In the midst of these global
struggles, advances in civil rights for women, racial
minorities, and ethnic minorities expanded the
bounds of civic identity—notable worldwide by
dramatic gains on some fronts and dramatic exclu-
sions and violations on others. Even the advances
highlighted the contested nature of civic identity in
theory and in practice. By all accounts, the scope of
civic identity remained deficient, and the problems
of civic identity remained unresolved. Meanwhile,
civic identity was morphing into mass mediated,
digitized images, mirrored by fragmentation and
dislocation for many people. Conditions at the end
of the century spawned skepticism and cynicism,
apathy, and disengagement from many quarters.
82 Civic Identity
Civic Paradoxes
The paradoxes of civic identity today are pro-
found. Theorists and critics continue to debate
definitions and terms of civic identity with refer-
ence to formation, subjectivity, agency, and ideol-
ogy. At a basic level, philosophical problems
concerning human rights continue to revolve
around whether there is any essential human
nature that justifies intervention and expansion of
civil rights when particular cultures and countries
refuse to address what others consider violations
or adopt a common stance on human freedom. At
more practical levels, the paradoxes persist.
Conditions would seem to favor formation of
strong civic identity, yet civic engagement lags.
Expanding availability of education and a higher
proportion of democratically constituted countries
should result in stronger civic identity, marked by
higher levels of participation and deliberation.
Instead, patterns of civic disengagement and declin-
ing social capital have been widely observed. The
fact that more people enjoy unprecedented access
to civic involvement only intensifies the paradox.
Integrated, interactive communication technolo-
gies like the Internet and cell phones promise
instant involvement in political processes. However,
apathy, skepticism, and cynicism thrive. The kind
of participation associated with civic identity has
reverted to mere spectatorship, rendering political
campaigns and processes often indistinguishable
from celebrity entertainment. Such conditions gen-
erate concerns related to civic identity, including
media preoccupation with a narrow scope of
national and international issues that people never
deliberate, at the expense of matters in local com-
munities and regions where people with healthy
civic identity could play a vital role.
In democratic societies, some people continue to
be shut out of full participation—compromising
their civic identity. One way to understand such
problems of civic identity is to contrast privileged
and marginalized civic status. Such perspectives on
civic identity explain much about unofficial, infor-
mal power dynamics and substructural means by
which people and groups can be disenfranchised.
A lingering paradox of civic identity remains
because judicial and legislative gains in civil rights
that should translate into greater participation
have not been realized by subsequent generations.
Civic leaders who have devoted their lives to
expanding the prospects of civic identity for
women, racial and ethnic minorities, and other
disenfranchised groups sometimes lament that
their civic descendants have failed to exploit
opportunities for expanded civic identity. This
might seem less strange in a context where many
privileged participants opt out of civic life. The
paradox of disengagement among those who could
participate, whether recently included or long-
privileged, illustrates that a persistent problem of
civic identity involves widespread devaluation in a
time when expanded participation seems to be
prominently available.
The Future
The current climate of civic identity retains a basic
relationship with the ancients. Real participation
and deliberation by citizens—people with a stake
in the deliberation—remains a common feature of
civic identity. Therefore, civic identity is central to
ongoing discussions about who is a citizen and
who should enjoy citizen status. Access to political
participation and international travel are now
taken for granted by many people, and the ques-
tion of civic identity remains open. Worldwide
immigration issues, international terrorism,
expanding global markets, new layers and forms
of international bureaucracy, and reconfigured
military alignments all point to new questions of
civic identity. Three perspectives suggest basic
approaches to the future of civic identity: cosmo-
politanism, common values, and commonwealth.
Cosmopolitanism, a contemporary version of
Diogenes’s ancient proclamation, “I am a citizen
of the world!” emphasizes global dynamics. From
this standpoint, civic identity is reconfigured as
membership in one international community. All
people should ultimately be able to function as
international free agents. Nations, national citizen-
ship, and nationalism become obsolete, in part
because everyone recognizes that their own civic
identity is merely relative to local customs, tradi-
tions, and values. Cosmopolitan visions build
international community on tolerance, diversity,
multiculturalism, and procedural political agree-
ments that invite broad participation from a vast
spectrum of civic identities.
 Clan Identity 83

Common values, as suggested by ethicist Sissela Further Readings

Bok in her book by the same name, point to a few Bok, S. (2002). Common values. Columbia: University of
guiding transcultural principles, a minimalist ethic, Missouri Press.
to help us navigate global networks and interna- Ong, W. J. (2002). Orality and literacy: The
tional interaction together. Civic identity is formed technologizing of the word. New York: Routledge.
and functions primarily in local and regional con-
texts, but global realities—for example, immigra-
tion, terrorism, genocide, and slavery—demand that
civic identity include affirmations tied to human Clan Identity
beings. The common values approach acknowledges
that, in fact, we can discern inductively a common
The word clan is derived from the Scottish Gaelic
ground of human and civic identity. Therefore,
word clan, which means offspring and children.
although common values are not comprehensive,
Specifically, the term clan is originally linked with
they can provide coherence and connection within
families belonging to the Highlands and Lowlands
culturally distinct civic identities as a basis for inter-
of Scotland. These families established a sense of
national cooperation and deliberation.
identity with clan chiefs who controlled their
Commonwealth refocuses on the local community,
regions. However, the term moved beyond the ter-
away from national and international attention—
ritory of Scotland and reemerged within tribal
especially mass media, global markets, and national
groups of other countries. Current notable clans
and international politics. Theoretically, the atten-
are those of Rwanda and northeastern Kenya and
tion to civic identity turns toward engagement in
the Navajo in the United States. Clan identity is
families and households, community culture and
linked to the culture of a tribal group, nation, or
custom, local governance, and local commerce.
society of people. A culture can be described as
Commonwealth begins with a provincial frame of
having three faces within a society: ethnonational-
reference, because larger arrangements quell delib-
ity, comprising the common cultural, linguistic
eration and invite oppression. Practically, the impact
traits and shared history of a nation; religious
of persons and groups in communities and locali-
identity; and clan identity. When it comes to cre-
ties is magnified considerably because civic identity
ating strongly interconnected religious, political,
can best be embodied through participation and
and social identities among its members, the most
deliberation at the local level. Positive forms of
powerful of these three faces is clan identity.
pluralism and tolerance can be practiced in har-
To frame an understanding of clan identity, this
mony with discrete civic virtues known and prac-
entry provides an overview of the significance of
ticed in the community. However, the impact of
clan identity in historical and contemporary terms;
larger issues on local engagement is inevitable, and
details the practices that enable individuals to
the problems of insularity require preventive prac-
maintain their clan identity; discusses the chal-
tices and sensibilities.
lenges that globalization and modernization pose
Civic identity is crucial to public participation,
to clan identity; and concludes with a brief reflec-
particularly deliberation and related activities vital
tion on clan identity practices within this historical
to democratic government. But conditions of civic
moment.
identity do not translate immediately into civic engage-
ment, that is, concrete participation. Citizenship,
official and unofficial enfranchisement, and other Significance in Historical
factors play into the formation and function of and Contemporary Terms
civic identity.
Understanding clan traditions, clan groups, and
Calvin L. Troup clan identity is an integral factor in the reconstruc-
tion of our past. Clan identity describes how each
See also Citizenship; Collective/Social Identity; Corporate clan acquires a particular identity from their expe-
Identity; Cosmopolitanism; Globalization; Identity and rience. Some clans formed villages that came
Democracy; Public Sphere; Social Capital together and produced a significant social change.
84 Clan Identity
Those who study clan identity question existing
notions of the connection between ancient clans
and their modern offshoots. For instance, the study
of clan identity offers a better understanding of the
demographic changes in different regions spanning
over time. Additionally, clan identity is a resource
that provides means to create and re-create strate-
gies for reconstructing the cultural, social, political,
and economic identities of the past.
However, in the present historical moment, clan
identity is pejoratively viewed as a primitive phe-
nomenon associated with clientelism, patronage,
and corruption that is relationally engaged. Clans
have a historic tradition framing human identity
around familial lineage and protective association.
Within modernity and a cosmopolitan perspective,
the notion of clan seems antiquated and anachro-
nistic. Clans are thought to be very old institutions
that are based on the model of descent, lineage,
and caste. This model is often regarded as having
no place in a global world that is a melting pot of
different ethnic groups. Many argue that lineages
are now weakened, and descent groups no longer
play their social roles. However, a limited exami-
nation of refugees entering a new country most
likely will reveal the continuing power of the clan.
The lingering reality of clan structure reflects its
primary social function: protection from those one
can trust against those who harbor ill or potential
disinterest in the success of one’s own people.
Clan in Practice
A clan typically involves a commitment to associa-
tion and proximity. Members of a clan demon-
strate a commitment to association by subscribing
to a particular set of norms that help to build col-
lective identity. Some of the norms within a clan
are kin unity, loyalty, multiple children, respect for
elders, compassion for poorer relatives, and com-
munal work. These norms reinforce the communal
life of the clan unit. The communal life is created
by an informal identity network founded on kin-
ship. Kathleen Collins defines clans as an informal
organization composed of individuals who are
linked by kin-based bonds. These kin-based bonds
are the basic communally enacted relations within
clan identity practices.
Kin-based norms and trust also serve political
and economic advancement of clan members. Clan
connections are important factors in getting jobs
and economic growth. Although clans are dis-
missed as primordial, clan identity creates informal
ties and networks and is an alternative to formal
institutions of market and state bureaucracies. A
clan member in need of a loan or financial assis-
tance turns to clan connections for support first
and later considers soliciting help from other insti-
tutions, such as banks, mosques, and government
agencies. The kinship within the clan builds trust
and reciprocity within a market system. These kin-
based bonds form a powerful informal identity
network that is often stronger than the affiliation
one feels with an institutionalized religious or
political system. For individuals in many areas of
the world who experience a collapse of their
national political system, clan identity offers social
and political stability. In this sense, clans are
extensive social organizations that are active in the
political sphere in the interest of its members.
The economic, social, and political support sys-
tems afforded to individuals within a clan emerge
from the network of elite and non-elite clan mem-
bers who belong to different states and varied lev-
els of society. The privileged members of the clan
are those with power and money. By virtue of their
birth and accomplishment, elite members have
status and prominence within the clan and can
influence the economic growth of their less privi-
leged clan members. In a powerful clan, the elite
members can be regional governors. In a less pow-
erful clan, elite members can comprise village
elders. Elites rely on loyalty and respect to main-
tain their status within the clan and are bound to
their clan network through the political, social,
and economic opportunities it provides. Being a
member of a clan offers financial stability even in
times of economic downturn. Through the prac-
tices of intraclan, kin-based patronage and reci-
procity, individuals are able to sustain themselves
during harsh economic times. The economic oppor-
tunities and financial stability that a clan provides
serves as a strong argument for maintaining clan
networks.
Modernization and Globalization
Modernization and globalization are two forces
that challenge the existence of clans. One factor that
influences the future of clan identity is emigration.

On one level, emigration may be problematic for
the establishment of clan identity due to the move-
ment of clan members from rural to urban com-
munities. For example, modernization in China
has caused urban, later-generation clan members
to move out of their clan locale. These urban emi-
grants are elite members of the clan who have the
power to support the clan socially and economi-
cally, and losing these elite members weakens the
clan. Often, clans find that they need to adopt
new strategies for integrating elite, urban later-
generation emigrants into their clan. The Zhao
Clan of Jiangxi adopted several strategies to assist
in assimilating the urban emigrants to the clan,
such as changing the definitions of who counts as
a family member, discarding value judgment, and
redefining family obligation. Another phenomenon
that has emerged with emigration is global clan
identity. Global clan identity can be illustrated
with the example of the changing identity of
Scottish migrants as they establish themselves in
new countries. As the Scots emigrated to India and
the Caribbean, they retained a connection with
other Scots and Scotland, as they would eventually
return to Scotland. Affinity and connections with
the local region from which Scots originated were
the most important factors in creating networks
described as a form of clanship to support fellow
Scots both at home and in the Caribbean. The ties
of kinship and affinity continue to be an intrinsic
part of Scottish migrants’ lives.
Although the Zhao of Jiangxi are redefining
clan values and norms to assimilate potential clan
members and the Scottish clans are adopting strat-
egies to maintain clan identity despite global emi-
gration, clans are increasingly facing the risk of
withering away in a modern society. To transform
clan norms and values from a traditional rural set-
ting to a contemporary urban setting is problem-
atic. To create and re-create kinship identities
among potential later-generation clan members is
a challenge as well. These limitations result in the
thinning of clans and the subsequent loss of their
cultural and symbolic importance.
As societies become less tribal and increase in size
and complexity, the probability of forming a social
organization based on kinship is a challenge. New
forms of social organizations arise that reduce the
significance of kinship as an organizing principle in
society. For example, as the Rajput clans of India
Clan Identity 85
increase in size because of growing population or
expanding territories, these clans become stratified
and less dependent on organizing principles based
on kinship. As the clan evolves into the state, the
clan chief or the Raja becomes dependent on merce-
naries and non–clan members for the functioning of
the state. Consequently, there is a decrease in the
significance of kin-based relations from which the
clans originally gained power and influence.
Permanence and Change
Clan identity offers a common history and binds
people together through clan norms. However,
globalization, emigration, and complex stratified
economic systems continue to challenge the preva-
lence of clan identities. Globalization and emigra-
tion bring about a loss of a common center. When
clan members are separated geographically, the
reliance on kinship is also weakened. The current
economic system is creating a market-driven soci-
ety in which everyone is dependent on markets to
meet their essential needs. The dependency on
market forces is much stronger than the reliance
on kinship for economic assistance.
The current historical moment requires that
kinship be recaptured in a way that assimilates
former clan members and initiates new members
into the clan. To achieve this, the rules, norms, and
values of clans need to be redefined. The Zhao
Clan of Jiangxi represents a guiding example of
how the meaning of clan identity is constantly
being redefined and renegotiated.
Reshmi Sen
See also Collective/Social Identity; Diaspora; Ethnicity;
Globalization
Further Readings
Bernhard, M. (1997). Dictionary of Celtic religion and
culture (C. Edwards, Trans.). Woodbridge, Suffolk,
UK: Boydell & Brewer.
Brown, B., & Brown, D. (2005). Beyond Boganism.
Journal of Popular Culture, 38(4), 632–649.
Collins, K. (2003). The political role of clans in Central
Asia. Comparative Politics, 35(2), 171–190.
Fox, R. G. (1971). Kin, clan, raja and rule: State-
hinterland relations in preindustrial India. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
86 Class
Hu, X. (2006). I am your sixth cousin twice removed:
Family registry and clan identity in 21st century urban
China. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
American Sociological Association, Montreal, Canada.
Retrieved August 21, 2008, from http://www
.allacademic.com/meta/p104003_index.html
McCarthy, A. (2006). A global clan: Scottish migrant
networks and identity since the eighteenth century.
London: I. B. Tauris.
Morgan, K. (1979). Clan groups and clan exogamy
among the Navajo. Journal of Anthropological
Research, 35(2), 157–169.
Class
Classes are social groups defined by the economic
circumstances of individuals and households.
Members of classes may differ in their social and
political attitudes, behaviors, lifestyles, income, and
wealth. Nonetheless, class groups do have an influ-
ence on how one defines oneself. In fact, it could be
argued that there is no way to conceive of social
groups characterized by their class distinction except
with respect to how they construct and define their
identities. Much contemporary research about class
draws on ideas developed by Karl Marx and Max
Weber, who were writing about early industrial
societies in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This
entry describes Marx’s theory of class, describes
Weber’s response, and outlines the theories of Erik
Olin Wright, John Goldthorpe, and Pierre Bourdieu,
three modern class theorists.
Marx’s Theory
Marx provided the first developed theory of class
in industrial societies. This entry provides a simpli-
fied description of one set of his ideas. For Marx,
class fundamentally explained the structure of
inequality in society and the process by which that
inequality would be overcome.
Marx defined classes in relation to economic
activity, especially the production of goods and
services. A society has to produce goods and ser-
vices for people to survive, but over time, people
learn to produce a surplus, more than they need
for basic subsistence. With a surplus, classes and
class-based inequality become possible.
In all capitalist societies, a group of people own
the means of production (i.e., the equipment and
property used to produce things), and another
group of people work with the means of produc-
tion. Owners of the means of production are the
bourgeoisie, or capitalists. People without produc-
tive property, who have to live, are the working
class, or the proletariat, who are employed by
capitalists to produce goods or services for sale.
Together, capitalists and workers make up the
class structure of capitalism.
For Marx, the relationship between capitalists
and workers was exploitative. Marx believed that
capitalists exploit workers. This was both a moral
judgment and an objective fact. The objective fact
of exploitation explains where the economic sur-
plus and capitalists’ profits come from, according
to Marx. When a capitalist employs a worker, the
worker produces a good or service by turning
some raw material into something that can be sold.
Today, the product might be something physical,
like a car or a pair of shoes, but it might also be a
service, like a haircut. The wages earned by work-
ers must be enough to buy what they need for
themselves and their families (food, shelter, cloth-
ing, consumer goods, and the like). The value of
what workers produce is determined by technol-
ogy, production methods, the technical organiza-
tion of work, and scientific knowledge. Workers’
wages are determined by the amount of money
needed to look after themselves and their families,
but productivity is determined by technology, pro-
duction methods, knowledge, and how hard or
long workers work. In general, Marx argued,
workers will produce more in a day than is needed
for their ongoing livelihood. This surplus or extra
value goes to the capitalist. If, in an 8-hour day, for
example, it takes a worker 2 hours to produce
goods equivalent to the value of her wages, for the
remaining 6 hours, she is creating surplus value for
her employer. This process, in which workers pro-
duce surplus value for capitalists, is what Marx
meant by exploitation.
Exploitation also means that capitalists and
workers have interests or social objectives that are
opposed. Capitalists are interested in maximizing
profits by increasing exploitation (paying lower
wages, working workers harder, and so on). In the
short term, workers are interested in improving
their circumstances through better pay and better

working conditions. But in the long term, workers
are interested in eliminating the system of class
inequality that promotes their disadvantage.
In the famous political book Manifesto of the
Communist Party, Marx and Friedrich Engels
explained how this would happen. At the time,
19th-century Europe was gradually being split into
the working and capitalist classes by the emergence
of capitalism and industrialism. The middle class
(tradespeople, craftworkers, shopkeepers) was dis-
appearing as rapid industrialization and increased
competition led to increased exploitation to
improve or maintain profits, forcing people into
working-class jobs and forcing inefficient capital-
ists out of business. Eventually, Marx and Engels
predicted, society would reach a stage where the
two classes could no longer coexist. As industrial
development continued, the opposition of interests
between capitalists and workers would become
more apparent. Under these circumstances, work-
ers would become aware of their class unity, con-
scious of their opposition to capitalists, and
politically organized. A class-in-itself becomes a
class-for-itself; that is, a class with a common iden-
tity, consciousness, and political organization. The
result is a working-class revolution in which pri-
vate ownership of the means of production is abol-
ished and a new society without classes emerges.
There has never been a working-class revolution
of this type. The Communist Manifesto was a piece
of political writing rather than a deep analysis, and
the story of working-class revolution it contained
was a simplistic one. However, it demonstrates
that Marx’s own analysis of classes is dynamic,
explaining not only class inequality and class divi-
sion but also economic, social, and political change.
Economic breakdown, class identity, conscious-
ness, and collective organization or class struggle
are the significant elements of this theory.
Weber’s Response
Marx’s ideas about class inequality have remained
influential today even though his predictions about
capitalism have been discredited. Yet even when he
was writing, Marx’s ideas were controversial. The
other equally influential classical theorist of class,
Max Weber, is often described as writing in dia-
logue with “Marx’s ghost,” because his own writ-
ings were, in many ways, a response to Marx’s.
Class 87
Marx never explicitly defined the word class—
the definition has been derived indirectly by read-
ing his work. Weber, in contrast, directly addressed
this issue twice, in two sections of his seminal
work Economy and Society. Weber’s ideas differ
from Marx’s in two ways. First, Marx believed
that classes were the fundamental social groups for
understanding inequality and social change. Weber
disagreed, arguing that other groups, along with
classes, could be important. Second, although both
Marx and Weber talked about classes, they defined
them differently.
Marx defined classes by relationships based in
production. For Weber, class situation (i.e., the
class circumstance of an individual) was based in
the market. Weber did not mean an actual, physi-
cal market. Rather, the market is a concept
describing the arena in which buyers and sellers
come together to exchange goods and services. An
individual’s class situation reflects the economic
resources she or he has, which can be sold in the
market to earn rewards, such as income, promo-
tional opportunities, and good working condi-
tions. In other words, class situation, for Weber,
reflects not how one relates to the means of pro-
duction and other people in the production process
but what one has and can bargain with for rewards
in the market.
Weber called these rewards and social opportu-
nities life chances. Like Marx, Weber makes a
fundamental distinction between people who own
and people who do not own productive property.
In capitalist societies, there are two property
classes: the propertied and the nonpropertied.
Unlike Marx, though, Weber recognized that other
kinds of economic resources also generate rewards.
The property-less might have particular market-
able skills for which there is a demand. In modern
societies, individuals with sought-after skills, or
who provide valued services, include skilled work-
ers and professionals, such as doctors, lawyers,
engineers, or information technology experts.
Education is the main way people acquire the
kinds of marketable skills Weber refers to.
Unlike Marx, Weber did not believe that people
in similar class situations would necessarily develop
a common identity and awareness of class inequal-
ity and act in an organized way. Under certain cir-
cumstances this might happen, but Weber did not
believe that the working class would automatically
88 Class
organize into a collective entity and overthrow
capitalism.
To illustrate how a class might become orga-
nized, Weber introduced the concept of social class.
The class situation of an individual describes the
combination of property and marketable skills she
or he has and can bargain with in the market.
There are potentially as many market situations as
there are people, because each person could differ
slightly regarding the kinds of property or skills
possessed. However, some market situations are
more similar than others, implying a reasonably
high probability of mobility or movement of people
between them. Mobility between market situations
may take place over a person’s lifetime as she or he
moves from one job to another. Mobility between
class situations may also be intergenerational—
linking parents’ and children’s jobs—for example,
when the son of an office worker becomes a civil
servant. Weber defines a social class as a cluster of
market situations with high levels of mobility
between them.
According to Weber, four social classes exist in
capitalist societies:
1. The working class of skilled, semi-skilled, and
unskilled blue-collar workers
2. The petit bourgeois, who are self-employed but
without employees
3. The middle class of “property-less intelligentsia
and specialists,” including white-collar workers,
technicians, and semi-professionals
4. Those “privileged through property and
education,” including the owners of large
companies, managers, and professionals
In describing the social class structure of capi-
talist societies, Weber begins to treat classes as
separate groups. Social classes are real groups of
people; individual market situations are not.
However, groupness, for Weber, is much more a
feature of status groups than classes. Unlike
classes, status groups are not economically deter-
mined. They are typically communities, groups of
people with a common lifestyle, who are distin-
guished from others because of a specific noneco-
nomic, social characteristic.
Possible criteria for status group formation
include age, race, gender, religion, ethnicity, and
region. Weber assumes that the status situation of
people is determined by estimations of social
honor or prestige. Within a status group, certain
kinds of behavior are typically regarded as being
appropriate, whereas others are inappropriate.
When status criteria are important elements of
social structure, status groups will have different
levels of prestige or social honor according to the
lifestyles and behavior of their members. In a sta-
tus group based around neighborhood, for exam-
ple, lifestyle differences may be evident in the kinds
of car(s) people own, what they do in their leisure
time, what their houses look like, where their chil-
dren go to school, and so on. Furthermore, differ-
ent ways of life may lead to status groups being
ranked or evaluated on some sort of prestige hier-
archy by members of the society with general
agreement about where groups are located. Status
distinctions have a strong symbolic component in
which certain groups, neighborhoods, and so on
are seen as desirable or undesirable.
Class and status are two sources of group forma-
tion. For Weber, the group structure of any society
reflects the relative importance of economic, mar-
ket factors, which give rise to classes, and social
status criteria like race, gender, or neighborhood,
which lead to status group formation. In a com-
munity, or the wider society, class and status may
overlap, as when people in the same social class are
also in the same status group(s). Class and status
may also cross-cut one another in varying ways.
This brief treatment of Marx’s and Weber’s
ideas illustrates some of the issues that have been
taken up by sociologists today. In the final section
of this entry, three modern theoretical approaches
to class are described.
Modern Theories
One of the most influential modern theories of
class was proposed by an American sociologist,
Erik Olin Wright. A second was proposed by a
British sociologist, John Goldthorpe. The third is
associated with a French sociologist, Pierre
Bourdieu. One of the common issues for modern
theorists is how to define the class structure, given
the complex occupational and industrial structures
in today’s capitalist societies. In particular, class
theorists must deal with several core groups: the
self-employed; managers who are employed to run

organizations and make decisions about how they
should operate; employees in professional and
technical occupations, such as lawyers, nurses,
accountants, teachers, and information technology
professionals; people in more routine white-collar
jobs, such as clerks and salespeople; people in
blue-collar jobs, such as truck drivers, machine
operators in factories, and laborers, cleaners, and
the like.
Erik Olin Wright
Wright starts with a distinction between people
who own income-generating property like a farm
or a business and people who do not. This defines
two groups: the self-employed who own businesses
or other income-generating assets and employees
who work for a wage or a salary. Some property
owners, employers, or capitalists have large enough
businesses to be able to hire people to work for
them. Other self-employed people have to work in
their own businesses. These small business own-
ers, such as family farmers, shopkeepers, and self-
employed tradespeople, are the petit bourgeois.
Wright identifies two sets of employees. The
first set includes managers and supervisors (those
who make organizational decisions and supervise
other employees) and nonmanagerial, nonsupervi-
sory employees, whose work is determined by their
superiors. The second set is skilled professional
and technical employees, who are distinguished
from employees without substantial skills.
Managerial authority and occupational skills
crosscut one another. Some employees are man-
agers and in highly skilled jobs, some are one or
the other, and some are neither. This gives rise to
four employee class categories: expert managers
(authority and occupational skill), managers
(authority only), experts (skill only), and workers
(neither authority nor skill). With the two self-
employed classes, employers and petite bourgeoi-
sie, this definition gives six class categories in
modern societies. These do not correspond to
more familiar labels like “middle class” or “upper
class,” but managers, experts, and the petite bour-
geoisie can be thought of as a “middle class,”
workers are the working class, and employers are
the dominant and most privileged class. Expert
managers are “middle class,” but as they become
more senior within the managerial hierarchy, their
Class 89
class circumstances start to more closely resemble
those of employers.
Wright argues that defining the class structure is
only the first step in understanding classes in mod-
ern societies. Researchers need to explain how
class “works” by linking the class structure to
other outcomes for which class is an important
cause. These outcomes include social and eco-
nomic inequality, individual and collective atti-
tudes and behaviors, systematic conflicts between
organized social groups, historical variations in
forms of inequality (i.e., understanding class
inequality associated not only with capitalist soci-
eties but with noncapitalist societies as well), and
finally, possibilities for human emancipation (i.e.,
eliminating oppression and class exploitation). For
Wright, as for Marx, classes are ultimately impor-
tant for eliminating inequality because the rela-
tionships between the different classes are inherently
based on exploitation, in which some groups
acquire income and wealth because of the activities
of others.
John Goldthorpe
Goldthorpe is influenced by Weber rather than
Marx. Goldthorpe first argued that class situation
depended upon market situation, particularly
source of income and level of reward. More
recently he has argued that the kind of employ-
ment relations that position individuals, in particu-
lar, whether they own productive property and,
among employees, what kind of relationship they
have with their employers, define classes.
Goldthorpe’s ideas are similar to Wright’s in some
respects, although Goldthorpe does not link his
theory to exploitation.
Goldthorpe identifies eight occupational classes.
Classes I and II include people in upper- and lower-
level professional occupations, administrators,
managers, and large proprietors. Together they
make up the service class. Classes IIIa and IIIb are
white-collar employees or employees in routine
occupations. Class IIIa consists of clerical workers,
and Class IIIb comprises employees in personal
service (for example, hairdressers or flight atten-
dants) and sales occupations. Class IV is small
employers and the traditional petite bourgeoisie.
Class V is lower technicians and foremen. Class VI
is skilled workers, and Class VII is made up of
90 Class
semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Classes IIIb
and V through VII represent blue-collar laborers
or skilled workers.
The service class is so called because it is distin-
guished by an ethos of service or commitment to
the employing organization. Bureaucrats, adminis-
trators, and professionals have considerable auton-
omy in their jobs, and as a result, organizations
have to largely trust these people to carry out their
work competently. Organizations try to buy trust
from the service class by guaranteeing economic
rewards, a career structure, employment security,
and so on. This gives the service class a privileged
position in the class structure of modern capitalist
societies. In addition to defining the modern class
structure, Goldthorpe has undertaken much
research to examine patterns of social mobility in
modern societies, in particular to examine how the
classes that people grow up in as children influence
the classes they occupy as adults. This focus on
mobility echoes Weber’s earlier arguments about
the role of social mobility in defining social
classes.
Pierre Bourdieu
Bourdieu was a French sociologist whose early
work that made him famous in English was
Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of
Taste. This book, a study of lifestyles and con-
sumption in France, begins with Weber’s analysis
of class and status. For Weber, class and status
were alternative economic (class) and symbolic
(status) bases of identity and group formation.
Bourdieu, however, believed that this separation
was misplaced. Class distinctions could exist only
when objective and symbolic differences coincided—
that is, when objective differences translated sym-
bolically into social recognition and meaningful
patterns of behavior, particularly consumption
behaviors and lifestyles. For Bourdieu, classes
designate groups with similar objective circum-
stances, widespread social recognition, and similar
lifestyles.
In Distinction, Bourdieu defines objective cir-
cumstances primarily in terms of economic and
cultural capital. Economic capital refers to income
and wealth arising from income-generating prop-
erty and skills. Cultural capital refers to cultural
competence or the ability to draw upon and use
culture in daily life, particularly aspects of culture
that are socially valued and rewarded. For Bourdieu,
the class structure of objective positions can be
thought of as a three-dimensional space. One
dimension measures what kind of capital (eco-
nomic or cultural) individuals have; another dimen-
sion measures how much capital they have; and a
third dimension broadly indicates time, that is,
where an individual is, in terms of his or her life
trajectory. One way to think about the third time
dimension is that it classifies people in terms of the
economic and cultural capital of the family they
grew up in, so it is possible to trace how people’s
circumstances change over their lives. Thinking
about the three dimensions of class structure as
being axes at right angles to one another, they
define a social space into which individuals can be
located in terms of the kind of capitals they have,
the amount of each, and where they are on their
life trajectory.
For Bourdieu, the habitus links the three-
dimensional social space to real groups of people
with different lifestyles and attitudes. Habitus refers
to socially learned dispositions, or taken-for-granted
sets of orientations, skills, and ways of acting that
shape behavior (practices). Individuals with simi-
lar kinds and amounts of economic and cultural
capital have similar experiences, which lead to
the development of similar habituses. These shape
their lifestyles and consumption patterns. By ana-
lyzing consumption patterns, leisure activities, and
cultural tastes, Bourdieu is able to show that mem-
bers of the dominant class (primarily capitalists,
managers and executives, and university academ-
ics) have certain kinds of lifestyles, blue-collar and
farm workers have others, and other, intermediate
occupational groups (small business people; tech-
nicians; clerical, sales, and service workers) have a
third. Within the dominant class and the interme-
diate group, however, lifestyles and tastes vary
depending on whether economic or cultural capital
is the dominant form of capital possessed.
This is a simplified account of Distinction.
Bourdieu later identifies that much social conflict
is symbolic conflict concerned with defining what
aspects of culture are seen to be socially legitimate
and valued and what aspects are devalued. He
argues that there is a cultural hierarchy of tastes
and practices that define certain cultural forms (for
example, high art, classical music, theater) as more

worthy than others (television, popular music,
sports) but that these cultural boundaries are
always being contested and are changeable. In
later work, Bourdieu also tries to link his class
analysis to other social divisions, most notably
gender, but those analyses are outside the scope of
this entry.
Mark Western
Source: Some parts of this entry have previously appeared in
Western, M., & Baxter, J. (2007). Class and inequality in
Australia. In J. Germov & M. Poole (Eds.), Public sociology:
An introduction to Australian society (pp. 216–236). Sydney,
Australia: Allen & Unwin.
See also Age; Class Identity; Complex Inequality;
Cultural Capital; Ethnicity; Gender; Habitus
Further Readings
Baxter, J. H., & Western, M. C. (Eds.). (2001).
Reconfigurations of class and gender. Palo Alto, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1984) Distinction: A social critique of the
judgement of taste (R. Nice, Trans.). Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press. (Original work published
1979)
Crompton, R. (1998). Class and stratification: An
introduction to current debates. Cambridge, UK:
Polity Press.
Goldthorpe, J. H. (1995). The service class revisited. In
T. Butler & M. Savage (Eds.), Social change and the
middle classes (pp. 313–329). London: UCL Press.
Savage, M. (2000). Class analysis and social
transformation. Buckingham, UK: Open University
Press.
Wright, E. O. (1997). Class counts: Comparative studies
in class analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Wright, E. O. (Ed.). (2005). Approaches to class analysis.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Class Identity
Social class has been explored from multiple per-
spectives over the years. In early conceptual-
izations, social class was examined strictly within
the context of socioeconomic factors, including
Class Identity 91
income, occupation, and residential patterns. Later
notions of social class included the analysis of
selected psychological factors that produced class
consciousness, often defined as personal identifi-
cation with a particular social class. More recently,
social class has been reconceptualized as an iden-
tity with cultural, sociological, and psychological
implications. This entry examines social class
through multiple perspectives—socioeconomic,
class consciousness, and social class identity.
The Evolution of Social Class Identity
Social class has traditionally been defined as a
socioeconomic construct, and social classes—
including lower, middle, and upper classes—have
been demarcated based on available government
statistics on income. The income levels for deter-
mining social classes have changed over the years
because of inflation. For example, in 1985 an
income of $15,000 or less for a family of four in
the United States was considered poor or lower
social class, whereas in 2007 the figure was
$27,000. In addition to income, occupation has
been associated with social class, with professional/
white-collar occupations more closely aligned
with middle and upper classes and hourly service
and blue-collar jobs associated with lower social
classes.
Social scientists have known for years that social
class is more than a socioeconomic category. In the
1950s and 1960s, class consciousness was fre-
quently used to refer to the psychological and socio-
logical dimensions of social class; these dimensions
include class identification, social outlook associ-
ated with class, and class opposition. Class identifi-
cation is a person’s awareness of membership in a
particular class which often includes such class enti-
ties as working class, middle class, and upper class.
Social class outlook is roughly defined as a way of
perceiving reality that reflects a person’s social class.
For example, working class, which frequently refers
to people who hold blue-collar positions, is reported
to have shared and coherent perceptions and
assumptions about work, family, religion, and gov-
ernment. Upper class also possesses a shared out-
look, which differs from working class in such areas
as the value placed on manual labor and personal
consumption patterns and expectations. Finally,
class opposition is the perceived conflict between
92 Class Identity
one’s social class and other social classes. The
Marxist notion of social class opposition generally
entails some form of class antagonism, hostility, or
both, between working class and the affluent. From
this perspective, this opposition is triggered by capi-
talism, the agent provocateur of class warfare.
Identity is the most recent formulation of social
class and expands past analysis of class as social
consciousness. This view of class places much
greater emphasis on processes of culture, lifestyle,
and taste. The culture of social class can include
perceptions, values, language, and social relation-
ships. Lifestyle and taste encompass the myriad
ways people live their respective lives and their
personal preferences with regard to appearance,
habitat, and consumption patterns. The cultural
components of perceptions and values, for exam-
ple, affect the way people cognitively process and
organize stimuli from their environment. The
working class, for instance, perceives political dis-
course differently than the affluent and tradition-
ally is more supportive of political candidates who
are culturally more conservative in such areas as
abortion, homosexuality, and religion.
Language and behavior are also integral to the
culture of social class. For example, Basil Bernstein,
a renowned British sociologist, examined the con-
nection between language and social class from the
perspective of code theory, which proposed two
language systems: restricted and elaborated codes.
A restricted code is a language system that pre-
sumes the communicators have a great deal of
shared knowledge and understanding and, hence,
do not need to elaborate their thoughts or provide
detail. Hence, sentences are short, word choice is
basic, and interrogatives like “You know, right?”
and “Don’t you think?” are often used. In con-
trast, an elaborated code is rich in detail, replete
with extended sentences and complex language
structure and word choice. Unlike restricted code,
nothing is taken for granted in an elaborated code
because the communicators share little in com-
mon. Working-class communicators tend to rely
heavily on restricted codes, whereas middle- and
upper-class speakers tend to use elaborated codes.
The difference in code usage between social classes
can produce a wide range of problems for the
working class.
For example, members of the working class
have been reported to experience more difficulty in
the classroom because of their reliance on restricted
code. Successful performance in the classroom is,
in part, based on the ability of students to articu-
late their thoughts in detail and synthesize and
precisely summarize complex ideas. This is difficult
for working-class students to achieve because of
their difficulty in using elaborated codes. Moreover,
working-class students can be viewed as less intel-
ligent by middle-class teachers because their lan-
guage system may be considered inadequate and
simplistic. So, too, individuals from different social
classes can misperceive each another; the middle
class, for example, may distance themselves from
working-class speakers, while the working class
may interpret the language of the middle and
upper classes as snobby and effete.
Class Identity and Social Relationships
One of the most important cultural dimensions of
class identity is the social relationship patterns of
specific social classes. Middle-class and working-
class people differ significantly in many aspects of
their relationships, including number of friends,
the definition of a friend, the difference between
friends and family, and the way married couples
experience friendships. Middle-class members, for
example, are reported to have more friends than
the working class, and they tend to live farther
away from their friends. Working-class individuals
choose friends primarily from their neighborhood.
Because members of the middle class tend to be
more mobile than members of the working class in
pursuit of occupations and education, their friends
tend to live less proximate to them than do friends
of the working class, who generally live in the
same neighborhood for longer time frames than
the middle class.
The middle class reports that a friend is defined
as someone whose company one enjoys, whereas a
friend for the working class is a person whom one
can turn to for help. However, when it comes to
social support, middle-class individuals tend to
rely far more on friends for advice and assistance
than do working-class people, who depend more
on the extended family for support. Class patterns
of social support are reflected in assistance with
financial, personal, and medical matters. As a
result, the working class is more apt to identify
family members as friends than is the middle class,

who generally separate their friends from their
family. Not surprisingly, working-class people
report significantly more contact with family
members, both nuclear and extended, than do
middle-class people. The middle class reliance on
friends for support may be a result of their mobil-
ity patterns, which causes them to live farther
away from their families than do working class.
In terms of marriage, it is interesting to note
that middle-class heterosexual couples tend to
have the same friends and often see their friends as
couples. In contrast, working-class married cou-
ples report having different friends of the same sex
and socializing with their friends as individuals
rather than couples. Married life appears to
be affected by these friendship patterns in that
middle-class couples tend to spend more time together
in leisure activities whereas working-class couples
are more apt to divide their time between their
respective friends and mates. Mirra Komarovsky,
a well-known sociologist who examined working-
class families, found that married working-class
men tend to seek the companionship of their male
friends; as a result, their wives report feeling sec-
ondary to their husbands’ buddies.
Social Class Identity Across Nations
Although social class appears to exist in all societ-
ies in one form or another, there are differences in
the mechanics of social class in different nations.
The opportunity for upward mobility, for exam-
ple, differs worldwide based on how industrial-
ized the country is. In highly industrialized
nations like the United States and Britain, mobil-
ity across social classes is greatest, and in less
industrialized societies, like Bolivia and Ecuador,
mobility is constrained. A father’s occupation in
a developing society is the strongest predictor of
social class, whereas education is the best predic-
tor in more industrialized and technologically
advanced nations.
Geert Hofstede, a world-famous management
theorist, developed the term power distance to
explain the psychological and cultural gaps between
people and social classes within and between soci-
eties. He found that nations located closer to the
equator with greater income inequality and lower
social mobility had more distinct social classes and
greater social distance between the elites, working
Class Identity 93
class, and poor. Countries in Latin America, for
example, have more rigid social classes and less
contact between the classes than do the United
States and Western Europe, which tend to be more
open societies where there is considerably more
social contact across class boundaries.
Nations also differ in how social class is com-
municated through titles and consumption pat-
terns. In Britain, for example, many titles from the
Middle Ages are still used, for example, Sir, Baron,
Lord and Lady of Manor, and an array of titles
associated with the Crown of England. These titles
reflect both social class and family lineage and are
status markers. The United States has no titles pre-
served from antiquity, and the only honorifics
used, albeit infrequently, refer to older people (e.g.,
sir or madam). In contrast, the Japanese use an
extensive array of honorifics when communicating
to people from different age groups and genders.
With respect to consumption patterns, nations
vary in the value placed on money and material
objects as signs of social class. In the United States,
money is the key factor for determining social
class, as are the acquisition and display of material
possessions. Although wealth is important in
Japan, there are other, more important factors for
determining status and, hence, social class, for
example, occupation and family background.
Modestly compensated occupations like teacher
and professor, for example, confer higher status in
Japan. Unlike the United States, the conspicuous
display of material objects in Japan is anathema to
the culture.
Critique of Social Class Identity
Some social class researchers argue that the litera-
ture does not adequately distinguish between the
poor and the working class. Normally, the poor
are considered a segment of the working class
because at some point in their lives, they have
worked in minimally compensated jobs. However,
poverty class academics reject this and argue that
the poor have a distinct class identity with unique
cultural, psychological, and sociological dimen-
sions. By including the poor in the working class,
their unique identity and experiences are invisible,
buried among the other predominant segments of
the working class such as blue-collar workers and
lower-income wage earners.
94 Code-Switching
There is also a paucity of research on how com-
munication is affected by social class identity.
Bernstein’s classic examination of social class and
communication is one of the few substantive
investigations on this topic. Missing from the lit-
erature are comprehensive communication studies
on the middle class that describe their relational
and communication practices. Moreover, few
studies have explored how social class identity and
communication are tied to race, ethnicity, and
gender.
Robert Shuter
See also Communication Theory of Identity; Social
Economy; Social Stratification Theory
Further Readings
Adair, V. (2005). US working-class/poverty-class divides.
Sociology, 10, 817–834.
Bernstein, B. (1973). Class, codes, and control (Vol 1).
London: Routledge.
Frable, D. (1997). Gender, racial, ethnic, sexual and class
identities. Annual Review of Psychology, 48, 139–161.
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences (2nd ed.).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Komarovsky, M. (1967). Blue-collar marriage. New
York: Random House.
Savage, M. (2005). A new class paradigm. British Journal
of Sociology of Education, 24, 535–541.
Surridge, P. (2007). Class belonging: A quantitative
exploration of identity and consciousness, British
Journal of Sociology, 58, 207–226.
Code-Switching
Code-switching is the process of shifting from one
linguistic code to another depending on the com-
munication setting or context. Identity researchers
are interested in the way that code-switching, par-
ticularly among ethnic groups, is used to shape
and maintain a sense of community and identity.
To develop a better understanding of code-switching,
the history of code-switching and the ideologi-
cal perspectives surrounding code-switching are
discussed in this entry.
From a linguistic perspective, code-switching
was originally thought of as the process of shifting
from the English language to the Spanish language.
Linguists studied code-switching within the con-
text of second language learning. Sociocultural
linguists, such as John J. Gumperz, have been
interested in the way that members within a speech
community alternate between their native language
and that of a foreign language.
From an African American linguistic perspec-
tive, code-switching is also viewed as the process
of shifting or changing from the use of Standard
English to African American English or nonstan-
dard dialect. Standard English is defined as the
language spoken by the majority population.
African American English or Black English is a
Creole-Africanized form of language spoken by
people of African descent. Other names associated
with Black English include Ebonics, Standard
Black English, African American Language, and
African American Vernacular English.
Code-switching is historically rooted in a major
school board decision that took place in Michigan
in the mid-1970s. In 1977, a federal judge ruled
that the home language of Black students needs to
be considered as part of teacher training rather
than having the teachers track the students into
remedial classes. As a result of the case, the
Michigan courts made it possible for teachers at
the predominately White Martin Luther King
Elementary School to teach the children Standard
English by using the child’s home language.
Furthermore, this case set a precedent for future,
related school board cases in Oakland and Los
Angeles, California. These school districts later
recognized the use of African American Language
as a “bridge language” to help students learn and
master Standard English.
Specifically, the “California controversies” sur-
rounding African American Language, Standard
English, and code-switching were an ideological
battle over language perspectives. At the heart of
this ideological battle was the issue of language and
identity. Two language perspectives are the correc-
tionist approach and the contrastivist approach.
The correctionist approach to code-switching
suggests that the language spoken in the child’s
community or home is viewed as being “broken
English,” or of “poor grammar.” Correctionists
may also label the language as being “ghetto” or
“country.” From the perspective of the correction-
ist, if the language is “broken,” then it needs to be

“fixed” and the grammar “corrected” by getting
the learner to use the appropriate language—
Standard English. For the correctionist, Standard
English is preferred over the learner’s home lan-
guage because it is the home language that is the
barrier to the child learning “correct English.”
In response to the correctionist approach, the
contrastivist approach places an emphasis on the
importance of language plurality. Those who have
adopted this perspective believe that the African
American learner’s home language is equally as
important as Standard English. Moreover, the
learner’s home language can be use as a bridge
language to learn Standard English. For example,
some African American learners come to school
and say the following to the teacher: “My brother,
he smart.” The contrastivist teacher will recognize
this phrase as having a West African sentence
structure known as topic comment. “My brother”
is the topic, and “he smart” is the comment.
Recognizing that from a Standard English perspec-
tive the phrase lacks a verb, the contrastivist edu-
cator will (a) show the student differences between
the two languages associated with structure, gram-
mar, function, and context and (b) show the stu-
dent that when a verb is incorporated into the
phrase, the sentence reads as follows: “My brother
is smart.” As a result of understanding these differ-
ences, the learner has a better understanding of
how to code-switch.
According to linguist Benjamin Whorf and
anthropologist Edward Sapir, language has the
power to reflect the worldview and shape the iden-
tity of its users. Both the correctionist and the
contrastivist ideology, through language, create
and shape the identity of learners in uniquely dif-
ferent ways. The learner whose language is shaped
by the correctionist’s ideology may adopt a main-
stream cultural identity. It is an identity couched in
Eurocentric values, ideals, and customs that, in the
end, will prepare the learner to function in
“American culture.”
However, the learner whose language is shaped
by the contrastivist’s ideology may adopt different
cultural identities depending on the communication
context or setting. Here, the speaker may move
back and forth between the language of the domi-
nant culture and his home language depending on
the situation. So, for example, an African American
businessperson addressing White colleagues in the
Cognitive Dissonance Theory 95
conference room of a major corporation may
express disapproval of company policy with a
resounding, “I disagree!” However, this same indi-
vidual, while in a heated fraternity or sorority meet-
ing, may say to fellow members, “This ain’t cool at
all.” It is safe to say that many African Americans,
particularly of the middle class, speak on a contin-
uum ranging from the language of the suites to the
language of the streets of urban life.
Code-switching involves moving linguistically
from one language to another depending on con-
text. It is a concept rooted in the historical experi-
ences of African Americans, particularly youth and
the education system that influences them. As a
result, educators have generally held two ideologi-
cal perspectives associated with code-switching:
correctionist and contrastivist. These perspectives
have played a major role in shaping the cultural
identity of the learners.
Carlos D. Morrison
See also Dialect; Discourse; Language Variety in
Literature; Signification
Further Readings
Green, D., & Walker, F. (2004). Recommendations to
public speaking instructors for the negotiation of
code-switching practices among Black English-
speaking African American students. Journal of Negro
Education, 73(4), 435.
Gumperz, J. (1982). Discourse strategies. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Hecht, M. L., Jackson, R. L., II, & Ribeau, S. A. (2003).
African American communication: Exploring identity
and culture. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Smitherman, G. (1977). Talkin’ and testifyin’: The
language of Black America. Detroit, MI: Wayne State
University Press.
Cognitive Dissonance Theory
In 1957, Leon Festinger proposed that cognitive
dissonance is a common psychological phenome-
non that many individuals experience on a daily
basis. For example, cognitive dissonance occurs
for smokers who are trying to quit when they light
96 Cognitive Dissonance Theory
up another cigarette. It also occurs for politicians
who propose legislation to restrict certain forms of
behavior, only to be caught later engaging in the
behaviors they tried to restrict. In each of these
examples, at least one of the cognitive elements
(e.g., behavior) is inconsistent with one or more
related cognitive elements (e.g., attitudes, values, or
beliefs). Festinger proposed that inconsistencies
between cognitions cause a negative drive state that
motivates a desire to restore consistency. Research
supports this assumption by showing that when
dissonance creates a phenomenologically aversive
state of arousal that people interpret as psycho-
logical discomfort, it can motivate them to seek
ways to reduce the discomfort. However, the way
in which people reduce cognitive discrepancies sug-
gest that other motives, such as the desire to main-
tain or enhance an important personal or social
identity, can play a role in dissonance processes.
Festinger proposed that there are three ways to
reduce the discomfort caused by inconsistencies
between behavior and belief. The first and most
obvious way to reduce discomfort is to change the
problem behavior. For example, research indicates
that when people advocate a behavior to others
and are then made mindful that they do not per-
form the behavior themselves, their hypocrisy can
motivate them to change their behavior to bring it
into line with their advocated beliefs. But Festinger
noted that changing behavior is not always a viable
strategy for restoring consistency. Smokers have a
difficult time quitting, and like politicians, once
people have committed themselves publicly to a
course of action, it can be impossible to reverse
direction. When behavior is resistant to change,
people become motivated to change their attitudes
or beliefs to accommodate their discrepant actions.
This strategy for reducing the discomfort associ-
ated with dissonance can lead to rather puzzling
and bizarre distortions of reality.
To test the effect of dissonance on attitude
change, Festinger and James Carlsmith had par-
ticipants perform a very boring task, after which
they were asked to tell another subject that the
task was interesting and enjoyable. In addition,
participants were either offered a large incentive
($20) or a small incentive for telling the lie ($1).
Festinger and Carlsmith predicted that those paid
$20 for lying to the confederate would not be
motivated to adjust their perceptions of what they
said. However, being paid $1 provided insufficient
justification for misleading the other person, and
as a result, the inconsistency created by telling the
lie would cause the psychological discomfort asso-
ciated with dissonance. The results confirmed that
after they told the lie, participants in the $1 condi-
tion reported that the boring task was significantly
more enjoyable than those who had told the lie for
$20. Presumably, to reduce the inconsistency
between the lie and their knowledge that the task
was boring, participants in the $1 condition
changed their attitude toward the task so that it
was consistent with what they told the waiting
confederate. This study was the first to show that
the need to maintain consistency between attitudes
and behavior can be powerful enough to cause
people to distort their perceptions of reality.
Similar changes in attitudes can follow from
everyday decisions. For example, Festinger pro-
posed that a choice between two equally attractive
alternatives necessarily creates inconsistency
between the positive features of the rejected alter-
native and the negative features of the selected
alternative. In one test of this hypothesis, partici-
pants rated their attitudes toward several con-
sumer products. After they were presented the
choice to keep one of two products that they had
rated as highly desirable, participants reported
significantly more attitude change toward the cho-
sen and rejected options compared to participants
for whom the choice was between two dissimilar
products. Subsequent research has shown that dis-
sonance processes can cause attitude change fol-
lowing a wide variety of decisions, including the
choice between jobs in the military, between horses
at the race track, between partners in close rela-
tionships, and the choice between types of research
in which to participate.
Dissonance theory provides an explanation for
a wide variety of interesting social behavior, such
as why people bolster their beliefs in the face of
disconfirming evidence, why they come to love the
things or people for whom they suffer, how they
can be motivated to avoid a forbidden behavior
following mild as opposed to severe threats of pun-
ishment, and why people feel the need to derogate
the innocent victims of their aggression. Perhaps
not surprisingly, one of the most influential expla-
nations for these effects is that they are driven by
the concerns over personal identity.

The Role of Personal Identity in Dissonance
When two cognitions are inconsistent, the amount
of psychological discomfort that people experience
depends on the importance of the cognitions.
According to Elliot Aronson, some of the most
important cognitions that cause dissonance are
those related to personal identity or the self. For
example, in the study described earlier in which
participants were asked to lie to the waiting con-
federate about the boring task, it is possible that
dissonance was not caused by an inconsistency
between the thoughts “I believe the tasks were bor-
ing” and “I told someone the tasks were interest-
ing.” Instead, the dissonance may have been
aroused by an inconsistency between positive cog-
nitions about the self (e.g., “I am a decent and
truthful human being”) and cognitions about the
behavior (e.g., “I have misled a person to believe
something that is not true”). By focusing on cogni-
tions about the self, it becomes easy to specify the
cognitions most likely to underlie dissonance pro-
cesses, and it also provides specific predictions
regarding self-esteem differences in dissonance
phenomena. Several studies show, for example,
that people with positive self-expectancies or high
self-esteem are more likely to reduce dissonance
following discrepant behavior compared to people
with low self-esteem.
Other researchers propose that cognitions about
the self played a critical role in how people reduce
dissonance. Specifically, Claude Steele proposes
that when people commit a discrepant act, one
way to reduce dissonance is to eliminate the incon-
sistency by changing the relevant behavior, atti-
tudes, or beliefs. However, if the primary goal of
attitude change is to restore a positive sense of the
self, then any thought or action that enhances self-
worth should also reduce dissonance. Several stud-
ies support this reasoning by showing that reflecting
on cherished value, receiving positive personality
feedback, or writing about positive self-attributes
eliminates the need to change attitudes following a
discrepant act. Thus, positive cognitions about the
self can also operate as “self resources” for disso-
nance reduction.
One way to explain how cognitions about the
self can operate both as expectancies in dissonance
arousal and as resources for dissonance reduction
is to understand what type of thinking about the
self occurs when people commit a discrepant act.
Cognitive Dissonance Theory 97
For example, once they have acted, if people evalu-
ate their behavior against relevant personal stan-
dards, cognitions about the self are more likely to
influence dissonance arousal. Furthermore, once
dissonance is aroused, the type of positive self-
attributes brought to mind appears to determine
their use as resources for dissonance reduction.
Consistent with these insights, studies show that
attitude change following counterattitudinal behav-
ior can be a function of people’s level of self-esteem
and the type of standard they use to assess the
meaning of their behavior. Thus, when and how
cognitions about the self moderate dissonance is a
function of the accessibility and relevance of the
self attributes that people focus on in the context
of a discrepant act.
In addition to the research on self-esteem dif-
ferences in dissonance, a number of other indi-
vidual differences related to identity moderate
dissonance processes, including repression sensiti-
zation, self-monitoring, and Machiavellianism.
When combined with research on how cognitions
about the self influence dissonance processes,
these findings suggest that whereas the need for
consistency can be a strong force in shaping atti-
tudes, beliefs, and behavior, under certain condi-
tions it may influence some people more than
others. Accurately predicting for whom disso-
nance will be most impactful requires identifying
the cognitions that underlie the inconsistency and
their importance to the people who are struggling
with the discrepancy.
The Role of Social Identity in Dissonance
As the theory of cognitive dissonance celebrates its
50th anniversary, researchers continue to investi-
gate the rich and complex predictions that can be
derived from the original book and the studies that
have been published since 1957. One area of active
contemporary research investigates the role of the
social group and social identity in dissonance
arousal and reduction.
When speculating about the conditions under
which dissonance is aroused, Festinger noted that
prevailing cultural mores and norms could deter-
mine whether or not two cognitions are inconsis-
tent. In other words, the same behavior might
be perceived as inconsistent in one culture but
completely consistent with cultural mandates for
98 Collective/Social Identity
behavior in another. Research on cultural differ-
ences in dissonance supports Festinger’s original
observation. For example, studies conducted in the
collectivistic culture of Japan show that dissonance
occurs among Japanese subjects, but it occurs only
when they look at their discrepant act from the
perspective of others. Similarly, recent immigrants
to the West from collectivist cultures in Asia engage
in postdecision justification, but only when their
decision has an effect on a close friend compared to
the self. In contrast, participants from the West or
acculturated immigrants from Asia are more likely
to justify a difficult decision they make for them-
selves compared to a close friend. Cross-cultural
researchers are only now beginning to understand
the full dynamics of how culture influences the dis-
sonance processes that determine change.
It is somewhat ironic that even though one of
the first examples of dissonance documented by
Festinger occurred in a group, researchers have
only recently turned to explore the role of social
groups and social identity processes in dissonance.
For example, some research investigates whether
people can suffer “vicarious dissonance” when
they share a social identity with someone whom
they observe commit a counterattitudinal behav-
ior. In one experiment, after exposure to an
ingroup or outgroup member’s counterattitudinal
speech, participants who identified most with their
ingroup showed the most attitude change in the
direction of the actor’s speech. Another experi-
ment showed that attitude change in the observers
was moderated by the ingroup actor’s choice to
make the counterattitudinal speech and the extent
to which the actor’s speech had foreseeable aver-
sive consequences. These and other studies indicate
that, as Festinger supposed, immersion in a social
group can provide interpersonal sources for disso-
nance arousal and reduction.
Jeff Stone
See also Self-Verification; Social Identity Theory
Further Readings
Olson, J. M., & Stone, J. (2005). The influence of
behavior on attitudes. In D. Albarracín, B. T. Johnson,
& M. P. Zanna (Eds.), The handbook of attitudes
(pp. 223–272). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Stone, J., & Fernandez, N. C. (2008). To practice what
we preach: The use of hypocrisy and cognitive
dissonance to motivate behavior change. Social and
Personality Psychology Compass, 2(2), 1024–1051.
Collective/Social Identity
As a result of globalization and increasing influ-
ence of mass media and communication, individu-
als around the world have the ability to come into
contact with diverse others. Increased intergroup
contact has led to a greater focus on how people
construe their identity as individuals seek to define
and know themselves. Two perspectives are com-
monly used to illustrate how individuals construe
their identities: individualist and collectivist views.
On one hand, individuals tend to think of them-
selves as independent of relationships. They value
autonomy and uniqueness and construe their sense
of self as separate from others. They describe
themselves with attributes that are not shared with
other people. Here, it is the “I” that prevails (com-
mon to many Western cultures). Others construe
their identities in terms of their relations with oth-
ers. People who adopt a collective identity tend to
think of themselves as interdependent with close
others and define themselves by their important
roles and situations. In this case, individuals place
primary importance on interpersonal relationships
and tend to see others as part of the self (“We”).
Consequently, for people with a collective identity,
the definition of self includes many of the attri-
butes of their social and familial groups.
Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama coined
the term interdependent self to define a flexible
and variable self that is connected with one’s social
context (common to many Asian cultures). For
these individuals, greater importance is given to
one’s relationships with specific others and with
ingroups. According to these authors, interdepen-
dent self construal may be acquired by the indi-
vidual through the process of socialization.
These two perspectives can be illustrated by the
study of group processes and intergroup relations.
After World War II, genocide, war, and intergroup
conflict in general were explained in terms of indi-
vidual characteristics (only an evil person could
partake in genocide). However, in the 1970s, the

focus shifted from individual differences to how
the social context affects intergroup relations (a
person that identifies strongly with a group could
be influenced by the group and partake in geno-
cide). Thus, the explanation rested in group mem-
bership. Henri Tajfel and John Turner developed
social identity theory, broadening our knowledge
of collective identity.
The following sections focus on social identity
theory, the most influential theory in social psy-
chology, explaining why individuals define them-
selves in terms of their group memberships.
Social Identity Theory
Tajfel and Turner defined social identity as the part
of an individual’s self-concept that derives from his
or her knowledge of his or her membership in a
social group (or groups). Individuals also ascribe a
value and an emotional significance to this group
membership. This description ties social identity to
the collective self. One’s identity and behaviors are
associated with group memberships.
Social identity theory explains why individu-
als identify with groups and why people define
and evaluate themselves in terms of the group to
which they belong. According to social identity
theory, individuals strive to achieve or to main-
tain a positive social identity. Positive social
identity is based on favorable comparisons that
can be made between one’s own group (ingroup)
and some relevant distinct group (outgroup).
Perceiving oneself and others in terms of social
categories facilitates one’s self-knowledge as
well as how one should feel, act, and think in
terms of one’s group memberships. Therefore,
two motivations for individuals to identify with
groups have been outlined: self-enhancement
and uncertainty reduction.
Social Identity Motivations
Self-Enhancement
Individuals are motivated to achieve a positive
and distinct identity and will join groups to satisfy
this need of identity. Indeed, in a group context,
self is defined as social identity and depends on
group memberships. Individuals will go to great
lengths to ensure that the ingroup is better than the
outgroup. The status and prestige of the group is
Collective/Social Identity 99
attached to one’s sense of self and will result in a
boost in self-esteem.
Social identity theory stipulates that individuals
who are satisfied with their social identity will
attempt to preserve the status quo or to improve
their group membership. On the other hand, when
social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals may
leave their existing group to join a more positively
distinct group, make their existing group more posi-
tively distinct, or redefine ingroup characteristics as
being positive (for example, “Black is beautiful”).
Uncertainty Reduction
Michael Hogg states that a second social identity
motive is uncertainty reduction. Individuals gain a
better understanding of their world thanks to social
categorization. Indeed, groups and their related
prototypes describe how people will and are
expected to behave and interact with one another.
Hogg states that people strive to reduce subjective
uncertainty about their social world and their place
within it—they like to know who they are and how
to behave and who others are and how they might
behave. Group memberships provide the individual
with the possibility to reduce uncertainty about the
future, one’s sense of self, and one’s place in the
world as groups enable individuals to know how
others will behave.
Fiona Grant
See also Collectivism/Individualism; Group Identity;
Social Identity Theory; Society and Social Identity
Further Readings
Baumeister, R. F. (Ed.). (1999). The self in social
psychology. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
Brown, R. (2000). Social identity theory: Past
achievements, current problems, and future challenges.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 30, 745–778.
Hogg, M. A. (2006). Social identity theory. In P. J. Burke
(Ed.), Contemporary social psychological theories
(pp. 111–136). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Markus, H., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self:
Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation.
Psychological Review, 98(2), 224–253.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory
of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel
(Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations
(pp. 33–47). Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
100 Collectivism/Individualism
Collectivism/Individualism
No two concepts have had more of an impact on
the nature of humans and society than collectivism
and individualism. Geert Hofstede suggests that in
collectivist cultures, people are communal, interde-
pendent, and influenced by their groups, whereas in
individualistic cultures, people are self-focused and
tend to behave based on their own attitudes and
not that of the group. Both collectivism and indi-
vidualism are levels of identity that help us under-
stand how people respond in the world. To develop
a more thorough understanding of collectivism and
individualism, this entry discusses the characteris-
tics associated with collectivist and individualistic
ideologies, the theories associated with collectivism
and individualism, and the communication dynam-
ics associated with the levels of identity.
Characteristics
As levels of identity, collectivism and individual-
ism present an ideological view that has a great
deal of influence in the world. One of the charac-
teristics associated with a collectivist ideology is
that it is group-specificity: The group is the pri-
mary focus and the individual is secondary. So,
for example, the villager’s need for attention and
recognition is given up, to a certain degree, so that
the village receives the necessary recognition.
Here, the individual has a collective responsibility
to ensure that the group develops and progresses.
On the other hand, self-specificity is a charac-
teristic associated with individualism, particu-
larly in American culture. The self is the primary
focus and the group is viewed as being second-
ary. Michael L. Hecht, Ronald L. Jackson II, and
Sidney A. Ribeau suggest that, as a Westernized
concept, the symbolic self is viewed as a unique
entity or property of the individual. For exam-
ple, self-concept, self-esteem, and self-perception
are things that an individual has within himself
or herself that impact the individual’s behavior
and how he or she functions and relates to oth-
ers in various situations. As a result, the primacy
of self privileges the individual’s need and desire
for recognition and achievement over the “greater
good” of the community. Here, the individual’s
self-interest is the “greater good.”
Another characteristic associated with the col-
lectivist ideology is interdependence. In collectivis-
tic cultures, group members share responsibilities,
roles, and relationships with others within the com-
munity or family structure in order to accomplish
a particular goal or task. Each member of the col-
lective is defined by the relationship they have with
other members of the group. The African proverb
“It takes a village to raise a child” is a good exam-
ple of how each individual member contributes his
or her life lessons, talents, values, and beliefs to the
growth and development of the child.
By contrast, the characteristic associated with
individualism is independence. Here, the “lines”
between people are clearly demarcated. Each person
is viewed as his or her own separate and indepen-
dent unit. Each person has rights and responsibili-
ties, and each person’s identity is the direct result of
individual effort, self-sufficiency, and accomplish-
ments. The “pull yourself up by your bootstraps”
phraseologism is a vivid metaphor for “sizing up”
American individualism because it suggests that an
individual make his or her own way without help or
assistance from others.
A final characteristic associated with collectiv-
ism is holism or circularity. Collectivities, such as
families and groups, are holistic entities by nature.
Members of collectivities seek both balance and
harmony as a result of their interdependent inter-
actions with themselves and others.
On the other hand, lineality is another charac-
teristic associated with individualistic ideology.
Lineality is the foundation for the development of
hierarchical and dichotomous thinking embedded
in individualism. Lineality, or the “line,” becomes
a metaphor for understanding social class arrange-
ments in individualistic capitalistic cultures. For
example, at the top of the social hierarchy is the
“upper class,” in the center is the “middle class,”
and at the bottom is the “lower class.” Each cate-
gory of class is its own entity arranged in sequential
order. As a result of this, dichotomous thinking sets
in motion competition within these categories—for
example, upper class versus middle class or upper
class versus lower class—which, in the end, can
lead to class conflict.
Group-specific/self-specific orientation, interde-
pendence/independence, and circularity/lineality
are only a few characteristics that define both col-
lectivism and individualism. It is important to note

that these characteristics, like collectivism and
individualism, are not mutually exclusive. There is
often an overlap of each within cultures.
Theoretical Approaches
Psychological-Cultural Approach
In 2001, Hofstede outlined various attributes
associated with collectivist and individualistic cul-
tures. Hofstede found that cultures, such as in the
United States and Great Britain, exhibited certain
attributes such as the following: Identity is created
by the individual, individuals are task-focused, and
speaking one’s mind indicates honesty. However,
other cultures, such as in South America and Asia,
demonstrated the following attributes: Identity is
based on social network, identity is relationship-
focused, and confrontation should be avoided and
harmony maintained.
As suggested earlier, collectivism and individu-
alism are not exclusive categories. Harry Triandis
posits that various cultures often demonstrate a
combination of collectivism and individualism; no
culture is all one or the other. If a culture was all
individualistic, it would promote a society that
was extremely self-centered. And if a culture was
extremely collectivistic, there would be no place in
that society for individual rights, self-expression,
or independent thought. The individual would be
completely alienated by the group.
It has been suggested by Elise Trumbull, Carrie
Rothstein-Fisch, Patricia Marks Greenfield, and
Blanca Quiroz that collectivism and individualism
exist on a continuum within cultures. Cultural
groups have a tendency to vacillate along the con-
tinuum. And so although collectivist cultures, such
as in South America and China, may gravitate
toward the collectivist end of the continuum, and
individualistic cultures, such as those in the United
States and Great Britain, may gravitate toward the
individualistic end of the continuum, collectivist
cultures may also demonstrate individualistic char-
acteristics and individualistic cultures may also
exhibit collectivist characteristics, depending on
how each culture identifies with a characteristic,
value, or situation traditionally associated with the
other culture. For example, in America, most
sports programs, such as football and basketball,
require both a group effort and an individual effort
Collectivism/Individualism 101
in order to be successful. While each member of
the team is independently trained to accomplish
the team objective, each member is also inter-
dependent on the other members of the team
in order to be victorious on the field or court.
American athletes vacillate between indepen-
dence (individualism) and interdependence (col-
lectivism), and vice versa, in order to achieve
athletic success.
More Theoretical Shifting
In addition to participation in sports (group or
individual), which causes a shift in either direction
between individualism and collectivism, Triandis
identified other characteristics or personal situa-
tions that cause a person to shift from individual-
ism to collectivism and vice versa. Some examples
of these situations are (a) changing residence (rep-
resents a shift toward individualism), (b) growing
up in a large family as opposed to a smaller one
(represents a shift toward collectivism), (c) travel-
ing (represents a shift toward individualism),
(d) traditional education (represents a shift toward
collectivism), and (e) number of TV viewing hours
per week (represents a shift toward individualism).
Triandis’s work further reinforces the notion that
people vacillate along the collectivism-individualism
continuum depending on the degree of impact that
their values and situations have on their lives. As
suggested earlier, no one is completely individual-
ist or completely collectivist. Triandis’s work sug-
gests that one’s identity is the result of both an
individualistic self and a collectivistic self and that
one’s identity is a state of movement or flux.
Types of Collectivism and Individualism
In addition to evidence that individualism and
collectivism exist on a continuum, researchers have
found that there are differences that exist within
each level of identity. Theodore Singelis, Triandis,
Dharm Bhawuk, and Michele Gelfand have named
at least four types of individualism and collectivism:
vertical individualism, horizontal individualism,
vertical collectivism, and horizontal collectivism.
Each level of identity falls within two categories:
(1) vertical hierarchy or (2) horizontal equality.
Vertical individualists are people who seek to com-
pete with others for power and status. Horizontal
102 Collectivism/Individualism
individualists are people who want to stand out in
the group but not at the expense of other group
members. Horizontal collectivists are people who
clearly are connected to the ingroup by virtue of
their commitment to the collective. And finally,
vertical collectivists are individuals who give up
personal ambitions for the goals of the group.
Communication Dynamics in
Collectivism and Individualism
In addition to types of collectivism and individual-
ism identified by cross-cultural psychologists,
scholars, such as anthropologists, working in the
field of communication have also examined the
communication dynamics that impact collectivism
and individualism. These researchers wanted to
understand the influence of culture and communi-
cation on collectivism and individualism.
Low-Context and High-Context Cultures
Anthropologist Edward T. Hall has explored
the manner in which different cultures communi-
cate based on the context or situation. Hall identi-
fied low-context cultures and high-context cultures
as existing on a communication continuum.
Individualistic cultures tend to be low-context cul-
tures. In low-context cultures, such as those in the
United States, Canada, and Germany, communica-
tion is straightforward and direct. The entire mes-
sage of what the person is saying is in the verbalized
code. Americans, like many Northern Europeans,
tend to be linear in their thinking. Problem solving
generally takes place in a step-by-step manner that
requires communicators to be clear and concise
with their use of language. People in low-context
cultures do not communicate or solve problems
based on intuition or feeling. They respond to others
based on the facts of the situation. Rationalization
and logic guide their precise use of words so they
are not misunderstood. And to make sure there is
no misunderstanding, an American businessper-
son, for example, may provide a legal contract for
all interested parties to sign.
However, the situation is different for collectiv-
istic cultures. Collectivistic cultures tend to be
high-context cultures. In high-context cultures,
such as those in Africa, Asia, and South America,
communication is indirect and formal. The vast
majority of the meaning for the message is in the
communication context or setting and not in the
words. As a result, people in high-context cultures
do not have to verbalize everything that they say.
Members of the culture are able to communicate
with each other because of cultural knowledge,
nonverbal gestures, and shared experiences they
have established in their interpersonal relation-
ships. These attributes exist in the context of the
communication. Intuition, trust, and feelings,
rather than facts and reason, guide their communi-
cation with each other. As a result, a Japanese
businessperson may be distrustful of his American
colleague’s contract negotiation process because
signing a contract shows a lack of trust.
Both collectivism and individualism have made
an impact on society and on humans. Some of the
characteristics associated with collectivism and
individualism are group-specificity/self-specificity,
interdependence/independence, and circularity/
lineality. Neither collectivism nor individualism is
exclusive; these concepts exist on a continuum, and
individuals tend to move between them based on
their values and personal situation. Moreover,
individualistic cultures tend to be low-context
while collectivistic cultures tend to be high-
context. As a result, both collectivism and indi-
vidualism shape the identity of a person in uniquely
different ways.
Carlos D. Morrison
See also Clan Identity; Eurocentricity; Group Identity;
Individual; Personal Identity Versus Self-Identity; Self
Further Readings
Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swindler, A.,
& Tipton, S. M. (1985). Habits of the heart:
Individualism and commitment in American life.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences (2nd ed.).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hui, C. H., & Triandis, H. C. (1986). Individualism-
collectivism: A study of cross-cultural researcher.
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 17, 225–248.
Triandis, H. C., Brislin, R., & Hui, C. H. (1991). Cross-
cultural training across the individualism-collectivism
divide. In L. A. Samovar & R. E. Porter (Eds.),
Intercultural communication: A reader (6th ed.,
pp. 370–382). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Colonialism
Colonialism describes the process in which a
nation-state or empire appropriates another peo-
ple’s labor, natural resources, and developed
resources for purposes that often include territo-
rial expansion, wealth acquisition, religious con-
version, and national glory. Typically, colonialism
involves members of a state that is more advanced
technologically, especially in the area of weapons
and naval navigation, migrating to a less techno-
logically advanced territory. After gaining a foot-
hold in the other territory, the colonizer uses
superior military force to remove the territory’s
indigenous rulers (or sometimes the people alto-
gether via genocide) and then systematically begins
to control the conquered country in key areas,
which often include political governance, econom-
ics, military operations, agricultural production,
domestic industry, education, technology, trade,
and religion. The invading state transforms the
territory into a colony and adds the newly con-
quered lands to its own territorial map; it also
extracts most of the wealth from the conquered
land, thus achieving two key purposes of colonial-
ism. Because of the extraordinary cultural upheav-
als involved, whenever it is practiced, colonialism
plays a crucial role in the development of identity
perceptions on both individual and national lev-
els. This entry provides a general overview of key
time periods and nations that have practiced colo-
nialism and examines differing views on the posi-
tive and negative nature of colonialism, especially
as it relates to identity.
Historical Overview
Most scholars mark Portuguese and Spanish explo-
ration and expansion that began in the 15th cen-
tury as the definitive launch of colonialism. The
Portuguese rediscovered and colonized the islands
of Madeira in 1419 and the Azores in 1427, and
they later discovered new trade routes to West
Africa and India and established forts and colonies
in both. By 1500, Portuguese explorers reached
South America and established the colony of
Brazil, and by 1557, Portugal held a monopoly as
the middleman for trade between China and
Japan. Establishing these colonies allowed Portugal
Colonialism 103
to dominate the sugar trade, which at the time was
a dominant source of agricultural wealth. Because
of the intense labor associated with sugar cane
cultivation, Portugal also dominated the slave
trade, which primarily used African slaves to toil
in the sugar plantations.
Starting with the now-famous voyage of
Christopher Columbus in 1492, the Spanish ulti-
mately colonized islands in the Caribbean, large
portions of both South and North America, terri-
tories in North Africa, and islands in the Far East,
including the Philippines, Guam, and surrounding
islands. Spanish colonization, especially on the
island of Hispaniola (now Haiti and the Dominican
Republic), was marked by its genocidal treatment
of the indigenous people, the Taínos. Like Portugal,
the Spanish turned to importing African slaves to
replace Hispaniola’s decimated indigenous work-
force. On the American mainland, Spain’s con-
quest of both the Inca and Aztec empires provided
the Spanish with vast reserves of gold and silver. In
fact, the silver reserves found in Spain’s American
colonies were so vast that by the late 1500s, the
extractions from these mines constituted one fifth
of the Spanish treasury.
Although Pope Alexander VI had issued a series
of papal bulls in 1493 dividing colonial acquisi-
tions between Spain and Portugal, the Netherlands,
France, and England ignored the Vatican’s allot-
ments and pursued their own colonial interests. In
the early 17th century, the Netherlands (the Dutch)
began to successfully build a colonial empire.
Working primarily through state-chartered corpo-
rate trading companies, the Dutch East and West
India Companies, the Netherlands managed to
acquire some of Portugal’s colonies in Asia, espe-
cially Malacca and Jakarta. After the Japanese
expelled the Portuguese from Japan in 1639, the
Dutch readily stepped in, and the Netherlands was
the only European power allowed to operate in Japan.
The Dutch also colonized Sri Lanka, a portion of
Java, and parts of Indonesia. Other important
colonies established by the Dutch include the Cape
Colony in 1652, which eventually evolved into
modern-day South Africa, and New Amsterdam in
1626 on Manhattan Island, which, after being taken
over by the English, became New York. Acquiring
these colonies allowed the Dutch to control much
of the spice trade, especially cloves, and of course
to expand their territories and their coffers.
104 Colonialism
Additionally, like Portugal and Spain before them,
the Dutch also used African slaves in their colonies
and were able to spread European culture and iden-
tity on a global scale.
In the early 1600s, the French established colo-
nies in North America, including Newfoundland,
Port Royal (in what is now Nova Scotia), Quebec,
and Louisiana. Focusing on the fur trade, the
French also set up a vast network of trading posts
in places such as current-day Illinois, Michigan,
and Arkansas. The French also established the
South American colony of French Guiana in 1624
and the West Indies territories Saint Kitts in 1625,
Martinique and Guadeloupe in 1635, and Saint
Lucia in 1650. The French also founded a colony
on the island of Hispaniola in 1664 (which later
became the Dominican Republic), which gave
France a prized sugar-producing colony. Like
the other European colonials before them, the
French also used African slave labor to farm the
sugar cane. France also turned its colonial ambi-
tions to Africa and Asia, forging colonies in West
Africa (Senegal) and parts of India. Much later in
the 19th century, during what is labeled the
Second French Colonial Empire, France also
gained a wide array of colonies, including posses-
sions in North, West, and Central Africa and
Southeast Asia.
British colonialism is perhaps the prototypical
example of territorial expansion and cultural
dominance: At its height, it was the largest empire
ever amassed, covering almost 25% of the earth’s
land mass. Britain established its first permanent
colony in the Americas in 1607 with the founding
of Jamestown in Virginia. This led to the estab-
lishment of 13 English colonies that later claimed
independence from Britain and eventually formed
the United States. The British also successfully
founded or annexed colonies in the West Indies,
including the colonies of Barbados in 1627,
Jamaica in 1655, and the Bahamas in 1666.
Competing with French colonials in what is now
a vast portion of Canada, the British created their
own fur-trading posts and forts around 1670.
Because African slaves were used to labor in the
British sugar plantations in the West Indies, the
British also dominated the slave trade, and to do
so, they established trading posts and forts in
West Africa. After a losing struggle to wrestle
control of the Indonesian spice trade from the
Dutch, the British trained their sights on India,
colonizing Bombay and Calcutta. Following the
War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714),
Britain emerged with new territories from France
and Spain, including Newfoundland, huge parts
of what is now New England, and Gibraltar. In
the Pacific, the British began a penal colony in
Australia in 1788 and started the settlement of
New Zealand in the early 1800s. After the
Napoleonic Wars in 1815, Britain obtained more
territories from France, the Netherlands, and
Spain; these included Malta, Saint Lucia, Trinidad,
Tobago, the Cape Colony, Mauritius, and Guyana.
A defeated France meant Britain was mostly
unchallenged globally, and British forces began to
exert colonial and imperial influence in areas such
as Java, Singapore, Burma, Hong Kong, Egypt,
Sierra Leone, and Rhodesia.
After declaring its independence from Britain,
the newly formed United States began a two-tiered
approach to colonialism: (1) obtaining territories
claimed or held by European or American states
and (2) seizing territories from Native Americans
and other indigenous peoples. Key land acquisi-
tions from Europe included the nearly 829 million
square miles of the Louisiana Purchase, obtained
from France in 1803; West Florida, a former
Spanish colony and independent republic that
included parts of modern-day Florida, Louisiana,
Alabama, and Mississippi in 1810; East Florida,
which included most of modern-day Florida and
was ceded by Spain in 1819; the Republic of
Texas, which was annexed from Mexico in 1845;
the Oregon Country, ceded by treaty with the
British and which garnered present-day Oregon,
Washington, Idaho, and portions of Wyoming
and Montana; Mexican Cession territories, which
in 1848 netted parts of modern-day Texas,
Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, and Wyoming
and all of the states of Nevada, California, and
Utah; and the Alaska Purchase, purchased in 1867
from the Russians.
Although the United States could now lay legal
claims to these territories, indigenous people still
occupied these lands, and U.S. forces had to
engage the natives to fully colonize the regions. To
seize Indian lands, the United States used treaties
or military force that resulted in the surrender of
native territory. From the inception of the nation
until the late 19th century, the United States

waged several campaigns to forcefully move
Indians westward or onto reservations, often using
brutally oppressive methods.
Other examples of U.S. colonialism outside of
North America include colonies in Hawai‘i in
1898, in which American settlers overthrew the
indigenous government, and Cuba, the Philippines,
Puerto Rico, and Guam, which were all obtained
as a result of the Spanish-American War in 1898.
Additional countries that engaged in colonial-
ism include Russia, which in 1742 established a
small colony in Alaska that focused on the fur
trade, and Germany, which carved out colonies in
the late 19th century that included East, Southwest,
and West Africa and the Solomon Islands, the
Marshall Islands, and the Mariana Islands.
Positive Assessment of Colonialism
Proponents of colonialism claim that even though
colonialism involved the abdication of self-rule,
there was an overall net gain for the colonized.
They claim that colonizers introduced the natives
to science, education, and new technologies that
prepared them for a globalized society. Colonizers
built roads, schools, hospitals, electrical grids, tele-
graphs, sewage treatment, and modern farming
that improved the entire region. In addition, colo-
nists help rid the colonized of harmful traditions
such as widow burning, ritual sacrifice, supersti-
tious medical practices, types of physical mutila-
tion, or the worship of false gods. Proponents also
claim that the colonized were incapable of self-
governance, and thus it was the burden of the colo-
nizers to provide natives with the rule of law via
court systems, stability through a disciplined police
force, and basic services through civil service insti-
tutions. Also, colonials get credit for “civilizing”
the region by drawing borders for the territory,
uniting or separating warring factions, thus build-
ing the stage for nationhood and lasting peace.
Negative Assessment of Colonialism
Indian writer Arundhati Roy suggests that debating
the positive and negative impacts of colonialism is
akin to pondering the pros and cons of rape. Others
who share her view point to the loss of autonomy
(including abject enslavement), the destruction of
cultural identity and rituals (language, religion,
Colonialism 105
laws, etc.), the theft of natural resources, and the
harsh violence and brutality (ranging from assault
to genocide) that often accompanied colonialism.
Opponents of colonialism also believe that identi-
fying the natives as people who lacked “civiliza-
tion,” culture, and the ability of self-rule was a
self-serving false assumption aimed at justifying
colonialists’ horrific treatment of natives. These
critics also say that the creation of racism/White
supremacy is a direct result of colonialism, because
it was used as a tool to control toiling slaves. They
also believe that today racism/White supremacy is
one of the root causes of poor self-esteem associ-
ated with cultural identity, and they feel that the
identity associated with the “White man’s burden”
ideology, which was fostered by colonialism, still
accounts for rationales behind economic and mili-
tary interventions practiced by first world nations—
rationales that still suggest that third world people
are incapable of self-governance. Another identity
problem linked with colonialism involves colonial reli-
gious iconography, which often depicts Christian
deities and characters as White, resulting in dam-
aged ideas of identity for many colonized peoples.
Opponents also insist that colonials provided tech-
nology, education, hospitals, and courts for their
colonies to service their commercial enterprises,
and whatever enhancements fell to the native
people from colonialism were certainly not worth
losing their lives, land, or culture. Finally, these
critics believe countries identified as third world
nations today suffer the conditions that warrant
this label because of past practices of colonialism—
conditions and identifications that may take
decades to reconcile.
D. Eric Harmon
See also Culture; Patriotism; Third World; World
Systems Theory; Worldview
Further Readings
Parenti, M. (1995). Against empire. San Francisco: City
Lights Books.
Stavrianos, L. S. (1981). Global rift: The third world
comes of age. New York: William Morrow.
Todorov, T. (1984). The conquest of America: The
question of the other (R. Howard, Trans.). New
York: Harper & Row.
106 Commodity Self
Commodity Self
Commodity self refers to one’s own subjective
identity arising from the commodities (goods or
services) one purchases and uses. During the sec-
ond half of the 19th century in the capitalist soci-
eties of Western Europe and North America,
factories produced new types and ever-greater
amounts of goods for mass distribution. In cities,
lavish displays in new department stores and their
electrified store windows along with images in
posters, billboards, and advertisements repro-
duced in newspapers and magazines encouraged
especially the middle and lower classes to consume
them. During the 20th century, manufacturing,
business, and advertising employed radio, film,
television, the Internet, and portable electronic
technologies to access not only public spaces but
also places and situations previously considered
private or off limits to commercial enterprise in
order to reach and stimulate the desire of everyone
to purchase and use consumer goods and services.
As a result, the public came to be understood less
as a homogenous mass market and more as con-
stellations of individuals’ economic, social, and
psychological characteristics.
Increasingly, advertising used psychology to
understand and capitalize on individuals’ wants,
needs, and motivations, and it relied on market
research to codify their preferences and demo-
graphics, and their characteristics. The display and
presentation of commodities, combined with the
media, technologies, and social science research
used to target and engage individuals as consum-
ers, integrated the commodity and consumerism
with subjectivity, in other words, a sense of self.
Consumers followed, altered, and even sub-
verted manufacturers’ and advertisers’ appraisal
of the value and meaning of commodities for
their lives by using them to establish, clarify, or
change their identities and to communicate their
identities as individuals and members of groups
affiliated by ethnicity, nationality, region, reli-
gion, gender, sexuality, and generation. Certain
concepts illuminate these processes and enable
us to grasp how works of art and visual culture
participate in them.
Commodities and Consumerism
Susan Mayhew defines a commodity as an object
of economic value intended for exchange in a
capitalist system that can take the form of things,
services, information, and events. Our relationship
to commodities occurs in societies in which indi-
viduals and groups exchange them for money and
use profits from the exchange to generate and
maximize additional wealth. For Mayhew, often
the exchange of commodities takes place in chains,
in other words, networks linking their production,
distribution, circulation, and consumption. A
major aspect of the commodity is its status as an
equivalent form. Commodities are exchangeable
because they have something in common that
makes them comparable. Chiefly, price renders
commodities sensible in terms of money and there-
fore exchangeable for a specific amount.
We consume commodities, which involves pur-
chasing as well as using them. During the 19th and
early 20th centuries, the word consumer was asso-
ciated with individuals and businesses. Slightly
later, consumer meant someone who buys goods
or services. Consumerism refers to the preferences,
motivations, and activities of people who think
and behave as consumers, together with related
industries and institutions such as advertising.
Historically, scholars have debated what consum-
erism contributes to a strong economy and how
the desire of individuals and groups to consume
can be maintained, if not increased.
Processes involving commodities affect subjec-
tivity variously. Conspicuous consumption is a late-
19th-century example linking consumerism to
identity in ways remaining relevant today. In The
Theory of the Leisure Class, sociologist and econo-
mist Thorstein Veblen analyzed how commodities
symbolize the economic status and social reputa-
tion of their owners. He observed that the emerg-
ing wealthiest economic class demonstrates its
prosperity and establishes its corresponding social
reputation through leisure. Members establish their
importance also by purchasing the most expensive
items, often characterized by excessive size, mate-
rial, design, age, or rarity. The purchase of such an
item is admired as much as the item, and both con-
tribute to the high social standing of the leisure

class while serving as an example of behavior and
value to members of other economic classes. Veblen
was showing that apart from using goods to sur-
vive, as we obtain and consume them, we establish
and signify our social status to one another.
The Commodification of Identity
Commodification refers to processes that happen
to things and, arguably, also to people, and it
implies a lessening of value or status. It involves
the reduction of what once was appreciated for its
utility and heterogeneity to something that can be
exchanged commercially and is less unique and
perhaps also culturally and socially prized less sim-
ply because it has a commercial value like other
commodities. In addition, commodification means
that beginning with its manufacture, a product is
intended for exchange yielding profit. In regard to
people, commodification refers to a person valued
chiefly for her or his economic worth or behaving
or treated like a thing controlled and beholden to
economic forces. In the essay “The Metropolis and
Mental Life,” sociologist Georg Simmel describes
the commodified self as an individual deprived of
human qualities, such as spirituality, and rendered
as a mass-produced part of a vast mechanical sys-
tem: “The individual has become a mere cog in an
enormous organization of things and powers
which tear from his hands all progress, spirituality,
and value in order to transform them from their
subjective form into the form of a purely objective
life” (p. 422).
Conversely, commodity fetishism refers to com-
modities treated as if they have personality and the
ability to act. An example of what Simmel calls
their “purely objective life” is that commodities
form the basis of our social relationships with one
another. The political philosopher Karl Marx
explained that in a capitalist society, almost all
aspects of human productivity are made sense of
through both exchange and commodities.
Furthermore, commodity fetishism means that
instead of appreciating commodities based on the
people who contribute their resources and labor to
making them and for their intended use, primarily,
we value commodities for their economic signifi-
cance in the marketplace. Moreover, we treat
Commodity Self 107
commodities as if they live and function according
to their own powers, that is, as if they have agency
to interact with one another. An example would be
an advertisement featuring a spectacular car speed-
ing along a winding road in a breathtaking land-
scape that fails to describe its social conditions,
including resources and labor that produced and
maintain the car, its driver, the scene, the adver-
tisement, and the intended relationship of the
advertisement to, and its effects on, its audience.
Marx and his followers said ideology conditions us
to perceive commodities as they relate to one
another instead of the social conditions of their
real-world makers and users.
Critiques of Commodification
In capitalist societies, based on their owning the
means to make, distribute, and use commodities
and reap the greatest profits from them, the
wealthiest classes acquire power, which they main-
tain and legitimize by deflecting attention from
how it depends on a social system organized so
that other classes must exchange their labor for a
wage and have fewer means to generate material
prosperity. According to Marx, culture functions
ideologically when it persuades us to fail to notice
these conditions, let alone change them. A failure
to examine them was facilitated by ideas like 19th-
century Romanticism, which suggested if the indi-
vidual, especially the artist, elects to live a certain
way, he or she can avoid the influence of major
social forces. Yet, since the mid-19th century,
many visual artists rejected the idea that anyone
can live beyond the reach of society, and in their
art they exposed if not critiqued the impact of
commodity capitalism and its cultural forms on
the self.
A good example is Das schöne Mädchen (The
Beautiful Girl), which Hannah Höch created by
cutting images from photographs and illustrations
mass reproduced in magazines and newspapers
and recomposing them to form a new picture fea-
turing a young woman perched on engine parts.
The bathing costume she wears alludes to a mes-
sage advertisers directed at the modern woman:
She is youthful and active, and physical sport
maintains her perhaps like a good mechanic keeps
108 Commodity Self
up his machines, using logic and precision to ensure
the parts work. Her oversize head frames not a face
but rather what appears to be part of a poster.
Where we expect to see her chin, she holds up a
huge electric lightbulb. Nearby, in front of a mask-
like White face with an odd, oversized cat eye, a
large hand dangles a stop watch. The remaining
space contains medallions with the blue and white
logo for BMW, or Bayerische Motoren Werke, the
German motor and automobile company. They
remind us that in 1919, BMW designed its first
motorcycle engine. Historically, certain types of
transportation, such as ships, have been gendered
female; perhaps in Das schöne Mädchen, the girl
who is beautiful because of her potential to gener-
ate light and unparalleled speed is the motorcycle.
Höch created Das schöne Mädchen while work-
ing in Berlin, one of the most modern cities in the
world. Its stores encouraged women to treat shop-
ping as a respite from daily life and to use products
to express their personality. Women were also
encouraged to use consumption to free themselves
from an older generation’s ideas about feminine
behavior and appearance. Correspondingly, Das
schöne Mädchen features items that either did not
exist or were not common a generation earlier.
The visual references to mechanized transporta-
tion indicate how shopping expanded women’s
geographic and social horizons. Women traveled
on electric streetcars and underground trains to
reach stores where friends shopped, and they
insisted on their families consuming certain prod-
ucts because doing so solidified a sense of belong-
ing to a particular lifestyle. Men associated women
with shopping and pleasure, too. Critics warned
that especially in the anonymous crowds of the
city, voyeuristically, men objectified women to
fulfill their dreams of sexual pleasure. Höch’s sub-
stitution and association of parts of the female
body for things alludes to advertising’s practice of
objectifying women’s bodies as discrete parts cor-
responding to consumer goods that promised to
improve their appearance or condition. Men asso-
ciated women with commodities also because
women staffed stores selling them and women’s
bodies were rendered as things in the form of man-
nequins appearing in store windows.
After 1945, services and information were some
of the fastest-growing segments of Western econo-
mies. Madison Avenue, New York, developed into
a world center for advertising, which generated
new cultural forms that became the basis for fur-
ther understanding the commodification of the
self. Historian David Potter concluded that in
the context of the growing affluence of the White
middle classes, individuals ideally take on the
qualities of the goods consumer rather than
the goods producer. In “The Culture Industry:
Enlightenment as Mass Deception” (1944),
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer noted that
the commodity self was being standardized as a
constellation of preferences that manufacturers
and marketers accommodated if not exploited to
increase consumption levels.
Interestingly, modern Western societies abhor
overtly valuing individuals as commodities and
seeming to directly exchange human life for
money. Many find putting a price on a person
objectionable if not also ludicrous. Nevertheless,
in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, soci-
ologist Erving Goffman observed that the middle
classes made sense of themselves in terms of con-
sumer culture, for example, as a finished product,
polished and packaged for the social market. In
1961, something along the lines of a packaged self
issued from the art world. Piero Manzoni’s series
of 90 tiny tin cans called Artist’s Shit each bore a
lid displaying Manzoni’s handwritten signature, a
number, and a statement confirming the artist pro-
duced it. On the label encircling each can, across
the name of the artist and printed repeatedly as a
background design, prominent text declared,
“Artist’s Shit/Contents: 30 Gr Net/Freshly Preserved/
Produced and Tinned in May 1961.” Institutions
of the art world valued the series for its contradic-
tions. On one hand, the series seemed to avoid
commodification because like many works of art,
it insisted on qualities such as uniqueness and per-
sonal expression. The tins displayed a handwritten
signature, were numbered in a finite edition, and
promoted content that outraged because of its
anticultural associations, which was typical of
avant-garde art. On the other hand, their stan-
dardized appearance rendered the cans similar to
other consumer goods, and they were like some
advertisements that avoid revealing what their
rhetoric promotes. Additionally, associating waste
with art raised important questions about value,
the body, and the self. Do we value anything an
artist generates because we value the artist’s self

and associate the self with his or her body? What
significance do the actions and products of any
bodies have beyond their persons, or in relation to
their cultural and social identities? Are processes
of commodification indiscriminate in their willing-
ness to transgress what we may consider private
and treat features of the body and its activities as
products for advertising, display, and sale?
Marketing Misconstrued Bodies
Typically, estimations of the market value for the
chemical composition of a human body generate a
figure so low in comparison to the worth of other
commodities that we insist something unquantifi-
able renders our worth incalculable. Yet, Manzoni’s
project seems to confirm the estimations. Its
appearance suggests at least waste from the artist’s
body belongs among low-cost, cheaply packaged
goods. Increasingly, artists would explore the com-
modification of the self in regard to the potential
impact that expensive new technologies have on
the biological self. GenoChoice: Create Your Own
Genetically Healthy Child! a Web site created by
Virgil Wong, suggests who we are biologically
results from elections that prospective parents
make for a price. It satirically envisions them using
the Internet to scan in their genomes and create a
custom-designed child via a fictitious hospital that
offers reproductive technology options such as
eliminating birth defects or creating a clone.
Other artists investigate how consumer culture
engages and represents the self. In 1987, Barbara
Kruger created an untitled silkscreen print featur-
ing a black-and-white photograph of a hand hold-
ing a small red sign toward the viewer. Its white
letters spell, “I shop therefore I am.” In this state-
ment Kruger imitates yet modifies the declara-
tion, “I think, therefore I am” from the French
Enlightenment philosopher, René Descartes.
Mainly, in place of philosophical introspection,
she substitutes shopping as an activity we use
to recognize and assert our existence to ourselves
and others.
By displaying “I shop therefore I am” as a sign,
Kruger reminds us of the sign, a cultural form
advertising uses to engage us. She rendered “there-
fore” to appear much smaller than “I shop” and “I
am.” Although “shop” and “am” link a particular
type of activity to our awareness of our existence,
Commodity Self 109
the individuality we associate with the personal
pronoun “I” is tempered as we realize that all
English language speakers employ “I” to refer to
themselves in distinction from others, who also
speak and think of themselves as a self by using the
same pronoun. Kruger reminds us that language
hails and enables us to know and refer to ourselves
as individuals, which is a context advertising
aspires to establish so everyone believes the com-
modities it promotes are meant for them expressly
while, at the same time, often we remain ignorant
of how, as “I’s,” together we constitute enormous
markets analyzed demographically to facilitate
consumption.
The print conveys something else about the rela-
tionship of the self to consumer culture and society.
It portrays a hand without indicating to whom it
belongs or how it connects to a body. Its appear-
ance reminds us of advertising’s tendency to visu-
ally represent people as parts requiring restoration
while it also straddles a widespread shift from the
industrial economy’s dependence on the physical
labor of workers to the postindustrial economy’s
labor recast to depend less upon the body and more
on the mind and its ability to analyze and commu-
nicate using signs. Interestingly, Kruger portrays
the hand as a physical prop for a sign communicat-
ing something about the conditions of identity
within the context of commodity capitalism.
The style of her art was influenced by her early
career as a designer for Mademoiselle magazine. In
turn, it influences the look of some advertising.
Thus, her art can be appreciated as a medium
through which economic power has widespread
effects on people and culture. In 1990, Kruger
reproduced the silkscreen print from 1987 on a
paper shopping bag, which alludes to the replica-
tion of works of art on coffee mugs, ties, pens, and
other inexpensive consumer goods. So reproduced,
these things function as trademarks advertising
an artist and his or her art and participate in the
culturewide tendency to brand organizations, per-
sons, events, and ideas visually. The small size and
portability of things visually bearing brands ensures
that our consumption of them entails our display-
ing them in our homes and on our bodies as we
circulate geographically.
We use commodities in myriad ways, and in
turn, they manifest our presence. Mirosław Bałka’s
sculpture, titled 480x10x10, consists of a variety
110 Communication Competence
of colors, shapes, and sizes of used bars of soap
strung vertically, one atop the other, to hang down
from a ceiling. Reconfigured by their use by the
artist, together, the bars of soap become like sym-
bols ensuring his welfare on a totem pole convey-
ing his history, presence, and beliefs. In practices
such as hoarding, saving, and bingeing, we may
use commodities to manifest, transfer, or symbol-
ize anxieties, fears, desires, and obsessions. Janine
Antoni alluded to the latter in Gnaw. To create the
three-part installation, she chewed 600 pounds of
chocolate and 600 pounds of lard; oversaw the
production of 130 lipsticks made with pigment for
coloring, which were added to beeswax along with
the lard she chewed; and oversaw the process of 27
heart-shaped packages manufactured from the
chocolate she gnawed.
Commodities require our attention and miscon-
strue our identities. Inattention to the ways we
contribute to the life span of commodities, as our
use of them shifts their status from venerated con-
sumer goods to trash we discard and forget,
inspired Mierle Ukeles to produce Social Mirror, a
New York City Department of Sanitation garbage
collection truck to which she attached a mirror
reflecting spectators at the New York City Art
Parade on Madison Avenue in Manhattan. In
Things I Never Told My Son About Being a
Mexican, part of her series, Cactus Hearts/Barbed
Wire Dreams, Yolanda López displayed goods
mass produced in the United States—food, cloth-
ing, toys, souvenirs, and advertisements—intended
for Anglo consumption that feature images of
“authentically Mexican” people suggesting they
are lazy, servile, alien, or meek. In re-creating the
installation in 2002, López pointed out that the
images appearing on so many items of daily use go
unnoticed in their collective ability to misrepre-
sent, in part because they depend on an ideology of
innocence. Along with the goods, their packaging
reproduces stereotyped assumptions about iden-
tity, which, according to J. H. Pearson, impact a
host of situations ranging from educational access
and unemployment to health care and the overall
economy. As in advertising, Ukeles and López use
visual presentation to tell us something about our
relationship to commodities. Yet, they also seek to
demonstrate what is missing or misrepresented in
our everyday uses of commodities, thus calling
attention to some of the deleterious effects that the
integration of commodities and consumption in all
facets of our lives have on our individual and col-
lective sense of self.
Jennifer Way
See also Material Culture; Social Capital; Values
Further Readings
Adorno, T., & Horkheimer, M. (1993). Dialectic of
enlightenment (J. Cumming, Trans.). New York:
Continuum Press. (Original work published 1944)
Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday
life. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
Pearson, J. H. (2003). Chicana critical pedagogies:
Chicana art as critique and intervention. In The
interpretation and representation of Latino cultures:
Research and museums national conference
documentation. Smithsonian Center for Latino
Initiatives. Retrieved December 2, 2009, from http://
latino.si.edu/researchandmuseums/presentations/
huacaya.html
Potter, D. (1954). People of plenty—Economic
abundance and the American character. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Simmel, G. (1903). The metropolis and mental life.
Adapted by D. Weinstein from K. Wolff (Trans.).
(1950). The sociology of Georg Simmel (pp. 409–424).
New York: Free Press. Retrieved December 2, from
http://www.gsz.hu-berlin.de/dokumente/georg_simmel-
the_metropolis_and_mental_life.pdf
Trentmann, F. (2004). Beyond consumerism: New
historical perspectives on consumption. Journal of
Contemporary History, 39(3), 373–401.
Veblen, T. (1902). The theory of the leisure class: An
economic study of institutions. New York: Macmillan.
Communication Competence
The need for competent communication dates
back to the beginning of time. It has always been
necessary to have effective and appropriate inter-
action among citizens who are equipped with the
skills, knowledge, and motivation to sustain a
progressive citizenry. The term communication
competence applies to a range of interconnected
fields of study that focus on broad aspects of
socialization and interaction, including identity

studies, as communication competence depends
on an understanding of one’s own identity and the
identity of the other.
Conceptually, communication competence
stems from knowing appropriate rules and behav-
iors in various communicative contexts and being
able to comprehend the outcomes for both con-
forming to and violating operative norms.
Communication competence assumes an ability to
choose communication behavior that is appropri-
ate for a given situation.
In lay terms, communication competence can be
defined as being able to communicate effectively
with others in various contexts. The average person
sees a competent communicator as one who can
articulate a message to an audience with the intended
message being understood by the audience.
Communication competence also encompasses the
ability to reveal appropriate communication in a
particular setting. Communication competence has
been described as being related to concepts such as
accuracy, clarity, flexibility, success, affection, empa-
thy, and effectiveness. This entry provides an over-
view of communication competence, a discussion of
interpersonal communication competence, an exam-
ination of organizational communication compe-
tence, a description of intercultural communication
competence, and a connection between communica-
tion competence and identity.
Overview
Communication competence has been conceptual-
ized in a variety of ways; however, the common
link among all scholars is the assumption that
communication competence is important and
essential in society. There are six broad categories
of human competence: fundamental competence,
social skills and competence, interpersonal compe-
tence, linguistic competence, communication com-
petence, and relational competence. These categories
offer a general grouping by which conceptualiza-
tions of communication competence can be organized.
Communication competence becomes essential to
all the categories because communication is the
foundation, center, or heart of all of these catego-
ries. The term communication competence, as it is
contemporarily understood, originated in the work
of Dell Hymes. Hymes developed the term com-
municative competence, out of which emerged a
Communication Competence 111
four-part typology that included as its fourth part
strategic competence. Contemporarily, when peo-
ple think of communication competence, they are
really referring to strategic competence, whereby
their success in interaction is defined by their
knowledge, skills, and motivation, as well as the
appropriate and effective use of communication
skills and knowledge.
Hymes, a sociolinguist, considered communica-
tive competence dependent on tactical knowledge
and the ability for use. The definition has since
evolved to incorporate a cognitive and behavioral
element. Scholars have argued that studying cogni-
tion alone ignores the performative aspects, which
include ability or skills. Knowing how to do some-
thing does not necessarily mean following through
in action. As a result, competence and performance
are not always equated; that is, knowing how to
do something does not always result in appropri-
ate behavior, and appropriate behavior does not
always relate to understanding of that behavior.
For example, a student might know how to give a
perfect speech, but the behavior during the speech
indicates otherwise. Or a student might memorize
the multiplication tables without really under-
standing the principles of multiplying. Moreover,
competence and effectiveness are not the same.
Competent communicators do not always accom-
plish every goal (competent without being effec-
tive); nor do incompetent communicators always
fail (incompetent but effective). For example, a
child who wants to go to a party might compe-
tently communicate what is desired but may not be
effective in achieving the goal when the request is
met by a firm “no” from a parent. These observa-
tions have led some scholars to consider communi-
cation competency to consist not only of knowing
but also of knowing how (the actual doing), know-
ing what one did, and knowing why the results
occurred in that particular situation. As a result of
these various conceptualizations, communication
competence can also be seen through three domains
of learning: cognitive, psychomotor, and affective.
The cognitive domain examines knowledge
and understanding. This domain of learning
moves from knowing specific facts to principles
and generalizations to synthesis and evaluation of
ideas. This domain encompasses knowledge of
the content of a given domain or area (for exam-
ple, one may know the appropriate titles to use in
112 Communication Competence
addressing coworkers and supervisors in one’s
employing organization). The psychomotor
domain focuses on behavioral and communication
skills. This domain focuses on specific behaviors
associated with interaction (e.g., looking at the
speaker, pausing, creating a concrete sentence).
The affective domain focuses on attitudes and feel-
ings of the learner about the knowledge and
behaviors acquired in the other two domains. This
allows the person to master behavioral skills and
be able to modify behaviors to fit the situation. All
of these domains of learning directly relate to
whether an individual will manifest or engage in
communication competence.
Competence and incompetence seem to be mir-
ror opposites, suggesting that their evaluation
would present similar types of conceptual chal-
lenges for those seeking to identify competence and
incompetence; however, researchers have found
more consensus in determining what constitutes
incompetent communication than what constitutes
competent communication. Incompetence occurs
in communication when there is a failure to accom-
plish simple social tasks and there is inappropriate
verbally violent behavior that results in others not
wanting to be around the person. Incompetent
communication is also associated with the belief
that one’s actions have produced undesirable out-
comes and one is incapable of altering the negative
outcomes. Incompetent communication is classi-
fied as both inappropriate and ineffective.
Whether one is competent or incompetent, the
most important evaluations of competence and
incompetence are made by oneself. When a com-
municator feels competent, that communicator
believes intended goals are achieved and feels respon-
sible for success. When a communicator feels incom-
petent, the communicator is more likely to treat
others poorly and demonstrate anxiety, helpless-
ness, loneliness, and depression. Communicators
do not always accurately judge their competence
level; there is false competence and ignorant com-
petence. False competence occurs when one takes
responsibility for positive outcomes that are not
one’s own. Ignorant competence occurs when one
fails to take responsibility for positive conse-
quences. Researchers have studied communication
competence and incompetence by examining per-
ceptions of self and other, and by finding compe-
tence to be a relative term that ranges by degree
rather than being an either/or outcome. Individuals
will experience varying levels of success in various
social interactions; hence, degrees of competence
may vary greatly.
The ambiguous nature of communication has
yielded studies with different quantitative mea-
sures. Despite differences in the conceptualization
of communication competence, there is consis-
tency in examining cognitive, affective, and psy-
chomotor domains, with most research focused on
the psychomotor and least on the affective domain.
A plethora of scales in various different disciplines
exists. This overview focuses on four measures.
The communicative competence scale assesses
communicative competence of an observed other
(the target person); a respondent completes a bat-
tery of Likert-type scale items assessing the compe-
tency exhibited by the target person in various
social settings. The construct of cognitive commu-
nication competence measures one’s own cognitions
about one’s own communication performances.
The communicator competence questionnaire
assesses interaction between persons in specific
roles within an organization. This instrument mea-
sures one’s perceptions of others’ competence
within an organizational setting. The Self-Perceived
Commun­ication Competence scale is designed to
permit the respondent to define communication
competence, allowing one to reflect on how compe-
tent one feels in a variety of communication con-
texts. Many of these measures assume a connection
to interpersonal communication, a specific area of
research in communication competence.
Interpersonal Communication Competence
Brian Spitzberg has made many contributions to
our understanding of interpersonal communica-
tion competence. He views interpersonal commu-
nication competence as neither a trait nor a set of
behaviors but rather as a perception people have
about themselves or another person. We make
competence judgments based on how we act in
conversation. Interpersonal communication com-
petence marks a conversation that allows for inter-
pretation, understanding, and response to a context.
Interpersonal communication competence is a way
to achieve a communication goal without the other
party’s loss of face. Interpersonal communication
is not just about what one person says, but rather

it focuses on a dyadic relation in which communi-
cation emerges in the “between” of the conversa-
tion. The component model of competence defines
knowledge, skills, motivation, outcome, and con-
text as essential to interpersonal communication
competence. Knowledge is the ability to determine
what behavior is best suited for a particular situa-
tion. Competent communicators know how com-
munication works and are able to understand,
predict, and explain how self and others communi-
cate in various situations. Competent communica-
tors know how to translate their knowledge into
skills. Skills reflect one’s ability to apply behavior
to a situation. Skill building is associated with
practicing and receiving feedback that allows one
to correct and improve one’s skills (e.g., listening).
Perfecting skills takes practice and motivation.
Motivation is the determination to communicate in
a competent manner. An individual needs to be
motivated to use knowledge and skills with the
intention of becoming a competent communicator
with others. The communicator must realize the
desired outcome of the conversation. When an
outcome is determined, one can conclude whether
one achieved success. The individual also needs to
understand and be sensitive to the context in which
the communication is taking place, including the
answers to questions such as Where am I? What is
nature of this setting? What kind of situation is
this? How do I see myself in relationship to the
other? How do others see me in relationship to
themselves? What is the purpose of my communi-
cation? These factors all point to a defined objec-
tive for the communication, or a reason for why
we communicate.
Western scholars commonly agree that commu-
nication is essentially purposive and goal directed.
Individuals communicate for many reasons—for
enjoyment, to obtain a raise in pay, or to ask a
question, for example. Therefore, when working
with others, a competent communicator must
assume a keen sense of control that allows for
adaptability and collaboration. Control, adapta-
tion, and collaboration are three key features
found in most definitions of interpersonal commu-
nication competence. Control allows for the com-
municator to think before speaking. One must
understand how to control one’s own response, the
other’s response, and, if possible, the context of the
situation. Control over the physical and social
Communication Competence 113
environment is another important element. The
idea of having control is either explicitly or implic-
itly at the foundation of most definitions of com-
municative competence. Without control, it is hard
to achieve competency. Control also allows for
adaptability within the communication event itself,
recognizing the fact that the other person possesses
goals and will attempt to have control as well.
Adaptability allows for one to alter one’s com-
municative strategies when change occurs. Partners
exhibit interpersonal communication competence
by adapting to each other. The ability to adapt cre-
atively and responsibly to the conversation is an
essential element in communication competency.
Adaptability allows for understanding various sit-
uational and personal constraints within communi-
cation. Collaboration accompanies adaptability,
because one cannot be competent alone. Collab­
oration allows for parties to achieve various goals
of self and other. Interpersonal communication
competence focuses on individuals being able to
sustain a favorable relationship through collabora-
tion. Through collaboration, parties are able to
work with one another and address potential mis-
understandings. Collaboration occurs in interac-
tion with others within a broader social context.
This social context can also be found within an
organizational context.
Organizational Communication Competence
Organizational communication competence is ana-
lyzed at multiple levels rather than just at the indi-
vidual level. A multilevel approach permits a focus
on the dynamic interdependence among the various
levels of analysis. Groups and organizations can be
characterized with respect to other groups and
organizations that form communication knowledge
and resources within a particular institution. To
study the application of communication compe-
tence to the organizational context requires an
examination of how tasks, situations, and persons
interact to determine what counts as appropriate
communication behaviors within the context of an
organization. Researchers of communication com-
petence in organizational communication also focus
on behavioral studies and cognitive studies.
Behavioral researchers examine specific communi-
cation behaviors and skills that the organizational
members consider competent. In organizations,
114 Communication Competence
competent communication is seen as “appropri-
ate behavior” or “goal achievement.” Cognitive
re­searchers examine social knowledge and mental
abilities that affect one’s communication within the
organization. In an organization, ideas such as “net-
working with knowledge” and knowing the mission
statement of the organization fall under the cognitive
aspect. In each of these areas, researchers seek to
identify behaviors or cognitive factors that are asso-
ciated with successful organizational communication
competence.
Several contextual factors are relevant to
organizational communication competence: peo-
ple, objectives, environment, and time. There are
usually numerous people in multiple positions in
an organizational context; as a result, questions
of who will be affected by the message and how
they will perceive the message are relevant for
competency. Because of the diverse nature of the
workforce, it is important to understand how com-
munication differs among bosses, managers, and
coworkers. Objectives focus on key goals or
expected outcomes, raising questions of how com-
munication hinders or helps one reach one’s goals
or objectives. The environment focuses on the cli-
mate as hostile or supportive, how comfortable
employees are with asking questions, and whether
employees feel threatened when they communicate.
Time examines issues of length of time one has
spent with others working on projects or group
activities. A greater amount of time with people
and projects usually yields greater competence.
Competent communicators need to take into
account how the message fits within the expecta-
tions of others, their own goals and outcomes, the
environment, and time. All of these factors play a
large role in organizational communication compe-
tence. Given the diversity of membership in organi-
zations and the need to coordinate with others to
accomplish tasks, cultural differences may lead to
misinterpretations and misunderstanding of a mes-
sage. Intercultural communication competence
becomes necessary in today’s historical moment.
Intercultural Communication Competence
Intercultural communication competence has been
of concern to human beings since the dawn of
time. The formal study of intercultural communi-
cation competence as a social science is relatively
more recent. There is wide cultural variation in
appropriateness of goals and strategies to pursue in
various contexts. Some cultures focus on individual
goals, whereas others focus on communal goals.
The differences that arise in various cultures make
cross-cultural communication competence a very
difficult task. Like other areas of communication
competence study, intercultural communication
competence focuses on knowledge, skills, motiva-
tion, outcomes, and context to inform one’s appro-
priate and effective interaction with members of
different cultures. Intercultural communication
competence focuses on demonstrating under-
standing of acceptable behavior within various
intercultural contexts. Exhibiting communication
competence becomes extremely difficult when the
norms, rules, and customs vary and clash among
cultures. Even if a person is considered highly
knowledgeable, skilled, and motivated in one cul-
ture, a person from a different culture may still
reject their perceived communication competence.
As a result, intercultural communication compe-
tence becomes contingent upon the optimal inter-
relationship of circumstances that usually requires
letting go of one’s cultural assumptions and prac-
tices, and acculturation, or adopting the new cul-
ture’s assumptions and practices. Communication
competence becomes more than just knowing what
behaviors are considered acceptable in a certain
culture. Intercultural communication competence
involves knowing the meanings, rules, and codes
for acting appropriately in various contexts in for-
eign or “strange” circumstances. Culture is based
on an understanding of one’s self-identity; as a
result, communication competence and identity are
intrinsically linked. Accordingly, it is important to
understand how communicators define their own
identities because communication competence is a
matter of successfully negotiating various identities
during the process of interaction.
Communication Competence and Identity
The concept of identity allows for further explora-
tion of communication competence. With an
understanding of one’s own identity and the iden-
tity of the other, communication competence is
likely. One’s identity, whether based on relation-
ships, institutional affiliations, or cultural similari-
ties and differences, gives insight into the

conversation. One’s identity and self-understanding
allow for communication competence within vari-
ous contexts. Our identity is shaped by interac-
tions with others, allowing interpretation of vari-
ous meanings, rules, and behaviors. Identity
provides a sense of one’s own ontological status as
an interpretive framework for various communica-
tive experiences. Identity informs communication
competency by allowing for a greater understand-
ing of self. The self-consciousness of an individual
also plays a role in the conceptualization of com-
munication competence. Persons who are overly
self-conscious may constantly analyze their behav-
ior and never perceive themselves as competent
communicators. For example, Judy may watch a
tape of herself speaking and perceive the perfor-
mance as of poor quality, whereas the observing
audience may have considered it excellent. One
goal in communication is self-presentation. As
communicators, we are constantly presenting our
identities by communicating who we are and how
we want to be perceived. Communication compe-
tency will vary depending on one’s own under-
standing of identity.
Communication competence has an intangible,
nebulous, contextual nature that makes it difficult
to study; however, the fundamental relevance of
communication competence to all disciplines
makes it an essential focus of investigation.
Communication competence is a skill that most
individuals strive to achieve. Individuals and orga-
nizations spend millions of dollars in training ses-
sions to become competent communicators.
Research shows that competent communicators
are considered to be more successful than incom-
petent communicators in relationships and in the
workplace. Recent studies show that communica-
tion competence is a needed asset in today’s world.
Despite the extensive literature on communication
competence, there is no concrete method for
becoming a competent communicator in every
situation. Even minimal communication compe-
tence requires knowledge, skills, and motivation,
requiring extensive time and experience for profi-
ciency. Human beings communicate in almost
every facet of life. Without competent communi-
cation, nothing would ever be achieved, even at
the most minimal level.
Leeanne M. Bell
Communication Theory of Identity 115
See also Consciousness; Narratives; Self-Consciousness;
Values
Further Readings
Hymes, D. H. (1972). On communication competence. In
J. B. Pride & J. Holmes (Eds.), Sociolinguistics
(pp. 269–294). New York: Penguin.
Jablin, F. M., & Sias, P. S. (2001). Communication
competence. In F. M. Jablin & L. L. Putnam (Eds.),
The new handbook of organizational communication:
Advances in theory, research, and methods
(pp. 819–854). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
McCroskey, J. C. (1982). Communication competence
and performance: A research and pedagogical
perspective. Communication Education, 31, 1–7.
Parks, M. R. (1994). Communicative competence and
interpersonal control. In M. L. Knapp & G. R. Miller
(Eds.), Handbook of interpersonal communication
(2nd ed., pp. 589–618). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Spitzberg, B. H., & Cupach, W. R. (1984). Interpersonal
communication competence. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Spitzberg, B. H., & Cupach, W. R. (1989). Handbook of
interpersonal competence research. New York:
Springer.
Wiseman, R. L. (2001). Intercultural communication
competence. In W. B. Gudykunst & B. Mody (Eds.),
Handbook of international and intercultural
communication (pp. 207–224). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Xiao, X., & Chen, G. (2009). Communication
competence and moral competence: A Confucian
perspective. Journal of Multicultural Discourses, 4,
61–74.
Communication
Theory of Identity
The communication theory of identity (CTI)
brings, as the name implies, a communication per-
spective to understanding identity. The theory
widens the lens on identity—changing the focus by
viewing it as layered (i.e., multiple levels), dynamic
(i.e., the interaction among layers of identity), and
enacted in communication. This layered view of
identity reflects the tension between internalized
and externalized identity as manifested in commu-
nication as well as the management of multiple
116 Communication Theory of Identity
and shifting identities. An important tenet that
differentiates CTI from other identity theories is
the explicitly acknowledged interdependency
between communication and identity. Identity is
formed, maintained, and modified in a communi-
cative process, and communication is a perfor-
mance of identity. Thus, the theory recognizes
how identity, frames the way messages are pro-
duced, enacted, and interpreted and how commu-
nication functions as identity. This metapicture of
an expanded social concept of identity, therefore,
is crucial to the theory’s contribution.
Expanding the Concept of Identity
Michael L. Hecht and colleagues posit two ways
through which communication is internalized as
identity—through symbolic meaning and when
people place themselves in socially recognizable
categories. Symbolic meanings of social phenom-
ena are created and exchanged through social
interaction. Identity is formed when relevant sym-
bolic meanings are attached to and organized in an
individual in various situations through social
interaction. Adapted from identity theory, CTI
focuses on how identity is created through inter-
pretive processes as well as how identity becomes
central to sense-making activities.
The second way in which communication is
internalized as identity is when people place
themselves in socially recognizable categories
and thereby validate, through social interaction,
whether these categories are relevant to them.
Whereas many of these categories involve social
groups, others may be grounded in personality
types and other memberships. Identity, in turn, is
manifested in social interaction through expecta-
tions and motivations. Specific identities elicit
specific expectations, and these expectations
influence the person’s communication. Thus,
identity is externalized to social interaction
through expectations attached to identities. With
this dual conceptualization established, CTI
adopts from postmodernism the notion that
identity can be conceptualized and operates as
multiple layers or frames. Identity is seen as
involving interpretation through various foci
or lenses.
A Layered View of Identity
CTI posits four loci of identity operating at the
individual, enacted, relational, and collective lev-
els. Although in mainstream American culture,
identity tends to be regarded as a cognitive schema
residing within the individual, proponents of CTI
argue for a more expansive view of identity as
residing within each of the four parts of the theory:
the individual, the social interaction, relationships,
and collectivities. Hecht posits four layers or
frames of identity that operate simultaneously at
these various levels.
Identity as a Personal Layer
The personal layer or frame of identity refers to
an individual’s view of self. The locus of identity,
thus, is situated in self-concept, self-image, self-
cognition, feelings about self, a spiritual sense of
self-being, or all of these. Identity as a personal
layer provides understanding about how individu-
als define themselves in a broad sense and in par-
ticular situations.
Identity as an Enactment Layer
The enacted layer places communication at the
locus of identity. While proponents of many
approaches recognize how communication influ-
ences identity or how identities influence com-
munication, proponents of CTI argue that
communication is identity—that it performs or
enacts identity. In other words, there is an identity-
expressive function for communication, and to
understand identity fully, we must include its
enactment or performance. That is, not only do
individuals consider their self-image (personal
layer), but they also respond to the exigencies of
the conversation (enacted layer), including the
timing, target, and context of the conversation.
In this frame, identity is experienced through
communication as it is enacted. Not all messages
are about identity, but identity is a part of all
messages.
Identity as a Relationship Layer
Although the negotiation of identity plays out at
the enactment level, it also plays out at a relational

level. Identity is a product, jointly negotiated and
mutually formed through communication within
an evolving relationship. The nature of that rela-
tionship (e.g., friend, romantic partner, coworker)
is taken into consideration with regard to identity.
According to proponents of CTI, the relational
layer has three levels. First, an individual consti-
tutes his or her identity in terms of other people
through social interaction. How other people view
an individual and the ascriptions they make influ-
ence the person’s identity. Second, an individual
identifies himself or herself through his or her rela-
tionships with others, such as spouses, siblings,
coworkers, and friends. Third, a relationship itself
is a unit of identity. Thus, for instance, a couple as
a social entity can establish an identity. This also
extends to group identities.
Identity as a Communal Layer
A communal layer conceptualizes the locus of
identity as existing within a collectivity or group.
Group members share characteristics and collec-
tive histories upon which a common group identity
is established. This concept is similar to “collective
memory” and objective ethnolinguistic identity.
This can be seen in cultural products, such as films
or television shows, and more recently has emerged
online in blogs and Web sites such as YouTube
that express cultural-level views of identity. Taken
together, the four layers of identity sometimes
match each other but sometimes are contradictory.
Hecht maintains that the “interpenetration” of the
layers are essential to understanding the dynamic
nature of identity.
Interpenetration of Identity Layers
Another key tenet of CTI is that it goes beyond
individual and societal constructions of identity to
present the interactional aspects of identity.
Although the four layers of identity can be seen as
functioning independently of each other for ana-
lytical purposes, they actually and necessarily
work together. Analyses are enriched if they con-
sider how the layers function with each other, two
at a time, three at a time, or all four at once. In
some situations, each or some of the layers may be
contradictory to, or exclusive of, each other. In
Communication Theory of Identity 117
other situations, some or all of the layers may be
integrated. With separation or integration (i.e.,
interpenetration of identity layers), the four layers
of identity show various aspects of identity in
various situations.
History and Development
Hecht developed CTI to examine the effects inter-
personal interactions have on identity develop-
ment in the context of investigating ethnic
differences in communication as well as describing
the nature of intraethnic and interethnic commu-
nication. Initially, Hecht and colleagues were
interested in exploring problematic issues in com-
munication (i.e., describing the main obstacles to
effective communication) in African American
and Mexican American ethnic cultures. Hecht and
colleagues were hoping to include ethnicity in a
theory of effective communication. An initial
model presented identity as influencing communi-
cation that, in turn, influenced outcomes such as
communication satisfaction.
Identity ⇒ Communication
       ⇒ Communication Satisfaction
When this model was tested, the path analysis
did not support the overall model. However, the
following model, in which identity was coupled
with communication, explained a significant pro-
portion of variance (80%) in communication satis-
faction for both African Americans and European
Americans:
Identity/Communication ⇒ Communication
Satisfaction
Although groups differed in how communica-
tion issues related to satisfaction, Hecht reasoned
that identity was not separate from communica-
tion. Indeed, these issues were so salient to person-
hood that communication itself was the enactment
of identity. This new way of conceptualizing iden-
tity was reported in a 1993 special issue of
Communication Monographs devoted to new direc-
tions in communication thought. Eight axiomatic
statements were proposed, which, in subsequent
118 Communication Theory of Identity
research, have been tested in sequential fashion
(Hecht, 1993, p. 80):
1. Identities have individual, enacted, relational,
and communal properties.
2. Identities are both enduring and changing.
3. Identities are affective, cognitive, behavioral,
and spiritual.
4. Identities have both content and relationship
levels of interpretation.
5. Identities involve both subjective and ascribed
meanings.
6. Identities are codes that are expressed in
conversations and define membership in
communities.
7. Identities have semantic properties that are
expressed in core symbols, meanings, and labels.
8. Identities prescribe modes of appropriate and
effective communication.
Research
Various researchers have applied CTI to studies involv-
ing Jewish Americans, African Americans, Mexican
Americans, Korean Americans, first-generation
college students, bicultural bilingual speakers, and
grandchild-grand–parent communication. Initial
CTI work focused on ethnic labels, ethnic identity,
and interethnic communication, whereas more
recent research has focused on the interpenetration
among identity frames, referred to as identity gaps.
Ethnic Labeling and Ethnicity
CTI stresses the interpretative process involved
in groups, focusing on the meanings associated
with identities. In doing so, the theory links iden-
tity to modes of behavior. The extent to which
people identify with certain ethnic groups varies
based on the dimensions of salience and intensity.
Salience refers to the fact that people view their
ethnic identity as an important part of who they
are, while intensity refers to the level of impor-
tance that people place on their ethnic identity.
Salience and intensity of identities are likely to
manifest particularly when people from different
ethnic backgrounds interact. This is also the case
developmentally across the life span, particularly
in adolescence.
Studies on ethnic identity and interethnic com-
munication have been conducted among adoles-
cents and adults, examining, for example, how
ethnic labels were used by members of an ethnic
group (African American, Black American, Black)
to describe a range of identities and link ethnic
identity with social interpretations and interethnic
communication.
Youth Identity as Substance Use Prevention
Studies on youth identity and substance abuse
prevention have been conducted in which ethnic
similarities and differences in adolescent communi-
cation about drugs were studied by examining
drug offer narratives. These studies described how
Mexican American, African American, and
European American adolescents were offered drugs
and how they resisted offers. Small but consistent
differences were reported across groups. Significant
interactions were observed that supported both the
complexity of identity as well as the conclusion
that ethnic identity functions differently for differ-
ent groups. The dynamic nature of identity has
been addressed in studies on identity negotiation.
Identity Negotiation
Similar to the notion of identity negotiation,
developed by Ronald L. Jackson II, CTI treats cul-
tural identity as a relationally driven negotiation
process in intercultural communication. Related
studies on identity negotiation involve a line of
research on Jewish Americans and African
Americans. These studies articulate issues that
emerge in interethnic interaction and strategies for
responding or managing those issues. In addition,
CTI uses the metaphor of negotiation to describe the
interplay among identity layers. Studying the ten-
sions that arise when different identity layers com-
pete or are in conflict with one another is referred to
as identity gaps within the CTI framework.
Identity Gaps
CTI research has delved into empirically research-
ing identity gaps to investigate the interpenetration
of identity frames. Researchers of CTI and identity
gaps have considered how Jewish Americans,

Korean Americans, grandchildren and grandpar-
ents, and international students handle their multi-
ple frames of identity—especially disparities or
inconsistencies between and among personal,
enacted, and relational identities. Constitutive ten-
sion among identity layers has also been linked with
adverse health outcomes such as depression. Some
newer directions the CTI framework has been
applied to include understanding illness identities.
Illness Identity
In general, this research has focused on describ-
ing identity transformations that accompany long-
term illness to explain illness in terms of
self-presentation problems. However, the CTI
framework has more recently been applied to link-
ing identity gaps not only with communication but
also with health outcomes such as depression. In a
study by Jung and Hecht in 2008, personal-enacted
identity gaps among recent or first-generation
Korean immigrants manifested in depression.
Depression can be caused by expressing a socially
desirable self while silencing an authentic self or
when ideas or behaviors such as self-concept are
not reinforced by others.
Future Research Directions
New Media and Identity
Technology such as the Internet not only changes
the geometry of identity enactment, it extends its
reach and opens up possibilities for new relation-
ships. Online interactions may in fact take place
with individuals and communities with which one
may not feel comfortable interacting offline. How
identity becomes salient within computer-mediated
communication sets the stage for innovative appli-
cations of CTI. This includes communication via
the Internet, text messages, online cooperative
gaming, YouTube, avatars, online illness discus-
sion bulletin boards, listservs, support groups, and
so on, with each mode having its unique place in
identity processes. New media have allowed tradi-
tionally isolated groups (e.g., rural communities) to
communicate and interact in ways unprecedented.
Rural Identity
CTI is guiding a number of new lines of research
that demonstrate its encompassing and expansive
Complex Inequality 119
view of identity. One of these lines of research
includes exploring the construct of rural identity as
it reflects multiple frames and how employing
alternative rural identities (other than the tradi-
tional one defined by population density and prox-
imity to dense population areas) will inform the
design of more effective public health campaigns
aimed at reaching rural populations.
Michael L. Hecht and
Suellen Hopfer
See also Collective/Social Identity; Culture; Identity
Negotiation; Identity Politics
Further Readings
Hecht, M. L. (1993). 2002—A research odyssey:
Towards the development of a communication theory
of identity. Communication Monographs, 60, 76–82.
Hecht, M. L., Jackson, R. L., II, & Ribeau, S. A. (2003).
African American communication: Exploring identity
and culture. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Hecht, M. L., & Miller-Day, M. (2009). The drug
resistance strategies project: A communication
approach to preventing adolescent drug use. In L. Frey
& K. Cissna (Eds.), Handbook of applied
communication research (pp. 535–557). London:
Taylor & Francis.
Hecht, M. L., Warren, J. R., Jung, E., Krieger, J. L.
(2004). The communication theory of identity:
Developmental, theoretical perspective, and future
directions. In W. B. Gudykunst (Ed.), Theorizing
about intercultural communication (pp. 257–278).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Jung, E., & Hecht, M. L. (2008). Identity gaps and level
of depression among Korean immigrants. Health
Communication, 23, 313–325.
Community
See Collective/Social Identity
Complex Inequality
The concept of complex (social) inequality refers
to both the actual patterns of inequality—social
hierarchy, domination, exclusion, or, to put it in
120 Complex Inequality
more technical terms, differential access to goods
and services, rights and entitlements, power, sta-
tus, and prestige—and the conceptualizations cum
representations of these inequalities. Inequalities
are regarded as social in at least two senses:
(1) when they are seen with a humanistic coeffi-
cient, that is, as socially evaluated (thus distinct
from economic or cultural inequalities); and/or
(2) when they are studied as aspects of asymmetric
social relations of domination, discrimination,
and so forth (thus contrasted with distributive
inequalities). Most social scientists see social
inequalities as implicating certain value standards
that underlie social perceptions. Thus understood,
social inequalities encompass only these aspects of
social hierarchy and exclusion that are seen as
problematic, unfair, or violating popular stan-
dards of justice. This makes them historically and
culturally relative. It also means that these actual
patterns of inequality are directly associated with
how people socially construct their understand-
ings of self-identity and others’ identities.
The concept of complex (social) inequalities
was introduced in the 1980s in critical response to
the dominant stratificationist and Marxist class
accounts of inequality and the accompanying
(mainly in comparative studies) simple hierarchical
gradational representations of social inequality.
These accounts and representations implied that
various aspects of social hierarchy and exclusion
were correlated and crystallized and, therefore,
could be represented as socially formed hierarchi-
cal classes, strata, or both. The resulting ladder-
like stratification schemes gained wide popularity
in the Anglo-American class and stratification lit-
erature. The best examples are the class hierarchies
popularized by Anthony Giddens, John Goldthorpe,
and Erik O. Wright. In spite of diverse theoretical
inspirations (mainly Marxist and Weberian), these
schemes have some common features: an emphasis
on hierarchical aspect (verticality); a synthetic
character reflected in (typically unidimentional)
ladder-like hierarchy (e.g., occupational or employ-
ment status); and, finally, universalism, reflected in
an underlying assumption that those simple class-
stratification schemes are applicable to the broad
family of developed, advanced, or (post)industrial
societies. Perhaps the best-known application of
these schemes was in comparative studies of occu-
pational stratification and social mobility, the
CASMIN (Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility
in Industrial Nations) project, and the comparative
neo-Marxist class analyses inspired and coordi-
nated by Wright.
Growing interest in complex social inequalities
has coincided with the acceleration of social
change—especially the process of globalization
and rapid social differentiation—and a revival of
the French theoretical tradition, as represented by
classic analyses of Alexis de Tocqueville, Émile
Durkheim, and, more recently, Pierre Bourdieu. In
this tradition, social inequalities are seen as having
complex, combining vertical (hierarchy) and hori-
zontal (exclusion) dimensions, as being culturally
embedded, and as being time and place distinctive.
French theorists tend to represent inequalities in
the form of multidimensional maps of assets/
capitals and the accompanying asymmetric social
relations of domination and (in the more radical
visions) exploitation. In more recent studies, such
complex inequalities are characterized by hybrid-
ization, that is, a fusion of different forms of
inequality into new forms (e.g., ethnoracial “under-
classes” separated in ghetto-like urban clusters),
the emergence of multiple and cross-cutting social
hierarchies, and multiplication of social divisions
based on socially “hermetic” distinctions (e.g.,
consumption-lifestyle categories). Consequently,
the consistency (crystallization), hierarchical trans-
parency, and degree of social formation are low,
and it is difficult to circumscribe, rank, and draw
boundaries around them. The emergence of “gen-
derized” occupations, ethno-specific or “racialized”
market segments (ethno-classes), consumption-
lifestyle categories, and ecologically distinct group-
ings (e.g., underclasses) illustrates the increasing
complexity of social inequality.
The concept of complex social inequalities
refers also to representations and images that
depart from hierarchical gradations and polarity
typical for class and stratification analyses. The
common characteristics of these representations
can be summarized in three points, each a counter-
point to the respective characteristics of simple
inequalities. First and foremost is a combination of
hierarchy and exclusion. Social exclusion is seen as
social separation and distancing accompanied by
prejudice and discrimination, as well as denials
cum attributions of certain identities (“other-
ness”). For example, Bourdieu’s maps of diverse

sociocultural habituses and Wilson’s descriptions
of racial ghettoization in U.S. cities involve both
hierarchical ranking and social exclusion. Second,
studies of complex inequalities do not attempt to
reduce inequalities to any single common denomi-
nator, such as class, occupational stratum, or
ethno-racial status group. On the contrary, they
recognize diverse and cross-cutting forms of hier-
archy and exclusion and highlight their dynamic
nature, the fact that they are in constant flux.
Again, Bourdieu’s sociocultural maps and his
social-anthropological schemes of discriminatory
classifications are good examples of the ways in
which complex social inequalities are represented.
Third, both the concepts and the forms of repre-
sentation of complex inequalities seldom claim
universal and comparative applicability. Typically,
they are specific to a particular time and place.
Therefore, the Bourdieusque tradition of research,
although popular, has not generated a wave of
comparative studies similar to CASMIN.
The French theoretical tradition links the analy-
ses of Tocqueville, Durkheim, and Bourdieu.
Particularly important are Tocqueville’s ideas link-
ing (a) inequality with social segmentation and
(b) egalitarianism with social openness, democratic
culture, and civic activism. Tocqueville saw the
progressive “equalization of condition” in early
19th-century United States as synonymous with
the elimination of aristocratic privileges and low-
ering of social divisions that accompanied the
expansion of civil and political rights, the spread
of democratic culture, and above all, the growth of
robust civil society. For him, the “equality of con-
dition” coincided with persisting hierarchies of
income and wealth, as well as gender division and
racial segregation. But it undermined all three, and
it manifested itself in the spread of egalitarian
social relations, participatory civic activism, and
increasing popularity of libertarian and individual-
istic democratic ideology. Similarly, Durkheim’s
analyses of “primitive social classifications” in
preindustrial societies, as well as his studies of
modern organic solidarity, division of labor, and
their symbolic representations at the end of the
19th century in France, have inspired many con-
temporary mappings of complex inequalities, espe-
cially in critical studies of gender and race relations
that stress the importance of ascription. The
Durkheimian heritage is more diffuse and more
Complex Inequality 121
difficult to detect, because it is reflected in overall
inspiration rather than direct references to
Durkheim’s work. Bourdieu’s studies of gender
and racial divisions, both ancient and entrenched,
carry a clear imprint of this heritage.
Bourdieu’s studies represent the most radical
break with Marxist visions of simplifying (i.e.,
polarizing) class hierarchy (which some consider
ironic considering the Marxist self-identification
and terminology). In spite of this identification and
commitment to the class terminology, Bourdieu
reinterprets the simple class scheme into a complex
Durkheimian scheme. He introduces the concepts
of cultural capital and habitus and links both with
social differentiation of consumption, tastes, and
lifestyles. Economic capital, according to him,
remains an important stratifying factor in shaping
social inequalities, but it is not privileged over
other forms of cultural, social, symbolic, and other
forms of capital. Bourdieu also proposes a scheme
whereby hierarchical social groupings form in a
social space according to the type, composition,
and volume of these multiple assets or capitals.
Classes, the categories of people who share a simi-
lar location in this multidimensional social space,
and with similar interests and dispositions due to
shared tastes and consumption, are never clearly
circumscribed and ranked. Their boundaries
change, and they seldom achieve a degree of con-
sciousness, cohesion, and solidarity to form dis-
tinctive social groupings.
Contemporary studies of complex inequalities also
owe much of their sophistication to the Weberian
analytic and theoretical tradition. Max Weber’s
rejection of the centrality of class domination/
class inequality, his skepticism about progressive
simplification of the class structure, and his insis-
tence on relative autonomy of class, status, and
command or authority hierarchies make him a key
theorist-patron for students of complex inequali-
ties. Together, class, status, and command divi-
sions form socially and historically diverse matrices
for the distribution of societal power and individ-
ual life chances. However, these matrices do not
necessarily correspond with the ways in which
social relations form, social clustering occurs,
social divisions appear, and social antagonisms are
played out. Social formation (i.e., the articulations
of diverse hierarchies of class, status, and com-
mand or authority) reflects the autonomous
122 Complex Inequality
processes of social clustering and closure, identity
and solidarity formation, cultural distantiation,
and political organization, which are all embedded
in dominant cultures. Social divisions and exclu-
sions may form along the class-market lines; along
ethnic, regional (national), party-ideological,
racial, or religious lines; or along the consumption
and lifestyle lines—the point stressed by contem-
porary neo-Weberians and Cambridge theorists of
differential association.
Social inequalities form patterns rather than lad-
ders, and they vary in the degree of complexity: the
interaction of different structural “generators,”
cross-cutting, hybridization, degree of social articu-
lation, and social divisions as reflected in identities
and differential association. When sociocultural
articulation of social hierarchies is weak, when crys-
tallization is weak, strata boundaries are blurred,
group identities and solidarities are confused, dis-
tances and divisions are fickle, and social inequali-
ties take a complex and unstratified (classless) form.
Late modernity—especially at the time of intense
social differentiation, rationalization, commodifica-
tion, progressive individualization, mass democrati-
zation, and globalization—accompanies a modern
shift in this direction: from simple toward complex
inequality.
This modern shift, among Western industrial-
ized societies, has been charted by Jan Pakulski
along three stages:
1. Early modern industrializing societies (liberal
capitalism), where class inequalities gained central-
ity, class overlapped with status/estate divisions
and crystallized at both ends of the social/power
spectrum. This resulted in class patterning of
inequality, especially the formation of nationalized
working classes and industrial bourgeoisie. The
spread of liberal ideology (emphasizing equality of
opportunity) and the accompanying expansion of
political citizenship further eroded status/estate
divisions and strengthened class stratification.
2. Modern industrial societies (organized capi-
talism), where class stratification and divisions
became strong, culturally organized, and politically
articulated (class parties, movements, ideologies,
etc.). Social and organizational/bureaucratic hierar-
chies combined with social class hierarchies and
divisions. Industrial development and urbanization
facilitated the social articulation—but also pro-
gressive occupational differentiation and market
segmentation—of middle classes, thus heralding a
transition from class stratification to increasingly
complex hybrid stratification.
3. Late modern/postmodern, postindustrial soci-
eties, where industrial classes decompose and
hybridization increases. Increasing globalization,
intensifying social differentiation, bureaucratization,
and progressive individualism prompt further class
decomposition and destratification. Conventional
status inequalities that accompany these processes
are complex and fickle and resemble a status bazaar.
This heralds a transition from hybrid stratification
to complex inequality. If one adopts a geological
analogy, this transition resembles a series of earth-
quakes that destroy the hierarchies of status and
class as reflected in clustered stratification (in the
geological sense of this term).
The process of globalization (increasing global
interconnectedness) contributes to increasing com-
plexity of social inequalities, and it encourages
complex and diverse conceptualizations and repre-
sentations. Social inequalities are no longer con-
fined by national boundaries, and they are
increasingly seen as global as well as national and
local in scope. Analytical schemes, like these social
perceptions of inequalities, become more sensitive
to multidimensionality, time-space distinctiveness,
cultural variation, and constant change.
Different aspects of globalization seem to affect
different aspects of social inequalities in different
and often contradictory ways. Trade liberaliza-
tion, for example, seems to produce new winners
and new losers, with the former heavily concen-
trated among the corporate elites and the latter
found mainly among itinerant workers, indigenous
minorities, and refugees from the unstable regions
of the world. By contrast, the intensified circula-
tion of information and knowledge—another key
aspect of globalization—is widely credited with
democratization and the narrowing of gender and
racial divisions. The net effect depends on the cal-
culus used in, and on the relative weight given to,
different aspects of social hierarchy and division.
Moreover, it is widely recognized that such a net

effect may vary with different regions, nations, and
segments of societies. Contemporary studies of
social inequalities show a declining poverty within
the most populous nations and point to a reduc-
tion in world inequality, but they also indicate the
widening of inequalities at both extremes of mul-
tiple social hierarchies: on the top end, the emer-
gence of super-rich, corporate elites and leaders of
hegemonic superpower(s); on the bottom end, the
refugees and the racially distinct underclasses. At
the same time, political analyses point to more
egalitarian distribution of influence, progressive
democratization, more open elite recruitment, and
elimination of gender barriers.
Generally, the Anglo-American trends seem to
combine socioeconomic polarization with socio-
cultural and sociopolitical leveling. In the sociocul-
tural sphere, inequalities seem to narrow down,
and this egalitarian trend is clearly linked to declin-
ing traditionalism, increasing education, and the
spreading egalitarian and “massified” popular cul-
ture. Under their combined impact, the established
hierarchies of status are either crumbling or hybrid-
izing. Racial divisions persist, but racial prejudices
and discriminations have been losing support,
especially among the educated and affluent “mid-
dle mass,” especially city dwellers. Established
hierarchies of taste have also been undermined by
an increasing polytheism of values, individualism,
and rapidly diversifying lifestyles. While sumptu-
ary capacities and lifestyles vary, claims to a cul-
tural superiority are hard to sustain.
The European developments are more complex.
Whereas in Western and Northern Europe the
postwar egalitarian trends combine with destratifi-
cation, the postcommunist societies of Central and
Eastern Europe are experiencing a sudden widen-
ing of socioeconomic gaps, albeit in increasingly
complex and fluid forms. The lack of systemati-
cally collected data makes it difficult to assess the
trends in the developing regions of the world, but
there are indications that these trends follow the
modern Western trajectory of destratification, pro-
gressive complexity, and flux.
Jan Pakulski
See also Class; Cultural Capital; Globalization;
Modernity and Postmodernity; Society and Social
Identity
Confessional Art 123
Further Readings
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A social critique of the
judgement of taste (R. Nice, Trans.). London:
Routledge. (Original work published 1979)
Pakulski, J. (2005). Foundations of post-class analysis. In
E. O. Wright (Ed.), Approaches to class analysis
(pp. 152–179). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Pakulski J., & Waters, M. (1996). The death of class.
London: Sage.
Confessional Art
Confessional art is a form of contemporary art
that focuses on an intentional revelation of the
private self. Confessional art encourages an inti-
mate analysis of the artist’s, artist’s subjects’, or
spectator’s confidential, and often controversial,
experiences and emotions. Confessional art
emerged in the late 20th century, especially in
Great Britain, and is closely associated with auto-
biographical visual arts and literature.
Definition and Time Frame
The term confessional art was first defined by Outi
Remes in The Role of Confession in Late Twentieth
Century British Art, which discusses confessional
art as a serious, consistent mode for producing art
that mimics, reconsiders, and departs from the
traditional modes of confession used in the Roman
Catholic tradition, autobiographical literature,
and psychoanalysis.
In defining confessional art, autobiographical
literature provides a helpful comparison. Sidonie
Smith and Julia Watson, in Reading Autobiography:
A Guide for Interpreting Life Narratives, distin-
guish between life writing, life narrative, and auto-
biography. They define life writing as a general
term for writing that takes a historical, novelist, or
biographical life as a subject matter, while a self-
referential life narrative is considered as a nar-
rower term that includes the subcategories of
autobiography and confessional writing. Smith
and Watson discuss these categories in relation to
literature but do not define confessional art in
visual arts.
124 Confessional Art
Like autobiographical forms of art, confessional
art draws on the past and borrows and amends
real life. It is based on a selection of autobiograph-
ical memories, feelings, and events. While both auto-
biography and confessional art are self-referential,
confessional art promises to reveal more. Charac­
teristically, it proposes to share the subject’s most
intimate and private experiences, events, and emo-
tions with the spectator.
Although confessional art often shocks and sen-
sationalizes the spectator, it also feeds the specta-
tor’s ever-growing appetite for personal relations.
It responds to a mode of consumption that is
familiar from tabloids, reality television, docu­
soaps, and real-time Internet sites. The paradox of
confessional art is that it reveals more than the
spectator wants to know: more than the spectator
experiences as “safe.” Confessional art reflects,
mimics, parodies, and is inspired by Western pop-
ular culture, values, and its language and ways of
confessing. It explores the relationship between art
and society’s obsessive voyeurism. Confessional
art departs from the conventional values of avant-
garde rebellion that is traditionally considered
superior to the common experience.
Sometimes the popularity of confessional enter-
tainment encourages the spectator to overempha-
size the confessional aspects of the artist’s work,
while ignoring other potential readings to the
work. Confessional art can be mistakenly reduced
to an entertaining reality show. This link between
popular culture and art has led to some hostile
stereotyping by popular press and art critics, such
as Julian Stallabrass in High Art Lite. Stallabrass
emphasizes the theoretical “liteness” of confes-
sional artists such as Tracey Emin and her genera-
tion of artists associated with YBA (Young British
Art), arguing that they take advantage of the
superficial, sensational, and commercial media
obsessions of violence, sex, child abuse, celebrity,
and gossip in order to respond to the recession in
the art market. Similarly, Robert Garnett, in
Occupational Hazard, suggests that British art is
cynical, attention seeking, and approaches the
everyday without serving to fetish the “low” and
affirm the popular. Stallabrass and Garnett con-
sider confession as a simple publicity trick.
There are two key differences that distinguish
confessional art and confessional entertainment
from one another. First, the difference between the
two lies in its very definition: art versus entertain-
ment. The key focus of a reality show is to provide
entertainment and attract large audiences. In spite
of its associations with popular culture, confes-
sional art is not tied to any requirements to please
or attract its audience. Moreover, the use of popu-
lar language and the association with commodity
culture may draw attention away from the fact
that confessional art often deals with complex con-
cepts, including poverty, depression, or trauma.
Second, confessional art encourages the specta-
tor to consider our cultural process of receiving,
making, and consuming confessions. While it
reflects, mimics, and explains these processes, it is
ironic about the cultural values, needs, fears, and
hopes that are expressed throughout confession
and are dominant in current society. Confessional
art does not only address confession from the art-
ist’s and the confessant’s perspectives, but also,
once successful, it involves the spectator by encour-
aging him or her to ask personal and revealing
questions about the confessional subject and the
spectator’s relation to the topic. Moreover, confes-
sional art often uses direct popular language that
may enhance the message, as opposed to the lan-
guage of traditional art that is sometimes perceived
as exclusive, difficult, and theoretical.
Confessional Art and Truth
Sigmund Freud discusses confession as a tool for
the production of truth. The Interpretation of
Dreams introduces a model of the mind that Freud
divides into unconscious, preconscious, and con-
scious domains, which are investigated through
imaginative processes and a personal confession.
The patient is encouraged to speak against his or
her conscious intentions, and confession is consid-
ered to be part of a spontaneous process of free
association in which, in theory, the unconscious
mind is freed while talking to the analyst in order to
discover the hidden truths of the patient’s mind and
selfhood. However, Freud acknowledged that con-
fession may not be the ultimate tool for repressed,
unconscious material, as the truth of psychoanalytic
revelations is estimated with difficulty.
Michel Foucault, in History of Sexuality: The
Will to Knowledge, also argues that confession is
one of the most valuable means of producing
truth. According to Foucault, Western societies

have established the confession as one of the main
rituals we rely on for the production of truth.
Confession has an important role in the judicial
system, medicine, pedagogy, family, and amorous
relations. Foucault discusses the ways in which
everything from desires and childhood to crimes,
sins, and problems are confessed. For Foucault,
confessing creates a power relationship. Power is
divided between the confessant and the confessor,
the priest and the confessant, or the analyst and
the patient—that is, between those dominating
(the confessors) and those being dominated (the
confessants).
Confessional art also pretends exceptional hon-
esty but only seldom presents a factual account;
rather it manipulates and even fabricates subjec-
tive and edited memories. Although confessional
works are sometimes considered as documentaries,
their main interest is not a truthful confession.
Confessional art rather explores the confessional
situation and the elements that influence the spec-
tator’s perception. The confessional subject is a
storyteller. The story is inspired by memories, not
the facts of the past. In art, confessants may
explore new, temporary, and adventurous identi-
ties that provide a route away from everyday real-
ity. The spectator aims to understand confessions
by comparing and contrasting the limited informa-
tion shared in confessional acts, sometimes per-
formed behind masks and wigs. Confessional art is
often a unique and subjective viewing experience
that varies among different spectators.
Confessional Artists
Confessional art emerged as a source of inspiration
in the work of British artists Tracey Emin, Gillian
Wearing, and Richard Billingham in the early
1990s. Outside the United Kingdom, confessional
art is created by Martha Rosler, Sophia Calle, Eija-
Liisa Ahtila, Nan Goldin, Wolfgang Tillman, Ulla
Jokisalo, and Dias & Riedweg.
Emin is a British artist of Turkish Cypriot ori-
gin. She is closely associated with YBA. Through
self-exposure, Emin has dedicated art for a process
of transferring her life into a confessional and per-
formative public artwork. Emin’s memories are
never stable or unchangeable, and she continu-
ously transforms and redevelops her memories.
There has been an increasing interest in Emin by
Confessional Art 125
critics such as Mandy Merck and Chris Townsend.
Emin is a “philistine artist”: The philistine, a prac-
tical and voluptuous person, departs from earlier
avant-garde principles; avant-garde is no longer
considered superior to common taste. According
to Dave Beech and John Roberts, the philistine
treats the aesthetically despised categories and
pleasures of the popular (the pornographic, sleazy,
abject, and facile) as things that are commonplace
and mutually defining of subjectivity, thus needing
no intellectual introduction into art.
Emin was nominated for the Turner Prize in
1999 for her display of My Bed, which repre-
sents her experience of depression. This contro-
versial installation consists of Emin’s unmade
bed and personal objects such as photographs,
cigarettes, condoms, underwear, and a suitcase.
Her other works include political installations
on her abortion experiences, such as The First
Time I Was Pregnant I Started to Crochet the
Baby a Shawl and Gin Bath, Bed and Moses
Basket. In these works, Emin takes neither a pro-
choice nor a pro-life side of the debate but rather
challenges the traditional code of silence and
reveals both positive and negative sides of her
abortion experiences.
Wearing is an English artist, associated with
YBA. Wearing’s art emphasizes ambiguous confes-
sional forms, needs, and motives. Wearing exam-
ines the role of confessional acts in society and
reworks the British “fly-on-the-wall” television
documentaries of the 1960s and the 1970s. Her
work is characterized by enthusiasm for recording
confessions by strangers. Wearing constructs con-
fessional situations in which volunteers with
ambivalent social, therapeutic, or religious motives
confess their acts of theft, revenge, or sexual explo-
ration to the camera. The color video projection
Confess All on Video: Don’t Worry You Will Be in
Disguise. Intrigued? Call Gillian consists of 10
monologues by volunteers who confess their expe-
riences in response to Wearing’s advertisement
“Confess all on video. Don’t worry, you will be in
disguise. Intrigued? Call Gillian,” published in the
London Time Out magazine. The confessants
wear different masks, wigs, or both, that represent
public figures such as former U.S. president George
W. Bush and former member of the British parlia-
ment Neil Kinnock. Wearing won the Turner Prize
in 1997.
126 Conflict
The British photographer Richard Billingham’s
Ray’s a Laugh series of photographs represents the
artist’s family, living in a council flat in the British
West Midlands. It departs from the typical images
of wedding, new baby, graduation, and birthday
photographs. The Ray’s a Laugh series has been
interpreted as an exposure of human drama and
poverty, which responds to the spectator’s habit of
consuming art as utterly social or confessional rev-
elations. Billingham has challenged the spectator’s
voyeuristic response to these readings of social
class. Billingham won the Citybank Photography
Prize in 1997 and was short-listed for the Turner
Prize in 2001.
In the early 21st century, a number of new art-
ists have established their positions within the
genre. The border between fabricated and true ele-
ments continues to remain indistinguishable in
recent confessional practices. Phil Collins’s nomi-
nation for the 2007 Turner Prize emphasized
Collins’s importance. His video projection The
Return of the Real investigates the camera as an
instrument of entertainment and manipulation, of
revelation of truth and shame. Grayson Perry is a
British artist specializing in confessional ceramics
and cross-dressing. Although Perry’s career began
in the 1990s, he is best known for winning the
Turner Prize in 2003. Perry’s topics include crime
and sex scandals, and his work often refers to his
childhood in Essex. The video installation Küba,
by the London-based Turk Kutlug Ataman, maps
the physical and psychological terrain through the
confessional stories of 40 inhabitants of the Küba
community in Istanbul. While these emotional sto-
ries seduce the spectator, the factual value of the
stories remains ambiguous.
Outi Remes
See also Aesthetics; Modern Art; Simulacra
Further Readings
Beech, D., & Roberts, J. (2002). The Philistine
controversy. London: Verso.
De Salvo, D., Ferguson, R., & Slyce, J. (1999). Gillian
Wearing. London: Phaidon Press.
Foucault, M. (1998). The history of sexuality: Vol. 1.
The will to knowledge (R. Hurley, Trans.). London:
Penguin. (Original work published 1974)
McCorquodale, N. S., & Stallabrass, J. (Eds.). (1998).
Occupational hazard: Critical writing on recent
British art. London: Black Dog Publishing.
Merck, M., & Townsend, C. (2002). The art of Tracey
Emin. London: Thames & Hudson.
Remes, O. (2005). The role of confession in late
twentieth century British art. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, University of Reading, UK.
Smith, S., & Watson, J. (2001). Reading autobiography:
A guide for interpreting life narratives. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Stallabrass, J. (1999). High art lite: British art in the
1990s. London: Verso.
Conflict
The word conflict, in its capacities both as a noun
and as a verb, is pressed into service ubiquitously
in the world of human affairs. The conditions and
dynamics of conflict attract scholarly attention
from the humanities; the social, behavioral, and
military sciences; the performing arts; and the fine
arts. These collections of academic disciplines
intersect where individual and collective bodies of
identities and forces (persons, families, groups,
communities, organizations, institutions, and
nation-states) clash and compete for resources
(anything of value). This entry provides an over-
view of conflict, characterizes its most prominent
models, describes the models’ core concepts,
sketches a critique of those models, and provides
a brief overview of the development of an emerg-
ing theoretical orientation.
Overview
Conflict takes place in a world of positioned iden-
tities and interested differences that shape the val-
ues of resources. That which is of value is desirable,
and that which is desirable is in demand, that is,
scarce by definition. Demand breeds competition,
which, under certain conditions, results in conflict.
The relations between competition and conflict are
variable; they are intimately related in several
important respects, but the two are not isomor-
phic. Conflict is understood conventionally as
intense competition for valuable resources in a
world of scarcity and demand. Desire and value

are driven by variable interests and represented by
positioned identities.
Developing alongside the study of conflict has
been the study of how best to manage it rather
than to exacerbate it. A variety of academic disci-
plines investigate forms of communication, such as
dialogue, diplomacy, negotiation, mediation, arbi-
tration, and litigation, as methods for dealing con-
structively with conflict on different scales of
analysis. Other disciplines focus on ways of inter-
vening in resistance, revolution, war, and terror-
ism when conflict escalates. Which methods are to
be used and under what conditions depends on the
particular ways conflict is theorized.
Models of Conflict
Given the immanence of conflict in daily life, it is
not surprising that conflict is explained so many
different ways. Most, but certainly not all, of these
explanations depict conflict in negative terms, as a
failure, a problem, or a threat of some sort. For
example, conflict is understood as a failure of
rationality that causes problems that threaten civi-
lized forms of life. Or the problems may stem from
a failure of social organization in ways that
threaten basic human needs. Or the failure of gov-
ernment institutions may threaten the basic human
rights of its citizenry. Or the moral integrity of a
culture or nation-state may fail, causing problems
that threaten identity itself. These depictions of the
causes of conflict share certain assumptions about
processes and properties of conflict even though
they focus on quite different manifestations of con-
flict. Four of the more prominent ways of under-
standing conflict are discussed in this section.
Rationality Models
In keeping with long-standing Enlightenment
values and principles, conflict often is assumed to
be a failure of economic, scientific, or legal ratio-
nality, resulting in a loss of rationality to irratio-
nality, a loss of objectivity to subjectivity, a loss of
emotional control, and a loss of logic to desire. The
resource assumed to be scarce here is the resource
of rationality itself. Proponents of rationality mod-
els assume that even though appeals to rationality
may not work to avoid conflict altogether, approx-
imations of rationality, objectivity, control, and
Conflict 127
logic can contain or minimize, if not resolve, con-
flict in ways that produce the most civilized, bal-
anced, and progressive solutions possible.
Rational human nature dictates that loss and
risk are to be minimized and that profit and value
are to be maximized. Conflict models are framed
as strategic games to be played, interactional puz-
zles to be solved. The underlying question is usu-
ally whether it is possible for both or all players to
maximize their individual outcomes without fram-
ing the game in competitive terms. For example, if
Party A can maximize his or her outcomes only by
assisting Party B to maximize his or her outcomes,
under what conditions is Party A willing to do so?
And the same question is at stake for Party B. Or is
it more important for Parties A and B to frame the
game in competitive, zero-sum, win–lose terms? Or
perhaps Parties A and B are so habituated to com-
petitive zero-sum games that neither recognizes the
opportunity to do otherwise, even though it would
be in their best interests to do so.
What counts as risk and benefit, however,
remains open to question. Debates persist over
how to determine the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for rationality. The objective of these
games is to find the most rational and thereby
profitable solution to dilemmas that present them-
selves as competitive, zero-sum games but that in
fact are variable-sum games of cooperation.
Microeconomics and game theory are the theoreti-
cal parents for these models of conflict; prisoner’s
dilemma and games of strategy and tactics provide
its research questions.
Social-Psychological Models
Models more in keeping with the social psychol-
ogy of human growth and development assume
that conflict is universal because unmet human
needs are universal. The scarce resources here are
first and foremost the material resources necessary
for survival itself. For humans to become fully
human and thereby to minimize unnecessary con-
flict, they must have their basic human needs met.
Once survival needs are met, higher-order needs
can be addressed, for example, the need for social
relationships and for self-actualization. Beyond the
basic biological requirements for organic life to
sustain itself, however, debate continues regarding
what constitutes the list of universal human needs.
128 Conflict
The universal problem from which universal
human needs derive, it is argued, is that the world
has insufficient resources to meet the basic human
needs of everyone. Some of the scarcity of valuable
resources, it is argued, could be remedied by find-
ing different ways of redistributing resources.
Others contend that there simply aren’t enough
resources for everyone if the competition necessary
for the liberty that provides for higher-order needs
is to be maintained. This argument over how best
to meet basic human needs, of course, is pivotal to
the integrity of democratic forms of governance.
The argument that must remain open for democ-
racy to remain viable is the argument over the val-
ues of equality as opposed to the values of liberty.
In this respect, conflict is assumed to be an integral
part of social psychological life. Within reason (and
those parameters are themselves debatable), some
humans acquire more than others, and different
forms of governance are designed in different ways
to address the problems of uneven and unequal
distribution of valuable resources, including ways
of engaging with the conflict that is an inevitable
by-product of these forms of governance.
Governmentality Models
Other models identify conflict not as a function
of irrationality or of unmet universal human needs,
but rather as a function of political organization,
the distribution of rights and responsibilities, and
the consequences of those functions. The scarce
resources here are power and control. There is never
enough of either for anyone. Power and control, it
is assumed, make order and efficiency possible, and
both are necessary for civilized forms of life to be
maintained. And of course power and control also
make repression and exploitation not only possible
but inevitable. The dynamics that produce conflict
are the struggles for power and control.
Monarchical, dictatorial, fascistic, totalitarian,
autocratic, oligarchic, authoritarian, democratic,
socialistic, and communistic forms of political orga-
nization are formulae for governing with a mini-
mum expenditure of power and a maximum
realization of control, without generating ungovern-
able amounts of resistance. Each form of govern-
mentality generates its own characteristic forms of
conflict, and no form of governance is capable of
doing away with conflict, no matter how permissive
or oppressive the regime may be. Systemically
engendered conflict in each of these forms of gov-
ernance exercises power and control at the same
time it produces resistance and opposition.
Morality Models
Other models assume that conflict arises from
transgressions of moral values that are cultural,
national, or religious in origin. The scarce resource
here is the moral rectitude to adhere to the unques-
tioned superiority of a particular set of moral val-
ues. These models assume the existence of universal
moral principles that distinguish between good
and evil. Transgressing this moral code constitutes
evil and demands retribution in the name of the
law of the unquestioned source of those values.
There are also ethical principles that distinguish
between good and bad, but ethical principles are
assumed to be inferior to moral principles. Ethical
principles are authored by mere mortals. Moral
principles are above question and reproach insofar
as they are authored by an unimpeachable deity.
Morality-driven conflict, then, is assumed to be
justified without question by adherence to its
moral code. It trumps ethically driven conflict on
moral grounds. Ethically driven conflict is secular
and ideological in nature. Adherents to different
moral codes may hold each other in profane con-
tempt, framing each other as evil rather than as
bad, and may assume that communicative contact
with evil is beyond reason and imagination.
The scarce resources here are morality and
sacrality; profanity and evil are in abundance.
Feeding the problem of scarce resources, many
argue, is the universal presence of desire. No mat-
ter how much adherence to a given moral code
there may be at any moment, that adherence is
never universal. And moral codes are universal in
reach and validity. There is always intense compe-
tition with the forces of immorality. The struggles
that produce conflict are struggles to protect
against the forces of profanation and to acquire
ever more universal adherence.
Core Concepts
Models of conflict are built from a core set of con-
cepts, and within each model are unique concepts
that give each approach its characteristic features

and explanatory reach. What follows is a brief
description of seven pairs of concepts that figure
prominently in the four models of conflict dis-
cussed in this entry. These pairings do not consti-
tute an exhaustive list of important concepts, but
they go a long way in explaining the conflict
dynamics of the four models discussed here.
Identity and Difference
Conflict presupposes the existence of at least
one difference and two identities, one on either
side of a difference. The identity us, for example,
can only exist on the other side of one or more
lines of difference that separate us from them.
There can be no identity in and of itself; identity is
by definition a relational, doubled concept. A dif-
ference dividing an entity into two or more parts,
then, is required for the emergence of two or more
identities. When those differences become vested
with interests, they acquire value and serve to but-
tress the positions of identities.
Reciprocity and Turn-Taking
Models of conflict assume the existence of a
norm of reciprocity and a turn-taking procedure.
Given at least one difference and two identities,
relations between identities across difference are
created and maintained by adhering to some form
of reciprocity, some exchange process that is
operationalized by means of a procedure for tak-
ing turns. Reciprocity and turn-taking are the
bases for establishing the minimal trust necessary
for even the most primitive covenant of sociality to
be established.
Resources and Values
Models of conflict also assume the existence of
resources and values. Resources are the contents
of desire that are exchanged, and in the process of
being exchanged, they create value. Resources that
are desirable, by whatever measure, are by defini-
tion in short supply; hence the motivation to
exchange them for other desirable resources. Of
course there is also strong motivation to stockpile
desirable resources that have been acquired. But if
exchange of desirable resources were to cease,
value would collapse. There is an inherent tension,
Conflict 129
then, to stockpile desirable resources without
causing the circuits of exchange to freeze and
value to plummet.
Scarcity and Abundance
Most models of conflict are constructed on the
assumption that valuable resources are scarce; that
scarcity is what explains the resource’s value. If the
resource were abundant, the demand for it that is
driven by desire would collapse. It is scarcity that
drives up the value of, and desire for, resources.
And demand and desire drive their circulation. That
which is abundant is by definition of little value; it
is plentiful to all and thereby not in demand.
Competition and Cooperation
That which is scarce and in demand by virtue of
its value and desirability fuels competition for its
possession, whether it is subsequently stockpiled
or exchanged. And competition requires a certain
amount of ingenuity and guile. Competition
assumes only one of the competing identities can
acquire the greatest quantity of a valued resource.
Sole ownership is assumed to be the valued condi-
tion; it trumps joint ownership or shared owner-
ship, even if that ownership is temporary, owned
only to be exchanged.
Power and Control
All models of conflict assume the existence and
operation of power and control. Some models
make no distinction between power and control,
equating both with the exercise of force. Others
differentiate them in important ways along the
lines of the expansive and self-generative capacities
of power and the repressive and limiting capacities
of control. Models predicated on the former are
interested in multiplying possibilities and exercis-
ing forces; those predicated on the latter are con-
cerned with subtracting possibilities and regulating
forces. Both types of models are used in attempts
to explain the ways in which attempts to manage
potential conflict actually promotes it.
Strategy and Tactic
Whether by these terms or by the terms struc-
ture and process, most models of conflict assume
130 Conflict
an overarching strategic logic for its structural
properties that accounts for its tactical maneuver-
ing in the process of its unfolding. To the extent
that conflict can be comprehended in terms of its
strategic intelligence as well as its tactical ingenu-
ity, it can be both waged and managed more pro-
ductively. By the same token, understanding
conflict in terms of its strategies and tactics creates
possibilities for diminishing conflict, if not resolv-
ing it altogether.
Emerging Models of Conflict
A seemingly unshakable assumption on which
most models of conflict rest is the assumption that
conflict is a negative condition or process that
threatens order and stability, which are assumed to
be preferable to chaos and revolution. But very
little of life is orderly and stable for any lengthy
duration, and conflict rarely appears as full-blown
chaos and absolute revolution. It is not so much a
matter of such models of conflict being wrong as it
is a matter of their being limited in different ways.
Current critiques of conventional conflict theories
argue for specifying the boundaries and limitations
of each of the models and then thinking beyond
those limitations.
The most intransigent and poorly understood
contemporary conflicts revolve around identities,
and identity-driven conflicts seem to be impervious
to rational, psychological, and governmental ways
of understanding and engaging them. The most
challenging current conflicts we face are morality-
driven conflicts revolving around moral identities,
issues of good and evil, of retaliation and redemp-
tion. Identities grounded in moralities are not for-
mulated rationally; they are outside the bounds of
being imaginable by opposing identities and moral-
ities, and they are beyond most contemporary
understandings of emotionality and normality.
It doesn’t appear to be productive simply to
assume that those with morality-based identities
who engage in conflict are somehow crazy, lack-
ing in rationality and normal psychological sophis-
tication. When others are placed outside of our
understanding, they readily become something
less than fully human. And that opens the door for
violent forms of conflict. Assuming that violence
is a less desirable form of conflict than are other
forms it takes on (and that assumption of course
is very arguable), how is it possible to identify
with identities lying far beyond our capabilities to
understand them?
One approach is to turn the assumptions of
failure and scarcity on their heads and to think
instead in terms of the abundant and even exces-
sive resources that make conflict not only possible
but inevitable. Rather than assuming from the out-
set that conflict is reprehensible and needs to be
eradicated, assume instead that conflict is pro-
duced very successfully on a near-universal scale.
What do we know about the most productive, that
is, the most efficient and effective, ways of produc-
ing and nurturing conflict? Rather than eradicat-
ing it, why not learn more about it in self-generative
and mechanistic terms rather than insisting on
understanding it only in negative and moralistic
terms in order to modify it internally in ways that
alter its consequences? This has been the approach
of governmental intelligence agencies, and most of
that work is classified.
Some cutting-edge work in ethics has turned
conventional assumptions about conflict upside
down. Rather than assume that conflict is the
given condition of the world and that our ethical
task is to do good in order to counter the effects of
conflict, this work is assuming that conflict is the
result of attempts to do good, in terms of helping
those we assume are victims and the downtrodden
of the world. The argument is that trying to help
can only produce conflict, that we then assume the
responsibility for resolving, which further exacer-
bates conflict. This approach to the study of conflict
is controversial and is meeting with considerable
resistance. It does, however, represent a radically
new orientation for trying to understand conflict.
Leonard C. Hawes
See also Articulation Theory; Collective/Social Identity;
Discourse; Hegemony; Mediation; Terrorism;
Values; War
Further Readings
Badiou, A. (2001). Ethics: An essay on the understanding
of evil (P. Hallward, Trans.). London: Verso.
Kimball, C. (2003). When religion becomes evil. New
York: HarperCollins.
Maalouf, A. (2000). In the name of identity: Violence
and the need to belong. New York: Arcade.

Schelling, T. C. (1963). The strategy of conflict. New
York: Galaxy Books.
Sen, A. (2006). Identity and violence: The illusion of
destiny. New York: W. W. Norton.
Simmel, G. (1955). Conflict and the web of group-
affiliations. New York: Free Press.
Consciousness
Consciousness begins with the self and may be
described as the active interpretation of social,
cultural, historical, spiritual, ideological, and
political forces of life. Various states of conscious-
ness are based on self-awareness, mindfulness of
one’s surroundings, and the ongoing response to
one’s environment. Consciousness also implies
attentiveness to one’s own thoughts, actions, and
sense of self or identity. As such, consciousness
may infer a cognitive and physical existence—
including the discernment of lived experience,
remembrance, and a sense of being within time
and space. Moreover, consciousness emphasizes
morality, correct and incorrect behavior, measures
of right or wrong, and higher order.
Consciousness is deliberate and intentional and
yet may be the result of phenomena that are quite
unintentional. For example, our subconscious
thoughts lie just beneath the surface of intentional,
observable, or palpable reality. More specifically, a
hypnotic state of consciousness, or dream state of
consciousness, might be described as truth beyond
concrete reality. So the questions continue: Where
does consciousness begin? When does it end? Are
we born into consciousness, or is it a realm to be
achieved? How do we know what we know?
In terms of communication and consciousness,
the theory of linguistic relativity suggests that
awareness of any concept requires having the lan-
guage to grasp and understand the concept. The
theory assumes that one cannot conceive a thing
without first having a transferable concept of the
thing—that is, the product of language. The value
of linguistic relativity is its emphasis on conscious-
ness as perceived, experienced, and understood
through symbols. However, counterarguments
posit that it is highly unlikely that consciousness
ever fails to exist—regardless of one’s (in)ability
to communicate.
Consciousness 131
Consciousness is both independent and collec-
tive. The famous and often quoted statement by
philosopher René Descartes, “I think therefore I
am,” suggests that consciousness begins with the
independent I. Conversely, the Afrocentric theorist
Maulana Karenga has suggested that it is not sim-
ply “I think therefore I am,” but rather “I am
related and relate to others, therefore I am,” which
situates consciousness as an ongoing, collective,
and interactive encounter.
Independent and collective states of conscious-
ness contribute to a perplexing dialectic. For
example, in his exploration of the African American
experience, W. E. B. Du Bois often used the formu-
lation of the veil as a metaphor for the division
between Blacks and Whites. For Du Bois, the veil
represents a particular and dynamic sense of dual
consciousness, which African Americans have
been forced to navigate in American life to the
extent that African and American have been
understood as distinct and competing positions.
Du Bois’s use of the veil can also be thought of
as expressing a cultural epistemology largely unrec-
ognized by dominant White society. Du Bois argues
that African Americans have long understood and
negotiated the dialectical tensions of existing in and
between two worlds. By removing the veil, Du Bois
reveals the self as filtered through the terminal
screen of Whiteness, resulting in a sense of dual
consciousness that is highly ambivalent across vari-
ous contexts of life. Removal of the veil then con-
notes sharing one’s understanding of social order
and meaning. For Du Bois, consciousness consists
of independent and mutual knowledge of self.
Whereas the aforementioned example of con-
sciousness in the work of Du Bois emphasizes
duality for descendants of Africa, several examples
of consciousness foreground other aspects of life
and living. For example, collective consciousness
includes collective efforts for social change and
demonstrates that great social movements result
from the increased awareness between and among
diverse persons forming a consensus on an issue. In
addition, critical consciousness illustrates the
imbalance of social power based on marginality
(e.g., race, gender, culture, class, orientation).
Global consciousness focuses on the presence,
activity, and well-being of societal groups world-
wide. Spiritual consciousness calls attention to
humanity in connection to a higher power.
132 Consumption
Likewise, cosmic consciousness connotes the ongo-
ing awareness of an expanding universe and one’s
place within it.
Undoubtedly, consciousness manifests in multi-
dimensional aspects of the mind and body, and it
may be viewed as the formation, function, opera-
tion, presence, and practice of being alive.
Consciousness is occurrence, both actual and
imagined. It is how we know what we know.
Simultaneously, it is paradoxical and nonmono-
lithic, biological and sensory, within and outside
the body. A nearly impossible concept to define,
consciousness is the ability to reason, rationalize,
access, deduce, and distinguish between and among
myriad levels of knowing.
Consciousness is the essence of experience and
awareness, but beyond simple alertness is a focused
attention to the biological, psychological, and
philosophical realms of living. Within various
states of consciousness is the capacity to reflect on
oneself as part of an internal and external narra-
tion and part of a larger totality. As a literary
concept, stream-of-consciousness consists of criti-
cal movement between what is and what can be,
making it a particularly precarious process to fol-
low. We learn that the smallest elements of our
existence hold transcendental meaning.
Assorted arguments situate consciousness as the
process and product of free will. It is a thing, and
simultaneously the product of all things. At the
risk of generalization, a postmodern approach sug-
gests that all things are integrated into conscious-
ness. Perhaps consciousness is all this and more.
Mark C. Hopson
See also Culture, Ethnicity, and Race; Language
Further Readings
Carruthers, P. (2005). Consciousness: Essays from a
higher-order perspective. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Du Bois, W. E. B. (1996). The souls of Black folk. New
York: Penguin. (Original work published 1903)
Karenga, M. R. (2003). Nommo, Kawaida and
communicative practice: Bringing good into the world.
In R. L. Jackson II & E. B. Richardson (Eds.),
Understanding African American rhetoric: Classical
origins to contemporary innovations (pp. 3–22). New
York: Routledge.
Lycan, W. (1987). Consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Rosenthal, D. (2005). Consciousness and mind. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press.
Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, thought, and reality:
Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf
(J. B. Carroll, Ed.). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Consumption
Identity, despite its idiosyncratic implications, is
not a free-floating quality. Rather it is a social con-
struct organically connected to varied dimensions
of social life. Each social order gives birth to a set
of opportunities and conditions that either enable
or constrain individuals in the making of their
respective identities. Even those who are interested
in transcending existing identities need the social
and cultural “materials” against which they work,
or better, on the basis of which they weave new
identities. Having this premise of the social produc-
tion of identities at the hub of their analysis, recent
social theorists contend that the self has assumed a
commodified form that is expressed through the
consumption of goods and services. Their argu-
ment is antithetical to the productivist logic, which
is premised on the idea that human beings are cre-
ative social agents who are primarily engaged in
productive activity through which they have the
potential to define themselves. In contrast, theore-
ticians of consumer society, including Zygmunt
Bauman and Jean Baudrillard, contend that the
nature of contemporary capitalism has assumed a
qualitatively new turn that the self has no choice
save to be swamped by the logic of consumer soci-
ety. Others, such as Thorstein Veblen, have pro-
vided a mild version of this contention, focusing on
status-driven consumption. On the other extreme,
critical theorists view consumption under advanced
capitalism, not as a sign of freedom in which mem-
bers of society construct their identities without
restraint but as an instrument of “repressive toler-
ance,” a state of unfreedom from which emancipa-
tion has become increasingly difficult.
Identity, Consumer Society, and Mass Culture
The first social theorist to have broken with
the productivist logic, although not completely

abandoning it, was Veblen. Veblen is noted in this
regard for his identification of the connection
between identity and consumption. The underlying
premise of his analysis is that for some groups,
consumption is not merely a passive moment
wherein individuals simply satisfy their appetites.
Instead, consumption can assume an active mode
with significant social implications. More precisely,
using the consumptive behavior of the upper
classes of his time, Veblen showed how status and
consumption patterns are connected. In demon-
stration of this connection, Veblen noted that
members are actively involved in the two-pronged
dimensions of “conspicuous waste,” namely, “con-
spicuous consumption” and “conspicuous leisure.”
Whereas the former involves engagement in pal-
pable waste of time and effort, the latter refers to
eye-catching waste of goods. These two processes
complement one another: Active consumers need
leisure time to cultivate appropriate dispositions in
order to understand the quality and hierarchy of
the goods to be consumed.
The fundamental feature of conspicuous con-
sumption and conspicuous leisure is not that they
are acts involving waste only. More importantly, in
tune with the idea that wealth and power are what
they are by virtue of the capacity of their possess-
ors’ ability to display the political significance of
their power and the value of the goods they own,
conspicuous waste serves as a critical instrument in
a status-making process. For instance, through
conspicuous leisure, members of a class express
their disdain for instrumental labor; thereby, their
nonlabor serves as a marker of higher distinction.
On the other hand, conspicuous consumption pro-
nounces social status by amplifying the utilization
of goods that are considered to be the visible signs
of a high position. Neither form of conspicuous
waste accomplishes its intended goal in the same
way and at all times. The extent to which the two
modes of waste are used is determined by “adver-
tising expediency.” In communities where the
size of the group is small, the most effective way
of reaching the group for which the display is
intended is conspicuous leisure. In contrast, in
highly differentiated societies, the most expedient
method is conspicuous consumption, because it is
the best available means to reach a wide range
of individuals. All the same, whether it is in small
groups or in highly differentiated societies,
Consumption 133
conspicuous waste can have an important conse-
quence for society as a whole. Over time, a “norm
of reputability” can be created in which the behav-
ior patterns of the uppers are legitimized, and
those who are below them can hardly afford to
violate “the accepted code.”
Despite Veblen’s interest in the relationship
between consumption and status, his theory had a
good dose of productivist logic. It is in the work of
Baudrillard that nonproductivism is extended to
its ultimate conclusion. Baudrillard’s first order of
business in this endeavor was to reconstruct Karl
Marx’s notion of value. To Marx’s exchange value
(the value of goods for which something could be
traded) and use value (the value of a commodity
when put to use), he adds a third element, sign
value (symbolic prestige value). Consistent with
his three-dimensional notion of value, Baudrillard
provided a qualitatively different interpretation of
consumption, which he believes aptly reflects the
nature of postindustrial societies. Accordingly, he
rejects a dichotomy between production and con-
sumption in which the two are perceived as oppo-
sites entailing dynamism and passive appropriation,
respectively. Under advanced capitalism, con-
sumption, from his perspective, assumes a differ-
ent role: It is not a docile “state of assimilation”
anymore; it is an “active mode of relations” in
which members of society enthusiastically partici-
pate. However, this involvement does not only imply
the consumption of goods at a massive scale. In
fact, the defining feature of this society is that con-
sumption ceases to be a material practice. Instead,
consumption becomes a signifying mode (a way of
signaling prestige and social status), and the satis-
faction of needs and the appropriation of objects
are its preconditions. Consumption involves the
manipulation of signs, and objects of consumption
are what they are only when they are amenable to
the processes of signification. This makes advanced
capitalism a distinctively unique social order with
important implications for identity formation.
One of the most salient traits of this “sign-value
regime” is that conspicuous consumption, far from
being a segmented activity, becomes the significant
feature of all and sundry. The universalization of
conspicuous consumption implies that status and
consumption are linked to one another in an
inseparable fashion. In the construction of iden-
tity, the process of consumption is not a side issue
134 Consumption
that members deal with at whim. To consume
means to assert one’s identity.
In a similar vein, Bauman contends that the
identity of “consumers in consumer society” is dis-
tinctly different from the identity of consumers of
the past. It is not in the nature of these identities to
stand still, for firm commitments to desires and
needs would contradict the fundamentals of con-
sumer society, a society of individuals with mal-
leable personas. Satisfaction is not presupposed by
a complex ability to consume objects either.
Consumer objects are readily available to be appro-
priated by the consumer without requiring a pre-
made sensibility. All this entails the reversal of the
traditional relationship between needs and their
satisfaction: Current needs are foreshadowed by an
intense promise for satisfaction. Furthermore, the
link between seduction and consumers is not a rela-
tionship between an external force and agents who
are out there to be manipulated. On the contrary,
without denying the impact of market forces on
individuals, Bauman notes that consumers possess
an inbuilt disposition to be seduced. Consequently,
consumers are not marked by their desire to collect
goods that meet their needs indefinitely. Rather
they are primarily ongoing “gatherers of sensa-
tions.” The combined effect of all these is that
“fixed signposts” in the life plan of individuals are
rendered irrelevant. There are no moments that are
considered and sought after to last ad infinitum.
Critical theorists provide an entirely different
picture with respect to the relationship between
consumer society and identity formation. For these
theorists, consumer culture is an important dimen-
sion of a “totally administered society.” In these
societies, identities are not constructed in a cre-
ative fashion via the processes of consumption as
implied in previous theories. The impact of con-
sumer society on identity formation has gone in a
different direction. It has created a state in which
individuals feel that they are able to assert their
autonomy, but in reality, there is so much that
constrains them. What is more, consumer culture
has the power of hiding the extent to which indi-
viduals lose their ability to make a difference in
their respective societies. The token autonomous
advantages that persons in mass societies seem to
get out of their consumptive actions are out-
weighed by their inability to create a better social
space in which they truly assert their identities.
More precisely, what consumptive behavior
does to individuals is redirect their attention into
areas that are harmless to the existing social order.
Because the identities of individuals are signifi-
cantly conditioned by market forces, they lose their
critical perspective and instead become “happy
robots” within a large-scale social system that pro-
vides little room for creative self-expression.
Consequently, identity is superimposed from with-
out instead of being the outcome of self-actualizing
processes. Members of a totally administrated soci-
ety are encouraged to be social monads and refrain
from collective actions that challenge the essentials
of the existing social order. This process of resigna-
tion, among other things, is made possible through
the creation of “false needs.” False needs are those
artificially created needs whose instrumental value
is external to those who are manipulated to trea-
sure them. The ultimate outcome of indulgence in
false needs is repression. By encouraging the exis-
tence of false needs, advanced capitalism promotes
the formation of administered individuals who are
caught within the framework of “civil privatism,”
an attitude that renders issues of social worth as
less important.
Other theorists, such as bell hooks, have gone
as far as asserting that commodification does not
merely constrain genuine self-actualization. By
demoting protest to the status of spectacle, it can
also “mortify” the social movement self. This hap-
pens when social objects constructed within a
social movement culture assume a meaning differ-
ent from what they were originally intended. From
objects of resistance, they turn into mere objects of
consumption for all. As a result, to the extent that
an insurgent attitude is diluted, social movement
objects lose their political significance. That is to
say, social objects that have an important place
within the movement culture increasingly lose
their previous meaning. Symbols that had meaning
within the culture of resistance now just become
mere objects of consumption. And the very people
who consume the same objects see them as instru-
ments of expression without political significance.
Hence, as bell hooks concludes, commodification
has the capacity to diffuse critical consciousness to
the extent that communities of resistance are
turned into communities of consumption, and con-
sumer identity—and not identity of resistance—
becomes the norm.

Future Theory
The discussion on the relationship between con-
sumption and identity under modernity and beyond
has taken diverse routes. The approaches in these
courses have made important contributions; yet,
like most theories, they are not immune to limita-
tions. Veblen’s approach made a breakthrough in
its consideration of the connection between the two
social elements. But his analysis was limited to the
case of certain groups without considering the
implications of his analysis to other cases in some
depth. Although this limitation is taken up by
Baudrillard and Bauman, their arguments may have
gone too far in disregarding the importance of non-
consumerist behavior in the formation of identities.
More specifically, Baudrillard’s argument that con-
sumption has assumed a nonmaterial mode and
Bauman’s contention that identities in consumer
society can only be malleable seem to be exagger-
ated assertions. On the other hand, critical theorists
have targeted their analysis on the negative implica-
tions of the connection between consumption and
identity. Yet they, too, may have gone too far in
disregarding the autonomy that members of mod-
ern societies have in their reactions to the conse-
quences of consumer society. It is hoped that future
theory will synthesize the important aspects of each
theory while at the same time adding new dimen-
sions to address emergent social features.
Alem Kebede
See also Identification; Identity and Democracy; Identity
and Reason; Identity Change; Identity Negotiation;
Identity Politics
Further Readings
Adorno, T., & Horkheimer, M. (1972). The culture
industry: Enlightenment as mass deception. In
J. Cumming (Trans.), Dialectic of Enlightenment
(pp. 120–167). New York: Seabury Press.
Baudrillard, J. (1988). Jean Baudrillard: Selected writings.
Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
Baudrillard, J. (1998). The consumer society. London:
Sage.
Bauman, Z. (1999). The self in consumer society.
Hedgehog Review, 1, 35–40.
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Distinction: A social critique of the
judgment of taste. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Contact Hypothesis 135
Dunn, R. G. (2008). Identifying consumption: Subjects
and objects in consumer society. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press.
hooks, b. (1992). Black looks: Race and representation.
Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
Marcuse, H. (1964). One-dimensional man. Boston:
Beacon Press.
Veblen, T. (1934). The theory of the leisure class. New
York: Modern Library.
Contact Hypothesis
In its most basic form, contact hypothesis posits
that contact with members of another group (e.g.,
racial, ethnic, religious, class, or gender group)
reduces prejudice toward the group. Since 1954,
when the contact hypothesis was introduced by
Gordon Allport in his book, The Nature of
Prejudice, the hypothesis has elicited numerous
studies and contributed to advancing the issue of
intergroup relations. Because social categorization
and sense of group membership constitute a base
of the hypothesis, identity issues, such as social
identity and group identity, underlie contact
hypothesis. This entry provides an overview of the
contact hypothesis, describes conditions for con-
tact effects, explains the process of contact effects,
presents a model summarizing the process of con-
tact effects, and summarizes the criticism of the
contact hypothesis.
Overview
For at least the past 50 years, numerous studies
about contact hypothesis have been conducted
with diverse groups and in a wide range of settings.
Many of these studies supported the hypothesis,
that is, that intergroup contact reduces intergroup
prejudice. However, it was questioned if contact
per se (or any kind of contact) reduced prejudice
or if certain conditions were necessary for the
positive effects of contact to occur. Initially,
Allport identified four conditions that lead inter-
group contact to a positive outcome. The first
condition is equal status. Contact between mem-
bers of two groups functions positively when the
status of the two contacting groups is perceived as
equal by the members in the contacting situation.
136 Contact Hypothesis
Second, when two contacting groups share com-
mon goals, the contact in the process of achieving
the common goals can reduce prejudice. The third
condition is intergroup cooperation. Reduction of
prejudice may not occur in the contact in which
members of different groups compete with each
other for their goals. When members of different
groups work cooperatively for common benefits,
the influence of contact can be positive. The
fourth condition concerns institutional support,
such as support of authorities, social atmosphere,
law, or custom. Social institutions provide criteria
or norms of intergroup acceptance and guidelines
for how people treat members of outgroups. For
example, civil rights legislation suggests the social
norms for interracial interaction in U.S. society.
When intergroup contact is discouraged and mis-
guided by social institution, the contact may not
produce the positive outcome. Whereas Allport
claimed that all four conditions are essential for
the positive outcome of contact to occur, Thomas
Pettigrew, in an extensive meta-analysis published
in 2006, discovered that contact alone can reduce
intergroup prejudice and suggested that the four
conditions played facilitating roles rather than
essential roles in the reduction of prejudice.
Conditions for Contact Effects
In the early studies of contact hypothesis, research-
ers were concerned with testing the contact condi-
tions that can ensure positive effects. Several more
conditions were identified in addition to Allport’s
original four. Among them are the following:
(a) The outgroup member should show stereotype-
disconfirming characteristics in contact, (b) the
contact situation should be individual oriented and
intimate, (c) the contact between members of dif-
ferent groups should be voluntary, and (d) mem-
bers of different groups should not have contrasting
values or beliefs. Besides these positive conditions,
negative conditions that can increase intergroup
prejudice were also the focus of some studies.
These negative conditions include competitive con-
tact, unpleasant and involuntary contact, contact
that lowers one group’s status, contact with a frus-
trated group, and contact with a group having
incompatible values and belief.
These positive and negative conditions are
understood as either antecedents of contact or
moderators in the relationship between contact
and prejudice. In case of antecedents, the condi-
tions influence intergroup contact first. Then,
contact influences intergroup prejudice. Intergroup
contact functions as a mediator that transmits
effects of the conditions to prejudice. As for the
conditions as moderators, effects of contact on
prejudice differ depending on the levels of the con-
ditions. For example, when a level of equal status
of two contacting groups is high, the intergroup
contact reduces intergroup prejudice. However,
when two contacting groups have a low level of
equal status, the contact effects of the unequal
groups can be negative (i.e., the contact can
increase intergroup prejudice).
Process of Contact Effects
Whereas researchers in early studies of contact
hypothesis were more interested in conditions of
contact effects, researchers in later studies paid
attention to the process or mechanism of how con-
tact reduces prejudice.
Cognitive Tendencies in Intergroup Contact
Some typical cognitive tendencies are observed
in intergroup contact. People divide individuals
into ingroup, outgroup, and stereotype outgroup
categories. This is very common in intergroup rela-
tions work. Attribution and expectancy-confirming
biases are also cognitive tendencies that occur when
people process intergroup information.
Social Categorization and Stereotyping
Intergroup contact presupposes division
between ingroup and outgroup, that is, social
categorization. Social categorization occurs as a
result of depersonalizing ingroup and outgroup
members and perceiving group members as hav-
ing prototypical common characteristics. Social
categorization is a natural and common cogni-
tive tendency. It has functions of simplifying
incoming information of the outgroup, process-
ing the information rapidly, predicting outgroup
members’ behavior with less effort, and guiding
one’s own behavior in the contact with outgroup
members. As a result of social categorization,
however, people tend to pay more attention to

others’ group affiliation and perceive them based
on the group membership rather than on their
individuality.
Social categorization is closely related to ste-
reotyping. The process of stereotyping includes
(a) categorizing people based on easily recogniz-
able characteristics, such as skin color; (b) ascrib-
ing the same characteristic to all members of a
group; and (c) perceiving any member of a group
on the basis of the characteristic ascribed to the
group. Whereas social categorization is more
likely to involve categorization of people and the
process of the categorization, stereotyping is more
about a focus on collective characteristics of a
group and assessing an individual on the basis of
these group attributes.
Both social categorization and stereotyping
emphasize an individual’s group membership
(social identity) rather than individuality, lead
people to seeing outgroup members in a mono-
lithic manner, and constitute a major source of
prejudice toward an outgroup. Intergroup preju-
dice can be reduced by individuating the mono-
lithic perspective on outgroup members. Repeated
contact with diverse members of an outgroup in
various settings can facilitate this move toward
seeing others as individuals rather than categori-
cally as groups or group members.
Attribution Bias
Attribution bias is another cognitive process
occurring in intergroup contact. When we observe
outgroup members’ negative behavior, we tend to
attribute the negative behavior to the collective
disposition of the outgroup and perceive it as
typical behavior of members of the outgroup. At
the same time, we attribute ingroup members’
negative behavior to outside sources rather than
ingroup disposition and we regard the negative
behavior as an exception. In addition, we perceive
outgroup members’ positive behavior as an excep-
tion, whereas ingroup members’ positive behavior
is attributed to our own group’s disposition.
Prejudice can be easily reinforced by a few cases of
negative observation and may not be reduced even
by many observations of outgroup members’ posi-
tive behavior. Again, repeated contact with out-
group members in diverse settings can adjust this
bias and reduce intergroup prejudice.
Contact Hypothesis 137
Expectancy-Confirming Bias
People have a tendency to seek and prefer infor-
mation of an outgroup that confirms their precon-
ception. They tend to ignore information that is
not consistent with their expectations of the out-
group. When people receive expectancy-confirming
information, they tend to accept it without screen-
ing or evaluating it, whereas they tend to reject
the information that disconfirms their stereo-
types toward the outgroup. Expectancy-confirming
bias also occurs when remembering and retrieving
information about an outgroup. Information that
is inconsistent with people’s stereotype is easily lost
in their memory, whereas stereotype-confirming
information is well stored and becomes salient
whenever it needs to be retrieved. The expectancy-
confirming bias strengthens people’s prejudice
toward an outgroup. People’s repeated exposure
to diverse outgroup members who show vari-
ous expectancy-disconfirming behavior can adjust
this bias.
Mechanism of Contact Effects
The mechanism of how contact reduces inter-
group prejudice is explained on the basis of two
main theories: the interpersonal attraction theory
and the cognitive dissonance theory.
Interpersonal Attraction Theory
According to the theory of interpersonal attrac-
tion, interpersonal contact with specific outgroup
members opens chances to recognize similarities in
beliefs, value, and attitudes between our own and
those of the outgroup members. Our discovery of
the similarities leads to personal understanding
and liking of the outgroup members we come into
contact with. This feeling of understanding and
liking expands as we have more contact with more
diverse outgroup members for a more prolonged
time period. The increased feeling of understand-
ing and liking eventually changes our overall atti-
tude toward the outgroup, from negative to
positive. The prejudice reduction based on the
interpersonal attraction works well when Allport’s
four conditions for positive intergroup contact are
met, because the conditions provide the basis on
which different group members demonstrate their
similarities.
138 Contact Hypothesis
Cognitive Dissonance Theory
When people experience dissonance between the
information they already have and new informa-
tion they receive, they feel uncomfortable and
make efforts to reduce the inconsistency. This cog-
nitive dissonance includes inconsistency between
people’s attitude and behavior. When people’s atti-
tude and behavior are not consistent, they attempt
to reduce the gap, frequently by changing their
attitude. That is, attitude change arises from dis-
sonance between attitude and behavior. In the
context of intergroup contact, when people with a
negative attitude toward an outgroup have contact
with outgroup members in social settings, they may
not feel free to express their negative attitude
overtly and thus might find themselves interacting
with the prejudiced group members in a positive
manner. Repeated experiences of this type of dis-
sonance between their attitude and behavior toward
outgroup members lead some people to change
their negative attitude to one that is consistent with
their behavior.
Process of Contact Effects
Influence of contact on a change in attitude
involves mediating processes. One explanation of
the mediating process is based on the different
types of group categorization (i.e., the different
ways people perceive ingroup and outgroup mem-
berships). The other explanation focuses on the
cognitive and affective factors.
Group Categorization
The strategy of decategorization (individuation)
emphasizes interpersonal contact by removing or
reducing salience of group membership in inter-
group contact. Intergroup contact, especially in its
initial stage, can be obstructed by intergroup anxi-
ety caused by intergroup differences, preconcep-
tions, and lack of information about the other
group. Contacting an outgroup member in an
interpersonal context where each person’s group
membership is not salient reduces the anxiety of
the contact and thus contributes to the persons
from each group developing a positive interper-
sonal relationship. This positive interpersonal rela-
tionship developed by decategorization reduces
intergroup prejudice as explained by the theory of
interpersonal attraction.
However, contact effects in a decategorized
context may be limited to the specific contact case
a person directly experiences. That is, one’s
reduced prejudice toward an outgroup member
based on his or her personal relationship may not
be applied to all members of the outgroup.
Because of this generalization issue, some scholars
claim that people’s group membership should be
salient for the reduction of prejudice at a group
level. Therefore, salient categorization is a neces-
sary process for generalized effects of contact on
prejudice.
The common ingroup identity model suggests
recategorization as an effective process for positive
contact effects. As a result of repeated contact with
outgroup members, commonalities between mem-
bers of different groups can be salient or discov-
ered. Based on the commonalities, the members of
different groups recognize or establish an over-
arching group category that embraces both groups.
Members in the originally different group perceive
themselves as one common group. Then, the origi-
nal intergroup prejudice fades away. Pettigrew
includes all three ideas—decategorization, salient
categorization, and recategorization—in the pro-
cess of contact effects by giving them an order. In
the initial stage of intergroup contact, decategori-
zation may be effective. Then, people need to
extend their reduced prejudice to the overall group
through salient categorization. Finally, recategori-
zation contributes to ensuring the reduction of
prejudice.
Mediating Factors
Some cognitive and affective factors mediate
effects of contact on prejudice. First, intergroup
contact increases knowledge about outgroup
members. Especially, repeated contact between
members of different groups provides more oppor-
tunities for mutual self-disclosure. Self-disclosure
involves an exchange of personal information; this
disclosure facilitates the development of a com-
plex and diversified perception of outgroup mem-
bers. This perception overrides negative stereotypes
toward outgroup members and eventually reduces
prejudices.
 Contact Hypothesis 139

Second, affective factors also play a mediating
role in the process of contact effects. Intergroup
contact lessens negative emotion and increases
positive emotion. Because of the anticipation of
negative consequences, such as embarrassment,
rejection, discrimination, or misunderstanding,
anxiety accompanies intergroup contact, which
contributes to negative outcomes of contact.
Consistent and diverse contact with outgroup
members increases familiarity with outgroup mem-
bers, decreases intergroup anxiety, and, finally,
reduces prejudice toward an outgroup.
Another affective factor that mediates contact
effects is empathy. Intergroup contact brings more
information about outgroup members, which can
produce empathy. With empathy, we perceive out-
group members as more similar to us. The percep-
tion of increased commonalities decreases negative
attitude toward outgroup members.
Third, intergroup contact influences not only
outgroup but also ingroup attitude. By experienc-
ing different characteristics of an outgroup, we can
gain a more flexible perspective on the social world.
That is, we may realize that the norms and customs
of our own group may not be the only criteria for
living in the social world. This flexible view on
characteristics of the outgroup softens our preju-
dice toward that group.
Model for Process of Contact Effects
A model can be formulated that summarizes the
process of the contact hypothesis (see Figure 1).
First, personal, situational, and societal anteced-
ents affect intergroup contact. The personal ante-
cedents include personal characteristics and
experiences of contact participants. Allport’s con-
ditions of equal status, cooperation, and common
goals are examples of the situational antecedents.
Social structure and social institution constitute
the societal antecedents. Second, effects of inter-
group contact are transmitted to two groups of
mediating variables, which interplay. Group cate-
gorization is one type of mediator and includes
decategorization, salient categorization, and recat-
egorization. The affective and cognitive factors
and reappraisal of the ingroup belong to the other
group of mediators. Finally, effects of these media-
tors are conveyed to prejudice.
Criticism
Although the contact hypothesis has been sup-
ported in numerous studies, authors of these stud-
ies have noted limitations and problems. Criticism
of the hypothesis centers on three issues: causal
direction, contact conditions, and generalization
problems.
Causal Direction
Numerous studies have shown an association
between intergroup contact and prejudice, but the
studies have not produced clear empirical support
for the causal direction from contact to prejudice.
Intergroup contact may reduce intergroup prejudice,

Group Categorization
(decategorization,
silent categorization,
recategorization)

Antecedents
(personal, Prejudice
Contact
situational,
societal)

Mediating Factors
(cognitive,
affective)

Figure 1   Process of Contact Effects

140 Corporate Identity
but it is also possible that people with less prejudice
have more intergroup contact.
Contact Conditions
In addition to Allport’s original conditions for
positive contact effects, many other conditions influ-
encing contact effects have been identified, and more
are coming to light. Because contact effects can be
affected by numerous factors (i.e., effects of contact
on prejudice vary depending on an endless number
of conditions), consistent measures of contact effects
may not be possible. That is, it may be problematic
to predict prejudice from contact, because of the
possible numerous influential conditions.
Generalization Problems
Studies on contact hypothesis do not clearly
specify how reduction of prejudice observed in an
specific individual’s contact with specific outgroup
members can be generalized to a reduction of
prejudice toward all members of the outgroup.
Three generalization problems were identified:
generalization across situation, generalization from
the outgroup individual to the outgroup, and gen-
eralization from the immediate outgroup to other
outgroups. The first problem questions if contact
effects observed in a specific situation can be
extended to other situations. The second problem
is about how contact effects with a specific out-
group member can be generalized to all members
of the outgroup. The third problem concerns
whether contact effects with a specific outgroup
can also occur with other outgroups.
Eura Jung
See also Attribution; Cognitive Dissonance Theory;
Collective/Social Identity; Group Identity; Stereotypes
Further Readings
Allport, G. W. (1979). The nature of prejudice.
Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books. (Original work
published 1954)
Amir, Y. (1969). Contact hypothesis in ethnic relations.
Psychological Bulletin, 71, 319–342.
Brewer, M. B., & Miller, N. (1984). Beyond the contact
hypothesis: Theoretical perspectives on segregation. In
N. Miller & M. B. Brewer (Eds.), Groups in contact:
The psychology of desegregation (pp. 281–302). New
York: Academic Press.
Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., & Bachman, B. A. (1996).
Revisiting the contact hypothesis: The induction of a
common ingroup identity. International Journal of
Intercultural Relations, 20, 271–290.
Hewstone, M., & Brown, R. (1986). Contact is not
enough: An intergroup perspective on the “contact
hypothesis.” In M. Hewstone & R. Brown (Eds.),
Contact and conflict in intergroup encounters
(pp. 1–44). New York: Blackwell.
Kenworthy, J. B., Turner, R. N., Hewstone, M., & Voci, A.
(2005). Intergroup contact: When does it work and
why? In J. Dovidio, P. Glick, & L. R. Rudman (Eds.),
On the nature of prejudice: Fifty years after Allport
(pp. 278–292). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Pettigrew, T. F. (1997). Generalized intergroup contact
effects on prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 23, 173–185.
Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup contact theory.
Annual Review of Psychology, 49, 65–85.
Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic
test of intergroup contact theory. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 751–783.
Stephen, W. G. (1987). The contact hypothesis in
intergroup relations. In C. Hendrick (Ed.), Group
process and intergroup relations (pp. 13–40).
Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Corporate Identity
Corporate identity is not only what an organiza-
tion perceives itself to be but also what an organi-
zation says it is. Hence, corporate identity is often
understood as an externally oriented concept. The
concept has its roots in the consultancy business
and marketing. Still, there is a marked increase in
literature focusing on corporate identity across
several disciplines. One reason for this might be
that identity, in general, is seen as important for
the foundation of the image and reputation of the
organization. This entry elaborates on the pleth-
ora of definitions of corporate identity, why aca-
demics and practitioners argue for the importance
of the concept, the question of whether the entity
can be managed, and the theoretical approaches
to corporate identity. The entry concludes some
words of caution for those wishing to understand
or work with corporate identity issues.

Definitions
The concept of corporate identity first appeared in
the 1950s and was first used in design studies.
Much of the literature dealing with the concept
since that time has also been distinctly practitioner
driven and oriented. It is, however, a common
complaint that there is a lack of consistent use of
the concept of corporate identity, both in theory
and in practice. Seemingly, the only thing that the
literature on this notion has in common is the view
that it implies something that symbolizes the orga-
nization as a whole. The plethora of meanings
assigned to the concept is partly a consequence of
how scholars within a wide range of disciplines
increasingly have worked with it. Publications on
corporate identity can be found in the literature
from marketing, corporate communication, man-
agement, organizational communication, public
relations, organizational theory, and psychology.
One conclusion reached by many scholars is that
corporate identity is a difficult concept that merits
an interdisciplinary approach.
Despite the many different takes, most scholars
agree that corporate identity is an externally ori-
ented and mediated concept. From an organiza-
tional perspective, it is often defined through the
question “Who or what do we say we are?” It has
to do with how an organization presents itself in
public, and it deals with the mental associations
that an organization wants stakeholders to have
about it. In other words, the articulation of a cor-
porate identity is a management task and is tied to
a managerial perspective. A distinction is often
made between corporate identity and organiza-
tional identity, the latter being seen as an internally
oriented concept. Organizational identity focuses
on what all members of an organization think the
organization is about. The question an organiza-
tion might ask is “Who or what are we?”
Corporate identity is influenced primarily by
management’s articulation of the vision and mis-
sion for the organization. Organizational identity,
on the other hand, is influenced primarily by the
perceptions, feelings, and thoughts about the orga-
nization held by its members or employees. Still,
these two entities, corporate identity and organiza-
tional identity, should be seen as having a dialecti-
cal relationship. Management will often influence
the organizational identity when offering up
Corporate Identity 141
symbols that are internalized and used by the
members or employees. On the other hand, man-
agement will also need to grasp and build on the
organizational identity in order to formulate a
corporate identity that can be rooted in the orga-
nization and that the members feel are relevant to
their own experience of the organization. As
pointed out by many scholars, however, the strict
division between external and internal stakehold-
ers does not necessarily do justice to the situation
of an organization because such boundaries often
are blurred.
Another useful distinction is between corpo-
rate identity, on the one hand, and image and
reputation, on the other. Image is often reserved
for describing the immediate impression that
stakeholders form of an organization, whereas
reputation is frequently said to deal with such
judgments over time. Reputations are seen as
more durable than images; for instance, they have
been defined as the collective judgments observers
have of an organization based on their assessments
of the financial, social, or environmental impact of
the corporation over time. In addition, reputations
are influenced by the stakeholders’ firsthand and
secondhand experience with the goods or services
of the organization.
Both image and reputation are entities that
reside in the minds of the stakeholders, thus mak-
ing it futile for organizations to control them.
Corporate identity, on the other hand, is some-
thing that an organization can control through
how it presents itself. In other words, corporate
identity can be understood as the way that an
organization presents itself to people, which in
turn helps form some of the basis for how people
think about and relate to the organization. The
latter point is also a partial answer for questions in
the next section.
Importance
The importance of corporate identity is said to
have increased as a result of environmental factors
such as globalization, increased competition, and
deregulation. For instance, whereas a provider of
telephone services previously might have enjoyed a
monopoly on such services, it now increasingly
needs to compete with private companies in the
same market. In this new business context, the
142 Corporate Identity
telephone company is expected to set itself apart
from its competitors and look at its identity, both
organizational and corporate, as a starting point.
Again, identity is thought to form the basis for
the image and the reputation of an organization. In
other words, identity is the basis for the distinc-
tiveness that marketers seek when they attempt to
position an organization. A growing literature on
identity, image, and reputation points to how a
consistent and pleasing corporate identity leads to
a positive image. Over time, positive images are
thought to create a good reputation for the organi-
zation. Researchers on reputation and reputation
management argue that this attribute leads to sev-
eral desired consequences for an organization. It is,
for instance, maintained that a good reputation
helps to increase sales, helps attract investors,
increases the ability to recruit and retain employ-
ees, and helps organizations to get favorable media
coverage that can cushion the blow to the organi-
zation during crises. Attempts to demonstrate and
quantify the direct impact of reputation on, for
instance, financial results have been wrought with
some methodological difficulties. Still, it seems
that few would dispute that a good reputation has
some value for an organization.
Management
Corporate identity deals with questions such as:
What is our business? What is our strategy? What
is our history? How do we perform? Where are we
going? By answering such questions, organizations
are taking steps to manage their corporate identity.
Corporate identity then can be seen as a strategic
tool of the organization. It is captured in the vision
and mission of the organization and the strategies
it chooses to reach its goals.
In their seminal work on identity, Stuart Albert
and David A. Whetten pointed to three require-
ments for identity, which in turn can be extended
to corporate identity and be made useful for those
wishing to manage or analyze it: First, corporate
identity has to do with claimed central character;
in other words, it involves the answers for ques-
tions such as What is the essence of the organiza-
tion? How crucial are certain characteristics about
the organization for the employees? Second, cor-
porate identity involves some kind of claimed dis-
tinctiveness. A corporate identity is formulated
through answering questions such as How is the
organization different from others? How does the
organization’s members perceive the organization
to be different from others? Third, a corporate
identity has to be sustained over time. The ques-
tion for managers then becomes Can the organiza-
tion claim sameness over time? The analyst might
want to ask what characteristics are used to tie
past and future together.
Some have also made the case that the strategic
approach to corporate identity is increasingly
focusing on not only the questions just mentioned
but also on tying those questions to what the
organizations want to be. That is, a strategic cor-
porate identity program should help organizations
to articulate a vision of where they want to be in
the future.
Cees B. M. van Riel argues that what he calls the
corporate identity mix is a useful systematic per-
spective to manage corporate identity. According to
him, the corporate identity mix involves verbal
communication, visual communication, and behav-
ior. It is with these three means that organizations
can demonstrate their distinctiveness. Behavior here
encompasses the contact that stakeholders have
with organizational members, but also corporate
governance and leadership. In public relations,
scholars have pointed to the importance of looking
beyond the other “traditional” communication
means, to build relationships between organizations
and publics.
Within marketing, it is particularly the field of
corporate communication that is singled out as
being responsible for focusing on the whole orga-
nization and by implication seeking to harmonize
and orchestrate the corporate identity mix. The
main task is to close the gap between the desired
corporate identity and the identity as perceived by
stakeholders. The latter is sometimes called the
actual identity.
Research shows, however, that the corporate
identity mix is defined in various ways and that
practitioners tend to include a greater number of
components than do academics. Some researchers
have thus suggested that the corporate identity mix
should encompass the organization’s communica-
tion, design, culture, behavior, structure, and
industry identity as well as strategy.
Visual-oriented identity scholars may focus on how
elements such as the look, feel, and even the scent

in the shops of a retail company help create an
identity for that company. An often-used example
is the smell in the Body Shop outlets.
Others argue for the need to focus on the struc-
ture of the organization to untangle the identity
concept. Obviously, organizations have different
structures. Some are seen as entrepreneurial and
run personally by a manager, whereas others are
diversified in distinct business units and divisions.
These structures will necessarily influence the cor-
porate identity structure of the organization as
well. Some organizations opt for a monolithic cor-
porate identity built around a single defined idea;
others allow for their subsidiaries to develop
brands that do not necessarily have clear links with
the parent company. Procter and Gamble’s range
of brands such as Gillette and Pampers is a prime
example of the latter. Virgin, on the other hand, is
an example of the former.
A later addition to the literature is the notion of
ethical corporate identity. Here, scholars call for
greater levels of reflexivity and a more socially
and dialogically embedded kind of organizational
practice. An ethical corporate identity is rooted
in corporate social responsibility and is formed
relationally between stakeholder groups and the
organization.
Another way of conceptualizing identity, and in
turn its management, is called the AC2ID Test and
implies that an organization has five types of iden-
tities: (1) actual identity, the current attributes of
the organization; (2) communication identity, the
controlled identity; (3) conceived identity, as per-
ceived by stakeholders; (4) ideal identity, the opti-
mal positioning of the organization; and (5) desired
identity, as formulated by management. These
identity types are said to be present in every orga-
nization, with each relating to the other. If these
identities are misaligned, it might create problems
for the organization. Hence, the responsibility of
management is to bring these identities as close to
each other as possible.
Theoretical and Methodological Approaches
Van Riel and John M. T. Balmer (the latter con-
ceived the previously mentioned AC2ID Test) are
among the most important corporate identity
scholars and have argued that the literature on
corporate identity can be divided in three camps.
Corporate Identity 143
First, there are corporate identity publications
dealing with graphic design—including the organi-
zational logo, the chosen building, and other forms
of visual identification. Second, the corporate
identity literature includes integrated corporate
communication, the term used to describe all the
communication activities of an organization,
including marketing and public relations. Third is
the multidisciplinary approach drawing on organi-
zational behavior. Scholars working in the latter
camp have issued what they call the Strathclyde
Statement, in which they point out that organiza-
tions cannot escape having an identity. This iden-
tity articulates the aims and values of the
organization and, if successful, helps the organiza-
tion set itself apart from others.
Scholars following another typology have sug-
gested that the theories of corporate identity either
relate to corporate identity as an expression of the
corporate personality, or to the corporate identity
as an organizational reality, or to the corporate
identity as the expression of a company. Joep
Cornelissen and Phil Harris criticize what they
believe are empirical and theoretical flaws in the
two first types of theories. For instance, they argue
against the belief that an organization has one cor-
porate personality and against the uncritical trans-
fer of theories relating human identities to corporate
ones. They also question the assumption that there
is a strict relationship between a company’s “inner
self” and its expressions.
A French school of thought has also been sin-
gled out in relation to corporate identity. After
the emergence of the concept of corporate iden-
tity in the 1960s, the so-called field theory of
Pierre Bourdieu was incorporated by some schol-
ars to gain better insight into the internal dynam-
ics of organizations. Researchers use a cultural
approach like this to identify elements that make
organizations stand out from others and contrib-
ute to their identity. A cultural approach also
helps analysts to move beyond description toward
explanation.
Some scholars suggest that the actual identity of
the corporation can be “revealed” through the use
of tools such as semi-structured interviews, obser-
vation, and document analysis. A combination of
such methods is referred to as a “laddering tech-
nique” and is used to describe the employee values
and behavior necessary to meet certain ends.
144 Corporate Identity
Balmer’s affinity audit is another such method,
which is constructed around four phases:
(1) definition of the corporate mission and strat-
egy, (2) revelation of the dominant systems of
values and beliefs within the organization,
(3) evaluation of these values and beliefs against
the corporate mission and strategy, and (4) the
nurturing of those values and beliefs that support
the corporate mission and strategy. This is thought
of as a cyclical process.
Other approaches use other methods to map the
values of their employees and the organizational
culture that is expected to have an influence on the
corporate identity. Consultants will typically ask
management and employees how they would
describe the company according to some desired
attributes like quality, integrity, innovation,
responsibility, service, and so on.
Words of Caution
There is reason to caution against a simplified view
of the relation between corporate identity and cor-
porate image. Both of these entities are socially
constructed in a given time period. This also means
that they should be judged on how well they work
rhetorically and not only how they fit with actual
reality. Indeed, there might be reason to question
the rhetoric concerning actual identity or the
revealing of corporations’ identities. Instead, it can
be argued that identity research needs epistemo-
logical and ontological grounding that borrows
ideas from social constructionism.
Lars T. Christensen and colleagues have also
taken many of the identity searches of corporations
to task for being self-absorbed and self-seducing.
While constantly hunting for unique selling propo-
sitions to make them distinct and visible, corpora-
tions often pander to popular notions and values
such as trust, care, honesty, and so forth, that do
not necessarily having a grounding in the organiza-
tion’s fundamental identity or raison d’être.
Furthermore, it can be questioned whether employ-
ees are as preoccupied with these values as man-
agement is. Certainly, it often is the case that the
search for an identity is a top-down exercise focus-
ing on vague ideas and values that have employees
disenchanted. This is particularly the case when
management is reluctant to let employees interpret
the organization’s vision and mission statements.
Much of the literature focuses on consistency in
carving out a corporate identity; meanwhile, it
seems that the value of having multiple identities
has been ignored. People often hold multiple and
contradictory images of an organization without
being uncomfortable with this situation. Therefore,
some scholars have attempted to reconcile the con-
cepts of consistency and multiplicity to help man-
agement of corporate communication. The theory
of common starting points is suggested here and
denotes the central values that an organization
uses but does not necessarily attempt to make uni-
form. The attempt to secure clarity and consistency
should not override the multiplicity of identities,
diversity, and voices in organizations.
Øyvind Ihlen
See also Communication Theory of Identity; Corporate
Identity; Impression Management; Organizational
Identity
Further Readings
Balmer, J. M. T., & Greyser, S. A. (Eds.). (2003).
Revealing the corporation: Perspectives on identity,
image, reputation, corporate branding, and corporate-
level marketing. London: Routledge.
Christensen, L. T., & Askegaard, S. (2001). Corporate
identity and corporate image revisited: A semiotic
perspective. European Journal of Marketing, 35(3/4),
292–315.
Cornelissen, J. P., & Harris, P. (2001). The corporate
identity metaphor: Perspectives, problems and
prospects. Journal of Marketing Management, 17,
49–71.
Hatch, M. J., & Schultz, M. (Eds.). (2004).
Organizational identity: A reader. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Leitch, S., & Motion, J. (1999). Multiplicity in corporate
identity strategy. Corporate Communications: An
International Journal, 4(4), 193–199.
Melewar, T. C., & Karaosmanoglu, E. (2006). Seven
dimensions of corporate identity: A categorisation
from the practitioners’ perspectives. European Journal
of Marketing, 40(7/8), 846–869.
Moingeon, B., & Ramanantsoa, B. (1997). Understanding
corporate identity: The French school of thought.
European Journal of Marketing, 31(5/6), 383–395.
Olins, W. (1990). Corporate identity: Making business
strategy visible through design. London: Thames &
Hudson.

Schultz, M., Hatch, M. J., & Holten Larsen, M. (Eds.).
(2000). The expressive organization: Linking identity,
reputation, and the corporate brand. New York:
Oxford University Press.
van Rekom, J. (1997). Deriving an operational measure
of corporate identity. European Journal of Marketing,
31(5/6), 410–422.
van Riel, C. B. M. (1992). Principles of corporate
communication. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
van Riel, C. B. M., & Balmer, J. M. T. (1997). Corporate
identity: The concept, its measurement and
management. European Journal of Marketing, 31(5/6),
340–355.
Corrosion of Character
Identity has a temporal dimension in that we come
to know others through repeated contact and social
exchanges that happen over time. Everyday interac-
tions inform what we expect and value in other
people. Trust and reliability are by-products that are
built out of predictable patterns of informal per-
sonal interaction. This is the case for everyday life in
families and relationships, and it is also true for
working life outside the home and family. But what
happens when working relationships are frequently
disrupted? How are people affected by these changes?
One influential way of explaining this is by the term
corrosion of character. By this is meant the under-
mining of the quality of relationships at work so
that contacts between people are shallow, short-
term, and instrumental. Work as a positive source of
identity is weakened and the moral character of rela-
tions between workers—that is, a sense of common
purpose and mutual support, which typified older
patterns of work—is diminished. This entry dis-
cusses the causes and consequences of this corrosion
and what can be done to address it.
Causes
Flexibility is advocated by many governments as a
way of staying ahead in competitive global eco-
nomic markets. Firms may need to hire and fire
workers if demand increases or decreases. Flexibility
might involve workers developing new work tech-
niques. Or it may involve new forms of work orga-
nization and structures such as teamwork, where
Corrosion of Character 145
teams can be assembled and reassembled as work
tasks change.
The use of new technologies at work is an addi-
tional factor in the trend toward flexibility, in
terms of replacing traditional craft skills with
machine-controlled technical processes. For exam-
ple, in a bakery, computer-assisted technology of
mixing ingredients and setting baking temperatures
simplifies and standardizes the work process and
replaces the knowledge and experience of a baker.
Making work less dependent on specific skills and
experience can make workers more dispensable.
On the other hand, new technologies may enhance
people’s working life, increase skill requirements,
and take away some of the drudgery.
If flexibility originated in the private sector, it
has also influenced the public sector and the provi-
sion of welfare. A slimmer and flexible public sec-
tor constantly restructuring and reorganizing work
involves a permanent process of changing work
roles and tasks. While “efficiency gains” are used
to justify this process, demoralization and lack of
commitment of the workforce are also potential
outcomes. Moreover, relationships of care, embod-
ied in the provision of welfare, are being reorga-
nized flexibly into short-term injections of support
that are time limited. This is sometimes referred to
as the transition from welfare to workfare. In the
era of flexibility, a new logic of short-term commit-
ments is pervasive.
Consequences
The fundamental problem is that flexible work
organization conflicts with work as an opportu-
nity to establish an enduring sense of identity.
Dependability and long-term commitments cannot
derive from the logic of short-term organization.
Although few would advocate a return to the dull
and mindless routine of older patterns of some
work, routines can be a virtue because they develop
skill (imagine an orchestra playing without prac-
ticing together), and dealing with difficult and
challenging work situations enables people to act
creatively and independently. The balance between
these attributes of work as a source of routine
activity, creative stimulation, and interdependence
is difficult to achieve but can provide genuine
opportunities to build narratives of work that
develop character.
146 Cosmopolitanism
Flexibility is often assumed to be a means of giv-
ing people greater freedom and control and there-
fore potentially a positive development. In some
cases this may be true, particularly if it’s possible
to ride difficult economic circumstances because of
sufficient resources. But not everybody is in such
fortunate circumstances. People with disabilities,
older people, those in poor health, or people who,
for family reasons, may be less mobile, the per-
sonal consequences of this trend are less beneficial.
Moreover, failure to adapt is usually attributed to
a character deficit or lack of effort on the part of
the individual. Mutual dependence is denigrated
rather than understood as a necessary attribute of
what makes a society and why it matters.
What Can Be Done?
One argument for addressing the corrosive impact
of short-term commitments is a return to commu-
nity. Community as a place to live may involve
more enduring relations because the frequency
with which people move is usually less than that of
changing jobs. But community is a slippery term. It
is often used to imply a romantic and nostalgic lost
world of organic, neighborly, social togetherness.
However, community can also be understood as a
locus for difference and conflicts, where people
interact and learn to live with their different identi-
ties and disagreements. The degree and nature of
conflict are key issues. Bitter and violent conflicts
between different social groups threaten the possi-
bility of mutual coexistence. Community can be
about reinforcing exclusion as well as inclusion.
Virtual communities may be another source of
identity that transcends the limits of time as well as
space. The growth of new information and com-
munication technologies may compress distances,
allowing people to keep in touch even when they
are far away and in different time zones. This
development raises issues about the quality of vir-
tual relations in comparison to face-to-face ones.
Virtual relations may not be as authentic or as
trustworthy as face-to-face relations. However,
research on virtual communities, that is, the argu-
ments and evidence for their significance in terms
of the nature and quality of relationships they gen-
erate, is as yet inconclusive.
Jim Crowther
See also Class Identity; Collective/Social Identity;
Neoliberalism; Social Capital
Further Readings
Castells, M. (1996). The network society. Oxford, UK:
Blackwell.
Harvey, D. (2000). Spaces of hope. Edinburgh, UK:
Edinburgh University Press.
Sennett, R. (1998). The corrosion of character: The
personal consequences of work in the new capitalism.
New York: W. W. Norton.
Cosmology
See Worldview
Cosmopolitanism
From the Greek κοςμοπολις, cosmopolitanism is the
belief that individuals should aspire to universal
citizenship and denounce localized cultures. Ancient
Greek cosmopolitans pronounced themselves citi-
zens of the world (cosmos). The contemporary
philosophical notion is that all humanity is of a
single moral community. In common vernacular,
cosmpolitan refers to personal affinity for sites of
intercultural contact. Regardless of the definition,
cosmopolitanism has implications for individual
and collective cultural identities. This entry explores
the history of cosmopolitanism from ancient Greece
to the present and examines contemporary identity
issues associated with cosmopolitanism.
Cosmopolitanism’s
Beginnings in Ancient Greece
Cosmopolitanism’s roots are in Cynicism, a school
of philosophy whose followers rigorously chal-
lenged the norms and values of ancient Greece and
classical Rome. The best representative of this
position from the Cynics is Diogenes of Sinope.
From his point of view, drastic measures were
needed to push humanity beyond the intellectual
and moral vacuum he perceived. He directed his

efforts toward defacing culture, which he believed
to be meaningless. Diogenes and the Cynics found
unacceptable anything that could not be justified
through reason—a line of thought picked up and
carried forward by the Stoics immediately after the
Cynics. Both schools believed that cultural norms
and traditions—indeed, the whole concept of soci-
eties whose boundaries were drawn along arbitrary
so-called cultural foundations—were unreasonable
and therefore untenable.
Diogenes of Sinope acted individually to call
attention to the irrational nature of cultural cus-
toms, believing it was his life’s calling to do so.
Little is known about him; the only source on his
life is the biography written by Diogenes Laertius,
who is also a shadowy character in ancient Greece.
A legend about Diogenes of Sinope states that one
of the oracles (versions of the story vary between
the Delphic oracle and the Apollonian oracle)
spoke to Diogenes about “defacing the currency.”
Diogenes and his father worked for a time minting
coins, and evidence suggests that Diogenes accepted
the oracle’s directive literally by defacing the
money for which he was responsible. However, the
significance of the legend also dictates that Diogenes
took it upon himself to deface the political and
cultural currency through philosophical commit-
ment and practical action.
Diogenes enacted his philosophy in ways that
may be considered extreme today. Believing that all
cultural norms were arbitrary, unreasonable, and
meaningless, he behaved in ways entirely opposite
to those norms. From what is written in Laertius’s
biography and from other references to Diogenes
the Cynic, his actions have been considered either
profoundly thought-provoking or certifiably insane.
Diogenes “the Dog” (Cynic) lived in a “tub,” or
rain barrel, which was also the typical dwelling
place of refugees from the Peloponnesian War. In
that sense, his lived habits announced two impor-
tant facets of his philosophy: first, that men ought
to consider themselves to be citizens of no particu-
lar place, but of every place. In coining the term
cosmopolitan, he was literally announcing a citi-
zenship of the universe, a defacement of the idea of
“citizen” in general. This was not meant to imply
the ease of movement from place to place, multiple
citizenships or affinities with other places, or com-
fort within the world. On the contrary, the second
facet of his philosophy that the “tub dwelling”
Cosmopolitanism 147
announces is his conviction that men needed very
few material comforts in order to live. By living
this way, he wanted to expose to other people the
absurdity of their cultural identities.
There is another ancient Greek meaning for
cosmopolitanism, though not as well-known or
prevalent as Diogenes’s coinage of the term. The
Greeks were concerned, as all civilizations are,
with the ways in which order may be structured or
imposed on human beings. In the ancient Greek
worldview, there were two basic orders: the order
of nature and the order of man. The order created
by humans was most aptly conveyed in the notion
of the polis, or city. The order of nature was
expressed by the word cosmos. Thus, cosmopoli-
tanism might be construed as the striving for har-
mony between these two orders, the order of
nature and the order of man. Cosmopolitans, in
this sense, were attempting to bring the order of
the cosmos and the order of the polis together.
Although this is a different and less popular defini-
tion of cosmopolitanism from ancient Greece, it
aligns with Diogenes’s famous actions against cul-
ture. With his actions against culture, Diogenes
exposed the order of man as overwrought and
confining and declared the order of the cosmos to
be paramount. This is a tradition that has existed
since the dawn of civilization: There were calls for
a return to the natural state of things far before
Diogenes’s time. The same yearning for a simpler,
“natural” human state also exists in the
Enlightenment concept of the “noble savage,” cre-
ated by European philosophers who admired the
native peoples around the world for their political
and sexual freedoms (most of which were exagger-
ated fictions in the minds of the Europeans). The
same popular yearning for a primal identity also
occurred as recently as the American men’s move-
ment in the 1990s, most famously with Robert
Bly’s book Iron John, which spurred countless
wilderness weekends and drumming lessons for
American businessmen.
Changes Since Ancient Greece
In looking at more modern and current philo-
sophical tracts from so-called cosmopolitans, it is
clear that the word has lost virtually all its mean-
ing as presented by Diogenes (both in his apparent
teachings, as followed by later Cynics and Stoics,
148 Cosmopolitanism
and in his provocative life choices in Greece).
Today the term cosmopolitan typically applies to
cities populated by multiple cultures yet still
endowed with the benefits of international trade
and the protection of the nation-state. When
applied to individuals, cosmopolitan invokes a
picture of sophistication in contrast with provinci-
ality. The cosmopolitan is a bustling world trav-
eler, knowledgeable about many diverse areas; his
opposite is the country bumpkin with simple tastes
and narrow opinions.
Thus, between Diogenes’s death in 323 BCE
and the 21st century, the word cosmopolitanism
came to mean an everyday orientation of open-
ness and comfort with the idea of other cultures.
After the Stoics, cosmopolitanism was kept alive
in Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations, and the ideal
was embraced by the early Christians. One can
envision the possibility that as the Holy Roman
Empire moved forward, a closing off to diverse
experience would have been easy to implement.
The Middle Ages have often been described as
the Dark Ages, a time of monolithic Latinate
unity in Europe. The ethnology open to Diogenes,
which spurred him to a conclusion that cultural
customs (being so diverse) were arbitrary and
meaningless, would not have been so prevalent
during the medieval period. Perhaps it can also
be argued that the authority of the church would
not have encouraged the effacement of cultural
practices, as the traditions and rituals of the
Mass are highly significant to Catholicism. At
any rate, it is difficult to find a medieval philoso-
pher as stringent as Diogenes on the topic of
world citizenship.
Because of these changes, what emerged from
the Enlightenment in terms of cosmopolitanism
seems a bit perverted in comparison to Diogenes’s
original meaning. The term became fashionable
again, perhaps for the first time since Erasmus, in
1751 when Denis Diderot defined cosmopolites in
his Encyclopédie as “strangers nowhere in the
world.” During the Enlightenment, Europeans were
described as cosmopolitan if they were curious
about, interested in, and appreciative of persons
from different nations, religions, and colors. Far
from denouncing cultural categories, cosmopolites
dabbled in them—with varying degrees of inno-
cence. The cosmopolite enjoyed the stock exchange,
museums, and geographic society meetings.
Recast in this much different definition from the
citizen of the cosmos first proposed by Diogenes,
Enlightenment cosmopolitanism entered everyday
vernacular discourse and became less conducive to
serious philosophical scrutiny on most fronts.
Diderot, for example, coined the term cosmopolite
but never ventured out of France. His fellow phi-
losophe, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, was also an enthu-
siastic cosmopolitan and admirer of native peoples
in faraway lands, yet he abandoned his own chil-
dren. Both of these Enlightenment philosophers
would stand in stark contrast to Diogenes because
of their lack of practical action. Cosmopolitanism
thus became an innocuous emotion rather than a
compelling philosophical commitment.
Yet some thinkers continued to interrogate cos-
mopolitanism and its practical implications. Most
notable among these is Immanuel Kant, who wrote
Perpetual Peace in 1795. Kant’s treatise has been
called prophetic in its call for a league of nations.
Among his other prescriptives for the end of war
are republican governments, free states, and uni-
versal hospitality. Cosmopolitanism became an
important term for political philosophy, and much
of its subsequent significance (including in the 21st
century) lies in that field. Kant also set in motion,
with Perpetual Peace, a line of thought that sug-
gests that patriotism is the root of all armed con-
flicts and that wars could indeed end forever if
loyalty to individual states were replaced with loy-
alty to universal humankind.
Cosmopolitanism and
Contemporary Identity Issues
Cast in this light, cosmopolitanism seems a valid
and positive idea. Few among us would not wel-
come perpetual peace. Yet although Kant was
meticulous in his arguments and was specific about
the steps that were needed to create a new world
order, cosmopolitanism is not always seen as an
achievable goal. The impracticality and potential
(and ironic) ethnocentrism of its main tenets have
been widely discussed in political science and
political philosophy. Some critics of Kant accuse
him of naïveté. Others argue that loyalty to one’s
own group is too much a part of human behavior
to be easily changed. After all, warring states do
depend on the loyalty (and even fanaticism) of
their respective citizens.

Because of the need of the state to foster a loyal
citizenry willing to defend its home, it is clear why
some are resistant to cosmopolitanism. It is also
worth noting that cosmopolitan has not always
been a positive term. During the 20th century, it
was combined with the adjective rootless, as in
rootless cosmopolitan, to describe Jews in Europe.
The derogatory label was used highly effectively
by both Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin in their mur-
derous campaigns against the Jewish people.
Combined with the resultant United Nations
actions, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which promises all individuals a state that
will protect them, and the many instances of
oppression and misery in numerous countries
around the world, the notion of being rootless is
not universally appealing. Few non-Western phi-
losophies have correlating counterparts to
Diogenes’s idea of cosmopolitanism.
Globalization is a factor in the current entrée of
cosmopolitanism into everyday vernacular dis-
course. The growth of multinational companies
proves that there are indeed practices that easily
cross borders. Such growth also affords individuals
opportunities for travel and intercultural contact.
Of course, such opportunities can also be virtual.
Globalization has always impacted human life,
since men and women first felt the urge to explore
their environment. But in the 21st century, global-
ization is accelerated and heightened by the World
Wide Web, rapid and widely available telecommu-
nications, and the demand for entertainment media.
The virtual interconnectedness people experience
across the globe, as well as the growth of multina-
tional corporations and postcolonial discourses,
make 21st-century globalization a particularly
potent factor in the way people craft their identities.
Being cosmopolitan, a citizen of the world, seems
more possible today than perhaps it did before.
Although cosmopolitanism is not the same
thing as intercultural harmony—in fact, it is some-
thing much different, an effacement of cultural
difference altogether—aficionados of travel and
culture call their pleasures cosmopolitanism none-
theless. It is fairly common today for laypersons,
perhaps especially those from the United States, to
declare themselves citizens of the world (although
their citizenship in a particular free republic is
what allows them to demand such hospitality from
the rest of the world’s countries).
Cosmopolitanism 149
How did cosmopolitanism become such a pop-
ular term in recent years? The answer, in part,
is through a 1994 essay by Martha Nussbaum,
“Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” published in
the Boston Review. Arguing for a more cosmopoli-
tan outlook in American public education, Nussbaum
resurrected the kernel idea at the center of Diogenes’s
philosophy for a late 20th-century audience. For the
first time in several centuries, the term cosmopoli-
tanism was used in a way Diogenes seems to have
intended. Although in the face of spirited debate
(her essay sparked nearly 30 responses in the same
issue), Nussbaum acknowledges that there are logis-
tical problems inherent in pure Diogeneian cosmo-
politanism. She also states that having the moral
orientation toward world citizenship is sufficient.
This stance reflects the academic philosophical notion
of cosmopolitanism—that all humanity is of a single
moral community—as well as American vernacular
openness to globalization.
Cosmopolitanism has broad implications for
identity and presents an alternative viewpoint for
dealing with cultural diversity in the contempo-
rary historical moment. Cosmopolitanism is dif-
ferent from—indeed contrary to—multiculturalism
or pluralism. In their various forms, multicultural-
ism and pluralism promote a range of responses to
difference: celebration, tolerance, fragmentation/
balkanization, mandated coexistence. Diversity is
always at the forefront of policies based on multi-
culturalism and pluralism. Cosmopolitanism
effaces difference in favor of an emphasis on com-
mon humanity. Few societies have succeeded at
avoiding internal conflict when attempting to
implement cosmopolitanism. It is also impossible
in today’s world order for a person to be cosmo-
politan in the literal sense, as all are governed by
national polities (unless one chooses to live pre-
cisely as Diogenes did). Nonetheless, important
scholars—particularly in the field of political
philosophy—continue to hone the cosmopolitan
project. Seyla Benhabib’s work on culture, iden-
tity, and citizenship texture the backdrop of
national polities particularly well.
How should an individual live then, with a
cosmopolitan outlook? Kwame Anthony Appiah’s
2006 book Cosmopolitanism provides a frame-
work for ethics in a globalizing world. The son of
an English mother and a Ghanaian father,
Appiah’s education and situatedness in the
150 Critical Race Theory
American academy make him part of a genealogy
that would use the term cosmopolitan in a less-
than-specific way. The title of his book is a return
to the French Enlightenment’s approach to cos-
mopolitanism, wherein the term is a catchall for
intercultural appreciation. Nonetheless, Appiah’s
fair-mindedness on globalization, on the con-
tested spectrum of “cultural colonization,” and
on other contemporary issues points us toward
better intercultural communication.
In the context of the everyday meaning of the
word, Appiah speaks as a “cosmopolitan” indi-
vidual: someone bicultural, multilingual, highly
educated, and well traveled. During Barack
Obama’s run for the U.S. presidency in 2008, he
called himself a “citizen of the world.” These
avowals from Appiah and Obama are both solid
examples of what is meant today by “cosmopoli-
tanism” in the popular sense. Like Appiah, Obama
is the son of an African father and an Anglo
mother. He spent part of his childhood in Indonesia.
Like Appiah, Obama lived in multicultural envi-
ronments and was educated in some of the world’s
finest universities. Instead of cosmopolitanism, a
better term to describe what both men mean might
be hybridity. Hybridity, or affiliation with two or
more cultures, applies to a majority of people in the
world today and yields multifaceted identities in a
range of forms. Cosmopolitanism, “citizenship in
the world,” expresses an aspiration—not a real
possibility—for one’s identity and for intercultural
communication.
Whichever term one chooses, the current debate
surrounding cosmopolitanism highlights the human
need both to avow a particular cultural identity and
also to satisfy curiosity about others, even to the
point of searching for common human ground.
Kathleen Glenister Roberts
See also Culture; Ethics of Identity; Globalization;
Multiculturalism
Further Readings
Appiah, K. A. (2006). Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a
world of strangers. New York: W. W. Norton.
Benhabib, S. (2002). The claims of culture. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Galbraith, K. (2001). Globalisation: Making sense of an
integrating world. London: Profile Books.
Kant, I. (2005). Perpetual peace (M. C. Smith, Trans.).
New York: Cosimo Classics.
Navia, L. E. (2005). Diogenes the Cynic. Amherst, NY:
Humanity Books.
Nussbaum, M. C., & J. Cohen (2002). For love of
country? Boston: Beacon Press.
Toulmin, S. (1990). Cosmopolis: The hidden agenda of
modernity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Critical Race Theory
Critical race theory (CRT) examines the intercon-
nections between cultural, historical, political,
and theoretical conceptions of race; invidious
forms of racism; and the principles and practices
of American jurisprudence. Having its origins in
the field of law and in legal studies scholarship,
CRT has evolved to become an umbrella term for
a variety of theoretical and methodological orien-
tations whose proponents seek to understand,
examine, and analyze how “race” is produced and
reproduced in modern society in relation to cul-
tural, economic, historical, intellectual, political,
and social forces. CRT is directly and unabash-
edly linked to the ways in which racial identities
have been affected by the previously mentioned
forces at work historically and contemporarily on
an almost daily basis.
CRT began in response to the limitations of the
legal advances of the modern civil rights move-
ment in dismantling the seemingly intractable ves-
tiges of racial discrimination as well as to the acute
underdevelopment of the fledging critical legal
studies movement in addressing the deep struc-
tures of racial inequality and injustice in American
law and society. Beginning in the 1970s, law pro-
fessors Derrick Bell and Alan Freeman, often cred-
ited as founding members of the CRT movement,
began to probe the shortcomings of civil rights
litigation in addressing the structural origins and
continuing effects of American racial inequality
and anti-Black racism while simultaneously argu-
ing for more critical assessments of underlying
liberal assumptions informing traditional concep-
tions of American law and politics. These two
professors pioneered a new form of legal scholar-
ship that questioned not only the underlying
assumptions that dominated the interpretation of

civil rights jurisprudence but also the formal foun-
dations of American law. Critical race theorists
urged legal scholars to take up the imperative to
closely examine how the language and rhetoric of
“colorblindness” mask the operations of power
and privilege in promoting a vision of an egalitar-
ian American society deeply at odds with its
unequal and unjust racial reality. CRT also opened
up a line of research into the socially constructed
nature of race and into the phenomenon of “inter-
est convergence” in examining the development
and residual effects of particular legal decisions
and remedies that address and mitigate racial dis-
crimination and inequality. In all, critical race
theorists seek to spotlight the very ordinary and
everyday aspects of racial privilege and invidious
forms of racial discrimination that are interwoven
into the very social and political fabric of everyday
life in America.
The substantive concerns of critical race theorists
with uncovering the racial protocols undergirding
American liberal democracy not only challenge the
dominant theoretical framework of legal scholar-
ship but also its very form. The innovative use of
narrative in legal scholarship is one of the hallmarks
of CRT scholarship. The use of narrative not only
highlights everyday aspects of racial bias in law and
society, but it also serves to test the epistemic limits
of dominant narratives that frame and support tra-
ditional interpretations of law and politics in legal
scholarship. Narrative theoretical strategies that
engage the nexus of legal ideas and public policy
issues raised in such cases as Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, 488 U.S.
469 (1989); and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) enable CRT scholars to
not only examine the institutional dimensions of
forms of racial discrimination and the American
legal process but also critically develop alternative
perspectives on how these cases highlight forms of
racial inequality and injustice that are eclipsed in a
purely formal legal analysis. The narrative thrust of
CRT has been the subject of criticism from such
notable scholars as Harvard law professor Randall
Kennedy and University of Chicago law professor
and judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit Richard Posner. Criticisms of the
narrative method of CRT revolve around charges of
excessive subjectivism, racial essentialism, and lack
Critical Race Theory 151
of scholarly rigor. Extending the critique of the nar-
rative dimension in CRT, Daniel Farber and Suzanna
Sherry, in their 1995 California Law Review article
“Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?”
raised the question of whether CRT’s critique of
merit harbored anti-Semitic sentiments.
From the mid- to late 1980s and throughout the
1990s, a new coterie of scholars in the field of CRT
extended the theoretical and methodological trajec-
tory of this intellectual project by incorporating
new developments emerging in the fields of Africana
studies, cultural studies, history, literary studies,
philosophy, and social theory. Building on what
has been termed the linguistic turn ushered in by
poststructuralism, CRT scholars moved much more
deliberately in highlighting the contingencies, con-
tradictions, and contestations within the discourses
of law, race, and society. The 1987 Stanford Law
Review article “The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism,”
by Charles R. Lawrence III, opened up the oppor-
tunity for critical race theorists to engage psycho-
analysis as a critical theoretical tool for examining
the intersections of racism, subjectivity, and the
law. Scholars such as Kimberlé Crenshaw, Angela
Harris, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Mari J. Matsuda,
Patricia Williams, and others have broadened and
deepened the narrative dimensions of CRT scholar-
ship by engaging feminist theory, gender studies,
sexuality studies, and history while deepening the
logic underpinning the idea of the socially con-
structed and historically contingent nature of race.
In recent years, critical race theorists have engaged
in extensive scholarly conversations and collabora-
tions with scholars in the emerging fields of dis-
ability studies, Native American studies, and
Whiteness studies, in addition to broadening con-
versations within the legal studies arena, particu-
larly in international law, Latino/a critical legal
theory, and law and economics.
Although these new developments in CRT have
been welcomed, there have been some criticisms
leveled at CRT scholars who have pursued a
research agenda viewed as more closely attuned to
the questions and issues raised by these other areas
of scholarly inquiry. Questions about the robust-
ness of these new intellectual endeavors vis-à-vis
the theoretical aims of CRT have been raised by
such foundational CRT scholars as University of
Pittsburgh law professor Richard Delgado. In his
152 Critical Realism
2003 review essay, “Crossroads and Blind Alleys:
A Critical Examination of Recent Writing About
Race,” published in the Texas Law Review, Delgado
argues that with the turn to, and preoccupation
with, the scholarly protocols of such famed French
theorists as Jean Baudrillard, Michel Foucault, and
Jacques Derrida, much of the new scholarship in
CRT evades its critical mission of illuminating the
reality of continuing regimes of racial inequality
and injustice. Delgado’s argument has subsequently
been the subject of a 2005 symposium at the
University of Michigan Law School and has elicited
responses countering the main thrust of his argu-
ment from scholars such as University of California,
Davis, professor of law and Chicana/o studies
Kevin R. Johnson. The new directions taken up by
scholars working in the area of CRT continue to be
subject to a vigorous debate.
Since CRT’s inception, CRT scholars have not
only challenged the norms and procedures of
legal scholarship but also opened up a critical
intellectual space for legal scholars and others to
examine how conceptions of, and negative ascrip-
tions attributed to, race are produced and repro-
duced in and through the American legal process
as well as other cultural, historical, and theoreti-
cal formations. As CRT has expanded to encom-
pass theoretical methods and approaches in such
fields as Africana studies, feminist theory, and
philosophy, legal scholars have continued to
advance new directions in the field of legal stud-
ies. In all, CRT has facilitated new and novel
understandings of how race and racism continue
to challenge the very fabric of American law and
society.
Corey D. B. Walker
See also Citizenship; Civic Identity; Narratives; Political
Identity; Racial Contracts; Whiteness Studies
Further Readings
Crenshaw, K., Thomas, K., & Peller, G. (Eds.). (2001).
Critical race theory: The key writings that formed the
movement. New York: New Press.
Delgado, R. (2001). Critical race theory: An introduction.
New York: New York University Press.
Delgado, R., & Stefancic, J. (Eds.). (1999). Critical race
theory: The cutting edge. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press.
Valdes, F., Culp, J. M., & Harris, A. P. (Eds.). (2002).
Crossroads, directions, and a new critical race theory.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Critical Realism
Critical realism is a neo-Aristotelian, neo-Marxist
philosophy of social science, based on the early
work of the contemporary British philosopher
Roy Bhaskar. Bhaskar has since developed his
ideas further, referring to his evolving position as
dialectical critical realism, transcendental dialecti-
cal critical realism, and, most recently, the phi-
losophy of meta-reality. This entry concerns
critical realism only. There are several sociologists
whose work is closely associated with critical real-
ism, including Margaret Archer, Andrew Sayer,
and Doug Porpora. Although critical realism does
not address identity specifically, it does provide
assumptions and lines of inquiry for critical real-
ists who consider identity.
The term critical realism is derived from a com-
bination of the positions that Bhaskar advanced in
his first two books, A Realist Theory of Science
(hereafter RTS) and The Possibility of Naturalism
(hereafter PON). In RTS, Bhaskar gave an account
of natural science that he called “transcendental
realism”; in PON, he extended his analysis to
social science and social objects, defending a posi-
tion that he called critical naturalism. Readers,
Bhaskar reports, generated the term critical real-
ism. Critical realism is both an epistemology and
an ontology. Arguably, in PON, Bhaskar also set
out the rudiments of a substantive social theory.
This last has been augmented and variously revised
by critical realist sociologists. This entry discusses
the epistemological and ontological modes of criti-
cal realism and its application to identity studies.
Epistemology
As an epistemology, critical realism is an alterna-
tive to empiricism and neo-Kantianism alike, in
both positivist and postmodern iterations. Against
empiricism, critical realism is the view that knowl-
edge is based on experience but not on surface
appearances. Against neo-Kantianism, it is the
view that neither the active, structuring processes

of cognition nor the social character of knowledge
production results in a need to distinguish between
knowledge of phenomenal objects-for-us and
knowledge of things-in-themselves. Bhaskar called
the idea that we cannot know what things are
“really” like (i.e., that instead we can know only
about our own thinking) the epistemic fallacy.
From a critical realist perspective, positivists and
postmodernists alike commit the epistemic fallacy.
For critical realists, the aim of both the natural and
the social sciences is to identify the causal powers
of things, or kinds of things. In the case of the
social sciences, the things in question are thought
to be social structures. Mainstream social scientists
sometimes talk of causal powers, but what they
mean by such talk is that the scientist may add on
a theory, into which a law, conceived as a state-
ment of universal regularity, may be seen to fit.
From a critical realist perspective, by contrast,
laws merely express tendencies that things have to
behave in certain ways, in virtue of being the kind
of object that they are. Adequate explanations,
then, require not just knowledge of what an object
regularly does but also knowledge of what it is, so
that one can say why it does what it does. Bhaskar
describes this as being able to give a real definition
of a thing’s real essence. Real definitions are not
analytic. They follow upon empirical investigation
into the nature of different kinds of thing.
Bhaskar combined this model of inquiry with
several general epistemological principles. One,
intimated earlier, is the view that knowledge is a
sociohistorical phenomenon, produced—as Karl
Marx would say—by definite people, in definite
circumstances, working with and upon available
conceptual resources. Bhaskar called this idea
epistemic relativism. He meant by this not that all
competing ideas are equally true, depending upon
one’s frame of reference, but rather that ideas are
created by human beings and that by which we
judge ideas to be true changes over time. Bhaskar
and critical realists also hold that there can be
rational debate over competing accounts. Theories
may be mutually exclusive, but preference for one
over another is not a matter of emotional attach-
ment or dogmatic assertion. Bhaskar called this
idea judgmental rationality. Third, most critical
realists believe that there are no formal or univer-
sal criteria of justification. The superior theory in
any given case is the one with greater explanatory
Critical Realism 153
power, which can only be adjudicated substan-
tively. Finally, Bhaskar and critical realists are
fallibilists about knowledge, holding that no the-
ory can be known with absolute certainty to be
true.
Ontology
As an ontology, critical realism is an early version
of a position called dispositional realism. Realism is
the view that, relative to a specified object or
domain of objects, the object(s) in question exist(s)
objectively vis-à-vis any given individual subject.
Materialism and objective idealism are both forms
of realism on this definition, whereas subjective
idealism is not. In his early work, Bhaskar defended
nonreductive materialism, that is, the position that
consciousness is an emergent property of material
bodies; many critical realists are nonreductive
materialists. Dispositional realism, meanwhile, is
realism specifically about powers. It is the view, not
shared uniformly by realists, that things have
intrinsic capacities to act or react in certain ways—to
affect and be affected by other things, in accor-
dance with what each thing is. Critical realists
express their belief in powers in two ways. One is
by talking about what Bhaskar in RTS called the
domain of the real, which includes underlying pow-
ers, powers that may or may not be exercised and
that, if exercised, may or may not be observed. The
other is by saying simply that causal mechanisms
are real things.
In RTS, Bhaskar focused on the powers, or causal
mechanisms, studied by natural scientists. The
nature of those purely physical processes, he argued,
is independent of human thought. That heat melts
ice, for example, is not contingent upon our con-
sciousness. Indeed, there is good evidence to suggest
that heat was melting ice long before human beings
even existed, even if the present global warming is
itself of our doing. In PON, Bhaskar turned to the
causal mechanisms studied (or, in his view, properly
studied) by social scientists—namely, social struc-
tures. In contrast to purely physical phenomena,
sociological phenomena such as structures are
ontologically contingent upon the existence of con-
scious human beings. That is, while they are real,
underlying causal mechanisms in the social world
are both activity-dependent and concept-
dependent. However, the model of scientific inquiry
154 Critical Realism
is (or ought to be) no different in the social sciences
than in the natural sciences. The aim is to identify
causal powers, or mechanisms, and to connect
these, via real definitions, to kinds of things, in this
case to kinds of structures.
The position raises a number of important ques-
tions. How can social structures be real but also
concept-dependent? In what sense are they bearers
of powers? Bhaskar got at these questions through
what he called the transformational model of social
activity (TMSA). The TMSA was introduced by
way of contrast with models advanced by Max
Weber, Émile Durkheim, and Peter Berger—to
which Bhaskar attributed the errors of voluntarism,
reification, and illicit identification, respectively.
Weber, Bhaskar argued, reduced social structures
to the intentions of individual actors; Durkheim
allowed for social structures but cast them as purely
external impositions upon agency; Berger treated
individuals and structures dialectically, as though
they were subjective and objective expressions of
the same thing Bhaskar ascribed causal power to
individuals and to structures alike, neither reducing
one kind of entity to the other nor equating them.
Action by individuals, he maintained, presupposes
the existence of social structures; social structures,
in turn (a) both enable and constrain action and
(b) are re-produced (rather than voluntaristically
produced) through the actions of individuals, nor-
mally as an unintended consequence of acts under-
taken for independent reasons.
The TMSA forms the crux of a substantive
social theory, but it also encapsulates answers to
the philosophical questions posed earlier. Social
structures are objective and, therefore, meet the
standard of realism but not in the sense that they
would exist in the absence of conscious human
activity. Rather, they are objective in the sense that
they preexist the conscious acts of any given
person(s). They are the backdrop, against which
individual agency occurs, as there is never a moment
when agents start from scratch. Meanwhile, struc-
tures are causally efficacious, not in the sense that
they are conscious, intentional actors but in the
sense that they always already delimit a range of
likely outcomes. Bhaskar conceived of structures
as being, in this regard, Aristotelian material
causes (i.e., that which is acted upon), as wood
may be the material cause of a house (giving it dif-
ferent properties than one made of grass or stone,
for example). Some critical realists think that the
Aristotelian category of formal cause (i.e., that
which organizes a thing; in this example, the archi-
tectural design) may be more and/or also apt. As
an illustration of the reality and efficacy of struc-
tures, Bhaskar refers to Durkheim’s example of
language as a social fact: If one lives in France, one
can expect to have to engage with French whether
one chooses to do so or not. This is so even though
French is not something that would exist if there
had never been human beings.
Insofar as the TMSA includes individual agency
as a variable, it also points toward what Bhaskar
called psychology, as opposed to social science.
Bhaskar defined psychology as the study of per-
sons rather than structures (which are the object of
social science) or groups (the object of social psy-
chology), and he argued that the causal mecha-
nisms that are relevant to psychology are states of
mind, or reasons, that is, beliefs held by actors.
The holding of core beliefs he described as a long-
standing disposition to act in a particular way. As
with other dispositional properties, a psychic dis-
position is thought to be connected to the essence
of the entity that bears them, here an individual
rather than a kind essence. In the case of individu-
als, a person’s essence just is his or her characteris-
tic psychic disposition(s). This said, an individual’s
beliefs may not be true and may not be the sole or
even the significant determinant of any given
intentional act to which they attach. Moreover,
there is no guarantee that the meaning that an act
has for an actor coincides with what Bhaskar calls
its social meaning. But it is a mark of action per se
that it is intentional, that is, consciously or uncon-
sciously directed. What distinguishes critical real-
ism from many hermeneutic approaches is that
critical realists do not assume that actors’ beliefs
are true and, more to the point, that actors seek to
explain the holding of false beliefs.
Identity
Because there is no definitive critical realist posi-
tion on identity, it may be useful to set out the
assumptions that a critical realist would bring to
the issue and to suggest lines of inquiry that a
critical realist might pursue. If a critical realist
researcher were to consider identity from a psy-
chological perspective, he or she would define the

phenomenon nonnaturalistically, as a set of beliefs
that may dispose a person to act in certain ways.
Whether or not, in any given case, the beliefs figure
into a person’s established psychological essence
would be an open, empirical question, subject to
investigation. A further step might be to explore
whether or not the identity itself rests upon other,
deeper beliefs, consciously or unconsciously held.
If a critical realist were to adopt a sociological
perspective, meanwhile, he or she would be likely
to regard identity as a social fact, a meaning-laden,
normative practice that precedes its enactment by
any given individual. Here the effort would be to
understand (a) its distinctive causal effects vis-à-vis
individual behavior, (b) the processes through
which it is reproduced, and (c) how it fits causally
into the larger pattern of kinds of relations, the
totality of which constitute any given social forma-
tion as a social kind. Given the dialectical nature
of the TMSA, a critical realist might well move
back and forth between psychological and socio-
logical modes of inquiry.
Ruth Groff
See also Critical Theory; Frankfurt School; Modernity
and Postmodernity
Further Readings
Bhaskar, R. (1978). A realist theory of science. Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
Bhaskar, R. (1989). Reclaiming reality: A critical
introduction to contemporary philosophy. London:
Verso.
Bhaskar, R. (1998). The possibility of naturalism: A
philosophical critique of the contemporary human
sciences (3rd ed.). London: Routledge.
Critical Theory
Critical theory is a key term in the humanities and
social sciences that has a wide range of meanings
and usages in contemporary art history, cultural
studies, film studies, literature, and philosophy.
One definition of critical theory points to its his-
torical and intellectual beginnings with the
Frankfurt school in Germany during the 1920s
Critical Theory 155
and 1930s. The second, more casual, definition is
more amorphous and comes into usage across the
disciplines as many of the Frankfurt school meth-
odologies and concepts circulate, uncritically, into
wider use.
Overview
Critical theory, as a philosophical approach to, or
critical sociology of, the arts, humanities, sciences,
and social sciences finds its origin in the 1920s and
1930s with the development of the Frankfurt
school, an interdisciplinary neo-Marxist intellec-
tual movement linked to the Institut für
Sozialforschung (Institute of Social Research) at
the University of Frankfurt am Main in Germany.
Critical theory is defined by Frankfurt school
figure Max Horkheimer as a critical philosophy or
critical sociology that views knowledge in the arts,
humanities, social sciences, and sciences as deeply
connected to political and social interests. In other
words, critical theory, as an intellectual praxis
developed by Frankfurt school figures such as
Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, and Herbert
Marcuse, emphasizes the historical materiality of
knowledge in relation to the dialectical totality of
society, a totality that remains, at its core, indefin-
able. Walter Benjamin, who is often linked to the
movement but not institutionally affiliated with
the Frankfurt school, is the person most associated
with critical theory of art in modernity. For
Benjamin, the history of modern art was not sim-
ply a natural evolution of aesthetics and technique;
it was art history as the material conditions for
reproduction in social contexts. A dominant or
shared concern for Frankfurt school critical theo-
rists, then, was the role of knowledge in the pro-
duction and development of a capitalist society.
Critical theory addressed the relationship between
power and rationality in capitalist society as well
as the problem of technological rationality in the
service of authoritarian regimes. While traditional
Marxism focused on the development of capital-
ism in strictly formal economic terms (e.g., modes
of production), Frankfurt school critical theorists
turned their attention to the critique of ideology,
institutions, and culture. Critical theory, as it first
developed, took as its object of study the super-
structural elements of capitalist infrastructure,
which led the way to comprehensive materialist,
156 Critical Theory
dialectical critiques of art, literature, music, phi-
losophy, social science, and science.
The distinctive feature of Frankfurt school
critical theory can be found in this reformulation
of traditional Marxist analysis. While many
Marxists of the 1920s and 1930s were pursuing
positivist or scientific uses of Marxism, Frankfurt
school critical theorists were expanding Marx’s
Hegelian roots. Martin Jay, in his landmark study
titled The Dialectical Imagination: A History of
the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social
Research, 1923–1950, describes the shared meth-
odology of Frankfurt school members as critical
of other philosophical traditions. It is important
to note, Jay observes, that critical theorists of the
Frankfurt school, especially Horkheimer, were not
content with further explicating metaphysical
truths or the unconcealment of truth. They were
committed to the development of social change
through intellectual work. Figures such as Friedrich
Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Henri Bergson
were highly significant to the development of
Frankfurt school critical theory, especially the
critical theory developed by Horkheimer that
emphasized anti-idealist thinking.
Methodological Features
Although Frankfurt school critical theory is a
diverse yet connected set of methodologies, it is
Horkheimer’s critique of 19th-century Leben­
philosophie that marks its unique characteristics.
The turn away from Marxian science or orthodox
Marxist economics is not a rejection of science and
an embracing of theoretical irrationalism or an
antiscience. It is, instead, a recognition and critique
of a metaphysical impulse in both science and anti-
science, a metaphysical impulse to see history as
one-dimensional or nondialectical. A critique of
Lebenphilosophie specifically allows Horkheimer
to emphasize his support of what he called “phi-
losophers of life,” rejecting the false choice between
scientism and irrationalism. Philosophers of life,
according to Horkheimer, did not sufficiently see
the necessity for political praxis in their moral
vision. From this assessment, one can see
Horkheimer’s general approach to philosophy and
his subsequent critical theory that he developed in
relation to the Frankfurt school as attempts to
redraw the contours defining intellectual work.
Scientism, idealism, mysticism, irrationalism, or
nihilism were not moral visions that could materi-
ally transform the future in Horkheimer’s view.
Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin, and members of
the Frankfurt school sought to tie together philoso-
phy, psychoanalysis, and Marxism in an attempt to
underscore the materiality of history and the trans-
formational power of reason that was not limited
by technological rationalism. Critical theory, in
this tradition, is largely a post-Enlightenment proj-
ect of emancipation and one that later Frankfurt
school figures, such as Jürgen Habermas, continue
to this day as a pursuit of a rational society.
Contemporary Meaning
The second form of critical theory to be discussed
arises as a partial thematic extension of Frankfurt
school critical theory. The Frankfurt school’s atten-
tion to the superstructural elements of society per-
mitted an analysis of cultural objects. With their
focus on the dialectical relationships between
everyday life and history (Benjamin), scholars and
critics began seeing aesthetic objects, primarily, as
part of a social totality driven by historical forces—
namely, economic and ideological. This rather
broad methodological practice invited a wide vari-
ety of intellectual pursuits. This was made even
more possible as Frankfurt school critical theorists,
Adorno in particular, were reluctant to name the
totality to which everything belonged—a precur-
sor to Derridean deconstruction, as some have
argued. Some scholars argue that among the mem-
bers of the Frankfurt school, Adorno perhaps most
consistently critiqued ontology, identity theory,
and positivism. Critics have, in addition, com-
mented on the religious or theological dimension
of Frankfurt school critical theory, with its prohi-
bition against identifying the absolute and its reli-
gious hope for a just world. For structuralist
Marxists of the 1960s and 1970s, Frankfurt school
critical theory, with its superstructure/infrastruc-
ture emphasis, functioned as a useful complement
to their endeavors. The wave of 1970s and 1980s
French post-Marxist critical practice in the form of
ideology critique stems from the insights of
Frankfurt school critical theory.
The most dominant understanding of critical
theory in this second formulation, however,
appears in the context of poststructuralism, a term

more or less coined by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
in her translation of Jacques Derrida’s Of
Grammatology. Critical theory, from the 1970s to
the present, has meant, generally speaking, “the-
ory.” The specificity of the Frankfurt school has
largely been forgotten, and critical theory, now, is
a generic term for any interpretive method of tex-
tual and/or cultural analysis. The terms critical
theory, poststructuralism, literary theory, theory,
postmodernism, and deconstruction are all used
synonymously to mean looking at something from
a point of view. This synonymous terminology can
lead to confusion, especially because all of these
terms have highly specific historical and philo-
sophical significance that can be traced to issues
explored by Frankfurt school figures.
Critical theory as theory in literary studies, for
instance, means modes of interpretation. Lois
Tyson, in her popular textbook Critical Theory: A
User-Friendly Guide, describes critical theory as a
tool to bring about new ways to view the world. In
this sense, critical theory becomes multiple theo-
ries, or tools that allow people to see their world
through a multiplicity of lenses, strengthening
their ability to think logically and creatively. With
this formulation is the potential for the dialectical
inversion or retooling of Frankfurt school critical
theory—theory as instrument. Nevertheless, some
aspects of Frankfurt school critical theory remain
in the contemporary usage of the term. For exam-
ple, critical theory, which Tyson equates with liter-
ary theory, can be distinguished from literary
criticism. The task of critical theory is to try to
explain the assumptions and values upon which
various forms of literary criticism rest. Tyson goes
on to add that when a reader is examining the cri-
teria for interpretation, he or she is doing critical
theory, but when that activity becomes applica-
tion, it is criticism. The faint trace of the Frankfurt
school tradition to be found in this distinction
leads back to Horkheimer’s reappraisal on Kant’s
critical philosophy in which philosophy becomes
critical when it turns to an analysis of the condi-
tion of and for its own articulation. This is the
critique function of critical theory, which may
become lost in the instrumentalization of critical
theory in contemporary literary studies.
In literary and cultural studies, critical theory,
when it is not a synonym for theory in general, is
associated with poststructuralist theory. While
Critical Theory 157
Frankfurt school critical theory and poststructural-
ist theory share concerns relating to epistemology,
metaphysics, and ethics, their respective histories
and methodologies are different. Even as the two
approaches identify the same figures—Kant and
Hegel—as essential to the working out of their
approaches, the trajectories are not shared. For
instance, Derrida was not extending Adorno’s
critical philosophy in his development of decon-
struction, although many have noted that Adorno
prefigures or anticipates many themes in Derrida’s
work. Where the two theories do, in fact, coincide,
it can be described as a similar thematic concern
about relating the world to truth. Adorno’s critical
theory takes shape as a hermeneutic process, a
second reflection, against the backdrop of a social
totality that is not reducible to cognitive forma-
tion. A negative dialectic that leaves an ungrasp-
able residual in its wake was quickly likened by
critics to Derrida’s différance, although the former
is largely an epistemological problem of linking
thought to an object and the latter is a metaphysi-
cal condition of a signifying network of signs with
no positive terms. On the surface, then, Frankfurt
school critical theory seems to resonate with other
theoretical models and traditions; however, these
conjunctions are largely thematic or coincidental
and not indicative of some deep-seated method-
ological expansion of Horkheimer’s initial con-
struction of critical theory.
A further overview of critical theory in contem-
porary literary studies shows that any practice of
reading in which perspective is emphasized becomes
theoretical. This defining feature of critical theory
in this account extends to other disciplines and
fields of inquiry, most noticeably culture studies. In
this context, critical theory appears as perspectives
organized around such fields as linguistics, history,
gender and sexuality studies, psychoanalysis, and
politics. Many guides to critical theory often list
particular approaches that cluster either histori-
cally or thematically. John Phillips’s Contested
Knowledge: A Guide to Critical Theory, which
only has one reference to the Frankfurt school, lists
as critical theory the following: structuralism,
semiotics, deconstruction, and psychoanalysis.
Tyson, on the other hand, lists in Critical Theory:
A User-Friendly Guide psychoanalysis; Marxism;
feminism; new criticism; reader-response; structur-
alism; deconstruction; new historicism; lesbian,
158 Cultivation Theory
gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) criticism; and
postcolonialism as examples of critical theory. The
casual definition of critical theory remains only
tangentially connected to the term that finds its
beginning with the Frankfurt school. In addition,
the casual definition of critical theory is fluid and
open to including any practice that fits the crite-
rion of reading or analyzing from a point of view.
Victor E. Taylor
See also Frankfurt School; Modernity and Postmodernity
Further Readings
Jay, M. (1996). The dialectical imagination: A history of
the Frankfurt school and the Institute of Social
Research, 1923–1950. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Payne, M. (1997). A dictionary of cultural and critical
theory. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Phillips, J. (2000). Contested knowledge: A guide to
critical theory. London: Zed Books.
Tyson, L. (1999). Critical theory: A user-friendly guide.
New York: Garland Press.
Wiggerhaus, R. (1995). The Frankfurt school: Its history,
theories, and political significance (M. Robertson,
Trans.). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Cultivation Theory
Devised by George Gerbner, cultivation theory
proposes that television viewing makes an inde-
pendent contribution to people’s conceptions of
social reality. The central hypothesis of cultivation
research is that those who spend more time watch-
ing television will be more likely to hold beliefs
and assumptions about life and society that reflect
the most stable messages embedded in television’s
dramatic programs. Television entertainment
offers vivid and repetitive “lessons” regarding
gender, race, class, sexuality, age, and other socio-
cultural dynamics. Over time, viewers absorb
stable images of different groups and perceptions
of a broad range of social “facts” and practices;
these patterns offer templates that viewers use in
navigating their own sense of identity. Cumulative
exposure to television’s massive flow of images,
representations, and symbolic models cultivates
specific values, images, beliefs, desires, and expec-
tations; these help shape what people think about
the world as well as how they perceive themselves
(and how others perceive them) in relation to it.
Background
Cultivation analysis was developed in the 1960s as
part of a larger paradigm, called the Cultural
Indicators project, which involves a three-pronged
research strategy. The first, called institutional pro-
cess analysis, is designed to examine various power
roles in media industries and to analyze the organi-
zational and institutional processes that affect how
media messages are selected and produced. The
second, called message system analysis, analyzes
weekly samples of network programs to track the
most common and recurrent images and portrayals
in television content over long periods of time.
Building on the findings from these first two phases,
cultivation analysis then investigates whether and
how exposure to television’s messages contributes
to viewers’ conceptions of social reality.
The theory of cultivation has played a major
role in communication research, and nearly 500
scholarly articles have been published relating to
the Cultural Indicators project. Early cultivation
research focused especially on the issue of televi-
sion violence, but in later years the research
expanded to examine sex roles, images of aging,
minorities, occupations, political orientations,
environmental attitudes, science, health, religion,
and other topics. Replications have been carried
out in dozens of other countries, including
Argentina, Australia, Hungary, Japan, Sweden,
and elsewhere.
Theoretical Framework
The theory of cultivation builds on the vital, life-
long role that storytelling plays in all cultures.
Unlike other species, human beings live in a world
that is created by the stories we tell. Great portions
of what we know (or think we know) are based
not on any direct or personal experience, but on
stories we have been told.
The stories of any culture tend to reflect (and
cultivate) that culture’s most basic, fundamental,
and often invisible assumptions, ideologies, and

values. In any culture, stories—myths, legends,
fairy tales, soap operas, cop shows—dynamically
express and reproduce a culture’s central beliefs
about what exists; what is real, normal, good, and
bad; and what different types of people can expect
in life.
Gerbner defined communication as “interaction
through messages.” Mass communication is the
mass production, distribution, and consumption
of cultural messages and stories. For much of
human history, the stories of a culture were trans-
mitted face-to-face by parents, teachers, or the
clergy. With the rise of mass media, television in
particular, the cultural process of storytelling has
become dominated by a centralized, advertiser-
sponsored system. Television now tells most of the
stories to most of the people, most of the time.
Most of the stories we now consume are not hand-
crafted works of individual expressive artists but
are mass-produced by bureaucratic institutions
according to strict market specifications. The com-
mercial imperatives of television require it to pro-
duce stories that reflect—and thereby sustain and
cultivate—the “facts” of life that most people take
for granted.
Cultivation analysis differs sharply from tradi-
tional ways of studying media effects. Prior to the
development of cultivation theory, most research
on television looked for some sort of change in
viewers’ perceptions, values, or behaviors following
exposure to specific scenes, episodes, programs, or
genres. In contrast, cultivation asks whether cumu-
lative exposure to television’s entire coherent sys-
tem of messages might promote stability (or gradual,
generational shifts) over long periods of time rather
than immediate change in individuals. Thus, culti-
vation theory differs from extant mass communica-
tion research by drawing attention to the entire
system of television’s symbolic messages and by
focusing on effects over long periods of time.
For example, for decades, most research (and
public debate) on the effects of television violence
has focused on whether or not watching scenes of
violence leads to imitation and makes viewers
behave aggressively. In contrast, Gerbner and his
colleagues argued that heavy exposure to televi-
sion does not change individual behavior (in most
cases), but instead cultivates exaggerated beliefs
about the amount of violence that exists in society.
This goes along with a greater sense of insecurity,
Cultivation Theory 159
victimization, and interpersonal mistrust, in a
cluster of outlooks Gerbner called the “mean
world syndrome.”
Cultivation theorists emphasize aggregate pat-
terns of images and representations to which entire
communities are exposed over long periods of
time; they do not address questions of artistic qual-
ity, perceptions of realism, or individual viewers’
“readings” of media messages. Of course, on some
levels, different types of programs present diver-
gent images and portrayals, and viewers often do
watch selectively and interpret programs in strik-
ingly different ways. Without denying these pro-
cesses, cultivation scholars instead focus on what
is most broadly shared and inescapable across
various program types and among large groups of
otherwise heterogeneous viewers. In other words,
cultivation theorists investigate and account for
the systemic consequences of television as a tech-
nology and an institution in terms of its whole, not
its parts.
In the process, cultivation researchers seek to
illuminate the broad-based ideological conse-
quences of a commercially supported cultural
industry that promotes specific forms of consump-
tion, materialism, individualism, and power and
that helps stabilize the status quo along lines of
gender, race, class, and age.
Methods
Starting in 1967, the Cultural Indicators project
each year conducted an extensive content analysis
of a weeklong sample of U.S. broadcast network
television drama to delineate selected features and
trends in television presentations to viewers. In the
1990s, the analysis was extended to include new
networks, cable channels, and genres (e.g., “real-
ity” shows). Message system analysis focuses on
the most pervasive content patterns that cut across
different types of programs, as these hold the most
significant potential lessons television cultivates.
The coding instrument covers a wide range of
themes, actions, and demographic representations
and is subjected to extensive reliability analysis.
The findings from message system analyses are
used to formulate questions about people’s concep-
tions of social reality, often contrasting television’s
“reality” with some other real-world criterion. For
example, on television most murders are committed
160 Cultivation Theory
by strangers, whereas in reality, most often the
victim and murderer know each other. From these
kinds of comparative patterns, survey questions (in
this case, “Do you think most murders take place
between strangers or between people who know
each other?”) are developed and posed to samples
of children, adolescents, or adults.
The surveys also measure amount of television
viewing (usually, “on an average day”), and
respondents are divided into groups of relatively
light, medium, and heavy viewers based on the
distribution within any specific sample. Then, the
analysis compares the percentage of light, medium,
and heavy viewers who give the “TV answer” (in
this case, that “most murders take place between
strangers”), to see if heavy viewers are more likely
to see the real world in terms of the patterns pre-
sented on television. Other statistical procedures
provide more elaborate and stringent tests con-
trolling for a wide variety of demographic and
other variables. The questions cover many differ-
ent topics and areas and do not mention televi-
sion, as the point of the research is to examine
how people perceive the world, not what they
think about television.
Findings and Processes
Prime-time television entertainment in the United
States is dominated by well-off White males in the
prime of life. Women are outnumbered by men at
a rate of 2 or 3 to 1 and are portrayed in a nar-
rower range of activities and opportunities. White
males are more likely to commit violence, while
old, young, female, and minority characters are
more likely to be portrayed as victims. Crime in
prime time is at least 10 times as rampant as in the
real world, and an average of 5 to 6 acts of overt
physical violence per hour involve well over half of
all major characters.
Cultivation researchers argue that these mes-
sages of power, dominance, and victimization cul-
tivate relatively restrictive and intolerant views
regarding personal morality and freedoms, wom-
en’s roles, and minority rights. Cultivation theo-
rists contend that heavy exposure to television
cultivates fear of victimization, mistrust, and alien-
ation and a willingness to accept repressive mea-
sures that will promise security, all of which help
maintain the prevailing hierarchy of social power.
Television viewing relates in different ways to
different groups’ life situations and worldviews.
For example, personal interaction with family and
peers makes a difference, as do real-world experi-
ences. A wide variety of sociodemographic and
individual factors produce variations in cultivation
patterns for different groups. These differences
often take the form of a phenomenon called main-
streaming, which means that heavy television
viewing may diminish differences in people’s per-
spectives that reflect other factors and influences.
Mainstreaming suggests that television viewing
cultivates a relative homogenization of otherwise
divergent viewers.
Critiques
Cultivation theory has generated a great deal of
academic controversy, and many critics have con-
tested the theory, methods, and findings of cultiva-
tion research. The theoretical assumptions and
methodological procedures of cultivation analysis
have been vigorously critiqued; extensive debates
and colloquies on the subject have engaged the
scholarly community over the years, and many
have led to refinements and extensions. Some have
criticized the assumption of relative stability in pro-
gram content over time and across genres and have
emphasized the differential and specific impacts of
exposure to different programs and types.
The literature contains many failures to repli-
cate cultivation findings along with many indepen-
dent confirmations. The most common conclusion,
supported by meta-analysis, is that television view-
ing makes a small but significant contribution to
viewers’ beliefs about the world. Given the perva-
siveness of television and even light viewers’ sub-
stantial cumulative exposure, finding observable
evidence of cultivation at all is remarkable.
Therefore, a systematic pattern of small but consis-
tent differences between light and heavy viewers
may indicate far-reaching consequences.
Later Developments and New Challenges
A substantial amount of research has been con-
ducted that attempts to illuminate the cognitive
processes through which television’s images are pro-
cessed, stored, and retrieved within viewers’ heads.
Additionally, numerous intervening processes have

been examined (e.g., the role of perceived reality,
active versus passive viewing, the family and the
social context of exposure). The spread of non-
broadcast alternative delivery systems—such as
cable, satellite, video cassette recorders, digital
video recorders, and the Internet—has been increas-
ingly taken into account, and cultivation has been
adapted to the virtual worlds of video games.
Increasingly complex and demanding statistical
tests and analytical models have been applied.
In the 21st century, U.S. broadcast networks
attract a fraction of the audiences they used to com-
mand, and viewers are fragmented among dozens
of specialized cable and satellite channels devoted
to specific interests. With the spread of digital video
recorders, digital broadcasting, video-on-demand
and the ability to download programs on the
Internet, cell phones, and portable music players,
audiences now seem to be able to choose from an
extraordinary range of diverse content, watching
whatever they want whenever they want, in ways
that contradict many assumptions of cultivation.
Yet, these new delivery systems alone do not
fundamentally change the dynamics that drive pro-
gram production and distribution. People are still
heavily exposed to “network-type” programming;
many new channels mainly offer more of the same
types of programs. Concentration of ownership has
increased as traditional barriers among networks,
studios, cable operators, and advertisers have bro-
ken down. Further, key aspects of the earlier media
system are amplified; for example, premium cable
channels have much higher levels of violence than
do broadcast networks, and for heavy viewers, new
media mean even greater exposure to more of the
same messages. Thus, if there is no fundamental
change in the aggregate cultural messages and sto-
ries, technological developments alone will not
diminish cultivation.
Cultivation theorists are concerned with the
most general consequences of long-term exposure
to centrally produced, commercially supported
systems of stories. Cultivation analysts concen-
trate on the common consequences of living with
television: the cultivation of stable, resistant, and
widely shared assumptions and conceptions reflect-
ing the institutional interests of the medium and
the larger society.
Michael Morgan
Cultural Capital 161
See also Consumption; Cultural Representation;
Narratives
Further Readings
Gerbner, G. (1973). Cultural indicators: The third voice.
In G. Gerbner, L. Gross, & W. H. Melody (Eds.),
Communications technology and social policy
(pp. 555–573). New York: Wiley.
Gerbner, G., Gross, L., Morgan, M., & Signorielli, N.
(1980). The “mainstreaming” of America: Violence
profile no. 11. Journal of Communication, 30(3),
10–29.
Gerbner, G., Gross, L., Morgan, M., Signorielli, N., &
Shanahan, J. (2002). Growing up with television:
Cultivation processes. In J. Bryant & D. Zillman
(Eds.), Media effects: Advances in theory and research
(2nd ed., pp. 43–67). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum.
Morgan, M. (Ed.). (2002). Against the mainstream:
Selected writings of George Gerbner. New York: Peter
Lang.
Shanahan, J., & Morgan, M. (1999). Television and its
viewers: Cultivation theory and research. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Signorielli, N., & Morgan, M. (Eds.). (1990). Cultivation
analysis: New directions in media effects research.
Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Cultural Capital
Pierre Bourdieu is the social theorist who gave
prominence to the concept of cultural capital—
that is, the cultural goods one uses or attains in
order to gain social standing. The concept, like
other terms coined by Bourdieu—including habi-
tus, field, and others—was formulated in congru-
ence with his special theory of practice. This
theory, generative structuralism (or reflexive soci-
ology, as it is known alternatively), is markedly
different from previous theories in its coverage of
both social psychological and structural processes
in the explanation of the dynamics of social pro-
duction and reproduction. In this formulation, the
two processes are closely knit to the extent that
each acts as a condition for the existence of the
other. One of the most important outcomes of this
orientation is a reconstructed notion of capital.
162 Cultural Capital
Whereas other theorists take the concept nar-
rowly, Bourdieu provides a nuanced view of capi-
tal with its varied forms. It is within this
theoretical range and Bourdieu’s committed inter-
est in integrating theory and research that cultural
capital emerged as an important concept. Just as
all capital, cultural capital presumes resources
available to draw upon at will. It is assumed that
cultural capital is paid out over time via relation-
ships with others but that its accumulation and
regeneration also emanates from social relation-
ships. It is this inextricable connection to relation-
ships that gradually leads to negotiating identities
to accumulate, sustain, and exchange an adequate
supply of cultural capital.
Forms of Capital
The concept of capital is borrowed from economic
theory. However, with Bourdieu, capital has
acquired an expanded meaning. By reducing all
forms of exchange to an economic one, economists
have been utilizing the term limitedly for a long
time. On the other hand, Bourdieu insists that
social exchange involves a multivaried form of
interaction in which social actors are motivated by
both “interested” and “disinterested” reasons.
Whereas the former are carried out for instrumen-
tal reasons, that is, for the purposes of maximizing
profit in its multifaceted modes, the latter are
activities that are carried out as ends in themselves.
Mindful of this and avoiding a reductionist
approach, Bourdieu defines capital as an “accumu-
lated labor,” which can be appropriated in the
form of “social energy” that acts both as a force
and as a principle permeating the social world.
Consequently, the place that members of society
have in the system of social relations is reflected in
their possession of the overall volume and the
composition of diverse forms of capital within
their respective social fields.
Although varied species of capital, including
political capital and linguistic capital, are the sub-
ject of academic deliberation, the major forms of
capital often discussed by Bourdieu and other
researchers are economic capital, social capital,
symbolic capital, and cultural capital. Each form of
capital is associated with what Bourdieu calls
social fields, social patterns of objective relations
between different social positions. In fact, capital
and field are so interrelated that one is inconceiv-
able without the other. The common denominator
among all the different forms of capital is that they
are resources that allow agents to maintain their
social position or status and thereby occasion the
reproduction of social inequality. Yet Bourdieu
does not think that agents fall into simple bifur-
cated dominant–dominated levels, because modern
societies are increasingly differentiated wholes
where one’s standing in one area may not necessar-
ily spill over to other social fields, although one
form of capital can be converted into another.
Among the four species of capital, it is economic
capital that is the most transmutable one. Mostly
existing in the mode of material goods, it also has
the unique property of being amenable to quantita-
tive description and being institutionalized in the
form of legal rights. Social capital, on the other
hand, refers to the resources social actors possess
by virtue of their place in the node of social rela-
tions. Of the four forms of capital, symbolic capital
is qualitatively distinct; because it is not specifically
related to a social field, it is used to legitimate the
possession of other forms of capital.
Cultural capital refers to symbolic goods exist-
ing in the mode of linguistic and cultural compe-
tence, and largely institutionalized in the form of
educational credentials, that agents use to main-
tain their prestige. Cultural capital is relatively
unstable, especially compared to economic capital,
because it is not as tangible. It is also subject to
criticism and is not always perceived to be a legiti-
mate form of capital. Bourdieu’s notion of cultural
capital, among other things, extricates culture
from its functionalist meaning, which merely refers
to a set of values and norms of a given society
through which social order is maintained. Instead,
culture is understood as an important instrument
of social reproduction. What is more, from this
vantage point, linguistic or cultural competence is
not the result of natural aptitude. Rather, it is an
acquired habitus made possible through varied
processes of cultivation wherein some have a pre-
existing head start over others.
Yet again, Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital
is different from the concept of human capital.
Human capital theorists, despite their important
contributions in establishing the relationship
between educational yield and economic invest-
ment, take into account only those endeavors that

are related to monetary investments without taking
into consideration other important dimensions of
cultural capital. This unidimensional approach has
conditioned them to gloss over the intricate forms
of socialization and the subtle strategies of cultural
transmission. As a result of the absence of proper
consideration in the examination of the relation-
ship between scholastic investment, educational
strategies, and the system of social reproduction,
the most critical factor in the pedagogical process—
the domestic transmission of cultural capital—is
left out of the picture. The adherents of the human
capital perspective, accordingly, hardly distanced
themselves from a functionalist assumption, which
overlooks the important place that cultural capital
has in the reproduction of social relations.
Forms of Cultural Capital
Bourdieu contends that cultural capital can assume
three distinct forms: objectified form, embodied
form, and institutionalized form. In its embodied
state, cultural capital exists as a body-mind sensi-
bility. As such, cultural capital is acquired over
time, as it is not an objectified reality that can be
attached to the body mechanically. Hence, embod-
ied cultural capital can be acquired only when the
person interested in it invests a good amount of
time in internalizing what exists external to him or
her. Certainly, this process of incorporation can-
not be carried out by proxy; it cannot be done in
the absence of the person who is interested in
acquiring cultural capital. Once appropriated,
embodied cultural capital, as the term suggests,
remains within the body even after the process of
social exchange in which an actor is involved is
over. Investing capital, in this case, means to get
something out of it without the worth of cultural
capital one possesses diminishing. Intellectuals
who are engaged in teaching do not lose their cul-
tural capital when involved in the processes of
instruction. In fact, the transmission of informa-
tion to others opens the venue for the further
expansion of cultural capital. The same discursive
space can be used as a medium to prepare the nec-
essary conditions for the creation of future objecti-
fied cultural capital.
Most importantly, cultural capital in its embod-
ied form cannot be “bought” or “sold” or trans-
ferred directly to another person as a gift. This
Cultural Capital 163
dimension of cultural capital creates an intricate
relationship between the possessors of cultural
capital, on one hand, and those who lack it but
own other forms of capital, on the other hand. The
latter, among other things, encounter the problem
of appropriating the labor of the former without
effectively empowering the people who possess it.
Although embodied cultural capital cannot be
passed directly as a gift, its acquisition can be
facilitated through the utilization of other forms of
capital. Economic capital, for instance, serves as
an important catalyst in the attainment of embod-
ied cultural capital as when wealthy parents send
their children to prestigious schools. Furthermore,
acquiring embodied cultural capital is not made
possible through formal processes alone, although
this is the most formidable way it is done; a good
amount of cultural capital is acquired informally.
Middle-class parents transmit cultural capital to
their children by virtue of acting in accordance
with their embodied sensibilities. Hence, students
from culturally well-to-do families have an advan-
tage over those whose background has not allowed
them to acquire cultural skills that are critical in
the school system. Because this process is hidden,
it appears as if some students are naturally more
talented than others. That is to say, the consistency
between personal background and the culture of
the school system is misrecognized as an organic
connection in which aptitude is viewed as inborn
and not the result of a social making.
In its objectified state, cultural capital exists as
material possessions such as paintings, books, vid-
eos, and others. Hence, objectified cultural capital,
unlike cultural capital in its embodied form, can be
easily transferred from one person to another.
However, the mere possession of these cultural
goods does not imply that the possessor is capable
of utilizing them. Meaningful possession of objec-
tified cultural capital requires that the owner has
the appropriate disposition to make use of the
objects under possession. Otherwise, objectified
cultural capital becomes a “thing” with exchange
value without being intellectually meaningful to
the possessor.
In many cases, individuals with the appropriate
disposition are not the possessors of objectified
cultural capital (material possessions with cultural
value). It is this factor that places those who have
cultural capital but do not possess a high volume
164 Cultural Contracts Theory
of economic capital in an ambiguous position in
the system of social relations. Members of this
group belong to the dominated fraction of the
dominant class. Insofar as they possess cultural
capital, they are part of the dominant group. On
the other hand, insofar as they do not possess eco-
nomic capital, they are the dominated fraction of
the dominant group. The strength of the holders of
cultural capital is directly proportional to the
amount of talent required in operating an instru-
ment. The higher the talent one possesses, the
higher the status an individual attains.
In its institutionalized mode, cultural capital
exists in the form of mostly educational creden-
tials. In addition to augmenting the added value of
cultural capital and guaranteeing its worth, the
institutionalization of cultural capital minimizes
the problem of cultural capital being constantly
questioned. This is done largely through the pro-
cess of instituting an essential difference between
the officially recognized and mere possession of
cultural capital. By establishing a qualitative differ-
ence between those who are licensed and those
who are not, even if they possess the talent, cul-
tural capital is made to acquire an autonomous
position, thereby guaranteeing the monetary value
of credentials. This is done by institutions that
impose recognition through the creation of stan-
dards intended to make possible the comparison
between qualification holders and the process of
exchange between them. Ultimately, the institu-
tionalization of cultural capital guarantees the
conversion rates between it and its critical counter-
part, economic capital.
Although Bourdieu has provided detailed infor-
mation on only three forms of cultural capital, his
theory clearly suggests the existence of other forms
of cultural capital as well. Insofar as fields and the
different forms of capital are closely knit, it is pos-
sible to have new species of cultural capital as
fields increasingly differentiate themselves into
further domains. This could be demonstrated in
relation to cultural capital and the scientific field.
All departments of knowledge require that scien-
tists possess what could be referred to as an “intel-
lectual habitus”—a disposition distinct from the
religious habitus, for instance. Yet, in each disci-
pline, experts are required to acquire a linguistic
habitus congruent to the methods and assumptions
of their intellectual enterprises. Hence, scientists
who are proficient in their respective area could be
total novices in other areas. Mathematicians, for
instance, do not speak the same language and, as a
result, do not perceive the social world in the same
manner as social theorists.
Alem Kebede
See also Cultural Studies; Habitus; Social Capital
Further Readings
Bourdieu, P. (1983). The forms of capital. In
J. Richardson (Ed.), The handbook of theory and
research for the sociology of education (pp. 241–258).
New York: Greenwood Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A social critique of the
judgment of taste (R. Nice, Trans.). Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press. (Original work published
1979)
Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J.-C. (1977). Reproduction in
education society and culture (R. Nice, Trans.).
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Cultural Contracts Theory
In the process of identity negotiation, there is an
attempt to hold onto one’s identity as a basic
definition of who one is. Ronald Jackson’s cul-
tural contracts theory (CCT) is a communication-
based, contractual agreement between cultural
others as they negotiate individual identities and
worldview alterations. According to the theory as
originally conceived, all human beings have cul-
tural identity contracts that become evident when
interactions between ingroup and outgroup mem-
bers take place; these contracts are particularly
salient in dominant–nondominant communicative
acts. This entry provides a brief discussion of the
relationship between cultural identity and com-
munication, discusses identity theories that inform
CCT, provides a detailed definition of CCT, and
discusses three applications of CCT.
Cultural Identities Are Communicated
Because it is based on communication, culture pro-
vides a blueprint for human behavior and social

structure. It is through cultural values, norms,
rules, language, rituals, and social practices that
humans learn who they are, how to behave, and
how to treat others. Identity is tied to communica-
tion and culture—that is, one’s identity is commu-
nicated by way of cultural verbal and nonverbal
expressions. Identity has two parts: personal (indi-
vidual) and collective (group). Personal identity is
relative to self-esteem but is also heavily influenced
by collective or group identity. In the identity con-
struction process, group membership is more
important than the personal—not only because of
the sense of belonging but also because of the
social values and mores that are associated with
groups. Importantly, individual identities are based
on how others see us, a major influence on how we
see ourselves. Put simply, cultural identity is
shaped through a two-way mirror—looking at
oneself through the eyes of others. Because humans
constantly come into contact with other humans,
the identity process is not static but dynamic, and
the identification process always occurs.
Representation of cultural norms and values as
standard by cultural groups is a communicative
reflection of ways in which cultural identities are
impacted. In relational coordination, cultural iden-
tity becomes more salient when comparisons are
made between ingroup and outgroup members.
This is particularly true when there are power
imbalances, such as between dominant and mar-
ginalized groups. Cultural contracts theorists
address the process of identity negotiation as indi-
viduals come into contact with cultural others and
both parties attempt to hold onto their own world-
views. In intercultural encounters, people behave
according to established norms and belief systems,
and cultural dominance impacts intercultural com-
petence. Much as cultural group values and norms
influence individual identities, dominant cultural
attitudes influence group attitudes and, therefore,
individual attitudes. Thus, the role of cultural
dominance in identity negotiation is an important
one, as cultural dominant attitudes and behaviors
influence group and individual behaviors.
Identity Negotiation
Social identity theory posits that strong dominant
group attitudes will promote assimilation attempts
by both ingroup and outgroup members. In
Cultural Contracts Theory 165
intercultural encounters, resistance or acceptance
is based on the strength of cultural identities and
an individual’s assessment of dominant cultural
beliefs. Related to psychological health and self-
esteem, a strong cultural identity can result in
separatist attempts by outgroup members. This
means that individuals with strong collective iden-
tities, which include a sense of group belonging,
will offer more resistance to dominant cultural
attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs. Individuals with
strong dominant-group attitudes are more accept-
ing of dominant cultural values and will, therefore,
attempt assimilation into the dominant group.
Where power imbalances exist in intercultural set-
tings, such as between dominant and marginalized
group members, a strong cultural identity is found
to be related to psychological health and well-
being, whereas assimilation attempts are found to
be related to socioeconomic status and social com-
fort. According to social identity theory, positive
intergroup comparisons increase intercultural com-
petence and reduce uncertainty, whereas negative
comparisons increase uncertainty, fuel stereotypes,
and reduce intercultural competence.
Communication accommodation theory is used
to explain the motivation and strategies that influ-
ence communication styles and facilitate code-
switching behavior. The theory differs from social
identity theory in that it focuses on communica-
tion choices and consequences that provide moti-
vation for identity negotiation. According to
communication accommodation theorists, motiva-
tion is influenced by cultural identity and cultural
dominance as individuals communicate their iden-
tities. Depending on the strength of power bal-
ances and collective identity, people will either
accommodate or not accommodate outgroup
members. One example of the negotiation of cul-
tural identity is the use of language choices and
conversational rules; through their use of language,
ingroup members can emphasize a strong collec-
tive identity. However, depending on the social
situation and desired outcomes, both ingroup and
outgroup members might use language to strengthen
intercultural competence.
Ethnolinguistic identity theory expands the iden-
tity negotiation paradigm of using language as a
way to determine cultural identity strength by
focusing on power. The theory explores how
groups with strong collective identities thrive and
166 Cultural Contracts Theory
resist assimilation, while groups without a strong
collective identity can cease to exist. In intercul-
tural settings, language of the highest status group
is the one that predominates—both on the interper-
sonal and the collective level. Thus, ethnolinguistic
identity theory illustrates the relationship between
power, social hierarchy, and identity negotiation.
Identity negotiation theory focuses on the role of
identity as it affects intercultural encounters by illus-
trating how identity negotiation is a communication
process. Self-image is influenced by culture—it
plays a primary role in how individuals see them-
selves and each other. Identity negotiation theory
emphasizes the relationship between cultural iden-
tity and self-image, focusing on self-conception as
both a motivator and a guide for intercultural
competence. Security is enhanced when one com-
municates with particular and general others like
one’s self, whereas vulnerability is enhanced with
communicating with particular and general others
unlike oneself. The theory emphasizes the use of
one’s concept of self as the primary motivating
factor during the identity negotiation process.
Although human beings desire positive group
and person-based identities in all communicative
situations, cultural identity salience has an impact
on intercultural encounters. As a result of cultural
dominance, for example, members of some mar-
ginalized groups may unfavorably compare them-
selves to members of the dominant group. During
the identity negotiation process, individuals con-
sider their own benefits and consequences as cul-
tural values and beliefs influence communication
competence in intercultural encounters. Being
mindful of one’s own cultural identity saliency can
produce favorable verbal and nonverbal communi-
cation strategies when interacting with cultural
others. Mindful communication is influenced by
motivation and impacts the identity negotiation
process.
Jackson’s 1999 study of European American
and African American students explored the iden-
tity negotiation process of both dominant and mar-
ginalized groups. Results from his study show that
both White and Black students claimed to resist
identity negotiation in intercultural encounters
with the other. Resistance of both groups illustrates
the relationship between cultural identity, power,
and identity negotiation. For Black students, resis-
tance was based on historical experiences of Blacks
in the United States—enough negotiation had
already taken place. Black participants also expressed
the desire to hold on to their own cultural identities
and still have positive intercultural encounters with
Whites. There was a “those days are over” mental-
ity, and many Black participants associated the
desire to assimilate with Whites with a weak cul-
tural identity and lack of self-esteem. White stu-
dents, however, reported a lack of need for the
negotiation process. Illustrating the power perspec-
tive of identity negotiation, many White participants
felt that non-Whites should assimilate (negotiate)
rather than Whites accommodate (negotiate) cul-
tural differences. From this study, Jackson con-
cluded that the negotiation of cultural identities is,
in large part, a marginalized group phenomenon—
mandated by dominant cultural groups. As with
any contractual negotiations, identity negotiation
is motivated by power balances that influence ben-
efits and consequences for all parties. Dominant
groups dictate relational coordination, not negoti-
ate. Hence, there is a lack of motivation to negoti-
ate among dominant groups.
Premises of Cultural Contracts Theory
CCT examines the process and power constructs
of altering one’s worldview and questions the goal
of intercultural competence or relational coordina-
tion between cultural others. In intercultural
encounters, cultural identities may conflict as a
result of competing worldviews. What “power”
one has influences the motivation to negotiate or
alter one’s worldview. Thus, in addition to the
cultural and social histories that influence cultural
identities, the theory takes an account of power
issues and cultural identities that influence identity
negotiation processes.
CCT is based on the premises that identities
require affirmation, identities are constantly being
exchanged, and identities are contractual.
Attachment to individual or group cultural con-
structs is healthy but may pose a problem for indi-
viduals when they come into contact with cultural
others. Marginalized groups are often presented
with the dilemma of either accepting or resisting
assimilation. Acceptance or resistance involves
power issues—intercultural competence may not
be always the goal. Identity negotiation constitutes
the signing of cultural contracts.

Because identities are communicated and the
communication process always occurs, just as cul-
tural and social values form individual identities,
personal experiences and histories influence indi-
vidual identity negotiation. How open individuals
are to negotiation with cultural others is a part of
the cultural contractual process. Because multiple
identities are functioning simultaneously (i.e.,
female, mother, professor), identity negotiations
are always taking place. Personal cultural histories
are important in the identity negotiation process so
that acceptance or resistance of cultural contracts
presented by cultural others is dependent upon
individual needs and situations. Therefore, a con-
tract will only be completed (negotiated) when
there is motivation (socioeconomic conditions,
relationship maintenance, etc.).
Cultural Contract Types
According to CCT, identities are contractual and
negotiable, and cultural contract types are used to
understand the identity negotiation process.
Everyone has at least one contract, and any can be
“signed” at any time. Ready-to-sign cultural con-
tracts are prenegotiated, designed to promote
assimilation rather than intercultural competence,
and resist any alteration in worldview. Illustrating
the power construct of identity negotiation, ready-
to-sign contracts are most often presented by
members of the dominant group to marginalized
groups. For example, Thanksgiving and the Fourth
of July are U.S. holidays, which, despite genocide
and slavery, communicate national freedom and
friendly relations with North American natives.
Presented with ready-to-sign contracts, marginal-
ized groups, such as Native Americans and Blacks,
are expected to participate in holiday rituals that
celebrate European American freedom and inde-
pendence while ignoring Native American and
African American genocide and slavery.
The second type of cultural contract is known
as a quasi-completed contract because it is both
prenegotiated and partly negotiated. The most
common type of cultural contracts, quasi-completed
contracts are often short term or episodic, although
individuals may spend a lifetime maintaining
this middle stance. Individuals who complete
quasi-completed cultural contracts “straddle the
fence”: not ready to fully give up their own
Cultural Contracts Theory 167
worldview but also not ready to fully challenge the
status quo (and accept the consequences). People
who question the Fourth of July and Thanksgiving
as examples of U.S. independence and freedom
may still feel compelled to participate in family or
work-related celebrations of these holidays. To be
accepted by the mainstream, members of margin-
alized groups may code-switch, showing a more
accepting attitude at work, while privately ques-
tioning the validity of these cultural celebrations.
Not willing to fully assimilate to dominant cultural
constructs, they are also not ready to fully accept
consequences of separation, which may result in
relationship termination, loss of socioeconomic
status, and so forth.
Cocreated cultural contracts are the ideal type
but least used contract. Demanded—not offered—
cocreated contracts are most often signed among
culturally alike individuals where differences are
minimized. Whereas ready-to-sign contracts stress
assimilation or separation, cocreated contracts
emphasize mutual validation of competing identi-
ties, ignoring power constructs that impact cul-
tural saliency. Cultural differences are neither
ignored nor celebrated; instead, relational coordi-
nation is based on mutual respect for the cultur-
ally other. Where quasi-completed contracts
maintain a middle stance, cocreated cultural con-
tracts are designed to fully validate cultural oth-
ers’ worldviews and allow relational differences.
Importantly, this acknowledgment is shown via
verbal and nonverbal behavior. A person demand-
ing a cocreated cultural contract would insist that
the histories of Native Americans, African
Americans, or both, be included in the discussions
of American independence and historical free-
doms. Mutual validation means that there is room
for both native and colonized histories.
Applications
Jackson used CCT to address a Eurocentric bias
within the communication discipline (and aca-
demia, in general). At many universities, African
American communication scholars are presented
with ready-to-sign contracts that may discourage
African-centered research. Because publication is
connected to the hiring and promotion process,
going outside of Eurocentric paradigms can affect
socioeconomic status and social well-being. To
168 Cultural Contracts Theory
keep her or his job, some Black communication
scholars may sign quasi-completed contracts—
code-switching, using Eurocentric theory and par-
adigms to study African artifacts, for example.
Jackson argues that African American communi-
cation scholars must demand cocreated cultural
contracts by using and developing scholarship that
examines and validates the Black experience.
Jackson and Rex Crawley applied CCT to
instruction within the university/college classroom
where preverbal communication, involving social
histories and cultural identities, impact pedagogi-
cal experiences of Black male instructors with
White students. Preverbal communication includes
racial stereotypes about Black males, which enter
into the classroom with them and affect students’
perspectives of their competence. In addition to
expectations of Eurocentric-based instruction
materials, race impacts White students’ perspec-
tives of Black male educators in another way—
White fear of Black males. The study illustrated
how, because many White students have had little
exposure to Black professional males in general
and Black male professors in particular, experi-
ences were based on stereotypical assumptions,
perpetuated by mainstream media. Thus, prenego-
tiated, ready-to-sign contracts were offered by
White students based on preverbal communica-
tion, which included stereotypes and racist assump-
tions about Black males. Quasi-completed cultural
contracts include the “I am not a racist” perspec-
tive, which opens dialogue but does not allow
complete contractual negotiations. When partici-
pants straddle the fence, resentment often occurs
because participants are not ready to fully give up
their worldview. Jackson and Crawley also dis-
cussed how “diverse” universities rarely create an
environment for cocreated cultural contracts, ped-
agogically or epistemologically.
In a study examining Black female beauty per-
ceptions, Cynthia Robinson-Moore used CCT to
address intercultural and intracultural influences
that encourage or discourage individual acceptance
or resistance of Eurocentric beauty standards.
Presented as a ready-to-sign contract, Eurocentric
beauty paradigms communicate that African/Black/
dark is ugly, whereas European/White/light is
attractive. Hair that is African/nappy/short is bad,
whereas hair that is European/straight/long is
good. Attempting to fit African features into
Eurocentric beauty standards is problematic because
standards exclude the skin color and hair texture
that many Black females have. For example,
straight hairstyles are influenced by dominant cul-
tural paradigms with long, straighter hair preferred
over short, natural (unstraightened) styles. Because
of its nature, the struggle of Black females as they
accept or resist societal modes of attractiveness and
constructs constitute the signing of cultural con-
tracts. Cultural dominant messages shape beauty
perceptions of Black women, influencing contrac-
tual identity negotiations. Resistance or acceptance
of messages is influenced by individual cultural
identities, family messages, and age.
Conclusion
The critical-interpretive perspective of identity
negotiation recognizes the relationship between
personal identities and cultural dominance in
worldview alteration by looking at power influ-
ences on nondominant groups. Self is developed
through a worldview using others as a guidepost
for normal behavior. By deciding who we are, we
determine how we will treat others and how we
want and allow others to treat us. Identity nego-
tiation processes must be viewed within larger
societal power structures and group/personal cul-
tural identities. Given power imbalances, what
must marginalized groups give up in the negotia-
tion process? Cultural contracts theorists address
the relationship between identity negotiation and
power.
Identity negotiation is influenced by motivation.
Using ready-to-sign, quasi-completed, and cocre-
ated cultural negotiations as “contractual” agree-
ments, CCT was developed to make sense of the
identity negotiation process. The theory suggests
that, although important, there is not necessarily a
mutual interest in relationship coordination,
worldview alteration, or intercultural competence.
Cultural contracts are signed (negotiated) because
of motivation and only when there is a perceived
or strong need for signing. CCT allows for the
examination of the identity negotiation process
rather than simply the end result.
Cynthia L. Robinson-Moore
See also Culture, Ethnicity, and Race; Group Identity;
Identity Negotiation; Patriotism

Further Readings
Griffin, E. (2003). A first look at communication theory
(5th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hecht, M. L., Jackson, R. L., II, & Pitts, M. J. (2005).
Culture: Intersection of intergroup and identity
theories. In J. Harwood & H. Giles (Eds.), Intergroup
communication: Multiple perspectives (pp. 21–42).
New York: Peter Lang.
Hecht, M. L., Jackson, R. L., II, & Ribeau, S. A. (2003).
African American communication: Exploring identity
and culture (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum.
Hendrix, K. G., Jackson, R. L., II, & Warren, J. R.
(2003). Shifting academic landscapes: Exploring
co-identities, identity negotiation, and critical
progressive pedagogy. Communication Education, 52,
177–190.
Jackson, R. L., II. (1999). The negotiation of cultural
identity: Perceptions of European Americans and
African Americans. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Jackson, R. L., II. (2002). Cultural contracts theory:
Toward an understanding of identity negotiation.
Communication Quarterly, 50, 359–367.
Jackson, R. L., II. (2002). Exploring African American
identity negotiation in the academy: Toward a
transformative vision of African American
communication and scholarship. Howard Journal of
Communications, 13, 43–47.
Jackson, R. L., II, & Crawley, R. L. (2003). White
student confessions about a Black male professor:
A cultural contracts theory approach to intimate
conversations about race and worldview. Journal of
Men’s Studies, 12, 25–41.
Robinson-Moore, C. L. (2005). A critical-interpretive
analysis of cultural identity and cultural dominance:
Communicating Black female beauty. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, University of Nebraska, Lincoln.
Ting-Toomey, S. (1999). Communicating across cultures.
New York: Guilford Press.
Cultural Representation
Cultural representation is a concept cultivated by
Stuart Hall within cultural studies, a discipline
originating in Great Britain during the 1960s.
Hall is recognized as a major contributor to the
field, particularly in expanding its focus on cul-
tural representations of race and ethnicity, as well
as gender. Culture can be understood as a set of
Cultural Representation 169
common beliefs that hold people together. These
common beliefs give rise to social practices, and
social practices are imbued with meaning. In
Hall’s view, any social practice is open to interpre-
tation, and for each individual within any interac-
tion, there is room for both ascribing (giving)
meaning and constructing (creating) meaning,
which in turn shapes human identity.
This entry begins with a biography of Hall, fol-
lowed by discussions of meaning in cultures and
representation. Then, Hall’s work regarding race
and racism, racial classifications, and racializing
are explored. Lastly, Hall’s belief concerning the
destabilization of knowledge is presented.
Biography
Born in 1932 in Kingston, Jamaica, Hall was the
son of an accountant working for the United Fruit
Company. After attending Jamaica College, in
1951 Hall moved with his mother to Bristol,
England. There he soon entered Merton College,
Oxford University, as a Rhodes Scholar. Hall
earned a PhD in American literature and infor-
mally studied European philosophy, international
socialist politics, left-wing British history, and
nationalist West Indian thought.
During the late 1950s, Hall joined forces with
other socialists, including Charles Taylor, Gabriel
Pearson, and Raphael Samuel, and launched
a radical journal, Universities and the New Left
Review. This publication later merged with
E. P. Thompson’s The New Reasoner, becoming
the New Left Review. In 1957, Hall joined the
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.
From 1957 to 1961, Hall taught high school in
Brixton, a working-class London neighborhood
with a large Afro-Caribbean immigrant popula-
tion. He continued to teach in London, changing
to film and media studies at Chelsea College from
1961 to 1964. His career took off, after coauthor-
ing The Popular Arts in 1964, when Richard
Hoggart offered him a position at Birmingham
University at what came to be known as the Center
for Contemporary Cultural Studies.
As a field, cultural studies focuses upon the
meaning of practices within everyday life, actions
that encompass ways in which people do certain
things in a given culture. For example, habits and
routines for contemporary Westerners include
170 Cultural Representation
watching movies, eating in restaurants, visiting the
bathroom, playing sports, and attending religious
ceremonies. Cultural studies focuses on the mean-
ings that people give to such social practices and
on the objects used within them: tickets, silver-
ware, a toilet, a football, or a special head garment
(veil, yarmulke, or turban).
In 1968 Hall became director of the Center for
Contemporary Cultural Studies and wrote a num-
ber of important articles and books, including
Situating Marx: Evaluations and Departures,
Encoding and Decoding the Television Discourse,
Reading of Marx’s 1857 Introduction to Grun­
drisse, and Policing the Crisis.
After being appointed professor of sociology at
the Open University in 1979, Hall continued to pub-
lish influential books, including New Ethnicities,
The Hard Road to Renewal, Resistance Through
Rituals, Modernity and Its Future, What Is Black in
Popular Culture?, Cultural Identity and Diaspora,
Questions of Cultural Identity, and Visual Cultural.
One of his most widely received and influential
texts, was Cultural Representations and Signify­
ing Practices, published in 1997, the year he
retired. After decades of teaching, Hall sat on the
Runnymeade Trust’s Commission on the Future of
Multi-ethnic Britain.
Much of Hall’s work focuses upon race and rac-
ism, particularly the representation of race within
cultures. Hall perceives race not as a fixed biologi-
cal entity but rather as a “floating signifier,” a
human invention, a concept that is not static but
rather fluid, changing meaning across contexts of
societies, history, and cultures.
The Production of Meaning in Cultures
Culture exists through shared meanings, and lan-
guage is the medium through which we make sense
of things. Hall believes that language is not only
how we share meaning but also how we make
meaning; thought is produced, not found. In other
words, through language, life is constantly being
defined (or imposed) by the speaker and negoti-
ated or redefined (accepted or rejected) by the lis-
tener. Language is viewed as a representational
system with signs and symbols to signify our ideas
and feelings to others. Generating meaning through
language is a complex process that occurs within
what Hall describes as “the circuit of culture.” In
this circuit, the production and consumption of
representation interlocks with its regulation of
human identity. In other words, meaning is pro-
duced in various sites and circulated through sev-
eral social practices; these forces actively shape
aspects of human identity.
The meanings we attribute are constructed by a
system of representation, a system that seems nat-
ural and fixed. However, according to Hall, mean-
ing is neither fixed nor natural; it is constructed by
humans and, therefore, malleable. Meaning is not,
therefore, solid or straightforward or even predict-
able. Things are “loaded” with potential meanings
that can differ among individuals. In addition, our
understanding of “the meaning” influences our
feelings and emotions, igniting various responses
that can propel our thinking in different direc-
tions. Hall notes that meanings sometimes call our
very identities into question. For example, they
define what and who is considered normal and
abnormal, and who belongs and who does not
belong. All of our lives are profoundly shaped
depending on meanings of Black/White, male/
female, straight/gay, rich/poor, young/old, able-
bodied/disabled, or citizen/alien. These identity
constructs are usually grouped into binaries, a
limited structure that reinforces constructions as
opposites. In addition, each binary represents rela-
tional patterns of empowered/disempowered sta-
tus pertaining to color, gender, sexuality, economic
status, age, ability, or nationality.
Representation
Hall understands the material world where things
exist and the symbolic practices through which
representation, meaning, and language operate.
He believes systems of representation give rise to
cultural meanings that organize and regulate social
practices. These social practices then influence our
behavior and subsequently have real, practical,
and material effects in the everyday world. Culling
from the work of Ferdinand de Saussure on lin-
guistics, further applied to cultural phenomena by
Roland Barthes, Hall focuses on the fixing and
unfixing—or what he also terms the sliding—of
meaning within culture. For example, using the
newspaper headline “Wednesday—A Black Day
on the Stock Market,” he is able to evoke long-
standing negative cultural connotations with the

word Black. In short, linguistics leads to semiotics,
or the meaning of words. If we ask, “What is the
meaning of this particular newspaper headline?”
we realize that what is signified is inextricably
meshed with culture, history, and knowledge gen-
erated within those discourses. Indeed, it can be
argued that it is through the world of culture and
history that meaning is inscribed.
In sum, Hall’s understanding of representation
is constructionist, viewing interaction existing
between three different orders: (1) things (people,
events, experiences), (2) the conceptual world
(meaning mental concepts we carry in our heads),
and (3) signs, arranged into languages, which
stand for or communicate these concepts.
Race and Racism
One of Hall’s enduring interests has been his ongo-
ing study of race within cultures and societies.
With the effects of racism as a starting point, his
work encompasses the culture of racism, including
how racism works and is cultivated within our
minds. He believes by understanding how racism
works, we can understand ways in which it can be
worked against. Contemplating race and racism
calls for the entire classification system of human
beings to be analyzed. Studying classification is
crucial as it maintains systems that determine the
order of things. Hall notes that there is always a
tension as to what actually secures these systems in
place (and, conversely, what moves them). In
terms of race, a classification system provides a
stabilization of culture, a system of clearly ranked
people, a social caste system. When used as a sys-
tem of power, classification becomes a generative
force. To classify is a profound cultural impulse,
and in that drive lies the desire to maintain or
restore who belongs inside that particular culture
and who belongs outside of it. The tendency to
classify preserves existing ideas, as any meaning
ascribed is in relation to those that already exist.
However, there are great political ramifications
when characteristics of people are essentialized.
The History of Racial Classifications
Until the advent of what we have come to know as
science, humans relied upon religion to substanti-
ate the truth of things in the world. When historical
Cultural Representation 171
encounters between groups from the “old” and
“new” worlds occurred, Europeans questioned:
Are these true people? Are they the same species?
In deeming the “new” populations as primitive
and godless, the Christian Church classified the
world into Christians and heathens. Thus, the
dominant knowledge structures of Western society
were reinforced through classification.
When science emerged, it was understood to be
the discipline through which to study the physical
world; everything came under its purview of objec-
tivity. However, Hall argues that because science is
embedded with a culture and history, it cannot be
neutral. Furthermore, he claims that in terms of
race, the cultural function of science is to provide
a guaranteed certainty of absolute difference.
Scientists sought to authoritatively “fix” race as a
real difference and, by doing so, ascribed greater
and lesser value to individuals depending upon the
surface features of “skin, hair, bone.” Thus, the
physical facts, those visible to the eye, came to
signify racial differences and were subsequently
inscribed upon human bodies.
The discipline of anthropology further reified
classificatory differences among humans, exerting
great influence over general knowledge about
race. Together, religion, science, and anthropology
have combined, interlocked, and reinforced the
reification of different races. Because the concept
of race has become neutralized, it seems “natural”—
appearing as fixed. Yet, Hall argues that if differ-
ence can be fixed and secured, it means it is
discursively constructed.
Discourses
Hall draws from the work of Michel Foucault to
analyze the discourse of race. A discourse is a way
of referring to the creation of knowledge about a
specific practice (such as racial classification).
Furthermore, a discourse is a constellation of ideas,
images, and practices that allow us to talk about
forms of knowledge and behaviors associated with
a particular activity, practice, or institution. This
constellation, or discursive formation, defines what
is appropriate knowledge (allowed) and what is
inappropriate knowledge (disallowed) in the for-
mation and maintenance of our practices in rela-
tion to a specific activity, practice, or institution. A
discourse reveals what knowledge is considered
172 Cultural Representation
relevant and “true” in a specific context and what
type of people embody its characteristics.
Acknowledging that physical things and actions
exist, Hall believes they take on meaning and
become objects of knowledge within a discourse. It
is the discourse, therefore, that produces our
knowledge in which abstractions (such as race)
become reified. Historicized discourses of race
stretch back for centuries, evolving from a cultur-
ally specific genesis that then gave rise to the circu-
lation of culturally sanctioned ideas. Discourses
are usually interpreted in terms of how power is
exercised through the circulation of knowledge.
When analyzing the discourse of race, Hall raises
the question: In whose interest does this knowl-
edge/power operate? Thus, a discourse upholds a
“regime of truth” that “disciplines” the body
through subjectification, inscribing “race” and
producing a type of body, categorized, for exam-
ple, as “Black” or “White.”
Racializing the Other
Once a person is classified as “Black,” Hall has
asked, what does that represent? How does race
function as a signifier (or, in the words of W. E. B.
Du Bois, as a “badge”)? Implicit in the classifica-
tion, Hall asserts, is an essentialization of race that
hails from a long, complex discourse entrenched in
European colonization of the world, the apartheid
of South Africa, and slavery and segregation in
North America and the Caribbean. He is interested
in the knowledges contemporary society spins, as
various national cultures hail from centuries of
anecdotes, stories, jokes, images, and “common
sense” beliefs. Hall recalls pervasive stereotypic
associations that dictate Black people excel in
sports and dancing, are emotionally expressive, are
sexually voracious, and have a tendency to behave
barbarously. All of this knowledge is implicit in
classificatory term of Black. Physical differences of
“color, hair, bone” come to mean differences in
intelligence, a notion that is still upheld by some
scholars, as evidenced by Richard Herrnstein and
Charles Murray’s bestselling The Bell Curve:
Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life.
Hall contends that in considering color and
intelligence, all scientific proof has failed. Moreover,
there is no genetic or biological fact in the concept
of race; it is rather a discursive phenomenon. Skin
color, Hall believes, works like language in that it
is given meaning, and the meaning of skin color
changes in context, subject to redefinition and
reappropriation. Race cannot be fixed or har-
nessed, as in an idealist’s approach to human his-
tory, and by unhinging the fixed notion of “it” (in
this case, race), what currently constitutes reality
then comes into question. On the other hand,
when Black signified lesser intelligence, institu-
tional practices such as colonialism, slavery, segre-
gation in school and society, and ritualized
degradation were justified.
The racial regime of representation is upheld
throughout the media in both subtle and not so
subtle ways (photographs, commentaries, movies,
etc.). Long-standing regimes of racial representa-
tion are recycled, including our training to imme-
diately lapse into restrictive binaries of Black and
White. Stereotyping, for example, is a representa-
tional practice that essentializes, reduces, and nat-
uralizes binary opposites, reinforcing differentials
of power.
A Destabilization of Knowledge
Whereas a signifier stays the same (for example,
the idea of Black), no meaning is solid or perma-
nent. There is always movement in meaning as it
shifts, slides, and floats. Within genetics and biol-
ogy, all conduct is inflected and shaped by mean-
ings that a classification brings. Therefore, within
the discipline of science, Hall believes that genetic
and biological claims are untenable. Understanding
has to be primarily sociohistorical or cultural. A
formalized rejection of biological racism leads him
to posit the importance of politics over biology. In
going against genetics as a form of fixed code,
Hall prefers to read the body as a text in relation
to classifiers; that is, the body is a text we inspect;
we are “readers” of race and social difference in
general.
Although surface appearances visibly differ, it is
the process of signification that makes a concept
such as race the product of a cultural system. In
other words, it is the stories imposed upon the
surface of bodies, and not their exterior per se, that
generate understandings about race. That race is
not finite calls into question the politics of both
antiracism and racism, as they are founded on a
notion that guarantees race. Thus, Hall’s claim

that race is a “floating signifier” has great implica-
tions for how we understand what he believes to
be the flawed concept of race. Furthermore, Hall’s
work has ramifications that can be generalized to
other aspects of identity, such as ethnicity, sexual
orientation, disability, and so on. His worldview is
somewhat destabilizing for many, as the rock-solid
“truths” on which they have built their under-
standing of the world are now seen as amorphous,
porous concepts, changing over time and place.
David J. Connor
See also Culture; Culture, Ethnicity, and Race; Identity
Negotiation
Further Readings
Hall, S. (Ed.). (2000). Representation: Cultural
representations and signifying practices (2nd ed.).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hall, S., & du Gay, P. (Eds.). (1996). Questions of
cultural identity. London: Sage.
Hall, S., & Gieben, B. (Eds.). (1992). Formations of
modernity. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Hall, S., & Jacques, M. (1989). New times. London:
Lawrence & Wishart.
Morley, D., & Chen, K. H. (Eds.). (1996). Stuart Hall:
Critical dialogues in cultural studies. London:
Routledge.
Procter, J. (2004). Stuart Hall. London: Routledge.
Rojek, C. (2002). Stuart Hall. Cambridge, UK: Polity
Press.
Cultural Studies
Although only a recent addition to academia, the
field of cultural studies has become an important
part of the humanities and the social sciences over
recent decades. To define cultural studies, beyond
the obvious (culture is being studied), is difficult;
however, a definition can be framed in terms of
theorizing: Cultural studies is the search for new
ways to conceptualize the political, ethical,
national, and technological phenomena of our
times. Because culture has implications for indi-
vidual and collective identities, the field of cul-
tural studies informs identity studies. This entry
Cultural Studies 173
examines the history of, and the theories and
theorists important to, cultural studies.
History
The establishment of cultural studies as an aca-
demic discipline began with the founding of the
Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural
Studies (CCCS) by Richard Hoggart and Raymond
Williams in the late 1950s. Researchers at the
CCCS elaborated on Leavism, after literary studies
scholar F. R. Leavis, whose highly original ideas
on the relationship between literature and life par-
ticularly interested them. Moving away from the
traditional art historian perspective in which an
artwork was considered a static final product of
culture, Leavis was interested in how art actively
contributed to it: how literature (his main empha-
sis) was always reflecting and contributing to the
events that compose our lives. Leavis thus regarded
literature not primarily an aesthetical experiment
but rather an ethical one. He claimed it was a
moral stance that connected society to literature, a
moral stance that was thus articulated with the
text. A good writer, in his view, was not someone
capable of writing beautiful stories that affect us
with the aesthetics of language but rather someone
able to create a new (or different, or other) lan-
guage capable of expressing the complex moral
problems of daily life.
An important consequence of Leavis’s approach
is that by stressing the nonlinear interdependency
between a book and daily life, one can read daily
life as a text. The book, or the work of art in gen-
eral, does not get situated as an imitation of life or
translation of its findings from a “real” discourse
into a textual discourse; life functions interdepen-
dently with textual discourse. Hence, the theories
of Leavis place important question marks around
traditional and dominant ideas of representation
in the works of both Plato and Aristotle by stress-
ing this radical mutual interdependence of life and
art. Reading daily life as a text allowed Leavis to
read not only the artwork but the entire sociocul-
tural context or historical moment in which it was
situated or from which it was drawn as a mani-
fold of signs and images. Consequently, Leavis did
not see a radical break between text and life, a
problematic moment in which one entity has to
pupate into another; literature flows into daily life
174 Cultural Studies
and back, continuously, performing a nonlinear
textual intermingling of all types of materialities
and moralities.
When Hoggart and Williams founded the CCCS,
a double critique was integrated into Leavis’s theo-
ries. This critique was not so much in opposition to
their teacher’s argument but more a continuation
or even a refinement of Leavis’s ideas. It is note-
worthy that these critiques were political critiques.
First of all, Hoggart’s book The Uses of Literacy
commented on the Leavisite appreciation for high
culture (which, in the end, led to the definition of
a rather conservative group of works that Leavis
titled “The Great Tradition”). Having come from
a working-class background, Hoggart was inter-
ested in low, or mass, culture and the influence that
working-class environments had on people’s lives.
This interest led him to expand the notion of art,
as used by Leavis, into all materiality and immate-
riality capable of articulating the cultural. Hoggart’s
critique on Leavis was in keeping with a long tradi-
tion: The study of the commonplace and mass
culture had been an issue in the British sciences and
arts since the early 1930s, coinciding with the
growth of anthropology. Hoggart’s ideas appealed
to many others, for if literature talked back to life,
wouldn’t other (or “lower”) artifacts like newspa-
pers, foods, buildings, and ultimately all things
produced by humans also exert an influence over
everyday discourse? Whether eloquent or crude,
authentic or derivative, the sheer number of com-
monplace artifacts makes an argument for also
studying their “lives,” as Arjun Appadurai refers to
the arc of their influence as artifacts. If we are not
so much interested in an artwork as a product of
an artist’s life but as an active contributor to life
and culture in general, pulp magazines are of no
less interest than their elitist counterparts of high
literature in terms of their moral impact.
In his most influential writings, Culture and
Society and The Long Revolution, Williams, the
other founding father of the CCCS, explored how
the products of so-called high and low culture
responded to society. Especially in The Long
Revolution, in which the press was analyzed,
Williams showed how the representations of mass
culture and their interweaving into our everyday
activities perform within the psychological, social,
ethical, and the political strata that provide struc-
ture for us and the societies we live in.
In the early years of the CCCS, the exploration
of varying ways in which these “ordinary” cul-
tural products function in our daily lives (some-
times in contrast to how high culture functions)
was an important part of the CCCS agenda. Yet,
scholars at the CCCS were never attempting to
tear down “the barrier” that supposedly separated
the high from the low arts, as is often falsely
claimed; the publications of the CCCS in its early
years were not directed against Leavis or in protest
against high culture, or set up as an attack on the
aesthetic principles of art history (and musicol-
ogy). Although later contributors celebrated mass
culture much more and even looked down upon
Leavis’s earlier mentioned “Great Tradition,”
Hoggart and Williams, in spite of their strong ties
with the British working class, expressed a great
sympathy for certain elements of so-called high
culture. Much more than a mere refutation of
Leavis, the CCCS expanded and experimented
with his ideas.
As practiced by the CCCS, the study of contem-
porary culture ultimately came to represent a
focus on what happens between the artifact and
the social, between cultural practices and their
representations. Rather than emphasizing the pro-
duction of culture or its consumption, CCCS
scholars looked primarily toward the ethical and
political themes that are created with these rela-
tions. Thus, the CCCS was able to create new
dynamic intellectual spaces that showed the cul-
tural in its performativity. CCCS scholars studied
culture at work in the meanings, types, and styles
incorporated and projected in individual life prac-
tices, products, institutions, or whatever material
and immaterial phenomena were at work; they
were concerned with mapping out those actualized
cultural fragments.
Semiotics/Structuralism
Although cultural studies does not emerge from a
particular methodological and theoretical frame-
work, there is definitely coordination among the
various movements that compose its arguments.
Since the founding of the CCCS more than
50 years ago, cultural studies discourses have been
varied and almost superfluous in many respects,
and yet cultural studies has a sense of stability as a
core area of inquiry.

Cultural studies discourses resonate in terms of
how they consider meanings to be generated.
Following after the tenets of Leavis, the first gen-
eration of CCCS scholars practiced a culturalist
perspective: They looked at culture as a set of
meaningful products or practices created by human
beings, wherein it was not the high arts but rather
the “ordinariness” of everyday culture that was of
greatest importance. Highlighting the residual,
oppositional, and emergent elements all capable of
expressing culturality from their margins, Williams
labeled this perspective cultural materialism.
Over time and as a reaction to the influence of
the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and the
ways in which Jacques Lacan and Roland Barthes
expanded upon cultural theory, scholars focused
on the role that language played in the construc-
tion of meaning. It was argued that language is not
merely a means through which meaning is created,
but that meaning is produced according to lan-
guage and the ways in which words and sentences
relate to one another. Thus, a focus on meaning
production superseded a focus on meanings and
the artifacts and outcomes of culture in cultural
studies discourses. This linguistic turn, as it is com-
monly referred to, and the study of the uses of
language, allowed scholars of culture to develop
anti-essentialist ideals in two major ways.
First of all, the linguistic turn was another step
away from cultural materialism as it was neither
the major artwork nor the (widely defined) artifact
that was being studied anymore. Secondly, human
subjectivity, which was, since the time of Immanuel
Kant, quite uncritically regarded the final touch-
stone of cultural theory, was placed in the same
linguistic network as the products it brought forth,
turning the Kantian “subject” (the “I think”) from
a fixed entity (a starting point, a conclusion) into
an in-between. Displacing “subject” from the cen-
ter of academic attention and replacing it with the
textual subject (a move inspired by Lacanian psy-
choanalysis) means that it is not the rational and
conscious “I” but rather the series of (unconscious)
networks in which it functions that becomes the
central object of cultural studies.
The ideas of de Saussure and the early Roland
Barthes were further developed as the field of semi-
otics (the study of symbols, representations, and
signs) and within structuralist theory applied to the
study of how culture is produced and consumed
Cultural Studies 175
through its texts—two areas very much in line with
(if not overlapping) one another. Scholars of both
were in search of those structures that produced
and consumed human beings and the products of
culture; whereas semioticians might put more
emphasis on the processes of objectivization, struc-
turalists are more interested in processes of subjec-
tivization. Taken together, these ideas were in sync
with the efforts of cultural studies scholars to show
the products of culture—and the human beings to
which they related—at work. Much more than
merely applying its ideas, cultural studies echoes
the semiotic/structuralist approaches, and scholars
weave them into most of the discussions.
In general, the structures proved to be particu-
larly suitable for the expression of the various
cultural hierarchies (notably those concerning
race, class, and gender) that dominated the cul-
tural studies agenda most notably in the 1980s. In
particular, as a response to the social struggles and
the neo-right political upheavals of Ronald Reagan
and Margaret Thatcher, and under guidance of
disciplinary icon Stuart Hall, cultural studies
researchers focused more and more on issues of
marginalization and the ways in which the poli-
tics of culture revealed the dominance of particular
set of meanings and opinions. These semiotic/
structuralist-inspired tools gave scholars a much
sounder (and less conservative) way of analyzing
the currents that haunted culture, compared to
what traditional cultural materialism (as defined
by Williams) had to offer. The potential of these
tools greatly contributed to cultural studies becom-
ing a global movement in the mid-1980s and
scholars began to study larger connections.
Dick Hebdige’s studies of punk cultures, David
Morley’s ideas on the power of television culture,
and Hall’s writings on otherness revealed much
about the functioning of British culture, but the
conclusions were not limited to it. These high-
quality studies, all of which echoed a semiotic/
structuralist stance (without turning it into the
scholars’ methodology), inspired many scholars
around the world to explore the courses of culture
accordingly. As a result, however, not only were
studies on local subcultures undertaken, but a much
more abstract notion of space came into vogue (in
which Williams’s notion of the cultural flow was
used more and more). Since the mid-1990s, and in
concert with the geopolitical developments and
176 Cultural Studies
technological advances at the time, the studying of
fixed communities was increasingly replaced by an
interest in much more dynamic and diverse cul-
tural groups. This then led to a rapid increase of
work on diasporic and postcolonial structures, all
the while still reverberating a semiotics/structural-
ist bent. The ethnographically inspired studies that
followed from this show that the emphasis on texts
was slowly but steadily being replaced by an
emphasis on the “active audience as a text” (lead-
ing to the surpassing influence of structuralist
ideas over semiotic thought). The work of Ien Ang
on the reception of soap operas (like Dallas) was a
pioneering effort on this front, but Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak, Arjun Appadurai, and
Edward Said have also made great contributions
toward opening up the cultural studies perspective
and the limits of structuralist research. Today, this
line of thinking is continued with the study of
digital groups and online cultures, and it is the
work of Lev Manovich, in particular, that has been
influential in this (though his work resonates more
with semioticians).
The continuing flirtation with structuralism and
its facility for opening up the dynamics of culture
ultimately challenged structuralism, especially its
idea that research was able to unveil the structures
through which culture functions. It did not take
very long to find out that the signs and images that
we interpret are far more polysemic—meaning
that one object can mean many things depending
on the situation in which it is actualized than as
first considered or than any closed system can
accommodate. Thus, structuralism silently slipped
into poststructuralism, a theoretical movement
founded on the basic premise that the structures of
culture were fragments—nonlinear, deformed, and
ever-changing parts of an endless intertextual net-
work from which its temporal meaning or content
unfolds. Of great influence here was Jacques
Derrida, whose concept of deconstruction allowed
theorists to explore the conditions of speech and
the ethics of the unspeakable.
Parallel to the increasing number of question
marks placed around structuralism, a growing
number of cultural studies scholars are drawn to
the idea of looking at cultural practices without
assigning language the role of an intermediary, or
without representation taking place (thus chal-
lenging semiotic paradigms in general). Starting
from the linguistic theories of Charles Sanders
Peirce, who had been influential in North American
cultural studies but was hardly studied in
Saussurean Europe, these neopragmatist or neo-
materialist studies leaned heavily upon the dynamic
cultural theories of Gilles Deleuze and Henri
Bergson in their efforts to create cultural theory
around concepts like affect, sensation, and percep-
tion. Today these scholars no doubt produce the
most radical alternatives to the Saussurean semi-
otic and structuralist cords that are so implicitly
interwoven into the arguments of cultural studies
discourses. They offer a useful antidote to many of
the discussions in cultural studies, which, despite
recent poststructural tradewinds, still have the
tendency to cluster around ideas of identity poli-
tics, ideas that still entail the self as both a begin-
ning and an end to all analysis.
New Marxism
Marxism and semiotics/structuralism are difficult
to separate. The explorations of semiotics and
structuralism depended on Marxist theories,
whereas the revivals of Marxism were largely
thanks to the success of semiotic/structuralist
thought and the influence this had on the develop-
ment of cultural theory. Yet, despite their parallel
and often entangled development, Marxism and
semiotics/structuralism function very differently
and are thus active within cultural studies in very
different ways. The linguistic emphasis on lan-
guage and language use, as an echo of structural-
ism/semiotics, continues to resurface in most of the
output in cultural studies—when Meagan Morris,
for instance, explains the logic of the shopping
center—while a fundamentally Marxist theory of
class or class awareness is only rarely found.
Marxism is more accurately portrayed as a catego-
rization that happens to cultural studies research
while its scholars generate arguments on issues of
culture and strategies of social marginalization or
suppression. Marxism is not a key ingredient of
cultural studies research methodology; it is more
correctly recognized as the context that supports
and strengthens the arguments generated in cul-
tural studies discourse. Whereas the vague echoes
of semiotic and structuralist theory within the
Saussurean/Lacanian legacy show remarkably little
development over the course of time, Marxism

continues to be renewed dramatically within cul-
tural studies. This consequent rereading and rein-
terpreting of Marx presents the most important
changes that have informed cultural studies dis-
course over the past decades. Marxism, in short,
provides cultural studies with its rhythm. Within
cultural studies, Marxism has proven to be a cha-
meleonic concept that sometimes has remark-
ably little to do with the writings of Karl Marx,
and the ways in which it emerges within cultural
studies discourse continues to vary immensely.
Notwithstanding the enormous differences in how
Marxist thought is explored, we can distinguish
several ways in which Marxist theory gives cul-
tural studies its pulse.
Perhaps because of its link to culturalism, which
was not highly regarded throughout academia, the
first volumes of the CCCS revealed those scholars’
developing ideas on class struggle and popular cul-
ture quite isolated from the dominant academic
Marxist perspective as presented by the Frankfurter
Institut für Sozialforschung (better known as the
Frankfurt school). Interestingly, these findings of
the CCCS nevertheless show remarkable resem-
blances to the work done by Theodor Adorno,
Max Horkheimer, and Walter Benjamin, perhaps
because both institutes were interested in warding
off the dominant disciplinary perspectives and
combined this with a strong sociopolitical involve-
ment. Hoggart’s concern with how capitalist mass
culture obscures the British working-class culture is
in line with Adorno’s critique on popular music,
which he claims to be insipid and predigested for
consumption by the masses. One might argue that
whereas Hoggart and others were already much
more interested in how popular culture was reflected
in the everyday life of the British working class,
Adorno was still concerned primarily with what
characterized these products of popular culture.
Adorno’s thorough and in-depth analysis of popu-
lar music (jazz in particular) reveals his knowledge
of musicology combined with a strong interest in
sociopolitical transformations, whereas Hoggart’s
analysis is much more autobiographical, emphasiz-
ing in what way the identity of the working-class
people was recoded by the popular arts and arti-
facts. But despite their different emphases and
trajectories, the overall arguments have a lot in
common. It is no surprise, therefore, that—perhaps
in keeping with the introduction of semiotics and
Cultural Studies 177
structuralism—the concept of the cultural indus-
tries that Adorno invented together with
Horkheimer was easily adopted by Hoggart’s suc-
cessors. Together with Adorno, Benjamin also
became of great importance to cultural studies,
especially his argument that the work of art in the
time of mechanical reproduction and in the absence
of any traditional, ritualistic value would inher-
ently be based on the practice of politics because of
its emphasis on technology, a concept that is
increasingly being used within contemporary stud-
ies of culture and with respect to the ubiquity and
influence of information technology.
In the wake of the influence of the Frankfurt
school, around the mid-1970s, three great thinkers—
Louis Althusser, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Antonio
Gramsci—set out the parameters around which
Marxism (blended with semiotics/structuralism)
was to be explored within cultural studies. The
first influence stressed that the symbolic order of
language and the way it constituted people as sub-
jects follows from state ideology and was perhaps
the first influence to move the interests of cultural
studies scholars from an emphasis on products of
popular culture and its consumers to the much
greater and extensive structures alongside the
capitalist narratives that had already been widely
discussed by Marxists. Bakhtin’s interests in the
vulgarity of popular culture as articulated in its use
of language and in the dialogic character of mean-
ing and personal identity—especially in relation to
Michel de Certeau’s conception of the practice of
everyday life—has been very influential in setting
parameters for the urban ethnographies that have
grown particularly dominant in the early 1990s.
Gramsci, finally, although his premature death in
1937 made him by far the least contemporary of
the three, has had the most influence on cultural
studies. His views have been so widely spread that
his theories are often regarded as the true starting
point of what has become known as contemporary
cultural studies, much more so than the writings of
Hoggart and Williams, as especially the former is
rarely cited today.
Gramsci owes his fame most of all to his con-
cept of hegemony, which refers to the continuous
implicit (re)production of authoritative sets of
meanings and practices that continuously overcode
the social. With this highly original notion of
power, Gramsci develops a Marxism in which the
178 Cultural Studies
dominant sets of meanings and practices are not
based on some kind of repression but on a moral
dominance. Gramsci thus discards the socioeco-
nomic reductionism that haunted Marxist class
theories for so long, replacing them with an overall
ethics that builds on the interests of Leavis, so
important to cultural studies in its formative years.
Gramsci’s ideas also turned out to be more compat-
ible with the (equally Marxist) active audience theo-
ries that had become more and more popular at the
cost of the textual analysis with which it all began.
Pioneered in Morley’s study on the “Nationwide”
audience, it was throughout the 1980s that the idea
of hegemony allowed scholars to conceptualize in
what way cultural dominance was both created and
approved of by audiences, or productive consumers
as Marx would have framed it.
Starting in the late 1980s, however, a new wind
stirred the discussions in dramatic new directions
as the theories of historian and philosopher Michel
Foucault made a lasting impression on many cul-
tural studies scholars. Foucault’s conception of
cultural discourse allows ideology to be inscribed
into meaning, matter, and bodies. His interests
have been used as a (semi-structuralist) tool to
explore cultural dynamics, and they presented little
conflict with Gramsci’s hegemonic structures that
were dominating cultural studies interests in the
working of power. The one reservation that led to
Foucault’s only partial acceptance in the 1980s
might have been caused by the absence of the con-
cept of class in his work—still of great importance
to Hall and his followers. The ongoing interest in
most of Foucault’s thoughts and the fleshing out of
his ideas, as happened in the following decades,
also meant the decrease of the influence of Hall
(although Foucault’s dynamic theorizations, with-
out falling subject to the creation of one fixed
theory, ironically fit Hall’s preference of “going on
theorizing,” as he once proclaimed it much better
that Gramsci’s more fixed and standardized way
of thinking).
Perhaps under the influence of the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the erosion of communism in
Eastern Europe and Russia (in the Western world),
Foucault’s new visions on Marxism began to con-
quer cultural studies as the absence of class in his
thinking appealed to those scholars questioning
Marx’s heritage in the first place. But probably of
more importance was the fact that Foucault’s
change of interests since the mid-1970s were char-
acterized by a lessening interest in discourses and,
instead, a growing interest in processes of subjecti-
fication and in how the coalescing of power and
knowledge played a role in these processes. With
Surveiller et Punir, Naissance de la Prison
(Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison,
published in France in 1975) and his three-volume
Histoire de la Sexualité (The History of Sexuality,
published in 1984), Foucault not only proposes to
consider power a strategy instead of a property but
also provides for a radically new antihumanist
analysis of humankind characterized by the active
currents of power and the processes of exclusion
that are thus performed. Foucault thus introduces
the concept of biopower: a series of creative forces
that comes with life. Biopower is a (post-) Marxist
notion of power that, in its exploration of charac-
ter and in its interests in the everyday creation of
the political and ethical, fits the needs of cultural
studies scholars perfectly.
Foucault’s positive concept of power gradually
found more and more resonance from cultural
studies scholars and meant a final break with the
negative ways in which politics was put forward in
earlier studies. Hoggart’s often cynical and coal-
black analysis of the loss of culture and tradition
in the British working-class environments still
made use of a concept of power that was more or
less the equivalent of repression (the fact that his
groundbreaking book The Uses of Literacy was
initially called The Abuse of Literacy says a great
deal). With Williams, Hall, and especially with the
introduction of Gramsci’s emphasis on morality,
the traditional Marxist sociopolitical theories had
already been severely changed. But Foucault’s
notion that power produces reality before it
represses and produces truth before it ideologizes
gave a more complete picture of the creative func-
tioning of power, as well as of its necessity, and
was the reason Foucault found himself in conflict
with the entire political left in the late 1970s. In
contrast to the allegations against him, Foucault’s
recognition of power’s necessity did not mean that
dominance could not be attacked but rather that
power would continue to remain an important
and inextricable part of naming, ordering, and
internalizing strategies that thus organized the
material forms and the immaterial functions that
connected them.

What made Foucault’s ideas much more popu-
lar among cultural studies scholars, compared to
earlier Marxist theories like those of Gramsci, is
that, in contrast to the latter, Foucault adopted a
micropolitical perspective, which means that he
always showed these strategies of power through
small-scale studies on the histories of schools,
armies, hospitals, the family, and psychiatry, to
name a few, subsequently showing how these
mechanisms are coextensive within the entire
sociocultural field. Foucault thus showed how
these individual micropolitical processes of power
have cultural systems of differentiation as its cause
and its effect, forming institutionalization and gra-
dations of rationalization, social hierarchies, and
economic profit. Foucault thus did what the CCCS
scholars and their heirs aimed to do in the first
place: write small qualitative sociopolitical ethnog-
raphies that somehow addressed the Zeitgeist,
explaining its political and ethical logic, reaching
out to culture as a whole.
Another important facet of contemporary cul-
tural studies that can be traced back to the work of
Foucault is the idea that these modern disciplining
powers are ultimately “pastoral” in their approach.
This concept then shows us that the bureaucratic
systems, administrators, and all other means
through which power is produced and maintained
are never positioned opposed to their subjects but
as welfare apparatuses intended to support and
keep them safe along life’s way. By making such a
strong reference to the Christian tradition, Foucault
reminds readers that his theories—although not
limited to a spatial and temporal location—are
predominantly focused on historical developments
in continental Europe. The less-than-critical appli-
cation of his thoughts on developments in other
parts of the world and on contemporary events
once again shows that the experimental environ-
ment created by cultural studies can actually fall
prey to the “interior decorator methodology”
suggested earlier.
One further contribution that can be labeled
Foucauldian, as explored in cultural studies today,
is that power is not merely about restraining peo-
ple. On the contrary, in confronting people with a
way of life, in imposing constraints, the strategies
of power also open up new ways of expression,
new ways of being in response to power. Especially
in his last volumes of The History of Sexuality,
Cultural Studies 179
Foucault claims that particular (ancient) ideas on
behavior also give rise to an aesthetics of existence,
taking care of the self through actions by which
one changes and transfigures oneself. Perhaps we
already saw this positive aesthetic effect at work in
Hebdige’s monumental work Subculture: The
Meaning of Style, in which he described the U.K.
punk scene very much as a cultural industry, in line
with what Adorno and his predecessors said about
this, but at the other end also noted that it gave rise
to a great amount of creativity and, not insignifi-
cantly, a creativity regarding the stylization of the
self. It is this positive take on how power structures
work as they generate resistance against them,
which, rather than celebrating mass or low culture,
shows instead the way in which great cultural
forces are searching for ways to discipline or con-
trol individual behavior while opening it up to new
thoughts, new experiences, and new ways of life.
Overall, Foucault’s influence on cultural studies
has been particularly effective. Some of today’s
main scholars in cultural studies (e.g., Donna
Haraway and Judith Butler) obviously continue to
elaborate his arguments, whereas others (e.g.,
Larry Grossberg, Elspeth Probyn, and Rosi
Braidotti) find their inspiration in connecting
Foucault to Deleuze, emphasizing power relations
in a neomaterialist environment. One could even
say that visual culture studies (which may be
understood as a series of discussions about art con-
tent in the postmodern era as interpreted through a
cultural studies lens, a critical conversation that has
overtaken and supplanted traditional discussions
of the art historical canon) owes much to Foucault,
as he unearthed the true meaning of power not by
studying how power was active in whatever can be
articulated in language, but how power articulates
the visible; Foucault’s famous reference to the
panopticon, which is best summarized as a tool for
imposing a particular conduct upon a particular
group, is perhaps the best example.
Contemporary Cultural Theory
Today, cultural studies continues to grow and
scholars continue their search for new ways to
theorize about the politico-ethical struggles of our
times. From sociologists like Pierre Bourdieu, Jean
Baudrillard, and Manuel Castells, to anthropolo-
gists like James Clifford, to urbanists like Paul
180 Culture
Virilio, cultural studies emcompasses anyone inter-
ested in the politics and ethics of cultural processes.
Continental philosophers have especially made
important contributions to cultural studies debates.
Ever since the theories on mass culture by the
Frankfurt school, and even more so since Jean-
Paul Sartre applied philosophy to contemporary
issues again, the link between continental philoso-
phy (Anglo-Saxon philosophy is hardly used) and
cultural studies reaches the point that its differ-
ences are hardly there anymore. The French phi-
losophers that replaced Sartre after the French
unrest of May 1968 (which convinced him that
intellectuals must use their skills to serve the
masses directly)—such as Foucault, Derrida, and
Deleuze—have each gone on to make great contri-
butions to cultural studies as previously men-
tioned. Most recently, however, it is not only
France but the rest of continental Europe as a
whole that contemporary cultural theorists have
turned to for key philosophical contributions
(notable icons include Alain Badiou from France,
Peter Sloterdijk from Germany, Giorgio Agamben
from Italy, and Slavoj Žižek from Slovenia, all of
whom are widely read in cultural studies today).
The evidence of interest in cultural studies from
theorists from all over academia best exemplifies
the enduring power and relevance of cultural stud-
ies today. The open structure of cultural studies
allows theorists to get beyond modernist disciplin-
ary traditions and theorize about the world in
which we live. Cultural studies creates a stage for
abstract theorists, for scholars interested in meticu-
lously analyzing the social life of things, for activ-
ists interested in radical social transformation, and
for students interested in understanding the world
they live in. Cultural studies is a practice of yield-
ing empowerment to the scholar while offering
power to the people as well.
Rick Dolphijn
See also Cultural Representation; Mediation; Visual
Culture
Further Readings
Barker, C. (2008). Cultural studies: Theory and practice.
London: Sage.
During, S. (Ed.). (1993). The cultural studies reader.
London: Routledge.
Osborne, P. (2000). Philosophy in cultural theory. New
York: Routledge.
Storey, J. (Ed.). (1996). What is cultural studies? London:
Arnold.
Culture
To give a single, uncontroversial definition of the
concept culture is a difficult task, for any defini-
tion of culture is itself an expression of a theoreti-
cal stance. With this caveat, the following definition
summarizes a conception of culture widely used in
contemporary psychology. Broadly, culture is a
collection of information (or meanings) that is
(a) nongenetically transmitted between individu-
als, (b) more or less shared within a population of
individuals, and (c) maintained across some gen-
erations over a period of time. As such, culture
plays an important role in the formation of indi-
vidual and collective self-concepts or identities
and has implications for human psychology.
This definition, however, excludes behavior or
artifacts (i.e., products of human behavior) from
culture. Information or meaning may be inferred
from overt behavior or artifacts. That is, behavior
and artifacts may act as markers of culture, but
they are not part of culture themselves. Culture
differs from society in that the latter refers to a
collection of individuals and groups, their rela-
tionships (interpersonal, intergroup, and group
membership), and their institutions. Social insti-
tutions such as rituals, laws, and the like are spe-
cial kinds of artifacts, which often represent
cultural information. However, they are not cul-
ture themselves. This entry presents the history of
culture in academic and popular discourse and
then discusses contemporary developments in
culture and psychology.
History and Background
Human curiosity about culture has a long history
as Herodotus’s History in Greek antiquity and
Chunqiu in early China clearly attest. Nonetheless,
contemporary academic and popular discourse
about culture has its roots in the 18th-century
Western European discourse of what is loosely
known as the Enlightenment, an intellectual

movement away from religious dogmas and super-
stitious beliefs and customs, and its counterpoint,
sometimes called the Counter-Enlightenment or
Romanticism. Enlightenment thinkers (e.g.,
Voltaire) emphasized civilization and human prog-
ress driven by the natural and universal human
capacity to reason. Rationality, and natural sci-
ence seen as its epitome, is to enlighten humans
away from their superstitions, irrational preju-
dices, and traditional rulers of the ancient régime.
Politically, it was a liberal movement to emanci-
pate people from the traditional power; epistemi-
cally, it was an empiricist push for knowledge on
the basis of systematic observation of the universe.
In contrast, the Counter-Enlightenment or
Romantic thinkers (e.g., Johann Gottfried Herder)
pit culture against universal civilization, claiming
the uniqueness and particularity of a people, their
history, and their tradition. A people—often
equated with a nation—constructs their culture,
using their unique language and following their
unique customs. Because they constitute their cul-
ture and culture constitutes their mentality, it is
only through a deep understanding of their culture
that one can fathom their thoughts and their way
of life. Politically, it was often associated with
nationalism; epistemically, it was aligned with an
achievement of Verstehen (understanding) rather
than experimentation.
Tension between these contrasting views took
the form of an epistemological and methodological
controversy between those who favor natural sci-
ence versus cultural science models of inquiry
throughout the history of social sciences. The natu-
ral science model is now seen to represent a constel-
lation of epistemic practices that emphasize universal
laws, causal explanation, and experimentation. Its
primary goal is to establish a universal law-like
causal explanation of a phenomenon. Using logico-
mathematical expressions, universal natural laws
are to be axiomatized, theory-based hypothetico-
deductive inferences are made, and experiments are
conducted to verify or falsify theories. In contrast,
the cultural science model emphasizes cultural and
historical specificity, interpretive understanding,
and hermeneutics (i.e., a method and discipline to
gain a true meaning of a text) rather than experi-
mentation as a method of knowing. According to
the cultural science model, human experience and
action are interpreted and understood within their
Culture 181
sociocultural and historical context. A deep under-
standing is sought by recursively applying a herme-
neutic method and achieving a holistic appreciation
of the meaning of the human experience and action
within their local milieu.
The natural science model dominated social
sciences, and the Enlightenment project of sci-
ence, technology, and progress dominated the
human political and economic affairs of the past
century or so. Despite some attempts to inte-
grate the two in the early 20th century, and an
abundance of culture-relevant theorizing in the
1920s and 1930s (e.g., Frederic Charles Bartlett,
Lucien Levy-Bruhl, Margaret Mead), logical
positivism in philosophy of science and its psy-
chological counterpart, behaviorism, pushed the
natural science model to the mainstream of psy-
chology by the mid-20th century. With its exclu-
sive focus on observable behavior, behaviorist
psychology removed the mind from its scope of
inquiry. Even the cognitive revolution of the
1960s, which brought the mind back into psy-
chology, failed to bring meaning and culture
with it. Psychology as a science was to be a
hypothetico-deductive and experimental endeavor
in search of universal laws of human behavior.
With this, culture and an emphasis on under-
standing human particularities were largely lost
from academic discourse.
Nonetheless, in the 1970s, social sciences began
to reevaluate the legacy of logical positivist philos-
ophy of science, and a contemporary Counter-
Enlightenment view began to take hold through the
writings of Clifford Geertz, Charles Taylor, and
others. In psychology, Richard Shweder defended
what he called cultural psychology, espousing a
more particularistic Counter-Enlightenment view
of culture. His insistence on the mutual constitu-
tion of culture and mind focused researchers’ atten-
tion on how culture shapes human mind and, in
turn, how the mind makes culture.
The 1980s was the historical period that saw
the formation of a visible global market economy.
The trans-Atlantic alliance between a U.S. presi-
dent, Ronald Reagan, and a U.K. prime minister,
Margaret Thatcher, promoted free trade across the
globe. Economically developing nations around the
world, gaining political independence from colonial
powers, began to participate in the world economy.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, symbolized by the
182 Culture
fall of the Berlin Wall, ended the cold war, which
structured much of the world affairs after World
War II. Some taunted the end of history (Francis
Fukuyama), understood as a dialectical progress
toward the final resolution of contradictions with
the apparent triumph of liberal democracy. In the
late 20th century, globalization—roughly under-
stood as an increase in economic, political, social
and informational relationships among people
across national boundaries in the world—became
an obvious reality. With greater human contact
and exchange came a greater exposure to behav-
iors and artifacts of people whose existence hith-
erto only remotely mattered to most. Human
curiosity about cultures was piqued.
Contemporary Developments in
Culture and Psychology
In the 1980s and 1990s, culture and psychology
emerged as a major research area. There was a
fertile social, economic, and political ground that
called out for social psychological research on cul-
tural differences. With the globalizing economy,
the unprecedented exchange of people and resources
across national borders created a mutual need for
knowledge about other cultures.
It is perhaps not a coincidence that Geert
Hofstede, an organizational psychologist working
for a multinational corporation, provided a broad
framework of cross-cultural comparison in his
1980 book, Culture’s Consequences, based on his
surveys about work values of IBM employees from
more than 40 countries around the world. He
identified four cultural dimensions—power dis-
tance, individualism and collectivism, masculinity
and femininity, and uncertainty avoidance—on
which each cultural group may be located. Power
distance indicated the extent to which people tol-
erated power differences in society; individualism
and collectivism capture relative emphasis placed
on individual or group; masculinity (as opposed to
femininity) had to do with the extent to which
gender-based roles were clearly differentiated; and
uncertainty avoidance indexed the degree to which
uncertainty was met with anxiety and clear rules
of conduct were preferred. Of these dimensions,
individualism and collectivism became the focal
point of empirical research in psychology. His
characterizations of individualist and collectivist
cultures echoed the well-known concepts such
as Ferdinand Tönnies’s Gemeinschaft and
Gesellschaft, or Émile Durkheim’s mechanical and
organic solidarity, which these founding fathers of
social science developed to describe social and
cultural changes from the traditional lifestyle to
the modern society in Western Europe in the late
19th and early 20th centuries.
In 1989, Harry Triandis theorized a critical link
between the macrolevel cultural difference in indi-
vidualism and collectivism and the microlevel psy-
chological process of the self and social behavior.
According to him, culture influences the preva-
lence of different types of self-concepts, which then
affect the likelihood that different self-concepts are
learned and activated in people’s minds. Social
behavior is then influenced by culture through the
activation of different types of self-concepts. Hazel
Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, in 1991, specified
psychological implications of culturally shaped
self-concepts. They suggested that there are two
types of self-concepts: independent and interde-
pendent self-construal. People with an independent
self-construal regard the self as bounded and sepa-
rate from others. The independent self is a unitary
and stable entity, which is characterized by its pri-
vate and inner attributes (e.g., honesty, kindness).
For independent people, it is important to express
their unique self, promote their own personal
goals, and assert what is on their mind. In contrast,
people with an interdependent self-construal regard
the self as connected to significant others (e.g.,
daughter, husband) and ingroups (e.g., a citizen of
a country, a member of a political party). For
interdependent people, it is important to belong
and fit in, occupy their proper place, engage in
appropriate action, promote others’ goals, and
“read other people’s minds.”
In 2001, Richard Nisbett and his colleagues
argued that cultures differ in the prevalence of dif-
ferent types of cognitive styles as well. When an
object is perceived and thought about, it is always
placed against its background. People’s perceptual
experience includes both the figure and its ground.
However, people with different cognitive styles
have a sharper or a broader focus on the object.
People with an analytical style focus their attention
and thought sharply on the object while largely
ignoring its background. In contrast, people with a
holistic style have a broader focus of attention and

thought, so that both the object and its context are
included in their construal of the object. People
with independent self-construals are more likely to
direct their attention to the individual person while
disregarding his or her social context. By contrast,
those who have interdependent self-construals
learn to direct their attention to the person as
embedded in his or her social context, including
his or her significant others and important groups.
As a result, people develop ontology (i.e., meta-
physical theories about the world) and epistemol-
ogy (i.e., theories about knowing and the nature of
knowledge) that are consistent with these cognitive
styles. They also develop styles of conflict resolu-
tion that are consistent with their cognitive styles.
So, people with an analytical style prefer to resolve
social conflict by rules and argumentation, whereas
people with a holistic style prefer compromises
and negotiation. Through these cultural and social
tendencies, the cognitive styles become general
tendencies to perceive and cognize any objects,
whether they be social objects such as people and
groups or nonsocial objects such as atoms and
physical things in the world.
Thus, by combining theories of self-concept and
cognitive style, the standard theory of cross-cultural
differences emerged, around which national cul-
tural differences have been investigated. Of these,
the most prominent have been comparisons between
North America and East Asia beginning in the
1990s. Consistent with the strong theorizing about
cross-cultural differences in self-concept, there is
evidence for individualist or independent North
America and collectivist or interdependent East
Asia. A comparison of self-concepts among people
in the United States, Australia, Hawai‘i, Japan, and
Korea found that Americans and Australians had
more individualist and less collectivist self-concepts
than Japanese and Koreans. When European
Americans, Asian Americans, and Koreans described
themselves in their own words, European Americans’
self-descriptions contained the highest proportion
of personality trait terms and Koreans, the lowest,
with Asian Americans in the middle, again suggest-
ing the American tendency to characterize the self
with individual-centered descriptors.
There is consistent evidence to suggest cultural
differences in cognition—in particular, what is
known as the fundamental attribution error, that
is, people’s tendencies to attribute the cause of an
Culture 183
individual’s behavior to his or her dispositional
characteristics rather than the context in which the
behavior occurred. Social psychological research in
the 1960s and 1970s, mainly conducted in North
America, showed that people in the experiments
have a strong tendency to explain someone else’s
behavior (e.g., writing an essay about a political
issue) in terms of the person’s disposition (e.g.,
political opinion) while underestimating the impor-
tance of the context of the behavior (e.g., someone
with a legitimate power told him to write an essay
taking a certain political stance). Although this ten-
dency was said to reflect a limitation of the human
cognitive system, it turned out to be an error often
observed in North America, but not necessarily
elsewhere. Cross-cultural comparisons between the
United States and India as well as comparisons
between the United States and Hong Kong showed
that the error was not so fundamental after all, and
that Indians and Chinese do not exhibit this ten-
dency as strongly as their American counterparts.
A cultural difference between North America
and Asia was found not only in cognitive processes
but in emotions as well. A large-scale cross-cultural
project comparing people’s happiness—often called
subjective well-being—showed a large difference
between North America and East Asia. North
Americans tended to say they are much happier
than East Asians. Paralleling these findings, cross-
cultural comparisons in self-esteem—people’s eval-
uations of their worth—typically showed a strong
tendency for North Americans to have higher self-
esteem than Japanese. A related finding involves
the optimism bias—a belief that in the future, one
is more likely to experience positive events, but less
likely to experience negative events, than the aver-
age person. Although this bias is strong in North
America and Western Europe, it is much weaker in
East Asia, especially in Japan, although a recent
study suggests that there is a universal tendency
toward unconscious positive self-regard. All in all,
these findings show a clear cultural difference in
how people express their feelings about their
lives and themselves. They are typically interpreted
as stemming from differences in self-concept—
individualists optimistically pursue their happi-
ness, whereas collectivists’ pursuit of happiness is
tempered by their sense of obligations for others.
Thus, a body of theoretical and empirical work
has given a coherent picture of cultural differences
184 Culture
in psychological process. Different types of self-
concepts are more or less prevalent in different
parts of the world; people enculturated in different
societies are likely to acquire different types of self-
concepts; culture influences social behavior through
the activation of a type of self-concepts; and
through the acquisition of different attentional
processes and cultural meaning systems, different
cognitive styles became more prevalent. In total,
culture, self, and basic psychology of perception,
thought, and emotion are all intricately linked in
human experience and action. In today’s globaliz-
ing world, many people are bicultural or multicul-
tural with different types of cultural information in
their minds. These bicultural individuals can switch
their cultural mind-sets easily and seamlessly.
Nonetheless, there is evidence for broad cultural
differences postulated by the standard theory.
Culture does not influence only higher-order cog-
nition but has a deeper implication for human
psychology as a whole.
Scholars of cultural comparisons tend to look
for global and stable cultural differences in psy-
chological profile such as individualism and col-
lectivism. In contrast, there is a class of theories
and research that may be called a neodiffusionist
approach that provides a perspective on cultural
dynamics, namely, how individuals’ specific behav-
iors give rise to global cultural profiles and con-
tribute to the formation, maintenance, and
transformation of culture over time. In the early
20th century, there was a popular culture theory
called diffusionism, according to which culture is a
collection of human inventions that were created
somewhere and diffused through human popula-
tion by migration, adoption, or colonization and
conquest. Although this early theorizing went out
of favor, various theories that combine this basic
idea with Darwinian evolutionism began to appear
in the 1970s and 1980s. One of the early propo-
nents was Donald Campbell, who argued that
human culture evolves through the process of ran-
dom variation and selective retention of cultural
information. Subsequently, a number of theories
appeared that regard cultural evolution as analo-
gous to biological evolution (e.g., Richard Dawkins,
Luca Cavalli-Sforza and Marcus Feldman, Robert
Boyd and Peter Richerson). In contrast to these
theories, Dan Sperber regards cultural evolu-
tion to be marked by a non-Darwinian process.
Nonetheless, common across these theorists of
culture is their commitment to the notion that cul-
ture is socially transmitted information. These
approaches are now beginning to provide some
insights into the basic process underlying the for-
mation and change of human culture.
Conclusion
In the context of contemporary human history,
the culture concept surfaced as a darling of the
academic and popular discourse. In academic dis-
course, there was an opposition between civiliza-
tion and culture; culture used to be something that
uncivilized people have. In popular discourse,
there used to be a connotation of the word culture
as something exclusive as seen in the words like
well cultured, or high culture. However, these
connotations seem obsolete. Culture is now seen
as something that everyone has. That is, not just
those in remote parts of the world “untouched by
the civilization,” or in an upper echelon of society,
but all humans have their cultures. Culture has
become a hallmark of humanity, critically distin-
guishing Homo sapiens from other animal species
believed to be without culture (notwithstanding
the recent research that suggests the existence of
some form of culture among nonhuman species
such as primates). Much of the conceptual opposi-
tion between the Enlightenment and the Counter-
Enlightenment seems dated. Nonetheless, one
element of this paradigm persists in the discourse
of culture. The culture concept continues to act as
a counterpoint to universality. Different groups of
humans have different cultures. With the 2001
tragedy of the September 11 attacks on the World
Trade Center (which many have interpreted in
terms of clashes of cultures), arguably a symbol of
globalization, the ideas of cultures and particu-
larities of human social groups have now been
throttled with a sense of urgency onto the center
stage of the contemporary academic and popular
discourse.
Yoshihisa Kashima
See also Acculturation; Collectivism/Individualism;
Culture, Ethnicity, and Race; Culture Shock;
Dimensions of Cultural Variability; Ethical and
Cultural Relativism; Etic/Emic; Globalization;
Multiculturalism; Self-Concept

Further Readings
Chiu, C.-Y., & Hong, Y.-Y. (2007). Cultural processes:
Basic principles. In A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins
(Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic
principles (pp. 785–804). New York: Guilford Press.
Heine, S. J. (2008). Cultural psychology. New York:
W. W. Norton.
Kashima, Y. (2000). Conceptions of the person and
culture for psychology. Journal of Cross-Cultural
Psychology, 31, 14–32.
Kashima, Y. (2008). A social psychology of cultural
dynamics: How cultures are formed, maintained, and
transformed. Social and Personality Psychology
Compass, 2, 107–120.
Smith, P. B., Bond, M. H., & Kağitçibaşi, Ç. (2006).
Understanding social psychology across cultures:
Living and working in a changing world
(3rd rev. ed.). London: Sage.
Culture, Ethnicity, and Race
Scholars from many disciplines have investigated
the concepts of culture, ethnicity, and race and
their impact on relationships, interactions, and
society. Over time, unpacking how meanings have
been attributed to “The Other” and understand-
ing conflict among people have been not only
attempts to understand one another better but
also processes of self-discovery. For example,
when Frederick Douglass wrote his first narrative
over 150 years ago, he was defining himself in the
face of negative attributions that questioned why
a brute should even be allowed to read or write. It
is from this context that the importance of under-
standing concepts of culture, ethnicity, and race
arises. This entry attempts to enter into a conver-
sation on culture, ethnicity, and race to frame an
understanding of how these concepts are used to
make sense of our reality and identity.
Culture
Culture can be understood as the traditions, cus-
toms, beliefs, values, norms, and perspectives that
are learned through shared behavioral patterns
and cultural practices passed down from generation
to generation. Culture is learned implicitly, though
it is the foundation for meanings we attribute to
Culture, Ethnicity, and Race 185
our perceptions and it influences how we describe
events. At its most fundamental level, culture is
reflected in the attitudes and behaviors that char-
acterize a group of people who share implicit
norms and rules. Unpacking these implicit norms
and rules can be accomplished by investigating the
primary components of culture: code, communica-
tion, and community. These primary components
are interrelated in constructing culture. For exam-
ple, a code is a system of rules, practices, and
meanings for individuals in a specific culture.
Thus, any code is conveyed through communica-
tion among individuals belonging to the same
community—those individuals who demonstrate
an affiliation with the implicit norms, rules, and
beliefs of one’s culture. Although often associated
with ethnicity, culture can be defined on many dif-
ferent levels (such as by nationality, corporately,
etc.). We exist as cultures within cultures.
The multifaceted nature of culture is expressed
well by Edward T. Hall, who explained that every
part of human existence is touched by or impacted
by culture. Culture then influences behavior in the
most subtle of ways, from how individuals express
themselves to how individuals think, solve prob-
lems, and live their lives. Culture therefore influ-
ences what we pay attention to and what we
ignore. For example, in some cultures, a person
would not think twice about finding space on a
crowded bus, whereas in other cultures an indi-
vidual would probably wait for the next bus.
Thus, each culture has its own understanding of
its implicit norms for space and nonverbal com-
munication, which are as unique as the norms for
spoken language.
Researchers have identified many dimensions of
culture to reveal the interconnection of code, com-
munication, and community and how they per-
petuate implicit norms, rules, and practices. Some
of the primary dimensions of culture include high
context and low context, individualism versus col-
lectivism, time, logic, and space.
High Context and Low Context
High-context and low-context cultures express
information in different ways based upon the
amount of information that is either implied
or directly stated in a communication message.
In high-context cultures, the meanings of the
186 Culture, Ethnicity, and Race
communication message are embedded in the situ-
ation, the relationship of the individuals, and the
implicit norms, beliefs, and values of the culture;
very little of the meaning of the message is con-
veyed in words. For example, in Japan, a person
can say “no” several different ways without actu-
ally saying “no.” The high-context expression of
“no” in Japan is based in the concept of face,
which is an individual’s public self-image. The con-
cept of face is very important, as individuals value
maintaining positive interpersonal relationships, in
addition to demonstrating a general concern about
the feelings of others. Thus, it is better to commu-
nicate “no” in a way that does not bring public
embarrassment to another person. In low-context
cultures, the majority of the meaning of the mes-
sage is understood from the verbal message.
Therefore, in low-context cultures, individuals
express themselves explicitly.
Investigating how messages are constructed in
high-context and low-context cultures illustrates
the importance of the situation in determining the
meaning of the communication. Furthermore, the
specific meanings derived from the context occur
in different proportions depending on the culture.
Thus, cultures can be classified on a continuum
with high-context cultures on one end and low-
context cultures on the other.
For example, Asian and Middle Eastern cul-
tures tend to be categorized as high-context cul-
tures due to the close personal relationships that
are developed among family, friends, and cowork-
ers. Because close bonds are developed among
individuals, there is less need for creating the con-
text or providing background information in
everyday interactions.
In contrast, North American and most northern
European cultures tend to be classified as low-
context cultures. Unlike people in high-context
cultures, who develop close and long-lasting rela-
tionships, people in low-context cultures compart-
mentalize each relationship. Thus, individuals in
low-context cultures provide more context and
background when communicating with each other.
Individualistic Versus Collectivistic
Cultures can also be defined by the value placed
on the individual or the group. Individualistic cul-
tures value self-sufficiency, independence, and
individual goals. Furthermore, individualistic cul-
tures emphasize individuals developing their own
identity and reaching goals based on individual
interests. As a result, individuals construct an
identity that is distinctive of other individuals in
the culture.
There is a tendency in individualistic cultures to
stress individual achievements in almost every con-
text, such as in the workplace, home, or social
engagement. When individuals reach a goal, they
are motivated to achieve more success such as a
better position or home. In individualistic cultures,
the focus is on moving up in the hierarchy ladder.
Sometimes, individual advancement can take pri-
ority over establishing good relationships.
Meanwhile, collectivistic cultures value the
group and think more of “we” instead of “I.”
Underlining this group orientation is the value of
harmony and loyalty (especially in relation to the
workplace or family). In collectivistic cultures, it is
very important to maintain relationships (and oth-
ers’ face) and avoid confrontation. The relationship
between employer and employee or business part-
ners is based on trust and harmony and a deep
understanding of moral values. The wealth of the
company and the group’s harmony are more
important than individual achievements. Therefore,
the goals and achievements of the group are more
important than individual goals and achievements.
Time
The concept of time represents a vital dimension
of culture that influences perception and behavior.
Researchers typically categorize cultures as being
either monochronic or polychronic. Monochronic
cultures tend to accomplish one task at a time,
concentrate on the job at hand, take time commit-
ments seriously, and are concerned not to disturb
others. Individuals from monochronic cultures
tend to be rule followers, demonstrate great respect
for private property, and emphasize promptness.
In addition, monochromic cultures tend to be low-
context cultures.
Polychronic cultures tend to be the opposite of
monochronic cultures. They tend to be high-
context cultures, in which individuals accomplish
many tasks at once, are highly distractible, and are
subject to interruptions. Although they consider
time commitments important to keep if possible,

they are more concerned with relationships, espe-
cially family and friends.
Logic
Logic involves the way information is presented
and organized. In Western cultures, logic is pre-
sented in a linear sequence with the content, evi-
dence, and arguments proceeding from beginning
to end in a straight line. Linear logic pragmatically
states a central idea, which is followed by specific
evidence and examples that directly relate to the
main idea. With linear logic, one point is directly
related to the next point as the message is specifi-
cally “spelled out” for the audience. In Western
cultures, when all information is linked in a linear
progression from start to finish, the information is
considered sound reasoning.
Logic and organizational patterns, however,
vary from culture to culture. Individuals from dif-
ferent cultures value different types of logic, which
produces different types of reasoning and organi-
zational patterns. Non-Western cultures demon-
strate configural logic when communicating with
another person or when presenting information.
Configural logic is characterized by presenting
information in a spiral or cyclical pattern where
information jumps from idea to idea with content,
evidence, and arguments being used as needed to
support specific ideas. With configural logic, the
speaker can demonstrate improvisation by express-
ing an idea from several different perspectives.
Whereas linear logic can be thought of as informa-
tion that proceeds in a line, configural logic can be
thought of as information that proceeds through a
progression of dots.
Configural logic is a cultural value that is often
found in high-context cultures. Thus, speakers are
able to move in and out of ideas easily because the
audience already understands the embedded mean-
ing in the context of the message and can “connect
the dots” without the explicit information neces-
sary in linear logic.
Space
Cultures also communicate implicit meaning by
space; this is known as territoriality. Territoriality
is the way individuals communicate meaning, sig-
nificance, and “ownership” of space from—a favorite
Culture, Ethnicity, and Race 187
living room chair to a favorite location at a park.
American culture is characterized by individuals
developing a strong sense of place. One form of
territoriality is personal space. Individuals tend to
reserve different measures of physical closeness for
other individuals based upon the relationship, the
context, culture, and emotional state.
Ethnicity
Understanding culture and its primary dimensions
illustrates how pervasive yet important culture is
when communicating with others, especially with
individuals with different cultural backgrounds.
Likewise, ethnicity is another concept that is vital
in understanding cultural differences. Ethnicity
can be defined as individuals who have a shared
ancestral heritage. More specifically, ethnicity is
the self-consciousness of a group who share a com-
mon origin or a separate subculture to maintain a
distinction between themselves and outsiders.
Like culture, ethnicity is characterized by indi-
viduals who share a common national or geo-
graphic origin, along with holding similar values,
beliefs, customs, and traditions. However, unlike
the concept of race, which is discussed next, eth-
nicity does not imply innate biological differences.
Instead, ethnicity emphasizes belonging to, or
being raised as part of, a specific group.
As with other concepts that attempt to define
groups, sometimes ethnicity can be used in ways
that undermine a group’s heritage by perpetuating
racist thinking and stereotypes. For example,
sometimes “ethnic” can be used to suggest “other-
ness” from the American norm, as in “ethnic
food” or “ethnic clothing.” This type of mislabel-
ing assumes that White individuals do not have an
ethnicity and/or defines ethnicity as relating only
to minority groups. When the label “White” is
used this way, it obscures the differences between
individuals from a wide range of ethnic groups,
such as German or Italian. Furthermore, some-
times when individuals use the term ethnicity, they
think that everyone can be categorized as belong-
ing to a specific, fixed ethnicity, which then can be
used to explain everyone’s behavior in the group.
This type of thinking can not only lead to misun-
derstanding but perpetuate long-held stereotypes.
Ethnicity is a more positive expression of
social categorization because it is not an imposed
188 Culture, Ethnicity, and Race
ideology (such as the concept of race); rather, it is
the group’s self-constructed social categorization
that embraces its own heritage and meaning.
Ethnicity is a positive manifestation of the lan-
guage, customs, practices, and traditions of a group
of people who share an ancestral heritage.
Individuals’ ethnic identity may assume greater
or less importance in their lives depending on their
experience of racism or other factors. However,
identity, whether on the basis of ethnicity, gender,
or other factors, should be seen as a dynamic and
active process of identification rather than a reflec-
tion of some fixed or innate character. As indicated
in the most recent U.S. census, the names and
labels used to identify ethnicity are always chang-
ing. For example, in the 2000 census, individuals
were able to “check off” one or more categories in
order to claim multiple ancestries. Thus, ethnic
identities say more about how society categorizes
people, not about unchanging facts in society.
Race
Although concept of race has been abandoned by
researchers and discredited by scientists, it still has
some currency among the general public due to its
historical legacy. The concept of race has a histori-
cal legacy that attempted to categorize individuals
based on the position of the self as the superior and
difference (based mostly on skin color) as “the
other.” Over time, attributions were associated
with innate biological characteristics that defined
individuals’ intelligence, morals, and behaviors.
Racial thinking was at its height in the 19th and
early 20th centuries and was associated with the
ideologies of empire and colonialism. Ideas about
distinct racial groups with distinct characteristics
were developed to support the notion that some
races (those of White, European origin) were
innately superior to others (usually non-White races
of African or Asian origin). Thus, race categoriza-
tion was the first step in racism and racialization—
the creation of negative stereotypes associated with
the social practices of the group. Racialization pro-
moted and perpetuated ideologies that created rigid
racial social categories.
In contemporary society, researchers have con-
cluded that race is a social construct—part of a
process in which individuals were assigned to par-
ticular racial categories that were not based on
scientific fact but ideological differences. Thus,
certain physical characteristics, such as skin color,
became markers of social difference in which the
concept of race was given specific social meaning.
Frequently, when people are assigned to a particu-
lar racialized group, they are perceived to have
specific characteristics that become stereotypes:
For example, Black people may be deemed to be
better at some sports than White people but also
not as intelligent. In fact, a great deal of early sci-
entific research on race focused on trying to deter-
mine intelligence by examining the size of the brain
in different racialized groups.
More significant than any minor physical dif-
ferences is the way in which supposed racial dif-
ferences have been used to explain people’s
behavior and to place them in a hierarchy in soci-
ety. Although the civil rights movement in the
United States has largely dismantled many of the
overt structures of racism, the concept of race
continues to be a social fact in the United States
despite the irrelevance of biological and genetic
differences.
Identity Construction
From a communication perspective, culture, eth-
nicity, and race have been at the center of the
construction of identity and how individuals
attempt to make sense of and attribute meaning
toward others. Within this complex negotiation of
identity is how an individual defines his or her
identity in relation to his or her orientation toward
his or her culture or ethnicity. Individuals can
demonstrate identification with their culture by
adopting the behavioral norms and language
codes, in addition to associating with the culture
literately and figuratively.
Although race is no longer considered an accu-
rate way to define an individual’s ethnic identity,
its historical legacy continues to shape the code,
communication, and community in which indi-
viduals interact and live. Exploring these concepts
reinforces the interrelationship between culture,
ethnicity, and race in understanding the construc-
tion of identity.
Timothy J. Brown
See also Globalization; Group Identity; Patriotism;
Stereotypes

Further Readings
Brown, T. J. (2007). African American rhetoric: Cultural
pluralism and the public speaking classroom.
Communication Annual, 63, 8–32.
Chen, G.-M., & Starosta, W. J. (2001). Foundations of
intercultural communication. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Downing, J., & Husband, C. (2005). Representing
“race.” Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hall, E. T. (1976). Beyond culture. Garden City, NY:
Doubleday.
Hall, E. T., & Hall, M. R. (1990). Understanding
cultural differences. Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural
Press.
Hecht, M. L., Jackson, R. L., II, & Ribeau, S. A. (2003).
African American communication: Exploring identity
and culture (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum.
Philipsen, G. (1987). The prospect for cultural
communication. In D. L. Kincaid (Ed.),
Communication theory: Eastern and Western
perspectives (pp. 245–254). New York: Academic
Press.
Culture Shock
Kalervo Oberg first described culture shock as the
anxiety and frustration resulting from the inability
to interpret and create meaningful communication
cues in a new culture. Culture shock may be the
result of a temporary (or permanent) social or geo-
graphic change, such as study abroad; interna-
tional business; military deployment; diplomatic,
mission, or volunteer worker trip; or even a
domestic move to a new region. People who engage
in these types of relocations are called sojourners.
Depending on the type of relocation, culture shock
has also been labeled transition shock, academic
shock, and social shock. The resulting loss of
familiar signs and symbols can lead to identity
conflict, disorientation, cultural misunderstand-
ings, interpersonal conflict, and feelings of power-
lessness. Culture shock is greater to the extent that
a person’s values, beliefs, customs, and behaviors
differ from those of the new culture. Lack of cul-
tural knowledge, inexperience, and unrealistic
expectations about life abroad further intensify
culture shock. Symptoms of culture shock are var-
ied but can include an insurmountable longing to
Culture Shock 189
return home, excessive concern over mundane
details, fear of host contact, a feeling of helpless-
ness, anger, hostility, and a great concern over
minor ailments and trivial inconveniences. Culture
shock has a significant impact on sojourners’ iden-
tities as their competence and ways of being are
challenged in the new cultural context. Sojourners
often respond to culture shock by (a) rejecting the
host environment and (b) retreating toward national
or international groups. This entry maps the con-
ceptual development and phases of culture shock
and reentry shock, lists suggestions for managing
culture shock, and presents criticisms of current
models and conceptualizations of culture shock.
History
Systematic study of culture shock began after
World War II when the United States made efforts
to increase international diplomacy through pro-
grams such as the Fulbright Program, the Foreign
Service Institute, and later the Peace Corps. In
1955, Sverre Lysgaard published one of the first
reports detailing the “adjustment crisis” experienced
by 200 Norwegian Fulbright scholars who returned
from their sojourn in the United States. His report
advanced the notion of a U-shaped adjustment
curve that takes place in four phases: a honeymoon
phase, in which sojourners are fascinated by the
host country and elated to be abroad; a crisis phase,
characterized by frustration and hostility toward
the host country; a recovery phase, wherein the
sojourner begins to adjust; and a final adjustment
phase, wherein the sojourner accepts and integrates
host country customs. Later, Oberg wrote in detail
about the experience of the crisis phase (labeled
culture shock) and gave rise to numerous scholarly
investigations into the value and usefulness of cul-
ture shock and the U-shaped curve.
U-Shaped Curve of Culture Shock
Although individuals experience the process of
cultural adjustment differently, sojourners’ retro-
spective accounts often, though not always, fit the
U-shaped curve advanced by Lysgaard. The degree
to which an individual adheres to the U-curve
depends on several factors, including previous
experience, expectations, time to prepare, time
abroad, severity of cultural differences, access to
190 Culture Shock
social support, knowledge about the host culture,
levels of ethnocentrism, belief in one’s ability to
succeed, ability and willingness to communicate,
how well the sojourner is received by the host
country, and so forth. Although sojourners may
take many routes to overcoming culture shock, the
phases of the U-curve are useful in outlining com-
mon experiences.
Honeymoon Phase
The honeymoon phase is marked by polite
interactions in which the sojourner is shielded
from the difficulties of everyday life abroad. Often
at this stage, a member of the host culture or a
well-seasoned traveler will introduce her or him to
pleasurable aspects of the culture or assist the
sojourner in accomplishing everyday tasks. During
the honeymoon phase, people are fascinated with
the sights, sounds, and tastes of the new culture.
Sojourners feel enthusiastic and carefree about
their adventures abroad and cast a positive glow
on their interactions. During this time, people may
choose to focus on similarities between the host
country and their home country and engage in
more superficial “tourist” behaviors, only skim-
ming the surface of their new culture and not pen-
etrating the deeper social structures of the culture.
Cultural differences and awkward social interac-
tions might be disregarded as humorous or eccen-
tric. The honeymoon phase can be the result of
experiencing relatively few negative incidents in
the first days abroad, not being attentive to hosts’
subtle negative reactions to sojourners’ faux pas,
or tending to ignore negative events and social cues
in order to protect the self. Moreover, surface
interactions that often accompany the honeymoon
phase present few identity challenges. Competency
is not challenged, because the sojourner is praised
for even simple tasks, and identities are not chal-
lenged, because the sojourner is viewed as a nov-
elty (and not a threat) by the hosts. The honeymoon
phase often begins before the journey and contin-
ues for a short duration upon arrival in the host
country. It might last days, weeks, or months
depending on the depth of social interaction
engaged in by the sojourner. However, not every-
one experiences a honeymoon phase. For some,
the honeymoon phase ends upon arrival in the
host country. Eventually, the honeymoon phase
dissolves as the sojourner begins to seek deeper
social relationships and desires to fit into the host
society as a participating member.
Crisis Phase
Once the sojourner begins to experience real
and irresolvable troubles abroad, he or she enters
the crisis phase, or culture shock. Difficulties man-
aging daily activities, such as shopping, ordering,
navigating transportation, and negotiating social
interactions, contribute to feelings of frustration
and anxiety. During this phase, sojourners find it
difficult to achieve goals because they are unable
to anticipate, predict, and explain behaviors.
Sojourners’ mental overload and behavioral inad-
equacy lead to distress, fatigue, depression, and a
feeling of lack of control. Loneliness develops as
the sojourner begins to feel out of place and starts
to blame the hosts for these feelings. In this phase,
sojourners become hypersensitive to small offenses
and the inconveniences and discomforts of living
abroad. Cultural differences seem exaggerated,
vexing the sojourner and eventually fatiguing him
or her. Sojourners begin to generate a dislike of the
host culture and may experience feelings of anger,
hostility, and aggression toward the hosts. At the
height of culture shock, sojourners are exasperated
by the accumulation of negative events (failures
and critical incidents abroad) and negative feed-
back from hosts. They become aware of their
wrong or culturally inappropriate behavior but
have not yet acquired the social tools to remedy it.
As a result, sojourners retreat to their comfort
zones by banding with others from their home
country and might begin to enact stereotypic
ingroup behavior (e.g., amplifying home culture
identity) while applying negative stereotypes to the
outgroup (hosts). These behaviors contribute to a
withdrawal from the host society and further
alienate the sojourner. The sojourner is no longer
shielded by the hosts but is expected to contribute
to, and function independently in, society. Identity
and language shock develops as the traveler real-
izes that he or she is unable to communicate com-
plicated and culturally appropriate expressions,
emotions, desires, commands, requests, humor,
and so forth. Finally, identity starts to break down
as the sojourner’s competency is challenged and he
or she begins to experience identity strain due to

the gaps between perceived self-identity (personal
identity) and his or her ability to enact that identity
in the new cultural context (enacted identity).
How long a person experiences culture shock
depends on the sojourner’s ability and motivation
to start integrating into the host culture.
Recovery Phase
The culture shock phase is typically followed by
the recovery phase. After a sojourner hits the rock
bottom of culture shock, he or she might engage in
some self-protective behaviors by taking a superior
attitude toward people of the country. During the
recovery phase, the sojourner realizes that it is up
to him or her to learn how to function in the new
culture, and the sojourner adopts an “I can do it
myself” attitude. The sojourner begins to interact
with sympathetic hosts and starts to build support-
ive cocultural and intercultural relationships.
Confidence is slowly restored and competency
increases as the sojourner receives positive rein-
forcement for some learned social behaviors. In
this way, the sojourner develops a verbal and non-
verbal communication repertoire for culturally
appropriate social interactions, problem solving,
and conflict resolution. As the sojourner becomes
more self-sufficient, he or she is able to help others
manage culture shock. Over time, the sojourner
starts to realize that difficulties are not deliberate
attacks by the hosts and begins to experience a
perceptual shift from “culture shock” to “culture
aware.” Finally, sojourners begin to resolve their
identity conflicts by changing identity perceptions
and behaviors to fit the environment. This reduces
dissonance created by identity strain and prepares
the sojourner to make a series of minor adjust-
ments to adapt to the host culture.
Adjustment Phase
Adjustment, or mastery, is the final phase in the
U-curve. This phase is marked by lower levels of
anxiety and the sojourner’s ability to interact suc-
cessfully with members of the host culture. They
now exhibit effective and culturally appropriate
communication, are able to build social relation-
ships, and are able to competently manage busi-
ness transactions, for example. Sojourners perceive
a certain “hardiness” and boost in self-confidence
Culture Shock 191
for having transcended culture shock. At this stage,
sojourners are able to resolve identity conflict by
embracing what the new culture has to offer, and
they start to identify with admirable traits of the
host culture. As this shift occurs, the sojourner
begins to realize that it is his or her perception and
identity that has changed and not the host culture.
As the sojourner continues to integrate into the
culture, some members of that culture, in turn,
begin to receive the sojourner not as a “tourist” or
“novelty” but as a participating member. This
phase brings satisfaction and an acknowledgment
of personal and social identity growth. Once the
sojourner has reached the adjustment phase, he or
she might experience occasional instances of frus-
tration, anxiety, or identity strain, but these occa-
sions are less frequent and less severe because the
sojourner has acquired the tools and perspective
necessary to manage it. Additionally, stressors and
strains of living overseas are somewhat buffered in
this phase because the sojourner has built up a
national, international, and host social support
network to share the burdens of daily life.
W-Shaped Curve of Reverse Culture Shock
Following Oberg’s research on culture shock, in
1963 John and Jeanne Gullahorn extended the
U-shaped curve to include sojourners’ reentry
experiences. They developed the W-shaped curve
to account for the reverse culture shock or reentry
shock experienced by sojourners as they readjusted
to living in their home country. The W-curve gets
its shape from attaching two U-curves together and
accounts for acculturation (to the host country)
and reacculturation (to home). The extension of
the U-curve was founded upon sojourners’ reports
of experiencing similar phases (honeymoon, crisis,
recovery, adjustment) upon return. Reverse culture
shock is often more stressful than initial culture
shock and is particularly difficult for first-time
sojourners. Reverse culture shock occurs when the
sojourner finds that although he or she is not
entering a “new” social system, the sojourner has
changed; aspects of the home culture, family, and
friend relationships have changed; and parts of the
home culture system now seems inferior to that of
the host country. Returnees begin to feel that the
home culture that was once natural to them is
somewhat “foreign.” The sojourner again feels
192 Culture Shock
alienated—this time because he or she is unable to
meaningfully connect to his or her home country
and people. Reentry shock leads to identity turbu-
lence as sojourners experience a gap between their
newly acquired identity and the “old self” they are
expected assume upon return. With time, returnees
begin to resolve their identity crisis by developing
social relationships and making life choices that
validate their experiences.
The honeymoon phase of reentry often begins
before the sojourner has left the host country. As
the sojourn comes to a conclusion, people might
fantasize about a happy return wherein the
sojourner is well received by his or her social net-
work, is admired for his or her newly acquired
identity and worldly experiences, and is sought
after to share his or her unique insights. In doing
so, the sojourner unknowingly creates a gap
between the expectations and reality of the return.
The honeymoon period of reentry can be extended
into the first days, weeks, or months of a return
through a welcome reception and initial mutual
celebration of a sojourner’s reentry.
Eventually, regular life resumes for the return-
ee’s social network, and he or she is expected to
return to his or her old ways of being. However,
the sojourner’s earlier shift in identity and cultural
perceptions abroad means that he or she might find
it difficult or undesirable to locate and enact the
old identity and cultural patterns. Sojourners
become nostalgic about their time abroad, putting
a positive halo on their overseas experiences and
longing to return. At this point, the returnee experi-
ences a crisis or reentry shock phase. Like culture
shock, reentry shock is experienced most severely
by first-time and younger sojourners, as well as those
for whom there is a great difference between the
host and home culture, those who created unrealistic
expectations about their return, those who failed to
anticipate any difficulties returning, those who
experienced the biggest identity shifts abroad, and
those who were most successful in adjustment
abroad. In this phase, returnees often experience
frustration and annoyance at a cultural system they
previously took for granted. They might be dis-
gusted, impatient, and disheartened by the cultural
practices of their home culture. Attempts to incor-
porate their new cultural practices or ideologies
into the home culture are sometimes rejected by
members of the home culture. On these occasions,
returnees might feel that the home culture perceives
them as snobby or brainwashed as a result of their
time overseas. Over time, the accumulation of
negative events upon return leads to withdrawal
and rejection from the home culture.
The reentry recovery phase begins when return-
ees start to reconcile differences between their
expectations and the realities of living in their
home culture. Slowly, sojourners begin to integrate
aspects from their life abroad with their new life at
home and accept the things that cannot be changed.
Once again, the sojourner realizes that it is he or
she who has changed and not so much the home
country. During the recovery phase, the sojourner
shifts from blind criticism of the home culture to a
more balanced perspective. Sojourners are able to
appreciate the positive and negative aspects of
their home culture and regain awareness that their
time overseas was not perfect and that their host
culture also had negative attributes. As the recov-
ery phase shifts to the readjustment phase, the
returning sojourner begins to feel at home again.
As the returnee learns to integrate aspects of both
cultures into several areas of his or her life, he or
she experiences a validation of self-concept and
increased self-confidence. Finally, returnees develop
social networks with people who share their views
or have shared similar experiences and complete
readjustment at home.
J-Curve and Roller-Coaster
Model on Culture Shock
In addition to the U- and W-curves, scholars have
also suggested a J-shaped curve. The J-curve is
argued to be the result of realistic or even negative
expectations about the host culture. The sojourner
does not experience a honeymoon phase but
instead enters the new culture in a state of shock
and distress. Because the sojourner is forced to
manage culture shock sooner and without the dis-
illusionment of the honeymoon, he or she experi-
ences a shortened culture shock phase and is able
to start adjusting more quickly.
A more contemporary notion of culture shock
uses a roller-coaster model. This model combines
the previous curves to explain that before, during,
and after the sojourn, the sojourner experiences
multiple honeymoon, culture shock, recovery, and
(re)adjustment phases. From this perspective, it is

expected that the sojourner will experience the
greatest drops (culture shock) shortly after entering
the new culture and again upon returning home.
However, this model explains that across the
sojourn, travelers will periodically experience
smaller cycles of culture shock and adjustment. As
they engage in more social and cultural encounters,
extreme culture shock yields to minor culture shock
that the sojourner is newly equipped to manage.
Managing Culture Shock
Individuals experience culture shock differently.
The length of time one endures culture shock and
when one first experiences it vary across individu-
als and experiences. Despite the many forms that
culture shock takes, there are several recommenda-
tions for how to manage it: (a) Sojourners can
become knowledgeable about culture shock,
including developing an awareness of the signs and
symptoms of culture shock; (b) sojourners can
make every effort to gain knowledge about cul-
tural practices of the host country, including ver-
bal and nonverbal communication; (c) sojourners
can make efforts to create realistic expectations
of their experience abroad; (d) sojourners can
immerse themselves in the culture and engage in
everyday tasks; (e) sojourners can observe cultural
practices and model behaviors; (f) sojourners can
develop meaningful intercultural relationships; and
(g) sojourners can maintain a supportive conational
social network.
Critique
Although the U- and W-curves are popular and
useful in outlining a generic process of culture
shock and adjustment, they are not without criti-
cism. The U-curve and its variations are criticized
for being largely anecdotal and have received
mixed results since their appearance in the 1960s.
Critics argue that the curves fail to account for
those who do not adjust and those who return
home early. For example, sojourners who return
before completing the adjustment can experience
negative consequences in terms of identity growth
and can also strain international and intercultural
relationships. Moreover, the U-curve and its vari-
ants do not address differences in time, location,
and intensity of the sojourn—predicting the same
Culture Shock 193
curve for people who experience little or signifi-
cant culture gaps. Another problem is that the
conceptualization of culture shock has been inher-
ently negative in nature. Many models present
culture shock as a crisis to be weathered before
successful adaptation can occur, rather than focus-
ing on the positive aspects of such encounters.
Instead, culture shock could be viewed as a good
sign that the sojourner is in the process of adjust-
ing and moving toward a positive identity shift.
Margaret Jane Pitts
See also Acculturation; Adaptation; Communication
Theory of Identity; Culture; Identity Change; Identity
Salience; Intercultural Personhood; Uncertainty
Avoidance
Further Readings
Gullahorn, J. T., & Gullahorn, J. E. (1963). An extension
of the U-curve hypothesis. Journal of Social Issues, 19,
33–47.
Lysgaard, S. (1955). Adjustment in a foreign society:
Norwegian Fulbright grantees visiting the United
States. International Social Sciences Bulletin, 7,
45–51.
Martin, J. N., & Harrell, T. (1996). Reentry training for
intercultural sojourners. In D. Landis & R. S. Bhagat
(Eds.), Handbook of intercultural training
(pp. 307–326). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Nash, D. (1991). The course of sojourner adaptation: A
new test of the U-curve hypothesis. Human
Organization, 50(3), 283–286.
Oberg, K. (1960). Culture shock: Adjustment to new
cultural environments. Practical Anthropology, 7,
177–182.
Storti, C. (2001). The art of coming home. Boston:
Intercultural Press.
Storti, C. (2001). The art of crossing cultures (2nd ed.).
Boston: Intercultural Press.
Sussman, N. (2000). The dynamic nature of cultural
identity throughout cultural transitions: Why home is
not so sweet. Personality and Social Psychology
Review, 4(4), 355–373.
Sussman, N. (2001). Repatriation transitions:
Psychological preparedness, cultural identity, and
attributions among American managers. International
Journal of Intercultural Relations, 25, 109–123.
Ward, C., Bochner, S., & Furnham, A. (2001). The
psychology of culture shock (2nd ed.). Philadelphia:
Taylor & Francis.
 D
Deconstruction
Although it is used in a wide variety of senses,
deconstruction generally refers to the process of
breaking down conventionally accepted concepts,
categories, and oppositions. Deconstruction is
often loosely used to refer to critiques that show
the artificial or arbitrary nature of categories that
seem natural. In a narrow sense, deconstruction
refers to an intellectual project initiated by Jacques
Derrida that involves philosophical claims and a
specific methodology. This method first gained
widespread popularity in literary studies in the
United States but has subsequently influenced
work in anthropology, history, political science,
and philosophy—and has provoked vociferous
opposition. Critics of identity have often turned to
deconstruction for theoretical support because
deconstruction targets the very idea of identity,
offering an alternative view of the world that
focuses on difference instead of identity.
Overview
Deconstruction involves elements of destruction,
tearing down assumptions about what the world is
like, as well as elements of construction, creating
new ways of seeing the world. Deconstruction
intentionally highlights the paradox of simultane-
ous destruction and construction. Indeed, para-
doxes such as these are typical of deconstruction; it
could even be said that they animate deconstruc-
tion. By showing how concepts that seem to refer to
195
one thing are also referring to their opposites,
deconstruction rattles conventional views and forces
a reconfiguration of how the world is viewed.
The method of deconstruction mirrors the
claims of deconstruction. It often proceeds through
critique of a particular text, demonstrating how
the language of the text challenges the explicit
message of the text. As this approach to reading
implies, deconstruction does not give any special
regard to the intentions of an author. Even the
distinction between author and text is challenged
in deconstruction. Derrida famously claimed there
is nothing outside a text (il n’y a pas de hors-texte).
Although sometimes understood as deemphasizing
the role of an author, Derrida’s remark is more
often taken to mean that the whole world can be
regarded as a text, or a network of texts. In other
words, the method of deconstruction can be
applied to everything, whether it is an article or a
cultural event or a flower arrangement. The claims
of deconstruction apply not only to literary inter-
pretation; they are general philosophical claims.
Derrida was trained as a philosopher, and his
early work applied the deconstructive method to
philosophical texts. This work challenged the pri-
macy of presence through critical engagement with
the phenomenological tradition. Phenomenologists
attempt to discard conventionally accepted con-
cepts and categories in order to access experience
directly. Experience is deemed irrefutable; it is the
attempt to represent experience that always goes
wrong. Deconstruction differs from phenomenol-
ogy because, for deconstruction, any concept of
direct access to experience is flawed.
196 Deconstruction
More generally, deconstruction opposes all
claims to directly access truth. Opposition to the
phenomenologist’s claim to such direct access
through experience is a special case of this general
claim. Rather than trying to find a better way to
access truth, deconstructionists criticize and refor-
mulate the claims that others make, often implic-
itly, to access truth. There are two important
corollaries to this stance. First, deconstructionists
oppose claims that there are foundations to schol-
arly inquiry, for such foundations presuppose
access to truth. Second, with the search for truth
no longer animating inquiry, deconstruction is
playful rather than serious, a self-understanding
reflected in the frequent wordplay in the writings
of those associated with deconstruction. Instead of
imagining scholarly inquiry as searching depths or
ascending to heights, deconstructionists imagine
scholarly inquiry as joyfully exploring a flat sur-
face, a plane of immanence.
Closely connected with deconstructionists’ skep-
ticism about claims to access truth is deconstruc-
tionists’ focus on the importance of language. The
view that a word can represent an object in the
world implies that truth could be accessed if
the world could be directly accessed, free from the
mediation of language. Deconstructionists argue
that words, as signifiers, are arbitrary; there is no
reason to suppose that they perfectly match the
world. Moreover, words are always defined in
terms of other words, so to suppose that any given
word perfectly refers to the world would be to sup-
pose, quite implausibly, that the entire language
perfectly matched the world. Instead of focusing
on what words signify, deconstructionists focus on
the relationship between signifiers. In other words,
instead of focusing on a world that can only be
imperfectly accessed through language, decon-
structionists focus on the workings of language.
If words do not refer to the world, it is difficult to
see how to make sense of language. Deconstruction
holds that every time a word is used, it draws on
the history of that word’s usage. Every time the
word dog is used, it does not refer to a particular
type of four-legged animal; it refers to every other
time dog has been used previously. This under-
standing of meaning is sometimes referred to as
intertextuality. If the world is understood as a text,
then to make sense of any part of that text, one
must refer to other parts of it, a point that is the
case not only for linguistic signifiers but also for
aspects of culture, according to deconstructionists.
For example, a presidential inauguration receives
its meaning from all past inaugurations.
From this perspective, deconstruction, often
characterized as radical, seems traditionalist,
emphasizing how everything that happens is a rep-
etition of what has happened before. However,
deconstruction also emphasizes the indeterminacy
of repetition. Each new word or event refers to
past instances of that word or event, but each is
different from past instances. The context in which
a word or event occurs is never the same as the
context in which it occurred in the past. Further,
its occurrence now will alter how it can occur in
the future.
Deconstruction as a Method
Deconstructive criticism opposes attempts, whether
they are explicit or implicit, to suppose that words
or events are particular instances of an essence.
Instead of attempting to identify necessary and
sufficient conditions for a word to refer to a thing
(e.g., that animal is a “dog” if and only if it is
four-legged and furry and man’s best friend),
deconstructionists examine how a word is used
within the context of a specific text and in lan-
guage more broadly. This method entails the
destruction of the received view of a word’s mean-
ing by showing the many different ways in which
that word has been used. Often this proceeds his-
torically, tracking the genealogy of a concept and
so showing that its meaning has changed and is
contingent. This method also entails construction
of new possible meanings by closely examining
the unorthodox ways in which the word is used
within a specific text.
Although deconstruction as a method has been
adopted more in literary studies than in other dis-
ciplines, it has also been used for cultural criticism
in a variety of fields. Feminist scholars have used
deconstruction in attempts to show that the seem-
ingly natural category of “woman” is actually
composed of a number of conjoined components,
including female anatomy, feminine behavior, and
desire for men. Deconstructive readings of texts,
both literary and cultural, by feminists have dem-
onstrated other possible configurations of gender
that are hidden—indeed, they would claim,

repressed—by the seemingly natural way that the
category of woman is understood. Such decon-
structive readings make it possible to acknowledge
the existence of, for example, lesbians: those who
have female anatomy but desire women.
Deconstruction has been applied in analogous
ways to the criticism of, inter alia, racial identity
categories, religions, and geographical regions
(e.g., “the Orient”).
In critiques such as these, deconstruction is
taken to be more than an ironic literary game.
Feminist critics using deconstruction understand
their work to have a normative valence. From their
perspective, the essence of “woman” is doing vio-
lence to actual women, particularly those lesbians,
transgendered people, and others whose very exis-
tence the category of “woman,” as currently
understood, precludes. As this example suggests,
deconstructionists challenge the distinction between
descriptive and normative claims. Challenging
received essences, which always do violence,
according to deconstructionists, is not simply a
way to see the world more clearly; it is also some-
thing that ought to be done. In one of his later
works, Derrida claims that justice is the only con-
cept that is impossible to deconstruct because
deconstruction and justice are the same thing.
Criticisms of Deconstruction
Deconstruction has been a highly controversial
topic in academia, and some of the polarization
around the topic is evident in popular culture as
well. Some of this criticism is directed more gener-
ally at postmodern culture, with its supposed
flaunting of traditional values, of which decon-
struction is taken to be a symptom. Deconstruction
has faced more substantive criticism from aca-
demic philosophers, both Anglo-American and
Continental, as well as social theorists. Anglo-
American philosophers have argued that decon-
struction makes much of a relatively small point by
dressing it up in obscure terminology and loudly
proclaiming its novelty. There is a long philosoph-
ical tradition of skeptical arguments, and refuta-
tions of such arguments, and these critics argue
that deconstruction should be viewed as just the
most recent in the line of such arguments. Further,
Anglo-American philosophers point out that con-
cerns about linguistic reference similar to those
Deconstruction 197
raised in deconstruction have also been raised by
analytic philosophers, such as W. V. O. Quine and
Donald Davidson. These concerns have been
addressed, and attention has now turned to new
problems about which deconstruction has nothing
to say (for instance, the problem of rigid designa-
tors raised by Saul Kripke).
Another criticism that has been leveled against
deconstruction is that its focus on language, texts,
and readings overlooks the social world and leads
to emaciated ethics and politics. That concepts and
categories are always less sturdy than they seem
appears to matter little to questions of how
humans live their lives together. Some critics
charge that oppression is a brute reality that can-
not be lessened by the intellectual labor that
deconstruction entails. Advocates of deconstruc-
tion often reply that oppression depends on a
shared understanding of certain categories (for
instance, “White” and “Black” or “man” and
“woman”). Showing the arbitrary nature of these
categories is a first step in opposing oppression.
But critics offer the rejoinder that political oppres-
sion is often overturned by mass social movements,
and such movements depend on positing essences
in order to mobilize individuals for their cause. If
deconstruction takes its task as critiquing every
posited essence, then it could cripple all such
movements.
Pragmatists argue that they fully accept decon-
struction’s critique of essence and identity without
limiting the task of critical scholarship to decon-
structing texts. Moreover, pragmatists charge that
using problematic categories and strategically pos-
iting essences is necessary to navigate the world.
The constant irony and play of deconstruction
precludes the serious business of accomplishing
political goals or deliberating about ethical quan-
daries. Some of the challenges posed to decon-
struction may be misdirected if deconstructionists
are right in their unyielding criticism of essences. If
that is the case, the notion that there is an essence
of deconstruction itself may be misleading. It may
be that deconstruction’s existence is in its haunting
effects on other disciplines: in the way that it forces
scholars to challenge long-held assumptions.
Vincent Lloyd
See also Being and Identity; Critical Theory; Difference/
Différance; Hybridity; Phenomenology; Signification
198 Deindividuation
Further Readings
Boghossian, P. A. (2006). Fear of knowledge: Against
relativism and constructivism. Oxford, UK: Clarendon
Press.
Butler, J. P. (1990). Gender trouble: Feminism and the
subversion of identity. New York: Routledge.
Cornell, D., Rosenfeld, M., & Carlson, D. G. (Eds.).
(1992). Deconstruction and the possibility of justice.
New York: Routledge.
Derrida, J. (1976). Of grammatology (G. C. Spivak,
Trans.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Derrida, J. (1978). Writing and difference (A. Bass,
Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gasché, R. (1986). The tain of the mirror: Derrida and
the philosophy of reflection. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Norris, C. (2002). Deconstruction: Theory and practice
(3rd ed.). New York: Routledge.
Deindividuation
The term deindividuation refers to the process
whereby people engage in seemingly impulsive,
deviant, and sometimes violent acts when they
cannot be personally identified for their actions
(e.g., in groups, in crowds, when communicating
on the Internet). Deindividuated contexts typi-
cally reduce accountability; this means that when
people are anonymous, for example, they cannot
be easily traced or blamed for their actions.
Deindividuation is often equated with a loss of
personal identity resulting in negative conse-
quences (e.g., rioting). However, research has
shown that deindividuation can also have posi-
tive consequences. In deindividuated contexts,
people can sometimes feel freer to express aspects
of their personal identity when otherwise it
would be difficult to do so. Anonymity can also
draw people’s attention to the norms and stan-
dards associated with their social identities. This
entry begins with a discussion of the history and
background of deindividuation theory. It then
examines the prosocial and antisocial conse-
quences of deindividuation. Lastly, this entry
provides a modern example: computer-mediated
communication.
History and Background:
Analyses of Crowd Behavior
Theories of crowd behavior provided the origins of
modern deindividuation theory. In particular, the
work of Gustave Le Bon in 19th-century France
resulted in a politically motivated criticism of
crowd behavior. At the time, French society was
volatile and protests and riots were commonplace
(e.g., the revolutionary crowds of 1848 and the
Paris Commune of 1871; see Émile Zola’s Germinal
and Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables for literary
accounts of the time). Le Bon’s work, which
described crowd behavior in general as irrational
and fickle, found much support at the time.
Le Bon believed that being in a crowd allows
individuals to act differently than they would act
when alone. Being submerged in a large group of
people allows an individual to react on impulses
that would normally be controlled and perform
behaviors that would normally be self-censored.
Some of these behaviors, in the words of Le Bon,
can be “primitive, base and ghastly.” Le Bon
argued that such undesirable behaviors can arise
due to three mechanisms. First, anonymity pre-
vents people from being isolated or identified from
others in a crowd. Being undifferentiated from oth-
ers leads to a loss of personal responsibility, a sense
of being “untouchable,” and a loss of self-control.
People are therefore free to express the darker sides
of themselves that they would normally keep hid-
den. Le Bon further argued that this loss of control
leads to contagion, where a lack of responsibility
spreads throughout the crowd and everyone begins
to think and act in the same manner. Finally, peo-
ple in the crowd become more suggestible. In other
words, being in a crowd leads to a blind accep-
tance of the demands of being in a crowd, and
people unquestioningly follow the impulses that
emanate from a common unconscious. Le Bon’s
analysis suggests that crowds are messy, incoher-
ent, and often dangerous rabbles where people are
not capable of self-control. Personal identity is lost,
and people behave as if they were all in possession
of the same, inferior mind.
Le Bon’s work was very influential. For example,
in the 1920s Sigmund Freud argued along similar
lines that crowds unlock people’s unconscious

impulses. Individuals’ basic impulses (derived from
the id) are controlled by crowd leaders who, via a
process similar to hypnosis, bring out the animal-
istic tendencies within all people involved. Similarly,
in the 1920s William McDougall argued that
crowds bring out people’s instinctive primary emo-
tions, such as anger and fear. Because everyone
experiences these basic emotions and people are
less likely to have more complex emotions in com-
mon, the basic emotions will spread rapidly within
a crowd as people express them. It was argued that
this process, similar to Le Bon’s idea of contagion,
leads to deregulated and impulsive behavior,
against normal personal standards.
Deindividuation and Accountability
Modern theories have applied and extended early
principles to understand people’s behavior in other
contexts, such as when people have the opportu-
nity to interact with others while concealing their
personal identity and remaining anonymous. The
term deindividuation was coined by Leon Festinger
and colleagues in the 1950s to describe situations
in which people cannot be individuated or isolated
from others. According to Festinger and colleagues,
being deindividuated brings about a loss of indi-
viduality. In a similar vein to Le Bon, Festinger and
colleagues proposed that being deindividuated
reduces normal constraints on behavior and people
can do things they normally would not do because
they are not directly accountable for their actions.
They are, in a sense, liberated to do what they like.
Festinger and colleagues found support for this
idea by demonstrating that participants who were
engaged in a group discussion about their parents,
while being dressed alike in a dimly lit room, were
more likely to make negative comments about their
parents than were participants in a control condi-
tion. In other words, the deindividuated situation
allowed participants to express views that they
would normally keep to themselves.
Philip Zimbardo is responsible for the develop-
ment of the deindividuation theory most com-
monly known today. Zimbardo was more specific
about what variables would lead to a state of dein-
dividuation, as well as the behaviors that should
result from deindividuation. Specifically, Zimbardo
Deindividuation 199
said that factors leading to a state of deindividua-
tion were anonymity, responsibility (shared, dif-
fused, or given up), group size and activity, altered
temporal perspective (so that focus is more on the
“here and now” than on the past or present),
arousal, sensory input overload, physical involve-
ment in the act, reliance upon noncognitive inter-
actions and feedback, a novel or unstructured
situation, and altered states of consciousness (such
as those brought about by the use of alcohol or
drugs). Zimbardo claimed that all of these factors
act to minimize self-observation and evaluation,
reduce concern for social evaluation, and lead to a
weakening of controls based on feelings of guilt,
shame, fear, and commitment. Thus, thresholds
for expressing inhibited behaviors are lowered,
and these behaviors are typically impulsive and
often negative and antisocial.
In the 1970s, Zimbardo conducted a series of
experiments in which participants were deindivid-
uated by dressing them in Ku Klux Klan–style
clothing. In one experiment, female participants
were asked to deliver shocks to another female
participant (who was in fact a confederate) as a
response to incorrect answers in a learning task.
Results revealed that the deindividuated partici-
pants gave shocks that were twice as long in dura-
tion as those given by participants who were not
dressed in the deindividuating clothing. Zimbardo
and his colleagues also carried out the famous
Stanford Prison Experiment, in which student par-
ticipants were deindividuated as prisoners or
prison guards in a simulated prison setting at
Stanford University. The students in the position
of guards were physically brutal to the students
who were deindividuated as prisoners, so much so
that the experiment had to be terminated early.
Ed Diener provided a theoretical clarification of
Zimbardo’s theory by introducing the concept of
objective self-awareness. Objective self-awareness
is high when people’s attention is drawn inward
toward the self and people actively monitor their
own behavior. On the other hand, objective self-
awareness is low when focus is directed outward
and people monitor their own behavior less, or not
at all. According to Diener, deindividuation is
caused by a reduction in objective self-awareness
rather than a loss of self or identity, and factors
200 Deindividuation
that can reduce this self-awareness (e.g., anonym-
ity or being in a group) can bring about deindi-
viduation. Under conditions of deindividuation,
attention is therefore drawn away from the self and
people are less capable of monitoring their behav-
ior with relation to internal norms and standards.
To support this idea, Diener and colleagues
observed the behavior of more than 1,300 children
one Halloween in the 1970s, focusing on 27 homes
where, upon their visit, the trick-or-treating chil-
dren were invited to take one candy from a table.
Half of the children were asked where they lived
and were asked for their names; half were not
asked for this individuating information. Results
revealed that deindividuated children and children
in groups were more than twice as likely to take
more than one candy. Diener and colleagues
argued that the groups and anonymous children
transgressed because the deindividuating condi-
tions reduced their objective self-awareness and
freed them from the normal constraints on their
impulse to take more candies.
Steven Prentice-Dunn and Ronald Rogers refor-
mulated Diener’s theory in the 1980s by introduc-
ing the distinction between public and private
self-awareness in deindividuated contexts. Public
self-awareness is said to decrease due to anonymity
such that people become less aware of how they
appear publicly to others. Anonymous individuals,
for example, are less aware of how they present
themselves and, as a result, their behavior will tend
to be antinormative, or against accepted norms
and standards. Also, private self-awareness, or
awareness of internal norms and standards, was
argued to decrease due to the physiological arousal
of being in a group and the high levels of group
cohesiveness. Because people become less aware of
their internal standards of behavior, they will
behave more impulsively. Deindividuation is said
to influence behavior by reducing the level of
explicit control that people have over their thoughts
and actions. That is, their identity does not disap-
pear completely—people are simply less aware of
their own standards of behavior and are less able
to control what they do.
Some archival observations support this view.
For example, Brian Mullen conducted a content
analysis of the newspaper accounts of 60 lynchings
committed in the United States from 1899 to 1946.
He found that the larger the lynch mob, the more
savagely they murdered their victims. In this case,
the arousal of being around others with a common
purpose increased the extent to which the group
performed atrocities. The same principle can also
apply to anonymity. It has been found that cultures
that conceal their identities before battle (e.g., by
use of face paint) have historically been more likely
to commit gruesome acts toward their prisoners
than those that do not hide their identities.
Deindividuation, Social Identity, and Norms
Much of the theorizing about deindividuation up
to this point has focused on how deindividuated
states cause antinormative behavior. Although, in
general, factors such as anonymity tend to increase
antisocial behavior and increase aggression, not all
research findings support this view. For example,
Zimbardo found that soldiers paradoxically gave
electric shocks of shorter duration when they were
deindividuated in the Ku Klux Klan–style clothing
he used in his earlier study. Further, Robert
Johnson and Leslie Downing adopted a similar
paradigm, but dressed female participants in either
the Ku Klux Klan–style clothing or in nurses’ uni-
forms. The participants dressed in the nurses’ out-
fits were significantly less aggressive.
These results suggest that aggression and anti-
social behavior are not inevitable by-products of
deindividuated situations. In situations where con-
textual norms and standards promote aggressive
behavior (e.g., soldiers dressed in uniform may
trigger norms associated with fighting and aggres-
sion), this may be the case. However, where norms
and standards instead promote positive, nonag-
gressive behavior (e.g., nurses dressed in uniform
may trigger norms associated with caring and
helping), behavior may be positive. In other
words, deindividuated behavior increases adher-
ence to the salient norms of the situation. Gustave
Jahoda pointed out a real-life example of this
effect of deindividuation. In some Islamic coun-
tries, women wear the full-length, dark-colored
chador, which, instead of allowing women to
engage in antinormative behavior, implies a strong
system of norms of behavior to which women
adhere. So, in some contexts, deindividuating fac-
tors such as anonymity serve as reminders of iden-
tity and the norms and standards of behavior
linked to identity.

Following this line of reasoning, some critics of
traditional deindividuation theories argue that,
although deindividuation can have prosocial and
antisocial consequences, this should not necessar-
ily be attributed to a loss of individual identity.
Steve Reicher, Russell Spears, and Tom Postmes
have argued that the notion of a “loss of identity”
relies, inaccurately, on an individualistic concep-
tion of identity. Rational action is equated with
the individual self, and group membership is
equated with the loss of identity and the loss
of rationality. According to Reicher and col-
leagues, this position limits our understanding of
deindividuation phenomena.
Drawing on social identity theory and self-
categorization theory, Reicher and colleagues
proposed that deindividuation does not automati-
cally entail a loss of identity. In each individual,
there are many levels of identity. The self is not
only the individual’s personal identity or what
separates that individual from other individuals.
It also encompasses a range of possible social
identities related to group memberships. That is,
a person’s selfhood is also determined by proper-
ties that are shared with others, such as race,
gender, and age. When a person feels part of a
group, he or she will be attuned to the norms of
that group. In turn, knowledge of the group’s
norms will guide his or her behavior. In their
social identity model of deindividuation effects
(SIDE model), Reicher and colleagues argued that
these social identity principles determine how
people will behave in deindividuated situations.
Revisiting Zimbardo’s paradigm where partici-
pants were asked to wear Ku Klux Klan–style
hoods and cloaks, Reicher and colleagues argued
that asking people to wear such garments should
have different effects on behavior depending on
the salient social identity and what is happening in
the deindividuated context. Reicher and colleagues
argued that manipulating deindividuation by
immersion in a group should reinforce the salience
of a prominent social identity (should one be
prominent) at the expense of personal identity. So,
if personal identity is salient, wearing Ku Klux
Klan outfits may increase personal focus and peo-
ple will rely on their own individual norms to
guide their behavior. But if a social identity is
salient, the deindividuation manipulation is more
likely to have the effect of promoting behavior
Deindividuation 201
consistent with the norms of the group that people
feel part of at the time, whether they are prosocial
or antisocial. Again, identity does not disappear
completely. Instead, the deindividuated context
causes a shift in people’s attention from their per-
sonal identity to the norms associated with a par-
ticular social identity.
Support for these ideas comes from a range of
work on crowd behavior and group behavior in
the laboratory. In one study, Reicher asked science
and social science students to watch either a pro-
vivisection (science norm) or anti-vivisection
(social science norm) video. Half of the partici-
pants took part as individuals, and half partici-
pated in groups. Further, half of the participants
were anonymous via the use of masks. In the
group condition, the masks were different colors
to mark the different groups. Results revealed that
people conformed more to their group norm when
they were tested within a group. That is, scientists
in groups were more pro-vivisection than scientists
tested as individuals, and social scientists were
more anti-vivisection under these same conditions.
Further, science students were more pro-vivisection
when they were deindividuated and when group
membership was salient (the group-anonymous
condition) than in the individual-anonymous con-
dition. So, when social identity is salient, anonym-
ity can serve to increase adherence to the norms of
a particular group.
Computer-Mediated Communication
A modern example of deindividuation phenomena
in action can be seen in computer-mediated com-
munication (CMC), for example, e-mail, blogs,
social networking sites, and chat rooms. CMC has
provided people with new ways of communicating
with each other; for example, unlike many other
media, CMC allows people to communicate anon-
ymously if they so wish. Just as traditional research
on deindividuation predicts, CMC is characterized
by increased hostile, negative interactions known
as flaming and increased levels of personal disclo-
sure. Theorists typically attribute this type of
behavior to the physical anonymity afforded by
the medium. It is argued that the anonymity of
CMC frees people from normal constraints on
behavior, allowing people to behave impulsively
and often antisocially. Again, this type of situation
202 Desire and the Looking-Glass Self
is often linked to a loss of identity. However, some
research shows that although the deindividuated
context of CMC blurs people’s individual charac-
teristics, an important consequence of this is that it
also enhances the salience of social identities and
their associated norms. As such, some research
shows that people who are deindividuated by
being anonymous on the Internet often adhere
more to group norms than when they and others
are identifiable. For example, research by Spears
and colleagues shows that group polarization, or
the heightened expression of attitudes consonant
with ingroup prototypical norms, occurs under
anonymous CMC conditions. People’s views,
expressed anonymously, become more group-like
than individual-like and therefore more normative
than antinormative. This is increased further if a
particular social identity is made salient.
Investigating the effects of anonymity on behav-
ior in CMC is currently an active area of research
in psychology. Examining how people express and
enact their personal and social identities in deindi-
viduated contexts is greatly facilitated by new
technology. A long tradition of research dating
back to the 19th century continues today as people
find new ways to interact with each other.
Karen M. Douglas
See also Collective/Social Identity; Deviance; Group
Identity; Identity Salience; Social Identity Theory;
Technology
Further Readings
Diener, E., Fraser, S. C., Beaman, A. L., & Kelem,
R. T. (1976). Effects of deindividuation variables on
stealing among Halloween trick-or-treaters. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 33, 178–183.
Festinger, L., Pepitone, A., & Newcomb, T. (1952). Some
consequences of deindividuation in a group. Journal
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 47, 382–389.
Le Bon, G. (1947). The crowd: A study of the popular
mind (D. S. Snedders, Trans.). London: Ernest Benn.
(Original work published 1895)
Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (1998). Deindividuation and
anti-normative behavior: A meta-analysis.
Psychological Bulletin, 123, 238–259.
Reicher, S., Spears, R., & Postmes, T. (1995). A social
identity model of deindividuation phenomena.
European Review of Social Psychology, 6, 161–197.
Zimbardo, P. G. (1970). The human choice:
Individuation, reason, and order versus
deindividuation, impulse, and chaos. In W. J. Arnold
& D. Levine (Eds.), Nebraska Symposium on
Motivation 1969 (pp. 237–307). Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press.
Desire and the
Looking-Glass Self
The concept of looking-glass self is one of the
best-known theories that explains self-concept
and identity development. It is often used by
social and behavioral scientists and researchers to
highlight the crucial role of how one’s self-image
is perceived by others. In his well-known theory,
Charles Horton Cooley outlines the three princi-
ples of the looking-glass self and explains the
stages of identity development. The theory also
highlights how one creates a sense of self through
social interaction. This entry provides an overview
of the theory, a discussion of the connection
between Cooley’s work on the looking-glass self
and Erving Goffman’s arguments on presentation
of self in everyday life, and an illustration on how
the theory of looking-glass self can be applied to
postcolonial experiences.
As Wayne E. Hensley explains, the basic idea of
the looking-glass self is drawn from the couplet
quoted by Cooley:
Each to each a looking glass
Reflects the other that doth pass.
Leigh S. Shaffer articulates that in English, the
term looking-glass self refers to a mirror. Shaffer
argues that Cooley used the familiar figure of a
person looking at his or her reflection in the mir-
ror as a metaphor for understanding the develop-
ment of the social self. Similarly, Donald C.
Reitzes believes the term is often incorrectly used.
Therefore, he suggests that if it is not defined cor-
rectly, the looking-glass self might suggest that the
self is a passive product formed by others and
motivated by acceptance seeking. As Reitzes points
out, the concept of the looking-glass self also indi-
cates the active participation of the individual in

forming one’s self and emphasizes the motivating
behavior and social interaction. Thus, the concept
refers to the complex process of identity forma-
tion and also the relationship between the self and
others as well as the potential reasons for the par-
ticipation and motivation of the self and others in
the process.
Principles of the Looking-Glass Self
Cooley explains that the theory of the looking-
glass self has three principles:
1. The imagination of our appearance to the other
person
2. The imagination of the other person’s
judgments of that appearance
3. Some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or
mortification
The first principle focuses on the individual’s
perception (imagination) and interpretation of
others and the idea of how one appears to the oth-
ers (or imagining how one might be seen by the
others). The second principle focuses on the indi-
vidual’s perception (imagination) of others’ judg-
ments. Here, the focus is not on the action of
others. Instead, the focus is on the individual and
his or her perception and interpretation of the
potential responses of others. Thus, in this pro-
cess, the self is not passive. Shaffer sees Cooley’s
looking-glass self as the product of an active pro-
cess of construction through the developing mode
of imagination. Hensley further elaborates on the
concept and argues that Cooley hypothesized that
the basis for self-concept is not necessarily the
image that is projected by the other person but the
potential image (this is often imagined) that is pro-
fessed to be projected by the other. To illustrate
this argument, Alan is used as an example. Let’s
assume that Alan believes that he does not have a
muscular body. Therefore, when he works out at
the gym, he imagines that other men at the gym
perceive him as less muscular or someone without
a good physique. Even though they might not
express this idea to Alan, based on their nonverbal
communication (gestures, facial expression, and
even the way that they look), he feels that they
perceive him as less muscular.
Desire and the Looking-Glass Self 203
As Hensley argues, both of these principles sug-
gest that the person (desired other) serving as our
looking-glass self is of crucial importance in the
process of self-definition. This is also apparent in
Cooley’s articulation of the concept. In his argu-
ment, Cooley reminds us that this process is evi-
dent from the fact that the character and weight of
the desired other, in whose mind we see ourselves
(imagined evaluations), makes all the difference
with our feeling. Reitzes calls attention to the
importance of the selectivity in this process. He
argues that the looking-glass self is applied selec-
tively; therefore, the individual can actively select
who will be influential, under what circumstances
or for what reason, as well as the extent and the
density of the other’s influence. It becomes appar-
ent that individuals often select others whose
reflected images and evaluations might influence
(both positively and negatively) their identity con-
structions. Without a doubt, we give more weight
to the image of ourselves that is projected by oth-
ers that we are close to or we desire, or people that
are important to us. Hence, we pay less attention
to persons who are less important in our lives and
often we do not select their projected images as
desired evaluations. The notion of desire particu-
larly becomes obvious in this argument. Most of
the time, individuals prefer evaluations from peo-
ple that they intellectually or physically desire. To
illustrate this argument further, Jason and Jane are
used as an example. For instance, if Jane is looking
for acceptance and admiration from Jason, it is
most likely that she will pick him as her looking-
glass self because his feedback and evaluations
would be important for her. Because she emotion-
ally and physically desires him, his evaluations
most likely affect the ways in which she sees and
evaluates herself.
Hensley explains that selectivity functions in
three ways in looking-glass self. The first way is the
significance of the other in an individual’s life. The
second way is the selection process of the evalua-
tions. Both Cooley and Hensley argue that indi-
viduals do not always select all the responses from
the selected others. Instead, they might also select
imagined feedback and evaluations from others. In
addition, Hensley argues that the impact of the
imagined appraisals and evaluation of the selected
others is selectively influenced by individual’s self
standards and his or her existing self-concepts.
204 Desire and the Looking-Glass Self
Therefore, individuals in some cases reject the
evaluation of others and do not allow these evalu-
ations to interfere with their identity development.
Cooley offers some sort of self-feeling, such as
pride or mortification, as the third stage of the
looking-glass self. Based on Cooley’s definition,
Hensley suggests that the value that we assign to
the selected desired-other is a powerful factor in
our own judgment of his or her evaluations.
Furthermore, Thomas J. Scheff argues that in his
explanations, Cooley is relatively explicit in his
examples of self-feeling, such as pride and shame.
Scheff argues that for Cooley both of these emo-
tions arose from self-monitoring. Clearly, shame
and pride play a significant role in one’s identity
formation, particularly when it comes to being
evaluated by the others. Even though he never
defined the meaning of the two words, for Cooley,
pride and shame are social emotions that are con-
nected to the self-monitoring process. Imagining
the possible evaluation of others clearly influences
one’s emotional state. This process also affects
how we perceive ourselves in different contexts.
Without a doubt, the idea of receiving negative
evaluation from the other (particularly from some-
one who is closer to us or whom we desire) influ-
ences our pride and also possibly makes us feel
ashamed of ourselves.
Erving Goffman and Looking-Glass Self
Hensley, Scheff, and Shaffer argue that Cooley’s
ideas on the looking-glass self are often echoed in
Erving Goffman’s work on symbolic interaction-
ism and presentation of self. Scheff suggests that
even though Goffman did not mention the notion
of looking-glass self, Goffman’s ideas are greatly
influenced by Cooley’s articulation of self and con-
struction of identity through communication with
others. For instance, according to Goffman and his
theory of presentation of self, the “embarrass-
ment” that actors feel resembles the treatment of
pride and shame as articulated by Cooley. Besides
the notion of embarrassment, there are other
echoes of Cooley’s work in Goffman’s theories.
For instance, Shaffer reminds us that just like
Cooley, Goffman also saw impression of others as
particularly important. Shaffer argues that like
Cooley, Goffman saw actors as being concerned
about their impressions in the eyes of others.
Goffman’s notion of “face” reflects the intellectual
connection between the Goffman and Cooley
approaches to defining self.
Postcolonial Desire and Looking-Glass Self
Cooley’s notion of the looking-glass self can easily
be applied to diasporic experiences and the con-
struction of desire and cultural identity in postco-
lonial contexts. As was pointed out earlier, there is
an apparent relationship between the notion of
desire and the ways in which individuals create a
sense of self. Individuals are often drawn to people
whom they desire; therefore, individuals often
select desired-others as looking-glass selves. Let’s
apply this logic to postcolonial and diasporic expe-
riences. As postcolonial scholars, Dennis Altman,
Donald Morton, and William Spurlin discuss the
complex relationship between diasporic and post-
colonial individuals and the Western colonizer or
the other. As by-products of the Western coun-
tries’ colonial past, diasporic communities are
formed within Western countries. Because of their
complicated lived experiences and complex past,
these individuals experience in-betweenness and
form a sense of self based on their experiences in
different cultural contexts. Gaining acceptance and
blending into mainstream host cultures are often
the primary goals of diasporic individuals; as a
result, the way they are perceived by the other
becomes particularly important.
The notion of desire works in two ways when
it comes to the relationship between diasporic
individuals and the mainstream other. First, one
has to recognize that the Western beauty ideals
often dictate the meaning of beauty in the global
context. For example, bodies that have more
Western appearances are often considered beauti-
ful or more desirable. As Cooley reminds us, indi-
viduals often select others whom they desire as
their looking-glass self. Similarly, diasporic indi-
viduals most likely would select a person as a
looking-glass self who would appreciate or desire
individuals who embody elements of non-Western
beauty ideals. Therefore, diasporic individuals
would select the other based on how attractive
they are to the person. Similarly, nondiasporic
individuals also might be selected by the other
based purely on if they are desired by the non-
diasporic other or not.

The principles of the looking-glass self can be
applied to further theorize the relationship between
the notion of desire and cultural identity formations
in postcolonial contexts. Because the idea of gaining
acceptance from the mainstream other is important
for diasporic individuals, the evaluations of the
mainstream other become significant. For example,
when diasporic individuals select the nondiasporic
other as their looking-glass self, the potential evalu-
ation of this person influences how diasporic indi-
viduals see themselves and create a sense of identity.
Even though the evaluations of the mainstream
other might not be apparent, it is likely that
diasporic individuals imagine an evaluation. It is
also likely that because diasporic individuals’ desire is
to gain recognition and acceptance from the person
who performs the looking-glass self, this imagined
evaluation influences how they view themselves.
For example, if a diasporic individual imagines that
he or she has been viewed as not attractive enough
by the nondiasporic mainstream other, this would
influence the ways in which he or she sees himself
or herself. Clearly, this evaluation would impact
their pride or mortification.
Even though it was originated in 1902, Cooley’s
looking-glass self is still an important concept in
theorizing the construction of self and the role of
perceived or imagined evaluation of the selected
other in this process.
Ahmet Atay
See also Face/Facework; Looking-Glass Self; Symbolic
Interactionism
Further Readings
Altman, D. (2001). Rupture or continuity: The
internationalization of gay identities. In J. C. Hawley
(Ed.), Post-colonial, queer: Theoretical intersections
(pp. 19–41). Albany: SUNY Press.
Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human nature and the social
order. New York: Scribner.
Hensley, W. E. (1996). A theory of the valenced other:
The intersection of the looking-glass-self and social
penetration. Social Behavior and Personality, 24(3),
293–308.
Morton, D. E. (2001). Global (sexual) politics, class
struggle, and the queer left. In J. C. Hawley (Ed.),
Post-colonial, queer: theoretical intersections
(pp. 207–238). Albany: SUNY Press.
Development of Identity 205
Reitzes, D. C. (1980). Beyond the looking glass self:
Cooley’s social self and its treatment in introductory
textbooks. Contemporary Sociology, 9(5), 631–640.
Scheff, T. J. (2005). Looking-glass self: Goffman as
symbolic interactionist. Symbolic Interaction, 28(2),
147–166.
Shaffer, L. S. (2005). From mirror self-recognition to the
looking-glass self: Exploring the justification
hypothesis. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 61(1),
47–65.
Spurlin, W. J. (2001). Broadening postcolonial studies/
decolonizing queer studies: Emerging “queer”
identities and cultures in southern Africa. In
J. C. Hawley (Ed.), Post-colonial, queer: theoretical
intersections (pp. 185–205). Albany: SUNY Press.
Development of Identity
The study of identity development, the psycho-
logical description of how individuals form an
identity as they mature from childhood into adult-
hood, was the foundation out of which much of
identity research began and exponentially grew
through the last half of the 20th century until
today. With its roots in the early emergence of
developmental stage theory, the field of identity
development has grown increasingly mature as it
has moved beyond simpler categories of stages
and statuses into more complex interdisciplinary
research involving cultural, cognitive, and neuro-
logical components of the developing human and
the role of identity across an individual’s life span.
This entry reviews the theoretical underpinnings
of identity development, the status paradigm of
identity formation, the general critiques of stage
and status measures, and the more recent psycho-
logical research in this field.
The Psychology of Identity Development
Erik Erikson, a theorist who founded and popular-
ized the psychological study of identity, originally
spoke of identity as a central ego achievement to be
reached in adolescence. Originally a child psycho-
analyst, Erikson was trained by Sigmund Freud
and adapted his psychosexual stage model of child-
hood into a broader model of human development,
which incorporated the biology, psychology, and
206 Development of Identity
sociology of the developing person. Instead of
Freud’s focus on pathology and sexuality rooted in
childhood, Erikson’s eight-stage model of psycho-
social development describes a positive ego task for
each stage of life from infancy through old age.
Incorporating an epigenetic assumption (the mor-
phological study of how organs must sequentially
develop in utero), Erikson argued that the epige-
netic process continues after birth to meet certain
biologically rooted tasks across the life span.
Integrating cultural ethnography, Erikson argued
that these developmental tasks can be culturally
influenced and met in many different ways, but the
primary sequence and general age of each stage
task are quite consistent.
According to Erikson, after the fourth stage of
industry versus inferiority (when societies often use
education and play to teach the tools of that cul-
ture), puberty generally initiates the fifth stage—the
desire to focus on ego identity. One’s ego identity
(ego comes from the Latin nominative pronoun I)
is formed from simpler identifications made in
childhood and then integrated into a coherent
sense of self in adolescence. Erikson theorized that
through evolution, the adolescent is biologically
wired to necessarily seek social resources for this
identity process during this time of life. Illustrating
the interdisciplinary quality of Erikson’s psychoso-
cial model, the psychological person is designed to
pull identity content from the relative and always
changing cultural resources. But how does Erikson
define identity? Consistent definitions eluded
Erikson, and his own ideas developed across his
life span. Generally, identity is the negotiation of
the self in relation to others. More specifically,
identity is both an integration of a consciously
expressed self (one that is presented and acknowl-
edged by others) and a relatively unconscious pat-
tern of consistent identity beliefs and behaviors.
With each of the eight stages, Erikson saw each
ego task as a positive balancing of one aspect over
(“versus”) another counterpoised aspect. In the
fifth stage, identity versus role confusion, the per-
son should form fairly consistent and satisfactory
attachments to a sense of a unified self. Yet, this
does not mean extreme unwavering identity com-
mitments, as some level of identity fluidity (“role
confusion”) is also helpful, but it should not be the
predominant method of identity expression. In
fact, Erikson argues that the ego identity is quickly
challenged in the next developmental stage, inti-
macy versus isolation. As a component of long-
term mating relationships, developing persons
need to fuse and mingle their new identities with
another person in early adulthood, at the same
time as they maintain a coherent sense of self.
Erikson later expressed frustration that scholars
had turned his model into achievement measures,
because such measures ignore the more complex
idea of a balance of psychological patterns.
Erikson’s work became a popularized develop-
mental model in the 1960s, being widely received
in both academia and popular culture. Among the
stages, identity was the most discussed aspect and
led to the cultural phrase identity crisis. Observing
that identity is often formed and integrated in ado-
lescence only to be renegotiated throughout adult-
hood, Erikson later expanded this stage of human
development to also be a constant psychosocial
element in adult life as aging individuals encounter
other identity crises (e.g., divorce, loss of vocation,
death of a child). Following Erikson’s own death
in his 90s, his wife, Joan, described a ninth stage of
life (80s and older) in which identity is challenged
as each of the other tasks unravel. Important to
gerontological studies in identity, Joan spoke from
her own experiences in which the basic foundation
of identity erodes (losing the ability to nurture
younger generations, to share in intimacy with
another person, to complete daily social and bio-
logical tasks, etc.). She proposed that older adult
identity may experience gerotranscendence, in
which the individual adapts by no longer seeking
to differentiate between the self and others.
Although Erikson’s work is frequently refer-
enced in the social sciences, the quantitative expec-
tation of research over the past few decades did
not mesh well with Erikson’s theory-driven model.
In the humanities, the deconstruction of stage
models also reduced Erikson’s popularity. Yet
Erikson’s impact in identity studies continues
today in both academic research and popular cul-
tural usage. Moreover, postpositivist and interdis-
ciplinary efforts throughout the 1990s and 2000s
have stimulated a renewed interest in Erikson in
fields as far apart as cognitive science to queer
theory. Moving beyond a critique of sharp stages,
the sequentially developing mind studied from sev-
eral disciplines continues to gain traction, espe-
cially in the study of identity.

The Status Measure of Identity Formation
In an effort to quantitatively validate Erikson’s
model of identity, James Marcia sought to make a
psychometric measure in which different qualities
of identity formation could be specified. Instead of
seeing Erikson’s model of identity as a positive and
mutual balancing of identity (consistency) with
identity diffusion (fluidity), Marcia interpreted
Erikson’s description of identity development as
an insufficient dichotomy and sought to break it
down into four identity statuses that could be mea-
sured. He distinguishes two factors that are rela-
tively independent of each other in identity
formation. The crisis axis measures whether a per-
son had ever had an identity crisis and whether
they are currently in an identity crisis. The com-
mitment axis determines whether or not someone
has made a commitment to a certain identity.
Identity diffusion (no crisis, no commitment),
identity foreclosure (no crisis, commitment), iden-
tity moratorium (present crisis, no commitment),
and identity achievement (past crisis, commitment)
make up the four identity statuses. The content of
the qualitative interview and the later psychomet-
ric measure of identity neatly divides the questions
into primary areas of vocation, gender, politics,
and religion.
In identity diffusion, a person is relatively
unconcerned with identity and has never worried
much about it. In identity foreclosure, a person has
made an identity commitment but has done so
without much reflection. In identity moratorium, a
person is concerned about identity and is currently
in a state of little identity commitment. In identity
achievement, the individual has spent considerable
effort to reflect on his or her identity and now has
a consistent sense of identity. The status paradigm
helps illustrate how some teenagers move from
identity diffusion straight to identity foreclosure,
and others move from identity diffusion to identity
moratorium and then to identity achievement.
Further, it illustrates how some adults can be in
foreclosure and suffer an identity crisis well after
adolescence. But it also shows how adults in iden-
tity achievement can struggle and move back into
identity moratorium, yet never back to identity
foreclosure nor to identity diffusion.
Marcia’s measurement paradigm of identity
status development has been well received by
Development of Identity 207
researchers and clinical therapists. In clinical work,
it is a frequently taught aspect of personality psy-
chology and has shaped the way in which psy-
chologists interpret identity problems (however
defined) in adolescence and adulthood. In aca-
demia, it has been used in hundreds of published
articles, and variations of the status measure are,
by far, the most widespread approach to studying
identity in the social sciences. Now associated with
a large academic society (SRIF—Society for
Research on Identity Formation) and a central
journal (Identity: An International Journal of
Theory and Research), research in the study of
identity formation is continuing to grow and
develop. Further, a good deal of research comes
from other disciplines, where researchers have
found different aspects that may cause or prevent
identity achievement. In general, identity achieve-
ment has been associated with multiple factors of
psychological well-being and is often considered
an important part of reaching a healthy and
mature adulthood. Factors such as community
participation, moral development, education, and
increased parental involvement are all associated
with higher levels of identity achievement. Other
variables, such as gender oppression, economic
disparity, and ethnic marginalization, are associ-
ated with lower levels of identity development.
Critiques in Identity Development Research
Identity Status Formation
From studies in ethnicity and vocation to politi-
cal theory and cancer treatments, the identity sta-
tus paradigm of identity development continues to
be fruitful. But this usefulness has also shown some
problems inherent in interdisciplinary work. For
instance, several studies have shown a positive
relationship between religiosity and identity
achievement. In general, the more religious one is,
the more likely one is to reach identity achievement
and the more likely one is to report positive psy-
chological well-being. The studies are generally
well done, but they also illustrate how quickly the
measurement paradigm can run into problems.
Marcia’s original identity status interview included
several domains of content, including religion. One
critique of his model is that if one is nonreligious
(and generally not concerned about religion), then
208 Development of Identity
he or she is less likely to demonstrate an achieved
identity. Moreover, the measures showing a posi-
tive relationship between level of religiosity and
level of identity status development overlapped, as
they measure the same thing—religion.
Unified Identity Versus Multiple Identities
One of the primary discussions in identity devel-
opment research is over whether there is one
global, unified identity to a person or if people are
more of a collection of diverse identities, expressed
fluidly in different social groups and identity con-
tent domains. Over the past decade, an increasing
number of scholars have come to see identity as a
collection of different identities, which may not
coalesce within the same identity status for one
person. Reflecting more of a postmodern complex-
ity of identity development, they propose that a
person is composed of many identity domains,
such as ethnic, sexual, or religious—each with
their own potentially differing level of identity
development. For instance, an individual may have
an achieved sense of vocational identity and yet a
diffused sense of the ethnic or cultural self.
Biased Assumptions in Stages and Statuses
The fact that White men in American universi-
ties conducted much of the early research and used
college students as subjects or participants would
prove to be a problem. Carol Gilligan, at one time
a teaching assistant for Erikson, would later argue
that Erikson’s stage model of identity development
prioritized male assumptions of individuation and
separation. Gilligan’s In a Different Voice pro-
posed that women develop identity not by individ-
uation but in relationship with others; identity is
not developed before intimacy but in conjunction
with intimacy.
Sampling problems with students, class, race,
and gender are slowly being corrected, but the larg-
est critique to normative aspects of identity devel-
opment involves the argument that Western
emphases on individual identity are quite different
from Eastern aspects of communal identity. Do
children entering puberty in other cultures, espe-
cially Eastern cultures, experience the same devel-
opmental need to form an identity for themselves?
Beyond identity development, many scholars have
argued that the entire focus on individual identity is
a Western construction. Biased assumptions within
questionnaires and broadly construed theoretical
models of human behavior are plagued by cultural
assumptions in many disciplines, including identity
development. Within critical disciplines in the
humanities, it is not uncommon to call the norma-
tive description of identity development not only
conceptually flawed and useless but, moreover,
harmful. However one sees the critique, if some
kind of identity development happens in all people
(whether individually or communally, or both),
then research into how others experience such iden-
tity development should certainly be culturally
contextualized.
New Directions in Identity Development
A new group of cognitive science researchers
approach identity development from the field of
autobiographical memory. Overall, one’s identity
is a neurological component of the brain that is
formed through memory encoding, selective
retrieval, implicit memory schemas, and many fac-
tors of psychosocial selective biases. Through
developmental studies of autobiographical mem-
ory, Robyn Fivush has shown that children form a
coherent sense of identity primarily through learned
patterns of adult and peer interaction. In other
words, repeated narrative styles used by parents
heavily influence how children come to express
their identity in adolescence and throughout life.
New research in functional magnetic resonance
imaging has shown specific modular patterns of
long-term memory encoding in which particular
regions of the brain are utilized in different types of
memory, which are complexified by variants in the
content of the remembered experiences. This work
lends evidence to identity development being spe-
cific to certain content domains. Also, recent cogni-
tive research has shown that memories of experiences
are reconstructed and that individuals typically
overestimate the correctness of their memories.
Humans naturally re-create their event memories
to fit patterns of belief expectations. As part of this
constructive process, implicit memories (uncon-
scious) are formed from a collection of various
experiences that then function as a filter through
which to interpret later experiences. This has lent
evidence to the fluidity of identity narrative, in

which identity may not only develop longitudinally
but situationally, according to identity schemas.
David M. Bell
See also Being and Identity; Development of
Self-Concept; Person; Self; Self-Presentation
Further Readings
Bell, D. M. (2008). Development of the religious self:
A theoretical foundation for measuring religious
identity. In A. Day (Ed.), Religion and the individual:
Belief, practice, and identity (pp. 127–142).
Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Erikson, E. H. (1950). Childhood and society. New York:
W. W. Norton.
Erikson, E. H., & Erikson, J. (1997). The life cycle
completed. New York: W. W. Norton.
Fivush, R., & Haden, C. A. (2003). Autobiographical
memory and the construction of a narrative self:
Developmental and cultural perspectives. Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Marcia, J. E. (1966). Development and validation of ego
identity status. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 3, 551–558.
Marcia, J. E., Waterman, A. S., Matteson, D. R., Archer,
S. L., & Orlofsky, J. L. (1993). Ego identity: A
handbook for psychosocial research. New York:
Springer.
Development of Self-Concept
Self-concept, understood as a multifaceted cogni-
tive structure supporting the way in which one
perceives oneself, is an integral feature to con-
structing one’s identity. Although providing a
sharp conceptual definition is difficult due to its
interdisciplinary usage, the term self-concept typi-
cally refers to a conscious appraisal or perception
of one’s self either under a global, unified identity
or within various content areas such as vocational,
social, physical, moral, and spiritual being. It has
been popularized in such disciplines as life-course
sociology, cognitive psychology, personality psy-
chology, and various clinical applications for treat-
ment. This entry discusses the development of
Development of Self-Concept 209
self-concept and is situated vis-à-vis the more
broadly defined subjects of self and identity. As
originally defined in personality psychology, self-
concept is a cognitive framework for personal per-
ception and organization of one’s life experiences
that is consciously accessible to the individual and
founded on mental representation of self. Compared
with the wide-ranging notions of identity and self,
self-concept more narrowly looks at the social
management of the self, narrative patterns of self-
presentation, and the selective attention of indi-
viduals to fit experiences into an established
self-concept. This entry first gives a historical
account of scholarship and research in self-concept
and then outlines discussions and topics regarding
the subject within the academic fields of sociology,
social psychology, and cognitive psychology.
History of Self-Concept
William James in the early 20th century discussed
the idea of self and identity, based on all a person
owns, the person’s vocation, and the person’s rela-
tionships as the sum total of how an individual
evaluates his or her existence. However, this early
theoretical description of self-concept was given
little consideration throughout much of the 1930s
to the 1960s as mechanistic models of behaviorism
dominated psychological research. Although psy-
choanalysis influenced personality psychology
through theorists such as Carl Jung, research into
the construction and functioning of self-concept
did not gain traction until the 1960s and 1970s.
The importance of self-concept was associated,
in the 1960s, with the therapeutic practices of Carl
Rogers’s client-centered or nondirective psycho-
therapy. Rogers suggested that a central aspect of
a client’s therapy was self-concept, or the view
consciously carried by the individual. Rogers
claimed that the client continually compared self-
concept or actual self with ideal self, the person the
client wished to be, and if discrepancies existed,
the result would be discomfort in the form of
depression or anxiety, depending upon the type of
discrepancy. Further, Rogers established a method
of therapy based upon self-concept, which worked
to establish a client’s internal locus of evaluation in
which the client evaluated self and creative prod-
ucts of self internally and not by the praise and
criticism of others.
210 Development of Self-Concept
In the 1970s, self-concept was legitimized as a
valid cognitive structure with the publications of
Hazel Markus, Nicholas A. Kuiper, and Terry B.
Rogers, and a door was opened for applied scien-
tists to seek ways of offering normative approaches
to self-concept. Two significant theoretical models
for self-concept structure were developed, and
these models allowed for research findings of a
self-concept structure to be grounded in a theo-
retical framework. The first theoretical model was
developed by Richard J. Shavelson and since
revised by Herbert Marsh. The Marsh/Shavelson
model is a hierarchical model in which the global
perception of self as a person is at the top and then
splits into two branches: academic and nonaca-
demic, including social, physical, and emotional.
These branches become increasingly differentiated
as the model moves down to actual behavior at the
base. The second model for self-concept structure
is the internal/external frame of reference model in
which the individual forms perceptions of his or
her own competency on two sets of comparisons:
an external comparison in which the abilities of
others in the same domain is used or an internal
comparison in which one’s ability in one domain is
compared with his or her ability in another
domain. These theories have been applied to edu-
cational psychology as a means of evaluating aca-
demic achievement in students and with the intent
of developing better academic self-concept and
self-esteem in students.
As a consequence to the legitimization and
development of theoretical models of self-concept,
the notion of self-concept was championed during
the 1980s as a means of healing social and cultural ills
through development of healthy self-esteem, cul-
minating in the California Task Force to Promote
Self-Esteem and Social Responsibility. During this
time, application of models and measurements for
self-esteem and self-concept were applied in clini-
cal and educational psychology with an agenda of
offering answers to societal concerns.
Since that time, the popularity of self-concept
has waned while disciplines have used the concep-
tualization of self-concept in many ways. One
application of self-concept research in the 1990s
has been the ongoing development and application
of social comparison theory by John Parker in the
concept known as big-fish-little-pond effect. This
effect exhibits the external frame of reference
model in which individuals compare abilities with
others that result in either a negative or positive
self-concept, based upon whether self or other is
more capable. This effect has been used to explain
the significance of social comparison in children’s
formation of self-concept.
Although applications of such theoretical mod-
els of self-concept like internal/external, hierar-
chical academic and nonacademic, and self-esteem
and content are still being used in recent years,
particularly in the field of educational psychol-
ogy, the most notable recent research is in the
field of cognitive psychology, regarding autobio-
graphical memory.
Sociological Aspects
There are two dominant trends in self-concept
theory development: the distinction lying between
social psychology developed from a sociological
tradition or from a psychological tradition. The
sociological research focuses on the antecedents of
self-conceptions and looks within social interac-
tion, whereas the psychological tradition looks
mainly at the consequences of self-conception. In
mapping the two fields, Victor Gecas defines self-
concept as the following: The sociological tradition
attends to social predictors while the psychological
tradition focuses on the outcomes of self-concept,
especially in behavior. According to sociological
tradition, self-concept is defined as a result of the
relationship between the dialectical “I” and “Me,”
a product of the relationship and dynamic between
personal self and social interaction. This product
(i.e., self-concept) is the organization or structure
of various identities and attributes, and their evalu-
ations, developed out of the interaction among indi-
vidual, social, and symbolic activities. Furthermore,
within a sociological framework for self-concept, one
may argue that the structure, content, and organi-
zation of a self-concept will reflect those of one’s
society. This argument is traditionally known as
symbolic interactionist and was introduced initially
by George Herbert Mead, Charles Cooley, and
William Isaac Thomas.
The research in this field has been rooted in a
measurement paradigm, which relies upon the self-
report of the participant. Given several limitations
to such measures, the very notion of what is being
studied is frequently debated. Some researchers

have argued for a differentiation between the
terms self-conception and self-evaluation (i.e., self-
esteem), two dimensions of the self-concept.
Whereas self-conception refers to the meanings
comprising the self as an object offering content to
self-concept, self-esteem refers to the evaluative
aspects of the self-concept. This differentiation is
argued as necessary for acknowledging the motiva-
tional aspect of self-concept.
Despite support for this theoretical distinction,
overviews of current research have not validated a
distinction between self-concept and self-evaluation,
meaning the two concepts appear to be measur-
ing the same thing (which could be due to the self-
report model). Given this lack of empirical evidence
for the distinction, many researchers continue to
use the terms self-esteem and self-concept inter-
changeably. Nevertheless, for the sociological
approach to self-concept, this distinction is signifi-
cant, for it undergirds the notion that self-concept
reflects evaluation by others. In other words, one
looks at the appraisal of self by others when deter-
mining self-concept, and this is done through
social comparison, the process by which an indi-
vidual evaluates his or her own ability and moral
content by comparison with other.
Psychological Aspects
Social Psychology
Research in social psychology has led to a dif-
ferentiation within self concept between content
and structure. Content is what the individual
believes to be true about himself or herself, and
structure is how the self-concept is represented in
memory. Within the area of content, research has
produced specific insights. First, self-concept is
typically positive in nature and grounded in a
strong belief of personal control. Furthermore,
self-concept is typically consistent in nature. For
example, individuals show a tendency to prefer
partners/spouses or roommates who view them
in a manner consistent with their personal self-
concept. Regarding structure of self-concept, mem-
ory research has shown that individuals expect and
maintain greater consistency for themselves than
in others, thus suggesting that creation of self-
concept in memory is not random amounts of
information but memories placed in structure with
associated links.
Development of Self-Concept 211
Self-Schemas
One of the most notable psychologists in the
field of self-concept study, Markus has influenced
the field significantly through research regarding
possible selves, the dynamic nature of self-concept,
self-schemas, and perception in self-concept.
Markus formulates self-concept as a set of self-
schemas that organize past experiences and are
used to recognize and interpret relevant stimuli in
the social environment. This formulation intro-
duced the consideration that an overarching self-
concept was supported by multiple self-schemas.
Self-schemas, according to Markus (1977), are
“cognitive generalizations about the self, derived
from past experience that organize and guide the
processing of self-related information contained in
the individual’s social experiences” (p. 64). These
self-schemas are developed by one’s acquiring
knowledge about self in a particular domain, and
they condition how one organizes information
about self and social interaction. Self-schemas
appear to influence memory of past thoughts, feel-
ings, and behaviors, as well as predictions about
one’s future; in other words, how one creates
memories of past events and how one predicts per-
sonal future events are shaped by the cognitive
structures of self-schemas. Moreover, self-schemas
select which stimuli are attended to and remem-
bered and what type of inferences are drawn. If an
individual has a self-schema for a particular
domain, he or she will attend to different stimuli
within that domain more than will someone who
has no constructed self-schema in that domain.
Possible Selves
Within the context of self-knowledge, Markus
introduced the concept of possible selves. Possible
selves is the cognitive manifestation of enduring
goals, aspirations, motives, fears, and threats and
is the mental representation of what the individual
perceives as possibilities, both good and bad, in
the future. This subsection of self-concept is com-
prised of hopes and fears and is represented with
multiple roles such as the successful self, the
depressed self, the unemployed self, the rich self,
and the thin self.
Although these possible selves are unique to
each individual, they are inextricably tied to the
social world. What one individual sees in another
212 Development of Self-Concept
person provides a frame of reference for the pos-
sible self that the person could become. One
possible self previously mentioned would be
Rogers’s ideal self—the person that I ideally
would prefer to be. Possible selves are what we
envision we could be, and as such, they become
the cognitive framework, meaning, and organi-
zation for future interpretation of self. In this
capacity, possible selves become the mediation
or essential link between motivation and self-
concept, for they can be either positive or nega-
tive, thus inciting the individual to either perform
or avoid actions that would inhibit positive
future selves or create negative future selves.
Furthermore, possible selves also provide a con-
nection between personal and social expecta-
tions: What one may expect of himself or who
he perceives himself to be may be different from
the expectations of others.
The possible selves one creates will be derived
from the individual’s social experiences, including
media and contexts of socioeconomics and his-
tory. Thus, possible selves are socially determined
and constrained while simultaneously construct-
ing. For example, the election of Barack Obama
as the first African American president of the
United States created powerful possible selves for
young African American children throughout the
United States as he showed a previously unat-
tained possibility. Markus’s model is generally
positive and has been popular in clinical fields.
For instance, Markus describes how previously
negative self-concepts (past selves) can also posi-
tively shape possible selves in the future; for
example, someone who has experienced a previ-
ous failure might be motivated to greater achieve-
ment by avoiding the feeling of failure associated
with the past self.
A significant progression in the development of
self-concept research by Markus has been an under-
standing that an individual’s self-concept not only
reflects behavior but also mediates and regulates
behavior. In this sense, self-concept is a dynamic
structure that is active and capable of change, while
interpreting and organizing one’s experiences, and
is as much a cognitive process as it is a structure.
This dynamic nature of self-concept is not a static
structure with a ready set of mental representa-
tions of self. Markus’s research shows how an
individual’s self-concepts are not all accessible at
any one time. With a fluidity of self-representations,
a person uses a perceptive lens through which an
individual interprets the self, others, and society,
attending to behavior relevant to personal self-
schemas. In doing so, the individual predetermines
what he or she observes and relates to regarding
self-concept.
Cognitive Psychology
In cognitive psychology, self-concept is the
explicit or conscious framework that partially
comprises an individual’s identity. Whereas a per-
son’s overall construction of identity may include
autobiographical memory retrieval that is influ-
enced by unconscious and unknown memory, the
cognitive structure of self-concept is maintained
from the declarative memory (memory that is con-
scious and episodic in nature).
Self-concept is made up of multiple cognitive
representations, which can be significantly dissimi-
lar, and it is the self-representations that are avail-
able or subject to conscious reflection that are
considered self-conceptions. Markus’s work has
also been influential in this field. Markus organized
self-representations into the categories of central/
peripheral, actual/ideal, temporal, and positive/
negative. In central/peripheral self-representations,
importance to the individual is of concern. Central
representations are those of higher importance to
the individual and are thought to affect informa-
tion processing and behavior with greater force.
These core representations are typically the best
elaborated and held in highest value to the indi-
vidual. Self-representations can also be categorized
by actual/ideal/ought selves. Each individual car-
ries conceptions of self that reflect (a) the actual
self, or that which really is; (b) the ideal self, the
person he or she would like to become; and (c) the
“ought” self, the representations of characteristics
that the self or other thinks the person should have.
Temporal representations suggest self-conceptions
that contain past, present, or future conceptions of
the self. In this categorization, one finds Markus’s
work on possible selves. Self-representations may
also be categorized as positive or negative, depend-
ing on whether the individual interprets self as
good or bad.

Building on Markus’s model, Robyn Fivush has
researched the role of family narrative interaction
in autobiographical memory and children’s sense of
self. Fivush has established a correlative pattern
between styles of family narrative experience with
self-esteem or locus of control, thus suggesting that
how a family interacts in discussing a memory with
each other influences content and structure of a
child’s self-concept. Furthermore, gender differences
have also been shown to influence autobiographical
memory, suggesting that self-concept is both a
product and an influential structure of memory. By
offering a definition of autobiographical memory as
not only a cognitive representation of events but a
fundamental way in which individuals understand
experiences and ultimately self, Fivush presents
autobiographical memory as a filter by which one’s
self-concept is examined and retold.
With a mosaic of theorists and researchers piec-
ing together different approaches and overlapping
terms, a singular understanding of self-concept is
elusive. Its meaning is only what each researcher
assumes it to mean. Yet it continues to be a fruit-
ful term with which researchers from education to
neurology to political theory find a helpful
approach to their work.
Holly Adams Phillips and David M. Bell
See also Narratives; Self; Self-Concept; Self-Esteem;
Self-Schema
Further Readings
Byrne, B. (1996). Measuring self-concept across the
lifespan. Washington, DC: APA Press.
Fivush, R., & Haden, A. (2003). Autobiographical
memory and the construction of the narrative self.
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Gecas, V. (1982). The self-concept. Annual Review of
Sociology, 8, 1–33.
Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing
information about the self. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 35, 63–78.
Markus, H., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic
self-concept: A social psychological perspective. The
Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 299–337.
Wylie, R. C. (1961). The self-concept: A critical survey of
pertinent research literature. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press.
Deviance 213
Deviance
The study of identity has, for a long time, entailed
how people deal with similarity and dissimilarity
to others. In particular, theories focus on whether
people prefer to be part of a group or to be dis-
tinctive and unique. Deviance describes situa-
tions in which people break social rules and
conventions. From an identity perspective, there
are many motives and causes for engaging in
deviant behavior and there are also causes for
defining other people’s behavior as deviant. This
entry explores the identity perspective of devi-
ance from two main points of view: sociological
and psychological.
Sociological Perspectives
Sociologists have analyzed how social order is sus-
tained both in society as a whole, through laws,
institutions, and distribution of wealth, and
through microsociological mechanisms of personal
relationships, roles, and influence. Society depends
on social order, which must be maintained by
ensuring individuals comply with consensual rules
when it is important to do so. Most everyday
actions, such as buying and selling items, arriving
for work in the morning, driving a car, and greet-
ing people, are governed by clear social rules.
Understanding and following these rules is essen-
tial for the smooth running of society. If people
disregarded these rules, social order would break
down. Erich Fromm argued that society depends
on people being motivated to conform to social
conventions and laws.
Anomie
Émile Durkheim viewed deviance as a social
fact, an inevitable part of how society functions.
He argued that deviance is a basis for change and
innovation, and it is also a way of defining or
clarifying important social norms. One reason that
people engage in deviant behavior may be a state
of anomie, which is the absence of clear social
norms. For people to understand what these norms
are, the rules need to be tested occasionally. As an
example, among stock market speculators, the
214 Deviance
boundary between clever dealing and improper
dealing is defined by laws. Sometimes individuals
are prosecuted legally (such as Enron’s Ken Lay, or
Nick Leeson, the rogue trader from Barings Bank).
Most of the time, however, inappropriate behavior
is likely to be regulated by informal social pro-
cesses. The groups surrounding these individuals
are likely to put pressure on them to behave in line
with relevant norms.
But Durkheim’s point is that unless we have a
clear idea of where the boundaries of acceptable
behavior lie, it is difficult for us to be aware of the
norms. As a simple example, in different countries,
there are different norms about waiting in line.
The British are known for their orderly approach
to queuing, and indeed people who jump a queue
in the United Kingdom are likely to receive strong
criticism from others, including being told to wait
their turn. In other countries, it is quite normal for
people simply to push to the front, leaving the hap-
less British feeling both frustrated and foolish.
British tourists abroad usually learn quickly that
they need to follow a different set of rules.
Robert Merton’s theory of anomie proposed
that deviance is often a response to situations in
which goals cannot be achieved through conven-
tional behavior. Democratic societies often claim
to be meritocratic, in that effort and ability will be
rewarded fairly. However, it turns out that people
from wealthier, better-connected, and more privi-
leged circumstances have easier routes to personal
success and prosperity. When people realize that
routes to achievement are blocked, they experience
“strain” and are likely to turn to tactics that will
help them get past the blockages. Some of these are
legitimate and approved. For example, poorer
people are more likely to play the lottery than
richer people. Merton regarded deviance as only
one of several possible reactions to frustration, and
his ideas have much in common with theories of
relative deprivation, social identity theory, and
system justification theory. Merton proposed five
types of reaction: conformity, innovation, ritual-
ism, retreatism, and rebellion. Conformity involves
simply trying harder to play by the rules (e.g.,
working harder to achieve). Retreatism involves
withdrawing from the game (e.g., not bothering to
work). Ritualism involves continuing to follow the
practices and rituals necessary for success and
approval (e.g., going to church) but without the
original purpose of doing so. These three reactions
leave the status quo unchanged. In contrast, both
innovation and rebellion are forms of deviance.
Whereas innovation is likely to involve breaking
rules to achieve normative objectives (e.g., stealing
to become rich), rebellion involves challenging the
rules or objectives themselves (e.g., antiglobaliza-
tion protests and terrorist acts).
Various types of social control inhibit deviance.
Primary groups such as families, work groups or
teams, and close social groups may control devi-
ance through direct sanctions over their members.
These groups can exert influence directly and
immediately. If a child is disobedient, a parent can
impose a sanction or punishment right away. If a
team member cheats in a game, the referee can
immediately exclude the player. In close-knit com-
munities, there is a high level of primary control so
that if a member breaks an important rule, he or
she may be excluded from the group. For example,
the family reputations of people in some cultures
may be put at risk if a member engages in a crimi-
nal or shaming activity. So-called honor killing of
women for adultery, or sometimes even for having
been raped, is an example of extreme reactions to
deviance. These examples, however, also highlight
that deviance is not easily defined in terms of a
specific behavior. Instead, deviance is defined by
the formal or informal rules imposed by other
people in the social context in which the behavior
occurs. Social control is also exerted through sec-
ondary groups that are more abstract, such as
organizations, or membership in larger social cat-
egories such as gender, and through the wider
social norms that they follow. Such organizations
and institutions often have formal power and
authority, rules and regulations by which they con-
strain their members. Travis Hirschi, analyzing the
causes of delinquency, proposed that social control
is based on bonds of attachment, commitment,
involvement, and belief.
Labeling
A further distinction, made by Edwin Lemert, is
between primary and secondary deviance. Primary
deviance involves relatively trivial departures from
rules that are generally socially acceptable. For

example, jaywalking is illegal, but in some cities
people do it frequently. Stealing minor items of
office stationery (pens, sticky notes, tape, etc.) is
common, and generally nobody bothers too much
about it. Similarly, most people tell white lies, and
once in a while people may not mention if they
received too much change in a shopping transac-
tion. When committing such acts, most people feel
able to sustain the idea that they are still honest
and law-abiding, acting within the bounds of their
roles, and that these acts are minor exceptions.
Linked to these forms of primary deviance, soci-
ologists also observe that societies allow certain
norms of evasion. For example, drivers on free-
ways often travel a little faster than the official
speed limit. It is widely accepted that breaking the
limit will be tolerated, but only up to a point.
Similarly, police officers often are given the discre-
tion to issue a warning rather than a formal charge.
These norms of evasion provide fuzzy boundaries.
People who show that they conform to most rules
are usually given a little freedom to bend some
rules, but if authorities so choose, they can impose
the rules strictly.
Secondary deviance describes a situation when
a person has been publicly identified as deviant,
for example, by being classified as mentally unsta-
ble, criminal, delinquent, or perverted. The impli-
cations of secondary deviance were explored
powerfully by Howard Becker, who argued, on the
basis of his research on marijuana smokers, that
deviance is a label placed by a given society, and
thus its meaning shifts depending on the context.
In other words, to understand deviance, we have
to also understand why behavior gets labeled as
deviant. An important feature of labeling theory is
the idea that once a person is labeled, this can gen-
erate a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby others
behave in ways that confirm or reinforce the label.
A person who is labeled finds himself or herself
unable to escape. Labeling theory has been applied
to mental illness by psychiatrists such as Thomas
Szasz; it has been shown that once a person is
labeled as mentally ill, the people around that per-
son reward behavior that confirms the label.
Labeling theory can be criticized for overplaying
the role of labeling. Abnormal behavior is some-
times associated with medical problems, and some
criminal behavior is so reprehensible or so unusual
Deviance 215
that it is difficult to explain purely in terms of
labeling. Critics of labeling theory argued that it
underplays the responsibility of the deviant for his
or her own behavior.
The distinction between deviance that is merely
labeled and deviance that may objectively be a
risk to the group is illustrated by situations of
ideological opposition. A powerful example of the
fact that deviance is often defined in relative
rather than absolute terms comes from how dif-
ferent sides define terrorism. Powerful and major-
ity groups may label sniper shootings and suicide
bombings as terrorist acts because they are out-
side the law and are not formal acts of war. In
contrast, the perpetrators of these acts often con-
sider them to be legitimate and appropriate reac-
tions to unjust oppression or exploitation by the
majority. Sometimes people who are labeled ter-
rorists by one camp are heroes and martyrs in the
eyes of another.
The focus of social control over deviance shifts
to different individuals and groups depending on
the broader social and historical context. For
example, in the 1960s surveys showed that
Americans felt greater distance from homosexual
and lesbian people than they did from alcoholics,
prostitutes, ex-convicts, and former mental
patients. Although public attitudes toward homo-
sexuality remain fairly intolerant, homosexuality
is now recognized as a legitimate lifestyle, with
legal civil partnerships in many countries. That
is, homosexuality has generally shifted from
being at the extreme end of criminality to being
noncriminal.
Sociologists study deviance at different levels of
analysis. Some deviance departs from cultural
norms and values, for example, women in Catholic
countries who decide to use birth control. Other
deviance is defined in terms of individual pathol-
ogy (e.g., psychosis, extreme neurosis). Some devi-
ance is expressed by individuals within a group
(e.g., a student who wears unusual clothes), and
other deviance can be expressed by a group within
society (e.g., a gang or a cult). The idea of deviant
subcultures is important because it highlights that
groups can generate their own sets of norms, and
people within those groups feel they are not devi-
ant even though the group as a whole may be
viewed as deviant by others.
216 Deviance
Psychological Perspectives
Individual Propensity to Deviate
Early psychological approaches to deviance
emphasized the biological and psychodynamic
roots of deviance. For example, theorists such as
William Sheldon argued that criminals had a par-
ticular type (muscular) of body shape. Although it
is plausible that certain types of crime might require
particular body shapes (e.g., a cat burglar may
need to be athletic), it is not plausible that there is
a generally criminal body type (stock market fraud-
sters may come in all shapes and sizes). Many
researchers tried to predict criminality on the basis
of personality traits (e.g., Hans Eysenck, who pro-
posed that criminality resulted from high levels of
psychoticism, extraversion, and neuroticism).
Psychoanalytic theory (e.g., the work of Freud
and Fromm) emphasizes the role of socialization.
Those who follow this perspective argue that par-
ents instill in their children a respect for rules and
authority; this respect is represented by the super-
ego. This superego is an internalized control sys-
tem that motivates people to follow social rules, to
respect law and order, and so on. That is, confor-
mity is thought to be important for people’s self-
concepts. However, criminality can be viewed as a
product of many forces aside from either biologi-
cal factors or parental socialization practices. The
absence of a stable home and the presence of nega-
tive socializing agents may play a role, but all of
these aspects of socialization may, in turn, be
affected by other factors such as poverty within the
home and in the wider community. Approaches
that focus on differences between individuals are
useful when explaining why some people break
rules more often than others, but they do not help
to explain why people are deviant in some situa-
tions rather than other situations, why people label
others as deviant, or how people react to deviant
individuals.
A different perspective concentrates on moral
reasoning and development. Delinquent behavior
may result from inadequate levels of moral devel-
opment or from faulty moral reasoning. This
might explain why people tend to be consistent in
their level of delinquency over time. From yet
another perspective, Nicholas Emler has argued
that delinquency is often a response to reputa-
tional, pragmatic, and situational demands.
An additional perspective on deviance is evolu-
tionary theory; proponents of this theory argue
that physically stigmatized (deviant) group mem-
bers may receive hostile and exclusionary reactions
from others because they pose a threat to survival
of the group. Norbert Kerr suggests that people
may be sensitized to the possibility of being
rejected because it has so many consequences for
their physical and psychological well-being.
Conformity and Deviance
Muzafer Sherif’s experiments on norm forma-
tion in the 1930s illustrated that in ambiguous situ-
ations people quickly form norms. In his autokinetic
effect experiments, participants viewed an illusion
in which an objectively stationary point of light in
a dark room appears to move (possibly a conse-
quence of eye movements). In a series of trials, the
light was shown and participants were asked to
estimate the distance moved on each trial. When
people listened to judgments made by others, they
quickly converged to make estimates within the
same range. Dependency on others was also illus-
trated by Solomon Asch’s conformity experiments,
which showed that in the face of a unanimous
majority, people would conform to their (incor-
rect) judgments about which one of a series of lines
was the same length as a comparison line. These
experiments illustrate the pressure toward unifor-
mity in groups. People feel that they should be in
agreement, especially about the physical world.
Thus, when people feel they are deviant, they will
often comply (publicly agree) with a majority in
the group. On the other hand, the presence of a
supporter can reduce such compliance, and in any
case, public compliance does not necessarily mean
that people privately agree with the majority.
Leon Festinger proposed that pressure toward
uniformity within groups is based on the group’s
ambition to move toward particular goals (group
locomotion) and the desire among group members
to validate their opinions about the nonphysical
world (social reality). The social reality function
involves both the process of evaluating the accu-
racy of opinions and validating (confirming) the
accuracy of those opinions. Faced with a dissent-
ing member, groups are likely to engage in com-
munication to deal with the problem. Possible
solutions are to evict the deviant from the group,

to pressure the deviant to conform, or to change
the group’s opinion to agree with the deviant.
Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander added
two further reasons why groups desire unifor-
mity: Uniformity helps to define the group’s
boundaries and distinctiveness from other groups,
and uniformity strengthens the cohesiveness of
the group.
Minorities
An important criticism of Festinger’s model is
the assumption that people want to compare them-
selves with others who are similar. Contrary to
that assumption, sometimes people prefer to com-
pare themselves with others who are dissimilar
(worse), because this allows people to enhance
their self-concept. People might also find dissimi-
larity useful because it allows them to contrast their
own position from that of a rival or enemy. Equally
fundamental is the assumption in Festinger’s model
that influence is likely to be unidirectional, namely,
from the majority to the minority. Serge Moscovici
proposed a theory of minority influence that
explains why a deviant group member can change
the majority opinion under some circumstances.
Moscovici’s genetic model proposes that any mem-
ber of a group can potentially exert influence on
others. Echoing Durkheim’s theorizing, Moscovici
holds that deviants play a key role in bringing
about social change. To illustrate this, Moscovici
and colleagues showed how judgments of whether
physical stimuli (a blue slide) were blue or green
could be influenced by a minority if the minority
showed an incorrect (green) but consistent response.
Moscovici identified that in these situations, even
though the majority opinion is known (we gener-
ally agree what blue looks like), a consistent mes-
sage from a minority can make us reconsider our
judgments. Further research suggested a minority
group member’s opinion has greater influence
when the minority combine their consistency on
that particular opinion with flexibility (e.g., agree-
ing with the majority in opinions on other top-
ics). Thus, in strong contrast to Festinger’s ideas,
Moscovici holds that groups progress and develop
as a result of conflict. Whereas people succumb
to “normative” influence from majorities (i.e.,
people simply conform without changing their pri-
vate opinions), conflict from minorities makes
Deviance 217
groups reevaluate their ideas and perspectives and
allows them to innovate.
Consistency of Deviance and Group Reactions
Given the potentially disruptive impact of a dis-
senting minority, it is not surprising that research
also examines how people react toward deviant
group members. One of the most widely reported
studies was conducted by Stanley Schachter. He
composed groups of 8 to 10 people. The group had
to reach agreement on the appropriate treatment/
punishment for a delinquent. The groups included
3 confederates, one of whom conformed to the
group’s modal opinion, one of whom disagreed
(deviate), and one who gradually changed from the
deviate to the modal opinion (slider). Results
showed that communication was directed more
frequently toward the deviant than the other con-
federates and that the deviant was less likely to be
treated favorably than other confederates.
Subsequent evidence suggests that there may be a
threshold effect with deviants. A deviant who
exhibits the potential to change (to conform) is
worthy of investment of time and effort because
this change will reinforce the group. A deviant
who is extreme or whose opinion seems rooted in
a more pervasive difference with the group is more
likely to be ignored or rejected from the group
altogether. This fits with research on minority
influence showing that extreme minorities are less
influential on the rest of the group than are moder-
ate minorities.
An important question is how people make
sense of deviant behavior within their group. It is
likely that people who deviate attract the attention
of other members of a group because they are dis-
tinctive and their actions demand an explanation.
This means that we are more likely to make attri-
butions (e.g., dispositional attributions) about the
deviant that we do not make for majority mem-
bers. John Levine and colleagues showed that devi-
ant members who shifted toward the majority
opinion were viewed as seeking greater approval
from the group, whereas deviants who shifted
away were viewed as being independent and asser-
tive. The interpretation of behavior may also
depend on other contextual factors. For example,
dissent in a group may be acceptable if it does not
threaten the group’s outcomes, but if it involves
218 Deviance
harm to the group (e.g., by reducing its rewards or
by revealing important information to a rival
group), it is likely to invite much harsher reactions.
Sometimes, however, a dispositional attribution
may be to the benefit of the deviant. Edwin
Hollander’s research on idiosyncrasy credit shows
that people who have shown loyalty to a group in
the past may be permitted to dissent from the
majority and to influence the majority. Other
research shows that incoming leaders may be given
more latitude to deviate from group norms and
that group members may accept a deviant’s views
or actions if they are believed to be espoused in the
interests or defense of the group.
Group Distinctiveness and Deviance
The intergroup context has a powerful effect on
how people judge deviant group members. For
example, José Marques and colleagues demon-
strated a black sheep effect, whereby people dero-
gate deviants in their own groups relatively more
than deviants in other groups. This is thought to
be motivated by people’s desire to sustain a posi-
tive social identity. A deviant in the ingroup
threatens the validity of social identity (based on
the idea that “we” are right and we agree with one
another); therefore, people are more concerned to
identify and respond to deviance in their own
groups than in other groups. Dominic Abrams and
colleagues also distinguished between two types of
deviance in intergroup situations. Antinorm devi-
ance is when, compared to the majority in his or
her group, a person expresses views that are rela-
tively opposed to his or her own group and agrees
with or supports an outgroup. Pronorm deviance
is when the person shows more extreme endorse-
ment of his or her own group and rejection of the
outgroup (e.g., a fanatic). People tend to be more
sensitive and react more strongly to antinorm
deviants. An interesting consequence is that people
are often positive toward outgroup members that
are antinorm deviants. This is because such devi-
ants lend credibility and support to the ingroup’s
social reality. The importance of social interaction
in groups as a mechanism of social control is dem-
onstrated by developmental psychology research.
As young as 8 years of age, children seem to learn
that groups expect their members to be loyal and
conform, and they recognize that ingroup deviants
will be criticized. This understanding appears to
be based on their ability to take different social
perspectives, and also on the actual experiences of
belonging to a range of social groups.
Deviant Groups
Groups expect and enforce loyalty and confor-
mity, sometimes resulting in phenomena such as
groupthink. Groupthink presupposes a shared and
unanimous way of thinking within a group.
However, they do not always derogate deviants.
Some groups have norms that encourage original-
ity and innovation, and others are involved in chal-
lenging the status quo. These include not only
deviant subcultures such as gangs but also groups
that are in conflict over their rights or resources.
Early theorists of crowd behavior (e.g., Gustav Le
Bon) argued that people become more primitive when
they are in a crowd, an idea echoed by Edward
Diener in his research on deindividuation in
groups, which showed that feeling anonymous and
unidentifiable in a group can reduce self-regulation
and constraint among the group members.
Although there is evidence that people may
become more violent and extreme when they are
in groups, it does not seem that this is always
because they have lost self-control. Social identity
theorists such as Stephen Reicher argue that
groups may establish or develop a norm to con-
front authority or behave in extreme ways, and
when people’s group identity is salient, the group
members follow these norms more closely. This
raises the question of who defines an act as deviant
and highlights that deviance is frequently defined
in relative (norm-violating) rather than absolute
(law-breaking) terms. Marilynn Brewer has pro-
posed that people seek optimal distinctiveness for
their identity. This means they may seek to be part
of groups that are not only sufficiently different
from the mainstream that they are distinctive but
sufficiently large that they are inclusive and pro-
tect the individual from feeling too unique.
Dominic Abrams
See also Collective/Social Identity; Group Identity;
Optimal Distinctiveness Theory

Further Readings
Becker, H. S. (1961). Outsiders: Studies in the sociology
of deviance. New York: Free Press.
Emler, N., & Reicher, S. (2005). Delinquency: Cause or
consequence of social exclusion? In D. Abrams,
J. Marques, & M. Hogg (Eds.), The social psychology
of inclusion and exclusion (pp. 211–241).
Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison
processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140.
Kerr, N. L., & Levine, J. L. (2008). The detection of
social exclusion: Evolution and beyond. Group
Dynamics, 12, 39–52.
Marques, J. M., Abrams, D., Paez, D., & Hogg,
M. A. (2001). Social categorization, social
identification and rejection of deviant group members.
In M. A. Hogg & R. S. Tindale (Eds.), Blackwell
handbook of social psychology: Group processes
(pp. 400–423). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Merton, R. K. (1938). Social theory and social structure.
New York: Free Press.
Moscovici, S. (1976). Social influence and social change.
London: Academic Press.
Packer, D. J. (2008). On being both with us and against
us: A normative conflict model of dissent in social
groups. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12,
50–72.
Reicher, S. D. (2001). The psychology of crowd
dynamics. In M. A. Hogg & R. S. Tindale (Eds.),
Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group
processes (pp. 182–208). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Schachter, S. (1951). Deviation, rejection and
communication. Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 46, 190–207.
Sheldon, W. A. (1949). Varieties of delinquent youth.
New York: Harper & Brothers.
Sherif, M. (1966). The psychology of social norms. New
York: Harper & Row.
Dialect
Meaningful arguments exist regarding language
use. One argument posits that linguists analyze
language use with objectivity: They describe and
record what they hear and observe. Another argu-
ment puts forth that linguists prescribe or judge
language use in an attempt to curb language
Dialect 219
variation in favor of some ideal standard. Whether
articulated or not, these perspectives figure into
any discussion of dialect.
Dialect is a variety of a language. Dialects are
central to identity, for they signal, among other
things, group affiliation, region, and social class.
Dialect variations occur on all levels of language.
Dialect, like language, is systematic and gov-
erned by its own rules. All varieties of a language
are dialects. Representative American English dia-
lects are Appalachian, Southern, Northeastern,
Midwestern, Black English (also known as African
American Vernacular English, and Ebonics), and
Brooklynese. Standard English, too, is a variety of
American English and therefore a dialect. Among
the various dialects that exist in American English,
no dialect is inherently better than another dialect.
Dialects are not deficient; they are different.
Another term related to dialect is vernacular.
Vernacular dialect is a variety of a language cate-
gorized as nonmainstream. A dialect may be con-
sidered vernacular based upon region, ethnicity,
class, socially stigmatized features, or all of these
factors. Whether standard or vernacular, everyone
speaks some variety of a language; therefore,
everyone speaks a dialect. Of these dialects, one is
not inherently better than the other; however, cer-
tain dialects are more socially favored than others.
Aware of listener attitudes regarding dialects,
speakers often consciously code-switch as they
move from one setting to another.
Related to dialect is idiolect. Idiolect refers to the
unique features of an individual speaker’s language.
Whereas dialect reflects speech variations among
groups, idiolect reflects speech variations within a
group. To further define dialect is to distinguish it
from slang. Although difficult to define, slang is
variously defined as an informal and age-graded
variety of a language. Social or peer groups figure
prominently in slang usage. Slang terms are gener-
ally short lived; however, certain terms become a
part of mainstream language. Dialect and slang are
not synonymous. Furthermore, a dialect of American
English is not “broken” American English. It is not
a failed attempt to produce standard forms. It is,
instead, systematic and governed by its own rules.
Dialect differences may occur on multiple levels.
Differences occur, for example, on the phonologi-
cal (sound), lexical (vocabulary), morphological
220 Dialect
(smallest meaningful units of words such as the
past-tense marker, -ed), and grammatical levels.
Laypersons refer to phonological differences as
“accent” because listeners recognize differences in
vowel variation. Phonological differences may
occur in the speech of those who speak English as
a second language. First-language intonation pat-
terns may alter vowel production in the second
language. Notwithstanding such variations, most
speakers of different dialects understand one
another. Such dialects, then, possess mutual intel-
ligibility. Even if speakers from, for example,
Tulsa, Oklahoma, experience difficulty under-
standing speakers from Ocracoke, North Carolina,
the two dialects still possess mutual intelligibility
because both groups share the same writing sys-
tem. Mutually intelligible dialects of American
English are dialects of the same language, not two
different languages, regardless of region.
Regional dialect features also occur on multiple
levels of language. In some areas of Pennsylvania,
speakers produce the low front vowel sound /a/ in
the following words: daughter, dawn, and Don. In
other dialects, the vowel sound differs in each word
due to lip rounding. Certain speakers in New
England might produce “r-lessness” or “r-deletion”
in that the word park sounds like /pak/, similar to
the vowel sound in clock. A listener might detect
the pronoun suffix /n/ in Appalachian speech such
as in hern for “her” and hisn for “his.” Lexical
variations such as “pail” for “bucket,” “pop” for
“soda,” “show” for “movie,” and “davenport”
for “sofa” also exist as regional differences among
speakers.
Such dialect differences emerge from settlement
patterns, migration, geographical factors, language
contact, occupation (e.g., military, mining, farm-
ing), social stratification, social networks, and
other factors. Regarding geographical factors, the
terrain contributes to the development of dialects.
Mountains, rivers, and valleys divide people;
therefore, dialects develop where speakers are
physically and socially separated and, in some
cases, isolated.
Various forms of social separation have contrib-
uted to clear distinctions between Standard English
and Black English. Although both are dialects of
American English, Standard English is socially
favored while Black English is socially disfavored.
Linguists conclude that socially favored groups
speak socially favored dialects, and socially disfa-
vored groups speak socially disfavored dialects. In
the latter, certain dialect features are tolerated,
whereas other features are stigmatized and thus not
tolerated. A stigmatized variant follows: “He be
late every day.” This example reflects the invariant
be. Although the production of the word teeth as
/tif/, with the voiceless labiodental consonant rather
than the voiceless interdental consonant th, reflects
phonological variation, it does not possess gram-
matical variation. It is therefore not stigmatized.
Variously referred to as “proper,” “correct,” or
“good” English, Standard American English gener-
ally omits grammatical variations. “Standardness,”
however, exists on a continuum that includes for-
mal standard and informal standard. Listeners use
the term standard loosely to compare how other vari-
eties of American English diverge from what they
perceive to be the formal standard, when, in fact,
the formal standard is the prescribed written form, not
the spoken, informal Standard American English.
Some linguists argue that no one actually speaks
formal Standard American English. Listeners, then,
evaluate the spoken dialect on the basis of a pre-
scribed, written ideal rather than the objective rules
of the spoken dialect.
Degrees of standardness, like class, cut across
regions. What is deemed standard in one region is
not necessarily deemed standard in another. For
example, certain Appalachian speakers use what
linguists call “a-verbing” as in “a-running” and
“a-walking”; however, certain classes of App­
alachian speakers do not reveal such features.
Similarly, certain Black English speakers produce
the stigmatized multiple negation (“He don’t know
nothing”) while other Black English speakers do
not. Other variations reflect meaningful phono-
logical differences such as the “intrusive r” that
emerges in words such as “idear” and “warsh.”
Like other variations, the emergence of the intru-
sive r is systematic and rule governed. According
to the rule, the intrusive r occurs when the word
precedes a vowel-initial word as in “She hoped
Amy would forget the idear of a sleepover.” The
intrusive r does not occur when the word precedes
a consonant-initial word, as in “The idea presented
in the form of an argument is an assertion.” Unlike
the intrusive r, the phonological variation of
r-deletion can make an impact on grammar and
result in a stigmatized form. For example, “their”

sounds like “they” when r-deletion occurs. Thus
“Voters cast their ballots” emerges phonologically
as “Voters cast they ballots.” Other stigmatized
forms include the invariant be. Rather than change
to is, am, and are in expected contexts, be main-
tains its original form as in “He be late every day.”
Again, because speakers live in a certain region or
belong to a certain group does not mean all respec-
tive speakers produce every feature that distin-
guishes the region or group.
Jacqueline Imani Bryant
See also Code-Switching; Invariant Be; Language;
Language Variety in Literature; Phonological Elements
of Identity; Profanity and Slang; Style/Diction
Further Readings
Alvarez, L., & Kolker, A. (Producers/Directors). (1987).
American tongues: A film about the way we talk
[Video recording]. New York: Center for New
American Media.
Bergmann, J. A., Hall, K. C., & Ross S. M. (Compilers).
(2007). Language files. Columbus: The Ohio State
University Press.
Crystal, D. (2000). The prescriptive tradition. In
P. Eschholz, A. Rosa, & V. Clark (Eds.), Language
awareness: Reading for college writers (8th ed.,
pp. 116–123). Boston: St. Martin’s Press.
Fromkin, V., & Rodman, R. (Eds.). (2010). An
introduction to language (9th ed.). Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.
Wolfram, W., & Schilling-Estes, N. (1998). American
English: Dialects and variation. Malden, MA:
Blackwell.
Diaspora
Since the days of early human settlement, groups
of people have moved from their homeland, some-
times seeking a better life and at other times
forced by circumstances, such as violence, to flee
the place they call home. The term diaspora gener-
ally refers to any group of people who have been
dispersed or have migrated from their homeland.
In ancient times, diaspora referred to colonization
and, later, to forced exile. In the 20th century, as
diasporic groups settled throughout the world and
Diaspora 221
gained significant political, economic, social, and
cultural influence, the term diaspora broadened to
include many other types of migration and groups
of people. An understanding of diaspora is essen-
tial for comprehending historical events and cur-
rent forces, such as globalization, as well as the
formation of ethnic, national, and transnational
identities. This entry (a) provides an overview of
the history and definitions of the term diaspora;
(b) discusses models of diaspora, focusing on their
general characteristics and categories; (c) describes
issues that concern postmodern scholars who
study diaspora; and (d) discusses relationships
between diaspora, politics, and conflict.
Definitions of Diaspora
Diaspora derives from the Greek verb diaspeirein,
which is composed of two parts: dia “about,
across, over” and speirein “to scatter.” Like other
words derived from the same root, including spore,
sperm, and spread, diaspora conveys agricultural
images of the dispersal and sowing of seeds and
their natural reproductive process.
The ancient Greeks used the word diaspora to
describe the colonization of Asia Minor and the
Mediterranean during the Archaic period
(800–500 BCE). The Greeks expanded their territo-
ries and created a diaspora through military con-
quest, colonization, and migration. Displacement
of Greek-speaking peoples also occurred as a result
of poverty, overpopulation, and interstate war. In
antiquity, the Greek historian Thucydides used the
term diaspora to describe the exile of the popula-
tion of Aegina after its destruction. In this particu-
lar case, however, the rupture and scattering of the
“parent” city did not produce an “offspring,” a
new settlement that clearly traced its heritage back
to its ancestor.
When capitalized, Diaspora refers specifically to
Jewish communities and the historical events that
led to their dispersion. The origins of the Jewish
Diaspora are linked to the capture of Jerusalem
and the destruction of its First Temple in 586 BCE.
At this time, a sizable number of the nobility and
leading citizens were deported to Babylon. Their
exile lasted until 538 BCE, when the Persian king
Cyrus the Great permitted groups of Jews to return
to Jerusalem and rebuild their temple. The comple-
tion of the Second Temple in Jerusalem in
222 Diaspora
516 BCE marked the end of the prophesized
70 years of captivity. In an early Greek translation
of the Torah (the Septuagint), the word Diaspora
referred to the Babylonian exile, as well as to other
instances in the Old Testament that describe the
scattering of peoples.
Since the Babylonian exile, there have always
been a large number of Jews living outside the
boundaries of their ancient homeland. Around
250 BCE, the Greek-speaking world began using
Diaspora to refer to the large, well-established
Jewish communities in the Middle East and eastern
Mediterranean regions, many of which were cen-
ters of culture and learning. With the destruction
of the Second Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE and
Judean defeat by the Romans, the Jews lost their
homeland and religious center. The Jewish Diaspora
became more widespread, with communities estab-
lished in many areas of Asia and Europe. In mod-
ern times, Jews have migrated to the Americas,
South Africa, and Australia. Today, the capitalized
term Diaspora still refers to Jewish communities
that exist outside Palestine or modern Israel.
The meanings and implications of diaspora
changed dramatically during the 20th century.
Until the late 1960s, the Jewish experience was
considered the prototypical diaspora, with its
characteristics of forced exile, suffering, and loss
of homeland. Greek and Armenian dispersions
were also cited as notable examples of classical
diasporas. Since the late 1960s, diaspora has been
used to designate many different groups of people,
including ethnic and racial minorities, immigrants,
alien residents, expatriates, overseas communities,
sojourners, migrants, exile groups, and political
refugees from various regions of the world. In
addition to referring to groups of people, the term
diaspora has also been used to refer to the disper-
sion of a language or culture or any object that is
scattered from its origin or center.
Since 1990, there has been increasing academic
interest in diaspora as an area of study. The schol-
arly journal Diaspora was established in 1991.
The discipline of diaspora studies emerged as an
important area of research about the same time as
related studies on transnationalism, globalization,
nationalism, and postcolonialism. Scholarly dis-
cussions about diaspora have addressed issues of
identity, ethnicity, hybridity, community, migra-
tion, displacement, political movements, economic
networks, gender, sexuality, and cultural politics.
Scholars have theoretically approached diaspora
either as a descriptive tool or as a process. They
have developed different models of diaspora,
which examine various characteristics and catego-
ries of diasporic communities.
Models of Diaspora
The concept of diaspora implies a relationship
between different societies, cultures, and groups of
people. The three social spheres include the dis-
persed group, the host societies or countries where
the group resides, and the homelands (real or
imagined) or nation-states to which the group has
maintained a connection. This triadic relationship
is a principal feature of diaspora.
William Safran and Robin Cohen developed
models that list specific characteristics of diaspo-
ras. These models emphasize the relationship of the
diasporic group to the homeland but also reflect
the tension between home and abroad. Members
of a diasporic community experience conflict
between living “here” and being from “there.”
Safran and Cohen both suggest that a cultural
group should possess several of the following char-
acteristics in order to be considered as a diaspora:
1. The specific cultural group involved has
migrated from a homeland to several different
countries, rather than just one, as often happens
in borderland cases. Cohen adds the idea that
dispersal may often be caused by a traumatic
event, the memory of which creates group
cohesion.
2. The group has developed a collective memory
and myth about the homeland. This idea of a
shared origin and birthplace facilitates the
grounding of a diasporic consciousness and its
legitimacy. Ancient and revered myths help
ethnic groups distance themselves from others
and provide them with a sense of superiority.
3. The dispersed group idealizes the ancestral
homeland, whether it is real or imagined, and
wants to return there when conditions allow.
The presence of a return movement assists the
diasporic group in resolving differences that
exist between its current situation and its
idealized past.

4. The diasporic group has a commitment to the
continuing support of the homeland, which may
include maintaining or restoring a homeland to
its former condition. Cohen further suggests
that a diaspora may assist in the actual creation
of a homeland.
5. The group has a continued relationship with the
homeland that significantly defines its collective
identity.
6. The diaspora has a troubled relationship with
the host society. Many groups have experienced
alienation, marginalization, discrimination,
antagonism, or violence in their countries of
settlement. Coping mechanisms include
identification with fellow members of their
diaspora in other countries and the possibility
of return to the homeland.
In his model, Cohen includes four additional
characteristics. First, he broadens the definition
of diaspora by including groups of people who
have left their homeland to search for work, who
are part of trading or commercial networks, or
who have migrated into foreign regions as impe-
rial or colonial settlers. Second, he stresses the
necessity of a strong ethnic group consciousness
that must emerge and be sustained over a long
period of time. A diaspora must retain its link to
the homeland and its history, maintain a distinc-
tive ethnic identity, and resist assimilation. Third,
he emphasizes the relationship between co-ethnic
communities, that is, those from the same home-
land that are settled in different countries. A sense
of empathy and solidarity among these various
diasporic groups can transcend nation-state
boundaries and significantly enhance the commu-
nal myth of belonging. Transnational relation-
ships are held together by bonds of language,
religion, culture, and a sense of a common des-
tiny. At the same time, the relationship between
scattered co-ethnic communities may be charac-
terized by a great deal of tension. Fourth, Cohen
addresses the quality of life in diaspora communi-
ties. He refers to the possibility of a diasporic
group living peacefully within a tolerant society,
one in which a collective identity is preserved and
creativity is nurtured. Cohen argues that diasporic
identity should be viewed in a positive way; the
tension among the various identities (ethnic,
Diaspora 223
national and transnational) can have creative and
enriching outcomes.
In addition to specifying general characteristics
that all diasporas share, Cohen divides diaspora
groups into five main types and chooses one or
more ethnic groups to represent each of these
types. Cohen acknowledges that some groups
belong to several categories; other groups change
categories over time. He classifies the wide range
of communities that have been dispersed for vari-
ous reasons into victim, labor, trade, imperial, and
cultural diasporas.
Victim Diasporas
Jews, as well as Africans, Armenians, Irish, and
Palestinians, among others, have been classified as
“victim,” or refugee, diasporas. The Jewish experi-
ence has served as the foremost example of
diaspora for more than 2,500 years, though it is
more complex and diverse than is usually acknowl-
edged. The victim category emphasizes a long and
descriptive list of characteristics, including the fol-
lowing: a catastrophic event that precipitates the
diaspora, forced movement, dispersion, exile, cap-
tivity, enslavement, collective trauma, oppression,
persecution, displacement, homelessness, stateless-
ness, powerlessness, alienation, isolation, insecu-
rity, affliction, suffering, loss, incompleteness,
loneliness, and sadness. Victim groups, in particu-
lar, sense a constant loss and longing for the lost
homeland, one to which they are unable to return.
As much as possible, they re-create the religious
and communal structures of the homeland.
Typically, victim groups were viewed as unwel-
come minorities in their host communities and
experienced the insecurity of diasporan political
and economic life. The characteristics of victim
diasporas are affirmed by the communities, as well
as by outside observers.
Labor Diasporas
Cohen defines labor diasporas as those that
occur when groups migrate overseas in search of
work with the following qualifications: (a) reten-
tion of a strong cultural identity over an extended
period, (b) maintenance of a strong homeland con-
nection and origin myth, and (c) experiences of
social exclusion in host countries. In contrast,
224 Diaspora
migrants who move between their homes and
workplaces are not considered a labor diaspora
because they are not permanently dispersed.
Differences in social class, during initial migration
and over time, significantly impact the upward
mobility of a diaspora. John Armstrong differenti-
ates between the elite or “mobilized diaspora”
with language, network, and occupational skills
and the exploited or “proletarian diaspora,” largely
unskilled labor with limited communication skills.
Labor diasporas are transitional in nature; they
may assimilate within a few generations as social
mobility increases. Cohen cites the example of the
Indian labor diaspora of the 19th century, when
millions of indentured servants were recruited to
work, primarily in agriculture. Other labor or ser-
vice diasporas include the Chinese, Japanese,
Sikhs, Turks, and Italians.
Trade Diasporas
Trade diasporas are networks of merchants
who move, buy, and sell their goods over long
distances. Trade diasporas existed in ancient times,
with the Phoenicians and many other groups of
people, and in 16th-century Venice, which con-
trolled trade between Europe and Asia. More
recent examples of this type of diaspora include
Chinese traders in Southeast Asia and Lebanese
merchants in West Africa and the Americas, as
well as present-day Indian and Japanese business
and professional workers. Trade diasporas may
depend on the initiative of families or individuals,
but they may also be supported by a government
or state.
Imperial Diasporas
In an imperial diaspora, a colonial power estab-
lishes settlements for colonial or military purposes.
The ancient Greeks were an early example of this
type of diaspora. Many centuries later, European
trade diasporas evolved into imperial diasporas.
Colonists from Britain, Spain, Portugal, the
Netherlands, Germany, and France were dispersed
to many parts of the world, where they occupied
the land and subordinated the indigenous peoples.
The British were particularly successful in found-
ing overseas colonies; the British imperial diaspo-
ras in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South
Africa have long maintained a political and cul-
tural connection with the homeland, though many
factors have weakened this bond.
Cultural Diasporas
Cohen uses the term cultural diaspora to describe
the features of many migration experiences in
modern times. These postcolonial identities are
characterized by fragmentation and hybridity. The
peoples of the Caribbean form a cultural diaspora,
one that is united by music, literature, art, religion,
politics, and lifestyle, as well as migration. More
recent examples of cultural diasporas include the
Chinese and Indians.
Critiques of Models
Models can be a useful starting point for explor-
ing the basic characteristics of diasporas, but there
are limitations. For example, because Cohen’s
model emphasizes the idea of homeland and attri-
butes that are more closely associated with the
victim type, certain diasporic groups are likely to
be overlooked. In addition, this model categorizes
people into homogenous groups, without taking
into account the many differences that exist among
them. Some scholars have questioned the assump-
tions behind these types of models, including fixed
ideas about nationality, identity, home, and exile.
Rather than using descriptive models for categoriz-
ing diaspora, postmodern scholars approach
diaspora as a process.
Postmodern Approaches
The fluidity, heterogeneity, hybridity, multiplicity,
and mobility of diasporic identities and communi-
ties are of central concern for scholars who take a
postmodern approach. Diasporas are heteroge-
neous social groups; that is, there are various seg-
ments within the same diaspora. These segments
have different interests, defined by class, gender,
sexuality, disability, generation, age, ethnicity, lan-
guage, occupation, ideology, and religion. Complex,
unequal, and constantly changing power relations
within a diaspora affect the relationships the
diaspora has with outside entities. Diasporas rep-
resent the postmodern condition, an existence that
incorporates the dangers and rewards of living in

and belonging to multiple places. Diasporic indi-
viduals must confront the paradoxes of multiple
belonging, sometimes described as double perspec-
tive or double consciousness.
Hybridity is a fundamental characteristic of
diasporic identities. Because the experience of
diaspora takes place at multiple locations, cultural
formations incorporate elements from the host
society, homeland, and other diasporic sites.
Cultural forms have become considerably more
hybrid and globalized, especially among diasporic
young people, who identify with more than one
cultural heritage. Diasporas depend on cultural
practices, such as music, dance, literature, visual
arts, and film, for their very existence. Diasporic
musicians, writers, and artists are important agents
in documenting the history and traditions of their
communities and in facilitating social change.
The phenomenon of diaspora has been pro-
foundly affected by globalization, technological
changes, and increased movement of people and
ideas. These developments have made it easier for
diasporas to build and sustain links with their
homeland and co-ethnic communities, and these
developments have increased their political influ-
ence. Yet, because diaspora communities tran-
scend physical space and reach across international
borders, they challenge the spatial and territorial
assumptions of community and politics. James
Clifford has approached diaspora by looking at
what it is defined against: specifically, the nation-
state and indigenous groups. Diasporas can be
perceived as a threat to the nation-state, because
political, economic, and social developments are
taking place outside its boundaries and the politi-
cal expression of diasporic communities cannot
easily be controlled by either the homeland or
host countries. The multiple loyalties of diasporic
communities (host country, homeland, and co-
ethnic groups) work against the notion of alle-
giance to one nation-state. Diaspora offers an
alternative identification to nation-state, but it
interacts with the state in social, economic, legal,
and political contexts.
Diaspora and Politics
Diasporas are significant international political
forces. They have an influence on events that
reach beyond one location, and they have access
Diaspora 225
to international organizations, media, and host
governments. Diasporas may exercise their politi-
cal power by influencing events within their places
of residence, such as elections, or outside of them,
such as a foreign policy action.
The concept of diaspora has typically been stud-
ied in terms of its relations with hostland and
homeland politics, but diasporas can also be
approached as transnational political systems, with
political practices that cross borders. In this view,
a diaspora forms its own political system, which is
supported by the political and organizational infra-
structures of the homeland and host countries. As
a transnational system, diasporic politics operates
outside a fixed territorial space and connects vari-
ous actors and political organizations and institu-
tions in the homeland, hostland, diaspora, and
transnational extensions of these entities.
Diaspora and Conflict
The relationship of diaspora and conflict is com-
plex and multifaceted. A diaspora can affect a
conflict in many spheres, including political, mili-
tary, economic, social, and cultural. In each of
these areas, a diaspora may wield influence—
directly on the host societies or indirectly on the
homeland. Different groups and individuals within
the same diaspora may have various approaches,
interests, and objectives within the same conflict.
Individuals and organizations within the diaspora
can play contradictory roles, some contributing to
peace and others to conflict. Even when these seg-
ments have more unified objectives, the diaspora
can play several roles in relation to a specific con-
flict: a positive role in peacemaking, a negative
role as a contributor to continued conflict, or a
neutral role. Diaspora involvement can be both
positive and negative in the same conflict, because
it may have different objectives at different stages
of the conflict. Diasporas have differing capacities,
opportunities, and motivations to intervene in
conflicts. Some of the factors that determine a
diaspora’s role in a conflict include its strength
and level of political organization in the host
country, its ability to exert political pressure in the
home country, the issues of concern in the con-
flict, and the international attention given to the
conflict. Homeland conflicts can have economic
and social consequences for a diaspora and can
226 Difference/Différance
affect its identity formation and treatment in the
host country.
Bliss S. Little and Benjamin J. Broome
See also Ethnicity; Globalization; Group Identity;
Hybridity; Immigration; Modernity and
Postmodernity; Nationalism; Transnationalism
Further Readings
Clifford, J. (1994). Diasporas. Cultural Anthropology, 9,
302–338.
Cohen, R. (1997). Global diasporas: An introduction.
Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Kalra, V. S., Kaur, R., & Hutnyk, J. (2005). Diaspora &
hybridity. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Laguerre, M. S. (2006). Diaspora, politics, and
globalization. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Turino, T., & Lea, J. (Eds.). (2004). Identity and the arts
in diaspora communities. Warren, MI: Harmonie Park
Press.
Difference/Différance
If identity and difference are understood as oppo-
sites, différance refers to difference so radical that
it cannot be described as anything’s opposite. The
concept of différance was introduced by Jacques
Derrida and has its origins in the phenomenologi-
cal tradition; it is deeply intertwined with Derrida’s
theoretical project, deconstruction, as a whole.
Difference and différance have gained wide circu-
lation in literary and cultural studies, where they
are used as tools to explore the complexity of sup-
posed identities.
Martin Heidegger introduced what he termed
the ontological difference to distinguish beings
(i.e., things and creatures existing in the world)
from Being (the quality of existence that is shared
by all beings). Humans long to bridge this gap, to
access Being. Authentic human life is life open to
Being. French philosophers working in Heidegger’s
wake affirmed his attempt to think about the
world beyond the way that it is conventionally
broken up into things of this or that sort, but they
rejected as obscure and problematic his notion of
Being. Difference continued to be philosophically
freighted, referring to the possibility that the
world could be broken up into things and catego-
ries in another way than it currently is, though
difference was no longer used in an ontological
sense to refer to an ascent (or descent) to increased
proximity to Being.
It is this sense of difference, developed most
notably by Gilles Deleuze and Derrida, that has
had the most influence across the humanities,
particularly in North America. Instead of focus-
ing on how to best define concepts or categories,
it is the ways that concepts and categories are
inadequate that become the focus of inquiry,
because these inadequacies point to the arbitrary
nature of current concepts and categories and to
the possibility that new ones could replace them.
Identity and sameness became associated with the
false and illusory, difference and hybridity with
the true and desirable. This philosophical move-
ment accompanied, and some argue reflected, a
cultural shift to postmodernity that privileged
similar values.
The unusual (in both French and English) spell-
ing of différance is intended to mark the philo-
sophical significance of difference. The French
words différence and différance are spelled differ-
ently but pronounced the same way, suggesting
that apparent similarity masks underlying dissimi-
larity. Further, the different spelling but same pro-
nunciation of these two words suggests that there
is a more complicated relationship between iden-
tity and difference than a simple opposition.
Although the words identity and difference may
conventionally be used as antonyms, there is a
more radical, philosophical sense of difference
orthogonal to these two terms: That more radical
sense is différance.
The word différance also alludes to the close
relationship between differing and deferring. A text
seems as though it should have a meaning that,
with enough information, it would be possible to
discern. Différance challenges this view. Texts exist
in the context of innumerable other texts, their
words in the context of the whole history of a lan-
guage. A text gains its meaning only in relation to
context, according to this view. Specifically, a text
gains its meaning through how it differs from those
texts that came before it. A word gains its meaning
through how its usage differs from previous usages
both of that word and of words with similar but
slightly different meanings.

Yet even if, impossibly, the entire context in
which a particular text exists is known, its mean-
ing still cannot be determined; it is always being
deferred. This is because the meaning of the text in
question is determined by its context, and its con-
text is always changing. Derrida argued that sup-
plements are dangerous. A text itself is a supplement
to the network of texts that existed before it,
changing the meaning of those texts, and this will
be the case with each subsequent text. Meaning is
always fluid; any attempt to still this fluidity will
fail and will do violence along the way. Différance
is this flux.
While literary theorists use différance as a way
to think about literary texts, différance has also
been applied to cultural studies more broadly.
European, African, and North American cultures
during the slave trade seem distinct and autono-
mous, but understanding these divisions as arbi-
trary exposes a more complex picture. A Black
Atlantic where ideas, stories, music, and individu-
als flow through these three regions emerges
through différance, the flux underlying these con-
ventional categories. The drag balls of 1980s New
York City, where boundaries slipped between
male and female, Black, White, and Hispanic, gay
and straight, might be understood as anomalous
rebellions against convention. But the différance
provides a way to understand that such drag balls,
where identity was fluid, revealed the unspoken
underpinnings of the entire culture.
Some scholars object to what they perceive as
an excessive focus on difference, arguing that
understanding how identity is created and main-
tained is just as important as attempting to under-
mine that identity by looking for difference.
Defenders respond that these critics are confusing
difference and différance. The latter is just as con-
cerned with how identity is created and maintained
as it is with difference. From the perspective of dif-
férance, identity and difference are so intertwined
that the investigation of one would not be possible
without the investigation of the other. Other critics
object that différance is a transcendental concept
and as such relies on implicit, problematic meta-
physical claims about the world. Such critics
charge that différance turns critical analysis into a
discipleship of the flux, a condition that faces the
same objections that made Heidegger’s ontological
difference unappealing. It is unclear, however,
Dimensions of Cultural Variability 227
whether literary and cultural theorists using dif-
férance are committed to such a metaphysical view
or whether their use of the différance is pragmatic,
without such commitment.
Vincent Lloyd
See also Critical Theory; Deconstruction; Hermeneutics;
Hybridity; Signification
Further Readings
Caputo, J. (1987). Radical hermeneutics: Repetition,
deconstruction, and the hermeneutic project.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Deleuze, G. (1994). Difference and repetition (P. Patton,
Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press.
Derrida, J. (1978). Writing and difference (A. Bass,
Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Derrida, J. (1982). Margins of philosophy (A. Bass,
Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Norris, C. (2002). Deconstruction: Theory and practice
(3rd ed.). New York: Routledge.
Dimensions of
Cultural Variability
A concept that emerged from the work of Geert
Hofstede, dimensions of cultural variability refers
to the dominant values, principles, beliefs, atti-
tudes, and ethics that are shared by an identifiable
group of people that constitute a culture. These
dimensions provide the overall framework wherein
humans learn to organize their thoughts, emotions,
and behaviors in relation to their environment.
Over the past few decades, scholars of intercultural
communication have isolated several dimensions
of cultural variability that can be used to differenti-
ate cultures. These include (a) individualism-
collectivism, (b) high-low context, (c) power distance,
(d) uncertainty avoidance, and (e) monochronic-
polychronic time orientation.
These dimensions of cultural variability are not
absolute; rather, they are relative. No culture is
purely and absolutely individualistic or collectivis-
tic (or small or larger power distance, etc.). Instead,
a culture may be more individualistic or more col-
lectivistic than some other culture. Furthermore,
228 Dimensions of Cultural Variability
these dimensions of cultural variability are not
opposites; that is, cultures where a large power
distance is practiced should not be thought of as
the opposite of a culture where small power dis-
tance is practiced. In some cases, these dimensions
may coexist in cultures. To be sure, many cultures
are in a state of great transition. Thus, a culture
that was once considered collectivistic may now be
considered individualistic. Finally, when a culture
is labeled as individualistic, or large power dis-
tance, or other, that does not mean that every
person in that culture is an individualist. The
United States, for example, is considered an indi-
vidualistic culture, yet groups within the United
States are collectivistic. Cultures are not static; on
the contrary, they are dynamic, continuously
developing and evolving.
Individualism-Collectivism
Perhaps the single most studied dimension of cul-
tural variability that is used to compare and con-
trast cultures is individualism-collectivism. Harry
Charalambos Triandis maintains that the most rel-
evant feature of individualism is valuing personal
independence; this involves putting an emphasis on
personal responsibility and freedom of choice, per-
sonal autonomy, and achieving self-fulfillment.
Individualists strive to maintain distinctive per-
sonal attitudes and opinions and prefer self-directed
behavior and independence of groups. Individualists
tend to see themselves as unique from others. In
individualistic cultures, emphasis is placed on indi-
viduals’ goals over group goals. In individualistic
cultures, social behavior is guided by personal
goals, perhaps at the expense of other types of
goals. Individualistic cultures stress values that
benefit the individual. The self is promoted because
each person is viewed as uniquely endowed and pos-
sessing distinctive talent and potential. Individuals
are encouraged to pursue and develop their abili-
ties and aptitudes. In many individualistic cultures,
people are taught to be creative, self-reliant, and
assertive. Behaviors associated with individualists
include satisfaction with self, satisfaction with free-
dom, ease of interacting with strangers, direct com-
munication style, lower relational commitment, and
a preference to work alone.
The central ingredient of collectivism is the
assumption that groups bind and mutually obligate
individuals. Triandis argues that collectivism is
linked to a sense of duty to group, interdependence
with others, harmony, and working with the
group. In collectivistic societies, group goals have
precedence over individual goals. Collectivistic cul-
tures stress values that serve the ingroup by subor-
dinating personal goals for the sake of preserving
the ingroup. Collectivistic societies are character-
ized by extended primary groups such as the fam-
ily, neighborhood, or occupational group in which
members have diffuse mutual obligations and
expectations based on their status or rank.
Collectivistic people see themselves as interdepen-
dent with others: Responsibility is shared and
accountability is collective. A collectivist’s values
and beliefs are consistent with, and reflect those of,
the ingroup. Moreover, a collectivist’s association
with his or her ingroup may last a lifetime. In many
collectivistic cultures, the primary value is har-
mony with others. Because group harmony is so
highly valued, obedience to and compliance with
ingroup pressures is routine. One’s behavior is role
based, and deviations from the prescribed role are
discouraged and often negatively sanctioned. In
this sense, a person’s behavior is guided more by
shame than by personal guilt. A collectivist who
stands out from the group disrupts the harmony
and may be punished. Most collectivistic cultures
value social reciprocity, obligation, dependence,
and obedience. The primary value stressed by
many collectivistic cultures is harmony. Behaviors
associated with collectivists include a high need for
affiliation, sensitivity to rejection, sensitivity to
being embarrassed, ingroup relationship prefer-
ences, and an indirect communication style.
High-Low Context
Human communication is dependent on the con-
text in which it occurs. The salient features of a
communicative context include the physical, social,
and psychological environments. The physical
environment includes the actual geographical loca-
tion of the interaction (e.g., office, classroom, bed-
room). The social environment encompasses the
relationship between the interactants (e.g., supe-
rior/subordinate, teacher/student, husband/wife).
The psychological environment consists of the atti-
tudes, motivations, and cognitive dispositions of
each interactant. The degree to which interactants

focus on these contexts while communicating var-
ies considerably from culture to culture. Edward
Hall classifies cultures as high or low context.
Depending on contextual features present during
communication, persons in low-context cultures
focus less on the context and more on the verbal
codes. Persons in high-context cultures focus more
on the nonverbal context (i.e., physical, social, and
psychological) than on the verbal code. Thus, in a
high-context culture, a message is one in which
most of the information is either in the physical or
social context or is internalized in the person. In a
low-context culture, information is placed in the
explicit verbal code.
High-context cultures generally have restricted
code systems. Users of a restricted code system rely
more on the contextual elements of the communi-
cation setting for information than on the actual
language code. In restricted code cultures, commu-
nication is not general across individuals in con-
tent; rather, it is specific to particular people,
places, and times. Within a high-context transac-
tion, the interactant will look to the physical,
social, and psychological environments for infor-
mation. Of particular importance is the social rela-
tionship between the interactants, especially their
status. Because interactants in a high-context cul-
ture know and understand each other and their
appropriate role, words are not necessary to con-
vey meaning. One acts according to one’s role.
Words and sentences may be collapsed and short-
ened. In this sense, restricted codes are not unlike
local dialects, vernacular, or even jargon used by a
well-defined group. Users of restricted codes inter-
pret messages based on their accumulation of
shared experiences and expectations. Persons com-
municating in high-context cultures understand
that information from the physical, social, and psy-
chological environments already exists and needs
not be codified verbally. Therefore, high-context
communication is fast, proficient, and gratifying.
Unlike in low-context communication, the burden
of understanding in high-context communication
rests with each interactant. The rules for communi-
cation are implicit, and communicators are expected
to know and understand unspoken communica-
tion. High-context communication involves using
and interpreting messages that are not explicit,
minimizing the content of verbal messages, and
being sensitive to the social roles of others.
Dimensions of Cultural Variability 229
In a low-context transaction, the verbal code is
the primary source of information. Low-context
cultures generally rely on elaborated codes. Unlike
users of restricted codes, users of elaborated codes
rely extensively on the verbal code system for cre-
ating and interpreting meaning. Information to be
shared with others is coded in the verbal message.
Although persons in low-context transactions rec-
ognize the nonverbal environment, they tend to
focus more on the verbal context. Moreover, the
rules and expectations are explicitly explained.
Users of elaborated codes are dependent upon
words to convey meaning and may become
uncomfortable with silence. In low-context trans-
actions, the communicants feel a need to speak.
People using low-context communication are
expected to communicate in ways that are consis-
tent with their feelings. Hence, low-context com-
munication typically involves transmitting direct,
explicit messages.
Power Distance
Although many cultures profess and even legislate
equality for their members, all cultures must deal
with the issue of human inequality. Some form of
inequality exists in virtually every culture. Inequality
can occur in areas such as prestige, wealth, power,
human rights, and technology, among others.
Power distance refers to the degree to which less
powerful members of a culture expect and accept
that power in the culture is distributed unequally.
Power distance can be seen in families, bureaucra-
cies, and even in friendships. Hofstede categorizes
cultures as possessing a small or large power dis-
tance. Cultures with a smaller power distance
emphasize that inequalities among people should
be minimized and that there should be interdepen-
dence between less and more powerful people. In
cultures with a small power distance, family mem-
bers are generally treated as equal and familial
decisions are reached democratically. In cultures
with a larger power distance, inequalities among
people are both expected and desired. Less power-
ful people should be dependent on more powerful
people. In larger power distance cultures, children
are expected to be obedient. In many larger power
distance cultures, there is a strict hierarchy among
family members where typically the father rules
authoritatively, followed by the eldest son and
230 Dimensions of Cultural Variability
moving down the ladder by age and sex. Large and
small power distance cultures may value different
types of power. Large power distance cultures tend
to emphasize positional power. Positional power is
based on formal authority (e.g., family rank).
Persons with positional power have control over
rewards, punishments, and information. Small
power distance cultures recognize and respect
earned power. Earned power is based on an indi-
vidual’s accomplishments, hard work, and effort.
Uncertainty Avoidance
Although uncertainty is a common feature of ini-
tial intercultural communication, levels of toler-
ance for uncertainty and ambiguity vary across
cultures. The communicative strategies for reduc-
ing uncertainty also vary across cultures.
Although the extent to which an individual
experiences uncertainty and the subsequent strate-
gies for reducing it may be unique to each person,
a general orientation toward uncertainty can be
shared culturally. Tolerance for uncertainty is
learned culturally. A culture’s technology, system
of laws, and religion are markers for how that
culture addresses and attempts to avoid or reduce
uncertainty. For example, some kinds of technol-
ogy help a culture manage natural uncertainty
(e.g., weather), systems of law are designed to pre-
vent and account for behavioral uncertainties (e.g.,
crime), and religion can help a culture cope with
supernatural uncertainty (e.g., death). A culture’s
technology, law, and religion are ingrained in the
individual through socialization, education, and
occupation. Hence, they lead to collective patterns
of tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty.
Uncertainty avoidance is the degree to which the
members of a particular culture feel threatened by
uncertain or unknown situations. This feeling is
expressed through nervous stress and in a felt need
for predictability and a need for written and
unwritten rules. Hofstede classifies cultures as pos-
sessing either a weak or a strong uncertainty
avoidance orientation. In cultures with a weak
uncertainty avoidance orientation, uncertainty is
seen as a normal part of life, where each day is
accepted as it comes. The people are comfortable
with ambiguity and are guided by a belief that
what is different is curious. In school settings, stu-
dents are comfortable with open-ended learning
situations and enjoy classroom discussion. In the
workplace, time is needed only as a guide, not as a
master. Precision and punctuality are learned
because they do not come naturally. Workers are
motivated by their achievements and personal
esteem or belongingness. There is also a high toler-
ance for innovative ideas that may conflict with
the norm. Conversely, cultures with a strong
uncertainty avoidance orientation sense that uncer-
tainty in life is a continuous threat that must be
fought. Life can be stressful where a sense of urgency
and high anxiety are typical. Strong uncertainty-
avoidant cultures are guided by the belief that
what is different is dangerous. Uncertainty-avoiding
cultures evade ambiguity in most situations and
look for structure in their business organizations,
home life, and relationships.
Monochronic and
Polychronic Time Orientation
How cultures perceive and manage time differs
dramatically. The concept of time is considered a
part of a culture’s psychological environment. Hall
has classified cultures as possessing either a mono-
chronic or polychronic orientation. Cultures with a
monochronic (M-time) orientation emphasize
schedules—the compartmentalization and segmen-
tation of measurable units of time. Conversely,
those living with a polychronic (P-time) orientation
see time as less tangible and stress multiple activi-
ties with little emphasis on scheduling. P-time cul-
tures stress involvement of people and the
completion of tasks as opposed to a strict adher-
ence to schedules. These two orientations are often
incompatible.
In M-time cultures, such as in the United States,
time is thought of as almost physical, like some-
thing you can touch and hold in your hand. Time
is treated like money. M-time cultures talk of sav-
ing, spending, wasting, and losing time. For
M-time people, time is linear and compartmental-
ized into discrete units (e.g., minutes, hours, days,
and so on). The schedule is paramount in mono-
chronic cultures. In M-time cultures, scheduling
dictates just about every activity of every day. In
some ways, scheduling is like a computer program,
specifying what actions will be performed and
what actions will be prohibited. Moreover, sched-
uling allows only a limited number of activities to

be performed in one place at one time. In M-time
cultures, people are concerned with doing only one
activity at a time. Because time is viewed as so
valuable, people with the most power and prestige
are given the most time (and space) and are
allowed more flexibility and less accountability
with their time. Although an M-time orientation is
learned and completely arbitrary, it becomes so
ingrained in people that they have no other way of
thinking about their world. At an early age, chil-
dren are taught the importance of time, schedul-
ing, and promptness. Moreover, they are often
punished if they fail to adhere. A child learns when
to eat, nap, and play. In schools, subjects are
taught at certain times of the day for a specific
duration. Through compartmentalizing and seg-
menting time, a person’s day is completely planned
and scheduled, including sleep, work, leisure, and
even sex. Tardiness and missed appointments are a
source of extreme anxiety for many M-timers.
Perhaps the most important consequence of M-time
is that it denies the natural context and progres-
sion of human communication. For example,
rather than completing an assignment or finishing
a conversation, people are forced, by their sched-
ules, into maintaining an artificial pattern and
sequence of behavior.
In P-time cultures, schedules are not important
and are frequently broken. Polychronic people
can do many things at once, and relationships take
priority over schedules. P-timers are often distract-
ible and tolerant of interruptions. In P-time cul-
tures, time is not thought of as tangible, and a
person may be engaged in several activities, in the
same space with several people, simultaneously.
P-time people are more interested in completing
the task at hand than leaving it because of some
predetermined schedule. P-time cultures are not
slaves to schedules and are frequently late for
appointments or may not show up at all. The guid-
ing principle behind polychronic cultures is that
the natural context, in the present, guides behav-
ior. Monochronic people have a particularly diffi-
cult time adjusting to polychronic-oriented cultures.
To an M-timer, people in P-time cultures may
appear disorganized or even lazy.
James W. Neuliep
See also Collectivism/Individualism; Culture; Uncertainty
Avoidance
Discourse 231
Further Readings
Hall, E. T. (1976). Beyond culture. Garden City, NY:
Anchor Press/Doubleday.
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s consequences:
International differences in work-related values.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and organizations:
Software of the mind. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Neuliep, J. W. (2009). Intercultural communication:
A contextual approach (4th ed.) Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
Oyserman, D., Coon, H. M., & Kemmelmeier, M.
(2002). Rethinking individualism and collectivism:
Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-
analyses. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 3–72.
Triandis, H. C. (1990). Cross-cultural studies of
individualism and collectivism. In J. J. Berman (Ed.),
Nebraska symposium on motivation: 1989
(pp. 41–133). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Triandis, H. C. (1993). Collectivism and individualism as
cultural syndromes. Cross Cultural Research, 27,
155–180.
Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism & collectivism.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Triandis, H. C. (2001). Individualism-collectivism and
personality. Journal of Personality, 69, 907–924.
Discourse
As it relates to questions of identity, discourse is
among the most important philosophical consid-
erations of the 20th and 21st centuries. Broadly,
discourse is defined linguistically as a set of lan-
guage units constructed by several sentences; in
this sense, conversation, debate, and explanations
are all semantic discourses. In contemporary phi-
losophy, however, especially in consideration of
identity, discourse has come to mean something
weightier. Philosophically, discourse has retained
the connotations of reason, order, and rationale
from its linguistic lineage, but it has also come to
carry political, ethical, and conceptual connota-
tions. This entry examines discourse in relation to
various philosophical traditions and theories.
Hermeneutics and the Linguistic Turn
In the 20th century, philosophy, psychology, and
rhetoric traditions were marked by a return to
232 Discourse
hermeneutics and a corresponding linguistic turn.
The questions of hermeneutics—namely, how do
we read, interpret, and understand texts and
ideas?—became universal questions, no longer rel-
egated to (biblical) textual interpretation but now
extensive, with ontological questions of being and
being with others in the world. Centrally, Martin
Heidegger’s seminal work Sein und Zeit (Being
and Time) poses the hermeneutic questions of how
we come to understand being in an existential
framework of self-interrogation or discourse. For
Heidegger and his lineage, Dasein (Being) must not
only interrogate itself as a part of its own identity,
but it must also understand the role of external
discourse with others in defining the parameters
for being in the world.
This new Heideggerian mode of hermeneutic
interrogation not only laid the foundation for con-
temporary philosophy but also provided the
groundwork for explorations of discourse and
identity in the disciplines of rhetoric and psychology.
In psychology, the interrogatory and phenomena-
oriented characteristics of Heidegger’s Dasein
reflect a move to understand psyche and self-
consciousness in new ways. Namely, the phenom-
enologically disclosed psyche is defined as engaged
in an experiential discourse with others and with
objects in the world.
In contemporary rhetoric, the method of herme-
neutics is an attempt to understand meaning in
communicative acts or discourses. Emphasizing
the experiential and subjective characteristics of
meaning, hermeneutic rhetorical method signifies
a change in understanding discourse. Meaning in
discourse is no longer assumed to be simply sys-
tematic or syntactical, but now understood to be
related directly to the speaker’s experiences, inten-
tions, and unique identity.
The linguistic turn in 20th-century theory repre-
sents an almost universal move in Anglo-American
and Continental thought to understand discourse
and language as constructive of the world, objects,
ethical relations, and even identity. Discourse and
language were no longer relegated to nominal
functions, but were now thought to be integral to
philosophical understanding. Heideggerian herme-
neutics obviously had an impact on this trajectory
of thought, but followers of other important theo-
retical traditions of the 20th century—including
structuralism, poststructuralism, psychoanalysis,
feminism, and critical theory—continued to explore
the importance of discourse.
Structuralism: Lacan and Foucault
A method for thinking about discourse, structural-
ism emerged most prominently in France in the
mid-20th century. At the turn of the 20th century,
the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure developed an
approach for understanding language primarily as
a system of signs, signifiers, the signified, and the
referent. By defining these linguistic relations in
such a concrete system, those who employed
Saussure’s method could identify the structure of
discourse and thereby attempt to categorize and
understand the discourse in its formal production.
However, it was not until after World War II,
when French theorists such as Jacques Lacan and
Michel Foucault adopted and adapted structuralist
ideas, that structuralism became popular.
Lacan, the most prominent psychoanalyst since
Sigmund Freud, adopted the structuralist system
for a discursive approach to psychoanalytic theory.
One of Lacan’s most important insights, utilizing
the systematizing approach of structuralism in a
new way, was his elaboration of the four discourses
in Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis.
The four discourses are the Master’s Discourse, the
University Discourse, the Hysteric’s Discourse, and
the Analyst’s Discourse. For Lacan, these dis-
courses not only corresponded to specific patient
types and analyst–analysand relations, but they
could also be used to describe the structures of
dialogue in the “external” sociopolitical and his-
torical world. The University Discourse, for exam-
ple, represents a way of systematizing hegemonic
meaning. Political forces, academic institutions,
and controlling individuals all represent manifesta-
tions of the University Discourse.
Whereas traditionally defined history is deter-
minate and unfolds unilaterally over time, Foucault
identifies discrete discursive epistemes, or eras of
specific epistemological commitments and pro-
ductions, uncovered through an archaeological
process. This new archaeology, developed most
fully in Foucault’s book The Archeology of
Knowledge, not only changes the way historical
studies are taken up but also illuminates a new
outcome of historical research—the effects of dis-
crete periods of rationality. By emphasizing the

notion of rupture, Foucault is able to analyze the
formations of specific knowledge regimes and the
unique discursive models of these periods. Defining
ruptures as the creative rifts in a series of historical
periods allows Foucault to analyze discrete forma-
tions of discourse, uncovering, in the strata of
language, the unique foundations for systems of
truth in society. Shifting his project to deal more
specifically with questions of subjectivity, free-
dom, and the nondiscursive operations of histori-
cal epistemes, Foucault then delves into a
genealogical project; perhaps most accessible are
his projects in the three volumes of The History of
Sexuality. Whereas the construction of knowledge
was of primary concern in the archaeological proj-
ect, the prioritizing of subjects in relation to power
becomes the central theme of the genealogical
project. The notion of subjectivation in Foucault’s
project is a twofold process. First, the subject must
recognize himself or herself in relation to the soci-
etal norms of the existent power/knowledge
regime, and then, in a self-reflexive move, the sub-
ject must identify his or her own specific truth in
relation to this subjection. According to Foucault,
subjectivation is a process both done to, and com-
pleted by, the individual. In this way, Foucault is
perhaps the most central figure for understanding
both the notion of discourse as such and the rela-
tion between discourse and identity.
Poststructuralism and
the Discourse of Difference
In response to structuralism’s impact in France, a
new set of theories, broadly called poststructural-
ism, emerged. Like the structuralists, poststructur-
alists found important philosophical insight in
uncovering tendencies in language and discourse.
However, unlike the traditional structuralists who
claimed that defined relations between signifiers,
signs, and the signified existed in a concrete system,
the poststructuralists tended to highlight differences
as they emerged in discourse and in intersubjective
discursive relations. Although it is always difficult
to label philosophers of the 20th century or to con-
fine them to certain philosophical movements, Luce
Irigaray may be one of the most important theorists
to have related poststructuralist ideas to discourse.
Irigaray’s philosophical works are primarily
concerned with the otherness of the alter-subject
Discourse 233
and how this otherness is or should be presented
in terms of its linguistic uniqueness. In her book I
Love to You, for example, femininity is defined
through the need for recognizing gendered dis-
course. However, this gendered discourse is situ-
ated in the plane of historical and political
context—a shared world between genders, even
though the experience of that world must be dis-
tinguished in terms of sexual difference. Irigaray
carefully examines her own qualitative research
on linguistic usage. Citing several studies, she pro-
vides evidence for the all-too-common practice of
speaking and writing with exclusively neuter/mas-
culine language and misusing such language to
express instrumentation rather than motivated
intentionality. For Irigaray, instrumentation is the
use of others, objects, or even the self in terms of
object-usefulness; therefore, instrumentation lacks
the necessary motivation and precise subjectivity
of the individual. This instrumental use of others,
this taking up of an Other as a useful object for
the self, defies the possibility of an intersubjective
experience. Because of her work exposing instru-
mentality in common use of language, Irigaray
formulates a system of ensuring intersubjectivity
via appropriate expression. For Irigaray, lived
experiences are reflected in language and vice
versa, so only a linguistic turn would create a
proper foundation for experiential change. Most
important for Irigaray’s notion of intersubjectivity
is the assurance that each subject retains its sub-
jectivity. Whereas the common use of “I love
you” expresses an instrumentality of using the
other as a love object, “I love to you” prevents
any subject from being reduced to an object. The
irreducibility of the subject expressed by the use
of “to” further allows for an actual linguistic
equity prevented by traditional neuter/masculine
language usage. For Irigaray, the possibility of
linguistic equity is the foundation for reciprocally
meaningful intersubjective relations, without the
possibility of a shifting back into a subject–object
relationship. The possibility of linguistic equity
adds another dimension to the enriching complex-
ity of a truly intersubjective experience—that of a
truly meaningful intersubjective dialogue. Not
only does language become the foundation of a
solution to intersubjectivity for Irigaray, but
meaningful discourse also becomes a desired out-
come of the intersubjective exchange.
234 Discourse
Queer Theory and Language
Taking from both the poststructural tradition and
the phenomenological tradition, queer theorists
such as Judith Butler use philosophies of discourse
and language to inscribe theories of action, resis-
tance, and change to the normative status quo. In
her philosophical term performativity, Butler
defines the possibility for individuals to phenom-
enologically recognize society’s interpretation of
certain ways and modes of being. Most often,
these ways and modes of being are labeled as
either normal or other, categorized accordingly,
and persons are compartmentalized according to
these categorizations. According to Butler, how-
ever, the possibility for permutations of performa-
tive gender acts occurs precisely in the discursive
space of recitation and repetition. Through repeti-
tion of specific speech acts, that which is named is
given being. In other words, performative acts of
a certain gendered behavior constitute the being of
the gendered self. And for Butler, as these perfor-
mative acts depend on repetition and recitation,
the self is always in flux, always in creation. For
Butler, discourse creates a nonnormative, non-
identical self.
Communicative Ethics and Identity Formation
By emphasizing a relationship between philosophi-
cal theory and political and ethical practice, critical
theory has developed as a philosophical tradition in
which emancipation, freedom, and normatively
affected diminished domination take precedence.
In contemporary critical theory, extending even
into 21st-century philosophical questions, the rela-
tion of discourse and identity has taken yet another
turn. For Jürgen Habermas, perhaps the foremost
critical theorist still working today, what consti-
tutes the public and private spheres is determined
by communicatively participating citizens. Through
discourse, citizens determine the historically consti-
tuted criteria for the equal autonomy of private
individuals; this is the foundation for a communi-
catively constituted ethics. In this theory then, not
only are the public and private realms determined
by communication, but also the autonomous capac-
ity of participants is communicatively dictated.
With his recurrent emphasis on the role of univer-
sal participation ensuring universal agreement and
equality, Habermas indicates that the validity of
norms is determined by the universal appeal of
practical discourse.
In addition to the notion of normalization,
Habermas claims that reflexivity is also necessary
to achieve the goal of consensus, indicating a
positive relationship with dialectic reasoning. Even
when not actively participating in communication,
an individual is subject to the ethical foundations
and ramifications of public, communicatively ori-
ented society. Habermas makes the further claim
that individual choice is merely an abstraction
from a socially constituted lifeworld. The system
of discourse or communicative ethics follows a
strict procedure of practical discourse, demon-
strating a move in critical theory wherein discourse
helps in understanding not only the formation of
individual identity but also the formation of soci-
ety and social norms. This means that questions of
discourse are now both explicitly ethical and
explicitly political, relating to philosophical ques-
tions of identity politics, globalization, and
normative justice.
Taine Duncan
See also Being and Identity; Critical Theory; Development
of Identity; Development of Self-Concept; Diversity;
Modernity and Postmodernity; Philosophy of Identity;
Sexual Identity; Sexual Minorities
Further Readings
Butler, J. (1993). Bodies that matter: On the discursive
limits of sex. New York: Routledge.
Evans, F. (2009). The multivoiced body: Society and
communication in the age of diversity. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Foucault, M. (1982). The archeology of knowledge and
the discourse on language. New York: Pantheon.
Foucault, M. (1990). The history of sexuality: Vol. 1. An
introduction. New York: Vintage Books.
Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative
action: Vol. 1. Reason and the rationalization of
society (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press.
Heidegger, M. (1996). Being and time: A translation of
Sein und Zeit (J. Stambaugh, Trans.). Albany: SUNY
Press.
Irigaray, L. (1996). I love to you: Sketch of a possible
felicity in history (A. Martin, Trans.). New York:
Routledge.

Lacan, J. (2007). The seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book
XVII. The other side of psychoanalysis (R. Grigg,
Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton.
Diversity
Diversity refers to all facets of variability found in
nature and throughout society. Some features of
human diversity are genetically predetermined,
some are socially constructed, and still others
derive from both biology and culture.
Diversity plays a dynamic and critical role in the
development of individual and group identities.
Among the sources of identity most often associ-
ated with diversity are an individual’s or group’s
race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, gender, age,
socioeconomic status, geographic background, job
or profession, physical capacities and limitations,
age, communal memberships, character traits,
types of intelligence and native abilities, interests,
values, and beliefs.
One of the key elements of personal and group
identity in each of these categories is a sense of
belonging and of connection with others. To the
extent that an individual is seen by group insiders
as embodying the attributes or traits associated
with a racial, ethnic, gender, ideological, religious,
or socioeconomic group, for instance, she or he is
able to belong.
Identity formation is a complex and dynamic
process; answers to the question “Who am I?”
evolve from diverse relationships, exposures, edu-
cation, and other defining experiences throughout
an individual’s life. Similarly, insider and outsider
status is often dynamic and fluid. For example,
through education, entrepreneurship, and other
vehicles of social mobility, individuals and groups
in many parts of the world “move” from one
socioeconomic class identity to another.
Related is the process of attribution. To attri-
bute is to assign an identity label to oneself or oth-
ers. Attributions “mark” an individual’s apparent
membership in an ethnic group, a socioeconomic
class, gender, or other type of affiliation. When an
outsider to an ethnic group perceives physical
markers of group membership on a stranger, for
instance, she or he may be inclined to attribute
group affiliation to the individual. In the face of
Diversity 235
diversity, stereotypes and related presuppositions
often accompany such attributions.
Research reveals, however, that human vari-
ability within groups is as complex and dynamic
as diversity across groups. For example, in many
communities, an individual’s identity as a woman
significantly influences how she is perceived
within the community. Her standpoint—including
her role, place, purpose, how she is perceived by
others, status, station, and power within the
community—is shaped accordingly. In this sense,
all women within a community share some ele-
ments of standpoint.
And yet, every woman within and outside a
given community is different from every other.
Even identical female twins raised by the same
parents within a shared home environment have
unique experiences that, in turn, help to shape
their individual perceptual frames. Indeed, no two
people in the world share all the myriad factors
shaping individual identity—from genetics to per-
sonal experience, from perceptions to beliefs,
from longings and desires to interests. Nor, as
noted earlier, are these factors stable. Each person
is a unique, dynamic, evolving constellation of
desires, hopes, dreams, abilities, memories, con-
nections with others, and values. Through this
fluidity and diversity, each individual at any given
time becomes a unique self. In this sense, diversity
and change are among the most significant fea-
tures of personal identity.
At the same time, however, research offers sev-
eral salient generalizations about identity and
diversity. Researchers have found important inter-
sections, for example, between several key aspects
of identity. Among these, perhaps the most com-
pelling are established patterns of association
between race, gender, and socioeconomic class.
Within the United States, race in particular has
been found to be a significant factor in predicting
individual wealth. Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres
note that ongoing disparities in wealth along
racial lines reflect patterns of discrimination
within a complex network of relations, such as
within the housing sector, educational opportuni-
ties, access to financial institutions and capital,
relations with police and public authorities, and
exposure to crime. These and related findings sug-
gest that one cannot reliably separate socioeco-
nomic class and race.
236 Double Consciousness
Humans share many traits in common as well.
All people are mortal and dependent upon nour-
ishment for their well-being. Most desire to be
loved, to avoid suffering, and to be treated with
dignity, kindness, and fairness. In these and related
broad ways, people across the world share much in
common with one another, regardless of their
unique biology, tribal affiliation, homeland,
dreams, or destiny.
Relationships between diversity and identity
throughout the 21st century will be especially
complex. For the first time in recorded history,
millions of people of diverse tribal ancestry, and
from diverse villages, regions, states, and nations,
routinely cross cultural boundaries through demo-
graphic shifts, cyber-connections, shared narra-
tives, mass-mediated communications, economic
globalization, and other types of border crossings.
On the one hand, some have responded to these
circumstances with revitalized forms of tribalism.
Identity groups feeling threatened in the face of
globalization and related phenomena employ a
variety of strategies in an effort to preserve tradi-
tional racial, ethnic, socioeconomic, religious, or
ideological kinship and cultural heritage against
compromising outside influences. In some cases,
tribalism has resulted in genocide or other forms of
ethnic cleansing. In other cases, isolationism and
other less violent means are used to protect the
group’s “sacred” space(s), traditions, familial,
communal, cultural, linguistic, and other kinship
ties. In still other circumstances, dominant groups
have sought to assimilate marginalized cultures to
form a kind of melting pot.
More recently, some scholars have suggested
that preservation of sacred cultural heritages need
not conflict with either the heterogeneity of human
experience or the global interdependence charac-
terizing today’s world. These writers see the
dynamic intersections of diversity and identity in
the 21st century as offering the promise of a new
form of cosmopolitanism. On this vision, societies
will replace cultural assimilation with multicultur-
alism. People from across cultural boundaries will
come to identify first as “citizens of the world.”
This recognition of shared kinship will enable the
human family to pursue peaceful resolution of
conflicts, sharing of scientific knowledge, artistic
revivals, freedom of expression, celebration of cul-
tural and linguistic diversity, and collaborative
quests to understand and resolve humanity’s most
critical challenges.
Whatever the future holds, intersections between
diversity and identity are likely to prove increas-
ingly complex and important in the years to come.
Understanding these intersections will be critical for
those seeking to contribute to the pursuits of peace,
justice, and prosperity for all across the world.
Josina M. Makau
See also Cosmopolitanism; Identity Change;
Multiculturalism; Other, The; Pluralism
Further Readings
Anzaldúa, G. (1999). Borderlands/La frontera: The new
mestiza. San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books.
Appiah, K. A. (2006). Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a
world of strangers. New York: W. W. Norton.
Belenky, M. F., Clinchy, B. M., Goldberger, N. R., &
Tarule, J. M. (1973). Women’s ways of knowing: The
development of self, voice, and mind. New York:
Basic Books.
García, A. M. (Ed.). (1997). Chicana feminist thought:
The basic historical writings. New York: Routledge.
Gardner, H. (1993). Multiple intelligences: The theory in
practice. New York: Basic Books.
Guinier, L., & Torres, G. (2002). The miner’s canary:
Enlisting race, resisting power, transforming
democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Harding, S. (1986). The science question in feminism.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Maalouf, A. (2000). In the name of identity: Violence
and the need to belong. New York: Penguin.
Rosaldo, R. (1993). Culture and truth: The remaking of
social analysis. Boston: Beacon Press.
West, C. (1994). Race matters. New York: Vintage
Books.
Double Consciousness
Coined by W. E. B. Du Bois to describe the con-
flict of being both “Negro” and “American,”
double consciousness is a term used to describe an
individual’s awareness and negotiation of the rela-
tionship between these two irreconcilable identi-
ties. It is used to identify the ways in which an

individual’s Black and American identities, because
they signify different sets of ideals and privileges,
neither can be reconciled nor can one entirely
usurp the other. Instead, the perpetually imbal-
anced relationship between these two identities
creates a dissonance within the individual that
makes him both a participant in and an observer
of his own life. In describing the Black American’s
awareness of his predicament, in “Of Our Spiritual
Strivings,” in The Souls of Black Folks, published
in 1903, Du Bois propounds that the Black
American is endowed with a “peculiar sensation,
this double-consciousness, this sense of always
looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of
measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that
looks on in amused contempt and pity” (p. 3). An
individual who is doubly conscious is not simply
cognizant of his identities but also of the freedoms
he is denied as a result of this antagonistic rela-
tionship. The Black American can never truly
enjoy all of the privileges of being an American
because his identity as Black mediates his ability
to do so because the latter subjects him to imposed
social restrictions. This “other” judges the Black
American based upon the assumption of his infe-
riority to his White American counterpart. Double
consciousness assumes a recognition of this hier-
archy of racial identities. However, at the same
time, because there is no essential code of conduct
for Blackness, the relationship between a Black
American’s two identities is a dynamic one—a
constant negotiation between imposed limitations
and the individual’s attempts to push beyond
those boundaries. This entry explores the conflict
associated with dual identities, examines how
double consciousness is experienced, and provides
a literary example.
Double Consciousness and Dual Identities
Double consciousness, for Black Americans, refers
to both an internal dialectic of identifying one’s
self as Black and American and the external con-
flict that results from this duality. How does one
exist as both and sustain a whole self? It is this
attempt to rationalize the reality of being Black,
and then American, or being Black versus being
American, and the desire to live as a Black
American that is captured by double conscious-
ness. In “Of Our Spiritual Strivings,” Du Bois
Double Consciousness 237
defines this internal conflict of being Black and
American as “twoness,” this duality of “two souls,
two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two
warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged
strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder”
(from The Souls of Black Folks, p. 3). Being both
Black and American births this double conscious-
ness because although ideally one should not limit
the other, simply being Black subjects one to arbi-
trary limitations upon the freedoms that are asso-
ciated with being American. But it is not simply the
limitations normalized by law; it is also the cus-
toms and judgments of others, informed by one’s
apparent identity as Black, to which one must con-
stantly anticipate being subjected. One’s aspira-
tions as a Black American are always at risk of
being subject to some other’s liberty to impose
limitations or place stipulations upon them.
This double consciousness can be even more
disruptive for mulattos who, being Black, White,
and American sometimes assume that their
Whiteness should permit them to engage in those
privileges of being American that their Blackness
would make difficult or impossible. Although
mulattos are sometimes allowed access to opportu-
nities their Black counterparts may not have been
granted, these individuals often find themselves
limited by the same social restrictions and judg-
ments to which their wholly Black counterparts
are subject. Du Bois belonged to that group of
mixed-race individuals who, despite their achieve-
ments, were unable to reconcile being Black, even
if only partially so, with being American. This
double consciousness of the mulatto works to
maintain the absoluteness of Blackness and its
inferiority within American society.
Experiencing Double Consciousness
Double consciousness is not a state of awareness
that is willingly assumed by an individual. It is an
unavoidable and even a necessary burden that
comes with being a Black American. In order to
navigate the American social landscape that
assumes the inferiority of Black Americans, double
consciousness becomes an important evaluative
tool for Black Americans. Once one has recognized
that he is being treated differently by others on
account of his racial identity, he begins to develop
an understanding of what expectations White
238 Double Consciousness
Americans may have for Black Americans, how to
live within their confines, or how to subvert them.
Often, and especially in literary works, this
epiphany is exemplified by an instance during
which individuals are forced to recognize their
twoness and how they are being limited as a result.
These instances during which African Americans
are made painfully aware of their twoness are
often developed and most striking in relationship
to an individual’s attempts to engage in some
activity over which White Americans have claimed
ownership. In such instances when Black Americans
are attempting to traverse this line between the
limitations of being Black and the liberties of being
American, they come into direct contact with
some representation of the social structures that
limit their freedoms and their aspirations are
intentionally or unintentionally checked. According
to Du Bois, this doubly conscious individual
desires fairness and socioeconomic equality with-
out a trace of spite or maltreatment from others.
But despite such wishes, in their everyday lives,
Black Americans instead are forced to recognize
their invisibility among their White counterparts,
stereotypical assumptions about their capabilities,
and denied participation in activities of upward
mobility, among many things. It could be some-
thing as simple as being ignored by a cashier in a
department store or something of greater conse-
quence, such as an otherwise inexplicable exclu-
sion as a candidate for a job promotion, that
makes the Black American acutely aware of the
primacy of his Blackness. It is the unpredictable
nature of such events that encourages a ubiquitous
anticipation of them and the assumption of a
doubly conscious disposition.
Double Consciousness in
Ralph Ellison’s “Battle Royal”
A prime example of this dissonance that double
consciousness creates for the Black American is
Ralph Ellison’s “Battle Royal,” a short story that
became the first chapter of his seminal novel
Invisible Man. The story is narrated from the point
of view of a young, Black student who has found
himself in the good favor of his hometown’s White
male leaders. Following his graduation, he is invited
to recite his speech on racial progress to a group of
respected White townsmen only to be forced to
take part in a “battle royal” with classmates who
dislike him. The battle royal turns out to be a
humiliating exposition of the freedom Whites have
to impose stipulations upon Black lives. They
parade a naked White woman in front of the
young men to embarrass them, blindfold them and
make them battle one another until they are utterly
exhausted, and as a reward for their participation,
make them scramble for coins and bills that have
been strewn across, to the young men’s surprise,
an electrified rug. It is only after the narrator must
suffer this trial that he is allowed to deliver his
speech and mockingly congratulated for his intel-
ligence. When he mistakenly says “social equal-
ity,” instead of “social responsibility,” he is chided
by one of the men who assures the narrator that
they intend to reward him, but he must remember
his place. He is rewarded with a briefcase and a
scholarship to a Black college, but is afterward
perpetually haunted by a dream in which he opens
a note inside of his briefcase that addresses the
note’s reader to “keep this nigger-boy running.”
This episode demonstrates double consciousness
because the nameless narrator is violently affronted
by the actual expectations held by the White men
who, up until this point, he believed respected him.
Despite his academic achievement and the praise
they give him before and after the battle royal, his
forced participation proves to the narrator that his
Blackness is an equalizer that Whites can wield
whenever they choose. The narrator has a difficult
time reconciling that he is given no greater courtesy
than the Black classmates to whom he believes
himself superior, and for a while he is still con-
cerned with being able to deliver his speech, just as
the White men are primarily concerned with being
entertained by the young men’s humiliation. This
duality in priorities is emblematic of the jarring
experience of double consciousness for the Black
American. While the narrator hopes to deliver his
speech to an audience that is proving itself increas-
ingly hostile, he is also aware of the White men’s
ability to sustain this hostility and eventually con-
descends to hope for a mere reprieve from the
White men’s manipulation.
The narrator receives a reprieve from bodily
harm, but it is displaced by a more damaging
assault upon his self, one that had been naively
eager to deliver its speech to a group of White men
from whom he had hoped to garner approval.

Instead, the men take the opportunity to remind
the narrator of his “place,” in no uncertain terms.
Again, this very act of checking the narrator’s
expectations is an instance of double conscious-
ness because he is reminded that, as a Black
American, he will always be limited. Their reaction
to his “social equality” misstatement teaches him
that he can never expect to be afforded any parity
with his White counterparts no matter what
lengths he goes to prove himself worthy of their
approval. He is always subject to their discerning
judgment, their intent upon keeping him in an
inferior position.
Near the end of the short story, the narrator
recounts the dream in which he opens a letter that
instructs its reader to “keep this nigger-boy run-
ning.” The image of a Black boy constantly in
motion, headed in the direction of a yet undefined
destination seems to evoke the very nature of dou-
ble consciousness for the Black American. He is
perpetually attempting to negotiate his identity as
Black and American, striving to achieve some equi-
librium between the two that does not necessitate
Double Consciousness 239
the deference of one to the conditions of the other.
And while that end may be unattainable, it must
be attempted all the same.
Ericka C. Smith
See also Consciousness; Individual; Looking-Glass Self;
Psychology of Self and Identity; Self-Consciousness
Further Readings
Dickson, B. J. (1992, June). W. E. B. Du Bois and the
idea of double consciousness. American Literature,
64(2). Retrieved December 15, 2009, from http://
www.jstor.org/pss/2927837
Du Bois, W. E. B. (2005). Of our spiritual strivings. In
The souls of black folks. New York: Bantam Dell.
(Original work published 1903)
Ellison, R. (1995). Invisible man. New York: Random
House. (Original work published 1952)
Larsen, N. (2003). Passing. New York: Penguin.
(Original work published 1929)
Wright, R. (1998). Native son. New York:
HarperCollins. (Original work published 1940)
 E
Embeddedness/
Embedded Identity
This entry assumes that embedded identity is the
natural state of being human. The confusion with
this “human given” rests within modernity. The
assumption of this entry is that we are now within
a corrective period, reclaiming the importance of
embeddedness and identity. Dietrich Bonhoeffer
stated that it was immoral to take the ground
from under the feet of another. His statement sug-
gested that identity rests with that upon which we
stand. The work of Charles Taylor, particularly
present in his significant work, Sources of the Self:
The Making of the Modern Identity, makes
explicit the ground under our feet and how that
ground has shifted over time.
Defining Embedded Identity
Embedded identity assumes that we are derivative
creatures. We are not self-made persons who pull
ourselves up by our own bootstraps. Instead, we
are the product of the stories, culture, and people
that shape us. When Ernest Boyer was the head of
the Carnegie Institute for Teaching he was asked
the following: “What is the best predictor of suc-
cess for students coming from lower-status home
environments?” His answer was that researchers
have found that SAT scores, school grades, and
even letters of recommendation are not the pri-
mary predictors of success. What predicts success
for a student from a socially challenged home is
241
one basic ingredient: a mom, dad, brother, sister,
friend, neighbor, coach, priest, teacher, someone
who in every action toward that student says,
“Come hell or high water, you will make it, and I
will make sure you do.” The following story illus-
trates this: A dad from such a family while driving
his son, the first in the extended family to attend
college, to college, said, “Your task is to do better
than us.” When the son was tired and wanted to
stop studying, that statement rang in his head over
and over again. When he completed his MA and
PhD in 3 years, a friend asked, “How could you
have done that?” For the first time, and not the
last, the son answered, “I am my father’s son.” As
Boyer noted, our identities are embedded with the
stories and people we know, and sometimes we are
fortunate recipients of a life that was given to us by
the life of another. Embedded identity is not an
abstract academic idea; it lives in the heart of all of
us for ill, at times, and, at others, for a good we
have not earned. The notion of embedded identity
is taken for granted by most people until it is dis-
rupted and we find ourselves rootless, living within
a sense of “existential homeless.”
Existential Homelessness
Understanding the power of embeddedness begins
with reflection on its absence. It is unlikely that we
think about our identity as embedded within a
given set of narratives providing practical ground
for understanding who we are until there is a chal-
lenge to our identity. The notion of existential
homelessness can inflict the lives of the wealthy
242 Embeddedness/Embedded Identity
just as quickly as those with little. Existential home-
lessness is a loss of a sense of “why” for human
life. Friedrich Nietzsche was often quoted that a per-
son can bear any “how” if he or she has a “why.”
The sense of “why” in modernity has been the
notion of progress—doing more. Such a position is
not problematic if one is able and has a love of the
doing while in pursuit in an ever elusive “more.”
However, once the end eclipses the means of get-
ting there, and the end seems to have no end, we
invite a modern substitute for a sense of dwelling,
home, ground, a sense of “why.” This substitute
works well as long as there is another challenge
within sight. It is little wonder that in modernity,
midlife crisis joined our common vocabulary. A
midlife crisis is possible only when the doing is
secondary or eclipsed by the demand of an end
that has no end, a phenomenon called progress.
When ruptures in our commitment to progress
occur, we are left with questioning a stark reality,
“Is this all there is?” The answer is yes, if the doing
of activity provides us with no joy or sense of
“why.” For when the end does meet an end and
there is no other ground under our feet, life takes
on a pain of recognition: “What are the sources of
life that can and must sustain me now?”
In essence, we live in a time in which, for many,
the notion of progress without an end works to
mask the reality of “homelessness.” However,
when we discover that some efforts at masking
reality fail, we are left with the questions that fit
best within the rubric of an existential homeless-
ness fueled by a narrative sickness, a lack of
ground under our feet.
Narrative Sickness
Paulo Freire discusses the notion of “narrative
sickness” that takes place when a people become
oppressed from a public story that has no opening
for change in the conversation. Additionally, it is
possible to find ourselves in narrative sickness
because there is no ground under our feet, no nar-
rative sources that support the self. We are narra-
tive creatures. The work of Alasdair MacIntyre
outlines the importance of narrative, and the work
of Stanley Hauerwas in A Community of Character:
Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic
offers clarity on the importance of narrative and
identity in his analysis of Richard Adams’s novel
Watership Down. Hauerwas takes us to rabbits
that have their warren disrupted and must strike
out on a journey; what makes the passage possible
are the stories that nourish the narrative life of the
displaced warren. The remaining members of the
warren are “saved” by stories that shape anew
their lives and their identity.
Such a commitment to narrative is not new. The
tales of Homer provided a view of the “why” of
life from an Athenian perspective. The journey of
Odysseus was not simply about cunning and
return but also about the necessary ingredients for
leadership in adversity. The Torah, the Christian
Bible, the Qur’an, and even the works of
Shakespeare have offered an embedded narrative
inspiration. Closeness to family and friends has
done the same. Connections to church and com-
munity guide us in our daily interactions, in good
and bad times.
It can be argued that it is not postmodernity
that took away confidence in these forms of narra-
tive ground; modernity worked like a virus against
narrative life. As Alexis de Tocqueville claimed,
there was once an American dream uniting con-
cern for the community with individual success.
When, however, concern for community no longer
is part of the equation, we are left with the
American failing within the scope of progress or,
put more vulgarly, greed. Postmodernity can be
viewed as a philosophical and pragmatic cry that
suggests that modernity and the blind commitment
to progress was a moral cul-de-sac. The question
that now meets us is how to respond to a sense of
existential homelessness. The answer is twofold:
(1) a narrative return and (2) the love of doing, a
reclaiming of leisure. However, one additional
issue is needed before examining some form of
solution—the ontological nature of human embed-
dedness. It has been suggested not that human
beings must embed themselves but that human
beings are already embedded, situated creatures.
Ontology and Situatedness
Human beings are embedded or situated in the
lifeworld. We may not like our situatedness, but the
limits of existence shape each of us. Being situated
is ontological. It is a defining characteristic of being
human. In Democracy in America, Tocqueville
makes a distinction between individualism and

selfishness. He considered selfishness to be a natu-
ral part of human life. Tocqueville’s wrath goes to
individualism, not to selfishness. Individualism
works at disembedding the human being from a
situated existence. Individualism works against
human ontology; it is a willfulness that puts at risk
our natural connectedness. It is for this reason that
Bonhoeffer considered it immoral to take ground
from under the feet of another. Individualism
makes this move—it takes the ground that situates
us out from under our feet.
We can visualize the difference between indi-
vidualism and selfishness by the question of self-
protection. Individualism engages self-protection
by trying to stand above the fray of attachment to
others, whether person, narrative, or institutional
commitment. Individualism can be visualized by
being in a group of persons and then standing on
a chair and looking down at them. The perspective
is one of height over the other; such is the delusion
that propels individualism. Selfishness, on the
other hand, can be understood by focusing on the
importance of connections. It is the pragmatic self-
interest of Benjamin Franklin housed in the classic
quotation, “We must, indeed, all hang together, or
assuredly we shall all hang separately.”
The situatedness to which Franklin points is an
appropriate place upon which to pivot into discus-
sion of the multifaceted understandings of situated-
ness or embeddedness. Bonhoeffer reminds us of
the importance of ground that has narrative con-
nections; he is talking about the traditional narra-
tive of faith and family. It is this ground that
permitted Bonhoeffer to contend with the Nazi per-
version of the public life in World War II Germany.
However, embeddedness is not limited to narrative
ground. There are times in which the narrative
ground for one reason or another is not present. At
such moments, grounding is still possible through
connection to practices. When narrative life is dis-
rupted, for whatever reason, we must engage in
practices that continue to embed our lives.
For instance, when John Wesley (founder of
what was later to be called Methodism) was at a
low point in his faith, he asked a Moravian minister
what he should do, and the answer was to preach
until he believed it again. The answer came in the
form of a practice, not a narrative suggestion.
There are times in which the practices are what
situate us and keep us connected. The importance
Embeddedness/Embedded Identity 243
of practices often emerges when a narrative seems
lost, forgotten, or broken and the best advice we
can receive is to put one foot in front of the other
and begin to go through the practices of life. Even
if we have a “bad job” and are finally able to retire,
it is unlikely that the retirement will be satisfactory
unless new practices are put in place.
In a consumption culture, we are unlikely to
find our way by constant complaining that life is
not what we want it to be. What is necessary is to
put in place new practices that can change the nar-
rative identity. This genius of practices can change
lives. One of the most impressive is the classical
music program in Venezuela; it is practice that
guides impoverished youth to constructive lives.
This state-run program has assisted more than
400,000 students in 30 years. This program works
at saving human lives by embedding them in prac-
tices that transform human identity. Venezuelan
conductor José Antonio Abreu works with chil-
dren who are poor, disabled, blind, and as young
as 2 years of age. He provides a safe place for these
young people, but what transforms their lives is
not just the safety but the children’s ongoing prac-
tice. Practices embed lives, even when narratives
are seemingly no more. The genuine importance of
practices, however, is that when done long enough,
they begin to connect to narrative life, permitting
the person in retrospect to understand the majesty
of human practices that situate a life.
Ronald C. Arnett
See also Historicity; Person; Saturated Identity
Further Readings
Arendt, H. (1977). Between past and future: Eight
exercises in political thought. Middlesex, UK: Penguin
Books.
Arnett, R. C. (1994). Existential homelessness: A
contemporary case for dialogue. In R. Anderson,
K. N. Cissna, & R. C. Arnett (Eds.), The reach of
dialogue: Confirmation, voice and community
(pp. 229–247). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
Arnett, R. C. (2004). Dialogic confession: Bonhoeffer’s
rhetoric of responsibility. Carbondale: University of
Southern Illinois Press.
Freire, P. (2000). Pedagogy of the oppressed
(M. B. Ramos, Trans.). London: Continuum
International. (Original work published 1968)
244 Embodiment and Body Politics
Hauerwas, S. (1981). A community of character: Toward
a constructive Christian social ethic. Norte Dame, IN:
University of Norte Dame Press.
MacIntyre, A. (1981). After virtue: A study in moral
theory. London: Duckworth.
Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: The making of the
modern identity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Tocqueville, A. de. (2002). Democracy in America
(H. C. Mansfield & D. Winthrop, Eds. & Trans.).
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work
published 1835, 1840)
Weil, S. (1952). The needs for roots: Prelude to a
declaration of duties toward mankind (A. F. Wills,
Trans.). Kirkwood, NY: Putnam. (Original work
published 1949)
Embodiment and Body Politics
Being a concept used for both describing and sur-
mounting the mind-body dualism, embodiment is
at the core of theories of cultural, social, personal,
and psychological dimensions of identity—
especially for issues about body politics. However,
the very broad use of the term in diverse contexts
(and also in the context of differing concepts of
identity) has led to a variety of meanings that can be
assigned to the term. Roughly speaking, the most
prominent aspects of embodiment for recent theory
can be subsumed under three major interests:
embodied action/agency, embodied thought/knowl-
edge, and embodied meaning/information. The
most unifying aspects that make embodiment a
paradigm for recent theories can be seen in the fol-
lowing generalizations: On the one hand, embodi-
ment implies situatedness—thus, it is always about
a here and now. On the other hand, embodiment is
always about something that also exists in disem-
bodied forms or processes of disembodiment—thus,
the embodied can be an object of either abstraction/
generalization or of transmission.
These generalizations allow for the emergence
of quite different concepts of embodiment: A neu-
roscientist or a cybernetic thinker conceives of the
embodied mind in terms of the functions of mental
activity in an embodied context. For a phenome-
nologist, situatedness corresponds to so-called
first-person experience and its state of sensing by
the body (e.g., the insurmountable location of the
eyes in visual experience of a place). To the phenom-
enologist’s eyes, this very experience can be differen-
tiated from the third-person experience of
disembodiment (which corresponds, for example, to
the experience of imagining one’s own location on a
mental map of the place in which one is situated—
indeed, the difference between “embodied” way-
finding and “disembodied” mapping is one of the
most striking examples of this difference).
In theories of identity, the prevailing premises of
embodiment are its relation to human personhood,
as linked to consciousness (and its situatedness in
basic environmental responsive activities), and as
linked to meaning and communication. This entry
provides a brief overview of phenomena of embodi-
ment with regard to these three overlapping
grounds and discusses the concepts of embodiment
and disembodiment as both a challenge to and
support for anthropological theories of identity.
As a preliminary historical consideration of this
brief overview, one issue about the concept of
embodiment must be highlighted, an issue that can
sometimes obscure an adequate understanding of
less recent concepts of embodiment and even the
related theological concept of incarnation. When
considering the relations of embodied (material)
and disembodied (spiritual) items, one should not
forget that only a few centuries ago the predomi-
nating medical theory conceived the body itself as
lifeless—an object animated only by the spiritual
forces of the soul. So if today we conceive the
embodiment of something spiritual as “giving life
(and sensual reality) to an idea,” not very long ago
the same process was thought of as “giving life
(and senses) to a body.” Thus, if today the semiotic
problem of prereflective meaning is a problem of
embodiment, not very long ago, it was instead
crucial to mystic and purely spiritual (disembod-
ied) experience as well.
Phenomenology, Psychology, and
Neuropsychology of Embodiment
Only few aspects of the embodied being occur to
consciousness; most of the corporeal processes
(such as the transportation of oxygen to our mus-
cles) never become conscious—or only do so in a
very mediated way. Many other processes could
become conscious, but they do so very seldom

(e.g., our breathing) or even never (e.g., the sensing
of the distinct muscles that move the heart). This is
also true with regard to processes related to the
environmental interactions of human bodies.
Nobody is ever aware of the coordination of all
the hundreds of muscles involved when she or he
is swimming; however, someone who is learning to
swim consciously focuses on many aspects of her
or his motion and these aspects will become auto-
matic and withdraw from consciousness later.
Furthermore, two different states of consciousness
with regard to human bodily relations must be
distinguished. According to the German phenom-
enologist Helmuth Plessner, humans are equipped
with a twofold experience of corporeality: On the
one hand, they “have” a body; on the other hand,
they “are” a body. Indeed, in their experience,
humans seem to be provided not only with a bio-
logical body but also with a phenomenal body that
is the focus of humans’ senses and that is perceived
by humans.
But perhaps Plessner’s consciousness-based
approach is still too much based on consciousness.
The latter implies that an observational, self-reflective
conscious bodily experience has to be distinguished
from a nonobservational, nonreflective one; it also
implies that these two options are always interfer-
ing. The French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-
Ponty accordingly distinguished what he called the
body-image (i.e., the conscious mental representa-
tion of the body) from the body-schema (i.e., the
partly unconscious and spontaneously working set
of embodied knowledges). To illustrate the distinc-
tion, Merleau-Ponty gives the example of writing on
a typewriter: Even without a conscious mental rep-
resentation of either the keyboard or the exact
direction in which to move across it (i.e., without
using the body image), the fingers can “know” the
keys themselves (by their embodied knowledge—
the body schema). So while the body-schema is
about direct and predominantly locomotive and
motor (inter)actions, the body-image is about indi-
rect and more conceptual interaction. Or, to turn to
the example of dance, if, so to speak, the body-
schema (as a presence phenomenon) is about the
creativeness of the dancer-as-body, the body-image
(as a mental representation) is about the creativity
of the dancer-as-choreographer.
Moreover, even in the most conscious and
seemingly disembodied acts, unconscious elements
Embodiment and Body Politics 245
are always already involved. In articulating
thoughts, for example, the intuitive, unplanned-for
aspects involved in developing and articulating
communicative messages plays as great a role in
their construction as any other factor. These
embodied actions are never completely conscious,
and they cannot be completely controlled by a
conscious will. For this reason, they are essential
parts of embodied emotional communication. Of
importance for this issue is the action of the vocal
chords, the respiratory system, muscles involved in
facial expression, and gestures.
Gestures, though, are also good spies of meta-
phorical reasoning (as theorized by George Lakoff
and Mark Johnson). Gestures show the shaping of
thoughts by the situated body. For example, some
spontaneous gestures show how abstract concepts
can be literally grasped by the hands, and they
allow for conceiving of even abstract mental action
as always already embodied.
Recent theories mentioned henceforth conceive
of both body and mind not as monadic but as
shaped by and acting upon their environment (a
fact implied in the neuroscientific understanding of
the plasticity of the brain). As referenced in the
keyboard example, embodiment always exceeds
the borderline of the skin; it always involves the
environment, media, and tools. Such tools, exceed-
ing body boundaries, may be considered prosthetic
and can even be figured as parts of the body.
Merleau-Ponty gives the example of a blind
person’s walking stick, which is not perceived as
object but rather as an organ of perception and a
part of the body-schema through which she or he
engages with the world.
Human embodiment is always, therefore,
already cyborgian: The technically shaped environ-
ment is part of human embodiment. The embodied
adaptiveness, indeed, cannot be discussed without
considering the environmental relation as a medi-
atic and as a cultural fact too. The human habitat
is culturally and technically shaped; hence, habitat
and habits are two related facts.
Mediated Embodiment
Accordingly, embodied identity is always distrib-
uted to and mediated by tools, prostheses, and
media. To begin with a simple example, our
embodied identity can be transported around the
246 Embodiment and Body Politics
world by a phone, transmitting our voice to remote
places. A more complex case is that of identities
mediated by the use of avatars in shared virtual
environments. Indeed, most users of virtual places
such as “Second Life” feel in some way identical
with their avatar, which (who?) seems to be a sec-
ond embodiment of their identity, transporting
their personhood into another world, and many
facts allow for the conclusion that the avatar in
these circumstances is much more than a mere dis-
embodied representation of a person. Moreover, it
also seems to be a second communicating body of
which there can be a self-reflexive body-image, a
second place to situate personhood, and thus the
avatar takes part in and is a part of one’s own iden-
tity. Hence, avatars are not only about the disem-
bodiment of identity but also about its technical
re-embodiment in a tele-present environment.
There are, however, other, less technically
advanced but nevertheless even more sophisticated
forms of embodied distributed personhood. Social
identities cannot be conceived of without consid-
eration of their extensions to the inanimate—
beginning with, for example, clothing and apparel
and extending to household items and collected
furnishings. This is, indeed, a phenomenon of
environmental relation with the personal habitat,
of disembodiment of personhood (an abstraction
from the biological body), and of re-embodiment
within the inanimate—the borders of which are
difficult to delineate, especially when thinking
about tools. Andy Clark argues that humans are
natural-born cyborgs, extending beyond their
natural limitations.
Semiotics of Embodiment
The problem of how meaning can be embodied is
much more complex than one might guess at first
glance. Meaning is conceived by most semiotic theo-
rists as something that derives from signification—
that is, from something present (the signifier)
standing for something else (the signified meaning)
in its absence. Embodiment, though, requires a dif-
ferent concept of signification—one that is based
more on presence—as becomes clear when think-
ing about laughter. Laughter is a fact of both
embodied emotional experiencing and embodied
emotional communication. From an observational
point of view, laughter stands for the emotion it
communicates—it is its index or indexical sign.
Because it can be faked, it can even become an
arbitrary sign. On the other hand, this observa-
tional stance does not take into account either the
contagious effects of laughter on our mood and on
our disposition to laughter or to the fact that, for
the experiencing person, it is not always only a sign
of but often is also part of the very emotion it com-
municates. Hence, communication by laughter also
works on the level of nonobservational and prere-
flective environmental interaction; and here it does
not stand for, it simply feels like.
Embodied communication of meaning cannot
be sufficiently analyzed by sole recourse to models
of cultural production of a deciphered meaning.
Culturally shaped embodied meaning must also be
described by drawing on the processes of disem-
bodiment and re-embodiment, shaped by mimetic
learning processes. This kind of embodied semiot-
ics has recently been discovered as a fundamental
issue of emotional communication mediated by the
action of mirror neurons basic to current theories
of emotional understanding and emotional reason-
ing. Current theorists have turned away from
thinking of emotions as inner and subjective expe-
riences and instead conceive them as ecologically
contextualized and sensual interrelations. These
theories are conceived based partially on our
empirical knowledge of the work of mirroring neu-
rons that allow for an embodied, noncognitive and
unmediated kind of empathy. Once perceived,
human actions spontaneously evoke simulated
body states, allowing the embodied sensorium of
another person to be felt as if embodied in one’s
own embodied sensorium. Emotional communica-
tion thereby seems to be a realm in which signs do
not distinguish a present, sensual signifier from an
absent, mental signified. Emotionality seems to be
a form of both embodied reasoning and embodied
knowledge, and emotional communication seems
to work by disembodiment and reembodiment—
rather than by a reading process executed by a
disembodied mind.
To be clear, the mere statement that embodied
communication can take place in a spontaneous
and noncognitively mediated way does not imply
that embodiment is a biological fact beyond the
cultural production of meaning, but means only

that the cultural production of meaning cannot be
sufficiently described by a hermeneutics of deci-
phering alone. Thus, embodied communication
may manifest itself in manifold ways. It can be
based on emotional and partly unconscious or cor-
poreal responses (such as tone of voice, blushing,
laughter, etc.); it can be semiotic in a narrower
sense of the word (such as the conscious use of
bodily signs and language—or the communication
by dressing, shaping a garden in the style of a
Tuscan castle, or driving an SUV); and it can be a
mixed phenomenon of habitual attitudes, gestures,
and so forth, participating in both forms of com-
munication. All of these issues are important for
developing a social embodied identity, distinct
from other identities.
Body Politics
In terms of semiotic phenomena, the body can be
described as a nodal point or nexus of power
based on discourse and hence as a means of pro-
duction. The body is “invested” with ideas, and
power relations are “inscribed” into the body by
disciplinary means. Michel Foucault has described
the body as a site of inscription and encodings. In
Discipline and Punish, Foucault focuses on cul-
tural means of either premodern punishment as a
form of revenge or modern punishment and con-
trol as a means for reaching required normaliza-
tion. (Foucault concentrates on factories, hospitals,
and schools modelled on the modern prison.) In
his History of Sexuality, Foucault’s concern is with
the internalization of norms developed by the sci-
ences of sexuality (i.e., he focuses on the subjective
issues of encoding bodies) instead of normaliza-
tions executed on individuals as objects of the
execution of power.
Another highly influential theory about both
embodied culture and embodied meaning is the
concept of the habitus. The term had been intro-
duced by the anthropologist Marcel Mauss and
was further developed by the French sociologist
Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu describes how, not only
by their clothes, furniture, and so forth, but also by
taste, cultural preferences, and even their mostly
unconscious—but nevertheless learned and
shaped—corporeal behavior (gestures, mimicry,
etc.), people communicate their social status and
Embodiment and Body Politics 247
emit signals about their truth claims and the social
class they belong to. Thus, it is impossible not to
embody meanings that other people can decipher
as signs of a social identity.
One criticism of both Foucault’s and Bourdieu’s
theory of embodiment is that embodiment is
described as a phenomenon of inscription of mean-
ing rather than one of incorporation at the core of
the production of identity. Judith Butler has focused
on this “paradox of inscription” by stating that the
fact of inscribing implies the preexistence of a neu-
tral and biologically given, nonculturalized body,
onto which meanings are then inscribed. In her
1989 article “Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily
Inscriptions,” Butler argues that such a precultural
body does not exist but that human corporeality is
always already culturally produced as a “result of
a diffuse and active structuring of the social field.”
From a feminist perspective, she argues that there
is no ontological difference between biological sex
and cultural gender, and yet sex is not conceivable
without cultural construction.
The fact that there is no body before cultural
construction means, in fact, that this impossibility
of avoiding construction is itself natural. Peter
Sloterdijk has furthered this argumentation in his
1999 lecture Rules for the Human Zoo by conceiv-
ing of humanism as always already being an active
production of what is to be considered human;
nevertheless, both the withdrawal of a metaphysi-
cal or divine truth and the challenges of biotech-
nology, in Sloterdijk’s eyes, exceed this constellation
and lead to a posthumanist situation in need of
concrete rules for “biocultural” reproduction.
Butler’s argument that there is no body before
culture can also be reversed by stating that there is
no body after nature either if the semantic encod-
ing and cultural construction of corporeality is
unavoidable in human experiencing or if the fact
of unavoidable cultural construction is part of
human nature. If the anthropological condition of
humans consists in already being habitualized and
thereby encoded, these predispositions can be
described (e.g., by referencing concepts of mirror
neurons). Hence, cultural studies have also par-
tially gone in the opposite direction by naturalizing
the disposition for culture and technology—as
Andy Clark did, for example, in conceiving the
Natural-Born Cyborgs.
248 English as a Second Language (ESL)
In her 1991 book chapter “A Cyborg Manifesto:
Science, Technology and Socialist Feminism in the
Late Twentieth Century,” Donna Haraway has
also countered and furthered both arguments by
referring to relations of technically mediated
embodiment to argue against such an anthropo-
logical basis by developing the figure of the cyborg
as an “impure” creature without a nature as an
ontological or anthropological given.
Nevertheless, the concept of the cyborg chal-
lenging ontological premises about the human
nature is not a new idea—and it can also lead into
the opposite, totalitarian direction. In 1931, four
years before his death and in the middle of the
Stalinist utopian era, Russian astronautic theorist
Konstantin Eduardovich Tsiolkovsky (1925), in
The Monism of the Universe, conceived of progress
creating an immortal and yet corporeal human
with no need for meat or plants, surrounded by a
protective transparent plasma. The concept of the
disciplining of the body and the concept of the
cyborg have rarely been driven as far as in these
considerations, showing that both can go hand-in-
hand and moreover that, if led into a utopian direc-
tion, cyborgian posthumanism also tends to exceed
concepts of embodiment: By conceiving of a body
that is a fact of construction only, one tends toward
the material realization of the Cartesian spirit
rather than a notion of embodiment in a more tra-
ditional sense of the word.
Jan Georg Söffner
See also Adaptation; Consciousness; Cultural
Representation; Habitus; Immediacy;
Mind-Body Problem; Phenomenology; Political
Identity; Self
Further Readings
Bourdieu, P. (2000). Pascalian meditations. Palo Alto,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Clark, A. (2003). Natural-born cyborgs: Minds,
technologies, and the future of human intelligence.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Gallagher, S. (2007). The arts and sciences of the situated
body. Janus Head, 9(2). Available at http://www
.janushead.org/
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002). Phenomenology of
perception. London: Routledge.
Empire
See Colonialism
English as a
Second Language (ESL)
English as a Second Language (ESL), also called
English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL),
refers to English used by a person who had
acquired at least one other language before learn-
ing English. The term is often used in educational
settings and in reports that provide demographic
information. There is an increasing ESL population
in the world as a result of colonialism, immigra-
tion, and economic and technological advancements
led by English-speaking people. Language and
English language policy contribute to the formation
of one’s individual and group identities, although
the relation is complex.
The English language has the third-largest pop-
ulation of native speakers among the many lan-
guages of the world. In addition, if both native and
nonnative speakers are considered, English is one
of the most spoken languages in the world (along
with Mandarin Chinese). English is widely spoken
because it is the primary language of two major
powers in recent world history: the United Kingdom
and the United States of America. Both countries
receive immigrants who either already speak
English or who need to learn ESL. Many former
colonies of the United Kingdom elected to use
English as a primary or an official language of their
nation, despite not being the people’s native
tongue. In addition, due to the preeminent position
of the United States in the 20th century, English is
used worldwide as a common language in various
fields, such as economy, science, technology, media,
and politics. In this capacity, English has emerged
as a leading international or global language.
ESL is defined by its use in three different con-
texts. In the first context, it refers to English
learned and used by immigrants and minority
groups in a country where the primary or official
language is English. ESL users in these countries

often speak their mother tongue at home and in
their linguistic and cultural communities, but learn
and use English to function in the dominant
group’s society. In countries such as Australia,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, immigrants from China may speak
Chinese with family and friends, but are expected
to use English at school and work and to conduct
official business.
In the second context, English is a designated
official language of a country, even though it is not
the first language of most people in the society and
few people may speak it well. In these countries,
there are often groups of people who speak differ-
ent and sometimes competing local languages, and
English is chosen as a common, neutral language
for communication. For example, although many
different languages are spoken in Uganda, English
is an official language of the nation and one of
the most commonly used languages. As English is
the language of education and of government, the
command of the English language allows a person
to obtain a better job, higher socioeconomic sta-
tus, and prestige. Other such countries in which
English serves this second function include India,
the Philippines, and Nigeria.
The third context involves a broader interpreta-
tion of ESL. In this case, ESL users live in societies
where English is not the primary or official lan-
guage and is not used in daily communication. The
users are likely to learn English as a Foreign
Language (EFL). English is used as the medium of
communication only when it is the common lan-
guage among two or more communicators. Such
ESL is often used for specific communication in
commerce, academia, technology, and so on. For
instance, a German business person may meet a
Japanese business person in Brazil and discuss
business deals in English, or a group of researchers
from Italy, Korea, and Russia may communicate
on the Internet using English.
In the first context, English is taught in bilingual
programs and ESL programs in schools and in
community adult education programs. Generally
speaking, bilingual programs support children
who are developing English language proficiency
while maintaining command of their mother
tongue and heritage culture. ESL programs often
offer total immersion in an English environment
English as a Second Language (ESL) 249
focusing on development of competence in English
and in the dominant culture. In the second context,
English is often a means of instruction in higher
education, while elementary and secondary-level
public schools generally use local languages. Parents
with financial resources may prefer sending their
children to private schools that use English because
this provides their children with access to socioeco-
nomic success and prestige. In the third context,
English is taught as a foreign language (EFL). EFL
curriculum and teaching approaches are different
from those used in an ESL context. Understanding
the target culture(s) is important in EFL learning,
but acculturation is not a goal in this situation. Some
ESL and EFL programs offer courses in English for
Specific Purposes (ESP), which provide instruction
focusing on the specific needs of a group of learners;
these courses include English for Academic Purposes,
English for Business, English for Science and
Technology, and English for Nursing.
The level of proficiency achieved in ESL varies.
Proficiency can depend on many factors, including
a learner’s first language, age, personality, educa-
tional level, motivation, and needs. How and
where English is learned are other important fac-
tors. Some people attain near-native and native-
like proficiency and become bilingual speakers,
whereas others develop only a basic proficiency
required to address daily needs. In some cases,
second-language proficiency may even come to
exceed that in the first language. With the rise of
ESL population in various parts of the world, a
wide variety of “Englishes,” such as Indian English
and Singaporean English, have emerged. There are
advocates for recognition of such “World
Englishes.” This has led to questions concerning
what “standard English,” “standard dialect,” and
“native speaker” mean.
Language is one of the key factors in the forma-
tion and expression of identity. English language
policy could be used to encourage or discourage a
certain group identity. For instance, Native
Americans who speak “good” English may be
viewed more favorably by people in the dominant
culture. Although the United States, a nation of
people with diverse backgrounds, purports to
endorse bilingualism and multiculturalism, English
is nonetheless the principal language associated
with U.S. national identity and is promoted as the
250 Enryo-Sasshi Theory
common language that connects and unites people
with different linguistic and cultural identities.
When people learn a second language, issues of
identity complexly interrelate with and affect the
course of acquisition. Second-language learners
develop a new linguistic identity as they renegoti-
ate their prior identity (associated with their native
language and culture). In an ESL situation, swift
and smooth cultural assimilation or acculturation
is likely to accelerate English learning and vice
versa. If immigrants perceive the dominant culture
and society positively and accept them, they will
learn the dominant language better and more
quickly. In this process, they identify with the
dominant culture and adjust their identity to fit
better with dominant norms and values. On the
other hand, if minority group members reject the
mainstream culture and keep their own ethnolin-
guistic identity, they may be resistant to learning
the dominant language.
As the number of ESL users worldwide is pre-
dicted to increase, bilingualism and multicultural-
ism will likely become more common. New
varieties of English and the use of English as a
global language will further augment the complex-
ity of the relation between ESL and identity.
Fukumi Tanaka Matsubara
See also Acculturation; Bilingualism; Ethnolinguistic
Identity Theory; Language; Multiculturalism; Sapir-
Whorf Hypothesis
Further Readings
Miller, J. M. (2000). Language use, identity, and social
interaction: Migrant students in Australia. Research
on Language and Social Interaction, 33, 69–100.
Nero, S. J. (Ed.). (2006). Dialects, Englishes, creoles, and
education. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Norton, B. (2000). Identity and language learning:
Gender, ethnicity and educational change. London:
Longman.
Enryo-Sasshi Theory
Many Westerners, especially U.S. Americans, share
the perception that the Japanese communicate
“ambiguously,” “passively,” “politely,” “mod-
estly,” and even “silently.” Sociolinguists and
communication researchers have suggested that
Japanese communication is characterized by less
verbalization, subtle nonverbal cues, and longer
pauses. Implicit nonverbal messages seem to play
a more important role in Japanese social interac-
tions than do explicit verbal messages. Japanese
enryo-sasshi theory was constructed to account
for the sources of these perceived cross-cultural
differences and demystify the psychology and pro-
cess of Japanese communication. Satoshi Ishii, a
Japanese pioneer in interpersonal and intercul-
tural communication research, first proposed the
enryo-sasshi model in discussing Japanese nonver-
bal behaviors in 1973. He refined it in 1984, as a
key to understanding Japanese interpersonal rela-
tions. It is one of the first non-Western attempts to
systematically theorize an Asian mode of commu-
nication with Asian indigenous concepts.
Enryo and sasshi, the two key communication
concepts of Ishii’s theory, had long been addressed
and adumbrated separately in Japan studies. Ishii
linked these cultural concepts in a theoretically
intelligible manner. Enryo refers generally to being
modest and reserved, exercising self-restraint,
being considerate and thoughtful, and refraining
from making requests or asking favors. Enryo
functions as a psychological filter and requires
control of one’s thoughts and actions so as to
avoid carelessly saying and doing things. Sasshi
roughly means social sensitivity, empathic guess-
work, mind reading, and “putting yourself in
another’s shoes.” Sasshi demands that one should
be very perceptive and receptive in order to under-
stand what others mean or to sense of what others
want or need. Ishii maintained that enryo on the
part of the speaker and sasshi on the part of the
listener constitute the two complementary wheels
of Japanese interpersonal communication.
In his 1984 model, Ishii identified a total of 16
stages of the enryo-sasshi communication process.
Person A has certain meanings (i.e., ideas, feelings,
and/or experiences) to convey to Person B (Stage 1).
In the process of encoding the meanings into verbal
and/or nonverbal messages, Person A first scruti-
nizes them through the psychological filter of enryo
(Stage 2). He or she carefully considers whether
the encoded messages will possibly damage inter-
personal and situational harmony. If Person A

suspects that the messages can hurt Person B or
disturb the atmosphere of wa (harmony), he or she
will reencode and reframe the meanings so as to
further “soften” the messages. Ishii called this act
internal self-feedback (Stage 3). Person A will send
out the messages only when he or she deems that
they are safe and perhaps vague (Stage 4). Due to
this enryo-screening process in consideration of the
other communicator and the communication con-
text, psychologically speaking, the message-sending
“exit” of the Japanese is narrower than their message-
receiving “entrance.” Even after he or she has sent
the messages, Person A can still rethink the mes-
sages and modify parts of them. Ishii called this act
external self-feedback (Stage 5).
To make the enryo-influenced communication
smooth and successful, Person B is expected to
receive the messages with his or her entrance wide
open (Stage 6). In the process of decoding Person
A’s implicit and often unclear messages, Person B
uses his or her sasshi competence to “expand” or
“develop” the limited and restricted information
(Stage 8). Person B deciphers the intended meaning
of the messages (Stage 9). Person B then will follow
the same message-sending process of enryo (Stages
9–14), and Person A will follow the same mes-
sage-receiving process of sasshi (Stages 15–16).
Both enryo and sasshi may be operating when
Japanese communicators frequently use silences
or “awkward” pauses during the conversation. A
person of good sasshi, called sasshi ga ii, is highly
appreciated in Japan partly because the enryo-
sasshi communication style is commonly employed
in everyday life.
To elucidate the historical background of enryo-
sasshi communication, Ishii pinpointed five con-
tributing factors: (1) cultural homogeneity, (2) the
autonomous rice-growing village lifestyle, (3) the
belief in kotodama (language spirit), (4) Zen
Buddhism, and (5) Confucianism. Despite ethnic
diversity in Japan, under the strong pressure of
assimilation, members of Japanese society shared
their sociocultural backgrounds to the extent that
they could contextualize their interpersonal inter-
actions in similar ways. The small-scale and self-
sufficient rice-growing villages also nurtured the
extended but close-knit family system of honke
(head clan) and bunke (divided branched families),
which rendered a harmonious, nonconfrontational
mode of communication necessary. Furthermore,
Enryo-Sasshi Theory 251
the Japanese have believed that spirits reside in
spoken words and that careless remarks will have
negative consequences. Additionally, Zen Buddhism
has underscored ishin-denshin (the meeting of
minds) through intuitive, silent communication.
Confucianism, on the other hand, reinforced
Japanese social stratification and hierarchical human
relations during the Edo period (1603–1867).
In his 1994 cross-cultural study of silence and
silences, Ishii (with Thomas J. Bruneau) character-
ized the dominant mode of interaction in the
United States as “exaggeration-reduction commu-
nication” in contrast to Japanese enryo-sasshi
communication. In Ishii’s view, U.S. society, in
which there has been a high degree of cultural
heterogeneity, impels its members to actively
exchange explicit and elaborated messages. U.S.
Americans are, by and large, accustomed to pro-
ducing straightforward and detailed messages
through the wider exit, in a somewhat “exagger-
ated” way, rather than implying or hinting at what
they want to express. Ishii commented that the
psychological mechanism of U.S. message screen-
ing and internal self-feedback are rougher than
that of Japanese enryo-sasshi. In processing the
exaggerated and elaborated messages, U.S.
Americans subconsciously “reduce” the over-
loaded information contained in the verbal and/or
nonverbal messages. Hence, the message-receiving
entrance is smaller than that of the Japanese.
When they decode messages as listeners, U.S.
Americans do not have to fathom out intended
meanings from the limited information given,
resorting to their socially sensitive, empathic
guesswork.
For the past several decades, Japanese enryo-
sasshi theory has been frequently referenced in
cross-cultural and intercultural communication
research. It has been widely used not only to illus-
trate Japanese premises and practices of communi-
cation but also to delineate non-Western,
particularly Asian, styles of communication. It has
been deployed even to describe and discern non-
dominant patterns of Western communication.
Interculturally, because other Asian cultures have
indigenous concepts very similar to enryo and
sasshi (e.g., the Filipino concepts of pahiwatig
and pakikiramdam, the Korean concept of nunchi,
and the Thai concept of kreng jai), it would be
intriguing to see how Japanese enryo-sasshi theory
252 Ethical and Cultural Relativism
will contribute to the formulation of a more general
model of Asian communication. Intraculturally,
Japanese communication scholars have made further
theorizing endeavors to invigorate the enryo-sasshi
model by investigating how the theory is positioned
in relation to other cultural values such as amae
(interdependence), awase (accommodation), ma (in-
betweenness), and omoiyari (thoughtfulness).
Yoshitaka Miike
See also Asiacentricity; Collectivism/Individualism;
Culture; Face/Facework; Group Identity; Perceptual
Filtering; Self-Efficacy; Values; Worldview
Further Readings
Ishii, S. (1973). Characteristics of Japanese nonverbal
communicative behavior. Communication: Journal of
the Communication Association of the Pacific, 2(3),
43–60.
Ishii, S. (1984). Enryo-sasshi communication: A key to
understanding Japanese interpersonal relations. Cross
Currents: An International Journal of Language
Teaching and Cross-Cultural Communication, 11(1),
49–58.
Ishii, S., & Bruneau, T. (1994). Silence and silences in
cross-cultural perspective: Japan and the United States.
In L. A. Samovar & R. E. Porter (Eds.), Intercultural
communication: A reader (7th ed., pp. 246–251).
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Klopf, D. W. (1991). Japanese communication practices:
Recent comparative research. Communication
Quarterly, 39(2), 130–143.
Koyama, S. (2009). Toward developing a Japanese enryo-
sasshi scale: An attempt to identify relevant variables
(in Japanese). Dokkyo Working Papers in
Communication, 35, 51–62.
Miike, Y. (2003). Japanese enryo-sasshi communication
and the psychology of amae: Reconsideration and
reconceptualization. Keio Communication Review, 25,
93–115.
Ethical and
Cultural Relativism
The principle of ethical and cultural relativism is
widely misunderstood within academic, political,
and social arenas. In its original sense, the principle
of cultural relativism is a methodological state-
ment about how cultures should be studied.
Anthropologists believe individuals’ cognitions,
motivations, and behaviors are learned culturally
and can be understood only in terms of the indi-
vidual’s cultural context. Although never specifi-
cally used in his writings, the phrase cultural
relativism is often attributed to the anthropologist
Franz Boas. The principle underlying cultural rela-
tivism is essentially methodological and not based
on political, social, or moral dogma. Boas believed,
as did many others, that humans are necessarily
ethnocentric (i.e., the belief that one’s native cul-
ture is the standard by which other cultures are
observed and judged) and that our observations of
other cultures are necessarily biased in favor of our
native cultural background. For example, a person
raised in Culture A is taught that his or her cultural
traditions, values, and customs are the preferred
and accepted standards by which one should con-
duct his or her life. Consequently, an individual
from Culture A cannot draw conclusions about
some other Culture B’s traditions, values, and cus-
toms without some inherent bias. Moreover, Boas
believed that any particular culture is an adapta-
tion to, and a distinctive product of, a unique set
of historical, social, and environmental conditions.
As these conditions vary, cultures vary accord-
ingly; in this sense, there is no correct culture.
Boas’s ideas follow from Darwin’s theory of evolu-
tion. Furthermore, Boas argued that to fully under-
stand a culture, researchers must compile a complete
taxonomy of the culture’s traditions, religious
practices, social mores, sex roles, physical appear-
ance and dress, dietary habits, and communica-
tion systems within the context of that particular
culture. To accomplish this methodologically,
researchers may be required to embed themselves
longitudinally in the environment of the culture
under study. This methodology is the basis of eth-
nographic research, where a researcher may actu-
ally live within some culture over time, establish
relationships with its inhabitants, learn its systems
of traditions and communication, and record its
activities. The principle of cultural relativism, then,
is a methodological principle about how to con-
duct anthropological research. Because cultures
vary significantly, conclusions about a particular
culture must be made within the context of that
culture, that is, relative to that culture.

By the 1950s, the tenets of cultural relativism
became widespread throughout the field of anthro-
pology and were accepted by most anthropolo-
gists. During this time, however, misinterpretations
of Boas’s original thesis were being disseminated
especially within political and religious circles.
Such misinterpretations, some of which confuse
cultural relativism with ethical relativism, exist
today. For example, critics who misunderstand the
original thesis of cultural relativism insist that cul-
tural relativism is the point of view that all cultur-
ally held beliefs are equally valid and that truth is
relative. These same critics mistakenly contend
that those who practice the methodology of cul-
tural relativism believe that all religious, ethical,
aesthetic, and political beliefs are entirely relative
to the individual within a particular cultural con-
text. Moreover, these critics often amalgamate
cultural relativism with moral relativism, situa-
tional relativism, and cognitive relativism. Scholars
studying cultures from a cultural relativist perspec-
tive describe cultural values, beliefs, and behaviors.
Critics from an ethical relativistic perspective pre-
scribe the way people should think and act. The
critical debate among ethicists is whether some
cultural tradition or act can be inherently right or
wrong, thus implying a form of universality in
ethical standards, or whether some cultural tradi-
tion or act can only be judged within the context of
its performance. For example, Manuel Velasquez,
Claire Andre, Thomas Shanks, and Michael
J. Meyer maintain that ethical relativism is the
perspective that holds that morality is relative to
the norms of a particular culture. Cultural beliefs,
traditions, or actions are considered right or wrong
based on the moral norms of the culture in which
they are practiced. From this perspective, there are
no universal moral standards that apply across
cultures. To the ethical relativist, the only moral
standards against which a society’s practices can
be judged are its own. The dilemma for the ethical
relativist, and thus for myriad cultural groups, is
that there can be no universal standard for resolv-
ing moral arguments. Most ethicists reject this type
of ethical relativism.
As a case study, for example, take the issue of
dowry deaths within Indian culture. In India, mar-
riages are often arranged between the parents of
the future bride and groom. In India, it is custom-
ary for young men and women to advertise their
Ethical and Cultural Relativism 253
availability for marriage, often in newspapers and
other media. Men will often allure potential brides
using their superior caste level. Rising up the caste
is seen by the bride-to-be’s family as a means to
move up the social hierarchy. In virtually all mari-
tal arrangements, the bride’s family is required to
pay a dowry; that is, a gift of some sort or financial
grant to be paid to the groom’s family. If the
bride’s family cannot meet the dowry arrange-
ments, or if the groom’s family sees the given
dowry as unacceptable, the bride suffers. In India,
the bride lives in the house of her husband’s family
following the wedding. There she may be treated
as a servant and have no distinctive relationship as
a daughter-in-law within her husband’s family. In
those cases, where her family is unable to meet the
expected dowry, she may be abused, beaten, and
sometimes murdered. The typical method of dowry
deaths is brutal. The bride is chained to the kitchen
stove, doused in kerosene, and set afire. Official
India government agencies estimate the number of
dowry deaths at 6,000 every year, and this is
believed to an underestimate. Legislation outlaw-
ing dowries in India was enacted in 1961, but such
laws are typically ignored.
The point of the Indian cultural example is that
few, if any, practicing cultural anthropologists
who have adopted the principle of cultural relativ-
ism would condone the practice of dowry deaths.
There is likely not a single anthropologist, who,
after immersing himself or herself within India
culture, would justify or excuse such a cultural
custom under the guise of cultural relativism.
James W. Neuliep
See also Collective/Social Identity; Culture; Ethics of
Identity; Ethnicity
Further Readings
Boas, F., (1963). The mind of primitive man. New York:
Collier Books.
Geertz, C. (1984). Anti-anti-relativism. American
Anthropologist, 86(2), 263–278.
Fox, J. F. (1994). How must relativism be construed to
be coherent? Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 24,
55–75.
Marcus G., & Fischer, M. M. J. (1986). Anthropology as
cultural critique: The experimental moment in the
human sciences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
254 Ethics of Identity
Velasquez, M., Andre, C., Shanks, T., & Meyer, M. J.
(1992). Ethical relativism. Issues in Ethics, 5(2).
Ethics of Identity
Identities are interactive. They are negotiated and
exchanged in highly complex ways. Whether on
the individual or the collective level, our vitality as
persons is constructed and maintained in relation.
Therefore, it seems obvious at first glance, that the
ethics of identity should also be dialogic and rela-
tional. But mainstream ethics in the Western tradi-
tion is basically monologic. After reviewing this
kind of ethics and its application to identity, the
recent work in dialogic ethics is introduced and
applied to identity studies. Two possible principles
for an ethics of identity emerge from this historical
overview—autonomy and human dignity. Each is
introduced by its primary advocates and assessed
for constructing an ethics relevant to identity.
History of Ethics
One-Way Systems
There are three major ethical systems in North
America and Europe. All three center on the indi-
vidual decision maker, with moral discernment,
choices, and action emanating from an agent
accountable for the decisions made.
Virtue ethics, first developed systematically by
Aristotle, is rooted in the way moral behavior of
specific persons shapes character. Consequentialist
ethics since Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill
focuses on the ordinary human motivation to
avoid painful results and pursue pleasurable ones.
The duty ethics of Immanuel Kant considers moral
obligations to be a person’s imperatives without
any exceptions.
In all three cases, the moral subject is first of all
an inner space—a mind or mechanism—capable
of processing representations. The first-person-
singular is an independent being with his or her
unique consciousness. Autonomous moral agents
apply rules consistently and formally to the deci-
sions they face.
These moral systems move one way, from the
actor outward, and open important pathways for
an ethics of identity. Skeptics, however, discredit
them as alien to the two-way discourse of identity
ethics. A recent version of ethics, the dialogic
model, starts from the same premise as identity
negotiation and therefore warrants examination
also, even though it is not as prominent as the
mainstream versions.
Dialogic Ethics
Humans are dialogic agents within a language
community. Sociocultural systems precede their
occupants and endure after them. Language as a
whole is presupposed by any one of its speakers
and hearers. Discourse is a community’s language
with common meanings embedded in the commu-
nity’s institutions and practices. Language does
not merely represent reality but constitutes humans
in their different dimensions and relations. Humans
live in a reality of their own making. Humans have
enveloped their species in linguistic forms, artistic
images, and religious rites and cannot see or know
anything except through the symbolic artifice they
have constructed. In dialogue, humans do not
merely reflect reality from the outside but recom-
pose the world into discourse, thus ensuring that
reality can be comprehended at all.
Because dialogue continually interprets and
makes distinctions, it is not neutral but value-
laden. As a species, for its survival, humans need
to identify important issues and goals and then
assess where they stand relative to them. Humanity
exists inescapably in a space of ethical questions.
In this kind of dialogic morality, transcendental
criteria shift from a metaphysical plane to the hori-
zon of community, world, and being, but norms
remain nonetheless.
A sophisticated ethics of dialogue is fed by sev-
eral streams. The expanding and deepening work
in feminist ethics is of particular importance. Nel
Noddings sets feminist ethics at odds with rule-
based systems, that is, with an ethics of moral
reasoning that arranges principles in a hierarchy
and then draws conclusions logically. For feminist
theorists, individuals who adhere to formal codes
cannot ethically deal with many important prob-
lems of moral action in complicated and often
ambiguous situations. Feminist ethicist Seyla
Benhabib and social ethicist Martha Nussbaum
have fundamentally restructured ethical theory

around human interaction. Daryl Koehn reorients
the feminist relational order, turning it from its
tradition of care and stitching it into dialogic com-
munication theory instead. Rather than the basic
mainstream standard of avoiding harm to others,
individuals with this ethics rooted in the primacy
of relationships insist on compassion and nurtur-
ance for resolving conflicts among others. To
make sure relationships have primacy, Noddings
emphasizes engrossment and motivational dis-
placement. We are engrossed in the needs of oth-
ers. Those who care are fully attentive to those
needing care. They organize their schedules and
resources as a response. Through motivational
displacement, those caring move beyond their own
interests to empathize with the experiences and
views of others.
Judeo-Christian ethics is another stream, with
even a longer and wider trajectory than feminist
ethics. In the Jewish tradition, Martin Buber insists
that genuine dialogue ought to be the human spe-
cies’ primary aim. Relationships, not individuals,
have primacy. The combination I-Thou is an inte-
grated whole. The relational reality, the in-
between, the reciprocal bond, the interpersonal
cannot be decomposed into simpler elements with-
out being destroyed it. In Christianity’s terms,
humans are to love their neighbors as themselves.
Love here means Other-directed commitment, giv-
ing and forgiving with spontaneity, and spending
oneself to fulfill a neighbor’s well-being. In
Christianity’s most sophisticated forms, ethical
persons do not live according to laws that must be
obeyed but as dialogical selves living in responsive
relations with others.
The dialogic ethics that is most directly tied to
identity construction brings these streams to matu-
rity. According to Ronald C. Arnett, dialogue is
understood as public communication. Dialogue
enables people with differences in opinion to come
together in one space to develop one story with
juxtaposed ideas. Dietrich Bonhoeffer asserts that
our stories interplay with history, so that, for
example, discourse of death, pain, and suffering
includes stories of life and gratitude. The moral life
is developed through community formation, not in
obscure sanctums of the innermost self. For
Emmanuel Levinas, ethics is revealed in face-to-
face encounters. The Other’s presence involves an
obligation to which one owes one’s immediate
Ethics of Identity 255
attention. Interaction between Others and selves
makes peace normative; nonviolence is both a
political strategy and a public philosophy. In Paulo
Freire’s language, only through dialogue do we
become fully human. In dialogic communication,
we can gain a critical consciousness as an instru-
ment of liberation.
In this Arnett-Freire-Levinas model of dialogic
ethics, Friere has special meaning for the cultural
tradition in identity theory. Ronald L. Jackson II
makes culture the first core assumption in his cul-
tural contracts version of identity studies. Human
beings cannot exist without culture, and culture
organizes social processes. Stella Ting Toomey’s
foundational work on identity negotiation also
highlights the cultural domain. Humans exchange
ideas, values, and beliefs. The process of negotiat-
ing cultural identity centers on one’s worldview; its
meaning, gain, or loss guides the human interpre-
tation of events. Likewise, according to Freire,
people are fundamentally cultural beings whose
language manifests a world, not merely an inner
self. As creators, distributors, and users of culture,
humans live in a world of their own making for
which they are therefore responsible.
According to Freire, dialogue is culture creation.
Dialogue is the only morally acceptable instrument
of critical consciousness. When we gain our voice
and declare our own destiny, we demonstrate
empowerment. Through speaking a true word out
of reflection and action, we build a new culture in
the interstices and open spaces within the status
quo and contrary to the power elite. Freire con-
fronts the evils of starvation, poor housing, unem-
ployment, health hazards, and lack of essential
commodities. But these problems cannot be solved
in a culture of silence. Without the discourse of
human dignity, no transformation is possible.
Dialogic ethics, restated here around Freire, has
the same scope and depth as the identity genre.
Three Major Principles
Autonomy
In monologic mainstream ethics, autonomy
emerges as the key principle for identity negotia-
tion. Freedom from coercion by others is consid-
ered crucial in social construction. Thinking, active
beings must be free to choose their own concep-
tions of the good life. Without liberty to be oneself,
256 Ethics of Identity
negotiation does not occur; persons without lib-
erty are actually adapting themselves to the will of
others.
The freedom motif is a driving force throughout
mainstream ethics, from the latter’s early roots in
classical Greece. During the Renaissance, freedom
was released with a fury and brought to maturity
in the Enlightenment. In 18th-century Western
culture, the cult of human personality prevailed in
all its freedom. Human beings were declared a law
unto themselves, set loose from every faith that
claimed their allegiance. The 18th-century mind
saw nature as an arena of limitless possibilities in
which the sovereignty of human personality was
demonstrated by its mastery over the natural
order. Achievements in mathematics, physics, and
astronomy allowed humans to dominate nature,
which formerly had dominated them.
Individual self-determination was heralded as
the highest good. In political theory, the liberal
state as it emerged in 17th- and 18th-century
Europe left citizens free to lead their own lives
without obeisance to the church or the feudal
order. John Stuart Mill insisted, for example, that
no one can be forced to be good. In his view, state
governments should not dictate the kind of life a
citizen should lead. He preferred to see citizens
choose badly than for them to be forced by the
state to choose well. Humans cannot be happy
unless their individuality is developed freely, and
this freedom is the key to individual and social
progress. The supremacy of individual autonomy
is obvious in utilitarian ethics and entrenched in
virtue and duty systems as well.
Kwame Appiah provides a sophisticated con-
temporary account of autonomy. Based on his
close reading of John Stuart Mill, the highest value
in an ethics of identity, as he sees it, is autonomy.
He orients his argument around liberalism because
he believes its basic ethical teachings are correct.
Whenever he works on identities as social forms,
the first issue that arises for him is autonomy.
There are idealistic and exotic versions of auton-
omy that are not realistic. But Appiah does not
want an ethics of identity built on partial auton-
omy either. Sometimes it is argued that history and
culture are so strong that human freedom is
restricted. Others speak of multiple autonomies,
that is, fleeting and transient freedoms without
agency. For Appiah, neither partial nor multiple
versions are acceptable. Healthy identities, both
personal and collective, require full autonomy and
not weak or limited versions.
Out of Mill’s legacy, Appiah sees autonomy as
leading to self-development, to the cultivation of
one’s faculties through reason and judgment. Only
those who are free can make the best of situations
that social circumstances provide. The decisions of
others should not dictate our life plans, but every-
one ought to be able to choose projects themselves
and act out of their own values.
In the past couple of decades, a great deal of
attention has been paid to collective identities such
as race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, gender, and
sexuality. The question for mainstream ethics is the
extent to which identities constrain our freedom
and our ability to make our individual lives mean-
ingful. Identity is presumed to be at the heart of
human life. For the ethics of identity in this tradi-
tion, personal autonomy ought to be prominent in
all social constructions as their enabler and goal.
Human Dignity
Dialogic ethics makes human dignity supreme
instead of autonomy, and in doing so, it presup-
poses the strongest possible definition of dignitas.
That is, the human species is to be treated with
respect and worth because of its distinctive charac-
ter. This species alone creates, maintains, and
destroys its own culture. Human dignity does not
rest on merit, nor is it commanded by someone
outside the species. Dignity arises from the inside
out. It is not time bound, coming and going with
circumstances. Dignity as a term speaks to the fact
of human creative agency and responsibility for its
use. It is not attributed to a select few as their pre-
rogative but is a feature of the species. When dig-
nity is defined, the fundamental meaning of
humanness is being described.
Different cultural traditions affirm human dig-
nity in a variety of ways, but together they insist
that all human beings have sacred status without
exception. Native American discourse is steeped in
reverence for life, an interconnectedness among all
living forms so that we live in solidarity with oth-
ers as equal constituents in the web of life. In com-
munalistic African societies, likute is loyalty to the
community’s reputation, to tribal honor. In Latin
American societies, insistence on cultural identity

is an affirmation of the unique worth of human
beings. In Islam, every person has the right to
honor and a good reputation. In Confucianism,
veneration of authority is necessary because our
authorities are human beings of dignity. Respect
for another’s dignity is one ethical principle on
which various cultures rest.
Humans are not victims of their inclinations
and are not determined by the forces of nature.
They are a distinct species who choose rational
ends by rational means, and because our rational
nature exists as an end in itself, every rational crea-
ture is to be respected as such. Within the dialogic
framework, one understands the ongoing vitality
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
issued by the United Nations General Assembly in
1948. In the declaration’s well-known terms, rec-
ognizing the inherent dignity and the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human
family is the foundation of justice and peace in the
world. Every child, woman, and man has sacred
status, with no exceptions for religion, class, gen-
der, age, or ethnicity. The common sacredness of
all human beings regardless of merit or achieve-
ment is a shared commitment, not an abstract
imperative. It is, therefore, the central concept in
the worldwide struggle for human rights.
Recognition
The dialogic principle of human dignity is devel-
oped in Charles Taylor’s work around the concept
“the politics of recognition.” His important work
on multiculturalism links identity with recogni-
tion. He defines the ethics of identity in terms of
the need of, often the demand for, recognition. In
fact, the need for recognition is a driving force
behind nationalist movements in politics. Whether
minority or subaltern groups, forms of femi-
nism, or ethnic identity through traditions and
culture, typically such politics centers on recogni-
tion. But recognition is not just a luxury granted to
people who demand it; it is a vital human need.
Nonrecognition or misrecognition inflicts psycho-
logical harm. Both are forms of oppression, impris-
oning the unrecognized in a false and reduced
mode of being. Cultural identity is thus a key affir-
mation of human dignity. Only when one’s songs,
ceremonies, traditions, and rituals thrive is there
full respect for one’s culture. This kind of respect
Ethics of Identity 257
facilitates human dignity. Imperialism of another’s
culture is morally unacceptable, in the same way
economic or political imperialism is.
From a dialogic perspective, recognition is not a
supercilious pursuit. If the crucial feature of human
life is its fundamentally dialogic character, there is
a close connection between identity and recogni-
tion. In Taylor’s way of thinking, we become full
human agents, capable of understanding ourselves,
and therefore able to define our identity, through
interaction with others. The language of human
dignity is not self-defined but learned through dia-
logue within the human community. Especially
those who matter to us—significant others, as they
are typically called—matter first of all because
they affirm our being. One’s identity crucially
depends on one’s dialogic relations with others.
From the perspective of humans as cultural
beings living in dialogue, recognizing multicultural
groups politically is one of the most urgent and
vexing issues on the democratic agenda at present.
In aristocratic societies, the majority could not
reasonably expect recognition from the elite. With
the rise of democratization and collapse of social
hierarchies, the demand for recognition becomes
inescapable. The contemporary challenge of multi-
culturalism—especially in immigrant societies such
as the United States and Canada—has raised the
stakes and made easy solutions impossible.
Underneath the debates over public policy is the
foundational question about the character of cul-
tural identity and its recognition. The manner in
which race, age, gender, class, and ethnicity are
represented in dialogue provides the possibility of
a just democratic order.
Conclusion
An ethics of identity centered on freedom and
emphasizing human dignity pulls in two different
directions. The imperative of freedom gives suprem-
acy to personal choice, while the principle of
human dignity highlights the collective. However,
both freedom and human dignity agree on the cen-
trality of ethics to identity construction. Without a
starting point, negotiations are indeterminate.
Without a shared sense of right and wrong, the
discourse of identity is only rhetoric for securing
power. Without the normative, identity claims are
merely emotional preference. The ethical dimension
258 Ethnicity
ensures that identity scholars promote human
flourishing. Taylor’s work with recognition is just
another manifestation of identity scholarship in
which one finds a “unity of contraries” in which
personal freedom and human dignity of the Other
unite to form the character and importance of
human recognition.
Clifford G. Christians
See also Cosmopolitanism; Diversity; Gender; Philosophy
of Identity
Further Readings
Appiah, K. A. (2005). The ethics of identity. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Arnett, R. (2005). Dialogic confession: Bonhoeffer’s
rhetoric of responsibility. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press.
Buber, M. (1965). The history of the dialogic principle.
In Between man and man (W. Kaufman, Trans.,
pp. 209–224). New York: Macmillan.
Freire, P. (1970). The pedagogy of the oppressed. New
York: Seabury.
Jackson, R. L., II. (2002). Cultural contracts theory:
Toward an understanding of identity negotiation.
Communication Quarterly, 50, 354–367.
Levinas, E. (1981). Otherwise than being or essence. The
Hague, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.
Moltmann, J. (2007). On human dignity: Political
theology and ethics (M. D. Meeks, Trans.).
Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press.
Taylor, C., et al. (1994). Multiculturalism: Examining the
politics of recognition (A. Gutmann, Ed.). Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ting-Toomey, S. (1999). Communicating across cultures.
New York: Guilford Press.
Ethnicity
Ethnicity and identity are closely aligned in popu-
lar and academic discussions. In fact, many often
use the term ethnicity as a way to identify how
individuals are grouped or group themselves
according to some shared national or regional
heritage, religion, class, language, or culture. In
other words, ethnicity generally refers to a com-
munity or group of people who share some form
of “kinship” with each other that identifies them
as different from (to varying degrees) other com-
munities within a particular region, city, or nation.
It remains a way to differentiate one group from
another for political, cultural, social, class, or
racial reasons.
Sometimes ethnicity is confused, and actually
used synonymously, with race. That is, in everyday
discussions of identity, one’s ethnicity can be
thought to refer to his or her race. For example,
within the United States, the common assumption
remains that to identify as Black (race) automati-
cally means that one is to be identified as being
African American (ethnicity); however, Caribbean
Americans of African descent might identify them-
selves as being Black but not African American
because of a difference in national origins
(Jamaican, Guyanese, Trinidadian, Barbadian),
history, or cultural heritage (music, food, dance,
etc.). Or someone might be referred to as White
but identifies himself or herself as Italian American,
Polish American, or Russian American.
How the borders of an ethnic group are deter-
mined—who belongs to, or who should be classi-
fied as belonging to, a particular group—has been
the subject of much debate, especially when it
underlies such issues as migration, immigration,
diversity, and multiculturalism, racial and postra-
cial identity, and citizenship. These debates often
arise (and have arisen) in different ways in the
media, as well as in academic and government
institutions.
Etymology
As the previous examples intimate, ethnicity usu-
ally refers to the members of a minority group that
has relocated to a new place across a national bor-
der, where there is a dominant native group. For
example, the adjective is often used to precede
minority, as in ethnic minority. In this manner, the
term ethnic identifies persons whose claims to a
new country are not as solid as those of the domi-
nant group, whose ancestors were born in that
country. This tension between who belongs and
who does not, or who has more of a claim to (the
benefits of) a particular space, has been a part of
the historical use of the term ethnic, the root of
which is the Greek word ethnos. As Thomas H.
Erikson points out, ethnos is derived from ethnikos,

which was employed to mark someone as a hea-
then or pagan. The Oxford English Dictionary
notes that ethnicity was used to name heathendom
and to describe heathen superstition. According to
Erikson, for some 500 years, from the 14th to the
19th century, this primarily negative connotation
continued with its use in English. He notes that the
term ethnicity began to be used to connote racial
characteristics in the 19th century.
David Reisman, an American sociologist, has
been credited for the first contemporary use of the
term ethnicity. In a 1953 issue of the American
Scholar, Reisman describes an interclass relation-
ship in which the minority group feels threatened
by the better-educated middle- and upper-class
people of a given region. Erikson traces the uses of
the term ethnic to World War II, after which it was
employed to politely refer to people of Jewish,
Irish, Italian, and other origins or backgrounds
who were regarded as inferior to persons descended
from a British bloodline or to those who belonged
to the American nation.
Conflicting Definitions
Because ethnicity is often tied to migration, many
scholars have questioned how these differences are
maintained. Some have argued that because human
beings have been migrating for such a long time
and globalization has become a new factor, it has
become increasingly difficult to create definitions
or boundaries that depend on differences in race,
language, religion, or culture. In particular, the
question has been one of placement: Is it deter-
mined by the clothes one wears, how one physi-
cally looks, the language one speaks, how one
pronounces certain syllables of the dominant lan-
guage, the food one eats, or where one decides to
worship? Is it determined by bloodline or by some
form of self-identification? Or is it a combination
of some of these factors?
Many authors and scholars have examined how
an ethnic group gets identified as one using a three-
pronged approach to their studies that takes into
consideration (1) how others in a given society look
at a particular group and regard them as such
(ascribed identity), (2) how that group looks at and
understands itself as a group (avowed identity), and
(3) how ascribed and avowed identities are linked
to reinforce their common cultural connections. In
Ethnicity 259
an examination of ethnicity as a source of strength
or conflict, J. Milton Yinger proposes that this
three-pronged approach to ethnicity might be the
reason why there is some disagreement in the litera-
ture on ethnicity, as the definitions depend on some
combination of those three factors. Yinger pro-
poses that a fourth factor—hidden ethnicity—might
help to resolve these disagreements. Hidden ethnic-
ity considers the fact that not all ethnic lines might
be immediately visible, as national ideologists
sometimes work to hide the fact that there are
indeed activities built around a common origin and
ancestral culture in order to reinforce those ethnic
boundaries.
To this end, Yinger points out that ethnic
groups might be classified as hard or soft ethnici-
ties. The hard ethnicities are those that have been
established over time and have accepted and clear
boundaries—who and what is in—and a strong
ideology—why we are who we are, or the beliefs
and practices that reinforce those boundaries; the
hard ethnicities remain sociologically and psycho-
logically important. Soft ethnicities, on the other
hand, do not have fixed boundaries and ideolo-
gies; the boundaries are moveable partly as a
result of what Yinger describes as ambivalent ide-
ologies, a kind of a working definition of that
group that is used for administrative or classifica-
tion purposes.
Historical Ethnic Conflicts
Ethnicity has also become associated with the
notion of conflict as in ethnic conflict. Over the
past 20 years or so, many international conflicts
and wars have been regarded as driven by cultural
differences, religious differences, or both. For
example, the Bosnian War (1992–1995) involved
the Bosniak, Serb, and Croat ethnic populations,
resulting in the conviction of former president
Slobodan Milošević for war crimes committed
under his watch. The current conflict in Sudan pits
the Arab-dominated government against its non-
Arab population, leading to the establishment of
mass refugee camps within the Darfur region and
a destabilized Sudan.
In post–9/11 United States, charges of racial
profiling proliferated the debate of government’s
immediate response, which was marked by nation-
wide investigations of Arab Americans and
260 Ethnicity

Muslim organizations, and continue to present Ethnicity and Political Organization

challenges for the government and human rights
As the previous situations highlight how ethnicity
activists. The response reignited the past treat-
has been at the root of, or factored into, historical
ment of Japanese Americans who were interned
conflicts, ethnicity has been used as a tool to orga-
during World War II. The Rwandan genocide of
nize politically and bring services within many
the late 1980s and early 1990s saw the mass
multiethnic societies. For example, within the
executions of Tutsis and Hutus perceived to be
United States, immigrants from various countries
sympathetic to the Tutsis by the then Hutu gov-
found ways to continue to share and build with
ernment, which had the support of the French-
each other despite, and as a result of, the demands
speaking African nations. The Crown Heights
of immigration. Scholars have noted that through-
riots (Brooklyn, New York) of the early 1990s
out the 20th century, Caribbean nationals, the
that stemmed from the death of a young Caribbean
Irish, Russian and Polish Jews, Mexican and Latin
immigrant and the retribution killing of a Hasidic
American immigrants, African Americans who
Jew partly arose from the tensions that result
migrated from one region of the United States to
from separate (ethnic) communities living closely
another, and other immigrants often provided ser-
together in one area. This particular conflict held
vices for their communities such as education,
both racial and ethnic undertones because it in-
health care, child care, early childhood education,
volved not only Hasidic Jews but also Caribbean
language education, homeownership, and other
Americans and African Americans and had inter-
cultural and political organizations. The same can
national implications.
be said for ethnic communities such as Indian
The Crown Heights riots evoked the complexity
nationals who migrated to Britain, or Algerians in
of ethnicity because it involved three groups who
France. These organizations often celebrated their
were considered to be a part of American minority
differences from the larger population and made
community. It brought to the fore a crucial aspect
concerted efforts to re-create some of the culture of
of ethnicity: an ethnic group’s tie to another home-
their homeland, as well as to provide services that
land. The close-knit Hasidic Jewish community,
often were not available to these minority groups
easily identifiable by their dress and rituals and
in their new nations.
regarded as a minority group within America’s
larger Jewish population, regard Israel as their
homeland; Caribbean Americans hold claims to Ethnicity in the Academy
various islands in the Caribbean; and African
Many higher education institutions have Ethnic
Americans regard the United States and Africa as
Studies departments or programs, which focus on
their homelands, a view that many Caribbean
the very question of how social categories are
Americans also hold as a result of their history of
formed within the United States and elsewhere.
forced migration into chattel enslavement.
Sometimes called Minority Studies, the departments
The Crown Heights riots presented a peculiar
and programs generally aim to cover myriad ques-
challenge for discussions of ethnicity because of
tions and issues related to the race, nation, religion,
the overlapped and intertwined racial tensions, in
and culture of ethnic peoples. Generally interdisci-
which Jewish became equated with whiteness and
plinary in nature, the goals of the programs and
the Caribbean American and African American
departments often are to address ever-changing
communities were figured as Black. Some scholars
questions related to these populations, which neces-
have pointed out this type of fluid conjoining of
sarily transgress the boundaries of academic disci-
race and ethnicity also appears within other con-
plines and therefore draw on the resources of
flicts such as in Trinidad and Guyana where par-
scholars of religion, philosophy, literature, history,
ties are organized according to ethnicity,
music, anthropology, sociology, politics, and law.
Indo-Trinidadian or Indo-Guyanese and Afro-
Trinidadian or Afro-Guyanese, and resulting con- Alwin A. D. Jones
flicts and disenfranchisements of either group
based on which party ascends to power often get See also Culture; Culture, Ethnicity, and Race;
termed as race-based discrimination. Nationalism

Further Readings
Daniels, R. (1991). Coming to America: A history of
immigration and ethnicity in American life. New
York: HarperPerennial.
Hutchinson, J., & Smith, A. D. (Eds.). (1996). Ethnicity.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Takaki, R. (Ed.). (1987). From different shores:
Perspectives on race and ethnicity in America. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press.
Ethnolinguistic
Identity Theory
Ethnolinguistic identity theory (ELIT) addresses
the relationship between socially subordinate eth-
nic groups and their language use in social con-
texts. It is conceptually derived from Henri Tajfel
and John Turner’s social identity theory, from
which ELIT borrows four main concepts: social
categorization, social identity, social comparison,
and psychological distinctiveness. These concepts
are linked causally, whereby social categorization
accounts for an individual’s perspective of another
as a member of one’s same group (ingroup) or as a
member of a distinct other (outgroup); social iden-
tity accounts for an individual’s awareness of his
or her own social group and the values associated
with it; social comparison means the person will
favor his or her own ingroup as more desirable for
membership as compared to a perceived outgroup;
and psychological distinctiveness is derived from a
positive perception of one’s ingroup, which in turn
contributes to a positive self-identification. Taken
together, these causal factors describe the ways in
which individuals define themselves in social con-
texts. ELIT takes these factors into account and
extends on them to focus more specifically on the
language aspects of social identity. A general point
of inquiry for ELIT scholars concerns the develop-
ment of an understanding of how and under what
conditions an understanding of one’s individual
self intersects with language use. Thus, ethnolin-
guistic identity theorists seek to identify the social
psychological factors involved in the relationship
between individuals’ ethnicity and language use.
According to ELIT, although an individual may
hold membership in multiple groups that serve to
Ethnolinguistic Identity Theory 261
compose his or her social identity, never will the
individual possess or have access to all of those
relationships in equal regard in any one particular
social situation. While gender, social class, and
social group membership (e.g., profession) figure
into a speaker’s construction of social identity,
ELIT focuses on perceived ethnic identification as
the main variable in the representation of a speak-
er’s affiliation. Additionally, ethnolinguistic iden-
tity theorists propose that when particular linguistic
characteristics (e.g., ethnic linguistic constructions
or standard usage) are perceived as more valuable
in a given social context, those characteristics will
be more emphasized by the speaker.
Beyond those concepts borrowed from social
identity theory, ELIT is focused on three variables
as relevant to a person’s increase or decrease in
feelings of what Howard Giles and Patricia Johnson
term ethnic belongingness. This sense of belong-
ingness has a direct relationship to how strongly a
person identifies with an ethnic group and its par-
ticular linguistic practices. The first variable is
perceived vitality, which concerns a person’s per-
ceptions of his or her ingroup status, demography,
and institutional support for the group language.
Ethnolinguistic identity theorists propose that
where higher levels of vitality are perceived on the
part of the speakers, the group identification
increases, which in turn leads to an increase in the
use of linguistic characteristics identified as ger-
mane to the group’s language practices. One way
a group’s perceived vitality can be influenced is by
the presence of a local ethnic community where
the language can be used on a regular basis.
Another influence on vitality is the group’s con-
nection to a homeland, either personally or through
the connections of others who are part of the local
ethnic community.
The second considered variable is perceived
group boundaries: Group boundaries perceived as
less permeable contribute to clearer categories and
norms for an ethnic group. Conversely, as group
boundaries are perceived as more permeable, the
norms that define ingroup membership become
less clear. The perception of more solid group
boundaries raises the salience of membership in
that group.
The third variable, multiple group member-
ships, suggests that individuals who see themselves
as members of multiple groups possess a more
262 Ethnolinguistic Identity Theory
permeable sense of identity compared to those
who consider themselves as members of only one
or two groups. Thus, those who identify with
fewer social categories possess a stronger sense of
ethnolinguistic attachment than persons who see
themselves as members of comparatively more
social categories.
In addition to the variables that relate to a per-
ception of ethnic belongingness, psychological cli-
mate is also an important consideration within
ELIT, which accounts for the following parame-
ters: the regard to which a group member’s status
is perceived in comparison to the socially domi-
nant group, the extent to which members consider
their group to be distinctive, how they perceive the
permeability of group boundaries for membership,
and the extent to which individuals consider them-
selves as members of other social groups.
Regarding the likelihood of language mainte-
nance in a subordinate ethnic group, ELIT scholars
propose that people are more likely to maintain
their primary ethnolinguistic identity in cases
where there is a strong sense of ethnic group iden-
tification, a lower perception of the outgroup, and
a lower level of identification with norms of social
categories that are not ethnically based. Further,
ELIT offers that in addition to these factors, mem-
bers are also likely to maintain their distinctive
language practices in either a situation where group
boundaries are firm and ethnic group vitality is
perceived as low or where group boundaries are
less firm and group vitality is perceived as high.
When members have a weak sense of group
identification, relate more positively to an out-
group, or have a stronger level of identification
with nonethnic social categories, they are less likely
to maintain their ethnolinguistic identity. These
perceptions are tempered by the dominant out-
group’s support of intercultural communication,
which is displayed by policy and structural support
of the subdominant ethnic group’s language. That
is, if the state does not support intercultural com-
munication, there is the potential to increase group
identification, lower ingroup perceptions of out-
groups, make boundaries less permeable, and revi-
talize ingroup status. The less apparent dominant
group support is for ethnic language use, the more
likely ethnic language group identity will persist
and increase, leading to more instances of intereth-
nic language breakdown.
Beyond these predispositional factors, Giles and
Johnson also account for situational variables that
might also affect individuals’ likelihood to continue
to identify with their ethnic and language groups.
In such cases when individuals identify a situation
as interethnic or not, the following situational fac-
tors are considered in determining if they will
maintain their ethnic speech patterns: (a) the group
member’s sense of commitment to the conversa-
tional issue as relevant or not to their ethnic iden-
tity, (b) how status-stressing and solidarity-stressing
dimensions of the interaction compare, (c) the
extent to which they are concerned with maintain-
ing effective communication in the interethnic situ-
ation, and (d) the extent to which they perceive an
overlap in group membership with the conversant.
Michael Burns
See also Labeling; Language; Social Identity Theory
Further Readings
Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. A. (1990). Social identity
theory: Constructive and critical advances. New York:
Springer-Verlag.
Giles, H., & Johnson, P. (1981). The role of language in
intergroup relations. In J. C. Turner & H. Giles (Eds.),
Intergroup behavior (pp. 199–243). Oxford, UK:
Blackwell.
Giles, H., & Johnson, P. (1987). Ethnolinguistic identity
theory: A social psychological approach to language
maintenance. International Journal of the Sociology of
Language, 68, 69–99.
Hildebrandt, N., & Giles, H. (1983). The Japanese
subordinate group: Ethnolinguistic identity theory in a
foreign language context. Anthropological Linguistics,
26, 436–466.
Oakes, L. (2001). Language and national identity:
Comparing France and Sweden. Amsterdam: John
Benjamins.
Simpson, A. (2008). Language and national identity in
Africa. New York: Oxford University Press.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory
of intergroup conflict. In W. C. Austin & S. Worchel
(Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations
(pp. 33–53). Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Etic/Emic
Kenneth Pike developed the terms etic and emic,
which are two different approaches to examining
culture. An etic approach assumes that culture can
be examined with predetermined categories that
can be applied to all cultures in the search for
cultural universals. In contrast, an emic perspec-
tive approaches each culture as a unique entity
that can only be examined by constructs devel-
oped from inside the culture. This entry explores
etic and emic approaches and their relationship to
social identity.
Etic accounts of social identity assume people
develop and maintain social identities in similar
ways regardless of their cultural background. For
example, Henri Tajfel, who developed social iden-
tity theory, proposed that human beings develop
their identities by being members of social groups.
To retain a positive self-identity, people generally
perceive their own groups favorably and the
groups they are not members of less favorably.
This is a universal process, according to Tajfel,
which can lead to prejudice and discrimination
because people exaggerate differences between
groups to elevate their self-identity and worth.
Consider the classic research on racial difference
in the United States and how Black Americans are
often viewed negatively by prejudiced White
Americans in order for White Americans to bol-
ster their own self-esteem. Skinheads and neo-
Nazis also link their self-identities to false claims
of superiority to Jews, African Americans, and
others.
Tajfel’s etic theory of social identity is based on
three universal premises of how identity is con-
structed. First, human beings categorize everything
they experience in order to understand and iden-
tify those experiences. For example, cultural cate-
gories such as African American, Polish, and
Brazilian are applied to groups, and certain traits
are associated with each category. Second, people
engage in social identification, which consists of
categorizing themselves as members of particular
groups and adopting group identities and adhering
to the behavior and norms of those groups. The
third stage of the theory is social comparison,
Etic/Emic 263
which involves comparing the group one identifies
with to other groups and making positive or nega-
tive evaluations of the “others.”
Mary Jane Collier developed an etic approach
to social identity that is grounded in culture. She
proposes that people have multiple cultural identi-
ties, such as gender, ethnicity, religion, and nation
of origin, that emerge from two etic processes:
avowal and ascription. Avowal is how individuals
view their own social identities, whereas ascription
is the perception of a person’s identities by others.
For example, people who are Jewish may perceive
themselves in particular ways (avowal), whereas
the public may view them differently (ascription).
A person’s social identities are a blend of percep-
tions of avowal and ascription. Moreover, although
each of us has multiple social identities, one of
those identities is usually more prominent in a par-
ticular situation; Collier calls this salience. For
example, while traveling out of country, U.S.
Americans are often aware of how American they
are, while the other identities they may have, like
gender and ethnicity, are not thought about.
An emic approach to social identity is quite dif-
ferent than either Tajfel’s or Collier’s theory. Emic
theorists assume that social identity is unique to a
culture and can only be understood by identifying
indigenous factors within a culture that lead to
identity. For example, Scandinavian identity is
linked to an emic value that is called Janteloven,
which means roughly: “Don’t be impressed with
yourself.” Historically, Swedes, Danes, and
Norwegians are conditioned early in childhood to
subordinate themselves to the larger cultural group
with which they identify. As a result, shyness and
humility are valued traits in Scandinavia and so is
being quiet. Standing out and bringing attention to
oneself are anathema to Scandinavian cultural
norms and clearly violate Janteloven. In contrast,
U.S. American cultural identity is based on indi-
vidualism, which influences the construction of the
self quite differently than does Janteloven. Because
the individual is paramount in the United States,
extroversion and self presentation are highly val-
ued, and speaking rather than silence is prized.
An emic approach to social identity provides
insight into specific dimensions of the construction
of the self within a society. For example, Japanese
264 Eugenicism
social identity is linked to amae, which requires
Japanese to be bonded to the group and to dimin-
ish the presence of self in social encounters. To
achieve this, Japanese families engage in practices
that encourage amae, which is defined as indulgent
dependency. Japanese mothers, for instance, tend
to parent permissively and are conditioned to
indulge young children by meeting their every
need. This parenting style produces a form of psy-
chological dependency between mother and child
that serves as the glue of group membership in
Japanese culture.
Jeitinho, another emic cultural value, reveals
much about the construction of social identity in
Brazil. Translated roughly as a “knack” or a
“clever dodge,” jeitinho encourages Brazilians to
find solutions to bureaucratic and legal issues in
their culture. It implores Brazilians to find creative
ways to deal with Brazilian bureaucracies that
often do not work well. Children are inducted into
jeitinho at an early age and learn to use artful com-
municative dodges to accomplish their goals. As
adults, these rhetorical flourishes are used to cir-
cumvent bureaucratic and legal challenges that
typify Brazilian society.
Etic and emic approaches are valuable portals
for viewing how social identity is constructed in
each of us. Despite criticism of each approach, the
combination of the two tends to provide a compre-
hensive view of social identity. An etic perspective
offers a global view of the dynamics of social iden-
tity that are common to individuals regardless of
cultural background. In contrast, an emic approach
tends to reveal unique dimensions of social identity
that are particular to a certain culture.
Robert Shuter
See also Collective/Social Identity; Communication
Theory of Identity; Culture; Social Identity
Theory
Further Readings
Collier, M. J. (1988). A comparison of conversations
among and between domestic cultural groups: How
intra and intercultural competencies vary.
Communication Monographs, 36, 122–144.
Pike, K. L. (1967). Language in relation to a unified
theory of the structure of human behavior. The
Hague, the Netherlands: Mouton.
Tajfel, H. (1978). Differentiation between social groups.
European Monographs in Social Psychology, 1,
149–178.
Eugenicism
Eugenicism is the constellation of beliefs, prac-
tices, policies, theories, and doctrines related to
eugenics, the improvement of the human species
by promoting the reproduction of certain bodies
and genetic structures (positive eugenics) while
discouraging and preventing reproduction of those
bodies and genetic traits deemed by the hegemonic
culture to be undesirable (negative eugenics).
Therefore, eugenics embodies issues of nation-
hood, citizenship, and democracy. Eugenics ques-
tions nature/heredity versus nurture/culture while
ultimately biologizing and valuating human beings.
The word eugenics, etymologically derived from
the Greek word eu (good or well) and the suffix
-gene–s (born), was coined in 1883 by polymath Sir
Francis Galton, the cousin of English naturalist
Charles Darwin. Eugenicism is rooted in utopi­
anism and has been the basis of a social movement
and social philosophy. As politics, science, and
technology advance and intertwine, eugenicism is
implicated in new biopolitical discourses, includ-
ing sexual orientation and gender identity, and in
the futuristic imaginary as transhumanism or post-
humanism. Eugenicism has been and remains con-
troversial and subject to bioethical mediation.
This entry first presents the conceptual frame-
work of, and empirical support for, eugenicism.
Next, this entry discusses the relation between
intention and behavior. Lastly, this entry examines
the critiques of eugenicism.
Conceptual Framework
Eugenicist notions emerged during the pre-Chris-
tian era. The earliest documented articulation of
eugenicism was possibly that laid out by Plato in
The Republic, written in 390 BCE, in which he
called for the best of either sex to be united with
the best as often as possible and the inferior with
the inferior as seldom as possible and that the off-
spring of the first should be maintained in optimal
conditions. Plato also understood that this work

should be carried out in secret by the rulers to
avoid the danger that the herd would rebel.
Eugenicism matured during the Enlightenment
period, structured by interdisciplinary theoretical
frameworks that were responsive to the nature
versus nurture debate of human development.
Gregor Mendel’s mid-19th-century research on
genetics and heredity was recovered in the early
20th century and became the basis for eugenicist
thought. Prior to Mendel, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck
posited that through the process of adaptation, an
organism can pass on to its offspring characteris-
tics that it acquired during its lifetime. Lamarckian
evolution grounds the theory of behavioral genet-
ics. The racialist thinking of Joseph Arthur Comte
de Gobineau, a French aristocrat considered to be
the father of racial demography and author of An
Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races,
established the superiority of an Aryan master
race. A few years later, in 1859, Charles Darwin
introduced a theory, in his On the Origin of
Species, that suggested an evolutionary process for
humans based on natural selection that Galton
later theorized could be aided by scientific inter-
vention. Herbert Spencer, influenced by Darwin,
coined the term the survival of the fittest in his
text, Principles of Biology, which rationalized
individualism and competitiveness based on a scar-
city of resources articulated in the dystopian vision
of Thomas Robert Malthus. Between 1798 and
1826, Malthus published six editions of his famous
treatise, An Essay on the Principle of Population,
which provided the rationale for population con-
trol. The intertextual readings of these theoretical
frameworks inform notions of the desirability and
viability of certain bodies and genes.
Determinations of the desirability of particular
phenotypes and genotypes are made at the indi-
vidual level (private eugenics), adopted democrati-
cally by the citizenry as a public good (promotional
voluntary eugenics) or can be mandated by the
state as in authoritarian eugenics. Early eugenics
relied on comparative assessments derived from so-
called scientific measurements that included biom-
etry, anthropometry, and psychometric/intelligence
testing. Advances in science and technology have
led to new genetic understandings. Mapping the
human genome has tremendous potential in elimi-
nating particular traits deemed abnormal from the
personal and social body. Fertility technologies
Eugenicism 265
ground a new reproductive aesthetics in which par-
ents (mothers) will be able to create their desired
offspring with preferred genotypic and phenotypic
traits. Technological advances have also led to new
relations between capital and reproduction in
which males and females considered to possess the
most desirable traits are paid handsomely for their
eggs and sperm. Middle- and upper-class women
unable to carry pregnancies to term can pay for the
womb services of other women.
Empirical Support
Eugenicism has been espoused by prominent states-
men, scholars, educators, and private citizens
throughout the United States beginning in the latter
part of the 19th century. Many states enacted laws
that prohibited marriage among those suffering
from physical, mental, and emotion afflictions.
Later, the U.S. eugenics movement developed from
the amalgam of the American Breeders’ Association
(ABA), the American Eugenics Society, the Eugenics
Research Association, the Galton Society, the
Institute of Family Relations, and the Race
Betterment Foundation. Through the work of the
Eugenic Committee, eugenicists began to investi-
gate and report on heredity in the human race and
to emphasize the value of superior blood and the
menace to society of inferior blood. In 1913, the
group began publishing the Journal of Heredity.
Eugenics courses were offered at colleges and uni-
versities. Empirical research was undertaken to
answer the following questions: What sorts of per-
sonality traits are inherited? What are their patterns
of inheritance? What are the best methods for
maximizing the number of good traits and minimiz-
ing the number of bad traits within a population?
The two leading figures of the movement were
Charles B. Davenport and Harry H. Laughlin.
In 1904, Davenport was the director of the
Carnegie Institution for Experimental Evolution
in Washington, D.C., which was funded by steel
magnate Andrew Carnegie. In 1910, Mary
Williamson Harriman, the widow of railroad mag-
nate Averill Harriman, funded the establishment
of the Eugenic Records Office (ERO) located at
Cold Springs Harbor. The ERO conducted a series
of “family pedigree” studies and concluded that
undesirables came from economically and socially
disadvantaged backgrounds. Eugenicists were
266 Eugenicism
charged with the task of identifying and isolating
these societal defects and prescribing methods for
limiting their growth. The early work of the eugen-
ics movement coincides with a period of nativism
when the United States sought to exclude and
restrict specific populations, including Irish, Native
Americans, African Americans, Asians, and
Southeast Europeans. This led to the anti-immigrant
legislation of 1924: the Johnson-Reed Act, also
referred to as the Immigration Act of 1924.
Intelligence testing, as developed by eugenicist
Lewis Terman, became a means to determine the
viability of specific bodies providing support for
separate schooling, segregated living spaces, and
even eugenic sterilization.
In the early part of the 20th century, Harry
Laughlin, then director of the Eugenics Record
Office, drafted a “model law” for compulsory ster-
ilization (authoritarian eugenics), which was pub-
lished in his 1922 study of American sterilization
policy, Eugenical Sterilization in the United States.
It called for the eugenic sterilization of the feeble-
minded, the insane, criminals, epileptics, alcohol-
ics, blind persons, deaf persons, deformed persons,
sexual deviants, and indigent persons. Indiana was
the first state to develop compulsory sterilization
laws in 1907. By 1930, 24 states had eugenic ster-
ilization laws. Eventually, 33 states formed such
laws with an estimated 65,000 people being steril-
ized, more than 20,000 in the state of California
alone. Laughlin’s treatise influenced eugenic prac-
tices in Nazi Germany, where approximately
350,000 people were subsequently sterilized. For
his work on behalf of the science of racial cleans-
ing, Laughlin, an epileptic, received an honorary
degree by the University of Heidelberg in 1936.
Following the lead of the United States, many
other countries such as Australia, Germany, Japan,
Canada, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, France, Finland,
Denmark, and Estonia instituted forms of authori-
tarian eugenics that targeted racial and ethnic
minorities and those thought to be inferior, includ-
ing drunkards, criminals, those with incurable dis-
eases thought to be transmittable genetically, and
those with sexual deviations. In addition to bio-
medical interventions, the purging of undesirable
behaviors was carried out at the cultural level. In
the United States, Canada, and Australia, mixed-
race children were separated from their families to
be socialized, acculturated, and assimilated into
White culture as in the case of the Australian
aborigines and First Nations people of the United
States and Canada.
Promotional voluntary eugenics was adopted by
groups who were targets of eugenicism. For
instance, the prominent African American sociolo-
gist W.  E.  B. Du Bois disparaged the breeding
practices of the lower classes of Blacks, predomi-
nantly in the U.S. South, whom he felt were the
least fit to breed. Du Bois, E. Franklin Frazier,
Mary McLeod Bethune, and others were support-
ers of Margaret Sanger’s birth control movement
and particularly her Negro Project, funded by
Procter and Gamble heir Clarence Gamble, which
attempted to curb the growth of the Black popula-
tion. Notions of the well-born versus the ill-born,
better breeding practices, and the constitutive ele-
ments of good marriages were contained in pam-
phlets, brochures, newspapers, and through the
oral communications distributed within the Black
public sphere as a means for group mobility and to
contest the stereotype of racial inferiority.
Maternalist discourse that promotes healthy
marriages, healthy women, and better babies can
be viewed as feminist eugenicism. Early feminists
charged that reproduction carried a social responsi-
bility, and thus women should be given eugenic
information to help them choose a proper mate.
Contemporary women who opt for anonymous
sperm donors most often look for donors who pos-
sess specific desired characteristics such as intellect,
hair color, eye color, height, and physical ability.
Women make decisions about whether to carry
fetuses with identified genetic abnormalities or even
of a particular sex. As is the case in China, under
the one-child mandate, the preference is oftentimes
for a male child; this preference can result in some
women choosing to abort female fetuses.
Currently, the Pioneer Fund and other conserva-
tive right-wing groups such as the Family Research
Council, Focus on the Family, American Family
Association, and the Heritage Foundation support
eugenics as a means of social control. Liberal
eugenics supports human enhancement and the
maintenance of personal choice and autonomy.
Intention-Behavior Relation
Eugenics is a utopian project whose proponents
seek to create a more superior, more efficient form

of life. Galton fantasized the ultimate expression
of this sublime human in his work Kantsaywhere,
written in the early 20th century, in which these
beings were known as Eugenes. Positive eugenics
encourages reproduction among the genetically
advantaged through a range of methodologies that
include financial incentives for people willing to
undergo the following four procedures: in vitro
fertilization, egg transplants, eutelegenesis (select-
ing “sires” to artificially inseminate prospective
human mothers), and cloning. Restrictive marriage
laws are another form of positive eugenics. Negative
eugenics deploys technologies to control the growth
of undesirable populations (e.g., birth control,
abortion, sterilization). An extreme form of nega-
tive eugenics is genocide, perpetrated through
imperial, civil, and urban wars. Indeed, some civil
wars have been framed in the language of hygiene
(e.g., ethnic cleansing).
Misapplication of theories related to human
evolution has led to practices to decrease certain
genetic and behavioral traits related to race, class,
gender, and sexuality. As discourse moves more in
the direction of evolutionary utilitarianism, ques-
tions are generated as to what genetic characteris-
tics and body types will be preferred in the evolving
market. In the realm of biopolitics, human capital
is a product of knowledge and education. What is
the value of those considered intellectually inferior,
cognitively disabled, or both, and incapable of
either producing or utilizing knowledge?
On the other hand, a number of nations stretch-
ing from North Asia (Japan) through Eastern
Europe to Russia are currently experiencing popu-
lation decline leading to promotional voluntary
eugenics where nations embark on public cam-
paigns that offer incentives to procreate. The
decline in birth rates among the White middle class
has led some in the United States to target middle-
class professional women by using symbols and
language related to biological clocks and ticking
time bombs. Research has determined that as one
ages, fertility decreases and the likelihood of genetic
abnormalities increases. Therefore, health care pro-
fessionals encourage women to undergo amniocen-
tesis; women who find genetic abnormalities in
their offspring may opt to abort the fetus. In a soci-
ety that promotes and rewards ableism, raising
a disabled child (and some consider class, race/
ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation to be
Eugenicism 267
disabilities) can be an unnecessary burden. In this
regard, notions of choice and autonomy are desta-
bilized by values that are embedded in the society
in which a person lives.
Critiques
Because of the pseudo-science used to define and
discover genetic defects and because of its overreli-
ance of race, class, gender, and sexual orientations
as determinants of deviance, eugenics has always
had its detractors. Negative eugenicism has wit-
nessed its ultimate expression through the state
sponsorship of sterilizations, hysterectomies, lobot-
omies, and institutionalization by scientists using
advanced technologies. Contemporary posthu-
manists imagine a future in which death is optional
for specific types, as is the case with cryonic pres-
ervation and resurrection, available only to the
elite few. In the postindustrial era, where human
capital is assessed by knowledge and education, it
is easy to imagine a seamless merger of flesh and
machine where technological prosthetics become
an extension of the human body. Genetic manipu-
lation also holds the potential for life forms cur-
rently relegated to the realm of science fiction.
The patenting of the human genome presents
beneficial as well as detrimental possibilities for
human evolution. Personal genomics, a branch of
genomics where individual genomes are genotyped
and analyzed using bioinformatics tools, can poten-
tially lead to personalized medical treatment based
on individual genotypes. However, access to tech-
nologies and the possibility for genetic discrimina-
tion raise ethical concerns. Additionally, the ability
to identify particular ethnic and racial groups
based on DNA structures makes these groups more
vulnerable to scientific and technological manipu-
lation in ways unavailable to early eugenicists.
Scientists now believe it possible to identify genes
thought to produce specific behaviors such as
homosexuality, obesity, addiction, and criminality.
In these instances, genetic screening serves to regu-
late and legitimate bodies deemed desirable to the
ruling classes. Cultural studies theorist Henry
Giroux theorized a biopolitics of disposability in
which the weak, poor, racialized, elderly, criminal-
ized, and those categorized as sexually deviant are
expendable. In Foucauldian articulations, bio-
power acts through and upon bodies to express
268 Eurocentricity
itself. The movement of science, technology, and
ideology into the moment of transhumanism sug-
gests a time when cyborgs and virtual bodies will
become the vehicle for this power.
Amira Millicent Davis
See also Citizenship; Culture, Ethnicity, and Race;
Embodiment and Body Politics; Nationalism; Passing;
Patriotism
Further Readings
Berson, M., & Cruz, B. (2001). Eugenics: Past and
present in social education. Silver Spring, MD:
National Council for the Social Studies.
Duster, T. (2003). Backdoor to eugenics. New York:
Routledge.
Kline, W. (2001). Building a better race: Gender,
sexuality, and eugenics from the turn of the century to
the baby boom. Los Angeles: University of California
Press.
Ordover, N. (2003). American eugenics: Race, queer
anatomy, and the science of nationalism. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Rosen, C. (2004). Preaching eugenics: Religious leaders
and the American eugenics movement. London:
Oxford University Press.
Stepan, N. (1996). The hour of eugenics: Race, gender,
and nation in Latin America. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Eurocentricity
Eurocentricity is an ideological system of knowl-
edge that places the European at the center of
intellectual thought. Identity researchers are inter-
ested in the study of Eurocentricity because, as an
ideology, Eurocentricity molds and shapes the
individual’s identity. In this entry, Eurocentricity
as ideology and the dimensions of a Eurocentric
identity are discussed.
Eurocentricity as Ideology
Ideology is often defined as a set of beliefs, values,
or ideas that define a culture. Moreover, it is a
worldview adopted by members of that culture.
In discussing the idea of European culture,
Eurocentrists hold several beliefs or tenets that
compose the ideology of Eurocentricity.
One of the major tenets of Eurocentricity is the
notion that European epistemology is universal.
Western perspectives of psychology, anthropology,
history, and sociology, for example, become the
standard by which all other “ways of knowing”
are judged and measured. Western knowledge is
imposed on the reality of others, and alternative
perspectives or realities are not recognized.
Moreover, the Western world seeks to control and
demonstrate power over the “other,” that is, any-
one other than European.
Another major tenet that defines Eurocentricity
is the idea of a materialistic view of reality.
Eurocentrists believe in an objective reality that is
rooted in the scientific philosophy of Aristotle. It is
a reality that is observable, measurable, and verifi-
able. As a result of taking this scientific approach
to reality, humans and human behavior are thought
to be deterministic and reductionist. The
Eurocentrist privileges the Western scientific
method as universal at the expense of other “non-
scientific” ways of knowing.
Lineality is another tenet that defines
Eurocentricity. Marimba Ani posits that lineality is
the interpretation of a phenomenon as being made
up of unidimensional, separate entities arranged in
sequential order. Lineality is the foundation for the
development of dichotomous thinking, that is,
right/wrong, black/white, good/bad, and the cre-
ation of categories. So, for example, Eurocentric
discourse privileges Europe by placing the United
Kingdom in the majority or “first world” category
and Africa in the “third world” or minority posi-
tion; Europe then is perceived as subject while
Africa is object. In other words, Europe is viewed
as the “teacher” and Africa the “pupil.”
Another tenet that defines Eurocentricity is the
notion of European nationalism. European nation-
alism comprises those beliefs, actions, and human
behaviors that promote White privilege and
European hegemony. For example, Eurocentric
classical studies scholar Mary Lefkowitz’s book
Not Out of Africa was an attempt to reposi-
tion and impose a hegemonic narrative about
Greek contributions to Western civilization on
Afrocentricity. By asserting this type of agency,
White intellectual thought is reestablished and
affirmed.

Dimensions of a Eurocentric Identity
European as Conqueror
One of the dimensions of a Eurocentric identity
is the notion of the European as conqueror. Since
the time before colonialism, Europeans, as well as
European Americans, believed that it was their
right, by birth, to conquer those they perceived as
different and weak. The ancient Romans, the
British Empire, and the American Calvary during
the 19th century conquered new lands and people.
Violence and aggressive tendencies were a part of
the warrior-like self-image of the Europeans.
Moreover, the Europeans’ attitude toward those
who were different and who needed to be con-
quered was manifested, once again, in their indi-
vidual God-given right to conquest.
Individualism
Individualism is a core value associated with a
Eurocentric identity. European individualism
asserts that one is motivated to control the “other”
out of self-interest. Self-interest could include either
monetary or political gain. The Eurocentrist uses
the power of language to further his or her mate-
rial or political objectives concerning the other.
A Language of Oppression
Another dimension of a Eurocentric identity is
the use of language as a tool of oppression.
Europeans have used language as an instrument to
tyrannize the other in order to advance political
goals. Europeans recognized that if you take away
the ability of the other to define self, you can then
replace self-definition with a language of your own
making. Conquering a group of people becomes
easy once their existence in the world has been
defined through the labeling process. During the
Crusades in medieval Europe, Christians labeled
those of Islamic faith “infidels” and “heathens.”
During the 19th century in the United States, the
White Southern planters called the enslaved
Africans “niggers” and the Native Americans “sav-
ages.” The Nazis, during World War II, labeled the
Jews “pestilence” and “varmints.” The ability of
the dominate culture to engage in the process
of labeling reinforces the notion that “the namer of
names is the master of things.”
Eurocentricity 269
Language not only names the other but also
identifies and locates the user in a particular
intellectual space. Molefi Kete Asante posits that
words such as savages, heathens, minority, riots,
natives, and mainstream become markers of a
Eurocentric identity. Moreover, these terms
reveal Eurocentric attitudes toward those who
are different. If, for example, the other is labeled
as the “object” of human experience, then,
through language, the European views himself or
herself as the “subject” of human experience in
the world. For many Europeans, America is a
“nation” that must be “defended,” while the
other is a “third world” with “weapons of mass
destruction” that engages in “terrorism” and
must be “suppressed.”
These labels and the naming process have their
greatest effect when they have been internalized
and acted out by the oppressed. Those engaged in
Eurocentric hegemonic discourse invite the
oppressed to accept their oppression as being right
and normal. Haig A. Bosmajiam posits that lan-
guage leaves such an imprint on the mind that
minority groups and individuals may accept the
label that reinforces the stereotype. Through the
process of naming, Europeans have exerted influ-
ence and control over the other. Their discourse
has shaped them to see themselves and Europe as
being universal. Moreover, a Eurocentric hege-
monic discourse causes the oppressed to internal-
ize and act out their oppression.
Carlos D. Morrison
See also Afrocentricity; Agency; Collectivism/
Individualism; Colonialism; Discourse; Hegemony;
Labeling
Further Readings
Ani, M. (1994). Yurugu: An African-centered critique of
European cultural thought and behavior. Trenton, NJ:
African World Press.
Asante, M. K. (1999). The painful demise of
Eurocentrism. Trenton, NJ: African World Press.
Bosmajian, H. A. (1983). The language of oppression.
Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Hecht, M. L., Jackson, R. L., II, & Ribeau, S. A. (2003).
African American communication: Exploring identity
and culture (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum.
270 Evolutionary Psychology
Evolutionary Psychology
Evolutionary psychology emerged in the 1980s
out of the young field of sociobiology, the study
of evolved biological determinants of human
social behavior. Evolutionary psychologists study
how and why human beings evolved to use impor-
tant resources in order to cognitively construct an
individual identity. The field of evolutionary psy-
chology has progressed into an independent disci-
pline and has become increasingly popular in both
academic research and popular culture. The basic
precept is that much of modern human behavior
has its roots in the emergence of human social
conditions between 20,000 and 100,000 years
ago. Scholars in the field refer not only to Darwin’s
principles of natural (survival) and sexual (repro-
ductive) selection but also to principles of kin
selection to describe how much of modern human
behavior is related to these basic modes of adapta-
tion in human ancestral environments. Evolution
has long described the development of organs and
biological systems related to species transmuta-
tion. Yet, considering how the brain itself is an
organ that is the product of natural and sexual
selection has been a relatively recent approach to
human behavior. In his study of ant colonies,
biologist Edward Wilson saw that evolution is not
just the process of individuals but also of the col-
lective social organisms.
Evolutionary psychologists look at specific
social behaviors, such as gendered patterns of mat-
ing (sexual strategies), that can be explained
through biological determinants of reproduction,
such as women bearing fetal responsibility. Thus,
males tend to benefit from frequency of mating
opportunities, and females benefit from selectivity
of mating opportunities. Rejecting pure social con-
struction paradigms, evolutionary psychologists
describe gendered patterns of aggression, care, and
infidelity through mating strategies where males
are wired to defend offspring, fight predators, and
provide resources until a next mating opportunity
arises. Research has also given insight into evolved
patterns of racism, group size preferences, and
ingroup resource administration.
Critiques of the field have been numerous. The
popularity of social construction models in the
humanities is evidence of the return of 19th-century
modernist approaches that explain all things through
biological reasons. In addition, much of the research
is criticized for justifying sexist and racist behavior.
To defend it, scholars in the field are interested in
(a) scientific explanations of behavior that give rea-
sons for unethical behavior free of these social jus-
tice concerns, and (b) the description of gendered
and social proclivities that can never be used for
specific conclusions about any one person. For
example, male aggression and patriarchy are seen
by social constructionists as purely arbitrary con-
structions of a culture that affects perceptions of
gender, whereas evolutionary psychologists see
them as proclivities of humans related to mating
patterns in which some societies may not be patri-
archal but most will be because of the wired evolved
roots of human mating behavior. One important
challenge has been to demonstrate evolutionary
reasons for human behaviors such as music, art,
and religion. The argument is that genetic drift and
patterns of evolutionary adaptations can explain
such behaviors that should be directly related to
survival and mating. For example, Pascal Boyer
argues that religion is a by-product of evolution
that parallels several specific, evolved patterns of
thinking.
For identity, researchers in evolutionary psy-
chology have largely not considered how or why
identity has evolved as an apparent need of
humans. Humans appear to universally have a
need to differentiate themselves from others
through expressed narratives and integrated iden-
tity beliefs. The process of identity formation and
management often appears to cause great angst in
humans. The evolutionary question arises: Why do
we need to worry about who we are? Are there
evolutionary reasons for why humans are con-
cerned with who they are and how they are per-
ceived by others in their social group?
From this paradigm, identity is dependent upon
the evolutionary emergence of consciousness. Once
Homo sapiens developed the cognitive ability to
perceive of the individual self with agency, social
intelligence emerged as a successful aspect of sur-
vival. Groups who were able to negotiate social
resources and protection would have been much
more successful than groups who were not able to
participate in the social exchange of resources.
This social intelligence is related to recent research
in a field termed theory of mind (ToM). Humans

evolved with a cognitive ability to anticipate the
motivations of another person, which is now
understood to be ToM. With the rise of a special-
ized intelligence of social behavior, Steven Mithen
and others argue that human minds have a unique
proclivity for attention to social behaviors and the
prediction of motivation from each individual.
Thus, the negotiation of presenting “my” identity
became a significant resource in which this ability
would garner more trust to receive social resources
and the perception of sexual attraction.
If this is the case, then identity needs should
arise when sexual needs arise in the developing
person. Future research in identity will examine
how identity arises from such sexual strategies.
From the viewpoint of evolutionary psychologists,
puberty can be seen as a fairly predictable time of
rearing offspring in which the individual is ready
to leave the “nest.” In modern human behavior,
puberty appears to be a time in which conceptions
of adolescent rebellion and identity concerns
emerge as the body changes, hormone levels affect
behavior, and the need to leave the immediate bio-
logical family arises. According to this model,
identity is a tool used by a mate to present himself
or herself as consistent, trustworthy, and sexually
attractive. Thus, the concern to find out “who I
am” (identity) may be related to a mating strategy
that has evolved over tens of thousands of years. It
continues to be a concern through adulthood as it
is useful in presenting a self that is socially trust-
worthy and can provide, nurture, and protect the
immediate social group. This research is just begin-
ning but should offer significant insight into the
study of identity and may be one of primary
aspects for how social activity has long been influ-
ential in the evolution of the human mind and
human behavior.
David M. Bell
See also Development of Identity; Theory of Mind
Further Readings
Boyer, P. (2001). Religion explained. New York: Basic
Books.
Buss, D. (1995). Evolutionary psychology: A new
paradigm for psychological science. Psychological
Inquiry, 6, 1–30.
Existentialist Identity Questions 271
Wilson, E. (2000). Sociobiology: The new synthesis.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Existentialist Identity
Questions
Existentialism is a broad label that most com-
monly is applied to philosophers, writers, artists,
and thinkers revolting against traditional ways of
philosophical thinking. Instead of providing a set
of tenets about existence qua existence detached
from reality, the existentialists’ center of focus is
questions about existence qua human existence
embedded in the lived world. The main concern is
the engaged human being and his or her struggle
to make the choices that give life meaning. Self-
identity is especially important to existentialists
because of this emphasis on individual choice and
freedom. Identities are not given in any essence,
but instead are created by individuals.
This entry proceeds by (a) giving an overview of
the movement of existentialism, (b) describing the
questions that existentialism brings to identity
with its attention to freedom and choice, (c) inves-
tigating the important existentialist questions of
the body and the facticity of our existence consid-
ering the condition of birth, (d) defining bad faith
and authenticity from an existentialist perspective,
and finally (e) interrogating common criticisms
about existentialism.
Overview
It is difficult to find a consensus or a unitary
stream of thought among thinkers of this philo-
sophical view, and several of these thinkers have
explicitly rejected the attribution of this label to
their thinking. Because the term existentialism
gained the most notoriety in the 20th century
through the works of Jean-Paul Sartre, some have
suggested that this term should be exclusively
applied to his work, the work of his associates, or
both. Others have connected existentialism to the
defunct cultural movement dealing with freedom,
anxiety, absurdity, alienation, responsibility, and
human existence inside Europe in the wake of
World War II.
272 Existentialist Identity Questions
Origins
There are two sets of philosophical influences
that shape the current manifestation of existential-
ism. The first is the philosophical school known as
phenomenology, founded by the philosopher
Edmund Husserl. Phenomenologists are concerned
with human experience and consciousness. The
works of Husserl that focused on the lifeworld were
especially important to 20th-century existentialists.
The second influence for the current understanding
of existentialism is the revolutionary philosophers
whose works have caused them to be identified as
early existentialists. These thinkers include the
17th-century French philosopher Blaise Pascal, the
19th-century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard,
the 19th-century Russian writer and philosopher
Fyodor Dostoevsky, and the 19th-century German
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche.
Thinkers
The 20th-century philosophers most connected
with existentialism are the German philosophers
Martin Heidegger (although he was one of the
most fervent to resist the application of the label
existentialism to his work) and Karl Jaspers. In
France, along with Sartre, the philosophers Simone
de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Albert
Camus, Gabriel Marcel, Jean Wahl, and Paul
Ricœur are all commonly identified as existential-
ists. The Spanish philosophers José Ortega y
Gasset and Miguel de Unamuno are also com-
monly labeled as existentialists. In Russia, Nikolai
Berdyaev and Lev Shestov are the philosophers
most commonly connected with existentialism.
John Wild is often credited for bringing Continental
philosophy to the U.S. academy, thus creating a
space for American existentialist thinkers Maurice
Natanson, Calvin Schrag, Walter Kaufmann,
Robert Solomon, William McBride, William Earle,
James Eadie, George Schrader, Don Ihde, Richard
Zaner, and Lewis Gordon.
Because existentialism is a movement that breaks
boundaries and rejects traditional philosophical
boundaries, it is not contained only within philoso-
phy. In theology, Paul Tillich, Karl Barth, Martin
Buber, Reinhold Niebuhr, Rudolf Bultmann, and
even Emmanuel Levinas have strains of their writ-
ings that are connected with existentialism. Many
of the existential philosophers expressed their ideas
in works of fiction, demonstrating the import of
literature for expressing the philosophical ideas of
existentialism. Writers such as Franz Kafka, Rainer
Rilke, Henrik Ibsen, André Gide, Ralph Ellison,
Arthur Miller, and Samuel Beckett made contribu-
tions via fiction with existentialist themes. In psy-
chology, Rollo May, R. D. Laing, Viktor Frankl,
Ludwig Binswanger, and Franz Fanon have been
labeled existentialists. Existentialism also was
found in the new medium of film, which flourished
as the existential movement reached its zenith in
the mid to late 20th century. Directors such as
Ingmar Bergman, Jean-Luc Godard, and even
Woody Allen created works that touched upon
existentialist themes or satirized existentialism.
Themes
The themes that bring these disparate thinkers
together center on three existentialist identity ques-
tions, which are important themes for existential-
ism in general. The first question is the following:
To what degree do we have freedom and to what
degree are our choices already predetermined? The
second existential question is one of embodiment:
What impact does our body and the raw facticity
of our existence influence who we are and how we
live? The final question: Are we so free that we are
able to lie even to ourselves, and if so, then how
can we live an authentic life in the face of bad
faith? These three themes are not touched upon by
all existentialists and are not meant to be an exclu-
sive list of existentialist tenets but instead are the
three most important identity questions that exis-
tentialist thought deals with. These questions
interrogate what it means to be a human being in
the world, and the answer to these questions will
not be found in science or in a formalized philo-
sophical reductionism. Certainty, prediction, and
objectivism are useless to answering questions of
absurdity, dread, anxiety, love, boredom, and
alienation. There never will be a formula that can
explain what it means to experience the passion of
human life.
Freedom and Choice
Who are you? What makes you the person that
you are? In answering these questions, philoso-
phers, from antiquity to today, have often relied

on some form of determinism. The argument is
made that our identity is already decided by God,
fate, or some sort of destiny. Or that identity is
limited by a human nature, or an essence. This
determinism can also be manifest in a form of uni-
versal causation that sees individual freedom lim-
ited by causes in nature, the environment, evolution,
genetics, impulses, or, as American psychologist
B. F. Skinner claimed, psychological conditioning.
In opposition to this determinism, the existen-
tialists answer the question to what degree are we
free to determine our identity with an exclamation
that we are absolutely free. The argument is that
identity is not something that is given to us, but
something that individuals establish through their
actions. An example of how radical a view of free-
dom existentialists have can be found in Sartre’s
famous short story “The Wall.” The lesson of this
story is that even a prisoner facing an impending
death sentence is still ultimately free in terms of
establishing personal identity. We are free even in
physical imprisonment because there is always the
last resort of suicide that is available to the pris-
oner. Our choices from birth to death are what
make us human beings. Nothing comes before this
freedom to choose our existence. Existence itself is
the project of self-authoring choice.
What if we decided not to make any choices?
Would it then be possible to escape our freedom?
To this, Sartre and the existentialists answer with
a resounding “no.” Even choosing not to choose is
itself a choice. To allow something to happen and
sit passively by is still a choice. Therefore, with this
freedom comes a radical responsibility. If we are
always free, then we are always responsible for
ourselves and to others. This is famously summed
up in Sartre’s magnum opus Being and Nothingness,
in which he claims that we are condemned to be
free. Freedom is a condemnation because we can-
not escape our freedom and because this freedom
entails responsibility.
Facticity, Transcendence, and the Body
How exactly can our identity have this absolute
freedom when we are obviously limited by our
physical bodies? The answer, in the terms of
Sartre, is that our identity is made up of two types
of being: being-in-itself (être-en-soi) and being-for-
itself (être-pour-soi). Being-in-itself is our physical
Existentialist Identity Questions 273
identity in the world. All objects have a physical
quality or being in the world. Just like a table, we
too have a physical form and body. In terms of our
identity, this physical reality constitutes the cold
facts of our existence in the world. This physical
objective givenness of our existence constitutes our
facticity. Simply defined, facticity refers to the facts
that constitute a being’s existence.
However, humans are objects in the world in a
way that is completely different from other objects,
such as a mere table. We go beyond the objective
in that we also have a subjective consciousness that
authors our existence. It is this transcendence of
our facticity that is the source of the being-for-it-
self. To be human is to be more than a mere object,
but to be a subject as well. And it is with this
upsurge of freedom that is transcendence. The
objective facticity of the being-in-itself is the fact of
being in the world. This is shared by people, ani-
mals, rocks, plants, cars, computers, and even
tables. Yet, it is only the human whose active and
advanced cognitive abilities allow him or her to be
more complex than a list of current facts that
describe his or her being. For it is the human that
exists for oneself to choose how one wants to live.
Unlike the table, humans have hopes, dreams,
desires, a past, and they project these conscious
trappings onto the context of the world, authoring
an existence for themselves.
It is important to note that identity for the exis-
tentialists is never a Cartesian dualism of a sepa-
rate mind and body. Instead, the human subject is
always embodied in the world. Hence, the human
body is important philosophically, for it is the flesh
of the human body that is both the source of
being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Our identity is
that of a physical subject in the world that chooses
to constantly constitute meaning. Our conscious-
ness is not some separate thing placed into a body
but literally is embodied. For example, a jazz musi-
cian must be able to flow and adapt and literally
play the music from his or her body. If the musi-
cian is lost in concentration, focus, and planning,
then the detached cerebral premeditation will
cause the musician to fail. Improvisation cannot be
planned in one’s head; it must be something that
one feels with the body. This is an example of
embodied identity. This focus on the body and
embodiment means that the body is both subject
and object. We are constantly under the gaze of
274 Existentialist Identity Questions
others in the world, yet the body is also the source
of freedom and the place that enacts the daily proj-
ect of what it means to be who we are.
Bad Faith and Authenticity
A consequence of this freedom is that we are so
free that we are able to lie to ourselves. This ability
to lie to ourselves is what existentialists call bad
faith (mauvaise foi in the original French). Bad
faith is trying to be what we are not. This is useless
because it is impossible for us to escape the facts of
our existence. Yet, this is what people regularly
attempt to do.
An example of bad faith can be found in the case
of a racist. The racist knows that what he is about
to say is offensive and racist. Yet, often, the racist
will preface the racist slur or remark with the
rejoinder “This is not racist” or “This may seem
racist but . . .” The fact that the racist knows that
he must preface his statement shows his awareness
of the fact that the remark is indeed racist. The self-
deception is the claiming that the statement is some-
thing that it is not. If the racist regularly engages in
racist actions, then racism is part of his identity and
there is self-deception in his defiance of the term.
Bad faith works in at least two different forms
of denial. One form is like the racist who refuses to
accept the actions that make up who he is. The
other form of bad faith is trying to be something
one is not. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre gives
the famous example of the waiter in the café who
tries to be the perfect waiter. Yet, the waiter is
doing a really bad job because he exaggerates his
actions by playing the role of the waiter like he is
some sort of robot. Here the bad faith comes in to
play not by denying one’s actions but by trying to
claim one’s actions are something other than what
they are. The waiter is in bad faith because his
actions become such that he becomes a waiter in a
café in the same way that my computer on my
table is a computer. This is a false understanding
of true conscious being, for we are truly conscious
only in the mode of being-for-itself. The waiter,
however, is entangled in the web of the world of
objects in such a manner that he tries to become
what he is not—just an object. In reality, the
waiter is only playing the role of waiter. The
waiter is the upsurge of transcendence away from
being-in-itself. This negation is how we come to
determine the being-for-itself. Ultimately, the
waiter is in bad faith because his actions are an
attempt to flee his freedom.
In addition to bad faith, existentialists speak of
good faith and authenticity. Being authentic is the
opposite of being in bad faith. But how do you live
an authentic life? This is more ambiguous.
Following a list of predetermined rules to live an
authentic life would violate the freedom that is
essential to existentialism. Authenticity is the
proper way an individual stands in relation to the
world. To be authentic is to embrace our freedom
and responsibility and author our own existence.
For an authentic existence, the choosing is more
important than the content or what is chosen.
Authenticity is a commitment to be responsible for
the making of one’s self and ultimately is only
revealed in our actions.
Criticisms
The final section of this entry briefly addresses
some criticism about existentialism. Critics have
claimed that existentialists are moral relativists,
nihilists, atheists, and/or are unengaged politically.
The first critique is that existentialists are moral
relativists. The reasoning for this view is that in
existentialist thought, the content of the choice is
not as important as the choosing itself. Therefore,
the critic interprets this as anything goes, there are
no universals. Yet, existentialist freedom is always
entwined with responsibility because we live in a
world with others. Our choices are not a choice
only for ourselves but for everyone. So, for exam-
ple, when I choose to have a child, I must make this
choice as my best choice and, in so saying, choose
to have a child as the best choice for all humanity
as a whole. My choices are never solely mine, made
adrift on the island of solipsism, but take place in
a lived intersubjective world of others.
A second critique of existentialism is that it is
nihilistic. With all the analysis on dread, anxiety,
suicide, violence, and Nietzsche’s death of God,
critics charge existentialism with pessimism.
However, existentialism is, at its heart, a philoso-
phy of hope. Hope is the prerequisite condition in
which we engage in free actions. To be free and to
hope are inexplicably intertwined because free
action requires hoping for a future in which the
choice becomes actualized.

A third criticism leveled against existentialism is
that it is atheistic. There are indeed existentialists
who are atheists, but there also are existentialists
who are believers. From Kierkegaard to Tillich, the
lesson of existential theology is that to be a good
religious person is not to blindly follow one’s faith
but instead to engage one’s beliefs as one’s own.
Kierkegaard famously critiqued Christendom for
the Christians who do not live as Christ does; they
go to church and then kick the homeless outside of
the church. Kierkegaard argues that religion must
involve a personal commitment to a leap of faith.
We must choose to enact our beliefs and our reli-
gion in all of our actions every single moment. Even
Nietzsche’s death of God can be interpreted as sav-
ing religion from inauthentic religious practices.
Finally, existentialism is critiqued for being an
idealistic philosophy detached from politics. Yet,
many of the existentialist philosophers (not all of
them) were very engaged in political life and saw it
as an extension of their existential beliefs.
Ultimately, existentialism changes the world
through our choices.
Erik Garrett
See also Agency; Authenticity; Embodiment and Body
Politics; Gaze; Hegemony; Individual Autonomy;
Intersubjectivity; Other, The; Phenomenology;
Reflexive Self or Reflexivity
Further Readings
Barnes, H. (1967). An existentialist ethics. New York:
Knopf.
Beauvoir, S. de. (1989). The second sex. New York:
Vintage Books.
Buber, M. (1970). I and thou. New York: Scribner.
Gordon, L. (1995). Bad faith and antiblack racism.
Amherst, NY: Humanity Books.
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. New York:
Harper & Row.
Kaufmann, W. (Ed.). (1989). Existentialism from
Dostoevsky to Sartre. New York: Meridian.
Kierkegaard, S. (2000). The essential Kierkegaard.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Marcel, G. (2002). The philosophy of existentialism.
New York: Citadel Press.
McBride, W. (Ed.). (1997). The development and
meaning of twentieth-century existentialism. New
York: Garland Press.
Extraordinary Bodies 275
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1999). The phenomenology of
perception. New York: Routledge.
Nietzsche, F. (1982). The portable Nietzsche. New York:
Penguin.
Sartre, J.-P. (1993). Being and nothingness. New York:
Washington Square Press.
Sartre, J.-P. (2007). Nausea. New York: New Direction
Books.
Wild, J. (1955). The challenge of existentialism.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Extraordinary Bodies
The meaning of what constitutes extraordinary
bodies can only be understood by first contem-
plating the notion of ordinary bodies. An ordinary
body is largely indistinguishable from others—
because, by definition, that is what makes it unre-
markable. An ordinary body reflects the accepted
understandings of social norms of a particular
culture in history. Conceptions of normalcy, like
beauty, vary enormously from culture to culture.
Ordinary is often used synonymously with terms
such as average, standard, regular, and normal.
When applied to bodies, the term extraordinary
conjures one or more physical characteristics that
are considered either above or below average mea-
surement, nonstandard, irregular, or even abnor-
mal. In plain terms, an extraordinary body is one
that exhibits noticeable discrepancies from what is
recognized as normal.
Individuals with physical differences from the
ordinary body have existed in all human societies
throughout history. The significance accorded
such anomalies has varied then, as it varies now,
throughout all different societies within the world.
For example, some cave paintings depict mon-
strous births; prehistoric gravesites reveal ritual-
ized sacrifices; and images on clay tablets found in
ancient Assyria record congenital abnormalities
(birth defects) revealing a systemized belief of
prophecies. Disability studies scholar Rosemarie
Garland Thomson notes how Western philoso-
phers throughout the ages from Aristotle to Cicero,
Bacon to Montaigne, were all intrigued by the dif-
ferently formed body, usually interpreting it as
part of God’s mysterious design or an example of
his wrath.
276 Extraordinary Bodies
Viewing physical anomalies can evoke a variety
of emotionally charged and often conflicting
responses in ordinary people, whom Garland
Thomson calls normates. Coexisting with attrac-
tion and fascination are gradations of repulsion
and fear, creating an uneasy combination that
destabilizes understandings held by normates about
their own identities, that is, what it means to be
human. Being viewed as having an extraordinary
body can also influence the identity of people with
extraordinary bodies. If accepted by the larger
group, people with extraordinary bodies are assim-
ilated, although they are always marked by their
difference. If rejected by the larger group, they are
excluded from mainstream society and relegated to
the margins (for example, in institutions, charities,
leper colonies, etc.). In some cases, individuals with
physical anomalies are systematically killed (through
sacrifice, abandonment at birth, forceful removal
and placement into Nazi concentration camps,
abortion following amniocentesis, etc.). This entry
focuses on society’s response to, and the representa-
tion of, people with extraordinary bodies.
Bodily Difference as Spectacle
A noticeable difference in another human being
pulls upon the onlooker in all of us. Even when
reared by their parents not to stare in public, many
people still gaze upon individuals who look differ-
ent. The phenomenon of staring at extraordinary
others has long and tangled roots that stretch back
centuries and requires far more time and space
afforded by this short entry. However, it is interest-
ing to highlight one instance of culturally sanc-
tioned spectatorship. Since its inception, those in
the field of medicine have been entranced by irregu-
larities of the human body. A commonplace long-
standing practice has been the display of an
extraordinary body at the center of a room waiting
to be examined by experts and then discussed by
professionals in attendance who name the differ-
ence and categorize the person. In this situation, the
importance of the physical features subsumes the
rest of the person, resulting in the process of profes-
sionalization built upon dehumanization. Two
individuals who were scrutinized by the medical
establishment for their extraordinariness and who
subsequently received posthumous, long-lasting
fame are Saartjie Baartman and Joseph Merrick.
Saartjie Baartman: Hottentot Venus
Born in 1789 to a Khosian family in South
Africa, Baartman eventually was employed as a
servant of Dutch immigrants. Her employer’s
brother persuaded Baartman to accompany him to
England in 1810. On arrival, she was exhibited as
“The Hottentot Venus” in London and Paris, caus-
ing quite a stir. For some performances, she was
exhibited near naked in an unlocked cage. Audience
members were mesmerized by her marked differ-
ence to themselves in terms of size, shape, color,
and hair texture. Some even paid extra to touch
her large buttocks. Although a court case ensued to
protect her from exploitation, she officially denied
that any enforcement was being used against her.
In Paris, she attracted the attention of two distinct
circles. The first was the general public, who
viewed her as a unique spectacle who became
popularized via newspaper articles, songs, and car-
toons. The second group consisted of scientists,
who observed, measured, made molds of her body
parts, and wrote extensive theories about them.
Having never seen a person like Baartman
before, scientists faithfully recorded the discrepan-
cies from the ethnocentric norms of European
women. In doing so, they accorded her differences
as a series of opposites: She was not civilized, but
primitive; she was not of the same race, but of an
inferior one; she was not normal, she was abnor-
mal. Baartman’s person was reduced to her extraor-
dinary body, in particular, her genitals. Because
the labia minora of some Khosian women are
greatly enlarged, these inner lips may hang several
inches below the vulva. Although she never dis-
played her genitals while alive, they were preserved
along with her brain and skeleton and put on per-
manent display in the Museum of Man in Paris
until the mid-1970s. Her remains were finally
returned to South Africa at the request of former
president Nelson Mandela.
Joseph Merrick: Elephant Man
Born in 1862 of a working-class family in
Leicester, England, Joseph Merrick began to devel-
oped deformities at age 5. After his mother died
when he was 11, Joseph’s father remarried to a
woman who did not like Merrick. He escaped to
find life in a workhouse but, in 1884, took a job as
a sideshow attraction in London that then traveled

to the continent. Sometime after his return, he col-
lapsed in a train station due to breathing difficulties
and was taken to the London Hospital and placed
under the care of the physician Frederick Treves.
Merrick was originally diagnosed with elephan-
titis, although subsequent tests on his remains
indicate that he had Proteus syndrome and neuro-
fibromatosis type I. The majority of his body was
covered with large tumors, enlarging his head and
limbs, thereby profoundly disfiguring his appear-
ance. Once under Treves’s care, Merrick entered
Victorian high society where he frequented the
theater and opera as well as becoming a parlor
favorite known for his gentle manners. He died in
1890 at age 27, having accidentally suffocated in
his sleep.
Merrick’s skeleton was preserved and publicly
displayed in the Royal London Hospital. In the
late 1970s and early 1980s, his story became uni-
versally known through an award-winning play
that was made into an Oscar-nominated movie. In
another strange twist to his story, Michael Jackson’s
interest in the life of “The Elephant Man” led him
to visit Merrick’s bones twice and allegedly to
offer to buy them for one million dollars.
Both Baartman and Merrick exemplify how
extraordinary bodies capture the public’s interest
and imagination. They piqued curiosities in cul-
tures composed of largely White, able-bodied
people, transforming ordinary individuals into
voyeurs of the extraordinary. In death, their skel-
etons continued to attract the general public, hal-
lowed and showcased within culturally revered
institutions of museum and hospital. However,
their careers as exhibits seemed to feed the curios-
ity of ordinary people for human variation, a fas-
cination with what came to be known as freaks.
Freak Shows
Reactions toward people with extraordinary bod-
ies reveal a society’s response to human variability.
In many cases, individuals with extraordinary bod-
ies are used to verify and reinforce generalized
parameters of normalcy. A concrete example of
validating such boundaries can be seen in special-
ized sideshows known as freak shows, historically
a display of others who were physically different
from the vast majority of the population. From
approximately 1840 to 1940, human differences in
Extraordinary Bodies 277
the form of extraordinary bodies were sensational-
ized and exploited commercially. People with
physical anomalies such as a girl or boy with
excessive bodily hair, a boy with vitiligo, or a man
with no arms, and a woman with disfiguring facial
tumors became the ape girl, the lion boy, the leop-
ard child, the frog man, and the mule-faced
woman, respectively. Note how these titles blurred
the boundaries between humans and animals
(including Elephant Man’s name, and in keeping
with Baartje’s cage), reinforcing the idea that those
with certain differences were not fully human.
In other cases, the concept of average weight
and height was clearly reified when obese women
(“The World’s Fattest Lady!”), rail thin men (“The
Human Toothpick!), very tall men (“A Real
Giant!), and a person of short stature (“Tom
Thumb!”) were also part of the ensemble. In some
cases, conjoined brothers or sisters (“Siamese
Twins!”) appeared, alongside conjoined animals
(“The Two-Headed Sheep!”).
Also of great interest is the reinforcement of
racial norms through the freak show. People repre-
senting the “far flung corners of the earth” were
also paraded for Middle America. Sometimes their
physical differences were entirely typical of where
they came from, such as Native Americans, but
nonetheless constituted their extraordinary status
by the paying beholders. Africans were staged to
be the missing link, accompanied by provocative
posters asking, “What is it?” Features were often
exaggerated, with European Americans in Victorian
attire sitting next to Africans scantily dressed in
leopard skins while holding monkeys. In one
extreme example of racial difference, a man named
Ota-Benga was marketed as “the African Savage,”
enthralling crowds with his teeth filed into points
(as is customary for the Batwa people of Africa),
which were billed as evidence of his cannibalism.
For a period of time, Ota-Benga was housed in a
monkey cage at the Bronx Zoo.
At the turn of the 20th century, normalized
racial hierarchies were reinforced by such sensa-
tional spectacles that were not confined to the
freak show but also were present at culturally pres-
tigious events like the World’s Fair. People were
brought from Asia, Africa, and South America to
be contrasted against the population of largely
European Americans. The differences deemed
extraordinary to European Americans revolved
278 Extraordinary Bodies
around what W. E. B. Du Bois terms “skin, hair,
and bone” and fortified their beliefs in racial hier-
archies according to the development of intelli-
gence. Propping up the masquerade of White
superiority, individuals with different skin colors,
physical characteristics, and disabilities were delib-
erately publicized as proof of physical and intel-
lectual inferiority. For example, Bartola and
Maximo were claimed to have been discovered in
Central America, were taken to Germany, and
were studied scientifically before being displayed as
“The Aztec Children.” Because both were micro-
cephalic and cognitively impaired, and Maximo
had twisted limbs, their image reinforced the child-
like, undeveloped mental and physical state of non-
White races. In another case of showcasing
microcephalic people, Elvira and Jenny Snow of
Georgia were billed as Pip and Flip, twins from the
Yucatán. Both of these cases reveal how physical
traits of people with developmental disabilities
were commonly assigned to non-Westerners.
Cinema
By the 1930s, when “talkies” took over the motion
picture industry, movies as a form of mass enter-
tainment outstripped antiquated state fairs and
traveling sideshows. The monstrous took new
forms such as Wolf Man, the Mummy, Frankenstein,
and Dracula—all part human, or in the case of
Frankenstein, of human parts. Each character
also evoked aspects of the supernatural, the dan-
gerous realm beyond the limits of human under-
standing. Almost 80 years later, new film versions
of these stories have been released, proving a cross-
generational appeal.
Freaks, one of the most notorious films of all
time, was made in 1932. Set in a traveling show of
real-life performers, almost the entire cast was
composed of people with extraordinary bodies.
During the shooting of the movie, these individu-
als were not allowed into the studio cafeteria and
were relegated to eat outside. When one character
is betrayed in the plot of the movie, poisoned by
his normal-sized wife, the others teach her a lesson
by seeking revenge in collectively deforming her
into “one of them,” The Chicken Woman. On its
release, the film was promptly criticized as being
unnerving, exploitative, and in extreme bad taste.
Apparently the freak show of a traveling circus
did not translate well to celluloid, and it was
banned for over four decades, only to become a
cult classic.
Extraordinary bodies are featured throughout
the history of cinema, from superheroes with spe-
cial powers to characters with a wide range of
bodily incarnations. Superheroes such as Superman,
Batman, Wonder Woman, and Spiderman have
perfect bodies and demonstrate skills such as flying
through the air, possessing amazing physical stam-
ina and strength, and having unique talents. On
the other hand, villains are often missing an eye,
leg, or an arm, signifying their supposedly corrupt
inner psyche. Awards for best actors frequently go
to a person playing the part of character with a
disability, such as Daniel Day Lewis in My Left
Foot, Al Pacino in Scent of a Woman, Marlee
Matlin in Children of a Lesser God, Tom Hanks
in Philadelphia and Forrest Gump, Dustin Hoffman
in Rain Man, Geoffrey Rush in Shine, Holly
Hunter in The Piano, John Voight in Coming
Home, Jamie Fox in Ray, Hilary Swank in Million
Dollar Baby, and Jack Nicholson in As Good as It
Gets. In some respects, such portrayals still permit
a more genteel, sanitized form of voyeurism of the
imagined lives of people with extraordinary bod-
ies. The medium of cinema has also extended the
possibility of viewing extraordinary minds.
Literature
Many cinematic representations originate in litera-
ture. As scholars David Mitchell and Sharon
Snyder point out, disability often functions in tra-
ditional narratives as a plot device, pivotal to the
action and outcome of the story, with little or no
basis in the lived reality of people with disabilities.
Classic examples include vengeful Captain Ahab in
Herman Melville’s Moby Dick and crippled Tiny
Tim in Charles Dickens’s A Christmas Carol. Both
disabilities are integral to driving the plot, and this
can be found in works of drama as well as the
novel. For example, William Shakespeare’s hunch-
backed Richard III or Tennessee Williams’s “lame”
Amanda Wingfield in The Glass Menagerie paral-
lels a vengeful Ahab and the pathetic Tim.
In her controversial modern novel Geek Love,
Katherine Dunn creates an inverted world in
which the greater the disability is, the more valued
and respected the individual is. In her fictional

world, the norms (people with ordinary bodies)
are held in contempt by the deformed family of
central characters for whom deliberate disfigure-
ment is held in the highest esteem. Those with
disfigurements persuade the norms to shed their
limbs to be liberated. The fact that the action
takes place in a traveling show reveals how much
this cultural phenomenon is lodged within the
American psyche.
Fantasy: Cyborgs and Science Fiction
In television series, superpowered prostheses and
high-tech implants transformed disabled figures
Steve Austin and Jaime Sommers into the title
characters of The Six Million Dollar Man (1974–
1978) and The Bionic Woman (1976–1978). Some
artificial features imagined for these characters
have since become reality, such as life-like looking
limbs that are operated by technology. The con-
cept of blurring the lines between human and
machine has always fascinated writers. The term
cyborg is generally used to refer to a person with
bionic or robotic implants. Stories of cyborgs often
take place in either the future on earth or in space.
The film Robocop revolves around a murdered
cop whose face and brain are preserved, but the
rest of his body is machinery. Science fiction sto-
ries such as Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream
of Electric Sheep? (made into the film Bladerunner)
frequently feature creations that “pass” as humans
but exceed their physical strength, feeling neither
emotion nor pain. Other extraordinary bodies are
seen in popular science fiction figures such as
Dr. Spock on Star Trek, whose pointed ears,
diagonal eyebrows, and emotionless disposition
clearly distinguish him from humans.
Popular Culture
Although it is no longer acceptable to exhibit
human curiosities, contemporary culture is filled
with people who elect to transform their bodies
through cosmetic surgery. Michael Jackson’s steady
shift from natural looks to a highly stylized recon-
structed appearance earned him much derision
throughout the media. Septuagenarian Joan Rivers
typifies the extraordinary look of multiple plastic
surgeries, with wrinkle-free skin stretching from
eyes and lips.
Extraordinary Bodies 279
In another instance, popular talk shows often
focus on people who are obese or anorexic.
Ostensibly saving people from themselves and
their extraordinary bodies becomes the central
focus of such entertainment, allowing normal
spectators to stare and wonder, not unlike their
great-grandparents did at freak shows. Other
extraordinary bodies come in the form of body
builders who push the limits of human physicality.
Yet, whereas males bulk up to look supermuscu-
lar, female body builders are viewed as strange—
defeminized through a hybridization of gender
roles. Finally, the multibillion-dollar, worldwide
pornography industry features individuals with
extraordinary bodies, usually women with enor-
mous breasts and men with large sex organs. This
extraordinary aspect of their otherwise trim, nor-
mal appearance is portrayed as an asset.
The Extraordinary
In plain terms, when an individual’s physical dif-
ference exceeds the culturally drawn lines of what
constitutes ordinariness, then that body comes to
be viewed as extraordinary. By definition, the
extraordinary helps delineate the ordinary; the
ordinary helps define the extraordinary. What
kind of bodily formations are accepted or rejected,
celebrated or mocked, revered or despised, loved
or feared in any given culture—past or present—
shows that the meaning of extraordinary bodies
has always shifted across times and cultures and
will continue to do so.
David J. Connor
See also Stereotypes
Further Readings
Adams, R. (2001). Sideshow U.S.A.: Freaks and the
American cultural imagination. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Dunn, K. (1989). Geek love. New York: Knopf.
Garland-Thomson, R. (Ed.). (1996). Freakery: Cultural
spectacles of the extraordinary body. New York: New
York University Press.
Garland-Thompson, R. (1997). Extraordinary bodies.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Stiker, H. J. (1999). A history of disability. Ann Arbor,
MI: Love Publishing House.
 F
Face/Facework
Face is the image a person puts forth and is given
by others in social interaction. Facework consists
of actions taken by participants to make what one
does consistent with face. All people have face
concerns, which are the particular ways a person
wishes to be seen. For example, a doctor may wish
to be seen as knowledgeable, competent, and car-
ing by her patient. The patient may wish to be
seen as intelligent, cooperative, and knowledge-
able about self-care. Facework involves the behav-
iors used by this doctor and patient to support,
maintain, or mitigate threats to these face con-
cerns. For example, when the patient tells this
doctor, “You really know your stuff,” he is sup-
porting the doctor’s face concern of being seen as
knowledgeable. When the doctor says to the
patient, “I’m sure you already know this, but it’s
my job to go over the specific things you will need
to do to take care of yourself after this proce-
dure,” she is mitigating a potential threat to the
patient’s face. Telling him how to take care of
himself could imply that she did not believe him to
be knowledgeable about self-care. Through face-
work, which is social in nature, people develop
and maintain their personal identities as well as
those of others with whom they interact. This
entry first explains the origin of the concept of
face and then discusses face concerns and face-
work in turn.
281
Origin
The concept of face originated in Chinese culture.
It is the translation of two Chinese terms: mien-tzu
and lien. Mien-tzu refers to one’s social reputation
and prestige. It is something that a person can
build by attaining success in life. Lien refers to a
person’s good moral character. All persons are
entitled to this, provided they have not engaged in
unacceptable conduct. In the social sciences, most
research on face is based on the work of Erving
Goffman. The concept of face is thoroughly social
in nature, as it focuses on the identity claims that
are communicated to others verbally and nonver-
bally, intentionally and unintentionally. The
emphasis, therefore, is on which identity claims
one puts forth and how, rather than on whether a
particular identity claim or presentation of self is
genuine or valid.
Face Concerns
A person’s face concerns vary across contexts and
over time. The doctor who wishes to be seen as
caring by the patient may wish to be seen as firm
by her teenage son or as honest and giving by her
closest friend. A doctor in his first year of practice
may be more concerned about being seen as com-
petent and knowledgeable by both patients and
other doctors than is a doctor in his or her 30th
year who might be more concerned with being
seen as up-to-date regarding the latest available
282 Face/Facework
treatments and procedures and still interested in
practicing medicine.
Face concerns are often complex, and a person
will often have multiple face concerns, some of
which may be in tension with one another. A col-
lege professor indicated that she must carefully
navigate the fine line between wanting to be a
teacher that is available and helpful to students
and, at the same time, not wanting to be imposed
upon and taken advantage of by last-minute
requests from students.
According to Penelope Brown and Stephen
Levinson’s politeness theory, there are two kinds
of face: positive face and negative face. Positive
face is each person’s desire to be seen as likeable,
competent, and appreciated. It is an overall desire
to look good and be affirmed socially. Negative
face is each person’s desire to be unimpeded, not
bothered, and given space.
Face includes concerns about how one wants to
be seen by others and concerns about the identity
claims of others. People both consciously and
unconsciously support one’s own face and the
face of others. Some argue that people generally
cooperate to maintain one another’s face; how-
ever, threats to face occur both intentionally and
unintentionally.
Facework
Facework may be strategic and conscious, or it
may be habitual and out of the awareness of the
actor. Erving Goffman suggested that facework
includes two kinds of moves: preventive and cor-
rective. Preventive moves are done to avoid and
prevent face threats. Defensive moves function to
avoid threats to one’s own face, whereas protec-
tive moves consist of steps taken to prevent threats
to another’s face. Corrective moves include actions
a person takes when one’s own or another’s face is
threatened. These are remedial in nature. Face-
saving behaviors are those used to reestablish
one’s own face after it has been threatened. There
are a variety of ways to respond to a face threat.
One way to save face is to attack another person’s
face. Other possibilities include justifying, blam-
ing, withdrawing, or reaffirming one’s own face.
Face-saving behaviors have been found to have
negative consequences with respect to conflict
resolution.
Some acts are face threatening by their very
nature. This means that they undermine or call into
question a person’s face concern. For example, a
criticism threatens the receiver’s positive face
because it suggests that something is wrong with
that person or that he or she did something incor-
rectly. A request threatens the receiver’s negative
face because it is an imposition. The degree of face
threat, according to politeness theory, is dependent
upon three factors: the power or status difference
between the two parties, the closeness of their rela-
tionship or social distance, and how risky the act
is. For example, asking another to lend you 5 dol-
lars is much less face threatening than asking that
person for one of his or her kidneys. In this case the
risk of the act affects the level of face threat. Also,
it is more face threatening to request a favor of a
peer than to ask the same favor of a teacher or boss
because of the hearer’s higher status. In turn, the
degree of face threat influences the kind of com-
municative strategies that will be used to perform
the act. Specifically, a person will be more polite as
the seriousness of the face threat increases.
In politeness theory, positive and negative polite-
ness were identified as strategies used to conduct
other-oriented facework, that is, to maintain the
other’s positive and negative face and mitigate
threats to face caused by face threatening acts.
Positive politeness strategies include compliments,
the use of nicknames and terms of endearment,
and other linguistic or language choices that
emphasize the positive attributes of another and
present the other as likeable, competent, and
appreciated. For example, when asking a professor
for an extension on a paper, a student could say,
“I would really appreciate it if you could allow me
to turn in my paper a few days late. I am asking
you because I know that you are someone whom I
can always count on to be helpful.” Phrases such
as “I would really appreciate it” and “you are
someone whom I can always count on to be help-
ful” are positive politeness markers that function
to enhance the hearer’s positive face needs, that is,
his or her desire to be approved of, appreciated,
and liked. Negative politeness strategies consist of
speech acts such as apologies and linguistic devices

that function to minimize the imposition on
another and indicate the speaker’s respect for the
hearer and the desire not to bother him or her. The
same student in the previous example could insert
negative politeness markers into the request for an
extension to enhance the hearer’s negative face and
minimize the face threat of the request. The stu-
dent could say, “Professor X, I really hate to
bother you, but could I just possibly have a tiny
extension on the paper? I would only need a day.”
These phrases indicate that the speaker would
rather not perform the request, which is recog-
nized as an imposition, and that the student is try-
ing to minimize the imposition by only requesting
an extra day.
Face is thought to be universal, but the specific
nature of face concerns and ways of conducting
facework have been found to be linked to culture.
In the United States, many people would agree that
performing a criticism indirectly would mitigate
the threat to the hearer’s positive face because the
use of indirectness allows the hearer to simply
ignore the request. However, among the Israeli
Sabra, those who speak dugri (“straight talk”)
would disagree. They might argue that being indi-
rect is actually impolite and perhaps even an insult
to the speaker. Being able to give direct criticism to
another is evidence of a strong relationship and
demonstrates a respect for the hearer as a capable
dugri speaker.
Culture is viewed as a major factor in determin-
ing whether one will be more concerned with one’s
own face, with the face of others, or with both face
of self and face of other, known as mutual face.
People from individualistic cultures, that is, cul-
tures that privilege the self, pay more attention to
maintaining one’s own face than the face of others.
On the other hand, people from collectivistic cul-
tures, that is, cultures that emphasize group mem-
bership and maintaining harmony over the needs
of the individual, attend more to maintaining the
face of others or mutual face, even during conflict.
Stella Ting-Toomey’s face-negotiation theory sug-
gests that the maintenance of face is the key vari-
able that connects culture to the strategies used to
manage conflict.
Similarly, research has found that people from
high power distance cultures, which are rigidly
Face/Facework 283
stratified in terms of power and wealth and where
inequality is accepted, tend to use more indirect
and cooperative facework strategies than those
from low power distance countries, who support
equality for all. In addition, people from countries
with a long-term orientation or that accept
Confucian teachings use different facework strate-
gies, including emphasizing harmony and coopera-
tion, than those from short-term orientation
countries.
Face concerns and facework have been exam-
ined in courtroom discourse, academic discourse
(including instructional communication and the
discussion and evaluation of academic research),
doctor-patient interaction, 911 call-taking encoun-
ters, and other institutional contexts. In the inter-
personal realm, studies have examined face threats
associated with the various stages of relationship
development; facework in talk about problems,
advice giving, and refusals in conversation between
friends; and facework in the management of
embarrassing situations. Cross-cultural compari-
sons of face concerns and facework have also been
conducted.
Sheryl Goodman
See also Collectivism/Individualism; Conflict; Impression
Management; Self-Presentation
Further Readings
Brown, P., & Levinson, S. (1987). Politeness: Some
universals in language usage. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Goffman, E. (1955). On face-work: An analysis of ritual
elements in social interaction. Psychiatry: Journal for
the Study of Interpersonal Processes, 18, 213–231.
Ting-Toomey, S. (Ed.). (1994). The challenge of
facework: Cross-cultural and interpersonal issues.
Albany: SUNY Press.
Ting-Toomey, S. (2004). The matrix of face: An updated
face-negotiation theory. In W. Gudykunst (Ed.),
Theorizing about intercultural communication
(pp. 71–92). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Tracy, K. (1990). The many faces of facework. In
H. Giles & W. P. Robinson (Eds.), Handbook of
language and social psychology (pp. 209–226).
Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
284 Figures of Speech
Feminism
See Gender
Figures of Speech
Figures of speech refers to the manner in which
one uses words (both written and spoken) to con-
vey messages indirectly. The one conveying the
message chooses to use language in figurative or
nonliteral ways in order for the reader or listener
to come to an understanding about what the mes-
senger wants understood about a particular sub-
ject matter, ideology, or concept. In doing so, the
reader or listener develops a deeper understanding
about the information presented because figures-
of-speech interactions challenge the reader’s or
listener’s well-established opinions about the
information brought forth during these interac-
tions. For this reason, figures-of-speech exchanges
serve to make one more aware of one’s personal
identity because interacting with figures of speech
challenges the reader or listener to examine his or
her way of thinking about the figures of speech
presented during this interaction. This type of
communication compels the reader or listener to
either reinforce his or her existing ideology or
thought process or reconsider his or her initial
opinion and then move on to form a new opinion
concerning the figures of speech offered. An
exchange involving figures of speech allows one to
broaden one’s perspective while enabling one to
understand oneself, and one’s opinions, as they
relate to that which is vague and abstract.
The Foundation
Figures of speech awaken the imagination by
heightening and stylizing words and phrases to
illuminate and broaden one’s understanding of an
idea or concept. Through this illumination, con-
versants using figures of speech appeal to the
senses and aesthetic proclivities of the intended
audience by penetrating the mental framework of
individuals. This mental framework then serves as
the conduit through which words and phrases can
transform and reshape one’s understanding about
a particular subject matter. The metamorphosis of
understanding created through the morphing of
words via the imagination (or mental framework)
allows the intended audience to experience new
ways of thinking about enduring ideologies and
concepts that are seemingly archaic and irrelevant
on the surface. The fresh revelatory insights that
come out of this mental framework create enliv-
ened discussions and debates about any subject
matter imaginable. There is no end to how speak-
ers and writers can use figures of speech to express
universal concepts in new ways.
Nonliteral expressions of ideas can seem unnec-
essary and bothersome when it comes to reading
and listening to pertinent material. In addition,
some believe that one should avoid the usage of
riddles and mysteries in how one expresses ideas
and concepts to others and, instead, employ con-
crete simplicity as one states what one actually
means when writing or speaking about any sub-
ject. The opponents of nonliteral expression also
believe that using direct expression leaves no room
for confusion and that there is less conflict and
turmoil as a result of saying what one actually
means in both verbal and written expression. This
belief may hold true in certain situations and disci-
plines (depending on the circumstances involved);
however, avoiding confusion and misunderstand-
ing when expressing ideas is not necessarily crucial
when attempting to communicate a message to an
intended audience. In this case, disagreements can
become an opportunity for open exchanges about
differences in opinion concerning rhetoric contain-
ing figures of speech. The usage of figures of
speech can be an indicator of the differences in the
mental frameworks among individuals when com-
municating. Moreover, the use of figures of speech
in certain situations lends itself to a better under-
standing about ideologies and concepts because it
invites commentary and encourages persons with
different opinions, perspectives, and backgrounds
to communicate openly.
Literal language, on the other hand, tends not to
lend itself to creative thinking in the same way that
nonliteral language does. Using language figura-
tively forces the intended audience to debate with
others who have opposing views, and this debate
challenges everyone involved to consider other ways
of thinking, or at least to develop a degree of empa-
thy for those who have a different understanding of

the same concept. In essence, figures of speech
compel speakers, writers, and listeners to reinforce,
reconsider, or even abandon their beliefs when
confronted by external thoughts and opinions that
challenge these belief systems that are either similar
to or dissimilar from their own.
Those who choose to use figures of speech in
verbal and written expression do so because they
want the concepts in which they believe to take on
new life. We understand that generally, there is
more than one way to go about accomplishing a
task. One person may choose to do something one
way, whereas another may choose to do that same
task in a completely different way. Nevertheless,
in the end, the task is still completed. Such is the
case with the usage of figures of speech. The con-
veyer of the message may choose various ways in
which to bring the listener to the end product via
figure of speech (i.e., the understanding of a par-
ticular concept); however, it is the listener or
reader, and his or her mental framework, which
decides how the message is received, understood,
and then ultimately expressed.
Before one reaches the end product via the
figures-of-speech rhetoric, there is a middle ground.
This middle ground is the imagination. In one’s
imagination, the figures of speech are transformed
into one’s own ideas and concepts about the
figures-of-speech rhetoric that is heard or read.
The mental framework, created from this transfor-
mation, is now the area in which our life experi-
ences have a place to dwell and expand. In other
words, this new mental framework, created in the
imagination realm, is the foundation for new
understandings about well-established opinions
presented during the figures-of-speech rhetorical
exchange. The way in which one lives, moves,
thinks, exists, interacts, and thrives comes out of
this mental framework; therefore, any attempt one
makes to understand the depths of the figures of
speech comes out of this place also.
Types of Figures of Speech:
The Middle Ground
It can be said that our thought processes inhabit
the middle ground between two or more people
who are communicating. This middle ground, or
what can be called the mental framework, leads to
use of specific types of figures of speech. These
Figures of Speech 285
figures of speech emerge and become apparent
when we hear words and phrases that attempt to
convey messages not readily understood. Examples
of figures of speech include the following.
Metaphor
The metaphor is an expression of the similari-
ties between two unlike entities that have some-
thing in common for the purposes of making a
comparison.
Example: The pen is mightier than the sword.
This statement shows how a figure of speech com-
pares two dissimilar things as if they are similar in
usage. The pen is for writing and a sword is a
weapon for war; however, this statement posits
that the pen, in a writing situation, becomes a more
powerful weapon within the context of this same
writing situation, than the sword is during a fight.
Simile
The simile does the same thing as the metaphor
but employs like or as to make the comparison.
Example: John is as sick as a dog.
John is sick, and when one compares his sickness
to that of a dog, one can then understand that the
nature of his illness is serious.
Metonymy
Metonymy involves the substitution of one
word or phrase for another. Generally, this is
when the substituted word represents a much
larger entity.
Example: The students who attend State College
call it “The Beast.”
State College is the name of the school. Even
though the students that attend State College call
their school “The Beast” (usually, this type of
nicknaming occurs due to established traditions
among students at certain schools), the students
understand that the official name of their school is
State College.
286 Figures of Speech
Hyperbole
A hyperbole is an exaggeration about a stated
fact through use of words to emphasize this fact.
Example: I am so tired I could sleep forever.
When one is tired, sleep is an option to relieve
one’s exhaustion. However, no one expects a per-
son to sleep forever (i.e., never awaken) because of
this tired condition. Stating that one will sleep for-
ever is an obvious exaggeration.
Paradox
A paradox is a statement that contradicts itself
even though it expresses the truth.
Example: James Bond is a well-known secret
agent.
Secret agents are inherently unknown because of
the nature of their professional responsibilities.
For this reason, a paradox exists in this situation
because the fact that James Bond is well-known
should nullify the fact that he is a secret agent.
Meiosis
Meiosis involves belittling or dismissing a per-
son or entity that warrants respect by intentionally
understating his or her significance via a one-word
description for this same person or entity.
Example: Jane refers to her psychiatrist as a
“shrink.”
Psychiatrists are medical professionals. Referring
to a psychiatrist as a “shrink” dismisses the fact
that psychiatrists deserve the same respect as any
other medical professional.
Synecdoche
Synecdoche is an expression where either more
or less is meant, or when the whole, or only the
parts of the whole, are meant.
Example: The company that Jack works for
hates him.
A company is a whole entity made up of many dif-
ferent departments. It is not the whole company
that hates Jack; more than likely, it is his boss or a
group of coworkers who hate him.
Litotes
Litotes is an understatement in which the
expression conveys less emotion or less intensity
than what actually exists.
Example: Joan said to her daughter: “Thanks for
walking across my freshly mopped floor!”
Even though Joan thanks her daughter for walking
across the clean floor, she is actually upset with her
daughter for doing this. Joan uses sarcasm to
lessen the intensity of her frustration toward her
daughter for walking across the floor.
Irony
Irony is when one expresses the opposite of
what is actually meant.
Example: Jack walks into a room and immedi-
ately notices that it is very hot. He then states: “Is
it hot enough in here?”
Jack understands that it is hot in the room he has
just entered. He draws attention to this fact by
implying that someone should turn up the heat in
the room, even though he knows that the room is
hot enough.
Oxymoron
An oxymoron occurs when two terms that con-
tradict each other are placed together to create a
different meaning.
Example: Joan eats jumbo shrimp.
Shellfish called shrimp are small. One may also
refer to a person, place, or thing as a “shrimp,”
meaning that it is also small. But when one places
the word jumbo in front of the word shrimp, it
makes the word seem implausible; however, jumbo
shrimp are simply the largest type of shellfish and
shellfish are inherently small.

The Final Frontier
Using, listening to, and reading figures of speech
force us to reexamine the basis from which we
draw conclusions concerning the methods used to
establish belief systems. How one interprets figures
of speech rhetoric depends, in part, on the intercon-
nectedness between one’s imagination and one’s
beliefs. In addition, exploring the various figures of
speech and the context of their usage provides an
opportunity to consider the infinite possibilities
contained within one’s mental framework, thus
opening up new interpretations of widely under-
stood, universal concepts. Figures of speech chal-
lenge writers, speakers, and listeners to consider the
virtual plethora of interpretations of concepts and
ideas concerning self-understanding and one’s
intrapersonal relationship to oneself. The hope is
that this challenge lends itself to creating listeners
and readers of figures-of-speech rhetoric who are
more dynamic in their thinking and more open to
treating others with more empathy and understand-
ing in the midst of point of view disagreements.
Vanessa Holmes
See also Communication Competence; Framing;
Hyperreality and Simulation; Other, The; Rhetoric;
Style/Diction
Further Readings
Colston, H. (2000). Comprehending speaker intent in
rebuttal analogy use: The role of irony mapping,
absurdity comparison and argumentative convention.
Language and Speech, 43(4), 337–354.
Colston, H., & Keller, S. (1998). You’ll never believe this:
Irony and hyperbole in expressing surprise. Journal of
Psycholinguistic Research, 27(4), 499–513.
Frankie, W. (2000). Metaphor and the making of sense:
The contemporary metaphor renaissance. Philosophy
and Rhetoric, 33(2), 137–153.
Gozzi, R. (1999). The oxymetaphor-paradoxical
superstar. ETC: A Review of General Semantics,
58(2), 211–216.
First Nations
First Nations is the official term employed by the
Canadian federal government and the British
First Nations 287
Crown to designate the indigenous peoples of
Canada, not including the Inuit or Métis. Inuit are
Arctic peoples, and Métis are descendants of inter-
marriages between Athabaskans and Europeans.
Although controversial, First Nations is consid-
ered a more culturally acceptable label than the
formerly used “Indian bands.” First Nations legally
structured identity in terms of blood status and
documentable ancestry. The term First Nations is
also employed, with varying degrees of acceptance,
by native peoples of Canada in self-designations.
Aboriginal Identities
In part, First Nations peoples’ identities have been
constructed by a history of colonization, persecu-
tion, and cultural genocide—as is the case for most
aboriginal societies where Europeans have migrated
since the 17th century. The many different nations
of the indigenous groups in Canada (from the
Mi’kmaq in the East to the Caddo in the West)
comprise very distinct identities. But their common
struggles and experiences since the arrival of
European colonists led to an additional shared
identity as First Nations. In the evolution of this
shared identity, First Nations peoples also have
much in common with other aboriginal societies
around the world.
In general, the governments of countries incor-
porating colonized aboriginal peoples—especially
the governments of the British Commonwealth
countries and their descendants—believed that it
was in the best interest of the indigenous peoples
that they be assimilated into a European-preferred
style of living. Primary goals of this assimilation
included changes in economic, educational, reli-
gious, and social attitudes. The quest to acculturate
native peoples follows a similar pattern in these
countries: contact, trade, resettlement, war, restric-
tion of territory, reeducation attempts, removal of
children to separate schools, abolition of cultural
traditions (including language), and even genocide.
This is not to say that all intercultural contact in
such situations has been malicious. Many intercul-
tural experiences of aboriginals and Europeans
have been benign or positive, as in the case of
individual decisions to intermarry or voluntary
affiliations with government institutions (such as
the military). In addition, in all cases, aboriginal
responses to this pattern of colonization and
288 First Nations
persecution have been active, not passive. Indigenous
peoples everywhere have strongly resisted others’
attempts to control indigenous freedoms, particu-
larly when cultural traditions were attacked.
Nevertheless, in most cases, aboriginal peoples’
collective histories in colonized situations have
been tragic.
Beyond these historic events, the interplay
between indigenous peoples and the European
colonists who arrived on their territory all over the
world has yielded challenges to identity in the
20th and 21st centuries. These challenges are
summed up in postcolonial theory. In most cases,
past persecutions have kept indigenous peoples out
of mainstream institutions and economic opportu-
nities. The history of marginalization has yielded a
cycle of poverty for most natives living in postco-
lonial contexts. In some cases, as with First
Nations, the restriction of territory keeps people
literally marginalized. First Nations reserves have
been granted some degree of autonomy, and many
First Nations leaders have succeeded in improving
community life on the reserves. Yet, economic
inequality is still pronounced in many places.
Postcolonial theorists explore not just economic
disruption but also identity issues impacted by
culture and psychology. A history of violence and
abuse at the hands of the colonizers has had a psy-
chological impact on many postcolonial peoples
and has caused enormous upheaval to peoples’
cultures, effacing or severely damaging customs
and traditions. Postcolonial theorists are especially
attentive to the disruptions to native peoples’ lan-
guages over the past few centuries. Many native
languages have died out, and many have only a
few remaining speakers; nevertheless, First Nations
peoples continue to work at recapturing their
native languages.
The desire to recapture native languages and
past traditions is hailed by many as the right of
postcolonial peoples. Others, including indigenous
people themselves, strive to strike a balance
between their native identity and the necessity of
living in the capitalist nation-state. For many, eco-
nomic survival requires moving off traditional
lands and into urban areas where there are more
educational and professional opportunities. Others
choose not to do this. But in all cases, globalization
affects indigenous individuals’ identities. They
might move away from traditional settlements to
contribute their skills to the global market. Even if
they do not, they are participants in the global
market through the purchase of goods and con-
sumption of media. In discussions about globaliza-
tion, which impacts all indigenous peoples, these
processes comprise the flow between periphery
and center.
Finding themselves within these processes, post-
colonial native persons may also experience hybrid
identities. First Nations members are no exception.
Hybridity occurs when an individual identifies
with two or more social groups. Indigenous people
around the world experience this as members of
their own native group and as participants in the
nation-state as well as the global market.
The common experiences of postcolonial native
societies around the world often frame another
aspect of their respective identities: affiliation and
identification with other indigenous people regard-
less of tribal identity. This is true within nation-
states, as in the Assembly of First Nations in
Canada, and across borders, as when First Nations
powwow organizers invite Hawaiian or South
American Indian dancers to their events. First
Nations individuals experience solidarity and
support in these acknowledgments of global
indigenous identities.
Distinctive Aspects of First Nations Identities
In the United States, such identification across
tribes and borders is known as pan-Indianism.
Although this is a controversial aspect of identity
for some, the term highlights the fact that indige-
nous peoples have had similar postcolonial experi-
ences but also have strong identification with
specific ethnic cultures. Canadian native persons
also have unique aspects of their identities, which
are encapsulated in the term First Nations.
Acknowledging once again that some individu-
als still interrogate this term First Nations, it is
accurate and positive in at least one sense: the
native peoples of pre-Columbian North America
comprised many distinct nations, and they still do.
In Canada, the experiences of First Nations mem-
bers are unique from person to person and band to
band. The Assembly of First Nations, an organiza-
tion which creates solidarity in the fight for politi-
cal rights, has been very beneficial. The Assembly
of First Nations recognizes that different First

Nations share similar values important to their
identities. Land rights and the protection of the
environment are important to many First Nations,
for example. Yet, the Assembly of First Nations
also recognizes that each First Nation has individ-
ual sovereignty and unique challenges.
Identifying themselves as First Nations under-
scores the strength of discrete native groups in
Canada. They are also, though, “nations within a
nation”: Their identities are forever connected to
Canadian citizenship as well. The particular stances
of the Canadian government toward its indigenous
groups have contributed to unique aspects of First
Nations identity. While the patterns of coloniza-
tion listed previously were fairly typical in Canada,
the Assembly of First Nations has emphasized the
need to overcome some specific abuses—especially
those that occurred in the residential schools many
First Nations children were forced to attend.
The fact that Canada is a country distinct from
the United States yet shares a border on the same
continent also contributes to the First Nations
identity of some Canadian natives. Long before
this border was drawn between the two countries,
native peoples lived for centuries in complex soci-
eties with large populations. Thus, many so-called
Native American tribes are relatives of First
Nations groups. One group is called Blackfeet in
the United States but Blackfoot in Canada; they
hunted buffalo together on a vast expanse of land
on the plains that today are Montana (United
States) and Alberta (Canada). In terms of ethnic
heritage, the Bloods, Siksika, and Piegans—bands
who make up this group—are only Native
American Blackfeet and First Nations Blackfoot
today because of arbitrary geopolitical boundar-
ies drawn relatively recently in the group’s his-
tory. These boundaries multiply because of the
establishment of Canadian reserves and American
reservations.
For those not remaining on the reserves, life in
Canadian cities is also complex, and the sensitivity
of their First Nations identity may be heightened.
Major urban areas in Canada are populated with
recent immigrants from former Commonwealth
colonies and from around the world. Recent soci-
ologists note that when indigenous people need to
compete with other minorities—such as Asians
and those from the African diaspora—for assis-
tance, indigenous groups tend to be given lower
First Nations 289
priority. There is sometimes an “invisibility” First
Nations people experience in the cities, perhaps
because their population is smaller; perhaps
because unlike other urban minorities, they are
physically disconnected from their community.
First Nations may share some similar experi-
ences with Native Americans in the United States,
but there are other layers to the postcolonial iden-
tity unique to Canada. Canada is a member of the
British Commonwealth; thus, there have been
interesting connections between First Nations and
the British Crown. Not the least of this was the
visit of the Duke of York to the Alberta Powwow
in 1901. The duke distributed medals to the chiefs
of each band visiting the powwow. Reportedly this
action was taken to strengthen both the political
status of chief and the First Nations’ ties to the
Crown. This is just one example of royal recogni-
tion of the First Nations as members of the
Commonwealth.
The unique experiences of First Nations as citi-
zens under a federal government connected to the
British Crown, even merely symbolically, textures
First Nations identity as distinctive from other
native peoples in the Americas. This is true also of
the founding colonists of Canada; many were
French. A French identity is also unique to First
Nations. For example, the Métis are an ethnic
group in Northwestern Canada, so-called because
of their distinctive half-French, half-Athabaskan
heritage. The Métis are descendants of native
people who intermarried with French traders.
Their identity is distinct from that of First Nations
peoples, and it highlights the experiences of
Canada’s native peoples with French trappers,
traders, and missionaries. For the majority of
groups, First Nations histories are intertwined
with those of the French—yielding a unique post-
colonial identity.
Kathleen Glenister Roberts
See also Colonialism; Culture; Globalization; Hybridity
Further Readings
Congress of Aboriginal Peoples & Chartrand, P. L. A. H.
(Eds.). (2002). Who are Canada’s aboriginal peoples?
Recognition, definition and jurisdiction. Saskatoon,
Canada: Purich.
290 Forms of Address
Dickason, O. P., & Calder, M. J. (2006). A concise
history of Canada’s First Nations. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Henry, W. A. (2000). Imagining the great white mother
and the great king: Aboriginal tradition and royal
representation at the “Great Pow-Wow” of 1901.
Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, 11,
87–108.
McMillan, A. D., & Yellowhorn, E. (2004). First Peoples
in Canada (3rd ed.). Vancouver, Canada: Douglas &
McIntyre.
Morrison, R. B., & Wilson, C. R. (2004). Native peoples:
The Canadian experience. Toronto, Canada: Oxford
University Press.
Sanna, E., & William, H. (2005). Canada’s modern-day
First Nations: Nunavut and evolving relationships.
Broomall, PA: Mason Crest.
Forms of Address
Forms of address or address forms are stylistic
features of speech. Stylistic features reflect a
speaker’s lexical choices. Whether a speaker
addresses a colleague as Mr. Baker, Bill, or dude
reflects a stylistic feature of speech. The use of
certain address forms may also indicate setting.
When speakers move from one speech situation to
another, speech participants—and thus stylistic
features such as address forms—change. Stylistic
features related to address forms include terms of
endearment and diminutives. Terms of endear-
ment express affection. Diminutives imply small-
ness, familiarity, or affection. The ways in which
speakers address one another provide insight into
social relations, cultural orientation, and regional
influences. Address forms serve as individual and
plural markers in language, for these forms reveal
aspects of the speaker’s identity and the partici-
pant’s identity in a particular speech situation.
Whether in real life or in imaginative literature,
forms of address reflect identity.
Forms of Address and Social Relations
Social roles, interpersonal relationships, and cul-
tural orientation dictate how speakers use address
forms. Speakers consider situation, setting, and the
status of others as they move from one speech
situation to another. Whether or not a speaker
identifies with the group also contributes to how a
speaker uses language. Regarding social hierarchy,
power and solidarity are important. Power pre-
supposes some semblance of control. Forms of
address may signal the extent to which one speaker
controls another speaker in the workplace and are
thus indicators of social hierarchy.
Interpersonal relationships, like social roles,
dictate forms of address. For example, if Joan
Jackson communicates with her colleague, Bill
Baker, during his public presentation, she may
address him as Mr. Baker. While conversing with
him in the corridor following the public presen-
tation, she may address him as Bill. Whether
Joan Jackson addresses her colleague as Bill or
Mr. Baker in the corridor following the presenta-
tion, or in an informal setting far removed from
the presentation, signals the level of their interper-
sonal relationship. Address forms are significant in
that they indicate relationships between speakers
within certain speech situations.
Cultural orientation, too, dictates how one
speaker addresses another. In certain cultures, age
is a primary factor directing language use. Whereas
the participant with power is generally in the
privileged position, certain cultures demand that
speakers privilege age. If cultural orientation
demands that one respect age, then the 25-year-old
manager who supervises the 59-year-old employee
addresses the employee formally regardless of the
corporate setting that invites (and, in some
instances, dictates) an informal, first-name address.
As a consequence, when forms of address diverge
from the group (i.e., those in the corporate set-
ting), the group may view the speaker as different.
Stylistic differences often trigger listener attitudes
and contribute to strained social relations.
Perceiving an unspoken resistance to formal
address, the culturally oriented manager will likely
engage in linguistic acrobatics in an effort to use
syntactic structures that omit forms of address
rather than to address an elder employee by first
name only. Setting, then, may prompt the omission
of address forms. Similarly, digital forms of com-
munication influence language style and thus
address forms. Rather than using an informal
address, many individuals omit oral and written

address forms when using fast-paced, digital forms
of communication. Those from the predigital era,
however, adhere to prescribed address forms, thus
providing yet another indicator of identity.
Forms of Address and Region
Region plays an important role in the use of
address forms. Terms of endearment such as
honey, sweetheart, sugar, and baby are common
among southern U.S. speakers. In general, speakers
address women using terms of endearment more so
than they address men. Terms of endearment such
as sugar and peach imply comparisons between
women and consumption. Although metaphorical
and affectionate, such connotations are considered
disparaging by some women. According to the
staunch Southerner, speech deficiency in terms of
endearment exemplifies rudeness and indifference.
Related to region and address forms are the use of
titles and first names only. For example, in the
southern region of the United States, one might
hear addresses such as Ms. Jane, Ms. Eva,
Mr. Fred, or Mr. Darrell. Similarly, regional and
cultural influences might produce terms of endear-
ment such as Big Mama, and Ma’dear. Regional,
historical, and social conditions were evident when
southern Whites addressed older Black women as
aunt, gal, and girl and older Black men as uncle
and boy. On the other hand, southern Blacks
addressed Whites as Mr., Mrs., and Miss. Black
men often addressed White men as Captain or
boss. These are yet other indicators of how address
forms reveal power relations, social conditions,
historical experiences, and regional differences.
The use of diminutives as forms of address may
also reflect regional differences. Along with imply-
ing smallness, familiarity, and affection, diminu-
tives are names or words formed by a suffix. It is
the suffix that expresses something small in size or
something of a lesser degree. Examples include
girlie for girl and cutie for cute. Other diminutives
occur in words such as ringlet for ring and droplet
for drop. The use of tummy for stomach is some-
times accompanied by a rise in voice pitch. This
pitch increase might be defined as “motherese.”
Although speakers other than mothers use such
diminutives, motherese spans regions and clearly
identifies the speaker.
Forms of Address 291
Formal Address and Identity
Formal address indicates status, occupation, posi-
tion, rank, nobility, and thus identity. Prescriptive
rules guide the use of written and spoken formal
addresses. For example, the spoken, formal
address for Cardinal is Your Eminence or simply
Cardinal. One formally addresses the Chief Justice
as Mr. or Madam Chief Justice, the Duke as Your
Grace or Duke, and the Duchess as Your Grace or
Duchess. For commissioned officers in the army,
navy, and marines, one uses the formal addresses
of rank such as Lieutenant, Colonel, and General.
Those of lower rank may be addressed simply as
soldier.
Formal address also includes Mrs., Miss, and
Mr. The use of Mrs. and Miss signals a woman’s
relationship with a man. Mr., like Ms., is silent
concerning male/female relations. Mrs. and Miss
suggest the woman’s name and identity change
after marriage, whereas Mr. implies that the man’s
name and identity remain unchanged. This is
important, for it hinges on notions of self-definition
and identity. Speakers must respect the woman
who retains her family name after marriage. If a
woman with the family name Victoria Naylor mar-
ries but refuses to take her husband’s last name,
Jackson, then calling her Mrs. Naylor or Mrs. Jackson
would be inappropriate. To address the woman as
Mrs. Naylor identifies her as her husband’s mother,
assuming the mother has taken on the married
name of her husband. To address her as Mrs. Jackson
disregards her wish to use her family name. To
address her as Ms. Naylor is appropriate.
Formal addresses possess a generative force in a
hospital setting where the patient is seemingly
stripped of all identifying aspects of his or her per-
son. Identified only as a medical record number,
room number, unit, diagnosis, and prognosis, the
use of formal address such as Mrs., Ms., Mr., or
Lieutenant restores some semblance of dignity
and, therefore, identity in the hospital setting.
There is also reciprocity in the use of formal
address. Rather than speech situations and partici-
pants dictating address forms, address forms may
influence speech situations and participants. For
example, the college instructor who addresses stu-
dents as Mr. and Ms. models the desired behavior
for the group. To use such address forms creates a
292 Forms of Address
formal learning environment. The instructor
addresses students formally, students address the
instructor formally, and, consequently, students
address their peers formally in the classroom set-
ting. According to speech accommodation theory,
when speakers shift stylistic features to align with
those of their audience, convergence occurs. When
speakers distance themselves from the stylistic fea-
tures of their audience, divergence occurs. The
previous example reflects divergence. The instruc-
tor promotes style shifting by modeling formal
address. The instructor’s pro-action creates change.
Although they may feel awkward initially, students
quickly adjust to the use of formal address in the
classroom.
Forms of Address in Literature
Like real life, fiction presents address forms that
reflect social roles, interpersonal relationships, and
cultural orientation. Some of the most interesting
examples collapse the social, interpersonal, and
cultural with the historical experience of slavery in
America. One example occurs in Charles W.
Chesnutt’s The Marrow of Tradition, set during the
post-Reconstruction period. The young, White
Tom Delamere, grandson of the respected old
Mr. Delamere, addresses his grandfather’s Black
servant, Sandy Campbell, as darky. Although loyal
and submissive, Sandy Campbell expresses his dis-
pleasure for two reasons. First, Tom Delamere’s
use of such an address reflects poorly on the
speaker, one who bears the highly regarded name,
Delamere. Second, the address denigrates him,
Sandy Campbell, a longtime, faithful servant.
Tom’s use of the term darky elicits Sandy’s mean-
ingful response—a response that clearly demon-
strates how address forms serve as individual and
plural markers in language.
Another literary example of the inextricable
link between address forms and identity occurs in
Richard Wright’s “Long Black Song,” set during
the post–World War I period. Readers might recall
the ease with which the White college student,
working as a door-to-door salesman, addresses
Sarah as Aunty. Interestingly, Sarah views the col-
lege student as a little boy but addresses him as
Mistah. Historical experiences shape both address
forms. The college student’s addressing Sarah as
Aunty suggests that he views her as a mature Black
woman; yet, he objectifies Sarah through the his-
torical lens of slavery and rapes her with the same
ease in which he addresses her.
Literary address forms offer great insight about
identity in seemingly insignificant ways in Frances
E. W. Harper’s 19th-century works, Iola Leroy
and Minnie’s Sacrifice. During a scene in Harper’s
Iola Leroy, set at the end of the Civil War, Robert
Johnson meets his former mistress. Changes in
social and political circumstances render the mis-
tress initially speechless. The mistress does not
know how to address Robert Johnson, the one she
previously enslaved. To capture this significant
moment, Harper exploits the narrative voice to
present the former mistress’ linguistic challenge.
This challenge is inextricably linked to identity, for
it was clear she did not now how to address him.
She had been taught since childhood that colored
people should be called either boys or girls, or aun-
ties or uncles. It would seem socially awkward and
almost nonsensical to address them as Mr. and
Mrs. Address forms in this novel reveal the signifi-
cance of setting and the use of such address forms.
Setting encompasses not only time and place but
also historical circumstances and conditions. In the
previous example, the Reconstruction period
reflects historical circumstances and conditions in
a state of flux. Uncertain conditions create uncer-
tainty in social relations. Uncertainty in social rela-
tions prompts changes in stylistic features such as
forms of address. The former mistress must grap-
ple with language and use it in ways that reflect
her new views of the world outside the bygone
mistress/enslaved social hierarchy.
Just as Robert Johnson’s former mistress ulti-
mately adopts new address forms, Eugene Leroy’s
wife, in Iola Leroy, does the same. Because Eugene
Leroy educates and marries the enslaved Marie,
she must stifle the urge to address her new hus-
band as master. Following several stern reminders,
Marie ultimately addresses her husband as Eugene.
Character dialogue clearly highlights shifting social
relations and interpersonal relationships through
the use of address forms.

In Harper’s Minnie’s Sacrifice, the use of address
forms exposes how changes in social and political
circumstances challenge those within the Black
community. For example, Louis discovers his
mixed racial heritage as an adult just prior to the
Civil War. He demonstrates his commitment to his
Black heritage initially by joining the colored regi-
ment and, following the war, by encouraging
Black men to exercise their right to vote. The nar-
rator reveals how Louis makes a concerted effort
to withhold the word uncle when he addresses a
newly freed man as Mr. Jackson. This is signifi-
cant. Address forms here signal Louis’s own
struggle to come to terms with his culturally mixed
heritage and his identity as a Black man rather
than his socialization as a White man.
Social relations, cultural orientation, and
regional influences inform stylistic features in
speech. Stylistic features include forms of address.
Whether a speaker uses formal address, terms of
endearment, or diminutives, forms of address serve
as plural markers that identify the speaker and the
participants in any given speech situation.
Jacqueline Imani Bryant
See also Dialect; Language; Worldview
Further Readings
Alvarez, L., & Kolker, A. (Directors). (1987). American
Tongues: A film about the way we talk [Video
recording]. Harriman, NY: Center for New American
Media.
Gates, H. L., Jr. (1990). C. W. Chesnutt. In H. L. Gates
Jr. (Ed.), Three classic African-American novels
(pp. 467–747). New York: Random House.
Harper, F. E. W. (1988). Iola Leroy (H. L. Gates Jr.,
Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. (Original
work published 1892)
Harper, F. E. W. (1994). Minnie’s Sacrifice, Sowing and
Reaping, Trial and Triumph: Three rediscovered
novels (F. Smith Foster, Ed.). Boston: Beacon Press.
Scherer, K. R., & Giles, H. (1979). Social markers in
speech. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Wolfram, W., & Schilling-Estes, N. (1998). American
English: Dialects and variation. Malden, MA:
Blackwell.
Framing 293
Framing
Framing refers to the use of language and ideas to
interpret and influence the understandings of oth-
ers regarding an issue or event. The concept has
been used most widely in the study of social move-
ments, collective attempts to bring about social
change. Social movement activists seek to con-
vince others to identify with and to join or support
their cause by strategically framing some aspect of
the social world they deem as unjust and in need
of correction. They do so by highlighting the seri-
ousness of a problem or injustice (e.g., racial
inequality, war, environmental decline, domestic
violence, homelessness), attributing blame for the
problem, offering solutions, and urging people to
take action to overcome the problem. Scholars
refer to the products of social movement framing
activities as collective action frames.
Early research focused on movement framing
strategies whereby activists sought to affect an
apparent alignment between a movement group’s
ideas and goals and the interests and values of the
targets of mobilization (e.g., potential recruits,
third party supporters, media). Such deliberative
movement discursive acts are called frame align-
ment strategies. One frequently employed frame
alignment strategy entails amplifying values
thought to be widely shared by the audience at
hand (e.g., equality, freedom of choice, fairness,
loyalty, privacy). Another often used frame align-
ment strategy involves highlighting widely held
beliefs (e.g., all politicians are corrupt, corporate
executives only care about profits, “the people
united will never be defeated”). A third frame
alignment strategy extends a movement’s original
claims so as to encompass the interests of the tar-
gets of mobilization. For example, the peace move-
ment has occasionally extended its peace-related
and antiwar framing activities to encompass eco-
nomic concerns (Jobs for Peace, Bread Not Bombs).
Researchers have found that successful frame
alignment tends to yield the acquisition and mobi-
lization of necessary resources (money, members,
media coverage) as well as the achievement of
movement goals for social change.
294 Framing
Whether or not framing activity succeeds in
mobilizing people to join or support a movement
depends on frame resonance, the extent to which
the target audience views the framings as credible
and salient. Researchers have found that frame
credibility is affected, in part, by the perceived
consistency of the various claims, the credibility of
those engaging in the framing activity, and empir-
ical credibility—the apparent fit between what
activists say and observable events in the world.
Salience is affected by how central the movement’s
ideas, beliefs, and values are to the audience; the
extent to which the movement framings are con-
sistent with people’s everyday life experiences;
and the fit between collective action frames and
the stock of folk tales, folk wisdom, and cultural
myths with which the audience is familiar. The
more a movement’s framings are characterized by
the previously mentioned elements of credibility
and salience, the greater is the frame resonance
and thus the more likely people are to identify
with, join, and support the activities of that
cause.
Collective action frames and other social move-
ment framing activity often include identity claims.
For example, activists and members of the gay,
lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and queer move-
ment assert that, other than sexual orientation,
they are no different than other people and thus
deserving of the same rights (e.g., right to marry,
right to own and inherit property, right to work)
and opportunities as everyone else. Framing related
to identity claims also typically entails the devel-
opment of identity fields marking boundaries
between avowed movement identities (sometimes
referred to as collective identities), and imputed
opponent’s identities. Movement framings are rife
with boundary framing that constructs and attri-
butes three types of clearly demarcated identity
fields: protagonist identity fields (us, the “good
guys”), antagonist identity fields (them, the
“bad guys”), and audience identity fields (bystander
audiences such as neutral or uncommitted observ-
ers, media, powerful elites).
Recent research on social movement framing has
focused on the contested nature of framing. When
activists frame a problem or an injustice in a par-
ticular way, their opponents or antagonists often
engage in counterframing, an attempt to rebut,
discredit, or otherwise neutralize the movement’s
initial framing. Counterframing can entail denying
the existence of the problem (e.g., “global warm-
ing is a myth”), agreeing that the problem exists
but arguing that the movement’s attributions of
blame regarding the problem’s cause(s) are wrong
(e.g., “global warming is occurring, but it’s not
due to industry and burning fuels but rather
because there are too many trees”), or that the
problem is real but that the movement’s solutions
are inappropriate, misguided, or impractical.
Opponent’s counterframing can also take the form
of attacking the collective character or identity of
the movement group. Peace movement opponents,
for example, have often asserted that peace activ-
ists are either “well-meaning but naive” or “aiding
and abetting the enemy.”
Once a movement’s opponents have engaged in
counterframing activities intended to undermine
and discredit the movement’s initial framings and
collective identity, the movement may decide to
engage in reframing activities. In other words,
movement activists may choose to respond to their
opponents’ counterframings by adjusting, clarify-
ing, or giving new emphasis to their original
framings. Continuing with the last example, peace
activists might reframe the attacks on their loyalty
by asserting that “we are the true patriots because
we care about the future of our country.” At times,
the framing, counterframing, and reframing activi-
ties of movement protagonists and antagonists
resemble a chess match or athletic contest. But in
the social movement arena, the stakes are interpre-
tations of reality, ideas, and meanings.
Framing contests occur not only between move-
ment activists and their opponents but also within
movements between social movement organiza-
tions as well as within a particular movement
group. Research indicates that these frame dis-
putes are sometimes about the actual causes of the
problem. On other occasions, intramovement
frame disputes concern the proposed solutions.
Most often, though, frame disputes are over which
framings or frame alignment strategies are most
likely to resonate with the intended audience.
Frequently, movement activists are faced with
choices between “in your face” rhetoric and more
moderate or conciliatory framings. The outcomes
of these intramural frame disputes, as well as the
wider framing contests between movement pro-
tagonists and antagonists, can affect the longevity

of a movement and its prospects for success or
failure.
Robert D. Benford
See also Attribution; Narratives; Social Movements
Further Readings
Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes
and social movements: An overview and assessment.
Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611–639.
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis. Boston:
Northeastern University Press.
Hunt S. A., Benford R. D., & Snow D. A. (1994).
Identity fields: Framing processes and the social
construction of movement identities. In E. Laraña,
H. Johnston, & J. Gusfield (Eds.), New social
movements: From ideology to identity (pp. 185–208).
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Snow, D. A. (2004). Framing processes, ideology, and
discursive fields. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, &
H. Kriesi (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to social
movements (pp. 380–412). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Frankfurt School
The Frankfurt school of critical theory, founded
as the Institute for Social Research in Germany in
1923, produced decades of theoretical and empir-
ical work on capitalism before and after World
War II. Although their main members, Theodor
Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse,
and, later, Jürgen Habermas, were trained in
philosophy, their work, such as Adorno and his
coauthors’ Authoritarian Personality book, is
sociological and psychological in orientation. This
entry focuses on the Frankfurt school in relation
to other theoretical traditions and their concep-
tions of identity.
Marxism
The Frankfurt intellectuals were Marxists,
although they felt that Marx’s original critique of
capitalism failed to anticipate two major develop-
ments in post–World War II capitalism: the culture
industry, which manipulates people’s needs and
induces them to consume commodities beyond
Frankfurt School 295
what they can afford, and the welfare state, put in
place first by President Franklin Roosevelt. The
culture industry relieves psychic crises of alienation
and anomie. The welfare state intervenes directly
in the faltering pure-market capitalist economy,
against the laissez-faire recommendations of Adam
Smith in The Wealth of Nations, in order to stimu-
late spending, create jobs, and buffer the poor
against the poverty caused by unemployment. The
Frankfurt school realized that in a “late” (post–
free market) capitalism, identity has become a
crucial political and economic factor. People’s
sense of who they are plays a major role in repro-
ducing the existing economic system and in reduc-
ing the potential for organized countercapitalist
social movements.
The Frankfurt theorists agreed with Marx that
capitalism is prone to crisis, but they disagree that
its collapse is inevitable, especially as capitalism
finds ways to sustain itself. One of the main ways
that capitalism protects itself is via subjectivity, or
what social psychologists term the self. In effect,
capitalism manipulates people’s identities, needs,
values, emotions, and even their experiences of the
world. They are thus led to love or at least accept
fatalistically what is not good for them: stress,
workplace subordination, fundamentalism, end-
less shopping (on credit), fatty diets, and lack of
exercise conceived as play.
Marx argued that workers are alienated in the
sense that they neither own the factories in which
they work nor control the working process. Profit
goes to the business owner and profit is derived,
according to Marx, from workers’ labor power.
The Frankfurt theorists agreed with Marx’s analy-
sis, but they add that alienation has been deepened
since the 19th century. Marx died in 1883, and he
firmly believed that capitalism was on its death
bed. But the culture industry and welfare state
have prolonged capitalism and have yet to elimi-
nate the basic contradiction (a term used by the
philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel)
between the idea of workers (as owners or control-
lers of the working process) and their capitalist
employers.
This deepened alienation was termed reification
by the early 20th-century Hungarian Marxist,
Georg Lukács, in his book History of Class
Consciousness. To reify something—here, the self
and its human relations—is to make it object-like,
296 Frankfurt School
hard, and without sensibility or emotion. The
Frankfurt theorists, partly influenced by Max
Weber’s theories of bureaucratic administration
and hierarchy, argued that domination can be used
to describe post–World War II capitalism in which,
as Horkheimer phrased it, reason has been eclipsed.
The self no longer thinks for itself but uncritically
inhabits a cultural ether in which independent
thought is nearly impossible.
Frankfurt theorists used the term domination to
refer to everyday experiences of work, family, lei-
sure, even childhood, that are, in Marcuse’s terms,
one-dimensional. One-dimensional experience is
flattened out, banal, routine. In people’s everyday
lives under a condition of domination, they do not
dream dreams of a qualitatively different, more just
social order; nor do they think deeply about what
is wrong with their lives and the surrounding soci-
ety. They are conformist, apathetic, and resigned to
their fate. They may even come to relish their seem-
ing fate—their 9-to-5 lives that they ameliorate
only through shopping and the occasional vaca-
tion. And they spend beyond their means using
credit, convinced that fulfillment lies in a big-screen
television and a new car every other year.
In this condition of domination, people, much
like the characters in George Orwell’s novel 1984,
do not consider the tedium of their lives as a condi-
tion that can be relieved. Instead, they accept and
even embrace their everyday lives, which they are
taught are unalterable. The appearance of this
unalterability is the essential condition of domina-
tion, and it sustains capitalism by mobilizing self-
hood and identity in reproducing a seeming fate.
Positivism
Various positivists texts and academic disciplines,
modeled on Isaac Newton’s 17th-century physics,
promote the impression of the world’s resistance
to radical change. The Frankfurt school critiques
positivism as the newest version of ideological
belief systems that disqualify utopia as impossible.
Positivist social science, seeking supposed social
laws of cause and effect, portrays the social world
as basically sound and post–World War II con-
sumer capitalism as the final stage of history, a
state of perfection.
In all this, the self and its identity are mobilized
to reproduce the social system, which is actually
quite alterable, as 1960s activists, including many
young people, demonstrated in the civil rights,
antiwar, and women’s movements. This is an
example of Robert Merton’s self-fulfilling proph-
ecy, where believing something to be so makes it
so. According to Talcott Parsons and other socio-
logical ideologists, people are locked in partly
because they lock themselves in, dutifully playing
the various economic, occupational, consumer,
and family roles.
In the 19th century, at the same time that
Charles Dickens depicted the grim poverty of
urban England, Marx wrote that grinding poverty
would reach a tipping point as people were thrown
out of work—as the capitalist rich became richer
and couldn’t profitably reinvest enough of their
capital in business ventures that would benefit the
poor (lumpenproletariat). The socialist revolution
would automatically spring from hunger.
To be sure, Marx knew it was not as simple as
that. Marx and Engels’s Communist Manifesto
and German Ideology acknowledge that revolu-
tionary activism is a deliberate choice, made with
a clear mind (class consciousness) and a vision of
a better society. Workers often suffer from false
consciousness, a belief, promulgated by ideolo-
gists (economists, political theorists, religious
leaders, advertisers), that revolutionary change is
impossible and that the most people can hope for
is to go to heaven and perhaps earn modest mate-
rial gains in the present. As Marx makes clear in
volume 1 of Capital, his last major work, dire
poverty caused by unemployment, along with
fomenting by revolutionary theorists such as him-
self and Engels, would push workers over the
brink and lead them to join an emergent commu-
nist movement, realizing that they have only their
chains to lose.
The Frankfurt school recognized that, with
growing yet unevenly distributed abundance, the
dispelling of false consciousness is more difficult.
Indeed, the self, the subject, in philosophical
terms, matters just as much as the collective sub-
ject of the working class. Capitalism has a way of
involving itself in people’s psychologies, sensi-
bilities, feelings, needs, and unconscious. This is
why the Frankfurt theorists, especially Marcuse
and Adorno, tried to integrate Freud and Marx,
as Marcuse’s 1955 book Eros and Civilization
demonstrates.

Depth Psychology
The Frankfurt school deployed depth psychology
to map the depths of domination—a deepened
condition of alienation. Where alienation in Marx
and Henry Ford’s era involved what Hegel called
loss of the object, of the commodity, profit, and
the working day, today alienation morphs into a
deeper condition of powerlessness characterized
by loss of the self—of people’s very identities (their
sense of who they really are). Gone are stable
meanings and values, as the person becomes a
receptacle for commodities and entertainment.
This is a condition of unfreedom that Adorno
termed the damaged life.
There remains some debate within the Frankfurt
school tradition about whether identity—how
people view themselves—is irrevocably tethered to
overbearing social-system imperatives, such as
profit, conformity, and distraction, or whether
there remains a deep core of indomitable identity
that resists total domination.
Adorno takes the former position, and Marcuse
takes the latter position. Adorno read Freud as
pessimistic about the prospects of happiness,
whereas Marcuse read Freud, merged with Marx,
as a prophet of a good society governed by what
Marcuse called a rationality of gratification. This
possible rationality, he contends, resides deep
within each of us as we struggle to be free, happy,
and gratified. Its flowering is made possible by an
abundant technology, in the post–World War II
era, which is in service of human needs and not of
the imperatives of profit. Marcuse speculated
about the possibility of a new science and technol-
ogy that would not dominate nature or the self.
This was the hippie sensibility of the 1960s, which
Marcuse theorized in An Essay on Liberation.
Postmodernism
Postmodernists have extended this debate, basi-
cally taking the side of Adorno. They contend that
the person or self has become a subject position,
positioned, as Michel Foucault describes, by subtle
processes that discipline us: sitting still in school,
learning penmanship, acquiring a rigid (hetero)
sexual orientation. Foucault’s discipline is similar
to Adorno’s domination in that he seems to aban-
don the possibility of utopia, that is, a good society
Frankfurt School 297
in which people become the selves they were meant
to be.
This allows us to distinguish among three views
of the self and identity within the Frankfurt school
and postmodernism:
•• Marcuse argues that there is an authentic self
who possesses true (non-self-destructive) needs
that will emerge once we eliminate domination
(self-inflicted alienation). Freud helps Marcuse
speculate about how these true needs spring
from an erotized self, who plays with work,
relationships, and the body.
•• Adorno argues that domination is so pervasive
(total administration) that it is fruitless to
conceive of an authentic self or of stable identity;
instead, utopian social theory can only be
written in fragments. Identity is damaged by
pervasive domination.
•• Postmodernists such as Foucault reduce the self
to subject positions, in this way countering what
they view as a dangerous trend in Western
philosophy to privilege the Promethean self with
world-making powers. The belief (Bacon) that
knowledge is power leads to dominion over
weaker Others and over nature, both of which
eventually revolt, regressing dangerously behind
the era of modernity (e.g., via religious
fundamentalism).
Both the Adorno and postmodern perspectives
on identity flow directly from Friedrich Nietzsche,
who was the first systematic critic of the
Enlightenment. Nietzsche questioned the hubris of
the Enlightenment and particularly of science.
Nietzsche, Jacques Derrida, and Albert Einstein all
rejected Newton’s idea that scientists can stand
outside of the world and view it in purely objective
terms. Instead, we are all captives of context, of
space and time, in Einstein’s terms. For Nietzsche
and Derrida, the source of our captivity is lan-
guage, which unavoidably introduces ambiguity
and lack of precision.
Nietzschean-influenced social theory tends to
reject sweeping and systematic social theory. In
Jean-François Lyotard’s terms, such theory is a grand
narrative (big story) that skips over nuances and
details in favor of large and sometimes unsupported
generalizations. Lyotard notices that Stalinism
is a big story that had dreadful authoritarian
298 Fundamentalism
consequences. Marcuse, although influenced by
Nietzsche, stops short of rejecting big stories.
Indeed, he favors Hegel’s approach, that is, Hegel’s
attempt to develop a philosophical story of the
totality—of everything human. This led Hegel to
conclude that the whole totality is the truth. Adorno
paraphrased Hegel to conclude that the totality is
false and that there can never be redeemed identity,
true needs, or a genuine social utopia after the
Holocaust. The systematic extermination of Jews
and other minorities was interpreted by the Frankfurt
school to represent regression behind the aims of
the 17th-century Enlightenment or Age of Reason
philosophers.
Today, postmodernism is more prevalent in
American universities than is the Frankfurt school
critical theory. This is perhaps because the critical
theorists were always Marxists who felt that the
underlying social problem was capitalism itself.
Postmodernists have reacted to Stalinism with a
sweeping rejection of Marxism, even the Marxism
of the Frankfurt school, opposing not only
Stalin’s grand narrative of democratic centralism
but also Marx’s of a dis-alienated self and society.
Indeed, postmodernists reject all theoretical sto-
ries that promise deliverance from alienation and
domination.
Postmodernists and some critical theorists, such
as Adorno, tend to view the person as a pastiche, a
mosaic of various social and contextual influences.
Marcuse, by contrast, retains Hegel’s view, grounded
in Greek philosophy, that people are, above all,
capable of reason, of figuring out their problems
and deciding what they genuinely require to be
happy. For Marcuse and Marx, the veil of false
consciousness will be lifted once. As we create a
classless society and people are no longer persuaded
by ideologists, such as advertisers, that particular
freedom means merely the freedom to shop.
Ben Agger
See also Critical Theory; Modernity and Postmodernity
Further Readings
Adorno, T. W., & Horkheimer, M. (1972). Dialectic of
Enlightenment. New York: Herder & Herder.
Agger, B. (2005). Speeding up fast capitalism: Cultures,
jobs, families, schools, bodies. Boulder, CO:
Paradigm.
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and punish. New York:
Pantheon.
Jay, M. (1973) The dialectical imagination: A history of
the Frankfurt school and the Institute of Social
Research, 1923–1950. Boston: Little, Brown.
Lukács, G. (1971). History and class consciousness.
London: Merlin.
Marx, K. (1967). Capital: A critique of political economy
(Vol. 1). New York: International Publishers.
Fundamentalism
Fundamentalism is a movement that originated in
the United States in the early 20th century as a
consequence of the Fundamentalist-Modernist
controversy and in reaction to the perceived liberal
tendencies in Protestant Christianity and American
popular culture. In a series of 12 booklets called
The Fundamentals, published between 1910 and
1915, a coalition of conservative Evangelicals
sought to define Christian belief by its essential
elements. As defined by Fundamentalists, these
fundamental beliefs of Christianity are (a) the iner-
rancy of scripture; (b) the deity of Christ (includ-
ing his birth from a virgin); (c) the substitutionary
atonement of Christ’s death, meaning that Jesus
died on behalf of others, bearing and ultimately
paying for their sins by his own death; (d) the lit-
eral resurrection of Christ from the dead; and
(e) the literal, imminent return of Christ in the
Second Advent. For Fundamentalists, those who
do not hold these essential beliefs are not authenti-
cally Christian. From its original impetus as a
theological protest against the Social Gospel,
Darwinism, and historical-critical biblical scholar-
ship that were gaining currency among liberal
Protestants, Fundamentalism expanded into a
social and political movement contesting secular-
ism in the broader society and, thus, plays a role in
the formation and maintenance of the religious,
social, and political identities of its members.
Although largely absent from The Fundamentals,
Fundamentalists also tend to share a set of beliefs
about the End Times called dispensational premil-
lennialism. Dispensationalism is the division of
human history into epochs called dispensations.
Each dispensation is a period of time marked by a
particular type of covenant, or binding relationship

between God and humanity. When the dispensa-
tion ends, God ceases to use that covenant and
never returns to it again. Although Fundamentalists
differ on what happens to those who cling to the
previous covenants of previous dispensations, most
would agree that a viable relationship with God is
dependent upon knowing the current dispensation
and adhering to the appropriate covenant with
God. Most dispensational schemes argue that we
are near the end of human history and that Jesus’
Second Coming is imminent. Premillennialism is a
theology of the End Times that relies heavily upon
fairly literal interpretations of the Bible’s book of
Revelation and other apocalyptic scripture. This
theological framework constructs a pessimistic
timeline of the end of human history that features a
mysterious Rapture, by which believers are instan-
taneously removed from the earth and tribulations,
disease, and death mark human existence until a
cataclysmic battle of world forces at Armageddon
ends with the ultimate triumph of Christ and his
forces, resulting in an era of peace. Although this
eschatology is not limited to Fundamentalists, it is
characteristic of those in the movement.
George Marsden famously wrote, “A Fundamen­
talist is an Evangelical who is angry about some-
thing” (p. 2). This humorous oversimplification
points to the fact that, although Fundamentalists
and Evangelicals share some beliefs, Fundamenta­
lists have turned them into militant programs of
political and social reform. Fundamentalists are
Evangelical Christians, but not all Evangelicals are
Fundamentalists. Evangelicals are Protestants who
share a set of core beliefs, including the centrality
and authority of scripture; the need for each person
to have a salvation, or born-again experience, in
order to enter into relationship with God; and
requirements to live a moral life and to engage in
missions or evangelism to spread the message of the
Gospel around the world. Fundamentalists differ
principally from other Evangelicals in that they tend
to be more theologically conservative and argue that
the Bible is not only authoritative but inerrant. By
calling it inerrant, Fundamentalists are stating that
the Bible is without error of any kind.
Fundamentalism is sometimes used inaccurately
to describe all aspects of Evangelical Christianity,
or more broadly, any conservative religious move-
ment. At times, it is used pejoratively as a synonym
for any social movement that which is fanatical,
Fundamentalism 299
anti-intellectual, rigid, extremist, or violent.
Increasingly, after the terrorist attacks that took
place in the United States on September 11, 2001,
the term Fundamentalist has been used as a
descriptor of militant Islam. Whereas there are
Protestant Christians who proudly call themselves
Fundamentalists, the label is almost always applied
to Muslims by others.
Protestant Christianity, with its links to power-
ful denominations and cultural institutions, was the
dominant theological and cultural influence of
the 19th century in the United States. However, by
the end of the 19th century, scientific theories (e.g.,
that of evolution) and critical approaches to bibli-
cal scholarship had begun to challenge traditional
understandings of the Bible. The immigration of
large numbers of Catholics and Jews had also
begun to chip away at Protestant majorities in large
cities as increased leisure time and the secularizing
influences of popular culture seemed to undermine
Victorian values, particularly for the young. World
War I further undermined moral certainties with its
horrors of mechanized, total war. Fundamentalism
emerged in this context as a battle to uphold tradi-
tional values and biblical interpretation against
modernism.
Often characterized by their battles, as when
they supported anti-evolution legislation in the
Scopes Trial of 1925, or when they protest against
legalized abortion, Fundamentalists remain a sig-
nificant political, cultural, and theological force in
the United States. In the 1980s, Fundamentalist
leader Reverend Jerry Falwell formed the Moral
Majority to support conservative political causes
and push for a Fundamentalist social agenda.
Although the Moral Majority eventually disbanded,
it helped push many Christians into the Republican
Party in the latter part of the 20th century.
Valerie Cooper
See also Religious Identity
Further Readings
Brasher, B. E. (Ed.). (2001). Encyclopedia of fundamentalism.
London: Routledge.
Bruce, S. (2000). Fundamentalism. Cambridge, UK: Polity
Press.
Marsden, G. (2006). Fundamentalism and American
culture (2nd ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
 G
Gay
For a long time, homosexuality was considered a
“taboo” subject for various reasons. It was thought
to violate societal norms, it went against religious
doctrines, and individuals simply were not com-
fortable with the thought of two people of the
same sex engaging in relations. In modern-day
reference, the term gay is associated with homo-
sexuality. However, the term has encountered
ambiguous meaning throughout time. A brief dis-
cussion of the historical usage of the word gay
shows how the term has come to be misappropri-
ated often within modern contexts. Because of
this, homosexual individuals and communities
struggle to maintain a strong identity within the
midst of continual shifting connotations of the
term gay within the vernacular.
The word gay originates from the Old French
word gai. It can be expressed as an adjective, noun,
or adverb. The term is primarily used as an adjec-
tive, but in efforts to identify an individual’s sexual
orientation, the use of the term as a noun is rela-
tive. As an adjective, gay can be used to describe
things that are pertinent to gay people, or simply
the gay culture. For example, a gay club itself is
not a homosexual club. Using gay as an adjective
simply refers to the sexual orientation of people
the club provides services to. Early on, for educa-
tional or literal references, the word gay referred to
“happiness” or “flamboyance.” In the late 1800s,
the word referred to the sexual behavior of men or
women who engaged in sexual activity frequently
301
with multiple partners; also known as promiscuity.
It was not until the early 1900s that it was used in
reference to homosexuality. Homosexuals refer-
enced the term as code among themselves to avoid
the stigma of being considered clinically ill by the
general public. The term gay has also encountered
a negative connotation among the younger genera-
tion. Statements such as “That is so gay” or “You
are so gay” are indicative of someone or something
being not being good or “cool.” As aforemen-
tioned, the word gay is associated with the term
homosexuality. Yet, generally speaking, it refers to
same-sex relationships and marriage, hence, gay
marriage. However, supporters of the homosexu-
ality community have steered away from coining
that phase because it is more inclusive of just gay
men and not lesbians, bisexuals, and transgen-
dered individuals.
In the late 17th century, the term gay began
acquiring sexual connotations with meanings asso-
ciated to pleasure. This proved to be an extension
of the primary meaning, “happiness” and/or “flam-
boyant.” In the following centuries, the term gay-
life was conceived as an indirect reference to
prostitution and other forms of sexual behavior
that was deemed immoral. The use of the word
gay in association with the term homosexual was
simply derivative of the sexual connotation the
word had to come inherit. Uses of the terms gay
and homosexuality are distinctly parallel in the
fact that they implied the notion of negating con-
ventional and traditional customs.
As of the 20th and 21st centuries, the word gay,
in conjunction with the term homosexual, acquired
302 Gaze
confusing connotations. As mentioned earlier, in
an educational and literal sense it took on the
meaning of “happiness” or “flamboyant” or
“carefree,” which implied a positive connotation.
Then it took on the meaning of same-sex relations,
which implied a negative, sexual connotation. This
negative, sexual connotation was enforced by soci-
etal views. Now, in the emergence of gay lifestyle,
the term gay still has a sexual connotation, but a
more positive portrayal of what the term really
means.
Emergence of the modern-day term gay relates
more to sexual orientation, rather than in old liter-
ary usage where it was used to describe people as
carefree and happy. What the term has revolution-
ized into has been criticized by mass populations
of sorts. The power and definition of the word as
a whole has changed. Oftentimes, gay is used as a
synonym for bad, weird, odd, or unusual. In the
21st century, individuals are now using the term
more freely, and it has lost its original meaning.
People are not using the word to describe their
happiness or how lively they are. More so than
ever, the word gay pertains to a group of people
known as homosexuals, but as stated before, when
the term is used freely it can come across as being
offensive or degrading to those who are gay. Most
individuals who use the modern-day term gay are
not intentionally belittling the gay community. An
individual referring to something as gay does not
necessarily mean it is happy or carefree, nor does
it have any relation to homosexuality. More often
than not, it is placed in the inappropriate context
and given a new meaning. The common miscon-
ception is that the word gay alone is powerful.
Common use of the term indicates the miscon-
ception that those who are gay have chosen to be
so, and therefore they choose to subject themselves
to such suffrage. The naming is especially impor-
tant to those who classify themselves as gay
because of the ongoing struggle to perpetuate
change in the language used by the mainstream. To
use the term gay and place it in the inappropriate
context is viewed as degrading, almost like calling
those who are gay, queer, fags, froci, poofs,
Schwule, or tapettes. Because the term is vague, the
context in which it is commonly used should be
concentrated on to rid the confusing connotation
and the lingering negative association with the
term. The problem with the modern-day usage of
the term gay is often argued. On one hand, there is
a notion of acceptance and open-mindedness, yet
there are others who do not agree and who think
that using the term in such a manner further per-
petuates the hostility the gay community has to
face. One challenge that is faced when concretely
defining the term is the fact that the term is preva-
lent in today’s media. Those who use the term in a
degrading manner are often confronted by public
outrage. Children are also being disciplined for
failure to use the term appropriately. Often chil-
dren use it colloquially, and oftentimes fail to real-
ize the potential harm considering the term has
been exploited socially.
Ronald L. Jackson II
See also Queer Theory; Sexual Identity; Sexual
Minorities
Further Readings
Cameron, D., & Kulick, D. (2003). Language and
sexuality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Dorenkamp, M., & Henke, R. (1995). Negotiating gay
and lesbian subjects. London: Routledge.
Hammock, P. L., & Cohler, B. J. (Eds.). (2009). The
story of sexual identity: Narrative perspectives on the
gay and lesbian life course. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Leap, W. L., & Boellstorff, T. (Eds.). (2004). Speaking in
queer tongues: Globalization and gay language.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Livia, A., & Hall, K. (Eds.). (1997). Queerly phrased:
Language, gender, and sexuality. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Gaze
The idea of the gaze is credited to the psychoana-
lytic theory of Jacques Lacan as developed in his
Seminar XI, Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de
la psychoanalyse (The Four Fundamental Concepts
of Psychoanalysis), held in Paris in 1964 and pub-
lished as a book in 1973. Prioritized as one of the
four fundamental concepts (the other three being
repetition, transference and the drive, and the field
of the Other), Lacan developed the concept of the

gaze through four lectures: “The Split Between
Eye and the Gaze,” “Anamorphosis,” “The Line
and the Light,” and “What Is a Picture?”
Look and the Gaze
The gaze has proven to be a very elusive concept
since its inception. Because the French term le
regard can be translated in English as “gaze” or
“look,” the English translation of Lacan’s work,
published in 1978, contained some ambiguity. Le
regard also has the connotation of concern and
caring; this makes its use that much more subtle
and difficult. Lacan made a distinction between
conscious looking and the ephemeral gaze that
affects us unconsciously in the way we come to
believe that the social Other (taken to mean the
symbolic order as a whole) positions us in it. A
split exists between our conscious perceptions and
the impossibility of ever seeing ourselves seeing.
There is a gap between seeing and being seen,
which introduces paranoia into the act of percep-
tion itself, because we can never be certain how we
are perceived from the outside as such. This is
why, for Lacan, the act of looking is always
marked by the deceptiveness of misrecognition
(méconnaissance). There is, however, an uncon-
scious investment made as to how we should be
seen by this outside symbolic order, referred to as
the Other. The Other positions us in a certain way
so that we are loved and accepted. There is a
demand by this Other for conformity as uncon-
sciously internalized through the desire of the
Other. We may rebel against or resist this expected
demand or desire, but such acts have direct social
consequences for our own conscious identity, our
own imaginative ideal ego. Hence, we may feel too
fat or not beautiful enough by the assumed gaze of
a culture that places high celebrity value on look-
ing slim and youthful. The gaze and the look are
therefore intimately connected to one another.
Although no one “owns” the gaze, this does not
prevent the look from coveting the gaze. For
example, certain celebrity stars become iconic of
what one should look like in the full light of the
gaze, as a star that is somehow perfect, as in the
saying she has “the look” or she is in the “spot-
light.” This is the overwhelming gaze of the Other.
(It should be noted that vision is totally dependent
on light and not space. Even a blind man can “see”
Gaze 303
by the way of tactile feel, positioning objects in
space through the mind’s eye.)
Of course, this experience is the height of fan-
tasy and ideology. But, this does not take away
from the feeling that a subject has under this
ephemeral societal gaze: I am somehow not wor-
thy enough because I cannot reach this Ideal sub-
jectivity (ego-Ideal) that a celebrity possesses; or
on the opposite end, I am totally worthy. Just look
at the way people celebrate who I am. The
“emperor may not have any clothes,” but if the
hegemony of spectators believe that he is wearing
the latest fashion, then he is wearing the latest
fashion, as in Robert Altman’s 1994 satiric film
about the fashion industry, Prêt-à-Porter (Ready
to Wear), in which models walk nude on the cat-
walk, displaying their “wares.” The crowd of
spectators continues to clap as the film’s credits
roll. No one dares to say they are nude. This ges-
ture is disavowed, for it would “ideally” collapse
the empire of the fashion industry, decentering
both authority and the economy that supports it.
The little boy in Hans Christian Andersen’s story
“The Emperor’s New Clothes,” who says what he
“sees” would have to be believed and not dis-
missed as just another ignorant child. It is possible,
therefore, to claim that the gaze is another variant
of the superego, which includes both the stated
and unstated laws, rules, and norms that are oper-
ating in the social order; that the gaze stresses the
unconscious obscene (not seen, or off-stage) sup-
plement to those laws, the unstated way laws are
manipulated and twisted by those in power who
are already consciously and unconsciously in the
social light.
Gaze and Screen Theory
Scholars of visual and cultural studies based on
British screen theory made use of Lacan’s psycho-
analytic theory of the gaze throughout the 1970s in
cinematic writings appearing in the journals Screen
and Screen Education. Laura Mulvey’s ground-
breaking essay, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative
Cinema,” written in 1973 and published in the
journal Screen in 1975, became the seminal essay
that politically incorporated psychoanalysis for fem-
inism into visual cultural studies, especially cinema.
Mulvey argued that Hollywood’s female charac-
ters of the 1950s and 1960s were “to-be-looked-at”
304 Gaze
by the spectator put in a masculine subject posi-
tion. The unconscious gaze was coded as (hetero-
sexually) male, whereas the woman’s body was a
desiring object that offered the male visual plea-
sure split between voyeurism and fetishism—in the
former as the beautiful virginal Madonna and in
the latter as an evil whore who possessed femme
fatale attributes.
In the Lacanian sense, the ambivalent split gaze
as developed by Mulvey was dependent on how
heterosexual males were able to negotiate the
potential power of heterosexual women. The vir-
ginal beautiful body was invested with power as
long as that power complemented the male. Too
much power and the woman possessed the “phal-
lus” and, hence, became evil—a femme fatale that
had to be punished. In the former case, the woman
is “castrated,” meaning that her power is relo-
cated from a position of public social authority
and confined to specific locations like the house-
hold, to birthing and raising children and to the
self-possession of her body as a desirable object
for the male voyeur. She is then to be revered by
men as a Madonna/Virgin. In the later case, she
becomes the “phallic woman,” who can use this
same body to manipulate the male, abandon (and
even kill) her children, and hence become uncon-
trollable and a source of fear and anxiety. Men, in
this theory of the gaze, are given the possibility of
active looking while women are rendered passive,
to be looked at—the classic split between subject
and object as unconsciously codified by the patri-
archal phallocentric order (a worldview which
designates the penis [symbolic and otherwise] as
the defining center of meaning).
Recent Developments
Mulvey’s use of the “male” gaze has since been
challenged, and debate continues whether Mulvey,
like Lacan, was simply describing (and not pre-
scribing) a specific historical formation of the gaze
and that postmodernism has begun to change that
once established order. Mulvey argued that this
visual pleasure should be “ruined” through avant-
garde feminist cinema. However, this possibility
has not emerged because to intervene into the gaze
itself requires a fundamental (perhaps slow and
imperceptible) change in the way sexual desire
circulates between the sex/gendered population
within particular cultural contexts. One might
argue that this is precisely what is happening to
the gaze in postmodern, postindustrial cultures
where theories of the “no” of the father and
repression of the feminine gaze that ruled during
Freud’s time is being dispersed and replaced by a
new sexual permissiveness through screen cultures
(television, Internet, film, iPhones, and so on),
introducing the perverse position of the permis-
siveness of enjoyment where the demand is to
consume and costume. Performative narcissistic
display is no longer divided along strict sex/gender
lines. This is the position that is advocated by
Slavoj Žižek.
The Real of the Gaze
Screen theory was challenged in the mid-1980s
when it was discovered that a fundamental psy-
chic Lacan register was ignored. The section on
the gaze in Lacan’s SXI was titled “Of the Gaze as
Objet Petit a.” While a full explanation of what
Lacan meant by objet petit a is not necessary, it is
sufficient to state that this “object” is inextricably
bound up with the notion of lack, which emerges
as the child is separated from the mother and must
face the world alone. The fulfillment of that lack,
as feeling that one is never truly whole and in total
command, is accomplished by attempting to bathe
in the full light of the gaze—to be desirous and
wanted, thus making up for this impossible loss
experienced as infants. The closer one’s ideal ego
matches the ego-Ideal that is expected consciously
and unconsciously by parents, teachers, priests,
best friends, and other figures of authority, the
more likely the satisfaction of loss is covered over.
Voyeurism in this sense provides the illusion of
complete desirous self-satisfaction. The Other
seemingly is not needed or ignored. It is a self-
assured position that can always be disturbed.
This notion of lack is strongly tied to the uncon-
scious psychic register, which Lacan named the
Real. Its capitalization here is meant to distinguish
it from the usual sense of the “real” as conscious
reality. Often, in translation it remains lowercased
in reference to Lacan’s own pun to claim that there
is a realm of experience that is nondiscursive and
nonrepresentable. Joan Copjec argued that screen
theorists, in their appropriation of Lacan, failed
sufficiently to recognize this psychic register of the

Real and instead focused their efforts primarily on
the Imaginary (what is representable) and the
Symbolic Order (discursive linguistic formations).
The screen was theorized as a mirror without a
crack (a disturbance, stain, or surplus) in it, a
crack that belonged to the psychic register of the
Real where this ephemeral gaze was to be found.
Placing the gaze in the Real complicated matters,
for now the gaze marks the subject’s culpability
and not just its visibility. The subject cannot be
totally trapped in the Imaginary because there is
always something missing from representation
itself, something that escapes it that appears to be
invisible, marking the absence of a signified. Where
meaning remains unrevealed is precisely the impos-
sible point of the Lacanian gaze in the register of
the Real.
Copjec’s intervention opened up further inquiry,
especially by Kaja Silverman, who reiterated that
the gaze, in and of itself, cannot be categorically
identified as male. It was always subject to appro-
priation, culpability, and intervention, thereby
signaling transformative psychic change, however
imperceptible it may appear. Consequently, the
gaze often began its conflation with the look when
exploring the culpability of a subject’s desire when
viewing or reading a text, raising new ethical as
well as political questions in terms of representa-
tion. The new demand to “enjoy,” forwarded by
designer capitalism, opened up the repressed sub-
ject positions of queer desire. The look as the cov-
eting gaze began to be discussed in the various
forms of spectatorship: when directly viewing a
text; in intradiegetic situations where characters
looked at one another, as well as extra-diegetic
situations where characters addressed the audi-
ence; and, lastly, as a camera gaze that was often
attributed to auteurship—to a director’s style.
With the gaze theorized as ephemeral, as a pure
point of light in Lacan’s terms, it no longer has a
definitive sex/gendering, enabling queer theorists
to contest its presumed heterosexual hegemony.
The struggle to recognize both unconscious desire
(gaze) and conscious desire (look) in terms of the
ethical and political questions that surround them
remains the challenge today.
jan jagodzinski
See also Scopophilia; Visualizing Desire
Gender 305
Further Readings
Copjec, J. (1989). The orthopyschic subject: Film theory
and the reception of Lacan. October, 49, 53–71.
Lacan, J. (1998). The four fundamental concepts of
psycho-analysis (J.-A. Miller, Ed., & A. Sheridan,
Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work
published 1973)
Mulvey, L. (1975). Visual pleasure and narrative cinema.
Screen, 16(3), 6–18.
Silverman, K. (1992). Male subjectivity at the margins.
New York: Routledge.
Žižek, S. (1989). The sublime object of ideology. London:
Verso.
Gender
Most gender scholars today agree that gender is a
socially constructed category of identity. This
means that gender is something that is created by
discourse, roles, and norms that are agreed upon
by a given society. In lay conversation, gender is
often conflated with the term sex, which is said to
be biological and based on a person’s chromo-
somal makeup, DNA, and genitalia. The most
common categories of sex are male, female, and
intersex (individuals), but there are myriad other
“sexes” out there, existing in liminal spaces and
identity formations. Gender, which is not necessar-
ily correlated to biological sex, is judged on a con-
tinuum of how a person identifies himself or herself
on a spectrum of masculine-androgynous-feminine.
Different schools of thought have produced differ-
ent ways to think about gender and identity. This
entry discusses several of these views.
Essentialist/Functionalist Paradigm
The oldest and most traditional school views gen-
der as an “essentialist” category of identity.
Meaning that there is a feminine, masculine, or
androgynous “essence” inside each individual and
that essence is what dictates that person’s gender(ed)
behavior. The essentialist school of thought views
gender as largely biological, determined by forces
that are “natural” rather than “naturalized.”
Natural forces are said to be those that preexist
language and social conditioning, whereas natural-
izing something means to make it an acceptable
306 Gender
mode or form of behavior as a result of socializa-
tion and other processes that are sociocultural,
political, and historical. The essentialist school of
thought argues that individuals live out their lives
based on gendered roles and prescriptions that
they were essentially “born to fill.”
Naturalist/Constructivist Paradigm
The next school of thought, the “naturalist” para-
digm, believes that gender roles are socially con-
structed and that discourse shapes our reality and
therefore our social markers of identity such as
gender. Adherents of this school of thought
believe that gender is not innate or inherent in the
individual; instead, society either agrees upon or
hegemonically/insidiously (Antonio Gramsci) per-
petuates a sex/gender system (Gayle S. Rubin) in
which individuals act out their gender identities
(usually) based on their biological sex.
When gender is seen as a cultural and social
construct, it is often conceptualized as a lens
through which a person views the world. Here is
where the potential for organizing based on gender
comes into play. In terms of identity politics, being
able to identify and organize based on one’s gender
identity gives a social movement a platform from
which to make change. With those who share a
similar gender identity as you, you can collectively
imagine new ways of doing gender and problema-
tize oppressive gender constraints through con-
sciousness raising and consciousness expansion.
Performance Paradigm
Following the constructionist/naturalist paradigm
is the performance paradigm. Followers of this
school of thought posit that discourse is not merely
shaped by reality but that it is reality, or an effect
structure of reality. These theorists are largely
influenced by postmodern and poststructuralist
theorists regarding gender and identity. Borrowing
from J. L. Austin’s speech act theory, Judith Butler,
a leading scholar in gender, identity, and perfor-
mance, posits that in the form of modeling, we act
out and perform our genders. Butler, like many
contemporary gender and identity theorists, believes
that gender is fluid and not monolithic and static.
Viewing our gender identity as a performance gives
us many ways in which we can “do” and “undo”
gender. Hyperbolic performances of gender and
identity (performances where the constructed
nature of gender and identity are overexaggerated
to make a point and call into question the facti-
tious nature of gender roles) are often championed
in order to challenge the ways in which we enact
our gender(ed) identities daily. Gender expressions,
therefore, are not an indicator of the person’s “true
self” or personality (as earlier scholars of gender
and identity have posited) but instead are viewed
as a “show,” a performance, that supports social
and universal mandates of behavior.
Butler defines the performative (and its relation
to gender) by collapsing the sex/gender distinction.
Previous generations of gender and identity schol-
ars (particularly earlier waves of feminist theorists)
fought hard to keep these categories separate, but
as Butler explains in Gender Trouble, “There is no
sex that is not always already gender” (p. 25).
Butler explains, because there is no prediscursive
self—that is, there is no “true self,” no “core self,”
no “authentic self” that exists outside or prior to
the discourse that brings it into existence—and
there is no self that is not always already a product
of the social, there is then no body that can preexist
the cultural inscription of that (gendered) body. In
this way, gender (as well as sex) is performed. That
is, gender is not something one has, it is not some-
thing one is; instead it is something that one does.
Gender is something that is enacted; it is an enact-
ment. This notion of gender has political potential
sequestered in it because if gender is not natural but
falsely naturalized (and sex is not a hard-nosed
fact), then we have multiple ways to perform,
undo, do, and manipulate our genders and our
gender identities. Gender becomes a verb; it is no
longer seen as a noun. It is instead seen as a series
of acts, not a fact. Instead of viewing gender and
sex as facts, we can view them as constructions,
and that way each time we “do” or “enact” our
genders, we are highlighting the fact that we are
indeed performing our gender(s), and we thus can
call attention to gender’s inherent constructedness
(or factitiousness). This gives the subject power
within the law to manipulate the law and use the
law against itself. This gives the individual (as well
as the collective) agency. It makes possible a multi-
plicity of genders and gender performances.
As much as gender exists on a continuum, and
even though there are a multiplicity of genders,

they are still very much culturally constrained. As
Butler explains in the first chapter of Gender
Trouble, gender is “a set of repeated acts within a
highly rigid regulatory frame” (p. 27). This means
that there are always already (cultural) scripts out
there. It means that we cannot just simply create
and then maintain a new one. Even if we view
gender as a performance, we have a relatively lim-
ited number of scripts out there to choose from
and a limited number of gender costumes to put on
and take off.
Judy Elizabeth Battaglia
See also Performativity of Gender; Sexual Identity; Social
Constructionist Approach to Personal Identity
Further Readings
Butler, J. (1990). Gender trouble: Feminism and the
subversion of identity. New York: Routledge.
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison
Notebooks. New York: International Publishers.
Rubin, G. (1984). Thinking sex: Notes for a radical
theory of the politics of sexuality. In C. S. Vance
(Ed.), Pleasure and danger: Exploring female sexuality
(pp. 267–319). London: Routledge & Kegan-Paul.
Generation X
and Generation Y
One way people identify themselves or are identi-
fied as a collective is through an ascription signify-
ing the historically defined period of time or
generation in which they were born. This entry
discusses two of the most recent generation age
cohorts: Generation X (born 1961–1981) and
Generation Y (generally born in the early 1980s to
early 2000s).
Generation X
For the group labeled “Generation X” (also known
as the “baby bust” generation, following a decline
in birthrates after the previous “baby boom” group;
“Generation 13,” as they were the 13th age-band
since American Independence; and the “Reagan
Generation,” as it was under this presidency in
Generation X and Generation Y 307
which they sociopolitically came of age), the exact
time frame remains sketchy; however, sources tend
to define its range from as early as 1961 to as late
as 1981. Those born during this period experienced
a life quite socially and culturally different from the
preceding age cohort, the baby boomers, and the
cohort that followed, “Generation Y” (also known
as “the millennials”).
History of the Term
One line of argument traces the history of the
term Generation X back to the United Kingdom
and a study conducted in 1964. Researcher Jane
Deverson conducted a study for Woman’s Own
magazine on the supposedly nonconformist atti-
tudes and antiestablishment rebellion of Great
Britain’s teenagers as they reacted to what they
considered antiquated and unnecessary sociocul-
tural traditions, practices, attitudes, and institu-
tions. The magazine rejected and chose not to
publish that which it deemed controversial research.
Believing in the merit of her work, Deverson
sought another avenue in which to release and
preserve her study on this anarchic “mod” (“mod-
ernist”) group of young people. Deverson eventu-
ally approached and collaborated with Hollywood
correspondent Charles Hamblett to produce a
novel on the findings, Generation X, hence creat-
ing not only a book but also a label.
The Term as Used in North America
As it applied to the 1961–1981 age cohort in
Canada and the United States, the term Generation
X began to circulate widely and was adopted ulti-
mately into the popular vernacular as a label
because of a writer named Douglas Coupland. A
Canadian author, Coupland (born in 1961) sought
to distinguish his age cluster from that of the previ-
ous one and to speak to the constraining images
and attributes ascribed to his group by those who
were not a part of his age collective (then known
as baby bust). Coupland wanted to redefine his
birth generation and challenge dominant baby
boom etic accounts (i.e., outsider’s accounts) of its
supposed culture and outlook. Coupland attempted
to take ownership of the label from within the gen-
eration and define it more broadly and accurately
from an emic, or insider’s, standpoint. Coupland
308 Generation X and Generation Y
did this in an effort to expand the scope of the term
Generation X and to clarify that there was a sig-
nificant distinction between the value system, per-
spectives, perceptions, and realities of his generation
and those of the baby boomers. As such, Coupland
produced a 1991 novel, Generation X: Tales for an
Accelerated Culture, in which he recounted allegori-
cally the stories of three overeducated, underem-
ployed, unpredictable, and private strangers who
chose to distance themselves from society. Borrowing
from Paul Fussell’s 1983 book, Class, Coupland
co-opted a term from the text, Category X, which
was used to describe a group of people in the
American social hierarchy who wanted to distin-
guish and define themselves as opposed to accept-
ing and fulfilling the cookie-cutter characterizations
and expectations doled out by the status quo of
their time. Coupland changed Category X to
Generation X and used the label as a framework
for explaining the historical and socially con-
structed disposition of the age cohort to which he
belonged. Coupland’s Generation X did not see
themselves as members of the baby boom genera-
tion or as a reflection of the baby boomers and did
not necessarily seek to align themselves with the
ideologies and practices to which that generation
was married. As the media and grunge music began
to make the term Generation X popular and helped
to perpetuate Coupland’s image of a cohort distin-
guishable from that of the baby boomers, the suc-
cess of his contribution soon had him heralded as
the spokesperson for the generation. Uncomfortable
with the title and the accolades, Coupland ada-
mantly declined the new appellation as “mouth-
piece” on the basis that the goal of his book was
not to offer a definitive conceptualization of
Generation X but instead to demonstrate that in
the group’s vastness and ever-evolving state, a sin-
gle description or solid parameters entrapping it
would not suffice. As with Fussell, “X,” in this
case, was to represent a category of people who
were broad, dynamic, and undefined.
Characterizations of Generation X
The 1960s was a period when young adults
began behaving in ways that were counter to the
conventional American culture. In essence, subcul-
tures in blatant rebellion to the social, political,
and cultural hegemony and authority began to
emerge. Although this ideological rift within the
baby boomers became quite evident in American
society, certain key values inherent in the group
remained integral to the defining cultural attri-
butes of that particular generation: commitments
to gender equality, racial equality, self-sacrifice,
professional hard work and loyalty, sociocultural
activism, and environmental stewardship. For
Generation X, though, these keystone values did
not seem to endure as priorities. Therefore, because
of Generation X’s perceived social apathy in con-
trast to the dynamism of their predecessors, the
group became popularly characterized as slackers,
noncommittals, underachievers, overeducated,
reactive, cynical, hopeless, frustrated, alienated,
pacifists, anti-institutional, economically conserva-
tive, disaffected, against the sociocultural grain,
directionless, and unmotivated workers in
“McJobs” (low-status, low-paying, low-skill, high-
turnover service industry jobs with minimal oppor-
tunity for intracompany advancement). These
stereotypical attributes, which were said to charac-
terize the generation, were strongly perpetuated by
the media, whereas other aspects of Generation X
experience seemed to pale in comparison and
were, more often than not, overlooked. For exam-
ple, as beneficiaries of the sociopolitical activism
of the baby boomers, Generation X experienced
greater cultural diversity and integration in
American social arenas and institutions. Because of
the experience of having to care for themselves as
latchkey kids, given that baby boomer mothers had
moved into the workforce, many in Generation X
became more independent, self-reliant, adapt-
able, and individualistic. As a result of develop-
ments in information and communication
technologies (personal computers, the Internet,
electronic videogames) Generation X was allowed
to engage the platform, innovate, and move the
world forward into the digital age. Because of the
commitment of the baby boomers to their careers
and to social advancement through promotion in
the labor force, some members of Generation X
reaped the benefits of affluence, availing them-
selves of higher education to create more, varied,
and short-lived career choices for themselves where
they could amass wealth, attain materials, and
establish a work-life balance that gave them more
leisure and family time. Overall, it was the good
intentions of the baby boomer generation, and the

social, cultural and political climate of the time,
that conspired and gave birth to a discernibly dif-
ferent worldview in Generation X.
The Generation X Experience
Whether political, cultural, technological, or
social, it is the sum total of the experiences, values,
and ideas shared among the members of an age
cohort that help to define them as a generation.
Situated between the baby boomers and the mil-
lennials, Generation X, with its 46 million mem-
bers (the smallest of the three cohorts), has had a
wide range of experiences common to them as a
group that has helped to characterize and reflect
their generation. Technologically, Generation X
gave birth to the innovators who offered the world
YouTube, Amazon, Twitter, MySpace and Google.
Without such advances, those in Generation X and
others would not have come to enjoy the ability to
shop, search, and maintain social networks via the
Internet. Socially, members of Generation X saw
the rise of yuppies (financially secure and upper-
middle-class “young urban professionals”) but
also felt the financial sting as the dot.com bubble
burst and the economy took a downturn. Moreover,
Generation X witnessed an increase of mothers in
the workplace, saw birth control made readily
accessible, observed the legalization of abortion on
demand given as an option, and had to manage
balancing their sexual freedom during the height
of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Culturally, Generation
X, unlike their predecessors, grew up with televi-
sions as permanent fixtures in and throughout the
home, began to see a change in the nature of the
traditional family, and initiated the hip-hop and
grunge musical movements.
The Scope of Generation X
Coupland’s argument of the lack of a single
description for Generation X undoubtedly has merit.
From its inception, Generation X has characterized
itself as multifaceted and hence unable to relegate
itself to a defining moment, experience, contribu-
tion, or area that uniquely reflects it. In essence, for
all of its diverseness, the undefined X in Generation
X is an unfettered symbol and appears as a broad
yet inclusive ascription, one deemed appropriate for
the generation of wide-ranging people it represents.
Generation X and Generation Y 309
Generation Y
Generation Y (also known as the millennials, hav-
ing witnessed the new millennium in the year
2000; the Net generation, having experienced the
Internet as a natural part of their daily lives; and
echo boomers, because of the generation’s large
size and relation to the baby boomers) is the age
cohort that succeeded Generation X. As with
Generation X, sources debate the specific time
frame defining the period for those born to this
age cohort but give, as a range, the early 1980s to
the early 2000s. Generation Y is popularly
described by how savvy they are in their use of
digital technology and how this has become an
embedded component of their cultural lives as
opposed to just a tool.
History of the Term
The term Generation Y first appeared in an
August 30, 1993, editorial in Advertising Age
discussing how to market products to the new
teenage consumers who followed Generation X.
As a label, Generation Y was an etic term exter-
nally applied to the age cohort. It alluded to a
succession from Generation X. However,
Generation Y was a misnomer, as the use of the X
in Generation X was not used as an alphabetic
designation or representation, but instead as a
mark or a symbol indicating a yet undefined clas-
sification of a group of people. In Millennials
Rising: The Next Great Generation, a book by
Neil Howe and William Strauss, who have done
extensive research on the group, the authors
report that from an emic perspective, those within
the cohort chose to self-identify and came up with
the label “millennials” for themselves as opposed
to adopting the imposed term Generation Y
ascribed externally. In doing so, the cohort has
sent a message of choosing not to associate itself
closely with Generation X.
Generation Y and Technology
Technology, from the Internet to both portable
and stationary electronics, is said to define this
generation unlike any other. Its presence has
become an inherent part of their lives that they
have come to approach, embrace, and expect.
Having had exposure and access to the Web as a
310 Generation X and Generation Y
part of their generation, the function of technology
in the lives of Generation Y is not as casual devices
separate from the body, but as natural, essential,
and almost invisible extensions below conscious
thought that are there to facilitate the ways in
which to successfully manage life and to connect
with others. Cell phones, MP3 players, social net-
working sites, laptops, gaming systems, wireless
devices, navigational tools, PDAs, ear buds, and
miniature video players have become seemingly
necessary accessories to daily life, as common as a
pair of eyeglasses, rings, or an umbrella. The
effortless way in which technology is managed and
operated in the lives of those in Generation Y has
given them an uncanny ability to multitask—to
perform a primary action while juggling and
engaging multiple electronic gadgets, devices, and
media simultaneously (doing schoolwork while
surfing the Internet, instant messaging a friend,
talking on a cell phone with another person,
downloading music files, updating their status on
various social network sites, and watching televi-
sion all at the same time).
Generation Y’s Characterizations
Beyond their intimate relationship with all
things technological, members of Generation Y are
characterized by their sense of optimism, pragma-
tism, and altruism. Trained since grade school to
work collaboratively and creatively, this genera-
tion enjoys hands-on experiences, networking,
community (human and virtual), consensus build-
ing, and praise.
They are a generation bent on public service
and harmony. Whether their eco-friendly efforts at
reducing their carbon footprint on the environ-
ment, their global consciousness and hope for suc-
cessful foreign relations, their concern for the
welfare, dignity, and human rights of the disen-
franchised of other nations, or their domestic vol-
unteer service for communities and areas that are
in need, members of Generation Y commit them-
selves to do their part and stand behind those
persons, businesses, and organizations who have
the goal of making the world a better place.
Generation Y is described as passionate and
eager to work, yet strong-willed and impatient;
they want it the way that they want it, and they
want and expect it now! Generation Y is dynamic
and insatiable. Their loyalty does not lie with any
one brand name, major in school, person, or
career path. They change on a whim, with an eye
toward the next best thing that they feel will posi-
tion them on a higher plateau of achievement and
success. Other generations deem them as embrac-
ing a materialistic lifestyle given their discretion-
ary funds and gravitation toward an array of
brands vying for their attention. A group that is
accustomed to immediate gratification, some
sources speculate that the baby boomer coddling,
pampering, sheltering from failure, and “helicop-
ter parenting” (always hovering around or being
involved with their child in every aspect of their
life) has done damage to Generation Y and has
created within them a sense of entitlement.
Referencing them as the trophy generation or tro-
phy kids, a sports metaphor where no one loses
and everyone receives recognition (a gold star or
trophy) for their participation even if they did not
win, this practice has set up in the minds of
Generation Y members that the various environ-
ments in which they operate (school, work, rela-
tionships, life, etc.) should conform to their
expectations as opposed to their having to adapt
to the requirements of the context.
As the most ethnically diverse generation,
Generation Y members belong to professional and
social circles that allow them to cross paths with
culturally different others. Often facilitated by
technology, social and educational settings, foreign
cultural influences from various industries and
markets, or the ethnic demographic shifts occur-
ring in the United States, Generation Y has had an
opportunity to connect with cultural others and to
forge relationships outside of their own ethnic,
racial, affectional, political, religious, and socio-
economic communities much more than those who
preceded them. As such, Generation Y has moved
beyond the attitude and posture of blatant intoler-
ance or mere tolerance for diversity, as demon-
strated in previous generations, and has appeared
more open-minded and accepting, if not celebra-
tory, of multicultural others. Shaped and influ-
enced by the civil rights struggles of earlier
generations, Generation Y has been reared in an
America that supports equality through law. This
cohort has only known a desegregated country,
and one that advocates for sexual equality and the
rights of minority groups.

Generation Y’s Future
Along the generational timeline, a label helps to
confer upon an age cohort a certain sense of his-
torical status, and as the story arc of this group con-
tinues, it remains whether the tag of Generation Y
will fittingly encapsulate their experience. Names
such as the YouTube generation, MySpace genera-
tion, Facebook generation, and the Obama genera-
tion are among other labels with which critics have
toyed. Whether any of these will emerge as more
popular or definitive remains unseen. However,
what is evident is that Generation Y, with its mas-
sive size, optimism, global consciousness, access to
information, technological vision, and innovative,
creative, entrepreneurial, and volunteer spirit, is
slated to influence the cultural, economic, and
political areas of this society and leave an indelible
mark as to their power.
Deric M. Greene
See also Etic/Emic
Further Readings
Carlson, E. (2009). 20th-century U.S. generations.
Population Bulletin, 64(1), 1–18.
Coupland, D. (1991). Generation X: Tales for an
accelerated culture. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Fussell, P. (1983). Class: A guide through the American
status system. New York: Summit Books.
Hamblett, C., & Deverson, J. (1964). Generation X.
London: Tandem Books.
Howe, N., & Strauss, W. (2000). Millenials rising: The
next great generation. New York: Vintage Books.
Rushkoff, D. (1994). GenX reader. New York: Ballantine
Books.
Strauss, W. & Howe, N. (1991). Generations: The
history of America’s future, 1584 to 2069. New York:
William Morrow.
Tapscott, D. (2009). Grown up digital: How the net
generation is changing your world. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Globalization
The term globalization is intended to convey a
specific idea and a particular concept about the
Globalization 311
workings of modern capitalism and about the
nature of international relations that animates this
perspective on capitalism and its functioning. At
its simplest, the concept of globalization is cap-
tured in the metaphor of the global village.
Inherent in this concept is the idea that techno-
logical innovations, the availability of affordable
travel, the flow of global capital, and the ubiquity
of the mass media have resulted in a world that is
significantly interconnected; it is thought that the
result is a “hybridizing” cultural mixture that
gives rise to innovative cultural forms and an
equalizing of opportunities for trade, travel, and
other forms of cultural exchange among all people
across the globe.
This is an optimistic conceptualization of glo-
balization, and many scholars, particularly those
who study culture from a critical perspective, are
more sober and guarded in their evaluation and analy-
sis of globalization and its impact. Postcolonial
scholar Bill Ashcroft argues that the discourse of
globalization finds its genesis in and is grounded in
the much more complex and widely analyzed dis-
course of modernity. Drawing on Ashcroft’s argu-
ment, the concept of modernity had its origins in
ideas and philosophies arising out of 16th-century
Europe. Building on the cultural and economic
energy linked to the discovery of the “New World”
by Europeans, the idea of the inevitable forward
trajectory of human social organization and the
desirability of economic development became tru-
isms that took on the status of a mantra.
From this perspective, the concept of modernity
became linked to the idea of progress as repre-
sented by increasing technological innovation.
Technologically advanced societies were seen as
civilized, and this form of human social organiza-
tion was understood to be far superior to alterna-
tive visions of human social systems. More
specifically, those societies that were deemed pre-
modern or “traditional” were seen as primitive
and uncivilized. These societies were also seen as
prisoners of the past. Linked to this conception of
human development was the ideal of the superior-
ity of logic and reason as sources for understand-
ing the nature of the physical world and the
known universe.
Ashcroft argues that the concept of modernity is
primarily about conquest and control of land, of
ideas, and of people. In linking the concept of
312 Globalization
modernity to the colonial domination of European
powers, Ashcroft sets the stage for thinking about
globalization as a modern synonym for a form of
imperialism—a controversial perspective. What is
clear is that the discourse of modernity found its
most salient construction in bifurcated discourses
where Europe was seen as modern and advanced
and non-European societies were seen as static and
underdeveloped. Capitalism, therefore, became the
economic discourse most often associated with
modernity. The flow of cultural production also
became an important concept associated with the
economic discourse. Built into these ideas is a focus
on the superiority of materialism as a representa-
tion of human progress and sophistication. A prob-
lematic offshoot of these perspectives, Ashcroft
argues, is the fact that these discourses of moder-
nity naturalized the unequal power relations
between Western Europe and the nations it colo-
nized. A logic developed that argued that the dif-
ferences between Western and non-Western
societies were the difference between innovation,
creativity, hard work, and talent.
The Role of the United States
The ascendancy of the United States as an eco-
nomic power in the 19th and 20th centuries has
resulted in a shift of dominant economic and cul-
tural energy from Europe to North America. From
Ashcroft’s perspective, the United States perfected
that which has come to most accurately character-
ize the global: mass production, mass communica-
tion, and mass consumption. Ashcroft sees
imperialism and globalization as similar systems,
both grounded in systems of domination. He
argues that globalization represents the transfor-
mation of imperialism, though stemming from no
obvious imperial center. There are important dif-
ferences, though. Globalization is seen as more
diffuse, an example of the emergence of a global
culture that is interesting precisely because of its
energy and its link to the concept of a globalizing
culture. Of course, the homogenizing properties
inherent in the concept of globalization are deeply
worrying to many scholars. Globalization heralds
the transnational flow of cultural products and
education and suggests that the influence of U.S.
popular culture, as well as the influence of large
numbers of U.S.-trained professionals around the
world, has led to the development of hybridized
world cultures. Significantly, this transnational
cultural flow is one-way: Knowledge produced in
the United States and Western Europe is assumed
to be automatically relevant in other national con-
texts, but not vice versa. In terms of the struggle
for renegotiating a national identity among smaller,
less-developed nation-states, it is thought by many
prominent scholars that the one-way flow of
North American cultural products reinforces
American cultural hegemony and feeds a taste for
all things American.
The divide between what some scholars have
derisively referred to as “the West and the Rest”
has exacerbated some of the key problems associ-
ated with globalization. There is an uneven distri-
bution and flow of the benefits of globalization, by
which developed countries are seen as being con-
sistent benefactors and non-Western cultures are
seen as lagging behind. Scholars such as Homi
Bhabha dismiss this kind of analysis as too simplis-
tic and point to the ways in which cultural mixture
has provided opportunities for the emergence of
transformative examples of cultural production
that have benefitted both Western and non-West-
ern cultures. Scholars point to the ways in which
the cultures of metropolitan areas in the United
States and Western Europe have been significantly
transformed by the presence of large numbers of
immigrants from the developing world.
The Concept of the Third World
Underscoring the concerns about the inequalities
associated with globalizing forces is the accepted
conceptualization of large portions of the globe as
underdeveloped or third world. The concept of the
third world is problematic for several reasons, but
scholar David Theo Goldberg provides a useful
discussion of the term and its origins and the cur-
rent associations that exist in the popular con-
sciousness. According to Goldberg, the designation
third world was coined by the French demogra-
pher Alfred Sauvy, and was initially used to politi-
cally position the world’s nation-states during the
cold war. The aggressive conflicts between the first
world (developed Western countries and some
Asian countries such as Japan) and the second
world (the then communist-dominated nation-
states) required a categorization of countries that

were not immediately involved in the conflict as
aggressors—the third world. Goldberg argues,
however, that the more complex meanings of the
term are overlaid with racial overtones. According
to Goldberg, the term third world became a syn-
onym for a kind of undifferentiated blackness and
an Otherness that was and is linked analogously to
the concept of “the primitive.” The third world is
the world of tradition and irrationality, underde-
veloped and overpopulated, disordered and cha-
otic. It is also non-European and non-White.
Jamaican sociologist Don Robotham argues
that historically, African-based culture and its
derivative forms were considered debased and
even “sinful” by various Western European colo-
nial hierarchies. This is a perception that contin-
ues, and Goldberg argues that European and
American attitudes toward third world cultures in
general, and African-based cultures in particular,
are as much characterized by disdain as by fear.
This reality provides a basis for understanding the
extent to which globalization and the attendant
free movement of people and goods between coun-
tries has created significant concerns around issues
such as immigration and transnationalism.
Immigration
Immigration and the discourse around borders has
become a hot-button political issue in developed
countries such as the United States and many
countries in Western Europe. The concern is not
just the sanctity of the borders of nation-states, but
the deeper concern is related to who is let in to
cross the borders and the extent to which their
presence impacts the perceived “originary” culture
of the host country. As an example from the
English-speaking Caribbean, Jamaican sociologist
Orlando Patterson describes the extent to which
people from the Caribbean have migrated to the
United States in large numbers as an act of resis-
tance and survival. According to Patterson, more
than 95,000 Caribbean immigrants arrived in
America more than 100 years ago with another
290,000 arriving in the first three decades of the
20th century. By the end of the 1960s, Jamaica
alone was sending more than 100,000 people a
year to North America; more than 845,000 immi-
grants arrived in North America between 1960
and 1993, 57% of whom came from Jamaica.
Globalization 313
From Patterson’s narrative, these migration pat-
terns have had a dramatic effect on the cultures of
both the Caribbean and the United States. In the
United States, these new immigrants became a
major component of the Black population in states
such as New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts,
with more than half of all Blacks from the Caribbean
living in New York. More than two thirds of these
immigrants are of English-speaking ancestry, with
Jamaicans being the largest group. Overall,
Patterson estimates that of the Black population in
the United States during the 1990s, at least 6%
(roughly 2 million people) are of Caribbean, Black,
non-Hispanic ancestry, of whom 86% are foreign
born. These estimates exclude undocumented immi-
grants. These immigrants have had a significant
impact on the culture of the United States.
Well-known icons such as Marcus Garvey, poet
Claude McKay, and historian C. L. R. James have
made a significant mark on Black nationalist move-
ments in the United States, starting with the Harlem
Renaissance. Influential public figures such as Colin
Powell and Louis Farrakhan share Caribbean
ancestry.
Transnationalism
An attendant issue with immigration is the extent to
which these large-scale migrations have reformed
and moved boundaries and borders that marked
communities. The research of communication schol-
ars Jolanta Drzewiecka and Rona Halualani point
to the complicated patterns of communication new
immigrants develop once they migrate to a new host
culture: The immigrant groups they studied retained
linkages with their homeland through rhetorical
claims of identification, as well as through commu-
nication exchanges with governmental agencies
back home, and engaged in contested within-group
negotiations of identity and ethnicity status. Rhada
Hedge and Humphrey Regis studied the communi-
cation strategies of new immigrants from India and
countries in the English-speaking Caribbean,
all former colonies of England, and found that the
immigrants they studied retained significant com-
munication connections with their homeland and
maintained almost exclusive within-group commu-
nication contact in the United States. These scholars
emphasize the extent to which colonial history,
race, and ethnicity, among other categories of
314 Globalization
identity, present a more complicated picture of cul-
tural adaptation than has been accounted for in the
research literature and prompts the question of
whether it is any longer productive to think of cul-
tural adaptation largely as a process in which new
immigrants focus on integrating, gradually incorpo-
rating the norms and values of the host culture
while shedding the assumptions and values of the
native culture.
Authors Maurice Hall, Jennifer Keane-Dawes,
and Amardo Rodriguez discuss the extent to which
political reforms in islands like Jamaica in the
1990s created a whole new trading class that trav-
els constantly between the Caribbean and North
America to buy and sell various kinds of goods
and merchandise. According to these authors,
affordable jet travel has led to frequent travel back
and forth between Caribbean countries and the
United States and Canada both for people living
on the islands and for immigrants. The authors
maintain that this flow of American cultural prod-
ucts and technology has resulted in a dramatic and
constant presence of American cultural and politi-
cal life in the Caribbean. Quoting Patterson, the
authors argue that these events have created a
Caribbean community that is a “transnational
social system” existing both in North America and
the Caribbean. To be more specific, as people
move freely between these countries, Caribbean
culture no longer exists geographically within the
borders of the island states; the culture also exists
significantly in major U.S. and Canadian cities.
People live, work, and travel in both geographical
spaces. This transformation of cultures exemplifies
transnationalism, and these types of transnational
communities exemplify cultural theories of limi-
nality, hybridity, and third culture.
Critiques
Some scholars have critiqued assumptions that
seem to be inherent in the metaphors associated
with globalization. Two important metaphors
commonly associated with the issue of globaliza-
tion relate to the spatial and the liminal. Spatial
metaphors, including tropes such as border, loca-
tion, and thirdness, are prevalent in analyses of
globalization. Cultural scholar Raka Shome asks
scholars to rethink the concept of space as a prod-
uct of relations that are conceptualized as active
and changing material practices, a component of
power that helps constitute social relations, as
opposed to more static conceptualizations. She
calls for specific theorizing of issues of power and
its relation to cultural production, not just in terms
of identity tropes and the politics of location, but
in terms of very specific geopolitical locations that
exemplify the active, structuring, material work-
ings of power in terms of pervasive discourses and
social and political activities that emphasize con-
tainment and control.
Liminality, or the status of being in between
two states, is often analyzed in relationship to the
concept of hybridity. In a critique of the use of
the concept, Marwan Kraidy reframes hybridity in
conceptual terms that allow for a more specific
analysis of neoimperialism. He argues that he does
not see any credible substitute concept to charac-
terize the dual forces of globalization and localiza-
tion. He proposes an intercontextual theory of
hybridity that, according to him, explicates trans-
national cultural dynamics by articulating hybrid-
ity and hegemony in a global context. Kraidy’s
reconceptualization focuses on understanding the
interwoven workings of power in various cultural
contexts: hybridity, therefore, is not seen as pos-
thegemonic but as a needed amendment that theo-
rizes power and inequality as a fundamental part
of the global cultural interchange.
Maurice L. Hall
See also Hegemony; Hybridity; Third Culture Building;
Third World; Transnationalism
Further Readings
Ashcroft, B. (2001). Postcolonial transformation. New
York: Routledge.
Drzewiecka, J. (2001). Discursive construction of
differences: Ethnic immigrant identities and
distinctions. In M. J. Collier (Ed.), Communication
and identity across cultures (Vol. 23, pp. 241–270).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Drzewiecka, J., & Halualani, R. (2002). The structural-
cultural dialectic of diasporic politics. Communication
Theory, 12, 340–366.
Goldberg, D. (1993). Racist culture: Philosophy and the
politics of meaning. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
Hegde, R. (1998). Swinging the trapeze: The negotiation
of identity among Asian Indian immigrant women in

the United States. In D. V. Tanno & A. Gonzales
(Eds.), Communication and identity across cultures
(Vol. 21, pp. 34–55). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Kraidy, M. (2002). Hybridity in cultural globalization.
Communication Theory, 12(3), 316–339.
Patterson, O. (1995). The culture of caution. New
Republic, 213, 22–26.
Regis, H. (1989). A theoretical framework for the
investigation of the role and significance of
communication in the development of the sense of
community among English-speaking Caribbean
immigrants. Howard Journal of Communications, 2,
57–80.
Robotham, D. (1998). Transnationalism in the
Caribbean: Formal and informal. American
Ethnologist, 25, 307–321.
Shome, R. (2003). Space matters: The power and practice
of space. Communication Theory, 13, 39–56.
Global Village
The global village develops when technologies col-
lapse physical and perceptual time and space, a
collapse in which cultural and spatial differences
collide and epistemologies of human otherness
change. Travel technologies such as roads, boats,
cars, trains, and planes and information technolo-
gies such as books, radio, television, and the
Internet allow people to move faster and easier,
physically and perceptually, to places once consid-
ered far away. When this collapse happens, when
human relations to geography blur, one culture—
the village—begins to emerge.
Marshall McLuhan developed and popularized
the concept of the global village during the 1960s
and 1970s. Influenced by James Joyce’s Finnegans
Wake and Wyndham Lewis’s America and Cosmic
Man, McLuhan devoted much of his career to
understanding how technologies influenced human
interaction, perception, and cultural change. The
emergence of the global village was one measure
of technological influence. Ironically, McLuhan
died on December 31, 1980, well before the
advent and rampant use of the Internet, the tech-
nology that makes an ever more connected virtual
village possible.
There are benefits to the development of a global
village. Being in constant physical and perceptual
connection with different others can allow for a
Global Village 315
blurring of cultural differences. The global village
thus accommodates an assimilationist, “melting
pot” philosophy of difference, a philosophy that
welcomes the emergence of one (or a few) cultural
ideal(s) and, as such, encourages people to adhere to
a dominant set of views and values; individual and
cultural differences are erased or made tangential.
Any attempt at making English the dominant
language—a move that, consequently, makes other
languages secondary—is an example of assimilation-
ist philosophy. And there are benefits to assimila-
tion: People transcend barriers of cultural difference
and relate with ease; fewer get “lost in translation.”
The development of a global village also makes
physical travel no longer a necessity to experience
“other” spaces. Such exposure and access can culti-
vate respect for human difference and allow people
to learn innovative ways to accomplish everyday
tasks (e.g., cooking, farming, shopping). Such expo-
sure and access can also benefit individuals who lack
the physical and economical resources for travel. For
instance, it is difficult for people using wheelchairs,
visually impaired persons, or economically disad-
vantaged individuals to physically travel. However,
with the assistance of technologies like television,
film, and the Internet, individuals can experience,
albeit virtually, distant areas with little effort; the
technologies provide alternate and inexpensive
routes for perceptual interaction with a place.
However, there are consequences to the global
village. When the physical and perceptual bound-
aries of cultural groups blur, culture-specific views
and values begin to disappear; local heritage, rela-
tional bonds, and unique customs can get lost
or forgotten. A liberationist, “tossed salad”
philosophy—a philosophy that embraces multiple,
often contradictory views and values and a philoso-
phy that allows individual and cultural differences
to flourish—thus becomes difficult to maintain.
The emergence of one global village encourages
people to meet and mold together, transcend differ-
ences, and develop a dominant set of views and
values; there is little room for multiple villages.
A liberationist philosophy warrants other con-
cerns as well. Powerful people and nations may
decide to change or obliterate a culture’s views and
values for ones considered better and more
advanced (e.g., implementing democracy as the
most ideal ruling philosophy, Christianity as the
most important religion, or capitalism as the best
316 Group Identity
economic system). Powerful people and nations
may also consider particular culture-specific prac-
tices unworthy, animalistic, and in need of eradica-
tion (e.g., male and female circumcision, hunting
whales for food and killing seals for fur, female
foot-binding, and arranged marriages). In the
global village, powerful people and nations may
force “inferior” others to conform to “superior”
views and values and, in so doing, may motivate
new kinds of conflict.
Increased virtual connection—a condition of
the global village—also turns face-to-face interac-
tion into a commodity. As a medium of communi-
cation, it is often assumed that this kind of
interaction has inherent value. Thus, when face-to-
face interaction becomes less frequent, a market
for this kind of interaction emerges, motivating
companies like Starbucks to cultivate and fulfill
embodied, relational and communal needs.
The global village will continue to develop and
solidify as technologies like satellites, GPS loca-
tors, cell phones, and the Internet improve; as dis-
ciplines traditionally constituted by material space
(e.g., sociology, anthropology, and geography) are
redefined in terms of globalization, postcolonial,
transnational, diasporic, and indigenous studies;
and as corporations embrace slogans like “Your
World. Delivered” (AT&T), “One World. One
Vision” (ACN), “The World’s Online Marketplace”
(eBay), and “Cover the Earth” (Sherwin Williams).
As such, the benefits—cultivating assimilation,
democratizing physical and virtual travel, learning
about human difference—and the consequences—
inhibiting human difference, a dominance of a few
voices, a disintegration of face-to-face interaction—
will heighten. It will thus remain important to
recognize the ways increasingly sophisticated tech-
nologies influence social interaction, cross-
village relations, and human difference.
Tony E. Adams
See also Clan Identity; Diaspora; Globalization;
Modernity and Postmodernity; Technology;
Transnationalism; Transworld Identity
Further Readings
Couldry, N., & McCarthy, A. (Eds.). (2004).
MediaSpace: Place, scale and culture in a media age.
New York: Routledge.
Denzin, N. K., Lincoln, Y. S., & Smith, L. T. (Eds.).
(2008). Handbook of critical and indigenous
methodologies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Goldberg, K. (Ed.). (2000). The robot in the garden:
Telerobotics and telepistemology in the age of the
Internet. Cambridge: MIT Press.
McLuhan, M. (1962). The Gutenberg galaxy:
The making of typographic man. London:
Routledge.
McLuhan, M., & Fiore, Q. (1968). War and peace in the
global village. New York: Bantam.
Putnam, R. D. (2001). Bowling alone: The collapse and
revival of American community. New York: Simon &
Schuster.
Schivelbusch, W. (1986). The railway journey: The
industrialization of time and space in the 19th
century. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Group Identity
Group identity exists when a relatively small num-
ber of people view themselves collectively as com-
prising an entity that is distinct from other entities.
Whereas group identity is a group-level construct
that references the extent to which members col-
lectively view themselves as a distinct group (and
are viewed as such by nonmembers), group identi-
fication is an individual-level construct that signi-
fies the degree to which individual members attach
significance to their association with a group (and
its identity). Group identification has three com-
ponents: (1) cognitive (a person categorizing him-
self or herself as a member of a group), (2) affective
(a person’s attraction to a group and its members),
and (3) behavioral (a person’s perception of the
joint effort required among members to reach a
common group goal). Although group identity
and group identification are inherently related (as
an individual cannot identify with a group that
does not exist) and the concepts often go together
when assessed along a relevant continuum (e.g.,
strong group identity among work team members
coupled with members’ strong identification with
the team), these constructs also can be relatively
independent (e.g., strong group identity among
team members but weak identification with the
team by an individual member). This entry explains
the relationship between individual and group

identity, both in general and in the small group
setting; the processes associated with creating and
sustaining group identity and identification;
and the effects that can result from group identity
and identification.
Individual and Group Identity
Although people have individual identities, those
identities are produced through their participation
in dyads (e.g., single parent–single child families),
groups (e.g., families with three or more members),
and larger collectives (e.g., organizations and soci-
eties). Dyads, groups, and collectives provide,
among many other things, language and other
salient symbols that shape people’s perceptions,
beliefs, attitudes, values, and behaviors, including
their view of themselves. Such influence explains,
for instance, why people in strongly individualistic
cultures privilege individual rights, whereas those
in primarily collectivist cultures prioritize the needs
of groups over those of individuals. In both cases,
people hold their view because of what they learned
as members of dyads, groups, and collectives.
The term group is often used to reference people
who share social characteristics (e.g., gender,
nationality, or race), such as in the study of social/
collective identity, or to describe large collections
of people gathered together (e.g., church congrega-
tions, political rallies, and sporting events). For the
purposes of this entry, the term refers to small
groups, defined as three or more people (thereby
excluding dyads, with the upper limit based on
members’ ability to be aware of the individuality
of every other group member) who (a) think of
themselves as a group, (b) are interdependent (e.g.,
with regard to shared goals or behaviors that affect
one another), and (c) communicate (interact) with
one another (via face-to-face or technological
means). Examples of groups that often meet these
criteria (but vary in the degree to which they
apply) include families, social groups (e.g., friend-
ship groups), activity groups (e.g., mountain-
climbing groups), learning groups, growth/
self-help/support/therapy groups, decision-making/
problem-solving groups (e.g., committees and
juries), and teams (e.g., work or sports).
In the small-group context, the relationship
between individual identity and group identity often
is perceived, especially by those from individualistic
Group Identity 317
cultures, as one in which individuals must give up
their identity to forge a group identity, a process
known as depersonalization. Although that belief
may be true to a certain extent with regard to par-
ticular individual identities (e.g., a self-described
loner who does not like to work with others will
need to see himself or herself differently to be a fully
functioning member of a work team), it is more
appropriate to view the relationship between indi-
vidual and group identities as a dialectical one in
which group members constantly try, individually
and collectively, to preserve both identities and to
manage the ongoing tensions that result from such
an attempt.
Creating and Sustaining
Group Identity and Identification
Group identity and identification are social con-
structions that are created and sustained through
symbolic interaction among group members and
between groups and their members with external
environments (e.g., other individuals and groups).
Looking at the process from the perspective of a
newly formed group, the construction of group
identity and identification begins even before peo-
ple interact (voluntarily or not). People enter a
group with goals, needs, personal characteristics,
social identities, previous and current group experi-
ences, interest in and attraction to the particular
setting and participants, and other characteristics
that potentially predispose them to creating a
shared group identity and identifying themselves
with that group. Research shows that it is easier to
create strong group identity and identification
when participants are similar (homogeneous) rather
than different (heterogeneous) on social character-
istics that are meaningful to group members, espe-
cially if those characteristics are associated with
high status, an effect that is amplified if participants
are simultaneously members of other groups that
have low rather than high status. Group identity
and identification also are enhanced when there is
congruence between how members see themselves
and how group members see them. The nature of
the relationship among group members also has an
effect, with researchers proposing that member
interdependence (e.g., with regard to outcomes)
promotes group identity and identification, which
is especially the case for heterogeneous groups.
318 Group Identity
Through their interactions, people create and
manage boundaries (both physical and symbolic)
that separate and differentiate the participants
from participants in other interactions they have,
forming a “membrane” around them that pro-
duces group members and nonmembers (with
those words derived from the Latin root, mem-
brum). Some group boundaries are relatively open
and permeable, meaning that group membership
can change easily (e.g., a support group that any-
one with a particular problem/issue can attend,
such as an Alcoholic Anonymous support group
meeting), whereas other group boundaries are rel-
atively closed and impermeable (e.g., the U.S.
Supreme Court).
Some symbolic practices (the specific forms of
symbol usage in a group) are especially influential
with respect to the development, display, mainte-
nance, and change of group boundaries, identity,
and identification. For instance, group members
often (a) name themselves (e.g., the musical group
the Rolling Stones), with some names expressing a
specific group identity (e.g., the Christian youth
group, Christ 4 Life); (b) employ nonverbal sym-
bols to represent their group identity and to display
their identification with the group (e.g., gang colors
or clothes); and (c) perform rituals that reinforce
their group membership (e.g., particular nonverbal
or verbal greetings between members). Members
also verbally interact in ways that create and rein-
force group boundaries, including using plural
pronouns (e.g., “we”) and metaphors (e.g., talking
about the group as a “family” and members as
“brothers and sisters”) to describe the group and its
members; making verbal pledges to the group (e.g.,
initiation rites in fraternity and sorority groups),
telling stories and narratives about the group that
express (implicit and explicit) beliefs, attitudes, and
values (e.g., “Remember when the group almost
disbanded and how we prevented it?”); and engag-
ing in groupspeak, language unique to a group (by
attaching new meanings to common words or by
creating new words that are not familiar to non-
members), with research showing that such argot
can develop in small groups in less than an hour of
interaction. These and other communicative prac-
tices lead members to converge symbolically on a
shared identity of their group. Hence, a “group”
and its identity and “group members” and their
identification with a group are interdependent
accomplishments that emerge from the symbolic
interaction among people.
The creation of group identity and identifica-
tion also can be affected by the communication
medium employed and members’ geographic prox-
imity; specifically, whether group members inter-
act primarily face-to-face (collocated groups) or
via communication technology (distributed or vir-
tual groups that employ computer-mediated com-
munication). Research has shown, for instance,
that members of collocated groups identify more
with their group than do members of distributed
groups, probably because collocated group mem-
bers (a) learn more quickly about their fellow
members because of the availability of more infor-
mation about them (e.g., via members’ nonverbal
behaviors), (b) engage in less task and affective
conflict, and (c) are more satisfied individually and
more cohesive collectively.
Effects of Group Identity and Identification
The creation of group identity and identification
potentially has positive effects on groups and
group members. Research has shown that strong
group identity and identification are positively
associated with trust in a group and its members;
adherence to group norms and loyalty to the
group, especially in times of an uncertain or bleak
future (with members choosing to stay rather than
leave the group, even in the presence of an attrac-
tive exit option); concern with promoting the
group’s welfare (as opposed to individual mem-
bers’ mobility or being concerned with the group’s
welfare only in the face of situational pressures);
participation in behaviors that establish or main-
tain connection with the group (e.g., wearing team
jackets); cooperative group behavior (with more
competitive behavior occurring in groups without
a strong identity); reduced task and affective group
conflict; selection of leaders who have a legitimate
power base (i.e., democratic, elected, and internal
leaders, as opposed to the selection of instrumen-
tal/functional leaders who punish noncontributing
members in groups with a weak identity); and suc-
cessful group task performance. In addition, strong
group identity and identification meets members’
needs (e.g., for belonging, inclusion, structure, and
predictability) and increases their personal satis-
faction with a group.

There are, however, potential negative effects of
strong group identity and member identification.
Researchers have found that strong group identity
and identification can lead members to perceive
their group as being more homogeneous and cohe-
sive than it actually is, exclude minority/deviant
perspectives represented in the group, and require
too much adherence to group norms, symptoms of
group polarization, where groups make extreme
(typically faulty) decisions that the individual
members would not make independently. A strong
group identity also can lead members to separate
themselves (physically and psychologically) from
other groups and be overly or only concerned with
their group. Such separation and insulation has
been shown to result in groups not communicating
and cooperating well with other groups, even with
those in the same organization.
The relationships between group identity and
identification and the positive and negative member-
level and group-level processes and outcomes that
have been documented by researchers undoubtedly
are reciprocal and mutually reinforcing. Thus, for
instance, group identity and identification may
increase group task performance, but group task
performance simultaneously may increase group
identity and identification.
Lawrence R. Frey and Stephen P. Konieczka
See also Collective/Social Identity; Collectivism/
Individualism; Communication Theory of Identity;
Group Identity 319
Development of Identity; Development of Self-
Concept; Identification; Language; Social Identity
Theory; Symbolic Interactionism
Further Readings
Abrams, D., Hogg, M. A., Hinkle, S., & Otten, S. (2005).
The social identity perspective on small groups. In
M. S. Poole & A. B. Hollingshead (Eds.), Theories of
small groups: Interdisciplinary perspectives
(pp. 99–138). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Henry, K. B., Arrow, H., & Carini, B. (1999). A
tripartite model of group identification: Theory and
measurement. Small Group Research, 30, 558–581.
Mortensen, M., & Hinds, P. (2001). Conflict and shared
identity in geographically distributed teams.
International Journal of Conflict Management, 12,
212–238.
Oetzel, J. G., & Robbins, J. (2003). Multiple identities in
teams in a cooperative supermarket. In L. R. Frey
(Ed.), Group communication in context: Studies of
bona fide groups (2nd ed., pp. 183–206). Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Polzer, J. T. (Ed.). (2003). Identity issues in groups.
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Riley, A., & Burke, P. J. (1995). Identities and self-
verification in the small group. Social Psychology
Quarterly, 58, 61–73.
Webster, J., & Wong, W. (2008). Group identity, trust,
and communication in naturally-occurring project
teams. International Journal of Human Resource
Management, 19, 41–62.
 H
Habitus
The concept of the habitus refers to a basic set of
principles that structure an individual’s identity,
judgments, and actions across a variety of life
spheres. It is today most commonly associated
with the work of the late French sociologist Pierre
Bourdieu, although the idea of habitus goes back
as far as the philosophy of Aristotle. Bourdieu used
the habitus concept, on the one hand, to describe
the way in which social structures are internalized.
An individual’s core dispositions are not innate but
rather are shaped by the social and material reali-
ties of the world in which he or she is socialized.
On the other hand, habitus captures the manner in
which dispositions are externalized, as we as indi-
viduals actively re-create the world through our
daily practices. After a brief description of the con-
cept’s background, this entry focuses on the forma-
tion and expression of habitus and its role in
creating and sustaining class inequalities.
Concept Background
A variety of philosophers, anthropologists, and
sociologists have drawn upon the idea of the habi-
tus to explain action and identity. Habitus is a
Latin translation of the Greek term hexus. In the
moral philosophy of Aristotle, the concept was
used to describe a positive quality of being that
came through training and repetition in various
arts and practices. It was not an innate characteris-
tic of all humans (such as the capacity for language
321
and reason); nor was it was a temporary condition
(such as being hot or cold). Rather, a habitus was
considered to be an acquired, durable disposition
that could be considered one’s “second nature.”
This idea of the habitus was mentioned in the
work of such thinkers as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel, Edmund Husserl, and Marcel Mauss. Its
recent resurgence as a key social scientific idea is
due to its use by Bourdieu. Trained as a philoso-
pher, Bourdieu later became a sociologist and
conducted empirical research on a variety of sub-
jects, including the peasant people of Algeria, the
system of education in France, and the social foun-
dations of art. He would latch upon habitus to
explain a puzzle that repeatedly arose during his
research projects. On one hand, he noticed that
people tend to think of themselves as independent
and autonomous beings. We feel that we make
reasoned choices and are in control of our desti-
nies. On the other hand, social scientists repeatedly
demonstrate that people tend to behave in pat-
terned, predictable waves. Surveys, censuses, and
other quantitative data show that our actions are
not as random or as freely chosen as we commonly
suppose. Bourdieu labeled this puzzle a conflict
between subjectivist and objectivist ways of know-
ing. It is in fact a long-standing dilemma in the
social and human sciences. Repeatedly throughout
history, thinkers have wondered whether we
humans exercise free will or are determined by
forces beyond our control.
Habitus provided Bourdieu with a way to tran-
scend this ancient debate, by linking individual
agency and social structure in a novel way. He
322 Habitus
argued that the habitus, as a disposition, is both
structured and structuring. It is structured in that
it is shaped by the material conditions of the world
in which it is formed. Though we may feel like the
authors of our own lives, we are in fact influenced
by variety of forces beyond our control. But our
habitus is also structuring, which is to say that it
allows us to be creative, inventive, and strategic.
The underlying contours of the habitus may be
socially determined, but the various ways in which
it may manifest itself in practice can never be
entirely predicted in advance.
Bourdieu described the nature and functioning
of the habitus as a “practical logic.” Because it is
so deeply ingrained, it is not a conscious state that
we are aware of. But nor is it synonymous with the
unconscious as it is understood in the Freudian
tradition. Rather, the habitus is best understood as
a “feel for the game,” a general sense of the social
order in which one is embedded and of how to
make strategic moves so as to succeed (or at least
survive) in it.
Habitus Formation
The following outlines a few basic processes
through which an individual’s habitus is formed.
First, the basic material conditions of existence of
the primary group (family or kin network) in which
one is raised will have important implications for
one’s disposition and identity. Bourdieu argued
that even at a young age, children are quite good at
reading their environments and recognizing that
the world opens up certain pathways to them and
closes off others. They then adjust their expecta-
tions and aspirations accordingly. For instance,
young boys may observe their fathers head off to
work each day, and they may come to understand
that obtaining a job outside of the home is the
proper thing for a man to do. In turn, a young girl
may spend the day doing housework with her
mother and thus come to feel that the home is a
woman’s place. As they age, children participate in
games and play sessions that further prepare them
for the roles they will likely adopt later in life. This
early socialization may be intentional on the part of
parents, as when a child from a wealthy back-
ground is explicitly told that a working-class play-
mate is “not like us.” But it may be unintentional
too. For instance, minority children internalize
small cues from their parents as to the proper
behaviors expected of them in public situations.
Initial socialization in the primary group pro-
vides the habitus with a basic foundation. These
are deep cultural principles inscribed in one’s
body, and they will undergird action and identity
throughout the life course. Subsequent experiences
with different institutions will then add to the
habitus a series of additional layers. In contempo-
rary Western society, this usually occurs when the
child leaves the primary group to begin formal
schooling, and again when he or she leaves school
for the workplace. A typical biography will there-
fore entail a series of socialization experiences all
in sync with one another, leading to a coherently
layered habitus. Consider a boy from a working-
class family who is taught from a young age to
value working with one’s hands over mental labor.
At school, he does poorly in his academic classes
and is channeled into vocational courses. After
graduation, he leaves the school system as quickly
as possible to obtain work in a factory. The social
world has produced in him a series of desires, iden-
tities, and competencies; these in turn motivate
him to act in ways that reproduce the conditions of
existence into which he was born. It is in this sense
that the habitus may be thought of as an “embod-
ied history” in which the past lives on in the pres-
ent and shapes the future.
During normal conditions, this pattern will
hold. An individual’s habitus and his or her envi-
ronment will be in sync, and social structures will
tend to reproduce themselves. But the world does
not stand still, and it may so happen that a habitus
produced under one set of conditions will appear
in a new situation. If the change is rapid, the indi-
vidual may be unable to adapt. He or she will
experience a sense of confusion, disorientation,
and loss of identity—a state Bourdieu labels hys-
teresis. In his own work, Bourdieu first docu-
mented such hysteresis among Algerian peasants
whose land had been colonized by the French. For
centuries, the Algerian social structure had been
agrarian and dominated by informal exchanges
among families. The disposition to which this sys-
tem gave rise—a traditional peasant habitus—was
ill suited for the impersonal system of capitalism
that the French imposed. Unable to adapt to these
rapid changes, Algerian peasants sank into a state
of despair and destitution.
 Habitus 323

The Expression of the Habitus has important consequences for understanding

how class inequality in modern society is created
Two points are essential to the understanding of
and sustained.
how the habitus is expressed in practice. First, the
In his book Distinction, Bourdieu argued that
habitus is prereflexive in nature. This means that
when a child is raised in poverty and without guar-
the choices we make on a daily basis are not the
anteed access to basic necessities, he or she will
product of conscious deliberation. In this regard,
develop a taste for things that are simple, safe, and
the idea of the habitus differs from one of the
functional. In line with the principle of transpos-
dominant perspectives in the social sciences today:
ability, this taste for necessity will express itself
rational action theory. Rational action theory
across a variety of life spheres. The individual will
holds that when confronted with a choice, indi-
prefer movies with formulaic plots, cook simple and
viduals will collect as much information as they
hearty meals, and read books that teach well-worn
can, evaluate various possible outcomes, and then
moral lessons. In contrast, children born into upper-
make the decision that maximizes their own util-
class families learn from a very young age that they
ity. In contrast, the theory of the habitus argues
likely will not ever need to worry about securing
that the vast majority of our decisions and actions
food, shelter, and clothing. Secure in their well-
are “gut reactions.” They are done simply because
being and with extra time to devote to extracurricu-
of a sense that this is the right or proper thing to
lar activities, these children develop a habitus
do. Consider the feeling invoked in most Americans
characterized by a taste for luxury. They will take
when they find out that other cultures treat dogs as
risks and prefer cultural goods that are complex and
a food source, not as family pets. Bourdieu would
hard to decipher by an untrained eye (think of the
argue that to the extent we experience repulsion or
abstract paintings of Picasso). In addition, they will
disgust, we are not making a formally rational
devote considerable time and expense to stylizing
assessment of the situation (in fact, hundreds of
their everyday behaviors and living spaces.
canines are euthanized in the United States daily,
Because the habitus is prereflexive, we cannot
while many Americans go hungry). Rather, our
easily step back and understand our own tastes
deeply ingrained habitus is generating an immedi-
and aptitudes as socially constructed. Thus, those
ate and visceral reaction.
in possession of a habitus of luxury will think of
Second, the habitus is characterized by transpos-
themselves as naturally gifted and refined. They
ability. This is to say that one’s habitus can be
look down upon the poor and working classes as
boiled down a few basic principles of action. These
simple and vulgar. In turn, those with a taste for
principles then guide decision making and actions
necessity will be ashamed of their inability to inter-
across a wide variety of otherwise disparate set-
pret and enjoy distinguished pieces of culture. They
tings. This is a powerful explanatory argument
come to feel that they deserve their miserable mate-
insofar as it allows the researcher to link together
rial state, because they are a lower-caliber person.
practices that, at first glance, do not appear to bear
any resemblance. Consider a statistical finding that The end result is that the material inequalities that
people who prefer beef over fish also tend to prefer gave rise to these different habitus are forgotten or,
action movies over romantic comedies. Attention to in Bourdieu’s terminology, misrecognized.
the habitus would direct the researcher to uncover Jeffrey J. Sallaz
the basic principle underlying both sets of choices
(perhaps beef and action films are considered more See also Agency; Being and Identity; Class Identity;
masculine than fish and romantic movies). Cultural Capital; Philosophy of Mind

Inequality and Identity Further Readings

Of all the principles that can structure the habitus,
Bourdieu argued that one is most fundamental: the
distinction between a habitus formed under condi-
tions of material scarcity and one formed under
conditions of material security. This distinction
Bourdieu, P. (1992). The logic of practice. Palo Alto, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (2007). Distinction: A social critique of the
judgment of taste. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
324 Hegemony
Lizardo, O. (2004). The cognitive origins of Bourdieu’s
habitus. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour,
34, 375–401.
Sallaz, J. J., & Zavisca, J. (2007). Pierre Bourdieu in
American sociology, 1980–2005. Annual Review of
Sociology, 33, 21–41.
Swartz, D. (1997). Culture and power: The sociology of
Pierre Bourdieu. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wacquant, L. (2006). Body and soul: Notebooks of an
apprentice boxer. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Hegemony
Hegemony in the common vernacular simply
means leadership or domination of a group or
society by another individual or group. For exam-
ple, in the medieval West African empires, the
Malinke were the hegemon of the Sahel and, later,
the Soninke. The term hegemony took on a differ-
ent meaning as it was used by the Italian Marxist
and political philosopher Antonio Gramsci.
Gramsci defines hegemony as a cultural and insti-
tutional order that functions as the dominant
informant of the values, customs, beliefs, princi-
ples, and social relations of a society. Under
Gramsci, hegemony was transformed into a social
and political construct that maintained itself and
civil order through civil consent and, when neces-
sary, through force. Hegemony is important to
discussions of identity and identity studies because
it contributes to the formation and maintenance
of individual and collective identities.
The order of the hegemony is constructed
through holding preponderant influence in five dis-
tinct spheres of influence that make up society:
ideological, political, cultural, economic, and force.
When these spheres of influence are brought
together and interconnected, hegemony can be
maintained in a society, empire, or even the world.
Ideological hegemony is the glue that binds the
entire construct of hegemony together. Ideological
hegemony is established when the ruling elite
achieves dominance of the ideas and cultural norms
of the poor and middle class. This phenomenon can
take place even when, in reality, the cultural norms
of the elite are in clear opposition of the interest of
the middle class and the poor. For example, the
concept of rugged individualism is often espoused
among poor inner-city communities. In contrast,
entrepreneurship and wealth acquisition are clearly
linked to the cultivation of business relationships
and establishing strong organizational systems for
people. The rugged individual seldom gains much
in terms of business and power.
Cultural hegemony, like ideological hegemony,
is the dominance of the ruling elite in cultural
norms and ideas. The difference is that cultural
hegemony is maintained through a more system-
atic and institutional framework. At inception,
cultural hegemony is a direct appendage to ideol-
ogy; it is when this ideology is taught in the school
system and perpetuated through the media (i.e.,
newsprint, textbook, radio, cinema, etc.) that it
takes its full cultural manifestation. At inception,
cultural hegemony can often be seen in the very
way that a group of people view historical events
or if the events are even acknowledged as having
occurred. This is typified in the cultural wars that
have come to exist in the debate about the United
States and the intentions of its founding fathers
and in the controversy surrounding gay marriage.
This is the dynamic that allows hegemony to have
influence even in a multiethnic setting and the
ensuing negotiations of cultural identities.
Along with the establishment of cultural hege-
mony comes the foundation of political hegemony.
Political hegemony is the domination of the elite
ruling class in the sphere of politics. For example,
the fascist dictatorship of Benito Mussolini in Italy
is a primary demonstration of complete political
domination. In this sphere, there is a limitation
placed upon access to governmental influence by
rival political ideologues and ideologies. This limi-
tation is necessary because it threatens one of the
main pillars of the ruling elite: the consent of the
masses. This control happens in the ideological
sphere and then culturally in that there is a prohibi-
tion placed on the right of dissemination and orga-
nization of the rival political points of view. As a
result, the view that things could be different polit-
ically never reaches the awareness of the masses.
There can ultimately be no power without
establishing a solid control of economic hegemony
in the arena of governance. Without the control of
the means and modes of productions, there can be

no hegemony. This is one of the primary genera-
tors of social consent for the ruling elite class. The
ruling elite class argues that, as a result of their
creating jobs and industry that benefit the society,
they should have the lion’s share of influence in the
society. The middle class and poor come to con-
sent because they benefit from these industries
through compensation for work, goods, and ser-
vices. An order is established that self-perpetuates.
This is exemplified in the rise of Friedman-style
capitalism, whose proponents argue that the least
regulation of markets possible creates a better
economy. Critics of economic hegemony are com-
pelled to ask: What things could be done differ-
ently that would be of greater benefit to the entire
society and not just the ruling elite?
Force is the final sphere of consideration. Force
hegemony is not simply the possession of superior
force. It is the sole right of the ruling elite to orga-
nize and legally use violence against the other
classes, when necessary, for the purpose of main-
taining dominance in the other spheres previously
mentioned. The use of force is not the primary
mode of operation chosen by leaders of hegemonic
systems. In fact, outbreaks of violence and social
upheaval often prove to be the death of hegemo-
nies. This fact hearkens back to the notion that a
strong presence of cultural and ideological consent
is required in order for a group of people to have
and maintain dominance.
Order is also maintained through the resultant
fear of the unknown. The middle class ask them-
selves what is on the other side of this way of life,
and in turn they are confronted with the abyss and
the horror of losing what they already enjoy. What
the answer might be is unknown. Therefore, revo-
lution is ideologically supplanted before it reaches
even its nascent stages. Better to dance with the
devil you came with than to face the chaos of
social upheaval. The poor struggle to deal with the
day-to-day issues of survival and have not the time
to contemplate, let alone organize against, the
grand scheme of society’s inner workings. In this
way hegemony is preserved through the tacit con-
sent of the governed.
Bradford R. Hogue
See also Culture; Nationalism; Political Psychology
Hermeneutics 325
Further Readings
Fontana, B. (1993). Hegemony and power: On the
relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Ives, P. (2004). Language and hegemony in Gramsci.
London: Pluto Press.
Williams, G. (1984). Antonio Gramsci. In E. Genovese
(Ed.), Red and black: Marxian explorations in
southern and Afro-American history. Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press.
Hermeneutics
In its most traditional usage, the word hermeneu-
tics refers to methods for attempting to systemati-
cally interpret and understand texts, mainly
religious ones. It employs ongoing part-to-whole
and whole-to-part analyses, engaging in what is
commonly called the hermeneutic circle, meaning
that we are always already embedded within what
we try to understand, that interpretation is always
already under way and ongoing, and that mean-
ing is to be found in the movement from part to
whole and back again. Historically, applications
of hermeneutics to identity occurred in several
waves: first, as a romantic attempt to reconstruct
authorial intentions, and then, as a reckoning
with the interpreter’s own historicity and situated
prejudices, and finally, as the latter half of the
20th century was characterized by a postmodern
turn toward textuality, hermeneutics has gained
relevant application in many areas of life beyond
the study of texts. As structuralist schools of soci-
ology and deconstructionist philosophies radically
challenged modernist versions of a bedrock self or
self-same identity, hermeneutists offered their
own kind of response, one eschewing both episte-
mological foundationalism, on the one hand, and
an absolutely displaced or eternally deferred self,
on the other. A hermeneutical sense of identity is
certainly not at all the transcendent fulcrum
sought by René Descartes, but it is one that offers
a coherent sense of self after postmodernity.
Hermeneutics, therefore, is one of the key resources
for discerning a refigured notion of personal iden-
tity after the supposed “deconstruction” of the
subject.
326 Hermeneutics
The Problematic
The modern Western philosophical notion of iden-
tity, the one which has been so problematic and
has remained fundamentally unresolved, was the
promise of a transparent presence of self as it was
sought in Descartes’ methodical doubt, which then
culminated in his dictum, “I think therefore I am.”
The main problems were that this approach ulti-
mately made purchases upon a nonempirical or
transcendent substance, and it also legitimated
kinds of doubt and skepticism which, in their own
wake, generated modernist epistemological para-
digms as attempted solutions. Immanuel Kant, as
well, for all his ability to navigate between empiri-
cism and rationalism, bequeathed to his successors
a largely transcendental I. Today, this I who does
the thinking, the supposed inner self who repre-
sents the world, has remained a proverbial ghost in
the machine, one who continues to haunt the con-
temporary philosophical landscape.
The early hermeneutics of Friedrich Schleier­
macher and, to a slightly lesser degree, Wilhelm
Dilthey were reconstructive. Whereas prior prac-
tices of hermeneutics were mainly used when peo-
ple encountered alien texts and knew that adequate
understanding was lacking, Schleiermacher recog-
nized and sought to deal with the naturally arising
fact, even the priority, of “misunderstanding” due
to various unnoticed obstacles and intervening
variables between the interpreter and the author.
Schleiermacher attended to the grammatical and
linguistic features of the text that might lead to
misunderstanding, and he also attempted a kind of
empathic identification with the subjectivity of the
author. Early reconstructive hermeneutics were
therefore largely romantic. They sought to extri-
cate and bracket out tradition, history, and the
knower’s own prejudices and to retrieve the world-
view of the author or the creative genius behind
the text. Dilthey expanded Schleiermacher’s ideas
and adapted a hermeneutics toward history and
human existence more generally. Contrasting the
explanations of events in the natural sciences to
the ways of understanding parts to whole in the
human sciences, Dilthey also sought to develop
adequate methodological and theoretical founda-
tions for the human sciences. Most broadly con-
strued, then, the early relation of hermeneutics to
identity was largely of recovering a self behind and
beyond the text and of reconstructing the histori-
cal situation of the author. By understanding indi-
viduals as historically situated interpreters,
hermeneutics sought to provide the grounds for
rigorously recovering the subjective ideas and
understandings of others.
Historical Situatedness
By the time of the works of Martin Heidegger and
his most hermeneutical student, Hans-Georg
Gadamer, historicity and situatedness were no lon-
ger taken as problems to be solved through use of
hermeneutical techniques. Hermeneutics became
part of the resources for revealing how historicity
itself is constitutive of interpretation and under-
standing. Heidegger’s monumental Being and Time
provided a robust challenge to the Cartesian
understanding of world and subject as well as to its
implied epistemological paradigm. Hermeneutics
thus slid into ontology, as understanding and
interpretation were taken to be not merely features
of linguistic signs but as pretheoretical and prethe-
matic conditions of human existence. Understanding
was regarded not as a mere occasional cognitive
act but as an operative intelligibility maintained,
because understanding is the mode of the human’s
being. Heidegger’s notions “thrownness,” “histo-
ricity,” and “fore-having” all came to play a vital
part in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Gadamer devel-
oped the idea of “fusion of horizons,” which
stresses that readers are interrogated by texts,
prejudices are brought to light, and by engaging in
ongoing dialogical relation to history and tradi-
tion, readers gain better knowledge of both texts
and themselves. For both Heidegger and Gadamer,
history and prejudice are no longer seen as obsta-
cles to understanding; they are constitutive condi-
tions for interpretation and understanding. In sum,
the Cartesian notion of identity was aligned with a
kind of identical, self-same substance, an enduring
permanent ego or self of the transcendental sort.
Such a depiction made purchases upon the dichot-
omies of permanence and change, being and
becoming, and thereby temporality was cast as a
threat to identity rather than as fundamental and
even constitutive of it. Moreover, the much larger
implication is that hermeneutics came to be rele-
vant well beyond written texts. In much of his

work, Gadamer sought to reveal the universal rel-
evance of hermeneutics to all of life and under-
standing, self-understanding included.
As existentialism and phenomenology domi-
nated the continental European scene for the early
part of the 20th century, the philosophical schools
of structuralism and poststructuralism emerged
and soon overtook the terrain. One of the major
themes that accordingly emerged was “the death of
Man.” Whereas the identity at stake in early phe-
nomenology and some forms of existentialism
admittedly remained within Kantian, idealistic, and
even epistemological frameworks, thus subscribing
to some kind of transcendental ego, growing num-
bers of philosophers sought to dissolve the subject
into larger social structures and linguistic or semi-
otic functions. Still others sought to deconstruct
identity by showing how it is eternally deferred.
For Claude Lévi-Strauss, the subject was dis-
solved as a result of methodological constraints of
the structuralist program of sociology. The notion
of the subject gave way to larger structural and
functional social forces. Michel Foucault announced
the “death of Man,” in his historical examination
of various epistemes in Western culture and sug-
gested that the modern notion of subjectivity is the
result of Kantian philosophical anthropology. He
further suggested that the individual is not only a
modern invention but one that soon enough would
be washed away like drawings in sand.
Paul Ricœur and others have suggested that
Sigmund Freud, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Karl
Marx all have engaged in what could be called a
hermeneutics of suspicion. Such a hermeneutics
bears upon identity in that motives for action and
the nature of identity are placed in processes that
are larger or other than the modern Cartesian
would at first presume. Freud revealed subterra-
nean domains to the ego, hidden and suppressed
subconscious drives, the oedipal complex, and these
radically challenged the idea that persons are in full
possession of themselves. Nietzsche’s work dis-
closed how power relations are nestled within sub-
jectivity and how norms of good and bad conscience
can be stultifying and even somewhat life-negating.
Marx was able to demonstrate larger social rela-
tions bearing upon consciousness and how philo-
sophical idealism was insinuated by bourgeois
ideology. Taken together, traditional notions of
identity have been displaced, and philosophers have
Hermeneutics 327
increasingly turned their attention to the larger tex-
tures and fabrics from which selves are constituted
and in which lives are stitched together.
Finally, Jacques Derrida, the most dissident of
the poststructuralists and most thoroughgoing in
his challenge to the modern quest for a fully pres-
ent subject, argues that the subject is eternally
deferred. We find not a speaking subject, not even
an author. Within Derrida’s program of decon-
struction, we find a play of differánce, a dance of
differences where absence is as important as pres-
ence, and the subject suffers a kind of erasure or
deferment. All we have are traces within writing.
Most recently, hermeneutic orientations toward
identity align with poststructural philosophies
whose proponents challenge the notion of tran-
scendental/metaphysical subjectivity, but they dif-
fer regarding the available space/room for
subjectivity. The modern hermeneutic sense of
identity thus neither appeals to a transcendent
subjectivity nor attempts to dissolve the subject
and demonstrate its deferment. It attends to the
ways that discourse, background practices, habits,
and cultural institutions constitute the warp and
woof of our understanding, especially how we
understand ourselves.
Meeting: Particularity and Thrownness
One is not simply born with a deep private self, an
identity that is complete unto itself and remains
independent of language, world, history, and other
factors. Hermeneutists are skeptical of such a
depiction of self, seeing it as a continuance of the
Cartesian epistemological paradigm. The person is
not a mere cogito wending its way around visual
space by making cognitive and theoretical observa-
tions. In contrast, hermeneutists cast identity as
always emerging within and against background
practices and beliefs. Language, world, history,
and other factors are not to be set over-and-against
identity; they are the very texture in which an
ongoing identity is negotiated and accomplished.
Identity, rather than being an expression of solip-
sistic volitional intention, grows in dialogue, and
consciousness itself is dialogic. This notion of iden-
tity moves away from the self–identical self and
turns toward the ongoing achievement of a decen-
tered and hermeneutically implicated identity. As
328 Historicity
with all human action and discourse, identity is to
be understood in its relation to the larger holistic
intersubjective spaces of joint endeavors and shared
involvements, of shared background practices,
communal memories, and communal goals.
To say that identity is implicated in discourse
and action is to suggest that the subject neither
comes prior to communication nor is simply a
product of communication. Within the work of
Calvin O. Schrag, for example, the subject is situ-
ated within an ongoing event of communicative
praxis, always immersed in cultural prejudices and
presuppositions but not completely lost within
them. It is communication itself that holds requisite
resources for distanciation from and critical reflec-
tion upon one’s presuppositions and the problem-
atic aspects of one’s tradition. At least two
recognizable postures are discernable: a hermeneu-
tics of nostalgia, which is a kind of participation
within the tradition, and a hermeneutics of affirma-
tion, which critically appropriates and distances the
subject from the tradition. The hermeneutical sub-
ject, therefore, participates within various tradi-
tions and yet is not without resources for critical
reflection upon them. The hermeneutics of distan-
ciation is not, then, a solipsistic act that simply cuts
against tradition. It is a kind of response to one’s
tradition, taken up from within it and in reference
to the future.
Each person is a unique identity. Each self is
different than all other selves. Although each iden-
tity is unique and irreplaceable, we need not to
interpret this self as monological, epistemological,
or transcendental. The uniqueness and nonsubsti-
tutability of identity is implicated in one’s unique
“throw” into history, the unique constellation of
particular others that comprise the communication
milieu in which one is embedded, the larger social
arenas in which one is situated, and the unique
futures implicated in and by one’s present-day
involvements and engagements. Identity, inter-
preted and understood accordingly, is hermeneuti-
cally implicated in the discourse and action that
comprises the ongoing texture of communicative
praxis.
Corey Anton
See also Embeddedness/Embedded Identity; Historicity;
Phenomenology
Further Readings
Caputo, J. (1987). Radical hermeneutics: Repetition,
deconstruction, and the hermeneutic project.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Gadamer, H.-G. (1976). Philosophical hermeneutics
(D. E. Linge, Ed. & Trans.). Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie &
E. Robinson, Trans.). San Francisco: HarperCollins.
Ricœur, P. (1974). The conflict of interpretations: Essays
in hermeneutics (D. Ihde, Ed.). Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press.
Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror and nature.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Schrag, C. O. (1986). Communicative praxis and the
space of subjectivity. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press.
Historicity
This entry assumes that identity emerges from
responsiveness to human existence. The notion of
historicity points to an understanding of human
existence shaped by responsiveness. Historicity, as
opposed to a normative understanding of the world
history, calls us to address, meet, and contend with
that which is before us. Historicity is the manner
through which existence communicates with us,
shaping and reshaping who we are in the midst of
ongoing responsiveness to that which is before us.
This entry discusses historicity in relation to his-
tory, interpretation, and the public domain.
Defining Historicity
Understanding the importance of historicity
requires us first to differentiate the term from the
conventional view of history. History in normative
terms involves a remembering of dates, events, and
persons that influenced phenomena in time. For
instance, the battle of Waterloo is central for
France, England, and the United States. It is a his-
torical fact that George Washington was the first
president of the United States. We can trace our
genealogies, finding family roots in countries other
than the United States, unless we are a descendent
of the original Americans. We can keep the events

of history straight with dates and periods, organiz-
ing given activities in particular ways, even as we
contend over the viability of historical periods.
Additionally, there can be contention about the
significance of dates, the people, and the facts
remembered. If one travels to Quebec, one finds
not an understanding of a history of liberation, but
a history about English conquest. In short, we have
a normative view of history that orders events for
remembering and attention. That effort now comes
with persistent challenge: What voices and per-
spectives were omitted by those in power? How
did the victors shape the identity of history?
Historicity does not eliminate questions about
history. A people need a history to claim an iden-
tity that transcends their immediacy. For many,
history is more rhetorical or persuasive than we
once considered it to be, starting from the first
argument about the contemporary field of history:
Is it a social science or is it part of the humanities?
The argument, crudely put, is an argument over
the center of history: data or human story.
Historicity aligns closer with a humanities and
story-laden view of history than with a social sci-
ence view. Historicity is one way of entering a
story about history.
Historicity is an interpretive entrance into
human existence. A working definition of historic-
ity includes the following elements: question, bias,
and response. Historicity is the announcement of a
question that is engaged in and, through a given
bias, culminates in a given response. After a
response is rendered to a given historical moment,
there is and will always be contention, just as there
is with the notion of history. Historicity does not
speak to us in pure terms, requiring us to have
some form of prophetic vision to understand it
properly. Historicity is better understood not as a
way in which we know, but as a manner in which
we engage the world in dialogue—we are not in
total control of what comes to us, and we cannot
offer an objective reading of a given question that
will last for all time. Historicity is the communica-
tive partner that existence gives us. Just as we are
sometimes frustrated with real people, our own
communicative partners, this same frustration can
and does happen as we meet existence in conversa-
tion. Historicity does not necessarily bring us what
we want; it opens the door to our engagement with
what is before us. Historicity is the shaping of who
Historicity 329
we are in response to the questions that existence
brings to us in everyday life, with our responsive-
ness shaping our identities.
There is one final caution about the notion of
historicity; the notion of historicity requires our
engagement, but it is not to be understood within
a modern context of individualism. For example,
one can find groups that deny the reality of the
concentration camps of World War II. Their denial
continues to remind us of one of the important
questions that defined World War II: How will we
treat those who are different from ourselves? One
could go so far as to suggest that it is this question
that announced for many the bankruptcy of
modernity and ushered in the necessity of what is
termed postmodern writing, which begins with
attentiveness to difference. Therefore, to under-
stand our time, it is not unwise to study an earlier
era in which the following question was asked:
How will we treat those different from ourselves?
Historicity permits historical time periods that are
far apart to inform one another. It is not that the
moments are identical; what binds the moments is
historicity—relatedness to a common question.
Historicity brings history alive. One begins to ask
what questions shape a given moment and when
those questions have kinship with contemporary
life, edifying us by the conversation.
In personal life, there is a cliché that one
becomes like one’s own parent later in life, and one
begins to sense that there was some wisdom in a
mother or father that was missed earlier in life.
The ironical cliché that a parent utters at such a
moment is: How could I have become so smart
seemingly overnight? The son or the daughter
changes, yes. Our identities have kinship with the
questions we attend to and respond to; as we begin
to respond to questions similar to those of our
parents, more overlap in identity formation takes
place. This is not magic; it is the conversation
across time that historicity permits. The questions
that shape our lives shape our identities. Of course,
this connection between generations does not hap-
pen in all cases. But when it does, historicity unites
disparate groups. Perhaps we could go so far as to
suggest that a generation gap only happens when
the questions that meet people divided by time
have no kinship. At such moments, there are radi-
cal disruptions in existence because historicity
permits an unstated form of empathy for those
330 Historicity
who came before us, and when the questions no
longer unite us, we are indeed divided. Historicity
is the communicative carrier of what is before us
and the connecting link to conversation that took
place years earlier that can continue to edify us.
Communicatively, generations are connected by a
sense of kinship of questions.
Historicity and Interpretation
The connection of historicity to history is the inter-
pretive entrance that one takes to a given text.
Historicity requires public admission of what is
before us, or at least what we think is before us.
Hans-Georg Gadamer frames the importance of
historicity in relation to interpretation. His work
begins with a question: What is announced by a
given text at a given time? Historicity in relation to
history is an announcement of a given question
that we must meet. Sometimes it takes a while for
a given question to emerge from the fog of exis-
tence, but when it does, it takes on a power of
attentiveness. We must then attend to that ques-
tion. In our contemporary existence, concern for
the environment has emerged as a major question
of our time. If one is or is not in favor of particular
positions on the environment, there must be a
statement about why or why not. Questions of a
given historical moment do not bring with them
uniform interpretation, just uniform attentiveness.
The question cannot be ignored by those on the
left or the right, those committed to economic
growth, and those concerned about resource distri-
bution. It does not matter what one’s position is;
the question requires our attention.
Historicity begins the conversation. We then
enter the conversation with a bias that has multiple
roots: our social-cultural position, our disciplinary
expertise, and all the ingredients that separate us
from those not like us. This bias opens the conver-
sation about important questions. Historicity
works more like an enthymeme than a logical syl-
logism; it requires our participation. We must fig-
ure the answers to the central questions of our
time—both local and global. There is no assurance
that our answers are correct, however. Historicity
only begins the conversation; we must hold up our
end if we are to engage the world that is before,
and in that engagement, we shape not only the
ongoing identity of existence but our own identity
as well. For instance, the play Fiddler on the Roof
can be understood as a story about historicity. The
question before the community is the tension
between tradition and change. Each daughter
answers the question differently, as does Tevye in
his role as a father, a member of a faith, and a
participant in prerevolutionary Russia. The ques-
tions that come to us come without answer; we are
required over and over again to do our best with
what we have (our bias, no matter how “edu-
cated,” to make sense of the questions before us).
Both the question and our responses take us into
the public domain and its enhancement.
Historicity and the Public Domain
One of the major critics of modernity was Hannah
Arendt. She worked both to warn us of the prob-
lems caused by modernity and to offer hope for
working our way out of the dilemmas before us.
The question of her time was how and why the
Nazis could have made their way into power. This
question was central for much of the West and
some other parts of the world long after the con-
clusion of World War II. Arendt understood the
power of the question. In fact, one could make the
case that the remainder of her academic life was
devoted to offering an answer to the question of
her time. Arendt’s identity was marked by the Nazi
question. However, her identity was additionally
marked by her interpretive response to this ques-
tion. In book after book, Arendt seeks to answer
this question with the bias of expertise she has at
hand. Arendt gives us insight into a world that had
lost its natural form of protection. People were
vulnerable to Nazi life as she witnessed the collaps-
ing of public and private life into a realm that she
called the “social.”
It is the collapse of public and private life that
concerned Arendt. She wanted each person to have
a form of natural defense. When public life is not
going as one wants it to go, then private life can
offer support and sustenance. When private life is
not going as one might wish, then public life might
offer a sense of meaning. To keep the public and
private life healthy, Arendt began to frame ways in
which the public arena could differentiate itself
from private space. Arendt offered a basic solution
to keep the public domain a place where no one
appropriates ownership of this space. The public

domain is a place where we function, at best, as a
guest and, unfortunately, sometimes as a stranger.
Arendt spent a lifetime responding to a ques-
tion. She then brought a bias that the public
domain must be strengthened if we are not to have
a repeat of the Nazi tragedy. Adding to Arendt’s
conversation, this entry assumes that the notion of
historicity is the benchmark of a vibrant public
domain in three ways. First, if there is something
called a public, then questions will emerge, not
with agreement about conclusions but with agree-
ment about the importance of the question itself.
Second, the interpretive bias we bring to a given
question contributes to the health of the public
domain. The vibrancy of a public space that is less
likely to invite the world that Arendt feared
requires multiple interpretive engagements. Finally,
the public domain benefits from engagement with
the question, diversity of interpretive engagement,
and public admission of both.
Keeping the Conversation Going
Richard Rorty was famous for the phrase “keeping
the conversation going.” The likelihood of keeping
the conversation going in the public domain hinges
upon the three major ingredients of historicity:
question, interpretive bias, and public admission.
Attending to historicity offers our best hope for a
vibrant public domain that can fend off the reality
of tyranny that Arendt so feared. Additionally,
historicity is our best hope of learning from those
who are no more but whose questions will shape
our identity as we engage the conversation.
Ronald C. Arnett
See also Embeddedness/Embedded Identity; Existentialist
Identity Questions
Further Readings
Arendt, H. (1998). The human condition (2nd ed.).
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Arnett, R. C., Fritz, J. H., & Holba, A. (2007). The
rhetorical turn to otherness: Otherwise than
humanism. Cosmos and History: The Journal of
Natural and Social Philosophy, 3(1), 115–133.
Gadamer, H.-G. (2004). Truth and method
(J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall Trans.). London:
Continuum International.
Human Figure, The 331
Ricœur, P. (1988). Time and narrative (K. Blamey,
Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
History of Religions
See Religious Identity
Human Figure, The
The human figure has been the principal subject
of Western art since the Renaissance. However,
each appearance of a human figure in art and as a
representation of metaphorical understandings of
personal and sociocultural identity must therein
be distinguished from the flesh-and-blood body it
is intended to imitate. Representations of the
human figure are part of a network of symbols in
the visual arts and cultural studies, imitations of
life through which we define and locate personal
and public identities, reminders of who we think
we are. Most significantly, Western art has long
sought the perfect method of representing the
human body, from Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona
Lisa (c. 1503–1506) to Marcel Duchamp’s Nude
Descending a Staircase, No. 2 (1912), idealizing
the body through corporealized constructs orga-
nizing an iconography of norms and resolving the
disconcerting mutability of flesh and blood. In
this way, the imperfect human body is overridden
by a plenitude of representations.
According to art historian Nicholas Mirzoeff,
art history is predicated partly on the assumption
that each perfectly expressive form—in this case, a
human figure—acts as a signifier exactly expressing
its signified, without excess or the need for expla-
nation and with complete aesthetic realization.
Feminist scholar Elizabeth Grosz advances a
theory of figuration as a remedy for our organic/
biological/natural incompleteness, an expansion of
Freud’s notion that one of the primary causations
of human unhappiness is our inability to master
our own bodies, a condition that renders a concep-
tion of our bodies as transient structures with a
limited capacity for adaptation and achievement.
332 Human Figure, The
Grosz writes that we understand our bodies as a
unified and cohesively organized structure only
through their physical and social inscription.
Material renderings of the human figure allow us
to manage and administrate our embodied experi-
ence of the indeterminate, amorphous, and rather
uncoordinated potentialities of having a flesh-and-
blood body. Renderings of the figure thus become
social triggers signaling eventualities. When we see
what we are supposed to look like, our potential
becomes that much more definable; the unknown
metastases of the flesh-and-blood body that occur
over the course of human development are thus
mitigated as a constant source of unease.
The Human Figure as Icon
When the representation of the human figure
becomes iconographic, certain questions come to
the forefront. How can the body be shown as type
and not merely as observed reality? Whose body
is representative of the socially agreed intent?
What corporealizations constitute the prevailing
norms and are hence approved as fit to be seen?
What corporealizations deviate from those norms
and, in consequently being kept from sight, are
thereby rendered obscene? The human figure as
icon references stereotypes of normality and
abnormality comprised of those morphological
characteristics that are most easily essentialized as
being representative of whatever human virtues or
limitations being depicted by the artist, this all
being managed in spite of the common human
experience of the mutability and unfixedness of
the biological/natural body.
In the field of sociology, the term symbolic
interactionism, elaborated by Herbert Blumer,
refers to the notion that the meaning of symbols,
in this case human figures, is determined through
the course of human interaction. The first of
Blumer’s three major tenets of symbolic interac-
tionism supports the premise that people act
toward human figures on the basis of the meanings
that the figures have for them. This correlates with
the position of Dutch philosopher Benedict de
Spinoza, who proposed that the human body is
radically open to all of its surroundings and con-
texts and can be composed, recomposed, and
decomposed by other interacting bodies and figu-
rations. Consequently, conceptions of identity can
also be composed, recomposed, and decomposed
with figurations of the human being generated for
the purpose of such reconceptualizations.
Spinozist philosophers understand the body and
mind as one whole substance working in concert,
not in a split duality. By extension, figurations of
the body are not happenstance phenomena; rather,
bodily figurations are extensions of how we see
ourselves within our social contexts. Furthermore,
figurations of the body further contribute to an
overall unity in how we see ourselves. Thus, ways
of representing and figuring the body are also ways
of embodying self-knowledge and worldly knowl-
edge, rationally marking out the parameters of
that knowledge. Portrayals of the human figure
may be viewed as embodied formations of knowl-
edge: exalted knowledge; carnal knowledge;
knowledge of our impending mortality; knowledge
of our power to control and manipulate other bod-
ies within our frames of action and influence; and
knowledge of our power to publicly represent pro-
jections of personal, social, and national identity.
Thus, in representations of the human figure, we
see a stir of echoes in our own faces and each
other’s frames. Within a Spinozist framework, the
embodied knowledge represented by the human
figure is a multifarious thing; each figure shares
and reveals other bodies of knowledge, their prec-
edents and their reinterpretations all arrayed in
one performative continuum. Beyond the frame or
the physicality of the representation, both the art-
ist and the audience are positioned amid an admix-
ture of rapprochements and similarities that bind
them to other covalent human bodies, informing
the meaning they make of their own humanity,
of their own self-referential figures in context.
The exalted human figure has generated bodies
of knowledge promoting a classical ideal of the
body that elevated the ancient Greek figure as a
representation of Aryan purity, Northern and
Western European cultural superiority, or both;
the Hellenization of the portrayal of the human
figure in art history was done at the expense of
“races” perceived to be inferior and perpetuated
the exclusion of all Semitic and African influences
(including those Egyptian) from canonization in
Western culture. The founder of systematic art
historical discourse, Johann Winckelmann, later
codified this filtering of representative imagery in
his 1764 text, History of Ancient Art. Winckelmann

believed Greek art was dedicated to the pursuit of
a beauty that could not be found, for instance, in
the form of an African, a form he was evidently
repelled by. The racialized distinction between
Africans, Semites, and the Europeans, which
became a staple of 19th-century art historical dis-
course, gave rise to the fixture of exemplars of
human figuration such as the statue of the Venus
de Milo, hyperbolically touted by art historian
Walter Copland as the highest symbol of the clas-
sical ideal, transcending experience and imagina-
tion, without prototype or equal.
Conversely, the debased and carnal human
body was sustained and made imaginable by figur-
ing an imperfect body for the racial Other—by
generating figures of the physically extraordinary
body in the shape of the cripple, the invalid, or the
freak of nature—or by casting figures voyeuristi-
cally captured in a moment of licentiousness or
dissipation. The ideal body, by contrast, was pro-
moted as an equivalence of the morally uncor-
rupted, spiritually enlightened soul while these
non-Hellenistic figures were being marked as
invalid representatives of the “common man,” as
illegitimate contributors to the pantheon of embod-
ied knowledge, and as invisible and irrelevant to
the public gaze.
Following from Blumer’s second major tenet of
symbolic interactionism, the meaning of human
figures inscribed as debased or immaterial to the
progress of history is derived from the very par-
ticular and proscribed social interaction early
modern and modern Europeans had with their fel-
low non-Europeans, an interaction based on colo-
nial and territorial expansion, religious parochialism
and pronouncements of superiority, and the profit-
able economics of race-based hierarchies, caste
systems, and social exclusion. In his historical
documentation of the imagery of Eurocentrism
titled White on Black: Images of Africa and Blacks
in Western Popular Culture, Jan Nederveen Pieterse
reveals a Western visual culture replete with mar-
ginalized depictions of non-Europeans, representa-
tive of their fixture apart from the central canons
of Western art history and sociocultural identity.
Drawings and illustrations of bodies being dis-
sected on the operating table, such as Johannes
de Ketham’s Fascicolo di medicina (1493), or
robust anatomical studies, such as Michelangelo
Buonarroti’s Studies for the Libyan Sibyl (c. 1511),
Human Figure, The 333
which displays an understanding of human muscu-
lature learned from the study of dissected bodies,
present to us figures bearing the stamp of the mor-
tality of the human body and the secrets it yields
about both the fragility and the complexity of the
human condition.
The manipulation of the human figure was
exemplified in the “Grand Style” espoused by
British painter Joshua Reynolds, who sought to
idealize the imperfect by emphasizing in his art-
work a contrast between civilized Europeans and
the primitives they were encountering during explo-
ration and colonization. Reynolds’s Portrait of
Omai (1776) was a depiction of a young Tahitian
man brought to England to evaluate his responses
to civilized Western virtues. Although Reynolds
paints a full-length portrait of Omai dressed in the
flowing classical robes and posed statuesquely, the
portrait also indicates the cynical amusement of
Omai’s British hosts at what must have been con-
sidered a hopeless incongruity between Polynesian
culture and British polite society. Reynolds is care-
ful to make sure the body tattoos on Omai’s hands
and arms are clearly visible against the elegant
background and robes, emphasizing the Otherness
of the figure before us.
The Human Figure as Body Politic
English philosopher Thomas Hobbes comments
that it is by art that we have historically created the
great leviathan called a commonwealth, or state,
which is a figure or type of man. The human figure
in art has been used to create an artificial man,
simultaneously the imitation of the flesh-and-blood
body and the representative of the body politic and
thus greater in stature and strength than the natural
man, for whose protection and defense this repre-
sentative was intended. In this way, a modernist
discourse of identity was constructed, as artificial
as the Hellenized White male body assumed to ide-
ally represent its corpus. Hobbes also spoke of the
discourses that create the artificial representative
body, the pacts and covenants, and visual regimes
by which the elements of the body politic were at
first made and brought together. In a way similar
to the scriptural pronouncement of God to make a
man in His own image, we may create a figure of
the body politic in the image of a monarch or
representative figurehead, or we may create the
334 Humanitarianism
portrayed figure as the metonym for the healthily
functioning republic or state. An example is the
painting Napoleon in His Study (1812) by Jacques-
Louis David, fusing elements of monarchic and
revolutionary symbolism in the wake of the French
Revolution into his portrayal of the man.
Philosopher and feminist scholar Moira Gatens
points out that the male body is typically chosen as
the figurative representative of the body politic in
modern political narratives, just as certain bodies,
because of race-based and gender-based hierar-
chies, are often excluded from representation,
invisible within the body politic.
Reinterpretive Implications of
the Figurative Imaginary
Revisiting Blumer once again, the third major tenet
of symbolic interactionism suggests that the mean-
ing of human figures is handled in, and modified
through, a (re)interpretive process necessarily used
in negotiating the multifarious body of knowledge
about the human condition represented by such
figures in the arts and cultural studies. The eclipse
of the figurative representation of the body by
abstraction in the visual arts after World War II
coincided with the installation of the body as a
central topic in cultural studies largely as a result
of the timely influence of Michel Foucault, who
reconceptualized the relation between institutions
and the bodies they exert power over and inscribe.
The body, represented by a typology of changing
figures, is seen in cultural studies as a key site of
resistance provoked by regimes of power.
Drawing upon Spinoza’s Ethics (1677), Gatens
suggests that the human figure is part of a corpo-
real imaginary of symbols, metaphors, and repre-
sentations through which we construct diverse
forms of subjectivity. Composed as we are of other
figures, it is safe to assume that our proximity to
reinterpreted figures in the imaginary also affects
our present constitution. Each figure is simultane-
ously acquainted with figures that are there and no
longer there, interacting simultaneously with pres-
ences and absences. Figures mill and shift; each
one repositions to fill the breaches, following the
movement of other figures, replicating certain
meanings and wrestling with others.
Human figures are visible throughout recorded
history and popular culture, figures useful in the
imagination of the larger body politic, its localized
constituencies, and individual identities. These fig-
ures are our plenipotentiary representatives, ambas-
sadors of our aspirations, and models of what we
wish to appear to be to the rest of the world. The
human figure is both a realization and a precursor
of identity, each identity an imaginary unto itself,
lodged within the larger collective imaginary as the
images, symbols, metaphors, and representations
found at the center of the arts, entertainment,
advertising, and popular musings. These figures
affect one another in proximity, configuring
together within a mutual formulation of identity.
James Haywood Rolling Jr.
See also Extraordinary Bodies; Ideal Body, The;
Stereotypes
Further Readings
Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective
and method. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Gatens, M. (1996). Imaginary bodies: Ethics, power, and
corporeality. London: Routledge.
Grosz, E. (1992). Bodies-cities. In B. Colomina (Ed.),
Sexuality and space (pp. 241–253). New York:
Princeton Architectural Press.
Mirzoeff, N. (1995) Bodyscape: Art, modernity, and the
ideal figure. London: Routledge.
Pieterse, J. N. (1990). White on black: Images of Africa
and Blacks in Western popular culture. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
Thomson, R. G. (1997). Extraordinary bodies: Figuring
physical disability in American culture and literature.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Humanitarianism
When one thinks of humanitarianism or humani-
tarian efforts, one generally pictures actions of
doing good for others, for example, rescue work-
ers and volunteers providing basic necessities for
victims of natural disasters, philanthropic dona-
tions of resources to war-stricken people in for-
eign lands, or even educational and development
programs designed for marginalized citizens.
Indeed, humanitarianism is an ideology of prac-
tices, or what one does to protect and promote the

dignity of human life. When it comes to humani-
tarianism and issues of identity, it is necessary to
understand the basic philosophical and ethical
presuppositions guiding these practices, for the
“doing” of one’s life emerges from the perceptions
that one holds as a self in a world of others. To
articulate what constitutes identity from a human-
itarianism perspective, this entry articulates the
philosophical roots of humanitarianism within the
historical moment of the Age of Reason; outlines
the major presuppositions of propriety, sympathy,
and duty that shape the humanitarian understand-
ing of human nature; and explores the implica-
tions this understanding has for the practices of
identity within the postmodern moment.
Philosophical Origins
The great thinkers of the 18th century supported a
rational science of morality based upon the tenets
of reason and nature. The general belief during this
historical period was that the order of nature
reflected a moral order as well as a natural one; the
nature of reality, as discovered through rationality
and science, not only articulates what is but also
what ought to be. In contrast to the thinkers of the
medieval era, who were guided largely by the doc-
trines of the church, the thinkers of the
Enlightenment turned from theological perspec-
tives on human knowledge toward a rational, sci-
entific understanding of humankind. The quest
became to discover a naturalistic ethic, or the natu-
ral, universal order of morals apparent across cul-
tures and across time, uncorrupted by traditions
and displayed as a socially useful set of practices.
For these reasons, 18th-century thinkers engaged
in what is called a morality of reasonableness, dis-
carding what was deemed irrational or unnatural
in traditional ethical frameworks and emphasizing
those practices that seemed reasonable for the con-
struction of the good life.
Benevolence became the highest virtue that one
could possess, and the ideas of utility and happi-
ness shaped the conditions of morality. Some
schools of the morality of reasonableness, such as
was proposed during the Scottish Enlightenment
by Lord Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson, held
that all persons innately possess knowledge of right
and wrong that balances one’s self-interest with the
concern for others. Thomas Hobbes, David Hume,
Humanitarianism 335
and Adam Smith held self-interest as the most
important motive for human action, while the sen-
timent of sympathy bridged these self-interested
sentiments to an understanding of the experiences
of others. In addition, the principles of utilitarianism
emerged during this period, as philosophers Claude
Adrien Helvétius and, later, Jeremy Bentham argued
that the natural order of self-interested humankind
is determined by principles of reward and punish-
ment: All of society should be engaged in reason-
able action that benefits all. The emerging ideals of
humanitarianism, then, originated from strong
utilitarian identifications.
Along with utility and happiness, humanity
became a key idea within this historical time.
Great thinkers advocated minimizing the articu-
lated differences between individuals and focusing
on the characteristics of humankind as a whole.
This movement was largely supported by the con-
tinually growing middle class in Western Europe,
who, in theory, contended that equal rights and
power should be possessed by all by merit of the
universal worth of humankind. With humanitari-
anism, the ideals of the Enlightenment included paci-
fism, cosmopolitanism, and toleration. Nationalistic
sentiments and pursuits of war were deeply opposed
by humanitarians, for any divisions among humans
are unnatural and reasonably harmful to human
welfare. Instead, the thinkers of the Age of Reason
advocated the development of a single ruling gov-
ernment: citizens of the world sharing equal rights
in an ideal society. This ideal society reflects a con-
temporary model of the spirit of the Roman
Empire or the medieval church with its emphasis
on unification. However, unlike those historical
times, this 18th-century moment held no truth as
certain enough to warrant justification or condem-
nation. The contemplation of truth was replaced
with the exploration of possibilities: Any belief or
sentiment could be regarded as true. Ironically,
within this moment of emphasis on humanity, the
individual emerged as metanarrative, for the expe-
riences of the self were believed to naturally repre-
sent the sentiments of the whole.
With this brief discussion of the historical
moment in which the ideals of humanitarianism
emerged, this entry now turns to the basic presup-
positions of the philosophy, including propriety,
sympathy, and duty, and their implications for
identity.
336 Humanitarianism
Propriety
Propriety, as was understood by the original think-
ers who shaped the humanitarian ideal, connoted
those characteristics or qualities of the true nature
of a thing. Rejecting the major traditions of the
Middle Ages, the philosophers of the Enlightenment
did not regard the world as a place in need of order
created and implemented by an incommensurable
and incomprehensible divinity, but instead
approached the world as inherently possessing and
exhibiting all characteristics of harmony and hap-
piness in an ordered, if not mechanistic, fashion. In
a word, all mystery is lost within the Age of
Reason; the task became to prune all tangles of
uncertainty from human life in order to expose the
simplest form of human behavior.
From this perspective, the simplest form for
understanding the complexities of humankind is
the biological or the natural. There exist original
qualities, or primary impulses, of the human mind
that arise in all cultures and within all times.
Nature within us, or rather nature as is reflected by
the actions of the self, determines the propriety or
the impropriety of behavior. Philosophers such as
David Hume and Adam Smith offer some general
characteristics of what constitutes the nature of the
self. First, humans are sensory beings. Individuals
are chiefly affected by circumstances that create
sensations of pleasure or pain. These are called
impressions of sensations and are the original
impressions one experiences of reality. These sen-
sations naturally attract or call forth certain sec-
ondary impressions, or reflections of passion. This
leads us to the second characteristic of humankind,
or humans as imaginative beings. Sensations that
are experienced biologically are translated into
representations, or images of reality, within the
human cognitive system. These images are then
imposed upon and modified by observations and
experiences of the world and others. The self, then,
can be defined by a succession of related ideas and
impressions within one’s consciousness. The ideas
that one has about the reality of nature reflect
more the nature of one’s own mind than the struc-
ture of the world. In a word, the self is the only
avenue for understanding reality.
However, in order for the individual to under-
stand completely the nature of his or her sensa-
tions and impressions in relation to the world, one
must approve or disapprove of these experiences.
This can occur only because of the final character-
istic of humankind, or humans as social beings.
The self always judges sentiments and actions
against a standard that presupposes one’s existence
in a society of others. Experiences of pleasure and
pain guide notions of propriety and impropriety,
or a collective and public recognition of what con-
stitutes virtuous or vicious behavior. Subjective
understanding of the world originates with physi-
cal sensations of the self. The self then turns those
sensations outward to associate them within the
social realm and then reflects back to ideas of pro-
priety that guide self-behavior. With this final
characteristic, this entry now turns to the meta-
phor of sympathy as another basic philosophical
presupposition of humanitarianism.
Sympathy
In humanitarianism, sympathy is the closest notion
we have to an idea of humanity. That is, sympathy
is the originative sentiment commonly shared by
all persons, or the essential characteristic that
binds humanity. More specifically, sympathy is
our ability, when observing or experiencing the
pleasures and pains of others, to experience sensa-
tions of pleasure and pain within ourselves. In its
truest form, sympathy is experienced without
regard for one’s own interest, despite the fact that
it can originate only from putting oneself “in the
shoes” of another. According to the humanitarian
ideal, even those relationships which are most dif-
ficult to articulate, such as the relationship between
a mother and a child, are based solely upon the
consciousness of the self. For example, a mother
may feel pain when she hears the cries of her sick
child. Although she cannot remove or displace the
physical pain of the child, she shares in the idea of
what it means to suffer. The consciousness and
memory of her own experiences of helplessness
and pain, in addition to a fear of what this disease
may hold for the future (which the infant may not
yet be able to understand because that sentiment
remains outside the realm of the infant’s conscious
experience), leads to a shared physical and emo-
tional commiseration by mother and child. Simply
put, while physically healthy, a mother may make
herself sick with worry for her child.

Sympathy becomes the medium through which
the inarticulate of life, such as the beauty of the
relationship between mother and child, can be
articulated. Sympathy becomes humankind’s com-
municative ground. Grounded within the sensa-
tions and experiences of the body, the human self
moves first into the imaginative and then into the
symbolic; from the order of our bodies comes the
order of our world. Experiences become universal-
ized for the sake of communication. Hume and
Smith do not suggest that our sympathies are
always correct. They recognize that our sympa-
thetic feelings can be ill-formed, misguided, or
biased. As such, moral judgments can exist inde-
pendent from individual perspectives; sympathetic
responses, however, cannot. Because we live and
communicate through our sympathetic responses
and can only reflect the moral order of nature,
there must exist premises of responsibility within
this humanitarian ethic.
Duty
The final philosophical presupposition of humani-
tarianism is duty. This presupposition reflects back
to humanitarianism as an ideology of practices, for
the idea of duty conveys a sense of moral commit-
ment to action. It is not merely a matter of passive
recognition of moral imperatives; it is a matter of
practice. As such, the influential theorists of the
humanitarian movement, such as Hume and Smith,
proposed that ethics is practical. Reason, they
argued, provides an important method for under-
standing the order of nature. However, they recog-
nized that reason impacts action only contingently.
Reason and passion (or sympathy) must both exist
in order to motivate. While sympathy turns one
toward the other, reason discerns the course of
action appropriate to the context.
The ethical imperative of humanitarianism
involves upholding the dignity of each person
based on the assumption of one shared human
essence that informs experience. This sense of duty
supposes that one must be accountable to others
not because of any one ideal, but because of the
ideal of human nature. Humanitarianism, espe-
cially within its 18th-century context and even, in
a sense, in the context of how it is practiced today,
is a philosophy of progress; its followers, despite
Humanitarianism 337
recognizing the existence of human suffering,
strive toward the perfection of human nature
through fostering benevolence and restraining ten-
dencies toward selfishness. Practices of equal
rights, freedom, and justice shaped the humanitar-
ian ideal in the past and continue to shape it
today.
The Humanitarian Ideal
and Postmodern Identity
In a postmodern moment of narrative diversity,
the humanitarian ideal appeals to the inclination
to find common ground among difference.
However, the philosophical presuppositions of this
framework warrant some caution. Most impor-
tantly, this framework for identity assumes that
moral agreement is to be expected and that dis-
agreements should be resolved. Postmodernists
would suggest otherwise: Differences cannot or
should not be ignored or solved. The traditions of
the local and the call of the universal coexist in a
textured ground of human understanding of iden-
tity. In light of this caution, it is important to reit-
erate humanitarianism as an ideology of
practices—practices that cannot and never will be
the same for every person within every moment.
As human beings, we breathe change. It is that
breath that motivates us to identification; identify-
ing our space, the space of others, and the space
that we share. Identity in shared space is at the
heart of humanitarianism, and sharing is first and
always an intentional act—a doing of life for the
other.
Celeste Grayson Seymour
See also Cosmopolitanism; Self-Consciousness;
Subjectivity
Further Readings
Hume, D. (2006). Moral philosophy (G. Sayre-McCord,
Ed.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Randall, J. H., Jr. (1940). The making of the modern
mind: A survey of the intellectual background of the
present age. Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press.
Smith, A. (1984). The theory of moral sentiments
(D. D. Raphael & A. L. Macfie, Eds.). Indianapolis,
IN: Liberty Fund.
338 Hybridity
Hybridity
Hybridity is often seen as the result of colonial-
ism, imperialism, and globalization. This entry
defines hybridity in the context of globalization;
therefore, it discusses cultural hybridity and con-
stantly changing and forming postcolonial identi-
ties. Hybridity most typically occurs in postcolonial
societies as a result of conscious moments of cul-
tural suppression, as when the colonial power
invades to dominate and control political and eco-
nomic conditions, and when colonizers (often
Western nations) force indigenous people to
assimilate to the new social style that is brought
by the colonizers. Hybridity also occurs when pat-
terns and lifestyles of immigrants and diasporic
communities in metropolitan locations, such as
London, New York, and Paris, influence host cul-
tures and produce change for the colonizers as
well as others in the postcolonial world.
Postcolonial studies scholars have been occu-
pied with theorizing the issues of hybridity, cre-
olization, mestizaje, in-betweenness, diasporas,
and liminality, as well as with the mobility, the
crossovers of ideas, and the constantly shifting and
changing identities generated by hybridity.
Therefore, hybridity can be seen as the result of
colonialism, imperialism, and globalization.
Because colonial and imperial powers influence
and change norms, values, rules, and cultural prac-
tices of colonized cultures, they often transform
these cultures into constantly changing and shift-
ing social and political entities. For example, in
colonized cultures, individuals often experience
constant in-betweenness and crossovers because
they continuously experience the clashes and inter-
sections between their original culture and the
colonizer’s culture. While they are adjusting to
new rules and regulations and assimilating to the
new ways of performing self, individuals from
colonies try to keep their customs and cultural
practices alive. Usually, this tension results in
hybrid, constantly shape-shifting, in-between
crossovers of identities. Individuals who experi-
ence in-betweenness create hybrid identities.
Some argue that all cultures are hybrid. One
way or another, cultures are influenced by other
cultures; there is no way to escape from the influ-
ence of others, especially in today’s world. There is
no pure culture to be corrupted because through-
out history, people from different cultures have
communicated and interacted with each other and
this has resulted in a cultural muddle.
It is impossible to discuss the notion of hybrid-
ity without connecting it to the notions of power
and domination. Traditionally, colonized and
imperial powers controlled and changed the prac-
tices of individuals in the colonized nations and
areas. It is also important to remember that today
these nations still use their power under the rubric
of globalization to control and dominate cultures
around the world. By using their power to gain
control, these power sources (historically Western
European countries and the United States) interject
their cultural practices, values, and lifestyles into
other cultures. As a result, colonized nations were
expected to adopt these values and beliefs and
practice the lifestyle of the colonizer. Thus, these
dynamics often created change and cultural confu-
sion for the colonized nations. Hybridity is the
result of cultural suppression. Because of cultural
suppression and political and economic control,
individuals experience constant in-betweenness:
They are stuck between two cultures. Hybridity
can be understood as a constant negotiation and
interaction that is dictated by power dynamics
such as the colonizer’s political, economical, and
cultural influence on colonized cultures.
Even though the colonizers historically influ-
enced the colonized nations’ cultures, beliefs, and
traditions, they are also influenced by individuals
from the regions and areas that they colonized. For
example, metropolitan cities such as London,
Paris, New York, Amsterdam, and Toronto are
filled with immigrants and diasporic communities.
Although these communities are influenced by
their host nations (often former colonial and impe-
rial powers), they, in turn, influence the cultural
traditions, beliefs, and practices of their host
nations. Therefore, citizens of these nations also
experience cultural hybridity and constant transla-
tion and negotiation among cultures, even though
these might not be as complex as the experiences
of immigrants, diasporic communities, and the
colonized individuals in former colonies.
Individuals who experience here (host nation
or culture) and there (home nation or culture)
simultaneously, such as diasporic individuals, are
caught in the discontinuous time of translation

and negotiation. This constant negotiation hybrid-
izes their experiences and cultural identities.
Hybridization of cultures and experiences can be
seen as a politically correct solution to antiethnic
or nationalist agenda. Although this state of being
weakens the power of nation-state as a concept, it
also troubles the individuals by creating conflict-
ing experiences. On the other hand, there can be
positive aspects of hybridity. Identity is con-
structed through negotiation of difference. Because
individuals who experience in-betweenness deal
with constant negotiation with here and there and
self and other, they create a hybrid cultural iden-
tity. Fissures and contradictions are not a sign of
failure; instead, they are viewed as a positive
aspect of hybridity.
Not only the colonial past of the Western cul-
tures but also globalization as an economic and
political agenda has fueled the creation of hybrid
identities and hybriditized local cultures. Because of
advancements in transportation, people now more
than ever have the freedom to travel from one coun-
try to another and experience different cultures, to
emigrate because of economical and political rea-
sons, or even to pursue higher education in a differ-
ent country. As a result of these cultural and
economic transformations, hybridity became a state
that defines cultures’ and individuals’ state of being
(condition), experiences, and constantly changing
cultural and social dynamics. As a result, hybridity
as a state of being defines the constantly changing
nature of host and home cultures and the constantly
changing lived experiences of the immigrants,
diasporic communities, and individuals in host
nations and the former colonies.
Ahmet Atay
See also Colonialism; Cosmopolitanism; Diaspora
Further Readings
Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G., & Tiffin, H. (1995).
Introduction. In B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths, & H. Tiffin
(Eds.), The post-colonial studies reader (pp. 183–184).
London: Routledge.
Kraidy, M. M. (2002). Hybridity in cultural
globalization. Communication Theory, 12, 316–339.
Loomba, A. (1998). Colonialism/postcolonialism.
London: Routledge.
Hyperreality and Simulation 339
Papastergiadis, N. (1997). Tracing hybridity in theory. In
P. Werbner & T. Modood (Eds.), Debating cultural
hybridity: Multi-cultural identities and the politics of
anti-racism (pp. 257–281). London: Zed Books.
Hyperreality and Simulation
Hyperreality and simulation are two closely related
concepts, which are generally linked to the French
theorist Jean Baudrillard. In short, hyperreality
refers to a simulation (i.e., copy) of reality, which
is considered as more real than reality itself. For
example, we believe in the images of reality given
by mass media rather than in reality itself. In this
sense, the concept of identity belongs to hyperreal-
ity as well: We believe in the idea of identity rather
than in identity itself; we act as if identity were still
possible. This entry discusses Baudrillard and his
works, his concept of hyperreality and its relation
to identity.
Baudrillard
Baudrillard was a French sociologist and philoso-
pher who, for more than four decades and in more
than 40 publications, sharply analyzed contempo-
rary society and all of the major changes of recent
times: from consumer society via the new mass
media to the globalized world. He is often associ-
ated with postmodern and poststructuralist theory,
and his writings and theories are highly influential
across many disciplines and controversial for their
provocative content.
Baudrillard was born in 1929 in Reims, France.
His true academic career began in 1966, when he
became an assistant to the sociologist Henri
Lefebvre (who was considered to be a neo-Marxist)
at the University of Paris X–Nanterre. In this year,
he handed in his dissertation, The System of
Objects (published in 1968) and began teaching
sociology. He remained a professor at Nanterre
until 1987 and died in Paris in 2007.
Because Baudrillard’s writing is essayistic, meta-
phorical, and full of free associations, radical
thoughts, and conclusions, he was criticized by
those of his academic peers who stand for develop-
ing arguments in a logical and comprehensible
manner. Yet Baudrillard’s unusual and extreme
340 Hyperreality and Simulation
way of writing is at the heart of his understanding
of the altered role of theory. According to
Baudrillard, theory can no longer be confined by
traditional thinking and methods, because the
importance of the perceived rupture between the
modern and the postmodern world necessitates
new ways of describing events in progress.
Baudrillard’s recurrent theme is the duality of
the subject and the object. In his earlier writings
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, one can
discern very clearly the influence of Baudrillard’s
mentor Lefebvre and of Marxist thought in gen-
eral. Baudrillard analyzes the rising consumer
society by decrypting the new role of what he gen-
erally refers to as things (or objects). Next to the
commodities’ production and exchange value,
which he associates with modern society, the so-
called sign value becomes predominant—a distinct
sign of postmodern society. The sign value is what
the thing stands for: For example, a specific car
stands for a certain social class. Baudrillard says
that this sign value has become the only one of true
importance. With Symbolic Exchange and Death,
which is considered as one of his major works,
Baudrillard radicalizes this idea, marking, at the
same time, his break with Marxist thought. In this
book, Baudrillard denies Marxist thought all revo-
lutionary potential by explaining how Marxism is
a theory adhering to the principle of production,
which, for Baudrillard, is passé. He depicts the
present as a world in which there is no longer an
exchange of things with an inherent value, but
purely an exchange—a permanent circulation—of
their sign value. What the signs used to refer to is
no longer of importance nowadays, as they have
become self-referential—a further developed semi-
ological approach that clearly shows Baudrillard’s
affinity to literary theorist and semiotician Roland
Barthes and linguist Ferdinand de Saussure.
Baudrillard pushes the idea of the exchange of sign
values even further, integrating the theories of
French anthropologists Marcel Mauss and Georges
Bataille by describing how the accelerating prolif-
eration of signs forms a spiral of gift and counter-
gift exchange, an expenditure to the point where
the ultimate gift is that of death. This should be
understood as a metaphor for a world in which
things proliferate, circulate, and accelerate to the
point of implosion, an image Baudrillard often
uses in his later writings.
Around this time, Baudrillard begins to turn
away from social theory, which he does not con-
sider to be adequate for explaining contemporary
developments. Instead, he turns more and more
toward metaphysical essays, in which one initial
idea sets off an accelerating proliferation of ideas
and associations—somewhat conforming to the
object that he tries to analyze. Whereas speech-act
theorists would call this writing technique perfor-
mative, Baudrillard names this strategy seduction.
In Seduction, Baudrillard depicts the duality
between subject and object under a new angle,
radically breaking with modern thought that cen-
ters on the subject and its presumed supremacy
over the object. Baudrillard favors reversibility,
that is, the possibility of everything being or turn-
ing into its opposite. This is why he can say that in
our contemporary, postmodern society, we live in
the realm of the object, the object being the one
that in fact has supremacy over the subject, seduc-
ing the subject into believing it is still predominant
and, by the means of this ruse, taking advantage of
it. It is what Baudrillard calls a fatal strategy, the
subject of another of his books.
Hyperreality
It can be argued that Baudrillard never gave up
searching for possibilities of subverting the world
of circulating signs, which, according to Baudrillard,
replace reality itself. These signs, which originally
referred to something, now only refer to them-
selves, according to Baudrillard. By this, reality
comes to an end, because the signs become more
real than reality itself—a state of the world which
Baudrillard calls hyperreality. The best example,
and which Baudrillard happens to develop the
most, is that of signs in the form of circulating
images. Images, thanks to television, computers,
and the Internet, have become predominant in
everyday life. Originally, one could say that soap
operas tried to represent everyday life or that
images shown on the news were depicting real
events in the world. For Baudrillard, the exact
opposite is the case: People take TV series as role
models for their own lives and TV images have

replaced our real experiences of the world. The
images that were supposed to provide us with
images of the real become the real itself. However,
for Baudrillard, even if there is no escape to this
virtual reality, this is not a dead-end situation.
Opposition and revolution may have become only
self-referential signs themselves (Baudrillard also
calls these simulacra), but there is the possibility of
subversion via seduction and via excess and ecstasy
(as seen in his writing style). These latter processes
will help to bring about the impending implosion—
implosion as a form of auto-destruction as opposed
to the more classical destruction from the out-
side that, for Baudrillard, belongs to classical,
modern thought. Such singularities, as he calls them,
can constitute a form of cunning, surreptitious
breakdown.
Baudrillard worked on these thoughts for all of
the 1980s and 1990s. With books such as The
Transparency of Evil, he shifted the focus from
the simulations and hyperreality of everyday life
to more global views on the world and the events
taking place, or precisely not taking place, as he
describes in The Illusion of the End. The strike of
events is a major theme within this work concern-
ing the disappearance of history, since one of the
many paradoxes of our time is that the accelera-
tion of virtual signs and images comes with a sort
of inertia concerning real events. Consequently,
Baudrillard supported the idea of an end of his-
tory like many fellow theorists during the 1990s.
He revised this viewpoint in the article “The Spirit
of Terrorism,” published shortly after 9/11, which
caused a scandal because of the provocative
analysis of the terrorist attack. For Baudrillard,
9/11 was indeed a real, all-encompassing event
that broke with the previous strike of events.
Staying true to his concepts of hyperreality and
circulating images to the point of implosion,
Baudrillard suggested that the terrorist attack was
an auto-destructive event created by our very own
system, proving, once more, the reversibility of
things.
Identity
The concept of reversibility, as well as Baudrillard’s
preoccupation with the duality of the subject and
Hyperreality and Simulation 341
the object, is at the center of his thoughts on iden-
tity. It is possible to discern two main concepts
concerning the construction of identity, even
though Baudrillard rarely uses the term, believing
it to belong to traditional modern thought and
considering it as yet another meaningless sign
having taken the place of what identity once used
to be. The first approach to Baudrillard’s under-
standing of identity lies within the idea of revers-
ibility: Just like the subject itself cannot be
thought without the object, one cannot think
identity (of a subject) without the concept of the
Other.
Baudrillard’s text “Pursuit in Venice” from
1983, reprinted in a slightly different version in
The Transparency of Evil, a commentary to a
work by French artist Sophie Calle, focuses on
this idea. For Baudrillard, the Other is the one
that allows the Me to reflect itself. Baudrillard
explains this by showing how the mirror used to
be something to reflect the subject, the Me. The
image one could see when looking at a mirror was
an other Me, a reflected, even alienated one.
Currently, screens have taken the place of mirrors:
Screens do not reflect, they absorb the subject, the
Me, letting the copy of the Me (the Same instead
of the Other) circulate just like other signs and
images. The Other used to function just like the
mirror, but in the virtual, hyperreal world of
simulations we live in, with no means of a duality
with an Other, of a play of seduction in which the
Me would be reflected, people let signs rule their
behavior and ideas (as seen with the example of
TV series serving as role models for one’s life).
The subjects no longer construct their own identi-
ties. Instead, they appropriate simulated identities
provided by signs and images, becoming com-
pletely influenced and determined by outside
sources. For Baudrillard, identity disappears just
like reality does.
A second approach to seeing identity through
the theories of Baudrillard is the concept of frag-
mentation, which is very popular in postmodern
and poststructuralist thought in general, in which
there is a strong focus on the notions of difference
and plurality rather than identity and unity. In
Fragments, published in 2001, which is a series of
interviews with philosopher François L’Yvonnet,
342 Hyperreality and Simulation
Baudrillard describes the fragmentation of the
subject, and thereby its fragmented identity, by
stating how the subject is always the embodiment
of one of the many possible subjects that it could
have become after being born. For Baudrillard,
these other subjects, these other Me’s, do not dis-
appear with time, but just like the one subject that
took form, they are constantly in the making.
Occasionally, he says, it is possible to become one
of these other Me’s. The subject that considers
himself as an entity is, in reality, obsessed with
these coexisting Me’s, obsessed with what else it
could have become. The subject does not have
one, clearly defined and constant identity like
modern thought tried to suggest: It is fragmented
and unstable. Instead of feeling serene by what
is, it is haunted by what could have been. This is
an unsettling concept, which, added to the impos-
sibility of assigning Baudrillard to a clear and
single school of thought, lets many journalists,
authors, and intellectuals ask, “Who was Jean
Baudrillard?”
Dagmar Danko
See also Simulacra
Further Readings
Baudrillard, J. (1983). Simulations (S. Lotringer, Ed.;
P. Foss, P. Patton, & P. Beitchman, Trans.). New
York: Semiotext(e).
Baudrillard, J. (1990). Seduction (B. Singer, Trans.). New
York: St. Martin’s Press. (Original work published
1979)
Baudrillard, J. (1993). Symbolic exchange and death
(I. H. Grant, Trans.). London: Sage. (Original work
published 1976)
Baudrillard, J. (1993). The transparency of evil. Essays
on extreme phenomena (J. Benedict, Trans.). London:
Verso. (Original work published 1990)
Baudrillard, J. (2002). The spirit of terrorism: And
requiem for the Twin Towers (C. Turner, Trans.).
London: Verso.
Baudrillard, J. (2004). Fragments. Interviews with Jean
Baudrillard (C. Turner, Trans.). London: Routledge.
(Original work published 2001)
Baudrillard, J. (2005). The conspiracy of art (S. Lotringer,
Ed.). New York: Semiotext(e).
 I
Id, Ego, and Superego
The id, ego, and superego are three components of
the mental apparatus advanced by Sigmund Freud.
Mental life and behavior are thought to be deter-
mined by interactions among these three compo-
nents and with the external environment. The id is
the part of the mind concerned with immediate
gratification of needs (e.g., eating, sex, comfort).
The ego is the realistic part of the psyche (able to
see practical limits). The superego is the moraliz-
ing part of the mind. Struggles for dominance
between these three aspects of the human psyche
lead to repression (the pushing of inappropriate
thoughts and wishes out of consciousness),
increased tension, and the shifting or relocation of
energy to alternative targets within and outside the
body. Thoughts and desires reside at varying
degrees of awareness, ranging from conscious (full
awareness) to preconscious (can be made aware
with little effort) to unconscious (completely
unknown to us). Repressed thoughts (those deemed
inappropriate by the ego and superego) are believed
to find expression across a continuum of behaviors
from the normal everyday (e.g., forgetting, slips of
the tongue) to the pathological (e.g., neurosis that
include somatic pain and paralysis). The id, ego,
and superego represent three parts of the self or
identity: a hedonistic self, a public self, and a
moral self. Freud used this tripartite model to
explain gender identity, sexual orientation forma-
tion, personality types, and psychological disor-
ders. Freud’s model caused controversy because of
343
its emphasis on sexual instinct. Despite the contro-
versy, his work has demonstrated lasting value and
has sparked numerous psychological theories.
This entry briefly describes the historical and
scientific context that influenced Freud in his con-
ceptualization of the human psyche; describes the
evolution and characteristics of the id, ego, and
superego; discusses the roles of id, ego, and super-
ego in reference to psychosexual stages; describes
how specific conflicts among these components
contribute to normal and abnormal behaviors;
and reviews how Freud’s concepts (id, ego, and
superego) contributed to various subfields of
social science.
Historical Context and Influences
In step with the medical climate of the late 19th
century, Freud, a medical doctor who studied
physiology and neurology, worked to describe and
classify hysteria. Hysteria was a condition predom-
inantly found in females that often included somatic
symptoms like paralysis, tics, numbness, and loss of
speech. Whereas his mentor and colleague Jean-
Martin Charocot used hypnosis as a tool to eluci-
date the symptoms of hysteria for classification
purposes, Freud was more interested in using hyp-
nosis as a treatment. Under hypnosis, through the
power of suggestion, patients with hysteria could
be temporarily relieved of their symptoms. Joseph
Breuer, a colleague in private practice, told Freud
that hysterical clients under hypnosis could
(a) trace the origins of their hysterical symptoms to
past events, and (b) find long-lasting relief of
344 Id, Ego, and Superego
symptoms after emotionally retelling or reliving the
event. Breuer discovered that although physical
relief was evident after the hypnotic state, patients
could not recall the traumatic events they had
reported earlier. In 1895, Breuer and Freud wrote
Studies on Hysteria, summarizing a case study of
Anna O., a patient diagnosed with hysteria who
was successfully treated. They explained the benefit
of the cathartic method, or the cure related to reliv-
ing the initial experience that caused the symptom.
From describing Anna O., Freud started to develop
a theory by which actual events and memories were
translated into physical symptoms without the indi-
vidual being aware of the process. In other words,
Freud developed a theory about how various parts
of the mind, conscious and unconscious, interacted
to produce human behavior.
In crafting his theory of the human psyche,
Freud was greatly influenced by prominent scien-
tific theories of the 19th century. Of primary
importance to Freud’s work was the writing of
Charles Darwin. The Darwinian notion that organ-
isms adapt to their environments by developing
from the most simple to the most complex is echoed
in Freud’s model, in which the ego emerges from
the id, and the superego, in turn, emerges from the
ego. The human psyche is initially concerned with
self-preservation and gratifying basic needs (id),
becomes more aware of social limits and rules and
seeks to comply with those standards (ego), and
ultimately develops the ability to internalize these
standards and have a conscience (superego). The
progression from id to ego to superego takes place
in response to one’s environment. Even Freud’s
contention that sexual motivation and gratification
are the impetus for all human behavior was congru-
ent with Darwin’s belief that all animal behavior
(including human behavior) is based on two
instincts: to survive and to sexually reproduce.
According to Darwin, natural selection—the vehicle
of evolution—could not take place without sexual
selection. Sexual selection is of critical importance,
as reproduction transmits hereditary material. Like
Darwin’s theory of evolution, Freud embraced the
idea that human behavior is determined by past
experience and is not random in its presentation.
All behavior has meaning and purpose.
In the field of physics, Hermann von Helmholz’s
principle stated that the total amount of energy
within a physical system cannot be lost but rather
is transformed; this was an idea adopted by Freud.
Though critics still debate whether Freud concep-
tualized the psyche as an actual physical entity,
there is little doubt that Freud used physical prin-
ciples to describe the workings of the mind. Within
Freud’s model, the mind’s energy/libido cannot be
destroyed but is altered in form through processes
like conversion and sublimation. An application of
Helmholz’s principle is the notion that energy/
libido needs to be expressed somewhere. Freud
used this principle both to explain how libidinal
energy would manifest and to inform treatment.
Regular correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess, a
personal friend and otolaryngologist, left a great
impact on Freud. Fliess, a researcher in his own
right, convinced Freud that both men and women
pass through dual periodic physiological cycles of
23 and 28 days; this observation is connected to
Fliess’s theory that both men and women are
essentially bisexual. Freud carried this notion for-
ward in his ideas of infantile sexuality and the role
of external socialization (not biology alone) in
determining one’s sexual orientation.
Evolution of the Psyche
Id
According to Freud, the id (or das Es, German
for “the It”) is the initial and most primitive part
of the human psyche. The id is unconscious and
operates solely on the pleasure principle, the pur-
suit of immediate gratification of basic needs
(food, water, and sex). According to Freud, humans
can satisfy their sexual/physical desires and release
tensions through various parts of the body, not
only through genital-to-genital contact. Freud
hypothesized that the infant (and primitive human)
brain was all id and contained two inherited and
opposing instincts. These instincts are (a) eros (or
libido)—the sexual drive that aims to have sexual
unions, to experience love in general, and to seek
self-preservation; and (b) the death instinct—the
aggressive drive that seeks to destroy life. He pos-
ited that every human possessed these two instincts
in varying amounts, and all behavior resulted from
how these instinctual energies are directed and
manifested by the psyche.
Freud reported that the id of the human infant
is easily seen. It is demanding and selfish. When it
is hungry, it wants to eat immediately, and it cries

if not promptly satisfied. The mental processes of
the id have no awareness of external constraints,
boundaries, or time. When the id’s needs are not
immediately met, it is said to engage in primary
process thinking. Primary process thinking, or
wish fulfillment, is a compensatory strategy in
which the denied id envisions the object that it
desires. For example, the hungry infant made to
wait for food might envision the breast of the
mother who had previously gratified the need. The
id is preverbal and functions via pictures. Because
the id is unconscious, its desires are best seen in
dreams (during sleep, when the ego’s connection
with reality is disrupted).The id does not have the
power to satisfy its own urges, and, therefore, the
id must evolve into the ego.
Ego
A part of the id is transformed into the ego (or
das Ich, German for “the I”), as the id is met with
the realities of the external world and its inadequa-
cies in bringing satisfaction. According to Freud,
the id sends libidinal energy to the newly formed
ego so that the ego can find a target or a love object
for its release. Under normal circumstances, the ego
locates an external target; occasionally, however,
the ego makes itself the love object (i.e., narcissism).
The ego is conscious and perceptive, and it controls
voluntary muscle movement. As such, it is respon-
sible for remembering noxious stimuli, avoiding
danger, and adapting to and acting on the environ-
ment to make it more favorable. Because of these
abilities, the ego becomes the intermediary between
the id and the world (and it also attempts to do the
bidding of the superego). The ego seeks to fully
gratify the desires of the id while holding onto the
limits of society. It operates on the reality principle
and engages in secondary process thinking, because
it uses rational thought to make decisions. As the
mediator, the ego decides whether the id should be
appeased, chooses the most appropriate targets or
possibilities, and decides when libidinal energy will
be released. There are some desires, however, that
the ego cannot satisfy and therefore represses.
Superego
The superego or the ego-ideal (or das Über-Ich,
German for “the Over I”) is the moral or ethical
Id, Ego, and Superego 345
part of the psyche, which develops from a part of
the ego after a person abandons sexual desire for
his or her opposite sex parent. This part of the
psyche is responsible for maintaining individual
and collective values. Freud credited two sources
for the development of the superego: (a) the child’s
prolonged dependency on parents and (b) the dis-
solution of the Oedipus complex or the Electra
complex. These factors are discussed using the
example of a male child. Initially, the infant’s sur-
vival depends on nurturing and protection by the
parent. Although the infant originally believes he is
all-powerful and views the mother as a part of him-
self, he eventually begins to realize his parents are
separate beings who provide essential care. Later
during this state of dependency, the male child
begins to desire the complete attention and love of
the mother and fantasizes taking his father’s place,
by force if necessary. This is called the Oedipus
complex. Because of great respect for the father
and fear of castration, however, the child begins
rationalizing that this takeover cannot be accom-
plished, feels guilty, and typically begins identifying
with his once-rival father. The child then internal-
izes the behavior and values of the same-sex parent.
As the child matures, other figures and institutions
of authority (e.g., teachers, police, and religious
figures) serve as regulating entities and take on the
role of the father. This process is said to cultivate
gender identification and sexual orientation and is
the impetus for conscience and moral character. A
similar process called the Electra complex is said to
occur in girls; however, their love object is the
father and the fear of castration is not present.
According to Freud, the strength of one’s superego
is directly and positively related to the sexual long-
ing for one’s parents. Although Freud sees the
superego as accountable for producing individual
and societal benefits like morality, religion, and
civic duty, the superego can also be overly critical
and place extreme pressure on the ego to maintain
high standards.
Psychosexual Development
Freud posited that the id’s libidinal and destructive
energies seek expression through various parts of
the body. His theory was radical, in part, as a
result of his belief that infants have sexual wishes
and exhibit sexual behavior. In his psychosexual
346 Id, Ego, and Superego
stages of development, Freud noted that from
infancy through puberty, individuals proceed
through the oral, anal, phallic, latency, and genital
stages. Although these stages do not always occur
sequentially, Freud posited that disruption of or
fixation in one of the earlier stages of development
is related to disordered behaviors and personality
formation. Freud described how the id, ego, super-
ego, and the child’s environment (parents, older
siblings) during this period of psychosexual growth
play a central role in determining gender identity,
sexual orientation, and which particular sexual-
ized behaviors a person will employ in pursuit of
releasing tension.
The first stage is the oral stage, during which
the infant receives pleasure through the mouth.
The id directs libidinal energy toward activities
like nursing, eating, and nonnutritious sucking,
which provide the infant great satisfaction. Failure
to receive adequate oral stimulation (e.g., early
weaning or inconsistent feedings) or overindul-
gence in oral activities may be seen in later adult
personality and behaviors that incorporate the
mouth. For example, individuals with oral recep-
tive personality traits are preoccupied with over-
eating, drinking, smoking, and nail biting and tend
to be passive, dependent, and sensitive to rejection.
Alternatively, oral fixation may express itself
through verbally aggressive hostile or cynical
behaviors. Individuals who exhibit these behaviors
are said to have an orally aggressive personality.
The second period, the anal stage, is the time
when the child receives pleasure through the pass-
ing and retention of feces. The libidinal and
destructive instincts, emanating from the id, are
represented in the pleasure and pain experienced in
defecating. Toilet training is a prominent feature
of this stage. During this stage, the child’s ego is
thought to develop (gain strength) as he or she
learns that he or she must use the bathroom in
specified places. Parents who are either too harsh
or too permissive during this stage are thought to
contribute to their children’s abnormal personality
formation. Children who do not successfully
advance from this stage are said to have either an
“anal retentive” or an “anal expulsive” personal-
ity. People with anal retentive personalities (result-
ing from overly strict toilet training practices) are
said to be uptight, stingy/withholding, and stub-
born and have a compulsive need for order and
cleanliness. Individuals with anal expulsive person-
ality exhibit irresponsible, messy, and careless
behavior (thought to develop from overly permis-
sive toilet training).
During the phallic stage, children explore their
genitals for the first time and receive pleasure
through genital self-stimulation. Masturbation and
the Oedipus or Electra complex are present during
this stage. Prohibitions against masturbation, sex-
ual fantasies about the parent, and the dissolution
of the Oedipus or Electra complex (which typically
includes identifying with the same-sex parent) are
directly reflected in the development of gender
identity, sexual orientation, the superego, self-
conscious emotions, and conscience.
The latency period is a time when children are
not interested in sexual behavior and spend a
majority of their time with same-sex peers. This
time reflects the successful internalization of paren-
tal prohibitions and the development of skills and
abilities (which may be thought of as sublimation
of sexual energy). Freud did not dedicate much of
his writing to this developmental period. During
puberty, children return to genital preoccupation.
Under optimal circumstances, children in this stage
integrate the previous sexual aims (oral, anal) to
form a more complete sexualized identity. Although
Freud assumed that every child was able to direct
libidinal energy toward either gender and toward
a variety of objects, he believed the successful pro-
gression through these stages would result in a
heterosexual orientation with genital-to-genital
contact being the preferred form of sexual release
(which is adaptive for the species because it leads
to procreation).
Sexual Identity and Sexual Behavior
Several factors may contribute to aberrant sexual
behavior. For instance, the repression of libidinal
energy by the ego, criticism by the superego of
sexual wishes or behavior, and/or restriction of
sexual expression by external forces (e.g., parents)
may result in delayed progression or regression to
the pregenital stages (oral and anal) and ultimately
compromise the desire for heterosexual genital-to-
genital contact. Emotions like shame and disgust
maintain repression and fixations and therefore
encourage restricted or pregenital (oral or anal)
sexual expression or the establishment of improper

sexual objects. According to Freud, homosexual
orientation and sexual practices like voyeurism,
fetishes, sadism, and masochism reflect the previ-
ously mentioned delays.
Freud attributed both everyday and clinically
significant behaviors to conflicts between the id,
ego, and superego during childhood psychosexual
development. Forgetting someone’s name, experi-
encing slips of the tongue, losing or breaking
objects, and forgetting events are examples of nor-
mally occurring behaviors that reflect the ego
defending itself against repressed sexual desires of
the id. Qualitatively similar to these everyday
behaviors, neuroses (i.e., clinically significant dis-
orders of the nervous system) indicate a greater
magnitude of repressed sexual instinct. Because the
ego will not allow sexual expression, the instinct is
repressed, builds tension, and finally reroutes its
energy to a behavior that is more acceptable to the
ego. These behaviors include physical symptoms
(e.g., loss of speech, tremors, or blindness) of the
hysterical patient, which reflect the altered sexual
release. Multiple personality disorders are also
explained in terms of id-ego conflict.
According to Freud, depression and obsessional
neurosis result from the ego battling the superego.
In the case of depression, the superego criticizes
the ego for allowing the id to enact unacceptable
sexual behaviors, and the ego agrees with the
superego, accepting punishment. With obsessive
compulsive behaviors (rerouted desires), the ego
also responds to punishment from the superego
(punishment for the id’s unconscious sexual
impulses), although in this case the ego has not
indulged the id.
Psychosis is thought to emerge when the pres-
sures of the external world overpower the ego such
that it retreats from reality in favor of a more sat-
isfying internal world. Freud remarked that psy-
choanalysis, the process of uncovering repressed
unconscious sexual wishes, does not appear to
help psychotic symptoms.
Criticism and Praise: Later Developments
Freud’s model has been met with great criticism.
Many reject his assumption that all human behav-
ior is motivated by sexual urges. Among these crit-
ics are former students Carl Jung and Alfred Adler,
who eventually parted ways with Freud because of
Id, Ego, and Superego 347
this focus. Jung and Adler developed new theories
of the self that reflected a more positive view of
human behavior. Jung continued to adhere to
Freud’s belief in the unconscious and advanced the
theory that all humans carry similar unconscious
beliefs, passed down through generations, which
guide behavior (i.e., the collective unconscious).
Adler focused on feelings of inferiority and
advanced the notion that humans can reach their
potential when internal and external barriers are
removed. The tenets of Jung’s and Adler’s posi-
tions became known as humanistic psychology, a
philosophy that assumes all areas of human func-
tioning can thrive if given freedom. Abraham
Maslow and Carl Rogers represent second-generation
humanistic psychologists.
Others criticize Freud’s notion that women are
less moral than their male counterparts (a notion
that was founded on the contention that women,
having already been castrated, cannot use the fear
of castration as the impetus for the development of
conscience and character). Psychoanalyst Karen
Horney rejected the idea of penis envy and the role
of castration and put forth her own theory that men
had “womb envy.” Horney’s theory emphasized
the role of culture and society in personality devel-
opment. Although Freud dismissed Horney’s work
as evidence of penis envy, he also remarked that he
did not know much about the motivations of
women. The unflattering and ignorant psychologi-
cal portrayals of women, of which Freud was chief,
contributed to the creation of feminist psychology.
Some detractors further point out that Freud’s
ideas do not constitute a theory, because they are
not testable or falsifiable. Specifically, Freud’s con-
cepts of unconscious thought and repression are
impervious to empirical scrutiny.
Contemporary critics also reject Freud’s views
on homosexuality as being a perversion. They note
that his Victorian views of sexuality unduly col-
ored his perception of abnormal behavior.
On the positive side, many theorists have found
Freud’s idea of drives within the structure of the id,
ego, and superego beneficial. Freud’s daughter,
Anna Freud, concentrated on the ego and the many
ways it defends itself from the internal pressures of
the id and the superego. Although the idea of
defense mechanisms can be attributed to her father,
Anna expanded and clearly identified the functions
of denial, displacement, projection, rationalization,
348 Ideal Body, The
reaction formation, repression, and sublimation.
Her ego psychology work is still relevant in psy-
chology, as it informs research on coping styles,
self-regulation, and emotion regulation.
The concept that individuals need an “other” or
an “object” in order to establish awareness of the
self (i.e., the field of object relations) is also a
descendant of the Freudian model. Melanie Klein’s
descriptions of the emotional lives of children and
her methods of clinically treating children through
play, Margaret Mahler’s focus on how the infant
develops his awareness of being a separate indi-
vidual from the mother, and John Bowlby’s
attachment theory all focus on early childhood
and supremacy of the mother. Otto Kernberg’s
concept that individuals with borderline personal-
ity disorder display symptoms that “border”
between the neurotic and psychotic pays homage
to Freud’s model.
Using Freud’s tripartite model with its focus on
drives, theorists have come to conceptualize nor-
mal and abnormal behaviors as not qualitatively
distinct but rather distinguished only by degrees.
That is, psychopathology can be considered nor-
mal development gone awry. This belief has
encouraged others to study normal development
and look for moments of crisis that disrupt func-
tioning, as well as to study pathological processes
to gain understanding of normal development.
Erik Erikson took a life span approach when look-
ing for age-related crises that influence identity.
Further, contemporary researchers still emphasize
the role of environment and socialization from
family members, religion, and culture in the for-
mation of identity.
Crystal N. Wiggins
See also Bisexual/Bicurious; Consciousness; Gender;
Identification; Individuation; Other, The; Voyeurism
Further Readings
Freud, S. (1949). An outline of psycho-analysis
(J. Strachey, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton.
Freud, S. (1960). The ego and the id (J. Strachey, Ed.;
J. Riviere, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton.
Freud, S. (1961). Civilizations and its discontents
(J. Strachey, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton.
Freud, S. (1961). Five lectures on psycho-analysis
(J. Strachey, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton.
Freud, S. (1995). The basic writings of Sigmund Freud
(A. A. Brill, Ed. & Trans.). New York: Random
House.
Greenberg, J. R., & Mitchell, S. A. (1983). Object
relations in psychoanalytic theory. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Jung, C. G. (1938). Psychology & religion. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
Sulloway, F. J. (1979). Freud, biologist of the mind:
Beyond the psychoanalytic legend. New York: Basic
Books.
Ideal Body, The
The concept of ideal body raises the question: ideal
for what—or whom? Broadly speaking, the ideal
body can be viewed in numerous ways. For exam-
ple, it may be perceived as a highly complex organism
evolving over time through biological adaptations
to natural environments, including differences in
body shape, texture and density of hair, skin color,
and so on. The ideal body can also be framed pri-
marily in terms of sexual reproduction: namely, the
recognition of a physically attractive partner who
is compatible for the act of procreation. In addi-
tion, the ideal body can be understood as an ideal-
ized body of the self, a certain physicality that each
individual strives to approximate in order to attract
attention or to conform to historical, societal, and
cultural norms that identify one as beautiful. While
acknowledging that many interpretations, includ-
ing those previously listed, are pertinent and inter-
connected, it is the idealized body that will
foregrounded in this entry.
The idealized body is one in which all physical
aspects function well, literally embodying a sense
of health and fertility. All senses are intact, all
limbs operational, and all internal organs work
smoothly; each body system integrates with others
to create a highly intricate organism. However,
regardless of their importance in maintaining the
body, its internal organs and systems are eclipsed
by attention focused on its external features. In
short, our current understanding of an ideal body
is inextricably tied to a beautiful body. To have a
beautiful body is to be desired, and to seek the
beautiful body of another person is perhaps close
to a universal desire.

Ideal Body in the Eye of the Beholder?
The criteria for what constitutes an ideal body is
always located within a specific society, culture, and
period in history. In addition, the timeless adage
“Beauty is in the eye of the beholder” indicates the
subjectivity of identifying beauty. Taken together,
these notions suggest that ideas of beauty differ
widely from person to person, while simultaneously
being shaped by strong cultural, social, and histori-
cal norms centered on what is commonly accepted
to be beautiful. For example, in Victorian England,
buxom women were viewed as sexually desirable,
whereas nowadays they are perceived as chubby.
Besides historical differences, cultural norms differ
among contemporary societies. For example, in
West Africa and Latin America, a heavy woman is
viewed as healthy, attractive, and sexually desirable.
Whereas “little fatty” is an insult in English-
speaking countries, its equivalent in Spanish (gord-
ita) is recognized as a term of affection and,
depending upon the context, a compliment.
Compared to females in contemporary Western
society, males do not have the same degree of pres-
sure exerted upon them to cultivate and display an
ideal body. Magazines such as Men’s Health and
GQ promote masculine standards of health,
beauty, and style, but such publications do not
significantly compare to the vast number in circu-
lation dedicated to defining female beauty. That
said, from an early age, males experience pressure
to participate in competitive sports, although this
may serve primarily as a socialization process and
reaffirmation of masculinity. In current times, the
ubiquitous presence of gymnasiums verifies the
relative pressure on males to maintain a physically
attractive body. Gay culture, in particular, includes
a frank foregrounding of the male body—to the
paradoxical point of hypermasculinity—a focus
that can be variously interpreted as a mixture of
glorification, idealization, celebration, and objecti-
fication, among other possibilities.
Classic Beauties
The Western tradition of beauty hails from ancient
Greece, which itself was inspired by stone sculp-
tures from Egypt and Mesopotamia. Ancient Greek
art displays a profound veneration for the human
body, encompassing physical beauty, detailed mus-
culature, and perfect posture. Influenced by their
Ideal Body, The 349
religious beliefs, ancient Greeks understood the
human body to be the ultimate subject within art.
Because their gods had human form, the ancient
Greeks created statues to represent deities, which
were concurrently spiritual and secular. Having
the “body of a Greek god(dess)” is still a com-
monplace notion in contemporary Western cul-
ture, exemplifying the ability of idealized beauty to
transcend millennia.
Accurate representations of the human figure
can be seen in both female and male forms.
Women’s bodies were often partially naked and
adorned with drapery, such as the Cnidian
Aphrodite and the Callipygian Venus. An accurate
understanding of the muscular-skeletal system
helped create representations of humans involving
symmetry, proportionality, and overall unity. The
Romans continued the traditions developed by
ancient Greeks, creating artistic representations of
an ideal body that was fit, healthy, competitive,
and warlike. The “classic” Roman male beauty
was tall, muscular, well proportioned, with long
legs and without any physical anomalies or defects.
His face had a strong jaw line complemented by a
wide and high forehead, a well-defined brow
above wide-set eyes, a strong but not overly large
nose, a firm mouth, sturdy neck, and full head of
hair. This ideal body type is still valued as proto-
typically masculine, handsome, and desirable in
present-day times.
Ancient cultures in other parts of the world,
such as China, India, and Egypt, also developed
standards of physical beauty that varied widely
and include bodily manipulation (or mutilation,
depending on one’s stance). These include bound
feet, elongated necks via rings, scarification, body
painting, tattooing, and so forth, most of which
are still practiced as a form of idealization or beau-
tification today. Although these customs and prac-
tices may strike Westerners as quaint, odd, or
bizarre, they reinforce how beauty is subjective
and is merely a consensus of opinion located in a
particular society, culture, tradition, and time.
It is clear that Greek and Roman bodily ideals
were reemphasized throughout various eras in
Western history, but perhaps no more so than in
the Renaissance period in which “classic” ideals of
beauty were reinforced. For instance, Botticelli’s
Birth of Venus depicts a naked woman recently
emerged from a foaming sea. She is tall, is well
350 Ideal Body, The
proportioned, and has flowing fair hair and lumi-
nous white skin. Another example is Michelangelo’s
sculpture of David, depicting him as larger than
life, poised gracefully, flawlessly handsome—a
celebration of male physical perfection. The depic-
tions of Venus’s and David’s bodies have entranced
generations and, in many ways, typify how the
ideal body is still represented, especially in relation
to youthfulness.
Current Standards
Perhaps above all, contemporary notions of Western
beauty are tied to youth. The idealization of beauty
is largely represented by fashion models, movie
stars, singers, entertainers, and beauty pageant
contestants. Pageant participants are almost always
between 18 and 25 years old, are tall and pretty,
have long hair, are slim, and have figures roughly
measuring 36 inches (breasts), 24 inches (waist),
and 36 inches (hips). What is known as the trium-
virate of vital statistics (breast, waist, hips) is an
example of what is deemed important by a specific
culture (as opposed to say, nose shape, foot size, or
curvature of the back). And because culturally
sanctioned notions of beauty carry cultural capital
(social currency), small breasts, thicker waists, and
large hips are subsequently devalued in women.
Idealized female bodies are not only young, they
are decidedly thin. Miss Universe and Miss World,
famous actresses, models, singers, or affluent
media celebrities all garner adulation for their fig-
ures as much as for their fame. Noticeable weight
gain or excessive loss becomes front-page news for
tabloids, as well as the pressure of public expecta-
tions for them to “return” to slim. The idealization
of female bodies as thin has resulted in a growth in
anorexia and bulimia, particularly among teenage
girls. Representations of young, pretty, slim women
pervade all aspects of media, including television,
film, advertisements, and magazines. The media
represents this image as the norm for beauty, thus
leaving the overwhelming majority of women out-
side of that realm, feeling inadequate and largely
craving to be within it.
Approximation into the realm of beauty can be
acquired permanently through exercise or tempo-
rarily through the purchase and application of
beauty products. Regular attendance at the gym
can firm flab and circumvent cellulite, and a careful
diet regulated by commercial companies can pre-
vent unwanted weight gain. In terms of beauty
products, the choice is countless for every region of
the body. Hair can be changed in color and vol-
ume, eyes can be emphasized through applying
surrounding color, eyelashes can be curled and
darkened, lips can be painted and glossed, imper-
fect skin can be camouflaged, nails can be filed and
polished, and so on. To state the obvious, the
intent of beauty products is to produce beauty;
makeup is intended to compensate for what is not
present, including youthfulness. Yet much of what
is considered beautiful can be attributed to artifice.
For example, Western ideals of beauty have prized
blonde women. However, many well-known
blondes are actually brunettes. In addition, women
who are not of Caucasian origin may choose to be
blonde, revealing the power of cultural representa-
tion and the subliminal messages sent: To be
blonde is to be more beautiful.
To a lesser degree, similar pressures are applied
to men, as the idealized male is also young, hand-
some, and slim (but muscular). Unlike their female
counterparts, males are more likely to have their
beauty stretch into middle age, indicating a clear
double standard. Many actors, like actresses, typ-
ify ideal bodies. However, like his female counter-
part, the ideal male beauty cannot have physical
flaws—such as being short, chubby, or without a
full head of hair—and be a leading man in the
romantic sense. If he does have one of these (or
other) features, the performer is known as a char-
acter actor, a euphemism often employed when an
individual does not measure up to being a hand-
some protagonist.
The (Re)Shape of Things
Many individuals who subscribe to ideals of
beauty change their natural bodies in an attempt to
metamorphose from the actual to an assumed
desirable state. The equivalent of female beauty
pageants for males is arguably bodybuilding con-
tests. At these events, males flex and stretch their
body parts, emphasizing musculature developed to
an extreme (some might argue highly unnatural)
degree, parading in competition for the biggest and
best proportioned. Similar bodybuilding competi-
tions for females are less popular, and some even
consider them “freakish,” possibly in part to the

dissolution of usually clear notions of masculinity
and femininity.
In another example of reshaping, women some-
times opt for breast augmentation or reduction. In
cases of augmentation, it is for the purpose of
looking and, by implication, feeling more attrac-
tive. The cultural fetishization of breasts has led
many women to have implants, appendages that
often look unnatural in size and shape. Cosmetic
surgery has become a culturally accepted practice
in the Western world, although many more women
than men undergo such surgery in an attempt to
reshape eyes, brows, cheeks, jaw lines, lips, noses,
buttocks, arms, legs, and stomachs. Such proce-
dures are intended to make a person look younger
and healthier and to increase their desirability,
helping them approximate an ideal.
Unfortunately, in the pursuit of the elusive ideal
of beauty, human intervention in what nature has
bestowed does not always go according to plan.
Results of unsuccessful cosmetic surgery may actu-
ally make women less desirable than they were
originally: skin stretched too tight, swollen lips that
never deflate, eyes slanted in unnatural ways. This
irony is made even greater by calling attention to the
significant physical risks involved in many cosmetic
surgical procedures, which leave some people acci-
dentally injured or, in extreme cases, cause death.
Controversial interventions such as gastric
bypass surgery are another example of high-risk
attempts at beautification. Although the procedure
can cause an individual to rapidly decrease in size
with a view to approximating an ideal, complica-
tions involving the disruption of internal organs
cannot be ruled out. Similarly, the now widespread
practice of directly injecting chemicals into the face
may diminish wrinkles and help “restore” a youth-
ful appearance, yet long-term effects are not yet
fully known, and some individuals experience side
effects such as a decreased ability to make facial
expressions. All in all, to risk one’s life for a closer
approximation to an ideal body speaks to the
power of this deeply ingrained concept, as well as
to the vulnerability of the human psyche in its
seemingly perpetual yearning to be what it is not.
The Good, the Bad, the Ugly
Ideal bodies conjure many associations, some
of them obvious and others more subtle or even
Ideal Body, The 351
subliminal. They represent a host of cultural
understandings, including what is valued and what
is not, that roughly translate in broad binary terms
to what is considered good and bad. In addition,
as the antithesis of beauty, the concept of ugliness
is worth highlighting, as its purpose is to reinforce
notions of what is considered an ideal body.
The Good
Cultural stereotypes are pervasive, including
those associated with beauty. A beautiful body can
be associated with a beautiful mind. This wide-
spread phenomenon can be seen from high art to
popular culture—from angels and nymphs to
Disney’s Sleeping Beauty and Snow White, from
Shakespeare’s Juliet to UNICEF ambassadors past
and present, such as Audrey Hepburn and Julia
Roberts. Perhaps more importantly, an idealized
body and mind can be seen as a guarantee of hap-
piness; the zenith of personal satisfaction. In short,
a common trope is that outer beauty reflects inner
beauty. The beautiful body, therefore, is held in
even greater value.
The Bad
Just as a beautiful body can be associated with
a correspondingly beautiful mind, it can conversely
be associated with a corrupt personality. Many
women with idealized bodies have been portrayed
as a dangerous seductress along the lines of
Meredith in the film Disclosure; a femme fatale,
like Cora in the novel The Postman Always Rings
Twice; or an evil schemer, such as Salome in the
Bible. In other words, the exterior appearance does
not mirror a magnificent inner self but rather pro-
vides a camouflage for corruption. Furthermore,
the beauty and sexuality of such women are used
to advance their own self-centered plans, fore-
grounding the connection between beauty and its
potential use to gain power.
In contrast, another typical trope is that of ugli-
ness or plainness on the outside masking inner
beauty. From a frog turning into a prince and a
duckling turning into a swan, “inner beauty” of an
unfortunate soul prevails and (in these cases)
allows him to be transformed into a highly desir-
able “outward” beauty, reinforcing the notion
that interior beauty equals exterior beauty. Indeed,
352 Ideal Body, The
culture has a fair share of plain female characters,
from the title character of Jane Eyre to Celie in
The Color Purple, who triumph over their sup-
posed physical limitations when protagonists come
to see and value their inner beauty, transforming
them into worthy heroines.
The Ugly
Characters who are depicted as ugly share a
similar fate with their physically idealized counter-
parts: Namely, their ugliness is seen as representa-
tion of their festering souls. Examples include the
hunchbacked Richard III, handless Captain Hook,
truculent trolls, and wart-faced witches. On the
other hand, a character’s appearance can signify
quite the opposite, serving as a mask to their true
inner self—beautiful, kind, and misunderstood, for
example, Quasimodo in The Hunchback of Notre
Dame or John Merrick in The Elephant Man.
Indeed, the fact that few heroes and heroines are
ugly is a premise used for comic exploitation in all
Shrek movies, where the title character and his
princess deliberately defy all conventions associ-
ated with beauty. In general, contrasting with the
beautiful or ideal body, the ugly body is largely
assumed to be an incomplete body, flawed, with
quirks, disabilities, and deformities. As such, unlike
the ideal body, the ugly body is perceived as highly
nondesirable to have and undesirable to be with.
Theories of the Ideal Body
Several theories have been suggested as to what
constitutes an ideal body. One notion is that
humans inherently find neonatal features attrac-
tive, explaining why individuals of either gender
who possess large eyes and a clear complexion are
considered beautiful regardless of culture. Another
theory is that the approximation to physical sym-
metry indicates an overall sense of bodily health.
A third idea is, paradoxically, based on ordinari-
ness; the more features are averaged, the more
they become a composite ideal. A fourth consid-
eration can be found by returning to ancient
Greece, where the sculptor Praxiteles developed a
mathematical formula to calculate ideal bodies. A
fifth possibility also includes the idea of measure-
ments; contemporary research claims most men in
the United States are attracted to women with a
0.7 waist-to-hip ratio, with the waist significantly
narrower than the hips. In addition, women have
been found to find shoulder-to-waist ratios of
males significant in their choice of mate, as well
as height.
Conclusion
The constitution of the ideal body comprises the
beliefs, values, and attitudes of the culture in which
people live. Thus, notions of ideal bodies shift and
change over time. Broadly speaking, ideal bodies
are associated with happiness, success, and per-
sonal satisfaction for those who have them.
Conversely, for those who do not have an ideal
body, they can incite envy and a personal dissatis-
faction with one’s own body. The overwhelming
majority of people who have less than ideal bodies
are stereotypically associated with an increased
likelihood of general unhappiness, failure to live up
to an ideal, and a personal dissatisfaction about
who they are. Human vulnerability is relentlessly
exploited in contemporary society by powerful
media that convey a distorted (mythical, yet credi-
ble) reality, constantly highlighting perfect bodies
while simultaneously offering products and proce-
dures to ameliorate all physical “shortcomings.”
However, despite the media’s influence on shaping
society’s collective understanding of beauty and
what currently comprises an ideal body, and despite
the diverse theories outlined in the preceding sec-
tion, knowledge of what constitutes a personal
ideal—that which attracts each individual to their
mate’s body—still remains a relative mystery.
David J. Connor
See also Extraordinary Bodies
Further Readings
Blood, S. K. (2005). Body work: The social construction
of women’s body image. London: Routledge.
Davis, L. J. (1995). Enforcing normalcy: Disability,
deafness and the body. London: Verso.
Dutton, K. R. (1995). The perfectible body: The Western
ideal of male physical development. London: Orion.
Evans, M., & Lee, E. (2002). Real bodies: A sociological
introduction. New York: Palgrave.
Foster, S. (1995). Corporealities: Body, knowledge,
culture and power. Oxford, UK: Routledge.

Leppert, R. (2007). The nude: The cultural rhetoric of the
body in the art of Western modernity. Exeter, UK:
Revaluation Books.
Massengill, R., & Braham, P. (2000). Exposed: A
celebration of the male nude from 90 of the world’s
greatest photographers. New York: Thunder’s Mouth.
McDonald, H. (2000). Erotic ambiguities: The female
nude in art. London: Routledge.
Stratton, J. (2000). The desirable body: Cultural fetishism
and the erotics of consumption. Urbana: University of
Illinois Press.
Identification
Identification can be defined as a relational pro-
cess rooted in group collectivities and social struc-
tures, by which one ascribes himself or herself to
a social group, a social group attaches meaning to
itself in ways that mark the group as distinctive,
or meaning is assigned to an individual or social
group from outside of the group. Identification
occurs when, for example, an individual locates
herself as a lesbian and as having ties to a sexu-
alities group on campus, to a local gay pride
event, or to a statewide advocacy group.
Identification also occurs when a gay/lesbian/
bisexual/transgender group on a college or univer-
sity campus educates others about homophobic
violence, thereby attaching a distinctive meaning
to the group’s definition of itself. Finally, identifi-
cation occurs as a designation from without. For
example, until 1973, the American Psychiatric
Association identified gays and lesbians as having
a mental disorder and thus assigned meaning to
gays and lesbians as a group.
Two primary distinctions can be made between
identity and identification. First, theories of iden-
tity focus, in part, on individuation from a group,
or the ways in which one is different from others.
Second, examinations of identity have often, espe-
cially in psychological frameworks, focused pri-
marily or exclusively on the individual. In contrast,
theories of identification generally stress the ways
in which members of a group have a tie that estab-
lishes attachment to, similarity to, or shared val-
ues with a collectivity. There is also an explicit
insistence on the significance of the social and not
only or primarily the individual. Other common
Identification 353
features of understandings of identification assert
that it (a) is a process and an outcome, (b) is made
up of complex interactions that are at once a
negotiation of individuals and collectives, and
(c) can be assumed or chosen from within or
imposed from without. This entry focuses on three
different approaches to identification: the psycho-
logical, the social, and the critical.
An emphasis on the individual is most apparent
in psychological approaches to identification. At a
broad level, those working in the field of psychol-
ogy assert that identification occurs when a person
acts on his or her connection to a role or group.
Further, this process of identification stresses the
autonomy of the individual in the process of iden-
tification. Psychologists, and particularly those
who work in the field of social psychology, also
claim that identifications can be both separate
from, or unified and integrated with, an individu-
al’s other identifications. Identification can be
grounded in intrinsic or extrinsic motivation.
Intrinsic motivation occurs when an individual
does an activity because that activity is enjoyable
for its own sake. Related to identification, intrinsic
motivation occurs when an individual identifies
with, for example, a gay/lesbian/bisexual/transgen-
der group on campus for the pleasure of being
with that group. When an individual is extrinsi-
cally motivated, he or she chooses to act because
of the likelihood of a useful outcome. Extrinsic
motivation is the basis for identification when an
individual identifies with a group because it has
been integrated as part of one’s value system, an
important aspect of an individual’s sense of self. In
both cases, for social psychologists, identification
rests on autonomous choices and the assumption
of self-determined behavior.
In contrast to an emphasis on the individual,
sociological theories of identification focus on the
complex interaction of the individual and the
social. Sociological perspectives on identification
differ from psychological perspectives in that iden-
tification is grounded in the interplay of internal
and external norms, of individual and collective
meanings, and of agency and structure. There are
three important components in sociological theo-
ries of identity. First, in the process of identifica-
tion, individual identity and collective identity are
equally important and “real.” A second component
of identification for sociologists is the relevance of
354 Identity and Democracy
structures of constraint and possibility. This com-
ponent again stresses that identification is shaped
by external factors. At a basic level, one’s choice to
attend religious services is influenced, in part, by
the existence of places of worship where one lives.
Finally, a third aspect of identification for sociolo-
gists is that it always occurs from a particular point
of view. One engages in the process of identifica-
tion from a very specific way of understanding self,
other, social norms, and institutions, and the rela-
tionship of all of these.
For critical theorists’ understanding of identifi-
cation, point of view is linked to the concept of
social location. Social location refers to “where
one stands” in relation to dominant and subordi-
nate cultural groups. These groups have different
access to structures of power. One’s location, and
a group’s relationship to power, can change.
Identification with the dominant group will have
different outcomes than identification with a sub-
ordinate group. Critical theorists have a strong
focus on power and the relevance of exploitation,
domination, and subordination to identification.
Finally, compared to psychologists and sociolo-
gists, critical theorists offer more attention to the
ways in which identification can be a process
originating from outside the individual or group.
Identification can be imposed from without as a
mechanism of control, as in sending American
Indian children to boarding schools, or, as a form
of resistance from within, as expressed by libera-
tion movements such as the American Indian
Movement. It is likely that theorists of identifica-
tion will continue to grapple with the relationship
of individual agency and structure, with identifica-
tion as a means of controlling subordinate groups
and as resistance to definitions constructed by
those in power, and with the process of identifica-
tion as both intersectional and based in structures.
Jennifer S. Simpson
See also Collective/Social Identity; Group Identity;
Identity Negotiation; Identity Salience
Further Readings
Alcoff, L. M., Hames-García, M., Mohanty, S. P., &
Moya, P. M. L. (Eds.). (2006). Identity politics
reconsidered. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Jenkins, R. (2004). Social identity. London: Routledge.
Simon, B. (2004). Identity in modern society: A social
psychological perspective. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Woodward, G. C. (2003). The idea of identification.
Albany: SUNY Press.
Identity and Democracy
Democracy and issues of identity have been linked
throughout history. Since ancient Greece, ques-
tions of citizenship, participation, rights, and
duties have been tied to understandings of race,
ethnicity, sex, and class. In later attempts to uni-
versalize democratic principles and connect them
with human nature, identity and difference became
subordinate to theories of universal human nature
and shared identity found in Enlightenment rea-
son and Romantic humanism. As criticisms of
those periods and particularly of universal notions
of human essence rose in the 20th and 21st centu-
ries, identity and difference again became focal
points for democracy.
While ancient Athens is often idealized as the
wellspring of democracy in Western civilization,
identity was also important to Athenians. As
Robert Dahl has noted, to participate in the demo-
cratic system of Athens, one had to prove that one
was a true Athenian citizen by right of birth. That
required not only that one be male but also that
one be both free (not a slave) and born of parents
who were both themselves Athenians. Immigrants,
even after many generations, could not be citizens
except by special decree of the assembly. Although
statistical estimates are difficult to find, it may be
that at some points in time, as few as 10% of the
total population of Athens was eligible to vote,
and an even smaller portion actually participated.
The reasons for these restrictions were both about
notions of identity in Greece and about notions of
democracy. For the Greeks, democracy was not
about universal human rights or about basic
human dignity but a system of governance particu-
larly well-suited to Greek citizens and the Greek
state. The fit between ancient Greece and democ-
racy was successful not only because of tight
restrictions on who was allowed to participate but
also because the value of democracy was found in
its participants’ capacity to negotiate differences

within a relatively homogenous group. Among
Greek citizens, one would find a great deal of con-
tinuity in religion, traditions, history, and culture.
For the Greeks, it was those commonalities that
made democracy an ideal system of governance.
Thus, when someone violated those foundational
norms, it was quite consistent with the Athenian
understanding of both identity and democracy to
simply remove them from the citizenry, by enslave-
ment, banishment, or even death.
Of course, the difficulty for contemporary
democratic theory and democracies is that few of
them can take for granted that kind of similitude
among persons, even in relatively homogeneous
countries. While some nations maintain high
degrees of cultural continuity among their popula-
tion, the exclusion of even a small minority of
persons from a democratic process has become
anathema to contemporary understandings of
democracy. Part of the reason for that shift is a
distinctly modern articulation of universal human
rights and human dignity that connected democ-
racy to a notion of what it means to be a human
being and how one can realize one’s full humanity.
Thus, democracy became the promise of coopera-
tion, or at least negotiation, among radically diver-
gent persons who share a political and social
space. Although the full culmination of that new
humanism did not manifest until the early
20th century, the grounds for it can be found in
17th- and 18th-century thinkers’ articulation of
innate human reason, the duty to publicly use that
reason, and the explicit connection of such reason-
ing to democratic governance. Two of the most
widely recognized foundational thinkers for mod-
ern democracy are John Locke and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau. However, much of the implementa-
tion of the modern democratic state looks more
like the republican aristocracy advocated by
Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay, Perpetual Peace.
Nonetheless, what binds all three thinkers together
is the central importance of the innate human
capacity for reason and the moral duties or rights
that might be derived from that capacity. Bridging
the Age of Reason and the Age of Enlightenment
in Western thought, the development of a modern
democratic theory was deeply wedded to, if not
always clearly grounded upon, a notion of a shared
human essence, a nature, which could lie behind or
beneath all the questions of difference and identity.
Identity and Democracy 355
Thus, where the Athenians had placed the uniquely
Greek cultural and ethnic identity at the core of
their democratic theory, Enlightenment thinkers
placed a universal human nature. In this way, they
could vacate questions of identity and difference
by always appealing to that which was taken as
the same among all persons.
The problem, of course, is that even in the 19th
and more definitively in the 20th and 21st centu-
ries, difference and pluralism in nations and cities
provided daily difficulty in locating this universal
human nature that was to make cooperation or at
least civil society possible. Confronted with radical
disparities among persons who count as citizens,
two major lines of thought developed. On the one
hand a deepening development of the principles of
universality and commonality in humanity, often
grounded in the practices of reason or in psycho-
logical theory, can be traced. In this school are
figures such as John Dewey, John Rawls, and
Jürgen Habermas. This has also largely been the
philosophy of civil rights and human rights mani-
fest in documents ranging from the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),
the U.S. Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of
Education (1954), and the U.S. Civil Rights Act
(1964). In this line of thinking, democracy depends
upon the capacity to “get past” identity and differ-
ence or to focus only on that which can be com-
mon or shared. For a democracy to be healthy,
they argue, persons must be able to see themselves
as sharing in some set of values or purposes when
they argue and deliberate.
On the other hand, following a path first
described by 19th-century existentialists, is the
movement of an interrogation of essentialism that
later produced a heightened attention to diversity
and differences generated by social classification,
cultural norms, linguistic patterns, and learned
perceptions, which in turn complicated and diver-
sified identity categories. In this latter school are
thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel
Foucault, and Drucilla Cornell. Expanding this
map to legal theory, one would find thinkers
deeply concerned with the intersection of identity
categories (intersectionality) and critical race theo-
rists such as Kimberlé Crenshaw and Richard
Delgado. From this theory, there is no “getting
past” identity. Instead, for a democracy to be
democratic, it must be willing to get into identity
356 Identity and Reason
and difference without the presumption that there
is something shared or common behind or beneath
those differences to which one might appeal. The
imposition or presumption of shared values or
purposes is far more likely to benefit a party with
greater cultural capital and subvert democracy for
the gain of particular orientations or groups.
Hence, the operative value for democracy, they
argue, must be difference rather than similitude.
Pat Gehrke
See also Citizenship; Civic Identity; Public Sphere
Further Readings
Bohman, J., & Rehg, W. (Eds.). (1997). Deliberative
democracy: Essays on reason and politics. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Gutman, A. (2004). Identity in democracy. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Miller, D. I. (2000). Citizenship and national identity.
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Trend, D. (Ed.). (1995). Radical democracy: Identity,
citizenship, and the state. London: Routledge.
Identity and Reason
The relationship between the notion of identity
and that of reason is complex and not easy to
summarize. The two most obvious intersections
between the concepts of reason and identity run
through the field of logic and the many popular
theories of human nature in the Western philo-
sophical tradition. This entry provides a brief
account of both the role of the law of identity in
logic and the identification of the human being
with a rational creature.
First, however, it may be useful to understand
what is usually meant by reason. Although it has
become increasingly popular to conflate the terms
reason and logic, there is a difference in meaning
that should not be ignored. Logic is an area or a
specific expression of reason that attempts to derive
basic principles of reason. It is much harder to
define reason, especially because there are so many
historical descriptions that are almost completely
opposed to one another. In the broadest possible
sense, reason can be defined as a web of mental
activities associated with giving the basis for beliefs
and actions, judging, rigorous analysis, and knowl-
edge and is classically associated with states of san-
ity and madness as well as language use.
Law of Identity
Within the Western intellectual tradition, logic is
usually understood as the formal expression of
reason or the science of argument. That is to say,
logic is a rigorous method through which princi-
ples of reason are explored and further explicated
through the evaluation of arguments. Although
there are a number of logical principles or laws
that are seen as integral to a logical argument—the
law of non-contradiction is another especially
important one—the most basic is usually under-
stood to be the law of identity.
The law of identity states that any term in a
logical argument must be identical to itself. This is
normally expressed as A = A. It is the most basic
principle of any form of logic because it holds that
our terms must be stable or always identical with
themselves. So, if I use the term cat at the begin-
ning of an argument, I can rest assured that it will
mean the same thing at the end of the argument
because the law of identity holds. If the law of
identity did not hold, I could not be sure the terms
I had previously used would have the same mean-
ing at a future date. Again, although there are
many laws important to logical argument, it seems
as if all of them depend upon the terms of an argu-
ment remaining stable throughout the course of
the argument. Thus, the law of identity is an indis-
pensible concept for any system of logic and there-
fore a basic principle of reason.
The law of identity is usually thought to have
emerged in the course of ancient Greek phil­
osophy, especially in the writing of Parmenides
(5th century BCE), and, somewhat later on, in Book
VII of Aristotle’s (4th century BCE) Metaphysics.
Although Aristotle takes the law of noncontradic-
tion as the most basic logical principle, he still gives
us the first description of the law of identity.
Reason and Human Identity
Since the time of Aristotle, it has become common
to distinguish humans from other sorts of creatures

through their possession of reason. In numerous
passages from his Metaphysics, Aristotle describes
humans as “rational animals.” That is, what makes
humans unique among all other possible animals is
that they alone are able to give and ask for reasons—
being able to think through and give an account of
phenomena ranging from the natural world to their
own motivations. In doing this, Aristotle inaugu-
rated a long tradition in the West that directly iden-
tified the human being as reasonable.
The idea that reason is an essential component
of human identity was a common theme through-
out Western thought, including much of early
Catholic theology, which is heavily indebted to the
philosophy of Aristotle. In his On Free Choice of
the Will, Saint Augustine of Hippo (4th–5th cen-
turies CE) distinguishes humans from animals
through their ability to know that they exist as
they exist. In various other writings, especially in
his magnum opus City of God, Saint Augustine
explicitly asserts that reason is unique to humans
as earthly creatures. Later, Saint Thomas Aquinas
(13th century CE) would also affirm that reason is
natural to human beings as it is to no other earthly
creature and represents a way in which humans
might better understand the nature of the divine.
René Descartes (17th century) devoted sections
of his most famous writing, Meditations on First
Philosophy, to giving a definition of human beings
that explicitly identifies them as res cogitans or
“thinking things.” Descartes argues that whereas
we can imagine a person with a different sort of
body or with no body at all (meaning a soul), we
cannot imagine a human without a mind, a mind
that contains the ability to reason as one of its most
important features. The lack of a mind, especially a
rational mind, is how Descartes distinguishes
between humans and animals. In perhaps his most
notorious argument, Descartes asserts that because
animals lack mind and reason, they also lack the
ability to feel (even pain) or possess emotions.
Many theorists of the mind reject the philosophical
distinction Descartes makes between the mind and
the body—a distinction that places reason squarely
in the mind—his arguments have exerted a great
deal of influence in debates concerning the relation-
ship between human identity and reason.
Two especially important figures after Descartes
who rejected the notion that human identity and
reason are inseparable were 19th-century German
Identity and Reason 357
philologist and philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche
and Austrian physician and founder of psycho-
analysis Sigmund Freud. Nietzsche, following the
theories of natural history advanced by Charles
Darwin, suggests in The Gay Science that reason is
not an original property of humans but rather
emerges as an evolutionary development by a
small group of humans that found it to their
advantage. That is to say, there is nothing essen-
tially reasonable in human identity; reason is a
fairly recent development in humans that may die
out if it loses its competitive advantage for sur-
vival. Sigmund Freud suggests in a variety of writ-
ings, including his widely popular The Interpretation
of Dreams, that although conscious life may seem
to be governed by reason, the unconscious mind of
humans is inherently unreasonable. Any theory of
human identity that relies on reason is at best
incomplete and at worst wholly mistaken.
In the 20th century and the early years of the
21st century, objections to reason as an integral
part of human identity intensified, especially phi-
losophers who were influenced by Nietzsche and
Freud, for example, French theorist Michel
Foucault; literary theorists, such as American aca-
demic Stanley Fish, who were influenced by psy-
choanalysis and poststructuralism; and in theory
of mind scholars from certain schools of cognitive
science influenced by contemporary evolutionary
theory, perhaps most notably, Daniel Dennett.
Many of the aforementioned philosophers and lit-
erary theorists are suspicious of the political and
social effects that any definition of reason brings
with it (because, they argue, it must always be
opposed to some notion of unreason or madness,
which will inevitably be stigmatized) and question
whether there can be an account of reason that is
not relative to the time and place of its inception
(they might point that Aristotle, Saint Augustine,
and Descartes all present differing descriptions of
reason that fit their particular historical circum-
stances). Therefore, there should be no expectation
that an account of human identity must have any-
thing to do with reason at all. A philosopher of
mind/cognitive scientist influenced by evolutionary
theory (e.g., Dennett) might make a less ambitious
argument, simply pointing out that conferring the
designation of human upon a certain group of ani-
mals is merely a pragmatic gesture. Because species
are always in an evolutionary flux, we must always
358 Identity Change
be open to changing the ways in which we catego-
rize them. Other species may develop the capaci-
ties for reason, thus forcing us to rethink the
classical method of defining human identity.
Adam Hutchinson
See also Authenticity; Mind-Body Problem
Further Readings
Alcoff, L. M. (2005). Visible identities: Race, gender, and
the self. New York: Oxford University Press.
Alcoff, L. M., & Mendieta, E. (Eds.). (2003). Identities:
Race, class, gender, and nationality. Malden, MA:
Blackwell.
Appiah, K. A. (2005). The ethics of identity. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Identity Change
Identity change, or the adoption of a new identity,
raises basic and substantive questions of truth,
permanence, and permutation that permeate a
number of academic disciplines, including psy-
chology, literature, philosophy, and Africana stud-
ies, to name a few. Because identity change is
addressed in many different fields of study and
because it does not stand as an autonomous
sphere of discourse, this discussion approaches the
issue of identity change broadly as an important
question concerning what it means to be human
and the extent to which human beings are shaped
by their sociocultural context. Thus, this entry
provides philosophical grounding for the question
of identity change, applies this understanding of
identity change to the contested issue of race, and
proposes identity change as a form of resistance
that defies essentialist notions of the self.
The Ship of Theseus
At its most basic level, identity change suggests
that at one time (in the past) an object had a spe-
cific set of properties that made it one thing, but it
is now (in the present) a different object with a
completely new set of properties that define it. The
most familiar philosophical example of identity
change is the Ship of Theseus, which comes to us
in print via Plutarch. The Ship of Theseus refers to
a scenario in which, as the planks of the original
ship decayed, the Athenians replaced them one by
one. Over time, there were eventually no planks
remaining from the original ship. So, the dilemma
emerges: Is the ship displayed by the Athenians the
true Ship of Theseus, or is it a new ship altogether?
To push this dilemma even further, one variation
of this tale sets the vessel in motion. As the planks
of the ship at sea (A) rot, they are thrown over-
board and replaced with identical replacement
planks. Following the ship, however, is a scavenger
boat (B), which picks up the planks thrown over-
board and uses them to replace its own planks. At
the time of its arrival, the original ship (A) has
discarded and replaced all of its original parts,
while the scavenger boat (B) has taken up the dis-
carded parts and reconstituted the ship with the
original parts thrown overboard by the original
ship (A). Which of the two ships, then, is the real
Ship of Theseus? Is it the ship on which Theseus
was aboard throughout the voyage (A), or is it the
scavenger boat that has now reconstituted all of
the original parts from the original ship?
The answer to this question depends on what
conception of a thing’s identity one adopts. If a
thing’s identity is defined by its material constitu-
ents, then clearly the scavenger boat (B) is the true
Ship of Theseus. However, this yields the odd
result that Theseus has, at some point in the
voyage, changed ships, even though Theseus obvi-
ously remained on one single boat throughout the
voyage. As a result, one might opt for the alternate
conclusion that the ship on which Theseus remains
(A) is the true ship. This is known as the spatio-
temporal continuity thesis, according to which the
identity of the ship is understood in terms of the
ship’s underlying continuity throughout its jour-
ney from its point of departure to its destination.
This thesis, likewise, yields an odd result in that it
leads to the conclusion that two boats with exactly
the same components—belonging to the original
ship (A) at the point of departure and the recon-
structed ship (B)—would be different ships in spite
of their material identity.
This entry does not try to resolve this dilemma;
rather, the Ship of Theseus serves as a fruitful
metaphor for thinking about the question of iden-
tity. Given that one has to decide whether ship A

or ship B is the true Ship of Theseus and given that
there are equally strong grounds for adopting
either viewpoint, this example highlights the fact
that, in every conception of identity, there is an
interpretation or negotiation about the identity of
a person or thing that inevitably must take place.
This suggests that identity is ultimately the product
of an interpretive framework or some type of
sociocultural negotiation.
Passing as Identity Change
From the Ship of Theseus example, one can see
that identity change is more complex than a mere
change in the appearance of a thing, such as a
change of hairstyle, eye color, or, arguably, even
one’s gender. In addition to a person’s taking on a
new set of appearances, identity change also
implies that this newly assumed identity puts forth
a petition for recognition by another individual or
a social group. That is to say that a change in iden-
tity must be perceived and accepted by another
person or group. Racial identity provides a con-
crete example of the important role of interper-
sonal, social, or political recognition in identity
change. Racial identity does not depend solely on
outward appearances; in addition, it depends on
an interpretive framework (with social, historical,
and political dimensions) that determines the
meaning of those visual cues.
In the context of racial identity, the discussion
of identity change focuses primarily on the issue of
racial passing, although it is important to note that
passing is not exclusively a racial phenomenon. In
the gay and lesbian community, the term closeted
refers to a person who has not publicly revealed his
or her sexuality and who thus passes as a hetero-
sexual. Likewise, a member of the disabled com-
munity who hides a disability can be viewed as
passing as a nondisabled person. The idea of pass-
ing can even be extended to illiterate persons who
pass as literate in order to function in a society that
privileges writing over orality or other forms of
communication.
Within a specifically racial context, passing
refers to the adoption of a racial identity or cate-
gory that differs from the one recorded at one’s
birth, or simply put, to “change” racial classifica-
tion from one race to another. For racial passing to
be successful, several things have to coincide. First,
Identity Change 359
the person has to have the physical characteristics
that would enable him or her to pass. Second, the
person has to choose to deny his or her recorded
and socially designated racial identity in favor of
another racial identity. Finally, the person must be
accepted as a member of the new racial identity by
members of that racial group (usually, the original
racial identity is unknown by the group’s mem-
bers). For these reasons, the term passing, as
pointed out by Corinne E. Blackmer in “The Veils
of the Law: Race and Sexuality in Nella Larsen’s
Passing,” points to an act of deception as one is
being accepted for something one is not.
In an era that is increasingly more accepting of
multiracial identity, racial passing does not capti-
vate the public’s attention as it once did. Steven
Belluscio believes that racial passing (i.e., Blacks
passing for White) reached its peak between 1880
and 1925. Belluscio observes that one credible esti-
mate has 10,000 to 25,000 African Americans
passing for White each year from 1880 to 1925. In
that era, racial passing was of great concern in both
White and Black communities, but for different
reasons.
White racists feared miscegenation or the con-
tamination of White blood with Black blood. The
study of eugenics and the wide use of intelligence
tests in the 1920s reflected an eagerness in American
society to provide scientific evidence of the negative
effects of racial mixture. These fears among White
Americans persisted even though the long history
of sexual contact between Blacks and Whites was
well known. In fact, laws like patrem ventum
sequitur further entrenched the system of enslave-
ment by stipulating that the child follows the con-
dition of the mother regardless of the race of the
father, thus allowing for the sexual exploitation of
Black women by White men. While the history of
racial mixture is apparent in the visages of many
notable African Americans, including Charles
White, Jean Toomer, and W. E. B. Du Bois, what
is important about laws such as patrem ventrum
or, for that matter, Plessey v. Ferguson, is that they
codify concrete legal guidelines on how to inter-
pret the (sometimes dubious) visual clues of race.
The question is whether one can perceive one sin-
gle feature of Black physiognomy or identify one
drop of Black blood and not the reverse.
While Whites interpreted passing as an infil-
tration of Blacks into White society, the Black
360 Identity Change
community also held passing in low regard. Blacks
viewed passing as a denial of the Black community
and feared the loss of talented people, who would
not be a credit to their race if they were to pass suc-
cessfully. Blacks were additionally concerned about
the heavy emotional and social toll of passing, as
many of those who crossed over had to disassociate
themselves from friends and relatives.
Passing is a common theme in much African
American literature, especially in the early part of
the 20th century. For example, James Weldon
Johnson’s novel The Autobiography of an
Ex-Colored Man describes the psychic trauma
inflicted upon his protagonist (who, tellingly,
remains nameless) after he witnesses a horrific
lynching and burning of a Black man. The narrator
eventually decides to grow a mustache and let soci-
ety judge his race (yet, we know that due to his
features, society would take him to be White). In
this instance, the narrator chose to shed his former
racial identity as Black and to assume a more
advantageous racial identity as White. With this
racial change, he necessarily had to assume an
identity that would fit with his persona as White
and what it meant to be White in the time that he
lived.
Nella Larsen’s Passing provides another stark
example of radical identity change. Larsen’s main
character Clare Kendry, like the Ex-Colored Man
in Johnson’s novel, chooses to step across the
racial divide. Tragically, she is destroyed because
she is torn between her love for both the Black
world and the White world. Clare’s death at the
end of the novel represents the limit of choice
when it comes to the contrast between how society
sees a person and how a person sees himself or
herself. Yet, the issue of passing does not solely
concern the move from being Black to being
White. Another dynamic example of identity
change is that of the influx of Eastern and Southern
European immigrants into America at the turn of
the 19th century.
Two books by David R. Roediger, The Wages of
Whiteness and Working Toward Whiteness: How
America’s Immigrants Became White, show how
the identity of new immigrants changed from non-
White to White and how these new immigrants
were thereby able to gain the benefits of White
privilege in America. Roediger’s study is important
for mapping the debate over Eastern European
racial identity by politicians such as Henry Cabot
Lodge, who believed that the influx of new immi-
grants represented a significant change within the
White American race. Although there were strict
concepts of race espoused during the 19th century,
American society’s idea of race evolved as it grap-
pled with European immigrants. Roediger’s study
acknowledges that many new immigrants were
classified as in-between peoples. New immigrants
were in between racism and inclusion, navigating
the dynamic between similarity and difference.
Although the new immigrants did not experience
racism on a par with that experienced by Blacks,
Roediger shows that they certainly experienced
disenfranchisement, racism, and racialization.
These barriers served to impede their inclusion into
White culture and prevented them from exercising
White privilege early on. Despite this, the new
immigrants were eventually taken into the fabric of
White identity, not as ethnic Whites but as full-
blown White citizens. Roediger’s work thus dem-
onstrates the fluidity of racial identity.
The issue of racial passing retraces all of the
complex dilemmas raised by the example of the
Ship of Theseus. Can one willfully change one’s
own identity by changing one’s appearance, man-
nerisms, and associations? Or, is one’s identity
biologically determined by one’s genotype?
Historically, it is undeniable that many people
have indeed succeeded in passing. Yet, the issue of
passing suggests that racial identity is not simply a
matter of choice; it is also influenced by social
construction. For a racial identity change to be
possible, there is always some type of negotiation
between the individual and the members of the
racial group. This negotiation is the product of a
sociocultural background that establishes the
framework for deciding the terms of membership
in a racial group.
Thinking critically about the notion of passing, in
his article “On Becoming an Ex-Man: Postmodern
Irony and the Extinguishing of Certainties in The
Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man,” Neil
Brooks observes that the notion of passing incor-
rectly implies that a person cannot inhabit multiple
racial categories. One must assume, for example, a
singular racial category of either Black or White in
order to talk about passing as either a Black or a
White person. In his book To Be Suddenly White,
Belluscio adds that racial passing implies that the

character of a person who passes is suspect. As an
alternative, he asserts that another way to look at
passing is to see it as linked to performativity,
where we draw upon an infinite number of cul-
tural and ethical texts.
The aforementioned definition emphasizes the
more fluid and dynamic nature of identity change
to be discussed in what follows. This more fluid
understanding of identity is exemplified by the
increased calls for the acknowledgment of multira-
cial categories. Instead of regarding passing as the
result of a character flaw, it is now clear that pass-
ing is the result of limited categories of identity and
the social and political forces that compel individ-
uals to belong to either one race or another.
Identity Change and Resistance
In dealing with identity change through the lens of
passing and through the movement of ethnic
Whites to the category of White, there is an unfor-
tunate trap that must be avoided: the “tragic
mulatto” and the peril of the in-betweens. Both are
negative stereotypes of people who do not fit into
the prescribed categories of race. In fact, mixed-
race people and other in-betweens or not quite this
or that people may view their ability to assume
different categories and engage actively in identity
change as a position of resistance to the forces of
essentialism. Much critical discourse is centered on
the idea of rejecting the notions that there is one
way of being-in-the-world, or one set of properties
that define a person (or in this case, one set of
racial characteristics that define a racial group).
Scholars like Maria P. P. Root have long advo-
cated that mixed-race people should be able to
choose (or not choose) a specific racial identity.
Root does this most notably in her Bill of Rights
for Racially Mixed People, which has been adopted
as the creed of the mixed-race community. This
document proclaims that mixed-race people have
the right to identify themselves differently from
how strangers or their parents identify them. They
also have the right to identify themselves differ-
ently from their other siblings (so a mixed-race
person can publically identify as White, even while
a sister or brother identifies as Black). Mixed-race
people also have the right to identify themselves
differently from situation to situation. Root’s Bill
of Rights for Racially Mixed People thus explodes
Identity Change 361
essentialist notions of static and definable racial
categories by establishing a fluid, situational con-
ception of racial identity.
By granting mixed-race people the right to
inhabit multiple racial categories at will, a number
of parallels again emerge with the earlier discus-
sion of identity change in the Ship of Theseus
example. In both cases, there is an interpretation
or negotiation about the identity of a person or
thing that inevitably must take place. This suggests
that identity, instead of being an essential property
of an object or person, is ultimately the product of
an interpretive framework or some type of socio-
cultural negotiation. One’s identity is the product
of a continued negotiation among myriad factors,
including one’s choices, social circumstances, his-
torical background, and political institutions.
Maria Davidson
See also Collective/Social Identity; Cosmopolitanism;
Critical Race Theory; Culture, Ethnicity, and Race
Further Readings
Asch, A. (2004). Critical race theory, feminism, and
disability: Reflections on social justice and personal
identity. In B. G. Smith & B. Hutchison (Eds.),
Gendering disability (pp. 9–44). Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press.
Belluscio, S. (2006). To be suddenly White: Literary
realism and racial passing. Columbia: University of
Missouri Press.
Blackmer, C. E. (1998). The veils of the law: Race and
sexuality in Nella Larsen’s Passing. In K. Myrsiades &
L. Myrsiades (Eds.), Race-ing representation: Voice,
history, and sexuality (pp. 98–118). Lanham, MD:
Roman & Littlefield.
Brooks, N. (1998). On becoming an ex-man: Postmodern
irony and the extinguishing of certainties in The
Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man. In
K. Myrsiades & L. Myrsiades (Eds.), Race-ing
representation: Voice, history, and sexuality
(pp. 84–97). Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield.
Broyard, B. (2007). One drop: My father’s hidden life: A
story of race and family secrets. Boston: Little, Brown.
Butler, J. (1990). Gender trouble: Feminism and the
subversion of identity. New York: Routledge.
Butler, J. (1997). Undoing gender. New York: Routledge.
Fuligni, A. J. (2007). Contesting stereotypes and creating
identities: Social categories, social identities, and
362 Identity Diffusion
educational participation. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
Rockquemore, K. (2002). Beyond Black: Biracial identity
in America. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Roediger, D. (2005). Working toward whiteness: How
American immigrants became White: The strange
journey from Ellis Island to the suburbs. New York:
Basic Books.
Root, M. P. P. (1992). Racially mixed people in America.
Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Identity Diffusion
Identity diffusion, in general, refers to a sense of
self that is not fully developed or well defined. It
is best viewed from a developmental perspective,
using adolescence as the organizing frame of refer-
ence. Adolescence is emphasized for two reasons:
(1) More than any other period of development,
adolescence modifies social relationships and
meanings for the adolescent and his or her family,
and (2) it is commonly agreed that identity cannot
develop fully before adolescence. Identity diffu-
sions may be viewed as one variation of adoles-
cence identity development. This entry begins
with a description of the underlying conceptual
framework and then discusses the empirical sup-
port for and critiques of identity diffusion.
Conceptual Framework
Human beings are naturally curious and have
always sought answers to the ancient and primor-
dial question: Who am I? Answers have been pro-
posed from a variety of perspectives—perspectives
that include the biological, the psychological, and
the social. In addition, several theories exist that
propose ideas about self or identity development.
Prominent among these theories are Sigmund
Freud’s psychosexual development, Erik Erikson’s
psychosocial development, James Marcia’s per-
sonal identity development, Jean Piaget’s cognitive
development, and Lawrence Kohlberg’s moral
development. Although these researchers may not
agree on all the vicissitudes of identity develop-
ment, all except Freud suggest that the concept of
self or an identity cannot develop fully before ado-
lescence. Freud argued that the first 6 years of life
were the most formative years for a person’s devel-
opment. Further, Kohlberg believed that some indi-
viduals may not reach the higher levels of identity
development.
Freud’s research served as the precursor to the
other four studies on identity development. He
viewed human development as a series of five psy-
chosexual stages in the expression of the libido or
sensual pleasures. According to Freud, the fifth
stage, the genital stage, occurs in adolescence when
reproduction and sexual intimacy become possible.
Erikson, building on Freud’s work, proposed eight
stages of psychosocial development. He suggested
that psychosocial crises be viewed as an opportu-
nity and challenge. Erikson’s fifth stage, identity
versus role diffusions, is relevant to adolescence.
Erikson proposed that the developmental task in
this stage is to establish a coherent sense of iden-
tity; failure to complete this task successfully leaves
the adolescent without a solid sense of self.
Not unlike Erikson, who expanded on Freud’s
work, Marcia expanded upon Erikson’s notion that
adolescents struggle with issues of identity versus
role diffusion. According to Marcia, adolescents
vary in how they develop personal identity. Marcia
proposed four kinds of identity in adolescents:
1. Identity achievement: Identity that results from
a period of questioning self and others or the
exploration of roles and values, followed by
commitment.
2. Identity foreclosure: Identity that relies
principally on little questioned parental
standards and commitment made to roles and
values without exploration.
3. Moratorium: A crisis state with little sign of
resolution or exploration of roles and values
without commitment.
4. Identity diffusion: Identity with or without crisis
that is disorganized and lacking cohesiveness or
no exploration of, or commitment to, roles and
values.
Piaget proposed four stages leading from con-
crete to abstract thought. He postulated the last
stage, formal operations, would occur in adoles-
cence, thereby allowing the adolescent to engage in
more abstract thinking about life’s most important
question: Who am I? Piaget also believed that at

this fourth stage of development, adolescents begin
using their formal operational skills to think in
terms of what is best for society.
Kohlberg extended Piaget’s concepts about moral
thinking. He described three major levels of moral
development and believed that adolescents became
capable of postconventional moral reasoning or
morality based on moral principles that transcend
social values. He further believed many people
never go beyond morality based on social rules.
Although all five theories have been influential
in the conceptualization of self-identity, Erikson’s
work, inspired by his personal and professional
experiences, is perhaps the most influential. Despite
this far reaching impact, some authors believe that
Erikson never precisely defined identity. The gen-
eral consensus is that a solid, well-formed identity
is a feeling of “being at home with oneself,”
“knowing where one is headed,” “being comfort-
able with one’s body,” and “feeling comfortable
with who and what one is.” Erikson believed that
identity was not purely internal but was inclusive
and resulted not only from one’s own narrative or
story but also from the narrative of one’s group.
The formation of identity is complex. It is con-
cerned with meaning and the understanding of
oneself and others. This understanding of self and
others, associated with the moratorium, includes a
worldview and experiences for some adolescents
that are colored by racism and structural inequali-
ties, gender issues, and trauma in the form of vio-
lence at home, at school, and in the broader
community. Several scholars, including Erikson,
suggest that this period of questioning is inevitable
and is usually resolved through a period of “time
out” for idle class adolescents. Other scholars have
suggested that societal oppression serves as a cata-
lyst in propelling individuals through these stages
of development. Robert Galatzer-Levy and Bertram
Cohler believe that college often serves the function
of moratorium for the oversocialized middle-in-
come adolescent. The alternative for other adoles-
cents are military service, the Peace Corps, VISTA,
and residential treatment centers. Researchers have
continually questioned the role and usefulness of
the moratorium as a part of healthy adolescence
for less privileged adolescents, biracial individuals,
or individuals with a homosexual identity. It is
generally agreed that most adolescents resolve
issues associated with moratorium without serious
Identity Diffusion 363
or protracted difficulties. It is further agreed that it
is sometimes difficult to differentiate benign diffu-
sion from adolescents’ morality or rules of conduct;
reality testing or being properly oriented to time,
place, person, and situation; reaching appropriate
conclusions about cause-effect relationships; per-
ceiving external events and discerning the intentions
of others with reasonable accuracy; differentiat-
ing one’s own thoughts and feelings from those
that emanate from others; and in relations with
others from the temporary distress of identity dif-
fusion or major psychiatric disorders that first
appear in adolescence.
Available evidence seems to suggest that adoles-
cents with diffusions are markedly isolated from
others and from intimacy. According to Salman
Akhtar, these individuals reflect the following
characteristics:
•• Contradictory character traits: These include
naïveté and suspiciousness, greed and self-denial,
and arrogance and timidity.
•• Temporal discontinuity in the self: The past,
present, and future are not absorbed in a manner
suggesting continuity but are fragmented.
•• Lack of authenticity: Easily adopts characteristics
of others and alters personality to fit the
situation.
•• Feelings of emptiness: This feeling is void of
loneliness or longing but suggests a deadening of
inner emotions.
•• Gender dysphoria: Lacking a sense of gender
and overall gender appropriate behavior.
•• Inordinate ethnic and moral relativism: Lacking a
sense of historical and cultural basis for identity
with unexpected contradictions in the value
systems or a peculiar absence of genuine values.
It seems evident from the foregoing description
that individuals experiencing identity diffusion may
be viewed on a continuum ranging from mild to
severe levels of functioning with origins in early
childhood. Sense of self in these individuals is
poorly developed. In other words, object relation-
ships are grossly disturbed, and their capability to
experience ambivalence is markedly compromised.
These individuals experience early deprivation in
both their caregiving and the environment, and in
turn they become anxious, fearful, and unstable
and are at greater risk for mental disorders, such as
364 Identity Diffusion
psychotic disturbances of identity, multiple person-
ality, and adolescent identity diffusion. Although
identity diffusion may first become evident during
adolescence, the symptoms are not restricted to
adolescence and may manifest in adults of all ages.
Empirical Support
Erikson’s reputation as an outstanding clinician
preceded his contribution as a theoretician and
researcher of the development of identity. In total,
he spent over a decade observing Native American
children and working with emotionally troubled
young people at a prominent psychiatric facility in
Stockbridge, Massachusetts. This ethnographic
approach to data collection and theorizing served
as the foundation for his postulating of the eight
stages of human development and his introduction
of the term identity diffusion.
As noted earlier, identity diffusion was first used
by Erikson to capture the failure in those individu-
als to master various developmental stages. Other
theoreticians who contributed to the development
of this concept include Margaret Mahler, known
for her study on separation-individuation and the
importance of consistent attentiveness from the
child’s caretaker during the first 3 years of life;
Edith Jacobson, whose major contribution dealt
with the development of a sense of identity and
self-esteem; and Otto Kernberg, who synthesized
the work of Mahler and Jacobson and conceptual-
ized “the syndrome of identity diffusions” with
emphasis on severe character pathology. Marcia’s
research extended Erikson’s work by distinguish-
ing different forms of adolescent identity. Marcia’s
work provided empirical evidence for Erikson’s
theory that the successful resolution of the crisis of
adolescence positively influences how one handles
the crisis of early adulthood.
Critiques
In many empirical studies on identity, researchers
employed techniques that largely measured stereo-
types. Critics of Erikson’s conceptualization of
identity believed that he not only did not fully
explain what identity was, but he was also incorrect
in postulating that identity was limited to a specific
age (i.e., adolescence). Some argue that it is a devel-
opmental process that can start in adolescence or
during other developmental stages. They further
assert that many scholars doubt that turmoil and
distress are necessary or that the moratorium is an
inevitable part of healthy adolescence. Some argue,
especially for those individuals who have been his-
torically oppressed or disenfranchised, that forma-
tion of identity is contingent upon the social
environment and that diffusion is more benign
than pathological. Galatzer-Levy and Cohler con-
tend that part of the problem with Erikson’s theory
of identity development in adolescence is his focus
on external manifestation; in other words, focus-
ing on what is going on around the individual
instead of focusing on the individual’s experience
of what is going on around them. These authors
believe that more emphasis on the experiential
world would provide a useful understanding of
why some highly successful young people who
adopt conventional positions do so thoughtfully,
while some apparent rebels accept society’s values
without question.
Despite the lack of robust empirical support,
Erikson’s postulation of how identity is developed,
as well as the term identity diffusion, remains a key
concept in understanding adolescence and adult
identity development.
Sadye L. M. Logan
See also Authenticity; Consciousness; Id, Ego, and
Superego; Psychology of Self and Identity; Other, The
Further Readings
Akhtar, S. (1984). The syndrome of identity diffusion.
American Journal of Psychiatry, 141(11), 1381–1385.
Erikson, E. H. (1956). Identity: Youth crisis. New York:
W. W. Norton.
Erikson, E. H. (1983). Ghandi’s truth: On the origins of
militant nonviolence. New York: W. W. Norton.
(Original work published 1969)
Freud, S. (1953). Three essays on the theory of sexuality.
In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard education
of the complete works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 7,
pp. 135–243). London: Hogarth. (Original work
published 1905)
Galatzer-Levy, R. M., & Cohler, B. J. (1993). The
essential other: A developmental psychology of the
self. New York: Basic Books.
Jacobson, E. (1964). The self and the object world. New
York: International Universities Press.

Kohlberg, L. (1984). Essays on moral development:
Vol. 2. The psychology of moral development. San
Francisco: Harper & Row.
Mahler, M., Pine, F., & Bergman, A. (1975). The
psychological birth of the human infant. New York:
Basic Books.
Marcia, J. E. (1980). Identity in adolescence. In J.
Adelson (Ed.), Handbook of adolescent psychology
(pp. 159–187). New York: Wiley.
Piaget, J. (1972). Intellectual evolution from adolescence
to adulthood. Human Development, 15, 1–12.
Identity Negotiation
Since the late 1970s, identity negotiation, as a pro-
cess of coming to know the self in relational,
social, and cultural contexts, has been an increas-
ingly popular object of inquiry in the social sci-
ences. Communication scholars (as well as those in
sociology, anthropology, and social psychology,
among other disciplines) have built on symbolic
interaction, social constructionist, and constructiv-
ist theoretical frames to study the various ways
individuals come to understand themselves simul-
taneously as unique and as part of numerous social
groups, as mainstream or dominant, marginalized
or oppressed—or in fact all of these things at vari-
ous moments and places. Identity negotiation has
been examined as part of a constellation of con-
cepts and constructs, and in terms of perspective or
cognition, of ideology and structural condition(ing),
as well as actually occurring interaction. In fact,
research into the processes through which selves or
identities came to be understood in social context
has formed the bedrock upon which all social sci-
ences have been built.
Identity negotiation can thus mean so many
things as to mean nothing. To explicate the concept
for the purposes of understanding its use and use-
fulness in contemporary theory building and
research, this entry first looks briefly at the histori-
cal context in which identity negotiation was
named as a significant developmental process for
the purposes of inquiry. In the 1970s, researchers in
sociology, social psychology, anthropology, and
communication became interested in the processes
through which individuals come to identify with
social groups as well as those processes through
Identity Negotiation 365
which they are identified as insiders and outsiders
to those social groups. Importantly, the research
and theory building that gained attention at this
time was also a reflection of historical circum-
stances in the United States, when mass protests for
civil rights, countercultural movements, and oppo-
sition to the Vietnam War created a sense of disor-
der and discomfort among researchers and in their
institutions. Since the 1990s, as the phrase identity
politics gained prominence on the political stage,
academic research on identity negotiation moved
from the focus on culture. In this manner, the
development of self and identity negotiation research
can be seen as an attempt on the part of scientists
to find order in the chaos of societal changes.
Epistemologically, then, identity negotiation is
most popularly studied as a process through which
a self comes to represent its entity or interests in
interaction with society. The modern study of
identity negotiation as meaning making places
identity as both subject and object of inquiry. This
process necessarily involves a boundary crossing
(although certainly not one way) from the internal
world of thoughts and perceptions (self) to the
external world of significant others (including
mediated others). One both has an identity
(avowed) and is assigned an identity by others
(ascribed); one’s avowed and ascribed identities
often overlap, and confusion may result when an
avowed identity is not mirrored in the responses of
others, and vice versa.
Nested in a particular ontology of the self as
individual, separated from other selves and from
the environment, identity presents an epistemologi-
cal dilemma for scientists, although it has been
somewhat ignored. Bounded by individual bodies
and minds, the self is unknowable, and yet, identity
also assumes some sociocultural categorization.
One is made of substance and that substance is
contained and knowable in the social world.
Edward Sampson discusses the modern individual
as coherent, self-contained, and, most importantly,
singular. Yet, even in its singularity, the self regis-
ters its credibility in terms of deviations from the
norm. In different disciplines, and among different
philosophies, that norm (as White, middle class,
male, able-bodied, heterosexual, etc.) is now widely
questioned. Still, ontology and epistemology run
deep, and so to the degree that social sciences in the
Western world rely on the concept of a bounded,
366 Identity Negotiation
knowing, and knowable self (i.e., separate from a
physical body, from others, and from nature), the
individual as an isolatable substance, capable of
objectification and of being objectified, remains.
Rom Harré separates the ontology and episte-
mology of selves into Self-1 and Selves-2, the first
being the internal, personal entity from which the
“I” is spoken. Selves-2 then becomes the social
counterpart to the internal being represented as
“I”—the contextual narrative within which multi-
plicities of “I” are embedded. Self-1 is viewed as
consistent and stable across contexts. Self-1 is con-
structed (primarily through Western epistemologies,
histories, and culture) as core personality and a nor-
mal expression of selfhood. Yet, because identity is
also created within social contexts that call for a
variety of social roles and selves, identities must be
constructed according to the dictates of a social
scene. Selves-2, while culturally appropriate and
morally and socially sensitive to others, may thus be
unstable, contradictory, duplicitous, or inconsistent
across social contexts. For Harré, both the internal
“given” self and the self “given off” in social scenes
are constructed through a grammar assumed to
represent some truth or reality of true being. The
grammar, as it portrays both Self-1 and Selves-2
may thus overlap and be constitutive of both.
The differences (artificial though they may be)
between Self-1 and Selves-2 are important distinc-
tions for those who are interested in the negotiation
of identity. Scholars of identity negotiation from
the perspective of Self-1 are interested primarily in
the ways the Self develops and maintains consis-
tency through the course of ongoing threats to its
stability. For example, social psychological studies
of identity negotiation analyze self-verification
within interaction as a sign of self-esteem.
Negotiation, thus, is from the standpoint of a core
self whose authenticity is determined through its
stability across interactions. For those scholars
whose vantage point is that of Selves-2, recogni-
tion of the relational formation of selves means
that people necessarily shift their “I” in communi-
cation with the “I” of others. Social construction-
ist studies of identity negotiation, for instance,
may turn first to the social, relational, and cultural
contexts of interaction (rather than to the individ-
ual) for a particular narrative of identity.
Both clarifying and complicating matters, iden-
tity negotiation scholarship (both Self-1 and
Selves-2 identity) can describe the negotiation pro-
cess on micro-, mezzo-, and macrolevels, or among
these levels. Microlevel studies focus on the nego-
tiation of selves that may be reflective or imagined
or that happen in episodes of conversation.
Mezzolevel studies focus on the relationships
between individuals in interaction with each other
in the context of social and cultural group forma-
tions. Macrolevel analyses of identity negation
attempt to incorporate the mezzo level of research
with analyses of institutions and the economies of
meaning that produce and maintain them.
Microlevel analyses of identity negotiation focus
on interaction and the narratives of self that are
constructed therein. Davies and Harré, for exam-
ple, studied the ways identities are constructed
through choices among position possibilities in
narrative (e.g., as a listener, an observer, a domi-
nant). Microlevel approaches provide information
on the specific details of interaction as they relate
to a narrative of selfhood; however, the narrative
as it relates to other social, political, economic,
historical, and other structures of identification is
often left out of such analyses.
On the mezzolevel, the negotiation of cultural
identity has been described by Ronald L. Jackson II
in The Negotiation of Cultural Identity as “a pro-
cess in which one considers the gain, loss, or
exchange of their [the self’s] ability to interpret their
own reality or worldview” (p. 10). Jackson theo-
rizes the process of identity negotiation through the
metaphor of a contractual agreement that is worked
out in the course of interacting with others. People
do not necessarily have to have a mutually shared
understanding of their own and the other’s cultural
identity to “sign a contract,” but they do coordi-
nate social interaction based on negotiation over
cultural perceptions, values, and beliefs. The impor-
tance or salience of the relationship also determines
the degree to which a cultural contract may be
open to further revision or change.
The strength of this approach to identity nego-
tiation is that it retains a sense of the need for
stability and consistency in our understandings of
self and others (“signing off” on “contracts”) and
the relative degrees of stability contained and con-
tainable in such interactions. The implications of
misunderstanding, of course, are personal and
social, cultural and political, philosophical and
economic.

Macrolevel approaches to identity negotiation
include the ways that selves are made meaningful
in interaction with symbols, structures, and econo-
mies of media, culture, nation, and globalization,
among others. Such studies offer a structural anal-
ysis of networks and flows of money and power
and their relationship to the ways identity is com-
municated at a group level. Natalie Debray, for
example, argues that media are the mode through
which identities are confirmed, denied, and negoti-
ated in debates among Canadian citizens on the
anniversary of Charles de Gaulle’s “Vive le Québec
Libre” speech in Montreal in 1967.
The categorizations or levels described earlier,
as with all organizing schemes, are somewhat arbi-
trary. Just as Self-1 is implicated in Selves-2 and
vice versa, the individual is implicated in the struc-
tures and identities of his or her society, culture,
nation, and so on, and vice versa (although
whether identity is central or marginal to those
meanings and structures is of key importance).
What ties the terms identity and negotiation
together to form an area of study in contrast to
simply the study of identity, is the emphasis such
studies generally place on communication as both
ongoing and as central to meaning making.
Still, studies of identity negotiation can be and
have been critiqued for their Western epistemo-
logical assumptions, which place the individual as
the central unit of analysis and which (despite their
attempts to the contrary) render identity static and
one-dimensional through their focus on selves in
interaction over bodies in performances located in
social and cultural spaces. Lastly, identity negotia-
tion borrows from an epistemology of communi-
cation as barter and exchange. Other orientations,
such as the Native American perspective of com-
munication as a “gift” or focusing on relational
units of analysis, could produce interesting new
paths for study.
Communication, as the mediation of self and
other, is the paradox at the crux of the matter of
social and cultural knowledge. Just as communica-
tion (social interaction) is never final or complete,
so, too, the process of knowing the self or the other
can never be complete. Likewise, communication is
the experience of the self and the other simultane-
ously (being-together, as noted by Gregory
Shepherd), an empathic awareness that one’s own
identity is never separate from the presence of the
Identity Politics 367
other with their own messy needs, desires, motiva-
tions, and so on. Negotiation is thus used to
describe the relative ability of the self to close off
meaning so that one’s intended self is that which is
displayed to others. Negotiation, then, is a term
that straddles the boundaries of interaction, of
meaning making, and places communication as
both the promise of mutual respect for identities
and the center of the irreconcilable difference
between self and other.
Leda M. Cooks
See also Collective/Social Identity; Culture; Identity
Politics; Identity Salience; Self-Presentation; Self-
Schema
Further Readings
Debray, N. T. (2006, June). Mediating the Motherland:
The role of the media in maintaining and contesting
Quebec’s French past. Paper presented at the annual
meeting of the International Communication
Association, Dresden International Congress Centre,
Dresden, Germany. Retrieved May 9, 2009, from
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p91757_index.html
Harré, R. (1991). The discursive production of selves.
Theory and Psychology, 1(1), 51–63.
Jackson, R. L., II. (1999). The negotiation of cultural
identity. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Jackson, R. L., II. (1999). White space, White privilege:
Mapping discursive inquiry into the self. Quarterly
Journal of Speech 85, 38–54.
Sampson, E. E. (1993). Celebrating the Other: A dialogic
account of human nature. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press.
Shepherd, G. (2006). Transcendence. In G. J. Shepherd,
J. St. John, & T. Striphas (Eds.), Communication
as . . . perspectives on theory (pp. 22–30). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Swann, W. B., Jr. (1987). Identity negotiation: Where the
two roads meet. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 53(6), 1038–1061.
Identity Politics
Identity politics is the political activity and theo-
ries rooted in social justice for marginalized,
oppressed, or disadvantaged social groups.
368 Identity Politics
Throughout the second half of the 20th century
and into the 21st century, there has been increased
politicization of identity. Thus, it is important to
understand why identity politics has become one
of the core issues of identity after almost 60 years.
What follows is a broad overview of the concept,
its history, the major positions of its proponents
and opponents, and a projection of its future.
Identity politics represents the discourse and
activism of the oppressed, the disadvantaged, the
minority, and the dominated and their struggles
for justice, recognition, autonomy, power, and
equal opportunities and rights as members of a
society. Identity politics is both individual and col-
lective. However, most of the transformative
nature of identity politics has come from the col-
lective, the social group—African Americans, gays
and lesbians, women, the disabled, Native
Americans, aboriginals, and other identities.
The power to fix identity into our lives and
institutions is an ongoing struggle of power and
control—knowledge, political, social, cultural,
economic. These struggles presented themselves in
radical social movements from the mid-20th cen-
tury. Marginalized people, the other, organized in
various group affiliations to politicize race, sexual-
ity, interpersonal relations, lifestyles, and culture.
The Black civil rights movement, the second wave
of the feminist movement, anticolonial national
movements, gay rights movements, disabled move-
ments, and American Indian movements were
organized to change the social, cultural, economic,
and political conditions of the oppressed, disad-
vantaged, and marginalized.
Scholars date the beginning of identity politics to
the civil rights movement of Martin Luther King Jr.,
the Black Power movement, and global anticolo-
nial movements, where activists called for a new
collective identity to offset White imperialism.
Second-wave feminism, gay and lesbian liberation,
and other social identity movements followed and
led to transformative moments in relations among
the dominated and the dominant.
Identity politics is also anchored in consciousness
raising; in transforming one’s sense of self and com-
munity from a position of inferiority to equality—
embracing self-esteem and self-worth. Proponents
of this aspect of identity politics come together
based on similar experiences as a social group; this
bond empowers members of that group to organize
for social change. Group solidarity against their
oppressors allows members of the group to trans-
form their sense of self and community.
The discourse of identity politics has created a
vast body of knowledge that oscillates between the
proponents or adherents of identity politics and
the opponents or dissidents. Reflections on “who
we are” on the identity spectrum is evident in the
many consciousness-raising literary works of the
19th and early 20th centuries. However, it was not
until the last half of the 20th century that academ-
ics and activists used the term identity politics and
defined its philosophical underpinnings. The dis-
cursive represents models of the self, political
inclusiveness, solidarity, and resistance. It is a dis-
course centered on the struggle for political voice
by marginalized groups in society.
Ideologies of identity politics and the social
movements also created new identity-based schol-
arship. Identity programs were started at many
colleges and universities: Women’s studies, Black
studies, Chicano studies, postcolonial studies, and
other identity-based programs were established.
Marginalized social groups pushed for scholarly
representations of their lives and experiences that
were more balanced—more truthful and less
distorted—and they wanted more diverse and
inclusive faculty. These programs provided a
wealth of scholarship and diversified the body of
knowledge on human experiences.
Critics of identity politics have attacked both
the political and academic ideologies of identity
politics. Political critics discredit identity politics
for its divisiveness, for breaking up coalitions and
creating distrust of others (those outside the social
group). Their arguments are mainly concerned
with the reductionist, simplistic, and deterministic
nature of identity politics, which, according to
some critics, has caused the demise of the Left.
Theoretical critics point out the social construction
of identities (i.e., they are not natural) and claim
that the oppression they seek to eliminate is recre-
ated through exclusivity of the social groups,
which thus makes them divisive and hierarchal.
Some feminist critics believe the question of
identity politics should be reconsidered on the
grounds that some of the earlier proponents and
opponents formed hasty conclusions about the
claims of identity-based social movements. Some of
these feminists believe that ideological boundaries

were drawn too quickly and tightly around issues of
race, ethnicity, gender, nationality, and sexuality
and that this resulted in a form of ideological polic-
ing. To this end, they believe identity politics has led
to silencing. Those who argue for reconsideration
believe that for too long, the focus has been on
identity as a category rather then on “identification-
with.” Identification-with is seen as the more liber-
ating dimension of identity politics and the way
forward. Identification-with requires us to shift
from our fundamental way of being in the world to
an ethical and political model of identity. It requires
a shift to a model that can take account of change:
a model of transformative identity politics. Allison
Weir defines transformative identity politics as the
incorporation of both relations of identification and
recognition of relations of power: Thus, transfor-
mative identity politics is a politics of self-critique
and self-transformation, and transformation of a
“we.” In the 21st century, the discourse on identity
politics is still anchored to its historical roots, but
the intensity of the debate over who has power and
control over identity has been diffused. The notion
of solidarity, as contemporary critics argue, has
shifted into the collective body politic—engagement
and identification of “with-ness.” Some feminist
scholars see the future of identity politics in trans-
formative identity politics. Perhaps, the historical
symbolism of the first African American U.S. presi-
dent holds promise for a transformative social
movement of with-ness identification.
Juliette Storr
See also Being and Identity; Civic Identity; Collective/
Social Identity; Diversity; Ethics of Identity; Group
Identity; Identification; Identity Salience
Further Readings
Alcoff, L., & Mohanty, S. (2006). Reconsidering identity
politics: An introduction. In L. Alcoff, M. Hames-
García, S. Mohanty, & P. Moya (Eds.), Identity
politics reconsidered (pp. 1–9). New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Hobsbawn, E. (1996). Identity politics and the Left. New
Left Review, 217, 38–47.
Kauffman, L. A. (1990). The anti-politics of identity.
Socialist Review, 90, 67–80.
Ryan, B. (2001). Identity politics: The past, the present
and the future. In B. Ryan (Ed.), Identity politics in
Identity Salience 369
the women’s movement (pp. 1–18). New York: New
York University Press.
Weir, A. (2008). Global feminism and transformative
identity politics. Hypatia, 23, 110–133.
Identity Salience
In everyday speech, the term identity salience can
be taken to refer to how prominent, significant,
and important an identity is to oneself or in one’s
perception of others. In social psychology, the
term salience has a related but, not unexpectedly,
more specific technical meaning. In particular,
identity salience has been most explicitly explored
from the perspective of social identity theory.
Perceptual Salience
The study of how we notice, process, store, and
draw upon information about people is social cog-
nition or the study of social or person perception.
One well-substantiated finding in this literature is
that perceptually distinctive information catches
our attention—for example, one man in a group of
women, one Republican in a group of Democrats,
a person who is taller than everyone else, and so
forth. There is an adaptive reason for this. Humans
have a limited cognitive capacity to process infor-
mation, and so we have evolved to pay most atten-
tion to and think most carefully about things that
are outside the “ordinary”—that are figural against
the background of the immediate situation or the
broader context of everyday life and experience.
At the most basic evolutionary level, people need
to consider and understand contextually distinc-
tive stimuli to know whether those stimuli pose a
danger—a sudden movement in the bushes, is it a
lion about to pounce?
One interesting implication of this is David
Hamilton’s notion of illusory correlation based on
paired distinctiveness. In a series of experiments
conducted in the 1970s and 1980s, Hamilton and
his colleagues were able to show that people
tended to overestimate the correlation between
distinctive human attributes and distinctive human
groups. The clear implication for how we subjec-
tively construct others’ identities is that undesir-
able human attributes (which are cognitively
370 Identity Salience
distinctive because they are both perceptually rare
and they signal possible danger) tend to be paired
with minority groups (numerically or experien-
tially distinctive)—leading to, or reinforcing, unfa-
vorable stereotypes of minorities.
Social Identity Theory
Researchers studying social cognition tend to focus
mainly on salience as perceptual distinctiveness—
salience is something “out there.” Proponents of
social identity theory, originating in the work of
Henri Tajfel and John Turner, focus on salience as
a psychological state of mind—something “in
here”—that is associated with self-conception and
identity-related behavior.
For social identity theorists, people’s overall
conceptualization of self, of who they are, is tex-
tured and compartmentalized into more or less
discrete self-conceptions grounded in idiosyncratic
personality attributes (kind, inquisitive, trustwor-
thy, etc.) and specific relationships with others
(brother, friend, wife, etc.) that define one’s per-
sonal identities and group memberships (American,
engineer, Muslim, etc.) that define one’s social
identities. People do not experience themselves in
totality but rather through the lens of the particu-
lar self-conception or identity that is psychologi-
cally salient in a particular context.
Social identity theory is primarily a theory of
how people’s conception of who they are is associ-
ated with their membership of social groups and
categories and with group and intergroup behav-
iors. The focus is on social identity rather than
personal identity. It argues that people mentally
represent social groups and identities as complex
fuzzy sets of related attributes (behaviors, beliefs,
attitudes, customs, dress, etc.), called prototypes,
which capture similarities among members of the
group and differences from relevant outgroups.
Prototypes describe group attributes. Prototypes of
one’s own group, ingroup prototypes, are also
prescriptive—telling one how one should and
ought to behave as a group member.
The process of categorizing someone has pre-
dictable consequences. Rather than “seeing” that
person as an idiosyncratic individual, you see
them through the lens of the prototype of the cat-
egory you have placed them in. They become per-
ceptually depersonalized in that they are viewed as
possessing the attributes of the prototype.
Prototype-based perception of outgroup members
is more commonly called stereotyping—you view
“them” as being similar to one another and all
having outgroup attributes.
People also depersonalize ingroup members and
themselves in exactly the same way. When you
categorize yourself, you view yourself in terms of
the defining attributes of the ingroup, and, because
prototypes also describe and prescribe group-
appropriate ways to think, feel, and behave, you
think, feel, and behave group prototypically. Your
own behavior conforms to ingroup norms. In this
way, self-categorization not only transforms one’s
self-conception but also produces normative behav-
ior among members of a group.
Psychological Salience
Given these far-reaching consequences of social
categorization for how you perceive yourself and
others, how you behave, and how you treat others,
the question of what makes a particular social cat-
egorization and associated identity psychologically
salient becomes very important.
The principles governing identity salience were
first mapped out by Penelope Oaks in the classic
1987 book by Turner and his colleagues describing
self-categorization theory. Building on the social
identity premise that a social identity comes into
play psychologically to govern self-conception,
perceptions, attitudes, feelings and behavior only
when it is psychologically salient, Oakes elabo-
rated on Jerome Bruner’s early 1957 ideas about
cognitive-perceptual salience—specifically his
notions of accessibility and fit.
People are cognitively wired to strive to make
the best sense they can of the social world they live
in, or the immediate context of social interaction,
and their place within it. To do this, people rela-
tively automatically invoke and draw on social
categorizations and identities that are readily
accessible to them. Categorizations are accessible
if they are valued, important, and frequently
employed aspects of the self-concept—they are
chronically accessible in memory; on the tip of the
tongue, so to speak. Gender, ethnicity/race, profes-
sion, age group, and religion are examples of iden-
tities that can be chronically accessible for many
people. Categorizations are also accessible if they

are self-evident and perceptually obvious in the
immediate situation—they are situationally acces-
sible; perceptually distinctive in the social cogni-
tion sense referred to earlier.
The cognitive system uses accessible categoriza-
tions and identities to make sense of the social
context. It checks how well the categorization
accounts for (fits) similarities and differences among
people—this is called structural/comparative fit. A
categorization into French and English would have
a good comparative fit if the people assembled
were all French and English but a poor fit if they
were all Icelandic and Norwegian. The cognitive
system also checks how well the categorization, or
its prototypical properties, accounts for (fits) the
actual behavior of people in the situation—this is
called normative fit. The French-English categori-
zation would have good normative fit if the French
people were riding bikes, wearing berets, and car-
rying baguettes and the English were sipping hot
tea, wearing bowler hats, and swinging umbrellas;
it would have a poor normative fit if the English
were extolling the virtue of wine and fine food and
the French were grumbling about the weather and
getting excited about cricket.
People trial or cycle through different accessible
categorizations until an optimal level of fit is
achieved. The categorization with optimal fit
becomes psychologically salient—the basis for self-
categorization and associated perceptions, feelings,
and behaviors. Although the accessibility-by-fit
process is usually fast and automatic, it is also
framed and steered by people’s motivations, which
can be automatic but can also be quite deliberative
and sometimes strategic. The specific social iden-
tity motivations that impact the process are uncer-
tainty reduction and self-enhancement.
Impact of Social Identity
Motivations on Identity Salience
According to Michael Hogg’s uncertainty-identity
theory, people strive to reduce feelings of uncer-
tainty about themselves, their social world, and
their place within it—they like to know who they
are and how to behave, and who others are and
how they might behave. Because social identity ties
self-definition and behavior to prototypes that
describe and prescribe behavior, social identity
reduces uncertainty about who you are and about
Identity Salience 371
how you and others will behave. Some prototypes
are better suited to identification-related uncer-
tainty reduction—specifically prototypes that are
simple, unambiguous, and clearly defined.
Prototypes like this typically define groups that are
distinctive, homogeneous, and clearly structured.
From the perspective of identity salience, this
means that the accessibility-by-fit process is guided
by the extent to which accessible categorizations
reduce self-related uncertainty. The more uncer-
tain people feel about themselves in a certain situ-
ation, the more they may deliberatively and
strategically try to access and make psychologi-
cally salient categorizations that maximally reduce
or manage self-conceptual uncertainty. Such cate-
gorizations may, according to Marilynn Brewer’s
optimal distinctiveness theory, be ones that strike
a balance between people’s need to feel included
and their need to be distinctive. Large groups over-
satisfy the inclusion motive, and very small groups
oversatisfy the distinctiveness motive. Midsize
groups within larger social aggregates are more
likely to be optimally distinctive.
The other motive that may guide the salience
process is the pursuit of self-enhancement or self-
esteem. Because social identities define who we are,
they also evaluate who we are in our own eyes and
in the eyes of others—all things being equal, people
would prefer that their social identities are evalua-
tively positive, and so social identity processes are
impacted and guided by various behaviors oriented
toward securing or maintaining a social identity that
is distinctive and evaluatively positive relative to
relevant outgroups. Positive group distinctiveness,
and associated self-enhancement and self-esteem, is
a core motive for social identity processes—this is
usually referred to as the self-esteem hypothesis.
From the perspective of identity salience, this
means that the accessibility-by-fit process is guided
by the extent to which accessible categorizations
are positively rather than negatively distinctive.
People will prefer to access and will strategically
work to make psychologically salient categoriza-
tions that reflect positively on self: high-status,
prestigious, respected self-categories.
Constraints on Identity Salience
For social identity theory, identity salience is
an emergent property of the immediate social
372 Identity Scripts
interactive context—identities come and go, psy-
chologically, as a function of motivations and the
dynamics of accessibility and fit in a particular
context. However, the notion of chronic accessi-
bility implies that some categorizations are more
important than others for some people, and they
tend to “leap to mind” as the first attempt to
make sense of the social context. These kinds of
identities may act as an anchor for assessments of
fit. This aspect of salience has not been fully
explored. However, from social psychological
research on intergroup relations, it would appear
that minority and stigmatized social identities are
generally more chronically accessible than are
majority identities.
Another constraint on identity salience is simply
the extent to which a person has a rich or impover-
ished repertoire of identities and self-categories. If a
person has few identities or few positive identities,
they will be highly accessible and, as for stigmatized
identities, will tend to anchor the accessibility-by-fit
process. Finally, the nature of the relationship
among self-categories may influence identity
salience—a repertoire of subjectively discrete non-
overlapping self categories (Dutch, mountaineer,
philosopher) may allow one to be more cognitively
versatile in the accessibility-by-fit process than hav-
ing a repertoire of subjectively similar overlapping
categories (Dutch, cyclist, tulip grower).
Michael A. Hogg
See also Collective/Social Identity; Optimal
Distinctiveness Theory; Social Identity Theory
Further Readings
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition
(2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hogg, M. A. (2006). Social identity theory. In P. J. Burke
(Ed.), Contemporary social psychological theories
(pp. 111–136). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1988). Social
identifications: A social psychology of intergroup
relations and group processes. London: Routledge.
Moskowitz, G. B. (2005). Social cognition:
Understanding self and others. New York: Guilford
Press.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity
theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel &
W. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations
(pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D.,
& Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social
group: A self‑categorization theory. Oxford, UK:
Blackwell.
Identity Scripts
Identity scripts are social expectations regarding
how members of a particular group behave and
communicate as a part of their social identity.
Kwame Anthony Appiah, the chief theorist of
what he calls the “social scriptorium,” under-
stands such social identities (also called group or
collective identities) as being a woman, homosex-
ual, Black, Latina/o, or poor to be labels associ-
ated with stereotypes and, more important, with
“scripts” governing those who share the social
identity. The stereotypes motivate many others,
both within and outside a group, to treat someone
(and, more generally, to think about and respond
to him or her) as a member of the group.
Internalized, the thought “I am a woman (or
homosexual, Black, etc.)” also frequently prompts
and is seen as a reason by people to act (and, more
generally, in many respects to live) as a woman (or
homosexual, etc.)—doing, wearing, eating; choos-
ing, rejecting, resolving; liking, rejecting, wanting,
spurning, preferring; believing, doubting, assum-
ing, expecting; valuing and deprecating certain
things, all because she is a group member. Familiar
aspects of what are called gender roles (innocent
maiden, cunning coquette, adoring wife, selfless
mother) are seen as instances of such scripting,
though the variety, dependency on local custom,
and dubious validity that such norms manifest also
display some of the concept’s difficulties. Robyn
Wiegman suggests that society inscribes gender
and race on our bodies but holds that these inscrip-
tions indicate positions within the social hierarchy,
economies of interaction, and expectations for
what and how we think, feel, value, and act.
Theater Analogy
Theater scripts (here understood to include stage
directions as well as lines) tell an actor what to say

and when, but also what to do, how to appear and
sound as the actor moves about and speaks, and
even what thoughts, doubts, suspicions, realiza-
tions, feelings, desires, preferences, and decisions
to indicate by behavior, tone, physical bearing,
and facial expressions. In a way Appiah and many
other theorists judge similar, not only are Hamlet
and Hecuba but also Hispanics and homosexuals
(and so on) expected to do, want, believe, feel,
value, profess, and protest certain things. At least,
some in and some outside their group expect that
and often prefer it.
How stringent are a script’s (including its stage
directions) directives? This varies. In different the-
atrical productions, directors may take more
loosely or tightly scripted approaches to how per-
formers act their roles. Actors’ improvisation may
be forbidden in a given production and discour-
aged, accepted, encouraged, or demanded by the
director in another. What is the proper place for
individual creativity and how can it coexist with
group cooperation? Does an actor’s improvisation
and creativity interfere with the director’s, whose
instructions for interpreting the script an innova-
tive actor may ignore? Does the director’s creativ-
ity constrain the author’s, whose lines the director
(or actor) may change, drop, or replace? Reflecting
on these questions and possibilities displays vari-
ous options for script’s normative stringency.
Similar questions arise in social life.
Significance for Social Life
In a play, scripted roles cohere to form the drama’s
narrative, giving significance both to the whole play
(on page or stage) and to each of its individual parts
(characters and incidents). Some maintain that the
same holds true of social identities. Whereas some
see such demands on a person’s behavior, feelings,
and so on, as limits and threats to his or her free-
dom, Will Kymlicka argues that a person’s society
provides the person the context wherein he or she
has specific options that make meaningful the per-
son’s ability to choose what to do and how to live.
In that way, society, through the scripts it furnishes
a person, enables the agent to make meaningful
choices and live a life he or she values. Without
scripts of social identity, he maintains, liberalism’s
guarantee of freedom to choose would lack signifi-
cance and substance, and individuals would regard
Identity Scripts 373
the choices as empty. Thus, the social scriptorium
is seen to provide parameters in which personal
assessment and choice are meaningful rather than
as illiberal constraints on free choice.
Ontology and Performativity
Every theater character or role is constituted by the
script and its performance. However, the actor
sometimes exists prior to, and always outside and
independently of, the character. What is the rela-
tion between an individual and his or her group
identity in social life? Strong constructivism sees
being homosexual, Black, or Hispanic, and so on,
even being a woman, as a product of local social
behavior and customs. However, this reduction of
identity to “a position in social space” seems to
collapse into an idealism according to which there
is no objective fact about who is or is not in the
group (but only variant local standards in people’s
minds and practices) and can even provide a path-
way to manipulation by depriving individuals of
grounds for rejecting imposed norms on members
of their group. Even if we see the individual’s social
self as “negotiated” by the individual with both
those inside his or her social group and those out-
side it, that still does little to empower the individ-
ual, insofar as it leaves the individual’s very identity
subject to others’ ideas and, thus, to their control.
Performativity of social identities—the ways
people are said to enact them by conforming to
scripts—combines with the possibility of different
versions of a play’s text to introduce a deep con-
text relativity. Perhaps there is no such thing as
Hamlet’s psychology or actions but only those of
Shakespeare’s (or Stoppard’s) Hamlet, or the
Hamlet of Shakespeare’s Folio F1 (as contrasted
with a possible variant in Folio F2). Again, such
theorists as José Medina want to extend this rela-
tivity to the social realm, where different local
stereotypes and expectations (scripts) might be
thought to generate varying conditions on what it
is to be a woman, or a homosexual, Latina/o,
Black, person, as well as how such a person is to
behave, feel, think, and so on.
Disidentification
Controversy exists over whether, how, and to
what extent social identities, like stage roles, are
374 Identity Scripts
or should be chosen. A classification as a member
of a certain social group can be accepted and even
valued by someone who nonetheless chooses to
reject various scripts and norms of behavior, taste,
preference, political program, social interactions,
and so on, that are based on the person’s social
identity. Medina and Judith Butler talk of disiden-
tification in this connection. Can someone choose
not only to refuse to act, think, and feel as those
in his or her social group are expected to, rejecting
the stereotype of some group (e.g., a woman or
homosexual) to which others assign him or her,
but also meaningfully choose not to be in the
group, declining to be a woman (or homosexual,
etc.)? If so, under what circumstances is it effica-
cious for a person to refuse to be a homosexual,
Hispanic, woman, or other? If such opting out
of a social group is a genuine possibility, what of
opting in? Can someone choose to be a member of
a social group to which others do not assign him
or her? (Can a White person decide she is Black?)
If so, under what circumstances, if any, would
such a choice suffice to make the person a mem-
ber of the social group? If group membership is
ontologically performative in such a way that a
woman (or Black or Latina/o) person is simply
anyone who has or manifests certain (stereo)typi-
cal feelings, practices, or values, then these seem-
ingly fanciful options become real choices that
everyone faces.
Authenticity
A Black person who intentionally (or, a bit differ-
ently, consciously) follows a script for his or her
racial identity may be thought to have what
Tommie Shelby calls a “thick(er) Black racial iden-
tity” or to have added being a Black person to the
person’s simply being someone who is Black.
Likewise, in the case of a Latina/o person,
J. Angelo Corlett calls this identifying more with
her Latina/o ethnicity. Such a person may even be
what some consider to be more Black or more of a
Latina (more than she used to be or more than are
others in her group). These concepts and social
identity projects are tied to anxiety over someone’s
being authentic in his or her group affiliation and
to presuppositions behind rhetoric of comparative
and scalar group classification. Blacks perceived to
be varying from the identity script in certain ways
have been accused of “acting White” or assumed
to be ashamed of their race. However, this anxiety
seems to be misplaced and the presuppositions
considered dubious for reasons indicated later in
this entry, and unless one accepts some version of
performative ontology for social identities, which
some consider problematic, it is difficult to see
why doing, thinking, or liking certain things makes
one more Black or more of a woman. (However,
insofar as being Latina/o is an ethnic and cultural
category and to the extent that ethnic culture
involves customs and values, that sort of social
identity may be somewhat different.)
Inauthenticity may be thought to threaten iden-
tity, from an actor’s deviating from an assigned
script (thereby mangling the character) or, alterna-
tively, from an actor’s slavishly acting it out (risk-
ing psychological incoherence, pretense). So, too,
in social life, the waiter whom Jean-Paul Sartre
famously describes tries too hard to act like a
waiter. Someone who makes a point of complying
with expectations of how a woman or homosexual
or Black person is to act, think, and feel may not
only be trying too hard but perpetuating stereo-
types and acting from a deep misunderstanding
and overestimation of these social categories.
Plurality
In social life but not on stage, someone simultane-
ously plays many roles, whose scripted demands
on him or her may conflict. This makes “thin”
group affiliation—wherein one accepts the desig-
nation but remains aloof to (or picks and chooses
among) the associated script norms—more attrac-
tive to some theorists. Some of them also propose
a cosmopolitan alternative to reducing the indi-
vidual self to social identity. In an individual’s
struggle to transcend his or her social identity in
norms the individual observes, as Amartya Sen
suggests, the supposed plurality of social identities
and their competing and conflicting scripts may
help. Appiah worries that some group identities
(e.g., racial identities) tend to “go imperial.” That
is, some think that any values, interests, tastes, or
commitments a Black person in today’s West may
have—in part because he or she is a member of a
trade union, profession, neighborhood, nation, or
other—count for little or nothing as compared
with those he or she has (or should have) because

he or she is Black. The supposed plurality of social
identities may help here, as Sen thinks. However,
it need not; the plurality of identity norms could
reinforce one another in ways that further mask
their need for objective justification.
The problem of hybridity and intermingling of
scripts in this time of globalization should also be
mentioned. What should we make of, say, teenag-
ers in the developing world who wear T-shirts and
blue jeans, use American slang, prefer hip-hop to
indigenous musical forms, and adopt other
American (or European) customs? Are they admi-
rably creative agents of individual self-invention,
confused and pitiable victims of Western cultural
imperialism’s destruction of indigenous culture, or
despicable collaborators in a globalized process of
insidious assimilation? Answering such questions
requires prior moral theorizing. We need to know
just what it is that is supposed to make voluntary
assimilation so bad and whether this assumption is
correct. To determine this, we need to ask the fol-
lowing: Who loses what when a member of one
cultural group assimilates to the ways of another?
How serious is this loss? How serious is it when
even every member of the first group so assimilates
that the group loses its distinctiveness, perhaps
even its existence? Whose responsibility is it to
preserve the ways, values, and customs that consti-
tute a certain group’s culture, even if their preser-
vation is an important good? Why should we
assume that it falls exclusively or chiefly on those
(all of them? some?) now in the group to preserve
its culture by continuing those customs and values
rather than on (some of) those now outside it to
newly adopt and embrace them?
Modalities
Norms for how a woman, a homosexual, a Black,
or Latina/o, or poor person is to think and feel and
act need to be analyzed and justified, though this
crucial step is often neglected in the literature.
Questions that are in need of study include the fol-
lowing: What are the normative type, modality,
source, and weight of these social scripts, or implicit
norms? Are they ethical (e.g., grounded in virtue
and human nature), moral (appealing to the overall
greatest good, for example, or to imperatives of
pure reason), political (matters of justice for each,
or of the common good of some community),
Identity Scripts 375
social (rooted in what is needed for group cohesion
or success), prudential (individual self-interest), or
are they norms of some other type? Do they
depend on assumptions about an individual’s self-
realization, personal benefit, the group’s survival
or advancement, or about ways the world as a
whole is thought to profit from, and even need,
cultural diversity? How are such justifications for
these scripts’ normative significance grounded and
defended? What gives such norms their authority?
In what way, and for whom or what, is it good to
conform to, appropriate, and internalize these
scripts? Are they mere recommendations or require-
ments? Absolute or conditional? How grave is it to
violate or ignore one (or all) of the norms, even if
they are obligatory?
Limitations of Social Scripting
Julius Lester talks of letting Black people alone so
that they can lead their good, Black lives, and
Henry Louis Gates Jr. talks of “learning to be
Black.” However, being Black isn’t a skill or tech-
nique or character trait someone acquires or mas-
ters, and it’s hard to give meaning to the idea that
someone’s life can be Black, or lived (in a) Black
(manner). Nor is it clear that or how lives can be
more or less Black. Still less, consider Ron Karenga’s
imagined path of blackness: Can someone “think
Black, talk Black, act Black, create Black, buy
Black, vote Black, and live Black”? There is only
being more or less characteristic, typical (or stereo-
typical) of Black people in certain respects and in
certain communities, showing or having more or
fewer attributes that originated or became promi-
nent in predominantly Black communities (or in
Black culture). Often such scripts privilege some
customs over others in such a way as to privilege
some group members and depreciate others, thus
dividing the group, validating and perpetuating
stereotypes, elevating conformity over individual-
ity, and, in other ways, setting back the shared
interests of (many of) those inside the group. The
same can be said for such categories as woman,
homosexual, Latina/o, poor, and others. In light of
such political difficulties, as well as the ways in
which constructivist accounts of these categories
make them depend on others’ practices and atti-
tudes and reduce them to mere performances and
features that may be donned or doffed at will,
376 Identity Uncertainty
today’s theorists must face the question whether it
has been at all proper or profitable to understand
such classifications as social identities.
J. L. A. Garcia
See also Collective/Social Identity; Ethnolinguistic Identity
Theory; Role Identity; Society and Social Identity
Further Readings
Appiah, K. A. (1996). Race, culture, identity:
Misunderstood connections. In K. A. Appiah &
A. Gutmann (Eds.), Color conscious (pp. 30–104).
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Appiah, K. A. (2005). Ethics of identity. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Blum, L. (2002). “I’m not a racist, but . . .” The moral
quandary of race. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
Corlett, J. A. (1999). Latino identity. Public Affairs
Quarterly, 13, 273–295.
Corlett, J. A. (2003). Race, racism and reparations.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
García, J. L. A. (2006). Identity confusions. Philosophy
and Social Criticism, 32, 839–862.
García, J. L. A. (2007). Racial or ethnic identity? In
J. J. E. Gracia (Ed.), Race or ethnicity? On Black and
Latino identity (pp. 45–77). Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Gates, H. L., Jr. (1996). Parable of the talents. In
H. L. Gates Jr. & C. West (Eds.), The future of the
race (pp. 1–52). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Helms, J. (Ed.). (1990). Black and White racial identity:
Theory, research, and practice. New York: Praeger.
Jackson, R. L., II. (2006). Scripting the Black masculine
body. Albany: SUNY Press.
Karenga, R. (1966). Maulana. In Quotable Karenga.
Timbuktu, Mali: University of Sankore Press.
Kymlicka, W. (2001). Politics in the vernacular. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press.
Lester, J. (1968). Look out, Whitey! Black Power’s gon’
get your mama! New York: Grove Press.
Medina, J. (2003). Identity trouble. Philosophy and
Social Criticism, 29, 655–680.
Sen, A. (2005). Argumentative Indian. New York: Farrar,
Straus & Giroux.
Sen, A. (2006). Identity and violence. New York:
W. W. Norton.
Shelby, T. (2005). We who are dark. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Taylor, C. (1992). Ethics of authenticity. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Wiegman, R. (1995). American anatomies. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press.
Identity Uncertainty
Although a technical term in information science,
in the study of human beings identity uncertainty
means a lack of consistency, clarity, or both, in an
individual’s answer to the question “Who am I?”
Individuals, in their intrapersonal communication
(communication with oneself) or cognitive pro-
cesses, seek reliability in the answer to such a
pervasive and significant question. When an indi-
vidual cannot answer the questions “Who am I?”
and “To which group do I belong?” with consis-
tency, clarity, and stability, identity uncertainty
develops. In general, humans are found to dislike
uncertainty (although this is probably truer in
some cultures than in others). They are thus moti-
vated to resolve uncertainty, resulting in attendant
theories of human behavior.
Approaches and Applications
From Diverse Fields
For the psychologist, humans’ struggles to self-
identify can be explained by internal motivations
and natural development. Some of the most inter-
esting work in identity concerns developmental
psychology, particularly that of children and ado-
lescents. But the individual’s perception of self,
sociologists tell us, is always shaped by contact
with other human beings—with society.
Sociologists help to explain how identity may be
called into question by societal expectations and
norms. We desire group belonging and a range of
contact with others.
This contact with others shapes our perceptions
of self-identity and is more fully described within
the field of communication. Assuming that all
human beings would find uncertainty at least
somewhat undesirable, our quest for surety can
only be undertaken through interaction. Verbal
and nonverbal processes help us to obtain informa-
tion, inference, context, and understanding. They
also allow us to assert, negotiate—and manage

uncertainty within—our identities. Several theories
in the field describe this process, especially uncer-
tainty reduction theory, identity negotiation the-
ory, and anxiety/uncertainty management theory.
Identity uncertainty has other practical applica-
tions. Information sciences is ironically similar to
the human sciences previously mentioned, in that
identity uncertainty describes objects in data
analysis that lack uniqueness or distinction. In
criminal justice, the term is literal, referring to
inconclusive DNA or other evidence in the identi-
fication of a potential perpetrator of a crime, for
example. Homeopathic medicine takes a less posi-
tivist approach, linking physiological disease to
identity dis-ease.
Potential Causes
Some might say that identity uncertainty is inevi-
table, because an individual’s identity is multifac-
eted and complex. Race, gender, ethnicity, age,
profession . . . the list goes on and on: The combi-
nation of these unique aspects make up an indi-
vidual’s identity. This combination is often called
“interpellation” and suggests that there are multi-
ple sources of identity uncertainty. For instance,
psychologist Erik Erikson described a stage in ado-
lescent development called “identity versus role
confusion,” wherein a teenager experiences a crisis
when contemplating her future adult role in soci-
ety. The teenage years are often when some may
also experience gender identity confusion, uncer-
tain of the objects of their sexual attraction.
Because homosexuality is marginalized in many
societies, the individual experiences an identity
crisis.
Conventional wisdom states that our world is
rapidly changing and saturated with media mes-
sages interrogating our identities. In the 21st cen-
tury, cultural identity may be the most prevalent
source of identity confusion in many societies.
Mary Jane Collier has described the potential dis-
crepancy between avowal (the identity one claims
for oneself) and ascription (the identity mapped
onto one by others). The perception of race in some
societies is potentially problematic. Members of
some cocultures—racial groups afforded less power
than the majority culture—may consider their race
to be of little consequence until they experience
prejudice from the majority group. This moment of
Identity Uncertainty 377
prejudice—a “racially shattering event”—may be
particularly traumatic for biracial children, who try
to claim multiple identities yet are the targets of
societal assumptions about one race over the other.
The same is true for adopted children, whose
appearances represent a particular race but whose
families may belong to another. Raised in one cul-
ture but perceived as part of another, such indi-
viduals are uncertain in their sense of group
belonging. Culture today is marked by hybridity
(affiliation with two or more groups). So identities
are regularly in flux, yielding uncertainty.
Of course, this list is by no means exhaustive,
and each individual person will encounter unique
personal and social circumstances that could cre-
ate identity conflict, confusion, and uncertainty.
Others, even in the face of such circumstances,
may experience very little disruption in their per-
ceptions of self.
Kathleen Glenister Roberts
See also Collective/Social Identity; Culture; Development
of Self-Concept; Hybridity; Psychology of Self and
Identity
Further Readings
Bandura, A. (1996). Social foundations of thought and
action: A social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Berger, C. R., & Gudykunst, W. B. (1991). Uncertainty
and communication. In B. Dervin & M. Voight (Eds.),
Progress in communication sciences (pp. 21–66).
Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Collier, M. J. (1997). Cultural identity and intercultural
communication. In L. Samovar & R. Porter (Eds.),
Intercultural Communication (pp. 36–44). Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth.
Cupach, W., & Imahori, T. (1993). Identity management
theory: Communication competence in intercultural
episodes and relationships. In R. Wiseman &
J. Koester (Eds.), Intercultural communication
competence (pp. 112–131). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Erikson, E. H. (1970). Reflections on the dissent of
contemporary youth. International Journal of
Psychoanalysis, 51, 11–22.
Ethier, K. A., & Deaux, K. (1994). Negotiating social
identity when contexts change: Maintaining
identification and responding to threat. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 243–251.
378 Idiomatic Expressions
Gudykunst, W. B. (1995). Anxiety/uncertainty
management (AUM) theory: Current status. In
R. Wiseman (Ed.), Intercultural communication theory
(pp. 8–58). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Helms, J. (Ed.). (1993). Black and White racial identity:
Theory, research, and practice. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Jackson, R. L., II. (1999). The negotiation of cultural
identity. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
McCallum, A., & Wellner, B. (2004). Conditional models
of identity uncertainty with application to noun
coreference. Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, 17, 905–912.
Orbe, M. (1998). Constructing co-culture theory: An
explication of culture, power, and communication.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Terry, D. J., Hogg, M. A., & White, K. M. (1998). The
theory of planned behavior: Self-identity, social
identity, and group norms. British Journal of Social
Psychology, 38, 225–244.
Idiomatic Expressions
An idiom is the syntactical, grammatical, or struc-
tural form peculiar to a language. The word idiom
is a derivative of the Greek word idios, meaning
“private.” Greek idioma (the “o” has a long
vowel sound) is indicative of an idea, thought, or
concept having a peculiarity or a unique feature—
particularly in language and literature. An idiom-
atic expression retains all of the meaning of its
idiom origin. Like an idiom, an idiomatic expres-
sion is symbolic of an expression or group of
words that contains an idiom, but the meaning of
the expression or group of words cannot be deter-
mined by analyzing the literal meaning of the
individual components that make up the expres-
sion or phrase.
The ability to extract meaning and to use idiom-
atic terms appropriately outside of literal meaning
are specific indicators of cultural identity because
in order to comprehend idiomatic terms, one must
first understand not only the language but also the
liberties of usage, including the interchangeability
of various parts of speech and cultural norms when
communicating within the boundaries of a particu-
lar culture’s societies, ethnic, age, and gender cat-
egories. For this reason, idioms and idiomatic
expressions are dynamic aspects of communica-
tion. Even if the meaning of every word in an
expression or phrase is understood, the intended
meaning of the expression or phrase still may not
be obtained because the meaning may be more
solidly rooted in the exact knowledge of the lan-
guage in relation to cultural use than in the literal
meaning of the word or words that make up the
expression or phrase.
The English language features many idiomatic
expressions and phrases that cannot be deciphered
through literal means. For example, the expression
“You don’t miss your water until your well runs
dry” cannot be interpreted literally because it
implies lack of water and inevitable thirst when
that is often not the case in the context of its gen-
eral usage. Translated idiomatically, the expres-
sion means that you won’t miss a good thing until
it is gone. Colorful expressions such as the exam-
ple provided are used in everyday communications
and draw upon all parts of speech, including
nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and preposi-
tions. If an individual is not adept to processing the
semantics and syntax used in forming idiomatic
expressions and phrases, there is a risk of miscom-
munication, confusion, or lack of understanding.
Processing Idioms and Idiomatic Expressions
As descriptive and common as idioms are to a cul-
ture’s language, there are questions and proposed
answers as to how idioms and idiomatic expres-
sions are processed and understood without the
assistance of exact literal computation and inter-
pretation. Models of language comprehension sug-
gest that idiomatic interpretation relies on
compositionality to assist with comprehension.
Analyzing the compositionality of a word, expres-
sion, or phrase and ascertaining its meaning relies
on the reader’s or speaker’s mental lexicon, the
syntactic behavior of words, and the reader’s or
speaker’s familiarity with the language and cul-
ture. And though these same elements are neces-
sary for processing idioms, it is thought that idioms
are largely noncompositional because their mean-
ing cannot be determined by a literal analysis of
the word or words that make up the idiom or idi-
omatic expression or phrase.
In an effort to determine how idioms are under-
stood, three models of idiom comprehension have

been introduced—the literal processing model, the
lexical representation model, and the direct access
model. No strict conclusions have been drawn to
say that one method is more likely than the other,
but regardless of how the processing and compre-
hension occurs, interpretation is unattainable with-
out a firm understanding of a culture and the
flexibility of its language.
The literal processing model of idiom compre-
hension suggests that when encountered with an
idiom or idiomatic expression, the speaker or
reader attempts to interpret the word or phrase
literally, and if that fails to produce a meaning,
then the reader or speaker relies on a stored idiom-
atic list for figurative retrieval.
The lexical representation model proposes that
idioms and idiomatic expressions are stored and
retrieved upon encountering the first word of an
idiom or idiomatic expression and then a simulta-
neous computation of both figurative and literal
meaning begins, with figurative processing occur-
ring before literal computation.
The direct access model purports that the figu-
rative meaning is initially accessed from the speak-
er’s or reader’s mental lexicon, and if no meaning
is derived from that method, then the speaker or
reader opts for a literal meaning.
Types of Idioms
In the manner that idioms signify a flexibility of
language by definition, there are some limits to how
far a phrase or expression can go as an idiom. For
example, the idiom “grab the bull by the horns”
means to face a problem or situation head on. This
type of idiom is identified as phraseological idiom.
A phraseological idiom does not draw on any par-
ticular part of speech and requires a paraphrase that
is longer than a word to support the phrase or
expression. Another type of idiom is the frozen
idiom. A frozen idiom is an idiom whose form can
only be written in one way so as not to destroy the
meaning of the idiom. A popular example of a fro-
zen form idiom is the idiom “kick the bucket,”
which means to die. If the phrase is changed to, for
example, “The bucket was kicked,” then the mean-
ing has been changed and it no longer means to die;
hence, loses its title as an idiom. All idioms do not
come in the form of phrases or expressions. Some
idioms are only one- or two-word combinations.
Idiomatic Expressions 379
For example, in the sentence “The car is a lemon,”
lemon is a single-word idiom. To call a car lemon
implies that the car is not literally a lemon but
instead a vehicle that is not in good running condi-
tion. An example of a two-word idiom is the term
at peace. In the sentence: “She is at peace,” the state-
ment describes a female who is relaxed and happy.
The following is a sampling of common idiom-
atic phrases and expressions and their meanings.
Idiomatic Phrases
Add insult to injury: to say or do something that
makes a bad situation worse or to hurt the feelings
of a person who has already been hurt
And all that jazz: all that stuff or all that nonsense
Baptism of fire: a first experience of something, usu-
ally something difficult or unpleasant
Beat around the bush: to avoid answering a question
or to stall
Blow a gasket: to become very angry
Break a leg: good luck—often said to actors or
actresses before a performance
Come hell or high water: no matter what happens
Cry over spilled milk: to cry or complain about
something that has already happened
From the heart: from a deep and sincere emotional
source
In the same breath: almost at the same time
Johnny come lately: someone who joins in some-
thing after it is under way
Jump through hoops: to do everything possible to
obey or please someone
Let off steam: to release excess energy or anger
Let the cat out of the bag: to reveal a secret or sur-
prise by accident
Make a mountain out of a molehill: to make a major
issue out of a minor one or to exaggerate the impor-
tance of something
Middle-of-the-road: halfway between two extremes
Over the hill: too old to do something
Pain in the neck: a bother or an annoyance
380 Idiomatic Expressions
Pass the buck: to pass the blame to someone else or
to give the responsibility to someone else
Pull oneself up by one’s bootstraps: to achieve some-
thing through one’s own efforts
Rest on one’s laurels: to enjoy one’s success and not
try to achieve more
Sitting on top of the world: feeling wonderful
Wake the dead: to be so loud as to wake those who
are sleeping
Zero in on: to aim or focus directly on something
Idiomatic Expressions
I will cross that bridge when I come to it: I’ll put off
dealing with a problem or issue until forced to do so.
Don’t count your chickens before they hatch: Don’t
count on good fortune or plans going your way until
it actually happens.
Don’t put all of your eggs in one basket: Avoid
investing all your efforts, interests, or hopes in a
single person or thing.
If the shoe fits, wear it: You should pay attention to
advice or criticism if it applies to you.
Time flies when you’re having fun: Time passes
quickly when you’re enjoying yourself.
You can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make
him drink: You can show someone the way, but you
cannot make the individual follow given advice.
Sometimes it is best to let sleeping dogs lie: One
should not search for trouble.
The Challenge of Idioms
The use of idioms poses a challenge for readers,
writers, and speakers unfamiliar with a language
and culture. In what may appear to be the most
fundamental aspect of a particular language, learn-
ing a language and understanding the exact mean-
ing of words does not guarantee comprehension of
idioms and idiomatic expressions and phrases. If a
reader, writer, or speaker encounters language or
text in which every word is understood, but there
is still no comprehension, then it is likely that an
idiom or idiomatic expression has been encoun-
tered. To fully understand idioms and their usage
in a language, there must be a firm understanding
of the boundaries of flexibility within the language
in question. Understanding the boundaries of lan-
guage has a strong correlation to cultural identity.
Knowledge of culture allows for a command
regarding perception and appropriateness when
attempting to engage in communication that uses
idioms and idiomatic expressions. Every culture is
governed by different rules of what is considered
acceptable in regard to ethnic groups, societal
norms, suitable conversation, humor, and timeli-
ness for whom a particular message is intended.
Culture, Identity, and Idiomatic Expressions
Culture highlights the strength of collective iden-
tity and provides a way to assess how an identify-
ing characteristic thrives against the norm. In the
United States, the dominant culture is American.
In assessing the defining link between idioms, idi-
omatic expressions, and identity, the uniqueness of
a culture’s accepted behaviors, practices, customs,
and beliefs must be considered.
One may understand a particular language, but
one’s identity is not secure within a particular lan-
guage experience if there is not a full understanding
of the language in conjunction with such idiosyn-
crasies as idiomatic expressions or phrases. Perhaps
this is most evident in the idiomatic expressions of
everyday language. Whether the idiomatic expres-
sions or phrases reference the dialect or the figura-
tive speech that is different from the language of
other cultures, the ability to fluently use and com-
prehend idioms and idiomatic expressions is indic-
ative of a person’s identity within the confines of a
language experience.
Adena Washington
See also Dialect; Figures of Speech; Semantics; Style/
Diction
Further Readings
Caillies, S., & Butcher, K. (2007). Processing of idiomatic
expressions: Evidence for a new hybrid view.
Metaphor and Symbol, 22(1), 79–108.

Kemper, S. (1986). Inferential processing and the
comprehension of idioms. Metaphor and Symbolic
Activity, 1(1), 43–55.
Spears, R. A., & Kirkpatrick, B. (1999). Essential English
idioms. Lincolnwood, IL: NTC.
Tabossi, P., Fanari, R., & Wolf, K. (2008). Processing
idiomatic expressions: Effects of semantic
compositionality. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 34(2), 313–327.
Titone, D. A., & Connine, C. M. (1994). Comprehension
of idiomatic expressions: Effects of predictability and
literality. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 20(5), 1126–1138.
Titone, D. A., & Connine, C. M. (1994). Descriptive
norms for 171 idiomatic expressions: Familiarity,
compositionality, predictability, and literality.
Metaphor and Symbolic Activity, 9(4), 247–270.
Immediacy
Immediacy refers to nonphysical closeness people
have with each other when communicating. Albert
Mehrabian, often credited with developing the
principle of immediacy, asserts that people tend to
be attracted to people and things they like, prefer,
and evaluate highly. Conversely, they avoid or
move away from people and things they dislike, do
not prefer, or evaluate negatively. Immediacy has
also been defined as psychological closeness, or
creating a sense of togetherness or oneness. When
people communicate, they convey a sense of atten-
tion, attraction, understanding, and/or concern.
Immediate communication behavior conveys these
attributes in a manner that shows closeness; there-
fore, messages are sent that reflect higher amounts
of the aforementioned traits. Nonimmediate com-
munication behavior conveys distance between
communicators.
Both verbal and nonverbal messages reflect
immediacy; however, people tend to respond more
to nonverbal cues when assessing immediacy.
Cultural groups construct and respond to imme-
diacy differently; however, research suggests that
people respond more favorably to more immedi-
ate communicators than those who convey dis-
tance and lack of concern. Most of the existing
immediacy research focuses on communication
Immediacy 381
between instructors and students in educational
settings. The verbal and nonverbal experience of
immediacy within and between groups shapes
how a self relates to others. In the most significant
sense, immediacy can either invite or exclude a self
into a particular worldview. Consequently, imme-
diacy behaviors and norms shape the process by
which a self identifies with another or an entire
social group.
Verbal Immediacy
Verbal messages communicate immediacy. The
use of names, pronouns, and terms of endearment
can often attract people and make them feel liked
or closer to others when communicating. During
a conversation, using a person’s name can increase
immediacy. Public speakers are also often advised
to use pronouns such as us instead of you to show
a connection between them and audience mem-
bers. When people feel close to each other, they
often develop nicknames or pet names for each
other to reflect closeness. General terms of endear-
ment, such as honey or sweetheart, also convey
feelings of closeness and attraction. Verbal mes-
sages can also be used to decrease immediacy or
show distance between speakers. Refusing to
address someone by his or her correct name or
using the pronoun you can convey lack of con-
cern or understanding. For example, the com-
ment, “You know how you people can be” can be
interpreted negatively and promote distance
between communicators. Name-calling or the use
of negative nicknames also decreases immediacy
and can result in psychological distance and hurt
feelings.
When people communicate, they may not
always agree on immediacy behaviors. For instance,
a person calling a colleague “honey” may intend
to promote a connection and closeness, but the
recipient of the message may interpret this as inap-
propriate or condescending behavior. If the mes-
sage is interpreted in this manner, the use of
“honey” can have the opposite effect and create
distance and lack of understanding instead of pro-
moting immediacy. In instances such as these, to
reduce potential misunderstandings one must take
care to understand how one’s messages can be
interpreted.
382 Immediacy
Nonverbal Immediacy
Proxemics
Physical closeness sends messages about imme-
diacy when communicating. Edward T. Hall, an
early pioneer of physical space, labeled the use of
space when communicating proxemics. He divided
the use of space into four distances: intimate dis-
tance, personal distance, social distance, and pub-
lic distance. Hall placed intimate distance at 0 to
18 inches. When communicating with others,
people place very close friends and loved ones at
this distance. Personal distance ranges from
18 inches to 4 feet. At this space, people cannot
touch one another. They can, however, close this
space easily by extending an arm. People generally
prefer to communicate with others within this
range. This space provides a comfortable distance
within which to communicate, and people can eas-
ily move into the intimate space if so desired, for
example, to embrace or hug. Some refer to this
distance as a “personal bubble” that protects peo-
ple from invading the intimate space of others
while remaining close enough to communicate eas-
ily. Communicating within intimate and personal
distances increases immediacy. Although people
generally react to more immediate communicative
behavior positively, there are times when changing
distances to increase immediacy can have negative
results. For example, if two people are communi-
cating and one feels more comfortable at the per-
sonal distance, the other person moving to the
intimate distance may cause the first person to react
negatively to an uncomfortable change in distance.
Social distance ranges from 4 to 12 feet. People
interact at social gatherings, with others they do
not know very well, and when conducting affairs
that are more impersonal in nature at this distance.
Because of the loss of immediacy at the social dis-
tance, communicating within this range conveys
formality instead of closeness. If someone uses this
distance to communicate in a more intimate set-
ting, it can send the message of coldness or dis-
tance. At this distance, however, people can adjust
their immediacy by moving closer to the range of
personal distance. For instance, when two people
meet at a social function, they may communicate
at the social distance range. When they feel more
comfortable and wish to increase immediacy, they
may move to the personal distance range to
increase nonverbal closeness. If one of the people
does not feel comfortable with more immediate
behavior, he or she may respond by taking a step
back and reestablishing the social distance range.
The last distance, public distance, ranges from
12 to 25 feet. This distance is the least immediate
and is generally reserved for more impersonal
events, such as public speaking engagements. At
this distance, people must work harder to increase
immediacy. This can be done verbally, as previ-
ously discussed, through the use of pronouns.
Simply switching from you to us can increase
immediacy and foster feelings of closeness. It can
also be achieved nonverbally, such as through eye
contact and body movement.
Oculesics
Oculesics, more commonly known as eye con-
tact, also impacts perceptions of immediacy. In
most Western societies, people generally perceive
direct eye contact as more immediate, as it conveys
understanding, closeness, and attentiveness. When
people do not establish direct eye contact when
communicating, it conveys distance and disinter-
est. Eye contact and immediacy are also closely
related to credibility and trustworthiness. More
immediate, direct eye contact establishes or rein-
forces trust, honesty, and competence. Less imme-
diate, indirect eye contact can convey suspicious
behavior and incompetence. When communicating
at the public distance, for instance, speakers may
try to look at everyone in the audience to increase
immediacy. Although direct eye contact is posi-
tively associated with immediacy, maintaining it
for too long can be construed as staring and per-
ceived in a more negative way.
Haptics
Haptics also refers to the manner in which
physical contact, generally referred to as touch,
impacts immediacy. Touch can communicate con-
cern, attention, and understanding during interac-
tions. Touch can replace verbal expressions of
concern, particularly when used to mitigate feel-
ings of uncertainty or discomfort or during times
when people cannot find the right words to

express immediacy. If people are interacting at a
social distance and one of the parties wishes to
increase immediacy by moving to the personal
distance but is uncertain if the other party wishes
to do the same, he or she may first touch the other
person’s arm and wait for a reaction. If received
positively, this use of touch will successfully
increase immediacy in a manner comfortable for
both people interacting. If someone wishes to
express immediate behavior and lacks the words
to do so, touch can accomplish this as well. For
example, a hug or an arm around the shoulders
may show sympathy at a funeral when one is at a
loss for words.
Even though touch generally increases imme-
diacy, people should use it with caution when
interacting in professional settings or with people
they do not know very well. Because there is less
agreement regarding when it is appropriate to use
touch to convey closeness, touch can easily be
misinterpreted. Touching too much can appear
unprofessional or even be construed as an
unwanted advance.
Kinesics
Kinesics is the study of body movement in com-
municative encounters, including movement of the
head, arms, legs, and eyes. Kinesics has also been
referred to, in more general terms, as body lan-
guage. The way people position and move their
bodies when communicating significantly impacts
how others interpret a message. Congruence
between verbal messages and kinesics can increase
immediacy. For example, saying “job well done”
with an accompanying smile or thumbs-up can
foster feelings of closeness and genuine support.
Congruence can also reduce immediacy. For
instance, stating a verbal message of discontent
while having one’s arms folded across one’s chest
can communicate distance.
Kinesics can also contradict a verbal message
that influences immediacy. If someone has a nega-
tive verbal message and then winks an eye, the
nonverbal message supersedes the verbal message,
therefore increasing immediacy. Contrarily, some-
one can verbally foster immediacy and then contra-
dict this message by the rolling of the eyes. Because
people tend to rely more upon the nonverbal
Immediacy 383
message for meaning, this body movement can
signal distance and lack of concern.
Culture and Immediacy
Interpretations of immediate behavior can vary
greatly according to cultural contexts. Some con-
sider Hall’s notion of proxemic distances appro-
priate for Western societies but not as much for
people of other cultural backgrounds. Haptics,
specifically high- and low-contact cultures, illus-
trates this point. High-contact cultures tend to use
touch more often to communicate than do low-
contact cultures. Because Western cultures tend to
be low-contact, especially the United States, Hall’s
four zones of distance cohere. Contrarily, high-
contact cultures may use shorter distances in the
personal and social proxemic zones.
Cultures that have a mixture of different back-
grounds can also convey and interpret immediacy
differently. For example, Italian Americans and
African Americans may use haptics more often to com­
municate immediacy than European Americans,
who may rely more upon verbal immediacy cues.
Oculesics also serves as a useful example of how
immediacy varies by cultural contexts. For exam-
ple, a teacher in a U.S. elementary school often
tells students to look him in the eye when recount-
ing events. He deems direct eye contact more
immediate and a sign of honesty. He assumes that
students not looking him in the eye are dishonest.
He once stated that Asian students tend to be the
most dishonest and used lack of direct eye contact
as “proof.” When he was informed that many
Asian cultures regard direct eye contact with
authority figures disrespectful, he reconsidered
direct eye contact as a measure of honesty.
Empirical Support:
Immediacy in the Classroom
Existing communication research studies support
the notion that people respond more favorably to
immediate behavior than they do to nonimmediate
behavior. Most of this body of research examines
immediate behavior and its response through ana-
lyzing the use of immediacy in the classroom.
Students who feel that their instructors use more
immediate behavior generally believe that their
384 Immigration
courses were more valuable and that the instruc-
tion was better than instructors who do not use
immediate behavior in the classroom. Both verbal
and nonverbal immediacy cues influence students’
perceptions of their instructors. Studies have also
shown that nonverbal immediacy increases stu-
dents’ willingness to contact their instructors out-
side of classroom settings. Immediate behavior can
also positively impact student learning and willing-
ness to engage material. Students and instructors
also use immediacy to gauge whether they like
each other in academic settings.
Based upon the research regarding immediacy,
instructors are often trained to be more immedi-
ate with their students. Common advice often
includes suggestions regarding verbal and non-
verbal immediacy behaviors. Instructors should
learn their students’ names as soon as possible
and use them when addressing the students in the
classroom. Also, instructors have been advised to
communicate immediacy through nonverbal cues,
such as maintaining open body language, nod-
ding their heads to encourage participation, and
using direct eye contact when lecturing. Instructors
have also been advised to use cultural sensitivity
with immediate behavior; however, this can be
difficult to achieve when counterbalanced with
the goal to use immediate behavior consistently
with all students so they do not perceive some as
teacher’s pets. Despite the difficulties in balanc-
ing consistency with misinterpretation, people
generally respond more favorable to immediate
communication.
Cerise L. Glenn
See also Communication Competence; Contact
Hypothesis; Culture; Face/Facework; Forms of Address
Further Readings
Allen, J. L., & Shaw, D. H. (1990). Teachers’
communication behaviors and supervisors’ evaluation
of instruction in elementary and secondary classrooms.
Communication Education, 39, 308–322.
Baringer, D. K., & McCroskey, J. C. (2000). Immediacy
in the classroom: Student immediacy. Communication
Education, 49, 178–186.
Burgoon, J. K., Birk, T., & Pfau, M. (1990). Nonverbal
behaviors, persuasion, and credibility. Human
Communication Research, 17, 140–169.
Hall, E. T. (1966). The hidden dimension. Garden City,
NY: Doubleday.
Hickson, M., III, Stacks, D. W., & Moore, N. (2004).
Nonverbal communication: Studies and applications
(4th ed.). Los Angeles: Roxbury.
Mehrabian, A. (1971). Silent messages. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.
Immigration
Immigration refers to the act of moving from one
place to another. Thus, immigrants are mobile.
They are not indigenous but foreign, often seen
and defined as abnormal by the indigenous ele-
ment. To the host citizen, immigrants may com-
municate strangely and may follow alien mores.
The unfamiliar behavior of the immigrant is often
perceived by the host country as “wrong.”
Meanwhile, the immigrant may be quite aware
that he or she does not know all aspects of the
host cultural ways and may attribute mistakes
made to his or her lack of knowledge about the
local environment, that is, innocent ignorance,
rather than to personal malice, disrespect for local
folkways, or to his or her own moral failing. The
difference the immigrant embodies may be attrib-
uted by the host as an inherent failing of the immi-
grant. For the immigrant, however, it is not an
inherent failing but a matter of innocent misun-
derstanding that can be ameliorated with time and
experience. The alterity, or the otherness, of the
identity of the immigrant is based both in lan-
guage and behavioral differences, which include
cultural differences, differences in values, motives,
beliefs, and expectations.
Language and Immigrant Identity
Otherness and marginalization do not always
mean being weak, but they do demand from the
immigrant greater cognitive and affective effort at
socialization because of the complexity of the
immigrants’ cultural and linguistic backgrounds.
For a sojourner, the semantic field “thickens,” to
borrow a term from Clifford Geertz. Everything,
even the most mundane processes and objects, sud-
denly seem salient and become more prominent in
one’s consciousness. For the sojourner, food,

clothing, rules for crossing streets, instructions for
how to use a public telephone, and so forth, all
become prominent in awareness, and this sudden
foregrounding of so many experiences greatly
increases the affective and cognitive labor for the
newcomer. This increase in cognitive complexity
and cognitive effort is not limited to being com-
pelled to translate between two or more languages
much of the time. Life abroad is more complicated
and difficult than life in one’s place of primary
socialization.
Culture, as a way of life, becomes an important
concept because it powerfully influences how an
individual understands and interprets the actions
and reactions of the world at large. To some
extent, the self and culture are inseparable. The
self is always a cultured being, a person who has
been raised and enculturated by a larger group of
people. And so, to the degree that cultures vary
around the globe, so too must there exist many
different kinds of selves. When a person says that
he or she is Greek or Malaysian, this expresses the
identification that exists between the person and
his or her culture and, often, his or her language.
Language is important to personal identity.
Language, culture, and self are difficult to sepa-
rate. Language is a sensitive subject because it
involves peoples’ sense of community and identifi-
cation. In France, l’Académie française guards
against the use of non-French words in public dis-
course. As early as the ancient Taoists, in what is
now China; the ancient Jews in the Middle East;
and the ancient sophists, such as Isocrates in
Greece, thinkers have believed that language acqui-
sition is the same thing as acquiring the ability to
think and acquiring an identity, indeed acquiring a
cultural identity. When children learn a language,
they learn a system that will structure not only
what they can think about but also how they think
about it.
The structuration of one’s consciousness is
largely a process that one is not, and indeed cannot
be, initially aware of. The formation of oneself,
one’s language, one’s world, as such, is largely out
of one’s control. We are part of the field of experi-
ence. It is not so much that a person speaks a lan-
guage as it speaks him or her, meaning that one’s
language has already structured the world into
which one was born and it shapes one’s very
modes of conscious awareness. We are an integral
Immigration 385
part of the ecology of meaning. Who we become is
not a matter of our own volition. As developing
children, we cannot guide our own development
consciously or according to our own intentions
and principles. Though everything is meaningful to
us, what things mean to us, that is, how we per-
ceive and evaluate the world, is largely beyond our
control. We are taught how to see the world, not
in a formal classroom setting but by being an
active participant in the social world, by being an
integral part of the ecology of meaning, which is
not directional but a field of constant interactive
and interpretive activity. This is what Eric Kramer
calls the field theory of human communication. It
is not limited to conceptual symbolic language
(spoken written, or both; the metaphysical reduc-
tionism of lingualism) but includes nonverbal ways
of being and expressing ourselves from how to
drive a stick-shift car to how one holds one’s fork
or chopsticks, dances, laughs, cries, points, and
walks. For instance, Kiowa Indians in the United
States always curl their index finger a little when
they point because to point directly is rude and
may have supernatural consequences.
According to the field theory of human experi-
ence and communication, we are born into an
already complex and operant semantic field. When
an immigrant crosses a boundary, he or she must
contend with a new semantic field, which includes
not merely spoken language like vocabulary and
grammar but also paralinguistics, such as when it
is appropriate to laugh, when it is appropriate to
be silent, whether it is appropriate to talk about
oneself, when jokes are appropriate, at what vol-
ume should one speak, how turn taking works,
and so forth. In Japan, for instance, what might be
called personal efficacy regarding communica-
tion competence has more to do with being self-
controlled enough to remain silent and listen
intently than to interject one’s opinion. In the
United States, what counts as personal efficacy has
more to do with being an eloquent speaker: witty,
quick, well informed, and so forth. In addition,
there are nonverbal codes that are difficult to mas-
ter when crossing borders.
When one crosses a boundary and becomes
marginalized, this means that one is not automati-
cally included via social ritual and scripted behav-
ior. Upon breeching the boundary, suddenly
interaction is no longer routinized and normative.
386 Immigration
Instead, it becomes laborious—effortful. The invol-
untary becomes voluntary, subconscious behavior
rises to the threshold of awareness. Self- and other-
monitoring increases. All of this means that inter-
action becomes more complex, which means that
options must be weighed in the moment; cognitive
labor increases and, with it, feelings of frustration.
As such, immigrant identity is very much a process
of intercultural communication and negotiation.
Commonsense Negotiation
The newcomer does not share the common sense,
the folk knowledge presupposed by the indigenous
population. Part of intercultural adjustment means
to begin to inhabit that common sense. The com-
mon sense is the sense or mode of meaning that
permeates a worldview, which seems natural,
obvious, logical, and rational. It is the basis of the
“realism” of a worldview for those who live within
that hermeneutic horizon.
Communities are bound by the common sense
they share, the way they make sense of the cosmos,
what it means to them; this includes understanding
their sense of self, their place. One can arrogantly
refuse to take another’s way of being in the world
seriously because it seems “primitive,” “back-
ward,” or “ignorant,” but if a person wants to
understand why people do what they do, he or she
has to understand the world from their perspec-
tive. That does not mean the person has to pre-
sume the other worldview as true, but in order to
understand others, he or she has to at least take
their lifeworld into account.
The status of being an immigrant means one
who crosses boundaries between groups, which
usually means crossing from one commonsense
ecology into a different lifeworld. What we have
then is a status, an identification of a person who is
on the move between groups. It is also a mood, a
state of mind, a set of mannerisms and an expressed
custom that is not merely contingent but has serious
moral implications. Often, immigrants try their best
to get along with the indigenous ways they encoun-
ter even if they do not understand. They may make
mistakes and misinterpretations and harbor differ-
ent values, but they typically try to get along. It is
not in their interest to conflict with the local folk.
Despite the best efforts of negotiation by the
immigrant group, the host culture still may see the
immigrant as lacking in many competencies and
even in moral character. Ethnocentrism means
more than simply observing obvious differences in
lifestyle and mannerisms. It involves applying par-
ticular values and moral judgments to that behav-
ior. In addition to being a cultural and political
phenomenon, ethnocentrism is also a moral and
ethical phenomenon. The local folk may tend to
blame mistakes on the character and personality
traits of the newcomer, impugning the morality and
ethical judgment of the stranger, suggesting that
there is something inherently inferior, lazy, stupid,
malicious, or malevolent about the newcomer.
Given a lack of information, they may well fall
back on stereotypes and attribute the newcomer’s
mistakes or odd behavior to the group to which he
or she “belongs,” be it a racial or ethnic group,
nationality, religious affiliation, level of educational
attainment, or political party membership.
To bring the immigrant closer to the host, the
immigrant and host must learn about each other.
This involves communication. Lowering anxiety
can be achieved through information gaining and
understanding, a process that takes time. For the
immigrant, many barriers exist to successful infor-
mation gathering, such as social and psychological
distance as well as possible language barriers. The
only way such distances can be bridged is through
extended contact between the immigrant and indi-
viduals in the host culture. Once they learn more
about each other, they may come to identify more
with certain elements of each others’ lives and see
a common, shared humanity. Empathy, and per-
haps even sympathy, grows through contact. As a
result, there are a variety of ways in which the
immigrant may assimilate, adapt, or cointegrate
within the host culture.
Assimilation to Cointegration
Host society receptivity is a measure of how wel-
coming a host society or group is to an outsider.
This initial posture will determine how long it
might take for individuals to get to know each
other. This factor is essential to the success of the
newcomer. Many researchers make untested pre-
sumptions about immigrant identity and host
receptivity and the interaction between the two.
One presumption is that simple interaction between
immigrants and their hosts will eventually lead to

assimilation, meaning that their cultural identity
will follow a process of conformity whereby the
immigrant abandons his or her original culture,
values, and ways of thinking and adopts the cus-
toms, values, and social attributes of the host soci-
ety until the immigrant becomes indistinguishable
from a majority group member. As interactions
between ethnic groups sharing a common socio-
cultural boundary increase, their distinct ethnici-
ties will disappear until the groups become
culturally indistinguishable. When one looks at the
preservation of cultural identity over centuries
among ethnic groups that live side-by-side through-
out Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, there
is much evidence to contradict this claim. Whereas
some immigrant groups assimilate, others retain
aspects of their native culture. Assimilation is far
more complex than some scholars admit.
Another unfounded presumption made by the
original students of immigration is that the host
society presents a monolithic “mainstream” cul-
ture. This is denied by the presence of modern
multicultural societies such as the United States.
Rural Nebraska is very different from San Diego,
which is very different from Mobile, Alabama.
Even within Mobile and San Diego, there are
neighborhood cultures. The claim that an immi-
grant faces a singular and simple mainstream cul-
ture that will guide the direction of assimilation is
still prevalent in some writing.
As we follow the evolution of the idea of immi-
grant identity and assimilation theory from Robert
Park to Milton Gordon and beyond, the concepts
adapt, adopt, adjust, assimilate, and integrate
sometimes become entangled. Gordon realized
that the change that constitutes assimilation is on
both sides of the equation: that the host culture is
changed by the presence of immigrants just as
immigrants are changed by the host culture, a pro-
cess Kramer calls coevolution which also involves
the coconstitution of identities.
At the social level, integration is really cointe-
gration. Communication is not a one-way process.
Although what some call conformity pressure,
claiming that it is exerted one-way onto minority
immigrants by the numerical majority of the host
population, is real, it does not and cannot com-
pletely overwhelm the immigrant’s mind. It is
impossible to “unlearn” or “deculturize” oneself.
If it were possible, immigrants would be like an
Immigration 387
erased computer memory, having no operating
system left with which to translate and interpret
their new world even though that interpretation
must be accented. Instead, the sojourner builds a
repertoire of cultural and communication compe-
tencies as he or she gains intercultural experience
and learns how to switch at will between cultural
codes to fit the situation. This is how new lan-
guages and cultures emerge by means of deviation
from their mother cultures and languages. Like the
coconstitution of identity and the coevolutionary
process, whereby a society both changes and is
changed by immigrants who move in joining the
living process of society as a system, as a semantic
field, integration is also a communicative process.
Integration is cointegration. In short, both sides
influence each other. Conformity pressure exists in
both directions, and the intensity of the pressure
cannot be reduced to simple quantification. A sin-
gle missionary entering a village can have tremen-
dous influence.
Increasingly in this globalizing world, many
contemporary writers refer to bicultural and multi-
cultural individuals as transnational. To under-
stand the complexity of this new development, the
term transcultural may be used to capture the mul-
tiple linguistic communities that often reside within
modern nation-state boarders and across political
boundaries. Increasingly, culturally mobile indi-
viduals do not abandon contact with their home
culture even as they live in another. New technolo-
gies such as the Internet and cell phones allow
immigrants to stay in close, even daily, contact
with their home societies and cultures. They stay
abreast of the latest changes in music, television
programs, news, and so forth via the Internet. They
also can stay in close touch with friends and family
back home. Social networks among immigrants
today are extensive and vital, transcending cultural
and geopolitical boundaries. Immigrants master a
repertoire of communication and cultural rules and
move between cultures with increasing facility. The
unidimensional, simplistic notion that had cur-
rency during the 1950s and is still echoed by a few
writers today—namely, that one can attain new
competency, can really achieve “functional fit”
(assimilate) only to the extent to which one
unlearns and sheds one’s original identity—has
been proven false by of the growing research lit-
erature on immigrant life and identity.
388 Immigration
Coconstitutional and
Coevolutionary Identity Formation
Differences between the immigrant and the host
society never absolutely disappear as he or she
integrates into a host society. Rather, integration
involves what Kramer calls cultural fusion, a pro-
cess whereby subjects encounter a host cultural
form, adopt it, and, inevitably, add their accent to
it. Examples from multicultural societies are innu-
merable. A few are curry hamburgers, playing jazz
with traditional Japanese instruments, and adding
Polynesian warrior dances to an American college
football pregame routine. Immigrants influence the
societies into which they move and are also influ-
enced by those societies.
Whereas assimilationists argue that the evolu-
tionary goal of an immigrant should be to adopt
the host culture’s predominant mode of thinking,
acting, and even feeling—what they call cognitive,
behavioral, and affective functional fitness (inter-
cultural adaptation)—as much as possible, the
reality of immigrant experience is a coevolutionary
process whereby the host culture and the sojourner
communicate, that is, exchange, interpret, and
borrow some of each other’s ways.
Cultural fusion is a theory of intercultural com-
munication. It presupposes hundreds of years of
hermeneutic research and observation in interpre-
tation studies and accepts the hermeneutic tenet
put forth by Friedrich Nietzsche and, later, Martin
Heidegger, that the human condition is fundamen-
tally a process of interpretation, of making sense of
experience. The hermeneutic process presumes
that all interaction involves interpretation, a pro-
cess of making sense of one’s surroundings, includ-
ing Others’ behaviors. This process of making
sense always presumes one’s own perspective.
Without a perspective, a person cannot make sense
of anything. And so, all human experience is lim-
ited; without limitation, there is no sense making,
no knowing. Cultural fusion thus explains how
immigrants make sense of their adopted home-
lands. Because of perspectivism, everyone has an
accent; each person has a particular take on the
world. People who share a common cosmology
and more or less common history and experience
tend to share a common way of seeing the world,
a common accent on perception and conception.
To be an immigrant has various meanings
depending on the context, the human ecology that
is constituted of the civilizational and cultural
interface that is the necessary condition for immi-
gration to exist and, consequently, for the identi-
fication of “immigrant” to exist. The more
homogeneous a group is, the less individuals are
identifiable as unique. The moment a person steps
into a group that he or she is not a member of and
becomes Other, or the moment someone steps
into your group and is Other, homogeneity (the
quality of sameness or similarity) gives way to
heterogeneity. In the real world of immigration,
the process of identity morphogenesis is complex
and ever-present. Dependent on difference for its
very existence, identity changes as differences
change. However, no matter the valence of how
the experience is perceived, in all cases it involves
the realization of what Ernst Jentsch and Sigmund
Freud called the uncanny. The uncanny is the
paradoxical experience of something or someone
who is both familiar and foreign at the same time.
The immigrant to the host and the host to the
immigrant can seem uncanny. The strangeness of
difference can be fascinating or frightening, curi-
ously pleasing while alienating, liberating while
lonely, in essence, more or less sublime in the
most profound sense, for it involves self-realization
and a heightened sense of self-monitoring and
also a heightened effort at observing the ways of
the Other.
Eric Mark Kramer
See also Culture; Culture Shock; Diaspora; Self
Further Readings
Alba, R., & Nee, V. (2005). Remaking the American
mainstream: Assimilation and contemporary
immigration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Bacon, D. (2006). Communities without borders: Images
and voices from the world of migration. Ithaca, NY:
ILR Press.
Huntington, S. (2005). Who are we? The challenges to
America’s national identity. New York: Simon &
Schuster.
Kramer, E. (1997). Modern/postmodern: Off the beaten
path of anti-modernism. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Massey, D., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A.,
Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (2005). Worlds in
motion. New York: Oxford University Press.

Suárez-Orozco, C., & Todorov, I. (2008). Learning a
new land: Immigrant students in American society.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Impression Management
Impression management is a sociological concept
coined by Erving Goffman, one of the most
important social theorists of the 20th century,
who is well known for his astute observation on
the microphysics of social interaction. Goffman
introduced the term in his famous book The
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, considered
to be a momentous contribution to the social psy-
chological examination of the relationship between
the individual and society. In this book, Goffman
spelled out a dramaturgical theory of everyday
life. The theory, however, is not about how
aspects of the theater spill over to everyday life.
Instead, without confounding social life and
drama, Goffman effectively used the metaphor of
theater to show how the self is a dramatic effect
and not a preordained substance that, together
with its own kind, carries out social performances.
The self does not act on the basis of a previously
spelled out social script that social actors read to
their respective audiences either. Rather, social
scripts are the outcome of active agents who are
involved in vital processes of social interaction.
This social interaction forms, maintains, and
changes both the personal and the social identity
of an individual as the “drama” of the self and the
other unfolds.
In the dynamic social scene, the self, according
to Goffman, encounters the fate of being credited
or discredited in the midst of the very performance
that defines its characteristics. Social actors, accord-
ingly, employ several techniques to create a credit-
able self. One of these techniques is impression
management, a technique of staging a character
effectively and preventing performance disruptions
that violate the interactional scene. Incidents of
performance disruptions include unmeant gestures,
fortuitous acts that contradict the intended perfor-
mance; inopportune intrusions, intrusions of out-
siders who are not part of the performance; faux
pas, verbal or nonverbal acts that are exercised
without seriously considering their implications in
Impression Management 389
full; and scenes, intentional acts that condition the
unfolding of a new interactional drama. Hence, a
successful social show is materialized only when
both actors and audiences possess appropriate dis-
positions and are prepared for forthcoming inter-
actions. Individuals who are involved in effective
impression management possess attributes that
allow them to take defensive, protective, and pro-
active measures.
Loyalty, Discipline, and Circumspection
Goffman notes that there are three ways by which
performers can be resourcefully engaged in an act
of impression management. These include drama-
turgical loyalty, dramaturgical discipline, and dra-
maturgical circumspection. Dramaturgical loyalty
is a condition in which a team obtains an uncondi-
tional commitment from its members so that it can
carry out its performance successfully. Members
who are lax to expose the secrets of a team or who
act out of line to protect their individual vested
interest, disregarding the interest of the group as a
whole, jeopardize dramatic performance. Also, if
actors are not prevented from strongly attaching
themselves with their respective audiences, a blurred
distinction between the two parties may arise,
thereby impinging on a smooth team performance.
There are various ways by which dramatic loy-
alty can be maintained. Establishing solidarity
among members is one way of sustaining drama-
turgical loyalty. Solidarity among actors whose
disposition, among other things, allows them to
see the audience as an outgroup that should be
kept at bay, prevents an outward orientation. The
more there is an organic connection among per-
formers in which each member, however minimal
his or her role, is recognized, the less likely will
there be the possibility for doubt and dissension.
Another way of securing dramaturgical loyalty
involves audience alternation. Alternating between
audiences from time to time prevents performers
from forming strong ties with their “clients.”
Moreover, periodic alteration of audiences coun-
teracts against off-show actions that arise as a
result of strong emotional ties between performers
and audiences.
Dramaturgical loyalty must be accompanied by
dramaturgical discipline in order for performance
to be carried out more efficiently. Dramaturgical
390 Impression Management
discipline entails a two-pronged process in which
performers are deeply involved in their respective
actions while at the same time possessing the dispo-
sition to distance themselves from the same actions.
Whereas the former allows them to align their per-
formances with group actions, the latter stops them
from being carried away and provides them with a
mental room to respond to unforeseen incidents
that emerge in the midst of the performance.
Disciplined performers, accordingly, have the
following distinguishing features. First, they are set
to carry out their roles while at the same time tak-
ing discretionary measures where appropriate.
Rather than being distracted by emergent incidents,
such as mistakes made by teammates, they react
creatively in order to avoid the disruption of the
performance. In this case, truly disciplined perform-
ers are those whose interventions are not perceived
as out-of-step actions that contradict their assigned
roles. The ability to self-control is another mark of
disciplined performers. Disciplined performers
strictly abide by the principles of “expressive status
quo,” even when they are exposed to acts that may
tempt them to indulge in their own personal dis-
play. By so acting, they put a stop to trans-place
exposés and avoid the distinction between perform-
ers and audience from being muddled up. Related
to this ability is the faculty to move between what
is private and public. In private, disciplined per-
formers are much more relaxed than when they are
acting in the public domain. And all these abilities
cannot be possible if disciplined performers do not
possess the appropriate face and voice. Control
over facial expressions and verbal tones, attained
after some experience, allows performers to have
proper expressive reactions in multiple scenarios.
Dramaturgical circumspection primarily involves
preparation on the part of actors for the forthcom-
ing performance ahead of time. Appropriate dispo-
sitions are critical for participating in performances
fruitfully. Yet it would be in the interest of perform-
ers if they are prepared for future interactions in
advance. These preparations allow performers to
keep possible disruption at a minimal. However,
rigid designs are also equally risky. Not only do
they prevent actors from utilizing their good judg-
ment whenever opportunities arise, but misunder-
standings may ensue instead of intended goals being
achieved. Hence, dramaturgical circumspection has
to be carried out with caution.
Dramaturgical circumspection can be achieved
by adhering to various methods: (a) Performers
who are considered to be loyal and disciplined
need to be carefully selected. This saves the team
from investing its energy on issues that are mar-
ginal to the objectives of a team. (b) Actors need to
keep away from audiences that are likely to create
problems for performance. If audiences are unsym-
pathetic to performers, the latter may be forced to
participate in improvisations to restore proper per-
formance. Improvisations that require a good
amount of time investment and creativity put
actors out of step. (c) The number of teammates
needs to be set at the appropriate level in order to
avoid problems associated with group size. The
smaller the number of performers there are in a
team, the more performance is carried out with
some ease. Limiting the number of participants,
however, should not go as far as robbing the group
a critical mass requisite for group performance.
(d) Finally, due preparation needs to be made in
order to tackle unexpected events properly. This
can be done by rehearsing appropriately, selecting
disciplined actors that can handle contingencies
effectively, working out an agenda beforehand,
and imparting the outlines of the act to the audi-
ence before performance is carried out.
Tact and Protective Measures
Because performance is a dynamic process involv-
ing performers and audience, its effective execution,
however disciplined and astute the former are, can-
not be possible without the cooperative involve-
ment of the latter. Hence, for a performance to go
smoothly, the proactive and defensive measures of
performers need to be complemented by the protec-
tive measures of the audience. A hostile audience
can seriously affect performance, and a reluctant
audience can force performers to make an extra
effort to meet their objectives. The existence of a
well-mannered audience, which properly under-
stands its social role and acts in accordance with the
proper definition of audience-actor relationship, is
critical for running a trouble-free performance.
Central to the protective measures taken by the
audience is tactfulness. Tactfulness on the part of the
audience largely involves an audience’s willingness
to stay away from regions where they are unsum-
moned or regions in which actors are preparing for

the forthcoming performance. In most cases, non-
performers consciously adopt the policy of nonin-
tervention to let performers finish their job without
interruption. And if they have to enter a place
where the performance is being carried out, they
give actors appropriate cues to signal that they are
in the vicinity of the front region where the perfor-
mance is being enacted. Such signals are not merely
indicative of respectfulness, but they are also
intended to give actors some time to readjust them-
selves to the new configuration in which a non-
member is part of the performance. Where the
arrangement is such that performers and outsiders
are in close proximity, well-mannered outsiders
actively distance themselves from the performance
to gesture that they are not interested in what is
being said or done. The role of outsiders, however,
is not to refrain from any form of participation
under all circumstances. In some instances, consci-
entious outsiders intervene to facilitate a perfor-
mance. The extent to which this involvement is
permissible is culturally situated. In some cultures,
intervention may be perceived as rude; in others it
might be discerned as the sign of politeness. Even
in places where intervention is mostly considered as
an unwarranted intrusion, situations might dictate
outsiders to offer their hands.
Tactfulness on the part of outsiders is not some-
thing that ends once nonperformers enter the
social space where the act is being executed.
Rather, it is a process that is often extended to the
front region as well. In this case, outsiders use dif-
ferent cues to suggest that they are “extras” and
not active doers in the current performance. By so
acting, they show that they are not interested in
stealing the show. Or a nonperformer can give due
attention to what is being deliberated or done
without actively participating in the performance.
In addition to these activities that are intended to
facilitate performance, nonperformers also take
extra care to avoid inconsistencies that might dis-
rupt the performance. If nonperformers happen to
see any gaffe on the part of performers, they adopt
the policy of “civil inattention”; that is, they act as
though nothing significant has happened, or they
are quick to accept the excuse made by performers.
In cases where the performer is novice, supportive
audiences are less inclined to exaggerate the mis-
take made by the same person. Despite all these
proper relationships between performers and their
Impression Management 391
audiences, it is possible that the cooperative ven-
ture between the two parties could be so success-
fully carried out that the boundary between actors
and nonactors can be blurred, thereby impacting
performance negatively.
Performance disruption is not caused by lack of
proper delineation between the boundary between
performers and outsiders alone. Even when outsid-
ers are willing to help performers, performers can
be the cause for dramatic failure if they are not
aware of what is being done to them. Persuasive
performance requires that both participants carry
out their role appropriately. Most importantly,
performers are required to be tactful with regard
to their tact. For instance, if outsiders are within
the vicinity of the performance, they need to avoid
topics that would make the “tactful withdrawal”
of outsiders burdensome. On the other hand, the
care taken by performers should not be taken to
the extreme either, for it might create the impres-
sion that the audience is not to be trusted. There
has to be a happy medium.
Alem Kebede
See also Individuation; Self; Symbolic Interactionism
Further Readings
Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of the self in
everyday life. New York: Anchor Books.
Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the management
of spoiled identity. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
Hochschild, A. R. (1983). The managed heart:
Commercialization of human feeling. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Leary, M. (1996). Self-presentation: Impression
management and interpersonal behavior. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
Manning, P. (1992). Erving Goffman and modern
sociology. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Smith, G. (2006). Erving Goffman. New York:
Routledge.
Indigenous
See Clan Identity
392 Individual
Individual
An individual is a whole unit, an organism sepa-
rate from other organisms of its own kind.
However, when referring to, or speaking of, an
individual as a rational human, it is in reference to
a specific and separate human individual. An indi-
vidual is one, perhaps among many humans. How
one views himself or herself and how cultures and
religions define an individual is where the argu-
ments unfold and difference emerges. An individu-
al’s identity may be defined by that person’s place
within a family unit, community, or society, for
instance, as a part of a larger whole. The individ-
ual has an identity, known to himself or herself,
and perhaps created by the self, with that identity
also known to others. This identity has a capacity
to be changed throughout the time and life of the
individual, based on the individual’s actions or
based on how society views that particular indi-
vidual and forces a morality upon the individual.
The Locus of Responsibility
As individuals, we assume people are capable of
and responsible for their own thoughts and actions.
Throughout written history, philosophers and sci-
entists have attempted to answer the question of
what an individual is and how one perceives one-
self. Metaphysical, ethical, social, psychological
and religious questions abound when discussing the
individual and how and why one becomes separate
and different from others. In the West, responsibil-
ity ultimately rests in one pivotal location—the
human agent, as well as our philosophical vocabu-
lary, has termed this agent individual. The individ-
ual becomes the focal point of responsibility, the
ultimate decision-making realm within the West.
There are and have been for centuries, argu-
ments and discussions within the sciences, religion,
and society as to when an individual begins.
Aristotle wrote about the formation of life as a
scientist and a philosopher. He explained his deter-
mination of when an organism becomes an indi-
vidual, but Aristotle based his account on his
limited notions of the male and female anatomies.
Thomas Aquinas, drawing on his Catholicism and
foundation in Aristotelian philosophy, considered
the individual as one who can accept knowledge
based on intelligent reasoning and learning from
the world affecting the senses. This religious iden-
tity, then, is an individual which houses a soul that
leaves the individual upon death. In the early
17th century, René Descartes’s famous phrase “I
think, therefore I am” suggested that if one ques-
tions one’s self then he or she must be. Thus, think-
ing and intuition separate the individual from the
animal species. An individual, as John Locke first
described in the later part of the 17th century, is
one person in a particular place in a particular time
that has a consciousness about himself or herself.
An individual’s being is contrasted and evaluated
based on how one views and defines oneself as
compared to others within a certain group. It is the
individual that begins to take shape as a person
who has rights within a larger citizenry, not the
larger society dictating what that person ought to
be. An understanding of individual rights within a
larger community was born out of this thinking,
which led into the late 18th century and the French
Revolution. Once again, the focal point of respon-
sibility, accountability, and human freedom was
centered in the idea of the individual.
Understanding Identity as Derivative
In the early 19th century, Søren Kierkegaard,
through formally published pieces and his own
journal entries, questioned organized Christianity
and the continued political strength of the church
because it took away from an individual’s signifi-
cance. In the early 20th century, John Dewey sug-
gested that the individual recognizes one’s self as it
takes its form in the environment of the customs of
the community in which one is engaged. The
potential for an individual rests in the person’s
engagement with the community. In the 20th cen-
tury, Martin Buber suggested that the interpersonal
connection of one individual to another, through
the I-Thou relationship, permits the individual to
have a relationship with the other; there lies the
beginning of how the individual shapes the other.
The individual has potential to become some-
thing different in characteristic, by changing actions,
behaviors, and, eventually, its identity. Through
knowledge of the world or environment in which
one find one’s self, the ability to change, to adapt,
to enhance, or to digress rests within our daily
understanding of the individual. This individual is

derivative of the dialectic between the experiences
that shape one and the formation present at the
given moment of meeting new information from
the environment. Based on one’s experience within
a unit, whether it be as small as a family or as
large as the state, an individual chooses to identify
with certain characteristics that make that person
unique and separate from others. Those experi-
ences dictate how an individual chooses to be
known and valued externally and validated inter-
nally. An individual, therefore, has mental attri-
butes that signify a certain personality but also
has physical attributes further distinguishing that
person’s individuality.
The individual in the 21st century is indeed the
focal point of freedom, responsibility, and deriva-
tive change. The environment, particularly with
technological innovation, continues to impact the
constitution of the individual. Indeed, the notion
of the individual understood within this derivative
sense becomes not simply what he or she takes in
from the environment but in the dialectical
exchange between one’s temporal formation and
that environment. Change is inevitable. Just as the
seasons change, so does the individual. Unlike the
seasons, however, there is no beginning and no
end, simply a sense of difference.
Melissa A. Cook
See also Identity and Democracy; Identity and Reason;
Person
Further Readings
Buber, M. (1970). I and Thou (W. Kaufmann, Trans.).
New York: Simon & Schuster.
Cassirer, E. (2000). The individual and the cosmos in
renaissance philosophy. Mineola, NY: Dover.
Descartes, R. (2004). Discourse on the method of rightly
conducting the reason, and searching for truth in the
sciences. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger.
Locke, J. (1996). An essay concerning human
understanding (J. W. Yolton, Ed.). London: Orion.
Individual Autonomy
Individual autonomy refers to the concept that
each human being is personally independent to
Individual Autonomy 393
make the decisions encountered in day-to-day living;
in political terms, it could be stated that an indi-
vidual possesses the ability to be self-governing.
When a young child tells a supervising adult,
“You’re not the boss of me!” he or she is acting
upon an unreflective commitment to individual
autonomy. A more reflective understanding of the
concept is found in various debates within the
study of politics, health care, and religion.
Regardless of the sophistication of one’s under-
standing of the concept, a belief in individual
autonomy suggests that one’s identity is created
through actions resulting from some level of self-
determination. When viewed as a continuum,
found on one side is extreme individual autonomy,
in which the solitary individual is solely responsi-
ble and accountable for any actions taken; found
on the other side of the continuum is minimized
individual autonomy in which the larger commu-
nity (or leader) takes control of the decision-
making process of the individual. A middle ground
is found when a person willingly surrenders some
degree of individual autonomy in order to produc-
tively work and live within a society, an approach
to living that is commonly witnessed within a
democratic society. The following brief historical
survey of the roots of the concept provides a con-
text for subsequent contemporary examples.
Historical Engagement
The contemporary understanding of individual
autonomy is primarily influenced by Aristotle, the
classical Greek philosopher, and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, both writing dur-
ing the European Enlightenment of the 18th cen-
tury. Aristotle’s belief is that the purpose of
government is to create public space in which each
individual citizen can productively contribute to
society, or, in Aristotle’s terms, achieve the good
life. Through personal choice and the development
of productive habits, an individual alone possesses
the ability to achieve the good life; the role of the
government is merely to provide the context in
which such achievement is possible. Kant, inspired
by the writing of Rousseau, believed that individ-
ual autonomy is an essential aspect of human
nature. The work of Aristotle, Rousseau, and Kant
served as great inspiration for the founding fathers
of the United States of America and presents the
394 Individuation
dominant framework for an understanding of indi-
vidual autonomy within Western society. Within a
democratic society, there is a general tension that
exists between the exercise of one’s autonomy and
the will of the larger society; this tension often
emerges in discussions regarding free speech.
Although a Western understanding of individual
autonomy, in which the individual is emphasized
over the group, is privileged within this entry, a
thorough study of worldwide cultures reveals
many cultures that emphasize the group over the
individual and that have a very different under-
standing of the concept.
Although the 20th-century work of the Conti­
nental existentialists emphasized total autonomy
and personal freedom, most who assumed this
approach to living found it unlivable over an
extended period of time. When living within a
society made up of more than a single individual,
one cannot totally separate oneself from the larger
culture. For example, regardless of one’s position
on the justness of war, one must recognize that the
sacrifices of earlier generations allows one to have
the freedom to publicly discuss and debate whether
war has any value. As stated earlier, discussions
surrounding free speech are one way in which the
tension between individual autonomy and a larger
society reveals itself. A person has the freedom to
say, “I completely disagree with you and believe
you’re wrong, but I will fight for your ability to
say what you believe.” One’s responsibility is to
share this dual commitment between protecting
the freedoms of the individual and being sensitive
to the concerns of the larger society.
The Dialectic
Concerns about health care also provide a cogent
example of the tension between individual auton-
omy and the concerns of the larger community.
The simple illustration of a decision about child-
hood immunization presents a variety of perspec-
tives. If, for religious or philosophical reasons, a
parent chooses to not have a child immunized
prior to entering school, the parents are able to
exercise their decision-making ability for them-
selves and their child but in turn could place the
greater community at risk if the child contracts a
contagious disease that would have been prevented
through the immunization. The importance of a
strong public sphere that allows for conversation
about concerns such as this cannot be overstated.
The law allows for the parents to choose what is
believed to be best for the child and family, but the
decision must be made in light of the concerns
raised in public conversations.
The example of the child whose resistance to
parental authority demonstrates an unreflective
commitment to be self-governing helps demon-
strate how one’s identity is connected to individual
autonomy. As one is socialized into a group—
whether a workplace or a family—one eventually
comes to a point in time when the realization
occurs that in order to productively live within this
organization, some sacrifices must be made.
Negotiating these decisions assists one’s move
from a solitary individual living a completely
autonomous existence to a person within a larger
narrative fulfilling a vital role. When surrendering
some level of individual autonomy to live in a
larger society, one finds personal freedom in the
ability to work and be creative within the limits of
the role.
Brent C. Sleasman
See also Citizenship; Civic Identity; Existentialist Identity
Questions; Identity and Democracy; Individuation;
Personal Identity Versus Self-Identity; Political Identity
Further Readings
Barker, E. (Ed. & Trans.). (1980). The politics of
Aristotle. New York: Oxford University Press.
Garrison, M., & Schnieder C. E. (2002). The law of
bioethics: Individual autonomy and social regulation
cases and materials. Eagan, MN: West.
Werhan, K. (2004). Freedom of speech: A reference guide
to the United States. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Individuation
Individuation refers to the emergence of a person’s
differentiated identity in relation to the larger
group of individuals with whom he or she is situ-
ated. From an onlooker’s perspective, a person
becomes individuated whenever he or she begins
to be recognized as a unique person within a larger

crowd, not only as a result of physical location or
appearance but mostly as a result of the person’s
habits, character, and personality. To be differenti-
ated from the group, a person must have, at one
time, been considered part of that particular group.
Under most circumstances, a person does not enter
into a group as an individuated person; this emer-
gence occurs as a function and by-product of
group interaction that takes place over a length of
time. In some ways, the progression toward indi-
viduation is counterintuitive because to become
differentiated, a person must first submit and
adopt some of the habits and characteristics found
within the larger group. Only through placing
one’s focus of attention upon the needs of the
larger group can a person emerge as an individu-
ated person within the larger context.
The contemporary understanding of individua-
tion is greatly influenced by the study of psychol-
ogy, specifically the work of Carl Gustav Jung.
Although this particular approach to understand-
ing the term dominates current discussions, a
wider understanding that includes a philosophical
perspective, including the organizational dynamics
of the marketplace, contributes to a more holistic
conception of the term. The work of Jürgen
Habermas provides a philosophical understanding
of individuation as it occurs through socialization
and firmly places this concept within the public
sphere of society.
Typically there are three phases that a person
will experience as he or she moves toward indi-
viduation. Phase 1 is when a person joins or enters
a group and has his or her individuality eclipsed by
the larger group or society with which he or she
takes part. To move beyond this phase, a person
must recognize that the organization or group pre-
existed his or her individual involvement and there-
fore must submit to the dominant practices of the
group. Phase 2 occurs as a person is socialized into,
and situated within, the larger group or society as
he or she internalizes the implicit or explicit expec-
tations and converts them to appropriate habits
and actions. Within this phase, the person begins to
sense that he or she is “one of them,” and the mem-
bers of the group begin to regard him or her as
“one of us”; although this is a necessary stage to
pass through to fully achieve individuation, some
may never move beyond this point. Failing to move
beyond this point can have a negative impact upon
Individuation 395
a person’s ability to productively interact and con-
tribute to the larger whole. Phase 3, the achieve-
ment of individuation, takes place as the individual
is firmly established within the organization. The
person’s identity emerges as a by-product of engage-
ment with those who are part of the group, not by
placing the focus of attention upon the self but by
actively contributing to the common purpose of the
group. Building upon the foundation offered by
Habermas, the following examples provide a brief
portrait of what individuation looks like within an
academic and a marketplace setting.
Consider the example of the progression of a
typical undergraduate university classroom. On
the first day of the semester, students are nothing
more than names on a page. As the instructor
attempts to learn the names of the students, and as
students begin to learn the names of each other,
the uniqueness of each student begins to emerge.
At some point during the semester, cohesiveness
emerges from the consistent interaction among
peers and professor. No longer is a student known
as the “one who always sits in the front row” but
she becomes “Jane, who always asks stimulating
questions.” While her physical position in the
classroom can help locate her, the observations
about her academic habits help identify her in ref-
erence to the other students in the class. By the end
of the semester, students’ unique personalities
begin to move to the foreground while their physi-
cal location in the classroom shifts to the back-
ground. For the students to feel accepted within
the classroom, each should achieve some level of
individuation. Although the phases outlined earlier
can provide insight into the progression each stu-
dent may experience, the process is unique for each
person and should not be viewed as a something
that can be artificially manufactured or achieved.
A second example from the marketplace pro-
vides additional insight into the stages of individu-
ation. When beginning a new job with a preexisting
organization, a person begins as an outsider to the
organization. As the person begins to internalize
the routines and habits necessary to succeed in that
particular role, the person begins to be seen as
“one of us” by the other employees. As the person
continues to effectively serve in that role, his or her
unique personality begins to emerge. He or she
goes from being “the new guy” to being the person
who “always wears a tie,” or the person who
396 Interaction Order
“always arrives early,” or the person who “always
eats at the same restaurant for lunch,” or the per-
son who “has a great personality.” These factors
begin to differentiate the person from other mem-
bers of the organization but also allow for reinforc-
ing he or she is “one of us.” Whether joining an
organization that has a preexistent tradition, such
as the marketplace example, or a newly formed
group, such as a classroom, each person has the
potential to achieve some level of differentiation.
Brent C. Sleasman
See also Deindividuation; Embeddedness/Embedded
Identity; Individual; Individual Autonomy;
Socialization
Further Readings
Habermas, J. (1992). Individuation through socialization:
On George Herbert Mead’s theory of subjectivity. In
Postmetaphysical thinking: Philosophical essays
(pp. 149–204). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Jung, C. G. (1968). Man and his symbols. New York:
Dell.
Strauss, A. L. (2005). Childhood socialization. Edison,
NJ: Transaction.
Interaction Order
The concept of the interaction order refers to the
complex system of entitlements and responsibili-
ties that constitute the realm of face-to-face con-
duct, embracing both nonverbal and verbal
channels of communication, and that are occa-
sioned when humans enter into each other’s
physical copresence. Such face-to-face interaction
is the foundation of human social life and plays a
role in one’s identity or self-image and how that
image is presented to others.
Interaction order, however, has been largely
ignored as a distinct topic of inquiry. Social scien-
tists—with one or two notable exceptions—have
had little to say about how interaction works as a
phenomenon in its own right, treating it as a largely
taken-for-granted matter. Its neglect as a distinctive
area of investigation can partly be accounted for by
its interdisciplinary character. Of relevance to
sociologists, ethnologists, social psychologists, and
linguists, interaction order appears to have been
seen by each as the responsibility of the others. For
sociology—arguably its core disciplinary home—
the prevailing assumption of most postwar think-
ing was that such everyday interactional conduct
was too fleeting or disorderly to permit systematic
investigation. In linguistics, the Chomskian focus
on the acquisition of competence with regard to
the deep structure of communicative rules
(Ferdinand de Saussure’s langue), as opposed to
the performance of particular conversational utter-
ances (parole), has also served as an inhibitory
factor in its scholarly pursuit.
The exploration of the interaction order was
initially largely undertaken by the American soci-
ologist Erving Goffman. In a series of books and
articles, commencing with The Presentation of Self
in Everyday Life and culminating in his American
Sociological Association presidential address in
1982 (posthumously published as “The Interaction
Order”), Goffman sought to demonstrate that
face-to-face interaction was a viable topic for
sociological inquiry, an institution every bit as
important as the more commonly recognized insti-
tutions such as the family, law, or polity. Conduct
in interaction, for Goffman, differed from, and
could not be reducible to, the behavior of a small
group. For one thing, groups continue to exist
when their members are apart, but face-to-face
encounters are by definition predicated upon
physical copresence. Moreover, the interaction
order must be seen as an autonomous domain in
the sense that its component behavioral features
could not be understood as the effects of tradi-
tional sociological variables—gender, class, or
urban-rural and public-private dichotomies. Nor
could interaction be regarded as a matter for psy-
chology: Its proper study was not the individual
but “the syntactical relations among the acts of
different persons mutually present to one another,”
as Goffman noted in Interaction Ritual (p. 2).
At the heart of Goffman’s analysis of the interac-
tion order was his concern to demonstrate its ritual
or expressive character. Interaction can be seen as
having both instrumental and expressive compo-
nents, but Goffman’s project can be understood as
a sustained attempt to try to view it solely as a rit-
ual endeavor. For Goffman, interaction can be
analyzed as an intricate ritual of communicative

control in which people are continually seeking to
manage their appearances or their activities in such
a way as to generally present a positive or favorable
self-image. Equally, we also act so as to sustain the
self-images that others are seeking to present to us.
The expressive ends of interaction are closely linked
to the concept of face, the immediate claims an
individual makes about who he or she is at a given
moment in interaction and the line he or she has
taken toward this developing situation. Ultimately,
the mutual honoring of selves and face claims pre-
sented in interaction sustains social order.
Goffman employed a variety of images and con-
cepts throughout his work in his exploration of the
interaction order. In his early work, these were
primarily taken from the world of the stage or
theater and comprised, inter alia, the dramaturgi-
cal metaphor, civil inattention, role distance, and
team performances. His later works drew upon
imagery from games, espionage, con men, and
confidence tricksters. The place of such metaphors
in his explication of interaction have often been
misunderstood; rather than literal descriptions,
these metaphors serve as heuristics, part of a delib-
erate methodological ploy—an attempt to make
the taken-for-granted features of interaction visi-
ble. He commented cryptically that the dramatur-
gical metaphor was no more than a convenient
scaffold and that scaffolds should be erected with
an eye to their later removal.
Although his work represented a sustained argu-
ment for the viability of interaction as a topic of
social scientific investigation, Goffman nevertheless
paid much less attention to the detailed empirical
documentation of this domain and was notoriously
imprecise in stipulating the methodological proce-
dures that would be required for this task. Since his
death, work on this topic has been principally car-
ried forward by scholars in the conversation analy-
sis tradition, an ironic development in that despite
his scholarly mentoring of several of the first gen-
eration (e.g., Harvey Sacks and Emanuel Schegloff),
in his later work, Goffman expressed serious reser-
vations about the conversational analysis project.
Conversation analysis advances the study of
the interaction order beyond Goffman in two
important and interrelated ways. Talk-in-
interaction for Goffman had both “ritual” and
“system” components—mechanisms governing
the allocation of turns and the orderly relations
Intercultural Personhood 397
between utterances—and it was with the former
that he felt the analytical significance should lie.
Conversation analysts insist that the system and
ritual components to talk cannot be seen as dis-
crete theoretical modes of unraveling interac-
tion. They are inextricably connected, but system
considerations logically underpin anything else
that happens in interaction. Second, in contrast
to Goffman’s eclectic and idiosyncratic use of sec-
ondary materials to illustrate his conceptual
points, conversation analysis requires the collec-
tion and rigorous examination of data taken
from naturally occurring settings. This is the
only way in which empirical, data-driven claims
about the practices comprising interaction can
be advanced.
Michael J. Emmison
See also Society and Social Identity
Further Readings
Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction ritual: Essays on face-to-
face behavior. Garden City, New York: Doubleday.
Goffman, E. (1981). Forms of talk. Oxford, UK:
Blackwell.
Goffman, E. (1983). The interaction order. American
Sociological Review, 48(1), 1–17.
Intercultural Personhood
The concept of intercultural personhood was
developed by Young Yun Kim to describe a person
who has experienced a fundamental psychic trans-
formation toward an intercultural identity. Akin
to the concept of world citizen, intercultural per-
sonhood describes an identity that extends beyond
the limits of one’s original cultural perimeters and
transcends apparent cultural differences to acknowl-
edge the interconnectedness among all peoples.
The transformation is achieved through prolonged
and stressful intercultural communication and
adaptation experiences over time, whether through
living, working, or traveling abroad or participat-
ing in multiple intercultural encounters at home.
Individuals who have achieved intercultural per-
sonhood demonstrate a rich and multifaceted
398 Intercultural Personhood
identity involving cultural empathy and openness
toward embracing cultural and group diversity. An
intercultural person is able to step into other world-
views; this ability demonstrates a complex under-
standing of multiple ways of knowing and being.
This entry offers an overview and background of
intercultural personhood, followed by an outline of
the developmental process and outcomes for devel-
oping intercultural personhood. It concludes with a
description of challenges, criticisms, and applica-
tions of intercultural personhood.
Background
Intercultural personhood, also termed intercultural
identity, emerged from nearly three decades of
research on communication, cross-cultural adapta-
tion, and identity transformation among immi-
grants, sojourners, refugees, and others who have
had significant intercultural experiences. The ori-
gins of intercultural personhood are rooted in
Kim’s doctoral work in the late 1980s on cross-
cultural adaptation among Korean immigrants in
the United States. This work has since expanded to
include the study of cultural adaptation and iden-
tity transformation in many cultures, ethnicities,
cocultures, and across a great diversity of intercul-
tural encounters. The progression of intercultural
personhood was mapped primarily through the
analysis of anecdotes, testimonials, biographies,
letters, diaries, and television and radio programs
from the real-life experiences of people who have
developed an intercultural personhood. Social sci-
entific evidence of intercultural identity transfor-
mation was also drawn from studies of adaptation
and identity transformation among sojourners and
immigrants in North America, Australia, and
countries in Europe and Asia.
Intercultural personhood embraces the notion
that identity development is not necessarily an
additive process but can be a transformative, syn-
ergetic process that stretches identity beyond the
composite of individual cultural traits. Although
conceptually similar, the term intercultural person-
hood or intercultural identity is preferred over
terms such as bicultural, multicultural, biracial,
multiracial, and so forth, because it places empha-
sis on the culture-general, rather than culture-
specific, nature of the concept. It is considered
culture-general because the idea of intercultural
personhood is not tied down to one specific cul-
tural way of being, nor is it specific to one group,
place, time, or communication pattern. Intercultural
personhood does not imply any specific cultural
attributes. Rather, it depicts personal characteris-
tics that transcend any given cultural group.
Developmental Process
Intercultural personhood entails a person’s ability
to continually adapt to strange environments and
situations and increase complexity in identity such
that over time, it transcends the boundaries of one
cultural or group identity and evolves into an
intercultural identity or intercultural personhood.
In this process, the self is stretched and challenged
to discover new ways of communicating, new
ways of understanding, and new ways of being.
Intercultural personhood develops in stages as
individuals gain skills, knowledge, and motivation
to integrate new concepts, attitudes, and behaviors
into their lives. It is an active rather than passive
construction of self wherein the old identity is
never completely erased but is transformed. Two
theories underpin the conceptual development and
process of intercultural personhood.
General Systems Theory
Intercultural personhood is based on the notion
that identity is pliable, fluid, and permeable in
order to adapt to new experiences across the life
span. As an individual encounters, and learns to
navigate, unfamiliar social contexts and strange
episodes, he or she gains new knowledge, aware-
ness, and abilities. The conceptual development of
intercultural personhood is grounded in a general
systems theory approach, wherein transformation
is viewed as a natural outcome of an individual’s
struggle for equilibrium in response to environ-
mental changes. Systems theory has explanatory
value in describing the emergent process of inter-
cultural personhood: (a) Each person is an open
system and is therefore capable of communicating
with and responding to the surrounding environ-
ment; (b) humans have a driving need for homeo-
stasis, or consistency; (c) when the internal order is
disrupted, as in the case of strange encounters, dis-
equilibrium ensues creating stress.; (d) people are
then motivated to reduce stress and regain balance;

(e) in order to reestablish homeostasis, people
engage in adaptive activities to meet the environ-
mental demands and eliminate stress; and (f) in the
process of adapting to the new demands, people
experience internal growth and develop a more
complex sense of self. If these identity adaptations
occur over time and across multiple cultural
encounters, the result is an orientation toward
intercultural personhood.
Integrated Theory of Communication
and Cross-Cultural Adaptation
Of particular importance to the development of
intercultural personhood is the stress-adaptation-
growth model presented in Kim’s integrated theory
of communication and cross-cultural adaptation.
Specifically, the development of an intercultural
identity is a transcendental process achieved only
through the stress-adaptation-growth cycle inevi-
table when a person encounters strange environ-
ments and new situations. Unfamiliar contexts
create stress and bring our traditional modes of
being and doing into question. Although the stress
might initially provoke the person to withdraw
from intercultural encounters, eventually he or she
will be motivated to adapt to the new situation to
reduce the stress and uncertainty. Culture shock is
fundamental to this process, because the sojourner
must manage the social, psychological, and philo-
sophical discrepancies present in intercultural
encounters. Each encounter presents an opportu-
nity for psychic growth and strengthening of self.
Over time, identity transformation results from the
multiple crises, unsettling moments, stress, and
anxiety present in strange encounters, particularly
when crossing cultures. When managed success-
fully, identity boundaries shift from rigid to per-
meable as the original identity loses cultural
distinctiveness and a new, intercultural self emerges.
The process is gradual as a person learns to think,
feel, and behave outside of the limitations of his or
her own cultural and group boundaries and
toward a more universal perspective with a focus
not on small collectives of people but on humanity
as a whole.
In future encounters, people with a disposition
toward intercultural personhood do not retreat to
the comfort of their own cultural ways but rather
adapt by adding a new dimension to their identities
Intercultural Personhood 399
and integrating new cultural elements and prac-
tices. The development of intercultural personhood
yields a greater repertoire of communication and
cultural skills necessary to participate in an increas-
ingly multicultural and globalized world. Such
identity growth contributes to greater intercultural
communication competence as individuals build
skills to communicate with each other at a per-
sonal, or individualized, level rather than through
stereotypic, group-based assumptions. Intercultural
personhood transcends cultural categories by
engaging in processes of individualization (devel-
oping a clear sense of self and ability to see others
as unique entities rather than as group members)
and universalization (focusing on common human-
ity among people rather than on difference).
Identity Outcomes
A person who develops intercultural personhood
demonstrates respect, empathy, and appreciation
for cultural differences and is able to perceive and
engage in multiple ways of being. Over time, and
through increased and repeated interactions, peo-
ple who have achieved intercultural personhood
develop a more comprehensive understanding of
their and others’ cultures. This contributes to
higher cognitive complexity, that is, a person’s
ability to perceive any interaction from multiple
viewpoints, to integrate multiple perspectives, and
to approach a problem with multiple solutions.
Increases in cognitive complexity lead to increases
in cultural competency and more freedom and cre-
ative choice to select the most effective means of
interacting in any context rather than engaging in
cultural auto-pilot. The identity emerging from
intercultural personhood is richer in content and
more complex in structure than the original cul-
tural identity. Thus, the individual is able to dis-
play a greater range of competent cultural patterns
even in completely new, completely strange encoun-
ters. This ability offers a broader range for self-
expression, emotional maturity, and a deepened
understanding of human differences and common
humanity, as well as increased cognitive, social,
emotional, and behavioral depth. Ultimately, peo-
ple who achieve this identity also gain a worldview
that is larger than any one cultural perspective and
a perception of a universal whole that integrates
rather than separates humanity.
400 Intercultural Personhood
Problems and Practices
Not everyone who experiences multiple intercul-
tural encounters will develop intercultural person-
hood. Some who experience obstacles and crises
that are too difficult to overcome might reject cul-
tural differences or withdraw from intercultural
encounters. Intercultural personhood is an indi-
vidual process influenced by several factors. First,
not everyone is able to or desires to let the trans-
formation happen. Strength of cultural differences,
host receptivity, and personal qualities (flexibility,
willingness to communicate, empathy, psychologi-
cal resilience) contribute to a person’s overall
capacity to transform. Second, the more strenuous
the adaptation (e.g., level of culture shock) is, the
more a person’s adaptive abilities are strained.
More challenging encounters lead to the greatest
transformation but at the biggest effort. In the face
of the challenge, some will opt to return to the
home country, withdraw from the mainstream
culture, give up, or remain in a state of culture
shock or other phases where complete transforma-
tion is impossible. Finally, moments of intense
stress might cause a person to withdraw so far that
they reverse the transformative process and regress
toward an uncritical, ethnocentric fusion with the
original culture.
The process and development of intercultural
personhood is risky because an individual must
endure the stress and anxiety present in strange
encounters to change and experience identity growth.
However, there are exercises that can help a person
develop a mind-set toward intercultural person-
hood: (a) Practice responding to unpredictable
events with curiosity, (b) practice creating a mind-
set with a tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity,
(c) practice social and psychological flexibility,
(d) practice personal responsibility, and (e) create a
positive “I believe that I can do this” orientation.
Critique and Application
Kim describes intercultural personhood as an ideal
state of being to which everyone can strive; inter-
cultural personhood is not a hypothetical or
romanticized concept but an actual ideal that,
over time, individuals are capable of achieving.
Three criticisms of intercultural personhood chal-
lenge this assumption. The primary criticism is
that conceptual measurement is difficult. Questions
about how to measure intercultural personhood
and how to account for its subjective nature arise.
A second criticism is its ideological nature—there
is an underlying assumption that the transforma-
tion is both good and possible for most people.
Finally, in its current stage, the concept and devel-
opmental process lack strong empirical data.
Despite these criticisms, the concept of intercul-
tural personhood is likely to gain strength through
continued globalization. A person who develops
intercultural personhood is uniquely suited to
engage in the increasingly multicultural world.
People who have experienced the transformative
process of intercultural personhood are able to serve
as catalysts for cultural understanding, promoting
multiculturalism in personal and institutional set-
tings, bridging between cultures, mediating, inspir-
ing, demonstrating ability to creatively integrate
cultural differences harmoniously, and serving as
guides, teachers, and facilitators as others engage
in intercultural encounters.
Margaret Jane Pitts
See also Acculturation; Adaptation; Culture; Culture
Shock; Identity Change; Identity Salience; Third
Culture Building; Uncertainty Avoidance
Further Readings
Gudykunst, W. B., & Kim, Y. Y. (1997). Communicating
with strangers: An approach to intercultural
communication (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Kim, Y. Y. (1996). Identity development: From cultural
to intercultural. In H. B. Mokros (Ed.), Interaction
and identity: Information and behavior (Vol. 5,
pp. 347–369). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Kim, Y. Y. (2001). Becoming intercultural: An integrative
theory of communication and cross-cultural
adaptation. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Kim, Y. Y. (2005). Adapting to a new culture: An
integrative communication theory. In W. B.
Gudykunst (Ed.), Theorizing about intercultural
communication (pp. 375–400). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Kim, Y. Y. (2009). Intercultural personhood: An
integration of Eastern and Western perspectives. In
L. A. Samovar, R. E. Porter, & E. R. McDaniel (Eds.),
Intercultural communication: A reader (12th ed.,
pp. 435–446). Boston: Wadsworth.

Kim, Y. Y., & Ruben, B. D. (1988). Intercultural
transformation: A systems theory. In Y. Y. Kim &
W. B. Gudykunst (Eds.), International and
Intercultural Communication Annual: Vol. 12.
Theories in intercultural communication
(pp. 299–321). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Interpellation
See Identity Uncertainty
Intersubjectivity
Intersubjectivity is a concept used to describe the
space of shared understanding, or common ground,
between persons wherein people, as individual sub-
jects, collaboratively create and share meaning.
Originally central to the philosophy of phenome-
nology, the concept of intersubjectivity is also cen-
tral to a number of other fields, including dialogic
philosophy, hermeneutics, pragmatics, sociology,
linguistics, and communication. Intersubjectivity is
also an important concept in interdisciplinary stud-
ies of identity because of the ways that identities
are constructed through the communicative social
interaction between individual subjects and collec-
tivities. Thus, the idea of intersubjectivity points to
the constitutive dimensions of language and com-
munication, whereby understandings, meanings,
and identities are produced not by individual sub-
jects but rather between social subjects abiding
within communities of discourse.
Phenomenology
In the field of phenomenology, intersubjectivity was
originally associated with the work of late 19th-
century philosopher Edmund Husserl, who explored
how the intersubjective world of shared social
objects, constructs, and meanings must, by neces-
sity, transcend the clearly bounded, separate, and
dualistic constructs of subjects and objects. According
to Husserl, the consciousness of the experiencing
subjective self, or “I,” requires other subjective
selves, or other “I”s, to mediate and confirm the
self’s understanding of the world. This requirement,
Intersubjectivity 401
described by Husserl as the intersubjective world of
shared meanings, transcends the subjective world of
the self and the objective world of things and events.
French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty
extended Husserl’s work into the intersubjective
dimensions of perception and language.
Another of Husserl’s students, Martin Buber,
applied Husserl’s insights about the constitutive
nature of intersubjectivity into a philosophy of
dialogue that centers on a study of the I-Thou rela-
tion. Buber described how, in every interaction
between human beings, there exists what Buber
calls the between, a place located not in individuals
or in the general world but in a space between self
and other. To Buber, the relation between self and
other is foundational to human existence in that
the self can only come into being and exist when it
is in dialogic relation with other human beings.
Another philosopher of dialogue, Emmanuel
Levinas, drew on Husserl’s insights about the fun-
damental otherness, or alterity, of other subjective
selves wherein the other is always, by necessity,
elusive and inaccessible. Levinas describes the rela-
tion of self and other as an inherently ethical rela-
tion wherein the subjective self is always
responsible for and to the other. Yet another of
Husserl’s students, Hans-Georg Gadamer, intro-
duced the concept of intersubjectivity into the
already existing field of hermeneutics, a branch of
philosophy concerned with questions pertaining to
the problem of interpretation and understanding.
Drawing upon Husserl’s work, Gadamer explored
the insight that understanding is inherently dia-
logic and how, through every dialogue, something
different comes to be.
Outside of phenomenology, scholars from the
fields of anthropology, linguistics, and sociology
drew upon insights from the tradition of pragmatics
(the study of language use in particular social con-
texts) to explore questions about how social mean-
ings are produced and shared. In the field of
sociology, pragmatists of the 1930s such as George
Herbert Mead and Alfred Schutz explored how
social interaction and procedures of interpretation
were social resources that produced the self’s under-
standing of the world. Meanwhile, in the field of
structural linguistics, scholars such as Émile
Benveniste explored the linguistic production of
identity through various grammatical structures of
language, in particular through the contextual
402 Intersubjectivity
usage of pronouns such as I and you. In the 1950s,
sociologist Herbert Garfinkel drew upon these
insights to develop what he called ethnomethodol-
ogy, a method of studying how people make sense
of the world. This development influenced scholars
in anthropology, communication, and sociolingus-
tics, eventually leading scholars to the interdisci-
plinary method known as conversation analysis, or
talk in action, which analyzes how the interactive
structures and procedures of conversation, such as
turn-taking rules, enable people to produce shared
meanings and understandings. The linguist Emanuel
Schegloff, for example, defends the intersubjective
nature of conversation on the grounds of what he
calls the procedural infrastructure of interaction,
wherein misunderstandings can be identified and
repaired only through rule-governed intersubjective
processes. Other scholars in sociolinguistics use a
variety of analytical tools, including discourse
analysis, to explore how identities are intersubjec-
tively constructed linguistically through culturally
specific social interactions. Other contemporary
scholars, such as the German philosopher Jürgen
Habermas, draw on a variety of theoretical frame-
works from pragmatism and linguistics (including
speech-act theory, semantics, and semiotics) to craft
a theory of communicative action in which inter-
locutors collaborate to construct what Habermas
calls the intersubjectively binding validity of under-
standings through argumentative processes.
Communication
In the field of communication, scholars who focus
on the dialogic, intercultural, interpersonal, and
organizational dimensions of communication
explore intersubjectivity and the social production
of meaning by drawing from the phenomenologi-
cal, hermeneutic, pragmatic, and sociolinguistic
traditions. In the field of organizational communi-
cation, for example, the scholar Stanley Deetz has
drawn on the phenomenology of Husserl to explore
how intersubjectivity is not a thing in itself but an
achievement produced through communicative
social interaction. In contrast, drawing primarily
from the ethnomethodological tradition, Karl Weick
has developed a theory of intersubjectivity grounded
in construction and maintenance of identity that he
calls organizational sensemaking, which occurs
through organizational actors mutually producing
and reinforcing shared understandings and inter-
pretations. Drawing on Weick’s theories of sense-
making and adding insights from pragmatics and
linguistics, the scholars James Taylor and François
Cooren describe the coproduction of communica-
tion and organization that occurs through joint
sensemaking processes that they call collective
minding. In contrast to Weick, however, who the-
orizes intersubjectivity as something emergent
from a synthesis of multiple subjectivities, Taylor
and Cooren theorize intersubjectivity as something
not reducible to the summative convergence of
multiple points of view. In the areas of interper-
sonal and dialogic communication, the scholar
John Shotter draws on the phenomenological tra-
dition to explore the intersubjective and relational
production of what he calls conversational realities
and meaning-making processes of communication.
In contrast, the scholar Ronald C. Arnett draws on
the dialogic work of both Buber and Gadamer to
explore the ethical implications of intersubjectiv-
ity, particularly in relation to public dialogue and
community.
Lisbeth Lipari
See also Being and Identity; Communication Theory of
Identity; Consciousness; Discourse; Hermeneutics;
Organizational Identity; Other, The; Phenomenology
Further Readings
Arnett, R. C. (1986). Communication and community:
Implications of Martin Buber’s dialogue. Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press.
Buber, M. (1958). I and Thou (R. G. Smith, Trans.).
New York: Scribner.
Gadamer, H.-G. (2003). Truth and method (2nd ed.,
J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall, Trans.). New
York: Continuum.
Husserl, E. (1999). The essential Husserl: Basic writings
in transcendental phenomenology (D. Welton, Ed.).
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Levinas, E. (1969). Totality and infinity (A. Lingis,
Trans.). Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society: From the
standpoint of a social behaviorist. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002). The phenomenology of
perception (2nd ed., C. Smith, Trans.). New York:
Routledge. (Original work published 1945)

Intertextuality
Intertextuality is a term that addresses the mean-
ings generated via the intra-influences of subjects/
authors, addressees/readers or audience, and lin-
guistic units—that is, any material or perceived
signifier of meaning (e.g., in the form of text or
utterance)—within and through other texts. As a
concept, it accounts for the notion that no artifact
possesses the ability to make meaning by itself.
Meanings ascertained from a given text are always
negotiated relative to other, preexisting texts to
which the addressee has been previously exposed.
In other words, no text, however original, is able
to make meaning on its own. Intertextuality
implies that there are always referent texts—for
the author as he or she engages in the creative
process and production of a text, for the viewer as
he or she refers to other texts to which the viewer
has encountered that inform his or her meaning
making in the present, and in the textual artifact
itself, which by its very existence is composed of
already-existing linguistic units that have been
used to generate other alternate meanings in prior
instances. In identity studies, an understanding of
intertextuality contributes to an understanding of
identity, as how a text is interpreted is dependent
on one’s unique set of internally held understand-
ings and more common understandings.
Julia Kristeva is identified as one of the first theo-
rists to devise a theory of intertextuality. Her origi-
nal conception of the term is based on a
coconsideration of Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of dia-
logism, with its attention to the potential multiple
meanings—or heteroglossia—within a given utter-
ance or text, and Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural-
ist semiotics, which is concerned with the use of
signs in the process of meaning making in a given
text. Where dialogism accounts for the utterance,
whether between speakers and interlocutors, texts
and texts, or texts and readers, Saussure’s theory of
semiotics accounts for the structure of the language
through which meaning is made. Intertextuality
places these two perspectives in conversation with
each other, to the extent that interlocutors use signs
to generate utterances that simultaneously come
from somewhere and also go somewhere else.
Intertextuality refers to a situated meaning in a
given text that resides at the intersection of three
Intertextuality 403
dimensions: the author, the reader, and the text.
The shared codes among these three dimensions
are conveyed through the word (or related linguis-
tic unit) that serves as a mediator in the production
of meanings from those intersections. Compared to
Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism, intertextuality more
specifically parses out the distinctions between the
functions of the word/utterance/text (or other lin-
guistic unit) along two axes. The horizontal axis
situates the word between author and reader. The
vertical axis situates the word between present and
exterior texts. Any word (or text) is a function of
the intersection of these axes. Thus, as Kristeva
notes, intertextuality replaces intersubjectivity, as
meaning is transferred not directly between inter-
locutors but through the system of meaning mak-
ing (word or text) that serves as an intermediate
function in the production of meaning.
As such, Kristeva’s conception of the term prob-
lematizes prior theories of literary criticism in sig-
nificant ways. An important reconsideration is
that although the author is still acknowledged as
the subjective producer of a given text, intertextu-
ality assumes that there is no such thing as a single-
authored text. Texts are composed of preexisting
linguistic units and meanings, from which the
author borrows, that contribute to the process of
textual production in the present. Relatedly, inter-
textuality disrupts the idea of a single author as the
sole source and producer of meaning relative to a
given text. Readers come to a text informed by
other linguistic units and other texts in mind,
which also contribute to the production of mean-
ing in the present. Thus, readers’ distinct identities
inform the meanings they ascertain from engage-
ment with a given text.
Intertextuality also relates to the concept of sub-
jectivity as well as to the issue of authorship.
Around the time of prominence for structuralist
thought, there was a perceived overemphasis on
the originality of text as solely an authorial cre-
ation. Relatedly, the meaning of a text was thought
to reside within the artifact of the text itself, on the
page, in the image. This supported a structuralist
notion of a binary interpretation of a text. How
one understood meaning was either correctly
aligned with the author’s conception of meaning,
or it was considered discontinuous with the intended
meaning. Intertextuality, as it attempts to account
for the prior linguistic and textual encounters of
404 Intonation
the reader, allows for multiple valid interpreta-
tions of a given text. Moreover, the theory can
account for spatial and temporal influences on
textual meaning as well. When and where a reader
engages a text potentially has as much to do with
the meaning derived as the language on the page.
Rather than emphasizing the fixedness of the
meaning within a text, intertextuality emphasizes
the situatedness of the meanings ascertained.
Similarly, the identities of readers are also per-
ceived as more situated, as factors previously con-
sidered external and disconnected from individual
identities are recognized as integral to the process.
For Kristeva, structuration, how the structure of
the text came into being, is a component part in
the process of recognizing intertextual meaning.
Structuration is more important than the structure
of the text itself. It is not a feature or literary device
found within a given text but instead provides a
way to analyze how that text relates to other texts,
methods of meaning making (authorship), and
interpretation (readings, viewings, listenings). Her
notion of structuration relates to her increasingly
poststructuralist version of semiotics, which she
conceives of as existing outside of a restrictive
frame of identifying a set of practices, in order that
it may identify those practices. Although it is not
completely possible in practice, Kristeva is at least
acknowledging, in theory, that an awareness of the
ways in which a system of meaning functions
requires an awareness that such a system also
impacts how meanings are made.
Beyond the structuralist conception of where
textual meaning exists, intertextuality considers
the role of the addressee in the meaning making
process. As Roland Barthes conveys, a primary
text is a space of intersections where multiple non-
original forms of writing intersect. The reader is
also a space where the text is inscribed and, as a
space, becomes a destination for the meaning of
the text. Further, just as the text is an assemblage
of preexisting texts, so to is the reader comprised
of a mesh of preexisting means via memory, per-
sonal history, cultures, and the like. Barthes’s
move here contributes to the notion that meaning
is made not within the text but in the mind of the
reader. This shift in where meaning is made not
only supports the idea of multiple alternate mean-
ings but also validates those meanings as they are
connected to the simultaneously unique and shared
experiences of the reader. Further, the reader’s
textual interpretation can be understood as an
extension of an identity that is cocreated from a
unique set of internally held understandings and
more common understandings. Thus, the reader’s
interpretation is not solely her own but is instead
formed in space in which the reader exists.
Michael Burns
See also Deconstruction; Discourse; Intersubjectivity;
Modernity and Postmodernity; Narratives; Semantics;
Semiotics; Signification; Structuration
Further Readings
Bakhtin, M. M. (1981). The dialogic imagination: Four
essays (M. Holquist, Ed.; C. Emerson & M. Holquist,
Trans.). Austin: University of Texas Press. (Original
works published 1930s)
Barthes, R. (1988). The death of the author. In
K. M. Newton (Ed.), Twentieth-century literary theory
(pp. 154–157). London: Macmillan.
Kristeva, J. (1980). Desire in language: A semiotic
approach to literature and art. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Kristeva, J. (1997). The system and the speaking subject.
In K. M. Newton (Ed.), Twentieth-century literary
theory: A reader (2nd ed., pp. 180–185). New York:
St. Martin’s Press.
Moi, T. (Ed.). (1986). The Kristeva reader. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Intonation
Intonation is a meaningful aspect of speech. This
aspect of speech refers to patterns of changes in the
frequency of vocal fold vibrations. It is these pat-
terns of changes that convey meaning through
syntax. Syntax pertains to sentence formation. On
another level, intonation refers to pitch, loudness,
and the overall rhythm of speech. Pitch contours
accompany syntactical units such as phrases and
sentences. Linguists refer to intonation as one of
several suprasegmental features of speech. Along
with tone, stress, and length, intonation is thought
to occur above (supra) individual segments like
phrases, words, or individual speech sounds. When
a speaker’s voice rises at the end of a syntactical

unit, this generally signals a question. When a
speaker’s voice falls at the end of a syntactical unit,
this generally signals a statement. Whether pitch
rises or falls, pitch contours are meaningful.
Intonation, then, has the capacity to provide cues
for the listener regarding a speaker’s culture, gen-
der, mood, age, and other elements of identity.
Many English as a second language speakers
find it difficult to master intonation patterns like
native English speakers. Their use of first language
intonation patterns with second language speech
features clearly identifies the speaker as one whose
first language is not English. Differences in intona-
tional contours distinguish speakers. For example,
the speech of those whose native language is a tone
language clearly distinguishes the speaker. In tone
languages, such as many African languages, pitch
patterns are syllabically meaningful. That is, a ris-
ing syllable in a word may have one meaning while
a falling syllable in seemingly the same word may
have another meaning. Pitch is inherent in the
word, not the sentence. In intonation languages,
such as American English, pitch patterns are syn-
tactically meaningful. It is the phrase and sentence
that reflect meaning. Native English speakers con-
trol the meanings of syntactical units as they con-
trol pitch patterns. Depending on intonational
patterns within syntactical units, different mean-
ings may result. Misplaced intonational contours
may sound unnatural or cause ambiguity.
Appropriately placed intonational contours clearly
signal the pause in syntactical units or the end of
syntactical units. The intonational contour of the
syntactical unit ending in a full stop or period dif-
fers from the independent statement in a series of
independent statements punctuated with pauses or
commas. The following syntactical units illustrate
this point:
(a) He flew to Columbus.
(b) He flew to Columbus, drove to Cincinnati, and
walked to campus.
Intonation is meaningful in that the independent
statements punctuated with commas rise slightly in
pitch. This rise in pitch does not, however, rise to
the pitch level of a question. Intonation clearly
distinguishes the statement, the phrase, and the
question.
Intonation 405
The tag question combines both statement and
question. It reflects the rising and falling pitch. An
example of a tag question follows: “I would like to
visit the museum, wouldn’t you?” Intonation is
meaningful here because the tag question, or brief
question adjoining a statement, is often aligned
with women’s speech. Early studies suggest that
the use of tag questions in speech implies weakness
and conveys ineffectiveness. Even though many
women critics oppose this assertion, gender remains
a factor in the use of intonation.
Intonation also signals mood. In general, peo-
ple rely on intonation to determine whether to
initiate or prolong communication with others.
Rises and falls in pitch are important in interper-
sonal relations and formal social relations.
Consider how individuals communicate through
the use of fillers like “hmm” and “um,” or single
words like “nice” and “really.” Uttered with the
appropriate pitch, the filler or single word is as
meaningful as a complex sentence. Seemingly an
insignificant aspect of speech, intonation works in
concert with social markers in speech to signal
social relations and mood.
Similar to adults, infants also rely on intonation
to gauge the moods of those around them. Prior to
the language acquisition phase, infants respond to
intonation with facial expressions, body language,
and mood. Intonation contours appear to be the
first aspects of language the youngster acquires.
Furthermore, infants and young children respond
to a language variation referred to as motherese. A
rising pitch accompanies this universal form of
speech. Infants mimic this rising pitch long before
they produce connected speech. Despite its name,
motherese is a form of speech that both men and
women use.
Not only infants but children use intonation
during the earlier stages of language acquisition.
For example, the 1-year-old child usually collapses
the adult phrase into a single word. Rather than
“It is all gone,” the child might say “allgone.”
Whether the child consistently models the adult
speaker in intonation patterns is debatable. That
intonation plays a meaningful role in language
acquisition and language development is impor-
tant. For example, the adult speaker uses syntacti-
cal structure (the use of modals, etc.) and rising
intonation to signal the question. The child, on the
other hand, uses rising intonation alone to signal
406 Invariant Be
the question. Rather than ask “May I have more
juice?” the child might ask “more juice?” Both the
adult and the child share the rising pitch intona-
tional pattern. The child’s syntax, however, reflects
a marked difference from the adult’s syntax.
Whether by adult, infant, or child, the use of
intonation is common and consistent in speech. It
distinguishes culture and transcends culture.
Intonation also provides insight into gender differ-
ences in language use. Consider, too, the hearing
impaired. Intonation is important for these speak-
ers because they do not hear the intonational con-
tours of speech. Hearing-impaired speakers produce
speech with a distinctively different intonational
pattern. Thus, intonation is yet another identity
marker in speech.
Jacqueline Imani Bryant
See also Bilingualism; English as a Second Language
(ESL); Language; Phonological Elements of Identity;
Tag Question
Further Readings
Crabtree, M., & Powers, J. (Compilers). (1991).
Language files. Columbus: The Ohio State University
Press.
Fromkin, V., & Rodman, R. (2010). An introduction to
language (9th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Mackay, I. (1991). Phonetics: The science of speech
production (2nd ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Parker, F., & Riley, K. (1994). Linguistics for non-
linguists: A primer with exercises. Boston: Allyn &
Bacon.
Scherer, K. R., & Giles, H. (1979). Social markers in
speech. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Invariant Be
Invariant be, or unconjugated be, is a grammatical/
linguistic construction whereby the verb be is con-
jugated according to forms that differ aspectually,
with regard to the situating of language in time,
from those applicable to Standard English conju-
gations of the verb. Standard English calls for the
conjugation of the verb be to form agreement with
the subject in terms of person and number, for
example am, is, are, was, were. Invariant be most
often is an indication of habitual condition and is
not conjugated to agree with the subject in person
or number. Thus I be, you be, she/he be, it be, we
be, and they be are all grammatically acceptable
forms within language systems that employ invari-
ant be. To indicate past tenses, been is commonly
applied for all persons: I been finished (action
completed in the past). Future tense is usually indi-
cated by a time marker: We be there tomorrow
(We will be there tomorrow). To indicate action
that is completed in the present, zero copula is
employed; that is, no be verb is used. For example,
He happy is an indication that the person is happy
in the present moment, while He be happy signals
that the person’s happiness extends beyond the
present moment. Note that in Standard English,
He is happy requires additional cues to indicate if
the state of happiness is only for the present
moment or ongoing. Thus, while Standard English
accounts for the perfective aspect, or action com-
pleted in the moment, the language system does
not have a verb structure for indicating imperfec-
tive aspect, that is, a structure that indicates
whether the action is ongoing or repeated.
Invariant be is widely viewed as one of the
most readily identifiable markers of Black English,
the version of English spoken by some, but not
all, African Americans; as such, the use of variant
be can also be a marker of one’s cultural or racial
identity. Black English is viewed on a continuum
between being a vernacular or dialect of English
(African American Vernacular English) and a
distinct language in itself. There are many aspects
to Black English, including a particular rhetoric
and lexicon; invariant be is one of its most recog-
nizable components. Because of the high recogni-
tion of the form, the close study of the lineage of
invariant be has often been viewed as essential in
developing theories of the origins of Black
English. Further, there is some evidence that
invariant be also occurs in non-Standard English
use as well, and not exclusively by speakers of
Black English. Thus, it is important to make a
distinction in the construction and use of these
constructions.
Two Forms
There are at least two forms of unconjugated be
that are often convoluted. Traute Ewers notes the

prevalence of an infinitival form of be that can be
identified as distinct. This is a case where will/
would is deleted as part of the verb. Speakers of
Standard English will typically use the infinitive
form or contract it to ’ll or ’d. Colloquial English
speakers, in similar fashion to Black English
speakers, will also regularly leave off these forms
as indicators of the infinitive. For example, A
storm be comin’ soon (A storm will be/is coming
soon) shows up in Black speech as well as White
colloquial speech. Ewers labels this infinitive form
of the verb beww, which is recognized as distinct
from another form of the invariant be commonly
referred to as habitual, distributive, or durative
be. For example, He be at school. The habitual
form is labeled be2 . While both versions are prev-
alent in the usage patterns of speakers of Black
English, beww appears frequently enough in collo-
quial White speech with origins in the southern
United States that it cannot convincingly be attrib-
uted to only Black speech. Thus, it is more often
viewed as an indicator of a regional speech varia-
tion. Be2, on the other hand, has proven to be
more contentious.
Be2 has also appeared in contrastive analyses of
Black English and White English. Whether lin-
guists understand be2 unique to Black English or
more broadly part of White southern speech begins
to speak to the question of origins of invariant be
and also informs hypotheses of the origins of Black
English. For example, linguist Walt Wolfram, in
his study based in Mississippi, notes the presence
of be2 among White and Black speakers. However,
the existence of the habitual be form among White
speakers in his study has been attributed more to
social contact with Black speakers than acquired
as part of one’s home language. His argument sup-
ports the view put forth by William Labov and
others that be2 is unique to Black English and is
indicative of the persistence of some creolized
forms that connect in some way to African lan-
guages spoken by enslaved Africans brought over
as involuntary immigrants.
By contrast, Guy Bailey and Marvin Bassett, in
another Mississippi-based study, offer that when
controlling for education, sex, and age, there are
similar patterns of distribution for the use of
invariant be. They suggest that while the form is
more widely used among Blacks based on number,
when taking into account statistical analyses there
Invariant Be 407
is no reason to conclude that invariant be is a
unique aspect of Black speech. Their findings are
employed in theories that hold there is not enough
evidence to support Black English as a creole, but
instead that it has origins in other varieties of
English. These two perspectives inform the various
theories of origins for Black English through inves-
tigations of the origins of invariant be.
Origins Theories
While sociolinguists tend to disagree less on con-
temporary forms and syntactical uses of invariant
be, there is persistent debate as to the history, ori-
gins, and continued development of the form. To
date, four distinct hypotheses of the origins of be2
have been put forth: creole influence, Hiberno-
English influence, diffusion, and divergence.
The creole hypothesis is upheld by linguists who
see Black English as part of a creole linage, wherein
invariant be has consistently served primarily as a
marker of habituality. They generally note that by
contrast, Standard English does not account for
aspect and instead conjugates verbs by tense. For
creolists, the persistence of habitual be indicates
the use of a different verb system. Creoles com-
monly, though not exclusively, display systems of
conjugation that rely on aspect as an indicator of
the imperfective. This feature is also prevalent in
West African languages and English-based creoles
spoken by people of African descent. Further,
some African diasporic creoles, Jamaican and
Guyanese for example, also share markers of con-
tinuative and completive, as well as habitual
aspect, a feature they share with African languages
in the Kwa group. Drawing on these linguistic con-
nections, proponents of the creole hypothesis sug-
gest that there is a substructural connection
between languages in West Africa and creoles that
appear in the speech patterns of enslaved Africans
brought to the Caribbean and America and exposed
to English in the process.
Another hypothesis offers Hiberno-English as
another possible source of be2 that eventually
became part of Black English. Irish immigrants,
many brought over to the New World by the
British as indentured servants to work on planta-
tions, were present in large numbers in Jamaica
and Barbados in the 17th century prior to the apex
of the African slave trade. Around the same time in
408 Invariant be
colonial North America, Irish indentured servants
worked on southern plantations, alongside enslaved
Africans. Additionally, the Scotch-Irish were sec-
ond in number only to the English as they immi-
grated to the United States in large numbers in the
18th century. Thus, in terms of population, there
was a high likelihood that enslaved Africans and
their descendants were exposed to the dialects of
Irish/British-English spoken by recently arrived
European Americans, whose English dialect also
contains several forms of invariant be. Where in
some cases dialects of Hiberno-English lost the
conveyance of aspect in their use of be, other dia-
lects had historically employed invariant be to
convey meanings beyond habitual aspect. Ewers
offers an in-depth discussion on various uses of the
forms be, bees, do be, and does be that are consis-
tent and prevalent from the Old World to the New
World. In addition to these forms being part of
Hiberno-English speech patterns, there are also lit-
erary examples of the form in works of James
Joyce. Thus, this theory holds that the invariant be
form was not germane to the deep structural com-
ponents of the languages spoken by enslaved
Africans, but instead arrived in America and the
Caribbean before the height of the African slave
trade and creolized there.
John Rickford theorizes that both creole and
Irish/English dialects bear important influences on
the presence of invariant be in Black English. His
diffusion theory, in agreement with the Hiberno-
English theory, also takes into account the history
of contact between enslaved Africans and Irish
indentured servants. The theory also goes further
with this contact thesis to make the distinction
between Irish influence in the Caribbean and
Scotch-Irish influence on the mainland United
States. In each case, the substructural forms of
African languages combined with the superstruc-
tural forms of Hiberno-English and British English
in their respective regions. Extended contact between
speakers of each language led to a process of decre-
olization, which plays out in distinct ways in the
Caribbean and on the mainland United States.
In the case of 17th-century Irish immigration to
Barbados and Africa, those indentured servants
most likely spoke Gaelic upon arrival. In the time
before enslaved Africans arrived, the Irish were able
to learn a version of English that was influenced by
their first language. In turn, enslaved Africans were
exposed to a version of English that had already
been influenced by Irish immigrants. Thus, in the
case of Jamaican and other Caribbean creoles, the
does (be) form is maintained.
The explanation of the influence of Irish immi-
gration in North America is more complex. Among
the multiple waves of Irish immigration to the
United States in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries,
Rickford holds the 17th century to be the most
important for Black/Irish language contact. Prior
to immigration, Scottish dialects were introduced
into the northern part of Ireland in the Plantation
of Ulster in 1609. As a result, there was a preva-
lence of the habitual be form spoken by the Irish
of this region before they immigrated to North
America. This is the version of the form that even-
tually became incorporated into Black English.
Rickford’s theory is not without its shortcomings,
however, as other linguists have noted. Although
diffusion theory is attractive from a sociolinguistic
standpoint, it has been subject to too many possi-
ble variations in accounting for a definitive expla-
nation of the lineage of invariant be.
The divergence hypothesis is distinct from
either the creole hypothesis or the dialect hypoth-
esis. Instead of attempting to trace the origins of
Black English, it focuses on trends in language use
occurring within the past 100 years. Guy Bailey
and Natalie Manor note in an intergenerational
study that older speakers of Black English born
between 1891 and 1937 exhibited more variation
in their use of be2 , in convergence with White
English, than did younger speakers of Black
English from the same region. They attribute the
divergence in be2 use by the younger group to
increased social segregation that occurred between
Blacks and Whites after the Great Migration.
Although Bailey and Manor’s study is often cited
in support of the divergence hypothesis, there is
also a critique that the study is too localized to
make any broad claims about the issue. In any
case, invariant be is still a readily identifiable com-
ponent part of Black speech, and the form is being
maintained if not gaining distinction among speak-
ers of Black English.
Michael Burns
See also Black Atlantic; Code-Switching; Dialect;
Immigration; Language Variety in Literature; Race
Performance; Rhetoric; Semantics

Further Readings
Bailey, G., & Bassett, M. (1986). Invariant be in the
lower South. In M. Montgomery & G. Bailey (Eds.),
Language variety in the South: Perspectives in Black
and White (pp. 158–179). Tuscaloosa: University of
Alabama Press.
Bailey, G., & Maynor, N. (1987). Decreolization?
Language in Society, 16, 449–473.
Ewers, T. (1996). The origin of American Black English:
Be-forms in the HOODOO texts. Berlin, Germany:
Mouton de Gruyter.
Gee, J. (2003). Social linguistics and literacies: Ideology
in discourses (2nd ed.). London: Falmer Press.
Rickford, J. R. (1986). Social contact and linguistic
diffusion: Hiberno-English and New World Black
English. Language, 62(2), 245–289.
Rickford, J. R., & Rickford, R. J. (2000). Spoken soul:
The story of Black English. New York: Wiley.
Smitherman, G. (1986). Talkin’ and testifyin: The
language of Black America. Detroit, MI: Wayne State
University Press.
Wolfram, W. (1971). Black-White speech differences
revisited. In W. Wolfram & N. Clarke (Eds.), Black-
White speech relationships (pp. 139–161).
Washington, DC: Center for Applied Linguistics.
Wolfram, W., & Thomas, E. (2002). The development of
African American English. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
I-Other Dialectic
I-Other dialectic is when an individual or group
constructs self through or from another individual
or group, known as the Other. This dialectic takes
place at both individual and collective levels.
The concept of I-Other was initially grounded
in the psychoanalytic work of Sigmund Freud,
who theorized that all human beings are uncon-
sciously connected to the Other. But for Freud, the
Other meant one’s mother, and much of his work
on the I-Other dialectic was grounded in the
unconscious and how it manifested in one’s sexu-
ality. Central to Freud’s claim was the construc-
tion of the Other—and ultimately oneself through
that Other—by a set of symbols and signifiers. Yet
Freud’s work seemed to disqualify the idea of
agency, and more importantly, held the construc-
tion of Self according to a universally applied set
of rules.
I-Other Dialectic 409
French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan expounded
upon Freud’s thesis and helped to define the
I-Other as a true dialectic grounded in the subject’s
active construction. Lacan believed that subjects
constructed their identities in relation to the Other,
arguing that the signifiers that one sees in the Other
are used as a mirror by which he or she develops.
But Lacan’s theory of the Other was not limited to
a maternal relationship; this allowed for psycholo-
gists to develop the I-Other dialectic into a con-
scious and tangible dynamic.
Lacan’s work had a powerful impact on antico-
lonial thinker Frantz Fanon, who used the I-Other
dialectic as a framework for explaining how colo-
nized natives internalized their oppression and
constructed their identities accordingly. For Fanon,
the I-Other dialectic inverts the sense of self for
colonized people, forcing them to see themselves as
the Other. Fanon believed that the institutions
developed by the colonizers only reified the natives’
sense of inferiority. In his works on the I-Other
dialectic, Fanon is often torn by a sense of hope-
lessness and budding optimism, yet he believes that
the I-Other dialectic is shaped by the conscious
actions of the subject.
Identity scholars have built upon and diverged
from the works of Lacan and Fanon, but in most
cases, they have emphasized a poststructuralist
approach that captures “I” as subject. Cultural
studies pioneer Stuart Hall, following Lacan’s and
Fanon’s approaches argues that identities are con-
structed through difference. Entire communities,
Hall argues, construct their identities in relation to
the Other. For subcultural groups, the Other is
often representative of a group in power, and the
I-Other dialectic serves as a counterhegemonic tool
by which oppressed actors can construct distinct
identities.
However, not all scholars reach such optimistic
conclusions. French philosopher Michel Foucault,
for example, argues individual and group identities
are developed through discourses that are often
regulated through institutions.
Foucault shows how the I-Other dialectic devel-
oped into self-regulations and society’s definitions
of sexual deviance. The discursive element of the
I-Other dialectic is evident in feminist, queer, and
postcolonial scholarship. For instance, Foucault
and prominent queer theorists such as Judith
Butler argue that homosexuality has been made
410 I-Other Dialectic
deviant by the constructions of self dictated by
right (hetero)sexual behavior. Foucault’s theory on
identity and the concept of Othering is popular in
feminist and queer theory because it is predicated
upon the notion that the subject does not have as
much agency in constructing his or her identities as
in the Lacanian approach.
Whereas Foucault seems to downplay the idea
of institutional power, noted postcolonial scholar
Edward Said argues that power is at the very core
of the I-Other dialectic. Said notes that the Other
is often shaped through an Orientalist lens that
structures binaries between the West and so-called
Oriental groups representing the expanse of the
non-European world. These constructs, Said argues,
are imposed through colonial power structures
and reinforced in literature and art.
Building upon both Foucault’s and Said’s argu-
ments, bell hooks questions the idea that I-Other is
dialectical. She instead argues that the Other is
imposed through power relations, governed by
patriarchal structures that make the Other both
powerless and consumable by those in power. To
sum up her views on how the I-Other relationship
is manifested, particularly in the West, hooks
coined the expression “eating the Other.” Scholars
such as Patricia Hill Collins and Eric King Watts
have reached similar conclusions, arguing that the
construction of both the I and the Other are inher-
ently grounded in who has more power.
One important development in the way scholars
view the I-Other dialectic since Freud’s and Lacan’s
work is the prominence of ideologies. Critical
scholars, often drawing from a Marxian frame-
work, argue that the construction of self and the
Other is inherently ideological. These ideologies
can be grounded in materialist concerns or simply
centered around a group consciousness.
The I-Other dialectic has become more popular
in recent identity studies of whiteness, particularly
in the construction of whiteness by non-Whites.
Scholars such as Ronald Jackson and Bryant
Alexander describe how African Americans con-
struct their identities in contrast with hegemonic
standards of gender and sexuality.
Cultural group identities are also shaped by
I-Other dialectic, often dictated by politics of inclu-
sion and outgrouping. Jolanta Drzewiecka, for
example, shows how Poles who immigrated to the
United States created a collective group identity by
cultivating the Jews into the Other. Similarly,
scholars such as Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak
argue that I-Other dynamics are used as strategies
to develop nationalist identities for diasporic groups
who are disconnected from their place of origin.
In media studies, particularly in the political
economy of communication, scholars such as
Georgina Born and David Hesmondhalgh have
argued that the Other is shaped by the media and
appropriated for commercial uses. These dynamics
are determined by a number of factors, including
bottom-line considerations such as segmented
markets. The examination of the I-Other dialectic
within critical media studies has moved the dis-
course to more institutional influences on the con-
struction of social identities.
Murali Balaji
See also Collective/Social Identity; Group Identity;
Identification; Identity Negotiation; Intersubjectivity;
Other, The
Further Readings
Alexander, B. K. (2006). Performing Black masculinity:
Race, culture, and queer identity. Lanham, MD:
AltaMira Press.
Bhabha, H. K. (1996) Cultures in-between. In S. Hall &
P. du Gay (Eds.), Questions of cultural identity
(pp. 53–60). London: Sage.
Born, G., & Hesmondhalgh, D. (2000). Introduction: On
difference, representation, and appropriation in music.
In G. Born & D. Hesmondhalgh (Eds.), Western
music and its others: Difference, representation, and
appropriation in music (1–58). Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Butler, J. (1999). Gender trouble: Feminism and the
subversion of identity. New York: Routledge.
Collins, P. H. (2004). Black sexual politics: Roots,
current realities, and future reparations. New York:
Routledge.
Drzewiecka, J. A. (2002). Reinventing and contesting
identities in constitutive disclosures: Between diaspora
and its others. Communication Quarterly, 50(1),
1–23.
Fanon, F. (1965). The wretched of the earth. New York:
Grove Press.
Fanon, F. (1967). Black skin, white masks. New York:
Grove Press.
Foucault, M. (1990). The history of sexuality. New York:
Vintage Books.

Gilroy, P. (1996). British cultural studies and the pitfalls
of identity. In H. A. Baker Jr., M. Diawara, &
R. H. Lindeborg (Eds.), Black British cultural studies:
A reader (pp. 223–239). Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Gurewich, J. F., Tort, M., & Fairfield, S. (Eds.). (1996).
The subject and the self: Lacan and psychoanalysis.
Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson.
Hall, S. (1990). Cultural identity and diaspora. In
J. Rutherford (Ed.), Identity: community, culture,
difference (pp. 222–237). London: Lawrence &
Wishart.
hooks, b. (1994). Black looks: Race and representation.
Boston: South End Press.
I-Other Dialectic 411
hooks, b. (2004), We real cool: Black men and
masculinity. New York: Routledge.
Jackson, R. L., II. (2006). Scripting the Black masculine
body: Identity, discourse, and racial politics in popular
media. Albany: SUNY Press.
Said, E. (2003). Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books.
Spivak, G. (1988). Can the subaltern speak? In C. Nelson
& L. Grossberg (Eds.), Marxism and the
interpretation of culture (pp. 271–313). Urbana:
University of Illinois Press.
Watts, E. K. (2004). An exploration of spectacular
consumption: Gangsta rap as cultural commodity. In
M. Forman & M. A. Neal (Eds.), That’s the joint: The hip-
hop studies reader (pp. 593–610). New York: Routledge.
 L
Labeling
Labeling, or the labeling perspective, is a concep-
tual approach to understanding deviant behavior
which directs attention away from the behavior
per se to the social reaction that such activity gen-
erates. The approach, which came to prominence
in the 1960s, is most commonly associated with
the work of interactionist sociologists such as
Howard Becker, Kai Erikson, Aaron Cicourel, and
Edwin Lemert. The roots of the labeling perspec-
tive can, however, be found in the earlier writings
of the criminologist Frank Tannebaum and his
argument (in Crime and the Community) that “the
dramatization of evil,” the assignment of a delin-
quent label to young offenders, was an important
step in their progression to an adult criminal
career. At a more fundamental level, the perspec-
tive can be seen as drawing inspiration from the
theoretical insights of the first generation of sym-
bolic interactionists, in particular George Herbert
Mead’s programmatic depiction of the social self
and W. I. Thomas’s dictum that social situations
defined as real have real consequences.
Labeling is important to a discussion of identity
because labeling and social reactions to labeling
can influence an individual’s sense of self and his or
her behavior. This entry discusses the conceptual
framework, application, and criticism of labeling.
Conceptual Framework
At the heart of the labeling approach is the relativ-
ization of what counts as criminal or deviant
413
behavior and the rejection of absolutist accounts
of these phenomena. According to Becker, devi-
ance is not an inherent property of any activity but
rather a label that is bestowed upon it by an audi-
ence. Theoretical attention is thus turned to the
process of labeling and of how social control agen-
cies can be understood as key actors in the genesis
of deviant behavior. There are at least three differ-
ent ways in which the creation of deviance can be
conceptualized. First, and most elementary, it can
simply mean that although a great deal of rule-
breaking behavior occurs in society, it does not
become recognized as deviance until a social group
labels it as such. Second, a more complex point, it
can also imply that an individual will become a
deviant as a result of the social reaction (labeling,
ostracism, a police warning, etc.) that accompanies
some initial or minor rule infraction. What is sug-
gested here is that the social reaction experienced
has powerful implications for the individual’s
sense of self, with the result that he or she comes
to accept the label and becomes increasingly com-
mitted to further deviant activity. This particular
aspect of the perspective was given its sharpest
formulation in the distinction that Lemert drew
between primary deviance—widespread acts of
rule breaking with no or minimal impact upon
one’s self-conception—and secondary deviance—
where the consequences of being labeled come to
the fore and the original reasons for engaging in
rule-breaking behavior recede. The majority of the
theoretical and empirical explorations of the per-
spectives are concerned with these two senses of
labeling. A third way in which labeling can be seen
414 Labeling
as constitutive of deviance focuses attention upon
the everyday organizational and administrative
practices of societies’ agencies of social control.
Also influenced by currents stemming from Harold
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, this conception of
labeling highlights the contingent nature of crimi-
nal statistics. The argument is that the official rates
of recorded deviance must be seen as a direct out-
come of the everyday administrative activities of
the social control agencies that handle and process
cases of deviance. In this sense, the official crime
statistics bear an unknown relationship to the
actual amount of rule breaking that is taking place
in any society, and they should instead be viewed
as indices of the ways that organizations, such as
the police, courts, and drug referral agencies, go
about their routine business.
Refinements and Applications
Becker was to subsequently argue that the labeling
of behavior as deviant must be placed alongside a
consideration as to whether the acts concerned
were conventionally recognized as “obedient” or
alternatively as “rule breaking.” These additional
variables allowed for the possibility that there
could be conforming or obedient behavior that
was mistakenly or maliciously labeled as deviant,
a category he referred to as “falsely accused.” But
they also gave rise to a category of “secret devi-
ance,” where acts that were in violation of rules or
norms were not identified as such. Such a category
would be inconsistent with the basic premise of the
approach that deviance was to be understood in
terms of the public social reaction. Without the
bestowal of a label, there can be no deviance.
Much of the empirical work conducted under
the auspices of the labeling approach has taken the
form of qualitative studies of encounters between
social control agents or agencies and persons
whose behavior or personal circumstances are of
special interest to these agencies. For example,
researchers have documented the ways in which
police officers pay particular attention to the
demeanor of juveniles they come into contact with
during regular patrols. Youth who are judged to be
uncooperative or lacking in respect are far more
likely to be apprehended and subjected to further
questioning or even arrested. In contrast, juveniles
whose demeanor is deemed contrite, who are
respectful to the officers and appear fearful of the
sanctions that might be imposed upon them, are
typically subjected only to an informal reprimand
or admonishment. Factors such as race or ethnicity
of the youth, their residential location, neighbor-
hood characteristics, and so on, are likely to be
compounding variables in the exercise of these
police discretionary practices. However, such prac-
tices may well have self-fulfilling consequences.
Youth who are innocent of any wrongdoing but
who come under repeated scrutiny by the police
will conceivably develop hostility to the law
enforcement personnel. Such encounters are likely
to become routine for the youth concerned, and
there will be a concomitant relaxation or diminu-
tion in the cooperative demeanor seen by police as
the crucial sign of their innocence. This then is seen
by the police as proof that their initial targeting
and scrutinization were warranted, and a vicious
cycle is set in train. The linking of labeling to such
self-fulfilling prophecies has been developed by
scholars who have considered the role that the
mass media play in this process. Stanley Cohen’s
Folk Devils and Moral Panics, published in 1972,
is the classic text in this line of inquiry.
The core, social psychological, assumption in
the labeling approach—about the importance of
the self and the criminogenic tendency attendant
on the bestowal of a deviant label for an individu-
al’s self-conception—was given an important rein-
statement in the theory of reintegrative shaming,
which emerged nearly two decades later in the
work of an Australian criminologist, John
Braithwaite. According to this theory, a core part
of the societal reaction to acts of deviancy is some
sense of shame experienced by the offender.
However, shame can take one of two forms: It can
be stigmatizing, or it can be reintegrative. Shaming
that is stigmatizing—as in the core precepts of the
original labeling approach—is likely to result in
deviancy amplification or increased commitment
to a deviant lifestyle. Stigmatization will typically
involve, among other elements, strong disapproval
and even humiliation of the offender; the labeling
of the offender, and not just the deed perpetrated,
as evil; and ceremonies to assign the label or cer-
tify the deviance that are not matched by corre-
sponding ceremonies to decertify the deviance. In

contrast, reintegrative shaming exhibits at least
some of the following: disapproval of the deviant
act while maintaining a relationship toward the
offender that is respectful; ceremonies certifying
deviance that are matched by ceremonies decertify-
ing the deviance; and the disapproval of the evil of
the deed committed but without labeling the perpe-
trator as evil. The theory of reintegrative shaming
has proved extremely influential and has served as
the basis for a range of practical noncustodial inter-
ventions into juvenile justice, such as community or
family conferences where offenders and their vic-
tims are brought together and discuss the harm
that has been done and agree upon appropriate
reparations.
Evaluation
Although there is an undisputed core of received
wisdom to the perspective, it has also been subject
to criticism from several quarters. Scholars who
espouse more conventional approaches to the
explanation of crime and deviance have criticized
it for the absence of any explicit theoretical propo-
sitions that can be tested. Critical criminologists
have argued that it ignores inequalities and exploi-
tation and denies agency on the part of the deviant
actor. Finally, it has also come under attack from
later, more radical, social action approaches for its
failure to document the detailed socially organized
language-based processes through which labels are
assigned and, perhaps, challenged or resisted.
Labeling, it now appears, was never intended to
be understood as a theory of crime or deviance in
the sense of a causal explanation of its incidence
and scope. Becker admits this in his essay “Labeling
Theory Reconsidered,” in the second edition of his
Outsiders, although the point had also been made
by a number of commentators in the 10 years since
the publication of the book’s first edition. In an
ironic comment, he regarded it as “unfortunate”
that the perspective on understanding deviance that
he and others had introduced had been labeled as a
theory. He suggests the approach should be better
described as an interactionist theory of deviance.
Nevertheless, much of the initial critique of the
approach focused on what was seen as the exces-
sive emphasis on the label and its effects. In one of
the most piquant discussions of the perspective,
Labeling 415
Ronald Akers argued, “One sometimes gets the
impression from reading this literature that people
go about minding their own business, and then—
“wham”—bad society comes along and slaps them
with a stigmatized label. Forced into the role of
deviant the individual has little choice but to be
deviant” (p. 463). This criticism was also echoed
by left-wing or Marxist criminologists who argued
that the perspective’s preoccupation with audience
reaction downplays agency in that individuals may
actively seek out deviant lifestyles as solutions to
structural problems in their lives.
Strikingly absent from any of the writings of the
original labeling theorists, or the work inspired by
the approach, is a detailed exploration of the ways
in which, in interaction, actors assign labels to
people and events. Part of the general way in
which the business of the production and recogni-
tion of descriptions is conducted in social life, the
invocation and application of labels in settings
such as courtroom cross-examinations, police
interrogations, parent teacher interviews, medical
consultations, and many others, is both inferen-
tially rich and morally impregnated. For labeling
theory this domain is something of a conceptual
black hole, but it has figured prominently in
research on the deployment of membership catego-
ries and category bound activities, research that
was inspired by Harvey Sacks’s pioneering studies
in conversation analysis.
Maria Wowk has shown the way in which a
suspect under interrogation in a murder case art-
fully deploys labels by constructing an account of
his victim’s character and conduct in such a way
that she could be seen as at least partly responsible
for the events that led to her death. Wowk shows
how the suspect accomplishes this “indirectly” by
attributing to his victim activities that he hopes the
police interrogator will “hear” as commonsensi-
cally tied to a particularly “morally deviant” cat-
egory of female. To the extent that labeling has a
viable place in social science research, it is likely to
be in the detailed investigation of these ordinary
interactional practices.
Michael J. Emmison
See also Collective/Social Identity; Deviance; Social
Constructionist Approach to Personal Identity;
Symbolic Interactionism
416 Language
Further Readings
Akers, R. (1967). Problems in the sociology of deviance:
Social definitions and behavior. Social Forces, 46,
455–465.
Becker, H. S. (1973). Outsiders: Studies in the sociology
of deviance (2nd ed.). London: Free Press.
Braithwaite, J. (1989). Crime, shame and reintegration.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cohen, S. (1972). Folk devils and moral panics. London:
MacGibbon & Kee.
Wowk, M. (1984). Blame allocation, sex and gender in a
murder interrogation. Women’s Studies International
Forum, 7(1), 75–82.
Language
For those raised in the United States or in another
modern Western nation, it is common to think of
language and identity as different, albeit linked,
aspects of human interaction. Everyday conversa-
tion and popular culture reflect a belief that lan-
guage serves as the self’s most important relational
and expressive tool. Without language, it is
believed, one’s self would be condemned to isola-
tion and silence; language allows the expression of
one’s innermost feelings, thoughts, or dreams to
another and, in the process, forges a connection
between two otherwise remote selves.
Despite its familiarity, this account of the rela-
tionship between language and identity increas-
ingly came under fire in the 20th century, as
scholars across a variety of disciplines challenged
its most basic assumptions. Far from refuting the
connection between self and word, these scholars’
writings suggested that the viewpoint described in
the preceding paragraph does not take this connec-
tion seriously enough. This entry summarizes the
theoretical work challenging this familiar account,
emphasizing the inseparability of these twin con-
cepts. Along the way, and in accordance with con-
temporary scholarship, this entry uses the terms
identity, self, and selfhood interchangeably, to
refer to the same phenomenon. This summary pro-
ceeds through examination of four assertions
regarding the connection between language and
identity: (1) The language of selfhood shapes con-
ceptions of identity; (2) changes in medium lead to
changes in identity; (3) humans create identity
through language; and (4) identity and language
reflect and challenge social order.
The Language of Selfhood
Shapes Conceptions of Identity
Central to the notion of identity that is commonly
held, at least in Western culture, is the belief in its
objectivity and its universality. That is, the prevail-
ing assumption operative in everyday life is that
the self, though mysterious at times, is substantial
and natural, part of what it means to be a human
being. Selves are things, in other words, that all
human beings have—and human beings have
always had.
As an increasingly large body of scholarship has
demonstrated, the contemporary notion of iden-
tity is neither universal nor inevitable. The term
self, when used today by a typical Westerner,
implies a very particular, culturally and histori-
cally situated set of assumptions: The self com-
prises the unique essence of a person, separating
him or her from other people; it is the realm of
private feelings, fears, desires, attitudes, and expe-
riences “inside” a human being, the subconscious
depths that cannot be fully plumbed; except in
moments of crisis or pathology, it is something
singular, not multiple; it cannot directly be seen,
heard, or touched by others, though signs of it can
be given through dress, speech, and action; it is a
guarantor of a host of legal (and often moral)
rights; and it is something that a person can lose,
find, hide, reveal, feel good about, feel bad about,
take responsibility for, scrutinize, or assess.
Although these descriptions (and others like them)
may be familiar to the reader of this entry, they
need not be; they are a product of a particular way
of thinking and talking about identity, one that is
not universally shared. In fact, quite the opposite
is true: There are innumerable people throughout
history, even across the world today, who do not
have selves—at least not in the sense described
here. Those who do (and did) not have such selves
far outnumber those who do.
As a number of scholarly studies (by Charles
Taylor, Kenneth Gergen, Anthony Wilden, and
others) indicate, identity is largely a function of the
language used by a culture to describe it. In other

words, the reason that modern Westerners have
the selves they do is because they have learned to
talk about identity (and persons) in this particular
way. This claim is supported by anthropological
studies of a host of non-Western cultures; the
results of these studies indicate that members of
these cultures do not share the Western conception
of identity and, more radically, that there are as
many different forms of identity as there are ways
of talking about it. In a culture that does not use
the language of individualism—describing human
beings as separate, unique entities—people simply
do not “have” separate selves. Many cultures simi-
larly do not have a vocabulary that distinguishes a
human being’s “inside” from his or her “outside”;
consequently, members of these cultures do not
experience the private, inner life that is character-
istic of the Western experience of identity.
In fact, a study of history reveals that this seem-
ingly universal notion of selfhood is a recent
innovation—even in the West. Plato is generally
credited with initiating the movement toward the
modern notion of identity, by introducing a vocab-
ulary emphasizing reason and self-knowledge.
Later thinkers, such as René Descartes, Thomas
Hobbes, John Locke, and David Hume, drew on
Plato for inspiration (and on Saint Augustine of
Hippo, who sharpened the distinction between the
inner life and outer life) in their accounts of iden-
tity. Their vocabularies, depicting an autonomous,
individual self—the sovereign subject, the pos-
sessor of rights—strongly influenced Romanticism,
even as this philosophical and aesthetic movement
rebelled against the Enlightenment valorization of
reason and science. The account of selfhood com-
mon today owes much to the Romantic faith in
(and language depicting) the deep interior of the
self, the home of imagination, passion, desire—the
irrational, subconscious forces longing, even need-
ing, to be expressed. Although this way of talking
about identity largely survived the Industrial
Revolution and the corresponding emergence of
mass (anonymous) society, contemporary public
discourse circulates a shallow, fragmented portrait
of selfhood, one reflecting the technological and
social upheavals of the 21st century. If this vocab-
ulary wholly displaces the Romantic language of
identity, this will likely also spell the end of the
subconscious and the inner life of the self.
Language 417
Changes in Medium
Lead to Changes in Identity
There is another sense in which language is con-
nected to the evolution of selfhood in the West.
Not only are forms of identity tied to particular
ways of talking about it, but these ways of talking
are conditioned by something more fundamental:
the culture’s dominant medium of communicative
interaction. In other words, changes in a culture’s
experience of the word produce changes in that
culture’s conception and experience of identity.
Three main technologies of the word, or stages in
the history of language, are relevant here: speech,
writing, and electronic communication.
Although literates can never recover the pri-
mary orality of a culture untouched by the medium
of alphabetic writing, scholars (notably, Eric
Havelock, Walter Ong, Harold Innis, and Marshall
McLuhan) have produced extensive studies of the
difference between preliterate and postliterate cul-
tures and peoples. For a preliterate person, the act
of speaking is akin to magic; as it is uttered, a
word conjures its meaning into presence. As a
result, for preliterates there is no distinction
between the word spoken and the thing so
called. To say the word lion is to magically (as if
using a spell) make the animal appear; sound and
meaning cannot be separated.
The world inhabited by the preliterate is a con-
sequence of the nature of the spoken word; in
acoustic space, all things are interconnected and
simultaneous, including the speaker, spoken-about,
and spoken-to. A culture oriented to this acoustic
space, the space of the voice, of the ear, perceives
the world around it as a unified whole—and as a
whole that they are woven into, inseparable
from.  There is no distance between the speaker
and his or her world, no distinction between
knower and known. The spoken word thus dis-
courages preliterates from conceiving of the self as
something separating one human being from oth-
ers, as something unique, private, or individual.
Identity, in a preliterate culture, is a matter of per-
forming (with other group members) the roles
provided by tradition; to be a self is not to stand
out but to successfully participate in the communal
reenactment of cultural history.
As a result, Plato’s emphasis upon reason, self-
knowledge, and self-mastery—the first stirrings of
418 Language
the modern notion of identity—reflected a revolu-
tion in Greek culture as a whole. Plato’s philoso-
phy signified a break with the traditional space of
orality; this rejection of tradition was made possi-
ble by, and was a product of, his acclimation to
literacy. Plato, like all Greeks of his time, had
begun to internalize the phonetic alphabet, a pro-
cess that moved the entire culture from the seam-
less, enveloping world of acoustic space (the ear)
to the objective, sequential, linear relationships of
visual space (the eye).
The phonetic alphabet produced such a shift
because, unlike other forms of writing, it separates
the sound of the word from its meaning, pulveriz-
ing the unity of the spoken word. The phonetic
alphabet dissolves the unified, spoken word into a
connected string of individual units (letters); if the
spoken word is magic, the written word is a code.
With the phonetic alphabet, then, sound is no lon-
ger inseparable from the meaning of a word but is
only meaningful in relation to a written character
(a letter of the alphabet). Further, unlike hiero-
glyphics, the letters of the phonetic alphabet have
no resemblance (pictorially) to any particular
meaning—they do not mean anything at all, unless
they are combined in particular, visually ordered
sequences. This separation of sound from meaning
(and the word from empirical experience) paved
the way, first, for silent reading and, later, for the
description and experience of an inner voice.
As a result, the impact of the phonetic alphabet
was not limited to the word; just as the phonetic
alphabet shatters the unity of the spoken word, it
allows for the first conceptualization of the sepa-
rate individual. The shift from acoustic to visual
space, prompted by alphabetic literacy, introduced
the importance of perspective into human thought.
Whereas sound is involving and decentered, sight
is oriented to a particular point—things are only
visible to a seer, one who is located in a particular
place in relation to the observed. This realization
of the importance of point of view makes possible
the intellectual separation of seer from seen,
knower from known. When this visual mode of
thought was reinforced, hypertrophied, through
the invention of the printing press (typography),
the result was the Enlightenment and Romantic
drive toward individualism—a near-absolute sepa-
ration of self from environment, individual psyche
from group and tradition.
Technological changes in the 19th and 20th
centuries disrupted both visual space and individu-
alism by introducing a new technology of the
word. The electrified word (via telegraph, film,
radio, television, computer, Internet, etc.) slowly
introduced a new amalgam of eye and ear, acoustic
and visual, into Western culture. In the process,
this created new possibilities for selfhood, possi-
bilities counter to the tenets of Enlightenment or
Romantic (typographic) modes of thought.
Moreover, by prompting increased reflection on
the word (and its various forms), these technolo-
gies drew attention to the role played by language
in the construction of the human self.
Humans Create Identity Using Language
As scholars reflected upon the significance of lan-
guage in human affairs, they increasingly critiqued
the Romantic view of the isolated individual with
an inaccessible (even inexpressible) inner life—
arguing that this way of talking about identity
ignores the centrality of language in the construc-
tion of the self. According to these writers (includ-
ing John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, Gregory
Bateson, Kenneth Burke, Alfred Schutz, and Ernest
Becker), the inner life of thought is dependent
upon the public discourse of a community; indi-
vidual identity is a result of socialization into a
language group.
On this view, the individual cannot be rigidly
separated from the community, because this com-
munity provides the materials used in the construc-
tion of that individual’s identity. These scholars
argue that even the most private individual charac-
teristics are socially, linguistically constructed.
This construction occurs in two, interrelated ways.
First, a human being becomes oriented to the
world by learning how to categorize and connect
the events and objects that he or she experiences.
Orientation is dependent upon socialization into a
particular linguistic community, because the mean-
ings embodied in a culture’s language establish the
linkages—the understanding of which events and
objects are connected, which are quite opposed—
necessary for the individual’s successful navigation
of the environment. Because the linkages learned
reflect the proprieties of a particular linguistic
group, the socialization process also teaches the
individual the values, beliefs, expectancies, morals,

and codes of conduct that characterize that com-
munity. The individual, by learning language,
thereby learns to take on, and identify with, group
roles, identities, and affiliations. Moreover, in
learning a language, the individual learns a vocab-
ulary of motives—an understanding of the socially
acceptable reasons for acting—which are used to
interpret the actions of the self, as well as the
actions of others. As a result, linguistic socializa-
tion makes possible not only an orientation to the
things of the world but also an orientation to the
nature and content of one’s self.
As a number of scholars have indicated (e.g.,
Burke, Paul Ricœur, Lee Thayer, Richard Rorty,
Daniel Dennett), there is another link between lan-
guage and the formation of identity. The process
of building a self entails the construction of a
(more or less coherent) narrative about one’s life.
This process begins even before a human being is
born, but begins in earnest after birth—as his or
her parents begin to tell the story of pregnancy,
birth, and infancy. Each human being’s self begins
with this story, the one told by his or her signifi-
cant others; this is the story that first tells the
human being who he or she is. As the young
human being becomes increasingly socialized into
a culture (via language), he or she draws on its
orienting resources to adopt and adapt this initial
narrative; adult status indicates the individual has
acceded to the role of primary storyteller, though
he or she remains indebted to the initial narrative
provided by significant others. On this view, iden-
tity formation is inseparable from the learning of
language; to be a self is not to be separate from
others but to be a successful narrator, one who
skillfully draws upon social and symbolic materi-
als to present a story applauded by others in the
community.
Identity and Language
Reflect and Challenge Social Order
The recognition of the symbolic, communal foun-
dations of identity led many 20th-century scholars
to focus on the connection between selfhood and
social order. Some of these scholars explored the
social roots of psychic disorders. If cultural materi-
als provide the raw materials for the construction
of identity, then, scholars such as R. D. Laing,
Becker, and Jules Henry reasoned, the inability of
Language 419
some human beings to form coherent, stable selves
might simply reflect the insufficiency of the narra-
tives provided by modern culture; because contem-
porary Western society is overly fragmented and
technologized, it can no longer provide its mem-
bers with the scripts and roles necessary for a
meaningful self-narrative. As a result, psychiatric
disorders reflect less private, psychic faults than
fissures in contemporary culture.
Scholars recognizing this intersection of self-
hood and society often adopt a critical perspective
on this connection—arguing that identity and lan-
guage reflect hegemonic processes of social con-
trol. Laing, Thomas Szaz, and Erving Goffman, for
example, read diagnoses of madness and deviance
as mechanisms aimed at protecting the social
order. Michel Foucault, more radically, suggested
that deviant identities are necessary constructions,
subjects-positions produced as objects of knowl-
edge by dominant social discourses; deviance,
according to Foucault, is required for the construc-
tion (and, therefore, control) of the “normal,”
“orderly” self.
This concern with the relationship between
social order, language, and identity is shared by
scholars in such fields as cultural studies, feminist
theory, critical race theory, queer theory, and dis-
ability studies; these scholars explore particular
processes whereby individual identities reflect (or
challenge) dominant social values. Some scholars
(such as Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall) argue
that capitalism is maintained not so much by coer-
cion as by language and culture, the creation of the
consumer self. Similarly, Judith Butler argues that
the familiar language of sex and gender—which
produces individuals who identify themselves as
either male or female—functions to protect the domi-
nant patriarchal, heterosexual order. Likewise, in
his studies of postcolonial cultures, Frantz Fanon
contends that language is the colonizer’s most pow-
erful weapon; systematic education in the domi-
nant culture’s language, which dramatically shapes
individual identity, is far more effective than mili-
tary force at controlling the colonized.
These critical scholars, and others like them,
contend that the struggle over social order is nec-
essarily linked to the struggle over language and
identity. The critique of structures of dominance
begins with (a) a critique of the language and
identity positions that reinforce the values and
420 Language Development
hierarchies of the prevailing social order, and
(b) an exploration of the alternative vocabularies
and selves that might disrupt, at least in part, this
dominant order. Although this critical viewpoint
is not shared by all scholars interested in these
topics, this final perspective suggests the power
and depth of the connection between language
and identity.
Bryan Crable
See also Commodity Self; Communication Theory of
Identity; Development of Identity; Development of
Self-Concept; Gender; Identification; Narratives;
Philosophical History of Identity; Technology
Further Readings
Becker, E. (1971). The birth and death of meaning
(2nd ed.). New York: Free Press.
Burke, K. (1984). Attitudes toward history (3rd ed.).
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Butler, J. (1990). Gender trouble: Feminism and the
subversion of identity. New York: Routledge.
Fanon, F. (1967). Black skin, white masks
(C. L. Markmann, Trans.). New York: Grove Press.
Foucault, M. (1991). The Foucault reader (P. Rabinow,
Ed.). New York: Penguin.
Gergen, K. (1991). The saturated self: Dilemmas of
identity in contemporary life. New York: Basic Books.
Henry, J. (1971). Pathways to madness. New York:
Vintage Books.
Laing, R. D. (1969). Self and others. New York: Penguin.
McLuhan, M. (1962). The Gutenberg galaxy. New York:
Signet Books.
Ong, W. J. (1982). Orality and literacy: The
technologizing of the word. New York: Routledge.
Schrag, C. O. (2003). Communicative praxis and the
space of subjectivity. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue
University Press.
Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: The making of
modern identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Language Development
Language development relates to the processes
involved in the acquired, or untaught, ability of
human beings to understand and produce speech
communication. The study of the development of
language ability encompasses many fields of inquiry,
including linguistics, sociolinguistics, behavioral
psychology, and speech and language proficiency.
The process of language development, including
the surrounding interactions and the environment
in which language development takes place, plays a
role in the formation of one’s identity.
Phonemic and Phonetic Awareness
Phonemic and phonetic awareness are the two lin-
guistic concepts that relate directly to language
development. A phoneme is the smallest linguistic
unit of sound for a given language. Despite ongo-
ing debate among linguists about the number of
phonemes in the English language, most can agree
on the presence of 36 distinct speech sounds.
Accounting for different dialects of English spoken
as a first language, including American and British,
fewer linguists agree that the number can be
increased up to 46 distinct phonemes. Linguists
believe the developed awareness of the phonemic
units present in a child’s home language forms the
foundation upon which the child develops lan-
guage. With the acquisition of phonemic aware-
ness, a child is able to expand his or her awareness
of the components of spoken communication to
use larger units of sound that account for rhymes,
syllables, and onsets, for example.
Infants as young as 2 days old consistently
respond to speech, especially that of the mother’s
or primary caregiver’s. Initially, the infant’s
response, indicated by his or her becoming quiet
and establishing eye contact with the speaker, is
more indicative of an emotional bond between
child and speaker. Eventually though, the child
becomes aware of consistent sounds, rhythms, and
changes in pitch. Within the first year of life, infants
are able to distinguish between sounds that are
present in language to which they are most exposed
and sounds that are present in other languages.
In the first year, the child may not produce
speech, per se, but the child is able to recognize
most speech sounds in the language and make
meanings from those sounds. What most children
are able to do at the age of 4 or 5 months is babble-
vocalize imitative and nonimitative strings of sounds.
Relatedly, the child will soon develop the ability
to connect sounds to meanings in phonetically

consistent forms. Although these sounds serve as
words for infants, they are usually not representa-
tive of phonetic productions in adult language.
Nevertheless, phonetic awareness fosters in the
child an understanding between speech sounds
and meanings.
Theoretical Approaches
Language development is also pertinent to the
physiological production of sounds in infants.
Motor and muscle control affect speech produc-
tion and vocalization, as does cognitive and brain
development. The correlation between language
development and speech is not a consistently
causal one, however, as there have been no signifi-
cant findings to designate when a child speaks as a
mark of his or her intelligence.
Most research on language development in the
past few decades has been drawn from four major
theoretical approaches: behavioral, psycholinguistic-
syntactic, psycholinguistic-semantic/cognitive, and
sociolinguistic.
B. F. Skinner was one of the most notable pro-
ponents of a behavioral approach to language
development, as conveyed in his book Verbal
Behavior. Broadly conveyed, this work is a theo-
retical application of Skinner’s method of func-
tional analysis to verbal behavior, such that
language was considered a subset component of all
learned behaviors. Behavioral theorists hold that
selective reinforcement of correct forms is the pri-
mary means for language acquisition, and parents
serve as the primary conveyers of input for the
child. Through the parents, children have positive
language behaviors reinforced and strengthened;
alternately, negative behaviors are punished or
ignored into extinction.
Although Skinner noted some limitations to
assigning verbal behavior as a dependent variable
in the functional analytic scheme, it is Noam
Chomsky’s negatively critical review of Verbal
Behavior that is remembered possibly more that
the book itself. In that review, Chomsky is critical
of the issues of reinforcement, imitation, and syn-
tactic development as they are conceived in Skinner’s
work. In short, Chomsky found that parents
enforce a very small percentage of the child’s lan-
guage development, imitation accounts for a small
part of children’s syntactic learning, and behavioral
Language Development 421
theory accounts for too little with regard to syntac-
tic development and the explicit understanding of
grammatical forms. In these cases, and others,
Chomsky found that Skinner’s theory did too little
to account for the generative aspect of language
production and what children bring to bear in the
process of linguistic production.
By his own account, Chomsky never set out to
describe language development. His research and
theorizing have focused on descriptions of pro-
cesses relevant to linguistic production. Coming
out of the period when Skinner’s theories domi-
nated, though, Chomsky was viewed as the leading
proponent of psycholinguistic-syntactic theory,
another prevalent theoretical strand. His research
as a whole contributed to the shift in thinking
about language production not as an externally
imposed process but instead as an internal and
generative process. Chomsky theorized that human
beings possess an inherent language acquisition
device that serves a specific purpose, beyond a
purely behavioral response, of helping human
beings decipher the transformational rules of
meaning making through language.
Some contemporaries of Chomsky in the early
1960s questioned theories of language develop-
ment that were so heavily based on syntax and
began to propose theories to also account for
semantics, the meanings that language makes.
Proponents of these semantic/cognitive theories
hypothesized that children first develop nonlin-
guistic understandings that later become expressed
semantically. Lois Bloom’s research marked the
beginning of a semantic revolution, whereby chil-
dren’s language was analyzed more for its intended
meaning, by taking into account linguistic and
nonlinguistic contexts. This analytic approach was
termed rich interpretation.
One criticism of the semantic-cognitive hypoth-
esis was that it only accounted for a one-way
causal link. That is, there was no accounting for
the influence of language on thought. Although
semantic-cognitive theory led to progress in under-
standing a child’s early language development,
there was little recognition of influence of the
child’s early exposure to linguistic input on lan-
guage development.
The theories of language development that
came out of the semantic-cognitive school took an
even more attentive account of the social aspects of
422 Language Loss
language. Sociolinguistic theory applies focused
attention to the influences of the communicative
context on language development. Thus, the inter-
vention that sociolinguistic theory makes is that it
applies more focus on the social and communica-
tive functions of language. Broadly speaking, the
theory notes two practical functions of language.
Intrapersonal language is internal language that is
applied to memory, problem solving, and concep-
tualization. Interpersonal language serves the pur-
pose of communication with others that is measured
by a unit of analysis termed a speech act. Compared
to semantic and syntactic units of analysis, the
speech act is a larger conceptual unit, taking into
account a speaker’s intentions, attitudes, and
propositions, as well as the listener’s interpretation
of a speech act.
In terms of language development, the sociolin-
guistic model holds the child–primary caregiver
relationship in highest regard. Beyond correcting
or reinforcing the child’s patterns of communica-
tion, the adult models and extends language for
the child, situating language use in a consistently
social context. In addition to emphasizing the
influence of the primary caregiver, sociolinguistic
theorists also emphasize the role of environment
on the child’s language development. Further, the
theory allows for attention to the social forces of
gender and ethnic background as integrative to the
child’s language processes. It is this combination of
relationships and environment that form a com-
municative foundation for meaning making well
before the child’s first words. Thus, the relation-
ship between the child’s identity formation and
language development is mediated through those
relationships and spatial engagements.
Michael Burns
See also Age; Culture, Ethnicity, and Race; Development
of Identity; Development of Self-concept; Language;
Mimesis; Phonological Elements of Identity; Semantics;
Semiotics; Setting; Society and Social Identity
Further Readings
Bloom, L. (1970). Language development: Form and
function of emerging grammars. Cambridge: MIT
Press.
Chomsky, N. (1959). Review of Verbal Behavior by
B. F. Skinner. Language, 35(1), 26–58.
Dore, J. (1974). A pragmatic description of early
language development. Journal of Psycholinguistic
Research, 3, 343–350.
Gleason, J. B. (1997). The development of language
(4th ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Owens, R., Jr. (1996). Language development: An
introduction (4th ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior. New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Language Loss
Language loss refers to the suppression of an
indigenous language or mother tongue. Language
loss results in the loss of the human factors (which
language embodies) relevant for self-definition,
self-expression and self-representation, and socio-
cultural and economic growth. Language is a
bulwark against foreign domination and occupa-
tion, and losing it partially or wholly can lead to
spiritual subjugation and control, which can open
doors to other forms of domination and exploita-
tion. This entry examines the causal conditions,
consequences, and implications of language loss.
Causal Conditions
There are two main conditions that can lead to
total language loss. The first is the total destruction
of a people resulting in having no one speaking
that language. In this case, the language disappears
naturally. The second is uprooting and dislocation
of a group of people from their linguistic commu-
nity. Such a condition could eventually rob the
dislocated people of their languages. The discursive
formations within which language is lost are hege-
monic and colonialist. In both cases, language loss
is a product of cohesion or force, domination, con-
trol, and exploitation. The language of the domi-
nant group displaces or marginalizes that of the
subordinate group. Imperial domination, in all its
variant forms, uses control over language and
knowledge to silence the voices of the oppressed
and to establish hierarchies of power that favor
imperialist nations. For example, Western eco-
nomic, cultural, and political dominance were
underwritten through language and education. The
displacement of languages of indigenous people

with languages of imperialist nations resulted in
indigenous people losing their self-image and self-
confidence. Consequently, many colonized people,
especially their elite, chose to share or participate
in the benefits associated with the language of the
dominant group and to avoid the inferiority asso-
ciated with the indigenous languages of the mar-
ginalized communities.
Consequences
The colonizing forces created the social, political,
and economic conditions essential for language
loss. They not only dispossessed the colonized
peoples of their material resources and political
power but, in addition, devalued their cultures and
languages. As a consequence, many colonized
peoples, especially the elite, developed reverence
for and faith in foreign cultures and languages
while looking down upon their own. They began to
believe in the colonially constructed hierarchy of
cultures and languages in which cultures of colo-
nized people and the languages through which
these cultures are communicated or represented as
inferior to the cultures and languages of the colo-
nizing societies. Eventually, the colonized people
believed that the cultures and languages of the
dominating societies are best suited to effectively
facilitate sociocultural and economic development
in the colonial world. As Jean-Paul Sartre explains
in the introduction to Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of
the Earth, the European elite produced alienated
indigenous elite. These elite were stuffed with a
servile mentality that often manifested itself in
rejecting indigenous languages as incapable of car-
rying complex thought. European education and
training produced in them an unprecedented rever-
ence for foreign cultures and languages and dis-
dain, not only for their people but also for their
cultures and languages. Thus, these “manufac-
tured” elite were forced to adopt the languages of
their colonizers or oppressors and to lose their own
indigenous languages. According to Fanon, the
African elite, by adopting European languages,
assumed European culture, supported the weight
of European civilization, and consequently pos-
sessed the world expressed in and implied by those
languages. Extensive research reveals that coloniza-
tion creates an inferiority complex in the soul of the
colonized: Such an inferiority complex disconnects
Language Loss 423
people from the sources of their creative potential
and originality, including culture and language.
Taking away the language and the culture it
expresses takes away a people’s initiative and
thwarts their creative potential.
The dominance of foreign languages and the
marginalization of indigenous languages are
achieved through conquest and subjugation. In
most cases, the defeat of indigenous people by for-
eigners signaled the loss of the preeminence of
their languages and the ascendance to dominance
of the languages of the foreigners. Alexander
Crummell reminds us that the dominance of the
English language in Liberia is related to the history
of subjection and of conquest. The experiences of
people of African descent in the diaspora illustrate
the inextricable link between the life of a people
and their language and the consequence of lan-
guage loss. The Africans who were forcibly taken
from Africa and brought to the Americas as slaves
were disconnected from their linguistic communi-
ties and were denied a social and linguistic envi-
ronment where a sustained use of their languages
was possible. Hence, even though they retained
elements of their cultures and structures of their
languages, their mother tongue was lost. By losing
their indigenous languages, African people in the
diaspora lost the right to define and name them-
selves, their circumstances, and their own experi-
ences in a language native and organic to them.
They lost languages that defined their humanity
and the world as they conceived it, that is, lan-
guages that embodied their ethos and expressed
their sacredness and uniqueness. The Haitian poet
Jean Brierre addressed the grief and anguish of
descendents of Africans resulting from language
loss. He stated that he felt incapacitated, as a
writer, because language loss forced him to express
the experiences of his people using a foreign
tongue. He wrote that the horror of slavery and
the murderous centuries of abusive violence
resulted in the loss of African dialects. Consequently,
African-descent writers are forced to write about
their experiences, sing their dreams and suffering,
and relate their anguish in foreign languages.
Implications
According to Ngugi wa Thiong’o, to lose one’s
language is to lose one’s identity because language
424 Language Loss
is a carrier of a people’s culture, which is the sum
total of a people’s values. He adds that values are
the basis of a people’s self-definition—the basis of
their consciousness. Similarly, Fanon ascribes great
importance to the phenomenon of language. He
argues that language shapes the way the speakers
of that language conceptualize and make sense of
their material and spiritual world and the relation-
ships arising from that worldview. He states that
when one speaks a language, one assumes a culture
and supports the civilization contained in that lan-
guage. Additionally, he suggests that every dialect
represents a way of thinking, with its own rules
and principles. Fanon posits that loss of language
disorients those who have lost their language and
are forced, by circumstances or violence, to adopt
another. In Black Skin, White Mask and The
Wretched of the Earth, Fanon writes about the
crisis of consciousness that the African people suf-
fer when they are forced to abandon their culture
and languages.
Language loss, thus, involves much more than
the loss of a medium of communication and lin-
guistic symbols and codes. Losing a language
means losing a philosophy of life and a worldview.
It means a loss of identity, culture, and social
memory. It also entails loss of self-knowledge, his-
torical knowledge, and social vision. Léopold
Sédar Senghor has argued that to be ignorant of
one’s mother tongue is to be uprooted from one’s
background. Language embodies values and sup-
positions on which other social, political, and
economic systems are grounded. Ethnic or national
identities are embedded in the mother tongue. As
Geneva Smitherman explains, reality is, to a large
extent, sociolinguistically constructed because
experience or reality is always filtered, appre-
hended, encoded, codified, and conveyed via some
linguistic shape. Wole Soyinka supports this argu-
ment when he explains that to understand a peo-
ple, one has to understand language as a speech act
and as the interior language of the people, the
database of their philosophy and their worldview;
that is, one has to understand both the spoken
language and the metalanguage of the people.
The full meaning and implications of language
loss cannot, therefore, be fully appreciated without
a broader understanding of the consequence of
such a loss on the identity, cultural practices,
spiritual life, and creative abilities of the people.
Because language is the “collective memory bank”
of a people’s cultural and historical experiences
embodied in the meaning and nuances of words,
its loss affects a people’s potential to develop.
Hence, Ngugi argues that issues of language and
language loss affect the distribution of wealth,
power, and values, all of which influence politics
in a society. He further argues that ideas are con-
structed and conveyed in specific languages, and it
is this crucial role that makes language loss a mat-
ter of life and death.
Some argue that a people who lose their language
also lose their ability to develop. Development
requires effective and relevant education, commu-
nication, and mobilization. Effective training and
education have to be carried out in the languages
accessible to the masses. Effective mobilization of
the masses to fully participate in developmental
processes can only be achieved through their own
languages. Complete or partial loss of indigenous
languages results in the loss of major resources in
the construction of democratic and development
processes.
Language loss dismembers the society by alien-
ating those who have adopted foreign languages as
the primary media of communication from those
who retain loyalty to their mother tongues. Making
foreign languages central to discourses about eco-
nomic, political, and social development denies the
masses of people full participation in those dis-
courses and processes they seek to inscribe.
Another concern surrounding the thought and
experience of language loss relates to literary cre-
ativity. Because language facilitates creativity, lan-
guage loss can have a substantial impact on a
people’s creative products. Daniel P. Kunene has
observed that language is the sine qua non of liter-
ary activity and is the means by which the writer
reveals the soul of his or her people, their attitude
toward life and death, and the totality of their
worldview. Foreign languages have proved to be
inadequate in expressing the full measure and com-
plexities of indigenous sensibilities and realities.
Geneva Smitherman argues that African languages
are the foundation stone of the education of people
of African descent and should be the medium of
instruction in all their subjects and disciplines.
European languages have failed to correctly name
and interpret the African material and spiritual real-
ity and the reality of other non-European peoples.

Marimba Ani supports the use of African languages
in the education as well as the production and
appreciation of African literature when she argues
that African-based languages are best suited to
accurately express African people’s ethos. She fur-
ther argues that only through the use of the mother
tongue can people communicate their feelings (and,
in so doing, make a statement about who they are)
and define the essence of their community.
Munashe Furusa
See also Colonialism; Culture; Language; Worldview
Further Readings
Diop, C. A. (1987). Black Africa: The economic and
cultural basis for a federated state. Trenton, NJ:
African World Press.
Fanon, F. (1967). Black skin, white masks. New York:
Grove Press.
Langley, J. A. (1979). Ideologies of liberation in Black
Africa 1856–1970. London: Rex Collins.
Mkandawire, T. (Ed.). (2005). African intellectuals:
Rethinking politics, language, gender and
development. London: Zed Books.
Ngugi wa Thiong’o. (1986). Decolonising the mind: The
politics of language in African literature. London:
James Currey.
Ngugi wa Thiong’o. (2000). The interpreters: Language
and politics. In H. Wylie & B. Lindfors (Eds.),
Multiculturalism and hybridity in African literatures.
Trenton, NJ: African World Press.
Smitherman, G. (2003). Talkin’ that talk: Language,
culture and education in African America. New York:
Routledge.
Language Variety
in Literature
Language variety is characterized by speech pat-
terns  (comprising grammar, pronunciation, pho-
nology, spelling, etc.) that divert from Standard
English. In literature, language variety is used to
establish cultural and social identities of a charac-
ter through vernacular. It also speaks to one’s
view of the world and one’s limitations. This tech-
nique is not new to literature, nor is it limited to a
Language Variety in Literature 425
specific genre. Language variety is a centuries-old
tradition that dates back to the works of Chaucer
and Shakespeare. More than giving voice  to a
character, language variety  is indicative of race,
class, social background, and level of education.
This entry provides an overview of language vari-
ety in literature; explores different types of dialect
features used to distinguish regional, social, and
ethnic idioms; shows how language variety is used
to distinguish class; examines the implications of
using language variety in literature, specifically in
relation to identity; and provides insight into the
use of language variety by contemporary authors.
Overview
Geoffrey Chaucer is credited with legitimizing the
use of English vernacular in the 14th century; thus,
scholars have crowned him the “father of English
literature.” In The Canterbury Tales, the more
refined characters eloquently speak the king’s
English, while the working-class characters speak
the local dialect. From the gallant knight to the
widowed shrew, each character’s social status and
persona are defined by speech. Largely avoided
during antebellum slavery except to characterize
European culture, dialect became a popular tool
among U.S. writers in the 19th century. Language
variety has appeared in novels, poetry, comic
strips, advertisements, and newsprint.
With the intention of creating authenticity or
realism in literature, authors use language variety
to illustrate the idioms of peoples from different
regions, ethnicities, and social backgrounds; it has
been used for satire, mimicry, acknowledgment,
and scrutiny of other cultures. Interpretations of
the U.S. southern drawl, urban slang, regional
accents, and other varieties of English can be
found in literature. Although scholars are unable
to clearly define what is considered standard, writ-
ers have used dialect to differentiate between
“proper” English and colloquialisms. Such differ-
ences in speech are often distinguished through
spelling and syntax.
Collections of folktales, slave narratives, and
stories regaling the South suggest more than a
mere fascination with colorful phrases, stereo-
types, and animated storytelling. Mark Twain,
William Faulkner, Zora Neale Hurston, and many
others affected dialect in an effort to speak for the
426 Language Variety in Literature
common folk. Dialect is a key component in litera-
ture, as it demonstrates that English is an ever-
evolving language and not a stagnant form of
speech originally brought to America from England.
More importantly, literature is a gateway in which
the use of language variety establishes the identity
of a subculture or underrepresented group.
Types of Dialect Features
Transferring language onto paper requires more
than an ear for the cadences and nuances of speech.
Capturing dialect can prove to be an arduous task
to take on in written form. Some words can be eas-
ily transformed by dropping the g and adding an
apostrophe, for example, replacing doing with
doin’. However, language variety can overwhelm a
text when it is largely made up of dialect. Even
simple sentences can interrupt the flow of the text
if the reader has to decode its language. In the
Uncle Remus tale, “The Wonderful Tar Baby
Story,” readers unfamiliar with the interpretation
of Black vernacular would find some of the text
hard to decipher. In the following sentence, Uncle
Remus describes Brer Rabbit as he walks right into
Brer Fox’s trap: En he didn’t hatter wait long, nud-
der, kaze bimeby here come Brer Rabbit pacin’
down de road (And he didn’t have to wait long,
neither, because by and by here comes Brother
Rabbit pacing down the road). In this instance,
vernacular begins to sound like a foreign language.
Joel Chandler Harris justified his use of Black dia-
lect by claiming that the language the slaves used
in his stories was 300 years old. Thus, he attributes
the language of his Black characters to the tongue
spoken in the early British colonies. In adopting
this speech, he argued that he was preserving
English dialect.
Writers implement certain techniques to shape
their characters’ voices; these techniques include
eye dialect, regional dialect, and African American
English Vernacular (also referred to as Black dia-
lect). Here, the terms are used interchangeably to
reflect the historical periods in which these con-
cepts took shape and have since changed. Eye
dialect is the phonetic spelling of words, such as
dawg (dog) or sez (says), and is used to demon-
strate nonstandard English. Although the pronun-
ciation of the word does not change, eye dialect
implies unintelligible speech. The reader “sees” the
way a character speaks. This variation of language
is magnified and exaggerated in contrast to what is
considered Standard English.
Regional dialect is a literary technique that
attempts to capture the inflections and intonations
unique to a particular region. In The Adventures
of Huckleberry Finn, Mark Twain uses dialects
specific to rural Missouri. Dialects are further cat-
egorized by race and class: Missouri Negro dia-
lect, backwoods southwestern dialect, Pike County
dialect and its variations. Similarly, William
Faulkner adopted dialect in his novels, making
stark linguistic, hence social, distinctions between
northerners and the southerners, servile Blacks
and impoverished Whites, the aristocrats and the
working class.
The U.S. southern accent is emphasized by the
drawl, the drawing out of the vowel sound of a
word, thus slowing down speech. In literature, it
would look something similar to this: awwriight
(all right). It is not hard to imagine how the words
sound even when in print. Like Black dialect, the
literary representation of Southern dialect some-
times comes off as uneducated speech. However, it
can also imply honesty and wisdom. The use of
ain’t and y’all is common, but by no means are
these terms unique to the southern speaker.
Sentence structure also plays an important role
in shaping Southern dialect in literature. In The
Sound and the Fury, a novel about the rise and fall
of a White Mississippi family, Faulkner imple-
ments a variety of literary techniques to mold his
characters’ voices. Here, Luster Compson uses a
double negative to convey that the golfers playing
on the land his father once owned are leaving:
“They ain’t coming back here no more.” Faulkner
uses language variety to represent region, class,
and financial loss.
For some authors, the influx of immigrants
meant the irreversible corruption of the English
language. Stephen Crane, Gavin Jones noted,
explored in his works the “decayed, inarticulate
speech” caused by immigration. In contrast, Edith
Wharton examined class and status through lan-
guage to implicate the bourgeoisie in its moral
decay. Summer, set in a fictional small town in
Massachusetts, is about a young, illiterate woman
with big city dreams. She feels inferior when a
handsome, young, well-spoken visitor comes to
town. Her deficiencies are heightened when a

failed love affair between the two causes her to run
off in search of her kinfolk who reside in the
mountains. Not only are they uneducated, they are
socially deprived. The substandard English they
speak symbolizes their substandard lives.
African American English Vernacular, histori-
cally known as Black vernacular or Black dialect,
mimics the way in which certain African American
populations are perceived to speak. Historically,
Black dialect was written in a style similar to that
of Harris’s Uncle Remus. The characters were
either slaves or former slaves who compensated for
their inability to grasp the common language by
making up their own. They were depicted as
humble, honest, happy-go-lucky creatures whose
inarticulate English merely added to their charm.
In urban literature, writers use slang or “street”
language to mold the voices of Black characters.
Slang, a loosely defined term that refers to a vocab-
ulary of nonstandard words such as bogish (a spin
on the word bogus), or homeboy (meaning friend),
is used to represent urbanized vernacular in litera-
ture. Also, grammar shapes the language of African
American characters through idiosyncratic speech.
Examples include grammatical inconsistencies such
as is you instead of are you, and the use of double
negatives (I ain’t got no . . . ).
Because accents are hard to duplicate in litera-
ture, authors rely on dialect to show differences in
ethnicity. Spanglish, a term meaning the intermin-
gling of Spanish and English languages, mocks the
diction of the Hispanic speaker. Referred to as
junk language, this linguistic technique attacks and
marginalizes nonnative English speakers. More
often than not, characters that speak nonstandard
English are depicted as comedic or ironic; they
speak unintelligible language, a language uncom-
mon to the mass population.
Use of Language Variety in Literature
The use of language variety in literature has had its
share of praise and criticism. Dialect oftentimes
reinforces racist and sexist stereotypes and beliefs;
in the past, it has been used for such purposes.
Whereas proper English symbolizes refinement,
intelligence, or affluence, nonstandard English
implies ignorance, poverty, or vulgarity. People of
color or low economic status and immigrants have
been especially vulnerable to parody because of a
Language Variety in Literature 427
general belief that they are a lowly, uneducated
group incapable of fully grasping the common lan-
guage. This belief extended to White southerners,
regardless of economic status, whose vernacular
and inflections were equated to ignorance and lazi-
ness of the tongue.
In Tarzan of the Apes, the language of the native
Africans is referred to as the “bastard tongue” by
the narrator of the story. This claim is solidified
through Esmeralda, the devoted Black servant to
Jane Porter, who adds comic relief by butchering
the English language as she calls out for “Gaberelle”
(Gabriel, the biblical angel) and faints at the slight-
est hint of danger. In contrast, Tarzan proves his
superiority through his agility and strength as well
as his ability to decipher and understand English,
albeit through writing. Before the end of the novel,
Tarzan has progressed beyond the language of the
apes to writing English and then on to speaking
perfect French. The narrator explicitly attributes
Tarzan’s inherent intelligence and mastery of lan-
guage to his European heredity.
The American Revolution and the Civil War
brought about a debate on the use of vernacular.
Some argued that Whites were condemning them-
selves by making a mockery of Black dialect.
Because the enslaved learned English from their
oppressors, Blacks were merely speaking the lan-
guage of their masters. Others argued that dialect
literature debased the English language and that
Black dialect was corrupting the speech of White
southerners. The strongest belief was that Black
vernacular was merely a reflection of the slaves’
backwardness and inherent inferiority.
In the midst of this debate, collectors began
recording the stories of former slaves and their
families. During the 18th and 19th centuries, writ-
ers and individuals pursuing their own interests
gained notoriety by capturing Black dialect on
page. Oral tradition was transformed and pre-
served into written history by way of personal
accounts. Slave narratives gave way to an interest
in Black folklore. Collectors, some whose families
were former slave owners, recorded and published
these popular tales although they would soon learn
that this was not an easy feat. Getting ex-slaves to
share personal experiences and such treasured sto-
ries was challenging in itself. Getting their voices in
print was taxing and often resulted in distortions
of Black dialect.
428 Language Variety in Literature
The White author’s interpretation of the mate-
rial presented it as reductive and comical. Whereas
the autobiographies of Frederick Douglass, Harriet
Jacobs, and other ex-slaves demonstrated that
African Americans were as well spoken and intel-
ligent as Whites when given the chance (teaching a
slave to read was illegal), the exaggeration of Black
vernacular became a popular and preferred literary
technique. It became a battle between appreciation
and White appropriation of Black culture.
The protest novel gained popularity with the
publication of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle
Tom’s Cabin. Stowe used Black vernacular to per-
sonify the voice of the slaves of the antebellum
South. The novel begins with a conversation
between two gentlemen who are negotiating the
terms of a debt; the selling of a few slaves will pay
it off. Mr. Shelby, the master of the plantation,
speaks Standard English and has a paternal rela-
tionship with his human property. Meanwhile,
Haley, the cold, calculating slave trader, speaks
Southern dialect.
Not surprisingly, there is little difference between
Haley’s diction and that of the slaves. Class dis-
tinctions are clearly drawn between Mr. Shelby
and Haley, one fact being that Haley is never
afforded the respect of being called Mister. Uncle
Tom’s Cabin overturns the misconception that
slaves lacked the capacity to speak Standard
English. Through Haley, it is confirmed that
Whites had as much influence on Black dialect as
Blacks had on Southern dialect. Even so, literary
representations of Black vernacular as an indica-
tion of one’s character and sensibility had a stron-
ger hold on society, and these interpretations of
language proliferated into minstrelsy.
Language Variety and Identity
Socially conscious writers used language variety to
define a given group or character’s identity. Dialect
was wielded as a weapon against racial violence,
oppression, and degradation. Writers such as
Richard Wright, Langston Hughes, and John
Beecher (Harriet Beecher Stowe’s descendant)
adopted African American English Vernacular to
speak against the evils of lynching, Jim Crow laws,
segregation, and other social injustices. Beecher’s
poem, “A Negro Mother to Her Child,” was writ-
ten in Black dialect to emphasize the plight of
African Americans in America: Quit yo’ wailin’
honey bo’ / ‘Taint no use to cry / Rubber nipple,
mammy’s breast / Both am gone dry. In Native
Son, Bigger Thomas is Black and uneducated. As
migrants from the South, he and his family are a
few generations out of slavery and still trapped in
Jim Crow America when they move to Chicago.
When speaking to Whites, Bigger lowers his head
and mumbles Yessum and Yessuh. Wright uses
language variety to underscore the realities and
consequences of segregation and poverty.
The Roaring Twenties marked a period of
social, sexual, and cultural freedom. Primitivism
and the concept of the exotic Other, the mythical
hypersexualized, barbaric Black being, was the lat-
est novelty of European culture. The Parisian
avant-garde’s fascination with exoticism and pri-
mal African art forms influenced U.S. interest in
Black culture. The Negro was in vogue and a
movement to celebrate Black artistic talent was set
in motion.
A bevy of books written by both White and
Black authors exploited and examined class differ-
ences among African Americans and their White
counterparts. In Carl Van Vechten’s controversial
novel, Nigger Heaven, his use of Black vernacular
and violent, animalistic images implied that even
middle-class African Americans could not resist
the call of the wild.
Ironically, Zora Neale Hurston, a friend of Van
Vechten’s, removed the stigma of Black vernacular
by pointing out its importance to Black culture.
For Hurston, language variety affirmed a rich
heritage. She encapsulated oral tradition in the
form of literature through a combination of liter-
ary techniques and a genuine understanding of
people and dialect. Her dialectical skills are exem-
plified in her novel, Their Eyes Were Watching
God. Throughout her works, Hurston captures the
voice of the Black southerner, emphasizing the
inflections and lyrical rhythm in his speech. In
refutation of the notion that the Harlem Renaissance
would erase the shame of the past (slavery and its
resulting lack of social progress for African
Americans), Hurston argued that there was no
reason to be shameful. Forced to adopt the culture
of a strange land, Africans reinvented their own
culture partly through language.
Wallace Thurman turned the tables on the
Black middle class in The Blacker the Berry.

Seemingly a minor character in the novel, Hazel
Mason, a Black girl with a booming Southern
accent and equally loud clothes to match, is an
outcast because of her dialect. Yet, it is her college
classmates that are insecure about their identities.
The best example of language variety in litera-
ture is George Schuyler’s Black No More, a satiri-
cal novel in which a Black doctor invents a chemical
to turn African Americans into Caucasians. When
asked about the cultural differences between Black
and White, the doctor shows that there is little dif-
ference in language between the two races. The
transmuted Blacks need not change the way they
speak because there is no pure form of English.
Current Use
Today, most contemporary authors view language
variety as an invaluable literary technique. Some
writers use vernacular to freeze-frame a historical
period; others use it to give their characters’ voices
realism. In The Color Purple, the voices of Celie,
Shug Avery, and Sofia may have seemed inauthen-
tic if Alice Walker had them speak Standard
English. Words are powerful and are a reflection
of the time in which the speakers lived; words are
an expression of oppression, pain, and strength.
In naturalistic literature, including Frank
Norris’s McTeague, Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man,
and Pete Dexter’s Paris Trout, authors developed
tension and plot in their novels with the help of
language variety. Still an imperfect literary tech-
nique, language variety reflects the imperfections
of life. The use of dialect features in literature
demonstrates the richness and adaptability of lan-
guage. Thus, language variety gives voice to the
masses.
Angela Watkins
See also Dialect; Figures of Speech; Idiomatic
Expressions; Language; Minstrelsy; Narratives;
Trickster Figure
Further Readings
Baker, H. A. (1987). Blues, ideology, and Afro-American
literature: A vernacular theory. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Blake, N. F. (1981). Non-standard language in English
literature. London: Andre Deutsch.
Liberation Theology 429
Jones, G. (1999). Strange talk: The politics of dialect
literature in Gilded Age America. Los Angeles:
University of California Press.
North, M. (1994). The dialect of modernism: Race,
language & twentieth-century literature. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Wallace-Holton, S. (1984). Down home and uptown:
The representation of Black speech in American
fiction. London: Farleigh Dickinson University Press.
Wolfram, W., & Schilling-Estes, N. (2006). American
English: Dialects and variation (2nd ed.). Malden,
MA: Blackwell.
Lesbian
See Sexual Minorities
Liberation Theology
Since the 1960s, when the Second Vatican Council
set in motion a chain of reforms that would trans-
form Roman Catholicism, theologies of liberation
have risen from the socioeconomic margins to
claim a central place as a globally disseminated
complex of progressive religious movements and
epistemologies. Gestated in a revolutionary cruci-
ble fired by the ideological claims of third world
decolonization, liberation theologies opened public
space for deep revisionings of Catholic identity and
polity, in movements that touched and transformed
Protestantism, as well as in other world religious
faiths—particularly Judaism and Islam, and even
Buddhism. To speak of a theology of liberation in
the singular is to overlook the multiplicity of reli-
gious and sociological perspectives liberationist
thinking has spawned over the past 40 years.
Theologies of liberation have played a role in many
of the profound shifts of cultural identity that have
unfolded since the latter half of the 20th century—
particularly on the axes of gender, race, sexuality,
and class. Arising out of the liberationist impulse,
if not exactly born of liberation theology, have
come profound feminist theologies; queer and
sexual theologies; North American Black and
womanist theologies; third world theologies from
Africa, the South Asian continent, and Korea; as
430 Liberation Theology
well as theologies influenced by recent trends in
postcolonial criticism. In addition, liberation theol-
ogy played a crucial role in political movements in
Latin America—particularly in El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Brazil—as an ideo-
logical cornerstone of Christian-based community
movements. Given the global sprawl and differen-
tiation of theologies of liberation, this entry offers
a sampler of voices from a few important move-
ments. After describing the methodological orien-
tation common to all liberationist theologies, this
entry reviews a few perspectives in liberation theol-
ogy from Latin America, some Latin American and
Latina feminist theologies, U.S. Black theology of
liberation and womanist theologies, and finally
sexual and queer theologies from North America
and Latin America.
A Common Method:
Critical Reflection on Praxis
At the heart of liberation theology’s contribution to
these movements lies its methodology, which brings
the discourse of Christian faith into critical relation
with new interpretations of world history and pro-
gressive social praxis, particularly those inspired by
late-Marxist analytics and critical theories of gen-
der, race, and sexuality. For Peruvian theologian
Gustavo Gutiérrez, one of its perennially important
voices, liberation theology is a critical reflection on
Christian praxis in the light of the Word of God.
That style of reflection tended to depart from tra-
ditional approaches to theological work by insist-
ing not only that theology is itself a praxis but also
that theology must be self-reflective, particularly
with respect to the ways Christian practice pro-
motes, limits, or endangers human freedom, socio-
economic viability, and even life itself. The theology
of liberation also enunciated a preferential option
for the poor and the oppressed that became not
only an axiom of theological reflection but an
option orienting the pastoral practice of the church.
The option for the poor insisted that God’s justice
is a universal project whose first clients must be the
poor and the marginalized. The option does not
exclude the wealthy but calls them to a conversion
in which they would renounce wealth and privilege
in the name of helping those most in need.
A crucial gesture of Latin American liberation
theology was to critique a Catholic faith that
seemed to have strayed far from the vision of its
founder, Jesus of Nazareth: a prophetic, first-cen-
tury, Palestinian Jew who is represented in scrip-
ture (particularly in the synoptic gospels) as
preaching social justice as a transcendental duty.
In doing so, liberation theology inevitably dis-
turbed the more complacent social orders in which
Christianity’s eschatological vision of what Martin
Luther King Jr. called “the beloved community”
had been converted into its opposite—colonial and
neocolonial Christendom—after 1492. Thus, the
theology of liberation presented a form of critical
analysis ideally suited to the subaltern counter-
struggles of the despised communities that Gutiérrez
cited as one constituency of the poor who would
make new claims on the privileges devolving from
Christianity. Theologians of liberation insist that
their approach to interpreting the faith is not
merely one approach among others. Rather, as a
practice, the theology of liberation draws from the
deepest possible roots: the prophetic practice of
Jesus of Nazareth, particularly as Jesus is remem-
bered as a critic of his own society’s substitution of
dogmatic Jewish legalism for the love of neighbor
in what he called the reign of God. In religious
terms, that reign was envisaged as a partially estab-
lished human, historical utopia. This human com-
munity, which liberationist Christian communities
in Latin America often called “the church of the
people,” was metaphysically—but also politically—
invoked whenever “two or three come together in
my name” (Matthew 18:20). Liberation theolo-
gians insisted that this partial historicity of the
reign of God opens a horizon of salvation to all
people, one that begins with justice making and
socioeconomic liberation and ends in the eschato-
logical resurrection at the end of history. Along the
way, liberation theologians conceived a process of
integral liberation, in which the conditions of pos-
sibility for universal justice are laid in complemen-
tary projects of psycho-spiritual healing and
wholeness and liberating historical projects of
socioeconomic healing of human communities.
Black and Womanist
Theologies of Liberation
It would be misleading to say unequivocally that
liberation theology originated in Latin America.
Almost at the same moment as Latin American

liberation theology was born, the Black Power
movement in the United States was influencing
more radical theologians in the denominations of
the Black churches. Born amid what Black theo-
logians called the invisible institution—slave-era
religions—Black theology was always involved
in the question of resistance to racial oppression.
The core question presented in Black theology, in
the words of Dwight Hopkins, is: “What does it
mean to be Black and Christian for a people situ-
ated in the midst of American racism and called
by God to be full human beings?” Responses to
that question would take a radical turn after the
civil rights movement won federal juridical
equality—in the Civil Right Act of 1964 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965—but failed to realize
substantial progress toward economic justice for
Black Americans.
Enter James Cone, whose 1969 book Black
Theology and Black Power stridently asserted
that Black power, rather than the antithesis of the
Christian faith—as many White church people
thought it to be—represented Jesus’s message to
contemporary Americans. He begins from German
theologian Karl Barth’s claim that the life of Jesus
Christ is the principal authority orienting Christian
reflection, but then re-visions that authority as
auguring a work of human liberation and emanci-
pation. In Cone’s early work, liberation reaches
its fruition in a revolutionary process that must
contend with the situation of unjust violence of
racial oppression, even to the point of supporting
a revolutionary counterviolence that, on its face,
seems most un-Christian. In doing so, Cone refuses
to base theology on a literal translation of Jesus’s
forbearing agapic practice into the situation of the
present age. Cone’s second book, A Black Theology
of Liberation, became a classic of Black theology.
In this book, he expanded the theological founda-
tions, leveraging biblical historical-critical method-
ologies to portray a counterculturally prophetic
Jesus who, in his own time, sided with the subal-
terns of his society and can be appropriated by
Black Americans of today as a Black Messiah.
Cone, and the other Black male theologians of
his generation, would come under fierce critique in
the theologies of Black women, who took aim at
both the patriarchalism of theologies produced by
males (of whatever race) and the racism and class
privilege implicitly or explicitly written into White
Liberation Theology 431
feminist theologies. Many in the generation of
women writing from the late 1970s to the mid-
1990s called themselves womanists—after novelist
Alice Walker’s formulation in a 1983 text—
precisely to express what theologian Frances Beale
called the double jeopardy of being both Black and
female. For womanist Jacquelyn Grant, again fol-
lowing Alice Walker, Black woman’s experience is
the principal resource for situating womanist theo-
logical options, and she cites four tenets of feminist
theology that inform the project: (1) the quest for
a wholistic theology that is gender inclusive, (2) the
critique of dualisms that characterize patriarchal
attempts to divide and conquer along artificial and
dehumanizing categories of the human, (3)  the
construction of positive images of women, and
(4) a deconstruction of male understandings of the
faith that simply promote patriarchalism. In par-
ticular, these themes are sharpened by the study of
Black women’s stories and narratives—not only
resources from the social sciences, as theologian
Dwight Hopkins writes, but also resources from
literature and literary criticism, slave narratives,
poetry, and song.
Latin American and
U.S. Latina Feminist Theologies
Likewise, because Latin American liberation theol-
ogy was born as an intellectual movement within
Roman Catholicism, its first major publications
were from male theologians, particularly those
ordained as Catholic priests. Meanwhile, women
informed by nascent feminist movements in Latin
America were also producing liberation theologies.
The first Latin American feminist writings, like
much of early feminism, tended to frame woman’s
identity in more essentialist terms, even amid
awareness that gender subordination was multi-
plied by the crisscrossing of poverty and racism. In
her foreword to Elsa Tamez’s 1989 collection of
Latin American women’s theology, Black woman-
ist theologian Delores S. Williams complained that
its passing references to racial subordination did
not do justice to the phenomenon of racism in
Latin America. Likewise, in another important
early work, Our Cry for Life: Feminist Theology
from Latin America, María Pilar Aquino frames
her analysis in terms of poverty, racism, and gen-
der, but with an implicitly heterosexist reading of
432 Liberation Theology
women’s sexuality, wholly without reference to
same-sex desire.
Over the next decade, feminist theology would
undergo the sort of differentiation that feminist
theory beyond religious studies would follow. In a
2002 article on U.S. Latina theologies, Aquino
deploys Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza’s concept of
kyriarchy, a notion of patriarchy leveraging the
Greek notion of lordship (kyrios) to construe male
domination in terms of structures of transnational
capitalism and intercultural exclusion. In doing so,
she demonstrates a mature feminism that has
apparently left behind the essentialist tendencies of
an earlier generation of feminist theological writ-
ing. Indeed, it could be said that Aquino’s later
work—in sync with many of her sisters—represents
a feminism transcending the category of woman,
one that could inform progressive, antisexist males.
Another, more sociologically grounded approach
emerges in Ada María Isasi-Díaz’s mujerista theol-
ogy, a term that leverages African American novel-
ist Alice Walker’s notion of womanist into North
American Latina experience. The abiding concern
of Isasi-Díaz’s writing is that of la lucha (the strug-
gle) of ordinary, working-class Latinas. In En la
lucha: Elaborating a Mujerista Theology, Isasi-
Díaz brings a substantial sociological apparatus to
her feminist theology through ethnographic inter-
views. For Isasi-Díaz, praxis is at the core of
mujerista theology, and women’s confrontation
with the twin banes of poverty and patriarchy
unfolds less as a struggle against grand narratives
of sexism and more in lo cotidiano—the everyday
predicaments of working women who fight to sup-
port their families at the margins of society.
Theologies of Sexuality: Queering Theology
The early liberationist idea of integral liberation
would find even deeper soundings in sexual theolo-
gies that began to emerge in the late 1990s, con-
ceived principally by Marcella Althaus-Reid, Lisa
Isherwood, and Elizabeth Stuart. Isherwood and
Stuart’s writing on body theology took up a theo-
logical explication of the body in terms of its bio-
logical and affective groundings, particularly in
sexuality, as well as the epistemologies that arise in
reference to it. In particular, they cite the dualizing
of gender and the marginalization of the body as a
positive site of experience as objects of criticism,
calling for an experiential retrieval of embodied
experience as a proper locus of reflection.
Reconceiving the erotic as a spiritual force, after
Carter Heyward’s theo-erotics, they critique the
way in which dualistic Christian sexuality surrepti-
tiously underwrites sadomasochistic society.
Against such bodily self-abasement, Isherwood and
Stuart conceive truth-telling narrative about bodily
experience as a crucial cite of epistemology.
Writing from her experience as an Argentine,
Althaus-Reid explicitly situated homosexuals as an
endangered sexual species, whose marginality has
been substantially girded by homophobic dis-
courses radiating from Christianity, particularly
Roman Catholicism. In early writings, she commit-
ted herself to indecenting (the adjective indecent
refigured into more active form as a gerund) theol-
ogy, that is, impeaching the complacent and
implicitly repressed aura of heterosexist decency
and puritanism surrounding theology. In later
work, she explicitly sought to queer theology, that
is, to subvert established readings of heteronorma-
tivity in the thinking of the church and its people.
Althaus-Reid understood theology as an act of love
in search of liberation from heterosexism. As a
theological project, that search would promiscu-
ously deploy a mix of theoretical tools, including
prior liberation theologies; critical theories of gen-
der, sexuality, and ideology; and many resources of
postcolonial criticism. The first gesture of her work
was to advance a hermeneutics of “indecenting”
and “genderfucking” as strategies of interrupting
the normality of oppressive sexual categories, even
in gender-critical theologies of liberation in which
heterosexist ideology is still normative.
Conclusion
Born in the revolutionary situation of the 1960s,
theologies of liberation have outlasted many
rumors of demise and stand today as one of the
most enduring and creative counterhegemonic,
metanarratives that Christian thought has pro-
duced. Relentlessly chipping away at the religious
hinges of imperialism, capitalism, patriarchy, and
heterosexism, liberation theologies continue to

develop today, breaking open forbidden topics,
shattering regressive epistemologies, and opening
manifold new spaces for justice work in aid of the
worlds of many marginal subjects.
Jorge A. Aquino
See also Critical Race Theory; Gender; Sexual Minorities
Further Readings
Althaus-Reid, M. (2005). From liberation theology to
indecent theology. In I. Petrella (Ed.), Latin American
liberation theology: The next generation (pp. 20–38).
Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
Aquino, M. P. (2002). Latina feminist theology: Central
features. In M. P. Aquino, D. L. Machado, &
J. Rodríguez (Eds.), A reader in Latina feminist
theology: Religion and justice (pp. 133–160). Austin:
University of Texas Press.
Beale, F. (1970). Double jeopardy: To be Black and
female. In T. Cade (Ed.), The Black woman
(pp. 90–100). New York: Signet.
Cone, J. H. (1969). Black theology and Black Power.
New York: Seabury.
Cone, J. H. (1970). A Black theology of liberation.
Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott.
Fiorenza, E. S. (1992). But she said: Feminist practices of
biblical interpretation. Boston: Beacon Press.
Grant, J. (1993). Womanist theology: Black women’s
experience as a source for doing theology, with special
reference to Christology. In J. H. Cone &
G. S. Wilmore (Eds.), Black theology: A documentary
history: Vol 2. 1980–1992 (pp. 208–225). Maryknoll,
NY: Orbis Books.
Gutiérrez, G. (1988). A theology of liberation: History,
politics, and salvation (C. Inda & J. Eagleson, Eds. &
Trans.). Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
Heyward, C. (1989). Touching our strength: The erotic
as power and the love of God. San Francisco: Harper
& Row.
Hopkins, D. N. (1999). Introducing Black theology of
liberation. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
Isasi-Díaz, A. M. (1993). Praxis: The heart of mujerista
theology. Journal of Hispanic/Latino Theology, 1(1),
44–55.
Isasi-Díaz, A. M. (2004). En la lucha = In the struggle:
Elaborating a mujerista theology. Minneapolis, MN:
Fortress.
Isherwood, L., & Stuart, E. (2000). Introducing body
theology. Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim Press.
Looking-Glass Self 433
Tamez, E. (Ed.). (1989). Through her eyes: Women’s
theology from Latin America. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
Books.
Walker, A. (1983). In search of our mothers’ gardens:
Womanist prose. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich.
Looking-Glass Self
The looking-glass self suggests that identity is
informed, in part, by our impressions of how
other people perceive us. The primary idea is that
we see ourselves mirrored in the eyes of the world
around us. As a reflection in the looking-glass, the
self emerges in response to a generalized other,
which is represented by relational and communal
attitudes. Essentially, the looking-glass self sees
itself mirrored on the eyes of persons, cultures,
systems, and structures—which in turn affect the
formation of identity.
Located between social construction theory and
symbolic interaction theory, the looking-glass self
speaks to the ways in which our social interactions
and societal roles are influenced by the world
around us. Here, identity is the result of perceived
interactions between self and others. Essentially,
with every interaction, three things occur: (1) We
imagine our appearance, (2) we imagine judgment
about that appearance, and (3) we respond accord-
ing to our perceptions about the judgment. Put
another way, social symbols, knowledge, and
resources constitute reality; and through interac-
tion, interpretation, definition, and appropriation,
we insert ourselves into that reality.
My looking-glass self is concerned with how
other people view me. As a result, I view myself
according to how I think I am seen. Thus, when I
view myself in the eyes of others, I locate an image
of self. The looking-glass self is a complex way of
seeing and being seen.
Frantz Fanon argued that descendents of the
African diaspora struggle within societal conditions
that impose a culture that has erased many of the
customs and sources on which African culture is
based. According to Fanon, any attempt to under-
stand this complex ontology requires understanding
434 Looking-Glass Self
a particular location: “Not only must the Black man
be Black—he must be Black in relation to the White
man” (p. 257). Consequently, for Fanon, there is an
ongoing dialectic between the Black man’s percep-
tions of self and the perceptions concerning how
others view him.
Mark C. Hopson
See also Symbolic Interactionism
Further Readings
Berger P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1967). The social
construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of
knowledge. Albany: SUNY Press.
Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective
and method. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human nature and the social
order. New York: Scribner.
Fanon, F. (2000). The fact of blackness. In L. Back &
J. Solomos (Eds.), Theories of race and racism: A
reader (pp. 257–266). New York: Routledge.
Gauntlett, D. (2002). Media, gender, and identity. New
York: Routledge.
Hecht, M. L., Warren, J. R., Eura, J., & Krieger,
J. L. (2005). The communication theory of identity:
Development, theoretical perspective, and future
directions. In W. B. Gudykunst (Ed.), Theorizing
about intercultural communication (pp. 257–278).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Kellner, D. (2003). Cultural studies, multiculturalism,
and media culture. In G. Dines & J. M. Humez (Eds.),
Gender, race, and class in the media (pp. 9–20).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Wood, J. T. (2004). Communication: Theories in action.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Yeung, K.-T., & Martin, J. L. (2003). The looking glass
self: An empirical test and elaboration. Social Forces,
81(3), 843–879.
 M
Masking
The term masking carries a multitude of mean-
ings. One definition that hints at the sociopolitical
import of the term is the act of covering the face
or part of the face to conceal identity. The act of
concealing one’s identity from a dominating pres-
ence is perhaps the central function of this sort of
masking. By necessity, it seems that races of peo-
ple have had to obscure their identity, physically
and otherwise, as acts of survival. The belief is
that if one were to behave in a fashion that would
accent one’s personality/visage/culture, a domi-
nating entity would compromise him or her.
African American poet Paul Laurence Dunbar
asserted that Black people in the United States
would have to mask themselves to transcend the
travails of their condition. In his most memorable
work, “We Wear the Mask,” he asserted that, in
the face of the dominant White culture and Jim
Crow laws, Black people should veil their true
identities, their hardships, for protective purposes.
In his essay, “Paul Laurence Dunbar and Turn-
into-the-20th-Century African American Dualism,”
James Smethurst states that Dunbar believed mask-
ing served as a necessary function of survival, par-
ticularly for oppressed populations seeking to
retain their senses of self. Smethurst wrote that
Dunbar’s split between “real” and “mask” remained
the paradigm for African Americans from his era
with its concern for representing an authentic self
without being imprisoned by the actual or potential
racism imparted by White readers.
435
Collectively, the African American community’s
quest for a holistic identity—in the face of the mid-
Atlantic slave trade and the mandated oppression
of Jim Crow laws, primarily—was the central
theme of many early Black literary works, a jour-
ney fraught with conflict and questions. Perhaps
no other writer better articulated this crisis of iden-
tity than W. E. B. Du Bois, when he famously
coined the term double consciousness to describe
the African American’s dual and spiritually distant
identifications: African and American. In his clas-
sic work, The Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois
describes the fight African Americans endured to
maintain identity. Du Bois suggests that African
Americans grapple with the duality of their iden-
tity, being an American and a Negro, which he
says are two opposing identities. The odyssey of
the African American has been to filter these seem-
ingly incongruous identities, while seeking viable
manhood and striving to unify those conflicting
ideals to become more realized in their humanity.
Critics have argued that Du Bois’s concept is
linked to a particular trope of African American
literature, what scholar Henry Louis Gates Jr.
identified in his groundbreaking critical study, The
Signifying Monkey. Gates links the Yoruba deity
Esu-Elegbara with the African American Signifying
Monkey, two Black, mythic trickster figures that
influence Black vernacular and ultimately, the
Black narrative. One form of signifying, Gates
argues, is the use of parody in African American
literature, which he refers to as “motivated signify-
ing,” citing Ishmael Reed’s novel Mumbo Jumbo,
which parodies Western culture. Parody, which is
436 Material Culture
defined as the act of imitating for purposes of ridi-
cule and satire, is a form of masking. Literary critic
Bernard Bell argues that although satire—
employed by writers such as Rudolph Fisher,
George Schuyler, and Wallace Thurman—was
commonly used to articulate ethnic virtues and
cultural truths, black satirists acted as moralists,
revealing their truth from behind reality’s mask.
Satire and its by-product, shame, serve as a
powerful tool for African American writers. Bell
uses Janie Crawford’s verbal lashing of her hus-
band from Zora Neale Hurston’s Their Eyes Were
Watching God as an example of the use of signifi-
cation. He mentions that verbal abuse and ridicule
were used as weapons in African American com-
munities and literary works for purposes of real-
izing social control or liberation.
Perhaps, no other field of study best exemplifies
the power of masking than that of literature, par-
ticularly within the African American tradition.
However, masking occurs in art as well as in text
and language. Although early African American
writers resorted to parody and satire to reveal
social truths, masking in art served the same func-
tion: to illicit social commentary. According to
Lucy Ann Harvard, traditionally, a mask allowed
one to discreetly revel with the spiritual self, while
allowing the wearer to change or alter her image;
her true self is concealed the whole time. Harvard
argues that Mexican artist and activist Frida
Kahlo, obsessed with her Mexican identity,
resorted to using figurative masks in her paintings
to make social and political commentary. The
painting Diego and Frida is Kahlo’s attempt to
unify gender, ethnic, and historical aspect, but
commenting on all three from behind a mask.
Harvard argues further that for Kahlo the subse-
quent act of masking had multiple purposes: it
hides, protects, liberates, and transforms, while
giving its wearer power.
Tacuma R. Roeback
See also Double Consciousness; Satire; Signification;
Trickster Figure
Further Readings
Bell, W. (2004). The contemporary African American
novel. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
Du Bois, W. E. B. (2005). The souls of Black folk. New
York: Pocket Books. (Original work published in 1903)
Dunbar, P. L. (1896). Lyrics of lowly life. New York:
Dodd, Mead.
Harvard, L. A. (2006). Frida Kahlo, mexicanidad and
máscaras: The search for identity in postcolonial
Mexico. Romance Studies, 24(3), 241–251.
Smethurst, J. (2007). Paul Laurence Dunbar and turn-
into-the-20th-century African American dualism.
African American Review, 41(2), 377–386.
Material Culture
Material culture consists of the material things
people make and use. Sometimes examples are
called artifacts. Their material aspect is concrete
or manifest physically in ways we can perceive
through our senses. Their cultural aspect indicates
material culture is an integral part of a way of life.
Material culture embodies and also gives rise to
consciousness, ideas, and spirituality—factors that
contribute to one’s identity. A major focus of con-
temporary material culture studies is everyday life
and lived experience. This contrasts historical
assessments of the material culture of everyday life
as inauthentic, trivial, and false and therefore
unworthy of serious study.
Material culture includes examples that one
may think lack physical substance. Space is an
example. It may not seem as tangible as an engi-
neer’s blueprint or the tools, machines, wood,
brick, steel, and glass construction workers use;
yet architects treat space in terms of weight, den-
sity, and shape, which they form as they design
buildings to contain and interact with it.
Additionally, together with regional, environmen-
tal, and landscape planners, architects elicit from
space a particular character, even a sense of time
and quality of movement. Think of the spaces you
inhabit—the interior of your home, a classroom,
or a car. Material qualities of the spaces result
from the ways economic, social, and cultural
forces along with our uses of the spaces and their
interrelation with other features of the material
environment render them intimate or formal,
serene or bustling, dull and heavy or dynamic.
Material culture also refers to a methodology—in
other words, a set of principles underlying the study

of artifacts. Art historian Jules Prown studied arti-
facts as primary data. According to Prown, features
such as the arrangement and appearance of the
materials of which artifacts consist reveal the mind
of an individual creator and something about her
or his society. According to Elizabeth Edwards and
Janice Hart, in this way artifacts provide valuable
bridges between our mental and physical worlds,
as well as between individuals and groups and
present and past ways of life. Beliefs and conscious-
ness cannot be divorced from the material world
because they help shape the appearance and use of
artifacts, which in turn contribute to the ideas, feel-
ings, and actions that constitute ways of life.
This entry explores the use of material culture
in various academic disciplines and the study of
identity within the context of material culture.
Interdisciplinary Application
Material culture has long been associated with the
study of extinct human culture and lives of nonlit-
erate people and people living outside the main-
stream or whose oral traditions are patchy. The
study of material things provides invaluable evi-
dence of how and why people lived and thought in
situations from which spoken remembrances are
difficult to obtain, written records no longer exist,
or no written texts ever existed because writing
had not been invented, materials on which writing
occurred did not last, records were not kept, or
they were lost. For example, in Small Things
Forgotten: An Archaeology of Early American
Life, anthropologist and archaeologist James Deetz
contends that because we lack written documenta-
tion from African American people about their
participation in colonial American history, we
must rely especially on the small things of life to
provide clues about habits of behavior and tenden-
cies in belief. Some scholars prefer to study society
through material culture because it encourages
them to use of all their senses and contributes to a
more multisensory, multidimensional understand-
ing of a subject than is possible to achieve by rely-
ing only on intellect and vision.
No single academic field is dedicated solely to
the study of artifacts; however, that so many fields
depend on material culture indicates its interdisci-
plinary potential. Whereas the natural sciences
offer methodologies for the study of the physical
Material Culture 437
properties of which the material artifacts are made,
material culture is especially associated with the
social sciences and humanities. In the social sci-
ences, material culture studies have an academic
home in anthropology, which the American
Anthropological Association explains consists of
four fields: biological anthropology, linguistic
anthropology, cultural anthropology, and archae-
ology. In unearthing and examining artifacts of
past cultures, archaeology might seem to have the
greatest interest in material culture. Yet, the other
anthropological fields also study material culture
to understand the lives of preliterate and historical
peoples. Researchers do so by combining an exam-
ination of artifacts with methods ranging from
participant-observation, cross-cultural compari-
son, context-based inquiry, field techniques, and
laboratory procedures methods. Throughout
anthropology, scholars study how materiality is
created and used and what it means and reveals
about social relationships, language, and the pro-
duction, exchange, and consumption of things.
In the humanities, art, culture, and social histo-
rians along with museum curators, geographers,
environmentalists, and members of other academic
fields study material culture in relation to histori-
cal and present-day social and cultural develop-
ments. During the 19th and until about the middle
of the 20th century, scholars applied what they
could glean about human development from arti-
facts to grand theories of social evolution, diffu-
sion, acculturation, and change that sought to
demonstrate the vitality of races, ethnicities, and
nations. Today, the study of material culture is
guided by the idea that objects and their uses and
meanings are best understood in relation to pro-
cesses and situations associated with a specific
time, tradition, or memory and the ways relation-
ships between individuals and groups are shaped
by their particular experiences of geography, eth-
nicity, gender, and class.
Within the visual arts, artists, critics, curators,
educators, and historians study material culture to
learn how individuals and their cultures and societ-
ies selected and employed materials, methods of
construction, fabrication techniques, and styles of
configuration. Researchers investigate how people
distributed, acquired, and used artifacts, including
how and why people altered or destroyed these arti-
facts, and what meanings, values, and significance
438 Material Culture
people associated with the artifacts. Scholars con-
sider artifacts synchronically, by considering how
examples belong to a particular historical era and
what they convey about other examples as well as
relationships between things, ideas, and people.
Also, scholars study artifacts diachronically,
through time, to understand what can be learned as
artifacts are used over many years or as types
change historically. When studying artifacts through
time, sometimes art historians document changes in
their appearance and seek to explain these changes
in relation to other activity occurring in a culture
and society or to changes in technology and theo-
ries about the ways artifacts transform as a result of
the movement of people or in relation to human
development.
In times past, artifacts deemed fine art or high
art were thought to exclusively engage aesthetics,
or ideas about beauty, and have special impor-
tance based on the way they look or the meanings
they conveyed, whereas in comparison, artifacts
characterized as decorative arts along with those
of visual culture and popular culture were distin-
guished from art in their materials, quantity, and
use. This was the result of their association with
the spaces and activities of the everyday lives of the
middle and lower classes. Also, whereas many
works of fine art exist as a one of a kind artifact,
examples of the decorative arts and visual and
popular culture often occur in quantities greater
than one, even numbering in the millions.
Historically, the categorization of types of material
artifacts into art, and then as fine or high art—
painting, sculpture, architecture—and decorative
arts, sometimes called minor arts—furniture, met-
alwork, jewelry, bookbinding—has been facili-
tated by institutions developed to create, collect,
display and maintain them. Thus, for many centu-
ries, the creation and evaluation of paintings has
been the province of fine art academies.
Photography, a newer art form that developed
during the industrial revolution, has had difficulty
being appreciated as art consistently, in part
because academies, museums, scholars, and critics
have insisted on its difference from fine art based
on its association with machinery and its repro-
ducibility, multiplicity, and popularity with the
middle and lower classes. Material culture studies
can direct our attention not only to photographs as
material things but also to how, historically and
institutionally, they have been evaluated as a spe-
cific type of material culture, what material forms,
processes, and affects have been emphasized in
treating photographs in these ways and to what
extent a culture or society has recognized and
made use of the materiality of photographs or
overlooked these dimensions, such as their combi-
nations of chemicals and paper or other support
materials, instead to focus on the appearance and
meaning of their subject matter.
Photographers and other types of artists work
with material culture insofar as they use materials
and when they assemble existing objects to make
pictures or create a sculpture or installation, which
is an entire space they create by modifying in some
manner. The ready-made is an especially impor-
tant way artists engage with material culture.
Ready-made refers to a mass manufactured and
distributed object that an artist purchases or other-
wise obtains and presents, either with some or no
changes other than placing it in a location associ-
ated with art or in such a way that the art world
treats it as art. The term ready-made is thought to
be first associated with artist Marcel Duchamp
especially in reference to his combination of a stool
and bicycle wheel, a urinal he turned upside down
and on which he signed the name R. Mutt, and a
shovel he titled In Advance of a Broken Arm,
among other examples he “created” and presented
in New York City between 1915 and 1923. In
addition, Duchamp treated gender as a ready-
made. He dressed as a fashionable modern woman,
referring to himself as Rrose Sélavy, a name that,
when said aloud, sounds like a French phrase
meaning, “Eros, that’s life.” By treating femininity
as an existing condition he could manifest materi-
ally, he put to the test what happens to the signifi-
cance of products developed for one set of uses
when they are replaced elsewhere or used in a dif-
ferent way, and to what extent gender identity can
be understood as a material state that can be con-
structed using things.
Identity in Context of Material Culture
Today, scholars treat identity, subjectivity, and con-
sciousness as cultural and social processes that take
place in contexts of which material culture is a part,
insofar as persons and things explain something
about and affect one another. Wearing clothing,

jewelry, and makeup manufactured for, advertised
for, and sold to women illuminates their intended
use to transform women into a particular cultural
and social idea of femininity, a power Duchamp
exploited when he used them to appear as a woman.
So transformed, he was photographed as Rrose
Sélavy, and he used the photographs in art projects.
He created a perfume bottle called Belle Haleine
Eau de Voilette (Beautiful Breath: Veil Water) fea-
turing a tiny photograph of himself as Rrose Sélavy
on the label and “her” signature on the back.
At present, material culture studies considers
the self not something fully formed at birth but
constructed or formed as we live in the world. The
constructed aspect means that how we conceive of
ourselves as a self, the relationship our self has to
the world, and the way the world conceives of us
is shaped by and shapes the world through pro-
cesses of change and development having contra-
dictions and irreconcilabilities. Many theoretical
models seek to explain how this works. From the
20th century, some of the more prominent models
include that we develop a mind split between con-
scious and unconscious impulses, with the latter
having the power to direct the former. Also, our
consciousness develops in a world understood as a
field of language in which we articulate individual-
ity in its preexisting terms. As well, our subjectivity
is the result of forces of power that direct us to
behave in particular ways, and gender identity
comes from a system and set of values organized
along lines of power, including that we are always
falling short of living in ways that a culture and
society recognize as wholly masculine or feminine.
Even as we become who we are, with artifacts
playing a central role, we are not in full control of
these processes or aware of their ultimate dimen-
sions and effects. Nor do they conclude when we
die. Art historians expect new generations of stu-
dents to continue discovering something about
artists by studying the artifacts they used and cre-
ated and by reflecting on what these artifacts tell
us about the artists and their cultures and societies.
Art historians study the clothing, jewelry, makeup,
perfume, and photographs associated with Rrose
Sélavy to learn how artifacts contribute to creating
her gender and appearance and grasp what rela-
tionship this had to Duchamp as he was culturally
and socially treated as a man and worked as a
creator, curator, collector, and founder of art
Media Studies 439
organizations involved the type of material culture
we call art.
Jennifer Way
See also Acculturation; Aesthetics; Commodity Self;
Consumption; Culture
Further Readings
Chilton, E. (1999). Material meanings and meaningful
materials: An introduction. In E. Chilton (Ed.),
Material meanings: Critical approaches to the
interpretation of material culture (pp. 1–6). Salt Lake
City: University of Utah Press.
Edwards, E., & Hart, J. (2004). Introduction:
Photographs as objects. In E. Edwards & J. Hart
(Eds.), Photographs objects histories: On the
materiality of images (pp. 1–15). London: Routledge.
Givens, D. B. (anonymously, 1998). What is
anthropology? Arlington, VA: American
Anthropological Association. Available at www
.aaanet.org/anthbroc.htm
Mansfield, N. (2000). Subjectivity: Theories of the self
from Freud to Haraway. New York: New York
University Press.
Miller, D. (1998). Material culture: The social life of
external objects. British Journal of Psychotherapy,
14(4, June), 483–492.
Prown, J. (1982). Mind in matter—An introduction to
material culture: Theory and method. Portfolio
17(1), 1–19.
Media Studies
The relationship between media studies and iden-
tity can be mapped over the four major areas of an
interdiscipline derived from a large range of cog-
nate areas, all of which coalesce as they contribute
to the study of media. In the contemporary his-
torical moment when nearly everything is medi-
ated and the centrality of media is crucial to
globalization, media remains a central area of
study. Moreover as Melissa A. Johnson observes,
media overlaps with identity studies in at least
three ways: identity is self-defined, partly through
the media; identity moves from the local to the
transnational as does the media; and identity is
situational and shifting as charted by the media.
440 Media Studies
Media studies derives from different traditions
in different geographical locations. In the United
States, the Ferment in the Field issue of the Journal
of Communication in 1983 signaled a field with an
incoming bifurcation between qualitative and
quantitative approaches. By the mid-1980s, the
dominant approach was quantitative and the cul-
tural or critical components were so marginal, in
power in the field, that they were reinscribed as
newcomers. As James Carey had written, however,
the study of culture could be traced back to John
Dewey in the 1920. The famed exchange between
Paul Lazarsfeld and Theodor Adorno in the 1930s
gave rise to the division between administrative
research—that took the status quo as given and
critical research that challenged the premises
implicit in much administrative work. The
Frankfurt school ushered in the study of cultural
industries that infused concepts of power and the
economy to the study of media. Decades later fol-
lowing the rise of British Cultural Studies issues of
ideology, working-class culture and the popular
would further enrich the interdiscipline of media
studies especially as it overlaps with identity stud-
ies. Although many see these as competing para-
digms, it is far more productive to understand that
they actually inform each other though they enter
the study of media at differing levels of analysis
based on divergent theories and methodologies.
The inclusion of major concepts such as identity
promises to link and enrich the many areas of
media studies. For example, while one scholar
might be asking questions about global media con-
glomerates in relation to capital flows and national
sovereignty/identity, another might ethnographi-
cally explore a community in Peru to see the indi-
vidual and community ramifications of local
cultural production in relation to the global con-
centration of intellectual property among a hand-
ful of transnational media corporations and how
national and regional identity can be asserted, pre-
served, and globally marketed to ensure survival of
a community. The remainder of this entry focuses
on the analytical components of media studies.
To facilitate the study of media, scholars sepa-
rate four analytical components: production, con-
tent and representation, audience and interpretation,
and effects and psychology. These are all experi-
enced as one by those involved in the circuit of
culture and are all related to issues of identity:
Produced media reach audiences in symbolic form
that they, in turn, interpret and that might have a
range of effects on them. This media might be pro-
duced by those who explicitly or implicitly hold
and may want to promote certain identity posi-
tions. Representations draw on a long history of
stereotypes and other signification practices that
rely implicitly or explicitly on identity components.
Audiences are composed partly by identity posi-
tions. Effects have been found to occur based on
contact with or proximity to people from different
identities. Nonetheless, it helps to separate out
these analytical moments.
To begin with production, media studies schol-
ars seek to understand the conditions, rules, and
conventions under which the media are produced.
Scholars have identified three important levels of
analysis in the study of production. At the institu-
tional level, scholars explore the social norms and
values, often unwritten but assumed, that govern
the production of media in any given setting. Neo-
Marxist political economic research that questions
the confluence of economics and power looks at
institutional values such as the profit motive within
capitalism as a filter that promotes the marketplace
and consumerism and precludes alternative social
and economic arrangements and possibilities that
might lead to more just distribution of resources
and result in media that promotes social justice
values. At the institutional level of analysis, one of
the unmentioned filters is the presence of identity
as a powerful norm. That is, masculinity and
whiteness are the norms in hard news though at an
implicit level. At the organizational level of analy-
sis, scholars examine the rules and regulations in
the workplace. How is it that the television show is
produced so that it delivers a season’s worth of
hour-long episodes? What type of planning gener-
ates such slick and regular output? Media studies
scholars find that elements of planning and sources
favor the middle class in journalistic media by
deploying workers during the 8-hour workday and
contacting authority figures that are likely to be
middle class, White, and male. At the individual
level of analysis, media scholars study those who
produce media. Although figures vary across dif-
ferent types of media production—for example,
most entry-level workers in advertising and jour-
nalism are female and the film industry continues
to have low levels of minority workers—the

research is inconclusive about whether the identity
of an individual producer influences the eventual
media product. Entry-level workers, regardless of
their identity, have to follow rules set at the orga-
nizational level and norms at the institutional level.
Conversely, if the violation of ethical norms is fla-
grant enough—for instance, a media company is
particularly racist or sexist—an individual commu-
nicator can appeal to the broader court of institu-
tional values of fairness and balance.
Most people think of media as the content that
they receive—the magazine, TV show, Web site,
digital gaming platform, popular music, advertise-
ment, news, movie, and so on. Media studies schol-
ars have analyzed content from a quantitative
approach—measuring numbers, frequency, and
correlation between the population, particular
identity categories, and their appearance in media—
and text from a qualitative approach—delineating
the tropes and narratives that represent particular
identities. Both methods yield findings of either
stereotypes or narratives that code people and situ-
ations according to long-standing racial, ethnic,
national, and sexuality types. Content analysis
yields the two-part finding of symbolic annihilation
that articulates both underrepresentation combined
with marginalization, ridicule, and sensationaliza-
tion. Furthermore, research cautions us not to
equate increased representation with better repre-
sentation. Contemporary scholarship finds pockets
of improvement, in ethnic channels and in large
multicultural cities and regions, as well as the con-
tinuing privileging of whiteness in mainstream
mass media.
The study of audiences has also been infused
by identity issues. In her canonical work on
The Color Purple, Jacqueline Bobo found that
African American women as an interpretive com-
munity took an oppositional spectatorship posi-
tion vis-à-vis mainstream Hollywood film. Bobo
drew on media theory that suggested audiences
relate to media in at least three ways: the main-
stream or intended view, a negotiated manner that
accepts some elements but discards others, and
oppositional in which the viewers know they are at
odds with the system of production and therefore
attend to media oppositionally. Whereas social
scientific approaches explore the uses and gratifi-
cations that audiences purposefully seek from
media, an interpretive approach explores how
Media Studies 441
media is taken up in people’s everyday lived expe-
rience. Work on ethnic media suggests that ethnic
audiences use it for community formation and cre-
ating and maintaining an identity. Audiences
demand more inclusivity and representation from
ethnic media than they ask from mainstream
media. Much work remains to be done to map
how overlapping and competing identity catego-
ries influence media attention and interpretation.
Within effects and media psychology research,
identity is usually pursued through the study of
ingroup-outgroup affiliation and formation.
Regarding mainstream media, the ingroup would
be the normative middle-class, Eurocentric iden-
tity. Media psychology scholars design experimen-
tal projects to find out if there are ingroup and
outgroup effects of particular media content.
Drawing on content analysis of underrepresen-
tation and symbolic annihilation, effects scholars
examine likely outcomes from such repeated media
exposure. One finding is that those without per-
sonal experience with ethnic minorities tend to
have attitudes consistent with the mediated forms
of identity content. Intergroup relations based on
discriminatory responses increase when content is
ethnically ambiguous, therefore allowing dominant
culture audiences to engage in identity-based
enhancement of self-esteem at the expense of ethnic
outgroup populations.
The study of media is inextricably linked to the
study of identity. As an interdisciplinary field
media studies has grown into a multitheoretical
and multimethodological enterprise, which illumi-
nates the study of identity and media.
Angharad N. Valdivia
See also Cultural Studies; Culture, Ethnicity, and Race;
Mediation
Further Readings
Bobo, J. (1995). Black women as cultural readers. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Johnson, M. A. (2003). Constructing a new model of
ethnic media: Image-saturated Latina magazines as
touchstones. In A. N. Valdivia (Ed.), A companion to
media studies (pp. 272–292). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Livingstone, S. (2008). On the mediation of everything:
ICA presidential address 2008. Journal of
Communication, 59(1), 1–18.
442 Mediation
Nguyet Erni, J. (2001). Media studies and cultural
studies: A symbiotic convergence. In T. Miller (Ed.),
A companion to cultural studies (pp. 187–213).
Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Mediation
Mediation is the process of conveying information
through an instrument, or medium. Thus, the idea
of mediation starts with the medium, a concept
widely discussed in the present era in media and
communications departments at educational insti-
tutes around the globe; in magazines, journals and
books; and at all kinds of conferences that take the
concept of mediation as their point of departure.
The concept of medium is also important for schol-
ars interested in identity because how information
or messages are conveyed can affect one’s sense of
self and others’ views of one’s identity. Yet, what
qualifies as a medium remains a source of continu-
ing inquiry and debate. There are the usual sus-
pects: mass media communications apparatuses
such as telephone, film, radio, television, and the
Internet. But there is much room to argue whether
these are the only phenomena through which a
message or information is transported. Many theo-
rists that claim that everything in a way has the
potential to work as a medium because every phe-
nomenon, both material and immaterial, is capable
of functioning as a means through which a mes-
sage is expressed. In this sense, there is no differ-
ence between a television, a concept, a Madeleine,
a newspaper, and a human body because they are
all able to carry information or convey meaning,
articulating messages in an array of differing con-
texts and situations. Yet a group of scholars also
claims the opposite, namely, that there is no such
thing as a medium. This counterargument posits
that information or meaning cannot possibly be
transferred through a medium from one thing to
the other. The message then only comes into being
when a recollection of words, gestures, and other
forms of expression affects one’s thoughts and
form an idea in the wake of their destabilization.
General Theory of Communication
The question of whether to define a phenomenon
as either a medium or not a medium is part of a
debate most central to the field of media studies,
which is concerned with how a medium functions
and what it does. The prevailing argument that
everything can function as a medium follows from
the ideas of Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver.
Mathematicians by profession, Shannon and
Weaver put forward a general theory of communi-
cation circa 1948 that already included ideas on
information source, message, signal, noise, receiver,
coding, and decoding. Consequently, the bulk of
cultural studies theorists from Stuart Hall to Lev
Manovich still construct the basic tenets of how
media and communications function from the
ideas of Shannon and Weaver, even though the
ideas have sustained much critique for their inher-
ent linearity. On the other end of the spectrum,
philosophers of language such as J. L. Austin and
Roman Jakobson inspired a number of media
theorists to elaborate on the idea that mediating
language comes into being with the speech act.
Language or any other type of communication
should not be studied from an analytical perspec-
tive but through a pragmatic lens, understanding
that language is just one aspect of human commu-
nicative behavior and functions as but one means
of orchestrated bodily expression. Austin and
Jakobson’s ideas have had great influence on the
work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari and
have found a place in new materialism and new
media theories.
As earlier stated, the critique of Shannon and
Weaver’s model focuses primarily on its linear
character. That is to say, their schematic of the
mediation process as represented by an arrow start-
ing with the sender, going through the medium to
be absorbed by the receiver is no longer widely
accepted today. For example, in Hall’s rereading of
the schematic of mediation from a Marxist perspec-
tive, the sender produces meaning in the mediation
process, but so does the receiver, the latter partici-
pant doing much more than passively absorbing what-
ever meaning he or she is exposed to. Manovich
also questions Shannon and Weaver’s linearity by
claiming that the digital and computer-generated
imagery and interfaces through which meaning is
expressed today represents future possibilities pro-
pelling the ideas of the sender into a world to come,
again open to the ideas of the receiver. Ultimately,
those proposing such counterclaims and critiques
have proven to be less interested in defining a

medium or explaining how the mediation process
as a whole works, than in the question of what hap-
pens at the point of mediation. This brings us then
to the heart of media studies, to the work of the one
scholar whose work still functions as the pivot
around which the field has evolved. Canadian
scholar Herbert Marshall McLuhan has been piv-
otal in addressing this latter question, positioning
him as one the foremost thinkers in the field of
media studies not because he has united the field,
but because he has opened the way to so many
diverse schools of thought in media studies. Whether
explicitly or implicitly, all are in some way elabo-
rating on McLuhan’s theory of the medium.
McLuhan’s Theory of the Medium
McLuhan started his career as a literary theory
scholar and a student of I. A. Richards, an impor-
tant thinker in new criticism and an advocate of
close reading, the emphasis on the particular over
the general in contemporary literary criticism.
While writing his PhD on the verbal arts (grammar,
logic, and rhetoric, also known as the trivium) from
Cicero to Thomas Nashe, McLuhan also finished a
manuscript in which he used a similar methodol-
ogy for studying contemporary texts that was later
published as The Mechanical Bride. After finishing
these two monographs, a remarkable change
occurred in McLuhan’s work as he bid farewell to
the content analysis of Richards, shifting his atten-
tion from the close reading of a text as an expres-
sive form to how this form allowed both the
information source and the receiver to enter into
communication. In his groundbreaking 1962 pub-
lication, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of
Typographic Man, McLuhan does not focus any-
more on the content of the text produced on early
printing presses, but rather on the new realities a
particular type of text produces. Claiming that the
invention of print was more important than any
book ever written, McLuhan shows us the social
and psychological consequences of book printing.
And these consequences, he claims, are enormous.
For as the invention of mechanical printing by
Johannes Gutenberg (ca. 1439) made possible the
uncountable verbatim reproductions of a single
text, it caused society, which was organized around
an oral tradition, to be reorganized by a literate
tradition. This fixation on strict interpretations of
Mediation 443
the literal text made both the worldly powers and
the church undergo a radical metamorphosis.
Unlimited reprinting, and thus the distribution and
implementation of laws and edicts, gave the urban
administrators a better means to extend their
power, causing cities to grow rapidly. The unlim-
ited reprinting of the Holy Word, McLuhan claims,
caused the first reliable Bible translations to appear
and set into motion the massive refusal of Rome’s
representative authority of the Kingdom Come
(which led to the Reformation).
Convinced then of the idea that new technolo-
gies or new media forms caused great changes to
occur in history, McLuhan turned his attention to
the electric age and started working on his most
cited work, Understanding Media: The Extensions
of Man. Starting by stating that the form of expres-
sion overcodes the content of a message into the
well-known phrase “the medium is the message,”
McLuhan then studied the ways in which different
media gave form to new ways of living. As the title
of this book already anticipates, his study on how
the different media forms work leads him to the
provocative definition of a medium as an exten-
sion of the human body, which means that through
the potentials of each particular medium humans
are engaged with what surrounds them and articu-
lates them, thereby coming into existence accord-
ingly. Mediation takes place in our interaction
with what is commonly understood as the (mass-)
media such as the speech, the book, radio, televi-
sion, or film. A car is also a medium because it
mediates a message (ourselves) from A to B, and
thus functions as an extension of our ability to
transport ourselves; the car thus extends the legs as
the conveyer of a message. McLuhan even says
that the instance of electric light shows us best
what a medium is all about: a means through
which a particular environment or event is staged.
Electric light, he argues, is pure information in that
it allows us to create an illuminated sphere in the
middle of the night, not so much redefining every-
thing that surrounds it, but allowing humans,
through their ability to see, to cater to their envi-
ronment, and to enlarge their power. Similarly, the
car improves our speed of transportation, and the
television allows us to communicate to a large part
of the world’s population at the same time.
Though McLuhan’s work received much praise
and continues to inspire scholars since the emergence
444 Memory
of so-called new media (mobile phones, the
Internet, navigation technology), his work was
also the object of fierce critique. Most notably,
Raymond Williams was not convinced of the
dominant role of technology in McLuhan’s
thoughts. A key figure in cultural studies, Williams
believed that it was not the form in which media-
tion took place that determined our actions.
Williams stressed that we ourselves are agents
and that we choose our means of expression
and work with them the way we like. What is
mediated is thus not a consequence of the medium
but of the ways we choose to express ourselves.
Friedrich Kittler criticized McLuhan’s work for
being anthropocentric, arguing that although
McLuhan seeks to illuminate the ways in which a
means of communication articulates the self, the
human is still the starting point of his analysis.
Rather than reducing media to an addition to the
human body, Kittler is interested in the possibili-
ties of the autonomy of technology. Scholars in
posthumanist circles, drawing on discourses in
contemporary continental philosophy, prefer an
emphasis on the abstract systematics within which
both the human being and technology function,
bringing us back again to processes of mediation
that can incorporate all kinds of phenomena.
Scholars such as Gilles Deleuze and other contem-
porary new materialist theorists add to this an
anti-essentialist resistance of bodies. Bodies, they
claim, although incorporated within a series of
abstract messages (known as the digital age, but
also as capitalism or as the state), are affected and
affect their external contexts according to their
own materiality and embodied spirituality.
Mediation in the sense of the transposition of mes-
sages is claimed to be impossible, leading back to
the question: What can function as a medium?
Nevertheless, despite the different critiques on
McLuhan’s work, his influence in media studies
has remained strong, particularly because he was
the first to write down a theory on what a medium
is and how it works in the broadest sense of the
word. Thus, McLuhan has inspired a second gen-
eration of media scholars including Jay David
Bolter and Richard Grusin and Arjen Mulder.
More importantly, McLuhan set the stage for con-
temporary discussions on how mediation works,
thus launching further studies in the related fields
of identity studies, media, mediation, and media
performance.
Rick Dolphijn
See also Cultural Studies; Embodiment and Body Politics;
Media Studies
Further Readings
McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding media: The
extensions of man. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Mulder, A. (2004). Understanding media theory.
Rotterdam, the Netherlands: NAi.
Williams, R. (1975). Television: Technology and cultural
form. London: Routledge.
Memory
Identity is the idea that there exists an individual
and authentic sense of self. The notions of identity
and memory logically presuppose one another.
Remembering and forgetting are fundamental to
the creation of identities. Our identities are the
result of the networks to which we belong and our
connections to particular networks (e.g., family,
work, nation) are only possible through both col-
lective remembering and collective forgetting. The
study of collective memory began with Maurice
Halbwachs, a student of Émile Durkheim. Halbwachs
argues that memories are not simply stored in our
minds awaiting retrieval, a common understand-
ing of how memory operates. Rather, the past is
constructed and reconstructed on the basis of
present needs. Memory is a social activity not pos-
sible outside of society and outside of what he
calls social frameworks of memory. Social frame-
works are the instruments used to reconstruct
images of the past and realign them with the pre-
dominant belief systems of the present society.
Thus, memory is a social construction rather than
a purely individual construction. This conceptual-
ization of memory understands memory as com-
ing from outside the individual rather than
emanating from within.
Social frameworks of memory do not exist in an
historical vacuum, but are products of their history.

Collective memory persists through its base in dis-
tinctive social units or, in other words, groups of
people. Memory is not possible outside of group
membership. From the moment an individual
belongs to a group, thinks in common with the
group, and maintains contact with the group, that
individual becomes capable of identifying himself
or herself with it. Group identity means merging
the individual’s past with the group’s past. This is a
social task. From this moment, the individual
thinks and remembers as a member of the group.
Although memories may seem purely personal,
they are social because of the greater complexities
required for their recollection (i.e., social frame-
works). Thus, a person remembers only by situat-
ing himself or herself within the viewpoint of one
or several groups and one or several currents of col-
lective thought. Halbwachs’s concept of the social
frameworks of memory illustrates that social bonds
are necessary to have memories. This idea is the
theoretical foundation that contemporary memory
scholars use to further investigate the relationship
between memory and identity.
Collective Remembering
Modernity brought with it various identity crises.
Individuals had to adapt to the fact that they had
to juggle multiple identities simultaneously (e.g.,
American, mother, wife, lawyer, NRA member)
while often searching for a fundamental identity
by which they can define themselves. Although
individuals use social frameworks to develop and
construct their memories, individuals also need
memory to form social bonds. The core meaning
of any identity (individual or group) is a shared
sense of sameness over time and space. This same-
ness is comprehended and sustained by remember-
ing. Remembering is the means by which we
understand our place in time because memory is
the negotiation of past, present, and future through
which we identify ourselves and others.
Building on this idea, Jan Assman proposes a
theory of cultural memory emphasizing that social-
ization processes allow us to remember, and more
importantly, our memories help and enable us to
become socialized. Cultural memory includes all of
an individual’s accumulated knowledge obtained
over generations through repeated social practices
Memory 445
and rituals. This theory of cultural memory
attempts to relate memory (the past), culture, and
the group (society) to each other. Identities are
acquired over time through learning from our
various types of social experiences. Thus, without
memory, identities are not possible. Identities can
be thought of as the accumulation and embodi-
ment of collective memories, as well as the expres-
sion of them. This theory stresses the importance
of remembering in making everyday social life pos-
sible, including the formation of identities.
Pierre Nora also theorized about the relation-
ship between memory and identity. He argues that
in modernity, there are only sites of memory
because there are no longer real environments of
memory. Before modernity, time was cyclical and
life was relatively unchanging. Thus, our past was
not something that needed to be preserved. In
modernity, time is linear and memory is no longer
everywhere, so we must deliberately create archives,
uphold anniversaries, and organize celebrations
because such activities no longer occur automati-
cally. This is because our identities are constantly
being threatened, otherwise individuals and societ-
ies would not feel such an obligation to build
monuments and store and restore history. Our
attempts to store our memories are an attempt to
search for history and construct identities.
Memories and identities are never solely con-
crete. At times, they can be rather solid and fixed,
but at others, our memories and identities can be
fluid and changing. As our memories change, so do
our identities, and the opposite is also true. As we
shift or alter our identities, our memories can also
shift. This is not to argue that memory and identity
are completely malleable, but rather, that they
should be conceived of as social processes.
Sociologist Jeffrey Olick’s work has consistently
argued against a static conceptualization of mem-
ory, one that reifies memory, referring to the col-
lective memory or discussing it as an independent
(collective memory → Y) or dependent (X →
collective memory) variable. His most recent book,
The Politics of Regret, most clearly outlines a the-
ory of collective memory that avoids the pitfalls of
process-reduction and reification, forwarding a
figurational theory of memory. Figurations of
memory are developing relationships between past
and present in which various images, contexts,
446 Memory
traditions, and interests come together in multiple
ways. This theory provides a new language that
will allow future scholars to avoid the reification
of memory, identity, and the relationship among
them by acknowledging their potential for both
stability and instability.
Collective Forgetting
In contemporary societies, people do not have a
singular identity. Rather, each individual is a part
of various networks and groups, all of which play
a role in the development of an individual’s iden-
tity. These multiple networks that compose our
identities can be peacefully overlapping, conflict-
ing, or overlap in some ways and conflict in others.
Any one network can contain conflicts and incon-
sistencies. For example, many scholars have dis-
cussed contemporary nationalism as problematic.
They investigate how it is possible for an individual
to be proud of his or her membership to a nation,
even when atrocities have been committed on that
particular nation’s behalf, or in other words, when
that nation has a difficult past. This is only possible
through collective forgetting. Thus, although
remembering is essential for identity, it can also be
dangerous because it brings to the surface memo-
ries that are potentially damaging to the solidarity
of the group. This is synonymous with psychologists’
understanding of the importance of repression.
Ernst Renan emphasized that forgetting is
equally, if not more, important to the creation of a
nation. Historical research brings violent deeds
that have taken place on the behalf of the nation
and its heroes to the surface, which is dangerous
for national identity. Friedrich Nietzsche was criti-
cal of what he referred to as monumental history,
arguing that the past must be forgotten; otherwise,
people will remain in the past, which can be
destructive to the present and for the future. Both
historical fact and fiction are necessary for the
health of individuals, groups, and cultures.
Remembering the past can be toxic to collective
identity because regardless of whether the level of
analysis is the nation, the group, or the individual,
there are always elements of the past that are dif-
ficult, embarrassing, or problematic. These difficult
pasts are damaging to feelings of collective identity
because they have the potential to break the bonds
holding individuals and groups together.
Forgetting can take many different forms, such
as denial, minimalization, covering, and reframing;
can be caused by outright manipulation; or can
occur as an unintended consequence of an event or
series of events. The destruction of Soviet monu-
ments is an example of a group of people inten-
tionally trying to alter their history to no longer
include certain parts of their past. James Young
argues that sometimes erecting a memorial to a
tragedy (e.g., the Holocaust) allows us to tempo-
rarily acknowledge that tragedy, and then forget
about it as soon as we are no longer in the presence
of the memorial. It is as if we have paid our respects
and can now try to forget that it ever happened.
Denial ranges from a partner brushing aside suspi-
cions of infidelity to governments and organiza-
tions denying responsibility for atrocities.
Minimalization occurs when past actions are justi-
fied through rationalizations such as “for the good
of the nation” or “We did what we could with the
information we had at the time.” Covering occurs
through the selective highlighting of some aspects
of the past and not others. Examples include
Croatia after the wars of Yugoslav secession and a
national holiday honoring Christopher Columbus
in the United States. These mechanisms of forget-
ting allow individuals and groups to maintain their
identity and protect it from tarnishing. Columbus
did many things when he arrived in the “New
World,” but we only officially remember him for
discovering it. Additionally, Eviatar Zerubavel’s
work Terra Cognita explains that Columbus played
a less central role to North America’s discovery
than we may like to remember.
Even though forgetting is in some ways essential
to collective identity, many scholars stress the dan-
gers of forgetting and denial to identity. Sigmund
Freud warned of “the return of the repressed,”
arguing that the buried pasts of individuals do not
stay buried forever. Collective memory scholars
have built on this, arguing that this is true at the
collective level as well. In this way, denial is an
unhealed wound that never fully heals. Zerubavel
argues that conspiracies of silence, what he refers
to as “the elephant in the room,” should be exam-
ined and brought to the surface because they
require large amounts of social energy to maintain
and have negative effects on social life.
Today, monuments are destroyed to forget for-
mer empires, wars are fought over claims to the

same land, and religions debate interpretations of
the same book. Unfortunately, these are only a few
examples of the mnemonic battles taking place all
over the world over identity claims and crises. This
illustrates the importance of understanding the
relationship between memory and identity. Also
important is the ability to understand memory and
identity as social processes, rather than static enti-
ties. We need to elucidate the conditions under
which memories and identities shift, change, per-
sist, and disappear. Only through the acknowledg-
ment that memories and identities do transform
will we be able to eliminate the conditions under
which these transformations occur. This knowl-
edge generates great possibilities for social change
and, in some cases, the social healing of wounds
that otherwise may never disappear.
Tara L. Tober
See also Civic Identity; Collective/Social Identity; Group
Identity; Nationalism
Further Readings
Assman, J. (2006). Religion and cultural memory. Palo
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
Gillis, J. R. (Ed.). (1994). Commemorations. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Halbwachs, M. (1941). On collective memory. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Nora, P. (1989). Between memory and history: Les lieux
de memoire. Representations, 26, 7–25.
Olick, J. K. (2007). The politics of regret: On collective
memory and historical responsibility. New York:
Routledge.
Schwartz, B. (1982). The social context of
commemoration: A study in collective memory. Social
Forces, 61(2), 374–402.
Young, J. E. (1996). The texture of memory: Holocaust
memorials and meaning. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Zerubavel, E. (2006). The elephant in the room: Silence
and denial in everyday life. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Mimesis
Especially when thinking about its implication for
identity and identification, the term mimesis offers
Mimesis 447
a broad variety of meanings. In Ancient Greek, the
mim- root (which had been present since the
6th century BCE) also occurred in mîmos—which
signified both the actor and the role played—and
accordingly, the verb mimeîsthai could mean to
“mime” or “imitate.” Nevertheless, it also meant to
act out a role or give presence to a character—and
consequently the mim- root also appeared if there
was no predecessor to imitate; for example, the role
acted out could also be invented by a maker or poet
(poietés)—and even musical performance could be
said to be mimetic without talking about imitation
of concrete sounds. Hence, the term mimesis also
has implications of acting out, of embodying, and
of (re)presentation; it thereby reflects both a tension
between imitation and production and a tension
between presence and absence. The relation of the
latter tension to issues of identity becomes clearer
when thinking about the stance one can have when
facing a mimetic object. Four options are possible,
which often overlap:
1. A mimetic object, observed from outside, is
perceived as taking over an identity/taking part
in an identity as present (e.g., the voice of a
distant person realized by a telephone: one acts
as if the person were partially/acoustically there,
or as if her or his personhood were distributed
into the medium).
2. A mimetic object, observed from outside, does
not take over the identity as present (e.g., the
same voice recorded by an answering machine).
3. A self corporeally realizes a form and takes over
an identity (e.g., a child learns the habits of the
culture into which it is born).
4. A self corporeally realizes a form, without taking
over an identity (e.g., an actor playing a role).
Options 1 and 3 not only imply a production of
identity, but also of presence; options 2 and 4
imply rather a semiotic difference of re-presentation.
Mimetic realization can either be conceived as a
mode of transportation/production of identity by
producing a simile—or as a mode of signification/
representation working by means of similitude.
The phenomenon of mimesis hence raises all kinds
of questions about identity-in-the-difference. In
what follows, these issues are traced along the
448 Mimesis
theories of Plato and Aristotle and then rediscussed
along with current theories.
Plato’s Concept and Critique of Mimesis
Plato, who was the first philosopher to offer an
elaborated theory of mimesis, theorized mimetic
objects and practices by introducing the concept of
participation (méthexis): In his view, any given
thing participates in the idea of what this thing is.
For example, a concrete triangle is a triangle only
because it is a realization of the idea/principle of a
triangle. This idea is about all possibilities of pos-
sible triangles—thus, it is only a limited realiza-
tion; realization only takes part in the completeness
of the idea. Nevertheless, the triangle can be recog-
nized and defined only by having recourse to its
idea; thus, the triangle has its defining being from
it: The triangle is a triangle by being a part of—
and taking part in—the idea of a triangle, so it has
its identity from the ideal being.
Based on this theory, the problematic issue is
human craftsmanship (tékhne); conversely, it could
help to make things more similar to the true ideas
(e.g., a carpenter mimetically realizes the idea of a
table)—on the other hand, human imagination
(phatasía) could not but be a source for aberration.
But mimesis works with mere appearances as well
as with ideas. So a painter, by his or her art, can
mimetically realize a table nobody can sit at. He or
she simply transports the sensually given into
presence—but not the essence. A similarly deceptive
presence of the idea of a hero is also the mimetic
performance of a bard: In performing a character
(instead of narrating a story), the bard does not
transport the essence of the hero into presence, but
only the mere external sensual resemblance—
as can easily be seen from the fact that a bard can,
yes, perform a wise or skillful person without
thereby becoming wise or skilful himself. Hence,
the bard just executes an impersonation, but he
will never be identical with the ideal essence of the
heroes and heroines performed by him.
Indeed, mimesis does shapes objects, and helps
humans participate in mimesis as the cosmic real-
ization of true ideas—for example, by a mimesis of
the astrological paths of the heavens of the idea of
the beautiful or of the realm of Kronos. This
applies especially when human bodies are shaped
by or moved by dance performance and singing,
“miming” the ideal musical principles. Even role-
playing can help here: a warden-to-be, according
to Plato, is to be educated by “miming” the role of
a warden and avoiding any other mimesis; he can
get into this role so much that his miming leads to
being. Plato thereby is the first philosopher to
think about the production of social and ideal
identity by mimesis. This identity, though, accord-
ing to Plato had to be modeled by following fixed
rules, which had to be protected from alterations
and from performances realizing nothing but their
sensual appearance.
Aristotle’s Poetic Mimesis
In Poetics, Aristotle developed a theory of mimesis
that merged poetic and anthropological perspectives
to explain conceptual link between sensual appear-
ance and essence. He does so by thinking about
mimesis more in terms of re-presentation/significa-
tion and less in terms of transportation/presence.
Even without understanding, children can learn by
acting/representing/imitating/miming what they see.
In tragedy, though, a higher form of mimesis is
acted out: If the principles of the world are imma-
nent to the world, observation becomes more
important than in a world with transcendent ideas
(as was Plato’s). As a good observer, a good poet is
able to individuate the world’s principles by means
of abstraction. In this way, he or she can understand
what is necessary, what is probable—and what hap-
pens by chance. Poetic mimesis is hence a creation
according to the probable and thereby leads to bet-
ter knowledge: by presenting only things likely to
happen, mimetic representation can make some
truths more evident than they are in the given world,
which is also reigned by chance. Mimesis therefore
does not simply replicate the given, but it is able to
create something more probable or likely than the
simply given—and to make truths more evident.
Aristotle hence brings mimesis as a creation (poíesis)
in line with truth (which was impossible for Plato)—
but this is only possible because mimesis has lost its
background of participation. Mimesis can therefore
lead only to re-presentation, not to presence.
Recent Theories of Mimesis
Even though this is rarely mentioned, Platonic and
Aristotelian mimesis are both still present in current

thought. In identity, ironically, and despite Plato’s
hostility toward all things corporal, the lack of a
third-person stance in the legacy of his mimetic
theory today ensures its survival in concepts of
embodied (collective) identity and unconscious
habituation—whereas Aristotle’s observational
mimetic theory turns out to be more fruitful in
discussing theories of identity as related to subjec-
tivity and subject-object relations. To be more
concrete: Aristotle’s theory is more apt for discuss-
ing agency as representing fulfillment of a role;
Plato’s theory is more apt for describing the habit-
ualization of a role and, hence, the formation of an
embodied identity. Accordingly, when discussing
the effects of violent video games on social behav-
ior, scholars, often unknowingly, recur to Platonic
and Aristotelian concepts of mimesis: either—like
Plato—they omit the player as a reflective observer
and do not sufficiently consider her or his aware-
ness of fiction, or they focus on this aspect of play-
ful role-playing and—like Aristotle—omit embodied
habitualization, by having recourse to a theory of
merely “cathartic” embodied effects.
Moreover, participation and observation are still
conflicting as leading principles of mimesis. French
anthropologist Michel Leiris, for example, focused
on the relation of mimesis and possession in rituals
of ecstasy apt for sensing participation. German
philosopher Theodor W. Adorno instead conceived
of (Aristotelian) mimesis as a first and basal act of
taking distance from an environment one is embed-
ded into: By imitating, one creates distinct, repeat-
able and manageable forms and objects. Thereby
humans gain a stance to the world that can no lon-
ger be considered as a merely instinct-driven, imme-
diate relation. Hence, the two anthropological sides
of mimesis become transferred into theories about
creating immediacy/presence (Leiris) or of over-
coming immediacy by producing objects and sub-
jects of knowledge (Adorno).
Of special interest for more recent discussions is
Michael Taussig’s work Mimesis and Alterity.
Taussig refers to an order of contact or contagion
as a second fundamental aspect of mimesis, as
important as imitation—an idea he borrows from
James Frazer’s work The Golden Bough. Even
though Taussig still refers to magic beliefs when
explaining this concept, in the process he also gets
quite close to what Alfred Gell 5 years later
referred to by the term index or indexicality, which
Mimesis 449
means the traces of presence of a personality or
divinity by which “agency” is transmitted. Mimesis
thereby turns out to be an impropriating and
embodying relation with something “other”
grounded on the laws of formal accordance or
analogy. It leads to presence (or ecstasy/magic) as
theorized by Leiris, but also to empowering one
subject over the other as theorized by Adorno.
Further insights offer the less recent theory of
mimetic desire as developed by René Girard. By
theorizing that mimesis is related to desire, Girard
focuses on an element of mimesis already stated, but
marginalized by Aristotle in the building of both a
personal and a collective identity—that is, the imita-
tion/role-playing that the Greek philosopher
observed in children. Departing from this premise,
Girard observes that—unlike simple needs—human
desire is not only about a desired object. It is instead
mediated by a third entity—in accordance with
which the desire is modeled. So desire is twofold: it
is a desire to be like somebody else and therefore to
desire what this somebody desires—and it is the
desire of this object the other desires. By means of
imitating a promising model, desire is hence split
into two directions: On the one hand, mimesis is
about identity with the model, but on the other
hand, mimesis also leads to an imitation of the
desire ascribed to this model. This constellation
leads to social identity of recognized similitude—
but also to a conflict that necessarily arises if the
object desired cannot be shared, and thus rivalry is
also both the grounds for and the expression of this
triangular concept of desire. And the more similar
the rivals are, the less they will be able to see their
similarity; instead, they will conceive themselves as
contrasting opponents.
A further opportunity to apply the rich term of
mimesis has recently been provided through the
neuropsychological discovery of mirror neurons
and their role for psychological theories on embod-
ied cognition. Mirror neurons are apparently
highly relevant for imitating motor actions. And
the whole concept of emotional communication, in
fact, seems to rely on their work: Neurobiologists
maintain that emotional states of other people,
communicated by involuntary emotional expres-
sion, are spontaneously experienced via empathic
identification, as if they were embodied in one’s
own organism. Particularly the Platonic theory of
mimesis, as embodied participation, is an adequate
450 Mind-Body Problem
term for discussing some facets of embodied cul-
tural identity.
Jan Georg Söffner
See also Cultural Representation; Embodiment and Body
Politics; Identification; Immediacy; Mind-Body
Problem
Further Readings
Auerbach, E. (1953). Mimesis: The representation of
reality in Western literature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Girard, R. (1965). Deceit, desire and the novel: Self and
other in literary structure. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Halliwell, S. (2002). The aesthetics of mimesis: Ancient
texts and modern problems. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Taussig, M. (1993). Mimesis and alterity: A particular
history of the senses. New York: Routledge.
Mind-Body Problem
The mind-body problem (MBP) names a philo-
sophical and scientific identity issue that is highly
debated. The complexity of the issue arises from
the intersecting interest of all the arts, humanities,
and science disciplines throughout history, not to
mention the social, political, and religious interests
of various cultures, East and West. The MBP high-
lights this identity process as a puzzle in which
human beings must interrogate the identifying
connection between their expression and percep-
tion of communication and culture. The identity
process accounts for the emergent evolution of the
consciousness in behavior that we call human.
Human beings, unlike animals and machines,
function on three simultaneous levels of conscious-
ness that integrate the expression and perception
of (1) affect or emotion, (2) cognition or thought,
and (3) conation or purposeful action. The scho-
lastic philosophers in the Middle Ages used the
respective Latin terms: (1) capta, (2) data, and
(3) acta, which today are still in use to varying
extents. In the specific context of the MBP, human
consciousness thus functions as a simultaneous
integration of (1) awareness, or preconsciousness;
(2) awareness of awareness, or consciousness; and
(3) representation of awareness of awareness, or
variously, nonconsciousness, subconsciousness,
unconsciousness. Jacques Lacan offers a short-
hand version of the three respective functions that
he names (1) the real, (2) the imaginary, and
(3) the symbolic. Likewise, Charles S. Peirce
describes the semiotic nature of consciousness as a
triadic identity among (1) an object, the thing
expressed or perceived (an icon); (2) the represen-
tamen, the expressed or perceived sign of the
object (an index); and (3) the interpretant, the
learned experience of combining the object and its
representamen (the symbol). Educational psychol-
ogists often summarize the three integrated semi-
otic states of consciousness as deutero learning,
that is, “learning how to learn.”
This entry begins with an overview of identity
methodologies and the various schools of thought
regarding identity and consciousness. Then, the
entry defines foundational terminology. The entry
concludes with a discussion of the discourse model
of identity.
Identity Methodologies
To ease into the complexities of the MBP, it is
helpful to understand the usual identity method-
ologies upon which researchers rely. Some investi-
gators use the method of analysis whereby a whole
is divided into parts (quantitative), or alternatively,
a substance is divided into attributes (qualitative).
The advantage of the analysis approach is that the
description based on parts or attributes is often
easier to work with, especially when one part sug-
gests another or some part that is obviously miss-
ing. The method allows researchers to reduce
uncertainty in their choosing, but does not help
them differentiate a good from a bad choice. The
weakness of analysis is that the whole or substance
must be assumed initially, hence the possibility of
an error in picking the best context of choice, that
is, the digital logic known as information theory.
Other researchers use the identity method of syn-
thesis in which the parts or attributes are added up
into a whole or substance, respectively. This
approach has the merit of being a description that
can adjust the whole or substance as new parts or
attributes are discovered. The method permits
researchers to constitute certainty in choosing by

simultaneously specifying both good and bad
choices as the context for one another. The short-
coming of synthesis as an approach is that mis-
takes can be made when selecting the criteria for a
part or attribute.
The definition of a part tends to generalize with
the selection of more parts creating a choice of
context, that is, the analogue logic known as com-
munication theory. For example, a researcher
might analyze by analogue logic that “every body
has both a brain and a mind,” or synthesize that
the “both the brain and the mind must be in the
body.” Most researchers try to use both methods,
one as a validity and reliability check on the other.
However, critics may counter that a digital logic is
more efficient. To illustrate, one might analyze by
saying “every body has either a brain or a mind.”
Thus, synthesis would say, “either the brain or the
mind is in the body.” In short, qualitative research-
ers tend to favor the analogue logic, but quantita-
tive researchers prefer the digital logic.
Another dimension of the MBP is to sort out the
assumed research perspectives that are variously
philosophical, scientific, phenomenological, or
logical. Depending on who is doing the research,
the MBP tends to be characterized as a puzzling
contest in which a subjective or eidetic view defines
the problematic as mind versus embodiment or in
which an objective or empirical perspective defines
the matter as brain versus body. The possible
combinations of interest among these four cate-
gory combination options account for the vast,
albeit confusing, literature on the MBP. Most of
this confusion can be sorted out by employing a
discourse model used in the discipline of commu-
nicology, the science of human communication.
The discourse approach allows one to sort through
and clarify the key elements of how people talk
about the MBP puzzle, including that the phrase
mind-body itself invokes a rather strong metaphor,
rather than a useful description.
Schools of Thought
The history of philosophy and science provides
researchers with many schools of thought when it
comes to investigating identity through the mecha-
nism of consciousness in human bodies. The first
of these schools is the doctrine of monism whereby
mind and body are one single unified category.
Mind-Body Problem 451
The approach is one of synthesis. There are three
standard positions here: (1) Materialists take the
position that only our experience of physical real-
ity can guide us, that is, “nature” is the guideline;
(2) subjective idealism is the belief that a single
basic spiritual or mental realm has reality, usually
within a specified cultural context such as politics
or religion; (3) phenomenalism, which is often
favored by cognitive scientists who assume that
neither mind nor body can be ultimately known or
substantiated by measurement—hence, only ideas
and sense impressions exist.
A second school of thought is called dualism.
These researchers use the method of analysis.
There are two traditions here: (1) Proponents of
instrumentalism, sometimes called operationalism,
argue that mind and body are assumed to be two
separate entities—for example, mental versus
physical or intellection versus sensation—each
obeying separate laws such that the mind is logical
whereas the body is phenomenological. However,
these two logics do intersect and mutually influ-
ence each other. (2) Advocates of psychophysical-
ism suggest that the mind and body be treated as
two distinct, independent, but perfectly correlated
elements in one living human organism. A well-
known use of this approach is the medical diagno-
sis of psychosomatic illness.
Holism constitutes the third school of thought
on the MBP. Researchers taking this approach
believe that the universe and living organisms in it
are complete essences, substances, or wholes that
are inherently synergistic, that is, the whole is
greater than the sum of the parts. For example,
three lines offer little and limited information, yet
the arrangement of these three lines into a triangle
creates an ever-expanding amount of information
(e.g., “inside” and “outside,” shape presence and
absence). The following are the three approaches
in this category: (1) Double aspectism assumes
that the two realities of physical sensation and
mental intellection occur because each is a particu-
lar attribute or aspect of a single underlying sub-
stance called actuality. (2) Epiphenomenalism
assumes the priority of brain functions within
which mental phenomena (mind) are a noncausal
duplication of specific brain functions. In other
words, the mind is just a shadow or time-delayed
electrical trace in the physiological operation of
the brain. This is a favorite scientific explanation
452 Mind-Body Problem
for the déjà vu experience or feeling of having
already lived through this moment. (3) Pheno­
menology takes an anti-monism and anti-dualism
view that treats consciousness and body as essen-
tial attributes that are reflexive, reflective, and
reversible in a holistic experience under the process
designation of embodiment. Psychoanalysis and
other psychotherapies are a good illustration here.
Contemporary image technologies of magnetoen-
cephalography (MEG) and magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) are providing medical insights into
the brain-mind dysfunction, including those of the
psychoanalysts described in the past. Of particular
interest is the current work by V. S. Ramachandran
on such phenomena as the phantom limb (ampu-
tees who still “feel” their missing appendage) and
synesthesia (where sensate cause and effect occur
in different senses such as smelling a color).
Category Issues
One of the chief difficulties with understanding
the MBP is the tendency to conflate basic terms
before the discussion even begins. From one per-
spective, there is a mixing of the terms mind and
brain. Yet, there is the counter blending of embodi-
ment and body. In philosophy and science, the
first conflation of mind and brain is rampant,
whereas the second mixture of embodiment and
body is part of our everyday conversation. The
connections are sorted out in the section on dis-
course modalities. For now, this entry reviews the
basic understanding of the foundational terms as
used by everyone to suit his or her conceptual
point of view.
Mind Versus Brain
When one takes the broad context, as this entry
does, there are at least eight discursive ways in
which humans address their mind. In the first dis-
cursive usage, there is no explicit or technical ref-
erence to the brain: (1) Mind can refer in a general
way to a person’s level of intelligence, as in “I
have a good mind to reprimand you!” (2) Mind
can signify a human characteristic or trait specific
to a person or cultural group as in a rhetorical mode
such as “the mind of an artist” or “the European
mind.” (3) Mind can exist as an analytically or syn-
thetically reduced property. Known as reductionism,
this view of mind names cultural cosmology cate-
gories that are considered the minimum unit for
consciousness, for example, ego, psyche, self, soul,
or spirit.
The second discursive usage makes explicit con-
nections between the mind and brain, taking the
discourse in a different direction. There are five
general usages in this context:
1. Mind constitutes the totality of philosophically
hypothesized mental processes and states that may serve
as explanatory devices or hypostatizations for psycho-
logical acta, capta, or data. Across the spectrum of
theorists, the location of the mind is in the brain, the
body, both, or neither. Pierce Howard champions the
brain when he argues that consciousness is principally
an activity that begins in the brain, but can be stimu-
lated by something within or outside oneself. At the
other extreme, denying any organic source, Carl Jung’s
thesis for mind is that before one can be or can exist, he
or she must first be conscious.
2. Mind is the totality of the preconscious, con-
scious, nonconscious, subconscious, and uncon-
scious mental experiences of an individual organism
(usually described as human comportment). Here
also, mind is located in the brain. However, behav-
iorism substitutes “behaviors” and “acts” for “con-
sciousness” to locate mind exclusively in the brain of
the body.
3. Mind exists as a collection of processes in the
brain. In this definition, the mind is a rubric of per-
ception and expression in communication whereby
cognition and affection account for conation. This
view best agrees with contemporary views of neuro-
physiology and cognitive science where brain hemi-
spheres provide direct and indirect evidence of brain
function. Robert Ornstein, for example, points out
that human beings are unique in that most of the
species is right-brained. Recall that in humans, left
and right brain hemispheres control the opposite
body side. So being right-handed is a left hemisphere
function. In the general population, most people
favor their right hand (90%), foot (80%), eye (70%),
and ear (60%). This type of hemispheric research
also demonstrates a gendered difference in humans.
Howard notes that males have a right hemisphere
larger than the left, the reverse of females. Females
listen with both ears, but males favor the right ear.
Males solve mathematical problems nonverbally,

whereas females talk while solving problems. Males
use less eye contact and have a shorter attention span
than females. And, the left hemisphere of males
shrinks irregularly with age, whereas females have a
minimal and symmetrical shrinkage. Nonetheless,
the hemispheres of all humans demonstrate a domi-
nance across genders and right-left-sidedness. For
example, the left hemisphere is dominant for speech
in 90% to 95% of right-handed adults and in about
60% of left-handers. Regarding brain lateralization,
the right hemisphere is associated with more creative
and holistic processes, such as music and painting.
The left hemisphere is associated with more linear
and rational processes, such as language and mathe-
matics. In popular discourse, these abilities are
coined as “right brain” and “left brain” to describe
human behavior generally.
4. Mind is functionally equivalent to the brain. This
is a philosophical perspective that emerges in the work
of William James and is represented on the contempo-
rary scene by Daniel Dennett, who combines the meth-
ods of phenomenological description with the logic
standards of physical science so that one might verify
the other (verificationism).
5. The mind is studied as an emergent property
(emergentism). This approach argues that the bio-
logical system of an organism reaches a point of
sufficient complexity and organizational structure
for mind or consciousness to emerge. This perspec-
tive is one focus of the field called complexity stud-
ies as used in neuroscience. This approach uses of
the new technologies of supercomputers to simulate
models of the neural pathways and neurons of the
human brain.
A fascinating qualitative approach to emergent
theory is the historical and archeological research
of Julian Jaynes. His research moves from human
behavior depicted in artifacts to known hemispheric
abilities in the human brain, for example, statues
that depict right-handedness. Other studies have
confirmed his analysis; for instance, in a survey of
more than 1,000 pictures drawn between 15,000
BCE and 1950 CE, 93% portrayed persons using
their right hand. Another study using a microscopic
analysis of 200,000-year-old tools shows 80% are
heavily worn on the right side. Jaynes’s argument is
that humans evolved with a bicameral mind, that
Mind-Body Problem 453
is, one mind in each hemisphere—two minds in one
head! Then, by evolutionary development into
modern human beings, the hemispheres began talk-
ing to each other. To illustrate his point, he argues
that although the left hemisphere controls speech,
both the right and left sides of the brain compre-
hend language, thereby making the other hemi-
sphere a “listener” (e.g., a sense of conscience, and
perhaps, the need for repression). And he illustrates
this by suggesting it is difficult, if not impossible, to
be fully conscious of your articulation as you speak.
He concludes that it will likely require that the indi-
vidual stop speaking to reach this complete level of
consciousness. Jaynes’s point is simply that the
hemispheres evolved to discover each other, to spe-
cialize, but remain in communication. His theory
provides a profound explanation of dysfunction
maladies such as hallucination and schizophrenic
“voices” inasmuch as the “abnormality” exempli-
fies a disruption in the unitary brain whereby the
bicameral minds re-emerge as two separate, but
equal, states of consciousness with each housed in
its own hemisphere.
Embodiment Versus Body
Somewhat less complicated is the place of
embodiment and the body in the MBP. There are
six basic discourse models at work on the issue.
The first model describes the body as a living indi-
vidual organism composed of anatomical and
physiological systems. Given the research on hemi-
spheres and issues such as gender capabilities,
most researchers agree the human body is species
unique with regard to cognitive, affective, and
conative abilities of being. The second model
portrays the body as an object of location in
the physical world of stasis and movement. The
human body is part of nature as depicted by the
physical sciences. The third model consists of a
quantitative measure of existence in which the
body is a space-time designation of measure (e.g.,
birth, life, and death).
Embodiment, by comparison, is more than just
the objective body—that is, there is the body-
subject explicated at length in the communicology
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michel Foucault.
The fourth model is that embodiment is a subject
of position in the eidetic world of being (e.g., com-
munity, society, culture). In the fifth model, a
454 Mind-Body Problem
qualitative measure of existence is described by the
human sciences as a measure of comportment,
duration, and signification. The final model is the
basic unit of communication: grounded in one’s
perception of the other’s perception, also known
as intentionality of consciousness. An analytic
example of this approach is John Searles’s work on
speech acts and other communication phenomena.
A synthetic example is the self-other apposition in
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception
and Foucault’s phenomenology of expression.
From the phenomenological perspective, the
grounded body of embodiment, in which proprio-
ception and exteroception are reflexive, reflective,
and reversible, is a holistic experience of con-
sciousness called intrapersonal communication.
Proprioception provides information about the
state of the human body (feelings, sensations)
where end organs are predominantly internal and
react to chemical and mechanical stimuli.
Exteroception gives information about relations
between the lived-body and the environment
where end organs are located on or near the sur-
face of the body and react to wave phenomena
(light and sound), in addition to chemical and
mechanical stimuli.
A Discourse Model of Identity
How we come to be satisfied with identities between
mind and brain and between embodiment and body
is a matter of discourse according to the psychiatrist
Jürgen Ruesch and the anthropologist Gregory
Bateson. The ways in which we talk about how
identity constitutes a state of human consciousness
that describes experience in rather precise cultural
ways that are variously regarded (following Lacan
and Peirce) as types of the real (embodiment is an
iconic sign of the body), tokens of the imaginary
(mind is an indexical sign of the hemispheric brain),
and symbols of tonality (consciousness is a sym-
bolic sign of unique human experience).
Our ordinary talk, our human discourse, about
the MBP can and does communicate our species
culture in four modalities of understanding (mind/
brain) commonly experienced (embodiment/body)
as tropes of speech named the quadrilateral model
of discourse. The first is synecdoche, in which the
part-whole relationship codes the relationship of
self-other. The appositional discussion of body and
brain by both philosophers and scientists illustrates
this discourse. The second modality is metaphor,
where the relationship of substance and whole
codes the relation of same-other as a commentary
on the mind-brain connection; for example, the
name mind-body problem is a starting point for
discourse. The third modality is metonymy as the
relation of substance and attribute that codes the
same or different discussion of brain and embodi-
ment, especially with respect to right versus left
hemispheres and their conative presence in com-
portment (e.g., gender difference). The fourth
modality is the self-different relationship that is
manifest discourse code in the mind-embodiment
relation as simile—the positive comparison of part
and attribute (e.g., synesthesia), or irony—the
negative comparisons of part and attribute (e.g.,
psychosomatic symptoms). In short, human con-
scious experience is at once both a unique and
universal identity in discourse. Just as human
beings are the only species that sees (brain) them-
selves in a mirror (mind) as identical, a person who
speaks (body) is the only one who already knows
the identity of what can be heard (embodiment).
Richard L. Lanigan
See also Communication Theory of Identity;
Consciousness; Discourse; Double Consciousness;
Embodiment and Body Politics; Figures of Speech;
Gender; Id, Ego, and Superego; Identity Uncertainty;
I-Other Dialectic; Phenomenology; Reflexive Self or
Reflexivity; Rhetoric; Self; Semiotics; Symbolism;
Uncertainty Avoidance
Further Readings
Bermúdez, J. L., Marcel, A. & Eilan, N. (Eds.). (1995).
The body and the self. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston:
Little, Brown.
Howard, P. J. (2006). The owner’s manual for the brain
(3rd ed.). Austin, TX: Bard Press.
Jaynes, J. (1976). The origin of consciousness and the
breakdown of the bicameral mind. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin.
Jung, C. G. (1990). The undiscovered self. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Lanigan, R. L. (1992). The human science of
communicology. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University
Press.

Medina, J. (2008). Brain rules: 12 principles for surviving
and thriving at work, home, and school. Seattle: Pear
Press.
Ornstein, R. (1997). The right mind: Making sense of the
hemispheres. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Ramachandran, V. S., & Blakeslee, S. (1998). Phantoms
of the brain: Probing the mysteries of the human
mind. New York: William Morrow.
Robertson, L. C., & Sagiv, N. (2005). Synaesthesia:
Perspectives from cognitive neuroscience. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Ruesch, J., & Bateson, G. (2008). Communication: The
social matrix of psychiatry. New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishing.
Sarno, J. E. (2006). The divided mind: The epidemic of
mindbody disorders. New York: ReganBooks.
Shorter, E. (1994). From the mind into the body: The
cultural origins of psychosomatic symptoms. New
York: Free Press.
Winston, R. M. L, Wilson, D. E., & Smithsonian
Institution. (2006). Human: Origins, body, mind,
culture, peoples. New York: DK Publishing.
Mindfulness
In any human communication transactional pro-
cess, meanings are negotiated via three layers:
content, relational, and identity. In developing a
mindful interaction state, the mindful communi-
cator is capable of being reflexive of her or his
own state of identity emergence and that of oth-
ers. Mindfulness is, simply phrased, the state of
intentional awareness of the self’s and the other’s
identity perspective.
In communicating with culturally dissimilar
others, it is vital that communicators develop a
mindful outlook because of multiple identity
issues at work. Although some individuals might
draw from their personal identities in interacting
with others, others might rely heavily on their
ethnic or cultural identities in framing their com-
munication intentions. Identity is conceptualized
here as the cultural, ethnic, societal, professional,
relational, and individual images of self-concep-
tion. This composite identity has group member-
ship, interpersonal, and individual self-reflective
implications.
Through mindful communication, communica-
tors can have a deeper grasp of the salient identity
Mindfulness 455
issues that are embodied in the intercultural
speakers. Communicators can also choose to
interact with others with greater intercultural sen-
sitivity and empathy. This entry reviews the role
of mindfulness in identity negotiation theory.
Identity Negotiation Theory
Core Theoretical Assumptions
Briefly, identity negotiation theory, developed
by Stella Ting-Toomey, assumes that human
beings in all cultures desire both positive group-
based and positive person-based identities in any
type of communicative situation. How individuals
can enhance identity understanding, respect, and
mutual affirmative valuation of the other is the
essential concern of this approach. To illustrate,
2 of the 10 core assumptions of the identity nego-
tiation theory are posited as follows: (1) The core
dynamics of people’s group membership identities
(e.g., cultural and ethnic memberships) and per-
sonal identities (e.g., unique attributes) are formed
via symbolic communication with others, and
(2) individuals in all cultures or ethnic groups have
the basic motivation needs for identity security,
inclusion, predictability, connection, and continu-
ity on both group-based and person-based identity
levels. However, too much emotional security will
lead to tight ethnocentrism, and too much emo-
tional insecurity (or vulnerability) will lead to fear
of outgroups or cultural strangers. The same dia-
lectical principle applies to identity inclusion, con-
nection, predictability, and identity continuity
across time. Thus, an optimal range exists on the
various identity negotiation spectrums: security-
vulnerability, inclusion-differentiation, predict-
ability-unpredictability, connection-autonomy,
and continuity-change.
The last two identity negotiation theoretical
assumptions emphasize the notion that competent
identity-negotiation process emphasizes the impor-
tance of integrating the necessary intercultural
identity-based knowledge, mindfulness, and inter-
action skills to communicate appropriately and
effectively with culturally dissimilar others.
Furthermore, satisfactory identity negotiation
outcomes include the feeling of being understood,
respected, and affirmatively valued. Identity-support
strategies such as mindful listening and dialogue,
shared empowerment and alliance formation
456 Mindfulness
strategies, and confirmation and empathetic inclu-
sion behaviors are some productive identity inter-
action moves that can promote quality intergroup
and interpersonal relationship development.
Knowledge and Skills
Without culture-sensitive knowledge, intercul-
tural communicators may not be able to match
cultural value issues with identity-related behav-
iors. Knowledge here refers to the process of in-
depth understanding of certain phenomena via a
range of information gained through conscious
learning and personal experiences and observa-
tions. To manage cultural differences mindfully, for
example, one must consider other people’s cultural
membership and personal identity factors. If others
are collectivists, one may want to pay extra atten-
tion to their process-oriented (i.e., relationship-
based) assumptions to communication. If others
are individualists, one may want to be sensitive to
their outcome-oriented (i.e., instrumental result-
based) assumptions to communication. Both
culture-general and culture-specific knowledge can
enhance one’s motivations and skills in dealing
with people who are culturally different.
The term skills refers to the actual operational
abilities to perform those behaviors that are con-
sidered appropriate and effective in a given cultural
situation. Adaptive interaction skills help us com-
municate mindfully in an intercultural situation.
Many interaction skills are useful in promoting
appropriate and effective identity-based competent
communication. Some of these, for example, are
values’ clarification skills, mindful observation,
mindful listening, social de-centering, conflict
reframing, culture-sensitive nonverbal decoding,
facework management process, and collaborative
dialogue skills.
Mindfulness: An Integrative Viewpoint
The concept of “mindfulness” can serve as the key
link in linking culture-sensitive knowledge with
the artful practice of communication skills.
Mindfulness can serve as the first effective step in
raising our awareness of our own systems of think-
ing and judging. Additionally, through mindful-
ness, we can learn to be more aware of the
commonalities and differences that exist between
dissimilar individuals and groups.
The roots of mindfulness practice are in the con-
templative practices common to both Eastern and
Western spiritual traditions. It is, at once, a spiritual,
meditative, reflective, psychological, and applied
way of intentional living and communicating.
An Eastern Notion
As an Eastern Buddhist spiritual practice, mind-
fulness means attending to one’s own internal
assumptions, arising emotions, intentions, cogni-
tions, attitudes, and behaviors. Mindful reflexivity
requires us to tune in to our own cultural and per-
sonal habitual assumptions in scanning a commu-
nication scene. It also means “emptying our
mind-set” and de-cluttering the internal noises so
that we can listen with a pure heart. Mindful lis-
tening means to listen deeply with our precon-
ceived notions, judgments, and assumptions in
check. Through the writings of Buddhist philoso-
phers such as Thich Nhat Hanh and Jon Kabat-
Zinn, mindfulness means tracking an unfolding
communication episode with one-pointed wake-
fulness and watchfulness.
It also means being fully present—attending
fully to our own arising emotions and that of our
intercultural partners. The Chinese character for
“listening” refers to the term ting, which means
listening with one-pointed attunement with our
focused ears, eyes, and heart. Thus, mindful listen-
ing in any intercultural situation means listening to
the words, tones, nonverbal nuances, and multi-
layered meanings and contexts that underlie the
words. This multilayered way of listening is espe-
cially beneficial in an intercultural tug-and-pull
conflict communication episode.
Mindful listening slows down the antagonistic,
polarized conflict process. It increases the chance of
mutual, authentic understanding. It essentially
involves a gradual shift of worldview or cultural
perspective as viewed from an alternative lens. It
means considering how things look from partner
A’s cultural identity perspective, as well as how they
look and feel from partner B’s intercultural identity
standpoint. It also displays respect that allows the
conflict storyteller to tell a complete conflict story
without interruptions and reactive judgments.

A Western Notion
From a Western psychological lens, mindfulness
means attuning to the other’s communication
assumptions, attitudes, perspectives, and commu-
nication styles. According to Ellen J. Langer’s con-
cept of mindfulness, mindfulness can include the
following characteristics: (a) learning to see the
unfamiliar behaviors presented in the communica-
tion situation as novel or fresh, (b) learning to view
the interaction situation from multiple viewpoints
or angles, (c) learning to attend to the identity
negotiation situation and the person in whom we
are observing the behavior holistically, and
(d) learning to create new categories through which
the unfamiliar behavior may be understood.
Applying this Western mindfulness orientation
to intercultural or interethnic communication, the
perspective suggests a readiness to shift one’s
frame of reference from an ethnocentric lens to an
ethnorelative lens, and the possibility of seeing
things from the other person’s cultural frame of
reference. Mindfulness can also support the use of
new categories (e.g., applying diverse cultural log-
ics) to understand cultural or ethnic membership
differences, and the commitment to experiment
with creative means of problem solving.
In contrast, mindlessness refers to the heavy
reliance on familiar frames of reference, habitual
designs or familiar categories, and customary ways
of doing things. It means that individuals are oper-
ating on automatic pilot without conscious think-
ing or reflection. It means that the intercultural
communicators are at the reactive stage rather
than at the reflective proactive stage. To engage in
a state of mindfulness, individuals need to practice
more intentional or conscious competence. In
competent intercultural communication, individu-
als should realize that both similarities and differ-
ences exist between the membership groups and
the communicators as unique individuals.
Intercultural Competence Criteria
To be mindful communicators, individuals need to
learn the value systems that influence others’ self-
conceptions. They need to be aware of the imbal-
ance of power dynamics at play in interethnic or
interracial communication. They need to be open
to a new way of identity construction.
Mindfulness 457
Competent intercultural communication empha-
sizes the importance of integrating the necessary
intercultural knowledge, mindfulness, and interac-
tion skills to manage identity-based process issues
satisfactorily and achieve desired interactive goals
appropriately and effectively. Furthermore, inter-
cultural communication competence relies heavily
on the perceptions of the communicators in evalu-
ating each other’s communicative performance.
What may appear appropriate (e.g., soliciting
age identity or relational status issue directly) in
one cultural context can be viewed as inappropri-
ate from another cultural perspective. Likewise,
what may appear as effective (e.g., dealing with
team problems monochronically with no regard to
trust-building process) in one cultural context can
be interpreted by another culture as ineffective. To
act appropriately and effectively, individuals have
to enhance their cultural knowledge and motiva-
tions to learn the culture-based identity rhythms in
different group membership communities.
Satisfactory Identity Outcomes
Finally, satisfactory identity outcomes include the
feeling of being understood, the feeling of being
respected, and the feeling of being affirmatively
valued. Together, they serve as the identity out-
come dimensions. The accomplishment of a satis-
factory identity negotiation process is contingent
on the perceptions of the communicators in the
interaction scene. It also depends on our willing-
ness to practice mindfulness in our interactions
with dissimilar others.
To the extent that communicators perceive
desired identities have been mindfully understood,
accorded with due respect, and are affirmatively
supported, the involved parties should experience a
high sense of identity satisfaction. To the extent
that the communicators perceive that desired identi-
ties have been mindlessly bypassed, misunderstood,
or insulted, the involved parties should experience a
low sense of identity satisfaction. Thus, the con-
struct of identity satisfaction acts as an essential
outcome of identity negotiation competence.
The feeling of being understood is one of the
most powerful means of being validated on the
identity level. The feeling of being understood con-
notes an echoing voice out there that empathizes
458 Minstrelsy
with one’s thinking, feeling, and behaving. The
feeling of being respected connotes that our desir-
able identity-based behaviors and practices are
being deemed as legitimate, credible, and on an
equal footing with members of other groups.
Identity respect connotes the mindful monitoring
of one’s verbal and nonverbal attitudes in inter-
acting with dissimilar others. It also means treat-
ing others’ salient group-based and person-based
identities with courteousness, consideration, and
dignity. The feeling of being affirmatively valued
refers to our sense of resonance and being posi-
tively supported as worthwhile individuals despite
having different group-based or idiosyncratic
identities. Positive identity endorsement is typi-
cally expressed through verbal and nonverbal
confirming messages.
The positive or negative consequences of the
identity negotiation process, ultimately, affect the
development of quality intercultural or intergroup
relationships. Competent intercultural communi-
cators are resourceful individuals who are attuned
to both self-identity and other-identity negotiation
issues. They are mindful of the antecedent, pro-
cess, and outcome factors that shape the dynamic
interplay of the intercultural identity negotiation
process. They are also attuned to the structural,
historical, and situational scripts in shaping a mul-
tifaceted identity in a pluralistic society.
Stella Ting-Toomey
See also Communication Competence; Culture Shock;
Face/Facework; Group Identity; Identity Negotiation
Further Readings
Hayes, H., Follette, V., & Linehan, M. (Eds.). (2004).
Mindfulness and acceptance: Expanding the cognitive-
behavioral tradition. New York: Guilford Press.
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1994). Wherever you go there you are:
Mindfulness meditation in everyday life. New York:
Hyperion.
Langer, E. (1989). Mindfulness. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley.
Langer, E. (1997). The power of mindful learning.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Nhat Hanh, T. (1998). Mindful living. Berkeley, CA:
Parallax Press.
Ting-Toomey, S. (1993). Communication resourcefulness:
An identity-negotiation perspective. In R. Wiseman &
J. Koester (Eds.), Intercultural communication
competence (pp. 72–111). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Ting-Toomey, S. (1999). Communicating across cultures.
New York: Guilford Press.
Ting-Toomey, S. (2005). Identity negotiation theory. In
W. Gudykunst (Ed.), Theorizing about intercultural
communication (pp. 211–233). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Minstrelsy
Minstrelsy is a form of entertainment that presents
African American culture through comedy, song,
dance, and satirical speech. The performances are
called minstrel shows. A minstrel show comprises
an actor, usually White, wearing blackface paint
to represent the African American. Minstrel shows
provided White actors the opportunity to manipu-
late Black identity on stage for entertainment and
economic purposes. Manipulating Black identity
on stage strengthened the belief that Whites were
superior to Blacks, and it reinforced the need for
slavery. On the minstrel stage, Blacks were igno-
rant, uncivilized characters in need of White mas-
ters to provide guidance and support. Although
often considered controversial, minstrel shows
succeeded at attracting attention to Black culture
and establishing U.S. entertainment.
History
Blackface minstrel performances can be traced to
the 1600s with the production of William
Shakespeare’s play Othello. In the era of Othello’s
production, Black people were barred from theat-
rical performances. Out of necessity, the actor
portraying the character Othello wore blackface
paint to represent the image of a Black male.
Several 18th-century plays required Black charac-
ters in roles of nannies, maids, and cooks. To meet
this need, White actors used burnt cork to paint
their faces black. The characters wearing blackface
normally had nonspeaking roles. When the charac-
ters were required to speak, it was usually to add
humor to the play.
White actors performing in blackface paint con-
tinued into the 19th century. Charles Matthews,
an Englishman, is credited as the founder of the

solo minstrel show. Matthews’s shows incorpo-
rated Black mannerisms he learned while studying
African American music, dialect, folklore, and ser-
mons. His shows were popular and led to addi-
tional minstrel shows featuring one-man
performances.
During the 19th century, audiences were recep-
tive of minstrel shows, and the reputation of the
performances grew. Performances often mirrored
societal issues such as social changes related to
slavery in the United States. Some actors consid-
ered their performances a distraction from the
mounting tensions between the North and the
South, but other performers used their shows to
counter the antislavery movement.
Minstrelsy often promoted the belief that slav-
ery was not an issue of great concern. The shows
portrayed Black people as being content with slav-
ery and presented the false perception that the
Black slaves valued their White masters and
wanted to remain on plantations. Blackface char-
acters scoffed at the notion of freedom. Actors
characterized slave owners as kind men who con-
sidered slaves as family rather than property.
Minstrel shows slowly transformed from mute
characters in theatrical plays to full-fledged shows
that claimed to showcase authentic African American
life. Over time, minstrel shows were further devel-
oped and continued to attract large audiences.
Performances
Minstrel show performances portrayed Black peo-
ple as simpleminded, lazy, ignorant individuals
who took sole pleasure in music and dance. The
performances reinforced notions of White superi-
ority. White audiences screened the shows and
found advantage in their lives compared to what
the minstrel show presented. Minstrelsy provided
a link between all classes of Whites. Despite the
White person’s class, he or she was still considered
superior to the Black person, based on the images
presented on stage during this historical period.
Matthews performed solo minstrel shows as
early as 1822, but Thomas Dartmouth Rice, also
known as “Daddy” Rice, is credited as the founder
of the minstrel show. During the 1830s, his shows
surpassed Matthews’s in popularity. Rice’s shows
included the African American male character Jim
Crow. The character was later fleshed out to
Minstrelsy 459
include the song and dance “Jump Jim Crow.”
Rice also performed in “Tom Shows,” which were
minstrel acts based on Harriet Beecher Stowe’s
1852 novel, Uncle Tom’s Cabin.
Other minstrel acts included the Virginia
Minstrels, a group of four men led by Dan Emmett,
who performed in blackface in New York City.
They were the first full-length minstrel show with
multiple characters. The Virginia Minstrels are
also believed to be the first group to pair the word
minstrel with blackface performances. The word
minstrel had previously been equated with White
chorus groups.
The Christy Minstrels, led by Edwin P. Christy,
created the three-act performance in minstrel
shows. They also created the stock characters
Mr. Tambo and Mr. Bones. The performances
placed the entire cast on stage in a semi-circle.
Mr. Tambo played the tambourine at one end of
the circle and Mr. Bones played the bone castanets
at the opposite end. The Christy Minstrels further
developed their performances by including a Black
chorus.
With the emergence of new groups and per-
formers, the format of minstrel shows was created.
A typical minstrel show consisted of two to three
acts. In a two-act show, the first act consisted of
performers telling jokes, singing ballads, and
engaging in solo performances to display individ-
ual talents. In the second act, performers danced,
performed various acts, engaged in imperson-
ations, and occasionally presented a social issue
through the burlesque.
The three-act minstrel show consisted of the first
part or Minstrel Line, the second part or Olio, and
the final act or Afterpiece. The host or interlocutor
wore white face paint. In some performances, the
actors removed their blackface paint to show the
audience their true, White identity. Specific actors
presented and made light of current social issues.
The Afterpiece often presented a parody of a novel
or play. The characters, Jim Crow and Zip Coon,
often appeared in this portion of the minstrel. Jim
Crow, though created by Rice, was a stock charac-
ter that appeared in many minstrels.
The appearance of the actor was vital to the
success of minstrel shows. Blackface paint was a
key element of the actor’s costume. Performers
used makeup to emphasize full-sized lips and large
eyes. Performers also wore ragged clothes with
460 Minstrelsy
patches. As the shows developed, they wore more
elaborate costumes.
Minstrel audiences played a vital role in deter-
mining the content of the shows. The audiences
were often rowdy, and it was not uncommon for
members of the audience to jump on stage. The
audience might demand that performers repeat or
halt a song. The audience might demonstrate its
displeasure through violence.
Minstrelsy in Literature
The minstrel show often drew its content from
literature just as literature often depicted the min-
strel show. For example, critics credit Harriet
Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin for contribut-
ing to the abolition of slavery because the novel
depicted the cruelties of slavery. Minstrel perfor-
mances, however, reduced the deeply religious and
faithful protagonist, Uncle Tom, to an amusing
character who consumed alcohol.
In Nella Larsen’s Quicksand, the mulatto pro-
tagonist, Helga Crane, moves to and from differ-
ent cities and situations in search of her identity.
During a stay in Denmark, Helga interestingly
embodies the minstrel. The only African American
in Denmark, Helga Crane’s Danish relatives show-
case her race by dressing her in brilliant colors,
heavy makeup, and garish jewelry.
In her search for happiness and belonging,
Helga accepts that her race is of great interest and
initially finds it amusing. She later grows tired of
the constant gaping and interest in her appearance.
After viewing a minstrel performance at a circus
and witnessing the delight and pleasure of the
Danish audience, Helga feels shame and confusion
at the attention and admiration the Black perform-
ers receive from the audience. The circus perfor-
mance becomes a metaphor for her life. Similar to
the circus performers, Helga performs, becomes a
spectacle for her family’s friends, and receives
praise from a White audience. This realization spi-
rals her into depression, and she soon leaves
Denmark to continue the search for her identity.
Minstrelsy emerges again in Charles Chesnutt’s
The Marrow of Tradition. In a subplot of the novel,
Tom Delamere, a young White man, seeks excitement
through gambling and alcohol consumption. When
his vices threaten to destroy his engagement to Clara,
he finds adventure by performing a cakewalk dance
in full minstrel costume. Delamere uses burnt cork
to disguise his face and borrows the clothes of his
grandfather’s servant, Sandy Campbell. Delamere’s
performing the cakewalk in blackface delights the
audience, unaware of his identity, but tarnishes
Campbell’s reputation. Furthermore, while in his
minstrel attire, Delamere commits murder and
catapults Campbell into near lynching. By assum-
ing Campbell’s identity through minstrelsy,
Delamere guarantees his own freedom and con-
firms Campbell’s entrapment.
African American Performances
As the Civil War ended, African Americans became
lead characters in minstrel shows. Minstrel shows
performed by Black entertainers were called
Ethiopian Minstrels. During the 1840s, William
Henry Lane and Thomas Dilward were the first
African Americans to perform lead roles in min-
strels. Lane followed the foundation set by White
performers. He covered his face with burnt cork
and wore rags. He is known for creating a dance
called the Juba. In the Juba, Lane would incorpo-
rate clapping, stomping, and patting to supply
music for his routine. Dilward, known as Japanese
Tommy, was known for singing, dancing, and
playing the violin.
Egbert Austin Williams was one of the most
famous African American performers in the 1900s.
He performed in minstrel shows, beginning as one
half of the popular Williams & Walker act.
Williams wrote the sketches he performed. Though
he performed stereotypical minstrel routines,
Williams worked to change the format of the
shows by including more general performances
that did not disgrace African Americans. He also
wrote music, performed vaudeville, and was the
first African American to achieve a lead role on the
Broadway stage. Yet, his successes were coupled
with habitual acts of racism. Though audiences
loved his performances, Williams was not allowed
to dine or use elevators in the restaurants and
hotels he performed in.
Other Black performers followed noted per-
formers Dilward, Lane, and Williams. The content
of Dilward, Lane, and Williams’s shows paralleled
White minstrel performances. White audiences
accepted these performances. After years of viewing
White actors mimic Black identity, White audiences

found it interesting to observe Black people mim-
icking their own lives. Any attempt to use the stage
to redeem their heritage, however, could result in
violence or death for Black actors. Still, Black per-
formers claimed to engage in authentic perfor-
mances. Black minstrels included religious content
such as the Spirituals.
Minstrels provided viable employment for
African Americans. The Black minstrel provided
the only available acting opportunity. In 1890,
nearly 1,500 African Americans considered them-
selves performers. Despite limited lodging, little
pay, and physical assaults following performances,
Black performers persevered. They received both
positive and negative responses from the Black
community. Many Blacks believed the Black min-
strel perpetuated Black stereotypes.
The Demise of the Minstrel Show
Although successful, Black and White minstrel
shows gradually lost their appeal and were replaced
by other performances. The decline of minstrel
shows, in the described format, began around
1870. The development of the entertainment field
led audiences to other types of entertainment. The
growth of minstrelsy also led to its demise. Grander
minstrel shows made it impossible for smaller
troupes to compete. Lavish performances eventu-
ally lost popularity with the end of the Civil War.
Overall, the minstrel industry was profitable, espe-
cially for White performers.
Minstrelsy in the United States has a complex
history. Its portrayal of African American life was
artificial and racist; yet it attracted the attention of
both Black and White audiences. Minstrelsy proved
that even if distorted, audiences were interested in
Black life and culture. The music and dancing in
the shows were considered entertaining while the
content of the comedy portion of the shows sup-
ported White beliefs that Blacks were inferior and
slavery was necessary. Despite its mixed reception
in the African American community, minstrelsy
expanded the entertainment field to include African
Americans, displaying the talent of African
Americans. Although blackface minstrelsy was a
disgraceful aspect of U.S. history, it is an impor-
tant aspect that cannot be disregarded.
LaTiffany D. Wright
Mirror Stage of Identity Development 461
See also Authenticity; Culture, Ethnicity, and Race; Race
Performance; Stock Character; White Racial Identity
Further Readings
Chesnutt, C. (1901). The marrow of tradition. Boston:
Houghton-Mifflin.
Cockrell, D. (1977). Demons of disorder: Early blackface
minstrels and their world. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Dunson, S. (2002). The minstrel in the parlor: Nineteenth
century sheet music and the domestication of
blackface minstrelsy. American Transcendental
Quarterly, 16, 241–257.
Larsen, N. (1986). Quicksand and passing
(D. McDowell, Ed.). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press.
Lott, E. (1993). Love and theft: Blackface minstrelsy and
the American working class. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
McNeil, W. K. (1999). Behind the burnt cork mask:
Early blackface minstrelsy and antebellum American
popular culture. Arkansas Review, 30, 260–262.
Nathan, H. (1977). Dan Emmett and the rise of early
Negro minstrelsy. Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press.
Taylor. F. (2005). Black music and musicians in the
nineteenth century. Western Journal of Black Studies,
29, 615–621.
Mirror Stage of
Identity Development
Jacques Lacan originated the theoretical concepts
of a mirror stage of child and identity develop-
ment, whereby a child identifies with an idealized
self as a means of healthy development. These
theoretical ideas focused on his interest in bring-
ing together and reformulating key elements of
Freudian thought: advancing the use of psycho-
analysis as a means of healing, and develop-
ing both a metapsychology convincing enough
to be used in diagnosing mental illness and a
sufficiently coherent model of human devel-
opment. Unusual among psychoanalytic think-
ing at the time, he also acknowledged broader
anthropological, cultural, and philosophical ideas
such as those of his friend and former student
462 Mirror Stage of Identity Development
Claude Lévi-Strauss, G. W. F. Hegel, Jean-Paul
Sartre, and Martin Heidegger. After presenting a
brief biography of Lacan, this entry discusses Lacan’s
theory of identity development and the role of lan-
guage in development. The entry concludes with an
examination of the impact of Lacan’s theory.
Biographical Details
Lacan was a French psychoanalyst who developed
a reputation for unorthodoxy. His seminal work,
Écrits, a collection of essays, has been hugely influ-
ential across many disciplines, including linguistics
and film theory. Lacan, though drawing strongly
from structuralist ideas in his account of human
development, is seen as a central figure in poststruc-
turalism. He became involved with, and was influ-
enced by, contemporary cultural figures such as
Salvador Dali, Pablo Picasso, and Andre Breton.
Lacan was born in Paris on April 13, 1901, the
eldest child of a prosperous middle-class Catholic
family, and was educated at a Jesuit school.
Following his medical degree and subsequent psy-
chiatric training, he worked in a variety of psychiatric
institutions, and attributed his move into psycho-
analysis to his contact with the then-influential
psychiatrist, Gaëtan Gatian de Clérambault. Lacan
completed his doctoral thesis (on paranoid psycho-
sis) in 1932, became a member of La Société
Psychoanalytique de Paris (SPP), and began his
personal psychoanalysis, which he continued until
war broke out. Clinically and professionally inac-
tive as a matter of principle during the Nazi occu-
pation, he rejoined the SPP during peacetime.
He developed his prominent, but complicated,
reputation during the postwar years, with expul-
sion from the International Psychoanalytic
Association (IPA) in 1962 being the most high-
profile example of the controversy that he gener-
ated. Lacan consequently established his own
analytic training school following his ban from the
IPA, which enabled him to influence a generation
of psychoanalysts with his own brand of psycho-
analysis. He dramatically closed it in 1980, the
year before he died, to set up instead a school for
“La Cause Freudienne,” explaining to his fellow
Lacanians that he now saw himself as Freudian.
Lacan published a paper in 1936—“On the
Mirror Stage as Formative of the I”—that made a
significant impact when it was published again in
1949. He published little in the intervening years—
this near-silence indicative of a lifetime’s ambiva-
lence toward publication. In 1953, he began his
annual seminar series, which continued for the rest
of his life, though under the auspices of various
different institutions during that time. This series
was the vehicle for the rigorous and relentless
development of his theoretical ideas, and its tran-
scripts have been widely published.
Nevertheless, Lacan’s Freudian contemporaries
were highly critical of his thinking, mistrustful of
his concepts of human growth and development
and of his understanding of the unconscious.
Lacan’s practice of seeing his patients only once or
twice a week and for up to 25 minutes, rather than
offering the established four- or five-times weekly
50-minute sessions also drew fierce criticism.
Lacan responded by attacking the psychoanalytic
establishment as paternalistic and of fostering the
analyst’s unhealthy dominance within the psycho-
analytic relationship.
Lacan married Marie-Louise Blondin in 1934, a
union that produced three children, and began a
relationship with the acclaimed actress Sylvia
Bataille in 1938, with whom he also had a child.
Bataille’s then husband was the surrealist writer
Georges Bataille. Lacan and his first wife divorced
at the end of 1941, and he and Sylvia Bataille were
wed in 1953. Lacan died on September 9, 1981.
Identity Development
In keeping with psychoanalytic theory as a whole,
identity formation for Lacan begins in infancy, the
key process involving a symbolic act of violence.
Initially, the infant’s identity is tied up in the figure
of the mother alone; through the acquisition of
language, in one sense an instrument of the father’s
desire that the infant’s separation from the mother
should occur, the infant makes the separation from
mother, a “violent” though, in developmental
terms, healthy act. This is a linguistic expression of
the Freudian Oedipus complex, the stage of child-
hood development that Freud argued was where
children see father as both an adversary and a
competitor for the love of mother. In Lacan’s the-
ory, the failure of this linguistically violent separa-
tion to occur leads to psychosis.
Lacan sees the newborn child as a separate being,
not as yet inducted into meaning. He suggests that

the baby, motivated—unconsciously—by her
acknowledgment both of her dependence on others
and of her inability to control these others, begins
to learn language. At this stage, there is, as Lacan
terms it, an imaginary order. There is no complete,
unified self, but a fractured, fragmented sense of
identity—a chaos of irreconcilable and competing
drives, sensations, and emotions.
At about 6 months, the imaginary order shifts as
the baby notices, and subsequently identifies with,
his mirror image, his reflection (the imago). This
imago, however, is, Lacan maintains, a fantasy in
that the infant experiences it as a unified, autono-
mous whole when, in reality, he remains frag-
mented and dependent. The mother colludes with
maintaining this fiction by rightly behaving toward
her baby as if the imago were indeed reality. The
imago is an idealized self that the infant identifies
with, and this process—the mirror stage—assists in
the baby’s development in four ways: It meets his
need for being able to have some measure of con-
trol over his own self-image, it manages to imprint
the idea that a unified self is possible, it begins to
engender a sense of both having a place in the
world and possessing a social history, and it begins
to build a protection against alienation. The mirror
stage, therefore, creates both a foundation for sub-
jectivity and a template for mature relating, with
others and within the self.
Lacan coined the term méconnaissance to
describe the way in which identity is developed at
this mirror stage. There is a play on words (a
familiar Lacanian device) in that méconnaissance
carries with it both the idea of self-knowledge (me-
connaissance) and misunderstanding (méconnais-
sance). The two are present at this early
developmental stage, and remain throughout life
as part of the human psyche; méconnaissance,
with the mirror stage less a point in infant develop-
ment and more a space within, remains part of our
adult functioning. As adults, we continue to iden-
tify with imaginary objects, an example of which
would be our tendency to be seduced by advertis-
ing. Méconnaissance plays a part when we fall for
the allure created around advertising goods even
though we are aware that the benefits associated
with them are not “true.” When we perceive some-
thing as desirable—a perfume, say—we identify
with it, we see the (imaginary) associations that
that perfume has with and for us, and we wish to
Mirror Stage of Identity Development 463
own it in the service of “being” this identity. The
functioning of méconnaissance in adulthood leads
us to the chasing of mirages, but may motivate us
to develop and achieve as, for example, when we
identify with someone whom we admire and wish
to emulate: we wish to be like them and seek to be
them, even though we know that this is impossible
in a literal sense, but we use that longing as moti-
vation for healthy development.
Identity and Language
The function of language is essential to Lacan’s
explanation of identity. His account works like
this: Lacan, following the structuralist Lévi-Strauss,
saw the incest taboo as fundamental in all cultures.
The Oedipal drama enforces the incest taboo, pro-
scribing through the law of the father and enacted
in language, the libidinal relationship between the
mother and baby. In so doing, this culturally
driven process obliges the infant to adopt subject
positions, which are in turn culturally bound and
accomplished through language. This is particu-
larly so in terms of gender, where the gender divide
is seen as possessing or lacking the linguistically
generated symbol of the phallus. Furthermore,
adopting subject positions involves the individual
attempting to insert himself or herself into what is
already given: the “I” is a predetermined symbol,
and therefore the fit is never quite right. In attempt-
ing to step into “I,” there is always either too little
or too much. Identification is always unsuccessful,
and this leads to an absence and a sense of loss.
The resulting longing to find a subject position will
mitigate this loss, which in turn drives the indi-
vidual to identify with other available positions, a
fantasy that can never be fulfilled. This gap—
between the subject’s occupation of positions
available within the symbolic order and what
remains—is, for Lacan, the unconscious. The
unconscious is thus produced through the linguis-
tic process of identification and is structured like a
language. It occupies a space outside the individ-
ual; it is, in a sense, external and intersubjective. It
is the space created by language and can be seen as
compensation for the father-enforced separation
from mother. Language represents what Lacan
calls a symbolic castration.
Identity, being constructed through interpella-
tion into already existing, linguistically produced,
464 Mobilities
subject positions, is, within Lacanian theory,
therefore unstable. For Lacan there is no “self”
that forms the foundation of identity, no “me” to
be found, known, or true to, which is mere illu-
sion. The subject is split both by and within lan-
guage. There are, therefore multiple selves, formed
through relationships and encounters with vari-
ous socializing, and linguistically encountered,
agents: school, family, work, peer group, the
mass media and so on. If not recognized, the state
of being not a unified, but a multiple subject, a
state, can, for Lacan, have pathological implica-
tions. This view of the self as both linguistically
bound and fragmented links Lacan strongly to
poststructuralism.
In describing the inability of the subject to find
a subject position through language because all
subject positions are “occupied,” Lacan draws
from Jacques Derrida’s concept of différance,
where a word (a linguistic sign, a signifier) has
meanings, or concepts to which it relates (the signi-
fied) that are in an endless chain of meanings.
Meanings are constantly deferred. The subject
comes into being only through language, and is
locked into language and its endless différance.
Impact
The continuing significance of Lacan’s ideas
about identity can be observed in the extent to
which they have been both influential in and chal-
lenged by, recent feminist accounts of the con-
struction of gender and sexuality. Judith Butler,
for example, draws from Lacan to argue that the
centrality of language in subject formation, and
its relation to the symbol of the phallus (and the
law of the father), implies that gender identity is
constructed rather than innate and therefore, in
principle, allows the space for potential resis-
tance. Within the French feminist tradition,
however—Julia Kristeva would be a good example—
the Lacanian position is disputed, and the view
proposed that there is significance outside lan-
guage. From this viewpoint, there is therefore the
possibility of gender identity in the prelinguistic
world of the infant.
Jonathan Wyatt
See also Bricolage; Gaze; Performativity of Gender;
Scopophilia
Further Readings
Dor, J. (2001). Introduction to the reading of Lacan: The
unconscious structured like a language. New York:
Other Press.
Lacan, J. (1998). The seminar, book II. The ego in
Freud’s theory and in the technique of psychoanalysis,
1954–1955 (J-A. Miller, Ed., & S. Tomaselli, Trans).
New York: W. W. Norton.
Lacan, J. (2006). Écrits: The first complete edition in
English (B. Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton.
Mobilities
Mobility refers to the capacity of people, images,
and objects to move rapidly across local and global
geographic space. The intersection of mobility and
identity is concerned with how identity is under-
stood through mobility across spaces, how the
movement between spaces or lack of movement
between spaces results in identity shifts, and how
different dimensions and types of mobility con-
struct different notions of identity. Mobility has
diverse meanings as well as a range of implications;
high levels of spatial mobility are simultaneously a
social fact of technologically enhanced society, a
necessity of everyday life and a cultural aspiration
of many. Mobility is a relatively scarce social
capacity and is defined by its opposite, immobility,
for whenever some things or people are mobile,
others are moored, their movements restricted or
difficult. Mobilities of various types have become
more possible, occur on a larger scale, and are
more evident in the global era with the assistance
of various technological innovations, from digitali-
zation to long-range jet airplanes.
As well as informing new theories and accounts
of globalization, the field of mobilities research
encompasses the study of movements of people,
goods, and vehicles locally and within cities,
informing developments in and forging alliances
with disciplines such as geography and urban plan-
ning. Some, such as John Urry, argue that this new
focus on mobilities provides a challenge to the tra-
ditionally static view of the social world and social
or cultural identities in the social sciences. Urry
suggests the concept of mobilities should form
an overarching conceptual framework for a new
era of the social sciences that is postglobalization

studies, and driven by innovative theorizing in new
areas such as network studies, digital technologies,
and transportation studies that write in mobility as
a core dimension of social life.
Mobility in Sociological Theory
Theories of mobility exist at two levels: the factual
and the metaphorical. First, they refer to a set of
facts describing key facets and characteristics of
the contemporary social world associated with
globalization, technological changes, fluidities,
and speed. These bodies of work argue that the
world is characterized by unprecedented levels of
mobilities: capital, people, information, and objects
are circling the globe more frequently, in greater
volume, and with greater speed. Increasingly, as
the global reach of economic and cultural interac-
tions intensifies, these things recognize no bound-
aries. This means that social action must be
re-imagined as possibly being able to take place at
a distance, and that ideas about home and not-
home, local and global, must be substantially
rethought.  Furthermore, it is not just people that
are mobile, but various types of objects, which cre-
ates increasingly complex global infrastructural
and communications networks. In the digital era,
as a result of such things as the Internet, laptop
computers, and increasingly sophisticated mobile
telephony, parcels of information relating to
finance, leisure, trade, and politics all circulate
relatively freely across borders.
Second, mobility also refers to a set of theoreti-
cal metaphors which some argue challenge tradi-
tional approaches to describing and analyzing the
social world. The new theoretical metaphors of
vertigo-inducing flux, mobility, and fast-paced
change continue to capture the theoretical spirit of
our times. Traditionally, mobility in sociology has
been concerned with examining the nature and
extent of vertical social mobilities, with mobility
referring to a central dimension of class and strati-
fication studies. In this field, mobility measures
individuals’ capacity to scale the social ladder,
according to their relative accumulation of valu-
able assets such as education and economic capital,
and against social structures such as family history,
geographic location, and inherited wealth. In this
view, people cannot be said to circulate or be fluid
in any real sense. Rather, their mobility is theorized
Mobilities 465
within a schematic, spatially bounded, and often
quite rigid or slow-moving model of social relation-
ships, where mobility refers to individuals’ capacity
to gradually alter their accumulation of socially
valued assets such as education or income through-
out the life course. Against this traditional sense
of social mobility, the contemporary metaphor of
mobility has been used to describe both a set of
epistemological and material shifts that drastically
reform the way sociologists might attend to theo-
rizing the basic structures of social and economic
life. Claiming to challenge sedentarist assumptions
that there is a natural connection between places
and people and territorial assumptions of tradi-
tional sociology, the new emphasis on mobilities
attempts to understand contemporary social change
and restructurings in such a way as to emphasize
the routine movements of things, people, and
images across the globe. To understand mobilities
and moorings is to pay attention to the fluid and
dynamic aspects of social life, leading to a radical
reconceptualization of the role of technological
objects and systems, diverse media, virtual and
corporeal travel, and questions of transfers, fluids,
systems, interfaces, networks, corridors, and con-
nections in forming the basis of social life.
Systems That Enable and Govern Mobilities
Mobilities are centrally linked to elements of infra-
structure that configure and enable the mobilities.
Many of these things that enable mobilities are
fixed in place and actually immobile, enlisted into
an interdependent technological system that sup-
ports massive global systems of mobility. For
example, systems of global air travel rely on air-
port hubs such as Singapore or Dubai, strategically
located around the globe for ease and scale of dis-
tributing passengers to other regional hubs or
smaller ports, and that support the capacity of
airliners to travel only certain distances without
refueling. Global air travel also relies on the exis-
tence of fixed radio beacons for navigation, trans-
missions from a terrestrial radio station for fixing
a glide slope to find the runway, or runway light-
ing to visually alert pilots to the runway upon
descent. There are many other examples of such
technological infrastructures that facilitate global
mobility, including ports, docks, factories, storage
areas, garages, and roads.
466 Mobilities
The increased scale and frequency of mobility
means that governments and organizations must
increasingly pay attention to potential problems
that might arise because of mobile people and things.
Mobility becomes a matter of governance—of
tracing, mapping, and monitoring things that
move about. To continue with the previous exam-
ple, radar systems monitor the movement of air-
planes around the world and dictate various
aspects of route such as altitude or bearing so they
do not directly encounter other aircraft. Another
pertinent example relates to systems of monitoring
global population movements. Kevin Hannam,
Mimi Sheller, and John Urry point to the way
globally networked computers and software form
the basic infrastructure required for sorting, check-
ing, classifying, and monitoring transnational
movements of people through ports and airports.
The material basis for governing this mobility rests
in the passport, a document that enables its owner
to pass through ports in a recognized and con-
trolled manner, yet consigns others to queues,
interview rooms, and international holding zones.
Dimensions and Types of Mobility
Two basic aspects that compel human mobility
can be distinguished: one based on choice that is
elective and capacity-based, and another that is a
compulsory or forced mobility based on displace-
ment or dislocation. In the former type, transna-
tional mobility is fast becoming a value in itself, a
good news story for people who are caught up in
the routines of everyday life that continues to be
steeped in the familiar and local. This type of
mobility is based on volition, choice, and the
capacity of individuals to be mobile in various
ways. Here, the promise is of travel, connection,
and generally pleasurable contact with distant oth-
ers and places and of associated enhanced eco-
nomic opportunities. This type of mobility often
relies on forms of social and cultural capital associ-
ated with income or occupation. For example,
some people are able to be globally mobile in their
work because they have high-level or highly
sought-after skills, often in fields of business or
technology. But, this type of mobility is in turn
based on privileged forms of cultural and eco-
nomic capital, meaning it is not an evenly distrib-
uted social capacity. Other people may move
because they are employed by transnational corpo-
rations such as banks, hotels, or airlines that rely
on a globally mobile, skilled labor force at the
executive level. Sometimes, however, workers tem-
porarily migrate between countries to fill relatively
low-paid occupations in more developed nations,
such as nannies or hotel workers. Alternately,
some forms of mobility are forced by necessity or
situation. This is the case with refugees or political
asylum seekers, for example, who may flee oppres-
sion, violence, natural disaster, or social break-
down within their home countries. The result of
such mobilities is that nation-state boundaries are
increasingly porous, with some arguing this repre-
sents a significant reorganization of historical
global social spaces associated with the nation-
state. For example, Neil Brenner has argued that
global history is characterized by rounds of global
restructuring that induces population flows that
result in the deterritorialization of some places and
the reterritorialization of others. What emerges is
that the global population is in constant flux, a
tangled mosaic of mobilities at various levels and
scales, situated against some stable and strong
nation-states trying to stem and control frequent
arrivals at their border zones.
Three types of mobilities, based on how human
mobility is achieved, can also be distinguished.
First, are corporeal mobilities, referring to the
bodily movements of people. These can be on vari-
ous scales and for various reasons. For example,
within their local geographies, people may travel
relatively small distances frequently for food, work,
or social contact. Other types of corporeal mobili-
ties are wide reaching, transcontinental, and often
for the purpose of tourism or business. Second,
virtual mobilities involve a type of redefining of
what it means to be mobile: no longer does one’s
body have to move, but one can experience differ-
ent people, places, and events at a distance and
enabled by technologies such as the mobile tele-
phone and, especially, the Internet. Such technolo-
gies are said to dematerialize space because they
bypass it, making it irrelevant to social interaction
and constructing through the computer screen a
type of stationary wanderer who is able to be co-
present with others via mediated forms that do not
rely on direct bodily presence. Third is imagined
and imaginative mobility, based on the desire for
various types of mobile experiences associated with

tourism, such as journey planning, anticipating,
and daydreaming about journeys or travel.
Critical Issues
A number of important critical issues arise when-
ever ideas of mobility are considered. The empha-
sis on an ultra porous and geographically
unbounded world that affords some citizens a
wide degree of corporeal and cultural mobilities is
bound to invite criticism that mobility is a middle-
class, Western-centric habit cultivated by the con-
temporary world. The experience of mobility is
both globally and, as far as individual societies are
concerned, structurally unequal. Mobility is asso-
ciated with freedom of movement but also with its
direct opposite, as the stories of refugees attest.
The mobilities of things—including people—
cannot be characterized as a set of perfectly fluid,
open flows of movement. All mobile things find resis-
tances, blockages, and boundaries. Furthermore,
when talking about the mobility of people, one
must confront questions of the relative role of
agency and structure in affording mobility, and
one must deal with questions of volition and the
desire for mobility, based on things such as occu-
pation, an aspiration to see beyond one’s local
setting, or a desire to seek new experiences. These
disclaimers notwithstanding, increased mobilities
in space are the marker of modern social life and
constitute and important field of cutting-edge
study within sociology and allied disciplines such
as geography, economics, and urban planning.
Ian Woodward
See also Globalization
Further Readings
Brenner, N. (2004), New state spaces: Urban governance
and the rescaling of statehood, Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Cass, N., Shove, E., & Urry, J. (2005). Social exclusion,
mobility and access. Sociological Review, 53(3),
539–555.
Cwerner, S., Kesselring, S., & Urry, J. (2008).
Aeromobilities. London: Routledge.
Hannam, K., Sheller, M., & Urry, J. (2006). Editorial:
Mobilities, immobilities and moorings. Mobilities,
1(1), 1–22.
Modern Art 467
Morley, D. (2002). Home territories: Media, mobility and
identity. London: Routledge.
Urry, J. (2000) Sociology beyond societies. Mobilities for
the twenty-first century. London: Routledge.
Urry, J. (2006) Mobilities. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Modern Art
Modern art encompassed a variety of artists,
styles, and movements from the mid-19th to the
mid-20th centuries that shared a response to and
engagement with the technological, social, and
cultural conditions viewed as new and distinct
from the past. What emerged in painting, sculp-
ture, architecture, and design was distinguished by
the use of materials, techniques and forms gener-
ating meanings that departed, often radically,
from previous artistic traditions. Although the
response to new conditions in Western societies
and the motivation to create new art is common
to modernist art, debates about modernist art’s
relationship to society have ranged widely. Two
common strains can be discerned. Some have
argued that cultural products should be judged by
the degree to which they reveal social issues, but
others, especially after the mid-20th century, have
argued that art exists in a distinct realm and
should be judged only by criteria internal to the
art object, with emphasis on creative processes
and notions of artistic expression that generalize
and universalize the identity of the artist indepen-
dent of social concerns.
During the past three decades, scholarly dis-
courses on modern art have focused on the context
within which art was created, including arguments
concerning the role of identity in relation to art.
Because of the strong relationship modern art had
to social and cultural conditions, modern art is
currently seen as constituting a response to how
societies generally, and artistic practitioners in par-
ticular, identified themselves as modern. Identity-
based approaches to modern art history examine
the ways that certain groups have been marginal-
ized or excluded from art historical discourses and
art institutions based on religion, class, gender,
sexuality, race, and ethnicity.
This entry provides an overview of key terms
that describe changes in conditions that occurred
468 Modern Art
when modern art emerged in Western societies;
theorists whose ideas formed the dominant idea of
the character and development of modern art; the
ideas that gave rise to art historical analyses
emphasizing identity; notions of identity that have
been uncovered in examples of important modern
styles, movements, and artists in the modern
period; and critiques of the dominant ideas of
modernism’s character and development in the late
20th century.
Modern Terms
The term modern and variations of it have been
used repeatedly in European culture, even as far
back as the 12th century, to distinguish an epoch
as new and distinct from an earlier, and usually,
ancient one. The early modern period in European
history is associated with the Renaissance’s revival
of humanistic discourses and naturalistic artistic
forms (meaning visual art that duplicates faithfully
the appearance of things in nature) of classical
antiquity. The Quarrel of the Ancients and the
Moderns was a debate that arose in the late
17th century between two camps of intellectuals
concerning whether necessary human knowledge
could be derived from the texts of ancient Greece
and Rome or the then modern age of science and
reason that represented a challenge to the author-
ity of the ancients. A legacy of the Enlightenment
was that the contemporary production of human
knowledge could surpass that of the ancients but
in the visual arts in Europe, connections to the
classical past persisted until the middle of the
19th century when artistic modernism began.
Since the 17th century, both the subject matter in
painting and sculpture and what was viewed as
good art was governed by powerful government-
sanctioned art academies that taught artists, put
on annual art exhibitions and served as the taste-
makers. This academic art privileged classical
themes as the most appropriate, even concerning
contemporary issues as allegories.
Modern visual art was shaped by the cultural
changes that occurred by the mid-19th century
according to most art historians. Three related
terms distinguish aspects of the modern in this
period: modernization, modernity, and modern-
ism. Modernization refers to the process of scien-
tific and technological advancement that created a
world different from that which existed before.
The machine increasingly affected and trans-
formed societies with a rapidity unprecedented in
human history.
The second term, modernity, refers to the social
and psychological experiences of modernization
and cultural effects of these changes. The rapid
changes brought about by industrialization, urban-
ization, and advancements in science and technol-
ogy led people to think differently about their
experiences, such as the feeling that life was moving
faster and that individuals were disconnected from
their communities or ways of life. These effects
were viewed by those who identified themselves as
modernists in both positive and negative ways.
Finally modernism, or more specifically, artistic
modernism, is the way that artists expressed the
experience of modern life in art. Many people think
of artistic modernism only in terms of abstraction,
as for example, a painting or sculpture that is
abstract in that it does not depict things as they
appear in the real world. Although much modern
art involves a degree of visual abstraction (even if it
includes a recognizable figure), that characteristic’s
relationship to modernity is not immediately appar-
ent. What most art since the Renaissance had in
common was naturalistic depiction. In the face of
the effects of modernization, the experience of
modernity, and the desire for a relevant art, natu-
ralistic representation and even the artistic tech-
niques and materials artists had used for centuries
were inadequate. For critics, an unnaturalistic
painting or a sculpture could be appreciated for
more than its deviations from the appearance of
nature, and for expressing other things: the artist’s
interior feelings, the effects of color for its own
sake, or some metaphor about the human condi-
tion. The characteristics of artistic modernism and
their relationship to the specific conditions of mod-
ernization and modernity are discussed in greater
detail in the following sections.
Modernity and Modern Art
The technological advancements and urbanization
of the industrial revolution, especially in such
European cities as Paris and London, created a
change in the shared experience of people in sharp
contrast to that in which they viewed the past and
of the ways people adapted to that change. Even

though England industrialized before France, the
discourse about the effects of modernization flour-
ished in the latter country. The French poet and
critic Charles Baudelaire was the first to describe this
experience modernity. Modernity for Baudelaire
was not about the technological aspects of the mod-
ern world but rather the fleeting and contingent
aspects such as the spectacle of shifting crowds and
shop window displays, the harsh realities of pros-
titutes, the stroller as a kind of anonymous observer
of the urban scene.
These characteristics of modernity—the emer-
gence of the bourgeoisie, the new urban landscape
and the rapid pace of life—were the subject matter
in the paintings of Édouard Manet and the impres-
sionist painters such as Claude Monet, Mary
Cassatt, Edgar Degas, and others who first worked
in the 1860 and 1870s. But it was not a naturalis-
tic depiction of modernity, a picturing, say, of
automobiles and factories themselves that charac-
terized the most innovative and experimental art
of the modernists in Europe in the new century.
Few modernists took such an approach for it
would have constituted a mere illustration of mod-
ern conditions akin to the naturalism anathema to
the idea of the modern. Rather, it was how artists
represented characteristics internal to art making
itself that was altered. Modernist artists sought
new subject matter, new ways to depict conven-
tional themes, and new artistic techniques. The
visible dabs of saturated color so characteristic of
impressionist painting could be thought of as cap-
turing, albeit abstractly, the fleeting effects of light
and shifting crowds. The effects on the viewer
were also a function of how the viewer perceived
color, which impressionists believed to be more
accurate. Postimpressionist George Seurat believed
his painstaking pointillist compositions of primary
colors to be even more scientific than the impres-
sionists were in their efforts to have an effect on
the viewer using color and form itself.
Modernism and Its Critics
Of the characteristics described, modernist critics of
the 20th century focused on the distinct qualities of
modern art as internal to the practice of artistic
expression and expressed by means only within the
work of art itself. British critic Roger Fry, for
example, argued that French postimpressionist
Modern Art 469
works were representative of the artist’s interior
emotions rather than of an objective reality. For the
U.S. critic Clement Greenberg, whose writings
before and after World War II eventually consti-
tuted the most influential ideas on the development
of modern art and artistic quality, what was most
significant about work of Manet, whom Greenberg
identified as the first modern painter, was not the
relationship of the subject matter to modernity but
rather the artist’s attention to the painted surface.
What Greenberg observed in works by the most
advanced modern artists (such as Picasso, Cézanne,
Matisse, and Pollock) was a focus on the nature
and limits of the medium in which each artist
worked. Peculiar to painting was the flatness of
surface on which the paint is applied and therefore
the only legitimate subject for a modernist painter.
Modernism was therefore to be analyzed on purely
aesthetic and formal concerns, and drawing on
Hegelian and positivist ideas of progress, the his-
tory of modernism was distinguished by a series of
increasingly original, reductive, abstract, and purely
self-referential art objects.
In keeping with the shift in modernist art, criti-
cism toward such formal concerns interior to the
work of art such as abstraction versus illusionistic
space and the emphasis on the artist’s personal
feelings versus social concerns began to shape a
critical view of the progressive evolution of mod-
ern art toward abstraction. By the mid-20th cen-
tury, three characteristics, best exemplified by
Greenberg’s writings, came to describe and become
the dominant understandings that characterized
modernism: first, the autonomy or independence
of the work of art from anything outside it; sec-
ond, the emphasis on the formal qualities of art as
the chief concern of artistic modernism; and third,
an emphasis on the aesthetic effects. The emphasis
on the work of art as effective object assumes all
viewers would be affected in the same way, so
notions of identity revolved around the universal
ideas of the artist and an assumed viewer.
Since the 1970s, historians of modern art have
broadened their analyses of the origin and develop-
ment of modern art from strictly formalist
approaches to new approaches that, broadly speak-
ing, considered the cultural context within which
art was created. Investigations of the relationship
of modern art and identity are found in this con-
text. These new approaches were inspired by the
470 Modern Art
political critiques and social liberation movements
of the 1960s and 1970s, among them the civil
rights, Black power, feminist, and gay liberation
movements, that privileged how certain groups
based on race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality
shared a collective experience in opposition to that
of a dominant culture and the social and political
mechanisms by which oppression functioned. In
scholarly analyses of art and culture in the 1970s
and 1980s, the new art history informed by Marxist
theory provided a framework by which the com-
peting interests of different classes played out in
relation to modern art and culture. In this way, the
art object functioned as a mirror representing how
various class dynamics of the time were socially
constituted and understood. Feminist theory intro-
duced an interrogation of the gender roles in soci-
ety, their effect on representation, and the exclusion
of women. Poststructuralist and postcolonial the-
ory informed analyses that uncovered how binary
oppositions such as civilized and uncivilized and
occident and orient have unequal value when
employed in art. The following examples are
informed by these theoretical methods and show
how new technologies, design, and modernist art
were never neutral or straightforward expressions
of the new in the 19th and 20th centuries but
always caught up in notions of collective identity.
Photography, Technology, and Modern Identity
Among the fruits of science and technology in
the 19th century, the invention of photography
had profound implications for the visual arts and
was a factor in how modernity shaped notions of
identity. In 1839, Louis Daguerre introduced the
daguerreotype process and the practice quickly
spread throughout the world. Even though most
artists and critics would not consider photography
an art until the following century—even as some
artists used it and others became professional
photographers—photography’s inexpensive, highly
naturalistic, and ultimately, mass-producible
images were viewed by still other artists as a threat
to painting at a time when the medium had reached
its apex of naturalism under the training of art
academies. Beyond the implications and debates
about its status as a medium, photography also
quickly became enmeshed in the social and eco-
nomic relations of modernity, the new social order
shaped by the bourgeoisie, urbanization, expand-
ing mass communication, and industrial capital-
ism, disrupting and refashioning notions of modern
identity. The portrait, previously among the prin-
cipal vehicles by which the bourgeoisie (and before
their ascendancy, the aristocracy) displayed their
social standing, was now available to all social
classes, becoming a democratic medium. With the
advancement of technologies that made photo-
graphs cheaper and reproducible in larger num-
bers, and the mass production of likenesses of
politicians, royalty, and performers, celebrity itself
became a commodity and public identity became
malleable in new ways. With the invention of the
camera, a mechanical device that could reproduce
the appearance of the real world, modernization
brashly encroached on what had previously been
the sole domain of the artist. The modern implica-
tions of photography as a reproducible medium
meant that if painting were to be modern, it had to
change in certain ways.
Industry, international trade, manufacturing of
all sorts, and the raw materials extracted from the
growing number of European colonial possessions
became powerful symbols of the collective national
identity of the modern, industrial nation-state that
were showcased in a series of exhibitions held
through the latter half of the century. These inter-
national exhibitions began with London’s Great
Exhibition in 1851, housed, appropriately, in a
Crystal Palace of glass and iron whose construc-
tion depended on mass-produced materials and the
railroads to transport them. Paris’s Eiffel Tower
was erected for a similar exhibition in 1889, one of
four exhibitions sponsored by the French govern-
ment. Still others were held in Vienna, Philadelphia,
Chicago, and other cities as the march of industri-
alization spread in the Western world.
Social Alienation, the
Avant-Garde, and Primitivism
In addition to the ways that art historians have
been able to uncover how identity was affected by
technological changes in the period that witnessed
the effects of modernization and the beginnings of
modernism in art, other diverse but important top-
ics were crucial to the development of modernism
in which collective identities were formed: first,
the experience of social alienation, an effect of

modernity; second, the emergence of an avant-
garde as a distinct and conscious group identity
for artists; and third, primitivism, an act within
modernism by which artists celebrated the cultures
and sensibilities of certain groups deemed outside
of civilization.
Social Alienation
A key set of ideas that flowed from modern
industrialization—and that affected artists and art
making—was the realization of the causes and
structures that brought them into being, the reac-
tions people felt collectively and how they were
divided. Industrial capitalism according to Karl
Marx had caused people to face the sobering fact
that what was significant about modern social
relations were the differing interests of social
classes. The new circumstances of the work envi-
ronment, particularly of the factory, caused work-
ers to feel alienated from what they produced.
Social critics viewed modernization as destroying
the world of the artist-craftsperson and the fruits
of artists’ labor. English artist and poet William
Morris in the 1870s attacked the poor design of
mass-produced products and the investment work-
ers had in their production, which he argued, in
keeping with Marx and others, resulted from the
economic organization of modern industrial soci-
ety. This revolt took the form of the arts and crafts
movement, which emphasized the pleasures and
social virtues of handmade everyday objects. The
graphic design, utilitarian objects, and architecture
of art nouveau in France and Belgium and the
Vienna secessionists in Austria grew out of these
ideas in the later 19th century. A formalist empha-
sis focused only on their modernism, which
stemmed from a rejection of historical artistic
styles for the simplified forms of nature. Only a
contextualist approach recognizes and uncovers
the relationships of class structure, conflicts, and
identity within industrial capitalism.
Social alienation as an effect of modernity was
addressed differently by early modern artists and
designers of the 20th century. The Bauhaus in
Germany, established after World War I and per-
haps the most influential educational institution of
modern art and design in the 20th century, repre-
sented a different approach to the problem of
alienation identified in the previous century.
Modern Art 471
William Morris’s ideas, though distinctly modern
and reform-minded socially, characterized indus-
trialization as detrimental to both the worker and
good design. Bauhaus artists and designers
addressed the arts and crafts movement’s animos-
ity toward the machine and by extension its rela-
tionship to the worker. Recognizing, as the Russian
constructivists had before them, that industrially
produced materials such as glass, metal and rein-
forced concrete by their nature provided new
opportunities for new, modern forms, Walter
Gropius and others created new designs in archi-
tecture (to whose legacy we owe the “glass box”
skyscraper) as well as a breakdown between artis-
tic disciplines, between artist and designer. Both
the Russian constructivists, who sought to create a
wholly new art for a new communist society after
the Revolution of 1917, and the Bauhaus designers
pursued a utopian vision that sought to unite art
and life.
Emergence of an Avant-Garde and Class
The impressionists and subsequent modernists
saw themselves as artistically progressive, as avant-
garde in ways that would remain a crucial part of
modernism for the next century. By engaging the
realities of everyday life in art and by eschewing
traditional artistic techniques for daring and inno-
vative ones, these artists positioned themselves as a
group apart from other artists, and against out-
moded artistic traditions and institutions. Because
the bourgeoisie could be viewed as complicit in
both the means of industrial production that
socially engaged artists critiqued, and as arbiters of
taste and therefore upholders of a traditional and
conservative artistic tradition, the avant-garde was
generally opposed to bourgeois interests. Originally
a military term meaning the advance guard in a
platoon, the term avant-garde was applied to artists
in the mid-19th century. The idea of the modernist
avant-garde gained strength as the salons (the offi-
cial yearly expositions of art approved by the acad-
emies) declined in importance and eventually ceased
and as modernists organized their own independent
exhibitions such as the Salon des Refusés (Salon of
the Rejected) mounted by the impressionists who
were rejected from the official salon in 1863.
The dual aspects of modernism’s relationship to
new conditions that gave rise to artistic techniques
472 Modern Art
constituted a kind of restlessness that informed
avant-garde artists throughout the modern period.
The investment in the changes that characterized
the modern, machine age, the rejection of a
tradition-laden past, bourgeois sensibilities, and
seeing themselves as a group apart meant that art-
ists continually needed to seek new approaches to
express themselves. A central criterion for distin-
guishing one’s self as a modernist was the employ-
ment of forms and techniques that that not been
used before. A constant theme of newness that
pervades avant-garde discourses is the idea of
originality.
Among the most radical of the early avant-garde
movements were the Russian constructivists and
dadaists. Dada, an international movement, began
in Zurich during and in response to World War I,
and spread to Berlin, Hanover, and New York after-
ward. For the dadaists, the great irony of the war
was that the societies that saw themselves as ratio-
nal, civilized, and ever-progressing waged the most
destructive and deadly war in human history abet-
ted by the technologies that stood for its advance-
ment. As artists and as modernists, the Dada artists
attacked the bases of that society—the bourgeois
social order and its values—by using anti-art strat-
egies and by undermining the time-honored and
inviolable values of artistic creativity, rationality,
and even the art object as commodity. German
Dada artist Hannah Höch used a disjointed collage
aesthetic to juxtapose images of modern European
women with African masks culled from maga-
zines to comment on the unnatural pressure
women faced to be beautiful. In the process, she
attacked art’s pretensions of originality and pre-
ciousness by clipping images from mass-produced
magazines and newspapers.
Primitivism: Race, Gender, and Modern Art
Liberal social theorists and artists were not the
only ones who rejected the positive view of moder-
nity. By the late 19th century, a growing number
of artists and intellectuals, especially those in the
avant-garde, believed that the rapid changes
brought about by industrial capitalism had the
negative effect of separating human beings from
their true and natural natures. Such thinkers
looked to so-called primitive societies and commu-
nities outside of European urban centers on whom
they projected their nostalgia for a simpler way of
life that modern industrial civilization had lost.
Those deemed primitive included non-Western
societies such as those in Africa, the Middle East,
Native America, and Oceania; certain people even
in Western culture such as women, children, and
the insane, those in remote parts of Europe such as
France’s Brittany or Scandinavia’s Lapland; and to
earlier periods in European history such as medi-
eval and preclassical periods that possessed primi-
tive qualities or primitive characteristics. Recent
theorists of critical theory and visual culture have
argued that the idea of the primitive is a relation-
ship of binary oppositions rather than a category
with an essential set of characteristics. Primitivism
establishes the identity of Europeans as dominant
and civilized, compared with those considered
inferior and uncivilized other.
Primitivism had for centuries has had negative
connotations, especially as Europe’s Christianity,
science and progress were used as evidence that
Western cultures were superior to those outside the
West who were viewed as savage heathens, back-
ward, and in an arrested state of development. Such
reasoning justified the slave trade from the 16th to
the 19th centuries as well as the expansion by
European powers of their colonies in the newly
explored interior of Africa, Asia, and the Pacific to
exploit raw materials and agricultural products such
as minerals and rubber. Artists such as cubist Pablo
Picasso and German expressionist Ernst Ludwig
Kirchner had greater exposure to art objects from
these colonies, which began to appear in flea mar-
kets and natural history museums and reports from
explorers, missionaries, scientists, and the military
appeared in the newspapers and magazines.
Europeans’ discontent with both modern cul-
ture and its legacy of artistic traditions led modern-
ists to look to other cultures for alternative artistic
conventions for inspiration. The impressionists
looked to the artistic traditions of Japan whose
prints became available in the West after the U.S.
Navy forcibly opened Japan to trade in the 1850s.
Subsequently, artists were attracted to the even
more primitive cultures of Africa, Oceania, and
Native America. A distinction needs to be made in
how artists and modernist art objects were distin-
guished relative to the primitive. Artistic primitiv-
ism refers to the influence of art object produced
by societies Europeans classified as primitive. The

people of these societies most often were called
savages. Nor were their cultural products such as
carved masks and figures copied. Modernists
believe it took their sensibility to appropriate forms
and ideas from non-Western cultures and translate
them to modern works of art. Artistic responses
varied. Most European modernists did not seek to
emulate exactly the practices of Africans or Native
Americans. Postimpressionist French painter Paul
Gauguin, however, was so dissatisfied with
European culture that he sought out and immersed
himself in primitive cultures, first by traveling to
Brittany, a remote region of France, and made
paintings of its residents’ archaic-appearing cos-
tumes and mystical religious practices that seemed
caught in a preindustrial medievalism. Seeking an
even more primitive environment, he eventually
moved to Tahiti, then a French colony where he
adapted designs from the simplified forms of native
textiles and wood carvings and the local colors that
inspired a personal rather than naturalistic expres-
sion in his art.
The focus on the artist’s interior expression at
the expense of naturalistic depiction or even realism
went hand in hand with European perceptions of
the unbridled expressive tendencies of the primitive
who was unfettered by civilization. This was the
case with the German expressionists such as the Der
Blaue Reiter (Blue Rider), a group formed around
1911 in Munich whose members saw themselves as
primitives whose work pointed the way to a new
epoch of more natural expression and instinct that
had long ago been lost. Picasso’s experimental
paintings that led to the fractured pictorial spaces of
cubist painting were inspired by African masks but
also functioned, following European understanding
of fetishes, as magic talismans.
An early example of the use of primitivism in
art scenes of the Middle East was known as orien-
talism. The orient for Europeans of the 19th and
early 20th centuries included and most often
denoted the cultures of North Africa and of the
Middle East. Orientalist subjects such as harems
(more the result of the artist’s imagination rather
than documentary experience) were popular dur-
ing the romantic period but found a secure place
within modernism.
For modernists such as the 20th-century French
artist Henri Matisse, the Orient provided both
sensual subject matter in the reclining female nude,
Modern Art 473
a passive figure to be acted upon by others and as
a source of inspiration, and as an alternative to the
rational order of perspective in the flat, two-
dimensional decorative patterns found in carpets
and tiles. Gender distinctions factor centrally in
primitivist thinking generally. Mastery and con-
trol, associated with the colonizing West, was
gendered masculine, and passiveness and being
acted upon was associated with the primitive so
that both women and nonindustrialized societies
generally were classified as feminine.
The surrealists, informed by the theories of psy-
choanalyst Sigmund Freud, sought to create art
that accessed the unconscious, or, the surrealists
believed, the primitive side of every human being’s
psyche for a fuller view of reality achieved through
techniques such as automatism, which supposedly
allowed the influence of the unconscious in art
making without the interference of the rationality
and civilizing associations of the conscious mind.
Modern Art and Identity After World War II
The outbreak of World War II and the rise of
Fascism in Europe prompted a number of the most
influential modernists (including surrealists
Salvador Dalí and Max Ernst; André Breton,
author of the Surrealist Manifesto; as well as
abstract painter Piet Mondrian) to immigrate to
the United States, influencing a shift both in U.S.
art and related notions of identity. The Europeans’
presence, if not their direct influence, prompted
discussions among U.S. advocates of abstract art
about automatism and the access to the uncon-
scious. U.S. abstractionists such as Arshile Gorky
and Jackson Pollock were less influenced by the
concepts of Freud than by those of another psycho-
analyst, Carl Jung, whose notion of the collective
unconscious, common to all human beings, was
compatible with a universal notion of identity.
This was especially significant given U.S. abstrac-
tionists’ increasing dissatisfaction with the reigning
styles of art in the 1930s such as social realism and
documentary photography in the United States.
Influenced as they were by Mexican artists such as
Diego Rivera and supported by federal government
programs under President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
administration, these styles were characterized by
distinctly figural representation, a lack of modern-
ist abstraction, a decidedly populist celebration of
474 Modern Art
the worker, and a politically liberal advocacy of the
downtrodden. Given the example of art promoted
by both the Communists (the Soviets had since the
1920s suppressed the avant-garde and abstract con-
structivism and replaced it with propagandistic real-
ism) and Fascists (the Nazis in Germany denigrated
avant-gardism in the 1930s as degenerate and
Jewish and replaced it with a conflicted neoclassi-
cism), realism of any stripe appeared to critics such
as Greenberg as too subjective, local, and literary.
Abstract expressionism, on the other hand, which
claimed no subject other than the reality of its flat-
ness and the materiality of its paint, and whose all-
over gestural markings were generated, spontaneously
and intuitively, from the depths of the artist’s
unconscious, seemed to provide an attractive, apo-
litical, and universal alternative. Greenberg’s notion
of the idea of a progressive evolution of modern
painting toward flatness and abstraction and non-
referentiality informed the idea of an artistic main-
stream that buttressed the argument for the
inevitable privileging of abstraction over any figural
or realistic art.
Critics of abstract expressionism since 1980
have noted inconsistencies and contradictions when
comparing the claims of its advocates in the 1950s
and the realities of its creation and exhibition his-
tory. Abstract expressionism was not always
abstract or even expressionistic. Its criteria and
histories privileged White men when women and
racial minorities also created quality works.
Scholars who have interrogated notions of how
whiteness is represented in discourses about art and
culture have argued that often lurking behind the
claims of universalism is the idea that White males
have no racial and gender identity while racial
minorities and women are defined by race and gen-
der and marked as inferior. Abstract expressionists
and their advocates in appropriating the notion the
universal primitive engaged in a binary opposition
that privileged, in effect, White identity in opposi-
tion to an assumed inferior other.
At the time that identity emerged as a focus of
scholarly attention—first in the social sciences—the
dominant idea of modernist art in the form of
Greenbergian modernism was at its peak. Threats
to the authority of this view of modernism and
modernist art itself were on the wane at the time of
two concurrent trends: first, the advent of artistic
practices and forms in the 1960s such as environ-
ments and happenings (later called installation art
and performance), assemblage and junk sculpture,
and pop art, all of which combined art and every-
day life in ways that challenged central tenants of
modernism such as the purity of media, abstraction
as the epitome of the evolution of modern painting,
and the idea that art should exist in a realm sepa-
rate from popular culture. Second, the 1960s saw
the rise of social protest movements that eventually
led to methods of analysis employing identities that
challenged the notion of a single universal identity
on which the dominant idea of modern art depended.
For these reasons, the period of modernism is
believed to have ended some time in the 1960s.
David Hart
See also Modernity and Postmodernity; Other, The
Further Readings
Berman, M. (1982). All that is solid melts into air: The
experience of modernity. New York: Simon &
Schuster.
Dyer, R. (1997). White. London: Routledge.
Eisenman, S. F. (2002). Nineteenth century art: A critical
history. London: Thames & Hudson.
Foster, H., Krauss, R., Bois, Y.-A., & Buchloh, B. H. D.
(2004). Art since 1900: Modernism, antimodernism,
postmodernism. New York: Thames & Hudson.
Frascina, F., & Harrison, C. (Eds.). (1982). Modern art
and modernism: A critical anthology. New York:
Harper & Row.
Gaiger, J. (2003). Frameworks for modern art. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press in association with
the Open University.
Gibson, A. E. (1997). Abstract expressionism: Other
politics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Gleason, P. (1983). Identifying identity: A semantic
history. Journal of American History, 69(4), 910–931.
Habermas, J. (1998). Modernity—An incomplete project.
In H. Foster (Ed.), The anti-aesthetic: Essays on
postmodern culture (pp. 1–15). New York: New Press.
Harrison, C., & Wood, P. (Eds.). (2003). Art in theory,
1900–2000: An anthology of changing ideas. Malden,
MA: Blackwell.
Harrison, C., Wood, P., & Gaiger, J. (Eds.). (1998). Art
in theory, 1815–1900: An anthology of changing
ideas. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Huyssen, A. (1986). After the great divide: Modernism,
mass culture, postmodernism. Bloomington: Indiana
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Lamoureux, J. (2000). Avant-garde: A historiography of
a critical concept. In A. Jones (Ed.), A companion to
contemporary art since 1945 (pp. 191–211). Malden,
MA: Blackwell.
McPherson, H. (2001). The modern portrait in
nineteenth-century France. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Meecham, P., & Sheldon, J. (2000). Modern art:
A critical introduction. London, UK: Routledge.
Meecham, P., & Wood, P. (1996). Modernism and
modernity: An introductory survey. In L. Dawtrey,
T. Jackson, M. Masterson, P. Meecham, & P. Wood
(Eds.), Investigating modern art (pp. 1–32). New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press in association with
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Nelson, R. S., & Schiff, R. (Eds.). (2003). Critical terms
for art history (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Rajchman, J. (Ed.). (1995). The identity in question. New
York: Routledge.
Rhodes, C. (1994). Primitivism and modern art. London:
Thames and Hudson.
Smith, B. (1998). Modernism’s history. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Modernity and Postmodernity
The concepts modernity and postmodernity refer to
particular historical epochs and also to multifaceted
sets of ideological, aesthetic, economic, and politi-
cal processes. Modernity refers to the features of
social and economic organization that consolidated
in Western Europe and the United States around
the 1850s and extended until late into the 20th
century. Modernity had its origins in Enlightenment
philosophy and science of the 17th and 18th centu-
ries. Postmodernity refers to the cache of rapid
social and economic changes that have occurred
predominantly in Western societies, but also increas-
ingly global in reach, since around 1970. The his-
torical origins of postmodernity can be traced to
earlier events and periods in the 1950s and 1960s;
however, the exact temporal origins of both moder-
nity and postmodernity are frequently matters of
debate among historians and sociologists. Because
Modernity and Postmodernity 475
of their distinct emphases, each concept holds
unique notions with regard to identity and identity
formation. This entry begins with an overview and
introduction of key terms. Next, this entry discusses
the features and processes of each concept. The
entry concludes with an examination of critical
issues regarding modernity and postmodernity.
Overview and Key Terms
The bedrocks of modernity are to be found in the
processes and ideologies encapsulated in scientific
rationality, specialization and individualism, and
commodification. A fundamental idea deeply
embedded within the ideals and systems of moder-
nity is that of social and cultural progress.
Conversely, postmodernity is principally defined by
questioning the modern values and assumptions of
progress, and questioning the values of scientific
and economic rationality. Postmodernity also places
an emphasis on matters of aesthetics and style in
cultural life and on the importance of leisure and
consumption in forming people’s identities.
It is helpful to begin thinking about the different
definitional components of modernity and post-
modernity by highlighting the possible different
uses of both terms:
1. Modernity/postmodernity refers to the stage or
epoch of social, cultural, and economic
development. Sometimes writers use the terms
modern era or postmodern era, which are
equivalent concepts. The key idea in this use of
both terms is that each represents a significant
and decisive shift in the basis of social change
and evolution that represents a break with the
previous era.
2. Modernism/postmodernism refers to the artistic,
aesthetic, philosophical, and stylistic facets of
these epochs. For example, modernism is
associated with particular canons and trends in
art, philosophy, literature, and architecture, as
is postmodernism.
3. Modernization/postmodernization refers to the
processes of social change associated with each
of these epochs, driving the transition from
traditional to modern and then postmodern
societies.
476 Modernity and Postmodernity
Basic Features
Before proceeding to explore each epoch and its
key processes in greater detail, it is helpful to list
some of the essential qualities and features of
modernity and postmodernity. Modernity is
informed by the belief that scientific rationality
and rational thought are essential and desirable
features of social advancement. This is a reaction
to earlier forms of traditional or premodern social
authority formed around religion and superstition
and associated with forager-tribal societies and
subsistence economic production. Modernity
places great emphasis on the idea of the sanctity of
the individual’s political and social rights, and val-
ues the individual as an essential unit of modern
life whose status is protected by the modern
nation-state. The individual is seen as tied to oth-
ers in the modern world through various types of
social and economic contracts that are often
implicit and unspoken dimensions of social belong-
ing. At its heart, modernity is associated with the
idea of progress, and a belief in the capacity of sci-
ence and rational systems of management, classifi-
cation, and ordering to form the cornerstones of
such progress. Modernity is also defined by a ten-
dency toward economic expansion based on prin-
ciples of economic specialization and the continued
global expansion of capitalist systems of produc-
tion. The basis of modernity is a system of mass
production and the growth of a consumer society
based on mass consumption of durables frequently
centered on the home, such as motorcars, washing
machines, or refrigerators.
Postmodernity is an era in which the capacity of
the modernity to promise a better life based on sci-
ence, rationality, and a drive toward progress has
been subjected to severe questioning by people.
Hence, Jean-François Lyotard has characterized
postmodernity as the era defined by the collapse of
grand (“modernist”) narratives. For example, the
growth of environmental protest movements and
ecology-based politics derives fundamentally from
this questioning of the dominant modern values of
progress. Furthermore, the postmodern era is char-
acterized by a sense that there are not necessarily
clear answers to major social issues or even life
choices, just a plethora of viewpoints and options.
The postmodern era is also often associated with
the proliferation of lifestyle choices—meaning that
people are supposedly freed from typical social
roles and mores to construct their own identities.
Postmodernity is also based around the consump-
tion of symbols and the active construction of
consumer-based lifestyles. Social exchange is seen
to be more symbolic play and image than real,
personal engagements. Perhaps most importantly,
postmodernity is about the questioning of experts,
such as doctors, religious leaders or scientists, as
people increasingly put more faith in themselves or
distant others, rather than trusting modernity’s
traditional experts.
Fundamental Processes
and Features of Modernity
Stephen Crook, Jan Pakulski, and Malcolm Waters
have defined the key processes driving the forma-
tion of early modern societies’ processes as those
of differentiation, commodification, and rational-
ization. These are also general processes in that
they are found across most or all spheres in mod-
ern societies such as the home, work, school, and
the legal system, for example. This phase of mod-
ern development began intensively during the mid-
to late-1800s and continued to around the 1930s.
Differentiation refers to processes that increas-
ingly complexify social and economic relations
based on principles of specialization and compart-
mentalization. For example, in the modern econ-
omy, an important development is the separation
of the production of commodities from the domes-
tic sphere. This is a process of differentiation
between the spheres of production and domestic
life that assisted in promoting various sorts of eco-
nomic productivities. Commodification refers to
the process by which all aspects of life are increas-
ingly assigned monetary values and are available to
be purchased through market exchange. For exam-
ple, love, sex, and happiness are all increasingly
commodified in modern societies through advertis-
ing that associates products with these deep human
needs. Another example would be the commodifi-
cation of nature, including the natural environ-
ment and animals. Tourism makes nature into a
valuable commodity, and through the mass farm-
ing of animals for food, modern societies have
commodified other animal life. Rationalization
refers to the application of regimes of scientific
positivism, systems of ordering and organization,
and principles of measurement and calculation to

daily life. For example, the development of modern
medicine is based on these principles.
The sociologist Max Weber is well-known for
his theory of bureaucracy, which is a form of orga-
nization based on the principles of rationalization.
Taking inspiration from Weber, the contemporary
social theorist George Ritzer has applied Weber’s
rationalization thesis to understand what he calls
the “McDonaldization” of culture, referring to the
way the organizational principles of a successful
fast-food restaurant chain are being successfully
applied to most other fields of everyday life, from
medical care to universities. Another example
would be the development of so-called practices of
Fordism in modern economies. Fordism is a system
of mass production, pioneered by motor car pro-
ducer Henry Ford, that relied on achievement of
economies of scale through mass production, an ide-
ology of consumerism, a popular mass-commodity
aesthetic, a scientifically based system of labor
control and management, and a particular ideol-
ogy of workplace self-discipline encouraged and
supported by workplace surveillance of various
forms. What allowed Fordism to become such a
pervasive mode of economic organization during
modernity was the massive demand for mechani-
zation and technologization that was manifested
throughout the United States and Europe con-
sumer economies—cars, ships, steel, petrochemi-
cals, consumer electrical goods and construction
were the big engines of economic growth.
After the Great Depression and World War II,
modern societies went through a more intense
phase of development where these characteristics
were further entrenched and altered in important
ways. Roland Robertson calls this the take-off
phase of modern societies. Scott Lash has called this
the organized phase of high modern society. This
phase is distinguished by the following types of
features: Economically, increasing population and
increasing discretionary incomes pushed economic
production to a scale and intensity not seen before.
The large transnational corporation was a feature
of this economic phase. Around this time, advertis-
ing industries developed scientific ways to help cre-
ate or at least manipulate consumer wants in the
new mass markets. Financial systems also became
increasingly complex, and the state began to play a
significant role in economic management, especially
in the decades directly after World War II where an
Modernity and Postmodernity 477
elaborate system of social welfare provision devel-
oped in response to the inevitable growth of an
underclass. The key economic management philos-
ophy in play here was Keynesianism. John Maynard
Keynes was an economist whose theories were
important in dealing with capitalism’s tendency
toward cyclical downswings and upswings.
Keynesianism demonstrated that governments had
a valid role to play in the management of demand
in the economy and, by intelligent tinkering, could
manage the economy through times of uncertainty.
Also at this time, communities developed around
suburbs where the home becomes a focus for the
performance of defined gender roles with women
caring for children and the home and men commut-
ing to work to earn money to help the family con-
sume a new range of goods, foods, clothing, and
other major household durables. Culturally, a key
development in this period is the rise of mass-
consumed commercial artistic forms: the develop-
ment of rock and roll from the fusion of folk
cultural forms jazz and blues, the success of movies
and huge movie production houses, the growth of
the television industry, and the rise of the superstar
or celebrity. Perhaps the final tendency of moder-
nity is for the economic system of capitalism to
maintain an outward-looking expansive approach,
meaning it has a tendency toward economic coloni-
zation and the development of transnational link-
ages and economic networks.
Fundamental Processes
and Features of Postmodernity
As modern life was defined in various social sphere
by processes of ordering, classification, rational-
ization, and differentiation, postmodern life has
variously been described in opposite terms such as
detraditionalized, reflexive, flexible, and liquid. At
its heart, postmodernity involves a radical ques-
tioning of the philosophical and cultural bases of
modernity, and a substantial reorganization of
many aspects of modern social and economic life.
The field in which the postmodern became
established was in the field of architecture, and this
remains an emblematic field in which to think
about the transition from modernity to postmo-
dernity. With a touch of irony, architect Charles
Jencks dates the end of modern architecture to July
15, 1972, at 3:32 p.m. At that time, several blocks
478 Modernity and Postmodernity
of the Pruitt-Igoe housing development in St. Louis,
Missouri, were demolished. The Pruitt-Igoe was an
example of modern housing and urban design, and
Jencks believed its destruction signaled the end of
the modern era. It had been designed to be practi-
cal, efficient, and above all, socially and ecologi-
cally rational. Yet, despite the modern urban
planners’ best attempts to devise the perfect mass
housing development, Pruitt-Igoe turned out to
be a uniform, machine-like, and overplanned to
the point of being a depressing and aesthetically
unpleasant place to live that was crime and vandal-
ism prone, and unresponsive to environmental and
human needs. A few years later, the architect
Robert Venturi and colleagues wrote a book that
urged architects to look to the populism, vibrancy,
and ornamentalism of leisure cities like Las Vegas
for their inspiration. The mood of Venturi’s work
was against the earnest, careful but sometimes uni-
dimensional, monochromatic designs of modern-
ism and in favor of the playfulness, irony, humor,
and populism of postmodern architectural and
urban design.
Economically, postmodernity has been defined
by the idea of reflexive or flexible accumulation.
This emphasizes the centrality of the knowledge
and information economy, rather than modernity’s
emphasis on large-scale industrial production. The
postmodern economy is often said to have an aes-
thetic basis, meaning that economic production is
not only based around goods and information, but
signs and symbols as well. Hence, Scott Lash and
John Urry’s notion of the semiotic society, where
production is centered on producing images, icons,
and symbols, and consumption become concerned
not so much with the utility of particular things,
but in assembling and presenting a particular life-
style and cultural choice through one’s consump-
tion. Consumption is thus also reflexive—we can
see this in the proliferation of styles and niche mar-
keting that associate consumption with making
distinctions and cultivating identity through one’s
consumption. There is also a process of detradi-
tionalization that defines postmodernity where
traditional social structures such as the family,
corporate groups and social class no longer play
such an important role in determining people’s
lives, their choices, and life chances. Instead, there
is an achieved and constructed quality to a per-
son’s identity, rather than an ascribed one. In this
sort of economy, consumer choice is fundamental
and is an arena where individuals are encouraged
to make decisions about their identities as created
through consumption.
Fredric Jameson produced a classic statement
on the characteristics of postmodern culture.
Jameson argues that the full-blown postmodern-
ism of the 1970s and 1980s can be traced back to
the 1950s and early 1960s and the waning of the
modernist aesthetic movement. For example, in
this era, abstract expressionism was replaced by
pop art, existentialist philosophy lost traction, the
avant-gardist music of John Cage arose in response
to the high rock and roll of the Rolling Stones, and
the utopianism of modernist architecture is replaced
by aesthetic populism and an architecture of popu-
lar culture that resembles a pastiche of historical
styles. According to Jameson, a postmodern soci-
ety and economy has a number of key features.
Aesthetics has been integrated into economic and
commodity production. The frantic economic
urgency of producing fresh waves of more and
more novel-seeming goods assigns a prominent
position to aesthetic innovation and experimentation,
encoding novelty and value in decorative features.
Second, Jameson points to the quality of depthless-
ness where images dominate. Contemporary soci-
ety privileges “signs” ahead of content, so people
consume images and symbols in place of goods.
Third is confrontation with the stable and predict-
able aesthetics of modernism. For example, art
styles develop that do not look like traditional paint-
ings of still lifes or portraits; architectural forms
arise that don’t take themselves too seriously and
hence can at once remind us of the Colosseum and
a Japanese temple.
In summary, Jameson says that postmodernity
is characterized by a flatness or depthlessness—a
sense of superficiality where meaning is emptied
out of cultural objects and what is left are flat,
stripped images. Furthermore, postmodern culture
is characterized by a loss of historicity. That is,
whereas modernism had an ideological basis and a
set of historically formed ideals and shared values,
postmodernism is struck by a sense of debased
normlessness that does not know where to look for
either inspiration or guidance. Finally, Jameson
points out that postmodern culture is characterized
by a waning of affect. Feeling and emotion is
drawn out of objects and images, in favor of the

depthlessness of the image. The art of Jeff Koons is
a good example of such waning of affect in cultural
life and is frequently discussed as either banal and
apolitical or, alternately, ironic and provocative.
Critical Issues
Some authors have argued that modernity has
never been a coherent and pervasive system or ide-
ology, for the project of modernity was fully real-
ized in few historical settings. Some praise
modernity for its applications of standards and
boundaries that allow for the formation of cultural
canons and supposedly collectively agreed cultural
norms. Likewise, the project of modernity is often
admired for its emphasis on reason, for attempting
to safeguard the sanctity and rights of the individ-
ual, and for its promotion of scientific rationality
as the basis for decision making. Furthermore,
modernity has fostered a commitment to valuing
the collective political struggle of marginalized
groups. From the perspective of postmodernity, the
project of modernity was always too suspicious of
other cultures, ways of life, and thought that are
not deemed appropriately modern, rational, or
scientific. Postmodernism is thus much about expe-
riencing and embracing difference and diversity
and the cultivation of hybrid, cosmopolitan models
of cultural engagement. Moreover, postmodern-
ism is sometimes even about embracing the pre-
modern, for example, in finding enthusiasm for
alternative medicines or non-Western spirituali-
ties. Postmodernity has also encouraged people and
researchers to relativize the basis of their knowl-
edge, not to assume certainties or universals, and
urged them to understand ideas about universal
truths and reason as bogus and merely reflections
of entrenched knowledge-power relations. On the
downside, as in the extreme reflections of the late-
period Jean Baudrillard, postmodernity becomes a
toothless critique that merely mirrors the mode of
reasoning postmodernists want to expose, for
example, in their criticisms of media cultures.
Likewise, with its focus on lifestyle, celebrity, and
consumerism, postmodernity has struggled to
escape the shallowness of its own modes of cultural
production. Though it is not an entirely dead set of
ideas, many scholars believe we are certainly post-
postmodernity and well beyond the era of high-
modernity. Academic discourses in the last decade
Multiculturalism 479
or so have been picking at the bones of postmod-
ern theory to judge which bits are worth keeping
and combining with the best features of modernity
to sustain a new vision of social progress.
Ian Woodward
See also Complex Inequality; Ontological Insecurity; Self;
Society and Social Identity
Further Readings
Bauman, Z. (1991). Modernity and ambivalence. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press.
Crook, S., Pakulski, J., & Waters, M. (1992).
Postmodernization: Change in advanced society.
London: Sage.
Harvey, D. (1989). The condition of postmodernity.
Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Heelas, P., Lash, S., & Morris, P. (Eds.). (1996).
Detraditionalization: Critical reflections on authority
and identity. Cambridge, UK: Blackwell.
Jameson, F. (1991). Postmodernism, or, the cultural logic
of late capitalism. London: Verso.
Lash, S., & Urry, J. (1987). The end of organized
capitalism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Lash, S., & Urry, J. (1994). Economies of signs and
space. London: Sage.
McGuigan, J. (2009). Modernity and postmodern culture
(2nd ed.). Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.
Turner, B. (1994). Orientalism, postmodernism and
globalization. London: Routledge.
Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism is a current and significant term
that deals with cultural identity and diversity; it
can be defined as a distinctive positive attitude
toward cultural diversity. Thus, the fundamental
root of its conception rests on the idea of differ-
ence. Multiculturalism, then, is understood as the
study and support for peaceful coexistence of
diverse cultures in a society. Thus, it is an issue of
ethics. The emphasis or the first principle of multi-
culturalism has to deal with the definition of cul-
ture. How culture is defined shapes human
perception. The interaction and communication of
diverse cultures should be thought in relation to
reception, recognition, and acknowledgment of
480 Multiculturalism
one culture by the other, or one individual by oth-
ers. To introduce multiculturalism, this entry men-
tions the origins of the term, the competing
definitions, the theorizing literature, the legal and
political aspects, and a brief discussion of the
sources for its critique.
Origins
Many point to the 1965 preliminary report of the
Canadian Royal Commission of Bilingualism and
Biculturalism as the quintessential official source
of multiculturalism as an idea. The commission’s
final report, which was published between 1967
and 1970, became the first publication that men-
tioned a multicultural society; thus coining the
term. Multiculturalism has been primarily used to
define the cultural diversity based on identity and
distinctiveness that depended on one’s native lan-
guage and ethnicity. However, this was not neces-
sarily a biologic definition; one person might have
come from diverse genealogical lineage and still
adopted a particular third ethnic identity or lan-
guage through a certain identification process.
The initial understanding of multiculturalism
mostly referred to the efforts of protecting minor-
ity or aboriginal cultures. Many democratic nation-
states considered enabling their minority and
aboriginal ethnic groups for political self-represen-
tation and granting them autonomy. Thus, the
term gained popularity during the 1970s, espe-
cially in countries like Australia, which intended to
follow Canada’s lead. This trend was even appar-
ent in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR), which recognized 16 autonomous ethnic
republics in its 1976 constitution.
Many countries, too, pondered the idea of mul-
ticulturalism as a consequence of having or inviting
large numbers of immigrants inside their boundar-
ies. Therefore, multiculturalism obtained more
interest, as the term also began to define a benevo-
lent attitude of a state toward its immigrant popu-
lace, allowing them to keep and maintain their
distinct ethnic and linguistic identities regardless of
their status of residency and citizenship. The pur-
pose here was to integrate new arrivals to the pre-
dominant culture and to provide a peaceful platform
for coexistence of different cultural ethnic groups
without perpetrating a form of oppression and mar-
ginalization. In different political and geographic
regions, the objectives of multiculturalism based on
immigration naturally varied between assimilation
and accommodation. Countries such as the United
States, Brazil, and Canada are examples of immi-
grant nations that each have their own distinct
pains in the process.
Multiculturalism also found its place as a move-
ment against racism and any type of social, politi-
cal, and cultural division of a society based on
racial segregation, that defended individual as well
as group rights and demanded equality for all, in
politics and law, regardless of race. Many promi-
nent figures theorizing multiculturalism even con-
sidered race as an illusionary social construct that
was used as a political instrument of domination,
conceiving cultural difference and ethnic diversity
as a sign of inferiority.
Definitions
The most common definition of multiculturalism
refers to ethnicity. It can be ideally described as the
will and desire of diverse and multiple ethnic cul-
tures to live together without exploitation and
subordination of others. Since its origin, however,
multiculturalism has evolved and expanded in its
definition because its first principle, culture, has
been more broadly perceived. The general descrip-
tion of culture and how people identity themselves
with a given culture has dramatically transformed
the meaning of the term. Multiculturalism no lon-
ger only discusses ethnicity, race, and the rights of
minorities. The multicultural argument extends
over the horizons of sex, gender, sexual orienta-
tion, religion, creed, culturally distinct traditions
and practices, political ideologies, pop-culture com-
munities, and their combinations. The philosophi-
cal, theoretical, legal, and political perspectives
concerning multiculturalism merge and become
one whole attitude. Such a broad understanding of
multiculturalism faces a problem of incomplete
theorization and results in disagreements because
of the vast volume of ideas under discussion.
A more extensive definition of multiculturalism
should contain all the connotations of culture
when it is referred in the earlier description—the
will and desire of diverse and multiple cultures to
live together. However, the extensive definition
seems to be trouble-laden when one begins to
question its likelihood and plausibility. At that

point, the conditions that are necessary for multi-
culturalism to emerge and exist in its largest pos-
sible sense should be deliberated. The agreement is
that, as for the first condition, a more inclusive
kind of liberal democracy needs to be adopted to
accommodate such a multicultural society. Such a
democratic regime should guarantee that an envi-
ronment for a multicultural society exists and leg-
islate the necessary laws to protect it by legitimizing
the demands of diversity.
The second condition refers to the ideas of recep-
tion, recognition, and acknowledgment of diverse
cultures within a society. Individuals and groups
should have the right and freedom to identify them-
selves with one or more cultures, voluntarily
obtaining an identity of their own. In addition,
each individual and group needs to accept others
and recognize their adopted or inherited cultures by
acknowledging that others’ rights are as legitimate
as their own. The extent of this condition ought to
be limited by the idea of respect for culture, as the
first principle of multiculturalism. Any type of cul-
ture that would not comply with the coexistence,
equality, and rights of diversity, and could not
allow the conditions necessary for multiculturalism
might lose countenance and moral support, even
though they may be tolerated. One example of this
condition could be permitting a racist group such
as Aryan Brotherhood to exist while ensuring that
its potential damage to others is minimal or nonex-
istent by pacifying the means of violence.
The last condition is that the multicultural soci-
ety needs to address the needs of its current mem-
bers and should have a determination to ensure that
future generations will enjoy the similar rights as
well as they could accommodate new needs as the
extent of the interpretations of culture may expand.
Thus, the ethical disposition of multiculturalism
seems to reside in a conscious cultural relativism
without falling victim to naïveté of degenerating in
principles and execution. In this sense, cultural rela-
tivism refers to a multicultural sensitivity that
would not let the so-called cultures that are incom-
patible and repugnant to multiculturalism control
and manipulate the fate of reasonable people that
have the desire and will to live in a diverse society.
Cases of cultural diversity, as mentioned previ-
ously in the largest sense of culture, present an
ideal but challenging list of theories and practices
that the proponents of multiculturalism attempt to
Multiculturalism 481
address. Keeping the three conditions mentioned
earlier in mind and depending on one’s philosoph-
ical stance, a rank of importance can be implied to
the list but it still remains indeterminate.
Race and Ethnicity
Under expanded definitions of multiculturalism,
as mentioned earlier, no one should claim any kind
of social, political, or legal superiority based on his
or her race or ethnicity, nor should one be assigned
an inferiority based on the same criteria. Minorities
and marginalized groups should be protected and
all deemed equal before law with equal rights. The
state can determine an official language and obtain
an ethnic national name without suppressing its
citizens, immigrants, and guest residents to main-
tain their own ethnic identity and native tongue,
dialect, or vernacular speech. The challenges asso-
ciated with race and ethnicity include nationalism,
tribalism, and cultural chauvinism.
Sex and Gender
As with race and ethnicity, an expanded defini-
tion of multiculturalism ensures that no one is
superior or inferior because of his or her sex or
gender. No sex or gender may have unequal social,
political, or legal expectations or responsibilities.
All sexes, including transsexuals and transvestites,
are deemed to have equal rights and entitled to be
equally treated by law. The challenges associated
with sex and gender include sexist traditionalism
and religious conservatism.
Sexual Orientation
This can sometimes be treated under the sex
and gender criterion; however, it is increasingly
considered as a separate multicultural issue.
Broader definitions of multiculturalism allow peo-
ple to have and perform the sexual orientation of
their choice regardless of sexual and gender roles
assigned and expected of them. No one can be
treated unequally before law nor denied his or her
civil rights because of sexual preferences.
Religion and Creed
In multicultural societies, as defined previously,
people can have and profess any religious belief
482 Multiculturalism
and creed. No one can be treated unequally
because of his or her faith before law. The state
ensures that no religion is considered superior or
prosecutable, and the state protects both individual
and group rights, ensuring that each individual has
the right to voluntarily choose and perform his or
her own religious faith without group oppression
as well as protecting all faith groups from degrada-
tion and suppression. The challenges of religion
and creed are religious practices and beliefs incom-
patible to multicultural ideals.
Political Ideology
No political ideology or party can be banned or
prosecuted under expanded definitions of multicul-
turalism. States ensure that both the individual and
group rights are protected, similar to religion and
creed, and all are equal before law. Any political
ideology or a party that undermines the democratic
state and political environment necessary for a
multicultural society will be tolerated as long as it
does not violate others’ individual and group rights
granted by legislation in a multicultural society.
The challenges to political identity include anti-
democratic and totalitarian political tendencies.
Traditions and Practices
One of the most challenging aspects of multicul-
turalism is the effort to accommodate some cul-
tural groups’ needs involving specific traditional
practices that might conflict with the ideas of mul-
ticulturalism and democratic civil rights. Usually,
many of these practices have religious origins, but
these are not exclusive. Some significant cases are
certain right-of-passage practices; religious, spiri-
tual, or sacrificial mutilation and scarring; particu-
lar ways of clothing or nudity; sacrificial slaughter
of animals; forms of polygamy; and so forth. In
many cases, a minority group’s traditional prac-
tices are against the norms of a mainstream culture
but also constitute a significant aspect of the way
of life for that specific culture. Some examples are
polygamy in Islam or Mormonism, female circum-
cision in East African cultures, or Ta– moko as a
form of tattooing of the face in Maori culture. The
most important issue around these traditional prac-
tices in the multiculturalism debate is the idea of
consent. However, not all practices are performed
with the consent of the subjects. In many cases, the
state needs to ensure that the individual’s rights are
protected. As a subdivision of this issue, some
advocates of multiculturalism also believe that
rights of children and animals should be protected
against any kind of traditional practices that might
be offensive or oppressive to them.
Pop-Cultural Communities
Probably the newest addition to the multicul-
tural debate is pop-cultural identity. The argument
is that an individual or a group might start identify-
ing with a cultural entity that is actually a product
of pop culture and ultimately obtain an identity
related to it. Some of the cases are simply treated as
pseudo-culture; however, some can be considered
as legitimate. For example, in the area of computer-
mediated communications, multiple hacker com-
munities legitimately talk about a hacker culture.
In the same vein, a free software community ulti-
mately produced the Linux-based free operating
system and regards its cause as a cultural one.
There are also some living history organizations,
which take form of communities that process a
specific culture. One of the most interesting exam-
ples is Nova Roma, which is an intercultural non-
profit organization that works for the revival of
Roman culture, religion, and religion. Many others
are based on music, literature, film, and sports. The
challenges of pop-cultural communities include
authenticity, recognition, and permanence.
Literature
The literature of multiculturalism is a new one.
Seminal works emerged in the late 1980s and early
1990s with a great impact that gathered critically
international support in the continuing debate.
Many argue that multiculturalism still goes under
the process and pains of theorizing. As mentioned
earlier in the definitions, multiculturalism’s scope
of influence has grown beyond the initial argu-
ments of ethnic and racial identity and equality.
Two works considered by many scholars as
essential to multiculturalism are Liberalism,
Community, and Culture by Will Kymlicka and
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of
Recognition by Charles Taylor. Kymlicka’s work
builds a theoretical foundation for minority rights

and cultural plurality within a defense of liberal-
ism. He argues that national minorities such as
native people or French-Canadians, Québécois,
need to be accommodated by a liberal democratic
state to maintain, protect, and profess their cul-
tures as a condition of multicultural society. In his
later works, he expands the discussion of multicul-
tural group rights to include ethnic minorities,
immigrants, and refugees.
Taylor’s work also has had a considerable effect
on multicultural debate and the theorization of
multiculturalism. He is actually well known for his
work on communitarianism. However, his work
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of
Recognition shaped the discussion of the relation-
ship between group identity and individual rights,
theorizing a philosophical foundation for recogni-
tion and reception of cultural identities. Taylor tries
to establish a link between the acknowledgments
of an individual identity and the recognition of a
group as a cultural entity. He believes that the indi-
vidual self only makes sense through its attachment
to group recognition. Thus, people’s cultural iden-
tity emerges in public life as they embed themselves
in meaningful and authentic communities of cul-
ture. Here the idea of authenticity is placed at the
center of multiculturalism. Authenticity is provided
by the affirmation that a person receives because of
that person’s associated group, tradition, or com-
munity, being respected in a given society.
The current literature of multiculturalism is
mostly in a form of debate in which the interlocu-
tors respond to the seminal works, expand the
scope of multiculturalism by redefining culture or
reject and critique the roots, pretensions, presump-
tions of the original or the expanded forms of
multiculturalism.
Legal and Political Aspects
Multiculturalism has many proponents of, repre-
senting a multiplicity of political views. There are
supporters and opponents of multiculturalism
from a wide variety of political spectrums.
However, the multicultural theories seem to fit
well within the discussion of liberalism and liberal
democracies. Liberal democracies are presumed to
provide the best protection for the individual and
group rights, including the personal and collective
identities through constitutional sanctions, even
Multiculturalism 483
though there are some other political philosophies
such as libertarianism, socialism, and anarchism
that are friendly to multiculturalist ideas. However,
types of totalitarian, traditionalist, and conserva-
tive political philosophies usually present hostile
attitudes toward multiculturalism.
Legal debate around multiculturalism follows
the political discussions. An important point of
deliberation is about the potential tension between
equal rights while providing accommodations for
cultural differences. The tension results because
the idea of equality theoretically posits a type of
universal understanding. While securing the same
rights for all members of a society, equality also
expects the identical expectations and responsi-
bilities from each member or group within that
society. Thus, if some individuals and groups—
because of their cultural identity, difference, and
values—cannot or would not perform, fulfill, and
complete their civil rights, an inconsistency
and contradiction will emerge in terms of justice
and social order. Many multiculturalists argue
that the problem of difference versus equality
needs to be legally resolved for a reasonable mul-
ticultural society.
A more important legal debate is around find-
ing ways to initialize, maintain, and continue a
legislative program that would ensure the legiti-
macy of the demands for diversity and pluralism in
terms of individual and groups’ rights based on a
given culture. This legal debate proves to be more
challenging because of the incomplete, indefinite,
and extensive interpretations of what culture
should really mean.
Critique
Multiculturalism faces many challenges. Some
simply believe that it is only a utopia, which never
can be reached. Some argue that it is only a roman-
tic idealism, which would not survive the realities
of everyday life. There are also criticisms from
traditionalist, nationalist, and conservative figures
who believe that certain cultures should not be
allowed because they are against the standards of
morality, tradition, and truth.
However, many meaningful critiques come
from people who share similar political and philo-
sophical perspectives and presumptions with mul-
ticulturalists. One of these predominant critiques is
484 Mythologies
that multiculturalism undermines the universalist
individual rights in favor of group identities based
on cultural differences. Group rights regardless
of their respect for individual freedom are privi-
leged, weakening the accomplishments of the
Enlightenment project. A second related critique
argues that by enabling group rights over individ-
ual rights, multiculturalism actually harms the
individuals who are usually oppressed in tradi-
tional cultures. This second critique sometimes
aligns with fundamental liberalism to claim that
even the personal consent for resignation of indi-
vidual rights for group identification is not accept-
able if it requires inhumane, violent, and
humiliating practices.
Cem Zeytinoglu
See also Authenticity; Citizenship; Collective/Social
Identity; Culture; Diversity; Ethnicity; Identification;
Identity Negotiation; Identity Politics; Immigration;
Language; Queer Theory; Religious Identity; Sexual
Identity
Further Readings
Barry, B. (2001). Culture and equality. Cambridge, UK:
Polity Press.
Fraser, N. (1997). Justice interruptus: Critical reflections
on the postsocialist condition. New York: Routledge.
Glazer, N. (1997). We are all multiculturalists now.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kelly, P. (Ed.). (2002). Multiculturalism reconsidered:
“Culture and equality” and its critics. Malden, MA:
Polity Press.
Kymlicka, W. (1989). Liberalism, community, and
culture. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
Kymlicka, W. (1995). Multicultural citizenship: A liberal
theory of minority rights. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Okin, S. M. (1999). Is multiculturalism bad for women?
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Shabani, O. P. (Ed.). (2007). Multiculturalism and law:
A critical debate. Cardiff, UK: University of Wales
Press.
Taylor, C. (1994). Multiculturalism: Examining the
politics of recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Willett, C. (Ed.). (1998). Theorizing multiculturalism:
A guide to the current debate. New York: Wiley.
Young, I. M. (1990). Justice and politics of difference.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mythologies
Mythologies contains 54 short journalistic articles
(28 in the English translation) written between
1954 and 1956 for the left-wing magazine Les
Lettres nouvelles. In these essays, literary scholar
and critic Roland Barthes references the work of
structural anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss as
he tries to expose the “mythic” content of mass
cultural phenomena. The texts are at the base of
Barthes’s investigations into the Marxist concept
of ideology and how it situates human identity.
In Mythologies, Barthes demonstrates the poten-
tial of semiotics as an instrument of cultural analy-
sis. Semiotics (Greek sêmeîon “sign”) is a system
that examines the life of signs within society, and
the basic unit of all sign systems is the sign.
Anything that expresses meaning is contained
within a system of signs—a semiotic system.
Semiotics takes its analytic framework from the
linguistic model formulated by Ferdinand de
Saussure. Semiotics is, therefore, encoded within
linguistics, but also extends to nonlinguistic sign
systems. Semiotics focuses on all modes of signifi-
cation, that is, all things that possess a capacity for
meaning; for example, painting, architecture, lit-
erature, but also photography, film, fashion, high-
way codes, music, restaurant menus, and so on.
Barthes’s influence as a writer and thinker is
attached to his application of semiotics to this
diverse range of cultural materials.
Taking his semiotics initially from Saussure and
then from the structural anthropologist Lévi-
Strauss, Barthes began in the 1950s to write a
series of monthly essays on topics that were sug-
gested by current events. These essays considered
the hidden codes and strategies deployed in mass-
cultural phenomena, for example, advertising and
film. A selection from this group of essays makes
up the book Mythologies. Barthes’s purpose in
Mythologies is to see how ideology works in real-
ity and how it positions human identity. The notion
of ideology is developed and extrapolated by the
French Marxist-structuralist Louis Althusser, who

argues that ideology is a continuum and permeates
everything, everywhere, and is absolutely inherent
in all societal practices and within institutions
themselves. In this account—an account analogous
to Barthes’s work—the social construction of the
image can be seen as a kind of inscription, indeed
an impress, albeit mediated, of these values and
beliefs that are also evident in societies’ “thoughts”
and “actions.”
Mythologies is significant because it introduces
Barthes to an international audience (Barthes’s
work was initially disseminated in the United States
by the critic Susan Sontag). It also includes a crucial
afterthought, “Myth Today.” This important essay
articulates his concept of semiological analysis. In
“Myth Today,” Barthes develops the terms that
reoccur throughout his career: the sign, represent-
ing the culturally mediated manifestation of the
signifier and the signified, the signifier being the
perceptual image of the sign, and the signified rep-
resenting the idea expressed by the signifier.
Although the signifier and the signified can be ana-
lyzed separately, they only exist in relation to one
another, like the sides of the same coin. In this
essay, Barthes introduced the concept of myth into
semiotics, myth being a particular form of significa-
tion, which is attached to previously existing signi-
fications. Signs are constructed of signifiers and
signifieds, which conjoin to form the communica-
tive message. Myth, according to Barthes, functions
at a different level than the sign does because myth
takes the sign of a preexisting message and uses that
to signify within the myth’s own system; this is the
process of secondary signification. Myth can be
understood as a metalanguage because it is a second
language that speaks of its precursors. Myth is a
peculiar system in that it is constructed from a
semiological chain that existed before it: Myth is
thus a second-order semiological system. Secondary
signification is contingent on society and culture. It
represents a powerful system of underlining mean-
ings encoded into images, artifacts, and cultural
practices. The essays that compose Mythologies are
motivated by a clear critique of political and social
convention—it is fair to say that Barthes’s writing
displays a Marxist approach toward identity, con-
sumption, power, and ideology.
Barthes’s 1977 book Image, Music, Text con-
tains a number of his most famous articles on
Mythologies 485
photography, film, and the image, for example,
“The Photographic Message,” “The Rhetoric of
the Image,” “The Third Meaning,” “The Death of
the Author,” “The Grain of the Voice,” “Writers,
Intellectuals, Teachers” and “From Work to Text.”
Most of these essays reflect Barthes’s concerns
with the structure of communication as it negoti-
ates the layers of codes embedded in the visual
sign. “The Rhetoric of the Image” and “The
Photographic Message” demonstrate the discon-
tinuous codes that make up press photography,
advertisements, and the like. In “The Photographic
Message” Barthes first speaks of the photograph
as a “message without a code,” a notion at the
heart of his larger treatise on photography Camera
Lucida. Barthes informs us that the photographic
message has a special status, namely, that there are
no transformations involved in its production;
hence, it differs from other forms, such as drawing
and painting, that offer a transformation (a subjec-
tive analysis and synthesis) of “reality.” Barthes
argues that the structure of the photographic
image can be separated into the two areas, that,
when combined together, form what he terms the
paradox of the photograph. First, there is the pho-
tograph’s denotative capacity to imitate the world:
Common sense tells us that the photographic
image is not reality, but it may be considered as an
analogue, or analogon of reality. This depends on
its ability to record precisely what is presented (its
literal denotation): actuality. Photography, accord-
ing to Barthes, carries a power of realist immediacy
by virtue of its iconic power; therefore, photo-
graphs are not subject to interpretive reading; as
noted, they are “signs without a code.” Second,
the photograph also possesses a second-order
capacity to signify—this is the photograph’s cul-
tural resonance, activated by its reception. As
objects of primary signification, photographs are
iconic signs, but as their power as symbolic signs is
enhanced through the reality analogue, their level
of secondary signification (connotation) is also
enhanced. For Barthes, this ability was the source
of photography’s mythological potential, that is,
its confusion of artifice with nature.
Among the influences that motivated Barthes
to move beyond his structural analysis of the
1950s and 1960s is his association with the jour-
nal Tel Quel, the French avant-garde literary
486 Mythologies
review published from 1960 to 1982. Tel Quel
(associated with Barthes and Julia Kristeva who
used its platform to rethink structuralism and
semiology) served as a forum for cultural intellec-
tual debate and became the locus for the shift
from structuralism to poststructuralism.
The last work published in Barthes’s lifetime,
Camera Lucida, is a commissioned book on pho-
tography. Barthes informs us that his desire is
ontological; he therefore places the study of the
nature of the photographic image into a meta-
physical order; that is, within the theories of
being and knowing reality. Barthes is proposing
the question—how, and by what means, does the
unique identity of the photographic image express
itself within the context of vision and representa-
tion? The most cited neologisms introduced here
are studium and punctum. Barthes’s punctum is a
spontaneous reaction called into being from the
levels of the unconscious. It reminds us of both an
irretrievable loss and a sense of mourning; yet
simultaneously, in another paradox, it offers the
possibility of reconnection with the “object of
desire.” Barthes notes that the punctum might be
defined as the self taken by surprise in a moment
of epoché, of shattering or rupture. In this sense,
the punctum can close the rift between self and
authenticity. In terms of the public and the pri-
vate space, the studium is the public availability
of the meaning of the image, that is, its cultural
context. In contrast, the punctum is the “arrow”
that disturbs the connotation and produces the
epoché. For Barthes, this punctum is a kind of
epiphany, which captures and projects certain
psychological modalities and situates the indi-
vidual’s identity.
One of Barthes’s essays in particular has become
a touchstone of postmodernism: “The Death of the
Author.” In this work, Barthes argues that the tra-
ditional notion of the author as someone who
gives meaning to the reader, is hopelessly limited,
overtly authoritarian, and needs to be replaced
with a different model. Barthes supports a kind of
writing that liberates what he describes as an
“anti-theological” activity. This, according to
Barthes, frees the reader by opening itself to a pro-
liferation of meanings. Existentialism and modern-
ism, in general, privileged the notion of the author,
a designation that raises associations of the self as
a contained, autonomous, and original individual.
Thinkers such as Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault,
Jacques Lacan, and Louis Althusser all questioned
the status of the autonomous individual, the self,
seen now as a construct of bourgeoisie ideology.
The critique of the author in which Barthes engages
locates the individual within a system of conven-
tions, norms, grammars, and so on, which actually
articulate or “speak” him or her. The new writing
form that results is strictly severed from intention,
origin, and even the author. “Text” becomes an
action in language, not an act of intended mean-
ing. The “Text,” therefore, signals (in one of
Barthes’ most successful polemical utterances) the
death of the author; what is important now is the
“writer,” because the writer challenges orthodoxy
and celebrates plurality. The development of this
notion of plurality or intertextuality inevitably
begins to change the perception of relationships
between individuals and their cultural environ-
ment: society. This dissolution of the text—also
the “I” and the author—was considered to be a
function of the dissolution of the fixed system of
meanings found in bourgeois “representations.” In
this way, textual practice reorients social under-
standings such that meaning and the subject are
only produced in the discursive work of the text,
and the subject is only experienced within the dis-
cursive process. This strategy of intertextuality is
common in works of the postmodern period.
Many feminist artists, for example, have used this
concept to relate the iconic image of the woman to
her rhetorical connotations. This intertextuality
can be found in the works of Ana Mendieta, Cindy
Sherman, Barbara Kruger, Mary Kelly, and many
other artists who take advantage of this continu-
ous field of interpretation.
Peter Muir
See also Intertextuality
Further Readings
Barthes, R. (1968/1953). Writing degree zero (A. Lavers
& C. Smith, Trans.). New York: Hill & Wang.
Barthes, R. (1972). Mythologies (A. Lavers, Trans.). New
York: Hill & Wang.
Barthes, R. (1977). Image, music, text (S. Heath, Trans.).
New York: Hill & Wang.
Barthes, R. (1981). Camera lucida (R. Howard, Trans.).
New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

Myths
Myths are culturally derived narratives or legends
that are shared by the members of a society.
Mythopoeia, the making and perpetuating of
these myths, were generally done by, or with the
support of, secular and or religious leaders.
Mythopoeia can be understood as products of the
imagination of those members of society, espe-
cially the secular and religious leaders, with power
and influence. These leaders sought to enhance
conditions that were favorable to governing and
expanding their societies. Myths created a struc-
ture that gave an enhanced meaning to people’s
lives and provided benefits for everyday living.
Myths also provided a context for individuals to
explore their own identities and define their own
existence within a particular society. Myths are
cultural universals that emerge in different cul-
tures at historical periods to fulfill basic emo-
tional, spiritual, and physical needs. It is generally
accepted that all societies have myths, and the
evidence of their existence dates from antiquity to
preliteracy and finally to Common Era (CE). In
antiquity, myths survived and were passed on
through cave paintings, other forms of mythogra-
phy, masks, totems, and orality. Later in Greek,
Roman, and other European societies, as literacy
developed and spread, myths became an integral
part of their literary traditions. And today, in non-
literate societies, as well as among citizens who
are not literate but live in literate cultures, myths
continue to exist as part of the oral traditions.
Currently, in literate societies, especially those
that now use science as the lens through which to
view their social and physical environment, myths
have been reinterpreted as fiction, old wives’ tales,
stories that have been lost in their retelling, or just
plain superstitions.
Myths cover topics ranging from angels to zom-
bies and involve peoples of Africa; Asia; Australia;
Europe; North, Central, and South America; and
the islands and territories in between. Their major
functions were carried out through a system of
gods and goddesses as well as a variety of rituals.
Myths provided explanations for the mysteries of
the present world as well as the world beyond.
Many myths describe the mysteries of nature such
as rainfall, wind, droughts, oceans, and celestial
Myths 487
bodies; the relationship to the animal and spirit
worlds; love, beauty, and desire; questions of
death, the afterlife, and immortality; the connec-
tion between humans and animals, and the sacred.
Myths also inculcated the values of social life and
offered guidance in matters of human emotions
such as love, fear, jealousy, anger, hate, and retri-
bution. Additionally, myths offered solutions nec-
essary to fulfill emergent needs during difficult peri-
ods such as famine and other threats from nature,
as well as threats from warfare. Furthermore,
often in conjunction with requisite rituals, myths
provided the moral guidance deemed necessary to
please or appease the gods with hope that they will
influence nature in the human’s favor, inflict evil
on others, or ameliorate evil in society. Myths
were usually audience- and situation-specific. For
instance, some were designed for political leaders,
children, young adults, elders, families, farmers,
religious leaders, and community members. Others
were designed to encourage loyalty, create fear,
and demonstrate power or influence over nature.
In essence, myths, especially those of antiquity and
the prescientific and preliteracy era, provided guid-
ance about survival in a world in which humans
were at the mercy of nature and the elements, and
in which they had little understanding or control
over their physical, social, or spiritual worlds.
Today’s myths often reflect the measure of a
society’s level of literacy and its ability to engage in
abstract reasoning and scientific development.
Consequently, a number of terms that at one time
were considered synonyms for myths now have
nuanced or subtle differences in meanings. Some of
these terms are legends, folktales, parables, fables,
folklore, lore, fairy tales, and stories. So, generally
although some scholars believe there are differ-
ences between these terms, others believe that to
the extent there are differences, they are not sig-
nificant but are more likely related to cultural
underpinnings rather than to categorical differ-
ences, and generally, many use the terms inter-
changeably. Today, some scholars view some of
the earliest myths that emerged in antiquity, as well
as more recent ones in cultures that still exist with
oral traditions, as legends or tales that are not nec-
essarily anchored in truths or facts. Others believe
these early myths to be narratives of actual events
of long ago that have become distorted over time
through the process of orality. The process of oral
488 Myths
distortion is much like the childhood game, Secret,
played by a group of children where one child
whispers a sentence that is passed around in whis-
pers, and at the end, the last whispered version of
the tale bears only scant, if any, resemblance to the
original sentence. Other speculations by current
scholars suggest that myths were early or primitive
attempts at scientific analyses of phenomena.
However, examinations of some myths that derive
from literate societies find them to be no more
anchored in truth or fact than myths that existed in
antiquity or in present-day nonliterate societies.
Some of the earliest recorded myths derived
from Greek and then Roman societies. Even the
term mythologia, which means story telling or leg-
ends, is derived from the Greek language. Greek as
well as Roman cultures were early in their develop-
ment of literacy and literary traditions, yet many
Greek and Roman myths that emerged subsequent
to the period of literacy can be described neither as
factual nor truthful. However, mythmakers con-
structed an elaborate world that spoke to the pow-
ers of gods and goddesses over the physical world,
over heroes and heroines, over the worlds of ani-
mals, and over the worlds of the afterlife. Eventually,
many of these leaders became the embodiments of
the gods. These myths evolved to become instru-
ments that empowered the rulers and further ush-
ered in the era of a world of divine rulers who could
call upon the gods for favors, and could offer sacri-
fices of appeasement to these gods.
Theory of Three Types of Gods
Theories about mythology suggest that three dis-
tinct types of myths about gods emerged over time.
One type relates to the gods of nature who per-
sonify rain and fire. The second type refers to the
gods of the poets who promote passions in human-
kind, and the third types of myths are about the
gods who are rulers or soothsayers.
In the first type of myth, the gods of nature
who personify rain and fire were of vital impor-
tance to humanity. Both rain and fire were neces-
sary to the development of human society. In the
case of rain, because agriculture was such a wide-
spread means of subsistence and was so dependent
on adequate rainfall, the power of the rain gods
was affirmed. Furthermore, evidence of rain gods
is extremely widespread and, indeed, is found in a
variety of cultures and across continents. In Hindu
culture, there was Indra, king of the gods and the
god of thunder and rain. Indra released cattle
from their mountain caves and caused the clouds
to burst so that the rain fell from heaven to earth
and eased the suffering of earthlings. The Aztecs
had their own god of rain, Tlaloc, the anthropo-
morphic god who had human features and feel-
ings. The Aztecs loved and worshiped Tlaloc;
perhaps because Aztec culture embodied a funda-
mental belief that their survival depended on rain,
they embraced their rain god with added fervor.
According to Aztec myth, Tlaloc had excellent
relationships with other gods and with humans.
Zeus, the busy and powerful king of the Greek
gods, was also the god of rain. Among his many
titles were Lord of the Sky, Cloud-gatherer, god of
Thunder, and Rain-god. Some have noted that
because of the hot and dry climate of Greece, rain
became a scarce and more valuable resource,
offering a plausible explanation for why rain was
the province of the mighty king god Zeus. Although
rain gods were perceived as crucial, and were
needed by humans in securing the precious rain
that was needed for their survival, there were
exceptions. For instance, the Egyptian rain god
Seth, who, in addition to rain, also controlled
flash floods and sand storms, was known to rep-
resent disorder and to be fond of mischief and
destruction. In Seth’s case, the Egyptians’ fear led
them to go to extraordinary lengths to avoid
incurring his anger and mischief.
Fire was equally as important as rain to many
societies. This was not lost on the Greeks, who
developed a myth about the acquisition of fire, and
the important contributions it made to the devel-
opment of human society. Thus, the myth of
Prometheus, the god of fire, was born. Zeus, the
king of the gods, possessed fire but because he did
not particularly like humans, he withheld fire from
them. Prometheus however, who liked and was
supportive of humans, stole the divine fire from
Zeus and gave it to humans. In so doing, Prometheus
saved humanity and released unparalleled inven-
tiveness and productivity among humans. These
inventions and industriousness led to further devel-
opments in arts, literacy, and culture. Humans
ultimately developed tremendous respect for the
immortal gods, and especially for Prometheus, the
god of fire.

The second category of gods, the poets, includes
those responsible for the promotion of passion in
humans. The Greco Romans produced Aphrodite,
the goddess of love, desire, and beauty. She reigned
over pleasure and happiness, sex and procreation,
and seduction. Eros is a god of desire. He is said to
have been so powerful that he could inspire love
among the gods, goddesses, heroes, and heroines.
It is said that neither the divine nor mortal could
resist the power of his spell. Eros has been referred
to as the inspiration for poets and artists for cen-
turies. Considerable contributions in the collec-
tions of mythography are credited to the inspiration
of Eros. Today, Cupid can be credited with longev-
ity because of the current custom of Valentine’s
Day; Cupid is said to be one of the few ancient
gods who play a part in today’s society.
The third category of gods includes the gods of
the city who are rulers and spiritual leaders. This
category of gods can be seen as deeply rooted in
the ideas of governance and social control. The
example from the Ashanti people of Africa,
the myth of the Golden Stool, is instructive. The
essence of the myth symbolizes the birth of nation-
hood but also rulers and religious mediums.
According to the legend, before the Ashanti people
could have their own nation, they had to call a
meeting of the heads of all the communities. At
that meeting, the Golden Stool was ordered by the
soothsayer of the king to descend from the heav-
ens. The Golden Stool floated down from the
heavens to the lap of the leader who became the
first king of the Ashanti people. This stool is
believed by the Ashantis to be sacred and to con-
tain their spirit. It is said that in the same way man
cannot live without a soul, the Ashanti people can-
not live without the Golden Stool.
Children as Audiences
As the era of literacy emerged, there was a tremen-
dous spread of myths because of the spread of lit-
erature across Europe and gradually across the rest
of the world. The literary tradition led to syncreti-
zation of myths between old and new as well as a
variety of cultures. The nature and purpose of
myths began to change to reflect the broader social
changes of the time. For example, the nature of
myths shifted from reliance on the gods to lessons
of social intervention for survival of the social
Myths 489
order. Myths for and about children are found
under topics such as fairy tales, Santa Claus sto-
ries, and Anansi stories, among others. These chil-
dren’s myths appear to be designed to teach
children the values of their society, keep them safe
from danger, and provide them with entertain-
ment. Most people are familiar with legends used
to socialize children such as Pinocchio, Little Red
Riding Hood, and Santa Claus.
In Italy, the value of truthfulness is exemplified
in Carlo Colloid’s myth of Pinocchio, the wood-
carved son of Geppetto. Pinocchio began to tell lies
to the good fairy, and the more lies Pinocchio told,
the longer his nose grew. He told so many lies that
the length of his nose prevented him from getting
out of his house. The moral of this story was that
telling lies had consequences. The tale of Little Red
Riding Hood is another myth with a lesson for
children. It is designed to teach children to be safe
by not trusting strangers. The tale of Little Red
Riding Hood appears in a variety of forms in many
European cultures, and is recognizable across cul-
tural divides. Generally, a young innocent girl
dressed in a red-hooded coat travels through the
woods to visit with and take a gift of food to an ill
grandmother. A wolf, that wishes her ill, befriends
her and she is innocently taken in by him, provid-
ing him with critical information about her jour-
ney to her grandmother’s house. In some versions,
when he arrives at the grandmother’s home in the
woods, he swallows the grandmother and tries to
harm Little Red Riding Hood, but the girl and her
grandmother are saved by a good man. In some
instances, the wolf’s belly is slit open and the
grandmother comes out unharmed, and in other
versions, Little Red Riding Hood is removed from
the belly of the wolf. The central lesson of this
myth is that young girls should not trust strangers
regardless of how innocent they may appear and,
perhaps secondarily, that young girls should not be
sent on errands that require them to traverse lonely
and dangerous places alone.
Saint Nicholas, or Santa Claus as he is also
known, is an excellent example of cultural and
temporal syncretization. The legend of the canon-
ization of Nicholas, who became Saint Nicholas
because of his purported good deeds, later became
intertwined with the pagan god Odin, with his
long flowing white beard, riding on his eight-
legged horse. The Norse legend of Santa Claus
490 Myths
emerged later, with the added feature of entering
homes via chimneys to bring gifts to good children.
For some writers, it remains unclear how Santa
Claus knew which children were good and deserv-
ing of gifts. One conclusion that can be drawn
from the current Santa Claus myth is that today’s
Santa Claus has evolved into the parents, who con-
tinue to propagate the myth as a tool for instilling
good behavior in their children. For example,
some parents threaten that Santa will not bring
presents down the chimney for children who are
bad, and many parents also dress in the traditional
red-and-white, jolly-old-elf outfit with bags of
presents, impersonating Santa for their children.
As emerging nations have developed wide-scale
literacy and their cultures have moved increasingly
from oral traditions, their myths have become
more available for universal examination. Certain
myths that exist in new world cultures are recog-
nized as part of African retentions in the Americas
and the Caribbean. In Jamaica and other Caribbean
cultures, there are myths about duppies. A duppy is
a malevolent spirit of the dead who is often mis-
chievous and scary. A duppy comes out at night to
chase or frighten people. In one popular song, a
person who was terrified by a strange sound
declared, “it must be a duppy or a gun man.” Also,
a well-known Jamaican statement that became
incorporated in another popular song states,
“Duppy knows who to frighten.” Anansi is another
mythological character found in West Africa and
throughout the African diaspora. Anansi is the
major character in many tales. He is a seemingly
benign character who is clever beyond measure. In
many tales, there is a shortage of desired resources
and Anansi, who tends to be lazy, invariably uses
his wit to get more than his fair share. In one story,
there are five persons in addition to Anansi. It is
lunchtime and everyone is hungry. There are, how-
ever, only five mangoes. Anansi tells the group he
realizes there are not enough mangoes to go
around, so everyone can have a mango and he will
go without. The group, feeling guilty and sorry for
Anansi, announces that each person will give
Anansi one-half of his mango. Each of the five per-
sons immediately hands over one half of a mango
to Anansi who, having collected two-and-a-half
mangoes, thanks the group and sets off by himself
to enjoy them. The lesson of these Anansi stories is
teaching to live by one’s wits without violence.
Animals
All cultures have myths about animals, whether
on land, in the ocean, or in the sky. In ancient
mythology, animals worked in conjunction with
the gods, and often were part human and part
animal, like mermaids. Certain animals, such as
wolves, were supposed to scare children. Snakes
were perhaps the most controversial. In some cul-
tures, they were revered, and in other cultures
feared or despised. The universal concept of the
snake is one of tempter. Blame is often placed on
the snake for encouraging the participation in
forbidden acts.
Universality of Myths
The late Joseph Campbell suggested that myths are
cultural universals, even to the extent that the tales
themselves have universal meanings. Many heroic
figures, regardless of their geographic area of ori-
gin or historic period of emergence, have such
commonality of character and purpose that they
are immediately recognizable. Campbell demon-
strated this thesis in The Hero with a Thousand
Faces. Campbell makes his argument by compar-
ing the stories of Buddha who was born about
563 BCE, Jesus about 3 BCE, and Mohamed
about 570 CE. Campbell concludes that despite
temporal and geographic differences, the three
heroes actually share the same story.
Myths Today
In 2009, globalization, rapidly expanding literacy,
and the ability to establish proof through the sci-
ences have diminished the substance and impor-
tance of myths. Early myths spoke of the gods
living under the seas; today, submarines enable
humans to live under the ocean. Early myths spoke
of the gods of the sky who flew through the heav-
ens; today, humans use airplanes to fly and astro-
nauts travel in spaceships to the moon. Man has
invented machines in the form of robots that
attempt to replicate many human qualities. Many

myths of yesterday are today’s reality. What are
today’s myths? Are they essentially urban myths?
Urban myths are propagated, disseminated, vali-
dated, and invalidated by the click of mouse.
Beverley J. Peart Anderson
See also Language; Narratives; Semantics; Trickster
Figure; Worldview
Further Readings
Beckwith, M. W. (1929). Black roadways: A study of
Jamaican folk life. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press.
Myths 491
Campbell, J. (1990). The hero with a thousand faces.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Campbell, J., & Moyers, B. (1988). The power of myth.
New York: Double Day.
Campbell, J., & Moyers, B. (1990). Love and the goddess
[Interview]. New York: Mystic Fire Video.
Campbell, J., & Moyers, B. (1990). The message of the
myth [Interview]. New York: Mystic Fire Video.
Cooper, J. C. (Ed.). (1992). Brewer’s myth and legend.
London: Cassell.
Osborne, M. P. (1989). Favorite Greek myths. New
York: Scholastic.
Scheub, H. (2000). A dictionary of African mythology:
The mythmaker as storyteller. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Editorial Board

General Editor
Ronald L. Jackson II
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Consulting Editor
Michael A. Hogg
Claremont Graduate University

Associate Editors
Ronald C. Arnett Corey D. B. Walker
Duquesne University Brown University
Jacqueline Imani Bryant Mark Western
Chicago State University University of Queensland
James Haywood Rolling Jr.
Syracuse University

Managing Editors
Danielle L. Blaylock Celeste Grayson Seymour
Queen’s University, Belfast, and Duquesne University
University of St. Andrews
Algernon Williams
Stephen Hocker University of Oxford
University of Illinois
Amanda G. McKendree
University of Notre Dame
Copyright © 2010 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Encyclopedia of identity / edited by Ronald L. Jackson.

p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4129-5153-1 (cloth : acid-free paper)
1. Identity (Philosophical concept) 2. Identity (Psychology) 3. Group identity. I. Jackson, Ronald L., 1970-

BD236.E42 2010
302.5—dc22 2010001777

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

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Contents
Volume 2
List of Entries   vii
Reader’s Guide   xi
Entries
N 493 T 815
O 511 U 849
P 531 V 853
Q 613 W 877
R 617 X 901
S 651

Index   903
List of Entries

Absolute Poverty Collectivism/Individualism

Accommodation Colonialism
Acculturation Commodity Self
Adaptation Communication Competence
Aesthetics Communication Theory of Identity
Afrocentricity Community. See Collective/Social Identity
Age Complex Inequality
Agency Confessional Art
Anomie Conflict
Antiracism Consciousness
Archetype Consumption
Architecture, Sites, and Spaces Contact Hypothesis
Articulation Theory Corporate Identity
Artistic Development and Cognition Corrosion of Character
Ascribed Identity Cosmology. See Worldview
Asiacentricity Cosmopolitanism
Attribution Critical Race Theory
Authenticity Critical Realism
Avowal Critical Theory
Cultivation Theory
Basking in Reflected Glory Cultural Capital
Being and Identity Cultural Contracts Theory
Bilingualism Cultural Representation
Biracial Identity Cultural Studies
Birmingham School. See Cultural Studies Culture
Bisexual/Bicurious Culture, Ethnicity, and Race
Black Atlantic Culture Shock
Brachyology
Bricolage Deconstruction
Deindividuation
Children’s Art Desire and the Looking-Glass Self
Citizenship Development of Identity
Civic Identity Development of Self-Concept
Clan Identity Deviance
Class Dialect
Class Identity Diaspora
Code-Switching Difference/Différance
Cognitive Dissonance Theory Dimensions of Cultural Variability
Collective/Social Identity Discourse

vii
viii List of Entries

Diversity Identity and Reason

Double Consciousness Identity Change
Identity Diffusion
Embeddedness/Embedded Identity Identity Negotiation
Embodiment and Body Politics Identity Politics
Empire. See Colonialism Identity Salience
English as a Second Language (ESL) Identity Scripts
Enryo-Sasshi Theory Identity Uncertainty
Ethical and Cultural Relativism Idiomatic Expressions
Ethics of Identity Immediacy
Ethnicity Immigration
Ethnolinguistic Identity Theory Impression Management
Etic/Emic Indigenous. See Clan Identity
Eugenicism Individual
Eurocentricity Individual Autonomy
Evolutionary Psychology Individuation
Existentialist Identity Questions Interaction Order
Extraordinary Bodies Intercultural Personhood
Interpellation. See Identity Uncertainty
Face/Facework Intersubjectivity
Feminism. See Gender Intertextuality
Figures of Speech Intonation
First Nations Invariant Be
Forms of Address I-Other Dialectic
Framing
Frankfurt School Labeling
Fundamentalism Language
Language Development
Gay Language Loss
Gaze Language Variety in Literature
Gender Lesbian. See Sexual Minorities
Generation X and Generation Y Liberation Theology
Globalization Looking-Glass Self
Global Village
Group Identity Masking
Material Culture
Habitus Media Studies
Hegemony Mediation
Hermeneutics Memory
Historicity Mimesis
History of Religions. See Religious Identity Mind-Body Problem
Human Figure, The Mindfulness
Humanitarianism Minstrelsy
Hybridity Mirror Stage of Identity Development
Hyperreality and Simulation Mobilities
Modern Art
Id, Ego, and Superego Modernity and Postmodernity
Ideal Body, The Multiculturalism
Identification Mythologies
Identity and Democracy Myths
 List of Entries ix

Narratives Racial Disloyalty

National. See Patriotism Recognition. See Ethics of Identity; I-Other
Nationalism Dialectic
Neoliberalism Reflexive Self or Reflexivity
Nigrescence Regulatory Focus Theory
Nomadology Religious Identity
Renaissance Art
Ontological Insecurity Rhetoric
Optimal Distinctiveness Theory Rituals
Organizational Identity Role Identity
Orientalism
Other, The Sacred. See Secular Identity
Otherness, History of Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis
Satire
Passing Saturated Identity
Patriotism Scopophilia
Perceptual Filtering Secular Identity
Performativity of Gender Self
Persistence, Termination, and Memory Self-Affirmation Theory
Person Self-Assessment
Personal Identity Versus Self-Identity Self-Concept
Personality/Individual Differences Self-Consciousness
Phenomenology Self-Construal
Philosophical History of Identity Self-Discrepancy Theory
Philosophy of Identity Self-Efficacy
Philosophy of Mind Self-Enhancement Theory
Philosophy of Organization and Identity Self-Esteem
Phonological Elements of Identity Self-Image
Photographic Truth Self-Monitoring
Pidgin/Creole Self-Perception Theory
Pluralism Self-Portraits
Political Economy Self-Presentation
Political Identity Self-Schema
Political Psychology Self-Verification
Postcolonialism. See Modernity and Semantics
Postmodernity Semiotics
Postliberalism Setting
Poststructuralism. See Modernity and Sexual Identity
Postmodernity Sexual Minorities
Pragmatics Signification
Profanity and Slang Simulacra
Propaganda Social Capital
Psychology of Self and Identity Social Comparison Theory
Public Sphere Social Constructionist Approach to Personal
Identity
Queer Theory Social Constructivist Approach to Political
Identity
Race. See Culture, Ethnicity, and Race Social Economy
Race Performance Social Identity Theory
Racial Contracts Socialization
x List of Entries

Social Movements Transcendentalism

Social Realism Transnationalism
Social Stratification Theory Transworld Identity
Society and Social Identity Trickster Figure
Society of the Spectacle
Sociometer Hypothesis Uncertainty Avoidance
Sovereignty
Spectacle and the Self Values
State Identity Velvet Mafia
Status Visual Culture
Stereotypes Visuality
Stock Character Visualizing Desire
Structuration Visual Pleasure
Style/Diction Visual Politics. See Embodiment and Body
Subjectivity Politics; Extraordinary Bodies; Ideal Body, The;
Surveillance and the Panopticon Otherness, History of; Propaganda; Stereotypes
Symbolic Interactionism Voice
Symbolism Voyeurism
Syncretism
War
Tag Question Whiteness Studies
Technology White Racial Identity
Terrorism Womanism
Terror Management Theory World Systems Theory
Theory of Mind Worldview
Third Culture Building
Third World Xenophobia
Reader’s Guide

As you read through the entries, it will be helpful for you to know how to use the Reader’s Guide. In
fact, you may choose to browse the terms simply by browsing the categories within the Reader’s Guide.
The Reader’s Guide is provided to assist readers in locating articles on related topics. It classifies articles
into 15 general topical categories: Art; Class; Culture, Ethnicity, and Race; Developing Identities;
Gender, Sex, and Sexuality; Identities in Conflict; Language and Discourse; Living Ethically; Media and
Popular Culture; Nationality; Protecting Identity; Relating Across Cultures; Religion; Representations
of Identity; and Theories of Identity. Entries may be listed under more than one topic. So, for example,
if you are interested in how identities are protected, you would go to the “Protecting Identity” section
in the Reader’s Guide and then look at the list of headwords that fall within that category. You will see
entries such as Agency, Deviance, Face/Facework, Race Performance, Role Identity, Self-Consciousness,
and Self-Construal. Then, if you select one—for example, Face/Facework—you can then search for that
entry and read a detailed description of what the term means, how it relates to the category, and how it
is related to identity.

Art Class
Aesthetics Class Identity
Architecture, Sites, and Spaces Complex Inequality
Artistic Development and Cognition Consumption
Bricolage Cultural Capital
Children’s Art Globalization
Confessional Art Hegemony
Human Figure, The Immigration
Modern Art Material Culture
Modernity and Postmodernity Social Stratification Theory
Photographic Truth Status
Renaissance Art Third World
Self-Image World Systems Theory
Self-Portraits
Setting
Culture, Ethnicity, and Race
Simulacra
Social Realism Agency
Visualizing Desire Biracial Identity
Class
Class Identity
Class Code-Switching
Absolute Poverty Complex Inequality
Anomie Critical Race Theory

xi
xii Reader’s Guide

Culture Self-Enhancement Theory

Culture, Ethnicity, and Race Self-Esteem
Diaspora Self-Image
Dimensions of Cultural Variability Self-Monitoring
Diversity Self-Perception Theory
Ethnicity Self-Portraits
Group Identity Self-Presentation
Hegemony Self-Schema
Race Performance Self-Verification
Racial Contracts Socialization
Racial Disloyalty Theory of Mind
Society and Social Identity
Status
Whiteness Studies Gender, Sex, and Sexuality
White Racial Identity Bisexual/Bicurious
Xenophobia Difference/Différance
Embodiment and Body Politics
Gay
Developing Identities Gaze
Age Gender
Being and Identity Ideal Body, The
Consciousness Identity Politics
Deindividuation Performativity of Gender
Development of Identity Queer Theory
Development of Self-Concept Scopophilia
Evolutionary Psychology Sexual Identity
Extraordinary Bodies Sexual Minorities
Generation X and Generation Y Velvet Mafia
Habitus Visuality
Hybridity Visualizing Desire
Id, Ego, and Superego Voice
Individual Voyeurism
Individual Autonomy Womanism
Individuation
Intersubjectivity
Mind-Body Problem Identities in Conflict
Nigrescence Accommodation
Person Acculturation
Personal Identity Versus Self-Identity Adaptation
Philosophy of Organization and Identity Bilingualism
Reflexive Self or Reflexivity Biracial Identity
Saturated Identity Clan Identity
Self Conflict
Self-Affirmation Theory Corporate Identity
Self-Assessment Cultural Contracts Theory
Self-Concept Culture Shock
Self-Discrepancy Theory Double Consciousness
Self-Efficacy Identification
 Reader’s Guide xiii

Identity Change Semiotics

Identity Diffusion Signification
Identity Negotiation Structuration
Identity Salience Style/Diction
Identity Uncertainty Symbolism
Intercultural Personhood Tag Question
Mindfulness Trickster Figure
Mobilities
Modernity and Postmodernity
Passing Living Ethically
Perceptual Filtering Antiracism
Philosophy of Mind Corrosion of Character
Simulacra Cosmopolitanism
Ethical and Cultural Relativism
Ethics of Identity
Language and Discourse Eugenicism
Ascribed Identity Humanitarianism
Avowal Identity and Reason
Brachyology Identity Politics
Colonialism Liberation Theology
Deconstruction Myths
Dialect Narratives
Discourse Neoliberalism
English as a Second Language (ESL) Postliberalism
Ethnicity Social Movements
Etic/Emic Terror Management Theory
Figures of Speech Xenophobia
Forms of Address
Framing
Hermeneutics Media and Popular Culture
Hyperreality and Simulation Articulation Theory
Idiomatic Expressions Consciousness
Intonation Consumption
Invariant Be Critical Theory
Labeling Cultural Capital
Language Cultural Studies
Language Development Embeddedness/Embedded Identity
Language Loss Framing
Language Variety in Literature Frankfurt School
Narratives Globalization
Phonological Elements of Identity Material Culture
Pidgin/Creole Media Studies
Profanity and Slang Mediation
Public Sphere Propaganda
Rhetoric Social Capital
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis Society of the Spectacle
Satire Spectacle and the Self
Semantics Stock Character
xiv Reader’s Guide

Surveillance and the Panopticon Double Consciousness

Technology Ethical and Cultural Relativism
Values Global Village
Visual Culture Immediacy
Visual Pleasure Impression Management
I-Other Dialectic
Multiculturalism
Nationality Nomadology
Citizenship Pluralism
Civic Identity Political Psychology
Clan Identity
Collective/Social Identity
Collectivism/Individualism Religion
Culture Fundamentalism
Diaspora Liberation Theology
First Nations Modernity and Postmodernity
Historicity Mythologies
Identity and Democracy Pragmatics
Immigration Religious Identity
Memory Rituals
Nationalism Secular Identity
Patriotism Syncretism
Philosophical History of Identity Transcendentalism
Political Identity Values
Sovereignty
State Identity
Representations of Identity
Terrorism
Third World Archetype
Transnationalism Attribution
Transworld Identity Authenticity
War Basking in Reflected Glory
Worldview Bricolage
Commodity Self
Critical Realism
Protecting Identity Cultural Representation
Agency Desire and the Looking-Glass Self
Deviance Existentialist Identity Questions
Face/Facework Extraordinary Bodies
Ontological Insecurity Hyperreality and Simulation
Personality/Individual Differences Identification
Psychology of Self and Identity Identity Politics
Race Performance Intertextuality
Role Identity Looking-Glass Self
Self-Consciousness Masking
Self-Construal Material Culture
Mimesis
Minstrelsy
Relating Across Cultures Orientalism
Bilingualism Other, The
Code-Switching Philosophy of Organization and Identity
 Reader’s Guide xv

Race Performance Global Village

Self-Presentation Identity Scripts
Social Constructionist Approach to Personal Immediacy
Identity Interaction Order
Social Constructivist Approach to Political Mirror Stage of Identity Development
Identity Modernity and Postmodernity
Stereotypes Optimal Distinctiveness Theory
Subjectivity Organizational Identity
Otherness, History of
Persistence, Termination, and Memory
Theories of Identity Phenomenology
Afrocentricity Philosophy of Identity
Articulation Theory Political Economy
Asiacentricity Postliberalism
Black Atlantic Pragmatics
Cognitive Dissonance Theory Public Sphere
Communication Competence Racial Contracts
Communication Theory of Identity Regulatory Focus Theory
Contact Hypothesis Social Comparison Theory
Corporate Identity Social Economy
Critical Race Theory Social Identity Theory
Critical Realism Sociometer Hypothesis
Critical Theory Symbolic Interactionism
Cultivation Theory Terror Management Theory
Cultural Contracts Theory Theory of Mind
Enryo-Sasshi Theory Third Culture Building
Ethnolinguistic Identity Theory Uncertainty Avoidance
Eurocentricity World Systems Theory
 N
Narratives
Questions of identity are some of the most com-
mon yet difficult questions that we as humans ask
of ourselves and others. One of the ways we make
sense of these questions is through the narratives
we share with others. These narratives may be per-
sonal or impersonal, they may relate to mundane,
everyday types of activities or be grander societal
narratives that large-scale communities recognize
and share. Narrative is often seen as the fundamen-
tally human way of organizing the world and at
the very core of who we are as individuals and
communities. The concepts of both narrative and
identity are approached from a wide variety of
perspectives. An entry such as this cannot hope to
capture all of these different perspectives and the
nuances associated with them. Instead, this entry
explains and illustrates some of the basic concepts
and ideas associated with narrative identities that
are shared in part by a variety of scholars. The
entry identifies five essential elements of a narra-
tive and explores links between these narrative
elements and ways they connect to identity forma-
tion and expression. However, before going fur-
ther, an example narrative is provided that can be
used to illustrate and explain the narrative ele-
ments to be discussed and provide a springboard
for the related discussion of identity as it pertains
to each element. The terms story/storyteller and
narrative/narrator are used interchangeably in this
entry, for although some scholars suggest subtle
493
differences, the more common practice is to treat
them synonymously.
Example Narrative
When I was young, we moved close to my mater-
nal grandparents. As part of the move, I had the
opportunity to start mowing my grandparents’
lawn as well as my own. I came home from one of
my first times doing this and proudly showed off
the five dollars I had made to my mother. I was
surprised because my mother was anything but
happy. She explained how my grandparents had to
live on a fixed income and that we were family and
that I should not need to be paid for mowing their
lawn. I felt bad both about the fact that I had
taken money from my grandparents and that I
wouldn’t be getting any more money. However,
the next week when I tried to politely refuse two
or three times, my grandmother finally just stuffed
the money in my pocket and told me to scoot. I
was not looking forward to having my mom find
out that I had again ended up getting money for
mowing my grandparents’ lawn. She asked about
the lawn mowing. I explained to her what hap-
pened. To my surprise, she was not upset and even
said it was okay. I came to learn that if I tried to
refuse the money (“Oh, you don’t need to pay me,
Grandma. I’m happy to help.”), it was okay to
eventually take it, but I should never act like it was
expected. As I got older it became a kind of game
for me to figure out how I could avoid getting paid
for the work I did for my grandparents without
494 Narratives
hurting any feelings. Alas, they won that game
more often than I did.
Universal Narrative Elements
and Their Connections to Identity
Narrative News and the Avowal of Identity
First, there is a point made or, in other words,
news to share. Narratives do not always have to
have an obvious moral point or big news; how-
ever, there needs to be some discernable purpose
(such as to make others laugh, show what a good
person you are, or warn someone). This point of
the story is inescapably intertwined with the news
of the story. The news may be something surpris-
ing, informative, enjoyable, or socially notewor-
thy, thus worth remembering. Some stories are
told over and over in the same community because
the news has some ongoing value. Typically, what
makes something news in this sense is not that it is
new, but that it is tied to an event or situation that
is unexpected or does not follow the normal pat-
tern of life. If there is no news, the story is seen as
pointless. Thus, humans are quite adept at finding
a point in narratives that may on the surface
appear mundane. The example narrative carries
multiple news items, including the potentially con-
tradictory reactions of the mother to the narrator
receiving money from the grandparents and the
way the narrator came to understand and deal
with this type of situation.
One of the more commonly researched forms of
narratives is the personal narrative. The narrator
herself or himself is a key character in the story (for
example, the son in the example narrative). These
types of stories can be particularly powerful and
persuasive—after all, an unspoken assumption
often exists that the person telling the story is the
best person to know what happened. This assump-
tion may be questioned because of issues of mem-
ory, honesty, and self-presentation. However,
regardless of accuracy, these stories play an impor-
tant role in identity because a major part of the
news or the point of the narrative is the avowal of
a particular identity by the narrator. Therefore,
these stories teach the narrator as well as others
who hear these narratives about the narrator by
both confirming past ideas and creating new ones.
When narrators tell stories that describe some-
thing they did, they frame themselves as being
certain types of people, who act and think in cer-
tain ways. No single narrative captures all that a
person does, thinks, or feels, but a given narrative
makes salient thoughts and actions in a way that
stakes an identity claim for that person. The narra-
tive thus presents a certain image of who the per-
son is to others and to the narrator himself or
herself. These narratives are not simply revealing
what exists (though they may be framed as simply
doing this), they are creating who the person is.
This creative process happens with others and in
the mind of the narrator. The stories people tell
themselves have great power. Despite other mun-
dane purposes associated with personal stories,
these narratives always address the great questions
of “Who am I?” and “Who are you?” Because
these questions are so fundamental to human life,
these types of narratives will always be a funda-
mental part of our lives.
Context and the Ascription of Identities
The news or point of a story is intimately related
to the context (social and physical setting, narrator,
audience, etc.) in which it is told. There is no such
thing as a narrative told in a vacuum. All stories
have a context, even if that context may be referred
to as artificial. The story told in the example narra-
tive has been shared in a variety of contexts.
Although these contexts are simplified for the
needs of this entry, they include family gatherings
that entail reminiscing, explicit teaching moments
between a parent and a child, and the university
classroom as part of a discussion of informal ritu-
als. The point in each of these settings is a little
different. In the academic setting, the news relates
to the power and taken-for-granted nature of ritu-
als and the subtle values they create and confirm in
our lives. The news for the parent–child setting has
to do with how to handle certain types of situations
involving family relations, money, and appropriate
expectations. At the larger family gathering (which
may include the participants in the story), the point
may be focused on humor or expressions of grati-
tude for lessons learned. Thus, the second universal
aspect of narratives, the existence of a context, is
crucially linked to our understanding of the point
or news of a story.
The audience aspect of the context in a narra-
tive is particularly important. The narrator of the

preceding story would present what happened dif-
ferently to his mother than he would present the
story of the events to his friends, and this would be
different from how he would present it to a schol-
arly audience. This does not necessarily mean that
the narrator is being untruthful or deceitful in the
telling of the story; rather, it means that the iden-
tity he has already created or wishes to create with
the various audiences is different. Narratives are
relational in nature. Directly or indirectly, one’s
point or the news item associated with the narra-
tive is conveying an identity. However, the identity
is not simply an avowal of personal identity;
indeed, many narratives people tell do not involve
the person telling the story at all. The narrator tells
a story about other people. In doing so, the narra-
tor ascribes to them certain identities.
Ascription in the narrative process refers to the
assigning of an identity by the narrator to others.
The narrator in this case may be yourself or others,
so that a given person is on both the sending and
receiving end of these ascribed identities. In the
narrative provided, both the mother and the
grandma are ascribed certain identities. They are
both described in ways that tell listeners about
who they are. Humans grow up hearing people
give narratives in which they are part of the action.
Identity is not simply something we claim, it is also
something received from others. One of the key
ways this happens is hearing narratives that involve
the person. A person does not have to accept what
is said, but as people hear many of these narra-
tives, they can have a profound impact on the
creation of personal identity and provide one win-
dow into the identity others associate with them.
Characters as Identity Templates
A third item is that stories always involve char-
acters acting in some way. The characters, typi-
cally human, act and react to the situations they
face in ways that provide insight into their identi-
ties. The characters do not have to be human, but
even nonhuman characters are fused with human-
like identity by the actions and thoughts attributed
to them. This allows humans to connect with oth-
ers and to see themselves through the stories and
lives of others. A human may see herself as a pro-
fessor, a mother, and an Italian. Narratives that
involve these types of persons have a similar
Narratives 495
ascriptive power in confirming and creating iden-
tity as those stories that involve a specific person
directly. The types of people referred to here go
beyond specific roles and political or familial asso-
ciations. These can also be associated with per-
ceived traits or social positions, such as hard
workers, nice guys, or underdogs.
In the example story, a specific mother, son,
and grandmother are referenced, but these are also
general types of characters or identities that poten-
tially link the story to all people. Narratives are
cumulative in nature; through hearing many sto-
ries of mothers, grandmas, and sons, a template is
built that allows other humans who may share
these social roles to understand what is expected
or associated with these types of roles. These
expectations or templates can be an important part
of our identity and are often referred to as our
social identity. These identity templates may be
seen as spaces or positions that people can fill.
Even though narratives tend to deal with devia-
tions from the norm at some level, they also rely
on common expectations associated with these
social positions to make a story sensible and
believable. Although a person may never directly
fit the socially defined role of grandma, that per-
son may still relate to the grandma in the story
because of perceived identity characteristics. By
relating to the grandma in one aspect, other
choices and actions made by the grandma can
affect identity issues of the listener. Although this
can be carried to the extreme, humans use per-
ceived similarity with others to expect and create
other similarities with those same people.
Temporal Sequencing and Identity
as Part of a Narrative Whole
A fourth inherent part of a narrative is that
there is temporal sequencing involved (often lin-
ear). This sequencing provides a sense or reasoning
behind the various actions taken in a story. In a
narrative, given things happen over time and
adjustments and actions can be understood in
terms of the sequencing of these events. In this
way, stories provide a basic way for humans to
make sense of their own lives and the other lives
around them. The narrator’s efforts in the earlier
story to refuse the money he actually wanted is
understood in relation to the mother’s earlier
496 Narratives
response to his eager acceptance of the money. The
temporal sequencing provides a structure that
encourages humans to see the connections between
people, situations, and actions. Narratives are not
a series of isolated elements: They are a cohesive
sequencing of events and people and things that all
interconnect together. These connections are the
substance of what it means to live a reasonable
and meaningful life.
Narratives create a logical space for people to
fill, an acceptable range of actions that allows for
cohesion and sense even when events threaten the
everyday common sense of life. This allows us to
deal with what is interesting and hard to under-
stand in a way that gives it structure and makes it
manageable and understandable. Although efforts
to find the ultimate deep structure of narratives
have had mixed results, understanding that narra-
tive itself is a structure that creates connections that
can both link and sever social relations provides an
important base for understanding why narratives
are an essential part of identity. Human identity is
embedded in a sequence of events and cannot be
fully understood outside of a narrative pattern.
Point of View and Identity
in the Telling of a Narrative
The fifth and final element of narratives is a
particular perspective or point of view. This is not
limited to common literary classifications, such as
first person, second person, and so forth, but refers
to a broader perspective that is embodied in the
persona (or voice created by the narrator to relate
the narrative). The narrator is not the persona. A
person may narrate a story, such as the example,
and yet adopt a different persona in each narration.
The persona in one telling may be a selfish person
who clearly likes money, but is constrained by
annoying social mores. This persona may convey a
sense that the process described in the story was
silly or hypocritical. In another telling, the persona
may be more supportive in nature, someone who
can laugh at himself and appreciate the value of
relational rituals. A single individual may create
multiple personas even when explicitly telling the
same narrative. No narrative includes everything
that could have been included (the example story
could have included much more detail). What con-
tent is included, the tone of voice, word choice, and
so on used to relate the narrative (even one just told
to ourselves) all suggests a point of view and atti-
tude. There is an explicit or implicit evaluation of
the characters and their respective actions in all
stories (even when one tries to be neutral). In addi-
tion, the existence of a single persona does not
mean that narratives are the expression of just one
voice. Narratives may be multivoiced through the
process of intertextuality (the use of other narrative
texts) and through different levels of voice, per-
sonal and communal, that are often expressed
without conscious forethought.
The point of view revealed by the persona is
important in the creation and understanding of
the various identities inhabiting a given narrative.
However, the persona also provides clues to the
identity of the narrator, for, although they are not
the same, they are seen as connected. Thus, when
researchers and others listen to a narrator, they
make assumptions about the identity of the per-
son based on the persona and the way the narra-
tive is expressed. Often, subtle aspects associated
with point of view create an identity for someone.
One may argue that the narrator is not the dutiful
son portrayed in the persona adopted for the nar-
rative above, but to do so would require other
narratives.
Final Thoughts
Although the elements of narratives and identity
are discussed in separate sections, they are all inter-
twined. The narrator of the example story may
raise eyebrows and indicate with a tone of voice
that he was a stereotypical young man who was not
too fond of work, but who appreciated money and
knew how to play the system to get it. This identity
may be used to get laughs and help the person
relate to others as just an ordinary guy. The cre-
ation of a different persona may allow for the iden-
tity of the narrator to be more about obedience,
family ties, and a willingness to respect authority.
The value of these identities may vary greatly
depending on the context in which the narrative is
told. Thus, narratives are an important way through
which identities are avowed and ascribed, directly
or indirectly. Identities, the way people view who
they and others are, are created and confirmed in
narratives in ways that help us interpret and evalu-
ate ourselves, others, and the world we live in.

There are, of course, other general elements of
narratives, such as framing techniques, that may
help regulate the production of a story, but the five
common elements noted cross cultures and com-
munities in a way that allows us to see the power
of narratives in everyday life and the relationship
they have with identities (for the purposes of both
doing research and living a life). That these ele-
ments cut across cultures does not mean that they
exist separately from culture in practice. Indeed,
cultural knowledge is both drawn upon and
(re)created in the news or point of a narrative, the
contextual meaning associated with a story, the
recognizable characters and identities, the reason-
ableness of the narrative’s sequencing, and the
points of view expressed through a persona.
Culture, narratives, and identity are inescapably
linked together, with each one providing windows
to the others.
Bradford ‘J’ Hall
See also Communication Theory of Identity; Culture;
Embeddedness/Embedded Identity
Further Readings
Bakhtin, M. (1981). The dialogic imagination. Austin:
University of Texas Press.
Brockmeier, J., & Carbaugh, D. (2001). Narrative and
identity: Studies in autobiography, self and culture.
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Bruner, J. (1990). Acts of meaning. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Fisher, W. (1989). Human communication as narration.
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
Hall, B. (2005). Among cultures: The challenge of
communication (2nd ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson
Wadsworth.
Johnstone, B. (1991). Stories, community and place.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Labov, W. (1982). Speech actions and reactions in
personal narrative. In D. Tannen (Ed.), Analyzing
discourse: Text and talk (pp. 219–247). Washington,
DC: Georgetown University Press.
Polkinghorne, D. (1987). Narrative knowing and the
human sciences. Albany: SUNY Press.
Straub, J. (Ed.). (2005). Narration, identity and historical
consciousness. Oxford, UK: Berghahan Books.
Sunwolf, & Frey, L. (2001). Storytelling: The power of
narrative communication and interpretation. In
Nationalism 497
W. Robinson & H. Giles (Eds.), The new handbook
of language and social psychology (pp. 119–135).
New York: Wiley.
Tracy, K. (2002). Everyday talk. New York: Guilford
Press.
National
See Patriotism
Nationalism
The concept of nationalism is embedded in the
everyday lives of citizens of modern nation-states.
The pride that people feel for national accom-
plishments, the appeals of politicians to the
national interests in justifying policies, and the
symbols that nations use for self-identification
(e.g., flags, national anthems, and monuments)
are omnipresent and help create a national con-
sciousness and national identity among diverse
individuals. However, when examined in its his-
torical, political, and social context, nationalism
takes on a much more sophisticated, controver-
sial, and ambiguous meaning that goes beyond the
romantic view reflected in everyday notions of this
concept. Although nationalism was essential to
the formation of modern nation-states and can
play an important role when societies face times
of crisis, it can also lead people to view their
nation as beyond reproach, justifying the use of
force and violence to deal with real or perceived
enemies. This entry provides an overview of vari-
ous approaches to nationalism, giving special
attention to potential negative consequences of
extreme nationalism.
Approaches to Nationalism
Academics from a wide variety of disciplines,
including history, anthropology, sociology, politi-
cal science, and cultural theory, have contributed
to a large body of literature that explores many
issues of nationalism, including definitions, ori-
gins, development, and forms. Scholarly interest in
the concept of nationalism increased significantly
498 Nationalism
during the 1980s and has continued. Earlier stud-
ies focused on European nationalism, but recently
there has been more emphasis on non-Western
examples, particularly in Asia, Africa, and the
Middle East.
Nationalism has been approached from various
philosophical perspectives, with considerable
debate surrounding these different interpretations.
There is general agreement that nationalism is a
Western construction or conception that is inextri-
cably linked to the formation of modern nation-
states in Europe. This gradual process, spurred by
the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French
Revolution as well as by the development of new
economic structures, involved transforming diverse
peoples inhabiting a defined territory into a nation
with a single identity.
Scholars usually make a distinction between
nations and states. A nation often consists of an
ethnic or cultural community, whereas a state is a
political entity with a high degree of sovereignty.
The sociologist Anthony D. Smith defines a nation
as a group of people sharing an historic territory;
common myths and historical memories; a mass,
public culture; a common economy; and common
legal rights and duties for all members. A nation
signifies a cultural bond, a community of people
united by ideology, language, mythology, symbol-
ism, and consciousness. A state refers to public
institutions that exercise legal and political power
within a given territory and require obedience and
loyalty from its citizens. The nation-state is a result
of a successful nationalist movement; thus, the
state has the same political boundaries and homo-
geneity of the population as the nation.
Social and political scientists have traditionally
made a distinction between the Western civic model
of the nation, which is based on European nation-
states, and the non-Western ethnic concept of the
nation, which is more closely associated with
Eastern Europe and Asia. The civic model empha-
sizes a spatial or territorial conception of home-
land, the idea of a legal-political community and
equality among its members, and a common civic
culture and ideology, whereas the ethnic model
stresses common descent, popular mobilization,
and vernacular languages, customs, and traditions.
Contemporary scholarship defines the concept
of a nation more broadly, combining both civic and
ethic categories. In this view, a nation is a cultural
group, one that may have a shared origin, with
loyalties to a common political state. Individuals’
membership in the nation is usually involuntary,
though there are instances where individuals choose
to be part of a particular nation (e.g., immigration).
In the classical form of nationalism, which is con-
cerned with the creation and maintenance of a
sovereign state, loyalty to the nation takes prece-
dence over other allegiances, such as regional, local,
or kinship ties. In contrast, moderate forms of
nationalism are more likely to promote individual
rights, creativity, and diversity of communities
within the nation. Liberal nationalism, for example,
strives to protect cultural communities while pro-
moting liberal universal principles.
Although most scholars today view the nation
as a modern creation, some scholars consider it as
a timeless phenomenon (primordialist view).
Others argue that nations have existed for a long
time, though they take different forms at different
points in history (perennialist view). Modernist
scholars also differ in their interpretation of nation.
Although some anti-realist modernists view nations
as pure “constructions,” others, such as Benedict
Anderson, view the modern nation as an “imag-
ined political community.” For Anderson, a criti-
cal feature of the emergence of a nation is its
“community of anonymity.” This form of com-
munity enables citizens to identify with one another
in a shared allegiance to the nation, allowing them
to imagine themselves as part of a national culture
without having personal contact with the vast
majority of members of that community. Anderson
emphasizes the role of literacy and print capitalism
in this process.
Nationalism: A Positive–Negative Dialectic
Since its advent in the 19th century, nationalism
has had an overwhelming impact on human his-
tory. In his work The Wrath of Nations, William
Pfaff shows how in its historical evolution, nation-
alism has been a relentless, driving sociopolitical
force that transcends and overshadows class differ-
ences, distinctions between the political ideologies
of the right and the left, as well as internal differ-
ences in specific policies and strategies within the
nation-state. Johann Gottfried Herder and Giuseppe
Mazzini spoke of nationalism as a divinely ordained,
historical force of liberation, destined to lead

humanity to universal justice and global peace.
Others have interpreted it as a functional, sociocul-
tural phenomenon that unifies people, sustains the
cohesion of the national community, defines and
clarifies collective values, and generates loyalty to
the larger whole. More recently, nationalism has
also been viewed as a legitimate moral and political
force securing the rights and independence of peo-
ple from the onslaught of globalization.
In contrast to those who conceptualize national-
ism as a positive force, others view nationalism as
subversive and erosive of the human spirit.
Nationalism is seen as an intolerant and destruc-
tive historical force; a phenomenon that deeply
divides nations and societies; an approach to poli-
tics that fosters a culture of collective narcissism
and exclusivist notions of belonging; a power-
driven and self-serving national and international
political force that escalates conflicts, precipitating
both civil and international wars; and as a world-
view that accommodates the use of force/violence
as a premium instrument of national politics and
that tolerates the loss of human life as a legitimate
necessity. Furthermore, nationalism has been
viewed as a sinister force that has contributed to
the globalization of conflict, while rendering glo-
balization a conflict-proliferating process.
Nationalism may thus be seen as creating a
positive–negative dialectic—promoting loyalty and
helping unify people across a variety of perspec-
tives into a national community, but at the same
time allowing the nation to absolutize its moral
authority regarding its freedom, interests, identity,
and power. In this sense, nationalism supports a
belief that we have “the right” to employ all
means, including adversarial and lethal means, in
the nation’s defense, sustenance, and advance-
ment. Nationalism justifies the expansion of pow-
ers to realize the nation’s alleged historical destiny.
Such a linkage helps explain the frequently per-
plexing question as to why nationalism has been so
appealing and ennobling but simultaneously dan-
gerous and violent.
Nationalism and the
Sacredness of the Nation
The idea of the nation has a power over people
that is perhaps best understood as a derivative of
the exaggerated qualities that the nationalist mind
Nationalism 499
elaborates and projects onto the entity referred to
as the nation. Irrespective of whether they see
nationalism as a positive or a negative force, schol-
ars generally acknowledge that in nationalism, the
nation is placed on the highest pedestal and viewed
as the supreme agency of meaning, collective iden-
tity, and moral justification. Eric Hobsbawm criti-
cally noted that one of the powerful ways in which
nationalism becomes historically established is
through its presumption that the nation is
sacred—an attribute that he likens to a kind of
secular equivalent of the church. Smith, an advo-
cate of nationalism, similarly speaks of the nation
as being a religion surrogate. This assertion can be
applied both to nationalisms that have incorpo-
rated traditional religion as part of their mental
edifice of values (e.g., Serbian, Greek, Hindu,
Islamic, Irish Protestant, and Irish Catholic nation-
alisms) and to secular nationalisms that purport to
have expunged traditional religion from their val-
ues structures (e.g., Turkish, French, Egyptian, and
Syrian nationalisms).
Historically, the attribution of sacredness to the
idea of the nation has been ritualized in the images
of national leaders, in ethnocentric public ceremo-
nies, and in master narratives of national heroic
acts that focus on extraordinary achievements and
events. These narratives are underscored by a pre-
sumed history of national glory, greatness, binding
destiny, and even divine election. Centered on an
exaggerated notion of the nation, nationalist histo-
riography projects a glorified image of the nation
into a superlative, primal past, transposed by
necessity into a compelling, duty-bound present
and an infinite, grandiose future. It cultivates a
monocentric, narcissistic concept of the nation’s
life-world, creating a perception of the nation’s
history that identifies the “good” with one’s own
nation and the “bad” with that of “the other,”
particularly of “the enemy other.” In so doing,
nationalist historiography presents the nation as
an inerrant, eternal political entity, concealing its
historical follies and the crucial fact that the
nationalist concept of the nation was a historical
product of the 19th century.
Such a nationalist approach to nationhood
places the nation in an untouchable “moral
realm,” above and beyond question, reproach,
and accountability. The concept of national sover-
eignty and self-determination, usually viewed as
500 Nationalism
the cornerstone of world order and stability, has
often been framed and conditioned by national-
ism. Such a perspective implies that the “right” to
pursue policies, devise strategies, and take actions
unilaterally supersedes the requirement for bilat-
eral or multilateral deliberations. From this per-
spective, the nationalist mind often views even
international law as subsidiary and secondary to
the status of the nation.
Nationalism and Conflict
The most problematic aspect of nationalism at
both the national and international levels has
been its capacity to link moral reasoning and the
use of force and violence, especially in time of
conflict. In a unique manner, nationalism has his-
torically grounded the right to use force or vio-
lence in the moral rationale that the nation is the
ultimate collective value and the imperative basis
for community, identity, security, and well-being.
This configuration of belief and action has made
nationalism a strong legitimizer of the use of force
and violence throughout modern and much of
postmodern history. The most prominent symbols
of nationalism, including national anthems,
national flags, monuments, and historiographies,
disclose symbols and involve narratives of war,
revolution, heroics, and the shedding of blood as
supreme references of national identity, glory,
and honor.
As a result of the capacity of nationalism to
“morally” legitimize force and violence in the
name of the nation, nationalist-minded leaders and
followers tend to develop high levels of tolerance
for the use of lethal means in dealing with conflicts,
particularly in confronting identifiable historical
“enemies” of the nation. Nationalists are inclined
toward a high level of tolerance for the loss of
human life among their own national community
as well as among the enemy community.
Nationalism presumes the nation to be sacred, so
the taking and offering of human life to its service
at critical moments in history is viewed as legiti-
mate and as a “moral duty.” Hence, according to
the nationalist mind, though momentarily inconve-
nient, the offering and taking of human life for the
sake of the nation is ultimately neither a problem-
atic nor a tragic phenomenon but one of “supreme
duty” and altruistic “ultimate sacrifice.”
During the periods preceding and following
nationalist conflict, the overall political process
becomes forged in a manner that structurally links
legitimate human needs and interests to nationalist
positions. In other words, vital needs such as secu-
rity, economic well-being, cultural identity, and
community become structurally intertwined with
nationalist positions derived from notions of moral
or cultural superiority, unilateral projections of
power and grandiosity, a sense of historical destiny
or divine mission, self-serving justice, and a “we-
do-as-we-see-fit” narcissism, all of which inevita-
bly function belligerently in relation to “the other.”
Legitimate human needs thus become absorbed by,
and integrated into, the framework of the absolute
and uncompromising value of the nation.
New Trends and Challenges
The rising phenomenon of globalization, associ-
ated with a postmodern world, has posed new
challenges to the nationalist concept and organiza-
tion of the nation-state. Advanced technologies,
international trade, energy needs, climate change,
electronic media, and international capital mar-
kets have rendered national economies structur-
ally interdependent and interlinked to global,
complex networks that transcend what any indi-
vidual nation can manage. This makes the nation-
alist premise of the nation-state increasingly
problematic and perhaps even untenable. To the
degree that the tenets of nationalism persist,
nationalist approaches to governance will collide
with the increasingly interconnected structures of
a globalizing world.
Harry Anastasiou and Benjamin J. Broome
See also Conflict; Ethnicity; Globalization; Group
Identity; Political Identity; Transnationalism
Further Readings
Alter, P. (1994). Nationalism (2nd ed.). London: Hodder
Arnold.
Anderson, B. (1995). Imagined communities: Reflections
on the origin and spread of nationalism. London:
Verso.
Deutsch, K. W. (1966). Nationalism and social
communication: An inquiry into the foundations of
nationality. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and nationalism. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Hobsbawm, E. (1990). Nations and nationalism since
1780: Program, myth, reality. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Smith, A. D. (1993). National identity. Reno: University
of Nevada Press.
Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism is a theory of political economy
that contends that free market capitalism is the
best, and perhaps only justifiable, basis for politi-
cal organization. Though often associated in the
United States with neoconservativism and
Republican Party politics, neoliberalism is a sepa-
rate movement based in the pursuit of individual
economic freedom through the protection of pri-
vate property, the development of free markets,
and the sharp limitation of state power. Since the
economic crisis of the 1970s, neoliberalism has
taken a place of preeminence, not only in the
United States and Great Britain but also in the
developing economies of Latin America and Asia.
As a theory of political economy, neoliberalism
has influenced the ways in which people view
their understandings of themselves and their obli-
gations to each other. This entry focuses on the
neoliberalism’s conceptual history, implications
for understanding identity, and criticisms.
Conceptual History
As its name suggests, neoliberalism sees itself as
standing within the tradition of liberalism. Though
today the term liberal refers primarily to those on
the political left, political theorist John Gray
reminds us that liberalism was the defining political
ideology of Western culture during the late 18th
and 19th centuries. Gray notes that liberalism in its
most classic sense—rooted in what he describes as
the Enlightenment’s individualistic, egalitarian, uni-
versalist, and meliorist conception of humanity—
saw in the creative capacity of the individual the
power to improve the human condition indefinitely,
as long as the individual was unencumbered by the
artificial constraints of tradition or religion, and the
market was left to run its course.
Neoliberalism 501
This first statement of the liberal tradition, what
is often called classical liberalism, did not last. The
challenges of industrialization, urbanization, and
bureaucratization during the late 19th and early
20th centuries encouraged many—most notably
the British economist John Maynard Keynes—to
move toward what anthropologist David Harvey
calls embedded liberalism. Where classical liberal-
ism tended to emphasize what Gray describes as
negative liberty, in which freedom was understood
narrowly as the right to be left alone, embedded
liberalism was far more concerned about positive
liberty, in which freedom was understood in terms
of the capacity to participate substantively in pub-
lic life. As Keynes’s economic theories gave a ratio-
nale and practical strategy for enabling the
development and participation of persons in the
market and the broader society, embedded liberal-
ism became increasingly committed to rigorous
governmental interventions in the economy, the
redistribution of wealth through progressive taxa-
tion, and broad social welfare programs.
During the quarter century following the Great
Depression and the World War II, Keynesian eco-
nomics and the welfare state it created were largely
unassailable. But for some scholars, embedded
liberalism’s apparent triumph amounted to a
betrayal of the liberal tradition. At the height of
World War II, when the intellectual consensus in
Britain and the United States saw Nazi Germany as
the natural outgrowth of unfettered capitalism,
Friedrich A. Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom made
the controversial claim that it was not capitalism
but the interventionist posture of the socialist wel-
fare state that was to blame for the rise of German
fascism. The Austrian economist’s book became
an instant classic and influenced an entire genera-
tion of intellectuals. By 1962, when U.S. economist
Milton Friedman published Capitalism and
Freedom, what would become the tenets of neolib-
eralism—the demand for individual economic
freedom; the concern about the size, inefficiency,
and inordinate expense of the welfare state’s con-
stantly expanding bureaucracy; and the belief in
the creativity of the free market to meet social
needs—were already beginning to be developed.
Keynesian economics’ apparent inability to
meet the worldwide economic crisis of the 1970s
saw this resurgence of classical liberal ideas emerge
as a viable alternative to the welfare state. During
502 Neoliberalism
the decade, Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet,
with the help of Friedman and others, began to
implement neoliberal principles, and Hayek and
Friedman both received Nobel Prizes for their
respective works. With the elections of Margaret
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan—the latter helped by
a Republican Party coalition of neoliberals and
Christian social conservatives that came to be
known as neoconservativism—neoliberalism
became politically dominant in Great Britain and
the United States. During its journey to power,
neoliberalism gave rise to what Harvey describes as
the financialization of economic life, in which the
focus of economic activity would shift from the
production of goods to speculative financial instru-
ments to create new sources of capital. As it
encouraged Latin American and Asian economies—
particularly China—to implement its principles,
neoliberalism simultaneously fostered the global-
ization of commerce, transforming both advanced
and developing nations. In the process, Harvey
concludes, neoliberalism at the beginning of the
21st century has achieved the same unquestioned
status that Keynesian economics enjoyed in the
middle of the 20th century.
Implications for the
Understanding of Identity
Perhaps the defining implication of neoliberalism
lies in its radical rehabilitation of classical liberal-
ism’s emphasis on individualism. Hayek consid-
ered classical liberalism’s understanding of the
importance and dignity of the individual to have
been Western civilization’s crowning achievement,
and his critique of the welfare state sought to pre-
serve this gift against those who would diminish
individuals’ abilities to define their lives as they
chose. Throughout his Capitalism and Freedom,
Friedman, too, defined society as a collection of
Robinson Crusoes—or, at most, families of
Robinson Crusoes—seeking to maximize their life
possibilities independently of each other. From
a neoliberal perspective, the competitive self-
maximization of the rugged individual is under-
stood to be the vital spark of human creativity and
progress, and societies are called to protect this
spark against those who would seek to stifle it. The
primary enemy in this struggle comes from the
institutions—perhaps most especially well-meaning
institutions—whose interventions to improve
human society diminish the dynamic capacity of
individuals to compete and create. As a result,
neoliberal individualism often manifests itself as
anti-institutionalism.
The neoliberal emphasis on creativity and mar-
ket competition also leads them to see individual
freedom primarily in terms of economic freedom,
with political and civic freedoms as a distant prior-
ity. Such freedom demands that individuals be
given the ability to participate in the marketplace
however they see fit, and that corporations be
given the ability to compete unfettered by burden-
some regulations or extraneous concerns that
would distract them from maximizing returns for
their shareholders. Consequently, neoliberals reject
any notion of corporate social responsibility or
redistributive justice—environmental regulations
and social welfare programs, for instance—as both
restrictive to individual economic choice and, as
Hayek believed, debilitating to the spirit of compe-
tition and risk essential to human life. Certainly,
many neoliberals also point out that their opposi-
tion to such interventions does not mean that they
are against such causes as the environment or
social welfare but rather that they believe that the
expense and inefficiency of governmental interven-
tion would far outweigh any possible benefit. As a
result, neoliberals instead seek to minimize govern-
mental intrusion, emphasizing the expansion of
individual choice and market competition—
through competitive environmental emissions mar-
kets to reduce pollution or the privatization of
social insurance programs, for instance—to pro-
mote economic expansion, a result they believe to
be far more effective in the long run.
Finally, the embrace of individualism and eco-
nomic freedom encourages neoliberals to see the
development of an efficient free market as the ulti-
mate goal of any political arrangement. As they
seek this goal, neoliberals such as Hayek reject the
charge that they desire a return to laissez faire, in
which a passive state leaves businesses to run
amok. Instead, neoliberal political life constantly
emphasizes participation in what Gray describes
as a limited state, in which a constitutional gov-
ernment limits itself to providing only those func-
tions that the market cannot provide on its own,
namely, the rule of law, property rights, security
and order, and basic infrastructure. Although this

understanding of politics falls far short of the
planned interventions of the welfare state, neolib-
eralism recognizes that all of these objectives are
significant—and expensive—undertakings that
have tremendous consequences in enabling indi-
viduals to pursue economic freedom. Furthermore,
as libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick argued
in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, neoliberals often
believe that asking anything more of the state pre-
supposes a level of consensus around a particular
set of social values that has never existed in human
history and would be inherently oppressive to
those who do not share such values. Consequently,
the minimal state is understood to be both more
fiscally responsible and far more respectful of
individual liberty.
Critiques
Neoliberalism has wielded a profound influence on
contemporary debates on political economy and
public policy, and its ideas have proved vital in
foregrounding the importance of creating efficient
and fiscally sustainable social programs. In addi-
tion, neoliberalism’s minimalist approach to public
policy seems to be a pragmatic response to the
moment of postmodernity, in which the decline of
guiding metanarratives has fragmented the moral
and ethical consensus necessary to undertake large-
scale public projects. Yet, since its inception, neo-
liberalism has sparked tremendous criticism.
Harvey catalogues the charges that have been
brought against it: that its strategy of globalization,
while achieving mixed results in emerging markets,
has succeeded primarily in enriching a small num-
ber of global elites, that it has had disastrous effects
on the environment, and that its financialization of
capital markets has promoted irresponsible specu-
lation and costly bailouts. But beyond these practi-
cal concerns, critics of the neoliberal perspective
have mounted deeper philosophical challenges that
correspond to its emphases on individualism, eco-
nomic freedom, and the limited state.
First, communitarians such as Michael Sandel
contend that neoliberalism’s emphasis on the indi-
vidual abstracted from any community ties is a funda-
mentally untenable anthropology. Communitarians
contend that individuals are never as isolated from
sustaining social relationships as neoliberalism—or,
indeed, liberalism—typically assumes, and that such
Neoliberalism 503
disregard for the role of community in shaping
individual identity has profound social conse-
quences. Harvey notes that neoliberalism’s ideal
of rugged, competitive individualism has indeed
had problematic effects on the societies and cul-
tures where it has taken root, often forcing neo-
liberalism to embed itself in conservative or
nationalistic frameworks—such as U.S. neocon-
servativism and Chinese nationalism—to reestab-
lish the social ties that it unravels and respond to
the anomie that its economic policies create.
Second, Harvey notes that neoliberalism’s
emphasis on economic freedom over either politi-
cal or civil freedom has often led neoliberals to
develop troubling relationships with rogue regimes.
Friedman’s support of the brutal Chilean dictator
Pinochet and the easy relationship between neolib-
eral ideas and a Chinese regime with a question-
able human rights record alarm many critics, even
if they believe the neoliberal argument that
increased economic freedom now will bring
increased political and civil freedom later. The
development economist and Nobel laureate
Amartya Sen contends that such a perspective on
international development neglects the real ways
that political and civil freedoms have proven essen-
tial in creating foundations for economic security,
social trust, and the constructive development of
values in diverse, developing nations.
Third, and finally, critics of neoliberalism con-
tend that a purely limited state is of limited value
in moving disenfranchised persons out of poverty.
Following embedded liberalism’s emphasis on the
importance of empowering persons to engage in
public life, Sen argues that, contrary to what neo-
liberal theory suggests, disenfranchised persons do
require a basic amount of social goods to secure
and exercise economic freedom. Indeed, the devel-
opment economist Jeffery Sachs has found that the
societies that have done the best for their people
are not pure neoliberal states but rather states like
the Scandinavian countries that have preserved
strong networks of social services. Such findings
suggest that although valuable, neoliberalism
works best when acting in concert with perspec-
tives that compensate for its deficiencies.
C. T. Maier
See also Globalization; Political Economy; Political
Identity
504 Nigrescence
Further Readings
Friedman, M. (2002). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Gray, J. (1995). Liberalism (2nd ed.). Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Hayek, F. A. (2007). The road to serfdom (B. Caldwell,
Ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and utopia. New
York: Basic Books.
Nigrescence
Nigrescence is a French term meaning “to become
Black.” This word has become recognized as one
of the most popular academic theories concerning
identity. Its progenitor William Cross conceived
the concept in 1971 to describe an identity process
experienced by Black people who undergo a meta-
morphosis from identification with whiteness to
identification with blackness and beyond. The
underlying presumption of the multistage para-
digm is that people with healthy identities are
comfortable in their own skins. Black people who
want to be White or identify primarily with white-
ness rather than blackness are said to have either
internalized a sense of self-hatred or perhaps not
have matured enough to immerse oneself in one’s
own culture. This is not meant to conflate identity
and identification. These words are distinct; how-
ever, they are connected in that one’s cultural self-
definition is linked to the degree to which one
identifies with one’s indigenous culture.
Nigrescence has been nicknamed the “Negro to
Black conversion model.” It fits within a constella-
tion of identity theories that have proposed that the
level of identity maturity is the principal character-
istic that determines the extent of identity mainte-
nance. In other words, when one is comfortable
with one’s self and has a high self-esteem, he or she
is more likely to have a higher degree of self-efficacy
than is someone who is uncomfortable with one’s
self. This hypothesis is contestable. Nonetheless, the
significance of this body of work is that it centers on
how people define themselves on a daily basis and
how that affects their lives. This approach estab-
lishes a way of understanding how a deculturalized
Black individual becomes revitalized and increas-
ingly identifies with self and culture.
This entry first discusses identity theories. Next,
it describes the stages of the nigrescence model and
criticisms of the model. Lastly, this entry examines
the significant methodological advancements to
identity research.
Identity Theories
A few years following the advent of Cross’s cele-
brated nigrescence paradigm in 1971, Edwin
Nichols decided to place cultures and their consis-
tencies in a theoretical framework that examined
cross-cultural differences; as a result, he created
one of the first comprehensive worldview publica-
tions. He originally called his model the “psycho-
logical aspects of cultural differences” model.
Presently, it is referred to as the “philosophical
aspects of cultural differences” model, and it is used
quite frequently for consultation with both public
and private industry organizations throughout the
world. The amount of worldview publications
increased during that decade and the next. In the
1990s, most of the literature on African American
identity is dispersed throughout disciplines such as
psychology, sociology, and increasingly within com-
munication. Joseph L. White and Thomas A. Parham
issued a second edition of their heralded volume
titled The Psychology of Blacks: An Afro-American
Perspective. This comprehensive guide to the Black
personality examines “ethnic” identity, its devel-
opment and maintenance, and worldview, among
other issues.
Ethnic identity in psychology is discussed in
some texts interchangeably with cultural identity.
Yet ethnic identity is seen as a group phenomenon,
socially and relationally driven and now under-
stood from a range of disciplinary perspectives.
Parham and Janet Helms developed the Black
Racial Identity Attitude Scale to address a specifi-
cally African American sociopsychological
approach to defining the cultural self and thinking
through identity stress and coping.
White and Parham discuss, in the vein of an
ethnic orientation toward psychological research,
coping strategies for a dual identity and social
competency measures. The authors claim, “Long
before the child can verbalize, he or she is aware of
the fact that something is fundamentally wrong in

the American society” (p. 45). Although this point
may be arguable, several ethnic identity models do
propose that identity awareness begins in early to
late adolescence. Both Charles Thomas and William
Cross offer several distinct models for examining
ethnic identity growth among Blacks. The psycho-
logical paradigm discussed most in identity litera-
ture is Cross’s nigrescence model.
Nigrescence Model
Again, Cross’s well-known nigrescence theory
describes a metamorphosis from Negro to Black,
and Black is defined as the optimal psychological
stage in which the Black individual comes to
identify and appreciate who he or she really is.
Persons at this stage do not consciously attempt
to imitate another ethnic group’s interpretation
of reality.
There are four stages to the nigrescence model:
pre-encounter, encounter, immersion-emersion,
and internalization. The first is the pre-encounter
stage, which is the identity locale for those who
embrace whiteness and devalue blackness. Thomas
uses the term negromachy to characterize this
stage. These persons refuse any link to a collective
conscience or Black culture and have never been
successfully influenced by Whites or themselves to
accept their blackness. The second stage, encoun-
ter, is the first instance or sequence of events in
which the individual is confronted with an unfair
situation because of his or her race. Because of the
inconsistency of inequity with the American dream
buttressed by “liberty and justice for all,” the indi-
vidual is initially shocked, then confronted with
the realization that his or her present worldview is
inappropriate. A new identity exploration gradu-
ally takes place; eventually the decision to maintain
a Black identity is made. The third stage, immersion-
emersion, represents the transformation from the
old to the new self. This transition is marked by
an extremist viewpoint on Black–White relations.
Whites are castigated for almost everything they
do, and Blacks are praised. The world is now per-
ceived from a Black–White perspective. Externally,
artifacts of Black identity are worn or bought to
decorate the home, car, office, and so on. Internally,
however, the individual has yet to become secure.
Internalization is the final stage, in which the indi-
vidual achieves a sense of self-comfort. Cross
Nigrescence 505
explains that the emotional and defensive disposition
is exchanged for a politically acute awareness of other
ideologies and a greater understanding of these
views. Since 1971, Cross has published an updated
version of the model and added internalization-
commitment as a final step in the process of nigres-
cence. This step explores issues of high and low
race and culture salience, presuming that those
who have matured to this stage are high in race
and culture awareness.
Criticisms
White and Parham indicate that their concern for
the nigrescence model is in its restricted focus on
young adults and adolescents, with little to no
regard for identity transitions later in life. White
and Parham theorized that identity transformation
is a lived experience beginning in adolescence and
continuing throughout life. Nigrescence, then, is a
cyclical occurrence that exists in early, middle, and
late adulthood. “Recycling” of identity stages
accounts for the individual moving back and forth
between the stages.
Cross and Peony Fhagen-Smith responded to
this critique. They modified the nigrescence para-
digm so that it accounts for ego identity develop-
ment. One of the theoretic concerns of the authors
relates to the range of identities and cultural ide-
ologies of persons who have matured to the inter-
nalization stage. The correlation between
self-esteem, ego-identity development, and racial-
cultural development greatly improves the nigres-
cence model. However, it may be possible that
African Americans with a high self-esteem will
have an enhanced sense of self-valuation resulting
from a self-satisfaction and self-comfort with their
present perception of their identities. The reformu-
lation of the nigrescence theory significantly con-
tributes to the advancement of identity studies by
considering three dimensions of identity. First, the
reformulation accounts for multiple realities by
considering the divergent ideologies of contempo-
rary conservative leaders. Second, it includes cross-
disciplinary research within the reconfiguration.
Finally, it theoretically considers the outcome and
process-oriented nature of identity throughout an
entire life span. Many other studies have since used
this new extension to make sense of Black identi-
ties in different contexts.
506 Nigrescence
There have been multiple critiques of the nigres-
cence paradigm over the years. One heuristic con-
tribution Parham provided was to conceptualize
“African American cultural identity” as an inde-
pendent phenomenon, not established as a reactive
formation to White oppression. Parham intuits that
African American cultural identity is able to stand
alone and function without a European American
identity to claim and alter it. Many scholars have
spoken of a psychohistorical matrix confounded by
an I-Other dialectic that has facilitated a link
between culture and personality. The id, ego,
superego, and culture are components of the matrix
that forms self-concept. In the tradition of a univer-
sal psychological mandate for all personality for-
mation, the ego is never satisfied. Progress is never
achieved, but simply made—the ego must continue
making progress, extending its domain.
Identity Research
There have been three primary themes in Black
psychological research: inferiority, deficit/deficiency,
and multicultural. The inferiority model asserts
that hereditary factors render Blacks inferior to
Whites. This inescapable predicament stagnates
identity. The deficit/deficiency model suggests that
race, class, gender, and other sociocultural factors
distract societal members from adhering to norma-
tive standards of living, defined by the White
middle class. These Black persons are “culturally
deprived” because of assumed environmental con-
ditions and a resilience to change. The deficiency
lies in the inability of Blacks to reconcile their
inherent lack of intelligence, sensible language,
family structure, and cognitive style. The multicul-
tural approach, the newest trend in psychological
research, contends that all languages, behaviors,
and worldviews are contextually related and char-
acterized by strengths and limitations. In the
1990s, ethnic identity research is primarily defined
with respect to these three approaches within psy-
chological literature.
Several cultural theories have depicted distin-
guished interpretations of reality. There has been
some confusion about which model best measures
cultural identity, but A. Kathleen Burlew and
Lori R. Smith maintain that each approach is use-
ful depending on the purpose of the research. The
existing measures at the time were divided into
four categories: developmental, Afrocentric,
group-based, and racial stereotyping approaches.
Developmental approaches were exemplified by
the process-oriented models of Thomas, Cross,
and J. Milliones. Milliones developed an instru-
ment used to measure Black consciousness, fore-
shadowing Cross’s nigrescence model by including
the respondent’s progression through four stages:
preconscious, confrontation, internalization, and
integration. The “africentric approaches” were
typified by James Baldwin’s African self-
consciousness scale, and the belief systems analysis
scale of Linda James Myers. The latter scale was
created to provide an optimal worldview, which
encouraged mental healthiness among African
Americans. It is composed of three constructs:
holistic, nonmaterialistic, and communalistic. The
Black Group Identification Index is one of several
“group” measures identified by Burlew and Smith.
J. P. Davidson, a former doctoral student from the
University of Maryland, who discovered a strong
correlation between Black student identification
and participation in extracurricular activities, cre-
ated this index. Burlew and Smith also mention
the Cultural Mistrust Inventory as it relates to
“racial stereotype” measures. This instrument was
developed to assess the suspiciousness of Blacks
toward Whites in workplace organizations. All of
the aforementioned measures are significant meth-
odological additions to identity research, yet they
are only a few among many. The nigrescence
model has been a major model for discussing
racial identity and identification. It is also impor-
tant to note that scholars such as Beverly Vandiver,
Peony Fhagen-Smith, Kevin Cokely, and Frank
Worrell have significantly advanced this work
along with William Cross.
Ronald L. Jackson II
See also Communication Competence; Culture, Ethnicity,
and Race; Self-Consciousness; Self-Esteem
Further Readings
Baldwin, J. A. (1980). The psychology of oppression. In
M. K. Asante & A. Vandi (Eds.), Contemporary Black
thought. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Burlew, A. K., & Smith, L.R. (1991). Measures of racial
identity: An overview of a proposed framework.
Journal of Black Psychology, 17(2), 53–71.

Cross, W. E. (1971). The Negro to Black conversion
experience: Towards the psychology of Black
liberation. Black World, 20, 13–27.
Cross, W. E., & Fhagen-Smith, P. (1995). Nigrescence
and ego identity development: Accounting for
differential Black identity patterns. In P. Pedersen,
J. Draguns, W. Lonner, & J. Trimble (Eds.),
Counseling across cultures (pp. 108–123). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Milliones, J. (1980). Construction of a Black
consciousness measure: Psycho-therapeutic
implications. Psychotherapy Theory Research and
Practice, 17(2), 458–462.
Myers, L. J. (1991). Expanding the psychology of
knowledge optimally: The importance of world view
revisited. In R. L. Jones (Ed.), Black psychology (pp.
15–32). Berkeley, CA: Cobb & Henry.
Thomas, C. W. (1971). (Ed.). Boys no more: A Black
psychologist’s view of community. Beverly Hills, CA:
Glencoe Press.
White, J. L., & Parham, T. A. (1990). The psychology of
Blacks: An Afro-American perspective (2nd ed.).
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Nomadology
Nomadology is a concept concerned with nomadic
distribution and the idea of nomad versus nomos.
The nomad is shaped by an identity of being that is
not connected to or bound by territory. Nomadology
permits us to ask questions about the politics of
location, the identities of the self and the other, and
the relevance of both defined and undefined identi-
ties. Although Gilles Deleuze had already discussed
this concept in his Différence et repetition (Difference
and Repetition), it became of great importance in
the magnum opus Mille Plateaux (A Thousand
Plateaus), which he wrote jointly with Félix Guattari.
The concept of nomadology, or rather the anti-
methodology that it implies, is used more and more
within the humanities and the social sciences today,
particularly in the more experimental areas of these
fields. In the work of Deleuze and Guattari, nom-
adology is closely connected to other theoretical
concepts aimed at converting their philosophy into
a form of praxis (think of “schizoanalysis,” “rhizo-
matica,” “empiricism,” “pragmatism,” and “ethol-
ogy”). In contrast to these other concepts, however,
nomadology has particular interest in the political,
Nomadology 507
though the authors also discuss it in terms of art,
religion, architecture, and science. This entry dis-
cusses nomadology’s conceptual framework;
describes its companion concept, the war machine;
and provides examples of nomadology’s use and
application.
Conceptual Framework
Nomadology is derived as a reference to the life of
the nomad, one whose being does not unfold
according to a territory, bound to cities and vil-
lages, but who travels and traverses territories, all
along the way following the surface of the earth,
from well to well, from marketplace to market-
place, and beyond. The nomad is radically opposed
to the civilian, the man/woman living within the
state. The civilian is coded in three stages: first,
man or woman is surrounded by all types of social
apparatuses; then, living according to them, he/she
becomes the subject of his/her statements (“I,” the
civilian); finally he/she is empowered accordingly,
functioning within all facets of the state as an
active part of its machinery.
The nomad is different. The nomad does not
live according to codes (neither of the self nor of
the space surrounding him or her). Instead of ter-
ritoriality he practices a de-territorialization, which
creates a mobile existence instead of a sedentary
life. The nomad is Genghis Kahn, who “didn’t
understand” the city, which is to say that he was
unaffected by the power of the state apparatuses
that had encircled him, warding off all forms of
organization through which the state needed to
work (intending to capture and organize life), and
not accepting the power (the status, the property)
it had to offer. The nomad is, however, also the
terrorist, the vagabond, the outlaw, or actually any
type of life capable of resisting the encoding
machineries of power.
Yet we need to think the concept of nomadol-
ogy in an even more abstract manner. For as actu-
alized in the person of the nomad or any other
anarchist personality, the concept still breathes an
anthropocentrism, which falls short of the concep-
tion of Deleuze and Guattari. In the words of its
creators, the nomad stands for a pure becoming:
nomadology maps an ontology of movement. It is
not a metaphor (there is nothing “meta” about it),
but rather expresses a way of thinking about both
508 Nomadology
the material and the immaterial that is remarkably
absent in the history of Western thought. This
denies the power of the state from occurring, along
with territoriality (or ownership), institutional sub-
jectivities, and other defined identities for that mat-
ter. But in the end nomadology prevents all fixed
states from taking place. Nomadology illuminates
the restless margins that hide themselves from any
kind of authority. They are akin to the “faceless
enemies” George W. Bush referred to when he
tried to define whoever was responsible for 9/11.
War Machine
A crucial companion of the concept of nomadology
is what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the “war
machine.” This concept, taken from Paul Virilio, is
external to the nomad but allies with it whenever
the nomad clashes with the state. The war machine
refers to the constitution of a series of phenomena
that in their aggregation produce or fabricate
“war”; radical de-stabilization, de-territorialization,
de-subjectification, and even de-identification are
the outcomes of this alliance. Denuding the military
connotations linked to the concept of a “war”
entirely, Paul Patton reads the war machine as a
machine of metamorphosis, giving us more insight
into how this concept should be used and revealing
nomadology, with the war machine or machine of
metamorphosis as its tool, as an anti-semiology,
aimed at decoding whatever strategies it is con-
fronted with. The politics of decoding is thus in the
end the way in which Deleuze and Guattari use this
concept to ward off political codes and codifying
machines in general. They question “royal science”
as it defines the science and theorize a (non-
Kuhnian) nomad science that persists in not being
absorbed by its dominant structure. They question
optic space as it defines the (visual) arts and theo-
rize a haptic space that stresses close vision allow-
ing the surface of the artwork to be felt. They
question striated space as it places a grid on the
surface of the earth, coding the built environment
but also the sea with its coordinates and its means
of measure.
Nomadology, hand in hand with the war
machine/machine of metamorphosis that allows it
to experiment with all kinds of decodings, thus
turns out be a concept at work within all kinds of
political phenomena.
Applications
In Mille Plateaux, Deleuze and Guattari take their
own advice seriously by showing us that the pur-
pose and value of philosophy are external to phi-
losophy itself. Thus, they say that productive insight
into what nomadology stands for necessarily exceeds
the realm of philosophy, which is precisely what
they do with their analysis. Yet their analysis is by
no means final. Nomadology is a concept with a
much greater potential, as so many publications
have already shown us. It is claimed that even the
Israeli army, in its attempts to reply to the urban
guerrilla warfare of the Palestinians, experiments
with the concept’s new take on territoriality (an
interesting twist of the concept’s uses, no doubt
much contrary to the original intent of both Deleuze
and Guattari). However, a more positive reading of
what the concept of nomadology has yet to offer is
still indeed possible in the following example.
In the area of postcolonial studies, Patton gives us
some interesting thoughts on rethinking nomadol-
ogy. Staging the so-called “Mabo” case, he sets the
concept into contemporary Australian jurisdiction.
The lawsuit dealt with the ownership of land on
the Murray Islands, and for the first time, the
judges agreed on an aboriginal or native right to
form part of Australian common law. It meant a
revolution in Australian jurisdiction, but more
interesting to us, it shows nomadology at work.
The influential Privy Council stated in 1919 that
indigenous inhabitants were barbarians without
settled law, thus refusing the idea that their claims
on property were transferable (from Aborigine
customary law to the civil code). Indeed, this case
shows us that colonialism is about overcoding,
about turning land into territory or property,
about identifying the self and the other, and about
defining nomads as those who “do not under-
stand” the strategies that surround them. This case
also tells us that it is still seldom, even in our post-
colonial times, that these social and cultural codes
meet a war machine, or a machine of metamor-
phosis. Nomadology reveals to us these colonial
codes that are still largely intact in the non-Western

world. Nomadology shows us how the British
organized the Indian caste system according to the
way the capitalist system has structured daily life
for people all over the world.
Within feminist theory, Rosi Braidotti made use
of the concept of nomadology in several of her
best-selling books. Deleuze (re-reading de Beauvoir)
claimed that there is no such thing as being a
woman, a woman is always a becoming-woman,
which means that she is marginalized according to
the dominant male. Writing from the female per-
spective then, is a nomadology, according to
Braidotti, a journey outside the phallogocentric
strategies that striate normality and intend to over-
code the marginal. Feminist resistance then is not a
search for equality, or for a new type of sedentary
subjectivity, or for recognition. Rather, it is about
the search for a nomadic subjectivity, a subjectivity
that primarily practices a not understanding of the
laws of sedentary masculinity and patriarchy.
Feminist resistance is about living and writing “the
politics of location” that immanently questions the
dominant masculine structures that are encoun-
tered everywhere. Deleuze and Guattari add to this
that becoming-woman is not a tactic limited to the
female: it is a necessary transformation for all
Nomadology 509
minorities and marginal practices. Even marginal-
ized men, in order to ward off the dominant forces
of society, have to enter a state of becoming-
woman. In line with Braidotti, it thus makes sense
to consider the nomadic subject she proposes a
new way of thinking about feminism, and actually
a new way to rethink all minorities. The nomadic
subject is an invitation to all minorities to write a
politics of location, an ethnography of everyday
life that uncovers all the dominant political struc-
tures that turn life into being.
Rick Dolphijn
See also Cultural Studies; Mediation; Self-Consciousness;
Self-Esteem
Further Readings
Braidotti, R. (1994). Nomadic subjects: Embodiment and
sexual difference in contemporary feminist theory.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1980). Mille plateaux:
Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2. [A thousand plateaus:
Capitalism and schizophrenia: Vol. 2]. Paris: Minuit.
Patton, P. (2000). Deleuze and the political. London:
Routledge.
 O
Ontological Insecurity
Ontological insecurity refers, in an existential
sense, to a person’s sense of “being” in the world.
An ontologically insecure person does not accept
at a fundamental level the reality or existence of
things, themselves, and others. In contrast, the
ontologically secure person has a stable and
unquestioned sense of self and of his or her place
in the world in relation to other people and
objects. Ontological insecurity is important for
understanding identity because it is an essential
foundation for a person to achieve a stable sense
of self-identity. In an existential sense, if a person
does not believe that he or she exists and that
other people and objects are real, that person does
not have the necessary foundations to develop a
stable self-identity. Total ontological insecurity is
rare. Most people achieve a general sense of onto-
logical security, a basic acceptance that they and
others exist, which enables them to function in
day-to-day life.
Central to achieving a sense of ontological secu-
rity is a belief in the continuity, reliability, and
consistency of oneself, other people, and things.
Therefore, a person must learn to trust, or develop
a generalized sense of trust, in the nature and sta-
bility of the social and structural environments
they inhabit. This type of generalized trust is
established in childhood and maintained through
routine. For instance, it is well documented that
good parenting engenders children with a sense of
trust in others and things; that through consistency
511
in parenting practices and love, children learn that
other people can be trusted; and that through rou-
tine, they obtain a sense of the reliability and sta-
bility of their social and structural world. People
then carry this generalized sense of trust with them
into adulthood as protection against existential
anxiety throughout their lives. The establishment
of flexible (not rigid or obsessive) routines is also
important as adults for maintaining a generalized
sense of trust. This is at the core of the establish-
ment and maintenance of self-identity. That is not
to say that such a generalized trust is ensured and
unchanging; research has also shown that acci-
dents or unexpected life events can undermine a
person’s sense of generalized trust and therefore
threaten the person’s ontological security.
Ontological security is central to Anthony
Giddens’s theory of self-identity. He argues that
the processes of late modernity and postmodernity
have eroded many of the traditions that under-
pinned trust in the nature and stability of the social
and material world (and therefore provided the
foundations for ontological security) in premodern
societies. Whereas premodern societies were char-
acterized by tradition, religion, and routine with
meaning, modern societies are characterized by
rapid change and uncertainty in the economy,
employment, culture, and the family. Therefore,
there are many social and psychosocial threats in
modern life, such as instability in work, employ-
ment, and family life. A person needs to develop
the ability to take for granted most everyday hap-
penings; people who do not can become caught in
a perpetual state of anxiety about the future that
512 Optimal Distinctiveness Theory
undermines their ontological security. Therefore,
the desire and need to manage these potential
threats raise fundamental questions of trust and
self-identity for modern individuals.
To manage the insecurity of day-to-day living,
individuals employ strategies to achieve and main-
tain a state of ontological security; one such process
is reflexivity. Individuals respond to social change
(and the resulting insecurity) by engaging with
expert systems and using the information to assess
their positions in the social and material worlds
they inhabit. By placing themselves in their own
fields of view and assessing their positions in the
social and material worlds they inhabit, individuals
can be assured of their own existence and manage
the risks associated with modern life. However, if
taken to the extreme, the process of reflection itself
can generate anxiety. An ontologically secure per-
son does not need to engage in a process of reflec-
tion about most things—he or she is able to trust or
accept things as they are. Self-reflexivity and the
ability to engage in the process of self-reflexivity are
partly structurally determined and vary depending
on class, gender, and ethnicity.
The concept of ontological security is impor-
tant because it suggests that people need more
than just their material needs to be met to live
happy and fulfilled lives. Ontologically insecure
people are unable to develop and maintain a stable
self-identity and therefore have trouble negotiat-
ing and “fitting in” to the social and structural
worlds they inhabit. This can have a profound
impact on an individual’s well-being, with research
indicating that ontological insecurity is associated
with poor physical and mental health, offending
behavior, housing instability and insecurity, and
national conflict.
Belinda Anne Hewitt
See also Being and Identity; Development of Identity;
Development of Self-Concept; Existentialist Identity
Questions; Modernity and Postmodernity; Reflexive
Self or Reflexivity; Self; Self-Consciousness
Further Readings
Giddens, A. (1990). The consequences of modernity.
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Giddens, A. (1991). The self: Ontological security and
existential anxiety. In Modernity and self-identity: Self
and society in the late modern age (pp. 35–69).
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Laing, R. D. (1965). Ontological insecurity. In The
divided self (pp. 39–61). Harmondsworth, UK:
Penguin Books.
Spitzer, S. P. (1978). Ontological insecurity and reflective
processes. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology,
8(2), 203–217.
Optimal Distinctiveness
Theory
“Everyone needs to belong.” “Everyone needs to
be unique.” That both of these statements are true
is the basis for the theory of optimal distinctive-
ness, which helps explain why we join social
groups and become so attached to the social cat-
egories we are part of. Optimal distinctiveness
theory is about social identity—how we come to
define ourselves in terms of our social group
memberships.
According to the optimal distinctiveness model,
social identities derive from a fundamental tension
between two competing social needs—the need for
inclusion and belonging on the one hand, and a
countervailing need for uniqueness and differentia-
tion, on the other hand. People seek social inclu-
sion to alleviate or avoid the isolation, vulnerability,
or stigmatization that may arise from being highly
individuated. Researchers studying the effects of
tokenism and solo status have generally found that
individuals are both uncomfortable and cognitively
disadvantaged in situations in which they feel too
dissimilar from others, or too much like outsiders.
Conversely, too much similarity or excessive dein-
dividuation provides no basis for self-definition,
and hence, individuals are uncomfortable in situa-
tions in which they lack distinctiveness. Being “just
a number” in a large, undifferentiated mass of
people is just as unpleasant as being too alone.
Because of these opposing social needs, social
identities are selected to achieve a balance between
needs for inclusion and for differentiation in a
given social context. Optimal identities are those
that satisfy the need for inclusion within one’s own
group and simultaneously serve the need for dif-
ferentiation through distinctions between one’s
own group and other groups. In effect, optimal

social identities involve shared distinctiveness.
(Think of adolescents’ trends in clothes and hair-
styles; teenagers are anxious to be as much like
others of their age group as possible, while differ-
entiating themselves from the older generation.)
To satisfy both needs, individuals will select group
identities that are inclusive enough that they have
a sense of being part of a larger collective but
exclusive enough that they provide some basis for
distinctiveness from others.
Although a theory of group identification, opti-
mal distinctiveness theory has direct implications
for self-concept well-being at the individual level.
If individuals are motivated to sustain identifica-
tion with optimally distinct social groups, then the
self-concept should be adapted to fit the norms
and expectations of such group memberships.
Achieving optimal social identities should be asso-
ciated with a secure and stable self-concept in
which one’s own characteristics are congruent
with being a good and typical group member.
Conversely, if optimal identity is challenged or
threatened, the individual should react to restore
congruence between the self-concept and the group
representation. Optimal identity can be restored
either by adjusting individual self-concept to be
more consistent with the group norms, or by shift-
ing social identification to a group that is more
congruent with the self.
Self-stereotyping is one mechanism for match-
ing the self-concept to characteristics that are dis-
tinctively representative of particular group
memberships. People stereotype themselves and
others in terms of salient social categorizations,
and this stereotyping leads to an enhanced percep-
tual similarity between self and one’s own group
members and an enhanced contrast between one’s
own group and other groups. Consistent with the
assumptions of optimal distinctiveness theory,
research has found that members of distinctive
minority groups exhibit more self-stereotyping
than do members of large majority groups. In
addition, people tend to self-stereotype more
when the distinctiveness of their group has been
challenged.
Optimal identities (belonging to distinctive
groups) are also important for achieving and main-
taining positive self-worth. Group identity may
play a particularly important role in enhancing
self-worth and subjective well-being for individuals
Optimal Distinctiveness Theory 513
who have stigmatizing characteristics or belong to
disadvantaged social categories. Some of the poten-
tial negative effects of belonging to a social minor-
ity may be offset by the identity value of secure
inclusion in a distinctive social group. Results of
survey research have revealed a positive relation-
ship between strength of ethnic identity and self-
worth among minority group members, and some
experimental studies have demonstrated that self-
esteem can be enhanced by being classified in a
distinctive, minority social category.
Finally, because distinctive group identities are
so important to one’s sense of self, people are
motivated to maintain group boundaries—to pro-
tect the distinctiveness of their groups by enhanc-
ing differences with other groups and limiting
membership to “people like us.” Being restrictive
and excluding others from the group may serve an
important function for group members. In effect,
exclusion may be one way that individuals are able
to enhance their own feelings of group inclusion.
Those who are the least secure in their membership
status (e.g., new members of a group or marginal-
ized members) are sometimes the most likely to
adhere to the group’s standards and discriminate
against members of other groups. Ironically, these
noncentral group members may be even more
likely than are those who truly embody the group
attributes to notice and punish others for violating
the norms and standards of the group. When given
the power, marginal group members may also be
more discriminating in determining who should
belong in the group and who should be excluded.
In experimental studies, it has been demonstrated
that when individuals are made to feel that they
are marginal (atypical) group members, they
become more stringent about requirements for
group membership and more likely to exclude
strangers from their group. Similarly, when group
identity is under threat (e.g., there is a fear of being
absorbed or assimilated into some larger group),
members tend to become more exclusionary.
Secure inclusion in distinctive groups enhances
well-being and motivates positive social behavior.
Insecure belonging or threats to the distinctive
identity of one’s important social groups motivate
defensiveness, protection of group boundaries, and
other efforts to restore optimal identities.
Marilynn B. Brewer
514 Organizational Identity
See also Collective/Social Identity; Group Identity; Social
Identity Theory
Further Readings
Brewer, M. B. (1991). The social self: On being the same
and different at the same time. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 17, 475–482.
Pickett, C. L., Bonner, B. L., & Coleman, J. M. (2002).
Motivated self-stereotyping: Heightened assimilation
and differentiation needs result in increased levels of
positive and negative self-stereotyping. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 543–562.
Pickett, C. L., & Brewer, M. B. (2001). Assimilation and
differentiation needs as motivational determinants of
perceived ingroup and outgroup homogeneity. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 341–348.
Organizational Identity
Introduced by Stuart Albert and David Whetten,
organizational identity generally refers to the cen-
tral and enduring features of an organization that
its members believe distinguish it from other orga-
nizations and groups. Research on organizational
identity is practically and theoretically significant
because it can be used to explain organization-
specific phenomena, such as organizational leader-
ship, performance, culture, and many other
organizational happenings. The need to understand
organizational identity and identification tran-
scends disciplinary demarcations by drawing inter-
est from a variety of diverse domains such as social
and organizational psychology, management, lead-
ership, sociology, persuasion and communication,
corporate relations, and marketing.
Albert and Whetten presented two uses of orga-
nizational identity. First, researchers can delineate
and describe certain features of organizations.
Second, organizational identity is a concept that
organizations can use to define themselves. That is,
organizations can decide, to a large extent, how
they want to be categorized. These uses imply that
organizational identity has a certain degree of flu-
idity, affording the organization some degree of a
malleable identity. This can provide organizations
with a means to reinvent their identities, replace
managers or leaders, or integrate newly acquired
companies or departments in a manner that is ben-
eficial, effective, and efficient for the organization.
The ability to reinvent an organizational identity is
important for many organizations because without
this capacity, many organizations would dissolve
or find themselves unable to cope with a constantly
evolving globalized economy.
This entry first discusses organizational identi-
ty’s necessary conditions and core attributes. Then
this entry explores the importance of organiza-
tional identity and the use of metaphors in defining
an organization’s identity. Finally, this entry details
some of the controversies associated with organi-
zation identity research.
Conditions for Organizational Identity
Three defining and necessary conditions of organi-
zational identity were presented by Albert and
Whetten: (1) the essence or central criteria of the
organization, (2) organizational distinctiveness,
and (3) temporal continuity. Of these three condi-
tions, the central character and distinctiveness are
closely linked. The core attributes of the organiza-
tion also distinguish it from other organizations.
Defining attributes of the organization, however,
are fluid in that they have the capacity to change
depending on the organization’s current purpose,
needs, perspectives, products, goals, culture, or
salient outgroups. Organization leaders play an
important role in embodying the central character-
istics of the organization via social identity pro-
cesses. A leader is defined as an individual or
group who has a disproportionate amount of
power and influence over a group. Leaders are
able to influence a group’s agenda, goals, and
achievements; thus, leaders can strategically posi-
tion the group to accentuate commonalities or
differences within and between groups to define
and distinguish the organization. This allows
organizations to define themselves in manners
decided by the organization and its members while
permitting placement of the organization into
multiple categories. Placement in multiple catego-
ries provides the organization the possibility of
change while not restricting identification to a
single category.
Consistent with Henri Tajfel and John Turner’s
social identity theory, Albert and Whetten argue
that the continuity of organizational identity is

critical. That is, one’s organizational identity must
be enduring in addition to being central and dis-
tinctive. Through enduring identities, organiza-
tions are capable of creating and maintaining roles
within and between organizational communities.
For example, Google has created many identities
for itself, but it is most commonly known as an
Internet search company and technological inno-
vator. The extent to which Google’s identity is
enduring, distinct, and central can be summed up
in a brief, two-word sentence: “Google it.”
Organizational identities are shaped and main-
tained through interactions with other organiza-
tions (e.g., mergers, negotiations), as well as
through within-group socialization processes (i.e.,
hiring new employees, training programs, organi-
zational goals); therefore, these between- and
within-organization processes directly influence
the degree to which an organizational identity is
enduring. The longer an organization holds a sin-
gle or small repertoire of identities, the more dif-
ficult it becomes for the organization to shift
between identities. For example, Apple has become
synonymous with stylish, fun, and easy-to-use
computers and other electronic products; however,
Microsoft is equated with boring, dull, and evil.
Both organizations have difficulty shifting their
identities to increase their customer base and mar-
ket base (e.g., Apple suggesting its products can be
used by everyone and not just college students).
The capacity for an organization to switch identi-
ties or assume multiple identities can be a difficult
endeavor for well-established organizations.
Importance of Organizational Identity
In addition to its theoretical and scientific impor-
tance, organizational identity and identification
have practical relevance for how organizations
function. It has been suggested that effective orga-
nizational leadership, communication, and devel-
opment could not exist without a perceived sense
of organizational identity. Organizational identity
also provides a means by which organizations can
successfully implement diversity training programs,
improve productivity, ensure smooth mergers and
acquisitions, effectively manage, and effectively
deal with changes between and within the organi-
zation. Because of the implications of organiza-
tional identity, it is easy to understand how and
Organizational Identity 515
why this concept attracts so much attention from
researchers in so many different disciplines.
Organizational Identity as a Metaphor
Using metaphors, researchers are able to define an
organizational identity based on the underlying
dimensional factors of the organization. This
approach enables researchers to define and charac-
terize the multiplicity of identities of a single orga-
nization by comparing it against at least two other
organizations. By using two or more metaphoric
comparisons, the organization passes the primary
tests of duality (i.e., that the organization has more
than one identity). For example, one might ask
how Company X is similar to Google (a utilitarian
organization) and to the army (a normative organi-
zation). This would be an appropriate metaphor
for Company X if the metaphor has the capacity to
be applied to the organization at narrow and broad
levels of comparison; said differently, the metaphor
must fit both general and specific comparisons
between the organizations under consideration.
When using metaphors, one must compare the
organization against practically significant alterna-
tive organizations that are diverse, rather than
homogeneous. If this critical step is not met, the
outcome may provide little to no practical use for
researchers or the organization. Determining that
an organization has more than one identity, how-
ever, might have considerable consequences for the
organization. As such, the extended metaphor
analysis provides researchers with a scientific
explanation for why and how events occur with
and between organizations—that is, it supplies
researchers with another avenue to understand
and make sense of organizational events.
Critiques
Garnering attention from researchers and practi-
tioners alike, organizational identity research has
capitalized on its diverse methodological, theoreti-
cal, and analytical perspectives. These diverse per-
spectives have provided a unique and fruitful
approach to advance our understanding of organi-
zations (i.e., groups) and their members; however,
many issues still need to be resolved by scholars.
Attempts for resolution have been debated in
special issues of organizational and management
516 Organizational Identity
journals, as well as in scholarly forums and work-
shops, devoted specifically to this topic. Incidentally,
many of the controversies regarding organizational
identity stem from this transdisciplinary impetus,
including what research methods are best suited
for studying organizational identity, the different
measures of identity, the effects of different meth-
ods and measures on interpretations of organiza-
tional identity, and the theoretical background of
organizational identity.
Although the original definition provided by
Albert and Whetten is the most commonly used,
there is still much debate about a single, accepted
definition. Other definitions refer to organizational
identity as a shared understanding based on com-
mon cognitive structures of organizational mem-
bers, rather than an identity based on what is
explicitly stated by the organization or its mem-
bers; other researchers integrate organizational
culture, performance, marketing, or production
into their definition of organizational identity.
This disagreement about an acceptable definition
of organizational identity primarily results from
the epistemological, disciplinary, and ontological
backgrounds of researchers. Regardless of the dis-
agreement about the meaning and definition, the
importance of understanding organizational iden-
tity and identification is less controversial.
Different measures and methods of organiza-
tional identity and identification have also caused
some difficulties for researchers. The wide range of
methodological approaches includes experiments,
quasi-experiments, surveys, ethnographies, meta-
phors, and archival data. These approaches are
further complicated by varying the level of analysis
from the individual to small groups to large
groups. As a result, data analyses can be difficult,
therefore, compelling researchers to apply various
quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-method
approaches to studying organizational identity.
Compounded with the lack of consensus regarding
the definition of organizational identity, the meth-
odological concerns seem grim. By working
together and across disciplinary boundaries,
researchers are able to integrate and replicate each
other’s findings.
The interpretation of organizational identity
is also affected by these concerns. Depending on
the theoretical or philosophical orientation,
organizational identity researchers adopt differ-
ent frameworks through which they explain simi-
lar organizational phenomena. These explanations
may be quite comparable, or contradictory. One
general theme stemming from theoretical orienta-
tions is whether organizational identity is consid-
ered a process or a thing. As a process, identity is
an entity under constant development, whereas as
a thing, it is perceived as a resource or item
obtained by the organization. Each approach
leads to different interpretations of identity.
Finally, many argue that organizational identity
researchers are examining a specific form of social
identity, but others argue that organizational iden-
tity is a different conceptualization of identity. A
seminal article by Blake Ashforth and Fred Mael
argued that from a social identity perspective,
organizational identity researchers could achieve
some consistency of agreement about the defini-
tion of organizational identity, as well as provide
a rich perspective of organizational behavior.
Although a social identity perspective is com-
monly prescribed by social psychologists, research-
ers from other disciplines do not seem to agree.
However, this area is becoming dominated more
by social psychologists, leading this view to be
mainstream among organizational identity
researchers. This should lead to some consistency
and, one hopes, reduce some of the controversy
between scholars and practitioners.
David E. Rast III
See also Social Identity Theory
Further Readings
Academy of Management Review. (2000). Special topic
forum on organizational identity and identification.
Academy of Management Review, 25, 13–152.
Albert, S., & Whetten, D. A. (1985). Organizational
identity. In L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw (Eds.),
Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 7,
pp. 263–295). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Ashforth, B. E., & Mael, F. (1989). Social identity theory
and the organization. Academy of Management
Review, 14, 20–39.
British Journal of Management. (2007). Organizational
and corporate identity [Special Issue]. British Journal
of Management, 18, S1–S94.

Orientalism
In his groundbreaking book Orientalism, Edward
Said systematically studies Western scholarship on
and representation of the Near East or the Arab
world. Focusing on British, French, and U.S.
thinkers and artists since the 19th century, Said
argues that rather than pure, objective, and disin-
terested scholarship and cultural practices,
Orientalism aims to discursively subjugate the
East. It belongs to the imperial drive to, rephrasing
Socrates, “know thy colony” and control it. Said
incisively diagnoses Orientalist representations as
projecting Western desires onto the Orient, ren-
dering the Other as shadow of the Self. The Orient
is thus turned into stereotypes of extremities, or
the Western Self’s aspirations for beauty and love,
such as the Islamic harem or Madame Butterfly,
and abject fears, such as barbarism and opium. As
a result, the Orientalist formula dictates that the
Orient is polarized, emptied of psychological
depth and subjectivity. The extremes of Samuel
Taylor Coleridge’s “A sunny pleasure-dome with
caves of ice!” in Kubla Khan is split between the
demonic and the domestic, with the exotic unfold-
ing in the most predictable manner. The West
projects its own neuroses onto the opposing con-
structs of, among others, Khans and Shangri-las,
of the Mongolian horde and the Tibetan religios-
ity. Inherent in both ends of Orientalist stereotypes
are transgressions and taboos that the West must
shun otherwise. At a time when science and reason
are secularizing the West, the need for myth and
what lies beyond reason is displaced onto the
Orient. Orientalism, hence, allows the West to
articulate its own repressions in the name of rep-
resenting the East. Thus, the West creates an iden-
tity for the Orient based on Western rather than
Eastern ideas and notions. This entry focuses
on the theoretical framework underlying Said’s
work, the response to Orientalism, and its appli-
cation in the realm of global capitalism.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of Orientalism derives
primarily from Michel Foucault’s discourse theory
and Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony.
Orientalism 517
Foucault inspires Said to cross the distinction
between nonpolitical and political knowledge in
that Western Orientalists are vested in the mainte-
nance of power over their subject matter of the
East. Accordingly, no such thing as true, apolitical
knowledge exists. Gramsci, on the other hand,
demonstrates that consensus or hegemony can be
forged in a civil society without resorting to coer-
cion or violence. Foucauldian discursive power is
woven into Gramscian hegemony to buttress
Saidian Orientalism.
Reaction
Iconoclastic and controversial, Said’s Orientalism
has been credited by some as having single-handedly
inaugurated postcolonialism. Said provides a
counter-hegemonic theoretical basis for Western
liberals and non-Western academics in search of an
alternative to canonical criticism. Many postcolo-
nial scholars build on Said’s foundational work:
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak links Said with Jacques
Derrida’s notion of deconstruction and the subal-
tern group that argues for the need for strategic
essentializing; Homi Bhabha refers to Frantz Fanon’s
psychoanalysis with Saidian colonial stereotypes
when interrogating the ambivalence of nation and
narration. Other scholars have taken Said to task
for creating yet another totalizing, master narrative.
Instead of Orientalism, critics accuse Said of
Occidentalizing, to the extent of anti-Western
rhetoric from a Western-trained elite of Palestinian
descent. Critics cite as an example Said’s fervent
devotion to the Palestinian cause in The Question
of Palestine, which Said supporters see as engaged
scholarship.
Politics aside, Said does ignore counter-hegemonic
voices within the colonies as well as within the
Western discourse itself. It has been argued that
Said’s monolithic Orientalism fails to account for,
in particular, inner tensions within artistic expres-
sions. A host of scholars have challenged Said from
various angles: Aijaz Ahmad from the local condi-
tions in India and from the global theory of
Marxism; Lisa Lowe from ethnic studies marked
by hybridity and heterogeneity; Dennis Porter from
the ambivalent genre of travel writings; and John M.
MacKenzie from historicism, among others. That
one must contend with Orientalism to stake out a
518 Orientalism
territory attests to the centrality of Said’s book, its
flaws notwithstanding. Any rehearsal of Said’s
flaws without acknowledging his potential sug-
gests a reactionary position, one that may be in
denial of the fundamental power dynamics of
knowledge production. After all, Said himself hints
at some blind spots of his work. With the caveat
that Europe sets itself off against the Orient as an
alter ego, Said points away from an antithetical
and mutually exclusive relationship between the
West and the Orient to a symbiosis, with a sense
of self-reflexivity shot through the manifest and
hegemonic as well as the subterranean and repressed
half. Said in Culture and Imperialism elaborates
that a cultural archive must not be read unilater-
ally but bilaterally, aware of both the hegemonic
discourse and the repressed, alternative discourse.
This suggests a possible symbiotic relationship
between the metropolitan and the subaltern because
we exist in the relationship between the two, rather
than outside it. Just as the imperialist instinct pro-
pels the West to study and hence gain control of
the Orient, the contrapuntal instinct leads the
West to absorb, to identify with, and to be the
Orient. Scholarship in the new millennium ought
to expand Said’s work to tease out the cultural
complexity Said has intimated.
The defensive reaction against Said is evidenced
in the discipline of the other Orient—Far East or
East Asia, which is not covered in Orientalism,
with its focus on the Muslim world and, by exten-
sion, the Anglophone and Francophone postcolo-
nial condition. Some in ethnic studies and area
studies appear to be in denial regarding the rele-
vance of Orientalism. In the former—Asian
American studies, for instance—Orientalism
resides as much in the mainstream culture against
which it defines itself as in the Western cultural
heritage it inherits. The White gaze at the Oriental
Other invariably taints Asian American represen-
tations of Asians and things Asian, as Sheng-mei
Ma contends in The Deathly Embrace: Orientalism
and Asian American Identity. Assuredly, compli-
cated psychology energizes ethnic identity forma-
tion: Ethnic writers Orientalize the Other to
dissociate themselves from their race and to assim-
ilate into the multiethnic United States. With
respect to area studies on East Asia, its genesis in
the cold war West is already Orientalist in its grap-
pling with the enemy of Red China. To refute
Orientalism without considering area and ethnic
studies’ own implication in Orientalist projects is
tantamount to late capitalism dismissing Karl
Marx’s critiques. Indeed, this rejection may signal
a self-Orientalizing vigorously repressed in Asian
America and in Asia. Ethnic and area studies shun
the word and concept of “Orientalism” perhaps
because it aptly describes their own impulse and
genesis. The millennial, self-empowering ethnic
and Asian subjects thus turn away from the 19th-
century colonial abjection, oblivious to the neo­
colonial traces within globalization.
Orientalism and Global Capitalism
Global capitalism does not inherently decolonize
and revolutionalize the human mind. Rather than
being undone by transnational cultural flow, old
mental constructs and biases may be repackaged in
neoliberal, politically correct, culturally sensitive,
aesthetically entrancing, and commercially viable
new clothes. For example, instead of the Oriental
yellow peril and Fu Manchu, global cinema now
regales us with Jet Li’s arch villain in Lethal
Weapon 4 and The Mummy: Tomb of the Dragon
Emperor. Instead of Madame Butterfly, Broadway
and Hollywood entertain us with Miss Saigon and
the blue-eyed Zhang Ziyi in Memoirs of a Geisha.
From Hong Kong gangster films, John Woo extracts
and perfects his aesthetics of violence for Hollywood
blockbusters. From J-Horror and Tartan Asian
Extreme labels, the horrendous Orient is wedded to
the hypnotic Orient, reinscribing the polarities
inherent in Coleridge. That Jet Li et al. would
blithely perform in a way that lends themselves to
self-Orientalization, admittedly with certain varia-
tions each time, can be seen as signaling the discur-
sive power of Western hegemony. Herein lies the
potential of Said’s Orientalism as a theoretical exit
from the omnipresent global capitalism: Said can
be applied to read cultural formations far from the
Near East in the new millennium, as long as the
researcher fine-tunes Said for local conditions.
For example, in the cultural productions from
greater China, a contender for world leadership in
the 21st century, Western hegemony lingers. The
paragon of China’s fifth-generation filmmaking,
Zhang Yimou, has long been charged with self-
Orientalizing in pursuit of international accolade
such as an Academy Award. It can be argued that

the spectatorial extravagance in Zhang’s historical
martial arts fantasies are intensified so much so
that the dynastic China becomes the exotic Other
parallel to the West’s exotic Orient. In Red Sorghum
early in his career, Zhang drew from the primor-
dial, archetypal rural past of China constructed by
root-searching writers such as Mo Yan. Premodern,
rural, and non-Han minority China can be seen as
serving the same function as the defamiliarizing
Orient in Western Orientalism. Although Mo Yan
may sincerely believe that his 1987 novel is icono-
clastic and revolutionary within the post-Mao liter-
ary landscape, to some the textual violence and
sexuality, both in English translation and in Zhang’s
film, confirm the long-held Orientalist stereotypes
in the West. The West does not read Mo Yan/
Zhang Yimou within the context of Maoist censor-
ship and repression, but within the context of
Orientalist representations. As if to compensate for
Oriental excesses, Zhang’s long career is punctu-
ated by neorealist films of common people strug-
gling against the authority—films such as The
Story of Qiu Ju, Not One Less, and Happy Times.
To mitigate the force of Orientalism, cultural prac-
titioners, particularly those with a non-Western
background, must weigh, consciously, ethical as
well as aesthetic consideration, balancing market-
ability with concerns for artistic integrity and col-
lective responsibility. China’s sixth-generation
filmmakers have seemingly rebelled against their
predecessors’ aesthetics in making realistic and
anti-Orientalist films; their films have been endorsed
by various international film awards and art house
aficionados, but China’s domestic viewers do not
particularly favor Jia Zhangke, Zhang Yang, Wang
Xiaoshuai, Hao Ning, and the like. Some consider
it ironic that anti-Orientalist self-representations
on the screen resonate more with film connoisseurs
abroad than with the masses at home, even though
these sixth-generation films are inspired by and
depict the quotidian life of the masses.
In Orientalism, Said heralds an egalitarian and
non-repressive relationship between the Orient
and the Occident, without having charted the
route to that utopia. However, that cultural bal-
ance remains an elusive dream in view of the
armed conflicts between the West and Islamic
fundamentalism, the socioeconomic cold war
between the United States and China, the inequal-
ity between Global North and South, and the
Other, The 519
divide between the haves and the have-nots within
any given nation.
Sheng-mei Ma
See also Colonialism; Cosmopolitanism; Culture
Further Readings
Ma, S. (2000). The deathly embrace: Orientalism and
Asian American identity. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Said, E. (1978). Orientalism. New York: Pantheon.
Other, The
The Other (which can refer to just one person or a
group of people) is directly related to personal iden-
tity and how a person defines himself or herself.
Typically, the Other is perceived negatively and is
deemed different from and less admired or respected
than the self. However, the Other can also be a
positive disassociation. When a person deems
another Other, he or she has decided that their
identities are different. The person rendered Other
may or may not be aware of the first person’s con-
tempt because the process of Othering may be a
direct communication, such as a racial slur, or an
unspoken disdain for, or avoidance, of the Other.
This socially constructed process of Othering
requires a sense of self, with either positive or nega-
tive elements, or both, and a motivation by the self
to categorize and cognitively organize the perceived
identities of other individuals and groups of people.
This entry discusses the history and process of
Othering, along with some examples of ways peo-
ple are deemed different and thus Othered.
History of Othering
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the German phi-
losopher, is credited with identifying the process
of Othering in his depiction of slave–master rela-
tionships and the reciprocal, but not necessarily
equal, power between them. Edmund Husserl,
also of German descent, further developed the
idea of Othering, focusing on lived experiences
and the standpoints of individuals based on their
520 Other, The
interaction with distinct, often different, individu-
als. The process of Othering is linked to power, as
described by the French philosopher Michel
Foucault, who suggests that behavior and interac-
tion are influenced by power in all relationships.
Othering is socially constructed by all parties of a
relationship; the negotiation of identity often
involves Othering, or noting differences between
individuals and groups, to identify what power a
person or group has and what power that person
or group would prefer to have. Edward Said’s
theory of Orientalism is directly related to the
Othering process. He argues that through colo-
nialism, Western ideas and practices were privi-
leged over those of the East or Arab countries.
When deciding that Western beliefs and practices
are better, the rest of the world, and specifically
foreign cultures, is Othered and deemed less
important or influential. Eating the Other, or par-
taking of and then consuming Othered cultural
products, practices, and values is a concept bell
hooks discussed in her many writings criticizing
the Othering process. More recently, theorist
Mark Orbe has investigated power relationships
and outlined communication patterns of cocul-
tural, or minority, groups and their communica-
tive responses to being Othered both in
interpersonal interactions and as a group member
in civic discourse. Orbe’s research identifies mul-
tiple strategies used to communicate more—or
less, depending on the goal of the minority indi-
vidual or group—effectively, with perceived or
obvious Others. His research also broadens the
traditional definitions of the Other from merely
racial and gender categories to all of the ways in
which the self distinguishes itself from Others,
including sexual orientation, age, and socioeco-
nomic status.
The Process of Othering
The Other is identified usually as different in
appearance, but not always. One can also be ren-
dered less worthy or not normal in ability or by
association to Others, such as friends or family.
Othering, or the process of identifying an individ-
ual or group of people as the Other, marks them
as strange, foreign, exotic, or heathen. Usually,
these descriptions of Otherness are negative or
unfavorable.
Othering is rooted in the concepts of ingroup
favoritism and outgroup bias. Ingroup favoritism
suggests that a person deemed similar—in multiple
ways including appearance, gait, socioeconomic
status, and so forth—to the self will be treated
well or better than a dissimilar person and will
receive some favoritism in interactions or behav-
iors by the self. The favoritism could be actual or
perceived and might be tangible, but usually is not.
Conversely, when someone is deemed a member of
an outgroup, or unlike the self, that person will be
Othered, or treated poorly or worse than someone
in the ingroup. Othering is often covert because of
the prescribed social requirements of polite behav-
ior and positive communication.
Othering can have multiple resulting behaviors
or outcomes. First, the Other may be ignored or
rendered invisible by the self. Ralph Ellison’s
Invisible Man initiated research on invisibility of
people because of their differences, suggesting that
the Black male is rendered invisible and disempow-
ered because of his Othering by White society,
which refuses to acknowledge him as a person or
his contributions to society. Because discussions
about race and racial research often focus on the
dualistic approach of White versus Black, other
races are often ignored completely or merely men-
tioned as footnotes. Recent invisibility research,
specifically about Asian American invisibility in
the workplace, has been conducted by Wei Sun.
Research about Othering and the rendering invisi-
ble of many people because of intersections of
identity are also being conducted. For example,
stay-at-home dads can be Othered because of a
combination of both their gender and occupation.
Additionally, overweight people are often ironi-
cally invisible when Othered, but age and attrac-
tiveness may also contribute to the self deeming
them different, or Other.
Second, if Others are not rendered invisible,
they may instead suffer from hypervisibility,
wherein differences between the preferred self or
group and the deemed deficient individual or
group are highlighted. For example, Muslim
women who wear headscarves that hide their hair
and necks may be Othered because of their defini-
tions and display of modesty. Although a woman
wearing a headscarf may not feel her religious
practices are the most important layer of her iden-
tity, and instead believes her educational level is

the most defining layer of her identity, she will
likely be hypervisible in the scarf to others and will
be deemed an Other.
Essentialism is a result of the hypervisible
Othering. Essentialism suggests that all who look
or act similarly have similar experiences. Instead of
recognizing individual attitudes and actions within
groups, all are perceived similarly, or Othered.
Muslim women may be Othered, or essentialized,
because it is perceived that they all must wear
headscarves because of their religious affiliation,
when, in reality, some who are devoutly religious
do not wear scarves. According to the research of
Ronald L. Jackson II, Black males are hypervisible
and Othered by essentializing. Black males are
often hypersexualized, stigmatized as criminals,
and underestimated in education and occupational
levels. These labels, all negative, further illustrate
the many intersections of identity that lead to
Othering, or defining the Other as different from
the assumed or actual status quo.
Third, Othering may be enacted and the Other
may be made to feel further unwelcome by linguis-
tic collusion. Linguistic collusion may involve
code-switching, or changing to a language foreign
or unfamiliar to the Other. When two or more
individuals want to exclude another from their
conversation, using a foreign language, or using
words unfamiliar to the Other sends a message of
exclusion. Linguistic collusion can also happen
when the self addresses the Other, but in a rude or
loud or gesture-filled manner that makes the
Other, who is deemed an intruder, uncomfortable.
Fourth, the process of Othering can permanently
stigmatize individuals or groups. Explanations for
stigmatizing and its negative outcomes are outlined
by scholar Erving Goffman. City governments and
police officials are usually hesitant to identify juve-
nile delinquents for fear that they will forever be
remembered as the child who either caused or was
in trouble. Besides behavior that results in Othering,
physical appearance or (lack of) ability can stigma-
tize, too. Members of the deaf community, when
using American Sign Language (ASL), are often
Othered linguistically and by ability because the
perception is that a normal, fully functioning per-
son requires hearing ability.
Fifth, the person may be Othered, but to some
degree accepted, as an outsider within. This con-
cept is also sometimes called the Other other, or a
Other, The 521
person who belongs to, and should act like, an
Othered group but does not. Some Others feel this
acceptance is an honorary position and are grateful
to be accepted by the self in that manner, having
their differences overlooked. Additional individuals
may find the outsider within perspective limiting
and patronizing. Passing is a related concept of the
outsider within. While passing, an Other’s differ-
ences are not noticed or evaluated. The Other oper-
ates as if there are no differences, even though they
are present and the self’s behavior toward the Other
would change if he or she was aware of the Other’s
differences. An example is easily found in sexual
orientation. Because of heteronormativity, some
closeted gay men who are not overtly effeminate are
thought to be straight and they pass as such.
Racially, some biracial people are difficult to Other
based solely on physical appearance. Sometimes
even though a biracial person would be Othered if
his or her race were known, the individual does not
disclose family ancestry, but instead passes as a
member of the preferred race. Finally, passing is
often seen in accents and pronunciation of words.
Just as actors expend energy to overcome linguistic
identifiers that identify their backgrounds, many
people practice pronunciations that sound distinctly
different from that of their casual interactions to
avoid being Othered.
Most persons can recall a critical incident in
their lives when they were deemed an Other or
told that their behavior, looks, or abilities were
different than those of the privileged and preferred.
On the playground, when choosing team members
for a kickball or baseball game, the perceived
weakest, or physically deficient, player is chosen
last by the team captain. When playing as a child,
some are told that girls do not play with trucks or
that boys do not play with dolls. Racially, slurs
and epithets are usually yelled as part of a critical
incident when someone is Othered. Mocking of
language ability or accents is another example of
Othering wherein the self discriminates and delin-
eates between normal and expected attributes,
traits, and behaviors, and those that are different.
Not all of these critical incidents will be as extreme
or affecting as Others as the self forms a personal
identity. Some may be deeply affected when told
they were too young or too old to participate in an
event, but less affected by a critical incident
Othering them because of race. Others will have
522 Other, The
the same experience but not remember its impact
as a critical incident, or defining moment of their
self-identity construction or cognitive categorizing
of Others.
Othering does not have to be based on just one
physical characteristic of a person or group of
people. Communication scholar Brenda J. Allen
refers to herself, a Black female, as both twice
blessed and doubly oppressed. When she is
Othered, both positively and negatively, it is likely
that multiple layers of her identity, or intersec-
tions of both gender and race, are being evaluated
or perceived in the Othering process. Groups of
people are Othered in a similar manner. The pro-
cess of Othering is not always completely nega-
tive. For instance, Cinco de Mayo (May 5th in
Spanish) commemorates a Mexican war victory
over France. Many U.S. citizens enjoy specific
Mexican foods and beverages each year on that
day, believing they are celebrating Mexican
National (independence) Day and will toast and
cheer anyone they deem Latino, or Other. How­
ever, Othering can definitely be negative. For
example, in the United States, one racial slur used
against Latinos is “lazy Mexican,” regardless of
where the person is from. Citizens of Brazil,
Paraguay, or Puerto Rico are just as likely to be
called “lazy Mexican” as is a Mexican national or
Mexican American. The Latinos’ phenotype, or
skin tone, facial features, and hair color all likely
influence the slur and perception of difference or
Other as it does positively in the Cinco de Mayo
example. Also, accents are just as likely to result
in them being rendered Other, as are their occupa-
tions or perceived educational levels and socioeco-
nomic status.
Otherness: Defining Differences
Accent and pronunciation lead to Othering. There
is no quicker way to decide someone is foreign
than to hear his or her pronunciation of words.
One need not be of a foreign nationality, though,
to be the Other based on accent and pronuncia-
tion. In many areas of the United States, local
pronunciations of street, city, and landmark names
are unexpected by outsiders and expose the out-
sider when he or she speaks. The pronunciation of
the state of Oregon provides an example, as does
the city of Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, and the Gila
Valley in Arizona. Accent and pronunciation are
also closely tied to geographical biases. Despite
everyone in the United States having an accent,
some are thought to evoke more intelligence or
credibility. For example, the Midwest accent is
most typically used by television and radio report-
ers and is thought to be the preferred accent of the
United States. Accents that are believed to express
less intelligence or educational background include
the southern drawl and the iconic accent from
Bronx, New York. Individuals who speak in these
accents are quickly—and negatively—identified as
Others. A notable exception to the Othering based
on accent is the Boston, Massachusetts, accent.
Even though it is especially distinct and unique,
speaking in the accent usually does not result in
being negatively identified as an Other.
In the United States, youth and ability are highly
prized. Conversely, age and a loss of agility are
despised and deemed Other. This privileging of
youth in the United States is opposite of that in
many foreign cultures. In Asia, for example, most
national cultures revere age and experience. Filial
piety, or respect for family and ancestors, are
important concepts to the structure of societal
interactions.
In recent years in the United States, there have
been many conflicts in workplaces caused by
Othering practices. New employees, who are typi-
cally young and comfortable using technologies to
accomplish work tasks, are rendered Other by their
older colleagues who value hard work and a focus
on task accomplishment. The younger employees
are deemed Other and less likely to show devotion
to the job, specific tasks, or their coworkers. Older
employees are labeled the Other because they are
perceived as being less savvy in using technology at
work or fully appreciating the concepts of work-life
balance. The Othering makes the older employees
less desirable colleagues because they are viewed as
unable to adapt to a changing work environment.
Twelve-step programs to overcome addictions
to alcohol, drugs, or problematic behaviors are
sometimes the topic of jokes. These jokes demon-
strate some disdain for the addicted person, who is
Othered for his or her inability to control his or her
appetite for the problematic substance or action.
Because 12-step programs are designed to stop and
prevent future deviant behavior, participants by
default are deemed Other, or unable to lead normal

lives without professional intervention and the sup-
port of similarly deviant Others. Others with
admitted addictions are Othered and sadly, forever
stigmatized. For example, during a single family
dinner, a person who has been Othered may be
reminded multiple times of his or her Otherness.
And, although the reminders of Otherness may be
meant well, such as to keep temptations away from
the Other, they further stigmatize and remind the
Other of his or her deviance.
Physical attractiveness is an important commod-
ity in U.S. society. Attractive people are usually
stereotyped as being more friendly or personable
than unattractive persons. Unattractive people,
conversely, are thought to be less intelligent or
capable and are Othered as different from the
norm, or perceived physical beauty. Situation com-
edies and movies are believed to reflect or mirror
current societal attitudes and opinions. If this
reflection is correct, the preferred body shape and
type in U.S. society is a mesomorph, or a v-shaped
torso with a small waist, slightly wider hips and an
obvious bust or pectoral muscles. Those whose
bodies are not mesomorphic are Othered and are
perceived to have idiosyncratic or stereotypical per-
sonalities. Men or women who are thin are called
ectomorphs and are usually thought to be some-
what erratic or nervous and uncomfortable with
themselves. Male and female overweight bodies, or
endomorphs, are Othered as being jolly, slow, and
typically less intelligent. The overweight bodies are
usually the object of jokes concerning their size,
appetite, slowness, or stupidity, which results in
ridicule and often laughter. Height, too, is used to
gauge similarity between the self and an Other.
Taller men are the preferred prototype and, as
such, typically earn more than shorter men and are
perceived to have more leadership skills and poten-
tial than are their shorter counterparts. Women are
Othered when they are too tall, too petite, or too
short; they are then perceived to be cute and nice.
Occupations and career choices are gendered in
the United States. A female who says she works in
the health care field is quickly dismissed or Othered
as a nurse or physician’s assistant, and only rarely
immediately identified as a medical doctor.
Additionally, the concept of a male nurse, or a
male performing tasks that are evaluated as female
tasks, causes laughter, especially in media depic-
tions such as the movie Meet the Parents.
Other, The 523
In the United States, except for notable excep-
tions, educational level dictates the career a person
has and his or her perceived intelligence. High
school graduates are seen more favorably than
are those who pass the General Educational
Development (GED) exams. Those without a high
school diploma are Othered, as are persons who do
not graduate from college. Having more education
typically translates to the perception of increased
cognitive abilities and accomplishment. Although
more and more colleges and universities are offer-
ing online courses and degrees, graduates of resi-
dential college programs are still more respected
than are those who graduated from online degree
programs, who are Othered, or deemed as having
a less rigorous or engaging academic experience.
Ethnicity is another way in which people are
deemed different, or Othered. Ethnic Othering
prescribes who is a member of the ingroup, and
will therefore likely be favored, compared with
outgroup members, who will likely encounter bias.
Some suggest that only by Othering are cultural
traditions and practices continued from generation
to generation. Holiday celebrations and traditions,
such as the spring celebration of No Ruz by Persian
Americans, are delineated as different than are
holidays that most U.S. citizens celebrate, and
worthy of Othering. Yet, if No Ruz is not cele-
brated within the Persian American community, it
will be forgotten quickly. Japanese Americans
were Othered by the U.S. government following
the attack on Pearl Harbor and were forcibly
moved to internment camps. Their extreme
Othering suggested the Japanese Americans were
not capable of having a sole allegiance to the U.S.
government, based on intersections of their iden-
tity including family and heritage and physical
appearance. Concerning ethnicity and Othering,
consider March 17th, or St. Patrick’s Day, which
is celebrated across the United States, even by
those who are not of Irish heritage. This example
is interesting because although Irish Americans are
now the third largest ethnic group in the United
States (following British and German Americans),
they were once overwhelmingly despised by the
U.S. population. Although Irish Americans were
once negatively Othered in U.S. history, they now
are Othered positively.
A person can be Othered because of his or her
family and heritage. In the United States, jokes
524 Other, The
and media depictions of Italian Americans often
refer to familial ties to the Mafia or criminal activ-
ity. Othering resulting from family affiliation is
typically the product of multiple intersections of
identity, including ethnicity and spiritual beliefs
or religious practices. For instance, families who
are hesitant to use medical advice and medicine
and instead rely more specifically on prayer or
meditation for healing are deemed different, and
Other. The family practices and faith may be spe-
cific to a religious sect, or an adaptation of a reli-
gion. The intersections of identity can contribute
to their Othering.
Contrary to family, a person chooses whom he
or she refers to as friends. The choice of some
friends can lead a person to be Othered because
those friends represent different social groups than
the self believes the Other should be involved with.
High school social groups and alliances are often
depicted in U.S. movies. The popular students are
usually the cheerleaders and athletes. Unpopular
Others include academic club members and staff
members of the school newspapers. Though it may
seem that the popular students are the only ones
describing the unpopular students as Other, this
goes both directions. The popular students are
often labeled negatively, also as Other.
Although the words gender and sex are often
used interchangeably, sex usually refers to biologi-
cal, genetic, and anatomical issues. Gender repre-
sents societal and familial socialization concerning
appropriate behaviors, communication patterns,
and pursuits. Because males and females are
specifically socialized concerning appropriate
behavior, Othering is often the result of deviant
gender(ed) behavior. Young girls are often told to
sit like ladies. Young boys are told to not throw
like girls or cry like babies. Not adhering to spe-
cifically taught gender roles renders one either
invisible or hypervisible and Othered. When filling
out most surveys, there is always a demographic
question labeled sex or gender. Usually male is
listed first and female is juxtaposed as Other,
which has been the focus and fight of feminists for
many years. The goal of feminism is that women
will not be recognized as a second choice, or less
than their male counterparts. The feminist move-
ment seeks equal rights for women that are man-
dated by the law and seen in practice in homes,
schools, and workplaces. To further explain how
Othering is a process of multiple layers of identity,
the womanism movement criticizes the feminism
movement as being solely concerned with the
rights and opportunities of White women. Women
of color in the womanism movement suggest they
are being Othered as less important or less regarded
and respected compared with men, when com-
pared with White women. In the socially con-
structed process of Othering, many intersections of
identity are perceived. Further Othering is experi-
enced by some who are intersexed because of the
two, limiting gender categories of male and female.
Intersexed individuals have both male and female
sexual organs and feel Othered when they are ren-
dered invisible and not acknowledged.
Geographical location and background can lead
to Othering. In global geography, practices of the
West, meaning North America, are often portrayed
as correct, or good, and contrary practices, particu-
larly those in the Southern hemisphere, as different,
or Other. The phrase “West versus the rest” fur-
ther demonstrates how ideas and practices emanat-
ing from the United States are adopted or imposed
worldwide, based on Said’s research on Orientalism.
Within the United States, the North versus South
Othering is consistent with that of the world. The
South is typically Othered as backward or slow to
accept change, whereas the North is progressive
and plentiful. Within cities, similar geographical-
based biases can affect perceptions and provide
Othering to its inhabitants. The city of South
Tucson, the south and west sides of Chicago, and
southeast Washington, D.C., all provide percep-
tions of crime and lack of opportunities, or Other.
Nationality, or country of origin, is information
used to determine Others. Depending on the pass-
port a person has, he or she will be deemed Other,
or different from the preferred. Othering resulting
from nationality is rooted in colonialism and the
suggestion that practices that are decided to be
negatively primitive should be discontinued and
progressive practices pursued. Nationality and
country of origin are also described, or Othered, in
common language, such as referring to places as
third world countries. The term developing nations
may or may not be less pejorative.
A person’s smell can render him or her as Other.
A person with poor hygiene or bad body odor is
immediately labeled homeless, which suggests any-
one with a home would prefer to carry no body

odor. A person’s smell, or olfactory signature, is
determined by his or her diet and body chemistry.
Those who smell different are labeled Other. The
Othering that is by smell is influenced culturally.
People who eat a lot of curry typically emit an
odor different from those on diets of pasta and
breads. A Korean word, norinae, which means
“White person smell” was used to describe the
new, distinct smell of the U.S. military personnel in
South Korea after the Korean War. The soldiers
were deemed Other by the local Koreans, whose
olfactic signatures were strongly influenced by the
kimchi (fermented cabbage) in their diets.
Physiological impairments, such as a loss of
hearing, or deafness, and blindness, provide oppor-
tunities to Other. Because normal is defined as
having five senses, those who cannot hear or can-
not see are deemed deficient and Other. There is a
real frustration within the deaf community, though,
concerning the portrayal of deafness as a defi-
ciency. With new technologies, some deaf people
can choose to undergo surgery and acquire a
cochlear implant, which enables them to hear.
Many members of the deaf community resist the
surgery, though, suggesting that getting the implant
reinforces the notion of a negative Other who can-
not hear. Instead, deaf people prefer to be Othered
positively, suggesting their other senses are height-
ened because they cannot hear.
Race is usually the first attribute noticed in
deeming someone an Other. Obvious and easily
recognizable differences in phenotype, facial fea-
tures, and skin tone suggest that race is salient to
Othering. Many recent researchers, including
Thomas Nakayama, have investigated “white-
ness” or the White race as relating to the preferred,
or status quo. All other races are then compared
with the White race, or Othered. Scholars have
also focused specifically on members of the White
race as not having race, or as having an absence of
racial attitudes or attributes. For instance, labeling
those who are not White “persons of color” seems
to further the idea that Whites are not of color and
are the preferred Other. The state of Hawai‘i is an
interesting place to study because many races share
the islands and no one race is a majority.
Children, teens, and adults have reported sexual
orientation as a form of Othering. Heterosexuality
is deemed correct or normal by many, and sexu-
alities that are different are negatively Othered.
Other, The 525
When children, teens, or adults are asked about
being bullied in school, extracurricular activities,
or even on the street, they often point to sexual
slurs as one way in which they were intimidated or
coerced. Bullying language directed toward males
often includes suggestions that the Other is gay or
is effeminate, which further embeds the idea of
heteronormativity, or that heterosexuality is normal
and correct. Females can also be Othered because
of sexual orientation. Although men are often
deemed invisible, or less than men because of their
non-heterosexuality, lesbians are often hypervisi-
ble in U.S. culture and revered as straight male
fantasies, if they are attractive. Lesbians, who are
Othered as being butch, or masculine, are also
Othered, but in a negative manner. Notable in this
manner of Othering is Elissa Foster’s research that
challenges the notion of heteronormativity, sug-
gesting educators need to reflexively evaluate their
teaching practices and change how they present
sexual orientations and relationships to their
students.
Others can be labeled as Other because of their
socioeconomic status or social class. In India, the
caste system dictates the social position and oppor-
tunities of a person based on family and ancestry.
Although the United States has no formalized caste
system, many suggest there is a system in the
United States based on socioeconomic status that
renders as Others those without ample monetary
means or social influence. Although U.S. society
emphasizes the concept of the American dream
wherein anyone can accomplish anything if he or
she works hard enough and follows the advice of
the common adage to “pick yourself up by your
bootstraps.” Those of lower socioeconomic status,
who have yet to achieve academically and do not
yet have monetary means, are labeled Other. For
examples of this concept, one can read biographi-
cal information about famous government and
business officials. Typically, their biographies indi-
cate that they began life with few resources but
worked hard and have accomplished a lot. Now as
a successful person, he or she may be Othered,
though, as an outsider-within, who is less entitled
to his or her current riches. Although socioeco-
nomic status Othering is typically negative, it
sometimes is used in a positive manner by the
Other. The Other may want to use the Othering as
proof that he or she is capable of accomplishing a
526 Otherness, History of
lot, especially because socioeconomic status was
transcended by diligent efforts.
Othering resulting from spiritual beliefs or reli-
gious practices has existed in the United States
since the founding of the country. The earliest U.S.
settlers sought religious freedom, and ironically
quickly Othered people in North America whose
spiritual beliefs differed from their own. Notably,
Native American reverence for the Mother Earth
and Great Spirit were labeled blasphemous and
Othered. Following September 11, 2001, it was
difficult to be a practicing Sikh in the United
States. Although the Sikh religion is not affiliated
with Islam—the religion of many of the September
11th hijackers—Sikh men, because they wear tur-
bans, were thought to be of the Muslim faith and
were Othered. The Othering against anyone
Muslim, especially men, or anyone perceived to be
Muslim or possibly engendering empathy with the
hijackers’ views, was intense and sometimes dan-
gerous. One Sikh man was killed in Arizona
because he was Othered to be a Muslim who sup-
ported or encouraged the hijackings. Differing
spiritual beliefs and religious practices are difficult
for many to rectify because they feel they person-
ally have the truth or are worshipping the one, true
God. All others who practice religious rites and
those who have no religious or spiritual affiliation
are deemed Other, or unbelievers.
Andrew J. Critchfield
See also Culture; Diversity
Further Readings
Allen, B. J. (2004). Difference matters: Communicating
social identity. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
Butler, J. (1993). Bodies that matter: On the discursive
limits of “sex.” New York: Routledge.
Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the management
of spoiled identity. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
hooks, b. (1992). Black looks: Race and representation.
Boston: South End Press.
Jackson, R. L., II. (2006). Scripting the Black masculine
body: Identity, discourse, and racial politics in popular
media. Albany: SUNY Press.
Sun, W. (2007). Minority invisibility: An Asian American
experience. Lanham, MD: University Press of
America.
Otherness, History of
The concept of “the Other,” and the related ideas
of “Otherness” and “Othering,” arose via a series
of interconnected intellectual moments in the
West, finding expression in philosophy, social
studies, literature, feminism, gender and sexuality
studies, race and ethnicity studies, aesthetics,
architecture, and the visual arts. These movements
are linked to investigations of identity and identi-
fication, with the need to find one’s own identity
or selfhood. An outcome of these searches is that
one’s self often becomes defined against another, a
phenomenon that can be called “definition through
difference,” articulated most clearly in the works
of the semiotician and linguist Ferdinand de
Saussure. He believes that all identity comes into
being in relational structures, or, put another way,
that individual entities gain meaning through for-
mally structured oppositions and differences.
Something is x, in part because it is not y, and only
through the knowledge of the identity of y can we
understand the identity of x (as “not-y”). In this
schema, y is “the Other,” the alterity. Today, the
designation “the Other” has come to be most com-
monly used to refer to an individual or group who
has been or is being marginalized from another,
that is being “othered.” This entry presents a his-
torical review of conceptualizations of Otherness.
The 19th-Century Origins
Conceptualizations dealing with Otherness have,
from their origins, been in some way intimately
related to definitions of modern and modernity—of
humankind’s existence and knowledge of self in the
modern world. At issue are not only self-identity
and identification, but also how to define the iden-
tity of the modern world and how to understand
the process of identification within it. The Ur-use of
the concept of the “Other” is believed to be Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s master–slave dialectic in
The Phenomenology of the Spirit. Within Hegel’s
schema, one can see the basis for the idea of the
Other as an issue of selfhood and as an issue of dif-
ference. To account for the development of “self-
consciousness,” as opposed to “consciousness,”
Hegel describes a mythical encounter between two
primordial (or “half”) people. Upon becoming

aware of an other, a “consciousness” has two
choices: it can choose to ignore the like-form in
front of it, or it can recognize the Other as a “mir-
ror” of itself and start to assert an identity in con-
tradistinction to that which it confronts—it can put
forth its identity as subject “I” against the object
with which it is faced. The encounter results in a
loss of and slippage within identity: In the recogni-
tion of another, a self loses itself, as it recognizes
the existence of the other consciousness. At the
same time, a self cannot truly see the other self but,
rather, sees its own self when looking at the other.
For Hegel, this encounter causes alienation, so that
a consciousness attempts to resynthesize the self
into a whole; it seeks resolution, the domination of
its subject—I—over the object, “the Other.”
An obverse thought process can be seen in the
work of the French modernist poet Jean-Nicolas-
Arthur Rimbaud. In a letter of May 15, 1871, to
Paul Demeny, one of two now known as the
“Letters of the Seer,” Rimbaud includes a phrase
that has come to be his signature utterance: je est
un autre. It can be translated in many ways, includ-
ing I is someone else, I is an other, and I is other.
The phrase has seen myriad interpretations, includ-
ing the argument that Rimbaud sought to know
himself by looking inward at his soul, distancing
himself from himself to be able to look at himself.
In so doing, he questioned every element of his
psyche, believing that the “I” that is left would be
the essence of his self. In this way, for Rimbaud, a
poet becomes a seer. Rimbaud’s formulation has
kinship with Hegel’s, except that the encounter is
interior rather than exterior. Additionally, his fer-
tile phrasing allows for two definitions of the
Other, both of which can exist simultaneously—
the Other that must be encountered and conquered
is within one’s self, or the Other and Otherness is
a state that one wants to achieve.
Early Developments of the 20th Century
The most immediate inheritors of these conceptual-
izations are found in 20th-century psychoanalysis
and philosophy. Jacques Lacan investigates the
Other in psychoanalytic terms, taking as his start-
ing point Sigmund Freud’s exploration of the ego.
In a series of lectures and writings, Lacan imagines
a scenario in which the Other is both interior and
exterior to a self. The two main concepts of import
Otherness, History of 527
here are his theories of the mirror-stage and of the
great Other. Lacan postulates that an infant first
sees himself or herself only incompletely, able to
view the body only in sections, from his or her eyes.
This phenomenon is the pre-mirror stage. At
6 months, the child encounters a mirror and is able
to see his or her self as a whole. The child at first
perceives the image as a competition, a contrast to
the fragmented identity seen up to that point. To
resolve this rivalry, the child identifies with the
image in the mirror, creating his or her ego identity
and giving rise to a feeling of victory or mastery.
However, the child also soon perceives the greater
mastery of the father and mother, the great Others,
whose gazes are all-encompassing. Thus, Otherness
in Lacan is both enabling and debilitating.
In Being and Nothingness: An Essay on
Phenomenological Ontology of 1943, the existen-
tialist philosopher and author Jean-Paul Sartre
posits an activation of self-ness that comes into
existence via an encounter with the Other, an
encounter that again involves the gaze. This
encounter is somewhat more positive than the one
outlined by Hegel and involves a Saussurian pro-
cess of identification via difference. For Sartre, a
being only becomes aware of itself when it encoun-
ters the gaze of an Other. In essence, upon realizing
that one is being watched by another, one gains
awareness of self. The outside viewer gazes on the
being, and in so doing, looks on that person as an
object. Realization of one’s objectness creates the
ability to look at oneself as an object, in something
of a Rimbaudian fashion. This phenomenon cre-
ates a paradox that Sartre sees but does not resolve.
On the one hand, a being learns to recognize itself
via that which it is not, and consciousness is predi-
cated on recognition of the outside world and
one’s difference. On the other hand, the gaze of the
Other is recognized as a power over the self, and to
challenge it one must attempt to reverse the
dynamic and become dominant, become the seer
rather than the seen, subject rather than object.
Thus, as is true with Hegel, the attempt to know
one’s self comes about via an exterior encounter.
Simone de Beauvoir, Sartre’s morganistic part-
ner in life and thought, works in a similar vein, but
she approaches the exterior interaction with the
Other from a different direction and addresses the
issue of the Otherness of gender. In “Pyrrhus and
Cinéas,” she explores the idea that the Other is
528 Otherness, History of
the one who has the freedom—as this self is free
because of his or her difference. The Other by
definition is free from the power of another, and
all Others are united by their contingent nature,
as one needs to convince another of an idea to
create a world of shared values. In The Second
Sex, de Beauvoir explicates the ways in which
the female gender has been placed in a second-
ary role to that of the male, codified as early as
Plato’s Republic. Here one can see the influence of
Hegel’s master–slave dialectic because she postu-
lates that it is a construct that woman is the Other
(object) to man’s primacy (subject). De Beauvoir’s
stance in The Second Sex is not contradictory to
the ideas she outlines in Pyrrhus: the contingency
she describes in Pyrrhus provides a path to libera-
tion. With The Second Sex, the definition of “the
Other” as one who is marginalized in society
becomes cemented. De Beauvoir has been criti-
cized, however, as being “heterosexist” because
she deals here with gender rather than sexuality.
However, she does later address the issue of the
Othering of the elderly, in The Coming of Age.
The complexities of these issues for feminist phi-
losophy were immediately picked up by others,
especially theorists influenced by Freud and Lacan,
including Luce Irigary and Julia Kristeva, who
both criticized and are indebted to de Beauvoir.
The 1970s to the Early 21st Century
The 1970s saw an explosion of scholarship regard-
ing Otherness in race, ethnicity, gender, and sexu-
ality. Of particular note are the works of Linda
Nochlin and Edward Said. In 1971, Nochlin pro-
duced the germinal work of feminist art history,
“Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?”
reprinted in Women, Art, and Power and Other
Essays. Nochlin addresses the “woman question,”
revealing that part of the problem lies in the ways
the issues have been formulated, the language with
which they are composed. She interrogates the
issue from all angles, including questioning the idea
of “greatness” and the “great artist,” and the for-
mulation of the identity of the “woman artist.” In
1978, Said ushered in colonial studies with his
groundbreaking book Orientalism. Examining his-
tory, art, and literature, Said argues that the West
is invested in depicting the Orient as a feminized
Other—irrational, weak, lesser, and secondary—in
essence revisiting the physical colonial act of
domination in the intellectual world.
Since the 1970s, a spectacular spectrum of
scholars has visited and revisited the issue of the
Other, resulting in numerous anthologies of great
rigor and scope. In the visual arts, the touchstone
exhibition for the exploration of the Other in all
its forms is The Decade Show: Frameworks of
Identity in the 1980s, a joint effort by the Museum
of Contemporary Hispanic Art, the New Museum
of Contemporary Art, and the Studio Museum of
Harlem in New York in 1990. In the 1970s and
1980s, artists and theorists explored the idea of
the Other from multiple directions, ranging from
investigations or condemnations of the ways that
one group can “other” another group to celebra-
tions of one’s own Otherness, an embracing of the
identities of difference. The philosopher and artist
Adrian Piper has had a particularly fascinating
oeuvre. As a woman of both Black and White
heritage and a Kantian scholar, Piper has probed
the issue from the point of view of both popular
culture and philosophical inquiry, and has been
able to address Otherness as one who is part of
two different cultures, who occupies a shifting
space that can be both liminal and central. Her
oeuvre spans the heydays of identity politics and
liberation movements of the 1970s and the multi-
culturalism of the 1980s, as well as the develop-
ments of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, in
which attention has increasingly been turned to
the limits to and paradoxes inherent in the idea of
the “Other.” In the first place, the Other is by
definition relative, that is to say, what is “other”
to one person or group is the familiar, recogniz-
able identity of another, and vice versa. Likewise,
to celebrate one’s “Otherness” can also in some
ways be a reinforcement of difference and distinc-
tion, a self-ghettoization. Thus, such scholars as
bell hooks, Mary McLeod, and Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak have investigated the “space” of Otherness,
a space both literal and psychic.
In like fashion, to accept the dynamic of the
“Other” is to accept a binary schema, with two
results. First, one group will always and only be
defined against another, and, more insidious, there
is only room for two groups. Latino/a scholars
have long complained that in a Black–White
schema, there is no place for another Other; the
same is true for other groups, including those of

Asian origin and Native Americans. Additionally,
a binary schema runs the risk of creating a hege-
monic Other, in which one determinant is given
precedent over all others. For instance, if race is
the criterion of Otherness, then socioeconomic
issues can remain unconsidered within a group of
a racial Other. Thus, recently scholarship has also
turned to examining ways around the binary
schema, as seen in Wendy Brown’s States of Injury:
Power and Freedom in Later Modernity and
Anthony Kwame Appiah’s Cosmopolitanism:
Ethics in a World of Strangers.
In part, these shifts in approaches are related to
the advent of the “post-s”—in particular, the post-
modern, the poststructuralist, the postcolonial, the
postfeminist, and the post-Black. The final term is
one coined by curator Thelma Golden and artist
Glenn Ligon, explored in the 2001 Studio Museum
of Harlem exhibition Freestyle, and the term and
the exhibition are together an extremely clear
example of such a shift. The Freestyle artists were
chosen because each, in some way, creates art that
both is predicated on Black identity and also goes
beyond it, so that blackness is not the signifier or
source of power, but one signifier among many.
Ewa Lajer-Burcharth articulates a similar issue
regarding gender and video art in her essay
“Duchess of Nothing,” in Women Artists at the
Millennium. Lajer-Burcharth discusses the video
art created by Pipilotti Rist and Sam Taylor-Wood,
works that interrogate the issue of the male gaze
and the female Other; again, for Lajer-Burcharth,
this issue is not the issue but one of many. In some
ways, this reframing is the legacy of the postmod-
ern Other, rather than that of the modern.
The Other and the Modern
Although the Other came into existence in and
through modern culture, the obverse is also true:
the “modern” and “modernity” were in part born
from the creation and use of Otherness. Definition
through difference is at the core of the modern
identity. A paradigmatic example is that of the so-
called inception of modern art, Pablo Picasso’s Les
Demoiselles d’Avignon. The “modernity” of this
canvas is linked both to the avant-garde work of his
immediate western predecessors—the impression-
ists and postimpressionists—and to Picasso’s use of
forms from outside the Western tradition—Oceanic
Otherness, History of 529
and African masks. To Picasso and his contempo-
raries, these masks were primitive forms that they
could appropriate and reinvent in a Western con-
text. These appropriative acts are quintessentially
related to Otherness: Picasso uses these outside
forms to create a “new” and different identity in
relation to the Western art that came before his,
and his appropriation relegates these forms to
Otherness, signaling their identity as primitive, as
less whole, less powerful, and less full.
These masks and cultures are Othered a second
time by a 1984 exhibition at the Museum of
Modern Art in New York, “Primitivism” in 20th-
Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and the Modern,
curated by William Rubin. As Hal Foster records in
“The ‘Primitive’ Unconscious of Modern Art, or
White Skin Black Masks,” the exhibition reinforced
this stereotype: Modern Western art is intentional,
sophisticated, individual, and deliberate, but non-
Western African and Oceanic art is tribal, primi-
tive, and lacking in individual identity. Faith
Ringgold addresses this issue in her work The
French Collection Part I; #7: Picasso’s Studio, 1991
Here, she reinserts an active Black female model
into Picasso’s creative process of Les Demoiselles
d’Avignon and reappropriates his appropriative
image into her work. She places it on a quilt, which
is both a feminine space and a traditional African
American medium. Ringgold reinserts the past,
precedent, and tradition that are lost when modern
artists such as Picasso “borrow” from African
sculpture and find their “inspiration” from the fig-
ure of a woman. Her work Picasso’s Studio is both
an illustration of the act of Othering and an image
of how to take back one’s Otherness.
Otherness and Early Modernity
Ironically, the act of Othering that has been the
least understood is that of the creation of the early
modern era—the invention of the Renaissance
against the late medieval, the so-called gothic. For
scholarship, this act of Othering has been treated
as less laden or personal, partly because of its tem-
poral distance from us. Unlike modern and con-
temporary Otherness, there is no living medieval
being with a voice to speak out against this act, yet
the issues are the same. Italian Renaissance human-
ists conceived of it (and themselves) as newly ratio-
nal, defined against the irrational medieval age.
530 Otherness, History of
The late medieval was deemed “Gothic” or “bar-
baric” from the 15th century on, and in the late
18th and 19th centuries, its art came to be known
as the work of the “Italian primitives.” With the
Renaissance as positive exemplar, Heinrich Wöfflin
codified the definition by difference and Otherness
of art history in his 1915 Principles of Art History,
creating a schema of binary identification. Only
recently has Marvin Trachtenberg proposed a
term not predicated on Otherness but on self-
identification: the medieval modern. In addition,
throughout scholarship on the late medieval and
early modern periods, there remains a tendency to
make assessments according to criteria of norms
and standards versus anomalies and deviations:
that which is not the norm becomes an Other.
Thus, the issue of the Other has reached the level
of the “post-Other” in some fields and in some
scholarship, but there remain many examples in
which the issue has been barely investigated, and
perhaps not even yet identified.
Mia Reinoso Genoni
See also Architecture, Sites, and Spaces; Renaissance Art
Further Readings
Armstrong, C. M., & Zegher, C. D. (Eds.). (2006).
Women artists at the millennium. Cambridge: MIT
Press.
Blake, N., Rinder, L., & Scholder, A. (1995). In a
different light: Visual culture, sexual identity, queer
practice. San Francisco: City Lights Books.
Foster, H. (1985). The “primitive” unconscious of modern
art, or White skin Black masks. In Recodings: Art,
spectacle, cultural politics (pp. 181–210, 228–233).
Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press.
Genoni, M. R. (2009). Vedere e ’ntendere: Word and
image as persuasion in Filarete’s Architettonico Libro.
Arte lombarda, tbd. Available at http://www.vponline
.it/riviste/666112/2009/1/5/acquista
Golden, T. (Ed.). (2001). Freestyle. New York: Studio
Museum in Harlem.
Hassan, S., & Dadi, I. (Eds.). (2001). Unpacking Europe:
Towards a critical reading. Rotterdam, the
Netherlands: Museum Boijmans Van Beuningen, NAi.
Peraza, N., Tucker, M., & Conwill, K. H. (1990). The
decade show: Frameworks of identity in the 1980s.
New York: Museum of Contemporary Hispanic Art,
New Museum of Contemporary Art, and Studio
Museum of Harlem.
Philippou, S. (2004). The primitive as an instrument of
subversion in twentieth-century Brazilian cultural
practice. Arq, 8(3–4), 285–298.
Shotwell, A. (2007). Shame in alterities: Adrian Piper,
intersubjectivity, and the racial formation of
identity. In S. Horstkotte & E. Peeren (Eds.), The
shock of the Other: Situating alterity. Amsterdam:
Rodopi.
Trachtenberg, M. (2000). Suger’s miracles, Branner’s
Bourges: Reflections on “Gothic architecture” as
medieval modernism. Gesta, 39(2), 183–205.
 P
Passing
Passing refers to the act of deception in which
individuals use their inherent appearance and/or
learned ability in the pretense of infiltrating a
socioeconomic or an ethnic population to which
they do not belong but of which they are assumed
to be part. Historically, the connotation is usually
in reference to fair-skinned African American
individuals who purposely misrepresent them-
selves to the public as White. Although rare, there
are cases where this definition does apply to other
social and ethnic groups who also conceal or
abandon their true identity to assume another.
The infiltrator’s purpose usually is to achieve
personal and material advantages or escape being
persecuted because of racial discrimination. Many
passers engaged in this practice as a means of gain-
ing employment or advancing their careers. Others
did so to gain access to racially exclusive retail and
eating establishments. Some individuals passed to
experience the euphoria of interacting with Whites.
Passing is the means by which individuals who are
classified internally or externally as part of a dis-
criminated group are able to penetrate socioeco-
nomic barriers and interact with a more privileged
social circle.
In some cases, the passers, only partially African
American (genetically speaking), are victims of
their parents’ deception, causing the individuals to
believe themselves to be White. Before learning the
truth of their ethnic heritage, these persons were
living under a mistaken identity of sorts. Those
531
who were aware of their mixed heritage but con-
sciously continued the deception either through
direct actions or the omission of their racial heri-
tage were considered to be passing. This is the
working definition for the purposes of this entry.
This entry first presents some personal accounts
of and details legal proceedings related to passing.
Next, the opinions of African Americans and sup-
porters of racial equality with regard to passing are
discussed. Last, literary representations of passing
are described and whether the practice continues
today is examined.
Personal Accounts
Personal accounts of passing include the testimony
of Gregory Howard Williams, product of a White
mother and fair-skinned Black man who pretended
to be White. History implies that Williams’s
mother was aware of the deception, but Gregory
and his younger brother were not. They lived their
lives believing themselves to be White Americans
living in the racially segregated state of Virginia.
Williams’s parents divorced when he was 10 years
of age, and that was when he learned his father’s
racial identity. Similar to many other individuals
facing this truth, Williams’s initial response was
shock and rejection of his newfound heritage.
Until this point, he was misinformed. However,
when he became aware of his racial identity and
still identified himself as White, even only on occa-
sion, Williams was passing.
As stated, the typical passers used their assumed
whiteness to escape slavery and discriminatory
532 Passing
practices. In keeping with this more common pur-
pose was the case of Ellen Craft, the product of a
sexual relationship between a slave owner and his
slave mistress in the early 1800s. In 1848, Craft
and her husband, also a slave, traveled by train,
boat, and carriage for 4 days fleeing slavery in
Macon, Georgia, in search of freedom in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. What made Craft’s
story more remarkable than most was that she
passed herself off as a White man, traveling with a
Black servant (her husband).
In a third case, Walter White, a light-skinned,
blue-eyed male, used his ability to pass for White
to report, through firsthand accounts, racially dis-
criminatory practices to the entire country. Between
1920 and 1955, White assumed the identity of a
White male and traveled the southern states of the
United States to conduct investigations on lynch-
ings. White’s immediate family all reportedly pos-
sessed Caucasian features but suffered persecution
because they, at the insistence of White’s father,
chose to identify themselves as African Americans.
The family’s home was the intended target of a
lynch mob. The mob was deterred by the Whites’
and their Black neighbors’ proven ability to defend
themselves.
Events such as these influenced White’s decision
to become a leader of the civil rights movement
and a member of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People. His principal
method was to investigate the crimes against
Blacks and publicly expose them to the entire
country in hopes of generating more sympathy and
possibly changing U.S. opinion. Ironically, during
one of his trips in 1919, White’s true identity and
purpose were exposed. He managed to board a
train back to safety where a White conductor
reportedly stated to him that Whites were on the
lookout for a “yellow nigger” passing for White.
The conductor failed to realize that he was address-
ing the “yellow nigger” in question.
Another example of personal accounts of pass-
ing is quite arguably one of the most historically
notable. A number of the children born to the
union of Thomas Jefferson and his Black mistress,
Sally Hemmings, reportedly “shed” their African
American ethnic heritage. In the 1820s, their
daughters, Beverly and Harriet Hemmings,
assumed the identity of White women and escaped
slavery. Their brothers Eston and Madison,
despite having been emancipated according to the
terms of Jefferson’s will, eventually left Virginia
after their mother’s death. They moved to Ohio
where they each married women of similar com-
plexion and mixed racial heritage. The two broth-
ers were assumed to be White, but their conscious
decision to pass appears historically inconclusive
at that point.
Ironically, under Virginia law, they were con-
sidered White, but White Americans who knew of
their admixture of colored blood regarded them as
Negroes and treated them according to the racial
practices of the day. As a result, Eston, who grew
increasingly aggravated at being barred from the
local judicial, political, and educational systems,
relocated his family to Madison, Wisconsin, where
he assumed the named Eston H. Jefferson and
“became” a White man. Although some of Sally
Hemmings’s descendants followed Madison’s
example and openly acknowledged their mixed
heritage, others chose to pass and gain entry into
all-White regiments of the Civil War or married
into prosperous White families.
Legal Issues
The issue of passing was the subject of several
legal proceedings in U.S. courts. One of the most
controversial and highly publicized examples was
a lawsuit in 1924, Rhinelander v. Jones. Alice
Jones was the daughter of a middle-class White
mother and a mixed-race father. Leonard Kip
Rhinelander was a “pure” White man born to a
wealthy and esteemed family in New York.
Allegedly, Rhinelander and Jones were in a roman-
tic relationship, during which time the former was
fully aware of Jones’s mixed ancestry. The two
married, and because of his family’s status in soci-
ety, the union was well announced. At that point,
the Rhinelander family learned of Jones’s mixed
ancestry and persuaded Rhinelander to annul the
union soon after the wedding. Rhinelander, per-
haps out of fear of losing his multimillion-dollar
inheritance, caved in to his family’s demands. He
initially declared that Jones, in an attempt to
deceive him, identified herself as a White woman.
During the proceedings, which focused on
defining Jones’s “true race” moreso than her
alleged deception, Rhinelander later contradicted
himself by claiming that Jones deceived him by

concealing her heritage. Jones’s attorneys logically
argued that Rhinelander could not have been igno-
rant of Jones’s admixture because of their sexual
relationship that began before their marriage.
Jones presented correspondence between the two
as evidence. In an unprecedented and shocking
move, Jones’s attorneys persuaded her to partially
disrobe exclusively before an all-White male jury,
revealing her upper back, breast, and upper legs
for the purpose of presenting aspects of her physi-
cal appearance that were supposed proof of her
mixed ethnicity. The jury was also reminded that
Rhinelander had ample opportunity to observe
and examine her entire body, which successfully
proved that Rhinelander must have been aware of
Jones’s ethnic identity. The court found in favor of
Jones, ruling that Rhinelander’s claims for an
annulment were invalid. The couple legally sepa-
rated in 1930.
Rhinelander v. Jones served as a prime example
of the mass paranoia some Whites exhibited at the
prospect of interaction with “invisible Blacks.”
There was a fear of unintentional marriage and
further contamination of the White bloodline. The
growing multitude of slaves who used their fair
complexions to escape their owners, and Blacks
who passed to gain access to “White America”
enraged White segregationists. The result was
increasingly strict enforcement of Jim Crow laws
in many state governments to create even more
severe punishment for passers.
Organizations such as the Anglo Saxon Clubs of
America were formed to preserve White dominance
and racial segregation in the United States. The
club’s members in the state of Virginia were known
for their attempts to identify passers and create
legislation that further defined race and put more
restrictions on interracial marriage. Before 1910, a
person was considered Black if he or she was quan-
tified as at least one-fourth African American in the
state of Virginia. Between 1910 and 1924, this limit
was reduced to one-sixteenth partly because of the
vigorous labor of the Anglo Saxon Club. Finally in
1924, the state defined “White” as any person
in possession of no other blood except Caucasian in
any traceable amount. This was a slight variation
of the one-drop rule, which stated that any indi-
vidual with a proven or even suggested African
ancestry, regardless of the amount of admixture,
was considered to be African American.
Passing 533
Ironically, the apprehension of many state lead-
ers who feared that they and their families might
become re-categorized as colored caused them to
include the descendants of Pocahontas and John
Rolfe, and anyone with one-sixteenth of Native
American blood, in the legal definition of mar-
riage. The club vehemently opposed this portion
of the legislation on the grounds that it permitted
Negro Indians to marry Whites and further dimin-
ish the already endangered “pure White” popula-
tion. Their objections, however, were given little
consideration.
African American Opinion
Supporters of White supremacy are not alone in
their negative opinions regarding the practice of
passing. Many African Americans and other
defenders of racial equality have often expressed
distaste for the act citing two main arguments:
(1) passing goes against Black solidarity, and
(2) passing poses a threat to those involved.
Passing, although a voluntary action that may or
may not be taken for the most noble of reasons,
robs individuals and their progeny of their racial
identity. In many instances, the truth is revealed at
the most inopportune instance. This causes the
progeny and others a great deal of psychological
and emotional trauma as a new identity is abruptly
forced on them. In an effort to maintain the decep-
tion, one usually has to sever all ties to the African
American community and abandon the most impor-
tant ties of family and friendship. Shedding one’s
identity for the purposes of assuming another
makes the already incomplete lineage of African
Americans even more convoluted. Perhaps the most
compelling argument against passing is the notion
that it further diminishes potential support for the
arduous cause of uplifting the African American.
Literature
The real-life tradition of miscegenation and the
resulting phenomenon of passing were both
depicted in the realm of literature. Numerous
works of both fiction and nonfiction were derived
from interviews, historical incidents, and even the
personal accounts of the writers themselves. These
works illustrate various opinions, often starkly
opposed to each other.
534 Passing
Iola Leroy, written by Frances E. W. Harper,
deals with the conflict of passing versus Black soli-
darity. The novel’s primary protagonist, Iola, is the
child of a White slave master and fair-skinned
slave who the former emancipates and takes as his
wife. Three children were born to their union—
Iola, Harry, and Grace, all of whom are light-
complexioned and able to pass. At the father’s
insistence, the children are brought up believing
themselves and their mother to be White. Iola and
Harry are sent from their southern plantation
home to be educated in the North. When
Mr. Leroy dies, the children learn of their mixed
racial heritage and the result is emotional and psy-
chological trauma that even manifests itself in the
form of physical sickness. Iola travels home in an
attempt to see her father before he dies and is sold
into slavery along with her mother. Shortly there-
after, Iola is freed because of the Civil War and the
Emancipation Proclamation. While Iola is working
as a Union Army nurse, a White doctor who is
fully aware of her ethnicity proposes to her. Harper
presents Iola’s choice as more than just to accept or
deny a marriage proposal but her decision to stand
with or abandon African American people and
their struggles. Iola declines the offer twice during
the novel and devotes her life to reuniting her fam-
ily and uplifting African Americans.
Iola’s brother, Harry, leaves school on recover-
ing from the knowledge of his mixed heritage and
decides to join the Union Army, where he is pre-
sented with the opportunity to join a White unit
because of his fair skin. He, like Iola, chooses to
identify with Blacks and take up the cause of
equality even after the war’s end. Throughout the
novel, several characters are confronted with the
same prospect of passing, and they unanimously
illustrate Harper’s notion of Black solidarity over
personal gain.
James Weldon Johnson’s The Autobiography of
an Ex-Colored Man presents another aspect of
passing by depicting a protagonist who chooses to
pass. Johnson’s unnamed protagonist initially
eschews his ability to pass. The ex-colored man at
the least comprehends the notion of Black solidar-
ity. He witnesses a lynching and succumbs to a fear
for his own survival. His sense of self-preservation
is coupled with a sense of shame and self-loathing
as he considers the socioeconomic standing in
which his inherent identity places him. The
protagonist ultimately sheds his true self and
assumes the identity of a White man. He marries
a White woman under this usurped persona and
eventually becomes quite wealthy. Ironically, in
the novel’s end, he encounters Black activists and
on self-examination judges himself to be insignifi-
cant in comparison with those who have spent
their lives striving for racial equality. He regards
his life’s accomplishments as worthless in contrast
to the unrealized labor of individuals such as
Booker T. Washington. Johnson presents just one
type of loss the passer experiences.
Louise Burleigh, an avid supporter of White
supremacy, attempted to further publicize the fear
of many about the possible union of uninformed
Whites and demonized passing Blacks in a short
story titled “Dark Cloud.” In this unpublished
narrative, the character Alicia Fairchild and her
daughter travel from New England to the South to
attend her mother-in-law’s funeral. At this point,
Alicia learns that her mother-in-law is Black, mak-
ing her own husband and daughter African
American as well. Enraged, the protagonist kills
her husband and locks her daughter in a burning
church. The author justifies the murders by illus-
trating Fairchild’s determination that she has been
defiled in a manner similar to rape.
One of the most popular and more modern lit-
erary depictions of passing is Nella Larsen’s
Passing. In this 1920s narrative, Larsen presents
the dual sides of the practice by providing two best
friends, both light-complexioned females. One
chooses to identify herself as Black and the other
decides to pass. Through these characters, the
author presents at least three major notions:
(1) even though some Blacks disagree with passing,
Black solidarity should ensure that they will not
expose a passer; (2) maintaining deception creates
anxiety for the passer; (3) the exposed passer may
encounter life-threatening dangers.
Continuing Practice and Evolution
Despite the abolishment of slavery and many
efforts made at enforcing racial equality, the prac-
tice of passing persists, but it has evolved beyond
the historical connotation of Blacks pretending to
be White. The term passing now incorporates vari-
ous ethnic and social groups such as Jews, gays,
and lesbians, all of whom pass to avoid religious

persecution, to enter into the armed forces, or for
other reasons similar to those of African Americans.
In the case of Blacks, those who choose to identify
themselves as multiracial for the purposes of the
census, applications for education, and employ-
ment are also passing. The debate regarding the
merits of passing in all its myriad forms and inter-
pretations continues as well.
Eddie Seron Pierce
See also Biracial Identity; Culture; Culture, Ethnicity, and
Race; Ethnicity; White Racial Identity
Further Readings
Behan, B. C. (2008). Leonard “Kip” Rhinelander trial.
The Black past: Remembered and reclaimed. Retrieved
October 10, 2008, from http://www.blackpast
.org/?q=aah/leonard-kip-rhinelander-trial-1925
Davis, J. F. (2001). Who is Black? One nation’s
definition. University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press.
Fabi, G. M. (2004). Passing and the rise of the African
American novel. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
Harper, F. E. W. (1990). Iola Leroy: Three classic
African American novels (pp. 225–463). New York:
Vintage Books.
Johnson, J. W. (1995). The autobiography of an
ex-colored man. New York: Dover.
Kennedy, R. (2001). Racial passing. Ohio State Law
Journal, 62, 1145.
Larsen, N. (1986). Quicksand and passing. New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Russell, K., Wilson, M., & Hall, R. (1993). The color
complex: The politics of skin color among African
Americans. New York: Doubleday.
Sollars, W. (1997). Neither Black nor White yet both:
Thematic explorations of interracial literature.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Patriotism
The term patriotism is derived from the Greek
word πατρίς (patris), which means father, and
patria, which means fatherland or home country.
So the word patriotism is used to represent a
positive link to one’s own nation or fatherland
and love for one’s home country or own people.
Patriotism 535
In this definition, patriotism is a positive aspect of
national identity. In cultural terms, patriotism
identifies distinctive aspects of the nation such as
its ethnic, cultural, political, and historical fea-
tures. Constitutional patriotism stands for loyalty
to a democratic constitution with international
ethical and political rules. These rules are based in
Western legal traditions that respect the central
dignity of human beings and thus refer to human
rights that are recognized universally. The “hip-
hip-hooray-patriotism,” however, that sees other
countries and peoples as inferior, and one’s own
country as most important or superior, is consid-
ered a negative type of patriotism.
From a historical point of view, in the first
instance patriotism was a political development. In
central Europe, patriotism evolved from ideologies
of liberalism and nationalism of the bourgeoisie or
emerging middle class and was regarded as revolu-
tionary. At that time the bourgeoisie sought to
establish a national state with a democratic consti-
tution by criticizing feudalism. However, the mean-
ing and the use of the concept changed over time,
increasingly becoming a serious, deeply rooted, ear-
nest engagement for the well-being of the commu-
nity. As a concept linked to democracy, or the reign
of the people, patriotism—understood as positive
nationalism by most people—became a constitu-
tional and real feature of most European states only
after the American Revolution in 1776 and the
French revolution in 1789. Before this, patriotism
was only an idea, discussed by intellectual elites,
and there were many historical setbacks to its estab-
lishment. Later, during the Napoleonic wars, patri-
otism became known as a political idea in bourgeois
circles in other European countries as the liberal
and democratic ideals of the French revolution—
liberty, equality, fraternity—spread. From the mid-
dle of the 19th century, the term patriotism was
increasingly connected with nationalism and chau-
vinism, terms that mean the belief in the superiority
of one’s own nation and the resulting devaluation
of other nations. Patriotism especially came to
imply national superiority after the German unifica-
tion of 1871 (“the German character will heal the
world”). Subsequently, those promoting European
fascism and National Socialism used patriotism as a
belief system to legitimate their aims and military
objectives. After World War II, the government of the
Federal Republic of Germany, as a reaction to the
536 Patriotism
ideologies of fascism and National Socialism, dis-
tinguished patriotism from the negatively connoted
nationalism, and thus enabled a place for increased
feelings for home country that had been lost under
nationalistic conceptions of the term.
Now the term patriotism has several distinctive
meanings. First, patriotism expresses the feeling of
positive identification with a nation. In this sense,
patriotism refers to the emotional aspect of national
identity. Second, at a macrolevel, societal-level
perspective, it describes a desire for high internal
cohesion in a democratically constituted society,
especially in the United States. Patriotism, in this
sense, is expressed by a variety of nation-related
rites such as the loyalty oath to the United States
(Pledge of Allegiance), the decoration of houses
with the national flag, or conferring laws such as
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act of 2001)
that are intended to protect the security of the
nation. The third use of the term patriotism, seen
from the microperspective of the individual, is
closely linked to the description of opinions and
behavior referring to the nation (ideology). This
ideology is different from nationalism and chau-
vinism in many ways. First, although nationalism
and chauvinism imply idealizing one’s own nation
without criticism (“my country right or wrong”)
and the belief in the superiority of one’s own
group, the meaning of patriotism is identification
with one’s own land and people without putting
them above others or implicitly devaluing other
people and nations. Second, there is a distinction
between patriotism and nationalism with respect
to the criteria that are used to define national
membership. Nationalism as an ideology implies
objective rules of membership of the nation, citi-
zenship, as the result of formal criteria such as
birthplace. Patriotism as an ideology puts more
emphasis on subjective criteria such as identifica-
tion with the nation, and people can be patriotic
without formal “membership” (citizenship) of the
nation. Third, patriotism differs from nationalism
in emphasizing what central characteristics should
define the nation as a social group. Although
nationalism emphasizes the importance of national
history and tradition, patriotism sees the defining
elements of nations in the successful accomplish-
ment of democratic principles and human rights.
Fourth, patriotism favors democratic principles in
communication between state and citizen whereas
nationalism implies authoritarian solutions to
achieving political order. Consequently, patriotism
as an ideology is more tolerant of foreigners and
minorities than is nationalism. Nationalism is a
central aspect in ethnocentrism, the belief that
one’s own racial or ethnic group is superior to the
rest. Apart from these differences, the ideologies of
patriotism and nationalism also have common ele-
ments. Both imply strong national identity, that is,
identification with the nation. Both ideologies also
become critical of the nation if the national reality
does not meet the respective ideological require-
ments of nationalism and patriotism.
Despite this distinction, however, concepts of
patriotism and nationalism are not always sharply
and separately formulated. Their use in research
literature is often not precise, and the terms fre-
quently overlap. In addition, researchers have not
resolved how to empirically assess patriotism and
nationalism in reliable and valid ways. Therefore,
researchers in many countries disagree about the
differences in the definitions of patriotism and
nationalism and thus about their effects on history.
Critics of the distinction between patriotism
and nationalism also see a danger that right-wing
groups might use the concept of patriotism to
advance nationalism. For these groups, national-
ism is the only “real” patriotism. Another basic
problem with definitions of patriotism is that all
define the nation as a homogeneous social group.
However, forming a group also excludes people,
which is potentially discriminatory; thus, even
when the concept is understood benignly, as love
for the country, an implicit nationalism may also
exist. There is also the danger that patriotism as an
ideology can be used to privilege certain ideas and
values as more supportive of the nation, while
denigrating other ideas and as being destructive of
the nation or not in the “national interest.”
Thomas Blank
See also Citizenship; Ethnicity; Nationalism; State Identity
Further Readings
Bar-Tal, D., & Staub, E. (Eds.). (1997). Patriotism in the
lives of individuals and nations. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Blank, T., & Schmidt, P. (Eds.). (2003). Special issue:
National identity in Europe. Political Psychology
24(2).
Kosterman, R., & Feshbach, S. (1989). Toward a
measure of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes.
Political Psychology, 10(2), 257–274.
Müller, J.-W. (2007). Constitutional patriotism.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Perceptual Filtering
Perceptual filtering refers to the process of taking
in new information and interpreting it according
to prior experiences and cultural norms. People
use these perceptual filters to help reduce uncer-
tainty about new experiences. As the term sug-
gests, perceptual filtering regards people’s
perceptions, the way people take in and make
sense of information, about the social world.
These perceptions are filtered through several
components of social identity, such as age and
gender, that help people decide what they decide
to communicate about themselves to others and
how they make sense of their everyday experi-
ences. Although perceptual filters provide neces-
sary and useful shortcuts for understanding the
vast amounts of information that people expose
themselves to everyday, they also form prejudices
and biases that can impede the ability to perceive
new information on its own merit.
Perception and Everyday Encounters
Perception regards how people look at the world
around them and comprises three elements: sensa-
tion, organization, and interpretation. Sensation,
sometimes called observation, can be defined as
the manner in which people learn something is
happening according to information received by
one or more of the five senses (sight, sound, touch,
taste, and smell). Once the mind observes that
something is happening, it organizes the informa-
tion it receives. The process of organization forms
perceptual sets that people use to categorize infor-
mation for current or future reference. Finally,
people interpret the information through mental
filters that help them make sense of the world
according to their own experiences, values, goals,
Perceptual Filtering 537
and needs. The process of perception occurs when
people move through these three steps to take in
and evaluate the large amounts of information
they are exposed to on a daily basis.
Perceptual filtering is closely tied to the process
of communication, which entails encoding infor-
mation, sending and receiving messages, and
decoding information. The process of encoding
includes placing the verbal and nonverbal meaning
into messages. Sending messages refers to the pro-
cess of transmitting these messages to others.
Receiving messages regards the process of obtain-
ing messages from others. Although sending and
receiving messages has often been thought of as a
linear process, people do both simultaneously.
Finally, people decode information as they receive
messages from others and understand them based
on their own knowledge and experiences. Perceptual
filtering influences how people encode and decode
messages when they communicate.
The Process of Filtering
People cannot process the amount of information
they receive through their senses, so they develop
shortcuts and filters to help them. These filters can
comprise numerous factors and experiences that
include sex and gender, culture and ethnicity, age,
societal status, and function. People become social-
ized at early ages to interpret the world according
to these factors. The filter of sex and gender helps
explicate the process of perceptual filtering. Girls
are often socialized differently than boys are
regarding perceptions of danger, strangers, appro-
priate behavior, norms, and so forth. This social-
ization process creates filters to help girls understand
how they should make sense of and respond to the
world around them. For example, boys may be
encouraged to perceive something potentially dan-
gerous, such as a fight, as an opportunity to dem-
onstrate their toughness. Girls, contrarily, may be
encouraged to perceive this as something to avoid.
This process shapes gendered behavior well into
adulthood and influences important life choices,
such as career and educational decisions.
Deborah Tannen, who coined the term gender-
lects, examines how females and males develop
different communication styles based on how they
have been taught to understand their social
worlds. She asserts that men interrupt more and
538 Performativity of Gender
tend to be more competitive as they focus on
being heard. Women, contrarily, focus on listen-
ing and understanding, which causes them to be
more polite when they communicate. Tannen’s
ideas help elucidate how gender forms an impor-
tant perceptual filter for communicating and
understanding social reality.
Biases and Potential Misunderstandings
The process of perceptual filtering makes it possi-
ble to understand the world and to communicate
to others more quickly and efficiently. Despite the
benefits of creating and using perceptual filters,
they can also have consequences such as biases and
misunderstandings. These consequences can range
from slight to severe. For example, someone once
stated that she enjoyed hot salsa and asked if
another person enjoyed hot salsa as well. The sec-
ond person stated that he also enjoyed hot salsa
and mentioned that cold salsa was not as good.
The first person expressed confusion and then
stated that she meant hot as in spicy. In this
instance, the first person encoded hot to mean
spicy, but the second person decoded hot to mean
warm. Based on different experiences about how
this condiment is served, the two people filtered
this information differently.
In this example, the misunderstanding is harm-
less and even comical. Sometimes, however, per-
ceptual filters can lead to hurtful and damaging
outcomes, such as prejudices and stereotypes.
Following the previous explication of gender and
sex socialization, perceptual filters can create
norms that constrain people’s construction of real-
ity. Females and males may be encouraged into
career paths that do not meet their strengths and
skills because of these filters, which affects their
perceptions of potential job skills and educational
paths. Females may be socialized to filter helping
fields and childcare positions as gender appropri-
ate. Males, on the other hand, may be socialized
into the natural sciences or athletics. Those that do
not adhere to these norms may experience negativ-
ity when they interact with others and their choices
are perceived according to someone else’s percep-
tual filters. Girls who are natural athletes or excel
in the natural sciences may be labeled too strong
or masculine. Boys who prefer taking care of chil-
dren may be labeled too feminine or domestic.
Even though perceptual filters help people make
sense of their social worlds, people must take care
to acknowledge the potential limitations and con-
sequences of filters. Acknowledging biases and
prejudices can help mitigate the effects of misun-
derstandings and limitations that perceptual filters
can place on understanding of social reality.
Cerise L. Glenn
See also Class Identity; Cultural Representation; Gender;
Looking-Glass Self
Further Readings
Hickson, M., III, Stacks, D. W., & Moore, N. (2004).
Nonverbal communication: Studies and applications
(4th ed.). Los Angeles: Roxbury.
Tannen, D. (1990). You just don’t understand: Women
and men in conversation. New York: William
Morrow.
Tannen, D. (1994). Gender and discourse. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Performativity of Gender
The notion of the performativity of gender is con-
cerned with an understanding that, rather than
possessing a given gender identity, we are con-
stantly in the process of constructing—performing,
doing—gender. Gender, in other words, can be
seen as being a verb in flux rather than a fixed,
essential noun.
This take on gender identity is most strongly
associated with Judith Butler. A prolific writer, Butler
is the author, for example, of Gender Trouble:
Feminism and the Subversion of Identity; Bodies
That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”;
Excitable Speech: Politics of the Performance;
The Psychic Life of Power: Theories of Subjection;
and Undoing Gender. A recent book, Precarious
Life, considers, in the light of September 11, 2001,
violence, mourning, and the state of modern United
States. However, Butler is most renowned for her
contribution to queer theory and her work on gen-
der and identity. Indeed, many scholars propose
that Butler has helped establish both queer theory
(along with others such as Gayle Rubin and Eve

Sedgwick) and a new theoretical framework for
thinking about gender identity and subjectivity.
Butler’s book, Gender Trouble, in particular, has
been widely influential.
Troubling Gender
Butler made the case in Gender Trouble that femi-
nism had erred by suggesting, both implicitly and
explicitly, that “women” were a homogenous
group with shared, universally common attributes
and concerns. Drawing from a range of theoretical
approaches throughout—including Michel
Foucault, Sigmund Freud, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel, Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, Jacques Lacan,
Friedrich Nietzsche, and Monique Wittig—Butler
argued that this stance led to what she described
as a reification of gender relations: an unquestion-
ing assumption that we know what we mean when
we say “woman” and “man,” and the inference
that there are only these two genders. Such an
attitude, she claimed, closes down possibilities,
narrowing the range of identities from which
people can choose.
Although feminism had rejected the account
that gender is the result of biological destiny,
instead, according to Butler, it had erected a con-
structivist account that masculine and feminine
genders are shaped, through the influence of cul-
ture, onto the biological givens of the male and
female bodies. This in a sense therefore reinstates
the same determinism that feminism had sought to
surmount: that one is born with a “male” or
“female” body and consequently becomes, as a
matter of course and with no scope for altering the
inevitable, a “man” or “woman,” respectively.
Butler instead took the view in Gender Trouble
(developed in later work such as Bodies That
Matter) that sex, sexuality, gender, and identity are
all located within a matrix of power and discourse
that produces and regulates how we understand
the terms, among others, man, woman, masculin-
ity, and femininity. She saw there being a multitude
of options through which it is possible to disturb
the received understandings of such terms. Gender
is variable and fluid, changing for each of us at dif-
ferent times and within different contexts. Being a
woman is, for Butler, a term that is always in pro-
cess and becoming. We say “I feel more/less like a
man” or “I feel more/less like a woman,” which,
Performativity of Gender 539
Butler suggested, implies that we see our experi-
ence of a gendered identity as something that we
achieve, rather than as a given attribute.
Troubling Sex
Butler deconstructed, through a Foucauldian gene-
alogical approach, the commonsense argument that
sex causes gender, which, in turn, causes desire for
the other (“opposite”) gender. Even if we were to
assume the stability of the binary of men and
women, Butler argued, it does not necessarily fol-
low that the cultural construction of men and
women will exclusively attach itself only to male
and female bodies, respectively, and that the one
will desire the other. Moreover, she asserted that
even the notion of sex (male/female) is as much a
cultural construct as gender. Sex, for Butler, is a
construct rather than a “fact”; it is a process
whereby norms consistently materialize the body.
This is achieved through language in that, consis-
tent with the poststructural view that reality can
only be understood as being produced through lan-
guage, there is no such entity as a pure body, only
one that is being further formed by the language
used to describe or refer to it. The act of articulat-
ing sex results in an imposition of cultural norms.
Sex, gender, and desire are each open and, cru-
cially therefore, despite the patriarchal cultural
requirement to conform to the heterosexist hege-
mony, they are subject to choice; the “givens” are
open to challenge. Hence, Butler proposed, there is
opportunity for subversion, for action that demon-
strates that gender is not a binary but a multiple
choice. There is, in short, scope for gender trouble.
Performativity
The controversial notion of the performativity of
gender identity is implicit in the previous discus-
sion. Butler advocated that there is no essential
identity behind manifestations of gender. Instead,
the reverse is the case: Gender identity is per-
formed, constituted by the manifestations them-
selves. Gender is what we do rather than who we
are; it is a verb and not a noun. This applies to
everyone, whether or not the gender we perform is
conventional. Gender, as something objectively
natural, does not exist; it is real to the extent that
it is performed. Indeed, for Butler, we do not
540 Persistence, Termination, and Memory
choose to perform; we choose only what shape our
performance will take.
Choice is neither simple nor free. It does not, for
Butler, mean that we have the option of deciding
each day which sex or gender we will have. Given
cultural norms impel us, require us to cite them;
for us to get by as subjects we have to buy into
them. However, given that for norms to survive
they have to be constantly reiterated, we are never
wholly governed through them; there is scope for
potential subversion.
The notion of performativity is a significant com-
ponent of queer theory, where identity (or, more
accurately, identities) in general is/are the outcome
of how we perform, rather than our behaviors being
the expression of an inner, essential identity.
Whatever is challenging of the norm, relating to sex,
gender, sexuality, or otherwise, is queer. Implicitly,
this suggests that identities can in principle be rein-
vented through different performances.
Jonathan Wyatt
See also Gender; Queer Theory; Sexual Identity
Further Readings
Butler, J. (1990). Gender trouble: Feminism and the
subversion of identity. London: Routledge.
Butler, J. (1993). Bodies that matter: On the discursive
limits of “sex.” New York: Routledge.
Butler, J. (1997). Excitable speech: A politics of the
performative. New York: Routledge.
Butler, J. (1997). The psychic life of power: Theories of
subjection. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
Butler, J. (2004). Precarious life: The powers of mourning
and violence. New York: Verso.
Butler, J. (2004). Undoing gender. New York: Routledge.
Persistence, Termination,
and Memory
Concerning identity, the relationship between per-
sistence, termination, and memory emerges from
the common experience of continuity and change
in the self and in the world. Persistence goes
beyond basic consciousness of self-existence to
self-reflexive knowledge of personal identity in and
through time. We are conscious of present identity
and of having been ourselves in the past with an
expectation of continuing to be in the future.
Memory and termination are past and future
boundary conditions; both of which limit cases
when considering persistence in personal identity.
Philosophical perspectives provide alternative
explanations of persistence, termination, and
memory. From an essentialist view, the continuity
of identity reflects the essential core of the self—a
fixed individual identity that exists beyond time.
Essential identity does not change; people play
roles and adapt to the external dynamics of time
and change. From a strict constructionist view,
identity is an artifact of social, cultural, and ideo-
logical forces. The self, a complex of constructed
subject positions sustained and disrupted by social
discourses, is a social identity. Participation in the
ideological discourses of society and culture gives
identity a semblance of persistence—continuity
and coherence of self—when actual conditions of
life are dominated by discontinuity and incoher-
ence. Constructionist views point to the memory
as an unstable social production and to termina-
tion as an inevitable, ongoing feature of past, pres-
ent, and future identity. From phenomenological
perspectives, exploration begins with functional
approaches to persistence in identity as a common-
place human experience. For example, people may
come to an understanding of persistence by con-
tinually revising their personal theories of identity,
by their identification with cultural narratives, or
by recognizing the ongoing process of navigating
personal identity in their lives. During everyday
living, people consider questions of persistence and
identity, partly because the boundary conditions of
memory and termination are inescapable.
This entry introduces persistence, termination,
and memory as a dynamic triad in identity, chang-
ing the focus of attention from one to the other to
better explicate the necessary relationship between
them. First, the entry describes the paradox of
persistence within the context of memory and ter-
mination. Second, the boundary condition of
death directs attention toward termination and
transitions of temporal identity that challenge per-
sistence and place the paradox in sharper relief.
Third, the function and role of memory suggests
an enigmatic ground of persistence. The entry
concludes with an implication of the paradox of

persistence, explaining persistence, termination,
and memory together as a riddle of identity.
Persistence: The Paradox of Identity
I am the same person I have always been, yet my
identity has definitely changed over time and I
expect it to change in the future. In a simple form,
this is the paradox of identity. In one sense, I do
not feel like a different person; the person I am
today bears an unmistakable resemblance to my
earliest memories, to accounts from others of my
past life, and to records of personal identity that
are uniquely mine. This commonsense assumption
of persistence corresponds with many philosophi-
cal standpoints that declare identity a fiction if
entertained without some essential ground.
Likewise, the science of genetics can identify me as
a unique human being according to my DNA, a
specification that suggests an essential biological
persistence. Conversely, who I have been, who I
am, and who I will become seems less certain, and
seems a much more difficult problem than docu-
menting genetic identity. For instance, the psycho-
logical necessity theory of persistence posits personal
identity as dependent on conditions of psychologi-
cal viability—a condition of change. Other theories
insist on the continuation of identity apart from
conventional psychological and medical criteria of
personality. Concerning personal identity, there-
fore, the dynamics of permanence and change con-
stitute the paradox of persistence.
Observing others confirms the paradox of per-
sistence. For instance, an acquaintance of many
years may become effectively unrecognizable in
appearance and character. The person’s name may
change, both in practice and in official records.
Regular, expected changes in seasons of life can
explain many such transformations. Others result
from persons purposing to alter their identity.
Nevertheless, even a purposeful identity change
confirms the stability of identity in another sense;
it is an alteration of a unique, distinct identity. If
legal records change, they remain records of altera-
tion of one distinct person’s identity. The new legal
identity belongs to one whose personal identity
persists. The idea of someone pretending to be
someone or something he or she is not, and has not
been, reinforces the paradox of persistence. The
permanence of identity and alterations in identity
Persistence, Termination, and Memory 541
both seem real, even profoundly real. I remember
others and see changes, sometimes radical changes,
in their identities—but the identities have been
altered, not reassigned. I remember who I am and
yet can see the same “me” changing.
Behind basic reflections and observations that
confirm the paradox of persistence, dramatic ques-
tions compound the paradox. The questions,
though dramatic, are common. What if I had
grown up in a different time, place, culture, and
family? Who would I have been? We ask such
questions with the expectation that our identity
would be different; the interesting question is
“how different?”—a question of substance, degree,
and process. An even more difficult set of ques-
tions concerns how long, and under what condi-
tions, identity can and will persist—the questions
of termination.
Termination: Identity Transition
If the paradox of persistence is a common, even
unifying dynamic of human existence, the reality
of death is its dialectic counterpart. No one else
can live my life, or lose it, but what it means to lose
one’s life is contested ground. The capacity to con-
template one’s own death is a defining feature of
human identity. The inevitability of death forces us
to consider what happens to personal identity at
death, in death, and after death. Although it is not
the purpose of this essay to define death itself, only
to consider it functionally, death imposes on
humankind and every sentient human person the
demands of identity—it constitutes the ultimate
limit case of identity. A “limit case” represents a
condition in which we have gone as far as we can
go within the terms or categories of a theory, a
philosophy, or reasoning itself. So, memory and
termination define the terms in which we can think
about persistence of personal identity.
The present question of personal persistence—
who am I?—is transformed into the future ques-
tion of termination, that is, what will become of
me? The terminus of physical death begs the ques-
tion of termination. For many people, the death of
a close family member, a friend, or even a pet
forces the issue. As one author has noted, as if it
were not enough to have lost the person, one’s
own identity is shaken to the core. Part of oneself
and cherished parts of others closely related to the
542 Persistence, Termination, and Memory
deceased are lost. Thoughts, emotions, and actions
that only the deceased could animate in us depart
in their death; therefore, the breadth and depth of
our distressed identity can multiply exponentially.
Termination issues also emerge from factors
unrelated to literal death. Metaphorical death—
fear of temporal losses and anxiety about related
death of identity—invites consideration of choice
and moments of temporal transition as forms of
termination. People make defining choices that
shape ordinary life and challenge identity by termi-
nation. Choosing one line of work and one job
position, choosing to live in one place rather than
any other, and choosing to marry or remain single
involve termination of potential futures. Changing
circumstances, conditions, and seasons of life call
identity into question. In more extreme versions,
all expressions of personal preference and individ-
ual style become associated with identity forma-
tion and, by extension, termination.
Death remains the ultimate, future limit case in
the paradox of persistence. Empirically, the ques-
tion of persistence is uncomplicated. Death solves
the problem of persistence. For instance, the psy-
chological necessity theory declares the condition
of persistence to be cognitive response—brain via-
bility. Persistence ends at the moment of brain
death. Philosophy and religion offer an alternative
range of accounts, all of which treat brain viability
as an overly reductive condition to establish iden-
tity. If conditions of human identity include spiri-
tual conditions and various definitions of human
souls, then conditions for personal identity super-
sede brain viability alone. Death unequivocally
raises the question of persistence into the future;
philosophers and theologians suggest that multiple
conditions may exist whereby the personal identity
continues beyond physical death, whether through
reincarnation, resurrection, or other forms of per-
sonal existence.
The issue of persistence is essential to the work
of Emmanuel Levinas, who reminds us of the call
that we hear continually from those who no longer
walk among us. Levinas has an understanding of
persistence that is phenomenologically based. The
call of the other continues after physical death.
The identity of another can continue to direct us
when that person is no longer physically among us.
This persistence manifests itself in everyday life
when a maturing adult utters a statement or
reaches for an object only to simultaneously notice
and remember that the gesture is repetitive, com-
ing not simply from oneself but from another who
no longer is physically present. This phenomeno-
logical attentiveness to persistence and call also
rests within an understanding of memory that is
not simply a turning to the past, but a turning to
the present with an ear attentive to an ongoing
voice that is no longer empirically present, but
phenomenologically active.
Memory: Enigmatic Necessity of Identity
A person cannot contemplate identity beyond the
bounds of memory. The structure of memory
spontaneously generates a sense of identity and the
conditions for the commonsense assumption of
persistence. Memory is an internal mental record
of our own past. Self-consciousness and memory
emerge concurrently. The memory by which we
shape identity and discern persistence is not merely
personal. Much of what constitutes memory
involves the expressed memories of others that
become part of a person’s own memory. Others
tells us who we are, based on collective memory—
stories and records from family and friends. We
interpret memorable moments, events, and docu-
mentary materials concerning our initial develop-
ment with others. In preliminary terms, this basic
form of memory is the fabric of persistence through
which identity is fashioned. However, a basic
description of personal and communal memory
does not yet touch on the contribution of memory
to the paradox of persistence.
Memory is profoundly variable. In many ele-
ments and details, human memory at its best is
unreliable. When people reflect on their own
memories, some are distinct, complete, and pre-
cise. Others are uncertain, incomplete, and fuzzy.
People can discern the specific quality of particular
memories—recognizing some as more trustworthy
than others. Furthermore, selective memory is a
condition that most would recognize as being vir-
tually universal. Together, these factors suggest
that competent human memory produces a sub-
stantive and definitive memory of the past self, but
not necessarily a precise, comprehensive, or entirely
certain identity.

Memory constitutes a limit condition for persis-
tence by the intrinsic uncertainties of a “healthy”
human memory. Threats to memory make it a limit
case for past identity—that is, the question of what
identity, if any, persists. As a rule, memory deterio-
rates with age. A specific injury (e.g., head trauma),
or illness (e.g., stroke) can destroy memory.
Amnesia—the partial or total death of memory—
constitutes the ultimate limit case for persistence in
memory. Most simply, if people cannot remember
anything about their lives, have they lost their iden-
tities? The question includes elements of the debate
in termination of persistence linked to brain death.
But does a person’s identity persist if the person
loses specific memories, but retains an active
mind?
Like death—the question of future termination—
memory raises a set of questions focused on the
past. In simpler forms, the questions suggest
uncertainties that do not disrupt persistence, but
make an unchanging identity more difficult to sus-
tain. Meanwhile, more profound memory loss
raises more intense questions concerning persis-
tence of identity. At best, memory is an enigma
concerning persistence of identity. It insists on
persistence, but cannot provide the kind of reli-
ability that would make persistence of coherent
identity demonstrable. The enigmatic nature of
memory compromises the ability to construct a
coherent, centered identity.
Implications: An Identity Riddle
In his work, Confessions, Saint Augustine of Hippo
traversed the full spectrum of questions concerning
persistence, termination, and memory. He offers an
integrated philosophy, psychology, and theology of
memory and temporal identity that acknowledges
the recalcitrance of persistence while exploring the
uncertainties of memory against the backdrop of
the certainty of death. His radical commitments to
the problems of human temporality and the elu-
siveness of identity and eternity led him in the nar-
rative of Confessions to declare the whole matter of
his own identity a conundrum. He said, “and I
became a riddle to myself.”
The recalcitrance of persistence drives a com-
plex of questions concerning identity. Persistence
points toward inscrutable ultimate questions about
Person 543
the conditions for continuation of identity in the
future. Compelling memories that are themselves
unstable and inclined toward termination form the
ground of persistent identity. Therefore, persis-
tence, termination, and memory pose significant
questions of identity, but provide no satisfactory
answers.
Calvin L. Troup
See also Corrosion of Character; Identity Negotiation;
Identity Uncertainty; Memory; Philosophy of Identity;
Self-Consciousness; Social Constructionist Approach
to Personal Identity
Further Readings
Augustine. (1960). Confessions of Saint Augustine
(J. K. Ryan, Trans.). New York: Doubleday.
Chandler, M. (2000). Cultural-historical time. Culture &
Psychology, 6(2), 209–231.
Mackie, D. (1999). Personal identity and dead people.
Philosophical Studies, 95, 219–242.
Person
Person is a concept that has been addressed at
length by many philosophers throughout the ages.
The question of what it means to be a person has
been approached through etymological, religious,
analytical, phenomenological, and ontological
perspectives. Etymologically, person as a human
being originated from the Latin word homo,
which is a technical term rather than a philo-
sophical term. Homo denotes a physical man or
woman, and it is connected to humus or ground
as an effort to distinguish human beings from the
Roman gods. Scholars are interested in under-
standing person from more textured philosophi-
cal perspectives because this understanding is
critical to a comprehensive exploration of iden-
tity. The idea of person has been connected to
concepts including rationality, intentionality, con-
sciousness, and mind-body relationships. A con-
sideration of these different perspectives provides
a panoramic view of the relationship between
person and identity.
544 Person
Form and Matter
From some religious perspectives, a person is a
coexistence of both spiritual and material aspects.
Theologians consider the idea of person as a coex-
istent body and soul, which suggests a person is a
union of form and matter. From this perspective,
one part of the soul, the intellect, elevates the con-
ception of person above all other animals. In this
religious framework, a body is not a person and a
soul is not a person but the person is constituted in
the union of these two essences.
Analytical philosophies distinguished the con-
cept of human being from the concept of a person
through an understanding of consciousness. The
nature of what constitutes consciousness has been
explored from many different perspectives that
range from rejecting the existence of consciousness
at one end to perspectives that claim there is only
consciousness, which implies there is no reality
apart from whatever “has” consciousness. Some
scholars find that to accept the existence of con-
sciousness, human beings must first deny its exis-
tence, but other scholars suggest that the process
of awareness by which we make decisions is con-
sciousness or the thinking part of being. In this
case, person is a name for this conscious self. Some
more complex philosophies suggest that a person
is present and past existence by the consciousness
that owns and commits to past actions. Other phi-
losophies from psychological perspectives suggest
that the physical embodiment of a corporeal
human being can be more than one person if there
is more than one consciousness. So, one physical
human being can be more than one person if she
or he has more than one consciousness.
Nevertheless, a person is something, an entity,
whose actions are imbued with responsibility.
Because of this responsibility, people impose laws
on themselves, and this imposition of laws requires
some kind of reason.
Form and Being
The question whether a person is a mental or
physical entity is considered at length in analytical
philosophy. From this perspective, the idea of a
person is a unitary being comprising a psychologi-
cal (mentalistic) and material (physicalistic) foun-
dation. Ontological considerations of person refer
to the anyone, which is a complete amassment of
norms for a community that embraces conformity.
These norms determine the behavioral dispositions
of nondeviant members of the community who are
deemed the conformists. The idea of person involves
the ontic notion of conforming. Conforming is the
essence of community because persons conform as
particular cases or occurrences that make up the
larger community. A person is not a whole of
Dasein (Being) because Dasein cannot be measured
as people can be measured. A person is therefore
an occurrence or a case of Dasein, which is an
expansive phenomenon of individual occurrences.
Persons are primordial institutions, which means
there is accountability to the larger institution, and
this commitment is a conformist accountability
because communities must sustain a pattern of nor-
mative behavior. This means that there is an inher-
ent responsibility to the larger picture of existence
as a person. Something exists if what (or who) it is
tries to understand what (or who) it is, similar to
cogito ergo sum. This is a reflexive questioning
that suggests that having this understanding means
knowing one’s own ability or potential, ipso facto,
intentionality. A person is a case of Dasein who
exists in the action of engaging intentional acts.
Form and the Other
Other philosophers argue that a person is not in the
totality of the individual and physical being but
that a person exists in the presence of the face of
the other and that presence permits one person to
be in some kind of relation with another person.
The person is awakened by and for the other per-
son. To further consider person as a presence, phe-
nomenologists suggest that the element that is
necessary for a person to exist is the essential action
that occurs when one person does something and
becomes a presence toward another person. The
action or intention that comes out of something
incomprehensible and makes a presence to some-
thing else is the idea of what constitutes a person.
The idea of a person is most clearly not limited
to the totality of individual matter and composi-
tion. Thus, philosophically speaking, person can
be considered in the following ways: as a coexis-
tent union of form and matter, as consciousness
that holds actual or potential decision-making
abilities, as a conforming unitary primordial being,
as consciousness tied to responsibility, as a case of

Dasein connected to a phenomenological presence
of rationality, as intentionality of being, and as a
concept embodied in a space where consciousness
is constituted through questions. This discussion
does not presuppose that these are the only ways
in which person has been considered philosophi-
cally; however, these are valuable representations
of the philosophical frameworks that inescapably
consider the idea of the meaning of person.
Annette M. Holba
See also Consciousness; Double Consciousness; Mind-
Body Problem; Philosophy of Mind; Psychology of Self
and Identity; Reflexive Self or Reflexivity
Further Readings
Aquinas, T. (1999). On human nature. Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett.
Heidegger, M. (1963). Being and time (J. Stambaugh,
Trans.). Albany: SUNY Press.
Locke, J. (1995). An essay concerning human
understanding. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Strawson, P. F., & Hahn, L. E. (1998). The philosophy
of P. F. Strawson. Chicago: Open Court.
Personal Identity
Versus Self-Identity
The terms personal identity and self-identity can be
traced to ancient Greece and are at the heart of the
basic philosophical question: Who am I? Both
terms explore what it means to be human, their
broad nature allowing them to be engaged through
a variety of perspectives that include psychologi-
cal, philosophical, psychosocial, and narrative.
Although the terms are often used interchangeably,
C. O. Evans differentiates the terms by referring to
personal identity as the identity of persons other
than ourselves and self-identity as being aware of
one’s own identity. The relationship between per-
sonal identity and self-identity is a source of schol-
arly debate because differentiating between
personal and self-identity is a matter of idiosyn-
crasy for some scholars and a matter of central
importance for others. Differentiating between
personal identity and self-identity is central to a
Personal Identity Versus Self-Identity 545
discussion on identity in that these terms texture
an understanding of identity and how we define
our own existence. This entry develops an under-
standing of personal versus self-identity by differ-
entiating between these terms, explaining the
relationship between the two terms, and detailing
the implications of personal identity versus self-
identity as individuals interact in a social world.
Perspectives on Personal Identity
In The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self, Raymond
Martin and John Barresi suggest that theories of
personal identity can be traced to the 5th century
BCE. Even though the idea of personal identity has
a rich history, there is no generally agreed-upon
definition or any consensus about what constitutes
personal identity for scholars. Some identity schol-
ars identify personal identity with individual
autonomy, but others believe that values determine
one’s personal identity.
At the most basic level, personal identity can be
defined as a self-description of highly specific details
and experiences. Personal identity can also be
defined as a set of traits and characteristics that are
assigned to a particular person. Conventional defi-
nitions of personal identity, such as those offered by
scholar Erving Goffman, suggest that personal
identity is concerned with what makes an individual
distinct from other individuals. When viewed in this
way, personal identity is tied to individual auton-
omy and the values, qualities, attributes, and per-
sonality characteristics that make the individual
unique. A more philosophical rendering is offered
by Peter Unger, who defines personal identity as the
philosophy of our own strict survival.
Some of the earliest philosophical questions
related to personal identity center on what makes
it possible to persist over time and through
changes. For example, scholars such as Unger are
interested in what is involved when a person sur-
vives from the present time to some future time.
Another question that has emerged relates to the
possibility of establishing a set of criteria or condi-
tions that define personal identity and allow a
person to persist from one time to another. A third
question that has emerged is whether a list of con-
ditions or characteristics can be used to define a
person’s personal identity. Differing perspectives
have emerged that attempt to address these three
546 Personal Identity Versus Self-Identity
similar, yet slightly different, central questions.
Scholars differ on what constitutes a personal
identity and how the identity persists over time
and through changes. For example, scholars dis-
agree whether personal identity should be con-
nected to psychological or bodily criterion and the
specific conditions that constitute personal iden-
tity. Scholars also disagree about whether there is
a sense of consistency over time or whether per-
sonal identities are always evolving.
Differing conceptions of personal identity result
in a variety of approaches to engaging personal
identity, including philosophical, psychological,
biological, and narrative. A philosophical approach
considers personal identity and conscious experi-
ences as topics of metaphysics. Metaphysics has
been defined as any inquiry that raises questions
about reality that lie beyond or behind those
capable of being tackled by the methods of science.
John Locke’s theory of personal identity and the
connection to metaphysics and psychology offers
a foundational philosophical perspective of per-
sonal identity. His Essay Concerning Human
Understanding from 1694 ties personal identity to
continuity of consciousness. Locke does not agree
that personal identity resides with the soul; rather,
he moves to consciousness. Consciousness is what
allows the identity of a person to persist over time.
Locke also defines personal identity in terms of
memory. For example, Locke’s view of personal
identity is tied to the individual’s ability to recall
experiences from memory. His memory theory of
personal identity defines identity in terms of linked
memories. Personal identity relies on one’s ability
to recall past experiences.
Scholars who identify with a philosophical
approach tend to also tread closely to a psycho-
logical approach. According to Unger, a psycho-
logical approach to personal identity suggests that
the key to a person existing at a future time is that
one’s present psychology be causally carried for-
ward in time and be much of one’s future psychol-
ogy. Foundational to a psychological approach to
personal identity is the work of Derek Parfit.
Parfit’s theory of personal identity has continued to
stir debate since 1970. Parfit is credited with bring-
ing the terms psychological continuity and psycho-
logical connectedness to a psychological approach
to personal identity. According to Parfit, psycho-
logical continuity is central to both survival and
personal identity. Psychological continuity is defined
in terms of psychological connectedness in that the
overlap of connections gives way to continuity over
time. Unger offers the following example to demon-
strate the distinction between Parfit’s use of psycho-
logical continuity and psychological connectedness:
People change psychologically from day to day, so
there may be little psychological connectedness
between myself now and myself 30 years ago.
However, there may be psychological continuity
between me now and me then because of the over-
lap of connections that ensure this continuity.
Eric T. Olsen differentiates between a psy-
chological perspective of personal identity and a
biological perspective of personal identity. A psy-
chological perspective of personal identity suggests
that identity through time persists by connecting
current mental capacities, memories, beliefs, and
desires to past mental capacities, memories, beliefs,
and desires. The crux of Olsen’s psychological
approach is that persistence consists in psychologi-
cal continuity. In contrast to this perspective, Olsen
also presents a biological perspective that ties per-
sistence to biological continuity. One persists
because of the capacity to breathe and circulate
one’s blood.
A narrative approach to personal identity
emphasizes that personal narratives form people’s
identities. A reciprocal relationship exists between
story and identity in that identity influences the
story, but it is also informed by the story that is
being told. This approach focuses on the stories
out of which an individual constructs his or her
personal identity. Research suggests that people
may construct their stories differently. Rivka
Tuval-Mashiach points out one noted difference,
suggesting that men and women construct narra-
tives differently. Men’s narratives are character-
ized by clear, defined plots, and their stories tend
to be more linear, chronological, continuous, and
coherent. In contrast, women’s stories tend to be
more fragmented and constructed along multiple
dimensions. Regardless of how stories are con-
structed, a narrative approach to personal identity
suggests that the story is one’s personal identity.
Perspectives on Self-Identity
The term self-identity emerged in the 1970s from
the academic field of social psychology, and

scholars situated in sociology, anthropology, and
philosophy takes an interest in the term. Studies
on self and identity can be traced to the 1890s
with the work of William James and to 1900 with
the work of James’s student, Mary Whiton
Calkins. Self-identity refers to the understanding
that an individual has of himself or herself. The
term also refers to the awareness of one’s identity
and the set of traits and characteristics that one
assigns to oneself. Defining self-identity is not a
simple task. There are differing perspectives of
self-identity because each scholar who studies self-
identity defines the concept differently and has a
different understanding of what the concept
means. As a result, a multiplicity of definitions
and conceptualizations of self-identity exist.
Psychologists typically define self-identity as a
process that begins in infancy. Self-identity can
also be described in terms of natural self and
environmental self. The natural self is the stable,
innate self that is preserved over time. For the
natural self, there is a consistency in how one
reacts to life experiences. Environmental self
refers to the mental and physical changes that one
experiences in addition to experiences in a social
world. In addition to a lack of a standard defini-
tion of self-identity, no standard set of properties
exists for defining the concept.
Self-identity can be defined by role identities
and personal traits, as well as by social structures.
The attributes of a particular society inform the
particular role identities for a person. Self-identities
are dynamic and can be defined in terms of rela-
tionships, affiliations, and attributes. Derek Layder
suggests that social, psychological, and emotional
qualities constitute self-identity. He also believes
that self-identity is tied to control over self and
others and that there is flexibility associated with
self-identity in that it is not fixed or static. A per-
son’s identity can change because of interactions in
social situations or because of the individual’s own
choices. Layder suggests that transformations in
self-identity are more gradual and minor changes
are more frequent.
A narrative approach to self-identity suggests
that individuals can understand and give order to
the self and the larger social space through stories.
For example, Dora Shu-fang Dien defines self-
identity as a life story that is socially constructed
and constantly being revised throughout the life
Personal Identity Versus Self-Identity 547
span, which provides a sense of continuity despite
change. Following this perspective, self-identity is
defined as life-story construction. A life story
gives meaning and offers a sense of continuity
over time.
Relationship Between
Personal Identity and Self-Identity
Defining the relationship between personal iden-
tity and self-identity and the extent to which these
two concepts are intertwined is a complicated
enterprise. Scholars often use these terms inter-
changeably because scholars do not begin their
inquiries into identity studies by differentiating
personal identity and self-identity. When the
assumptions guiding how the scholar is working
with personal identity and self-identity are not
publicly disclosed, it is difficult to determine how
the scholar is defining the terms. The use of per-
sonal identity and self-identity as interchangeable
terms contributes to the difficulty in pointing out
the relationship between the two terms. As noted
earlier, the relationship between personal identity
and self-identity is a source of scholarly debate
because differentiating between personal and self-
identity is a matter of idiosyncrasy for some schol-
ars and a matter of central importance for others.
Additionally, both personal identity and self-
identity are dynamic phenomena that are changing
throughout people’s lives. Presenting the relation-
ship as a static construct would be a misrepresen-
tation of the interplay between personal identity
and self-identity.
A starting point for beginning to articulate the
relationship between personal identity and self-
identity is to consider the term self. Personal iden-
tity is often seen not in relation to a larger
community but in relation to the self. Personal
identity is central to the self and can be considered
a level of self. Differences in personal identity
manifest themselves in the self identities that peo-
ple create and sustain. As the external environ-
ment changes for people, so too will personal
identity and self-identity. Personal identity and
self-identity each texture the concept of human
identity and are central to understanding the
human experience. Personal identities and self
identities can also be described by their connection
to social identities.
548 Personality/Individual Differences
Implications in a Social World
A social world creates a larger context from which
the concepts of personal identity and self-identity
engage questions related to rationality, ethics, and
morality. Personal identity and self-identity can be
considered social phenomenon. According to Roy
F. Baumeister, personal identity is a crucial inter-
face between the private organism and society.
Self-identity is also influenced by the interface with
the social world. Individuals often define them-
selves in terms of social connections and their
interactions in a social world. Both person and self
exist within social environments, so both personal
identity and self-identity can be understood in
social terms. Both terms are theoretically engaged
by social identity theory. Social identity theory,
developed by Henri Tajfel and John Turner in
1979, suggests that an individual’s identities are
formed by interactions with various groups.
Whereas personal identity is derived from the indi-
vidual’s unique attributes, social identity is derived
by group memberships. Michael Hogg differenti-
ates between the collective or social self and the
private self by suggesting that collective or social
self is defined by group memberships and that the
private self is defined individually.
Questions regarding who one is are often tied to
relationships and to finding one’s place within a
social world through family, community, and reli-
gious interactions. For example, Charles Taylor
suggests that defining who one is requires a social
space. Social interactions influence the develop-
ment of self-identities. Self-identity emerges in the
interplay of a variety of characteristics that exist
within the individual and within society. Scholars
also suggest that possessing a self-identity is essen-
tial for interacting in a social world. This view
assumes that the concept of self is an autonomous
agent that engages with society.
Not all social identity theorists link personal
identity to social identity. Layder views the self as
partly independent of social forces but also subject
to social influences. At the societal level, cultural
values influence the conception of personal iden-
tity and self-identity. Cultural values and beliefs
influence the interactions between parents and
children and guide group activities within a given
community.
The increased use of technology and social
media networking has changed the way social
groups can interact in a public space. The phenom-
enon raises questions related to developing a self-
identity in a virtual community. Individuals identify
with particular online communities that are based
on professional, recreational, or personal affilia-
tions. Individuals construct identities by participat-
ing in blogs, reacting to posted articles, posting
topics on message boards or forums, and playing
online virtual games. Participants in virtual or online
communities participate in computer-mediated com-
munication where interactions over the Internet
help shape self-identities. The increased use of tech-
nology and social media networking continue to
challenge previously held notions related to the rela-
tionship between individual and society.
Amanda G. McKendree
See also Psychology of Self and Identity; Social
Constructionist Approach to Personal Identity; Social
Identity Theory
Further Readings
Goffman, E. (1996). The presentation of self in everyday
life. New York: Doubleday.
Layder, D. (2004). Social and personal identity:
Understanding yourself. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Parfit, D. (1971). Personal identity. The Philosophical
Review, 80, 3–27.
Perry, J. (Ed.). (1975). Personal identity. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: The making of the
modern identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Unger, P. (1990). Identity, consciousness, and value. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Personality/Individual
Differences
Personality researchers have suggested numerous
theories on the structure and organization of per-
sonality. These theories are attempts at providing
a framework for the study of personality—the
important ways people differ in their enduring
emotional, interpersonal, attitudinal, and motiva-
tional styles. The five-factor model has developed

as the most influential personality theory cur-
rently used by psychologists and other personality
researchers. The study of personality, or more
specifically the person, has important implications
for the study of social behaviors as well, and inter-
est in the role of personality in people’s lives con-
tinues to have a profound impact on empirical
research and theoretical development. Additionally,
it has been suggested that personality traits may
play a role in the development of identity. This
entry provides an overview of the five-factor
model of personality, describes the strategies used
to study personality and social behavior, and
examines the role of personality and personal
identity in social identity theory.
Five-Factor Model
Although personality psychologists do not agree
upon a single definition of personality, the most
commonly used definitions consider the relatively
permanent traits and characteristics that give con-
sistency to an individual’s behavior. Traits refer to
individual factors that consistently influence behav-
ior across time and situations. Even though elabo-
rate theories and classifications were developed
and used by researchers suggesting the structure
and implications of personality traits, including
Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory and Alfred
Adler’s individual psychology, no overarching
theory or classification system was consistently
used by personality researchers until the develop-
ment of the five-factor model.
In the 1980s, researchers factor analyzed almost
every major personality inventory available, includ-
ing the commonly used Myers-Briggs Indicator and
the Eysenck Personality Inventory. The five-factor
model, developed through the factor analyses
being conducted, attempted to answer the two
burning questions at that time. First, with so many
personality inventories being used, each with its
own scale, how was a common language to emerge
for personality researchers to use? With research-
ers using different inventories, with different mea-
sures, and each having its own unique labels and
terms, making comparisons between studies was
incredibly difficult. The five-factor model also pro-
vided an answer to another pressing question:
What is the structure of personality? Researchers
were arguing about the number of factors involved
Personality/Individual Differences 549
in the structure of personality. Was personality
best understood by 3, 5, or even 16 factors? The
development of the five-factor model answered
both of these questions by providing a common
framework for researchers to discuss empirical
findings and providing a theory of the structure of
personality.
Although the idea of personality consisting of
five factors was originally suggested by Lewis
Goldberg in the late 1970s, in response to the con-
sistent findings from early factor analyses, the pub-
lication of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory
by Paul T. Costa Jr. and Robert R. McCrae in 1985
provided the first common taxonomy, a scientific
technique for classification, for a five-factor model.
Research using the five-factor model, and the
Revised NEO Personality Inventory, has found
permanence in the five factors with age. That is,
people tend to maintain their personality structure
throughout their lives. Additionally, cross-cultural
research has found the five factors across a variety
of cultures. The five factors in this model are extra-
version, agreeableness, openness to experience,
conscientiousness, and neuroticism.
Extraversion
At the core, extraversion refers to the extent to
which people prefer to be alone or with others.
Individuals who score high on extraversion mea-
sures tend to be sociable, talkative, active, and
confident. These individuals enjoy interacting with
others and take pleasure in attending social gather-
ings, such as parties. In contrast, people who score
low tend to be quiet, reserved, cautious, and tend
to lack the energy and excitement associated with
those high in extraversion. Individuals scoring low
on extroversion measures tend to find enjoyment
in spending time alone and may find social gather-
ings less rewarding. Extraversion has been referred
to as surgency by several personality researchers.
The term surgency is a label that is meant to cap-
ture the energetic aspect of those who score high
on extraversion.
Agreeableness
The agreeableness factor distinguishes compas-
sionate and considerate individuals from more
ruthless and adamant individuals. People who
550 Personality/Individual Differences
score high on measures for agreeableness tend to
be trusting, good-natured, generous, and lenient.
These individuals tend to have a positive view of
human nature and, in social situations, tend to be
pleasant and accommodating of others. In con-
trast, those who score low tend to be stingy, suspi-
cious, critical, and frequently irritable. They tend
to have a negative view of human nature, are more
likely to compete than cooperate, and tend to be
manipulative in their social relationships.
Openness to Experience
Openness to experience differentiates individu-
als who are attracted to and prefer variety in life
from those who prefer the comfort of the familiar
and who have a need for closure. Individuals who
enjoy novelty and seek out new experiences,
whether it is trying a new “exotic” restaurant or
traveling in a foreign country without a set agenda,
would score high on measures for openness to
experience. People who prefer to frequent the same
restaurant and enjoy the comfort associated with
familiar people, food, and other items would score
low on openness to experience measures. High
scores on this trait have been linked to the ques-
tioning of traditional values, creativity, being imag-
inative, and being liberal. Low scores are associated
with being conventional, down-to-earth, conserva-
tive and having low curiosity.
Conscientiousness
Conscientiousness refers to people who are
ordered, focused, controlled, self-disciplined, and
ambitious. Individuals who score high on conscien-
tiousness tend to be industrious and hardworking.
When taken to the extreme, these individuals may
be perfectionists, workaholics, and compulsive. In
contrast, those who score low tend to be unorga-
nized, lazy, without direction, less ambitious, and
less goal-oriented. Recent work has found low
conscientiousness to be associated with a more
liberal-leaning political orientation and high consci-
entiousness with a more conservative political orien-
tation. Conscientiousness is less tied to interpersonal
behavior than are the other traits. Specifically, con-
scientiousness is related more to one’s own behav-
ior (e.g., clean, desire to work hard, setting goals)
than to interactions with others.
Neuroticism
Neuroticism, like conscientiousness, is not as
strongly related to interpersonal behaviors as the
other factors. This factor deals with the emotional
life of people. Individuals who score high on neu-
roticism tend to be emotional, temperamental, self-
conscious, and self-pitying and are more likely to
experience stress-related disorders. Moreover, these
individuals are more likely to interpret ambiguous
situations as threatening and view minor setbacks
and frustrations as impossible to overcome. Those
who score low on measures of neuroticism are
more even-tempered, calm, and less emotional.
Personality and Social Behavior
In a proposition that has guided theory develop-
ment and research for years in the social sciences,
Kurt Lewin claimed behavior is a function of the
person and the environment. Thus, behavior is a
result of the individual’s characteristics (i.e., traits,
dispositions, past experiences) and of the charac-
teristics of the situation in which the behavior
occurs. Three strategies have been commonly used
to study the relationship between personality and
social behavior: the dispositional strategy, the
interactional strategy, and the situational strategy.
These strategies differ in the extent to which they
emphasize the importance of personal characteris-
tics and social sources of influence.
The Dispositional Strategy
The dispositional strategy attempts to under-
stand consistencies and regularities in behavior
based on stable traits and enduring dispositions
that are believed to be located “within” the indi-
vidual. Empirical work using the dispositional
strategy has focused on defining domains of
behavior where it is possible to discern regularities
over time and across situations. These regularities
that manifest themselves across various situations
and are not limited to any particular length of time
are believed to be components of personality.
Research has considered the impact of a wide
range of traits on behavior: extraversion, empathy,
locus of control, need for approval, authoritarian-
ism, and Machiavellianism.
The main critique of the dispositional strategy is
that it gives too much emphasis to the role of the

individual and overlooks, or greatly minimizes,
the powerful impact of the situation. This critique
argues that in certain situations people may behave
in unusual and irregular ways. Focusing on just
the traits and dispositions of individuals may miss
the role of the situation in determining and guiding
behavioral decisions.
The Interactional Strategy
The interactional strategy attempts to under-
stand behavior by focusing on the interactive influ-
ence of personality (i.e., traits and dispositions of
the individual) and features of the situation. This
strategy addresses the main critique of the disposi-
tional strategy by considering the influence of the
situation in addition to the influence of personal
characteristics. Specifically, the interactional strat-
egy considers the traits of individuals and aspects
of situations within which regularities and consis-
tencies in behaviors are found. Essential to the
interactional strategy is the role of moderating
variables in the relationship between personal
characteristics and aspects of the situation in deter-
mining behavioral decisions. The functional
approach to the study of moderation seeks to
determine variables that shift the cause of behavior
from personal characteristics and traits to aspects
of the situation or vice versa. Strong situations,
those that provide clear guides for behavior and
appear to be structured and clearly defined, may
exert a greater influence on the person than dispo-
sitions and trait. As a result, characteristics of the
situation should guide behaviors more than per-
sonal characteristics do. Conversely, weak situa-
tions, those that are ambiguous and unstructured,
should exert a minimal amount of influence on the
individual. Thus, the minimal pressure exerted on
individuals in weak situations allows dispositions
and traits to guide behavioral decisions.
Although the interactional strategy is often
viewed as superior to the dispositional strategy,
critiques have been leveled against it as well. For
instance, critics have claimed that according to this
view the causal link between personality and
behavior is always assumed to be unidirectional with
behavior unable to influence personality, and that
this strategy assumes that personality characteris-
tics and the situation are independent, they do not
influence each other, and they are not influenced by
Personality/Individual Differences 551
behavior. A bidirectional view of behavior and per-
sonality suggests that behavior can influence per-
sonality just as personality can influence behavior.
The Situational Strategy
The situational strategy attempts to understand
consistencies in social behavior in terms of the
settings and social situations in which people live
their lives. Compared with the restrictions in
experimental studies on the social situations peo-
ple are placed in and the behavioral options avail-
able to the participants, the real-world situations
people find themselves in have the ability to be
the result of an individual’s own choosing. People
are able to choose their social situations, so the
regularities and consistencies often associated
with personality may be the result of situational
consistency. Personal traits and dispositions may
be reflected in the decision to enter into and
remain in certain situations and in the processes
by which the situation is influenced by decisions
and actions of individuals. Thus, people high in
extraversion may seek social situations allowing
them to express this trait. In contrast, individuals
low in extraversion may seek situations that do
not require them to frequently interact with oth-
ers. People high in openness to experience may
choose to enter into situations that allow the
expression of this trait, such as joining a book
club or joining a local sports team, whereas those
low in openness to experience may actively avoid
these situations.
The situational strategy reflects the dynamic
interaction between personality and the situation.
Consequently, the situational strategy is subject to
the same criticisms as the interactional strategy.
The situational strategy, however, stands apart
from the other strategies in its view of the relation-
ship between personality and the situation. To the
extent that individuals are able to choose their
social situations, people may inadvertently choose
the situations that influence their behavior.
Personality, Individuality,
and Social Identity Theory
Social identity theory developed as a theory of inter-
group relations, providing an explanation for preju-
dice, discrimination, and conflict and cooperation
552 Personality/Individual Differences
between groups. According to social identity the-
ory, the self-concept is distinguished between both
social identity, defined by specific group member-
ships, and personality identity, defined in terms of
personality, personal attributes, idiosyncrasies,
and close personal relationships. Although social
identity theory has focused almost exclusively on
the influence of social identities, research shows
people do feel they are unique, that they have an
overall personality system, and that people have a
stable sense of who they are as individuals. Despite
focusing on social identities, social identity theory
is a theory of the self at its core. In particular, by
making comparisons between one’s own group and
other groups, people are able to self-enhance and
feel good about themselves and their group.
According to social identity theory, making social
comparisons between groups—and particularly
perceiving our own groups to be better off than
other groups and people—increases our self-esteem
and makes us feel good. Essential to these com-
parisons is how we categorize, or classify, our
social surroundings into groups.
A development in the 1980s that focused on the
role of categorization processes on identification
and behavior was referred to as self-categorization
theory, or the social identity theory of the group.
Categorizing both one’s self and others into
groups, specifically into ingroups and outgroups,
depersonalizes individuals. That is, this process
assimilates people to the prototype or stereotypical
member of that group and, as a result, depersonal-
izes the self and others in terms of the self-concept.
By categorizing people, the self included, individu-
als are viewed as group members rather than by
their own unique attributes and abilities. Three
levels of categorization have been suggested. The
superordinate level of categorizing includes catego-
rizing in a large, inclusive group, such as human
beings. The intermediate level of categoriza­tion
focuses on social similarities and differences (e.g.,
female, male, African American). The subordi-
nate level of classification involves personal self-
categorizations. This level of categorization focuses
on the unique aspects of the individual, and com-
parisons are made between other individuals.
Social identity theorists have suggested that
people experience different levels of the self,
depending on specific contexts and situations. For
instance, personality and a sense of individuality
may be a result of the particular level of social com-
parison being made. When people categorize at the
superordinate or intermediate level, intergroup
comparisons are made and the focus is on social
identities. However, at the superordinate level,
comparisons are often made between other species.
When one categorizes at the subordinate level,
however, comparisons are made between self and
others, generating a focus on the unique aspects of
the self. Accordingly, this level of categorization
highlights the unique aspects of individuals and
serves as an impetus for interpersonal comparisons.
One critique against this level of categorization as
generating a focus on personality is whether this
level focuses on self–other distinctions, or whether
it actually focuses on intragroup comparisons rest-
ing on evaluations of self and other as more or less
prototypical group members. Proponents of this
argument claim making comparisons based on the
perceived group prototype does not involve any
unique aspects of individuals—it simply focuses on
how well they match the prototype for the group.
Justin D. Hackett
See also Perceptual Filtering; Personal Identity Versus
Self-Identity; Self
Further Readings
Baumeister, R. F. (1991). The self in social psychology.
Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
Goldberg, L. R. (1981). Language and individual
differences: The search for universals in personality
lexicons. In L. Wheeler (Ed.), Review of personality
and social psychology (Vol. 2). Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage.
Hogg, M. A. (2006). Social identity theory. In P. J. Burke
(Ed.), Contemporary social psychological theories
(pp. 111–136). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Leary, M. R., & Tangney, J. P. (2003). Handbook of
social identity. New York: Guilford Press.
McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1987). Validation of the
five-factor model of personality across instruments
and observers. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 52, 81–90.
McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1996). Toward a new
generation of personality theories: Theoretical
contexts for the five-factor model of personality. In
J. S. Wiggins (Ed.), The five-factor model of

personality: Theoretical perspectives (pp. 51–87). New
York: Guilford Press.
McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1997). Personality trait
structure as a human universal. American
Psychologist, 52, 509–516.
Snyder, M., & Cantor, N. (1998). Understanding
personality and social behavior: A functional strategy.
In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.),
Handbook of social psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 635–679).
New York: McGraw-Hill.
Snyder, M., & Ickes, W. (1985). Personality and social
behavior. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.),
Handbook of social psychology: Vol. 2. Special fields
and applications (3rd ed., pp. 883–948). New York:
Random House.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D.,
& Wetherell, M. (1987). Rediscovering the social
group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford, UK:
Blackwell.
Phenomenology
Phenomenology opens up new vistas and mines
uncharted depths about human experience. Any
attempt to come to terms with identity—who the
human person was, is, and will become—takes
place in the crucible of experience, so it is essential
to have an appreciation for phenomenology. This
entry exposes the manner in which human experi-
ence has been analyzed by foundational figures in
the phenomenological tradition.
Definition
Philosopher Robert Sokolowski defines phenome-
nology as the study of human experience and of
the way things present themselves to humans in
and through such experience. Two corollary points
regarding this experiential focus give specificity to
this definition, according to Carol Becker, a
humanistic psychologist. First, experience is a
valid and fruitful source of knowledge. Second,
everyday human worlds are valuable sources of
knowledge. The intersection of knowledge and
experience provides a fitting springboard for con-
textualizing the rise of the phenomenological
movement, most specifically in the tradition of
continental philosophy.
Phenomenology 553
Edmund Husserl:
Returning to the Things Themselves
Edmund Husserl founded the phenomenological
movement. A native Austrian, he held teaching
positions in Germany, including the University of
Freiburg, where he also chaired the philosophy
department. Even though the term phenomenol-
ogy is used by Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel, only with its debut in Husserl’s
project did phenomenology in the proper sense of
the term begin in earnest to exert an influence on
contemporary thought. Although Husserl’s intel-
lectual formation was initially in the field of math-
ematics, the setting in which his thought took
shape sparked his curiosity to cross disciplinary
lines. The emergence of a new psychology and a
revival of the theory of knowledge in philosophy
influenced Husserl to make phenomenology a sci-
ence of genuine knowledge. To underscore the
operative notion of “genuine” in Husserl’s striv-
ings for knowledge within the vagaries of human
experience, Rudolf Bernet maintains that the goal
of Husserl’s phenomenology is to account for the
validity (“being-true”) of objects on the basis of
the way in which they are given in the lived expe-
riences of consciousness.
Eidetic and Transcendental Phenomenology
Human consciousness is the basis for the attain-
ment of any true understanding, so Husserl devised
a sophisticated theory to explain its inner work-
ings. Essentially, all consciousness is intentional in
that it possesses an inherent directedness—when-
ever humans are conscious, they are always already
conscious of something. Husserl emphasized dif-
ferent aspects of this dynamic throughout his
career. Early on, his phenomenology was identi-
fied as eidetic, from the Greek essence, and this
embodied Husserl’s mantra to get back to “the
things themselves.” Martin Jay, who specializes in
phenomenological experience, asserts that Husserl
set an ambitious goal for himself in attempting to
find eternal, essential, ideal truths amid the flux of
passing encounters between self and world or self
and others.
At a subsequent phase, Husserl’s phenomenol-
ogy became transcendental. He shifted his con-
cerns from the functioning of consciousness that
enables the knower to derive the essence of an
554 Phenomenology
object of his or her consciousness to the structure
of the act in which the knower experiences any
object. When the human person experiences some-
thing, it can be experienced in a variety of ways—
for example, a dime can be used for the toll and it
can become a makeshift screwdriver. In each case,
the same coin is given a different meaning. The key
here is the indispensable role of consciousness.
Husserl scholar Steven Crowell contends that
Husserl would want the knower to attribute these
differences in meaning not solely to the thing itself
but to the consciousness that experiences them in
these ways because only the conscious act explains
why at this moment just these aspects of the object
are experienced. Human beings cannot fully antic-
ipate the meaning that an object will have when
consciously experienced, nor can they fully explain
why it takes the meaning it does, so this dynamic
retains a transcendental aspect.
Realistic and Constitutive Phenomenology
Husserl redistributed his attention to ensure
that the various functionings of consciousness
were exposed, and his earliest students as well as
contemporary Husserlians can be distinguished
according to the emphasis given to the diverse
operations of consciousness—object-oriented or
act-oriented. These orientations are expressed,
respectively, as realistic or constitutive phenome-
nology. Johannes Daubert advanced the former in
the early 1900s. His gleanings from Husserl’s
Logical Investigations convinced him that Husserl
gave primacy to object-oriented phenomenology,
which in turn underscores the inextricable entan-
glement of consciousness and world. Barry Smith,
a contemporary realistic phenomenologist, sum-
marizes Daubert’s interpretation of Husserl by
explaining that consciousness functions in a nor-
mal way when it “hits” an object in veridical per-
ception. Consciousness is therefore exhausted in
its relation to an object.
The counterpoint to realistic phenomenology is
constitutive phenomenology, a term Husserl expli-
cates in Ideas I. Constitutive analysis focuses on
the correlation between constituting consciousness
and constituted objects. Although this conveys a
sense of balance because the structures of con-
sciousness are reciprocally bound up with the
objects of consciousness to constitute a world,
Husserl actually maintains that an asymmetry
exists. Steven Crowell explains that Husserl’s posi-
tion is “idealistic,” as privileging the subjective
pole in the functioning of consciousness to consti-
tute objective worldly being.
The Phenomenological and Natural Attitudes
The processes associated with constitutive phe-
nomenology cultivate the phenomenological atti-
tude. This is in contradistinction to what Husserl
dubbed the natural attitude. Fostering a natural
attitude leads to a preoccupation with ordinary
human living, most specifically to being caught up
with the various things in the world. However, the
complacency of the natural attitude, which takes
for granted the nature of the world and all that it
signifies, can be converted to a phenomenological
attitude. This process requires a fluency with
Husserl-specific conceptualizations—reduction,
bracketing (epoché), and description.
Turning toward the phenomenological attitude
is called the reduction. With the Latin root
re-ducere, reduction is a leading back, a withhold-
ing, or a withdrawal. When co-opting the phenom-
enological attitude, the person suspends the
taken-for-granted way that the world and every-
thing in it are assumed to be. Husserl uses the term
bracketing for this suspension because all mun-
dane beliefs about the world and things contained
therein are bracketed. Epoché is the technical
word Husserl uses for bracketing.
The upshot of adopting the phenomenological
attitude is the ability to engage in the activity of
description in a novel way. Typically, descriptions
provide a litany of the features of an object.
However, when describing something in the phe-
nomenological attitude, this is not just a matter of
relating its properties; rather, it becomes an effort
to describe an object in terms of the way it can be
experienced.
Martin Heidegger:
Human Experience and Being
As innovative as Husserl’s undertaking was in
developing an intricate mechanism for analyzing
consciousness and human experience, it remained
heavily idealistic—the individual person as a sub-
ject attains a heightened insight into reality through

a consciousness purified from all the distractions
of routine daily existence. Later, Husserl became
interested in issues such as embodiment, sociality,
and history, which helped recast his study of
human experience in less subjectivistic ways.
However, the subsequent phenomenologists
inspired by him moved the study of human experi-
ence to new levels. Chief among these is Martin
Heidegger. While lecturing at the University of
Freiburg as a Privatdozent in the philosophy
department, Heidegger formed a close relation-
ship with Husserl. Heidegger referred to his men-
tor as the thinker who “opened my eyes.”
Nonetheless, Heidegger’s gaze soon looked askance
at many of Husserl’s key concepts or beheld them
with such radical acuity that he ushered in a new
era of phenomenology.
Foremost among Heidegger’s revisions was his
appropriation of consciousness. According to
Charles Siewert, Heidegger maintained that typical
studies of consciousness had the built-in tendency
to oppose the inner realm of consciousness with
the external world. Not wanting to perpetuate
such dualistic views of subjective consciousness
and the objective reality, the early Heidegger’s
phenomenology in Being and Time was oriented
toward a general account of the being of human
being or Dasein. Because Dasein is always and
already in a reciprocal relationship with the world,
it is unnecessary to overanalyze how consciousness
interacts with the objective world.
Aside from shifting attention away from the
inner workings of consciousness, Heidegger’s phe-
nomenology also reassigned human experience to
a lofty (metaphysical) role. No longer is experi-
ence to be reserved for describing how things
present themselves to a human person in a par-
ticular instance; instead, experience now poten-
tially discloses being itself. Although a bold
assertion, it is not without precedent in the con-
text of Heidegger’s overall project. Heidegger
believed that philosophy since Plato has not effec-
tively thought through the question of the mean-
ing of being, thus afflicting the West with a
“forgetfulness of being.” This is unconscionable
because of the importance and pervasiveness of
being for everything that is. Heidegger advanced
several approaches to steer philosophy to revisit
the question of the meaning of being, including
the contention that human experience is linked
Phenomenology 555
with being. The concept Ereignis (translated
“event”) best expresses this interaction. The
event-like character of experience enables it to be
receptive to being, which in turn fosters a deeper
affinity between humanity and being. Experience
as event also possesses a passive quality. When
humans undergo an experience with something,
whether it is a thing, a person, or a god, it is not
of their making. Instead, that which is being expe-
rienced must be received and submitted to with
the ultimate outcome of the encounter as poten-
tially overwhelming and transformative.
Hermeneutical Phenomenology
Although Heidegger’s approach to the rapport
between human experience and being is sanguine,
he also avers that any encounter with being has
both reveling and concealing dimensions. Heidegger
offers a sobering rejoinder to the realization that
being beckons humans in their lived experiences—
for as much as there is revelation about the mean-
ing of human experience vis-à-vis being in these
encounters, there are also aspects that remain hid-
den and beyond human grasp at the bidding of
being. Thus, there is a need for interpretation of
the meaning of these experiential encounters largely
because of being’s retreat. Because Heidegger
issues the call for interpretation, he is credited with
inaugurating another branch of phenomenology—
hermeneutical phenomenology. It remained the
work of others to make hermeneutics known in its
own right to the world at large, that is, Heidegger’s
student Hans Georg Gadamer.
French Phenomenology:
Existentialism and Beyond
While broadly acknowledging how Heidegger’s
linking of human experience and being paved the
way for hermeneutical phenomenology, it must
also be heeded from a more circumscribed call for
interpretation that Heidegger inspired yet another
tendency in the phenomenological tradition—
existential phenomenology. The human experience
with being must be interpreted for that which
remains concealed in the encounter, but the human
existence (Dasein) itself should also be subjected to
a rigorous interpretation in its own right. It was
left mainly to a group of French philosophers to
556 Philosophical History of Identity
elucidate Heidegger’s overarching description of
human existence as situated freedom. In different
ways from one another, Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
Jean-Paul Sartre, and Simone de Beauvoir appro-
priated and extended phenomenological insights
as they offered their descriptions of the bodily,
interpersonal, and historical contingencies of the
human condition.
France has also served as the staging area for
more radical interpretations of phenomenology in
light of the challenges of postmodernism. Although
it is beyond the scope of this entry to trace the
rudimentary tenets of these positions, representa-
tive thinkers such as Emmanuel Levinas, Michel
Foucault, and Jacques Derrida all have been
influenced by and, to some degree, defined their
work in opposition to, the phenomenologies of
Husserl and Heidegger. Some commentators have
deemed these figures “post-phenomenological”—
thus, a phase of deconstructive phenomenology
could be added to the various trends delineated
earlier.
Daniel J. Martino
See also Being and Identity; Consciousness; Existentialist
Identity Questions; Hermeneutics; Intersubjectivity;
Mind-Body Problem; Modernity and Postmodernity;
Subjectivity
Further Readings
Critchley, S., & Schroeder, W. R. (Eds.). (1999).
A companion to continental philosophy. Malden, MA:
Blackwell.
Dreyfus, H. L., & Wrathall, M. A. (Eds.). (2006).
A companion to phenomenology and existentialism.
Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Embree, L., et al. (Eds.). (1997). Encyclopedia of
phenomenology. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic.
Moran, D. (2000). Introduction to phenomenology.
London: Routledge.
Sokolowski, R. (2000). Introduction to phenomenology.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tymieniecka, A.-T. (Ed.). (2002). Phenomenology world-
wide: Foundations, expanding dynamisms, life-
engagements: A guide for research and study.
Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.
Philosophical History
of Identity
The philosophical history of identity in the West
begins with the ancient Greeks and carries forth
through textured evolutions of philosophical
inquiry. Each engagement that follows meets the
well-known phrase from Socrates: “To know thy-
self.” Such a commonplace phrase finds constitu-
tive significance that is both varied and, at times,
contrasting throughout the historical horizon of
the West. The following sections, beginning with
the Greeks and ending in postmodernity, reveal
not so much the complexity of the term to know
thyself, but the confounded nature of knowing
itself. A philosophical history of identity began
perhaps with Socrates’ phrase and continues today
with that same phrase with multiplicity of para-
digmatic differences in the meaning and the
understanding of the word know and the word
thyself. The history of identity bespeaks differ-
ence, not uniformity.
The Ancient Greeks
Any journey across a field this vast must necessar-
ily be but one possible version that takes shape by
way of a particular organizing principle. This sec-
tion begins by going back—back in the manner
fitting in the West to philosophies of anything—to
Socrates and Plato. If identity can be understood
initially as being related to the ancient Greek
notion of philosophy, then all such philosophy is
concerned with a way of life. To give this idea its
context, the dictum, as famous as it is misunder-
stood, is that the task of identity is to know thyself.
For the Greeks, this means not that one is already
a fully formed self and identity, hence the Greek
desire to understand education; rather, one’s iden-
tity must never take leave of the acknowledgement
that one is not an immortal.
Thus, one’s place is in mortality, and to know
this is to know something inescapable about one’s
identity. To be mortal—having to have to die—is
the overriding issue in the forming of one’s iden-
tity. This pressing truth is always linked with his
never-ending belief in the transformative power of

talk, and for Socrates, education remains the key
to understanding one’s identity. Using this idea of
knowing yourself in its Greek sense, from the
start, identity is a way of making one’s way in the
face of one’s mortality, and this concern is what
can be a way of seeing the motivation of all subse-
quent searches in the philosophies of identity. The
idea of finitude has exerted a nearly unimaginable
power in Western thinking about who and how
we are. Furthermore, thinking about identity
demands questions concerning who and how we
ought to be.
A growing concern for the distinction between
the psyche (soul) and the soma (body), and from
this to the belief in a this-worldly life and an other-
worldly life, began to take shape in Greek thinking
(this other-worldly thinking in Plato, of course,
has differing versions, see e.g., Republic, Gorgias,
Phaedrus, and see also the claim in Phaedo,
“Philosophy is the preparation for death”).
Platonism (one is careful not to say Plato here)
won the day rather than Socrates or other of his
heirs (e.g., Diogenes or Epicurus), which makes it
possible in the face of knowing one’s mortality for
a certain Christianization of identity to take hold
of Western thinking.
Medieval to the Advent of the Modern
On this trajectory, the next stop is with
St. Augustine, by way of the Platonist Philo of
Alexandria. Augustine turns his thinking about
identity in the face of finitude toward a radical
inwardness perhaps not seen before in Western
thinking. This sense of inwardness tends at the
same time upward toward G-d (this entry observes
the Jewish tradition of spelling God as G-d) in light
of Augustine’s disquieting discovery: “I had become
a conundrum to myself” (or in another translation:
“I have become a question to myself”). This
Christian turn inward and upward (to wit in
Confessions: “The light was in me, but I was out-
side myself”) places care for the soul so that its fate
in the afterlife becomes the way identity gets
understood. This became no fleeting way of under-
standing identity. Through the power of the church
in Europe, Western thinking is destined by
Augustine’s thinking.
Philosophical History of Identity 557
With this turn to a monotheistic understanding
of G-d understood as a certain and infallible place-
holder in thinking, a consequence of a Platonism
has remained no matter how secular we believe we
have become. Against this Platonized and
Christianized backdrop, comes René Descartes.
Descartes takes over the idea that the identity of
who we are needs, by definition, a certain and
unassailable starting point.
From his position of methodological doubt,
Descartes begins the now-famous search for at least
one certain claim free from all possible doubt no
matter how hyperbolic or intense. Through his bril-
liant, if ultimately flawed, Meditations, Descartes
believes he has found such certainty in the cogito,
which leads to his claim: cogito ergo sum (I think,
therefore I am). The separation of the subject and
the object that might well be said to begin with the
distinction between body and soul finds its final
and lasting stamp in the Cartesian project.
Overturning the notion of identity founded in
the claim “know thyself” and further embodied in
an entire Greek sense of the polis held together by
their keen and grounded sense of discourse/rhetoric/
education, Descartes completes the Platonization
and Christianization of identity, making the self
and its identity an asocial enclosed zero-point
somehow thought to exist in an objective world of
things extended in mathematical space, the objec-
tivity of which is guaranteed by G-d himself. This
Cartesian completion, then, accomplished the
disastrous move from know thyself as a question
of living to a question of “What can the self know
for certain?” as if epistemological questions matter
more than living well. Next, a certain strain of
continental philosophy is made up of the various
attempts to “un-enclose” this self-contained sub-
ject as well as the various attempts to reintegrate
identity in the relational social world, in history,
and in the various structures of understanding that
might lurk within and around us.
Although Immanuel Kant makes his most press-
ing arguments against Descartes in Kant’s famous
first Critique, the types of thinking that begin in
earnest the long process of reintegrating identity
into the social world are found in Kant’s political
philosophy. Although Kant’s position places one’s
identity in contact with reason, he nonetheless also
558 Philosophical History of Identity
realizes that reason is articulated by persons in
association with others. In both “What Is
Enlightenment?” and “Idea of Universal History
From a Cosmopolitan Point of View,” Kant, though
not always credited with such, shows that who and
how we ought to be is an identity produced by talk
and discourse. To place identity in the purview of
discourse and talk is already to begin to undo the
Cartesian project and reintroduce thinking about
identity that concerns itself not with wholly isolated
individuals. Such persons are not those who wonder
how they shall ever encounter the other; rather, Kant
begins with persons with shared identities (which
do not simply reproduce the same) who are always
already caught up in the social world and ask what
they shall do to create an ethical commonwealth.
G. W. F. Hegel claims that one’s identity is
always tied to the identity of others and how others
take us to be furthers the reintegration of identity
in the social world. Difference from what is “not-
self” leads to one’s own identity. This position is
epitomized in Hegel’s description of the bondsman
and servant dialectic in the Phenomenology of
Spirit. Identity needs difference, and this difference
is expressed as meaning by way of the unfolding of
social and historical relations. Following Kant,
who is the beginning of the undoing of the Platonic,
Christian, Cartesian dilemma of identity, Hegel’s
linking the self and identity to difference, history,
and the social makes way for three major think-
ers who have followed him to lasting conse-
quences: One to set him right—Karl Marx; one to
make a way away from him while appealing to his-
tory as genealogy in its usefulness and avoiding its
disadvantages—Friedrich Nietzsche; and one to tell
a different developmental story that is in its own
way historical—Sigmund Freud.
The Modern as a Hermeneutics of Suspicion
What Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud share is a com-
mitment to understanding identity as something we
cannot conceive outside history and social relations.
The self and its identity, no matter how unencum-
bered we might pretend them to be, is in its exis-
tence made possible by the intricate web of social
relations in which it must find itself to undertake
any sense of identity at all. Marx also understood
this situated notion of identity from the standpoint
of discourse and talk, as did Kant, who believed that
language is practical consciousness that arises
through interaction with others: Language. Identity
for Marx, then, becomes a question of where one
finds oneself in the ensemble of social relations,
including language, that make up class societies.
Beginning from his notion of species being and the
alienation one suffers from one’s actual identity in
the 1844 Manuscripts, and which it might be said
he never abandons, identity is social, historical, and
class-based, and brings with it an historical role in
the praxial process of liberation.
Nietzsche considers identity of modern persons
as a transitional identity by placing identity in
terms of the genealogy of selves who must find a
way to will higher forms of existence and who
must find an answer to what their suffering means
after the madman announces the death of G-d. In
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche argues that the
identity created by the history of the West must be
overcome, making way for a change that would
require the transformation of resentment and guilt
fostered by Christianity into the creative-aesthetic
remaking of identity. The exhortations to “live
dangerously” relative to the status quo and to
“give style to one’s character” are calls by Nietzsche
to a sophisticated type of aesthetics that includes a
creative transformation of identity and self as well
as culture as a whole.
The death of G-d takes a different path in
Freud’s psychoanalytic project as determined by
his embrace of modern scientific methods. In an
attempt to tell a developmental story of how iden-
tity is formed in infancy and childhood and how
the earliest formations of identity stay with us and
shape our struggle with ourselves and others in the
taking of adult identities, Freud asks us to face the
fact we contain forces of otherness shaping our
identity over which we do not have complete con-
trol. Thus, identity as a response to relationships
with others is configured partly by unconscious
forces acting, as it were, on their own. As with
Marx and Nietzsche, this loss of control over iden-
tity places questions of identity in tension with the
forces of otherness, whether the forces of history
and class, resentment, or the unconscious.
Departing From the Modern
In his masterpiece Being and Time, Martin
Heidegger articulates the way to think about

identity for the foreseeable future. In this work, he
returns to philosophy as a way of life grounded in
a certain understanding of Greek insights about
who and how we are. In his analytic portrait of
Dasein, Heidegger shows we must twist away from
the still-lingering predicament of Cartesianism and
its consequences. We must work through these by
returning to an understanding of identity grounded
in discourse, being-with-others, and world. Rather
than beginning with subjects standing over and
against a world of objects, Heidegger’s genius is to
show one is always who and how one is by way of
a primordial set of manifold and significant rela-
tions with otherness.
By Heidegger’s account, one’s identity is
grounded in these relations without being deter-
mined to a predicable end by them. Dasein is, then,
from the standpoint of understanding who it is,
always incomplete and, what is more, always
incompletable. We cannot, however, mistake our
incompletability as a condition that would allow
us to say our identities are completely fluid. We
cannot take on an identity invented ex nihilo. We
are always who and how we are in the web of sig-
nificance of our being-in-the-world—that is to say,
a series of relations given from the start that we
cannot wholly transcend. Identity is never wholly
fixed nor wholly fluid.
Unlike certain popular existentialists and some
poststructuralists repeating Descartes’s mistake in
their own way, Heidegger does not pass over the
beginning. Rather than suggesting we begin as
resolute wills standing before choices, he begins at
the there of our being-in-the-world. We are,
before this misconstrual of the will, understand-
ingly attuned to the world and held in this
grounded understanding by discourse/talk that is
communication in its ontologically broad sense.
This is a receptive passivity that allows us to
understand that the choices we do make about the
authenticity of our living well come from the
already disclosed world of our existence, which
we nonetheless structure partly by our own accu-
mulated historical understandings. With Heidegger,
the understanding of identity becomes inextrica-
bly linked to language and being-together-with-
one-another. Any sophisticated understanding of
identity after Heidegger will have to have an
equally sophisticated way of thinking about lan-
guage, meaning, and interpretation from within
Philosophical History of Identity 559
which and from out of which we always already
share a (social) world.
Finally, Heidegger’s focus in Being and Time on
death—as the going-to-be of each of us—returns
without merely going back to the dictum “know
thyself” from the Oracle at Delphi with which we
began. Following Heidegger’s thought, the next
stage of thinking about identity addresses issues
such as death, difference, and care. There will be
no thinking about these issues in the centuries to
come that does not take its opening moves from
Heidegger’s existential phenomenological project.
Having Passed Through Heidegger
Three thinkers will be noted here, each of whose
works, as with all those mentioned throughout,
demand intensive study and are some of the most
radical works in the post-Heideggerian era.
Michel Foucault’s project on the care of the
self goes back to a certain classical Greek and
Roman thinking that returns questions of identity
to understanding philosophy as a way of life and
as the embodied care of the self (The Hermeneutics
of the Subject). Furthermore, Foucault’s work can
be said to be a radical rethinking of the Nietzschean
creative-aesthetic project of identity dealt with ear-
lier, as well as a way to return to talk (fearless
speech), communication, and hermeneutics as
embodied grounds for the exercise of power and
resistance with respect to one’s identity (Care of
the Self ).
Luce Irigaray’s project is seen in this context as
thinking of identity on the grounds of sexual dif-
ference. Again with Irigaray, identity is linked to
understanding language and communication from
the standpoint of sexual difference (see I Love to
You) and as a radical critique of the Freudian and
traditional patriarchal understanding of identities
ensconced in the history of Western philosophy. In
all such radical feminist projects as Irigaray’s, gen-
der and sexuality play a fundamental role in think-
ing through questions of identity.
Finally, Jacques Derrida’s post-Heideggerian
project can be said to press the understanding of
language and communication to its most radical
position to date (e.g., “Signature, Event, Context”).
In a rethinking of Marx (Specters of Marx) linking
it to what Derrida calls the messianic without mes-
sianism, identity is linked to the continual coming
560 Philosophy of Identity
of the other. Thus, identity is linked in strict ways
to questions of politics and ethics. In The Gift of
Death, Derrida can be said to return us to know
thyself understood as a question now of not only
our mortality but the responsibility of the mortal-
ity of others. This is another way of saying that
questions of identity always become questions of
ethics and responsibility. Derrida is a philosopher
who thinks through death and difference to orient
us toward living, toward philosophy as a way of
life that must see identity in relation to language
and otherness. Socrates might well understand this
standing before the Oracle at Delphi and when he
is off again, on his way to dialogue with others
about what it means to know thyself.
Ramsey Eric Ramsey
See also Language; Self
Further Readings
Descartes, R. (1960). Discourse on method and
meditations (L. J. Lafleur, Trans.). New York:
Macmillan.
Hegel, G. W. F. (1979). Phenomenology of spirit
(A. V. Miller, Trans.). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie &
E. Robinson, Trans.). New York: Harper & Row.
Kant, I. (1983). Perpetual peace and other essays
(T. Humphrey, Trans.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Schrag, C. O. (1997). The self after postmodernity. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Philosophy of Identity
At whatever level of analysis of most diverse disci-
plines, from metaphysics through structures of
civilization, there appear two encompassing and
completely interrelated facets: identity, the fixed or
permanent, and the streaming, the flux, the
dynamic becoming. Using a variety of cultural
phenomena, expressive of identity and change, this
entry articulates the logic of this interrelationship.
Thus, myths, signs, facts, languages, cultural aims
and cultures, egos, and metaphysical and onto-
logical claims are variants that express the basic
phenomena of identity and flux and their combi-
nations that can be either thickened or attenuated
resulting in field-depth compositions sufficient
to encompass both the esoteric and the exoteric
modes of communication. What is singular about
these compositions is that they allow cross-
disciplinary and cross-cultural understanding.
Comparative Worlds
Identity and becoming are not meanings, but pro-
vide the “logics” in whose contexts meaningful
discourses are composed. The study of societies
and cultures, and the disciplines within them,
reveals their constant and irrevocable presence. No
sociocultural discourses and intersubjective prac-
tices are totally structural, revealing only fixed
identity, or totally in flux. Social and cultural phe-
nomena suggest that in principle, identities are
describable in their essence, whereas flux, also in
its essence, cannot be delimited without residua.
Flux lends itself only to an approximation, and the
latter depends on culturally available means of
discourse and intersubjective understanding. There
are two pervasive modes of discourse, one suited
for identity, the other for dynamics. The former, in
the West, exhibits something Platonic-scientific,
something “puritan” about it; it is bounded and
circumscribed, delimiting a presumed order that
can be expressed either theoretically or practically.
Changes, in turn, may be understood in a sense of
wild immersion in some spontaneous movement of
forces whose sense requires one to live through the
process. This living through appears in life philos-
ophies. This does not imply a superiority of one
over the other mode of expression. In some cul-
tures, identity is deemed to be the ruling factor, but
the dynamic is more important in others. Thus, for
example, in Bali the most significant decisions are
gleaned from cryptic sayings of persons caught in
a trance, or rebirth is elicited by a catharsis of a
revivalist, or national pride and destiny are invented
in a flux of political rhetoric uttered by an actor on
television. This allows the introduction of one of
the pervasive distinctions between the exoteric dis-
course, appropriate to identity, and the esoteric,
appropriate to becoming.
The relationship and differentiation between
identity and change, and their major articulations,
can be deciphered in rough outlines. Change and

identity can be correlated in a harmonious way
(e.g., Chinese Confucianism), arranged in a succes-
sion of temporary domination of one over the
other (e.g., a tendency in Hinduism), immersed in
a hierarchy of powers and controls (e.g., medieval
and early modern Europe), or even understood as
a battle until one of them is completely annihilated
(e.g., Marxian revolutionary theory, and some
prophetic and eschatological religions). Some
becomings can be regarded as totally dominated
by the permanent identity wherein the only solu-
tion is a complete escape (e.g., Gnosticism), or,
finally, the identity could be conceived as a mere
appearance, a maya, veiling a total flux (e.g.,
Buddhism).
Many characteristics relating identity and
becoming can be read from the discursive systems
of particular traditions. In Chinese tradition, the
identity term LI is related to the inner, whereas
becoming term CH’I designates the external. Thus,
becoming is not contained by the identity, as
would be the tendency in Western romanticism;
rather, identity emanates change. In addition, such
terms as spontaneity and life are associated with
the identity term LI, the immanent, whereas such
terms as order and law are tied to CH’I, flux, the
outer. It seems, then, that in the Confucian tradi-
tion, identity is natural, one must adhere to it
spontaneously, and spontaneity consists of this
adherence. In turn, flux, in its purity, is compelled
less naturally; in this sense, fits of passion that are
outside the normal psyche, or even illness as being
either abnormal or artificial, require that sponta-
neity adhere to identity. Taoists even claim that
evil becoming arises solely from artificial human
self-assertion.
Other phenomena appear to be of similar scope.
Though not encompassing all of the complexities,
at least the Taoist, Tantric, Western mystical, and
even scientific and Romantic traditions exhibit a
tendency of assigning masculine terms or qualities
to identity and feminine terms to change. In addi-
tion, these traditions tend to regard women as
emotionally energetic, religiously and politically
subversive and radical, without submitting such
radicalism to rational logic of identity. When the
masculine is regarded as identical and superior, it
is always exposed to the cunning dangers and mys-
terious traps of the feminine energy, most com-
monly depicted in erotic terms. The most vivid
Philosophy of Identity 561
expressions of this danger are found in monastic
cultures that are structurally most rigid and com-
prise efforts to subdue and transcend the erotic-
energetic in a movement toward the totally
identical point, usually called divine.
Basic Interpretations of Identity and Change
Various dynamisms are regarded as life-sustaining,
even if they do not possess positive value in all
cases. Vital drives, eros, and desires that, in the
case of Hinduism and Buddhism, are deemed to be
the sources of suffering, but in Greek culture, spe-
cifically eros, are seen as life infusing and elevating.
The vital drives and even eros have been regarded
as components of natural spontaneity, or at times
as influxes from some transcendent source—a
god’s love for his children. Moreover, they can be
wild, both in natural and supernatural senses, or
cultivated in accordance with custom and socio-
cultural functions.
Dark, disruptive, chaotic, indeed deadly, related
to Thanatos, and associated with the libidinal
death instinct, is at times regarded as demonic,
irresistible, and self-defeating; manifesting itself, in
Émile Durkheim’s understanding of Faustian
impulses and bargains with the demonic region.
These dynamisms are associated in the main with
the lower region. They intrude into identifiable
and polite social order through various openings,
such as greed, infidelity, jealousy, and destructive
obsession, and if they reach the higher plane, they
tend to infuse it with pollution and degradation.
The Ur-becoming, signified as hurricane, vast
upheaval of unknown cosmic forces, appears in
revolutions and is uncontrollable and spontaneous
when manifested in mass movements and charis-
matic figures. Ur-becoming may appear as ambiv-
alent and can be destructive or revitalizing, or
both. This appears in G. W. F. Hegel’s as well as
Sun Tzu’s conceptions of war where spirit is puri-
fied from daily and mundane concerns and may
appear in its pristine nobility, and in Friedrich
Nietzsche’s depiction of life that is both destruc-
tive and creative. Basically, this prime becoming
does not signal any warning concerning the rules
of its appearance; if it posts signs, they are designed
to constantly deviate toward dissolution of any
identity. Any chaos theory is premised on this
becoming.
562 Philosophy of Identity
Constructive events are regarded as impulses
striving to establish meaningful designs, both for
symbolic purposes and for direct human interrela-
tionships. These impulses are exemplified in the
constant effort to establish and refine legalistic and
moralistic systems, precisely coded modes of
behavior—Jesuit discipline, and Confucian designs
for ritualized ethics—all considered as cultivations
of the human. Such disciplines and rituals may
become rigid and lose their dynamic attraction.
The impulses assume a variety of designations,
ranging from vital, through sensuous and emo-
tional, all the way to spiritualities. There is also an
allowance for mutual intersections among these
impulses.
Mechanistic designs are constructed to signify
an indifferent, lifeless, and simultaneously deter-
ministic cosmos. Such designs range from a mean-
ingless and purposeless clash of forces, operating
by attraction or repulsion—whether in Greek
atomism, or their conception of a battle among
psychic cosmic forces—through modern physics,
empiricist associational and behavioral psychol-
ogy, market forces, and logico-mathematical sys-
tems, to such notions as predestination—all
containing identifiable and indifferent rules.
Although mainly masculine, and partially
monastic, certain energies or dynamisms can
become all-pervasive preoccupations to transcend
the immediate solicitations of the world, to return
to the extra‑worldly paternal home, so prevalent in
chiliastic and eschatological movements and, in
another sense, in the detachment of sciences. Such
transcendentalizing is expressed usually by atti-
tudes of uninvolvement or nonparticipation in the
states of affairs of one’s world. It may be regarded
as an external look with an attendant longing for
something else, for the source of this transcendence
and detachment, regardless whether such source is
known or unknown. This preoccupation at times
assumes an identification either with something
extra-worldly, or with something that is deemed
pure and ultimate, such as surrender to the laws of
nature or a will of divinities. Dynamics of this type
may appear in active rituals of purification that
result in the shedding of terrestrial pollutions.
Vitalistic flux, usually expressed in animistic
forms, shows various unattached, freely floating
forces, capable of entering various objects and
phenomena, vivifying them, and departing. These
forces dominate ritualistic incantations, where the
act becomes the power of the event; the word
brings about storms, healing, and destruction; and
the mask becomes the enacted entity. Additionally,
these forces are present in transubstantiations,
where the bread becomes flesh, and the wine
blood, where a chant gives rebirth such that the
human becomes the enchanted word. This is the
magic dynamism where through prayers and
appropriate deeds, one becomes identical with the
powers of a demon, a divinity, or a totemic animal;
this identification stretches all the way to an
assumption of names of animals or figures of
power. Sports teams have their vital names and
parade their mascots, and populations identify
themselves with the victorious teams by proclaim-
ing, “We won.” It appears in rituals of identifica-
tion with political, religious, and “pop” culture
rituals: one becomes a Nazi, a Muslim, a Jew, a
Christian, a Communist, a Republican, a Democrat,
a German, an American, or a Hindu and is ready
to sacrifice everything for this identity. This aware-
ness is also at the basis of theater, where the actor
becomes the enacted role, is absorbed, and disap-
pears into the portrayed character.
Cultures suggest permanent identities, ranging
from eternal presence of some ultimate being,
through the presumption of changeless laws that
pervade all movements, all the way to stable and
identifiable changes. We shall decipher some
invariants of identities that range across diverse
cultures. The first, and well-known, interpretation
of identity is a stabilizing and directing container
that preserves the flow without escape. It might
become an iron cage or a prison house for the
becoming within it, leading to the conception of an
empty shell of mechanical process devoid of any
life and working in accordance with changeless
laws. This identity is seen as extrinsic to flow.
Hence, if there is flow, it has to be dealt with by
artificial technical means. The modern mechanistic
universe requires no energy; everything that does
not conform to the identifiable laws must be “con-
ditioned” to attain the status of a mechanism—
such as behavioral, economic, and social
conditioning. This is also expressed in Platonic aim
at identifiable forms where flow must conform to
and be contained by the “forms.” The same can be
said of “formal” sciences that can be “applied” to
categorize and identify becoming, whether such

identities are interpreted objectively or subjec-
tively. An identifiable, ultimate being, who tran-
scends the world, also controls the events from
outside.
Identifiable essentialisms are associated with the
following phrasings: human nature, gender classi-
fications, racial features, positions within coded
rules, such as husband/wife, and hierarchy of
ascribed bloodlines, such as aristocrat/serf. More
recently, the quest for essential identity assumed
the guise of science: DNA codes and genetic com-
position led to attempts to identify desirable char-
acteristics such as intelligence or physical abilities.
Such identities are regarded as created by some
divinity, are present in nature, or can be con-
structed by technical means.
A mediating function of identity is necessary for
transmitting the relationships among various dyna-
misms. Such a design is stable, but not free of dis-
tortions. Some fluxes that require such transmission
may fall under a designation of being inaccessible
by themselves, mysterious, too dangerous, or too
blind to relate of their own accord. Immanuel
Kant’s a priori understanding of logical identity of
categories does not equate intelligibility with the
empirical. Modern democratic institutions can be
seen in this light; all activities are permitted as long
as they are under the guidance of identifiable law.
Various psychiatric and even sociopolitical theories
construct an identifiable ego as a function that must
mediate between the forces of id and the require-
ments of the superego, correlating to the identities
of economic classes: lower, middle, and ruling.
A permanent core, a stable axis, is necessary for
the flow of impulses and dynamisms. Though per-
manent, such a core is amorphous and cannot be
defined in a limited description. Through Buddha’s
head or through Christian caritas flow all impulses,
but neither one can be ascribed definitive param-
eters. In Hinduism, all events flow through the
ever-present Shakti energies. Through Haiku
poetry or Zen practice flow all events without dis-
ruption, and the forever-present maternal impulses
lead all events to their orgiastic fertility and cold
dissolution.
A momentary confluence of impulses and dyna-
misms yields a cross-section of processes. These
cross-sections can shift and require constant analy-
ses: constant demographic shifts, incessant shifts in
supplies and distribution of economy, instability of
Philosophy of Identity 563
political power alliances, and even spiritual powers.
Such confluences do not have a single core, but
rather consist of crisscrossing of numerous processes
at various levels and domains. Michel Foucault’s
incessant social battle, though dynamic, manages to
maintain an identifiable society. The confluence of
fundamentalist and feminist forces with a common
purpose to battle the sexed images of women in
mass media represents a major identity syndrome
central to the modern understanding. The major
identity syndrome is modern understanding of an
individual as a cross-section of technical-pragmatic
discourses: economic, social, cultural, genetic, bio-
chemical, linguistic, religious, professional, psycho-
logical, gender, and age. Such discourses can cross
into each other: Identifiable psychological states
can be “found” in identifiable genetic codes.
Conjunctions
The relationship between identity and change fol-
lows identifiable rules that equally cut across cul-
tural boundaries. The first rule decipherable from
the sketches of identity and change shows that
change can function to enhance, promote, and
maintain identity. Whether one works hard to
maintain the same job; whether the king fields an
army of knights to maintain the identity of his
throne; whether Lucifer, before the fall, acts to
ensure the changeless paternal edicts; or whether
the working class is pressed for labor power to
maintain the ruling position of the owner class—
all are engaged in identity-maintaining dynamics.
The second rule shows that change can disrupt
identity. The barbarians are breaking down the
edifices of the civilized world, Lucifer rebels and
establishes a process of corruption of paternal
edicts, overproduction and resultant workers
strikes and revolts disrupt the self-identity of the
capitalist class. Meanwhile, the dissidents are dis-
rupting the identity of the new communist state,
and the secular devils in the West are disrupting
the identity of Islamic republics. In modern litera-
tures and sciences, the primordial chaos is slowly
breaking down all order and identifiable laws of
nature, and the women’s revolution is disrupting
the history of the identity of patriarchal rule.
The third rule shows that identity can suppress
becoming and disrupt its dynamics. The despotic-
imperial edicts prohibit any deviations, the erotic
564 Philosophy of Identity
spontaneities are deflected along the paternal
edicts, the passions become mortified by the sal-
vific codes of all brands of fundamentalists, and
the Confucian hierarchy suppresses the Taoist
spontaneity, the “garden of freedom.” The scien-
tific reductionism of all social dynamics to identi-
cal mechanical rules, the global standardization of
all products to identifiable brands, tends to abolish
change.
The fourth rule emerges with permanence as
enhancing flow. Democratic institutions, articu-
lated in the Promethean mythology of rebellion,
but impossible in the Judeo-Christian and Islamic
rebellion, are enhancing change. A constant revo-
lution, leading to the possibility of postmodern
surrender of hierarchical, stratified, sublimated,
ideologized, and alienated thought results in the
claim that all identities across all cultures, whether
of individuals, divinities, social norms, or scientific
laws, are artificial constructs.
The fifth rule shows that each kind of dyna-
mism can subsume or pervade, overlap with, trans-
form, and find resonances in others. For example,
both the vital as well as the erotic can be an impe-
tus toward detachment and transcendence toward
an identity, or an attraction to identify with them
as expressions of cosmic life and love. Such an
identity is an implicit criterion that decides what
kind of specific dynamics may be regarded as dan-
gerous, even if the criterion is good, simply because
it needs strict controls without which it might
transgress its limits and become decadent both by
overuse and a lack of use.
The Chinese tradition designates becoming as
basically life-sustaining. Although the Taoists
stress this life-sustaining flow, they express it in
primordial terms of Tao; in contrast, the Confucians
regard the primordial becoming as coextensive
with civilizing impulses seeking identifiable moral
laws. If a destructive force appears, it is relegated
totally to human selfishness. Resonances of such
impetus can be found in the Platonic tradition
where eros is the dynamic impulse toward the
transcending, such as truth in itself that can be
identified eternally. Most changes are regarded as
life-preserving, and the dynamics of life are regarded
as a way of preserving some identity from which
life itself emanates. In the modern West, Nietzsche’s
interpretation articulates dynamics as a struggle
between the civilizing Apollonian forces creating
identities and the life-sustaining Dionysian force
that disrupts identities even when it gives life. The
two relate in a constant fluctuation across various
domains, without exhibiting fixed boundaries. In
the medieval and early modern West, the two
forces are strictly distinguished, but in Gnosticism,
there is a continuous struggle between the life-
sustaining becoming and the transcendentalizing
impulses with a built-in teleological identity that is
destined to be victorious. There appears a general
designation of these polar impulses in gender
terms. For the most part, the life-preserving, the
disruptive and dissolving, and even the primordial
flow are regarded as feminine, but the transcen-
dentalizing, the ascetic, the striving, and the search
for identity are masculine. One could suggest that
no woman would ever invent a monastery, designed
to lead to one of the transcendentalizing commit-
ments to pure identity. Although there are appar-
ent movements of one gender into its polar
impulses, the feminine seems to be better equipped
to know both. Then there is aggression as a pri-
mordial and disruptive force, although in modern
interpretation it is lauded when it becomes directed
toward productive expansion and the creation of
identifiable individuals at the head of such expan-
sion. In broad terms, the contemporary West
takes for granted that dynamics either create or
promote the emergence of their own identity; one
reason for the emergence of this identity out of
becoming might be that the modern West regards
itself as having been born both politically and sci-
entifically out of revolutions that, by their own
energy, have overthrown previous social systems
with their identifiable forms and have created the
radically new.
Various relationships among dynamisms reveal
clear outlines of the ways that such relationships
require identities. In broad terms, some designs of
identity function either to separate or to connect
diverse impulses. The caste system in Hinduism is
a composition capable of weeding out the impulses
of purity and of pointing them toward transcen-
dence, from the disruptive, infectious impulses of
pollution. Although the West does not contain a
strict caste differentiation, it has devised ways or
well-coded programs for exorcising the polluting
elements: witch hunts and religious and political
fundamentalisms and extremisms. Societal struc-
tures in the late Renaissance set up a specific

identity for the controlling of change. Yet, these
controls are seen to be artificially designed and
cease to carry a compelling force. For example, in
William Shakespeare’s play, The Tempest, Prospero
keeps both nature, the primordial force of Caliban,
and spirits, the defused flow of Ariel, confined
temporarily in a magically established identity of
an artificial culture—an evanescent design of
emerging institutionalized humanism. Here, the
problem arises of identifying a fundamental design
of a culture that no longer contains a strong iden-
tity with sufficient power of interrelating texts and
activities. This allows an unlimited diversity of
autonomous worlds and phenomena, designed
under the rubrics of arbitrary or practical given
staying power and the substance of identity through
public rhetorical conviction. The resultant conclu-
sions of modernity are obvious in what we now
label as postmodernity. How are we to decipher
identities in texts, discourses that are designed sin-
gularly and purely for rhetorical efficacy? At what
levels can such a multitude of contingent identities
be related? The problem becomes more compli-
cated when, in light of such an emergence, post-
modernity forces the other cultures and the modern
West to regard their identities as arbitrary, even
backward, outdated, and irrelevant. Indeed, the
process is completely reversed: One can invent any
anonymous identity through electronic mass
media, construct any trajectory of one’s life, and
enact it in daily masquerades. We are in the age of
simulacra identities.
Algis Mickunas
See also Culture; Identity Change; Philosophical History
of Identity
Further Readings
Mickunas, A. (1994). Cultural logics and the search for
national identities. In L. Embree (Ed.),
Phenomenology of the cultural disciplines
(pp. 140–147). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic.
Mickunas, A. (1998). Permanence and flux. In
B. Hopkins (Ed.), Phenomenology: Japanese and
American perspectives (pp. 253–273). Dordrecht, the
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.
Mickunas, A. (2001). Self-identity and its disruption. In
B. Hopkins & S. Crowell (Eds.), The new yearbook
Philosophy of Mind 565
for phenomenology and phenomenological research
(Vol. 1, pp. 161–181). Seattle, WA: Noesis Press.
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of mind is the branch of philosophy
concerned specifically with mental phenomena. It
deals with questions about the nature of mental
phenomena and their place in the causal structure
of reality, the mind’s connection with action and
behavior, and its knowledge of both itself and
other minds. Consciousness and subjectivity are
also central topics. Philosophy of mind houses
philosophy of psychology, which is a consider-
ation of the philosophical foundations of psychol-
ogy. Topics of analysis include psychological
concepts (e.g., belief, desire, and intention), the
models and methods employed by psychological
inquiry, and the mechanisms posited by psychol-
ogy as being responsible for different cognitive
processes. Increasingly, there tends to be a great
deal of overlap between philosophy of mind and
philosophy of psychology.
Traditionally an a priori armchair enterprise—
characterized most vividly by René Descartes,
whose famous thought experiments were conjured
while reclining before the fire in his dressing
gown—some philosophers now freely use empiri-
cal research. It is no longer unusual for philoso-
phers to draw upon literature from cognitive
sciences including psychology, neuroscience, lin-
guistics, artificial intelligence, and anthropology.
This robust interdisciplinary engagement, coupled
with a recent explosion of interest in brain and
consciousness research, means that philosophy of
mind is one of the most active areas in contempo-
rary philosophy. This entry begins with a brief
historical overview of philosophical approaches to
mind, then looks at how contemporary philoso-
phers of mind have refocused on questions about
subjectivity and identity.
Classical Questions
Thinking philosophically about the mind is by no
means an exclusively modern enterprise. Descartes
is considered to be the father of modern philoso-
phy of mind. Yet the mind had surely been an
566 Philosophy of Mind
object of philosophical interest long before
Descartes. Such ancient Greek thinkers as Plato
and Aristotle had much to say about the nature of
the mind and mental activity; they offer views on
perception, memory, and representation. Classical
Indian sources such as the Advaita Vedanta school
of philosophy and the Buddhist Abhidharma tradi-
tion developed rich typologies of mental phenom-
ena, programs for cultivating elevated mental
states and self-discipline, and sophisticated attempts
to explain how the mind fits into the causal struc-
ture of the physical universe. This latter meta-
physical concern gives rise to one of the perennial
problems of philosophy of mind, East and West:
the mind-body problem. The mind-body problem
concerns the issue of how best to characterize the
nature of the mind-body relation. In his Phaedo,
Plato speaks to this problem by arguing for a kind
of dualism: that the mind or soul of the individual
is substantially distinct from the body because the
former is immaterial and eternal but the latter has
neither of these properties. Two thousand years
later, Descartes argued that mind and body thus
have fundamentally distinct natures, which he
labeled substance dualism, because physical sub-
stances (e.g., bodies) are essentially extended in
space, and moreover, because mental phenomena
(e.g., thoughts, images, memories, and representa-
tions) are substances essentially lacking extension
in space. Descartes was clearly aware that minds
are intimately linked to bodies and even posited
the pineal gland as the seat of this union.
Nevertheless, he insisted (following Plato) that the
mind is not reducible to the body and that it can
continue to exist after death. To be a human per-
son, according to Descartes, is therefore to be a
unique entity endowed with a dual nature consist-
ing of both an extended material body and an
unextended immaterial mind. Importantly, how-
ever, Descartes insisted (again, following Plato)
that the essence of a human person is the mind, or
consciousness; the body is peripheral to identity.
This assumption has been a common one through-
out the history of western philosophy.
Descartes’s view faced immediate challenges.
The most difficult problem for Cartesian dualism
is this: How can a nonspatial, immaterial sub-
stance causally interact with a spatially extended,
material substance? Given the fundamentally dif-
ferent natures of mind and body, it is difficult to
see how the two-way psychophysical interaction-
ism Descartes proposed is supposed to occur.
Descartes never offered a satisfactory resolution to
this problem.
Several of his followers, such as Arnold Geulincx
and Nicolas Malebranche, proposed the doctrine of
occasionalism: the idea that an episode of mind-
body interaction (e.g., willing to raise one’s left arm
and then doing so) is the occasion for God to coor-
dinate sensations and volitions of the immaterial
mind with overt actions of the physical body.
Mind-body causal interaction is thus a species of
divine action, and God the only true causal agent.
Gottlieb Leibniz’s parallelism denied that mind and
body interact at all, asserting instead that God is
responsible for the preestablished harmony coordi-
nating mental and physical states. According to
Leibniz, all substances are programmed at the
moment of their creation such that their subsequent
states run in perfect harmony with the states of
every other substance in the universe. Genuine
substance-to-substance causal interaction has no
place in this account. Proponents of another kind of
dualism, epiphenomenalism, deny that mind has
any causal efficacy. Instead, they claim that mental
states are caused by physical states (such as brain
activity), but mental states have no causal effect on
physical states; mental activity is like a steam whis-
tle that plays no causal role in the workings of a
locomotive, to use the image of Aldous Huxley, a
proponent of epiphenomenalism. Critics charge
that this is a patent absurdity: Mental states and
processes (e.g., being in pain, desiring a cold glass
of beer, fearing a wild animal) clearly cause physical
behavior (e.g., wincing, opening the refrigerator to
retrieve the beer, turning and running for safety).
Despite its philosophical difficulties, Cartesian
dualism’s severing of the mind from the body, as
well as its concomitant prioritizing of mind as the
locus of personhood, remained the dominant way
of conceptualizing mind and self until the 20th cen-
tury. Many 20th-century approaches to the mind
are direct attempts to challenge this “ghost in the
machine” model of mentality, as Gilbert Ryle mem-
orably christened it. But dualism is by no means an
abandoned view. Philosopher David Chalmers,
who has done much to reinvigorate current interest
in consciousness research, defends a brand of prop-
erty dualism, the view that consciousness is not
reducible to brain processes or anything else in

the physical world but is, rather, an emergent
phenomenon—a fundamental property of the
universe alongside properties such as mass and
space-time.
Contemporary Issues
Despite some prominent defenders, dualism is no
longer a widely held view, mainly because of the
rise of materialism and the influence of both
behaviorism and functionalism in the early to
middle parts of the 20th century. Materialism is
the view that the mind, like everything else in the
universe, is ultimately a physical entity. Behaviorism
was a kind of materialist thesis. Proponents rejected
Cartesian dualism and the notion of mind as some
sort of immaterial substance or interior theater of
psychological activity, arguing instead that mental
talk could be translated into talk about externally
observable behavior and dispositions to behave in
certain ways, under certain environmental condi-
tions, without loss of meaning. Behaviorism came
in multiple forms; sorting out these views is beyond
the scope of this entry. But competing formula-
tions of behaviorism were united by a dismissal of
conceiving of mind in terms of its interiority, an
inner structure purportedly accessible via intro-
spection. Critics, however, balked at the idea of
jettisoning the notion of an inner mental life, find-
ing the prospect highly implausible and vulnerable
to commonsense objections. For instance, a para-
lytic incapable of all movement and thus lacking
behavioral capacities and dispositions (both neces-
sary conditions for thought and experience, accord-
ing to the behaviorist) can nevertheless enjoy a rich
inner life full of thoughts, desires, and intentions.
As philosopher Hilary Putnam noted, highly disci-
plined “pain-pretenders” can, through sheer acts
of will, suppress all pain behavior and thus experi-
ence pain internally while lacking the behavioral
dispositions to externally express it.
Whereas behaviorists defined mental processes
exclusively in terms of environmental inputs and
behavioral outputs, functionalism left room for
inner mental states within its taxonomy of the
mind. For the functionalist, mental states are
defined by their causal relations to sensory inputs,
other mental states, and behavior outputs. Mind is
thus given an abstract characterization; mental
states are individuated by their causal-functional
Philosophy of Mind 567
role within a cognitive system rather than by their
internal constitution. Like behaviorism, the term
functionalism refers to a family of positions, and
not one unified view. But functionalists are united
by their belief that the nature of mentality is inde-
pendent of its physical realization; that is, mental
states are in principle “multiply realizable” within
different physical systems, including, for instance,
a digital computer. John Searle’s famous “Chinese
Room” thought experiment is directed at pros-
pects for artificial intelligence but offers a strong
challenge to functionalist theories of mind.
Though behaviorism and functionalism offered
ways out of the conundrums of Cartesian meta-
physics, their Achilles heel for many critics was
that neither had anything to say about conscious-
ness. However, after being neglected during the
heyday of behaviorism and functionalism, con-
sciousness and subjectivity have now taken center
stage in current philosophy of mind. With this
renewed interest in consciousness and subjectivity
comes a renewed focus on themes related to iden-
tity and selfhood.
Conscious states such as tasting a lemon, view-
ing a sunset, and suffering from a toothache are
mental states that have a distinct phenomenologi-
cal character. It is “like” something for the subject
to be in these states, as Thomas Nagel famously
put it. Conscious states thus have a qualitative feel
or first-personal mode of givenness that marks
them as structurally distinct from nonconscious
states. This observation about the phenomenologi-
cal character of consciousness generates a puzzle:
How do first-person conscious states emerge from
third-person physical processes in the brain? In
other words, how do the experiential riches of
subjectivity fit into the impersonal structure of the
physical world? This is known as the “hard prob-
lem” of consciousness research. Much current
debate centers on issues related to this problem.
The term subjectivity refers to the phenomeno-
logical character of conscious states, but addition-
ally, it captures the way that the ongoing stream of
conscious states is unified over time in a relatively
continuous and coherent way within a subject’s
experiential life. Subjectivity also captures the way
that conscious states are always given to or for a
subject who experiences those states as his or her
own—states given to the subject from a privileged
perspective on the world. Subjectivity is thus
568 Philosophy of Mind
intimately tied to consciousness. Subjectivity is a
fundamental feature of human identity: namely,
that conscious subjects are first-person perspectives
anchored in a world providing content for their
experiences. However, human subjects are more
than simply the sum total of their conscious states:
Humans are storytelling creatures. They weave
overlapping narratives that bring intelligibility,
order, and meaning to their own and others’ expe-
riences. Inspired by phenomenological thinkers
such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-
Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, some
individuals working in philosophy of mind have
attempted to elucidate these dimensions of con-
sciousness and subjectivity by distinguishing
between a core minimal self and an extended nar-
rative self.
The minimal self refers to the primitive core of
conscious states that mark them as experientially
given to a subject (i.e., a minimal self) with a first-
person perspective on the world. Neuroscientist
Antonio Damasio and philosophers Shaun
Gallagher, Dan Zahavi, and Evan Thompson,
among others, have argued for the necessity of
such a minimal self for understanding conscious-
ness. For these thinkers, the minimal self is the
first-personal mode of givenness or “mineness”
character of a given state that individuates that
state as belonging exclusively to the subject expe-
riencing “what it’s like” to have that state. This
self is “minimal” in that it is a purely formal fea-
ture of mind. In other words, the minimal self is an
invariant structural feature of consciousness that
must already be in place for conscious episodes to
occur in the first place—a necessary feature of our
moment-to-moment conscious states.
In contrast, the narrative self refers to the self
that emerges over time and within our social
engagements. Whereas the minimal self secures the
subjective mineness of individual conscious states,
the narrative self allows the development of the
more comprehensive forms of self-understanding
and self-knowledge that humans seem uniquely
capable of. Thinkers as diverse as Paul Ricœur,
Daniel Dennett, and Alasdair MacIntyre have
argued that the identity of the self resides in the
stories we tell about ourselves and have told about
us. These stories give meaning and direction to
our lives, situate our own experiences next to
one another, and shape how we understand both
ourselves and our relationships with others. Thus,
although the minimal self is experientially given
within the innermost dimension of consciousness,
the narrative self is progressively constructed
through our ongoing storytelling activities and
social engagements. Arguably, however, the mini-
mal self is phenomenologically and ontologically
prior to the narrative self. To be a narrative self, one
must already be a minimal self capable of having
experiences that one can then tell stories about. But
narrative activity serves a highly important func-
tion: Narrative activity is what inaugurates the
minimal self into a more robust form of person-
hood. To be a person is to be a socially situated
subject with a continually constructed narrative
identity. Whether one wholly agrees with this dis-
tinction or not, the minimal/narrative self-paradigm
demonstrates that philosophical considerations of
mind have direct bearing on our theorizing about
selfhood and identity.
In addition to bracketing explicit questions
about the self as peripheral to a “pure” consider-
ation of mind, behaviorists and functionalists also
said little about how the animate body shapes men-
tal activity. But times have changed. Recent research
programs emphasizing the “4 E’s” of mind—its
embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended
nature—have played a pivotal role in shaping cur-
rent debates. These approaches argue that, in con-
trast to Cartesian dualism, all mental activity is
inherently embodied. More strongly, 4E approaches
urge that the structures of mind emerge from the
structures of embodiment. Research into the nature
of mentality must thus account for how mind
emerges from different forms of brain-body-world
interactions. For mind is fundamentally embodied
in that thoughts, concepts, representations, and
other aspects of our mental life depend on the
body’s perceptual system, as well as its capacity for
environmentally sensitive movement and feeling.
This environmentally sensitive movement and feel-
ing is a function of the embodied mind always being
embedded in and interacting with encompassing
biological and social environments. The embodied
and embedded mind is enacted within the changing
forms of its skillful engagements with the biological
and social world; in other words, mind is a modal-
ity of embodied and embedded action. In addition
to such “body friendly” phenomenologists as Sartre
and Merleau-Ponty, other prominent embodied

thinkers include philosophers and cognitive scien-
tists such as José Luis Bermúdez, Hubert Dreyfus,
Antonio Damasio, Gerald Edelman, Shaun
Gallagher, Raymond Gibbs Jr., Mark Johnson, and
Francisco Varela, all of whom situate the body at
the center of our thinking about mind and self.
Perhaps the most contentious aspect of the 4E
program is the claim that mind is extended.
Currently, the extended mind thesis is defended by
its principal exponent, Andy Clark. Philosophers
such as Susan Hurley, Alva Noë, Richard Menary,
Mark Rowlands, and Robert Wilson, among oth-
ers, also defend variants of the thesis. According to
the extended mind thesis, or what is sometimes
termed vehicle externalism, not all mental processes
are located in the head of the subject. Many pro-
cesses (e.g., remembering a date, working through
a complex mathematical problem, or searching for
and finding the men’s toilet in an unfamiliar restau-
rant) are essentially world-involving; that is to say,
these processes do not occur exclusively in brains
but rather spread across brain, body, and parts of
the surrounding environment. By exploiting struc-
tures and artifacts in the environment (e.g., pen-
cils, paper, computers, signs, and labels), cognitive
processes dynamically extend beyond the confines
of the skull and are, at times, thus constituted by
both neural and nonneural vehicles. Critics such
as Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa charge that
extended mind proponents commit a coupling-
constitution fallacy. Adams and Aizawa argue that
proponents of the extended mind move directly
from observations about different types of causal
couplings linking brain, body, and world to the
stronger, unsupported claim that the units of these
couplings somehow together constitute an
extended cognitive system. Adams and Aizawa
point out that just because an object or process X
is causally coupled to cognitive process Y, it
doesn’t follow that object or process X therefore
comes to constitute a cognitive process. Despite
many strong challenges, the extended mind thesis
has garnered much support. Part of this support
stems from the way the extended mind thesis
offers suggestive ways for thinking through the
nature of the self. If the mind is extended beyond
the skin and skull of the agent, it seems plausible
to think that the self, too, is similarly extended.
What does this then mean, exactly? And does
an extended or “soft” notion of nonlocalized
Philosophy of Organization and Identity 569
selfhood require us to rethink our usual concep-
tions of agency, personal responsibility, and self–
other relations? These and other questions will
continue to provide fodder for philosophical
approaches to the mind.
Joel Krueger
See also Consciousness; Embeddedness/Embedded
Identity; Intersubjectivity; Mind-Body Problem;
Narratives; Phenomenology; Self; Self-Consciousness;
Subjectivity
Further Readings
Anuruddha. (2000). A comprehensive manual of
Abhidhamma: The philosophical psychology of
Buddhism (B. Bodhi, Ed.). Seattle, WA: BPS Pariyatti
Editions.
Chalmers, D. (Ed.). (2002). Philosophy of mind: Classical
and contemporary readings. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind.
Analysis, 58(1), 7–19.
Descartes, R. (1993). Meditations on first philosophy
(D. A. Cress, Trans.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Husserl, E. (1964). Cartesian meditations (D. Cairns,
Trans.). The Hague, the Netherlands: Martinus
Nijhoff.
James, W. (1950). The principles of psychology (Vols. 1
& 2). New York: Dover.
Lycan, W. (Ed.). (1999). Mind and cognition: An
anthology. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception
(C. Smith, Trans.). New York: Routledge.
Plato. (1977). Plato’s Phaedo (G. M. A. Grube, Trans.).
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in life: Biology,
phenomenology, and the sciences of mind. Cambridge,
MA: Belknap.
Zahavi, D. (2005). Subjectivity and selfhood:
Investigating the first-person perspective. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Philosophy of Organization
and Identity
Identity is a vast topic with tremendous signifi-
cance in both everyday life and academic research.
570 Philosophy of Organization and Identity
Like power and rationality, identity is an impor-
tant center of attention in modern life, even as it
begs any sort of definitive definition or formula-
tion. These observations are just as true when one
considers applications of identity at the level of or
in reference to organizations. That is to say, orga-
nizations are just as engaged in the pursuit of
identity as are individuals, and this is seen in the
domains of advertising, public relations, and mar-
keting as well as in the ways individuals struggle
to essentialize organizations as they try to derive
meaning from them. In industrialized societies, it
has become common both to attribute identities to
organizations and to hear organizations speaking
about “who they are.” The idea of organization’s
possessing “real identities” is often taken for
granted by consultants and managers.
One who speaks of the philosophy of organiza-
tion and identity is concerned with the principles
underlying applications of the concept of identity
to organizations and to organizational experience.
However, one must at the same time consider how
principles can be inferred or derived from social
practices in this realm and what difference it
makes, practically speaking, to make one or
another assumption about an organization’s iden-
tity (including the ontological existence of an orga-
nization’s identity). For example, one can
conceptualize an organization as having an identity
fixed in time or as a temporal frame periodically
disclosed in the unfolding of a given organizational
story. That organizations today are frequently pre-
occupied with issues of identity calls for further
analysis and a modest suspension of judgment
about the notion of organizational identity.
Situating Identity and Organization
Historically and Culturally
If contemporary notions of individualized identity
arose in the European Renaissance and became
fully manifest after the European Enlightenment,
then the idea of organizations having identities
grew up with the institutionalization of the corpo-
rate voice from the appearance of public relations
in the 1880s through the emergence of postprod-
uct advertising in the 1920s and then with market-
ing just after World War II. Business, governmental
agencies, and later nonprofits gradually came to
concern themselves with things such as public
image, reputation, and even personification. For
this reason, corporate paternalism took on a
strong symbolic dimension from the late 1880s
through World War II, as many corporations in
the United States and Western Europe portrayed
themselves as caretakers of the public trust and
even as “part of your family.”
The idea of organizations speaking was not new
because we can hark back to the embodiment of
organizations and institutions in royalty, clergy,
lords, and their various representatives. The Treaty
of Westphalia in 1648 accorded a similar status to
what is now taken for granted to be a central insti-
tution of modern society, the state. Along with
according the state rights and responsibilities, a
line of legal reasoning from that point to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948
also implicitly granted the state voice, which can
then be embodied or strategically mystified for
purposes of the preservation of power. A U.S.
Supreme Court ruling in 1886 that created “juristic
persons” turned out to be momentous. The per-
sonhood granted to corporations at that time has
been expanded to include rights of due process and
rights of free speech, among others. In this way, the
identity of an organization is simply assumed in
formal as well as informal practices, without any
searching examination of the root metaphors of
person or even that of the organism.
The Modern Organization as a
Source and Resource of Identity
The linkage of the individual self to the organization
and its presumed identity was not an acknowl-
edged concern of three major founders of organi-
zational studies: Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and
Max Weber. None of these theorists operated at
the individual level of analysis, nor were they writ-
ing during the period when individual attachment
to organizations would become as much an issue
(especially with the spread of commercial brand-
ing) as did the idea of an individual’s identity and
“identity crisis.” Organizational identity and indi-
vidual identification with the organization was
only hinted at in the earliest modern writings on
identity by figures such as Sigmund Freud and
William James.
In the United States in the 1950s, identity and
the organization became something of a public

issue with William H. Whyte’s best-selling book
The Organization Man, which criticized bland
acquiescence, and with research on such topics as
organized persuasion, obedience to authority, and
social conformity. Perhaps one of the most impor-
tant yet seldom-cited studies in the area of organi-
zational identity was social psychologists Manford
Kuhn and Thomas McPartland’s “Twenty
Statements Test,” which highlighted that individ-
ual citizens were increasingly seeing themselves
and their identities as leaning on those of organiza-
tions. Critical skepticism toward excesses in indi-
vidual attachment to organizations and institutions
followed in the 1960s and 1970s, channeled to
some degree into the consumer activism move-
ment. By the 1990s, however, propelled largely by
the success of marketing and its infusion into every
domain of contemporary life, organization-based
identities moved to the forefront of public con-
sciousness and display as never before. The conta-
gion of branding reached beyond organizations
and industries to nations and social issues, as seen
in Benetton’s controversial ads of the 1980s and
1990s and in the use of focus groups to modify
national symbols from Europe to New Zealand.
Key Tensions in the Study
of Identity and Organization
A significant tension exists between the granting of
an ontological status to an organization’s identity—
seeing it as standing on its own—and a position
that instead views organizational identity as being
an epistemological creation or tool to investigate
what is seen to be “the organization.” The onto-
logical position is appealing to many audiences
and becomes the foundation for writings on orga-
nizations’ essences, hearts, heads, souls, and so on,
at least insofar as those metaphors are taken seri-
ously and at least somewhat literally. By contrast,
the machine metaphor is probably the single most
influential metaphor for organization, but it is not
typically inspiring or carried forth in quite the
same way as the “living” metaphors. The episte-
mological perspective on organizational identity
has several variants, including the neo-Weberian
interpretive position that organizational identities
are “real” to the extent that people extend such
cherished concepts to organizations. One position
in this set would focus on language and images to
Philosophy of Organization and Identity 571
suggest that an organization’s identity is what is
commonly used to represent the organization.
Another important tension exists between eco-
nomic and political interests that would celebrate
themselves publicly and those that would conceal
their role in an organization’s identity projects.
Narrow commercial interests can present them-
selves as broad public ones within a corporation’s
formal identity projects but in a manner at odds
with the policies of the organization. Relatedly,
one should discern when to take seriously a corpo-
ration’s claim to be “green.” The question of
actual or real interests, however, is not always easy
to assess, nor can it be determined in an essential-
ized way. Therefore, it is important to look at
various expressions of an organization, treating
those as a large “text” available for interpretation
and criticism.
Underrepresented Issues in the
Study of Identity and Organization
One of the least talked about yet most important
issues yet to be investigated is the importation of
certain cultural assumptions into discussions of
organizational identities by researchers, consul-
tants, and organizational members themselves.
This is true in at least two senses: First, the sorts of
identities projected onto organizations by individ-
uals and groups will inevitably carry with them
biases of identity held by those persons with
respect to gender, race/ethnicity, class, nation, and
so on. Second, the projects of identity as con-
structed and administered by policymakers and
managers, such as the recently popular “manage-
ment of diversity,” will often manifest biases
toward specific groups and certainly toward con-
formity in general. These observations represent
one important way that research on “difference”
can more directly encounter research on organiza-
tional identity, where the two areas have tended
not to intersect.
Another important area for investigation is the
set of challenges posed to the idea of a bounded
identity by new media technologies and by net-
work forms of organization. Organizational bound-
aries have never been completely distinct except in
the case of such total institutions as prisons or
monasteries, and even then, there are people in
roles that span those boundaries. Today, however,
572 Philosophy of Organization and Identity
one finds challenges to the notion of what an orga-
nization “is,” especially when one considers such
formations as multicephalous social movements,
ad hoc coalitions and alliances, and even clandes-
tine organizations (engaged in either socially legiti-
mate or illegitimate activities).
Finally, globalization in various forms exposes
the balancing act between attempts at consistently
expressing an identity and the adaptation to multiple
cultures, situations, and times. The overwhelming
emphasis on solidity and consistency in organiza-
tional identity places organizations in bind with
respect to rapid change and the necessity of speaking
in at least somewhat different ways to multiple audi-
ences. In this way, fragmentation and multivocality
necessarily become part of the project of identity for
an organization, unless the organization is to risk
rigidity and, ironically, impermanence.
All of these issues merit further reflection and
research.
Implications of Attention to
Organization and Identity for Practice
Several important practical issues bear mention
here. First is the question of individual investment
of the self in an organization to the extent that
either that person’s identity becomes monolithic or
univocal or in a way that grants an organization
license for excesses in its own pursuits. The two
ends of this single problem are reminders of how a
lack of competing voices and therefore resources
of identity can limit the decision-making and
moral horizons of people at any level of society.
Totalitarianism is an obvious instance of what can
occur at the level of state; fascism is a case where
the state, its people, and their leader may be seen
to line up in a perfect kind of embodiment. (It has
been suggested that the parallels and differences
between the state and the corporation have not
received sufficient attention by researchers and
practitioners.) Additionally, Hannah Arendt’s work
in her differentiation of public and private lives
provided a buttress against the organization becom-
ing a social totality for the individual; in this case,
the realm of the social blurs the distinction between
public and private life, curtailing the natural abil-
ity of a human being to engage in an natural dia-
lectic in which neither public nor private life solely
defines one’s communicative engagements.
Second, one should be aware of the practical
and material limits of one’s own symbolic con-
structions as one pursues identity projects with,
within, and for organizations. The pursuit of iden-
tity can be a somewhat closed language-and-image
game. The questions of significance for either the
organization or society at large are swamped by
the attention of corporate communication manag-
ers to their own clever manipulation of symbols.
Therefore, a degree of playfulness and self-criticism
are important to cultivate in the identity business.
Third and finally, organization and identity
evokes questions about the roles of organizations
in today’s world, convoluting organization with
person and character, engaging machine meta-
phors for describing their operation, and nourish-
ing dwellings of creation before clarity of
understanding is yet feasible by the creators them-
selves. If organizations are machines, then what do
we do when they are not running well? As is the
case with other domains of inquiry, our ability to
create is often far ahead of our ability to fully
understand our own creations.
George Cheney
See also Corporate Identity; Organizational Identity
Further Readings
Ashforth, B. E., & Mael, F. A. (1996). Organizational
identity and strategy as a context for the
individual. Advances in Strategic Management, 13,
19–64.
Balmer, J. M. T., & Greyser, S. A. (Eds.). (2003).
Revealing the corporation: Perspectives on identity,
image, reputation, corporate branding, and corporate
level marketing, London: Routledge.
Cheney, G., & Christensen, L. T. (2001). Organizational
identity. Linkages between “internal” and “external”
organizational communication. In F. Jablin &
L. L. Putnam (Eds.), The new handbook of
organizational communication (pp. 231–269).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Christensen, L. T., Morsing, M., & Cheney, G. (2008).
Corporate communications: Convention, complexity
and critique. London: Sage.
Dutton, J. E., & Dukerich, J. M. (1991). Keeping an eye
on the mirror: Image and identity in organizational
adaptation. Academy of Management Journal, 34,
517–554.

Marchand, R. (1998). Creating the corporate soul: The
rise of public relations and corporate imagery in big
business. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Whetten, D. A. (2006). Albert and Whetten revisited:
Strengthening the concept of organizational identity.
Journal of Management Inquiry, 15(3), 219–234.
Phonological Elements
of Identity
Language consists of multiple levels, including
grammatical, lexical, semantic, morphological,
syntactical, pragmatic, prosodic, and phonologi-
cal. The grammatical level of language pertains to
unconscious rules of a language related to compe-
tence and performance. The lexical level encom-
passes vocabulary. Semantics relates to meaning in
its myriad forms, whereas morphological refers to
the smallest meaningful units of language.
Examples of these small, meaningful units are the
past tense marker, -ed, and the third person, sin-
gular, present tense marker, -s. The syntactical
level of language relates to sentence formation
rules, and the pragmatic level considers the impor-
tance of context and language use. Although the
prosodic level reveals the complex features that
accompany the production of speech sounds such
as pitch and timing, and the phonological level
pertains to the general sound system of language.
Different systems contribute to distinctions in
speech and speech sounds. The systems are the
phonatory, velopharyngeal, lingual, labial, and
mandibular. These systems control vocal fold
movement to produce sound, nasality, vowel and
consonant articulation, lip action, and jaw move-
ment. Phonetic symbols help graphically distin-
guish the various sounds produced by these speech
systems. Representative phonetic symbols follow:
(1) /ɔ/, /b ɔI/, boy; (2) /ə/, / əbʌv/, above; (3) /ɚ/,
/dIn ɚ/, dinner; (4) /ɛ/, /bɛt/, bet; (5)/ʌ/, /kʌp/, cup;
(6) /œ/, /kœt/, cat; (7) /℧/, /b ℧k/, book; and
(8) /θ/, /ti θ/, teeth. Many phonetic symbols resem-
ble the regular vowels, a, e, i, o, u. The symbols,
however, present phonetic representations of
sounds. To illustrate, the /i/ represents the high,
front vowel sound in teeth rather than the regular
vowel “i” reflected in the word bite. To describe
the /i/ as “high front” indicates where the sound
Phonological Elements of Identity 573
occurs in the oral cavity as well as tongue, jaw,
and lip movement. Vowel sounds are produced
without obstruction to airflow in the oral cavity.
Consonant sounds are produced with various
obstructions to airflow in the oral cavity and may
be variously described as interdental, alveolar,
fricative, bilabial, stop, and so on. Each term yields
information about the place or manner of articula-
tion. Variations in vowel and consonant produc-
tion contribute to the speaker’s identity.
Phonological Variation and Identity
Dialect, age, gender, physical ailments, and numer-
ous other factors influence phonological variation.
Both Standard English and Black English possess
rules that permit variations in the articulation of
sounds. In the context of linguistics, a rule states
how an aspect of language operates. Rules are
descriptive, not prescriptive. That is, linguistic rules
describe what actually occurs when people speak.
These rules are not prescriptive like those found in
grammar books. Linguistic rules do not judge lan-
guage use or curb language variation; instead, lin-
guistic rules describe language use and language
variation. One such rule relates to consonant clus-
ter reduction. A Black English dialect speaker might
pronounce “desk” as /dɛs/ rather than /dɛsk/. The
Black English dialect rule permits the final conso-
nant omission when both consonants in a conso-
nant cluster are either voiceless or voiced. Vocal
fold vibrations distinguish voiceless and voiced
sounds. When speakers produce voiceless sounds,
the vocal folds do not vibrate. When speakers pro-
duce voiced sounds, the vocal folds vibrate. In
/dɛsk/, the /s/ is voiceless and the /k/ is voiceless.
Because the dialect rule permits the final consonant
deletion, what results is /dɛs/. Although consonant
cluster reduction creates an identifiable difference
among speakers, this variation is acceptable.
Speakers whose dialects permit consonant clus-
ter reduction in a cluster that forms the grammati-
cal past tense marker, ed, also permit consonant
cluster reduction in words that do not consist of
the past tense marker but are phonologically
equivalent. Examples are guest and guessed. Their
phonetic equivalence appears as follows: /gɛst/ and
/gɛst/. Certain dialects, however, permit consonant
cluster reduction, and the following results: /gɛs/
guest and /gɛs/ guessed. Because /s/ and /t/ are
574 Phonological Elements of Identity
voiceless consonants, certain dialects permit the
final consonant deletion. Likewise, in the words
find and fined, phonetically represented as /faInd/
and /faInd/, the phonological rule permits deletion
of the final consonant in a consonant cluster.
Because /n/ and /d/ are voiced consonants, this
dialect rule permits final consonant deletion result-
ing in the following phonetic representations:
/faIn/ and /faIn/. Interestingly, consonant cluster
reduction does not occur in consonant clusters
consisting of one voiced and one voiceless conso-
nant. For example, the word stump does not per-
mit consonant cluster reduction because the /m/ is
voiced and the /p/ is voiceless.
Yet another phonological variation and identifi-
able difference occurs when speakers produce /d/
for the voiced th as in the. Specifically, speakers
replace the interdental fricative, th, with the alveo-
lar stop, /d/. Thus, the words the, that, and those,
sound like da, dat, and dose. Although stigma-
tized, this phonological variation occurs in numer-
ous speech communities. As speakers adopt
different speech patterns over time, phonological
changes occur as well. Still, linguists observe little
change in the use of /d/ for voiced th when they
study the language of speakers over time and in
succeeding generations.
Still another phonological variation that reflects
identity is r-deletion or r-lessness. Rather than pro-
duce the possessive, plural pronoun, their, speak-
ers may produce what sounds like they. In this
instance, a phonological rule that permits final
r-deletion creates what sounds like a grammatical
error. Rather than the possessive, plural pronoun,
their, the speaker produces what sounds like the
nominative, plural pronoun, they, as in “We went
to ‘they’ house.” Such a sound variation veers
from the expected sound that results from the pres-
ence of r. That this variation creates a seeming
grammatical error thrusts it into the category of
stigmatized language use. This r-deletion rule also
occurs in words with medial r as in /bak/ for bark
and /dak/ for dark. Because these sound variations
create no seeming grammatical errors, they are
considered nonstigmatized. This r-deletion rule
operates in several varieties of English such as the
“Brooklynese,” New England, Black English, and
Southern English dialects.
Certain varieties of Southern English include
phonological rules that permit changes from /z/ to
/d/ and /v/ to /b/ in the environment of nasal
sounds. These changes reflect a process called
accommodation. That is, certain speech sounds
modify other speech sounds because of the proxim-
ity of sounds in a particular environment. Examples
occur in the words business /bIznɛs/ and heaven
/hɛvən/. When the Southern English phonological
rule operates, /bIznɛs/ becomes /bIdnɛs/. The frica-
tive /z/ followed by the nasal /n/ produces the stop
/d/. Similarly in the word heaven /hɛvən/, the
schwa /ə/ follows the fricative /v/; however, because
the schwa receives minimal syllabic stress, the fol-
lowing nasal sound /n/ still influences /v/, which
surprisingly results in /hɛbm/. The alveolar nasal,
/n/, changes to the bilabial nasal, /m/, because of
the bilabial stop, /b/. The process of accommoda-
tion, then, permits changes in speech sounds and
exemplifies yet another phonological rule of lan-
guage that contributes to identity.
Lexical items or vocabulary clearly signal group
identity, especially age. For example, older speak-
ers may use the term icebox even though the appli-
ance no longer exists. Regarding lexical items and
phonological elements, older speakers may retain
phonological and grammatical patterns acquired
during their youth. Such retentions in speech act
as clear identity markers. Furthermore, there is a
relationship between age and the use of certain
phonological and grammatical variants. Adults, in
general, use fewer phonological and grammatical
variants, and adolescents use more variants. Peers
influence the speech of adolescents. Adolescents
naturally adopt phonological and other speech
patterns from their peers. Because adolescents use
more stigmatized forms in general, this presup-
poses that they use more stigmatized phonological
features.
Gender is also important when considering the
phonological elements of identity. Males tend to
use more stigmatized forms than do females, thus
by extension more phonological variants such as
the /d/ for the voiced th. Stigmatized forms seem to
parallel with maleness or masculinity. Although
paradoxical, one might argue for positive values
associated with the use of stigmatized forms
among males. Interestingly, linguists observe that
females possess more awareness of language use
and listener attitudes. These factors then contrib-
ute to the use of fewer stigmatized forms in general
and phonological variants in particular.

In addition to ethnicity, age, and gender, seem-
ingly insignificant aspects of speech, such as para-
linguistic features, contribute to phonological
variation. Paralinguistic features such as hesitation
in speech or vowel lengthening could alter sound
production. An example similar to the latter occurs
in some southern dialects. Rather than /bɛd/, the
speaker says /bɛyəd/ for bed. The speaker pro-
duces what sounds like a two-syllable, monosyl-
labic word. Other aspects of speech such as
suprasegmental features contribute to phonologi-
cal variation. An example of a suprasegmental
feature is intonation. Pitch, timing, and syllabic
stress relate to intonation and therefore phono-
logical variation. Even a physical ailment such as
the common cold can contribute to sound varia-
tions in speech. Restricted nasal passages alter
nasal consonant sounds. For example, the conso-
nant sound, /m/, can be identified by its place and
manner of articulation. Its place of articulation is
bilabial, whereas its manner of articulation is
nasal. Likewise, the consonant sound /b/ can be
identified by its place and manner of articulation
as bilabial and stop, respectively. Because these
consonant sounds share the same place of articula-
tion, /m/ becomes /b/ when the nasal cavity restricts
the airflow and thereby alters sounds. Thus, “my
head aches” sounds like “by head aches.” These
familiar examples show how multiple factors con-
tribute to phonological variation and serve as
markers of identity.
Listener Responses and Identity
Social markers in speech signal ethnicity, age, and
gender. Such markers often cause listeners to judge
the speaker’s social status because of stylistic vari-
ations in speech. Stylistic variations, as noted ear-
lier, are often phonological. Listeners may associate
social status, education, and competence with
sound variations that result from r-deletion, con-
sonant cluster reduction, or the proximity of nasal
sounds. Certain variations may amuse listeners in
that they listen to how a speaker says rather than
what a speaker says. Other phonological varia-
tions could elicit disdain and result in discrimina-
tory practices because listeners associate certain
variations with certain groups. Although there is
nothing inherently wrong with vowel variation,
assimilation of sounds, or omission of sounds, the
Phonological Elements of Identity 575
myths, images, and prejudices related to particular
groups elicit listener attitudes. Although all speak-
ers recognize social markers in speech, all do not
judge variation. For example, children recognize
social markers and variation; however, they do not
judge language use. A child might respond to pho-
nological elements in speech by saying, “An ‘old
man’ called about the garage sale.” Speech sounds
then simply elicit an awareness of age and gender,
not judgment.
Phonological elements exemplify yet another
way in which language reveals identity. The pho-
nological or sound systems of language have the
capacity to reveal ethnicity, age, and gender.
Additionally, these sound systems and their varia-
tions identify those with different abilities such as
deaf speakers, cleft palate speakers, and English as
a second language speakers. Difference, however,
does not signal deficiency. Individual sounds of
language do not naturally possess negative quali-
ties. Based on life experiences and preconceived
notions, listeners attribute negative qualities.
Listeners determine that individual speech sounds
and combinations of sounds are stigmatized; there-
fore, those who produce particular speech sounds
are often deemed socially, educationally, or men-
tally challenged. Listeners must instead view lan-
guage through a descriptive lens and with the
understanding that phonological elements of iden-
tity do not occur haphazardly. Like dialect fea-
tures, phonological elements are governed by the
rules of language.
Jacqueline Imani Bryant
See also Code-Switching; Dialect; English as a Second
Language (ESL); Intonation; Invariant Be; Semantics
Further Readings
Fromkin, V., & Rodman, R. (1983). An introduction to
language. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Jeremiah, M. A. (2008). Linguistic insights from slave
narratives. CLA Journal, 52(1), 38–54.
Mackay, I. (1987). Phonetics: The science of speech
production. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Scherer, K. R., & Giles, H. (1979). Social markers in
speech. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Wolfram, W., & Fasold, R. W. (1974). The study of
social dialects in American English. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
576 Photographic Truth
Wolfram, W., & Schilling-Estes, N. (1998). American
English: Dialects and variation. Malden, MA:
Blackwell.
Photographic Truth
At the heart of the current discourse on still pho-
tography in the digital age remains a concern that
the “objective truth” of photographs is threatened
as image makers digitally alter images into con-
structions that bear no relation to the reality from
which they were originally taken. It is implied that
still photographs deal with objective truth, whereas
the digital photograph is freed from such an obli-
gation. If the objective truth is argued to be an
obsolete concept, then, by extension, so is the tra-
ditional still photograph. But although the critical
debate on still photography is far from closed, as
a starting point, photographic truth may be
understood as a partial and constructed truth, the
product of a technical form of mediation originat-
ing from and appealing to human subjectivities
and therefore as subjective a means of understand-
ing as it is objective.
As new technologies are invented, those enam-
ored with them are often quick to apply Darwinian
notions of “the survival of the fittest,” prophesy-
ing the extinction of existing media. Before accept-
ing that the traditional still photograph is a “less
evolved species” than the digital photograph
because it is “tied to objective truth,” it is neces-
sary to examine whether the still photograph ever
represented any kind of objective truth in the first
place. Likewise, before labeling still photography
an “endangered species” and carting it off to the
ready-to-go-extinct pile, it is important to uncover
how it is that it ever came to be regarded as “the
truth.”
When one examines the past for clues to the
present, what comes to the surface is a dominant
ideology that has narrowed and confined the dis-
cussions on still photography from its beginnings.
What becomes more apparent is how the still pho-
tograph, since its invention, may have never been
objective; it may have never been “the truth.”
Although the still photograph attests to its subject’s
existence in a way that no preceding pictorial form
did before it, existence is not synonymous with
truth. Rather, the photograph may have always
been a construction shaped by a dance of negotia-
tion between objective and subjective processes,
convention and invention, nature and culture, real-
ity and illusion. An additional layer of this explora-
tion might even show that the emergence of the
digital photograph may have only pushed further
the split from reality that the still photograph had
already begun. The medium of photography, in
both traditional still and digital forms, explores
identity through visual representations of the self
and others. The concept of photographic truth fur-
ther textures the extent to which photography con-
structs, maintains, and challenges notions of identity.
Additionally, this concept raises ongoing questions
of what photography can reveal about identity.
Early Applications of Photography
Since the appearance in 1826 of the oldest known
version of a photograph, Joseph-Nicéphore Niépce’s
heliograph titled View From a Window at Gras, an
aura of magic has been attached to photography.
To some degree, this has resulted from sensational-
istic advertising by the inventors themselves. In this
regard, Niépce joined with Louis-Jacques-Mandé
Daguerre (who in 1839 published his new photo-
graphic process, the daguerreotype) to define pho-
tography as the spontaneous reproduction of the
images of nature received in the camera obscura (a
box with a lens used as an aid in Renaissance paint-
ing). He concludes that the daguerreotype is not
merely an instrument, but a process that allows
nature to reproduce itself. Such words are hardly
value-neutral; indeed, they actively contributed to
the sense of magic connected with the act of pho-
tography from the beginning.
This sense of awe regarding photography is
apparent in the earliest responses of the public. La
Gazette de France, in 1839, declared the invention
to be so significant that it upsets all scientific theo-
ries on light and optics. The public, like the inven-
tors, believed that the daguerreotype was a fixed
and everlasting impression that can be taken away
from the presence of the objects.
U.S. writer Edgar Allan Poe regarded photogra-
phy to be a miraculous invention, even perhaps the
most significant of modern science. Poe was more
than fascinated by photography; he became an
avid supporter, writing three articles within one

year explaining and championing the invention.
He believed the photograph to be both absolute
truth and supreme perfection.
In addition to celebrating the magical qualities
of the invention, early commentators on photogra-
phy wrote about the superhuman ability of the
camera to see and record all things. Lady Elizabeth
Eastlake (wife of the English neoclassical painter
Sir Charles Eastlake) published articles on photog-
raphy arguing that the camera was a supreme
eyewitness to the objects and events of life.
However, she contributed an important concept
that has gripped many commentators long thereaf-
ter: the idea of the photograph being a trace or
impression taken from the real. What is implicit in
this idea is the belief that the photograph has taken
something from something. What that something
taken is and to whom that something-taken-from-
something belongs is a question that still instigates
debate in contemporary criticism of photography.
In 1859, U.S. writer Oliver Wendell Holmes,
like Poe, celebrated the miraculous nature of pho-
tography. Holmes, too, believed the photograph to
be a perfect mirror that fixes reality. His fascina-
tion with photography came from his belief that
the negative represents form divorced from matter.
And this conviction led him to flagrantly disregard
the value of the object being photographed. Holmes
admitted that there is only one Colosseum, but
added that once we have a negative of it, we can
make thousands of copies. His exaltation of form,
in his mind, necessitates a debasement of matter.
He regarded this as a good thing, something com-
mendable. Holmes then concluded that photogra-
phers will hunt objects as cattle, taking their skins,
and leaving them to die by the roadside.
Among the themes evident in these early com-
mentaries is the photographer’s ability to take and
scale off the surface of the real, to be a trace or
impression of the real. Another theme is the pho-
tographer’s superhuman ability to do (spontane-
ous reproduction) and to know (supreme
eyewitness) things beyond human capacities. Poe
even stated that the photograph is more true and
perfect than the object photographed.
The Unreality of Photography
Writer Fred Ritchin believes that the status of pho-
tography as a truthful pictorial form faces a severe
Photographic Truth 577
threat from digital technology. Because digital
images may have no origin other than their com-
puter programs yet maintain the look of the pho-
tographic image, he doubts whether photographs
will mean anything anymore. Ritchin’s worry
sounds similar to warnings of early commentators
on photography who believed that the invention of
photography would mean the death of painting.
When a new art technology appears, there are
often those who foretell the imminent doom of
existing media. Many felt photography would ren-
der painting obsolete, but it continues to thrive.
What usually happens with the introduction of a
new art form is a reassessment of the one from
which the new form springs. Great questions
emerge. Was the still photograph ever a truthful
pictorial form? If not, then why have critics like
Ritchin come to believe this? If yes, then what
exactly is the traditional still photograph evidence
of that the digital photograph is not?
As the discussion of the early responses to pho-
tography illustrates, there is little that is new in
contemporary responses, which betray a belief in
photography’s privileged relationship and respon-
sibility to reality. Contemporary critics argue that
because the film within a camera reacts to the light
reflected by objects, the negative constitutes a kind
of proof of the object’s existence. The object
“must” have been there, it is argued, or else there
would be no light reflected from it and no form for
the negative to “capture.”
It can be pointed out, however, that belief in the
transparency of photographic representation is a
fallacy, fostered by the historical development of
artistic perspective in Western civilization. An eye
already accustomed to reading paintings and prints
according to Renaissance perspective is precondi-
tioned to perceive the photograph as an especially
“realistic” means of representation. Participants in
a given culture are conditioned to see and decipher
an image through the particular conventions cre-
ated by that culture. Pictorial realism is culturally
specific. Styles of representation are invented by a
culture to be viewed within that culture. Styles of
picturing become so familiar and readable to mem-
bers of that culture that they seem to be realistic,
natural, and the way the world is.
Art theoretician Joel Snyder challenges realist
theories of photography by claiming that we have
falsely come to believe the photograph to be more
578 Photographic Truth
natural and more closely tied to the real than is
any other convention. Snyder reminds us that cam-
eras themselves were invented to conform to
Renaissance painting standards. The camera
obscura, or “dark chamber”—which was the earli-
est form of camera—was in use as early as the 16th
century precisely to facilitate the way of picturing
developed by Renaissance artists, who traced the
mirror image it generated. The photograph shows
us what the camera sees, not what we do. The cam-
era itself, the lens, the type of film, and the angle
and speed at which an object or person was photo-
graphed are just a few factors inventing a picture of
the world. Along with many other theorists, Snyder
affirms that photography is no more inherently tied
to the real than is painting, drawing, or, for that
matter, language. Rather, photography is merely
another way of constructing, ordering, and com-
municating meaning. Photography relies just as
much on convention as do other media.
Anthropological Applications of Photography
Anthropology’s beginnings are closely tied to pho-
tography. Early anthropology used photography as
a tool to identify and categorize human races, to
record visually the physical characteristics of differ-
ent racial groups. Spurred on by Charles Darwin’s
theory of natural selection, anthropologists used
photographs in anthropometry to measure body
mass and skeletal size, which were believed to dif-
fer among racial groups. Photography provided the
visual information used to classify human races in
support of theories of social evolution.
Early anthropologists considered photography
to be a truth-revealing mechanism. By 1920, how-
ever, photography diminished in importance in
anthropology as social organization, which was
considered to be less visual, increased in impor-
tance. Photographs became marginal, relegated to
the process of explanation. Photography was per-
ceived to be a technique that recorded the surface
rather than the depth that the anthropologist was
required to seek.
This perception seems to haunt anthropology
today because it remains primarily a discipline of
words. Ethnographic studies seek to provide an
analysis of the arrangements and practices of a cul-
ture. However, these studies are usually presented
in the written mode, even though the fieldwork
experience involves many senses, especially sight.
Although many ethnographies since the 1920s
include photographs relating to the fieldwork, the
photographs are included more as illustrations
rather than as an analysis of the visual dimensions
of culture. Photographs have been peripheral to the
principal analysis undertaken in ethnographies.
Rather than being used as investigative topics in
and of themselves, photographs are treated merely
as descriptions or a slide show.
Photographs have been greatly underana-
lyzed in anthropological work. Generally, a com-
prehensive written report is accompanied by a
handful of photographs used only to illustrate the
more serious analysis undertaken by the written
text. Anthropologists have not used their photo-
graphs as a way of doing serious analysis. Instead
of using photographic methods as a research tech-
nique to investigate, analyze, and critique, the
anthropologist photographs to illustrate a finding.
The photograph is incidental to the research activ-
ity itself and confirms the analysis already accom-
plished by the written account, rather than as a
central research methodology.
One ethnographic study that used photography
as a vigorous method of observation and analysis
is Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead’s book,
Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis. This
text embodies an interweaving of both image and
word. The photographs are neither illustrations
nor descriptions in service of the written analysis—
beyond serving as mere resources, the photographs
are the topics of investigation. After studying and
writing about Balinese culture for nearly 10 years,
Bateson and Mead added photographs to their
analysis. After a 2-year field experience, they made
more than 25,000 photographs from which they
selected 759 photographs for Balinese Character.
Bateson and Mead’s book offered a new model for
integrating words and images. Balinese Character
remains one of the most exemplary uses of photo-
graphic analysis in ethnography today. The photo-
graph was treated as a topic of investigation, as a
source of data worthy of analysis, and as a way of
doing anthropology.
Sociological Applications of Photography
Visual sociology and photography have had a
special relationship for quite some time. Like

anthropology, visual sociology’s beginnings reach
back to the 19th century. Between 1896 and
1916, 31 articles using photographs were pub-
lished in the American Journal of Sociology, the
then-premier journal of the discipline. These arti-
cles explored a range of aspects of U.S. life, such
as playgrounds, schools, prisons, housing, and
work, from a social problems lens. However, the
absence of photographs in the journal after 1916
may be the result of its editors’ desire to advance
sociology as a science. Today major sociology
journals in both Europe and the United States
seldom publish articles with photographs. Like
anthropology, sociology appears to be a discipline
of words, where the serious analysis is verbally
rather than visually communicated, and where the
visual data (if there are any) tend to be tables,
graphs, and histograms. Sociologists hoping to
publish papers with photographic materials have
to turn to specialist journals such as The
International Journal of Visual Sociology.
Being relegated to the fringes of sociology, most
visual sociologists sought inspiration from docu-
mentary photographers who were examining issues
that were being ignored by mainstream sociology.
Even though documentary photographers did not
employ sociological theories, they offered visual
sociologists a more direct visual method for critical
inquiry and analysis. Documentary photographers
were deeply involved with their subjects, and many
sociologists believed it could inform and improve
sociological fieldwork greatly.
Presently, as the objectivity of science itself is
being questioned by postmodern theories, as is
sociology’s status as a science, so too are photo-
graphs being regarded as problematical and tenta-
tive statements rather than reflections of truth.
Similarly, ethnography is being seen more and
more as partial truth rather than as a complete
document. Any text that represents a culture,
either verbally or visually, is also considered par-
tial or incomplete, because culture itself is not
precisely bounded and continually evolves.
Postmodern ethnography challenges the idea of
analysis, moving away from abstraction to the
lived world, to the experiences of the ethnographer
and the subject. Thus, the type of narrative encour-
aged by this new ethnography is seated in the point
of view, voice, and experience of the author.
Sociology modeled its verbal text in the shape of
Photographic Truth 579
the scientific report with the use of the third person
and a devotion to objectivity. Postmodern ethnog-
raphies instead suggest alternatives to traditional
research models: the first person, and the acknowl-
edgment of the subjectivity of all presentations and
re-presentations.
Postmodern forms of ethnography challenge the
traditional interaction between subject and
researcher, arguing that the resulting text is coop-
eratively constructed. Redefining the relationship
between the researcher and the subject, proponents
of the new ethnography promote the collaborative
nature of this relationship, the two-way flow of
information and meaning from researcher to sub-
ject and back again. Photography’s constructed,
subjective, and mutually constitutive nature lends
itself as a methodology to this new ethnography.
In turn, new forms of ethnography pose the ques-
tion of what constitutes data in visual sociology: Is
photography a method of collecting data, are pho-
tographs the data themselves, or is photography
the process of analyzing, interpreting, and making
meaning of the data? The new research in both
anthropology and sociology attests to the photo-
graph’s dynamic ability to do all three of these.
Because sociologists and anthropologists have
been reconsidering ways of using the still photo-
graph for quite some time now, their efforts can
therefore give us clues as to how the photograph
can be redefined. Postmodern sociology and
anthropology recognize both the still photograph
and the verbal text as partial truths rather than
complete documents in the constitution of ethno-
graphic research. What remains of photographic
truth in the digital age? What has always been
there since photography’s invention: a partial
truth.
Aphrodite Désirée Navab
See also Mediation; Technology
Further Readings
Ball, M. S., & Smith, G. W. H. (1992). Analyzing visual
data. Qualitative Research Methods Series #24.
London: Sage.
Barrett, T. (1996). Criticizing photographs: An
introduction to understanding images (2nd ed.).
Mountain View, CA: Mayfield.
580 Pidgin/Creole
Bateson, G., & Mead, M. (1942). Balinese character:
A photographic analysis. New York: New York
Academy of Sciences.
Clarke, G. (1997). The photograph: A visual and cultural
history. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Edwards, E. (Ed.). (1992). Anthropology and
photography 1860–1920. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Harper, D. (1998). An argument for visual sociology. In
J. Prosser (Ed.), Image-based research (pp. 24–41).
London: Falmer Press.
Navab, A. D. (2001). Re-picturing photography:
A language in the making. Journal of Aesthetic
Education, 35(1), 69–84.
Ritchin, F. (1990). Photojournalism in the age of
computers. In C. Squires (Ed.), The critical image
(pp. 28–37). Seattle, WA: Bay Press.
Snyder, J., & Walsh, N. A. (1975). Photography, vision,
and representation. Critical Inquiry, 2(1), 148–169.
Trachtenberg, A. (Ed.). (1980). Classic essays on
photography. New Haven, CT: Leete’s Island Books.
Pidgin/Creole
Pidgins and creoles are languages. When speakers
of different language bases encounter one another,
and multilingualism does not predominate, a lan-
guage woven of intersecting systems develops to
accommodate communication. A pidgin has no
native speakers—for all users, the pidgin is a sec-
ond language. When pidgin is no longer spoken as
a second language, but as a first language, it
becomes a creole language. For example, a pidgin
becomes creolized or nativized when the children
of a society begin learning the pidgin as a first
language. The different needs of native users, ver-
sus those of second language users, catalyze nativ-
ization. During this process, grammar and
vocabulary expand to fill what gaps may exist in
the pidgin.
Pidgins and creoles range continuums with one
or more basilects, first languages, and an acrolect,
or target language, at the poles. The features of the
basilect are frequently less evident and often dis-
missed as errors. The mesolect, or mid-range of the
creole or pidgin, sound much different when
approaching the acrolect and basilect poles. Thus,
a creole may be mistaken for a dialect of the con-
tributing languages. The creole may grow to
resemble one of its input languages so much that it
is decreolized and relabeled a dialect. Without
careful linguistic analysis, creoles and pidgins can
be difficult to identify.
The word creole also refers to people. The
demographic makeup of creole people differs dra-
matically across the globe. The word has, histori-
cally, referred to Europeans born in the Caribbean,
mixed-race people of various ethnic makeups
across the African and Latin diaspora, indigenous
natives, and imported African slaves.
Little ubiquity exists among creoles, pidgins, and
extant or honorary creole societies. Nonetheless,
the identities of pidgins and creoles and the culture
of their language communities and other creole
societies deepen two or more coexisting cultures
by uniting them.
Examples
Increasingly, creoles and pidgins are recorded and
studied. e-mail, text languages, and blogs have
opened access to written representations of infor-
mal discourse, allowing greater exposure to creoles
and pidgins. Features such as spelling, pronuncia-
tion, meaning, implication, mood, level, pitch,
tone, and frequency of use are considered. Studying
a creole or pidgin can uncover clues about geo-
graphic expansion.
Hindi and Urdu provide a family of deeply
interrelated creoles. At the formal registers, these
languages look different, but the creoles merge to
form mutually intelligible mesolect mid-ranges. A
speaker of one may be functional in many without
learning the other creoles. Documented Australian
Aboriginal creoles also share mutually intelligible
mid-ranges.
The creoles and pidgins of the slave trade have
been deeply researched. Including Kiswahili, other
existing African trade pidgins, Caribbean creoles,
creoles of the American South and South Sea
Islands, these creoles and pidgins have long pro-
vided a microcosm for viewing language change in
pidgins and creoles. African American English,
once a distinct creole, decreolized. In form and
function, it is now a dialect of Standard American
English.
Hawai‘i Creole provides significant studies.
This language formed the basis for what seminal
creolist Derek Bickerton catalogued as the features

of creoles. Recent theorists prove, using Hawai‘i
Creole English, that creoles are far more compli-
cated than Bickerton hypothesized. Cantonese,
Portuguese, Japanese, and Filipino pidgin basilects
intersected over many generations to form Hawai‘i
Creole English. The result is an expressive and
colorful language. Bickerton offers some examples:
“So da guy bin laik daunpeimen bikas i dono mi,”
or, “so the guy ant want down payment because
he don’t know me.” In Standard American English:
“So, the guy wanted a down payment because he
didn’t know me.” In another example from
Bickerton: “Dis gai hia sed daet hi gon get mai
vainil” or “This guy here said that he was going to
get my vinyl.”
Nativization/Creolization
Full exposure to another language has successfully
produced fluent speakers of foreign tongues, and
children have even greater potential for language
acquisition than adults do. Languages resist pres-
sure from “corruption” quite well. Languages,
both formally and informally, protect themselves.
Language adaptations, multilingualism, bureaucra-
cies, canonical and popular literatures, language
academies, schools, and social pressures all contrib-
ute to the preservation of languages. The ability to
communicate with others satisfies many profound
human needs, so it corresponds that a speaker has
deep emotional and psychological associations with
his or her native tongue. The speaker will take great
pride in his or her language and guard it, fiercely.
The vocabulary contains his or her history, and the
grammar has ordered his or her thoughts. Speakers
are much more likely to integrate or resist a foreign
language than to abandon a native one.
Given the natural resistance of languages to ero-
sion, the historical circumstances that produce a
vastly shared or long-enduring pidgin or creole
must be remarkable. Natural languages generate
independent of, or with minimal interference from,
other languages. In the case of a pidgin, one lan-
guage has been dramatically reduced and simpli-
fied. At least one other has lost viability for
communication. Both collapse under opposing
pressures and merge. Pidgins and creoles are lan-
guages, but the distinctions between these and
natural languages reveal profound truths about
humanity.
Pidgin/Creole 581
Pidgins do not begin because equally yoked lin-
guists negotiate a common parlance. Intense socio-
historical pressures compel a large number of
people to acquire new speech. Often, though not
always, colonialism generates the context from
which pidgins and creoles derive. Although early
research on pidgins and creoles examines a broad
survey of mother tongues, including other pidgins
and creoles, these correspond, frequently, to
English, Portuguese, or French target languages.
These tongues represent the parlance of power at
the genesis of many pidgins.
A pidgin may be a scant jargon or a complicated
language. Often, however, reduction and simplifi-
cation characterize a pidgin in its nascent state.
Second-language acquisition need not result in
reduction, simplification, or the creation of a pid-
gin, but it might. The common historical genesis of
colonialism for recorded pidgins and creoles span-
ning Asia, Africa, Australia, the Americas, and
islands across the globe, underscores that the tar-
get language was often expressed in reduced and
simplified forms—jargons, commands, curses, and
slang. With only limited exposure to the foreign
speech, using intrinsic logic and the patterns of
their native language, speakers approximate the
target tongue. A comprehendible pidgin emerges.
An emergent pidgin may not allow for full
expression, but if sufficient for communication,
the pidgin can become the dominant vernacular of
a multilingual populous. The pidgin articulates the
concepts, attitudes, objects, and actions of a cul-
ture of intersection. The words, accents, tones,
pronunciations, and phrasings of that emergent
tongue contribute to a culturally specific mélange
of expression. One society’s pidgin may be more
advanced than is the creole of another. Nonetheless,
if speakers of the pidgin—a second language, by
definition—cannot employ the pidgin to express
an idea, they might use their first languages.
Nativization distinguishes pidgins from creoles.
A pidgin may not expand, or need to, during nativ-
ization; likewise, it is not prerequisite that a pidgin
be standardized before nativizing. A population
may be required to shift, parent and child, into a
proto-pidgin before it has grammatical patterns,
predictable pronunciations, or a fixed vocabulary.
However, rearing a child with the pidgin as his or
her first language obligates adults and youth to
partner, creatively, to name the unnamed. Concepts
582 Pidgin/Creole

that would have been expressed in the former Creole People Versus Creole Languages
mother tongue must be integrated into the pidgin
Though creole people may or may not speak a
or creole. An intricate and enduring pidgin may
creole language, many similarities exist. The term
never creolize. A pidgin may creolize before it is
creole, when referring to people, indicates a racial
standardized. The resultant creole is no more a lan-
identity, but the demographic referents differ
guage than the former pidgin; it is, however, unlike
starkly. The creole identity may shift along a con-
the pidgin, the native language of a generation.
tinuum; a person may consider himself or herself
less creole than others are. Creole people often
Misunderstandings bear the stigma of colonialist influences, and this
history invokes mixed reactions inside and outside
Deepening understanding in the field of creolistics,
the community.
the study of pidgins and creoles, corrects many
During the exploration of the Americas, the
false prejudices about creoles, pidgins, and their
term creole referred to the offspring of Spanish
speakers. Only recently, during the late 1950s and
citizens born in the New World. This broadened
early 1960s, have linguists conceded that pidgins
to encompass all Europeans born there. A notice-
and creoles are legitimate languages. Labeling a
able population of biracial slaves emerged in the
pidgin or creole becomes increasingly difficult as
New World. To differentiate the mixed race slaves
languages evolve.
from others, the former were dubbed Black cre-
Languages will borrow, must adapt, and do col-
oles. However, not all creole slaves descend from
lide. They change to accommodate full expression
mixed race genealogies. Notably, in the L’Isle de
and resist external language pressure. Common
France, as slavery yielded to indentured servitude,
intuition and multilingual influences blur the dis-
native African and locally indigenous slaves were
tinctions between pidgins, creoles, and the input
lumped by the term creole to distinguish them
languages.
from the indentured servants emigrating from
Speakers often do not know that their speech
India. For many, this definition predominates.
patterns constitute a creole language. According to
Just as creole languages differ vastly, so creole
their enduring social reality, they simply failed to
people vary.
acquire the acrolect. The influence of the basilect,
Few schools teach creole or pidgin languages.
often a marginalized language, will be mistaken
Rarely will societies accept them as standard gram-
for a series of idiosyncratic errors, rather than pat-
mars. As a result, creole language groups splinter
terned language choices, and the speaker dismissed
into those who master the parlance of power and
as undereducated or unintelligent.
elevate socially, and those who cannot. The threat
Creole languages and pidgins may be haunted
of decreolization looms. People of creole cultures
by their function as languages of submission, fur-
must often fight for inclusion and acknowledge-
ther hindering their acceptance. Language learn-
ment or remain isolated and face extinction. If a
ers may be encouraged to adopt the mother
creole society defines itself independent of its input
tongue of oppressed ancestors, royal lineage, or
cultures, members face charges of snobbery, min-
powerful colonialists. Some may argue that the
strelsy, and separatism, among others.
pidgin or creole vocabulary is too limited, or too
Creole or pidgin speakers, creole and pidgin
few outsiders speak the native tongue. In response
language communities, and creole societies repre-
to scholarly, critical, and political attitudes, the
sent the efflorescence of a unique identity. A widely
typical language preservation systems, schools,
adopted pidgin or creole may become an indis-
bureaucrats, and writers, among others, correct,
pensable resource in nurturing the collective growth
mask, deepen, or otherwise legitimize the pidgin
of multicultural communities.
or creole.
Pidgins and creoles face the vulnerability of Jewel Sophia Younge
decreolization. Language pressures may, ulti-
mately, encourage speakers to gravitate toward or See also Bilingualism; Biracial Identity; Code-Switching;
actively resist the acrolect. A creole may lose the Dialect; Language; Language Development; Language
distinctions that give it autonomy as a language. Loss; Language Variety in Literature

Further Readings
Bickerton, D. (1976). Pidgin and creole studies. Annual
Review of Anthropology, 5, 169–193.
DeGraff, M. (2002). Relexification: A reevaluation.
Linguistic Anthropology, 44(4), 321–414.
Deuber, D., & Hinrichs, L. (2007). Dynamics of
orthographic standardization in Jamaican creole and
Nigerian pidgin. World Englishes, 26(1), 22–47.
Diamond, J. (1991). Reinventions of human language.
Natural History, 100(5), 22–28.
Heath, J. G. (1984). Language contact and language
change. Annual Review of Anthropology, 13,
367–384.
Jourdan, C. (1991). Pidgins and creoles: The blurring of
categories. Annual Review of Anthropology, 20,
187–209.
Mufwene, S. (2002). The ecology of language evolution.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Ravi, S. (2007). Re-thinking creole identities in 18th-
century Isle de France. Postcolonial Studies, 10(3),
327–332.
Sebba, M. (1997). Contact languages: Pidgins and
Creoles. London: Macmillan.
Siegel, J. (2007). Recent evidence against the language
bioprogram hypothesis: The pivotal case of Hawai‘i
Creole. Studies in Language, 31(1), 51–88.
Pluralism
Pluralism is a philosophical perspective that has
been embraced by postmodernists, poststructural-
ists, and pragmatists. From these perspectives, it is
acknowledged that there is no one privileged posi-
tion but instead a plurality of positions or interpre-
tations that exist. Postmodernists argue for a
plurality of narratives, poststructuralists argue for
polysemy, and pragmatists argue for plurality of
language in everyday discourse. This philosophical
perspective is a co-creation influenced by many dif-
ferent philosophers creating many pluralisms. The
emergence of pluralism as a philosophical perspec-
tive can be traced back to English and U.S. phi-
losophers at the end of the 19th century and the
beginning of the 20th century who were reacting
against the limiting philosophies of monism, or
only one, and dualism, or only two. Pluralists
oppose the abstract and general aspects of monism
and oppose the limited duality of dualism. As a
Pluralism 583
comparison, monism is a philosophy that is of the
whole and pluralism is a philosophy that is of the
parts. Although this comparison poses more ques-
tions of legitimacy to the existence of a real whole,
pluralism is a philosophical perspective that opens
to and invites investigation of new questions.
Pluralism is relevant to our understanding of iden-
tity because a multiplicity of identities emerge
within the context of pluralism. The interfacing of
pluralism and identity account for cultural plural-
ism and other manifestations of identities that
naturally emerge, exist, and compete in the world.
Pluralism and Context
Discourse on pluralism often falls under contextual
couplets such as cultural pluralism, democratic
pluralism, religious pluralism, moral pluralism,
and other social, political, or feminist frameworks.
Issues within these frameworks have sometimes
been considered through binary opposites that
identify the tensions inherent in living among and
with other human beings. These oppositions include
diversity and homogeneity, disunity and unity, and
difference and similitude. Pluralism emphasizes the
hallmarks of a postmodern structure that includes
diversity, multiplicity, and difference.
Cultural pluralism emerged from different and
opposing perspectives that privileged dominance,
exploitation, and hegemony. Cultural pluralists
embrace and respect difference—they do not
intend acculturation or assimilation; rather, their
aim is for pragmatic and moral engagement
between groups of difference to be able to continue
and coexist with respect and harmony.
Democratic pluralism, or pluralistic democracy,
is a form in which there are descriptive and prescrip-
tive models of pluralism; laissez-faire pluralism is a
self-correcting system that provides for competing
political agents and bargaining among various inter-
est groups; corporate pluralism describes a system
in which monopoly cannot emerge, but there is still a
controlling power that is outside of any self-correcting
system; and public pluralism is a prescriptive model
of pluralism because it is reform oriented and invites
and regulates interplay of competing interests in
society. Religious or theological pluralism has been
interpreted as polytheism, and moral pluralism
refers to a plurality of ethical systems that engage
interpretive interplay of right and wrong. A broader
584 Political Economy
and cosmological way to think about pluralism
includes the idea that it recognizes there is more
than one principle at play in the universe.
Beyond the contextual aspects of pluralism, phi-
losophers distinguish between substantival plural-
ism and attributive pluralism. Substantival pluralists
offers a perspective that suggests the world con-
tains numerous things that are incapable of being
reduced or transformed into other conditions or to
other things. Conversely, the multiplicity in attribu-
tive pluralism does not reside in the thing or sub-
stance as in the case of substantival pluralism but
instead refers to the diversity of attributes and
characteristic features that make up the things to be
distinct and separate from another. In other words,
attributive pluralists find the nature of the plural-
ism in its properties, but substantival pluralists find
the nature of pluralism in the-thing-itself and not
dependent upon the properties of the thing.
Implications
Implications of pluralism have been situated within
the metaphors of vitality, justice, and understand-
ing. Within these metaphors, truth becomes less
important than the daily toil and struggle of
human engagement. Inherent in the nature of plu-
ralism is the idea that there is not one pluralism;
rather, there are pluralisms, and the rejection of
these pluralisms then more often results from a
misunderstanding of the nature of the term.
Therefore, a stance of pluralism suggests these five
aspects. First, pluralism permits engagement in
critical discourse and self-implicature. Second,
meaning emerges out of pluralism from the engage-
ment of critical inquiries. Third, because systems
of pluralism are distinct, there is no complete or
absolute knowledge. This framework propels a
hermeneutic cycle rather than perpetuating an
end. Fourth, engagement of more than one per-
spective can bring about appropriately sufficient
results, and having only one perspective falls short
of any adequate response. Fifth, some perspectives
are deficient; therefore, multiple perspectives are
necessary to provide opportunity for optimum
engagement, consideration, and understanding.
Pluralists suggest that there are a variety of
potential yet conflicting responses to any given ques-
tion, and this idea is open to a plurality of visions
and versions that do not privilege one over the
other. Pluralism can invite skepticism because there
may not be a rational basis to prefer one response to
another. Therefore, this recognition of alternatives
annihilates the maintainability of a given position.
Nevertheless, pluralism has been embraced by
scholars and philosophers as a descriptive and pre-
scriptive philosophical perspective. Pluralism is
derived from a disposition that sees the whole world
in continuous fluctuation, divergence, variance, dis-
order, possibilities, and difference. A pluralistic
perspective can be applied to a variety of contexts in
which human beings engage other human beings
under contentious, competing, and ethical condi-
tions. An inescapable and inevitable conclusion
about pluralism is that there is more than one.
Annette M. Holba
See also Difference/Différance; Diversity; Hermeneutics;
Modernity and Postmodernity; Pragmatics
Further Readings
Antczak, F. J. (1995). Rhetoric and pluralism: Legacies of
Wayne Booth. Columbus: The Ohio State University.
Kelso, W. A. (1978). American democratic theory:
Pluralism and its critics. Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press.
Rescher, N. (1993). Pluralism. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Tumin, M. W., & Plotch, W. (1977). Pluralism in a
democratic society. New York: Praeger.
Wahl, J. A. (1925). The pluralist philosophies of England
and America. London: Open Court.
Political Economy
Political economy refers to that body of economic
thought whose rise between the 17th and mid-
19th centuries coincided with the rise of capital-
ism and the modern nation-state and the rise of
modern science; political economy was composed
of “economy in general” and “the art of govern-
ment.” Economy in general was understood as the
art of household management; political economy
was understood as the same art applied to the
polis, or political entity. Before the 17th century,
economics was deemed a matter of ethics and
politics and after the mid-19th century, a science.

This entry examines political economy and its
relevance to identity by considering it in relation to
the traditional (antique and medieval) ethical
understanding that assumed embedded identity in
contrast to the modern, scientific (ethically neu-
tral) that assumes atomic individualism. Political
economy encompasses aspects of the traditional
(naturalistic, organic, holistic, qualitative, con-
crete) and the modern (materialistic, mechanistic,
atomistic, quantitative, abstract).
Traditional Understanding
Aristotle considers the relation between human
beings and the socioeconomic order to be natural
and organic—socioeconomic order cannot exist
without them; they cannot realize their nature
without it. As the only animals with the potential
for acquiring language, human beings are by
nature “political” (because that potential can be
actualized only within the polis as a language-
using community) and “rational” (because the
potential for reason can be actualized only through
language). The polis exists for the sake of the good
life facilitated by labor’s division (providing more
abundantly for the common good) and exchange
(holding the polis together through mutual need).
Wealth constitutes an adequate stock of products
useful for the good life; it is the means sufficient to
the end of realizing our rational nature in the exer-
cise of moral and intellectual virtues within the
polis—for achieving happiness.
Labor, its division, and exchange are natural.
Labor is defined by its concrete end and its product
by its end or use. A product’s use-value is natural
and given; its exchange-value is conventional and
problematic because different products and the
labors producing them are incommensurable.
Defined as they are by different ends (and there-
fore different qualities), use-value and exchange-
value share no natural factor that can be measured
to calculate reciprocal proportions for equal
exchange (e.g., supposing some common factor
found twofold in shoes and fivefold in coats, five
pairs of shoes would equal two coats). Exchange-
value therefore varies, subject to persuasion.
In primitive exchange, products are bartered; in
more advanced markets, money mediates. Over
time, exchange of products mediated by money
becomes instead exchange of money for more
Political Economy 585
money mediated by products—begging the ques-
tion, toward what end is a product produced,
used (quality being paramount), or exchanged
(profit being paramount to quality’s detriment).
Ultimately, mediating products are dropped and
money is bartered for more money still. Thus,
money, introduced as a conventional means to
facilitate exchange, is itself transformed into an
end. Products have natural ends and limits to their
consumption and acquisition, as does wealth—
that is, whatever constitutes enough for the good
life. Money as a means has no end and hence no
limit to its acquisition, making its pursuit endless,
limitless, irrational, and unnatural.
Modern Understanding
Before the 17th century, argues R. H. Tawney, the
socioeconomic order was envisioned as a highly
articulated organism within which different mem-
bers contributed in different ways to the material
and spiritual well-being of the whole. Thereafter,
socioeconomic order was envisioned as a joint
stock company in which the liability of sharehold-
ers was limited; an individual entered a contract
ensuring rights vested in him by nature but not
obligating him to pursue anyone’s interests but his
own—the doctrine of liberal individualism
advanced by Thomas Hobbes, among others.
Contract theories assume a method of explana-
tion typical of modern science—resolution of a
complex whole into parts and their recombination
in such a way as to (supposedly) reconstitute the
whole; thus, resolution of the complex whole of
social life into individuals and their recombination
by means of a contract. The explanation is mecha-
nistic versus organic (disassembling and reassem-
bling a machine vs. an organism being possible vs.
impossible without loss of life) and atomistic ver-
sus holistic (the whole being a quantity—i.e., the
sum of its parts vs. a quality—i.e., more than the
sum of its parts). The explanation is congenial to
the genius of modern science (the quantification of
nature) and consistent with its tendency toward
oversimplification (reduction of complex wholes
to their simplest parts—e.g., reduction of natural
entities to material ingredients).
The presocial being is by nature individual and
nonsocial but liable to be aggressive in the case of
perceived threats to life or livelihood. Because such
586 Political Economy
a being is supposed to be linguistic and rational, she
determines her best interests require entering a con-
tract limiting her and all others’ freedom to dimin-
ish the prospects for harm. Within the contract,
however, her selfish nature remains unchanged;
apparent selflessness is actually selfishness dis-
guised. She proceeds in the market as she would in
nature except when constrained by the contract.
According to Alasdair MacIntyre, as far back as
Plato self-interest has not been considered a real
motive, no such thing being the same in all. Self-
interest is an abstraction typical of modern science.
If a man is thirsty, he seeks water; if hungry, bread.
Only abstractly does he seek pleasure–or more
abstractly, self-interest. If he drinks or eats in dis-
regard of others when water and bread are scarce,
he acts selfishly; if he refrains in regard for them,
he acts selflessly. Only in situations involving
incompatible aims in which behavior is competi-
tive or noncompetitive does self-interest or benev-
olence pertain. Such situations are not paradigmatic.
Most relations are reciprocal—friendship is sought
not out of self-interest but out of a mutual desire
for friendship, and exchange out of mutual need.
The abstract end of self-interest gave way to the
supposedly more concrete and measurable pursuit
of “pleasure” in the 19th century as the utilitarian-
ism characteristic of modern science and implicit
in previous economic thought gives way to an
explicit, hedonistic form; with the emergence of a
more sophisticated consequentialism in the
20th century, pleasure gave way to the “good”—
however it is understood. But so abstract an end
requires an equally abstract, universalizable means
because no other type could be specified for
achieving good defined in whatever ways individu-
als choose. Money constitutes just such a means.
But money increasingly becomes an end in itself
given the indeterminate good it serves. All forms of
utilitarianism judge an act by quantifying its utility
as a means for maximizing a desired consequence.
For such purposes, money again proves ideal—
maximize money to maximize the consequence of
whatever is understood to be good. The path open
to thorough mathematization of its matter, eco-
nomics in imitation of biometrics and quantum
physics incorporates statistics and proclaims itself
a science.
With means and ends so completely abstracted
from life, the distinction between natural and
conventional blurs. “Need” is subsumed in
“demand,” which is ever subject to persuasion.
The “individual” becomes a bundle of desires
whose “identity” is tied to the stream of “goods”
he or she is persuaded to purchase, then discard
for something new (disregarding use-values they
retain). Thus capitalism’s immensely productive
machinery is maintained in perpetual motion.
Political Economy
Mercantilism was truly modern in some respects—
the state between rival nations was viewed as
analogous to the state of nature. Nations were to
pursue their interests among rivals, establishing
colonies as sources of precious metals plus raw
materials to be exported as finished products in
exchange for more precious metals—that is, money,
the measure of wealth. Adam Smith argued that
wealth should be gauged by material goods con-
tributing to the standard of living and that free,
rather than restricted, domestic and foreign trade
was the best means to such wealth.
Smith was more accepting of physiocracy (“the
rule of nature”). Francois Quesnay, a fellow free
trader who also rejected money as a measure of
wealth, argued wealth arose from production and
circulated through the body politic. But he consid-
ered agriculture—being natural—the only produc-
tive enterprise, and manufacture, commerce, and
service—being artificial—sterile shifters of wealth.
Smith believed the most significant feature of
economic life was division of labor, the source of
productivity and material wealth. Concentrating
on one job or function enables workers to become
more skillful and imagine improvements more eas-
ily. Benefits of labor’s division can be seen in the
household, but as the market extends to the village
and beyond and opportunities for exchange
increase, the degree of specialization and produc-
tivity increase as well.
Smith, however, warned about the adverse
effects of dividing and subdividing labor. He
feared that, confined to repetitive tasks involving
few operations with no occasion to exert under-
standing, workers would grow “stupid and igno-
rant,” the rot eventually spreading to moral
capacities, both domestic and civil. More materi-
ally advanced, they would nonetheless suffer
stunted personalities. In this regard, he anticipated

the effects of atomized labor associated with
interchangeable parts assembled on long produc-
tion lines; confined to turning out smaller parts or
exercising lesser functions divorced from com-
pleting larger wholes, workers grow bored and
robotic.
When Smith turns to economic motivation, he
appears trapped by the moral vocabulary of his
time. He escapes somewhat when he rejects pru-
dence (rational self-interest) or benevolence as the
basis for social life, arguing instead for “imagina-
tion” (the ability to see ourselves in others’ situa-
tions) and “sympathy” for their actions (the basis
for judgment), out of which conscience (“the
impartial spectator”) develops. Smith, however,
appears to offer no alternative to prudence or
benevolence in economic life, stressing the former
over the latter. But D. D. Raphael argues Smith
must be understood in the context of labor’s divi-
sion and mutual dependence—that is, in terms of
cooperation.
Given his vocabulary, however, the problem of
reconciling competing acts proves pressing. Smith’s
recourse is the metaphor of “an invisible hand,” a
religious idiom chosen to convey the phenome-
non’s incredible character. Though a deist, Smith
was predisposed to seeing beneficent order in the
natural course of human affairs, says David
Raphael, given his early enthusiasm for Stoicism,
whose proponents professed belief in harmony
(sympatheia) within the organism that is nature.
Smith’s vocabulary may be modern, but his sym-
pathies are clearly traditional, as are those of Karl
Marx. Scott Meikle argues that Marx is basically
Aristotelian, his critique of capitalism an extension
of Aristotelian economics. Marx accepts the nature/
convention distinction leading to incommensura-
bility in exchange. The problem does not exist for
Smith and David Ricardo, who blur the distinction
and thus bridge the gap between use-value and
exchange-value. Ricardo argues the only common
factor in different products is labor, the basis for
commensurability and the measure of value. Marx
counters that for labor to constitute a common fac-
tor, natural differences in labors directed toward
different ends would have to be homogenized by
totally abstracting them from their concrete ends so
that their different qualities could be rendered uni-
formly as quantities of time and money. Such labor
for a wage becomes a commodity for exchange,
Political Identity 587
bought for a little, its product sold for more—a
medium for monetary gain.
Human beings realize themselves through their
labor and its products. Divorced from their natural
ends, our labor and our lives may become a means
to the end of money, their qualities compromised
by the quest for quantity. Then all capacities, says
Meikle, become particular applications of a single
general capacity—that of enterprise. Thus, we are
lost or lose ourselves in the conventional, or the
taken-for-granted, alienated from what is natural
and valuable in the world.
Richard H. Thames
See also Social Economy
Further Readings
MacIntyre, A. (2007). After virtue (3rd ed.). Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Meikle, S. (1985). Essentialism in the thought of Karl
Marx. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Meikle, S. (1995). Aristotle’s economic thought. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press.
Raphael, D. D. (1985). Adam Smith. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Tawney, R. H. (1998). Religion and the rise of
capitalism. London: Transaction.
Tuck, R. (1989). Hobbes. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Political Identity
Political identity as a concept frames understand-
ing of political affiliation within a spectrum of
ideological categories (Democrats, Republicans,
Leftists, Centrists, Pluralists, etc.) or movements
(women’s movement, civil rights movements, work-
er’s rights movement, etc.). Although preliminary
formulations as the modern concept appeared in
theoretical work of the 19th and 20th centuries, the
term became central to Western scholarship and
activism in the tumultuous social-political-cultural
transformation of the 1960s and 1970s. This entry
offers a comprehensive understanding of the con-
cept of political identity and how the term is used
to describe individuals and citizens who identify
with a particular (if evolving) understanding of
588 Political Identity
political agency and participation. After offering a
social constructivist perspective on identity, this
entry explores some typical philosophical frame-
works of political identity and offers examples of
groups of individuals who struggle over the formu-
lation of a common political identity as part of
their consciousness-raising processes.
Breakdown of Solidarity
Because of the breakdown of solidarity amid
increasing alienation and individualism, the rise of
multiculturalism, and the emergence of concepts
like identity politics, some argue that the concept
political identity itself should be abandoned because
of its uselessness in a postmodern era. Political
identity is a distinct term that intersects with the
concept of identity politics, a term that emerged
into common usage in the early 1980s. Scholars
argued that the conceptualization of identity is
threatened by the politics of difference, which is the
result of competing and intersecting understandings
of political identity. Recent scholars have focused
on how constructivism rather than neoliberalism
would promote the use of rhetoric and identity
labels that would signal to others what type of rela-
tionship or treatment certain groups desired for
their sense of political identity.
Identity gives groups and individuals a concep-
tual location from which they can clarify a stand-
point, purpose, and capacity for action. Erik
Erikson is often the starting point for understand-
ing the social-relational character of identity; he
saw identity as both a persistent uniformity within
oneself (self-sameness) and a persistent correspon-
dence of some kind of essential character with oth-
ers. Social identity, understood as a preexisting
identity, is often the starting place for understand-
ings of political identity; social and political identi-
ties are sometimes developed after an identity
crisis, which signals that preexistence of social
identity is perhaps tentatively conceived here. As
the world of work became more public, the family
became more private. Within the concept of politi-
cal identity, one might bridge the two realms.
Transformational Nature
Political identity is by no means a static concept,
even in its earliest inceptions; the transformational
nature of political identity has to do with the pre-
determined understandings of sociological, psy-
chological, and moral identity that we base political
choices upon. Although this identity might feel
stable, it is being formed, deliberated, and reformed
continuously. This process is influenced by many
factors, and our multiple roles in society make the
process of identification difficult. The evolution of
political identity as a concept is tied to the differ-
entiation of public and private spheres. As Jürgen
Habermas traces it, a bourgeois public sphere was
formed in England, France, and Germany as a
forum within which private people gathered to
form a public. Identity was formed at the intersec-
tion of the institutions of the family, the private
(economic and cultural) realm, and the public (the
state). A collective political identity emerged through
mutual reinforcement from private and public
institutions. However, some scholars, especially
those focusing on welfare and justice theories,
argue that political identity and mobilization
(toward social change) emerge from a sense of
injustice formed by past political struggles.
Scholars in varying disciplines have weighed in
on how to classify identity as a category useful for
understanding of this intersection of the interests
of self and others. Debate is located around
whether social identity initiates politics or politics
influence social identity. William Mackenzie
stressed the emergence of the popular usage of
political identity in academia in the mid-1960s and
early 1970s when scholars focused on issues of
decolonization, alienation within systems and
institutions, and increasing individualism.
Habermas, for example, acknowledges the histori-
cal and cultural conditions associated with struc-
tural differentiation of identity, including the
political ramifications of identity affiliations. He
explains that social identity is based on class struc-
tures and arises from a sense of publicness that
forges a public opinion.
Identity and Consciousness
However, Karl Marx felt public opinion was false
consciousness and situated political identity as
consciousness-raising. Marx felt political identity
emerged as an epistemological process based on
conflict of goods and conflict of rights. Prominent
debate over the origins of political identity began

chiefly with Marx and the Marxists that followed
him. Marxists feel identity is always a social, col-
lective matter that cannot be conceived without a
link to politics, whether understood as given or
constructed. Western Marxists emphasized the
politics of subjectivity to preserve hope in revolu-
tion because that helped individuals develop soli-
darity through their identification with a particular
category of politics. Such scholars tended to think
that through consciousness-raising, workers could
become materially liberated following cultural lib-
eration; however, the causal relationship and focus
of unity within revolution has been disputed by the
full spectrum of Marxist perspectives, including
post-Marxists. Marx felt that to understand an
individual point of view in terms of a political
identity, individuals needed to view society as a
whole; political identity allowed one to negotiate
one’s own views of the world with one’s position
within that world.
Marx notably identified the political identity
categories of bourgeois and proletariat, arguing
that the identity of the proletariat was unique epis-
temologically, politically, socially, and historically
because the proletariat was a large and growing
number of people carrying out functions that sup-
ported the structure of capitalism while providing
an opportunity to gain material interests; conse-
quently, members of the proletariat wielded
increasing power in a democratic age, particularly
if they identified with this common consciousness
of proletariat political identity. Political identity is
culturally situated and bound to everyday life; it is
often the product of class politics and its creation
and re-creation of material and cultural existence.
As Stanley Aronowitz suggests, working-class
identities are reproduced in everyday living that
demonstrate not just a worldview but a lifeworld
perspective of identity.
An individual’s understanding of political iden-
tity is affected by his or her view of politics and
whether we view politics as idealism or action.
Marx’s view of political identity formation ema-
nated from the view that our political identity is
tied to our political ideals and interests. For exam-
ple, in this view, the working class would be better
able to express socialism’s ideals with a better
understanding of their own material interests.
Forming a self-conscious sense of identity helps
individuals internalize that with which they relate
Political Identity 589
while letting go of that which should be external-
ized, representing a tension between subjectivity
and objectivity.
Identity and Multiplicity
Political identity is subject to multilayered under-
standings and emergent divisions. The duality of
identity that can occur as a result of class mobility
can result in a personal, psychological struggle with
duality that requires a need for balance to maintain
some sense of stability. Social construction of iden-
tity is challenged and redefined by social move-
ments as well, which challenge and re-create
our understandings of identity in relation to eco-
nomics, politics, culture, race, gender, and ethnic-
ity. Just as identity markers shift as times change,
the philosophical and practical underpinnings of
political identity shift. As political identity is
declared, this identity is tested through its relation-
ship to existing identities formed from existing and
previous economic, cultural, and political contexts.
For example, in South African apartheid, colo-
nial rule established a correlation between race and
class, and consequently, political identities emerged
along a continuum of resistance to that subjuga-
tion. In that context, race constituted group iden-
tity, and racial segregation as part of official
government policy classified racial groups as
Caucasian, Asian, colored, and Black to justify
capitalist exploitation and control of the minority
by the majority. Further delineating the groups was
the concept of ethnic group identity, which was
used by government to segregate by language, tradi-
tion, territory, or politics. Ethnic identity changed as
migration and community division occurred; yet eth-
nic identity is highly accessible but not the most reli-
able predictor of political identity. Differentiation
of political identities was reinforced because it
served the powers that be, in this case, the colonial
state; individual identities were overtaken by group
identities. Then, as Africans were educated in the
Western world, African pride was elevated, but
subjugation in Africa continued; nationalist move-
ments resisted this subjugation, which resulted in
elimination of race as a qualifier of power but left
ethnicity as a determinant of privilege. Ethnic ten-
sions have escalated because of competition for
state resources. Thus, identity politics emerged
from an initial concept of political identity in this
590 Political Psychology
specific case of how race, culture, and ethnicity
were differentiated.
Another prominent case of the splintering of
political identity through identity politics emerged
within the U.S. feminist movement. In the general
sense, feminists have sought sanctioned political
identities within national and regional governance;
women sought to be identified as citizens rather
than as women, representing the transformation of
women’s political identity from one rooted in vir-
tue and gender to one of national citizenship and
natural rights. Yet deeper divisions about what
constituted a woman’s political identity arose,
based on differing notions of Universalist ideals of
equality and individualism and more nationalistic
understanding of the political virtues affiliated
with being feminine and masculine.
Deeper divisions in women’s political identity in
the United States resulted when White and Black
women were segregated during early slavery days.
Class issues created a tension between Black men
and women’s voting rights and White women’s
voting rights. White male abolitionists supported
the Negro male vote, as did many Black women;
however, some educated White women considered
their vote as necessary to balance the uneducated
Black male vote. Feminist identity politics have
emerged as a response to the perceived dominance
of White women in the early women’s suffrage
movement. Rather than assuming we are in a post-
feminist era, most third-wave feminism emphasizes
the need to negotiate differences across multiple femi-
nist standpoints (often categorized as American
Indian, Arab American, Asian American, Black,
Chicana, cultural, ecofeminist, electoral, liberal,
international, Jewish, Latina, lesbian, Marxist,
Puerto Rican, radical, socialist, working-class fem-
inists, and womanists) in the pursuit of social
change that benefits women’s political identity.
Although the politics of identity difference arose to
broaden the self-conceptualization of feminism,
they proved taxing to the movement’s sense of
unity; they slowed the pace and fragmented the
focus in many ways, yet they also resisted essen-
tialist understandings of political identity.
Elesha L. Ruminski
See also Agency; Group Identity; Identity Politics;
Political Psychology; Psychology of Self and Identity;
Womanism
Further Readings
Aronowitz, S. (1992). The politics of identity: Class,
culture, social movements. New York: Routledge.
Dean, K. (Ed.). (1997). Politics and the ends of identity.
Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Escobar, E. J. (1999). Race, police, and the making of a
political identity: Mexican Americans and the Los
Angeles police department, 1900–1945. Los Angeles:
University of California Press.
Habermas, J. (1975). Legitimation crisis. Boston: Beacon
Press.
Mackenzie, W. J. M. (1978). Political identity.
New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Meister, R. (1990). Political identity: Thinking through
Marx. Cambridge, UK: Blackwell.
Zaeske, S. (2003). Signatures of citizenship: Petitioning
anti-slavery, and women’s political identity. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Political Psychology
Political psychology is the application of the tools
of psychology to the realm of politics. Specifically,
political psychology usually takes what is known
in this behavioral discipline and attempts to
explain the political behavior of various actors or
events using scientific method. This is accom-
plished by establishing or manipulating a set of
variables that facilitate the study of the actor or
event. There is an International Society of Political
Psychology, and a dominant journal specializing
in the field: Political Psychology.
Political psychology as a distinct field is relatively
young. Carolyn Funk and David Sears trace the first
formal academic course offered with this subject to
1970. Study of the more general use of known
human behaviors in political activity may be as old
as any politics: from Shakespeare’s skillful crowd
control by Marc Antony in Julius Caesar written
during the 16th century to Gustav Le Bon’s The
Crowd in 1889, where he analyzed the manipula-
tion of the mass movement of General Boulanger in
France from 1886 to 1889. During World War II,
the U.S. government commissioned several
independent studies of Adolph Hitler by estab-
lished psychologists. Psychological warfare has
become a standard of modern security studies.
Attempts to influence politics, sometimes referred

to as propaganda, has become an equal mainstay
of mass movements and wartime enterprises.
Indeed, Ho Chi Minh, in his outline for the strate-
gic defeat of the United States in Vietnam, specifi-
cally counted on the psychological defeat of the
nation’s population through the use of political
means inserted into the media. In domestic elec-
toral politics, vast sums are amassed and spent on
media to gauge, shape, and consolidate political
identity. In the realm of political life, the behavior
and motivations that are propelled by the identity
of the participants have become a key engine “for
consolidating political identity” or “for shaping
domestic electoral politics.”
Theoretical Perspectives
Psychology, as a social science, depends upon
empirical as well as normative study to analyze its
subject material. Psychologists have tried method-
ologies to use as tools in generating population sets,
mining them for data and analyzing their findings.
The experimental quality of psychology—which is
to say its ability to postulate and test in quantitative
samples—may not always translate well into the
analysis of political behavior. Psychology does,
however, offer some dazzling insights into decision
making, voting choices, national security, and inter-
national relations, to name just a few of the applica-
tions. Real-time polling in elections may be the most
didactic example of this approach. Just as there are
powerful schools in psychology, there are also dis-
tinct perspectives on interpreting political behavior.
David Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis
describe such precise areas as being personality
theories, behaviorist theories, developmental theory,
incentive theories, social cognition, and intergroup
relations, among others.
Not all descriptors in political psychology are
testable, or even empirically demonstrated with
reference to data sets. Yet other inferences abound:
biological, gender, and environmental explanations
for the development of peoples, the construction of
their identity, and their behavior in political pro-
cesses have devoted followings in contemporary
writing. Harold and Margaret Sprout postulate
ecological explanations for behavior, whereas Sir
Halford Mackinder has written extensively on geo-
political explanations. Graham Allison’s seminal
study of decision making (Essence of Decision)
Political Psychology 591
during the Cuban missile crisis is a wide-ranging
use of normative models to explain behavior at the
individual, bureaucratic, and organizational levels
by analyzing the participation in the processes by
individuals. Despite this accessible, normative
strength, the discipline of political psychology still
maintains substantial measurement tools to gener-
ate and evaluate data sets.
Political Behavior and Identity
Implicit in the notion of political activity is that a
core personality exists that participates in the
world around it. This personality must have val-
ues, and these form an identity. From this identity,
the political actor interacts with the environment.
The identity possesses opinions, attitudes, and
emotions that may influence these activities. More
importantly, all of these elements are an impetus to
form associations—groups—that may reinforce
membership with a new social identity in addition
to individual identity. This group participation, or
membership, can deepen personal identity and
values as well as be influenced by what individual
members bring to their group. Cognitive processes
employed by the individual are important to iso-
late and study. They are the connectors with the
wider environment and are the processes through
which the identity that is forming receives input.
Needless to say, identity is an integral object in
political motivation and is of keen interest to the
political psychologist. Some dominant or charis-
matic individuals—leaders—can accelerate all of
these tendencies, as well as mobilize them for spe-
cific purposes. At the core, however, such powerful
notions as nationalism, religious sentiment, ethnic
or cultural beliefs, and partisan politics are cen-
trally influential in the identity of their members.
The political psychologist, therefore, is strongly
motivated to understand the formation of any rel-
evant identity because it is a vital rung in the wider
understanding of political behavior. Practical dem-
onstrations of this analytic process, for example,
would facilitate insight into mass movements,
political party affiliation, voting choices and deci-
sion making, and ethno-religious identity.
Contemporary Challenges
The past century was replete with powerful dem-
onstrations of mass political movements and
592 Postliberalism
international events that shook not just the interna-
tional system, but humanity’s conception of its own
moral self. Other trends were heady with dreams of
a better, perfectible world. Totalitarian movements
such as fascism and communism, nascent national-
ism and decolonization, the flowering of a prosper-
ous and numerous middle class, creation of
unprecedented international cooperative organiza-
tions, and the terrible incidence of genocide all have
given political psychologists much to reflect upon.
What cognitive processes permitted individuals to
form identities that could conceive of such ambi-
tious global projects, or be capable of doing such
pernicious deeds? The game theory speculation asso-
ciated with nuclear competition and the revolution
of terrorism in recent years have shown that there
are still plenty of challenges to understand regarding
individual identification and value formation.
John Sawicki
See also Political Identity; Social Constructivist Approach
to Political Identity; Terrorism
Further Readings
Allison, G., & Philip, Z. (1999). Essence of decision
explaining the Cuban missile crisis. New York:
Longman.
Cottam, M., Dietz-Uhler, B., Mastors, E., & Preston, T.
(2004). Introduction to political psychology. Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Houghton, D. (2008). Political psychology: Situations,
individuals, and cases. New York: Routledge.
Sears, D., Huddy, L., & Jervis, R. (2003). Oxford
handbook of political psychology. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Postcolonialism
See Modernity and Postmodernity
Postliberalism
Postliberalism is an orientation in modern Christian
theology characterized by its preoccupation with
developing an alternative theological framework
from dominant liberal and conservative frame-
works and practices. Founded by theologians at
the Yale Divinity School in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, postliberal theology, as it became
known, holds significant connections and distinc-
tions with neoorthodox ways of approaching the
relation between theology and culture. Postliberal
theology is distinctive in the following ways:
(a) truth is determined analogically, or by analogy
to the narrative of scripture; (b) doctrine is deter-
mined by the primacy of God, or the language of
the church being primarily accountable to God;
and (c) religious practices are determined by
Christocentrism, or the focus on the personhood
and teachings of Christ. These distinctions lay the
foundation for postliberalism’s beliefs about the
formation and maintenance of religious and cul-
tural identity.
Origins
A consistent area of inquiry for contemporary
theologians has been the realm between conserva-
tive and liberal theology. The idea of finding a
third theological option between these two frame-
works has attracted numerous, and quite different,
neoorthodox Christian movements: from the medi-
ating theology of 19th-century Germany supported
by such scholars as Isaak Dorner and Friedrich
Schmid to Karl Barth’s theology of the word and
Reinhold Niebuhr’s social ethics in the 1940s and
1950s. Most neoorthodox theologies emphasized
a similar language, however: the biblical language
of sin, the realization of transcendence, and “the
primacy of the Word” of God. The neoorthodox
movements in modern theology gained recognition
and support until the early 1960s when, after
many of the leading thinkers such as Barth and
Niebuhr passed away, liberal theology emerged in
Latin America and began to grow.
The neoorthodox movement did not find its
footing again until the mid-1970s and early 1980s.
This time, it emerged within the postliberal writ-
ings of the Yale Divinity School. The movement’s
first significant work, Hans Frei’s The Eclipse of
Biblical Narrative, was published in 1974.
Providing some of the founding arguments of the
postliberal school, Frei’s work supported an anti-
Enlightenment view to biblical interpretation. Frei

critiqued the Enlightenment idea that truth could
be found within a universal foundation of knowl-
edge, such as rationality, or that the individual
constituted the center of authority and experience.
Instead, Frei’s theology supported biblical truth as
grounded within the living communal experience
of scriptural narrative. Instead of liberal or conser-
vative theologies that further emphasized the loss
of the biblical narrative as formative to religious
life, Frei supported a theological framework that
emphasized how Christians make sense of the
world around them by relating to and participat-
ing within scriptural stories.
George Lindbeck’s The Nature of Doctrine,
published in 1984, further differentiated the mode
of thinking between postliberalism and both con-
servative and liberal frameworks. Lindbeck articu-
lated the dichotomy that dominated modern
theology: conservatism and liberalism. Conservative
theology relies on the cognitive-propositional
understanding of the Bible and the world.
Conservative theologians, following analytic phil-
osophical frameworks, claim that statements of
doctrine within the Bible literally refer to the expe-
rience of the world. Consequently, biblical lan-
guage, and hence claims to reality, should be held
as universally valid. Conversely, liberal theolo-
gians rely on a more expressive-experiential under-
standing of the Christian faith. Liberal theologians
ground their claims to reality on the immediate
experience of religious feelings. From this experi-
ence, an individual believer is connected to a uni-
versal experience of moral value and truth that can
be abstracted from the text of the Bible.
By dichotomizing cognitive-propositional con-
servatism and expressive-experiential liberalism,
Lindbeck’s work offers postliberalism as a third
alternative situated in between these extremes: the
cultural-linguistic alternative. Postliberal theology
supports the claim that religious identities are his-
torically situated and culturally grounded. The
scriptural narrative is the source of meaning for the
postliberal Christian, shaping how the individual
believer understands biblical truth and participates
within the collective body of Christ. As such, doc-
trines should not be understood as universalistic
propositions of the nature of reality or as interpre-
tations of an abstracted universal religious experi-
ence. Instead, Lindbeck claimed that Christian
doctrines are akin to the rules of grammar—a
Postliberalism 593
linguistic experience of describing and making
sense of the world that is understood and shared
within a particular community. Postliberal theol-
ogy, then, is often referred to as narrative theology
because of this cultural and linguistic way of
understanding the individual’s relation to the
world.
Narrative Theology and Identity
The emphasis on narrative in postliberal theology
has significant implications for the formation and
maintenance of religious and cultural identity.
Postliberal theology presupposes that we are born
into particular languages with particular ways of
looking at the world. As such, our identities are
communally and historically shaped. Postliberalism
emphasizes the importance of tradition in the
shaping and the experiencing of thought, belief,
and communally held values.
Both the Christian historical and empirical com-
munities are of vital importance to the shaping of
individual and collective identity. The postliberal
Christian identifies with a faith that is both lived
and learned—faith emerges not solely from the
historical reality of biblical truths nor from the
abstracted experience of the individual, but instead
from the history of a narrative started long before
the individual and that continues to offer theoreti-
cal and pragmatic import. The identity of the
Christian community is derivative of an engage-
ment of the scriptural narrative with the language
that helps a given community to make sense of the
world.
As such, postliberal theologians believe that the
element of narrative is central to the unity of scrip-
ture. Biblical narrative needs to remain coherent
within the text itself, and it needs to lend cohesive-
ness with the experience of the reader with the
world. This is what postliberal theologians refer to
when they claim that truth is to be determined by
analogy. A narrative perspective of the Bible allows
significant elements of similarity and dissimilarity
between the Word and its object, or the text of the
Bible and the referent within the world of experi-
ence. Simply put, faith in biblical truth is insepara-
bly linked to the communal and individual
experience of the world.
Postliberal theology points out that we live
within a living community of memory and faith.
594 Pragmatics
Christian identities are shaped by the ability to live
the narrative of Christ consistently, ever attentive to
the ebb and flow of temporal linguistic existence.
Celeste Grayson Seymour
See also Narratives; Religious Identity
Further Readings
DeHart, P. (2006). The trial of the witnesses: The rise
and fall of postliberal theology. London: Blackwell.
Dorrien, G. (2001, July 4–11). The origins of
postliberalism. Christian Century, pp. 16–21.
Hauerwas, S., & Jones, L. G. (1989). Why narrative?
Readings in narrative theology. Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans.
Lindbeck, G. (1984). The nature of doctrine: Religion
and theology in a postliberal age. Philadelphia:
Westminster Press.
Poststructuralism
See Modernity and Postmodernity
Pragmatics
The discipline of linguistics is classically divided
according to three distinct fields of inquiry. First,
there is syntax: the study of grammar, or the rules
of proper sentence construction. Second, there is
semantics: the study of meaning, or conceptual
content. Third, there is pragmatics: the study of
language use, or the relationship between speak-
ers and words in social contexts. Both syntax and
semantics seek to explicate their respective subject
matter without reference to social, cultural, and
historical circumstances. Thus, a syntactic or
semantic analysis seeks in principle to study the
formal or universal features of language.
Pragmatics is different in that it pays attention to
speakers and the way they use words in socially
particular settings to achieve different goals, the
kinds of goals that require communicating with
others. It has been said that pragmatics is the
study of those questions that semantics is ill
equipped to answer. For example, how is it pos-
sible that a speaker can say one thing, but mean
something else, as in the case of sarcasm or a
polite hint? Pragmatics examines the social and
cultural conventions that permit these and other
types of speech phenomena. Among the principal
topics of pragmatic inquiry are deixis, presupposi-
tion, conversational implicature, and speech acts.
Pragmatic inquiry considers the role of context
and language use in identity construction and
maintenance. Identity of self and other is shaped
by speech phenomena as contextualized by social,
cultural, and historical forces.
Deixis
The meanings of certain utterances depend on
their contexts of use. The deictic elements of an
utterance vary with such contexts. Deictic elements
are primarily of three types: person, spatial, and
temporal. Person deixis is itself divided into three
subtypes: first person (e.g., “I”), second person
(e.g., “you”), and third person (e.g., “she”).
Depending on which language one speaks, per-
sonal pronouns can be either singular or plural and
the use of either depends partly on cultural prac-
tice. Thus, in modern English, it is not customary
to employ the first person plural pronoun we when
referring to oneself. There is also no second person
plural pronoun in formal English. (“You people”
would be an exception in informal English.) On
the other hand, in French, as in many other lan-
guages, it is customary to employ the second per-
son plural pronoun vous when speaking to a
person of a higher social status or rank. The use of
personal pronouns can thus communicate infor-
mation not otherwise apparent in the literal form
of an utterance.
Person deixis can also be used to send an indi-
rect, but firm, message. A parent, for example,
might employ a third-person pronoun when speak-
ing about a child present in the room, as in (1):
  (1) Billy can’t play until he finishes his home-
work.
Spatial deixis employs terms such as this, that,
here, and there to indicate physical as well as psy-
chological location and distance. Utterances

employing spatial deictic terms might communi-
cate directionality as well as location, as in (2):
  (2) Move this box over there.
Alternatively, an utterance might employ the term
there to identify an abstract entity, as in (3):
  (3) Now, there’s a great plan.
The term where, ordinarily used in reference to a
physical location, might also be used to indicate a
psychological state of mind, as in (4):
  (4) Where are you right now? You seem like
you’re on another planet.
Spatial deixis communicates information, often
quite vital to the meaning of an utterance, which
cannot always be extracted by semantic analysis
alone.
Temporal deixis employs terms such as now,
then, this, and next to indicate events in the past,
present, or future. Certain temporal deictic terms,
such as past, might refer to a previous unit of time,
as in (5).
  (5) This past week was exciting.
Temporal deictic terms vary from language to lan-
guage and idiom to idiom. Phrases such as in the
old days, once upon a time, and at some point are
culturally specific and do not have literal parallels
in every language. Moreover, certain temporal
deictic terms, such as could or would, are liable to
be misinterpreted unless a historical context is
made explicit, as in (6a) and (6b).
(6a) I could run a five-minute mile.
(6b) I would watch all of his movies.
Only in the light of a historical context can (6a) and
(6b) be interpreted as referring to past conduct.
Presupposition
The meaning of certain utterances hinges on a
background of facts and assumptions known by
Pragmatics 595
the speaker and the audience. Implicit appeal to
this background is known as presupposition. It is
possible to extract, or make explicit, a presupposi-
tion from an utterance. For example, (1b) may be
extracted from (1a):
(1a) Peter changed the tires on his car.
(1b) Peter has a car.
Presuppositions can be of several different
types. Existential presuppositions assume that a
person or thing exists by virtue of a statement
made about a person or thing. A statement about
the hairstyle of the king of France, for example,
presupposes that the king of France exists. Lexical
presuppositions imply a change in a state of affairs,
such that two propositional statements can be used
interchangeably. Thus, (2a) and (2b) can be used
interchangeably:
(2a) Alice is now awake.
(2b) Alice was sleeping.
Structural presuppositions are assumed by vir-
tue of the form of certain types of sentences. The
prime example of such types of sentence is that of
a question. A question in the form of (3a) presup-
poses the content of (3b):
(3a) Why did Peter leave the house?
(3b) Peter left the house.
Nonfactive presuppositions assume that some
state of affairs is not the case. Nonfactive presup-
positions typically feature terms that indicate a
hypothetical scenario. Thus, from (4a), one can
infer (4b):
(4a) Kate wishes she didn’t have any homework.
(4b) Kate has homework.
Taken together, these presuppositions—existential,
lexical, structural, and nonfactive—are classified
as potential presuppositions, an umbrella category
referring to presuppositions that remain inopera-
tive unless activated by conversation.
596 Pragmatics
Cooperation and Conversational Implicature
All conversations require a basic degree of trust
between speakers. Without this basic degree of trust,
no human community would be able to survive.
Often, even between enemies, some degree of trust is
evident in conversation. In pragmatics, such trust is
referred to as cooperation. When speakers accept,
wittingly or unwittingly, the presuppositions embed-
ded in each other’s utterances, they may be said to
be cooperating with one another. For example, if
one stranger asks another for the time and is told
what time it is, each can be said to assume that the
other is familiar with the concept of time. Likewise,
consider an exchange between two enemies, in
which one utters (1) and the other utters (2).
(1) Where is the money?
(2) I will never tell you where the money is.
Even though the two are enemies, each presup-
poses that the other is familiar with the concept of
money. If such basic and minimal cooperation is
required for an intelligible exchange between ene-
mies, it is all the more important in the exchange
between friends, family members, and colleagues.
The philosopher H. Paul Grice has proposed what
he calls the cooperative principle, a norm implicit
in ordinary conversations: Make your conversa-
tional contribution such as is required, at the stage
at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which you are
engaged. Grice has also proposed a set of maxims
grouped under four categories:
1. Quantity
a. Make your contribution as informative as is
required (for the current purposes of the
exchange).
b. Do not make your contribution more infor-
mative than is required.
2. Quality
a. Do not say what you believe to be false.
b. Do not say that for which you lack adequate
evidence.
3. Relevance
a. Be relevant
4. Manner
a. Avoid obscurity of expression.
b. Avoid ambiguity.
c. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
d. Be orderly.
Related to cooperation is Grice’s concept of
conversational implicature. Often, we mean more
than what we say. This additional meaning can be
both implicit and intended. This is the case with
sarcasm. When one, for example, utters (1), he or
she might really mean (2):
(1) I just love hearing my neighbor talk about
his endless problems.
(2) I don’t like hearing my neighbor talk about
his endless problems.
Although the concept of implicature at first seems
rather simple and straightforward, it has nonethe-
less generated considerable controversy and debate
among specialists in pragmatics.
Speech Acts
Although utterances convey information, they can
also constitute the performance of an act, the type
of act that would not be possible if not for the
exchange of words between speakers. The concept
of a speech act was first formulated by the philoso-
pher J. L. Austin and later further developed and
expanded by the philosopher John Searle. Speech-
act theory brings to light a wide range of phenom-
ena associated with human speech.
Consider the example of a court trial, during
which a lawyer utters the words, “Objection, your
Honor.” The lawyer would have invoked a stan-
dard type of utterance appropriate for those occu-
pying a certain role within a certain institutional
setting. The lawyer’s utterance would carry weight
and force by virtue of his or her institutional sta-
tus. If, conversely, a member of the audience had
similarly uttered, “Objection, your Honor,” the
literal meaning would be the same, but the utter-
ance would lack force by virtue of the audience
member’s lack of the requisite institutional status.
This type of force is referred to in speech-act the-
ory as illocutionary force. Although two utterances

might consist of the same words, the pragmatic
significance of each depends on the social and insti-
tutional context. If, after hearing the lawyer’s objec-
tion, the judge were to respond by uttering the
words, “Objection sustained,” the lawyer can be
said to have achieved his or her desired result. This
would be known as the perlocutionary effect.
Certain speech acts are aimed at bringing about
such effects, though they are not always successful.
Speech acts are not limited to formal institu-
tional settings. They may be performed in casual
conversational settings as well. For example, if, in
response to a compliment, one were to say, “Why,
thank you,” one would have performed a speech
act. It is common in such exchanges for the com-
plimenting party to acknowledge this expression
of gratitude with a supplementary utterance like,
“You’re welcome.” Conversations often feature
performative utterances such as these, in which
there is a conventional order by which such utter-
ances are performed. It would be out of place,
for example, to say, “You’re welcome,” before
someone says, “Thank you.” When speech acts
follow a standard social or cultural conven-
tional order, they are felicitous. Those that do
not are infelicitous.
Speech-act theory has attracted a great deal of
attention in the study of law, ethics, literary theory,
and cultural studies. In a sense, it represents the
cutting edge in the study of pragmatics. Because of
its explanatory power and broad appeal, speech-
act theory has been adopted by a wide range of
thinkers and put to various uses, some more prom-
inent than others. Perhaps the most famous use of
speech-act theory has been the universal pragmat-
ics of the German philosopher and social theorist
Jürgen Habermas. According to Habermas, uni-
versal norms embedded within the use of language
provide a communicative foundation for a demo-
cratic conception of justice.
A similar, albeit far more complex, argument
has been made by the U.S. philosopher Robert
Brandom. According to Brandom, language use
must be understood as an inferential practice. That
is, to engage in conversation is to be suitably
caught up in the language game of giving and ask-
ing for reasons. Brandom’s argument has received
widespread attention because of his persuasive
contention that semantics ought to be collapsed
Profanity and Slang 597
into pragmatics, a move that has been termed the
use-theory of meaning.
Jason Hannan
See also Communication Competence; Discourse;
Performativity of Gender; Rhetoric; Sapir-Whorf
Hypothesis; Semantics; Semiotics
Further Readings
Austin, J. L. (1976). How to do things with words
(2nd ed., J. O. Urmson & M. Sbisà, Eds.). Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press.
Brandom, R. (1994). Making it explicit: Reasoning,
representing, and discursive commitment. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole &
J. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and semantics: Vol. 3.
Speech acts. New York: Academic Press.
Habermas, J. (2001). On the pragmatics of social
interaction: Preliminary studies in the theory of
communicative action (B. Fultner, Trans.). Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Levinson, S. C. (1993). Pragmatics. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
May, J. (1993). Pragmatics: An introduction. Malden,
MA: Blackwell.
Searle, J. (1969). Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy
of language. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Yule, G. (1996). Pragmatics. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Profanity and Slang
Profanity and slang are two derivatives from
established lexicons that occur in most known
languages. They both originate from subcultures
and are often viewed as assertions of the rebel-
lious. Profanity includes spoken indecencies and
gestures that are considered rude, vulgar, insult-
ing, abusive, and offensive; it includes largely irrev-
erent speech or action that causes the majority
of a society’s members to feel disturbed. Slang
refers to words and terms from a subculture of
society that assists in the evolution of language by
adding to its vocabulary. This lexical adaptation
598 Profanity and Slang
occurs through established words being short-
ened, known terms being assigned nontradi-
tional definitions, and the incorporation of foreign
words. Profanity and slang are both derivatives
from existing lexicons and are common in most
spoken languages. Profanity and slang reflect iden-
tity and the linguistic changes of a society. Language
is ever changing through the metamorphosis of its
lexicons.
Western profanity has its historical origins in
statements made against the church. These state-
ments were defined as profane; such declarations
were interpreted as being opposed to God, thereby
blasphemy. The term profanity grew to include
words not in favor of the church and God, as well
as any avowals that could not be said in church.
Religious oaths and swearing were also considered
profanity; one was not to swear or promise in the
name of God.
This blasphemous swearing of oaths was chiefly
used by the lower class of English society and was
eventually incorporated into use for lesser situa-
tions and personal insults. As the language adapted
to fit the lives of the users, blasphemous statements
became individual damnations and expletives for
emotional states. What was once thought of as the
strong language of the rebellious heretic is now
overlooked as cursing of the provoked. For exam-
ple, the swear phrase God damn originally was
calling for God’s damnation on the speaker’s foe.
Over time, the phrase became a simple expression
of an altered state, “God damn it, the Bears lost.”
The modern-day usage of profanity occurs more
during social interactions between people, than
during oaths between God and one person.
Modern profanity appears in agitating phrases
and physical motions. These unsettling verbaliza-
tions and gestures are often racist, scatological
(related to human waste functions), sexist, deroga-
tory, and sexual in nature. Profanity in its current
form is universally human in nature. The profane
renaming of copulation as well as the anatomy
employed in the sexual act is worldwide, although
individual cultures have different profane names
for the act and genitalia.
Profane physical gestures as well as verbal pro-
fanity are part of most human languages. One
profane gesture appears to cross most social bor-
ders: the flipping of the bird. The prone, extended
middle finger incites unrest globally. The “finger”
has made its appearance throughout history; the
Greeks used it for a phallic symbol in theater. The
Romans incorporated it for the same purpose;
however, the use spread from the theatre to an
emperor who forced citizens to kiss him on his
middle finger rather than the back of his hand. In
the mid-1600s, the finger was included in sign lan-
guage as a severe insult.
Slang’s recorded origin began in the lowest social
economic caste in England; it was a tabooed deriva-
tive from the established British vocabulary. What
made and makes slang taboo or considered rebel-
lious is the change it brings to established standards
of language. The ruling class of England did not
want its spoken language altered in any form. To
this point, early recorded slang was titled the
English Criminal Cant. Many of the subcultures
that develop slang were or are on the outside of
society’s mainstream. For example, U.S. slang
sprouts from jazz musicians, rap artists, the free
love era of the 1960s, drug culture, gangs, and so
forth. Slang is often produced by groups outside of
the mainstream of society that are struggling for a
voice.
Subcultures often use known terms and assign
nontraditional definitions to them. Members of
the free love era changed the meaning of the word
dig. Its customary meaning was to turn up soil.
The free love era included understanding as part of
its definition; to dig meant to understand. Here, an
established word took on new significance because
of a subculture’s usage.
Slang marks membership to a particular subcul-
ture. The altered usage and coinage of phrases
allow a group to be unique, which is important to
subculture identity. The term homey was largely
used by gang members as a reference to a person
living in the same area. The term’s formal defini-
tion is a characteristic of home. The term homey
being used only by those of that subculture identi-
fied the user as a member. This sharing of an
altered language helps bond a subculture.
The spoken slang of a subculture differs greatly
from jargon. Jargon consists of terms used in a par-
ticular trade such as plumbers or electricians. Slang
is also pointedly different from dialect that is based
on social, geographical, and regional varieties in
language, which include colloquialisms, and it is
notably different than slogans that can be linked to
marketing campaigns and jingles. In current media,

modern slang is incorporated in many ad cam-
paigns and jingles.
Slang is an important part of the evolution of
language causing the growth of it lexicons. Through
the subculture’s usage, slang spirals upward to the
mainstream. For example, the word cool devel-
oped its slang etymology from the subculture of
jazz musicians. Cool, a word whose denotation
refers to temperature, took on the connotation of
being reserved and not excitable, and commonly
thought of as popular or in style.
Slang has also been used to exclude outsiders
from a subculture by changing the meanings and
pronunciation of established words; many groups
code their language. This coding is particularly
common among the drug cultures that may fear
police involvement within their group. A fre-
quently used word such as buzz takes on an
entirely different connotation within the drug cul-
ture. The definition changes from the sound made
by insect wings to an altered state of consciousness
brought on through a narcotic.
Tony Lindsay
See also Dialect; Language Development; Language Loss;
Semantics; Style/Diction
Further Readings
Burke, W. J. (1965). The literature of slang. Detroit, MI:
Gale Research.
Lighter, J. E. (Ed.). (1994). Historical dictionary of
American slang. New York: Random House.
Major, C. (1990). Juba to jive: A dictionary of African
American slang. New York: Penguin.
Thorne, T. (1990). The dictionary of contemporary slang.
New York: Pantheon.
Propaganda
A contemporary reading of the persuasive power
of propaganda confronts the deliberate attempt to
shape the perceptions, thinking, and behavior of
others through a systematic use of language, rit-
ual, and images. The manipulation of perceptions,
thinking, and behavior is premeditated to accom-
plish a purpose—working to shape identities that
Propaganda 599
are inclined to respond favorably to, or in affilia-
tion with, the desired intent of the propagandist.
The propagandist’s desire to shape identities is
inherently political, serving both in the original
case and in the modern era to secure and extend a
base of power and influence across social arenas.
Originally, however, the term propaganda
derived from a missionary body called the Sacra
Congregatio de Propaganda Fide or, the Sacred
Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith,
established in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV. This
body was charged with fostering the spread of the
Catholic faith to the New World and with reviving
and strengthening the Roman Catholic Church in
Europe as a means of countering the threat posed
by the success of the Protestant revolution. However,
although the origin of our modern usage of the
word propaganda is derived from a benign mis-
sionary effort by a committee of cardinals in service
to a religious intent, an important aspect of that
intent was to propagate the widespread demonstra-
tion of the Catholic identity with all of its accom-
panying ritual social interaction, liturgical language,
ecclesiastical costuming, and ceremonial visuality.
The principal intent of propaganda is to per-
suade a desired social behavior by influencing the
opinions of large numbers of people, either by the
omission or obfuscation of information or the fab-
rication of a useful fiction or misinformation that
elicits the desired response. The original proselytiz-
ing intent of propaganda is revisited by any secular
organization or institution employing similar tech-
niques for manipulating opinion and injecting the
memes of particular beliefs through any medium
into the thinking of potential acolytes within its
sphere of influence. Thus, those who are schooled
in the propaganda of a political belief, public pol-
icy, or sociocultural norm are also schooled for the
purpose of perpetuating a regime of influence.
In the polyglot visual culture of the modern and
postmodern eras, the regimes of influence that
shape social identities and individual behavior
have gone global with propaganda being employed
in everything from media product advertisement to
political campaigns to Olympics competitions. For
example, the intent to caricature one group of
people as insignificant, foolish, or dangerous in the
eyes of another group of people is often executed
by the act of stereotyping. Propagandists may pro-
duce their caricatures willingly, as in the malicious
600 Propaganda
stereotypes of identity that were first conceived in
the minds of demagogues before being unleashed
as propaganda to the embrace of an overzealous or
bigoted populace. Or, regimes of influence may
produce their caricatures unthinkingly, simply cre-
ating en masse the thin experience that a dominant
and generally homogenous sociocultural group has
had in interfacing with its local minorities.
Stereotyped imagery, fraught with omissions about
the familiarities to be found in the lives of those
being targeted as abnormal, is one means of con-
stituting the power of visual regimes to shape indi-
vidual and social identities.
Most widespread, albeit with varying themes
from one social group to another, is the propa-
ganda of normalcy that cultivates the desirability of
a normal identity in the public opinion by system-
atically stigmatizing alternative behaviors and
appearances. Because behavior patterns are fair
predictors of future behaviors, the manipulation of
public behavior patterns—such as legislated penal-
ties for nonconformity to the U.S. “ugly laws” of
the 19th and 20th centuries that made it illegal for
persons with deformities to be in public—public
school curricula employing stigmatizing narratives
and texts, the advertisement of a desirable standard
of behavior and appearance and social rewards for
adherence to those models, and the segregation of
deviants and undesirables into marginalized social
arenas, communities, and vocational tracks have
served as tools in stabilizing the norms that Western
societies continue to hold central.
There are many historical instances around the
world of the propagandistic advertisement, legisla-
tion, or enforced conformity of a desirable stan-
dard behavior and appearance, but perhaps none
so common as occurs in the institutionalized com-
mon schooling of youngsters. Education is often
seen in both the West and the East as an important
structure for maintaining a unified national, cul-
tural, and linguistic identity, the sanctity of which
is a major pretense of the propaganda of normal-
ity. The European child-study movement of the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, which extended
its sphere of influence to U.S. educational philoso-
phy and practice, first coalesced around the belief
that an ideal educational practice could manufac-
ture an ideal citizen and serve as a curative for the
ills of society. Scientific beliefs about the develop-
ment of humans suggested that youngsters grew in
stages similar to all other biological organisms;
consequently, the psychological development of
the young was expected to be a recapitulation of
what has come to be understood as an evolution-
ary model. Science and evolutionary theory were
conflated into a propaganda of normality that
medicalized certain parts of society as unclean and
a near-biological threat to the survival of a unified
national, cultural, and linguistic identity. Common
schooling was thus intended as a systemized and
purifying contravention to the urban influx of chil-
dren from the laboring and maligned lower classes
of society viewed as the implicit carriers of poten-
tial depravity and dissolution.
Based on a persistent conceptualization of Native
American communities as childlike, the U.S.
Congress enacted the Civilization Act in 1819,
implementing into policy the propagandistic use of
tribal schools as a means of social control intended
to further manipulate the destiny of Native Americans
and ensure their continued subservience to the
homogeneous ideal inherent in a European American
national identity. With the same resolve as the
Roman Catholic Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda
Fide centuries earlier, Protestant churches inthe
United States organized to civilize Native Americans
by sending in missionary educators intent on convert-
ing Native American tribal groups from “foreigners”
and “heathens” to good Christians.
To fundamentally alter the traditions that consti-
tuted and supported the authentic demonstration
of the varying Native American social identities,
events in missionary and tribal schools both per-
formed and ritualized the visual iconology of the
dominant Anglo-American culture. Educators for-
bade the speaking of non-English languages, as
well as the wearing of traditional clothing and
ceremonial costumes, and forced students to adopt
the cultural norms prescribed in a pro-Anglo-
American curriculum emphasizing patriotism and
fealty to the U.S. government. Once they were
replaced by tribal schools, tribal governments
raised the flag of the United States. Students were
compelled to pledge allegiance to their conquerors
and participate in patriotic exercises and celebra-
tions of U.S. national holidays and heroes.
Whether propaganda is aimed at the deliberate
omission or obfuscation of the information that
once informed identity or at the fabrication of a
useful fiction or misinformation that generates the

environment for new identity, it must be reckoned
with as a formidable tool in the sociopolitical con-
struction of identity.
James Haywood Rolling Jr.
See also Language; Rituals; Socialization
Further Readings
Baker, B. M. (2001). In perpetual motion: Theories of
power, educational history, and the child. New York:
Peter Lang.
Jowett, G. S., & O’Donnell, V. (1999). Propaganda and
persuasion. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Nandy, A. (1983). The intimate enemy: The loss and
recovery of self under colonialism. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Spring, J. (2001). The American school: 1642–2000
(5th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Psychology of
Self and Identity
The study of self and identity has a long and sto-
ried history in the field of psychology. William
James began the discussion by commenting on the
distinctions between the I and Me at the beginning
of the field. Since then, the study of self and iden-
tity has exploded into one of the more researched
topics within psychology. However, the discussion
of the self did not begin with the field of psychol-
ogy; it began long before that time. In the begin-
ning, the self was considered to be a simple and
uninteresting concept—people were not much
aware of themselves and their thoughts. Over the
centuries, people’s view of the self has morphed
from this basic view into a complex, multifaceted
structure that operates at a level that the individual
does not always perceive. This evolution of self
was made possible by philosophic and technologi-
cal advances throughout human history that begged
to be applied to how people viewed the self.
The self as conceptualized in modern times is
capable of much more than simply being a physical
being within space, as was once conceived in medi-
eval Europe. As viewed today, the self comprises
three aspects, which are linked to a person’s ability
Psychology of Self and Identity 601
to assess his or her identity. The first major aspect
of the self is reflexive consciousness. In the most
basic terms, reflexive consciousness refers to an
individual’s ability to be self-aware. Second, the self
is capable of being an interpersonal being where
information of the self is gained from interactions
with others. Because people do not exist in a social
vacuum, it is important that individuals be able to
define who they are with reference to those around
them. Finally, the self is capable of executive func-
tioning. This is the most complex and least under-
stood of the three aspects but allows the self to act
upon the world by expressing choices and decisions
that interplay with the world around an individual.
These three aspects allow an individual to express
his or her identity as expressions of the self.
People are able to express identity based on two
primary sources of information: information from
within and information beyond. Identity from
within is based heavily on the component of the
reflexive consciousness within the self. Here, people
draw a sense of identity from information about
their own beings through mood, self-knowledge,
and expectations. Gaining identity from beyond is
based heavily on the interpersonal aspect of self
where information from others is used to gain infor-
mation about the self. Of note, because the self is
capable of gathering information from others to
create an identity, identity can come from interac-
tions with others, or the perception of others, on a
one-on-one basis as well as from larger conglomera-
tions of people, such as groups and organizations.
This entry focuses on how aspects of the self
allow individuals to take information from multi-
ple sources to create identities. The sources of
identity considered here are information within,
information from the other, and information from
the collective. The information that is provided by
these three sources may not always produce a con-
sistent identity between the sources or within any
one source. Inconsistencies may arise, so mecha-
nisms to create a coherent sense of self from these
potentially differing identities exist. These mecha-
nisms are discussed throughout the entry and in
the final portion of the entry.
Individual Self: Identity From the Person
The individual self is responsible for individuals’
own beliefs about who they are and their evaluations
602 Psychology of Self and Identity
of these identities. Using information available to
the individual, a person can try to understand who
he or she is solely on this internal information.
Before looking to the rest of the world for useful
information about identity, people look inward, at
the self, to make their own determinations about
the person they are in the world.
To identify with anything, people must first be
aware that they are capable of such action. Self-
awareness is the ability a person has to focus on
the self in some manner or another and then to
compare it with some standard. Unfortunately,
simply becoming aware of the self usually leads to
people realizing there is some shortcoming between
what they are and the standard of comparison.
This creates a great deal of tension in the individual
that must somehow be reduced. For example, self-
discrepancy theory argues that people have three
selves that are used for comparative purposes:
actual self, ideal self, and ought self. The actual self
is the actual perception of the individual. The ideal
self is what the individual wants to be like, and the
ought self is something the person should be, usu-
ally based on some moral grounding. When actual–
ideal and actual–ought discrepancies are made
apparent, the individual is driven to reduce the
emotional distress caused by these inconsistent
self-conceptions. Different emotional responses are
likely to occur based on the type of self-discrepancy
that is experienced. Regardless of the emotional
response, though, this is a negative experience that
must be dealt with because people want to main-
tain a positive sense of self. The cognitive disso-
nance theory states that a person will go through
any number of options to reduce tension created
by inconsistencies, including changing behavior,
changing thoughts, finding alternative informa-
tion, creating new cognitions, or simply ignoring
the inconsistency, though this does not effectively
address the issue at hand. Based on this, people are
motivated to reduce this uncomfortable tension,
which is assisted by seeking self-knowledge.
Self-knowledge can be sought from any number
of places and is used to create self-schemata that
help dictate attitudes and behaviors. Self-schemata
are generalizations a person holds about the self
that come from past experience. These are used to
organize and process information about the self so
people understand who they are and how they
should behave in different social settings. Each
self-schema has only a certain piece of information
or belief related to it, so different self-schemata can
be activated in different situations. Interestingly,
the information that is sought to create these self-
schemata is not exhaustive. People have a tendency
to seek specific types of information about who
they are, which are driven by three motives:
appraisal, self-verification, and self-enhancement.
Appraisal motives focus on gaining information
that is valid and accurate. Self-verification motives
lead people to seek information that confirms the
beliefs they already hold. Finally, self-enhancement
motives direct people toward information that
makes the individual seem positive. Based on this
motive, favorable new information about the self
is sought as is information that disconfirms nega-
tive self-knowledge.
Research has shown that a hierarchy exists
among these three knowledge-seeking motives that
dictates the type of self-knowledge that is actually
sought. Though seeking valid and accurate infor-
mation would seem most useful and beneficial to
understanding the self, this is by far the least
important type of information sought. The most
important information people seem to seek is self-
enhancing in nature, followed by self-verifying
information. This creates a situation where people
are seeking information that is positive or, at least,
disconfirming of negative information about the
self. This is then maintained because people then
seek information that is going to verify what they
already believe. If people originally collect infor-
mation about the self that is self-enhancing, a cycle
is created to focus only on this type of information.
In essence, people only want to hear information
that is positive about the self and deflect negative
information. The ability to seek certain types of
information rather than others implies the ability
to self-regulate. This means the self is capable of
monitoring its own status at any given moment
and acting on the status, if necessary. Essentially,
self-regulation gives the self a constantly recycling
flow of information that can be acted on in the
following process: test, operate, test, exit. Basically,
the self is capable of recognizing a shortcoming
between actual and either ideal or ought, it can
attempt to do something to fix this, it can then
check to see if the action taken fixed the problem,
and it can then either stop if the problem was dealt
with or go back to the beginning until a solution is

reached. Again, self-regulation allows people to
realize if there are discrepancies that may threaten
a positive sense of self, which then allows them to
seek new information. Fortunately for the sense of
self, people have a tendency to seek information
that is self-enhancing rather than information that
may be accurate.
Considering that people generally seek positive
self-knowledge, research has shown that in the
United States, people generally do not score below
average on scales of self-esteem, which is the evalu-
ative measure of the self in terms of ability and
worth. This means people generally have a positive
evaluation of who they are. It is important to dis-
tinguish between the two types of self-esteem that
are found in the literature. Trait self-esteem repre-
sents the general outlook a person holds about his
or her self, on average. This is believed to be a
relatively stable construct. However, state self-
esteem tends to fluctuate between situations
because it is assessing self-worth and ability on a
contingent basis. Discussions of low and high self-
esteem, then, are relative in nature on a scale that
goes from moderate to high and that normally is
assessing trait self-esteem. This is still not an arbi-
trary distinction because low self-esteem has con-
tinually shown negative outcomes on a number of
variables compared with those who have relatively
higher self-esteem.
A major explanation for the existence of self-
esteem comes from the sociometer hypothesis.
Based on this conception, self-esteem serves as an
indicator of social inclusion, with fluctuations indi-
cating an increase or decrease in how likely an indi-
vidual is be included by others. Lowered self-esteem
would drive people to identify and change whatever
issue is leading to this decrease in positive self-
regard. Generally speaking, the sociometer asserts
that self-esteem can be considered analogously to a
gas tank meter in a car. Trait self-esteem could be
considered the average miles per gallon a car gets
during its lifetime. The gauge that fluctuates during
a specific drive would be analogous to the state self-
esteem of an individual. An alternative explanation,
terror management theory, asserts that self-esteem
developed as a way to buffer against thoughts of
mortality. Because people are self-aware, they have
the ability to explore the possibility of their own
deaths, which is a discomforting feeling. Self-esteem
works to reduce these unpleasant feelings. Even
Psychology of Self and Identity 603
though each explanation for the functional purpose
of self-esteem is drastically different, both operate
within the bounds of the psychology of self and
identity; both theories address the issue of reducing
discomfort from information that is threatening to
the positive self-image.
Regardless the reason for the development of
self-esteem, the result is that people seem designed
to view the self in a generally positive light. The abil-
ity to ruminate on the internal happenings of an
individual offers a situation where discomfort may
be created because of disconnects between actual
self and either ideal or ought self that put pressure
on the desire to maintain a positive sense of self.
Discomfort may also arise from a shift in self-
esteem, which has been argued to be a measure of
inclusion or as a buffer against fear of death. This
pressure demands the attention of the individual
and it somehow must be dealt with, which is where
information from other people becomes useful
because it may help alleviate this tension if self-
enhancing and self-verifying information are
sought.
Relational Self: Identity From the Other
Social comparison theory argues that people look
to others to gain information about themselves
through their abilities and attitudes. Through these
comparisons with others, people gain an under-
standing of their relative standing and whether
their abilities and attitudes are acceptable or
whether work must be done to bring them into a
consonant state. This is an important consider-
ation when looking at self and identity because
people gain information from others to understand
who they are as persons. Importantly though,
people will not simply choose any person to com-
pare with because this could offer potentially dam-
aging information if comparisons with the wrong
person are made. Ideally, people seek out others
who are similar in ability or belief to make com-
parisons because the information gathered from
this person would be most useful when compared
with information from someone who is much bet-
ter or worse in ability or beliefs. This relational self
creates identities based on the interpersonal inter-
actions an individual has with others and gathers
important information about the self from these
interactions.
604 Psychology of Self and Identity
When considering the role others play regarding
self and identity, the issue of self-presentation must
be considered. Self-presentation is where people
will change their attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors to
make an impression on another individual. The
reason behind this manipulation falls into one of
two categories, including strategic motives and
expressive motives. Strategic motives are meant to
get others to go along with a certain position or
belief the individual holds, which follows the self-
verification motive of self-knowledge seeking. In
this instance, the individual is concerned with
what the other thinks and is attempting to gain
some benefit. However, expressive motives focus
on presenting an identity that is desirable to the
individual in terms of who he or she wants to be
or should be in his or her mind. The concern in
expressive self-presentation is with the beliefs of
the individual, and there is an attempt to get valida-
tion of the presented identity from others. Expressive
motives of self-presentation operate under the self-
enhancement motive of self-knowledge seeking
because the individual is attempting to validate an
identity he or she holds.
Another important consideration in under-
standing the influence of others stems from research
on symbolic interactionist theory. This theory
claims that people do not have any understanding
of who they are without gaining information from
other people. As information begins to gather,
people gain a clearer picture of themselves.
Unfortunately, the correlation between what oth-
ers believe about the individual and the individual’s
own self-beliefs are weak. Again, if people are
operating under the belief that they are subjectively
good in their own eyes, other people may not see
these attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors as such. An
outsider could easily view the actions of an indi-
vidual as negative, even though that individual
may see his or her own actions as positive. Also, if
a person does see his or her own actions as nega-
tive, such as an actual–ideal discrepancy, others
may be operating under expressive motives to
present themselves as polite so they may not agree
that there is a discrepancy. That said, research has
shown that there is a strong correlation between
the beliefs people have about their selves and what
they believe other people think of them. In essence,
people are making a cohesive picture of who they
are in their own minds by believing that others
have similar beliefs about who they are. People are
not necessarily seeking valid and accurate informa-
tion as dictated by the appraisal principle, but
rather, they are seeking information that confirms
their previous beliefs, which is self-verifying that
they are good persons.
Research on the self-fulfilling prophecy supports
the view that the person’s belief of what the other
person thinks is what matters. According to the
self-fulfilling prophecy, people’s false beliefs can
become true by influencing their behaviors. For
example, if students think that their teacher hates
them, they will act negatively when they interact
with that teacher. This causes the teacher to per-
ceive that the students do not like the teacher, who
might then reciprocate the negative interaction—
thus confirming the students’ belief that the teacher
does not like them. If the student does poorly in
this class, instead of being the fault of the individ-
ual, the individual can still believe he or she is
smart, and that the problem is the fault of the
antagonistic relationship with the teacher. This
allows the self to be maintained in a cohesive,
positive manner. This phenomenon stresses the
importance of people seeking consistency in how
they see themselves, and this is generally a positive
belief.
Individuals are also capable of taking in infor-
mation from other people, especially those who
are close to them, and using it to their own advan-
tage. For example, people are capable of basking
in reflected glory (BIRG), where a person will
enjoy in the successes and failures of close others,
as if these were his or her own. A sense of pride is
gained from a close partner when the partner suc-
ceeds at something that is not a competitive
domain of the two people involved. Interestingly, if
the other succeeds at a task that is a competitive
domain of the two people, the individual may
retreat from being associated with that other
because he or she realizes that he or she now looks
relatively worse in comparison. This affects the
individual’s positive sense of who he or she is and
acts as a buffer against such feelings. Also, pro-
cesses such as downward social comparison facili-
tate finding information that maintains a positive
self-schema. In downward social comparison,
people will look to those who are in a worse situ-
ation than their own to make themselves relatively
look better.

By being interpersonal creatures, people have
the ability to use information from others, factual
or believed, to gain a clearer picture of who they
are in the world and solidify their positive self-
schemata. This shows that the self is not simply a
static entity but pulls in information from the
world around the self to help make identities that
are cohesive with the general worldview of a posi-
tive self. Though the power of a relationship, per-
ceived or actual, with another individual is capable
of shaping identity, a conglomeration of people
also has the power to shape identity.
Collective Self: Identity From the Group
Collections of individuals play an important role
in developing identities for an individual. In many
instances, people can gain a sense of identity from
their groups and organizations because of shared
characteristics and interests between members,
which is known as the collective self. However,
there are also those groups that people do not
choose to join but are naturally grouped into based
on distinguishing characteristics resulting from
genetics, phenotype, and region (e.g., race, sex,
and nationality), which also are included in the
collective self. Regardless of the type of group
membership, the collections of people we associate
with offer a great deal of information when it
comes to self and identity.
When discussing the influence of groups on
identity, culture is something that is often discussed
in research settings because it can be such a perva-
sive source of influence. Culture can be considered
a set of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors that are
transmitted from one generation to the next that
dictate the manner in which individuals will
approach their world regarding their views of the
self and others. Individuals observe the people
around them to understand and express the atti-
tudes, beliefs, and behaviors their culture dictates.
Culture is something people experience from birth
and is constantly experienced based on how others
from that culture behave and interact with other
people. In an effort to maintain consistency between
actual–ought self-construals, individuals quickly
adopt these practices because it is expected that
people within a culture will abide by these rules;
not adopting these ideals can have serious negative
consequences for the individual, including potential
Psychology of Self and Identity 605
ostracism from the group. Within the psychology
literature, cultural considerations tend to focus on
the dimension of independence versus interdepen-
dence. Those cultures high in interdependence tend
to be classified as collectivist in nature, whereas
those low in interdependent tendencies are classi-
fied as individualist. Collectivist cultures tend to
have people who value the goals of the group over
those of the individual. This creates individuals
who have self-construals that are more likely to see
their membership in groups, especially kinship
groups, as the essence of their identity. In contrast,
people from individualist cultures tend to have self-
construals that favor the goals of the individual
over the group and will see their membership in
groups as an expression of their unique individual-
ity. This means that cultures offer different types of
identity for individuals within different cultural
contexts but put equal pressure to abide by the
norms and practices dictated by the self-construal
of the culture because it is such a pervasive entity.
From an evolutionary perspective, groups func-
tionally serve the purpose of increasing chances for
survival. However, psychologically, uncertainty
identity theory argues that groups offer a means to
reduce uncertainty for an individual because groups
offer a clear source of identity by dictating atti-
tudes, beliefs, and behaviors for group members.
According to social identity theory, people gain a
positive sense of self from the groups they identify
with because the group allows them to positively
distinguish themselves from other relevant groups,
which is operating on the self-enhancing motive
for individuals. These features have been shown to
exist in a vast range of group settings from the
completely artificial, using a minimal groups para-
digm, to those groups that are more natural set-
tings, such as culture and ethnicity. The larger the
distinction between the two groups is, the clearer
the group identity is for the members, which is
known as optimal distinctiveness theory. If a group
does not provide this distinction that produces a
positive sense of self, individuals can choose to
either leave the group or focus on some other
dimension where a positive distinction can be
made between groups.
Self-categorization theory argues that to attain
this optimal distinctiveness, groups have a pro-
cess in place to help members monitor their iden-
tity within the group to distinguish whether their
606 Psychology of Self and Identity
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors are still in line
with the group. Through the process of deperson-
alization, people no longer see themselves as
unique individuals but as members of the group
that share a fuzzy set of attributes, known as the
prototype, that define the group identity. This
definition is derived from both what the group is
and what the group is not. The attitudes, beliefs,
and behaviors of the group an individual is a part
of define this group (what the group is) but they
should also be clearly different from other groups
(what the group is not). This clear definition of
the group makes it easy to find information that
is self-verifying, if the group is important to the
individual and shares the group’s characteristics.
People within the group are then able to moni-
tor themselves and other group members by com-
parison with the prototype. By focusing on this
prototype, individuals within a group will examine
how the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors they hold
and that others hold compare with the prototype.
People who do not compare favorably with the
prototype are deemed outsiders to the group
because they blur the line between the ingroup and
outgroup. This is a problem for members within
the group because the strong distinction brings
about a positive sense of self (self-enhancement in
action) and people can easily self-verify if people
within the group all share the same characteristics.
A lack of a clear distinction creates tension that
has to be dealt with, which is why the offending
group member may be ostracized so that balance
and distinction may be restored. As the group
becomes more salient to an individual, the indi-
vidual’s identity becomes more closely tied to the
group identity, which leads the individual to be
more and more prototypical because losing this
source of identity would be threatening because it
raises uncertainty.
People are members of multiple groups, which
means they can garner identity from these various
memberships. Social identity complexity theory
argues that people are capable of maintaining mul-
tiple memberships in diverse groups, which is
analogous to having a diversified stock portfolio.
From this perspective, the strength of identity with
any one group can vary, with some memberships
being more or less central to the identity of an indi-
vidual, much like some stocks are more central to
a portfolio because there is a larger investment
with those. Similar to stock portfolios, some people
invest in companies that are simply subsidiaries of
a larger company whereas others choose to invest
in companies that are not at all related to each
other. Some people are members of groups that are
similar, not requiring much cognitive ability to
make sense of these group constellations. However,
people can also be members of groups that do not
overlap much in their norms and beliefs, which
requires more cognitive activity to make sense of
such a complex group constellation.
The self benefits from the complex memberships
because it is capable of losing group membership
without a big an impact on identity because the self
comprises multiple group identities that extend
across boundaries. Losing membership in a group
that is central to identity with low social identity
complexity is dangerous because all memberships
overlap heavily and all identities are central to an
individual’s self-concept. Relative to stock portfo-
lios, it is more secure to have investments spread
out across differing companies with not too much
money invested in any one company because this
diversity provides a safety net for invested money.
Investing money all in one stock is dangerous
because if it suffers, so does all invested money. For
social identity complexity, this lack of diversity will
have severe consequences for the individual because
the individual has lost a defining portion of the
self. However, the more diversified group member-
ship is for an individual, the easier it will be to
recover from such an impact.
Groups affect the identities people develop by
offering clarity to an uncertain world. These mem-
berships dictate attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors
that become central aspects of the self as the group
membership becomes more important to the indi-
vidual’s identity, allowing a great deal of self-
verification and self-enhancement. People are able
to derive identity from multiple sources, which can
be beneficial to the self because identity is not tied
to any one group. However, with individual, rela-
tional, and collective inputs for the identity of an
individual, the self must have mechanisms in place
to help make sense of these inputs to present a
cohesive self that is positively valued among the
many identities a person may juggle, even in a
single day.
 Psychology of Self and Identity 607

Creation of a Positive Self will either be left or a new level of comparison will
be created just so a positive comparison between
People have a tendency to attribute their own fail-
groups can be made that assist the self-enhancement
ures to the circumstance, whereas the failures of
motives of the individual. Within any group, there
others are attributed to the individual. People
are pressures to conform to the norms and prac-
assume their failures are the fault of some outside
tices that define the group and that create distinc-
force, but the failures of others are their own faults
tions between groups. The specter of actual–ought
that result from some internal force. Known as the
discrepancies helps individuals abide by the rules
fundamental attribution error, this demonstrates
of the group so all members can gain the positive
the importance of maintaining a positive sense of
identity that comes from the clear distinctions with
self and identity. Processes exist that make people
other groups. Threatening the clear distinctions
look better to themselves and that keep other
between groups that are meant to bring about
people relatively lower in the mind, so that the
positive sources of identity for group members can
individual can view himself or herself positively.
be dangerous for an individual. Blurring distinc-
The individual self is capable of monitoring atti-
tions has the potential for ostracism, which would
tudes, beliefs, and behaviors as well as their inclu-
increase uncertainty for the individual because
sion with others, which could be considered a
positive sources of self are not easy to garner for
measure of how much people like the individual. If
group members. This operates as a mechanism to
any of these become inconsistent with a positive
maintain group cohesion, which also maintains
self-belief, an individual then attempts to return this
positive senses of self for the individual group
system to consonance through various methods.
members. Group membership also offers a great
The self focuses only on knowledge that casts the
deal of self-verification because the incidence of
individual in a positive light or that deflects the
conformity to group norms and ideals creates a
individual from being cast in a negative light.
more homogenous setting for attitudes, beliefs,
Following this, people will seek information that
and behaviors.
confirms their own beliefs, which have already been
In the end, the psychology of self and identity
tainted to be mostly positive. Accuracy and validity
seems to have one focus: the creation and mainte-
are afterthoughts in the grand scheme of the types
nance of positive self-schemata. Whether identity
of self-knowledge sought by an individual.
is derived from internal information about the
The relational self uses information from others
self, information from other individuals, or from
to attain a more accurate picture of the self.
groups, people seem to strive for consistency in
However, the information used may not necessar-
the way they present themselves, which tends
ily be accurate and could be completely fictitious if
toward a positive light. The self has many tools to
it means that a positive sense of self is maintained.
help alleviate any pressures that inconsistent iden-
Using the successes of a close other helps to bolster
tities could create. These can range from the rela-
the positive sense of self. However, success in a
tively simple (joining a relatively homogenous
competitive field puts pressure on the individual to
group) to the relatively complex and cognitively
disassociate from that close other because the
taxing (seeking self-enhancing and self-verifying
other’s successes make the individual look rela- information with the intent to deflect negative
tively worse. If individuals cannot benefit from the self-knowledge). Accuracy of information is not
successes of others, people can benefit from the as important, especially if the accurate informa-
failures of others. These downward comparisons tion could be perceived as potentially damaging to
help the individual seem better and offer further the self. Ultimately, whether simple or complex
confirmation of the belief that the individual has a tools are employed, a cohesive, positively evalu-
positive sense of self. ated self is typically created that balances the
With groups, the collective self uses membership identities from the individual self, relational self,
to garner a positive sense of self by distinguishing and collective self.
the group from other groups on relevant dimen-
sions. Groups not offering this positive identity Jason E. Rivera and Zachary P. Hohman
608 Public Sphere
See also Development of Identity; Development of Self-
Concept; Group Identity; Identification; Individuation;
Self; Self-Schema; Social Identity Theory
Further Readings
Baumeister, R. F. (1998). The self. In D. T. Gilbert,
S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social
psychology (4th ed., pp. 680–740). New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Baumeister, R. F. (Ed.). (1999). Key readings in social
psychology: The self in social psychology.
Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
Hogg, M. A. (2006). Social identity theory. In P. J. Burke
(Ed.), Contemporary social psychological theories
(pp. 111–136). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Leary, M. R., & Tangney, J. P. (Eds.). (2003). Handbook
of self and identity. New York: Guilford Press.
Markus, H. R. (1977). Self-schemata and processing
information about the self. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 35, 63–78.
Sedikides, C., & Brewer, M. B. (Eds.). (2001). Individual
self, relational self, collective self. Philadelphia:
Psychology Press.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). The social identity
theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel &
W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup
relations (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., &
Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social
group: A self-categorization theory. New York:
Blackwell.
Public Sphere
A general definition of the public sphere is a realm
within which individuals discuss the public good.
Many scholars insist that a public sphere is a nec-
essary element of democratic society, a realm
wherein citizens can freely engage in discourse
without interference from the state and its agents.
However, public sphere is a term that has inspired
much debate and multiple, sometimes competing,
definitions and applications. Interest in theories of
the public sphere was revived in the wake of the
cold war and the demise of colonialism. Scholars
of democratic theory, social movements, rhetoric,
and media studies have turned to theories of the
public sphere to explore and explain the dynamic
changes in civil societies after the fall of the Berlin
Wall, the growth of diasporas, and the continued
efforts of marginalized religious, sexual, racial,
and gender groups to attain equality in contempo-
rary societies. Many of these explorations investi-
gate the role of public discourse in these
phenomena and aim to combat triumphalist nar-
ratives of capitalism’s victory over other forms of
sociality. Writers in search of ways to reinvigorate
ideals of citizen participation, equality of opportu-
nity, and multiculturalism in global societies have
looked to public sphere theories for inspiration
and to highlight concerns, including how the pub-
lic sphere shapes social identity and how one’s
participation in the public sphere or in counter-
publics shapes and reshapes one’s identity.
Habermas and the
Revival of Public Sphere Theory
Much of the renewed interest in the public sphere
during the last three decades was sparked by
Thomas Burger’s 1989 translation of Jürgen
Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere. In this generative volume, Habermas
traces the rise of the bourgeois public sphere in the
era of the European Enlightenment, and its demise
in the modern era. He defines the public sphere as
the arena where private persons who gathered out-
side of the state to discuss matters of public import,
including issues concerning the state. These discus-
sions were guided by rational-critical debate norms
and required individuals to shed particularities of
identity to be recognized as rational speakers. The
book sparked a host of responses from scholars in
anthologies, special issues of academic journals,
and book-length treatises.
Critiques of Habermas
Although many writers found Habermas’s thesis
and history intriguing and vital, multiple critiques
of the work quickly found their way to print. Chief
among the concerns raised by scholars and social
movement activists was the focus on a bourgeois
public, the definitions of rational debate, and the
bifurcation of public and private. Many respon-
dents felt his history and theory did not contain
sufficient attention to marginalized groups and did

not apply to the conditions of the multicultural
modern societies of either Europe or the United
States. From these concerns came reformulations
of Habermas’s history of the bourgeois Western
public to include concurrent formations of work-
ing class, women’s, and other publics to account
for differences in power and access to resources.
Counterpublics
Many critics of Habermas posit that counter-
publics exist in opposition to majority publics or a
dominant public sphere in an ever-shifting terrain
of institutions, identity positions, and media are-
nas. Indeed, long before the English translation of
The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere, Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge described
the emergence of working class publics in tandem
with bourgeois publics. In 1992, Nancy Fraser
posited a feminist public sphere emerging in oppo-
sition to the male-dominated bourgeois public.
Simultaneously, Houston Baker Jr., Michael
Dawson, and others gathered at the University of
Chicago to delineate the contours of a Black coun-
terpublic, pondering the ways in which African
Americans created separate and overlapping pub-
lic spheres in response to slavery and White
supremacy. These explorations of multiple publics
acknowledge the role of cultural identities in creat-
ing speech norms, setting agendas, and defining
borders between public and private concerns.
Many of these writers cited how multiple forms of
speech, including more performative and emotive
modes of engagement, could not be excluded from
the realm of the public, thereby favoring certain
identity groups and norms over others.
Lippman, Dewey, and Arendt
Debates over the utility and limits of Habermas’s
formulation also inspired many to return to the
writings of Walter Lippman, Hannah Arendt, and
John Dewey on the form and function of public
deliberation, public opinion, and civic action.
Some scholars question whether any formulation
of the public sphere is emancipatory, concurring
with Lippman’s conclusion that the public itself is
a phantom strategically used by elites to leverage
opinion and shape agendas. Others look at Dewey’s
enthusiasm for the public to be reengineered into a
Public Sphere 609
great community as an unattainable ideal in a fast-
paced, global society. Likewise, Arendt’s vision of
public involvement, influenced by ancient Greek
articulations of citizenship, is seen as too burden-
some and idealized for the modern world. Writers
in this vein suggest that earlier so-called golden
eras of democratic debate were warped by exclu-
sions based on class, gender, and ethnicity and,
upon close study, rarely approached the ideals of
rational-critical discourse or consensus building.
These historians excavate evidence of the rowdy
crowds that attended presidential debates; ribald
commentary and satire in newspapers; sensational-
ized stories of celebrities crowding out more tame
updates on debates over railroad expansion; and
of the carnivalesque, sometimes violent, atmo-
sphere that accompanied public gatherings meant
to tease out public opinion.
Critiques of New Public Sphere Theories
Some critics have raised concerns that a model of
multiple publics and counterpublics encourages a
fractured vision of civil society and heightens cul-
tural balkanization. Many of these critics lament
the lack (or imagine the loss) of a common culture
and common arenas to gather the public for
debate. Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone is often
held up as an exemplary description of how U.S.
society has lost key institutions of social integra-
tion, such as Elks Lodges and bowling leagues,
sites that formed community ties and provided
opportunities for folks to discuss common issues
and interests. Like Dewey’s vision of the lost
Great Community and Habermas’s narrative of
decline, works such as Bowling Alone imply that
a sense of public belonging and spirit has been lost
in the midst of ever-multiplying media distractions
and identity blocs that keep citizens separated into
privatized realms and segregated interest groups.
Diversity and Public Spheres
One major response to the charge of balkaniza-
tion is that, like Habermas’s early formulation of
the public sphere, it depends on a nostalgic look
back to a golden era where identity politics alleg-
edly did not exist. However, close investigations of
eras of seeming homogeneity reveal fissures and
disjunctures of identity that allowed undemocratic
610 Public Sphere
public spheres to operate without full inclusion of
people of color, women, and other marginalized
members of society. Similarly, writers point to the
implied preference for public discussion to only
and always end in consensus and emphasize the
importance of dissent to democratic debate. A
model of public discourse that does not allow for
multiple, overlapping public spheres, proponents
argue, is both anemic and antidemocratic, and
ignores what Fraser termed the actually existing
conditions of civil society.
Emerging Approaches to Public Sphere Theory
Numerous scholars have suggested that the
spatial metaphor of the public sphere is both mis-
leading and too limited to adequately describe the
agents and activities of the public. In an era
of multiplying discursive environments, multina-
tional population flows, and media tools that blur
interpersonal and mass media practices, the sphere
metaphor seems rather simplistic. Influences from
cultural studies, postcolonial studies, and queer
theory have provided alternative means for recon-
ceptualizing how the public sphere is considered
and described. Arjun Appadurai suggested scapes
and fractals as alternative conceptualizations
for the complex interactions between publics and
discourses. As multinational capitalism, ethnic
diasporas, and labor migrations affect communi-
cative practices and spatial realities, Appadurai
posits that global flows within technoscapes,
finanscapes, ideoscapes, mediascapes, and
ethnoscapes will alter relationships between indi-
viduals, nation-states, and the actions of publics.
Others posit that the network might be a better
way to conceptualize the communicative interac-
tions of publics in a multi­media world of near-
instantaneous communication.
Scholars are also concerned that the emphasis
on the different identity groups that may form
multiple publics may distract from understanding
what makes a public a public versus an identifiable
demographic segment or a crowd. This has inspired
many scholars to focus more on the how of being
public rather than the where. For instance, Michael
Warner describes the public as a space that exists
by virtue of being addressed. That is, shared social
identities, whether national, ethnic, sexual, or reli-
gious, are not sufficient to form a public or coun-
terpublic. Rather, people must attend to a public
address and recognize themselves as members of
the public as they pay attention to a public text,
whether an advertisement or a presidential radio
address. Warner still acknowledges the existence
of counterpublics, but focuses on the participation
of its members in responding to an address, attend-
ing to a text that marks them as members of a gay
or Black or women’s counterpublic. Moreover, by
attending to those particular public texts, one’s
participation in the counterpublic shapes and
reshapes one’s identity. In this spirit, Robert Asen
and Daniel Brouwer have recently called on schol-
ars to think in terms of public modalities as a more
flexible means to understand public spheres—that
is, examining the many ways of being public as a
means to escape the limitations of the spatial meta-
phor and to allow a greater variety of explorations
of public activity.
Undoubtedly, scholars will continue to build
on current themes in public sphere theory to
explore a host of emerging questions regarding
citizenship and communication. Recent events in
the United States, Iran, and China necessitate
studies of public culture and public spheres with
an eye toward understanding the interactions
between discourse, new media technologies, social
identities, and state repression. For example, dur-
ing the protests after the Iranian presidential elec-
tion, many have asked whether an Iranian diaspora
became a public sphere via cell phone and Twitter
technologies. Likewise, the Obama campaign’s
savvy use of the mass and interpersonal aspects of
Internet messaging has been described as a bold
new means for connecting disparate citizens into
a great community, à la Dewey, and as a means to
send tailored messages to diverse groups to
manipulate publics into a temporary, powerful
voting bloc. As the actually existing circumstances
on the ground change, the myriad tools provided
by public sphere theorists will be applied to
understanding the dynamics of modern communi-
cations and identities and their role in shaping
civil society.
Catherine R. Squires

See also Civic Identity; Cosmopolitanism; Culture,
Ethnicity, and Race; Discourse; Diversity; Hegemony;
Identity Uncertainty; Multiculturalism; Rhetoric
Further Readings
Asen, R., & Brouwer, C. (2001). Counterpublics and the
state. Albany: SUNY Press.
Black Public Sphere Collective. (Eds.). (1995). The Black
public sphere. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Public Sphere 611
Calhoun, C. (Ed.). (1992). Habermas and the public
sphere. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gaonkar, D. P. (2002). The forum: Publics and
counterpublics. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 88,
410–412.
Landes, J. B. (Ed.). (1998). Feminism, the public and the
private. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Robbins, B. (Ed.). (1993). The phantom public
sphere. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.
 Q
Queer Theory
Queer theory is concerned with the philosophy of
difference and marginality, and how language,
meaning, and identity can be used for political
ends to disempower minority groups. Compared
with other branches of philosophy, the name
itself is especially resonant—intentionally vulgar
and defiant. It simultaneously engages the origi-
nal meaning of queer as unnatural, counterfeit, or
deviant, and the effort by a minority group
inspired by gay rights and theory to reclaim a
term originally intended to wound and stigma-
tize. Queer is less a name or identification here
than an ironic wink at the politics of identifica-
tion, a verbal taunt meant to reverse attention
from those called queer to a culture that has so
named them.
The origins of queer theory lie at the intersec-
tion of postmodernism, feminism, and gay theory,
each of which has taken up in its own way prob-
lems of difference, identity, and resistance to the
dominate culture. Queer theory’s immediate roots
can be traced to three seminal works by three very
different authors: Michel Foucault’s History of
Sexuality, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s Epistemology
of the Closet, and Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble.
The Problem of Subjectivity
In the History of Sexuality, Foucault deconstructs
the idea of queer/gay identity. His argument, like
those in many of his books, is at once obvious,
613
unsettling, and revelatory. In this work, Foucault
distinguished between sexuality and sex. Sex had
been an act, a set of pleasures that one performed.
Yet at the beginning of first millennium, the
Pauline tradition of Christianity focused on sexual
pleasure and its restraint as the fundamental ques-
tion of a religious morality. To live a moral life
meant knowing and controlling one’s urges, ten-
dencies, and temptations. Foucault calls this sexu­
ality rather than sex—sex being something visible
and external that one did, sexuality being invisible
and interior, something within oneself. Sexuality
thus made it possible to generate feelings of guilt
and sin simply because one dreamed of or desired
disfavored pleasures, especially any one of those in
an ill-defined category of illegal acts called sod­
omy. One could be guilty of sinfulness at any time
or place one’s sexuality emerged.
In the middle of the 19th century, with the rise
of the medical establishment, psychiatry patholo-
gized desire. Certain desires could now be classi-
fied as disease. Patients who suffered from this
disease required diagnosis and treatment. An
entire taxonomy of desire was created that classi-
fied people by their pleasures: the homosexual,
the invert, the onanist, the pederast, and so
forth—each of whom was not just diseased but a
specific kind of person. A new priesthood of psy-
chiatrists arose to help them understand and heal
their sexuality to save their mental health. Like
religion before them, these priests installed sex as
the central issue of psychological health and well-
being. To know oneself meant to know one’s
sexuality.
614 Queer Theory
Foucault argued that before the rise of psychia-
try in the mid-19th century, the idea that one’s
social identity was defined by one’s desires—the
idea of being a homosexual—was unknown. Even
the ancient Greeks, who were familiar with same-
sex acts, had no category for it because they did not
view pleasure or desire as issues of moral or mental
health. The homosexual is an extension of the
religio-psychiatric demand that each of us define
ourselves by our sexuality. From this perspective,
homosexuality is an invention of heterosexuality,
and homosexuals are complicit in identifying them-
selves by their deviation from norms of sexuality
that were themselves heterosexual in origin.
Foucault is interested not just in deconstructing
homosexuality and identity, but in subjectivity
itself; that is, how we come to know and experi-
ence ourselves as certain kinds of individuals but
not others, how and when these particular selves
appear, and whose interests they serve. Although
how we experience our sense of self seems a natural
fact, inevitable and innocent, it is not. It is the
product of specific cultural intentions and aims. In
short, subjectivity is political, an extension of
political aims.
The Problem of Erasure
The promotion of one kind of identity or meaning
inevitably erases or excludes many others. As
Foucault more evocatively puts it, in this exercise
of power, there is not one silence, but many
silences. Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the Closet
takes as its project exposing the erasure of homo-
sexuality in the arts, exposing these silences, and
recovering themes that were excluded or hidden.
Western art—especially literature, theater, TV,
and movies—has long employed a wide range of
gay themes, characters, and plotlines—often
created by gay authors, playwrights, and
directors—without ever naming them as such.
From Marcel Proust to Tennessee Williams, from
the character Lakey in The Group, to the character
Jane Hathaway in The Beverly Hillbillies, to a long
tradition of sexually ambiguous relentlessly fussy
male supporting actors—Edward Everett Horton
and Gayle Gordon’s bank manager in I Love
Lucy—there are things that are pervasive, unseen in
plain sight, forces that drive emotion and narrative
tension, and yet are never spoken of or named.
Sedgwick seeks to expose and abolish this
ancient silence—a violent and intentional erasure—
and to make it impossible thenceforth. Epistemol­
ogy was the first and the best known of what has
become a river of books deconstructing a wide
array of social texts in order to read homosexual
themes and identities back into them. Authors fol-
lowing Sedgwick’s path—and some would argue
Sedgwick herself—have sometimes gone over-
board, insisting that homosexuality is in every-
thing, finding homosexuality in closets that were
likely bare, and reading it into situations and texts
on, at best, the slenderest of evidence. Yet the proj-
ect that Epistemology began has exposed whole
new layers of meaning in what were thought to be
familiar and well-understood texts, opening new
areas of interpretation and scholarship while ignit-
ing fierce controversies that are unlikely to be set-
tled anytime soon. In doing so, this book has not
only recovered an entire history for a marginalized
community, but returned homosexuality to its
rightful place among the major themes sustaining
Western art.
The Problems of Identity
Butler’s Gender Trouble is the most audacious of
the three books. In the first two dozen or so pages,
Butler reinvents feminist theory and suggests a
path to reinventing feminism itself.
Feminism appears to be founded on the simple,
uncontroversial idea of forming a movement to
represent and pursue the political interests of
women. Yet for Butler, identity is always contro-
versial. First, to preserve any sort of coherence, an
identity category must have boundaries. This
means some identities applying for inclusion must
be refused—as transgender women are today.
Others must be expelled, as lesbians and the
Lavender Menace were by the National
Organization for Women in 1970. To decide who
can be included requires judges who are empow-
ered to rule on others, creating hierarchies. A
movement created to liberate its members gener-
ates new powers over them. Some candidates will
fit the normative requirements of the identity less
well than others and will suffer further discrimina-
tion for it, both inside the category and outside it.
Paradoxically, identity boundaries eventually
begin to serve an unintended function: They keep

members in, and they place some areas off-limits
as male. Thus, a movement designed to free
women ends up imposing new restrictions of its
own on them. Because the category woman
remains unmarked by other dimensions such as
race, class, or sexual orientation, the needs of
women of color, lesbians, and others are subordi-
nated to those of middle-class, White, heterosexual
women with families.
For all these reasons, Butler considers identity to
be permanently troubled, the instrument of regula-
tion and exclusion. When she is invited to write
essays as a lesbian theorist, she responds by asking
how to write as a lesbian when the name itself
announces a set of terms she wants to dispute. One
of her solutions is not to do away with identity
categories, but to leave them permanently open,
incomplete, and undefined.
Butler offers a way out of basing our political
movements on unstable and ultimately oppressive
identity categories. She wants politics to be based
on aims, not bodies. This means that, instead of
being the foundation for political struggle, our
identities are created out of the struggles in which
we participate. Butler wants identity to become an
effect of politics, rather than its basis. The mobility
and incompleteness of identity should not be seen
as a threat or hindrance to women’s political aims
but a crucial feminist goal.
Butler believes that gender should be unfixed as
well. It should be mobile, shifting, and incomplete.
To trouble gender should be a key function of a
feminist struggle. This should be uncontroversial
because a key tenet of feminism is that gender is
not fixed and “biology is not destiny.” In reality,
much of U.S. feminism remains deeply wedded to
essentialist notions of womanhood, and Butler’s
“embrace the contradiction, the problem is really
the solution” approach remains highly controver-
sial. Although her ideas have permanently altered
feminist theorizing, their effect on organized femi-
nist practice remains negligible.
Limitations
Depending as it does on deconstruction, queer
theory is a set of tools for taking things apart, but
has little to suggest by way of replacement.
Because of its attachment to alterity, queer theory
can be reflexively antagonistic toward similarity
Queer Theory 615
and assimilation, a modicum of which is necessary
for society to survive. In addition, in their empha-
sis on insubordination and marginality, queer the-
orists sometimes equate culture with oppression.
Any kind of organizing must involve power and
hierarchy, so queer theory is unable to embrace
any kind of organized political response other than
general insubordination. Butler’s prescription for
small, individual acts of gender rebellion is a good
example. Although such acts serve the goal of
overturning the regulation of binary gender, one
wonders if it is a big enough gun for the game at
hand. Gender is a large target. Will this system
really be destabilized and overthrown by little pri-
vate acts of mutiny? Moreover, will it be able to
combat the kinds of broad social injustice still vis-
ited on those who are gender different?
Gay rights and even transgender rights are
changing the way the dominant culture under-
stands these rights in their relation to sexual orien-
tation and gender, just as feminism before them
permanently altered how many men understand
and experience themselves. Perhaps, then, some
co-optations can have positive as well as negative
effects, and some uses of political power to create
subjectivity can be morally defensible.
Unfortunately, moral criteria by which we
might approach these questions are exactly what
postmodernism cannot provide because its aim is
tearing down precisely the sort of Universalist
claims to truth that moral systems make. This
antipathy is understandable, considering that
claims of morality were used to tyrannize, torment,
and ultimately pathologize the homosexual.
Yet underneath all this, queer theory is also
making its own implied moral claims: that differ-
ence and multiplicity are good; that uniformity,
societies, and organization are bad; and so on.
This contradiction—the truth about the evil of
truth and the immorality of morality—is at the
heart of queer theory and postmodernism and
is—within its own terms—inherently irresolvable.
Perhaps its dislike of organization, power, and
unanimity explains why queer theory—unlike its
antecedents in gay and feminist theory—has not
yet produced anything like a coherent social
movement. That is understandable, given its
aims. Yet, given the importance of those aims and
those identities still to be heard from, it is also
unfortunate.
616 Queer Theory
Into this vacuum has stepped a host of individual
youths who understand themselves as genderqueer,
who are challenging the boundaries of identity,
rejecting simplistic binaries like man/woman, gay/
straight, and even Black/White while creating new
ways of naming themselves. They are moving
beyond the labels by which older movements like
gay rights or feminism navigate, and their existence
challenges the coherence of the categories on which
these movements are based. Indeed, genderqueer
youth understand such labels as extensions of the
same systems of sexism, racism, and heterosexism
they want to combat.
Messy are new identities we cannot name and
do not understand, yet which nonetheless create
new possibilities and freedoms we never intended.
This may be another sort of progress. If so, it is
something that queer theorists may applaud.
Riki Wilchins
See also Diversity; Gay; Gender; Sexual Minorities
Further Readings
Butler, J. (1999). Gender trouble: Feminism and
subversion of identity. London: Routledge.
Foucault, M. (1998). The history of sexuality (R. Hurley,
Trans.). New York: Penguin.
Sedgwick, E. K. (2008). Epistemology of the closet.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
 R
Race
See Culture, Ethnicity, and Race
Race Performance
There are different ways in which to think about
performance. One can analyze a performance in
the role of the art critic, attending to self-referential
aesthetics—the qualities that give form to the
work produced, the quality of the performance as
it measures against the artistic genre in which it is
embedded, and the quality of the performers
themselves. Cultural theorists, however, present a
different view of performance, one based on the
notion of performance as a signifier of cultural
and social values, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors.
For example, one can perform race, gender, and
other identities through a work of art or through
everyday life. In this way, a performance can be
read as a cultural text, a site for contestation and
negotiation of sociocultural issues such as iden-
tity. Another use of performance concerns the
ways in which it is used as a theory and research
methodology. In this way, performance as an ana-
lytical concept implies that cultural phenomena
will be seen and analyzed as active, fluid, and
potentially transformative rather than passive or
fixed. Moreover, a performance implies a context,
situational acts that constitute a frame in which
something can be named as a performance.
617
Performance Studies
In the academic field of performance studies, per-
formance is both a subject of study and method of
inquiry. Performance studies focuses on the critical
analysis of performance and performativity, incor-
porating theories from the visual and performing
arts, anthropology, cultural studies, folklore, phi-
losophy, and sociology. The origin of performance
studies has no single narrative; rather, it is con-
structed of multiple narratives that examine per-
formance as ritual and social drama, performance
as a speech act, performance as the presentation of
self, and performance as the ongoing process of
identity construction.
Whereas performance has traditionally been
associated with the theatrical or with entertain-
ment value, performance has been reconceived in
more contemporary thought as a means for critical
social action and for the study of how people cre-
ate meaning and reinvent their own experiences in
the world. Social gestures such as eating, dressing,
dating, greeting, and other everyday social prac-
tices have been analyzed, as have cultural activities
such as plays, operas, weddings, funerals, joke tell-
ing, and other staged or ritualized acts of perfor-
mance in everyday life. Victor Turner examined
these categories as well as that of social drama,
which occurs when there is a break or disturbance
in an otherwise expected social order. Dwight
Conquergood challenged the notion of perfor-
mance as theater and posited that performance
studies involves imagination, inquiry, and inter-
vention, the latter category involving activism and
civic struggle for social justice.
618 Race Performance
Performance conceived as an act of intervention
or activism can be seen in the work of many schol-
ars who study elocution, speech, and literature. In
his speech-act theory, J. L. Austin argued that
action is performed with any utterance. Language
does not only describe, it actively does something
that makes a difference in the world. Whereas
Austin referred to particular moments of speech,
his student John R. Searle argued that whenever
words are spoken, they become performative. In
his critique of speech-act theory, Jacques Derrida
suggested that speech acts have a history and that
their repetition or reiteration (their repeated use
over time) determines the effects of speech because
certain meanings and intentions are recognizable
through repeated use.
Against this background, the development of a
concept called performativity can be explored as
one of the critical theoretical means of exploring
the performance of race identity.
Performativity
Social categories such as race, gender, age, sexuality,
and ability can be framed as performative, and
according to the specific context, they can be chal-
lenged, reconstituted, and transformed. Perfor­
mativity refers to the ways in which subjectivity (i.e.,
one’s own personal views, experience, or back-
ground that can be thought of constituting the self)
is constructed through the norms of society yet is
also a constant process of reconfiguration within
existing social institutions, cultural practices, his-
torical traditions, and power relations according to
a specific individual. Performativity denotes a cul-
tural convention that has come to define norms
associated with a certain identity category (e.g., ges-
tures, acts, speech associated with racial identity or
with gender identity); thus, performativity becomes
the manifestation of acts that are associated with
certain identities. Identity, however, is never fixed
because language, gesture, habits, and other acts are
part of a social practice that is interpreted at an indi-
vidual level; discourses and actions are situated
within power relations and remain open for recon-
figuration of alternative identities. In her theory of
gendered performativity, Judith Butler identifies the
concept of reiteration as a performative process that
constitutes a subject while also creating a space in
which subjectivity can contest and rupture existing
identity categories. Identities are constantly repro-
duced through repetition: People do not merely
perform roles but rather, in the process of repeti-
tion, establish and destabilize identity categories
such as race. The concept of performativity chal-
lenges the notion of race identity as biologically
determined and instead suggests race identity is
socially configured. This is an important theoreti-
cal move because it allows for the possibility of
alternative performativities and identities. As a
theory, performativity allows for shifts, contradic-
tions, movement, and ruptures within existing
identity categories.
Performance and Race
Much in the same way that performance has been
reconsidered and reworked as a concept, definitions
of race have also been revisited. One contemporary
theory of race is critical race theory. Growing out of
legal scholarship, critical race theory holds that rac-
ism is a normative rather than an aberrant compo-
nent of U.S. society. Critical race theorists challenge
the essentializing categories of race as well as gen-
der and class. Beyond the dichotomous views of
race as either culturally or biologically constructed,
race is situated within a system of power relations
that are deeply embedded in American life. Manning
Marable defines racism as a system not only of
ignorance but also of exploitation and power that
are used to oppress people on the basis of ethnicity,
color, culture, and behaviors.
When considered in relation to performance,
and specifically to the idea of performativity, race
can be understood as an identity category that is
not inherent or fixed in an individual or group but
rather constructed in, through, and by perfor-
mances of race norms, behaviors, and traditions
that have come to be expected. Individuals may
continually challenge these norms, and that is
where racial identity becomes a performative cat-
egory rather than a stable and fixed category.
Theorists have commented on the ways in
which performance is a reflexive act—that is, it
facilitates an understanding of self and society.
Commenting on the cultural construction of black-
ness, for example, cultural theorist Stuart Hall
notes that it is through the ways in which people
represent and imagine themselves that individuals
come to understand how they are constituted.

Other scholars in the field of Black performance
studies have discussed the ways in which perfor-
mance has historically always been a galvanizing
force for Black culture, whether it is through the
reinforcement of stereotypes or through the resis-
tance and disruption of such stereotypes through
the presentation of new identities.
Examples of Performance in Visual Art
A wide range of artists have explored race identity
through art-making practices. Perhaps a challenge
to the concept of performance is the fact that many
visual art pieces are spatially and visually static as
opposed to moving and temporal—qualities that
have traditionally marked the performing arts.
Performance in visual art refers to the extent to
which the subject matter, materials, and context of
an artwork represents and, in effect, performs cer-
tain issues such as identity in interaction with the
viewer. An example can be found in the work of
Kara Walker. Through the use of silhouette, an art
form directly associated with Victorian art, Walker’s
artwork explores race, gender, and sexuality by
subverting the concept of portrait profile through
cutouts of disturbing images that evoke the antebel-
lum South, Black stereotypes, violence, and sexual-
ity. In one of her works, Darkytown Rebellion, the
artist uses overhead projectors that project colored
light onto the ceiling, walls, and floor of the exhibi-
tion space, which overlay her posted silhouetted
figures. This work is performative in several ways.
First, this uncommon, subversive use of silhouette
prompts a viewer to consider the new ways in
which an artistic medium might perform in new
ways and thus call attention to critical issues such
as race. Second, as an audience views this particular
installation, the viewer’s body is cast in shadow by
the projector and thus intermingles with the images
affixed to the wall. In this way, one’s own identity
expressed via silhouette moves theatrically among
Walker’s images of a slavery rebellion.
Another example can be found in the work of
Fred Wilson, an African American artist whose
installation art challenges traditional museum
exhibitions by creating new contexts and thus
new meanings for exhibitions. His work chal-
lenges the ways in which art is curated and the
ways in which curators present historical “truth,”
accuracy, artistic value, and cultural value. One of
Race Performance 619
his well-known works, titled Mining the Museum,
reexamined the Maryland Historical Society’s arti-
fact collection. In a series of installations, Wilson
placed objects together to tell stories that were
quite different from those usually presented in
museum settings. For example, in Metalwork
1793–1880, he juxtaposed silver goblets and
pitchers with iron slave shackles by placing them
alongside each other. His Cabinetmaking 1820–
1960 presented four parlor chairs facing a wooden
whipping post in the shape of a crucifix that was
once used at a Maryland jail. These works can be
said to be performative in that Wilson calls our
attention to the display of objects in a different
way. The objects take on a new identity in relation
to race in the United States; they call into focus
racial identity in the United States.
Creators of performance art, a genre within
contemporary visual art, are more consciously
concerned with the construct of performance as a
means for artistic expression of issues such as iden-
tity. Growing out of the 1960s, performance art
can be defined as an event that occupies a particu-
lar place and period of time, typically using the
body as the artistic medium. Often, performance
artists critique traditional aesthetics of the visual
arts, blurring boundaries between the visual arts
and performing arts and between art and everyday
life. Notably, performance art allows artists and
viewers to question and challenge historical, social,
and cultural conventions.
Many performance artists have focused on the
performance of race. James Luna, for example,
critiques cultural stereotypes of Native Americans
in Western museum displays. For his installation
“Artifact Piece,” Luna placed himself in a glass
museum display case, dressed in a loincloth and
laying motionless for museum-goers. The labels
surrounding the display revealed his name and
scars on his body attributed to drinking, thus con-
fronting stereotypical images of the drunken
American Indian and parodying images of cultural
oppression of Native Americans.
The Performance of Objects
The performance of race continues to be of central
concern in performance art, but there is also a his-
tory of race performance in painting, installation,
sculpture, assemblage, and collage, to name a few.
620 Racial Contracts
The aesthetics of a work of art performs a social
function. An object is made, sold, constructed,
and used, and people imbue an object with mean-
ing based on past experiences, emotions, and
desires. Art objects are always in social interaction
with the artist and the viewers. As such, objects
can perform racial meanings, whether they con-
note stereotypes or new configurations of racial
identity on purpose or unintentionally.
Kimberly Powell
See also Aesthetics; Cultural Studies; Culture, Ethnicity,
and Race
Further Readings
Butler, J. (1990). Gender trouble: Feminism and the
subversion of identity. New York: Routledge.
Butler, J. (1993). Bodies that matter: On the discursive
limits of sex. New York: Routledge.
Conquergood, D. (2002). Performance studies:
Interventions and radical research. Drama Review,
46(2), 145–156.
Garoian, C. (1999). Performing pedagogy: Toward an art
of politics. Albany: SUNY Press.
Johnson, E. P. (2006). Black performance studies. In
D. S. Madison & J. Hamera (Eds.), The Sage
handbook of performance studies (pp. 446–463).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Madison, D. S., & Hamera, J. (Eds.). (2006). The Sage
handbook of performance studies. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
Schechner, R. (2002). Performance studies: An
introduction. London: Routledge.
Turner, V. (1986). The anthropology of performance.
New York: PAJ Books.
Racial Contracts
Whereas John Rawls and others, in the 20th-
century revival of contractualism, took the hypotheti-
cal contracts of John Locke and Immanuel Kant as
models and sought to justify norms as the output
of imagined choices made in designed situations of
deliberation, Charles Mills seeks to recover a dif-
ferent, secondary strand of contractualist theory,
one centering on the explanatory potential of non-
ideal agreements. Such non-ideal contract theory,
of which Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “Second
Discourse on Inequality” is locus classicus and
Carole Pateman’s Sexual Contract is Mills’s chief
recent model, is used to explain non-ideal actuality,
exposing its immorality according to norms that
must be otherwise grounded. Mills says his project
rests on three claims: existential—that White
supremacy exists; conceptual—that White suprem-
acy is a political system; and methodological—that
White supremacy can be helpfully modeled as a
contact among Whites.
The racial contract, as Mills proposes it, is politi-
cal, moral, and epistemological. Mills defines the
racial contract as (mostly) informal agreements
among people deemed “White” (by shifting criteria)
to relegate others (deemed “non-Whites” and sub-
persons) to inferior moral and civil status, and
therein legitimizing the restriction of the normal
moral and juridical rules so that they do not fully
apply to Whites’ interactions with non-Whites and
the exploitation of non-Whites’ bodies, land, and
resources. At the moral and political level, the racial
contract’s purpose is differentially to privilege Whites
by founding a racial polity. In it, all Whites benefit
from the racial contract, but only most Whites are
signatories/parties to it. Because the racial contract
entitles and even requires Whites to govern their
dealings with one another by higher standards than
those it imposes on their dealings with non-Whites,
Mills claims to reveal a Herrenvolk (master race)
ethics in Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, and others usually
said to champion equality. Epistemologically, Mills
says the racial contract establishes an inverted
epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, and
cognitive dysfunction, which blinds both Whites
and non-Whites to the manifestly unjust struc-
tures whereby Whites exploit non-Whites. Mills
claims that as non-ideal, the racial contract is, or
at least approximates, a historical actuality. He
thinks it comprises an expropriation contract,
which rationalized, for example, taking lands
from Native Americans; a slavery contract that
purported to justify the chattel enslavement,
especially of Africans and Native Americans; and
a colonial contract that was used to vindicate the
oppression of many Africans, Native Americans,
Asians, Pacific Islanders, and others, in their own
homelands.
Their agreeing to the racial contract is implicit
in Whites’ complicity of silence, which Mills

thinks is the conceptual, juridical, and normative
equivalent of signing. The racial contract is thus
fundamentally an exploitation contract. The
actual racial contract, unlike the older, imagined
social contract, is primarily economic, though it
also secures to Whites a host of psychic, social,
political, and cultural privileges. For example, the
racial contract rationalizes European exceptional-
ism and entitlement. Its economic structures work
independently of individual ill will. The racial
contract is also continually being rewritten, with
today’s de-emphasizing the supposed biological
inferiority of non-Whites and stressing their cul-
tural inferiority.
According to Mills, the racial contract “norms”
and “races” space by, for example, depicting
Africa as a “dark continent,” its inhabitants as
savage peoples, and Blacks in general as bodily
driven by appetites and emotions, in contrast to
Whites characterized by rational detachment, rea-
sonableness, and self-control. Thus, political space
is not the same as geographic space. Europe, con-
ceived as the only real civilization, can be extended
to other parts of the world, but colonists can “go
native” by embracing savagery, and returning col-
onists or imported colonials can infect Europe
with outposts of Asian, African, or Native American
barbarism. Mills contends that the racial contract
also “norms” and “races” individuals. For him,
the term Black American is an oxymoron because
an American is implicitly assumed to be White. So,
the racial contract establishes both non-Whites’
subpersonhood and White personhood, even as it
replaces biological racism with cultural racism
across three epochs of White supremacy: the
period before White supremacy, that of formal and
de jure White supremacy, and more recent de facto
White supremacy.
Though the racial contract can mask itself by a
pretended self-erasure, it provides the “real” mean-
ing of the modern social contract, which it under-
writes. Racial contract constructs its parties, just
as those parties construct it, with criteria of who
counts as White—criteria that shift over times and
from place to place. The racial contract not only
constructs some people as Whites but also con-
structs its victims as Black, Red, Yellow, and,
sometimes, different kinds of Browns, all of whom
are treated within the racial contract as inferior, as
in the U.S. Jim Crow contract.
Racial Contracts 621
The racial contract needs and gets enforcement
through violence and ideological conditioning.
Thinking in terms of the racial contract, police
brutality, and lynchings are revealed not as excep-
tions but parts of the racial contract’s enforcement
mechanism. Because both Whites and non-Whites
must be trained not to notice the many injustices
and absurdities embedded in the social system, for
it to function smoothly, ideological conditioning
operates as part of the racial contract’s epistemol-
ogy of ignorance to depreciate non-Whites’ moral-
ity, intellect, beauty, cultural achievements, and
their very being as humans.
Mills claims certain “naturalized” merits for
thinking of recent history within the framework
that the racial contract provides. First, the idea
of the racial contract tracks the actual moral and
political consciousness of (most) White agents.
That is, it explains White psychology of brutality
toward non-Whites and their subjugation. It also
explains how some Whites, for example, John
Brown and Bartolomé de las Casas, managed per-
sonally to repudiate the racial contract and become
noble race-traitors. Second, the racial contract, in
Mills’s view, has always been implicitly recognized
by non-Whites as what they must challenge. Thus,
recent standpoint theory within epistemology,
forms of cross-racial solidarity among non-Whites
uniting against their moral, epistemic, aesthetic,
and ontological subordination and slandering can
be seen as countermeasures against a perceived but
not yet theorized racial contract. Modes of non-
White self-assertion, by claiming full personhood
or offering cognitive resistance to racial mystifica-
tion are also illuminated and captured within the
idea of the racial contract. Third, Mills holds that
the racial contract, as a theory, offers a superior
explanation in comparison with that of the suppos-
edly raceless social contract. Within racial contract
theory, races are conceived as real existents, but as
sociopolitical constructs rather than biological
entities. So seen, whiteness is ultimately not a
color but a set of power relations, so that Mills
maintains that Black, Yellow, or Red people might
have been politically White. Indeed, he thinks a
Yellow racial contract is revealed in the Japanese
supremacism manifest in the empire’s rhetoric and
conduct just before and during World War II.
Tying his approach to critical race theory, Mills
insists that the racial contract is a true, accurate
622 Racial Disloyalty
metanarrative, repudiating deconstructionist and
postmodernist claims that the truth (here, about
society) cannot be known or that no justifiable
means of investigation can be established.
Critics have objected to Mills’s central claims
on a variety of grounds. Some think the contractu-
alist tradition, and liberalism more generally, are
too stained with the racism of its developers to
serve as an effective tool of critique. On the oppo-
site side, some judge Mills too harsh in his criti-
cism of liberalism’s major classical and recent
thinkers. Critics mindful of Karl Marx have held
that Mills underplays the materialist role of the
economic in his discussion of race relations. On
the opposite side, thinkers more race-centered in
their analyses worry Mills overplays the economic
in a way that resembles Marxism’s dismissal of
race as epiphenomenal. It has also been argued
that Mills vacillates between treating the racial
contract as a historical actuality that causally
explains race relations and, quite differently, as an
imagined model to frame and organize facts. Does
Mills conceive the racial contract as a contribution
to social science or to normative political theory?
His claims that the racial contract captures every-
day Black sociopolitical thought, and that of activ-
ists, are among others that have been challenged,
as well as his stringent standards for what Whites
need to do to opt out of the racial contract.
J. L. A. Garcia
See also Critical Race Theory; Culture, Ethnicity, and
Race; White Racial Identity
Further Readings
Garcia, J. L. A. (2001). The racial contract hypothesis.
Philosophia Africana, 4, 27–42.
Mills, C. (1997). The racial contract. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Mills, C. (2003). The “racial contract” as methodology.
In C. Mills, From class to race. Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Pateman, C. (1988). Sexual contract. Palo Alto, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Pateman, C., & Mills, C. (2007). Contract and
domination. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Rousseau, J.-J. (1964). Discourse on the origin and
foundations of inequality among men. In
R. D. Masters (Ed.) & R. D. Masters & J. R. Masters
(Trans.), The first and second discourses (pp. 77–181).
New York: St. Martin’s Press. (Original work
published 1755)
Racial Disloyalty
Racial loyalty is conceived (on the model of patri-
otism) as a steadfast allegiance to one’s race and
faithfulness in discharging supposed obligations
of duty, love, and friendship. It partially answers
the questions: What do people owe? and How
should people feel about their race, its other mem-
bers, and their own membership within it? Tommie
Shelby cites such loyalty as at the core of Black
solidarity, along with trust in other Black people,
special affection for them, racial pride, and shared
values. Racial disloyalty, therefore, can be defined
as the betrayal of this allegiance to one’s race.
Demands to demonstrate racial loyalty and, con-
versely, accusations of disloyalty have been promi-
nent among African Americans, whose socially
disadvantaged condition and unjust treatment by
Whites have made ingroup solidarity particularly
urgent and birthed a variety of colorful and (often
cruelly used) pejoratives including “Uncle Tom”
(from Harriet Beecher Stowe’s eponymous fictional
slave), “Oreo” (from the sandwich cookie with a
dark chocolate exterior and white cream filling),
“house-slave” (from the belief that enslaved domes-
tics were less militant than were field hands), and
“Afro-Saxon.” Such epithets have implications for
the racial identity of those labeled.
Many charges of racial disloyalty over the past
half-century have been expressions of hatred and
efforts to marginalize, intimidate, and silence intel-
lectual and political outliers. Serious conceptual
and ethical inquiry into the content, presupposi-
tions, and truth conditions of racial disloyalty and
its norms is rare. Randall Kennedy, in his book
Sellout, has begun an examination of this dis-
course, its motivation, assumptions, and problems.
This entry further explores Kennedy’s work.
Understanding Kennedy’s
Work on Racial Loyalty and Betrayal
Kennedy asserts every group needs to regulate and
police its members. Defection, that is, having some

members coerced or enticed into disloyalty by
powerful social forces, is antagonistic to a socially
disadvantaged group’s advancement and even sur-
vival. Viewing such anxiety, and consequent
attempts at regulation, as inescapable and ineradi-
cable, he suggests epithets and charges of selling
out are used to trigger ostracism within the group,
making some ingroup members, in effect, into out-
siders. Thus, he rejects the counsel of Stephen
Carter and others who insist on freedom of discus-
sion and debate in a future rid of charges of racial
betrayal, selling out, or other conflicts of interest.
Nevertheless, Kennedy is himself concerned that
racial discourse wherein Black participants are
ruled by fear of being labeled sellouts encourages
both self-policing and self-censorship, which stifle
and distort needed ingroup discussion and debate.
Yet Kennedy proposes that epithets expressing
anxiety over the threat of racial defection and
betrayal should be used sparingly and that evi-
dence should be both demanded and provided by
the group’s members.
Kennedy, a law professor, takes a legalistic
approach to the problem. Rather than focusing on
questions of identity (what someone is)—whether
someone is a sellout, an Uncle Tom, an Oreo, or a
Trojan Horse—Kennedy’s emphasis is on how
they act. His project is to determine whether a
certain offense has been performed. To this end, he
demands defining and specifying the charge (infor-
mal), procedures for challenging it and requiring
the public presentation and weighing of evidence,
high standards for the informal analogue of con-
viction, and a (perhaps implicit) presumption of
innocence for the person accused.
Criticisms of Kennedy’s Position
Kennedy’s terminology of racial disloyalty may be
criticized as problematic. Kennedy defines sellouts
as those who betray a fundamental principle that
one owes allegiance to one’s social, cultural, or
racial group. He defines Black racial sellouts, more
particularly, as Blacks who knowingly or with
gross negligence do something contrary to the inter-
ests of Blacks as a whole, usually for personal gain.
The “sellout” is as such “bought off.” Selling out
must therefore be intentional, self-interested, and
materialistic. More pertinently, as Kennedy stresses,
the sellout must turn against what is perceived as
Racial Disloyalty 623
the welfare of the race as a whole to obtain per-
sonal gain. Those who oppose programs of racial
preference because they believe such programs are
in some way counterproductive for Black people
are not selling them out, even if their political judg-
ment turns out to be incorrect.
Similarly, to be what some call an Oreo, a per-
son must reject or neglect one’s culture (special
racial values, modes of reasoning, beliefs, prefer-
ences, customs, styles, etc., supposed to exist
“inside”), maintaining only outer racial markers.
This presupposes some account of specifically
Black beliefs, reasoning processes, norms and val-
ues, tastes, preferences, motives, goals, and so
forth. However, a critic can object that such pre-
sumptions about racial identity are dubious at
best, murky in their justification as a guide, and
counterproductive politically because they margin-
alize or exclude some from within the group.
Kennedy may be correct that a sort of ostracism
for embracing certain positions has a proper place
even within a regime of free speech. People should
be, for example, made to feel shame for advancing
racist or totalitarian (e.g., Nazi) ideologies; that
they do constitutes social progress. Black people
may also have special moral grounds for detesting
slavery and racism, or simplistic majoritarianism,
because of the salience of these moral horrors in
the lives of their ancestors. Still, to the skeptic, it
needs to be better articulated just how the racial
group benefits from—let alone, needs—anxiety
over defection. (What harm does betrayal do, to
which individuals, and under what circumstances?)
Moreover, this benefit then needs to be shown to
be so great as to justify the loss that individuals
suffer from social ostracism, self-censorship, and
racial intimidation. Obviously, different acts some-
times deemed betrayals will have different effects,
which may not matter unless repeated. Even if a
racial group were to cease to exist through cultural
assimilation or intermarriage, it would need expla-
nation: just what sort of loss or harm this would
be, who would suffer it, and why it would be
deemed. Other problems with free resort to the
rhetoric of selling out, beyond the debate stifling
that Kennedy mentions, may lurk. In this dis-
course, certain political positions, modes of speech,
ways of dressing, or aesthetic preferences can
implicitly be elevated as normative for the group,
in ways that (a) privilege some subgroups (urban,
624 Racial Disloyalty
younger, leftist, etc.) and depreciating others;
(b) impose rigid group norms that can undermine
the unity and camaraderie within a group, thus
undoing the existing ingroup solidarity, the very
values that racial disloyalty advocates claim to
promote and charge others (or their earlier selves)
with compromising; and (c) encourage and per-
petuate stereotypes.
Such self-censorship, arguably, harms (sets
back the welfare of) both those individuals and the
group itself (and perhaps even the wider society),
who need such critique. However, undue influence
by powerful social forces antagonistic to a group’s
advancement that is clearly detrimental may par-
tially justify a prima facie liberty to employ such
self-censorship tactics. Still, that need seems chiefly
to motivate and explain the inclination (or per-
haps temptation) within the group to discipline
and punish; it remains to be shown whether it
authorizes or legitimizes such conduct. Rather,
only moral considerations can generate moral
responsibilities on those in the group and legiti-
mize coercive measures of policing against them.
The critique of racial disloyalty thus needs to be
tied to the moral virtues in accord with human
nature, to imperatives of reason, to universal
human sympathy, or to other sources of moral
obligation.
It is not obvious that using racial epithets
against some people, even if done with a valid goal
and even if legitimate, suffices to make true what
is said therein. Assertive speech cannot be merely
prudentially justified because it makes some claim
about how the world is. True claims need to match
reality. Kennedy expects that those inside the
group will, in effect, come to the defense of those
unfairly charged with racial disloyalty (by expect-
ing other group members to challenge those who
charge some group member’s traitorous actions),
but this may be an unrealistic expectation, because
it exposes the defenders to the same charges of
selling out.
The lesson of these considerations seems to be
that charges of selling out should not be accepted
without critical scrutiny, and challenges to them
need to come from outside the group as well as
from within it. As seen, this scrutiny may be sub-
ject to the charge of racial disloyalty, as the inten-
tions of those who rise to defend a supposed
sellout become the subjects of such suspicions.
This may be further reason to tightly scrutinize
such rhetoric by assessing its narrow content, lest
charges of selling out become self-protected,
immunizing the accusers from scrutiny and cri-
tique. From this perspective, if one is to follow
Kennedy’s advice that the rhetoric of selling out
be retained but taken more seriously, then per-
haps one should first insist on narrow interpreta-
tions of such retained terms, in order to target the
search for evidence, facilitate the substantiation
of challenges, and preserve a presumption of
innocence.
Claims of racial disloyalty need further analy-
sis. If members of socially suppressed racial groups
should feel racial loyalty, what sort of “should”
judgments are essential, and how might they be
justified? The explication can occur along two
dimensions or types of modality. First, it can be
explicated as a “should” of personal self-interest,
group (self-)interest, group self-perfection (or
group survival), political advantage consequence,
or some moral type. Psychologist Janet Helms
and nigrescence theorists hold that racial loyalty,
pride, and a sense of belonging may be aspects of
a Black person’s mental health. Second, within
the moral, any “should”-judgment needs to be
specified as one of morally virtuous action, of
what morally fulfills or realizes the self, of what
has or brings intrinsic value, of what is admirable/
supererogatory, or of interpersonal duty to the
group. Sellouts described by Kennedy know they
act against their race’s interest, which shows lim-
its to their concern for others of their race. That
raises the question of whether they are viciously
neglectful, insensitive, or uncaring toward others.
Even if there is some responsibility not to avoid
defection borne by all or some of those in the
group, it needs to be shown when and why that
ethic takes precedence over someone’s other
responsibilities and virtues. The widespread view
that a people’s race is their identity tends to exac-
erbate this problem.
What Is the Morality of Racial Solidarity?
It can be argued that Kennedy goes too far when
he suggests that elite Black law students and gradu-
ates owe nothing to Black people (or, what may be
different, to the U.S. Black community) and should
simply go into whatever parts of the law they find

fulfilling. They may reasonably see adopting the
goal of racial advancement as one legitimate way
of expressing justified gratitude to those forebears
who worked and sacrificed in ways from which
they have benefitted. Gratitude is owed to those
who sacrificed to help people like oneself (e.g., civil
rights pioneers who worked to break down barri-
ers that would otherwise still be obstructing people
today), and this can take the form of today’s ben-
eficiaries adopting the project of Black advance-
ment. In contrast, efforts to ground a moral virtue
(or even duty) of racial loyalty, trust, special affec-
tion, or pride in appeals to a presumed shared
racial identity, or to conceiving a race as a family,
may be implausible. An individual’s adhering to
any of what Shelby posits as Black people’s shared
values and goals should be justified, one by one, by
independent moral considerations.
As noted earlier, for someone to undertake a
project that has as its goal to become more (ste-
reo)typically Black, Latina/o, or other, is a dubi-
ous project, securing no clear benefit even if
successful. Rather, it could be harmful. Shelby
suggests that poorer and less privileged Black
people may be justified in demanding explicit
signs of racial loyalty from the more privileged
members of the group and seems to excuse, if not
vindicate, anti-White race-baiting by Black dema-
gogues as a response to this scrutiny. However,
some may see that as ignoring the vocation and
responsibility of intellectual and social leaders to
speak truth to power, even those with the power to
hurt and marginalize, whether by deploying the street
idiom of “Uncle Tom,” “Oreo,” and “sellout”; talk
of being “more Black” or “not Black enough”; or the
scholarly discourse of “thick racial identity” and
“authenticity.” Independent individual judgment is
still needed to balance the competing needs of most
people. Even taking culture as tradition, a past or
currently widespread belief about what benefits
Black people cannot be treated as proving such
claims true. Empirical fact finding and moral theo-
rizing must be done anew. Many actions that some
deem to be forms of selling out, when viewed from
another perspective, represent social progress—for
example, joining the police force, working in a
prosecutor’s office, becoming a corporate lawyer—
while those who break the law are victimizing
other Black people (in their reputation, if not
more personally with crimes against others).
Racial Disloyalty 625
Although Kennedy may be correct that we
should individually continue to think of genuine
racial betrayal as immoral, rather than expecting
stable success in raising standards for public
“conviction” as such a traitor, there may be
grounds that his legal/adversarial model for pro-
ceeding is flawed. It could be we may do better,
as a practical strategy, to develop a disposition to
laugh off such public charges as presumptively
empty and politically motivated, thus depriving
them of social power and leaving us to rely instead
on internal moral compunction against real
ingratitude and betrayal.
Many Black people may be expected to have a
privileged perspective for seeing through this
instinct to coalesce around a Black race or cul-
ture. This is potentially rife with multiple logical
errors that employ moral and political justifica-
tion. That is because Black people will often have
knowledge and appreciation of how such theories
have gone wrong in Black history, even if they
have no special (racial) responsibility to acquire,
deepen, perpetuate, or spread such knowledge.
Still, people of every race have moral ground,
rooted in the virtue of compassion and benevo-
lence, to care for the least fortunate; rooted in the
needs of comity and the common good, to help
the marginalized; and, rooted in the virtue of
(especially, reparative) justice, to tend to those
who have been victimized.
The Rhetoric of White Racial Disloyalty
Kennedy notes that some White social thinkers
take pride in proclaiming themselves “race-traitors”
for repudiating and working against White suprem-
acy. These include activists who proclaim them-
selves “wiggers,” that is, young White people who
emulate styles and speech patterns (stereo)typically
associated with urban Black youth. More serious
are scholars involved in the recent academic initia-
tive Whiteness studies—studying historically and
geographically variant conceptions and construc-
tions of race, including what some pejoratively call
“White trash” studies, which focus on low-
income, minimally educated White people. U.S.
Senator James Webb’s celebratory studies of Scots–
Irish people of mountain and rural Mason–Dixon
line border states are notable. An earlier phenom-
enon that can be seen as anticipating Whiteness
626 Reflexive Self or Reflexivity
studies was Norman Mailer’s 1957 Dissent maga-
zine essay, “The White Negro,” which lionized the
White hipster as cultural outsider and embodiment
of “an American existentialism,” adapting what
Mailer saw as the status of Blacks in 1950s
American society. However, Mailer’s appropria-
tion has been decried as just repackaged primitiv-
ism about Black people.
Seeing it as more a matter of racial loyalty than
disloyalty, Anna Stubblefield suggests that White
people should see themselves as a family in such a
way as to take responsibility for White racists’
misconduct. Racial disloyalty presents many issues
and concerns as everyday people grapple with
race, regardless of their culture or race. It presumes
an allegiance to an ascribed or avowed group just
on the basis of being intentionally or unintention-
ally associated with that social group.
J. L. A. Garcia
See also Authenticity; Critical Race Theory; Patriotism;
Whiteness Studies
Further Readings
Appiah, K. A. (1996). Race, culture, and identity:
Misunderstood connections. In K. A. Appiah &
A. Gutmann (Eds.), Color conscious: The political
reality of race (pp. 30–105). Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Baker, H. (2008). Betrayal: How Black intellectuals have
abandoned the ideals of the civil rights era.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Carter, S. (1992). Reflections of an affirmative action
baby. New York: Basic Books.
Helms, J. (Ed.). (1990). Black and White racial identity
theory. New York: Praeger.
Kennedy, R. (2008). Sellout: The politics of racial
betrayal. New York: Pantheon.
Shelby, T. (2006). We who are dark. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Stubblefield, A. (2005). Ethics across the color line.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Recognition
See Ethics of Identity; I-Other Dialectic
Reflexive Self or Reflexivity
In the study of identity, reflexivity refers to the
human capability of turning the attention of con-
sciousness back upon itself—being aware of the
fact that we are aware, thinking about thinking, or
more mundanely, perhaps, providing accounts of
our selves. The concept of the reflexive self was
developed most extensively by the British sociolo-
gist Anthony Giddens in the 1990s, though other
prominent social theorists with an interest in iden-
tity, such as Margaret Archer, Zygmunt Bauman,
and Ulrich Beck, have approached reflexivity in
different ways. It has become an important and
controversial concept in the contemporary sociol-
ogy and social psychology of identity, used by
Giddens and others to elucidate what are perceived
to be changes in the relationship between contem-
porary social structures and people’s intimate
sense of self.
Giddens’s model of selfhood consists of three
components: the unconscious, practical conscious-
ness, and self-reflexivity. The realm of the uncon-
scious is of primary importance for the development
of self—identity as it is here where relationships of
basic trust are initiated. The experience of trust at
an unconscious level in infancy provides the indi-
vidual with a secure orientation toward the world
that protects her or him from engulfment when
threats to identity inevitably come. But the onto-
logical demand (i.e., demands associated with
people’s being and existence in the world) for rela-
tive order and constancy in the reality of everyday
life cannot be met in infancy or at the level of
unconscious trust alone; the routine ability to go
on in everyday life without being overwhelmed by
uncertainty and anxiety is lodged at the level of
practical consciousness—a stock of learned knowl-
edge that has become second nature or taken for
granted but is nonetheless potentially available to
the reflexive scrutiny. Practical consciousness effec-
tively answers existential questions in the doing of
everyday life, without them having to be pored
over and contemplated at the level of reflexive
awareness. Different cultural contexts and tradi-
tions consecrate trust in the coherence of everyday
life through any number of possible symbolic
answers to the existential questions that underpin

experience. The success of practical consciousness
in defending the self against overwhelming anxiety
thus appears dependent upon the viability of tradi-
tions to allow subjectivity a relatively unquestioned
passage through the trials of life. The final aspect
of self-identity is reflexivity, understood as a uni-
versal human capability. Any awareness of self as
a self of some form or another is, by definition, a
reflexive feat. Reflexive awareness is the universal
vehicle through which we fully constitute and
maintain the identity of a self and sustain aware-
ness of it as a distinct and propertied entity.
Traditional and Posttraditional Societies
Although self-reflexivity is considered ubiquitous
in this model, the novelty of recent conceptualiza-
tions of reflexivity lie in the claim that it is only in
posttraditional societies that the self becomes a
genuinely reflexive project. This claim rests, in
turn, upon an account of the nature of recent
social changes and the impact they have upon
Gibbons’s tripartite model of self. Giddens’s
account of social change hinges in part on what is
considered to be a decisive break with tradition. It
is claimed that traditions once provided people
with fairly rigid and temporally constant points
through which to navigate a sense of self and thus
facilitated self-reflexivity within fairly narrow exis-
tential parameters; narrow because much of what
might be questioned is effectively answered by the
givens of tradition. The prescriptive nature of tra-
ditional rituals, routines, and beliefs went largely
unquestioned and combined forcibly with the
chronic localization of most people’s experience to
bind one’s sense of identity. For Giddens, Beck,
and others, this past extends right up until the
post–World War II period, before which moder-
nity was in thrall to the traditions it had created or
inherited from the Enlightenment, a period and
philosophical movement beginning in 18th-century
Europe and associated with the rise of rational
discourse, scientific thinking, and political ideolo-
gies such as republicanism and liberalism. For
Giddens, Beck, and others, modernist identities
were prescribed by traditional institutions of
nationality, class, family, sexuality, and intimacy.
Although the Enlightenment was premised upon
radical doubt, it is argued that these institutions
Reflexive Self or Reflexivity 627
continued to structure people’s identities in rela-
tively unquestioned ways—functioning just as tra-
ditions had done in traditional societies and
therefore allowing but limiting the scope of self-
reflexivity. Numerous social changes are now
argued to have propelled individual’s experience of
themselves out of the orbit of tradition.
Prominent among these changes are factors com-
monly associated with late 20th-century and early-
21st-century globalization. Rapid technological
developments in communication, travel, and finance
have led to an increase in the traffic of human activ-
ity in its broadest and most varied sense. If the
power of tradition in shaping identity lies, as
Giddens asserts, from it not being consciously
understood as tradition, then the increasing expo-
sure of humans to humans with other ideas, behav-
iors, and collective ways of doing things works
against such an understanding of any tradition.
As a consequence of the dynamism of social
changes touched upon briefly here, the institutions
through which social relations are organized and
defined are no longer held in stasis by any unifying
external criteria. What replaces stability is a con-
stant, chronic reflexive approach to knowledge and
practice. These changes are argued to have a pro-
found impact upon the structure of the self, the
upshot of which is an extension of reflexivity at the
level of self-identity. In such a world, we find it
increasingly difficult to build our life stories accord-
ing to the taken-for-granted knowledge stocks of
practical consciousness previously provided by tra-
ditions. Instead, we develop our own narratives,
and our accounting for ourselves is marked by a
pervasive reflexivity. Theorists differ substantially
in considering how such an extension of reflexivity
is experienced and what its implications are for the
future, but there is a general consensus that indi-
vidual identities are increasingly marked by self-
reflexivity at the expense of taken-for-granted
knowledge. As a consequence, ontological security
(basic security about the conditions, routines, and
circumstances of life and existence) is, at the very
least, at risk. At the heart of more nuanced theori-
zation, there is a tendency to view the situation as a
dilemma for the self. On the one hand, there is a
certain liberation and sense of mastery in being
able, required even, to have more choice in the way
we fashion our relations to others and in developing
628 Reflexive Self or Reflexivity
our own biographical trajectory. On the other
hand, such a situation is fraught with anxieties and
uncertainties—which may stretch as far as uncon-
scious anxieties over the constancy and permanence
of relationships with others—basic trust. For
Giddens, at least, the balance is tipped toward the
positive, as we can increasingly establish the char-
acter of our identity through reflexively made
choices, heralding the emergence of “the reflexive
project of the self,” as it is commonly referred to by
Giddens.
Giddens, Beck, and Bauman pursued the con-
ceptualization of reflexivity theoretically rather
than empirically. Empirical investigation into the
role of reflexivity in contemporary identities has
since gained some momentum, however. Numerous
studies based on interview data have offered quali-
fied support for the claim that self-reflexivity is a
contemporary organizing principle of identities in
relation to specific areas such as reincarnation,
emotional labor, and television viewing, qualifica-
tions based on the persistence of structuring prin-
ciples such as gender, class, and nationality.
Onetime interview studies do not reveal much
about changes over time in general, so they cannot
inform debates over the supposed extension of
reflexivity. Neither can they tell us much about the
role of reflexivity in structuring life chances and
choices that underpin the realization of “projects of
selfhood.” Longitudinal studies researchers inter-
ested in these issues have tended to view reflexivity
as a partial and piecemeal phenomenon, and dis-
cussions have been much more ambivalent about
the material impact of extended reflexivity, where
there is evidence of it, having a transformative
effect upon people’s lives. A stronger case is made
in such studies that social structure still underpins
identities in differential ways, feeding into some
aspects of the critical reception with which claims
of extended self-reflexivity have been greeted.
Critique
Criticism of the conceptualization of heightened
self-reflexivity has developed out of a number of
concerns stemming from a core issue: the apparent
neglect of the contextualized, specific, and situated
nature of the construction and maintenance of
identity. Critique has centered on the ways in
which the reflexive capacities of identity are always
already physically embodied (e.g., habitus) and
socially embedded, encouraging a reemphasis on
the cultural, material, and affective parameters of
identity formation. In assigning an increased per-
spicuity to the contemporary reflexive self, there is
a danger in losing sight of the ways in which
reflexivity emerges from a complex interface of
socially and culturally stratified (e.g., classed) con-
texts, dynamic interpersonal relations, and psy-
chodynamics. These contexts shape not only the
way choices become reflexively known and acted
upon but also the forms of reflexivity through
which the self engages with, and is constituted
through, social reality.
The structural bases for the differentiation of
reflexivity are argued to emerge out of more
nuanced symptoms of the very social changes
claimed to underpin its universal extension: a
decline in collective labor power; the international
division of, and competition for, labor; the rise of
a workforce with little legal protection; and
socially differentiated technological advancement,
including surveillance technology. Via these struc-
tures, beneficially situated groups and individuals
are able to consolidate and create new forms of
knowledge and power embedded in cosmopolitan-
ism and embodied in forms of heightened reflexiv-
ity, but it is claimed to be a partial reflexivity, not
least in terms of the unequal structural base of
privilege on which it rests. On the other hand,
reflexivity accompanying states of extreme poverty
may only bring some the starkness of the paucity of
life chances available and the relative prosperity of
others, whose lifestyles are made increasingly
proximate through aforementioned changes and
yet are out of reach. The end result is the critical
claim that the conceptualization of extended reflex-
ivity thesis relies on an excessively voluntarist
notion of the individual agent.
The concept of reflexivity has been central in
reinvigorating debates over the relationship
between structure and agency in social theories of
identity. It has been particularly useful in address-
ing specific social changes and, particularly in
Giddens’s work, remarkably adept as a corner-
stone concept in metatheorization of the interrela-
tionship of psychological and social dynamics.
Empirical support for the concept has been quali-
fied, and criticism has cast doubt on the universal
applicability of the notion of heightened reflexivity

as a response to social change. There is still a great
deal of potential, however, in tracing the paths of
reflexivity as it confronts traditional props of iden-
tity, where as a phenomenon its positive transfor-
mative power, however elusive, is in some senses
and on some occasions welcomed as very real.
Matthew Adams
See also Class; Gender; Habitus; Narratives; Ontological
Insecurity; Self; Self-Concept; Self-Consciousness;
Society and Social Identity
Further Readings
Adams, M. (2007). Self and social change. London: Sage.
Adkins, L. (2003). Reflexivity: Freedom or habit of
gender? Theory, Culture & Society, 20(6), 21–42.
Alexander, J. (1996). Critical reflections on “reflexive
modernization.” Theory, Culture & Society, 13(4),
133–138.
Beck, U., Giddens, A., & Lash, S. (1994). Reflexive
modernization. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity.
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Giddens, A. (1992). The transformation of intimacy.
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Plumridge, L., & Thomson, R. (2003). Longitudinal
qualitative studies and the reflexive self. International
Journal of Social Research Methodology, 6(3),
213–222.
Threadgold, S., & Nilan, P. (2009). Reflexivity of
contemporary youth, risk and cultural capital. Current
Sociology, 57(1), 47–68.
Regulatory Focus Theory
The hedonic principle that people approach plea-
sure and avoid pain has been the dominant moti-
vational principle for centuries. But is this principle
enough? What if there are different ways to
approach pleasure and avoid pain, and, if there
are, might this tell us something about motivation
that is as important as the hedonic principle itself?
Regulatory focus theory proposes that there are,
indeed, distinct systems for regulating pleasure
and pain and these distinct systems create funda-
mentally different ways of experiencing and deal-
ing with the world. Identity studies interacts with
Regulatory Focus Theory 629
regulatory focus theory through the motivations
that underlie selection of particular regulatory
focus strategies of an individual or group. The
process of identity development is shaped as dif-
ferent choices or different ways to proceed on a
task result from differing systems for regulating
pleasure and pain.
Regulatory focus theory begins with an evolu-
tionary perspective on motivation. Like other ani-
mals, people need both nurturance and security to
survive; they need support or nourishment from
the environment and they need protection from
dangers in the environment. The theory proposes
that two distinct regulatory systems have devel-
oped to deal with each of these distinct survival
concerns. Both systems involve approaching plea-
sure and avoiding pain, but the type of pleasure
and the type of pain experienced in these two sys-
tems are different, as are the mechanisms and strat-
egies that underlie the self-regulation. Regulatory
focus theory emphasizes the motivational and emo-
tional significance of the differences between these
systems in how the hedonic principle unfolds.
Regulatory focus theory associates the nurtur-
ance motive with the development of promotion
focus concerns with accomplishment, with fulfill-
ing hopes and aspirations (ideals). It associates the
security motive with the development of preven-
tion focus concerns with safety, with meeting
duties and obligations (oughts). People can suc-
ceed or fail to fulfill either their promotion con-
cerns or their prevention focus concerns, but the
consequences of success or failure in these two
systems are not the same. When people have a
promotion focus, they experience cheerfulness-
related emotions following success (e.g., happy,
joyful) and dejection-related emotions following
failure (e.g., sad, discouraged). In contrast, when
people have a prevention focus, they experience
quiescence-related emotions following success
(e.g., calm, relaxed) and agitation-related emotions
following failure (e.g., nervous, tense). Individuals
with a promotion focus also appraise objects and
events along a cheerfulness–dejection dimension
more readily than along a quiescence–agitation
dimension, whereas the opposite is true for indi-
viduals with a prevention focus.
If we think of a current satisfactory state of
self-regulation as being neutral or the status quo,
signified by 0 (zero), then the promotion and
630 Regulatory Focus Theory
prevention systems can be distinguished in terms
of which kind of change from 0 is the predominant
concern. The promotion focus system is concerned
with creating change from 0 to +1, whereas the
prevention focus system is concerned with stop-
ping change from 0 to -1. The promotion system
is more concerned with advancement and attain-
ment (gains), whereas the prevention system is
more concerned with security and maintenance
(non-losses). These different concerns translate
into different preferences for which strategies to
use when pursuing goals. Individuals with a pro-
motion focus prefer to use eager strategies to pur-
sue goals—strategies of advancement (a gain) that
move the actor to a more positive state. In con-
trast, individuals with a prevention focus prefer to
use vigilant strategies to pursue goals (a non-
loss)—strategies of carefulness that stop the actor
from moving to a negative state.
This difference in strategic preferences contrib-
utes to the regulatory focus difference in emotional
experiences from success and failure. When indi-
viduals succeed in a promotion focus, it increases
their eagerness (experienced as high-intensity joy).
In contrast, when individuals succeed in a preven-
tion focus, it reduces their vigilance (experienced
as low-intensity calmness). When individuals fail
in a promotion focus, it reduces their eagerness
(experienced as low-intensity sadness). In contrast,
when individuals fail in a prevention focus, it
increases their vigilance (experienced as high-
intensity nervousness). This regulatory focus differ-
ence influences postperformance expectations as
well. After success on an initial trial of a task, indi-
viduals with a promotion focus raise their expecta-
tions for the next trial more than do individuals
with a prevention focus because optimism increases
eagerness (a promotion fit) but reduces vigilance (a
prevention non-fit). After failure on an initial trial,
individuals with a prevention focus lower their
expectations for the next trial more than do indi-
viduals with a promotion focus because defensive
pessimism increases vigilance (a prevention fit) but
reduces eagerness (a promotion non-fit).
Regulatory focus differences in strategic prefer-
ences have significant effects under conditions
where there is a conflict between different choices
or different ways to proceed on a task. When
people are uncertain, they can take a chance and
accept something as true, thereby risking an error
of commission. Alternatively, they can be cautious
and reject something as true. Studies on memory
and judgment have found that individuals with a
promotion focus are generally more “risky” than
those in a prevention focus (as long as the current
state is satisfactory). Promotion-focused individu-
als are more willing than prevention-focused indi-
viduals to consider new alternatives under
conditions of uncertainty rather than simply stick-
ing with the known (albeit satisfactory) current
state of affairs. They are also more creative and are
more willing to change and try something new
when given the opportunity. The trade-off, how-
ever, is that prevention-focused individuals are
more committed to their choices and thus stick to
them even when obstacles arise.
There is also evidence that promotion-focused
individuals emphasize speed more than accuracy,
whereas prevention-focused individuals emphasize
accuracy more than speed. In addition, promotion-
focused individuals are more likely to represent
objects and events in a global and abstract manner
than in a local and concrete manner, whereas the
opposite is true for those with a prevention focus.
Other studies have found that the nature of the clas-
sic ingroup versus outgroup bias varies by regula-
tory focus. For individuals with a promotion focus,
ingroup members are treated with a positive bias
(“promoting us”), but there is little bias regarding
outgroup members. In contrast, for individuals
with a prevention focus, outgroup members are
treated with a negative bias (“preventing them”),
but there is little bias regarding ingroup members.
All of these emotional and motivational differ-
ences between promotion and prevention are found
not only when regulatory focus is a chronic indi-
vidual difference (a personality variable) but also
when regulatory focus is a momentary, situation-
ally induced difference (a situation variable).
Moreover, specific individuals can be chronically
high in both promotion and prevention, with dif-
ferent situations making either their promotion or
prevention dominate. As either a personality or
situation variable, regulatory focus affects people’s
experiences of the world and how they get along
within it.
E. Tory Higgins
See also Psychology of Self and Identity; Self; Self-
Discrepancy Theory; Self-Perception Theory

Further Readings
Crowe, E., & Higgins, E. T. (1997). Regulatory focus
and strategic inclinations: Promotion and prevention
in decision making. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 69, 117–132.
Higgins, E. T. (1998). Promotion and prevention:
Regulatory focus as a motivational principle. In
M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social
psychology (Vol. 30, pp. 1–46). New York: Academic
Press.
Shah, J., Higgins, E. T., & Friedman, R. (1998).
Performance incentives and means: How regulatory
focus influences goal attainment. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 285–293.
Religious Identity
Religious identity describes how a person or group
understands, experiences, shapes, and is shaped by
the psychological, social, political, and devotional
facets of religious belonging or affiliation. There
has not yet emerged a unifying theory of religious
identity, but the plurality contained within the cat-
egory has occasioned psychological, sociological, and
political, as well as philosophical, theological, and
tradition-centered, accounts of religious identity. As
objects of academic inquiry, religion and religious
practices can be the subject of functional or sub-
stantive approaches. Scholars with a functional
approach understand religion as performing a
social, cultural, psychological, or political function.
Those advocating substantive definitions of reli-
gion, on the other hand, investigate religion, includ-
ing beliefs, rituals, and institutions, for the sake of
understanding what constitutes religion. Adherents
of functional approaches are interested in what
religion does, whereas adherents of substantive
definitions are interested in what religious is.
This entry reviews functional approaches to
religious identity that examine psychology and
identity formation, the sacralization of identity,
religious identity among multiple identities, and
religious identity and politics. To demonstrate sub-
stantive approaches to religious identity, the entry
discusses the emergence of secularity as forming
Western identity, the negotiation of the universal
and particular in religious identity, and religious
identity in interreligious dialogue.
Religious Identity 631
Functional Approaches to Religious Identity
The following selection of approaches indicates
what religious identity does, whether it alleviates a
potential identity crisis, shapes a person’s sense of
place in social order, or provides resources for
responding to political events.
Psychology and Identity Formation
In his theory of the eight stages of psychosocial
development, Erik Erikson identified religion as an
important resource for identity formation. Each of
Erikson’s stages is marked by a conflict between a
polarity that, when negotiated, results in the per-
son recognizing an attendant virtue. For example,
the infant stage is marked by a conflict between
trust and mistrust that is resolved in hope, whereas
an early childhood stage that shifts between indus-
try and inferiority results in competence. Erikson
concluded that in order to negotiate each stage suc-
cessfully, a person must hold the elements of each
polarity in tension, rather than rejecting either.
The fifth stage, fidelity, addresses a person’s
teenage years, which are lived along a polarity of
identity and role confusion. In these years, a per-
son self-consciously asks questions like “Who am
I?” “Who do people think I am?” and “How do I
fit in?” To successfully negotiate the fifth stage, a
person needs to develop an identity that stead-
fastly coheres to an ideology. Identity and ideol-
ogy are linked, according to Erikson, for ideology
provides a way to make sense of life and a world-
view coherent enough to inspire a person’s total
commitment—or fidelity—and to allay identity
confusion. Erikson pointed out that the kind of
questions an adolescent typically asks in the fidel-
ity stage (e.g., “Who am I?”) often leads to ques-
tions about a transcendent, such as “Is there an
ultimate arbiter of which identities are authentic?”
or “Is there one transcendent meaning that sub-
sumes disparate identities?”
Religion may also provide the source of ideol-
ogy, a necessary ingredient for adolescent identity
construction. Erikson offered Mohandas Gandhi
and Martin Luther as two examples of people who
underwent identity crises that were finally resolved
when religion provided an ideological anchor for
identity. Erikson depicted Luther as torn between
his father’s expectations for him to be a lawyer and
his own desire to become a monk. When Luther
632 Religious Identity
contravened his earthly father’s wishes and joined
a monastery, he discovered his identity as the son
of the heavenly Father. Similarly, Erikson discussed
Gandhi’s discovery of Hindu and Jain teaching
when he was in his early 20s as providing him with
the resources he would use to take a nonviolent
stand against colonialism in South Africa and
India. Although Erikson comes close to collapsing
religion with ideology, he emphasized the capacity
of religion to be the object of fidelity and thus an
important resource for identity formation.
Sacralization of Identity
In his sociological theory of religious identity,
Hans Mol considered identity as a sort of religion.
Mol claimed that people have an irrepressible need
for a strong and reassuring identity and that reli-
gion can meet this need. What all religions have in
common, according to Mol, is that they produce
and sacralize identity. Mol was careful to point
out, however, that not all activities that are identity-
producing are also religious. For example, work,
play, and daily routines may produce identities,
but these are not religious ones.
Identity is a fundamental human need and reli-
gion is the institution par excellence that helps
human beings realize this need. Mol began his
investigation of identity by recounting the work of
animal behaviorists who define identity as an ani-
mal’s place in the social order. In this sense, an
animal’s identity determines his place in the
group’s hierarchy, which in turn determines his
relationship with other animals, responsibility to
defend territory, and so on. While human animals
are advanced symbol makers who can articulate
their place in social order in different ways, they
retain a primordial need for identity, which defines
their place in the group. At the heart of Mol’s con-
ception of the sacralization of identity is a dialecti-
cal movement between adaptation and identity,
differentiation and integration. To exemplify these
dynamics, Mol compared religious identity forma-
tion to an oyster absorbing grains of sand, for both
must incorporate diverse elements and transform
them into something integral.
Mol identified four mechanisms that sacralize
identity: objectification, commitment, ritual, and
myth. Objectification is a process that puts various
elements of worldly existence into an orderly and
timeless frame of reference. Commitment refers to
the emotional commitment that a person feels as a
result of identity. Mol underscored the importance
of this emotional experience of attachment as a
way to confirm a specific identity against compet-
ing claims to meaning. Ritual maximizes order and
reinforces bonds between an individual and the
community. Ritual can also do the important work
of restoring identity when disruptions occur.
Myths, as a central feature of religious life, are
interpretations of reality and in so being, they have
the power to reaffirm social and personal identity.
Mol’s four mechanisms indicate that religious
identity formation is a dynamic process that con-
tributes to a basic human need of articulating a
person’s place in the social order. Mol did not
focus on historical examples in particular religious
traditions but anticipated a contemporary under-
standing of religious identity as emerging from an
ongoing process of negotiation.
Religious Identity Among Multiple Identities
According to sociologist Nancy Ammerman,
much of turn-of-the-millennium theorizing about
identity has ignored religious identity or relegated
religion to the margins of mainstream culture, as
something that it is shaped in religious institutions
or in private. Ammerman theorized religious iden-
tity as intertwined with the multiplicity of soli-
darities and entanglements in which a person
necessarily exists, including race, class, sexuality,
and ability, among others. Ammerman specified
religious identity as the strand of identity that
directly or indirectly invokes the coparticipation of
sacred others.
Following social theory that addresses the prob-
lem of agency and structure in identity formation,
Ammerman asked whether religious identity is
formed by powerful others, particularly religious
institutions, or whether a person is an agent in the
creation of his or her own religious identity. The
answer, according to Ammerman, is both. Agency
describes a person’s ability to employ symbolic
and material resources that guide patterns of
behavior. Agency does not mean a person is free of
these patterns, but rather that the person can
mobilize them in new or alternative ways.
Ammerman confirmed that each social encounter
provides the possibility for shaping our identity as

we negotiate our multiple entanglements in an
ongoing process of revision and innovation.
Religious institutions are most often cited as
the structures that play a role in religious identity
formation. They provide narratives through which
an individual can understand his or her identity,
for example, as redeemed, one who has surren-
dered, or as a member of the Buddha’s family.
Myths, rituals, shared meals, and music provide
material opportunities for a person to confirm and
rehearse aspects of his or her religious identity.
But Ammerman insisted that religious identity is
never simply limited to a religious institution or
kept within the confines of the private. Instead,
religious narratives and practices appear in mass
media, political campaigns, and the workplace,
among other locations. The construction of reli-
gious identities is a dynamic process, in which a
person is shaped by, and shapes, intersecting iden-
tities. Religious identity cannot simply be willed
by the individual, nor is it available at an unchang-
ing core of a specific religious tradition. Ammerman
concluded that religious identity is the result of an
ongoing and fluid negotiation of dominant narra-
tives, institutional authority, and individual
agency.
Religious Identity and Politics
In his influential 1993 essay “The Clash of
Civilizations,” Samuel Huntington argued that
cold war divisions between West and East no lon-
ger had the power to shape international politics.
In their place, Huntington posited that so-called
civilizational divisions would be the fault lines for
future conflicts. Huntington identified eight major
civilizations as the broadest level of identification
a person can have. Huntington connected civiliza-
tions to religion; for example, he identified Islamic,
Hindu, Slavic Orthodox, and Western (where it
suggests Christian) identities. Huntington famously
predicted that the most important fault line was
between “the West” and “Islam” and it was along
this line that future conflicts would be fought.
Huntington’s article emerged just before conflict in
the Balkans erupted and was cast by some readers
as prescient of a new world order: Here on the
border between, according to Huntington, the
West and Islam was a region that was seemingly
ripped apart by civilizational differences.
Religious Identity 633
Nobel Prize–winning economist Amartya Sen
disputed that Huntington’s civilizational identity
was useful to identify a person’s political or social
commitments. Huntington’s civilizational approach
reduces a person to one dimension, argued Sen,
and misunderstands religious identity as univocal.
For example, Islam has adherents all over the
world and the meaning of a person’s religious
identity may differ whether the person lives in Los
Angeles, Kuala Lumpur, or Lagos. Huntington’s
premise that religious identities posit the fault lines
between civilizations masks historical communica-
tion and collaboration between adherents of dif-
ferent religious traditions. Furthermore, Sen
pointed out, each person has multiple identities
and the relative importance of a select identity can
change depending on the context or the person’s
priorities in changing circumstances.
Lori Peek offered specific insight into how the
salience attached to religious identity can be modi-
fied in response to political events. Peek focused on
the religious identities of college-age Muslim
American students in the United States after
September 11, 2001. Peek discovered that the stu-
dents’ sense of religious identity became more
important in the wake of growing anti-Muslim
sentiment in the United States. She identified three
stages of religious identity development: religion as
ascribed identity, religion as chosen identity, and
religion as declared identity.
Religion as ascribed identity describes the reli-
gious identity of the majority of her subjects in
their childhoods. Most of Peek’s subjects were
born into Muslim homes and raised as Muslims.
They reported that religious identity was part
of their everyday lives and not something on which
they reflected often. Some of Peek’s subjects
reported having been stigmatized as adolescents,
and many responded by casting their religious
identity aside in an effort to assimilate into main-
stream U.S. culture. Once her subjects reached
college age, however, they became aware of their
ability to choose their own religious identity. A
religious identity that had been ascribed from their
upbringing and their families’ religious practices
now was an identity that the majority of her sub-
jects claimed for themselves and became, therefore,
a chosen identity.
Peek described that following 9/11, one third of
her subjects developed a strong sense of religious
634 Religious Identity
identity in response to the crisis. As many Americans
did, this group of Peek’s subjects turned to their
religious identity for reflection and reassurance. In
response to rising anti-Muslim sentiment in the
United States, many students made an effort to
learn more about Islam, which in turn strength-
ened their sense of religious identity. This group of
students declared publicly their religious identity,
for example, by wearing Muslim attire. Peek con-
cluded that hers is not a universal model for reli-
gious identity formation but that her research
points to how individual identity can shift over
time. Peek’s research indicates how a political cri-
sis can motivate a shift in identity salience, the idea
that one kind of identity may become more impor-
tant than others at a particular time.
Substantive Approaches to Religious Identity
The following selection of substantive approaches
indicate what religious identity is—whether it is a
transformation into secular identity, a negotiation
of the universal and the particular, or a dynamic,
syncretic process.
Secularity and Western Identity
Charles Taylor is a philosopher whose expan-
sive oeuvre of writing addresses the historical
development of the modern self in the West. In A
Secular Age, Taylor connected the development of
Western identity to negotiation of religious iden-
tity. He challenged two extant meanings of secu-
larity, as either the evacuation of any reference to
God or the transcendent from our public spaces or
as a general withering of religious belief and
church attendance. These accounts are not robust
enough to describe our current situation, Taylor
insisted, for the rise of modernity is not merely a
story of loss or subtraction. The organizing ques-
tion of A Secular Age is how it was virtually
impossible not to believe in God in the 1500s,
whereas in the 21st century, religious identity is
one option among many. Taylor proposed a third
meaning of secularity that traces the redirection of
meaning from transcendence to immanence.
At the heart of Taylor’s investigation is the
Reform Master Narrative, his moniker for a
centuries-long process of reform that occasioned
an anthropocentric turn in Christian theology,
philosophy, art, and politics. This kind of religious
reform and its attendant leveling of social roles
prompted a drive to reorder society. A sense that
people can sustain the order on their own occa-
sioned secularity. Modern philosophy responded
through Kant’s articulation of inner sources of
morality, signaling a shift from a worldview in
which our highest spiritual and moral aspirations
pointed to the transcendent to one in which “full-
ness” is available solely in immanent terms. Western,
or secular, identity is, therefore, the result of a redi-
rection of the source of meaning. Whereas Western
identity used to be oriented toward transcendence,
modernity has occasioned a reorientation toward
immanence. There are necessarily shortcomings in
Taylor’s metanarrative, but his sprawling account
of modern identity provided an innovative way of
understanding secularity as transformed, rather
than forsaken, religious identity.
Religious Identity as a Negotiation
of Universal and Particular
A metaphysical distinction between the univer-
sal and the particular has shaped Jewish and
Christian models of religious identity. This section
discusses three examples of how this distinction is
negotiated.
A Christian theologian, Miroslav Volf, drew
his account of religious identity in part from a pas-
sage in Paul’s Letter to the Galatians: “There is no
longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or
free, there is no longer male and female; for all of
you are one in Christ Jesus” (Gal. 3:28, New
Revised Standard Version). According to Volf,
this text acknowledges that selves are situated in
more than one identity at a time; for example, a
person can be both Greek and female or slave and
male. Volf developed an account of religious iden-
tity to model how reconciliation among different
identities is possible, especially in light of the great
inhumanities of the 20th century. Volf wrote at
the end of a bloody century of battles not only
over ideology but also over identities. As he wrote,
genocidal policies were undertaken in the name of
identity in his native Croatia and neighboring
nations in the former Yugoslavia. Volf concluded
that for a Christian, identity means a change in
loyalty from particular identities to a universal
identity in Christ. This kind of religious identity

necessitates privileging a transcendental ideal over
historical identities, or of the universal over the
particular.
Using the same Pauline text, Daniel Boyarin
developed a model of religious identity that holds
the universal in tension with the particular. As a
Jewish scholar of Rabinnical Judaism, Boyarin
argued that contemporary Jews have a lot to learn
from Paul, an ancient Jew who understood himself
as undertaking a Jewish revival. Boyarin read Paul
as grappling with questions about identity that are
familiar to contemporary readers, such as whether
identities are valuable or if they get in the way of
universal community. In Paul’s claim that in Christ
there is “neither Jew or Greek, free or slave, male
and female,” Boyarin interpreted a radical call for
a nonhierarchical, nondifferentiated humanity.
Boyarin noted that in the ancient Roman Empire,
as remains the case today, community has orga-
nized along hierarchies of nationality, class, and
gender. Paul recognized these distinctions and
advocated that in the community of saints (an
ancient term for Jesus’s followers), the distinctions
no longer mattered.
Boyarin credited Paul with wanting to over-
come hierarchies that should have no bearing on a
person’s membership in community. But Boyarin
resisted what he interpreted as Paul’s related call
for a nondifferentiated humanity, a community
where differences between people are no longer
valued. Boyarin wanted to maintain the distinc-
tiveness of his Jewish identity, even as he aspired
for a community that resists hierarchy. Contra
Paul (and Volf), Boyarin insisted that a sense of
identity that values a universal equality should also
value particularity in the form of national, gender,
and religious differences. Boyarin promoted a reli-
gious identity that holds the universal promise of
equality in tension with a valuation of differences.
Womanist ethicist Stacey Floyd-Thomas simi-
larly maintained a tension between the universal
and the particular in religious identity when she
attested that traditional universality emerges from
reflection on the particularities of African American
women’s experiences. Drawing from Alice Walker’s
definition of womanism, Floyd-Thomas explained
how womanist ethics asserts a traditional univer-
sality in reference to Walker’s description of black-
ness as containing a multiplicity of colors. This
kind of Black identity points to the universal by
Religious Identity 635
resisting dominant accounts of monochromatic
blackness. Walker’s emphasis on Black women’s
moral agency is adopted by womanist ethicists as
a guide to resist dominating structures of oppres-
sion and to recognize Black foremothers’ efforts to
do the same.
Floyd-Thomas advocated a diasporic identity as
a means to redefine identity away from exclusion
and marginalization and toward liberation. She
argued that traditional universality is available
only through investigations of the particular, in
this case through the remembering and chronicling
of Black women’s experiences of, and resistance
to, the social evils of racism, classism, and sexism.
Only through contextual, material, and historical
investigations of Black women’s identities can
womanist ethics contribute to the universal task of
liberation. It is in the particularities of identities,
therefore, that the universal is available.
Religious Identity in Interreligious Dialogue
An ongoing dialogue between Buddhists and
Christians provides a syncretic model of religious
identity. An exemplary discussant is Thich Nhat
Hanh, a Zen Buddhist monk originally from
Vietnam. Nhat Hanh operates a monastery and
retreat center in France for those who want to
learn more about Buddhism. Nhat Hanh not only
encourages non-Buddhists to learn and practice
the Dharma, or the Buddha’s teaching, he also
insists that it is important for people to be
(re)rooted in their own traditions. According to
Nhat Hanh, religious identity is shaped by a per-
son’s culture, upbringing, and life journey and
should not be hastily abandoned. Instead, a per-
son should become an instrument for compassion
and change in the person’s own tradition. Nhat
Hanh uses rootedness as a metaphor for religious
identity, but he suggests that a person may grow
roots in more than one tradition. He offers his
own religious identity as an example. He grew up
and was trained in Zen and so considers the
Buddha to be his spiritual ancestor, but years of
dialogue and shared practice with Christians has
helped him to become rooted in the Christian tra-
dition and to recognize Jesus to be his spiritual
ancestor as well. For Nhat Hanh, this religious
identity is not contradictory, because he insists
that every religious identity necessarily contains a
636 Renaissance Art
plurality. The historical development of each reli-
gious tradition has meant the appropriation of
various elements from many different sources.
Buddhist scholar Jeffrey Carlson responded to
Nhat Hanh with a theory of religious identity as
syncretic. Religious identity is a dynamic process
that entails selecting, appropriating, and internal-
izing elements from a wide array of possibilities,
even if a person understands himself or herself as
developing his or her religious identity out of the
resources of a single tradition. According to
Carlson, religious identity is a composite of diverse
elements brought together in the midst of cultural
and linguistic frames that both limit and make
identity possible. To characterize religious identity
as syncretic discourages any claim to an unchang-
ing or pure religious identity that represents a dis-
tinct tradition’s presumed best lights. A syncretic
religious identity is attuned to how religious tradi-
tions emerge in historical processes that cannot be
circumscribed to absent other religious and philo-
sophical roots and ongoing influences. A religious
identity that draws sharp distinctions between
itself and other religious traditions will likely miss,
therefore, the plurality that exists within its own
tradition and overlook resources to sustain and
strengthen religious identity.
Sarah Azaransky
See also Identity Salience; Political Identity; Psychology of
Self and Identity; Syncretism; Womanism
Further Readings
Ammerman, N. T. (2003). Religious identities and
religious institutions. In M. Dillon (Ed.), Handbook of
the sociology of religion (pp. 207–224). New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Boyarin, D. (1994). A radical Jew: Paul and the politics
of identity. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Carlson, J. (2000). Pretending to be Buddhist and
Christian: Thich Nhat Hanh and the two truths of
religious identity. Buddhist-Christian Studies, 20,
115–125.
Erikson, E. (1962). Young man Luther: A study in
psychoanalysis and history. New York:
W. W. Norton.
Floyd-Thomas, S. (2006). Mining the motherlode:
Methods in womanist ethics. Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim
Press.
McCarus, E. (Ed.). (1994). The development of Arab-
American identity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press.
Mol, H. (1976). Identity and the sacred: A sketch for a
new social-scientific theory of religion. Oxford, UK:
Blackwell.
Nhat Hanh, T. (1995). Living Buddha, living Christ.
New York: Riverhead Books.
Peek, L. (2005). Becoming Muslim: The development of a
religious identity. Sociology of Religion, 66, 215–242.
Pinn, A. (2003). Terror and triumph: The nature of Black
religion. Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress.
Sen, A. (2002, June). Civilizational imprisonments: How
to misunderstand everyone in the world. New
Republic, 226, 28–33.
Volf, M. (1996). Exclusion and embrace: A theological
exploration of identity, otherness, and reconciliation.
Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press.
Renaissance Art
Renaissance art includes a variety of media and
genres, falling into the major categories of paint-
ing, sculpture, works on paper, objects, and archi-
tecture. The first four categories can be further
subdivided into panel painting, frescoes, oil paint-
ing, portraits, genre scenes, sculpture-in-the-round
(ranging from monumental to miniature), reliefs,
altarpieces, coins, drawings, prints, illuminated
manuscripts, printed books, tapestries, jewelry,
works in bronze, stone, ivory, and wood, and
domestic objects such as dinnerware, clocks, and
marriage chests (cassoni). Architecture in the
Renaissance includes sacred buildings—cathedrals,
monasteries, churches, and chapels; civic structures—
town halls (often called palazzi in Italy), piazzas,
buildings with courts and prisons, loggias, and
bridges; and other secular and domestic architec-
ture—villas, personal houses (also known as palazzi),
gardens, and grottoes. The Renaissance began as
an Italian phenomenon, in which humanists and
artists believed they were effecting a “rebirth” of
classical Greco-Roman art and life. Thus, many of
the art forms (e.g., monumental sculpture) are
related to classical counterparts. As the Renaissance
spread throughout the Italian peninsula and
Europe, it was affected by differing governments
and socioreligious movements, local aesthetic tra-
ditions, and available material, as well as new

technologies. The Italian Renaissance in the north-
ern courts of Mantua and Milan, for instance,
differed in many ways from that of the republics
of central Italy, whereas the French Renaissance
on Fontainebleau cannot be separated from the
aspirations of King François I in the 16th century.
The identity of the German Renaissance is inti-
mately linked with Johann Gutenberg’s mid-15th-
century invention of the printing press as well as
with the Reformation. The Burgundian Netherlands
housed the most important centers for tapestries,
and the port city of Venice was affected by devel-
opments and traditions in northern and southern
Western Europe as well as from the East.
Renaissance and Rebirth
Despite its origins in Italy, the term that we use to
describe this period, Renaissance, is the French
word for “rebirth.” The earliest codified usage is
believed to be found in the first volume of Honoré
de Balzac’s Scenes From Private Life, The Ball at
Sceaux of 1829, and it was subsequently codified
in Jules Michelet’s The Renaissance of 1855 and in
Jacob Burckhardt’s German work The Civilization
of the Renaissance in Italy of 1860. The Italian
word is rinascità, used as early as Giorgio Vasari’s
account of Renaissance art, The Lives of the
Painters, Sculptors and Architects. Vasari listed
three ages of the Italian Renaissance: first, the ear-
liest stirrings in the works of the late Duecento
(1200s) and the Trecento (1300s)—such as that of
Cimabue, Giotto, Duccio, and the Pisanos; second,
the early mature works of the Quattrocento
Renaissance (1400s)—such as that of Brunelleschi,
Donatello, Massaccio, Alberti, Verrocchio, and
Mantegna; and third, the culmination of the
Renaissance in works of the late Quattrocento and
early Cinquecento (1500s)—such as that of
Leonardo da Vinci, Raphael, Michelangelo,
Bramante, Peruzzi, and Vasari himself. This last
phase is now known as the High Renaissance,
which is followed by Mannerism.
The touchstone for the original concept of a
rebirth is Petrarch’s 1341 letter to Fra Giovanni
Colonna, in which he expressed the sentiment that
Rome would enact her own rebirth if she were able
to rediscover her true (classical) self. From Petrarch
to Vasari, the new humanists conceptualized their
rinascità as being a purposeful and successful
Renaissance Art 637
break from the medieval art that preceded it. They
described this art as being of the maniera tedesca
(German manner) or the maniera dei Goti (Gothic),
and the term Gothic has been in use ever since,
carrying the connotation of being “barbaric” or
“uncivilized,” as opposed to the classicism reborn
of the Renaissance. Scholarship since the
Renaissance has essentially accepted the self-
definition that these humanists devised. There had
been a series of what are now called renascences,
or brief renaissances of ancient Roman and early
Christian classicism throughout the Middle Ages,
including the Carolingian renovatio of Charle­
magne, the 10th-century Ottonian Renaissance,
and the so-called Tuscan proto-Renaissance of the
11th and 12th centuries (typified by the church of
San Minato al Monte in Florence), not to mention the
period now known as the Romanesque, which was,
quite literally, Roman-esque. Erwin Panofsky’s intro­
duction to his Studies in Iconology: Humanistic
Themes in the Art of the Renaissance of 1939
reveals the degree to which 20th-century scholars
still accepted this humanist self-identity. In this
introduction, Panofsky first formulates his famous
dictum that although there were examples of clas-
sical survivals throughout the Middle Ages in
Europe, classical motifs were divorced from clas-
sical themes. That is to say, a medieval classical
motif was not employed to express classical
themes, and when a classical theme was commu-
nicated, a nonclassical motif was used. Thus, it is
not until the Italian Renaissance that classical
theme and motif are reunited, and classicism
reborn; all other medieval examples are partial
survivals as opposed to revivals. This later con-
cept was later further developed, with some cor-
rectives, by Aby Warburg and Georges
Didi-Huberman.
Anne-Marie Sankovitch has recently pointed
out that the Italian Renaissance is not only based
on the idea of a rebirth but specifically on the
humanists’ belief that they had successfully recre-
ated a perfect classicism. The Renaissance narra-
tive of history is thus not predicated just on a
break but on the ability to overcome that break. In
essence, the Renaissance humanists invented a
powerful way to define through difference in a
Saussurean fashion. In reality, of course, it is nec-
essary to understand that there are both connec-
tions and differences between late medieval and
638 Renaissance Art
early Renaissance art and culture. It is possible to
locate significant sociopolitical shifts that had far-
reaching artistic and cultural consequences at the
start and end of the Italian Renaissance. Two of
the most salient involve Rome. From circa 1305–
1378, the papacy left Rome for Avignon, France—
the period of the Avignon papacy, which was
followed by the Great Schism in the Catholic
Church (1378–1414); this religious conflict dis-
rupted Roman influence throughout the Italian
peninsula. The Cinquecento saw the Sack of Rome,
an attack on the city by the armies of Holy Roman
Emperor Charles V in 1527 that devastated the
urban fabric and High Renaissance culture, caus-
ing the artists and intelligentsia to flee to Venice
and elsewhere.
The Italian Renaissance
In the intervening centuries, Florence rose to be the
most influential cultural center. In any discussion
of the Italian Renaissance, Florence must hold a
position of prominence, due to its undeniable
importance in the creation and development of
Italian Renaissance art, life, and culture. However,
it is often taken for granted that because it came to
pass that Florence became the birthplace of the
Renaissance, this occurrence was natural or inevi-
table. Such a conception diminishes our under-
standing of the Renaissance throughout Italy, both
in Florence and in other cities. In the Duecento and
Trecento, there were many sociopolitical, cultural,
and aesthetic factors in play, with cities and artists
experiencing triumphs and reversals of fortunes.
For instance, Florence and Siena were urbanistic
and aesthetic competitors; in the Duecento and
Trecento, they competed in the building of their
cathedral complexes and town halls, and the
Florentine Giotto’s and the Sienese Duccio’s picto-
rial inventions are of equal import. Indeed, if
Filippo Brunelleschi had not spectacularly solved
the problem of the dome of the Florentine
Cathedral, the center of the Renaissance may have
been elsewhere.
Also interconnected with the idea of a rebirth
are the twin poles of the Italian Renaissance: imita-
tion and invention. Renaissance art is judged by
these criteria, to the degree to which a work can be
seen to be an imitation of a classical precedent and
to be a new and individual invention. These criteria
seem to be paradoxical, but they are not, as inven-
tion is in part defined by a fidelity to classical ideas,
and imitation is in part defined as an ability to act
as classical artists did, not necessarily to copy them
per se. Further, invention and imitation are the two
skills necessary to create art that mimics the prin-
ciples of the natural world: paintings that employ
one-point perspective, sculptures of figures that are
of human proportions, buildings whose architec-
tural members are based on the scale and ratio of
the human body. Indeed, the motivations behind
movements toward such naturalism are complex,
going beyond a simple desire for a classical rebirth.
Scholars have shown, for instance, that religious
shifts created by the emergent mendicant orders,
especially the Franciscans, were of great import.
St. Francis’s teachings affected both buildings and
visual arts, as a need arose for accessible buildings
in which one could speak to and welcome masses
of people, accompanied by a need for imagery that
could illustrate stories and theology in vivid and
legible ways. These effects were immediately seen
in Siena, Florence, Padua, and Assisi. Likewise, in
Dominion of the Eye, Marvin Trachtenberg has
shown that the nascent Florentine republican gov-
ernment, the Commune, was invested in creating
an urban fabric that was constructed specifically to
order space on a human scale, for purposes of
communication and control.
The Renaissance in Northern Europe
The issue of imitation and invention is also integral
to any definition of the Renaissance outside the
Italian peninsula. One criterion applied is that of
humanism and classicism. For France, the use of
this criterion is largely accurate. The Renaissance
in France can be traced to King François I’s explicit
desire and purposeful intent to import Italian clas-
sicism and humanism in contrast to the lingering
court style of the French Gothic. In 1527, he
embarked upon a large-scale building campaign in
the Île-de-France, and beginning in 1530, he
invited a series of Italian artists to Fontainebleau,
including Rosso Fiorentino, Primaticcio, Nicolò
del Abate, and Cellini. These artists helped influ-
ence French-born artists, so that a generation later,
Jean Cousin, François Clouet, and Jean Goujon, as
well as the architects Philibert de L’Orme and
Pierre Lescot, were working in an idiom both

French and classical. If we judge German art by the
same standard, the German Renaissance begins
with the works of Albrecht Dürer, a humanist-
artist who traveled specifically to Italy and who stud-
ied Italian prints and humanist ideas. Likewise, in
the Netherlands, the classicism of the Renaissance
was also introduced primarily via prints, especially
those of Raphael, as well as printed architectural
treatises, starting with Peiter Coecke van Aelst’s
publication of a Dutch translation of Serlio’s trea-
tise in 1539 in Antwerp, which was followed by
Hans Vredeman de Vries’s pattern book and edi-
tions of Vitruvius and Serlio.
Another criterion that is more helpful for an
understanding of the Northern Renaissances of
Germany and the Netherlands is a more general
conceptualization of the humanist endeavor.
Humanism is in part predicated on a belief in the
individual, or, as some scholars note, in a privileg-
ing of human ideas over divine control and inter-
vention. It is thus possible to find parallels that may
not have their roots in classicism but that are none-
theless linked to this exploration of a modern
human identity. In this context, it is helpful to
examine the genre of portraiture. Certainly the
interest in the self-portrait is both strictly classical
and also reflects an exploration of the identity of an
individual. If we use the interest in, and attention
to, portraiture as a detail, then we can locate a
Northern Renaissance in the early 15th century,
and not only in the 16th century. We are thus able
to discuss artists such as Claus Sluter, Jan van Eyck,
Robert Campin, Rogier van der Weyden, and
Konrad Witz, without losing major figures such as
Dürer, who was famous for his self-portraits, or
excluding other later artists such as Hans Holbein
the Younger, Quentin Metsys, and Joos van Cleve,
all known for their portraits. Furthermore, this
criterion has the added benefit of revealing critical
difference between northern and southern renais-
sances. In Italy, portraits were primarily profiles,
created in imitation of antique coins. In the North,
there was a significant interest in the three-quarter
view, in which both the profile and the full face are
depicted. Thus, we see two portrait traditions, con-
nected by an interest in naturalism and the indi-
vidual; this way of looking encompasses but is not
dependent upon humanism and classicism. This
standard also has the benefit of being linked not
only to Renaissance narratives, but also with those
Renaissance Art 639
detailing art of the North after the Renaissance.
In The Art of Describing: Dutch Art of the
Seventeenth Century, Svetlana Alpers offers an
analysis of northern art as one predicated on
description rather than representation or narrative,
noting that the metaphor in question here is not
that of a window (Italian Albertian perspective) but
of a mirror, or a map. Overall, then, applying such
criteria also allows us to understand the bridge
between Renaissance and Reformation ideals. As
Stephen Greenblatt has powerfully argued in rela-
tion to English culture, in Renaissance Self-
Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare, during this
time, there was a strong belief both in the existence
of individual identity and of one’s ability to shape
one’s own identity; these concepts are found in
Renaissance and Reformation alike. It is in part for
reasons such as this that scholars have argued for
the term early modern to describe this time period,
both in Europe and in the New World.
Beyond the Normative Renaissance
There is a corollary issue that arises in a dis­
cussion of identity and identification in and of
the Renaissance, and this is the question as to
whose Renaissance it is. In defining the Renaissance
and Renaissance art, the Otherness of gender, sexu-
ality, religion, and geographical location is critical.
Many excellent anthologies on the issue of gender
and sexuality in Renaissance art have been pub-
lished, including Rewriting the Renaissance:
The Discourses of Sexual Difference in Early
Modern Europe and Picturing Women in
Renaissance and Baroque Italy. From the middle to
the end of the 16th century, and beyond, we have
knowledge of a number of strong female artists in
the Italian and Northern Renaissances, including
Sofonisba Anguissola, Lavinia Fontana, Caterina
van Hemessen, and Levina Teerlinc, some of whom
are discussed by Vasari in his Lives. Before the
16th century, there is evidence of strong female
patronage of the arts and architecture, by women
such as Catherine de’ Medici, Isabelle d’Este,
Caterina Piccolomini, and numerous other noble
women in the North, as well as by now-anonymous
women. In terms of religious structures, scholars
have studied nuns and abbesses who were patrons,
as well as investigated buildings and works of art
that were commissioned for them to order their
640 Renaissance Art
space, life, and beliefs. In addition, female saints,
especially the Virgin Mary, were an important facet
of Renaissance art, providing exempla for men and
women throughout Europe of all socioeconomic
strata. The “fallen” women of the Bible, such as
Eve and Mary Magdalene, also appeared in
Renaissance art, as part of a moralized tale, an
eroticized image, or both. Likewise, scholars such
as Sarah Blake McHam and Geraldine Johnson
have shown how the images and identities of
women from mythology and the Bible were co-
opted to stand as metaphors of political and per-
sonal power and control, especially as monumental
sculptures in public spaces; of particular interest is
McHam’s 2001 article in Art Bulletin, “Donatello’s
Bronze David and Judith as Metaphors of Medici
Rule in Florence.” Returning to the issue of portrai-
ture, the role of women is the exploration of identity
is paramount. Elizabeth Cropper has investigated
the ways in which female beauty has functioned
rhetorically. Likewise, in a 1995 article in Zeitschrift
für Kunstgeschichte, “Looking a Sight: Sixteenth-
Century Portraits of Woman Artists,” Catherine
King has revealed the strategies that were available
to female artists in creating self-portraits in which
they could both etch out their own identities and
work within the recognizable and available portrait
conventions. Male homoeroticism in Renaissance
art has long been understood and explored, notably
in Leonard Barkan’s 1991 Transuming Passion:
Ganymede and the Erotics of Humanism, and
recent scholarship has turned its attention to les-
bian identities and cross-dressing.
In terms of dealing with cross-currents of
Otherness in Europe and beyond, including trans-
atlantic studies, the most critical work to emerge is
found in Reframing the Renaissance: Visual Culture
in Europe and Latin America, 1450–1650. Two
essays in particular provide much-needed informa-
tion with regard to the European interaction with
the so-called New World. Cecilia Klein reveals
how European writers and artists manipulated the
forms and identities of indigenous goddesses to
create imagery of domination and control. Dana
Leibsohn traces the fascinating clash of traditions
that occurred when Europeans commissioned maps
from chthonic artists, whose cartographic conven-
tions were neither Cartesian nor Albertian.
Likewise, the work of Thomas da Costa Kaufmann
and Jonathan B. Reiss provides much-needed
information about interactions between Italian art-
ists and other European cultures, as well as issues
within Italian society. Kaufmann discusses Italian
sculptors working outside of Italy, in areas such as
Hungary and Poland, and Reiss addresses the issue
of anti-Semitism in Luca Signorelli’s Rule of
Antichrist in the Cappella Nuova of Orvieto
Cathedral. Anthony Cutler’s analysis of the ways
that the European Renaissance defined Byzantine
art, and the ways in which modern scholarship has
continued to follow these identifications, brings
us full circle to the issue of the Renaissance self-
identification against the medieval and its ramifi-
cations for Renaissance art in the East and the
West. As the act of self-identification is quintes-
sentially modern, it may be that the term early
modern art is a fuller, more evocative descriptor of
the art and culture both within and outside and
beyond Italy, able to contain the concept of an
intentional rebirth as well as other interests in the
individual and the natural world.
Mia Reinoso Genoni
See also Architecture, Sites, and Spaces; Other, The
Further Readings
Aikema, B., Brown, B. L., & Nepi Sciré, G. (2000).
Renaissance Venice and the North: Crosscurrents in
the time of Bellini, Dürer, and Titian. New York:
Rizzoli.
Baxandall, M. (1971). Giotto and the orators: Humanist
observers of painting in Italy and the discovery of
pictorial composition, 1350–1450. Oxford, UK:
Clarendon Press.
Farago, C. J. (Ed.). (1995). Reframing the Renaissance:
Visual culture in Europe and Latin America, 1450–
1650. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Ferguson, M. W., Quilligan, M., & Vickers, N. J. (Eds.).
(1986). Rewriting the Renaissance: The discourses of
sexual difference in early modern Europe. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Johnson, G. A., & Matthews Grieco, S. F. (Eds.). (1997).
Picturing women in Renaissance and Baroque Italy.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
McIver, K. A. (2006). Women, art, and architecture in
Northern Italy, 1520–1580: Negotiating power.
Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Paoletti, J. T., & Radke, G. M. (2005). Art in
Renaissance Italy (3rd ed.). London: Laurence King.

Payne, A., Kuttner, A. L., & Smick, R. (2000). Antiquity
and its interpreters. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Sankovitch, A.-M. (2006, Spring/Autumn). Anachronism
and simulation in Renaissance architectural theory.
Res, 49/50, 189–203.
Snyder, J., Silver, L., & Luttikhuizen, H. (2005).
Northern Renaissance art: Painting, sculpture, the
graphic arts from 1350 to 1575 (2nd ed.). Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Trachtenberg, M. (1997). Dominion of the eye:
Urbanism, art, and power in early modern Florence.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Zerner, H. (2003). Renaissance art in France: The
invention of classicism (D. Dusinberre, S. Wilson, &
R. Zerner, Trans.). Paris: Flammarion.
Rhetoric
Rhetoric may be defined as persuasive communi-
cation, written or oral, formal or informal; a ver-
bal art or a type of poetics; or an academic
discipline concerned with persuasive communica-
tion. In his seminal work, Rhetoric, Aristotle pro-
vided the original, neutral definition of the concept
as simply “the available means of persuasion.”
The content and style of one’s rhetoric can help to
convey to others information about one’s politics,
geographic region, nationality, race, socioeco-
nomic status, age, religion, level of education, and
other critical aspects of self. Depending on its
content, for example, one may be correctly or
incorrectly labeled “right-wing,” “left-wing,”
“feminist,” “chauvinist,” “fundamentalist,” and
so on. This entry explores various aspects and
issues of rhetoric, including appeals and canons,
history, verbal art or poetics, performance, variet-
ies, and tropes and schemes.
Appeals and Canons of Rhetoric
In Rhetoric, Aristotle outlines three modes or
appeals of rhetoric: logos (reason), pathos (emo-
tion), and ethos (ethics). To have maximum per-
suasiveness, a message or speech must appeal to
audience members in each of these three ways;
that is, it must be logical and well constructed, it
must touch the hearer emotionally, and it must be
Rhetoric 641
presented by someone who is ethical (or who at
least is believed to be a person of integrity).
The five canons of rhetoric are inventio (pre-
writing), dispositio (arrangement), elocutio (style),
memoria (memorization), and pronuntiatio (deliv-
ery). Inventio involves planning and research to
give one’s communication substance. Arrangement,
selection, and use of words, figures of speech, var-
ied sentence types, and paragraphs for greatest
effect are all the purview of dispositio. Style (elo-
cutio) can be formal or informal, depending on the
type of audience for which one writes or performs.
With respect to memoria, orators often make use
of various mnemonic devices to help them memo-
rize material they will perform or execute verbally.
Lastly, pronuntiatio (delivery) is key to persuasive-
ness. A powerfully written message with limp or
lukewarm delivery loses much of its effectiveness
for an audience.
History
Classical Greek Rhetoric and
Its Relationship to African Oratory
Many textbooks begin discussion of rhetoric’s
history at the 4th and 5th centuries BC with the
work of Aristotle, Socrates, and others who high-
lighted techniques for persuasive argumentation in
the courtroom and other settings, and there is
debate about the influence of African oratory on
Greek rhetoric. The question arises, for instance, as
to whether the Greeks invented or merely cata-
logued tropes and schemes they learned from
African orators. Deborah Sweeney’s study of law
and rhetoric in ancient Egypt uncovers the use of
repetition, parallelism, antithesis, hyperbole, meta-
phor, and other tropes and schemes. The current
intellectual milieu is one of increasing suspicion of
revisionist history in textbooks, history that high-
lights European civilizations and their achieve-
ments and overlooks non-Western civilizations and
their contributions to rhetoric and other fields.
Certain anthropological and rhetorical sources,
by African, African American, and White scholars,
suggest that whereas ancient Greeks acknowl-
edged the influence of Egyptians on their culture,
later Eurocentric scholars, with their own agenda
of establishing and maintaining views of White
642 Rhetoric
superiority, sought to diminish, if not outright
deny, this African influence. James Berlin and
other scholars committed to recovery of a history
that fully describes the extensive cultural exchanges
that went on between persons of ancient Greece
and Egypt suggest, for instance, that Socrates and
others studied in Egypt and brought back what
they learned to help shape the teaching of rhetoric
and other aspects of Greek civilization.
Martin Bernal, Carol Lipson, Roberta Binkley,
Jacob Carruthers, Cheikh Anta Diop, Lucy Xing
Lu, and others have written extensively on issues
related to the Eurocentric slant on the history of
rhetoric and the distortion of world history in gen-
eral. In Black Athena Writes Back, Bernal describes
the difference between an Aryan model of history,
which asserts that Greece was conquered from
persons to its north and that there was no philoso-
phy before the Greeks, and an ancient model,
which highlights the interchanges between Greece
and Egypt. Bernal notes that the ancient model
was not doubted until the end of the 18th century,
and it was not seriously challenged until the 1820s.
He proposes a “revised ancient model,” one that
acknowledges dual influence on Greece of cultural
practices from peoples both to the north and south
of that country.
Split of Rhetorical Studies and Composition
Rhetoric also is an academic discipline. Two
crucial splits occurred in the early 1900s between
the teaching of oral and written rhetoric (the his-
tory, theory, and practice of persuasive communi-
cation) and the teaching of composition (basic
writing). With regard to the teaching of oral
rhetoric (specifically, elocution and debate), such
instruction saw a decline for the period 1860 to
1910, then experienced a renaissance beginning
in 1914 when the National Association of
Academic Teachers of Public Speaking (now the
National Communication Association) broke
away from the National Council of Teachers of
English.
A watershed moment occurred in the early
1900s with respect to written rhetoric instruction
when the previous approach to rhetorical studies
of continental Europe shifted from a focus on the
rhetorical thought and methods of ancient philoso-
phers to focus on technical mechanics of the writ-
ing process. Specifically, with the advent in 1907
of Edwin C. Woolley’s Handbook of Composition:
A Compendium of Rules, written rhetorical instruc-
tion languished as the handbook era began.
Woolley’s was the first college-level text of its
kind, unapologetically covering every aspect of
mechanical correction (spelling, grammar, punc-
tuation, etc.) at a very basic level. Edward
P. J. Corbett and Robert J. Connors suggest that it
was Cornell University that revived interest in clas-
sical rhetoric in the 1920s by establishing a semi-
nar in which students read and discussed the
works of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. As
graduates from that program went on to be hired
at schools in other parts of the country, renewed
interest in rhetoric occurred.
Verbal Rhetoric, Poetics, and Performance
In his work on language and artful verbal structure
(poetics), Roman Jakobson outlines six functions of
language and identifies the appropriate function of
poetics within these. In brief, the constitutive fac-
tors of any speech event are as follows: An addresser
sends a message to an addressee. To be understood,
the message must have a context, a code or lan-
guage, and a contact (physical channel and psycho-
logical connection that allow addresser and
addressee to enter and remain in communication).
The functions can be diagrammed as follows:
Referential
(Context)
Emotive Poetic Conative
(Addresser) (Message) (Addressee)
Phatic
(Contact)
Metalingual
(Code)
If we try to relate the diagram to a piece of
political rhetoric, such as U.S. Senator Barack
 Rhetoric 643

2008 Presidential Election

(Democratic National Convention)
Impassioned Orator Nomination Speech National Audience
(Senator Obama) (Message about change he plans to bring to (Americans who construe or
America) interpret his message as
TV, Cable, Internet/ convincing or not)

Relationship Between Obama and “The Public”

(Their shared concern over what is good for
the country)
Standard American English
(Polished version, charismatic in its delivery)

Obama’s Nomination Acceptance Speech, given
in August 2008 at the Democratic National
Convention at the Pepsi Center in Denver, it might
look like the the chart above.
Rhetorical Frames and Performance
In his work Verbal Art as Performance, scholar
Richard Bauman suggests that modern theorists in
a variety of disciplines, including anthropology,
linguistics, and literature, tend to have a text-
centered approach to the notion of verbal art or
oral literature, focusing on “special usages or pat-
terning of formal features within texts” (p. 7).
Specifically, he notes that theorists such as Roman
Jakobson and Edward Stankiewicz focus on the
message for its own sake, whereas others, such as
William Bascom, are greatly concerned with the
way a message is expressed or presented. Still oth-
ers, like Bohuslav Havránek, suggest that verbal
art has to do with maximized, conspicuous use of
oratorical devices.
By contrast, Bauman wants to study the nature
of performance and distinguish it from other ways
of speaking. His approach involves particular
attention to Gregory Bateson’s notion of the inter-
pretive frame or context within which messages are
to be understood. In addition to the literal, there
are many other types of communicative frames that
vary by culture. These include but are not limited
to insinuation, joking, imitation, translation, quo-
tation, conversational speech, ceremonial speech,
and storytelling (viewed as straight speech in some
cultures and as performative speech in others).
Bauman recognizes performance as a distinctive
frame that involves, among other things, a display
of communicative competence, accountability to
the audience for which the communication is
given, and delivery that heightens enjoyment for
hearers of this act of expression. He views perfor-
mance as constitutive of verbal art or verbal
rhetoric.
Performance verbal art types, features, and
styles vary from speech community to speech
community. Here are two examples from
Latino/a rhetoric. Sociolinguistics ethnographer
Marcia Farr has done extensive research on the
Mexican speech event (or frame) relajo (“jok-
ing”) and the Mexican ranchero speech style
known as franqueza (“frankness”). Farr defines
relajo as a Mexican speech event or oral perfor-
mance during which normal seriousness is sus-
pended, and individuals can deliberately breach
the prevailing code of propriety by which they
usually live. Her study of verbal art among
Mexicanas in Chicago contains details of an
oral performance in which the focus is changing
gender roles of Mexican and Mexican American
women. Relajo provides a social space in which
tensions can be released and those participating
644 Rhetoric
can collectively explore community values criti-
cally and humorously.
Franqueza, according to Farr, is direct, straight-
forward, candid language that goes directly to a
point. It is the speech of the rancher who owns
property and takes a proud, egalitarian stance with
landowner bosses of large farm cooperatives. Farr
says this contrasts with the cortesia or indirect
verbal politeness style of speech used by the stereo-
typical indigenous Mexican Indian, who stands
with a bowed head and hat in hand before land
bosses.
Varieties of Specialized Rhetoric
Studies abound on specialized varieties of rhetoric.
Dell Hymes has chronicled aspects of Native
American ethnopoetics. In addition to Farr, Victor
Villanueva and Jose Gutiérrez also have detailed
elements of Hispanic or Latino/a rhetoric. Ronald
L. Jackson II, Elaine Richardson, John Lucaites,
Michelle Condit, Richard Riecke, and James
Golden are among those who have provided
groundbreaking scholarship on African American
rhetoric. Gerald Davis, Henry Mitchell, Katie
Cannon, Susan Bond, and others have written
comprehensively about the Black sermon as a spe-
cial form of rhetoric. Arla Bernstein, Kristina Horn
Sheeler, and others are to be credited for creative,
insightful scholarship on women’s political rheto-
ric. Various other scholars have tackled Asian and
other types of rhetoric.
As an example of the kind of rhetorical concep-
tual work available, the work of Maulana Karenga
on African rhetoric and its relation to African
American rhetoric will be considered briefly.
Maulana Karenga outlines four characteristics of
African American rhetorical communicative prac-
tice, which is rooted in African rhetoric. Specifically,
this practice features rhetoric of community, rhet-
oric of resistance, rhetoric of reaffirmation, and
rhetoric of possibility.
Drawing on the works of Molefi Asante, Shirley
Wilson Logan, and others, Karenga describes
African American rhetoric as one of community,
involving communal dialogue and action to bring
positive outcomes in the community and the
world. The community context, one of historical
enslavement and ongoing systematic oppression,
has helped to shape a brilliant rhetoric of resis-
tance, struggle, and protest. African American
rhetoric also is a rhetoric of reaffirmation. It is
intentional about reaffirming the dignity and
divinity of African persons and their rights to free-
dom, meaningful lives, and the opportunity to
share their cultural truth and their contributions
to the world in their own ways. Lastly, Karenga
characterizes this communicative practice as a
rhetoric of possibility, which seeks to share,
inform, question, explore, and investigate in order
to solve problems and maximize human quality of
life.
The work of Bauman, Farr, Jackson, Condit,
Karenga, and others makes clear that all cultures
have a variety of speech events and related inter-
pretive frames, but that the performance frame
(which is culture specific) is significant because it
emphasizes the idea of competence in speaking in
socially acceptable ways for an evaluating audi-
ence. Bauman’s list of communicative means
used for framing in various cultures includes but
is not limited to special codes, figurative lan-
guage, parallelism, special paralinguistic fea-
tures, special formulae, and a disclaimer of
performance.
Special codes can include archaic language (“We
the people . . .”), poetic language, and other special
linguistic usages. Figurative language includes the
use of metaphor and other figures of speech.
Parallelism is the systematic repetition and varia-
tion of poetic, phonic, grammatical, and semantic
structures. It can help a performer with memoriza-
tion of a written text or with fluency in delivering
a spontaneous, improvised piece. Further, Bauman
posits that parallelism is as important for the effec-
tiveness of informal and brief passing utterances as
for elaborate, public performances.
Special paralinguistic features are those that
typically are not recorded in written texts. These
include articulation, speed, accents, and other fea-
tures of delivery style. In his work on Zuni narra-
tive, Dennis Tedlock has developed conventions
for indicating features such as rate, loudness,
stress, and pitch contour. “Once upon a time,” the
opening for a fairy tale, and the common joke
introduction, “Did you hear the one about . . . ,”
are among special formulae, which often serve as
markers of specific genres.

Finally, another means of announcing perfor-
mance is the disclaimer of performance, or denial
of competence. Bauman views such disclaimers as
attempts at modesty in settings and situations
where self-assertiveness is considered a liability.
Figures of Speech: Tropes and Schemes
In the work Classical Rhetoric for the Modern
Student, Corbett and Connors describe a figure as
a type of speech that is creatively crafted in ways
divergent from normal usage. Tropes and schemes
are the two main types of figures. In her work on
conversational involvement strategies, Deborah
Tannen explains that J. D. Sapir and Paul Friedrich
use the term trope to refer to figures of speech that
operate on meaning. Sapir identifies four master
tropes: metaphor (speaking of one thing in terms
of another), metonymy (speaking of a thing in
terms of something associated with it), synecdoche
(a part for the whole), and irony (saying the oppo-
site of what one means).
The Greeks cataloged some 250 schemes, or
artful patterns or arrangements of words. A few
examples follow.
Anaphora—repetition of a word or group of
words at the beginning of successive clauses.
“Now is the time to make real the promises of
democracy. Now is the time to rise from the dark
and desolate valley of segregation to the sunlit
path of racial justice. Now is the time to lift our
nation from the quick sands of racial injustice to
the solid rock of brotherhood. Now is the time to
make justice a reality for all of God’s children.”
(Martin Luther King Jr., “I Have A Dream”
speech, 1963).
Antimetabole—repetition of the same words or
ideas in transposed order.
“And so, my fellow Americans: Ask not what
your country can do for you—ask what you can
do for your country.” (John F. Kennedy, Inaugural
Address, 1961)
Assonance—the repetition of rhyming sounds in
words or phrases.
Rhetoric 645
“Down with dope! Up with hope!” (Frequently
uttered exhortation of civil rights leader Reverend
Jesse L. Jackson Sr.)
Parallelism—the systematic repetition and varia-
tion of poetic, phonic, grammatical, and semantic
structures.
“My faith in the Constitution is whole; it is com-
plete; it is total. I am not going to sit here and be
an idle spectator to the diminution, the subver-
sion, the destruction of the Constitution.” (From
the historic Statement on Impeachment, given by
the late congresswoman from Texas, Barbara
Jordan, during the Nixon impeachment hearings,
July 1974)
Polyptoton—repetitive use of words with the same
root.
“That’s an implausible solution to a plausible
dilemma.”
Polysyndeton—use of many conjunctions for
emphasis.
“The farmer planted and fertilized and watered
and tended and ultimately harvested his crops.”
Conclusion
Crafting polished persuasive communication involves
attention to the various appeals, canons, functions,
factors, and frames of rhetoric, as well as concern
for one’s audience. Rhetoric has many varieties and
is culture specific. Its persuasiveness in public as well
as private arenas depends ultimately on how well
each of these considerations is addressed.
Brenda Eatman Aghahowa
See also Communication Competence; Communication
Theory of Identity; Ethnolinguistic Identity Theory;
Language
Further Readings
Aghahowa, B. E. (2009). Grace under fire: Barbara
Jordan’s rhetoric of Watergate, patriotism, and
equality. Chicago: Third World Press.
646 Rituals
Bauman, R. (1984). Verbal art as performance. Prospect
Heights, IL: Waveland Press.
Binkley, R., & Lipson, C. S. (Eds.). (2004). Rhetoric
before and beyond the Greeks. Albany: SUNY Press.
Corbett, E. P. J., & Connors, R. J. (1998). Classical
rhetoric for the modern student (4th ed.). New York:
Oxford University Press.
Farr, M. (2008). Essayist literacy and other verbal
performances. Written Communication, 10(1), 4–38.
Golden, J. L., & Rieke, R. D. (1971). The rhetoric of
Black Americans. Columbus, OH: Merrill.
Hammerback, J. C., Jensen, R. J., & Gutiérrez, J. A.
(1985). A war of words: Chicano protest in the 1960s
and 1970s. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Hymes, D. (1981). “In vain I tried to tell you”: Essays in
Native American ethnopoetics. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Jackson, R. L., II, & Richardson, E. B. (2003).
Understanding African American rhetoric: Classical
origins to contemporary innovations. New York:
Routledge.
Jakobson, R. (1966). Closing statement: Linguistics and
poetics. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), Style in language
(pp. 350–373). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Logan, S. W. (1999). “We are coming”: The persuasive
discourse of nineteenth-century Black women.
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Tannen, D. (1989). Talking voices: Repetition, dialogue,
and imagery in conversational discourse. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Rituals
Rituals are often symbolic and are defined as any
customary behavior or routine that may vary by
location (e.g., manners of greeting), or as pre-
scribed by religious, spiritual, cultural, or political
traditions (e.g., rites related to birth or death). Erik
Erikson described identity development as occur-
ring along three clusters: society-inward, person-
outward, and an interaction between individual
and society. Rituals may be analyzed similarly. On
a societal level, rituals have the sociological power
of making it possible for people to distinguish
between groups. On a personal level, rituals deter-
mine group affiliation and detail self-identification.
From a developmental perspective, studying
engagement with rituals contributes to understand-
ing personal identity development and also
illustrates how communities maintain cultural
cohesion over time. This entry explores the differ-
ent forms that rituals may take and discusses
mechanisms linking rituals and identity develop-
ment processes.
Rituals and Ingroup/Outgroup Distinctions
From a sociological perspective, rituals help
researchers to distinguish ingroups from out-
groups. Early ethnographic research done by
Erikson detailed the behaviors and rituals of peo-
ple native to the United States and differentiated
tribes through ritual behavior (e.g., how a particu-
lar tribe entered their homes). If a person exhibits
familiarity with a ritual characteristic of a particu-
lar group, others may identify him or her as a
member of the referenced group. If participation
in the behavior seems unfamiliar or awkward,
group membership may be considered by others as
unauthentic. Ritual behavior may demarcate not
only major sociological groups (e.g., religious
groups, ethnic groups, political factions) but also
less structured or more localized social groups
(e.g., families, friends and neighborhood groups,
office culture). For example, work cultures may
define rituals for acknowledging special occasions
for employees (e.g., first and last day of employ-
ment, birthdays, promotions), and these rituals
often are consistent with other aspects of the work
environment.
The rituals that distinguish ingroups from out-
groups may range in the degree to which they
require knowledge or intensity of practice. If ritu-
als require a high degree of technical knowledge
and language (e.g., a bar mitzvah or bat mitzvah),
participation in them may require more prepara-
tion or previous experience. The relatively high
levels of knowledge may preclude some people
from participating in the ritual. Alternately, other
ritual observances may have relatively lower entry
points. For example, observance of particular holi-
days may merely mark national affiliation (e.g.,
Independence Day). The content and significance
of rituals associated with holidays may vary
according to local values.

Psychological Meaning
of Rituals for the Individual
Whereas rituals are socially defined, the individual
often has considerable agency in determining the
level of participation. For example, one person
may participate in a holiday in a minimal manner,
such as recognizing the historical reason for the
holiday. Another person may celebrate the holiday
more deliberately, perhaps by organizing a holiday
parade or commemorative event. The degree to
which a person participates may reflect important
aspects of the identity process, particularly the
identity socialization process (i.e., whether a per-
son has been afforded previous opportunities to
participate in such rituals, coupled with how the
individual has responded to the opportunities).
On a personal level, rituals may organize and
mark key developmental transitions. For example,
coming-of-age ceremonies vary considerably in
terms of how they are celebrated and how they
acknowledge physical, spiritual, and social matu-
rity. Whether the ritual is private and can be
observed publicly, such as the donning of hijab for
a Muslim girl after her first menses, or public such
as in a confirmation ceremony, rituals are often
integral to coming-of-age ceremonies. A related
public ceremony may mark the entry of a young
person into a religious community, as observed in
traditions like the baptism of children or the
Sacred Thread Ceremony.
Less-prescribed rituals may be connected with
nearly every feature of the identity development
process. In a Western context structured by formal
education, one’s professional identity frequently
has rituals associated with entry into school (e.g.,
reciting the Pledge of Allegiance), rituals linked
with attending school (e.g., awards ceremonies),
and rituals coupled with exiting the educational
setting (e.g., graduation ceremonies).
Membership in various social groups requires
the knowledge and use of rituals appropriate to
that group. The identity development process may,
to an extent, be measured by the degree to which
a person has not only appropriated but also
explored the meaning of the rituals. Such explora-
tion may differentiate between the person
who preserves a particular ritual habitually and
Rituals 647
the person who has knowledge of the historical or
symbolic significance of a ritual and implores the
ritual not merely in a routine manner but in a way
that invokes its deeper symbolic meaning.
Ritual Use, Early Socialization,
and Identity Development
The study of rituals and their meanings to indi-
viduals may provide important insights into the
outcomes and internal processes of identity forma-
tion. Sociocultural theoretical perspectives high-
light how young children appropriate the values of
adult members of their community, in large part,
through the shared use of rituals and practices that
have particular cultural meaning in context. For
example, a young child who participates in pre-
paring a communal ritual meal to mark the boun-
ties of harvest season may orient to the ethnic and
religious identity aspects of the identity formation
process in a qualitatively different manner than a
young child who participates in ritual meals with
different religious significance (e.g., a seder) or a
communal meal with no religious significance.
Implications for Understanding Identity
The study of rituals in the practiced routines of
individuals and communities reveals how signifi-
cant early experiences may influence later identity
development markers. Additionally, studying ritu-
als and what they mean to individuals and com-
munities may provide insights into the content and
form of the identity development process.
Mona M. Abo-Zena
See also Collective/Social Identity; Culture; Individual;
Religious Identity; Socialization
Further Readings
Erikson, E. (1950). Childhood and society. New York:
W.W. Norton.
Erikson, E. (1968). Identity, youth, and crisis. New York:
W.W. Norton.
Rogoff, B. (2003). The cultural nature of human
development. New York: Oxford University Press.
Schwartz, S. J. (2001). The evolution of Eriksonian and
neo-Eriksonian identity theory and research: A review
648 Role Identity
and integration. Identity: An International Journal of
Theory and Research, 1(1), 7–58.
Role Identity
In society, individuals occupy different social posi-
tions. These social positions may be as varied as
student, parent, criminal, or hockey player. Tied
to each social position are roles or expectations
that guide people’s attitudes and behavior. For
example, the roles associated with student may
include learning new material, attending and pass-
ing courses, and obtaining a degree. The role of
parent may involve feeding, clothing, bathing,
educating, and emotionally supporting a child.
The meanings people attribute to themselves while
in a role are their role identities. For example, the
student role identity may mean being academically
responsible. The parent role identity may mean
being nurturing and loving. Thus, what it means
to a person to take on the role of student or parent
is the role identity. In this entry, role identity is
defined and discussed, and how role identities are
played out in interaction is reviewed.
Defining a Role Identity
For each role a person assumes, there is a corre-
sponding identity associated with it. A role identity
consists of the internal meanings and interpreta-
tions that individuals bring to their roles. There are
two dimensions of a role identity: a conventional
dimension and an idiosyncratic dimension. The
conventional dimension is the meanings most
people share with one another about a role based
on a common culture. Individuals learn the mean-
ings of a role identity in interaction with others in
which others act toward individuals as if they had
the identity appropriate to their role behavior. The
idiosyncratic dimension of a role identity is the
unique meanings that individuals bring to their
roles; it is individuals’ own understanding of the
role as it applies to them. For example, the profes-
sor role identity typically entails the meanings of
one as “instructor” and “educator.” This is the
conventional dimension of the professor identity.
Some may add to this the idiosyncratic dimension
of “friend to students” or “protector of students.”
Either one of these meanings is more distinctive
and not necessarily shared with others while in the
role of professor.
Role identities often contain multiple meanings.
Individuals turn to more than one characteristic to
describe what the role means to them. Additionally,
different individuals may have different meanings
for the same role identity. For example, for one
person, the student role identity may mean being
studious and taking one’s coursework seriously,
whereas for another, the student role identity may
mean being outgoing and having fun with friends
at school. When role identity meanings are not
held in common, individuals must negotiate the
meanings with others who may have a different
understanding of that role identity. They may find
that they have to compromise as to the role iden-
tity meanings they can claim and the behaviors
that correspond to those meanings.
Despite the actual meanings of one’s role iden-
tity, the meanings should be similar to the mean-
ings implied by one’s behavior. For example, if the
role identity of student involves the meaning of
being studious, a student should behave in ways
that match this meaning, for example, by attend-
ing class, taking notes, completing homework
assignments, and passing exams. On the other
hand, if the student identity means being sociable,
a person’s behavior should include spending time
with one’s friends and going to parties.
The meanings individuals attribute to them-
selves while in a role become their role identity
standard. This role identity standard guides their
behavior as they play out their roles in situations.
Furthermore, individuals will perceive feedback
from others in the situation regarding their role
behavior, and the perceived meaning of others’
feedback should match the meanings held in their
role identity standard. When there is correspon-
dence between the meaning of others’ feedback
and role identity standard meanings, identity veri-
fication has occurred and individuals will feel
good. However, when there is noncorrespondence
between the meaning of others’ feedback and role
identity standard meanings, role identity nonverifi-
cation has occurred and individuals will feel bad.
In turn, they will act to reduce the negative feelings
by changing their behaviors, changing their per-
ceptions of others’ feedback, or, at a slower pace,
changing their identity standard.

For example, a woman may characterize her
mother identity as involving meanings of being
nurturing and loving. These meanings form her
identity standard. She should then act in ways
consistent with this, such as engaging in warm,
physical and verbal interactions with her child,
attending to her child’s needs and providing com-
fort. Others who see this will give her feedback
that she will perceive as consistent with her view
of herself as nurturing and loving. This verifies
her mother identity and she will feel good.
However, if she is inattentive and ignores her
child’s physical and emotional needs, she may
perceive that others see her as neglectful and care-
less. This disconfirms the meanings of her mother
identity and she will feel bad. To feel better, she
may change what she is doing by becoming more
attentive to her child’s needs, she may ignore oth-
ers’ disconfirming feedback, or she may change
her identity standard meaning and see herself as a
neglectful mother.
Role Identity in Interaction
When two people interact, they are relating to each
other as persons with specific roles. Interaction is
guided by the principle of role reciprocity. The
idea is that for every role that is played out in a
situation, there is a counterrole to which it is
related. For example, the role of “teacher” makes
no sense without the role of “student.” The teach-
er’s behavior can only be understood in relation to
the behavior of a student. The role of a husband
cannot exist without a wife to which he relates.
If roles are related to counterroles, then role
identities must be related to counteridentities. For
example, the employee identity has a correspond-
ing counteridentity of the employer identity.
Because each person has a different identity in the
situation, there will be different perceptions and
actions between individuals. For instance, a per-
son in the student identity will have particular
goals, use certain resources, and engage in particu-
lar behaviors that may be different but interrelated
to the goals, resources, and behaviors of the pro-
fessor identity. A student may desire to excel in an
area of study, use resources such as printed texts,
videos, and the computer, and engage in behaviors
such as attending lectures, completing homework
assignments, and taking exams. Correspondingly,
Role Identity 649
the professor educates the student in the area of
study by providing resources such as books, mov-
ies, speakers, and Web-based computer material
and will enact actions such as lecturing, stimulating
class discussions, and distributing homework exer-
cises and exams. Rather than the student and pro-
fessor acting alike in their identities, they are acting
differently, with each person’s perception and
action interconnected to the other in the situation.
This interrelatedness of identities and counter­
identities is successful in situations when individuals
effectively make compromises regarding the differ-
ent meanings and corresponding behaviors tied to
each identity. Individuals have their own interests
and goals to fulfill, and these may compete with the
interests and goals of others in the situation. People
need to cooperate for effective interaction to take
place. Each needs to give up some of his or her own
meanings tied to a particular identity in favor of
another’s meanings of that identity. Through these
concessions, meanings come to be shared.
Ultimately, everyone in a situation wants to
verify their identities. Recall that identity verifica-
tion means that perceptions of the person in the
situation are consistent with the person’s identity
standard meanings. Lack of identity verification
occurs when the perceptions about the person in
the situation disconfirms the person’s identity stan-
dard meanings. Persons attempt to achieve identity
verification by engaging in behaviors that will keep
the perceived meanings of who they are in a situa-
tion consistent with the meanings held in their
identity standard. If all goes well for all individuals
in the situation, there will be mutual identity veri-
fication. However, this may not happen automati-
cally in a situation. Mutual identity verification in
a situation often requires cooperative and mutually
agreed-upon ways of behaving. Because each per-
son’s behavior is not the same as the other in the
interaction, given the role identities and counter-
role identities of each, individuals’ respective
actions must reflect this complementarily in a coor-
dinated manner. This coordinated effort might
involve individuals modifying their behavior some-
what or altering their identity standard a little in
order to accomplish identity verification and facili-
tate the verification of the other’s identity.
To illustrate how noncooperative behaviors can
generate problems in identity verification, let us
take a student–professor interaction. If George, a
650 Role Identity
student, claims the meaning of “studious” as part
of his student identity standard, then we expect
him to attend a professor’s class and complete the
course requirements. If the professor, Dr. White,
claims the meaning of “instructor” in the professor
identity, we expect him to provide the tools for
learning, such as lectures and reading materials,
and we expect him to evaluate the student’s mas-
tery of course materials through assignments and
exams. If George does not attend class or attends
class but surfs the Internet on his computer or text-
messages his friends on his cell phone, he is not
verifying his student identity, and he is not provid-
ing the feedback necessary to the professor to ver-
ify Dr. White’s identity as instructor. Alternatively,
if Dr. White does not test George on his knowl-
edge of the course material, then Dr. White is fail-
ing to verify his professor identity as well as the
identity of his counterpart, the student.
If individuals do not obtain verification for their
identities, they will become less satisfied with their
roles, and they may withdraw from an interaction.
For example, research on the leadership role iden-
tity shows that when individuals cannot negotiate
in a group the behavior that matches the meaning
of the leadership identity, those assuming the lead-
ership role become less satisfied and are less
inclined to remain in the group than if they suc-
cessfully negotiate the appropriate leadership
behavior. Other research shows that when hus-
bands and wives successfully negotiate the behav-
ior of each in a marriage, what develops is a strong
emotional attachment to the other, commitment to
the marriage, and a movement away from a self-
focus (an “I”) to a global unit (a “We”). Thus, the
verification of one’s role identity verification is not
just a result of one’s own action but of one’s action
in relation to others’ actions.
By verifying role identities—that is, behaving in
ways consistent with the meanings and expecta-
tions associated with role identities—individuals
come to have a heightened sense of self-efficacy.
They feel competent and effective. As a result of
this strong feeling of competence, persons with
higher self-efficacy are more likely to engage in dif-
ficult behaviors that they have not tried before
because they have the expectation that they will
successfully carry out those behaviors. Persons who
have low levels of self-efficacy are more likely to
shy away from problematic situations because they
feel that they will fail. Self-efficacy arises from the
successful verification of role identities. People with
high self-efficacy try more things and thus have the
opportunity to learn they are successful. In con-
trast, because people with low self-efficacy tend not
to make the effort, they may not have the opportu-
nity to learn about the things they are good at.
Jan E. Stets
See also Identity Change; Identity Salience; Self-
Verification; Symbolic Interactionism
Further Readings
Burke, P. J., & Stets, J. E. (2009). Identity theory. New
York: Oxford University Press.
McCall, G., & Simmons, J. L. (1978). Identities and
interaction. New York: Free Press.
Stryker, S. (2002). Symbolic interactionism: A social
structural version. Caldwell, NJ: Blackburn Press.
(Original work published 1980)
 S
Sacred
See Secular Identity
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis asserts that humans’
use of linguistic communication relates to their
specific cultural norms. Edward Sapir developed
and published the conceptual framework for this
hypothesis in the 1920s. In 1956, Benjamin Lee
Whorf published his work developing this hypoth-
esis based on his work using the Hopi and English
languages. Sapir and Whorf’s ideas have been
commonly known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis,
which has also been referred to as linguistic rela-
tivity. This hypothesis counters notions of univer-
sal and objective meaning and use of language.
This hypothesis further posits that language frames
human expression instead of human expression
framing language. In other words, the grammati-
cal structure and function of language shapes
human thought processes and the manner in
which humans perceive reality. The relevance of
the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis for identity formation
is that it challenges the commonsense notion that
a preexisting identity creates and shapes language;
rather, the hypothesis argues that identity is
formed and informed by language.
651
Sapir’s Concept of
Language and Social Reality
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis asserts that the func-
tion and structure of a culture’s language shapes
the perception and behavior of those in that cul-
ture. Therefore, language use and development is
relative to the culture that uses it. Sapir believes
that language and behavior mutually influence
each other. Language use predisposes choices and
interpretations of everyday behavior and interac-
tion. The “real world” is composed of the lan-
guage structure of cultural groups. Thus, the world
cannot exist objectively or in a manner that sepa-
rates human interaction from cultural linguistic
expression. Reality is subjective relative to the
development and form of language. Further, lan-
guage does not merely reflect social reality, it
determines it.
Sapir’s views are often linked with determinism,
the notion that human cognition and behavior can
be causally linked to prior occurrences. In the
instance of language, Sapir argues that linguistic
systems determine perceptions of social reality. He
further contends that cultural groups of different
language systems will operate under different
frames of reality for making sense of their social
world and their behavior in it. Sapir derived these
ideas while a student of Franz Boas, who has often
been credited as the founder of anthropology,
which is a field closely related to communication
and language as it regards human behavior. Boas
believes that each language has its own paradigm
652 Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis
(worldview) and that language serves as a media-
tor between humans and their understanding of
reality. Like Boas, Sapir asserts that language clas-
sifies and categorizes human experiences. Sapir
built on the relationship between language and
behavior by asserting that language determines
human behavior. He believes that this causal rela-
tionship between language and behavior is auto-
matic and involuntary. Because of the nature of
language and behavior, it may be difficult for
people to understand how language causes and
frames their actions.
Whorf’s Principle of Linguistic Relativity
Sapir’s protégé, Benjamin Lee Whorf, developed
Sapir’s ideas into what he coined the linguistic
relativity principle. Whorf’s linguistic relativity
principle has also been referred to as linguistic
relativity as well as linguistic determinism. In
Language, Thought, and Reality, Whorf explains
linguistic relativity as “the forms of a person’s
thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pat-
tern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are
the unperceived intricate systematizations of his
own language shown readily enough by a candid
comparison and contrast with other languages”
(p. 252).
Simply phrased, because language shapes reality
and multiple language systems exist, multiple
realities must exist also. Whorf’s notion directly
counters the notion of Universalism, which asserts
that humans fundamentally share similar percep-
tions of the world even if they do not share the
same language. He contends that different gram-
mar patterns cause people to observe phenomena
in multiple ways, thus creating cultural differences
because language does not remain the same across
all social groups. Language determines the nature
of human thought and accounts for many cultural
worldviews. Whorf contends that language creates
perceptions of social reality, and he further asserts
that language is the originator of culture. Because
language controls human cognition, it in turn pat-
terns humans’ experiences in systematic ways.
Language shapes ideas and interactions. Whorf
posits that because cognition is an unconscious
process, people cannot control their own language.
This explains how misinterpretations and misun-
derstandings occur in intercultural encounters
because meanings of different language systems do
not converge.
Whorf’s Examination of Language Systems
Whorf supported his ideas of linguistic relativity
through his research of language systems from dif-
ferent cultures. One of his most renowned research
projects examined Native American language sys-
tems and what he terms Standard Average European
languages. He is most famed for his comparison
and analysis of Hopi and English to illustrate his
ideas. To argue for linguistic determinism, Whorf
examined the constructions of time in each lan-
guage system. Because speakers of Hopi and
English encode time differently, they construct
their concepts of time in different manners as well.
In English (in addition to other Western lan-
guages), time is referred to grammatically as object
nouns. It is also described in a linear, logical fash-
ion. Hopi does not regard time in this manner.
Instead, time refers to temporal cycles, rather than
concrete objects. Therefore, time is not a “thing,”
but a recurring process. English speakers perceive
time as a fact occurring on the continuum of past,
present, and future. The phrases “She is running”
or “He ran” illustrate linear notions of time. Hopi
speakers, on the other hand, focus on whether time
is recalled, observed, or expected. For example, the
phrase era wari refers to someone running as a
recalled event, not as an observed event.
Whorf contends that the manner in which
English and Hopi systematically frame and regard
time causes speakers of these languages to perceive
and experience time according to these linguistic
frames. Hopi speakers regard time as a process
resulting in accumulated experiences. Therefore,
they spend more time engaging in preparation of
an experience. English speakers regard time as an
object that orders occurrences. They perceive time
as an occurrence that has taken place, is currently
taking place, or will take place. Because of this,
time as an object can be lost or bought. In Western
languages, a person who does not adhere to time
correctly can be considered “late” or “early.” In
some Native American languages, however, there
is no word for “late.” Linguistic determinism con-
tends that because this word does not exist in a
language, this concept cannot exist in the minds of
its speakers.

Illustrations in Other Language Systems
Advocates of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis have
examined how Native American and Western lan-
guage systems affect behavior and perceptions of
reality as well. Diné, the language of the Navajo,
uses vocabulary for colors differently than English
does. For example, Diné has two different words
for variations of the color black. In English, the
language structure recognizes blue and green as
distinctive colors. In contrast, Diné uses the same
word to refer to both colors. Proponents of the
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis contend that since lan-
guage frames reality, Diné speakers and English
speakers perceive these colors differently based on
the vocabularies within these distinct languages.
Communication and linguistics scholars have
noticed difference in language systems even when
there are more cultural similarities. Whorf com-
pared Western languages and Native American
languages using English and Hopi as exemplars;
however, languages that have more in common
also reflect tenets of this hypothesis. For example,
Spanish (a Western romance language) and English
use formal and informal pronouns differently.
Spanish uses tu and usted for the pronoun you. Tu
is used for informal contexts, whereas usted is used
for more formal settings. English, however, makes
no distinction between informal and formal uses of
the pronoun you. According to the Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis, this difference in language structure
affects how speakers of each language construct
and interpret reality in terms of the formality and
informality of social settings.
Critiques
The Universalist Position
Universalists do not support the Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis because they assert that language mir-
rors reality, not constructs it. As the name sug-
gests, Universalists believe that different language
structures may refer to social phenomena in differ-
ent manners; however, they fundamentally address
the same objective, external reality. Some lan-
guages make more nuanced distinctions of reality
based on its relevance to their particular cultures.
For example, Universalists would assert that the
differences in colors between Diné and English
describe the same reality. The differences suggest a
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis 653
variation of the importance of a certain aspect of
reality, not different realities. According to the
Universalist position, even though Diné has two
words for shades of black and English uses only
one, English speakers can modify the word black
to show distinctions between these shades. The
adjectives, light and dark can make these distinc-
tions. Further, a phrase such as midnight black
may also be used to refer to a darker shade of
black. Language structures possess multiple ways
of referring to the same reality, but these distinc-
tions do not affect how people perceive reality—
merely how they describe it.
Critiques From Nonverbal Communication
Communication scholars assert that communi-
cation comprises both verbal and nonverbal mes-
sages. Those studying nonverbal communication
believe that language only constitutes part of what
people communicate to each other and, therefore,
how they respond to and interpret the world
around them. Cultural context serves as a useful
exemplar of the impact of nonverbal cues in com-
municative exchanges. Communication scholars
generally regard nonverbal cultural context in two
categories: low-context communication and high-
context communication. Low-context cultures
place a higher emphasis on language when com-
municating. High-context cultures, however, place
a higher emphasis on the context and nonverbal
cues when communicating. The Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis is more applicable in low-context cul-
tures that derive meaning primarily from words.
Members of high-context cultures, contrarily, use
more nonverbal cues to communicate and derive
meaning when interacting with others. Language
does not weigh as heavily as a source of informa-
tion when constructing meaning about the social
world.
Functional Relativity:
Finding a Middle Ground
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, with roots in deter-
minism, directly opposes the Universalist approach,
which contends there is one external, objective
reality. Functional relativity provides another per-
spective regarding the relationship between lan-
guage and culture. Proponents assert that language
654 Satire
must be understood in terms of its function in
human communication. Functional relativists do
not focus on cognition or causality, nor do they
contend that one objective reality exists for every-
one. Instead, they believe that language exists to
achieve understanding of the social world and
communicative exchanges between people. Because
different social and cultural groups will under-
stand the world in different ways and have various
communication needs, scholarship should examine
the relationships between language use and goals
of particular cultural groups. People purposefully
apply language systems to understand their par-
ticular social context, so cultures develop distinct
and multiple ways of manipulating language to
achieve their goals.
Functional relativists do not attempt to predict
the relationship between language and culture;
rather, they seek to describe its use in selected cul-
tural groups. Language correlates to the values of
its users at specific times, so there can be no static
objective reality. With a focus on understanding,
functional relativism opens the door to learning
about the relationship between language and cul-
ture without predetermined assumptions about the
social world. This approach considers multilingual
speakers who have more than one language system
in their linguistic repertoires. Further, it addresses
language that may not be verbalized, such as
American Sign Language, a linguistic system com-
monly used in deaf communities in the United
States. Proponents have also examined cross-
cultural exchanges between people of different cul-
tures. Although functional relativity does not adhere
to the strong beliefs of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis
or Universalism, it serves as a useful alternative to
understand the dynamics of language and culture
that both Sapir and Whorf sought to achieve.
Cerise L. Glenn
See also Acculturation; Bilingualism; Code-Switching;
Language; Language Development
Further Readings
Gudykunst, E. (Ed.). (2003). Cross-cultural and
intercultural communication. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Sapir, E. (1921). Language: An introduction to the study
of speech. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Sapir, E. (1949). The selected writings of Edward Sapir in
language, culture, and personality. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, thought, and reality.
New York: Wiley.
Satire
Satire is considered a literary genre; it is often used
in the performing arts; and it is used to highlight
human folly, vice, abuse, or shortcomings to affect
a change in attitude, action, or belief. Thus, satire
refers to ridicule or criticism with a moral inten-
tion. Commonly, satire is comical although it is
not always humorous because the intention is to
encourage serious improvement in the lives of the
audience. In other words, although satire is often
meant to be funny, its purpose is not to merely
entertain the audience; the purpose is to specifi-
cally condemn the subject by drawing attention to
the subject’s shortcomings. Most satire seems to
glorify the topic being criticized, but the use of
satiric elements shows that the satirist actually
disapproves of the subject. Satire is now part of
mainstream U.S. culture and is often used in popu-
lar movies, situational comedies, and newspapers.
Often a satirist employs irony, parody, sarcasm,
exaggeration, juxtaposition, caricature, and dou-
ble entendre to make his or her point about the
topic or individual of reproach. Irony is an incon-
sistency between what is said and what is meant.
There are three types of irony—dramatic, verbal,
and situational. Parody is a humorous imitation of
a serious work. Sarcasm is related to irony, in that
what is said is the opposite of what is intended.
Sarcastic remarks require a second order of inter-
pretation to ascertain the speaker’s intention.
Exaggeration is a rhetorical device that deploys
overstatement. Juxtaposition is a technique that
places two concepts side by side for comparison or
contrast. A caricature is a description or a portrait
that exaggerates or distorts prominent characteris-
tics or attributes of a public figure either for humor
or critique. Double entendre is language that has
more than one meaning; usually, one of the inter-
pretations can be unseemly. However, some satire
relies solely on the use of humor without using
any other satiric devices such as irony, parody, or

double entendre. Humor is often used so that the
audience is more likely to receive a message that
may otherwise come across as moralistic, but some
satire uses no humor at all. Perhaps the message is
considered so serious that humor is not deemed
appropriate. Furthermore, satiric devices are often
used in other genres, so the audience needs to
know the purpose of the work to determine if it is
satire to avoid misunderstandings. Language is,
therefore, critical in a satirical work because it is
the crux upon which the clear reception of the
message rests.
This entry discusses the role satire plays in iden-
tity formation and maturation and in U.S. culture,
provides literary and cinematic examples, and
presents criticisms of satire.
Role in Identity Formation and Maturation
Satire can be used as an important tool of identity
formation and maturation because satire is criti-
cism with moral intention, and moral responsibility
is an integral part of a person’s identity. A formed
personal and social identity are both critical for
recognizing and attacking social malaise. Effective
satire depends on the moral sensitivity and critical
ability of the audience; without either, the audience
may not receive the message or may not be aware
that a message is being communicated. Without
these, the audience cannot enact the desired
change. Further, identity is influenced by culture;
so satire, which permeates culture, influences the
identity formation of many U.S. citizens. Satire
pushes boundaries and asks individuals to take
stock of the ills of their society and necessary
change: change of self, change of alliances, or
change within society.
Forms of Satire
Satire has been used in the United States since early
in the country’s development. Benjamin Franklin is
often noted for his use of satire although several
other colonists used this tool in encouraging a cul-
tural identity and set of social norms. This genre
has also been important in the 20th century, used
by authors such as George Orwell to warn European
and U.S. societies of the consequences of their
actions. Some have commented on how prophetic
Orwell’s writings have been. Other U.S. satirists
Satire 655
include Ambrose Bierce, H. L. Mencken,
Washington Irving, P. J. O’Rourke, Ishmael Reed,
and Kurt Vonnegut.
Literature
Mark Twain is another well-known U.S. sati-
rist. His novel The Adventures of Huckleberry
Finn is an example of a satirical U.S. literary work
that depicts the ills of society and the need for per-
sonal maturation; however, it is also an example of
a work that was not readily accepted by its con-
temporary audience and is still debated for its
merits in modern U.S. society. In this novel, Twain
addresses the racial tension that was present in the
United States before the Civil War. Slavery was
integral in the U.S. South, but a careful reading of
this text may reveal that Twain uses this work to
show how oppression degrades the oppressed and
the oppressors. Twain shows that people who
were considered good people did not extend sym-
pathy to others who were being mistreated, so
Huckleberry Finn, who was abused, questions the
moral fabric of the society.
As Huckleberry Finn develops a friendship with
Jim, a slave seeking freedom, he begins to assess
situations making moral judgments based on his
conscience. His decisions were not considered
appropriate according to the South’s set of cultural
mores, but Huck Finn was learning to make deci-
sions based on his own interpretation of right and
wrong. Huck becomes the moral antithesis of the
culture around him. This work, although it is often
interpreted as showing the degraded moral state of
a society, also depicts one young man’s personal
maturation. Huck Finn develops as an indepen-
dent thinker, one who does not easily conform
to the expectations of others. As he grows and
experiences and witnesses abuses, Huck balks at
the hypocrisy that he sees. The Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn is considered adolescent fiction,
so the protagonist, Huck Finn, can serve as an
example for young people who read the novel. As
an adolescent boy, Huck is in the same process of
developing personal identity and critical thinking
abilities as young readers are. However, if the
reader does not recognize this work as satire, the
example is lost and the book may seem offensive.
Because many people do not read The Adventures
of Huckleberry Finn as satiric, this work has been
656 Satire
considered controversial since its publication in
1885. Initially, the book was considered crude, but
as more attention has been focused on race rela-
tions in the United States, Twain’s treatment of
race has become more the center of contention. As
this book is vivid and the characters’ language
depicts vernaculars that were employed during the
period, many critics believe that the work glorifies
racism of the period while other scholars maintain
that the work satirizes racism in the United States.
This current controversy can reveal that race is still
an unsettled matter in the United States more than
100 years after the publication of this work, but
more to the point, it is also an example of how
satire is a genre that can be interpreted or misinter-
preted by the audience and therefore, accepted or
rejected unfairly. Interpretation depends on the
audience’s knowledge of the author’s purpose for
writing and his or her intended message.
Another commonly read satire is Jonathan
Swift’s pamphlet “A Modest Proposal: For
Preventing the Children of Poor People in Ireland
From Being a Burden to Their Parents or Country,
and for Making Them Beneficial to the Public.”
Swift was not a U.S. satirist, but the pamphlet is
considered an important work that is commonly
read in the United States as an example of argu-
mentative writing. In this work, the narrator states
that poor Irish citizens should sell their children to
wealthy people so that the children can be eaten,
thereby eradicating poverty. The narrator begins
gravely discussing the plight of the poor Irish
people and their children who are forced to beg in
the streets. The lofty language and serious tone in
the beginning of the pamphlet suggest that the nar-
rator is serious about this particular matter, but as
one continues to read, the argument presented is so
preposterous that it is difficult to imagine people
not recognizing Swift’s use of metaphor, sarcasm,
and irony.
Some scholars think that this work attacks the
conditions of Ireland and England’s treatment of
the Irish while still holding the Irish responsible for
not bettering their situation. Other scholars feel
that the work underscores the economic structure
of the period. Still others feel that the work is more
critical of social workers of the period who devise
illogical, useless plans to better the living condi-
tions of the less fortunate. Nevertheless, this work
forces the reader to look closely at the plight of the
Irish and what people or circumstances are respon-
sible for the predicament. Readers of the period
may not have readily accepted the message con-
tained in Swift’s pamphlet, but perhaps they would
have been able to decipher the metaphors and sar-
casm employed and, as a result, realize the deplor-
able conditions of the impoverished. Some,
however, may have taken the work as a declara-
tion of the benefits of cannibalism.
Television and Cinema
Many other U.S. satirists have helped shape
the U.S. cultural identity. These satirists are more
often found in mainstream United States because
they employ the use of television and cinema. This
U.S. satire usually includes humor, however, and
focuses most commonly on social ills or human
shortcomings although some satire does specifi-
cally target the political arena. Most people are
more familiar with the social commentaries because
these satires tend to be more prevalent in everyday
U.S. life. For example, many of the most-watched
or long-running television shows are satirical. It is
difficult to watch U.S. television without viewing
something that is purely satiric or has elements of
satire. The Simpsons, Reno 911!, South Park,
Saturday Night Live, and Family Guy are some
contemporary U.S. television shows that condemn
aspects of U.S. life. For example, The Simpsons
and Family Guy are both animated shows that
center on the lives of middle-class U.S. families,
but each has a different focus. The Simpsons tends
to discuss global issues such as the environment
and the entertainment industry, whereas Family
Guy illustrates the ills of a dysfunctional family
and comments on the particular personality flaws
in people of various walks of life.
In Family Guy, Peter Griffin is the patriarch of
the family, but he does not demonstrate the matu-
rity and responsibility typically associated with
adults. His wife Lois teaches piano lessons and
dotes on their youngest child. The two have three
children, each of whom has some mediocre quality
or offbeat characteristic. Peter makes fun of their
daughter Meg because she is unattractive and
unpopular. Their older son Chris is overweight
and dull like his father. Stewie, the youngest, is
adult-like, speaks with a British accent, and
attempts to wreak havoc on humankind. Finally,

the family has a dog named Brian who has been
personified, walks on two legs, and participates in
human conversation. Brian also drinks alcohol and
smokes cigarettes; nevertheless, he is considered
the family pet. Like other satiric television shows
focusing on the U.S. family—Married With
Children, for example—this television show pres-
ents the unrealistic nature of other shows that
encourage the myth of the ideal U.S. family, which
is believed to contain a husband, wife, 2.5 chil-
dren, a house, and a dog.
Reno 911! is another popular satirical television
show, and it parodies another television show,
Cops. Cops is considered a serious “reality” show
about criminal activity in the United States. Cops
follows real police officers in their daily routines.
Reno 911!, however, depicts the experiences of an
inept police force in daily encounters. This show
pointedly parodies Cops and some of the docu-
mented experiences of the real-life police officers.
Reno 911! depicts the absurdity of some criminal
behavior but also emphasizes problems inherent in
local U.S. law enforcement agencies.
Other contemporary U.S. satire focuses on
political events and attitudes. The Simpsons and
South Park are often considered political commen-
taries, although the political references are often
vague and not the focus of the episodes. Other
shows such as The Daily Show With Jon Stewart
and The Colbert Report are premised on ridiculing
the U.S. political arena as well as critiquing jour-
nalistic or media practice in the United States. The
Daily Show is a fake news show that exposes the
shortcomings of broadcast journalism. A spin-off
of the Daily Show, the Colbert Report is a direct
parody of conservative news commentators, fea-
turing Daily Show alumnus Stephen Colbert.
Colbert’s character is an arrogant, ignorant, stub-
born, and self-righteous ideologue. Colbert’s show
highlights what can be deemed the extreme nature
of some commentators who may seem to misinter-
pret or exaggerate the actions and statements of
political figures. Both shows condemn commenta-
tors and public figures for making illogical assess-
ments of political events.
Most satirical U.S. films use humor to ridicule
some political event or idea, the entertainment
industry, or human folly. These films often rely
heavily on parody and usually contain bawdy
material. The Great Dictator, arguably Charlie
Satire 657
Chaplin’s most critically acclaimed film, is an
example of early cinematic use of satire. In this
film, Chaplin mocks Hitler and Nazism. This film
bitterly condemned the treatment of the Jews and
is still held as an intensely culturally relevant
movie. Blazing Saddles, Clueless, Fight Club,
Citizen Ruth, and Thank You for Smoking are
examples of more recent U.S. satirical films that
draw attention to many U.S. social problems such
as racism, sexism advertising ethics, and contro-
versies over family planning, birth control, abor-
tion, and so on. The Wayans family is a more
contemporary example of satirical entertainers.
This family of actors and producers has made
movies and TV shows satirizing the entertainment
industry, specifically condemning racism in “blax-
ploitation” films—movies that rearticulated and
extended stereotypes of African Americans as they
were marketed to primarily Black audiences.
Criticism
Satire is often misunderstood—many people do not
take the message that a satirist expresses seriously.
Although many satirists bemoan the misunder-
standing, they also commonly complain about the
listeners who are offended by the messages that are
understood. Often, the satirist will discuss the indi-
viduals who approve of jokes or parodies that do
not criticize their position or particular experience
but who become incensed when the focus is on an
event or idea that affects them directly. Some critics
say that satire that offends them is in poor taste or
crude, as is the case with Twain’s The Adventures
of Huckleberry Finn. Often, however, the reader
has simply misunderstood the author’s message.
A recent example of controversy over satirical
humor is the public outcry over a political cartoon
in The New Yorker magazine that featured a depic-
tion of President Barack Obama. Because Obama is
the first African American president, it was unclear
to audiences if the cartoon in question was merely
recirculating racist stereotypes, or if the artist was
ridiculing Americans who held racist attitudes. This
particular cartoon featured then-Senator and
Mrs. Obama. They are depicted fist bumping—
Mrs. Obama is dressed as a terrorist with a large
afro and machine gun, and Mr. Obama wears
Muslim attire. In the background are a large pic-
ture of Osama bin Laden and a U.S. flag in the fire.
658 Saturated Identity
A firestorm of outrage was expressed in response to
this drawing, but the cartoonist claims that the reac-
tion to his work was not warranted. The cartoon
was intended to deride individuals who made claims
about the Obamas being radicals that “palled
around with terrorists” in the oft-quoted phrase.
However, many people were unsure of the artist’s
intent. Was he endorsing this view of the Obamas,
or was the ridiculous and offensive depiction meant
to reveal the preposterous nature of those claims?
Despite the cartoonist’s explanation and apology,
many people were unwilling to view the work as
satiric. Thus, there is always a risk that audiences
will not interpret material as satirical.
Role in U.S. Culture
U.S. satire is an important tool used to express
concerns about various aspects of U.S. life. Much
of it has become so commonplace that it is consid-
ered humor, but U.S. residents often do not realize
that they are being shaped by those they consider
simple comedians making them laugh. Personal
thoughts and resolves are reaffirmed by satirists
who publicly condemn many things that common
U.S. residents find reprehensible but do not have
the voice or ability to rally against.
Mari A. Johnson
See also Conflict; Culture; Figures of Speech; Idiomatic
Expressions; Language; Semantics; Stereotypes
Further Readings
Archbold, W. A. J. (1970). Twentieth-century essays and
addresses. New York: Books for Libraries Press.
Dryden, J. (1693). A discourse concerning the original
and progress of satire. In The satires of Decimus
Junius Juvenalis (Translated into English verse by
Mr. Dryden and several other eminent hands).
London: J. Tonson.
Elkin, P. K. (1973). The Augustan defence of satire.
Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
Frederick, K., & Shuttleworth, J. M. (1971). Satire from
Aesop to Buchwald. New York: Odyssey Press.
Highet, G. (1962). The anatomy of satire. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Kirk, E. (1980). Menippean satire: An annotated
catalogue of texts and criticism. New York: Garland
Press.
Orwell, G. (2003). Animal Farm: A fairy story. New
York: Harcourt Brace.
Swift, J. (2001). Gulliver’s travels. New York: Penguin.
Saturated Identity
In the last half of the 20th century, people’s daily
experiences began to be transformed through
technological change. Saturated identity (also
referred to as saturated self) refers to the idea that
self is increasingly saturated or filled to overflow-
ing by the unceasing stimuli available via techno-
logical advancements. Social psychologist Kenneth
Gergen coined the term saturated self to address
the relationship between the individual and his or
her social environment, which is technologically
dynamic. Identity scholars are interested in the
saturated self because this idea points to the mul-
tiple possibilities that exist as an individual con-
tinuously emerges and reforms one’s identity in
relationship with others. Although social and
informational technologies assault the self through
massive stimulation, they also hold the possibility
for advancing community over individualism and
promoting more meaningful relationships.
Identity: A Normative Product
In shaping one’s identity, what a person is really
like is a product of the ideological, intellectual,
political, economic, and literary forces that con-
struct culture, as well as the historical moment of
which one is a part—one’s cultural inheritance. At
various points in time, different views of the self
have dominated social thought. The romanticist
conception of self gave rise to a vocabulary of
moral feeling, loyalty, and inner joy. The modern-
ist view of personality held the reason and obser-
vation manifest in science, government, and
business as central to human functioning.
Historically, identities were seen as more stable
and reliable, created through face-to-face interac-
tion, which enabled a firm sense of self. There was
strong agreement on patterns of right and wrong,
and one could simply be.
As the modern self began to be pulled in differ-
ent directions through technology, people experi-
enced an enhanced sense of playing a role and

acting a part to achieve various goals. With the
emergence of postmodern pluralism came an
increasing sensitivity to the social construction of
reality. No self exists independently of the rela-
tionships and context in which one finds oneself.
There is no individual essence(s) to which a per-
son remains true or committed—although one
may adhere to romanticist and modern views of
the self that are also available as a possibility
within postmodernity. Identity is continuously
emerging and reformed through relationships
with others made possible by cell phones, the
Internet, and other emerging technologies. Lived
experiences are saturated with textuality and dis-
course. Popular culture barrages people with
images and aspects of potential identities that can
be purchased or developed.
Identity: Multiplicity and Fragmentation
A person shapes one’s identity by populating the self
or infusing multiple partial identities. Multiphrenia
refers to the fragmenting or splitting of the individ-
ual into multiple areas of self-investment. Each area
of self-investment informs aspects in the creation of
self—whether to invest (or not) in athletic, culi-
nary, musical, intellectual, and other pursuits as a
means to define oneself. One may experience ver-
tigo thinking about the unlimited possibilities for
creating one’s identity. A pastiche personality
emerges because it becomes increasingly difficult
to distinguish a core essence(s) to which one will
remain true. Compared with a modern sense of
self, in postmodernity authenticity becomes frayed
and a perception of superficiality emerges. As
social saturation occurs, people imitate selected
patterns of being that are introduced by others.
Each “truth” about one’s identity is constructed in
a particular moment and true for a specific time
within certain relationships. At different times,
people foreground selected aspect(s) of their iden-
tity, which is at the same time influenced by frag-
ments of other identity practices.
With respect to communication, the saturated
self recognizes that words are expressions used by
various social groups to represent conventions par-
ticular to that group. Different social groups use
different vocabularies to reflect their values, poli-
tics, and ways of life. These forms of communica-
tion become localized to participants in various
Saturated Identity 659
professional, political, religious, and other social
groups. No perspective-free position or final voice
speaks beyond the interests of a given community,
social group, or even individual. All attempts to
tell the truth are constructions of language that are
fragments that represent meaning in pluralistic and
diffuse ways. Some people find it difficult to make
a serious investment in language, which is con-
stantly undergoing change. Diverse social groups
use language differently to represent their varied
experiential realities.
Identity: Otherness
Technologies of social saturation are central to the
contemporary erasure of an individual self. We live
in a multiplex that acknowledges the interrelation-
ship of biological, social, and physical worlds. The
saturated self is not a dissolution of one’s self but
a shift to a relational self. When people are bom-
barded by electronic messages and open to unlim-
ited personal relationships, the self as an entity
breaks down and a person becomes a relational
self—wherein the relationship, rather than the
individual, is the center of human action. A stable
sense of self is replaced by the reality of relatedness
with others. Rather than focusing on personal
being, one’s role is as a participant in the social
process; each person is ever-exploring the over-
abundance of possibilities associated with the con-
struction and manifestation of oneself within the
social sphere. Living in a world saturated by com-
munication technologies intensifies the possibilities
for relationships with others and enhances oppor-
tunities for people to increase their social connec-
tions. Within postmodern pluralism, co-created
culture is the center of human functioning.
Pat A. Arneson
See also Development of Identity; Development of Self-
Concept; Identity Change; Language; Self-Concept;
Society and Social Identity
Further Readings
Gergen, K. J. (1991). The saturated self: Dilemmas of
identity in contemporary life. New York: Basic Books.
Gergen, K. J. (1994). Realities and relationships:
Soundings in social construction. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
660 Scopophilia
Sugiman, T., Gergen, K. J., Wagner, W., & Yamada, Y.
(Eds.). (2008). Meaning in action: Constructions,
narratives, and representations. Tokyo: Springer.
Scopophilia
Scopophilia is mostly related to Jacques Lacan’s
notion of the gaze. However, Sigmund Freud first
introduced the concept in 1905 in his Three
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Scopophilia
refers to the pleasure of looking as well as the
pleasure of being looked at. It therefore has both
voyeuristic and exhibitionistic, as well as narcis-
sistic, overtones. Freud believed the child’s look-
ing is motivated by an inquisitive and curious
desire to look at forbidden body parts and func-
tions that foreshadow fantasies concerning phallic
(masculine) desire, such as the shocking pleasure
of seeing genitalia that establish sexual differ-
ences. Children manifest voyeuristic tendencies in
their desire to see the private and the forbidden.
This applies to heterosexual and homosexual
sexual desire. Scopophilia is therefore a pre-Oedipal
phase when the child still continues to blur the
important distinction between an active pleasure
of looking (voyeurism) and the passive pleasure of
being looked at (exhibitionism), which become
codified, according to Freud, as masculine and
feminine respectively during Oedipal develop-
ment. Classically, according to this view, the
active voyeuristic function is distinctly masculine
and phallic, whereas the passive exhibitionist view
is distinctly feminine and castrating. Scopophilia
remains a part of our sexual identity because
through it we derive erotic pleasure in either het-
erosexual or homosexual forms of sexual desire.
The Look of Desire
Lacan linked this scopophilic drive to G. W. F.
Hegel’s master-slave relationship when developing
his theory of the gaze. Lacan demonstrated the
dialectical association between the subject and the
Other, which he claimed constituted subjectivity.
The outside societal gaze, in effect, puts one in the
social symbolically constructed “picture.” By
knowing how one is being put in this picture, how
one is situated in it—that is, by the way a subject
is being framed by the societal gaze—enables some
agency to occur. One can “play” with the expected
societal gaze to disturb it performatively and
thereby mask identity. This raises the notion of
simulacra where identity through camouflage can
take place. One can mask or pretend—that is,
feign—a form of subjectivity precisely to avoid
detection by imitating or mimicking the way the
social order is “putting one in the picture.” Lacan
made scopophilia more complex.
Visual and cultural theorists have taken up the
notion of scopophilia as constituting a look of
desire. Laura Mulvey is credited with initiating a
politically feminist agenda into cinematic studies
maintaining that the constituted screen that is
technologically materialized through various appa-
ratuses (television, cinema, the computer’s World
Wide Web, camera digitalization, cyber-screens
and so on) plays with our scopophilic drive
through voyeuristic, exhibitionistic, and narcissis-
tic fantasies that enable desire to wander about in
imaginative pleasure. In contrast, scopophobia is
the fear of being looked or stared at. Spectators
love looking at themselves in narcissistic fashion,
especially when the images they see of themselves
come close to the ego ideal they imaginatively hold
as to how they should and do look. The confirm-
ing mirror is therefore the scopophilic drive, which
assures us that we “love” ourselves in the way we
believe we look. Cinema’s attention to the human
form, in the way cinema anthropomorphizes the
image, provides ample opportunity to satisfy our
needs for likeness and recognition. When we see
other people as objects (as voyeurs), we covet a
certain power, and we acquire power in exhibi-
tionism through the desire of being looked at and
confirmed as being beautiful and recognizable.
Narcissistic scopophilia becomes an act of looking
at other people and seeing them as surrogates of
oneself. This is a confirmation of self-love.
Spectators identify with characters in movies, as
well as abjecting others, thus creating a tension
between the sense of power they receive from
observing others as being separate and different
from themselves and the pleasure received in imag-
ining and identifying with characters and people
they are looking at.
We can say that reality television, as first devel-
oped in the beginning of the 21st century, offers
the perfect closed circuit of scopic looking. Reality

television presents the perversion of scopophilia in
a society of enjoyment and consumerism. During
Freud’s time, blatant displays of both voyeurism
and exhibitionism were policed through social
norms, taboos, and rules. Beginning with the soci-
ety of the spectacle as articulated by Guy Debord,
and well into our own screen society of the 21st
century, what were considered perverse acts have
become commonplace occurrences in celebrity cul-
tures. Women can no longer be so easily looked at
as merely sex “objects” by men because women
can look back, as do hyper-femme fatales who risk
their bodies to be seen, rejecting patriarchy and
wielding power as in Rob Marshall’s 2002 ironic
film Chicago. Set in the 1920s, Velma Kelly and
Roxie Hart have killed their double-crossing lovers
(husband and boyfriend, respectively), yet they
continue to vie for stardom on death row through
media hype by using their “bodily” talents.
Complexities of Voyeurism
In reality television, spectators are always posi-
tioned as active voyeurs having power over the
subject they are seeing in containers, on islands, in
houses, or in compounds—in short, in any con-
tained identifiable space that is riddled with cam-
eras. This active looking is then perfectly
complemented by the passive exhibitionism of the
ordinary “real” actors themselves. They are told
not to play into the camera, for this would disturb
the perfect exchange of erotic desire that is estab-
lished between audience and the pseudo actors
who are quite aware that cameras are present.
Another subject position also disrupts this per-
fect scopophilic circuit and ruins the voyeur’s plea-
sure, making him or her doubt having the power of
looking in rather than looking out. This can be
illustrated by the reality game show Joe Schmo that
took its script from the film, The Truman Show.
The contestant was unaware that actors pretending
to be part of a reality show within the Joe Schmo
show were mislead him. The first season had Matt
Kennedy Gould as the “schmo” who thought he
was a contestant in a reality game show called
Lap of Luxury. What Gould did was to follow the
rules of the game to the letter, so much so that it
became difficult for audience and producers alike
to figure out whether he was “in the know.’” Was
he intentionally overplaying his part, becoming a
Scopophilia 661
hyper-exhibitionist who was beginning to short
circuit the active/passive binary? This led to a hys-
terical state that spread even to the actors. When
Earl (“the Veteran”) on the set bonded with Gould,
but was then “voted” off the show, Gould psychi-
cally broke down and began to openly weep,
unable to pull himself together. Was Gould “genu-
inely” feeling Earl’s loss, like the moment when
Truman reunites with his father again and begins
to shed tears? Or was he faking it? The actors were
not sure. They began consoling one another as
well. Were they then faking it or genuinely dis-
traught because Gould was distraught? Both voy-
eurism and exhibitionism perversely collapse into
one another with the pleasure of seeing is disrupted
because the viewers are left unsure of what they
have seen. Even the normative pleasure derived
from simply knowing, which is what scopophilia
makes possible when watching television programs
(other than reality series), is cast into doubt here.
The producers wanted to stop shooting. Gould’s
case shows how the power of imitation, in this case
over-identification, can be disruptive.
Television is therefore a medium suited to scopo-
philic intimacy. Trevor Parry-Giles discusses how
the political campaigns of presidential candidates in
the United States have to play the game of intimate,
self-disclosing style that appeals to the voyeurism of
some voters and the normative pleasures of scopo-
philic identification for others. The scopophilic
impulse of the spectator-voters has to be properly
judged and weighed. Candidates have to exhibit
moments of self-disclosure but too much exhibi-
tionist exposure leads to a loss of the sense of the
candidate being presidential, as one who is capable
of wielding symbolic capital. In other words, inti-
macy can lead to castration, a sense of impotency
and loss of authority. The candidate would be
reduced to being just another ordinary schmo—the
danger candidates face by making guest appear-
ances on the nightly televised comedy circuit.
Evil Eye
With the emergence of YouTube on the Internet, it
has become easier to ridicule the pretense that elec-
tion campaigners are not trying to garner symbolic
capital through election promises and slogans.
Campaigners become simply ordinary schmos,
caught saying outrageous statements, exhibiting
662 Secular Identity
outbursts of uncontrollable emotions, or simply
caught picking their noses or scratching their der-
rieres. Therefore, another side of scopophilia is
much more sinister; Lacan referred to this as the
evil eye. The one who is able to totally harness the
gaze through his or her look has extraordinary
powers. The evil eye is a fascinum (spell). A magi-
cian or a witch is said to possess a powerful evil
eye, albeit sex/gendered differently, that renders
the Other into having complete lack or agency;
movement is frozen through fascination. Arresting
movement or suspending it, like a doe caught in
the lights of an automobile, spells death. This is
precisely what the perverse subject of the evil eye
desires—to keep the Other perfectly passive, in
denial, and in disavowal. The evil eye possessing
the symbolic gaze is therefore a threat. Even the
handheld camera that exposes the politician
through the YouTube can be said to possess an evil
eye of power and explains why the paparazzi are
so hated by celebrities who are afraid of being
photographed off guard. Consider, for example, a
celebrity who is caught in public in various states
of undress or “costume malfunctions.” Are these
intentional acts on the celebrities’ part? Or, are
they perverse acts of intentional exhibitionism that
reward the voyeuristic public that wants to see the
celebrities exposed? We may never know. Under
the normative circumstances of scopophilic desire,
inadvertent exposure of genitalia—the most pri-
vate of body parts becoming public—truly renders
the subject naked and frail and not nude, which
still has a sense of agency about it. This is why the
pornographic image, it is argued, cannot be so eas-
ily rendered as simply as an objectification of a
woman’s body. The naked-nude distinction rests
on the relationship of the way one is seen. This is
starkly rendered by women who install cameras in
their bathrooms and bedrooms and have paying
customers observe them over stream video on the
Internet. It is not unusual, however, for these
women to tease and infuriate their paying voyeurs
by turning a camera off now and again, castrating
the Other, and confirming who is controlling and
in possession of the gaze. Here the paranoid posi-
tion of being watched is reversed and controlled.
The perverse position of an exhibitionist is not one
of feeling naked; on the contrary, it is wanting to
be seen in the full desire of the Other, including the
gesture of covering up the body when so desired.
Scopophilic nakedness of the evil eye mortifies
the body. It exposes the subjects. There is no pro-
tection, no mask, and no masquerade to hide from
the blinding light of the gaze in possession of the
Other. This scopophilic look that captures the gaze
cannot be articulated in positive, that is, represen-
tational, terms. In other words, it is not possible to
specify all the characteristics of identity. When
looking, something always escapes. Identification
based on the dialectics of negativity—what is, is
what is not—presents the complicated phenome-
non of non-representability as informing scopo-
philia; and this non-representability is, for Lacan,
unconscious and not articulable.
jan jagodzinski
See also Gaze; Simulacra; Society of the Spectacle;
Visualizing Desire
Further Readings
Debord, G. (1995). The society of the spectacle. New
York: Zone Books.
Freud, S. (1953–1974). Three essays on the theory of
sexuality. In J. Strachey et al. (Eds.), The standard
edition of the complete works of Sigmund Freud
(24 vols., SE 7, pp. 123–243). London: Hogarth Press
and the Institute of Psychoanalysis. (Original work
published 1905)
Parry-Giles, T. (1996). Political scopophilia, presidential
campaigning, and the intimacy of American politics.
Communication Studies, 47, 191–205.
Secular Identity
The concept of secular identity was first developed
in the mid-19th century to describe a set of beliefs
about freedom of religion for the individual in a
modern, national state. Secular identity grew with
the expanding power and relevance of the state in
the life of its citizens in European countries and the
United States.
Early scholarly discussion of secular identity
was dominated by its connection with the rise of
power in the West. The sociologist Max Weber
saw the decline in religious identity as marked by
the changing social order caused by mass-market
economies, industrialization, and universal ideas

of citizenship in a state. The sociologist Paul Berger
saw the West as predisposed to the rise of a secular
identity because of its Judeo-Christian tradition of
monotheism and ethical rationalization. For such
thinkers, religion was increasingly viewed as less
relevant to modern life. Émile Durkheim saw the
rise of specialization in government and societal
agencies as pushing religion to an ever-decreasing
place in the lives of modern people. This view of
secular identity is most easily understood by
reviewing specific historical instances. The case of
Zionism illuminates the new awareness of a chang-
ing identity especially well.
With the 20th-century emergence of fundamen-
talism (or the idea that religious doctrines and
practices should be taken literally) in Islam,
Christianity, and Judaism, secular-versus-religious
debates have become part of an overall global dis-
pute about the role of religion. For the anthropolo-
gist Talal Asad, the narratives of modernity have
erased the importance of religion for personal
identity in the modern nation state. For Asad, con-
tinued exercises of power by modernists were
attempts to eliminate religion as a competitor. But
the debate has reached no conclusion. For every
attempt to secularize a population, there is also an
example of an effort to place religion back into the
discourse of public life. As an example, the recent
history of Iran provides a valuable example of the
struggle between religious and secular identity in a
modern state.
Secular as a Political and
Individual Definition: The Case of Zionism
Secular is often defined as a national or political
identity. For example, the state of India is officially
secular in its orientation. The state does not
endorse a particular religion, and its institutions
and offices are free from religious control.
Secularism, in this context, becomes tied to the
idea of national identity and is inseparable from it.
The notion of a secular national identity developed
along several lines in the 19th and 20th centuries,
and often, quite surprisingly, arose from religious
contexts. One such secular identity was Zionism.
Traditional religious Judaism was based partly
on the assumption that individual Jews would not
participate in the larger secular or religious cul-
tures that surrounded them. Jews in Poland in the
Secular Identity 663
18th century, for instance, were viewed primarily
as Jews who existed within their own religious
community. Jewish identity, as such, was derived
from apolitical Jewish religious sources. Jewish
identity before the formation of Zionism came
from a mix of religious, cultural, and linguistic ele-
ments that combined to create a matrix of assump-
tions. One of the most important assumptions was
that Jews would be restored to their homeland of
Palestine, or the Land of Israel, by a God-appointed
savior who would return Jews to their land and
provide them with a Jewish government. This
future messianic age would be completely in God’s
hands and would not be under the control of indi-
vidual or collective Jews. Before the creation of
Zionism, Jewish political identity was submerged
in Jewish religious beliefs. Jews could not hasten
the coming of the messiah and their return to the
Land of Israel and their own government.
During the early- to mid-19th century, several
European countries formally emancipated their
Jewish citizens. Jews were no longer forced to
reside in ghettos, wear distinctive clothing, or
engage in certain proscribed trades. But the eman-
cipation of Jews in Western Europe led to an iden-
tity crisis among some Jews who began to embrace
the new, secular definition of a citizen of a modern
state. In what sense was a person a Jew if he or she
was now also a full-fledged citizen of a state that
gave him or her another national identity? This
vexing question, combined with the rise of anti-
Semitism in some modern, secular countries, led to
the emergence of Zionism.
Zionism from its beginning was conceived as a
secular, Jewish alternative to modern European
secularism and nationalism. Zionism took the
political element latent in Rabbinic Judaism and
gave it a place of centrality in an emerging secular
outlook: the Land of Israel was the land promised
to the Jews, but rather than being brought about
by God, their return would be brought about by
human activity. Zionist identity was deeply practi-
cal, eschewing most, if not all, of the theological
elements of Judaism. It took from religious Judaism
an abiding sense of the sacredness of the Land of
Israel and molded that into a pragmatic program
for the settlement of Palestine and the establish-
ment of an independent Jewish state.
Zionism became, in a sense, a new religion of
secular Jewish national identity. But Zionism
664 Secular Identity
opposed religious Judaism, and most religious Jews
were opposed to Zionism in the early days of its
existence. Still, Zionism took many of its most
potent symbols from religious Judaism. For exam-
ple, holidays in the Bible that stressed a connection
with the Land of Israel were appropriated. The
Feast of Shavuot, or the Feast of Weeks, was cele-
brated with great ceremony among the early agri-
cultural communities in Palestine in the late
19th century because the harvest holiday fit with
Zionism’s goal of creating a new, secular Jew with
a firm, concrete connection to the land. The Jewish
religious holiday of Purim also took on new mean-
ing in Zionism. In early Tel-Aviv, which was touted
as the first modern Hebrew city, Purim became a
vast municipal celebration, when citizens of Tel-
Aviv wore costumes and marched in parades. In
religious Judaism, Purim is a holiday based on small
gatherings of people and the reading of the book of
Esther, but for secular Zionism, the holiday became
a great celebration of a new, secular identity. As
secular Zionism spread and grew, it developed
increasingly potent symbols, which enabled it to
expand its reach and appeal to Jews who felt left
out of the emerging secular nationalism of Europe.
Zionism came to provide an all-around identity
for secular Jews in Palestine. Most importantly,
Hebrew was revived as a spoken language, which
gave Jews a common language of communication
for the first time in 2,000 years. Hebrew was
roundly endorsed as the language of secular
Zionism and became the prime vehicle for the
emergence of this new national and secular iden-
tity. A robust literature was created in Hebrew as
poems, stories, and novels were written and pub-
lished. Daily newspapers were printed in Hebrew,
and all official business of the Jewish community
in Palestine had to be conducted in Hebrew.
Schools were created in which the primary lan-
guage of instruction was Hebrew, and schools
using other languages either volunteered or were
forced to change to Hebrew.
Zionism became one of the most successful
secular movements of the modern era. Zionists
founded a Jewish state modeled after Western
European democracies in Palestine, revived Hebrew
as the language of that state, and most importantly,
created a new Jew, called an Israeli, who was con-
structed wholly along nonreligious, secular lines.
Zionism created a lasting shift in Jewish identity:
The Israeli citizen could be Jewish without being
religious.
The Religious Critique of
the Secular: The Case of Iran
Secular identity has been criticized from a reli-
gious standpoint almost from the beginning of the
concept. Early in its development, secularism—
especially in its nationalist, state-sponsored form—
was viewed as atheistic, or essentially hostile to the
idea of religion. In the West, ideas of human worth
and value had been based on religious concepts, so
the entire set of assumptions behind secular iden-
tity and secularism were viewed as false. In this
view, there could be no identity without a religious
foundation. Even so, the idea of secularism gener-
ally took hold in the West, and the neutrality of
secularism was eventually viewed as a self-evident
truth: society was a secular space where individu-
als could work, reside, and play without the sys-
tems or structures of organized religion.
Yet, with the spread of European colonialism
and after its collapse following World War II,
secular identity was increasingly viewed by non-
Western cultures as simply another imperial tool
of the West. Just like colonialism, secularism and
its attitudes were criticized as largely harmful to
postcolonial societies in Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East.
Nowhere can this be better illustrated than in
the case of Iran. In 1979, Islamic religious groups
in Iran ousted the shah, or king of Iran. The shah
had sought to secularize Iran and install nonreli-
gious institutions in his government. For many
Iranians, however, the government of the shah was
deeply unpopular and seen as autocratic and
oppressive to its people. When religious clerics
seized power in Iran in 1979, they immediately set
out to dismantle the shah’s westernizing program.
They imposed Islam in every facet of Iranian life,
in a sense seeking to destroy the secular identity
that had been created under the auspices of the
shah. An Islamic Republic was formed, and ele-
ments of Islamic law, or the Shari‘a, became the
law of Iran.
The Iranian revolution was a change of govern-
ment, but it was also a profound shift of identity.
The leaders of the revolution sought to impose a
religious identity on everyone in Iran. Iran’s new

religious government stripped the country of its
secular base, and created a theocracy—a state
ruled by religious law. There was an inherent criti-
cism of secular identity in these moves. The Iranian
revolutionaries did not see secularism as a neutral
concept. For them, secular and Western ideas were
equated; thus, the West was responsible for the
harsh dictatorial rule of the shah and his support-
ers in the United States. All the trappings of secular
society—such as freedom for women, religious
tolerance, a free press, and the rights of religious
minorities—were largely viewed as unwanted
Western, anti-Islamic imports.
Iran’s revolution was part of a greater, overall
rejection of secular identity in some developing,
non-Western regions of the world. Secular iden-
tity, by then long considered a neutral entity pro-
viding personal and religious freedom, was now in
question. Secular identity was conceived as an
imported concept competing with native culture
and religion. It was viewed as anything but neu-
tral, and actually as harmful and corrosive to tra-
ditional beliefs, religions, customs, and norms.
Agreeing with the general reevaluation of the West
and its values that took place in postcolonial arts,
philosophy, politics, and historical studies, Iranian
religious leaders viewed secular identity as yet
another Western import.
This assessment has had powerful resonances
throughout the world and has led to a great deal
of cultural and religious dialogue. What, exactly, is
the role of religion in a nation or for an individual?
Can there be such a thing as a truly neutral, secular
society or a secular self?
Future Directions
Secular identity as a concept has had a profound
impact on the modern world, and the strength of
its appeal can be seen in such diverse places as
India, the United States, South Africa, and
Taiwan. The great strides of secularism and secu-
lar identity point to a movement which will likely
continue to grow in strength despite its crit-
ics.  Secular identity continues to develop and
transform under the pressure of new demands and
challenges, and as it broadens its set of definitions,
its relevance applies to new groups in new ways.
Eric Maroney
Self 665
See also Citizenship; Colonialism; Eurocentricity;
Fundamentalism; Globalization; Identity and
Democracy; Religious Identity; Third World
Further Readings
Almog, O. (2000). The Sabra: The creation of the new
Jew. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Amstrong, K. (2000). The battle for God. New York:
Knopf.
Jackobsen, J., & Pellegrini, A. (2008). Secularisms.
Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press.
Keddie, N. (2008). Modern Iran: Roots and results of
revolution. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Malise, R. (2004). Fundamentalism: A search for
meaning. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Wheatcroft, J. (1996). The controversy of Zion: Jewish
nationalism, the Jewish state, and the unresolved
Jewish dilemma. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Self
Understanding the constructed nature of social
reality, the symbolic dimensions of social pro-
cesses, the social production of human selves, the
shared nature of meanings, and the dynamics
entailed in the formation, reinforcement, transfor-
mation of the negotiated social order are some of
the pivotal issues that students of social psychol-
ogy have discussed ever since the discipline
asserted itself as a viable intellectual enterprise.
Among these issues, the discussion of the relation-
ship between self and society has received a dis-
proportional attention. The prominent figures in
the field have addressed the issue in different ways
while mostly attempting to provide a nuanced
view of how individual actions are constituted in
social contexts. These scholars have exhibited a
strong desire to avoid the pitfalls of social deter-
minism and psychological reductionism. Whereas
social determinism focuses on the role of social
structural processes in the making of individuals
to the extent of disregarding singularity, psycho-
logical reductionism considers the individual as
the building block of social history without
accounting for the role of social forces. Recent
social theorists are even clearer regarding the rela-
tionship between self and society than were their
666 Self
previous counterparts. In describing the connec-
tion between self and society, the preferred expres-
sion is “society of selves” instead of “self and
society” because the latter implies that self and
society are mechanically related to one another
where the former acknowledges the reciprocal
interconnection between active agents and social
situations without glossing over their separation.
This entry examines several theories of the self.
Modern Theories of the Self
The U.S. pragmatist George Hebert Mead was the
first modern social theorist to clearly spell out a
full-fledged theory of the self. In Mead’s symbolic
interactionist theory, the self is a social construct;
yet the self retains its distinctiveness without being
outside the context of the social. Selves are respon-
sible for the existence of social activities, but the
self exists in the context of social organization
only. Following this important precept, Mead was
able to provide a luminous view of the self as a
process. Three important conclusions follow from
this assumption. First, the self as process is an
active agent, rather than a passive receptacle,
whose nature is determined by unparalleled exter-
nal social forces. The self reacts with dynamism in
as much it is acted upon by processes beyond it.
Second, the self, as a process, has the characteris-
tics of being both subject and object to itself. As
subject, the self is an agent that is actively involved
in acts of reflexivity and communicative action,
and as an object to itself, it is the subject of its own
analysis. Third, by virtue of its capacity to observe
itself as an object, the self adds an important
dimension to itself: It is capable of taking the per-
spective of the other. Through this capacity to be
in the shoes of others, individuals retain their iden-
tity without being an “I” unto themselves while
the social characteristics of the self are asserted
and reinforced.
Mead elaborates the latter point by way of a
discussion of the bifurcated nature of the self. The
self, according to Mead, consists of two inseparable
and mutually reinforcing dimensions. He calls these
aspects of the self the “I” and the “Me.” The I rep-
resents the spontaneous and creative facet of the
self. The I denotes that the social is not a fully coor-
dinated organization in which individuals merely
play a socially prescribed role. The Me represents
the social face of the self. Although the I and the
Me are interrelated, they remain separate. Except in
uncharacteristic circumstances, such as religious
fervor or acts of patriotism, in which both tempo-
rarily blend, the I and the Me are distinct. Because
the self is a social construct, an individual is not
born with the two aspects of the self marked for
him or her. A good amount of time passes before
the two facets of the self are differentiated. This
moment of segregation, which is organically linked
with the capacity of the self to participate in role-
taking processes, comes at a later age.
Mead, accordingly, notes that there are three
major steps in the genesis of the self. The first step
involves what could be referred to as the pre-play
stage. At this stage, children mimic the acts of their
significant others. Despite taking the role of the
other, the child cannot yet take on or see another
person’s perspective. Here the individual is a mem-
ber of society by virtue of his or her descent and
the social rights that it possesses. Sociologically
speaking, however, it is an imminent “self-object”
that lacks social characteristics. Hence, the self at
this stage is a self only to the degree that it exists
within the midst of a society of selves and it has the
potential to be a full self. Only in the last stage, the
game stage, does a child become a full person in
the sense of being able to take the role of multiple
others and understand the interconnection that
exists between varied roles. Only here is imitation
meaningful because it is based on a proper under-
standing of the subject reproduced. Once a child
assumes the role of the “generalized other,” he or
she is capable of taking the perspective of the com-
munity at large—not passively imitating the actions
of significant others, but creatively reacting to
actions on the basis of understanding broader
social processes. But this important stage is reached
only after a child passes through the play stage, a
stage in which a child takes the role of one con-
crete other at a time. Role taking at a play stage is
limited, for a child lacks the capacity to partake in
an abstract imaginative act to see the interconnec-
tion between multiple roles.
Quite a few social theorists have managed to
reconstruct Mead’s theory of the self with some
success. Sheldon Stryker and Erving Goffman are
among the most important theorists in this regard.
The U.S. sociologist Stryker, who is famous for his
identity theory, believes that, despite his important

contributions to the theory of the self, Mead has
not adequately addressed the relationship between
social person and social structure. Although Mead
contended that an individual can possess multiple
selves, and the I and the Me are important dimen-
sions of the self, he never fully extricated himself
from the view that the self is an undifferentiated
whole. Accordingly, consistent with Mead’s point
that the self is an active agent that exists in a sym-
bolic universe, and mindful of the intersection
between the self and social structure, Stryker pro-
vides his own structural version of symbolic inter-
actionism. This structuralist perspective is primarily
intended to show the intricate nature of the self
because it exists within the perimeters of an
increasingly differentiated social system. Self and
social structure, however, do not exist in a sepa-
rate realm; rather, they are two mutually condi-
tioning aspects of the same whole.
In Stryker’s structural symbolic interactionist
approach of the self, role theoretic concepts play a
critical role. Roles, as position-related performa-
tive expectations, act as important mediators
between the social person and social structure. The
concept of role, however, has to be stripped of its
static connotations before it is synthesized with
other symbolic interactionist concepts of the self.
Stryker thus notes that roles are not preestablished
scripts that are played out by social actors who
have no choice but to act accordingly. Although
roles are made possible in a relatively structured
system of social relations, they are recast as they
are played out. The extent to which roles are made
depends on the nature of the existing structure.
Some social structural conditions are much more
open than others are in enabling members of soci-
ety to perform roles in a creative fashion.
In Stryker’s reconstructed notion of the self, a
person does not possess more than one self; rather,
Stryker notes the existence of multiple interrelated
positional designations. He calls these context-
dependent designations identities. An identity is a
“part” within the same self and exists with other
counterparts insofar as an individual is actively
engaged in a complex social structure. Because
actors assume multiple positions and play different
roles corresponding to them, they have to priori-
tize their choices. Here, Stryker introduces the
concept of identity salience, according to which
identities are invoked in a given social situation on
Self 667
the basis of their place in the hierarchy of posi-
tional designations. Identity invocation is situa-
tional. In a relatively isolated social condition,
only the same identity is invoked. But under situa-
tions where varied social spaces intersect, there is
a good likelihood that multiple identities are
brought into play in which an individual is much
more committed to some identities than to others.
Commitment to an identity largely depends on a
person’s relationship to a set of individuals with
whom he or she interacts on a regular basis.
Goffman, the Canadian American social theorist
who described a dramaturgical perspective, was
much more specific than Mead was in his descrip-
tion of the self as a social construct. In contrast to
Mead, who provided an interiorized view of the
self, despite his emphasis on social experience,
Goffman sees the self as the dramatic outcome of
interactions made possible through the copresence
of multiple actors. In describing the nature of the
self, Goffman used the metaphor of drama without
subscribing to the view that actors are born agents
who, on the basis of pre-spelled scripts, make per-
formance possible. The self is also not an organic
entity whose potentialities unfold over time. Rather,
Goffman sees the self as a dramatic effect instead of
being responsible for the existence of dramatic pro-
cesses. From this perspective, the self is not a social
integrated unitary whole existing in its own right.
Instead, the self is the result of a joint “ceremonial
labor” whose existence is intimately related to the
existence of other selves. Nor is the self, although a
social element, the result of a generalized social
reality. The self is constructed and reconstructed in
specific social scenes. More exactly, the self is a
performed-character whose fate is either to be cred-
ited or discredited.
And so that the self may not be a discredited
character, and so that actors can carry on their
performances smoothly, they use different tech-
niques, including the techniques of idealization
and mystification. In the case of idealization,
actors go by the officially subscribed social rules.
In instances where their acts contradict these rules,
utmost care is taken to hide the act so that it may
not be part of the publicly executed transcript.
One such example includes secretive consumption,
such as consuming alcohol or eating animal prod-
ucts where actors are expected to abide by the
principle of ascetic purity. Or, actors may exercise
668 Self
constraint in revealing their wealth to foster the
impression that their social status may not be per-
ceived as the result of ascription. However, all
idealizations are not carried out in a positive fash-
ion. Actors can be engaged in negative idealization
as well. A beggar who pretends that he is too weak
to move is acting on the basis of a stereotyped
image that may allow him or her to get the desired
outcome. Actors do not present the same image to
all audiences under all circumstances. They have to
be engaged in audience segregation. By so acting,
actors make sure that they are presenting them-
selves in the right manner to the right audience. A
politician may be less successful if he or she is
engaged in self-presentation of the self to all audi-
ences in the same way; rather, he or she has to
highlight certain facts and suppress others to meet
the expected demands of a particular audience.
Regulating information to foster a positive
impression alone may not bring about the desired
outcome. In addition to avoiding acts that disrupt
the anticipated definition of the situation, actors
have to be involved in regulating their contact with
their audiences to avoid ritual contamination.
Managing contact with the audience is accom-
plished through the acts of mystification. To mys-
tify oneself does not mean to be completely
extricated from the social scene where the drama
is being enacted, for such action renders the actor
into a non-actor. Rather, mystification is a bal-
anced form of social distance through which actors
create a sense of awe among their audiences. By
creating a distance between themselves and their
audience, actors get ample time and space to pre-
pare for the forthcoming interaction. Moreover,
distance keeps the audience from observing actors
at a close range, which could cause performance
disruption. Most importantly, social distance pre-
vents actors from revealing “secret mysteries,”
however minimal they are, that play a critical role
in presenting the self positively.
High-Modern/Postmodern
Theories of the Self
Contemporary theorists contend that the nature of
the self has changed as a result of the major social
changes that have taken place recently. Hence,
these theorists argue that a reconstructed notion of
the self is timely. These social theorists, however,
differ regarding the nature of the social change
that has occurred. Some contend that a rupture has
transpired between the modern and postmodern
worlds. Others assert that modernity has not
become a bygone era; instead, they note that
modernity has asserted itself in a radicalized form
rather than leaving the historical space for a quali-
tatively new social order.
Anthony Giddens, an internationally renowned
English sociologist, is one such social theorist who
belongs to the second category. He holds the view
that we live in what he calls high modernity, a
global social order in which the salient features of
modernity are extended to their ultimate limits.
Accordingly, despite some overlaps, his stance on
the self is different from the postmodern views of
the self. Fundamentally, according to Giddens, the
self is now a reflexive agent that is actively involved
in the practice of self-construction. To accomplish
this, members of the radicalized modernity have to
undertake self-observation on a regular basis. Each
moment is examined for what it is worth. And in
their reflexive engagements, individuals are assisted
by experts and expert systems that dominate late
modernity. Hence, the self under radicalized
modernity can hardly dissociate itself from its
autobiographical project in which creative inputs
are constantly sought. The project, however, is not
limited to a cognitive level. The body is also
involved, not as a passive receptacle but as an
“action system.” In general, the self has not been
rendered inconsequential as a result of overwhelm-
ing global processes and a good dose of constrain-
ing conditions set on it. Rather, despite the
enormous influences exerted on it, the radicalized
modern self frequently asserts and reconstructs
itself, thereby affecting the social processes that
condition it.
Conversely, Kenneth Gergen, an U.S. social psy-
chologist who became well-known after proposing
an interesting theory of the postmodern self, con-
tends that the change recent Western societies have
undergone is so radical that societies have entered
a new era and the nature of the self consequently
is altered dramatically. The self has now, accord-
ingly, become a “saturated self,” a postmodern self
much different from selves based on romanticist
and modern conceptions that are grounded in the
precepts of personal depth, passion, and soul, on
the one hand, and reason and rationality, on the

other hand. The concomitant results of these con-
ceptions have been, among other things, deeply
committed relations, dedicated friendships, and
life purposes for the romanticist self and relation-
ships based on rational choice and predictable
persona for the modernist self.
The emergence of the postmodern self, according
to Gergen, is mainly caused by what he calls tech-
nologies of saturation, technological transforma-
tions that have assumed both low-tech (the railroad,
public postal services, the automobile, the tele-
phone, radio broadcasting, motion pictures, printed
books) and high-tech (air transportation, television,
and electronic communication) forms. The impact
of these technologies of saturation on interpersonal
relations has resulted in the perseverance of the past
and acceleration of the future. In the former case,
time and distance have become less threatening ele-
ments that jeopardize social relationships. By way
of technologies, the cast of characters has increased
with the consequences of either creating discomfort
from the overburdens of interpersonal contact or
creating comfort as a result of the opportunity to
maintain relationships with a significant number of
people. However, the acceleration of the future
entails that the paces of relationships have assumed
a faster mode such that interpersonal contacts are
carried out almost instantly and in an uninterrupted
fashion, leading to an increasing interdependence
among individuals. Hence, the “population of the
self”—the exposure of the self to varied images,
encounters, and opportunities—has undermined
commitments to romanticist and modern concep-
tions of the self. Although the saturated self is well
informed in its orientation of the social world and
efficient in its undertakings, it is more decentered
than were the previous forms of selves. The satu-
rated self is less enduring in its essence and much
more subject to reformation and redirection with
multiple possibilities of expression.
Alem Kebede
See also Impression Management; Symbolic
Interactionism
Further Readings
Bauman, Z. (2004). Identity: Conversations with
Benedetto Vecchi. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Self-Affirmation Theory 669
Burkitt, I. (2008). Social selves: Theories of self and
society. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Elliott, A. (2008). Concepts of the self. Cambridge, UK:
Polity Press.
Elliott, A., & Lemert, C. (2006). The new individualism:
The emotional costs of globalization. London:
Routledge.
Gergen, K. (1991). The saturated self: Dilemmas of
identity in contemporary life. New York: Basic Books.
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity: Self and
society in the late modern age. Cambridge, UK: Polity
Press.
Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday
life. New York: Anchor Books.
Mead, G. H. (1962). Mind, self and society: From the
standpoint of a social behaviorist. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1934)
Stryker, S. (1980). Symbolic interactionism: A structural
version. Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin/Cummings.
Self-Affirmation Theory
Self-affirmation theory asserts that people have a
fundamental motivation to maintain self-integrity,
that is, a perception of themselves as good, virtu-
ous, and efficacious. Self-affirmation theory exam-
ines how people maintain self-integrity when they
perceive it to be threatened. The theory posits
flexibility in the way the self-system copes with
such threats, such that people can respond to
threats in one domain by reaffirming self-integrity
in another, altogether different domain. Although
people may react defensively to information or
events that threaten self-integrity, they need not
do so if they can secure their self-integrity.
Research and theorizing inspired by self-
affirmation theory has led to theoretical advances
in social psychology, with wide-ranging implica-
tions for how people cope with threats to valued
identities. Self-affirmation theory research suggests
that defensive resistance to identity-threatening
information, group-serving biases, intransigence in
social disputes, prejudice and stereotyping, and
intellectual under-performance can be understood
as arising, in part, from threats to self-integrity and
the motivation to protect it. Self-affirmation theory
provides a framework for understanding the ori-
gins of these problems and points toward some
promising interventions to address them.
670 Self-Affirmation Theory
Background and History
In the late 19th century, the psychologist William
James introduced the notion of the social self. This
notion implied that people care about the way oth-
ers see them and that their self-worth is based
partly on their perceptions of the way others per-
ceive them. As a consequence, an important source
of identity and self-integrity involves people’s social
or group identities and their social roles and rela-
tionships with others. How people cope with
threats to these social bases of self-worth is a ques-
tion of historical and contemporary concern in
psychology, and one of the central issues addressed
by major social psychological theories such as
social identity theory.
When an important aspect of the self, such as a
social identity, is threatened, people will engage in
various adaptations to maintain self-integrity.
Some of these adaptations can be termed defensive
in that they involve denying or distorting the
threatening information. Such adaptations may
involve rationalizations and even distortions of
reality, and can be thus considered defensive in
nature. Self-affirmation theory addresses the way
people cope with threats to the self—both per-
sonal threats, such as those that result from a lack
of control or health risk information, and threats
to a group or a social identity, such as identifica-
tion with a sports team, a country, an organiza-
tion, or a gender or racial group. These identities
can constitute important bases of self-worth.
Consequently, people will defend against threats
to these collective aspects of the self much as they
defend against threats to individual or personal
aspects of the self.
For example, information that is antagonistic to
one’s political beliefs may be viewed with skepti-
cism whereas information supporting one’s politi-
cal beliefs may be accepted with little scrutiny.
Similarly, when people feel that they could be
judged negatively on the basis of a stereotype about
their group, they may feel psychologically threat-
ened and as a consequence engage in various adap-
tations, including avoiding or dis-identifying from
the domain in which they feel negatively judged.
Positive events that happen to one’s group may
be thought of as caused by the group itself whereas
negative events may be attributed to external
factors. Such adaptations can help an individual
maintain self-integrity by reducing the potential
threat to a valued identity.
The theory of self-affirmation was first pro-
posed by the social psychologist Claude Steele. A
major insight of this theory centers on the notion
that although people try to maintain specific self-
images and identities (such as “being a good stu-
dent” or “being a good group member”), that is
not their primary motivation. Rather, individuals
are motivated to maintain global self-integrity—a
general perception of their goodness, virtue, and
efficacy. There is thus great flexibility in how the
self-system responds to threats. If individuals feel
relatively positively about themselves in one
domain, they will be more willing and able to tol-
erate threats to self-integrity in other domains.
Consequently, when self-affirmed, people can
respond to identity-threatening information with-
out resorting to defensive biases.
Self-affirmation theory led to a reinterpretation
of classic research findings in cognitive dissonance.
In a classic cognitive dissonance study, people are
shown to change their attitudes to bring them in
line with their past behavior. People led to commit
an action that violates a core identity (for example,
individuals subtly led to oppose funding for the
disabled might feel that they have violated a core
value) subsequently change their beliefs to bring
them in line with their actions (for instance, they
become more opposed to funding for the disabled).
Previously, such cognitive dissonance effects had
been viewed as evidence of a basic motivation for
psychological consistency; people want to see their
actions as consistent with their attitudes. However,
Steele and colleagues demonstrated that these
effects arise, in part, from the motivation to main-
tain self-integrity. Thus, when people are given an
opportunity to affirm their self-integrity in an
alternative domain, the rationalization effect dis-
appears. For instance, writing about an important
value unrelated to the decision task (such as musi-
cal interests) reduced people’s tendency to revise
their beliefs in light of regrettable past actions.
Contributions of Self-Affirmation Theory
When self-integrity is threatened, according to
self-affirmation theory, people need not defen-
sively rationalize or distort reality. Instead, they
can reestablish self-integrity through affirmations

of alternative domains of self-worth unrelated to
the provoking threat. Such self-affirmations, by
fulfilling the need to protect self-integrity in the
face of threat, can enable people to deal with
threatening events and information without resort-
ing to defensive biases. Self-affirmations can take
the form of reflecting on or expressing overarching
values, such as relationships with friends and fam-
ily, religious values, or reminding oneself of valued
identities, such as important group memberships.
Numerous studies demonstrate that individuals
are less likely to rationalize, deny, or resist identity-
threatening information in one domain if their
sense of self-integrity is “affirmed” in other
domains. People have been shown to be more open
to counter-attitudinal information, and less biased
in their evaluations of new and identity-relevant
information, if they are first permitted to self-
affirm in an unrelated domain, for instance, by
reflecting on an important personal value. For
example, proponents and opponents of capital
punishment proved less critical of scientific evi-
dence contradicting their beliefs regarding the effi-
cacy of the death penalty as a deterrent of would-be
murderers if they first wrote an essay on an impor-
tant value unrelated to their political identity.
Self-affirmation also leads individuals to accept
greater responsibility for negative events that hap-
pen to their group. When affirmed, winners and
losers in a sports competition were less self-serving
and group-serving in their attributions for success
and failure. That is, those who were affirmed were
relatively more willing to lay the blame for their
defeats on themselves and their group, and less
willing to take credit for their successes.
People are also more open to identity-threatening
courses of action—for example, compromising
with an adversary in a divisive social-political
dispute—when self-affirmed. Pro-choice advocates
were more likely to make concessions to a pro-life
advocate in a negotiation on abortion policy when
they had first been given the opportunity to affirm
themselves in an alternative domain of self-worth.
Self-affirmation theory also illuminates the way
in which prejudice and stereotyping are forms of
self-integrity maintenance. People were less likely
to discriminate against a Jewish job candidate, rela-
tive to a Catholic one, if they had previously been
provided with a self-affirmation. Individuals, it
seems, can use a negative stereotype as a cognitively
Self-Affirmation Theory 671
justifiable way of putting other people down, to
make the individuals feel better about themselves
and their groups. However, if their needs for self-
integrity are met in another domain, they have less
need to use negative stereotypes.
One of the most important implications of con-
temporary research on self-affirmation theory
involves its demonstration that seemingly small
interventions can have large effects, if they are
attuned to psychological processes of self-integrity
maintenance.
Self-affirmation was used successfully to mitigate
the social identity threat arising from being a target
of a negative stereotype in school. Previous research
had demonstrated that African Americans experi-
ence psychological threat when they know that they
or fellow group members could be judged in light
of a negative racial stereotype, a phenomenon
known as stereotype threat, which can undermine
performance. A series of field experiments demon-
strated that a self-affirmation intervention adminis-
tered in the context of students’ classroom activities
improved African American students’ end-of-term
course grades and thus reduced the racial achieve-
ment gap by 40%. Although the affirmed state
stemming from a self-affirmation may appear rela-
tively brief, the changes in information processing
it prompts can become self-reinforcing or self-
sustaining over time.
Intersection of Self-Affirmation
and Social Identity Theories
Recent research has integrated self-affirmation and
social identity theories to help explicate phenomena
of interest to both perspectives. One question cen-
ters on the motivational origins of group-serving
judgments. Two basic premises of social identity
theory are that people are motivated to enhance or
maintain self-esteem and that membership in groups
constitutes an important part of individuals’ self-
concept. Consequently, social identity theory pre-
dicts that judgments that reflect well on the group
will enhance self-esteem; however, reviews of social
identity theory suggest mixed support for this self-
esteem postulate. The self-affirmation approach,
by demonstrating that manipulations that secure
an individual’s self-integrity can reduce the ten-
dency to make group-serving judgments, has pro-
vided important experimental evidence to support
672 Self-Assessment
the role of the self in motivating group-serving
judgments.
A second question centers on the moderating
role of identity salience on the effectiveness of self-
affirmations on increasing acceptance of identity-
threatening information. The centrality of a given
identity as a source of self-integrity varies as a func-
tion of situational or contextual factors. When a
particular social identity is made salient, people are
particularly likely to engage in identity-protective
strategies, such as defensive information processing
of threatening political information. In these situa-
tions, self-affirmations are most effective at reduc-
ing defensive responses. By contrast, manipulations
that make a given identity less salient to the indi-
vidual reduce the motivational pressure to defend
the self. Consequently, affirmations are less effec-
tive at reducing bias when the motivation to defend
a particular social identity is reduced.
A third area of theoretical overlap between self-
affirmation and social identity theories centers on
the utility of group affirmations, that is, affirma-
tions of values that are central to one’s group.
When people affirm their group on values unre-
lated to a focal threat but central to their group,
they are more accepting of threatening group
information, particularly when the individuals are
highly identified group members. For instance,
highly identified sports fans were more likely to
acknowledge the role of their favorite team in
defeat when they affirmed a value of importance to
the group. These findings are consistent with the
notion of social creativity proposed in social iden-
tity theory, that individuals can cope with threats
to their groups by affirming the importance of
alternative dimensions of value to their group.
David K. Sherman and Geoffrey L. Cohen
See also Cognitive Dissonance Theory; Psychology of Self
and Identity; Self-Image; Social Identity Theory
Further Readings
Cohen, G. L., Garcia, J., Apfel, N., & Master, A. (2006).
Reducing the racial achievement gap: A social-
psychological intervention. Science, 313, 1307–1310.
Cohen, G. L., Sherman, D. K., Bastardi, A., McGoey,
M., Hsu, A., & Ross, L. (2007). Bridging the
partisan divide: Self-affirmation reduces ideological
closed-mindedness and inflexibility in negotiation.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93,
415–430.
Fein, S., & Spencer, S. J. (1997). Prejudice as self-image
maintenance: Affirming the self through derogating
others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
73, 31–44.
Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. (2006). The psychology
of self-defense: Self-affirmation theory. In M. P.
Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social
psychology (Vol. 38, pp. 183–242). San Diego, CA:
Academic Press.
Sherman, D. K., Kinias, Z., Major, B., Kim, H. S., &
Prenovost, M. A. (2007). The group as a resource:
Reducing biased attributions for group success and
failure via group-affirmation. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 33, 1100–1112.
Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation:
Sustaining the integrity of the self. In L. Berkowitz
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology
(Vol. 21, pp. 261–302). New York: Academic Press.
Self-Assessment
Self-assessment, or the desire to know the truth
about oneself, is one of four self-evaluation motives
that pervade the study of the self. Self-assessment
is characterized by a motivation to accurately
evaluate one’s self or self-concept. A key feature of
this motive that distinguishes it from other self-
evaluation motives (i.e., self-enhancement, self-
verification, and self-improvement) is that people
desire to accurately evaluate themselves, some-
times at the risk of learning information that is
negative with respect to their abilities. Individuals
engage in self-assessment to reduce uncertainty
about their abilities and self-concepts, or put sim-
ply, to increase their self-knowledge. An accurate
diagnosis of one’s abilities allows individuals to
feel confident making predictions regarding their
world and their place within the world.
People use a variety of tools to increase or
acquire self-knowledge. Leon Festinger’s 1954
social comparison theory rests on the assumption
that people turn to similar others to assess their
own abilities and opinions. Specifically, people
engage in this comparison process to evaluate the
veracity of their opinions and the extent of their
abilities in the absence of an objective means of

evaluation. For example, students commonly
compare exam marks to determine where their
individual class performance lies in comparison
with other students’ marks. The study of self-
assessment is often researched within the achieve-
ment realm. By definition, achievement implies
assessment, thus offering a germane means of
studying when and how people choose to engage
in self-assessment.
Research in self-assessment has consistently
demonstrated that individuals actively seek to
engage in activities that provide diagnostic infor-
mation concerning their abilities. The extent to
which people prefer diagnostic tasks depends on
their uncertainty with their abilities; thus, indi-
viduals seek tasks that provide them with self-
knowledge concerning their abilities in an effort
to reduce this feeling of uncertainty. Importantly,
research on self-assessment has demonstrated that
when uncertain of their abilities within a particu-
lar domain, people do not actively avoid a task
that they believe will provide them with a nega-
tive evaluation of their abilities; rather, they seek
evaluative and diagnostic practices regardless of
how positively or negatively they elucidate their
abilities. The veracity of the test of their abilities
motivates people to engage in this process of self-
assessment, as an accurate ability to know their
own abilities increases confidence in people’s pre-
dictions regarding their capabilities. Along the
same lines, people will also engage in a task lon-
ger when they believe that the task will diagnose
their abilities than when the task cannot provide
them with self-knowledge, further highlighting
the importance of acquiring self-knowledge
regarding one’s own abilities.
Though uncertainty about one’s abilities may
lead most individuals to seek self-assessment, a great
deal of literature suggests that self-enhancement
may be a competing self-motive. For example, peo-
ple may compare themselves with less fortunate
others, particularly when they feel threatened or
are experiencing low self-esteem, in an attempt to
self-enhance. The motive for this comparison is not
an accurate self-assessment, but rather an attempt
to attain or maintain a favorable sense of self.
Often, an accurate diagnosis of ability may threaten
the self-concept (e.g., in the case of a good student
failing his first calculus exam, there is the potential
threat to the student perceiving himself as a good
Self-Assessment 673
student). Research in both self-assessment and
self-enhancement demonstrates that these appar-
ently contradictory motives (i.e., accuracy of self-
knowledge vs. enhancement) can be explained by
the importance of the ability being assessed.
Research comparing these two motives has high-
lighted that people prefer to engage in diagnostic
tasks when they are uncertain regarding their
peripheral traits or tasks (i.e., traits and tasks that
are not central or important to the self-concept).
On the contrary, this same line of research suggests
that people tend to avoid diagnostic feedback for
central traits and tasks when there is an indication
that the feedback will be negative, in an attempt to
protect the self-concept (i.e., self-enhancement).
Another important factor that may determine
whether one will express a self-enhancement or a
self-assessment motive is whether one’s perfor-
mance on the given diagnostic task can be improved
in the future. In the case of the good student who
deems his grades as important to his self-concept,
the poor mark on his calculus exam may indeed
lead to a lowered sense of self-adequacy; however,
if the student realizes that he can study hard for the
next exam to improve his grade, he may indeed
continue to engage in self-assessment regarding his
calculus abilities. Conversely, if a student believes
that there is no way she can improve her calculus
abilities (i.e., her calculus ability is fixed, and there
is no possible way to change that ability), then the
student may seek to avoid feedback from such
exams that threaten the part of her self-concept
that allows her to perceive herself as a good stu-
dent. This line of research generally demonstrates
that individuals express preference for diagnostic
feedback after a success in the given domain, but
not after a failure in that domain (i.e., demonstrat-
ing a self-enhancement motive). When they believe
that they can improve their performance in that
domain, particularly when they believe the domain
to be important to the self-concept, they tend to
express interest in diagnostic feedback.
Self-assessment is an important self-evaluative
motive that helps individuals structure and under-
stand their worlds. People engage in assessment
processes when they are uncertain of their own
abilities or the traits that they possess. Accurate
assessment of the self reduces one’s subjective
sense of self-uncertainty and allows individuals to
predict and control their environment, based
674 Self-Concept
partly on an accurate understanding of their abili-
ties and capabilities. The extent to which people
will engage in and pursue this accurate assessment
depends on how central or peripheral the task or
trait is that is being assessed, the valence of the
expected feedback, and whether one’s ability in the
given domain is mobile or fixed.
Amber M. Gaffney
See also Self-Concept; Self-Enhancement Theory;
Self-Verification
Further Readings
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison
processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140.
Sedikides, C. (1993). Assessment, enhancement, and
verification determinants of self-evaluation processes.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2,
317–338.
Sedikides, C., & Strube, M. J. (1997). Self-evaluation: To
thine own self be good, to thine own self be sure, to
thine own self be true, and to thine own self be better.
In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social
psychology (Vol. 29, pp. 209–296). New York:
Academic Press.
Trope, Y. (1979). Uncertainty-reducing properties of
achievement tasks. Journal of Social Psychology, 37,
1505–1518.
Trope, Y., & Ben-Yair, E. (1982). Task construction and
persistence as means for self-assessment of abilities.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4,
637–645.
Self-Concept
Self-concept is a topic both well-known and heav-
ily discussed by a number of professionals, includ-
ing philosophers, psychologists, and educators. In
addition, the ideas concerning self-concept have
been implemented into various disciplines, such as
psychology, sociology, education, and so forth.
For example, the famed psychologist Carl Rogers
described self-concept as the development of self-
image and an individual’s progress from an undif-
ferentiated self to one fully differentiated. Relative
to personality development, self-concept is viewed
as being the cognitive or thinking aspect of self.
Self-concept is defined as the general idea people
have about themselves; that is, it is a complex and
dynamic system of learned beliefs and attitudes
that one believes to be true about one’s own per-
sonal existence. Overall, one’s self-concept indi-
cates how an individual sees himself or herself and
comprises three major components: ideal self
(what someone most wants to be), (2) public self
(the image one thinks others have toward him or
her), and (3) real self (what one thinks about him-
self or herself). When a difference exists between
these components, it often creates psychological
issues, leading individuals toward an unpleasant
state of being, that is, anxiety, depression, sadness,
and so forth. To maintain a level of mental health,
one’s public and ideal self need to be companion-
able with one’s real self.
Another way of viewing self-concept is how an
individual is aware of his or her behaviors, traits,
and other characteristics. The content of the self-
concept ranges from episodic memories of behav-
ior and larger self-narratives to specific beliefs
about personality traits. The trait self-concept
incorporates important dimensions called self-
schemas, and neurological evidence suggests that
processing of information about one’s self-concept
activates the medial prefrontal cortex. People’s
self-concepts develop through social feedback, and
people often act to try to verify these views, which
promote consistency in behavior across different
situations. This entry focuses on the development
of self-concept and highlights the major theorists
that have contributed to our current understanding
of it.
Personality Theorists and Self-Concept
The idea of self-concept began when René Descartes
wrote Principles of Philosophy in 1644, in which
he discussed his innermost thoughts regarding
doubt. In his opinion, if he doubted, he was think-
ing, and therefore, he could validate his own exis-
tence; thus, his famous cogito ergo sum (“I think,
therefore I am). Moreover, one’s existence depends
on his or her self-perception. Sigmund Freud pro-
vided new meaning and discussed the significance
of the internal mental process, at which point self-
concept theory development entered a new stage.
Whereas Freud hesitated to view self-concept as a
major psychological theory, his daughter Anna

experienced no such hesitation. Anna discussed the
importance of self-interpretation and ego develop-
ment, which focused people’s attention once again
on self-concept.
According to social theorist George Herbert
Mead, individuals learn about themselves every
day. For example, he believes that when people tell
you you’re good looking today, this statement
becomes part of self-knowledge. He further
explains that the primary source through which we
learn and develop self-concept is interacting with
others. Thus, he concluded that self-concept is
affected each day by interacting with others. To
understand the significance of self-concept, a per-
son needs awareness concerning the profound
implication about how an individual perceives
himself or herself; likewise, each person should be
aware about how he or she relates and interacts
with others.
William James wrote that the “self” is com-
posed of two features: the I and the Me. The I is
the self that thinks, experiences, and acts in the
world; it is the self as a knower. The Me is the self
that is an object in the world; it is the self as
known. He further stated that the I is much like
consciousness, which is a perspective on all of
experiences but the Me is about a concept of a
person. James further defined self-concept as a
person’s explicit knowledge of his or her own
behaviors, traits, and other personal characteris-
tics. He stated that a person’s self-concept is an
organized body of knowledge that develops from
social experiences and has a profound effect on a
person’s behavior throughout life.
Rogers, the creator of person-centered therapy,
brought self-concept theory into the field of psy-
chology and studied it extensively. He viewed self-
concept as the way an individual perceives himself
or herself in certain images and felt that self-
concept development was heavily influenced by
individuals’ life experiences. As a result, if a child’s
life experience is negative, the child will likely
develop a poor self-concept in adulthood.
At the center of Rogerian therapy is the self, and
an individual’s consciousness of it. In Rogers’
opinion, an individual’s self-concept sways how a
person looks at himself or herself, as well as his or
her environment; thus, the self-concept of an indi-
vidual who is psychologically healthy is in har-
mony with what he or she thinks, feels, and acts.
Self-Concept 675
However, it is possible for someone to sustain a
self-concept that is diametrically opposed to his or
her inner desire to succeed in winning the admira-
tion of one’s peers, either in a social or professional
setting.
When this situation occurs, it entails the sup-
pression of one’s genuine feelings, which ultimately
leads a person to feel disconnected from himself or
herself, while twisting experiences in such a man-
ner that it is highly unlikely that he or she will ever
attain happiness or self-actualization. This gap
concerning someone’s self-concept and his or her
genuine experiences (also known as incongruence)
is an unremitting foundation of apprehension and
can lead to mental illness. Rogerian therapy posits
the idea that when a person has a durable self-
concept based on reality, it is adaptable while
allowing the individual to tackle new encounters
or concepts without experiencing anxiety.
Abraham Maslow, the great humanistic psy-
chologist, stated that to grow as a human being,
one had to follow a hierarchy of needs. At the low-
est levels, one must have needs met regarding such
basic biological processes as thirst, hunger, feeling a
modicum of safety in one’s life, having a sense of
belonging to something, and feeling loved and lov-
ing others. Higher than these are the needs an indi-
vidual has for self-esteem and competence, but at
the apex of the hierarchy is self-actualization, which
is extremely difficult to reach. Assuming one is born
into a middle-to upper-class family in a prosperous
country, the acquisition of lower-level needs such as
having enough food to eat, feeling safe, and or hav-
ing a place to live can be a straightforward process;
however, it can prove difficult to fulfill the basic
human need for love and belongingness. When a
person has not had these requisite needs met, his or
her personal growth is usually hindered, often lead-
ing into a negative self-concept.
Social psychologists stated that self-concept is
vital to how each person forms his or her notions
of others. This process is called attribution explains
the origins of our behavior and others; thus, it is
highly affected by self-concept. A major emphasis
of social learning theory centers on how each indi-
vidual views himself or herself, especially whether
a person feels he or she has affected the environ-
ment. Julian B. Rotter stated that the anticipated
result of any deed and the worth each person places
on that result decide how each person will act in a
676 Self-Concept
specific setting. For instance, someone possessing a
positive self-concept often feels that he or she will
succeed with a given assignment because he or she
has the ability to succeed. The reverse is true for
someone thinking he or she will fail; that is, a per-
son will fail because he or she lacks the innate
ability to be successful.
Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, stated that
when someone is subjugated by an overactive
superego (the conscience), the ego (the rational part
of our personality) strives for an equilibrium
involving the continual battles between the id (the
part of our personality that seeks pleasure) and the
superego. In other words, a person wants to be able
to do things he or she knows is morally wrong, but
at the same time, his or her conscience states that
he or she should refrain from any illicit behavior
because it is immoral. The superego is dominant,
so it forces the person to obey, and if the individual
gives in to temptation, he or she feels guilty, which
in turns leads to a negative self-concept.
Development of Self-Concept
One’s self-concept never stops developing; rather,
it begins in infancy and lasts for the rest of an
individual’s life. When a parent or significant
other begins to take an interest in the child’s devel-
opment, the child is influenced by the attention
and love exhibited, which influences his or her
developing self-concept. Quite possibly the most
important period in a child’s life is the first
2 years. If the child has received a strong psycho-
logical foundation, he or she will likely possess a
healthy self-concept. The manner in which a par-
ent relates to his or her child on a daily basis is
vital for the child’s future development. An infant
learns to trust others because loving caregivers are
there to meet the child’s needs. As the child ages,
the parents must make sure that the child is
allowed to complete more and more tasks on his
or her own. As the child grows, so should his or
her beliefs regarding his or her ability. The child
should come to see that he or she is capable of
doing new things, and this attitude will develop
over time.
Erik Erikson, the famed Harvard psychologist,
believed that each person must successfully con-
clude the conflict that is inherent in each stage.
How each individual deals with the conflicts can
influence greatly his or her self-concept. When we
deal with crisis and conflict in a positive manner,
our resulting self-concept is often positive, but the
reverse is also true; if we deal with conflict nega-
tively, our self-concept is apt to be the same.
According to Erikson, individuals experience eight
stages throughout their lives that include infancy,
toddler, preschool, adolescence, teenage, young
adult, middle adult, and senior. Each of these
stages is characterized by a set of unique crises.
For example, the infancy stage (0 to 12–18
months) is characterized by the crisis of whether
we learn to trust others. For the toddler stage (18
months to 3 years), the crisis is whether the child
feels he or she is able to investigate his or her sur-
roundings. The preschool stage (3 to 6 years)
focuses on the crisis of whether the child feels
independent enough to do new things and, like-
wise, whether he or she feels guilt at trying new
things. The adolescence stage (6 years to 12 years)
is concerned with the child becoming aware that
he or she is different from others. More specifi-
cally, the child thinks he or she is capable of doing
things on his or her own; the reverse is that the
child thinks he or she lacks the wherewithal to
attempt new things.
Following the adolescence stage, the teenage
stage (12 to 20 years) is characterized by the indi-
vidual seeking to “know” who he or she is. A success-
ful conclusion leads to greater self-understanding,
whereas failing leads to a search for identity. In this
stage, problems with alcohol and drugs first appear.
During the young adulthood stage (20 to 35 years),
an individual feels that he or she is worthy of affec-
tion, begins romantic encounters that usually lead
to marriage and parenthood. On the other hand, if
a person feels that he or she is unlovable, emotional
isolation from others is the norm. During the mid-
dle adulthood stage (35 to 65 years), the individual
will likely lead a life that is full of activity that he or
she finds rewarding, if the individual has a positive
self-concept. From age 65 years on, individuals
experience the senior stage or the final stage of a
person’s life. If the individual has a positive self-
concept, it is likely that he or she will feel integrity;
if a person possesses a negative self-concept, the
individual probably sees his or her life as a waste of
potential.

In addition to the crises that mark each of the
eight stages, other factors are vital in the develop-
ment of self-concept. These factors include age,
gender, culture, sexual orientation, appearance, life
experiences, emotional maturity, and education.
Each of these factors influences how we perceive
ourselves and how we perceive others. The myriad
experiences a person gains from life are relatively
close to how someone views himself or herself, as
well as his or her relationship with others.
Self-concept consists of three major characteris-
tics: (1) It is learned, (2) it is organized, and (3) it
is dynamic. The first characteristic indicates that a
person’s self-concept does not come prepackaged
in an infant’s brain; rather, self-concept is learned
over time. In other words, self-concept gradually
emerges in the early months of an individual’s life,
and his or her life experiences shape self-concept.
The second characteristic is organization. An indi-
vidual’s basic perception about himself or herself is
stable and is unlikely to experience any rapid
change, while possessing both consistency and sta-
bility. In essence, each individual holds countless
perceptions regarding his or her personal exis-
tence, and each perception is synchronized with
others. Such a stable and organized quality of self-
concept is essential and gives consistency to the
personality. As a result, researchers agree that self-
concept has a relatively stable quality that is char-
acterized by harmony.
The third characteristic is dynamic. As men-
tioned earlier, self-concept development is a con-
tinuous process, and there is a constant assimilation
of new ideas and expulsion of old ideas through-
out life. The world and the things in it are not just
perceived; they are perceived in relation to one’s
self-concept.
Self-concept may be defined as the way in which
a person perceives himself or herself. It can be
divided into three primary categories: (1) personal
self-concept: one’s own opinion about one self,
such as “I am smart”; (2) social concept: one’s
perception about how he or she is perceived by
others in that society, such as “My colleagues
think I am attractive”; and (3) self-ideals: one’s
own idea about what one wants to be, such as “I
want to be successful.”
One critical component affecting an individual’s
self-concept development is called referencing,
Self-Concept 677
which includes temporal and social referencing.
Temporal referencing occurs when individuals
make a self-comparison from an earlier moment in
their lives to a later time, and usually takes place
in childhood and old age when relatively rapid
changes occur because of physical and cognitive
transformations. Social referencing occurs when
individuals compare their own lives with those of
others and tends to occur during adulthood when
any change is less noticeable.
Self-concept is organized through a series of dif-
ferent memories. Memories are arranged and orga-
nized as highlights of a person’s life with memories
consisting of specific events, life tasks, memories of
people that affect a person, and memories of places.
In addition, self-concept can be organized and
arranged in an abstract way relative to personality
traits, which allows individuals to judge themselves
on any number of traits, such as laziness, intelli-
gence, attractiveness, toughness, and so forth.
Each person finds certain unique personality
traits especially important for conceptualizing
himself or herself. For example, one person might
define himself as attractive and another person
might emphasize her intelligence and ability to
achieve tasks. This phenomenon is called self-
schemas, which are the traits people use to define
themselves.
Cary Stacy Smith and Li-Ching Hung
See also Development of Identity; Development of Self-
Concept; Personal Identity Versus Self-Identity
Further Readings
Bushman, B. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Threatened
egotism, narcissism, self-esteem, and direct and
displaced aggression: Does self-love or self-hate lead to
violence? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
41, 305–312.
Corey, G. (2001). Theory and practice of counseling and
psychotherapy (6th ed.). Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole.
McAdams, D. (1993). The stories we live by: Personal
myths and the making of the self. New York: William
Morrow.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Rogers, C. (1980). A way of being. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin.
678 Self-Consciousness
Self-Consciousness
Self-consciousness is a personality trait that involves
a heightened sense of self-awareness about per-
sonal behavior, appearance, or other attributes of
the self. An unpleasant feeling of self-consciousness
occurs when one envisions being watched or
observed by others, resulting in an overconcern
about the impression one is making on others.
People tend to differ in the degree to which they
are consciously thinking about themselves. Some
individuals are more self-conscious than are others
and are characterized as high in self-consciousness,
whereas some individuals are less self-conscious
and are characterized as low in self-consciousness.
The level of one’s self-consciousness can affect
one’s identity, behavior, and communication. This
entry provides an overview of self-consciousness;
describes two dimensions of self-consciousness—
public and private; discusses how self-conscious-
ness affects one’s identity; and presents
philosophical views of self-consciousness.
Overview
The significance of and interest in self-consciousness
came from research on the effects of people’s
behavior and emotion under conditions of an
increased sense of awareness about the self and its
relationship to surroundings. Early scholarship on
self-awareness or self-focused attention showed
that directing attention toward oneself provokes a
comparison process. This process allows people to
judge their behavior against relevant personal
standards—goals, attitudes, values, beliefs—and
allows them to reflect on how to match their behav-
ior to the standard set by self or society. When
people are self-focused, they tend to behave consis-
tently with the standards they set for themselves;
when they are not self-focused, they do not place as
much emphasis on scrutinizing the self in various
situations. Self-consciousness is also associated with
self-evaluation. The quality of the self-evaluation,
whether positive or negative, is often determined by
what one perceives as self-relevant information. For
example, those who are overly self-conscious may
examine more behaviors (e.g., a look, a comment, a
gesture) as being directly related to them, whereas
those who are less self-conscious may not evaluate
as many behaviors as being relevant to the self.
Scholars developed an interest in the personality
trait of self-consciousness when it was discovered
that people vary greatly in the degree to which they
focus on the self. The degree to which people focus
on the self also influences their actions, behaviors,
and communication with others.
William James, who was influential in experi-
mental and systematic psychology, made the obser-
vation that whenever humans are thinking, they
are at the same time aware of themselves and
their personal experiences. This observation pro-
moted further discussion on self-consciousness.
Researchers looked to the family to understand
how a sense of self-consciousness is developed and
found that family life provides some of the param-
eters for self-consciousness. Children come to
understand who constitutes their family and use
this information to formulate an initial sense of the
self. The development of self-consciousness pro-
ceeds with the attainment of more experiences
outside the family. For example, children start to
realize differences when they interact with other
children outside the home (e.g., at school, at a
friend’s house, at the playground). Awareness of
the self and one’s own personal existence start to
shape self-consciousness. Throughout life, people
become more conscious of how others, objects,
physical features, and events shape their lives.
Moreover, people remain conscious of themselves
in relationship to people, objects, features, and
events. Experience with the world brings about
this tension between self-consciousness and people
as social entities. This interest in the self and the
self in relationship to the other helped develop the
research agenda on self-consciousness and led to
the development of the self-consciousness scale. The
most commonly used measure of self-consciousness
is the self-consciousness scale. This scale includes
subscales for private and public self-consciousness
and for social anxiety. The scale has demonstrated
reliability and validity as a means of measuring
individual differences in self-consciousness. The
scale has been translated into several languages
including Chinese, French, German, Brazilian,
Dutch, and Turkish. As a result, cross-cultural dif-
ferences in self-consciousness have been observed.
Moreover, the private and public dimensions of
self-consciousness may relate differently for other
cultures than they do in U.S. samples. These

private and public dimensions add to a textured
understanding of self-consciousness.
Private and Public Self-Consciousness
Many scholars make a distinction between two
components of self-consciousness—private and
public. Both of these dimensions refer to cognitive
styles. Private self-consciousness is the degree to
which people examine their private, inner selves
that are not directly open to observation by
others—for example, thoughts, feelings, and
motives. Public self-consciousness is the degree to
which people are aware of public external aspects
of themselves that can be observed by others—for
example, physical appearance (i.e., weight, cloth-
ing, style), overt behaviors, and mannerisms.
Research shows that public and private self-
consciousness relate to behavior differently. With
a focus on private aspects, there is an increase in
obedience to personally held standards, whereas a
focus on the public aspects of self-consciousness
relies on socially held standards. As a result, these
dimensions of private and public self-consciousness
predict the degree to which people can be influ-
enced by self, others, and society.
Private self-consciousness is related to a clearer
understanding of the self, a greater devotion to
one’s own personal standards, and a higher aware-
ness of stressful situations. Research shows that
people high in private self-consciousness direct
attention inward, allowing a greater sense of self-
awareness. People who are high in private self-
consciousness behave more consistently with their
own beliefs, values, and attitudes than do people
who are low in private self-consciousness. Highly
private self-conscious individuals are also less
likely to conform to social pressures, erroneous
group judgment, and persuasion. Their own per-
ceptions and beliefs are prominent and clear to
themselves; as a result, their views tend to persist
over the views of others. High levels of private self-
consciousness are also associated with a stronger
level of independence and autonomy when faced
with social demands.
People who are high in private self-consciousness
have a heightened tendency to self-reflect, which
enhances their understanding of their behaviors
and actions, causing less bias in answering ques-
tionnaires or reporting on issues where they have
Self-Consciousness 679
to rate themselves. In addition, privately self-
conscious people are said to be more accurate in
reporting their behavior and actions and are more
likely to dispute inaccurate information that others
report about them. When making decisions about
the future, highly self-conscious people rely more
on their personal standards and experience; conse-
quently, they tend to ponder personal experiences
and their implications, causing greater levels of
stress. Highly private self-consciousness is also
associated with a stronger sense of anxiety, depres-
sion, and unease in the company of stressful events
because of the tendency to overanalyze. Private
self-consciousness does not mean being oblivious
to social implications of conduct or being indiffer-
ent to the impressions other people form; however,
people who have high levels of private self-
consciousness are more concerned with personal
rather than social factors of identity.
Public self-consciousness is related to a height-
ened sense of the public aspects of behavior.
Individuals who possess high levels of public self-
consciousness pay close attention to how they are
perceived, evaluated, and judged by others. Public
self-consciousness can result in self-monitoring,
social anxiety, a stronger sense of embarrassment,
worry about one’s physique, more blushing, a lack
of confidence in social situations, and a greater
sensitivity to being shunned by others. High public
self-consciousness is correlated with the amount of
consideration people devote to their appearance—
the importance of make-up, clothing, body weight,
and overall style. For example, those who have a
high level of public self-consciousness might con-
stantly be worrying about whether they are saying
the right thing or dressing appropriately for a par-
ticular situation. A main concern of those with high
public self-consciousness is making desired impres-
sions with the intention of pleasing others; as a
result, they are more likely to give into peer pres-
sure, conform to others’ incorrect decisions, and
follow the crowd. These individuals are more sensi-
tive to the opinions of others because of fear of
possible rejection. Publicly self-conscious individu-
als may be seen as having a chameleon-type person-
ality in social situations, basing their public conduct
on various social contingencies instead of personal
conviction. They continually focus on fitting in.
Highly public self-consciousness results in individu-
als who constantly focus on how they think others
680 Self-Consciousness
want them to be, act, and look. The other becomes
imperative in how decisions are made.
Scholarship has shown that the private and pub-
lic dimensions of self-consciousness should be
viewed as two distinctive aspects that are weakly
correlated rather than two opposite ends of the
spectrum. The relationship between high private
self-consciousness and high public self-conscious-
ness centers on the presentation and construction of
identity. People construct and defend desired iden-
tities all the time in social life, although they differ
in the particular images that constitute their iden-
tity. Private self-consciousness is associated with an
identity of authenticity in social settings, whereas
public self-consciousness focuses on an identity that
promotes a greater sense of presentation and varia-
tion. As a result, people who focus on public self-
consciousness look toward others for their identity,
whereas those high in private self-consciousness
look toward their inner self for a desired identity.
Self-Consciousness and Identity
Erik Erikson helped develop the work on the rela-
tionship between self-consciousness and identity.
Self-consciousness reveals that people are self-
aware authors of their own social conduct in
which they participate and through which they
engage the world. This awareness allows them to
shape a desired identity. Through self-conscious-
ness, they are aware of being distinct from the rest
of the world and understand that “I” does not
exist alone but rather that “I” exists in relationship
to others. Self-consciousness involves the ability to
make reflective decisions about one’s own beliefs
and desires, in addition to a sense of embodied
agency. As Paul Ricœur noted, people are con-
scious of being the authors of their own actions,
and this awareness often comes from the actions
being reflected in the existence of others. Thus,
people become aware of themselves through the
eyes of others. Through relationships with others,
people will modify and reinvent themselves, and
by responding to different situations with others,
they change themselves and their identity in the
process. As a result, intersubjectivity and sociality
play an important role in the development of self-
consciousness. For example, people are aware of
themselves as one among others; this awareness is
framed from the perspective of the other. When
people attempt to see themselves as others see
them, the result may be a change in or a heightened
sense of self-consciousness. The experience with
the other is at the same time an experience that
involves a self-conscious nature pre-reflectively
aware that one is an object for another. This idea
is articulated in the work of George Herbert
Mead’s symbolic interaction theory, which details
different images of “I” and “me” with the latter
focusing on image construction, in Martin Buber’s
six dimensions of interplay of images in relational
exchanges, and in the Johari window model that
uses various quadrants to suggest that parts of the
self are open to reflection and sharing information
with others and parts of the self are closed and hid-
den from the self and others. The level of self-
consciousness determines how identity is shaped
and developed in various situations. Researchers
have also linked an excessive focus on self-
consciousness and identity confusion. Self-
consciousness helps determine a sense of identity
and value; however, because self-consciousness
depends on social interactions, people may have
difficulty understanding their own identities.
Self-consciousness allows people to carefully
monitor social situations, imagine the reaction of
others, and adapt their behavior to the social con-
text to present a desired identity. Such an identity
calls for different sets of self-presentation strate-
gies, relating to either autonomy or conformity.
Social psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists,
and communication scholars all articulate the idea
that people possess multiple perceptions of the self
that portray various identities. Whether in the
public or private setting, self-consciousness influ-
ences how people view or interpret situations and
at the same time regulates their involvement in
interactions. For example, during an interview,
one may have a greater sense of self-consciousness
because one is trying to impress a potential
employer. One may actively reflect on what “I”
should wear, what “I” should say, and how “I”
should act during the interview process.
A self-consciousness perspective considers that
people have to balance their own perceptions of
who they are with what a collective society says
they should be. Factors such as social roles, self-
concept, self-perception, and self-esteem all influ-
ence how people see themselves in relationship to
their surroundings. In addition, the judgments

people make about themselves are constrained by
both social expectations and cultural values. Self-
consciousness is contextualized as people try to
understand how they appear to others through
behaviors and actions. As Edmund Husserl noted,
people become aware of themselves specifically as
human beings only through intersubjective rela-
tions. The idea of self-consciousness has been a
subject of a rich and multifaceted discussion within
the philosophical community.
Philosophical Views of Self-Consciousness
One view of self-consciousness is that it is consid-
ered a reflective structure of the mind that forces
people to have a conception of themselves—it is the
consciousness of the object, the “self.” The mind-
body problem, a central metaphysical concept in
dealing with “philosophy of the mind,” is the prob-
lem of whether mental phenomena are physical
and, if not, how they are related to physical phe-
nomena. Different philosophers have argued in
different ways about the idea of self-consciousness
as an object of the self. The answer lies in the prac-
tical question of the possibility of reflecting on the
unreflected. For example, David Hume believes
that people can never catch themselves without a
perception or never observe anything but the
perception—the subject of thought cannot be
thought about as such. Just as the eye cannot see
itself, the self cannot be aware of itself as an object;
as a result, a subject cannot be an object to itself.
Stated a different way, humans can never stand on
their own shadow because as the person moves,
the shadow moves. Immanuel Kant believed that
knowledge of the self as it is in itself is impossible.
However, he disagreed with Hume’s idea that
there is no more to self-consciousness than con-
sciousness of subject-less mental occurrences. Kant
believed that consciousness of the self consists in
the ability to assign thoughts, expressions, and
experiences to oneself.
Another view of self-consciousness consists in
the idea of transformation. The self is always
changing in consciousness and, as a result, does not
attain a final form of completeness or permanence.
All objects of experience are constituted as objects
of a larger experience, and it would be unsuccessful
to discuss them as existing outside this experience.
Just as an object possesses and obtains an identity
Self-Consciousness 681
as an experienced object, so does the self, for which
it has its nature and function within a social order.
The self is one of many similar selves interacting on
each other. The mind of the self is a social affair
that involves the realization of life with others.
Self-consciousness is real and genuine, but it has its
reality within the social order and within the order
of nature. One philosophical argument is that it is
impossible to think about a certain mental state
without thinking about the subject whose mental
state it is; self-consciousness is an awareness of the
particular state people are in, and therefore their
awareness of their conscious state is an awareness
of themselves as the subject of those particular
mental states.
Self-consciousness has been studied across many
disciplines (e.g., anthropology, communication,
philosophy, psychology, sociology) with implica-
tion for greater understanding of why people do
the things they do. Self-consciousness is one area of
research that explains the ability to reflect actively
and thus increase a sense of self-awareness in vari-
ous situations. Many studies have been conducted
with the self-consciousness scale, resulting in much
research that correlates various variables with the
public and private dimensions. The public and pri-
vate dimensions of self-consciousness further
explain how people construct their identity in vari-
ous situations. The idea of self-consciousness and
identity are inseparable—people construct and
shape their identity through self-consciousness.
This identity is continually being shaped by self-
perception in relationship to the surrounding
world. Moreover, the philosophical implications of
understanding self-consciousness play a fundamen-
tal role in understanding the self in relationship to
consciousness. Self-consciousness is essential to
understanding how the self fits into the larger
philosophical meaning of one’s place in the world.
Leeanne M. Bell
See also Consciousness; Development of Identity;
Development of Self-Concept; Intersubjectivity;
Philosophy of Mind; Self-Assessment; Self-Concept;
Self-Image; Society and Social Identity
Further Readings
Bermúdez, J. L. (1998). The paradox of self-
consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press.
682 Self-Construal
Birkmann, K. (2005). Consciousness, self-consciousness,
and the modern self. History of the Human Sciences,
18, 27–48.
Cohen, A. P. (1994). Self consciousness: An alternative
anthropology of identity. New York: Routledge.
Fenigstein, A. (1987). On the nature of public and private
self-consciousness. Journal of Personality, 55,
543–554.
Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (1975).
Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and
theory. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology,
43, 522–527.
Manfred, F. (2004). Fragments of a history of the theory
of self-consciousness from Kant to Kierkegaard.
Critical Horizons, 5, 53–136.
Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1985). The self-
consciousness scale: A revised version for use with
general populations. Journal of Applied Social
Psychology, 15, 687–699.
Schlenker, B. R., & Weigold, M. F. (1990). Self-
consciousness and self-presentation: Being
autonomous versus appearing autonomous. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 820–828.
Tani, T. (1998). Inquiry into the I, disclosedness, and
self-consciousness: Husserl, Heidegger, Nishida.
Continental Philosophy Review, 31, 239–253.
Taylor, C. (1989). The sources of the self: The making of
modern identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Self-Construal
Since its conception, Hazel Markus and Shinobu
Kitayama’s self-construal theory has been one of
the most popular theoretical frameworks in cross-
cultural psychology. Self-construal research pri-
marily focuses on how the individual’s self differs
across cultures. A self-construal can be defined as
a constellation of thoughts, feelings, and actions
concerning the relationship of the self to others
and the self as distinct from others. Self-construals
are presumed to mediate the influence of culture.
Since Markus and Kitayama introduced the con-
cept of the independent and interdependent self to
represent individualist and group-oriented identi-
ties, numerous studies have attempted to predict
communicative, cognitive, emotional, motiva-
tional, and behavioral outcomes associated with
the two distinct conceptualizations of self. Many
intercultural scholars were becoming dissatisfied
with nationality, broad cultural variability dimen-
sions (e.g., individualism and collectivism), or other
forms of crude classification of individuals (such as
“Westerners” and “Asians”) as a culture proxy for
explaining individual behavior. Furthermore, a
single paradigm of human functioning (i.e., “indi-
vidualism”) has had a virtual stranglehold within
the social sciences in general. Given these criti-
cisms, self-construal research has attracted enthu-
siastic scholars and has turned into one of the most
influential directions in the past decade in cultural
research. This entry first describes the cultural dif-
ferences in self and then discusses the usefulness
and criticisms of self-construals.
Cultural Differences in Self
In describing the culture-specific nature of self,
Markus and Kitayama suggest that cultural and
social groups at any given time are associated with
characteristic patterns of sociocultural participa-
tion, or, more specifically, with characteristic ways
of being a person in the world. Each person is
embedded within a variety of sociocultural con-
texts or cultures (e.g., country, ethnicity, religion,
gender, family). Each of these cultural contexts
makes some claim on the person and is associated
with a set of ideas and practices (i.e., a cultural
framework) about how to be a “good” person.
Markus and Kitayama refer to these characteristic
patterns of sociocultural participation as “self-
ways.” Extending the notion of selfways, Markus
and Kitayama delineate two general cultural self-
schemata: independent and interdependent. These
two images of self were originally conceptualized
as reflecting the emphasis on connectedness and
relations often found in non-Western cultures
(“interdependent self”) and the separatedness and
uniqueness of the individual (“independent self”)
stressed in the West.
Whereas the self-system is the complete configu-
ration of self-schemata (e.g., gender, race, religion,
social class, and one’s developmental history), the
independent and interdependent construals of self
are among the most general and overarching self-
schemata of these in an individual’s self-system.
Based on an extensive review of cross-cultural lit-
erature, Markus and Kitayama argued that these
two construals of self influence cognition, emotion,

and motivation more powerfully than previously
thought.
According to Markus and Kitayama, the main
difference between the two self-construals is the
belief one holds regarding how the self is related to
others. In the independent construal, most repre-
sentations of the self (i.e., the ways in which an
individual thinks of himself or herself) have as their
referent the individual’s ability, characteristic,
attribute, or goal (“I am friendly” or “I am ambi-
tious”). These inner characteristics or traits are the
primary regulators of behavior. This view of the
self derives from a belief in the wholeness and
uniqueness of each person’s configuration of inter-
nal attributes. The normative imperative of such
cultures is to become independent of others and to
discover and express one’s own unique attributes.
Thus, the goals of persons in such cultures are to
stand out and to express their own unique charac-
teristics or traits. This orientation has led to an
emphasis on the need to pursue personal self-actu-
alization or self-development. Individual weakness,
from this cultural perspective, is to be overly
dependent on others or to be unassertive. This per-
spective is rooted in Western philosophical tradi-
tion. The ontological goal of this perspective is to
highlight the division between the experiencer and
what is experienced, in other words, to differenti-
ate the individual from the context.
By contrast, in the interdependent construal, the
self is connected to others; the principal compo-
nents of the self are one’s relationships to others.
This is not to say that the person with an interde-
pendent view of the self has no conception of inter-
nal traits, characteristics, or preferences that are
unique to him or her, but rather that these internal,
private aspects of the self are not primary forces in
directing or guiding behavior. Instead, behavior is
more significantly regulated by a desire to main-
tain harmony and appropriateness in relationships.
Within such a construal, the self becomes most
meaningful and complete when it is cast in the
appropriate social relationship. So one’s behavior
in a given situation might be a function more of
the needs, wishes, and preferences of others than
of one’s own needs, wishes, or preferences. As a
result of this interdependent construal of the self,
one may attempt to meet the needs of others and
to promote the others’ goals. Weakness in this
perspective is to be headstrong, unwilling to
Self-Construal 683
accommodate the needs of others, or self-centered.
The emphasis is on downplaying the division
between the experiencer and the object of experi-
ence, and it is connection with, rather than separa-
tion from, others and the surrounding context that
is highlighted.
The distinctions between independent and inter-
dependent construals must be regarded as general
tendencies that emerge when the members of the
culture are considered as a whole. For instance,
even in the United States a theme of interdepen-
dence is reflected in the values and activities of
many of its cultures. Religious groups, such as the
Quakers, explicitly value and promote interdepen-
dence, as do many small towns and rural commu-
nities. Markus and Kitayama observe that even
within highly individualistic Western culture, most
people are still much less self-reliant, self-contained,
or self-sufficient than the prevailing cultural ideol-
ogy suggests that they should be. “Independence”
and “interdependence” refer to two different ori-
entations toward society and people. But cultures
and individuals can balance and develop each of
these orientations in many different ways. Thus,
although social practices based on these two cul-
tural orientations may differ dramatically, they are
not necessarily diametrical antitheses. Nor are
their psychological consequences always simple
opposites.
Although Markus and Kitayama do not directly
link their conceptualization of the self-construals to
any culture-level dimensions, they discuss the cul-
tural differences at the individual level under a
framework similar to individualism and collectiv-
ism. Several cross-cultural studies have reported a
link between individualism and collectivism and
independent and interdependent self-construals.
Self-construals have been used to predict cross-cul-
tural differences in a wide variety of situations,
including preferred conversational styles, request-
ing styles, deception, attribution errors, embarrass-
ment, interactive constraints, conflict strategies,
self-esteem, coping, cross-cultural adaptation, depres-
sion and social anxiety, five factors of personality,
self-esteem, relationship harmony, life satisfaction,
acculturation, biculturalism, self-enhancement, and
consumer behavior. Recent research has also exam-
ined the role of the relational self-construal in social
cognition, in the development of closeness in rela-
tionships, and in well-being.
684 Self-Construal
Why Self-Construals Are Useful
Historically, cross-cultural researchers have found
many cross-cultural differences in individual behav-
iors and psychological functioning. However, there
had been no theoretical framework to explain how
culture creates those cultural differences. Then
Markus and Kitayama offered their theory, imply-
ing that cultures produce specific self-schemata
(independent and interdependent self-construals),
thereby producing culturally distinct behaviors.
This may be the reason self-construal theory has
become one of the most influential theories in
cross-cultural psychology since the 1990s.
A major benefit of self-construal research is that
self-construals or related notions of cultural iden-
tity are well suited to identify the nature of identity
within an individual who crosses cultural bound-
aries. Increasing cultural connections, with subse-
quent hybridization and the emergence of a world
system consisting of an interpenetration of the
global and the local, increase the complexity of
culture. Therefore, there is a pressing need to for-
mulate views of the self-concept that include the
newer ideas of multiple or hybrid identities.
Further, the use of broad cultural variability
dimensions has been criticized by many authors
for its lack of explanatory power. When broad
dimensions such as individualism-collectivism or
high- versus low-context are invoked to account
for cultural differences, it is not clear exactly how
or why these differences occur. Although useful in
evaluating whether cross-cultural differences exist,
they are far less helpful in explaining why culture
has an effect. Therefore, a better way to evaluate
the effect of culture on behavior is to examine the
mediating role of self-construals. To better under-
stand the effect of national culture, it is necessary
to identify the psychological variables that distin-
guish people belonging to different cultures.
Finally, over many years, social scientists have
taken for granted the norm of an individualistic,
independent self, and many theories in the social
sciences are based on this assumption. In the pre-
dominant discourse of contemporary Western
culture, “self” is equated with the autonomous or
self-sufficient individual. Recent research, how-
ever, has revealed that substantial variability exists
in the self; many theories based on an assumption
that the self is independent and separated from
others require revision given the interdependent/
relational self-construal.
Critique
Critics have pointed out that Markus and
Kitayama’s original formulation is misleading
because it gives too simplistic a portrayal of how
individuals construct their self-construals from
their cultural experiences. When Markus and
Kitayama introduced the notion of self-construals,
they were not clear about the dimensionality of
self-construals. Only recently have researchers
cautiously started proposing two or more dimen-
sions instead of a single bipolar dimension.
Numerous journal articles and books have revealed
ever more complexity and subtle issues relating to
self-construals. Dimensionality of selves such as
independent, relational, interdependent, collective,
and many other closely related terms vary mark-
edly between investigators.
Although self-construals are one of the most
influential concepts in cross-cultural research, their
validity has also been challenged. Some scholars
contend that the theory has gained much more
prominence than is warranted by the empirical
support for it. Further research is needed to test the
validity of self-construal theory as well as pro-
posed scales for defining self-construal in ways
that can be measured.
Markus and Kitayama introduced the notion of
self-construals only in 1991, and self-construal
scales were developed even more recently. The
scales measuring self-construals may themselves
need revision before the validity of self-construal
theory can be tested. Establishing validity of the
scales is a crucial prerequisite to scientific inquiry
and the proper understanding and interpretation
of findings. Currently, the validity of the findings
of numerous studies in this literature are being
seriously debated. Anomalies in the literature war-
rant a deeper analysis of the current conceptualiza-
tion of self-construals and the scales employed to
measure them.
Accelerated change in the modern world com-
pels us to take cognizance of the dynamic nature of
individuals’ cultural identity. A contemporary view
of self-culture relations suggests that this relation-
ship is more complex than previously assumed, and
certainly more complex than a simplistic view of

self that pits individual and group needs against
each other. Research on cultural identity encour-
ages psychological work that also accounts for
hybrid identities. Such identities may be shaped by
migration, discrimination, poverty, and minority
(e.g., ethnic, racial, or religious) status. There is a
need for more fine-grained analyses that capture
subtleties such as the heterogeneity and the overlap
that exist between and within different cultural
communities. The notion of self-construals, although
still evolving, may be well suited for this purpose.
Min-Sun Kim
See also Collectivism/Individualism; Self-Schema
Further Readings
Cross, S. E., & Gore, J. (2002). Cultural models of the
self. In M. Leary & J. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of
self and identity (pp. 536–564). New York: Guilford
Press.
Kim, M. S. (2002). Non-Western perspectives on human
communication: Implications for theory and practice.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Markus, H., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self:
Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation.
Psychological Review, 98, 224–253.
Matsumoto, D. (1999). Culture and self: An empirical
assessment of Markus and Kitayama’s theory of
independent and interdependent self-construals. Asian
Journal of Social Psychology, 2, 289–310.
Singelis, T. M. (1994). The measurement of independent
and interdependent self- construals. Personality and
Social Psychological Bulletin, 20, 580–591.
Self-Discrepancy Theory
Why is it that when people are emotionally over-
whelmed by a tragedy or serious setback in their
lives, such as the death of their child, the loss of
their job, or the break-up of their marriage, some
suffer from depression whereas others suffer from
anxiety? Self-discrepancy theory was developed to
find an answer to this question. The answer pro-
posed by self-discrepancy theory is that even
when people have the same goal, such as college
students wanting a good grade point average
(GPA) or older adults wanting a good marriage,
Self-Discrepancy Theory 685
they can vary in how they represent the goal.
Some people represent their goals as hopes, wishes,
or aspirations—called ideal self-guides in self-
discrepancy theory. Other individuals represent
their goals as beliefs about their duties, responsi-
bilities, or obligations—ought self-guides.
According to self-discrepancy theory, this differ-
ence between pursuing ideals versus oughts
explains why people have such different emotional
reactions to the same negative life event.
Self-discrepancy theory proposes that people
treat what is currently happening in their per-
sonal lives as saying something about them
now—as representing their actual selves. These
actual selves are then compared with their ideal
or ought self-guides. People suffer emotionally
when there is a discrepancy between some aspect
of their actual self and one of their self-guides—a
self-discrepancy. When there is an actual-self dis-
crepancy from a personal ideal, people feel sad,
disappointed, discouraged—dejection-related
emotions that relate to depression. When there is
an actual-self discrepancy from a personal ought,
people feel nervous, tense, and worried—
agitation-related emotions that relate to anxiety.
Thus, according to self-discrepancy theory, peo-
ple’s emotional vulnerabilities depend on the type
of self-guide that motivates their lives—a vulner-
ability to dejection or depression when ideals
dominate and a vulnerability to agitation or anxi-
ety when oughts dominate.
Why are different emotions associated with an
actual-ideal discrepancy versus an actual-ought
discrepancy? According to self-discrepancy theory,
this is because different emotions are associated
with different psychological situations that people
experience: Success or failure in ideal goal pursuit
produce different psychological situations than
does success or failure in ought goal pursuit.
Specifically, when pursuing ideal goals, people
experience success as the presence of a positive
outcome (a gain), which is experienced as feeling
happy, and they experience failure as the absence
of positive outcomes (a non-gain), which is experi-
enced as feeling sad. In contrast, when pursuing
ought goals, people experience success as the
absence of a negative outcome (a non-loss), which
is experienced as feeling relaxed, and they experi-
ence failure as the presence of a negative outcome
(a loss), which is experienced as feeling nervous.
686 Self-Discrepancy Theory
Self-discrepancy theory also proposes that dif-
ferent kinds of parenting contribute to children
developing strong ideal self-guides or strong ought
self-guides, and this is because of the different psy-
chological situations involved in the parenting.
When children interact with their parents (or other
caretakers), the parents respond to them in ways
that make the children experience specific kinds of
psychological situations. Over time, the children
respond to themselves like their parents respond to
them, producing the same specific kinds of psycho-
logical situations. Over time, this develops into the
type of self-guide that is associated with those psy-
chological situations—ideal or ought self-guides.
The kind of parenting that is predicted to create
strong ideals in children is the combination of bol-
stering (when managing success) and love with-
drawal (when disciplining failure). Bolstering
occurs, for instance, when parents encourage the
child to overcome difficulties or set up opportuni-
ties for the child to engage in success activities—it
creates an experience of the presence of positive
outcomes in the child. Love withdrawal occurs,
for instance, when parents take away a toy when
the child refuses to share it or stop a story when
the child is not paying attention—it creates an
experience of the absence of positive outcomes in
the child.
The kind of parenting that is predicted to create
strong oughts in children is the combination of
prudence (when managing success) and punitive/
critical (when disciplining failure). Prudence occurs,
for instance, when parents train the child to be
alert to potential dangers or teach the child to
“mind your manners”—this creates an experience
of the absence of negative outcomes in the child.
Punitive/critical occurs, for instance, when parents
yell when the child doesn’t listen or criticize when
the child makes a mistake—it creates an experi-
ence of the presence of negative outcomes.
Self-discrepancy theory also distinguishes bet­
ween self-guides as a function of whose viewpoint is
associated with the self-guide. Self-guides can repre-
sent individuals’ own independent viewpoint about
the kind of persons they ideally want or ought to be,
such as “What are my goals for myself?”
Alternatively, self-guides can represent the view-
point of a significant other about the kind of person
this other ideally wants or believes they ought to be,
such as “What are my mother’s goals for me?” The
theory proposes that individuals differ in whether
their own self-guides or their significant others’ self-
guides are the basis for self-regulation and deter-
mine emotional vulnerabilities.
Consistent with the predictions of self-discrepancy
theory, research with both clinical and nonclinical
populations has found that suffering from dejection-
depression feelings is more strongly predicted by
actual-ideal discrepancies than by actual-ought dis-
crepancies, whereas suffering from agitation-anxiety
feelings is more strongly predicted by actual-ought
discrepancies than by actual-ideal discrepancies.
Moreover, because some individuals have actual-
self discrepancies from both their ideal and their
ought self-guides, studies have found that one or
the other kind of suffering can be temporarily
induced by activating (through verbal priming)
either an ideal or an ought. When such “priming”
occurs, participants whose actual-ideal discrepancy
is activated suddenly feel sad and disappointed and
fall into a depression-like state of low activity (e.g.,
talk slower), and participants whose actual-ought
discrepancy is activated suddenly feel nervous and
worried and fall into an anxiety-like state of high
activity (e.g., talk quicker). Studies with U.S. sam-
ples have also found that discrepancies from own
independent self-guides are a more important deter-
minant of emotional vulnerabilities for males than
for females, whereas discrepancies from significant
other self-guides are more important for females
than for males. Self-discrepancy theory has been
used to develop effective therapy interventions for
treating depression and anxiety disorders.
E. Tory Higgins
See also Cognitive Dissonance Theory; Self-Concept; Self-
Esteem; Self-Perception Theory
Further Readings
Carver, C. S., Lawrence, J. W., & Scheier, M. F. (1999).
Self-discrepancies and affect: Introducing the role of
feared selves. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 25(7), 783–792.
Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating
self and affect. Psychological Review, 94, 319–340.
Higgins, E. T., Klein, R., & Strauman, T. (1985). Self-
concept discrepancy theory: A psychological model for
distinguishing among different aspects of depression
and anxiety. Social Cognition, 3, 51–76.

Self-Efficacy
Albert Bandura’s 1997 social learning theory con-
tains the concept of self-efficacy, which is the self-
perception that one can perform in ways that
allow some control over life events. More specifi-
cally, self-efficacy determines one’s perception that
he or she can produce desired results. Self-efficacy
forms the foundation of human agency—people’s
will—and is located in one’s self-perception. Self-
efficacy can be described in terms of magnitude
and generality. Self-efficacy differs in the magni-
tude of the level of perceived difficulty of the
task; the more difficult the task completed, the
higher the level of self-efficacy. Accomplishing
tasks spurs feelings toward other associated tasks.
For those people with higher levels of self-efficacy,
when a particular task is achieved, feelings of con-
fidence are generalized to other tasks. Research
indicates that children who perform well on math
tasks, for example, should efficiently learn new
material built on those domains.
Accurate assessment of one’s skills is an impor-
tant component to self-efficacy—there is a devel-
opmental component to assessing one’s skill.
Children are less able to accurately assess their
skills than are adults.
Bandura differentiated efficacy expectations
from outcome expectations. Outcome expectancy
is an estimation that a given behavior will lead to a
certain outcome, whereas an efficacy expectation is
the confidence that one can successfully execute the
behavior required to accomplish the outcome. The
two concepts differ when a person believes that a
course of action will produce outcomes (outcome
expectation) but is unsure that he or she can com-
plete the task (efficacy expectation). Furthermore,
people’s expectation of their ability to successfully
complete a task determines how much effort and
persistence they will devote to accomplish it.
Nonetheless, according to Dale Schunk in 1995,
high self-efficacy will not influence behavior when
people do not value the outcome.
Components of Self-Efficacy
A person’s strength of conviction influences self-
efficacy. The stronger the perceived self-efficacy,
the more effort a person is willing to devote to the
Self-Efficacy 687
task. Those willing to take risks may not always
succeed, but they learn from their mistakes and
subsequently are more likely to embark on trying
more complex tasks. People with low self-efficacy
typically are afraid of failing at a task. They either
don’t risk trying to accomplish what they perceive
as difficult or they often give up before succeeding.
Cognitive Thought
Bandura believed that cognitive thought or
what he referred to as self-reflective thought
informs self-efficacy. People interpret their experi-
ences in ways that add to or detract from one’s
perceived self-efficacy. Bandura identified the type
of information people use for this interpretation,
including difficulty of the task, level of effort,
assistance received, conditions under which the
task was performed, emotional and physical state,
and perceived improvement over time. A person’s
biases also play a factor in this interpretation. For
example, a person’s biased selection of what to
remember and what to forget provides data for
interpretation.
One’s level of perceived self-efficacy influences
whether one will focus on opportunity or risk. A
person with strong expectations of success will
persevere because of established coping strategies
despite a previous failing experience. People with a
strong perceived self-efficacy are more likely to
possess cognitive resourcefulness, be flexible, and
effectively manage their environment for contin-
ued success. People with lower self-efficacy dwell
on what can go wrong.
Motivation
Motivation is another important component to
Bandura’s social learning theory and is related to
self-efficacy. Bandura believed that motivation was
often cognitively generated and was affected by
casual attributions, outcome expectations, and cog-
nitive goals. Casual attributions means that a person
with low perceived self-efficacy will assume that a
task was not successful because of his or her low
ability whereas a person with high self-efficacy
assumes that a task’s incompletion resulted from
other factors such as insufficient effort and unfavor-
able circumstances. One’s expectation of an out-
come influences whether someone will be motivated
688 Self-Efficacy
to pursue the task. People with low self-efficacy will
doubt they can succeed and are likely not to pursue
the task and think little of the consequences.
Therefore, outcome expectation influences imple-
mentation. Reflective thought about goals influ-
ences what goals to undertake, the amount of effort
required, and how long to persevere in attempts to
achieve them. People with higher self-efficacy are
likely to set motivating goals for themselves and
expect favorable outcomes. They strategize about
how to overcome obstacles and place responsibility
for failures on factors that are controllable.
In describing motivation more precisely, Bandura
identified sources that influence self-efficacy. They
are described here.
Performance Accomplishments
First titled “performance accomplishments,”
but later altered to “sources of mastery experi-
ences,” Bandura explained that the frequency of a
person’s accomplishments or failures influenced
one’s self-efficacy. Perceived frequent failures
decreased self-efficacy, whereas increased successes
encouraged self-efficacy. Though occasional fail-
ures spurred learning from mistakes, the timing,
importance, and frequency of failures is important
in determining degree of self-efficacy.
Vicarious Experiences
Vicarious sources of self-efficacy include mod-
els, both live and symbolic. Parents, caretakers,
teachers, and peers become important vicarious
models. By watching others, people with a strong
perceived sense of self-efficacy believe that they
too can succeed. However, watching others fail
tends to instill increased self-doubt for those with
weak self-efficacy prompting a circular phenome-
non of doubt, failure, and more doubt. Research
has indicated that providing diverse models of
observing the repeated successful completion of
tasks by a variety of people increases self-efficacy
for those with low self-efficacy.
Social Persuasion
Earlier described by Bandura as “verbal persua-
sion,” social persuasion can influence self-efficacy,
but its influence is short lived. Persuasion takes
forms other than only through verbal means such
as through writing, body language, rewards,
awards, and punishment. Experiences that discon-
firm social persuasion have a stronger impact on
self-efficacy than social persuasion does.
Physical and Emotional States
In his early work, Bandura stressed the emo-
tional influence on self-efficacy, but in his later
work, he added the influence of physical factors.
People who expect success are not overwhelmed by
fear, anxiety, depression, or other arousal states.
They are able to reduce negative emotional states,
whereas people with low perceived self-efficacy
find that more difficult. Their fear of failure begets
more fear. People with lower self-efficacy read
their tension as a sign of personal deficiency.
Situational Circumstances
Some tasks are more difficult than others are
and require more physical and emotional resources
to complete. The perceived difficulty of a task
influences one’s perceived success in accomplishing
it, which relates to one’s perceived strengths and
weaknesses connected to the task.
Application of Aspects of Self-Efficacy
Social learning theory and self-efficacy in particu-
lar have been used frequently to guide educational
practices, especially in ways to motivate learning
from infants to adults. Caregivers early in a child’s
life pave the way for self-efficacy. Experiences pro-
vided by them to enhance curiosity lead to self-
mastery, which in turn encourages caregivers to
provide additional varied and complex opportuni-
ties for self-mastery. According to Dale Schunk
and Frank Pajares, environments that offer stimu-
lating exploration through moderate challenges
are best able to encourage self-efficacy.
Bandura believed that adults with a low self-
efficacy lived in a stressful environment of their
own making. Those with higher levels of self-
efficacy find means to cope with and manage
adversities by transforming threats to achievement.
Through cognitive reframing, Bandura believed
that people with low levels of self-efficacy could
interrupt detrimental thought processes by turning

them off. This alters the cause of stress. Depression
is of particular concern in relation to self-efficacy.
Unfulfilled goals and dreams can lead to a depres-
sive state that can weaken self-efficacy. Depressive
states can also weaken social supports. Another
avenue in raising levels of self-efficacy is to assist
people in selecting environments that nurture their
potential. For children and adolescents, schools and
peers that contribute to feelings of autonomy and
relatedness improve the likelihood of self-efficacy.
Examples in schools include less emphasis on com-
petition, more teacher attention to individual prog-
ress, and support during school transitions (i.e.,
moving from elementary school to middle school).
Children and adolescent peer networks greatly
influence self-efficacy. According to Schunk and
Pajares, academic achievement increases for stu-
dents in networks where peers are talented aca-
demically. However, academic ability groupings in
schools can hinder self-efficacy of students who
find their academic performance below their
peers.
Research addresses the impact of teacher self-
efficacy on student achievement. Because teachers
with higher levels of self-efficacy predict higher
student achievement, efforts in teacher preparation
and professional development to ensure teacher
self-efficacy is critical.
Bandura observed that prejudicial systems neu-
tralize high levels of self-efficacy. He believed that
self-efficacy exceeded academic performance in
such environments. In 1997, in response to these
environments, Beverly Tatum suggested peer men-
toring groups (that she metaphorically referred to
as cafeteria tables) and other mentoring programs
that offer support and validation to students from
others who have had similar experiences. In 2007,
Tatum wrote about how racist notions undergird-
ing achievement tests negatively influence the self-
efficacy of students of color. She highlighted
Shelby Steele’s work in stereotype threat that dem-
onstrated how racism and sexism are detrimental
to self-efficacy.
Efforts to improve self-efficacy of students can-
not overcome under-resourced and ineffective
schools. Bandura proposed that collectives as well
as individuals possess self-efficacy. Research sug-
gests that paying attention to the self-efficacy of
low-performing schools as well as to the individu-
als in those schools is warranted.
Self-Efficacy 689
Self-efficacy is often used in career and voca-
tional counseling. In that regard, Vernon Zunker
noted that self-efficacy, outcome expectations, and
personal goals are the building blocks that deter-
mine the course of career development.
Bandura found the concept of self-efficacy eas-
ily applicable to people suffering from phobias. He
felt that treatment interventions should include
modeling with guided participation. Because moti-
vation is often cognitively generated and emotional
states can serve as barriers to greater self-efficacy,
steps to increase self-efficacy must incorporate
managing emotional states. Those with lower lev-
els of self-efficacy consistently worry about crises
that rarely come.
Remaining Questions About Self-Efficacy
According to Schunk and Pajares, the generalized
impact of self-efficacy is unclear. They also point
out that Bandura’s emphasis on persistence as a
variable of self-efficacy may be problematic because
a teacher or parent often imposes environments
where children have no choice but to persist.
Because confidence is important to self-efficacy,
Schunk and Pajares question whether there is a
point at which someone becomes too confident.
Though they discourage efforts to decrease stu-
dents’ confidence levels, Schunk and Pajares believe
that the impact of overconfidence should be inves-
tigated. They also cite questions regarding the
cross-cultural validity of self-efficacy.
Bandura lamented problems in measuring self-
efficacy in that respondents often offered their
hope of succeeding rather than their prediction of
whether they would succeed. Research on hope
may address this concern.
Jan Arminio
See also Ascribed Identity; Avowal; Identity Change; Self;
Self-Concept; Self-Esteem
Further Readings
Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Bandura, A. (1997). Social cognitive theory of
personality. In L. A. Pervin & O. P. John (Eds.),
Handbook of personality: Theory and research
(2nd ed., pp. 154–196). New York: Guilford Press.
690 Self-Enhancement Theory
Schunk, D. H. (1995). Self-efficacy and education and
instruction. In J. E. Maddux (Ed.), Self-efficacy,
adaption, and adjustment: Theory, research, and
applications (pp. 281–303). New York: Plenum Press.
Schunk, D. H., & Pajares, F. (2005). Competence
perceptions and academic functioning. In A. J. Elliot
& C. S. Dweck (Eds.), Handbook of competence and
motivation (pp. 85–104). New York: Guilford Press.
Snyder, C. R., Sympson, S. C., Michael, S. T., &
Cheavens, J. (2001). Optimism and hope constructs:
Variants on a positive expectancy theme. In
E. C. Chang (Ed.), Optimism & pessimism:
Implications for theory, research, and practice.
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Tatum, B. D. (1997). “Why are all the Black kids sitting
together in the cafeteria?” And other conversations
about race. New York: Basic Books.
Tatum, B. D. (2007). Can we talk about race? And other
conversations in an era of school resegregation.
Boston: Beacon Press.
Zunker, V. G. (2006). Career counseling: A holistic
approach (7th ed.). Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Self-Enhancement Theory
Self-knowledge is fundamental for developing a
sense of the self. Regardless of the accuracy of this
self-knowledge, it influences one’s perceptions of
the self, as well as one’s interactions with others.
One way of learning about the self is through the
evaluations and feedback that one receives from
others. Self-enhancement theory is based on vari-
ous personality theories and suggests that people
have a basic drive to perceive the self positively
and receive positive evaluations from others.
One’s desire for positive feedback increases if
positive evaluations are not received. This theory
emphasizes self-enhancement as a basic motive for
gathering self-knowledge. The following sections
describe self-enhancement theory, provide exam-
ples of competing hypotheses for self-evaluation,
and present research about the role of enhance-
ment in mental health in different cultures.
Self-Evaluation Motivations
The idea that people want to feel good about them-
selves is not a unique or unusual concept. Sigmund
Freud, a pioneer in the field of psychology, was
perhaps one of the first proponents of this idea in
the early 1900s. He proposed that people continu-
ally strive to achieve pleasure and avoid pain. This
drive is called the pleasure principle, and it is
important especially with respect to young children
because of what is considered their selfishness and
disregard for others, which allows them to receive
basic needs for survival (e.g., crying when hungry).
This drive continues over time, where the individ-
ual is interested in feeling good about the self and
seeking immediate gratification. The same motiva-
tion for seeking pleasure was introduced in the
drive-reduction theory in the 1940s. Once again,
the basic premise was that all behavior is moti-
vated by the desire to seek pleasure that is a result
of needs and desires being met. When drive-in-
duced tensions are alleviated, the individual feels
pleasure, resulting in an enhancement of the self.
That people want to feel pleasure by thinking
positively of themselves and having others express
the same regard has been evident in numerous
studies within psychology. Self-enhancement the-
ory arose from this basic premise, suggesting that
regardless of how a person feels about himself or
herself, the person wants others to think positively
of him or her. A widely studied phenomenon in
social psychology, self-enhancement has been con-
sidered a universal motivator. Because an individ-
ual cannot directly observe the self, one must look
to others to gain self-knowledge that allows one to
create beliefs and opinions about the self. Although
this knowledge about the self is not always accu-
rate, it still plays an influential role in how one
perceives the self.
One way to learn about the self is through
interaction and feedback from others. Learning
what others think about the self can help reinforce
one’s self-knowledge. Feedback can be positive or
negative and can be consistent or inconsistent with
one’s self-view. The extent to which people prefer
good/bad or (in)consistent self-evaluations has
been widely studied. In the 1970s, there were sev-
eral competing schools of thought on the type of
feedback people preferred. Until this time, many
“mini-theories” tried to explain the motivational
processes affecting self-knowledge. These mini-
theories were then categorized into three distinct
areas to indicate the type of information preferred
from others: accurate information (self-assessment
theory), consistent information (self-verification

theory), and positive information (self-enhancement
theory).
Accurate Feedback
The first motive for self-knowledge is called the
appraisal motive, which suggests that people want
to receive accurate information about the self.
Proposed by Yaacov Trope, self-assessment theory
suggests that uncertainty is created when people
do not have an objective view of the self. To reduce
this aversive state, people seek accurate self-
knowledge. One way of gathering accurate infor-
mation is through diagnostic tests. These tests
provide information about one’s abilities on a
given task. Without extrinsic motivation, the
results of these tasks should be able to reduce
uncertainty. Research by Trope and colleagues has
found that people prefer tasks when they accu-
rately diagnose ability (i.e., tasks high in diagnos-
ticity), regardless of whether such tasks identify
failure or success.
Consistent Feedback
A second motive related to self-knowledge
involves receiving confirmation about how one
sees the self and can be traced to such early sym-
bolic interactionists as Charles Cooley and George
Herbert Mead. William Swann called this self-
verification theory, which suggests that people
prefer having others see them as they see them-
selves. Having this correspondent feedback is
important because it allows people to understand
responses from others, predict their behavior, and
know how to act toward them. For example, if
individuals have positive self-concepts, they want
others to think positively of them, whereas if they
have negative self-concepts, they would prefer to
get negative feedback because it is consistent with
their self-views.
Preference for consistent feedback can be traced
to Prescott Lecky’s seminal work on self-consis-
tency theory and other consistency theories from
the 1950s such as Fritz Heider’s balance theory
and Leon Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory.
Balance theory proposes that people prefer cogni-
tive consistency and are motivated to achieve
psychological balance. Cognitive dissonance the-
ory suggests that when people have contradicting
Self-Enhancement Theory 691
cognitions (defined as attitudes, emotions, beliefs,
or values), they are motivated to reduce the nega-
tive state of psychological discomfort that such
dissonant state produces. To minimize this dis-
comfort, an individual can acquire new thoughts
or modify existing thoughts to restore the percep-
tion of consistency of cognitions. In interpersonal
contexts, a person can change his or her own self-
concept, change his or her own actions, or change
the relationship with the other person. According
to consistency theorists, a person can also choose
acquaintances based on consistent self-views. For
example, one may only choose to be friends with
people who have the same views of the individual
that the individual has of himself or herself.
According to self-consistency literature, if a person
has a negative view of himself or herself, that per-
son would be more receptive to feedback that
confirmed his or her view of himself or herself
instead of contradicting it.
Many studies have been conducted to test self-
verification theory. The research paradigm usually
involves measuring self-evaluations of participants
and providing them with positive or negative
evaluations from their group members. Those with
high self-evaluations react more favorably toward
group members who provide them with positive
evaluations than toward those providing negative
evaluations. Participants with low self-evaluations
prefer group members who provide negative feed-
back. Morton Deutsch and Leonard Solomon con-
ducted one of the earliest studies on self-consistency
in 1959. In a 2 × 2 experimental design, researchers
manipulated self-evaluation and evaluations from
others. Participants were told they either succeeded
or failed a task, and their partner either wanted to
work or not work with them again. Results
revealed that participants who were told they
succeeded on the task (i.e., had a positive self-
evaluation) preferred partners who also gave them
positive feedback. Participants who were told they
failed the task (i.e., had a negative self-evaluation)
preferred partners who gave them negative feed-
back. Although the study had limitations, it showed
that preference for group members was in the
direction predicted by self-consistency theories.
Though numerous studies have been conducted
to test self-verification motives, critics argue that it
is difficult to test the theory because these processes
are rare. To test the theory, it is essential to have
692 Self-Enhancement Theory
participants with negative self-views. However,
most people have relatively positive self-views,
thereby making it difficult to test the theory.
Positive Feedback
Self-enhancement theory suggests that all indi-
viduals, regardless of their self-view, prefer to
receive positive evaluations from others. This view
can be traced to early personality theorists such as
Karen Horney, Carl Rogers, and Abraham Tesser.
Theorists in this line of research explain that peo-
ple want to have a high sense of worth. This basic
need for self-esteem can be achieved through hav-
ing others like and respect them. People should
respond favorably toward those who provide them
positive evaluations of themselves because this
feedback fulfills their self-esteem needs. Similarly,
they should respond unfavorably toward those
who give them negative evaluations. These predic-
tions arose from the social-exchange literature,
which suggests that people are attracted to groups
that fulfill their needs. Contrary to the self-consis-
tency literature, self-esteem theorists suggested
that individuals with low self-esteem respond more
favorably toward positive feedback than do those
with high self-esteem because those with low self-
esteem have a higher need for esteem enhance-
ment. Thus, although everyone prefers positive
rather than negative self-evaluations from others,
those with low self-esteem prefer it even more
than do those with high self-esteem. In 1959,
J. E. Ditties conducted one of the earliest experi-
ments on self-esteem, in which participants pro-
vided self-reports about self-esteem and either
received positive or negative feedback from group
members. Results showed that participants with
low self-esteem who received negative evaluations
were less attracted to the group than when they
received positive evaluations.
Comparing Theories
Although extensive empirical support has been
found for the three motivations described, they
have also been investigated through independent
studies. Constantine Sedikides conducted several
experiments comparing the three motivations in the
self-evaluation process. Participants in these studies
were asked to reflect on central or peripheral traits
by asking themselves questions that varied in diag-
nostic ability. The central traits were highly descrip-
tive and important and peripheral traits were low
in descriptiveness and importance to the individual.
Based on previous findings, the researchers assumed
that participants had great self-knowledge and cer-
tainty about central traits but not peripheral traits.
The study asked participants to reflect on three
traits that were central/positive (kind, friendly, and
trustworthy), central/negative (unkind, unfriendly,
and untrustworthy), peripheral/positive (modest,
predictable, and uncomplaining), or peripheral/
negative (immodest, unpredictable, and complain-
ing). Results demonstrated that participants con-
firmed both central and peripheral traits, providing
evidence against self-verification theory. Supporting
the self-enhancement view, participants confirmed
possession of positive traits and disconfirmed pos-
session of negative traits. Participants were also more
likely to confirm possessing positive traits when the
traits were central versus peripheral, and more likely
to disconfirm possessing negative traits when they
were central versus peripheral. Pitting self-assessment,
self-verification, and self-enhancement motivations
against each other, the results from six experiments
provided support for the self-enhancement framework
(followed by self-verification, then self-assessment),
suggesting that enhancement is the most powerful
motivation in the self-evaluation process.
Before Sedikides’s study, decades of research
revealed mixed results, with some studies finding
support for one theory over the others. More
recently, researchers have attempted to demon-
strate that the three theories may be integrated to
better explain self-knowledge motivations.
J. Sidney Shrauger conducted a literature review
to better understand contradicting results about
self-knowledge. He found that responses to feed-
back were measured in two fundamentally differ-
ent ways: cognitively and affectively. This
difference could account for the contradicting
results between consistency and enhancement
theories. When cognitive reactions to feedback are
being studied, people prefer receiving consistent
information. If the information is not consistent
with the view of the self, it is less accurately
recalled and is not perceived as credible. In con-
trast, the study of emotional responses to feedback
(e.g., satisfaction with the evaluation, liking of the
evaluator), suggests that people prefer receiving

enhancing information. In these studies, people
with positive or negative views of the self prefer
receiving positive evaluations. Shrauger concluded
that people favor getting evaluations that are con-
sistent with the self-view when processing informa-
tion cognitively. However, emotionally speaking,
people prefer to receive enhancing evaluations
even if they are inconsistent or distrusted. Though
this was an important finding, little research has
directly examined cognitive and affective responses
to evaluations within the same study. The few
that were conducted immediately after Shrauger’s
review found evidence for the self-enhancement
model rather than for the consistency model.
William Swann and colleagues later conducted a
study where they measured both cognitive and
affective reactions to feedback that were consis-
tent or inconsistent with participants’ self-view.
They found that participants preferred consistent
feedback; however, those who received negative
feedback were more depressed, hostile, and anx-
ious compared with those who received positive
feedback. Consistency of feedback with self-view
did not influence these affective responses. Taken
together, these findings support Shrauger’s
hypothesis that preference for feedback may be
different depending on cognitive or affective
measures.
Self-Enhancement and Mental Health
Self-enhancement motives are studied across
numerous contexts, including the mental health
domain. Within the mental health field, it is gener-
ally accepted that psychologically healthy individ-
uals maintain a realistic view of the self. However,
people often have inflated positive illusions of the
self. In a review of the literature, Shelley Taylor
and Jonathon Brown concluded that people evalu-
ate themselves positively (often unrealistically),
have exaggerated illusions of control over their
environment, and have unrealistic optimism. Data
indicate that people tend to choose positive traits
to describe themselves more often than they choose
negative traits, positive information about one’s
personality is more easily recalled than negative
information, and positive outcomes are attributed
to the self but negative outcomes are not. However,
those with low self-esteem or moderate depression
have a more balanced view of the self, in which
Self-Enhancement Theory 693
they acknowledge both good and bad traits and
outcomes. This suggests that, contrary to the men-
tal health literature, healthy individuals may not
have a realistic view of the self. Taylor and Brown
also found that people believe themselves to have
more control over events than they actually pos-
sess, for instance, over chance events (e.g., gam-
bling). This is not evident among those who are
depressed or in a negative mood. The last set of
results from Taylor and Brown’s review found that
people have unrealistically positive views of their
future. Individuals tend to believe the future will
be better than the present or the past, and that it
will result in more positive outcomes for them-
selves than for their peers. The results, therefore,
suggest that self-enhancement may help improve
mental health. Indeed, Taylor and Brown indicate
that those who enhance self-abilities and attributes
may be more caring, have higher work productiv-
ity, and are generally happier.
Cultural Differences in Self-Enhancement
People learn about norms and values through
socialization. Behaviors deemed appropriate in one
culture may not be the same in another culture. To
function successfully in a given culture, an indi-
vidual must learn the cognitive, emotional, and
motivational processes that are common and
acceptable within that society. In the extensive
body of cross-cultural literature, Western cultures
are often depicted as being independent and Eastern
cultures as interdependent. In Western cultures,
people display more concern for their own goals
rather than for the goals set out by their ingroups.
In addition, people in these cultures pay less atten-
tion to the opinions of ingroup members and make
decisions based on their own perspectives, rather
than on the views of others. Eastern cultures, how-
ever, encourage members to base goals and wishes
on familial and community desires, thereby dis-
playing interdependent tendencies. Examining
employees in the international branches of a large
multinational firm, Geert Hofstede found that
independence was valued in countries such as the
United States, and interdependence was empha-
sized in countries such as Japan.
The aforementioned research in this review of
self-enhancement theory has been primarily con-
ducted in the United States. These studies have
694 Self-Esteem
provided evidence that self-enhancement—
promoting positive aspects of the self—is prevalent
and functional in this country. Because individual-
ism is a cultural norm and is thus valued, enhanc-
ing the self and emphasizing one’s uniqueness is
socially valued. Research has shown that these
individuals enhance evaluations of themselves,
attribute positive outcomes (e.g., success) to the
self and negative outcomes to external causes, and
overestimate their own positive characteristics.
These enhancing behaviors can help the individual
function within an individualistic society because
the behaviors emphasize uniqueness and indepen-
dence. Research in other countries, especially
Asian countries, has shown that self-enhancement
is not highly prevalent and is sometimes completely
absent. Shinobu Kitayama, Hazel Rose Marcus,
and colleagues have conducted numerous studies
examining beliefs and behaviors about the self in
various countries and found that people in Eastern
cultures rarely make attributions in the same direc-
tion as individuals in Western cultures. For exam-
ple, after reviewing several studies conducted in
Japan, the researchers found that positive out-
comes were often attributed to luck or chance
instead of to the self, and negative outcomes were
attributed to a lack of ability or talent. In addition,
people were reluctant to indicate their own unique-
ness and positive outcomes. These tendencies,
though different from those found in the United
States, are functional within interdependent socie­
ties where dependence and conformity are norma-
tive. Kitayama and colleagues put forth a collective
constructionist theory of the self, which suggests that
psychological processes such as self-enhancement
and self-criticism are a result of cultural norms and
values. They found that situations in the United
States are particularly conducive to enhancement
tendencies, where people are likely to engage in
self-enhancement. In contrast, situations in Japan
are conducive to self-criticism, and Japanese indi-
viduals are more likely to engage in self-criticism.
Both tendencies are functional and appropriate for
the different cultures. These studies demonstrate
that the self can be viewed differently in various
cultures and contexts, and people act in ways to
follow the norms and values of the culture in
which they live.
Namrata Mahajan and David E. Rast III
See also Development of Identity; Development of Self-
Concept; Psychology of Self and Identity; Self-
Assessment; Self-Esteem
Further Readings
Baumeister, R. F. (Ed.). (1999). The self in social
psychology. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
Brown, J. D., Collins, R. L., & Schmidt, G. W. (1988).
Self-esteem and direct versus indirect forms of self-
enhancement. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 55, 445–453.
Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., Matsumoto, H., &
Norasakkunkit, V. (1997). Individual and collective
processes in the construction of the self: Self-
enhancement in the United States and self-criticism in
Japan. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
72, 1245–1267.
Sedikides, C. (1993). Assessment, enhancement and
verification determinants of the self-evaluation
process. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
65, 317–338.
Shrauger, J. S. (1975). Responses to evaluation as a
function of initial self-perceptions. Psychological
Bulletin, 82, 581–596.
Swann, W. B., Pelham, B. W., & Krull, D. S. (1989).
Agreeable fancy or disagreeable truth? Reconciling
self-enhancement and self-verification. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 782–791.
Self-Esteem
Identity is an individual’s ability to know himself
or herself, and self-esteem is the value that an indi-
vidual places on himself or herself. Self-esteem is a
salient component of identity development and
maintenance as individuals construct their identity
based on interpersonal relationships, group affili-
ations, and other cultural influences. Some experts
think self-esteem is central to human existence
from being an innate longing in the subconscious,
to a conscious need that must be met by planning,
motivation, and determination, all of which influ-
ence the thoughts and behaviors of individuals
and groups. But just what is self-esteem? And how
can something so abstract be measured? And why
would one want to measure it? This entry addresses
these questions.

What Is Self-Esteem?
Psychologist William James, in his 1890 work
Principles of Psychology, provides a broad defini-
tion for the concept of self-esteem as simply being
a person’s evaluation of himself or herself. In sum,
high self-esteem is a good self-evaluation and low
self-esteem is a poor self-evaluation, but that may
be too simple. Self-esteem, generally speaking, is a
subjective concept because it strongly relates to
feelings and perceptions of an individual’s self-
worth imposed by the self and others. Objectively,
self-esteem can be related to how one is evaluated
by the self or others in the performance of a par-
ticular skill or talent (e.g., a good public speaker +
great audience acceptance = high self-esteem ver-
sus a poor public speaker + audience rejection =
low self-esteem). The meaning of self-esteem can
be divided into two components, group and per-
sonal, which adds to its complexity of meaning.
The component of group self-esteem refers to
how an individual feels about group membership
and his or her perceived role and acceptance by the
group (e.g., racial or ethnic), and personal self-
esteem refers to how an individual feels about
himself or herself comprehensively as an individual
without regard for group or the approval of oth-
ers. Trends in the study of self-esteem have gone
through three phases—that of human instinct,
human need, and motivation—to its current state
of wanting to know the reasons why humans are
motivated to maintain high levels of self-esteem.
Self-esteem seen as an innate or instinctual con-
cept left many questions unanswered, and many
researchers quickly found this perspective useless
and moved to the need phase made popular by
Abraham Maslow and others. Esteem is generally
represented as the fourth level on Maslow’s hierar-
chy of needs and refers to a person’s concept of
self-worth and need to belong. This need includes
such complex and interrelated variables as self-
esteem, confidence, achievement, respect of others,
and respect by others. Without the esteem need
fulfilled, individuals will not reach self-actualiza-
tion and cannot grow until the esteem need has
been fulfilled.
In 1969, however, Nathaniel Branden sug-
gested two additional elements when defining self-
esteem: first, the ability to cope with the challenges
of life, and second, an individual is always worthy
Self-Esteem 695
of happiness. This view considered that the esteem
need would always be met. Branden also believed
that the six elements or pillars for healthy self-
esteem were (1) living consciously—be aware of
what is going on in the world and be willing to
understand; (2) self-acceptance—be willing to take
ownership for personal thoughts, feelings, and
actions; (3) self-responsibility—be part of the solu-
tion rather than the problem and each individual
is responsible for his or her choices in life; (4) self-
assertiveness—be authentic when dealing with
others and value humanity even in difficult situa-
tions; (5) living purposefully—be able to identify,
plan, and organize to reach short-term and long-
term goals; and (6) personal integrity—be one
who has the ability to keep his or her word (e.g.,
do what you say and say what you mean).
Self-esteem widely understood to be embedded
in an individual’s construct of identity, as one
determines who he or she is, how one feels about
oneself, and how much the feelings others have
about him or her influence his or her perceptions
of self-worth. This need-based thinking about self-
esteem considers two types—global self-esteem
and domain-specific self-esteem.
Global self-esteem is an overall value judgment
of one’s self-worth that is not tied to any specific
situation. Domain-specific self-esteem is the assess-
ment of one’s value in a particular area (e.g., social
settings, academic or intellectual ability, or physi-
cal prowess). The human need for positive global
and domain-specific self-esteem gave way to phase
three, that of human motivation and goal setting to
reach desired self-esteem goals. The media is filled
with books and speakers giving advice about how
to build confidence, develop strengths, break bad
habits, smile, work well with others, and have the
right attitude all to enhance individual self-esteem
while achieving personal success. To test and mea-
sure self-esteem, various scholars have categorized
self-esteem into additional subcategories: (a) con-
tingent self-esteem, which is based on the qualities
an individual perceives are needed or things that
need to be done or accomplished to be considered
a person of value or worth, versus noncontingent
self-esteem; (b) explicit self-esteem, which is a
conscious and reflective type of self-evaluation,
versus implicit self-esteem, which is the ability to
unconsciously or without thinking perform self-
evaluation; (c) authentic versus false self-esteem;
696 Self-Esteem
(d) stable versus unstable self-esteem; (e) global
self-esteem versus domain-specific self-esteem;
(f) trait self-esteem, which is the result of self-
evaluations made over an extended period, versus
state self-esteem, which is immediate self-evaluations;
and (g) personal self-esteem, the value or worth
one has for himself or herself, versus social self-
esteem, which is the worth or value that holds the
shared self-image for ingroup belonging. The vari-
able elements were used to subcategorize self-
esteem to refine research and assist in providing
specific definitions of self-esteem in ways that that
make it ameliorable to measurement These self-
esteem subtypes can be combined with the group
and personal components for added specificity in
research measurement.
How Does One Measure Self-Esteem and Why?
Humans are inquisitive and often look for answers
to explain the behaviors and communicative pat-
terns exhibited by individuals and groups. A spe-
cific area of research is related to that of self-esteem
and identity. For instance, what role does racial or
ethnic identity have on personal or group self-
esteem? What happens if one’s racial identity cre-
ates tension or anxiety in others? And what type of
behavior is exhibited that could be interpreted as
low self-esteem versus high self-esteem? Can high-
self esteem be a coping strategy to deal with the
fears expressed by others? These are just some of
the questions surrounding self-esteem and identity
rather than an exhaustive list. Many theoretical
frameworks have been proposed and tested to
answer these and many other questions related to
self-esteem and cultural identity.
Many sociopsychological theories indicate that
individuals are motivated to maintain or enhance
feelings of self-esteem, continuity, distinctiveness,
belonging, and efficacy in their identities. Most
studies using sociopsychological theories indicate
that a greater sense of self-esteem is derived from
identity elements that provide a positive sense of
meaning. This includes individual-, relational-, and
group-level identity.
Conceptually, self-esteem is studied through a
variety of theoretical perspectives that include
social identity theory; sociometer theory, also
known as sociometer hypothesis; and terror man-
agement theory.
Social Identity Theory
Henry Tajfel and John Turner developed social
identity theory in 1979 to understand individual
and collective behavior based on social group
membership and status or classification within the
group (e.g., group members engage in intergroup
discrimination for higher group status compared
with other groups). Self-esteem is one of the con-
cepts or variables that can be assessed using this
theory because self-esteem corresponds to per-
ceived worth within the group and perceived worth
compared with other groups. An additional assump-
tion is that in addition to the personal self each
member has additional selves based on the number
of group memberships. Researchers studying iden-
tity, prejudice, stereotyping, conflict negotiation,
and language have applied this theory.
Sociometer Theory
As a modern theory for the study of self-esteem
created by Mark Leary and colleagues in 1999,
sociometer theory posits that self-esteem is used to
monitor an individual’s social environment for
indicators of low or declining relational value.
Self-esteem is then viewed as an internalized repre-
sentation of societal rejection or acceptance because
interpersonal relationships and social acceptance
have a higher value. Sociometer theory suggests
that people are not motivated to maintain their
self-esteem but, rather, seek to increase their rela-
tional value and social acceptance by using self-
esteem as a gauge of their effectiveness. An
application of this theory would be to consider
how an individual with low or high self-esteem
approaches the decision-making process in a group
setting.
Terror Management Theory
Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom
Pyszczynski developed terror management theory
in the 1980s. As a general theoretical framework,
terror management theory is used to determine
and measure the level that individuals experience
and how they handle anxiety in certain situations.
However, the main idea of terror management
theory is that humans are afraid of death and those
with high self-esteem are less afraid of death than
are those with low self-esteem. So, what does the

fear of death have to do with self-esteem? Terror
management theorists posit that individuals seek
self-esteem because it provides protection from
anxiety or fear of the world. Said another way,
when individuals behave in ways that maintain
cultural standards of value, self-esteem will be
enhanced. As with any theory, some scholars
believe that there is not enough evidence to sup-
port the correlation between the fear of death and
self-esteem. Some have suggested that sociometer
theory is better equipped to measure self-esteem in
relation to anxiety and the fear of death.
Future Directions
People have an inherent need to belong and feel
good about themselves. Individuals are motivated
to develop and protect their self-esteem from an
early age as evidenced by the “Everybody gets to
play and nobody loses rule” in some children’s
sports and education methods. Self-esteem and
identity development are two of the most often
studied elements of human behavior across a vari-
ety of disciplines, including anthropology, psy-
chology, and human communication studies, and
will likely continue to be as scholars continue to
question and search for answers to explain human
behavior.
Annette D. Madlock
See also Development of Identity; Development of Self-
Concept; Social Identity Theory; Sociometer
Hypothesis; Terror Management Theory
Further Readings
Branden, N. (1994). Six pillars of self-esteem. New York:
Bantam.
Hogg, M. A. (2006). Social identity theory. In P. J. Burke
(Ed.), Contemporary social psychological theories
(pp. 111–136). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Leary, M. R. (2004). The function of self-esteem in terror
management theory and sociometer theory: Comment
on Pyszczynski et al. (2004). Psychology Bulletin,
130(3), 478–482.
Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Arndt, J., &
Schimel, J. (2004). Why do people need self-esteem?
A theoretical and empirical review. Psychology
Bulletin, 130(3), 435–468.
Self-Image 697
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory
of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel
(Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations
(pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Self-Image
Self-image is more than how one sees one’s physi-
cal appearance; it is an overlapping of self-con-
cepts from multiple sources and points of view.
Self-image is simultaneously how one sees oneself
physically and how one interprets one’s personal-
ity through the lens of one’s mood at any given
moment; how one sees one’s place in relation to
the social groups in which he or she participates;
how one believes others see him or her both
physically and in relation to the social groups in
which he or she participates; and how one esti-
mates one’s status as a human being as a whole by
measuring and re-measuring one self-concept
against another. The complexity and mercuriality
of self-image reveals that the totality of self-
concept has no one form or shape but is a shape-
shifting arena of possibilities bounded and
overwritten by a palimpsest of self-images making
sense of and overwriting our experience of the
world over and over again. Self-image, like all
images, elicits behavioral and emotional responses
toward that imagery, both self-directed responses
and responses from others.
An archaeological layering of verbal images and
mental images further complicates a reading of the
self. As it signifies an aspect of the self-concept or
self-schema, a verbal image is a name, the verbal
quotient of an idea characterizing one’s presence in
the world. The verbal attributions that shape self-
image may include either surname or the absence
of the record of parentage or lineage, national
affiliation, social labeling, taxonomic category,
stereotype, or other stigmatizing appellations
known as name-calling. Although these verbal
images may not necessarily be warranted or even
apt, once applied, a name, label, category, or ste-
reotype becomes a part of the archaeology of self-
imagery, a part of the emerging story.
A mental image of self is a narrative of personal
memory, imbricated images of the self held in
mind, unconsciously impressed in the recollection
698 Self-Image
of lived experience in our passage through the
world. Philosopher David Hume describes the
remnants left after memory’s dynamic storage pro-
cess as “faint images” and “decayed sensation.”
Mental images of the recollected self store infor-
mation about our experiences and ultimately influ-
ence the way we think and how we remember and
relate our lives to those of others. Even misremem-
bered or purposely distorted narratives of a lived
experience may become a part of the archaeology
of self-image.
Each of our self-images is in vertiginous align-
ment with a deeper archaeology of verbal and
mental imagery that constitutes an identity, a mul-
tiformational arrangement representative of indi-
vidual experience that is often also manifested in
the visual culture, a construction that recounts a
uniquely personal and publicly shared experience.
In the visual culture’s theater of multiple selves
and simultaneous stories, galleries of reinscribed
images become sites for newly inaugurated com-
plexities, for freshly enunciated matrices of iden-
tity and self-imagery. Thus, at the surface,
self-image is both hybridized and interactional, all
images contesting for preeminence and position in
the constitution of the larger stories of the local
experience, the national experience, and the human
experience. At the same time, the weight of the
archaeology of layered self-imagery means that
those self-images that are the most long-lived are
also the most foundational and the most difficult
to remove or reposition.
According to philosopher Julia Kristeva, any
text works by absorbing and destroying at the
same time other texts operating in the same arena.
Identity can thus be understood as an ongoing
interpretation of context-bounded verbal images
and mental images, wresting coherence from the
contradictory. No self-image is an immutable text,
so identity is often rewritten in the diaphanous
superimposition of one self-image and another
competing self-image, an emergent story impro-
vised while self-images are still being contested.
Research on the brain’s processing of visual
information offers a useful analogy in how sys-
temic coherence among contesting self-imagery is
achieved within an organism as complex as is the
human brain. The human brain processes informa-
tion along parallel pathways. Evidence exists of
the abundant parallel and multitrack processing
that occurs in similar fashion in many systems
within the human brain. For example, memories
have often been shown to be reconstructive, the
reflection of a confluence between present circum-
stance and a number of prior experiences.
Increasing evidence indicates that the brain
stores its information in temporary functional col-
lections of neurons, or cell assemblies, which are
scattered widely across the brain, and in which
synaptic electrical firings are synchronized at a
given frequency. Moreover, each neuron within an
assembly can simultaneously be part of several cell
assemblies, each working concurrently to achieve
or revive its own uniquely ingrained synaptic sem-
blance. The brain is theorized to contain conver-
gence zones in multiple sensory and motor regions
throughout the brain where new sensory frag-
ments can be apprehended and bound to one
another to create new experiential sense and to
preexisting assemblies of synaptic relationships to
augment prior sense. Remembering is said to occur
when signals or cues from a convergence zone trig-
ger the simultaneous reactivation and reblending
of a constellation of sensory fragments from sev-
eral distinct brain regions that were once linked
together. In essence, we recollect prior sense
through a reentrant signaling process that inte-
grates a unified representation as an elaboration of
segregated and distributed sensory inputs.
The brain’s ability goes beyond mere recon-
struction of incoming perceptions of circumstantial
data. When we construct a coherent self-image, we
order our awareness in keeping with our experi-
ence such that the image formed is not necessarily
one that others would claim to see in their descrip-
tion of us. The brain routes streams of sensory
input to merge with existing tributaries of mean-
ing, attaching data to sense in fluid impressionist
brushstrokes rather than Cartesian exactitude.
Daniel C. Dennett theorizes a multiple drafts
model of consciousness wherein representations
such as self-image arise from the continuous edito-
rial revision of all that we perceive; each draft
contributes to the interpretation of other contents,
beliefs, or behaviors; each draft is impressed on the
memory where it may ultimately decay because of
lack of further correlations, is incorporated into
subsequent percepts, or is overwritten in part or in
entirety. A self-image is thus the result of the
brain’s editorial liberties.

Hence, identity is a meta-symbol, a by-product
of the symbolic systems of verbal and mental imag-
ery by which we construct or re-construct repre-
sentations of our experience of the world. Personal
identity is located within the archaeology of self-
imagery, symbols within which we are defined and
through which we continually remind ourselves of
who we think we are. As a meta-symbol composed
of sub-archaeologies of self-imagery, an identity is
a living text. Identities are also then intertextual, a
system of interrelationships between individual
psyche and public memory.
Any given self-image and its oppositional other
self-images engage in a form of play, a theater of
simultaneity, of mutual clarification, of social
performativity. Our self-images are variations in
an ongoing and embodied fugue of personal sto-
ries; thus, self-imagery remains malleable. Self-
image, like memory, can be erased by time or
modified as facts are forgotten or misremembered
over time. Psychologically, self-image can be con-
torted by falsehoods or accusations; physiologi-
cally, self-image can be invaded by trauma or
brain lesion. Self-image can be altogether discon-
nected from factual experience and either be rein-
forced by fictional episodes and fantasy, or
damaged by acts of stigmatization. Self-image can
be recalled by alternative cues and be remembered
in emotional keys varying from the discordant to
the melodious. An individual’s archaeology of
self-imagery is a story-in-progress, an improvisa-
tion converging to constitute the present sense of
personal identity from a plurality of social influ-
ences and root stories.
James Haywood Rolling Jr.
See also Development of Identity; Development of Self-
Concept; Self-Construal; Self-Esteem
Further Readings
Anderson, W. T. (1997). The future of the self: Inventing
the postmodern person. New York: Tarcher.
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston:
Little, Brown.
Dowling, J. E. (1998). Creating mind: How the brain
works. New York: W. W. Norton
Edelman, G. (1989). The remembered present: A
biological theory of consciousness. New York: Basic
Books.
Self-Monitoring 699
Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the management
of spoiled identity. New York; Simon & Schuster.
Schacter, D. L. (1996). Searching for memory: The brain,
the mind, and the past. New York: Basic Books.
Self-Monitoring
Self-monitoring, a concept introduced by Mark
Snyder in 1974, refers to individual differences in
the extent to which one monitors or controls the
outward expression of his or her attitudes, beliefs,
and opinions in social situations. According to
Snyder’s original theory, individuals may control
their public expressions or behaviors depending
on the importance of accurately presenting their
actual or true personal attitudes, beliefs, or opin-
ions weighed against the importance of portraying
the proper attitudes, beliefs, and opinions. The
concept of self-monitoring is essential in the for-
mation and maintenance of one’s social identity.
Self-monitoring can also occur when an indi-
vidual hides an improper or unpopular response
by either acting as if he or she has no reaction at
all or by expressing a more socially appropriate
response. One example of this form of self-moni-
toring is in the expression of prejudice. Because
overt prejudice is generally looked down upon in
today’s society, a person will commonly try to
mask any sort of expression of prejudicial atti-
tudes. Even though an individual may inwardly
feel prejudiced toward another, he or she may out-
wardly express acceptance of a person of a differ-
ent race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.
Self-monitoring may occur when an individual
actually has no true emotional reaction, but
behaves as if he or she does. One instance of this
may be when everyone else in a group or setting is
outraged by another group, but the individual
is not really bothered by the other group. Because
a lack of a reaction is not acceptable to those
around him or her, the individual has to behave as
if he or she is just as angry as everyone else.
The ability to monitor or control behavior does
not necessarily encompass all modes of expression.
An individual may not be able to control all of the
ways that various attitudes and beliefs can be pub-
licly expressed. In other words, individuals can say
one thing, but display a contradictory response
700 Self-Perception Theory
through nonverbal communication such as through
body language.
Although some individuals may differ in their
outward expressions of attitudes and beliefs
depending on the situation, individuals generally
differ in the degree to which they control their
behavior in front of others across situations. Those
high in self-monitoring are social chameleons in
the sense that they adapt to the recognizable norms
of appropriate behavior depending on different
situations and others present within the social set-
ting. Generally, the behavior of high self-monitors
tends to be less consistent across situations and is
less likely to reflect the individual’s true emotions
and beliefs. High self-monitors are also better than
low self-monitors at interpreting the body lan-
guage of others within a social situation and better
at recalling information about others in the social
setting. Because high self-monitors are motivated
to adapt to their social situations, they are more
likely to choose situations with clearly defined
norms and guidelines that display the behavior of
the ideal individual in that setting. For example, a
high self-monitor may choose to be a member of a
sorority or fraternity—a group with specific norms
dictating appropriate behavior.
Low self-monitors, however, display more con-
sistent behavior across situations. This consistency
occurs because individuals who are low self-monitors
are more likely to express their true opinions and
attitudes no matter what differences exist in situa-
tions. In this way, unlike those high self-monitors
who adapt their behavior according to social
cues, low self-monitors look within themselves to
determine how to behave. This occurs because low
self-monitors generally value being true to their
“self.” For this reason, attitudes of low self-moni-
tors generally align with their behavior. Because
low self-monitors are motivated to express their
own opinions, they are more likely to seek situa-
tions conducive to open expression whenever pos-
sible. One such situation would be various
intellectual settings where debate is welcome and
even encouraged.
Researchers have conceptualized self-monitoring
as an individual difference variable in a diverse
range of research areas. Self-monitoring has been
found to influence the effect of the perceived norms
and behavior of others on changing behavior in
persuasion research. In the realm of interpersonal
relations research, self-monitoring orientation has
been linked to managing relationships, romantic
relationship styles, and risky sexual behavior. The
role of self-monitoring has also been addressed in
relation to leadership styles, prejudice, and creativ-
ity to name just a few areas. The influence of self-
monitoring has been applied throughout the
psychological literature.
Heather T. Stopp
See also Personal Identity Versus Self-Identity; Psychology
of Self and Identity; Self-Image
Further Readings
Flynn, F. J., Reagans, R. E., Amanatullah, E. T., & Ames,
D. R. (2006). Helping one’s way to the top: Self-
monitors achieve status by helping others and
knowing who helps whom. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 91, 1123–1137.
Snyder, M. (1979). Self-monitoring processes. In
L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social
psychology (Vol. 12, pp. 85–128). New York:
Academic Press.
Snyder, M., & Gangstead, S. (1982). Choosing social
situations: Two investigations of self-monitoring
processes. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 43, 123–135.
Yates, R. A., & Noyes, J. M. (2007). Web site design,
self-monitoring style, and consumer preference.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 37, 1341–1362.
Self-Perception Theory
Self-perception theory describes how people form
new attitudes and beliefs, including those related
to the self, from observing their own behavior. In
1965, Daryl Bem proposed that people deduce
their own internal states, like attitudes and emo-
tions via the same processes by which they deduce
the internal states and dispositions of others.
Specifically, when people attempt to explain the
behavior of another individual, they can assume
the attitudes, beliefs, and other internal character-
istics of the actor by observing the actor’s behav-
ior and the external factors that reduce or increase
the observed act. By taking an outsider’s perspec-
tive, people can also deduce their own internal

states, including their attitudes, beliefs, emotions,
and even self-views, from information provided
by their own actions.
The inferences that people make about their
own states critically depend upon the external fac-
tors perceived to be influencing their behavior in
the situation. For example, when observers think
that another person’s interaction with an object is
caused by something external, such as a large
reward or pressure from others, observers can rea-
sonably conclude that the behavior does not reflect
how the actor thinks or feels about the object.
Behavior that is clearly caused by something exter-
nal to a person does not provide useful informa-
tion regarding how the person views the issue or
about what type of person he or she is. However,
behavior that occurs when there is no clear exter-
nal cause can provide more information about the
actor’s internal states. Thus, when observers per-
ceive that an actor’s behavior was not influenced
by external factors such as big rewards or confor-
mity pressures, then observers are likely to con-
clude that the cause of the observed behavior must
be related to the actor’s attitudes, values, or beliefs
about the object.
Using the same process, if people observe that
their own behavior was influenced by external fac-
tors, they are reluctant to conclude that their
actions say anything about who they are as a per-
son, or anything about their own attitudes or emo-
tions. But when they observe themselves acting
without external pressures or other inducements,
then people conclude that their behavior was
caused by something internal to them, such as an
attitude, belief, or even their personality or self-
concept. Consequently, people can form a new
view of themselves simply by observing that they,
and nothing else, were responsible for how they
acted in a given situation.
A Rival for Dissonance Theory
Self-perception theory was initially introduced as a
rival explanation for the attitude change effects
observed in cognitive dissonance experiments.
Bem proposed that despite the evidence for atti-
tude change, there was no corroborating evidence
that the effects were driven by inconsistency or an
aversive state of discomfort. Bem believed self-
perception processes, which do not assume that
Self-Perception Theory 701
arousal or a motivation play a role in the attitudes
people form, could account for how attitudes fol-
low from discrepant behavior. For example, Bem
proposed that in the classic study by Leon Festinger
and James Carlsmith, participants who lied about
their enjoyment of the boring task for a large
reward did not subsequently favor the boring task
more because they reasonably concluded that the
large reward caused them to tell a lie. In other
words, because of the huge reward for lying, no
logical assumption could be made about their atti-
tude toward the task. However, participants who
lied about the boring task for a small reward sub-
sequently came to like the boring task more
because, in their analysis, the only explanation for
the lie was that they believed the task was fun.
Reasonable conclusions about their own attitudes
could be made because there were no clear exter-
nal reasons for lying about the task. Thus, Bem
proposed that participants used their own behav-
ior (the lie about the task) and the relevant exter-
nal factors (high or low reward to tell the lie) to
infer how they personally felt about the task.
Bem further suggested that if self-perception
processes were at the heart of dissonance effects,
then observers would be able to accurately deduce
the attitudes held by actors after they committed a
discrepant act. For example, in one study, partici-
pants were allowed to observe the $20 and
$1 conditions in the Festinger and Carlsmith pro-
cedure. As predicted, observers replicated the
original effect by reporting that participants who
lied about the task for $1 liked the task more com-
pared with participants who lied for $20. Based on
a number of “interpersonal simulations” in which
observers were able to reproduce the results of a
published dissonance experiment, Bem argued that
self-perception presented a more parsimonious
explanation for how behavior determines attitudes.
The introduction of self-perception as an alter-
native explanation for dissonance effects caused a
lively debate among psychologists about how to
interpret the effects of behavior on attitudes. The
debate eventually focused on two critical differ-
ences between the theories. One was that observers
in Bem’s interpersonal simulations did not have
access to the prior attitudes held by participants in
a dissonance experiment. As a result, observers
simply assumed that those who would perform a
counter-attitudinal act held more positive attitudes
702 Self-Perception Theory
toward the issue all along, which is not the same
process of inference assumed by self-perception
theory. Bem responded to this criticism by suggest-
ing that the interpersonal simulation did reproduce
the experience of dissonance because participants
were not aware of their initial attitude when they
were asked to evaluate their behavior. Several
papers from self-perception and dissonance
researchers were published to test the “forgetting”
hypothesis, but in the end, none were widely
accepted as having solved the debate.
The second critical difference between self-
perception and dissonance theory concerns the
role of arousal and discomfort in how behavior
influences attitudes. According to dissonance the-
ory, inconsistency between attitudes and behavior
causes an uncomfortable state of arousal that
motivates people to change their attitudes. In con-
trast, self-perception theory assumes that attitudes
are formed from assumptions about the cause of
behavior and the conditions under which the
behavior was performed. Thus, arousal and the
motivation to reduce it do not mediate the effect of
behavior on attitudes. This difference permits a
clear prediction about the conditions under which
self-perception and dissonance theory accurately
account for how behavior influences attitudes.
Dissonance theory explains the effect of behav-
ior on attitudes when the two are perceived to be
discrepant or incongruent with each other. When
behavior falls outside of a preferred position,
people feel an aversive form of arousal and are
motivated to reduce it by bringing their attitudes
into line with their behavior. In contrast, self-
perception theory explains the effect of behavior
on attitudes best when the behavior is perceived to
be congruent with a preferred position. Research
supports these boundary conditions by showing
that arousal mediates attitude change more when
a behavior is perceived to fall outside of what
people expect of their behavior. Thus, researchers
solved the debate about whether self-perception
theory accounts for dissonance phenomena by
identifying the appropriate conditions under which
each theory applies.
Research further shows that people are most
likely to infer internal qualities such as attitudes
and beliefs from their behavior when preexisting
thoughts and feelings are unclear, unimportant,
and when cues imply that behavior accurately
reflects their existing attitudes. Today, self-perception
theory provides an important explanation for how
people form new attitudes and beliefs when they
do not have much else to go on.
Applying Self-Perception to Social Behavior
Self-perception processes have been applied to
understand a wide variety of social behavior,
including how people develop attitudes and beliefs
about objects, issues, and other people, including
romantic partners. Self-perception also helps to
explain why people lose their motivation to engage
in otherwise enjoyable behavior, why they laugh at
a joke, and finally, how they can develop new
views of themselves that, under some conditions,
cause them to comply with a potentially costly
request from a salesperson.
Self-perception theory provides useful insights
into the power of intrinsic motivation on behavior.
Intrinsic motivation refers to the desire to perform
a given behavior simply because it is inherently
enjoyable. What happens when people are highly
rewarded for a behavior that they perform because
it is intrinsically enjoyable? According to self-
perception theory, strong external rewards for
conducting a behavior reduce the tendency to con-
clude that the behavior is caused by an internal
state. It follows that when actors are highly
rewarded for performing an intrinsically enjoyable
behavior, they tend to dismiss the role of internal
states and conclude that their behavior was caused
by the external rewards. As a result, an overjustifi-
cation effect occurs whereby the external rewards
overjustify the act and reduce the intrinsic pleasure
of the behavior. Research shows that the overjusti-
fication effect can reduce the motivation that stu-
dents have for learning and that employees exhibit
for their work. However, research also indicates
that rewards will not undermine intrinsic motiva-
tion when they are offered as a reward for excel-
lence and as long as they are not seen as a means
for controlling behavior.
Self-perception processes also play a role in the
experience of affective states. For example, studies
show that when asked to frown or smile while
performing a task, people report feeling more
angry or happy, and as a result, they recall more
negative or positive memories, respectively. Other
studies show that when people hold a pen in their

teeth to mimic smiling, they think cartoons are
more humorous. These findings suggest that, as
self-perception theory predicts, people can use
their physical expressions as cues to how they feel
about an object or stimulus and as cues for what
type of information to use in their thinking.
Drawing inferences from behavior can also
determine how the influence of others can shape a
new view of the self. For example, when people are
the target of a social influence attempt, they may
deduce a new belief about themselves by observing
their reaction to a salesperson’s request. Research
on the foot-in-the-door social influence technique
shows that when people first comply with a small
request, they are significantly more likely to com-
ply with a second, more costly target request, com-
pared with when they are only asked to comply
with the costly target request. The act of comply-
ing with the small initial request causes the actor
to conclude that he or she is a helpful person.
Consequently, when asked for the second, more
costly request, the new view of the self as helpful
then increases the desire to comply, partly because
thoughts about being helpful are present in one’s
thinking, and partly because refusing to help
would be inconsistent with being a helpful person.
The effect of the foot-in-the-door on perceptions
of helpfulness suggests that self-perception can
play an important role in the formation of the self-
concept, especially to the degree that people feel
they had free choice to comply and became self-
aware when they committed the initial act.
The act of influencing others can also engage
self-perception processes that create new views of
the self. For example, making rational arguments
to persuade another person causes the speaker to
perceive himself or herself as more intelligent and
friendly, but taking an authoritative approach to
persuading others causes the speaker to view him-
self or herself as more dominant and unfriendly.
This suggest that in the absence of other informa-
tion, portraying oneself in a particular light can
lead to new perspectives on the self.
Finally, new research indicates that there are
conditions under which people can draw conclu-
sions about their own internal states from observ-
ing the behavior of others. To the degree that
people share an important social identity, watch-
ing others perform an act may be the same as when
the self performs the behavior. As a result, people
Self-Portraits 703
can deduce what they think and feel from observ-
ing the behavior of similar others. The parameters
to “vicarious self-perception” processes await
future research.
Jeff Stone
See also Cognitive Dissonance Theory
Further Readings
Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology
(Vol. 6, pp. 2–62). New York: Academic Press.
Burger, J. M. (1999). The foot-in-the-door compliance
procedure: A multiple-process analysis and review.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3,
303–325.
Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive
consequences of forced compliance. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58, 203–210.
Self-Portraits
Since the introduction of the mirror in the 15th
century, many artists have created independent
self-portraits—a portrait that an artist makes
using himself or herself as its subject, typically cre-
ated from a reflection in a mirror. Most painters
have painted a self-portrait, and some artists, such
as Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn, have
intensely practiced this form of self-study through-
out their careers. There are generally six types of
self-portraits: the self-portrait used as a signature,
the self-portrait as a projection of self, the self-
portrait as a self-study, the self-portrait as fantasy,
the narrative self-portrait, and the metaphorical
self-portrait. This entry first places these types
in historical context and then discusses the con-
cept of self in relation to self-portraits. Finally, the
entry examines the psychological meaning of
self-portraits.
History and Types
When and in which culture the first self-portrait
appeared is difficult to answer with certainty.
Self-portraits painted in burial scenes in ancient
704 Self-Portraits
Egyptian temples and pyramids have been discov-
ered as far back as 1365 BCE and can be catego-
rized as self-portraits that function as a signature.
However, the self-portrait as a signature was most
prevalent during the Middle Ages and the
Renaissance period. The emergence of the self-
portrait as an independent genre of artistic expres-
sion, regardless of the medium, has been attributed
to the invention of the flat, nondistorting mirror.
The first independent self-portrait (a sketch) or self-
portrait as a projection of the self may have been
created by Filippino Lippi at the end of 15th cen-
tury. However, many scholars identify Jean
Fouquet’s self-portrait (c. 1470) as the earliest sur-
viving example. Even though self-portraits as a
projection of self may have begun with Fouquet,
artists such as Albrecht Durer who painted several
self-portraits reflected the detailed exploration of
their own images. Rembrandt is attributed as the
first artist to create self-portraits as a study of the
self. He created 60 autobiographical self-portraits.
The fourth type of self-portrait attempts to
break away from the traditional depiction of the
face and attempts to reveal the character of the
artist. For example, Gustave Courbet created self-
portraits that depicted fantasy by adding an envi-
ronment to symbolize social status or mental state.
The fifth type is the narrative self-portrait, painted
by such notable artists as Pablo Picasso and Marc
Chagall. Abstractionism led to a shift away from
representational painting to painting that allowed
colors, shapes, and patterns to represent the inner
life of the artist and the world around the artist.
This led to the final type, the metaphorical self-
portrait pioneered by the abstract expressionists,
notably Mark Rothko and Jackson Pollock, who
infused their identities into abstract images by con-
veying their emotions as artists.
The Concept of Self and Self-Portraiture
Since the end of the 15th century, it has become
somewhat of an unwritten rule that artists of
Western origin paint a self-portrait. Before pho-
tography was invented, the portrait was the only
means (with the exception of sculpture) for a per-
son to possess an image of himself or herself.
Historically, most artists have created at least one
self-portrait as a potential memorial. Most artists
have sought to present themselves in the best
possible light when painting a self-portrait. Whether
an artist paints a self-portrait as a projection of self
or a self-study, the artist must study his or her own
image and consequently explore his or her own
persona. For some artists, the self-portrait is
cathartic, for others the process is insightful. The
self-portrait allows the artist to create characters
and myths of himself or herself as the portrait
becomes a mask. Despite their vain intentions, self-
portraits are still informative. In many self-
portraits, the facial features offer limited hints to
character. The setting, costume, body language,
hands, and overall composition must also be con-
sidered. Attributes and symbols are used to reveal
the subject’s traits and qualities through nonnarra-
tive self-description.
Despite the different types of self-portraits, the
question remains, why create a self-portrait in the
first place? In a letter to his brother Theo, Vincent
Van Gogh suggests that self-portraiture is attrac-
tive to an artist because it is a private activity,
where pleasing others is not an issue. Some schol-
ars believe that artists created self-portraits to
avoid hiring models to sit for them. However, this
theory is untenable when closely considered. When
considering the motivations of the great masters of
self-portraiture, the lack of a model or money to
pay a model is often not the case. In fact, Van
Gogh ultimately disclosed that although the self-
portrait he presented to Paul Gauguin was origi-
nally created for lack of a model and to practice
painting the human figure, his motives were more
significant. In a letter to Gauguin, Van Gogh
explains the technical process in creating his self-
portrait. However, he goes on to state, “I also
exaggerate my personality . . . it has cost me a lot
of trouble, yet I shall have to do it all over again if
I want to succeed in expressing what I mean”
(Gedo, 1999, p. 77).
Artists such as Rembrandt, Paul Cézanne, and
Max Beckmann painted so many self-portraits that
self-portraiture became an essential part of their
oeuvre. For Cézanne, it was possibly a conve-
nience, but for Rembrandt and Beckmann, it was
an exploration into self-knowledge.
The idea of fleeting time or mortality could have
impelled many artists to create a series of self-
portraits. The artist acknowledges the imperma-
nence of existence and attempts to record
the change. Perhaps painting a self-portrait is

instinctual, an attempt for self-perpetuation. The
self-portraiture allows an artist to deal with death
by creating an immortal self (the portrait) and is
similar to the desire to have a child to carry on
one’s name. The artist Edvard Munch embodied
this belief. Munch immediately created duplicates
of any paintings he sold because he was reluctant
to sell his paintings and claimed the paintings still
belonged to him even after selling them.
When creating a self-portrait, the artist must
confront the self, which includes self-interest, self-
love, self-evaluation, and self-knowledge. Therefore,
likeness or realism is not always the primary goal.
Painting a self-portrait can address other concerns,
such as spirituality or emotional experience.
Beckmann described the idea of the self in self-
portraiture in his essay On My Painting: “Who am
I”? This question haunted Beckmann as he probed
deeper and deeper into self-discovery and admit-
tedly played some part in his art. By nature, the
dialogue between subject and art is self-referential.
The art reflects back to the artist (the subject) and
vice versa, which in turn allows us to see a glimpse
of the artist’s life and personality. The artist con-
fronts himself or herself in mirror image, and
re-presents himself or herself on the canvas. The
resulting self-image is not just a passing expression
of the self, but a lasting object, which can be seen
by the creator and others as part of the objective
world. The self is essentially objectified.
The common practice in contemporary self-
portraiture is for artists to depict their idea of
themselves in an effort to answer the question
“Who am I?” or to ask the bigger question “Who
are we?” In addition to exploring their feelings
about themselves, the artists also considered how
they fit or do not fit into contemporary society.
Common issues explored are sexuality, gender,
age, ethnicity, religion, artistic identity, and a
broader cultural identity.
Three conditions must be filled to be able to
create a self-image. First a sense of self, distinct
from other persons’ selves must be developed.
Second, mastery of a symbolic system must be
adequately achieved to enable someone to make
communicative representations. Finally, a link
must be established between self-awareness and
symbolic capacities, so that self-symbolization can
occur in visual images. Evidence shows that achieve-
ment of these three conditions has been historically
Self-Portraits 705
late, both for humankind and for the individual.
The word self-portrait is used to mean a type of
effigy, an image created by the artist to represent
himself or herself to the contemporary world or to
a future audience. Examples of these types of self-
portraits are those that were painted as part of
altar-paintings or frescoes of the 15th century. As
time progressed, the concept of self developed and
periods in painting such as the Renaissance changed
the way people perceived themselves. As Western
culture progressed from the Middle Ages, the
Renaissance, romanticism, and so on, concepts
such as individual freedom developed. For exam-
ple, during the romantic age, the experience of the
“self” changed into the “person of feeling.”
The Psychological Meaning of Self-Portraits
What psychological meaning can self-portraits
serve for the artist? Many psychologists, especially
those psychoanalytically oriented, have studied
famous historic artists’ self-portraits in a quest for
answers. Van Gogh is considered one of the great-
est painters of the 19th century, and it is well-
known that his life was tragic, ending in psychosis
and suicide. He painted more than 40 self-
portraits. The self-portrait acted as a mirror for
van Gogh, as a reflection of his mind. His self-
portraits reflect his inner conflicts and self-image.
Thus, the mirror can portray the ego, superego,
self-representations, introjections, and object rep-
resentations. Self-portraits constitute the best
example of psychodynamic theories on the origin
of identity by mirroring the level of decline and
object relations of the individual.
Jacques Lacan was the first to define the mirror
phase, an episode in which the infant initially dis-
covers himself or herself in the mirror. For
D. W. Winnicott, the mother is the first mirror. By
interacting with his or her mother, the infant
begins to develop a definition of self. The mirror-
ing experience is responsible for giving the child
his or her first sense of identity. The mother and
child develop a safe place together called the tran-
sitional space. At that point, the child who has had
good enough caretaking begins to hold in his or
her memory a positive image of the mother and
internalize this image. When the mirroring experi-
ence is distorted, negative, or absent between
mother and infant, the child’s own existence
706 Self-Presentation
becomes negated and he or she develops a distur-
bance in primitive self-feeling.
Egon Schiele, an Austrian artist, produced hun-
dreds of self-portraits throughout his lifetime.
Schiele, with other artists, produced a new art
form, expressionism. Schiele lived in Vienna at the
end of the 19th century, which coincided with
the birth of psychoanalysis. His exploration into
the depths of his self, primarily through confronta-
tions with his sexuality, is analogous to the con-
cerns of psychoanalysis at that time. He often
depicted himself in a castrated, deformed, and
mutilated state. Schiele seemed to create self-
portraits as a means to objectify and master his
problems with identity. Schiele had an unusual
relationship to mirrors that may have reflected
faulty mirroring experiences during childhood. For
example, he never passed a mirror without stop-
ping to scrutinize his reflection. The full-length
mirror from which he drew his self-portraits and
took with him wherever he went originally belonged
to his mother.
Frida Kahlo’s self-portraits can also be seen as
an attempt at self-consolidation or identity mainte-
nance. For Kahlo, the object of intensive study was
herself. After a terrible vehicular accident, which
left her permanently crippled at age 18, Kahlo
began to paint self-portraits, which she continued
to do until her death. Kahlo was preoccupied with
her appearance and she surrounded her bed with
mirrors. Mirrors of all sizes were placed at varying
angles from her bed with a huge one installed on
the underside of the canopy. This repeated encoun-
ter with her reflection possibly served as a concrete
reminder of her existence.
Therefore, a self-portrait can be considered a
projection of self or a reflection of the mind. The
personality of the artist, which includes the uncon-
scious, is represented in the self-portrait. The self-
portrait works as a transitional space that provides
a safe area in which to process the feelings associ-
ated with emotional distress. Creating a self-
portrait may allow the artist to discharge inner
emotional tension through a controlled and appro-
priate artistic outlet. By reproducing aspects of
emotional distress in symbolic form, the artist may
feel more in control and can master chaotic or
disturbing feelings without being overwhelmed.
Self-portraits may also be a means to cope with
the impermanence of existence and an attempt to
record change. By documenting his or her image
over time, the artist recognizes that the environ-
ment is changing around the artist and that the
artist changes, which is effected by and affects the
environment. This endeavor to record change can
be understood as an attempt to deal with mortal-
ity. The artist acknowledges the impermanence of
existence and attempts to record the change. The
self-portrait represents the most fundamental desire
of humanity, the need for self-perpetuation. The
self-portrait allows the artist to cope with death by
creating an immortal self (the portrait), similar to
having a child to carry on one’s name and proof of
one’s purposeful existence.
Elizabeth A. Patton
See also Self; Self-Concept; Self-Esteem
Further Readings
Bonafoux, P. (1985). Portraits of the artist: The self-
portrait in painting. New York: Skira/Rizzoli.
Gedo, M. M. (1999). The self-portrait as covert message:
The van Gogh–Gauguin exchange. Annual of
Psychoanalysis, 26, 59–81.
Kelly, S., & Lucie-Smith, E. (1987). The self-portrait: A
modern view. London: Sarema Press.
Van Meel-Jansen, A. (1993). Images of the self in portrait
and autobiography. In G. L. Van Heck, P. Bonaiuto,
I. J. Deary, & W. Nowack (Eds.), Personality
psychology in Europe (pp. 281–303). Tilburg, the
Netherlands: Tilburg University Press.
Warick, L. H., & Warick, E. R. (1984). Transitional
process and creativity in the life and art of Edvard
Munch. Journal of the American Academy of
Psychoanalysis, 12(3), 413–424.
Self-Presentation
In our daily lives, we form impressions of people
and treat people in a way that is consistent with
those impressions. Our selves are constructed,
modified, and played in interactions with other
people, and it is often in our best interests to influ-
ence the impressions that others form of us. Self-
presentation is the process through which people
present a public image of the self to others and
attempt to control the impressions that others

form of them. Self-presentation helps us obtain
the objects we need and value, helps us create and
maintain desired identities, and enables our social
interactions to run more smoothly.
Most researchers have used the terms impression
management and self-presentation interchangeably,
although other researchers have distinguished
between them. In general, impression management
is a broader term than is self-presentation; for
example, people can manage the impressions of
other people and even organizations. For this rea-
son, the term self-presentation is generally reserved
for instances in which the images that people proj-
ect are relevant to the self. This entry discusses
why and when people engage in self-presentation
strategies, along with areas of application and
debates associated with self-presentation research.
Why Do People Engage in Self-Presentation?
Roy Baumeister has argued that people engage in
self-presentation for two reasons: (1) to please
the audience and (2) to construct one’s public self.
The first motive for self-presentation—to please
the audience—is the most common notion of what
is involved in self-presentation. That is, other
people control desired and valued resources and
we obtain these rewards by getting the audience to
think favorably of us. Thus, an important motiva-
tion for impression management is the attainment
of social and material outcomes—conveying the
right impression increases the likelihood that one
will obtain desired outcomes (e.g., friendship,
power, promotion) and avoid undesired outcomes.
However, self-presentation behavior is also moti-
vated by a fundamental need to belong, with the
result that individuals will present themselves in
ways that enhance their belongingness and group
membership. A number of strategies might be
employed to achieve this end, such as self-promotion
(i.e., to persuade others that you are competent),
ingratiation (i.e., to persuade others to like you),
and exemplification (i.e., to persuade others to see
you as a morally respectable individual).
The notion that individuals attempt to please an
audience to obtain desired outcomes is a familiar,
but somewhat negative, connotation of self-
presentation. Self-presentation behavior is often
viewed as deceitful and manipulative because
people may say and do things they do not really
Self-Presentation 707
believe to please the audience and obtain desired
outcomes. However, rather than being deceptive
and duplicitous, the impressions people try to
create are likely to be accurate and honest because
people often manage their impressions so that
other people will see them as they see themselves.
In addition, self-presentation strategies such as
intimidation (i.e., persuading others that you are
dangerous) or supplication (i.e., persuading oth-
ers that you are helpless) may appear negative
but still enable individuals to achieve their desired
goals.
Another motive for self-presentation is self-
construction. Indeed, early theorists such as Mark
Baldwin, Charles Horton Cooley, and George
Herbert Mead recognized that the self-concept is
constructed during social interaction as actors
come to infer personal qualities from the roles they
enact and other people’s reaction to them. Thus,
self-presentation can be used to construct and
present particular identities for validation by oth-
ers and individuals can build the self-concept by
presenting certain images to others. Indeed, to
claim a particular identity, individuals often need
to demonstrate that they have the traits and quali-
ties associated with that identity. For example,
gang members need to display delinquent behavior
to have the identity validated by other gang mem-
bers. As a result, self-presentations can have an
impact beyond what might seem to be their
momentary, local, and often self-serving func-
tions—their influence extends across audiences and
situations to shape the actor’s public identity and
private self-conception.
One by-product of the self-presentation process
is that the actor’s behavior, which initially may
have been intended to create a desired impression
on others, may come to influence the self-concept
and the way in which individuals view themselves.
A number of researchers have demonstrated that
self-presentation behavior can be internalized such
that behaving in a particular manner can lead to
self-concept change where the individual comes to
think of himself or herself as the kind of person
who engages in that behavior. For example,
Dianne Tice asked participants to present them-
selves as either emotionally stable or responsive or
introverted or extroverted in public and private
settings and then to rate their emotional stability
and introversion at the end of the study. The
708 Self-Presentation
results demonstrated that participants’ ratings came
to mirror their self-presentation behavior, espe-
cially when the behavior was performed in public.
In addition to the audience pleasing and self-
construction motives for self-presentation, Mark
Leary has suggested a third reason for self-
presentation: emotion regulation. Specifically, he has
suggested that an audience’s reaction to an indi-
vidual’s attempt at self-presentation, and the indi-
vidual’s perception of the success or failure of their
self-presentation attempts, may increase or decrease
positive feelings and an individual’s self-esteem.
When Do People Engage in Self-Presentation?
People are more likely to engage in self-presentation
when they perceive themselves to be in the “public
eye.” Indeed, the most common procedure for
investigating self-presentation is to compare two
situations that are identical in all aspects except
that some circumstance, such as the actor’s behav-
ior, is public in one situation but private in the
other situation. If public awareness makes people
change their behavior, it is inferred that they are
concerned with what their behavior communicates
to others. Anonymity, in contrast, is seen to remove
people’s concern with self-presentation because
one’s behavior cannot influence the impressions of
other people if one is acting anonymously.
We become more concerned with self-presentation
when observers can influence whether we achieve
our goals (such as when we are observed by a
potential employer versus a stranger), when those
goals are important to us (such as obtaining our
dream job), and when there is a discrepancy
between the image we desire to project and the
image that the observer holds of us (such as when
we believe that the potential employer thinks we
are unqualified for the job).
It is also important to consider who the audi-
ence is for our self-presentations. Certain audi-
ences may have special value or meaning for
constructing particular identities, and we may be
more likely to engage in self-presentation to these
audiences. For example, we may be more likely to
project a positive image as a sociable, attractive
person in a room full of potential romantic part-
ners (such as in “speed dating” situations) than in
a room of one’s family members. In addition, the
type of self-presentation will vary as a function of
the audience. For example, Tice and her colleagues
have found that people are more likely to be mod-
est in their self-enhancement to an audience of
friends but self-enhancing in their self-presentations
to an audience of strangers.
Areas of Application
Self-presentation processes have been examined in
relation to a number of social psychological phe-
nomena. Research has examined altruistic behav-
ior, finding that donations made in public are
dramatically larger than donations made in pri-
vate. Aggressive behavior is also subject to self-
presentation concerns: People are much more
likely to display aggressive behavior when the audi-
ence is likely to favor aggressive behavior (e.g., a
karate instructor) than when the audience is likely
to frown upon aggressive behavior (e.g., a pacifist).
Conformity, influence, and reactance are major
areas of interest in the self-presentation domain.
Research has demonstrated that self-presentational
concerns mediate and determine how and whether
a person responds to external pressures and influ-
ence. In general, a person will conform more read-
ily to the opinions and expectations of others when
those others are observing her than when they are
not (although a desire to be seen as nonconforming
or individualistic may produce reactance in public
situations). Self-presentation accounts have also
been important in the attitude change literature,
with some theorists arguing that attitude change via
cognitive dissonance can be explained by a desire to
present a consistent self. Other phenomena that
have been subjected to a self-presentational analysis
include attribution, leadership, nonverbal behavior,
social facilitation, self-handicapping, social anxiety,
personnel selection, and even depression.
Recent research on self-presentation has exam-
ined reasons why people may fail at their self-
presentation attempts. Not all self-presentation
attempts are equally successful—sometimes we suc-
ceed at projecting the desired image, but at other
times, we fail. Traditional answers provided by self-
presentation theorists explained poor self-presentation
on a lack of motivation (i.e., not caring about the
audience) or a lack of knowledge (i.e., not know-
ing how to project one’s desired image). In recent
years, however, Roy Baumeister and Kathleen Vohs
have suggested that self-regulation may play a

crucial role in self-presentation. Self-presentation,
particularly in novel situations or to new audiences,
is an effortful process that requires the use of self-
regulatory resources. When people must effortfully
plan and alter their behavior to convey the desired
self-image, success at self-presentation will depend
on effective self-regulation.
Debates and Controversies
One criticism of the self-presentation approach is
the range of phenomena to which it has been
applied. Indeed, it seems that if a phenomenon has
a social dimension to it, then the self-presentation
approach has been advanced to explain it. Thus, it
has been argued that the self-presentation approach
provides a ready-made, post hoc account of find-
ings already accounted for by existing theories,
and the absence of a formal theoretical structure
means that there are no constraints on advocates
who want to interpret research findings in terms of
a self-presentation perspective.
One debate in the self-presentation literature
relates to the idea of private self-presentation—
that is, behavior directed at impression manage-
ment and self-construction in the absence of an
audience. Some theorists have argued against the
idea that behavior enacted in private has any impli-
cations for the self-concept. This unwillingness to
acknowledge the role of private self-presentation
and private audiences may reflect the way in which
public and private self have been conceptualized in
much of the self-presentation literature. Traditional
accounts of self-presentation have been relatively
individualistic in nature, paying little attention to
the impact of group memberships on social behav-
ior. Within the field of self-presentation, the public
self is varied, controlled, and observed, and the
private self exists only for the individual and is
immune to the constraints that shape and direct the
public self. However, these two extremes ignore
the possibility of a collective self—a self created in
reference to groups and arising from group mem-
bership, but a self that continues to exist and shape
behavior, even in private. Recent research within
the social identity approach, such as that con-
ducted within the framework of the social identity
model of deindividuation effects, has examined the
way in which the collective self and social identities
can be the focus of self-presentation efforts.
Self-Schema 709
Many analyses of self-presentation have consid-
ered impression management in terms of single
encounters, often with strangers. However, if one
accepts that the audience often consists of mem-
bers of our social circles and groups, this trans-
forms self-presentation in two ways. First, the
repercussions of a single public performance extend
far beyond the immediate occasion. Second, dis-
plays of behavior contribute to impressions cre-
ated by numerous such displays over an extended
period to create reputations as individuals or
group members.
Joanne R. Smith
See also Impression Management; Looking-Glass Self;
Self-Concept; Symbolic Interactionism
Further Readings
Baumeister, R. F. (1982). A self-presentational view of
social phenomena. Psychological Bulletin, 91, 3–26.
Schlenker, B. R. (2003). Self-presentation. In J. P.
Tangney & M. R. Leary (Eds.), Handbook of self and
identity (pp. 492–518). New York: Guilford Press.
Self-Schema
Self-schema refers to people’s self-conceptions, or
the ideas and beliefs they have about themselves.
As a cognitive-affective structure that organizes
information about a concept, or type of stimulus
(including representations and relations among
those representations), self-schemas are similar to
schemas held about others. But differing from
schemas about others, this self-knowledge is
stored more complexly in separate, context-
specific modules. With different contexts, differ-
ent self-schemas are activated and thus, different
aspects of self. As such, self-schemas form a part
of individuals’ idea of who they are, or their self-
concept, based on one’s experience.
Schematic Versus Aschematic
Based on Daryl J. Bem’s self-perception theory,
individuals gain self-knowledge only based on
attributions they make about themselves. On
710 Self-Schema
dimensions where individuals have clear and well-
developed self-conceptions or schemas, they are
considered schematic; in dimensions where they do
not have clear schemas, they are aschematic.
Schemas are derived from experience and one’s
interpretation of experiences. According to Hazel
Markus, the dimensions where individuals are self-
schematic are those that are personally important
to the individual, those that individuals think they
hold strongly, and those that individuals are sure
that the opposite does not stand true. So if a per-
son thinks he or she is athletic, definitely not
unathletic or out of shape, and being athletic is
important to him or her as part of the self-concept,
he or she is schematic on this dimension. If an
individual does not care about having an attribute
or about the attribute itself, then he or she is con-
sidered aschematic for that dimension. An interest-
ing paradox is that in domains in which one is
highly self-schematic, or an expert, an individual is
likely to form judgments more quickly and more
efficiently about information relevant to the self-
schema than is a person who is aschematic in that
domain, despite having more information to pro-
cess. This is because self-schematic information is
more readily noticed and is overrepresented in
one’s thought processes, although it is also associ-
ated with having a longer processing time.
Individuals will also resist information in their
environment that is inconsistent with their self-
schema, which is related to self-verification.
Schemas vary in their contents and how elabo-
rate they are; some are interrelated but others are
discrete. Individuals derive part of their self-
concept from their group membership, which is
referred to as their social identity. The amount of
interrelatedness or perceived overlap of social
identities by an individual is called social identity
complexity, as developed by Sonia Roccas and
Marilynn Brewer. Along with their descriptive
role, self-schemas also provide us with various
possible selves, including those we would like to
become and others we fear we might become.
Moods
According to Patricia W. Linville, most individuals
have complex self-concepts with a moderately siz-
able amount of discrete self-schemas. Having this
assortment helps people buffer the negative effects
that one encounters in life by always allowing self-
schemas that allow people to draw a sense of ful-
fillment. However, Carolin Showers suggested
that if an individual’s self-schemas are too discrete
or detached and on extremes (some positive and
others negative), external events may lead to
extreme mood swings depending on whether the
primed self-schemas are negative or positive.
Therefore, the more adaptive self-schemas are
those that are more integrated because the effects
of contexts would be less intense on moods in
comparison with those with more compartmental-
ized self-schemas.
Self-Discrepancy Theory
and Regulatory Focus Theory
E. Tory Higgins’s self-discrepancy theory suggests
that we have three types of self-schemas, namely,
the actual self (how we are currently), the ideal self
(how we would like to be), and the ought self (how
we think we should be). This is an offshoot of
Karen Horney’s tripartite model (real, actual, and
ideal selves). The ideal and ought selves direct our
behavior by providing different types of goals;
with the ideal self supplying promotional goals
(goals to strive for) and the ought self with preven-
tion goals (goals to avoid doing). Differences
between the actual and ideal or ought selves are
referred to as self-discrepancies. These can moti-
vate individuals to act to remedy the discrepancy
by engaging in self-regulation, strategies used to
modify our behavior to attain ideal or ought stan-
dards. However, if one is unsuccessful in resolving
discrepancies, negative emotions can be produced.
Specifically, actual-ideal discrepancy leads to dejec-
tion or depression-type emotions (e.g., sadness,
dissatisfaction, disappointment) and actual-ought
discrepancy leads to agitation or anxiety-type
emotions (e.g., fear, apprehension, threat).
This is further elaborated with the regulatory
focus theory in that the two self-regulatory
systems, promotion and prevention, are separate
and concerned with different types of goal attain-
ing. The promotion system works with the achieve-
ment of an individual’s ambitions and expectations,
previously defined as an individual’s ideals.
Promotion-focused individuals use approach

strategic means to reach their goals and are geared
to notice whether positive events are present or
absent. While in this promotion focus, individuals
are likely to find ways to improve their situations,
seek novel challenges, and consider impediments
as unique barriers over which to triumph. The
prevention system works toward the fulfillment of
an individual’s duties and obligations, previously
defined as an individual’s oughts. Prevention-
focused individuals use avoidance strategic means
to reach their goals and are geared to notice
whether negative events are present or absent.
With this prevention focus, individuals are likely
to keep away from new or unfamiliar situations or
new people, and to focus on averting failure than
on attaining the their best.
Script, Attribution Bias,
Self-Esteem, and Aggression
An individual’s beliefs about himself or herself
may influence aggression by influencing script
(schema about an event) selection, as self-schemas
provide an internal context for where scripts can
be evaluated. So when a self-schema is nonaggres-
sive, heightened activation of it decreases likeli-
hood of aggressiveness probably because it filters
out potentially aggressive scripts. According to
social perception and aggression research by Susan
T. Fiske, it has also been posited that hostile attri-
bution biases are products of aggressive scripts.
Individuals who are aggressive have a tendency to
perceive hostility in others even when there is
none, thereby displaying a hostile attribution bias.
This can lead aggressive individuals to perceive
relatively more aggression while observing one-on-
one interactions, expecting others to behave in
more aggressive manners in hypothetical scenarios.
This pattern has also been observed in individuals
with greater ingrained beliefs of persecution. With
cues being interpreted as hostile over time, they
can become an automatic cognitive process.
Self-esteem refers to an individual’s self-assessment
of self-worth as a static characteristic (trait self-
esteem) or situational variance (state self-esteem).
Those with inflated or unstable self-esteem are
most prone to anger and are most aggressive,
especially when their high self-image is threat-
ened. When those with average self-esteem receive
Self-Verification 711
negative evaluations for self-esteem relevant
domains, it promotes them to engage in prosocial
behavior to counteract the negative evaluation.
Shirley Samson
See also Regulatory Focus Theory; Self-Affirmation
Theory; Self-Assessment; Self-Concept; Self-Construal;
Self-Discrepancy Theory; Self-Esteem; Self-Image; Self-
Perception Theory; Self-Verification; Social Identity
Theory
Further Readings
Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology
(Vol. 6). New York: Academic Press.
Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating
self and affect. Psychological Review, 94, 319–340.
Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing
information about the self. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 35, 63–78.
Roccas, S., & Brewer M. B. (2002). Social identity
complexity. Personality and Social Psychology
Review, 6, 88–106.
Showers, C. (1992). Compartmentalization of positive
and negative self-knowledge: Keeping bad apples out
of the bunch. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 62, 1036–1049.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity
theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel &
W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup
relations (2nd ed., pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
Self-Verification
Self-verification refers to the desire for others to
substantiate their thoughts and feelings about their
sense of self. Specifically, we seek self-verification
to maintain certain views of the self that can pro-
vide us with the impression of a coherent identity,
a framework for organizing life experiences, and a
guide for everyday social interaction. Thus, people
want others to confirm the core elements of their
self-concept so that these elements may act as a
steering wheel, providing continuity and stability,
allowing people to navigate the road of social life.
Research has uncovered various factors that make
712 Self-Verification
self-verification more or less likely to outweigh
other motives for self-evaluation.
Self-verification theory advances the idea that
individuals feel a basic need to verify the central
aspects of their self-concepts. Desires for self-
verifying evaluations, or feedback from others that
confirms our self concepts, are thought to be moti-
vated by larger needs for certain knowledge of
oneself and predictability of one’s social behavior.
First, self-verifying evaluations can reinforce peo-
ple’s perceptions of psychological consistency by
confirming that their self-views and construction
of reality are accurate. Second, self-verifying evalu-
ations can provide people with assurance that their
social interactions will proceed smoothly and
appropriately. Research on the self-assessment
process suggests that individuals are motivated to
gain verification of their views of themselves,
which is both personally and socially beneficial.
For example, studies of married couples and room-
mates have revealed that people favor self-verifying
partners, even when they confirm negative self-views.
People tend to rate the need for self-knowledge
(e.g., “I’d feel more at ease with someone who can
judge me for what I am”) and predictability of
social interaction (e.g., “He knows what he’s deal-
ing with, so we might get along better”) among
their top reasons for preferring a partner who
verifies their self-concept over one who does not.
Obtaining self-verification from a partner can be
beneficial to relationships in that it encourages
intimacy, happiness, and commitment.
Research on self-verification processes has
revealed that people tend to regard self-verifying
evaluations as more convincing and legitimate,
compared with feedback that does not seem to
confirm self-views. Individuals also tend to pay
more attention to, and tend to better remember,
evaluations that confirm their self-concept.
Evaluations that do not match people’s self-views
may be threatening in two ways. First, evaluations
that are inconsistent with individuals’ ideas and
beliefs about who they are may cause them to
become uncertain about their self-concepts, which
conflicts with their need for self-knowledge.
Second, people can infer from contrary evaluations
that others do not have similar expectations of
them, which does not satisfy their need for predict-
able and smooth social interactions. Further, peo-
ple who maintain a negative self-concept tend to
desire, seek, and receive self-verification the same
way as those who hold positive self-views do. But
individuals who see themselves negatively tend to
seek different types of feedback. Specifically, those
who see themselves in a more positive light are
likely to prefer and seek positive evaluations, but
others who hold a more negative self-conception
tend to desire negative reactions. Such evidence
suggests that self-verification motives may super-
sede self-enhancement motives in the self-evaluation
process under certain circumstances.
Depending on the situation, self-verification
may be more or less likely than other motives (e.g.,
self-enhancement) to influence the self-evaluation
process. For example, people may be more likely to
self-verify when they can pay attention to others’
feedback and are not so distracted by the current
task that they cannot process others’ evaluations of
them. When we discover that another sees us in a
way that does not verify our self-concept, self-
verification is likely to be the most dominant self-
evaluation motive. Also, how close or connected
we feel to a person can affect the level of self-
verification we seek from them. In illustration,
studies of intimate partners have revealed that
married couples seek more self-verification from
each other than do dating couples. People tend to
engage in self-verification most when they receive
feedback about self-views that are at the core of
their identity. Thus, the more central a self-view is
to one’s self-concept, the more likely he or she is to
be motivated to substantiate that view. This idea
that the importance of a self-view affects the self-
evaluation process is in line with the motives for
self-knowledge and predictability of behavior that
self-verification theory suggests. If core self-views
are at the heart of our identity, when they fail to
be verified by another, our sense of coherence
or knowledge of who we are is questioned.
Consequently, the lack of a strong and stable self-
concept can lead to inappropriate social behaviors
or misunderstandings and conflicts, like an adoles-
cent who may feel or behave awkwardly in some
social situations because his or her identity has yet
to be fully forged.
Although substantial evidence indicates that
people are motivated to self-verify under the condi-
tions outlined, some individuals do not present such
motivations. Just as some individuals who hold
themselves in low regard seek positive evaluations

from others, some of those who think highly of
themselves indicate a desire for distinctly negative
reinforcement. Identity researchers suggest that
such outcomes result from the multidimensional
nature of people’s self-concepts. For example, we
may hold an overall negative self-concept, but a
positive view of ourselves as a student. Such people
may seek positive evaluations of their academic
ability, while still behaving in ways that demon-
strate their low self-regard.
Robert D. Blagg
See also Impression Management; Self-Assessment; Self-
Concept; Self-Perception Theory
Further Readings
Swann, W. B., Jr. (1996). Self-traps: The elusive quest for
higher self-esteem. New York: W. H. Freeman.
Swann, W., Rentfrow, P., & Guinn, J. (2003). Self-
verification: The search for coherence. Handbook of
self and identity (pp. 367–383). New York: Guilford
Press.
Swann, W. B., Jr., & Schroeder, D. G. (1995). The search
for beauty and truth: A framework for understanding
reactions to evaluations. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1307–1318.
Semantics
Language is a mode of communication that can be
used in both its oral and written forms to relay
meaning. Because language consists of many levels,
meaning resides on many levels. Language includes
the grammatical, lexical, morphological, phono-
logical, pragmatic, syntactic, and semantic levels.
The grammatical level consists of descriptive rather
than prescriptive rules of language. All language
use adheres to rules whether speakers can articu-
late those rules or not. The lexical level encom-
passes the vocabulary of a language. Morphological
refers to rules of word formation in language.
Phonological relates to the sounds of language; an
aspect of learning a language is learning agreed-
upon meanings of sound combinations. Pragmatics
considers how various contexts influence language
use. Syntax deals with rules of sentence formation.
Semantics 713
Semantics, in general, refers to the system of mean-
ings that includes words, phrases, and sentences.
How a person conveys or understands such mean-
ings is part of the complexity of his or her indi-
vidual and collective identity.
Study of Meaning
Syntax—or rules that regulate the way words are
arranged to form sentences, phrases, or any other
form of complete thought—contributes to the
meaning of the words. Different languages adhere
to different syntactical rules. To form sentences
according to the syntactical rules of a particular
language presents a systematic, orderly arrange-
ment of words that contribute to meaning in a
particular language. Semantics is the philosophical
and linguistic study of meaning; it is the study of
the relationships between words and meanings.
Philosophers study the meaning of sentences
through the perspectives of reference and truth
conditions. An example of reference occurs in the
sentence “Biden is vice president of the United
States.” The word Biden and the phrase vice presi-
dent of the United States refer to the same entity,
Joe Biden. Truth conditions consider the condi-
tions under which a statement can be deemed true
or false. An example of truth conditions is
“Gwendolyn Brooks passed away in December
2000.” This is true. “Gwendolyn Brooks passed
away during the 21st century.” This is true.
Linguists study the meaning of sentences, phrases,
and words through lexical decomposition. Lexical
decomposition illuminates the semantic properties
of a word in an effort to consider the sense of the
word. Semantic properties specify meanings in
words. Knowing the meaning of a word means
knowing to what it refers. For example, the word
boy is +male and –adult, whereas the word man is
+male and +adult. Likewise, woman is –male and
+adult, and girl is –male and –adult. Lexical decom-
position provides insight in that it demonstrates
the close relationship between man and boy.
The semanticist pursues the understanding of
the word and the object to which the word refers.
When one considers the term semantics one also
considers its ambiguous nature, for the develop-
ment of various lexicons over time systematically
gives “new” meanings to “old” words. Metaphorical
meaning in phrases such as time is money may also
714 Semantics
contribute to ambiguity; yet, semantic properties
of literal meaning contribute to metaphorical
meaning. Semantics is one of the most complex
levels of language, for semanticists must ponder
what inferences can be legitimately drawn from
words, phrases, and sentences while they consider
meaning on multiple levels.
Forms of Meaning
Connotation is the associated or secondary mean-
ing of a word or expression in addition to its
explicit, core, or primary meaning, which is deno-
tation. Interestingly, people often believe that the
dictionary definition or explicit meaning of a word
more accurately represents the word’s meaning
than does a person’s understanding of a word. The
connotative form of meaning maintains its signifi-
cance in language, regardless. Connotation is a
suggested idea or notion. Informative connotation
refers to socially agreed-upon, impersonal mean-
ings. Affective connotation refers to the personal
feelings that words arouse in people. People gener-
ally disregard informative connotations when they
are strongly moved to express their views through
affective connotations.
Language reveals one’s views of the world—
that is, language reveals one’s perceptions and
misconceptions. Other than connotation and deno-
tation, various other forms of language contribute
to meaning in language, reveal one’s perceptions,
and reveal one’s identity. For example, figures of
speech contribute to meaning in language. Figures
of speech include the use of metaphor, simile,
idiom, symbol, irony, satire, understatement,
hyperbole, metonymy, synecdoche, double enten-
dre, pun, and so forth. Like figures of speech,
dialect usage contributes to variations in mean-
ings. Similarly, slang and signification contribute
to variations in meanings. Using common words in
different ways (lexical), changing pronunciation
(phonological), and changing word patterns (syn-
tax) alter meaning (semantics).
Meaning resides in natural language and artifi-
cial language. Linguists study meaning in natural,
spoken languages. Specialists, such as computer
programmers, study and use artificial language.
Whether natural or artificial, one derives meaning
from the arrangement of words. In natural lan-
guage, syntactic linguistic rules contribute to the
meaningful arrangements of words. Linguists iden-
tify these rules of language following in-depth
study of natural speech in varieties of languages.
Factors Contributing to Meaning
As noted, language reveals one’s views of the world.
Understanding how cultural orientation affects lan-
guage is central to communication. For example, a
possible interpretation of the word home could be
a place of comfort or warmth for one person, but a
place of danger and strife for another. Personal
perception and emotion are key, despite dictionary
definitions and denotations. Differences in cultural
orientation often contribute to ambiguity. Words,
phrases, and sentences possess ambiguity when
they can be interpreted in several ways. For exam-
ple, “He found the cross on Jackson” could be
interpreted in a number of ways depending on
one’s life experiences and cultural orientation.
Consider the following meanings: (1) A long-lost
accessory, the cross was found on Jackson (Street
or Boulevard). (2) The individual saw the cross, a
long-lost accessory, affixed on the lapel of an
acquaintance by the name of Jackson. (3) The indi-
vidual found salvation at this particular location,
on this particular street, or in this particular dwell-
ing. Thus, meaning is not fixed.
The meaning of words, phrases, and sentences
often depends on the sentiment behind the word.
Consider how one’s attitude changes when pre-
sented with the following words:
nude versus naked
wildflower versus weed
award versus gift
slender versus skinny
The word manipulates the perception of the
thing described. Note the example nude versus
naked. Both words refer to one’s being without
clothing; however, the words may elicit different
responses. The subtexts and contexts of the words
prompt certain responses, a function of the power
of language.
Consider also the words debate and dispute.
One might say that the meaning of the words dif-
fers significantly or that the meaning is the same.

The word debate means a discussion, as of a pub-
lic question in an assembly, involving opposing
viewpoints—for example, a debate in the Senate
on farm price supports. The word dispute means a
discussion or an argument. The difference is the
suggested emotion behind the words, debate gen-
erally indicating more positive interaction than
dispute. Whether written or spoken, words,
phrases, and sentences possess something more
than suggested and literal meanings. Words pos-
sess force. Words possess power.
A significant feature of language is that it
changes over time. The perpetual evolutionary
development (or deterioration) of language pres-
ents a recurrent complexity because its application
veers from its intent. Early poetry and prose reflect
how language changes over time, semantically,
phonologically, grammatically, and lexically. On
the lexical level, words can undergo broadening,
narrowing, and meaning shifts. Examples of broad-
ening include the word picture. During an earlier
period, picture meant a painting. Today, its mean-
ing has broadened to mean a photo or an elec-
tronic image. Another example of lexical
broadening occurred in the word holiday, which in
earlier times meant “holy day,” a day of religious
significance. Today, holiday means a day to com-
memorate an event, or a day free from the routine
of work. Broadening has also occurred with brand
names. Although Kleenex and Xerox are brand
names, these words have been broadened to mean
any type of facial tissue and any form of photo-
copy, respectively. An example of lexical narrow-
ing occurred in the word meat. In earlier times,
meat meant food in general. Today, meat refers to
a specific type of food. Interestingly, the word girl
once referred to a child, regardless of gender.
Another example of narrowing occurred in the
word starve, which once meant meant “to die.”
Today, one uses the phrase to die of hunger.
Informally, one might use hyperbole, a figure of
speech, to express hunger by saying “I am starv-
ing.” An example of meaning shift occurred with
the word silly. In Old English, silly meant happy.
In Middle English, it meant naïve; however, in
Modern English, it means foolish. The word
knight has also undergone meaning shift, for its
earlier meaning referred to any young person.
Because words influence context and change
perspective, this leads one to ponder whether
Semantics 715
writers consider the inherent power in the mean-
ings of the words they choose. Words can stimulate
a “true” assessment of the happenings of the time
through the compelling symbolic effects of the
words used in written works. Words inevitably
trigger programmed perceptions within the brain
and change the feelings and judgments of the events
described in the written work solely because of the
words that are used to describe them. Reader-
oriented critics might describe this as a transac-
tional experience. In the transactional experience,
words and their meanings possess the power to
elicit certain past life and literary experiences of the
reader. Because life and literary experiences differ,
words and their meanings elicit different experi-
ences for different readers. Identity plays a central
role in this transactional experience—an experi-
ence that occurs during each reading. As noted
earlier, cultural experiences, literary experiences,
emotions, and numerous other factors contribute
to meaning.
Because semantics relates to the study of the
relationship between words and their meanings
and the study of how words mean, one must con-
sider how inconsistent elements such as subtexts
and contexts influence the meanings of words,
phrases, and statements. The context of an utter-
ance contributes to its meaning. A word does not
necessarily mean the same thing each time it is
used. It must, however, possess some semblance of
the same meaning; otherwise, those who speak the
same language would fail to communicate.
Semantics is yet another level of language that con-
tributes to the complexity of identity.
Christina Robinson
See also Figures of Speech; Idiomatic Expressions;
Language; Pragmatics
Further Readings
Crystal, D. (2006). Words, words, words. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Crystal, D. (2007). How language works. New York:
Avery.
Francis, C. (2002). “Downstream” effects on the
predicate in functional grammar clause derivations.
Journal of Linguistics, 38(2), 247–278.
Fromkin, V., & Rodman, R. (1983). Introduction to
language. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
716 Semiotics
Hayakawa, S. I. (1978). Language in thought and action
(4th ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Hipkiss, R. A. (1995). Semantics: Defining the discipline.
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Parker, F., & Riley, K. (1994). Linguistics for non-
linguists. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Steinmetz, S. (2008). Semantic antics: How and why
words change meaning. New York: Random House
Reference.
Semiotics
Semiotics refers to the study of signs, their produc-
tion, use, and meaning. The meanings provided by
signs contribute to social identities, and thus,
semiotics is often incorporated into studies of
identity, communication, and culture. Semiotics
covers four areas: semantics, syntactics, pragmat-
ics, and semiosis.
Semantics is the study of the relationship between
signs and the things they reference. For instance,
one might study the relationship between an object
and its name. Charles Morris refers to objects of
reference as designata, or something designated by
a certain sign. For instance, when one thinks of the
word dog, several things can come to mind, such
as a beloved golden retriever, the menacing pit bull
that bites, or the evil man that broke a woman’s
heart by cheating.
Syntactics refers to scholarship that deals with
the formal properties of signs and symbols.
Specifically, scholars look at the rules that govern
how words come together to form phrases and
sentences. In other words, syntactics is the study of
how signs relate to each other in formal settings.
Under syntactics, scholars find interest in how we
use words together in particular sentences, phrases,
settings, and occasions.
Semiosis refers to the use of signs. Under semio-
sis, a scholar investigates the ways in which cul-
tural groups produce, use, and assign meaning to
signs. Pragmatics functions within semiosis because
it deals with the practical and natural elements of
sign usage. Pragmatics represents the study of how
signs affect the people who use them from psycho-
logical, biological, and sociological perspectives.
For example, under pragmatics, a researcher could
study how using a term directly correlates to a
community’s cultural production.
Cultural and communication scholars trace the
origins of semiotics back to Ferdinand de Saussure,
and later, Charles Sanders Peirce. Many consider
Saussure the “father” of modern linguistics, spe-
cifically in relation to the signified and the signi-
fier. The signified relates to the referent, object, or
mental concept. The signifier relates to the sign, or
word or phrase, one utters to conjure that mental
concept. According to Saussure, the signifiers we
assign are arbitrary; there exists no necessary con-
nections between a sign and its meaning. The com-
municator decides what a particular sign means
for his or her audience.
Roland Barthes, a famous philosopher and
scholar, found semiotics useful in his studies of
bourgeois society. In Mythologies, he looked at the
symbol of the wine bottle as a signifier, and the act
of consuming wine as the signified. The bourgeois
class used the wine bottle as a signifier of whatever
they wanted it to mean, in this case, a normal and
healthy, robust, and relaxing activity. For others
not a part of the bourgeois class, wine might sig-
nify something unhealthy and expensive.
Peirce founded the school of pragmaticism. He
broke semiosis down into action, or influence, that
is or involves the cooperation of a sign, and object,
and an interpretation. Thus, he caused a shift in
the understanding of semiotics because he studied
the use of signs rather than Saussure’s structure.
Peirce deemed the study of the ways in which cul-
tures produced and assigned meanings as impor-
tant. This understanding of semiotics continues to
develop in the field of communication, culture,
and identity.
Semiotics is particularly useful for communica-
tion and cultural scholars. Cultures form through
language. Scholars refer to users of a common lan-
guage as a speech community. Within speech com-
munities, language manifests as discourse, a
multifaceted system that incorporates speech
sounds, words, and sentences, and provides mean-
ing, values, and social identities to speech commu-
nities. Communication and semiotic scholars study
discourse, or the systematic pairing of signs and
meaning in a particular cultural setting. In critical
cultural studies, semiotics is the analysis of how
linguistic and nonlinguistic cultural “signs” form

systems of meaning. For instance, the peace sign
symbolizes antiwar sentiments for some, or a way
to say good-bye for others. When a student receives
a B grade on an essay, that letter grade symbolizes
competency in a subject area. Thus, semiotics rep-
resents a critical approach for investigating the
construction of meaning in written languages,
visual images, and the auditory and visual images
of film and television.
There are many popular contemporary studies
of semiotics and meaning in cultural settings. In
popular culture research, one can study how
engagement rings came to represent commitment
in relationships. For instance, the tagline “Diamonds
Are Forever” gives social significance to the idea of
an engagement ring symbolizing commitment. It
also highlights the importance of diamond gem-
stones preferred over other precious stones. It also
implies that an engagement is not forever, unless it
is brokered with the exchange of a diamond.
Several collections of communication essays use
semiotics as their method. One such collection is
the Feminism and Visual Culture Reader, edited by
Amelia Jones. In this text, authors focus on semiot-
ics as method because it allows scholars to look at
how images and words are formed, and how those
forms affect communication and shared meaning.
Other collections include works by Stuart Hall and
Paul du Gay.
Amber Johnson
See also Discourse; Pragmatics; Semantics; Signification
Further Readings
Barthes, R. (1957). Mythologies. Paris: Edition de Seuil.
Jones, A. (2002). Feminism and visual culture reader.
London: Routledge.
Saussure, F. de (1986). Course in general linguistics. New
York: Open Court.
Setting
A reciprocal relationship exists between language
and identity. Language and how people use lan-
guage change as people adapt to new environments
Setting 717
and interact in these new settings. In considering
setting and identity, one’s identity, in part, depends
on current life status, interactions with others, and
physical location or setting.
Setting is multifaceted, for it reflects region,
social interaction, occupation, and even the arts.
Setting is more than location; it encompasses a
complex environment surrounding people. It
includes language use, interactions with others,
and historical and cultural conditions. Just as with
characters in the literary realm, setting also includes
what people know, own, and experience. This
entry discusses the various definitions of setting
and the ways setting indicates identity.
Definitions
Authors, actors, and artists offer their audiences
unique experiences by transporting them from
familiar to unfamiliar, and from realistic to imagi-
nary locations. In the literary realm, setting
encompasses time (time of day, season, year, era,
etc.), place (kitchen, balcony, valley, ocean, desert,
etc.), and cultural and historical conditions (war
time, enslavement, genocide, etc.). Setting also
encompasses what characters know (several lan-
guages, family secrets), experience (psychological
state, spiritual state), and own (stocks and bonds,
a wheelchair). Setting might also be described as
the background in which action occurs. When a
writer foregrounds setting, that is, when a writer
foregrounds the language and customs of a par-
ticular place, this literary style is called “local
color.” Setting, in essence, holds the same signifi-
cance as character. In many instances, characters
become extensions of the setting. The two ele-
ments seem to merge. Based on their identities,
characters respond to their environments in unique
and interesting ways.
In addition to literary definitions, many other
definitions of setting exist. Consider setting and
the computer. The computer allows writers and
readers to expand their surroundings. Users can
capture and freeze time using digital, still, or video
pictures. One can even merge images together to
create unique sceneries or backdrops. Inanimate
objects gain life through shape, motion, and ani-
mation. Technology defines setting through vari-
ous audio and visual means by allowing light and
718 Setting
sound waves to be transmitted into different media
with the assistance of electricity. Computer spe-
cialists define setting as the transference of infor-
mation from one computer to another using a
series of 1s and 0s. The Internet allows messages
and images to travel through space through HTML
coding and advanced technology.
In the literary and virtual worlds, setting is
important. In the literary world, setting is inextri-
cably linked to characters. Characters are verbal
representations of human beings. Similar links
exist in the virtual world. Both relate to the real
world.
Regional Indicators
Geographical boundaries and migration patterns
relate to setting and contribute to language varia-
tion. Geographical boundaries such as mountains,
lakes, rivers, and valleys divide people. When
people do not interact with one another, they
develop different language patterns. Different lan-
guage patterns distinguish identities.
When groups verbally interact regularly, each
group picks up cues and emulates aspects of the
other’s language features. Over time, a change
called linguistic convergence occurs. Linguistic con-
vergence suggests that speakers adjust their speech
to that of their addressees. Groups no longer in
proximity, and groups that maintain minimal con-
tact with each other, tend to exhibit minimal lin-
guistic convergence. Listeners, then, refer to the
differences in language and language varieties as
accents. If referring to the southerner, listeners
might also use the term southern drawl. In actual-
ity, what listeners hear is vowel variation. Listeners
identify the southern speaker based on differences
in sounds of the language and differences in vocab-
ulary usage. A sound difference unique to the
southern U.S. dialect results from monophthongi-
zation. Monophthongization results when a speaker
produces a one-part vowel rather than a two-part
vowel. A two-part vowel is called a diphthong.
When speakers produce diphthongs, they produce
a sound that consists of one vowel sound that glides
into another vowel sound. An example of a diph-
thong occurs in the word time. The usual pronun-
ciation is something like “taym.” Rather than the
two-part vowel, the Southern speaker produces a
lengthened, one-part vowel (monophthongization),
and “time” becomes “ta:m.” (The colon indicates
the lengthening of the vowel.) Even the rhythm and
a slower or faster pace influence the sounds of
words and can serve as indicators of identity.
In addition to vowel sound changes, listeners
recognize differences in vocabulary among speak-
ers from different regions. For example, in some
regions, the non-alcoholic beverage is called pop;
in other regions, it is called soda. In still other
regions, it is called soda pop. In some regions, a
front porch is known as a veranda, the expressway
is called the highway, and the sofa is called the
davenport. Other examples are the chest of draw-
ers and the chifforobe or chifferobe, the faucet and
the spigot, and the pail and the bucket. In the
southern region of the United States, listeners hear
more terms of endearment such as sweetie pie,
honey, and darling. Just as those from other
regions recognize these terms of endearment as
distinctive markers in southern speech, the south-
erner recognizes the absence of such terms as dis-
tinctive markers in northern speech. Southerners
often view the absence of terms of endearment as
rude, cold, or inconsiderate. For the southerner,
the use of “you-all” rather than the plural “you”
is common and might be viewed as redundant or
grammatically incorrect by the northerner. Such
language variations distinguish one group from
another group and serve as indicators of identity.
In addition to the sounds of the language and dif-
ferences in vocabulary identifying southern speak-
ers, behavior in social relationships contributes to
identity. For example, the southerner displays
more openness toward strangers than do the mid-
westerner or the northerner. A sense of community
and a display of courtesy exist in the South.
Setting, then, influences language and behavior.
Social Indicators
Language is culturally and regionally based. The
possibility of the average U.S. speaker listening to
a classmate, peer, or coworker and distinguishing
dialects is minimal. Listeners recognize differences,
but they do not necessarily know the linguistic or
social reasons for differences. Representative U.S.
English dialects include Standard American English,
African American English or Ebonics, Southern

African American English, Southern White
American English, and Cajun/Creole English.
Linguists observe and study natural language use
and compare and contrast various words, sounds,
and individual speech patterns. They also test and
evaluate the results. Many linguists focus on the
historical development of social dialects, and others
engage in sociolinguistic practices. Sociolinguistics
is the study of language in society—the study of
language use in its various social contexts. Of inter-
est to the sociolinguist is why people change the
ways in which they speak when they move from
one setting to another.
Many speakers possess the ability to engage in
situational variation or to engage in code-switching
as they move from one setting to another. To code-
switch entails a change from the use of one lan-
guage to another, depending on the setting.
Bilingual speakers often switch from their native
languages to English in a setting that includes
native English speakers. In private speech situa-
tions, they often switch to their native language.
Code-switching also includes changing from the
use of one dialect to another, depending on the
setting. For example, a speaker might engage in
classic African American English when talking
with peers in one setting but switch to Standard
American English when talking with his employer
in another setting. Code-switching is also known
to occur within a single speech situation and even
within an individual speech act. Speakers con-
sciously and unconsciously select the speech behav-
ior most appropriate for each speech situation or
setting. News reporters often discuss the fact that
public figures code-switch as they move from one
audience to another. Code-switching might entail
a change in diction from, for example, formal to
informal. Diction reflects the choices speakers
make in vocabulary and word order. Formal dic-
tion might include polysyllabic words, grammati-
cally complete sentences, and sentences that reflect
complex word order. Using formal diction, the
speaker might select the word dine. Using informal
diction, the speaker might choose the phrase chow
down. Informal diction might also include con-
tractions, sentence fragments, slang, and even pro-
fanity. In an attempt to use formal diction and
emphasize Standard English, speakers of other
dialects tend to engage in hypercorrection.
Setting 719
Hypercorrection extends a particular language
feature beyond its normal boundary. For example,
speakers engaged in hypercorrection might overly
emphasize word endings such as -ed and -ing.
Hypercorrection gives the appearance of elitism.
Changes in language occur as speakers move
from one setting or social context to another.
When changes occur, they provide cues about the
speaker’s role in a particular speech situation, the
speaker’s relationship with others, and the speak-
er’s mood, and, generally, changes in language use
reveal information about the speaker’s identity.
Jargon
Jargon is technical or specialized language used by
particular occupational or social groups and
reflects a particular field of knowledge or activity.
Jargon users might include chemists, medical doc-
tors, lawyers, computer graphic designers, educa-
tors, and even members of sports teams. The use of
specialized terms and phrases indicate identity.
Speakers generally produce these specialized terms
and phrases in specific settings, such as medical
offices, chemistry labs, courtrooms, or bowling
alleys. Jargon often consists of familiar terms that
possess different meanings for specialized groups.
For example, bowlers refer to the bowling alley as
the “house,” and “average” as the highest sanc-
tioned score. Sanctioned means to be certified by a
state organization. Legal jargon includes root
words that appear familiar, but their endings
appear unfamiliar. Examples include trustee, trus-
tor, testate, and testator. Many legal terms derive
from Latin forms. Examples include pro se and pro
per. Both terms relate to an individual who repre-
sents himself or herself in court. Like many special-
ized fields, medicine uses jargon in the form of
acronyms. Representative terms are CATT, which
means crisis assessment and treatment team, and
EEG, which means electroencephalogram.
Writers and speakers in specialized fields must
consider their settings and audiences when using
jargon. If the goal is to reach wide audiences, then
writers and speakers must minimize jargon.
Jonnie Simmons-Johnson
See also Code-Switching; Dialect; Figures of Speech;
Language; Pragmatics; Semantics; Style/Diction
720 Sexual Identity
Further Readings
Hickerson, N. P. (1980). Linguistic anthropology.
New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Kennedy, X. J., Gioia, D., & Bauerlein, M. (2009).
Handbook of literary terms. New York: Pearson/
Longman.
Labov, W. (2002, August 2). Driving forces in linguistic
change. Retrieved June 24, 2009, from University of
Pennsylvania Web site: http://www.ling.upenn.edu
Mabele, M. C. (2006). Linguistic identity. Retrieved June
24, 2009, from Intertext Syracuse University Writing
Program Web site: http://wrt-intertext.syr.edu/XI/
linguistic.html
Roberts, E. V. (2008). Literature: An introduction to
reading and writing. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson
Prentice Hall.
Scherer, K. R., & Giles, H. (1979). Social markers in
speech. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Sterling, P. (2000). Identity in language: An explosion
into the social implications of linguistic variation.
Retrieved June 24, 2009, from Texas A&M University
Web site: http://www.tamu.edu/chr/agora/winter2000/
sterlilng.pdf
Wolfram, W., & Schilling-Estes, N. (1998). American
English. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Sexual Identity
Sexual identity has a least two meanings in the
social sciences, both relating to inner convictions or
claims about who and what we are. The first mean-
ing refers to the various ways we see ourselves as
male or female, and the second defines our sexual-
ity or the kinds of erotic partners we prefer. These
inner convictions usually begin with medical desig-
nations made about biological sex at birth, based
on the appearance of genitalia and presence of cer-
tain chromosomes. Children are then raised as girls
or boys, and encouraged to accept gender roles or
certain mannerisms and behaviors considered
appropriate to their biological sex. However, sex-
ual identity is not always consistent with medical
designations, physical anatomy, or gender roles.
Sexual identity is difficult to define and measure
because it is an inner conviction that could be
inconsistent with appearance or overt behavior,
because it can change throughout life, and because
it does not always reflect the perceptions of others.
A man may be comfortable with his male body, act
in a socially appropriate way for his culture, have
occasional sex with men, but be married and see
himself as a heterosexual. A woman could grow up
a tomboy, dress and behave in “masculine” ways,
and work in a male-dominated job but know she is
a heterosexual woman. A “lipstick” lesbian could
wear ultra-feminine clothing and accessories but
live with a female partner. Outward expressions of
sexual identity can also be altered to suit different
social circumstances, or can be radically trans-
formed through sex reassignment procedures.
Most people subconsciously accept social and
cultural expectations about sexual or gender-related
behavior. Although they may question their degree
of masculinity or femininity, they may seldom or
never question whether they are male or female.
Those who are confused about their sexual identity
may disguise these feelings to fit in with social con-
ventions, or become celibate. Alternatively, they
may attempt to change societal attitudes, their own
external appearance, or their anatomy. Nevertheless,
social scientists now argue that individuals can
have multiple sexual identities, which may be
inconsistent, contradictory, and transitional.
Sex Versus Gender
Historically, biological sex has been considered a
dichotomy that can be determined at birth by
genitalia and chromosomes. Although a few babies
are born with ambiguous genitalia or both male
and female anatomy, babies are typically desig-
nated as male or female at birth and are expected
to grow up accordingly. Some children or adults
may undergo sex reassignment or reconstruction
surgery if there is a major conflict between what
sex they think they are (or want to be) and the
medical decision at birth.
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, males and
females were thought to be polar opposites with dif-
ferent minds and bodies. Early social theorists
argued that biology is destiny and suggested that
biological sex led to different dispositions, emotions,
and abilities, which explained the “separate spheres”
of men and women. Nevertheless, a number of psy-
choanalysts and psychologists argued that masculine
and feminine behavior, as well as heterosexuality
and homosexuality, were influenced by biology but
resulted more from distinctive life histories.

After the 1950s, more social scientists focused
on social learning theory, viewing the newborn
child as capable of learning sex-appropriate behav-
ior for either sex if given the right circumstances.
The concept of “sex roles” was used to explain
how men and women become so different in their
behavior. Social scientists argued that children are
normally treated differently based on their sex.
They are held and cuddled differently by parents,
given distinctive toys, and encouraged to develop
varying interests and to occupy different sex roles.
Social researchers now use the concept of “gender
roles” because sex is used as a biological concept
relating to physical differences, whereas gender
refers to the socially constructed ways of thinking,
looking, and behaving that relate to cultural ideas
of masculinity and femininity.
Although there has recently been a resurgence of
genetic theories of behavior in science, sociologists
continue to focus on the social construction of
identity, arguing that people normally create mul-
tiple gender and sexual identities. The sociological
concept of “doing gender” implies that people
express their inner convictions through “perform-
ing” certain behavior. These could include girls
playing house, women wearing dresses and high
heels, or wives accepting responsibility for house-
work. Males do gender by playing contact sports
with other males, pretending to be tough, develop-
ing an interest in cars and speed, or performing
outdoor housework such as cooking on the bar-
beque but resisting indoor housework. These per-
formances are sometimes played only for specific
audiences and could change in different circum-
stances. For example, men may acquire various
technical skills and regularly fix the car but still ask
their wives how to operate the washing machine.
Many cultures polarize gender roles through the
ways that children are raised and educated and
through etiquette rules, labor force segregation,
the division of labor in families, and cultural ritu-
als. This polarization helps shape gender identity
but could also reinforce sexual identity and “com-
pulsory heterosexuality.”
Sexual Preference
Many researchers now acknowledge that biologi-
cal sex is a continuum because people vary in their
mixture of male and female characteristics. These
Sexual Identity 721
researchers argue that the development of sexual
identity is a psychological process that is shaped
from infancy to adulthood by emotional interac-
tion with parents and others. Most adults are clear
about whether they are male or female, and most
also see themselves as heterosexual. A minority of
participants in research projects define themselves
as homosexual, bisexual, asexual, intersexed, or
transsexual.
Until recently, only heterosexuality was assumed
“normal” by governments, professionals and par-
ents in Western countries, although some cultures
permitted same-sex relationships and cross-dressing
under certain circumstances. Homosexual behav-
ior was generally viewed as deviant and thought to
originate from ambiguous genitalia at birth, chro-
mosomal or hormonal abnormalities, or inappro-
priate gender socialization during childhood.
People who were caught engaging in homosexual
acts or cross-dressing were treated by authorities
as mentally ill or criminalized until well into the
20th century.
Sexual orientation used to be described as an
enduring preference but researchers now acknowl-
edge that some people identify as heterosexual,
bisexual, or homosexual on different occasions or
in different periods of their lives. People might
change their sexual identities through lifestyle and
associational changes (including hair style, cloth-
ing, and association with certain communities),
but a few undergo surgical transsexual procedures.
Sexual identity does not always match up with
biology at birth or even the biological sex of occa-
sional erotic partners.
Much of recent research on sexual identity
focuses on gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transsexu-
als, including how they “come out” or communi-
cate their sexual identity to others, ways of dealing
with discrepancies between identity and lived
experience, and sexual practices and relationships.
Earlier research on heterosexual identity focused
on femininity but much of the current research
deals with the development and social organiza-
tion of masculinity. Some studies have compared
the attitudes and lifestyles of same-sex and hetero-
sexual couples, the way they bring up their chil-
dren, life satisfaction, and patterns of aging. This
research suggests that gay couples tend to be less
committed and monogamous than lesbian couples
do but that both have more egalitarian divisions of
722 Sexual Identity
labor than do heterosexual couples, especially
those that are legally married. However, the family
lives of same-sex couples, the outcomes for chil-
dren they raise, and factors contributing to life
satisfaction are similar to those of heterosexuals.
Many same-sex couples want to be treated as mar-
ried couples, and some have taken advantage of
new opportunities for marriage or civil unions.
Recent research also discusses the link between
sexual identity, sexual performance, and ability to
reproduce, finding that parenthood is still used as
a rough indicator of maturity, heterosexuality,
men’s sexual prowess, femininity, mental health,
and even moral worth. Those who choose not to
reproduce often need to justify their decisions to
others in the way that parents do not, and are
often seen as immature, sexually incompetent, or
hedonistic. Generally, people who choose to live
outside heterosexual nuclear families still have
greater need to protect their inner convictions
from public scrutiny. However, the expectation of
heterosexual parenting is less prevalent among
younger people.
Social Influences on Sexual Identity
Considerable research concludes that sexual iden-
tity is shaped by early emotional interaction with
parents but is further modified by sexual experi-
ences, gendered patterns of work and social rela-
tions, and identity politics. Sexual identity has
also been influenced by improvements in contra-
ception that have separated sex from marriage.
New ideas about lifestyle choices and human
rights have also encouraged people to live out
their inner convictions.
Innovations in surgery and drugs have enabled
people to change their bodies as well as their sex-
ual identities, and more people are taking advan-
tage of these procedures. The cosmetic surgery
industry has grown rich from people’s concerns
about sexual identity, enlarging or reducing breasts,
reshaping genitalia, and tucking tummies. In addi-
tion, new medical procedures have assisted child-
less people and even postmenopausal women to
become parents, and have helped people change
from one sex to another through surgery and hor-
monal treatments.
Advertising and television programs continually
encourage us to reshape our images of the desired
body and sexual partner. Television programs try
to persuade us that changing our appearance will
alter our confidence and identity. Grooming prod-
ucts formerly used by women are now promoted
for men (including hair removal products and
dye), and new products are marketed to improve
sexual experience, including those to resolve erec-
tile dysfunction, moisturize vaginas, and make sex
fun. Generally, television programs and advertis-
ing have normalized sex outside marriage, same-
sex lifestyles, transsexual experiences, and medically
assisted conception.
Identity politics, designed to change the social
meanings of masculinity and femininity or eradi-
cate compulsory heterosexuality, have affected
sexual and gender identity. The women’s move-
ment of the 1960s and 1970s attempted to redefine
femininity and encourage women to become more
assertive, to consider the possibility of childfree or
lesbian lifestyles, and to strive for education and
better jobs. Participants also sought to change atti-
tudes and social organization by lobbying for pay
equity, equal rights in marriage, and homemakers’
pensions.
Around the same time, the gay rights movement
fought to legalize homosexual acts and prevent
discrimination against gays and lesbians and, more
recently, to encourage gay pride and gain legal
protection for same-sex relationships and trans-
sexuals. The men’s and father’s rights movements
have encouraged men to view themselves as caring
fathers as well as family breadwinners, to express
their emotions, and to improve access to their chil-
dren after separation. Various religious movements
have discouraged or encouraged celibacy.
Over the years, identity politics have changed
laws and practices, but they have also transformed
assumptions that many people make about sexual
preference and gender-related behavior. In addi-
tion, these movements provide like-minded com-
munities that encourage people to live their lives
according to their inner convictions.
Conclusion
Sexual identity refers to the ways that people see
themselves as sexual beings. For most people, their
sexual identity, sexual orientation, and gender
identity are in agreement, but others experience
contradictions and conflicts. Different academic

disciplines disagree about the origin of sexual
identity. Although sociobiologists and some medi-
cal researchers focus on genetic and hormonal
factors, social psychologists concentrate on peo-
ple’s unique family histories and psychosexual
development. Many sociologists and feminist the-
orists argue that sexual identity is culturally rather
than biologically based.
More opportunities now exist to “create our
own biographies” and remake our sexual identi-
ties, with more personal freedom and innovations
in contraception, surgical procedures and drug
treatments, human rights, and laws. However, the
development of sexual identity and its exemplifica-
tion in behavior are still constrained by social
forces. Heterosexuality is still considered the dom-
inant and normal sexual orientation by govern-
ments, religious institutions, and many individuals.
Western culture no longer polarizes gender roles as
much, but the socioeconomic status of men and
women still differs. These factors may discourage
some people from publicly acknowledging contra-
dictions in their sexual identity or living their inner
convictions.
Maureen Baker
See also Gender; Sexual Minorities; Society and Social
Identity
Further Readings
Diamond, M. (2002). Sex and gender are different:
Sexual identity and gender identity are different.
Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 7, 320–334.
Tolman, D. L., & Diamond, L. M. (2001). Desegregating
sexuality research: Cultural and biological perspectives
on gender and desire. Annual Review of Sex Research,
12, 33–74.
Sexual Minorities
Sexual identity is a relatively recent and contro-
versial concept. Common cultural practice and
scholarly convention have each developed many
of the ways currently used to define and catego-
rize human sexual identity. Some of these focus on
sexual orientation, defined as a person’s gendered
Sexual Minorities 723
preference in the choice of sexual partners. Viewed
in this way, an individual could be defined as
asexual (having little to no interest in sex, and
therefore no need for sexual partners), bisexual
(sexual interest in both men and women), gay
(preference by a male for male sexual partners),
lesbian (preference by a female for female sexual
partners), straight (preference by a male for female
sexual partners, and for male partners by females),
and questioning (still in the process of discerning
sexual orientation). Other preferences with respect
to choice of sexual partners include necrophilia
(desire to have sexual contact with a corpse) and
zoophilia, also known as bestiality (desire to have
sexual contact with animals).
Another commonly used means of defining
sexual identity is through the enumeration of an
individual’s concurrent sexual partners. Numerical
categories of this kind include celibacy (abstinence
from sex, and thus no sexual partners); monogamy
(sex with only one committed partner); polygamy,
of which there are two primary types: polygyny
(sex between a male and two or more concurrent
and committed female partners) and polyandry
(sex between a female and two or more concurrent
and committed male partners); and polyamory
(sex with multiple partners, with whom one may
or may not have committed relationships).
Still another means of defining sexual identity is
to do so in terms of an individual’s preferences
regarding specific sexual foci and practices. There
is a wide range of fetishistic interests, also known
as paraphilias, which involve eroticizing parts of
the human body, manufactured and natural
objects, and sensations and situations not nor-
mally associated by most people with sex. Examples
include erotic interest in such body parts as the
ankles or hair, objects such as cigarettes or shoes,
and sensations or situations associated with bond-
age (deriving sexual pleasure from tying others or
being tied up), masochism (deriving sexual plea-
sure from receiving psychological distress and
physical pain), fantasy and role play (e.g., disci-
pline, dominance, submission), and sadism (deriv-
ing sexual pleasure from imposing psychological
distress and physical pain). Fetishes can be as
rare—and, from the perspective of the sociosexual
mainstream, as disturbing—as such forms of “scat
play” as coprophilia (deriving sexual pleasure
from playing with or eating feces) and urophilia
724 Sexual Minorities
(deriving sexual pleasure from playing with or
drinking urine). Fetishes can also be relatively tame,
per normative sociosexual standards, as for example
an interest in having sex while dressed as cute, fuzzy
animals, or as pirates, sailors, soldiers, Victorian
school marms, or their students, and so on.
The broad sexual identity categories briefly
outlined—sexual orientation, partner enumera-
tion, and preferred sexual practices—are not mutu-
ally exclusive. For example, a woman might define
herself as a monogamous lesbian sadist or a man
as a polyamorous bisexual. In contrast, some,
although not all, of the subcategories within each
broader category are mutually exclusive. For
example, it is impossible to be simultaneously
monogamous and polygamous. At other times,
several related sexual categories can be collapsed
into an omnibus sexual identity, such as BDSM.
The first two letters of this abbreviation, “BD,”
stands for bondage and discipline (physical restraint
and light pain); the middle two letters, “DS,” for
dominance and submission (fantasy and role-
playing); and the last two letters, “SM,” for sadism
and masochism (heavy pain).
Some sexual identities currently carry a great
deal of sociocultural weight, and thus have signifi-
cant public implications (cultural, legal, social,
political, and religious) and personal consequences,
as is the case, for example, with gays, lesbians, and
straights. Other sexual identities are deemed unim-
portant or outright ignored by the mainstream.
For example, as long as shoe fetishists do not steal
or bother others, they are generally permitted to
quietly pursue their passion without interference,
nor are they typically defined in terms of their
sexual preference in the same way that gay men or
lesbians are.
Sexual identity is both ascribed and assumed.
Ascription is the process whereby definitions of
sexual identity are imposed on individuals and
groups by others. Scientists, medical doctors and
psychologists, legislators and lawyers, religious
leaders, and others with presumed normative
authority define sexual categories into which they
conceptually place individuals and groups.
Assumption, in contrast, is the process through
with which individuals and groups define their
sexual identities in their own terms, rather than
having identities imposed by others. Thus, at dif-
ferent times during the past century, gay men have
been defined as homosexuals (by pioneering psy-
chologists), as sodomites (by various religious
traditions), and as proudly queer (by gay activ-
ists). These same men have often defined them-
selves differently.
A sexual minority is made up of those whose
shared sexual preferences and practices differ in
some significant way from those of the sociosexual
mainstream. However, as anthropologists, histori-
ans, sexologists, other social scientists, and critical
scholars point out, sexual preferences and prac-
tices that are regarded as normal in one time and
place might well be regarded as strange, and per-
haps even undesirable, in another historical and
cultural context.
In ancient Greece, for example, it was a com-
mon, accepted, and indeed favored practice for a
mature man to enter into a mentoring relationship
with a pre-pubic boy. This relationship had emo-
tional, intellectual, and sexual dimensions. The
latter often included the practice of intercrural
(nonpenetrative) intercourse, which for the ancient
Greeks typically involved the older male rubbing
his penis between the legs of the younger boy.
Today, this same pederastic sexual relationship
would result in the adult male being arrested, con-
victed, and imprisoned in accordance with the laws
of the United States. The same is true for those
who enter into polygamous marital relationships,
which are currently prohibited by the laws of most
Western countries, but which were fairly common
marital arrangements for the ancient Jewish patri-
archs and that nation’s early kings (for example,
according to 1 Kings 11:3, Solomon had 700 wives
and 300 concubines). Today, polygyny is still per-
mitted under specially defined conditions (e.g., fair
and equal treatment toward, and support of, as
many as four wives) by those Islamic countries and
peoples that adhere to the traditional Shari‘a inter-
pretation of the Qur’an. Given the legal status of
polygamy in the United States, such relationships
are rare, although they do exist, especially in parts
of Utah and the U.S. Southwest. Canada and
Mexico also have polygamous communities.
Having briefly defined the terms sexual identity
and sexual minority, this entry outlines practical
and theoretical problems associated with defining
sexual identity and identifies problems in obtaining
accurate demographic data regarding sexual minor-
ities, describes the cultural dimension developed by

some sexual minorities, discusses the marginaliza-
tion and oppression of sexual minorities, notes the
occasional social elevation of some sexual minori-
ties, and finally points out the continued relevance
of sexual identity as a concept driving social scien-
tific research and critical-cultural critique.
Difficulties in Defining
Human Sexual Identity
For most of human history, people were not cat-
egorically defined in terms of their sexuality. In
the Western world, to the extent that such catego-
rization occurred before the 19th century, it was
tied to Judeo-Christian moral concerns, rather
than to psychological or social constructs. For
example, during the Middle Ages, a person might
be labeled an adulterer, fornicator, or sodomite,
but these labels would refer to sins committed and
would not be understood as referring to some
essential core feature of an individual’s identity.
(Although in much the same way as habitual
thievery would brand a person a thief, habitual
same-sex relations between a man and other men
would brand him as a sodomite.) The focus of
traditional Judeo-Christian moral concerns regard-
ing sexual behavior was not identity definition,
however, but rather the need to differentiate
between permitted and prohibited sexual prac-
tices. Some practices were expressly forbidden
(defined as sins within the Christian tradition).
Examples include the commandment forbidding
adultery (Exodus 20:14, Deuteronomy 5:18), and
the Levitical injunction against male-male sexual
intercourse (Leviticus 18:22).
The systematic scientific categorization of
human sexual preferences and practices has its
origin in work done in the 19th century by pio-
neers in the field of psychology. The most influen-
tial of these scientists was Richard Freiherr von
Krafft-Ebing, who authored Psychopathia Sexualis,
in which he famously coined the terms sadism and
masochism. During this same period, the term
homosexual originated. Krafft-Ebing, and those
who followed him, pathologized sexual behaviors
that had once been deemed sinful. In this way, sci-
ence assumed in the Western world a normative
role regarding sexual behavior that had once
belonged solely to religion. To these were added
other sexual “pathologies,” which were sexual
Sexual Minorities 725
preferences and practices that significantly devi-
ated from the norm. This statistically based lan-
guage reflects the social scientific interest in
measuring human attitudes and behaviors, and in
designating as mental illness those that deviate too
far from the mean.
There is much controversy regarding whether
human sexual identity is a product of biology, cul-
ture, or both. Disagreement also exists about
whether sexual identity is fixed or fluid. In his
unfinished magnum opus, the multivolume Histoire
de la sexualité, French philosopher Michel Foucault
argues that human sexuality is fluid, and as such,
it is shaped by the changing historical, personal,
and sociocultural contexts in which it is experi-
enced and expressed. According to Foucault, these
contexts are powerful shaping influences that
determine the range and acceptability of sexual
options, and the material and other ways in which
these options are expressed. This contextual dimen-
sion of the expression of human sexuality is
reflected in the ancient Greek gay practices and the
polygamous marital arrangements discussed previ-
ously, and in the adoption of black leather as de
rigueur regalia by BDSM practitioners described
later in the section on sexual cultures.
Difficulties in Quantifying Human Sexuality
There are logistical and methodological difficulties
in obtaining accurate demographic data regarding
sexual preferences and practices. Some people are
reluctant to provide strangers with honest and
open information regarding their sexual prefer-
ences, the nature and frequency of their sexual
practices, and other intimate information they
might regard as personal. For religious and cul-
tural reasons, some might be ashamed to acknowl-
edge what they do, and with whom. Others might
be inclined to exaggerate or outright lie about the
nature and frequency of their sexual activity. The
difficulty in obtaining honest self-report informa-
tion regarding human sexuality is illustrated by the
controversy regarding the accuracy of the informa-
tion included in Margaret Mead’s classic, Coming
of Age in Samoa, with some scholars suggesting
that she had been misled by her informants,
whereas others support her findings, and still oth-
ers suggest the truth about what Mead was actu-
ally told might never be known for certain.
726 Sexual Minorities
The first serious scientific attempt to gather
descriptive and statistical data about the sexual
attitudes and practices of Americans were the stud-
ies of males and females conducted during the
1940s and 1950s by Alfred Charles Kinsey, an
Indiana University biologist who turned his atten-
tion to humans after having extensively studied
gall wasps. The opportunity and snowball sam-
pling techniques used by Kinsey to obtain data
regarding the sexual habits of Americans resulted
in the inclusion in his study of a disproportionate
number of prison inmates, prostitutes, sex offend-
ers, and other groups not representative of the
general population. Critics claim this inclusion
skewed the statistical results reported by Kinsey. A
particularly controversial figure is Kinsey’s oft-
cited claim that 10% of the general population is
homosexual.
A more recent scientific survey of U.S. sexuality
was conducted in 1992 by a University of Chicago
team of researchers employing the same sophisti-
cated sampling techniques pioneered and perfected
by marketing and political pollsters, which the
team employed in the hopes of obtaining as accu-
rate a count as possible. The results of this study
depict a sociosexual landscape that differs signifi-
cantly from that charted by Kinsey. Indeed, the
team of researchers report that about 3% of those
surveyed claimed to have engaged in a same-sex
act during 1991, and only 4.5% said they had
done so at any point during their lives. The diffi-
culty of obtaining accurate results regarding mat-
ters related to human sexuality is illustrated by the
percentage of the general population said to be gay
by this and other major studies conducted during
the past few decades, with a reported low of
approximately 2% to a high around 13%. These
numerical differences might be explained by the
use of different research methodologies, different
operational definitions of same-sex attraction and
behavior, changing attitudes toward gays and les-
bians, and so on. Difficulties occur as well in
attempting to gather statistical data about BDSM
practitioners, necrophiliacs, polygamists, various
fetishists, and the members of other sexual minor-
ities. Thus, although it is usually possible to say
that a particular sexual group is in the minority, it
is difficult to state decisively what percentage of
the general population that group represents.
The Cultural Dimension of Sexual Minorities
Sexual preferences and the practices associated
with them, although personal, have sociocultural
implications. With a few rare exceptions (e.g.,
asexuals, solitary masturbators, some object fetish-
ists, those for whom bestiality is their sole source
of sexual pleasure), sex requires at least one human
partner, and thus the need for a social network
that makes meeting and keeping partners possible.
Often, however, those whose sexuality differs
from the sociosexual mainstream are denied the
cultural affirmation, and social networking and
support, that members of the mainstream take for
granted. In response, some sexual minorities have
fostered a sense of community through the cre-
ation of alternative cultures that both draw and
differ from the dominant sociosexual culture.
These cultures can be quite elaborately developed
and organized, possessing their own distinctive
artifacts, events, historical memory, language,
organizations, publications, ritual observances,
social practices, symbols, and so forth.
The origin and evolution of the contemporary
U.S. BDSM community provides an example of
such a culture and illustrates Foucault’s claim that
sexuality is contextually and socially constructed.
This culture first emerged in the wake of World
War II, when gay veterans returned home pro-
foundly influenced by their military experiences,
which included rigid discipline, strict regimenta-
tion, an acknowledged hierarchy, an easy camara-
derie among buddies, an almost exclusively male
environment, and for some men, their first gay
sexual encounter. Some of these gay veterans
sought to recreate as civilians aspects of military
life they enjoyed while in the service. Many found
what they were looking for in the gay motorcycle
clubs that emerged in the decade following World
War II, notably in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New
York. Like the military, these clubs had their rules,
rituals, insignia, and so on. In this way, the wearing
of black leather biker gear by gay BDSM practitio-
ners emerged as an easily recognizable sign of their
sexuality, one that was later adopted by a signifi-
cant segment of the lesbian and straight BDSM
communities. Today, the BDSM community has its
own geography (bars, dungeons, leather shops),
historical memory (as remembered in books, the
Leather Archives and Museum, etc.), language

(with its own unique use of such words as bottom,
top, play, toy, and scene), social mores (dungeon
etiquette), and many other attributes one associates
with a developed and distinctive culture.
The cultures created and maintained by some
sexual minorities are deliberately hidden from the
scrutiny of the sociosexual mainstream, so that
members of that minority are protected from any
adverse legal, social, or other unwanted conse-
quences that might occur should their sexual iden-
tity be revealed. Such was the largely case with the
largely underground U.S. gay and lesbian cultures
that existed until the gay liberation movement that
emerged in the wake of the 1969 Stonewall riots
pushed for and obtained greater public acceptance
for, and visibility of, gays and lesbians in contexts
ranging from local communities to mass popular
culture. Such secrecy is still the case with some
sexual minorities. The degree to which a sexual
minority values secrecy depends on its acceptance
by others. There is, for example, greater gay visibil-
ity in urban centers than in rural communities,
although this is changing as gays have gained
greater acceptance in the United States within and
outside urban areas.
Like other groups, sexual minorities have staked
their claim to their own space on the Internet, thus
extending their cultures into cyberspace. Indeed,
without trying, one can easily find Web sites that
cater to those with even the most specialized sexual
interests. The offerings of such sites are diverse,
ranging from educational material to hardcore por-
nography, from online dating and social network-
ing to the Web pages of clubs and other organizations.
Some sites, such as the one maintained by the
North American Man/Boy Love Association
(NAMBLA), promote a legal and political agenda
intended to change laws unfavorable to a particular
sexual minority.
Not all sexual minorities have developed their
own distinctive cultures. Necrophiliacs, for exam-
ple, tend to be isolated from one another largely
because of the strong social stigma attached to,
and the legal prohibitions against, the practice of
having sexual relations with human corpses. Nor
do necrophiliacs have any incentive to search out
others with same sexual proclivities because they
have a sexual interest in the dead, not the living.
The development of elaborated sexual cultures is
Sexual Minorities 727
thus a consequence of the establishment of sexual
communities, which in turn reflect common needs,
shared goals, and the desire for social connection.
The Marginalization and
Oppression of Sexual Minorities
Sexual minorities have experienced cultural, legal,
political, religious, social, and other forms of mar-
ginalization. Such marginalization can have a vari-
ety of oppressive consequences for members of
sexual minorities, including social ostracization,
denial of basic human and legal rights, and even
death. Instances of such oppression are numerous
throughout history and around the world. The fol-
lowing two examples (one contemporary and one
historical) are representative.
During the first decade of the 21st century, in
the United States and elsewhere, there has been
much spirited debate about whether gays and les-
bians should be allowed to enter into legally sanc-
tioned marriages, with all the responsibilities and
rights that come with such recognition. The legal
status of gay marriage has been fought in the acad-
emy, in the courts, in legislatures, in popular cul-
ture, and via ballot initiatives. Today, same-sex
marriages are legally recognized in some countries,
including Canada, South Africa, Spain, and
Sweden. In the United States, the legality of such
marriages varies by state, and its status is changing
rapidly in response to state referenda, new legisla-
tion, and court decisions. At the time this entry
was written in 2009, gay marriage enjoyed legal
recognition in Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts,
and Vermont, but other states have explicitly ren-
dered such marriage illegal though constitutional
amendments and other means. In 2008, a hotly
contested battle raged over California’s Proposi­
tion 8, which would add the following words to
that state’s constitution: “Only marriage between
a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California.” Proposition 8 passed, but was chal-
lenged in court. In May 2009, the California
Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8.
One of the saddest chapters in the history of
gays during the last century was the extermina-
tion of gays and the decimation of their vibrant
culture by the Nazis. Although technically illegal,
homosexuality was tolerated in Weimar, Germany,
728 Sexual Minorities
which resulted in a gay golden age immortalized
by Christopher Isherwood in The Berlin Stories
and celebrated by the Broadway musical and film
versions of Cabaret. This de facto tolerance ended
when the Nazis assumed power. Approximately
100,000 gay men were imprisoned by the Nazis in
concentration camps under the provisions of the
anti-sodomy Paragraph 175 of the German penal
code. Some estimate that as many as 60% of
those imprisoned gay men died, a mortality rate
second only to that of the Jews. Although the
Nazis have been consigned to the dustbin of his-
tory, gays are still at risk of being the victims of
violence and murder. Indeed, such violence is so
common that there is a term for it: gaybashing.
Symptomatic of gaybashing is the case of Matthew
Shepherd, a young man who was tortured and
killed in Laramie, Wyoming, on October 12,
1998, for no other reason than because he was
gay. To date, violent crimes perpetrated against
gays and lesbians because of their sexual orienta-
tion are still not defined as hate crimes under
federal law.
The Social Elevation of Sexual Minorities
Sexual minorities are not always marginalized or
oppressed by the societies in which they are situ-
ated. Some are tolerated, and some are simply
ignored. Occasionally, certain select sexual minor-
ities are accorded special status that sets them
apart from, and even places them above, the social
mainstream.
An example of the social elevation of a sexual
minority is offered by the Two-Spirit people (for-
merly referred to as berdaches, a term that has been
largely abandoned because of its perceived pejora-
tive connotation), who are accorded special sexual
and social status, and the respect associated with
such status, by many Native American tribes and
Canadian First Nations. These are “men” who are
regarded as belonging to a third gender, neither
male nor female but possessing attributes and
assuming the roles of both. They are perceived to
have special power as a result of this liminal posi-
tioning. As a result, they often assume important
leadership roles within their communities as con-
ciliators, healers, matchmakers, keepers of commu-
nal history and wisdom, tribal leaders, and so on.
Ongoing Implications
Interest in issues related to the concept of sexual
identity is an ongoing concern driving research in
anthropology, history, psychology, sociology, and
many other social sciences. In the humanities,
critical-cultural studies—especially the growing
body of scholarship and critique that goes by the
name of queer theory—continues to explore the
cultural, personal, political, religious, and social
implications of sexual identity, even as some schol-
ars within that tradition question the legitimacy of
defining people in terms of fixed sexual identity.
These and other related issues are not merely of
academic interest. The continuing debate raging
around the legal status of gay marriage is just one
indication that the personal and political conse-
quences associated with sexual identity will remain
a mainstay of identity politics for years to come. If
recent and current trends are any indication, the
study of sexual identity promises to be an interest-
ing and fruitful focus of research and scholarship
during the first century of the new millennium.
Robert Westerfelhaus and Celeste Lacroix
See also Diversity; Gay; Gender; Queer Theory; Sexual
Identity
Further Readings
Baldwin, G., & Bean, J. (1993). Ties that bind: The SM/
leather/fetish erotic style: Issues, commentaries and
advice. Los Angeles: Daedalus.
Foucault, M. (1990). The history of sexuality: Vol. 1. An
introduction. New York: Random House.
Foucault, M. (1990). The history of sexuality: Vol. 2.
The use of pleasure. New York: Random House.
Foucault, M. (1990). The history of sexuality: Vol. 3.
The care of the self. New York: Random House.
Kimmel, M. S., & Plante, R. F. (Eds.). (2004). Sexualities:
Behaviors, identities, society. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Kinsey, A. C., Pomeroy, W. B., & Martin, C. E. (1948).
Sexual behavior in the human male. Philadelphia:
W. B. Saunders.
Kinsey, A. C., Pomeroy, W. B., Martin, C. E., &
Gebhard, P. (1953). Sexual behavior in the human
female. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders.
Krafft-Ebing, R. von. (1998). Psychopathia sexualis.
New York: Arcade. (Original work published 1886)

Laumann, E. O., Gagnon, J. H., Michael, R. T., &
Michaels, S. (1994). The social organization of
sexuality: Sexual practices in the United States.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Laumann, E. O., Michael, R. T., & Kolata, G. (1995).
Sex in America: A definitive study. New York:
Warner.
Mead, M. (2001). Coming of age in Samoa: A
psychological study of primitive youth for Western
civilisation. New York: Harper. (Original work
published 1930)
Signification
Signification is the process of using language,
directly or indirectly, in a creative and clever way to
verbally assault or attack an opponent. The oppo-
nent is signified on (i.e., verbally goaded) by the
signifier (i.e., the speaker). Signification, or signi-
fyin’, as it is called in African American vernacular
discourse, requires that a speaker demonstrate a
great deal of verbal dexterity to outwit the oppo-
nent. Other names that are synonymous or associ-
ated with signifyin’ include crackin’, cappin’, jonin’,
soundin’, and playing the dozens. By playing this
ritualized type of game, speakers are communi-
cating their cultural identity. This entry explores
signification as African American discourse, char-
acteristics of signification, and “Yo Momma” as
the quintessential example of signification.
Signification as African American Discourse
Signification is a form of African American dis-
course. African American discourse is spoken com-
munication by people of African descent such as
sermons, speeches, poetry, rap, call and response,
and so forth. Molefi Asante’s preferred term for
African American discourse is orature, which is an
all-encompassing term for the body of work pro-
duced by Africans in the United States. Nevertheless,
African American discourse is grounded in a West
African oral tradition that recognizes the role of
the spoken word in the transmission of culture. In
African and African American culture, the beliefs,
values, ideals, and knowledge of a people are com-
municated orally through the spoken word rather
Signification 729
than the written code. Through signifyin’, African
American speakers communicate humor and wit,
as well as selfhood and identity.
Nommo
An important concept in African American dis-
course that affects signification is nommo. Nommo
is the magical or generative power of the word; it
is the spiritual force behind the word. In the
African worldview, the spoken word produced
by the chief of the village or by the village doctor
has the power to heal or effect change in the minds
of the audience. The power of the word can cause
the audience to emote.
This phenomenon is also true within an African
American communication context. An example of
this is the wielding of the power of nommo by the
preacher in the traditional Black church. At the
center of the Black preacher’s delivery of the ser-
mon is the presence of nommo. The classic example
of the manifestation of nommo in the mind and
soul of the Black audience is as follows: After leav-
ing the church, one parishioner says to the other,
“Rev sure did preach today. My soul was fed. I
don’t know what he said, but he sure did sound
good.” This statement shows that the power of
nommo is not just in what (content of sermon) is
being said, but in how the sermon is communicated
to the audience.
The magical power of nommo is present in sig-
nification as well as in the delivery of a sermon.
The centrality of nommo in the delivery of a
speaker verbally mocking or jeering an opponent is
paramount. Nommo is the generative force that
gives the sarcastic or scornful language its sting and
is the generative force behind the scornful words
that creates tension between opponents that must
be relieved through ritualized verbal play but not
physical violence. In the end, victory goes to the
speaker who can best an opponent with nommo
and word play without resorting to physical harm.
Whoever throws the first blow loses the game.
In addition to playing a critical role in the
speaker’s delivery, nommo is also the generative
force behind other modes of discourse that are
present in signification such as tonal semantics
and improvisation. Tonal semantics is the use of
the voice to convey meaning, and improvisation is
730 Signification
the ability to perform without preparation.
Nommo is the force behind the speaker’s use of
tonal semantics. So, when a speaker retorts with,
“Ahhhhhhhhhhh sh$@,” nommo is manifested in
the voice and conveys the following meaning:
“Man, you done really messed up now, it’s on!!”
The best example of the power of nommo behind
improvisation is the quick retort: “Yo momma!”
Characteristics of Signification
Verbal Dexterity
In addition to the concept of nommo, other
characteristics of signification help us further under-
stand the phenomenon. One of those characteristics
is verbal dexterity. Verbal dexterity is the ability of
a speaker to be skilled or proficient in the use
of language. A speaker who is skilled in the use of
language will have a keen understanding of code-
switching. While under verbal assault, the speaker
will quickly switch from the use of pun to a one-
liner. Players may name-call, and then switch to the
use of tonal semantics to irritate opponents.
However, if the speaker’s use of the verbal fails,
then gamers may attack opponents by using non-
verbal hand gestures such as the “middle finger.”
Signification requires that a speaker be proficient
and skilled in the use of style—both verbal and
nonverbal.
Participant as Rhetorician and Wordsmith
Another characteristic of signification is partici-
pant as rhetorician and wordsmith. Signification
requires that participants be skilled in the art of
persuasion and the use of style. As rhetoricians,
participants rely on the creative use of language to
attack their opponents and influence the audience.
Moreover, those who have mastered the art of
signifyin’ are also skilled in their ability to wield
the power of nommo. Having a command of the
transformative power of verbal expression is a key
attribute of the participant as rhetorician in the
ritualized game of signification. Victory goes to the
rhetorician who can control the power of nommo
the best.
Those siggin’ are also master wordsmiths. They
have a variety of concepts to choose from in their
rhetorical tool bags. When engaging their oppo-
nents, they rely on the use of one-liners, punning,
obscenities, word play, gestures, tonal semantics,
humor, and rhyming. As suggested earlier, when
nommo is the force behind the word, the partici-
pant is a rhetorical threat to an opponent.
Audience as Participant
The audience as participant is another charac-
teristic of signification. Rarely is signification
played in isolation. The game is usually played in
the presence of friends, associates, or onlookers.
Moreover, the audience can and often does par-
ticipate in the game. Richard Majors and Janet
Mancini Billson suggest that the audience’s role in
the game is to act as a catalyst by magnifying the
insults, egging the participants on or “upping the
ante” with their own verbal assaults. For example,
an audience participant might up the ante by say-
ing the following: “Dog, you goin’ let Mr. Ugly
talk about yo momma like dat. You better get on
him.” Game members are presented with a unique
challenge by audience participants. Participants
have to engage in a verbal assault with each other,
and they must verbally duel with audience mem-
bers. To do this, a great deal of skill and tact is
needed in negotiating and managing the commu-
nication interaction between all parties involved.
Signification demands that participants multitask
while engaging each other in the context of the
game.
Cool Pose
Another characteristic of signification involves
the notion of cool pose. According to Majors and
Billson, cool pose is the public persona that African
Americans, particularly males, wear to maintain a
sense of coolness while under pressure. A cool pose
allows Black males to convey a “hardcore” mascu-
line image in the face of other Black males who
may attempt to “try” (to confront in a negative
way) them on the urban streets of the United States
to see how tough they are. African American males
often demonstrate the cool pose image through
stylish dress, verbal cunning, quick wit, and an
aggressive attitude.
Black males and Black females must manage
this persona during the playing of the game as a
way of maintaining a cool posture in the face of
verbal assault. Signifyin’ requires that participants

not give the impression that they are timid. To be
perceived as being weak gives the opponent a
chance to attack. While signifyin’, participants
must manage a “hardcore” persona despite insults
about one’s mother to demonstrate control of the
situation if they want to win.
“Yo Momma!”
A specific type of signification that must be dis-
cussed is called playing the dozens, the dozens, or
if obscenities are involved, playing the dirty doz-
ens. “The dozens” has its origins on the slave
blocks in New Orleans, Louisiana, during the 19th
century, where enslaved Africans who had defor-
mities or were disfigured were sold cheaply by the
dozen. To be sold to a slave trader as part of a
dozen was degrading and viewed as an insult.
Thus, to play the dozens is to make insulting
remarks about one’s opponent.
As with signification, playing the dozens requires
that opponents be skilled in speech. Verbal dexter-
ity, quick thinking, wit, and mental toughness are
important attributes to have to be a successful
player. Moreover, insults about each other’s moth-
ers are commonplace during the playing of the
game.
Deconstructing “Yo Momma”
Geneva Smitherman suggests that the most rec-
ognized and most common example of signifyin’
or playing the dozens is yo momma or ask yo (ya)
momma. An example of a “yo momma” joke is as
follows: Speaker #1—Man, you are butt-ugly;
Speaker #2—Just like yo momma! Another exam-
ple is this: Speaker #1—Man, what do you want
to have next? Speaker #2—Yo momma! As these
examples show, “yo momma” is a powerful
counter-argument because it is used as a retort. A
retort is an insulting or witty statement that turns
the words of the speaker back upon himself or
herself; it is a quick and creative reply to a charge
or accusation.
What makes “yo momma” rhetorical is the
word choice of the players. For example, yo is a
powerful term as slang. Its power lies in its brevity.
It is a truncated form of the word your. Moreover,
yo is a much more creative and clever term than
your. As an exclamation, the term communicates
Signification 731
emotion and feeling. Yo is also used to show greet-
ings in some speech communities.
Momma is the other term that makes up the
stylistic content of the message. Momma is the
African American vernacular word for mother.
And as a result, momma has a completely different
meaning for African Americans, particularly
African American males. In White U.S. culture,
mother is the biological female parent. Although
this is also true in African American culture,
momma is also the nonbiological parent who
“raised” the African American male and kept him
or got him out of trouble. Carlos Morrison and
Celnisha Dangerfield posit that “momma” or “the
mama complex,” which is deeply rooted in African
American and hip-hop culture, is symbolic of deep
love, strength, and perseverance in the face of
adversity, such as “raising” the African American
male in an urban society. As a result of the mean-
ing associated with the word, insults marshaled
against “momma” are particularly hurtful as well
as powerful, and always up the ante of the game.
Signification or signifyin’ requires that a speaker
demonstrate control over nommo—the generative
power of the word to outwit an opponent.
Characteristics associated with signification include
verbal dexterity, participant as rhetorician and
wordsmith, audience as participant, and cool pose.
Through signification, participants communicate
their cultural identity as African Americans through
the telling of “yo momma” jokes. “Yo momma”
jokes are the most recognizable type of signifyin’
or playing the dozens in the African American
community.
Carlos D. Morrison
See also Code-Switching; Dialect; Discourse; Impression
Management; Language Variety in Literature;
Rhetoric; Trickster Figure
Further Readings
Abrahams, R. D. (1970). Deep down in the jungle: Negro
narrative from the streets of Philadelphia. Chicago:
Aldine.
Asante, M. K. (1998). The Afrocentric idea. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press.
Baugh, J. (1983). Black street speech: Its history,
structure, and survival. Austin: University of Texas
Press.
732 Simulacra
Kochaman, T. (1972). Rappin’ and stylin’ out:
Communication in urban Black America. Chicago:
University of Illinois Press.
Majors, R., & Billson, M. J. (1992). Cool pose: The
dilemmas of Black manhood in America. New York:
Lexington Books.
Smitherman, G. (1977). Talkin and testifyin: The
language of Black America. Detroit, MI: Wayne State
University Press.
Simulacra
The notion of the simulacra has become a promi-
nent concept in a postmodern digitalized culture as
the question of representing reality has become
more and more of a contested zone; the belief that
a sign can refer to and be exchanged for guaranteed
meaning has been challenged. However, the notion
of the simulacrum is an historical phenomenon
predating our contemporary society, always center-
ing its concerns in the efficacy of the image.
Stemming from the Latin root simulare, “to make
like, to put on an appearance of,” simulacra raise
the worth of the copy in relation to the original. An
image, having internalized its own repetition,
begins to question the authority and legitimacy of
the original model. In a social order where the
reproduction of images and goods has become a
standard economic practice, the meaning of simu-
lacra has become crucial when questions emerge
concerning the identity of—what is and is not—the
genuine article, like the knockoff designer goods
sold in various parts of Asia.
Two versions of the concept of simulacra have
emerged in postmodernity: one negative—that of
Jean Baudrillard—and the other positive—that of
Giles Deleuze. Both rethink Plato’s initial denounce-
ment of copies as simply deceptive idols that are
nothing more than false semblances. The relation-
ship between copy and original for Plato is merely
an external relation of similitude, rather than one of
intrinsic and essential resemblance as would be the
case of Siamese twins for instance. This later rela-
tionship is also theorized by Plato as a good copy,
an icon that does participate in the idea of the
original. Each twin, for instance, could iconically
participate in the ideal form of man or woman. In
contrast, a bad copy can be illustrated in Pliny’s
account of the battle between the master paint-
ers Parrhasius and Zeuxis to capture the realness of
life on canvas. The grapes that Zeuxis paints are
indeed “real” and are pecked at by birds. However,
they have no taste and bear only an external appear-
ance. They do not participate in the original idea of
“grape-ness.” This entry explores the Baudriallardian
simulacra and the Deleuzian simulacra in turn.
Baudrillardian Simulacra
Baudrillard, the scourge of analytic philosophers,
presents us with the negative notion of the simula-
cra by conceiving the simulacrum as the copy of a
copy, which then produces an effect of identity
whereby the grounding in an original simply drops
out. The authentic original no longer serves any
purpose. This leads to a hyperreality where it
seems the “real” has disappeared, or rather, the
referent of the copy can no longer be located or
even needs to be located. He identifies the modern
means of mechanical reproduction, namely pho-
tography and film, as the beginning of this slide
toward hyperreality. Baudrillard traces a historical
trajectory of the changing reference of the sign that
leads to this postmodern condition. He begins with
the uncontested representation of the sign as the
basic reflection of reality; he then moves through
to the sign’s emancipation from the feudal world
in the Renaissance as a counterfeit sign; from
there, he moves on to the industrial commodity
where signs become unhinged, yet a pretense to
reality is maintained, although there is no model of
it (e.g., the “original” bottle of Coca-Cola as the
“Real thing”); and finally he reaches the emer-
gence of hyperreality of the simulacrum that has
no relation to reality whatsoever. In brief, seeing
the transformation of the object into a sign in
capitalist consumption becomes a simulacrum of
the real object. This reduction of reality to sign
values means that the symbolic as the lived charac-
ter of the world is lost. The spheres of reproduc-
tion (fashion, media, publicity, information and
communication networks) become the codes of the
simulacra upon which the global processes of
capital are founded. Institutionally sanctioned
signs of the real are substituted for the real itself,
which Baudrillard calls the simulation model.
For Baudrillard, the simulacrum is the domi-
nant discourse of postmodernity. Reality has

become a product of the sign as a simulacrum of
the symbolic. Lived reality is reduced to sign value
and sign exchange. Designer capitalism of the
simulacra designates, abstracts, and rationalizes a
separate sphere that devalues its actual referent.
The “real” of the sign is therefore imaginary, a
phantasm or “reality-effect” that overrides the
symbolic as lived, yet unsignifiable reality. There is
no longer any obligation or recourse to any legiti-
mate ground or any presuppositions of resem-
blance outside simulacra’s own immanent effects.
Reality is submitted to the repetitions of its codes.
The simulation model of the simulacra is judged
strictly on its performative value—namely, how
well the model operates given that it produces its
own heuristic truth that is confirmed through its
operation. Because the code of the simulacra
answers only to its own functionality, those who
control the code can easily fall into a cynicism.
Manipulating the code is what the “real” is all
about, which has shown to be true with such fraud
scandals as Enron and WorldCom that are just tips
of these floating global icebergs. Profit margins are
to be manipulated to keep up with the market
shares to ensure investment and trust in the com-
pany. Baudrillard maintains that this loss of the
symbolic “scene” results in obscenity where the
excesses of overexposure, overrepresentation and
oversignification fall into an all-too-visible realm,
whereby the rule of “disenchanted simulacra”
drains desire from reality, presenting us with a
hypervisible, pornographic, exhibitionistic, and
banal reality to which we have nothing to add. The
real is faced not as something living, but as some-
thing dead.
Deleuzian Simulacra
Deleuze develops a more positive notion of the
simulacra in a surprising way: He recognizes its
disruptive powers. The history of the simulacrum
is also the history of the image and its reception.
The power of the image in the West has long been
recognized as a threat to the real (to reality) as
being truly demonic, taking hold of the viewer’s
psyche. Every effort is made to limit its efficacy, to
banish this side of it as an “evil demon,” and
domesticate it as a “good” reflective image. The
image as copy participates in or acquires the prop-
erties of the represented. However briefly, it
Simulacra 733
becomes “real.” Mimesis therefore transforms the
imitational image into the original. The erasure of
distinction threatens the original and all the
authority associated with it. For instance, anthro-
pologists noted that upon seeing their photographs,
aboriginal people felt that their souls (as their
imagined double) had been captured and stolen
from them. The Judeo-Christian separation of
sacred and profane—Christ as God made flesh—
enabled a psychic way to subdue this “pagan”
belief in the demonic threat of the image by seeing
(imaging and imagining) the material world as a
deficient reality compared with the purified tran-
scendental sacred realm. The image could no lon-
ger attain its “real” idol-like status, but became
subject to mediation and reflection. Because of the
image’s nihilistic power to unground all founda-
tions for truth and falsity, it threatens to overturn
ontological and epistemological traditions that
ground the West. Deleuze therefore identifies this
effect as being positive in the way a model or
privileged position is challenged. The simulacrum
contains a positive that negates both the original
and bad copy, both model and reproduction, thus
removing the possibility of distinction between
truth and falsity.
For Friedrich Nietzsche, the murder of our tran-
scendent guarantor of meaning, value, and signifi-
cance (be it God or Science) leads to the nihilism of
a cold, empty universe, but the saving grace is a
will to power associated with his notion of the
eternal return. Deleuze latches on to this idea by
evoking the “powers of the false” as another name
for this will to power, which the simulacrum can
evoke by producing an effect that subverts the icon
and the world of representation. This positive
simulation is described in terms of Nietzsche’s
eternal return. Artists, in this sense, are placed in a
privilege position, creating simulacra for the poten-
tial of becoming through their will-to-deceive.
Artists play with appearances—selecting, correct-
ing, redoubling, and affirming them to produce a
“truth affect.” Truth itself becomes an appear-
ance. Each repetition does not necessarily lead to
sameness but introduces difference by extracting a
potential that is already immanent within the
representation.
The “power of the false” has no being on its
own: It is not grounded in any teleological truth or
origin. It is merely an appearance that passes from
734 Social Capital
one repetition to another by becoming other than
itself. There is a certain self-enjoyment in such
repetitive expression and self-invention. This is not
a nihilistic gesture, for it frees the artist from the
supposed stable identities and essences that consti-
tute the “true’” world. Through the false, which
becomes possible through the creation of images
or masks, the powers for transformation of an
object, a historical role or a collective institution,
begin to emerge. The eternal return that marks a
difference is therefore a revelatory procedure,
although the narrative is not fully known, it is a
thought of the future. Thus, such a notion of the
simulacra overcomes the original as well as the
good and bad copy as Plato envisioned them in
the distance from which they participate in the
transcendental ideal forms.
Deleuze’s appropriation of Nietzsche overturns
Plato and celebrates appearance over any form of
idealism. For Nietzsche, there is no image that can-
not be subverted by difference and divergence;
there is no identity that is so well-grounded that it
is not haunted by masks that can virtually exploit
the potential that is as yet unactualized—the
power to become someone else, assume another
role, and so on. An actor can repeat a role only by
playing other roles, each repetition being a theatri-
cal space that offers an expression for potential
metamorphosis. The experience of repetition of
the simulacrum becomes the masked return of dif-
ference. The simulacrum’s true nature is therefore
the potential for variation and displacement that
haunt it.
Closeness of the Two Positions
It may well be said that the Baudrillard and Deleuze
notions of the simulacra in the end come together
in their own mutual ways when maintaining that
appearances can be positive for change through
imperceptible difference. With Deleuze, this is by
appropriating the Nietzschean notion of the eter-
nal return and the “powers of false.” For
Baudrillard, it becomes the order of seduction as a
way of mastering the realm of appearances in a
game of signs, creating a symbolic relationship
with other participants or witnesses, with the order
of appearances or with the world itself. Baudrillard
pits an “enchanted simulation” against the “disen-
chanted simulacrum” that hegemonically rules the
order of truth. The former turns the “evil forces”
of appearance against the order of truth. Further,
Baudrillard also rejected any simple empirical
methodology. This would be an impossibility given
his characterization of hyperreality. Hence, he too
advocated a theory of the false, maintaining that
theory should not be true, but should provoke
antagonistic opposition of its own making. Such a
position follows the creative use of philosophy
Deleuze advocated bringing both positions close to
one another when it comes to the affirmation of
simulacra.
jan jagodzinski
See also Gaze; Scopophilia; Visualizing Desire
Further Readings
Baudrillard, J. (1994). Simulacra and simulation. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Deleuze, G. (1983). Plato and the simulacrum. October,
27, 45–56.
Deleuze, G. (1994). Difference and repetition (P. Patton,
Trans.). London: Athlone Press.
Merrin, W. (2005). Baudrillard and the media: A critical
introduction. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Zurbrugg, N. (Ed.). (1997). Jean Baudrillard: Art and
artefact. London: Sage.
Social Capital
Social capital is a popular interdisciplinary con-
cept, and yet its origin, meaning, use, and value
are highly contested. To begin with, many attri-
bute the origin of social capital to either U.S.
political scientist Robert Putnam or French sociolo-
gist Pierre Bourdieu. In his renowned text Bowling
Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community, however, Putnam credits the term
social capital to scholars that long preceded his
time, including Lyda J. Hanifan, Yves Dubé, J. E.
Howes, D. L. McQueen, Jane Jacobs, Glenn
Loury, Pierre Bourdieu, and James Coleman.
Although the term social capital was used far
before the works of Putnam and even Bourdieu,
Bourdieu is most often accredited with bringing
the term into use in the field of sociology. One’s

identity status influences one’s social capital,
whether social capital is conceived in terms of
what social organizations or networks one is
allowed to join, or how one can function within
these groups.
The Meanings of Social Capital
The meaning of social capital varies depending on
the approach of authors using the term in their
work. Just recently via a thorough review of socio-
logical research, Gregory M. Fulkerson and
Gretchen H. Thompson identified two overarching
positions in the conceptual debate: (1) normative
social capitalists and (2) resource social capitalists.
Normative social capitalists fall in alignment with
the works of Coleman, who conceptualized social
capital with strong regard to social organization at
the macrolevels of community and civil society.
Strongly influenced by Coleman, this position on
social capital is thought to underscore community
development, engagement, and action. In essence,
by having a shared stake in social capital, commu-
nity members and communities work together for
mutual benefit. In 1988, Coleman described social
capital as a means for actors (individuals or corpo-
rations) to control certain resources and share a
vested interest in those resources. In this context,
social capital is considered a valuable and produc-
tive entity. Coleman also described social capital
as depending on trust and obligations held among
actors; for Coleman forms of social capital include
but are not limited to information that facilitates
potential action, cultural norms, and joint obliga-
tions and expectations.
Expanding Coleman’s conceptualization, Robert
Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti
highlight elements of social capital that play an
exceptionally strong role in civically engaged com-
munities, including trust, values, norms of reciproc-
ity, and networks. Operating from this perspective,
social bonds (i.e., social capital) are instrumental in
any given community movement to achieve partic-
ular goals or overcome specific struggles. For
example, if a community wants to take action
against local crime, the presence of social capital is
thought to make the process and the outcome of
taking action far more productive. In this sense,
social capital is likely to influence community liveli-
hood and, by subsequent relation, individual life
Social Capital 735
opportunity as well. Given the focus on macrocon-
texts espoused by normative social capitalists,
social capital in this sense can also be extended to
understanding how states, regions, and even nations
collectively operate. In the global sense, these
authors also note how the lack of social capital can
inhibit a region’s ability to effectively contribute to
and draw from a dynamic economy.
By comparison, resource social capitalists fall in
alignment with the works of Bourdieu who con-
ceptualized social capital as a means to access and
distribute power and privilege at the microlevel.
The basic premise of Bourdieu’s argument was
that the structure and functioning of the hierarchi-
cal social world cannot be fully understood with-
out considering how capital operates among
individuals. Therefore, whereas normative social
capitalists take a communal approach toward
social capital, resource social capitalists highlight
how social capital creates and maintains structures
of inequality through individual and subsequently
collective access to capital. For Bourdieu, the sig-
nificance of social capital is rooted in its emphasis
on the role of others in the determination of self-
worth. As such, individuals with access to social
capital belong to groups of people who via rela-
tional networks share their capital. Thus, the value
of one’s social capital depends on the number of
connections an individual can secure, along with
the capital that each member of a group has. In
this context, social capital is endlessly reproduced
by social exchange and often via power, protected
by gatekeepers to limit who has access. Given the
value of social capital, it can be used to barter for
and attain additional forms of capital (i.e., cultural
or economic) as well. In a similar vein, Alejandro
Portes offers three aspects of social capital closely
related to Bourdieu’s initial conceptualization:
(1) social control (i.e., power), (2) family-mediated
benefits, and (3) access to nonfamily networks. To
offer an additional differentiation between norma-
tive social capitalists and resource social capital-
ists, social capital is an attribute of the individual
accrued via small group networks for the latter,
whereas for the former, social capital is an attri-
bute of the community itself.
Although Fulkerson and Thompson label and
highlight the respective differences between what
they term normative social capitalists and resource
social capitalists, definitive lines have not been
736 Social Capital
drawn in the field of sociology or elsewhere. Thus,
there are notable similarities between the scholars
whose work has fueled the use of social capital as
a means to critique individuals at the microlevel or
communities at the macrolevel. For example, both
Bourdieu and Coleman conceptualized social capi-
tal in relation to the shared resources among indi-
viduals and families. In addition, both Coleman
and Putnam advocated for social capital to be
applied in the understanding of larger social com-
munities, social structures, and civic engagement.
Furthermore, most authors who rely upon social
capital as a means to examine lived experience,
social realities, and social organizations agree that
social capital greatly affects levels of agency and
the quality of life.
Social Capital Remains Contested
Despite numerous scholars who have attempted to
refine and clearly conceptualize—and, in many
instances, may agree about the meaning of—social
capital, this term remains highly contested for a
variety of different reasons. Disagreements about
the origin and meanings of social capital remain,
and strong critiques of the value and use of social
capital have arisen as well. For example, Portes
calls for scholars to resist assuming that social
capital has a steadily positive impact on individu-
als or communities. Hence, group solidarity and
social support are not always positive in intent or
outcome. In a similar vein, in a book titled The
Rise of the Creative Class: And How It’s
Transforming Work, Leisure, Community, and
Everyday Life, Richard Florida cautions against
“bonding” social capital, which can stymie com-
munity innovation when groups become too
homogenous and exclusive.
Articulations of Social
Capital Beyond Sociology
Social capital has been conceptualized to examine
diverse phenomena in several different fields
including but not limited to education, politics,
economics, urban development, sport, and vio-
lence. For example, in the field of education social
capital has been applied to student achievement,
faculty promotion, and tenure for scholars of
color. Social capital has also been used in the realm
of politics to evaluate political participation and
civic engagement. Taking the economic route,
researchers have used social capital to explore eco-
nomic growth and development in metropolitan
areas and poverty as well. Likewise, others have
explored social capital in the context of sport as it
relates to trust, building community, and civic
engagement. Social capital (or the lack thereof) has
also been identified by researchers as an important
factor in parenting styles, relationships, and family
violence. Extending the discussion of social capital
further, in The Dynamics of Violence in Central
Africa, Rene Lemarchand addresses how social
capital has played a role in the violent and geno-
cidal conditions in North Kivu.
Additional Forms of Capital
Scholars such as Bourdieu and Coleman theorized
additional forms of capital (i.e., economic and cul-
tural/human capital) that work in tandem with
social capital. Along with the conceptualization of
social capital, Bourdieu also articulated cultural and
economic capital. Cultural capital (a similar concep-
tualization is referred to as “human capital” by
Coleman) may exist in three different states: embod-
ied, objectified, or institutionalized. Embodied cul-
tural capital refers to personal characteristics housed
within an individual such as knowledge or determi-
nation. Objectified cultural capital takes on mate-
rial or symbolic form such as talent. Institutionalized
cultural capital entails an institutional recognition
of power such as a degree certification or skill
endorsement. By comparison, economic capital was
defined as that which can immediately be trans-
formed into money and may or may not be institu-
tionalized as property rights. For Bourdieu, all three
forms of capital that he proposed (i.e., social, eco-
nomic, and cultural) are mitigating factors of equal-
ity, opportunity, and access. Furthermore, Bourdieu
argued that all forms of capital are derived from
economic capital and can (under certain conditions)
be transformed into economic capital. Generally
speaking across multiple works, the forms of capital
provide a language to discuss various indications of
worth that influence people’s lives.
Rachel A. Griffin
See also Civic Identity; Cultural Capital; Culture;
Diversity

Further Readings
Bourdieu, P. (1997). The forms of capital. In
N. W. Biggart (Ed.), Readings in economic sociology
(pp. 280–291). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Coleman, J. S. (1993). Social capital in the creation of
human capital. American Journal of Sociology, 94,
S95–S120.
Fulkerson, G. M., & Thompson, G. H. (2008). The
evolution of a contested concept: A meta-analysis of
social capital definitions and trends (1988–2006).
Sociological Inquiry, 78(4), 536–557.
Portes, A. (1998). Social capital: Its origins and
applications in modern sociology. Annual Sociology,
24(1), 1–24.
Putnam, R. (2002). Bowling alone: The collapse and
revival of American community. New York: Simon &
Schuster.
Putnam, R., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R. (1993). Making
democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Social Comparison Theory
Generally speaking, as one of many theories and
concepts dedicated to understanding the self,
social comparison theory can be described as a
sociological framework that addresses the com-
plex process of self-evaluation to further one’s
understanding of one’s identity. This entry begins
with a historical overview and then discusses his-
torical and current understandings and applica-
tions of social comparison theory.
Historical Overview
The formal articulation of social comparison the-
ory can be traced back to Leon Festinger who
published an article titled “A Theory of Social
Comparison Processes” in 1954 that called atten-
tion to the ways that self-knowledge and social
knowledge are connected. More specifically, peo-
ple learn and draw conclusions about who they are
by comparing themselves with who they perceive
other people to be. Festinger’s original essay and a
subsequent symposium paper titled “Motivation
Leading to Social Behavior” placed specific empha-
sis on how comparison information was used
rather than on how comparison information was
Social Comparison Theory 737
acquired. In his original works, Festinger examined
how people socially evaluated their opinions and
abilities compared with similar others (rather than
dissimilar others) when there was a lack of objec-
tive information to base comparisons on. He noted
that dissimilar others were not used for social com-
parison to generate accurate information about the
self. Likewise, those who were selected for com-
parison represented similarities along abilities,
opinions, and characteristics that were deemed
relevant by the person drawing comparisons. At
the foundation of Festinger’s early work was the
assertion that people have the desire to perform
well, rather than worse than or even equal to, com-
pared with similar others. Within his theoretical
premise, he also highlighted how pressures toward
uniformity were relevant as well. In essence, being
similar to, in alignment with, or competitive with
those held in high regard as representatives of what
is good, correct, or appropriate fosters positive
perceptions of the self. Essentially, these individu-
als serve as favorable role models to whom the
comparer wants to measure up.
Although Festinger’s original essay was rela-
tively overlooked for a number of years and
sparked only a minimal amount of scholarly
research, social comparison theory resurfaced in
1966 with an issue of the Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology dedicated to its examination.
The first book on social comparison theory titled
Social Comparison Processes: Theoretical and
Empirical Perspectives, edited by social psycholo-
gists Jerry Suls and Richard Miller, emerged
11 years after the special issue. Since these two
major publications, social comparison theory has
become a staple in social psychological research.
Understandings of Social Comparison Theory
At the foundation of social comparison theory is
the desire to succeed in implicit or explicit compe-
tition with others as a means to engage in identity
formation. Reflecting on William James’s histori-
cal essay on the self, Suls asserts that people engage
in social comparison only when the element being
compared is salient to their self-definition. Although
these two points of emphasis are rooted in
Festinger’s work, which remains highly acclaimed,
social comparison theory has since been extended
in many ways. Inspired by his work, researchers
738 Social Comparison Theory
have examined the desire for self-enhancement and
the desire for self-improvement as motivating factors
for individuals to engage in social comparison in
addition to Festinger’s emphasis on self-evaluation.
The roots of social comparison theory also highlight
how individuals evaluate their opinions and abili-
ties via social comparison and were substantially
extended to include comparisons of affiliation,
fear, threat, and emotion by Stanley Schachter in
1959. For example, Schachter’s work indicated
that social comparisons were used by individuals
to ascertain whether their affective responses were
appropriate in specific situations. In addition to
the inroads made regarding what people tend to
compare, research has also indicated that com-
parisons can be made at the individual level (micro)
as personal comparisons or at the group level
(macro) as categorical comparisons. When engag-
ing in group comparisons, evaluations may be
intragroup (comparisons within a particular group)
or intergroup (comparisons between two groups).
Researchers have also termed the need for social
comparison information as social comparison
orientation.
The outcomes of social comparison often entail
self-judgments, either favorable or unfavorable.
People seek comparisons for characteristics, skills,
opinions, abilities, and so forth that are salient to
them and heavily desire the evaluation to result in
a favorable outcome for themselves. However,
in the case of a negative comparison outcome in
which an individual’s result is unfavorable, Brenda
Major, Maria Testa, and Wayne H. Bylsma assert
that levels of perceived control over the character-
istic or ability being socially evaluated in accor-
dance with others will influence self-blame. For
example, if someone loses their health insurance
because they become unemployed, the amount of
self-blame will likely be influenced by the contex-
tual circumstances (e.g., bad economy, being fired,
quitting) surrounding their job loss.
Downward and Upward Social Comparisons
Festinger’s original work has also led to the differ-
entiation between downward and upward compari-
sons. Downward comparisons, originating with the
work of Tom Wills in 1981, occur when individuals
select people to judge themselves against who are
likely not to fare well to increase the individuals’
subjective well-being. Wills argues that the likeli-
hood of such comparisons increases when someone
perceives threat or is experiencing stress. Individuals
engage in downward comparisons to feel better
about their abilities, opinions, or social standing.
Therefore, people with low levels of self-esteem or
self-confidence are more likely to make downward
comparisons because comparing one’s self with
someone who is less fortunate or who is socially
positioned as inferior is often used to increase one’s
sense of well-being, self-esteem, and self-confidence
while decreasing one’s sense of risk, inadequacy, or
vulnerability. In this vein, although a highly con-
tested area of social comparison research, down-
ward comparisons can also be understood as coping
mechanisms for personal struggles such as disease,
addiction, and destructive behaviors. Beyond Wills’s
early work, the examination of downward com-
parisons is often found in research that addresses
stereotyping, fear, perceived threat, humor, or
scapegoating. Although downward comparisons
have been associated with feeling better about one-
self, more secure, and experiencing uplifted moods,
downward comparisons do not necessarily change
social standing, levels of ability, or levels of correct-
ness. Thus, although a person may feel better about
himself or herself, the salient characteristic of com-
parison is likely to remain the same.
In contrast to downward comparisons, upward
comparisons entail individuals comparing them-
selves with someone who embodies a salient aspect
of the comparer’s identity. For example, if a male
youth aspires to be a professional basketball player,
then he may evaluate his athletic talents in com-
parison with an athlete he greatly admires. In this
context, although upward comparisons may seem
self-defeating, such comparisons can serve as a
source of positive inspiration in group affiliation,
role models, access to information, and self-
improvement. More specifically, upward compari-
sons can be a source of positive esteem because
individuals tend to seek and expect to find markers
of congruence between themselves and the admired
social other. Therefore, in this example, the male
youth may lay claim to the similarities he perceives
between himself and his idol; perhaps they come
from similar neighborhoods and excel at the same
special move on the court. Researchers indicate that
upward comparisons in U.S. society are virtually
unavoidable and thus arguably forced because
 Social Constructionist Approach to Personal Identity
members of the upper classes, such as celebrities,
are highly visible via social institutions such as the
media.
Examination of the Self
Since its inception, social comparison theory has
been closely linked with theories of attribution,
affiliation, appraisal, reflected appraisal, equity,
social identity theory, and self-categorization the-
ory and, perhaps most notably, is quite relevant to
Festinger’s later work, which generated the theory
of cognitive dissonance. In an article titled “Social
Comparison Theory: Psychology from the Lost and
Found,” George R. Goethals positions Festinger’s
original work and subsequent publications in the
myriad of theories and concepts dedicated to
understanding the self, including but not limited to
self-concept, self-perception, self-attribution, self-
awareness, self-schemata, self-esteem, self-appraisal,
and self-image. To generate self-understanding via
the examination of social comparison, methods
used include but are not limited to comparison
selection, reaction effects, ratings, narrative, and
social comparison records maintained by research
participants.
Contemporary Applications
of Social Comparison Theory
In recent years, social comparison theory has
become far more interdisciplinary. Researchers
have extended its reach beyond social psychology
to areas such as education, physical appearance,
health, and media. For example, in Bullying in
American Schools, Dorothy L. Espelage and Susan
M. Swearer link social comparison theory to the
possible reasons why bystanders typically do not
intervene in bullying situations. In addition,
researchers have addressed the role of social com-
parison theory in relation to body image, eating
disorders, and media representation. See, for
example, Body Image: Understanding Body
Dissatisfaction in Men, Women, and Children by
Sarah Grogan and The Media and Body Image: If
Looks Could Kill by Maggie Wykes and Barrie
Gunter. A significant amount of research regard-
ing the relationship between health and social
comparison looks particularly at breast cancer and
the role of support groups in treatment and the
739
role of social comparison in decisions regarding
the risks of AIDS/HIV and safe sex. Finally, take,
for instance Adolescents, Media and the Law by
Roger Levesque, which specifically highlights the
role of social comparison theory relative to the
media and adolescent development.
Rachel A. Griffin
See also Cognitive Dissonance Theory; Collective/Social
Identity; Self-Affirmation Theory; Self-Image; Social
Identity Theory
Further Readings
Festinger, L. (1954). Motivation leading to social
behavior. In M. R. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska symposium
on motivation, 1954. Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press.
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison
processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140.
Suls, J. (1986). Notes on the occasion of social
comparison theory’s thirtieth birthday. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12(3), 289–296.
Suls, J., & Miller, R. L. (Eds.). (1977). Social comparison
processes: Theoretical and empirical perspectives.
Washington, DC: Hemisphere.
Suls, J., & Wheeler, L. (2000). A selective history of
classic and neo-social comparison theory. In J. Suls &
L. Wheeler (Eds.), Handbook of social comparison:
Theory and research (pp. 3–19). New York: Kluwer
Academic/Plenum.
Wills, T. A. (1986). Discussion remarks on social
comparison theory. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 12(3), 282–288.
Social Constructionist
Approach to Personal Identity
A social constructionist perspective conceives that
personal identity is established within the percep-
tion of self as derived from thoughtful reflection on
communicative interactions between oneself and
others from the societal environment. With a prag-
matic approach and drawing from the work of
George Herbert Mead, among others, social con-
structionists assume that significant communication
is coordinated meaning among individuals where
each can take the perspective of the other regarding
740 Social Constructionist Approach to Personal Identity
his or her own gestures and symbols. Where this
reflexive objectification of the self occurs, personal
identity is uniquely socialized, and one chooses how
to live within society. Identity is not static, but
evolves throughout life in ongoing, dynamic social
interaction. The conceptual framework of personal
identity includes social construction of identity via
the generalized other, communication, the I and me
of identity, and the evolution of identity throughout
a life span, resulting in an accumulated identity with
many roles within a society.
Personal Identity as Socially Constructed
Personal identity is not a priori, but is formed
through interactions with the social world.
Experiencing the attitudes, values, and beliefs of
the social community, known as the generalized
other, precedes the establishment of one’s personal
identity with particular and unique attitudes, val-
ues, and beliefs. While one interacts within a soci-
etal context, one encounters the norms of a given
social environment (the generalized other), which
can call one to reflect on the perspective of those
norms and decide whether to align with them or to
function otherwise than social convention.
Encountering the generalized other allows a per-
son to experience who he or she is as a person.
From one social context to another, a person elects
elements to take on as part of his or her personal
identity from a multiplicity of perspectives. Through
each encounter with another, an individual reflects
on himself or herself as a person and how others
view him or her. Other persons’ perspectives can be
imagined, and adjustment to one’s own self is con-
stituted to form a unique and personal identity.
Humans, unlike others in the animal species, are
capable of reflecting on their own identities and the
impression made upon other humans. In doing so,
objectification of the self occurs, placing reflexivity
as a pragmatic skill of viewing oneself as if from the
standpoint of others where one grasps or under-
stands the perspective of the other. In this social
interaction, self-realization of identity is processed
and a person comes to know who he or she is.
Communication, Play, and Game
Through communicating with significant others,
playing, and participating in games, children begin
to make sense of who they are. When children are
born, their personal identities are not present; as
significant symbols and gestures are learned and
others communicate with children, identities begin
to form. Identities cannot develop without experi-
encing others through communication and then
reflecting upon these social interactions. Play is a
medium for children’s imaginations to use these
symbols and gestures while children’s capability of
taking the role of another develops. So, as children
pretend to be firefighters, doctors, or Indiana
Jones, they are playing the role of another. With
maturity, children begin to organize the various
roles they choose to play and how to act within the
greater community. The set of rules of how to act
within each role is, in a sense, the game. Humans
are socialized to play the game of life in their
respective communities while attaining their own
identities within that community with respect to
others. The rules of game playing and appropriate
interactions with others are established within a
societal context, and social norms constitute the
generalized other. In games, individuals cooperate
with others and learn how to interact effectively by
reflecting on perspectives of others, learning to
think as others think, and playing the game. In
childhood, these actions of communication, play,
and games are foundational to identity formation
and continue into adulthood. Unlike a chameleon
that changes with every new environment, per-
sonal identity is anchored in attitudes, beliefs, and
values developed over one’s youth. Then, with
every new social interaction, personal identity
evolves as one reflects on new encounters and
decides what values, virtues, and characteristics to
accept or reject.
Personal Identity as
Comprising the I and the Me
Identity is not just a reflection of the generalized
other, but a result of the individual’s decision
about who he or she will be and the role he or she
will play given the attitudes of others. Therefore,
personal identity comprises both a me and an I.
The me is the part of an individual that accepts the
ideas of the social context—the generalized other—
and chooses to conform to the accumulation
of social norms, patterns, and unconscious opin-
ions of the social environment. The I is a person’s
 Social Constructionist Approach to Personal Identity
individuality with his or her own reflection and
creative opinion. The I of a person’s identity
reflects on the attitudes of the generalized other,
but does not merely accept these attitudes because
the I is a person’s distinctiveness and what sets him
or her apart from others. The me conforms and
plays the game of their social community, whereas
the I stimulates the creative and novel impulses of
the self. The me is socially aware of the appropri-
ateness of interactions within each social situation,
and the I is spontaneous. Together, the combina-
tion of me and I form personal identity where a
unique individual dwells and constitutes part of
the larger social community.
A person can only come to know his or her dis-
tinctiveness by reflecting on past encounters and
noticing his or her reactions to the general social
norms of the situation. Identity is objectified and
comprehended as a temporal historical dimension.
In other words, an individual comes to understand
himself or herself, his or her identity, by remem-
bering the responses of the I to the me. A person
views his or her past actions and assesses who he
or she is—his or her personal identity.
Personal Identity Evolves Over the
Life Span and Many Roles Are Played
Personal identity emerges socially and is the prod-
uct of social interaction; therefore, identity devel-
ops over the life span through the process of
interacting with others—communicating—in the
social world. As adults, individuals have an under-
lying sense of who they are—a sense that does not
change noticeably—unless epiphanies are encoun-
tered. Epiphanies are social experiences that are so
salient that enlightenment or crisis brings about
adjustments in how individuals think of them-
selves. As individuals communicate with others
from various contexts and situations, they make
reflective assessments of their own identity. All
their experiences, beliefs, values, goals, interests,
and reflections are accumulative and aid in assess-
ing new social encounters with others where per-
sonal identity is confronted. When individuals
communicate with others, reflect on these novel
interactions, and assess the exchanges according to
past experiences, personal identities evolve.
An individual is not confined to interact with only
one generalized other; therefore, communication
741
with various others results in identity continually
evolving. A person is not helpless in the process of
his or her developing identity; a choice is made to
accept or reject changes to one’s identity as one
interacts with others. The skill of taking the per-
spective of the other is developed as one communi-
cates, plays games, and reflects on how others view
him or her. Social roles in society are learned by
observing others and then deciding to accept or
reject what is observed. One’s identity is a compi-
lation of many roles. As such, one does not change
with every passing whim but because humans are
flexible and can take the perspective of others, one
selects and plays the role that is suitable for the
particular situation and moment in history. Situated
within the context of the moment, one expresses
an identity that is appropriate.
Society and the Social Act
Society is not a collection of static individuals but
comprises a whole set of evolving individuals who
are in a process of becoming. Individuals within a
society learn who they are by participating with
others in their social worlds. Society shapes an
individual’s identity as the person chooses to coor-
dinate with the others within society through the
social act.
The social act is the process by which one acts
toward an object while perceiving the perspective
that others have toward the same object. With this
ability, a person is capable of coordinating mean-
ing with others and assessing the perspective of the
other toward himself or herself. An individual
within the social act finds meaning while realizing
the perspective of the other, then decides how to
act from this knowing. A social act spans from the
simple interaction of two persons (e.g., playing
chess or baking cookies) or many together (e.g.,
constructing a bridge or playing soccer) or the com-
plex interactions of social organizations and com-
munities (e.g., postal service or environmental
awareness). A person assesses how others are react-
ing to his or her own actions and communication
and takes the perspective of others regarding what
they think. Consequently, an individual changes
himself or herself or his or her ideas to conform to
a social counterpart, resulting in evolution of per-
sonal identity. Key to taking the role of the other is
the generation of self-consciousness and knowing
742 Social Constructivist Approach to Political Identity
one’s own personal identity. The notion of social
act is key to social construction with the following
scholars functioning as exemplars of the interplay
between social construction and identity.
Erving Goffman used the scenario that the
social actor operates on a stage with props and
plays to a particular audience. In this case, the
social actor performs on the front stage while
interacting with others; however, the actor also
can withdraw to a back stage where his or her
identity remains out of the view of others. While
on stage, each actor performs with other actors in
unique ways.
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann were the
first scholars to coin the term social construction
with their proposition that knowledge and people’s
conception of what reality is (i.e., meaning) arises
from people interacting with one another over
time. Typifications are formed that eventually
become habitualized into reciprocal roles played in
relation to each other. Meaning and the way peo-
ple define themselves (personal identity) occurs
through a dialectical and reflexive relationship
between individuals and society.
Kenneth Gergen refers to the relational self as
occurring when a person loses his or her own per-
sonal identity to seeing the self and his or her iden-
tity in terms of the rendezvous with those
surrounding them. For the relational self, the tra-
ditional view of identity created between the indi-
vidual and society is replaced with an emphasis on
the individual’s relationships with others.
Conclusion
Personal identity develops and evolves as an indi-
vidual internalizes the attitudes of the generalized
other and makes them his or her own. This social
process occurs through significant communication,
play, and the game. The I and the me live in a
dynamic relationship with one another, and iden-
tity emerges from the social encounters where
ideas of I and me are negotiated. The I restructures
the me with every ongoing interaction with soci-
ety. With every interaction, both individual auton-
omy and social norms are essential for the emerging
personal identity. Identity is the by-product of
social construction.
Naomi Bell O’Neil
See also Development of Identity; Development of Self-
Concept; Face/Facework; Looking-Glass Self;
Psychology of Self and Identity; Reflexive Self or
Reflexivity; Socialization; Symbolic Interactionism
Further Readings
Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social
construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of
knowledge. New York: Anchor Books.
Gergen, K. (1991). The saturated self: Dilemmas of
identity in contemporary life. New York: Basic Books.
Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday
life. New York: Doubleday.
Gubrium, J., & Holstein, J. A. (2000). The self we live
by: Narrative identity in a postmodern world. New
York: Oxford University Press.
James, W. (1948). Psychology. Cleveland, OH: World
Publishing.
Kelley, E. C. (1977). The fully functioning self. In
J. Stewart (Ed.), Bridges not walls (pp. 106–117).
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Social Constructivist
Approach to Political Identity
A social constructivist approach to political iden-
tity assumes that we create realities—and make
these realities meaningful—by way of interaction.
We come to know society by interacting with cul-
turally significant others (such as parents, teach-
ers, and doctors), institutions (such as churches,
schools, and governments), and symbolic uni-
verses (such as capitalism, patriarchy, and
Christianity). The approach frames knowledge as
learned, situational, and fallible, and, as such, par-
tial, consequential, and sometimes problematic.
Social constructivists attend to the processes in
which realities—and knowledge of these realities—
are developed by, maintained by, and transmitted
to cultural members. Social constructivists focus
on the ways in which a group’s beliefs, attitudes,
and practices metaphorically crystallize into objec-
tive, authorless, seemingly natural and seemingly
necessary matters of fact. By way of socialization,
these matters, consequentially, also come to be

perceived of as correct, valuable, normal, and
therefore, unquestionable; they become phenom-
ena we must understand and negotiate to be per-
ceived as competent, legitimate cultural members.
A social constructivist approach to identity rec-
ognizes that we experience life being particular
kinds of people. These kinds often take the form of
categories and are kinds both personally chosen
and determined by culturally significant others,
institutions, and symbolic universes. Categories
influence how we interpret ourselves and others,
and when we do not enact the appropriate charac-
teristics relevant to the kinds of people we claim or
are perceived to be, questioning, conflict, and rela-
tional strife can result.
We come to understand ourselves by the catego-
ries of people always already present in the culture(s)
in which we’re immersed, and we learn, via interac-
tion, how to and why we fit particular labels.
However, we can never know, definitively and
completely, what categories others may demand of
us or what kinds of people others will consider us
as; we can try to pass as particular kinds of persons
but may not succeed or know if we succeeded. And
even though we may consider some categories piv-
otal to our being, this does not mean that others
will recognize these categories always and every-
where or that we will forever consider these catego-
ries pivotal. A social constructivist approach to
identity thus recognizes that identity requires con-
stant care and negotiation, and understands that
the kinds of people we claim or are perceived to be
can change with context and relationship.
The kinds of people we claim or are perceived
to be can influence interpretations of what we say
and do, perceptions of our character, and how we
are evaluated; who speaks affects what is said and
who listens influences who speaks, what is spoken
about, and how a speaker and her or his discourse
is perceived. These sense-making processes around
identity—the interpretations, perceptions, and
evaluations that correspond to claiming or being
perceived as a particular kind of person—are what
make identity political.
Political Implications
From a social constructivist approach, making
identity political means asking what happens when
we claim or are perceived to be a particular kind of
Social Constructivist Approach to Political Identity 743
person: What material circumstances develop or
shift, what assessments are made, what opportuni-
ties are gained or lost, what relationships begin or
end. It means discerning the consequences and ben-
efits of identifying, or being identified, as belong-
ing to certain categories. It means recognizing that
we, as different kinds of people, have different dis-
cursive baggage—different histories, prejudices,
perspectives. And it means recognizing that when
we are marked as a particular kind of person, we
can be evaluated based on this kind’s baggage as
well as on how this baggage is understood.
Consider, for instance, the categories of female
and male. When we enter society, culturally sig-
nificant others, institutions, and symbolic universes
classify us as one or the other. We must understand
and negotiate these categories to be perceived as
competent and legitimate cultural members, and
the labels will follow us throughout our existence
regardless of what we say or do; we cannot live
outside of or uninfluenced by the female-male clas-
sificatory system. These categories often seem
objective, authorless, seemingly natural, and neces-
sary, and, consequentially, are often perceived as
correct, valuable, normal, and unquestionable.
When this happens—when sex is perceived as
correct, valuable, normal, and unquestionable—
then a person who does not align nicely with the
appropriate sex-requirements—the interpretations,
perceptions, and evaluations of how persons should
be sexed—can experience questioning, conflict, and
relational strife as a result. Babies born with charac-
teristics of both sexes may undergo corrective surgery,
and persons who do not enact appropriate feminine
and masculine behaviors that correspond to their
(classified-at-birth) sex may be physically harmed,
fired from jobs, forced into traumatic therapeutic
situations, or ostracized by friends and family. Such
acts are what make sex, as an identity, political.
The act of categorizing also makes interpreta-
tions, perceptions, and evaluations of people pos-
sible. Categories that are binary (such as female
and male) function differently than do categories
that are not (such as Catholic, Baptist, and athe-
ist); in binaries, one term is usually privileged over
the other. For instance, across many contexts
within the United States, feminine traits are infe-
rior to masculine ones; blackness is made inferior
to whiteness; Western cultures are discursively
defined as better than those considered Eastern;
744 Social Constructivist Approach to Political Identity
heterosexuality is framed as a more beneficial
identity and preferred type of relationship than
homosexuality is; able-bodied-ness is referred to as
more valuable and productive and thus better than
disabled-ness; and young and youthful qualities
are better than old and aged things. Though each
term is not necessarily superior or inferior to its
binary-other, the terms used to define people can
have corresponding logics that influence how
people marked by such terms are understood.
The ways in which a category is understood can
also facilitate human interpretation, perception,
and evaluation. If a category is understood as
innate (and, consequently, unable to change), then
evaluating a person as good or bad, right or wrong
based on her or his identification with this category
becomes irrational, particularly because she or he
could not choose to be this kind of person (and
thus cannot be judged for identifying in this way).
Conversely, a person who claims, or is perceived,
to be an identity that is understood as innate may
negate her or his personal responsibility for engag-
ing in particular acts (that is, if she or he justifies
the acts as a result of being a kind of person).
Furthermore, if an identity is understood as innate—
particularly one rooted in genetics—then medical
intervention becomes possible; doctors can find
ways to change a person from one kind of (bad)
person to another (better, more normal) kind. And
eugenics and genocide—both attempts to control
the presence of a particular kind(s) of person—are
premised on the possibility that the targeted
population(s) is connected by blood, by biology.
However, if a category is understood as chosen
(and, consequently, conducive to change), the per-
son identifying with this category may be viewed
as having made a good or bad, right or wrong
choice. A person’s responsibility for acts related to
being this kind of person also become indisput-
able. Attempts to medically alter a person’s (cho-
sen) identity are futile as well (since the identity
lacks genetic roots), and eugenics and genocide are
unfathomable in that no shared biology or com-
mon blood exist among the undesired population(s);
a society can never be cleansed of the identity.
Real-World Example
The following real-world situation illustrates a
variety of assumptions about identity as well as
the ways in which identity can work in interaction.
It illustrates the importance of and consequences
for claiming to be, or being perceived to be, par-
ticular kinds of people. It illustrates that identity,
though often assumed to be something a person
possesses, is something others can influence and
decide. And this situation illustrates that identity
can change with context and relationship.
In 1952, Christie Littleton was born in San
Antonio, Texas. At this time, she was named Lee
Cavazos and classified as male. In 1977, she
legally changed her name from Lee to Christie Lee.
In 1979 and 1980 she underwent sex reassignment
surgery, and, in so doing, was able to legally
change her birth certificate from “male” to
“female.” In 1989, she married Jonathan Littleton
in Kentucky, a (legal) heterosexual consummation
that reinforced Christie’s female status (that is,
because same-sex marriages were, and are, illegal
in the state). In 1996, Jonathon died because of
medical error. In 1999, Christie, acting as
Jonathon’s spouse, filed a malpractice suit against
Mark Prange, the doctor responsible for the error.
In his defense, Prange argued that Christie was
and would always be male because of her original
sex-at-birth classification, and, as such, had no
right to marry a person of the same sex, and, as
such, could not file a suit as Jonathan’s (female)
spouse. The court ruled in favor of Prange, thus
invalidating the once-legal bond between Christie
and Jonathan, invalidating a bond often indicative
of legitimate commitment and love.
Markers Engaged
The understood innate- or chosen-ness of catego-
ries—and humans marked by these categories—
becomes political when such understanding
influences interpretations, perceptions, and evalua-
tions of people. For instance, the one-drop rule in
the United States categorized a person with non-
White (primarily African American) ancestry as
non-White. Such categorization understood race as
innate and rooted in biology. Consequentially,
such understanding fueled arguments against inter-
racial marriage, against the relational mixing of
blood. Or consider the example of Christie Littleton.
Even though Christie changed her name, under-
went sex-reassignment surgery, and got married—
acts that constituted her as female—understanding

sex as innate, as something incapable of change,
marked her as male.
A social constructivist approach to political
identity treats categories as phenomena with which
we must contend, embrace, and use for a variety of
purposes. Identity becomes something we can
manipulate and use for a variety of social pur-
poses; the approach allows us to learn ways of
positioning ourselves as particular kinds of people
while distancing ourselves from being marked as
something other.
A social constructivist approach to political
identity attends to the ways in which identities
emerge in unstable, slippery relational processes as
well as how these identities, and the humans
marked by these identities, are interpreted, per-
ceived, and evaluated.
A social constructivist approach to political
identity suggests that we can never know, com-
pletely or definitively, the ways in which innate or
chosen characteristics of an identity, and the
humans marked by this identity, affect interaction.
Rather, the approach maintains that, in interac-
tion, we can only infer another’s innate or chosen
characteristics. We cannot test another person’s
biology or blood to determine who she or he really
is nor can we engage in a rigorous, all-inclusive
analysis of the processes involved in her or his
coming to be a particular kind; all we can ever do
is attend to what might happen if and when a per-
son comes across as a certain kind of person at a
particular time and place.
A social constructivist approach to political
identity recognizes that the people we claim to be,
or are perceived to be, matter.
Tony E. Adams
See also Face/Facework; Identity Negotiation; Identity
Uncertainty; Masking; Passing; Queer Theory; Social
Constructionist Approach to Personal Identity; Society
and Social Identity
Further Readings
Adams, T. E. (2005). Speaking for others: Finding the
“whos” of discourse. Soundings, 88(3–4), 331–345.
Fenstermaker, S., & West, C. (Eds.). (2002). Doing
gender, doing difference: Inequality, power, and
institutional change. New York: Routledge.
Social Economy 745
Gergen, K. J. (2000). The saturated self: Dilemmas of
identity in contemporary life. New York: Basic Books.
Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday
life. New York: Doubleday.
Greenberg, J. A. (2000). When is a man a man, and when
is a woman a woman? Florida Law Review, 52,
745–768.
Hacking, I. (1990). Making up people. In E. Stein (Ed.),
Forms of desire: Sexual orientation and the social
constructionist controversy (pp. 69–88). New York:
Garland Press.
Weeks, J. (1993). Necessary fictions. In J. Murray (Ed.),
Constructing sexualities (pp. 93–121). Windsor, ON,
Canada: Humanities Research Group, University of
Windsor.
Yoshino, K. (2007). Covering: The hidden assault on our
civil rights. New York: Random House.
Social Economy
The economic, philosophical, and practical rele-
vance of the social economy has been considered
across disciplines, cultures, and historical moments.
With its origins arguably established thousands of
years ago in Chinese dynasties and its contempo-
rary roots often cited vis-à-vis the work of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and Karl Marx, the significance
of this interpretive economic framework contin-
ues to deepen in the global marketplace of the
21st century. Specifically, as the world’s economy
experiences unprecedented change and growth the
conversation about economics and its relationship
to the human condition likewise experiences
unprecedented visibility and engagement. More
than simply a textbook term, the social economy
is being advanced to bring about greater public
accountability for the economic enterprise and its
impact on people, especially how economic
resources shape people’s individual and shared
sense of identity. The common thread among
those researching and actively engaging the social
economy in the marketplace is a directive to invest
an otherwise scientific discipline with a distinctly
human perspective.
Conceptualizing the Social Economy
As a complement to traditional economics, the
social economy is a term characterizing an approach
746 Social Economy
to the marketplace that focuses on answering ques-
tions that traditional economics does not. Social
economists aim to resolve discord and debilitating
divisions often associated with the development of
capitalism. To this end, the social economy is not
about monetary capital alone; instead, it is funda-
mentally concerned with the social and personal
dimensions of economic life.
In its broadest sense, understanding what is
meant by the social economy is captured in the
18th century writings of Rousseau. His affirma-
tion of the ordinary life whereby an honest and
useful trade yields virtuous civic engagement
emphasizes the unity between civic and private life
in which the common good is evident everywhere.
In 1871, J. E. Thorold Rogers made explicit the
common good of the social economy as that which
permits the greatest regularity for the largest num-
ber of people that work and safety might be the
hallmarks of collective existence. Writing in
20th century, Marx intensified the idea by arguing
for a more critical evaluation of the relationship
between production, distribution, exchange, and
consumption. His intent was to expose the prob-
lems in capitalism, validate the worker, and offer
an alternative in socialism. Today, the social econ-
omy is represented in many ways, not the least of
which is the prominent call for sustainability in
every aspect of business and society. The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency defines sustain-
ability as meeting the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs. Sustainability argues for
responsibility to all forms of capital—natural,
monetary, and human—as essential to guiding
today’s decisions as well as tomorrow’s vision so
that all generations receive adequate provision.
Irrespective of the source or solution, the inner
workings of the social economy point toward the
importance of gaining a deeper understanding of
all forms of capital and their impact on the human
condition, especially identity formation. At the
heart of this undertaking is a careful examination
of how resources, or a lack thereof, affect individ-
ual and collective existence. Implicit in this con-
cern is a desire to combat exclusion based on
socially useful goods by focusing on the multiplica-
tion of resources to bridge human social activities
with production and reproduction. For example,
advocates for connecting a community to local
farmers through a cooperative food establishment
argue that it offers sustainable benefits to all par-
ticipants. Such relationships establish a pattern for
cooperative living that supports the local economy
while binding the community together around
shared values.
Conceptualizing the social economy is, there-
fore, a task attentive to the human component of
economic activity. Beyond the social science of
evaluating people through demographic data, the
social economy attempts to establish a textured
understanding of how people shape and are shaped
by the economic forces at work in their lives. The
commitment is to nourish a traditional enterprise
(economics) with a cooperative, humane, and sus-
tainable way of doing business. The anticipated
outcome is that through a more visible engagement
of the social economy people will find their place,
reconstitute their sense of personal responsibility,
and enhance the collective resolve of a community
through their social citizenship.
Embedded Social Engagement
Achieving a heightened awareness and engagement
of the social economy calls people to recognize
their social embeddedness and the universal pre-
suppositions of that existence. Clark Everling
explains these presuppositions as the ways in
which capital builds a given social space. Capital
in any form, but especially monetary capital,
affects the nature of personal as well as social
transactions. It builds spaces through appropria-
tion, consumption, and accumulation. These social
transactions embed people in specific practices,
each of which inform the fabric of their experi-
ences and how they form associations with others.
What follows is a sense of identity and relation
between people that is cultivated partly by certain
social expectations established in and through the
communicative life of goods.
Within the social economy, this embedded
transaction process associates exchange and pro-
duction as two sides of the same coin. The ideal is
a balanced, proportionate relationship between
the two indicative of the classical Aristotelian
golden mean. When enacted with the appropriate
magnitude, exchange is more than monetary; it is
embedded in useful values that benefit the indi-
vidual as well as the collective. Consumption is

simply the use of relevant goods associated with
the necessities of everyday life.
The competitive capitalist marketplace, how-
ever, also supports another twofold relationship of
consumption and production. It is argued that this
relationship encourages and even glorifies the
commoditization of life experiences. Exchange is
an exchange of values established by the individ-
ual. This form of exchange does not focus on the
usefulness of goods. Instead, it elevates a dispro-
portionate relationship between consumption and
production in favor of consumption. According to
the social economy, such an unbalanced dynamic
in favor of consumption edifies autonomous behav-
ior and narrows the community focus to only that
which supports the individual’s emotive desires. As
Alexis de Tocqueville, Alasdair MacIntyre, and
Charles Taylor have noted, an emotive turn dis-
tances the individual from others, causing a con-
formity to the self absent any commitment to
acknowledge that life is lived in relation—to oth-
ers, institutions, and so forth.
In sum, the social economy posits that a propor-
tionate relationship between exchange and pro-
duction lends itself to constructive alliances with
the potential for yielding comprehensive benefits.
The disproportionate relationship between con-
sumption and production, however, releases the
individual from his or her connectedness to a
larger social enterprise. Consciousness of one’s
embeddedness and social responsibility is thus
compromised.
Commitment, Connection, and Community
Embedded social engagement is a part of everyday
life even though many may not be aware that they
are participants in the social economic enterprise.
Capital transactions and their subsequent impact
on experience and association take place as people
adjust to shifts in the commodities exchange,
respond with aid to those suffering from natural
disasters, support local merchants, or donate their
time and talent to people in need. The alterity of
the social economy calls for business to elevate
social needs in an order that Marx advocated in
attending to the use-value of goods over the poten-
tial exchange value. This alterity perspective on
social economy might inspire a renewed commit-
ment (even priority) to useful goods that benefit
Social Economy 747
collective existence and the expansion of human
life. The desired outcome is to advance greater care
and attention toward the human dimension of
economic life.
Commitment, connection, and community are
drivers of active participation in the social econ-
omy; they reflect a textured, threefold emphasis on
the role and value of people within this enterprise.
Sustainable action requires attentiveness to each,
offering a measured, socially concentrated approach
to all forms of capital management as they are
enacted through appropriation, consumption, and
accumulation.
Commitment
The social economy is firmly rooted in commit-
ment. It is committed to a shared space in which
social relations are shaped by and depend on other
social relations. This commitment constitutes a
framework for developing personal and collective
identity. It reaffirms the interconnectedness of
humanity while recognizing that this bears with it
tremendous responsibility to the other.
Whether to one’s neighbor or a generation yet
to come, the commitment of the social economy
demands invested action that reflects an implicit
trust. This trust, according to Bruce G. Carruthers
and Sarah L. Babb, is derived from interpersonal
or interorganizational relationships and networks
that are established through the economic sphere.
The historical relevance or contractual agreements
does not build the potential for this trust. Rather,
meeting the expectations and obligations of social
relationships establish the ground from which this
trust can emerge. Economic coherence is thus a
by-product of an interpersonal or interorganiza-
tional commitment to goods that extend beyond
any one perspective.
Connection
The result of trust is an interconnectedness that
makes public the dynamics, constitution, and
demands of social relations. This trust addresses a
core issue of the social economy: redemption from
social exclusion. As mentioned earlier, social exclu-
sion inhibits individual and collective potential for
sustainable production and reproduction. Max
Weber’s conception of “webs of significance,” a
748 Social Economy
concept further developed in the work of cultural
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, points to a poten-
tial source of disconnectedness or exclusion as
emergent from culturally transmitted meanings
that shape how we interact and the value we
ascribe to social interactions. If negative or limit-
ing, these interactions can plague generations and
even entire cultures, making it difficult to compre-
hend the latent potential of embedded persons
within those contexts. Likewise, the nature of
exclusion can also be considered through June
Lapidis’s conception of “webs of relationships.”
To the web metaphor, Lapidis brings a sense of the
tension between connectivity and economic needs,
making visible the reality that we are affected and
even shaped by the goods that inhabit our every-
day lives.
Both web metaphors address the root issue of
exclusion versus inclusion, suggesting that con-
nectivity is more involved than simple claims of
“being green” or making charitable gestures to
gain visibility in the moment. Connection is about
acknowledging embeddedness in webs whose
strands reach into the past and ahead to the
future, certain of only one thing: that identity is
shaped in relation to others. The social economy
presupposes that individual and collective identi-
ties are inseparable, that one affects the other.
Therefore, the social economy embraces connec-
tivity because it privileges interrelation that aims
to meet and sustain the needs of people, not prop-
agate the isolation of emotive, purely consumptive
behaviors.
Community
The final driver of social economy posited here
is community. Pierre Bourdieu presents a compel-
ling look at the implications of community in the
social economy as it is formed around dwelling
spaces or habitats. At one time, work and home
were located in the same space or local commu-
nity. The economic infrastructure that made this
possible has, however, changed significantly.
People are now deployed out of the local commu-
nity to work. This economic transition creates an
increasingly disconnected sense of social relation-
ships. People are gathered together in what is
termed a community, yet no one knows each other
and their work often exists to benefit areas outside
of that local space.
The importance of true community within the
social economy is in heterogeneous individuals
gathering around a common center or shared com-
munity interests that, according to Bourdieu,
emerge from working together. What contempo-
rary housing developments and sprawling suburbs
lack is a connectedness that affirms interdepen-
dency and a collective purpose.
The social economy reclaims community as a
central factor in individual and collective identity
formation that ultimately shapes the state of the
economy. Trust is built in interpersonal and inter-
organizational sanctuaries from which connection
is made possible. Connection creates opportunities
for community to form and be sustained in the
long run. The community calls the individual into
responsibility; the community establishes a sus-
tainable future for generations to come.
S. Alyssa Groom
See also Consumption; Embeddedness/Embedded
Identity; Material Culture; Society and Social Identity
Further Readings
Amin, A., Cameron, A., & Hudson, R. (2002). Placing
the social economy. New York: Routledge.
Bourdieu, P. (2005). The social structures of the economy
(C. Turner, Trans.). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Carruthers, B. G., & Babb, S. L. (2000). Economy/
society: Markets, meanings, and social structure.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
Everling, C. (1997). Social economy: The logic of
capitalist development. New York: Routledge.
Lapidis, J. (2004). All the lesbian mothers are coupled, all
the single mothers are straight, and all of us are tired:
Reflections on being a single lesbian mom. Feminist
Economics, 10(2), 227–236.
Marx, K. (1976). The economic and philosophical
manuscripts of 1844. In Collected Works (Vol. 3).
New York: International Publishers.
Rousseau, J. J. (1994). Discourse on political economy
and the social contract (C. Betts, Trans.). Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: The making of the
modern identity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.

Social Identity Theory
Social identity theory is a social psychological
theory that explains how people’s conception of
who they are (their self-concept) is associated with
their membership of social groups and categories,
and with group and intergroup behaviors. The
theory defines group membership in terms of
people’s identification, definition, and evaluation
of themselves as members of a group (social iden-
tity), and specifies cognitive, social interactive and
societal processes that interact to produce charac-
teristic group phenomena.
Originating in Britain in the work of Henri
Tajfel in the late 1960s and collaboration with
John Turner in the 1970s, social identity theory
has a number of different but compatible concep-
tual foci. The two most significant are Tajfel and
Turner’s social identity theory of intergroup rela-
tions and Turner and colleagues’ social identity
theory of the group, the latter called self-categori-
zation theory. Social identity theory has developed
to become one of social psychology’s most signifi-
cant and extensively cited analyses of intergroup
and group phenomena—in such topics as, for
example, prejudice, discrimination, stereotyping,
cooperation and competition, conformity, norms,
group decision-making, leadership, and deviance.
Within social psychology, social identity theory
was predicted on a metatheory that differentiated
the behavior of people as group members from
individual and interpersonal behaviors and encour-
aged the development of theory specifically catered
to the former.
How People Represent Themselves:
Personal and Social Identity
People have a repertoire of different ways to con-
ceive of themselves—they have many different
identities that can be classified as personal identi-
ties or social identities. Personal identities are defi-
nitions and evaluations of oneself in terms of
idiosyncratic personal attributes (e.g., witty, shy),
or personal relationships (e.g., X’s friend, Y’s
spouse). Social identities are definitions and evalu-
ations of oneself in terms of the attributes of spe-
cific groups one belongs to (e.g., American,
Social Identity Theory 749
Democrat, nurse). Personal identity is tied to the
personal self and associated with interpersonal or
idiosyncratic individual behaviors; social identity
is tied to the collective self and associated with
group and intergroup behaviors.
Recently, Marilynn Brewer has argued that in
some cultures, particularly more collectivist cul-
tures, social identity rests more on people’s net-
works of relations with one another within a
group than on self-definition in shared attributes
and is thus associated with the relational self.
How People Represent
Groups: Categories and Prototypes
Human groups are social categories that people
mentally represent as prototypes—complex fuzzy
sets of interrelated attributes (behaviors, beliefs,
attitudes, customs, dress, and so forth) that cap-
ture similarities within groups and differences
between groups. Prototypes represent attributes
that maximize the group’s entitativity—the extent
to which a group appears to be a distinct and
clearly defined entity. Prototypes also maximize
meta-contrast—the ratio of differences between
the group and other groups to differences within
the group. One way to think of a group prototype
is what comes immediately to mind if, for example,
one were to say to you, “French,” “Republican”
or “terrorist.”
Overwhelmingly, we make binary categoriza-
tions where one of the categories is the group that
we are in, the ingroup. Thus, prototypes capture
similarities within the ingroup and accentuate dif-
ferences between our group and a specific out-
group. Ingroup prototypes can therefore change
when one compares one’s group with a different
outgroup. For this reason, prototypes are context-
dependent. Generally speaking, however, group
prototypes are not completely context-determined—
usually a core component is modified or qualified
to varying degree by context. If a particular con-
textual change is enduring, the prototype changes
more profoundly and more enduringly.
Categorization and Depersonalization
The process of categorizing someone has predict-
able consequences. Rather than “seeing” those
750 Social Identity Theory
people as idiosyncratic individuals, you see them
through the lens of the prototype of the category
you have placed them in—they become deperson-
alized. Depersonalization is not at all the same
thing as dehumanization—the former refers to a
change in the basis of perception, the latter to a
perception that someone is not a human being.
Prototype-based perception of outgroup members
is more commonly called stereotyping—you view
“them” as being similar to one another and all
having outgroup attributes.
You can also depersonalize ingroup members
and yourself in exactly the same way. When you
categorize yourself, you view yourself in terms of
the defining attributes of the ingroup (self-stereo-
typing), and, because prototypes also describe and
prescribe group-appropriate ways to think, feel,
and behave, you think, feel and behave group pro-
totypically. Your own behavior conforms to
ingroup norms. In this way, self-categorization
transforms one’s self-conception and produces
normative behavior among members of a group.
Depersonalization of self should not be con-
fused with deindividuation—the former describes
how self-perception and behavior conforms tightly
to group-defining norms, the latter to a loss of
responsibility and accountability that is associated
with an unsocialized and primitively impulsive
self. Stephen Reicher has shown how explanations
of crowd behavior that often hinge on deindividu-
ation fail to capture the goal-oriented and social
identity-contingent structure of crowd events—a
self-categorization–based depersonalization expla-
nation does a better job.
Feelings for Group Members: Social Attraction
Social categorization affects how you feel toward
other people. Feelings are governed by how proto-
typical of the group you think other people are,
rather than by personal preferences, friendships,
and enmities—liking becomes prototype-based
depersonalized social attraction. The more ingroup
prototypical people are, the more you like them.
Furthermore, because within one’s group, there is
usually agreement over prototypicality, prototypi-
cal members are liked by all—they are “popular.”
Likewise, less prototypical members are “unpopu-
lar,” and can be marginalized as undesirable devi-
ants. Outgroup members are effectively
un-prototypical of the ingroup and so are liked less
than are ingroup members.
Social attraction also occurs because our ingroup
prototypes are generally more favorable than our
outgroup prototypes. We engage in ethnocen-
trism—evaluating the ingroup more favorably
than the outgroup on as many dimensions as pos-
sible. Thus, preference for ingroup members over
outgroup members and for prototypical ingroup
members over non-prototypical ingroup members
reflects a bias for the prototypical and the valence
asymmetry of ingroup and outgroup prototypes.
Social identity–based liking is also affected
by the extent to which a person is seen as threaten-
ing the normative integrity of one’s group, and
thus, the essence of who one is as a group member.
According to Dominic Abrams and José Marques’s
theory of subjective group dynamics people who
occupy positions that are nonnormative of the
ingroup are disliked more if they are ingroup than
outgroup members—this is because ingroup devi-
ants are considered “black sheep” who are partic-
ularly threatening to social identity.
Intergroup Behavior
As described previously, the tendency for ingroup
prototypes to be more favorable than outgroup
prototypes represents ethnocentrism—the belief
that all things ingroup are superior to all things
outgroup. Ethnocentrism exists because of the
correspondence, through social identity and self-
categorization, between how the group is evalu-
ated and how we ourselves are evaluated. Thus,
intergroup behavior is a struggle over the relative
status or prestige of one’s ingroup—a struggle for
evaluatively positive ingroup distinctiveness and
social identity. Higher-status groups fight to pro-
tect their evaluative superiority; lower-status
groups struggle to shrug off their social stigma and
promote their positivity.
The strategies that groups adopt to manage their
identity depend on subjective belief structures—
members’ beliefs about the nature of the relation-
ship between their group and a specific outgroup.
Beliefs focus on status (what is my group’s social
standing relative to the outgroup?), stability (how
stable is this status relationship?), legitimacy (how
legitimate is this status relationship?), permeability
(how easy is it for people to change their social

identity by “passing” into the outgroup?), and
cognitive alternatives (is a different intergroup
relationship conceivable?).
A social mobility belief structure hinges on a
belief in permeability, that intergroup boundaries
are effectively soft and easy to cross. This causes
members of lower-status groups as isolated indi-
viduals to dis-identify from their group to try to
join and gain acceptance by the higher-status
outgroup—they try to “pass.” In reality, inter-
group boundaries are rarely permeable, but domi-
nant groups often promulgate an ideology of social
mobility, and sometimes limited passing because it
undermines and prevents collective action by the
minority.
A social change belief structure hinges on recog-
nition that permeability is actually low; that inter-
group boundaries are actually hard and difficult to
cross. This causes low-status groups to engage in
social creativity—behaviors aimed at redefining
the social value of their group and its attributes,
coupled with attempts to avoid (upward) com-
parison with higher-status groups and instead
engage in (lateral or downward) comparisons with
other groups lower in the social pecking order.
Dominant groups can sometimes promulgate a
social change belief structure that encourages lat-
eral or downward comparisons and competition
among subordinate groups—an often effective
strategy of “divide and conquer.”
Where a social change belief structure is coupled
with recognition that the social order is illegiti-
mate, group members can develop cognitive alter-
natives (essentially a critical ideology and road
map for the plausible achievement of social change)
and engage in social competition—direct competi-
tion with the outgroup over status, which can
range from debate through protest, to revolution
and war.
Social Identity Motivations
The group pursuit of positive distinctiveness is
reflected in people’s desire to have a relatively
favorable self-concept, in this case through posi-
tive social identity. The self-esteem hypothesis
draws out this logic—social identity processes are
motivated by the individual pursuit of a relatively
favorable self-concept, and possibly by the global
human pursuit of self-esteem. Research suggests
Social Identity Theory 751
that group membership generally does make peo-
ple feel good about themselves, even if the group is
relatively stigmatized, but feeling good or bad
about oneself does not easily predict whether one
will actually identify with a group.
Another perspective on social identity motiva-
tion is offered by Brewer’s optimal distinctiveness
theory. People are driven by contrasting motives
for inclusion and distinctiveness, and strive to
reach an optimal balance. Large groups over-satisfy
the inclusion motive and small groups over-satisfy
the distinctiveness motive. Mid-size groups within
larger social aggregates are more likely to be opti-
mally distinctive.
According to Michael Hogg’s uncertainty-
identity theory, there is another basic motivation
for social identity processes. People strive to reduce
feelings of uncertainty about themselves, their
social world, and their place within it—they like to
know who they are and how to behave, and who
others are and how they might behave. Because
social identity ties self-definition and behavior to
prototypes that describe and prescribe behavior, it
reduces uncertainty about who you are and about
how you and others will behave. Some prototypes
are better suited to identification-related uncer-
tainty reduction—specifically, prototypes that are
simple, unambiguous, and clearly defined.
Prototypes like this typically define groups that are
highly entitative—distinctive, homogeneous, and
clearly structured.
One implication of uncertainty-identity theory
is that under conditions of chronic or extreme self-
uncertainty (e.g., economic collapse, cultural disin-
tegration, civil war, terrorism or large scale natural
disasters, or unemployment, bereavement, divorce,
relocation, or adolescence), the motivation to
reduce uncertainty is greatly amplified. Under
these circumstances, people will identify strongly;
having a powerful feeling of belonging and attach-
ment to the group, and a sense of self comprehen-
sively defined by the group—they could be described
as zealots, fanatics, or true believers. Furthermore,
they will seek to identify with groups that are not
merely entitative but extreme—groups that are
homogeneous in their attitudes, values, and mem-
bership; have inflexible customs and carefully
policed boundaries; have orthodox and ideological
belief systems; are intolerant and suspicious of out-
siders and of internal dissent and criticism; are
752 Social Identity Theory
rigidly and hierarchically structured, often with
strong autocratic leadership; and are ethnocentric
and narcissistic.
When Does Social Identity Come Into Play?
A social identity comes into play psychologically
to govern perceptions, attitudes, feelings, and
behavior only when it is psychologically salient.
Penelope Oakes has elaborated on Jerome Bruner’s
1957 notions of accessibility and fit to describe a
set of principles that govern the psychological
salience of social identity.
People draw on readily accessible social identi-
ties and categorizations (e.g., gender, profession).
These are valued, important, and frequently
employed aspects of the self-concept (chronically
accessible in memory), or those that are self-evident
and perceptually obvious in the immediate situa-
tion (situationally accessible). People use accessible
identities and categorizations to make sense of
their social context. They check how well the cat-
egorization accounts for similarities and differ-
ences among people (structural/comparative fit)
and how well the stereotypical properties of the
categorization account for people’s actual behav-
ior (normative fit). People try different categoriza-
tions, and the categorization with optimal fit
becomes psychologically salient. Although largely
an automatic process, salience is influenced by
motivations to employ categorizations that favor
the ingroup and do not raise self-uncertainty.
Influence Processes in Groups
People in groups adhere to similar standards, have
similar attitudes and behave in similar ways. They
conform to group norms and behave group proto-
typically. Self-categorization is the cognitive pro-
cess responsible for an individual group member
behaving prototypically—transforming his or her
self-concept and behavior to be identity-consistent.
Because it is critical to know what the context-
specific group norm is, people are highly motivated
to obtain reliable information about the norm.
There are many sources of such information. For
example, one can observe fellow members’ behav-
ior, or construct a norm that contrasts with the
behavior of outgroup members or deviant/mar-
ginal ingroup members. However, according to
Turner’s referent informational influence theory,
the most reliable information is usually gleaned
from the identity-consistent behavior of people
who are known to be generally prototypical
members of the group. Members pay close atten-
tion to these people and infer from their behavior
what is contextually group normative and thus
self-defining.
This idea underpins Hogg’s social identity theory
of leadership. In salient groups, prototypical mem-
bers occupy a leadership role, and prototypical
leaders are more effective than are non-prototypical
leaders. People look to these people to provide
reliable information about their identity as group
members. They do this because prototypical lead-
ers are assumed to be “one of us”—highly identi-
fied members who are trusted because they are
unlikely to behave in ways that do not protect and
promote the group. Paradoxically, this trust allows
prototypical leaders to actually be normatively
innovative, which is a key transformational func-
tion of effective leadership. People are prepared to
follow their lead even if at first blush the direction
they are taking the group looks odd.
Another quite different source of transformative
normative information in groups is ingroup criti-
cism. Simply being a nonnormative ingroup mem-
ber, someone occupying a nonnormative position,
invites rejection. However, according to Matthew
Hornsey’s intergroup sensitivity effect and William
Crano’s leniency bias, although people pretty
much outright reject actively norm-challenging
information from outgroup sources, they are much
more tolerant of such behavior from ingroup
sources. In this way, an ingroup critic (Hornsey) or
an active ingroup minority (Crano) can play a role
in changing ingroup norms.
Michael A. Hogg
See also Collective/Social Identity; Deindividuation;
Identity Salience; Identity Uncertainty; Optimal
Distinctiveness Theory
Further Readings
Abrams, D., Hogg, M. A., Hinkle, S., & Otten, S. (2005).
The social identity perspective on small groups. In
M. S. Poole & A. B. Hollingshead (Eds.), Theories of
small groups: Interdisciplinary perspectives
(pp. 99–137). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Hogg, M. A. (2003). Social identity. In M. R. Leary &
J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity
(pp. 462–479). New York: Guilford Press.
Hogg, M. A. (2005). The social identity perspective. In
S. A. Wheelan (Ed.), The handbook of group research
and practice (pp. 133–157). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Hogg, M. A. (2006). Social identity theory. In P. J. Burke
(Ed.), Contemporary social psychological theories
(pp. 111–136). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1988). Social
identifications: A social psychology of intergroup
relations and group processes. London: Routledge.
Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (2003). Intergroup behavior
and social identity. In M. A. Hogg & J. Cooper (Eds.),
The Sage handbook of social psychology
(pp. 407–431). London: Sage.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity
theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel &
W. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations
(pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher,
S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the
social group: A self‑categorization theory. Oxford,
UK: Blackwell.
Socialization
Socialization refers to the process through which
people learn skills, knowledge, values, motives,
and roles appropriate to their position(s) in a
social group or society, resulting in a particular
identity or identities relevant to that social group
or society. Socialization takes place through com-
municative interaction with others whenever new
roles are engaged as part of a group or society.
One basic assumption of socialization theory is
the internalization of group or social require-
ments. During socialization, one learns to take on
an identity associated with a particular group and
perform it in a competent manner.
Disciplinary and Contextual Engagement
The process of socialization involves multiple dis-
ciplinary perspectives, including anthropology,
communication theory, psychology, social psy-
chology, and sociology, with a common pool of
Socialization 753
intellectual ancestors (e.g., Erik Erikson, Sigmund
Freud, George Herbert Mead). The academic con-
cept of socialization as the relationship of the
individual to society or collectives can be traced
from its emergence in the late 1800s to current
theory and research, including work on self-social-
ization, moving from a focus on stages tied to
biological development to increased focus on the
interaction of person and environment through
language. Persons are socialized to identities based
on their connection to and membership in particu-
lar social groups.
Socialization takes place in multiple life con-
texts, including family socialization, occupational/
professional socialization, and organizational
socialization. Gender and sex role socialization,
language socialization, parental role socialization,
political socialization, racial socialization, and
consumer socialization tap particular identities
drawn from a given domain of social life. Primary
socialization refers to family and school socializa-
tion, where children learn behaviors appropriate
to a particular culture, secondary socialization
refers to socialization into particular groups dur-
ing adulthood (for example, to an organization or
occupation), and resocialization refers to learning
patterns of behavior different from previously
learned ones—for example, joining the military.
From the social collective’s perspective, social-
ization is the individual’s adaptation and confor-
mity to role expectations, others’ opinions, and the
norms and values of the collective. This structural-
ist/functionalist approach stresses the transmission
of group culture. Socialization involves adaptation
to the group for which the person will develop an
identity. From the individual’s perspective, social-
ization is the development of personal and social
identity and associated attitudes and behaviors
resulting from social influences. Symbolic interac-
tion is the theoretical tradition of this view.
Through interaction with others, one is socialized
to norms and rules relevant to identity as a member
of a particular gender, race, class, or other group.
Theories of Socialization
Theories of socialization can be organized accord-
ing to life stage, life span, and life course perspec-
tives. Life stage perspectives (e.g., Sigmund Freud,
Jean Piaget, Erik Erikson) focus on a biological
754 Socialization
basis for socialization. Life span perspectives (e.g.,
Orville Gilbert Brim and Stanton Wheeler) empha-
size the role of both biology and experience. The
life course perspective (G. H. Mead, Margaret
Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Erik Erikson) highlights
the influence of social norms, role prescriptions,
and group processes on age-related life transitions.
Karl Mannheim suggested that one’s generation
defines a unique socialization experience.
Much subsequent theoretical work on socializa-
tion was a reaction to Freud, who assumed that
movement from one stage to another is ordered,
basically fixed or invariant, and biological in ori-
gin. Most sociological research until the late 1960s
and the 1970s emphasized childhood socialization,
as did Freud, though its basis was no longer
believed to be related to psychosexual stages.
Socialization theorists came to recognize the role
of environmental influences on the person’s move-
ment through stages, along with the shaping influ-
ence of communicative interaction on identity
formation during the socialization process.
Piaget’s cognitive-developmental theory has
stages similar to Freud’s, but differs in that experi-
ence and social interaction are central in movement
from one stage to another. Freud considered the
social environment as potential interference with
the individual’s development; he attributed devel-
opment to maturation, not to interaction, assuming
that biology unfolds the individual. Piaget focuses
more on the social, collective world than does
Freud, as does Lev Vygotsky. Piaget’s emphasis is
placed on the person as active agent in the social-
ization process, resonating with the symbolic inter-
actionist tradition as articulated by G. H. Mead
and Charles Horton Cooley, which highlighted the
influence of social interaction on learning to take
on a role particular to a given identity.
G. H. Mead’s theory of self in social interaction
assumes that socialization takes place through a
process of social interaction, emphasizing social-
ization’s social character. Whereas Piaget focuses
more on the individual’s acting on and adapting
information to cognitive structures, Mead focuses
on taking on society’s attitudes as one’s own, a
process that accompanies maturation. Taking atti-
tudes and roles of other individuals and of the
generalized other constitutes the basic process of
socialization. Mead’s perspective focused on the
life span perspective as an ongoing process and
suggested two stages to development of identity. In
the first, the self or identity is built through par-
ticular attitudes of other people toward self or
others. In the second, the person constructs a gen-
eralized other from these attitudes.
Anthropologists Margaret Mead and Ruth
Benedict dealt with status transitions or passages
during the socialization process, unlike Freud,
Piaget, or G. H. Mead. Passages from childhood to
adolescence to adulthood are significant to identity
as a member of a culture. M. Mead and Benedict
focused on the extent to which cultures provide
continuity or discontinuity for role transitions.
Their work provided an important foundation for
subsequent theories on the life course and life
cycles.
Erikson offered a socialization theory of self in
social interaction with eight ages of the human
being, emphasizing the life span. Working from
the psychoanalytic tradition with the ego as the
central psychic structure, he emphasized develop-
mental tasks that human beings must accomplish
in stages from childhood through adulthood.
Mannheim brought the issue of generations to the
forefront, arguing that each generation is social-
ized differently, providing a standpoint from which
to view the world. From this perspective, a genera-
tion could be seen as constituting a distinct group
with an identity tied to temporal location.
Janie Harden Fritz
See also Gender; Group Identity; Identity Change;
Language; Looking-Glass Self; Mirror Stage of Identity
Development; Role Identity; Self-Concept; Symbolic
Interactionism
Further Readings
Bush, D. M., & Simmons, R. G. (1981). Socialization
processes over the life course. In M. Rosenberg &
R. H. Turner (Eds.), Social psychology: Sociological
perspectives (pp. 133–164). New York: Basic Books.
Heinz, W. R. (2002). Self-socialization and post-
traditional society. In R. A. Settersten & T. J. Owens
(Eds.), Advances in life course research: New frontiers
in socialization (pp. 41–64). New York: Elsevier.
Luftey, K., & Mortimer, J. T. (2003). Socialization
through the life course. In J. Delamater (Ed.),
Handbook of social psychology (pp. 183–202).
New York: Kluwer Academic.

Maccoby, E. (2007). Historical overview of socialization
research and theory. In J. E. Grusec & P. D. Hastings
(Eds.), Handbook of socialization: Theory and
research (pp. 13–41). New York: Guilford Press.
Ochs, E. (1993). Constructing social identity: A language
socialization perspective. Research on Language and
Social Interaction, 26(3), 287–306.
Social Movements
Social movements can be defined as socially con-
structed groups, networks, and organizations that
express social and cultural conflict through a
reflexively negotiated and contested, permanently
evolving collective identity. At times, these conflicts
are expressed through highly visible mobilization
and engagement with and against the state. At
other times, conflict may be expressed in alterna-
tive forms of cultural expression and in daily life.
In either case, the construction and negotiation of
collective identity is central to the definition and
work of a movement. This entry draws distinctions
between the individual identity quest often associ-
ated with social movements and movement collec-
tive identity; provides an overview of collective
identity as a key process for social movements,
highlighting the centrality of conflict to these pro-
cesses; discusses some of the criticisms of social
movements and identity politics; outlines some of
the strategic uses of identity in social movements;
and suggests some of the paradoxes inherent to
collective identity in social movements.
Overview
Social movement identity can be understood across
two dimensions. The first is the relationship of the
individual to the collective and the impact on indi-
vidual biography that occurs through the identity
quest often associated with joining a social move-
ment. The second is the ongoing process of con-
structing and maintaining a collective or movement
identity. Such an identity is never fixed, but repre-
sents the sorts of permanently evolving solidarity
networks that, in and of themselves, raise symbolic
challenges to the dominant social order. Within
these networks also exists a range of multiple,
overlapping, and sometimes conflicting individual
Social Movements 755
identities. Social movement actors must negotiate
across differences in these identities to create a
strategic unity through which to articulate move-
ment claims.
Identity and Biography
Individual identities are often changed in the pro-
cess of joining a social movement and such move-
ments are understood to play an identity-affirming
function for many participants. For many activists,
the act of joining a social movement is part of an
individual identity quest. Activists often report
experiencing new feelings of “belonging” and “rec-
ognition” in movement groups and organizations.
The conscious and reflexive process of defining an
identity that is separate from—or oppositional
to—an identity imposed by the dominant social
system is the most personal experience of the lib-
eration associated with social movement action.
Individuals who identify as belonging to a particu-
lar movement can enjoy feelings of solidarity with
other activists with whom they share a range of
values and aspirations, but with whom they may
not otherwise experience personal contact.
An interest in individual identity has also been
driven by social movement scholars’ attempts to
answer what is known as the “free rider” dilemma
as it relates to activists’ motivation to participate in
collective action. Scholars working in the rational
tradition of social movement scholarship have
struggled to understand why individuals would
make the “irrational” choice of engaging in social
movement activism when they could instead make
the more “rational” decision to “free ride” on the
efforts of others, enjoying the collective benefits
produced by others but without cost to themselves.
The pleasures and rewards associated with identity-
quest have been posited as one alternative to mate-
rial rewards that may motivate individuals to
participate in social movement action.
The key difference between an individual iden-
tity and a collective identity is the extent to which
the latter is a fundamentally political rather than a
personal or psychological concept. That is, rather
than an individual identity, say, as a lesbian, being
based merely in an individual’s sexual orientation,
a collective identity as a member of the gay and
lesbian rights movement is based in the shared
understandings among movement participants of
756 Social Movements
the way in which their identities are shaped by
common experiences of oppression and resistance
that in turn are grounded in their identities. In con-
trast to the (primarily U.S.-based) rationalist social
movement scholars, the constructivist European
tradition of social movement scholarship turned
their attention to the question of collective identity
not as a movement resource or as an explanation
for movement participation, but as a process key to
the existence of social movements.
Collective Identity
A social movement’s collective identity is more
than merely an aggregation of individual identities.
The identity of a social movement—its collective
identity—is not a natural or accidental occurrence.
Social movement collective identity is arrived at
through an ongoing process of contestation and
negotiation and is located in the highly observable
realm of action and interaction rather than at the
level of individual attitudes or beliefs. Collective
identity is based in a perception of a shared status
or social relation, usually associated with some
form of oppression, marginalization, or injustice.
The concept of collective identity is vital to under-
standing the work of social movements that are
engaged in politics beyond institutional transfor-
mation because it enables scholars to recognize
movement continuity and to identify struggles that
occur in culture and everyday life.
The key theorist of social movement collective
identity was the late Italian sociologist and psycho-
analyst Alberto Melucci. Melucci argued that col-
lective identity should not be understood as a
“thing to be studied” or as a fixed and observable
social phenomenon. Rather, Melucci suggested
that collective identity is a crucial analytical tool
for understanding processes that produce a set of
reflexively constructed and negotiated definitions
regarding the field of opportunities and constraints
offered to social movement actors. These processes
are not free floating but are constrained by the
context and location of social action and involve
acts of perception, construction, and negotiation
among actors. Understanding the processes of col-
lective identity in this way provides insight into the
ways in which social movements determine such
issues as membership and activities and agree on
the fundamental question of “who they are,” while
allowing for the constantly debated and contested
nature of these agreements.
Engaging in processes of collective identity
allows social movement groups to create the labels
by which they define themselves, the barriers by
which they determine who is in and who is out, and
to work toward common understandings of their
goals and strategies. In this sense, collective identi-
ties are constantly changing and evolving in response
to debate and discussion, and can only exist for as
long as movement actors are prepared to engage in
their construction. Ultimately, however, that we
are able to observe the action of social movements
in the form of organizational structures presup-
poses ongoing processes of collective identity.
Melucci outlines the processes of collective iden-
tity as requiring three central factors. First, these
processes require the sorts of shared cognitive defi-
nitions about the goal and strategies of social
action discussed earlier, and an acceptance that
these definitions are constructed through interac-
tion and compromise. Second, collective identity
requires networks of active relationships, in which
norms of organization, leadership, and communi-
cation will vary across different movements. Third,
these processes necessitate emotional investment
by participants, through which individuals are
enabled to feel like part of a common unity.
Through an ongoing and reflexive engagement
with these factors social movements are able to
present an empirical unity. However, Melucci also
emphasizes that this apparent unity should not be
considered as an endpoint or as evidence of the life
of a movement. Rather, the processes underlying
this presentation of unity are the focus of interest
and investigation. Collective identity involves con-
tinual reformulation and discussion in groups
about the central questions of personal, social, and
political action. Continued debate about the fac-
tors that Melucci outlines is an indication of a
movement’s ongoing vitality and relevance.
Conflict and Collective Identity
Contrary to the view that collective identity
assumes a homogenous and united movement
membership, conflict and disagreement play an
important role in processes of collective identity.
To many activists, experiences of conflict appear
to clash with notions of unity and solidarity that

are often deemed essential to successful political
practice. For this reason, conflicts themselves are
often repressed or smothered. Attempts to repress
conflict, however, do not recognize its significance
as a creative force in social movement processes of
collective identity. Through conflicts regarding dif-
ferences to do with identity (race, class, sexuality
and age), meaning, goals, and strategy, movement
actors are able to conceive new forms of social
existence and produce new understandings of
social, cultural, and political life that have implica-
tions beyond the movement itself.
Processes of collective identity provide the space
for these conflicts to occur. Further, these conflicts
should be seen as both productive and as integral
to movement survival, rather than as something to
be resolved and put aside. Movements often renew
and remake themselves in periods of internal con-
flict to maintain their relevance in changing politi-
cal contexts. Even more importantly, however,
movement actors have the possibility of imagining
and constructing new forms of social existence in
the processes of these debates.
Social Movements and Identity Politics
The birth of “identity politics” in the 1960s created
a new political paradigm by which identity and
liberation became closely linked in the minds of
those working for progressive social change. This
new view of politics made visible some of the previ-
ous assumptions on which the social order rested.
Feminists exposed the invisible masculinity inher-
ent in the universal subject, gay and lesbian activists
exposed the heteronormativity of this subject, and
activists of color exposed the invisible norms of
White race privilege in much political thought and
action. Those who challenged these assumptions
articulated the ways in which dominant identities
had been historically and structurally entrenched
and universalized. Identity took on a new impor-
tance as an organizing principle for movements,
and actors were committed in their belief that rec-
ognition of their identities would in and of itself
provide a challenge to the dominant social order.
By the 1980s, however, identity politics began to
be seen as something of a retreat from the broader
challenges of social and political reform. As neo-
conservatism began to dominate mainstream poli-
tics, activists became increasingly disillusioned and
Social Movements 757
pessimistic about the possibilities of social trans-
formation. The new conservatism became domi-
nant in the West, leaving the ideals of the 1960s
seeming less and less attainable. During this period,
identity politics scholars focused less on social
transformation than they did on claims for recog-
nition of a marginalized or victimized identity.
With the socialist alternative dismantled along
with the Berlin Wall, the struggles for a new model
of society seemed to have been lost. In their place
emerged competing identity or recognition claims
that of themselves did not focus on challenging
broader social structures. Critics of this version of
identity politics saw it as rejecting the search for a
comprehensive solution to social problems in favor
of separatism and political goals focused on the
well-being of particular groups.
The tension between this approach to identity
as struggles for recognition and the older struggles
for social justice through a redistribution of
resources is articulated in the work of U.S. political
philosopher Nancy Fraser. Fraser analyses what
she calls the postsocialist condition, which she
defines as the absence of a credible, progressive
alternative to the current order, marked by a false
antithesis between claims for recognition and the
need for redistribution. Central to Fraser’s argu-
ment is the notion that what has essentially been
constructed as an either/or choice between, on the
one hand, a social politics of class or equality and,
on the other hand, a cultural politics of identity or
difference is unnecessary and evades the postso-
cialist tasks of understanding how culture and
economy work together to produce injustices. She
further argues that developing a critical theory that
integrates recognition and redistribution in politi-
cal claims making is an essential and urgent task.
Like other critics of identity politics, Fraser sug-
gests that recognition struggles can function to
simplify and concretize group identities with the
result that the important struggles within groups
are obscured.
Identity as Movement Strategy
Despite the criticism of identity politics as an end
in itself, however, social movement identity should
not be understood as distinct or separate from
movement strategy. Many social movement groups
use identities strategically, and a range of other
758 Social Movements
strategic options is meaningful precisely because of
the groups with which they are identified. In this
sense, identity should not be seen as being at odds
with strategy. Rather, processes of collective iden-
tity and the making of identity claims can be seen
as strategies in and of themselves.
Francesca Polletta and James Jasper have sug-
gested that collective identity processes make a
range of strategic contributions to the work of a
social movement. In periods where a movement is
less publicly visible, collective identity processes
maintain a political space for future cycles of
movement activity. Identity work is also important
for sustaining abeyance structures during periods
of limited political opportunities, meaning that
identities nurtured within these often-invisible net-
works contribute to a spillover effect from one
movement to another. Broad movement identities
such as feminist, pacifist, or anarchist can be pre-
served in discourse and popular culture as well as
in institutions and organizations, thus becoming
available for subsequent waves of protest. Further,
how successful a movement group or organization
is in framing its identities for public consumption
affects its ability to recruit new members and sup-
porters, to gain a public hearing, make alliances
with other groups, and defuse opposition.
Maintaining a degree of exclusivity in its collec-
tive identity can also be an important movement
strategy. One possible cost of social movement
success, however, is that the collective identity of a
movement is transformed into a public good,
thereby losing its power to compel participation.
This diffusion of a movement’s collective identity
blurs the boundary between the movement and the
general public and allows a more heterogeneous
group to attach itself to a movement organization.
This can, in turn, contribute to the decline of a
movement as the definition and distinctiveness of
its collective identity becomes more ambiguous.
Although this flow of a movement’s discourse into
the realms of the public and popular culture is
often thought of as success, what can instead occur
is a neutralizing of contemporary movements’
more radical critiques.
The Paradox of Identity
Identity work is an essential aspect of social move-
ments and collective action. However, as the above
sections suggest, it is also inherently paradoxical.
Collective identity is both fluid and dynamic in the
internal processes by which it is constructed and
maintained, as well as fixed and unified in the way
that it is presented or performed to the wider pub-
lic. Collective identity is rooted in history as activ-
ists draw on movement identities from earlier
periods to nourish contemporary struggle, as well
as constantly evolving and changing as a part of
the negotiation and debate that are central to pro-
cesses of collective identity. There is a further
paradox to movement collective identity derived
from the multiple identities of activists themselves.
The unified identity of feminist, environmentalist,
or unionist is inevitably complicated because the
feminist might also be a unionist, the environmen-
talist might also be woman of color, or the union-
ist might also be a lesbian. At times, these different
aspects of activists’ identities will conflict, and the
carefully constructed unity of the movement will
come under enormous pressure.
Knowing who is in and who is out begins the
process of creating a movement identity, defin-
ing what the struggle is about and determining
the strategies that activists will use. Yet, many
social movement groups are torn between assert-
ing a clear identity for themselves and decon-
structing it, revealing the group’s internal
diversity and the constructed nature of its public
expressions of unity. Where some activists see it
as important to expose the internal processes of
a movement’s collective identity even when
those processes involve conflict, others may be
concerned that such exposure is a threat to
group unity that may diminish the group’s legit-
imacy in the eyes of the public.
In response to these paradoxes, many activists
focus on constructing a partial and contingent col-
lective identity. Complicating Melucci’s under-
standing of collective identity as involving shared
cognitive definitions of movement goals and strat-
egy, many activists acknowledge that what they
share may also be complicated by incommensura-
ble differences. Many activists share a vision of a
society characterized by equality among socially
and culturally differentiated groups, who are able
to respect and affirm one another in their differ-
ences. Although the public articulation of a unified
collective identity is necessary to achieve that
vision, the unity required must be fluid, shifting,

and flexible rather than constrained by definition,
uniformity, or rigid, impermeable boundaries.
Sarah Maddison
See also Collective/Social Identity; Identity Politics
Further Readings
Fraser, N. (1997). Justice interruptus: Critical reflections
on the “postsocialist” condition. New York:
Routledge.
Goodwin, J., Jasper, J. M., & Polletta, F. (2001).
Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Laraña, E., Johnston, H., & Gusfield, J. R. (Eds.). (1994).
New social movements: From ideology to identity.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Melucci, A. (1995). The process of collective identity. In
H. Johnston & B. Klandermans (Eds.), Social
movements and culture. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Melucci, A. (1996). Challenging codes: Collective action
in the information age. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Melucci, A. (1996). The playing self: Person and meaning
in the planetary society. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Meyer, D. S., Whittier, N., & Robnett, B. (Eds.). (2002).
Social movements: Identity, culture and the state. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Polletta, F., & Jasper, J. M. (2001). Collective identity
and social movements. Annual Review of Sociology,
27, 283–305.
Stryker, S., Owens, T. J., & White, R. W. (Eds.). (2000).
Self, identity, and social movements. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Social Realism
Social realism was a politically engaged and
socially critical form of U.S. painting during the
1930s that called attention to the plight of the
working class and the poor. Though it emerged
directly from the bleak conditions of the Great
Depression, which provoked many artists to
emphasize the social function of their work, its
origins can be traced to the European movement
of realism in the mid-19th century. Artists such as
Social Realism 759
Gustave Courbet and Jean-François Millet were
known for their depictions of peasants who
embodied their attitudes toward industrialization
and urbanization. Realism as a tool of social cri-
tique was also employed in 19th-century Russia
and later in the United States with the Ashcan
school’s depictions of the grim conditions of
urban life. For this reason, social realism is some-
times broadly used to refer to these other interna-
tional movements. In 1930s United States,
however, at a time when many artists and critics
turned to leftist ideologies, realism was not simply
seen as a necessary mode of representation for
those committed to socialist and communist poli-
tics. It was also tied to a nascent nationalism and
growing desire for an aesthetic that had a distinct
identity as U.S. art.
Social Role of Artists
This desire to return a social role to artists in the
United States manifested itself—by artists and crit-
ics alike—in the need for art to be more demo-
cratic. The modernist ideal of the artist as a
bourgeois individualist, isolated and misunder-
stood by society, was replaced by one in which the
artist was fully integrated into that society. Artists
would now work alongside other artists on com-
munal projects, such as murals, and their art would
be brought into the public realm, moving beyond
the restricted space of the museum and art gallery,
and into libraries, schools, hospitals, prisons, and
other public institutions. Rejecting contemporary
art in the United States as feeble imitations of mod-
ern European art, the new ideal was an art created
by Americans and for Americans. Epitomized by
Pablo Picasso, who in the 1930s was creating
increasingly abstract art, modern art was perceived
by artists and the public as decadent and bour-
geois, far removed from questions of politics and
society, and concerned only with its own aesthetic.
Moreover, as a foreign influence, it had to be
purged in the search for an indigenous U.S. art.
Several art critics, including Thomas Craven and
Royal Cortissoz were adamantly against modern-
ism, and the artist Thomas Hart Benton, who had
been a modernist painter before World War I,
turned against it during the Depression. Realism—
the opposite of modern art, which was moving
increasingly toward abstraction—thus came to be
760 Social Realism
the most appropriate and authentic mode of repre-
sentation. This rejection of the avant-garde distin-
guishes social realism from the realism of 19th-
century Europe.
These goals lay at the center of Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s Federal Art Project (FAP), which
began in 1935 and ended in 1943. Part of the New
Deal, the FAP employed artists as state workers,
often collectively, on public projects in return for a
standard weekly wage. The commissioned works
put into visual form the nationalist and populist
rhetoric of Roosevelt’s reformist policies, their
function was to restore public faith in the govern-
ment as a unifying source in a moment of political
and economic crisis and to offer images of a prom-
ised social utopia. Murals such as Philip Guston’s
Work and Play in the lobby of the community
room in the Queensbridge Housing Project in New
York City, with its images of a family, children
playing, musicians and dancers, and workers, were
meant to depict the different social roles of a pro-
ductive society, and its idealization of these roles
illustrated the unifying and ordering function of
state-sponsored art. Other FAP works, such as
Cesare Stea’s Sculptural Relief for the Bower Bay
Sewage Disposal Plant (1936), offered heroic and
monumental images of workers, symbolic of the
country’s efforts to rebuild itself.
Social Realism Versus
Socialist Realism and Regionalism
These heroic depictions of workers come closest to
the socialist realist iconography of art within the
Soviet Union at that time. However, it should be
understood that social realism is distinct from its
counterpart in the USSR. Whereas the latter was a
heroic and monumentalizing style institutionalized
by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1934, social real-
ism, though it could encompass this type of iconog-
raphy, was not limited to it. Thus, social realism
could offer images far more varied in subject, rang-
ing from idealizations of workers to pointed cri-
tique depicting poverty or racial and social injustice,
and as the decade went on, agitating against the
growing threat of fascism. Moreover, social realism
also had far greater stylistic latitude. In addition to
naturalism, which was the only form of representa-
tion permitted by Stalin, social realism also included
forms of expressionism as well as symbolism.
Nor should social realism be confused with a
similar form of U.S. painting in the 1930s, region-
alism. If regionalist artists also longed for a demo-
cratic art integrated into everyday life—and as a
result rejected modernism as foreign and elitist—
regionalism was determinedly apolitical in content.
Instead, in place of heroic workers, lynchings, and
other scenes of poverty and injustice, regionalism
offered rustic and country views, suffused with a
sentiment of nostalgia. The effects of the Depression,
both economic and social, were almost always
ignored for an idealized vision of a rural past.
Murals
Although the FAP also commissioned sculptures
from artists, the predominant form of art created
for the organization was the mural. Perceived as an
art form both permanent and public, mural paint-
ing was hailed by Roosevelt’s administration as a
vital mode of national expression. Interest in the
medium was spurred largely by the Mexican
muralists, notably Diego Rivera, José Clemente
Orozco, and David Alfaro Siqueiros, who had
already begun to garner critical acclaim for their
work by the early 1930s. A series of exhibitions on
Mexican art, including one by the New York
Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1930 and a Rivera
retrospective at the New York Museum of Modern
Art the following year, along with commissions for
these artists within the United States, familiarized
the U.S. public with the Mexican muralists and
added to their growing popularity. Using their
murals to demand social justice, the Mexican art-
ists combined revolutionary imagery of the work-
ing class with sympathetic depictions of their
country’s mistreated and oppressed indigenous
ethnic minorities. Their fight against the inequali-
ties of race and class held a strong attraction for
leftist artists in the United States who saw in it a
model for a politically engaged and aesthetically
powerful art that appealed to the masses.
African Americans in particular were drawn to
the art of Rivera and others. Many of them held
similar political views, and they appreciated the
resonance between their fight against racism and
the muralists’ documentation of the oppression suf-
fered by Mexico’s ethnic minorities as well as admi-
ration for those indigenous cultures. Additionally,
they could not have failed to take note of the

muralists’ inclusion of African Americans in their
depictions of racial and social injustice in the
United States and in their images of revolutionary
workers. Thus, it is hardly surprising that several
African American artists were strongly influenced
by their contact with the Mexican muralists.
Charles Alston, for example, often went to see
Rivera’s Man at the Crossroads before it was
destroyed; Hale Woodruff apprenticed with Rivera
in Mexico in 1936; and both Charles White and
John Wilson studied in Mexico in the mid-1940s
and early 1950s, respectively. These contacts were
all the more important given the limited number of
African American artists employed by the FAP.
The U.S. government officials were interested in
the Mexican muralists for similar reasons, though
they appropriated the idea of the mural and its
monumentalizing conventions while eliminating all
reference to its revolutionary ideology, replacing it
with patriotic content supporting Roosevelt’s New
Deal administration. Despite the leftist politics of
many artists, visual evidence of either socialism or
communism often resulted in the censorship or
destruction of the works. Murals that were not
obvious in their criticism of a capitalist society,
such as Diego Rivera’s Detroit Industry frescoes
(1932–1933) at the Detroit Institute of Arts, posed
no problems. His Man at the Crossroads, however,
painted for the Rockefeller Center in New York in
1933 and that included a portrait of Lenin along-
side workers to symbolize the possibility of revolu-
tion instead of further capitalist development, was
painted over when the artist refused to comply
with Nelson Rockefeller’s demands to eliminate
Lenin. The FAP was no less adamant in its desire
to maintain the images free from allusions to revo-
lutionary ideology. This was in addition to its
requirement that artists paint in a representational,
rather than abstract, mode. Any extremists—
abstractionists, Mexican partisans, academics—
were rooted out and, depending on their compliance
with the directives, divided into three categories of
“good,” “medium,” and “bums.”
Criticism
If social realism had seemed like the ideal mode of
representation for the artist-as-worker to demand
justice and equality in the early 1930s, less than 10
years later, it had already fallen out of favor. The
Social Realism 761
rise of fascism in the late 1930s, combined with the
revelations about Stalinism in the Soviet Union, led
to increasing disillusionment with communism.
What little support remained among artists largely
collapsed in April 1940 when the American Artists’
Congress (AAC), an organization affiliated with
communism, voted in support of the USSR’s inva-
sion of Finland the previous year. Despite the dif-
ferences separating social realism from socialist
realism, the two became linked in the public mind,
associating the former with Stalin’s doctrinaire
enforcement of the latter as the only acceptable
mode of art. Even worse, there were widespread
suspicions that the American Communist Party, or
even Stalinist communists who had infiltrated the
United States, were employing social realism as a
tool of propaganda. Once hailed as the embodi-
ment of democracy and social justice, social real-
ism now exemplified totalitarianism and brutality.
Critics also faulted social realism for its inability
to effect the social change it promised. By its
nature, social realism looked to the past rather than
the future in relying on an artistic style that was not
modern and, thus, contradicted its claims to a the-
ory of progress in politics. Moreover, by depicting
scenes in which everything was recognizable to the
viewers, social realism seemed to suggest that the
social and political change it promised would not
be any different from the current situation.
Regionalism fared even worse in the eyes of critics
in the early 1940s. Though social realism ultimately
seemed entrenched in the past, it at least made the
promise, albeit one that remained unfulfilled, of
effecting a social utopia. Regionalism, however,
made no such claims, and was instead unabashedly
nostalgic and sentimental with its depictions of a
mythic U.S. past. This had worked well in the pre-
vious decade when the nation had been concerned
with its economic recovery and establishing a sense
of nationalism and pride among its citizens. But
with the onset of World War II, the fight for free-
dom and democracy against the threat of fascism
acquired paramount importance. Regionalism’s
antimodernism and its desire to create a native U.S.
art purged of all foreign influences were now seen
as fascist attitudes antithetical to the heart of the
U.S. project. Democracy in the 1940s was equated
with aesthetic freedom.
In the end, artists and critics turned to abstrac-
tion as exemplifying U.S. democracy and freedom.
762 Social Stratification Theory
Several artists who had been committed to social-
ism in the 1930s—including Jackson Pollock,
Barnett Newman, and Mark Rothko—became
part of abstract expressionism, a U.S. movement in
painting that emerged after the war. Their art was
completely abstract; with titles often composed
only of numbers or colors (when given titles at all),
it created the impression that their art was free of
any political or social subject matter, and most
important of all, any propagandistic elements.
Critics discussed the new movement in terms of
universality, individuality, freedom, and
Americanness, the same terms used to describe
U.S. democracy during the cold war.
Isabel Suchanek
See also Collectivism/Individualism; Modernity and
Postmodernity; Nationalism; Propaganda
Further Readings
Anreus, A., Linden, D. L., & Weinberg, J. (Eds.). (2006).
The social and the real: Political art of the 1930s in
the Western hemisphere. University Park: Pennsylvania
State University Press.
Brown, M. C. (1998). Socialist realist painting. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Folgarait, L. (1998). Mural painting and social revolution
in Mexico, 1920–1940: Art of the new order.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Guilbaut, S. (1983). How New York stole the idea of
modern art: Abstract expressionism, freedom, and the
cold war (A. Goldhammer, Trans.). Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Harris, J. (1995). Federal art and national culture: The
politics of identity in New Deal America. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Morgan, S. I. (2004). Rethinking social realism: African
American art and literature, 1930–1953. Athens:
University of Georgia Press.
Whiting, C. (1989). Antifascism in American art. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Social Stratification Theory
Drawing on the metaphoric image of strata in
rock formations, social stratification theory is con-
cerned with understanding the forces that shape
and affect the identity and lives of members of
particular strata of social and cultural systems and
groupings through their relationship to other
strata within larger social and cultural formations.
Moving beyond this geological image, social
stratification theory is not simply concerned with
the formation of strata, but with the social, cul-
tural, political, psychological, and communicative
dynamics by which people’s identities are shaped,
maintained, resisted, conflicted, changed, and
reproduced around the important construct of dif-
ferences between and among important types of
social strata. Put simply, social stratification is a
group of ideas, theories, and research that is con-
cerned with how differences make, and are made
to make, a difference for people within societies in
terms of who they are, what they can be, how they
are viewed by others, the life-scripts that people
perceive are possible for them, and even the struc-
tural conflicts (for example, class struggles) with
members of other strata. To explain the important
specifics of this theory as it relates to identity, this
entry explains what social stratification theory
assumes about differences that make a difference,
how such differences work within the dynamics of
social systems, and the relationship of the differ-
ences and dynamics of stratification for peoples’
identities.
Historical Conditions
Inspiration for earlier versions of social stratifica-
tion theory came from the study of largely historical
exemplars of social and cultural strata. Specifically,
examination of feudal societies (primarily European)
and their impact on people’s lives revealed the
importance of largely ordained social class strata on
the lives and identities of people. Simply, being born
into specific strata was fundamental in shaping
one’s life. For example, “aristocracy,” “tenant
farmer,” “trader,” and “peasant” were significant
constructs in structuring social order that was rela-
tively fixed and impermeable, as well as the long-
term identities and relationships of people within
and between such social strata. Perceptions of self-
worth, status, life opportunities—one’s place in the
world—as well as a host of ways that relationships
between such different strata were managed helped
show how status, power, class, hierarchy, and the
identities of individuals and groups within these

strata were organized or stratified. Some branches
of social stratification theory approach the rela-
tively fixed or preordained structure of classes and
function both as sources of strength and as possible
ways of explaining how such feudal societies, in
which everyone seemed to know their place, became
dominant—even colonial—powers. Some branches
of thought about social stratification focused less
on hierarchy as a functionally strong characteristic,
and more as a source of division and struggle.
Later theoretical permutations of social stratifi-
cation theory focused on more critical treatments
of how feudal and, later, industrial societies
affected people’s lives. Important anthropological
data on more cooperative social and cultural
groupings added to the questioning of the func-
tionalist assumptions that feudal order in some
societies was a natural, desirable, or even divinely
inspired way of organizing strata of people.
Interesting too are the ways that ancient feudal
structures still permeate and echo through the
identities and the relationship between social
classes in societies that have long since moved
beyond feudal ways of organizing people and insti-
tutions. It is possible, for example, to understand
current conflicts in some cultures over fox hunting
as a reproduction or re-articulation of ancient class
tensions between aristocracy and lower classes.
Aristocracy appears to be holding onto fox hunt-
ing as part of its way of life, and protestors believe
it to be a cruel remnant of privilege born of high
social status. Although social class is a fundamen-
tal construct in social stratification theory, in
European societies of this kind, material wealth
and class are not necessarily correlated. It is pos-
sible to be poor materially and be considered
“upper class,” and it is possible to be rich materi-
ally and be considered lower or middle class. Class
is not earned or acquired in the same way that it is
in some societies because markers of class may be
different from society to society (birth versus
earned education or wealth, for example). In many
European societies today, it is also much more
likely that people can experience mobility between
strata such as social class and status. Upward
mobility can occur through professional status,
and related aspects of taste and consumption hab-
its through which particular aspects of the perfor-
mance of higher class status are appropriated into
people’s performances of identities.
Social Stratification Theory 763
Modern Conditions
More recent inspirations for the development of
social stratification theory came from modern
industrial and colonial examples, experiences, and
concepts. Primary among the issues arising from
the move from agrarian to industrial modern soci-
eties was an increased sensibility to the importance
of social class. “Owners,” “managers” (middle
class) and “labor” (working class) are three of the
important strata that emerged through industrial-
ization and remain important dimensions of iden-
tity for people as well as places (for example, some
towns identify themselves as having a blue-collar
identity). In some cultures, “caste” is a particularly
fixed and intractable form of class strata where
one’s identity is closely correlated with one’s level
of social hierarchy. In terms of social stratification
theory, the often stark differences in the lives of
people based on their place in the industrial order
led to the emergence of more critical theoretic
accounts of social structure that were grounded in
Marxist schools of thought. These critical
approaches attempted to link people’s experiences
of social class to issues of working conditions,
access to ownership and production, and other
opportunities with the argument that labor classes
not having a connection to the means of produc-
tion or ownership often resulted in their exploita-
tion and neglect. Access to health care, concerns
with public health, and developments in the legal
protection of working classes (including child
labor laws) can be read as progress in lessening the
gaps between the life experiences of those in lower
and middle social strata. Concepts such as margin-
alization and oppression began to take on an
explanatory significance in accounting for the
experiences of those members of lower strata at
the hands of those of higher strata. With the devel-
opment of mass media in industrialized countries,
attention also turned to the role that media play in
helping to express a variety of tensions related to
stratification. Some have argued, for example, that
media have often been complicit in helping to
manufacture and diffuse images and assumptions
that privilege the upper levels of social strata. For
example, a good deal of research in cultural studies
suggests that news media often support the status
quo regarding social order, and might have a ten-
dency to demonize or discredit the voices and
764 Social Stratification Theory
actions of activists and strikers who might be per-
ceived by members of upper levels of social strata
to be a threat to social order, and the potential loss
of privilege that this would mean to members of
upper social strata.
When immigrants from colonies began to relo-
cate to the major industrial nations that had colo-
nized them or, as in the case of the United States,
when slaves were freed and society was struggling
with the deep change thereafter, this brought race
and ethnicity to the fore for researchers as signifi-
cant sources of social stratification. Coupled with
this were changes relating to gender roles in soci-
ety. Hence, social stratification theory developed
beyond social and economic class to embrace
notions of status and hierarchy related to race,
ethnicity, and gender (particularly the experiences
of women in modern societies). Key to understand-
ing identity was an increased sensitivity to ways
that class, race, ethnicity, and gender were inti-
mately interrelated and mediated by culture (high
culture and popular culture). The 20th century in
particular brought changes in assumptions about
gender roles and the deconstruction of prevalent
gender stereotyping. These changes were often
brought about by activists who voiced dissent with
the way that women’s experiences were often
structured in ways that were assumed to be natu-
rally subordinate to men. Questioning the ways
that women’s lives were structured and stratified
by social institutions, including politics, social and
public policy, and law, has led to much progress
in changing the ways that social stratifications
affect the ways opportunities for women are dif-
ferent from (and less than) those for men.
Questioning around these issues and implications
of stratification continues in the United States and
around the world and often takes the form of
examining mass media images and portrayals of
women. Such issues as how media present and
represent issues that should be of priority to
women (body type, relationships, domestic work
in the home), often indicate that there are subtle
ways that identities are still assumed to echo those
of times before the women’s liberation movement
challenged and changed sexism. Social stratifica-
tion theorists and activists have done much to
show how assumptions of gender roles can be
linked in often subtle and subliminal ways to social
structures that propagated inequality, and how to
change those assumptions and the behavior that
spring from them. As a natural extension of the
understanding of gender has come more recent
activism related to the rights and treatment of gay,
lesbian, and transgendered people. Social stratifi-
cation, it may be argued, is part of the explanation
of why such groupings of people outside of the
traditional norm have been treated as subordinate
to those strata of society that are heterosexual.
Race and Gender
Some have argued that one of the greatest struggles
in contemporary U.S. society is the resolution of
formerly slave-owner relationships and its interre-
lationship with class and related issues of fairness
and opportunity for African Americans. Significant
for social stratification theorists, for example, is an
examination of how the previous relationship—
one essentially of ownership or property—trans-
lates into ways that social strata (class and race) in
contemporary society still maintains the reproduc-
tion of unequal status and prestige for non-Whites.
Research in this vein has explored social and cul-
tural constructions of “whiteness” in terms of how
the experiences and identity constructions of White
people are often still connected to assumptions of
privilege and even superiority. One concern is with
how the assumptions and habits of previous times
are still significant in shaping life trajectories for
both White people and, more importantly, for
African Americans. Another main concern would
be with how progress can be made toward equal-
izing the opportunities that African American citi-
zens experience. This quest for a reduction in the
impact of social strata in ways that are unfair or
oppressive takes up a good deal of space in the
U.S. psyche. Significant also to theorists is an
understanding of the ways that African American
experiences of contemporary culture express this
troubled and complex social and cultural transi-
tion to a society that is supposedly progressing
toward one less stratified by race/ethnicity. Perhaps
most poignant to social stratification theorists is
an examination of the complex and difficult expe-
riences of stratification that African American
women face in adapting to and succeeding in con-
temporary society given the dual difficulty of the

remnants of subordination for race as well as gen-
der. Social stratification can help explain the racial
tensions, conflicts, and even rioting that can occa-
sionally erupt when members of traditionally sub-
ordinate strata (African Americans) perceive
intolerable levels of unequal and unjust treatment
in communities and by government and govern-
ment agencies. Such conflicts show that strongly
held and enduring perceptions of inequality and
injustice still exist and that there is much work to
be done on this issue of promoting a society less
grounded in unequal social stratification and more
grounded in equality and social justice.
Cultural Studies
Inspiration for contemporary versions and appli-
cations of social stratification theory draw on
postcolonial and postmodern examples, experi-
ences, and concepts. Most notable for cultural
studies is, perhaps, work that links issues of social
stratification to the performance of class and class
distinctions through consumption. Read one way,
consumption choices based on class-based taste,
styles (clothing, cars, interior-design choice), and
sensibilities can be seen as everyday habits of con-
structing oneself within a particular class or pres-
tige framework. Consumption based on particular
name brandings, for example, might be viewed as
a semiotic strategy for constituting a hierarchi-
cally class-based identity around exclusivity. That
is, styles stand in place of—or symbolize—cultural
superiority, or membership of upper social strata
such as being middle class. Other forms of con-
sumption choices such as musical taste and related
(particularly youth) subcultural memberships
have also been read as cultural performances of
identity based largely on class that may be either
middle or lower class, or grounded in racial iden-
tity, depending on the stylistic choices made. In
either case, style and its consumption are inti-
mately linked to the constitution of class-based
identities.
Contemporary cultural analyses that are based
on social stratification principles have produced
valuable critical questioning of, and insight into, the
ways that class and other stratifications (race, gen-
der) affect people’s lives. For example, social strata
have been used to help account for the variability of
Social Stratification Theory 765
governmental and community preparedness and
response to emergencies and disasters such as hur-
ricanes. A key question involves asking if there is
a link between race/class and the speed at which
help in such emergencies is mobilized. Are com-
munities, or parts of communities that have mem-
bers of different social strata treated differently in
such events? Another example of a contemporary
application of social stratification principles would
be within so-called post-Fordist or postmodern
workplaces in which hierarchy and divisions
based on status are supposedly minimized. A key
question is whether there is a link between age,
gender, disabilities, and so on, and the way that
people are hired, treated, or promoted in contem-
porary workplaces. Other examples relate to
questioning the variability of health care as it
relates to status of the health care recipients. A
key question here is if and how race and class
have a significant impact on the quality of health
care provided in communities of differing social
status. More examples of applying social stratifi-
cation principles have to do with understanding
the various ways that social status, class, prestige,
and so on affect educational institutions—partic-
ularly regarding the experiences of students in
schools. Key questions relating to stratification
have to do with ways that identities of students
are affected by class membership, subcultural
groups such as gangs that are in competition with
other groups, the impact of race on access to and
quality of educational training in schools, and the
impact of more traditional and hierarchically
gender-based prejudices relating to subject spe-
cializations and related career trajectories such as
examining how young girls are socialized away
from or into science and mathematics. Social
strata can be seen to permeate and be reproduced
in many more ways in these and other institutions
(schools, government, health care, etc.) and affect
the impact of these institutions on the practices of
everyday life.
Pulling together the central threads across the
various branches and developments of social
stratification theory, some defining assumptions
and characteristics are particularly important for
understanding the relationship between social
strata, people, and their individual and collective
identities. First, social stratification has been
766 Society and Social Identity
important in promoting the understanding of the
impact of hierarchy of various types on people’s
lives. Specifically, it can be seen through many
examples that the hierarchical organizing of peo-
ple primarily into classes, as well as other charac-
teristics such as race, gender, and sexual orientation,
can have significant and enduring implications for
the lives that people live and the often conflicted
relationships between people in different social
strata. Second, social stratifications can and do
change, and individuals can move between social
strata such as class in some societies. Strata can be
reorganized effectively, especially if there is suffi-
cient energy and persistence in managing such
change, and especially if change is linked rhetori-
cally to progress, fairness, and social justice. It is
possible to address steps to make sure members of
different social strata receive the same consider-
ation and treatment during disasters, for example.
Third, change is complex in that people’s assump-
tions, perceptions, and ways of being often change
more slowly than they might appear to. Racism
and sexism still echo quite loudly through many
societies—even the most progressive. Systems
have a tendency to try to preserve themselves and
the status quo, and those with higher social status
and prestige will naturally support that status quo
unless there is an overriding will toward equality.
Finally, the understanding of social strata is a key
to understanding human behavior within the con-
text of all social and cultural systems where par-
ticular groups or human characteristics are valued
more highly than others.
Peter M. Kellett
See also Class Identity; Conflict; Political Economy;
Status; Structuration
Further Readings
Beeghley, L. (2000). The structure of social stratification
in the United States (3rd ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Massey, D. (2007). Categorically unequal: The American
stratification system. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
O’Brien, J., & Howard, J. A. (1998). Everyday
inequalities: Critical inquiries. New York: Blackwell.
Rose, S. J. (2007). Social stratification in the United
States: The American profile poster. New York: New
Press.
Society and Social Identity
Identity and its equivalents in languages other than
English may currently be among the most used
nouns in the world. They can be encountered in all
kinds of contexts, referring to all kinds of phenom-
ena. Gender, family, nationality, ethnicity, race,
politics, place of residence, religion, age, sexuality,
occupation, employment, consumption patterns,
musical tastes, sporting allegiances, and leisure
activities apparently all have something to do with
the expression identity and are, for some people,
foci for identification. That this could easily have
been a longer list suggests genuine contemporary
significance. But what does it actually mean, this
word identity?
Before addressing that question, however, a few
remarks about society and the social are necessary.
To turn to society first, although it is a word in
everyday use, what it might be is often frustrat-
ingly unclear. Are small, face-to-face groups societ-
ies, or do only the biggest and most abstract
collectivities qualify? From a different perspective,
does society refer to a generic dimension of the
human repertoire—which might as easily be call
sociality, perhaps—and to the fact that we are not
solitary creatures and need our fellows to become
competent human beings at all?
To narrow the focus somewhat, does the fact
that the conventional sociological model of a soci-
ety is based on the modern nation-state—an orga-
nized unitary group, characterized by definite
boundaries and definite, if not exclusive, criteria of
membership, with a hierarchical division of labor
and some capacity for collective mobilization—
imply that there were no premodern societies? No.
And does this nation-state model actually fit all
societies, as they are discussed today, anyway?
Probably not: Just think about a building society
(what is known as a savings-and-loan in the United
States), a society for the protection of animals,
industrial society, or high society, and the point is
made. The word is imprecise.
Society is also a notion that is sometimes invoked
in implicit or explicit contrast to culture, the one
being patterns of human behavior, the other the
meanings of that behavior. Looked at closely, how-
ever, society and culture depend on each other—
one without the other is unthinkable—and, in

many of the ways in which they are used, particu-
larly to talk about collectivities, they seem to have
more in common with each other than not. Once
again, certainty about what one is actually talking
about when using these words seems to be elusive.
Accepting these reservations, perhaps the best
thing to do is to use society and societies as, at
most, general words referring to the varieties of
human collectivity, and the generic sociality on
which they depend. They are certainly not words
that encourage greater precision in their definition
or use. This may be one of those cases in which
strategic imprecision, which does not foreclose on
the complex variety and routine fuzziness of the
everyday human world, is necessary to achieve the
greatest possible clarity.
This brings us to the social and to social iden-
tity, in particular. The adjective social is arguably
redundant here, although it is probably now a fact
of contemporary life. Human beings learn all that
they know and most of what they can do directly
from, or indirectly during dealings with, other
humans (and this does not refer just to socializa-
tion in childhood and youth, nor does it ignore
individual creativity and innovation). Identities are
no different, and are definitively social: Their pro-
duction and reproduction depends on interaction
with other humans, with some of whom they will
be in some senses shared.
Taken with the arguments of the previous para-
graphs, this suggests that we should not attempt to
distinguish too rigorously between social and cul-
tural identity. More critical, however, is the need
for skepticism about the distinction between per-
sonal identity and social identity that is a staple of
the social identity school of social psychology. In
this social psychological model, which derives
from the pioneering work of the late Henri Tajfel,
personal identity refers to that which distinguishes
a unique individual from other, equally unique,
individuals; social identity is the internalization of
shared, frequently stereotypical, identities. In this
tradition, social identity is often seen as the more
influential in the shaping of behavior.
In the spirit of the discussion so far, however,
personal identity cannot really be anything other
than social: Personality is expressed in language,
behavior, and things, which all draw on more-or-
less shared human repertoires. The content of that
expression may be somewhat idiosyncratic from
Society and Social Identity 767
person to person, but total idiosyncrasy is an
unlikely prospect, and difficult to imagine. Nor is
it, in fairness, what the social psychologists seem to
have in mind. Individuality is actually a matter of
combining elements of shared repertoires. Bearing
this in mind, it perhaps makes most sense to distin-
guish between individual and collective identity
and identification, each of which is utterly social.
This may look like mere quibbling over termi-
nology. However, the real-world implications of
taking the meaning of words seriously can be seen
in U.S. sociologist Rogers Brubaker’s recent cri-
tique of social science analyses of ethno-national-
ism. He argues that “groups” as defined by social
scientists—and what he has in mind is basically the
nation-state model of society, discussed earlier—
are illusions. Worse, they are social theoretical
versions of, and only reinforce, the images of col-
lectivity conjured and manipulated by political
entrepreneurs, for their own, typically nefarious,
purposes. Groups as such have no substantive real-
ity: All that is real, Brubaker argues, are individual
actors, organizations, and a shared, socially con-
structed sense of “groupness,” by which he means
identification with a particular set of people.
Brubaker may partly be tilting at windmills
here, because one accepted social scientific under-
standing of groups defines their reality exactly
with reference to a shared sense of membership
(i.e., “groupness”). However, his argument high-
lights two important themes. First, identity is not
just a matter of academic debate. It continues to be
a game of serious consequences for many people.
Second, whether they agree with Brubaker or not,
social scientists must, in their use of words if noth-
ing else, beware of carelessly appearing to bestow
unwarranted substance on collectivities and identi-
ties—such as “the Serbian people,” “the African
American community,” or “gays and lesbians,” to
offer three random examples—the reality of which
may be primarily rhetorical. When discussing a
certain “identity”—or indeed “society” or
“group”—social scientists must perpetually be on
guard against carelessly assuming that these terms
designate actual collective entities.
Knowing Who’s Who
So, what is identity? Put most simply, it is a matter
of who people are, or, rather, who they are seen to
768 Society and Social Identity
be, by themselves and by others. Identification is
the complex generic human capacity to work out
who’s who, individually and collectively, in the
human world—the multidimensional mapping of a
human world that is in perpetual motion, of our
place in that world, and of the places of others.
This capacity is fundamental to the ongoing daily
creation and recreation of the complex human
world(s) in which we all live. Without knowing
who’s who, it is impossible to work out what’s
what. Mutual identification is, indeed, a basic pre-
requisite of society (and, as discussed earlier, the
same is true vice versa).
It is probably not overstating the case to say
that the first response of any person, on entering
any situation—even a familiar situation, such as
dinner with the family—is to do the identificatory
work required to establish who’s who and what’s
what. Identification is so routine, and usually so
quick, that it only becomes obvious when there is
a question or a problem. All day and every day, we
draw on verbal and nonverbal communicative and
interpretive repertoires to identify others and iden-
tify ourselves to others, who are engaged in the
same business, at the same time. The most com-
mon of these repertoires are based on either lan-
guage or the body:
•• Linguistic repertoires draw on individual and
collective naming, speech patterns (language,
dialect, ecolect, idiolect), and the disclosure of
further personal details (whether orally or in
writing).
•• Embodied repertoires draw on physiology (sex,
skin color, etc.), nonverbal behavior (posture,
facial expression, gesture, etc.), clothing,
adornment, body modification (from cosmetics
to amputation), smell, and touch.
This does not exhaust the possibilities, but in its
emphasis on communication and interpretation, it
suggests a further conclusion. Identity is not a
thing that people have, it is something that they
do—identification—a process that, in principal at
least, is always open to some flexibility and varia-
tion. Although we should not overestimate the
degree to which change is possible—it is one thing
to take a new name, for example, but quite another
to embark on gender reassignment—nor should we
claim identity as a fixed, essential, and imperative
aspect of either individual or collective being. The
observable realities of human life tell a somewhat
different story. In this respect, Brubaker’s argument
that we should banish identity from the social sci-
ence lexicon, replacing it by identification, may be
unrealistic, given existing accepted usage, but it is
understandable. The concern here is with processes
of identification, for which identity is simply a
shorthand term.
Apropos those processes, identification is an
interaction, between how we identify ourselves
and how others categorize us, between self-image
and public image: This is what has elsewhere been
called the internal-external dialectic of identifica-
tion. One of the things that this means is that
there can be no privileging of self-identification.
Another is that identities, rather than being
anchored on individuals, should be understood as
distributed within networks: Identification is a
process that in a real sense takes place between
individuals. Finally, this also means that the prod-
uct of the interaction, identity, at least partly
depends on power relations, particularly on whose
definition of the situation counts most. Identity
can thus be imposed, something to which this
entry returns later.
Similarity and Difference
Identification, before it is anything else, is a pro-
cess of classification, drawing on criteria of simi-
larity and difference. These criteria of comparison
are the logical principles of all classificatory sys-
tems, and each depends on the other for classifica-
tory work to be possible. Thus, to be an A is in
some respects to resemble all other As, but it is
also, and necessarily, to differ from Bs, Cs, Ds, Es,
and so on; to be an English vowel, however—an A,
an E, an I, an O or a U—is to be like other vowels,
but different from the English consonants.
Human collective identification works in the
same way. Being Danish, for example, is appar-
ently to differ from the near neighbors, Swedes and
Norwegians. Linguistically, however, Danes closely
resemble other Scandinavians, the Swedes and
Norwegians, but not Finns or Icelanders.
Nonetheless, in other contexts, other classifica-
tions of culture and political system come into
play, and Danes, Swedes, Norwegians, Finns, and
Icelanders all become Nordic together.

Even with something as apparently clear-cut
and definite as sex/gender—which, before it is any-
thing else, is a matter of identifying individuals—
the distinction between men and women depends
as much on putative similarities within each cate-
gory as on, equally putative, differences between
them. What is more, the category-of-similarity
“human,” denoting our differences from other
primates, provides the broader classificatory sense
within which the distinction between men and
women is made.
So difference in one context may become similar-
ity in another. What is more, neither similarity nor
difference can make any sense without the other.
This is a more profound point than mere logic.
Difference on its own would result in a world of
incomparable individuality; similarity if pursued far
enough would create a universe of homogenized,
abstract monotony. Neither option is humanly
plausible: Similarity and difference play off each
other in the creation and attribution of meaning.
This argument becomes particularly important
when considering much of the recent social sci-
ence of identity. For the last 20 years or more,
many of the most dominant voices in this field
have emphasized difference. Under the signs of
various mutations of postmodernism, postcolo-
nialism, and poststructuralism, a fashionable
orthodoxy has developed that emphasizes differ-
ence as the most important theme of identification
in the contemporary world. Even those authors
who recognize a distinction between identity
(sameness) and difference seem to prioritize differ-
ence as the more significant.
The intellectual and political sources of this
approach to this subject are not hard to see. In no
particular order of significance, these include
French philosopher Jacques Derrida’s critique of
structuralism and his notion of différance, psycho-
analytic models of identification as early dissocia-
tion from significant others, hostility to universal
(often Eurocentric) grand narratives, attempts to
come to terms with globalization’s subversion of
old national certainties, the realities of extensive
long-distance migration, the left’s gradual move
away from class politics, and, not least, campaigns
for equality and rights by women, ethnic minori-
ties, gays and lesbians, and disabled people. The
unifying theme, such as it is, amounts to a celebra-
tion and defense of difference and diversity.
Society and Social Identity 769
Under these circumstances, it is probably not
surprising that this perspective has never amounted
to a cohesive school of thought, but is rather a
diverse, and loose-knit, network of broadly liberal
and left-of-center intellectuals and commentators,
who share some common points of agreement, but
also disagree on many issues. Where there is a bed-
rock of broad agreement, some of this common
ground is helpful if we want to understand how
identification works: First, there is an insistence
that identity is not fixed or primordial (although
this is a theoretical wheel that has merely been
reinvented) and, second, a healthy skepticism
about political universalism, with its tyrannical
implications of compulsory homogeneity.
In at least two respects, however, the difference
model can be seen as a formidable obstacle to
understanding identity and how identification
works. The first issue is the privileging of difference
as the driving force of identification. However, if
we pay attention to difference alone, even if we just
emphasize difference, we will find ourselves at odds
with the observable realities of the human world. If
nothing else, the significance to humans of collec-
tive belonging—community, for want of a better
word, although we might also talk about kinship,
friendship, faith, or other idioms of we and us—
cannot easily be comprehended by this approach.
Many difference theorists do acknowledge belong-
ing, in its many forms. There is, however, a tension
between that acknowledgement and the counter
argument that identity politics is predicated on the
creation and maintenance of difference.
The recognition of difference per se is not the
issue here. The issues are, rather, the placing of
differentiation on an analytical pedestal as the
fundamental principle of identification; the failure
to grasp the necessary and simultaneous interde-
pendence of similarity and difference, each pro-
ducing and informing the other; and mistaking
how the world ought to be for how the world is.
The latter may be the underlying concern:
Celebrating the positivities of diversity and pro-
moting mutually tolerant recognition are political
positions that many doubtless support, but politi-
cal programs, no matter how progressive, do not
make for good theory, and wishful thinking is
generally bad social science.
The second issue concerns history. Difference is
seen as the dominant side of the equation and
770 Society and Social Identity
perceived to be something that is relatively new, a
script for the times in which we live. This is the
grand historical narrative that underwrites the
analytical privileging of difference. It is worth a
section in its own right.
Modernity and Identity
An image of difference and diversity as historically
relatively novel—whether modern, late modern, or
postmodern is beside the point—emerges in the
work of many difference theorists. One example,
from Stuart Hall, on the more moderate wing of
difference theory, may make the general point:
“Cultural diversity is, increasingly, the fate of the
modern world” (p. 8). It is as if cultural diversity
is either new or somehow on the rise. On the one
hand, everything that we know about the past tells
us that the cultural landscape, whatever else it may
have been, has always been a panorama of diver-
sity; on the other hand, the historical consequences
of imperialism, ethnocide, nation-state building,
and globalization are at least as likely to push us
in the direction of greater homogeneity. Cultural
diversity has always been the state of the human
world.
Nor is it just difference that is at issue. A more
general argument asserts that identity has become
more salient in the modern world. There are three
distinct elements to this argument: first, that iden-
tity today is chosen or achieved rather than
ascribed; second, that identity has become a more
pressing existential issue of selfhood than it was in
earlier times; and third, that life is less stable and
change more rapid and overwhelming than in pre-
vious eras. Each of these is discussed in turn.
To what extent, then, is identity in the modern
human world chosen or achieved? The immediate
answer is that identity is, to a large extent, mutable
for some people. A marked degree of social mobil-
ity, which has no obvious historical precedent, is
characteristic of modern capitalist industrial soci-
eties. It is the long-term result of economic expan-
sion, democratic revolutions between the 17th and
20th centuries, the transformation of peasantries
into proletariats, the impact of women’s move-
ments and mass-mobilized warfare on gender
roles, expanded educational opportunities, and
changing attitudes with respect to class (in approx-
imate historical order). In addition, capitalists
learned long ago to use appeals to identity as a
marketing strategy, so today the market place
encourages and caters to all kinds of “identity
projects,” from youth lifestyles, to trophy child­
rearing, to middle-aged adventurism, to post-
retirement reinvention. One of the most important
nexuses of identification has become money: If one
can afford it, there are all kinds of possibilities.
The “for some people” is crucially important.
Not everyone has access to the resources—
economic and educational, in particular—that are
required to either choose, or reject, particular iden-
tities. Despite increased affluence, this remains true
for large numbers of people in democratic indus-
trial societies because class stratification has not
gone away. It is even more true for many millions
of people in the poor countries of the world.
Merely staying alive may be the most urgent iden-
tity project that there is.
What’s more, for many people, the experience
of being authoritatively categorized in the course
of being “processed” by more powerful others and
by organizations is an everyday, consequential fact
of life about which they can do little: welfare
claimants, disabled people, homeless people, and
those who are confined in hospitals, prisons, refu-
gee camps, asylum seeker detention centers, and
similar institutions are only the most obvious. The
labeling perspective in the sociology of deviance
reminds us that this external categorization may
become internalized as self-identification. Children
and young people are in a particular situation in
this respect. Lacking competence and the formal
and informal rights of adulthood, categorization
by others is simply a routine fact of life for them,
and, indeed, an important and necessary part of
socialization. So not everyone can choose who
they are, or who they will become.
Disability has been mentioned already, but
embodiment—or physiology—is important in
other respects, too. It sets limits to what can con-
veniently or easily be achieved with respect to
identity change. Gender reassignment, for example,
is possible, but, by virtue of its bodily nature, no
one can just do it, unilaterally. In addition to eco-
nomic resources, the process requires the approval
and participation of authoritative significant
others—surgeons and possibly psychologists—and
the everyday interactional cooperation of loved
ones, friends, and a more distant audience. Race is

even more obstinate: passing (identifying oneself as
a member of race to which he or she does not
belong) may be possible, depending once again on
the limits set by embodiment, but it is unusual.
Less dramatically, the magazine racks of afflu-
ent societies are eloquent testimony that many of
us are dissatisfied with our bodies: We may want
to be taller, heavier and more muscled, thinner, or
generally better looking. Despite the cornucopia of
remedies on offer, however, individual bodies set
real limits to how far we can change them. With
respect to physiological embodiment, the world is
not everyone’s oyster.
Moving on, what can be said about the existen-
tial weight of identity, the pressing imperatives of
selfhood and its realization that apparently charac-
terize modernity? Does the fact that there is so
much talk about identity today reflect anything
other than the relatively recent adoption of a spe-
cialized term for something that was always part
of the human repertoire? The most well-known
sociological account of the contemporary existen-
tial significance of identity comes from British
sociologist Anthony Giddens, who argues that
reflexive self-identity—identity as a conscious
project of self-improvement and personal develop-
ment, as part of the “examined life”—is in some
sense definitive of late modernity and is distinctly
late modern. Reflexive self-identity, understood in
this way, enables individuals, with the help of the
expert knowledge of counselors, therapists, and
the like, to write scripts for their lives that allow
them much-needed senses of personal agency.
Much depends here on Giddens’s narrow defi-
nition of reflexive self-identity, as a matter of
planned personal growth rather than as a generic
characteristic of all human beings. The latter may
be a more defensible definition sociologically, not
least because the former seems, simply by defini-
tional fiat, to exclude most humans, throughout
most of the long haul of human history, from the
scope of the argument, implicitly dismissing them
as incapable of reflecting on their lives or even,
perhaps, knowing who they were. The most cur-
sory look at the historical and ethnographic
records suggest that Giddens’s argument may say
more about the conceits of modernist social theory
than about selfhood.
Even taking Giddens’s definition of reflexive
self-identity at face value, however, the argument
Society and Social Identity 771
can be considered problematic for two reasons.
First, there is simply too much evidence—not
least in the religions of personal redemption, from
the Buddhist scriptures to St. Augustine’s
Confessions—of premodern attitudes toward the
self that at least somewhat resemble Giddens’s
reflexivity and the examined life. Second, Giddens’s
projects of reflexive selfhood, far from being
definitive of modernity, are at most the preoccupa-
tion of a minority of relatively educated, relatively
well-off people in the affluent capitalist industrial
societies. Many other people in those societies,
affluent or educated or not, do not spend too
much time cultivating projects of the self in the
manner that he describes: They have more urgent,
if not better, things to do. This is essentially to
revisit the argument about choice, earlier; these
bear reiteration, however, and suggest the need for
a political economy of identity.
To take the point further, and move away from
Giddens, it is impossible to know how one might
begin to assess empirically the claim there is a
greater need “for a sense of who one is” today
than there was in the past. All that can be said with
any confidence is that society and sociality are, and
have always been, matters of humans interacting
with each other in mutually meaningful ways, for
which a sense of who’s who—with respect to self
and others, individuals and collectivities—is neces-
sary. How, or why, could that basic human need
have become more urgent or pressing?
This is precisely the question that the argument
about social change addresses. There can be little
doubt that the pace of social change has speeded
up during the 20th century (although the speed-up
started earlier). The motors of change include
capitalism, the spread of democratic government,
the greater speed and volume of transportation,
migration, successive revolutions in communica-
tions media, and the establishment of public health
and welfare regimes. Many other factors could be
mentioned. It is less certain, although it is plausible,
that as a consequence of this array of changes, the
nature of everyday human experience has changed.
This, for example, is at the heart of the concept of
globalization: Most humans are now believed to
know, experientially in their everyday lives, that
they live in a nonlocal, globalized world.
However, this does not mean that we can
assume that there has been dramatic change in the
772 Society and Social Identity
networks and groups within which people live
their lives and engage in mutual identification.
Humans are adaptable and deal with change—
indeed that may be one of the keys to understand-
ing the global dominance of the species—but the
continuity of human experience should not be
ignored either. For most people, the basic contexts
of everyday life and identification are family and
kinship relations, friendship networks (whether
face-to-face or online), neighborhood life, eco-
nomic activity, spiritual or religious communion,
and the institutions of authority or government.
With respect to these facts of the human world, the
more things change, the more they stay the same.
Nor does it necessarily mean that, in terms of
identification, there is more to make sense of, or
that sense making has become more difficult
(although, depending on local circumstances, it
may have become more complex, which is not
always the same thing). Diversity is as diversity is
experienced, rather than something than can be
calibrated and measured, and too little is known
about how diversity was experienced in the past
to draw conclusions with confidence. However,
then and now, some social settings and places
were or are experienced as more or less diverse,
and complex multicultural societies are not defin-
itively modern. If anything, modernity has been
characterized by the attempts of nation-states to
discourage diversity in the pursuit of public cul-
tural homogeneity.
Although identification in the modern world
may, in some respects, be distinctive, that distinc-
tiveness is not necessarily a matter of greater diver-
sity or the greater significance of self-identification.
Another—perhaps more plausible—view in this
respect is that diversity, belonging, and everyday
identification processes are, and have always been,
generic characteristics of human life. They are part
of what it is to be human.
What may be distinctively modern is the every-
day significance of categorization by powerful oth-
ers, and by organizations of power. This point was
made compellingly by French social theorist Michel
Foucault in his book Discipline and Punish. The
process began in earnest with the state registration
of populations for the purposes of taxation, which
can be traced back to the ancient world. It gath-
ered pace as the nation-state became the geopoliti-
cal norm, taking shape in population censuses,
passports and identity cards, fingerprinting, and
bureaucratized internal political and criminal sur-
veillance. With benign progressive intentions, the
process spread into voter registration, public health
monitoring, and state welfare distribution.
Capitalists got into the act because marketing
became ever more sophisticated, targeting indi-
viduals as members of consumer categories. Most
recently, the process has expanded exponentially
as new technologies have been developed—from
cheap computing, to spy satellites, to electronic
eavesdropping, to closed-circuit television in pub-
lic places—and grounds for using them, such as the
“war on terror” and “reclaiming the streets,” have
become available.
The broad historical direction of travel has
been from population monitoring to individual
surveillance. Today, we are recorded and catego-
rized in ways that are often not visible to us. This
categorization is always potentially consequential,
and those consequences may be significant indeed,
from the refusal of welfare or other benefits to the
imposition of financial or other penalties. The
power of states and corporations today comes at
least as much from knowledge, specifically iden-
tificatory knowledge about individuals, as it does
from the barrel of a gun or from money (not that
there is any contradiction between these
options).
Generic human identification is an ongoing
interaction between self-identification and catego-
rization by others, and individuals and groups will
continue to assert their own identifications, to
resist categorization in whatever ways they can.
Where the balance will eventually be struck remains
to be seen.
Richard Jenkins
See also Difference/Différance; Modernity and
Postmodernity; Self; Social Identity Theory
Further Readings
Benhabib, S. (1996). Introduction: The democratic
moment and the problem of difference. In S. Benhabib
(Ed.), Democracy and difference: Contesting the
boundary of the political. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Brubaker, R. (2004). Ethnicity without groups.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Foucault, M. (1979). Discipline and punish: The birth of
the prison. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin.
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity: Self and
society in the late modern age. Cambridge, UK: Polity
Press.
Gilroy, P. (1997). Diaspora and the detours of identity.
In K. Woodward (Ed.), Identity and difference.
London: Sage.
Hall, S. (1992, June). Our mongrel selves. New
Statesman and Society, 19, 6–8.
Howard, J. A. (2000). Social psychology of identity.
Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 367–393.
Jenkins, R. (2008). Social identity (3rd ed.). London:
Routledge.
Society of the Spectacle
The writings of Guy Debord, and the idea of a soci-
ety of almost total commodity-based reification—
the society of the spectacle—is likely to remain the
most significant legacy of Situationist thought.
Debord’s major work, The Society of the Spectacle,
published in 1967, is a critique on the nature of the
individual’s identity in French society.
Debord was born in Paris in 1931 and grew up
in the Mediterranean city of Cannes. He dropped
out of the University of Paris, where he had been
accepted to study law, to become a poet, revolu-
tionary writer, and filmmaker. He founded the
Lettrist International (perhaps most famous for
disrupting the Cannes Film Festival in 1951) with
Gil J. Wolman. This is a postsurrealist group of
poets and writers that seeks the destruction of
bourgeois cultural ideas and values by reducing its
language—symbolized by the written word—to
onomatopoeic syllables. The Lettrist ideas and
interventions are represented by the journal ION.
From 1957, Debord determined the actions of the
Situationist International (SI), an activist movement
that sought to set itself up as “the only contempo-
rary power against the forces of the past.” At the
founding meeting, Debord presented a program-
matic text titled “Report on the Construction of
Situations,” in which he outlined the strategies of
the SI in relation to the cultural avant-garde. In the
1960s, Debord took the leading role in the SI move-
ment and was a supporter of the Paris uprising of
1968. His major written work is the SI-inspired
Society of the Spectacle 773
The Society of the Spectacle. In the 1970s, he dis-
banded the SI movement, and continued with film-
making supported by the financial backing of
Gerard Lebovici. Debord’s two major films are the
Society of the Spectacle of 1973, and the autobio-
graphical We Turn in a Circle at Night and We Are
Consumed by Fire (In Girum Imus Nocte et
Consumimur Igni) of 1981. Debord committed
suicide (shooting himself through the heart at his
cottage in Champot) on November 30, 1994.
The SI is a political and artistic movement that
centered on Debord’s ideas and interventions. The
movement is represented by a journal of the same
name published between 1958 and 1969. Debord
and his colleagues attempt to create a series of
strategies to engage in Marxist class struggle by
reclaiming a sense of individual autonomy from
the pervasive embrace of the spectacle: “All of life
presents itself as an immense accumulation of
spectacles” (The Society of the Spectacle, p. 12).
These strategies include the most-cited neologisms
dérive and détournement, and draw on the tradi-
tions of the historical avant-garde, Dada, and sur-
realism in particular. Dérive might be described as
a productive wandering, a Situationist drifting
through the city to map the pyschogeography of
different communities. Rather than being impris-
oned by the daily routines of life, Debord urged
citizens to follow their emotions in such wonder-
ings and reconsider the urban spaces in which they
and others live and work; this idea allies with
Henri Lefebvre’s call for the Critique of Everyday
Life. Such wanderings led Debord to the belief that
cities and their modes of spatial organization con-
trol populations through their design (the notion
of spatial politics). Détournement suggests diver-
sion, deflection, or hijacking for prohibited or
political purposes. In this strategy, an artist reuses
well-known elements to create a new work with a
different, often contrary, message. This notion
is anticipated by Marcel Duchamp’s ready-
mades, Bertolt Brecht’s understanding of
Umfunktionerung, and Dada photomontages. This
strategy is also practiced contemporarily, as in
Andy Warhol’s Coca-Cola bottles, Brillo boxes,
and Campbell’s soup cans, in which consumer
gratification is mimicked and appropriated, or in
the work of the Brazilian artist Cildo Meireles,
who silk-screens political messages onto empty
glass Coca-Cola bottles and then “reintroduces”
774 Society of the Spectacle
them into the capitalist system. Such strategies, in
the hands of the Situationists, attempt to confront
the power of the spectacle with its own commodity
detritus. Capitalist products thus subvert capital-
ism itself.
The collection of writings that constitute The
Society of the Spectacle is divided into 221 theses;
Debord’s discussion sets itself against the ruling
conditions of contemporary French society. The
book maintains its ground in relation to each single
thesis, but seen as a whole, the work is significantly
fragmentary and ambiguous. Nevertheless, it repre-
sents a powerful critique of the nature of the indi-
vidual’s identity in French society. Debord and
Michel Foucault described two different ways of
criticizing visual culture in terms of what is widely
called the scopic regime. Foucault focused on the
normalizing effect of being the object of the gaze,
and Debord and the Situationist emphasized the
dangers of being the subject of that gaze. For the
Situationist, the seductive political manipulation of
images is far more pernicious than is Foucault’s
concept of uncanny surveillance (brought to a head
in contemporary closed-circuit television observa-
tions). In the French language, spectacle also refers
to a theatrical presentation, that is, a suspension of
belief, a situation analogous to the situation of the
commodified consumer. According to Debord, in
societies where the modern conditions of production
prevail, all of life presents itself as an immense accu-
mulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly
lived has moved away into mere representation; all
that was once solid melts into air. It is a world of
vision and image, which has become completely
objectified. Debord’s point is that the image (TV
images, advertising images, images of popular cul-
ture and of celebrity, newspaper images, film, and
so on) is not at fault as such, images simply act as
mediators among the people of a society. The real
issue is the denigration of the way in which images
mediate between those individuals. Debord argues
that the spectacle, and its hypnotic, anodyne media-
tion, separates and alienates the individual—thus
preventing any political engagement, any dialogue
and consensus about class structure and class strug-
gle within a society. According to this scenario,
those who consume visual culture in passivity are
suspended in a dream world of capitalist fantasy.
The commodified or reified individual (a situa-
tion where individuals themselves are reduced to
commodities in capitalist cultures) no longer asks
these images, or their systems, for knowledge or to
provide some purchase on reality. The consumers
of these images expect nothing of them but a con-
tinuation of a limitlessly productive game; one
image after another, one commodity after another.
In this schema, the individual subject is dealing
with an explosion of signs without meaning, and
without a means of exit. Society as a whole has
been reduced to a giant spectacle, in which the
images of the commodity (commodity fetish)
totally occupy everyday existence, thus uniting
capitalist production and consumption in a perfect
dance. In The Society of the Spectacle, Debord
describes a vast and meaningless game of mean-
ings: Images lead only to other images and con-
sume themselves in ever more rapid production, no
deeper significance or object hides behind them,
and they are entirely superficial. This is a��������
simula-
tion of reality or, as Jean Baudrillard would have
it, a simulacrum of reality. That is, a condition
arrived at when the distinction between representa-
tion and reality, between signs and their significa-
tions, dissolves. It was hoped that the strategies of
détournement and dérive would go some way to
break the pattern of reciprocal alienation Debord
identifies as underpinning the relationship between
the spectacle and the real (the real in this case being
historical materialism). Debord is highly critical of
the conventional practice of art because it is recu-
perated by capitalism (museums, collectors, the art
market, critics, and historians) as a means of con-
ditioning, “brain washing,” the wider population.
Asger Jorn, a founding member of SI, resigned
from SI in 1961 in response to increasingly hostile
criticism of art from the group around Debord,
and in 1962, SI disqualified art from consideration
as a legitimate site of revolutionary struggle.
Peter Muir
See also Artistic Development and Cognition; Collective/
Social Identity; Modern Art; Propaganda
Further Readings
Debord, G. (2004). The society of the spectacle. New
York: Zone Books.
Lebovici, G. (Producer), & Debord, G. (Writer/Director).
(1973). La société du spectacle [Documentary].
Paris: Gaumont.

Lebovici, G. (Producer), & Debord, G. (Writer/Director).
(1978). In girum imus nocte et consumimur igni
[Documentary]. Paris: Gaumont.
Sociometer Hypothesis
The sociometer hypothesis is rooted in the histori-
cal tradition of psychology explaining the existence
of self-esteem. According to this hypothesis, self-
esteem acts as a gauge that measures the quality
and state of an individual’s relationships with other
people. The foundational premise for the hypothe-
sis states that people are pervasively driven to pos-
sess and maintain meaningful interpersonal
relationships and group memberships. It would
then follow that some type of mechanism would
evolve that could monitor the status of relation-
ships for individuals so they could then adjust
accordingly to maintain their standing within social
settings and not risk ostracism. This mechanism—
the sociometer—constantly assesses cues from the
social environment to determine the extent to
which an individual is successfully maneuvering
through his or her interpersonal relationships.
Psychologists have historically examined self-
esteem because it has been seen as an important
psychological construct. Researchers have identi-
fied two distinct types of self-esteem: trait self-
esteem and state self-esteem. Trait self-esteem
refers to an individual’s general understanding of
his or her value in the individual’s social world,
and state self-esteem refers to the situational fluc-
tuations a person may experience in relation to his
or her worth within the individual’s social settings.
Originally, the sociometer hypothesis was criti-
cized for not considering these differentiated states
of self-esteem; however, further clarifications of
the hypothesis revealed that both states were
accounted for by the sociometer hypothesis.
Regarding the hypothesis, state self-esteem could
easily be considered a baseline level self-esteem
that has accounted for a lifetime’s worth of evalu-
ations of relational standing for an individual.
State self-esteem, however, offers an evaluation of
the current situation for an individual that can lead
to fluctuations from the baseline trait self-esteem
level depending on whether an individual encoun-
ters cues that relay high or low relational standing.
Sociometer Hypothesis 775
If one considers the sociometer to be a gas gauge
in a car, where the needle rests, on average, repre-
sents the trait self-esteem of a person, and the
movement of the needle represents the state self-
esteem that is affected by the inputs received from
the social cues in an individual’s environment.
Considering the sociometer hypothesis attempts
to explain the functional existence of self-esteem,
other theories have come forward to offer oppos-
ing views. One of the most prominent alternative
theories is terror management theory. This theory
concludes that self-esteem exists because it helps
distract people from the fear of death, which is a
uniquely human experience because humans are
capable of considering their own mortality. Terror
management theory has been offered as a more
cogent theory to explain self-esteem in contrast to
the sociometer hypothesis, and several articles
have examined the differences and similarities in
their ability to explain the function of self-esteem.
However, the authors of the sociometer hypothesis
have summarized their own positions on this mat-
ter because each theory is useful in explaining
certain domains of social behavior.
From social identity theory, people join groups
to gain positive self-esteem based on comparisons
with other relevant groups. Therefore, it would be
most useful to have some mechanism in place that
could monitor self-esteem. Also, within social iden-
tity theory, self-categorization theory argues that
people within any given group will evaluate the
characteristics of other group members to deter-
mine whether individual members are doing enough
to maintain group membership. Based on this infor-
mation, the sociometer serves an important func-
tion because it allows people to understand if their
behaviors and attitudes are acceptable to the rest of
the group. If the member successfully displays the
appropriate behaviors and attitudes, he or she
would experience positive self-esteem because his or
her standing with in the group would be secure.
However, if he or she does not properly display
behaviors and attitudes indicative of the group, the
individual would experience low self-esteem because
this would communicate that he or she was in jeop-
ardy of being ostracized and isolated.
Since its development, the sociometer hypothesis
has been tested and shown to exist when people are
given the choice of joining a new group. People low
in self-esteem were more likely to join groups if
776 Sovereignty
they knew there were no conditions on acceptance.
Meanwhile, people high in self-esteem showed no
preference for group membership based on whether
they were guaranteed acceptance from other group
members. These findings have been replicated in
other nations and while controlling for other vari-
ables that might have mediated the relationship
between self-esteem and social acceptance.
The sociometer hypothesis stipulates that self-
esteem is used as a mechanism for monitoring
social cues that give information about acceptance
in interpersonal relationships and group member-
ships. As self-esteem fluctuates around a general
baseline state of self-esteem, it conveys specific
information about an individual’s standing within
social settings. For example, low self-esteem con-
veys the message that an individual is at risk of
being ostracized and isolated. However, having
high self-esteem provides the information that a
person has little need to change attitudes or behav-
iors because all social cues indicate that his or her
social standing is secure. This means the person
would have a good balance of enough individua-
tion while displaying the necessary social markers
for maintaining strong group identity. The sociom-
eter is an evolutionarily important mechanism that
is believed to have developed to monitor the social
cues necessary to determine social standing through
fluctuations in self-esteem.
Jason E. Rivera
See also Collective/Social Identity; Group Identity;
Individuation; Self-Esteem; Self-Monitoring; Social
Identity Theory; Terror Management Theory
Further Readings
Hogg, M. A., Hohman, Z. P., & Rivera J. E. (2008).
Why do people join groups? Three motivational
accounts from social psychology. Social and
Personality Psychology Compass, 2/3, 1269–1280.
Leary, M. R. (2004). The function of self-esteem in terror
management theory and sociometer theory: Comment
on Pyszcznski et al. (2004). Psychological Bulletin,
130, 478–482.
Leary, M. R., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). The nature
and function of self-esteem: Sociometer theory. In
M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social
psychology (Vol. 32, pp. 1–62). San Diego, CA:
Academic Press.
Sovereignty
Sovereignty is a characteristic of a political entity
that, within a defined geographical area, possesses
and exercises power that is the highest in that
area. The sovereign entity’s decision is both gener-
ally applicable throughout the area and, although
extraneous matters such as public or world opin-
ion are not typically disregarded, the sovereign
entity acts independently. Sovereignty has, since
the European Renaissance, been an important
characteristic of the modern state, assisting in the
development of national identity. Initially, sover-
eignty operated within a state, establishing where
power resides. Eventually, sovereignty functioned
more within the context of international relations,
distinguishing one state from another and thereby
defining exclusive areas of political power as well
as separable national political identities. Both
political thought and political realities since the
Renaissance have complicated both the intrastate
and international applicability of the concept of
sovereignty, however.
Sovereignty in Domestic Affairs
Within any geographical area, entities compete
for power. When the concept of sovereignty
developed in the Renaissance, there was competi-
tion between ecclesiastical and secular entities.
Today, the competition might be between trans-
national corporate and secular entities. The con-
cept of sovereignty assumes that there is a winner
in any competition. This winner would possess
the highest power and be able to exercise it inde-
pendently of other entities. This victor’s decisions
would govern affairs throughout the area and
would be final. This victor would be said to pos-
sess sovereignty.
The concept was defined well in Jean Bodin’s Six
Books of a Commonwealth (1576) and reiterated
in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651). Both Bodin
and Hobbes assumed a strong state, one that in
their time would have been associated with a strong
ruler such as a monarch. In the next hundred or so
years, John Locke, Montesquieu, and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau challenged the assumption that sover-
eignty rests in such a ruler. They instead invested
power in the people or, at least, in a governmental

body thought representative of the people.
Although the concept of sovereignty and the idea
that the state possesses this characteristic survived
this challenge, these philosophers generated more
democratic thinking, further texturing the con-
cept of identity and democracy.
For example, if the sovereign state is said to pos-
sess the highest power, how can that be if the peo-
ple are ultimately superior, especially if they can
demonstrate that superiority by either voting the
governors of the state out of power or by reversing
the governors’ decisions by referenda? Furthermore,
if the people as voters have this ultimate power and
if those who govern are aware of its existence as
they act, how can the governors’ decisions be said
to be truly independent? Are not the decisions to
some extent swayed by public opinion?
Many of the emerging democratic governments
featured a system of checks and balances among
those engaged in ruling the state. If an elected
assembly’s will can be overruled by an elected
executive’s veto, then is not that assembly’s sover-
eignty at least qualified? Furthermore, if that
assembly’s will can be overruled by a court engaged
in judicial review, is not that assembly’s sover-
eignty still further qualified? The answer, in cases
such as these, may well be to hold the government
in its totality sovereign or to posit that a document
such as the U.S. Constitution is sovereign, possess-
ing power that is higher, more final, more gener-
ally applicable, and more autonomous than any
governing body or agent that the document may
establish and define.
Democracy, insofar as proponents assume pop-
ular sovereignty or features checks and balances, is
not the only complication to the idea of sover-
eignty. The size and resulting complexity of the
modern state also complicates the concept. In such
a state, there is typically a distribution of power. In
such a diffuse system, few acts are as generally
applicable as are those of a monarch or despot.
Furthermore, in such a state, there are typically lay-
ers of power. Final power may be distributed hori-
zontally throughout the system based on jurisdiction
as well as vertically based on whether the decision
is thought to be trivial or important. Where the
highest and final authority rests may well depend
on what the matter under consideration is.
Despite these complications, the concept of sov-
ereignty has endured. Theorists seem to grant
Sovereignty 777
popular sovereignty, checks and balances, and the
diffuse, layered modern government while adher-
ing to the assumption of the sovereign state ini-
tially articulated by Bodin and Hobbes. Political
realities require qualifications but not a revision of
the fundamental concept.
Sovereignty in International Affairs
As the names of the philosophers already men-
tioned suggest, sovereignty is a Western political
concept. In the less-developed world, the concept
has taken hold and is still functioning much as it
did in the Renaissance: as a way to resolve compe-
tition for power among entities within a state. In
the developed Western world, however, the con-
cept is now functioning less within a state and
more among states. In this larger context, sover-
eignty allows states, however they might be gov-
erned, to exercise the highest, the final, and the
most all-encompassing power over their internal
affairs without interference from other entities. The
United Nations (UN) charter, for example, in
Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 7, establishes this con-
cept of sovereignty as a basic assumption for the
conduct of international affairs in the post–World
War II period.
Already implicit in that charter, however, is a
complication that undercuts this concept of sover-
eignty: The charter recognizes the right of the global
community to act under certain circumstances—for
example, if human rights are being violated. That
concern was important in the post-Holocaust envi-
ronment in which the charter was written, and that
concern has incrementally increased in the decades
since. Joining it has been a concern for the common
resources of air and water as well as the presum-
ably common frontier of space. If the supposed
sovereign state is violating human rights or fouling
the commons, the international community should
be able to act in some manner to overrule that
state’s internal decisions. Is, then, the international
community—or some international organization
such as the UN—sovereign? Most would say no,
for UN edicts can be ignored by the state. Of
course, the renegade state then tempts the UN to
enforce its position militarily. Such action, however,
would not be viewed as an affront to the state’s
sovereignty but, rather, an extraordinary response
to a sovereign state’s affront to internationally
778 Spectacle and the Self
recognized standards of conduct that transcend
sovereignty.
International law has long wrestled with the
conflicting idea of sovereignty and the need to deal
with the many matters that either do not stay
neatly situated within a state’s boundaries or
require international intervention on moral
grounds. Commerce, of course, was the primary
example of boundary-crossing activity after the
Renaissance. Initially, those involved could be
clearly associated with one sovereign state or
another, thereby providing international law as a
starting point. Today, the globalization of com-
mercial activities has created an environment in
which the individual players are not necessarily
under a single sovereign state’s jurisdiction but are
transnational. Under whose authority are they? Or
do they possess power that transcends and perhaps
surpasses that of the individual state? If so, perhaps
these corporations, as well as other international
entities, might be said to possess sovereignty.
Again, despite these complications, the concept
of sovereignty and the assumption that it inheres
in the state have endured. Theorists seem to admit
both the sanctity of the sovereign state in the inter-
national arena and the circumstances under which
this sanctity might have to be violated. They fur-
thermore grant the many ways in which the
autonomy of the state is increasingly a functioning
myth. Again, political realities require qualifica-
tions but not a revision of the fundamental con-
cept of sovereignty.
The concept of sovereignty then endures. It is,
however, the subject of a considerable body of
writing. That theorizing attempts to reconcile the
fundamental notion found in Bodin and Hobbes,
which presumes one kind of state, with newer
political realities in many if not most states.
Furthermore, that theorizing attempts, first, to
modify the concept from one defining power
within a state to one useful in defining the terms of
relationships among states and, second, to adjust
this modified concept to fit newer political realities
in international affairs. In this literature, some
have suggested that the concept of sovereignty has
limited value in contemporary government and
international relations. The prevailing opinion,
however, seems to be that the concept, although it
must be modified to fit contemporary political
realities, offers a valuable if somewhat fictitious
basis for defining power relations within a single
state and among several.
Theodore F. Sheckels
See also Political Identity; State Identity;
Transnationalism
Further Readings
Bull, H. (1977). The anarchical society: A study of order
in world politics (3rd ed.). New York: Columbia
University Press.
Dicey, A. V. (1959). Introduction to the study of the law
of the constitution (10th ed.). London: Macmillan.
Held, D. (1989). Political theory and the modern state.
Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
Hinsley, F. H. (1986). Sovereignty (2nd ed.). Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Jouvenal, B. de. (1957). Sovereignty: An inquiry into the
political good. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kelsen, H. (1949). General theory of law and state.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
King, P. (1974). The ideology of order: A comparative
analysis of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes. London:
Allen & Unwin.
Laski, H. J. (1917). Studies in the problem of sovereignty.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Merriam, C. E. (1900). History of the theory of
sovereignty since Rousseau. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Morgenthau, H. (2005). Politics among nations: The
struggle for power and peace (7th ed.). New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Stankiewicz, W. J. (1976). Aspects of political theory:
Classical concepts in an age of relativism. London:
Collier-Macmillan.
Spectacle and the Self
The history of the spectacle is tied to the politics of
illusion, seduction, fantasy, and exaggeration. The
spectacle’s main function is to promote passivity
and confusion by manipulating the perception of
events in such a way as to obscure their true
nature. Under different social formations, it emerges
in different forms. Under late capitalism, what
constitutes the modern spectacle is a complex net-
work of ideological and material conditions. These

conditions now play an increasingly significant
role in the formation of the sociopolitical sense of
identity and self that panders to a subjectivity that
is narcissistically concerned with its own develop-
ment in the name of self-fulfillment. As such, the
common good is built on the promise of symbolic
rather than material satisfaction; the contested
territory of competing political solutions gives
way to culturally defined niche markets and other
distractions.
In the early 1960s, Guy Debord—the experi-
mental filmmaker and the principle theorist for
the Situationist International (SI), a rag-tag, ad
hoc  assemblage of self-proclaimed revolutionary
intellectuals and avant-garde artists sporting sur-
realist, Marxist, Maoist, and Frankfurt school
beliefs—first identified the qualitative change tak-
ing place in the character of capitalist society. In
his book The Society of the Spectacle published in
1967, Debord advances the thesis that capitalism
(both its liberal democratic and autocratic state
forms), to cement its grip on all spheres of private
and communal life, was turning society into an
object. The condition of an all-encompassing
social and economic system that promises the sat-
isfaction of all individual needs is built on a kind
of schizophrenia inherent in the taxonomy and
idealism of Western society.
Though Debord was decidedly a Marxist in the
1960s at the time he identified the emergent spec-
tacularization of society, he held the unique view
that capitalism as an institution and a system
had culturally co-opted its antithesis in the form of
Soviet communism. Consequently, his critique of
the spectacle as a totalizing environment of imme-
diacy and manufactured values, rather than being
rooted in a specifically class-based analysis, is pre-
mised on a model of difference and agency. From
this perspective, reason, autonomy, individuality,
self-representation, and self-determination are
achieved and sustained only by resisting the dis-
traction of capitalism’s field of manufactured pos-
sibilities and opportunities, which are tied to its
hegemonic ideology. The only true contradiction
that exists within the society of the spectacle there-
fore is the one between imagination (creativity)
and standardization (conformity). This critique
builds on Walter Benjamin’s view of the image
world being created in the 1920s to 1930s by
Hollywood in the United States as akin to the
Spectacle and the Self 779
Nazis in that both used mass media to motivate
and control their audience’s imagination.
By attracting attention to the unpleasant,
unusual, or ridiculous, the spectacle gives cohe-
siveness to reality by manipulating every subjective
value and criteria until it has no other alternative
but to become its opposite. This is then supple-
mented by a vision of cultural redemption in which
it is proposed that neither group identity nor self-
reflexivity are any longer necessary—and that
these long-held goals just might be the cause of our
present unhappiness. The Lacanian political theo-
rist Slavoj Žižek envisions this phenomenon result-
ing from a condition he dubs “the passion for the
real,” which leads one to become fascinated by
violence and those agents who express raw rage
without apology. This repressed admiration for
the other becomes an all-consuming fantasy of
destruction, annihilation, transcendence, muta-
tion, and apocalypse that dominates popular cul-
ture. In turn, Žižek urges us to protect ourselves
against our own protective capacities, which form
the prohibitions that simultaneously perpetuate
institutional, economic, ecological, social, and
other injustices. Afraid of its self and all others, the
resulting self this dynamic produces is vulnerable
to the growing role that machination and manipu-
lation play in assuring us what we truly desire is a
more controllable world to which no alterity might
be imagined. The power of the spectacle, therefore,
resides in its ability to represent our fantasies as if
they were always already real.
Though test marketing and psychological
research consume significant amounts of resources,
the spectacle is not so much the outcome of con-
spiracies by the military/industrial complex, or a
cabal of monomaniacal capitalists; rather, it
depends on exploiting existent habits of thought.
Consequently, the spectacle is not something
imposed on society but a condition that arises
from its motivating forces and desires; the specta-
cle is not reducible to the effects of the mass media.
Although today the media are an all-important
component of the spectacle, due to the media’s
ability to turn everything—sports events, breaking
news and the weather, the lives of celebrities (those
who are famous for being famous)—into heavily
dramatized occurrences whose sole effects are to
attract, distract, and influence its audience day
after day.
780 Spectacle and the Self
Disseminating a dizzying array of conflicting
messages of desire and fear, optimism and uncer-
tainty, as well as promises of fulfillment and
empowerment, mass media provides models for
emulation, which in turn drives capital’s economy.
As a mechanism of cultural control, the spectacle
as employed by capitalists infiltrates and organizes
the private sphere in the name of convenience and
profit, by creating demands for consumable novel-
ties, which play on our sense of insufficiency, limi-
tation, and fear. Inversely, in seeking ever-new
content, the cultural venues that persist in produc-
ing or sustaining the notion of quality, innovation,
or difference come to be appropriated so that they
can be repackaged and commoditized. Therefore,
the terror of the spectacle consists of the constant
threat of loss, boredom, or inefficiency. This is
reinforced by the collective experiences and confu-
sion that comes from the dissemination of infor-
mation from standardized sources and formats.
This culminates in a failure to be able to differenti-
ate between fact and fiction, between individual
and collective experiences.
Aware that this power makes the public uneasy,
the claim advanced is that the contents circulated
reflect what the public wants and demands. This
democracy of the marketplace masks the insidious
nature of consumerism, which buttresses the ten-
dency for profit to win over the social good.
Beyond the proliferation of mass media as a way
to realize profit and control, modern science and
psychoanalytic theory—which proposes that the
objective world is only the raw materiality from
which we construct our reality—also plays an
important role in society’s spectacularization. The
Western concept of subjectivity that these disci-
plines build on hypothesizes that the real is what it
is thought to be and the individual is self-defined
by what he or she thinks and feels. The interaction
of the social, economic, and cultural spheres as
ordered by the logic of capitalism results in an
impossibility of determining who or what acts on
what, which effectively turns the populace into
spectators who view from a distance the events
that circumscribe their lives. This results in an
inability for broad sectors of society to autono-
mously differentiate their selves from the condi-
tions of production and reproduction that the
spectacle represents as the essence of their reality.
This instrumentality, which conceals the real
implications of being inundated 24 hours per day
by the interminable amount of information that is
filtered and distributed through an ever-increasing
network of mediated outlets functions to prevent
the formulation of a political critique.
As we evolve an “experience-based economy,” a
designation that references the micromanaged zones
of commerce that project ambience (or a kind of
branding) around products, all aspects of daily
life—from the way we are managed at work, to the
lifestyles we consume—are being designed, stan-
dardized, and anesthetized. These messages differ
from market to market, fragmenting society into
competing groups whose self-interest is based on
cultural affinities rather than on those of politics
and economics, the latter of which once were the
primary sources of both individual and group cul-
tural identity. The intent is to lead the consumer to
believe that his or her relationship to business, gov-
ernment, and even one to another is little more than
that of client to a service provider of both individu-
ated and common experiences. The constant dis-
semination of bourgeois values embedded in the
seemingly neutral space of leisure time and personal
consumption transforms subjectivity itself into an
object of aesthetic experience. In these moments,
feelings and thoughts are reconstructed, producing
a simulated self, which is in turn experienced
and affirmed as mutable in its wants, but as essen-
tial in its content. This manifestation of an essential
self presents itself as an “as if” metaphor in which
the self is regarded “as if it” were an object, and “as
if it” were an autonomous subject. This leaves us
with a vision of ourselves in which consciousness
and the moment-to-moment  restatement of self
appear to be something potentially cruel, a cause
for long-lasting pain by making the things that seem
most important look futile, obsolete, and negligible.
The ultimate effect of this is the redirection of the
political impulse onto a marketplace of potential
fulfillment ordered by the relative liberty of a judg-
ment-free choice of lifestyles and diversion.
The political implications of creating a cultural
environment that absorbs all and has no demon-
strable borders rather than a political environment
is that it creates an illusionary territory in which all
issues may be resolved in a truly democratic man-
ner. So in the place of the political, the ideology of
consumerism has created a condition in which we
no longer believe that we might realize ourselves in

our ability to produce effect, but instead only on
our ability to consume. The consequence of this
process was the continuous seeking of reasons to
apply technology to those territories of human
activity that either had eluded colonization or been
liberated. This process takes idealized forms and
their contents, exchanging them for those of com-
merce and technology. All the products of the
culture industry, not just the advertising, are com-
mitted to making us susceptible to this process by
showing how the traits that lead to greed exploita-
tion, manipulation, and dominance are also those
of self-liberation and leadership. The resulting
sense of self is that of being an autonomous subject
existing in a world in which the public and private,
political and economic, alternately disconnect and
conflate into the cultural.
Susan Buck Morse, in discussing Benjamin’s
statement concerning aesthetics and politics, points
out that the goal was to anesthetize the individual’s
experience of everyday life, therefore subsuming
and disorienting him or her. Debord identifies this
same process as having become an intrinsic aspect
of capitalist society, wherein individuals’ experi-
ences are constructed and encoded for them as
both a form of diversion and social and economic
management. The objective of this process is not to
direct us—but to addict us. Consequently, the real-
ity of the spectacle is at first nuanced and complex;
however, it is also less layered, varied, and con-
crete as the glut of un-ordered information closes
the gap between the plausible, the improbable, and
the existent. In this environment—a situation in
which the distinction between past, present, and
future is blurred—everything appears to be equally
relevant, or worthless, foiling our attempts to
make informed judgments. Inversely, the ongoing
interaction between the technological, social, and
cultural deeply embedded in an ideology of subjec-
tivity and self-realization becomes a confusion of
facts, fictions, and ersatz experiences sustained by
the appeal of pragmatism, positivism, and passiv-
ity. Within this environment, the self is made sus-
ceptible to the permutations and changes in the
symbolic values that come to be promoted as sub-
stantive content. It is no wonder that conspiracy
theories concerning all aspects of government and
business emerge alongside the enthusiastic promo-
tion of computers, interactive games and the
promise of virtual realities—as something that will
Spectacle and the Self 781
fulfill what has become our neurotic need not to be
idle or alone.
The dynamic that underlies the spectacle is mul-
tigenerational and continues to resonate with the
cold war rhetoric that revolved around the repre-
sentation of the individual’s freedom to choose a
lifestyle as constituting a political choice. This
dynamic is indicative of this ideological shift.
Accompanying this state of affairs was the addi-
tional promise that the resolutions of the conflicts
and inequities inherent to capitalism would be
resolved in the marketplace of cultural offerings.
In the West, even those who opposed this schema
have contributed to the successful dissemination of
it by adhering to an idealized vision of individual,
material, and conceptual wants and desires that
are derived ideologically from the Enlightenment
and then modernism. With poststructuralism’s
critique of the master narratives that made up
these systems, the idea of the spectacle took on
greater theoretical importance because its effects
had become all pervasive. Jean Baudrillard pro-
posed that the world of symbolic representation
had become an “empire of the sign” in which the
economy of images and meaning also carved out a
new dematerialized reality in which signs and
images precede the real. Within this field of cul-
tural transformation, the constituent parts of a
new collective sense of  a virtual self were ulti-
mately founded on the premise that biotechnology
and nanotechnology were propelling the human
species toward a post-human state. This sense of
self rests on the notion that identity is little more
than a construct of experiences, concepts, and
social models, which are often at first thought to
be inauthentic and then become real.
Postmodern individuals seek self-affirmation in
their own distinctive personalities, to which they
may give self-expression. Viewed in this frame, the
political aspiration of various sectors of the society
come to be represented as nothing more than a list
of scripted positions awaiting to be fulfilled. At
present, these scripts are more rightist than leftist
and more emotional than intellectual given capi-
talism’s successful appropriation of postmodern-
ism’s critique of how history and reason are used
to advance a model of reality in which objects
(such as freedom, progress, equality) can be pre-
scribed, while allowing them to be subjectively
interpreted as conditional terms. Within this
782 State Identity
schema, everything appears to be a disconnected
component, whose value only resides in our ability
to formulate a hierarchy of values permitting us to
imagine and then assemble them into an integrated
sensible whole. This awareness, rather than pro-
ducing what once was identified as a state of
emancipation, instead generates its antithesis. The
fascistic nature of the spectacle lies in that its rep-
resentations do not just displace the symbolic
world of order, control, and meaningfulness but
actually dissolve it into a sequence of externals
that exist beyond our control—not as simulacra of
the real, but as a condition of the environment in
which all things come to exist.
Saul Ostrow
See also Frankfurt School; Simulacra; Society of the
Spectacle; Visual Culture
Further Readings
Adorno, T., & Horkheimer, M. (1979). The culture
industry: Enlightenment as mass deception. In
T. Adorno & M. Horkheimer (Eds.), Dialectic of
enlightenment. London: Verso.
Althusser, L. (1971). Ideology and ideological state
apparatuses. In L. Althusser (Ed.), Lenin and
philosophy and other essays. New York: Monthly
Review Press.
Baudrillard, J. (1994). Simulacra and simulation. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Bell, D. (1979). The cultural contradictions of capitalism.
London: Heinemann.
Benjamin, W. (1992). Illuminations (H. Arendt, Ed., &
H. Zohn, Trans.). London: Fontana. (Original work
published 1936)
Debord, G. (2004). The society of the spectacle. New
York: Zone Books.
Giroux, H. A. (2006). Beyond the spectacle of terrorism:
Global uncertainty and the challenge of the new
media. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
Kellner, D. (2005). Media spectacle and the crisis of
democracy: Terrorism, war, and election battles.
Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
Merish, L. (1996). Cuteness and commodity aesthetics:
Tom Thumb and Shirley Temple. In R. G. Thomson
(Ed.), Freakery: Cultural spectacles of the
extraordinary body (pp. 185–203). New York: New
York University Press.
Virilio, P. (1989). War and cinema: Logistics of
perception. London: Verso.
Warner, M. (1992). The mass public and the mass
subject. In C. Calhoun (Ed.), Habermas and the public
sphere (pp. 377–401). Cambridge: MIT Press.
State Identity
State identity generally refers to the body of inter-
ests, values, self-understandings, and orientations
from which states act in the world. As a term,
state identity posits that it is meaningful to under-
stand the political community of a state as having
a collective identity or sense of itself at a highly
generalized, but nevertheless important level. The
body of interests, values, and self-understanding
that makes up state identity is rooted in a coun-
try’s history and cultures, human and physical
geography, economy and underlying strategic
context. At the same time, state identity is shaped
by the state’s experience of the process of interna-
tional interaction through time.
A number of fundamentally important features
of the concept of state identity flow from this.
Although complex and multilayered, a state’s iden-
tity has considerable stability. This gives the con-
cept real analytic value because analysis can be
framed in a way that appeals to general principles
(of international politics in particular) while being
sensitive to the dense particularity of specific
states. Even though state identity is relatively sta-
ble, however, it is also flexible and evolving. Many
of the elements in which state identity is embed-
ded, or their significance, are changing through
time—cultures are dynamic, the economic or stra-
tegic value of resources can change, and so on.
Thus, the concept does not demand an essentialist
or ahistorical account of identity. Moreover, as
with individual or group identity, the ongoing
development of state identity occurs to a signifi-
cant extent through interaction with other states
and international actors. This gives the concept of
state identity particular relevance to questions of
foreign policy as well as to efforts to theorize the
nature of international politics.
The idea of state identity is closely associated
with one of the leading contemporary theories of
international relations: constructivism. As the
name implies, constructivists understand states’
identities as constructed through the process of

international interaction. Conversely, the nature of
the international sphere is constituted through the
character of states’ identities and actions. This
emphasis contrasts with the other theoretical per-
spectives dominating mainstream international
relations theory: neorealism and neoliberalism. In
the words of Alexander Wendt, a leading exponent
of constructivism, “anarchy is what states make of
it”—that is, the international arena is as conflict-
ual or as cooperative as states determine through
their interactions over time. This is a dynamic,
interactive grasp of international politics, which
gives self-directed human action (or agency) a cen-
tral role in shaping the character of international
politics while providing a way of conceptualizing
the complexity and difficulty of change. The con-
cept of a socially constructed state identity also
gives constructivists a way of understanding mean-
ing and value as well as power and material inter-
ests as drivers of action in the international arena.
This capacity to account for change, in ways that
give norms and values a potentially significant role
without being idealist, has given constructivism
considerable appeal as a practical reflection on
international politics.
Conceptual Frameworks
The concept of state identity in international rela-
tions theory provides a relatively complex, nuanced
way of understanding a state’s actions in the inter-
national arena. In this sense, state identity makes
the category of the state as that category is under-
stood by the preeminent neorealist schools and to
a lesser extent by neoliberalism (liberal institution-
alism) problematic.
The state is the primary international actor for
neorealists, neoliberals (compared with earlier iter-
ations of liberalism), and constructivists. In the
1970s, realism and liberalism were significantly
influenced by rational choice theory, particularly in
the United States, contributing to a refocusing for
both orientations. As a consequence, both orienta-
tions conceptualized states more tightly as rational
egoists; both also intensified their commitments to
empirically driven social science research agendas.
For both approaches, the international arena, as the
context within which states act, is characterized by
the lack of any compelling, overarching authority—
that is, by international anarchy. For neorealists,
State Identity 783
the fundamental feature of anarchy is the ever-
present threat of conflict; to ensure survival, states
are driven to seek security by maintaining or maxi-
mizing their relative power and resources. Although
cooperation occurs, it is not the most salient reality
of the international realm, which is fundamentally
a self-help system, defined by each state’s need to
rely on its own resources to protect its own inter-
ests. Anarchy thus establishes the nature of the
international system (as conflictual and competi-
tive) and states pursue their interests, which neces-
sarily revolve around calculations of security and
relative power, within it. Though accepting the
proposition of anarchy, proponents of liberal insti-
tutionalism are concerned with understanding the
conditions under which cooperation is possible
because cooperation as well as conflict characterize
international interaction. States pursue interests,
but these include interests in absolute (not only
relative) gain that may result from cooperation.
Neoliberalists consider that states can learn, but
neoliberalism does not provide a conceptually inte-
grated basis upon which to theorize the ways learn-
ing occurs.
Constructivism takes a different approach to
the state, as the primary form of agency. The emer-
gence of constructivism since the late 1980s (with
scholars including Nicholas Onuf, Peter Katzentein,
Frederich Kratochwil, and John Ruggie) reflected
long-standing debates in social theory about the
nature of society, human agency, and the state and
about the best ways to seek to understand them
(that is, methodological or epistemological
debates). Rather than investigating social reality as
an already established set of given “facts” (positiv-
ism) or the state as a set of fixed institutional
arrangements peopled by individuals understood
as rational calculators of interests (instrumental
rationalism), constructivists drew on interpretive
approaches to social theory. In particular, they
were influenced by sociology of knowledge in the
1960s (notably Peter Berger and Thomas
Luckmann) and sociological institutionalism in the
1970s. These approaches emphasized the ongoing
work of collective human activity in constructing
social reality and the close relationship between
the ways we make reality and the ways we make
sense of it.
Constructivists applied these approaches to the
analysis of international politics. The idea of state
784 State Identity
identity points to states as having interests and
identities through which interests are filtered;
moreover, these identities are complex and evolv-
ing. Whereas “self-interest” or “self-help” in
analyses of international relations can function as
a closed box—fundamental categories that allow
only narrow lines of investigation—state identity
potentially opens the self of the state to further
questioning and analysis. Thus, it becomes possi-
ble to explore what self-interest might mean for a
particular state and how or why that may have
changed beyond explanations offered by the anal-
ysis of strategic and economic opportunities or
threats. What a state values can change how it
construes its interests. The self-interest of security,
for example, while remaining fundamental, could
be understood and sought in radically different
ways. State identity in principle at least provides a
conceptual bridge for closely integrating analysis
of the internal domestic and the international
dimensions of why states act as they do.
Constructivism does not presume the pre-given
identity or fixed system of exchange that is
embedded in the rational egoist model of state
interaction. The identities of states evolve to a
significant extent through participation in inter-
national and transnational relations over time;
they may become more pro-social and collective
or more egoistic, or more or less confrontational,
collaborative, or withdrawn. The character of the
international arena can also shift in turn, albeit
not readily. Identity generates motives and orien-
tations and is the basis of interests, but interests
are in turn defined and redefined through interac-
tion; shifts in interests and their pursuit will
cumulatively have an effect on self-identity and
the perception of others. Identity is thus sustained
or transformed through the inter-subjective pro-
cesses of pursuing interests and dispositions, of
planning, action, and experience in a world
shaped by the dynamics of exchange. The idea of
state identity thus provides a means for conceptu-
alizing and exploring the ways by which states
might change beyond the explanations offered by
behavioral adaption to changing circumstances or
an account cast purely in terms of individual lead-
ers’ decisions. Identity is nevertheless relatively
stable and not readily changeable. More emphati-
cally than neoliberalists, constructivists argue that
states learn. The notion of state identity, more-
over, provides a way of explaining how learning
takes place.
The idea of state identity is part of a process and
practice-oriented view of identity, at least insofar
as the international arena is concerned. In this
view, international life is ordered not by natural
systems but by socially constructed institutions,
understood as cultural frameworks and deeply
embedded cognitive practices or ways of knowing
and being. This means that systems and norms
develop across histories. For example, two of the
key concepts structuring much international rela-
tions theory—the security dilemma (that is,
entrenched cycles of competition driven by insecu-
rity) and the balance of power—are understood as
institutions, if deeply entrenched ones, not as sys-
temic reality. Interests, identities, and institutions—
process and structure—are thus understood as
constitutive of each other.
The idea of state identity has been applied in an
increasing number of ways. Some applications
endeavor to render the concept more sharply
defined, scientific and testable. Other applications
emphasize the social interpretive dimensions. State
identity has been used to analyze national security
policies by considering cognitive frames and cul-
tural and normative factors; it has also been
expanded beyond the state to examine regional
identities, international norms, and changes to the
character of international interaction around par-
ticular issues. Some German constructivists have
incorporated theories of mutual deliberation and
dialogue (communicative action theories) into
their approaches. The idea of the socialization of
states has been enthusiastically embraced by theo-
rists of global civil society and transnational advo-
cacy networks because the idea of state identity
allows norms and values a genuine, though not
necessarily preeminent, place in this understanding
of international politics. This flexibility enables
constructivists to address both the dynamics of
conflict and power and the conditions under which
cooperation takes place. Some constructivists then,
argue that constructivism occupies a pivotal posi-
tion between neorealism and neoliberalism because
constructivism can work with the intellectual proj-
ect of either approach. Constructivism is also
sometimes put forward as a bridge between these

mainstream approaches to international relations
and the more critical or reflectivist approaches.
Critiques
As various scholars have noted, the constructivist
concept of state identity also has limitations, at
least in its more prominent conceptualizations.
State identity remains shaped by the conceptual
division between inside and outside the state,
despite its efforts to “bring society back in.” The
construction of state identity remains significantly
located in the sphere of international interaction.
Despite some focus on popular views (of national
security orientations, for example), examination of
the state as a political community tends to remain
limited. Although state identity can open valuable
avenues for understanding international politics,
the political, social, and economic dynamics within
or across states—that is, the processes of state for-
mation that might produce and shift state identi-
ties from the “inside” or by mechanisms other
than states—can remain obscured from view.
Although some simplification of the object of
study is necessary, this bifurcation imports unex-
amined and highly problematic assumptions into
the study of state identity and weakens the con-
cept’s ability to be used to explore the production
of collective meaning and action. In important
respects the state continues to be taken as a given.
(Wendt, for example, explicitly distinguishes
between an established corporate identity inside
the state and social roles constituted by interna-
tional interaction.) Despite the potential of the
concept, then, analyses using state identity can rely
on overly simple characterization of states, by
using an homogenized image of national identity,
that is, of what is important to “Germans” or
“Americans” and so on.
Inside the state can become in practice identified
with policy makers or elites or what can be ascer-
tained by social surveys; although in themselves
important foci of study, these seem insufficient
grounds for a conceptualization of state identity.
Finally, constructivist renderings of state identity
tend to assume an ideal model of the state based on
the experience of the Global North, that is, on
states not struggling fundamentally with the forma-
tion of political community. There is an assumption
Status 785
that states form relatively coherent political units
and that these units are represented by govern-
ments. This reduces the relevance of the concept,
at least as it is currently and predominantly
applied, to a significant proportion of the world.
M. Anne Brown
See also Civic Identity; Nationalism; Social
Constructionist Approach to Personal Identity
Further Readings:
Guzzini, S., & Leander, M. (Eds.). (2006).
Constructivism and international relations: Alexander
Wendt and his critics. London: Routledge.
Smith, S. & Owens, P. (2008). Alternative approaches to
international theory. In J. Baylis, S. Smith, & P.
Owens (Eds.), The globalization of world politics: An
introduction to international relations (4th ed., pp.
174–­191). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Status
Status refers to social rank defined in terms of
prestige or esteem. Status is one of the most
important variables governing the lives of social
animals, human beings included. Although status
is not the same thing as power, the two are closely
related. Status tends to stem from power, and vice
versa, because status elicits respect and deference.
This simple case illustrates that status is of interest
as both a dependent variable (an outcome of
social-psychological processes) and an indepen-
dent variable (a cause of social-psychological pro-
cesses). Thus, this entry considers the dynamics of
status, including how it is gained, maintained
through its effects on social interactions, and
resisted.
Gaining Status
Groups are seldom arranged along entirely egali-
tarian lines. Illustrating this point, the Harvard
sociologist Robert F. Bales convened small deci-
sion-making groups of undergraduate students
and found that typically within the first hour-long
786 Status
meeting, a hierarchy of status had developed.
Usually, these status hierarchies formed quickly
and smoothly. Where power struggles did occur,
this postponed but did not cancel the development
of a stable, unequal status hierarchy.
Status within these hierarchies can be earned or
achieved by one’s actions, or it can be assigned or
ascribed on the basis of inherited characteristics,
such as the status of one’s family, race, or gender.
This distinction is reflected in expectation states
theory by Joseph Berger, in which the status
granted to an individual depends on how much he
or she is expected to help realize group goals.
Individuals with characteristics that are task-
relevant, such as expertise and talent, will tend to
be granted high status. Individuals who are proto-
typical of the group are also seen to be likely to
further its interests and are granted status and,
indeed, power as a result. But diffuse status char-
acteristics such as family, race, and gender also
influence group members’ perception that an indi-
vidual may assist the group. Therefore, these char-
acteristics influence the status awarded to an
individual. Indeed these traits are often more
apparent than task-relevant characteristics in the
early stages of group formation. These characteris-
tics may therefore have an unduly powerful influ-
ence on the initial assignment of status.
This process, sometimes referred to as status
generalization, illustrates how individuals’ status
outside the group affects their status within the
group. It means that similar people tend to occupy
high- and low-status positions within groups, even
when the formation of each group is entirely inde-
pendent. For example, when groups are composed
of both men and women, men tend to occupy the
high-status positions, be those groups political,
cultural, religious, or economic. Thus, status hier-
archies within local groups tend to enact and rep-
licate global status hierarchies.
Diffuse status characteristics need not be social.
For example, tall people tend to have higher status
than do short people. This effect seems reliable in
both experiments and in field studies, which show
for example that CEOs are taller than average and
tall job applicants are more likely to be successful.
The link between status and height is implicit in the
etiquette of many cultures, in which low-status
individuals bow, curtsey, or even sit or kneel to
confirm the higher status of high-status individuals.
Metaphors such as “social climber,” “upper class,”
and “ideas above one’s station” also reflect an
implicit cultural equation of social status with
physical height or elevation.
Maintaining Status
Research since Bales’s pioneering studies has shown
that once status hierarchies are formed, they tend
to be reinforced and legitimized by group pro-
cesses. A person’s status characteristics influence
the size of the contribution to the group’s goals
that the person will make. When a large contribu-
tion is expected of an individual, he or she tends to
be given every opportunity to make one. These
people are given opportunities to contribute earlier
than other members are. Identical contributions
are evaluated more favorably if made by a high-
rather than low-status individual. Higher-status
members are also rewarded more richly: Rewards
within groups are assigned as a legitimizing marker
of status independently of the value of a person’s
contribution to a group. The case of spectacular
bonuses awarded to executives of failed corpora-
tions seems to illustrate this point well.
Status also tends to perpetuate itself by moder-
ating the character of interpersonal relations.
Across all known human cultures, people use def-
erential forms of address for strangers and those
who are high in status (e.g., Madam, Sir, or vous
in French), but not for familiars and persons of
low status (where first names will do, or in French,
tu). Any relaxation in formality is usually sug-
gested by the higher-status communicator: A doc-
tor is more likely than her patient to suggest a
switch to first names. So, being high in status con-
fers the privilege of control over intimacy.
Further, compared with lower-status persons,
those high in status gaze more into the eyes of their
conversation partners while talking, touch others
more, stand in a more erect posture, interrupt
more often, are more likely to direct who takes the
next turn in a conversation, and criticize more fre-
quently. High-status people are also likely to
receive more flattery and more measured and miti-
gated forms of critical feedback, and are likely to
benefit from others’ attempts to ingratiate them-
selves. In some settings, low-status speakers tend
to use more polite and tentative language.
Consistent with expectation states theory, this

phenomenon is most likely to manifest itself when
lower-status people talk to those higher in status,
and where the basis of status (e.g., gender, race,
occupation, or class) is perceived to be relevant to
the goals of the conversation.
Status can also be seen as a self-perpetuating
form of social capital, allowing individuals to
achieve their goals by enhancing their influence
over others. Several studies show that compliance
is more likely to requests made by higher-status
individuals, and representatives of higher-status
organizations. One of the most famous demonstra-
tions of the effect of status on compliance was
provided by Stanley Milgram’s studies of obedi-
ence. In these studies, participants were asked to
deliver an apparently life-threatening dose of elec-
tricity to an innocent stranger. The higher the
apparent status of the experimenter (e.g., an Ivy
League professor versus an employee of a shadowy
research company), the more participants acceded
to his requests. Similarly, high-status sources are
more persuasive than are low-status ones.
People’s status helps them win influence within
a group and may help them enter a group in the
first place. Groups are often keen to recruit indi-
viduals with high social status because they perceive
these individuals to be able to assist in the realiza-
tion of their aims. For example, the recruitment of
high-status individuals allows groups to bathe in
the associative glow of their prestige. High-status
individuals may be able to employ their enhanced
capacity for social influence to enhance ingroup
cohesion and to successfully negotiate with external
parties in the interests of the group.
Resistance to Status Hierarchies
Social psychological theories offer differing per-
spectives on the how people respond to their posi-
tion within their group, and to their group’s status
within an intergroup hierarchy. According to both
social dominance theory and authoritarian theo-
ries, many people prefer contexts in which there is
a clear status hierarchy of groups to situations
where groups have equal status. Social dominance
theory also suggests that people actively seek a
dominant position for their group, and support
measures that might further this aim. In contrast,
right-wing authoritarianism is thought to lead to
acquiescent or “yielding” responses to low status.
Status 787
In contrast, just-world and system-justification
theories are premised on the idea that people gen-
erally prefer to see the intra- and intergroup hier-
archies that they occupy as fair. This means that if
individuals occupy low-status positions within
their group, they are apt to perceive themselves as
deserving of that status. Reductions in self-esteem
and especially perceptions that one is lacking in
status-relevant attributes such as competence tend
to follow. Similarly, members of low-status groups
may be prone to “outgroup favoritism” in an
unconscious attempt to justify their collective posi-
tion, endorsing negative stereotypes of their own
group and seeing higher-status groups as superior
to their own on key traits such as competence.
According to these theories, how people feel
about their personal status is more or less the same
as how they feel about their group status. In con-
trast, social identity theory postulates a subtle
interplay between people’s perception of the status
of themselves and their group. For example, mem-
bers of low-status groups are less likely to take
action to improve their collective lot if they per-
ceive that group boundaries are permeable, and
that their personal status may therefore improve.
They are also less likely to take action if they per-
ceive the low status of their group to be legitimate,
and if they are unaware of alternative social con-
texts in which their group may have higher status.
If status relations between groups are seen as ille-
gitimate and alterable, then social identity is said
to be “insecure.” When social identity is insecure,
individuals are likely to take action to address the
low status of their group.
One such class of strategies is known as social
competition, in which groups collectively strive to
better rival groups on the dimensions on which
they are currently perceived as inferior. Another is
“social creativity.” These strategies include attach-
ing positive value to attributes that were hitherto
seen as negative, choosing other attributes as the
basis of comparison with the outgroup, and choos-
ing to compare themselves with other outgroups.
The specific strategy that group members may use
to enhance their status depends on contextual fac-
tors such as what is practical in the circumstances
and how other groups react.
The status of one’s own group in relation to oth-
ers is not merely of symbolic importance, relevant
only to collective self-esteem. Often, as recognized
788 Stereotypes
by social identity theory, group status determines
what groups can do to each other. According to
Susan Fiske’s stereotype content model, group
members are motivated to know what other groups
can, and want to, do to their group. This means
that they are particularly interested in two types of
traits, namely competence (is the group capable or
not?) and warmth (do they mean well or ill?). High-
status groups tend to be seen as competent but cold,
whereas low-status groups are often seen as warm
but incompetent. These stereotypes are likely to
help observers justify inequality and to cope with
conflicting information (e.g., prevailing negative
representations of an outgroup on the one hand,
but a normative ban on prejudice on the other
hand). Also, the stereotypes tend to explain how the
high- and low-status groups got where they are.
Conclusion
Status is a precious, contested, and to some extent
self-perpetuating social resource. Consensus has yet
to be reached on key problems, for example, on
when high-status groups exhibit more prejudice and
ingroup favoritism than low-status groups do.
Nonetheless, status is a crucial variable at the intra-
and intergroup levels of human behavior. Given all
the social benefits that status confers, it is not sur-
prising that it is also beneficial to physical well-being.
A number of studies link status to health and longev-
ity, even when related factors such as wealth are
controlled for. One of the most striking and well-
publicized examples was uncovered by the University
of Warwick economists Andrew Oswald and
Matthew Rablen in 2005. They found that Nobel
laureates in physics and chemistry lived 2 years
longer than did the peers who were “merely” nomi-
nated for a Nobel Prize. The number of nominations
received by scientists was not predictive of their life
span, and neither was the size of the monetary award
given to each laureate. As Oswald noted in an inter-
view subsequent to the publication of this research,
winning the Nobel Prize per se seemed to confer “a
kind of health-giving magic.”
Nonetheless, we probably do not need to appeal
to magic to explain this finding. Researchers have
observed immediate physiological responses to
social status in human and nonhuman animals
alike. For example, animals that are experimen-
tally locked into a low-status or “subdominant”
position display endocrinologic changes, involving
elevated levels of harmful, stress-related chemicals
in their blood. Low status therefore appears to be
an aversive and unhealthy state for many social
animals. In some animals, however, these effects
disappear once status hierarchies have been estab-
lished and each animal settles into its place in the
regime. In these cases, animal behavior is reminis-
cent of some of the patterns predicted by the social
psychological theories we have reviewed.
Robbie M. Sutton
See also Forms of Address; Group Identity; Political
Psychology; Social Comparison Theory; Social
Movements; Stereotypes; Voice
Further Readings
Hogg, M. A. (2001). A social identity theory of
leadership. Personality and Social Psychology Review,
5, 184–200.
Kroger, R. O., & Wood, L. A. (1992). Are the rules of
address universal? IV: Comparison of Chinese,
Korean, Greek, and German usage. Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology, 57, 416–425.
Levine, J. M., Moreland, R. L., & Choi, H. (2001).
Group socialization and newcomer innovation. In
M. A. Hogg & S. Tindale (Eds.), Blackwell handbook
of social psychology: Group processes (pp. 86–106).
Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Marmot, M. (2004). Status syndrome: How your social
standing directly affects your health and life
expectancy. London: Bloomsbury.
Ridgeway, C. L. (2001). Social status and group
structure. In M. A. Hogg & S. Tindale (Eds.),
Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group
processes (pp. 353–375). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Ridgeway, C. L., & Smith-Lovin, L. (1999). The gender
system and interaction. Annual Review of Sociology,
25, 191–216.
Turner, J. C., & Brown, R. (1978). Social status,
cognitive alternatives and intergroup relations. In
H. Tajfel (Ed.), Differentiation between social groups
(pp. 201–234). London: Academic Press.
Stereotypes
A stereotype is a social construct, a textually
based assertion of what a given type of individual

should be. A stereotype is also a representation.
Whenever something is represented, something is
always left out of the account, and this disconti-
nuity is central to the meanings we derive; how-
ever, a stereotype leaves so much out of the
account it operates more as a fiction than a reli-
able portrayal of an identity. The discontinuity in
a representation leads to a desirousness to retrieve
lost reality and to fill in what has been left out of
the account, resulting both in readings that occur
despite what has been left out of the account, and
in misreadings because of what has been left out
of the account. The more left out, the greater the
scope of possible misreadings and the more likely
the emergence of stereotyped understandings and
oversimplifications based on the preponderance of
absences. Stereotypes hew closely only to the most
obvious regularities and irregularities of human
body type and behavior.
Stereotypes are literary- and image-based texts
based on sensory data, typifying and creating nar-
ratives of identity around harshly delimited sets of
identity markers to stigmatize some and normalize
others. Constituted thusly, a typecasting of sensory
impressions can represent the whole panoply of
stigmatizing social stories and mythologies with
which it has been qualitatively associated.
Normality itself is a social construct, comprising
stereotypes and confirmed by contrasting stereo-
types. A norm is constructed systematically, orga-
nizing only the most apparent and atypical
textualizable regularities of human bodies and
behaviors to make problematic any traits that do
not coalesce in uniformity with those textual iden-
tifiers constructed as central to prevailing social
hierarchies.
Stereotyping constructs some to be ugly, some to
be beautiful, some to be heroes, and some to be
monsters—oversimplifications rendered as texts
that secure and extend a base of power and influ-
ence in social arenas. Regimes of influence that
shape social identities and individual behavior
employ stereotypes to caricature one group of peo-
ple as insignificant, foolish, or dangerous in the eyes
of another group of people. Dominant groups ste-
reotype those they oppress; marginalized groups
also stereotype those who dominate them; however,
dominant groups also possess the means to institu-
tionalize their stereotypic representations through
the various media of mass communications.
Stereotypes 789
In Western scientific discourse, one invariably
encounters medians, averages, likelihoods, and
patterns constructed as binary axes, polarities of
understanding, normal distributions, and standard
deviations. Stereotyped narratives of identity have
converged with scientific discourse in several
ways. The concept of establishing norms has a
statistical derivation advanced amongst Western
industrialists during the early 1800s. Adolphe
Quetelet elaborated a conception of the “average
man” with the bourgeoisie standing in at the mean
position of a rational order of things. Quetelet
believed that any middle-class individual epitomiz-
ing all the qualities of the average human was also
invested with all the purported greatness, beauty
and goodness imagined to be present at the center
of society.
Within the dispensation of a rule of averages,
this implies that the norm must somehow comprise
the majority of the population. In a society where,
for instance, the concept of “able-bodiedness” as a
norm is in operation, the desirability of normalcy
is further entrenched if every deviating or limited
body is made problematic as a societal defect and
marginalized as a repository for social angst and
uncertainty. Public opinion and common sense
can, however, generate a tyranny of normalcy
when averages are corporealized through the
media as stereotypes of desirability, while differ-
ences are measured either as natural deviations
from the desirable, or as tragically acquired dis-
abilities that cripple conformity to agreed con-
structs of beauty and well-being.
The propaganda of normalcy, and correlating
acts and declarations of stigmatization, fixes the
desirability of normalcy in the public opinion by
systematically stigmatizing alternative behaviors
and appearances. Because behavior patterns are
fair predictors of future behaviors, the manipula-
tion of public attitudes—such as legislated penal-
ties for nonconformity to norms, public schooling
using normalizing and stigmatizing textbook nar-
ratives, the media advertisement of desirable
behavior and appearances and social rewards for
adherence to those models, and the segregation of
deviants and undesirables into marginalized social
arenas, communities, and vocational tracks—have
all served as masking strategies, leaving the spot-
light only on the norms Western societies continue
to hold central.
790 Stereotypes
It is a useful fiction that some are normal citi-
zens of the state, and others are marked as exem-
plars of a tragic failing, still yet to emerge from
savagery and the natural, prelingual, irrational,
amoral, and primitive state imagined so vividly in
the seminal texts of Enlightenment mythology.
This fiction makes possible the emergence of the
normal and the invisibility of those who deviate
from publicly accepted norms of beauty, speech,
and lifestyle. Paradoxically, the representation of
disabled figures in culture and literature as beings
that wear lesser-than-normal masks simultane-
ously buttresses stereotypes of a normative identity
and shapes a narrative of difference excluding
those whose bodies or behaviors do not measure
up to prevailing norms.
When a citizen is marked with the stigma of
invalidity, that citizen is also weighed down with
a mantle of illegitimacy regarding his or her con-
tribution to history or the common sense regard-
ing the known world. A bastardized identity
nullifies the claim of equal partnership and shared
citizenry in the discourse of nation building. When
an identity is so stereotyped, its familiar humanity
is masked from public gaze and rendered irrele-
vant to its interpretation; the stereotyped body is
transformed by the normalizing/stigmatizing lan-
guage game into something akin to a corporeal-
ized fingerprint, that of a cartoon character, not a
human being. However, the stereotype of identity
is interpreted as nothing less than “real” in the
court of public opinion where the language game
plays out.
The majority population within a diverse citi-
zenry sets the norms of social discourse as well as
the spokespersons of its norms, and the majority
population’s point of view establishes accepted
boundaries of significance and normalcy and the
power to confer stigmatization or “abnormalcy”
on those who do not compare favorably to those
in the center—the denizens of positions that fall
beyond acceptable boundaries. As Western
Europeans have constructed the story of progress
of civilizations, the tale that has been told has been
described by political psychologist and social theo-
rist Ashis Nandy as a worldview that believes in
the absolute superiority of the human over the
nonhuman, the historical over the ahistorical,
the masculine over the feminine, the adult over the
child, and the modern or progressive over the
primitive; the West has nevertheless shown impar-
tiality in its belief in the monsters beyond the bell
curve of Western normality. Western theology
equated the gods of the Indian religions with the
devil. Europeans also categorized Africans as hea-
then, and their folklore and religions as the spawn
of the devil. The powers of the Indian shaman to
cure or to kill, African idolatry, and the European
belief in magic and witchcraft all blended into a
fear of the uncontrollable as a power that must
either vanquish or be vanquished. Anomalous
identities and worldviews unfamiliar to Westerners
were reduced to widely disseminated and destruc-
tive stereotypes.
The idea that the anomalous is synonymous
with danger and evil has also been characterized in
Western literature and film through symbolic
depictions of disability, indigenous cultures, and
dark-skinned peoples. In his poem The White
Man’s Burden, Rudyard Kipling stereotypes those
lesser-than-normal bodies newly subject to colo-
nialism as new-caught sullen peoples that were
half-devil and half-child—the racialized depiction
of a daunting confluence of congenital physical,
spiritual, intellectual flaws, and deviances that
would certainly doom all non-Europeans to live in
poverty and ignorance were it not for the benefi-
cence of the ruling empire.
Operating within the currency of what disabili-
ties studies specialist Lennard J. Davis has termed
the “hegemony of the normal,” the history of the
U.S. government is replete with instances wherein
the proximity of subaltern bodies was meliorated
by schooling or institutionalization as the initial or
primary means for the corrective address; one of
the more egregious of these instances is perhaps
the U.S. “ugly laws” of the 19th and 20th centu-
ries, which banned visibly disabled people from
appearing in public places.
Norms tell stories both of favor and desire;
deviations from the norm are always predicated on
those stories. Western society strives to make beliefs
of what it sees or thinks it sees with its own eyes,
and ideates the preponderance of its constituents as
representing the core of those beliefs and ideolo-
gies. Norms reflect the majority of instances falling
within a particular “bell curve” of empirical sight-
ings. In his video titled Representation and the
Media, cultural studies professor Stuart Hall sug-
gests that the supplanting of media stereotypes with

new representation requires revisiting and reenter-
ing the stereotyped representation, inhabiting the
territory that has been glutted by fixed and closed
representations, thereby turning the stereotype
against itself, permeating the sanctity of its borders
with disruptive self-same reinterpretations. Any
such interrogation of what was once a closed set of
meanings serves as a fenestration of the authorial
enclosures of those who have exercised the power
to name. Perforating the names that bind us opens
up window-like “micro-becomings,” new possibili-
ties for identity.
An enclosure constructed to normalize a set of
meanings that it is no longer able to enclose is
thereby un-named. Enclosure thus becomes a tran-
sitional space. A stereotype is constructed to
enclose a set of meanings so they cannot migrate
and, like animals in contemporary zoo enclosures,
make it appear as if those meanings were abso-
lutely natural to the setting of that particular
enclosure—as if it were inconceivable that those
meanings might be otherwise born free, born to
mean something else altogether. A stereotype that
can no longer enclose is a norm that can no longer
capture, restrict and define—and is thus opened to
poststructural renovation. Stereotype thereby
becomes a site of inquiry, a transitional space
awaiting the assignment of new meaning.
James Haywood Rolling Jr.
See also Orientalism; Stock Character; Xenophobia
Further Readings
Brunner, D. D. (1998). Between the masks: Resisting the
politics of essentialism. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield.
Davis, L. J. (1995). Enforcing normalcy: Disability,
deafness, and the body. London: Verso.
Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the management
of spoiled identity. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Jhally, S. (1997). Representation and the media
[Featuring a lecture by Stuart Hall, Professor, The
Open University]. New York: Insight Media.
Nandy, A. (1983). The intimate enemy: The loss and
recovery of self under colonialism. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Pieterse, J. N. (1990). White on Black: Images of Africa
and Blacks in Western popular culture. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
Stock Character 791
Taussig, M. T. (1986). Shamanism, colonialism and the
wild man: A study in terror and healing. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Thomson, R. G. (1997). Extraordinary bodies: Figuring
physical disability in American culture and literature.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Stock Character
The phrase stock character refers to one-dimen-
sional characters in literature, theater, and film
who are constructed based on archetypical or ste-
reotypical representations that inform their speech,
mannerisms, style of dress, personality traits, or
behavioral patterns, which are easily identifiable
to a particular audience. Some examples of stock
characters include the following: the hero, the vil-
lain, the damsel in distress, and the ingénue. Stock
characters are beneficial to writers because they
allow the author an opportunity to introduce
familiar figures into a storyline who require little
to no explanation. More often than not, the one-
dimensional construction of the stock character
lends itself to parody. However, it must be noted
that the stock character is also a rather controver-
sial figure, as one-dimensional representations of
specific social and ethnic groups are said to influ-
ence identity politics and culture. This entry pro-
vides a brief historical overview with examples of
stock characters, a critique of stock characters,
and a discussion of the persistence of stock char-
acters today.
Historical Overview
Stock characters can be traced back to the ancient
Greeks. Comic playwright Aristophanes is consid-
ered the first to have posited the construction of
stock characters in his work in Old Comedy. His
plays are the only surviving examples of this genre.
Aristophanes’s work tended to focus on political
satire. His plays often employed three character
types: the alazon/imposter, the eiron/opponent,
and the bomolochos/buffoon. Each character used a
dialect and donned individual costume pieces to sug­
gest characterization. However, in Aristophanes’s
writings is found the emergence of other stock
characters who later figured greatly into the stock
792 Stock Character
character type. For example, in The Clouds, the
character Socrates functions similarly to the mad
scientist.
The notion of character type was expounded
by Greek philosopher Aristotle who in the
Nichomachean Ethics, his text on virtue and moral
character, is said to have drafted the basis for spe-
cific character types through the development of
traits, which he termed virtues. He lists the follow-
ing virtues: liberality, prodigality, magnanimity,
modesty, amiability, sincerity, wit, and magnifi-
cence. These traits provided ancient Greeks termi-
nology to assist them in the creation of characters
with a variety of virtues and flaws that could be
introduced into storylines. For example, one may
have found the presence of the magnificent man
who went out of his way to show off his wealth
contrasted with the liberal man who would give all
his belongings for the sake of the noble and just.
However, not until Aristotle’s student and suc-
cessor Theophrastus used his observations from
Athenian life to create the text The Characters,
sometimes translated as Ethical Characters, were
the beginnings of contemporary explorations of the
stock character seen. Some argue that Theophrastus
borrowed from Aristotle’s theories and used them
to more specifically define character types who
would later serve as the basis for all stock charac-
ters. With his work that is now classified as New
Comedy, Theophrastus was able to identify the fol-
lowing character types: the ironical man, the flat-
terer, the garrulous man, the boor, the complaisant
man, the reckless man, the chatty man, the gossip,
the shameless man, the penurious man, the gross
man, the unseasonable man, the stupid man, the
surly man, the superstitious man, the grumbler, the
distrustful man, the offensive man, the unpleasant
man, the man of petty ambition, the mean man, the
boastful man, the arrogant man, the coward,
the oligarch, the late learner, the evil speaker, the
patron of rascals, and the avaricious man.
Each character possesses an unattractive trait
that dominates him. In The Characters,
Theophrastus reflects on offensive traits that man-
ifest as superficial patterns of behavior.
Theophrastus’ work served as the source for char-
acter development during the time when character-
izations began to shift to more relatable characters
who dealt with ordinary issues. This transitional
period classified its work as Middle and New
Comedy, which are often referred to as the ancient
Greeks’ version of the comedy of manners—a
genre of comedy popularized during England’s
Restoration period.
With the emergence of the celebrated playwright
Menander, the most noted author of New Comedy,
one finds a revisiting and fleshing out of the stock
character. In New Comedy, the emphasis turned
primarily to stock characters within everyday situ-
ations. Most New Comedy plays relied on recog-
nizable Athenian types such as the angry old man
and the trickster servant. Most common in new
comedy were stories generally involving a roman-
tic conflict between young lovers—a rich man and
a poor girl. The interaction of the character types
generates humor and creates urgency within the
work. This is quite evident in Menander’s The
Dyskolos/The Difficult Man or The Grouch,
where a rich young man falls for the daughter of a
surly old farmer. One can certainly see more evi-
dence of the stock characters in the titles of other
new comedy works, such as The Farmer, The
Flatterer, and The Ship’s Captain. New comedy
influenced much of Western European literature
and specifically the work of William Shakespeare
and Ben Johnson. However, the introduction of
commedia dell’arte during the Italian Renaissance
created a larger range of stock characters than had
previously been seen; these remain visible in present-
day literary and dramatic forms, which range from
musical theater to situation comedy.
Commedia dell’arte, sometimes referred to as
Italian comedy and loosely translated as comedy of
the professional players, was popularized in Italy
during the 16th century and marked the height of
the stock character in performance. The commedia
dell’arte acting troupes consisted of 10 to 12 actors
who played stock characters that were easily rec-
ognizable to audiences because of the mannerisms,
the personality traits, and the behaviors of the por-
trayers. The characters were fixed, although the
stories were largely improvised. Actors in the per-
formance troupe would wear masks or costuming
that would have clearly identified their character
type to the audience. The stock characters,
Commedia dell’arte’s best-known feature, were
easily divided into three groups: the lovers, the
masters, and the servants. Considered by many as
popular art, which was less refined than the art
found throughout Western Europe at the time,

commedia dell’arte went on to become one of the
most popular theatrical forms of all time.
Listed here are some of the popular commedia
dell’arte stock characters:
•• Harlequin/Arlecchino is a clown and a member
of the Zanni. He is a simpleton who evolves
into a sophisticated man. He generally wears a
black hat and carries a slapstick—the origin of
the term slapstick comedy.
•• Pantalone is the rich elderly miser. He usually
has a young wife or an adventurous daughter.
•• Isabella is usually Pantalone’s daughter. She is
a prima donna who is flirtatious and
headstrong.
•• Brighella is a villain who would do anything
for money.
•• Il Capitano is the captain. He is a seemingly
macho but cowardly military man.
•• Scaramuccia is seen as the Italian Renaissance’s
“Robin Hood.”
•• The Innamorato and Innamorata are the
handsome and fashionable young lovers.
•• The Zanni represent the sly servants.
•• Il Dottore is the pompous doctor.
•• Pulcinella is a humpback with a crooked nose
who chases pretty girls.
•• LaRuffiana is the old woman or village gossip.
•• Pedrolino is the dreamer or clown.
Although stock characters experienced their heyday
during the Italian Renaissance, remnants of these
characters persist in literature and theater.
Critique
Although stock characters serve a distinct purpose
in the literary and dramatic arts, they also have
been viewed as problematic representations. Even
Menander was criticized for the lack of depth that
his stock characters displayed. However, the pre-
sentation of stock characters becomes most prob-
lematic when they are presented through a certain
racial or cultural lens. A case in point is the
uniquely U.S. theatrical tradition of minstrelsy,
which was the most popular form of entertainment
during the 19th century. Minstrel shows told the
stories of Blacks in the United States, although the
shows were most often performed by Whites. With
the application of burnt cork to their faces, actors
Stock Character 793
were able to don the mask known as blackface to
suggest racist archetypes. The stories were told by
stock characters such as Jim Crow, Jim Dandy,
and Zip Coon. Other characters included the
mammy, the old darky, and the mulatto wench.
These characters were one-dimensional representa-
tions that deliberately distorted the image of Blacks
by presenting characters who were often buffoon-
ish, lazy, ignorant, or grotesque. These character-
izations aided the shaping of White America’s
perception of Blacks, while playing into the curios-
ity that Northern Whites had about Black people
and their culture. Although the popularity of min-
strelsy soared during the 19th century with even
African Americans playing some roles in blackface,
the presence of such ill-informed stock characters
created much tension. These problematic represen-
tations continue to have an affect on African
Americans today, making the discussion of charac-
terization and the role that imagery plays in con-
structing identity a widely debated discursive
practice.
Persistence of Stock
Characters in Popular Culture
Stock characters have become an integral part of
our dramatic experiences. In theatrical mediums
such as theater and television, these character
types persist. Different genres thrive on the pres-
ence of stock characters. For example, when view-
ing westerns, one always finds the hero, the villain,
and the sidekick. For example, in the short-lived
television series Deadwood, one finds the hero in
Timothy Olyphant’s Sheriff Seth Bullock and the
villain in Ian McShane’s Al Swearengen. In soap
operas, often one will find the lovable rogue, the
tart with a heart, the con man, the fussy widow,
and the villain. Situation comedies have what some
have termed the shrew and the slob. A clear exam-
ple of these types could be in seen in the once-
popular Married With Children. Ed O’Neill’s Al
Bundy fit nearly perfectly the type of the slob, and
Katey Sagal’s Peggy Bundy exemplified the shrew.
In other genres such as science fiction, one often
finds the mad scientist and the absent-minded pro-
fessor. Even reality shows feature stock characters:
the good girl, the jock, and the troublemaker.
Stock characters continue to factor into our every-
day reality. One need not look far to find remnants
794 Structuration
of historical figures that were drafted centuries ago
and now fulfill a well-established role in our col-
lective conscience.
Kamesha Jackson
See also Archetype; Discourse; Minstrelsy; Stereotypes;
Trickster Figure
Further Readings
Aristotle. (350 BC). Nicomachean ethics. Retrieved
December 28, 2008, from http://classics.mit.edu/
Aristotle/nicomachaen.4.iv.html
Brockett, O. G. (Ed.). (1992). The essential theatre.
Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Jebb, R. C. (1870). The characters of Theophrastus.
Retrieved December 28, 2008, from http://www
.eudaemonist.com/biblion/characters
Jones, J. B. (2004). Our musicals, ourselves. Hanover,
NH: Brandeis University Press.
Rudlin, J. (1994). Commedia dell’arte. New York:
Routledge.
Worthen, W. B. (Ed.). (2007). The Wadsworth anthology
of drama (Brief 5th ed.). Boston: Thomson
Wadsworth.
Structuration
British social theorist Anthony Giddens’s theory of
structuration presents some key insights about the
extent to which social structures (organizations,
social networks, societies) are influenced by human
interaction. Giddens’s theory addresses the debate
about the complex relationship between individu-
als and society. On the one hand, one may argue
that human action is influenced and even con-
strained by the rules, norms, and institutions that
are central in human social systems. On the other
hand, it may be argued that creative human action
and human will are central in the creation of
human social systems. According to communica-
tion scholar James Olufowote, Giddens’s theory
rejects both of these conceptual polarities.
Olufowote argues that in understanding struc-
turation theory, one has to understand Giddens as
proposing three fundamental axioms: first, Giddens
argues that social structure is constituted by cre-
ative and knowledgeable human agents. That is,
the social actors who are engaged in regular inter-
actions are aware of their social worlds and their
surroundings and often act intentionally in these
contexts. Second, Giddens argues that knowledge-
able human creation is itself informed by social
structure, and third, he claims that both structure
and agency are mutually constituted in human
social practices. In this third axiom, Olufowote
argues, Giddens is positing that human social prac-
tices are the fundamental unit of social analysis.
This third axiom also comprises what Giddens
conceptualizes as the duality of structure.
Giddens posits that human interaction is the
central force in constructing and maintaining
social practices while producing and reproducing
social systems and structures. Social structures are,
therefore, both the medium and outcome of social
interaction. The structuration perspective is useful
to explicate the relationship between the produc-
tion and reproduction of social structures and
human interaction, and to underscore the perspec-
tive that social actors do not exist independently
from the social structures that influence—and
sometimes constrain—them.
Scholars have used structuration theory to
research communication, culture, and identity
issues. This entry first explores the conceptual
framework of structuration theory and then exam-
ines the use of structuration theory in communica-
tion and culture and identity research. Finally, this
entry discusses critiques of the theory.
Conceptual Framework
Three key concepts are important to understanding
structuration: practices, systems, and structure.
The theory of structuration argues that practices
are human activities that are consistent, repeatable,
and meaningful to the persons who do them; they
can be small-scale activities, such as going to the
store, or they can be large-scale activities such as
the management of a supermarket or some other
commercial enterprise. In structuration theory,
systems are defined as observable relational pat-
terns as manifested in various practices. Structure
represents the rules and resources that social actors
draw on as they partake in various system prac-
tices. Communication scholars Marshall Scott
Poole and Robert McPhee define rules as principles
or routines that guide people’s actions. Poole and

McPhee describe a resource as anything people are
able to use in action, whether material (money,
tools) or nonmaterial (knowledge, skill).
The key argument of structuration is that draw-
ing on rules and resources to enact social systems
of practice results in the reproduction of the sys-
tem and its structure. Poole and McPhee argue that
reproducing the system does not necessarily imply
that the system continues to exist without any
changes; rather, change and transformation of the
system can be thought of as reproduction, but in a
new direction. In structuration, all actions and
individual sequences of interaction produce impor-
tant practices and reproduce the system and its
structure either as changed or as stable. The key
insight here, according to Poole and McPhee, is
that structuration theory explains the system itself
as the product of human actions operating in a
duality in which structures are both the medium
and the outcome of the actions. Human actors cre-
ate social structures that are produced and repro-
duced in human interaction, so the implication for
issues of identity is that communication is deeply
consequential and fully implicated in the creation
and maintenance of human social systems.
Structuration Theory
and Communication Research
There has been significant communication scholar-
ship during the past two decades that draws on
Giddens’s work to articulate concepts related to
communication theory. Communication scholars
such as Olufowote, Poole, and McPhee have set
out to categorize the kind of scholarship that has
developed in the communication field using struc-
turation principles, and they have also sought to
articulate the ways in which structuration provides
fertile ground for more complex analysis of the
role of communication in understanding the rela-
tionship between individuals and society.
According to Olufowote, during the past two
decades, structuration theory has been used to
frame investigations in communication subfields
such as small group theory, organizational politics
and culture, and organizational-group technology.
Olufowote posits that structuration theory’s popu-
larity is partially explained by the breadth of its
ideas and its openness to researchers operating in
various traditions. Olufowote proposes four central
Structuration 795
elements to the theory of structuration, elements
that can be used to understand the wealth of com-
munication research that has been conducted using
this perspective. These four elements also constitute
a model for understanding how communication
researchers have come to analyze and explain the
process of structuration and situate it in the context
of theories and concepts of communication.
Olufowote argues that first, the fundamental
unit of analysis in structuration is situated social
practices. By this, he means that scholars’ explana-
tion and analysis of human social systems is based
on a scholarly review of the routine practices
engaged in by social actors with the aim of provid-
ing comparison of the nature of the routine inher-
ent in these practices. The second element he
proposes is the idea that structures partially
explain why routines sustain themselves. He
describes these structures as deeply sedimented or
macrosocially shaped. By this, he means that struc-
tures are stable and predate and outlast the social
actors who continually help to shape and re-shape
them. Examples of these kinds of structures can
include various kinds of communities, legal sys-
tems, and organizations. The history and stability
of these structures are factors that are crucial to
their analysis.
Third, Olufowote posits that structures are
influenced by and are implicated in the interac-
tions between real-life human beings who set out
to reproduce or change the social systems of which
they are a part. In other words, the interactions of
human beings with various structures matter, and
the communicative processes that are the founda-
tion of these interactions have a significant impact
on these structures. Fourth, he posits that the inter-
action between social actors and various institu-
tions may result in various outcomes—some of
which are intended and some of which are unin-
tended. These outcomes are influential in the sub-
sequent series of interchanges and interactions
between social actors, which are then influential
for affecting structures into the future. In using
these categorizations, Olufowote set up important
criteria for evaluating and contextualizing the
scholarship that has been developed using struc-
turation as a theoretical framework.
Poole and McPhee argue that scholars who
treat organizations as social systems find structura-
tion to be useful for analyzing how organizations
796 Structuration
are created and sustained by human interaction.
Structuration theory also provides useful perspec-
tives for understanding how organizations can be
changed. Organizations are not, therefore, treated
as static, implacable entities that are uninfluenced
by the human beings who populate them.
Poole and McPhee also argue that because the
theory charges scholars to closely examine the pro-
cesses that underlie and undergird the social reality
of organizations, it provides fertile conceptual
ground for scholars to analyze the role of power
and domination that may be inherent in the struc-
turing processes that create and sustain organiza-
tions. Poole and McPhee argue that there is much
utility in the interpretive and cultural perspectives
inherent in this theory, and they provide a review
of the literature that analyzes how scholars have
applied the principles of the theory in communica-
tion studies that have examined organizational
issues at the individual, group, and organizational
levels of analysis.
Structuration, Culture, and Identity
Scholars who focus on issues of culture and iden-
tity across different communication research con-
texts also use structuration to investigate the
interrelationship between human social actors,
human social systems, and social identity. Anne
Nicotera, Marcia Clinkscales, and Felicia Walker
use structuration perspectives to examine the com-
plexities of social identity and cultural negotiation
that occur when organizational members who
share predominantly African-based ancestry make
up the numerical majority in an organization that
is predominantly European in form, structure, and
design, and that is situated in the primarily Anglo-
European influenced national culture of the United
States. The work of Nicotera and her colleagues
reinforces our understanding of organizations as
being embedded in complex relationships within
national cultures, and underscores that organiza-
tions and their internal cultures cannot be under-
stood separately from the cultural peculiarities of
the societies in which they exist. As Nicotera and
her colleagues point out, the concept of the mod-
ern organization is, in part, the result of the pro-
duction and reproduction of an organizational
form and design that is linked to cultural and
scholarly discourses emanating from Western
Europe at the turn of the last century. Social inter-
actions that include varying socialization processes
such as orientation seminars, training workshops,
and business school curricula have continually
reproduced the modern organizational design and
form conceptualized by European thinkers such as
Frederick Taylor and Max Weber. These social
and scholarly discourses have thus created and our
social interactions routinely reproduce the notion
of an organization as a White, Western European
construct.
Other scholars such as Olufowote and Erika
Kirby and Kathleen Krone have used structuration
perspectives to examine how hidden, taken-for-
granted meaning systems and discourses in organi-
zations influence, for example, the use and meaning
of informed consent procedures in health care con-
texts, or employees’ decisions of whether to take
maternity leave. These scholars have used struc-
turation perspectives to argue that organizational
and societal cultures are largely discourse-driven
and have, therefore, made analysis of social dis-
courses central to their analysis.
Critiques
Some of the critiques of structuration as outlined
by Poole and McPhee focus on the fact that
Giddens overemphasizes action in that he gives too
much power to human agents and therefore over-
simplifies human agency in the process of social
change. Other critiques argue that structuration
does not adequately provide an account of how
social and organizational change can be both con-
ceptualized and implemented. In this sense, Giddens
is regarded as a social critic who does not fully
account for the extent to which inequality and
domination are pervasive features of many modern
human social systems. Giddens seems to pay scant
attention to capitalist exploitation, gendered and
racial inequality, and the pervasive, lingering effects
of the processes of colonization. Poole and McPhee
provide thoughtful rebuttals to many of these cri-
tiques, arguing that structuration provides a frame-
work for research using critical perspectives, and
they point out that the field is open for more com-
munication scholars to pursue such research.
Maurice L. Hall
See also Culture; Identity Politics; Organizational Identity

Further Readings
Giddens, A. (1976). New rules of sociological method.
Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
Giddens, A. (1979). Central problems in social theory:
Action, structure and contradiction in social analysis.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Giddens, A. (1989). The orthodox consensus and the
emerging synthesis. In B. Dervin, L. Grossberg,
B. O’Keefe, & E. Wartella (Eds.), Rethinking
communication: Vol. 2. Paradigm exemplars
(pp. 53–65). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Kirby, E. L., & Krone, K. J. (2002). “The policy exists
but you can’t really use it”: Communication and the
structuration of work-family policies. Journal of
Applied Communication Research, 30, 50–77.
Nicotera, A., Clinkscales, M., & Walker, F. (2003).
Understanding organization through culture and
structure: Relational and other lessons from the
African American organization. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Olufowote, J. (2003). Structuration theory and
communication research: Developing and applying
an organizational-evaluative framework. Paper
presented at the Annual Convention of the
International Communication Association,
San Diego, CA.
Olufowote, J. (2008). A structurational analysis of
informed consent to treatment: Societal evolution,
contradiction, and reproductions in medical practice.
Health Communication, 23, 292–303.
Poole, M. S., & McPhee, R. D. (2005). Structuration
theory. In S. May & D. K. Mumby (Eds.), Engaging
organizational communication theory and research:
Multiple perspectives (pp. 172–195). Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
Style/Diction
Diction describes word choices in written and spo-
ken communication. Correct diction includes
appropriate and accurate word choices. A writer
or speaker must make careful, well-informed word
choices to communicate effectively with the
intended audience. Diction also extends to proper
arrangement of words, including grammatical
concerns, such as subject-verb agreement, and to
mechanics, such as punctuation and spelling.
Style/Diction 797
Mastery of diction establishes the purpose, tone,
and accessibility to any written or spoken work. In
the discussion of writing, diction is synonymous
with style. When describing spoken communica-
tion, diction more commonly refers to the ability to
articulate and enunciate words clearly. This ability
is more rooted in vocabulary, pronunciation, and
tone than in word choice and style, as is connoted
by the term diction in written communication.
Diction in written work varies with such factors
as regional dialect, but the term generally describes
the writer’s distinct choices in vocabulary and the
style of expression. William Strunk Jr. and E. B.
White, authors of The Elements of Style, suggest
that writers base their style on the fundamental
rules established by Standard English.
In written and spoken communication, two
basic types of diction exist: formal and informal.
Formal diction strictly follows the rules of
Standard English, whereas informal diction devi-
ates from these rules and vocabulary. Whether in
text or speech, the style best suited for a particu-
lar audience’s level of understanding emerges
through word choices that are either general or
specific.
Using proper diction helps writers establish
credibility; conversely, lax or sloppy diction can
confuse the reader and diminish the writer’s trust-
worthiness. Speaking with good diction focuses on
controlling volume, pace, and enunciation, any of
which may distract listeners from the message and
risk a negative perception of the speaker.
When undertaking a written work, the writer
must consider the readers for whom the informa-
tion is intended. For example, even where identical
terminology is used, the diction choices made in
writing a textbook about finance will differ depend-
ing on whether the book is to be read by sopho-
mores in a high school consumer economics course
or by students in a master of business administra-
tion program. The vocabulary and sentence struc-
ture in the graduate-level text would be greater in
complexity, befitting the sophistication of someone
in a college course. Similarly, the formality or
informality of style changes the way information is
imparted and received, again depending on the
reader.
Along with word choices that collectively con-
struct either formal or informal diction, the writer
must discern the best use of abstract and concrete
798 Style/Diction
words throughout the text. The writer’s relationship
with readers relies heavily on the ability to execute
these choices effectively. Vague language can be
interpreted as imprecise thinking. Diction, then,
contributes to a speaker’s or character’s identity.
Formal
In the United States, formal diction follows linguis-
tic rules known as Standard English. These rules
were cultivated by certain cultural leaders and
taught to and perpetuated by English speakers both
native and foreign. Standard English is thought to
be normative for educated native speakers. The
structure includes guidelines for grammar, spelling,
syntax, vocabulary, and pronunciation. Formal
diction is commonly used for professional and aca-
demic communication in both written and spoken
forms, including textbooks, scientific articles, polit-
ical speeches, and government documents.
Formal diction acts as a base for communicat-
ing with a diverse audience. Readers and listeners
alike may be interested in the subject at hand, but
a lack of formal diction in a written work may
obscure, rather than communicate clearly, the
writer’s message. To avoid shortfalls in interpreta-
tion, it is best to address the audience formally.
In an article published in the New England
Journal of Medicine, Julie R. Ingelfinger uses pre-
cise word choices to explain the contamination of
infant formula in parts of Asia. Ingelfinger wrote
that more than 294,000 children in China were
reportedly affected by melamine poisoning stem-
ming from tainted infant formula. At the time,
more than 50,000 were hospitalized, and at least
6 died. In her research on the matter, other reports
indicated that children in other parts of Asia—
such as Taiwan, Singapore, and Vietnam—were
also affected because they ingested melamine-
contaminated powdered infant formula. In efforts
to stop the further spread of contamination, the
22 brands that were implicated were taken off the
market.
The facts of the epidemic are clearly stated: the
number of children who have been reportedly
affected, the countries where the contamination
has spread, the action steps taken to avert further
contamination. The writer demonstrates her
knowledge of the subject and offers the reader
enough information to understand the depth of the
issue. From this article, the reader can assess the
problem without being influenced by the writer’s
personal opinions or colloquial language.
Standard English, when applied to formal ora-
tion, allows a speaker’s words to truly influence the
listener. In the delivery, the proper pronunciation
and tone will persuade the audience of the speaker’s
knowledge and conviction. For example, U.S.
Representative Shirley Chisholm, Democrat of New
York, gave a speech in support of the Equal Rights
Amendment on August 10, 1970. Although she
spoke to her peers and colleagues, Chisholm chose
words not typical in casual conversation; she thus
established formal diction. In her address, without
using first-person speech, she listed her reasons for
supporting the resolution. Chisholm declared the
amendment would provide equality under the law
for both men and women against the “subtle and
pervasive” institution of prejudice in the United
States. The use of precise language suggests the
importance and gravity of the subject at hand.
The use of formal diction thus underscores cer-
tain qualities of the subject, typically excluding the
identity or attributes of the writer or speaker. In
general, formal communication is void of the
writer’s voice, though the writer is able to shape
and direct the text through the choice of words
and information. This indirectly creates a vehicle
or subtext through which the writer’s own influ-
ence may pervade the text or speech.
Informal
In speaking with friends or family, people com-
monly use informal language. In prose fiction,
informal language typically occurs through char-
acter voices. This informal diction gives the char-
acter a distinct voice separate from that of the
writer. It also offers the reader clues to help situate
a character by identifying the character’s level of
education, social status, regional influences, and
other characteristics that can be associated with
certain word choices. For example, a character
says, “I was really happy.” Another character says,
“I felt undoubtedly exultant.” The reader may
infer that the second character has a better vocabu-
lary, and therefore is probably older and more
educated than is the first character. In another
text, when the main character speaks of his private
jet being repaired, the reader can assume that he is

wealthy. When another character refers to the
United States as “the mainland,” the reader can
deduce that she is from Hawai'i, Alaska, or one of
the insular areas in the Caribbean.
The autobiography of Claude Brown, Manchild
in the Promised Land, exemplifies how diction and
identity are inextricably linked through informal
diction. Brown grew up in Harlem in the late
1940s. In one section, he has just returned to his
neighborhood after a stay in the hospital, where he
was recuperating from a gunshot wound in his
stomach. The virtue of Brown’s character is empha-
sized when he discovers that he has missed a riot
and returns to the neighborhood in the aftermath
of the incident. He seeks details from police officers
and friends alike. The police officers reject his
inquiry and tell him to go home. When he talks
with his friends, Brown shows himself to be unfa-
miliar with the concept of a riot, but the idea that
people were stealing things clearly entices him. The
reader can use this information to help in more
precisely identifying young Claude’s origins, his
values, his habits, and his influences.
The types and degrees of informal diction are
most typically exhibited in colloquialisms, slang,
and jargon. According to the Modern Writer’s
Handbook, colloquial language is the conversa-
tional and everyday language of educated people.
Colloquialisms are the words and expressions that
characterize this language. Although not as infor-
mal as slang, colloquialisms are nonetheless gener-
ally too casual to be used in formal writing.
Examples follow:
Formal: He had fun at the party.
Colloquial: He had a ball at the party.
Slang exists at another, more esoteric level of
casual communication. An extremely informal
style of speaking, slang can be trendy and often is
humorous, ironic, or both. Words such as snazzy,
chillin’, and teenybopper are informal terms. More
undignified or flippant slang terms such as bimbo,
lush, and twerp can also evoke a response from the
audience. Slang often is highly exaggerated and
short lived. Subject to differences in connotations,
it may be misunderstood. Despite these drawbacks,
however, slang, used judiciously in formal writing,
can communicate effectively.
Style/Diction 799
Jargon is used to communicate with listeners
who have related technical or professional back-
grounds. It is frequently professional, highly spe-
cialized, and esoteric in meaning. These terms are
used in addressing a knowledgeable audience of
people with specific technical or professional knowl-
edge. As a result, this highly specific language may
exclude those outside the profession. Consider the
following jargon related to photography: dpi, TIFF,
ISO, and F-stop. Although people outside of this
knowledgeable group may be aware of these terms,
they may not know the origins, exact definitions,
and particular meanings of such technical terminol-
ogy. Their comprehension of the material in which
these terms occur will therefore be limited.
General and Specific
It is the writer’s responsibility to use precise lan-
guage to communicate effectively with any audi-
ence. General words will “tell” the reader, but
specific words “show” the reader. Consider the
example: “He entered the room.” This general
statement serves the basic purpose of placing a
character in a room. The statement does not indi-
cate whether he entered the room on an electric
stand-up scooter, in a pair of house slippers, or on
the shoulders of an acrobat. To vividly depict the
scene, the writer might use specific terms such as
sauntered, burst, or floundered.
Abstract terms refer to general ideas or concepts
and have no physical referents. Love, success,
democracy, and feminism are all abstract terms.
Writers must caution themselves to avoid general
or vague words when the idea at hand is specific.
Selecting concrete terms will create a clearer image
in the mind of the reader. Words such as spoon,
hot, and mask are concrete terms that refer to
objects or conditions that can be captured by the
five senses; readers can easily identify such terms in
familiar, specific ways. The closer the words are to
the reality of the subject, the clearer their meaning
becomes to the audience. Without these precise
distinctions, the writer’s words could be misinter-
preted in countless ways and clarity diminished.
Rashida S. Restaino
See also Dialect; Figures of Speech; Idiomatic
Expressions; Intonation; Profanity and Slang; Reflexive
Self or Reflexivity; Voice
800 Subjectivity
Further Readings
Brown, C. (1965). Manchild in the promised land. New
York: Signet.
Chisholm, S. (1998, April). For the Equal Rights
Amendment (M. E. Eidenmuller, Ed.). Retrieved
December 26, 2008, from American Rhetoric.com
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
shirleychisholmequalrights.htm
Harris, J., & Cunningham, D. (1997). The Simon &
Schuster guide to writing (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Ingelfinger, J. R. (2008). Melamine and the global
implications of food contamination. New England
Journal of Medicine, 359, 2745–2746.
O’Hare, F. (1986). The modern writer’s handbook. New
York: Macmillan.
Strunk, W., Jr., & White, E. B. (2000). The elements of
style. New York: Longman.
Subjectivity
Subjectivity refers to one’s conscious and uncon-
scious feelings, beliefs, and desires regarding expe-
riences and relations to the world (i.e., to objects).
Subjectivity addresses both individual experience
and the shaping of those experiences’ meanings;
thus, subjectivity is the ground on which identity is
constructed. Subjectivity implies a degree of thought
and self-awareness about identity, while allowing
myriad unconscious constraints on our abilities to
understand our own, or others’, identities.
Most contemporary philosophy of subjectivity is
a reaction to Enlightenment thinking, where the
subject was a rational and autonomous agent, the
origin of all knowledge and experience. The self
became the point of connection between all cogni-
tive impulses (as in René Descartes’s famous “I
think, therefore I am”). The I was an active agent,
encountering the world outside it in a way that gen-
erated a unified self. Enlightenment thinkers such as
Descartes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau
encoded a sense of agency in which one could
remake and perfect oneself through methodical
action. They valorized the “natural self,” viewing
persons as possessing an essential nature and poten-
tial, which could become entrapped by society.
Several critics suggested that the Enlightenment
view ignored irrationality, emotionality, and the
unconscious while de-socializing the subject.
Friedrich Nietzsche, for instance, asserted that the
subject was a grammatical fiction, not a real entity
existing in the world. Martin Heidegger followed,
questioning the nature of consciousness and sub-
jectivity by arguing that being-in-the-world makes
us of the world, not merely placing us in it. He
charged that Enlightenment thinkers failed to
question the character of experience and the need
for an openness to being. These themes are devel-
oped in the five streams of thought most com-
monly drawn on in contemporary humanities and
social science scholarship.
Freud
Sigmund Freud initiated a radical rethinking of
subjectivity. Freud replaced the Enlightenment’s
autonomous and rational subject with a complex
self directed by deep psychological drives obscured
from the person’s own awareness. Subjectivity is
neither innate nor determined, but constituted by
gender relations and sexual identifications forged in
early childhood, particularly in the nuclear family.
Freud suggested that children move through stages
in early life where desires corresponding with body
regions (oral, anal, genital) are either met or frus-
trated. Prominent among his concepts is the Oedipus
Complex, which operates through the child’s rec-
ognition of male and female genitals and fear of the
father’s power; it leads children to identify with
either the powerful father (and to imagine sex with
the mother) or with the mother and her role as the
object of the father’s sexual desire. In either case,
said Freud, Oedipal desire is understood as inap-
propriate and is repressed: It is placed into the
unconscious to avoid its effects. But repressed
drives animate dreams and guide our experiencing,
such that adult compulsions and identifications are
shaped by unconscious gender associations, repres-
sions of the libido, and projections of hidden and
irrational sexual desires. The inner world is thus
transparent to the self, yet one can grasp and con-
trol these unconscious forces with the objectifying
assistance of the psychoanalyst.
Lacan
Not long after Freud, Jacques Lacan modified the
former’s claims through the application of

Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic structuralism.
Saussure held that language was a system of differ-
ences in which the arbitrary relation between the
signifier and signified are held together in one’s
mind. From this, Lacan reasoned that the uncon-
scious is structured like a language, and that if we
are to understand subjectivity, we must understand
linguistic human communication.
His most compelling notion along these lines is
the mirror stage, the point at which an infant rec-
ognizes itself as being separate from the persons
and objects around it, perhaps through seeing its
reflection in a mirror. Such an image presents itself
to the infant as undivided and, therefore, conveys
a sense of mastery over the body. But this imagi-
nary image is contradicted by the child’s experi-
ence of fragmentation, disconnection, and
powerlessness. Both image and experience are rep-
resented by signifiers repressed into the uncon-
scious. This is accompanied by immersion in the
symbolic order, where the stark distinctions of
language provide an external definition of whole-
ness. The problem, then, is that the subject cannot
define itself except in terms of the symbolic order’s
imaginary unitary identity. The subject is conse-
quently decentered, and our sense of self, our iden-
tity, is generated from a misrecognition, a subject’s
misunderstanding of the unity of the ego alongside
the accompanying alienation from oneself.
An important implication is that the subject
seeks in the symbolic order—the apparently objec-
tive world we inhabit—the imaginary unity of the
image in the mirror, and hence is driven by an
unconscious desire to compensate for separateness
and lack. And though we identify with the seduc-
tive objects of language to secure unity, the sym-
bolic realm’s basis in arbitrary linguistic distinctions
and logical reason simply cannot provide that
coherence. No object can replace the forever-lost
unity and, in time, desire becomes its own object.
In his consideration of the symbolic domain,
Lacan retained a Freudian attention to masculine
domination. Freud saw the child’s developing sub-
jectivity as hinging on the possession (or lack of) a
penis and a fear of the father, as controller of its
possession. Lacan, however, emphasized language
over anatomy. The father served as the transcen-
dental signifier, marking the symbolic domain as a
phallocentric order where meaning, reason, and
truth reside. This line of thought later became
Subjectivity 801
central to thinkers influenced by both psycho-
analysis and feminism.
Althusser
Louis Althusser moved beyond Lacan in theorizing
the subject as a social construction, suggesting that
subjectivity is a consequence of power-laden prac-
tices. Althusser’s contribution is based on a read-
ing of Freud’s unconscious and Lacan’s mirror
phase to produce a conception of the power of
ideology. Althusser argued that ideology, and
capitalist reproduction, is based on ideological
state apparatuses (ISAs)—institutions such as reli-
gion, education, the political and legal systems,
mass communication, culture, and the family—
that interpellate, or hail, subjects (as when police
on the street yell “hey, you!” and persons, guilty or
not, recognize the call and turn) by appealing to
their unconscious fears and desires. These ISAs
generate submission to the rules of the established
order because they are supported by public-domain
repressive state apparatuses, that function by
force. Drawing on these notions, Althusser argued
for the impossibility of existence outside of ideol-
ogy, while displaying how individuals enter the
subject position they inhabit. In his thinking, indi-
viduals are interpellated by ideology as free sub-
jects in a manner that leads them to freely accept
their subjection and, concomitantly, perform the
requisite gestures and actions on their own voli-
tion. From this, he suggested that the notion of
subject refers both to the thinking, feeling person
at the center of experience—the subject of action
and the location of experiences, and to the person
as an object of power, as in a citizen who is “sub-
ject of” a monarch.
The ruling ideology is powerful precisely because
it can provide subjects an image of identity coher-
ence and ontological security in an uncertain
world. It involves a misrecognition that differs
from Lacan’s: Here, subjects believe themselves to
be the source of meanings when they are, actually,
the effects of those meanings. With such claims,
Althusser’s view appears to present a deterministic
model of domination, but the picture is somewhat
more complicated because (a) Both the dominated
and dominators are interpellated into their posi-
tions because submission is required for all; (b) the
functioning of ideology and subjectivity limits the
802 Subjectivity
degree to which a dominant group can smoothly
reproduce itself; (c) the subject’s recognition of the
ISA’s role in constructing its identity can lead to a
critique of these institutions; and (d) by showing
the multiplicity and overdetermination of ISAs, he
helped show how “articulations” between prac-
tices and structures can become sites of struggle
over meanings and associations among elements.
Foucault
Michel Foucault, a student of Althusser, developed
a unique conception of subjectivity based on a
denial of any ontologically given “nature” to the
subject. Strongly influenced by Nietzsche, Foucault
argued that discursive formations, or regimes of
truth, created the concept of subjectivity to exert
control over persons. Once the person is defined as
a center of experience and responsibility, discur-
sive formations classify and regulate subjects
according to particular conceptions of knowledge
and truth while providing materials to shape them-
selves. Subjectivity, then, cannot be an authentic
expression of “who you really are,” but rather is a
contingent effect of power (or, more appropriately,
of power/knowledge regimes). Foucault suggested
that key in the construction of contemporary
forms of subjectivity was the human sciences,
which did not exist until “man” was constructed
as an epistemological category in the 18th century.
Akin to Freud’s unconscious and Althusser’s ideol-
ogy, the discursive formation in Foucault positions
and “disciplines” subjects in the appropriate means
of expression and self-construction.
Power, for Foucault, is not the top-down
authority of a unitary logic or a sovereign entity.
Instead, it is “capillary,” infusing all sorts of
micropractices and entering into the deepest
recesses of the individual. Thus, power does not
remain external to the subject, but occupies the
person’s interiority; power produces the proce-
dures by which we observe, analyze, interpret, and
act on ourselves, and is not merely coercive.
Feminist Poststructuralists
Several of the preceding theorists see gender as cen-
tral to the formation of subjectivity, but they tend
to either portray it in deterministic terms that can-
not conceive of woman except in the negative (e.g.,
Lacan’s phallocentric order) or fail to theorize it
explicitly (Althusser and Foucault). Dissatisfied,
feminist thinkers produced novel views of gender,
sexuality, and subjectivity, usually based in some
fashion on Simone de Beauvoir’s claims about
“woman” being the “Other,” perpetually defined
and classified only with respect to “man.”
Although many lines of theorizing follow from
this, two are of particular interest. The first consists
of work by French feminist psychoanalysts, includ-
ing Hélène Cixous, Julia Kristeva, and Luce Irigaray.
Irigaray, in particular, sought to deconstruct
Lacanian phallocentrism. She argued that women’s
subjectivity cannot be captured in traditional terms
because it is both multiple and decentered; thus,
female subjectivity cannot be reduced to the con-
verse of the male. Attempting to fit this version of
subjectivity has forced women to replicate a male
language that erases the feminine. In its place, she
advocated developing a “female imaginary,” fos-
tering language and experience that is fragmented,
nonlinear, and polysemic. The result would not be
a subjectivity built on a female “essence,” but
instead would be open-ended, ambiguous, and
destabilizing—and, in turn, would generate new
possibilities for selfhood. Kristeva (as well as
Cixous) took a similar stand, seeing the feminine as
occupying a distinct mode of language. From this
perspective, subjectivity is fundamentally and
always in process, and desire is seen as an outcome
of ongoing changes and contradictions in that sub-
jectivity. Moreover, in Kristeva, the subject never
considers herself stable and knowable, even to her-
self, and therefore cannot be fully captured by
patriarchy’s efforts to secure a controllable unity.
Also important here is Judith Butler and her con-
ception of performativity as the basis of subjectiv-
ity. Butler argued that gender, sex, and sexuality are
not the outcomes or implications of a (distinct) lin-
guistic code, but are objects in a system of norma-
tively governed and iterative performances, not all
of which are under our control. These perfor-
mances, always scrutinized for gender appropriate-
ness, present themselves to subjects as both natural
and authentic presentations of self. Their repetitive-
ness emphasizes the ritualized character of subjec-
tivity but, at the same time, displays indeterminacy
in that each iteration awaits its enactment and can
never provide precise duplication. Performativity,
therefore, assumes a potential for resistance to

regulative discourses, sometimes unintended or
unperceived by the actor herself. Recently, Butler
argued that self-narratives are necessarily incom-
plete and that subjects are insufficiently aware of
Others’ claims on their subjectivities; accordingly,
assertions about ethical obligations are always
based on limited knowledge of self, implying an
interrogation of regulative discourses as essential to
ethical interaction. Butler, thus, retains a concep-
tion of agency, constrained though it may be, in her
view of subjectivity, accompanied by a desire to
shape ethical accountability. She does not subscribe
to Irigaray’s vision of a distinct female imaginary,
preferring to seek destabilization and examination
of all models of subjectivity to keep selfhood open.
Subjectivity and Identity
These five lines of thought present rather different
conceptions of subjectivity, forming dramatic con-
trasts with Enlightenment thinking and, for sev-
eral, creating the basis for social-political action.
They address the unconscious, language, and the
social world to varying degrees, and, with respect
to identity, theories of subjectivity help us investi-
gate how, when, why, and from where identity is
constructed. Subjectivity thus concerns the nature
of the self as well as the relationship between indi-
vidual and collective—persistent and central con-
cerns across the human sciences.
Timothy Kuhn
See also Critical Theory; Cultural Studies; Gender;
Language; Modernity and Postmodernity; Philosophy
of Identity; Self-Consciousness
Further Readings
Althusser, L. (1971). Ideology and ideological state
apparatuses (B. Brewster, Trans.). In Lenin and
philosophy and other essays. London: New Left Books.
Butler, J. (2005). Giving an account of oneself. New
York: Fordham University Press.
Foucault, M. (1970). The order of things: An archaeology
of the human sciences. New York: Pantheon.
Foucault, M. (1982). The subject and power. Critical
Inquiry, 8, 777–795.
Hall, S. (1985). Signification, representation, ideology:
Althusser and the post-structuralist debates. Critical
Studies in Mass Communication, 2, 91–114.
Surveillance and the Panopticon 803
Surveillance and
the Panopticon
In its simplest sense, surveillance is the act of
observing or the condition of being observed, and
it has always existed in some form. The term sur-
veillance is generally used, however, to mean the
act of watching or being watched in a systematic
and focused manner. The Panopticon is a prison
structure designed by Englishman Jeremy Bentham
in 1785, which allows one guard to observe all the
prison cells from a central tower that provides a
view into each prison cell. The Panopticon is often
used to illustrate the ways in which surveillance
can discipline the individual. Surveillance strate-
gies can have a specific impact on racialized and
gendered identities that are often targeted in spe-
cific ways by surveillance. This entry looks at the
impact surveillance technologies have had on the
entertainment industry, the importance of surveil-
lance in a post–9/11 world, the ways in which
data collection constitutes a form of surveillance,
the details of Bentham’s Panopticon prison, Michel
Foucault’s influential ideas about surveillance, the
impact of surveillance on racialized and gendered
identities, and the development of a new field of
scholarship, surveillance studies.
In the past few decades in Western countries,
sophisticated surveillance technologies have been
developed that make it possible to monitor the
activities of just about anyone or to put oneself
under observation for the purview of others.
Although surveillance has traditionally been under-
stood to be the act of watching someone without
that person’s explicit knowledge, with the prolif-
eration of surveillance technologies in public spaces
(cameras in elevators and closed-circuit televisions
to monitor public spaces, for instance), people are
now often aware that they are being watched or
that there is a possibility that they may be watched.
Additionally, surveillance now includes collection
of information about the activities of an individual
and is thus no longer understood as an exclusively
visual activity.
Surveillance activities are particularly relevant
to the modern age because they can be used to
monitor workers in industrial and bureaucratic
institutions. Such institutions can improve produc-
tivity and maximize effectiveness by tracking and
804 Surveillance and the Panopticon
collecting information about the movements and
activities of workers, for example. More recently,
in the era of globalization and corporatization,
surveillance has become a vital consumer market-
ing tool. A Web site such as amazon.com, for
example, stores information about purchases made
and products viewed by a consumer and uses this
data to pitch products to the consumer based on
his or her individual tastes and habits.
Surveillance and Entertainment
Surveillance technologies are increasingly being
employed for entertainment purposes. Reality TV
uses surveillance technology to gather footage of
real people doing real things, often putting willing
participants under constant 24-hour surveillance
for an extended period. This footage is then used
to create a television show. The popularity of real-
ity TV signals a noticeable shift in perceptions of
surveillance. The phrase “Big Brother is watching
you,” for example, originally referred to the inva-
sive and controlling gaze of a totalitarian govern-
ment that monitored inhabitants in the fictional
Oceania of George Orwell’s novel 1984. In the
reality TV show titled Big Brother, on the other
hand, a group of people willingly agree to be con-
fined to a house for several weeks to have their
every move caught on camera and broadcast to
paying viewers on the World Wide Web with
select segments broadcast on national television.
This show illustrates the shift from a view of sur-
veillance as an ominous activity that monitors and
controls a population to a comfort with surveil-
lance and a perception of it as nonthreatening.
The use of surveillance to create entertainment
products has extended to cyberspace as well with
the explosion of online blogging that allows others
to learn about the private parts of a person’s life
and the proliferation of Web sites where people put
themselves on display doing any number of activi-
ties in front of a webcam. What is unique about the
use of surveillance for entertainment purposes is
the willingness of people to put themselves on dis-
play, to be monitored, to be under surveillance.
Surveillance Post-9/11
Surveillance became a hot topic after 9/11.
Governments in many Western countries view
surveillance as crucial in preventing acts of terror-
ism, shoring up national borders and protecting
against potential security threats. The USA
PATRIOT Act, signed into law by President
George W. Bush on October 26, 2001, is largely
about increasing the ability of government agen-
cies to use surveillance techniques to track the
activities (e-mail, phone conversations, bank trans-
actions, medical records, and so on) of U.S. citi-
zens as well as foreigners located in or wishing to
gain entry to the United States. Surveillance here
has the mandate to track the activities of individu-
als identified as potential threats to the nation and
to intercept these individuals before their plans are
carried to fruition.
Dataveillance and Cybersurveillance
Although surveillance has typically relied on visual
observation, there has been a proliferation of tech-
nologies for dataveillance and cybersurveillance,
that is, gathering nonvisual data to monitor an
individual’s activities (Web sites visited, online
purchases made, physical location, and so forth).
Dataveillance involves gathering information
about an individual’s activities through his or her
use of information technology—collecting data
from electronic tracking devices (GPS systems),
cell phones, or online activities, for example.
Cybersurveillance is a more specific term referring
to the monitoring of an individual’s actions in
cyberspace—Web sites visited, activities performed
on these sites, online purchases, and so forth.
An important aspect of dataveillance and cyber-
surveillance is that they produce a data persona
rather than an embodied self. Additionally, sur-
veillance practices increasingly focus on consump-
tion practices: what people buy, how, when, and
where. This produces an ideal consumer—that is,
a consumer whose habits, tastes, likes, and dislikes
can be tracked and catered to. Dataveillance and
cybersurveillance enable mass individualization of
advertising. Hence, a tool such as Gmail, the
e-mail technology by Google, can electronically
scan a user’s e-mail for keywords that can then be
used to advertise specific products to that individ-
ual: Ads are displayed on a sidebar when the user
opens e-mail, each user seeing a different set of ads
tailored to him or her based on data collected from
the e-mail account.

Bentham’s Panopticon
Bentham’s prison was designed to lower operating
costs by creating a structure requiring fewer guards
to watch over and discipline prisoners. Bentham’s
panoptic prison is circular, with a tower at the
center and several stories of prison cells surround-
ing and facing the tower. A prison guard sits in an
observatory located in the tower, its windows cov-
ered by venetian blinds. This means the prisoners
cannot see into the observatory, but the guard can
see into any of the prison cells. Because a single
person in the tower can observe all the prison cells,
only one prison guard is needed at any given time.
The ingenuity of the structure is that the threat of
being watched by someone with the power to pun-
ish can make the prisoners behave as if they are
always being watched (when in fact they may
never be, may always be, or may only be once in a
while). The fear of being observed breaking the
rules of the prison results in obedient behavior, all
this without the use of overt force. In other words,
the specter of surveillance disciplines the behavior
of prisoners.
The panoptic structure makes explicit some of
the ways in which the threat of being under surveil-
lance—being watched, observed, monitored—can
be powerful. The terms panoptic, panopticism, and
the panopticon suggest a structure, situation, space,
or setting in which an individual’s movements may
be tracked either by real people through observa-
tion (visual or with the help of technology) or by
monitoring his or her activities. The terms also
express the power that knowledge of the potential
of being monitored can exert on the individual.
Foucault, Discipline, and Docile Bodies
Bentham’s Panopticon also serves as a metaphor
for the power that institutional forces can exert.
This metaphor was first used by French theorist
Foucault in his 1975 work Discipline & Punish.
Panopticism creates what Foucault calls “docile
bodies,” that is, bodies that self-discipline without
explicit force being exerted upon them and that
self-regulate according to the demands of their
context. Foucault looks at the social and structural
apparatuses undergirding changes in Western
European society during the modern age, an age
marked by industrialization and bureaucratization.
Surveillance and the Panopticon 805
In his examination of the emergence of the penal
system in the section of the book titled “The Birth
of the Prison,” Foucault explores the origins,
implications, and productive powers of panopti-
cism—how the threat of punishment can discipline
the individual, how people learn to self-discipline
to become ideal citizens for a given context. The
need for docile bodies, Foucault argues, emerges in
the modern industrial age with its factories, schools,
military, medical institutions, and so forth that
require the orderly and disciplined conduct of bod-
ies. These institutions need individuals who can
master particular tasks and excel at the training for
such tasks. The discipline of bodies through insti-
tutional—panoptic-like—power is instrumental for
this purpose. The exemplar of the type of institu-
tion that might generate these bodies is Bentham’s
Panopticon, which produces a body that internal-
izes the discipline needed to survive in this context
without overt external force.
Race and Gender
Race and gender often define our identities, shap-
ing how we interact in the world and how people
perceive and treat us. They are thus important in
assessing how surveillance practices affect the indi-
vidual. Surveillance practices that rely on visual
observation—looking and being physically visible
to others—are especially relevant when it comes to
how gender or race can make an individual more
or less visible, more or less prone to attracting the
look of others.
Historically, women and people of color have
been subject to surveillance in particular ways. For
instance, as art critic John Berger outlines in his
1973 book Ways of Seeing, women have become
accustomed to perceiving themselves as always on
display—on television, in film, in photographs—so
much so that they look upon themselves in this
manner, possessing a profound understanding that
their physical appearance is integral to their iden-
tity. In her influential article “Visual Pleasure and
Narrative Cinema,” film theorist Laura Mulvey
argues that women in film are constantly on dis-
play and subject to what she terms a “male gaze,”
that is, that they are filmed from the perspective of
an imaginary masculine spectator who objectifies
the women on screen. This suggests that women
may experience visual surveillance as particularly
806 Symbolic Interactionism
stressful because of the existing focus on their
physical appearance and the emphasis in much
popular culture in putting women visually on dis-
play. Additionally, research has shown that some
men who operate surveillance devices use them to
objectify women for their viewing pleasure, by
focusing a closed-circuit camera on a woman’s
body parts, as Kevin Haggerty notes in his research
on the topic. Thus, a person’s gender can affect
how an individual experiences surveillance and
how it is directed at him or her.
People of color are watched with particular
attention in certain circumstances. For example,
when it comes to crime, surveillance of people of
color is especially intense: Areas with dense African
American populations tend to have more surveil-
lance cameras than other areas do because these
are considered places with higher crime rates.
Concomitantly, African Americans are likely to be
watched more often in stores because of the suspi-
cion that they will shoplift. As Haggerty again
highlights, this can result in a disproportionate
amount of surveillance (closed-circuit cameras, for
instance) directed at certain racial groups. A per-
son’s race can have a particular impact on how he
or she experiences surveillance and how it is
directed at him or her.
The ability to willingly put oneself on public
display—through the use of a webcam or a blog, for
instance—can also offer a rebellious, liberating, and
important outlet for people who have traditionally
been oppressively put under the gaze of surveillance
because it provides an opportunity to appropriate
the means of surveillance and control its use.
Surveillance Studies
In the past two decades, surveillance studies has
surfaced as an area of research in academia, result-
ing in work such as the online journal Surveillance
and Society and the Surveillance Project at Queen’s
University in Ontario. This scholarship is con-
cerned with the implications of the use of surveil-
lance technologies and techniques. The research
has grown alongside developments in new tech-
nologies and the changing social infrastructures
around the practice of surveillance. The work is
multidisciplinary, looking at the emergence, impli-
cations, effects, occurrences, and theories needed
to understand how surveillance is used. Broadly
speaking, this work can touch on issues of democ-
racy, privacy, freedom, and oppression, and look
at the implications of the use of surveillance on
politics and policy.
Rachel E. Dubrofsky
See also Voyeurism
Further Readings
Berger, J. (1973). Ways of seeing. New York: Penguin.
Foucault, M. (1995). Discipline & punish: The birth of
the prison. New York: Vintage Books.
Haggerty, K. D. (2006). Tear down the walls: On
demolishing the panopticon. In D. Lyon (Ed.),
Theorizing surveillance: The panopticon and beyond.
Devon, UK: Willan.
Mulvey, L. (1975). Visual pleasure and narrative cinema.
Screen, 16(3), 6–18.
Symbolic Interactionism
Symbolic interactionism is a sociological perspec-
tive rooted in the philosophy of pragmatism, espe-
cially as it was developed by the philosopher
George Herbert Mead, who taught social psychol-
ogy at the University of Chicago in the early 20th
century. His student, Herbert Blumer, who named
the perspective “symbolic interactionism,” asserted
the three basic precepts that have defined the inter-
actionist approach. First, people act in and toward
the social world—its people, situations, social roles,
goals, ideas, institutions, and material things—on
the basis of meaning. Second, meaning is not fixed
or immutable, but arises in concrete situations of
social interaction, in the give and take of everyday
life as people pursue their aims in cooperation and
sometimes conflict with others. And third, meaning
is used, and often transformed, in an ongoing pro-
cess of interpretation in which self-consciousness
plays a major part. The symbolic interactionist
approach to identity rests on these ideas.
The Nature of Meaning
Human beings are symbolic creatures, for whom
linguistic symbols are the principle basis for

constructing, experiencing, and acting meaning-
fully on their worlds. A symbol is anything—a
word, an image, a gesture—that stands for some-
thing else. National flags symbolize “patriotic”
attitudes and feelings; certain hand gestures or
facial expressions signify the user’s contempt or
disdain for another; names and labels identify peo-
ple by their social roles, group memberships, and
personal characteristics and thus establish expecta-
tions for and limits on their conduct. Of the various
kinds of symbols, those carried in language are the
most important for human conduct. People live in
a world of named objects, and people’s capacity to
act successfully rests on learning the possible and
expected ways of responding to or acting toward
these objects.
Symbols enable people to coordinate their con-
duct because they arouse shared responses. The
person who uses a symbol evokes thoughts, feel-
ings, and ideas about possible actions in the minds
of others who see or hear it, as well as in his or her
own mind. For example, an announcement that
building is on fire arouses in all who are present—
announcer as well as listeners—a set of ideas about
the dangers of fire in an enclosed space as well as
how to respond to it. Likewise, derogatory words
lay a shared basis for thoughts and feelings, and
ultimately, actions toward others. The responses
aroused by symbols are not identical from one
person to another, but they are sufficiently similar
to allow the individual to assume (at least initially)
that others are responding to the situation in more
or less the same way he or she is responding.
Meaning is thus a social rather than merely an
individual phenomenon. It is the individual, of
course, who learns and uses the meanings provided
by the language of his or her community. Yet to
use a word is to bring into public view a part of the
individual’s state of mind at a particular time and
thereby to communicate it to others. To speak of
“fire,” for example, is to indicate to others (and to
oneself) that one believes there is danger and is
prepared to act on it, that the others should define
the situation and act in a similar way, and that col-
lectively they are seeking escape or rescue from a
dangerous situation. To invoke a racial or ethnic
stereotype in a conversation is to invite the other
to view the member of a racial or ethnic outgroup
in the same way as the speaker, and implicitly
(though not necessarily immediately) to act toward
Symbolic Interactionism 807
the outgroup member on the basis of that attitude.
Meanings thus shape both the individual’s conduct
and that of others.
Meaning and Interaction
The symbols, and thus also meanings, available to
the members of a society or one of its subgroups
may seem fixed and immutable, but they are not.
Linguistic symbols—words—do have relatively
stable meanings, in the sense that they have dic-
tionary definitions and, more significantly, because
they are used more or less consistently by those
who speak a given language. It might seem, there-
fore, that human beings are confined by a linguis-
tic straightjacket, able only to respond to a given
and more or less fixed set of symbols and to enact
the lines of conduct they make possible. A cry of
“fire” in a public place, in this view, could only
lead to more or less well or badly coordinated
efforts to escape.
Meaning is not a fixed quality, however, but an
emergent one. Human conduct and the meanings
on which it depends are situated. People form their
conduct as they interact with others, use and hear
symbols, define the situations in which they find
themselves, construct lines of conduct for them-
selves, and influence the conduct of others. In this
process, new meanings emerge and shape conduct,
previous meanings prove not to be useful, and
unexpected events transform meanings, whether
subtly or drastically, and lay the basis for new
conduct. In other words, people use meanings to
organize their conduct and respond practically to
the situations they face. They adopt new symbols
and discard or transform others as circumstances
dictate or make possible.
Consider conflict between an adolescent and his
or her parents over the young person’s freedom to
come and go as he or she pleases. “Independence”
is a principle goal of the young in U.S. culture and
a matter of concern to and often resistance by their
parents. Middle and high school students expect
increasing degrees of freedom year by year, and
their parents, concerned (realistically or not) about
the dangers of drugs, alcohol, cars, and sex,
are often inclined to hold their children close and
resist their quest for independence. Many argu-
ments thus begin with established cultural
meanings—“independence,” “freedom,” “rebellion,”
808 Symbolic Interactionism
“danger.” But the conduct of the disputants—
what they say and what they do—arises in the
situation and not simply and automatically from
fixed cultural meanings and scripts. Who did what
to spark an argument? How did participants
define those actions? Was staying out past curfew,
for example, seen by the adolescent as a declara-
tion of independence or by his or her parents as an
act of rebellion? Or was it taken as an unintended
but avoidable mistake? Likewise, to grasp how an
argument became more heated or how it cooled,
we must examine how participants interpreted one
another’s words and deeds. Did a parent, for
example, recognize his or her own adolescence in
the son or daughter’s actions and therefore decide
to be more accommodating? Did the adolescent
come to regard overt resistance as futile and thus
decide to present a more contented self while find-
ing more secret means of rebellion? Established
meanings provide a framework for interaction,
but the process of interaction often yields fluidity
and change.
The Self
Because human beings are symbolic creatures, they
are necessarily also self-conscious. Humans live in
a world of named objects and are capable of acting
toward themselves as objects, much as they act
toward any object. Individuals have names, just as
other objects—houses, chairs, cars—have names.
To name something—whether it is a new Lexus or
a newborn infant that is called by such relational
names as “son” or “daughter” as well as by an
individual name, “Jacob”—is to assign it a place in
the social world and to invoke shared ways of act-
ing toward it. A new luxury car invokes shared
ideas about social standing or wealth; a new infant
invokes shared ideas about how girls and boys
should be treated or about an ancestral “Jacob”
whose qualities it is hoped will be shared by his
namesake. Cars do not hear or use their names,
but people do. “Jacob” learns his name and, along
with it as socialization proceeds, he learns his
“meaning” in the eyes of others. He learns the
attitudes they hold, the expectations they have of
him, the ways they are prepared to act toward
him. In thus becoming an object he can himself
name, think about, develop feelings about, and act
toward, he acquires a self.
In the symbolic interactionist perspective, the
essence of the self lies in reflexivity—that is, in the
capacity of the person to be conscious of his or her
own past, present, and future actions from the
imagined perspective of other people. Infants are
born into a relatively small world of caretakers
such as parents, siblings, and other kin whose rela-
tionships to one another they gradually grasp and,
as they acquire language, name. The social world
expands—to the extended family, neighborhood,
village, town, city, nation—and as it does, the indi-
vidual develops a cognitive map of that world and
his or her various roles in it. The child learns he or
she is “son” or “daughter,” and later “Black” or
“White,” “college student” or “worker.” The
social roles that others enact provide the perspec-
tives from which individuals imaginatively see and
respond to themselves. The “son” sees himself as
son by adopting the perspective of others, particu-
larly of “mother” and “father.”
This reflexive capacity to see oneself from the
point of view of the other enables people to trans-
form meanings rather than merely respond auto-
matically to fixed meanings. When people act, they
indicate meanings to themselves. For example,
they tell themselves that they are angry, that their
parents are trying to exert too much control over
them, or that their protests are only making things
worse. In other words, in forming their conduct
people consider themselves—their own thoughts,
feelings, and actions—as a part of the situation in
which they find themselves. They imagine how
they appear to others and how their impending
actions will affect how others see and act toward
them. And as they indicate alternative meanings,
they also lay out alternative lines of conduct
for themselves, and thus lay the basis for choosing
one act instead of another. And when individuals
find themselves defined in ways they do not like
because of their actions, they seek to repair dam-
age to the conceptions others have of them by
excusing or justifying their conduct. In any case,
self-consciousness makes it possible to sort, sift,
and consider various meanings, and to replace one
set of meanings with another.
Identity
Although Mead did not use the term, the concept
of identity has become central to the symbolic

interactionist analysis of the self. Identity refers to
the individual’s location in social life, and it is
established by the thoughts, feelings, and actions
of others as well as those of the individual. Identity
is therefore inherently a social process rather than
simply an individual possession. A person “has”
an identity—as a parent or child, as an African
American or a Jew, as a Roman Catholic or a
Lutheran, as a friend or enemy, as brilliant or intel-
lectually slow—when the individual’s announce-
ments of identity correspond with the placements
made by others. Every act announces an identity of
one kind or another. Approaching a sales clerk in
a store with a confident sense that one expects the
clerk’s attention is an announcement of one’s iden-
tity as a customer. The executive who disdainfully
ignores a janitor or other service worker announces
an identity of “superior” and assigns the other the
place of “subordinate.” When the clerk attends to
the customer, he or she places the other in the cus-
tomer identity. When the service worker avoids
eye contact and attends only to the work at hand
rather than to the executive, he or she places the
other in the claimed position.
Identities vary along two major dimensions—
social versus personal and situated versus bio-
graphical. People announce and are placed in a
variety of identities that depend on group, organi-
zational, and demographic memberships or affilia-
tions: familial, occupational, educational, age
related, political, ethnic, religious, and the like.
These social identities locate the individual in a
social world whose map is shared and understood
by its members. Some of these social identities
acquire a more central place in the self than others
do—the individual may be chiefly identified by oth-
ers and identify himself or herself as a professor,
for example, or an African American, or a woman.
These social identities are announced when people
enact the social roles on which they are based, as
when the professor enters the classroom and begins
to teach. They are also announced in other situa-
tions, as when an individual is introduced to some-
one at a cocktail party as “Professor Smith.”
Social identity is a key part of the person’s sense
of self—and for some people, the most important
part—but it does not fully define the self. People
also construct personal identities that reflect their
particular life histories or accomplishments rather
than only their group memberships and social roles.
Symbolic Interactionism 809
Some individuals—Apple Computer CEO Steve
Jobs is a good example—develop such distinctive
personal identities that their names alone establish
their place in the social world. They truly “need no
introduction” and their actions are interpreted as
manifestations of “themselves” rather than of their
social roles or group memberships. Their personal
identities nonetheless depend as much on the acts of
others as on their own actions. Steve Jobs is “Steve
Jobs” because of his announcements and because of
his placement by others as a unique individual with
a particular history of accomplishment.
Identity is both situated and biographical. In any
given social situation, the individual typically acts
on the basis of a particular identity—for example,
mother, professor, physician—and does so in rela-
tion to particular others—son, student, patient.
Situated identities are established largely on the
basis of role relationships, and when the person
departs the situation, the situated identity is left
behind, to be replaced by an identity relevant to the
next situation. The son leaves for school and
becomes a student; the mother leaves for work and
becomes a professor. But people are not merely
participants in situations, with their actions merely
governed by role requirements. They are creatures
of biography. That is, they have life histories, a
series of experiences with a variety of situations
and roles, and they think of themselves—and are
thought of by others—as having a reality beyond
the boundaries of the particular situation. Sometimes
the biographical sense of self is mainly founded on
particular social identities that they experience
repeatedly, such as occupational or familial ones.
Other people emphasize personal attributes or
accomplishments. In either case, and in various
mixtures of the social and the personal, the person
has a life history and his or her identity is founded
on a biographical narrative announced to and
accepted by others. We use the stories we tell about
ourselves to locate ourselves in the social world.
Identity provides a major basis for motivation
and action. People see the world from the vantage
points of their various identities. As Catholics or
Jews; Blacks, Whites, or Hispanics; or as Steve
Jobs, they define their circumstances and opportu-
nities for action on the basis of their identities. The
actions people take within the groups to which
they belong or in the roles they enact as well as
their relationship to the members of other groups
810 Symbolism
and occupants of other roles are shaped by their
identities. People act on the basis of meanings pro-
vided by their identities and by interaction with
others in terms of identity norms. Individuals
explain their actions in terms of their identities.
Thus, for example, the professor in the college
classroom sees that microscopic social world as a
professor—he or she views the others present as
“students,” responds to their questions or lack of
questions as indicators of professorial success or
failure and, at least in theory, does not pay atten-
tion to gender, race, or other characteristics that
are presumably not relevant to the student iden-
tity. Taking “professor” as the essence of the self
in that situation, his or her perception of self and
others is that of a professor.
The motivational significance of identity, how-
ever, can be complex. If a student in a classroom
makes a comment that the professor and others
regard as racist, for example, the roles and identi-
ties of all present are challenged and may be tem-
porarily transformed. Instead of “professor” and
“student,” those present may find themselves inter-
acting as “tolerant” and “intolerant” or as “con-
demners” of a “bigot.” Even within defined and
relatively stable situations, therefore, roles and
identities can be somewhat fluid. In contemporary
life, many people are conflicted about which iden-
tity should claim most of their time and energy, as
when a demanding occupational role interferes
with a parental role. Moreover, announcements
and placements do not always agree. Members of
an ethnic group may be more interested in placing
an individual among them and eliciting identifica-
tion with the group than the individual is in
announcing a group affiliation and identifying
with it. An individual’s identification with a group
may be met with indifference or rejection by group
members. In such circumstances, we cannot really
say that the individual simply “has” a particular
identity. Nonetheless, identity is a motivating ele-
ment in his or her conduct, whether it promotes an
effort to reconcile the demands of work and family
or to resist a group’s pressures or to overcome its
resistance.
John P. Hewitt
See also Collective/Social Identity; Identification;
Impression Management; Looking-Glass Self;
Narratives; Reflexive Self or Reflexivity; Self;
Self-Presentation
Further Readings
Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective
and methods. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Hewitt, J. P. (2007). Self and society: A symbolic
interactionist social psychology (10th ed.). Boston:
Allyn & Bacon.
Mead, G. H. (1964). On social psychology (A. L. Strauss,
Ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Reynolds, L. T., & Hermann-Kinney, N. J. (Eds.).
(2003). Handbook of symbolic interactionism. Walnut
Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
Symbolism
Symbolism is a technique used widely to convey a
deeper message, substitute for language when lan-
guage is not shared, and enhance the intended mes-
sage. Symbolism occurs in literature, religion,
politics, and many other disciplines, academic and
beyond. What makes symbolism so diverse is that
people often use this technique to enhance com-
munication. Identity often depends on symbols,
thus symbolism and identity are inextricably linked.
Both symbolism and identity operate beyond the
individual. Identity studies scholars recently refo-
cused their attention from the study of “me” to
include the collective and the political implications
that result from the interaction of the collective.
Signs on buildings, streets, and other venues use
symbols to represent establishments, provide direc-
tions, and send messages. Symbolism transcends
language and cultural barriers that, at times,
impedes communication. Tourists often rely on
symbols to identify landmarks and other essential
places when in a land where language is not
shared. Mathematicians rely on symbols as road
maps to solve equations. Symbolism may be uni-
versal, that is, widely recognized. Often symbolism
is universal even when the symbol is culturally
specific. A symbol is loosely defined as an object
that represents or suggests something else, and
symbolism has various universal and contextual
applications. This entry explores several of these
applications.
 Symbolism 811

Literature the tenets specified by a governing book, spirit, and

so forth. Many religions share the belief that as
In literature, symbolism is often contextual in that
reward for people’s “good works” during their
specific symbols develop meaning only in the con-
mortal days, their eternal life will be spent in a
text of the literary work. Writers rely on symbolism
place free from iniquity and filled with divinity.
to elicit the reader’s prior knowledge, bring a
This idea is reinforced by using symbols of heaven,
deeper meaning to the words that transcend the
such as purely clad angels maneuvering harmoni-
textual description, and, as a creative art form, to
ously through clouds and playing harps. Many
use language and style. The key component of sym-
people use religious symbols to identify themselves
bolism is that symbols, words, or pictures are used
as believers of those specific tenets. Biblical texts
to represent something other than the actual defini-
inscribe symbols to reinforce ideals and “prove”
tion of a word. The intent is to give words deeper
that the consequences or rewards exist. Examples
or profound meaning. For example, in Charlotte
emerge in the book of Revelation as it foretells the
Perkins Gilman’s “The Yellow Wallpaper,” the
occurrences of the last days. Unnatural weather
yellow wallpaper represents many arguable issues
conditions are among the many occurrences
in the story. Each detail of the wallpaper represents
mentioned in the text. Some Christians viewed
an idea or conflict between the protagonist and the
Hurricane Katrina as a symbol, for they attributed
setting. Thus, the wallpaper itself represents or sug-
its devastation to those references in the book of
gests something else, and the character’s identity
Revelation. Hurricane Katrina became a modern-
hinges on her interpretations of the symbols.
day symbol of the wrath of God and his communi-
Other literary genres rich in symbolism are
cation with the earth. Although the weather
poetry and drama. Symbolism is systematically
phenomenon was itself a hurricane, and there was
weaved through the fabric of a poem. Some poets
scientific evidence to substantiate this occurrence,
strategically place symbols in their poems, and oth-
some people relied on symbolism inscribed in the
ers use symbols as the primary language of the
book of Revelation.
poem. The reader is able to identify the voice, tone,
Another common religious symbol is the number
and mood by the use of symbols throughout the
seven. In 2007, the world witnessed the occurrence
stanzas of a poem.
of July 7, 2007, or 07/07/07. Deemed the luckiest
Drama depends greatly on the use of verbal
day of the century, July 7, 2007, became the day
communication. Language is filled with symbolism
couples exchanged vows, parents induced labor,
and stresses the identity of the author and the char-
and casinos ushered in crowds, all in the name of the
acters. Like other language-specific techniques,
divine and complete number. Christianity, Judaism,
spoken language reveals much more than the
and Islam share a divine connection to this number,
rhythmic sounds and blends of letters. The listener
which is identified as sacred and complete. Islamic
is able to identify the speaker’s origin, culture, and
texts relate the number seven to sacred rituals,
many other details. In addition, language uses tonal
heaven, and creation. Christian texts relate the num-
shifts to communicate emotion and emphasize ber seven to heaven, creationism, sin, and virtue.
meaning. Drama uses symbolism as a necessary Those who believe in religion as a governing
tool for communication. Many dramatists use sym- source rely on symbols to identify deeper meanings
bolism to assist the actor in bringing the words to in religious texts. Many people wear religious sym-
life. Additionally, this technique is used to help the bols to identify themselves as members of a specific
reader envision every element that assists the words belief system and to identify with others who share
in painting a picture in the reader’s mind. the same belief system. Historically, people have
relied on symbols in almost every area of human
Religion existence.

The use of symbolism is a large part of religion.

Many religions embrace the idea that believers Politics
walk by faith and not by sight. The hope of reward Politicians use symbols to identify with potential
at the end of life serves as motivation to adhere to voters and pledge their allegiance to change the
812 Symbolism
status quo in the name of progress. In a period of
unbalanced budgets and sagging economies, politi-
cal promises hinge on the idea of change and eco-
nomic stability. Many political analyses refer to a
stronger economy and a balanced budget as sym-
bols rather than are actual achievable goals.
Politicians themselves often become symbols of
hope and representatives of the people who iden-
tify with their messages and goals.
The use of symbolism to identify with potential
voters is a key component of any political cam-
paign. As potential candidates tour the country in
an effort to garner support for election, they seek
effective ways to engage the people. The use of
patriotic colors, images, paraphernalia, and words
symbolize the candidate’s political rhetoric. For
constituents, words such as hope and change sym-
bolize the promise of a better tomorrow.
Constituents often look for symbols as they
consider which candidate they will support. Many
seek candidates who proffer symbols of hope.
Interestingly, the most effective political symbols
are ambiguous in nature. Constituents respond to
symbols that appeal to their sense of self rather
those with concrete definitions.
Race
One of the most sensitive referrals to symbolism
and identity is race. Even more sensitive is the
exploitation of a race with the use of a symbol.
History reveals that the idea of superiority divides
people. The idea of superiority presupposes that
one group is superior and another group is inferior.
Historically, symbolism has been used in reference
to race identification. Differences in skin color,
nose width, and hair texture have affected the
degree to which different groups interact. Symbolism
is often used to evoke fear and send disturbing
messages to people of various races and cultures.
Recently, a small town in Louisiana gained
national attention when a group of White students
hung a rope from a tree. The rope was looped
around itself to form a circle. The rope became a
noose. Once the object changed from rope to
noose, it evoked a long history of racial inequality
and physical abuse. The noose, then, resulted in
symbolic violence. During the days, weeks, and
months that followed, people from different races
and cultures united and divided around the issue.
Once an object becomes a symbol, its historical
and current meanings have the potential to inflict
pain, cause joy, or galvanize a community. Like
the noose, the Confederate flag holds the same
dark history. Although the Confederate flag is the
historical flag of the South, it also represents the
dark days of slavery that was primarily practiced
in the southern region of the now United States.
Many believe that those who continue to hang the
confederate flag are doing so to show their support
of a caste system that dehumanized a race of peo-
ple. A symbol has the same impact as words or,
perhaps, a greater impact than words.
Symbolism, then, hinges on the use of objects as
themselves, but those objects carry an implied
meaning. In an attempt to maintain the idea of
race, physical attributes that may be consistent
with a race of people are often used as symbols.
Groups of people with certain physical character-
istics have been persecuted for centuries. Identity is
greatly influenced by public reaction to specific
symbolic characteristics of race and culture. People
often go to great lengths to change these character-
istics with the hope of changing their identity.
Identity
Human existence and experience are inextricably
linked. A symbol has the potential to evoke a
range of responses with varying intensities. Based
on the origin of the symbol and its implied mean-
ing, a symbol has the potential to bridge gaps in
communication and culture or further create a
wedge. Symbols that are culturally specific and
associated with pain are usually the symbols that
have the most potential to either separate or unite
a people. Still, people rely on symbols to identify
with belief systems and society-at-large.
Furthermore, identity itself is symbolic. Identity
uses symbolism to further its “we” agenda.
Inextricably linked, identity and symbolism offer
society a mechanism for forming a collective. Key
questions related to symbolism, such as how
meaning is assigned and how meaning is rooted in
experience, clearly reflect identity.
Symbolism has the greatest potential to offer
society a mechanism for change and unity. The
greatest contribution that symbolism can make to
identity is to emphasize likeness and respect diver-
sity while building a strong and sound collective.

Although this task has not been attempted, it is
possible. Once groups find similarity, the potential
for unity is greater. Symbolism can offer unity in
the name of identity.
Concetta A. Williams
See also Cultural Representation; Symbolic Interactionism
Further Readings
Cobb, J. (2008). The noose. Ebony 63(3), 110.
Cohen, A. (1979). Political symbolism. Annual Review of
Anthropology, 8, 87–113.
Duster, T. (2007). How to read a noose. The Chronicle
Review, The Chronicle in Higher Education,
54(11), B24.
Fogelin, L. (2007). The anthropology of religious ritual.
Annual Review of Anthropology, 36, 55–71.
Fonrobert, C. E. (2005). The political symbolism of the
Eruv. Jewish Social Studies, 11(3), 9–35.
Gilman, C. P. (1973). The yellow wallpaper. New York:
Feminist Press. (Original work published 1892)
Goud, N. H. (2001). The symbolism identity technique.
Journal of Humanistic Counseling, Education, and
Development, 40(1), 114–121.
Spears, A. K. (Ed.). (1999). Race and ideology: Language,
symbolism, and popular culture. Detroit, MI: Wayne
State University Press.
Turner, V. (1975, October). Symbolic studies. Annual
Review of Anthropology, 4, 142–161.
Syncretism
Syncretism describes the mixing, blending or com-
bining of beliefs, practices, and traditions from
one religion to another, or in certain cases between
multiple religions, that result in the creation of
complicated individual and group religious identi-
ties. Syncretism has become a term used almost
exclusively in religious studies, although it may
also exist in culture, politics, and philosophy.
Syncretism is often a way for religious identity to
grow or expand, sometimes without official sanc-
tion of religious authorities, and finds its greatest
expression in such practices as saint veneration,
mysticism, and folk belief and practice.
Before the rise of more or less strictly monothe-
istic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam)
Syncretism 813
that believed in one god to the exclusion of others,
nearly all religions had a marked syncretistic char-
acter. For example, Greek and Roman religions in
the Greco-Roman period (about 332 BCE to 640
CE) borrowed from each other and the varied cul-
tures with which they had contact. The native
Greek and Roman religions adopted practices,
beliefs, and dogmas from Egyptian, Persian, and
Near Eastern religions, among others. Local reli-
gions, such as the worship of Isis in Egypt, reached
the scope and level of Mother-Goddess worship
found in most ancient Mediterranean cultures, and
had a wide appeal throughout the Roman Empire.
Mithraism, a religion from Persia, was adopted by
Roman soldiers and carried all throughout the
empire, where it picked up elements from different
religions. Isis worship and especially Mithraism,
which were both deeply syncretistic religions, had
some influence on the rise of Christianity and the
shape it took.
Yet, syncretism has not been confined to ancient
religions and has influenced the monotheistic reli-
gions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. For
instance, syncretism played a vital role in the for-
mation of early Christianity. Members of early
Christianity, or the Jesus movement, moved increas-
ingly away from their Jewish roots in the 1st and
2nd century of the Common Era, and syncretism
was one of the factors that helped the new religion
expand its reach. For example, early Christians
borrowed heavily from their rival religions, includ-
ing Mithraism, and even adopted Mithra’s birth
date in December as Christ’s. Ancient Roman reli-
gions also helped give form and substance to early
Christianity, making it more appealing for Greek-
and Latin-speaking peoples. Christian identity in
its formative years was deeply syncretistic, borrow-
ing heavily from the rich and diverse range of
Greek and Roman religions and philosophies, even
as they supplanted those same religions and phi-
losophies to become the official religion of the
Roman Empire in 380 CE.
During the long periods both before and after
the destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem
in 70 CE, Jews adopted and adapted their faith as
they traveled to new lands. For example, for much
of their recorded history, the Jews of Morocco
venerated Jewish saints, a practice not widely
found in other Jewish communities. Moroccan
Muslims also venerated saints, and the custom
814 Syncretism
probably dates back to the practices of the pre-Is-
lamic, Berber native religions. Moroccan Jews
made pilgrimages to saints’ shrines to venerate,
feast, and pray. The shrines were usually in semi-
isolated places, and their locations were most often
near prominent rocks, trees, or wells, which also
points to the pre-Islamic origin of Jewish saint
veneration: The rock, tree, or well was once the
sacred object of the pilgrimage, and the Jews of
Morocco simply adopted the local landmark into
their version of Judaism, creating an overlay of
syncretistic identities by blending elements of
Judaism, Moroccan Islam, and the nature worship
of native Berbers.
Syncretism is also found in many elements of
Islamic practice and theology and in the many
regions of the world where Islam is observed.
Perhaps no varieties of Islam are more powerfully
syncretistic than Sufism, or the mystical orders of
Islam, and the folk expression of Islam, or the Islam
practiced by people with little or no religious train-
ing or education. A powerful example of syncretism
in Islam can be found in the Balkan region of
Europe. In the 13th century, the Ottoman Turks
began their invasion of the Balkans, and eventually
conquered much of the region. They brought with
them a variety of Islam heavily influenced by
Sufism, which encompassed a range of mystical
movements developed early in the history of the
religion. Balkans Sufism was quite pliant, and the
preachers and Sufi masters who converted Slavic
Christians to Islam were not averse to retaining
many of the old Balkan native folk practices already
found in Balkan Christianity—as well as those
Christian practices and beliefs. Balkan Islamic iden-
tity was deeply syncretistic. Balkan Muslims often
venerated Christian saints, kept Christian holidays,
and baptized their children in the belief that it
would protect them from disease. The form of
Islam created and spread in the Balkans borrowed
heavily from Greek and Roman Christianity, Balkan
folk beliefs, and Sufi pantheistic tendencies (the
belief that God exists not as one entity, but is the
world or the universe) to create a unique form of
religious identity.
Scholars of religion have recently criticized the
term syncretism as too broad. They argue that
changes and developments in a religion are an
expected process in its growth, and cannot be
clarified by so wide a concept as syncretism.
Syncretism has been viewed as too reductionist, or
useful for little more than breaking apart the com-
ponent elements of a religion and labeling them
according to their individual origins. Those who
wish to study religion more holistically oppose this
view, and see religious identity as the more or less
fluid working of systems of belief and practice.
The concept of syncretism has also been accused of
belittling religions of less developed areas or peo-
ples, and insulting their identity as impure or
debased forms of some parent religion. Cases in
point are Afro-Caribbean religions such as Santeria
and Haitian Vodou or Voodoo. All these criticisms
point to the need to use the term syncretism care-
fully and precisely, and with fine variations.
Eric Maroney
See also Acculturation; Clan Identity; Fundamentalism;
Globalization; Multiculturalism; Pluralism; Religious
Identity
Further Readings
Leopold, A., & Jensen, J. (2005). Syncretism in religion:
A reader. New York: Routledge.
Maroney, E. (2006). Religious syncretism. London: SCM
Press.
Steward, C., & Shaw, R. (1994). Syncretism/anti-
syncretism: The politics of religious syncretism. New
York: Routledge.
 T
Tag Question
A tag question is a form of indirect communica-
tion consisting of a short question appended to a
declarative statement. It often is used in polite
speech to soften or weaken a statement’s impact
(e.g. “The meetings would run more smoothly
if we e-mailed the documents to everyone in
advance, don’t you think?”). Throughout this
entry, tag questions are italicized.
The tag question has many functions. For
instance, it may (a) help prevent the speaker from
appearing pushy and thereby help circumvent con-
flict; (b) confirm information of which the speaker
is nearly but not totally certain (“The meeting is at
2 p.m., is that correct?”); (c) intimidate or coerce
courtroom witnesses being interrogated under oath
(“You did have time to hide the gun after you shot
your brother, didn’t you?!”); (d) show empathy
(“That’s a shame about the company’s closing,
isn’t it?”); (e) enhance camaraderie and humor
among speakers of African American Vernacular
English (“Obama ain’t playin’, o-kay?”); (f) express
sarcasm in colloquial fashion (“Governor Sarah
Palin could focus a little less on lipstick and a lot
more on foreign policy, ya think?”). Robin Lakoff
also provides an example of frequent colloquial use
of tags by teenagers: “So I went to see her, OK?
And she was all—y’know?—‘What’re you doing
here,’ right?”
In this entry, discussion of the tag question is set
within the broad context of scholarly discourse
about women’s language use, differences in men’s
and women’s communication styles, features of
815
African American and hip-hop women artists’ lan-
guage use, and impact of the credibility and con-
text of a speaker on persuasion. Use of the tag
question in various professional and social arenas
is also explored. The concept has relevance in mat-
ters as diverse as social education of boys and
girls, court interpreting for foreign-language defen-
dants, authenticity in advertising, communication
between nurses and physicians, and the political
communication style of women elected officials,
among other issues. Tag questions can reveal iden-
tity status among speakers, as well as power dif-
ferentials among different identities.
Tag Questions and Women’s Language
The tag question long has been viewed as a feature
of women’s language, which traditionally is more
deferential and indirect than men’s because of
socialization. Since the late 1960s, much has been
written about the tag question, often considered an
element of powerless or overly polite speech of
those lacking agency.
Generally, women and girls are socialized to
communicate in ways that avoid conflict and pre-
serve relationships, whereas men and boys often
are culturally programmed to dominate, control,
and take charge. As Daniel Distelhorst notes, when
women and men work together in groups, these
issues of deference and dominance can create frus-
tration for women and hinder overall group effec-
tiveness and collaboration.
Women’s socialization results often in their
abandoning direct speech, along with the assertive-
ness and self-confidence connected with it.
816 Tag Question
Examples of indirect communication strategies
frequently used by women (and generally by per-
sons in subordinate positions professionally or
socially) include use of qualifiers (“Perhaps you
might consider . . .”); use of disclaimers (“This is
probably a stupid idea, but what about . . .”); use
of tag questions (“That was a fine performance of
Othello, don’t you agree?”). Groundbreaking
work by Lakoff in the early 1970s suggested that
women’s language is typically marked by three
characteristics: propriety, hesitancy, and verbal
excess. Hesitancy often is expressed by circumlo-
cution, the use of hedge or filler words (such as
um), and tag questions.
Barbara Stern suggests that feminist critics, led
by Lakoff, have studied the impact of place on
woman’s language, focusing on such things as
word choice, sentence structure, and organiza-
tional flow, to determine how women select, com-
bine, and use words in their daily lives. This
language is the direct result of covert messages that
women receive from the culture about their
“proper” place. Cultural imperatives require
women to communicate in ways that are nice,
polite, and ladylike, and that show concern for
others’ feelings. By contrast, cultural signals to
men permit them to be rough, tough, powerful,
and intellectual in speech. Such male speech habits
are learned on athletic playing fields, in the mili-
tary, and in industrial and other blue-collar work
settings. Deborah Tannen refers to these distinctive
male and female ways of speaking as genderlects.
Thus, women often complain that they make a
suggestion during a meeting and it is not accepted,
but then a man in the group makes the same sug-
gestion a bit later and it is enthusiastically received.
This is because men do not take a tentative, hesi-
tant approach seriously. Daniel Distelhorst sug-
gests that when women, seeking not to appear
overly aggressive or to jeopardize relationships,
use tag questions to present an idea (“That would
be a good way of going about it, don’t you
think?”), men hear it through their own language
culture, one of tough, direct talk and one that val-
ues projecting oneself, and dismiss whatever is
being proposed. When the same idea is presented
later in a more direct way by a man, the men in the
group hear it and connect with it.
Stern and other marketing experts discuss the
need for verisimilitude in human behavior and
speech depicted in mini-dramas or dramatic sce-
narios used to sell products and services in print
advertisements and in radio and television com-
mercials. To be profitable, ads must show the
“culturally approved” version of femininity and
masculinity. Marketing research gives attention to
the use in advertising devices of women’s language
features described here, including use of the tag
question. Debate persists regarding the degree to
which advertising serves as an agent of change
with respect to societal norms for men and women
versus the degree to which it actually perpetuates
or concretizes societal norms of men’s and wom-
en’s behaviors and features of communication.
Social Education of Boys and Girls
Kathryn P. Scott stresses the need to understand
sex-based language differences and argues that to
be professionally successful, both boys and girls
need to be socialized to balance skills of leadership
(assertiveness—typically associated with males)
and nurturance (typically associated with females).
She posits that boys should be taught the same
skills of interpersonal sensitivity as girls, and that
girls should be socialized to be more self-confident
and assertive like boys. For girls, such social educa-
tion would involve close attention to communica-
tion strategies employed, and would call for
instruction in direct communication. Use of direct
speech involves eliminating the use of qualifiers,
disclaimers, and tag questions. It also involves mak-
ing requests directly (“Please close the door,” rather
than, “Would you please close the door?”), and not
smiling when expressing a negative or challenging
viewpoint. To this list of direct communication
strategies one also might add the need to not use
the inflection of a question for statements (“He
seems as if he is really not interested?”).
Nurse-Physician-Patient Communication
Others such as Linda Lindeke and Ann Sieckert,
who have written about nurse-physician collabo-
ration and communication, also suggest the elimi-
nation of tag questions by nurses when expressing
a difference of opinion with doctors about patient
care. They suggest that there is a direct correlation
between some aspects of collaboration between
these health care professionals, who have an

unequal power relationship, and the quality of
patient care. Although doctors tend to bring more
money to hospitals and, thus, often receive more
respect from bottom-line-oriented administrators,
nurses are critical to patient care and must be
respected. Creation and maintenance of an atmo-
sphere in which nurses are free to disagree with
physicians’ decisions is critical. To be more asser-
tive in making patient care recommendations,
Lindeke and Sieckert stress the need for nurses to
refuse to use disclaimers that rob them of credit for
their contributions and suggest the elimination of
tag questions, which often deprive them of respect.
Frankness, along with flexibility and open-
mindedness, are urged to improve communication
and overall collaboration with physicians in the
interest of patients’ well-being. However, use of
tag questions with patients by doctors, nurses, or
any other health care professionals likely would
show empathy (“That spot is a bit swollen and
tender, isn’t it?”), and thereby enhance the patient-
caregiver relationship.
African American Vernacular
English and Hip-Hop Language
So-called powerless or self-effacing speech often
has been attributed to African Americans as well
as women. From the time of slavery until the Black
Power Movement in the late 1960s, survival often
depended on deferential communication with
Whites. Rosina Lippi-Green, Geneva Smitherman,
and others have written extensively about the
African Verbal Tradition (AVT) and its unique
African American Vernacular English (AAVE)
intonation, address systems, rhetorical features,
discourse strategies, sermonic tone, and use of tag
questions. Here are two examples of AAVE tag
question use: “Naw, they gots to go, know what
ah’m sayin’?” “The Bears bettah be on they
A-game Saturday fo’ I lose my shirt, ya heard me?”
Of note, scholars in this field of linguistics stress
that although some view AAVE speakers as mostly
poor individuals with limited education, highly
educated, prominent African Americans who are
bidialectal also are AVT speakers, not because
they use the morphology, phonology, or syntax
traditionally associated with AAVE, but rather
because they make use of certain intonations and
discursive techniques that are connected with it.
Tag Question 817
Marcyliena Morgan and other scholars indicate
that during slavery and Jim Crow segregation,
speech expressing subservience and subordination
was necessary for Black survival. Such speech fea-
tured the overuse of tag questions and other ele-
ments of female speech to help ensure that a White
person to whom one was speaking would not be
provoked to anger. Under those historical circum-
stances, use of linguistic agency that provoked
White anger could lead to brutality and cruelty—to
beatings, maiming, castration, and lynching.
Since the civil rights and Black power move-
ments of the 1960s, however, both Black men and
women have increased the use of direct speech
with Whites. With the heightened popularity of
urban hip-hop music and culture in the 1980s and
1990s has come the advent of “in-your-face,”
sometimes threatening, sometimes sexually explicit
verbal directness of Black women hip-hop artists.
Per such scholars as Angela Davis, these women
take their cues from earlier, bawdy blues women.
Hip-hop women strenuously reject societal expec-
tations both for women’s (people-pleasing) speech,
which basically focuses on helping others keep
their turn during conversation, and for what they
consider subservient, slave discourse, with its tag
questions and other forms of hesitancy.
The bolder language has replaced former defer-
ential speech, often considered “Uncle Tom”
speech used by those possessing a slave mentality
or filled with self-hatred. The new discourse style
confronts White supremacy and evidences a sense
of entitlement by the speaker.
Court Interpretation and Interrogation
After the 2000 census, the United States boasted
some 47 million citizens who spoke a language
other than English, and some 2,000 different lan-
guages spoken in U.S. homes. Thus, the issue of
interpretation of court proceedings for non-English
speakers has gained much attention in recent years
and has resulted in legislation requiring that inter-
preters be assigned to all those identified as foreign-
language defendants who need them, to help ensure
their Constitutional right to a fair trial. Specifically,
the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments guar-
antee due process of law and related rights.
Elena de Jongh has written comprehensively
about the issue of court interpreting and the
818 Tag Question
concepts of linguistic presence versus linguistic
absence during criminal legal proceedings. Courts
have determined that it is not enough for a crimi-
nal defendant to be physically present in the court-
room. Rather, he or she must be meaningfully
present. One who has no linguistic presence (i.e.,
does not understand the language and does not
have assistance in the courtroom of a qualified
foreign-language or sign language interpreter) is
not meaningfully present, and his or her constitu-
tional rights may be abrogated as a result. Examples
abound of instances involving wrongful imprison-
ment or extended jail time because of language
miscommunication during trial.
False cognates and tag questions often are the
source of misunderstandings. For instance, the
English word crime should not necessarily be
translated as the Spanish word crimen. The former
refers to any illegal activity, whether a misde-
meanor or a murder. The latter Spanish term,
however, refers to the most serious crimes—those
that might secure the death penalty or long impris-
onment. The Spanish term delito, which means
any violation of law, would be a more appropriate
translation for the word crime when lesser offenses
are involved.
De Jongh asserts that in U.S. English, tag ques-
tions, which she defines as interrogative fragments
added to a statement to elicit agreement or dis-
agreement, require a negative answer to deny an
accusation (e.g., “You vandalized the equipment,
didn’t you?” “No, I did not.”) In Spanish and
many other languages, however, tag questions can
be answered either negatively or affirmatively with
no change in the meaning of the response.
The potentially coercive nature of tag questions
in legal proceedings already has been mentioned.
Lakoff has written about the use of tag questions
in the interrogation of Anita Hill during the Senate
confirmation hearings for then-Supreme Court
Justice nominee Clarence Thomas in fall 1991, and
how answering these can sometimes go against a
witness’s interests. In a related study, Norma
Mendoza-Denton notes that Hill was asked sig-
nificantly more tag questions than was Thomas
(27% vs. 17% of the total), and addressed with
many more declaratives functioning as questions.
Through use of tag questions, the questioner forces
a response, and thereby can highlight (a) the inap-
propriateness of a woman speaking in public at all;
(b) the inappropriateness of her accusations against
a man; (c) her weakness, incompetence, and pos-
sible prevarication (for she must respond, but has
to be prompted to do so).
Source Credibility and
Women’s Political Communication
Recent scholarship by Kevin L. Blankenship and
Traci Y. Craig highlights the role of context in
which tag questions are uttered and the credibility
of the source or speaker. Issues such as power
relationships and status come into play. The tag
question, often viewed as a form of powerless
speech that diminishes persuasion, may not be
viewed as such if the source or speaker is in a
power position or considered knowledgeable on
the topic at hand.
Much research exists about the perceptions of
competence, credibility, and persuasiveness of the
messages of women elected officials, research that
buttresses the insights of Blankenship and Craig.
For instance, Arla Bernstein, Margaret Andersen,
and others suggest that women politicians are
viewed as most competent and credible when they
address issues traditionally of concern to women
(such as child care and education), and are viewed
as less competent where they address so-called
masculine issues (such as prison reform, defense,
and the economy). The research also indicates that
women are associated with warmth and expres-
siveness, but men are associated with rationality
and competence, as if the two were somehow
mutually exclusive.
Scholars in the field of women’s political com-
munication often speak of the backlash that can
occur when women politicians use a communica-
tion style perceived as “masculine,” thereby violat-
ing the societal expectation that women’s speech
should be deferential. They experience a decrease
in persuasiveness. Scholars such as M. S. Leeper
suggest that even given this, if the candidate’s issue
position is unambiguous and assertive, persuasive-
ness is enhanced and the use of gender cues in
evaluation of candidates is minimized.
In their research examining the possible moder-
ating role of source credibility on the persuasive
effects of tags, Blankenship and Craig conclude
that use of tag questions by persons perceived as
experts on their topic do not reduce persuasiveness

of the message. If used by a noncredible source,
the use of tags indicates to listeners that the
speaker is not knowledgeable and lacks confi-
dence or certainty about his or her message.
Persuasiveness is then adversely affected. Listeners
who consider why a credible source uses a tag
question, however, are unlikely to decide that the
speaker is lacking in confidence or knowledge.
Rather, they deem the use as an indication of the
speaker’s anticipation of an affirmative response
from hearers.
Brenda Eatman Aghahowa
See also Communication Competence; Communication
Theory of Identity; Ethnolinguistic Identity Theory;
Gender; Language
Further Readings
Andersen, M. (1997). Thinking about women:
Sociological perspectives on sex and gender (4th ed.).
Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Bernstein, A. G. (2000). The effects of message, theme,
policy explicitness, and candidate gender.
Communication Quarterly, 48(2), 159–173.
Blankenship, K. L., & Craig, T. Y. (2007). Language and
persuasion: Tag questions as powerless speech or as
interpreted in context. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 34(1), 112–118.
De Jongh, E. M. (2008). Court interpreting: Linguistic
presence v. linguistic absence. Florida Bar Journal,
82(7), 21–32.
Distelhorst, D. (2005). Dominance and deference: Status
expectations of men and women. The Diversity
Factor, 13(2), 24–28.
Lakoff, R. T. (2001). The language war. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Lakoff, R. T. (2004). Language and woman’s place (Rev.
exp. ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Lippi-Green, R. (1997). What we talk about when we
talk about Ebonics: Why definitions matter. Black
Scholar, 27(2), 7–11.
Morgan, M. (2005). Hip-hop women shredding the veil:
Race and class in popular feminist identity. South
Atlantic Quarterly, 104(3), 425–444.
Scott, K. P. (1986). Learning sex-equitable social skills.
Theory Into Practice 25(4), 243–249.
Stern, B. (1997). Advertising to the “other” culture.
National Forum, 77(2), 35–43.
Tannen, D. (1994). Gender and discourse. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Technology 819
Technology
Technology refers to scientific knowledge, mani-
fested in the form of artifacts, ideas, techniques,
and dispositions, which can be used in some kind
of productive capacity. Information and commu-
nications technologies (ICTs) facilitate virtual
interaction and the flow of information between
individuals who need not be physically copresent.
Given the tendency among scholars to regard the
self and its relation to others as formed primarily
through face-to-face contact, the capacity to cir-
cumvent such interaction using ICTs undermines
many traditional ideas about identity. This entry
provides a conceptual overview of recent develop-
ments in the relationship between identity and
technology, reviews early claims about the impact
of ICT-mediated interaction on individual and
collective processes of identity formation, and
presents several important critiques and theoreti-
cal implications of these claims.
Conceptual Overview
Identity, the enduring sense of who I am and who
others perceive me to be, is socially constructed
through our everyday interactions with others.
According to symbolic interactionism, this is a
complex process in which claims about identity
are made and verified through the continuous
exchange of meaningful symbols. Individuals form
images of themselves, modeled on their own self-
perception and on how they feel they are perceived
by others, which they convey to others via cues
that have context-specific meaning. Those who
bear witness to these self-presentations interpret
them and respond in ways that either affirm the
identity claims being made or question them. The
latter scenario is likely to occur whenever there are
seen to be discrepancies between the cues that an
individual provides. As a result, the extent to
which individuals freely construct this image of
themselves is tempered by a need to consider their
anticipated audience; a shared agreement on iden-
tity is negotiated between the interacting parties.
The meanings social actors attach to the symbolic
cues they exchange during this process are context-
specific, and reflect the broader discourses that
structure relations of power and identity across
820 Technology
society. Recent technological innovations shape
this process in two important ways. First, the
boundaries that delineate contexts of social inter-
action, which thereby specify the meanings and
discourses applicable to those contexts, have begun
to erode. This has been made possible by transpor-
tation and communication networks that foster
interconnectedness between people and places
across the globe. As flows of information within
and between societies accelerate, space is less
bounded by time and distance, and decisions in
distant regions shape events in one’s own back-
yard. Meanings that were once specific to certain
contexts acquire broader applicability because it is
no longer clear where one kind of setting ends and
another begins. This expands the repertoire of
meanings on which individuals draw when they
present themselves to others and interpret their
responses, thus adding a degree of flexibility and
ambiguity to the identity process.
The second way in which technology affects
identity consists in the use of communications
media to conduct the symbolic exchanges that
underpin identity formation. The concept of vir-
tual space has emerged as a kind of generalized
“place” whose distribution across multiple physi-
cal spaces is sufficiently entrenched and wide-
spread for it to be thought of as a new category of
space. The spread of ICTs, especially the Internet,
creates a virtual space where people may interact
without being physically copresent. In face-to-face
settings, people make and verify claims about iden-
tity by exchanging cues that are primarily physical;
this makes it difficult for people to consistently
present images of themselves that conflict with
their physical appearance because this discrepancy
in cues is always visible to others. In a virtual envi-
ronment though, self-presentation is not bound by
the same physical constraints as in face-to-face set-
tings. Furthermore, as the boundaries between
these settings erode, those who interact virtually
must grapple with an expanded array of meanings,
and they must learn to couple these with a new
symbolic repertoire of text and imagery to con-
struct their identities online.
ICT-Mediated Interaction and Identity
The implications of these developments for indi-
vidual and collective processes of identity have
been the subject of extensive debate, especially in
the literature dealing with the social and psycho-
logical effects of ICT-mediated interaction. Much
of the preliminary research into Internet usage
relies on qualitative techniques, such as participant
observation in chatrooms and bulletin boards, to
illustrate the nature of online interaction and
explore its links to postmodern ideas about iden-
tity. According to this view, the modern notion of
self as a fixed, unified, and hierarchical entity lying
“behind” every action, has merit only insofar as it
describes the kind of identities that arise in a face-
to-face context. Individuals who interact anony-
mously online are not bound by physical constraints
or, therefore, by the inscribed meanings and dis-
courses that order spatial settings according to
relations of power. People are free, it is argued, to
construct personae that reflect the different aspects
of their personalities that are ordinarily suppressed
in such contexts. Without physical cues, individu-
als must author the narratives or biographies of
these personae for those with whom they interact,
employing the symbols at their disposal. Identity,
under these conditions, is decidedly postmodern—a
flexible, decentered assortment of multiple selves
or identities that an individual cultivates and cycles
through depending on the context in which they
find themselves.
Alongside their claims about individual pro-
cesses of identity, postmodern theorists contend
that the experience of online interaction chal-
lenges assumptions about the categories that are
used to socially construct identity. These binary
categories, which distinguish between various
modes of collective experience such as masculine/
feminine or Black/White, enable people to pair
certain meanings with the symbols that are
exchanged during interaction. In face-to-face
exchanges, the relationship between these mean-
ings (i.e., masculine) and their usual physical cues
(i.e., firm handshake) appears “natural” and nec-
essary. Yet when individuals author their online
identities, it appears they have a choice—to main-
tain these associations or to subvert them. How
people choose to deploy identity categories is thus
revealed as a contingent process, and one that
reproduces a specific hierarchical ordering of
power relations between social groups on the
basis of their characteristics. Furthermore, it is
claimed that the sorting of those characteristics

into dichotomous categories (i.e., male/female)
denies and excludes the existence of an array of
meaningful social experiences that fit neither cat-
egory (i.e., transsexual), but which individuals are
able to express online when they appropriate the
symbols with which to do so. The Internet, along
with other ICTs, is thus portrayed as enabling
individuals to “be themselves” and interact with
others in ways that traditional social settings and
conventional discourses often do not allow.
As a result, it has also been argued that ICTs
facilitate the rise of a new form of community.
Unlike traditional communities, where being a
member often entails satisfying some form of
physical criteria, virtual communities arise spon-
taneously out of interaction between diverse clus-
ters of people pursuing common goals and
interests. To the extent that they reconcile indi-
viduals from a wide range of geographic locations
and social backgrounds, these communities have
been viewed as promoting a more inclusive sense
of collective identity. For this reason, ICTs are
often hailed as having the potential to halt and
reverse declining levels of social capital within
traditional communities, to give marginalized
individuals access to valuable information and
social support, and to enhance participation in all
areas of society.
Critiques and Theoretical Implications
Early literature on ICT-mediated interaction and
identity has been criticized as lacking empirical
support for its theoretical claims, and for its fail-
ure to situate the online experiences of ICT usage
within the offline context of everyday life.
Subsequent research, which has begun to develop
more sophisticated sampling techniques and a
broader range of qualitative and quantitative
methods, has shown a number of these claims to
be problematic. For example, the ability of indi-
viduals to “freely” construct online identities that
circumvent the physical constraints of face-to-face
interaction appears conditional on the relative
proximity of their audience. If, as evidence sug-
gests, our most regular online interactions involve
people with whom we also interact offline, then
our claims to identity will be assessed on the basis
of both the physical and the virtual cues we give.
Having to physically face up to the expectations
Technology 821
of one’s audience, in this sense, ensures that
discourses in everyday life still influence how indi-
viduals present themselves online.
On this note, more recent studies have shown
how ICTs extend the existing capacity of individu-
als to conceal and emphasize aspects of themselves
as they negotiate identity. By exploiting the ambig-
uous, disembodied nature of interaction online,
ICT users are able to manage more effectively the
impressions others have of them in the flesh.
However, some also argue that for the remaining
portion of online interactions—those involving
complete strangers—this ambiguity poses an obsta-
cle to the symbolic exchanges through which iden-
tity is formed. Although individuals may be able to
make any identity claim they wish online, including
ones that fall outside of traditional identity catego-
ries, this does not mean others will verify those
claims. On the contrary, the increased possibility
for deception and identity fraud has been shown in
some cases to engender skepticism and distrust
about such claims, and ultimately, to reinforce the
use of stereotypes to make sense of identity.
The view that ICTs foster a new and more
inclusive sense of collective identity has also been
criticized for several reasons. First, this claim
assumes that simply because ICTs afford people
the capacity to interact with others to whom they
have little or no relation, they will exercise this
capacity. Yet, as noted previously, the ambiguity
of disembodied interaction represents a major
obstacle for individuals as they attempt to negoti-
ate identity with anonymous others. As a result, it
is unclear whether ICT-mediated social networks
are any more immune to the effects of homophily,
the tendency for individuals to associate with
similar others, than are ordinary face-to-face net-
works. Second, the idea that the goal-directed
nature of virtual communities would constitute a
shift toward more heterogeneous social relations
has itself been questioned. Critics argue that the
grouping of individuals into communities of inter-
est may simply create new and more pervasive
forms of social exclusion, based on more specific
and individualized identity criteria, thereby increas-
ing homogeneity. Third, underpinning many such
claims about the social impact of ICT is a kind of
technological determinism, where technology is
portrayed as a neutral force that transforms soci-
ety while remaining unaffected by it. In reality,
822 Terrorism
individuals and groups vary in their access to, and
use of, technology, and these variations are reflected
in how technologies are designed to be used. As
such, values, behaviors, and identities are not
shaped by ICTs as much as values, behaviors, and
identities are shaped through ICTs, according to
broader processes that structure how individuals
and groups interact.
To fully understand the relationship between
technology and identity, it is therefore necessary to
situate claims about the role of ICT-mediated
interaction within a theoretical context dealing
with the changing nature of contemporary society.
Many scholars argue that in late modern society,
the influence of traditional structures and pro-
cesses has waned, rendering identity less embed-
ded in the structural realities of society and more
open to reflection and self-appraisal. As they
reflexively construct their own life narratives, indi-
viduals move more freely between the spheres of
everyday life, forming relationships with others
that circumvent geographic region and social
background. The spread of ICTs, which facilitate
such relationships, is thus seen as accelerating
these processes of deinstitutionalization and reflex-
ivity. This coheres with preliminary claims about
ICT-mediated interaction and identity that empha-
size the potential for individuals to construct
online personae and to interact with others in
ways that were not possible within a physical set-
ting. However, as critics of this early research have
pointed out, identities acquire shared meaning
when there is a reciprocal exchange of symbolic
cues, and although online interaction might pro-
vide a new symbolic repertoire with which to pres-
ent oneself to others, it offers no guarantee that
presentation will be interpreted as intended. Such
ambiguity likely hinders ties between strangers
online and reinforces bonds between those who
are already familiar offline. This means individuals
who construct identities online are still constrained
by the structures and discourses to which they are
subject in their interactions in face-to-face settings.
Yet this also means that as the boundaries between
such settings erode, individuals encounter diverse
new ways of constructing and interpreting iden-
tity. Increasingly, ambiguity and flexibility feature
in the symbolic exchanges that underpin identity
in everyday life; ICTs simply extend the existing
ability that all individuals have to seize on such
ambiguity as they endeavor to manage the impres-
sions others have of them.
Jonathan F. Smith
See also Modernity and Postmodernity; Reflexive Self or
Reflexivity; Self; Society and Social Identity; Symbolic
Interactionism
Further Readings
Castells, M. (2004). The power of identity: The
information age—Economy, society and culture.
Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Cerulo, K. A. (1997). Identity construction: New issues,
new directions. Annual Review of Sociology, 23,
385–409.
Rheingold, H. (2000). The virtual community.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Turkle, S. (1995). Life on the screen: Identity in the age
of the Internet. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Zhao, S. (2005). The digital self: Through the looking
glass of telecopresent others. Symbolic Interaction,
28(3), 387–405.
Terrorism
Although not a new phenomenon, the incidence of
terrorism in the present age has several elements
that make it distinctly different from previous
experiences. Contemporary terrorism generally
has several expected elements: It is egregious vio-
lence, perpetrated against innocents, for a political
agenda. Furthermore, contemporary terrorism is
typically staged before an audience for maximum
multiplication of psychological effect. As former
British Prime Minster Margaret Thatcher noted,
publicity is the oxygen of terrorism. It is often is
undertaken by a nonstate actor (NSA). Terror and
fear are the intended result. Globalized mass media
and the Internet greatly magnify these results.
State-level actors do use terror for their interests
and may be the invisible forces behind transna-
tional terrorist groups doing their bidding. But
state sponsors of terror run the risk of interna-
tional opprobrium and sanctions, and can have
state-centric remedies applied against them, includ-
ing war. The disastrous example of Serbia and the
Black Hand’s assassination of Austro-Hungarian

Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia-Herzegovina
in 1914 is a prime example. States that employ ter-
ror as a matter of policy—as in ethnic cleansing
and human rights abuses—are subject to the afore-
mentioned sanctions and perhaps war crimes pro-
ceedings. The application of terror by NSAs has
garnered the most attention.
There exists no agreed upon definition for ter-
rorism within the international system. The United
Nations has been unable to draft a summary defi-
nition despite shepherding more than a dozen
international conventions (treaties) on many aspects
of terrorism. Moreover, the argument is continu-
ally restated that what one nation may view as a
terrorist act, another will see as legitimate resis-
tance. Despite the requests of its close ally, the
United Kingdom, the United States refused to name
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as a terrorist group
for many years. Likewise, the United Kingdom
allows the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
to operate openly in its borders despite the pleas of
many of its allies. Consensus on definition, to say
nothing of identity, remains elusive in this area.
This entry, therefore, addresses several questions
that are often asked about terrorism.
What Motivations Exist for Terrorism?
The modern global community has passed through
four significant eras of terrorist activity. The anar-
chist period of the late 19th and early 20th centuries
sought to overturn the international order. Post–
World War II to the mid-1960s saw the liberationist
and nationalist motivation for terrorism as many
societies strove for political mastery of their desti-
nies. Ideological motivations for terrorist activity,
especially of the leftist sort, characterized the 1960s
through the late 1980s. The latest division has been
the religious period, which describes many groups
since the late 1980s. In addition, motivations for
terrorist activity can range from outrage over social
and economic conditions for the attackers to inhu-
man policy decision making on the part of the terror
masters who carry out their attacks.
Martha Crenshaw has surveyed terrorist moti-
vations and mapped its motivation this way: ter-
rorism has a certain logic. It can be both effective
and satisfying to the terror perpetrators. Robert
Pape, studying the worrying trend toward suicide
bombers as the weapon of choice in modern terror,
Terrorism 823
describes this as a strategic logic. Although an
immediate, existential defeat of its target opponent
may not be possible, the terrorist movement is
resilient and attractive because at a certain level it
is successful, especially against a superior enemy
military force. Terrorism is attractive because it
works in the right circumstances where other
methods have not worked. The apparently unstop-
pable Oslo Peace Process between Israel and the
Palestinians was stalled—perhaps stopped—by a
cascading barrage of suicide bomber attacks from
several organizations which claimed thousands of
Israeli lives. Attacks against Madrid commuter
trains in 2004 seemed to convince Spain to with-
draw its troops from Iraq. Moreover, such attacks—
and suicide bomber attacks are just the most
dramatic—are both economic and effective.
Relatively small investments in time and personnel
net huge media attention, demoralizing civilian
casualties in the target population, and can be
countered only with great difficulty. The security
measures necessary to arrest terror attacks can
become so autarkic that the terrorist group wins a
strategic victory merely by destroying the oppo-
nent’s public square and denying its people a nor-
mal life. The open society that is always on guard
against a terror attack does not long last as an
open society.
Who Becomes a Terrorist?
A comprehensive study commissioned by the U.S.
government and published in 1999 profiled terror-
ists as generally poor and uneducated, with limited
training and operational capability. Although there
were notable exceptions—especially among suicide
bombers—this view has described the dominant
profile for terrorist identification. Recent research
has pointed to a different picture, at least for ter-
rorists motivated by religion. This new wave of
terrorist descriptors finds them well educated,
middle income to better in wealth, generally mid-
twenties in age, religiously motivated, socialized
toward violence, and alienated from the norms of
their surrounding society. Their identification with
radicalized agendas often leads them to exclusive
associations that Marc Sageman terms “ingroup
love and outgroup hate.” This includes recruit-
ment efforts as well as terrorist cell maintenance.
Members are motivated strongly to self-sacrifice
824 Terrorism
and personal bravery out of devotion not just to
their cause, but also to the friends and associates in
their group. Likewise, these attachments—so
strong internally—are matched by a vigorous
rejection of those outside, especially the named
enemy. He further delineates their associations as
that of friendship, kinship, and discipleship. Thus,
most contemporary terrorist groups are recruited
and are close social groupings related by ties of
friendship or blood. Relatively few are knit together
by other ties, such as meta belief systems. They
may share these beliefs ultimately, but personal
associations bring them into membership initially.
Ultimately, the group becomes self-reinforcing,
admits no external contradiction, and becomes dif-
ficult to disassociate from because this means
abandoning friends, perhaps even family.
How Can Terrorist Violence Be Possible?
Security video files of the November 2008 attacks
on India’s financial center of Mumbai by Lashkar
e-Taiba showed quite ordinary looking young men
coldly, almost joyfully killing large numbers of
people with hand-held weapons. It is difficult to
assess the psychological topography that would
permit such acts of violence within an integrated
personality. A consistent vein running through the
literature on terrorism studies holds that acts of
terror are usually rational acts—often requiring
notable amounts of premeditation, planning, and
even technical expertise. Although vast portions of
the world’s populations would find such violence
against civilians (at least) repellent, the terror mas-
ters do not. Part of this dynamic may be revealed
in the insights of Sageman and his description of
ingroup love, outgroup hate. This form of ingroup
love and outgroup hate can both acknowledge and
question the existence of another human being.
Such extremes render the possibility of deliberate
elimination of another’s personhood. Once the
victim is marginalized as irretrievably different, the
Other, he or she can be treated in summary fash-
ion. They become nonbeings. Worse, they can be,
as Hannah Arendt noted for the Nazis, beneath
human and a rallying point for many inchoate
angers. One can find in the rhetoric of Al Qaeda,
for example, characterizations of their target soci-
eties as being descendents from monkeys, dogs,
unclean, and so forth. The Italian Red Brigades,
the German Baader-Meinhof Gang, and the U.S.
terrorists Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber
left significant written testimonies of the moral
alienation they felt toward their target-victims.
The utility of hatred as a lightning rod for violence
and an excuse for violence is the theme of Italian
psychologist Franco Fornari, who observes that
warfare and violence are useful for exorcizing
internal fear (which he terms the pantocrastic ter-
rifier) by slaying those who have been branded as
the personifications of that evil. Thus, frequently,
the terrorist is not killing innocents, but something
alien to the human condition—or at least some-
thing inimical to the human condition as it is con-
ceived by the terrorist’s worldview.
Is Terrorism Synonymous
With Religious Identification?
The nature of a religious identity for a broad swath
of terrorist activity in the present day seems to
argue for some affective connection. Successful
religious organization closely parallels the struc-
tures successful terrorist movements must produce,
and so a terrorist group that can assimilate a reli-
gious system—or more commonly—emulate reli-
gious systems, can be formidable. Several connectors
between the two present themselves. Both move-
ments tend to see their struggle in Manichean
terms—a relentless, zero-sum competition between
what is good and what is evil. Both tend to rely on
self-regimented idealists who willingly follow char-
ismatic, inspirational leadership. Each depends
heavily on self-sacrifice, and self-sublimation. Both
offer a sort of paradise prize: one a perfect spiritual
world where evildoers are punished, and the other
a perfect social-political world where evildoers are
punished. This offers the benefit of instantly bend-
ing an already functioning infrastructure to the
goals of the terror group. Most major religious
systems can successfully resist the splinter into vio-
lence. But where the co-option is successful, it can
be a devastatingly effective synchronicity. As in the
case of the Japanese millennial cult Aum Shinrikyo,
the movement may resort to terrorism after its sal-
vific message has been delivered—and rejected—by
its wider audience. But where religious messages
are combined with terror tactics, the religious sys-
tem rarely begins with terror as its tactic, much less
its end.

Ethno-Nationalistic Terrorism
Occasionally, the terrorist movement may have
purely secular motivations—or have religious
identifications that are synonymous with ethnic or
national identity. Such groups can be highly cohe-
sive, and add the further binding agent of language
or ethno-identity to the exclusivity of member-
ship. These movements operate in many of the
same lanes as religious groups, but also add sev-
eral distinctive features of their own. Generally,
ethno-nationalistic groups have a vitriolic image
of their enemies, and a redemptive image of them-
selves; they believe their extremes of violence are
justified by the vicious history of oppression they
themselves have suffered at their targets’ hands.
Furthermore, this leads to a fantastic self-image of
victimhood that brooks little historical criticism or
redaction by the facts. The sense of justification by
being wronged usually grows with time. This rein-
forces their determination to see justice done and
justifies their extreme violence. The target in turn
responds to this crescendo of violence with—in
the eyes of the terror group—more outrageous
actions. This fuels the pejorative image of the
other, vindicates the use of extreme violence, and
buttresses the iron triangle of hate, violence, and
destruction.
Insurgency, Guerillas, and Terrorists
These three groupings tend to segue into each
other in tactics in popular conception and media
eyes. But they are distinctly different. Although they
borrow from each other, the three represent differ-
ent elements of asymmetrical warfare. Insurgencies
are organized, disciplined military actions seeking
to overthrow an established government. They have
a set political agenda and often a strong political
philosophy. These groups—from Tito’s Yugoslav
Partisans to Ho Chi Minh’s Vietminh—often are
successful in defeating and overthrowing far greater
powers. Others, such as the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, may struggle for decades
and make no headway against their governmental
opponents. Guerillas—a term coined to describe
the nonuniformed soldiers of Spain’s resistance to
French occupation during the Napoleonic era—are
several stages below the insurgency level. They are
irregular warriors with no immediate chance at
confronting their governmental opponent in the
Terrorism 825
open, let alone toppling the state. Their political
and philosophic program may or may not be
sophisticated enough to motivate large numbers of
the wider society. But their relative popularity
with some section of the masses, success in asym-
metrical warfare, and their small numbers makes
them difficult to target and eradicate. Sendero
Luminoso in Peru and the Armed Islamic Group
(GIA), as well as other groups, in Algeria during
its civil beginning in 1991, are cases in point. Both
insurgencies and guerilla movements may employ
terror as a tactical element of their combat. As a
result, it is easy to conflate them into terrorist
typologies.
Terrorists lack the comprehensive military
capacity of an insurgency, as well as the broader
social or political support of the guerilla move-
ment. Terror movements are by definition weak. If
their political, social, or religious messages were
universally attractive, their extreme violence would
be unnecessary. Alternately, in the case where their
agenda has a coherent ethnic following or definite
political goals—such as the Kurdish Parti Karkerani
Kurdistan (PKK) battling the government in
Turkey—there already exists a sovereign state with
a well-established national identity resisting them.
Therefore, apropos of Crenshaw’s strategic logic,
the terrorists employ the egregious violence that—
magnified by a globalized media—leverages their
relatively small abilities into national and even
international impact. Occasionally—as in the cases
of the World Trade Center attacks on September
11, 2001, and the Bali disco bombings on October
12, 2002, in Indonesia—the shockwaves can be
massive, global, and deeply effective.
Transnational Insurgencies
It is useful to identify a new metastasis in the
terrorist canon: the evolution of a globalized,
sophisticated structure of terror cells operating at
several levels and capable of challenging not just a
state level opponent but perhaps the international
system itself. To achieve such success, the move-
ment would need to employ violence outrageous
enough to earn the terrorist moniker, but be
popular enough to enjoy transnational support to
facilitate its operations on a global scale. The
anarchist movement of the 19th century may have
been a candidate for this description, although its
826 Terrorism
central direction, by obvious definition, made
such control moot. Nonetheless, some 600 major
national and international leaders were killed by
the anarchists’ hands from about 1880 to 1920.
In recent years, however, only the Al Qaeda orga-
nization and Hezbollah would fit this description.
They are different entities and have quite different
goals. Nonetheless, both employ terror tactics
with considerable success, have international
reach heretofore unseen in such groups, and have
a staying power that is beyond many smaller
states. More significantly, both have managed to
directly challenge—and as of this moment
survive—much more powerful military oppo-
nents. Yet, despite their characterization as terror-
ist organizations, both Al Qaeda and Hezbollah
retain important support from various popula-
tions in the world.
The advent of such global insurgencies may be
a new phenomenon to the international system.
Their effectiveness is amplified by all of the strate-
gic theater enjoyed by successful terror groups, as
well as the growing lawlessness of fragile and
failed states that becomes useful safe areas for
training, recruitment, and logistics. Opinions differ
about the gravity of their threat to the state-centric
world system. But they have a resiliency and
attraction that has been successful in defying their
more potent state-level antagonists.
Terrorist and Criminal Identities
Terrorist and criminal enterprises have tradi-
tionally been assumed to be separate, pathological
behaviors. The trend in recent years has been for a
nexus between the two to become increasingly
advantageous. Many terror groups—especially
local terror cells—have become self-financing
through highly profitable crime. The globalized
world and the Web have permitted identity theft to
be a vast profit center for even small cells. Other
criminal formats from counterfeiting to credit card
fraud to the illegal drug trade have allowed terror
groups to thrive. In addition, in important instances,
criminal and terror networks have become symbi-
otic. Al Qaeda is closely linked to the heroin trade
in Central Asia and Europe. The Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia
has been the security apparatus for the cocaine
cartels there for decades.
Should the State Negotiate
With Terrorist Movements?
The state may see the terrorist violence as so
obligatory that such groups do not merit the dig-
nity of negotiation. On the one hand, negotiating
with the terrorists has several risks: It lends their
cause recognition, provides them with a platform
for their views, potentially legitimates them as
equals to the state, might seem like appeasement,
and could alienate allies of the government. On the
other hand, some benefits may accrue should such
discussions be held. Negotiations with terror
movements—assuming such are possible with a
particular group—can provide the terror groups
with an alternative to violence for political action,
split their own cadres into moderates and hard­
liners, give insight into their mind-sets to their
opponents, and show that the state has a human
face. Saudi Arabia’s Counseling Program, which
uses religious scholars teaching from the Koran to
answer the arguments of captured Al Qaeda mem-
bers, has an audience far beyond them. The Good
Friday Accords of 1998 were possible in no small
way because the British government did what had
not been publicly possible before: sit down and
speak with Sinn Fein, the ostensible political front
for the IRA.
How Do Terrorist Groups End?
A small sample of the overall movements is suc-
cessful in their violent methodology and the target
society agrees to their agenda. Most groups are
either destroyed through coercive measures, or co-
opted by gradual political programs by target
populations that undermine their effectiveness.
Time, and some political or economic accommo-
dation, can undercut the vital social underpinnings
that allow terrorist elements to move like fish
through sympathetic social water. Welsh (United
Kingdom), Süd Tyrol (Italy), and Quebecois
(Canada) groups were ultimately undone by a
minimum of force and a methodical application of
cultural and political concessions. Unlike the state,
which has durable resources, terrorists groups do
not generally have the ability to sustain lengthy
campaigns. Of those that do, such as in Ireland,
Spain, and Greece, their life spans can be measured
in scores of years. Terrorist groups closely tied to

national insurgencies can take decades to defeat,
or in some cases, achieve victory for their causes.
John Sawicki
See also War
Further Readings
Combs, C. (2009). Terrorism in the twenty-first century
(5th ed.). New York: Pearson/Longman.
Crenshaw, M. (1998). The logic of terrorism: Terrorism
behavior as a product of strategic choice. In W. Reich
(Ed.), Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies
theologies, states of mind. Washington, DC:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Ganor, B. (2006). The counter-terrorism puzzle: A guide
for decision makers. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishing.
Howard, R. D., & Sawyer, R. (Eds.). (2009). Terrorism
and counterterrorism: Understanding the new security
environment (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Kegley, C. W., Jr. (2003). The new global terrorism.
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Nacos, B. L. (2008). Terrorism and counterterrorism:
Understanding threats and responses in the post-9/11
world (2nd ed.). New York: Pearson/Longman.
Pape, R. (2005). Dying to win: The strategic logic of
suicide terrorism. New York: Random House.
Sageman, M. (2004). Understanding terror networks.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Schmitt, M. N. (2003). Counter-terrorism and the use of
force in international law. Garmsich-Partenkirchen,
Germany: George C. Marshall Center for European
Security.
Terror Management Theory
Terror management theory (TMT) offers a social
psychological and empirical framework for exam-
ining such questions as “What is the psychologi-
cal function of culture?” and “Why do people
need self-esteem?” The theory suggests that exis-
tential concerns associated with the awareness of
mortality underlie a pervasive need for meaning
imparted by the culture and value derived from
living up to cultural standards. In short, cultural
worldviews impart a context for deciding what is
meaningful and setting the standards through
Terror Management Theory 827
which individuals can perceive their lives as sig-
nificant. To the extent that individuals obtain
self-esteem by perceiving themselves as valuable
members of a meaningful reality, they can obtain
a sense of symbolic (i.e., feeling that they can live
on by being part of something larger, more sig-
nificant, and more enduring than their own indi-
vidual lives) or literal (i.e., promise of an afterlife)
immortality, and thereby manage existential con-
cerns. This framework provides an account of
how existential motivation can affect a great deal
of human behavior, including how a person forms
and maintains identity.
This entry begins by detailing the history of
TMT. Next, this entry discusses empirical support
and extension of the theory. Last, this entry
explores the implications of TMT on identity.
Theory and Background
In the early 1980s, while graduate students study-
ing social psychology at the University of Kansas,
Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom
Pyszczynski met often and pondered these ques-
tions about the function of culture and self-esteem.
Shortly thereafter, the trio discovered Ernest
Becker’s Pulitzer Prize–winning text, The Denial of
Death. In this book, Becker postulates that the
human species faces a unique existential dilemma.
On the one hand, humans share with other ani-
mals instincts aimed at biological survival, yet, on
the other hand, humans’ cognitive capabilities ren-
der them aware of the inevitably of their own
death. This awareness, agued Becker, posed the
potential to paralyze people with terror. However,
rather than experience the terror, argued Becker,
humans used these same cognitive capabilities that
render them aware of the threat to contrive a solu-
tion: To the extent that individuals can conceive of
themselves as beings of value in a symbolic world,
rather than animals fated only to obliteration upon
death, they can ameliorate the existential terror.
The psychological insights of Becker’s ideas were
apparent to Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski,
thus they went on to develop TMT to provide an
empirical framework to test these ideas in the con-
text of social psychological research.
In developing TMT, Solomon, Greenberg, and
Pyszczynski began with two fundamental assump-
tions. First, Becker’s perspective implies that faith
828 Terror Management Theory
in a worldview and maintenance of self-esteem
should buffer anxiety and protect people from
death-related concerns. The TMT team called this
the anxiety-buffer hypothesis of TMT. They fur-
ther deduced that if, as Becker indicated, world-
views and self-esteem provide protection against
death-related concerns, then reminding individuals
of death should increase their need for these struc-
tures. This was labeled the mortality salience
hypothesis, because to test it, thoughts about mor-
tality would have to be rendered salient. In con-
junction with numerous colleagues, the trio tested
these, and other, propositions, resulting in one of
the most prolific programs of theory-driven empir-
ical research in all of social psychology.
Empirical Support
The first basic hypothesis of TMT, the anxiety buf-
fer hypothesis, suggests that faith in one’s world-
view and self-esteem should buffer anxiety and
protect people from death-related concerns.
Research has supported this hypothesis by demon-
strating, for example, that boosting people’s self-
esteem in the context of an experiment (with
favorable personality feedback) reduces the anxi-
ety that they experience in anticipation of a painful
electric shock. Other research has found that high
self-esteem is particularly protective in the context
of death-related concerns. In addition, research
recently conducted by Jeff Schimel and colleagues
demonstrates that threatening people’s worldview
(for example, presenting pro-creation participants
with an anti-creation essay) brings thoughts of
death closer to consciousness. These represent just
a few of the ways in which research has tested, and
provided evidence in support of, the anxiety-buff-
ering properties of culture and self-esteem.
The lion’s share of TMT research, however, has
tested variations of the mortality salience hypoth-
esis. In this research, thoughts of mortality are
rendered salient (mortality salience) in several
ways. The most common manipulation entails pre-
senting participants with open-ended questions
concerning the thoughts and feeling associated
with their own deaths. This is then followed by
some kind of delay and distraction (for example, a
puzzle task or short essay to read), so that thoughts
of death are activated, but not conscious, when
participants respond to the dependent measures.
Alternatively, some research has manipulated mor-
tality salience with subliminal death primes, or
naturalistic events, such as walking by a funeral
home or viewing a car crash. Notably, mortality
salience has been shown to produce defensive reac-
tions distinct from a variety of other aversive top-
ics, such as giving a speech, failing an exam,
intense physical pain, becoming paralyzed, social
exclusion, or uncertainty, suggesting that these
effects result specifically from thoughts of one’s
own mortality rather than general negative affect
or threats to self.
Most research testing the mortality salience
hypothesis has focused on the effects that remind-
ers of mortality have on individuals’ efforts to
conform to and defend their cultural worldviews.
In one study, mortality salience led participants to
express more hesitancy when an experiment called
for using a culturally cherished artifact, such as a
U.S. flag or crucifix, in an inappropriate manner
(hammer a nail with the crucifix). Perhaps the
most frequently replicated finding in all TMT
research is that people to respond more positively
to others who support their worldview and more
negatively to individuals who threaten their beliefs
(sometimes by merely holding different ones) after
a reminder of death. For example, Christian par-
ticipants reported liking a person more when the
person was purported to be a fellow Christian
after being reminded of death, but when the same
person was described as Jewish, reminders of mor-
tality led participants to like this person less.
More recently, Iranian researcher Abdolhossein
Abdollahi joined forces with Tom Pyszczynski and
the rest of the TMT team to demonstrate how
prejudiced attitudes exacerbated by mortality
reminders can contribute to aggressive tendencies.
Their research showed that Iranian students
become more supportive of martyrdom (suicide
bombing) and U.S. students of extreme military
interventions when mortality was primed. Thus,
TMT depicts how fears associated with mortality
can underlie prejudice and its consequences.
People seek validation of their cultural world-
views in response to mortality salience, and they
seek validation of their standing within the cul-
tural context; thus, they strive to bolster their self-
esteem. For example, people for whom the physical
body is an important source of self-worth respond
to mortality salience by indicating that the body is

a more central aspect of the self. As another exam-
ple, people who derive self-esteem from driving
fast have been shown to drive faster on a driving
simulator when mortality is primed. Notably, this
research demonstrates that efforts to manage mor-
tality concerns do not necessarily coincide with
that which would be most likely to facilitate sur-
vival (driving carefully), but rather, with psycho-
logical defenses aimed at reducing the potential for
anxiety associated with awareness (rather than the
actuality) of mortality.
Extensions
Beyond the basic model, TMT has been extended
in numerous directions. For example, Jamie
Goldenberg joined forces with the TMT team to
investigate the pervasiveness of anxiety surround-
ing the body and sex. The researchers speculated
that the sheer physicality of the body threatens the
symbolic modes of defense (worldview and self-
esteem) against death anxiety. It follows that con-
frontations with physical aspects of the body can
pose a psychological threat, at least under some
conditions, and that people should be especially
motivated to imbue the physical body with sym-
bolic meaning when thoughts of death are salient.
In support of this, research has shown that pre-
senting people with “disgusting” bodily products
and activities causes thoughts of death to become
more accessible to consciousness. In addition,
priming mortality salience causes people to report
less interest in the physical aspects of sex and to
avoid physical sensations (such as a foot massage).
With her colleagues, Goldenberg applied this
framework to specific aspects of women’s bodies
(pregnancy, lactation, menstruation), and other
research spearheaded by Mark Landau shows that
mortality salience leads men to deny attraction to
women who arouse lustful feelings in them.
Researchers Mario Mikulincer, Victor Florian,
and Gilad Hirschberger have also suggested that,
in addition to worldviews and self-esteem, close
relationships function as a death-anxiety buffer-
ing mechanism. Close relationships help people
feel that their lives are meaningful and that they
are valued, and they may also provide a funda-
mental source of comfort regarding the threat of
death because of the psycho-evolutionary mam-
malian importance of attachment to close others.
Terror Management Theory 829
In support of these ideas, a substantial body of
research has shown that mortality salience height-
ens the motivation to form and maintain close
relationships and increases appreciation of one’s
romantic partner. In addition, thinking about the
dissolution of important relationships brings death-
related thoughts closer to consciousness.
In another recent extension of TMT, Jamie
Goldenberg and Jamie Arndt developed a terror
management health model (TMHM). Building on
research that indicates that the type of symbolic
defenses characterizing worldview and self-esteem
defenses occur when thoughts of death have been
activated but are no longer conscious, in contrast
to more direct (and intuitive) defenses that occur in
the context of conscious death thought, TMHM
suggests that health behaviors will be motivated by
different factors (self-esteem compared with health
protection) as a function of the consciousness of
death. One implication is that to the extent that a
health appeal highlights the fatal consequences of
a health risk behavior, once thoughts of death fade
from focal attention, people’s health decisions
should be guided more by the need for self-esteem
than by health protection. Thus, research reveals
that people become more, rather than less, likely to
engage in behaviors that convey both self-esteem
and health risk (e.g., tanning, smoking) when
thoughts of death are nonconsciously activated.
Implications for Identity
The TMT conceptualization of culture and self-es-
teem has clear implications for the ways in which
people form and maintain senses of identity.
Individuals’ identities are based largely on the cul-
tural worldview into which they are socialized.
Beyond that, identities are shaped by the desire to
sustain a sense of significance within the context of
that worldview. Thus, TMT posits that people
strive to emphasize aspects of their personal iden-
tity, and their identification with others, in ways
that enhance their own perception of significance
(similar to other theories, such as Henri Tajfel and
John Turner’s social identity theory). TMT suggests
that these motives are fueled by mortality concerns,
thus reminders of mortality lead people to manage
their identities to optimally enhance them.
The previously described research depicting
self-esteem striving in response to mortality salience
830 Theory of Mind
supports this position. Recall that people drove faster
and placed more importance on their physical bod-
ies as a function of mortality salience and the cen-
trality of these values to their identity. Moreover,
research conducted by Jamie Arndt, Mark Descene,
and others demonstrates that in response to mor-
tality salience people dis-identify with important
aspects of their identity (even their own gender and
ethnicity) when these aspects are portrayed to
reflect negatively on the individual. In addition,
building from the ideas of Otto Rank, and in psy-
chology, Brewer’s optimal distinctiveness theory,
research conducted by Linda Simon and colleagues
indicates that reminding participants of their mor-
tality leads them to identify relatively more or less
with others depending on feedback they are given
about their distinctiveness. This research, and the
TMT framework more generally, provides insight
into the origin, maintenance, and function of per-
sonal and social identity.
Jamie L. Goldenberg
See also Culture; Optimal Distinctiveness Theory; Self-
Esteem; Worldview
Further Readings
Becker, E. (1973). The denial of death. New York: Free
Press.
Goldenberg, J. L., Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., &
Solomon, S. (2000). Fleeing the body: A terror
management perspective on the problem of human
corporeality. Personality and Social Psychology
Review, 4, 200–218.
Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Arndt, J. (2008). A basic
but uniquely human motivation: Terror management.
In J. Shah & W. Gardner (Ed.), Handbook of
motivation science. New York: Guilford Press.
Landau, M. J., Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (2008). The
never-ending story: A terror management perspective
on the psychological function of self-continuity. In
F. Sabio (Ed.), Self-continuity: Individual and
collective perspectives. New York: Psychology Press.
Theory of Mind
In developmental psychology, theory of mind
(ToM) refers to the normative capacity for humans
to understand the intentions of another person.
With early aspects of ToM apparent in 3- to
4-year-olds, the mind begins to understand that
one’s own knowledge and intentions differ from
those of other people. As ToM becomes more
sophisticated as the child becomes increasingly
social, this cognitive ability is the first step in asso-
ciating personal characterizations of another per-
son’s self: their patterns of goal-directed behavior
and general autonomous agency. These ToM iden-
tity files for others are then followed with the
emerging adolescent’s own social skill of being able
to display a personal identity that is a calculated
plan to represent a chosen set of characterizations.
Thus, the foundation of identity involves represent-
ing in your mind an expectation for how another
person will perceive your chosen characterizations.
Within this research, identity does not exist to
express basic innate beliefs about one’s own self,
but rather, it primarily functions as a social skill to
importantly gain more social resources. This aspect
of cognition is also related to evolutionary psychol-
ogy in that it is a second phylogenetic step (after
primary consciousness) toward advanced neuro-
logical identity. In an evolutionary model, ToM
emerged from the need to display trustworthiness
to one’s social group. ToM became increasingly
sophisticated and adaptive as humans could rea-
sonably predict the desires (agency) of other group
members, especially whether they are advanta-
geous or harmful regarding both the self and the
collective good of the group.
The term was originally coined by David
Premack and Guy Woodruff in 1978 at the
University of Pennsylvania to illustrate how chim-
panzees infer the mental status of their fellow
chimpanzees and was broadly understood as the
ability to attribute mental states, intents, desires,
and knowledge to oneself and others. Grounded in
the neurosciences is an innate potential cognitive
process in humans, which enables humans to see
others as intentional agents, to develop a “theory”
about another person’s mind, different from our
own. For one modern and basic example, consider
the experience of driving behind another driver
whose turn signal is on for an extended time. With
ToM, you predict that the first driver is not plan-
ning to turn and is unaware that the turn signal is
activated. Of course, ToM may be incorrect. The
driver may be experiencing trouble and have the
caution lights on with one side of the signal bro-
ken, or the first driver may activate a turn signal

long before most other drivers would choose. At
other times, ToM also stimulates not one but a set
of cognitive scenarios in which a person will hold
to a group of interpretations until further informa-
tion is gained. For example, a couple walks out of
the restaurant they just dined in, the wife turns and
runs back in. The husband wonders why: Maybe
his wife was looking for something she wanted to
retrieve, and she thought it was in the restaurant.
Maybe his wife saw someone familiar in the res-
taurant, and wanted to say hello to that person.
Maybe his wife intended to grab another beverage,
but in her haste to leave the restaurant, she forgot.
In knowing that his wife has a mind and that her
behavior has purpose, the husband is using ToM.
Research in developmental psychology has
shown that cognitive functions associated with
ToM begin to appear in children at about 3 to 4
years of age. Considered a basic standard in devel-
oping ToM, the false belief task is the ability of a
child to understand that another person may hold
an incorrect belief. In a typical scenario, Sally has
two boxes and sees a person place a marble under
one box. Sally leaves the room, and the person
moves the marble to the other box. Then Sally
returns. After witnessing this scenario, the
researcher asks where Sally will look for the mar-
ble. Without ToM, young children and those with
nonnormative cognitive development will not be
able to understand that Sally will be wrong (false
belief) about where the marble will be. Without
ToM, individuals can only represent their own
thinking and thus they know that the marble was
moved and everyone else, including Sally, should
know this. It is thought that the lack of ToM is the
key deficit in autism. Children with affective disor-
ders such as autism cannot comprehend that peo-
ple have minds or feelings; such deficiencies may
be detrimental to the child’s social, communica-
tive, and imaginative abilities. In Asperger’s syn-
drome, children show a higher level of cognitive
functioning and may excel in math and science,
but may be socially deficient; they are incapable of
understanding the feelings of others.
There are two categories of ToM: instrumental
ToM and affective ToM. Instrumental ToM
allows humans to make predictions about another
person’s behavior to achieve a specific goal; we
may try to influence another person’s behavior to
meet that goal. One might conclude that deceit is
an important aspect of instrumental ToM and is
Third Culture Building 831
necessary for many human activities, such as war,
politics, and business. There is a tendency when
using instrumental ToM to assess behaviors attrib-
uted to the whole when only part of that behavior
is observed; this incomplete assessment of behav-
iors can lead to inaccurate ToM.
Affective ToM refers to the cognitive process
involved in understanding another person’s emo-
tional state. This process takes into consideration
how another person might feel now and predict
how another person might feel in a particular situ-
ation. Empathy is the hallmark of affective ToM.
Affective ToM requires internalizing and feeling
another person’s emotional state. And subsequent
to empathy is compassion, another cognitive abil-
ity that gives us the drive to alleviate or reduce the
pain and suffering of other people.
Self-perception and ToM are related in that
one’s theories of self stem from one’s ability to
make theories about others. One’s identity is cre-
ated through social interaction with others, includ-
ing one’s other’s perceptions and understandings
of others as intentional agents, and the two aspects
are interconnected in a way that reinforces one
another through interactive experiences.
Christopher See and David M. Bell
See also Development of Identity; Evolutionary
Psychology
Further Readings
Brune, M., & Brune-Cohrs, U. (2006). Theory of mind-
evolution, ontogeny, brain mechanisms and
psychopathology. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral
Reviews, 30, 437–455.
Carey, S., & Gellman, R. (1991). The epigenesis of mind:
Essays on biology and cognition. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Drubach, D. (2008). The purpose and neurobiology of
theory of mind functions. Journal of Religious Health,
47, 354–365.
Wellman, H. (1990). The child’s theory of mind.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Third Culture Building
Third culture building (TCB) denotes a process by
which two parties, through protracted interaction,
832 Third Culture Building
consciously decide that they would like to share per-
spectives, negotiate values, test beliefs, or proceed in
a direction that leaves both of them permanently
changed. TCB therefore implicates relationships,
business transactions, cultural exchanges and home
stays, and intercultural or interracial communication
in general. TCB’s premises include that the interac-
tants must be willing to change themselves during
the interchange and that neither party should domi-
nate from a position of greater power or lay out
preconditions for participating in TCB. Actual inter-
actions over an extended period are measured
against these expectations.
TCB moves from a unilateral process to a bilat-
eral one, and from an intrapersonal to interper-
sonal to rhetorical to intercultural one. If it
successfully proceeds, it leaves both parties with a
new and enduring identity. This entry explores the
process of TCB.
Unilateral Awareness
One prospective interactant develops awareness
and interest in another. The other’s unfamiliarity
requires the first party to consider variations in lan-
guage and cultural preferences and values to refine
some motivation to initiate contact. Initiation of
contact proceeds following investigation into the
state and nature of perceived differences between
the parties. A motive such as curiosity or the need
for some form of business exchange may be modi-
fied in light of the findings of the process of unilat-
eral inquiry. The ideal TCB mind-set examines both
the self and the other before initiating contact.
Interpersonal Contact
The first interactant makes some contact with the
prospective partner, directly or through a third
party, in person, or through electronic means. The
first interactant represents a stranger to the other,
and the mutual uncertainty among the parties will
begin to be reduced with the assistance of informa-
tion that was learned by the first interactant during
the stage of unilateral awareness. The interper-
sonal contact may continue indefinitely for as long
as both parties are able to identify some benefit to
continuing the contact. At this stage, elements of
the identity of the self and the other become more
evident to both parties.
Persuasion Stage
The parties gain a more thorough understanding
of one another. To move toward achieving the
goals they have identified as worthy of pursuit,
they engage in perspective taking and negotiation,
first of material aspects of the negotiation and sub-
sequently of their perceptions about cultural reali-
ties. Some aspects of the cultural preferences of the
other become attractive, and elements of one’s
own cultural approach are placed under closer
scrutiny and evaluation. Partly because of the need
to address a new social reality that stems from the
contact between the parties, new ways of defining
and addressing social needs develop. These alter-
native approaches are tested, then adopted, then
dropped, or retained by the parties. In those cases
where new and overlapping behavioral repertoires
develop for both parties, identity changes in accor-
dance with the demands of the new requirements.
Intercultural Stage
Once the parties find a reason to prefer cultural
behaviors of the other or to develop behaviors that
were native to neither party as their new primary
means of communicating, their altered preferences
may be institutionalized in rules, protocols,
adjusted languaging, or behaviors. Because the
new pattern of communication behaviors repre-
sents a change from previous practice, and because
the changed behavior has proven to be adaptive,
the new behaviors are passed along to others as
preferred behaviors. The relationship, the business,
the offspring of the union, move to form a gener-
alizable mode of conduct. By linguistic analogy, a
pidgin has become a creole, and an identity
emerges that is neither that of one nor the other
interactant but, rather, represents some fusion of
both interactants.
The TCB model represents an idealized process.
Enslavement, colonization, and hegemony repre-
sent one-way processes that seek personal and uni-
lateral benefit at the expense of the other. Motives
to engage in the TCB process may be the same or
they may be complementary, but both parties must
continue to perceive a benefit in following the rules
and conventions of the hybridized identity.
To this extent, the TCB model encounters skep-
ticism from those who believe that nature always
presents hierarchies and that self-interest always

places the needs and wishes of the self over those
of another interactant. Given the belief in hierar-
chies of power, those in power might fear any
relinquishing of their authority. Apart from its use
as an ideal state toward which parties might aspire,
TCB could be made to work more effectively
through the inputs offered by third parties to the
interaction. The prospect, of allowing third parties
to influence the interpretation or the course of
TCB interactions, has not yet been explored in
the literature.
Double-Emic Analysis
The two interactants start with a native or emic
understanding of social realities. The TCB process
moves them gradually or precipitously toward
some double-emic, or comparative perspective. As
the process proceeds, it moves toward a new syn-
thesis at some higher level of generality and
awareness.
Third culture building seeks ways to de-anchor
persons from their native perspective, and to lead
persons, companies, and governments to a more
global sense of community. That broadened com-
munity may be known as an international market,
a human ecosystem, a world at peace, a regional or
religious heritage, or some other prospective com-
munity of interests. The native way of seeing things
inevitably gets redefined when some broader vision
expands the scope of action. This emic view may
be expanded and refined under conditions of
mutual need and benefit.
Before moving to a broader horizon, to a wider
vision, the parties each assert their own parochial
ways of acting on the world. For this reason, a
world event, or anything that takes place outside
the usual scope of one’s own native heritage, inher-
ently gets pictured in a combination of two ways:
by applying the native view of the sending com-
munity, and by applying the native view of the
receiving community. Each community has its
enculturated meanings for the event, as well as its
sense of what is in the interest of the community
itself. Taken in isolation, the two emic views may
be the subject of cultural analysis.
Treaties, cultural exchanges, competition for a
share of a world market, ecological concerns, aca-
demic collaboration, the wish for intercommunity
harmony, and others may increasingly place the
Third Culture Building 833
discourse of one emic perspective before the eyes
of some other emic community. Messages in an
Internet era can no longer be counted on to
remain within the circles of one’s own discourse
community.
The double-emic perspective occurs when a
member of one community sizes up the messages
from someone of another community. If the com-
munities have been relative strangers to one
another, and in the absence of historical antipa-
thies, such interaction becomes a matter of culture
learning. The interactants are aware of differences
and may realize a need to work through these dif-
ferences through self-edification to share the same
intellectual and psychological space. Area studies
and language learning, home stays, tourism, com-
parative literature, lectures, films, and ethnic
events and cuisine may be avenues to learning
about the unfamiliar culture. This effort might be
mutual, but often it is unilateral. As globalization
occurs, it becomes more likely that more and more
persons will learn at least something new about
unknown populations. This knowledge is filtered
through existing perceptions, so such knowledge
may resemble or not resemble the interpretations
offered by the other native community of its own
discourse and actions.
More often, given that some motivation was
present to encourage or to force one native to hear
the words of some other, the two interactants hold
some prior impressions or knowledge of the other
party, and of that party’s community. That moti-
vation may stem from a sense of historical similar-
ity, or the belief that the two parties share some
interest such as religion or business needs. Or it
may arise out of a perceived competition for the
same scarce resources.
Actions based on the perception of competitive
difference or threat seldom reach a stage of disin-
terested inquiry or goodwill that mark the ideal-
ized case. In the face of conflict, the parties may
find the need to deal with the other in the interest
of preventing warfare or of lowering the level of
hostilities between the communities. In this latter
case, a third party enters the equation.
The Roles of Third Parties
At the level of the critic, a third party may investi-
gate the comparative views that members of the
834 Third Culture Building
respective cultures hold of an event or piece of
discourse. The critic starts by delineating what was
said, and then offers a plausible interpretation of
how the message might be parsed within the
respective native communities. Aiding the critic
may be the interpretive investigation of the way
the message has been received by members of the
communities. Also, the creating of a collaborative
research team that combines both professional
expertise and the cultural insiders’ knowledge can
place the critic(s) into a position that speaks more
meaningfully to the differences in perspective that
are derived from the multiple communities than
might review by single critic of one or the other
native community. Thus, increased clarity and
objectivity should result from the interpretation of
the double-emic critic. The public should be able
to better grasp how those of the respective com-
munities size up the discourse generated by the
other community.
A second double-emic perspective deals with
cases where the native parties seek to intercom-
municate on a less acrimonious and a more coop-
erative basis. This moves toward what might be
considered as intercultural listening, and it defines
a role for someone who is conversant with the
rival views of social reality to facilitate interaction
among the parties. The two parties begin from
incompatible understandings of the social world,
and may start from the idea that the gains of one
community correspond to the loss of the other, so
a third party who can rise above the alternative
perspectives to promote conciliation and inter-
understanding among them becomes the means to
achieving higher social, political, and intellectual
aspirations. Such a third party must be tolerated
or respected by members of both of the native
communities for authentic intercultural listening
to be promoted.
Third parties may adopt a number of perspec-
tives and represent differing levels of familiarity or
institutional authority. Their role may be construc-
tive vis-à-vis the goals of third culture building, or
detrimental to the achieving of those ends. It seems
probable that some parties find a benefit to main-
taining perceptual differences and frictions among
defined cultural communities, perhaps for political
or economic gain, whereas other parties may orga-
nize to promote greater understanding and
smoother contact between those of different com-
munities (e.g., the “Teaching Tolerance” initiative
of the Southern Poverty Law Center). Whether the
third party is a relative or neighbor, a counselor or
facilitator, a business or government, the position-
ality of the party and the interpretation of the
motives of that party will be of paramount impor-
tance in determining the influence that party can
exert in defining and guiding the parties toward
some mutual goal.
Third Culture Building,
Intercultural Listening, and Identity
Though the literatures on intercultural communi-
cation, interracial communication, third culture
building, culture learning, training, intercultural
rhetoric, intercultural competence (particularly
intercultural sensitivity), international listening,
relationships, and intercultural training draw from
different sources and move in diverse directions, at
their core they deal with common questions of
identity. Persons or businesses, ethnic groups and
linguistic communities, the privileged and those
excluded from power, partners in bicultural rela-
tionships, and diversity trainers face questions of
identity on an ongoing basis. These questions
appear to be partially contingent on the choices of
others because the assertion of one’s own identity
hinges in some measure on the assertion of the
identity by the other. Although this diversity of
possible identities might be regarded as a luxury or
as a source of synergy, in practice it often produces
competition. Attempts to avow an identity are off-
set by attempts by some other to ascribe an identity
for the community and to proscribe its content.
The TCB process supposes that a relationship
can be developed to promote the examination,
testing, and exchange of elements of identity in an
environment that is voluntary and mutually
rewarding. The negotiation of identity, and with it
the formation of a third culture, takes place longi-
tudinally. TCB requires a sustained, ongoing, con-
scious, and mutual effort to survive. The TCB
process can lead to the birthing of a culture that is
new in content, insofar as it is the result of pro-
tracted exchange of cultural impressions, their
testing, their adoption or rejection, and their pos-
sible transmission to a new generation. As framed,

the thrust of TBC is toward cooperation, inter-
understanding, and the amelioration of frictions
that occur when those of different native views
first start to interact across difference.
William J. Starosta
See also Acculturation; Intercultural Personhood; Third
World
Further Readings
Chen, G.-M., & Starosta, W. J. (1997). A review of the
concept of intercultural communication sensitivity.
Human Communication, 1, 1–16.
Chen, G.-M., & Starosta, W. J. (1998). Foundations of
intercultural communication. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Chen, G.-M., & Starosta, W. J. (2004). Communication
among cultural diversities. In G.-M. Chen &
W. J. Starosta (Eds.), Dialogues among diversities:
Intercultural and international communication annual.
Washington, DC: National Communication
Association.
Starosta, W. J. (1971). United Nations: Agency for
semantic consubstantiality. Southern States Speech
Journal, 36(3), 243–254.
Starosta, W. J. (2000). dual_consciousness@USAmerica.
white.male. In M. W. Lustig & J. Koester (Eds.),
AmongUS: Essays on identity, belonging, and
intercultural competence. New York: Longman.
Starosta, W. J., & Chen, G.-M. (2005). Intercultural
listening. In W. J. Starosta & G.-M. Chen (Eds.),
Taking stock in intercultural communication: Where
to now? Intercultural and international
communication annual. Washington, DC: National
Communication Association.
Starosta, W. J., & Chen, G.-M. (2005). Where to now for
intercultural communication: A dialogue. In
W. J. Starosta & G.-M. Chen (Eds.), Taking stock in
intercultural communication: Where to now?
Intercultural and international communication annual.
Washington, DC: National Communication
Association.
Starosta, W. J., & Coleman, L. (1986). A case study of
rhetorical interethnic analysis: Reverend Jackson’s
“Hymietown” apology. In Y. Y. Kim (Ed.),
Interethnic communication: Current research
(pp. 117–135). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Starosta, W. J., & Olorunnisola, A. (1995). A meta-
model for third culture development. Pittsburgh, PA:
Eastern Communication Association.
Third World 835
Third World
The label third world as it relates to identity high-
lights issues of national cohesiveness, authority,
epistemology, and cultural and social roles. The
rank of third is currently designated to and associ-
ated with a country’s general economic condition
and the difficult circumstances that result. These
include widespread poverty, susceptibility to dis-
ease and natural disasters, and disorganized gov-
ernance. The etymology of the term third world is
found in an article written by Frenchman Alfred
Sauvy and published in L’Observateur on August
14, 1952. In this article, Sauvy coined the term
third world stemming from the medieval notion of
the third estate, a term that described the common
man as distinguished from nobility and clergy.
The relationship of third world identity to the
historical third estate contextualizes critiques of
first and second world ideological and cultural
domination through military and political power.
It also creates a historical underpinning that con-
nects third world identity to imperial domination,
ethnocentric politics, and arbitrary geographical
and ideological boundaries.
The Third Estate
The meeting of Eastern and Western thought clears
a field in which to revisit the historical contexts of
third world and its etymological origins. Both the
historical understanding of third estate and the
reality of colonialism influence interpretations of
human dependency and necessity within contem-
porary third world identities. These conditions are
perpetuated with international aid programs and
international political, economic, and juridical
bodies. The third estate during the Middle Ages
was dependent on both the clergy and the nobility
to fulfill certain needs: the clergy spiritual, and the
nobility political and judicial. The lack of equality
and the abuse of power between these three estates
or three worlds is as problematic now as it was
then. The relationship of third worlds to this his-
torical social classification does, however, texture
the historical genealogy of present global circum-
stances that continue to affect individual interpre-
tations of human experience. A most significant
836 Third World
aspect of the medieval third estate, even though
grouped together as common, was the particularity
of profession and skilled labor, exemplary of social
multiplicity and diversity. The people of the third
estate were artisans and craftspeople, the social
class being responsible for much of the physical
legacy that exists from the medieval period.
Colonialism
One of the more important historical trends that
influences characterizations of third world identity
is imperial colonialism, generally assigned a time
period between the 15th and 20th centuries.
Colonialism, originating and perpetuated for many
different reasons, has had a significant and lasting
impact on economic and social structures in con-
temporary third worlds. Colonialism is also a phe-
nomena that textures the meeting of the proverbial
East and West, where commonly more industrial,
capitalistic nations exploited less industrially devel-
oped nations, mining their natural and their cul-
tural resources. Colonized countries were used as
centers of production but not necessarily for indus-
trial development. Often when imperial interests
diminished, countries were left in varying levels of
social, political, and industrial disarray. These cen-
turies of exploitation have had lasting effects on
the formulation of indigenous third world govern-
ments that are not sufficiently representative of the
multiplicity of ethnic groups that persist in third
world contexts.
Colonialism also marks a shift from social and
communal divisions to nationalized divisions indic-
ative in the creation of national borders based on
imperial control and conquest. The borders created
in the African continent or the partition of the
Indian subcontinent in 1947 demonstrates the
attempt by colonial or imperial powers to create
boundaries ideologically without attention to
human relationship, resource, and necessity. These
events leave a lasting impression on current third
world identities as different indigenous or dis-
placed parties fight against borders that test a more
fluid experience of time and space in third world
mentalities. Warfare over sacred ground or porous
borders cannot be understood without paying
attention to the strong resilient connection in third
world identities between the immanent and tran-
scendent qualities of human identification. This
reality places third world identity in direct relation-
ship with the two other historical estates in the
Middle Ages that completed a social structure with
national and social roles.
Other visible factors include the slow develop-
ment, or decay, of reliable transportation infra-
structure that prohibits easy travel between
different regions in third world countries. This
lack of infrastructure has perpetuated a certain
degree of provinciality that has been classified as
exotic or exemplary of a radical alterity compared
with the universal power and purpose attributed to
first world countries. Although it would be an
exaggeration to say that alterity in third world
counties can be directly associated with provincial-
ity and physical isolation, these attributes do fac-
tor into third world mentalities regarding
nationalism. In these terms, third world identity
can be considered more particular and local, ori-
ented toward communal and familial concerns.
The epithets of radical alterity and particularity
as common or characteristic of third world men-
talities have been criticized as representative of
thoughtless attempts to perpetuate notions of
extreme or incommensurable difference. These
appositional cultural differences are interpreted as
magical, as demonstrated in the generic classifica-
tion of novels that describe third world experience
through magical realism, in which stark contrasts
are made between the tragic reality of third world
poverty and hardship, and miraculous events taken
in stride by the characters in the story. Authors
that exemplify this interpretation include Louis de
Bernieres and Gabriel García Márquez. Both
authors, while representing first and third world
authorial origins, describe unfortunate events com-
mon to less developed countries, interspersed with
supernatural episodes that are often unexplainable
through the lens of realism. This is the presump-
tion that anything can happen in places like these.
Authority and Epistemology
The magical interpretation of third world identity
highlights the significant contrast in third world
and first world understandings of authority and
epistemology. Third world ideas of authority are
greatly influenced by the history of colonialism
that influences political and national, as well as
intellectual and artistic identities. The authority of

imperial powers over less developed nations is
proven through the use of mechanics, method,
careful administration and technical prowess. The
authority of Western thought and art is demon-
strated in the ranking of progress as industrial,
spurred on by scientific discovery and in art as the
extension of formal boundaries. The significance
of authority in the third world is determined by
longevity and adherence to forms of class and tra-
dition. These forms in third world identity tran-
scend the industrial focus of first world authority,
in which religious mentalities compete with scien-
tific methods for the realm of knowledge. First
world epistemology is derivative of industrial ide-
ology, specifically the scientific method, in which
knowledge is developed and maintained through
careful scrutiny and measured doubt is developed
in things that present no physical evidence.
Epistemological credibility in third world contexts
is often asserted through less quantitative means,
determined much more on the basis of traditional,
historical, and class qualities.
The issue of epistemological authority highlights
foundational characteristics in third world identity
linked to religion and timelessness. A third charac-
teristic of third world authority and epistemology
relates directly with ideology itself. Ideology, often
a common way to trace the development of first
world countries, has less interpretive cogency when
applied to third world contexts. Religious posi-
tions still hold sway in third world identities, posi-
tions that have in some ways been replaced by
ideological concerns in first world mentalities. This
again highlights the dichotomous interpretation of
third world identities as largely disconnected or
beyond real because time and space is interpreted
from different experiences of natural and super-
natural distance and a person’s relationship to his
or her surroundings and circumstance.
The meeting of two significant figures in Western
and Eastern histories acts as an exemplar of this
division. A conversation that occurred on July 14,
1930, on the nature of truth and reality between
Albert Einstein, considered to be one of history’s
most influential scientists, and Rabindranath Tagore,
a Nobel-Prize-winning poet from Bengal, reveals, at
first, apparent differences, the bridging of incom-
mensurable alterity, and the magical reality that
characterizes interpretations of third world identity.
Tagore, adhering to a Platonic understanding of
Third World 837
science, describes the world as appearing, and
only having meaning and truth in its relation to
human interpretation. Einstein, alternatively,
understands truth as existent outside of human
space and time, giving it an objective quality.
Einstein’s first question follows the characteristic
dichotomy of first world mentalities: “Do you
believe in the Divine as isolated from the world?”
He ironically concludes the conversation by stat-
ing, “I am more religious than you are!” Situating
truth outside human interpretation indicates the
significance of ideology in first world identities as
individual, not relative to existential circumstances
but to the capabilities of human cognition. Tagore
interprets truth as dependent on the human inter-
preter, and on his position in the world. This per-
spective aligns itself with the physical attributes of
third worlds that are not peripheral to identity but
serve as its lens. The third world’s depletion of
necessary physical resources by a history of coloni-
zation creates circumstances in which dependency
is a daily mode of existence. All aspects of human
life and experience are reflected through the lens
of daily necessity and dependence on familial and
cultural fidelity. Einstein’s statement that he is
more religious than Tagore in his understanding of
truth and reality reveals the ideological bases of
his position, which are linked to a notion of an
ideal, the separation of human sociality from the
existential limits of human dependence and neces-
sity. Third world identities instead demonstrate
the combination of both, of the magical and the
real, which is not an ideological mysticism but
rather grounded, embodied position that is too
close to necessity and dependence to allow a total
transcendental isolation or ideologically indepen-
dent experience.
The possibility of a distinct third world identity
therefore depends on its relation or dependence on
other nations with first and second ranking,
whether it is economic, political, or ideological.
Although in some instances, the defining charac-
teristic of the third world is its stated difference
and alterity, in others, the defining characteristic is
its necessary or circumstantial relationship with
other national figures of authority, epistemology,
and ideology. Critics of the epithet third world
make the claim that the designation is arbitrary
and rhetorical. Third world, instead of classifying
a distinct type or category of nation or economy,
838 Transcendentalism
defines a third removed rank preventing identifica-
tion with other world nations. Postmodernity as a
theoretical structure and globalization as an eco-
nomic reality have questioned the clear divisions
that are often made between first, second, and
third worlds. In an expanding world economy, and
the union of multiple nations into cooperative gov-
erning bodies, the physical and political boundar-
ies that were once the means of distinguishing
alterity in world identities have lost some of their
distinctive clarity. Singular or universal ideological
boundaries have lost their efficacy to legitimate
colonial imperatives, making the line between East
and West and North and South tenuous. Third
world perspectives do in some cases accept these
limiting boundaries as a way to understand neces-
sary relationships and existential dependencies
that form the framework for both social and
national identities. Notions of authority and epis-
temology are derivative of purported limitations,
for it is often in relation to difference and rank that
another position, whether first or third, becomes
possible. From these existential lived boundaries,
third world identities emerge and flourish.
Joel S. Ward
See also Collective/Social Identity; Colonialism;
Nationalism; Transnationalism
Further Readings
Larrain, J. (1994). Ideology and cultural identity:
Modernity and the Third World presence. Cambridge,
UK: Polity Press.
Tagore, R. (1931). The religion of man. London: Allen &
Unwin.
Transcendentalism
The subject of transcendentalism and transcen-
dental argumentation generally are a major part
of the claims of professional philosophers to a
distinct and autonomous, nonempirical, area of
inquiry, clearly distinguishable from the natural
and social sciences. In the continental European
tradition, the term transcendental philosophy cov-
ers a wider range of philosophical approaches
than just the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, from
whom that term originated. Transcendentalism is
a systematic way of doing philosophy that includes
writers from Johann Gottlieb Fichte, G. W. F.
Hegel, and Friedrich Schelling to Edmund Husserl,
Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre, as well as
the field of hermeneutics. Transcendentalism
includes the social phenomenology of Alfred
Schutz and the “proto sociology” of Peter
L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann in the 1960s.
Transcendentalist scholars described the basic
parameters of the historical process, whereby
objective social reality comes to be confronted by
a human subject. These parameters were held to
be nonempirical, universal structures, a priori,
rather than a description of any specific society.
These structures were said to find expression in
human history and were to be given content in
empirical inquiries by sociologists into particular,
concrete societies. Transcendentalism plays a role
in present-day studies of identity, where debate
has focused on whether identities are fixed or
adaptable. This entry explores the two types of
transcendentalism, their criticisms, and their rele-
vance to the study of identity.
Two Types
There are two main kinds of transcendental inquiry
in philosophy, both dealing with something uni-
versal, conceived as either (a) above and beyond
the universe or (b) in the human cognition of
nature and society. Variants of these two can be
found, adapted, and blended with social data and
concepts widely in sociology and social theory.
Transcendental thinking of type (a) is in evi-
dence where the focus of a study of social processes
relies on postulated ideal states of affairs existing
as a potential in society, or when employed as a
universal yardstick for social criticism of the pres-
ent (e.g., in Karl Marx, and versions of Marxism).
Type (b) informs conceptual schemes that express
the preconditions that make society or cultural
forms possible or knowable (e.g., in Georg Simmel,
Max Weber, Alfred Schutz, Talcott Parsons, Michel
Foucault). Few major thinkers in the sociological
tradition have escaped the tacit absorption from
philosophy of premodern transcendental motifs
into their theoretical and empirical work. A nota-
ble exception is Norbert Elias, whose work was

founded on an abandonment of philosophy as
such, including all forms of transcendentalism.
Transcendence as Potentiality
Type (a) inquiries in philosophy conjecture
about a deity or deities or perhaps a spirit world or
the enigma of Being itself. In this sense, the term
transcendence preserves an uplifting, sometimes
visionary, tenor and contrasts with its opposite,
immanence, which is evocative of what is actually
existing in the less inspiring, mundane world. The
utopian writings of Marx and later Marxists are
essentially secularized and politicized, social-scien-
tific versions of this kind of thinking, involving a
transformation of Hegel’s notion of the “concrete
universal.” Hegel argued that universals such as
pure freedom or justice or the “absolute ethical
life,” were actually embedded in the finite and
imperfect world. This conception provided
Hegelians with an absolute evaluative standard for
the critique of present society. Against them, Marx
wanted to transform society to make it, in practice,
what it could ideally be. This accent produced the
characteristic contrast in later Marxist work
between society as it is (capitalism) and society as
it could ideally be (communism). The latter stage
of human society was said to be embedded in the
present society as its telos, or transcendental
potential, yet to be realized by the revolutionary
action of the proletariat.
Writing in the 1920s, the Marxist writer Georg
Lukács, in a sophisticated example of transcenden-
tal reasoning of type (a), distinguished between the
actual and imputed consciousness of the proletar-
iat. He argued that these two forms of conscious-
ness represented two truths. The transcendent,
imputed class consciousness existed on a higher
philosophical plane from the actual consciousness
of the proletariat that could be empirically ascer-
tained. Lukács argued that even if the Marxian
hypothesis were proved wrong empirically, it
would not affect the higher truth of the potential
proletarian class consciousness.
Once the possibility of proletarian revolution
faded with fascism, the critical theory of the
Frankfurt School (Theodor Adorno, Max
Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse) sought to preserve
the transcendental truth of communism and free-
dom in theory as a possibility. Adorno and others
Transcendentalism 839
talked of the “utopian moment” or “horizon.”
Later, theorists such as Jürgen Habermas, Karl-
Otto Apel, and Zygmunt Bauman have looked for
new models of the unrealized utopia to provide a
defensible yardstick for social criticism of inequal-
ity and injustice in the present. These have taken
the form of Habermas’s and Apel’s ideas about
distorted communication and the presupposed
“ideal speech situation” or “speech community,”
and Bauman’s speculations, drawing on the phi-
losopher Emmanuel Lévinas, about a “pre-social,”
transcendent responsibility for others implicit in
the human being-in-the-world.
One drawback of this kind of inquiry is evident
in Bauman’s conception of the present global soci-
ety as a condition of “liquid modernity.” This
viewpoint systematically undervalues the present
reality as producing unremitting anxiety and
uncertainty. This negative diagnosis is made, typi-
cally, by comparison with the ideal of a pure state
of democracy, freedom, and equality, which exists
as a continual, nagging possibility. From this point
of view, it is difficult to assemble an inventory of
progressive human achievements that must be pre-
served. Type (a) inquiries in general, when applied
to the nature of modern society, as in the case of
Bauman, tend to devalue the identity experiments
and preferences of ordinary people (e.g., lifestyle
groups or mass entertainment). They are implicitly
and sometimes explicitly, presented as a “lower”
form of social life, compared with the “higher”
form of communal life that could be achieved in a
future society.
Transcendence as Conditions of Possibility
Type (b) inquiries seek to establish a different
kind of universality or truth, by focusing on
the nonempirical conditions of possibility of
valid knowledge, society, or cultural forms.
Transcendental philosophy in this sense was inau-
gurated by Kant in the 18th century as an enter-
prise occupied not so much with the objects in the
world, but with the mode of our knowledge of
them. This mode of knowledge makes it possible
for us to know objects at all. But we can never
know the objects themselves, as such. He attempted
to establish as a universal mode of knowledge a
priori (prior to experience) certain categories of
the understanding (such as space, time, cause,
840 Transcendentalism
number, etc.) that were said to be the conditions
of possibility—sometimes called the limits—of all
experience.
In various adaptations, reasoning of type (b) is
common in the mainstream sociological tradition.
It has been well-established that the work of many
of the key writers in the classical tradition of sociol-
ogy (e.g., Émile Durkheim, Simmel, Weber, Parsons)
was fundamentally shaped by principles derived
from the philosophy of Kant, as developed by vari-
ous 19th and early 20th century neo-Kantians such
as Charles Renouvier, Rudolf Lotze, Hermann
Cohen, and Heinrich Rickert. Weber’s ideal-types,
for example, were formal constructs related to
reality by the principle of “objective possibility.”
They were heuristic, regulative postulates, used to
connect the objects of experience, otherwise
deemed to be structureless. Simmel’s forms of soci-
ality play a similar role as a mode of a priori
knowledge that makes possible for individuals the
experience of society or other social regularities.
Parsons’s notion of the importance of the central
value system in the maintenance of social order
posits—against Utilitarian individualism—the
transcendental normative conditions of ordered
economic life. This viewpoint also lies behind
Durkheim’s insistence that economic individualism
is made possible by the prior moral categories that
inform and enable it.
Critique of Later Variants
The Kantian transcendental method has also been
adapted more recently to provide analyses of the
conditions of possibility of many cultural items,
practices, and activities. These include, for exam-
ple, Claude Lévi-Strauss’s demonstration of invari-
ant structures across the contents of many myths
and Michel Foucault’s epistemological organiza-
tion of the main discursive practices (e.g., political
economy, psychology, law) of a particular epoch
as an epistème, or historical a priori. The transcen-
dental approach of the two authors shapes research
into the production of synchronic, static invento-
ries of the invariant features that make possible
whatever is the focus (myths or discursive forma-
tions in these cases). Transcendental sociology
often also provides analytically distinguished sub-
systems of action (personality, culture, politics,
etc.) as the preconditions for the possibility of a
social system, as in, for example, the work of
Parsons. This approach appeared in a new form in
the 1980s with Giddens’s theory of structuration.
This comprises an analytically elaborated metathe-
ory of action, depicting the preconditions neces-
sary for the reproduction of society as a system by
the intentional actions of those it constrains.
Some writers, including Lévi-Strauss, Parsons,
and Foucault, have openly acknowledged their
Kantian inspiration, whereas other social scientists
are unaware of its presence. This is partly because
the transcendental dimensions of the theoretical
frameworks that they have inherited and find
available in disciplines in university institutions
have been forgotten or only partially understood.
Parsons and Giddens are not so much concerned
with actual actions of real people as with the con-
ditions that enable action as such. This feature
points to one of the drawbacks of sociology con-
ducted in this manner, that is, over-abstraction
and an attenuation of social reality. There is also a
problematic relationship between analytically dis-
tinguished static preconditions (say subsystems in
a determinate hierarchy, as in Parsons, or the
forms of sociation in Simmel’s or Giddens’s condi-
tions of system reproduction) and the real world.
Factual evidence and examples can be cited in rela-
tion to these, but they will not disconfirm them
because of their transcendental status. They are
not a description of the real world, nor a testable
theory. Nor, by their nature, do they contain a
dynamic conception of social development.
A further example of this problem from the
sociology of identity is Giddens’s analysis of the
“pure relationship” in sexuality, marriage, and
friendship. This is presented as an ideal-type con-
struct and said to be one that can guide empirical
investigations. This model lists the features of inti-
macy, commitment, and reflexive organization and
posits an entirely internally self-sufficient relation-
ship, driven by mutual and equal effort bargaining.
It is said not to be linked externally to the eco-
nomic system because the identities of both part-
ners are now assumed to include the possibility of
either one being a possible breadwinner—unlike in
former times, when in heterosexual marriages
invariably the man was the breadwinner.
Interview research has shown, however, that there
is no evidence that this model of relating is becom-­
ing predominant in heterosexual partnerships, in

particular. Strictly speaking, though, this evidence
does not affect the conceptual integrity of the ana-
lytic model. It cannot be changed by it. The author
could legitimately neutralize the empirical findings
by saying that the model is only an ideal type, a
regulative principle, so may not necessarily corre-
spond entirely to all cases or contexts. It is a regu-
lative principle, an idealization. An unresolved
issue is the desirability of proceeding in this tran-
scendental fashion in the first place. The method
carries the further disadvantage that because the
individual theoretician creates the construct, there
is no control over the selection of the dimensions
included. There is little to prevent the smuggling in
of assumptions based on the author’s convictions
as to how society and relationships ought to be
organized.
Beyond Transcendentalism
Much debate has taken place in the sociology of
identity as to how far people today can adopt iden-
tities at will and how fixed are the clear identities
of male and female. Attention has been drawn to a
spectrum of “we” identities of varying strengths,
including those relating to family, social class,
community, neighborhood, region, ethnicity, gen-
der, religion, language group and nation, which
can vary in intensity as part of the rise and fall of
tensions between opposing or socially adjacent
groups defined by these dimensions. More transi-
tory group attachments have also been put for-
ward as being typical of the so-called postmodern
world—for example, Michel Maffesoli’s theory of
neo-tribes, which draws on transcendental motifs
from Friedrich Nietzsche and Durkheim. These
affinity groups are diverse, including youth subcul-
tures and style groups and many more groups such
as golf clubs, rock festivals, coffee mornings, and
supporters of sports teams, as collective identity
responses to modern political, economic, and con-
sumerist individualism.
Norbert Elias’s figurational or process sociol-
ogy is notable because it has explicitly expunged
all traces of transcendentalism and thus provides a
useful counterpoint. Elias pointed out that in the
age of extensive individualization, most “we”
identities within what he calls the “We”/“I” bal-
ance have correspondingly weakened, with the
exception of national and ethnic identities. These
Transcendentalism 841
appear to have strengthened as the result of the
geopolitical repercussions following the fall of the
Soviet empire dominated by Russia, and the subse-
quent end of the polarized superpower tension of
the cold war.
Abram de Swaan’s theory of widening circles of
identification, drawing on Elias, provides a longer
view of the contemporary debates about identity.
He shows how the scope of “we” identifications
has become wider and wider throughout human
history, from those based on kinship and proxim-
ity, such as villages or neighbors, to broader forms
based on clans, dynasties, military affiliations,
monastic orders, and medieval guilds. An enlarg-
ing and unifying momentum can be observed,
from primary survival groups right through to
nation-states, culminating in substantial “we”
identifications with social classes, religions, and
nations. Nation-states are the largest and most
persistent, large-scale survival units.
Harbingers of possible higher, continental, and
global integrations of nations can be observed in
the current period. The highest possible “we”
identity would be with humankind as a whole,
although this does not carry at present the same
emotional charge as the “we” identity of national
or ethnic consciousness. This is partly because
national identities are bound up with people’s sur-
vival in wars between nation-states in recent cen-
turies, which continue unevenly until the present
day. This entire process can be seen to have a
demonstrable structured direction of widening
scope, but in this framework, no telos or end-state
of a unified, global humankind is assumed.
Richard Kilminster
See also Being and Identity; Critical Theory; Frankfurt
School; Social Identity Theory
Further Readings
Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1967). The social
construction of reality. London: Allen & Unwin.
Elias, N. (1991). The society of individuals. Oxford, UK:
Blackwell.
Kilminster, R. (1998). The sociological revolution: From
the Enlightenment to the global age. London:
Routledge.
Kilminster, R. (2007). Norbert Elias: Post-philosophical
sociology. London: Routledge.
842 Transnationalism
Transnationalism
Simply defined, transnationalism is the continu-
ous communication and exchange of ideas as well
as transaction of relationships that occur across
spaces of separation. Transnationalism can be
understood as the ways in which immigrants, or
members of diaspora cultures, import idioms,
conventions, and resources of communication to
continue to maintain the identity that they acquired
in their home countries even as their identities are
open to the vast unknown of identityscapes in
their new country of settlement. This entry dis-
cusses the conceptual framework of and debates
surrounding transnationalism.
Conceptual Differences
and Theoretical Framework
To understand transnationalism in the most pre-
cise ways, one must distinguish it from colonial-
ism, postcolonialism, nationalism, and globalism.
Colonialism was and is a process by which differ-
ent countries and cultures came into assault by a
foreign power known as an empire. This resulted
in a state of siege for those experiencing colonial
relations. Colonialism can be said to have resulted
in the erosion of culture, language, symbolisms,
and psychic unity of those who experienced its
traumatic effects. However, colonialism also
resulted in uprisings, revolution, and transforma-
tion of colonial oppression into conditions for
freedom and liberation. A clear-cut example is
British rule in India and the subsequent nonviolent
freedom movement spurred by Mohandas Gandhi
and his followers. The ways in which people who
were formerly colonized expressed their sense of
liberation as well as critique of colonialism can be
called postcolonialism. The possible continuation
of former process of domination and subordina-
tion also falls under the rubric of postcolonialism.
An extensive and exhaustive undertaking of this
concept is beyond the scope of this entry.
Postcolonialism is associated with the spaces of
colonialism, the vigorous transformation of home
turned colony to nationhood.
Nationalism is the construction and constitu-
tion of identity through processes of nation
building as well as the ideologies and discourses
that constitute nationhood. Nationalism is not a
unified construct but rather an imagined one of
unification. Nationhood can be rife with the con-
flicts and tensions that accompany it, such as
gender, race, class, and ethnicity, as well as reli-
gion. Nevertheless, insofar as nation building in a
postcolonial context was a response to the excesses
of colonialism, it can be said to be an identity-
conferring process, a means by which individuals
and groups come to identify under the umbrella of
nationhood.
Although these are broad brushstrokes of the
building blocks of a conceptual and theoretical
framework within which to understand transna-
tionalism, it is important to grapple with the his-
torical processes of change undergone by
individuals living under colonialism and its after-
math. Postcolonial individuals may engage in
migratory behavior as a means to seek better
opportunities for themselves and their families in
an ironic sense in the metropole or centers of capi-
talism and commerce. However, it has become
evident that immigration is not a unidirectional
movement. It is not about leaving never to return,
though this option is limited to those who leave
under voluntary conditions rather than forced cir-
cumstances of exile. In the process of keeping ties
with the home country as well as countries to
which fellow migrants emigrated to, individuals
can be said to have spawned a wide variety of
communication practices that connect home and
abroad. A key factor in establishing continuity is
media. This includes both conventional and new
media. Conventional media can be exemplified,
for instance, by the concept of Bollywood. There
has been much research done on the effects of
Bollywood movies on Indian immigrants to the
United States. Immigrants turn to Bollywood as a
means of defining and redefining space, particu-
larly the concept of home and abode. Immigrants
find Bollywood a means to connect with the home
country, albeit in a fantastic way. Bollywood offers
them a sense of space and familiarity that is not
available where they reside in the host country.
Therefore, transnationalism begins to take root
as the expansiveness of nationalism, a means to
bridge two countries at the same time. The imag-
ined ways in which national identities begin to
take hold of the psyches and sensibilities of the
audiences across the spectrum of oceans can be
understood as transnationalism. Another source of
transnationalism is travel. The back-and-forth

dynamic that accompanies immigrants the world
over is what continues to sustain and foster trans-
nationalism. When immigrants return to their
home countries, they may feel reverse culture
shock or a feeling of nonadaptability because of
profound changes to their identities. Yet, their
return is accompanied by a strong yearning for the
feeling of recreating a home where they live.
Catching up with their lives, that of their extended
families, the friends they have left behind, politics,
culture, and so forth gives birth to a discursive
sense of transnationalism. In addition to the psy-
chic and discursive, there is institutional transna-
tionalism. Institutional transnationalism takes the
form of attending such institutions as places of
religious worship as well as building organizations
that crosscut boundaries and borders between
home and abroad. These organizations are fluid
and permeable spaces where culture, belief systems,
and affinities flow back and forth. Transnationalism
is then a splitting of the concept and experience of
nationhood. What occurs elsewhere occurs here, so
to speak, though the nature and quality as well as
feel of that occurrence may differ considerably
between there and here.
Debates
Several debates underlie transnationalism, and
these merit consideration. The first of these revolves
around the concept of essentialism. Is transnation-
alism an essentialist concept? Some would disavow
any connection between essentialism and transna-
tionalism, essentialism being the idea that there is
some universalizing force that unites and confers
some kind of sameness and uniformity to all
members of a culture, race, or ethnic group.
Transnationalism is not an offshoot of sameness.
In this sense, it anticipates a different debate that
is space, place, and time.
Transnationalism is an experience that accom-
panies relocation. It is not the exclusive preserve of
members of a culture to experience transnational-
ism. Transnationalism can be experienced and
enjoyed by members of an associative culture as
well. For example, two friends who may be dif-
ferentiated on basis of place of origin and citizen-
ship might still savor each other’s trajectories of
transnationalism. The key seems to be degree of
participation and alertness as well as attentiveness
to the connectors and stressors that accompany
Transnationalism 843
relocation to a different place. So even if an indi-
vidual claims a transnational identity on basis of
being from a certain country or culture, those
around him or her can still experience its effects
and benefits. Cyberspace is an example of how dif-
ferent individuals can tune into the dimensions of
transnationalism. Anyone can enter the interlock-
ing set of vectors that constitute transnationalism
to increase one’s awareness of the factors that pro-
pel, push, and pull together individuals from dif-
ferent countries who are separated from one
another by great oceanic distances.
Another example of the contested terrain of
transnationalism shares an intellectual border with
globalism. Is globalism a homogenizing and flat-
tening tendency? Does globalism threaten to wipe
out differences and create a singular world sub-
ject? Such debates are equally applicable to trans-
nationalism. In values, attitudes, and ideologies
crisscrossing the oceans at great speed, does the
transnationalist subject become the subject effect
of such destinies rather than find a way to carve
out a path, or pathways, for himself or herself?
One could argue that transnationalism is about
finding difference-in-sameness. There is no logical
explanation for why individuals would lose their
specific places in the world because of the various
influences that span the oceans. If anything, trans-
nationalism has an element of volition in it. An
individual or even group can choose to be influ-
enced by certain elements that attend their separa-
tion from their home countries. Similarly, an
individual can be constituted by variegated influ-
ences from many different countries that have
become a home to their fellow citizens from their
birthplace. Therefore, identity becomes a kaleido-
scope of an infinite possibility of existence rather
than some one-dimensional aspect that is the func-
tion of being exposed to the same influences from
the same place. Similarly, a transnationalist indi-
vidual can be exposed to a multitudinous set of
influences from many countries both in a contigu-
ous and noncontiguous sense. These proliferate the
possibilities for identity rather than limit them.
Another crucial debate that cuts through trans-
nationalism is that of longue durée (literally, “over
the long term”) or temporality versus space and
place. Each of these concepts of space and place
themselves constitute a debate. The debate regard-
ing space and time is a timeworn one, yet it is
critical to consider if transnationalism is one or the
844 Transworld Identity
other. Transnationalism is a temporal concept
insofar as it is galvanized by relocation. From the
time an individual relocates from one country to
another and begins to connect with the home coun-
try, a variety of factors are activated. When and to
what extent these are a source of change, transfor-
mation, and reconstitution of identity is a matter of
time. Yet, transnationalism is a spatial concept as
well. Transnationalism is the recreation of the con-
cept of home and the distance between there and
here through conventions and idioms of familiar-
ity. For transnationals, home is not some readily
identifiable artifact that one can point to and say it
is theirs or mine. Instead, a whole host of imagi-
nary and fantastic acts constitute this space of
home. This takes us to a critical distinction between
place and space. On the one hand, place can be said
to be a physical topographical entity, something
readily identifiable as solid matter. Space, on the
other hand, is a set of practices that constitute a
surrounding or milieu. Therefore, transnationals
can be said to be a composite of both space and
place. Immigrants, for instance, have physically
relocated to a different place, and this place has a
huge impact on their quests for identity. Navigability
of this place through the imaginative and creative
resources of transnational building is definitely a
spatial exercise. It takes a whole range of practices
to put into motion the aspect of transnational iden-
tity. To reiterate, it requires renewed social rela-
tions, redefining conventional and new media,
travel, and in general an openness to what is occur-
ring to members of the home country the world
over. This is a spatial exercise, an exercise to create,
build, and rebuild space.
Finally, the debate about transnationalism’s lim-
its and boundaries is not complete without a foray
into ideology. Is transnationalism ideological, and
as such, does it promote retrograde concepts of
nationalism and anti-cosmopolitanism? In other
words, does transnationalism limit individuals’
endeavors to begin to fit into their host country by
tending to hold onto their roots tenaciously despite
spread of globalization? Transnationalism, like
other forms of nationhood, is loaded with ideolo-
gies of gender, religion, and class as well as nation-
hood writ large. Let us look in particular at gender
and sexuality. The ideologies surrounding gender
and sexual expectations and norms in the home
country can exert a tremendous power over those
who leave. Gender is subjected to the intersecting
demands of patriarchy and religion, and in this
sense, these norms can be viewed as restrictive and
prohibitive. At the same time, these norms can also
be productive, generating different ways to be a
woman or man. The conceptions of femininity that
emerge and circulate in the circuits of transnation-
alism can be rigid, however, lacking motility and
mobility. Many films of the diaspora suggest just
this, that transnationalism can generate oppressive
and repressive images of Indian gender and sexual-
ity. Ideologies can be contested and transformed
into progressive notions of gender. For instance,
many domestic violence support centers have
developed because of the realization of the trans-
nationalist connections between ideologies of
dependence, reliance, and self-effacement and the
need to change them toward empowerment of
women in transnational spaces. These are some of
the debates about transnationalism—a concept
and experience whose time has come, is here to
stay, and can be said to have fundamentally
changed the world into one of difference.
K. E. Supriya
See also Colonialism; Diaspora; Hegemony; Hybridity;
Nationalism
Further Readings
Mendez, J. B., & Wolf, D. L. (2001). Where feminist
theory meets feminist practice: Border-crossing in a
transnational network. Organization, 8, 723–750.
Rocco, R., & García Selgas, F. J. (Eds.). (2006).
Transnationalism: Issues and perspectives. Madrid,
Spain: Editorial Complutense.
Smith, M. P., & Guarnizo, L. E. (Eds.). (1998).
Transnationalism from below (Vol. 6). New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishing.
Transworld Identity
The term transworld identity is often discussed in
the discipline of philosophy as an individual’s
identity across possible worlds. This is rooted in
the idea that a person’s identity exists in more than
one possible world, including the world in which
he or she currently lives, which is referred to as the
actual world. According to the philosopher David
Lewis, there is no objective difference in status

between an actual world and a possible world. The
possible world is a place similarly “real” to an
actual world and the difference in one’s identity in
either world is one of interpretation. Lewis, for
instance, suggests that the playwright Bertrand
Russell could be a playwright in his actual world,
but a philosopher in a possible world. Russell
could inhabit simultaneously the identity of a play-
wright and a philosopher depending on when,
where, and by whom he was being perceived. This
entry discusses transworld identity as an individu-
al’s coexistence in multiple possible worlds, rely-
ing on a few key concepts from postcolonialism
and the related area of cosmopolitanism.
The Process of Identification
Interpretive researchers are interested in trans­
world identity because it implies an understand-
ing of identity as a process that is dynamic,
unstable, and constantly in emergence in tempo-
rally distinct spaces and geographies. Recently,
academic discourse on identity has shifted from
discussions about the self as a stable entity to the
self as a socially produced subject that, as Stuart
Hall points out, is neither simple nor stable.
Referring to it as a structure that is split, Hall pro-
poses that identity can be many things at many
different times as a “process of identification.”
Our selves are influenced to a great degree by
people with whom we choose to identify and this
can mean that we can simultaneously reside in
different worlds.
Such approaches to identity have become com-
monplace in postcolonial and cosmopolitan studies
where scholars have focused their attention on
transworld identity in related ways. Postcolonial
theory is a term that refers to cultures—in the
Americas, Africa, and Asia—affected by the impe-
rial process from the moment of colonization to
the present. Postcolonial theorists are interested in
examining how the colonial epoch affected educa-
tion; language; geographic borders; religion, insti-
tutional, and governmental structures; and cultural
values; and how these influences are lived and
indeed embodied by individuals in the present.
This theory makes complex any simplistic under-
standing of identity, especially among individuals
born and raised in postcolonized countries or those
who moved to the colonial metropoles after decol-
onization movements. Hybridity and liminality are
Transworld Identity 845
two identity-specific concepts that are central to
postcolonialism.
Multiplicity
Homi Bhabha defined hybridity as the condition
of identity of persons who live between colonial
pasts and postcolonial presents. Bhabha identifies
three spaces along which a postcolonial identity
may be understood. The first space is identifica-
tion with the colonizer. The second space is iden-
tification with the colonized. The third space is
where a postcolonial identity resides because the
postcolonial identifies with yet feels outside of first
and second space identifications, thereby residing
in an in-between or liminal third space. For
instance, for a person from India, which is a for-
mer British colony, identity could reside in-
between Englishness and Indianness—a third space
that is neither here nor there but in-between.
Hybridity exemplifies the complex and multiple
ways that people are located within contingent
realities and affiliations.
Cosmopolitanism
In the past few decades, it has been argued that
hybridity can refer to most individuals and not just
persons from postcolonized nations because the
world is witnessing a period of constant reterrito-
rialization and replacements driven by powerful
forces of globalization, capitalism, wars, and so
forth. Contemporarily, power can be understood
in more complex ways than as merely the simple
binary opposition between colonial subjugation
and domination.
Given these trends, contemporary scholars
within the area of cosmopolitan studies have been
proposing the idea of “the cosmopolitan”—a per-
son who views himself or herself as belonging to
the world and thereby of obligations that exceed
any one community, religion, ethnicity, or nation-
ality. Cosmopolitanism dates back to the Cynics of
the 4th century BCE, who are credited with coining
the expression that means “citizen of the cosmos.”
The movement was a rejection of the conventional
view that human beings belong to one community
among communities. Instead, a cosmopolitan was
a person who straddled many communities within
the universe; thus, his or her identity was spread
across worlds. Although cosmopolitanism as a
846 Trickster Figure
movement went in and out of popularity, it has
seen resurgence in the humanities and social sci-
ences. For those interested in understanding iden-
tity in complex ways, cosmopolitanism entails
universality plus difference and suggests that we
can and do belong to various worlds and so have
disparate identity affiliations. Alongside, we are all
universally connected and have obligations to each
other. Cosmopolitanists oppose the solitarist
approach to identity that implies that human
beings are members of merely one group. Such an
approach is unable to capture the complexity of
alliances and choices that a person encounters in
contemporary life. A cosmopolitan identity is a
transworld identity because it entails a person who
belongs to many groups, and even though these
groups may or may not agree with each other, they
include the person in their midst.
As understood by social researchers, a trans­
world identity suggests human identities that are
spread across worlds are based on our affiliations
with different groups, that are affected by geopo-
litical, social, and economic developments, and
most importantly, that implicate universality plus
difference.
Devika Chawla
See also Cosmopolitanism; Diaspora; Hybridity
Further Readings
Appiah, K. A. (2006). Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a
world of strangers. New York: W. W. Norton.
Bhabha, H. (1994). The location of culture. London:
Routledge.
Hall, S. (1991). Ethnicity: Identity and difference. Radical
America, 23(4), 9–20.
Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford,
UK: Blackwell.
Sen, A. (2006). Identity and violence: The illusion of
destiny. New York: W. W. Norton.
Trickster Figure
The trickster figure appears in the myths and folk-
tales of nearly every traditional society. In the
study of mythology and folklore, the trickster
character may be a god, goddess, man, woman,
spirit, or animal. There are significant differences
between trickster characters in different tradi-
tions. They may be cunning, comic, or foolish,
but in African and now in African diasporic lit-
erature, they usually perform an important cul-
tural task. The roots of the African American
trickster figure can be traced to fundamental
terms maintained through mnemonic devices
peculiar to the African oral literary tradition that
continue to function now both as meaningful
units of New World belief systems and as traces
to their origins. These cultural fragments were not
obliterated but retained major elements that sur-
vived the Middle Passage. African American folk-
lore derives from the trickster figure of Yoruba
mythology known as Esu-Elegbara. He is known
in African American literature as Exu, Echu-
Elegua, Papa Legba, and Papa Le Bac. Esu-
Elegbara of the Yoruba people in Nigeria speaks
to the aspects of culturally retained epic memory
that manifests itself in African New World liter-
ary traditions. Because these individual tricksters
are related parts of a larger, unified figure, they
are usually referred to collectively in the United
States as Esu (also known as Eshu), or as Esu-
Elegbara. These variations on Esu-Elegbara speak
eloquently of a continuous metaphysical presup-
position and a pattern of figuration shared through
time and space among certain Black cultures in
West Africa, South America, the Caribbean, and
the United States. The trickster figure is relevant
to identity and identity studies because it embod-
ies an African worldview and contributes to one’s
understanding of the significance of connecting
early African American writing to the oral African
tradition.
Esu as trickster informs and becomes the foun-
dation to locate, reassemble, and then theorize
complex diasporic fragmented experiences unique
in the west. Additionally, Esu is complementary—
that is, he connects truth with understanding, mas-
ters the elusive, and works to dispel the mystical
barrier that separates the divine world from the
profane. Much of Esu’s literature concerns the
origin of nature and the function and interpreta-
tion of language. Esu can be seen as the indigenous
Black metaphor for the literary critic or as the
study of methodological principles of interpreta-
tion itself, or what the literary critic does. Using

the trickster figures as a historical or cultural cen-
ter ensures that the entire analytical process
remains located in the culture that produced the
work. Other trickster figures can be identified in
Legba “the divine linguist” from the Fon people of
Benin; also as Exu in Brazil, Echu-Elegua in Cuba,
Papa Legba in Haiti, and Papa La Bas in the Ioa of
Hoodoo in the United States.
In 1988, Henry Louis Gates Jr. presented the
concept of the signifying monkey in Signifying
Monkey: A Theory of Afro-American Literary
Criticism based on the functionality of the divine
Esu trickster figure. The text examines the origins
of the African American cultural tradition of “sig-
nifying” and ties that tradition back to West
African oral traditions. Gates noted how the trick-
ster figure had assimilated into the ordinary
dimensions of African American life and that
African ancestors continued to make their pres-
ence felt in African American literature. Gates’s
use of the monkey figure can be traced back to the
Yoruba myth of the origins of interpretation that
is relevant to the use of Esu as the figure of the
critic and is helpful in explaining the presence of a
monkey in Latin American versions of their primal
myth. The presence of the monkey in Yoruba
myth, repeated with a difference in Cuban ver-
sions, stands as the trace Esu in African American
myth, a trace that enables us to speculate freely on
the functional equivalence of Esu and his African
American descendant, the signifying monkey.
Following in this tradition, Esu’s various char-
acteristics are gleaned from several sources: what
the Yoruba call the Oriki Esu, the narrative praise
poems, or panegyrics, of Esu-Elegbara: the Odu
Ifa, the Ifa divination verses; the lyrics of Esu song;
and the traditional prose narratives in which are
encoded the myths of origin of the universe, of the
gods, and of human beings’ relation to the gods
and their place within the cosmic order. Much
of Esu’s literature concerns the origin, nature, and
the function of interpretation and language
use beyond that of ordinary language. Esu is the
Yoruba figure of the meta-level of formal use, of
the ontological and epistemological status of figu-
rative language and its interpretation. The Ifa
consists of philosophical and ethical teaching texts
of the Yoruba people—Esu acts as the translator.
The importance of the trickster figure to literary
theory can be summarized in three related ways.
Trickster Figure 847
First, the characters function as focal points; the
vernacular or “folk” tradition names the opposi-
tion of its formal literary counterpart. Second,
using a trickster figure enables the creating tradi-
tion to define the role of the figurative, placing
agency within the culture that produced the work
ensuring cultural fidelity. And finally, the trickster
figure confirms the importance indeterminacy of
interpretation; that is, the trickster figure under-
scores the relationship of some common assump-
tions of literary theory. In the Americas, the
trickster figures displayed an early understanding
of the way cleverly manipulated language can dis-
mantle restrictive hierarchy.
In earlier writings, the trickster figure was
referred to as primitive and childlike; however,
now in the light of Afrocentric scholarship, trick-
ster figures are viewed as linkers of cultural trans-
formation, personal history, and social
change—suggesting that the spirit of the trickster
figure is critical to human and social maturation.
V. Nzingha Gaffin
See also Aesthetics; Afrocentricity; Agency; Diaspora;
Language; Mythologies; Narratives; Signification;
Worldview
Further Readings
Baker, H. (1971). Black literature in America: New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Baker, H. (1984). Blues, ideology and Afro-American
literature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gates, H. L., Jr. (1988). The signifying monkey: A theory
of Afro-American literary criticism. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Holloway, K. F. C. (1992). Moorings & metaphors:
Figures of culture and gender in Black women’s
literature. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press.
Hynes, W. J. (1988). Mythical trickster figures.
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
McDermott, G. (1996). Zomo the rabbit: A trickster tale
from West Africa. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace.
Pelton, R. D. (1989). The trickster in West Africa:
A study of mythic irony and sacred delight. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Smitherman, G. (1977). Talkin and testifyin: The
language of Black America. Detroit, MI: Wayne State
University Press.
 U
Uncertainty Avoidance
Cross-cultural investigations based on uncertainty
avoidance enlighten research on identity and its
role in behavior and communication. Geert
Hofstede developed uncertainty avoidance in 1980
as one of four dimensions of national culture on
which people vary in their thinking because of
their different cultural values. Hofstede points out
that uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which
people attempt to avoid experiences that they per-
ceive as unstructured, ambiguous, or unpredict-
able by maintaining strict codes of behavior
through laws and rituals and beliefs in absolute
truths. This is similar to xenophobia.
Different cultures vary in the degree to which
they value uncertainty avoidance and fall on a con-
tinuum between weak and strong uncertainty
avoidance. Weak uncertainty avoidance can be
found in Hong Kong, Sweden, and the United
States, and countries with strong uncertainty
avoidance include Greece, Japan, and Argentina.
The following entry describes the conceptual
framework of strong and weak uncertainty avoid-
ance, controversies and support for this construct,
and the relationship of uncertainty avoidance to
identity and cultural facework communication.
Conceptual Framework
Uncertainty avoidance is an important predictor
for understanding national differences. Studies of
849
cultural dimensions such as uncertainty avoidance
tend to focus on the differences between societies.
Such studies help bring into focus the workings of
the global world. Hofstede describes cultures with
strong uncertainty avoidance as security seeking,
nervous, intolerant, aggressive, and emotionally
expressive.
For example, when a person enters a store in a
strong uncertainty-avoidant culture, the store owner
feels nervous because of being uncertain about
what the person will do. So if, for instance, a cus-
tomer picks up a piece of merchandise and handles
it, the security-seeking owner may feel intolerant of
this person, preferring to stand over the customer
to make sure that nothing unpredictable is done. If
the customer should become bolder and start to try
out a mechanical piece of merchandise, the store
owner may become intolerant and aggressive and
insist that the potential customer put down the
merchandise. The storekeeper may even become
irate and insist that the customer leave the store.
In contrast, people from cultures with weak
uncertainty avoidance are typified by subjective
feelings of well-being, strong achievement motiva-
tion, calmness, and risk taking, and tend to be less
emotional, less aggressive, more relaxed, more
accepting of personal risks, and relatively tolerant.
Consequently, store owners in weak uncertainty-
avoidant cultures do not mind if customers try out
merchandise, handle it, or even break things (they
will call someone to clean up the mess), and may
even not charge people for breaking the merchan-
dise that they handle.
850 Uncertainty Avoidance
Cross-Cultural Controversies
and Conceptual Support
Although a number of research articles employ
Hofstede’s conception of uncertainty avoidance,
there is a shortage of research using uncertainty
avoidance compared with Hofstede’s other cul-
tural dimensions. This could be a result of a con-
troversy that arose when Hofstede and M. H. Bond
revealed a fifth dimension of culture, long-term
orientation (LTO). Specifically, when LTO was
discovered, a debate ensued about whether LTO
had replaced the uncertainty avoidance dimension
in Asian samples. Later, however, Hofstede
affirmed that the uncertainty avoidance dimension
characterizes whether organizations are tightly
controlled (e.g., structured) versus loosely con-
trolled (e.g., open). Support for uncertainty avoid-
ance as a predictor of national differences was also
found regarding such concepts as expectancy viola-
tions and self-assessed fears.
Despite this support, another controversy arose
about whether Hofstede’s overall approach to
studying culture via cultural dimensions should
even be considered altogether. Also, authors of a
study carried out with airline staff found it hard to
interpret uncertainty avoidance results because
they were so highly intercorrelated with Hofstede’s
power distance dimension of culture. A final point
of controversy questions whether one can general-
ize Hofstede’s findings to other contexts at all,
given that his original study used a single IBM
organizational sample. Despite this viewpoint,
however, claims have been made that Hofstede’s
findings are applicable to other contexts such as
the mental health field and the airline industry.
Uncertainty Avoidance and Identity
The underlying anxiety associated with strong
uncertainty avoidance is connected to a person’s
cultural identity or self. A person’s self is reflected
in his or her face. According to Erving Goffman,
face is the public self-image that a person effec-
tively claims for himself or herself. One’s face
expresses the self through interactive facework.
During the process of facework, one’s face resides
in the flow of the events of an encounter. People
from cultures with strong uncertainty avoidance
perform facework nervously seeking security and
could possibly become inappropriately aggressive
or emotionally expressive if they feel a threat to
their faces during interactions. In contrast, during
public encounters, people from weak uncertainty-
avoidant cultures do not feel terribly threatened by
the ambiguity inherent in meeting strangers who
are different from themselves. Actually, the more
distinct people are, the more potentially interesting
they may seem. Thus, face threats are perceived
differently depending on an individual’s level of
uncertainty avoidance.
This difference in perception can be further
explained by understanding B. Aubrey Fisher’s
psychological perspective, which demonstrates
how communication takes place in the individual.
According to the psychological perspective, after a
message is presented, an internal mediational state
that acts as a filter is stimulated in the mind of the
receiver. This filter affects the meaning of the mes-
sage as noise that intervenes between the message
and the receiver. Thus, the psychology of the
receiver is a type of noise or filter that determines,
or colors, what the receiver perceives.
A person’s psychology is affected by his or her
culture, and cultures differ in emotional percep-
tions and the attribution of meaning to a message.
This process becomes relevant when, for whatever
the reason, we try to communicate interculturally
and want to make an impact on a recipient in a
strong uncertainty-avoidant culture. To make an
impression, we need to have the receiver’s atten-
tion. Yet, if our recipients are from cultures with
strong uncertainty avoidance, they receive others’
messages through a filter. First, they must reduce
uncertainty. Only after that can they attend to the
message. If there is too much initial uncertainty
present, they will not be able to focus on our
message at all because they are too concerned
with their perceived face threat and consequent
heightened anxiety during unpredictable meetings.
Hence, strong uncertainty avoidance is implicitly
expressed during intercultural interactions, and
affects facework behaviors because such cultures
have a low tolerance for ambiguity in perceiving
others.
Cultures vary widely in their beliefs about the
nature of uncertainty and what to do when
encountering it. Members of strong uncertainty-

avoidant cultures have a strong need for clarity. In
such cultures, people’s underlying beliefs about
uncertainty lead to measures for escaping from
ambiguity. One way such cultures manage to
reduce situational uncertainty is through the use of
rules or rituals.
Internally, when doubt replaces basic trust in the
way of life of one’s social group or in one’s place in
it, one’s sense of identity can be undermined.
Therefore, one’s social group and its corresponding
communication rituals take on a great importance
to culture members with strong uncertainty avoid-
ance. This is because the violation of social commu-
nication rules could possibly lead to a loss of face.
During an interaction to establish control,
receivers of ambiguous messages also aim to impart
their communication rules. In strong uncertainty-
avoidant cultures, rules or rituals are explicitly
conveyed to the uninitiated to prevent the uniniti-
ated from engaging in unpredictable communica-
tion that might violate their trust.
Clear low-context messages are characterized
by spelling things out and tend to be the expression
of choice by strong uncertainty avoidant culture
members. Helen Mer Lynd points out that there is
a natural tendency to feel a kind of security with lan-
guage where meaning does not alter. Communica­
tion that includes free verbal play with its inevitable
risks of misunderstanding is something to be
feared by people from strong uncer­tainty-avoidant
cultures, but the same encounter for people from
weak uncertainty-avoidant cultures could be seen
as inviting. Strong uncertainty avoidance calls for
a conception and sense of the world that implies
and depends on an exact definition of words
because without this armor of verbal specificity
there is no feeling of security in one’s thinking.
Therefore, along with strong uncertainty avoid-
ance come formal rules for interaction that are in
place to avoid face-threatening uncertainty. These
formal rules often take the form of predictable
ritualistic practices.
In particular, research findings have shown that
strong versus weak uncertainty-avoidant culture
members report using more ritualistic and aggres-
sive facework strategies and fewer harmonious
ones. Numerous cultural implications could ema-
nate from this conceptualization. For example, if
someone from the United States is having a business
Uncertainty Avoidance 851
meeting with someone from Japan, the U.S. citizen
must pay careful attention to Japanese communi-
cation rituals (e.g., the exchange of business
cards). Although rituals may seem trivial to U.S.
citizens (weak uncertainty avoidance), this is not
the case with the Japanese (strong uncertainty
avoidance). To the strong uncertainty-avoidant
Japanese, a violation or mishap relating to the car-
rying out of rituals sets up an internal alarm mes-
sage that causes Japanese people to be guarded to
prevent further mishaps that could possibly cause
a loss of face. Furthermore, after a communica-
tion mishap, there may be a communicative
response from the Japanese of silence and stone-
walling to express their anxiety to the U.S. busi-
ness partner. What’s more, if after the silence, the
U.S. business partners still display no cultural sen-
sitivity to the required rituals of the Japanese busi-
ness partners, the Japanese party could become
aggressive and remove themselves entirely from
the face-threatening situation.
Thus, uncertainty avoidance is an important
predictor for understanding cross-cultural face-
work. As a part of facework, after experiencing a
response to the face presented, individuals deter-
mine whether to amend their strategies or not.
Thus, a person presents his or her face and, based
on the responses received, then negotiates his or
her face further when intermingling with people.
Those who have strong uncertainty-avoidance are
afraid of experiencing a loss of face so they won’t
be caught off guard in front of others. This is true
for those with weak uncertainty avoidance as well,
but to a much less significant extent. Although
there are cross-cultural differences in how much
uncertainty avoidance people experience, a univer-
sal cultural similarity is that all people need to save
face. It is essential to keep this universal need in
mind during intercultural interactions by striving
for clarity and certainty as much as possible if one
wishes to develop global relationships.
Rebecca S. Merkin
See also Face/Facework; Rituals; Values; Xenophobia
Further Readings
Arrindell, W. A., Eisemann, M., Oei, T. P. S., Caballo,
V. E., Sanavio, E., Sica, C., et al. (2004). Phobic
852 Uncertainty Avoidance
anxiety in 11 nations: Part II. Hofstede’s dimensions
of national cultures predict national-level variations.
Personality and Individual Differences, 37, 627–643.
Burgoon, J. (2005). Expectancy violations and interaction
adaptation. In W. B. Gudykunst (Ed.), Theorizing
about intercultural communication (pp. 149–171).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Fisher, B. A. (1978). Perspectives on human
communication. New York: Macmillan.
Goffman, E. (1955). On face-work. Psychiatry, 18,
213–231.
Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction ritual. New York:
Doubleday.
Helmreich, R. L., & Merritt, A. C. (1998). Culture at
work: National, organizational, and professional
influences. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences: Comparing
values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations
across nations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hofstede, G., & Bond, M. H. (1984). Hofstede’s cultural
dimensions: An independent validation using
Rokeach’s value survey. Journal of Cross-Cultural
Psychology, 15, 417–433.
Hoppe, M. H. (1991). A comparative study of country
elites: International differences in work-related values
and learning and their implications for management
training and development. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
Lynd, H. M. (1958). On shame and the search for
identity. New York: Harcourt Brace & World.
McSweeney, B. (2002). Hofstede’s model of national
culture differences and their consequences: A triumph
of faith—a failure of analysis. Human Relations, 55,
89–118.
Merkin, R. S (2006). Uncertainty avoidance and
facework: A test of the Hofstede model. International
Journal of Intercultural Relations, 30(2), 213–228.
Shackleton, V. J., & Ali, A. H. (1990). Work-related
values of managers: A test of the Hofstede model.
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 21,
109–118.
 V
Values
Values are our important and fundamental beliefs
about what we consider to be good or right. As
such, they are necessarily broad and prescriptive
in nature. They are closely related to attitudes that
also have an evaluative component; however, atti-
tudes relate more toward specific objects whereas
our values are broader life-orienting principles.
Being prescriptive in nature, they also relate to our
norms about what one should and should not do.
However, norms are also more context specific.
This entry looks at the relationships between our
values and our social identities. The values we
share with others form part of our social identi-
ties. Our socialization into specific groups and
broader society involves internalizing their associ-
ated values and norms, as part of performing our
various social roles within those social groups and
broader society.
Values associated with social identities can be
distinguished from values associated with personal
identities. Both our social and personal identities
contribute to our self-concept. However, our social
identity derives from membership of our social
groups whereas our personal identity derives from
our unique personal characteristics and traits, as
well as our unique interpersonal relationships. The
relative importance of personal and social identi-
ties varies between social contexts from the per-
spective of social psychology. However, from the
perspective of symbolic interactionism, even per-
sonal identities are ultimately social constructions
853
because they can only be formed within the con-
text of social exchanges and shared meanings.
Nevertheless, this entry focuses on values relating
to social identities derived from social group mem-
berships and broader society.
The first section in this entry examines our val-
ues as derived from our social groups. This section
comes from the perspective of social psychology,
which focuses on how individuals are influenced
by the actual or implied presence of others. The
remaining two sections come from a broader
sociological perspective. The second section exam-
ines our values as they relate to our different social
classes and class cultures in society. The third and
final section takes a more national and interna-
tional perspective by examining how countries
differ on two broad values: (1) traditional values
versus secular-rational values, and (2) survival
values versus self-expression values. This entry
finishes with a short summary.
Values, Social Identities, and Social Groups
Values become linked to social identities because
we internalize the values of social groups to which
we belong. We tend to positively value the attri-
butes of our social groups because we are also
motivated to view ourselves positively and wish to
represent ourselves positively to others. These
social values influence how we evaluate ourselves
and how we evaluate others. Generally, we evalu-
ate ourselves and others within our social group
with a positive bias (i.e., ingroup favoritism and
ethnocentrism), and similarly we tend to evaluate
854 Values
those in other social groups with a negative bias.
In this way, intergroup comparisons (ingroup ver-
sus outgroup) can contribute to our self-esteem,
based on our social group memberships.
As well as the social groups we join voluntarily,
our social identities are also based on our ascribed
social characteristics, such as sex, ethnicity, and
nationality. Social identities relating to our ascribed
characteristics are interesting because our ascribed
characteristics are not chosen; however, we are
nonetheless motivated to value them positively.
This often leads to creative strategies in the social
construction of social identities relating to these
ascribed social characteristics.
For example, Nigel Edley and Margaret
Wetherell in 1997 described a study of male stu-
dents aged 17 to 18 years at a single-sex school.
These male students negotiated the meaning of
being masculine in the context of being students in
a lower-status group because they did not play
rugby. Rather than accepting the less manly and
negative social identity relating to not playing
rugby, these students reconstructed masculinity in
their own discourses so that masculinity was
related more to mental agility and toughness rather
than to physical agility and toughness. They then
attributed more mental agility and toughness to
themselves and so favorably compared themselves
to the dominant rugby group.
Our social comparisons with others tend to be
positively biased because we do not consider both
favorable and unfavorable comparisons in equal
measure. Although we have a need to evaluate
ourselves by comparing ourselves with others
according to social comparison theory, we are also
motivated to make comparisons that enhance our
social identities. This results a range of innovative
cognitive strategies such as selecting favorable
dimensions of comparison, making comparisons
with lower-status groups, and changing the mean-
ing of evaluated characteristics.
These cognitive explanations of how values
relate to social identities are part of the social cog-
nition paradigm within social psychology. Social
psychology usually focuses on individuals in small
group contexts—in particular, how an individual’s
values, attitudes, and behaviors are influenced by
the actual or implied presence of others. Sociology,
however, is more concerned with examining how
we are influenced by larger social structures and
institutions. The rest of this entry focuses on the
larger societal context.
Values, Social Classes,
and Class Culture in Society
Different values and cultures have been associated
with different social stratifications in society that
are themselves hierarchical social orders based on
wealth, status, and power. Stratification research
commonly focuses on social classes (e.g., lower,
middle and upper classes), though other dimen-
sions of inequality also exist such as gender, race,
ethnicity, and age, which are often neglected and
marginalized in stratification research.
Although relationships between social classes
and values do exist, the relationships are not
straightforward in that social classes will share
some values and will vary on others. For example,
Melvin Kohn and colleagues have found that both
working- and middle-class parents value honesty,
consideration, obedience, and dependability in
their children. However, working-class parents
generally placed more importance on obedience
and compliance, and middle-class parents generally
placed more importance on consideration of others
and self-control. These value distinctions have been
found in both U.S. and Italian cultures and are
linked to aspects of the father’s occupation: the
degree to which the father’s work was supervised
or self-directed, and the degree to which the father
worked with things, other people, or ideas.
Even though some values may be more associ-
ated with some classes, there is no clear correspon-
dence between particular class identities and class
cultures. This may be partly because our social
class identity is not always salient or easily identi-
fied. For example, working-class identity is made
more salient under oppressive working conditions
that stimulate values of solidarity and loyalty
toward organizations such as trade unions and
associated political parties, as in the classic study
in 1956 of Yorkshire coal miners by Norman
Dennis, Fernando Henriques, and Clifford
Slaughter called Coal is Our Life.
Such instances are case specific, however, and
often identifying one’s class is frequently not
straightforward. For example, with the increasing
affluence of workers in Western countries, many in
traditionally working-class employment identify

with the middle class; however, they may still have
lower education levels and cultural traits normally
associated with the working class. These affluent
workers may be accommodated within a tradi-
tional Marxian class framework by defining sub-
classes such as lower-middle class (or petty
bourgeois). However, this only accounts for the
economic dimension of class. Pierre Bourdieu, in
his 1984 classic Distinction, enriched the study of
class, culture, and values by introducing another
dimension of discrimination in addition to eco-
nomic capital: the discrimination between social
groups based on different lifestyles and tastes (i.e.,
cultural capital).
Bourdieu explains that social discrimination is
also marked by social symbols of what constitutes
good taste, which can be implicitly and uncon-
sciously acquired through living in one’s particular
social milieu. The objective characteristics of one’s
social milieu he calls “fields” and the subjectivity
experience of living in those fields he calls “habi-
tus.” Our own fields and habitus shape our aes-
thetic experiences, preferences, knowledge, and
tastes. According to Bourdieu, the dominant higher
classes have the power to define the preferences of
lower classes as being of lesser taste, and thus
higher classes tend to have more cultural capital.
Also, there is a natural barrier for the lower classes
in acquiring more cultural capital because the
most authentic way to acquire the sensibilities of
higher classes requires growing up in their field
and habitus.
With the example of affluent “workers,” social
mobility into the middle class is hampered by
lower cultural capital, even if more economic
capital is acquired. Bourdieu argues that acquiring
more cultural capital through education is only
partially effective because such scholastic knowl-
edge is considered lesser than the more authentic
and naturally acquired knowledge gained through
living in and growing up in the higher classes.
Bourdieu’s shows that cultural capital (e.g.,
good taste in manners, music, food and other cul-
tural goods) is largely constructed, that cultural
capital is largely inherited from one’s social milieu,
and that it does not necessarily align with eco-
nomic capital when determining one’s class iden-
tity. However, Bourdieu’s work has some
limitations. Any innate aesthetic sensibilities are
downplayed. More importantly, Bourdieu does not
Values 855
explain how higher classes dominate what is con-
sidered good or bad taste, and he does not address
how what is considered good or bad taste changes
over time.
Values, National Identity,
and International Comparisons
At a national and international level, Ronald
Inglehart and his colleagues have identified two
main value dimensions from the World Values
Survey (an international study of values in contem-
porary societies) along which all countries can be
measured: (1) traditional values versus secular-
rational values and (2) survival values versus self-
expression values. On the first dimension, traditional
values are associated with religious beliefs, nation-
alistic pride, and conformity among other things,
whereas secular-rational values are associated with
less conservative values toward issues such as
divorce, euthanasia, and international collabora-
tion. On the second dimension, survival values are
concerned with gaining income, material, job, and
economic security and self-expression values give
more importance to issues such as the environment,
friends, leisure, imagination, and free choice.
Using 18 years of data from the World Values
Survey, Inglehart and Wayne Baker in 2000 pub-
lished evidence supporting their thesis that national
values change as countries develop economically,
which is also reflected in generational changes in
values. They theorized that as countries move from
agrarian-based to industrial-based economies,
national values on the first dimension change from
more traditional values to more secular-rational
values. This occurs with a declining dependence on
the vicissitudes of nature and increasing human
control over physical environments. Also, national
values on the second dimension change from more
survival values to more self-expression values as
countries move from industrial-based economies to
postindustrial economies with higher levels of
employment in the professional and services sec-
tors. This theory is actually a sociological extension
by Inglehart of Abraham Maslow’s theory describ-
ing a hierarchy of needs at the individual level.
Inglehart argues that in postindustrial economies,
younger generations generally grow up in affluent
circumstances and so national values shift from
concerns about survival and security to concerns
856 Velvet Mafia
about self-expression and quality-of-life issues.
Thus, the move from industrialized to postindus-
trialized countries is generally associated with a
shift from materialist to postmaterialist values.
However, the strength of any generational shifts in
values may also depend on political factors such as
presence and ability of minor parties and social
movements to legitimize postmaterial values.
There are differences between individuals within
the same country in their values on these two
dimensions. For example, in the study by Inglehart
and Baker in 2000, different values were associated
with different religions within countries. Nonethe­
less, the value differences between religions within
countries were less than the value differences
between religions across countries. This suggests
that societal institutions and economic development
are more important than are religious institutions in
promulgating values on these two dimensions.
Countries often share religious and cultural his-
tories, and these countries tend to cluster together
on the two value dimensions (see the Inglehart-
Welzel Cultural Map of the World on the World
Values Web site). However, these clusters are fairly
loose, and two countries with different religious
and cultural histories could have similar values on
these two dimensions (e.g., Poland and India).
Thus, countries with otherwise distinct national
identities can share similar national values on these
two broad dimensions (i.e., traditional/secular-
rational values and survival/self-expression values).
In summary, our social identities are socially
constructed and our associated values are derived
from the social groups and societies to which we
belong. These social identities and values influence
how we see ourselves and others, often in biased
ways. They influence how we evaluate ourselves
and others, what we consider is good and bad
taste, and our concerns with economic security
and self-expression. We are often unaware of these
social influences.
Rod McCrea
See also Class; Society and Social Identity
Further Readings
Berger, B. M. (1986). Taste and domination. Review of
Distinction: A social critique of the judgment of taste
(Pierre Bourdieu). American Journal of Sociology,
91(6), 1445–1453.
Devine, F., & Savage, M. (2005). The cultural turn,
sociology and class analysis. In F. Devine, M. Savage,
J. Scott, & R. Crompton (Eds.), Rethinking class:
Culture, identities & lifestyle. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Edley, N., & Wetherell, M. (1997). Jockeying for
position: The construction of masculine identities.
Discourse & Society, 8(2), 203–217.
Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization,
cultural change, and the persistence of traditional
values. American Sociological Review, 65(1), 19–51.
Pearlin, L. I., & Kohn, M. L. (1966). Social class,
occupation, and parental values: A cross-national
study. American Sociological Review, 31(4), 466–479.
Vaughan, G. M., & Hogg, M. A. (2008). Introduction to
social psychology (5th ed.). Frenchs Forest, New
South Wales, UK: Pearson Education.
World Values Survey: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org
Velvet Mafia
The Velvet Mafia, or Gay Mafia, is an imprecise
term that refers to either a secret cadre of power-
ful gay elites believed to control the fashion and
entertainment industries or the amorphous collec-
tion of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) rights and advocacy groups that work to
repeal discriminatory laws and change social atti-
tudes toward LGBT people. No one claims to be
a member of the social group Velvet Mafia or Gay
Mafia; rather, the Velvet Mafia or Gay Mafia is
largely a pejorative category invoked by people
who have an anti-gay bias.
This aim of this entry is threefold: First, it out-
lines two key assumptions on which the concept of
a Velvet or Gay Mafia rests. Second, it discusses
the historical, social, and cultural conditions from
which the term Velvet Mafia emerged. Third, the
term’s circulation and political relevance within
the wider culture is tracked.
One cannot engage in a discussion of sex or
gender nonconformity in Western culture without
engaging with a wider debate about the etiology
of LGBT identities, whether these identities are
inborn or acquired. The search for the cause of
homosexuality has dominated scholarly writing in

the West since the coinage of the term in the early
19th century. Alongside this tendency is the
notion that homosexuals have unique intrinsic
aesthetic or artistic sensibilities, codified in the
early writings of sexology and psychiatry in the
19th century. An in-depth recounting of this his-
tory is beyond the scope of this entry, so the
reader is referred to Camille Paglia’s recent reit-
eration of this long-standing cultural trope. Paglia
argues that gay men are born with an artistic
gene, which is the root cause of homosexuality.
Within this logic, gay men would be both predis-
posed to aesthetic competency and, with this
genetic advantage, dominate the field of aesthetic
production.
Sometime in the 1990s, Gay Mafia replaced
Velvet Mafia as a term of choice, but neither term
is taken seriously in reputable scholarship, though
it continues to have currency in the popular arena.
The concept of a Gay Mafia is commonly mocked
within LGBT circles, and at least one comedy
troupe has adopted it as its stage name. A widely
circulated quip begins by announcing the Gay
Mafia broke into a home the previous evening.
The punch line is that the Gay Mafia did not steal
anything, but they had redecorated. This joke suc-
cessfully exploits the contradictions in the term,
juxtaposing the audience’s conception of the
“Mafia” and its implied violent behavior with
common stereotypes of gay men who are often
believed to be overly concerned with aesthetics and
interests culturally defined as “feminine” and
nonthreatening.
The term Velvet Mafia was coined by journalist
and author Steven Gaines in a New York Daily
News article in the 1970s, in reference to influen-
tial captains of the entertainment and fashion
industries. This coincided with a more visible gay
presence in U.S. cities, the result of the emergence
of gay rights movement. Gaines also deployed the
moniker in a thinly disguised novel called The
Club about the infamous Studio 54 and the influ-
ential gay powerbrokers who routinely patronized
that establishment. This “mafia” was more or less
rumored to include fashion magnates, media
moguls, artists, and playwrights.
At this time, U.S. culture in general was strug-
gling to come to terms with a newly emerging vis-
ible LGBT subculture that historians argue took
root in its cities after World War II. The massive
Velvet Mafia 857
mobilization and urbanization that occurred after
the war laid the groundwork for the formation of
gay neighborhoods. Some soldiers coming home
from the war who had discovered their homosex-
ual orientation opted not to return to the farm and
preferred the anonymity and freedom that the cit-
ies offered, where they might live their lives free of
familial interference. Although a gay subculture
existed in U.S. coastal cities such as New York and
San Francisco, after the war, most of the gay
establishments were owned by the established
“Mafia,” or organized crime syndicates. Many
such establishments, though illegal, remained open
through bribes paid to the police. The Stonewall
Inn (the gay bar where the infamous Stonewall
riots took place, which is commemorated every
year as the start of the modern gay movement) was
actually a Mafia-owned bar. The rise of the gay
liberation movement led to the emergence of busi-
nesses that catered to a gay clientele. Thus, “gay”
sections of cities formed, much like ethnic and
racial neighborhoods. Furthermore, LGBT politi-
cal organizing also borrowed from the successes of
the civil rights movement, and adopted a racial or
ethnic model for political organizing. Within this
model, homosexuality is an inborn, essential iden-
tity, much like conventional ideas of race and
ethnicity.
The Velvet Mafia, in Gaines’s conception, was
probably intended in a camp, ironic way, and not
meant to describe a dangerous threatening mob;
it was an attempt to understand and describe
emerging visible gay populations. Within this
logic, the Velvet Mafia organized around sexual
orientation, whereas crime syndicates organized
around ethnic and racial identity. The increased
visibility of ethnic/racial crime syndicates in
popular culture (for example, The Godfather tril-
ogy of films) coincided with increased LGBT vis-
ibility. The shift from Velvet to Gay Mafia has
implications, however. In dropping velvet and its
juxtaposition with Mafia, the ironic or tongue-
in-cheek elements of the term were lost. The
trope of the Gay Mafia deployed later by those
opposed to the LGBT movement served to dele-
gitimize LGBT advocacy organizations and their
efforts. Standard tactics employed by social
activists such as lobbying, protests, and product
boycotts become reconfigured as “mafia tactics”
construed as intimidating and threatening.
858 Velvet Mafia
The tactic of “outing”—the process of reveal-
ing one’s privately held gay status—figures prom-
inently in any discussion then of a Gay Mafia,
whether one’s usage of Gay Mafia references
political action groups or connotes a secret cadre
of elites believed to control media and politics.
Employment discrimination has always been an
issue for sexual minorities, much as for ethnic and
racial minorities. Soldiers can still be discharged
from the military (in the United States) if their
homosexual identity is discovered. Homosexuals
have been the target of such Mafia tactics as
extortion and blackmail since the 19th century,
where they were threatened with having their
secret sexual orientation revealed. Gay people
themselves first used the tactic in the late 1980s.
The emergence of the HIV/AIDS pandemic raised
the stakes, and secretly gay politicians who either
did nothing to help gay causes or, at worst, voted
against bills that would assist people living with
HIV, had become unacceptable. With the new
pandemic, these issues were far from trivial but,
rather, matters of life and death. Gay activists
were no longer willing to keep closeted politi-
cians’ homosexuality a secret when they sup-
ported anti-gay causes. Critics of outing sometimes
referred to gay activists who engaged in the prac-
tice as a “Gay Mafia.” Thus, the term Gay Mafia
shifted from describing a group of influential but
closeted gay men to LGBT journalists and activ-
ists who would expose closeted politicians for
their hypocrisy.
The practice of outing is also relevant because a
major component of the concept of the Gay Mafia
is that powerful elites control media and politics.
Yet these individuals were actually the targets of
outing precisely for promoting anti-gay agendas in
both the political arena and in the popular media
by circulating insulting and demeaning stereotypes
of LGBT people.
Recent same-sex sex scandals involving
Congressman Mark Foley (R-FL) and Congressman
Jim Kolbe (R-AZ) and teenage congressional
pages, as well as Senator Larry Craig’s (R-ID) con-
viction for soliciting an undercover police officer
for sex in a Minneapolis airport bathroom led
some television news commentators to speculate
that there might be a Republican “Gay Mafia” in
national politics. In 2006, the New York Times
ran a front-page article exposing this Republican
“Velvet Mafia,” (their term) and noting the “pres-
ence of homosexuals, particularly gay men, in
crucial staff positions has been an enduring if
largely hidden staple of Republican life for decades,
and particularly in recent years.” Highlighting
their alleged power and influence, the Times noted
that gay Republicans “have played decisive roles
in passing legislation, running campaigns and
advancing careers.”
However, congressional leaders, specifically
Kolbe, Foley, and Craig, did not support gay-
affirmative legislation; voted against hate crimes
legislation aimed at ensuring that crimes against
sexual minorities received fair sentencing; voted
against the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA) that would make it illegal to discriminate
in employment on the basis of sexual orientation;
opposed efforts for civil unions for same-sex
couples; and supported legislation such as the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that defined
marriage as a union between a man and a woman
and did not require other states to legally recog-
nize same-sex marriages, even if they were recog-
nized legally in the states they were performed.
Thus, little evidence suggests that collectives of
hidden gays conspired to promote any unified
“gay” agenda, and much evidence suggests the
opposite.
The notion of a Gay Mafia still circulates within
the political realm and news, but is also salient and
perhaps more elaborated within the realm of “real-
ity” television. Reality television consists of sup-
posedly unscripted dramatic situations, or
documented actual events, that usually feature
ordinary people rather than professional actors.
The implicit assumptions that underlie the notion
of a Gay Mafia are the accepted taken-for-granted
working assumption of reality television program-
ming staples like Queer Eye for the Straight Guy
(Bravo Network) and Project Runway (Bravo/
Lifetime). Within these shows, homosexuality is
normalized and features openly gay people in their
presumed “natural habitat,” in fashion and aes-
thetics. Queer Eye features five openly gay men
tasked with providing a makeover for an aestheti-
cally challenged “straight” (heterosexual) presum-
ably in an effort to woo a female love interest.
Each of the gay men, or “fab five,” are responsible
for increasing the straight man’s cultural capital,
by redecorating his living space, instructing him on

appropriate dress, updating his coiffure and insti-
tuting “proper” grooming regimens, expanding his
epicurean boundaries, and assisting him in acquir-
ing upscale aesthetic tastes. The fab five stand in
judgment as the arbiters of “taste.”
In Project Runway, contestants (some of whom
are openly gay) compete to win the top honors as
a fashion designer. The premise of such shows is
the assumption that being victorious in the series
will secure for the lucky winner entrance into the
fashion industry and a prominent, coveted place
within it. Openly gay fashion guru Tim Gunn
functions as a gatekeeper to this world, making
decisions about what is good and what is bad, who
in allowed in, and who is cast out.
These programs take for granted that gay men
are imbued with an aesthetic sensibility intrinsic to
their sexual orientation: a “queer eye” presumably
inaccessible to heterosexual man. When examined
critically, the supposed prominence of gay men
within the world of aesthetic production, if it has
any resonance with reality, arose out of more com-
plex historical, cultural, and social formations
than biological markers. Although the term Gay
Mafia may also embody some “positive stereo-
types” for gay men—for example, that gay men
are artistically talented or aesthetically gifted—like
all stereotypes, it is a double-edged sword.
Although the term Velvet Mafia could imply that
gays are gifted in aesthetics production, the
homophobic other side is that gays control fash-
ion, and entertainment seems to be inextricably
embedded in the term.
Stephen Hocker
See also Aesthetics; Identity Politics; Self; Sexual
Minorities; Social Movements
Further Readings
Becker, H. (1982). Art worlds. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
D’Emillio, J., & Freedman, E. (1988). Intimate matters:
A history of sexuality in America. New York: Harper
& Row.
Gross, L. (1993). Contested closets: The politics and
ethics of outing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.
Leibovich, M. (2006, October 8). Foley case upsets tough
balance of Capitol Hill’s gay Republicans. New York
Visual Culture 859
Times. Retrieved December 26, 2009, from http://www
.nytimes.com/2006/10/08/washington/08culture.html
Marotta, T. (1981). The politics of homosexuality.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Murphy, P., & Stout D. (2007, August 8). Idaho senator
says he regrets guilty plea in restroom incident. New
York Times. Available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2007/08/29/washington/29craig.html?_
r=2&oref=slogin
Paglia, C. (1994). Vamps and tramps: New essays. New
York: Random House.
Popkin, J., & Roston A., & NBC News Investigative
Unit. (2006, October 13). Feds probe trip that Kolbe
made with pages. NBC Nightly News, msnbc.com.
Retrieved December 26, 2009, from http://www
.msnbc.msn.com/id/15249733
Russo, V. (1987). The celluloid closet: Homosexuality in
the movies. New York: Harper & Row.
Sender, K. (2004). Business, not politics: The making of
the gay market. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Top Gunn. (n.d.). Entertainment Weekly. Retrieved
December 26, 2009, from http://www.ew.com/ew/
article/0,,1217353_2,00.html
Zernike, K., & Goodnough, A. (2006, September 30).
Lawmaker quits over messages sent to teenage pages.
New York Times. Retrieved December 26, 2009, from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980CE
4DA1730F933A0575AC0A9609C8B63
Visual Culture
For many people around the globe, life in contem-
porary times is mediated through the swirl of
visual imagery. Television, film, the Internet, med-
ical imaging devices, cell phone cameras, satellites,
newspapers and magazines, and a host of other
multimedia devices enhance our sight, represent
ideas, and help human beings see and be seen.
Attempting to understand this cultural condition,
its material and symbolic manifestations, and the
effect on our individual and collective identities is
the project of visual culture. As a hybrid enterprise
recently formed through the convergence of a vari-
ety of theories and methodologies, visual culture
examines relationships between individuals, societ-
ies, and images. Visual culture is the characteriza-
tion and examination of meaning making through
the visual—how we see, what we see, what we
860 Visual Culture
can’t see, what we are not allowed to see, and so
on—beyond traditional disciplinary boundaries.
Beginning in the early 1990s, scholarly texts,
professional journals, new course and program
descriptions, and conference proceedings specifi-
cally focusing on the concept of visual culture
began to flourish across disciplines. These disci-
plines included art education, art history, cultural
studies, English, and media studies. There are three
interrelated definitions of visual culture woven
through the literature emerging from these areas.
The definitions suggest that visual culture is (1) a
cultural condition in which human experience is
profoundly affected by images, new technologies
for looking, and various practices of seeing, show-
ing, and picturing; (2) an inclusive set of images,
objects, and apparatuses; or (3) a critical field of
study that examines and interprets differing visual
manifestations and experiences in culture. The
three definitions often overlap, converge, and
inform one another. In some cases, scholars use the
term visual culture to mean all of the definitions
simultaneously. The potential source of confusion
notwithstanding, all three definitions of visual cul-
ture deal largely with the process and pressures of
constructing individual and collective identity.
Visual Culture as a Cultural Condition
The term visual culture can connote a shift or turn
in society where the increase in production and
consumption of imagery in concert with techno-
logical and economic developments has profoundly
changed the world and the context in which aware-
ness of that world and one’s identity in it is rooted.
Visual culture is thus defined as a shift in reality
and a present-day condition where images play a
central role in the creation of knowledge and the
construction of identity. Although one could argue
that the “visual” has always mediated an under-
standing of identity, experience in much of the
world today is deeply affected by an abundance of
visual imagery in a variety of global contexts, in a
different respect than the past. For example, images
flow across borders to convey information, offer
pleasure, and initiate and reinforce values and
beliefs. These circulating signs affect the formation
of individual identities and inter-individual power
relations in ways unimaginable for many even a
few decades ago.
The relationship between humans and their
experience in visual culture is engendered by what
some describe as an endless placement and dis-
placement of meanings through the proliferation of
imagery, as well as the negotiation of social rela-
tionships through images and the process of imag-
ining. Like the postmodern condition, identity in
visual culture depends largely on images and the
tendency to visualize ourselves and others as pic-
tures in our imagination. On the one hand, these
pictures come together in our minds with purpose
and direction. On the other hand, we uncon-
sciously learn to look and practice interpreting
meanings of images around us on a daily basis.
For many human beings around the globe,
visual culture is how the feeling of life in contem-
porary times is toned, colored, and textured. The
increased visual stimuli in the mediated through
constructed instruments help forge identities. These
identities include notions of ethnicity, race, nation-
ality, sexuality, friendship, family life, indepen-
dence, and citizenship. In this new cultural
condition, visual representations and their mediat-
ing resources do more than “represent” a world
already out there; they shape and limit visions of
the world and are constitutive of identity itself.
Visual Culture as Stuff
When the term visual culture is used to describe a
cultural condition, it often emphasizes the identities
that are constructed through culture. Although
images cannot be easily separated from the values
and beliefs they imbue, another definition of visual
culture focuses on the substantial things of culture—
the “stuff.” Scholars who use the term visual cul-
ture to describe the substance of culture offer
examples of images, objects, sites, and instruments.
This register of stuff includes, for instance, adver-
tisements, architecture, artworks, automobiles,
computer games, fashion, films, graffiti, Internet
sites, landscape design, malls, magazines, medical
images, newspapers, packaging, performances,
photography, popular images, satellite images, sci-
entific illustrations, simulation rides, tattoos, tele-
vision programs, textiles, toys, and videos. Although
some of the things mentioned in the attempts to
catalog visual culture’s constituent parts include
fine or high art, most of them come from outside
of the art world—outside the museum realm.

When describing visual culture as stuff, scholars
also refer to new technologies designed to enhance
biological vision. In recent years, for example,
apparatuses for monitoring and tracking individu-
als, such as surveillance cameras, global position-
ing systems, spy-cams, thermal imaging devices,
and biometric machines have become visual objects
of interest. These things are of particular interest to
scholars writing about identity in a time of global
“permanent war.” Some theorists, however, focus
less on technology and more on “natural” objects
and scenery. Examples of these things include land-
scapes, geographic conditions, outer space, and
animals. Although these forms may seem to fall
outside things that are culturally mediated, they
are in most cases encountered by individuals who
have been affected consciously and unconsciously
by previous representations of nature and the
entire history of imaging nature in a particular
society. All natural objects and sites are part of
visual culture when people bring cultural knowl-
edge to bear on their experience with them.
None of the substantial parts of visual culture
are exclusively visual. Applying the term visual
culture to a thing does not exclude the multimedia
aspects of that thing. Using the term visual culture
to describe a particular image, for example, does
not negate the fact that images appear in a variety
of contexts and are viewed in different situations.
These specific contexts and situations—whether
watching television, playing a video game, leafing
through a magazine, or standing in a museum—
affect the available senses to one degree or another.
Although one representational register may be
more acute than another, usually we cannot vol-
untarily immobilize all other senses and view an
image in complete optical isolation. Therefore,
our experience with visual culture, similar to our
identity in general, is also always situated and
incomplete. For most scholars of visual culture,
however, the content for study is not simply
“things.” The experience of human subjects inter-
acting with the substantial parts of visual culture
is of primary concern to visual culture when
defined as a field of study.
Visual Culture as a Field of Study
Besides referring to a cultural condition or suggest-
ing a range of images and objects, visual culture
Visual Culture 861
can be defined as a field of study. As a critical set
of projects, visual culture attempts to interpret the
wealth of visual (multi-mediated) experiences in
culture and the visual practices of a culture—the
interactions between viewers and what is being
viewed. Some theorists prefer to use the term
visual culture to refer to a field of study, but other
scholars prefer to deploy the term visual culture
studies or visual studies. For those who prefer to
use visual culture to connote the project, the term
is usually employed as a field of study not
abstracted from its substantial content (stuff) and
historical presence (cultural condition). For others,
the attempt to extricate formations of the visual
from the cultural is mainly based on the belief that
the term visual culture is a potential source of con-
fusion. Either way, whether one uses the term
visual culture, visual cultural studies, or visual
studies, there seems to be no categorical forma-
tions or fixed components of the field. However,
two general themes seem to cut across most schol-
arly writing around the subject of inquiry and
methodological process. One is the contextualizing
of visuality in everyday life and the other is the
notion of transdisciplinarity.
Contextualizing of Visuality in Everyday Life
For many scholars interested in visual culture, the
subject of inquiry and methodology for their proj-
ect is often determined around issues that stem
from the conditions of everyday life. The concept
of everyday life is important because meanings and
identities are created and contested through the
seemingly endless array of visual images we encoun-
ter on a daily basis. The questions involved in the
study of visual culture may be determined by the
circumstances created by this proliferation of visual
representations that function within public and
private spaces everyday. When the inquiry turns to
specific forms of visual culture, such as artwork or
film for example, understanding the context of
production and reception is vital. Context includes
the cultural purposes of the development, produc-
tion, distribution, and regulation of images. Context
also includes the sociopolitical, economic, environ-
mental, and historical conditions around the pro-
duction and reception of images.
Although many scholars of visual culture often
refuse to adopt a predetermined methodology,
862 Visual Culture
there are central questions around visuality that
seem to be common across disciplines. For instance,
these questions may revolve around how identities
have been fashioned through the visual in the past
and how they are being refashioned in present.
Other questions may deal with the politics of
identity as constituted through social categories of
seeing, spectatorship, gazing, and glancing. In
addition, there may be questions of what it means
to be looked at, seen, not seen, or made invisible.
In this sense, the project may focus on who is
privileged as producers of images and as consum-
ers of images, what aspects of history circulate as
visual representations, and who is empowered and
who is subjugated through visuality. Here, visual-
ity refers to the socially constructed character of
vision, and the politics and ideology of specific
visualizing practices that may serve the needs of
particular identities.
Other inquires in the field of visual culture
revolve around the concept of vision as a totality,
the ubiquity of vision in a particular era, or how
images play a central role in representing certain
parts of the world. Additional questions may focus
on differences and similarities between so-called
high and low culture, or between fine art and ver-
nacular images. Although these questions and
issues can be understood as part of a larger rubric
of inquiry, as stated earlier, the methodologies to
engage these issues are usually quite fluid.
Visual culture’s methodological fluidity is con-
nected to and depends on its ability to destabilize
traditional notions of disciplinarity—the legitimate
knowledge base of a discipline. Therefore, visual
culture is transdisciplinary by crossing and chal-
lenging disciplinary boundaries to provide a useful
set of provisional theoretical collaborations.
Transdisciplinarity can be understood as a glean-
ing of knowledge and practice from a myriad of
disciplines while pushing against and permeating
the rigid boundaries of those disciplines. Visual
culture as a transdisciplinary field of study does
not negate disciplinary areas of inquiry—it merely
refuses to remain confined to restricted parameters
defined by experts in a given field.
The following disciplines and areas of study are
usually implicated in the field of visual culture:
anthropology, archaeology, architectural theory,
art criticism, art education, art history, Black stud-
ies, critical theory, cultural studies, design, feminist
studies, film studies, linguistics, literary criticism,
Marxism, media studies, philosophy, postcolonial
studies, poststructuralism, psychoanalytic theory,
queer theory, semiotics, and sociology. Scholars
interested in visual culture work in these fields and
appropriate ideas from them. They reject doctrinal
disciplinary foundations and patch together what-
ever works for the study of visual culture.
Conclusion
Visual culture is used to describe a social and cul-
tural condition (historically and contemporane-
ously) where visuality and visualizing practices
have a profound effect on individual and collective
identities. Visual culture is also a way of referring
to the images, objects, and instruments tangled up
in the complex process of understanding what it
means to see and be seen, and to picture something
or someone—including ourselves. In addition,
visual culture is a transdisciplinary field of study
that attempts to recognize, theorize, and interpret,
in all of their contextual richness, the interactions
between subjects and objects, and viewers and
what is being viewed.
Kevin Tavin
See also Gaze; Scopophilia; Simulacra; Spectacle and the
Self; Visuality
Further Readings
Barnard, M. (1998). Art, design, and visual culture.
New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Darley, A. (2000). Visual digital culture: Surface play and
the spectacle in new media genres. New York:
Routledge.
Elkins, J. (2003). Visual studies: A skeptical introduction.
New York: Routledge.
Mirzoeff, N. (Ed.). (1998). The visual culture reader.
New York: Routledge.
Mitchell, W. J. T. (2002). Seeing showing: A critique of
visual culture. Journal of Visual Culture, 1(2),
165–181.
Sturken, M., & Cartwright, L. (2001). Practices of
looking: An introduction to visual culture. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press.
Walker, J., & Chaplin, S. (1997). Visual culture: An
introduction. Manchester, UK: Manchester University
Press.

Visuality
Visuality refers to the intersection of text and
image, or more precisely, the relationship between
the verbal and the visual within a social and ideo-
logical context. W. J. T. Mitchell, professor of
English and art history at the University of Chicago
and editor of the interdisciplinary journal Critical
Inquiry since 1978, is strongly associated with
visuality, its relation to cultural and social identity,
and the emergent field of visual studies (or visual
culture). His book Picture Theory (and other sub-
sequent works) has been significant in establishing
visual culture (a term often associated with, and
perhaps analogous to, postmodernism) as a field
of critical inquiry in the humanities. Because of his
work, and the work of others of like mind, this
field now has a recognizable institutional profile,
with a number of associated journals and univer-
sity programs functioning internationally. This
entry provides an overview of the concept of visu-
ality and the discipline of visual studies.
In Picture Theory, Mitchell proposes that a
verbal image is a picture in logical space. This is a
proposition that he explores over a wide range of
visual material, including an analysis of Michel
Foucault’s significant 1968 essay on the relation-
ship between words and image, “Ceci n’est pas
une pipe” [“This is not a pipe”]. The essay consid-
ers the complexities of the appearance of words
(language) in René Magritte’s 1929 image Les
trahison des images. Foucault’s text can be inter-
preted as challenging the self-understanding and
the social positioning of the autonomous and uni-
fied self in modern society. The picture, Foucault’s
text, and by association poststructural visual
criticism, are interpreted as an attempt to destabi-
lizes self-identity (the stable Cartesian self) and
dominant ideology by exploring the complex and
circuitous transaction between the picture, the
text, and the observer. Mitchell explores this com-
plex relationship, here and throughout his writ-
ing, as he attempts to expand the field of what
constitutes visuality.
In 1995, Mitchell was invited to present his
intellectual perspective in the journal Art Bulletin,
the long-established, and some might say, the con-
servative voice of the College Art Association of
America. An association that had already awarded
Visuality 863
Picture Theory, the Morey Prize for a book of spe-
cial distinction; further, in 1996 in a special issue
(No. 77), the poststructuralist writers associated
with the journal October (Rosalind Krauss, Yve-
Alain Bois, Hal Foster, Annette Michelson, and
Benjamin Buchloh) initiate a discussion that brings
to the surface the crucial tensions between the dis-
cipline of art history and the emerging discipline of
visual culture. These writers suggest that visual
culture avoids dealing with the aesthetic specificity
of works of art, concentrating instead on images
that are mediated by mass culture and, therefore,
open to the processes of commodification and
reification. This is a challenge to visual studies’
integrity that Mitchell responds to by proposing a
cluster of arguments and neologisms.
Mitchell suggests that Western culture has con-
sistently privileged the spoken word as the highest
form of intellectual pursuit, and seen visual repre-
sentations as mere “illustrations” of ideas.
According to Mitchell, visual culture as a subject
of study contests this hegemony, developing what
he calls picture theory. In Mitchell’s view, Western
philosophy and science now use the pictorial,
rather than the textual, for making models of the
world. This marks a significant shift in under-
standing and presents a challenge to the notion of
the world conceptualized as a written text. A posi-
tion that has dominated contemporary intellectual
discussion in the wake of the linguistic-based
movements: structuralism and poststructuralism
(Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Roland Barthes,
Michel Foucault, Rosalind Krauss, and others).
In exploring the conditions that enable the life
of images, Mitchell attributes a crucial role to their
“medium,” which he understands as an expanded
field of study, as a “habitat” or “ecosystem,” in
which images circulate. By doing this, Mitchell
questions the received notion of medium specific-
ity. Emphasis on medium specificity as an internal
and constitutive characteristic of modernism ful-
fills the Greenbergian stipulation that “purity” in
art consists in the acceptance of the limitations of
the medium of the specific art. For Mitchell, the
notion of the medium is much more than a mate-
rial or limitation that is specific to a particular art
form. According to Mitchell, the medium now
includes the entire range of practices that make an
image possible in the world. This represents a
much wider notion of the visual as a social field.
864 Visualizing Desire
This is one of Mitchell’s most important contribu-
tions to the emerging field of visual studies.
Those writers who promote visual studies
against traditional forms of art history, a model of
inquiry that concentrates, for example, on devel-
opments in medium and style, would do so by
saying that the material groundings and fixed
notions of quality or historical and aesthetic speci-
ficity so important to that discipline have never
been lost; they have, in the postmodern period,
simply migrated from one system to another: that
is, visual studies. Those defending this emerging
phenomenon in the humanities would argue that
the “history” now involved is that of the viewing
subject (the previously silenced voice of the
beholder that simply received the images pre-
sented). It might be suggested that such a new
discipline is not organized around its “objects” of
study, rather, the theories and methodologies by
which it considers those objects.
In the 2002 article “Showing, Seeing: A Critique
of Visual Studies,” Mitchell charts the expanding
territory of visual studies, and its character as dan-
gerous supplement, as well as the possible ramifi-
cations of its de-disciplinary effect. According to
Mitchell, visual studies stands in an ambiguous
relation to art history and aesthetics. It functions as
an internal complement to traditional fields of art
historical study and is a way of “filling in a gap”
between the disciplines. If art history is about
visual images, and aesthetics about the senses, then
it can be proposed that a subdiscipline might
evolve that concentrates on the notion of visuality
as such. Mitchell suggests that this discipline would
link, or integrate, the field of aesthetics and art his-
tory around the conceptual problems of the visual
experience. For example, issues concerning light,
visual apparatuses of various kinds (for example,
the camera and the mirrors), optics in general
(microscopic and macroscopic), and optical experi-
ences, the eye, notions of the scopic drive, and so
on. As noted, Mitchell tells us that the problematic
issue arises when this supportive or complemen-
tary function of visual studies threatens to become
what Derrida calls supplementary (the supplement
transfigures what has been previously interpreted
as a site of wholeness and authenticity). In this
aspect, visual studies might be understood as
threatening the internal coherence of aesthetics and
art history because these disciplines have somehow
failed to pay attention to consider the most central
material in their own domain.
Mitchell is reflecting a position adopted by many
contemporary writers and critics who deal with an
expanded field of culture and visuality, for exam-
ple, Kobena Mercer, Richard Dyer, Simon Watney,
Isaac Julien, John Grayson, Judith Baine, Teresa de
Lauretis, Tom Waugh, Cindy Patton, Richard
Fung, and Stuart Marshall. One might suggest that
these writers feel that cultural and social identity,
which include sexual and race identities, has not
been sufficiently theorized or understood by the
academic world. Within contemporaneous social
determinates, their writing, along with Mitchell’s,
attempts to coordinate issues and practices con-
cerning the exercise of power, ideology, the aes-
thetic marginality of race and gender, and
psychological self-division (homosexuality and
lesbianism) in relation to contemporary philoso-
phies of consciousness and selfhood. Others would
warn that such interpretations might lead to a
type of fetishism that focuses too much on differ-
ence and not enough on human commonality and
solidarity.
Peter Muir
See also Society of the Spectacle; Visual Culture
Further Readings
Mitchell, W. J. T. (1986). Iconology: Image, text,
ideology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mitchell, W. J. T. (1994). Picture theory: Essays on
verbal and visual representation. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Mitchell, W. J. T. (2005). What do pictures want? The
lives and loves of images. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Visualizing Desire
Vision plays a key role when one thinks of desire.
Although vision in and of itself is a synesthetic
activity involving the interrelations of all the senses,
it is the primary sense when we think of the way
desire, unconscious desire in this case, is mobilized.
Desire, as conceptualized within psychoanalysis, is

central to the construction of identity. Desire is
sex/gendered when looking, and hence, the dis-
course of psychoanalysis has attempted to expose
its difficulty, given that the desire of the subject
who looks is not confined to biological sex alone.
To illustrate visualizing desire, this entry first turns
to Jacques Lacan and then to the discussions of
desire that surround the art of French painter
René Magritte as interpreted by several feminist
critics.
Lacan develops the notion of unconscious visual
desire in his seminar, The Four Fundamental
Concepts of Psychoanalysis. In his lecture, “What
Is a Picture?” he recounts the story told by Pliny to
demonstrate the generation of desire when look-
ing. It seems that one day, Zeuxis and Parrhasius
were having a painting contest to determine who
could best paint nature in all its verisimilitude.
Zeuxis went away and painted grapes that were so
lifelike that birds came and began to peck at them.
Overjoyed, he thought that he had won the
mimetic prize. Parrhasius, on the other hand,
painted a picture of a curtain. Zeuxis came over to
see what Parrhasius had painted behind the cur-
tain. When he tried to pull it away, he realized that
he been fooled. But it was not the quality of the
curtain (in Latin, linteum is translated as “veil”)
that fooled Zeuxis. Neither birds nor man need an
exact representation to be drawn in. Such gestalts
could vary widely in quality and yet serve their
purpose. Birds merely required a crude stimulus to
be attracted, and Zeuxis was not deceived so much
by the representation of the veil (curtain) itself, as
by his gaze that had lured him into searching for
the fantasy—the fascination for a presence beyond
the absence. He had been seduced by desiring to
know what lay behind the curtain.
From such a tale, many feminists have written
about imagination’s desire for that ideal closure—
the hidden picture that fulfills fantasy, the final
signifier, so to speak, to fulfill the perpetual “lack”
that lies beyond our grasp, but paradoxically
doesn’t exist. The enigma of a heterosexual woman
as an unconscious desire for a heterosexual man
conceals that there is nothing to conceal. There is
“nothing” behind the mask, nothing behind the
veil, but another displaced signifier, another veil
ad infinitum. With visual desire, we are all caught
by appearances as we project the fantasy into the
object its ability to make us feel satisfied and
Visualizing Desire 865
whole. In the remainder of this entry, this com-
plexity of visualizing desire is illustrated by the
critical reception of two of René Magritte’s paint-
ings by feminist critics.
Elizabeth Wright: Le Viol
Elizabeth Wright develops the machinations of
visual desire in her examination of René Magritte’s
picture Le Viol (The Rape). The subject of the pic-
ture is apparently a face surrounded by hair in what
was then a consciously fashionable manner. On
closer inspection, however, the viewer sees that this
is an illusion: The eyes become nipples, the nose is
a navel, and the mouth becomes the woman’s pubic
hair. If the hair is removed, the naked torso is made
plainly visible, suggesting yet another level of read-
ing of Le Viol that Wright overlooks. Removing the
hair through an intentional act of the imagination,
the viewer rehearses the removal of hair from
painting of classical nudes, exposing the scopo-
philic unconscious imagination. Hair, after all, is a
sign of virility. Its removal adds to the passive qual-
ity as an objectification of flesh that infantilizes
women. At the same time, it eroticizes looking and
feeling, certainly for the hetero male. Magritte’s
trompe l’oeil effect, however, mitigates such a pos-
sibility by forcing a misrecognition to take place.
Mary Ann Caws: Les Liaisons Dangereuses
Mary Ann Caws, like Wright, sees the potential
disruptive possibilities of Magritte’s oeuvre in terms
of sexual desire. She draws on Rosalind Krauss’s
analysis of surrealist photography for its transgres-
sive potentials as the “denial of presence.” According
to Krauss, within surrealist photography, the dou-
bling of the signifier produces a paradox that
exploits what we think is real. Caws explains how
this same “doubling” of vision is possible so that
the singularity, the unifying experience of looking,
is ruptured and destroyed. The viewer is caught
looking at his or her own looking. Here, we have an
example of the copy as a double, as simulacra func-
tioning in its capacity for disruption. Magritte’s
painting Les Liaisons Dangereuses (1936) serves as
Caws’s example of the denial of presence.
Paraphrasing Caws’s description: Here a woman is
shown down to her ankles with her head bent down
in profile. She is holding a mirror exactly in the
866 Visualizing Desire
middle of her body. Portrayed in the mirror is a
side view of her nude. It is reversed in the center of
the image, parts of her hair in the mirror do not
match her hair outside it, nor does the lower part of
her body match her thighs that are outside the mir-
ror. This deformation can be read as central to the
self; the woman divided is also watching herself,
but without seeing us see her from behind. The
narcissistic glance in the mirror is reversed. Les
Liaisons Dangereuses stages a ruination of sexual
desire. The look that captures the gaze is thwarted.
Caws’s interpretation of “dangerous meetings”
as the loss of presence of the self borders on the
belief in a humanistic subject that Magritte wanted
to avoid; namely, as if the model could “read” her-
self (as “natural frontal beauty”) in a mirror pro-
vided that she had been properly painted in
perspective. Another way to read Les Liaisons
Dangereuses is to take the pun of the title seriously:
The self should not be confused with the mirror
image of the self. In other words, desire of the self
should not be confused with the object that pro-
poses itself to satisfy the desire, namely, the mir-
rored image. A dangerous meeting happens when
this is forgotten. That may be why Magritte painted
a side view of the nude in the mirror. It is an ana-
morphic projection, a mirror within a mirror, or
mise-en-abyme, which sets up the acknowledgment
of a “split subject,” a subject who “is” only insofar as
it is not where it thinks it is as Lacan might say.
Susan Gubar: Le Viol
Susan Gubar, whose antipornographic stance is
well-known, gives an entirely different reading of
Magritte’s Le Viol. She maintains that Magritte’s
“body parts” are indicative of the historical degra-
dation of women that pornography has wrought.
After presenting the contradictory readings of Le
Viol, including the radical disruptive possibilities
of Magritte’s surrealist rhetoric developed earlier,
she settles for a more conservative reading:
Magritte’s imagery is a vindictive mockery over his
mother’s suicidal drowning while he was still an
adolescent. Sadistic desire is at work. The rejection
of his mother leads to rejecting the feminine part
of himself.
Gubar returns to the “scene/seen” of the crime
playing a familiar psychoanalytic card. The ambi-
guity surrounding the interpretations of surrealist
art and Magritte in particular (Is it art? Is it por-
nography?) comes down to Le Viol as a projection
of Medusa, the ambiguity involved in the male’s
pleasure and horror of seeing women’s genitals, a
direct result of castration anxiety. Magritte’s Le
Viol is a decapitation of his lost phallic mother,
who, having drowned, remained omnipotent and
now needs a proper burial so that Magritte may
reduce the threat to his own vulnerability.
Magritte’s desire of loss is now appeased through
this painting.
Given that Le Viol suggests a male face (accord-
ing to Gubar), and given that there are many
paintings of absent men pictured in empty suits, or
with missing heads throughout Magritte’s oeuvre,
Gubar suggests that Magritte has also been cas-
trated, made impotent. Le Viol now becomes an
inverted portrait. If that is not enough, Le Viol
becomes a fearful portrait. According to Gubar, by
re-creating in his own image the woman who cre-
ated him, by repossessing through fantasy the
woman who had to be relinquished, by punishing
the woman whose separateness was itself experi-
enced as a punishment, and by eroticizing the
woman whose eroticism was taboo, Magritte
coverts his greatest trauma into his greatest thrill,
a fact that explains why the perusal of pulp maga-
zines and the communal showings of stag films
function like rites de passage for so many adoles-
cent boys. Visualizing desire in Magritte has now
become a semi-pornographic and sadistic act in the
eyes of Gubar confirming that—in the eyes of the
beholder—desire plays with what is hidden as
Lacan’s lesson on Pliny’s story indicates.
These interpretations of Le Viol range from
being an art of rupture to a pornographic sadistic
art of domination. Historically situated, Gubar
claims that the surrealist image reflects the mascu-
line anxiety of the World War I and the breakdown
of heroic individualism. Magritte, once a hero, has
been broken. His images of corporeal absence are
now balanced by his disgust of the female subject.
Deconstructed, he has joined the ranks of porno-
artgraphy, that “third” term that avoids assimila-
tion in the opposition art/pornography, a realm
between art and pornography where artists are
buried who searched for revenge on their mothers.
In defense of Magritte, one might consider
Magritte’s title, Le Viol, which translates as viola-
tion or desecration. Magritte linguistic theories

made the naming of things through his puns and
play of the signifier problematic. Reversing just
two letters and adding an “e,” one arrives at “Le
Voile,” or veil, and is thrown back to Parrhasius’s
curtain. In this sense Gubar, Caws, and Wright are
like Zeuxis, reading their own desires to articu-
late what’s behind the veil when there is nothing
there except another veil (the canvas). There is
another interesting aspect of this title. In German,
Magritte’s Le Viol translates as Vergewaltigung—
literally, a misuse of power. Freud took advantage
of the German language to present these para-
praxes (errors and slips in speech) of everyday
life. In German, the prefix ver performs an ana-
morphic function, a displacement to the side, call-
ing up the unconscious. Vergewaltigung means a
violence coming from the unconscious; the
desire to remove the veil of the woman and
forcibly possess the thing she hides without
her permission. Magritte is providing us with an
anamor­phic view, a “looking awry” as Slavoj
Žižek would put it, of this form of masculine
desire. As mentioned earlier, the title refers to the
male’s failure at possession.
This discussion of Lacan’s reading of Pliny and
the reading of masculine desire in Magritte’s paint-
ings by Wright, Caws, and Gubar is meant to illus-
trate the difficulty of unconscious desire when
looking that directly draws on the notion of what
is sanctioned by a societal gaze. Most problemati-
cally, that gaze has been identified as being mascu-
line and patriarchal; however, Magritte turns that
gaze around, confounding the looking and placing
masculine desire in doubt through his clever images
and punning titles. The ambiguity of reading desire
in his work by Caws and Gubar testify to Magritte’s
ability to have his images (appearances or simula-
cra) play a devilish role for us spectators.
jan jagodzinski
See also Gaze; Scopophilia; Simulacra
Further Readings
Caws, M. A. (1985). Ladies shot and painted: Female
embodiment in surrealist art. In S. R. Suleiman (Ed.),
The female body in Western culture: Contemporary
perspectives (pp. 262–287). Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Visual Pleasure 867
Gubar, S. (1987, Summer). Representing pornography:
Feminism, criticism, and depictions of female
violation. Critical Inquiry, 13, 712–741.
Krauss, R. W. (1985). The originality of the avant-garde
and other modernist myths. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Wright, E. (1984). Psychoanalytic criticism: Theory in
practice. London: Methuen.
Visual Pleasure
Visual pleasure refers to the enjoyment one feels
when viewing an object of desire. Visual pleasure
is a common topic in feminist theorizing, includ-
ing the role it plays in the formation of women’s
individual and social identity. It has also been the
subject of an article by British feminist film theo-
rist and filmmaker Laura Mulvey. This entry
focuses on Mulvey’s article “Visual Pleasure and
Narrative Cinema” and its relevance to feminist
intervention, film theory, and psychoanalytic con-
cepts of identity.
Central to Mulvey’s ideas on visual pleasure is
the notion of the unconscious in patriarchal soci-
ety being structured around inequality: an inequal-
ity that positions women as the inferior “other.” In
a short article written in 1973, “Fears, Fantasies
and the Male Unconscious; or, You Don’t Know
What’s Happening, Do You, Mr. Jones?” Mulvey
reviewed the work of the British Pop artist Allen
Jones. This article, along with her essay “Visual
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” established
Mulvey’s engagement with Freudian and Lacanian
psychoanalytic thinking. Christian Metz and Jean-
Louis Baudry had already tried to configure psy-
choanalytic ideas in relation to the theorizing of
the cinema, but Mulvey’s essays begin a specific
historical intersection of feminist intervention, film
theory, and psychoanalysis.
Mulvey’s article “Visual Pleasure and Narrative
Cinema” does not engage with any empirical
research in relation to film audiences. Instead,
Mulvey make a political use (in the sense of gender
politics) of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan,
adapting some of their concepts to argue that clas-
sical Hollywood cinema positions the spectator
(male or female) as masculine and the figure of the
woman on screen as the “object” of desire.
Mulvey’s influential study links different types of
868 Visual Pleasure
looking and the pleasure derived from them to
notions of gender, society, and difference. The
emphasis in her work in the 1970s is placed on
how these different forms of looking express
inequality and oppression within capitalist society,
but more particularly, patriarchal society. One
approach to artworks is from the standpoint of
aesthetic experience, but the other, adopted by
Mulvey and others, involves treating artworks as
heuristic devices that can teach us about the world
and human identity. Such psychoanalytically
inspired studies do not investigate the viewing
practices of individuals in specific social contexts,
but instead consider how subjects’ positions and
identities are constructed by ideology.
The primal scopic scene considered by Mulvey
in “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” echoes
the search for identity through the intermediary of
the image and conforms to Freudian and Lacanian
paradigms; that is, models that center on the cas-
tration fear of the male viewer. This fear of castra-
tion invokes a crisis between the conception of the
subject (the self) and its authentication. Mulvey
points to a relationship between the young boy’s
horror of castration (in the Symbolic phase of
development) symbolized by the metaphorically
castrated body of the female, and the subsequent
implications of the male viewers’ projection of
that primal horror as a threat to his psychic coher-
ence. According to Mulvey’s thesis, when viewing
filmic images of the female, two possible resolu-
tions to this scopic crisis present themselves: either
to disavow the fear of castration through a
fetishization of the female body, or to avow the
female by a certain disparagement of her symboli-
cally mutilated form; in other words, the viewer
can either reenact the original trauma by continu-
ally “investigating” the woman (the feminine) in
an attempt to demystify her (which is counterbal-
anced by a devaluation of the woman) or else
completely disavow the castration by substituting
a fetish object or turning the represented figure
itself into a fetish. In this way, the feminine body
becomes reassuring rather than dangerous. This
strategy can lead to an overevaluation of the
female, producing, for example, the cult of the
female star. This second avenue—fetishistic scopo-
philia—amplifies the physical beauty of the femi-
nine object, transforming it into something
satisfying in itself.
According to the choice of disavowal through
the evocation of fetishism, part of the female
anatomy or an item of feminine clothing becomes
the focus of desire to compensate or substitute for
the penis, which is symbolically missing. The ave-
nue of avowal has another result: instead of dis-
placing or deflecting desire away from one part of
the body to another, it moves the focus from the
woman’s “cosmetic outside,” to her “abject inte-
rior”; an interior as it were, unknown and primal.
The female is understood as being inferior, which
can be traced back to her own interior/internal-
ized nature. The resolution of the male viewers’
anxiety (male in the sense of the type of active
looking, not necessarily in relation to gender) per-
mits “him” to move to a position of superiority;
that is, away from the “other” (female) who is a
mutilated and uncanny figure. Thus, Mulvey
describes the female body as a spatial metaphor
for the structural division between surface allure
and concealed decay as well as a metaphor for
structured inequality in human relations (thus
engaging with a politics of identity). The cosmeti-
cally finished surface of the body must conceal the
abject matter of the interior of the female body. In
psychoanalytic terms, this cosmetic surface con-
ceals the wound or void left in the male psyche
when it perceives sexual difference.
Mulvey considers that in patriarchal societies
pleasure in looking has been split between the
active/male and passive/female. This is reflected in
dominant forms of cinema as well as many other
representations. Conventional narrative films in
the classical Hollywood tradition typically focus
on a male protagonist in the narrative and assume
a male spectator. In “Visual Pleasure and Narrative
Cinema,” the viewer (male or female) occupies a
specifically masculine position—a position that
provoked strong reactions to Mulvey’s text, and a
position that she later reevaluated. The viewer
identifies with the gaze of the male, experiencing
his anxiety of castration and, at the same time, the
pleasure and desire of the neutralization of that
anxiety through the two methods of avowal and
disavowal already described. In terms of the
nature of the scopophilic gaze, Freud isolated sco-
pophilia as one of the component instincts of
sexuality that exist as drives quite independently
of the erotogenic zones. At this point, he associ-
ates scopophilia with taking other people as

objects, subjecting them to a controlling and
intrusive gaze. This position describes the moral
paradox faced by a woman when viewing another
woman. The female viewer can either betray her
(the viewed female) and identify with the mascu-
line point of view (the male gaze) or, in a state of
accepted passivity, adopt a masochistic/narcissis-
tic attitude to identify with the object of the mas-
culine gaze (the desired or complete woman).
Mulvey argues that certain features of the cine-
matic apparatus and experience allow viewing
conditions (e.g., dark and essentially private) that
facilitate both the voyeuristic process of objectifi-
cation of female characters and the narcissistic
process of identification with an ideal version of
the self projected on the cinematic screen.
According to Mulvey (and other feminist writ-
ers), the meaning of woman is ultimately sexual
difference, the absence of the penis is visually
ascertainable, the material evidence on which is
based the castration complex essential for the
organization of entry into the symbolic order and
the law of the father. What this sense of feminine
castration entails is the woman’s exclusion from
the symbolic power articulated by her passivity:
The woman’s gaze, according to this thesis, is par-
tial, passive, and flawed. She is left without a
voice, silenced by the patriarchal symbolic order.
Mulvey’s argument in “Visual Pleasure and
Narrative Cinema” is that the pleasure derived
from these films reinforces the oppression of
women. As a response to this repression, she advo-
cated a radical experimental cinema that renounces
the standard pattern of fascination built into estab-
lishing filmic forms. In this way, Mulvey calls for
a total negation of the plenitude of the narrative
fictional film. A major criticism of the essay is that,
although Mulvey believes that classical Hollywood
cinema reflects and shapes the patriarchal order,
the perspective of her writing actually remains
within the heterosexual order that she seeks to
expose as oppressive. The radical claims of the
article are, thus, a perpetuation of patriarchy. The
basis of this criticism is that Mulvey’s article pre-
supposes the spectators’ identity to be a male,
heterosexual. Thus, it was posited that she denied
the existence of lesbian women and even hetero-
sexual women.
Sixteen years after the publication of “Visual
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” Mulvey’s 1991
Visual Pleasure 869
essay on the artist Cindy Sherman “A Phantas­
magoria of the Female Body” articulates a modi-
fied position. As in “Visual Pleasure and Narrative
Cinema,” Mulvey is concerned with what images
can tell us about popular culture, specifically the
images of women circulating in modern capitalist
societies. The artist Cindy Sherman is considered
noteworthy because she is thought to have found a
way of representing woman that achieves a “criti-
cal effect.” Mulvey argues that it is significant that
the women depicted are always Sherman herself;
Mulvey sees the images as important because
together they constitute a kind of glossary of pose,
gesture, and facial expression that characterize the
“construction” of feminine identity (anti-essential-
ism). Sherman’s work, then, performs a crucial
role not by refusing the dominant images or trying
to produce something new, but by compulsively
reiterating the existing images of women. Mulvey
thematizes this argument by suggesting that
Sherman’s photographs constitute “infinite variet-
ies of the masquerade.” The notion of the mas-
querade has been developed by the psychoanalyst
Joan Riviere, who suggests that femininity—wom-
anliness—is a kind of performance. In this argu-
ment, femininity is not the real condition of
women; rather, women wear femininity as a kind
of cultural mask, and masks hide or obscure the
identity of the wearer. Cosmetics and cosmetic
rituals offer a useful metaphor for this role. A
number of feminist theorists have developed this
idea along with Mulvey, suggesting that femininity
is a heavily ironic mode—a hyper-femininity as it
were, preceding the representational character of
gender difference—that enables women to occupy
the role inscribed for them in patriarchal culture
while managing to keep a psychological distance
from it. Because gender identity is considered a
role to be played, different performances can be
imagined. This argument plays a key role in the
development of theories of performative subjectiv-
ity and the construction of gender, cultural, and
racial identities. “A Phantasmagoria of the Female
Body” represents a key shift from “Visual Pleasure
and Narrative Cinema”; the account of the mas-
querade allows Mulvey to conceptualize female
subject positions as more than ventriloquized ver-
sions of masculine fantasy. Mulvey reads Sherman’s
work as a gradual movement from the exteriority
of woman-as-fetish (based, as previously described,
870 Voice
on male castration anxiety) to the interiority of
what is hidden behind this mask in terms of the
defetishized female body.
Peter Muir
See also Gaze; Scopophilia
Further Readings
Mulvey, L. (1975). Visual pleasure and narrative cinema.
Screen, 16(3), 6–18.
Mulvey, L. (1991). A phantasmagoria of the female body:
The work of Cindy Sherman. New Left Review,
1(188), 136–150.
Mulvey, L. (2005). Death 24x a second: Reflections on
stillness in the moving image. London: Reaktion.
Visual Politics
See Embodiment and Body Politics;
Extraordinary Bodies; Ideal Body, The;
Otherness, History of; Propaganda;
Stereotypes
Voice
Literature depends a great deal on the manner in
which the identity of the author, narrator, or
speaker is perceived by the reader. Voice is the
literary term for this presence. Sometimes the
author speaks without pretense as the author;
sometimes he or she adopts a persona—that is, a
mask of some kind. Sometimes he or she creates a
narrator who has a distinctive voice of his or her
own separate from the author; sometimes the nar-
rator is simply a mouthpiece for the author.
Sometimes there is apparently no narrator or
authorial presence at all.
The voice of a work may be difficult to perceive
because often it lies behind the story itself. How­
ever, it may be inferred through tone and mood.
Tone measures the author’s attitude toward the
reader; mood measures the author’s attitude toward
the subject matter. As an example, Harriet Beecher
Stowe, who is quite outspoken in Uncle Tom’s
Cabin, is earnest in tone as she reveals the evils of
slavery to her audience and argues for its abolition;
her mood is a combination of bitter sarcasm and
sympathy: She is sarcastic toward those who profit
from slavery or compromise with it, and she is
sympathetic toward the slaves.
There have been several famous misappraisals
of voice that have led to misinterpretation of inten-
tions and even punishment for authors. Daniel
Defoe’s The Shortest Way With the Dissenters was
an ironic mockery of the intolerance of Anglicans
toward dissenting Protestants that landed him in
jail for sedition, neither side in the controversy
having much patience with the subtleties of voice
in his work. The letters of Johann Wolfgang von
Goethe’s Sorrows of Young Werther so inspired
young men to suicide pacts that Goethe was asked
to preface the second edition of the work (ostensi-
bly in the voice of Werther himself) with a warning
for young men not to follow his path to suicide.
A master of using voice was Frederick Douglass,
who used two voices for rhetorical advantage in
his famous Fourth of July speech. He began in a
conciliatory tone searching for common ground
between him and his audience, then abruptly
changed course and, emphasizing the vast distance
between him—a slave—and the audience—free
men and women—denounced the present genera-
tion of Americans for their sloth in not fighting for
freedom as their ancestors once had.
The use of voice in fiction and poetry is multi-
faceted. Wayne Booth’s The Rhetoric of Fiction
categorizes the many forms that the author’s voice
can take in novels and stories. In one of the earliest
novels, Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones, the author is
a reliable commentator who speaks boldly in his
own voice to provide facts, describe scenes, or
summarize action. He is reliable in that the reader
can trust that his words are truthful. Such com-
mentators can be used to mold beliefs as well. Jane
Austen establishes moral norms in her novels and
then, usually in an ironic mood, shows characters
stumbling over them. A later author, Kate Chopin,
establishes an unconventional moral norm in “The
Storm,” one in which extramarital affairs need not
have any more consequence than a thunderstorm
that cools and freshens the summer air.
Sometimes the reliable voice is a character who
narrates the action. In Great Expectations, an
older and wiser Pip is able to guide the reader’s

impressions of the younger, mistake-prone Pip as
he misapprehends the source of his expectations.
Likewise, Robert Hayden in the poem Those
Winter Sundays looks back on his uncomprehend-
ing younger self with a mature understanding of
the lonely and disciplined love of his father.
It is particularly challenging to discern the
author’s presence behind unreliable narrators.
Toni Cade Bambara’s Sylvia narrates “The Lesson”
and affords no respect at all for Miss Moore, her
mentor; yet, through the haze of Sylvia’s childish
prejudices, Bambara still manages to reveal the
remarkable benevolence of Miss Moore and the
essential lesson she tries to teach a group of under-
privileged children. Likewise, in Robert Browning’s
dramatic monologue My Last Duchess, the arro-
gant duke is unaware that he is ruthless and self-
centered, but the reader soon understands that
Browning intended his audience to see him in pre-
cisely this manner. In each case, the author grants
readers enough clues so that they can infer his or
her attitude toward the subject.
With the realist and naturalist movements in the
latter half of the 19th century and modernist
movement that followed, fictional narration
became more impersonal. Innovative artists—such
as Gustave Flaubert, Henry James, and James
Joyce—wished to avoid unrealistic, extraneous,
and overt commentary. To avoid it, for example,
James sought a way to dramatize commentary,
thus effacing the author as much as possible.
Rarely does any story completely accomplish this,
but a hallmark of modern fiction is the extent to
which the reader is left to struggle alongside char-
acters in confusion without help from a guiding
authorial or narrative voice. Voice in such novels
as Madame Bovary, The Ambassadors, Ulysses,
and As I Lay Dying reinforces the modernist
stance that individuals are disconnected from their
fellows, lonely, and confused by shifting concep-
tions of truth.
In the past, even with an implied author, there
could be collusion between reader and author. For
instance, the reader of The Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn could enjoy with Mark Twain the
King and the Duke’s making a hash of their perfor-
mance of Shakespeare even though none of the
characters in the novel, including narrator Huck,
got the joke. But in a modernistic work such as
Ernest Hemingway’s “Hills Like White Elephants,”
Voice 871
the authorial voice is silent. Hemingway’s prefer-
ence for a dramatic point of view—that is, present-
ing essentially a scene or dialogue between characters
with little or no narration—effectively eliminated
the authorial voice.
In poetry, a radical change in the use of voice
came with the romantic movement. Whereas clas-
sical and neoclassical authors saw the poet’s voice
as a learned one speaking in a poetic diction that
was dignified and heightened above the common,
Romantics argued for new criteria. The voice and
language of poetry, said William Wordsworth in
his “Preface to the Lyrical Ballads,” should be
common to all of humankind. The poet’s identity
should not be an artificially poetic one, separated
from ordinary persons, but one that was down-to-
earth and accessible for all to understand. The U.S.
poet Walt Whitman adopted such a voice in Song
of Myself, a poem spoken by a kind of U.S. every-
man in a universal voice resonating with the
romantics’ sympathy for political democracy.
As with modernist fiction writers, modernist
poets, such as T. S. Eliot, Wallace Stevens, William
Carlos Williams, and Marianne Moore, gravitated
more and more toward impersonal voices even as
their subject matter became increasingly personal
and introspective. A notable exception to this
increased self-reflexivity was African American
poetry. Concerned like the romantics with finding
an authentic voice that would connect with com-
mon people, African American poets attempted to
incorporate the distinctive voices of the blues,
spirituals, Black preaching, and other cultural
expressions to articulate a vernacular culture com-
mon to all African Americans.
Voice varies greatly from work to work and
period to period and has a wide range of purposes.
Although harder to define than such elements as
character, plot, theme, and setting, voice is partic-
ularly important as a way of measuring the inter-
action between readers and authors. The identity
of an authorial voice may be as essential to a
reader as a story well told or a character well
drawn; in more modern works, understanding the
author’s intention of communicating with a
severely limited voice or his or her effort to speak
in a communal voice serve ultimately to enrich the
experience of literature.
William L. Howard
872 Voyeurism
See also Discourse; Language; Masking; Narratives;
Rhetoric
Further Readings
Booth, W. C. (1983). The rhetoric of fiction (2nd ed.).
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Brown, F. P. (1999). Performing the word: African
American poetry as vernacular culture. New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Doreski, W. (1995). The modern voice in American
poetry. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
Wolosky, S. (2001). The art of poetry: How to read a
poem. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Voyeurism
The term voyeurism is etymologically derived from
the French word voir, which ultimately comes
from the Latin word videre, both meaning “to
see.” Voyeurism describes in general the behavior
of a voyeur or a voyeuse, suggesting a secret spec-
tator who experiences satisfaction in the sexual
activity of others. To look at or to observe other
persons—secretly or openly—can be a way to gen-
erate one’s own identity by reflection, by contrast
or stimulated by the wish for visual participation.
Numerous examples of voyeuristic depictions
and subjects are found in the art of all eras in
Western art as well as beyond the Occident, in
Chinese and Japanese art for example. It is impor-
tant to note that voyeurism is not an exclusively
male phenomenon as is often suggested. Numerous
females, including artists such as the U.S. photog-
rapher Merry Alpern, work purposefully within
the constructs of the voyeuristic gaze.
The definition and use of the term voyeurism
customarily recurs in association with the fields of
psychoanalysis and psychology. Jean-Paul Sartre’s
and Jacques Lacan’s examinations of voyeurism
drew on the theories of Sigmund Freud. In Freud’s
theories, voyeurism is assessed as a perversion in
which the “passive” party is perceived as a victim,
and “active” exhibitionism plays only a secondary
role. Defining voyeurism as a form of victimiza-
tion without fully considering the role of the “pas-
sive” party continues to stigmatize the voyeuristic
act as a “perversion,” resulting in prejudicial and
moralizing reflexes. This one-sided and negative
assessment of voyeurism may have to be analyzed
or reversed.
Religious moral traditions play a role in the
issues and debates surrounding voyeurism.
However, it may be possible to dispense with rigid
moralizing around the phenomenon of voyeurism
when one considers it as one of many legitimate
possibilities for appropriation in a visual world.
Nevertheless, it should be understood that the phe-
nomenon of voyeurism cannot be delimited to
occurrences within the world of art, which is only
one of the places it has manifested itself.
This entry first discusses the roots and chrono-
logical frame of voyeurism. Next, this entry pre­
sents the primary types of voyeuristic depictions.
Finally, this entry examines the implications of
voyeurism in today’s global environment.
Roots of Voyeurism
The roots of voyeurism are closely connected with
undiscriminating visual curiosity, a basic human
quality. On one hand, visual curiosity is a compel-
ling drive and is necessary in the formulation of
research and science. On the other hand, visual
curiosity is fundamentally an amorphous longing,
directed toward all aspects of an individual’s
experience and surroundings, both the existing
and nonexisting, visible and invisible, obvious and
obscure.
Hierarchically speaking, the eye or the act of
seeing is allocated first place in human sensory
functioning. In a grand sense, the operation of
curiosity can be focused equally on areas consid-
ered as either legitimate or deviant. Seeing, both
as an active sense and as a matter of principle,
tends to disregard frontiers, to ignore them, to
cross over them, or to obviate them. The growing
number of regulations and frontiers, restrictions
and bans, avoidances and exclusions to viewing
what we are socialized to treat as invisible or
accept as taboo makes collisions with our desire
to see inevitable.
At its roots, voyeurism does not distinguish
between sexual interest and other kinds of curios-
ity, between eros and insight. The threshold
between prurience and platonic curiosity remains
thin even after determining a rationale for their
separation; therefore, there continues to be a fluent

transition between the desire to view either the
illicit or the irreproachable.
Chronological Frame
Even though the term voyeurism is relatively
young (it left its mark primarily in the 19th cen-
tury) the phenomenon is not. Documents of voy-
eurism go back so far and are so closely connected
with the development of human civilization that
one may speak of the phenomenon as an anthro-
pological constant. A relatively large number of
voyeuristic depictions have been preserved from
Greek and Roman art. Examples are repeatedly to
be found in wall paintings in Pompeii and in the
imagery of the Warren Cup, a silver cup with relief
decoration of homoerotic scenes in the British
Museum in London (c. 1–20 CE). Typical in this
imagery is that spectators and eyewitness are in
many respects hard to distinguish and that moral
assessments about the appropriateness of viewing
do not yet seem to play a role.
The earliest figurative depictions of voyeuristic
scenes of the post-antique eras are to be found in
Carolingian book illumination but pieces of cir-
cumstantial evidence suggest that the roots of voy-
euristic practice go back even further. The
connections between voyeuristic practices and
mythical traditions that revolve around visual pro-
hibitions within sacred contexts also speak for
this. Veils or curtains, and acts of covering and
unveiling, often play a central role. An example of
this is the revelation of the “naked truth”; as an
allegory in the form of a naked woman it exem-
plarily combines eros and insight. The mergers
between the emperor cult traditions of Antiquity
and early Christian rites reveal a deft ability to
generate visual euphemisms for both dignity and
inviolability.
Early illustrative examples for this practice are
the variations of the hole-boring motif in the late
Carolingian and Ottonian book illumination. They
show how the scribe of Gregory the Great uses his
stylus (writing implement) to pierce the curtain that
separates the saint to observe through a peephole
the inspiration of the Holy Spirit in the form of a
dove. He becomes in a double sense the eyewitness
of the divine origin of Gregor’s words and voyeur.
Emerging from the Middle Ages, depictions of
biblical topics have entered the visual arts canon as
Voyeurism 873
certain archetypal scenes, such as King David’s
voyeuristic attraction to Bathsheba (2 Samuel 11),
or the two old men who lusted after Susanna as
they secretly watched her daily walking to work in
her husband’s orchard (Daniel 13:7–14). Such
scenes are depicted in numerous variations, in
almost all techniques and styles up to the 21st cen-
tury. Characteristically, they appear in religious
contexts emphasizing an unambiguous morality.
However, the motives of the artists depicting these
subjects were far more ambiguous, as they are fre-
quently only pretexts to depict attractive female
nudes, erotic scenes, or the culturally charged dia-
lectic of unveiling and covering.
The flux between sacred topics and profane
topics with voyeuristic motifs that since the late
Middle Ages have often used the same picture
schemes is of particular note. An example for this
is the scheme of the “window observer,” common
to both sacred and profane imagery. This continu-
ity is reflected, for example, in the popular appeal
in producing and contemplating “deputy” portraits,
in which the observer in the picture represents the
observer in front of the picture. Nevertheless, tra-
dition and the history of voyeurism in the fine arts
reveal certain fashions or economies of voyeuristic
motif to be revisited in increasing numbers.
Between the Middle Ages and the 19th century,
fine artists developed a great number of voyeuristic
topics, exploring variations from the lustful com-
plicity of the viewer to the tragic dissipation of the
protagonist in the carnal drama. Since the 18th
century, there seems to be evidence of an increas-
ing frequency of voyeuristic depictions in painting
and graphic arts in particular. The growing num-
ber of depictions correlates to the increasing pro-
liferation of images of all kinds in modern and
postmodern visual culture. It has been long
acknowledged that the invention of photography
and the efficiency of other mechanical forms of
reproduction have contributed considerably to the
spread of visuality. Just as would later prove to be
the case in film, video, and newer digital forms of
media reproduction, photography is a technique
that makes distance, secrecy, and anonymity pos-
sible merely by the preconditions concerning the
use of the apparatus—each an important criterion
contributing to the voyeuristic gaze.
It is not by chance that the voyeuristic gaze
through the viewfinder is similar to a look through
874 Voyeurism
the keyhole—and to the look through the peephole
in the peep show. The motif of a person looking
through the keyhole was especially popular from
the late 18th century until the early 20th century.
The keyhole can be described in its characteristic
form as a hole or passage in a frontier (curtain,
door, wall, etc.) and be compared with a small
window. Once prevalent, the keyhole has nowa-
days disappeared as a framing device for paintings
or an image-matting schema, imitating a window-
like visual passage. However, it continues to be
used as a trope of secret visual participation in
one’s surroundings, or of the acquisition of inti-
mate knowledge or erotic insight that is at the
same time forbidden—and it also owns modern-
day equivalences to minimally invasive “keyhole
surgery.” As such, it remains a popular design
motif in magazines, book covers, and works of art.
The artists René Magritte and Mel Ramos repeat-
edly painted variations on keyhole paintings and
other voyeuristic motifs.
The work of Pablo Picasso is a treasure trove of
voyeuristic motifs. In numerous early drawings
and paintings, Picasso tackled the voyeuristic; in
his late work, however, he increases the erotic
intensity of the voyeuristic scenes into burlesque
and the absurd. In Picasso’s 1903 painting Self-
Portrait, Making Love, he includes himself in the
imagery and thus reveals in an unabashed open-
ness himself as artist for whom seeing means life.
William Hogarth’s engraving Boys Peeping at
Nature, originally created in 1730, draws on
ancient myths of fauns, sagas involving putti, and
legends of Mother Nature into one image involv-
ing the secret behind the curtain and the unity of
eros and insight for the depicted as a metaphor of
the search for natural truth. In this image, how-
ever, the old curtain or veil as it often appeared in
Renaissance and later periods of art has become
the skirt of a woman—in this case, the skirt of
Artemis or Diana of Ephesus, the classical per-
sonification of “Mother Nature.” The identity of
the skirted figure alters in different successive ver-
sions of the etching, varying between an antique
sculpture and a living female figure.
Typology
In principle, at least three types of voyeuristic
depictions can be distinguished in the fine arts. The
first type is the most popular variation, which only
shows the secret male or female observer but
excludes the object of his or her desire, occurring
often in caricatures; what he or she can see or
observes remains omitted and is left to the fantasy
of the viewer in front of the picture frame. An
example representing this first type is an erotic
print titled The Impatient Adulterer (1896), one of
a series of a pen-and-ink drawings created by
Aubrey Beardsley as illustrations to the Sixth Satire
of Juvenal; this image leads into the world of the-
atre and shows us a half-naked masturbator no
different than any other actor before the beginning
of the performance as this man peeks through the
theatre curtain. But whatever he witnesses and
whatever excites him to fiddle with his foreskin in
impatient expectation, as Beardsley himself
describes in a private letter, can only be revealed
by the reading the text of the play.
The second type comprises the depiction of voy-
euristic constellations that allocate the role of the
voyeur to the observer in front of the picture
frame. Depending on the viewer, this may happen
reluctantly and with no small embarrassment, or
in a passionate and accepting way. The first viewer
of the captured image is of course the artist him-
self. Thus, artist and observer are identified one
with each other, or the artist lets the observer look
through his eyes, so to speak, and allocates to him
or her a role that originally belonged to the artist.
This typically leads to a bipolar constellation
wherein the viewer in front of the picture frame is
like an outsider, observing the scene or the events
captured in the image as if through a window, and
sometimes literally looking through a window into
a closed room. The persons shown within the pic-
ture frame consider themselves to be unobserved.
Three completely different examples of this include
Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres’s famous late work
The Turkish Bath (1862), in which the round
shape of picture becomes a peephole. Edward
Hopper’s painting Night Window (1928) can be
considered an iconographic exemplar of voyeuris-
tic looking, taking a point of view across the street
from a trio of open upper-story windows in an
unidentified apartment building. The viewer looks
into a wide-open room with the occupant, a par-
tially clad woman bent over slightly with her back
to the window, unaware that she is being watched.
The Polish artist Katarzyna Kozyra used a hidden

camera to secretly film and observe the public ver-
sus private behavior and hygiene rituals of men
and women visiting the nude bathhouses at the
Hotel Gellert in Budapest.
The result of Kozyra’s voyeurism consists in
almost monumental projections of highly aesthetic
value. Is it, nevertheless, the objective acquisition
of the “male gaze”? Critics found fault with the
violation of the privacy of the women observed,
particularly as their identities are not obscured for
the camera. The manner in which Kozyra filmed
the male counter piece—by disguising herself as a
man, using fake body hair, and covering her
breasts by using a towel draped strategically over
her shoulders—does nothing to refute the objec-
tion that that those being filmed were also in a real
way being violated.
It is not uncommon that the observed figure in
the picture is given the illusion of awareness of the
observer in front of the picture frame. This picture
strategy allocates to the observer the role of an
accomplice. As such, he or she can take on this role
consciously or refuse to do so: The observer can
accept it with pleasure or can be made accomplice
against his own will. This is usually revealed by the
fact that figure being gazed upon also looks out on
the world outside the frame of the picture inviting
onlookers with a gesture, with spoken words, or
with some other form of body language inviting
participation. The protagonists of such images and
the forms their depictions take are thus applied to
the observer. So a dialogue-like synergy develops
that possesses the possibility of a theoretically
unlimited duration. A classical example for this
invitation is Jacob van Loo’s erotic painting Le
Coucher à L’italienne (c. 1650).
This painting represents the third type of voy-
euristic depiction; in it, van Loo adapts a well-
known painted subject that he reduces to just the
central figure, the nude wife of Candaules, king of
Lydia. Jacob Jordaens’s King Candaules of Lydia
Showing His Wife to Gyges (c. 1646) at the
National Museum of Stockholm concerns the clas-
sical ménage à trois that includes the observer as
the fourth participant and as eyewitness. This
exemplar reveals the primary characteristic of the
third type of voyeuristic depiction: the observed
observer. In this form, of voyeuristic depiction the
observer in front of the picture becomes witness of
how the observer in the picture secretly observes.
Voyeurism 875
It concerns a two-sided voyeurism, so to speak. In
this third voyeuristic type, Sartre’s reflections on
voyeurism and shame, which play a crucial role in
his main philosophical work L’être et le Néant:
Essai d’ontologie phénoménologique [Being and
Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological
Ontology], may well have their starting point.
Distance and the Global
Implications of Voyeurism
The voyeuristic gaze is characterized by distance.
Distance may have disadvantages when it is too
vast, making it too difficult to see or too dangerous
to negotiate the illicit gaze without risk of retribu-
tion or being revealed. The advantages of distance,
however, are not to be overlooked: the avoidance
of contact, odorless, faceless, anonymous, imper-
ceptible, and above all harmless, as is the gaze of
the hunter through his binoculars. The voyeuristic
eye is able to bridge the distance actively as well as
passively. It needs only to be supported by a grow-
ing arsenal of assistive instruments.
A classic example of the assisted voyeuristic
gaze—and at the same time an exemplar of the
cinematic voyeurism—is the 1954 Alfred Hitchcock
film Rear Window, which was also jokingly called
a “backyard peep show.” The cinema is often
regarded as the prime voyeuristic medium.
Numerous films work with voyeuristic effects or
motifs make voyeurism a direct subject of discus-
sion. An example is the film Peeping Tom, pro-
duced and directed by Michael Powell in 1960, the
title referring to the old English legend of Lady
Godiva and Peeping Tom. (In the English language,
peeping tom is a synonym for voyeur.) Television
series such as Big Brother have popularized the
interest in voyeuristic forms of media, inviting the
participation of a large audience on a new level.
Most recently, film, television, and video have had
new competitors to their potential as voyeuristic
media such as webcams and cybersex.
As a symbol of transparency and in relation to
contemporary possibilities of glass construction,
voyeurism can also become an aspect of modern
architecture. The glass house is an architectural
metaphor. The connections between transparency
and secrecy, clarity and “We’ve nothing to hide”
sincerity, frankness, and identity, which all are sug-
gested by glass houses, are surprisingly complex
876 Voyeurism
and versatile. Life, similarly to glass architecture,
so to speak, often takes place in a shop window.
The visual participation in other people’s lives
afforded by glass architecture and the like also
demonstrates socially performed identity: By show-
ing what you have, you show who you are.
Traversing previously proscribed visual fron-
tiers with newfound ease and detachment charac-
terizes the increasing proliferation of contemporary
voyeurism. French multimedia and performance
artist Orlan purposely co-opts the technical possi-
bilities of medical image production and uses them
for the worldwide transmission of cosmetic opera-
tions of her own body. New theoretical analogies
and correlations follow. Techniques for watching
people that did traditionally exist before have been
expanded in various ways because of present-day
realities of mass electronic and satellite surveil-
lance. Thus, it is justified to speak tendentiously of
a global voyeurism.
Voyeurism is advancing as a global phenome-
non. Increasingly, we live in glass houses; what
was once kept secret is now open to public scru-
tiny. It is fair to ask whether a world character-
ized by total transparency is at the cusp of a new
utopia or an inevitable insurrection and the grass-
roots abolishment of voyeurism as we know it
today.
Peter Springer
See also Gaze; Scopophilia; Visualizing Desire
Further Readings
Bonnet, J. (2006). Die Badende. Voyeurismus in der
abendländischen Kunst [The (female) bather.
Voyeurism in Western art]. Berlin: Parthas.
Clarke, J. R. (1998). Looking at lovemaking:
Constructions of sexuality in Roman art 100 B.C.–A.D.
250. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Levin, T. Y., Frohne, U., & Weibel, P. (Eds.). (2002).
CTRL [SPACE]: Rhetorics of surveillance from
Bentham to Big Brother. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Öhlschläger, C. (1996). “Unsägliche Lust des Schauens.”
Die Konstruktion der Geschlechter im voyeuristischen
Text [Unspeakable sensual pleasure of looking. The
construction of gender in the voyeuristic text].
Freiburg, Germany: Rombach Verlag.
Springer, P. (2008). Voyeurismus in der Kunst
[Voyeurism in art]. Berlin: Reimer.
 W
War
War, which can be broadly defined as armed con-
flict between groups of persons, has been a peren-
nial feature of the human condition. Yet, despite
its ubiquity and importance, the true nature of
war is complex. Though the “total wars” of the
19th and 20th centuries have prompted many to
think of war solely in terms of pitched battles
between massive, technologically sophisticated
armies, many scholars of warfare contend that
such a style of war making is actually only a rela-
tively recent phenomenon in world history. Today,
new forms of warfare—terrorism, guerilla insur-
gencies, genocide, or even large-scale police actions
to combat piracy or organized crime—are trans-
forming how and why people fight each other,
with important strategic and human consequences.
This entry provides an overview of the current
debate concerning the nature of warfare framed
by the classic work of the Prussian general Carl
von Clausewitz, describes the importance of just
war theory in understanding armed conflict, and
suggests ways in which war influences the under-
standing of identity.
Clausewitz and Beyond
In A History of Warfare, the British military histo-
rian John Keegan argues that war is not a mono-
lithic phenomenon but a diverse practice that is
both culturally and historically situated. People
have fought each other throughout human history,
877
but combatants’ understandings of the nature and
purpose of war, the technologies that they have
had at their disposal, and the ways in which they
have conducted themselves in battle have contrib-
uted to profoundly different approaches to fight-
ing. Wars fought between states are different from
those fought between ethnic groups, for instance,
and wars of national survival are different from
wars fought for primarily ceremonial reasons.
Keegan’s work emphasizes the need to recognize
the importance of these differences and to encoun-
ter military theorists and their theories as reflective
of particular cultural and military traditions. For
the Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld,
these traditions can be engaged by asking five inter-
related questions: By whom is war fought? What is
war all about? How is war fought? What is war
fought for? And, finally, Why is war fought? In ask-
ing these questions, van Creveld draws attention to
the ways in which the nature of war can change
depending on the involvement of professionalized
armies or irregular forces; the fundamental assump-
tions and norms that guide the conduct of war; the
strategies, tactics, and technologies deployed; the
interests or reasons that are understood to justify
war; and the sense of meaning or overarching pur-
pose that inspires combatants to fight.
Such perspectives encourage readers to encoun-
ter texts like Sun Tzu’s The Art of War through the
eyes of its ancient Chinese author instead of their
own preconceptions. The corporate executives and
military strategists who currently read The Art of
War to position themselves against the threats in
their midst may be startled to find a Confucian
878 War
military theory that is often at odds with Western
expectations. Though its 13 chapters certainly
address topics that have since then become the
stock-and-trade of military strategy—building
strategic advantage, strategic deception, and so
on—Sun Tzu encourages generals to harmonize
themselves and their forces within the tao or
“way” of battle through the careful balance of
their strengths and weaknesses. Keegan notes that
this emphasis on harmony, which is described
through natural metaphors, contributes to an
unexpectedly conservative approach to conflict, in
which destroying the enemy’s forces always comes
second to preserving one’s own. In many ways,
The Art of War is not the art of combat but the art
of developing and using one’s strategic capacities
to avoid combat and bloodshed altogether.
Clausewitz’s On War, perhaps the definitive
statement of the modern war-making tradition,
rejects Sun Tzu’s ideal of bloodless warfare as
naive. Drawing from the experience of the
Napoleonic wars and the intellectual foment of
modernity, Clausewitz places armed conflict within
the context of the burgeoning mass societies of
industrial Europe. For Clausewitz, war making is
a fundamentally political phenomenon that con-
stantly triangulates among what he describes as
the strange trinity formed by the government, the
military, and the people. Much like Machiavelli,
whose recovery of the classical war-making tradi-
tion also emphasizes the importance of military
power attached to the state, Clausewitz believes
that warfare is always conducted by the army in
pursuit of the state’s rational political self-interest,
even as the more irrational forces of public opinion
may seek to force the war’s strategic direction in
one way or another. By understanding and negoti-
ating the relations and calculations of these over-
lapping sectors of society, On War sees armed
conflict not as an aberration of social life but as
something inextricably connected to—and a neces-
sary consequence of—human life together.
Van Creveld argues that Clausewitz’s conten-
tion that war is a product of mass society leads
almost necessarily to the conception of total war,
in which all of a society’s resources become focused
on achieving victory in what Clausewitz under-
stands to be a zero-sum game. For Clausewitz, the
concentration of forces necessary for such strategic
victory is an organizational and technological
problem, in which bureaucratic organization and
constant technological advancement play impor-
tant parts in developing the rationalized efficiency
necessary to achieve overwhelming strategic advan-
tage. As a centralized strategic planner, the com-
manding general and his staff become the
animating consciousness of a vast military machine,
minimizing instances of inefficiency—which
Clausewitz describes through the metaphor of
friction—and gathering the mathematical, geo-
graphic, and statistical information necessary to
reduce the inherent uncertainty of war. In contrast
to Sun Tzu’s emphasis on the limitation of casual-
ties and fighting, Clausewitz contends that the
general and his staff must approach their task with
grim indifference toward those under their com-
mand. Whether through a series of direct blows or
a war of attrition, he contends, war is an inherently
bloody endeavor that must be prosecuted ruth-
lessly in pursuit of the state’s political self-interest.
Whether or not one agrees with its conclusions,
Clausewitz’s On War is a foundational text in the
study of modern warfare, and the connections it
makes between military force and political self-
interest remain essential to contemporary debates
in power politics. Yet, given the experiences of the
20th century, in which massive displays of military
force led to two catastrophic world wars and a cold
war that placed humanity on the brink of mutually
assured destruction, many military historians have
come to question the importance that has been
placed on the text. B.  H. Liddell Hart, a British
historian and army officer during World War I,
blames Clausewitz’s militarism and emphasis on
direct combat for almost single-handedly causing
the horrors of the trenches. Other critics, however,
are more nuanced in their approach. On War cap-
tured the 19th-century imagination, Keegan con-
tends, because Clausewitz’s understanding of
warfare spoke directly to conditions that were
already present in European culture, which was
steeped in nationalistic fervor, committed to unfet-
tered technological progress and bureaucratic ratio-
nality, and enamored with military valor. Keegan’s
reading of Clausewitz’s classic text has important
practical implications. Keagan argues that for all its
emphasis on rational objectivity and pretensions of
definitiveness, On War’s conclusions about armed
conflict are not absolute but conditioned by the
demands of a particular historical moment and

that, as conditions change, our understanding of
armed conflict will change as well.
Even as Clausewitz remains important in the
fields of military planning and defense policy,
scholars such as van Creveld are rethinking
Clausewitzian orthodoxy to meet the emerging
threats of the 21st century. In response to
Clausewitz’s emphasis on technological develop-
ment and massive concentration of force, van
Creveld contends that the massive concentration
of nuclear and conventional forces—which, he
notes, has led to 95% of the world’s military might
being confined to only a handful of nations—has
made the armies of advanced nations less relevant
on the world stage than ever before. As
Clausewitzian military planners seek to expand
their already massive technological superiority to
meet what van Creveld describes as high-intensity
conflicts, other threats, particularly terrorism, gue-
rilla insurgencies, genocide, and violent criminal
activity, have emerged in spaces that have histori-
cally been ignored. Van Creveld describes these
threats as low-intensity conflicts, not because they
are less violent but because they occur in less devel-
oped regions without the professional armies or
sophisticated weapons systems deployed by
advanced nations. Low-intensity conflicts are not
only extraordinarily costly in terms of human
life—van Creveld describes them as “warre” in the
Hobbesian sense—but also extraordinarily diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for Clausewitzian armies to
meet successfully. Sophisticated and expensive
weapons systems designed to fight professional
armies are suddenly useless against enemies that
readily use civilians as cover, and armies designed
to serve the political wills of nation-states are eas-
ily frustrated by transnational threats.
Most important, van Creveld notes how low-
intensity conflicts disturb the very foundation of
Clausewitz’s definition of war, which assumes that
war can always be reduced to rational political
interests and that conflicts can be resolved by
appealing to those interests. When modern states
encounter low-intensity conflicts like acts of terror-
ism or genocide that are driven by deep-seated
ethnic hatreds, religious differences, or ideologies
that seem “fanatical,” the result is typically a mix-
ture of bemusement, confusion, and military fail-
ure. Such reactions are not unusual. Indeed, Keegan
notes how Clausewitz reacted with horrified
War 879
confusion when he encountered the Cossacks,
whose marauding warrior culture was categori-
cally different from the staid, professionalized
military tradition of European armies. In such a
moment, advanced, “high-tech” militaries are
increasingly called to move beyond Clausewitzian
orthodoxy to discover new ways of meeting these
emerging, “low-tech” threats.
Just War
Both Keegan and van Creveld note that war occurs
for any number of reasons, only a few of which
have anything to do with Clausewitz’s emphasis
on political “interests.” What is more, a society’s
understanding of what war is and what armed
conflict should achieve places important restraints
on fighting. Wars fought for primarily ceremonial
purposes, for instance, may cease as soon as there
is bloodshed, and wars fought for the sake of glory
may be restrained by strict codes of honor.
In the Clausewitzian conception of war as an
extension of politics, war is limited by political
calculation, ending only when the enemy is
destroyed, when fighting is not in the state’s stra-
tegic interest, or when some other objective is
achieved. As both Keegan and van Creveld note,
the Western intellectual tradition before Clausewitz
understood war not as an extension of politics but
as an extension of justice. Understanding war as
justice by other means limited combat by placing it
within the framework of what is known as just
war. Though just war theory began with the reflec-
tions of Christian thinkers like Augustine and
Thomas Aquinas, it developed into a broad tradi-
tion of religious and secular ethical reflection
about warfare and its possible limitations. Political
philosopher Michael Walzer observes that because
war inevitably involves killing and the destruction
of property, proponents of a just war framework
recognize that armed conflict is always a grave
moral matter. Just war theorists proceed by deter-
mining whether or to what extent a particular
conflict meets certain publicly acknowledged crite-
ria or “tests”; this allows just war theorists to
assess the relative “guilt” or “innocence” of the
warring parties and the justifiability of their
responses before, during, and after hostilities.
The standards of just war are high. At the out-
set of hostilities, for instance, parties must show
880 War
proper grounds for going to war (jus ad bellum),
and once hostilities begin, they must adhere to cer-
tain standards of military conduct (jus in bellum).
For van Creveld, parties seeking to establish the
justice of their cause must show that the war is
being fought with the legitimate authority of a
government that has the support of the people; that
the war is being fought with the intent of address-
ing a specific and appropriate grievance, such as
keeping the peace or addressing a clearly justifiable
wrong; and that the military prosecuting the war
uses force that is proportionate to the threat.
Walzer’s treatment of just war, however, suggests
additional criteria. Because, according to just war
theory, armed conflict must always be the course
of last resort, parties must establish (a) that they
have exhausted ordinary means of resolving the
conflict, (b) that the war would have tangible ben-
efits that outweigh the harms that it will inevitably
inflict, and (c) that the parties would have a good
chance of attaining their objectives. Furthermore,
parties must show that the safety of noncombat­
ants has been respected and that the war has
resulted in a “just peace” acceptable to all sides.
In an age of nuclear weapons and other weap-
ons of mass destruction, the notion of just war and
its various tests have become controversial. Walzer
notes the ways in which policy realists dismiss the
framework of just war as irrelevant—indeed,
Clausewitz summarily declares such strictures to
be nonsense—while pacifists reject the notion of a
“just” war altogether. The terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and U.S. involvement in Iraq
and Afghanistan have further tested the criteria of
just war by raising important questions about the
proper response to enemies who reject the conven-
tions of just war, the problems of “preventative
war” in response to uncertain intelligence reports,
and the proper treatment of those detained during
military action. Though these questions present
significant and difficult challenges to just war the-
ory, van Creveld contends that the notion of just
war continues to remain relevant, because the men
and women who fight and die in war always need
to establish that the justice of their cause outweighs
their sacrifice. As the challenges of war change,
reflection continues to be necessary to establish the
conventions and criteria that make armed conflict
intelligible, legitimate, and limited.
War and Identity
Scholars of warfare universally recognize that war
is an extreme environment that has important and
far-reaching effects on those touched by it. Indeed,
the methodical training and discipline that
Clausewitz demands are intended to help soldiers
caught in the middle of battle to survive the
trauma of combat. Yet war and the effects of war
are not confined to combatants alone. Today, the
mass migrations of refugees, humanitarian crises,
and programs of ethnic cleansing emerging from
low-intensity conflicts have significant political,
cultural, and psychological implications that
extend far beyond those immediately involved in
the fighting.
Warfare also has more indirect effects on soci-
ety and culture. Perhaps the subtlest effect emerges
in how military metaphors have come to penetrate
the everyday conversation of the postindustrial
marketplace, as executives consult Sun Tzu in
developing business plans, the military language of
“strategies” and “tactics” predominates in corpo-
rate discourse, and the business world matter-of-
factly expects the same level of strategic
aggressiveness and calculation that Clausewitz
expects of his generals. The interrelationship is not
accidental. Observers of Clausewitz’s military
theory often note the interrelationship between his
understanding of the creation and deployment of
military force and the broader development of
bureaucratic organizations and technological prog-
ress that occurred throughout the 19th and 20th
centuries. Clausewitz sees strong parallels between
warfare and the competition between business
interests, which he understands to be an essential
part of the political life of states. At the same time,
however, this subtle interrelationship also has sig-
nificant ethical and social implications that can go
unnoticed by those embedded in it.
Scholars have also noted the important implica-
tions of war for our understanding of gender. For
instance, Keegan shows how much Clausewitz’s
understanding of warfare both reflected and
informed the European understanding of masculin-
ity that was predominant during the 19th and early
20th centuries. For generations of European men,
Keegan contends, war and military service were
understood to be vital rites of passage, the crucible

where honor and courage were simultaneously
tested and forged. Van Creveld notes the forgotten
place of women in this cult of masculinity—a fact
that is especially true of Clausewitz’s text, which
contains no reference to women at all—and he
observes that war remains a deeply gendered phe-
nomenon, an area of human existence in which
men and women are still kept separate. For mili-
tary studies, this omission is particularly tragic, not
only because it ignores the heroic contributions of
the women who have fought and died in war but
also because women and their children are particu-
larly vulnerable to the effects of war, including
displacement, starvation, and rape. For van Creveld,
acknowledging the presence and contributions of
women in war is an essential but nevertheless miss-
ing part of military theory, as women increasingly
become active participants in war and increasingly
face the consequences of low-intensity conflicts
that directly target noncombatants.
In his cultural history of war, Keegan raises a
provocative question that has important implica-
tions for those who seek to understand the human
person: Is war an inevitable part of human nature?
Are people naturally warlike or naturally collab-
orative and peaceful? Keegan finds no easy answer
to that question, suggesting instead that warfare,
while perhaps not intrinsic to human nature, is a
habit that has become so ingrained that it has
become second nature to human life. For this rea-
son, he concludes, although war will always exist
and armies of some sort will always be necessary,
war itself—how it is fought and understood—
remains a habit that can, and perhaps must, be
changed.
C. T. Maier
See also Conflict; Terrorism
Further Readings
Clausewitz, C. von. (1971). On war (O. J. Matthijs
Jolles, Trans.). New York: Random House. (Original
work published 1832)
Keegan, J. (1993). A history of warfare. New York:
Knopf.
Liddell Hart, B. H. (1991). Strategy (2nd rev. ed.).
London: Meridian.
Whiteness Studies 881
Sun Tzu. (1993). The art of warfare (R. T. Ames, Trans).
New York: Ballantine.
van Creveld, M. (1991). The transformation of war: The
most radical reinterpretation of armed conflict since
Clausewitz. New York: Free Press.
Waltzer, M. (1992). Just and unjust wars (2nd ed.). New
York: Basic Books.
Whiteness Studies
As an academic field, whiteness studies began in
the 1990s for the purpose of critically examining
what it means to be White in the United States.
Black writers such as James Baldwin and W. E. B.
Du Bois wrote about whiteness much earlier. Du Bois
defined whiteness as ownership of the earth. David
Roediger defined whiteness as a destructive ideol-
ogy exercising political force despite its discrediting
as a culture, meaning that though many White
people do not recognize that they have a race, they
have been given profound systematic advantages.
In fact, Ruth Frankenberg found that her research
participants experienced being White as unmarked
and unnamed. Christine Sleeter wrote that charac-
teristics of whiteness include ravenous materialism,
competitive individualism, and a way of living
characterized by putting acquisition of possessions
above humanity.
Because naming White as a racial category with
advantages was not previously included in the aca-
demic curriculum, whiteness studies is considered a
suppressed history. Though whiteness studies is
often traced to the writings of Black intellectuals as
early as David Walker’s Whites as Heathens and
Christians in 1830, its inclusion in the academic
curriculum was spurred by mostly White writers
and intellectuals who study history, literature,
labor movements, economics, popular culture,
identity development, and communication. Because
of its interdisciplinary nature, whiteness studies
has no specific journals, professional associations,
book series, or academic departments in the United
States, though a professional association exists in
Australia. Nonetheless, the field has offered pro-
vocative scholarship exposing the problem of
whiteness. There is an international whiteness
studies movement with scholarship coming from
882 Whiteness Studies
Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia as
well as the United States. This entry focuses on
whiteness studies as it pertains to the United
States.
The Beginnings of Whiteness Studies
Black writers were the first to write about white-
ness. Du Bois offered that though the degradation
of others is as old as humankind, Europe discov-
ered the eternal worldwide mark of meanness—
color. Baldwin wrote that White people realize
that the history written by White people is mythic
but that White people do not know how to release
themselves from the myth. Subsequently, White
people suffer from the incoherence of claiming to
be perpetuators of justice and democracy while
being appallingly oppressive. Whiteness studies
offers a means for White people to release them-
selves by naming and recognizing their ancestors’
role in past oppression and their current benefits as
a group and as individuals from these acts.
In addition to Roediger, Noel Ignatiev is consis-
tently associated with whiteness studies. Roediger
wrote that the field’s foundational texts would
include Alexander Saxton’s The Rise and Fall of
the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass
Culture in Nineteenth-Century America, written in
1990, and Toni Morrison’s Playing in the Dark:
Whiteness and the Literary Imagination, published
in 1992. Acknowledging the field’s impetus,
Roediger’s 1998 edited book Black on White
offers examples of what Black writers had to say
about White people.
Current Concepts in Whiteness Studies
The body of literature encapsulating whiteness
studies includes the intersections of the social con-
struction of race with antiracist consciousness-
raising and the analyses of the culture of whiteness,
immigration to the United States, and economics
of labor practices. Because whiteness studies can-
not be described without an understanding of the
literature that defines it, overlapping themes of
whiteness studies are described here along with a
few examples of authors and their works. These
are not exclusive categories of themes but rather
porous intersections of topics that are common
throughout the field of whiteness studies.
Social Construction of Race
The cornerstone of whiteness studies is the
understanding that race is socially constructed.
Race is not a natural phenomenon but rather was
created by White men to advantage themselves and
disadvantage others. Means of separating humans
into racial groups is based on social models that
represented scientists’ biases and attitudes of the
time rather than on biological fact. Current-day
biologists and anthropologists agree that there is
no organic fact of race. Means used today to iden-
tify human groupings, such as through antibodies
and DNA, have no correlation with racial group-
ings. However, there are profound historical and
current-day social implications of race. Ignatiev
wrote that Africans were not enslaved because
they were Black; rather, they were defined as Black
because they were enslaved.
Ivan Hannaford’s 1996 Race: The History of an
Idea in the West is a detailed historical account of
how early Greek philosophical writings planted
the seeds for the creation of the idea of race that
was nourished by European scientists in the 1500s
and refined in the 1700s into racial groupings we
can recognize today. Frankenberg’s edited book
Displacing Whiteness contains essays that expose
current-day repercussions of the social construc-
tion of race.
Attention has also been paid to the role that
place or geography has had on the social construc-
tion of race. For example, Joe Kincheloe and
William Pinar, in several essays as well as in a
1991 edited book, explore the significance of the
U.S. South as a place of slavery, a place under
attack, and a place where people are longing for
atonement.
Antiracism
When they first hear of whiteness studies, some
people perceive it to be connected to White
supremacy groups, when in fact whiteness studies
exposes the detriments of White supremacy to all
people. A goal of whiteness studies is the erasure of
racism and other oppressions from society. This
can occur first through the recognition that racism
exists. Raphael Ezekiel’s 1995 text The Racist
Mind is an account of extreme racism from inside
neo-Nazi and Ku Klux Klan groups. However,
more numerous antiracist works are memoirs of

White scholars reflecting on their lives in White
communities where extreme racism, as well as
more subtle forms of racism, was rampant. These
include Melton McLaurin’s Separate Pasts:
Growing Up in the Segregated South (1987), Mab
Segrest’s Memoir of a Race Traitor (1999), Timothy
Tyson’s Blood Done Sign My Name (2004), and
Tim Wise’s White Like Me: Reflections on Race
From a Privileged Son (2005). These books offer
personal experiences of the emotional and psycho-
logical cost of racism on both people of color and
White people. These authors expose how they were
influenced by those around them to continue racist
practices and also to become antiracist activists.
Joel Kovel’s White Racism: A Psychohistory
(1970), Roediger’s Towards the Abolition of
Whiteness (1994), and Benjamin Bowser and
Raymond Hunt’s edited volume Impacts of Racism
on White Americans (1996) analyze the costs of
racism to White Americans and to their institu-
tions and organizations.
It is one thing to read about whiteness and quite
another to discover how one can and should act
once knowing about whiteness. Subsequently,
there is an application aspect to whiteness studies.
Several authors have addressed the “so what now
what” aspect of whiteness studies. They include
Allen Johnson’s 2006 book Privilege, Power and
Difference, in which he offers a chapter titled
“What Can We Do?” Paul Kivel’s book Uprooting
Racism: How White People Can Work for Justice,
written in 1995, also advocates for ways in which
people can fight racism. There is also novel work
being reported in the area of ally development in
higher education. Allies are those people who
work to confront oppression when they are not the
targets of that oppression. In their study on racial
justice ally development, Robert Reason, Elizabeth
Roosa Millar, and Tara Scales found that college
students were more likely to become racial justice
allies when they were invited to participate in
opportunities to reflect on their racial identity.
This was especially the case in structured experi-
ences such as in coursework and activities that
involved people of color. Opportunities to work
with other allies encouraged students to continue
to be not only allies but mentors for allies. These
researchers found that their study participants
responded to specific and concrete opportunities
for action.
Whiteness Studies 883
European Immigration
Roediger and Ignatiev, as well as others, have
written about how immigrants to the United States
considered race both before coming and after hav-
ing arrived. It has been noted that one of the first
aspects of American life learned by new immigrants
is the “n” word. In instances of several immigrant
groups from Europe, the abandonment of their
national identity and complicit joining of a White
racist identity allowed for a higher status above
people of color. Ignatiev’s 1995 work, How the
Irish Became White, follows Irish immigrants as
they left a country opposed to slavery and became
supporters of a slavery state. Ignatiev noted that the
misery of the Irish in the United States in the 1850s
was severe. The life expectancy was only 6 years
after arrival. Efforts of the Irish to gain rights simi-
lar to those of other White men conflicted with the
efforts by free Blacks to maintain their right to
work. Karen Brodkin’s book How Jews Became
White Folks and What That Says About Race in
America (1998) and Roediger’s 2006 book Working
Toward Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants
Became White: The Strange Journey From Ellis
Island to the Suburbs also expound on the racial
mutation of immigrant groups.
Du Bois exclaimed that the public and psycho-
logical wage of whiteness led to many workers
defining themselves as White, yet at a cost. Authors
of whiteness studies acknowledge whiteness as a
prize but verify that it comes at a cost of sacrificing
the moral self and an ethnic heritage.
Culture of Whiteness
Several articles on whiteness studies proposed
that there were two disagreeing camps within
whiteness studies. One camp promotes the exis-
tence of a White culture and White subcultures.
Writers in this group include cultural critics such
as Fred Pfeil, who, in White Guys (1995), analyzed
White rock and Wild West cultures. In 1997, Matt
Wray and Annalee Newitz edited White Trash,
which illuminated cultural characteristics of poor
Whites. Ignatiev advocates for the abolition of
whiteness, which necessitates the resistance of the
perks that come with being White. Ignatiev claims
that without privilege, there would be no signifi-
cance to White as a racial marker. In fact, he wants
to destroy the meaning associated with race. For
884 Whiteness Studies
many years, he edited a newsletter and later a jour-
nal called Race Traitor, which carried the motto
“treason to whiteness is loyalty to humanity.”
Today there is a “Race Traitor” online journal.
Class and Labor Studies
How race influences socioeconomic status and
labor practices in the United States and around the
globe is another theme of the genre that is white-
ness studies. The struggles of poor White people
and their perception of race against the main-
stream myth that the poor in the United States are
solely Black and urban is a reoccurring topic of
analysis. According to Roediger, whiteness schol-
arship reflects Marxist commitments to social
problems. In her book The Politics of Whiteness
(2001), Michelle Brattain examined how racial
discrimination and hence occupational segregation
contributed to the definitions of race. She main-
tains that jobs are important representations of
racial identity. This mirrors the notion of Black
feminist scholar Patricia Hill Collins that White
people are their work, whereas Black people do
their work.
Tensions Within Whiteness Studies
In addition to the disagreement over the existence
or nonexistence of White culture, there also is ten-
sion over other aspects of whiteness studies. First,
why might it be that though early Black authors
wrote about whiteness, it took White authors writ-
ing about whiteness to move the field into aca-
demia? White authors had to legitimize whiteness
studies in order for it to gain entry as a field. This
phenomenon is exactly what whiteness studies
authors are trying to expose and eliminate: the
privilege and advantage of White people.
Moreover, by writing about whiteness, White
authors are accepted as genuine contributors to the
multicultural and social justice paradigm in ways
they were not previously. Paradoxically, the bulk
of what traditionally was taught in schools and
colleges was the history, literature, and experi-
ences of White people. However, it was not labeled
as such, but rather as universal scholarship. The
European American experience had been studied
for quite some time and without critique. Whiteness
studies offers a critique of the mythic America
where people succeed based on merit alone.
However, in adding whiteness studies to the cur-
riculum, it adds more in the curriculum about
White people. At least now it is a critical look.
There is also a concern from whiteness studies
authors of generalizing too broadly about the
experiences of White people. Some authors fear
that offering too generalized a picture of whiteness
does not adequately express the complexities of
society and lived experience. Whiteness studies
attempts to offer complexity to its interdisciplinary
subjects—history, economics, psychology, and
education about poor and rural White people as
well as those who are rich, middle class, and sub-
urban. In addition, where might the new scholar-
ship on multiracial people and their experiences be
placed? Proponents of White racial identity models
and ally identity development models promote the
notion that advocating for social justice is a devel-
opmental task, emphasizing that descriptors of
White people (like all people) should be nuanced
and multifaceted. Educators and psychologists
believe that through individual customary cogni-
tive development, in addition to educational efforts,
racist attitudes and behaviors can be eliminated.
Lastly, if the purpose of whiteness studies is to
eliminate the notion of whiteness, does writing
about it help achieve this intent, or does whiteness
become more legitimized by holding whiteness up
to the microscope? Most whiteness scholars would
concur that exposing and problematizing white-
ness are necessary. Before a social problem can be
eliminated, it must first be exposed, defined, and
dissected. This process then allows society to begin
to forge a way to enact solutions without its racist
underpinnings.
Criticism of Whiteness Studies
Such provocative scholarship as whiteness studies
has received intense criticism from outside the
field. Newsweek magazine reported in 2003 that
Ignatiev was one of the 10 most dangerous minds
in the United States. Whiteness studies has been
called a leftist philosophy, a derogatory term for
Western civilization, and important only to those
who think ethnic studies has not made sufficient
progress in challenging Anglo-American bias,
Roediger wrote that whiteness studies has become
a lightning rod for critics. This is partly because

whiteness studies is not specialized but rather
crosses several disciplines; a cursory glance often
misses its broad narratives and impact. It is also
the case that whiteness studies questions some of
our most profound assumptions about U.S. soci-
ety. The existence of criticism suggests that white-
ness studies is taken seriously.
Jan Arminio
See also Culture, Ethnicity, and Race; White Racial
Identity
Further Readings
Bailey, P. (2003, July 14). World without “white.”
Newsweek, p. 7.
Baldwin, J. (1998). On being White . . . and other lies. In
D. R. Roediger (Ed.), Black on White: Black writers
on what it means to be White (pp. 177–180).
New York: Schocken Books. (Original work published
1984)
Breines, W. (2006). The trouble between us: An uneasy
history of White and Black women in the feminist
movement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Collins, P. H. (1991). Black feminist thought: Knowledge,
consciousness, and the politics of empowerment.
New York: Routledge.
Du Bois, W. E. B. (1998). The souls of White folks. In
D. R. Roediger (Ed.), Black on White: Black writers
on what it means to be White (pp. 184–199). New
York: Schocken Books. (Original work published
1920)
Fears, D. (2003, June 20). Hue and cry on “whiteness
studies”: An academic field’s take on race stirs interest
and anger. Washington Post, p. A01.
Frankenberg, R. (1993). White women, race matters: The
social construction of whiteness. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Goldstein, E. (2006). The price of whiteness: Jews, race,
and American identity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Ignatiev, N. (1995). How the Irish became White.
New York: Routledge.
Jacobson, M. F. (2006). Roots too: White ethnic revival
in post-civil rights America. Boston: Harvard
University Press.
Negra, D. (2006). The Irish in us: Irishness,
performativity, and popular culture. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press.
Reason, R. D., Roosa Millar, E., & Scales, T. C. (2005).
Toward a model of racial justice ally development.
White Racial Identity 885
Journal of College Student Development, 46,
530–546.
Roediger, D. R. (1994). Towards the abolition of
whiteness. London: Verso.
Roediger, D. R. (Ed.). (1998). Black on White: Black
writers on what it means to be White. New York:
Schocken Books.
Roediger, D. R. (2006, July 14). Whiteness and its
complications. The Chronicle of Higher Education,
p. B5.
Sletter, C. (1996). White silence, White solidarity. In
N. Ignatiev & J. Garvey (Eds.), Race traitor
(pp. 258–265). New York: Routledge.
Talbot, M. (1997, November 30). Getting credit for
being White: Porn theory and queer scholarship were
last year’s college news. The latest academic trend:
Whiteness studies. The New York Times Magazine,
pp. 116–119.
Yemma, J. (1997, December 21). “Whiteness studies”:
An attempt at healing. Boston Sunday Globe,
pp. A1, A40.
White Racial Identity
White racial identity refers to how White people
conceptualize their sense of self as members of the
White race. A person’s racial identity is influenced
by a complex mixture of environmental forces
(e.g., familial attitudes, geography), individual
attributes (e.g., cognitive development), and per-
sonal life experiences. For many White individu-
als, an extremely influential aspect of racial
identity is being a member of the numerical major-
ity and the socioeconomic and political dominant
group. White racial identity models have been cre-
ated as a way to understand how White people
could escape the effects of living in a racist society.
Two theorists who are most connected with White
racial identity development are Janet Helms and
Rita Hardiman. Both began their work within the
same 5-year period (1979–1984) but did so inde-
pendently. Both models propose a progression
toward a personal responsibility and abandon-
ment of racism. The discussion here focuses mostly
on the work of Helms because she has attempted
to verify the model through empirical research.
Though initially considered a stage theory,
whereby a person moves through a linear process
of increased acknowledgement of racism and
886 White Racial Identity
consciousness, Helms replaced her initial concept
of “stage” with “statuses” to better communicate
that people can act and have attitudes at all levels
simultaneously but have one status from which to
behave most comfortably.
Progression Through Helms’s
White Racial Identity Development
According to Helms, there are two phases of White
racial identity development: overcoming racism
and developing a positive sense of self as a White
person. The statuses in the abandoning racism
phase are contact, disintegration, and reintegra-
tion. The statuses of pseudo independence, emer-
sion, and autonomy lead one to a positive sense of
self as a White person.
Contact
Contact is the status of White people who are
becoming aware that different racial groups exist.
Depending on where an individual lives, this could
occur at a very young age or not until early adoles-
cence. Television has allowed White people in
secluded areas to become more aware of people of
other racial groups at an earlier age than in the
past. Racial naïveté could be a simple description
of contact. Even if people realize that people of
other races exist, people in contact do not believe
that there are consequences of belonging to a par-
ticular racial group. Common contact statements
include, “I’m color blind,” “I don’t see race,” or “I
belong to the human race.” All the while, this per-
son is benefiting from racism. Consequently, this
person remains satisfied with the racial status quo
and judges people of color according to White
cultural criteria. The longer the person remains
segregated from people of color, the longer he or
she will be most comfortable in acting from a con-
tact perspective.
Disintegration
Through socialization with people of color,
White people usually discover that not all people
are treated equally and that differences in treat-
ment are often determined by racial group. For
example, a White person may notice how often a
colleague of color is stopped for speeding, asked to
speak on behalf of his or her race, or singled out
because of his or her race. The person may begin
to feel guilty and anxious about such realizations.
As these negative feelings increase, White individu-
als may attempt to alleviate the guilt and anxiety
by avoiding any occasion to witness these inequi-
ties or by beginning to blame people of color for
them. Moreover, the desire to be accepted by one’s
own White racial group influences one’s racial
belief system.
Reintegration
In this status, sometimes referred to as the “rac-
ist” status, to avoid guilt and anxiety, White people
consciously acknowledge a White identity where
they idealize people of their own race and grow
intolerant of people in other racial groups. From
the status of reintegration, they not only believe
that bad things happen to bad people but that per-
haps bad things should happen to people of color.
Individuals in this status believe that White culture
is superior and that White people are superior.
Helms noted both a passive and an active aspect of
reintegration. Reintegration behavior does not
only entail outrageous and criminal behaviors such
as joining hate groups and attending cross burn-
ings (active reintegration) but also subtler behav-
iors, such as telling racist jokes, not welcoming
people of color into one’s community, only reading
literature of one’s cultural group, and only advo-
cating for one’s own needs (passive reintegration).
Pseudo Independence
Many White people can come to see, act, and
behave beyond reintegration often through wit-
nessing racist events or connecting racism to their
own experiences of oppression (i.e., sexism,
homophobia, classism, ableism). Through these
connections, White individuals begin to under-
stand the reality of oppression. This reality often
occurs first as an intellectual exercise. People often
begin to read about race and racism, attend lec-
tures, and contemplate racial issues as they pertain
to society at large. However, because at this point
the White person has few White social justice men-
tors, he or she may want to help people of color
become more like White people, rather than desir-
ing to change the racist beliefs of White people.

Immersion/Emersion
In this status, White people begin to under-
stand their individual responsibility in creating a
more just society and the ways they personally
benefit from racism. They begin to reflect upon
their racist behaviors and those of people around
them as well as the systematic nature of racism.
They read biographies of White people who are
antiracist activists, find mentors who are antira-
cist activists, and join groups that promote antira-
cist work. In addition, they assess their individual
actions and contemplate how they must change
their behaviors to create a more just society. Such
individuals learn skills to confront others’ racism
and, in doing so, begin to take on a positive racial
identity. Some feel liberated from previously held
distortions of themselves and other racial groups.
In this status, White people dive into (immersion)
learning about their racial group and subsequently
learn to work with other racial groups, diving
from one’s own group (emersion).
Autonomy
Though autonomy is a difficult status from
which to behave consistently, people in this status
work collaboratively with others to eliminate indi-
vidual and systematic racism. To act in autonomy
means to go against the status quo of White supe-
riority. It means to confront racist practices,
including those of supervisors, family members,
friends, and teachers. One’s commitment to con-
front racism can be measured by what one is will-
ing to risk on behalf of it; in autonomy, White
individuals take risks. In doing so, they feel posi-
tive about being White.
People use internal standards for defining them-
selves. They take advantage of opportunities to
learn from other racial groups and become increas-
ingly aware of the oppression of other stigmatized
groups in addition to racial groups. Autonomy
requires ongoing learning and action.
Application
White racial identity models were created as a
way to understand how White people could
escape the effects of living in a racist society. One
of the foundations of White racial identity devel-
opment is that as a result of socialization, it is
White Racial Identity 887
difficult for White people to be immune to racist
tendencies.
White racial identity development not only
describes a model by which a White person can
overcome racist attitudes and behaviors and come
to have a positive White identity, but it also pro-
vides a means to better serve clients and students
in a variety of settings. Because we live in an
increasingly diverse society, and because making
social justice reality requires cultural cohesion
across differences, there is a need for the general
population to become multiculturally competent.
Interactive Dyads
Helms created an interaction application model
to demonstrate how the racial identity develop-
ment of counselor and client dyads influences the
counseling process. This model is based on the
framework of parallel, regressive, and progressive
relationships. A progressive relationship—the inter-
action dyad with the largest potential for growth—is
a relationship in which the person with the most
influence (i.e., the counselor, supervisor, or teacher)
has developed a more complex racial identity than
the person with less power (the client, student, or
employee). For example, this would occur when a
counselor is most often behaving from the status of
autonomy and the client is most often behaving
from the status of contact, disintegration, or reinte-
gration in White racial identity or encounter in
Black or people-of-color racial identity. Racial
identity theorists believe that progressive relation-
ships lead to a stronger counselor–client relation-
ship, are more likely to not end prematurely, and
offer the most potential for client growth.
A regressive relationship occurs when the per-
son with the most influence or power in the rela-
tionship has a less complex racial identity. In this
relationship, the client’s growth is stifled. Because
people of color typically learn about race and
racial consequences earlier than do White people,
it is not uncommon for the White “helper” to have
a less sophisticated racial identity than the student
or client of color. These relationships can be sti-
fling if not harmful to clients of color.
Lastly, a parallel relationship is when the client
and counselor share a racial identity worldview. It
is the least contentious of the three types of interac-
tions, but there is little potential for growth. The
888 Womanism
counselor, teacher, or supervisor is unable to chal-
lenge the client, student, or employee to think more
complexly about race. This interaction model could
also be helpful in other interactive dyads, such as in
trying to understand and mediate conflicts.
Theory Validity
When Helms first proposed her model, the reinte-
gration aspect of her model, in particular, was
criticized. Some White people rejected the idea of
reintegration because they did not join hate groups,
burn crosses in lawns, or use racist language.
However, it is argued that they failed to consider
the subtler and more common forms of racial bias
as behaviors and attitudes encompassed in reinte-
gration. Subsequently, more authors and research-
ers have acknowledged the validity of both active
and passive reintegration.
Whereas Helms’s model is readily accepted by
researchers, the instrument most associated with
measuring White racial identity, the White Racial
Identity Attitudes Scale (WRIAS), has come
under scrutiny for psychometric reasons. When
tested using factor and component analyses, the
WRIAS scales do not consistently hold up inde-
pendently, and the factors do not correspond to
the theory. Other research indicates that the
WRIAS has yielded adequate reliability estimates
to measure factors such as White superiority/
segregationist ideology, cross-racial competence and
comfort, and interest in racial diversity. In essence,
though the WRIAS has psychometric problems in
measuring White racial identity development,
it does measure important constructs of the the-
ory. Furthermore, there is debate over whether
White identity development is a theory of
what White people should do and feel or rather
what they are meant to do.
Some theorists question the conceptualization
of Helms’s White racial identity theory in that it
was formulated on similar grounding as William
Cross’s Black racial identity development.
Regardless of the psychometric concerns, the the-
ory has had a major impact on the identity devel-
opment expectations of White people.
Jan Arminio
See also Being and Identity; Culture, Ethnicity, and Race;
Development of Identity; Development of Self-Concept;
Whiteness Studies
Further Readings
Carter, R. T. (1997). Is White a race? Expressions of
White racial identity. In M. Fine, L. Weis,
L. C. Powell, & L. Mun Wong (Eds.), Off white:
Readings on race, power, and society (pp. 198–211).
New York: Routledge.
Cross, W. E., Jr. (1971). The Negro-to-Black conversion
experience: Toward a psychology of Black liberation.
Black World, 20, 13–27.
Hardiman, R. (2001). Reflections on White identity
development theory. In C. L. Wijeyesinghe &
B. W. Jackson III (Eds.), New perspectives on racial
identity development: A theoretical and practical
anthology (pp. 108–128). New York: New York
University Press.
Helms, J. (1990). Black and White racial identity.
Westport, CT: Praeger.
Helms, J. (1995). An update of Helms’ White and people
of color models. In J. G. Ponterotto, J. M. Casas,
L. A. Suzuki, & C. M. Alexander (Eds.), Handbook of
multicultural counseling (pp. 181–199). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Tatum, B. D. (2003). Why do all the Black kids sit
together in the cafeteria? And other questions about
race. New York: Basic Books.
Wing, L., & Rifkin, J. (2001). Racial identity
development and the mediation of conflicts. In
C. L. Wijeyesinghe & B. Jackson III (Eds.), New
perspectives on racial identity development:
A theoretical and practical anthology (pp. 182–208).
New York: New York University Press.
Womanism
Womanism is a form of feminism that focuses on
the perspectives and experiences of women of
color. As a term, it has an often-quoted genealogy.
In 1983, Alice Walker coined the term with a four-
part definition in her text In Search of Our
Mother’s Gardens. The first part of the definition
emphasizes the importance of women’s handing
down their wisdom from one generation of women
to the next. The second part of the definition
stresses communal thought and action. The third
part of the definition critiques the standards of
beauty Black women are subjected to. Finally,
womanism is a critique of the limitations of White
feminist thought and activism and its shortcom-
ings in dealing with race and class. This etymology
is the birthplace of womanism as a term but not as

a tradition. In this entry, the etymology or history
of the term is mentioned, but the focus is on the
ways in which womanism functions as a theory,
method of inquiry, and framework for identities.
Theorizing womanist rhetoric is about locating
the cultural and theoretical narratives that place
Black women at the center of their own narrative.
This has been the overarching goal of womanist
scholarship since its inception. This goal recog-
nizes that for centuries, women in general and
Black women in particular have been the oppressed
subjects of “universalizing” European academic
discourse.
Womanist scholars bring to academic theorizing
their own historic locations and cultural, social,
and political knowing. This knowing is born out of
a place of liberation rather than a constant dwell-
ing on the limiting discourse of oppression. This
opens womanist scholarship up to new possibilities
for theorizing. For womanists, theorizing happens
primarily outside of the academy as a result of
finding solutions to the problems that persist in the
communities of women of color. Through woman-
ist theorizing, scholars have created a paradigm
and a discourse shaped as much by experiences as
raced, classed, and gendered as by identities aligned
as sexual, professional, or national.
The strength of womanist theorizing lies in the
privileging of multiple identities in a singular body.
This means that the womanist is understood to be
gender/race/class/sex/family/friend/worker/nation.
These are not mutually exclusive identity con-
structs that exist as boxes on shelves like so many
pairs of shoes. Identities, unlike shoes, can be worn
40 at a time. Womanist theorists may be inclined
to delete the slashes in this construct, preferring
instead to argue that the strength in the theory is
the ability to reveal the world as an interlocking
narrative of genderraceclasssexfamilyfriendwork-
ernation. Without punctuation to separate identi-
ties that are mutually informative and totally
encompassing, womanists utilize all the cultural
scripts available to investigate the world and artic-
ulate modes of change. The cultural scripts used to
construct a worldview that gives moral agency to
Africana women can be spiritual, academic, reli-
gious, literary, music, personal narrative, or all of
these. The creation of womanist knowledge is
mapped from local spaces to academic places.
Walker’s definition and coining of the term wom-
anism came at a critical juncture for Black women
Womanism 889
scholars who have developed a theory of woman-
ism that privileges multiplicity in identity. The
naming of the cultural identity womanist allowed
for the construction of theory and theology that
lead directly to epistemological centeredness.
Womanist Epistemology
Editors Marsha Houston and Olga Davis intro-
duce the volume Centering Our Selves with the
idea that in the daily lives of African American
men and women, there is an acknowledgment of
a cultural knowledge of survival. This cultural
knowledge is expanded daily with the embodied
narratives and performances of individuals within
a given community. Coming out in a variety of
ways in womanist scholarship, cultural knowl-
edge appears in the womanist consciousness and
informs narratives of self presented within this
text. This section explores the ways in which the
theory of knowledge is articulated as womanist
ways of knowing, which are authenticated through
communal discourses, both formal (academic)
and informal (daily cultural interactions), by
womanist scholars.
As a centralizing work that focuses on the ways
in which social knowledge is constructed in African
America, Patricia Hill Collins opens her text with
a positioning of the discourses of Black women.
For her, central to a discourse on Black feminism
is that it be understood not as an offshoot of White
feminist theories or movements but as a vital
movement and theory that is unique. She recalls, in
part, Walker’s fourth part of the womanist defini-
tion, which critiques White feminist thought and
activism. Collins is but one example in a long and
varied list of scholars who use Walker’s definition
of womanist to center a formal epistemology of
Black womanhood.
The use of Walker as a central access for wom-
anist epistemology allows for a relational discourse
of Black women’s theories that centers her narra-
tives as a valued part of the discourse. Collins
begins the historical account of womanist thought
with Maria Stewart, one of the first African
American women to be granted an itinerate minis-
ter’s license. This move locates womanist rhetoric
as a semiotic relationship between race, class, and
gender oppressions and predates Walker’s use of
the term. In hailing past discourses, womanist
scholars create tangible links to cultural ways of
890 Womanism
knowing that exist outside of the formal structure
of academe yet influence the ways in which theory
is articulated within that context.
Womanist ways of knowing often begin in the
informal cultural discourses that shape daily life.
In the modern era, one could argue that womanist
ways of knowing are informed as much by hip-hop
as by the Bible. History and personal narrative are
coconstructors of womanist knowledge in local
and global ways. By using scholars, preachers,
domestic workers, and political workers, woman-
ist scholars articulate the variation in interpreta-
tions of womanist. What is most important is the
diversity from which knowledge is created.
Womanist takes on the notion that knowledges are
created, shared, and maintained through various
methods. We engage in information sharing in
classrooms, living rooms, boardrooms, and chat
rooms. Knowledge produced and perpetuated
through and by the academy carries cultural
weight; yet at the same time, localized knowledge
is perhaps the most valuable to womanist scholars
as they seek to ensure their communities survive
and thrive.
Womanist Theology—Defining a Discourse
As part of the process of womanist theorizing,
practitioners become a transparent and an active
agent within the text. This does not mean that
there is a rampant self-disclosure without reflec-
tion. Rather, it requires that the scholar consider
herself or himself as both speaker and hearer of the
text presented. In this way, one remains consis-
tently engaged. In terms of womanist theology, this
is particularly evident in the scholars who take on
the definition of womanism and immediately put it
to use in the American Academy of Religion. In the
25 years since these women first began to engage in
womanist theology, there have been significant
changes in the landscape of theological education.
Much of that change is owed to the work of foun-
dational womanist theologians. As scholars, these
women and men expanded the academic space in
which theologians of color could function. The
contribution of womanist theology to womanist
identity discourse is of central import. Most women
of color find their primary institution of daily inter-
action outside of employment is with the church.
As the number of seminary-trained preachers
increases, the influence of womanist theology on
the daily lives of women also increases.
Womanist theologians define womanist theol-
ogy as a theological tradition with sermonic roots
that far extend its own short history. Womanist
readings of the Bible support a narrative of Black
women that is positive and productive for them
and their communities. Three foundational theo-
logical texts were written between 1984 and 1995.
Each text explores the questions of race and gen-
der as identity constructs that influence the prac-
tices of religion. Each work of early womanist
theology also served as a response to feminist the-
ology and liberation theology, which are unique
theological perspectives that deal with justice,
race, gender, or all of these, as elements of a
Christian hermeneutic.
As outsiders within, African American women
engage in a process of theology building that takes
on a critique of the limits of both feminist and
liberation theologies. What is unique about their
critique is that there is a legitimacy granted to
both feminist and liberation hermeneutics, while
at the same time African American women work
toward a legitimating space of their own that cen-
ters the narrative of Christ in the experience of
Black women.
In the introduction to Katie’s Canon, the defini-
tion and development of womanist theology brings
about a new methodology by which to view the
work of African American women in the American
Academy of Religion and the Society of Biblical
Literature. Cannon comes to her explanation
through some frustration with the limiting
responses she received from other theologians who
attempted to delegitimize Black women’s voices.
She developed a discourse of womanist theology
that located the narrative of Christ and the
redemption of the church within a space where
African American women could thrive without
apology or constant reminders of oppression. She
argued that womanist theology provides a
Christology that centers the salvation of women of
color within the redemptive discourse of Christ.
This means reading Christ as the savior of all and
not the savior of the few.
The work of womanist theologians met with early
resistance. Some read Walker’s all-encompassing
definition of womanism as one whose secular ori-
gins were not suitable for identity work within the

narrow parameters of theology. Others insisted
that it was time that theologies expand to allow
the voices of a new generation of scholars and
readers, each of whom may explore the meanings
of religious text for an ever-expanding identity
politic that looked at identities not as singularities
but multiple actions and discourses. This meant
necessarily interrogating dichotomies of theology,
such as feminist (White) versus womanist (Black),
while providing a critical response.
Some scholars, including Jacquelyn Grant, argue
that womanist theology is more closely aligned
with liberation theology. They demonstrate that
womanist theology serves the purpose of liberating
Black women from forms of Christology that sub-
jugate and marginalize women of color. Grant
explains that where feminist theologists might ask
how or if Jesus can be the savior of women, wom-
anist theologists look at why he is the savior of
everyone, particularly those oppressed in society.
What becomes central to Grant’s argument is the
humanity of African American women. Citing
from the Old Testament through to contemporary
movements by which Africana women experience
firsthand the voice of God, Grant estimates that if
God includes Africana women in his earliest
works, then their humanity cannot be denied. She
troubles the claim that it was only as slaves that
Africana women had biblical significance, by call-
ing the reader’s attention to the number of wives
and mothers whose Africanness is central to the
teachable moments of the Holy Spirit. She argues
that even as Christian slavery and its psychological
residue attempted to erase or misrepresent the
roles of biblical Africana women, the centrality of
their existence in basic biblical narratives is so
apparent that it becomes the theme of contempo-
rary Black women’s identity within the body poli-
tic of Jesus Christ. In this way, womanist theology
becomes a continued discourse in the lives of
women of color. It is these narratives that are then
preached from pulpits around the world, that pro-
vide libratory moments.
Womanist Ethics and the
Location of Authentic Voice
Womanist theology functions as a theory and
method of inquiry. Similarly, womanist ethics pro-
vides contemporary womanist scholars with a
Womanism 891
means to discuss womanist identity politics. The
ethic of voice in the womanist context is under-
stood in terms of the speaker and the cultural com-
munity. Voice is the authentic telling of truth and
knowledge that is agreed upon between the scholar
and cultural community. Each possesses voice, and
the ethic of voice is constituted by and through
each person’s presence.
Womanist ethics as theory and method centers
the ethical and moral choices that Black women
make as foundational discourse. Womanist ethics
sets forth the argument that Black women are
capable of, and engaged in, ethical behaviors and
discourses. Womanist ethics speaks directly to the
images, discourses, and actions, upheld by norma-
tive ethics, that support a racist ideology against
Africana women. As a theory advanced in schol-
arly arenas, womanist ethics is grounded in the
daily practices and talk of women who, in their
lived experiences, speak back to normative ethics
that seek to discount them.
The backbone of this ethic is a clear understand-
ing of Black women’s daily applications and inter-
ventions in a contemporary moment. The test of
such theorizing, however, is the ability of a group
of people to live the ethic of the community over
time. Like womanist theology, womanist ethics and
womanist rhetoric are rooted in the lives of Africana
diaspora women in literary, historic, biblical, and
present-day narratives. Karen Baker-Fletcher argues
that only through the telling and hearing of wom-
en’s stories are women’s experiences articulated
and that storytelling is the singular construction of
womanist theological and ethical discourse.
It is through the telling of the personal past, both
triumph and tragedy, that a Black woman develops
an ethic of voice. Central to her ability to share her
story is a womanist appeal to her moral center and
the morality of her community. Next is her author-
ity as a speaker. For an ethic of voice to be effective,
a speaker must be viewed as having authority to
speak with knowledge and discernment. This
requires the speaker to be able to tap into her own
narrative and locate that narrative within the cul-
tural knowledge of the larger community. In this
way, womanist theo-ethicist Stacey Floyd-Thomas
argues for a method of doing womanist ethics
research. This method uses several elements, includ-
ing sacred text—both biblical and literary sources.
She acknowledges that the systematic analysis of
892 Womanism
such sources is strictly an academic pursuit, yet the
analysis is not foreign to the communities of
Africana women. She argues that as women
employ these sacred texts in their daily lives, they
draw on the narratives as a source of strength,
identity, and method through which to articulate
resistance.
What is unique to womanist ethics is the idea
that voice and narrative are central constructs for
identity and community. As such, a woman is
judged ethical through the way in which she tells
her narrative and that of others. It is through dis-
course, as much as through action, that one is
ethical. A primary example is seen in Toni
Morrison’s Beloved when Sethe tells of her choices
in providing liberty to her children. Morrison pre­
sents a character who, when judged by normative
standards, is unethical. However, in light of the
unethical rules of slavery that make a body not
human but property and yet also humanly and
morally responsible for the act of murder, which is
unethical, one sees the illogical demands of an
impossible bind. Morrison’s character sought her
own narrative of ethic voice, one that understands
the conundrum of multiple identities and the need
for an ethic that privileges an ultimate truth: Only
God can judge. Through the telling of the narra-
tive, the character establishes an ethic of voice that
allows the narrative of choice, liberty, and discern-
ment to be of central importance. Womanist ethics
is ultimately focused on the ways in which narra-
tive choices give rise to ethical discourses that are
practically and theoretically confirmed by the cul-
ture in which they exist.
Womanist Rhetoric
Womanist rhetoric is used as an umbrella to dis-
cuss the various formal and informal discourses
entered into by African American women. These
conversations center on the mental, physical, and
spiritual health, wealth, and vitality of African
American women and their community. This
includes an active discourse about the roles of race,
class, gender, and sexuality as normative social
constructs. Critical to womanist rhetoric are
authentic womanist voice, gendered cultural
knowledge, and ethical discourse for salvation.
Authentic womanist voice creates an opposi-
tional discourse to normative social constructs. The
identities constructed through normative discourses
function in both historic and contemporary frame-
works to demean, exploit, and destroy Black bod-
ies. Womanists employ an authentic womanist
voice to privilege their standpoint as social agents.
Womanist rhetoric seeks out the injustices within
and outside of the Black community. Womanist
social agents attempt to find humane and equitable
solutions for the good of the whole community
rather than simply the good of women.
Womanists employ gendered cultural knowledge
as a way to contextualize the world around them.
This is done through the use of narratives that con-
tain gendered verbal, nonverbal, and paralinguistic
cues. Central to gendered cultural knowledge are
the ways of knowing that come through the narra-
tive of Black women. Womanist intellectual tradi-
tion exists in and outside of the academy. As a
narrative, womanist rhetoric is identifiable by its
concern and search for equitable solutions to the
problems of liminal identity discourses that play
themselves out within and outside of the African
diaspora. Gendered cultural knowledge is used to
organize the narratives of Black women as solutions
to the problem of normative identity discourses that
exclude them and their unique ways of knowing.
Finally, womanist rhetoric contains an ethical
discourse for salvation. Ethical discourse for salva-
tion focuses on the ways in which Black women
organize their narratives to privilege their salva-
tion. This discourse is a response to normative
Christology that does not articulate a way for
Black women to attain salvation. Womanist social
agents engage in ethical discourse for salvation
through daily discourse, sermons, personal narra-
tives, novels, and other forms.
Spaces for Men and
Non-Black Womanists of Color
One of the most interesting and powerful aspects
of womanism is its usefulness to theorists and
practitioners of various identities. Where feminists
tends toward exclusionary identity politics, limit-
ing theoretical and practical space to those who
share in a gendered female identity, womanists
tend toward an open gender policy. Likewise,
although the earliest womanist definitions tended
to focus specifically on African American women,
this has not limited the use of the theory to only

women and men who choose to mark their bodies
within the racial constructs of blackness.
There are spaces for practitioners of womanism
that are not identified by the etymology of the
term. African American womanist scholars have
included the diverse intellectual traditions of race,
class, sexuality, and gender in their inquiries. It is
perhaps for this reason that scholars such as Gloria
Anzaldúa, Eric King Watts, Wenshue Lee,
Bernadette Calafell, Ronald L. Jackson II, and oth-
ers are comfortable working from womanist para-
digms of inquiry. Rather than be excluded from
this location of inquiry, scholars who share the
epistemological goals of womanism are encour-
aged to share in the intellectual work of equitable
justice and discourse espoused by the womanist
identity construct.
Toniesha Latrice Taylor
See also Afrocentricity; Diaspora; Gender; Language;
Liberation Theology; Worldview
Further Readings
Baker-Fletcher, K. E. (1994). A singing something: The
literature of Anna Julia Cooper as a resource for a
theological anthropology of voice. New York:
Crossroad.
Cannon, K. G. (1995). Katie’s canon: Womanism and the
soul of the Black community. New York: Continuum.
Collins, P. H. (2000). Black feminist thought: Knowledge,
consciousness, and the politics of empowerment. New
York: Routledge.
Floyd-Thomas, S. M. (2006). Mining the motherlode:
Methods in womanist ethics. Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim
Press.
Grant, J. (1989). White women’s Christ and Black
women’s Jesus: Feminist Christology and womanist
response. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press.
Morrison, T. (1987). Beloved. New York: Penguin.
Walker, A. (1983). In search of our mother’s garden:
Womanist prose. New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich.
World Systems Theory
World systems theory (WST) is an interdisciplinary
theoretical approach that advances an integrated
World Systems Theory 893
framework for examining the development and evo-
lution of the modern world under the transformative
cultural, political, and economic effects of capital-
ism. Founding theorist Immanuel Wallerstein
(1974) defined a world system as
[a] social system, one that has boundaries, struc-
tures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and
coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting
forces which hold it together by tension and tear
it apart as each group seeks eternally to remold it
to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an
organism, in that it has a lifespan over which its
characteristics change in some respects and
remain stable in others. . . . Life within it is
largely self-contained, and the dynamics of its
development are largely internal. (p. 347)
Four fundamental conceptions are at the heart
of WST. First, a world system is one social system
with many interlocking parts. Contemporary poli-
ties are not societies, but pieces of one socioeco-
nomic system expanding in the interests of capital.
Second, a world system is characterized by eco-
nomic conflict between varying polities, with the
market as the chief stratifying force. Polities vie for
access to, and control over, goods and services,
while their uneven positions within the market
produce distinct political and cultural effects.
Third, a world system is structured by a core, semi-
periphery, and periphery. The core consists of
advanced liberal democratic societies that are
industrialized, whereas the periphery remains
underdeveloped and exploited for its labor and
natural resources. The semi-periphery lies between
the core and periphery and has more access to nec-
essary goods and services but little control over the
division of labor and flow of power to the core.
Fourth, cycles of growth, contraction, contradic-
tion, and crisis affect the evolution of a world
system. Eventually, the world system of today will
give way to an alternative social order.
WST’s methodological approach draws from
the fields of history, sociology, economics, and
area studies. It has become a popular tool among
scholars interested in the large-scale and long-term
conceptions of historical development of global
society, critical understanding of the evolution and
plight of developing nations, and identity and
identity formation within the social sphere. This
894 World Systems Theory
entry discusses the rise of the modern world sys-
tem, the theoretical influences and criticisms of
WST, and the role of WST in identity and identity
formation studies.
The Rise of the Modern World System
According to WST, there have been three social
orders in human history: mini-systems, single-polity
world empires, and multipolity world economies.
Wallerstein located the origin of the modern mul-
tipolity world economy (i.e., the “modern world
system”) at the start of early European capitalist
mercantilism. With the spread of capitalist hege-
mony, distant geopolitical entities were incorpo-
rated into a singular market-based economy
characterized by a global division of labor. Unlike
world empires—societies dominated by extensive
political networks beholden to one political center—
the capitalist economy produced a system in which
multiple polities flourished under the expansion of
a singular economic order. In this system, eco-
nomic stratification became society’s principle
structuring factor.
World systems theorists argue that in the mod-
ern world system, society’s core is made up of
polities that established strong centralized govern-
ments, bureaucracies, armies, and cultural identi-
ties that allowed them to take part in the Industrial
Revolution and colonialism. These states devel-
oped technologies and social networks that allowed
them to produce and distribute complex goods and
services and attain an economic edge over others.
Over time, they fabricated diversified regional
economies marked by cutting-edge information
and service industries. Core states continue to have
stable political orders that facilitate long-term eco-
nomic planning and management while providing
insulation from external political intervention.
Conversely, polities that were previously colonized
or did not make the agrarian-to-industrial transfor-
mation (states located in what many today term the
Global South) have consistently been forced to sup-
ply natural resources that constitute those goods
and services and provide free or cheap labor. Many
continue to be exploited by foreign entities in con-
junction with local ruling classes. These polities are
internally polarized with respect to income, educa-
tion, and citizen life chances, and the majority live
far below the standards of core states. Some nations
have entered the semi-periphery by way of gain or
loss of stability in their political systems, alterations
to the level of diversification in their local econo-
mies, or changes to the integrity of culture and
quality of education within their borders. These
nations may set trade policies with the core or
periphery that benefit themselves, but they con-
tinue to contribute to the dominance of the core.
World system theorists recognize the United
States as the elite core polity. Wallerstein delin-
eated three types of economic dominance: produc-
tivity dominance (the ability to produce cheaper
and better products for a lower price), trade domi-
nance (the ability to sell more goods on the global
market), and financial dominance (the ability to
amass greater wealth and control the system’s
financial markets). Related to these types is mili-
tary dominance, which, according to world sys-
tems theorists, can cause polities to lose wealth
and status in the global economy. Wallerstein, for
example, believes that the United States is losing its
dominance as a result of costly and unpopular
postwar military exploits.
Theoretical Influences
WST emerged at the nexus of Marxism, develop-
ment theory, cyclical economics, and the Annales
School of historical studies. Along with Marxism,
WST takes a totalizing approach to humanity and
human history. Within this grand social history,
world systems theorists maintain that economic
conflict is the driving factor of social formation,
order, and change, and they consider social class as
the dominant social structure. Thus, WST adheres
to the historical materialist principle that describes
social evolution as divisible by material (as opposed
to ideal) stages of development. WST analyses are
expressed in Marxian dialectical terms.
With Marxism, WST also focuses on the increas-
ing alienation and estrangement of human labor,
proletarianization, and the commodification and
festishization of goods via an ever-expanding divi-
sion of labor. World systems theorists agree that
society’s division of labor is best characterized by a
ruling capital class (the core), which dominates a
subordinate, exploited class (the periphery and
semi-periphery). World systems theorists use the
language of surplus value, capital accumulation,
and uneven exchange to discuss social dynamics

within the system. World systems theorists also
draw upon Lucácsian and Gramscian notions of
class consciousness and hegemony in order to
reveal the powerful role ideas play in the world
economy. Foremost, world systems theorists advo-
cate for a socialist solution to the ills of the modern
capitalist order.
Following brands of development theory popu-
lar at its emergence, world systems theorists
oppose theories of modernization that assume the
nation-state is the main agent in the struggle for
modernization and that there is one trajectory that
all polities must follow. Instead, world systems
theorists view varying polities as interdependent
and in flux. Likewise, they emphasize underdevel-
opment as a form of avertable socioeconomic
exploitation. World systems theorists adopt the
language of dependency theory—terms that high-
light the uneven social relations between core and
peripheral states. However, they augment tradi-
tional dependency theory with recognition of a
liminal state that core and periphery move in and
out of (the semi-periphery).
Finally, WST is drawn from major concepts in
cyclical economics and Annales School historical
studies. World systems theorists are particularly
indebted to Joseph Schumpeter and Nikolai
Kondratiev, two economists focused on rise-and-
fall intervals pertaining to seismic economic shifts,
for their critical expansion/constriction view of
social history. WST is a combination of Schumpeter
and Kondratiev’s long-term cyclical perspective
and an Annales School longue durée historio-
graphical approach, wherein local events are por-
trayed in terms of broader historical dynamics and
regional socioeconomic transformations are ana-
lyzed with an eye to larger systematic shifts.
Recent Debates
Economists, sociologists, and historians alike
have criticized WST. Neoliberal and conservative
economists have criticized WST primarily for its
negative characterization of capitalism and glo-
balization, its prediction of the eventual rise of
socialism, and its characterization of core states as
hegemonic entities. Sociologists have suggested
that world systems theorists too often focus on
elite institutions and dominant discourses. Many
have, likewise, opposed the foregrounding of
World Systems Theory 895
economic, as opposed to political or cultural, con-
cerns. Historians have rejected specific historical
evidence provided by WST analyses. In particular,
broad characterizations of political booms and
declines have come under fire for failing to prove
the dominance of one or another polity in the
drive for capitalist accumulation.
Internal theoretical and empirical debates also
permeate the discourse. Some points of contention
include what countries have constituted the core,
semi-periphery, and periphery at a given time;
exactly when the transition from world empire to
world economy took place and who was at the
helm of that change; whether the cycles of growth
and decline are appropriate units of analysis for
describing social change and, if so, how they map
out over time; what constitutes hegemonic domi-
nance in a modern world system; what constitutes
growth or decline; what the relationship between
colonialism and capitalism is and how processes
between colony and metropole have informed
broader systemic change; and what contemporary
dynamics reveal about previous models.
Relationship to Identity
WST has inspired many scholars to criticize the
uneven relations between advanced liberal democ-
racies and less developed nations. It has provided a
framework and language for analyzing local and
historically particular instances of exploitation in
terms of a larger humanistic picture. WST has
become a popular tool for those writing revisionist
histories and sociologies. One example is Eric
Wolf’s Europe and the People Without History,
which drew together histories of local colonial
economies to make a systematic critique of capital-
ism under colonialism. Histories of colonial con-
tact and postcolonial effects are common themes in
WST. Together, these critical studies promote a
space for scholars to think relationally about iden-
tity, identity formation, and the categorical dichot-
omies that permeate today’s social sphere. In
particular, WST’s focus on grand-scale interconti-
nental processes permits a critical viewpoint on the
formation of racial concepts, the evolution of racial
theories, and the effects of concepts and theories in
the racial identities people assume today.
Catherine Bliss
896 Worldview
See also Class; Colonialism; Globalization; Hegemony;
Political Economy
Further Readings
Abu-Lugod, J. (1989). Before European hegemony: The
world system a.d. 1250–1350. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Chase-Dunn, C., & Grimes, P. (1995). World-systems
analysis. Annual Review of Sociology, 21, 387–417.
Chirot, D., & Hall, T. D. (1982). World-system theory.
Annual Review of Sociology, 8, 81–106.
Goldfrank, W. L. (2000). Paradigm regained? The rules
of Wallerstein’s world-system method. Journal of
World-Systems Research, 6, 150–195.
Wallerstein, I. (1974). The modern world system I:
Capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European
world-economy in the sixteenth century. New York:
Academic Press.
Wallerstein, I. (1984). Politics of the world-economy: The
states, the movements, and the civilizations.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Wolf, E. (1982). Europe and the people without history.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Worldview
To posit a discussion of identity and worldview is
to explore philosophical constructs of time, place,
and culture. The components of a definition of
oneself (self being a commonly accepted synonym
for the identity of the human) change depending
on the habitat of the human, the historical era in
which he or she lives, and the culture to which his
or her community subscribes.
One’s worldview encompasses not only one’s
particular and individualized perspective on the
common, mundane, and ordinary comings and
goings of daily life but also a comprehensive and
usually personal conception of the collective self,
humanity in all its pluralities.
The word worldview comes from the German
word Weltanschauung. It was first used in 1858 to
denote a broad idea of the world, especially from
a specific point of view. The term worldview can
be further organized into perspectives on identity
related to place (physical location on the globe),
time (historical era), and culture. The intersections
of identity, worldview, and culture are the center-
pieces of this entry. The entry explores the roles
played by the interpretations of religions, genders,
politics, languages, fashions, and leisure activities
in the formation of both individual and collective
worldview identifications of self. It examines
whether any of these constructs act as identity
exemplars, as metaphors or similes for worldview
identities of self.
Worldview, Identity, and Definitions
In the interest of understanding the conceptual
frameworks of this discussion, operant definitions
of worldview and identity must be established. A
beginning point for the establishment of such defi-
nitions can be found in religious philosophy.
Religion in this context is broadly and universally
defined as the attention paid to the existence of
metaphysical forces. And it is to this word self that
religion, again in its broadest and most universal
aspects, addresses itself. Believers in these meta-
physical forces are assured that to know oneself is
indeed a prime directive. The self, as commonly
defined in religious terms, refers to the essence of
the human being. The study of self, as defined in
this way, can be seen as part of the science of
hermeneutics. For the quest for identity is indeed
universal and subject to interpretation, oftentimes
in terms of morality, values, and distinctions
between the black and white philosophical poles
of right and wrong. These subjects, of course, are
the major axes along which religious thought is
promulgated.
A survey of various dictionary definitions of self
leads to the concepts of intention, knowledge, and
cultural norms. As one unpacks these definitions,
one learns that the self is essentially a singular,
inner awareness of the human being. The self con-
nects with the world, forming a singularly individ-
ual worldview, through its interpretation of its
existence within a particular time frame, a discreet
era in history. These periods or ages of human his-
tory (time) are characterized by unique circum-
stances of existence of specific cultural,
philosophical, or religious mores. The self may even
be projected onto the world stage in a futuristic
way as is depicted in the popularity of science fic-
tion. In summary, worldview meets identity in the
focusing of the lens through which one envisions

the world. Worldview is an aggregate set of val-
ues, an individual prism for interpreting reality. It
is the outcome of thinking about the way things
were, the way things are, or the way things could
or should be.
The passage of time, whether counted in centu-
ries or months, has a profound impact on one’s
individual worldview. Identity is extended to indi-
viduals at birth. Where, when, and even how one
is born have lasting effects on the sense of self and
what is possible for the self to achieve and to do.
A 16th-century British royal female has in com-
mon only the country of birth with a 20th-century
phenomenon like Princess Diana. Low-birth-
weight, premature babies endure dreadful struggles
to achieve and maintain the state of well-being
held by full-term infants.
Worldview, Identity, and Time
Central to a discussion of worldview, identity, and
time is an examination of what time is and when
and how time began. How time is regulated is also
significant. It is generally accepted that time has
both metaphysical and scientific attributes.
According to Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler, and Max
Urchs, time is essentially the interaction of tempo-
ral relations with other logical connections and
operators. To begin a review of the philosophy of
time is to begin with Aristotle and Immanuel Kant.
In De Interpretationes, 4th-century Greek philoso-
pher Aristotle described time as an aggregate of
motions or actions counted sequentially and fixed
in place onto a continuum, a decidedly linear and
Western view of the cosmos. History is cast as a
slide rule against which people may calculate their
place in time. History informs them about their
personal realities. Kant, the 18th-century German
philosopher, on the other hand, relates time to the
observer’s subjective analysis, a more metaphysical
approach. But it is Aristotle’s contemporary
Augustine, an important Latin church father, who
relates time to the identity of humans, through a
comparison with God.
Augustine is giving the believers a model of iden-
tity to which they are exhorted to strive. As created
things/beings, the believers both have and do not
have the identity of God. This conundrum is the
legacy of free will. But to define worldview, time,
and identity in terms acceptable to the religious and
Worldview 897
nonreligious alike, the concept of time seems to be
a basic organizing principle, a necessary prerequi-
site to understanding ourselves and the world in
which we live.
The accident of birth at a particular time causes
the formation of identity in a particular manner—a
manner that is married to the particular moment
in time when the birth occurs. In the previous
example of the two British princesses, outside of
birth in England and gender, the two royals have
nothing in common. As we are seeing in the 21st
century, even concepts of gender identification
have changed dramatically. The march of time
orders the world, demarking human behaviors,
cultures, and conditions.
Grant McCracken, in his book Transformations:
Identity Constructions in Contemporary Culture,
gives us a startling perspective on how the passage
of time affects the definition of both the individual
and collective self as each seeks identity. In one
example, he contrasts the collective life spans of
humans as hunters and gatherers with the changes
that have occurred in life experiences over an
astonishingly shorter period of time.
He presents a ratio of movement and achieve-
ment across a backdrop of time, putting into per-
spective the stasis of the earliest human identity
(diggers with sticks), even as it juxtaposes the
remarkable and miraculous achievement of the
human race as a fraction of time. Whereas
McCracken’s theory is based on a linear and decid-
edly Western concept of time, the African-centered
concept of time is circular. This entry on world-
view, time, and identity accepts the Western and
the African, the linear and the circular concepts
of time.
Issues of identity repeat themselves and resur-
face as the human progresses through time. For
example, the righteous yet benign “noble savage,”
an object of literary studies in the early 19th cen-
tury, reemerges as a member of the beat generation
of the mid-20th century. While primarily seen as
other, apart from society, there was a significant
evolution of this modern noble savage. Identity
struggles, both individual and collective, which
had taken place over the passage of time, served to
empower the beatniks. Their influence on the arts
was far-reaching, explosive, and long lasting.
A couple of additional examples underline the
importance of time as an agent of identity and
898 Worldview
worldview. In the 18th century, society was con-
structed along fairly rigid and castelike lines. Any
movement across the lines was achieved only
through an extraordinary change in individual cir-
cumstances. This change, or upward mobility,
came with prima facie identity reformations in
fashion, language, domicile, and community. But
these exemplars of changing identity were unable,
in the 18th century, to establish this new identity
on their own. Contrast this state of affairs with the
current, postmodern time, when identity and the
assumption of it has become an individualized
activity, almost by definition. It is the identity as
destiny school of thought.
Worldview, Identity, and Space/Place
If, in examining identity, worldview, and place,
one divides the spaces and places occupied by
humans into rural and nonrural, suburban and
urban, across the continuum of time, one finds
both similarities and differences in the formation
of the self. This bifurcation of identity can be
brought into clear focus using the optic of contem-
porary United States in the context of its global
citizenry. In contemporary times, those who were
born in the United States are hardly culturally dis-
tinguishable from those who acquire citizenship
through a legal process. In fact, it is not really even
necessary to live in the United States to live the
cultural life of an American. U.S. popular culture
is pervasive: Euro Disney, Starbucks in Russia, and
the popularity of Oprah worldwide. E Pluribus
Unum, the motto on the U.S. Seal and translated
as “Out of One, Many,” has become the keyword
phrase for U.S. culture.
An interesting sidebar to the discussion of a
globally colored U.S. identity is analysis of the cli-
mate of the post–9/11 United States. H. V. Savitch
looks at identity in a time of terror by tracing the
connections to space and place of so-called jihad-
ists and religious extremists and the important
functions of place in terms of support for individ-
ual identity. The formations of identity would
appear to apply as well to domestic terrorists like
Timothy McVeigh, the D.C. sniper, and the Son of
Sam. These men are examples of youthful males
untethered to any one cultural community and
only loosely tied to those with similar philoso-
phies. As these agents of twisted identity roam
their neighborhoods and the world, the impact has
been a shrinking of the perception of available,
safe space within U.S. cities. Space is physical and
outlined by a sense of personal boundaries. The
self operates freely within the confines of those
boundaries. Some cite the Homeland (place)
Security Act, a direct outgrowth of 9/11, as having
significantly altered the U.S. self-concept by col-
lapsing the boundaries of personal space.
Worldview and Cultural
Formations of Identity
The historical review of worldview and identity
formation has focused on formations not necessar-
ily individualized or achieved as a matter of indi-
vidual effort. Upward mobility and the resultant
change in self-concept required at least tacit
approval of society at large. Even then, such self-
definitions could carry a negative valence, for
example, the difference between the newly rich
and old money. The stories of unsuccessful attempts
of immigrants to recast themselves are analogous
to the continuing saga of the Black man in the
United States. For example, one of the legacies of
slavery, in North America in particular, has been
the remnant of identities formed by the slave mas-
ters. Throwing off the jacket tailored with hostility
and hate has proven to be very difficult.
Assimilation, integration, cultural rites of pas-
sage, even the study of archetypes—as agents of
identity transformation, all require a modicum of
collective will. The ascendancy of the self as its
own creator is a relatively recent phenomenon
(given the vast timeline of human existence pre-
sented at the beginning of this entry). But the defi-
nition of self, by self, seems to be growing
exponentially. There are hundreds of dictionary
definitions of words beginning with the prefix self,
self being defined equally as the essence of the indi-
vidual, the survival instinct, and moral character.
We are now situated in the era of “to each his
or her own.” We are cocooned inside our individ-
ual cars, listening to our own personal theme music
created for us by the iPod shuffle, and wearing
jeans to work on Friday in honor of “dress down
day,” an acquiescence to a collective of individual
identities: no uniforms for us. We are almost slav-
ishly beholden to popular culture. Entertainment
icons define and transform us into specific types

and orientations. Pervasive use of the World Wide
Web has made it possible for individual identities
to meld with like minds, sending viral messages of
“come fly with me” seamlessly and effortlessly,
seeking to effect a more perfect “brave new world.”
People everywhere are in chat rooms, on blogs and
social networks, gaming and reinventing them-
selves. Culture in the 21st century is breeding an
individualistic orientation to the world, which
seems to know few limits. Leaving traditional ways
of the world in defining self, McCracken offers a
postmodern construct that defines the self in terms
of worldview. He posits that the individual is actu-
ally a multiplicity with distinct assignments for its
parts. A global self is the result of interactions
between the world and this individuated self.
Achievement of a global self is the purpose of life.
The postmodern exemplars of identity are those
who are in the vanguard of world movements.
McCracken offers two cultural formations of
identity that are globally present today and that
will likely extend into the near future. The first is
the swift self, and the second is the radiant self.
Each can be seen as aspects of the global self. The
swift self is an outgrowth of a need for change. The
advent of computer technology is an example of
what happens when a need is met with the ability
to effect a change. In less than 50 years, computers
have revolutionized almost everything. Their pres-
ence in the market has affected the worldwide
economy and the stock market, the language, the
spaces we inhabit, the way we communicate, and
the way we have come to define business. The
computer industry morphed into a wealth of infor-
mation technology architects and engineers, who
work to invent smaller and smaller gadgets, until
our bodies are literally and figuratively wired for
sound and action. All of this happened, and is
changing at the speed of thought, simultaneously
across the globe. It is a transforming or transfor-
mation phenomenon that is producing transforma-
tional selves. The swift self is a product of this
movement of change. The swift self stands ready to
sacrifice all to better its own environment. Swift
selves are about refashioning reality.
The swift self stands apart from another mod-
ern identity formation, the radiant self. One of the
casualties of the Age of Reason was a turning
away from the metaphysical, a rebuke of the
mythical and magical, a repudiation of the third
Worldview 899
eye, fifth dimension, and supernatural powers of
man and woman. In postmodern times, we have
seen a massive return to what McCracken calls
“Re-enchantment” New Age teachings; feng shui,
iridology, and the healing powers of touch and
crystals now inform the lifestyles of not only the
rich and famous but also the ordinary mother,
father, and child. The radiant selves lead the
charge toward all things new. The radiant selves
are global selves responsible for raising global con-
sciousness on a variety of critical issues: the envi-
ronment, genocide, and clean energy, for example.
Momentum is not all, but exploration of possibil-
ity and hope is paramount. Some see the election
of Barack Obama as president of the United States
as a result of a call to the radiant selves of the
world. His challenge to believe in change is in
alignment with the quintessential character of
radiant selves to concretize possibility.
There is, however, another school of thought as
relates to McCracken’s transformational construct,
which poses the possibility that, at least in the
United States, this acceptance of all things global
leads to the nondevelopment of self. In Death of
the Grown-up, Diane West argues that we (conti-
nental Americans) are undergoing an identity crisis
that has to do both with our split personality as
the world policeman and world villain and what
she calls unbalanced attention to multiculturalism.
Far from embracing the global self, West is holding
out for some emphasis on distinctly U.S. ways and
means. She rejects the reticence to choose one’s
own way of being, to the exclusion of others, in
the name of multiculturalism. To her way of think-
ing, some cultural practices, especially when
defined in terms of identity, should be subjected to
a standard of acceptability. Without such judg-
ments, without such an absence of so-called politi-
cal correctness, West argues that our children are
being taught to be so accepting of others as to
become members of a nation of people afraid and
unable to speak plainly or in a forthright manner,
an ability essential to maintaining a contained
sense of self.
No matter which cultural formation of identity
one subscribes to, as we move deeper into the 21st
century, a fierce sort of individualism is pervasive
throughout the world, forming the neural network
of our senses of self. This individualism is unique
to this time, but not to space, place, or national
900 Worldview
culture. This individualism is a world culture that
reinforces identity. Fueled by a worldwide and
seemingly unceasing desire for change and aug-
mented by a longing for the mystical and mythical,
the postmodern sense of identity is in a perpetual
state of recareering. McCracken calls it “the
switching of hats.” The citizenry of the earth is
now engaged in phenomenal changes in conscious-
nesses and self-management. In fact, change
appears to be the hallmark of 21st-century con-
structions of identity. The global self is a complex
personality, feeding on the synergy of its multiple
selves and astonishing in its ability to meld its
various faces. The global self, an identity crafted in
line with universally held tenets of belief, is a trans-
formational self. And like the popular toys known
as transformers, which reassemble themselves
from one form to another, in a process akin to the
transformation of the caterpillar into the butterfly,
assumption of identity, when subject to prevailing
worldviews, produces creatures of magnificence,
flexibility, and utility.
Lydia Brown Magras
See also Archetype; Cultural Studies; Gender; Identity
Change; Philosophical History of Identity; Religious
Identity; Self
Further Readings
Faye, J., Scheffler, U., & Urchs, M. (Eds.). (1997).
Perspectives on time. Dordrecht, the Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic.
Gates, B. (1999). Business @ the speed of thought. Using
a digital nervous system. New York: Warner Books.
McCracken, G. (2008). Transformations: Identity
construction in contemporary culture. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press.
Muhammad, E. (1965). Message to the Blackman in
America. Chicago: Muhammad’s Temple Number 2.
Peters, T. (2003). Re-imagine! London: Dorling
Kindersley.
Savitch, H. V. (2007). Cities in a time of terror. Space,
territory, and local resilience. Armonk, NY: M. E.
Sharpe.
Spiro, P. J. (2008). Beyond citizenship. American identity
after globalization. New York: Oxford University
Press.
 X
Xenophobia
Prejudice is one on the most common forms of
conscious injury perpetuated by humans on one
another. Ethnicities and cultures of mass propor-
tions all have their own interpretation of preju-
dice, although the general consensus is that all
people have their own prejudices. People are com-
posed of essential characteristics that are unique
to their own ethnic groups. People do not all share
the same belief system, skin color, or history, and
traditions. Whether one is the object or subject of
prejudice, the challenge lies in having mutual
respect and tolerance for those who are different
from oneself. The xenophobia phenomenon is one
form of prejudice, the term derived from the
Greek word xenos, which means “stranger” or
“foreigner,” and phobos, which means “fear.”
The concept of xenophobia can be traced back to
historical, evolutionary sources. Its manifestations
are distinctly rooted in the impression that indi-
viduals have a thoughtless discomfort with strang-
ers. It is based on the idea that the target of
prejudice is directed toward people who are differ-
ent from oneself. The term xenophobia is typically
used to describe the irrational fear or hatred of
strangers or foreigners. One’s attitude toward dif-
ferent ethnicities and the intent to carry out acts of
xenophobia classifiy one as a xenophobe.
Xenophobia tends to have two main objectives.
The first objective, based on phobia, is to exclude
or maltreat a group that is not considered part
of a specific society. Those who are considered
901
nonmembers of the society are often deemed as
immigrants, and xenophobia is regularly directed
toward them and in some cases toward a popula-
tion of people that has existed in the country for
centuries (i.e., Native Americans or First Nations
people in the United States). This form of xenopho-
bia can manifest into outright violence and hostil-
ity or, in extreme cases, genocide. Acts of genocide
are committed with the intent of mass expulsion of
a population of sorts. The second objective relates
to the purification of a culture or language. This
manifestation of xenophobia is primarily cultural;
hence, the targets of the phobia tend to be toward
aliens. Aliens are individuals who reside in a coun-
try other than their birthplace without obtaining
citizenship. In essence, all cultural groups have the
potential of being subjected to cultural xenopho-
bia, which is narrowly directed. For example,
many countries are exhausting their efforts and
resources to try to implement English as an official
language. Xenophobia can take on various forms;
one can be socially xenophobic referring to a fear
or hatred toward a particular social group. One
can also be xenophobic toward cultures and belief
systems—all of which can potentially manifest into
acts of violence, hate crime, race wars, religious
prosecution, and ethnic cleansing, to name a few.
Externalization of xenophobia can be demon-
strated in two forms: projection identification and
projective identification. One is classified as a fear-
ful type, and the other is a hate-filled type.
Projection identification often precedes projective
identification in that projections flood individuals’
conscious in a given experience. Projection is
902 Xenophobia
prevalent in various forms, and many of our pro-
jections shape many of our actions and feelings.
For example, many high schools seniors will pro­
ject their fear of going to college so they don’t
necessarily need to experience this fear. By displac-
ing or projecting this fear, they are released from
admitting to themselves that they have this fear
and its accompanying feelings. Projection (identifi-
cation) is one of the first defense mechanisms
developed early on in childhood.
The second type is projective identification,
which is related more to hatred. During an interac-
tion between a stranger (subject) and a xenophobe
(object), the xenophobe will first suppress the
rejected parts of the stranger, and then the sup-
pressed rejected parts will be projected on the
stranger. For example, if I as a xenophobe think
members of a certain culture are inherently non-
intellectual, then I will project this perception onto
them and suggest they always tend to make poor
choices or underperform in school. I will seek out
cases where that is true and use that as verification
of my belief that is, of course, shaped by my xeno-
phobia. To completely prevent the fear, the xeno-
phobe will need to rid his or her conscious of having
an encounter with the stranger—this is the premise
of projective identification. The concept of projec-
tive identification involves the impulse of xenopho-
bia either repressed incompletely or not at all. With
the repressed thoughts still present in one’s con-
scious, the projection invokes the thoughts, feelings,
or behaviors projected. Simply put, the xenophobe
is consciously aware of his or her own impulses
even though he or she has projected them upon the
subject. Typically, this results in a delusional, dis-
torted, even schizophrenic view of reality. Projective
identification is a self-fulfilling prophecy in that the
person believes something to be false, and then
behaves in such a manner as to make the belief true.
Another example of projective identification would
be a paranoid person developing the delusion that
he or she is being pursued by the police. A total
fixation on the fight against the pursuer (police)
would result in the paranoid person behaving in
such a manner that raises suspicion that he or she
has committed a crime. Consequently, the police
would presume that he or she has engaged in crim-
inal activity, thus making the belief true.
The xenophobia phenomenon is not a concrete
ideology in that it takes on various patterns such
as faces, agendas, and forms of establishment. In
various contexts, xenophobia has been inter-
changeably used with ethnocentrism and often
racism; however, the ideology is completely differ-
ent from both phenomena. Ethnocentrism is an
orientation toward one’s own ethnic group and
tendency to elevate one’s own culture above oth-
ers, and racism is an enacted prejudice about a
race that is managed by someone who has the
power to influence a collective in any given soci-
ety. As indicated earlier, xenophobia takes on
various patterns whereas racism is solely based on
race. One particular pattern or concept of the
xenophobia phenomenon is unmentalized xeno-
phobia. Unmentalized xenophobia is the act of a
profound disinterest in those who are culturally,
racially, or religiously different and have a height-
ened sense of self. Furthermore, one who exhibits
unmentalized xenophobia is not attracted to the
idea of educating himself or herself about those
who are racially, culturally, or religiously different
from him or her. Unmentalized xenophobics also
fail to seize any opportunities one may gain by
having such knowledge to and lacks knowledge of
them. Socially, unmentalized xenophobics are
restricted to those of their own kind, resembling a
lifestyle of loyalty to his or her group. Xenophobia
is one of the most dangerous types of hatred
potentially causing mental, physical, emotional,
and epistemic violence.
Ronald L. Jackson II
See also Clan Identity; Cultural Contracts Theory;
Culture, Ethnicity, and Race; Etic/Emic; Eugenicism;
Self-Monitoring
Further Readings
Jackson, R. L. (2006). Scripting the Black masculine
body: Identity, discourse, and racial politics in popular
media. Albany: SUNY Press.
Kupe, T., Worby, E., Verryn, P., & Abad, D. (2009). Go
home or die here: Violence, xenophobia and the
reinvention of difference in South Africa.
Johannesburg, South Africa: Witwatersrand University
Press.
Roemer, J., Lee, W., & Straetan, K. (2007). Racism,
xenophobia, and distribution: Multi-issue politics in
advanced democracies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Index

Entry titles and their page numbers are in bold.

Abate, Nicolò del, 2:638 Adolescence, 1:362–364

Abdollahi, Abdolhossein, 2:828 Adorno, Theodor, 1:108, 155–156, 177, 295–298, 440,
Abel, 1:30 449, 2:839
Aboriginal cultures, 1:480, 2:508 Advaita Vedanta school, 2:566
Abrams, Dominic, 1:218, 2:750 Advertising, 1:106–110
Abreu, José Antonio, 1:243 Advertisting Age (magazine), 1:309
Absolute poverty, 1:1–2 Aelst, Peiter Coecke van, 2:639
Abstract expressionism, 1:474, 2:762 Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, 1:30
AC2ID Test, 1:143 Aesthetic attitude, 1:9
Académie française, 1:385 Aesthetics, 1:8–11. See also Art; Modern art
Accents (language), 1:220, 2:522–523 gay culture, 2:856–859
Accommodation, 1:2–4. See also Acculturation; gender, 1:9–10
Adaptation history of, 1:8–9
age and, 1:3 identity, 1:8, 9
aggressive, 1:3 intersubjectivity, 1:10–11
assertive, 1:3 postmodern and contemporary, 1:9, 478
defining, 1:2 race, 1:9–10
e-mail, 1:4 visual culture vs., 2:864
identity, 1:3–4 Africa. See also Colonialism
nonassertive, 1:3 dignity, 1:256
power and, 1:3 high-context culture, 1:102
Acculturation, 1:4–6. See also Accommodation; language loss, 1:423–425
Adaptation; Intercultural personhood trickster figure, 2:846–847
deculturation and, 1:5 African American English, 1:94–95, 219, 220, 426–428,
defined, 1:4 2:580. See also African American Vernacular
ethnic identity, 1:5–6 English; Black English
factors in, 1:5 African Americans
language, 1:4–5 code-switching, 1:94–95
levels of, 1:5 counterpublics, 2:609
Achieved status, 1:44 Crown Heights riots, 1:260
Acrolect, 2:580 cultural contracts theory, 1:167–168
Acting White, 1:374 double consciousness, 1:67–68, 131, 236–239
Actual self, 1:212, 2:602, 685, 710 European immigration and, 2:883
Adam, 1:30 global cultural appropriation of, 1:68–69
Adams, Fred, 2:569 identity, 2:504–506
Adams, Richard, 1:242 liberation theology, 1:431
Adaptation, 1:6–7 masking, 1:435–436
accommodation, 1:2–4 material culture, 1:437
acculturation, 1:4–6 minstrelsy, 1:458–461
predictors of successful, 1:6–7 mural painting, 2:760–761
Adeniran-Kane, Toro, 1:11 one-drop rule, 1:63, 359, 2:533
Adler, Alfred, 1:347, 2:549 passing, 1:359–361, 2:531–535

903
904 Index

performativity, 2:617–620 Alpern, Merry, 2:872

poetry, 2:871 Alpers, Svetlana, The Art of Description, 2:639
racial contracts, 2:620–622 Al Qaeda, 2:824, 826
racial disloyalty, 2:622–626 Alston, Charles, 2:761
rhetoric, 2:644 Althaus-Reid, Marcella, 1:432
signification, 2:729 Althusser, Louis, 1:18, 36, 38, 177,
social stratification theory, 2:764–765 484–486, 2:801–802
tag questions, 2:817 Altman, Dennis, 1:204
trickster figure, 2:846–847 Altman, Robert, 1:303
White cultural appropriation of, 1:68 Amae, 1:264
womanism, 1:431, 2:524, 635, 888–893 American Academy of Religion, 2:890
African American Vernacular English, 2:817 American Anthropological Association, 1:437
Africana Studies, 1:14 American Artists’ Congress, 2:761
African Verbal Tradition, 2:817 American Breeders’ Association, 1:265
Afrocentricity, 1:12–14. See also Black Atlantic American Communist Party, 2:761
cultural identity, 2:506 American Eugenics Society, 1:265
defining, 1:12–13 American Family Association, 1:266
education, 1:13 American Journal of Sociology, 2:579
future of, 1:14 American Psychiatric Association, 1:353
influence of, 1:46 American Revolution, 1:81
origins, 1:12 Ammerman, Nancy, 2:632
social sciences, 1:14 Amundson, Najla, 1:7
Agamben, Giorgio, 1:180 Analogue logic, 1:451
Age, 1:15–17 Anal stage of psychosexual development, 1:346
accommodation, 1:3 Analysis, 1:450
approaches to study of age identity, 1:16 Anansi, 1:490
coming-of-age archetype, 1:30 Anaphora, 2:645
language use, 2:574 Anarchists, 2:823, 825–826
significance of, 1:15 Anarchy, in international relations, 2:783
social/cultural constructions of age identity, 1:15–16 Andersen, Margaret, 2:818
types, 1:15 Anderson, Benedict, 2:498
Agency, 1:18–20 Anderson, Elijah, 1:68
defined, 1:18 Anderson, Hans Christian, “The Emperor’s New
habitus, 1:321–322 Clothes,” 1:303
poststructural conceptions, 1:20 Andre, Claire, 1:253
structuration, 1:18–19, 2:794 Ang, Ien, 1:176
structure vs., 1:18–19 Anglo Saxon Clubs of America, 2:533
Aggressive accommodation, 1:3 Ani, Marimba, 1:268, 425
Agitation-related emotions, 2:685 Animals, myths about, 1:490
Agreeableness, 2:549–550 Annales School, 2:895
Ahmad, Aijaz, 2:517 Anomie, 1:20–24
Ahtila, Eija-Liisa, 1:125 defined, 1:20
AIDS, 1:65, 2:858 deviance, 1:213–214
Aizawa, Ken, 2:569 earliest use of concept, 1:21
Akbar, Na’im, 1:12 early sociological approaches, 1:21–22
Akers, Ronald, 1:415 recent sociological approaches, 1:22–23
Akhtar, Salman, 1:363 Anonymity, 1:198, 200
Ala Plastica, 1:11 Anthropology, 1:252–253, 437, 2:578
Albert, Stuart, 1:142, 2:514 Anti-essentialism, 1:26, 47. See also Essentialism
Alberti, Leon Battista, De re architectura, 1:34 Anti-institutionalism, 2:502
Alexander, Bryant, 1:410 Antimetabole, 2:645
Alienation, 1:295, 297, 471, 2:527 Antiracism, 1:24–28
Allen, Barbara J., 2:522 critical race theory, 1:27
Allen, Woody, 1:272 critiques of, 1:27–28
Allison, Graham, 2:591 future of, 1:28
Allport, Gordon, 1:135–136 integrative antiracism, 1:27
 Index 905

multiculturalism vs., 1:25 Renaissance art, 2:636–640

overview, 1:24–25 self-portraits, 2:703–706
theoretical components, 1:25–26 social realism, 2:759–762
Whiteness Studies, 2:882–883 voyeurism, 2:873–875
Antoni, Janine, 1:9 Art Bulletin (journal), 2:863
Gnaw, 1:110 Art history, 1:437–439, 2:528, 864
Anxiety-buffer hypothesis, 2:829 Articulation theory, 1:36–39
Anzaldúa, Gloria, 1:33, 2:893 case studies, 1:38
Apel, Karl-Otto, 2:839 criticisms of, 1:38–39
Apokoinou, 1:70 overview, 1:36
Aposiopesis, 1:70 rearticulation, 1:38
Appadurai, Arjun, 1:174, 176, 2:610 versions, 1:37–38
Appiah, Kwame Anthony, 1:33, 256, 372, 374 Artifacts. See Material culture
Cosmopolitanism, 1:149–150, 2:529 Artistic development and cognition,
Appraisal, 2:602 1:39–43
Aquinas, Thomas, 1:357, 392, 2:879 contemporary views, 1:43
Aquino, María Pilar, 1:431–432 graphic development, 1:75–76
Arasaratnam, Lily, 1:5 perception, 1:40
Archer, Margaret, 1:152, 2:626 postmodern perspectives, 1:42–43
Archetype, 1:29–32. See also Myths; Symbolism psychosocial development, 1:76–78
conceptual framework, 1:29–30 sociocultural approaches, 1:42
critiques of, 1:32 stage theories, 1:40–41
literary examples, 1:29–32 theories of cognitive development, 1:40
Architecture, sites, and spaces, 1:32–36 Art nouveau, 1:471
natural appearance of, 1:33–34 Asad, Talal, 2:663
postmodernism, 1:477–478 Asante, Molefi Kete, 1:12, 46, 269, 2:644, 729
voyeurism, 2:875–876 Asch, Solomon, 1:216
women, 1:34–35 Ascribed identity, 1:44–46
Arch of Constantine, 1:33–34 avowed vs., 1:54
Arendt, Hannah, 1:59–60, 330–331, ethnicity, 1:259
2:572, 609, 824 etic approach, 1:263
Aristophanes, 2:791–792 identity uncertainty, 1:377
Aristotle, 1:80, 173, 254, 268, 275, 321, 356–357, 392, narratives, 2:494–495
393, 2:566, 585, 792, 897 religion, 2:633
Poetics, 1:448–449 Asen, Robert, 2:610
Rhetoric, 2:641 Asexual, defined, 1:64–65
Armed Islamic Group (GIA), 2:825 Ashanti people, 1:489
Armstrong, John, 1:224 Ashcroft, Bill, 1:311–312
Arndt, Jamie, 2:829, 830 Ashforth, Blake, 2:516
Arnett, Ronald C., 1:255, 402 Asia
Arnheim, Rudolf, 1:40, 41, 75 collectivism, 1:101, 183
Aronowitz, Stanley, 2:589 communication, 1:251–252
Aronson, Elliot, 1:97 high-context culture, 1:102, 186
Art Asiacentricity, 1:46–48
aesthetics, 1:8–11 Assembly of First Nations, 1:288–289
artistic development and cognition, 1:39–43 Assertive accommodation, 1:3
children’s art, 1:75–78 Assimilation
commodity self, 1:107–110 as acculturation, 1:5
confessional art, 1:123–126 global village, 1:315
critical theory, 1:155 immigration, 1:386–388
human figure, 1:331–334 Assman, Jan, 1:445
life and, 1:173–174 Assonance, 2:645
masking, 1:436 Asyndeton, 1:70
modern art, 1:467–474 Ataman, Kutlug, 1:126
morality and, 1:173 Athens, 1:354–355
race performance, 2:619 Atkinson, Dennis, 1:42–43
906 Index

Attitude Bali disco bombings, 2:825

acculturation and, 1:5 Balmer, John M. T., 1:143, 144
cognitive dissonance and, 1:96 Balzac, Honoré de, Scenes From Private Life, 2:637
contact hypothesis, 1:136–140 Bambara, Toni Cade, “The Lesson,” 2:871
Attribution, 1:48–51 Bandura, Albert, 2:687–689
attribution theory, 1:48–49 Barkan, Leonard, 2:640
biases and errors, 1:49–50, 137, 183, 2:607, 711 Barresi, John, 2:545
defined, 1:48 Barth, Karl, 1:272, 431, 2:592
diversity, 1:235 Barthes, Roland, 1:33, 170, 175, 340, 404, 2:716, 863
identity, 1:51 Camera Lucida, 1:485–486
one’s own behavior, 1:50–51 Image, Music, Text, 1:485
self-affirmation, 2:671 Mythologies, 1:484–485
self-serving bias, 1:51 Bartlett, Frederic Charles, 1:181
Attribution theory, 1:48–49 Bartola and Maximo, 1:278
Augustine, Saint, 1:357, 417, 2:543, 557, 879, 897 Bascom, William, 2:643
Aum Shinrikyo, 2:824 Basilect, 2:580
Austen, Jane, 2:870 Basking in reflected glory, 1:57–58, 2:604
Austin, J. L., 1:306, 442, 2:596, 618 Bassett, Marvin, 1:407
Australia, 1:480 Bataille, Georges, 1:340, 462
Authenticity, 1:52–53, 274, 374 Bataille, Sylvia, 1:462
Author, death of, 1:486 Bateson, Gregory, 1:418, 454, 2:643
Authoritarian eugenics, 1:265, 266 Balinese Character, 2:578
Authority Baudelaire, Charles, 1:469
authenticity, 1:53 Baudrillard, Jean, 1:33, 132, 133, 135, 152, 179,
third world, 2:836–837 339–342, 479, 2:732–734, 774, 781
Authorship, 1:403 Baudry, Jean-Louis, 2:867
Autonomy, 1:255–258, 393–394 Bauhaus, 1:471
Avant-garde, 1:471–472 Bauman, Richard, Verbal Art as Performance, 2:643–645
Avatars, 1:246 Bauman, Zygmunt, 1:132, 134, 135, 2:626, 628, 839
Averages, and stereotypes, 2:789 Baumeister, Roy F., 2:548, 707, 708
Avignon papacy, 2:638 BDSM sexual community, 2:724, 726–727
Avowal, 1:53–55 Be, invariant, 1:406–408
ethnicity, 1:259 Beale, Frances, 1:431
etic approach, 1:263 Beardsley, Aubrey, The Impatient Adulterer, 2:874
identity uncertainty, 1:377 Beauty, 1:8, 168, 349, 352
narratives, 2:494 Beauvoir, Simone de, 1:33, 272, 2:556, 802
Second Sex, The, 2:527–528
Baader-Meinhof Gang, 2:824 Beck, Ulrich, 2:626–628
Baartman, Saartjie, 1:276 Becker, Carol, 2:553
Babb, Sarah L., 2:747 Becker, Ernest, 1:418
Bachelard, Gaston, 1:33 The Denial of Death, 2:827–828
Bacon, Francis, 1:275 Becker, Howard, 1:215, 413–415
Bad faith, 1:274 Beckett, Samuel, 1:272
Badiou, Alain, 1:180 Beckmann, Max, 2:704–705
Bailey, Guy, 1:407–408 Beech, Dave, 1:125
Bailey, J. Michael, 1:66 Beecher, John, “A Negro Mother to Her Child,” 1:428
Baine, Judith, 2:864 Beecroft, Vanessa, 1:11
Baker, Houston, Jr., 2:609 Behaviorism, 1:181, 421, 452, 2:567
Baker, Wayne, 2:855–856 Being and identity, 1:59–61, 2:511–512, 555. See also
Baker-Fletcher, Karen, 2:891 Philosophy of identity
Bakhtin, Mikhail, 1:42, 177, 403 Bell, Derrick, 1:150
Bałka, Mirosław, 480x10x10, 1:109–110 Belluscio, Steven, 1:359–361
Balance theory, 1:57–58, 2:691 Bem, Daryl, 1:50, 2:700–702, 709
Baldwin, James, 2:506, 881, 882 Benedict, Ruth, 2:754
Baldwin, Mark, 2:707 Benhabib, Seyla, 1:149, 254
Bales, Robert F., 2:785 Benjamin, Walter, 1:33, 155–156, 177, 2:779
 Index 907

Bentham, Jeremy, 1:254, 335, 2:803, 805 Bisexual oppression, 1:66

Benton, Thomas Hart, 2:759 Black Atlantic, 1:66–69
Benveniste, Émile, 1:401 African diaspora, 1:68–69
Beowulf, 1:31 différance, 1:227
Berdyaev, Nikolai, 1:272 double consciousness, 1:67–68
Berger, John, 2:805–806 Black English, 1:94–95, 219, 220, 406–408, 426–428,
Berger, Joseph, 2:786 2:573. See also African American English
Berger, Paul, 2:663 Blackface. See Minstrelsy
Berger, Peter, 1:154, 2:742, 783, 838 Black Group Identification Index, 2:506
Bergman, Ingmar, 1:272 Black Hand, 2:822
Bergson, Henri, 1:156, 176 Blackmer, Corinne E., 1:359
Berlin, James, 2:642 Black Power, 1:431, 2:817
Bermúdez, José Luis, 2:569 Black Racial Identity Attitude Scale, 2:504
Bernal, Martin, 2:642 Black sheep effect, 1:218
Black Athena Writes Back, 2:642 Black theology, 1:431
Bernet, Rudolf, 2:553 Bladerunner (film), 1:279
Bernieres, Louis de, 2:836 Blankenship, Kevin L., 2:818
Bernstein, Arla, 2:644, 818 Blaue Reiter, Der (The Blue Rider), 1:473
Bernstein, Basil, 1:92, 94 Blondin, Marie-Louise, 1:462
Bethune, Mary McLeod, 1:266 Bloom, Lois, 1:421
Beverly Hillbillies, The (television series), 2:614 Blumer, Herbert, 1:332–334, 2:806
Bhabha, Homi K., 1:33, 312, 410, 2:517, 845 Bly, Robert, Iron John, 1:147
Bhaskar, Roy, 1:152–154 Blyden, Edward Wilmont, 1:12
Bhawuk, Dharm, 1:101 Boas, Franz, 1:252, 2:651–652
Bias. See also Prejudice; Stereotypes Bobo, Jacqueline, 1:441
attribution, 1:49–50, 137, 2:711 Bodin, Jean, Six Books of a Commonwealth, 2:776
correspondence, 1:49–50 Body. See also Embodiment and body politics
expectancy-confirming, 1:137 commodity self, 1:109
historicity and hermeneutics, 1:330 cultural construction of, 1:247
perceptual filtering, 2:538 embodiment vs., 1:453–454
self-serving, 1:51 existentialism, 1:273
Bible, 1:21, 30 extraordinary bodies, 1:275–279
Bickerton, Derek, 2:580–581 human figure in art and culture, 1:331–334
Bierce, Ambrose, 2:655 ideal body, 1:332–333, 348–352
Big Brother (television show), 2:804, 875 liberation theology, 1:432
Big-fish-little-pond effect, 1:210 mind-body problem, 1:450–454
Bilingualism, 1:61–63 mobilities, 1:466
acculturation, 1:4–5 mortality salience, 2:829
circumstantial, 1:62 Othering process, 2:523
elective, 1:62 social identity, 2:770–771
English as a Second Language, 1:248–250 Body-image, 1:245
sequential, 1:61–62 Body language, 1:383
simultaneous, 1:61–62 Body politic, 1:333–334
Billingham, Richard, 1:125, 126 Body politics, 1:247–248
Billson, Janet Mancini, 2:730 Body-schema, 1:245
Binary categories, 2:743–744 Body Shop, 1:143
Binkley, Roberta, 2:642 Body theology, 1:432
Binswanger, Ludwig, 1:272 Bois, Yve-Alain, 2:863
Biographical identities, 2:809 Bok, Sissela, 1:83
Biological approach to personal identity, 2:546 Bolstering, 2:686
The Bionic Woman (television series), 1:279 Bolter, Jay David, 1:444
Biopower, 1:178, 267 Bond, M. H., 2:850
Biracial identity, 1:63–64 Bond, Susan, 2:644
Birth cohorts, 1:16 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, 1:241, 243, 255
Bisexual/bicurious, 1:64–66 Booth, Charles, Life and Labour of the People of
Bisexual chic, 1:65 London, 1:1
908 Index

Booth, Wayne, The Rhetoric of Fiction, 2:870 Brown, Jonathon, 2:693

Born, Georgina, 1:410 Brown, Penelope, 1:282
Bosmajiam, Haig A., 1:269 Brown, Sterling, 1:31
Bosnian War (1992–1995), 1:259 Brown, Wendy, States of Injury, 2:529
Botticelli, Sandro, Birth of Venus, 1:349–350 Browning, Robert, My Last Duchess, 2:871
Boundary framing, 1:294 Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 1:355
Bourdieu, Pierre, 1:19–20, 86, 90–91, 120–121, 143, Brubaker, Rogers, 2:767
161–164, 179, 247, 321–323, 2:734–736, 748 Bruneau, Thomas J., 1:251
Distinction, 1:90, 323, 2:855 Brunelleschi, Filippo, 1:34, 2:638
Bourgeoisie, 1:88, 2:608–609, 789 Bruner, Jerome, 1:40, 370, 2:752
Bourriaud, Nicolas, 1:10 Buber, Martin, 1:255, 272, 392, 401, 402, 2:680
Bowlby, John, 1:348 Buchloh, Benjamin, 2:863
Bowser, Benjamin, 2:883 Buddhism, 1:456, 2:566
Boyarin, Daniel, 2:635 Bultmann, Rudolf, 1:272
Boyd, Robert, 1:184 Burckhardt, Jacob, The Civilization of the Renaissance in
Boyer, Ernest, 1:241 Italy, 2:637
Boyer, Pascal, 1:270 Bureaucracy, 1:477
Boym, Svetlana, 1:33 Burger, Thomas, 2:608
Brachyology, 1:69–70 Burke, Edmund, 1:8
Bracketing, 2:554 Burke, Kenneth, 1:78, 418, 419
Braidotti, Rosi, 1:179, 2:509 Burleigh, Louise, “Dark Cloud,” 2:534
Brain Burlew, A. Kathleen, 2:506
gender, 1:452–453 Burroughs, Edgar Rice, Tarzan of the Apes, 1:427
hemispheric activity, 1:452–453 Bush, George W., 1:125, 2:508, 804
identity development, 1:208 Butler, Judith, 1:20, 33, 179, 234, 247, 306–307, 374,
mind vs., 1:452–453 409, 419, 464, 2:538–540, 618, 802–803
Braithwaite, John, 1:414 Gender Trouble, 2:539, 613–615
Branden, Nathaniel, 2:695 Bylsma, Wayne H., 2:738
Brandom, Robert, 2:597 Byron, George Gordon, Lord, 1:30
Brattain, Michelle, 2:884
Brazil, 1:264 Cage, John, 1:478
Brecht, Bertolt, 2:773 Cain, 1:30
Brenner, Neil, 1:466 Cain, Carole, 1:42
Breton, André, 1:462, 473 Cain, James, The Postman Always Rings
Breuer, Joseph, 1:343–344 Twice, 1:351
Brewer, Marilynn, 1:218, 371, 2:710, 749, 751 Calafell, Bernadette, 2:893
Bricolage, 1:71–73 California Task Force to Promote Self-Esteem and Social
Brierre, Jean, 1:423 Responsibility, 1:210
Brim, Orville Gilbert, 2:754 Calkins, Mary Whiton, 2:547
Britain Callahan, Laura, 1:3
class, 1:93 Calle, Sophie, 1:125, 341
colonialism, 1:103–104, 224 Campbell, Donald, 1:184
confessional art, 1:123–126 Campbell, Joseph, 1:490
First Nations, 1:289 Campin, Robert, 2:639
individualism, 1:101 Camus, Albert, 1:272
inequalities, 1:122 Canada, 1:102, 287–289
Sinn Fein negotiations, 2:826 Canadian Royal Commission of Bilingualism and
social norms, 1:214 Biculturalism, 1:480
British Cultural Studies, 1:440 Cannon, Katie, 2:644, 890
Brittain, W. Lambert, 1:75 Capital, 1:162–163, 2:736. See also Cultural capital;
Brodkin, Karen, 2:883 Economic capital; Social capital
Brontë, Charlotte, Jane Eyre, 1:351 Capitalism
Brooks, Neil, 1:360 class, 1:86
Brouwer, Daniel, 2:610 consumption, 1:132–133
Brown, Claude, Manchild in the Promised Land, 2:799 critical theory, 1:155, 295–296
Brown, John, 2:621 hegemony, 1:325
 Index 909

social economy, 2:746–747 self-guides, 2:686

spectacle, 2:773–774, 778–782 social construction of personal identity, 2:740
Carey, James, 1:440 socialization of, 1:44–45, 322, 2:647
Caribbean Americans, 1:260, 313–314 theory of mind, 2:830–831
Caricature, 2:654 Children’s art, 1:75–78
Carlsmith, James, 1:96, 2:701 artistic development and cognition, 1:39–43
Carlson, Jeffrey, 2:635–636 graphic development, 1:75–76
Carnegie, Andrew, 1:265 psychosocial development, 1:76–78
Carnegie Institution for Experimental Evolution, 1:265 China, 1:85, 101
Carruthers, Bruce G., 2:747 Chisholm, Shirley, 2:798
Carruthers, Jacob, 1:12, 2:642 Chivers, Melanie L., 1:66
Carter, Stephen, 2:623 Choice, 1:272–273
Cartwright, Dorwin, 1:217 Chomsky, Noam, 1:421
CASMIN project, 1:120 Chopin, Kate, “The Storm,” 2:870
Castells, Manuel, 1:179 Christensen, Lars T., 1:144
Castration, 1:304, 345, 347, 463, 2:660–662, 866, Christian, Chester, 1:4–5, 255
868, 869 Christianity
Categorization, 2:749–750. See also Classification conservative theology, 2:592–593
Catholic Church liberal theology, 2:592–593
Great Schism, 2:638 liberation theology, 1:429–432
liberation theology, 1:429–432 postliberalism, 2:592–594
propaganda, 2:599 sexuality, 2:613
Cattelan, Maurizio, 1:11 syncretism, 2:813
Causation, 1:48–49 Christy, Edwin P., 1:459
Cavalli-Sforza, Luca, 1:184 Christy Minstrels, 1:459
Caws, Mary Ann, 2:865–866 Cialdini, Robert, 1:57–58
Cellini, Benvenuto, 2:638 Cicero, Marcus Tullius, 1:275
Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies, Birmingham Cicourel, Aaron, 1:413
University, 1:169, 173–174, 177, 179 Cinema
Central America. See Latin America extraordinary bodies, 1:278
Certeau, Michel de, 1:177 feminism, psychoanalysis, and, 2:867–870
Césaire, Aimé, 1:12 Mulvey on the gaze in, 1:303–304, 2:805, 867–870
Cézanne, Paul, 2:704 satire, 2:657
Chagall, Marc, 2:704 self-Orientalization, 2:518–519
Chalmers, David, 2:566 voyeurism, 2:875
Change, and identity, 2:560–565 Circularity, 1:100
Chao, Wen-Yu, 1:3 Circumstantial bilingualism, 1:62
Chaplin, Charlie, 2:657 Citizenship, 1:78–80
Chappelle, Dave, 1:68 Athens, 1:354
Chappelle’s Show (television show), 1:67–68 civic identity, 1:80–83
Charcot, Jean-Martin, 1:343 communicative democracy, 1:79–80
Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, 2:638 cosmopolitanism, 1:82, 146–150, 2:845
Chaucer, Geoffrey, The Canterbury Tales, 1:425 enactment of, 1:78–79, 82
Chesnutt, Charles W., The Marrow of Tradition, Civic identity, 1:80–83
1:292, 460 citizenship, 1:78–80
Chicago (film), 2:661 future of, 1:82–83
Childhood, concept of, 1:15, 42 modern developments, 1:81
Childhood identifications, 1:44 origins, 1:80–81
Children paradoxes, 1:82
bilingualism, 1:62 Civilization Act (1819), 2:600
development of self, 2:666, 705–706 Cixous, Hélène, 1:33, 2:802
identity formation, 1:208, 362–364 Clan identity, 1:83–85
myths and, 1:489–490 Clark, Andy, 1:246, 247, 2:569
rituals, 2:647 Class, 1:86–91. See also Class identity
scopophilia, 2:660 agency, 1:18
self-concept, 2:676 defined, 1:86, 87
910 Index

inequalities, 1:323 Collective/social identity, 1:98–99. See also Group

language variety in literature, 1:428–429 identity; Society and social identity
Marx on, 1:86–87 aesthetics, 1:11
modern theories, 1:88–91 cognitive dissonance, 1:97–98
Othering process, 2:525 communication theory, 1:116–117
social stratification theory, 2:762–766 conditions for, 2:756
values, 2:854–855 conflict, 2:756–757
Weber on, 1:87–88 framing, 1:294
Whiteness Studies, 2:884 identity scripts, 1:372–376
Class consciousness, 1:91 memory, 1:444–447
Classical liberalism, 2:501 optimal distinctiveness theory, 2:512–513
Classical model of artistic development, 1:76 personal vs., 1:54, 2:749, 767
Class identification, 1:91 political identity, 2:588
Class identity, 1:91–94 psychology of self, 2:605–606
concept of, 1:91–92 self and, 2:670
critiques of, 1:93–94 selling out, 2:622–624
national perspectives, 1:93 social movements, 2:756–759
social relationships, 1:92–93 symbolic interactionism, 2:809
Classification, 1:171–172, 188, 2:768–769. See also Collective unconscious, 1:347
Categorization Collectivism/individualism, 1:100–102
Class opposition, 1:91–92 anomie and, 1:21–22
Classroom characteristics, 1:100–101
immediacy in, 1:383–384 communication dynamics, 1:102
individuation in, 1:395 consciousness, 1:131
Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, 2:878–881 critique of individualism, 1:243
Cleve, Joos van, 2:639 culture, 1:186
Clifford, James, 1:179, 225 dimensions of cultural variability, 1:228
Clinkscales, Marcia, 2:796 Eurocentricity, 1:269
Closeness, in communication, 1:382 face concerns, 1:283
Clouet, François, 2:638 identification, 1:353–354
Code-switching, 1:94–95, 2:719. See also Dialect identity formation/development, 1:98, 208
Code theory, 1:92 modern moral order, 1:21
Cognition. See Artistic development and cognition neoliberalism, 2:502–503
Cognitive dissonance theory, 1:95–98 psychological-cultural approach, 1:101, 182–184
contact hypothesis, 1:138 psychology of self, 2:605
psychology of self, 2:602 self-construal, 2:682–683
self-affirmation theory, 2:670 self-enhancement, 2:693–694
self-perception theory vs., 2:701–702 theoretical approaches, 1:101–102
self-verification theory, 2:691 types, 1:101–102
Cognitive psychology, 1:212 College Art Association of America, 2:863
Cognitive style, 1:182–183 Collier, Mary Jane, 1:263, 377
Cohen, Hermann, 2:840 Collins, Kathleen, 1:84
Cohen, Robin, 1:222–224 Collins, Patricia Hill, 1:410, 2:884, 889
Cohen, Stanley, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 1:414 Collins, Phil, 1:126
Cohler, Bertram, 1:363, 364 Colloid, Carlo, 1:489
Cokely, Kevin, 2:506 Colloquial language, 2:799
Colbert, Stephen, 2:657 Colomina, Beatrice, 1:33
Colbert Report, The (television show), 2:657 Colonialism, 1:103–105
Coleman, Eli, 1:66 defined, 2:842
Coleman, James, 2:734–736 effects of, on the colonized, 1:409,
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 2:517 423–424, 433–434
Collective action frames, 1:293–295 First Nations, 1:287–288
Collective consciousness, 1:131 hybridity, 1:338
Collective forgetting, 1:446 imperial diasporas, 1:224
Collective memory, 1:444–447 linguistic influences, 1:422–425, 2:581
Collective minding, 1:402 overview, 1:103–105

pros and cons, 1:105
third world, 2:836
Colonna, Giovanni, 2:637
Columbus, Christopher, 1:13, 103, 446
Comedy, stock characters in, 2:792–793
Commedia dell’arte, 2:792–793
Commodification, 1:476
Commodity fetishism, 1:107
Commodity self, 1:106–110. See also Consumption
commodification of identity, 1:107
commodities and consumerism, 1:106–107
critiques of, 1:107–109
marketing, 1:109–110
Common sense, 1:386
Common unconscious, 1:198
Common values, 1:83
Commonwealth, 1:83
Communication
class, 1:94
collectivism/individualism, 1:102
cultural identities, 1:164–165
embodied, 1:246–247
emotional, 1:246
gender, 2:537–538, 815–816, 818
general theory, 1:442–443
immediacy, 1:381–384
immigrants and host culture, 1:386
intersubjectivity, 1:402
Japanese, 1:250–252
media studies, 1:439–441
perceptual filtering, 2:537
psychological perspective, 2:850
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, 2:651–654
structuration theory, 2:794–795
tag questions, 2:815–819
uncertainty avoidance, 2:850–851
Communication accommodation theory, 1:2–3, 165
Communication competence, 1:110–115
components of, 1:111–112
evaluating, 1:112
identity and, 1:114–115
intercultural, 1:114
interpersonal, 1:112–113
organizational, 1:113–114
overview, 1:110–112
Communication Monographs (journal), 1:117
Communication theory of identity, 1:115–119
concept of identity, 1:116
history and development of, 1:117–118
layers of identity, 1:116–117
research in, 1:118–119
Communicative democracy, 1:79–80
Communicative ethics, 1:234
Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels), 1:87, 296
Communist Party, 2:761
Community, 1:146, 2:748, 821
Index 911
Community art, 1:11
Compendious comparison, 1:70
Competition, 1:129
Complex inequality, 1:119–123
Complexity studies, 1:453
Computer-mediated communication, deindividuation
effects in, 1:201–202
Condit, Michelle, 2:644
Cone, James, Black Theology and Black Power, 1:431
Confessional art, 1:123–126
Configural logic, 1:187
Conflict, 1:126–130. See also War
collective identity, 2:756–757
core concepts, 1:128–130
ethnic, 1:259–260
models, 1:127–128, 130
nationalism, 2:500
new perspectives, 1:130
overview, 1:126–127
Conformity, 1:22, 216–217
Conformity pressure, 1:387
Confucianism
communication, 1:251
dignity, 1:257
identity and change, 2:561, 564
Connected knowing, 1:11
Connors, Robert J., 2:642
Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, 2:645
Connotation, 2:714
Conquergood, Dwight, 2:617
Conscience collective, 1:21
Conscientiousness, 2:550
Consciousness, 1:131–132
embodiment, 1:244–245
mind-body problem, 1:450–454
multiple-drafts model, 2:698
person, 2:544
personal identity, 2:546
phenomenology, 2:555
philosophy of mind, 2:567–568
practical, 2:626–627
reflexive, 2:601
self-consciousness, 2:678–681
Consciousness raising, 1:368
Consensus information, concerning causality, 1:49
Consequentialist ethics, 1:254
Conservative Christian theology, 2:592–593
Consistency information, concerning causality, 1:49
Consistency theories, 2:691–693
Conspicuous consumption and leisure, 1:133
Constantine, Emperor, 1:33–34
Constitutive phenomenology, 2:554
Constructivism, and international relations, 2:782–785
Constructivist structuralism, 1:19
Consumerism, 2:780. See also Commodity self
Consumption, 1:132–135. See also Commodity self
912 Index

Contact hypothesis, 1:135–140 Counterframing, 1:294

cognitive tendencies, 1:136–137 Counterpublics, 1:79, 2:609
conditions, 1:136 Counter-storytelling, 1:27
critiques of, 1:139–140 Coupland, Douglas, Generation X, 1:307–308
defined, 1:135 Courbet, Gustave, 2:704, 759
mechanism, 1:137–138 Court interpretation, 2:817–818
overview, 1:135–136 Cousin, Jean, 2:638
process, 1:138–139 Covaleski, Mark, 1:54
Contagion, 1:198–199 Craft, Ellen, 2:532
Continuous variables, in ascribed identity, 1:45 Craig, Larry, 2:858
Contract theory, 2:620–622 Craig, Traci Y., 2:818
Contrastivist approach, to code-switching, 1:95 Crane, Stephen, 1:426
Control, conflict and, 1:129 Crano, William, 2:752
Convergence, linguistic, 2:718 Craven, Thomas, 2:759
Conversational implicature, 2:596 Crawley, Rex, 1:168
Conversation analysis, 1:397, 402 Credibility, of communication source, 2:818–819
Cooley, Charles Horton, 1:202–205, 210, 2:691, 707, 754 Crenshaw, Kimberlé, 1:151, 355
Cool pose, 2:730–731 Crenshaw, Martha, 2:823, 825
Cooperation, 1:129, 2:596 Creole, 2:580–582
Cooperative principle, 2:596 Creolization, 1:73
Cooren, François, 1:402 Crime
Copies. See Simulacra anomie, 1:23
Copjec, Joan, 1:304 terrorism, 2:826
Copland, Walter, 1:333 Critical consciousness, 1:131
Cops (television series), 2:657 Critical Inquiry (journal), 2:863
Corbett, Edward P. J., 2:642 Critical race theory, 1:27, 150–152, 2:618
Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, 2:645 Critical realism, 1:152–155
Corlett, J. Angelo, 1:374 epistemology, 1:152–153
Cornelissen, Joep, 1:143 identity, 1:154–155
Cornell, Drucilla, 1:355 ontology, 1:153–154
Cornell University, 2:642 Critical theory, 1:155–158. See also Frankfurt School
Corporate identity, 1:140–144. See also Organizational consumption, 1:134, 135
identity contemporary meaning, 1:156–158
definitions, 1:141 identification, 1:354
importance of, 1:141–142 methodological features, 1:156
management, 1:142–143 origins, 1:155–156
theoretical and methodological approaches, 1:143–144 Critical White studies, 1:27. See also Whiteness studies
Corporate identity mix, 1:142 Crook, Stephen, 1:476
Corporations. See Organizations Cropper, Elizabeth, 2:640
Correctivist approach, to code-switching, 1:94–95 Cross, William, 2:504–506, 888
Correspondence bias, 1:49–50 Cross-cultural differences. See Cultural differences
Corrosion of character, 1:145–146 Crow, Jim (minstrel show character), 1:459
Cortissoz, Royal, 2:759 Crowd behavior, 1:198–199, 218
Cosmic consciousness, 1:132 Crowell, Steven, 2:554
Cosmopolitanism, 1:146–150 Crown Heights riots (Brooklyn, New York), 1:260
civic identity, 1:82 Crummell, Alexander, 1:423
contemporary identity issues, 1:148–150 Crystal Palace, London, 1:470
diversity, 1:235 Cultivation theory, 1:158–161
modern meanings, 1:147–148 critiques of, 1:160
multiculturalism/pluralism vs., 1:149 findings and processes, 1:160
origins, 1:146–147 later developments, 1:160–161
transworld identity, 2:845–846 methods, 1:159–160
Costa, Paul T., Jr, 2:549 theoretical framework, 1:158–159
Costa Kaufmann, Thomas da, 2:640 Cultural capital, 1:161–164
Council of Independent Black Institutions, 1:13 Bourdieu’s theory, 1:19
Counter-Enlightenment, 1:181 class, 1:90, 2:855
 Index 913

embodied, 1:163, 2:736 multiculturalism, 1:479–484

forms of, 1:163–164, 2:736 narratives, 2:497
institutionalized, 1:164, 2:736 psychology of self, 2:605
mobilities, 1:466 self-construal, 2:682–683
objectified, 1:163–164, 2:736 social structure vs., 1:22
social differentiation, 1:121 society in relation to, 1:180, 2:766–767
Cultural contracts theory, 1:164–168 space, 1:187
applications, 1:167–168 structuration theory, 2:796
identity negotiation, 1:165–166 third culture building, 2:831–835
premises, 1:166–167 time, 1:186–187, 230–231
types, 1:167 worldview, 2:898–899
Cultural diasporas, 1:224 Culture, ethnicity, and race, 1:185–188. See also
Cultural differences, 1:183–184, 2:682–684, 693–694 Ethnicity; Race; Racism
Cultural fusion, 1:388 Afrocentricity, 1:12–14
Cultural identities, 1:164–165, 366 antiracism, 1:24–28
Cultural Indicators project, 1:158, 159 biracial identity, 1:63–64
Cultural materialism, 1:175 clan identity, 1:83–85
Cultural mediation, 1:42 code-switching, 1:94–95
Cultural memory, 1:445 communication theory, 1:117
Cultural Mistrust Inventory, 2:506 contact hypothesis, 1:135–140
Cultural psychology, 1:181 critical race theory, 1:150–152
Cultural relativism. See Ethical and cultural relativism culture, 1:185–187
Cultural representation, 1:169–173 ethnicity, 1:187–188
fluidity of meaning, 1:172–173 identity construction, 1:188
production of meaning, 1:170 language, 1:62
racism, 1:171 multiculturalism, 1:479–484
representation, 1:170–171 race, 1:188
Cultural studies, 1:173–180 Culture industry, 1:295
articulation theory, 1:36–39 Culture learning, 2:833
contemporary, 1:179 Culture shock, 1:189–193
defined, 1:173 adjustment phase, 1:191
Foucault’s influence, 1:178–179 crisis phase, 1:190–191
history of, 1:173–174 critiques of, 1:193
Marxism, 1:176–178 history of, 1:189
semiotics/structuralism, 1:175–176 honeymoon phase, 1:190
social stratification theory, 2:765 J-shaped curve, 1:192
Cultural variability. See Dimensions of cultural managing, 1:193
variability recovery phase, 1:191
Culture, 1:180–184. See also Culture, ethnicity, and race roller-coaster model, 1:192–193
anomie, 1:22–23 U-shaped curve, 1:189–191
communication competence, 1:114 W-shaped reverse culture shock curve, 1:191–192
contemporary developments, 1:182–184 Current Population Survey, 1:2
defined, 1:180 Cutler, Anthony, 2:640
dimensions of cultural variability, 1:227–231 Cutting of reflected failure, 1:58
fear of death and, 2:827–830 Cybersurveillance, 2:804
hegemony, 1:324 Cyborgs, 1:245–248, 268, 279
high-context, 1:102, 185–186 Cyclical economics, 2:895
history and background, 1:180–182 Cynics, 1:146–147, 2:845
hybridity, 1:338 Cyrus the Great, 1:221
idiomatic expressions, 1:380
immediacy, 1:383 Dada, 1:472, 2:773
immigration, 1:384–386 Daguerre, Louis, 1:470, 2:576
intercultural personhood, 1:397 Daguerreotypes, 2:576
language, 1:423–424, 2:651 Dahl, Robert, 1:354
logic, 1:187 Daily Show With Jon Stewart, The
low-context, 1:102, 185–186 (television show), 2:657
914 Index

Dali, Salvador, 1:462, 473 computer-mediated communication, 1:201–202

Damaged life, 1:297 depersonalization vs., 2:750
Damasio, Antonio, 2:568, 569 history and background, 1:198–199
Dangerfield, Celnisha, 2:731 norms, 1:200
Dante Alighieri, 1:31 pros and cons, 1:198
Darwin, Charles, 1:252, 264–265, 344, 357, 2:578 social identity, 1:201
Dasein, 1:61, 232, 2:544, 555, 559 Deinstitutionalization, 2:822
Dataveillance, 2:804 Deixis, 2:594–595
Daubert, Johannes, 2:554 Dejection-related emotions, 2:685
Davenport, Charles B., 1:265 De Jongh, Elena, 2:817–818
David, Jacques-Louis, Napoleon in His Study, 1:334 Delany, Martin, 1:12
Davidson, Donald, 1:197 De las Casas, Bartolomé, 2:621
Davidson, J. P., 2:506 De Lauretis, Teresa, 2:864
Davis, Angela, 2:817 Deleuze, Gilles, 1:10, 33, 71, 176, 179, 180, 226, 442,
Davis, F. James, 1:64 444, 2:507–509, 732–734
Davis, Gerald, 2:644 Delgado, Richard, 1:151–152, 355
Davis, Jessica, 1:41 Deliverer archetype, 1:30–31
Davis, Lennard J., 2:790 Demeny, Paul, 2:527
Davis, Olga, 2:889 Democracy
Dawkins, Richard, 1:184 ancient Greek, 1:355
Dawson, Michael, 2:609 communicative, 1:79–80
D.C. sniper, 2:898 conflict, 1:128
Deadwood (television series), 2:793 contemporary, 1:355–356
Deaf community, 2:521, 525 identity, 1:354–356
Death modern, 1:355
fear of, 2:696–697, 775 sovereignty, 2:777
identity and, 2:541–542, 556–557, 559 Dennett, Daniel, 1:357, 419, 453, 2:568, 698
terror management theory, 2:827–830 Dennis, Norman, 2:854
Death of God, 2:558 Denotation, 2:714
Death of the author, 1:486 Depersonalization, 1:317, 2:606, 750
Debord, Guy, 2:661, 773–774, 779 Depth psychology, 1:297
Society of the Spectacle, The, 2:774 Dérive, 2:773, 774
Debray, Natalie, 1:367 Derrida, Jacques, 1:20, 33, 60, 71–72, 152, 157, 176,
Decade Show, The (exhibition), 2:528 180, 195–197, 226–227, 297, 327, 464, 2:517, 556,
Deconstruction, 1:195–197 559–560, 769, 863, 864
critiques of, 1:197 Of Grammatology, 1:157
cultural studies, 1:176 Descartes, René, 1:109, 131, 326, 357, 392, 417, 2:557,
defined, 1:195 565–566, 674, 800
Heideggerian philosophy, 1:60 Descene, Mark, 2:830
method of, 1:196–197 Desire, 1:449, 2:864–867
overview, 1:195–196 Desire and the looking-glass self, 1:202–205
subjectivity, 1:327 Goffman and, 1:204
Deculturation, 1:5 postcolonialism, 1:204–205
Deetz, James, 1:437 principles of looking-glass self,
Deetz, Stanley, 1:402 1:203–204
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 2:858 De Swaan, Abraham, 2:841
Deficit/deficiency model, 2:506 Determinism, 1:273, 2:651
Defoe, Daniel, The Shortest Way With the Détournement, 2:773, 774
Dissenters, 2:870 Deutsch, Morton, 2:691
Degas, Edgar, 1:469 Developed countries, 1:1
De Gaulle, Charles, 1:367 Developing countries, 1:1
Dehumanization, 2:750, 824 Development of identity, 1:205–209
Dei, George Sefa, 1:27 adaptation, 1:6
Deindividuation, 1:198–202 critiques, 1:207–208
accountability, 1:199–200 mirror-stage, 1:461–464
coining of term, 1:199 new directions in study of, 1:208–209
 Index 915

psychology of, 1:205–206 Dick, Philip K., Do Androids Dream of Electric

status measure of, 1:207 Sheep? 1:279
Development of self-concept, 1:209–213. See also Dickens, Charles, 1:296
Self-Concept Christmas Carol, A, 1:278
history of self-concept, 1:209–210 Great Expectations, 2:870–871
looking-glass self, 1:202–205 Diction, 2:797–799
psychological aspects, 1:211–213 Diderot, Denis, 1:148
sociological aspects, 1:210–211 Didi-Huberman, Georges, 2:637
Development theory, 2:895 Dien, Dora Shu-fang, 2:547
Deverson, Jane, Generation X, 1:307 Diener, Ed, 1:199–200, 218
Deviance, 1:213–218 Difference/différance, 1:226–227. See also Personality/
anomie, 1:213–214 individual differences
antinorm vs. pronorm, 1:218 conflict, 1:129
conformity, 1:216–217 democracy, 1:355–356
group distinctiveness, 1:218 identification, 2:768–770
group reactions, 1:217–218 Lacan on, 1:464
labeling, 1:215, 413–415 multiculturalism, 1:479
minorities, 1:217 negative dialectic, 1:157
primary vs. secondary, 1:214–215, 413 Othering process, 2:522–526
psychological perspectives, 1:216–218 subjectivity, 1:327
sociological perspectives, 1:213–215 Differentiation, in modernity, 1:476
Dewey, John, 1:355, 392, 418, 440, 2:609 Diffuse status characteristics, 2:786
Dexter, Pete, Paris Trout, 1:429 Diffusionism, 1:184, 407–408
Dialect, 1:219–221. See also Style/diction Digital logic, 1:451
code-switching, 1:94–95 Dignity, 1:256–258
eye dialect, 1:426 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 1:156, 326
literary uses, 1:425–429 Dilward, Thomas, 1:460
regional dialect, 1:426 Dimensions of cultural variability, 1:227–231
Southern dialect, 1:426 high-low context, 1:228–229
types, 1:426–427 individualism-collectivism, 1:228
Dialogical aesthetics, 1:11 power distance, 1:229–230
Dialogic ethics, 1:254–255 time, 1:230–231
Dialogism, 1:403 uncertainty avoidance, 1:230
Dias & Riedweg, 1:125 Diné, 2:653
Diaspora, 1:221–226 Diogenes of Sinope, 1:146–148
Black Atlantic, 1:68–69 Diop, Cheikh Anta, 1:12, 2:642
conflict, 1:225–226 Dirsmith, Mark, 1:54
critiques of models, 1:224 Disabilities, stereotypes and, 2:789–790
cultural diasporas, 1:224 Disclosure (film), 1:351
definitions, 1:221–222 Discourse, 1:231–234
hybridity, 1:338–339 articulation theory, 1:36–39
imperial diasporas, 1:224 characteristics, 1:20
labor diasporas, 1:223–224 communicative ethics, 1:234
language loss, 1:423 defined, 1:37, 231
looking-glass self, 1:204–205 hermeneutics, 1:231–232
models, 1:222–224 identity and, 1:454
politics, 1:225 Orientalism, 2:517
postcolonialism, 1:204–205 poststructuralism, 1:233
postmodern approaches, 1:224–225 queer theory, 1:234
trade diasporas, 1:224 race, 1:171–172
transnationalism, 2:842–844 structuralism, 1:232–233
victim diasporas, 1:223 Discursive formation, 1:37
Diaspora (journal), 1:222 Disidentification, 1:374
Dichotomous thinking, 1:268 Disinterestedness, aesthetics and, 1:8, 9
Dichotomous variables, in ascribed Dispensationalism, 1:298–299
identity, 1:45 Disposition. See Personality
916 Index

Dispositional realism, 1:153 Ebonics, 1:94–95, 219, 220

Dispositional strategy, for personality and social Eco, Umberto, 1:33
behavior, 2:550–551 Economic capital, 1:90, 162, 2:736
Dissonance theory. See Cognitive dissonance theory Economy
Distance hegemony, 1:324–325
communication space, 1:382 liberalism, 2:501
power distance, 1:93, 182, 229–230, 283 modernity, 1:477
social distance, 2:668 neoliberalism, 2:501–503
voyeurism, 2:875 political economy, 2:584–587
Distelhorst, Daniel, 2:816 postmodernity, 1:478
Distinctiveness information, concerning causality, 1:49 social economy, 2:745–748
Ditties, J. E., 2:692 world systems theory, 2:893–895
Divergence, 1:407–408 Edelman, Gerald, 2:569
Diversity, 1:235–236. See also Multiculturalism; Edley, Nigel, 2:854
Pluralism Education
Domination, 1:296–297, 338 Afrocentricity, 1:13
Dorner, Isaak, 2:592 art and, 1:40–41, 75–76
Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 1:272 bilingualism, 1:62–63
Double aspectism, 1:451 code-switching, 1:94–95
Double consciousness, 1:67–68, 131, 236–239, 435–436 cognitive development, 1:40
Double-emic perspective, 2:833–834 English as a Second Language, 1:249
Double entendre, 2:654 Othering process, 2:523
Douglass, Frederick, 1:32, 185, 428, 2:870 propaganda, 2:600
Downing, Leslie, 1:200 Edwards, Elizabeth, 1:437
Downward social comparison, 2:604 Efficacy expectation, 2:687
Dowry deaths, 1:253 Efland, Arthur, 1:42
Dozens, the, 2:731 Art and Cognition, 1:40
Dramaturgical circumspection, 1:390 Ego, 1:343–348
Dramaturgical discipline, 1:389–390 Egypt, 2:641–642, 703–704
Dramaturgical loyalty, 1:389 Eidetic phenomenology, 2:553
Dreyfus, Hubert, 2:569 Eiffel Tower, Paris, 1:470
Drucker, Peter, 1:54 Einstein, Albert, 1:297, 2:837
Drzewiecka, Jolanta, 1:313, 410 Eisner, Elliot, 1:40
Dualism, 1:451, 2:566 Elaborated codes, 1:92
Dubé, Yves, 2:734 Elective bilingualism, 1:62
Du Bois, W. E. B., 1:12, 67, 131, 172, 236–238, 266, Electra complex, 1:345
278, 359, 435, 2:881–883 Elements, in articulation theory, 1:37
Duccio, 2:638 Elephant Man, 1:276–277, 352
Duchamp, Marcel, 1:438, 2:773 Elias, Norbert, 2:838–839, 841
Belle Haleine Eau de Voilette, 1:439 Eliot, T. S., 1:29, 2:871
In Advance of a Broken Arm, 1:438 Ellipsis, 1:69
Nude Descending a Staircase, No. 2, 1:331 Ellison, Ralph, 1:272
Dunbar, Paul Laurence, 1:435 “Battle Royal,” 1:238–239
Dunn, Katherine, Geek Love, 1:278–279 Invisible Man, 1:429, 2:520
Dürer, Albrecht, 2:639, 704 E-mail, 1:4
Durkheim, Émile, 1:21–23, 120–121, 154, 182, Embedded liberalism, 2:501
213–214, 444, 2:561, 570, 663, 840, 841 Embeddedness/embedded identity, 1:241–243
Duty, 1:337 Embodiment and body politics, 1:244–248. See also Body
Duty ethics, 1:254 body vs. embodiment, 1:453–454
Dyer, Richard, 2:864 mind-body problem, 1:452
Dystopia, 1:36 phenomenology, 1:244–245
philosophy of mind, 2:568–569
Eadie, James, 1:272 Emergentism, 1:453
Earle, William, 1:272 Emic. See Etic/emic
Eastlake, Charles, 2:577 Emigration, clan identity and, 1:84–85
Eastlake, Elizabeth, 2:577 Emin, Tracey, 1:124, 125
 Index 917

Emler, Nicholas, 1:216 Ethical and cultural relativism, 1:252–253

Emmett, Dan, 1:459 Ethics
Emotional communication, 1:246 autonomy, 1:255–258
Empathy, 2:831 conflict and, 1:128
Empire. See Colonialism consequentialist ethics, 1:254
Empiricism, 1:152–153 cosmopolitanism, 1:149–150
Employees, 1:89 dialogic ethics, 1:254–255
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), 2:858 dignity, 1:256–258
Energy, conservation of, 1:344 duty ethics, 1:254
Engels, Friedrich, 1:87, 296 feminist ethics, 1:254–255
England. See Britain history of, 1:254–255
English as a Foreign Language (EFL), 1:249 Judeo-Christian ethics, 1:255
English as a Second Language (ESL), 1:248–250. See also major principles, 1:255–257
Bilingualism recognition, 1:257
intonation, 1:405 virtue ethics, 1:254
English for Special Purposes (ESP), 1:249 womanism, 2:891–892
English language, 1:248 Ethics of identity, 1:254–258
Enlightenment Ethiopian Minstrels, 1:460
cosmopolitanism, 1:147, 148 Ethnic belongingness, 1:261–262
culture, 1:180–181 Ethnic cleansing, 1:267
democracy, 1:355 Ethnic identity, 1:5–6. See also Culture, ethnicity,
humanitarianism, 1:335–336 and race
liberalism, 2:501 Ethnicity, 1:187–188, 258–260. See also Culture,
subjectivity, 2:800 ethnicity, and race
Enryo-sasshi theory, 1:250–252 biracial identity, 1:63–64
Entitativity, 2:749 definitions, 1:187, 259
Environmental self, 2:547 etymology, 1:258–259
Epiphanies, 2:741 hard ethnicity, 1:259
Epiphenomenalism, 1:451, 2:566 hidden ethnicity, 1:259
Epistemic fallacy, 1:153 higher education, 1:260
Epistemic relativism, 1:153 historical conflicts, 1:259–260
Epistemology multiculturalism, 1:479–484
of identity, 1:365–367 Othering process, 2:523
third world, 2:836–837 political organization, 1:260
womanist, 2:889–890 race vs., 1:258
Époche, 2:554 soft ethnicity, 1:259
Erasmus, Desiderius, 1:148 terrorism, 2:825
Ereignis (event), 2:555 Ethnic Studies, 1:260
Erikson, Erik, 1:44–45, 205–206, 348, 362–364, 377, Ethnocentrism, 1:252, 386, 2:750
436, 2:588, 631–632, 646, 676, 680, 753, 754 Ethnography, 2:578–579
Erikson, Joan, 1:206 Ethnolinguistic identity theory, 1:165–166,
Erikson, Kai, 1:413 261–262
Erikson, Thomas H., 1:258–259 Ethnomethodology, 1:402
Ernst, Max, 1:473 Etic/emic, 1:263–264, 2:833
Eros, 1:489 Eugenicism, 1:264–268
Espelage, Dorothy L., 2:739 conceptual framework, 1:264–265
Essentialism. See also Anti-essentialism critiques of, 1:267–268
correspondence bias, 1:50 defined, 1:264
defined, 1:50 empirical support, 1:265–266
democracy, 1:355 intention-behavior relation, 1:266–267
gender, 1:305–306 Eugenic Records Office, 1:265–266
Othering process, 2:521 Eugenics Research Association, 1:265
race, 1:26, 172 Eurocentricity, 1:268–269
transnationalism, 2:843 Afrocentricity and, 1:12–13
Este, Isabelle d’, 2:639 Asiacentricity and, 1:48
Esu-Elegbara, 1:435, 2:846–847 characteristics, 1:268–269
918 Index

cultural contracts theory, 1:167–168 Face/facework, 1:281–283, 2:850, 851. See also
imagery, 1:333 Impression management; Self-presentation
Europe Facticity, 1:273
inequalities, 1:122 False belief task, 2:831
low-context culture, 1:186 False needs, 1:134
Evangelical Christians, 1:298–299 Falwell, Jerry, 1:299
Evans, C. O., 2:545 Family Guy (television series), 2:656–657
Eve, 1:30, 32 Family Research Council, 1:266
Everling, Clark, 2:746 Fanon, Frantz, 1:272, 409, 419, 423–424, 433–434, 2:517
Everyday life Black Skin, White Masks, 1:424
nationalism, 2:497 Wretched of the Earth, The, 1:423–424
visual culture, 2:861 Farber, Daniel, 1:151
Evil eye, 2:662 Farr, Marcia, 2:643–644
Evolution Farrakhan, Louis, 1:313
cultural relativism, 1:252 Faulkner, William, 1:425
culture, 1:184 As I Lay Dying, 2:871
sexual selection, 1:344 “Barn Burning,” 1:30
Evolutionary psychology, 1:270–271 Light in August, 1:31
Ewers, Traute, 1:406–408 Sound and the Fury, The, 1:426
Exaggeration, in satire, 2:654 Faye, Jan, 2:897
Exchange-value, 2:585 Federal Art Project (FAP), 2:760–761
Exclusion, social, 1:120–121 Federal Plaza, New York City, 1:33
Executive functioning, 2:601 Feldman, Marcus, 1:184
Exhibitionism, 2:660–662 Femininity, performance of, 2:869
Existential homelessness, 1:241–242 Feminism
Existentialist identity questions, 1:271–275 aesthetics, 1:9
authenticity, 1:274 Butler’s Gender Trouble on, 2:614–615
body, 1:273–274 counterpublics, 2:609
critiques of, 1:274–275 deconstruction, 1:196–197
freedom, 1:272–273 discourse, 1:233
origins, 1:272 epistemology, 1:11
overview, 1:271–272 ethics, 1:254–255
themes, 1:272 feminist theology, 1:432
thinkers, 1:272 intertextuality, 1:486
Existential phenomenology, 2:555–556 Latin American, 1:431
Expectancy-confirming bias, 1:137 nomadology, 2:509
Expectation states theory, 2:786 political identity, 2:590
Expressionism, 2:706 subjectivity, 2:802–803
Extended mind thesis, 2:569 visual desire, 2:865–867
Extraordinary bodies, 1:275–279. See also visual pleasure, 2:867–870
Ideal body, the womanism, 1:431, 2:524, 635, 888–893
body as spectacle, 1:276–277 Feminist eugenicism, 1:266
cinema, 1:278 Festinger, Leon, 1:95–98, 199, 216–217, 2:672, 691,
freak shows, 1:277–278 701, 737, 739
literature, 1:278–279 Fetishism, 2:723–724, 868–870
popular culture, 1:279 Feuerbach, Ludwig, 1:18
science fiction, 1:279 Fhagen-Smith, Peony, 2:505, 506
television, 1:279 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 2:838
Extraversion, 2:549 Fielding, Henry, Tom Jones, 2:870
Extrinsic motivation, 1:353 Fields, Bourdieu’s concept of, 1:19, 162
Eyck, Jan van, 2:639 Field theory of human communication, 1:385
Eye contact, 1:382 Figurative language, 2:644
Eye dialect, 1:426 Figures of speech, 1:284–287. See also Idiomatic
Eysenck, Hans, 1:216 expressions
Eysenck Personality Inventory, 2:549 defined, 1:284
Ezekiel, Raphael, The Racist Mind, 2:882–883 foundation of, 1:284–285
 Index 919

semantics, 2:714 France

types, 1:285–286 colonialism, 1:103–104
Film. See Cinema First Nations, 1:289
Filtering. See Perceptual filtering Renaissance art, 2:638
Fine art, 1:8, 438 Franck, Karen, 1:35
Finley, Karen, 1:9 François I, King of France, 2:638
Fiorentino, Rosso, 2:638 Frankenberg, Ruth, 2:881
Fiorenza, Elizabeth Schüssler, 1:432 Displacing Whiteness, 2:882
Fire gods, 1:488 Frankfurt school, 1:155–158, 177, 180, 295–298, 440,
First Nations, 1:287–289 2:839. See also Critical theory
Fish, Stanley, 1:357 Frankl, Viktor, 1:272
Fisher, B. Aubrey, 2:850 Franklin, Benjamin, 1:243, 2:655
Fisher, Rudolph, 1:436 Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, 2:823
Fiske, Susan T., 2:711, 788 Fraser, Nancy, 2:609, 610, 757
Five-factor model of personality, 2:549–550 Frazer, James, 1:29
Fivush, Robin, 1:208, 212–213 Golden Bough, The, 1:449
Flaubert, Gustave, Madame Bovary, 2:871 Frazier, E. Franklin, 1:266
Flexibility, in work organization, 1:145–146 Freaks (film), 1:278
Fliess, Wilhelm, 1:344 Freak shows, 1:277–278
Florence, 2:638 Freedom. See also Liberty, positive vs. negative
Florian, Victor, 2:829 economy, 2:502–503
Florida, Richard, The Rise of the Creative existentialism, 1:272–273
Class, 2:736 morality, 1:255–258
Floyd-Thomas, Stacey, 2:635, 891 Freeman, Alan, 1:150
Fluxus, 1:10 Free rider problem, 2:755
Focus on the Family, 1:266 Freestyle (exhibition), 2:529
Foley, Mark, 2:858 Frei, Hans, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative,
Foot-in-the-door social influence, 2:703 2:592–593
Force hegemony, 1:325 Freire, Paulo, 1:242, 255
Fordism, 1:477 French Revolution, 1:81
Foreign Service Institute, 1:189 Freud, Anna, 1:347–348, 2:674–675
Forgetting, collective, 1:446 Freud, Sigmund, 1:32, 44, 65, 198, 205, 216, 296–297,
Formality 327, 331, 343–348, 357, 362, 409, 446, 473, 2:539,
address, 1:291–292 549, 558, 570, 674, 676, 690, 753, 754, 800, 867,
diction, 2:798 868, 872
Forms of address, 1:290–293 Interpretation of Dreams, The, 1:124
formal address, 1:291–292 Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 2:660
literature, 1:292–293 Friedman, Alice, 1:35
regional factors, 1:291 Friedman, Milton, 2:501–503
social relations, 1:290–291 Capitalism and Freedom, 2:501–502
Fornari, Franco, 2:824 Friedrich, Paul, 2:645
Foster, Elissa, 2:525 Friends, 1:92–93
Foster, Hal, 2:529, 863 Fromm, Erich, 1:155, 213, 216
Foucault, Michel, 1:20, 33, 54, 71, 124–125, 152, 171, Frozen idioms, 1:379
178–180, 232–233, 247, 297, 327, 334, 355, 357, Fry, Roger, 1:469
409–410, 419, 453, 454, 486, 2:517, 520, 539, 556, Frye, Northrup, 1:29
559, 563, 774, 802, 838, 840, 863 Fukuyama, Francis, 1:182
Discipline and Punish, 2:772, 805 Fulbright Program, 1:189
History of Sexuality, 2:613–614, 725 Fulkerson, Gregory M., 2:735
Fouquet, Jean, 2:704 Functionalism, 2:567
Fox, Jamie, 1:278 Functional relativity, in language, 2:653–654
Fragmentation, 1:341–342 Fundamental attribution error, 1:183, 2:607. See also
Frame alignment strategies, 1:293 Ultimate attribution error
Frame disputes, 1:294 Fundamentalism, 1:298–299, 2:663
Frame resonance, 1:294 Fung, Richard, 2:864
Framing, 1:293–295, 2:643–644 Funk, Carolyn, 2:590
920 Index

Fusco, Coco, 1:33 sex vs., 1:305, 2:720–721

Fuss, Diane, 1:33 social stratification theory, 2:764
Fussell, Paul, 1:308 surveillance, 2:805–806
transnationalism, 2:844
Gablik, Suzi, 1:11 war, 2:880–881
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 1:326–327, 330, 401, 402, 2:555 Genderlects, 2:537, 816
Gaines, Steven, 2:857 Genderqueer, 2:616
Galatzer-Levy, Robert, 1:363, 364 Gender-Space-Architecture (Rendell, Penner, and
Gallagher, Shaun, 2:568, 569 Borden), 1:35
Galton, Francis, 1:264–265, 267 Generalized other, 2:740
Galton Society, 1:265 General systems theory, 1:398–399
Gamble, Clarence, 1:266 Generation approach, 1:16
Games, 2:740 Generation X and Generation Y, 1:307–311
Gandhi, Mohandas, 2:631–632 characteristics of X, 1:308–309
Garber, Marjorie, 1:66 characteristics of Y, 1:310
García Canclini, Néstor, 1:33 experiences of X, 1:309
Garcia Márquez, Gabriel, 2:836 future of Y, 1:311
Gardner, Howard, 1:40, 41, 75 history of X term, 1:307–308
Garfinkel, Herbert, 1:402, 414 history of Y term, 1:309
Garland Thomson, Rosemarie, 1:275–276 scope of X, 1:309
Garnett, Henry Highland, 1:12 technology and Y, 1:309–310
Garnett, Robert, Occupational Hazard, 1:124 Genital stage of psychosexual development, 1:362
Garvey, Marcus, 1:12, 313 Genocide, 1:267, 2:901
Gatens, Moira, 1:334 Gerbner, George, 1:158–159
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., 1:33, 375 Gergen, Kenneth, 1:416, 2:658, 668–669, 742
Signifying Monkey, The, 1:435, 2:847 German Ideology (Marx and Engels), 1:296
Gauguin, Paul, 1:472, 2:704 Germany
Gay, 1:301–302, 2:728. See also Queer theory; Sexual colonialism, 1:105
identity low-context culture, 1:102
Gay, Paul du, 2:717 Renaissance art, 2:639
Gay Mafia, 2:856–859 Gerotranscendence, 1:206
Gay marriage, 2:728 Gesellschaft, 1:182
Gaze, 1:302–305, 2:660–662, 774. See also Visualizing Gestalt psychology, 1:40, 41
desire; Visual pleasure Geulincx, Arnold, 2:566
Gazette de France (newspaper), 2:576 Ghana, 1:69
Ge, Gao, 1:6–7 Gibbs, Raymond, Jr., 2:569
Gecas, Victor, 1:210 Giddens, Anthony, 1:17, 18–19, 21, 120, 2:511,
Geertz, Clifford, 1:181, 384, 2:748 626–628, 668, 771, 794, 796, 840
Gelfand, Michele, 1:101 Gide, André, 1:272
Gell, Alfred, 1:449 Giles, Howard, 1:2, 54, 261–262
Gemeinschaft, 1:182 Gillick, Liam, 1:11
Gender, 1:305–307. See also Feminism; Men; Women Gilligan, Carol, 1:208
aesthetics, 1:9–10 Gilman, Charlotte Perkins, “The Yellow Wallpaper,” 2:811
brain, 1:452–453 Gilroy, Paul, 1:66–67
Butler’s Gender Trouble on, 2:615 Giotto, 2:638
communication styles, 2:537–538, 815–816, 818 Girard, René, 1:449
Duchamp and, 1:438–439 Giroux, Henry, 1:267
essentialism, 1:305–306 Glaspell, Susan
gaze, 1:303–304 “Jury of Her Peers, A,” 1:32
language use, 2:574 Trifles, 1:32
liberation theology, 1:432 Global consciousness, 1:131
multiculturalism, 1:481 Globalization, 1:311–314
naturalism, 1:306 characteristics, 1:311
Othering process, 2:524, 527–528 clan identity, 1:85
perceptual filtering, 2:537–538 complex inequality, 1:122
performativity, 1:306–307, 2:538–540 cosmopolitanism, 1:149
 Index 921

critiques of, 1:314 identity, 2:556–557

global village, 1:315–316 myths, 1:488
hybridity, 1:339 religious syncretism, 2:813
immigration, 1:313 rhetoric, 2:641–642
mobilities, 1:464–467 Greenberg, Clement, 1:469, 474
modernity, 1:311–312 Greenberg, Jeff, 2:696, 827
Orientalism, 2:518 Greenblatt, Stephen, 2:639
pros and cons, 1:315–316 Greenfield, Patricia Marks, 1:101
third world, 1:312–313 Gregory XV, Pope, 2:599
tradition overthrown by, 2:627 Grice, H. Paul, 2:596
transnationalism, 1:313–314, 2:842–844 Grimm Brothers, 1:30
U.S. role, 1:312 Grogan, Sarah, 2:739
Global village, 1:315–316 Gropius, Walter, 1:471
Gobineau, Joseph Arthur, Comte de, 1:265 Grossberg, Lawrence, 1:37, 38, 179
God Grosz, Elizabeth, 1:35, 331–332
death of, 2:558 Group, The (television series), 2:614
mind-body problem, 2:566 Group identification, 1:316
Godard, Jean-Luc, 1:272 Group identity, 1:316–319. See also Collective/social
Gods, types of, 1:488–489 identity
Goethals, George R., 2:739 creating and sustaining, 1:317–318, 2:513
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, Sorrows of Young defined, 1:317
Werther, 2:870 effects, 1:318–319
Goffman, Erving, 1:202, 204, 281, 282, 396–397, 419, identification, 1:353–354
2:521, 545, 666–667, 742, 850 identity scripts, 1:372–376
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, The, 1:108, individual vs., 1:317
389, 396 influence processes, 2:752
Goldberg, David Theo, 1:312–313 I-Other dialectic, 1:410
Goldberg, Lewis, 2:549 memory, 1:444–447
Golden, James, 2:644 optimal distinctiveness theory, 2:512–513
Golden, Thelma, 2:529 self and, 2:670
Goldenberg, Jamie, 2:829 selling out, 2:622–624
Goldin, Nan, 1:125 Group locomotion, 1:216
Goldthorpe, John, 1:86, 89–90, 120 Groupspeak, 1:317
Goodman, Nelson, 1:41 Group-specificity, 1:100
Gordon, Lewis, 1:272 Groupthink, 1:218
Gordon, Milton, 1:387 Grumet, Madeleine, 1:40
Gorky, Arshile, 1:473 Grusin, Richard, 1:444
Gothic art, 2:637 Guattari, Félix, 1:10, 442, 2:507–509
Goujon, Jean, 2:638 Gubar, Susan, 2:866
Gould, Matt Kennedy, 2:661 Guerrillas, 2:825
Governmentality, conflict and, 1:128 Guinier, Lani, 1:235
GQ (magazine), 1:349 Gullahorn, Jeanne, 1:191
Gramsci, Antonio, 1:36, 38, 177–179, 306, 324, 2:517, 895 Gullahorn, John, 1:191
Grand narratives, 1:297 Gumperz, John J., 1:94
Grant, Jacquelyn, 1:431, 2:891 Gunn, Tim, 2:859
Gray, John, 2:501, 502 Gunter, Barrie, 2:739
Grayson, John, 2:864 Guston, Philip, Work and Play, 2:760
Great Britain. See Britain Gutenberg, Johannes, 1:443, 2:637
Great Dictator, The (film), 2:657 Gutiérrez, Gustavo, 1:430
Great Schism, 2:638 Gutiérrez, Jose, 2:644
Greece Guyau, Jean-Marie, 1:21
body ideal, 1:332–333, 349
civic identity, 1:80–81 Habermas, Jürgen, 1:11, 33, 156, 234, 295, 355, 395,
cosmopolitanism, 1:146–147 402, 2:588, 597, 608–609, 839
democracy, 1:354–355 Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,
diasporas, 1:221 The, 2:608
922 Index

Habitus, 1:321–323 Hayden, Dolores, 1:35

Bourdieu’s theory, 1:19–20 Hayden, Robert
conceptual background, 1:321 “Middle Passage,” 1:29–30
defined, 1:90 Those Winter Sundays, 2:871
embodiment, 1:247 Hayek, Friedrich A., The Road to Serfdom, 2:501, 502
expression of, 1:323 Hebdige, Dick, 1:72, 175, 179
formation of, 1:322 Hebrew language, 2:664
social differentiation, 1:121 Hecht, Michael L., 1:100, 116–117, 119
Haggerty, Kevin, 2:806 Hedge, Rhada, 1:313
Halbwachs, Maurice, 1:444 Hedonic principle, 2:629
Hall, Edward T., 1:102, 185, 229, 230, 382 Hegel, G. W. F., 1:33, 157, 295, 297, 298, 321, 462,
Hall, Maurice, 1:314 2:519, 526–527, 539, 553, 558, 561, 620–622, 660,
Hall, Stuart, 1:36–39, 169–173, 175, 838, 839
178, 409, 419, 442, 2:618, 717, Hegemony, 1:324–325
770, 845 articulation theory, 1:38
Representation and the Media, 2:790–791 Gramsci’s theory, 1:177–178
Halualani, Rona, 1:313 Orientalism, 2:517
Hamblett, Charles, Generation X, 1:307 Heian, James, 1:54
Hamilton, David, 1:369 Heidegger, Martin, 1:33, 59–61, 226–227, 272, 326,
Hanh, Thich Nhat, 1:456, 2:635–636 388, 462, 2:555–556, 568, 800, 838
Hanifan, Lyda J., 2:734 Sein und Zeit (Being and Time), 1:59, 232, 326, 2:555,
Hanks, Tom, 1:278 558–559
Hannaford, Ivan, Race, 2:882 Heider, Fritz, 1:48, 57, 2:691
Hannam, Kevin, 1:466 Helmholz, Hermann von, 1:344
Happenings, 1:10 Helms, Janet, 1:44, 45, 2:504, 624, 885–888
Happiness, 1:183 Helvétius, Claude Adrien, 1:335
Haptics, 1:382–383 Hemessen, Caterina van, 2:639
Haraway, Donna, 1:179, 248 Hemingway, Ernest, “Hills Like White Elephants,” 2:871
Hard ethnicity, 1:259 Hemmings, Beverly, 2:532
Hardiman, Rita, 2:885 Hemmings, Eston, 2:532
Hardy, Thomas, Tess of the D’Urbervilles, 1:31 Hemmings, Harriet, 2:532
Harlem Renaissance, 1:428 Hemmings, Madison, 2:532
Harper, Frances E. W. Hemmings, Sally, 2:532
Iola Leroy, 1:292, 2:534 Henriques, Fernando, 2:854
Minnie’s Sacrifice, 1:292–293 Henry, Jules, 1:419
Harré, Rom, 1:366 Hensley, Wayne E., 1:202–204
Harriman, Averill, 1:265 Hepburn, Audrey, 1:351
Harriman, Mary Williamson, 1:265 Herder, Johann Gottfried, 1:181, 2:498
Harris, Angela, 1:151 Heritage Foundation, 1:266
Harris, Joel Chandler, 1:31 Hermeneutic circle, 1:325
Uncle Remus, 1:427 Hermeneutics, 1:325–328
Uncle Remus Tales, 1:426 defined, 1:325
Harris, Phil, 1:143 discourse, 1:231–232
Hart, Janice, 1:437 historicity, 1:326–327
Harvard, Lucy Ann, 1:436 identity, 1:325–328
Harvard Project Zero, 1:40, 41 immigration, 1:388
Harvey, David, 2:501–503 phenomenology, 2:555
Hasidic Jews, 1:260 Hermeneutics of suspicion, 1:327, 2:558
Haslam, Nick, 1:50 Herodotus, 1:13, 180
Hauerwas, Stanley, 1:242 Herrnstein, Richard, The Bell Curve, 1:172
Havelock, Eric, 1:417 Hesmondhalgh, David, 1:410
Havránek, Bohuslav, 2:643 Heteroglossia, 1:403
Hawai'i Creole English, 2:580–581 Heteronormativity, 2:525
Hawthorne, Nathaniel Heterosexism, 1:432, 2:539
“My Kinsman, Major Molineux,” 1:30 Heterosexuality, defined, 1:64
Scarlet Letter, The, 1:32 Heyward, Carter, 1:432
 Index 923

Hezbollah, 2:826 Hornsey, Matthew, 2:752

Hiberno-English, 1:407–408 Hottentot Venus, 1:276
Hidden ethnicity, 1:259 Houston, Marsha, 2:889
Hierarchy of needs, 2:675, 695, 855 Howard, Pierce, 1:452
Higgins, E. Tory, 2:710 Howarth, David, 1:39
High-contact cultures, 1:383 Howe, Neil, 1:309
High-context cultures, 1:102, 185–186, 228–229, 2:653 Howes, J. E., 2:734
High culture, 1:174 Huang, Larke, 1:54, 55
High modernity, 2:668 Huddy, Leonie, 2:591
Hill, Anita, 2:818 Hughes, Langston, 1:428
Hill, Christine, 1:11 Hugo, Victor
Hindi, 2:580 Hunchback of Notre Dame, The, 1:352
Hinduism, 2:564 Misérables, Les, 1:198
Hip-hop language, 2:817 Human capital, 1:162–163, 2:736
Hirschberger, Gilad, 2:829 Human Development Index, 1:1–2
Hirschi, Travis, 1:214 Human dignity, 1:256–258
Historicity, 1:328–331 Human figure, the, 1:331–334. See also Body;
defining, 1:328–330 Ideal body, the
interpretation, 1:330 Human Inference (Nisbett and Ross), 1:49
public domain, 1:330–331 Humanism, 2:637, 639
History-in-person, 1:42 Humanistic psychology, 1:347
Hitchcock, Alfred, Rear Window, 2:875 Humanitarianism, 1:334–337
Hitler, Adolf, 1:149, 2:590, 657 duty, 1:337
HIV, 1:65, 2:858 philosophical origins, 1:335
Hobbes, Thomas, 1:333, 335, 417, 2:585 postmodernism, 1:337
Leviathan, 2:776 propriety, 1:336
Hobsbawm, Eric, 2:499 sympathy, 1:336–337
Höch, Hannah, 1:472 Human nature. See also Person
Schöne Mädchen, Das, 1:107–108 democracy, 1:355
Hoffman, Daniel, 1:32 mind-body problem, 1:450–454
Hoffman, Dustin, 1:278 reason, 1:356–357
Hofstede, Geert, 1:93, 100–101, 182, 227, 229, 230, Hume, David, 1:8, 335–337, 417, 2:681, 698
2:693, 849–850 Hunt, Raymond, 2:883
Hogarth, William, Boys Peeping at Nature, 2:874 Hunter, Holly, 1:278
Hogg, Michael, 1:99, 371, 2:548, 751, 752 Huntington, Samuel, “The Clash of Civilizations,” 2:633
Hoggart, Richard, 1:38, 169, 173–174, 177, 178 Hurley, Susan, 2:569
Holbein, Hans, the Younger, 2:639 Hurricane Katrina, 2:811
Holism, 1:100, 451 Hurston, Zora Neale, 1:425, 428
Holland, Dorothy, 1:42 Their Eyes Were Watching God, 1:428, 436
Hollander, Edwin, 1:218 Husserl, Edmund, 1:59–60, 272, 321, 401, 2:519,
Höller, Carsten, 1:11 553–555, 568, 681, 838
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 2:577 Hutcheson, Francis, 1:335
Holocaust, 1:298 Huxley, Aldous, 2:566
Homeland Security Act, 2:898 Huyghe, Pierre, 1:11
Homer, The Odyssey, 1:30–31 Hybridity, 1:338–339
Homophobia, 1:66 cosmopolitanism, 1:150
Homosexuality, 1:64, 2:614. See also Gay diasporas, 1:225
hooks, bell, 1:33, 35, 68, 134, 410, 2:520, 528 First Nations, 1:288
Hopi language, 2:652 globalization, 1:314
Hopkins, Dwight, 1:431 identity scripts, 1:375
Hopper, Edward, Night Window, 2:874 transworld identity, 2:845
Horizontal collectivism, 1:101–102 Hybridization, 1:120
Horizontal individualism, 1:101–102 Hymes, Dell, 1:111, 2:644
Horkheimer, Max, 1:108, 155–157, 177, Hyperbole, 1:286
295–296, 2:839 Hypercorrection, 2:719
Horney, Karen, 1:347, 2:692, 710 Hyperreality and simulation, 1:339–342
924 Index

Hysteresis, 1:322 culture, ethnicity, and race, 1:188

Hysteria, 1:343–344 defined, 1:53–54
development of, 1:205–209
I, 2:666, 675, 740–741 discourse model, 1:454
Ibsen, Henrik, 1:272 embedded identity, 1:241–243
Id, ego, and superego, 1:343–348 ethics of, 1:254–258
critiques of, 1:347 evolutionary psychology, 1:270–271
ego, 1:345, 347–348 existentialism, 1:271–275
evolution of psyche, 1:344–345 formal address, 1:291–292
functions, 1:343 Frankfurt school, 1:297
historical context and influences, 1:343–344 Freudian tripartite model, 1:343–348
id, 1:344–345 group identity, 1:316–319
later developments, 1:347–348 hermeneutics, 1:325–328
psychosexual development, 1:345–346 information and communications technologies,
superego, 1:345 2:819–822
Ideal body, the, 1:332–333, 348–352. See also innate vs. chosen, 2:744
Extraordinary bodies; Human figure, the language, 1:3–4, 249–250, 385, 416–420, 423–424
criteria, 1:349 language variety in literature, 1:428–429
shaping, 1:350–351 material culture, 1:438–439
the bad, 1:351–352 memory, 1:444–445
the good, 1:351 modernity, 2:770–772
theories, 1:352 motivation, 2:809–810
the ugly, 1:352 narratives, 2:493–497
Idealization, in self-presentation, 2:667–668 neoliberalism, 2:502–503
Ideal self, 1:209, 212, 2:602, 674, 685, 710 nigrescence, 2:504–506
Identification, 1:353–354, 2:768. See also Group organizational identity, 2:514–516
identification passing, 1:359–361
Identification-with, 1:369 pastiche, 1:298
Identity (journal), 1:207 persistence, termination, and memory, 2:540–543
Identity (logic), 1:356 personal vs. self-, 2:545–548
Identity (persons). See also Collective/social identity; philosophical history, 2:556–560
Personal identity; Society and social identity phonological elements, 2:573–575
accommodation, 1:3–4 political identity, 2:587–590
aesthetics, 1:8 postmodern approaches, 1:297–298, 2:820
African Americans, 2:506 poststructuralism, 1:20, 42, 2:863
archetypes, 1:32 psychology of, 2:601–607
ascribed identity, 1:44–46, 54 reference group identity, 1:45
attribution, 1:51 religious identity, 2:593–594, 631–636
avowed identity, 1:54 role identity, 2:648–650
Baudrillard on, 1:341–342 saturated identity, 2:658–659
being and, 1:59–61 secular identity, 2:662–665
bilingualism, 1:62 self-consciousness, 2:680–681
biographical identity, 2:809 situated identity, 2:809
biracial identity, 1:63–64 social movements, 2:757–758
clan identity, 1:83–85 symbolic interactionism, 2:808–810
class identity, 1:91–94 symbolism, 2:812–813
cognitive dissonance, 1:97–98 terror management theory, 2:829–830
communication competence, 1:114–115 transworld identity, 2:844–846
communication theory of, 1:115–119 uncertainty avoidance, 2:850–851
conflict and, 1:129, 130 unified vs. multiple, 1:208
consumption, 1:134 war, 2:880–881
contextual aspects, 1:54 Identity achievement, 1:207
core aspects, 1:54 Identity and democracy, 1:354–356. See also Democracy
corporate identity, 1:140–144 Identity and reason, 1:356–358
critical realism, 1:154–155 Identity change, 1:358–361
cultural identity, 1:164–165, 366 Identity crisis, 1:206
 Index 925

Identity development. See Development of identity Immediacy, 1:381–384

Identity diffusion, 1:207, 362–364 classroom uses, 1:383–384
Identity fields, 1:294 culture, 1:383
Identity foreclosure, 1:207 defined, 1:381
Identity formation. See Development of identity nonverbal, 1:382–383
Identity gaps, 1:118–119 verbal, 1:381
Identity methodologies, 1:450–451 Immigration, 1:384–388. See also Diaspora; Refugees
Identity moratorium, 1:207 acculturation, 1:4–6
Identity negotiation, 1:365–367 bilingualism, 1:62
communication theory, 1:118 common sense, 1:386
cultural contracts theory, 1:164–168 culture, 1:384–386
mindfulness, 1:455–456 globalization, 1:313
Identity negotiation theory, 1:166, 455–456 immigrant–host culture relations, 1:386–388
Identity politics, 1:367–369, 2:588, 722, 757 language, 1:385, 426
Identity programs, 1:368 race, 1:360
Identity salience, 1:369–372 restrictions on, 1:266
constraints, 1:371–372 transnationalism, 2:842–844
perceptual salience, 1:369–370 Whiteness, 1:360, 2:883
psychological salience, 1:370–371 Immigration Act (1924), 1:266
self-affirmation, 2:672 Imperial diasporas, 1:224
self and, 2:667 Imperialism. See Colonialism
social identity theory, 1:370 Impression management, 1:389–391. See also Face/
Identity scripts, 1:372–376 facework; Self-presentation
authenticity, 1:374 Independent self, 1:100, 2:682–683, 693–694
disidentification, 1:373–374 Indexicality, 1:449
limitations, 1:375–376 India, 1:85, 253
modalities, 1:375 Individual, 1:392–393
ontology, 1:373 Individual autonomy, 1:393–394. See also Autonomy
performativity, 1:373 Individual differences. See Personality/individual
plurality, 1:374–375 differences
significance for social life, 1:373 Individualism. See Collectivism/individualism
theater analogy, 1:372–373 Individual self, 2:601–603
Identity uncertainty, 1:376–377, 2:751. See also Individuation, 1:394–396
Uncertainty avoidance Industrialization, 2:763
Identity verification, 2:649–650 Industrial Revolution, 1:21–22
Ideological racism, 1:25 Inequality, 1:323. See Complex inequality
Ideological state apparatuses, 2:801 Inferiority model, 2:506
Ideology Information and communications technologies,
Althusser on, 2:801 2:819–822
Barthes on, 1:484–485 Ingelfinger, Julie R., 2:798
defined, 1:268 Inglehart, Ronald, 2:855–856
Eurocentricity, 1:268 Ingres, Jean Auguste Dominique, The Turkish Bath,
hegemony, 1:324 2:874
I-Other dialectic, 1:410 Ingroups
Ideology critique, 1:156 accommodation, 1:3
Idiolect, 1:219 acculturation, 1:5–6
Idiomatic expressions, 1:378–380. See also Figures of attribution, 1:50, 137
speech avowal, 1:54
Ignatiev, Noel, 2:882–884 cognitive dissonance, 1:98
Ihde, Don, 1:272 collectivism, 1:228
Illocutionary force, 2:596 contact hypothesis, 1:136, 138–139
I Love Lucy (television series), 2:614 criticism within, 2:752
Imagery, archetypal, 1:31–32 cultural contracts, 1:164–165
Imaginary order, 1:463, 2:801 culture shock, 1:190
Imitation, in art, 2:638 deindividuation, 1:202
Immanence, 2:634 deviance, 1:218
926 Index

ethnolinguistic identity theory, 1:261–262 Intertextuality, 1:403–404

Othering process, 2:520 Barthes and, 1:486
promotion focus, 2:630 deconstruction, 1:196
prototypes, 2:749–750 defined, 1:403
rituals, 2:646 difference/différance, 1:226
social identity, 1:99 postmodernism, 1:486
terrorism, 2:823–824 Intonation, 1:404–406
Initiation archetype, 1:30 Intrapersonal language, 1:422
Innis, Harold, 1:417 Intrinsic motivation, 1:353, 2:702
Innovation, 1:22 Invariant be, 1:406–408
Insecurity. See Ontological insecurity Invention, in art, 2:638
Institute of Family Relations, 1:265 Invisibility, of Others, 2:520
Institutional anomie theory, 1:23 ION (journal), 2:773
Institutionalism, 2:783 I-Other dialectic, 1:409–410
Institutional process analysis, 1:158 Iran, 2:664–665
Institutional racism, 1:24–26 Irigaray, Luce, 1:33, 233, 2:528, 539, 559, 802
Instrumentalism, 1:451 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 2:823, 826
Insurgencies, 2:825–826 Irony, 1:286, 2:645, 654
Integration, as acculturation, 1:5 Irving, Washington, 2:655
Integrative antiracism, 1:27 Isasi-Díaz, Ada María, 1:432
Intelligence testing, 1:266 Isherwood, Christopher, The Berlin Stories, 2:728
Intentionality, 1:454 Isherwood, Lisa, 1:432
Interactional strategy, for personality and social Ishii, Satoshi, 1:250–251
behavior, 2:551 Isis worship, 2:813
Interactionism, 2:566 Islam. See also Muslims
Interaction order, 1:396–397 clash of civilizations, 2:633
Intercultural communication dignity, 1:257
competence criteria, 1:457 fundamentalism, 1:299
knowledge and skills, 1:455 syncretism, 2:813–814
mindfulness, 1:455–458 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), 2:823
Intercultural competence, 1:457 Isocrates, 1:385
Intercultural personhood, 1:397–400 Israel, 2:823
Interdependent self, 1:98, 100, 2:682–683, 693–694 Italian Renaissance, 2:637, 638, 792–793
Interdisciplinarity I-Thou relationship, 1:392, 401
material culture, 1:437–438
media studies, 1:439–441 Jackson, Jesse L., Sr., 2:645
visual culture, 2:860 Jackson, Michael, 1:277, 279
Interest convergence, 1:27, 151 Jackson, Ronald L., II, 1:100, 118, 164, 166–168, 255,
Intergroup sensitivity effect, 2:752 366, 410, 2:521, 644, 893
Internal locus of evaluation, 1:209 Jacobs, Harriet, 1:32, 428
International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 1:24 Jacobs, Jane, 2:734
International Journal of Visual and Sociology, 2:579 Jacobson, Edith, 1:364
International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA), 1:462 Jahoda, Gustave, 1:200
International relations, 2:782–785 Jakobson, Roman, 1:442, 2:642, 643
International Society of Political Psychology, 2:590 Jamaica, 1:313
Internet, authenticity, 1:52 James, C. L. R., 1:313
Interpellation, 2:801 James, Henry, The Ambassadors, 2:871
Interpersonal attraction theory, 1:137 James, William, 1:209, 453, 2:547, 570, 601, 670, 675,
Interpersonal language, 1:422 678, 695, 737
Interpersonal racism, 1:24 Jameson, Fredric, 1:33, 478
Interpretation. See Hermeneutics Jandt, Fred, 1:5
Interrogation, 2:818 Janteloven (don’t be impressed with
Intersectional approach, to cultural differences, 1:26 yourself), 1:263
Intersubjectivity, 1:401–402 Japan
art, 1:10–11 class, 1:93
Irigaray on, 1:233 communication, 1:250–252, 2:851
 Index 927

high-context culture, 1:186 Julien, Isaac, 2:864

social identity, 1:263–264 Jung, Carl, 1:29, 32, 209, 347, 395, 452, 473
Jargon, 2:598, 719, 799 Jung, E., 1:119
Jasper, James, 2:758 Junk language, 1:427
Jaspers, Karl, 1:59, 272 Just war, 2:879–880
Jay, Martin, 1:156, 2:553 Juxtaposition, in satire, 2:654
Jaynes, Julian, 1:453
Jefferson, Thomas, 2:532 Kabat-Zinn, Jon, 1:456
Jeitinho (clever dodge), 1:264 Kafka, Franz, 1:272
Jencks, Charles, 1:477–478 Kahlo, Frida, 1:436, 2:706
Jervis, Robert, 2:591 Kant, Immanuel, 1:8, 9, 157, 175, 254, 326, 393, 2:553,
Jesus, 1:30, 430–431, 2:634–635, 891 557–558, 563, 620, 634, 681, 838–840, 897
Jews Perpetual Peace, 1:148, 355
Diaspora, 1:221–222 Kapoor, Anish, Cloud Gate, 1:35
ethics, 1:255 Karenga, Maulana, 1:12, 131, 2:644
Hasidic Jews, 1:260 Karenga, Ron, 1:375
rootless cosmopolitanism, 1:149 Katchadourian, Nina, 1:35
Zionism, 2:663–664 Katzentein, Peter, 2:783
Jobs, Steve, 2:809 Kaufmann, Walter, 1:272
Joe Schmo (television show), 2:661 Keane-Dawes, Jennifer, 1:314
Johari window, 2:680 Keegan, John, 2:877–881
Johnson, Allen, 2:883 Kegan, Robert, 1:44
Johnson, Ben, 2:792 Kelley, Harold, 1:48–49
Johnson, Geraldine, 2:640 Kelly, Mary, 1:486
Johnson, James Weldon, The Autobiography of Kemper, Theodore, 1:44, 45
an Ex-Colored Man, 1:360, 2:534 Kennedy, John F., 2:645
Johnson, Kevin R., 1:152 Kennedy, Randall, 1:151, 2:622–625
Johnson, Mark, 1:245, 2:569 Kenya, 1:83
Johnson, Melissa A., 1:439 Kernberg, Otto, 1:348, 364
Johnson, Patricia, 1:261–262 Kerr, Nicholas, 1:216
Johnson, Robert, 1:200 Kester, Grant, 1:11
Johnson, Sheri Lynn, 1:151 Ketham, Johannes de, Fascicolo di medicina, 1:333
Johnson-Reed Act (1924), 1:266 Keynes, John Maynard, 1:477, 2:501
Joint Economic Committee of Congress, 1:2 Keynesianism, 1:477, 2:501
Jokisalo, Ulla, 1:125 Kierkegaard, Søren, 1:59, 272, 275, 392
Jonah, 1:30 Kim, Jean, 1:55
Jones, Alice, 2:532–533 Kim, Jin, 1:5
Jones, Allen, 2:867 Kim, Young Yun, 1:7, 397–400
Jones, Amelia, Feminism and Visual Culture Kincheloe, Joe, 2:882
Reader, 2:717 Kindler, Anna, 1:41
Jones, Gavin, 1:426 Kinesics, 1:383
Jones, Susan, 1:54 King, Catherine, 2:640
Jordaens, Jacob, King Candaules of Lydia Showing His King, Martin Luther, Jr., 1:368, 430, 2:645
Wife to Gyges, 2:875 Kinnock, Neil, 1:125
Jordan, Barbara, 2:645 Kinsey, Alfred, 1:65–66, 2:726
Jorn, Asger, 2:774 Kinsey Reports, 1:65
Josselson, Ruthellen, 1:44, 53 Kipling, Rudyard, The White Man’s Burden, 2:790
Journal of Communication, 1:440 Kirby, Erika, 2:796
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2:737 Kirchner, Ernst Ludwig, 1:472
Journal of Heredity, 1:265 Kiswahili, 2:580
Joyce, James, 1:408 Kitayama, Shinobu, 1:98, 182, 2:682–684, 694
Finnegans Wake, 1:315 Kittler, Friedrich, 1:444
Ulysses, 2:871 Kivel, Paul, 2:883
Judaism, syncretism in, 2:813 Klein, Cecilia, 2:640
Judeo-Christian ethics/morality, 1:255, 2:725 Klein, Fritz, 1:66
Judgmental rationality, 1:153 Klein, Melanie, 1:348
928 Index

Kluge, Alexander, 2:609 Language, 1:416–420. See also Bilingualism; Black

Koehn, Daryl, 1:255 English; Standard English
Kohlberg, Lawrence, 1:362–363 accommodation, 1:3
Kohn, Melvin, 2:854 acculturation, 1:4–5
Kolbe, Jim, 2:858 class, 1:92
Komarovsky, Mirra, 1:93 consciousness, 1:131
Kondo, Dorinne, 1:10 convergence, 2:718
Kondratiev, Nikolai, 2:895 creoles, 2:580–582
Koons, Jeff, 1:479 cultural studies, 1:175
Kovel, Joel, 2:883 culture, 1:423–424, 2:651
Kozyra, Katarzyna, 2:874–875 deconstruction, 1:196
Krafft-Ebing, Richard von, 1:65, 2:725 development of, 1:420–422
Kraidy, Marwan, 1:314 dialect, 1:219–221
Kramer, Eric, 1:385, 387, 388 English as a Second Language, 1:248–250
Kratochwil, Frederich, 2:783 ethnolinguistic identity theory, 1:165–166,
Krauss, Rosalind, 2:863, 865 261–262
Kripke, Saul, 1:197 Eurocentricity, 1:269
Kristeva, Julia, 1:33, 403–404, 464, 486, 2:528, 539, figures of speech, 1:284–287
698, 802 functions, 2:642
Krone, Kathleen, 2:796 Heidegger and, 1:60, 2:559
Kruger, Barbara, 1:109, 486 identity, 1:3–4, 249–250, 385, 416–420, 423–424,
Kudak, Anna, 1:7 2:559
Kuhn, Manford, “Twenty Statements Test,” idiomatic expressions, 1:378–380
2:571 immigrants, 1:385
Kuiper, Nicholas A., 1:210 intra- vs. interpersonal, 1:422
Kunene, Daniel P., 1:424 invariant be, 1:406–408
Kwon, Miwon, 1:11 linguistic turn, 1:232
Kymlicka, Will, 1:373 oppression, 1:269
Liberalism, Community, and Culture, Othering process, 2:521
1:482–483 phonological elements of identity, 2:573–575
Kyriarchy, 1:432 pidgins, 2:580–582
power, 1:62
Labeling, 1:413–415. See also Stigmatization pragmatics, 2:594–597
conceptual framework, 1:413–414 production of meaning, 1:170
critiques of, 1:415 resistance to erosion, 2:581
deviance, 1:215, 413–415 Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, 2:651–654
refinements and applications, 1:414–415 semantics, 2:713–715
Labor, 2:585–587, 884 style/diction, 2:797–799
Labor diasporas, 1:223–224 Language development, 1:420–422
Labov, William, 1:407 pidgins and creoles, 2:580–582
Lacan, Jacques, 1:20, 175, 232, 302–305, 409, 450, semantics, 2:715
461–464, 486, 2:527, 539, 660, 662, 705, 800–801, Language loss, 1:422–425
863, 865, 867, 872 causal conditions, 1:422–423
Lachicotte, William, 1:42 consequences, 1:423
Laclau, Ernesto, 1:36–39 implications, 1:423–425
Lacy, Suzanne, 1:11 Language maintenance, 1:262
Laing, R. D., 1:272, 419 Language variety in literature, 1:425–429
Laissez faire, 2:502 current uses, 1:429
Lajer-Burcharth, Ewa, 2:529 identity, 1:428–429
Lakoff, George, 1:245 overview, 1:425–426
Lakoff, Robin, 2:815–816, 818 types of dialect features, 1:426–427
Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste, 1:265 uses of, 1:427–428
Lambarde, William, 1:21 Lapidis, June, 2:748
Landau, Mark, 2:829 Larsen, Nella
Lane, William Henry, 1:460 Passing, 1:360, 2:534
Langer, Ellen J., 1:456 Quicksand, 1:460
 Index 929

Lash, Scott, 1:477, 478 Lewis, C. S.

Lashkar e-Taiba, 2:824 Last Battle, The, 1:31
Latency period of psychosexual development, 1:346 Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, The, 1:30
Latin America Magician’s Nephew, The, 1:31
articulation theory, 1:38 Lewis, Daniel Day, 1:278
class, 1:93 Lewis, David, 2:844–845
collectivism, 1:101 Lewis, Wyndham, America and Cosmic Man, 1:315
dignity, 1:256–257 Lexical decomposition, 2:713
high-context culture, 1:102 Li, Jet, 2:518
liberation theology, 1:430–432 Liang, Chung-Hui, 1:3
Laughlin, Harry H., 1:265–266 Liberal Christian theology, 2:592–593
Lavender Menace, 2:614 Liberalism
Law classical liberalism, 2:501
critical race theory, 1:150–152 multiculturalism, 1:483
multiculturalism, 1:483 neoliberalism, 2:501–503
Law and Order (television series), 1:33 postliberalism, 2:592–594
Law of the father, 1:463 Liberation theology, 1:429–433
Lawrence, Charles R., III, “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Black theology, 1:431
Protection,” 1:151 Latin America, 1:430–432
Lay, Ken, 1:214 method of, 1:430
Layder, Derek, 2:547, 548 origins, 1:430
Lazarsfeld, Paul, 1:440 sexuality, 1:432
Leadership, 2:752 womanism, 1:431, 2:891
Leary, Mark, 2:696, 708 Liberation Tigers, 2:825
Leavis, F. R., 1:173–174, 178 Liberty, positive vs. negative, 2:501. See also Freedom
Le Bon, Gustave, 1:198–199, 218 Liddell Hart, B. H., 2:878
Crowd, The, 2:590 Life chances, 1:87
Lebovici, Gerard, 2:773 Life course perspectives, 1:16, 2:754
Lecky, Prescott, 2:691 Life span perspectives, 2:754
Lee, Wenshue, 2:893 Life stage perspectives, 2:753–754
Leeper, M. S., 2:818 Life writing, 1:123
Leeson, Nick, 1:214 Ligon, Glenn, 2:529
Lefebvre, Henri, 1:33, 339–340, 2:773 Liminality, 1:314
Lefkowitz, Mary, 1:268 Lin, Maya, Vietnam Veterans Memorial, 1:35
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 1:10, 2:566 Lindbeck, George, The Nature of Doctrine, 2:593
Leibsohn, Dana, 2:640 Lindeke, Linda, 2:816–817
Leiris, Michael, 1:449 Lineality, 1:100, 268
Lemarchand, Rene, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Linear logic, 1:187
Africa, 2:736 Linguistic convergence, 2:718
Lemert, Edwin, 1:214, 413 Linguistic relativity. See Sapir-Whorf hypothesis
Leniency bias, 2:752 Linguistics, divisions of, 2:594
Lenin, Vladimir, 2:761 Linguistic turn, 1:151, 175, 231–232
Leonardi, Robert, 2:735 Linton, Ralph, 1:44
Leonardo da Vinci, Mona Lisa, 1:331 Linville, Patricia W., 2:710
Lesbians. See Sexual minorities Lippard, Lucy, 1:33
Lescot, Pierre, 2:638 Lippi, Filippino, 2:704
Lester, Julius, 1:375 Lippi-Green, Rosina, 2:817
Lettrist International, 2:773 Lippman, Walter, 2:609
Levesque, Roger, 2:739 Lipson, Carol, 2:642
Levinas, Emmanuel, 1:255, 272, 401, 2:542, Literacy, 1:81
556, 839 Literature
Levine, John, 1:217 death of the author, 1:486
Levinson, Stephen, 1:282 extraordinary bodies, 1:278–279
Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 1:71, 327, 462, 463, 484, 2:840 forms of address, 1:292–293
Levy-Bruhl, Lucien, 1:181 language variety, 1:425–429
Lewin, Kurt, 2:550 masking, 1:435–436
930 Index

minstrelsy in, 1:460 Magritte, René, 2:874

multiculturalism, 1:482–483 Liaisons Dangereuses, Les, 2:865–866
satire, 2:655–656 Trahison des images, Les, 2:863
stock characters, 2:791–793 Viol, Le (The Rape), 2:865–867
symbolism, 2:811 Mahler, Margaret, 1:348, 364
voice, 2:870–871 Mailer, Norman, “The White Negro,” 1:68, 2:626
Litotes, 1:286 Mainstreaming, 1:160
Littleton, Christie, 2:744 Major, Brenda, 2:738
Littoral, 1:11 Majors, Richard, 2:730
Liu, Shuang, 1:5 Malebranche, Nicolas, 2:566
Locke, John, 1:355, 392, 417, 2:546, 620, 776, 800 Malthus, Thomas Robert, 1:265
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 1:360 Mandela, Nelson, 1:276
Logan, Shirley Wilson, 2:644 Manet, Édouard, 1:469
Logic Mannheim, Karl, 1:16, 2:754
analogue vs. digital, 1:451 Manor, Natalie, 1:408
cultural differences, 1:187 Manovich, Lev, 1:176, 442
reason vs., 1:356 Manvi, Meera, 1:46
Logical positivism, 1:181 Manzoni, Piero, Artist’s Shit, 1:108–109
Long-term orientation, 2:850 Marable, Manning, 2:618
Looking-glass self, 1:202–205, 433–434 Marcel, Gabriel, 1:272
López, Yolanda, Things I Never Told My Son About Marcia, James, 1:207, 362, 364
Being a Mexican, 1:110 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 1:148
Lorde, Audre, 1:33 Marcuse, Herbert, 1:155, 295–298, 2:839
Lotze, Rudolf, 2:840 Eros and Civilization, 1:296
Loury, Glenn, 2:734 Essay on Liberation, An, 1:297
Louw, Eric, 1:5 Marginalization, acculturation and, 1:5
Love withdrawal, 2:686 Marina, Areli, 1:34
Low-contact cultures, 1:383 Markus, Hazel, 1:98, 182, 210, 211, 212, 2:682–684,
Low-context cultures, 1:102, 185–186, 228–229, 2:653 694, 710
Low-context messages, 2:851 Marlowe, Elizabeth, 1:33
Lowe, Lisa, 2:517 Marques, José, 1:218, 2:750
Lowenfeld, Viktor, 1:75, 77 Marriage, 1:93
Creative and Mental Growth, 1:41 Married With Children (television series), 2:793
Lu, Lucy Xing, 2:642 Marsden, George, 1:299
Lucaites, John, 2:644 Marsh, Herbert, 1:210
Luckmann, Thomas, 2:742, 783, 838 Marshall, Rob, 2:661
Lukács, Georg, 1:295, 2:839, 895 Marshall, Stuart, 2:864
Luna, James, 2:619 Martin, Raymond, 2:545
Luquet, Georges-Henri, 1:75 Marx, Karl, 1:18, 38, 86–87, 107, 133, 153, 177,
Luther, Martin, 2:631–632 295–296, 327, 471, 2:558, 570, 587–589, 622,
Luxury, 1:323 745–746, 838, 839
Lynd, Helen Mer, 2:851 Marxism
Lyotard, Jean-François, 1:33, 297, 476 agency, 1:18
Lysgaard, Sverre, 1:189 articulation theory vs., 1:36
L’Yvonnet, François, 1:341 Baudrillard, 1:340
cultural studies, 1:176–178
Ma, Sheng-mei, 2:518 Frankfurt School, 1:295–296
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 1:242, 2:568, 586, 747 liberation theology, 1:430
MacKenzie, John M., 2:517 political identity, 2:589
Mackenzie, William, 2:588 social inequalities, 1:120–121
Mackinder, Halford, 2:591 transcendence, 2:839
Mademoiselle (magazine), 1:109 world systems theory, 2:894
Madrid train bombings, 2:823 Masking, 1:435–436. See also Double consciousness
Mael, Fred, 2:516 Maslow, Abraham, 1:347, 2:675, 695, 855
Maffesoli, Michel, 2:841 Masquerade, 2:869
Magical realism, 2:836 Mass culture, 1:174. See also Popular culture
 Index 931

Master-slave dialectic, 2:526–527 McLuhan’s influence, 1:444

Material culture, 1:436–439 production, 1:440–441
Materialism, 1:451, 2:567 Mediation, 1:442–444
Material scarcity, 1:323 Medici, Catherine de’, 2:639
Material security, 1:323 Medina, José, 1:373–374
Matisse, Henri, 1:473 Medium, 1:442–444, 2:863
Matlin, Marlee, 1:278 Mehrabian, Albert, 1:381
Matsuda, Mari J., 1:151 Meikle, Scott, 2:587
Matthews, Charles, 1:458–459 Meiosis, 1:286
Mauss, Marcel, 1:247, 321, 340 Meireles, Cildo, 2:773
May, Rollo, 1:272 Melucci, Alberto, 2:756
Mayer, John, 1:68 Melville, Herman, Moby Dick, 1:278
Mayhew, Susan, 1:106 Memory, 1:444–447
Mazzini, Giuseppe, 2:498 collective forgetting, 1:446
McBride, William, 1:272 collective memory, 1:444–447
McCracken, Grant, 2:897, 899–900 cultural memory, 1:445
McCrae, Robert R., 2:549 identity development, 1:208
McCullers, Carson, The Member of the Wedding, 1:31 persistence and, 2:540–543
McDonaldization of culture, 1:477 social construction of, 1:444
McDougall, William, 1:199 Men, beauty ideal for, 1:349–350
McEwen, Marylu, 1:54 Menander, 2:792
McHam, Sarah Blake, 2:640 Menary, Richard, 2:569
McKay, Claude, 1:313 Mencken, H. L., 2:655
McLaurin, Melton, 2:883 Mendel, Gregor, 1:265
McLeod, Mary, 1:33, 35, 2:528 Mendieta, Ana, 1:486
McLuhan, Marshall, 1:315, 417, 443–444 Mendoza-Denton, Norma, 2:818
Gutenberg Galaxy, The, 1:443 Men’s Health (magazine), 1:349
Understanding Media, 1:443 Mentoring, 1:54
McPartland, Thomas, “Twenty Statements Test,” 2:571 Mercantilism, 2:586
McPhee, Robert, 2:794–796 Mercer, Kobena, 2:864
McQueen, D. L., 2:734 Merck, Mandy, 1:125
McShane, Ian, 2:793 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1:245, 272, 401, 453, 454,
McVeigh, Timothy, 2:824, 898 2:556, 568
Me, 2:666, 675, 740–741 Merrick, Joseph, 1:276–277
Mead, George Herbert, 1:210, 401, 413, 418, Merton, Robert, 1:21–23, 214, 296
2:666–667, 675, 680, 691, 707, 739, 753, 754, 806 Mesolect, 2:580
Mead, Margaret, 1:181, 2:754 Mesopotamia, 1:35–36
Balinese Character, 2:578 Message system analysis, 1:158
Coming of Age in Samoa, 2:725 Messner, Steven, 1:23
Meaning Meta-contrast, 2:749
embodiment, 1:246 Metaphor, 1:285, 2:645
fluidity of, 1:172–173 Métis, 1:287, 289
interaction and, 2:807–808 Metonymy, 1:285, 2:645
nature of, 2:806–807 Metsys, Quentin, 2:639
production of, 1:170 Metz, Christian, 2:867
semantics, 2:713–715 Meyer, Michael J., 1:253
Mechanical solidarity, 1:182 Michelangelo Buonarroti
Méconnaissance (misrecognition), 1:463, 2:801 David, 1:349–350
Media Studies for the Libyan Sibyl, 1:333
political psychology, 2:591 Michelet, Jules, The Renaissance, 2:637
transnationalism, 2:842 Michelson, Annette, 2:863
Media analysis, 1:159. See also Cultivation theory Middle class, 1:89, 108
Media studies, 1:439–441 Middle East, 1:186
audience and interpretation, 1:441 Miike, Yoshitaka, 1:46–47
content and representation, 1:441 Mikulincer, Mario, 2:829
effects and psychology, 1:441 Milgrim, Stanley, 2:787
932 Index

Mill, John Stuart, 1:254, 256 systems, 1:465–466

Millar, Elizabeth Roosa, 2:883 types, 1:466–467
Millennials Rising (Howe and Strauss), 1:309 Modern art, 1:467–474. See also Modernism
Millennium Development Goal, 1:1 avant-garde, 1:471–472
Miller, Arthur, 1:272 characteristics, 1:469
Miller, Richard, 2:737 critical theory, 1:155
Millet, Jean-François, 2:759 modernity, 1:468–469
Milliones, J., 2:506 Otherness, 2:529
Mills, Charles, 2:620–621 overview, 1:467
Miloševič, Slobodan, 1:259 post–World War II, 1:473–474
Mimesis, 1:447–450 primitivism, 1:472–473
Aristotle on, 1:448–449 social alienation, 1:471
Plato on, 1:448–449 social realism vs., 2:759
recent theories, 1:448–450 sociohistorical approach, 1:469–470
Mind terminology, 1:468
brain vs., 1:452–453 theories, 1:469
4 E’s, 2:568–569 Modernism. See also Modern art; Modernity
philosophy of, 2:565–569 aesthetics, 1:8
theory of mind, 2:830–831 artistic development model, 1:76
Mind-body problem, 1:450–454, 2:566 authorial voice, 2:871
Mindfulness, 1:455–458 defined, 1:468, 475
characteristics, 1:455 Modernity. See also Modernism; Modernity and
Eastern perspective, 1:456 postmodernity
identity negotiation, 1:455–456 anomie, 1:23
integrative viewpoint, 1:456–457 Arendt on, 1:330
intercultural competence, 1:457 civic identity, 1:81
satisfactory identity outcomes, 1:457–458 commodification, 1:476
Western perspective, 1:456 complex inequality, 1:122
Minh, Ho Chi, 2:591, 825 defined, 1:468, 475
Minimal self, 2:568 democracy, 1:355
Minorities, deviance and, 1:217 differentiation, 1:476
Minstrelsy, 1:458–461 globalization, 1:311–312
African American performers, 1:460 high modernity, 2:668
defined, 1:458 identity, 2:770–772
demise of, 1:461 identity crises, 1:445, 2:511–512
history of, 1:458–459 immanence vs. transcendence, 2:634
literary treatments of, 1:460 individualism, 1:21
performances, 1:459–460 life course dynamics, 1:16–17
racial attitudes, 1:459 processes and features, 1:476–477
stock characters, 2:793 purpose of life, 1:242
Mirror neurons, 1:449 rationalization, 1:476–477
Mirror stage of identity development, 1:461–464, 2:705, 801 self, 2:668
Mirzoeff, Nicholas, 1:331 technology, 1:470–471
Miss, Mary, 1:35 tradition and, 2:627
Mitchell, David, 1:278 Modernity and postmodernity, 1:242, 475–479. See also
Mitchell, Henry, 2:644 Modernity; Postmodernity
Mitchell, W. J. T., 2:863 features, 1:476
Picture Theory, 2:863 issues, 1:479
Mithen, Steven, 1:271 modernity, processes and features of, 1:476–477
Mithraism, 2:813 overview, 1:475
Mixed-race people, 1:361 postmodernity, processes and features of, 1:477–479
Mobilities, 1:464–467 terminology, 1:475
elective vs. compulsory, 1:466 Modernization
issues, 1:467 alienation, 1:471
overview, 1:464–465 clan identity, 1:84–85
sociological theory, 1:465 defined, 1:468, 475
 Index 933

Mol, Hans, 2:632 sex and gender, 1:481

Moments, in articulation theory, 1:37 traditional practices, 1:482
Mondrian, Piet, 1:473 Multiphrenia, 2:659
Monet, Claude, 1:469 Multiracial identity. See Biracial identity
Monism, 1:451 Mulvey, Laura, 2:660
Monochronic cultures, 1:186, 230–231 “Phantasmagoria of the Female Body, A,”
Montaigne, Michel de, 1:275 2:869–870
Montesquieu, Baron de, 2:776 “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” 1:303–304,
Moods, 2:710, 870 2:805, 867–870
Moon, Seung-jun, 1:5 Munch, Edvard, 2:705
Moore, Marianne, 2:871 Munro, Alice, “Boys and Girls,” 1:30
Morality Mural painting, 2:760–761
art and, 1:173 Murray, Charles, The Bell Curve, 1:172
conflict and, 1:128, 130 Museum exhibitions, performativity and truth in,
nature and, 1:335 2:619–620
reason and, 1:335 Museum of Contemporary Hispanic Art, 2:528
superego, 1:345 Museum of Modern Art, New York, 2:529
Moral Majority, 1:299 Muslims, 2:526, 633–634. See also Islam
Moral relativism, 1:253 Mussolini, Benito, 1:324
Morgan, Marcyliena, 2:817 Myers, Linda James, 2:506
Morley, David, 1:175, 178 Myers-Briggs Indicator, 2:549
Morris, Charles, 2:716 Mystification, in self-presentation, 2:668
Morris, Meagan, 1:176 Mythologies (Barthes), 1:484–486
Morris, William, 1:471 Mythopoeia, 1:487
Morrison, Carlos, 2:731 Myths, 1:487–491. See also Archetype
Morrison, Toni animals, 1:490
Beloved, 2:892 Barthes’s Mythologies, 1:484–485
Playing in the Dark, 2:882 children and, 1:489–490
Morse, Susan Buck, 2:781 contemporary, 1:490–491
Mortality salience hypothesis, 2:828–830 defined, 1:487
Morton, Donald, 1:204 function of, 1:487
Moscovici, Serge, 1:217 overview, 1:487–488
Motherese, 1:405 types, 1:488–489
Motivation, 1:353, 2:629, 687–688, 702, 751, 809–810 universality, 1:490
Mouffe, Chantal, 1:36–39
Mujerista theology, 1:432 Nagel, Thomas, 2:567
Mulder, Arjen, 1:444 Nakayama, Thomas, 2:525
Mullen, Brian, 1:200 Nandy, Ashis, 2:790
Multiculturalism, 1:479–484. See also Diversity; Nanetti, Raffaella Y., 2:735
Pluralism Narratives, 2:493–497. See also Storytelling
antiracism vs., 1:25 characters, 2:495
concept of, 1:480 context, 2:494–495
conditions for, 1:481 critical race theory, 1:151
cosmopolitanism vs., 1:149 identity, 2:493–497
critiques of, 1:483–484 myths, 1:487–491
defined, 1:479 personal identity, 2:546
ethnicity, 1:481 philosophy of mind, 2:568
identity formation, 2:506 point of view, 2:496
legal/political aspects, 1:483 purpose, 2:494
literature of, 1:482–483 self-identity, 2:547
origins, 1:480 temporal sequencing, 2:495–496
politics, 1:482–483 Narrative self, 2:568
pop-cultural communities, 1:482 Narrative sickness, 1:242
race, 1:481 Narrative theology, 2:593–594
recognition, 1:257 Natanson, Maurice, 1:272
religion, 1:481–482 Nation, state vs., 2:498
934 Index

National Association for the Advancement of Colored Neorealism, 2:783

People (NAACP), 2:532 Netherlands, the, 1:103–104, 2:639
National Association of Academic Teachers of Public Neurophysiology, 1:449, 452
Speaking, 2:642 Neuroticism, 2:550
National Communication Association, 2:642 New Comedy, 2:792
National Council of Teachers of English, New conservatism, 2:757
2:642 New Deal, 2:760–761
Nationalism, 2:497–500. See also Patriotism Newitz, Annalee, 2:883
approaches to, 2:497–498 New Left Review (journal), 1:169
collective forgetting, 1:446 Newman, Barnett, 2:762
conflict, 2:500 New Museum of Contemporary Art, 2:528
contemporary challenges, 2:500 New Reasoner, The (journal), 1:169
everyday manifestations, 2:497 Newsweek (magazine), 2:884
I-Other dialectic, 1:410 New Testament, 1:21
patriotism vs., 2:536 Newton, Isaac, 1:296, 297
pros and cons, 2:498–499 New Yorker, The (magazine), 2:657–658
sacredness of the nation, 2:499–500 New York Times, The (newspaper), 2:858
secularism, 2:663 Nguzu Saba (Seven Principles), 1:13
terrorism, 2:825 Nichols, Fred, 2:504
transnationalism vs., 2:842 Nicholson, Jack, 1:278
National Organization for Women, 2:614 Nicotera, Anne, 2:796
National Socialism. See Nazi Party Niebuhr, Reinhold, 1:272, 2:592
Nation-state, 2:498, 766. See also State Niépce, Joseph-Nicéphore, View From a Window at
Native Americans Gras, 2:576
dignity, 1:256 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1:59, 156, 242, 272, 274–275,
education imposed on, 2:600 297–298, 327, 355, 357, 388, 446, 2:539, 558, 561,
First Nations compared to, 1:288–289 564, 732–734, 800, 802, 841
museum exhibitions, 2:619 Nigrescence, 2:504–506
Othering process, 2:526 Ning, Hao, 2:519
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, 2:652–653 Nisbett, Richard, 1:182
Nativism, 1:266 Human Inference, 1:49
Nativization, of language, 2:581 Nochlin, Linda, “Why Have There Been No Great
Natural attitude, 2:554 Women Artists?” 2:528
Naturalism, 1:306 Noddings, Nel, 1:254–255
Natural self, 2:547 Noë, Alva, 2:569
Nature Nomadology, 2:507–509
gods of, 1:488 Nommo, 2:729–730
morality and, 1:335 Nonassertive accommodation, 1:3
photography and, 2:576–577 Nonstate actors, 2:822–823
Navajo, 1:83 Nonverbal communication, 1:382–383, 2:653
Nazi Party, 1:330, 2:501, 657, 728, 824 Nonverbal pattern similarity, 1:6
Nearness, in communication, 1:382 Nora, Pierre, 1:445
Necrophilia, 2:723, 727 Noriega, Ernesto, 1:11
Negative dialectic, 1:157 Normalcy, 2:789–790
Negative liberty, 2:501 Norris, Frank, McTeague, 1:429
Negro Project, 1:266 North American Man/Boy Love Association
Negt, Oskar, 2:609 (NAMBLA), 2:727
Neoconservatism, 2:502 Northern Renaissance, 2:638–639
Neodiffusionist approach, 1:184 Nova Roma, 1:482
Neo-Kantianism, 1:152–153 Nozick, Robert, 2:503
Neoliberalism, 2:501–503 Nussbaum, Martha, 1:149, 254
conceptual history, 2:501–502
critiques of, 2:503 Oakes, Penelope, 1:370, 2:752
identity, 2:502–503 Obama, Barack, 1:150, 212, 2:610, 642–643,
international relations, 2:783 657–658, 899
politics, 2:502–503 Oberg, Kalervo, 1:189
 Index 935

Objective self-awareness, 1:199 Osorio, Pepón, En la barbería, no se llora, 1:35

Object relations, 1:348 Oswald, Andrew, 2:788
Observation, mimesis and, 1:448–449 Ota-Benga, 1:277
Occasionalism, 2:566 Other, the, 2:519–526
October (journal), 2:863 Baudrillard on, 1:341
Oculesics, 1:382 binary schema, 2:528–529
Oedipus complex, 1:345, 462, 2:800 defining differences, 2:522–526
Old age gaze, 1:303–304
concept of, 1:15 generalized other, 2:740
identity development, 1:206 history of, 2:519–520, 526–530
Old Comedy, 2:791 I-Other dialectic, 1:409–410
Old Testament, 1:21 Orientalism, 2:517–519
Olick, Jeffrey, 1:445 person and, 2:544
Olsen, Eric T., 2:546 process of othering, 2:520–521
Olufowote, James, 2:794–796 Otherness, history of, 2:519–520, 526–530
Olyphant, Timothy, 2:793 early 20th century, 2:527–528
One-drop rule, 1:63, 359, 2:533 later 20th/early 21st centuries, 2:528–529
O’Neill, Eugene, The Hairy Ape, 1:31 modern art, 2:529
Ong, Walter J., 1:81, 417 19th century, 2:526–527
Ontological insecurity, 2:511–512 Renaissance art, 2:529–530
Ontology of identity, 1:365–366 Other other, the, 2:521
Onuf, Nicholas, 2:783 Ought self, 1:209, 2:602, 685, 710
Openness to experience, 2:550 Outcome expectancy, 2:687
Operationalism, 1:451 Outgroups
Opportunity structures, 1:23 attribution, 1:50, 137
Oppositional culture, 1:68 avowal, 1:54
Optimal distinctiveness theory, 1:371, 2:512–513, 605, cognitive dissonance, 1:98
751, 830 contact hypothesis, 1:136, 138–139
Optimism, 1:183 cultural contracts, 1:164–165
Oral culture, 1:417–418 culture shock, 1:190
Oral stage of psychosexual development, 1:346 deviance, 1:218
Orbe, Mark, 1:3, 2:520 ethnolinguistic identity theory, 1:261–262
Organic solidarity, 1:182 Othering process, 2:520
Organizational identity, 1:141, 2:514–516. See also prevention focus, 2:630
Corporate identity; Philosophy of organization and prototypes, 2:749–750
identity rituals, 2:646
Organizational sensemaking, 1:402 social identity, 1:99
Organizations terrorism, 2:823–824
communication competence, 1:113–114 Outing, 2:858
corporate identity, 1:140–144 Out There (Ferguson, Gever, Minh-ha, and West), 1:35
image, 1:141, 142, 144 Overjustification effect, 2:702
organizational identity, 1:141, 2:514–516 Oxford English Dictionary, 1:259
reputation, 1:141, 142 Oxymoron, 1:286
structuration theory, 2:796
Orientalism, 2:517–519 Pacino, Al, 1:278
art history, 1:473 Paglia, Camille, 2:857
Othering process, 1:410, 2:520, 528 Pain, self-regulation and, 2:629–630
Orlan, 2:876 Pajares, Frank, 2:688–689
Orme, Philibert de L’, 2:638 Pakulski, Jan, 1:122, 476
Ornstein, Robert, 1:452 Palestinians, 2:823
O’Rourke, P. J., 2:655 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 1:2
Orozco, José Clemente, 2:760 Pan-Indianism, 1:288
Orrù, Marco, 1:21 Panofsky, Erwin, 2:637
Ortega y Gasset, José, 1:272 Panopticon, 2:803, 805
Orwell, George, 2:655, 804 Pape, Robert, 2:823
Oslo Peace Process, 2:823 Paradox, 1:286
936 Index
Paralinguistic features, 2:644
Parallelism
language, 2:644, 645
mind and body, 2:566
Paraphilias, 2:723
Pardo, Jorge, 1:11
Parenting, self-guides promoted by, 2:686
Parfit, Derek, 2:546
Parham, Thomas A., 2:504–506
The Psychology of Blacks, 2:504
Park, Cheong Yi, 1:5
Park, Robert, 1:387
Parker, John, 1:210
Parody, 1:435–436, 2:654
Parreno, Philippe, 1:11
Parrhasius, 2:732, 865
Parry-Giles, Trevor, 2:661
Parsons, Michael, 1:41
Parsons, Talcott, 1:296, 2:838, 840
Participation, mimesis and, 1:448–449
Parti Karkerani Kurdistan, 2:825
Pascal, Blaise, 1:272
Passing, 1:359–361, 2:521, 531–535
African American opinion, 2:533
contemporary, 2:534–535
legal issues, 2:532–533
literary treatments of, 2:533–534
personal accounts, 2:531
Pastiche, 1:298
Pastiche personality, 2:659
Pateman, Carole, Sexual Contract, 2:620
Patrem ventrum sequitur, 1:359
Patriarchy, Hollywood cinema and, 2:867–870
Patriotism, 2:535–536. See also Nationalism
Patterson, Orlando, 1:313–314
Patton, Cindy, 2:864
Patton, Paul, 2:508
Paul, Saint, 1:69–70, 2:634–635
Peace Corps, 1:189
Pearson, Gabriel, 1:169
Pearson, J. H., 1:110
Pearson, Judy, 1:7
Peek, Lori, 2:633–634
Peeping Tom (film), 2:875
Peirce, Charles Sanders, 1:176, 450, 2:716
Perceived value similarity, 1:6
Perception, visual art and, 1:40
Perceptual filtering, 2:537–538
Performance art, 1:10, 2:619
Performance studies, 2:617–618
Performative utterances, 2:597
Performativity
agency, 1:20
discourse, 1:234
femininity, 2:869
identity scripts, 1:373
museum exhibitions, 2:619–620
race, 2:617–620
subjectivity, 2:802–803
Performativity of gender, 1:306–307, 2:538–540. See also
Sexual identity
Perkins, David, 1:40, 41
Perlocutionary force, 2:597
Perry, Grayson, 1:126
Persistence, termination, and memory, 2:540–543, 546
Person, 2:543–545. See also Human nature; Self;
Subjectivity
corporation as, 2:570
embodiment, 1:244
Personal identity
cognitive dissonance, 1:97
communication theory, 1:116
defined, 1:45
evolution of, 2:741
I and Me, 2:740–741
perspectives on, 2:545–546
self-identity vs., 2:545–548
social/collective vs., 1:54, 2:749, 767
social construction of, 2:739–742
symbolic interactionism, 2:809
Personal identity versus self-identity, 2:545–548. See also
Personal identity
Personality/individual differences, 2:548–552
attribution bias, 1:49–50, 183
five-factor model, 2:549–550
social behavior, 2:550–551
social identity theory, 2:551–552
Personal space, 1:187
Person deixis, 2:594
Persuasion, 2:688
Petite bourgeoisie, 1:88, 89
Petrarch, 2:637
Pettigrew, Thomas, 1:50, 138
Pfaff, William, 2:498
Pfeil, Fred, 2:883
Phallic stage of psychosexual development,
1:346
Phenomenalism, 1:451
Phenomenology, 2:553–556
body awareness, 1:244–245
constitutive, 2:554
deconstruction vs., 1:195
defined, 2:553
eidetic, 2:553
existential, 1:272, 2:555–556
Heidegger, 1:59–60, 2:555–556
hermeneutical, 2:555
Husserl, 1:59–60, 2:553–555
intersubjectivity, 1:401–402
mind-body problem, 1:452
realistic, 2:554
transcendental, 2:553–554
 Index 937

Phillips, John, Contested Knowledge, 1:157 Pike, Kenneth, 1:263

Philo of Alexandria, 2:557 Pinar, William, 2:882
Philosophical history of identity, 2:556–560. See also Pinochet, Augusto, 2:502, 503
Philosophy of identity Pioneer Fund, 1:266
Heidegger and after, 2:558–560 Piper, Adrian, 2:528
medieval period, 2:557 Place
modern period, 2:557–558 space vs., 2:844
Philosophy worldview, 2:898
existentialism, 1:272 Plato, 1:21, 173, 264–265, 417–418, 448–449, 2:557,
Heidegger, 1:59–61 566, 732
phenomenology, 2:553–556 Platonism, 2:557
pluralism, 2:583–584 Play, 2:740
self-consciousness, 2:681 Playing the dozens, 2:731
transcendentalism, 2:838–841 Pleasure
transworld identity, 2:844–846 desire for, 2:690
Philosophy of identity, 2:560–565. See also Being and self-regulation and, 2:629–630
identity; Philosophical history of identity visual, 2:867–870
basic interpretations, 2:561–563 Pleasure principle, 2:690
change and, 2:560–565 Plessner, Helmuth, 1:245
discourse of identity and change, 2:560 Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 1:359
relationship of change and identity, 2:563–564 Pliny, 2:732, 865
Philosophy of mind, 2:565–569 Pluralism, 2:583–584. See also Diversity;
classical approaches, 2:565–567 Multiculturalism
contemporary issues, 2:567–569 cosmopolitanism vs., 1:149
Philosophy of organization and identity, 2:569–572. See identity scripts, 1:374–375
also Organizational identity implications, 2:584
Philosophy of psychology, 2:565 religious identity, 2:636
Phonemic awareness, 1:420 types, 2:583
Phonetic alphabet, 1:418 Plutarch, 1:358
Phonetic awareness, 1:421 Pocahontas, 2:533
Phonological elements of identity, 2:573–575 Poe, Edgar Allan, 2:576–577
Photographic truth, 2:576–579 Poetry, 1:29, 489, 2:811, 871
Photography Politeness theory, 1:282
anthropological applications, 2:578 Political economy, 2:584–587. See also Social economy
Barthes on, 1:485–486 modern, 2:585–586
digital vs. still, 2:576 neoliberalism, 2:501–503
early applications, 2:576–577 Smith on, 2:586–587
material culture, 1:438 traditional, 2:585
modern art, 1:470 Political identity, 2:587–590, 663–664, 742–745
reality, 2:576–578 Political psychology, 2:590–592
sociological applications, 2:578–579 Political Psychology (journal), 2:590
surrealist, 2:865 Politics
truth, 2:576–579 body politic, 1:333–334
Phraseological idioms, 1:379 body politics, 1:247–248
Physiocracy, 2:586 diasporas, 1:225
Piaget, Jean, 1:40–42, 44, 75, 362–363, 2:753, 754 ethnicity, 1:260
Picasso, Pablo, 1:462, 472, 473, 2:704, 759, 874 hegemony, 1:324
Demoiselles d’Avignon, Les, 2:529 identity politics, 1:367–369
Guernica, 1:78–79 multiculturalism, 1:482–483
Self-Portrait, Making Love, 2:874 neoliberalism, 2:502–503
Piccolomini, Caterina, 2:639 political economy, 2:584–587
Picture theory, 2:863 religious identity, 2:633–634
Picturing Women in Renaissance and Baroque Italy symbolism, 2:811–812
(Johnson and Matthews Grieco), 2:639 women politicians, 2:818
Pidgin/Creole, 2:580–582 Polletta, Francesca, 2:758
Pieterse, Jan Nederveen, White on Black, 1:333 Pollock, Jackson, 1:473, 2:704, 762
938 Index

Polychronic cultures, 1:186–187, 230–231 critical theory, 1:156–157

Polyptoton, 2:645 cultural studies, 1:176
Polysexuality, 1:65 discourse, 1:233
Polysyndeton, 2:645 identity, 1:20, 42, 327, 2:863
Polytomous variables, in ascribed subjectivity, 2:802–803
identity, 1:45 Potter, David, 1:108
Poole, Marshall Scott, 2:794–796 Poverty, 1:1–2
Pop-cultural identity, 1:482 Powell, Colin, 1:313
Pope Alexander VI, 1:103 Powell, Michael, Peeping Tom, 2:875
Popular culture. See also Mass culture Power
Barthes’s Mythologies, 1:484–485 accommodation, 1:3
cultural studies, 1:177 adaptation, 1:7
extraordinary bodies, 1:279 antiracism, 1:26
multiculturalism, 1:482 ascribed identity, 1:45
stock characters, 2:793 biopower, 1:178, 267
Popular sovereignty, 2:776–777 conflict, 1:129
Porpora, Doug, 1:152 cultural studies, 1:178–179
Porter, Dennis, 2:517 Foucault’s theory, 2:802
Porter, Richard, 1:2, 54 hybridity, 1:338
Portes, Alejandro, 2:735, 736 language, 1:62
Portugal, 1:103 performativity of gender, 2:539
Positive liberty, 2:501 status in relation to, 2:785
Positivism, 1:296 Power distance, 1:93, 182, 229–230, 283
Posner, Richard, 1:151 Practical consciousness, 2:626–627
Possible selves, 1:211–212 Practice
Possible worlds, 2:844–846 embeddedness, 1:243
Postcolonialism structuration theory, 1:18–19
defined, 2:842 Praegnans constructio, 1:70
First Nations, 1:288 Pragmatics, 2:594–597, 716
hybridity, 1:338 Pragmatism, 1:197
looking-glass self, 1:204–205 Prange, Mark, 2:744
Said’s Orientalism, 2:517–519 Praxiteles, 1:352
transworld identity, 2:845 Prejudice. See also Bias; Stereotypes
Postliberalism, 2:592–594 contact hypothesis, 1:135–140
Postmes, Tom, 1:201 fear of death, 2:828
Postmodernism. See also Modernity hermeneutics, 1:325–326, 328
academic influence, 1:298 self-affirmation, 2:671
aesthetics, 1:9, 478 xenophobia, 2:901–902
artistic development and cognition, 1:42–43 Preliterate peoples, 1:417, 437
critical theory, 1:297 Premack, David, 2:830
defined, 1:475 Premillennialism, 1:299
ethnography, 2:579 Prentice-Dunn, Steven, 1:200
humanitarianism, 1:337 Presentation of self. See Self-presentation
identity, 1:116, 297–298 Pre-Socratic philosophers, 1:59
intertextuality, 1:486 Presuppositions, 2:595–596
Postmodernity. See also Modernity and postmodernity; Prevention focus, 2:629–630, 710–711
Postmodernism Primary process thinking, 1:345
defined, 1:475 Primary socialization, 2:753
diasporas, 1:224–225 Primaticcio, 2:638
identity, 1:297–298, 2:820 Primitivism, 1:472–473, 2:529
processes and features, 1:477–479 “Primitivism” in 20th-Century Art
self, 2:668–669 (exhibition), 2:529
simulacra, 2:732–734 Private eugenics, 1:265
Postmodernization, 1:475 Private self-consciousness, 2:679–680
Poststructuralism Probyn, Elspeth, 1:179
agency, 1:20 Procter and Gamble, 1:143
critical race theory, 1:151–152 Profanity and slang, 2:597–599
 Index 939

Progress, 1:242, 476 Pyszczynski, Tom, 2:696, 827–828

Projection identification, 2:901–902 Pythagoras, 1:13
Projective identification, 2:901–902
Project Runway (television show), 2:858–859 Quadrilateral model of discourse, 1:454
Promotional voluntary eugenics, 1:265, 266 Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns, 1:468
Promotion focus, 2:629–630, 710–711 Queer Eye for the Straight Guy (television show), 2:858–859
Pronunciation, 2:522 Queer theory, 2:613–616
Propaganda, 2:599–601 critiques of, 2:615
Propriety, 1:336 defined, 2:613
Protestantism, 1:298–299 discourse, 1:234
Protestant Reformation, 1:81, 443 erasure, 2:614
Prototypes, 1:370, 2:606, 749 liberation theology, 1:432
Proust, Marcel, 2:614 performativity, 2:538
Prown, Jules, 1:437 subjectivity, 2:613–614
Proxemics, 1:382 Quesnay, Francois, 2:586
Prudence, 2:686 Quest archetype, 1:29–30
Pruitt-Igoe housing development, St. Louis, 1:477–478 Quetelet, Adolphe, 2:789
Psychoanalysis Quine, W. V. O., 1:197
critical race theory, 1:151 Quiroz, Blanca, 1:101
expressionist art, 2:706
screen theory, 1:303–305, 2:867–870 Rablen, Matthew, 2:788
Psycholinguistic-syntactic theory, 1:421 Race. See also Culture, ethnicity, and race; Race
Psychological climate, 1:262 performance
Psychological necessity theory, 2:541–542 aesthetics, 1:9–10
Psychology antiracism, 1:24–28
cultural, 1:181–184 articulation theory, 1:38
cultural studies, 1:182–184 ascribed identity, 1:45–46
evolutionary, 1:270–271 biracial identity, 1:63–64
personal identity, 2:546 classification systems, 1:171–172, 188, 2:882
political, 2:590–592 critical race theory, 1:150–152
rituals, 2:647 ethnicity vs., 1:258
self-portraits, 2:705–706 eugenicism, 1:265
Psychology of self and identity, 2:601–607 human figure in art, 1:332–333
collective self, 2:605–606 minstrelsy, 1:459
individual self, 2:601–603 multiculturalism, 1:479–484
maintaining positive sense of self, 2:607 Othering process, 2:525
relational self, 2:603–605 passing, 1:359–361
Psychosexual development, 1:345–346 social construction of, 1:172–173, 188, 2:882
Psychosocial development social stratification theory, 2:764–765
art and, 1:76–78 surveillance, 2:805–806
Erikson’s theory, 1:206 symbolism, 2:812
Public art, 1:11 third world, 1:312
Public self, 2:674 White racial identity, 2:885–888
Public self-consciousness, 2:679–680 Race Betterment Foundation, 1:265
Public sphere, 2:608–610 Race performance, 2:617–620
contemporary approaches, 2:610 Race Traitor (journal), 2:884
critiques of, 2:608–610 Racial contracts, 2:620–622
defined, 2:608 Racial disloyalty, 2:622–626, 884
Habermas on, 2:608 Racial profiling, 1:259–260
historicity and hermeneutics, Racism
1:330–331 articulation theory, 1:38
Punctum, 1:486 colonialism, 1:105
Punitive/critical parenting, 2:686 cultural representation, 1:171
Punk subculture, 1:72 essentialism, 1:26
Putnam, Hilary, 2:567 intersectional approach, 1:26
Putnam, Robert, 2:735 power, 1:26
Bowling Alone, 2:609, 734 types, 1:24–25
940 Index

Radiant self, 2:899 Regionalism (art), 2:760, 761

Rain gods, 1:488 Regis, Humphrey, 1:313
Rajput clans, 1:85 Regression, 1:298
Ramachandran, V. S., 1:452 Regulatory focus theory, 2:629–630. See also Self-
Ramos, Mel, 2:874 regulation
Rank, Otto, 2:830 Reicher, Steve, 1:201, 218, 2:750
Raphael, 2:639 Reification, 1:295–296, 2:773–774
Raphael, D. D., 2:587 Reintegrative shaming, 1:414–415
Rational action theory, 1:323 Reisman, David, 1:259
Rational choice theory, 2:783 Reiss, Jonathan B., 2:640
Rationality Reitzes, Donald C., 1:202–203
conflict and, 1:127 Relational aesthetics, 1:10–11
human nature, 1:356–357 Relational self, 2:603–605, 659, 742
identity, 1:356–358 Relative poverty, 1:1
judgmental, 1:153 Relativism. See Ethical and cultural relativism
morality and, 1:335 Religion. See also specific religions; Religious identity
Rationalization, in modernity, 1:476–477 Black theology, 1:431
Rawls, John, 1:355, 2:620 evolutionary explanation, 1:270
Re, Edward, 1:33 existentialism and, 1:275
Read, Herbert, Education Through Art, 1:41 fundamentalism, 1:298–299
Ready-mades, 1:438 identity formation, 1:207–208
Reagan, Ronald, 1:175, 181, 2:502 liberation theology, 1:429–433
Realism, social, 2:759–762 multiculturalism, 1:481–482
Realistic phenomenology, 2:554 Othering process, 2:526
Reality profanity, 2:598
authenticity, 1:52–53 secular identity, 2:662–665
photography, 2:576–579 self, 2:896
simulacra, 2:732–734 symbolism, 2:811
Reality television, 2:660–661, 804 syncretism, 2:813–814
Real self, 2:674 terrorism and, 2:824
Rearticulation, 1:38 third world, 2:837
Rear Window (film), 2:875 womanism, 2:890–891
Reason. See Enlightenment; Identity and reason; Religious identity, 2:593–594, 631–636
Rationality agency and structure, 2:632–633
Reason, Robert, 2:883 defined, 2:631
Rebellion functional approaches, 2:631–634
anomie and, 1:22 interreligious dialogue, 2:635–636
archetype of, 1:30 multiple identities and, 2:632–636
Reciprocity, 1:129 politics, 2:633–634
Recognition, 1:257 psychology and identity formation, 2:631–632
Red Brigades, 2:824 sacralization of identity, 2:631–632
Reduction (phenomenology), 2:554 secularity, 2:634
Reductionism, 1:452 substantive approaches, 2:634–636
Reed, Ishmael, 2:655 universal and particular, 2:634–635
Mumbo Jumbo, 1:435 Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn, 2:703, 704
Reentry shock, 1:191–192 Remes, Outi, 1:123
Reference group identity, 1:45 Renaissance art, 2:636–640
Referencing, 2:677 anomie, 1:21
Referent informational influence theory, 2:752 beauty ideal, 1:349–350
Reflexive self or reflexivity, 2:626–629 beyond normative, 2:639–640
age, 1:17 extent and variety, 2:636–637
consciousness, 2:601 Italian Renaissance, 2:637, 638
information and communications technologies, 2:822 Northern Renaissance, 2:638–639
modernity, 2:771 Othering process, 2:529–530
Refugees, 1:7 perspective, 2:577–578
Regional dialect, 1:426 rebirth theme, 2:637
 Index 941

self-portraits, 2:704 Ritzer, George, 1:477

urban planning, 1:34 Rivera, Diego, 1:473, 2:760, 761
Renan, Ernest, 1:446 Detroit Industry, 2:761
Reno 911! (television series), 2:657 Man at the Crossroads, 2:761
Renouvier, Charles, 2:840 Rivers, Joan, 1:279
Repression, 1:446 Riviere, Joan, 2:869
Repressive state apparatuses, 2:801 Roberts, John, 1:125
Resources, conflict over, 1:129 Roberts, Julia, 1:351
Responsibility, existentialism and, 1:273 Robertson, Roland, 1:477
Restricted codes, 1:92 Robinson-Moore, Cynthia, 1:168
Retreatism, 1:22 Robocop (film), 1:279
Return of the repressed, 1:446 Robotham, Don, 1:313
Revelation, book of, 2:811 Roccas, Sonia, 2:710
Reverse culture shock, 1:191–192 Rockefeller, Nelson, 2:761
Revised NEO Personality Inventory, Rockquemore, Kerry Ann, 1:64
2:549 Rodriguez, Amardo, 1:314
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Roediger, David R., 2:881–884
(FARC), 2:826 Wages of Whiteness, The, 1:360
Rewriting the Renaissance (Ferguson, Quilligan, and Working Toward Whiteness, 1:360
Vickers), 2:639 Rogers, Carl, 1:209, 212, 347, 2:674, 675, 692
Reynolds, Joshua, Portrait of Omai, 1:333 Rogers, J. E. Thorold, 2:746
Rhetoric, 2:641–645 Rogers, Lisa, 1:55
academic discipline of, 2:642 Rogers, Ronald, 1:200
appeals and canons, 2:641 Rogers, Terry B., 1:210
citizenship, 1:78–79 Role identity, 2:648–650
defined, 2:641 Role reciprocity, 2:649
history of, 2:641–642 Role theoretic concepts, 2:667
signification, 2:730 Rolfe, John, 2:533
tropes and schemes, 2:645 Rolling Stones, 1:478
varieties of specialized, 2:644–645 Romanticism, 1:107, 181, 2:871
womanism, 2:892 Rome
Rhinelander, Leonard Kip, 2:532–533 body ideal, 1:349
Rhinelander v. Jones (1924), 2:532–533 civic identity, 1:80
Ribeau, Sidney A., 1:100 myths, 1:488
Ricardo, David, 2:587 religious syncretism, 2:813
Rice, Thomas Dartmouth “Daddy,” 1:459 Roosevelt, Franklin, 1:295, 473, 2:760–761
Richards, I. A., 1:443 Root, Maria, 1:64
Richardson, Elaine, 2:644 Bill of Rights for Racially Mixed People, 1:361
Richardson, Kenneth, 1:58 Root-Bernstein, Michele, 1:40
Richerson, Peter, 1:184 Root-Bernstein, Robert, 1:40
Rich interpretation, 1:421 Rootless cosmopolitanism, 1:149
Rickert, Heinrich, 2:840 Rorty, Richard, 1:331, 419
Rickford, John, 1:408 Rosenfeld, Richard, 1:23
Ricoeur, Paul, 1:272, 327, 419, 2:568, 680 Rosler, Martha, 1:125
Riecke, Richard, 2:644 Ross, Lee, Human Inference, 1:49
Rieger, Gerulf, 1:66 Rothko, Mark, 2:704, 762
Rights, 1:81 Rothstein-Fisch, Carrie, 1:101
Rilke, Rainer, 1:272 Rotter, Julian B., 2:675
Rimbaud, Jean-Nicolas-Arthur, 2:527 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 1:148, 355, 393, 2:745–746,
Ringgold, Faith, The French Collection Part I; #7: 776, 800
Picasso’s Studio, 2:529 “Second Discourse on Inequality,” 2:620
Rist, Pipilotti, 2:529 Rowlands, Mark, 2:569
Ritchin, Fred, 2:577 Roy, Arundhati, 1:105
Rituals, 2:646–647 Rubin, Gayle S., 1:306, 2:538
anomie, 1:22 Rubin, William, 2:529
uncertainty avoidance, 2:851 Ruesch, Jürgen, 1:454
942 Index

Ruggie, John, 2:783 Scarcity, and conflict, 1:129

Rush, Geoffrey, 1:278 Schachter, Stanley, 1:50, 217, 2:738
Russia, 1:105 Schaeffer-Simmern, Henry, The Unfolding of Artistic
Russian constructivism, 1:471–472 Activity, 1:40
Rwanda, 1:83, 260 Scheff, Thomas J., 1:204
Ryle, Gilbert, 2:566 Scheffler, Uwe, 2:897
Schegloff, Emanuel, 1:397, 402
Sachs, Jeffrey, 2:503 Schelling, Friedrich, 2:838
Sacks, Harvey, 1:397, 415 Schemes, 2:645
Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, 2:599 Schiele, Egon, 2:706
Safran, William, 1:222 Schimel, Jeff, 2:828
Sageman, Marc, 2:823–824 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 1:326
Said, Edward, 1:176, 410, 2:517–519, 520 Schmid, Friedrich, 2:592
Culture and Imperialism, 2:518 Schrader, George, 1:272
Orientalism, 2:528 Schrag, Calvin, 1:272, 328
Question of Palestine, The, 2:517 Schumpeter, Joseph, 2:895
Saint Francis, 2:638 Schunk, Dale, 2:687–689
Salinger, J. D., The Catcher in the Rye, 1:31 Schutz, Alfred, 1:401, 418, 2:838
Salome, 1:351 Schuyler, George, 1:436
Salon des Refusés, 1:471 Black No More, 1:429
Same-sex marriage, 2:728 Science
Samovar, Larry, 1:2, 54 racial classification, 1:171–172
Samuel, Raphael, 1:169 social science vs., 1:181
Samuel, Sajay, 1:54 Science fiction, 1:279
Sandel, Michael, 2:503 Scopes Trial, 1:299
Sandel, Todd, 1:3 Scopic regime, 2:774
Sanger, Margaret, 1:266 Scopophilia, 2:660–662. See also Gaze; Visualizing
Sankovitch, Anne-Marie, 2:637 desire; Visual pleasure
Sapir, Edward, 1:95, 2:651–652 Scotland, 1:83, 85
Sapir, J. D., 2:645 Scott, Kathryn P., 2:816
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, 2:651–654 Screen (journal), 1:303
Sarcasm, 2:654 Screen Education (journal), 1:303
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1:180, 271–273, 374, 423, 462, 2:527, Screen theory, 1:303–305, 2:867–870. See also
556, 568, 838, 872 Scopophilia
Being and Nothingness, 1:273, 274, 2:875 Scripts, 2:711
“Wall, The,” 1:273 Searle, John, 1:454, 2:567, 596
Sasshi. See Enryo-sasshi theory Sears, David, 2:590, 591
Satire, 2:654–658 Secondary socialization, 2:753
African American literature, 1:436 Second-language competence, 1:7
cinema, 2:657 Second Vatican Council, 1:429
critiques of, 2:657–658 Secular identity, 2:662–665
identity formation and maturation, 2:655 Secularity, 2:634
literature, 2:655–656 Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky, 2:538–539
overview, 2:654–655 Epistemology of the Closet, 2:613–614
television, 2:656–657 Sedikides, Constantine, 2:692
Saturated identity, 2:658–659, 668–669 Segrest, Mab, 2:883
Saussure, Ferdinand de, 1:170, 175, 232, 340, 396, 403, Self, 2:665–669. See also Person; Subjectivity
484, 2:526, 716, 801 actual self, 1:212, 2:602, 685, 710
Sauvy, Alfred, 1:312, 2:835 capitalism and, 1:295–296
Savitch, H. V., 2:898 commodity self, 1:106–110
Saxton, Alexander, The Rise and Fall of the White concepts of, 1:416
Republic, 2:882 consciousness, 1:131–132
Sayer, Andrew, 1:152 defining, 2:896
Scales, Tara, 2:883 environmental self, 2:547
Scandinavia, 1:263 Giddens’s model, 2:626–627
Scapegoat archetype, 1:31 I and Me, 2:666, 675, 740–741
 Index 943

ideal self, 1:209, 2:602, 674, 685, 710 Self-employed, 1:89

individual self, 2:601–603 Self-enhancement, 1:99, 2:602, 673
intertextuality, 1:486 Self-enhancement theory, 2:690–694
Lacan on, 1:464 basking in reflected glory, 1:57–58
looking-glass self, 1:202–205, 433–434 cultural differences, 2:693–694
minimal self, 2:568 evaluative studies, 2:692–693
narrative self, 2:568 mental health, 2:693
natural self, 2:547 self-evaluation motivations, 2:690–692
ought self, 1:209, 2:602, 685, 710 Self-esteem, 2:694–697
positivism, 1:296 basking in reflected glory, 1:57–58
postmodern, 2:668–669 cognitive dissonance, 1:97
psychology of, 2:601–607 cultural differences, 1:183
public self, 2:674 function of, 2:603
radiant self, 2:899 measuring, 2:695–696
real self, 2:674 self-concept and, 1:211
relational self, 2:603–605, 659, 742 self-enhancement theory, 2:692
religion, 2:896 social behavior, 2:711
saturated self, 2:658–659, 668–669 social identity processes, 1:371
self-portraiture, 2:704–705 sociometer hypothesis, 2:775–776
spectacle and, 2:778–782 terror management theory, 2:827–830
swift self, 2:899 types, 2:603, 775
symbolic interactionism, 2:808 Self-esteem hypothesis, 1:371, 2:751
threats to, 2:670–671 Self-evaluation, 2:672, 690–692, 712
tradition and, 2:627–628 Self-fulfilling prophecy, 1:296, 414, 2:604
Western concept of, 1:416–417 Self-guides, 2:685–686
Self-affirmation theory, 2:669–672 Self-handicapping, 1:51
Self-assessment, 2:672–674, 690–691. See also Self-identity, personal identity vs., 2:545–548
Self-enhancement theory; Self-verification Self-image, 2:697–699. See also Self-concept
Self-awareness. See also Self-consciousness Self-integrity, 2:669–672
defined, 2:602 Self-interest, 2:586
objective, 1:199 Selfishness, 1:243
public vs. private, 1:200 Self-knowledge, 2:602, 672, 690–692
Self-categorization theory, 1:201, 2:552, 605–606, 749, Self-monitoring, 2:699–700
752, 775 Self-Orientalization, 2:518–519
Self-concept, 2:674–677. See also Self-image Self-Perceived Communication Competence scale, 1:112
basking in reflected glory, 1:57–58 Self-perception theory, 2:700–703
cultural differences, 1:183–184 attribution, 1:50–51
defined, 2:674 cognitive dissonance theory vs., 2:701–702
development of, 1:209–213, 2:676–677 overview, 2:700–701
history of, 1:209–210 social behavior, 2:702–703
optimal distinctiveness theory, 2:513 Self-portraits, 2:703–706
personality theorists, 2:674–676 concept of self, 2:704–705
self-esteem and, 1:211 history and types, 2:703–704
types, 1:182–183 psychological meaning, 2:705–706
Self-consciousness, 2:678–681. See also Self-awareness Self-presentation, 2:706–709. See also Face/facework;
identity, 2:680–681 Impression management
measuring, 2:678 applications of theory, 2:708–709
overview, 2:678–679 controversies, 2:709
philosophical views, 2:681 defined, 2:706–707
public vs. private, 2:679–680 functions of, 2:707–708
Self-consistency theories, 2:691–693. See also Self- looking-glass self, 1:204
verification motives, 2:604
Self-construal, 2:605, 682–685 occasions for, 2:708
Self-construction, 2:707 Self-referential life narrative, 1:123
Self-discrepancy theory, 2:602, 685–686, 710 Self-regulation, 2:602–603, 629–630, 708,
Self-efficacy, 2:687–689 710–711
944 Index

Self-schema, 2:709–711 sex vs. gender, 2:720–721

moods, 2:710 social influences, 2:722
psychology of self, 2:602 Sexual minorities, 2:723–728
schematic vs. aschematic, 2:709–710 bisexual/bicurious, 1:64–66
scripts, 2:711 cultural dimension, 2:726–727
self-concept, 1:211, 2:674 defining, 2:724
self-discrepancy theory, 2:710 gay, 1:301–302
Self-serving bias, 1:51 marginalization and oppression, 2:727–728
Self-specificity, 1:100 Othering process, 2:525
Self-stereotyping, 2:513 social elevation, 2:728–729
Self-verification, 2:602, 690–693, 711–713. See also Sexual orientation. See Sex and sexuality; Sexual
Self-assessment minorities; Sexual preference
Selfways, 2:682 Sexual preference, 2:721–722
Semantic/cognitive theories of language, 1:421 Sexual selection, 1:344
Semantics, 2:713–715, 716 Shadd, Mary Ann, 1:12
Semiosis, 2:716 Shaffer, Leigh S., 1:202–203
Semiotics, 2:716–717 Shaftesbury, Lord, 1:335
areas of, 2:716 Shakespeare, William, 2:792
Barthes’s Mythologies, 1:484 Hamlet, 1:31
cultural studies, 1:175–176 Julius Caesar, 2:590
embodiment, 1:246 Midsummer Night’s Dream, A, 1:31
intertextuality, 1:403 Othello, 1:458
Semlak, Julie, 1:7 Richard III, 1:278
Sen, Amartya, 1:1, 374–375, 2:503, 633 Tempest, The, 2:565
Sendero Luminoso, 2:825 Shame, 1:414–415, 436
Senghor, Léopold Sédar, 1:424 Shanks, Thomas, 1:253
Separation, acculturation and, 1:5 Shannon, Claude, 1:442
September 11, 2001, attacks, 1:184, 341, 2:526, 538, Shavelson, Richard J., 1:210
633, 804, 825, 880, 898 Sheeler, Kristina Horn, 2:644
Sequential bilingualism, 1:61 Shelby, Tommie, 1:374, 2:622, 625
Serbia, 2:822 Sheldon, William, 1:216
Serra, Richard, Tilted Arc, 1:33 Sheller, Mimi, 1:466
Setting, 2:717–719 Shelley, Percy, “Prometheus Unbound,” 1:30
definitions, 2:717–718 Shepherd, Gregory, 1:367
jargon, 2:719 Shepherd, Matthew, 2:728
regional indicators, 2:718 Sherif, Muzafer, 1:216
social indicators, 2:718–719 Sherman, Cindy, 1:486, 2:869–870
Seurat, Georges, 1:469 Sherry, Suzanna, 1:151
Seven Principles, of Afrocentrism, 1:13 Shestov, Lev, 1:272
Sex and sexuality Ship of Theseus, 1:358–359
evolutionary psychology, 1:270–271 Shome, Raka, 1:314
Foucault’s History of Sexuality, 2:613–614 Shotter, John, 1:402
Freudian model, 1:344–347 Showers, Carolin, 2:710
gender vs., 1:305, 2:720–721 Shrauger, J. Sidney, 2:692–693
liberation theology, 1:432 Shrek movies, 1:352
multiculturalism, 1:481 Shweder, Richard, 1:181
Othering process, 2:525 Sibley, Frank, 1:8
performativity, 2:539 Sieckert, Ann, 2:816–817
quantifying sexuality, 2:725–726 Siewert, Charles, 2:555
Sexual identity, 2:720–723. See also Performativity of Signification, 1:435–436, 2:729–731, 847
gender Signifying Monkey, 1:435
bisexual/bicurious, 1:64–66 Signorelli, Luca, Rule of Antichrist, 2:640
defining, 2:720, 723–725 Signs, 2:716–717. See Semiotics
gay, 1:301–302 Sikhs, 2:526
sexual behavior, 1:346–347 Silverman, Kaja, 1:305
sexual preference, 2:721–722 Simile, 1:285
 Index 945

Simmel, Georg, 2:838, 840 historical overview, 2:737

“Metropolis and Mental Life, The,” 1:107 relational self, 2:603
Simon, Linda, 2:830 self-assessment, 2:672–673
Simpsons, The (television series), 2:656 Social competition, 2:787
Simulacra, 2:732–734, 774 Social constructionist approach to personal identity,
Simulation. See Hyperreality and simulation 2:739–742
Simultaneous bilingualism, 1:61 age, 1:16
Singelis, Theodore, 1:101 anti-essentialism, 1:26
Singer, Jerome, 1:50 body, 1:247
Sinn Fein, 2:826 evolutionary psychology vs., 1:270
Siqueiros, David Alfaro, 2:760 gender, 1:305–307
Sites. See Architecture, sites, and spaces memory, 1:444–447
Situated identities, 2:809 race, 1:172–173, 188
Situational strategy, for personality and social behavior, Social constructivist approach to political identity,
2:551 2:742–745. See also Political identity
Situationist International, 2:773–774, 779 Social creativity, 2:751, 787
Six Million Dollar Man, The (television series), 1:279 Social distance, 2:668
Skinner, B. F., 1:273, 421 Social economy, 2:745–748. See also Political economy
Skinner, Debra, 1:42 commitment, 2:747
Slack, Jennifer Daryl, 1:36–39 community, 2:748
Slang, 1:219, 427, 2:597–599, 799 connection, 2:747–748
Slaughter, Clifford, 2:854 defined, 2:745–746
Slave narratives, 1:427 Social exclusion, 1:120–121, 2:747–748
Slavery, 1:12, 459 Social identity. See Collective/social identity; Social
Sleeter, Christine, 2:881 identity theory; Society and social identity
Sloterdijk, Peter, 1:180, 247 Social identity complexity theory, 2:606, 710
Sluter, Claus, 2:639 Social identity theory, 2:749–752. See also Collective/
Smethurst, James, 1:435 social identity; Society and social identity
Smith, Adam, 1:335–337, 2:586–587 categorization, 2:749–750
Wealth of Nations, The, 1:295 defined, 2:749
Smith, Anthony D., 2:498, 499 deindividuation, 1:201
Smith, Barry, 2:554 ethnolinguistic identity theory, 1:261
Smith, Lori R., 2:506 identity negotiation, 1:165
Smith, Sidonie, 1:123 identity salience, 1:370
Smitherman, Geneva, 1:424, 2:817 intergroup behavior, 2:750–751
Snow, Elvira and Jenny, 1:278 motivation, 2:751
Snyder, Joel, 2:577–578 occasions for social identity, 2:752
Snyder, Mark, 2:699 organizational identity, 2:514
Snyder, Sharon, 1:278 personal identity and self-identity, 2:548
Social act, the, 2:741–742 personality, 2:551–552
Social attraction, 2:750 psychology of self, 2:605
Social behavior, personality and, 2:550–551 representation of groups, 2:749
Social capital, 1:162, 2:734–736 representation of people, 2:749
mobilities, 1:466 self-affirmation theory, 2:671–672
nonsociological applications, 2:736 self-esteem, 2:696, 775, 829
normative perspective on, 2:735 social attraction, 2:750
resource perspective on, 2:735 status, 2:787
Social categorization, 1:136–137 Social identity theory of leadership, 2:752
Social change, 1:26, 2:751, 771 Social inequalities. See Complex inequalities
Social class, 1:88. See also Class Socialist realism, 2:760, 761
Social class outlook, 1:91 Socialization, 2:753–754. See also Habitus
Social comparison orientation, 2:738 children, 1:44–45, 322, 2:647
Social Comparison Processes (Suls and Miller), 2:737 contexts, 2:753
Social comparison theory, 2:737–739 defined, 2:753
contemporary applications, 2:739 primary vs. secondary, 2:753
downward and upward comparisons, 2:738–739 theories, 2:753–754
946 Index

Social justice, liberation theology and, 1:430–431 Sociolinguistic theory, 1:422

Social learning theory, 2:675, 687, 721 Sociology, and photography, 2:578–579
Social location, 1:354 Sociology of knowledge, 2:783
Social mobility, 2:751, 770 Sociometer hypothesis, 2:603, 696,
Social movements, 2:755–759 775–776
collective identities, 2:756–759 Socrates, 2:556–557, 641
conflict, 2:756–757 Soft ethnicity, 1:259
defined, 2:755 Soja, Edward, 1:33
framing, 1:293–295 Sojourners, 1:189–193, 384–385
identity as strategy, 2:757–758 Sokolowski, Robert, 2:553
identity politics, 1:368–369, 2:757 Solomon, Leonard, 2:691
individual identities, 2:755–756 Solomon, Robert, 1:272
overview, 2:755 Solomon, Sheldon, 2:696, 827
paradox of identity, 2:758–759 Son of Sam, 2:898
Social order, language and identity and, 1:419–420 Sontag, Susan, 1:485
Social persuasion, 2:688 Sophists, 1:21
Social psychology, 1:211 Sophocles, Oedipus the King, 1:29, 30
Social realism, 2:759–762 South Africa, 2:589
Social reality, 1:216 South America. See Latin America
Social referencing, 2:677 Southern dialect, 1:426
Social relationships, 1:92–93, 290–291 Southern Poverty Law Center, 2:834
Social sciences South Korea, 1:7
Afrocentricity, 1:14 Sovereignty, 2:776–778
science vs., 1:181 Soyinka, Wole, 1:424
Social Security Administration (SSA), 1:2 Space. See also Architecture, sites, and spaces
Social space, 1:90 communication, 1:382
Social status, 1:7. See also Status cultural differences concerning, 1:187
Social stratification theory, 2:762–766 globalization, 1:314
cultural studies, 2:765 material culture, 1:436
gender, 2:764 place vs., 2:844
historical conditions, 2:762–763 transnationalism, 2:843–844
modern conditions, 2:763–764 virtual space, 2:820
race, 2:764–765 worldview, 2:898
Social structure Spain, 1:103
culture vs., 1:22 Spanglish, 1:427
habitus, 1:321–322 Spatial deixis, 2:594–595
Society and social identity, 2:766–772. See also Spears, Russell, 1:201
Collective/social identity; Social constructionist Spectacle and the self, 2:778–782. See also Society of the
approach to personal identity; Social identity theory spectacle
culture, 2:766–767 Speech accommodation theory, 1:2–3
culture vs. society, 1:180 Speech acts, 1:422, 442, 2:596–597, 618
defining “society,” 2:766 Speech community, 2:716
deindividuation, 1:201 Spencer, Herbert, 1:265
etic vs. emic approaches, 1:263–264 Sperber, Dan, 1:184
identification, 2:768 Spinoza, Benedict de, 1:332, 334
similarity and difference, 2:768–770 Ethics, 1:334
social act, the, 2:741–742 Spiritual consciousness, 1:131
symbolic interactionism, 2:809 Spitzberg, Brian, 1:112
values, 2:853–854 Spivak, Gayatri, 1:33, 35, 157, 176, 410,
Society for Research on Identity Formation (SRIF), 1:207 2:517, 528
Society of Biblical Literature, 2:890 Sprout, Harold, 2:591
Society of the spectacle, 2:773–774. See also Spectacle Sprout, Margaret, 2:591
and the self Spurlin, William, 1:204
Sociocultural approaches to artistic development and Stalin, Josef, 1:149, 2:760, 761
cognition, 1:42 Stalinism, 1:298
Socioeconomic status. See Class Stallabrass, Julian, High Art Lite, 1:124
 Index 947

Standard English, 1:94–95, 219, 220, 406–407, 425, Stowe, Harriet Beecher, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, 1:428, 459,
2:573, 798 460, 2:622, 870
Standpoints, 1:235 Strathclyde Statement, 1:143
Stanford Prison Experiment, 1:199 Stratification schemes, 1:120
Stankiewicz, Edward, 2:643 Strauss, William, 1:309
Star Trek (television series), 1:279 Stress-adaptation-growth cycle, 1:399
State. See also Nation-state Structuralism
international relations, 2:782–785 cultural studies, 1:175–176
nation vs., 2:498 discourse, 1:232–233
sovereignty, 2:776–778 identity, 1:327
state identity, 2:782–785 Structuration, 1:18–19, 404, 2:794–796, 840
terrorism, 2:822–823 Structure, 2:794
war, 2:878 Strunk, William, Jr., The Elements of Style, 2:797
State identity, 2:782–785 Stryker, Sheldon, 2:666–667
State self-esteem, 2:603, 775 Stuart, Elizabeth, 1:432
Status, 2:785–788 Stubblefield, Anna, 2:626
ascribed identity, 1:45 Studio Museum of Harlem, 2:528, 529
defined, 2:785 Studium, 1:486
gaining, 2:785–786 Style/diction, 2:797–799. See also Dialect; Figures of
health and well-being, 2:788 speech; Idiomatic expressions
identity development, 1:207 Subcultures, 1:72, 2:598
maintaining, 2:786–787 Subjective group dynamics, 2:750
power in relation to, 2:785 Subjective idealism, 1:451
social status, 1:7 Subjective well-being, 1:183
Weber on, 1:88 Subjectivity, 2:800–803. See also Intersubjectivity;
within-group and intergroup, 2:787–788 Person; Self
Status generalization, 2:786 aesthetics, 1:9
Stea, Cesare, Sculptural Relief for the Bower Bay Sewage contemporary perspectives, 2:800–802
Disposal Plant, 2:760 cultural studies, 1:175
Steele, Claude, 1:97, 2:670 defined, 2:800
Steele, Shelby, 2:689 hermeneutics, 1:327
Sterbak, Jana, 1:9 intertextuality, 1:403
Stereotype content model, 2:788 I-Other dialectic, 1:409–410
Stereotypes, 2:788–791. See also Bias; Prejudice; Stock philosophy of mind, 2:567–568
character poststructuralism, 1:327
contact hypothesis, 1:137 queer theory, 2:613–614
cultural representation, 1:172 spectacle, 2:780–781
defined, 2:788–789 subject position, 1:297
identity salience, 1:370 textuality, 1:175
normalcy and, 2:789–790 Subject positions, 1:463
propaganda, 2:599–600 Sublime, 1:8
prototypes, 2:750 Sudan, 1:259
self-affirmation, 2:671 Sufism, 2:814
self-stereotyping, 2:513 Suggestibility, 1:198
Stereotype threat, 2:671, 689 Suicide, 1:22, 2:870
Stern, Barbara, 2:816 Suicide bombers, 2:823
Stevens, Wallace, 2:871 Suls, Jerry, 2:737
Stewart, Maria, 2:889 Sun, Wei, 2:520
Stigmatization, 2:521. See also Labeling Superego, 1:216, 343–348
Stock character, 2:791–794 Surplus value, 1:86
Stoics, 1:147 Surrealism, 1:473, 2:865, 866
Storytelling. See also Myths; Narratives Surveillance and Society (journal), 2:806
antiracism, 1:27 Surveillance and the Panopticon, 2:803–806
cultivation theory, 1:158–159 academic discipline of, 2:806
embeddedness, 1:242 basic principles, 2:805
narrative sickness, 1:242 entertainment, 2:804
948 Index

new technology, 2:804 Tamez, Elsa, 1:431

overview, 2:803–804 Tamil Eelam, 2:825
post-9/11, 2:804 Tannebaum, Frank, 1:413
Surveillance Project, 2:806 Tannen, Deborah, 2:537–538, 645, 816
Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1:2 Taoism, 2:561, 564
Sustainability, 2:746 Taste, 1:8
Swank, Hilary, 1:278 Tatum, Beverly, 2:689
Swann, William, 2:691, 693 Taussig, Michael, Mimesis and Alterity, 1:449
Swearer, Susan M., 2:739 Tawney, R. H., 2:585
Sweeney, Deborah, 2:641 Taylor, Charles, 1:169, 181, 241, 257, 416, 2:548, 747
Swift, Jonathan, “A Modest Proposal,” 2:656 Multiculturalism, 1:482–483
Swift self, 2:899 Secular Age, A, 2:634
Syllipsis, 1:70 Taylor, Frederick, 2:796
Symbolic capital, 1:162 Taylor, James, 1:402
Symbolic interactionism, 2:806–810 Taylor, Shelley, 2:693
age, 1:16 Taylor-Wood, Sam, 2:529
basic principles, 2:806 Technology, 2:819–822. See also Photography
human figure, 1:332–334 Generation Y, 1:309–310
identity, 2:808–810 global village, 1:315–316
meaning and interaction, 2:807–808 immigrants, 1:387
nature of meaning, 2:806–807 information and communications technologies, 2:819–822
psychology of self, 2:604 language and identity, 1:418
self, 2:666–667, 808 mediation, 1:443–444
self-concept, 1:210 modernity, 1:470–471
socialization, 2:753 public sphere, 2:610
Symbolic order, 2:801 saturated identity, 2:658–659, 669
Symbolic violence, 1:19 surveillance, 2:804
Symbolism, 2:810–813. See also Archetype visual culture, 2:861
group identity, 1:317 Tedlock, Dennis, 2:644
identity, 2:812–813 Teerlinc, Levina, 2:639
literature, 2:811 Television
overview, 2:810 cultivation theory, 1:158–161
politics, 2:811–812 reality television, 2:660–661, 804
race, 2:812 satire, 2:656–657
religion, 2:811 scopophilia, 2:660–661
symbolic interactionism, 2:807 stock characters, 2:793–794
Sympathy, 1:336–337 Tel Quel (journal), 1:485–486
Syncretism, 2:813–814 Temple University, 1:14
Synecdoche, 1:286, 2:645 Temporal deixis, 2:595
Syntactics, 2:716 Temporal referencing, 2:677
Syntax, 2:713 Temporary Services, 1:11
Synthesis, 1:450–451 Terman, Lewis, 1:266
Szasz, Thomas, 1:215, 419 Termination, of identity, 2:540–543
Territoriality, 1:187
Tagore, Rabindranath, 2:837 Terrorism, 2:822–827
Tag question, 2:815–819 characteristics of terrorists, 2:823–824
African American Vernacular English, 2:817 contemporary characteristics, 2:822
court interpretation, 2:817–818 crime, 2:826
defined, 2:815 defining, 2:823
functions, 2:815 deviance, 1:215
nurse-physician-patient communication, 2:816–817 effectiveness, 2:823
source credibility, 2:818–819 end of, 2:826
women’s language, 2:815–816 eras, 2:823
Taiwan, 1:3–4 insurgencies and guerrillas vs., 2:825
Tajfel, Henri, 1:99, 261, 263, 370, 2:514, 548, 696, 749, motivations, 2:823
767, 829 nationalism, 2:825
 Index 949

negotiation with, 2:826 Toomer, Jean, 1:359

psychology of terrorists, 2:824 Toomey, Stella Ting, 1:255
religion, 2:824 Topic comment, 1:95
space/place, 2:898 Torres, Gerald, 1:235
suicide bombers, 2:823 Totality, 1:298
Terror management health model, 2:829 Touch, in communication, 1:382–383
Terror management theory, 2:603, 696–697, 775, Townsend, Chris, 1:125
827–830 Trachtenberg, Marvin, 1:34, 2:530, 638
anxiety-buffer hypothesis, 2:828 Trade diasporas, 1:224
empirical support, 2:828–829 Tradition
extensions, 2:829 anomie and, 1:21–22
identity, 2:829–830 disruption of, 2:627–628
mortality salience hypothesis, 2:828 modernity and, 2:627
theory and background, 2:827–828 multiculturalism, 1:482
Tesser, Abraham, 2:692 sense of self, 2:627
Testa, Maria, 2:738 Traits, 2:549
Texts. See Intertextuality Trait self-esteem, 2:603, 775
Thatcher, Margaret, 1:175, 181, 2:502, 822 Transcendence, 1:273, 2:634
Thayer, Lee, 1:419 Transcendentalism, 2:838–841
Theophrastus, The Characters, 2:792 beyond, 2:841
Theory of mind, 1:270–271, 2:830–831 conditions of possibility, 2:839–840
Theseus, Ship of, 1:358–359 critiques of, 2:840–841
Thiong’o, Ngugi wa, 1:423–424 potentiality, 2:839
Third culture building, 2:831–835 types, 2:838–839
Third estate, 2:835–836 Transcendental phenomenology, 2:553–554
Third world, 1:312–313, 2:835–838 Transformational model of social activity, 1:154
authority and epistemology, 2:836–838 Transformative identity politics, 1:369
colonialism, 2:836 Transnationalism, 1:313–314, 2:842–844
origin of concept, 2:835 Transworld identity, 2:844–846
third estate, 2:835–836 Treaty of Westphalia (1648), 2:570
Thomas, Charles, 2:505, 506 Trecento Italian urban planning, 1:34
Thomas, Clarence, 2:818 Treves, Frederick, 1:277
Thomas, William Isaac, 1:210, 413 Triandis, Harry, 1:101, 228
Thompson, Christine, 1:42 Trickster figure, 1:31, 435, 2:846–847
Thompson, E. P., 1:169 Trope, Yaacov, 2:691
Thompson, Evan, 2:568 Tropes, 2:645
Thompson, Gretchen H., 2:735 Truman Show, The (film), 2:661
Thucydides, 1:221 Trumball, Elise, 1:101
Thurman, Wallace, 1:436 Trust
Blacker the Berry, The, 1:428–429 authenticity, 1:52–53
Tice, Dianne, 2:707, 708 clan identity, 1:84
Tillich, Paul, 1:272, 275 conversation, 2:596
Tillman, Wolfgang, 1:125 evolutionary psychology, 1:271
Time ontological security, 2:511–512
cultural differences, 1:186–187, 230–231 social economy, 2:747
narratives, 2:495–496 Truth
temporal deixis, 2:595 authenticity, 1:53
transnationalism, 2:843–844 confession, 1:124–125
worldview, 2:897–898 deconstruction, 1:196
Time Out (magazine), 1:125 first and third world conceptions, 2:837
Ting-Toomey, Stella, 1:6–7, 455 museum exhibitions, 2:619–620
Tiravanija, Rirkrit, 1:11 photographic, 2:576–579
Tito, Josip, 2:825 Tsiolkovsky, Konstantin Eduardovich, 1:248
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 1:120–121, 242–243, 2:747 Turner, John, 1:99, 261, 370, 2:514, 548, 696, 749,
Tone, 2:870 752, 829
Tönnies, Ferdinand, 1:182 Turner, Victor, 2:617
950 Index

Turn-taking, 1:129 terrorism, 2:823

Tuval-Mashiach, Rivka, 2:546 time, 1:230
Twain, Mark, 1:425 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, The, 1:29, 426, Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
2:655–656, 871 Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Two-Spirit people, 2:728–729 2:536, 804
Tyson, Lois, Critical Theory, 1:157 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See United
Tyson, Timothy, 2:883 Nations: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Tzu, Sun, 2:561, 880 (1948)
Art of War, 2:877–878 Universality
democracy and human nature, 1:355
Ukeles, Mierle, Social Mirror, 1:110 myths, 1:490
Ultimate attribution error, 1:50. See also Fundamental religious identity, 2:634–635
attribution error Sapir-Whorf hypothesis vs., 2:652, 653
Unabomber, 2:824 selfhood, 1:416–417
Unamuno, Miguel de, 1:272 Universal pragmatics, 2:597
Uncertainty avoidance, 2:849–851. See also Identity Universities and the New Left Review (journal), 1:169
uncertainty University of Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics
conceptual framework, 2:849 (PSID), 1:2
cultural differences, 1:230, 2:849–850 Urban planning, 1:34
identity, 2:850–851 Urchs, Max, 2:897
identity salience, 1:371 Urdu, 2:580
social identity, 1:99, 2:605, 751 Urry, John, 1:464, 466, 478
strong vs. weak, 2:849–851 USA PATRIOT Act (2001), 2:536, 804
Unconscious U.S. Civil Rights Act (1964), 1:355, 431
embodiment, 1:245 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2:746
Freudian, 1:347 Use-theory of meaning, 2:597
Giddens’s selfhood model, 2:626 Use-value, 2:585
Lacanian, 1:463 U.S. General Services Administration, 1:33
visual desire, 2:865 U.S. Supreme Court, 2:570
Unger, Peter, 2:545–546 U.S. Voting Rights Act (1965), 1:431
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 1:480, Utilitarianism, 1:335, 2:586
2:760, 761 Utopia
United Kingdom, 2:823 architecture, sites, and spaces, 1:36
United Nations, 2:777, 823 eugenicism, 1:264, 266–267
Human Development Index, 1:1–2
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 1:149, Values, 2:853–856
257, 355, 2:570 class, 2:854–855
World Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, common, 1:83
and Xenophobia, 1:28 conflict over, 1:129
United States defined, 2:853
adaptation, 1:7 national, 2:855–856
class, 1:93 social identity, 2:853–854
colonialism, 1:104–105 Van Creveld, Martin, 2:877–881
colonization of, 1:104 Vandiver, Beverly, 2:506
communication, 1:251 Van Gogh, Vincent, 2:704, 705
eugenicism, 1:265–266 Van Loo, Jacob, Le Coucher à L’italienne, 2:875
globalization, 1:312 Van Riel, Cees B. M., 1:142, 143
individualism, 1:101, 183, 263 Van Vechten, Carl, Nigger Heaven, 1:428
inequalities, 1:122 Varela, Francisco, 2:569
language, 1:249 Vasari, Giorgio, The Lives of the Painters, Sculptors and
low-context culture, 1:102, 186 Architects, 2:637, 639
patriotism, 2:536 Veblen, Thorstein, 1:132–133, 135
poverty line, 1:1–2 Theory of the Leisure Class, The, 1:106–107
race, 1:188, 2:533 Vehicle externalism, 2:569
racial profiling, 1:259–260 Veil, as metaphor of double consciousness, 1:131
 Index 951

Velasquez, Manuel, 1:253 Walker, David, Whites as Heathens and Christians,

Velvet Mafia, 2:856–859 2:881
Venturi, Robert, 1:478 Walker, Felicia, 2:796
Verbal communication, 1:381 Walker, Kara, Darkytown Rebellion, 2:619
Verbal pattern similarity, 1:6 Wallerstein, Immanuel, 2:893–894
Verification, self/identity, 2:602, 649–650 Walzer, Michael, 2:879–880
Verificationism, 1:453 War, 2:877–881. See also Conflict
Vernacular, 1:219, 425, 427, 2:817 defined, 2:877
Vertical collectivism, 1:101–102 forms of, 2:877
Vertical individualism, 1:101 high- vs. low-intensity, 2:879
Vicarious experience, 2:688, 703 identity, 2:880–881
Victim diasporas, 1:223 just war, 2:879–880
Villanueva, Victor, 2:644 societal effects, 2:880
Virgin (company), 1:143 theories, 2:877–879
Virginia Minstrels, 1:459 Warburg, Aby, 2:637
Virilio, Paul, 1:180, 2:508 Warhol, Andy, 2:773
Virtual communities, 1:146 War machine, 2:508
Virtual space, 2:820 Warner, Michael, 2:610
Virtue ethics, 1:254 War on Poverty, 1:2
Visual art, and perception, 1:40 Washington, Booker T., 1:32
Visual culture, 1:9, 42–43, 2:859–862. See also Visuality Waters, Malcolm, 1:476
characteristics, 2:860 Watney, Simon, 2:864
definitions, 2:860 Watson, Julia, 1:123
everyday life, 2:861 Watts, Eric King, 1:410, 2:893
field of study, 2:861–864 Waugh, Tom, 2:864
issues, 2:862 Wayans family, 2:657
substance of, 2:860–861 Wearing, Gillian, 1:125
Visuality, 2:863–864. See also Visual culture Weaver, Warren, 1:442
Visualizing desire, 2:864–867. See also Gaze; Scopophilia Webb, James, 2:625
Visual pleasure, 2:867–870. See also Gaze; Scopophilia Weber, Max, 1:86–88, 121, 154, 296, 477, 2:570, 662,
Visual studies, 2:861–864 747, 796, 838, 840
Vohs, Kathleen, 2:708 Weick, Karl, 1:402
Voice, 2:870–871, 891–892 Weir, Allison, 1:369
Voight, John, 1:278 Welfare state, 1:295, 2:501
Volf, Miroslav, 2:634 Wendt, Alexander, 2:783, 785
Voltaire, 1:181 Wesley, John, 1:243
Volunteer bias, 1:65 West, Diane, 2:899
Vonnegut, Kurt, 2:655 Wetherell, Margaret, 2:854
Voyeurism, 2:872–876 Weyden, Rogier van der, 2:639
architecture, 2:875–876 Wharton, Edith, Summer, 1:426–427
art, 2:873–875 Wheeler, Stanton, 2:754
cinema, 2:875 Whetten, David A., 1:142, 2:514
distance, 2:875 White, Charles, 1:359, 2:761
extent of, 2:875–876 White, E. B., The Elements of Style, 2:797
Freud on, 1:347, 2:872 White, Joseph L., The Psychology of Blacks, 2:504–505
history of, 2:873–874 White, Walter, 2:532
nature of, 2:872–873 White culture, 2:883–884. See also Whiteness studies;
overview, 2:872 White racial identity
scopophilia, 2:660–662 Black culture appropriated by, 1:68
typology, 2:874–875 colonialism, 1:105
Vygotsky, Lev, 1:40, 42, 2:754 cultural contracts theory, 1:167–168
ethnicity, 1:187
Wahl, Jean, 1:272 immigrants, 1:360
Walker, Alice, 1:431, 2:635, 888–890 I-Other dialectic, 1:410
Color Purple, The, 1:351, 429 Othering process, 2:525
In Search of Our Mother’s Gardens, 2:888 racial categorization, 2:881
952 Index

racial contracts, 2:620–622 openness of, 2:892–893

racial disloyalty, 2:625–626 origins, 2:888
social stratification theory, 2:764–765 Othering process, 2:524
White Negroes, 1:68 rhetoric, 2:892
Whiteness studies, 2:881–885. See also White racial theology, 2:890–891
identity theories, 2:889
critical White studies, 1:27 voice, 2:891–892
critiques of, 2:884–885 Woman’s Own (magazine), 1:307
issues, 2:882–884 Women. See also Feminism
origins, 2:881–882 archetypes, 1:32
racial disloyalty, 2:625–626 architecture, space, and, 1:34–35
tensions within, 2:884 art history, 2:528
White racial identity, 2:882, 885–888. See also White beauty ideal, 1:349–350
culture; Whiteness studies commodity self, 1:108
White Racial Identity Attitudes Scale (WRIAS), 2:888 communication, 2:815–816, 818
Whitman, Walt, Song of Myself, 2:871 Freud’s views on, 1:347
Whorf, Benjamin, 1:95, 2:651–652 gaze, 1:303–304, 2:805–806, 868
Whyte, William H., The Organization Man, 2:571 hip-hop artists, 2:817
Wiegman, Robyn, 1:372 nomadology, 2:509
Wild, John, 1:272 Renaissance art, 2:639–640
Wilden, Anthony, 1:416 subjectivity, 2:802
Williams, Delores S., 1:431 tag questions, 2:815–816
Williams, Egbert Austin, 1:460 war, 2:881
Williams, Gregory Howard, 2:531 Wong, Paul, 1:46
Williams, Patricia, 1:151 Wong, Takeo Hirota, “Asiacentrism and Asian American
Williams, Raymond, 1:38, 173–175, 177, 419, 444 Studies?” 1:46
Williams, Tennessee, 2:614 Wong, Virgil, GenoChoice, 1:109
Glass Menagerie, The, 1:278 Woo, John, 2:518
Williams, William Carlos, 2:871 Woodruff, Guy, 2:830
Wills, Tom, 2:738 Woodruff, Hale, 2:761
Wilson, Brent, 1:42–43, 76, 77 Woolf, Virginia, 1:33, 34
Wilson, Edward, 1:270 Woolley, Edwin C., Handbook of Composition, 2:642
Wilson, Fred Word choice, 2:797–799
Cabinetmaking 1820–1960, 2:619 Wordsworth, William, “Preface to the Lyrical Ballads,”
Metalwork 1793–1880, 2:619 2:871
Mining the Museum, 2:619 Work relationships, 1:145–146
Wilson, John, 2:761 World Bank, 1:1
Wilson, Marjorie, 1:42, 76 World systems theory, 2:893–895
Wilson, Robert, 2:569 World Values Survey, 2:855
Winckelmann, Johann, 1:332–333 Worldview, 2:896–900
Winner, Ellen, 1:41 cultural formations of identity, 2:898–899
Winnicott, D. W., 2:705 identity, 2:896–897
Winter, Irene, 1:35–36 overview, 2:896
Wise, Tim, 2:883 space/place, 2:898
Wittig, Monique, 2:539 time, 2:897–898
Witz, Konrad, 2:639 World War II, modern art after, 1:473–474
WochenKlausur, 1:11 Worrell, Frank, 2:506
Wöfflin, Heinrich, 2:530 Wowk, Maria, 1:415
Wolf, Eric, 2:895 Wray, Matt, 2:883
Wolfram, Walt, 1:407 Wright, Elizabeth, 2:865
Wolman, Gil J., 2:773 Wright, Erik Olin, 1:86, 89, 120
Womanism, 2:888–893 Wright, Richard
epistemology, 2:889–890 “Long Black Song,” 1:292
ethics, 2:891–892 “Man Who Was Almost a Man, The,” 1:30
identity, 2:635 Native Son, 1:428
liberation theology, 1:431, 2:891 Wykes, Maggie, 2:739
 Index 953

Xenophobia, 2:849, 901–902 Zander, Alvin, 1:217

Xiaoshuai, Wang, 2:519 Zaner, Richard, 1:272
Zen Buddhism, 1:251
Yale Divinity School, 2:592 Zero copula, 1:406
Yan, Mo, 2:519 Zerubavel, Eviatar, Terra Cognita,
Yang, Zhang, 2:519 1:446
Yimou, Zhang, 2:518–519 Zeugma, 1:70
Yinger, J. Milton, 1:259 Zeuxis, 2:732, 865
“Yo Momma,” 2:731 Zhangke, Jia, 2:519
Young, Iris Marion, 1:79 Zhao clan, 1:85
Young, James, 1:446 Zimbardo, Philip, 1:199–201
Young British Art (YBA), 1:124, 125 Zionism, 2:663–664
YouTube, 2:661–662 Ziyi, Zhang, 2:518
Zola, Émile, Germinal, 1:198
Žižek, Slavoj, 1:180, 304, 2:779, 867 Zone of proximal development, 1:42
Zahavi, Dan, 2:568 Zunker, Vernon, 2:689