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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

A. Background of the Study

“The Copyright Act did not anticipate this,” one Twitter user noted in connection

with the latest paparazzi vs. celebrity lawsuit.1

The relationship between the paparazzi and celebrities has not always been the best. It

has been said that the paparazzi are an occupational hazard for celebrities. Paparazzi are

photographers who follow famous people around, hoping to take interesting or shocking

photographs of them so that they can sell them to a newspaper.2 Historically, there have been

suits filed by famous celebrities against the paparazzi for their intrusion into the private lives

and properties of the celebrities.3 However, in recent years, due to the rise of social media

and the coming of the digital age, the tables have turned, it is now the paparazzi who are

filing suits against the celebrities.

In July 2021, Dua Lipa, the British singer known for global hit songs like Don’t Start

Now and New Rules, was sued for copyright infringement for posting a photograph of

herself on Instagram. The photograph in issue involved Dua Lipa queuing at an airport and

was taken on February 3, 2019 by a paparazzi of the company Integral Images. The same was

posted on Dua Lipa’s social media four days later but has now been deleted. Integral Images

had applied to register copyright for the images, and the request was granted on February 20,

1
The Fashion Law, As the Number of Paparazzi v. Celebrity Copyright Cases Grows, How Big of a Problem is
This Really?, available at https://www.thefashionlaw.com/as-the-number-of-paparazzi-v-celebrity-copyright-
cases-continues-to-grow-how-big-of-a-problem-is-this-really/ (last accessed Aug. 3, 2021).
2
Collins English Dictionary, Definition of ‘paparazzi’, available at
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/paparazzi (last accessed August 3, 2021).
3
Carmen Ribecca, Celebs Who Sued The Paparazzi For Going Too Far, available at
https://www.nickiswift.com/78195/celebs-sued-paparazzi-going-far/ (last accessed August 3, 2021).
2

2021. The company claims Lipa "knowingly" posted the photo to social media without

permission and stood to make money from the shot.4

This is not the first time that a celebrity has been sued or threatened to be sued for

copyright infringement for posting paparazzi photographs of themselves on social media

without the photographer’s permission. From 2016 to 2019 other celebrities who were sued

by the paparazzi were reality star Khloe Kardashian,5 singer-actress Jennifer Lopez,6 model

Gigi Hadid,7 basketball player Lebron James8 and singer Justin Bieber.9 A common link

among these cases is that the paparazzi filed a copyright infringement lawsuit against the

celebrity after the latter posts on social media, usually Instagram, which constitutes

"unauthorized reproduction and public display" of the paparazzi’s photography without the

latter’s consent.

These are just a few of the growing number of paparazzi-initiated copyright

infringement suits. However, the celebrities have been fighting back. The pleadings of the

abovementioned celebrities included the defense of right of publicity which in essence, is the

4
Mark Savage, Dua Lipa sued for putting paparazzi photo of herself on Instagram, available at
https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthart/2021/07/09/dua-lipa-the-latest-celeb-sued-for-posting-photo-of-herself-
on-social-media/?sh=e14074300cbf; https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-57775670 (last accessed
Aug. 3, 2021).
5
Michelle Kaminsky, Gigi Hadid Sued Over Unauthorized Publication Of Paparazzi Photo On Instagram,
available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/michellekaminsky/2019/01/29/gigi-hadid-sued-over-unauthorized-
publication-of-paparazzi-photo-on-instagram/?sh=1bd55f6814e7 (last accessed Aug. 3, 2021).
6
Chelsea Ritschel, Jennifer Lopez Sued For $150k By Photographer Over Instagram Photo, available at
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/jennifer-lopez-sued-copyright-infringement-photographer-instagram-
lawsuit-a9477236.html (last accessed Aug. 3, 2021).
7
Id. at 5.
8
Jaron Schneider, Lebron James Settles with Photog in Lawsuit Over Misuse of Photo, available at
https://petapixel.com/2021/02/05/lebron-james-settles-with-photog-in-lawsuit-over-misuse-of-photo/ (last
accessed Aug. 3, 2021).
9
Olivia Petter, Justin Bieber ‘sued’ For Sharing Paparazzi Photo Of Himself On Instagram available at
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/justin-bieber-sued-instagram-photo-paparazzi-lawsuit-a9159596.html
(last accessed Aug. 3, 2021).
3

reaction of the public to name and likeness, which may be fortuitous or which may be

managed and planned, endows the name and likeness of the person involved with

commercially exploitable opportunities.10 Another defense that has been raised by the

celebrities is the Fair-Use Doctrine found in Section 107 of the Copyright Act states that “the

fair use of a copyrighted work,” and here that would be the plaintiff’s photograph of the

celebrity, “including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other

means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news, reporting,

teaching, scholarship, or research is not an infringement of copyright.” 11 Others even went as

far as getting around the photographer’s rights by claiming that the celebrity is a co-author of

the photographer’s work.12

As can be gleaned from the defenses brought forward by the celebrities, notions of

fairness, creativity, and profitability would seem to dictate that they, too, deserve some

leeway to use photographs featuring themselves.13 Neel Chatterjee, a lawyer in the United

States who specializes in high-profile intellectual property disputes, said “It's just one of

those things that offends common sense, if someone's harassing me and takes a photograph

of me and I happen to like the picture and want to make use of it, after they harassed me and

made money from me - now they can sue me for that?” He further states that these cases are

10
Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc. (Wendt), 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (U.S.).
11
Meredith Wallen, Celebrities and Paparazzi and Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, Oh My!, available at
https://jost.syr.edu/celebrities-and-paparazzi-and-copyright-infringement-lawsuits-oh-my/ (last accessed Aug. 3,
2021).
12
David H. Siegel, Careful of Who Owns Photographs of You, available at
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/careful-who-owns-photographs-you?amp (last accessed Aug. 3, 2021).
13
Kelley Bregenzer, Modifying Co-Authorship for the Digital Age: Paparazzi Photographs as Joint Works, 13
DREXEL L. REV. 449, 452 (2021).
4

becoming known within the industry as "copyright trolling". He believes photo agencies are

exploring it as a "new and incremental way" of increasing their revenue streams.14

Therefore these recent copyright cases highlight an intersection of two significant

tenets of law: a celebrity’s right of publicity in their own image and a photographer’s right to

copyright their artistic work. There has been a decades-long replete relationship existing

between celebrities and paparazzi, but the rise of social media as a ubiquitous part of how

celebrities interact with their fans places everyone involved in uncharted legal waters.

Unfortunately, despite the number of occasions on which this scenario has arisen, the cases

have been largely settled out of court or decided on a pleading deficiency. 15 So, instead of

getting answers, more questions are left unanswered.

As of now, there has been no legislation or even jurisprudence in the Philippines that

touches on the copyright claims of paparazzi and the right of publicity and right to privacy of

public figures including celebrities. This is a novel issue that has been arising only in the past

few years due to the more instrumental role social media has taken in society. Therefore,

there is plenty of room for future legislation in the Philippine context as the interplay

between celebrities and the media in the Philippines is an ever growing issue especially due

to the growing interest of the general public to the more personal lives of celebrities and

other public figures.

B. Statement of the Problem


14
Kelly-Leigh Cooper, Why celebrities are being sued over images of themselves, available at
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47128788 (last accessed Aug. 3, 2021).
15
Meaghan Kent, Katherine Dearing & Danae Tinelli, Keeping Up with Copyright Infringement: Copyright,
Celebrities, Paparazzi, and Social Media, available at https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/10/30/keeping-
copyright-infringement-copyright-celebrities-paparazzi-social-media/id=115456/ (last accessed Aug. 3, 2021).
5

In a situation where a celebrity shares on social media a photo of him/herself that was

taken by a paparazzi, the question arises as to whether or not a photographer may sue the

celebrity for copyright infringement in light of the latter’s right to privacy and right of

publicity?

The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines provides that copyright shall belong

to the author of the work who is the natural person who has created the work. Therefore, by

that alone, it is the paparazzi who is the author of the photo and is entitled to copyright

protection. However, the right of publicity states that it is the right of a person to control the

commercial use of their identity, or in other words, the right to prevent others from using

their image, name or other aspects of their identity for commercial purposes without their

consent. Furthermore, the right to privacy otherwise known as “the right to be left alone” is

the right of a person to be protected from “unwarranted publicity.” Although the right of

ownership is given by the copyright law to the photographer, the right of publicity gives the

subject of the photograph control over its commercial exploitation. This implies that while a

paparazzi photographer owns copyright in the photographs taken by them, they cannot

commercially exploit the same without the authorization of the subject of the photograph.

The right of publicity also arises from the public figure’s right to privacy. Therefore, there

exists an intersection of three significant tenets of law: a celebrity’s right to privacy, a

celebrity’s right of publicity in his or her own image and a photographer’s right to copyright

their artistic work. This being the case, the concept of authorship and fair use in Philippine

Copyright Law must be examined and subjected to additional requirements and standards in
6

order to address this complex intersection of intellectual property, technology and privacy

law.

C. Definition of Terms

1. Paparazzi - photographers who follow famous people around, hoping to take

interesting or shocking photographs of them so that they can sell them to a

newspaper.16

2. Copyright - consisting of the exclusive right to carry out, authorize or prevent the

following acts with respect to a copyrightable subject matter.17

3. Right of Publicity - the reaction of the public to name and likeness, which may be

fortuitous or which may be managed and planned, endows the name and likeness of

the person involved with commercially exploitable opportunities.18

4. Right to Privacy - otherwise known as “the right to be left alone” is the right of a

person to be protected from “unwarranted publicity.”19

5. Public Figure - “a person who by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by

adopting a profession which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his

affairs, and his character, has become a 'public personage.’”20

16
Collins English Dictionary, supra note 2.
17
An Act Prescribing the Intellectual Property Code and Establishing the Intellectual Property Office, Providing
for Its Powers and Functions, and for Other Purposes [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE] Republic Act No. 8293,
§ 177, (1997).
18
Wendt, 125 F.3d 806 at 10.
19
Law Offices of Stimmel, Stimmel & Smith, The Legal Right of Privacy, available at https://www.stimmel-
law.com/en/articles/legal-right-privacy (last accessed Aug. 3, 2021).
20
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861, (1988).
7

6. Social Media - These are forms of electronic communication, such as websites for

social networking and blogging through which users create online communities to

share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content such as photos and

videos.

7. Copyright trolling - practice by some plaintiff law firms of using algorithms or other

digital fingerprint technology to search or “troll” for copyright violations of music

and images on the Internet, including, for example, on websites like YouTube and

Facebook.21

D. Objective of the Study

This thesis aims to accomplish the following objectives:

1. To examine the provisions of the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines,

particularly those relating to ownership of copyright and copyright infringement;

2. To establish the right of publicity and right to privacy of celebrities in the Philippines;

3. To provide for a recitation on how to find the balance in enforcing the photographer’s

right to copyright their artistic work without violating the public figure’s right of

publicity in their own image;

4. To provide guidelines for the courts in deciding whether there is copyright

infringement involved when the “celebrity-subject matter” of a photograph posts on

social media a paparazzi’s photo.

21
Heidi Crikelair & David Perry, Beware of the Trolls: Recent Uptick in Copyright Trolling and What You
Should Do, available at https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/beware-of-the-trolls-recent-uptick-in-63839/ (last
accessed Aug. 3, 2021).
8

E. Significance of the Study

Just like in all things there must be balance. On the one hand, the right of the

paparazzi to do their job and own their work under copyright laws must be respected. On the

other hand, the public figure’s right to protect the value of his or her name, image, and

overall likeness and his or her privacy must also be given credence.

The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines was passed in 1997, and took effect

on January 1, 1998.22 However, more than two decades have passed since then and the

current state of affairs have changed drastically. In the modern world we are living today

social media has become a staple in our everyday lives. The internet has brought this fast-

paced and ever growing interest of society in the personal lives of public figures. In effect,

the delineation of what remains private and what is up for public consumption is becoming

thinner and thinner to the detriment of the public figures. As aptly stated by Athul K.

Acharya, a public interest attorney at BraunHagey & Borden, told TFL The concept of

‘ownership’ of images and videos is shifting, and will shift further, as everyday people find

themselves in photos all the time, taken by people they know and don’t know, with and

without their permission.”23

The current imbalance that tilts towards the rights of the copyright holders without

taking much consideration to the right of publicity and right to privacy of the public figures is

somehow offensive to this modern reality. Therefore, this present study is undertaken to

22
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, § 241.
23
The Fashion Law, supra note 1.
9

respond to a complex intersection of intellectual property, technology and privacy laws while

conceding to the realities of the modern days.

F. Scope and Limitation

This thesis will only be limited to one main branch of intellectual property law which

is copyright because the subject matter of this thesis involves photographs which are within

the scope of copyright law. This study shall not delve into the creation of its own penalties

that will be applied against individuals who commit the prohibited acts for regulation

proposed by this study.

The literature of laws that will assist in explaining the topic is limited because the

right of publicity is a fairly novel concept in our own jurisdiction. However, this study will

utilize the Philippine laws available such as Intellectual Property Code, the Civil Code and

other related laws to fulfill the study’s objectives. Furthermore, preponderance of this

research will be culled from foreign jurisprudence.

The work subject to copyright that this thesis will discuss will be limited to

photographic works including works produced by a process analogous to photography

wherein the subject matter of such photograph is considered a public figure.

It is important to emphasize that the main issue of the proponent’s study is the

interplay between the laws on copyright, right to privacy and right of publicity. While the

thesis may have other related issues under the Constitution like the freedom of speech, such

discussions will only be touched upon to entangle the main issues stated.
10

G. Methodology

The proponent shall first examine the paparazzi-initiated copyright infringement

cases filed against celebrities in the United States of America, looking at the pleadings and

defenses of the opposing parties. After which, the proponent will provide a general overview

of the laws on copyright in the Philippines with a review the Intellectual Property Code of the

Philippines and the jurisprudence in the Philippines relating to copyright and the history of

copyright in the Philippines. Then, the proponent will discuss the concept of the right to

privacy in the Philippines and how it affects public figures. Foreign jurisprudence on this

matter will also be discussed. Thereafter, the proponent will explain and describe the

literature concerning the right of publicity. Foreign jurisprudence on the right of publicity

will be discussed and journal articles shall also be relied on. The proponent will also discuss

the right of publicity in the Philippines. The relevant principles in copyright law which were

presented as defenses in some of the copyright trolling cases filed which will aid the

proponent in addressing the said conflicts will then be presented. The proponent will then

present the existing conflict between the photographer’s copyright and a public figure’s right

to privacy and right of publicity in their own image. Finally, the proponent will create a legal

framework to aid courts in addressing such issues in order to balance the said opposing

rights.
11

CHAPTER TWO

COPYRIGHT TROLLING: THE LEGAL SUITS BETWEEN PHOTOGRAPHERS

AND CELEBRITIES

"I don't think pictures have any value today: anyone can take them, cameras have

developed so much that you don't need to learn any technique, and that kills the value of a

picture. It's a new generation."24 The value of paparazzi has greatly diminished due to the rise

of social media and the Internet.25 Seeking to remain relevant and desirable, the paparazzi has

developed the infamous act of "copyright trolling" which is as a means to sustain their

monetary needs.26

In order to portray how the practice of copyright trolling came to be, this chapter of

the thesis will first elaborate on the relationship between the celebrities and paparazzi.

Thereafter, the gradual rise and development of social media in recent years will be discussed

which is the root of the said practice. Finally, there will be a brief discussion of copyright

trolling and a number of paparazzi-initiated copyright infringement US cases will be

narrated so the current state of copyright trolling can be presented.

A. Celebrities and the Paparazzi


24
Austin Joseph, Feeling Cute, Might [Have to] Delete Later: Defending against The Modern Day Copyright
Troll, 27 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 329 (2020) citing Clement Cheroux, Camille Lenglois, Vera Leon & Max
Bonhomme, Hazards Of The Trade: Interviews With Paparazzi, reprinted in Paparazzi! Photographers, Stars,
And Artists 39 (Clement Chdroux ed., 2014).
25
Id at 331 citing Michael Guerrin, The Market For Paparazzi Pictures, Reprinted In Paparazzi! Photographers,
Stars, And Artists 57 (Clement Cheroux ed., 2014).
26
Id at 331 citing Kelly-Leigh Cooper, Why Celebritiesare Being Sued OverImages of Themselves, BBC
NEWS (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47128788 ("Mr. Chatterjee says
these are becoming known within the industry as 'copyright trolling.").
12

Celebrities

The historian Daniel Boorstin defined modern fame, to wit: "The hero was

distinguished by his achievement, the celebrity by his image. The celebrity is a person well

known for his well-knownness. We risk being the first people in history to have been able to

make their illusions so vivid, so persuasive, so realistic that we can live in them."27

The concept of ‘celebrities’ is nothing new, it has entered the public eye way back in

the eighteenth century due to the ascent in mass media distribution through newspapers in the

early 1800s.28 What started off as newspapers tackling wartime heroes and commendable

inventions soon shifted to discussions about entertainers.29

The definition of being a celebrity is ever-changing due to the media and global

communication constantly defining and redefining the ambit of celebrity status. Originally,

acquisition of celebrity status could be by birth or by skill as in the case of sportspersons,

political leaders, actors and members of royal families. However, due to the changes in the

modern world, such celebrity status has extended even to a reality show participant

performing histrionics in front of the cameras or an unsuccessful actor trying to be in the

limelight through controversial statements. Today, celebrity status can be acquired by almost

27
Jill Neimark, The Culture of Celebrity, available at
https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/articles/199505/the-culture-celebrity (last accessed Aug. 15, 2021).
28
Joseph, supra note 24 at 333.
29
Id.
13

anyone. At the same time with media's accentuated support, celebrity influence has pervaded

popular culture.30

There are many causes to the human desire to know more about celebrities. There is

an idea that by doing so, one may also become as famous or as highly sought after. 31 Also, by

“knowing what is going on with high-status individuals, you'd be better able to navigate the

social scene."32 Further, part of this curiosity is a way of learning what makes the great in our

own search for knowledge, fame and fortune and in an effort to emulate, and in some rare

cases to surpass such fame and fortune.33

What this long history of celebrity culture proves is that society is very much invested

in the lives of famous figures and today is somehow already part of human nature. 34 As such,

this fascination will likely continue because of the low probability that an average person

would encounter any celebrity in their everyday life so viewers rely solely on photographs or

other sources of media to see celebrities35. In recent years, this desire has been fulfilled by the

paparazzi.36

The Rise of Paparazzi

30
Garima Budhiraja, Publicity Rights of Celebrities: An Analysis under the Intellectual Property Regime, 6
NALSAR Stud. L. REV. 85, 86 (2011) citing Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. LAW. REV. 125, 128 (1993).
31
Stephanie Pappas, Oscar Psychology: Why Celebrities Fascinate Us, available at
https://www.livescience.com/18649-oscar-psychology-celebrity-worship.html (last accessed Aug. 15, 2021).
32
Id.
33
Sheila Kohler, Why Are We Fascinated By Celebrities?, available at
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/dreaming-freud/201408/why-are-we-fascinated-celebrities (last
accessed Aug. 15, 2021).
34
Joseph, supra note 24, at 333.
35
Id.
36
Id.
14

Today, the word “paparazzi” and “photographer” are somehow synonymous. The

term “paparazzi'' may trace its roots from the film La Doce Vita where the character,

Paparazzo, collected pictures of celebrities. 37 Thereafter, this behavior was replicated outside

the cinema as the profession quickly took shape. 38 The world of cinema was fast developing

so people became more infatuated with the glamorous Hollywood actors and actresses. As

the public’s interest towards the lives of the celebrities outside of films heightened, so did

their desire to see pictures and news of celebrities’ normal lives which led to the covers of

several papers being plastered with impromptu pictures of celebrities. 39 Such desire is rooted

from the “uncontrollable voyeurism" which created a "visual form of gossip." 40 Readers were

craving more than just text so the rise in consumerism and star culture gave the paparazzi a

lucrative position.

Paparazzi are often described as morally dubious people who make the lives of others

miserable, but, in fact, they are part of a complex web of obsession for celebrity images

which also includes the mass media market, consumers, and celebrities and their publicists.41

The irony was that the paparazzi were taking photos of the glamorous life of

celebrities, but the celebrities would likely argue that paparazzi were anything but glamorous

because they see them as cowardly and willing to do anything to "earn money off celebrities'
37
AnOther, The History of Paparazzi Photographs, Beginning on the Streets of 50s Rome, available at
https://www.anothermag.com/art-photography/11348/history-of-paparazzi-photography-1950s-rome-streets-
exhibition-sophia-loren (last accessed Aug. 6, 2021).
38
Id.
39
Daniel Ganninger, The Origin of the Paparazzi, available at https://medium.com/knowledge-stew/the-origin-
of-the-paparazzi-9ac131d2b740 (last accessed Aug. 5, 2021).
40
Joseph, supra note 24, at 334.
41
Elena Martinique, Paparazzi Photography, From Dolce Vita to Today, available at
https://www.widewalls.ch/magazine/paparazzi-photography-exhibition-vicenza (last accessed Aug. 5, 2021).
15

backs."42 Indeed the paparazzi were reporters but instead of receiving awards for their work

what they were gaining were provocateur recognition such as snapping the most scandalous

shots.43

B. Rise of Social Media

Courts around the world have noted the phenomenon of the rise of social media in

providing immediate, easy access, and widespread dissemination of digitalized content

online.44 In the Philippines, social media has been defined by the Supreme Court as web-

based platforms that enable online interaction and facilitate users to generate and share

content.45 There are various classifications of social media platforms and one can be

classified under the (1) "social networking sites" such as Facebook, (2) blog and microblog

sites (Twitter, Tumblr); (3) content communities sites (YouTube, Instagram); (4)

collaborative projects (Wikipedia); (5) Virtual social worlds (Farmville); and (6) Virtual

game-world (World of Warcraft).46

The beginnings of social media dates back to 1997 when Six Degrees, the first

official social media networking website was launched. 47 The users of the site were able to

42
Joseph, supra note 24, at 334.
43
Id.
44
Leow Wei Xiang Joel, Fair Use on Instagram: Transformative Self-Expressions Or Copyright Infringing
Reproductions, 31 SAcLJ 125 (2019).
45
Belo-Henares V. Guevarra, A.C. No. 11394, (2016) citing Government Social Research, Using social media
for Social research: An introduction, May 2016, available at
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/524750/
GSR_Social_Media_Research_Guidance_-_Using_social_media_for_social_ research.pdf>
46
Id.
47
Kent Anderson, Six Degrees of Facebook, MEDIUM, available at
https://medium.com/@kentanderson_17716/six-degrees-of-facebook-285adb9cdfd2 (last accessed Aug. 15,
16

upload pictures and connect with other users, but it was limited to that alone, so, by 2001 the

site came to an end. However, this led to the birth of other social media platforms such as

Myspace and Friendster and eventually to today’s most popular social media platforms:

Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram.

Ten years ago, social media didn’t play a strong role in anyone’s life. Now, we are a

generation of likes, shares and comments. 48 In each social media platform, users are driven

by the sense of affirmation given by interactions with their posts. 49 The uses of Facebook and

Twitter started off fairly simple: to connect and stay up to date on what your friends are

doing. Today, due to the fast paced technological advancements, these social media platforms

can broadcast live sporting events where users can discuss in real time, users can even post

live videos of what they’re doing in real-time. In the digital age we live in, social media has

become the king of connecting friends, strangers, old colleagues and companies. The chances

of a person or brand being on at least one form of social media is huge.50

The presence and impact of social media in the Philippines today is also undeniable.

In 2020, the Philippines topped the world ranking for time spent using social media for the

sixth year in a row with Filipinos spending an average of 4 hours and 15 minutes each day on

social media which is 22 minutes higher than the previous year’s average of 3 hours and 53

minutes, and 3 minutes higher than 2019’s average of 4 hours and 12 minutes. 51 So, not only

2021).
48
Bridget Meyers, social media: then vs. now, available at https://tcapushnpull.com/social-media-vs-now/ (last
accessed Aug. 15, 2021).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Kyle Chua, PH remains top in social media, internet usage worldwide – report, available at
https://www.rappler.com/technology/internet-culture/hootsuite-we-are-social-2021-philippines-top-social-
media-internet-usage (last accessed Aug. 15, 2021).
17

is the Philippines the top country in terms of social media usage, it appears that there is

reason to expect that such numbers would just keep growing.

There is a rise in participative technology epitomized by the outbreak of social media.

There is a striking difference in the internet landscape ten years ago to the collaborative

content sharing that is encouraged by these platforms today. There is a dramatic shift from

primarily user-generated content to user-found content. Before, the content uploaded online

consisted of independently created photographs and videos. Today, social media sites involve

the process called “linking” which is a way to "encourage users to post content that is not

their own.” Based on these separate user behaviors, scholars conceptualized two different

generations: “user-generated content” (first generation of social media) and “user-found

content” (second generation of social media). Unlike user-generated content, the primary

intention of user-found content-such as resharing of photographs found on the Internet-is to

achieve a cultural flow or start a social conversation. This behavior of copying has been

equated by some scholars to an extension of free speech due to the inherent conversational

nature of content sharing.

C. Social Media and the Celebrity-Paparazzi Relationship

In little more than a decade, the impact of social media has gone from being an

entertaining extra to a fully integrated part of nearly every aspect of daily life for many. 52

This phenomenon gave birth to many developments across different fields. In the realm of

52
Wharton University of Pennsylvania, The Impact of Social Media: Is it Irreplaceable?, available at
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/impact-of-social-media/ (last accessed Aug. 5, 2021).
18

the symbiotic relationship between celebrities and paparazzi, there arose two changes that

have been closely impacted by the rise of social media: citizen paparazzi and copyright

trolling.

Citizen Paparazzi

The collection, dissemination and way of sharing information has drastically changed

due to the onset of the internet, new technologies, social platforms and grass-roots media 53

and this has brought about the concept of citizen journalism which has been defined as the

“journalism that is conducted by people who are not professional journalists but who

disseminate information using Web sites, blogs, and social media.” 54 This is an alternative

form of news gathering and reporting, taking place outside of the traditional media structures

and which can involve anyone.55

What may be considered as a close relative of citizen journalism is what has been

coined as citizen paparazzi. Technological advancements like smartphones and the internet

have made it easier for ordinary people to pick up a camera, stand outside a celebrity’s home

or a place they’re eating at, snap pictures and give it to an agency. 56 Therefore, ordinary

people are now becoming paparazzi.57 Ordinary people, who were at the right place at the

53
Micha Barban Dangerfield, Power to the People: The rise and rise of Citizen Journalism, available at
https://www.tate.org.uk/art/art-terms/p/photojournalism/power-people (last accessed Aug. 13, 2021).
54
Sonny Albarado, Citizen Journalism, available at https://www.britannica.com/topic/citizen-journalism (last
accessed Aug. 13, 2021).
55
Id.
56
Zorianna Kit, "$ellebrity" explores paparazzi influence in fame game, available at
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ellebrity-idUKBRE90A0YK20130111 (last accessed Aug. 13, 2021).
57
Id.
19

right time holding a camera or a smart phone, are part of the changing face of the paparazzi

trade, an Internet-fueled industry that feeds on the public’s seemingly insatiable interest in

entertainment news.58 Photo agencies are increasingly relying on submissions from regular

folk who either happen to bump into celebrities while carrying digital cameras, or who have

injected themselves into the cat-and-mouse game of celebrity snapshots, despite any formal

training.

Copyright Trolling

The dramatic shift from user-generated content to user-found content, as discussed in

the previous section, wherein the practice of “linking” which is a way to "encourage users to

post content that is not their own” is becoming more and more normalized, is making a great

impact on the celebrity-paparazzi relationship and intellectual property law. The second

generation of social media’s ease of accessing and sharing content on the internet collides

with the traditional notions of copyright protection and this gives rise to a majority of the

problems of content users. Consequently, today, there is an emerging trend of copyright

trolling.

“Copyright trolling” takes place when a suit is brought by a paparazzi or

photographer against celebrities who post a paparazzi's picture in social media without first

paying to license the photo.59 It usually involves a photographer who will take a photograph

58
Andrew Lavallee, The Rise Of The Citizen Paparazzi, available at huffpost.com/entry/the-rise-of-the-citizen-
p_n_88537 (last accessed Aug 13, 2021).
59
Joseph, supra note 24, at 331.
20

of a celebrity in a candid moment, such as coming out from a restaurant in New York City,

and such photo will be posted online. The celebrity will then see the photo online and post it

on his or her social media account without asking for the photographer’s permission or

paying for licensing fee first (likely without knowing that he or she needed to do so since it is

a photo of him or her). Upon seeing this, the photographer will file a copyright infringement

suit against the celebrity. Wanting to avoid the time and expense of litigation, most

celebrities then settle with the photographer- sometimes to the tune of several tens, if not

hundreds, of thousands of dollars.60

In order to better illustrate the practice of copyright trolling and the defenses raised by

the opposing parties, a few examples of cases that were previously filed by paparazzi against

celebrities are narrated below.

Odell Beckham Jr.

In October 2017, New York Giants wide receiver Odell Beckham Jr. re-posted two of

the paparazzi photos surreptitiously taken of him returning home with crutches and a walking

boot.61 The photos’ owner, Splash News and Picture Agency, LLC demanded a $40,000

payment for Beckham’s alleged copyright infringement.62

Beckham fought back by filing a complaint for declaratory relief and damages against

Splash News wherein he sought declaratory judgment of non-infringement of Splash's


60
Id.
61
Trevor Maxim, Odell Beckham Jr.’s Copyright Fight with the Paparazzi, available at
https://www.gerardfoxlaw.com/news/thought-leadership/odell-beckham-jrs-copyright-fight-with-the-paparazzi
(last accessed Aug. 15, 2021).
62
Id.
21

purported copyrights, and seeks monetary relief and other damages from Defendants for their

violations of Beckham's right of publicity and right of privacy. 63 He claimed that the

photographer violated his right of publicity and right of privacy by taking photos of him in

his driveway and subsequently selling them to the photo agency without Beckham’s

knowledge or consent.64 He also claimed that the agency’s act of licensing the unauthorized

photos to other websites is in violation of his right of publicity. 65 After a year of back and

forth, the parties settled out of court.

Emily Ratajkowski

In October 2019, Robert O’Neil filed a suit for copyright infringement in New York

Federal Court against model Emily Ratajkowski and her corporate entity Emrata Holdings,

LLC for damages up to $150,000, for all the profits which have been earned by Ratajkowski

by the photographer's work and other unspecified monetary damages.66 In O’Neil’s complaint

he claims that Ratajkowski posted a photograph he took to her Instagram story and that she

had no right to do so. The picture shows Ratajkowski holding a floral bouquet in front of her

face as she walks down a city street.

In her answer, Ratajkowski raised many affirmative defenses. Among them, first, she

claimed invalidity or unenforceability of copyright because the alleged copyrights are invalid

63
Beckham V. Splash News and Picture Agency, LLC et al., 2:18-cv-01001-JTM-JCW (E.D. La. 2018) (US).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
O'Neil v. Ratajkowski et al, 1:19-cv-9769 available at https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/new-
york/nysdce/1:2019cv09769/525048/1/0.pdf?ts=1571974207 (last accessed Aug. 15, 2021).
22

and/or unenforceable, including by reason of lack of originality and lack of copyrightable

subject matter.67 Second, she also raised the Fair-Use doctrine. Third, she also raised the

doctrine of implied consent as a defense wherein she stated that O’Neil impliedly or

explicitly, directly, or indirectly, authorized, licensed, consented to, or acquiesced to

Ratajkowski allegedly infringing use of O’Neil’s copyright. 68 She also raised the affirmative

defense of bad faith on the part of O’Neil because the latter’s counsel is known as a

“Copyright Troll” and have instituted this action in bad faith and to harass her.69

In Ratajkowski’s opposition to O’Neil's cross-motion for summary judgment and

reply in support of Ratajkowski's motion for summary judgment and attorney's fees, she

expounded on the affirmative defenses she raised in her answer. As to the first affirmative

defense, Ratajkowski claimed that the photograph does not have the required “spark of

creativity” required to qualify for copyright protection because O’Neil merely took the

photograph when and where he happened to allegedly inadvertently cross paths with

Ratajkowski, rather than choosing the timing or location of the photograph based on any sort

of creative vision.70

For her second affirmative defense, she said that the use was transformative by

putting a caption “Mood Forever” is clearly a comment on how inappropriate it was for

O'Neil to photograph her (and attempt to license the resulting photograph) when she had

covered her face as a signal that she did not consent to being photographed. As for O’Neil’s
67
O'Neil v. Ratajkowski et al, 1:19-cv-9769-AT available at
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.525048/gov.uscourts.nysd.525048.17.0.pdf (last
accessed Aug. 15, 2021).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
O'Neil v. Ratajkowski et al, 1:19-cv-9769-AT available at https://f.datasrvr.com/fr1/220/85610/rat_opp.pdf
(last accessed Aug. 15, 2021).
23

claim that such was for commercial use, Ratajkowski said that she did not receive any

compensation in connection with the Instagram Stories. Ratajkowski also argued that O'Neil

photograph is subject to only minimal protection, if any, because the Court has explicitly

held that paparazzi images “do not reflect substantial creative expression” and are “further

from the core of copyright protections than creative or fictional works would be”. 71 This is

especially true where, as here “the photographer predominantly captured his subjects in

public, as they naturally appeared.”72 As of date of writing, this case has not been decided

upon nor have the parties settled the case.

Gigi Hadid

Jelena Noura “Gigi” Hadid, an American fashion model, is also no stranger to these

paparazzi-initiated copyright infringement suits.

First, on September 5, 2017, Peter Cepeda, a freelance photographer, filed a

complaint for copyright infringement in the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia against IMG Worldwide, Inc, and Hadid. 73 In his complaint, Cepeda

alleges that in July 2016 he captured a photograph of Hadid in New York then licensed the

copyright photograph to Instar Images for use on The Daily Mail who in turn posted the

photograph on the internet giving credit to Peter Cepeda as the copyright owner.74

Subsequently, Hadid posted this photograph to her Instagram page and posted a link of that

71
Id citing Barcroft, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 354.
72
Id.
73
Cepeda v. Hadid, 1:17-cv-00989-LMB-MSN (E.D. Va. 2017) (US).
74
Id.
24

photograph from her Instagram page and posted it to her Twitter page.75 Several other media

sources copied the photograph from Hadid’s post and credit either her or Instagram for the

photograph. The complaint further alleges that Hadid refused to remove the photographs

even after numerous attempts made by Cepeda asking to remove them. Cepeda alleges he did

not give permission or consent to Hadid to copy or use the photograph. This case was

dismissed.

Second, on January 28, 2019, Xclusive-Lee, Inc., a photographer, also filed a

complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for

copyright infringement and contributory infringement against Hadid.76 Xclusive-Lee, Inc.

alleges that they were the copyright holder of a photograph he took of Hadid and that Hadid

did not have a license or permission to post a cropped version of Xclusive-Lee, Inc’s

photograph to her Instagram account.77

In the Motion to Dismiss filed by Hadid, she used a fair use argument and an implied

license argument. As to the first argument, Hadid argued that “according to Xclusive-Lee’s

complaint, Ms. Hadid merely reposted the photograph to her Instagram page and made no

effort to commercially exploit it. Her reposting thus reflected a personal purpose different

than the photographer’s purpose in taking the photograph, which was to commercially

exploit Ms. Hadid’s popularity.”78 Moreover, the motion read, the shot was nothing but a

friendly photo taken on a city sidewalk – “a factual work, not a creative one, thus favoring a
75
Id.
76
Xclusive-Lee, Inc. v. Hadid, No. 19-CV-520 (PKC) (CLP), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119868 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)
(US).
77
Id.
78
Baker & Hostetler LLP, Gigi Hadid “Obliterates” copyrights with fair-use bazooka, available at
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e162b58c-9e96-4857-8505-5b58042af129 (last accessed Aug.
15, 2021).
25

determination of fair use.”79 As to her second argument, Hadid claimed that when she

voluntarily stopped and posed she enhanced the value of the photo in exchange for

permission to use the image in a manner that does not interfere with the photographer’s

ability to profit from it.80Legally, Hadid was alleging an “implied license,” or an unwritten

contract based on objective conduct, an agreement that would permit a reasonable person to

conclude that a deal had been struck between her and the photographer. 81 To this argument

Xclusive-Lee responds, “Ms. Hadid is as much a joint copyright holder in the Photograph as

the subject of a biography is joint copyright holder to the words used by the author to

describe her life.”82

Unfortunately, this case was dismissed on technical grounds and therefore such

contentions made by Hadid were not decided upon by the court. The court dismissed

Xclusive-Lee, Inc’s complaint for failure to meet the registration requirements established by

the Supreme Court, that copyright registration must be obtained in the work prior to filing a

lawsuit.83 Here, Xclusive-Lee, Inc concedes that an application for copyright was submitted

but had not yet been approved.84 This case was dismissed with prejudice.85

Third, in September 2019, Robert O’Neil, a photographer, filed a complaint in the

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Hadid. 86 O’Neil

79
Id.
80
James Sammataro, Gigi Hadid, Heroine of the Copyright Revolution? (Guest Column), available at
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/gigi-hadid-heroine-copyright-revolution-guest-
column-1226378/ (last accessed Aug. 15, 2021).
81
Id.
82
Sammatro, supra note 80.
83
Xclusive-Lee, No. 19-CV-520 (US).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
O’Neil v. Hadid, 1:19-cv-8522 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (US)
26

alleges he is the copyright holder of a photograph taken of English singer and songwriter,

Zayn Malik.87 Hadid posted this photograph, of her then boyfriend, on her Instagram page. 88

O’Neil asserts he did not give Hadid permission to use the said photograph. This case was

dismissed due to the parties reaching a settlement agreement.89

The above-mentioned cases are only a few of the growing number of paparazzi-

initiated copyright infringement cases against celebrities. It has become so frequent that it has

already been given a name. Unsurprisingly, these cases arose during the years when social

media started to make a greater impact globally, given the fact that the celebrity’s alleged

infringing act is through sharing in social media. In these cases, the plaintiff-photographers

would always bring forth the same case of copyright infringement. While the defendant-

celebrities have put forward different defenses such as: right to privacy, right of publicity,

implied license and fair use. Unfortunately, the courts have dismissed these cases on

procedural grounds without going into the merits, therefore, the questions that arose from the

defenses of both sides are left unanswered.

87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
27

CHAPTER THREE

COPYRIGHT LAWS IN THE PHILIPPINES

In the previous chapter the proponent showed the emerging practice of copyright

trolling wherein the paparazzi would file a copyright infringement suit against the celebrity

who posted in social media a photo of the celebrity taken by the said paparazzi. The main

cause of action involved in copyright trolling is copyright infringement. Therefore, in order

to establish the inherent conflict that is brought about by the cases narrated in the previous

chapter, this chapter will discuss the prevailing laws of copyright in the Philippines.

The 1987 Constitution contains a specific provision that supports the protection of

intellectual property, which provides: “The State shall protect and secure the exclusive rights

of scientists, inventors, artists, and other gifted citizens to their intellectual property and

creations, particularly when beneficial to the people, for such period as may be provided by

law.”90 This particular provision still serves as the backbone for subsequent laws passed by

Congress with regard to intellectual property, particularly our current Intellectual Property

Code. With respect to this provision, as well as Sections 10 to 12 which deals with Science

and Technology, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. has this to say:

While these provisions on science and technology are of little significance


as constitutional law, they are important as an expression of national policy
and concern. They are an admission of the sad state of science and
technology in the country, lagging as the nation is behind other ASEAN
countries, and at the same time an exhortation to the government and to the
nation as a whole to give to science and technology the attention they
deserve.91

90
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, art. XIV, § 13.
91
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY,
1310 (2009 ed.).
28

The Intellectual Property Code is the law that further realized the enunciated policy in

the 1987 Constitution. In the very policy of the law itself, the State recognizes that an

effective intellectual and industrial property system is vital to the development of domestic

and creative activity, facilitates transfer of technology, attracts foreign investments, and

ensures market access for our products.92 To this end, the State shall, through the Intellectual

Property Code, “protect and secure the exclusive rights of scientists, inventors, artists and

other gifted citizens to their intellectual property and creations, particularly when beneficial

to the people, for such periods as provided.”93 The social function of intellectual property was

also recognized therein, consequently, “the State shall promote the diffusion of knowledge

and information for the promotion of national development and progress and the common

good.”94

Being one of the primary sources for this thesis, a complete understanding of the

relevant provisions of this law will be critical to realizing the objectives of this thesis. This

law not only established the Intellectual Property Office but also provided for the regulation

of several intellectual property rights including but not limited to copyright, patent, and

trademark. With respect to copyright, which is the relevant intellectual property right under

consideration, the law provides for a long list of literary and artistic works, which are

“original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment

of their creation.”95

92
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, § 2.
93
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, § 2.
94
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, § 2.
95
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, § 172.
29

Copyright is one of the several intellectual property rights recognized and protected

under the Philippine jurisdiction.96 The goal of copyright law is to balance the interests of

artists, while ensuring that the public has the widest possible access to a diverse variety of

content.97 Copyright encourages artistic creation by ensuring that free-riders do not copy the

authors’ works by providing authors with a limited monopoly over their works since copying

tends to diminish the original author’s potential profit. 98 At the same time, other artists are

encouraged to utilize their own creative efforts rather than resort to copying when creating

their own artistic works.99 Therefore, the ultimate purpose of copyright law is the promotion

of the arts and for public benefit through the widespread dissemination of works.100

Copyright is a right granted by statute to the author of literary, scholarly, or artistic

productions. A non-exhaustive list of subject matter which are commonly made the subject of

copyright law is provided for in Section 172 of the Intellectual Property Code. 101 All such

works are protected by the mere fact of their creation.102

Under the system, protection also extends to derivative works or works which are

dramatizations, translations, adaptations, abridgments, arrangements, and other alterations of

literary or artistic works; or those which serve as mere collections or compilations of literary

96
Barton Keyes, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing Debate Surrounding Conceptual Separability in American
Copyright Law, 69 Ohio State Law Journal 109, at 145 (2008).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §172.
102
Id.
30

or artistic works.103 Such works are treated and protected as new works provided that such

new works do not affect the force of any subsisting copyright upon the original works.104

The rights afforded under the copyright system as provided for in the Intellectual

Property Code may be divided into two classes: economic rights and moral rights. Economic

rights enable creators to obtain remuneration or derive a profit from the use or exploitation of

their works by third parties. In effect, these rights protect the economic investment of the

author in creating the work as well as the fruits of his or her labor. These economic rights

include:

“177.1. Reproduction of the work or substantial portion of the work;


177.2. Dramatization, translation, adaptation, abridgment, arrangement or
other transformation of the work;
177.3. The first public distribution of the original and each copy of the work
by sale or other forms of transfer of ownership;
177.4. Rental of the original or a copy of an audiovisual or cinematographic
work, a work embodied in a sound recording, a computer program,
a compilation of data and other materials or a musical work in
graphic form, irrespective of the ownership of the original or the
copy which is the subject of the rental; (n)
177.5. Public display of the original or a copy of the work;
177.6. Public performance of the work; and”
177.7. Other communication to the public of the work.105”

On the other hand, what is protected under moral rights is the author’s right to be

attributed to his or her own work and the preservation of the work in all its integrity in a way

that he or she intended the work to be. These rights concern the capability of authors to be

attributed to their works rather than the capability of a creator to derive any pecuniary or

103
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §173.
104
Id.
105
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §177.
31

economic benefit from the use by others of his creation. Ultimately, they pertain to the

personal connection between creators and their works. These include the following rights:

“193.1. To require that the authorship of the works be attributed to him, in


particular, the right that his name, as far as practicable, be indicated
in a prominent way on the copies, and in connection with the public
use of his work;
193.2. To make any alterations of his work prior to, or to withhold it from
publication;
193.3. To object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or
other derogatory action in relation to, his work which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation; and
193.4. To restrain the use of his name with respect to any work not of his
own creation or in a distorted version of his work.106”

Under Philippine law, when there is a violation of any of the aforesaid exclusive

economic or moral rights granted to the copyright owner, copyright infringement occurs. 107 In

Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court has emphatically declared:

Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by


the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of
copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the
doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything
the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright.108

Furthermore, aside from the person who directly commits an infringement, others who may

also be liable for copyright infringement are those who benefit from the infringing activity of

another person who commits an infringement if the person benefiting has been given notice

of the infringing activity and has the right and ability to control the activities of the other

106
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §193.
107
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, § 216
108
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110318, [August 28, 1996], 329 PHIL 875-932
32

person and those with knowledge of infringing activity, induce, cause or materially

contribute to the infringing conduct of another.109

Copyright law encourages creativity by assuring creators the opportunity to obtain

financial rewards for their works.110 This is achieved by granting individuals exclusive

economic and moral rights from the moment of creation and generally for a period of 50

years from the individual’s death.111 These exclusive rights afford them protection against

unauthorized use of their creative works. Any violation of the aforesaid rights would

constitute copyright infringement.112

109
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, § 216
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
33

CHAPTER FOUR

RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF PUBLIC FIGURES

In order to establish the conflict between copyright laws, which were thoroughly

discussed in the previous chapter, and the right to privacy of public figures, the latter shall be

explained below, with a discussion on the recognition of the said right in the Philippine

jurisdiction, what constitutes a public figure and the recent developments on the right to

privacy of public figures in foreign jurisdictions.

Right to Privacy

The right to privacy is the “general right to be left alone and to define one’s circle of

intimacy; to shield intimate and personal characteristics and activities from public gaze.” 113 It

is an individual’s right to have his private affairs, which are not of legitimate public concern,

free from unwarranted publication.114

In the Philippines, the 1987 Constitution provides no explicit mention of the right of

privacy, but certain penumbras in the Bill of Rights have allowed for such a right to be

implied by the Supreme Court. In Ople v Torres,115 the Supreme Court presented the

constitutional provisions that recognize the right of privacy, stating that such is expressly

recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights: “The privacy of communication and

113
Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd inpart, rev'd in part,487 F.2d 986 (2nd Cir. 1973)
(US).
114
Ayer, G.R. No. 82380, 82398.
115
Ople v. Torres, 293 SCRA 141, (1998).
34

correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public

safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.” 116 It was also ruled that the right to

privacy is “accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is

fully deserving of constitutional protection.” 117 The Supreme Court also stated that various

provisions of the Bill of Rights also protect the other fronts of the right to privacy, to wit:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due


process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.

Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.118

In fact, the presence of the right of privacy in the Philippines has been recognized as

early as 1968 in the case of Morfe v. Mutuc119 where the Supreme Court stated:

116
Ople, 293 SCRA at 156 citing PHIL. CONST. art. III § 3 (1).
117
Id citing Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, 444 (1968).
118
Id at 156-157 citing PHIL. CONST. art. III § 1, 2, 6, 8, 17).
119
Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. 22 SCRA 424, (1968).
35

The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its


identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive
control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute
state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the
state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of
the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as
modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age —
industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area of
privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and
support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society."120

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. 121 Under the Civil

Code, invasion of privacy may also be a ground for torts that may produce a cause of action

for damages under Article 26 which states that “Every person shall respect the dignity,

personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.” 122 Article 32 of

the Civil Code also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual who directly

or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the

enumerated rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages. 123

Further, Article 723 recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications.124

Penal sanctions may also be imposed upon violation of privacy as provided in the

Revised Penal Code. The Code criminalizes the revelation of secrets by an officer, 125 the

120
Id.
121
Ople, G.R. No. 293 SCRA at 157.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
An Act Revising the Penal Code and Other Penal Laws [REVISED PENAL CODE], Act No. 3815, art. 229
(1932).
36

revelation of trade and industrial secrets,126 and trespass to dwelling. 127 The following special

penal laws also criminalizes violation of privacy: Anti-Wiretapping Law,128 the Secrecy of

Bank Deposits Act129 and the Intellectual Property Code.130 The Rules of Court on privileged

communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.131

Indeed, there is protection provided to the right to privacy by the Philippine laws and

jurisprudence. Therefore, there is strict scrutiny upon actions that may appear legitimate by a

worthy purpose, but which may impair this right.

Public Figure Doctrine in the Philippines

The entitlement of the right to privacy is not equal between private and public

individuals. In the Philippines, celebrities qualify as what has been called by courts as

“public figures”. In Ayer, the Supreme Court adopted the definition of a public figure in an

American textbook on torts. A public figure is someone who has become a public personage

due to his accomplishments, fame, mode of living or profession which gives the public a

legitimate interest in his doings.132 To quote,

A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments,


fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the
public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has
become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be
126
REVISED PENAL CODE, art. 290-292.
127
REVISED PENAL CODE, art. 28.
128
An Act To Prohibit And Penalize Wire Tapping And Other Related Violations Of The Privacy Of
Communication, And For Other Purposes [Anti-Wire Tapping Law], Republic Act No. 4200, (1965).
129
An Act Prohibiting Disclosure Of Or Inquiry Into, Deposits With Any Banking Institution And Providing
Penalty Therefor [Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act], Republic Act No. 1405, (1955).
130
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE
131
Revised Rules on Evidence (Rules 128-134), Bar Matter No. 411, Section 24 Rule 130(C) (1989)
132
Ayer, 160 SCRA at 874.
37

included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by
appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player,
a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes
public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary
soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a
lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public
attention is focused upon him as a person.133 Emphasis supplied.

The Supreme Court in Guingguing v. Court of Appeals134 pointed out one prominent

American legal commentator, Cass Sunstein who explained that a person counts as a public

figure “1) if he is a “public official” in the sense that he works for the government, (2) if,

while not employed by government, he otherwise has pervasive fame or notoriety in the

community, or (3) if he has thrust himself into some particular controversy in order to

influence its resolution.”135 Celebrities may come under the second and third categories.

In connection with these, the Supreme Court in Ayer recognized set a limitation on

the right to privacy of public figures, which has now been coined as the public figure

doctrine, to wit:

[a] limited intrusion into a person’s privacy [is] permissible where that person is
a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be
published about him constitute matters of a public character ...[as] [t]he interest
sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from
“unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and
activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.

xxx

Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to
privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less indiscriminately, in the decisions
that they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so could not complaint when
they received it; that their personalities and their affairs has already public, and could
no longer be regarded as their own private business; and that the press had a
privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become
legitimate matters of public interest. On one or another of these grounds, and

133
Id.
134
Guingguing v. Court of Appeals, 471 SCRA 196, (2005) citing Cass Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem
of Free Speech 9-10 (1995 ed.).
135
Id.
38

sometimes all, it was held that there was no liability when they were given additional
publicity, as to matters legitimately within the scope of the public interest they had
aroused.136

Right to Privacy of Public Figures in Foreign Jurisdictions

Although getting much publicity and an intrusion into their privacy is somehow

expected in the lives of celebrities and other public figure as it comes with the territory of

fame and notoriety, as is implied from the established public figure doctrine, there are still

many public figures who file suits questioning the limits and extent of their right to privacy.

In the US, a notable case of a celebrity successfully restricting the techniques of the

paparazzi through the use of the United States legal system was Galella v Onasis.137 In this

case, an action against Ron Galella was brought by Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis for the

former’s continuous surveillance and intrusion into the lives of the latter and her children. 138

In ruling in favor of Onassis, the court developed the rule that interference by the press in the

privacy of the individual can "be no greater than necessary to protect the overriding public

interest."139 Nordhaus states that the rule stated in Galella can be broken down into a three-

part balancing test that considers the propriety of granting an injunction against the obtrusive

presence of the press.140 First, the court should consider the legitimate public interest in the

information sought.141 Second, the court should consider the individual's right to be let alone-

136
Ayer, G.R. No. 82380, 82398.
137
Galella, 487 F.2d 986.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Jamie E. Nordhaus, Celebrities' Rights to Privacy: How Far Should the Paparazzi be Allowed to Go, 18
REV. LITIG. 285 (1999) citing Id at 310-311.
141
Id.
39

the right of privacy.142 Finally, the court should consider the likelihood of continued

surveillance absent court intervention.143 In this case, the court stated that the need to know

the daily habits of Onassis and her family was not essential to the public’s well-being. Also,

Galella’s constant presence and aggressive techniques interfered with the family’s daily

activities and were endangering them. Finally, it was without question that Galella intended

to continue his pursuit of Onassis which is evidenced by Onassis later filing a suit to enforce

the injunction against Galella's continued violations.

In Europe, one of the prominent cases concerning the privacy of a public person was

the case of Von Hannover v. Germany (No 2).144 From 1993 to 1997, Princess Caroline Von

Hannover, the eldest daughter of Prince Rainier III of Monaco, filed three proceedings in the

Hamburg Regional Court to prevent the republication of three series of photographs which

had been published in various magazines published by two German media companies. The

said photographs were taken without her knowledge and depicted Caroline horseback riding,

having a private dinner with her children or acquaintances, shopping and doing sports.

According to the German courts, Caroline had to accept the consequences of being a part of

the royal family because she was a figure of contemporary society par excellence and a

daughter of a monarch.

Caroline submitted this case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) where

she claimed that the German law infringed on her right to respect for her private and family

life guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention. The ECHR ruled that the German

142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2), no. 40660/08, ECHR (2012) (EU).
40

courts had breached the law as Caroline had not been awarded a sufficient level of protection

to the right of privacy, which is guaranteed to every person. They stated the need for an

examination of the fair balance that has to be struck between the applicants’ right to respect

for their private life and the right of the publishing company to freedom of expression

guaranteed under Article 10 of the Convention. In light of these factors, the ECHR derived

five criteria for balancing private life and freedom of expression in its landmark decision:

1. There needs to be consideration of the degree to which the publication (be it a photo

or an article) contributes to a debate of general interest, which is to be judged on a

case-by-case basis.

2. The status of the person concerned as a private individual or a public figure is also

determinative, since reporting on details of the lives of private individuals is less

likely to contribute to “a debate in a democratic society,” and thus, the press’ role as a

“public watchdog” also diminishes in this case. Even though in certain cases the

public has the right to be informed of “aspects of the private life of public figures,”

the reason for this must be more than mere “public curiosity.”

3. Prior conduct of the person with the press needs to be taken into account.

4. The way of publication of the photo or report as well as the manner of representation

of the person concerned need to form part of the consideration.

5. Whether the photo was taken with the consent of the persons concerned or was done

“without their knowledge or by subterfuge or other illicit means” is to be weighed.


41

The Court reiterated that, in certain circumstances, even where a person is known to

the general public, he or she may rely on a “legitimate expectation” of protection of and

respect for his or her private life. The ECHR further ruled that the publication of a photo may

thus intrude upon a person’s private life even where that person is a public figure. Regarding

photos, citing Reklos and Davourlis v. Greece,145 the Court stated that a person’s image

constitutes one of the chief attributes of his or her personality, as it reveals the person’s

unique characteristics and distinguishes the person from his or her peers. The right to the

protection of one’s image is thus one of the essential components of personal development. It

mainly presupposes the individual’s right to control the use of that image, including the right

to refuse publication thereof and the individual’s right to object to the recording,

conservation and reproduction of the image by another person. As a person’s image is one of

the characteristics attached to his or her personality, its effective protection presupposes

obtaining the consent of the person concerned at the time the picture is taken and not simply

if and when it is published. Otherwise an essential attribute of personality would be retained

in the hands of a third party and the person concerned would have no control over any

subsequent use of the image.

In Campmany Y Diez De Revenga and Lopez-Galiacho Perona v. Spain, 146 the Court

also ruled that the publication of articles and photographs concentrated on the purely private

aspects of the life of those concerned and even though those persons were known to the

public, the reports in issue cannot be regarded as having contributed to a debate on a matter

of general interest to society.


145
Reklos and Davourlis v. Greece, no. 1234/05, (2009) (EU).
146
Campmany Y Diez De Revenga and Lopez-Galiacho Perona v. Spain, no. 54224/00, ECHR (2000) (EU).
42

The right to privacy is the “general right to be left alone”. Although there is no

explicit mention of the right to privacy in the Philippine Constitution, the Supreme Court

recognized it as a constitutional right because it is found in certain penumbras in the Bill of

Rights and is also found in several zones of privacy within different laws including among

others the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code. The entitlement of the right to privacy is

not equal between private and public individuals. In the Philippines, celebrities qualify as

‘public figures’ within the definition adopted by the Supreme Court. As such, the Public

Figure Doctrine which states that “a limited intrusion into a person’s privacy is permissible

where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to

be published about him constitute matters of a public character” is applicable to them.

However, the limits and extent of the Public Figure Doctrine has been tested in courts in

different countries. A notable case is that in Europe wherein the right to privacy of public

figures and the freedom of expression of the press have been balanced and resulted in the

Van Hannover criteria.


43

CHAPTER FIVE

RIGHT OF PUBLICITY OF PUBLIC FIGURES

In the last chapter, right to privacy, one of the rights that conflict with copyright laws

in cases of copyright trolling was discussed. In this chapter, another right that is also in

conflict with copyright laws will be thoroughly discussed. In order to establish the conflict

between copyright laws and the right of publicity, the latter shall be explained below, its

history and its presence in the Philippines.

A. Origin, Evolution and Development of the Right of Publicity in the US

The right of publicity is the right of an individual to prevent others from using his

name, likeness, photograph or image for commercial purposes without obtaining consent. 147

In other words, it prohibits the unauthorized use of elements or indicia that uniquely identify

a person.148 Most of the time, it is characterized as the right to control and profit from the

value of one's own identity or persona.149 The extent of the interest in a celebrity’s public

persona encompasses the "natural copyright" interest in their physical appearance and the

fictitious persona that they may have developed. 150 Therefore, the issue of the right of

publicity is not whether the individual has been unfairly exposed to public view, but rather

147
Stacy Allen, Emilio B. Nicolas & Megan Honey, Non Human Persons and the Right of Publicity, available
at https://www.jw.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/1185.pdf (last accessed Aug. 5, 2021).
148
Id.
149
Nordhaus, supra note 140, at 304.
150
Id.
44

who will profit from the sale. 151 “When a celebrity is involved, the value of that sale can be

quite substantial. If celebrities' rights are not protected, their private and commercial lives are

effectively forced into the public domain, and they lose the right to exercise control over who

profits from the use of their persona.”152

Right of Publicity: Rooted from Right of Privacy

“The principal historical antecedent of the right of publicity is the right of privacy.” 153

The right of publicity is commonly regarded as protection to "injuries to the pocketbook",

whilst the right of privacy protects "injuries to the psyche". 154 The concept of 'right to

privacy' was introduced for the first time by Warren and Brandeis in their essay entitled

“Right to Privacy” which legal scholars hail to be the foundation of privacy law especially in

the U.S.155 In the said essay, privacy was defined as 'right to be let alone', a phrase adopted

from JUDGE COOLEY's famous treatise on torts in 1880.156

Over the next seven decades, William Prosser laid out the four torts that encompassed

the right of privacy: "unreasonable intrusions upon another's seclusion, public disclosure of

private facts, publicity placing another in a false light, and the appropriation for the

151
Id.
152
Id at 304-305 citing D. Scott Gurney, Note, Celebrities and the First Amendment: Broader
Protection Against the UnauthorizedPublicationofPhotographs,61 IND. L.J. 697, 709 (1985/1986).
153
Daniel Gervais & Martin L. Holmes, Fame, Property, and Identity: The Scope and Purpose of the Right of
Publicity, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 181 (2014) citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995).
154
Arvin Kristopher A. Razon, The Celebrity's Right to Autonomous Self-Definition and False Endorsements:
Arguing the Case for a Right of Publicity in the Philippines, 26 CANTERBURY L. REV. 65, 72 (2020).
155
Budhiraja, supra note 30 at 90.
156
Id.
45

defendant's advantage of the plaintiff's name or likeness." 157 The modern day right of

publicity grew out of Prosser's appropriation tort.158

The need for a cause of action that would protect the right of individuals to control

publicity about themselves drove the adoption by courts in the United States of the right to

privacy.159 However, the privacy roots of the early identity appropriation claim had several

implications for celebrities, to wit:

1. The mere publication of their photographs or images was typically not viewed by
courts as an invasion of any privacy interest, because the celebrities had actively
sought out their fame and could not be offended by its furtherance.
2. Second, while a celebrity could sometimes prevail on a theory that the defendant had
falsely suggested her endorsement of its product, courts generally held that the mere
use of the celebrity's image, even in advertising, did not suggest such endorsement.
3. Third, even when celebrities prevailed in privacy cases, their damages were limited
to the personal injury that they suffered, rather than the economic value that the use
brought to the advertiser.
4. Since the right of privacy was a personal right, it ran with the person and could not
be transferred or survive the death of the celebrity.39 These limitations led
celebrities and their advocates to push for a different, more economically oriented
right in their personas.160

Therefore, in 1953, Judge Jerome Frank of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit in New York explicitly recognized for the first time the right of publicity in

Haelan Laboratories Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.161 In the said case, the court ruled:

157
Gervais & Holmes, supra note 153 at 186 citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 46 (1995). See William Prosser, Priva, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
158
Id citing 1J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:25 (2d ed. 2014).
159
Kateryna Moskalenko, The Right of Publicity in the USA, the EU, and Ukraine, 1 International Comparative
Jurisprudence 113 at 240 (2015).
160
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 Stan.
L. REV. 1161 (2006) citing O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941); Smith v. Suratt, 7
Alaska 416, 423 (1926); Corliss, 64 F. at 282; Lane v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 199, 200 (Sup. Ct.
1939); Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1935); Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 1
Ohio Supp. 19, 23 (Com. Pl. 1938); Cf Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 73; Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. App. 1931);
Atkinson v. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285 (Mich. 1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895).
161
Howard I. Berkman, The Right of Publicity--Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOK. L.
REV. 527 (1976) citing 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
46

[i]n addition to and independent of that right of privacy....a man has a right in the
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of
publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be made "in gross," i.e.,
without an accompanying transfer of a business or of anything else.162

Judge Frank coined this right to be "right of publicity" and stated the practical

necessity for its existence:

[I]t is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-
players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for
authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in
newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways. This right of publicity would
usually yield them no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive
grant which barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.163

This ruling recognized that the distinguishing factor of the right of publicity, as opposed to

the right of privacy, is the pecuniary interest protected by it. 164 Haelan Laboratories Inc.

served as a foundation for later cases in which the right of a public figure in the use of his or

her name or likeness was deemed worthy of protection as a property.165 Other states followed

the lead of New York and Judge Frank, recognizing a similar right in the common law or

statutorily. Today, at least thirty-one states recognize the right of publicity in some form.166

Right of Publicity: Placement in the Intellectual Property Law

162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Gervais & Holmes, supra note 153 at 188.
47

The decision made in the 1977 case of Zacchini v Scripps-Howard Broadcasting167 is

considered to have "cemented the right of publicity's break from the right of privacy and its

placement into the intellectual property framework".168

In this case, Zacchini’s 15-second "human cannonball" act, in which he is shot from a

cannon into a net some 200 feet away, was, without his consent, videotaped in its entirety at a

county fair in Ohio by a reporter for respondent broadcasting company and shown on a

television news program later the same day.169 Zacchini then brought a damages action in

state court against respondent, alleging an "unlawful appropriation" of his "professional

property."170 The trial court's summary judgment for respondent was reversed by the Ohio

Court of Appeals on the ground that the complaint stated a cause of action. 171 The Ohio

Supreme Court, while recognizing that petitioner had a cause of action under state law on his

"right to the publicity value of his performance," nevertheless, relying on Time, Inc. v. Hill,

385 U. S. 374, rendered judgment for respondent on the ground that it is constitutionally

privileged to include in its newscasts matters of public interest that would otherwise be

protected by the right of publicity, absent an intent to injure or to appropriate for some

nonprivileged purpose.172

The Supreme Court of the United States in this case turned the right of publicity into

a form of intellectual property, under a distinct moniker, establishing the right of publicity

with a particular view that at that time had not yet been widely considered: that the "State's

167
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (U.S.).
168
Razon, supra note 154 at 83 citing id.
169
Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
48

interest in permitting a right of publicity is in protecting the proprietary interest of the

individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment". 173 The Court explicitly

analogized the right of publicity to patent and copyright laws, and imported the justifications

used for these IP laws, particularly the incentive rationale and the labor-reward rubric, to

justify the state law.174 Instead of focusing on the mental distress that Zacchini might have

suffered, the Court considered the State's interest as analogous to patent and copyright law,

focusing on Zacchini's right to reap the rewards from his economic endeavors. 175 In this

context and, as applied in succeeding cases, the independent right of publicity assures that the

commercial exploitation of an individual's fame properly belongs to the famous individual

concerned.176

The marked shift of the publicity right from its roots in privacy torts to an intellectual

property right can be attributed to the American veneration of intellectual property to foster

innovation and enterprise, extending this idea to the commercialization of a celebrity's

personal attributes.177 The said shift justified a far more expansive right -- one that could

survive death, that was broader in scope, encompassing even the mere evocation of a

person’s identity, and that started from a presumption that uses should be paid for.178

Right of Publicity: A Common Law and Civil Law Concept

173
Jennifer E. Rothman, The Right of Publicity's Intellectual Property Turn, 42 COLUM. J.L. & Arts 277
(2019) citing id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
id.
49

After years of development as can be gleaned from the above laid history of right of

publicity, in the United States today, the right of publicity has now become both a civil law

and common law concept. To this end, the 1992 case of White v Samsung Electronics

America, Inc.179 is instructive.180 In this case, the plaintiff Vanna White is the hostess of

"Wheel of Fortune," one of the most popular game shows in television history. 181 The dispute

in this case arose out of a series of advertisements prepared for Samsung by Deutsch. 182 The

advertisement which prompted the current dispute was for Samsung videocassette recorders

(VCRs).183 The ad depicted a robot, dressed in a wig, gown, and jewelry which Deutsch

consciously selected to resemble White's hair and dress.184 Unlike the other celebrities used in

the campaign, White neither consented to the ads nor was she paid. 185 So, White sued

Samsung and Deutsch in federal district court for infringement of various intellectual

property rights under: (1) California Civil Code § 3344; (2) the California common law right

of publicity; and (3) § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.186

As to White’s first basis, Section 3344(a) of the California Civil Code provides, in

pertinent part, that "[a]ny person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature,

photograph, or likeness, in any manner, ... for purposes of advertising or selling, ... without

such person's prior consent ... shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or

persons injured as a result thereof." In this case, Samsung and Deutsch used a robot with
179
White v Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992) (US).
180
Lolibeth R. Medrano & John Paulo S. Vicencio, Under the Shadows of Trademark: The Current State of
Publicity Rights in the Philippines, 63 ATENEO L.J. 751, 760 (2019).
181
White, 971 F.2d
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
50

mechanical features, and not, for example, a manikin molded to White's precise features. 187

Without deciding for all purposes when a caricature or impressionistic resemblance might

become a "likeness," the court agreed with the district court that the robot at issue here was

not White's "likeness" within the meaning of section 3344. 188 Accordingly, White's claim

under Section 3344(a) of the California Civil Code was dismissed.189

As to White’s second basis, the court cited the case of Eastwood v. Superior Court,

where the California court of appeal stated that the common law right of publicity cause of

action "may be pleaded by alleging (1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the

appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's advantage, commercially or

otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury."190 The court in Eastwood did not

hold that the right of publicity cause of action could be pleaded only by alleging an

appropriation of name or likeness.191 That court held only that the right of publicity cause of

action "may be" pleaded by alleging, inter alia, appropriation of name or likeness, not that the

action may be pleaded only in those terms.192 In Prosser, the court recognized that right of

publicity cases involved one of two basic factual scenarios: name appropriation, and picture

or other likeness appropriation. Since Prosser's early formulation, the case law has borne out

his insight that the right of publicity is not limited to the appropriation of name or likeness. 193

The specific means of appropriation are relevant only for determining whether the defendant

187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
51

has in fact appropriated the plaintiff's identity. 194 The right of publicity does not require that

appropriations of identity be accomplished through particular means to be actionable.195

Although the defendants in these cases avoided the most obvious means of

appropriating the plaintiffs' identities, each of their actions directly implicated the

commercial interests which the right of publicity is designed to protect. 196 Viewed separately,

the individual aspects of the advertisement in the present case say little but viewed together,

they leave little doubt about the celebrity the ad is meant to depict. 197 The female-shaped

robot is wearing a long gown, blond wig, and large jewelry. 198 Vanna White dresses exactly

like this at times, but so do many other women. 199 The robot is in the process of turning a

block letter on a game-board.200 Vanna White dresses like this while turning letters on a

game-board but perhaps similarly attired Scrabble-playing women do this as well. 201 The

robot is standing on what looks to be the Wheel of Fortune game show set. Vanna White

dresses like this, turns letters, and does this on the Wheel of Fortune game show. 202 She is the

only one. Indeed, defendants themselves referred to their ad as the "Vanna White" ad.

Because White has alleged facts showing that Samsung and Deutsch had appropriated her

identity, the district court erred by rejecting, on summary judgment, White's common law

right of publicity claim.203

194
Id,
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
52

As to White’s third basis, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is applicable to this case

which provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny person who shall ... use, in connection with any

goods or services ... any false description or representation ... shall be liable to a civil action

… by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such

false description or designation.”204 To prevail on her Lanham Act claim, White is required to

show that in running the robot ad, Samsung and Deutsch created a likelihood of confusion

over whether White was endorsing Samsung's VCRs. In the case of AMF, Inc. v Sleekcraft,

the factors relevant to a likelihood of confusion include: 1) strength of the plaintiff's mark; 2)

relatedness of the goods; 3) similarity of the marks; 4) evidence of actual confusion; 5)

marketing channels used; 6) likely degree of purchaser care; 7) defendant's intent in selecting

the mark; and 8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines. 205

After measuring White’s claims under each of the factors stated above, the court ruled

that White has raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning a likelihood of confusion as

to her endorsement.206 However, whether White's Lanham Act claim should succeed is a

matter for the jury.207

The above case is only one among a plethora of publicity-related cases in US

jurisprudence.208 This case illustrates the fact that if a publicity right of a plaintiff is violated,

several causes of action are available to him or her. In the US, the plaintiff can file for

infringement of various intellectual property rights and the legal action/s can be based on

204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Medrano & Vicencio, supra note 180, at 762-763.
53

Section 3344 of the California Civil Code, the California common law right of publicity, or

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.209

B. Right of Publicity in the Philippines

There is no law in the Philippines explicitly recognizing the right of publicity. The

development of privacy law, consumer law and intellectual property law in the Philippines

has left out any explicit reference to a right of publicity. However, several legal scholars

contend that indeed the right of privacy is present and recognized in the Philippines.

Medrano & Vicencio in their article “Under the Shadows of Trademark: The Current

State of Publicity Rights in the Philippines” 210 stated that it is safe to conclude that the right

of publicity exists in the country because of the direct recognition of the courts, through their

constant correlation of the right of publicity to the laws and jurisprudence of the U.S. from

which Philippine I.P. laws were adopted.211 Further, it has already been invoked by select

celebrities and institutions to protect their name, image, and likeness from commercial

appropriation without their consent and permission.212 To illustrate, Medrano & Vicencio

cited the case of Fredco Manufacturing Corporation v President and Fellows of Harvard

College (Harvard University).213

209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id at 775.
212
Id.
213
Fredco Manufacturing Corp. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 650 SCRA 232, (2011).
54

In the said case, Fredco Manufacturing Corporation (Fredco) filed before the Bureau

of Legal Affairs (BLA) of the Philippine Intellectual Property Office a Petition for

Cancellation of the Registration issued to Harvard University for the mark “Harvard Veritas

Shield Symbol”. Fredco claimed that Harvard University had no right to register the mark

since its Philippine registration was based on a foreign registration thus, Harvard University

could not have been considered as a prior adopter and user of the mark in the Philippines. 214

Fredco explained that the mark was first used in the Philippines by its predecessor-in-interest

New York Garments as early as 1982, and a certificate of registration was issued in 1988 for

goods.215 Although the registration was cancelled for the non-filing of an affidavit of use, the

fact remained that the registration preceded Harvard University’s use of the subject mark in

the Philippines.216 Harvard University, on the other hand claimed that the name and mark

“Harvard” was adopted in 1639 as the name of Harvard College of Cambridge,

Massachusetts, USA. The marks “Harvard” and “Harvard Veritas Shield Symbol,” had been

used in commerce since 1872, and was registered in more than 50 countries. 217

The BLA ruled in favor of Fredco and ordered the cancellation of Registration No.

56561.218 It found Fredco to be the prior user and adopter of the mark “Harvard” in the

Philippines.219 On appeal, the Office of the Director General of the Intellectual Property

Office reversed the BLA ruling on the ground that more than the use of the trademark in the

Philippines, the applicant must be the owner of the mark sought to be registered. 220 Fredco,
214
Fredco, 650 SCRA at 235.
215
Fredco, 650 SCRA at 236.
216
Id.
217
Fredco, 650 SCRA at 237.
218
Fredco, 650 SCRA at 239.
219
Id.
220
Id.
55

not being the owner of the mark, had no right to register it. The Court Appeals affirmed the

decision of the Office of the Director General.221 Fredco appealed the decision with the

Supreme Court. In its appeal, Fredco insisted that the date of actual use in the Philippines

should prevail on the issue of who had a better right to the mark.222

The Supreme Court in this case ruled in favor of Harvard University stating that

under Philippine law, a trade name of a national of a State that is a party to the Paris

Convention, whether or not the trade name forms part of a trademark, is protected “without

the obligation of filing or registration.”223 “Harvard” is the trade name of the world famous

Harvard University, and it is also a trademark of Harvard University. 224 Under Article 8 of

the Paris Convention, as well as Section 37 of R.A. No. 166, Harvard University is entitled to

protection in the Philippines of its trade name “Harvard” even without registration of such

trade name in the Philippines.225

More significant to the topic of this thesis is the ruling of the Supreme Court

recognizing the existence of the right of publicity in the Philippines, to wit:

Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 166 is identical to Section 2 (a) of the Lanham Act, the
trademark law of the United States. These provisions are intended to protect the
right of publicity of famous individuals and institutions from commercial
exploitation of their goodwill by others. What Fredco has done in using the mark
"Harvard" and the words "Cambridge, Massachusetts," "USA" to evoke a "desirable
aura" to its products is precisely to exploit commercially the goodwill of Harvard
University without the latter's consent. This is a clear violation of Section 4 (a) of
R.A. No. 166. Under Section 17 (c) 22 of R.A. No. 166, such violation is a ground
for cancellation of Fredco's registration of the mark "Harvard" because the
registration was obtained in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 166. 226 Emphasis
supplied.

221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Fredco, 650 SCRA at 248.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Fredco, 650 SCRA at 246.
56

Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 166 has since been amended by Section 123 of the

Intellectual Property Code which is only a verbatim reproduction of the older law.

Comparing the aforesaid laws under the Lanham Act and the Intellectual Property Code

would show that the Philippine law is an exact copy of the US Law:

Lanham Act Intellectual Property Code

15 U.S. Code § 1125 Sec. 169. False Designations of Origin;

(a) Civil action False Description or Representation. -

(1) Any person who, on or in connection 169.1. Any person who, on or in

with any goods or services, or any container connection with any goods or services, or

for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, any container for goods, uses in

name, symbol, or device, or any combination commerce any word, term, name,

thereof, or any false designation of origin, symbol, or device, or any combination

false or misleading description of fact, or thereof, or any false designation of origin,

false or misleading representation of fact, false or misleading description of fact, or

which— false or misleading representation of fact,

which:

(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause

mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, (a) is likely to cause confusion, or to

connection, or association of such person cause mistake, or to deceive as to the


57

with another person, or as to the origin, affiliation, connection, or association of

sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, such person with another person, or as to

services, or commercial activities by another the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his

person, or or her goods, services, or commercial

activities by another person; or

(B) in commercial advertising or promotion,

misrepresents the nature, characteristics, (b) in commercial advertising or

qualities, or geographic origin of his or her promotion, misrepresents the nature,

or another person’s goods, services, or characteristics, qualities, or geographic

commercial activities, shall be liable in a origin of his or her or another person’s

civil action by any person who believes that goods, services, or commercial activities,

he or she is or is likely to be damaged by shall be liable to a civil action for

such act. damages and injunction provided in

Sections 156 and 157 of this Act by any

x x x x227 person who believes that he or she is or

likely to be damaged by such act.

xxxx228

(Sec. 30, R. A. No. 166a)229

227
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1946).
228
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §169.1.
229
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, § 169.
58

Furthermore, Medrano & Vicencio concluded that between the intellectual property

rights of copyright and trademark in the Philippines, the right of publicity has more in

common with the latter.230 They said that the nature and purpose of the right of publicity is

more in line with the nature and objectives of trademark, as opposed to copyright, because

both encompass a certain level of legal protection over the name, image, likeness or mark of

an individual or an institution from unauthorized use and exploitation by third persons.231

They further stated that “In the realm of publicity rights therefore, public figures can be

considered as “brands” in trademark in a way that they embody certain ideals and standards

such that unauthorized use of their names or pictures can affect the way the public perceives

goods, services and themselves.”232

Razon, in his paper entitled “The Celebrity's Right to Autonomous Self-Definition

and False Endorsements: Arguing the Case for a Right of Publicity in the Philippines” argues

that Philippine law offers its own version of the right of publicity: one that may be developed

from privacy tort and intellectual property law.233

As to the Philippines’ version of right of publicity developed from privacy tort, Razon

states that there is an opportunity to argue in the Philippine context that the right to privacy

can protect against false endorsements involving celebrities by going back to the original

conceptualization of privacy that protects all persons without distinguishing whether that

person is a celebrity or actively courts publicity in other ways, and by emphasizing the

230
Medrano & Vicencio, supra note 180, at 771.
231
Id at 772.
232
Id at 774.
233
Razon, supra note 154 at 66.
59

relationship between privacy, liberty and autonomous self-definition, contrary to the various

paths.234

Further, Razon avers that privacy torts may not be the Filipino celebrity's only

remedy in cases of false endorsements, as in other jurisdictions, unfair competition laws are

also a source of remedy.235 In the US, the “"so-called right of publicity is often protected by

less controversial doctrines of false endorsement and unfair competition".236 Razon states that

because of such observation, another remedy a celebrity may avail of to protect his or her

property right in false endorsement cases is unfair competition. He notes the verbatim

identity between Sec. 43(a) of the Lanham Act in the US and Sec. 169.1 of the Intellectual

Property Code in the Philippines. Although the Philippine Supreme Court has not applied Sec

169.1 of the Intellectual Property Code in the context of false endorsement, Razon notes, this

has already reached the Philippine Court of Appeals and has considered a passing off claim

in the context of a false endorsement in the case of Andres Sanchez v Honorable Judge

Ramon Paul Hernando.237 In this case, world-renowned Filipino boxer Emmanuel Pacquiao

initiated a criminal suit for violation of Section 169.1 of the Intellectual Property Code of the

Philippines.238

Pacquiao claimed that two entities, G2K Corporation owned by the petitioners,

publicly misrepresented and unlawfully used his name, image and goodwill without his prior

permission, with the intention of conveying his personal endorsement of the entities’ product
234
Id at 82-83
235
Id.
236
Id at 86-87.
237
Andres Sanchez v. Hon. Ramon Paul L. Hernando, Emmanuel Pacquiao, et al., G.R. S.P. No. 104070, July
7, 2009, available at http://services.ca.judiciary.gov.ph (The case may be downloaded from the Court of
Appeals Case Status Inquiry System) (last accessed Aug. 16, 2021).
238
Id.
60

called the ‘Wow Magic Sing microphone’. G2K and IAJ purchased 3,125 copies of

Pacquiao’s CD album with the plan of giving Pacquiao’s CD album free to customers who

would buy a Wow Magic Sing package as part of its promotion. The trial court denied the

move of Sanchez to quash the case and ruled:

In this Court’s fair and objective opinion, the image rights that pertain to a public
figure are protected in Sec. 169.1 of the Intellectual Property Code. In the United
States of America, the so-called ‘right of publicity’ has been recognized as early as
1953. Under this concept, the utilization of a private person’s name or likeness in
order to advertise a commercial product would be a ground for the issuance of an
injunction and the award of appropriate damages for the invasion of the private
person’s right to be let alone. This resulted in the passage of the Lanham Act
adverted to by the private complainant. Sec. 169.1 of the Intellectual Property
Code mirrors this Lanham Act and thus, as aptly noted by the prosecution,
should apply in our jurisdiction on the basis of the statutory construction
principle of ‘adopted statutes.’ In this light then, the facts charged in the Amended
Information sufficiently allege the offense of violation of Sec. 169.1 of the
Intellectual Property Code.239 Emphasis supplied.

Furthermore, the registration of Pacquiao’s ‘image rights’ as a trademark is not

mandatory as claimed by Sanchez, since Pacquiao is a high-profile celebrity. As his name is

at stake, he has a right to be protected from any unauthorized product endorsement which

would falsely imply that he endorsed or approved certain goods and services.

Among other grounds, the petitioners contended that the trial court gravely abused its

discretion in finding that the private respondent possesses ‘image rights’ which are entitled to

protection under the law on trademarks. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said ruling and

stated that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

239
Id citing Joyce, C., Patry, W., Leaffer, M., Jaszi, P., Copyright Law, 5 th Edition, at 12-13.
61

However, there has been no update on the progress of the case nor on whether the

false endorsement claim under Sec. 169.1 of the IP Code succeeded. 240 But still, despite the

non-precedential nature of its ruling, it provides a glimpse into the national appellate court's

tolerance for recognizing the existence of this right.241

To reiterate, the right of publicity is the right of an individual to prevent others from

using his name, likeness, photograph or image for commercial purposes without obtaining

consent.242 It has its roots from the right of privacy and has evolved to have found itself in the

intellectual property law. Today, it is both a civil law and common law concept in the US. In

the Philippines, the right of publicity has been recognized by the courts and it has been

theorized by legal scholars that it may be found in our intellectual property laws and privacy

laws as well. The right of publicity gives individuals the opportunity to obtain financial

rewards for fame and encourages creative efforts in the pursuit of fame. 243 This is achieved

by granting the individual the right to prevent others from using his name, likeness,

photograph or image for commercial purposes without obtaining consent. 244

240
Razon, supra note 154 at 87.
241
Id.
242
Allen, Nicolas & Honey, supra note 164.
243
Id.
244
Id.
62

CHAPTER SIX

RELEVANT PRINCIPLES IN COPYRIGHT

In the last three chapters, the concepts of copyright, right to privacy of public figures

and right of publicity have already been discussed in order to establish the conflict between

them later in the analysis. In this chapter, the principles that will be used to address the

emerging conflict between these aforesaid rights will be discussed thoroughly.

A. Who owns the copyright

In the case of original literary and artistic works, copyright shall belong to the author

of the work.245 The author of a work is the natural person who has created the work. 246 As can

be gleaned from the definition of an author under the Intellectual Property Code, the law does

not specify what is necessary to be considered to have “created” the work.

There may be more than one author, and such will result in joint authorship. In the

Philippines, the governing law for joint authorship is found in the Intellectual Property Code,

to wit:

178.2. In the case of works of joint authorship, the co-authors shall be the original
owners of the copyright and in the absence of agreement, their rights shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. If, however, a work of joint authorship
consists of parts that can be used separately and the author of each part can be
identified, the author of each part shall be the original owner of the copyright in the
part that he has created;247

245
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §178.1.
246
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §171.
247
f, §178.2
63

However, the Intellectual Property Code does not provide for any definition of works

of joint authorship. The Berne Convention provides little guidance on this matter as well.

While the notion of a “work of joint authorship” is recognized, this is only concerned with

the question of duration of protection when it stated that the provisions of Article 7 of the

same “ shall also apply in the case of a work of joint authorship, provided that the terms

measured from the death of the author shall be calculated from the death of the last surviving

author.”248 Due to the lack of a definition and further jurisprudence surrounding joint

authorship beyond Section 178.2 of the Intellectual Property Code, this thesis will now

present relevant foreign laws , jurisprudence and journals on the topic of joint authorship.

Joint Authorship in the US

In the US, where the Copyright Law of the Philippines is heavily based on, the

concept of joint authorship is an issue of contention among the courts and scholars. The U.S.

Copyright Act states “A "joint work" is a work prepared by two or more authors with the

intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a

unitary whole."249

Even after the passage of the Copyright Act in the US, the concept of joint authorship

remained vague and consequently there arose differences of interpretation among the federal

appellate courts resulting to a development of a substantial split between the courts of

appeals of the United States and substantial confusion among the district courts with respect

248
Berne Convention, art. 7bis.
249
US Copyright Act §101.
64

to the test for determining "joint works" or "coauthorship" under the Copyright Act of

1976.250 The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question of the appropriate test for

joint authorship.251

In Childress v. Taylor252 the Second Circuit came up with two requirements for joint

ownership: (1) that each of the parties contribute an independently copyrightable contribution

and (2) that the parties intended to be joint authors when they were working on their

respective contributions.253

The first requirement is the independently copyrightable element: that each of the

parties contribute an independently copyrightable contribution. In Erickson v. Trinity Theatre

the Second Circuit followed the lead articulated by Professor Paul Goldstein (The Goldstein

Test), to wit: “a collaborative contribution will not produce a joint work, and a contributor

will not obtain a co-ownership interest, unless the contribution represents original expression

that could stand on its own as the subject matter of copyright.” 254 The court further stated that

the reason why they used this test was because it advances creativity in science and art by

allowing for the unhindered exchange of ideas, and protects authorship rights in a consistent

and predictable manner.255 The copyrightability standard allows contributors to avoid post-

contribution disputes concerning authorship, and to protect themselves by contract if it

250
Michael Landau, Joint Works under United States Copyright Law: Judicial Legislation through Statutory
Misinterpretation, 54 IDEA 157 (2014).
251
Seth F. Gorman, Who Owns The Movies? Joint Authorship under the Copyright Act of 1976 after Childress
v. Taylor and Thomson v. Larson, UCLA Entertainment Law Review, 7(1) (1999).
252
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (1991) (US).
253
Id.
254
Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994) (US).
255
Id.
65

appears that they would not enjoy the benefits accorded to authors of joint works under the

Act.256

In Erickson, the court also discussed the lead articulated by the late professor Melville

Nimmer (The Nimmer Test) that each contributor must make more than a de minimis

contribution and requires that only the combined product of joint efforts must be

copyrightable as opposed to Professor Goldstein's copyrightability test which requires that

each author's contribution be copyrightable.257 The Nimmer Test was rejected in Erickson

because, according to the court, it is not consistent with one of the Copyright Act's premises:

ideas and concepts standing alone should not receive protection. Because the creative process

necessarily involves the development of existing concepts into new forms, any restriction on

the free exchange of ideas stifles creativity to some extent.

However, such rejection of the Nimmer Test has been heavily criticized by

commentators due to the fact that a numerous amount of authorship is essentially

collaborative therefore commentators are questioning whether any individual deserves

monopoly rights in a work that draws its inspiration from many sources. 258 Furthemore, it has

been argued that Nimmer’s view is more aligned with both the purposes of the Copyright Act

and the Congress’s legislative intent. 259 Looking at the House Report on revisions to the

256
Id.
257
Id.
258
Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the Rights of Joint
Authors, 50 EMORY L. J. 193 (2001) citing Margaret Chon, Symposium Innovation and the Information
Environment: New Wine Bursting From Old Bottles: Collaborative Internet Art,Joint Works, and
Entrepreneurship,75 OR. L. REV. 257,264-72 (1996); Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence Of Benefits:
The Norms of Copyright And The ProblemofPrivateCensorship,57 U. CHmL.. REV. 1009, 1028-32 (1990);
Jaszi, supra note 14, at 295; Jessica Litman, The PublicDomain,39 EMORY L.J. 965,1007-11 (1990); Martha
voodmansee, On theAuthorEffect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279, 289-91
(1992).
259
Id at 210.
66

Copyright Act, different definitions for “joint work” and “collective work.” were purposely

provided by Congress.260 Section 101 defines “collective work” as one “in which a number of

contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into

a collective whole.”261 The House Report states:

A work is “joint” if the authors collaborated with each other, or if each of the authors
prepared his or her contribution with the knowledge and intention that it would be
merged with the contributions of other authors as “inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole.” The touchstone here is the intention, at the time the
writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or combined into an integrated unit,
although the parts themselves may be either “inseparable” (as the case of a
novel or painting) or “interdependent” (as in the case of a motion picture,
opera, or the words and music of a song). The definition of “joint work” is to be
contrasted with the definition of “collective work,” also in section 101, in which the
elements of merger and unity are lacking; there the key elements are assemblage or
gathering of “separate and independent works . . . into a collective whole. 262
Emphasis supplied

Therefore, it appears that Congress intended for the analysis of joint authorship to

focus primarily on the process and intent of the work and was not particularly concerned with

the ability of each contribution to be independently copyrightable. 263 There were even

attempts in 1987 and 1989 to amend the "joint work" provision in Section 101 of the

Copyright Act to include the requirement of "independent copyrightability" for each author's

contribution. However, the bill never passed, therefore the Congress, through the language of

the statute, is telling us that "independent copyrightability" is not the standard.264

In fact, in Gaiman v McFarlane the Seventh Circuit ruled, contrary to precedent and

consistent with the Nimmer Test, that even if the portion provided by the contributor would

260
Id.
261
The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101
262
Bregenzer, supra note 13, 469-470 citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 120 (1976).
263
Id.
264
Landau, supra note 250 at 213.
67

not be independently copyrightable he or she can still be considered a joint author. 265

According to Judge Posner, if at least two people labored to create a single, copyrightable

work, then it would be “paradoxical” if no one can claim copyright in a situation where

though the result of their joint labors had more than enough originality and creativity to be

copyrightable.266 He further stated that the decisions that ruled that the independently

copyrightable contribution is necessary to a joint work “weren't thinking of the case in which

it couldn't stand alone because of the nature of the particular creative process that had

produced it.”267

The second requirement in the Childress case is the intent element: that the parties

intended to be joint authors when they were working on their respective contributions. In

addition to the intent to create a unitary, inseparable whole, in order for a work to obtain joint

ownership status, each contributor must also intend to be a joint author. To satisfy the

definition, both putative co-authors must have possessed the requisite intent to merge their

contributions at the time they created those contributions. 268 This timing factor distinguishes

joint works from derivative works, in which one contributor incorporates some or all of

another's pre-existing work into a new and different work. 269 In addition to the intent to create

a unitary, inseparable whole, in order for a work to obtain joint ownership status, each

contributor must also intend to be a joint author.270

265
Teresa Huang, Gaiman v. McFarlane: The Right Step in Determining Joint Authorship for Copyrighted
Material, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 673 (2005) citing Gaiman v. McFarlane - 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004)
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944), modified, 140
F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1944); Eckert v. Hurley Chicago Co., 638 F. Supp 699, 702 (N.D. il1986) (US).
269
Gilliam v. American Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1976) (US).
270
Childress
68

In Aalmuhammed v. Lee271 the Ninth Circuit embraced an even more stringent

analysis for joint authorship. Here, the court stated that a person claiming to be an author of a

joint work must prove that both parties intended each other to be joint authors and therefore

necessitating mutual intent to be joint authors.272 In the absence of contract, several factors

may be considered, including who “superintends” the work by exercising control or the

“inventive or master mind” who gives effect to the idea, the objective manifestations of

shared intent to be co-authors, and the fact that the share of each in the work’s success cannot

be appraised. Control in many cases will be the most important factor. 273 Authorship,

according to the court in this case, is not the same thing as making a valuable and

copyrightable contribution.274

Same as the first element, the strict application of the intent element, that is

necessitating mutual intent to be joint authors as opposed to just an intent to merge their

contributions at the time they created those contributions, has also been heavily criticized in

the context of contemporary media. 275 It has been argued by some commentators that the

criticized approach is unrealistic and not aligned with the Congress’s determination that the

economic incentives created by copyright law encourage creativity and innovation. 276 Mary

LaFrance in her journal “Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving

the Rights of Joint Authors” argues that neither the text nor the legislative history requires

that contributors must have mutual intent to be joint authors. 277 Congress intended to limit
271
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1999) (US).
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
Bregenzer, supra note 13 at 466.
276
Id.
277
LaFrance, supra note 258g
69

“joint work” to works where the contributor’s desire to have his or her efforts contribute to a

single end could be evidenced at the time of the creation. 278 The House Report attempted to

add some further clarity to the timeliness of the intent element:

Although a novelist, playwright, or songwriter may write a work with the hope or
expectation that it will be used in a motion picture, this is clearly a case of separate
or independent authorship rather than one where the basic intention was behind the
writing of the work for motion picture use.279

LaFrance argued that the courts deviated from the objective of the 1976 joint work

provisions to “encourage creation and dissemination of original expression that will

ultimately enrich the public domain” when they adopted a test of joint work intent which

instead of focusing on “each party's intent with respect to the creative work itself” focused

more on “the intended or perceived relationship between putative co-authors.” 280 The strict

application of the intent element deprives persons who make significant creative

contributions to a work of authorship rights and consequently, absent authorship rights, or the

potential for economic gain, the Act deprives these artists with either monetary or legal

incentive to continue making creative contributions.281 Also, this is difficult to apply in

practice because the necessity to assess the subjective intent of the putative joint authors

would significantly increase the trial court’s fact-finding burden.282 Finally LaFrance states

that “Greater complexity in the definition of authorship reduces rather than enhances the

economic incentive to produce works of authorship.”283

at 166-167.
278
Id.
279
Id citing H.R. REP. NO. 1476, at 120.
280
Id at 255.
281
Id.
282
Id.
283
Id at 262.
70

Furthermore, Michael Landau in his note “Joint Works under United States Copyright

Law: Judicial Legislation through Statutory Misinterpretation” argues that the courts in

ruling for the necessity of “mutual intent to the joint authors” failed to address the rights of

collaborators who make copyrightable contributions in the absence of intent. 284 Same as

LaFrance, he states that it fosters additional litigation in order to determine exactly what the

copyrightable contributions are.285

To summarize the current landscape of joint authorship in the US courts, there are

two elements that the US courts look at in order to determine the presence of joint

authorship: contribution and intent. Under the first element of contribution, two tests are

being used by different courts: the Nimmer Test and the Goldstein Test. The Nimmer Test

states that each contributor must make more than a de minimis contribution and requires that

only the combined product of joint efforts must be copyrightable as opposed to the Goldstein

Test which requires that each author's contribution be independently copyrightable. Majority

of the courts use the Goldstein Test while there have been examples of courts that have

recently used the Nimmer Test. Furthermore, scholars have argued that the Goldstein Test is

inconsistent with the legislative intent and the purpose of the Copyright Act and is therefore

judicial legislation. Under the second element of intent, the courts have developed a rigid test

in which putative co-authors must have possessed the requisite mutual intent to be joint

authors at the time they created those contributions. However, this has also been criticized by

scholars because it is unrealistic, it discourages collaborations which is contrary to the

284
Landau, supra note 250 at 218.
285
Id.
71

Copyright Act’s purpose, and it finds no legal basis in the text of the provision nor its

legislative history.

Joint Authorship in the UK

In the United Kingdom, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 states that “a

"work of joint authorship" means a work produced by the collaboration of two or more

authors in which the contribution of each author is not distinct from that of the other author

or authors.”286 This has been called the joint authorship test. The case law on this matter has

been vague and tended to “employ brief, opaque or superficial reasoning.” 287 However, the

recent landmark case of Kogan v Martin has provided some clarity to the uncertainties

surrounding joint authorship in the UK.288

In Kogan, an Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC) decision was overturned

by the UK Court of Appeals wherein the latter identified a new test for determination of the

sufficiency of contribution in order to be considered a joint author of a copyright work. What

is involved in this case is a dispute over the screenplay authorship for the film “Florence

Foster Jenkins” wherein Mr. Martin, a screenwriter, brought proceedings against his former

partner, Ms. Kogan, in order to obtain a declaration that he was the sole author of the

Florence Foster Jenkins screenplay. Ms. Kogan claimed that she contributed to the main

character development and to the work as a whole through editing, criticism and support and

therefore must be considered a joint author. The IPEC held that Mr. Martin was the “ultimate

286
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988
287
Daniela Simone, Kogan v Martin: A New Framework for Joint Authorship in Copyright Law, 83 Mod. L.
Rev. 877 (2020).
288
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2019/1645.html
72

arbiter” and the sole author of the work while Ms. Kogan’s contribution was not decisive to

the screenplay.

However, the Court of Appeals, using a new joint authorship framework it has

identified, overturned the IPEC decision and stated that Ms. Kogan’s work on the screenplay

could be sufficient to fulfil all the joint ownership elements, to wit: collaboration, authorship,

contribution and non-distinctness contribution.

According to the framework, the starting point for the application of the joint

authorship test is the requirement for collaboration. In order to meet this requirement, the

work must be created by a collaboration of all the people who created it. Collaboration is

only possible for work with a common design as to its general outline, where collaborators

share the labour of working it out. However, collaboration must be more than editorial

corrections, critique or ad hoc suggestions of phrases or ideas. In order to determine whether

there is collaboration present one must look beyond asking "who did the writing?" because

authors can collaborate to create a work in many different ways. According to the Court of

Appeal, the requirement of collaboration’s main purpose is to distinguish a joint work from a

derivative work. In instances involving derivative works, a secondary author adapts a pre-

existing work in the absence of collaboration with the first author, thus, if there is evidence

showing that such derivative work has sufficient originality it may be separately protected if

the changes evidence sufficient originality. In contrast, in instances where collaboration is

present, the resulting work is jointly authored and copyright in it shared.

The second element is joint authorship wherein joint authors must have contributed a

significant amount of the skill and contributions must be “authorial”, which depends on the
73

nature of the copyright work in question. The focus should be shifted away from who pushed

the pen otherwise it will detract attention from what it is that is protected, and thus from who

the authors are. The court further stated that “we do not think that an inquiry into who

accepts responsibility for the form of expression in the work is a helpful concept, particularly

in a collaborative work.” The statutory test does not go any further than asking who

contributed to the creation of the work. The statutory concept of an author includes all those

who created, selected or gathered together the detailed concepts or emotions which the words

have fixed in writing.

As to the third element of contribution, in order to determine what is enough of a

contribution, the Infopaq test shall be applied: whether the putative joint author has

contributed elements which expressed that person's own intellectual creation. The crux of the

matter is that the putative author must have exercised free and expressive choices that reflect

his or her personality and imprint in the work his or her ‘personal touch’. The more

restrictive the choices the less likely it will be that they satisfy the test. A test that does not

coincide with the IPEC distinction between primary and secondary skills, which, according

to the Court of Appeal, has no basis either in the law or in the jurisprudence and implies that

less weight is to be given to conceptual contribution than to written words, when both are

essential components of a work.

The last element is the non-distinctness contribution which means that the

contribution must not be capable of being separated. The Court of Appeal stated that joint

authorship should not be prevented just because one contributor has the final say but it may
74

affect the proportion of ownership. Therefore, it is not necessary that the shares of the joint

authors be equal.

The Court of Appeal stated that there is no further requirement that the authors must

have subjectively intended to create a work of joint authorship. Citing the case of

Beckingham v Hodgens, the court in Kogan stated that such an element, as used in other

jurisdictions, is “policy driven, and was arrived at despite and not because of the language of

the US statute.”

To summarize, the joint authorship test in the UK has four elements: collaboration,

authorship, contribution and non-distinctiveness. In order to meet this requirement, the work

must be created by a collaboration of all the people who created a work with a common

design as to its general outline, where collaborators share the labor of working it out.

However, collaboration must be more than editorial corrections, critique or ad hoc

suggestions of phrases or ideas. The second element is joint authorship wherein joint authors

must have contributed a significant amount of the skill and contributions must be “authorial”,

which depends on the nature of the copyright work in question. The third element is

contribution, wherein the Infopaq test shall be applied: whether the putative joint author has

contributed elements which expressed that person's own intellectual creation. The last

element is the non-distinctness contribution which means that the contribution must not be

capable of being separated. Finally, there is no further requirement that the authors must have

subjectively intended to create a work of joint authorship.

B. Fair Use Doctrine


75

The fair-use doctrine is a defense that allows a court to steer clear from the stringent

application of the Copyright Act when such application would stifle the very creativity the

law was designed to foster.289 “In effect, the doctrine creates a limited privilege for those

other than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner

without the owner’s consent.”290 The fair use doctrine is “intended to further copyright’s

utilitarian goals of encouraging creative acts by letting third parties make use of copyrighted

works in limited circumstances.”291

In the Philippines, there is fair use and therefore no copyright infringement if the

copyrighted work is used for criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching including limited

number of copies for classroom use, scholarship, research, and similar purposes. 292 In

determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is fair use, four factors

shall be taken into consideration: a) The purpose and character of the use, including whether

such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; b) The nature of

the copyrighted work; c) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the

copyrighted work as a whole; and d) The effect of the use upon the potential market for or

value of the copyrighted work.293 Due to the consideration of the aforesaid four factors, the

application of the fair use doctrine is on a case-to-case basis and fact-specific. 294 There is no

289
Rivera v. Mendez & Compania, 988 F.Supp.2d 159, 169 (D.P.R. 2013) (US).
290
Id.
291
Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (US).
292
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §185
293
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §185
294
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2nd Cir. 2006) (US).
76

black or white test for its application. Each case is to be assessed on its peculiarities because

protected works may take on various forms.

The first factor scrutinizes the purpose and character of the use, and specifically

points at the presence of any monetary gain. 295 The overall purpose of the first factor is to

determine if the new work was “transformative” meaning whether it adds something new to

the original piece.296 Further, the statute states that a court may look at the commercial or

educational use of the recreation to determine what the character and purpose of the new

work entails.297 It must be noted that the statute used the word “including”, which implies that

the commercial or educational use of the recreation is not dispositive in nature, instead, it is

only meant to aid a court's understanding of the purpose.298

The second factor analyzes "the nature of the copyrighted work." 299 The courts have

stated that "the scope of fair use is greater with respect to factual than non-factual works." 300

This is most likely due to the fact that more creativity is being used to design non-factual

works as opposed to factual based works because an author may be able to better signify

emotional or artistic elements in a non-factual piece owing to the fact that an author may be

able to better signify emotional or artistic elements in a non-factual piece. 301 Courts have

steered away from copyrighting facts because copyright is meant to protect creativity and

innovation.302 For those involving unpublished work, the scope of fair use is also narrower,

295
Joseph, supra note 24 at 340.
296
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (US).
297
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §185
298
Joseph, supra note 24 at 340.
299
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §185
300
Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. v. Bloomberg, 756 F.3d 73, 89 (2nd Cir. 2014) (US).
301
Joseph, supra note 24 at 341.
302
Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 1290 (1991) (US).
77

therefore, works that have already been published, and thus where the "first appearance" of

the artist's expression has already occurred, are more likely to qualify as fair use.303

The third factor examines "the amount and substantiality" of the original copyrighted

work compared to the user's recreation of the work. For this factor, "the question is whether

‘the quantity and value of the materials used,' are reasonable in relation to the purpose of the

copying."'304 The copying may be more likely to be excused as fair use if the alleged infringer

takes less. But, if the junior user took “the heart” of the original work, the copying may not

be excused as fair use.305 However, this rule—less is more—is not necessarily true in parody

cases.306 A parodist is permitted to borrow quite a bit, even the heart of the original work, in

order to conjure up the original work. That’s because, as the Supreme Court has

acknowledged, “the heart is also what most readily conjures up the [original] for parody, and

it is the heart at which parody takes aim.” 307 Furthermore, it has been argued that in the

context of works of visual arts, like photographs, the third factor should not be taken into

consideration due to the required greater “amount and substantiality” from its use because

unlike other works, photographs cannot be summarized, paraphrased, described or quoted

from.308 Therefore, much weight should be placed on the other factors when analyzing

photographs, Stephen Weil argues.309

303
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (US).
304
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 257 (2nd Cir. 2006) (US).
305
Measuring Fair Use: The Four Factors, STANFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES, available at
https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/four-factors/#the_nature_of_the_copyrighted_work (last accessed
Aug. 5, 2021).
306
Id.
307
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (US).
308
Philip Ewing, “Influencing” Copyright Law: “Re-Evaluating the RIghts of Photographic Subjects in the
Instagram Age, 17 OHIO St. TECH. L. J. 321, 350 (2021).
309
Id.
78

Finally, a court will determine the effect of the use on the market. Here, the court

essentially measures the competition between the new work and the original work. Further, a

court compares "the benefit that the public will derive if the use is permitted and the personal

gain that the copyright owner will receive if the use is denied." 310 The ultimate question is

whether the infringer's conduct will harm the original copyright holder, thus, a copyright

owner has the ability to prove this factor by showing he received some form of economic

harm.311

In applying the four-factor test, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that “the fourth

consideration which is the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the

copyrighted work represents fair use’s most important element.” 312 As explained by Schuster

II, this fourth element is one of the primary considerations because “it touches most closely

upon the author’s ability to capture the fruits of his labor and hence his incentive to create.”313

In some cases, the fair use analysis is dispensed with when the amount of material

copied is so small (or “de minimis”). 314 For example, in the motion picture Seven, several

copyrighted photographs appeared in the film, prompting the copyright owner of the

photographs to sue the producer of the movie.315 The court held that the photos “appear

fleetingly and are obscured, severely out of focus, and virtually unidentifiable.” The court

excused the use of the photographs as “de minimis” and didn’t require a fair use analysis.316
310
Richard Stim, Fair use: The Four Factors Courts Consider in a Copyright Infringement Case, NOLO,
available at https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/fair-use-the-four-factors.html (last accessed Aug. 5,
2021).
311
Id.
312
Id (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (U.S.)).
313
Id (citing Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2003) (U.S.)).
314
Supra at xxx
315
Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 1998) (US).
316
Id.
79

In the Philippine context, our very own Intellectual Property Code has patterned its

provisions after that of the U.S. and the fair use doctrine was one of these provisions. Thus, it

may be safe to say that the application of the fair use doctrine must still be on a case-to-case

basis if a copyright infringement claim is brought under our jurisdiction.

Under Copyright Laws, the owner of a copyright is the author: the natural person who

has created the work.317 Due to the lack of any parameters as to who may constitute as an

author in the Intellectual Property Code and the Philippine jurisprudence, much weight is

given to US jurisprudence from which the Philippine Copyright laws is heavily based on.

Ultimately, there are two requirements for joint ownership: the contribution and the intent.

However, a substantial split between the courts of appeals of the United States and

substantial confusion among the district courts has developed with respect to the test for

determining "joint works" or "coauthorship" and the Supreme Court has not directly

addressed the question of the appropriate test for joint authorship.318

On the other hand, there is fair use if the copyrighted work is used for criticism,

comment, news reporting, teaching including limited number of copies for classroom use,

scholarship, research, and similar purposes.319 In determining whether the use made of a work

in any particular case is fair use, four factors shall be taken into consideration: a) The

purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is

for non-profit educational purposes; b) The nature of the copyrighted work; c) The amount

317
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §171.
318
Gorman, supra note 251.
319
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §185
80

and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and d)

The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.320

320
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §185
81

CHAPTER SEVEN

LEGAL ANALYSIS

This Thesis began by painting a picture of the emerging practice of copyright trolling

with a narration of some notable cases that have been filed by paparazzi in the US and the

defenses used by the celebrities. To reiterate, copyright trolling takes place when a suit is

brought by a paparazzi or photographer against celebrities who post a paparazzi's picture in

social media without first paying to license the photo or without the paparazzi’s consent. 321

The numerous paparazzi-initiated copyright infringement suits against celebrities have

brought forth the dilemma of opposing rights: the photographer’s copyright vis-a-vis the

celebrity’s right to privacy and the photographer’s copyright vis-a-vis the celebrity’s right of

publicity. The proponent will now examine these opposing rights based on the information

laid down in the previous chapters.

Philippine Context

In the Philippines, there has not been a known case of copyright trolling nor has such

a case reached the Supreme Court. Also, there are no rules set out in any law squarely

addressing the said matter. Therefore, much reliance has been placed on foreign

jurisprudence and journals.

321
Joseph, supra note at xxx, at 331
82

However, this lack of Philippine jurisprudence does not mean that there is no problem

to be addressed. In the country whose people have the highest social media usage in the

world and where the culture of “chismis” or gossip is prevalent, it is safe to assume that such

practice or something similar will find its way to Philippine soil. This issue has also become

more pressing considering the rise of the citizen paparazzi, wherein the term paparazzi is no

longer limited to the traditional notions of being just photographers who follow famous

people around, hoping to take interesting or shocking photographs of them so that they can

sell them to a newspaper. Today, due to technological advancements and social media almost

anyone who has a smartphone, or any type of camera can become paparazzi. For instance,

there was the infamous incident when Ellen Adarna took a photo of a normal citizen who was

allegedly taking a photo of Adarna using her smartphone, to which Adarna stated “When you

PAP us, we PAP you.”

The concept of celebrities and the way they interact with their fans in the Philippines

is also in line with the current practice in the US where copyright trolling is prevalent and is

also a reflection of the social media age. Today, celebrities are not confined to those who are

only seen in television and movies, famous personalities that came about online like in

youtube, twitter, tiktok or instagram are also deemed celebrities. Furthermore, these

celebrities, just like in the US, also heavily rely on social media in order to interact with their

fans and to build their image, likeness and fame in general. Therefore, a careful examination

of the conflicting rights of the photographer and the celebrity must now be analyzed.

No Copyright Protection if Right to Privacy is Violated


83

The right to privacy, although absent explicit provision in the Bill of Rights in the

1987 Constitution has been recognized by the Supreme Court to be present in the Philippine

jurisdiction as found in various sections in the Constitution, Civil Code of the Philippines and

the Revised Penal Code. There has been a line that was drawn as to the entitlement to such

right between private individuals and public figures, as evinced in the Public Figure

Doctrine. Under the definition of public figures adopted by the Supreme Court, celebrities

are considered to be public figures. As such, and in accordance with the Public Figure

Doctrine, limited intrusion into the private lives of celebrities is permissible as long as the

information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of

a public character.

However, this does not equate to the public having unlimited access to the lives of

public figures. The Public Figure Doctrine is not a wielding sword that can be cast

unwittingly by any person, including the paparazzi, to invade the privacy of public figures

without limitations. In this regard, the criteria set forth in Van Hannover balancing the right

of privacy of public figures and the freedom of expression of the paparazzi (the “Van

Hannover Criteria”) is instructive, to wit:

1. There needs to be consideration of the degree to which the publication (be it a photo

or an article) contributes to a debate of general interest, which is to be judged on a

case-by-case basis.

2. The status of the person concerned as a private individual or a public figure is also

determinative, since reporting on details of the lives of private individuals is less


84

likely to contribute to “a debate in a democratic society,” and thus, the press’ role as a

“public watchdog” also diminishes in this case. Even though in certain cases the

public has the right to be informed of “aspects of the private life of public figures,”

the reason for this must be more than mere “public curiosity.”

3. Prior conduct of the person with the press needs to be taken into account.

4. The way of publication of the photo or report as well as the manner of representation

of the person concerned need to form part of the consideration.

5. Whether the photo was taken with the consent of the persons concerned or was done

“without their knowledge or by subterfuge or other illicit means” is to be weighed.

Furthermore, photographs concentrated on the purely private aspects of the life of public

figures cannot be regarded as having contributed to a debate on a matter of general interest to

society. It has also been recognized that a person’s image is one of the characteristics

attached to his or her personality, its effective protection presupposes obtaining the consent

of the person concerned at the time the picture is taken otherwise an essential attribute of

personality would be retained in the hands of a third party and the person concerned would

have no control over any subsequent use of the image.

Under the Van Hannover criteria the freedom of expression has already been

balanced and considered, therefore, what is left to be tested is the celebrity’s right to privacy

and the photographer’s copyright. In Ople, the Supreme Court ruled that the right of privacy

is a constitutional right found in various provisions in the Bill of Rights. 322 On the other hand,

copyright is granted to the author of a work by the Intellectual Property Code. In this regard,

322
Ople
85

a right granted by a statute must yield if it is found that it does not pass constitutional muster

for violating a constitutional right to privacy.

Article 17 of the Berne Convention provides that Berne’s provisions do not affect

members’ rights “to control, or to prohibit, by legislation or regulation, the circulation,

presentation, or exhibition of any work or production in regard to which the competent

authority may find it necessary to exercise that right.” 323 Therefore, Article 17 allows

governments to take steps to prevent the circulation or exhibition of works that are

considered, for example, offensive to national standards of public policy or morality.324

In the case of Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd,325 Wright, who was

previously a British intelligence officer, wrote and published worldwide a book called

Spycatcher about the secret workings of British intelligence agencies, consequently, breaking

Wright’s contractual obligation of loyalty to the U.K. Government and the Official Secrets

Act 1911 (U.K.). An injunction was sought by the U.K. Government against some British

newspapers for participating in Wright’s breach of confidence by publishing, or threatening

to publish, extracts from the book. Due to the fact that the injunction could no longer avert

the publication of secrets that had by then spread widely around the globe, this order was

refused. However, a suggestion made by the judges hearing the case is that if Wright did

retain his copyright, neither he nor anybody claiming under it could enforce the copyright in

a U.K. court because of his illegal acts. Lord Jauncey stated “The publication of Spycatcher

was against the public interest and was in breach of the duty of confidence which Peter

323
Berne Convention
324
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/844/wipo_pub_844.pdf
325
Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1990] A.C. 109 (U.K., House of Lords)
86

Wright owed to the Crown. His action reeked of turpitude. It is in these circumstances

inconceivable that a United Kingdom court would afford to him or his publishers any

protection in relation to any copyright which either of them may possess in the book.”

Furthermore, in the case of Hyde Park Residence Ltd v. Yelland, 326 Lord Justice

Aldous stated that in his view, a court would be entitled to refuse to enforce copyright if the

work is: “(i) immoral, scandalous or contrary to family life; (ii) injurious to public life, public

health and safety or the administration of justice; (iii) incites or encourages others to act in a

way referred to in (ii).”

Therefore, if the photographs of the public figures taken by the paparazzi have not

passed the Van Hannover criteria, in light of the celebrity’s right to privacy being violated,

the photographs should not be given copyright protection. It is within the powers of the

government, including the courts, granted by the Berne Convention to withhold such

copyright protection due to the violation of the celebrity’s constitutional right of privacy

which is against public policy. Thus, the privacy rights of the said photographs remains with

its subject which means its dissemination and reproduction is also within the control of the

subject. Consequently, the posting of the said photograph on social media is within the rights

of the subject and no copyright infringement could occur if in the first place there is no valid

copyright to infringe.

The Conflict Between Copyright Laws and Right of Publicity

326
Hyde Park Residence Ltd v. Yelland [2000] 3 W.L.R. 215 (U.K.: High Court and Court of Appeal)
87

Copyright and right of publicity currently both exist and subsist within the

jurisdictions of the US and the Philippines as was illustrated in Chapters 3 and 5 of this

Thesis. While both copyright and the right of publicity concern intellectual, literary and

artistic creativity, there arises a conflict between the two.

On the one hand, copyright law encourages creativity by assuring creators the

opportunity to obtain financial rewards for their works.327 This is achieved by granting

individuals exclusive economic and moral rights from the moment of creation and generally

for a period of 50 years from the individual’s death. 328 These exclusive rights afford them

protection against unauthorized use of their creative works.329 On the other hand, the right of

publicity gives individuals the opportunity to obtain financial rewards for fame and

encourages creative efforts in the pursuit of fame. 330 This is achieved by granting the

individual the right to prevent others from using his name, likeness, photograph or image for

commercial purposes without obtaining consent. 331

Therefore, although the aim of both copyright and the right of publicity is to

encourage creative activity for the enrichment of society, they seem to employ clashing

incentives towards the same end. There is an inconsistency with copyright's limited

protection of expression and the right of publicity's broad protection of subject matter. The

clashing incentives arise in a situation when creative individuals use the personal attributes of

others in their works, as is in the case of paparazzi taking photographs of celebrities.

327
Id.
328
Id.
329
Id.
330
Id.
331
Id.
88

According to the laws on copyright, the author of the work can control such work. However,

following the doctrine of the right of publicity, it is the subject of the work, not the author,

who can control such. Therefore, under the laws of copyright, a book about a person belongs

to its author, a sculpture of a person belongs to its sculptor, and a photograph of a person

belongs to its photographer.332 However, taking into consideration the right of publicity, there

is reason to argue that such works may also belong to the subject of such a book, sculpture

and photograph.

In fact, there have been cases in the US that have ruled in favor of the right of

publicity over copyright. For example, in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. 333 the court ruled

that the poster of defendants that depicts the late Elvis Presley infringed the assigned

publicity rights of the plaintiff in the Presley persona. 334 According to the court, pursuant to

the assignment of the right of publicity, the plaintiffs had "the exclusive authority to print,

publish and distribute [Presley's] name and likeness."335 The court enjoined the defendants,

who had a valid copyright in the poster depicting Presley, from further sales of the poster

and awarded the plaintiffs damages equal to the defendants' profits from prior sales. 336

Therefore, effectively, the defendant’s copyright was abrogated by the court's enforcement of

the plaintiff’s right of publicity by divesting the former of their exclusive rights to reproduce

and distribute their work.337

332
Id.
333
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
334
Id.
335
Id.
336
Id.
337
Id.
89

However, in Jackson v Roberts338 the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

found that the federal Copyright Act preempts a state right of publicity claim when the latter

is merely “a thinly disguised effort to exert control over an unauthorized [use of a

copyrighted] work.”339 Both parties in this case are famous hip-hop artists. In 2015, defendant

Rick Ross released a free mixtape that included samples from many famous songs, including

50 Cents’s hit “In Da Club.”340 50 Cent sued Rick Ross, claiming that the unauthorized use of

his name and voice violated his right of publicity under Connecticut common law. Pursuant

to a recording agreement with his former record label, Shady Records/Aftermath Records, 50

Cent did not own a copyright interest in the “In Da Club” recording and therefore could not

sue for copyright infringement.341 The district court granted Roberts’s motion for summary

judgment, finding that Jackson had surrendered his publicity rights via the recording

agreement and that the right of publicity claim was preempted. 342 Finding that Jackson’s right

of publicity claim was preempted via the doctrine of implied preemption or under the express

terms of the Copyright Act, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment for Roberts.343

Such conflict between copyright and the right of publicity has further evolved due to

the rise of social media in recent years. There has been a transformation in the way

individuals consume, distribute and produce content due to the internet and social media. In

particular, social media has transformed the day-to-day lives of individuals and how they

338
Jackson v. Roberts, Case No. 19-480 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2020)
339
Id.
340
Id.
341
Id.
342
Id.
343
Id.
90

interact with others. Today, social media is often used by celebrities to engage with their fan

base and build their personal following. On social media, users are expected to engage with

content shared by others and have become accustomed to a culture of collaboration with

massive numbers of images shared and re-shared every day. 344 This newfound ability to

distribute content to the world at large with the tap of a finger has created many problems for

creators of copyrighted works that may have their work shared online without their

permission. The dramatic shift from user-generated content to user-found content resulting in

the ease of accessing and sharing content on the internet, especially in social media, has

emanated unique legal challenges that necessitate consideration of how the law can adapt to

the digital age.

The evolution of the copyright and right of publicity conundrum in this social media

age is best exemplified in the paparazzi-initiated copyright infringement suits against

celebrities. In these cases, there is a need to find a balance between the copyright of the

paparazzi who took the photo and is therefore the author of the photograph under copyright

laws on one hand, and the right of publicity of the celebrity who is the subject of the said

photo on the other hand. In connection with this, the existing copyright laws and

jurisprudence presented are insufficient to address them. Unfortunately, such suits have been

dismissed based on procedural grounds without going into the merits of the cases. Therefore,

the confusion as to how these conflicting rights should be addressed remain unanswered.

It is important to note that the principle of preemption of laws in the US as illustrated

in Jackson v Roberts is not applicable in this Philippine setting. Preemption is the rule of law

344
Lauren Levinson, Adapting Fair Use to Reflect Social Media Norms: A Joint Proposal, 64 UCLA L. REV.
1038, 1040–41 (2017).
91

in the US that if the federal government through Congress has enacted legislation on a

subject matter it shall be controlling over state laws and/or preclude the state from enacting

laws on the same subject if Congress has specifically declared it has "occupied the field." 345

Applying similar circumstances in the Philippines, there is no conflict between a national law

and a local law. Therefore, what must prevail is the principle that when Courts are confronted

with apparently conflicting statutes, they should not declare outright the invalidity of one

against the other, but should endeavor to reconcile them. 346 Thus, rather than ruling that the

laws on copyright should prevail over the right of publicity or the other way around, this

Thesis posits that they should instead be reconciled and harmonized.

Furthermore, to reward full copyright protection alone to the photographer without

taking into consideration the celebrity’s right to publicity would amount to unjust

enrichment. Unjust enrichment is found in Article 22 of the Civil Code, which states that

“Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires

or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal

ground, shall return the same to him.”347 “The prevention of unjust enrichment is a

recognized public policy of the State.”348 There is unjust enrichment when “a person retains

money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good

conscience.”349 The elements of unjust enrichment are as follows: “(1) a person is unjustly

benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.”350

345
https://definitions.uslegal.com/p/preemption
346
Gordon v. Veridiano, G.R. No. L-55230, [November 8, 1988], 249 PHIL 49-63
347
CIVIL CODE, art. 22.
348
Gonzalo v. Tarnate, Jr., G.R. No. 160600, [January 15, 2014], 724 PHIL 198-209
349
Id.
350
Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Ngilay, G.R. No. 174715, [October 11, 2012], 697 PHIL 403-413
92

Applying the elements in this case, first, the photographer or paparazzi may gain

money from licensing the photograph he or she took of the celebrity and second, such profit

is at the expense of the celebrity’s image or likeness, depriving the celebrity of his or her

property rights from the use of the celebrity’s persona, and diminishing their marketability.

Therefore, there exists unjust enrichment if no balance is found between the photographer’s

copyright and the celebrity’s right of publicity.

Based on everything that has since been tackled, this Thesis will now endeavor to

create the parameters that may guide the courts in addressing such copyright and right of

publicity issues considering the defenses raised by the celebrity-defendants in the paparazzi-

initiated copyright infringement suits. This Thesis posits that there is a need to redevelop the

concept of joint authorship and fair use in order to adapt to the realities brought by the

modern age.

Joint Authorship

Given the premise that this Thesis aims to address, in order to harmonize both the

copyright of the paparazzi and the right of publicity of the celebrity, the proponent posits that

the latter is entitled to co-authorship rights with the former.

In the Philippines, there is no provision in the law that provides the parameters nor

definition as to what constitutes works of joint authorship and who may be considered as

joint authors. The Intellectual Property Code merely provides the nature of the ownership

rights of each joint author. Neither does the Berne Convention provide for any definition
93

because it merely made mention of joint authorship. Therefore, the proponent looked towards

foreign laws and jurisdictions, specifically the US and UK, which are jurisdictions that the

Supreme Court heavily relies upon when it comes to Intellectual Property laws.

Upon review of the laws and jurisprudence, there is a divergence between the tests

applied in the US and the UK for the purpose of determining joint authorship. To compare,

below are the applicable laws and tests for joint authorship in US and UK laws:

US UK

Laws A "joint work" is a work “a "work of joint authorship"

prepared by two or more means a work produced by

authors with the intention that the collaboration of two or

their contributions be merged more authors in which the

into inseparable or contribution of each author is

interdependent parts of a not distinct from that of the

unitary whole."351 other author or authors.”352

Jurisprudential 1. Contribution 1. Collaboration

Joint Authorship 2. Intent 2. Authorship

Test 3. Contribution

4. Non-distinctiveness of

351
US Copyright Act §101.
352
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988
94

contribution

Upon comparison, the following observations were made by the proponent:

The contribution and intent requirements followed by the majority of the US courts

are a stark contrast to the UK’s collaboration, authorship and contribution elements.

In the US, the contribution of the putative co-authors must be independently

copyrightable in accordance with the Goldstein Test and as to intent the US courts developed

a test wherein putative co-authors must have possessed the requisite mutual intent to be joint

authors at the time, they created those contributions in order to be considered as joint authors.

On the other hand, the three elements of collaboration, authorship and contribution in the UK

obviate from the necessity of an independently copyrightable contribution. Under the UK

test, instead of seeking for the contribution to be “copyrightable” in itself, it seeks that such

contribution be “authorial” and therefore leans towards an approach that recognizes

collaborations. The UK test in seeking the contribution to be “authorial” puts more emphasis

on the amount of skill and labor that the putative co-author contributed to the work

considering the nature of the work. It is a question beyond who pushed the pen or who is the

mastermind, stating that authors can collaborate to create a work in many different ways. In

this regard, the UK test is more akin to the Nimmer Test in the US which states that each

contributor must make more than a de minimis contribution and requires that only the

combined product of joint efforts must be copyrightable.

In fact, the application of the intent requirement followed by the US courts has been

denounced by the UK courts in their joint authorship test. The UK courts expressly stated
95

that there is no further requirement that the authors must have subjectively intended to create

a work of joint authorship. The reasoning behind such outright rejection by the UK Courts is

analogous to the criticisms of the said requirement made by scholars in the US, in that, such

intent requirement is inconsistent with the letter and legislative intent of the law. However, it

is important to note that in the US, such showing of intent has been rendered important in

order to distinguish a joint work from a derivative work. But scholars in the US have stated

that instead of the restrictive mutual intent to be joint authors, what is merely necessary is to

limit “joint work” to works where the contributor’s desire to have his or her efforts contribute

to a single end could be evidenced at the time of the creation.

In the Philippines, high regard is placed on intellectual property, including copyright.

The 1987 Constitution itself recognizes the State’s policy to protect and secure the exclusive

rights of artists, and other gifted citizens to their intellectual property and creations,

particularly when beneficial to the people.353 The social function of intellectual property was

also recognized in the Intellectual Property Code, consequently, “the State shall promote the

diffusion of knowledge and information for the promotion of national development and

progress and the common good.”354 Therefore, evidently, both the Constitution and the law,

similar to the US and the UK, give due importance to artists and creators, whatever form

their contributions and creations may be, as long as the resulting work is copyrightable.

These state policies highlight the purpose of intellectual property laws in the Philippines in

giving incentives to creators: to encourage creativity and innovation. However, the strict

application of the contribution and intent elements deprives persons who make significant
353
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, art. XIV, § 13.
354
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, § 2.
96

creative contributions to a work of authorship rights and consequently, absent authorship

rights, or the potential for economic gain, deprives these artists with either monetary or legal

incentive to continue making creative contributions, which is against the very purpose of the

law.

Historically, the Philippine legal system is adaptive to the changes brought by

technology. In fact, Senator Raul Roco in his Sponsorship Speech for the Bill of the

Intellectual Property Code stated, “With the advances in technology, the country must have

the necessary legal infrastructure to anticipate the growth and expansion ushered in by these

advances.”355 Therefore, instead of turning a blind eye on the realities brought by the modern

age, the laws should embrace these realities. One of these realities is that technology has

made the creation of literary and artistic works less as an individual endeavor and more of a

collaborative effort which stems from the fact that art has expanded and has evolved in

numerous forms.

As to the “non-distinctiveness of contribution” element of the joint authorship test in

the UK, it is not found in the US joint authorship test. However, such an element may be

found in the US law itself where it stated that “their contributions be merged into inseparable

or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” In the Philippines, this element is also implied in

Section 178.2 of the Intellectual Property Code when it stated that “If, however, a work of

joint authorship consists of parts that can be used separately and the author of each part can

355
Sponsorship Speech of Senator Roco, Bill on Second Reading, S. No. 1719-Intellectual Property Rights
October 8, 1996 p 23
97

be identified, the author of each part shall be the original owner of the copyright in the part

that he has created.”356

Based on the aforesaid observations, the proponent posits that although the rules on

joint authorship that have been developed in the two jurisdictions are different, the letters of

the law are not too distant from each other. The contribution requirement in the US based on

the Nimmer Test, and not on the Goldstein Test, is in the same spirit as the collaboration,

authorship and contribution elements in the UK. As to the intent requirement, the proponent

leans towards the reasoning of the UK courts and scholars in the US that such a requirement

of mutual intent to be joint authors is policy-driven and cannot be gleaned from the letter of

the law nor its legislative history. However, the intent to merge their contributions at the time

they created those contributions is still important because it is this time element that

differentiates a joint work from a derivative work. Finally, the non-distinctiveness of

contribution requirement is without question in the US law, UK law and more importantly, in

the Philippine law.

Therefore, the proponent posits the following guidelines to be followed in

determining joint authorship in the Philippines, which are more in line with the objectives of

the 1987 Philippine Constitution and the Intellectual Property Code, specifically laws on

copyright, and more adaptive to the current realities of social media and the collaborative

environment we are in today based on the joint authorship rules in the US and the UK, as

heavily discussed above and in the previous chapter:

356
98

1. Contribution: Each contributor must make more than a de minimis contribution and

such contribution must be “authorial” which depends on the nature of the copyright

work in question. The question that must be answered is whether the putative joint

author has contributed elements which expressed that person's own intellectual

creation.

2. Intent: Putative co-authors must have possessed the requisite intent to merge their

contributions at the time they created those contributions. In other words, there must

be a showing of the contributor’s desire to have his or her efforts contribute to a

single end at the time of the creation.

3. Non-distinctiveness of contribution: The contribution must not be capable of being

separated.

With that said, the proponent will now test the elements in the setting of copyright

trolling. As to the first element of contribution, needless to say that the contribution of the

photographer is the taking of the photograph itself, what is in contention is the contribution

of the celebrity. It must be emphasized that the artistic and commercial value of the

photograph lies in the celebrity’s fame which constitutes the celebrity’s efforts-- stylistic

choices concerning wardrobe, hair, makeup, and posing. Indeed, there is creativity involved

in the celebrity’s creation of his or her image, managing all aspects of his or her fame and

directing a team around her, which in itself is an artform hence an expression of the

celebrity’s own intellectual creation. This same fame or celebrity factor is what the right of

publicity seeks to protect. Therefore, such image, likeness and fame is the celebrity’s
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contribution that is “authorial” given the nature of the photograph. It must be emphasized

that although it wasn’t the celebrity who took the photo, it is the celebrity’s essence, his or

her image and likeness, which made the photo what it was, hence, such contribution cannot

be considered as merely a minimum contribution but is more than a de minimis contribution

to the said photograph.

As to the second requirement of intent, both putative co-authors must have possessed

the requisite intent to merge their contributions at the time they created those contributions.

Therefore, in order to establish joint-authorship two things must be proven: intent of the

celebrity and intent of the photographer. As to the intent of the celebrity, two scenarios may

arise: that the celebrity deliberately posed in the photo, or such celebrity did not deliberately

pose in the photo. In the first scenario, the deliberate posing is equivalent to showing that the

celebrity indeed had the intent to be a joint author. In the second scenario, although there is

no upfront showing of such intent as in the first scenario, there may be prima facie evidence

of such by the fact that the celebrity later shared the said photo. As to the intent of the

photographer to co-author the photo, it must be noted that the surrounding circumstances

show that the photographer knew that the essence of the photo is the fame of the celebrity,

the main reason the paparazzi was taking the said photo was because he or she was banking

on the image and likeness of the said celebrity. Therefore, it can be gleaned by the

photographer’s act of taking the photo alone that he or she had the intent to merge the

celebrity’s contribution, the fame and image, and his or her contribution, the taking of the

said photo.
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As to the third requirement, the contribution must not be capable of being separated.

The work in issue is the photograph wherein the image and likeness of the celebrity, which is

protected by his or her right of publicity, is incorporated into. There is no way of separating

one from the other.

Therefore, given the general premise of copyright trolling, there is a basis to argue

that indeed the paparazzi and celebrity are joint authors of the photograph. As such, the

celebrity's subsequent posting of the photograph in social media does not constitute copyright

infringement.

Fair Use

Absent any of the circumstances stated above to constitute joint authorship, the

celebrity may still be held not liable of copyright infringement under the doctrine of fair use.

To reiterate, there is fair use if the copyrighted work is used for criticism, comment,

news reporting, teaching including limited number of copies for classroom use, scholarship,

research, and similar purposes.357 In determining whether the use made of a work in any

particular case is fair use, four factors shall be taken into consideration: a) The purpose and

character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit

educational purposes; b) The nature of the copyrighted work; c) The amount and

substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and d) The

effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.358
357
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §185
358
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §185
101

Due to the consideration of the aforesaid four factors, the application of the fair use

doctrine is on a case-to-case basis and fact-specific. 359 However, some general guidelines

may be followed given the peculiarities that arose from the intersection of copyright laws,

right of publicity and the rise of social media.

As to the first factor, it must be noted that transformative use is not necessary.

However, if the celebrity shares the photograph with a caption this may constitute “criticism”

or “comment” so as to fall within the ambit of fair use. 360 Absent any of these, the

commercialization of the work becomes more relevant. It has been argued by some of the

counsels for the paparazzi in the cases narrated in Chapter 2 of this thesis that through the

posting by celebrities of themselves in social media they are maintaining their personal brand

which constitutes commercialization. However, it has been ruled in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v

Accolade, Inc.361 that the commercial use factor of fair use where a company copied

computer code from a competitor to study it for the purposes of producing a competing

product. The court found that any commercial "exploitation" was indirect or derivative and

found the first factor in favor of the alleged infringer. Therefore, the celebrity’s indirect gains

from posting in social media, absent any explicit promotions from which the celebrity can

directly have monetary gain, does not constitute commercialization which may remove it

from the ambit of fair use.

As to the second factor, the scope of fair use is wider for factual and published works,

which is exactly the case in point. It has been repeatedly held that paparazzi photographs are

359
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2nd Cir. 2006) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569 (1994)).
360
361
Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (Jan. 6, 1993).
102

primarily factual works despite the involvement of some creative choices on the part of the

photographer.362 Also, it must be noted that the photos that are being reposted by celebrities

on social media have been searched online, therefore, they have already been published so

they are more likely to qualify as fair use.

As to the third factor, this has not much weight in photographs because unlike other

works that may be granted copyright protection, a photograph cannot be summarized,

paraphrased, described, or quoted from. Unless the photograph was cropped, this factor has

not much bearing.

As to the fourth factor, it must be noted that due to the rise of social media and the

internet, the posting done by the celebrity for personal use has not much of an impact on the

market because even before the time the photo reached the radar of the celebrity the original

photographer and agency has likely already made the money they will make from that

photograph through the sale of the exclusive license. So, it would be a stretch to say that the

reposting of the photograph will deprive the original purveyor of the photograph of

"significant revenues," and cause harm by not paying a licensing fee, as a license would

likely not be available due to exclusivity, and there would probably not be a future market for

the photograph given the ephemeral nature of the paparazzi news cycle.

Indeed, this approach may not be in keeping with the strict and traditional laws of

copyright that have been observed since its inception. However, the Supreme Court of the US

itself has outlined the importance of shifting copyright law to align with new developments:

“From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in

362
103

technology.”363 Given the fact that the Copyright laws in the Philippines is heavily based on

and relies on US laws and jurisprudence the same principle must also be adopted in the

Philippine legal landscape. Therefore, this approach would effectively reconcile the

photographer’s copyright and the celebrity’s right of publicity that has evolved due to the

presence of social media.

363
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984).
104

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

A. Conclusion

When reports of Dua Lipa being sued for posting a photo of herself started to

circulate, there was a collective confusion among laymen. There have been a lot of similar

cases filed years before under similar factual milieu with the same set of parties involved: the

paparazzi and celebrities. It has become so frequent that it has already been given a name:

copyright trolling. Unsurprisingly, these cases arose during the years when social media

started to make a greater impact globally, given the fact that the celebrity’s alleged infringing

act is through sharing in social media. In these cases, the plaintiff-photographers would

always bring forth the same case of copyright infringement. While the defendant-celebrities

have put forward different defenses such as right to privacy, right of publicity and fair use.

Unfortunately, the courts have dismissed these cases on procedural grounds without going

into the merits, therefore, the questions that arose from the defenses of both sides are left

unanswered.

Copyright trolling is somehow the love child of intellectual property law, privacy law

and technology and highlights the interplay between these opposing spectrums. This issue

has also become more pressing considering the rise of the citizen paparazzi, wherein the term

paparazzi is no longer limited to the traditional notions of being just photographers who

follow famous people around, hoping to take interesting or shocking photographs of them so
105

that they can sell them to a newspaper. Today, due to technological advancements and social

media almost anyone who has a smartphone, or any type of camera can become paparazzi.

This research aimed to determine the extent of a photographer’s copyright in a

situation where a celebrity shares on social media a photo of him/herself that was taken by

the said photographer, in light of the celebrity’s right to privacy and right of publicity. The

Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines provides that copyright shall belong to the

author of the work who is the natural person who has created the work, therefore, the

unauthorized use of paparazzi photos on social media is not permitted under current

copyright law. However, the problem lies when the celebrity’s right to privacy and right of

publicity are brought forward as defenses by the celebrity who posted on social media the

photographs of which they are subject.

Upon an in-depth analysis of the resources used, may it be case law or journal

articles, this thesis has shown that indeed there exists a conflict between the paparazzi’s

copyright and the celebrity’s right to privacy when the former takes the latter’s photographs

outside the limits that are protected by the Public Figure Doctrine as set out in Philippine and

foreign jurisprudence. In such cases, the proponent posits, the right to privacy of the celebrity

shall take precedence over the paparazzi’s copyright in light of the principle that a right based

on the constitution shall take precedence over a right granted by a statute, which in this case,

is the Intellectual Property Code. Furthermore, by virtue of the Berne Convention, it is within

the powers of the government, including the courts, to withhold such copyright protection

due to the violation of the celebrity’s constitutional right of privacy which is against public

policy.
106

This thesis has also shown that there is an inconsistency with copyright's limited

protection of expression and the right of publicity's broad protection of subject matter and

this conflict has further evolved due to the changes brought by social media’s dramatic shift

from user-generated content to user-found content. According to the laws on copyright, the

author of the work can control such work. However, following the doctrine of the right of

publicity, it is the subject of the work, not the author, who can control such. The proponent

posits that there is a need to find a balance between these two rights because to lean towards

copyright protection in favor of the photographer without taking into consideration the public

figure’s right of publicity would constitute unjust enrichment which is against public policy.

Jurisprudence and laws in the Philippines and in foreign jurisdictions do not squarely

address these arising conflicts and complexities therefore no clear-cut rules can be followed,

just like in many copyright infringement cases. The proponent posits that a public figure

should possess legal rights to use a paparazzi image. It would be inequitable if the subject of

a commercially valuable photograph, who provides the entirety of that commercial value,

would have no ability to enjoy personal use of the said photograph especially considering the

exploitative nature of paparazzi photography. Therefore, in order to balance these conflicting

interests a redevelopment of the concept of joint authorship and the fair use doctrine in the

Philippines is proposed.

Although the determination of the existence of copyright infringement usually

depends on the factual milieu of a given case, it is important to lay down a general

framework to set certain parameters that would guide the courts and provide the factors that

need to be considered in each case. These parameters have been well-thought out and
107

provided in the Recommendation which mainly considered Philippine laws and foreign

jurisprudence considering the current landscape brought by major technological shifts such

as smartphones and the age of social media.

B. Recommendation

First, the proponent recommends the express recognition of the right of publicity in

our law through a Supreme Court case when such an issue arises. In doing so, the requisites

under the common law right of publicity is suggested to be adopted. In order to have a cause

of action for appropriation, a plaintiff must allege that:

a. That the defendant used the identity of the plaintiff;

b. That the appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness was for the advantage of the

defendant whether commercially or otherwise

c. There was lack of consent on the part of the plaintiff

d. There was injury.

Second, this thesis recommends the amendment of the Intellectual Property Code to

reflect more clearly the concept of joint authorship in Copyright laws. In order to achieve

this, it is recommended that Section 171 of the Intellectual Property Code be amended to add

a definition for “work of joint authorship”. The suggested definition, based on the US and

UK definition of the same, is as follows:


108

A "work of joint authorship" is a work prepared by the collaboration

of two or more authors with the intent that their contributions will be

merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

(See Annex A)

Furthermore, it is recommended to amend Section 178.2 to read as follows:

In the case of works of joint authorship, the co-authors shall be the

original owners of the copyright and in the absence of agreement, their

rights shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In determining

if an individual is a joint author of a work, the following factors

should be considered:

(a) The joint author must make an authorial contribution meaning

it is more than a de minimis contribution which depends on the

nature of the copyright work in question. The joint author must

contribute elements which express his or her own intellectual

creation.

(b) The joint authors must have possessed the requisite intent to

merge their contributions at the time they created those

contributions or the joint author’s desire to have his or her

efforts contribute to a single end at the time of the creation.

(c) The contribution must not be capable of being separated.


109

If, however, a work of joint authorship consists of parts that can be

used separately and the author of each part can be identified, the

author of each part shall be the original owner of the copyright in the

part that he has created. (See Annex A)

Finally, through a thorough study of the case and journal articles, this set of

guidelines is proposed in addressing a dispute involving copyright trolling, which is a

scenario wherein a suit is brought by a paparazzi or photographer against celebrities who post

a paparazzi's picture in social media without first paying to license the photo or without the

paparazzi’s consent. This set of guidelines can be seen as a three-tier test that may be used by

the courts in deciding whether the celebrity may be liable for copyright infringement:

TIER 1: First, there is a need to examine whether the photograph involved violates

the celebrity’s right to privacy. In order to do such, the Van Hannover Criteria must be

followed, to wit:

1. There needs to be consideration of the degree to which the publication (be it a photo

or an article) contributes to a debate of general interest, which is to be judged on a

case-by-case basis.

2. The status of the person concerned as a private individual or a public figure is also

determinative, since reporting on details of the lives of private individuals is less

likely to contribute to “a debate in a democratic society,” and thus, the press’ role as a

“public watchdog” also diminishes in this case. Even though in certain cases the
110

public has the right to be informed of “aspects of the private life of public figures,”

the reason for this must be more than mere “public curiosity.”

3. Prior conduct of the person with the press needs to be considered.

4. The way of publication of the photo or report as well as the manner of representation

of the person concerned need to form part of the consideration.

5. Whether the photo was taken with the consent of the persons concerned or was done

“without their knowledge or by subterfuge or other illicit means” is to be weighed.

If the celebrity’s right to privacy is violated, the photographer is not entitled to copyright

protection therefore, the celebrity’s sharing of the photograph in social media does not

constitute copyright infringement. On the other hand, if the celebrity’s right to privacy is not

violated, proceed to the second tier.

TIER 2: There is a need to examine whether the celebrity may be considered as a

joint author of the photograph involved. In determining such, the following factors must be

considered:

1. Contribution: Each contributor must make more than a de minimis contribution and

such contribution must be “authorial” which depends on the nature of the copyright

work in question. The question that must be answered is whether the putative joint

author has contributed elements which expressed that person's own intellectual

creation.

2. Intent: Putative co-authors must have possessed the requisite intent to merge their

contributions at the time they created those contributions. In other words, there must
111

be a showing of the contributor’s desire to have his or her efforts contribute to a

single end at the time of the creation.

3. Non-distinctiveness of contribution: The contribution must not be capable of being

separated.

In this regard, the following must be taken special consideration, considering the

circumstances surrounding the case:

a. For the element of contribution, the celebrity’s fame, image and likeness which is

protected by his or her right of publicity is the essence of the photograph, therefore,

although on its own is not copyrightable meets the de minimis contribution required.

b. For the element of intent, the intent to be joint authors when they were working on

their respective contributions of both the celebrity and the photographer must be

examined. For the celebrity’s intent, if he or she posed in the photograph the intent to

co-author is unequivocal, on the other hand, if he or she did not pose in the

photograph there still arises a prima facie evidence of his or her intent to co-author by

the fact that the celebrity later shared the said photo in social media. For the

photographer’s intent, the photographer’s act of taking the photograph is prima facie

evidence of such intent because the photographer knew that the essence of the photo

is the fame, image or likeness of the celebrity therefore there was intent to merge the

celebrity’s contribution, the fame and image, and his or her contribution, the taking of

the said photo.

If the court is presented with evidence that may rebut the presence of any of three factors

enumerated, proceed to the third tier.


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TIER 3: There is a need to examine whether the celebrity’s posting of the photograph

in social media constitutes fair use. The fair use doctrine may be invoked both as a matter of

right and as a defense in copyright infringement cases, as in this case. To reiterate, there is

fair use if the copyrighted work is used for criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching

including limited number of copies for classroom use, scholarship, research, and similar

purposes.364 In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is fair use,

four factors shall be taken into consideration:

1. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial

nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;

2. The nature of the copyrighted work;

3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work

as a whole; and

4. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

In this regard, the following must be taken special consideration, in light of the circumstances

surrounding the case:

a. As to the first factor, taking into consideration the social media age and the shift to

user-found content, if the celebrity shares the photograph with a caption this may

constitute “criticism” or “comment” and is therefore transformative. However, absent

any of these, the commercialization of the work becomes more relevant and, in this

regard, the celebrity’s indirect gains from posting in social media, absent any explicit

promotions from which the celebrity can directly have monetary gain, is indirect and

364
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, §185
113

derivative thus, does not constitute commercialization which may remove it from the

ambit of fair use.

b. As to the fourth factor, the fact that the celebrity was able to search the photograph

involved in the internet and repost it would mean that any semblance of economic

harm on the part of the photographer is out of the question. It means that at that

juncture the photographer and agency has likely already made the money they will

make from that particular photograph through the sale of the exclusive license. This is

a recognition of the fast paced culture in social media and the ephemeral nature of the

paparazzi news cycle.

C. Recommendation for further study

In view of all the foregoing, it is the recommendation of the proponent that this set of

guidelines be used by the courts in deciding a case of copyright infringement dealing with

copyright trolling. While it is a possibility that some celebrities who are sued by paparazzi

for copyright infringement opt not to litigate and just settle, this set of guidelines allows said

celebrities to know their rights within and that they are not at a disadvantage just because a

license is not obtained. With this set of guidelines, the interests of the celebrity and the

paparazzi in light of the various technological advancements are all taken into consideration.

In addition, it is the recommendation of the proponent to future researchers who are

interested in tackling this issue to widen the scope and consider the latest changes in

technology. In particular, it is recommended to test similar circumstances, that is the


114

copyright of photographs but in light of a private individual’s right to privacy and right of

publicity as it has already been previously argued in other journals that both rights extend

even to private individuals.

Copyright must evolve to recognize contemporary notions of authorship, creative

possibilities and a 21st-century reality of online social networking that is fast becoming the

new norm. With the dramatically increased scale and distributive scope of works in this

digital era, copyright should encourage a potential golden age of cultural creativity rather

than constrain those possibilities.365

365
Fair Use citing Steve Collins & Sherman Young, "Fair Enough? How Technology and the Law Shape
Creative Mashups" (2017) 30(3) Australian Intellectual Property Law Bulletin 46 at 49; Debora J Halbert, The
State of Copyright: The Complex Relationship of Cultural Creation in a Globalised World (Oxford: Routledge,
2014) at p 197.
115

ANNEX A

Republic of the Philippines


HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Quezon City, Metro Manila

Seventh Congress
Second Regular Session

HOUSE BILL NO. _____

Introduced by STEFI MONIKA S. SUERO

AN ACT FURTHER AMENDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT


NO. 8293, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,” AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress


assembled:

SECTION 1. Section 171 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual
Property Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:

“ Sec. 171. Definitions. – For the purpose of this Act, the following terms have the
following meaning:

“171.14 A "work of joint authorship" is a work prepared by the collaboration


of two or more authors with the intent that their contributions will be merged
into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

SEC. 2. Section 178 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property
Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:

“ Sec. 178. Rules on Copyright Ownership. - Copyright ownership shall be governed


by the following rules:
116

“178.2. In the case of works of joint authorship, the co-authors shall be the
original owners of the copyright and in the absence of agreement, their rights
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In determining if an
individual is a joint author of a work, the following factors should be
considered:
(a) The joint author must make an authorial contribution meaning it is
more than a de minimis contribution which depends on the nature of
the copyright work in question. The joint author must contribute
elements which express his or her own intellectual creation.
(b) The joint authors must have possessed the requisite intent to merge
their contributions at the time they created those contributions or the
joint author’s desire to have his or her efforts contribute to a single end
at the time of the creation.
(c) The contribution must not be capable of being separated.
If, however, a work of joint authorship consists of parts that can be used
separately and the author of each part can be identified, the author of each part
shall be the original owner of the copyright in the part that he has created.”

SEC. 3. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act or the application of such
provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid, the remainder of this Act or the
application of such provision to any other person or circumstances shall not be affected by
such declaration.

SEC. 4. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, ordinances, rules and regulations, executive
or administrative orders and other presidential issuances inconsistent with this Act, are
hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.

SEC. 5. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from publication in two
(2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

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