IGNACIO, JACQUELINE LESLIE S.

CASE NO.: 4

MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner, vs.

RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL
ROSARIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939

PRINCIPLE OF LAW: IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

PONENTE: IMPERIAL, J.

FACTS:

Respondents, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana
Ambrosio,commenced a civil case to recover from the petitioner the possession of the
land and its improvements granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio (EA).

The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land
acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 plus
interest. In clause V, the parties stipulated that Emiliana Ambrosio was to pay, within 4
1/2 years the debt with interest thereon, in which event the mortgage would not have
any effect; in clause VI, the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its
improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of
the land; in clause VII, it was covenanted that within 30 days from the date of the
contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in the CFI of Bataan asking that
certificate of title no. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be issued under
the provisions of RA 496; in clause VIII the parties agreed that should EA fail to redeem
the mortgage within the stipulated period of 4 1/2 years, she would execute an absolute
deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount
of the loan including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated that in case the
motion to be presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI-Bataan, the
contract of sale of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would
subsist in all its force.

One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that Emiliana
Ambrocio was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and its
improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal
contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition
that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment
of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce
improvements thereon.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in good faith
because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its
acquisition by w/c it is invalidated.
2. Whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the law.

HELD:
1. Yes, the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in good faith. Ignorance of the
flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts as found by the CA, we can neither
deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the
manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in Sec. 116.

2. Yes, good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the law.

Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of good
faith but excusable ignorance may be such basis (if it is based upon ignorance of
a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he
is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on
the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the
alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive
its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and
enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the
latter, as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his
ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the basis of good
faith.

The petitioner being in good faith, the respondents may elect to have the
improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the value
thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the
improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be fixed
by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties.