Feelings and Emotions

Emotions
A social science reader
Edited by
M onica G reco a n d Paul Stenner
R
Routledge Student Readers
Emotions
A re emotions becoming more conspicuous in contem porary life? A re the social

sciences undergoing an 'affective turn'? This reader gathers influential and
contem porary work in the study of emotion and affective life from across the
range of the social sciences. Drawing on both theoretical and em pirical
research, the collection offers a sense of the diversity of perspectives that have
emerged over the last thirty years from a variety of intellectual traditions. Its
wide span and trans-disciplinary character is designed to capture the increasing
significance of the study of affect and emotion for the social sciences, and to
give a sense of how this is played out in the context of specific areas of interest.
The volume is divided into four main parts:
Universals and p a rticu la rs of affect

Embodying affect
P olitica l economies of affect
• Affect, power and justice
Each main part comprises three sections dedicated to substantive themes,

including emotions, history and civilization; emotions and culture; emotions,
selfhood and identity; emotions, space and place; emotions and health; emo
tions in work and organizations; emotions and the media; emotions and politics;
emotions and law, with a final section dedicated to themes of compassion, hate
and terror. Each of the twelve sections begins with an editorial introduction that
contextualizes the readings and highlights points of com parison across the vol
ume. Cross-national in content, the collection provides an introduction to the
key debates, concepts and modes of approach that have been developed by
social scientists for the study of emotion and affective life.
M onica Greco is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at Gold

smiths, University of London. She is the author of Illness as a W ork o f
Thought: A Foucauldianperspective onpsychosom atics (.Routiedge 1998) and
co-editor of The Body: A reader (with M. Fraser, Routledge 2005).
Paul Stenner is Professor of Psychosocial Studies at the University of

Brighton. He has lectured in Psychology at East London, Bath and University
College, London. Following his Doctoral thesis on jealousy entitled Feeling
deconstructed? (Reading 1992) he has published widely on the emotions and
psychosocial theory.
Rou t l edge S t u d e n t Readers
Series Editor: Chris Jenks, Professor o f Sociology, Goldsmiths College,

University o f London.
Already in this Series:
T heor ie s of Race and Rac ism: A Reader

Edited by Les Back and John Solomos
Gender: A S o cio lo g ic a l Reader

Edited by Stevi Jackson and Sue Scott
The S o c io lo g y of Health and Illness: A Reader

Edited by Mike Bury and Jonathan Gabe
So cial Research M eth od s: A Reader

Edited by Clive Seale
T h e I nform a ti o n So cie ty Reader

Edited by Frank W ebster
The Body: A Reader

Edited by Mariam Fraser and Monica Greco
Fashion T he or y: A Reader
Edited by Malcolm Barnard
So cial M ovem en ts : A Reader

Edited by Vincenzo Ruggiero and Nicola Montagna
E m o tio n s : A So cial Sc ie n ce Reader

Edited by Monica Greco and Paul Stenner
Emotions
A social science reader
Edited by M onica G reco and

Paul Stenner
| j Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK
First published 2008
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, O xon 0 X 1 4 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada

by Routledge
270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016
Routlcdge is an imprint of the Taylor Francis Group, an informa business
© 2008 Greco and Stcnner for selection and editorial matter; individual chapters,
the contributors
Typeset in Perpetua and Bell Gothic by

RefineCatch Ltd, Bungay, Suffolk
Printed and bound in Great Britain bv
The Cromwell Press, Trowbridge, Wiltshire
All rights reserved. N o part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced

or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means,
now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording,
or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Greco, Monica, 1966-
Emotions : a social science reader / Monica Greco, Paul Henry Stenner.
p. cm. (Routlcdgc student readers)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978—0 -4 1 5 - 4 2 5 6 4 - 3 (pbk.) - ISBN 9 7 8 - 0 ^ 1 5 -4 2 5 6 3 -6 (hardback)
1. Emotions. I. Stenner, Paul Henry, 1966 . II. Title.
BF531.G 73 2008
152.4-d c22
2008016530
ISBN 10: 0 - 4 1 5 - 4 2 5 6 3 - 8 (hbk)

ISBN 1 0 :0 415 42564 6 (pbk)
ISBN 13: 9 7 8 - 0 - 4 1 5 - 4 2 5 6 3 -6 (hbk)

ISBN 13: 978 0 415 4 2 564 3 (pbk)
There is nothing in the real world which is merely an inert fact. Every reality is there
for feeling: it promotes feeling; and it is felt.
A. I\l. Whitehead, Process and Reality
T h is p a g e in ten tion ally left blank
Contents
Notes on co n trib u to rs xiii

P refa ce x x iii
Acknow ledgm ents xxv
Monica Greco and Paul Stenner

INTRODUCTION: EMOTION A N D SO CI AL S C I E N C E 1
PART ONE
Uni versal s and part i cul ars of a f f e c t 23
Emotions, history and civilization 25
1 Thomas Dixon
FR OM P A SS IO NS TO EMOT IONS 29
2 Norbert Elias
ON C H A N G E S IN A G G R E S S I V E N E S S 34
3 Abram De Swaan
T H E P OL ITI CS OF A G O R A P H O B I A 43
4 Peter N. Stearns and Deborah C. Stearns

H IS TO RI CAL I S S U E S IN EMO TI ONS R E S E A R C H 51
Emotions and culture 59

5 Catherine Lutz
E N G E N D E R E D EMOTION 63
Viii CONTENTS
6 William M. Reddy
AGAINST CONSTRUCTIONISM 72
7 Michael E. Harkin
FE E LIN G AND THINKING IN M EM O R Y AND FORGETTING 84
8 Johan Lindquist
NEGOTIATING S H A M E IN THE INDONESIAN BORDERLANDS 93
Emotions and society 101
9 Jack Barbalet
EMOTION IN SOCIAL L IF E AND SOCIAL THEORY 106
10 Erving Goffman
EMBARRASSMENT AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 112
11 Susan Shott
EMOTION AND SOCIAL L IF E 116
12 Arlie Russell Hochschild

EMOTION WORK, FE E LIN G RULES, AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 121
13 Theodore D. Kemper
POWER, STATUS, AND EMOTIONS 127
14 Randall Collins
TH E ROLE OF EMOTION IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE 132
15 Niklas Luhmann
IN D IVID U ALITY OF PSYCH IC S YS T EM S 137
PART TWO
Embodying affect 141
Emotions, selfhood and identity 143
16 Silvan S. Tomkins
REVISIONS IN SCRIPT THEORY 147
17 Dick Pountain and David Robins

COOL R U LES 15 2
18 Charles Morgan and James R. Averill

TRUE FEELINGS, THE SELF, AND AUTHENTICITY 158
19 Agneta H. Fischer and Jeroen Jansz

RECONCILING EMOTIONS WITH W ESTERN PERSONHOOD 166
CONTENTS iX
20 W. Ray Crozier
S E LF -C O N S C IO U S N E S S IN S H A M E 175
Emotions, space and place 181
21 Nigel Thrift
IN T E N S IT IE S OF F E E L IN G 184
22 Rani Kawale
IN E Q U A L IT IE S OF T H E H EAR T 188
23 Mimi Sheller
AU TO M O TIVE EMOTIONS 193
24 Ben Anderson
DOM ESTIC G E O G R A P H IE S OF A F F E C T 201
Emotions and health 205
25 Peter E. S. Freund
T H E E X P R E S S IV E BODY 209
26 Alan Radley
P O R T R A Y A LS OF S U F F E R IN G 217
27 James M. Wilce Jr and Laurie J. Price

M E T A P H O R S OUR BO D YM IN D S L IV E B Y 226
28 Elizabeth A. Wilson
T H E W ORK OF A N T ID E P R E S S A N T S 240
29 Nikolas Rose
D ISORD ERS W ITH O U T BO RD ERS? 246
PART T H R E E
Political economies of affect 259
Em otions in w ork and organizations 261

30 Kiran Mirchandani
C H A L L E N G IN G R A C IA L S IL E N C E S IN S T U D IES OF EMOTION W ORK 264
31 Stephen Fineman
G ET TIN G T H E M E A S U R E OF EMOTION - A N D T H E C A U T IO N A R Y T A L E OF EM O TIO NAL
IN T E L L IG E N C E 276
32 Charlie L. Reeve, Steven G. Rogelberg,

Christiane Spitzmuller and Natalie DiGiacomo
T H E C A R IN G -K IL L IN G PARADO X 283
X CONTENTS
33 Allen C. Smith, III and Sherryl Kleinman

M A N A G IN G EM O TIO N S IN M E D I C A L SCH O O L 290
Emotions, economics and consumer culture 299
34 Colin Campbell
T H E R O M A N T IC E T H IC A N D T H E S P IR IT OF M O D E R N C O N S U M E R IS M 301
35 Danny M ille r
A T H E O R Y OF S H O P P IN G 307
36 Daniel Lefkowitz
IN V E S T IN G IN EM O TIO N 311
37 Jon Elster
EM O TIO N S A N D EC O N O M IC T H E O R Y 315
Emotions and the media 321
38 Birgitta Hoijer
T H E A U D I E N C E A N D M E D I A R E P O R T IN G OF H U M A N S U F F E R IN G 324
39 Imogen Tyler
"C H A V M U M C H A V S C U M " 331
40 Minna Aslama and Mervi Pantti

T A LK IN G A LO N E 339
41 Greg M. Smith
T H E MOOD C U E A P P R O A C H 347
PART FOUR
A f f e c t , power and justice 355
Emotions and politics 357
42 Barry Richards
T H E E M O T IO N A L D E F IC IT IN P O L IT IC A L C O M M U N IC A T IO N 361
43 Anne-M arie Fortier

P R ID E P O L IT IC S A N D M U L T IC U L T U R A L I S T C I T I Z E N S H I P 368
44 Clifford Shearing and Michael Kempa

A M U S E U M OF H O P E : A STORY O F R O B B E N IS L A N D 374
45 Deborah Gould
RO CK T H E BOAT, D O N 'T R O CK T H E BOAT, B A B Y : A M B I V A L E N C E A N D T H E E M E R G E N C E
OF M IL IT A N T A ID S A C T IV IS M 383
CONTENTS Xi
Emotions and law 393

46 Kathy Laster and Pat O'Malley
S E N S IT IV E N EW -A G E LAW S 396
47 Bettina Lange
T H E EM O TIO N AL D IM EN SIO N IN L E G A L R EG U LA T IO N 401
48 Arie Freiberg
A F F E C T I V E V E R S U S E F F E C T IV E JU S T IC E 405
49 Yael Navaro-Yashin
M A K E -B E L IE V E P A P E R S , L E G A L FO R M S A N D T H E C O U N T E R FE IT 411
50 Susanne Karstedt
EM OTIONS A N D C R IM IN A L JU S T IC E 418
Compassion, hate, and te rror 425

51 Marguerite Feitlowitz
A LEXIC O N OF TERRO R 429
52 Lauren Berlant
CO M PASSIO N (AND W IT H H O LD IN G ) 434
53 Judith Butler
V IO LE N C E , M O URN IN G , P O LIT ICS 439
54 Elaine Hatfield and Richard L. Rapson

EM O TIO N AL CONTAGION 443
55 Nathan Sznaider
TH E C O M PA S S IO N A TE T E M P E R A M E N T 449
Guide to further reading 455

Index 469
Notes on Contributors
Ben A N D E R S O N is a L e c tu re r in H um an G e o g rap h y at the U n iv ersity o f D u rh am .

H e is the au th or o f several artic le s on affect and e m o tio n , m ate riality and te c h
n o lo g y , and n o n -re p re se n tatio n a l th e o ry . H e is cu rren tly p re p arin g a m o n o g ra p h
on th e o rie s o f affect and e m o tio n , p rovisio n ally en titled Spaces of Affect and Emotion.
M inna A SL A M A is the P ro g ram O ffice r for the N e c e ssa ry K n o w le d g e fo r a

D e m o c ra tic Sph ere P rogram at the S S R C . She h old s a Ph .D . from the U n iv e rsity o f
H elsin ki and is the au th or o f several artic le s fo r Finnish and in tern ation al p u b lic a
tion s on to p ic s ran gin g from E u rop ean m ed ia p o litic s to n ation al id en tity and reality
telev isio n .
Ja m e s R . A V E R IL L is P ro fe sso r o f P sy ch ology at the U n iv ersity o f M assach u se tts,

A m h e rst. H e w o rk s in the fields o f p e rso n a lity th e o ry , stre ss and e m o tio n ,
c re ativ ity , a e sth e tics, h istory and sy ste m s o f p sy ch o lo g y . H e w as am o n g st the
p io n e e rs o f a so cial c o n stru c tio n ist ap p ro ach to the e m o tio n s and his b o o k s in clude
Anger and Aggression: An Essay On Emotion (S p rin ge r-V e rla g, 1 9 8 2 ), Rules o j Hope
(S p rin ge r-V crlag, 1 9 9 0 ), Voyages o f the H eart: Living an Emotionally Creative Life (T he
F ree P re ss, 1 9 9 2 ).
Jack B A R B A L E T is P ro fe sso r o f S o cio lo g y at the U n iv ersity o f L e ic e ste r and

D ire c to r o f the C e n tre fo r C lassical and C ritical S o c io lo g y . H e is the au th or o f
Emotions, Social Theory and Social Structure: A Macrosociological Approach (C a m b rid g e
U n iv ersity P re ss, 1 9 9 8 ) and e d ito r o f Emotions and Sociology (B lack w e ll, 2 0 0 2 ).
L auren B E R L A N T is G e o r g e M . P ullm an P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f E nglish at

the U n iversity o f C h icago. H e r w ork c o n c e n tra te s on the legal and n orm ative
p ro d u ctio n o f p e rso n h o o d in the LI.S. n in eteen th , tw en tieth and tw en ty-first
c e n tu rie s. She has recen tly finished a trilo gy o f b o o k s on U S se n tim e n tality : The
XiV NOTES ON C O N T R I B U T O R S
Anatomy of N ational Fantasy (C h ica g o , 1 9 9 1 ), The Qitcen of America Goes to Washington

City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship (D u k e , 1 9 9 7 ), and The Female Complaint: the
Unfinished Business o f Sentimentality in American Culture (fo rth co m in g 2 0 0 8 ).
Ju d ith B U T L E R is M axin e E llio t P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n ts o f R h eto ric and

C o m p ara tiv e L ite ra tu re at the U n iv ersity o f C alifo rn ia , B erk eley . She is a p o s t
stru c tu ra list p h ilo so p h e r w ith a b ac k g ro u n d in H e g e l, and she has m ad e significant
c o n trib u tio n s to fem in ist and q u e e r th eory and to political and cthical p h ilosoph y.
H er b o o k s in clu dc Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion o j Identity (R o u tlc d g e ,
1 9 9 0 ), Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limitations o j ‘Sex’ (R o u tle d g e , 1 9 9 3 ),
Excitable Speech: A Politics o j the Performative (R o u tle d g e , 1 9 9 7 ) and The Psychic Lije
o f Power: Theories o j Subjection (Stan fo rd U n iv e rsity P re ss, 1 9 9 7 ).
C olin C A M P B E L L is p r o fe sso r o f so c io lo g y at the U n iversity o f York. H e has

w ritte n on the so c io lo g y o f re lig io n , the so c io lo g y o f c o n su m p tio n and so c io lo g ic al
th e o ry , l l i s b o o k s in clu d c Toward A Sociology' o f Irreligion (M acm illan , 1 9 7 1 ), The
Myth o f Social Action (C a m b r id g e U n iv ersity P re ss, 1 9 9 6 ) and The Shopping Experience
(S age , 1 9 9 7 ).
R an dall C O L L IN S is the D o ro th y Sw ain e T h o m a s P ro fe sso r in S o c io lo g y at the

U n iv ersity o f Pennsylvania. In 2 0 0 4 he w as aw arded an A m eric an So cio lo g ica l
A ssociation L ifetim e C o n trib u tio n s A w ard for his w ork on the e m o tio n s. H is b o o k s
in clu de Four Sociological Traditions (O x fo r d U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 9 4 ), The Sociology o f
Philosophies: A Global Theory o f Intellectual Change (H arv ard U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 9 8 )
and Interaction Ritual Chains (P rin c eto n U n iversity P re ss, 2 0 0 5 ).
W. Ray C R O Z IE R is a P r o fe sso r in the Sch o o l o f Social W ork and P sy ch osocial

Scien ces at the U n iv ersity o f E ast A n glia. H e is the au th or o f n u m e ro u s artic le s on
shyn ess, and c o - e d ito r (w ith L. E. A ld en ) of The Essential Handbook o f Social Anxiety
for Clinicians (W 'iley, 2 0 0 5 ).
A bram D E SW A A N is E m e ritu s P ro fe sso r o f Social Scie n ce at the U n iv ersity o f

A m ste rd a m , w h ere he held the chair o f so c io lo g y b e tw e en 1973 and 2 0 0 1 . Since
2 0 0 4 he has been the d ire c to r o f the E u rop ean A cadem y o f Yustc (S p ain ). H is b o o k s
in clu dc In Care o f the Slate; Health Care, Education and Welfare in F.urope and the USA
in the Modern Era (O x fo r d U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 8 8 ); The Management o f Normality;
Critical F.ssays in Health and Welfare (R o u tle d g e , 1 9 9 0 ); Human Societies (P olity , 2 0 0 ! )
and Words o f the World: The Global Language System (P olity , 2 0 0 3 ).
N atalie D IG 1 A C O M O is V ice P re sid en t, D e v e lo p m e n t/O u tr e a c h P ro g ra m s o f T h e

H u m an e S o cicty o f the U n ited S tate s, W ashington, D C .
T h o m a s D IX O N is a L e c tu re r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f H isto ry at Q u ee n M a ry ’s,

U n iv e rsity o f L o n d o n . H e is the au th o r o f From Passions to Emotions: The Creation o f a
Secular Psychological Category (C a m b r id g e U n iv ersity P re ss, 2 0 0 3 ).
N o r b e r t E LIA S (1 8 9 7 —1 9 9 0 ) w as a G e rm an -Je w ish so c io lo g ist. H e coin ed the

e x p re ssio n s ‘ p ro c e ss so c io lo g y ’ and ‘ figuration al so c io lo g y ’ to d e sc rib e his
a p p ro ac h , w hich now influen ces w ork by m any o th e r sch o lars. H is m ain w o rk , The
Civilizing Process, w as first pub lish ed in G e rm an in 1939 (late st E nglish edition 1 9 9 4 )
but rem ain ed largely unknow n and unread am o n g the G e rm an and E nglish speak in g
NOTES ON C O N T R I B U T O R S XV
p u b lics fo r nearly th irty y e a rs, d u e to E lia s’ p re c a rio u s ac a d e m ic e x iste n c e as a

re fu g e e from N azi G e rm an y . H is o th e r w o rk s in clu d e: The Established and the
Outsiders (1 9 6 5 ), What is Sociology? ( 1 9 7 8 ), The Court Society ( 1 9 8 3 ), The Loneliness
o j the Dying (1 9 8 5 ), Involvement and Detachment (1 9 8 7 ), The Symbol Theory (1 9 9 1 ),
The Society o f Individuals (1 9 9 1 ) and Time: An Essay (1 9 9 2 ).
Jo n E L S T E R is the R o b e rt K . M e rto n P ro fe sso r o f Social S cien ces w ith a p p o in t

m en ts in Political Scien ce and Ph ilosoph y at C o lu m b ia U n iv ersity and professeur
attache at the C o lle g e d c F ran ce. H e w as aw arded the Jean N ico d P rize in 1 9 9 7 . His
b o o k s in clu dc Nuts and Bolls for the Social Sciences (C a m b r id g e , U K , 1 9 8 9 ); Strong
Feelings: Emotion, Addiction, and Human Behavior T h e Jean N ico d L e ctu re s. (M IT p r e ss,
1 9 9 7 ); Alchemies o j the .Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (C a m b r id g e , 1 9 9 9 ); Ulysses
Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment. and Constraints (C a m b r id g e , 2 0 0 2 );
Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (C a m b r id g e , 2 0 0 4 ) and
Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts f o r the Social Sciences (C a m b r id g e ,
2 0 0 7 ).
M a rg u e rite F E IT L O W IT Z is P ro fe sso r o f L ite ra tu re at B en nin gton C o lle g e . She has

published th ree v o lu m es o f literary tran slation s from French and Spanish and she
is an au th or o f fiction , p o e try , essays and a r t c ritic ism . H e r w o rk has been published
w id ely in the A m e ric as, E u ro p e , and Israel.
Stephen F IN E M A N is P ro fe sso r in O rgan isatio n al B eh aviour at the Sch ool o f

M an ag em en t o f the U n iv ersity o f Bath. H is w ork e x p lo re s the im p licatio n s o f
v iew in g organ izatio n s as e m o tio n a l aren as. R e c e n t b o o k s in clu de The Emotional
Organization: Passions and Power (B lack w e ll, 2 0 0 7 ), Organizing and Organizations (S a g e ,
2 0 0 5 ), and Understanding Emotion at Work (S a g e , 2 0 0 3 ).
A gn eta H . F IS C H E R is a P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f Social P sy ch ology at the

U n iv ersity o f A m ste rd a m . She is the au th or o f n u m e ro u s artic le s on g e n d e r d if
fe re n c es in e m o tio n ality and oth er asp e c ts o f the relation b e tw e en e m o tio n and
cu ltu re . She is the e d ito r o f Emotion and Gender: Social Psychological Perspectives
(C a m b rid g e U n iv e rsity P re ss, 2 0 0 0 ) and c o -e d ito r (w ith A. M an stead and N . F rijd a)
o f Feelings and Emotions: The Amsterdam Symposium (C a m b r id g e U n iv ersity P re ss,
2 0 0 4 ).
A n n e-M arie F O R T IE R is a S e n io r L e c tu re r in the D e p a rtm e n t o f S o c io lo g y at

L an caste r U n iv ersity . She is the au th or o f Migrant Belongings: Memory, Space, Identity
(B e rg , 2 0 0 0 ).
P eter E. S. F R E U N D is P ro fe sso r o f S o cio lo g y at M o n tclair State U n iv ersity in N ew

Je r se y . H e is the au th or o f n u m e ro u s a rtic le s lin kin g the so c io lo g y o f the b o d y to
that o f the e m o tio n s and o f health and illn ess. H is b o o k s in clu de The Civilized Body:
Social Domination, Control and Health (1 9 8 2 ) and Health, Illness and the Social Body: A
Critical Sociology (2 0 0 2 ).
A ric F R E IB E R G is Fou nd ation C h air o f C rim in o lo g y at the U n iversity o f M e l

b o u rn e . H e has h eld p o sitio n s w ith the A u stralian Institu te o f C rim in o lo g y and
the C o m m o n w e alth D ire c to r o f Public P ro se c u tio n s and w as P re sid en t o f the
A u stralian and N ew Z ealan d Society o f C rim in o lo g y Inc b etw een 1996 and 19 9 8 .
XVi NOTES ON C O N T R I B U T O R S
H e is an e x p e r t on crim in al sen ten cin g and con fiscation o f the p ro c e e d s o f crim e .

H e has au th o red m a jo r w ork s in both o f th ese fields and has pub lish ed o v e r seven ty
m o n o g ra p h s and artic le s.
E rv in g G O F F M A N (1 9 2 2 —1 9 8 2 ) w as an A m erican so c io lo g ist, best know n fo r his

c o n trib u tio n s to the stud y o f sy m b o lic in teraction through a d ram a tu rg ical p e r sp e c
tive. H e held p o sts at the U n iv ersity o f C h ica go , the U n iversity o f C alifo rn ia
(B e rk e le y ) and the U n iversity o f Pennsylvania. H e w as also 7 3 rd P re sid en t of the
A m erican S o cio lo g ic a l A sso ciatio n . H is b o o k s in clu dc The Presentation o f S e lf in
Everyday Life (U n iv ersity o f E dinb urgh Social Scien ce R e sea rc h C e n tre , 1 9 5 9 );
Asylums (D o u b le d ay , 1 9 6 1 ); Stigm a: Notes on the Management o f Spoilt Identity
(P rcn tic e -H all, 1 9 6 3 ); Relations in Public: Microstudies o f the Public Order (B asic B o o k s,
1 9 7 1 ) and Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization o f Experience (H a rp e r & Row ,
1 9 7 4 ).
D eb o rah G O U L D is A ssistan t P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f S o c io lo g y , Llni-

versity o f P ittsb u rg h . She is in te re sted in e m o tio n s in relation to social m o v e m e n ts,
q u e e r stu d ie s, and social and political th eory and has w ritte n several p a p e rs on HIV
related activism .
M ichael F.. H A R K IN is P ro fe sso r o f A n th ro p o lo gy at the U n iversity o f W yom ing.

H e is the au th or o f The Fleiltsuks: Dialogues o f Culture and ITistory on the Northwest Coast
(U n iv ersity o f N e b rask a P re ss, 1 9 9 7 ).
E laine H A T F IE L D is P ro fe sso r o f P sy ch o lo gy at the U n iv ersity of H aw aii. She has

m ad e sign ifican t and influential c o n trib u tio n s to the social p sy ch o lo gy o f e m o tio n ,
in clu d in g her b o o k Psychology o f Emotion (H a rc o u r t, B racc, Jo van ovich , 1 9 9 2 ) and
she is c o -au th o r (w ith R ichard R ap so n ) o f I.ove, Sex, and Intimacy: Their Psychology,
Biology, and Flistory (H a rp e r C o llin s, 1993) Emotional contagion (C a m b rid g e
U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 9 4 ) and Love and Sex: Cross-cultural Perspectives (A llyn & B acon ,
1 9 9 6 /2 0 0 5 ).
A rlie R u sse ll H O C H S C H IL D is P ro fe sso r o f S o cio lo g y at the U n iv ersity o f

C alifo rn ia (B e rk e le y ). In 2001 she w as aw ard ed an A m erican S o c io lo g ic a l A sso c i
ation L ife tim e C o n trib u tio n s A w ard fo r h er w o rk on the e m o tio n s. She is the
au th or o f The Managed H eart: The Commercialization o f Human Feeling (U n iv ersity o f
C alifo rn ia P re ss, 1 9 8 3 ) and n u m e ro u s artic le s on the so cio lo g y o f e m o tio n . H er
m o re re ce n t b o o k s in clu de The Time Bind: When Home Becomes Work and Work Bccomes
Home (M e tro p o lita n /I Iolt 1 9 9 7 ); Global Woman: Nannies, Maids and Sex-Workers in the
New Economy (co -e d ite d w ith B. E h ren reich , M e tro p o litan B o o k s, 2 0 0 2 ); The Com
mercial Spirit o f Intimate Life and Other Essays (U n iv ersity o f C alifo rn ia P re ss, 2 0 0 3 ).
B irgitta II O I JE R is P ro fe sso r o f M edia and C o m m u n ic a tio n at the U n iversity o f

O r e b r o in Sw ed en . She is the au th or o f several artic le s on the the m ed ia and
m ean in g creation in the au dien ce.
Je ro e n JA N S Z is a Sen io r A sso ciate P ro fe sso r in the D e p a rtm e n t o f C o m m u n icatio n

Scien ce at the U n iv ersity o f A m ste rd a m and re se a rc h e r in the A m ste rd a m Sch o o l o f
C o m m u n ic a tio n s R e sea rch (A S C o R ). H e has w ritte n exten sively on video g a m e s
and th eir e m o tio n a l ap peal and on the h istory and th eory o f p sy ch o lo gy .
NOTES ON C O N T R I B U T O R S XVi i
Susann e K A R S T E D T is P ro fe sso r o f C rim in o lo g y in the Sch ool o f C rim in o lo g y ,

E d u catio n , S o c io lo g y and Social W ork at K e e le U n iv ersity . She is the au th or o f
several article s and has c o -e d ite d (w ith K . B u ssm an ) Social Dynamics of Crime and
Control: New Theories for a World in Transition (H a rt, 2 0 0 0 ) and (w ith G. D. L aF re e )
Democracy, Crime and Justice (the ANNALS o f the American Academy of Political and Social
Science Series) (S a g e , 2 0 0 6 ).
Rani K A W A LE is an in d e p e n d e n t re se arc h e r w o rk in g on q u e stio n s o f sexu ality and

space.
M ich ael K E M P A is a so cio -leg al th e o rist and a L c c tu re r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f

C rim in o lo g y at the U n iv ersity o f M e lb o u rn e. H e is the au th or o f several artic le s on
p o licin g and o th e r g o v e rn an ce p ro c e sse s.
T h e o d o re D. K E M P E R is P ro fe sso r o f S o cio lo g y at St. Jo h n ’ s U n iv e rsity , N ew

York. In 2 0 0 3 he w as aw ard ed an A m erican So cio lo g ica l A sso ciatio n L ifetim e
C o n trib u tio n s A w ard for his w ork on the e m o tio n s. H is b o o k s in clude /I Social
Interactional Theory of Emotions (W ile y , 1 9 7 8 ), Research Agendas in the Sociology
of Emotion (State U n iversity of N ew York P re ss, 1 9 9 0 ) and Social Structure and
Testosterone: Explorations of the Socio-bio-social Chain (R u tg e rs U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 9 0 ).
Sh erry l K L E IN M A N is P ro fe sso r o f S o c io lo g y at the U n iv ersity o f N o rth C arolin a

at C h ap el H ill. She w ork s on the so c io lo g y o f e m o tio n s and m e m o irs and is in te r
este d in c lass, race and g e n d e r and in m e th o d o lo g y . H er b o o k s in clu d c Feminist
Fieldwork Analysis (S a g e , 2 0 0 7 ), Opposing Ambitions: Gender and Identity in an Alternative
Organization, (U n iv ersity o f C h icago P re ss, 1 9 9 6 ) and Emotions and Fieldwork (S a g e ,
1 9 9 3 ).
Bettina L A N G E is U n iv ersity L e c tu re r in Law and R egu latio n and a Fellow

o f W olfson C o lle g e at O x fo rd U n iv ersity . She is the au th or o f Implementing E ll
Pollution Control: Law and Integration (C a m b r id g e U n iv e rsity P re ss, 2 0 0 8 ).
Kathy L A S T E R is A sso ciate P ro fe sso r in the Sch o o l o f Law at La T ro b c U n iv e rsity ,

M e lb o u rn e . She sp ecializes on legal cu ltu re and m u lticu ltu ralism , legal ed u cation
and gen d er. H e r b o o k s in clu de The Drama o f the Courtroom: A Filmography (F ed eratio n
P re ss, 2 0 0 0 ), Domestic Violence: Global Responses (A B A c a d e m ic , 2 0 0 0 ) and Law as
Culture (F e d e ratio n P re ss, 1 9 9 7 ).
D an iel L E F K O W IT Z is A sso ciate P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f A n th ro p o lo gy at

the U n iv ersity o f V irgin ia and C h air o f M E SA (M id d le E ast Stu d ies A sso c iatio n ). He
is the au th or o f Words and Stones: Language and the Israeli/ Palestinian Conflict (O x fo r d
U n iversity P re ss, 2 0 0 4 ).
Johan L IN D Q U IS T is A ssistan t P r o fe sso r of Social A n th ro p o lo gy at the U n iversity

o f S to c k h o lm . H e is the au th o r o f The Anxieties o f Mobility: Emotional Economies at
the Edge o f the Global City (U n iv ersity of H aw aii P re ss, 2 0 0 8 ) and c o -e d ito r (w ith
T. B o e llsto rff) of a sp ecial issu e o f Ethnos en titled Bodies o f Emotion: Rethinking Culture
and Emotion Through Southeast Asia (2 0 0 4 ).
N ik las L L IH M A N N (1 9 2 7 —1 9 9 8 ) w as a G e rm an so c io lo g ist, ad m in istratio n e x p e r t

and sy ste m s th e o rist. H e held p o sts at the u n iv ersities o f M u n ste r and Fran k fu rt
XVi i i NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
before becom in g a P ro fesso r o f Sociology at the U niversity o f Bielefeld in 1969,

w here he rem ained until his retirem en t in 1993. H is magnum opus. Die Gesellschaft der
Gesellschaft (T he Society of Society) appeared in 1997. English translations of his
book s includc Social Systems (Stan ford U niversity P ress, 1996) and Love as Passion: The
Codification of Intimacy (Stanford U niversity P ress, 1998).
C ath erin e L U T Z is a W atson Institute P ro fesso r (research ) and holds a joint

ap poin tm en t w ith the D ep artm e n t of A nth ropology at Brow n U niversity. She is the
author o f Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and their
Challenge to Western Theory (C h icago, 1988) and n um ero us articles on the an th ro
pology o f em otio n . H er m o st recen t b ook s includc Local Democracy under Siege:
Activism, Public Interests, and Private Politics (N ew York U niversity P ress, 2 0 0 7 ) and
Homcfront: A Military City and the American 20th Century (Beacon P ress, 2 0 0 1 , w inner
o f the L eed s Prize and the V ictor T u rn er Prize).
D anny M ILLE R is P rofessor o f M aterial C ulture in the D ep artm e n t o f A n th ro

pology at U n iversity C o lle g e , London . He has w ritten extensively on m aterial
cu ltu re, m ass con su m ption , value and new m edia and relationships. His recen t
book s include The Cell Phone: /In Anthropology o j Communication (B e rg, 2 0 0 6 ), The
Dialectics o f Shopping (U n iversity o f C hicago P ress, 2 0 0 1 ), Car Cultures (B e rg, 2 0 0 1 ),
The Internet: An Ethnographic Approach (B e rg, 2 0 0 0 ).
Kiran M IR C H A N D A N I is an A ssociate P ro fesso r in the D ep artm e n t o f Adult

Education and C oun selling Psych ology, U niversity o f Toronto. H er research and
teaching focuses on h om e-based w ork , telew ork , con tin gen t w ork, e n tre p re n e u r
ship, transnational service w ork and self-em ploy m en t and she is coord in ato r o f the
D em ocratizin g W orkplace L earnin g W orking G rou p at the CSEW .
C harles M O R G A N collab orated w ith Ja m e s Averill in the w ritin g o f the article

included in this volum e, w hich w as based on his M a ste r’ s D issertation .
Pat O ’ M A L LE Y is a P rofessor in the D ep artm e n ts o f Sociology and A n th ropology

and o f Law at C arleton U niversity, O ttaw a. He has published w idely in the field
o f risk and secu rity , and has been a m em b er o f various go vern m en t b odies w orking
in related areas o f crim inal ju stice, d ru g policy and crim e prevention . His book s
includc Risk, Uncertainty and Government (Cavendish P ress, 2 0 0 4 ), Crime and the Risk
Society (D artm o u th , 1 9 8 8 ), Crime Prevention in Australia (Federation P ress, 1997) and
Law Capitalism and Democracy: A Sociology o f Australian Legal Order (G e o rg e Allen and
U n w in , 1983).
Yael NAVARO-YAS1 UN L cctu rcs in the D ep artm e n t o f Social A n th ropology at the

U niversity o f C am b rid ge. H er w ork ex p lo re s affect, sub jectivity, and psy ch ical/
psych ological m echan ism s in the dom ains o f politics, the public sph ere, b u reau
cracy, and law. She is author o f Faces o f the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey
(P rin ceton U niversity P ress, 2 0 0 2 ), and has recently co -edited (w ith Jane C ow an) a
special issue o f Anthropological Theory entitled ‘ Phantasm atic R ealities, Passionate
States: Special Issue in M em ory o f Begona A r c tx a g a ,’ 7 (1 ), 2 0 0 7 .
M crvi PA N T T I is a research fellow in the A m sterdam Sch ool o f C om m u nication s

R esearch (A S C o R ), U niversity o f A m sterdam and in the D ep artm en t o f C o m
NOTES ON C O N T R I B U T O R S XiX
m u n ication , U n iversity o f H elsin ki. She has published b o o k s and article s on the
n ation al cin em a , p o p u lar television and e m o tio n s in n ew s jo u rn a lism .
D ick F O U N T A IN is a tech n ical au th or and a d ire c to r o f D en n is Publishing. H e is

the au th or (w ith D avid R o b in s) o f Cool Rules: Anatomy o f an Attitude (R e ak tio n B o o k s,
2000 ).
L au rie J. P R IC E is P ro fe sso r o f S o cio cu ltu ra l and A p p lied A n th ro p o lo gy at the

C alifo rn ia State U n iversity (H a y w a rd ). She has co n d u cted research on E cu ad o r
d ealin g w ith illn ess m a n a g e m e n t, cu ltu ral iden tity , g e o g ra p h ie s o f p o w e r and
p a rtic ip a to ry planning.
Alan R A D LF.Y is P ro fe sso r o f Social P sy ch ology in the D e p a r tm e n t o f Social

S cien ces at L o u gh b o ro u gh U n iv e rsity . H is is the au th or o f n u m e ro u s artic le s on the
social p sy c h o lo g ic al asp ects o f health and illn ess, and on the aesth etics o f illn ess
re p re se n tatio n . H e is the au th or o f Prospects o f Heart Surgery (Sp rin ge r, 1 9 8 8 ); The
Body and Social Psychology (S p rin g e r, 1 9 9 1 ); Making Sense o f Illness (S a g e , 1 9 9 4 ), and
has e d ite d the volu m e IVorlds o f Illness (R o u tle d g e , 1 9 9 3 ).
R ich ard L. R A P S O N is P r o fe sso r of H isto ry at the U n iv ersity of H aw aii and w as

F ou n d er and D ir e c to r o f N ew C o lle g e . H e has w ritte n n u m e ro u s b o o k s on
A m erican h isto ry and cu ltu re and is co -au th o r (w ith E laine H atfield ) o f Love, Sex,
and Intimacy: Their Psychology, Biology, and History (H a rp e r C o llin s, 1 9 9 3 ) Emotional
contagion (C a m b r id g e U n iv ersity P re ss, 1 9 9 4 ) and Love and Sex: Cross-cultural
Perspectives (A llyn & B acon , 1 9 9 6 / 2 0 0 5 ) .
W illiam M . R E D D Y is the W illiam T. L ap rad c P ro fe sso r o f H isto ry and P ro fe sso r o f

C u ltu ral A b n th ro p o lo g y at D u k e U n iv e rsity . He is the au th or o f The Navigation
o f Peeling: A Frameworkf o r the History o f Emotions (C a m b r id g e U n iv e rsity P re ss, 2 0 0 1 );
The Invisible Code: Honor and Sentiment in Post-revolutionary France, 1 8 1 S —1 8 4 8
(U n iv ersity o f C alifo rn ia P re ss, 1 9 9 7 ), and o f several artic le s on the h isto rio g rap h y
and eth n ograp h y o f e m o tio n . H e is cu rren tly w ritin g a h istory o f ro m an tic love.
C h arlie L . R E E V E is A sso ciate P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f P sy ch o lo gy at the

U n iv ersity o f N o rth C aro lin a at C h arlo tte . H e has pub lish ed n u m e ro u s scien tific
a rtic le s, p articu larly on p sy c h o m etric s.
B arry R IC H A R D S is P ro fe sso r o f Pu blic C o m m u n ic a tio n and H ead o f R e sea rc h at

the M ed ia Sch o o l at the U n iversity o f B o u rn e m o u th . H e is au th or o f Disciplines
o f Delight: The Psychoanalysis o f Popular Culture (F re e A sso ciatio n B o o k s, 1 9 9 4 ),
Im ages of Freud (P algravc M acm illan , 1 9 9 0 ), The Dynamics o f Advertising
(H a rw o o d A cad e m ic P re ss, 2 0 0 0 ) and Emotional Governance: Politics, Media and
Terror (P algrave M acm illan , 2 0 0 7 ).
D avid R O B IN S (1 945 2 0 0 7 ) w as an u n d e rg ro u n d jo u rn a list, so c io lo g ist and charity

w o rk er and auth or, am o n g st o th e r b o o k s, o f Tarnished Visions: Crime and Conflict in the
Inner City (O x fo r d U n iv ersity P re ss, 1 9 9 2 ).
Steven G. R O G E L B E R G is P ro fe sso r o f O rgan izatio n al Scien ce and P ro fe sso r o f

P sy ch ology at the U n iversity o f N o rth C aro lin a at C h arlo tte. H e is also D ire c to r o f
XX NOTES ON C O N T R I B U T O R S
O rgan izatio n al S c ic n ce , D ir e c to r o f In du strial and O rgan izatio n al P sy ch o lo gy , and

is the f o u n d e r /d ir e c to r o f the O rgan izatio n al Scicn cc C o n su ltin g and R e search
U n it. H is re se arch in te re sts in clu d c team e ffe ctiv e n e ss, health and e m p lo y e e w e ll
b ein g , m e e tin g s at w o rk , organ ization al research m e th o d s, and organ ization al
d e v e lo p m e n t. H e se rv e d as E d ito r-in -C h ie f o f the tw o -v o lu m e Encyclopedia o f Indus
trial and Organizational Psychology (S a g e , 2 0 0 6 ) and the Handbook o f Research Methods
in Industrial and Organizational Psychology (B la c k w e ll, 2 0 0 2 , 2 0 0 4 ).
N ik olas R O S E is the Ja m e s M a rlin W h ite P ro fe sso r o f S o c io lo g y , and the D ire c to r

o f the B IO S C e n tre for the Study o f B io scien ce, B io m e d icin e , B io tech n o lo g y and
Society at the L on d on Sch o o l o f E co n o m ics and Political Scien ce. H is b o o k s include
The Psychological Complex: Psychology, Politics and Society in England, 1 8 6 9 —1 9 3 9
(R o u tle d g e , 1 9 8 4 ); Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self (R o u tle d g e ,
1 9 8 9 ); Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power and Personhood (C a m b r id g e U n iversity
P re ss, 1 9 9 6 ); Powers o f Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (C a m b r id g e U n iversity
P re ss, 1 9 9 9 ), and The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the
Twenty-First Century (P rin c eto n U n iv ersity P re ss, 2 0 0 6 ).
C lifford S H E A R IN G is P ro fe sso r o f C rim in o lo g y and D ir e c to r o f the In stitu te o f

C rim in o lo g y at the U n iv ersity o f C ap e Tow n. H is b o o k s in clu de Imagining Security
(w ith Je n n ifer W o o d ; W illan , 2 0 0 7 ) and Governing Security: Explorations in Policing
and Justice (w ith L cs Jo h n sto n ; R o u tlc d g e , 2 0 0 3 ).
M im i S H E L L E R is a V isitin g A sso ciate P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f S o cio lo g y

and A n th ro p o lo gy at S w arth m o re and a V isitin g Sen io r R e search Fellow in the
Faculty o f A rts and Scien ces at the U n iv e rsity o f L an caster. H e r b o o k s in clude
Consuming the Caribbean: From Awawaks to Zombies (R o u tle d g e , 2 0 0 3 ), Democracy After
Slavery: Black Publics and Peasant Radicalism in H aiti and Jam aica (M acm illan , 2 0 0 0 ),
Tourism Mobilities, Places to Play (R o u tlc d g c , 2 0 0 4 ) and Mobile Technologies o j the City
(R o u tle d g e , 2 0 0 6 ).
Susan S H O T T w as b ased at the U n iv e rsity o f C h icago. H e r 1979 artic le ‘E m o tio n

and social life: a sy m b o lic in tc ra ctio n ist an aly sis’ is w id ely re c o g n ise d as an early
and influential co n trib u tio n in the so c io lo g y o f e m o tio n s.
A llen C . S M IT H , III c o -au th o re d ‘ M an agin g e m o tio n s in m e d ical s c h o o l’ w h ilst at

the U n iversity o f N o rth C aro lin a at C h apel H ill.
G re g M . SM IT H is A sso ciate P ro fe sso r o f C o m m u n icatio n at G e o rg ia State

U n iv e rsity , A tlan ta. H e has w ritten exten sively on m e d iate d com m u n icatio n and
e m o tio n s and is au th o r o f Beautiful TV: The Art and Argument o f Ally McBeal (U n i
versity o f T exas P re ss, 2 0 0 7 ), Film Structure and the Emotion System (C a m b rid g e
U n iv ersity P re ss, 2 0 0 3 ), On a Silver Platter: CD-ROMs and the Promises o f a New
Technology (N e w York U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 9 9 ) and Passionate Views: Film, Cognition,
and Emotion (Joh n s H o p k in s U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 9 9 ).
C h ristian e S P IT Z M U L L E R is A ssistan t P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f P sy ch ology

at the U n iv ersity o f H o u sto n . She has pub lish ed scientific artic le s in the fields o f
o ccu p ation al p sy ch o lo gy and organ ization al behaviour.
D eb o rah C . S T E A R N S is A d ju n ct P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f P sy ch ology at

NOTES ON C O N T R I B U T O R S XXi
G e o rg e to w n U n iv e rsity . She e arn ed h er Ph .D . fro m the U n iversity o f Pennsylvania

and h er re se arch in te re sts in clu de p e rso n p e rc e p tio n and in tim ate relation sh ip s
w ith a p a rtic u la r fo cu s on pow er, gen d er, se x u ality and se x u al o rie n tatio n .
P eter N . S T E A R N S is P ro fe sso r o f H isto ry at G e o rg e M ason U n iv e rsity . H is b o o k s

in clu d c Emotions and Social Change: Towards a New Psychohistory (w ith C . Z . S te arn s;
H o lm e s and M eier, 1 9 8 9 ); American Cool: Constructing a Twentieth-century Emotional
Style (N Y U P re ss, 19 9 4 ); An Emotional History o f the United Stales (c o -c d itc d w ith Jan
L e w is, N Y U P re ss, 1 9 9 8 ); Anxious Parents: A History o f Modern Childrearing in America
(N Y U P re ss, 2 0 0 3 ); American Fear: The Causes and Consequences o f High Anxiety
(R o u tle d g e , 2 0 0 6 ) and Anger: The Struggle f o r Emotional Control in America’s History
(w ith C . Z . S te a rn s; U n iv ersity o f C h icago P re ss, 1 9 8 6 ).
N athan S Z N A ID E R is P ro fe sso r o f S o cio lo g y in the Sch ool o f B eh avioural Scien ces

at the A c a d e m ic C o lle g e o f Tel-Aviv-Yaffo. He is cu rren tly w o rk in g on a m o n o g ra p h
on m e m o ry and hum an rig h ts, and his b o o k s in clu dc The Holocaust and Memory in the
Global Age (T em p le U n iv ersity P re ss, 2 0 0 5 ), The Compassionate Temperament: Care and
Cruelty in Modern Society (R o w m an & L ittle fie ld , B old er, C o. 2 0 0 0 ), and Uber das
Mitleid im Kapitalismus (E d itio n M iin ch en , 2 0 0 0 ).
N ig e l T H R IF T is the V icc -C h an ce llo r and a P ro fe sso r at the U n iv ersity o f W arw ick.

H e is also a V isitin g P ro fe sso r o f G e o g rap h y at O x fo r d U n iv ersity , and an E m e ritu s
P ro fe sso r o f G e o g rap h y at B ristol U n iv ersity . H e is a Fellow o f the British A cadem y
and an A cad em ician o f the A cadem y o f Social Scien ces. H is b o o k s include Spatial
Formations (S a g e , 1 9 9 6 ); Money/ Space: Geographies oj Monetary Transformations (w ith
A. L eysh on ; R o u tle d g e , 1 9 9 7 ); Cities: Reimagining the Urban (w ith A . A m in ; Polity,
2 0 0 2 ); Automobilities (w ith M . F ea th c rsto n e and J. LIrry; Sage, 2 0 0 5 ) and Non-
Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect (R o u tlc d g c , 2 0 0 7 ).
Silvan S. T O M K IN S (1 9 1 1 —1 9 9 1 ) w as on e o f the m o st influential th e o rists on

e m o tio n and e m o tio n al e x p re ssio n o f the tw en tieth ccn tu ry . A fte r co m p le tin g a
d o c to ra te in ph ilosoph y and w o rk in g on p e rso n a lity asse ssm e n t at the H arvard
P sy ch o lo gical C lin ic u n d e r the tu te lag e o f H en ry M u rray and R o b e rt W h ite, he
to o k up a p o st at the P sy ch ology D e p a r tm e n t at P rin ceton U n iversity in 1 9 4 7 . His
Magnum Opus w as the fou r v o lu m e w ork Affect, Imagery, Consciousness. T h e first tw o
v o lu m es w ere pub lish ed in 1962 and 1963 and the last tw o w ere se n t to the
p u b lish ers d u rin g the final y ear o f his life. In 1965 Tom kin s h elp ed to establish the
C e n te r for C o g n itio n and A ffect at the G rad u ate C e n te r o f the C ity U n iversity o f
N ew York and from 1968 until his re tire m e n t he w ork ed at L ivin gston C o lle g e ,
R u tg e rs U n iversity .
Im ogen T Y L E R is a L e c tu re r in the S o cio lo g y D e p a rtm e n t at L an caste r U n iv ersity .

H e r re se arch fo cu se s on the in te rse c tio n s o f gen d er, race and class re se arch in the
fo rm a tio n o f social and cu ltu ral id e n titie s and has a p a rtic u la r in te re st in social
m argin ality and ‘b o rd e r id e n titie s’ . She is cu rren tly w o rk in g on a m o n o g ra p h on
social ab jectio n .
Ja m e s M . W IL C E is P ro fe sso r o f A n th ro p o lo gy at N o rth e rn A rizon a U n iv ersity . He

is the au th o r ol Eloquence in Trouble: The Poetics and Politics of Complaint in Rural
Bangladesh (O x fo r d U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 9 8 ) and o f Crying Shame: Metaculture,
X X i i NOTES ON C O N T R I B U T O R S
Modernity, and the Exaggerated Death of Lament (B la c k w e ll, in p r e ss). H e has e d ited
Social and Cultural Lives o f Immune Systems (R o u tle d g e , 2 0 0 3 ).
E lizabeth A . W IL S O N is an A u stralian R e sea rc h Fellow in the Sch o o l of E nglish ,

M edia and P e rfo rm in g A rts at the U n iv ersity o f N e w South W ales, Sydn ey. She has
a Ph .D . (U S y d ) in P sy ch o lo gy and is au th or o f a b o o k on n e u ro sc ie n c e en titled
Psychosomatic: Feminism and the Neurological Body (D u k e U n iv ersity P re ss, 2 0 0 4 ).
Preface
The p ro cess o f p roducin g a R ead er o f this kind is challenging, inherently frustrating

in som e w ays, and yet also trem endously in stru ctive. We have learn ed m uch along
the w ay, and accum u lated many deb ts that we w ant to ackn ow ledge here. We are
gratefu l, first and fo re m o st, to the auth ors w ho have given their p erm ission s fo r us
to rep rin t extracts from their previously published articles or book s. The com m en ts
o f the anonym ous review ers at the early stages o f the p ro cess w ere extrem ely
helpful, and w e arc grateful for them . We w ish to thank the several frien ds and
colleagues w ho respo n d ed with advice and suggestion s: although we did not always
use them , they go t us thinking. In particular, our thanks go to A ndrew Barry,
G eorgin a B orn , Steve B row n, R os G ill, K atherine Joh n son , Sonia Livin gstone, Peter
I.unt, K ate N ash, and Andy Pratt. At R o u tlcd gc, wc wish to thank G erhard Boom -
garden w ho so w arm ly w elcom ed the idea o f this p ro jec t, and Ann C a rte r who
un d ertook the arduou s task o f sourcin g perm ission s.
O u r m o st im p o rtan t thanks go to our tw o children, Ezra and Anna. They are
too young to realize w hat exactly has been com petin g w ith them for o u r tim e and
attention — yet they have shown a rem arkable deal o f un derstandin g and patience
(m o st o f the tim e ), while never ceasing to rew ard us with their laugh ter and love.
This book is for them and for their gen eration .
Monica Grcco — Goldsmiths, University o f London

Paul Stenner —University o f Brighton
2008
Acknowledgements
T h e p u b lish ers w ould like to thank the fo llo w in g fo r th eir p e rm issio n to re p rin t
th eir m aterial:
A m erican E co n o m ic A sso ciatio n fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t Jo n E lster, Emotions

and Economic Theory, in Jo u rn al o f Economic Literature ( 1 9 9 8 ), volu m e 36 (1 ),
pp. 6 3 —6 8 .
A m erican S o c io lo g ic a l A sso ciatio n lo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t A llen C . Sm ith and
Sh crry l K lcin m an , M anaging Emotions in Medical School, in Social Psychology
Quarterly (1 9 8 9 ), v o lu m e 52 (1 ), pp. 5—6 9 .
Blackw ell P u blish ing for p e rm issio n to re p rin t N o r b c r t E lias, On Changes in
Agressiveness, pp. 157—166, 4 7 5 —4 7 8 ; W. Rav C ro zie r, Self-Consciousness in Shame,
in Journal f o r the Theory o f Social Behaviour, v o lu m e 28 (3 ), pp. 0 2 1 ; A gn eta H .
Fisch cr and Jc r o c n Ja n sz, Reconciling Emotions with Western Personhood, in Journal for
the Theory o f Social Behaviour, volu m e 25 (1 ), pp. 0 2 1 ; N igel T h rift, Intensities o f
Feeling, v o lu m e 8 6 B (1 ), pp. 6 4 6 8 ; P eter F.. S. F re u n d , The Expressive Body
(1 9 9 0 ), v o lu m e 12 (4 ), pp. 4 5 2 - 4 7 7 ; C h arlie L. R e e v e , Steven G. R o g e lb e rg ,
C h ristian e S p itzm iiller and N atalie D iG ia c o m o , The Caring-Killing Paradox,
in Journal o f Applied Social Psychology, volu m e 35 (1 ), pp. 1 1 9 —135; D an iel
Lcfkovvitz, Investing in Emotion, in Jo u rn al o f Linguistic Anthropology, volu m e 13 (1 ),
pp. 7 1 —9 7 ; Bettin a L an ge , The Emotional Dimension in Legal Regulation, in Jo u rn al o f
Law and Society (2 0 0 2 ), volu m e 29 (1 ), pp. 197—2 2 5 .
C a m b rid g e U n iv ersity P ress fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t T h o m a s D ix o n , From Passions
to Emotions ( 2 0 0 3 ), pp. 1—3, 4 , 2 1 —2 4 ; C ath erin e L u tz, Engendered Emotion: Gender,
power and the rhetoric o f emotional control in American discourse, in L u tz and
A b u -L u g h o d , Language and the Politics o f Emotion (1 9 9 0 ); Ja c k B arb alet, Emotion in
Social Life and Social Theory, in Social Theory and Social Structure ( 1 9 9 8 ), pp. 8—9,
xxvi A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S
11—13; Silvan S. T o m kin s, Revisions in Script Theory, in Tom kin s and D e m o s,

Exploring Affect ( 1 9 9 5 ); E lizabeth A . W ilso n , The Work of Antidepressants, in BioSoci-
eties ( 2 0 0 6 ), v o lu m e 1 (1 ), pp. 125—1 3 1 ; N ik olas R o se , Disorders Without Borders,
in BioSocieties (2 0 0 6 ), v o lu m e 1 (4 ), pp. 4 6 5 —4 8 4 ; e x tra c ts fro m G re g M . Sm ith ,
Film Structure and the Emotion System (2 0 0 3 ), p p .4 1 —5 1 ; E laine H atfield and R ic h
ard L. R ap so n , Emotional Contagion, in T ic d e n s and L e ac h , The Social Life o f
Emotions (2 0 0 4 ), pp. 129—143.
C olin C am p b ell fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t e x tra c ts from C olin C a m p b e ll, The
Romantic Ethic and the Spirit o f Modern Consumerism (1 9 8 7 ) pp. I 2; 202 206.
D uke U n iv ersity P ress for p e rm issio n to re p rin t M ich ael E. H ark in , Feeling
and Thinking in Memory and Forgetting, in Ethnohistory (2 0 0 3 ), volu m e 50 (2 ),
p p .261 -28 4 .
E lsevier Ltd fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t Kathy l.a ste r and Pat O ’ M alley, Sensitive
New-Age Laws, in International Jo urn al o f the Sociology o f Law ( 1 9 9 6 ), v o lu m e 24 (1 ).
O x fo r d U n iv ersity P ress fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t e x tra c ts from M a rg u e rite
F eitlo w itz, A Lexicon o f Terror ( 1 9 9 9 ), pp. 4 8 —4 9 , 5 0 —6 0 .
Polity P ress L td for p e rm issio n to re p rin t e x tra c ts from D an iel M iller, A Theory o f
Shopping (1 9 9 8 ) pp. 15—21.
R eak tion B o o k s L td fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t e x tra c ts from D ic k P ountain and
D avid R o b in s, Cool Rules ( 2 0 0 0 ), pp. 19—32.
R ow m an & L ittlefield fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t e x tra c ts from N athan Sznaider, The
Compassionate Temperament (2 0 0 1 ).
Sage P u blication s L td fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t M im i Sh ellcr, Automotive Emotions, in
Theory, Culture and Society (2 0 0 4 ), volu m e 21 ( 4 / 5 ) , pp. 2 2 1 —2 4 2 ; Alan R ad ley ,
Portrayals of Suffering in Body and Society ( 2 0 0 2 ), volu m e 8 (3 ), pp. 1 - 2 3 ; K iran
M irch an d an i, Challenging R acial Silences in Studies of Emotion Work in Organizational
Studies (2 0 0 3 ), v o lu m e 24 (5 ), pp. 7 2 1 —7 4 2 ; Steph en Fin em an , Getting the
Measure of Emotion — and the Cautionary Tale of Emotional Intelligence, in Human
Relations ( 2 0 0 4 ), v o lu m e 57 (6 ), pp. 7 1 9 —7 4 0 ; B irgitta H o ijer, The Audience and
Media Reporting o f Human Suffering, in Media, Culture and Society ( 2 0 0 4 ), v o lu m e 26
(4 ), pp. 5 1 3 —5 3 1 ; M inna A slam a and M e rv i P antti, Talking Alone, in European
Journal o f Cultural Studies ( 2 0 0 6 ), v o lu m e 9 (2 ), pp. 167—184; Susann e K a r stc d t,
Emotions and Criminal Justice, in Theoretical Criminology ( 2 0 0 2 ), v o lu m e 6 (3 ),
pp. 2 9 9 3 1 7 ; A ric F re ib e rg , Affective Versus Effective Justice, in Punishment and
Society (2 0 0 1 ), v o lu m e 3 (2 ), pp. 2 6 5 - 2 7 8 ; Yacl N avaro-Y ashin , Make-Believe
Papers, Legal Forms and the Counterfeit, in Anthropological Theory ( 2 0 0 7 ), volu m e 7
(1 ), pp. 7 9 - 9 8 .
Stan ford U n iversity P ress for p e rm issio n to re p rin t N ik las L uh m an n , tran slated by
Jo h n B ed n arz, Jr, Individuality o f Psychic Systems, in Social Systems, © 1996 by the
B o ard o f T ru ste e s o f the L clan d Stan ford Jr. U n iversity for the tran slatio n ; 1 9 8 4
by Suh rk am p V crlag for the o rig in al G e rm an edition .
Taylor & Fran cis Jo u rn a ls for p e rm issio n to re p rin t Johan L in d q u ist, Negotiating
Shame in the Indonesian Borderlands, in Ethnos ( 2 0 0 4 ), volu m e 69 (4 ), pp. 4 8 7 —5 0 8 ;
R ani K aw ale, Inequalities o f the H eart, in Social and Cultural Geography (2 0 0 4 ),
volu m e 5 (4 ), pp. 5 6 5 —5 7 7 ; Ben A n d e rso n , Domestic Geographies o f Affect, in Social
and Cultural Geography ( 2 0 0 5 ), volu m e 6 (5 ), pp. 6 4 5 —6 5 9 ; A n n e-M arie F ortier,
Pride Politics and Multiculturalist Citizenship, in Ethnic and R acial Studies (2 0 0 5 ),
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S X X V i i
volu m e 28 (3 ), pp. 5 59—5 7 8 ; Im ogen Tyler, Chav Mum, Chav Scum, in Feminist
Media Studies (2 0 0 8 ), volu m e 8 (1 ); B arry R ich a rd s, The Emotional Deficit
in Political Communication, in Political Communication ( 2 0 0 4 ), v o lu m e 21,
pp. 3 3 9 - 3 5 2 .
Th e U n iv ersity of C h icago P ress fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t W illiam M . R c d d v ,
Against Constructionism, in Current Anthropology (1 9 9 7 ); A rlie R u sse ll H o ch sch ild ,
Emotion Work, Feeling Rules and Social Structure, in American Journal o f Sociology
(1 9 7 9 ); E rv in g G o ffm an , Embarrassment and Social Organization, in American
Journal i f Sociology (1 9 5 6 ); Susan S h o tt, Emotion and Social life , in American Journal
o f Sociology (1 9 7 9 ); D eb o rah G o u ld , Rock the Boat, D on’t Rock the Boat, Baby, in
G o o d w in , Ja sp e r and P o llctta, Passionate Politics (2 0 0 1 ).
V erso for p e rm issio n to re p rin t e x tra c ts from Ju d ith B utler, P re c ario u s L ife (2 0 0 6 ),
pp. 1 9 , 2 0 - 2 3 , 2 3 - 2 5 .
T h e p u b lish ers have m ad e every e ffo rt to co n ta c t au th o rs and co p y rig h t h o ld e rs o f

w ork s re p rin te d in Emotions. T h is has n o t b een m ad e p o ssib le in every case how ever,
and w e w ou ld w elc o m e c o rre sp o n d e n c e from in dividuals o r co m p a n ies w e have
b een un able to trace.
I n t r o d u c t i o n : e m o t i o n and
social science
ONG A KEY interest amongst psychologists and biologists, the study of

L emotions has become increasingly im portant to the work of social scientists in
the course of the last three decades. The sociology and anthropology of emotions, for
instance, are now well established sub-disciplines with their own textbooks, courses
and research networks. Beyond sociology and anthropology however, concern
with emotion, passion, feeling, mood and sentiment - let us for convenience call it
'affective life' - has come to provide a shared focal point for an emerging community
of scholars and students based in a wide range of disciplines including history,
geography, cultural studies, politics, economics, legal studies and criminology, media
studies, gender studies, management studies; the list could go on. The Em otions: A
S o cia l Science Reader has been designed to give students, scholars and the general
reader a birds-eye view of some of this research activity. The task of addressing such
a vast and complex area of work may appear overambitious, and the result of our
efforts is certainly destined to remain provisional. Nevertheless, we considered it
im portant to offer a collection framed in terms of 'social science' broadly defined
rather than, as is more often the case, in terms of an individual discipline or research
tradition. It is im portant for the simple reason that most of us researchers, scholars
and students are so preoccupied with the overwhelming number of developments in
our own discipline or sub-discipline, that it has become alm ost unthinkable to 'see
the wood for the trees' and to strive for a more general perspective. The recent
proliferation of publications on emotions across the field, though in itself a positive
development, has compounded this problem. In many cases, there is a noticeable
tendency to celebrate the conceptual novelty (still) associated with the study of affect
and emotion, at the expense of rigorous reflection on continuities and differences with
previous research. The inclusive notion of social science adopted in this volume is
informed by the idea that academic disciplines are historical creatures in a constant
2 INTRODUCTION: EMOTION AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
process of change; some changes - in the type of questions asked, or in the manner of
asking them - are discipline-specific, while others transcend disciplinary boundaries.
Our aim has been to capture the more general significance of the study of affect and
emotion for the social sciences, as well as to give a sense of how this is played out
in the context of specific sub-fields. We have thus deliberately tried to give a sense of
the diversity of perspectives that have emerged over the years from a variety of
intellectual traditions. As a whole, the collection is intended to provide an intro
duction to the key debates, concepts and modes of approach that have been developed
by social scientists for the study of emotion and affective life.
It is in the nature of a Reader to present but a selection of a ll the authors or
texts that might have been included, and this volume is no exception. Having stressed
that variety and inclusiveness have been key crite ria for us in putting together this
collection, it is equally im portant to stress that our selections cannot claim to be
representative of all that has been accomplished in social science research on the
emotions. We have gathered together texts that, in our view, could productively be
made to speak to each other in the interest of facilitating their understanding and
discussion; we have alm ost exclusively drawn from traditions of qualitative, rather
than quantitative research. We expect that readers w ill appreciate our editorial
choices differently, at least to some degree, depending on th eir own disciplinary and
intellectual location. Nevertheless, we hope they w ill find that the collection as a
whole reflects much of the diversity constituting the field, and that it works in stim u
lating learning and debate. As editors, we have considered it im portant to ease access
to the m aterial by providing a substantive introduction at the beginning of this volume,
as well as shorter introductions to each of the sections within it. The general intro
ductory overview is designed to give a sense of the background, both intellectual and
social, against which the study of emotion and affect in social science has emerged
and evolved in recent years. By contextualizing the m aterial in this way, our intent has
been to make some of the fundamental continuities and differences inherent in the
field more clearly intelligible to readers. The final section of the introduction outlines
the structure of the Reader and a number of other features of the volume.
T H E A F F E C T I V E SOCIETY
If interest in emotions and affect has burgeoned in social science, this is not due
simply to intellectual reasons, internal to the disciplines in question. A concern with
'the em otional' is indeed apparent in all aspects of social life and, at one level, the
turn to affect and emotions in social science reflects and responds to this broader
societal development. For a number of years now, social scientists have observed that
emotions have become conspicuous and increasingly im portant in the form s of inter
action and com munication that are typical of late - or post-modern societies (see,
Lasch 1978; Wouters 1986; W illia m s 2001). We now live, it is claimed, in an 'affe ct
ive society' (Watson 1999, Squire 2001). This diagnosis has been made not only in
relation to society as a whole, but also in relation to the specific institutions, sectors
or sub-systems that make it up. Let us unpack this last point first. According to
classical historical sociology, a key characteristic of modern societies is the fact of
INTRODUCTION: EMOTION AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 3
being structured into functionally distinct sectors or sub-systems (as opposed to

being predominantly structured into clan-based segments or into a fixed hierarchy
of types of people, as in feudal Europe). The law, economics, medicine, education,
politics, science, a rt and so on are examples of such functionally specialized spheres
of social activity. In relation to each of these, it is now rem arkably easy to find
specialists commenting on an 'affective turn' within their area of interest.
In the crim inal justice system, to give a first example, emotions have become
conspicuous in connection with what Bottoms has called 'populist punitiveness'
(1995; see also P ratt 2000, Garland 2001) and, in a more positive vein, with
emerging practices of 'restorative justice' that bring victim s of crime fact-to-face
with perpetrators (Van Stokkom 2002; M asters and Sm ith 1998; Braithw aite,
1993). For some this is an unwelcome shift from the 'jurisdiction of law' to the
'jurisdiction of em otion' (Garapon, 1996), w hilst it is embraced by others as a
positive corrective to an overly dry and rational system (Freiberg 2001, Solomon
1995). Others still prefer to take the position of neutral observers (Lange 2002). On
the one hand, em otionalization is sometimes critic a lly associated with the role of the
mass media and with spectacular events such as the OJ Simpson tria l. On the other
hand, it may also be championed in the interest of taking emotions and 'sensibilities'
(e.g. 'em otional harm ') seriously in the making, applying and enforcing of laws.
Theorists of the media, to give a second example, have sim ilarly noted the rise of
a new culture of intim acy associated pa rticu la rly with the emergence of 'factual
television' and its sub-genres - ta lk shows (both traditional and 'tabloid') docu-soaps
and docu-drama, and reality T V (Dovey 2000; Bignell 20 00 a and 2000b; Coles
2000; Holmes and Jermyn 2004; H ill 2005). F irst person media and factual tele
vision are characterized by subjective, autobiographical and confessional modes of
expression, with narratives involving the intimate revelation of real life experiences
of deviance, crime, illness or accident. Some see this squarely as a form of exploitation
of sometimes tragic circumstances, turning audiences into voyeuristic consumers of
second-hand, or 'vicariou s' emotions (M estrovic 1997). Others have argued that
these shows offer the opportunity of representation to m arginalized groups, in what
has been described as a 'counter public sphere' (Shattuc 1997; see also Gamson
1998). Others yet have stressed how tabloid shows such as Je rry S pringer constitute
an 'em otional public sphere'. Rather than simply undermining the possibility for
rational debate, this emotional public sphere offers a forum for the airing of moral
dilemmas in the absence of traditional community fram ew orks (Lu nt and Stenner
2005). A shift towards em otionally saturated modes of expression is also evident
in the context of news reporting (Altheide 2002), and has been associated to a
'hybridization' of television genres whereby the traditional distinction between
information and entertainment has been eroded (Brants 1998; Dovey 2000; Coles
2000). This hybridization, in turn, is sometimes held responsible for a general climate
of 'com passion fatigue' (M oeller 1999; Tester 2001).
The fields of business and management offer a third example. These have seen a
great proliferation of academic publications and manuals on the importance of
addressing emotions in the workplace. Topics range from how to recognize and
handle 'to x ic' emotions (e.g. Frost 2004, 2007; Jordan et al. 2006) to the relevance
of emotional intelligence in decision making and leadership (Jordan et al. 2007; Kerr
et al. 2006; Humphrey 2002; Cherniss and Goleman 2001; Goleman, Boyatzis and
M cKee 2002; Goleman 1998). A clear symptom of the new conspicuousness of
emotions in the workplace is the inauguration, in 2005, of the International Jo u rn a l
o f Work, O rganization and Em otion, alongside a steady stream of journal special
issues in the field. A sim ilar conspicuousness of emotion is evident in the economy
more generally, where the emphasis on consumption is closely related to the fore
grounding of aesthetic and hedonistic concerns. The study of the role of emotion in
marketing has been expanding over the last 25 years (Erevelles and Granfield 1998),
while the com m ercialization of emotions has become a topic in journals of general
sociology (M a rtin et al. 2003). Companies now explicitly adopt strategies of
'em otional branding' (Gobe 2001).
The political sphere, to mention a fourth example, has allegedly abandoned its
former seriousness and severity and become the kind of setting where people expect to
see, and experience, emotional engagement. Prom inent politicians now routinely sport
caring and smiling facia l expressions, where once it was com pulsory to look stern
and disciplined. 'Feel good7 policies are 'spun' along with images crafted for their
emotional appeal (such as senior ministers wearing baseball caps or carrying low
strung electric guitars) and it is commonplace for serious world events to be mediated
via accounts of personal joys and sorrows. Policies, we are told, are increasingly
tailored around predictions of mass 'fea rs' and mass 'hopes' (Shearing and Kempa
2004; Furedi 2005; Braithw aite 2004). Liberal politics is said to depend upon
'em otional intelligence' (Shalin 2004) and the new international security paradigm
upon 'em otionology' rather than 'ideology' (Pupavac 2004, 2006).
M any more accounts of the em otionalization of different sectors of social life
could be provided. Observers of the education system, for example, write of 'the
emotional turn in education' (Tamboukou 2003: 209). Education has allegedly
become more 'child centred', stressing dialogue and emotional engagement over
didactic and rational instruction; there is increasing discussion of the 'pleasures' and
other affective dimensions of pedagogy (B oler 1999; M cW illia m 1999; Schutz and
Lanehart 2002; Bendelow and M ayall 2002; Price 2002). Observers of the health
system claim that it has become 'patient centred', stressing choice, wellbeing, quality
of life and 'happiness' over 'doctor knows best' paternalism (Layard 2005; W illiam s
1998). Theorists of social policy and welfare have stressed the increased relevance
of 'love and hate' (Froggett 20 0 2) and of 'feeling and fear of feeling' (Cooper and
Lousada 2005) to the policy process. Even natural science appears to have made
moves to shed its 'D r Strangelove' image of cold m artial rationality in favour of a
science in the loving image of a feeling Venus (Serres 2 0 0 0 :1 0 7 -1 0 9 ; M alin 2001;
Eastman and Keeton 2004; Stenner 2004).
To these observations of specialized spheres we must add the various diagnoses
of society in general. For some (e.g. Richards 2004), this general 'affective turn' is
associated with a more 'hum an' and 'civ ilize d ' form of social order. For this reason it
is embraced and valued positively. For others, the same trends are associated with
negative values such as a culture of selfish hedonism (e.g. Furedi 2004). M estrovic
(1997) goes as far as to argue that emotions have become fetishized as consumable
items in the context of a media-led 'authenticity industry'. As such, they have been
subjected to processes of M cD onaldization and Disneyfication that have ultimately
corrupted th eir power to move us. He thus writes of a 'postem otional' society in which
emotions are ubiquitous yet so shallow as to be effectively meaningless.
The suggestion of an 'em otionalized' contem porary society and a corresponding
turn amongst its social sciences stands in rather stark contrast to a more fam ilia r
picture that is painted of 'Enlightenm ent m odernity' and of modern scientific
knowledge. When classical sociologists began offering th eir descriptions of modern
society they tended, if anything, to describe modernity as a move away from the
alleged em otionality of so called traditional societies. Weber, for instance, wrote of
the spread of bureaucratic and calculative forms of rationality associated with
the rise of capitalism . A little later, Elias wrote of the gradual encroachment of a
'civilizing process' entailing ever increasing forms of affective restraint and
disciplined self-control. Parsons, to briefly mention a third, wrote of a trend towards
'affective neutrality' as society differentiates itself into functional sub-systems. He
argued for example that money, as a sym bolically generalized medium of com m uni
cation, can remove the need for the more complex and em otionally fraught circum
stances of barter: one merely pays the agreed price. On the few occasions when
emotion was directly addressed by early social scientists, it was typica lly associated
with the primitive, the embodied, the female. Le Bon (1895) and Sighele (1898), for
example, were concerned with the irration ality and infective em otionality of crowd
(mob) behavior (see Stainton Rogers et al. 1995).
In addition to the content of these classical accounts, it can also be noted that the
m anner in which these social scientists wrote and conducted th eir research was
framed in the ch aracteristically detached form of objective and rational science.
If the transition to modernity was grasped as a move from nature to society and
from emotion to reason (as expressed in the famous Gem einschaft/Gesellschaft
distinction, for example), it was also grasped in this way via form s of thinking and
research which themselves valorized detached reason over the affective.
MOVING DI S C IP L IN E S
We have suggested that the turn towards affect and emotion in social science may
be regarded, on one level, as the expression of a broader societal turn in the same
direction. To the extent that we may speak of an affective turn now taking place in
social science, however, this does not simply mean that social science disciplines have
come to take the emotions on board as an object of study, each in its own distinctive
way. W hile this is certainly the case, what is at stake in this 'turn' is not only the
incorporation of a novel subject matter into an existing disciplinary framework.
Rather, the phrase indicates that an engagement with affective life has the potential
to transform the ways in which social science disciplines conceive th eir own way of
knowing and their objects of research. Where this has happened, we might say that
the social sciences themselves are being moved or affected.
When we speak of social science disciplines, it is im portant to remember that
these are fa r from constituting homogenous and coherent wholes. Some social
scientists embrace a new paradigm, for instance, while others dismiss it as a shallow
fad and still others reach for a compromise position (even the use of the term
'paradigm ' is problem atic here, precisely due to the absence of a general consensus).
Several distinct ways of construing and enacting a discipline can - and mostly do -
exist during any one time period, and it is im portant not to lose sight of this variability.
In addressing the affective turn, we are dealing with a transdisciplinary shift com par
able to the textual turn that transformed a great portion of social scientific practice
during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Although the two shifts occurred at
different times and involve some im portant theoretical differences, strong elements
of continuity between them become apparent when they are considered in a broader
historical context.
When cultural anthropology, critica l social psychology and interpretive sociology
went through their respective textual turns, they did not sim ply take on a new subject
matter (narrative, for instance). Rather, those who were part of this intellectual
movement began to seethe full gamut of their inherited subject m atter as a complex
weave of socially constructed cultural 'texts' im plicated in relations of power.
W hat had previously been treated as objectively measurable variables or factually
observable processes (such as, 'attitudes', 'personality traits', 'class', 'gender' and
even Balinese cock fights) came to be newly construed as 'discursive form ations',
'interpretive repertoires', 'lo cal and contingent scripts' and other 'modes of textual-
ity'. Again, it is im portant to recognize that the textual turn was by no means total or
uncontested (particularly in those disciplines closer to the natural sciences, such as
psychology). Nevertheless, this new way of seeing was, for those who embraced it,
part of a wholesale rethinking of the very nature and mission of the social sciences.
It was a shift in self-definition away from a so-called 'positivism ' associated with
the natural sciences, and towards different ways of constructing knowledge as
accountable and valid. Intellectually, the sources of this transform ation included
philosophical movements such as existential hermeneutics and phenomenology,
ordinary language philosophy and semiotics, pragmatism and post-structuralism ,
as well as the work of sym bolic interactionist and dram aturgical sociologists, and
feminists offering critiques of m asculinist forms of power (C urt 1994; Gorton 2007).
These forms of thought and practice challenged, among other things, the scientific
superiority of 'detached reason' and 'objective observation' over the 'em otional' and
the 'subjective'.
H istorically, the resurgence of em pirical and theoretical interest in the emotions
among social scientists is thus closely associated with the textual turn. It was first in
that context that affective life became the site of an intellectual battleground of sorts.
Em otions became the object of a tug-of-war in which social scientists influenced
by the textual turn struggled to drag them across the line separating the psycho-
biological from the socio-cultural. P rio r to this struggle, affective life had fallen
squarely within a territory claimed by the natural sciences. For the most part, social
scientists who wished to tackle the emotions had been obliged to deal with more
peripheral issues, such as the social shaping of the expression of emotions. The
im plicit understanding was that emotions, at root, were psychobiological, 'n a tu ra l'
objects. It is worth dwelling on this last point in just a little more detail, for it helps us
to appreciate the magnitude of the challenge social scientists faced (and posed) when
they proposed emotions as viable objects of research for their own disciplines.
F r o m a positive sc i ence of e mo t i o n to soci al c o n s t r u c t i o n i s m
Em otions have long been a core topic of scientific psychology. When W illia m James
articulated his definition in the famous a rticle 'W h a t is em otion?' (1884), he was
drawing upon more than half a century of physiological and medical research on
the topic. James proposed that emotions are but the awareness of the bodily changes
that accompany the perception of an exciting fact (for example, the raised heartbeat
that accompanies the encounter with a threatening anim al). Around the same time,
the Danish physician and psychologist Carl Lange proposed that vaso-motor changes
themselves are the emotion. In the standard histories of psychology, the Jam es-Lange
theory of emotion (thus named despite the fact that James and Lange had developed
th eir accounts independently) is superseded in the 1920s by W alter Cannon's theory,
in which emotions are identified with thalam ic processes (later elaborated as the
'lim b ic system'). W hile the two theories are significantly different, the move from the
Jam es-Lange theory to Cannon's is a move from a physiological account grounded
in the functioning of the autonom ic nervous system - or the 'viscera' to use the
terminology of Jam es' day - to another physiological account, grounded in sub-
co rtica l brain processes.
Naturally, the science of emotion did not end with the work of W alter Cannon
(see Cornelius 1996, for an overview). However, with a few exceptions, it did continue
in the same direction, deepening the conception of emotions as psychobiological
phenomena. This trend has been boosted in recent years by the development of tech
nologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging ( F M R I) that can provide
'real-tim e' representations of brain processes in action and that have facilitated the
development of new fields such as affective neuroscience. Panksepp (1998), for
instance, argues on the basis of neuroanatomical evidence for the existence of a
number of distinct emotional systems - including systems for seeking (interest, cu ri
osity, excitement), rage, fear, and panic (distress) - that are effectively homologous
in a ll mammals. These are associated with very localized neural circuits that mature
shortly after birth and whose stim ulation in experimental anim als yields coherent
affective displays. In the same vein, Hyman (1998) asserts that emotions 're ally are
circuits in our brain that allow us to survive'.
Perhaps the standard approach amongst contem porary experimental psycholo
gists is to define emotions as response systems or response syndromes (Parkinson
1995). The idea here is that what we call emotions involve m ultiple components or
factors, coordinated or organized into a tem porarily unified and coherent response.
There appears to be reasonably good agreement about what these m ultiple factors or
components might be, and they are either biological or psychological. Cornelius
(1996), for instance, mentions four factors: expressive reactions (such as facial
expressions); physiological reactions (such as increased heart-rate); behavior (such
as withdrawal from danger) and cognition (such as persistent trains of thought).
W hat we call distress or joy would thus be a tem porary coordination of these factors
into a generally recognizable form. Scherer (1984, 2005), to give a second example,
defines emotion as a sequence of state changes in five organism ic sub-systems. Four
of these correspond to the components offered by Cornelius: the motor system (which
deals with expressive reactions); the autonom ic system (arousal); the motivational
system (action tendencies); and the cognitive system (appraisal). To these, Scherer
adds a fifth: the m onitor system, which he argues supplies the conscious feeling
of emotion. Scherer argues that usually these sub-systems function relatively
independently. But in response to im portant events that trigger emotions, they con
verge into interdependence, giving rise to fam ilia r emotions like fear, anger and
shame.
Em otions have thus been territorialized by the psychobiological sciences which
take them to be 'natural kinds' amenable to analysis in terms of measurable factors
and variables, and hence to objective scientific observation and intervention: emotions
can, in principle, be described, predicted and controlled. It is this conception that
came to be challenged by social scientists in the context of the textual turn. In the
1970s and 80s, influential figures such as James Averill, Theodore Sarbin, A rlie
Russell Hochschild and Rom Harre published landm ark texts articulating broadly
'con stru ctivist' or 'social constructionist' accounts of emotion (Averill 1974, 1980;
Harre 1986; Hochschild 1979; Sarbin 1986). A key issue here, as we have suggested,
was to lay claim to the emotions as a properly social and cultural subject matter as
opposed to a subject matter belonging firm ly within the biopsychological sciences.
Rather than viewing emotions as organic systems hard-wired through evolution, these
authors began to stress some of the very different ways in which emotions are played
out interactionally amongst people from different cultural backgrounds, and the
variety of ways in which they have been made sense of in different historical periods.
A key feature of the social constructionist accounts of emotion is their 'non-
representational' epistemology which holds that discourse does not merely describe
reality but is a constitutive part of that reality. W ith respect to affective life, this
means that emotion ta lk is considered to be constitutive of emotional experience
rather than sim ply reflective of it (H arre 1986; Harre and Parrott 1996). For
this reason, the em pirical study of emotion ta lk became a focal point for social
constructionist approaches to emotion, demonstrating that great variation exists
concerning how people ta lk and think about the location, the genesis and the
management of emotional episodes (see Heelas 1986, for a review).
It should be noted that the door to social constructionist accounts had been
p a rtia lly opened by the famous experimental work of Schachter and Singer (1962)
and by the broadly cognitive accounts of emotion articulated by figures such as
Arnold (1960). These stressed that emotions are essentially permeated and indeed
constituted by cognition, including high level thought processes. The Schachter and
Singer studies, for example, provided some mixed support for the idea that subjects
injected with adrenalin can interpret the resulting feelings of arousal as a range of
different emotional experiences, depending upon the causal attributions they make
(e.g. as anger in one experimentally engineered set of circum stances and euphoria
in another). The resulting 'two fa c to r' theory - the two factors being arousal and
cognition - directly challenged the hegemony of previous biological accounts and
chimed with some of the insights emerging from the work of figures such as Goffman.
In this theory, organic factors were relegated to the minor role of supplying undif
ferentiated arousal w hilst the cognitive system had the more subtle job of lending
specific emotional meaning to this arousal. It was a short step from here to argue - as
did Averill and his social constructionist colleagues - that the content of the meaning
at play is largely 'second-hand' and social. In other words, cognitive processes such
as thinking could be framed within the broader communicative and interactional
practices of a given culture. Ergo, if emotions were irreducibly cognitive, then they
were also irreducibly social.
In the context of the textual turn emotions came to be considered as discursive,
dia lo g ica l phenomena, structured and influenced by the historical and cultural con
tingencies of com m unicational interactions. Positivist accounts were criticized for
being scientistic and reductionist and for stripping emotions away from the social
context in which they acquire their force and meaning. There was a call for qualitative
and phenomenological methodologies capable of reflexiveiy grasping the subjective
dimension of emotion through its modes of narration, and these were often contrasted
with the quantitative methods associated with positivism (Denzin 1984; Stenner
1993; Stenner and Stainton Rogers 1998). Given these origins within an intellectual
tug-of-war between the two extremes of (social) constructionism and positivism, it is
not surprising that arguments raged about the degree to which this thesis concerning
the fundam entally social nature of emotions could be sensibly maintained. Some
sociologists, such as Kemper (1978), sided with the positivists and advanced theories
of emotion aiming at general predictions. Anthropologists and historians joined the
fray, some providing am munition in support of cultural and historical relativism , and
some arguing for universals.
F r o m the textual t o the a f f e c t i v e t ur n in soci al sci ence
W hile the textual turn gained ascendancy in the 1970s and has been around ever
since, references to the affective turn are a lot more recent and very much presented
as the cutting-edge way forw ard (e.g. Massumi 2002; Sedgwick 2003; Clough 2007;
see Hemmings 2005; and Agnew 2007 for critiques relative to the fields of fem inist
cultural studies and historiography respectively). W hat is the relationship between
the textual and the affective turn? Genealogically speaking, the textual turn may
be described as one of the conditions of possibility for the more recent affective turn.
The affective turn follow s on from the textual turn, in the context of a theoretico-
political landscape dominated by different concerns - some of which stem from
the intellectual legacy of the textual turn itself. A key concern, for example, is that
of avoiding the theoretical impasse of relativism that is associated with the
m ethodological bracketing out of all pre- or extra-discursive reality. A t one level,
the affective turn is thus a turn against the privileging of text and discourse as the key
theoretical touchstones, drawing attention instead to the 'p itfa lls of w riting the body
out of theory', and to the 'residue or excess that is not socially produced, and that
constitutes the very fabric of our being' (Hemmings 2005: 550, 549). This agenda
also (cor-)responds to a renewed dominance and cultural presence of biology,
including the ascendancy of neuroscientific, biochemical, genetic and evolutionary
accounts of affect and emotions within both psychology and psychiatry (Le Doux
1998; Panksepp 1998; Greenfield 2000; Damasio 2003).
Despite a reconnection with issues of m ateriality and embodiment, what is
involved in the affective turn is by no means a return to the naive representationalism
1 0 INTRODUCTION: EMOTION AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
associated with positivism. On the contrary, invoking affect is closely related, in many
accounts, to the call for a post-deconstructive rethinking of ontology (T h rift 2008).
The move from 'text' to 'a ffe ct' thus parallels a shift in emphasis from epistemo-
lo g ica l questions as to the nature, sources and lim its of knowledge, to ontological
questions as to the nature of (pre-discursive) realities. In foregrounding these
ontological questions, the relationship between the natural and the social sciences is
no longer construed sim ply in terms of opposition and critique. Social scientists - in
the wake of the ascendancy of sub-disciplines that take natural science and the work
of scientists as their object - have come to recognize the need to be more discerning
of the variety and m u ltiplicity that characterizes the natural sciences themselves,
not a ll aspects of which can by any means be lumped together under the label of
'positivism '. On this basis, social scientific theories of affect may well draw on post
positivist forms of biology and psychology, as well as on forms of process philosophy
that take their constructivism well beyond the lim itations of so c ia l constructionism .
These influences include cybernetic and second-order systems theories, form s of
psychoanalytic theory, and Silvan Tom kin's work on the psychology of affect. On the
side of philosophy, they include the work of Henri Bergson, A lfred North Whitehead
and G illes Deleuze.
Having outlined some of the clear differences between the textual and the
affective turn in social theory, we hope this outline also shows that there is a strong
element of continuity between them. The critique of the social and discursive lim its of
the textual turn represents a deepening of constructivism and not its abandonment
(Stenner 2008). The constructivist notions of power, perform ativity and activity
which gave value to the concept of discourse in the textual turn have been extended
beyond the socio-cultural domain to include pre-conscious and pre-discursive forms
of existence, and the concept of 'a ffe ct' has become a marker of this extension. If the
textual turn involved a tug-of-war between positivists and social constructionists,
then the affective turn turns against w hat is perceived as a linguistic im perialism that
threatens to throw the babies of 'the body' and its 'affe cts' out with the bathwater of
naively scientistic 'representational theory'.
A f f e c t and e mo t i o n
In this volume so fa r we have been using the terms 'a ffe ct' and 'em otion' as if they
were interchangeable. It is worth mentioning that this would be considered deeply
problem atic by many proponents of the affective turn. A brief anecdote might serve
to illustrate this point. A t a conference on Psychosocial Studies recently held at a
College of the University of London (B irkb eck 2 0 07), Barry Richards stressed
what he saw as the fundamental importance of distinguishing affect from emotion,
suggesting that emotion is a more superficial and conscious affair, w hilst affect refers
to the deep and often unconscious organism ic processes discussed by psychoanalysts.
Consistent with the shift we outlined above, Richards was at pains to distinguish
his own 'psychosocial' approach from social constructionist accounts that treat
'em otions' as social categories amenable to explicit com m unication and to conscious
reflection (see also Hollw ay and Jefferson 2000; Rustin 2002; Froggett and
INTRODUCTION: EMOTION AND SOCIAL SCI E NCE 11
Richards 2002). A re-engagement with psychoanalytical theory - within which the

concept of affect has a long pedigree - is thus one clear pathway into the affective
turn (Redding 1999; M atthis 2000; Green 1977). But it is not the only pathway.
Interestingly enough, comparable moves were made by a number of delegates at a
conference held at another London College (Goldsm iths 2007) just two days earlier.
This time the traditions invoked in connection with a turn to affect were philosophical
rather than psychoanalytical, stemming from Deleuzian post-structuralism and
W hiteheadian metaphysics. The concept of affect as opposed to emotion was at play
in both conferences, but the theoretical resources informing it were quite distinct. It
was notable, however, that in both settings the term 'a ffe ct' was being associated with
a ll things sophisticated and good and the term 'em otion' with all things superficial
and bad.
A sim ilar tendency can be detected more generally. T h rift (2004), for instance,
works hard to separate his preferred concept of affect from the 'nice', 'cuddly' and
even 'touchy feely' issues he appears to associate with the words 'em otion' and
'feeling' (cf. Thien, 2005 for a critique). Likewise, M cCorm ack contrasts the lim ita
tions of 'em otion' with the 'creative potential of affect'. Emotion is associated with
the individual person and with a certain fixity within regimes of discursive meaning,
w hilst affect is associated with an 'unqualified intensity' that is 'never reducible to
the personal quality of em otion' (2003: 500). Both T hrift and M cCorm ack draw
on Brian M assum i's elaboration of Deleuzian philosophy (see Massumi 1996; also
W issinger 2007 and Clough 2007).
We believe that insisting on this term inological distinction is not inherently help
ful, and may actually obscure more than it clarifies at a conceptual level. If Sedgwick
(2003) and her follow ers prefer 'affect', for instance, then this is probably because
it was the term employed by Silvan Tomkins in his magnum opus Affect, Imagery,
Consciousness. But Tomkins himself used 'a ffe ct' to ta lk about experiences and
expressions such as shame, anger, fear, excitement, joy and distress that are quite
com patible with the word 'em otion'. Tomkins was not terribly concerned to draw a
radical distinction between 'a ffe ct' and 'em otion', and often used the terms inter
changeably, although he did consider the conscious experience of affects to be decisive
to their b io lo g ica l function as drive am plifiers. Likewise, if Deleuze and his follow ers
prefer to use 'affe ct', then this is probably because of Spinoza's use of the Latin word
affectus in his Ethics. Spinoza himself used the term as a generic for such specifics
as joy, fear, jealousy, shame. Spinoza did not outline - pace M assumi - a 'difference in
nature between affect and em otion' (M assum i 1996: 222).
It seems to us that drawing an overly sharp (and value laden) distinction between
affect and emotion serves, paradoxically, to perpetuate the illusion that such words
refer unproblem atically to states of the world, thus bypassing the need to think care
fully about the conceptual issues at stake. The issue at stake in Deleuzian philosophy,
for example, is a shift towards modes of thought and practice that concern the
potential and the virtual as much as the actual and the real. A ffe ct is thus a decisive
concept for grasping transform ations, potentialities, 'unpredictable connections
between bodies and forces' (Tamboukou, 2003: 217), and 'shifts in the energetic
capabilities of a body' (Conradson, 2007: 104). This shift - which concerns how
we address reality more generally - can be masked by a preoccupation with words.
If indeed the concern of the affective turn is to argue for a move beyond a narrowly
'discursive' conceptualization of emotion, then it might be more sensible to argue,
along with people such as K atz (1999), that there is more to emotion than ta lk
about em otion and more to emotion than can be captured in its conscious
experience (see also Stenner 2005b). This strategy serves to highlight that w hat is at
stake is the contestation of a concept and not the mere application of a linguistic
label.
In short, our approach to these term inological questions is to stress that ter
minology serves first of all as a marker of difference for groups of intellectuals, keen
to distinguish th eir own approach from that of specific others. As we have stressed,
however, shared terminology need not imply a shared theoretical position. One only
has to move from Goldsmiths to Birkbeck College to find the term 'a ffe ct' being used
in very different ways, albeit to accom plish a comparable criticism and deepening
of the textual turn. It is instructive in this context to reflect on the fact that the term
'em otion' is actually a rather recent addition to the English lexicon. As Dixon dis
cusses (see extract in section one of this volume), the term 'em otion' came into
common currency amongst speakers of English as late as the nineteenth century.
Before that, people were more likely to talk of affections, passions, sentiments and
the like. Passions and affections, especially since Augustine and Aquinas, were terms
that were very much part of a theological semantic web. They resonated with other
terms such as the soul (whether animal, vegetative or intellective) and the w ill, and
they operated within a normative moral fram ework at whose pinnacle stood a
transcendent deity. The term 'em otion' entered into circulation as part of a medico-
scientific discourse associated with the early development of scientific psychology.
In calling affective life 'em otion', these novel scientific discourses also transformed
the ways in which people thought about their affective life. Specifically, the emotions
came to be thought of as quasi-mechanical b io lo g ica l processes. The association of
'em otion' with physiology has been boosted in recent years by Dam asio's (1999;
20 03 ) distinction between 'em otions' and 'feelings', where the former are construed
as objectively observable organic processes w hilst 'feelings' are the subjective
experience of emotions. It is thus somewhat ironic that Massumi, M cCorm ack, T hrift
and others associate the word 'a ffe ct' with issues of m ateriality and corporeality, and
'em otion' with subjective experience, since the very term 'em otion' marks a historical
rupture whereby the affections of the soul lost their place to the emotions of the
viscera.
DISCIPLINING A F F E C T S
Despite the rich diversity that characterizes approaches to affect and emotion in the
social sciences, there is a clear common denominator in this research. In a nutshell,
this lies in the foregrounding of the link between affective life and relations of power.
Specifically in the context of the textual and affective turns, this foregrounding
becomes reflexive in character. The textual turn and the affective turn, as we have
seen, share a non-representational epistemology - the notion that discourse and
knowledge are not simply about reality, but constitute an active part of it. Theories of
INTRODUCTION: EMOTION AND SOCIAL SCI E NCE 1 3
emotion do not simply hover above th eir subject matter. Rather they intervene in the
affective life they scrutinize, a little like a geologist's map of a coal seam might
enable the extraction of the coal and hence the transform ation of the landscape. A t a
m ethodological level, non-representational epistemology translates into a com m it
ment to reflexivity vis-^-vis the normative im plications of knowledge about emotion.
How does knowledge about emotion enter into the power configurations of our time?
How does it contribute to the ways in which individuals and collectivities can both
affect and be affectecR
In linking emotions to the political dimension of power and governance, the social
sciences may be said to re-establish a profound continuity with debates that predate
the historical attempt to define and explain emotion scientifically. P rio r to the
inauguration of 'em otion' as a scientific category, passions, sentiments and affects
had been at the centre of p ractically all the great moral, ethical and religious dis
courses on what constitutes a good life. Consider for example the connection between
ethics and passions in Aristotle, or the doctrine of the seven cardinal sins in Christian
morality. The effort to define the proper nature and place of the affects became bound
up with struggles of a specifically political character in seventeenth-century Europe.
This was part of a broader philosophical reflection on the role and function of nascent
secular governments, as distinct from systems of ethical and moral governance
(Koselleck 1988). For Spinoza and Hobbes, both witnesses of the p olitical earth
quakes engendered by the w ars of religion, a reframing of affective life in terms of
natural philosophy was part of the search for new, secular answers to political ques
tions. This is especially clear in Hobbes' Leviathan, where the discussion of passions,
appetites and desires in P art I grounds his proposals for the Commonwealth made in
P art II. But this sequence - whereby the discussion of emotions comes 'before' the
discussion of political, legal or economic questions - constitutes a more general
pattern, common to many of the classics from the late 17lh through to the mid 18th
century. Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1 6 89 ) appears the year
before his Two Treatises o f Government. Volume 2 of Hume's Treatise o f Human
Nature, entitled On the Passions (1739), is sw iftly followed by the essays on political
economy, m orals and ethics. Sm ith's Theory o f the M o ra l Sentiments (1759) pro
vided the ground for the W ealth o f N ations (1776). W ith Rousseau, the analysis of
affective life takes place in his novels. J u lie (1 76 1 ) precedes the S o c ia l Contract by
one year, and Em ile is published in the same year (Stenner 2004; see also Barbalet,
extract in section 3, for a discussion of Sm ith and Ferguson in this light).
The normative dimension of knowledge of affective life is thus made perfectly
apparent in the work of these Enlightenment thinkers: different p olitical prescriptions
literally follow from different ways of thinking about passions or sentiments and their
place in human nature. It was only with the functional specialization that marks the
establishment of scientific disciplines in the 19th century, and with the appropriation
of the domain of affect (as 'em otion') into the territories of biology and psychology,
that the link between concepts of emotion and the dimensions of politics, m orals and
ethics disappeared from view. Although these disciplines - psychology in p a rticu la r -
were no less embroiled in the normative business of governance and social engineer
ing, they intervened in the name of a supposedly value-neutral distinction between the
'n o rm al' and the 'p ath o logical' (H acking 1991).
As relative late-comers to the study of emotion, the social sciences have con
structed their agendas not in a vacuum, but in relation to a social situation already
marked by the success of the natural and clinical sciences of emotion. For this reason,
one agenda for social scientists has been to c ritica lly document the ways in which
the psy-disciplines (and, more recently, neuroscience) have actively contributed to the
shaping of affective experience in modern and late-modern times. E arlier in this
introduction, for example, we addressed what has been called an 'em otionalization' of
all spheres of social life in late modernity. This phenomenon has been attributed, at
least in part, to a process of 'proto-professionalization', whereby psychotherapeutic
concepts and terminology gradually found th eir way into the everyday vocabulary of
social actors (De Swaan 1990). As Doyle M cC arthy has put it, it is only in the
specific context of a 'psychological age' - one distinguished by the dissemination of
psychological knowledge and therapeutic discourse - that 'emotions acquire a social
meaning previously a bsent:. . . emotions are "w orked a t" and "w orked on", one has
an "em otional life " ' (1989: 66). But the im pact of the sciences of emotion has
not been limited to facilitating a greater scope for the awareness, expression, and
management of emotional experience. In so doing, these sciences have also facilitated
profound transform ations in the ways social relations are conducted, at an inter
personal level and beyond. Social scientists have examined the dissemination of
psy-concepts and the social conspicuousness of emotion talk within the context
of rationalities of government that increasingly rely on reflexive forms of self
management and self-regulation on the part of individuals (Rose 1996a, 1996b,
1999). A t a more general level, this development has been addressed in terms of
processes of in divid u alization (Beck, 1992) and reflexive m odernization (Giddens
1992; Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994; see also CastelIs 2004; and Dean 2007 for a
critique).
To employ a dram aturgical metaphor, we may say that the occasions and settings
wherein we are called to act in the name of our 'selves', beyond the prerogatives and
limits of form al roles, have consistently m ultiplied in the course of the 20th century.
These occasions and settings are now ubiquitous in Western liberal democracies,
reaching well beyond the context of intimate or private relationships. As a dram a
turgical role, the self is characterized by its informal, personal and confessional style:
we act as selves by follow ing a (supposedly) unique and authentic m otivational script
to which we and we alone have access through introspection. The acknowledgment
and/or expression of emotion acts a prime signifier and guarantor of the self as a
social actor. Emotions, writes Doyle M cCarthy, are 'necessary "p ro p s" with which the
drama of self establishes its realism ' (1989: 66). Social scientists have been at pains
to demonstrate, in various ways, how these new touchy-feely forms of interaction
management do not imply a greater fairness or equality of social arrangements,
contrary to the impression th eir rhetoric conveys.
Social scientists can thus provide a form of critica l reflection on how psycho
logical knowledge of emotions contributes to social processes, how it increasingly
mediates relations of power and governance, and with it also the sensibilities and
likely affective experiences of participants. But what of the social sciences them
selves? How does their knowledge of emotion enter into these relations, shaping
their development in pa rticu la r directions? Any critica l reflexive assessment of their
INTRODUCTION: EMOTION AND SOCIAL SCI E NCE 1 5
contribution, pa rticu la rly given the rapidity with which the field is expanding, is
necessarily provisional. Generally speaking, however, we may say that the social
sciences offer a measure of distance with regard to commonsense accounts. They
allow us to consider any proposition regarding affective experience in the context of
broader fram eworks and dynamics. For example, if it is the case that the expression
of authentic feelings increasingly features as a normative feature of interaction
management, social scientists may point to the paradoxical character of the situ
ations this generates. Commenting on the phenomenon of 'p o litica l correctness', for
example, Schw artz writes: '[t]o have to try and act in a p olitically correct manner
is to be p olitically incorrect. As George Orwell put it in 1984, " A party member is
required to have not only the right opinions, but the right in s tin c ts " .. . . Love of the
Oppressed, not the display of love but love itself, is a criterion for one's moral accept
a b ility' (1993: 210, emphasis added). This comment highlights how the opportunities
for the expression of 'au th entic' emotion can be logically subverted by their
institutionalization, codification, and inevitable standardization, once emotional
expression becomes a feature of routine interaction management. W hat can it mean
to act 'true to oneself', in the name of deep personal feelings or beliefs as opposed to
mere conventions, when doing so also represents the adequate response to social
requirements and expectations?
Acknowledging this paradox does not involve an epistem ological commitment
to the notion of an authentic self as the source of authentic emotions, or indeed an
opposite com m itm ent against it - the paradox can be taken either way. On the one
hand, it may support a form of ironic detachment from the notion of authenticity as a
theoretical possibility, and a view of identity as something to be reflexively 'invented'.
On the other hand, the paradox may be taken to suggest that the dynamics of con
tem porary governance contribute to forms of affective 'false consciousness' that are
problem atic, for example on grounds of physical and mental health. The point here is
that, in each case, the sociological diagnosis has im plications of a normative, and
thereby also affective character (cf. Greco 2001).
Engagement with the topic of affect and emotion on the part of social scientists
may be said to produce a measure of disenchantment with the em ancipatory promise
of psychological knowledge. A t the same time, this engagement carries an em ancipa
tory potential of its own, to the extent that it has produced awareness of the con
straints im p licit in supposedly relaxed and 'lib e ra to ry' form s of interaction. But we
must, of course, be careful not to suppose that the work of social scientists is exempt
from contributing to the creation of new constraints, as much as it may free us from
old ones. We are not, indeed, to think in terms of a dichotomy opposing power and
freedom. We may think instead in terms of a need to address the performative value
im plicit in the interventions we make at any one time, in any p a rticu la r context.
Producing ironic detachment from the theoretical possibility of authenticity, for
example, may well be em ancipatory in one context, though not necessarily in another.
For the community of social scientists, this reflection on performative value is an
im portant aspect of the significance of the turn to affect. To redescribe the social
world as saturated with affect and emotion is to redescribe it as saturated with
value, or with the possibilities of affecting and being affected in positive or negative
ways.
U si ng the Rea der
We have organized the Reader into four Parts, each com prising three Sections. P art I
is entitled Universals and p a rticu la rs o f affect. As this title suggests, one of the
key features of social-scientific research on emotions is an acknowledged tension
between those who emphasize the universally 'hum an' aspects of emotions and those,
conversely, that stress the contingency of emotional experience and expression on
variables such as historical time, culture, or social situation. This P art aims to intro
duce how the disciplines of historiography, anthropology and sociology have each
differently contributed to the fram ing of this debate, and how central the debate itself
is to the definition of a broadly social-scientific approach to the emotions. P art II,
Em bodying affect, includes texts that address emotion in relation to the embodied
individual self, and in relation to subjective space. Spatial metaphors feature
prominently in how the relationship between the self and emotions has been con
ceptualized in different cultures and historical periods. The experience of space
through the body, on the other hand, plays a crucial role in rendering space affectively
significant. Last but not least, emotions have been described as the embodiment of
culture, and thereby as the 'missing link' between the social and the physical
determinants of health and illness. The aim of this P art of the book is to introduce the
reader to the literatures that have addressed emotions and selfhood, emotions and
space/place, and emotions and health as topics in their own right, w hilst pointing to
the mutual resonances between these subjects. In P art III, P o litic a l economies o f
affect, we have included extracts that address emotions from the angle of political
economy, broadly defined. A ffect is central to contem porary economic processes,
whether in the form of 'em otional labor' in the service industry, of 'em otional intelli
gence' in the context of organizational management, or of the increasing attention
paid to feeling in developing marketing strategies for p a rticu la r products. The
centrality of emotions is equally evident in the media. Here, the increasing prominence
of ta lk shows, docu-soaps and other rea lity genres, and the merging of information
and entertainment as infotainment, reflects an erosion of the boundaries between
the public and the private spheres, and between work and leisure. This P art includes
texts relative to emotion in the contexts of work and organizations, economics and
consumer culture, and the media industry. In the last P art of the book, entitled Affect,
pow er and justice, we have gathered extracts that address the relationship between
emotions and issues of social justice on a global and local level. These texts address
themes such as the role of emotions in p olitical m obilization and social movements;
the influence of mass-mediated emotional com m unications upon crim inal justice and
the legal system; the importance of a discourse of compassion to contemporary
hum anitarian and human rights movements; the role of emotions like 'te rro r' and
'hate' in contem porary political rhetoric and debate.
In addition to this general introduction, where we have presented the general
background and our rationale for the volume as a whole, we have produced a brief
introduction for each of the twelve Sections of the book. These shorter introductions
are designed to provide a guide to the specific themes covered by the extracts, and to
highlight points of mutual relevance and comparison. There then follow s an annotated
Guide to Further Reading. In this Guide we have listed a number of im portant texts
I N T R O D U C T I O N : E M O T I O N A N D S O C I A L S C I E N C E 1 7
th a t a re n ot o th e rw ise in clu d e d , fo llo w in g the s tru c tu re o f th e R ea d e r itse lf. A lth o u g h

the G u id e is by no m eans co m p re h e n siv e o r co m p lete , we hope it w ill su p p o rt re a d e rs
in fo llo w in g up th em e s o r qu e stio n s o f p a r t ic u la r in terest.
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PART ONE
Universals and particulars

of affect
1. Emotions, history and civilization
H I S IS T H E F I R S T O F three sections where we have gathered texts that

T share a concern with questions of universality and difference in the study of
emotions. The concern is common across the disciplines of history, anthropology and
sociology, as are some of the concepts through which it is articulated (e.g. 'con
structionism '). Debates in each discipline, however, are coloured by different
emphases and priorities. The texts included in this section address the dimension of
tem poral continuity and difference through the work of historians and historical
sociologists.
H istorical research on the emotions can be broadly distinguished in terms of the
focus on two very different kinds of object. One strand of research addresses theories
or ideas about emotion as these have been developed by philosophers, theologians,
psychologists and psychiatrists. This strand is exemplified here in our first extract,
from Thomas D ixon's Fro m Passion to Em otions: the creation o f a secular psycho
lo g ica l category (2003). Ideas and theories of 'em otion' as such are relatively recent,
as the term was not widely in use before the early nineteenth century. W hile much
historical writing underplays the significance of this term inological point, sometimes
to the point of ignoring it altogether, it is central to Dixon's analysis. Dixon proposes
that the shift from 'passions' to 'em otions' cannot be understood simply as the
employment of a new word to describe the same thing. Passions and affections,
especially since Augustine and Aquinas, were terms embedded in a theological
semantic web. They resonated with other terms such as the soul and the w ill, and they
operated within a normative moral fram ework at whose pinnacle stood a trans
cendental deity. 'E m otion ', by contrast, has its provenance in the secularized idiom
of the increasingly specialized and autonomous practices of science and medicine.
As a concept, it is born of a quasi-em pirical distinction between external and internal
affections of the mind. As internal affections of the mind, emotions are in turn
2 6 U N I V E R S A L S AND P A R T I C U L A R S OF A FF ECT
distinguished from thought or intellect. In this manner, emotions are dissociated from
the dimensions of m orality and ethics, and construed as non-rational feeling states
with evident ties to the body. The text by Dixon included here points to the historical
specificity of the concept of emotion, and to the methodological dangers im plicit
in the historiographical task of mediating between this modern concept and its
equivalents in the past. D ixon's argument in this work parallels anthropological
deconstructions of Western concepts of emotion, such as the studies by Lutz (1986;
see also extract in this volume), which seek to highlight the epistem ological and
normative assumptions these concepts imply, and the methodological p itfa lls of
ignoring them.
Another strand of historical research on the emotions addresses changes not in
theories or concepts of emotion, but in the social norm s regarding their experience
and expression - changes in attitudes, standards, or what sociologist A rlie Hochschild
named 'feeling rules' (see section 3 below) and what historians Stearns and Stearns
called 'em otionology' (1985). Here the focus can be on the historical trajectory
of individual emotions such as anger, jealousy or fear, or it can be on general styles of
affect management typical of entire epochs. The work of Norbert E lias is the clearest
example of this latter approach and, for better or for worse (see the critique by
Rosenwein, 2002), it has been credited with providing something like a paradigm for
subsequent historical and historico-sociological research on the emotions. The text
included here comprises two short extracts from E lia s' magnum opus, The C iv iliz in g
Process, originally published in 1939. The theory of the civilizing process offers an
account of the long-term correlation between changes in personality structure and
socio-political changes since the late M iddle Ages in Europe. In a nutshell, the theory
describes how the increasing complexity of networks of human interdependence,
as particu larly evident in the emergence of the modern state with its increasing
functional differentiation, goes hand in hand with the development of increasing
capacities for foresight and calculation on the part of individuals. These capacities for
foresight and calculation rely in turn on increasing measures of impulse restraint, of
detachment and observation of self from the vantage point of others. Over time, both
the quality of affective experience and the form s of its expression are profoundly
transformed through this process. In relation to emotions, and contrary to some
readings of E lia s' theory, it is im portant to realize that the theory of the civilizing
process does not suggest changes in the direction of a wholesale repression of a ffec
tive life. One keyw ord to describe the direction of the overall process is 'psychologiza
tion'; this involves an expansion of the occasions for the experience of emotions like
shame and repugnance, for example, as much as it involves restraint over the physical
expressions of, say, anger and joy.
The theory of the civilizing process constitutes much more than a historio
graphical endeavour. It also offers a diagnosis of typ ically modern form s of self
perception, which in turn provides the basis for a h istorically reflexive sociology of
knowledge. For Elias, an historical movement in the direction of increasing capacity
for detachment and affective neutrality was crucial for the development of modern
science. This capacity occurred earlier in relation to the observation of natural
phenomena, and only later in relation to the reflexive observation of human behaviour
and relationships. The theory of the civilizing process should be read, on one level, as
EMOTIONS, HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION 2 7
an expression of the very dynamics it describes: it is designed to bring a further

measure of affective detachment (and thus w hat Elias called 're a lity congruence') to
the study of human beings. This is evident, for example, in the relationship between
E lia s' theory and psychoanalysis. E lias borrowed and adapted many Freudian con
cepts, such as that of 'repression'; but he was also critica l of Freud for assuming that
the structure of the mental apparatus as he had described it was universal and
relatively ahistorical. Elias considered that Freud, like most of his contemporaries,
was trapped (or still too 'involved') in the human self-image typical of modernity, one
that regarded the opposition between 'in dividual' psyches and 's o cia l' constraints as
a static epistem ological given. The constructionism im plicit in E lia s' theory thus
assumes a fundamental plasticity of emotional experience, while positing the a vail
ability of universal psychological mechanisms for the moulding of that experience.
The selections from The C iv iliz in g Process that we have included in this volume
touch on these m ultiple aspects and valences of the theory. The first part addresses
changes in aggressiveness, underscoring the im portance that E lias ascribed to
violence and to the relative degree of pacification in a society for the purposes of
explaining changes in emotional experience and expression. The second part of the
text focuses on the concept of 'psychologization', illustrating the pivotal importance
of the European courts as sites for the exponential development of capacities for
emotional detachment, observation and self-observation.
Abram De Swaan is one of a group of Dutch sociologists who have applied and
developed E lia s' insights to the study of more contem porary social phenomena. This
extract from an essay entitled 'The politics of agoraphobia' (1990) presents an
analytical fram ew ork for understanding how social developments 'm ay have altered
the intimate relations between people, so that the difficulties they experience with
themselves and with one another may have become translatable into the vocabulary
of psychotherapy and suitable for treatm ent as psychic problems'. The argument
developed in the text speaks to a number of interrelated theoretical concerns. The
broadest of these is the question of whether the relaxation of codes of behaviour and
the 'in fo rm a lization ' of many social relations, especially evident since the 1960s,
signifies a reversal in the direction of the 'civilizing process' - a movement towards
decreasing self-restraint. The answer is a resounding 'no': inform alization involves
new and subtler form s of affective self-restraint and self-discipline, and these are
associated to the proliferation of a range of psychic problems. De Swaan thus takes
issue with the constructionist notion that the emergence of psychic problems in their
contem porary form is a consequence of the rise of the profession of psychotherapy.
According to the constructionist argument, professional and bureaucratic institutions
have provided a vocabulary of troubles through which the lay public construct their
definition and experience of everyday difficulties, and thereby also the presentation
of th eir com plaints. W hile this may be true on one level, argues De Swaan, the
explanation is reductive and sim plistic, for it fails to take into account the context
of wider changes in the patterns of mutual interdependence between individuals.
De Swaan focuses on a transform ation in the management of power relations that
is im plicit in processes of 'in fo rm alization ', which he describes as a transition
from 'management by com m and' to 'management by negotiation7. Against this
background, a range of psychic problems can be interpreted as ways of 'opting out'
of form s of social interaction that are not as liberating as their rhetoric often
suggests.
The fourth and final extract in this section is from a chapter by Peter and
Deborah Stearns, where the authors discuss issues of causation and timing in the
historical study of emotions. In the chapter as a whole, Stearns and Stearns present a
number of m ethodological choices in relation to the problem of causation in historical
research. One choice is between taking changes in specific emotions the explanatory
focus, or adopting a larger, m eta-historical focus of analysis by looking at changes in
general frameworks, or 'em otional styles'. A focus on larger fram eworks assumes
'th a t changes in individual emotion follow simply from the larger innovations'. These
issues of scale in causation have rarely been considered by historians, they claim , but
are in fa ct m ethodologically crucial. A second choice involved in the analysis of
historical change concerns the balance between 'fu n ctio n a list' and 'cu ltu ra list'
explanations. Functionalist explanations of emotional change interpret such change
as an adaptation to novel social conditions (such as industrialization and urbaniza
tion, in the modern period). Cu ltu ralist explanations, on the other hand, examine
change in connection with factors such as the nature of dominant discourses
(e.g. religious vs scientific, and variations within these), and changes in the media
employed by advice-givers and educators. W hile outlining these methodological and
analytical alternatives, the authors stress that they are not m utually exclusive and
that causation, in most instances, is 'm ultifaceted'. Our selection from this chapter
focuses on the discussion of causation in relation to changes in specific emotions.
References
Rosenwein, B. H. (2 0 0 2 ) 'W orrying about emotions in history', A m erica n H isto ric a l

Review, 107 (3): 8 2 1 -8 4 5 .
Stearns, P. N. and Stearns, C. Z. (1 9 8 5 ) 'Em otionology: clarifying the history of emotions
and em otional standards', The A m erica n H is to ric a l Review, 90 (4): 8 1 3 -8 3 6 .
Chapter 1
Thomas Dixon
FROM P A S S I O N S TO E M O T I O N S
I
N THIS BOOK I INVESTIGATE the crcation o f ‘the e m o tio n s’ as a
psychological category. By seein g how this category w as con ceiv ed , and by
looking at the different psychological catego ries it replaced durin g the eighteenth
and nineteenth cen tu ries, 1 aim to provide read ers w ith reso u rces that w ill help
them to step back from the con tem p orary obviousn ess o f the existen ce and im p o r
tance of ‘the e m o tio n s’ and to ask fundam ental question s ab out this c ate g o ry ’ s
m eaning and value. In other w ords, I hope my h istorical accoun t w ill stim ulate
philosophical and psy ch o lo gical reflection . O f particular im portan ce to this story
is the d isplacem en t, in the h istory of system atic psy ch o lo gical theorisin g, of m ore
differentiated ty p ologies (w hich included ap petites, p assion s, affections and se n ti
m en ts) by a single over arching category o f em otio n s d u rin g the nineteenth
century. Perhaps these past ty p o lo gie s w ill give re a d e rs pause for thought, and
encourage them to ask w hether the em otio n s, as w e think o f them today in
psychology and philosophy, really form a coh eren t c a te g o ry .1 I will su gg est that a
m ore differentiated typology w ould be a useful to o l, and w ould help us to avoid
m aking sw eeping claim s about all 'e m o tio n s’ being go o d o r bad things, rational or
irrational, virtu ou s or vicious. . . .
My argu m en t about the h istorical provenance o f m o d e rn th eories o f the
em otio n s is revision ist, especially w ith re sp e ct to R o b e rt So lo m o n ’ s thesis in his
influential b ook The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning o f Life (1 9 7 6 , 19 9 3 ) . 2
S o lo m o n ’ s thesis is, in sh o rt, that W estern thinkers have been pron e, right up to the
late tw entieth cen tury, to take a negative view o f the em otio n s and to think o f them
as inherently bodily, involuntary and irrational. Solom on blam es this negative view
o f em otio n s on the influence o f rationalist view s (in w hich reason and the em otions
arc an tagon ists) that have been dom inant am on g W estern ph ilosoph ers in gen eral
and certain C hristian theologians in particular.
3 0 T H O M A S DIXON
S o lo m o n ’ s w as the first in a sp ate o f b o o k s in rc c e n t d e c ad e s that all se e k , in

on e w ay o r anoth er, to reh ab ilitate the e m o tio n s. . . . M any of th ese w rite r s also
ech o S o lo m o n ’ s th esis that from an tiquity up until the late tw en tieth cen tu rv
p h ilo so p h e rs and p sy ch o lo g ists have g e n e rally , and m isg u id e d lv , th ough t of reason
and the e m o tio n s as an tag
O
o n ists. . . . O n e o f m yJ aim s in this b o o k is to show how
th ese view s on the h isto ry o f ideas ab o u t p assio n s and e m o tio n s arc th e m se lv e s, in
certain re sp e c ts, m ythical and e rro n e o u s.
T h e h istorical sto ry I tell h ere tu rn s S o lo m o n ’ s view on its head. I argu e that it
w as in fact the rc c c n t d e p a rtu re from trad ition al view s ab o u t the p assio n s (n o t the
influence o f th ose v ie w s) that led to the creation o f a cate g o ry o f ‘ e m o tio n s’ that
w as co n ceiv ed in o p p o sitio n to re a so n , in te lle ct and w ill. T h e cate g o ry o f e m o tio n s,
con ceiv ed as a se t o f m orally d ise n g ag e d , b o d ily , n on -cogn itive and in volun tary
fe elin gs, is a rc c c n t in ven tion . P rio r to the creation o f the e m o tio n s as an
o ver-arch in g c a te g o ry , m o re su b tle ty had b een p o ssib le on th ese q u e stio n s. T h e
‘ a ffe ctio n s’ , and the ‘ m o ral se n tim e n ts’ , fo r e x a m p le , cou ld be u n d e rsto o d as both
ration al and v olu n tary m o v e m e n ts o f the so u l, w hile still b e in g su b jectiv ely w arm
and lively p sy c h o lo g ic al states. It is n ot the case that p r io r to the 1 9 7 0 s n o one had
realised that thinkin g, w illin g and feelin g w ere (and should b e ) in te rw in e d in one
way o r anoth er. A lm o st every b od y had re a lise d this. Too m any c o n te m p o ra ry
w rite r s still ap p e al, n o n e th e le ss, to the idea . . . that eith er a p a rtic u la r in dividu al, o r
sch oo l o f th ou gh t, o r p e r io d , o r even the en tire h istory o f ph ilosoph y has been
ch a ra c te rise d by the view that the e m o tio n s . . . are en tirely in sidiou s and are to be
su b je c ted at all tim e s to alm ighty re aso n . A nythin g m o re than the b rie fe st o f glan ces
at the h istory o f th ough t establish es that this is a th orough ly un ten able id e a, even
w hen ap p lied to Sto ic o r C h ristian p h ilo so p h e rs (th o se m o st o lten accu sed o f
passion - o r c m o tio n -h a trc d ) . 1 [. . .]
It is an im m en sely strik in g fact of the h isto ry o f E n glish -lan gu age p sy ch o lo g ical
th ough t that d u rin g the p e r io d b e tw e en c. 1800 and c. 1850 a w h olesale ch an ge in
establish ed vo cab u lary o c c u rre d such that th o se en gaged in th e o retical d iscu ssio n s
ab o u t p h en o m en a in clu ding h o p e , fear, love, h ate, jo y , so rro w , an g e r and the like no
lo n g e r prim arily d iscu ssed the p assio n s o r affection s of the so u l, n or the se n tim e n ts,
b u t a lm o st invariablv re fe rre d to ‘ the e m o tio n s’ . T h is tran sition is as strik in g as
if establish ed c o n ccp tu al te rm s such as ‘r e a so n ’ o r ‘ m e m o r y ’ o r ‘ im ag in a tio n ’ or
‘ w ill’ had been quite sudden ly re p la c e d by a w holly new cate g o ry .
T h e pu zzlin g h istorical q u e stio n , th en , at the h ea rt o f this b o o k (a q u e stio n that,
equally puzzlin gly, has rarely b een p o se d b e fo re , let alone an sw ered ) is: w hen and
why did E n glish -lan gu age p sy ch o lo gical w rite r s sto p usin g ‘p a ssio n s’ , ‘ affe c tio n s’
and ‘se n tim e n ts’ as th eir p rim ary c a te g o rie s and sta rt re fe rrin g in stead to the
‘ e m o tio n s’ ? . . .
O n e im p o rta n t e le m e n t o f m y an sw er to this cen tral h istorical q u e stio n is that
it w as the sec u larisa tio n o f p sy ch o lo gy that gave rise to the creation and ad o p tio n o f
the new c ate g o ry o f ‘ e m o tio n s’ and influen ced the w ay it w as o rigin ally and has
su b seq u en tly b een con cciv ed . [. . .]
T h e initial b ack d ro p I p rovid e to this sto ry o f g rad u al, c o m p le x and in co m p le te
se cu larisa tio n , takes the fo rm o f an analysis o f p atristic and sch o la stic C h ristian
th e o lo g ie s o f the sou l. C lassical C h ristian th e o lo g ia n s, especially St A u gustin e o f
H ip p o and St T h o m a s A q u in as, . . . p ro d u c e d m o d e ls o f the h um an so u l in w hich
F RO M P A S S 10 N S T O E M OTI O N S 3 1
the passions and ap p etites, w hich w ere m ovem en ts o f the low er anim al sou l, w ere
distinguish ed from the affections, w hich w ere acts o f the higher rational soul. The
ap petites w ere hunger, thirst and sexual desire. The disob edien ce of the low er soul
to the higher, and o f the body to the sou l, e x p erien ced in sexual appetite and in the
passions w as a sign of, and punishm ent for, the original sin o f Adam and Eve. O ften ,
passions w ere unruly and disturb ed the body; they included love, hate, h ope, fear
and anger. T h e higher affections o f love, sym pathy and joy w ere signs o f rclatcdn ess
to G od and held out the possibility o f reunion with G od . T h e affections w ere also
signs o f the o rd e r o r direction o f the w ill. A carnal w ill w as affected by w orldly
ob jects and, ultim ately, by love o f self; a holy w ill’s affections w ere for go o d n ess,
truth an d, ultim ately, G o d .
It is im p o rtan t to have an understan ding o f the im p o rtan ce o f the w ill to
Christian m orality and Christian psychology in o rd e r to appreciate the significance
o f its gradu al disappearance in eighteenth- and nineteenth -century w orks. The
destiny o f each person w as determ in ed by freely taken voluntary decision s —
decision s o f the individual w ill. The w ill w as divided by Aquinas into tw o ‘ap p e
t ite s’ : the higher in tellectual appetite (the w ill p ro p e r), w hose m ovem en ts w ere
the affections; and the low er, non-rational sense ap petite, w hose m ovem en ts w ere
the ap p etites and passions. It is particularly im p o rtan t, then, to realise that —
contrary to pop u lar opinion — classical Christian view s about reason and the
passions w ere equivalen t n either to the view that reason and the ‘e m o tio n s’ arc
inevitably at war, n or to the idea that ‘e m o tio n s’ overpow er us against o u r will.
A p petites, passion s and affections, on the classical C hristian view, w ere all m o v e
m en ts o f different parts o f the w ill, and the aftections, at least, w ere potentially
in lorm cd by reason.
C h apter 3 exam in es so m e o f the m ovem en ts away from classical Christian
p sych ology tow ards m ore secular and m echanistic view s of passions and affections
in the eighteenth cen tury, as w ell as w ays that the traditional C hristian pictu re w as
m aintained and d eveloped. Christian thinkers such as Josep h Butler, Jonathan
E dw ards and T h om as R eid adapted the tradition al m od els in various ways. The
tenden cies to see passions and affections as ‘m ech an ism s’ designed by G o d , and
as ‘p e rce p tio n s’ , w ere both sy m pto m atic o f psy ch o lo gies in w hich the will had
b eco m e less im p o rtan t. Passions and affections w ere conceived increasingly as
m ini-agents in their own right, o r as a faculty o f their ow n, rath er than as acts or
m ovem en ts o f the individual w ill. This had significant m oral and theological
im plication s. The d iscou rse o f ‘m oral se n tim e n ts’ specifically and the culture o f
‘ se n tim e n t’ and ‘sen tim en talism ’ m ore gen erally, w hich w ere fascinating features
o f this sam e p e rio d , arc also referred to in chapter 3. T h ese serv e as further
exam p les o f the variety o f catego ries and con ceptu alisation s used durin g this
p e rio d , w hich w as an age o f passions and sen tim en ts as m uch as it w as an ‘ Age o f
R e aso n ’ .
The initial baptism o f the term ‘e m o tio n s’ . . . in its m od ern sense occu rred in
the school o f Scottish em p iricist ph ilosoph ers and m ental scien tists from David
H u m e ’ s Treatise o f Human Nature (1 7 3 9 —4 0 ) on w ards. The m ost im portan t tex t w as
Thomas B row n ’s Lectures on the Philosophy o f the Human Mind (1 8 2 0 ) in which
‘ e m o tio n s’ w as the term ad opted for all those feelings that w ere n either sensations
n or in tellectual stales. Brow n developed a new term in ology and classification o f
3 2 T H O M A S DIXON
m en tal sta te s, m otiv ate d by a d e sire to b reak away fro m trad ition al faculty p sy c h
o lo g y , and to cre ate a d c -C h ristian ise d and scien tific altern ative. ‘ E m o tio n s’
in clu ded a w id e variety o f state s that had previou sly b een d iffe ren tiated , and m any
o f w hich had b een c o n sid e re d active p o w e rs o f the so u l. T h e te rm ‘ e m o tio n s’ w as
b ap tised in a w ay that su g g e ste d these m en tal state s wrere passive and n on -cogn itive.
T h e c ate g o ry w as o ver-in clu sive and w as e m b e d d e d in a trad ition c o m m itte d to the
ap plication o f scien tific m e th o d o lo g y to the stu d y o f the m in d . H ow ever, the a p p li
cation o f scientific m e th o d and c o m m itm e n t to C h ristian ity w ere by n o m ean s
m utually e x clu siv e : the evan gelical th eologian T h o m a s C h alm e rs ad o p ted and even
stren gth en ed the n on -co gn itiv e, in volun tary and m ech an ical te n o r o f B ro w n ’ s ‘ fe e l
in g ’ th e o ry o f e m o tio n s.
. . . Physical scien ce re p la c e d m en tal scien ce as the d o m in an t m e th o d o lo g y in
w ork s on e m o tio n s by H e r b e r t Spen cer, A le x a n d e r Bain and C h arles D arw in
in the 1 8 5 0 s to 1 8 7 0 s. T h e a ssu m p tio n , still m ad e by C h ristian p h ilo so p h e rs and
p sy c h o lo g ists at this tim e , that p assio n s and affection s w ere in stan ces o f the soul
actin g upon o r usin g the b o d y , w as re p la ce d w ith the assu m p tio n that e m o tio n s
w ere in stan ces o f the brain and n e rv e s acting u p o n o th e r p a rts o f the b o d y . T h e
m in d o r so u l p e r se w as n ot given an active ro le. P h y sio logical and e volu tion ary
th in kers w ere q u ic k er to a p p ro p ria te the cate g o ry ‘ e m o tio n s’ than th in kers w ithin
the C h ristian trad itio n , so m e o f w h om w ere still speak in g the lan gu age o f ‘ w ill’ ,
'p a ssio n s’ and ‘ affe c tio n s’ in the 1 8 7 0 s. So use o f the te rm w as gen erally indicative
o f fam iliarity and sym path y w ith B ro w n ’ s se c u larise d m en tal scien ce. T h e re la tio n
ship b e tw e en th ese ph ysicalist th in kers and the m o ral p h ilo so p h e rs and n atural
th eo lo g ian s w hose w o rk they w ere d e v e lo p in g u p o n , w as not alw ays straig h t
fo rw ard , how ever. D a rw in ’s relation sh ip w ith Scottish m o ral ph ilosoph y and Sir
C h arles B e ll’ s design th eology se rv e s as an illu stratio n o f th ese c o m p le x re la tio n
ships. T h e th e o rie s of e m o tio n and e x p re ssio n p ro d u c e d by this ge n e ra tio n o f
scien tific p sy c h o lo g ists wrere shaped both po sitiv ely and n egatively by th eo lo g ical
and re lig io u s id eas. S o m e C h ristian and th eistic p sy c h o lo g ists (fo r e x a m p le , W illiam
Lyall o r Ja m e s M cC o sh ) ad o p ted the n ew cate g o ry o f e m o tio n s but o p p o se d the
ph y sicalist ap p ro ach o f the new e m o tio n s th e o rists and p ro p o se d m c n talistic and
cogn itiv e alte rn ativ e s. . . .
M o re p r c sc n tist and n arro w e r h isto rie s o f p sy ch o lo gy m igh t b egin their
a cc o u n t o f the h isto ry o f p sy ch o lo gical th e o rie s o f e m o tio n s w ith W illiam Ja m e s. In
this h isto ry , in c o n trast, Ja m e s ’ in fam ou s th eory is d e p ic te d as the cu lm in atio n o f
c o m p le x p ro c e sse s o f se cu larisatio n and innovation in p sy c h o lo g ical d isc o u rse .
Ja m e s ’ ico n ic 1884 artic le ‘W h at is an e m o tio n ? ’ m ad e e x p lic it in a n ew way the
tacit c p ip h c n o m c n alism o f the ph y sio lo g ical-ev o lu tio n ary th e o ry o f e m o tio n s. H is
th e o ry o f e m o tio n s — that they w ere felt aw are n e sse s o f visceral activity — w as a
flagship th eory o f the new scien tific p h y ch ological p ro fessio n . Ja m e s in verted the
trad itio n al assu m p tio n that the o u tw a rd b odily m an ife statio n s o f e m o tio n s w ere
cau se d by eith er the activity o f the soul o r even — as in the case o f the ph y siological-
e volu tion ary sch o o l — by the activity o f the b rain ; the v iscera w ere m ad e p rim ary
and the brain and its m in d se co n d ary by Ja m e s. |. . .]
F RO M P A S S 10 N S T O E M OTI O N S 3 3
Notes
1 For a very helpful article sum m arising recent debates about the natural kind
status o f ‘em otion ’ ,and arguing that ‘em otion’ is indeed a natural kind term , see
Charland (2002).
2 Solom on (1993).
3 O n Stoic and early Christian attitudes to passions, will and reason, see Sorabji
( 2 0 0 0 ).
References
Charland, L. (2002) ‘The natural kind status o f em otion ’ , British Journal fo r the
Philosophy of Science. 53(4): 1—27.
Solom on, R. (2003) The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning o f Life. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Sorabji, R. (2000) Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation.
O xford: O xford University Press.
Chapter 2
Norbert Elias
ON C H A N G E S I N A G G R E S S I V E N E S S
[• • •]
T
HE ST A N D A R D OF A G G R E S S I V E N E S S , I T S tone and intensity,
is not at presen t cxactly uniform am on g the dilTerent nations o f the W est. But
these differen ces, which from close up often ap p ear quite con siderable, d isap pear if
the aggressiven ess o f the “civilized” nations is com pared to that o f societies at a d if
ferent stage o f affect con trol. C o m p ared to the battle fury o f Abyssinian w arrio rs—
adm ittedly pow erless against the technical apparatus of the civilized arm y— o r to the
frenzy o f the different tribes at the tim e o f the G reat M igration s, the aggressiven ess
o f even the m ost w arlike nations of the civilized w orld ap pears su b dued. Like all
other instincts, it is boun d, even in directlv w arlike actions, bv the advanced state o f
the division o f function s, and by the resultin g gre ater depen den ce of individuals on
cach other and on the technical apparatus. It is confined and tam ed bv innum erable
ru les and proh ibitions that have b eco m e self-con strain ts. It is as m uch tran sfo rm e d ,
“refin ed ,” “civilized ,” as all the other fo rm s o f p leasu re, and its im m ediate and
un controlled violence ap pears only in d ream s or in isolated o u tb u rsts that we
account for as path ological.
In this area o f the affects, the theater o f the h ostile collisions betw een m en ,
the sam e h istorical tran sform ation has taken place as in all others. N o m atter at
w hat point the M iddle A ges stand in this tran sform ation , it will again suffice here
to take the standard o f their secular rulin g class, the w arrio rs, as a startin g poin t, to
illustrate the overall pattern o f this d evelopm en t. T h e release o f the affects in battle
in the M iddle A ges w as no longer, p erh aps, quite so uninhibited as in the early
p erio d o f the G reat M igration s. But it w as open and uninhabited enough com pared
to the standard o f m o d ern tim es. In the latter, cruelty and joy in the destru ction and
to rm e n t o f o th ers, like the p ro o f o f physical su p e rio rity , are placed under an
increasingly stron g social con trol an ch ored in the state organization. All these fo rm s
o f pleasure, lim ited by threats o f d ispleasure, gradually com e to e xp re ss them selves
0 N C H A N G E S IN A G G R E S S IV E N E S S 3 5
only in d irectly , in a “ refin ed” fo rm . And only al tim e s o f social upheaval o r w here
social c o n tro l is lo o se r (e .g ., in colon ial re g io n s) do they b reak o u t m o re directly ,
unin hibitedly, less im p e d e d by sh am e and rep u gn an ce.
L ife in m ed iev al so c iety ten d e d in the o p p o site d ire c tio n . R ap in e, b attle , h u n t
ing o f m en and an im als— all th ese w ere vital n e c essitie s w h ich , in ac co rd an c e w ith
the stru c tu re o f so c ie ty , w ere visible to all. A nd th u s, for the m igh ty and stro n g ,
they fo rm e d p a rt o l the p le a su re s o f life.
“ I tell v o u ,” says a w ar hvm n attrib u te d to the m in strel B crtran de B o r n ,1
“that n eith er eatin g, d rin k in g, n o r sle ep has as m uch savor fo r m e as to h ear the
cry ‘ F o r w a rd s!’ from both sid e s, and h o rse s w ith ou t rid e r s shying and w hin n y
in g, and the cry ‘ H elp ! H e lp !’ , and to see the sm all and the g r e a t fall to the g rass
at the d itch es and the dead p ie rc e d by the w o o d o f the lances d eck ed w ith
b a n n e rs.”
Even the lite ra ry fo rm u la tio n giv es an im p ressio n o f the orig in al savagery o f
feelin g. In an oth er p lace B e rtran de B o rn sin gs: “T h e p le asan t se aso n is draw in g nigh
w hen o u r ships shall lan d , w hen K in g R ich ard shall c o m e , m e rry and p ro u d as he
n ever w as b e fo re . N o w w e shall see go ld and silver sp e n t; the n ew ly b u ilt sto n e
w o rk w ill c rack to the h e a r t’ s d e sire , w alls c ru m b le , to w e rs to p p le and c o llap se ,
o u r e n e m ie s taste p riso n and chain s. I love the m e le e o f blue and verm ilio n sh ield s,
the m a n y -co lo red en sig n s and the b an n e rs, the ten ts and rich pavilions sp read out
on the plain , the b reak in g lan ces, the p ie rc e d sh ield s, the g le a m in g h elm ets that are
sp lit, the b low s given and re c e iv e d .”
W ar, on e o f the chansons de geste d e c la re s, is to d e sce n d as the stro n g e r on the
e n em y, to hack dow n his vin es, u p ro o t his tre e s, lay w aste his lan d, lak e his castles
by sto r m , fill in his w ells, and kill his p e o p le . . . .
A p a rtic u la r p leasu re is taken in m u tilatin g p riso n e rs: “ By my tr o th ,” says the
king in the sam e chanson, “ I laugh at w hat you say, I care n ot a fig lo r y o u r th reats, I
shall sh am e every knight I have taken , cut o ff his n o se o r his cars. If he is a se rg ea n t
o r a m erch an t he w ill lose a fo o t o r an a r m .”
Such things arc n o t only said in song. T h e se e p ics are an in tegral p a rt of social
life. A nd they e x p r e ss the feelin gs o f the liste n e rs fo r w h om they arc in ten ded far
m o re d irectly than m o st o f o u r literatu re. T h ey m ay e x a g g e ra te in d etail. Even in
the age o f chivalry m on ey already h ad, on o cc asio n s, so m e p o w e r to su b d u e and
tran sfo rm the affects. U su ally only the p o o r and low ly, fo r w h om no co n sid erab le
ran som cou ld b e e x p e c te d , w ere m u tila te d , and the kn ights w ho co m m a n d e d
ra n so m s w ere sp a re d . T h e ch ro n icles w hich d irectly d o c u m e n t social life b e ar
am p le w itn e ss to these attitu d es.
T h ey w ere m o stly w ritte n by c le rics. T h e value ju d g m e n ts they con tain are
th erefo re often th ose o f the w eak er g ro u p th reaten ed by the w a r rio r class. N e v e r
th e le ss, the p ictu re they tran sm it to us is qu ite gen u in e. “ H e sp en d s his life ,” we
read o f a kn igh t, “in p lu n d e rin g , d e stro y in g ch u rc h es, fallin g upon p ilg r im s,
o p p re ssin g w id o w s and orph an s. He takes p a rtic u la r p le asu re in m u tilatin g the
in n ocen t. In a single m o n a ste ry , that o f the b lack m o n k s o f Sarlat, th ere are 150
m en and w o m en w h ose h ands he has cut o ff o r w h o se ey es he has p u t o u t. And his
w ife is ju st as cru e l. She h elp s him w ith his e x e c u tio n s. It even giv es h er p le asu re to
to rtu re the p o o r w o m en . She had th eir b re asts h acked o ff o r their nails to rn o ff so
that they w ere in capable o f w o rk .”’
3 6 N O R B E R T ELIAS
Such affective o u tb u rsts may still o c c u r as e x c e p tio n a l p h e n o m e n a, as a “ p a th o

lo g ic a l” d e g e n e ra tio n , in later ph ases o f social d e v e lo p m en t. But h ere no punitive
social p o w e r e x iste d . T h e only th reat, the only d an g er that co u ld instill fe ar w as that
o f b e in g o v e rp o w e re d in b attle by a stro n g e r o p p o n e n t. L eavin g aside a sm all elite,
rap in e, pillag e, and m u rd e r w ere stan d ard p rac tic e in the w a r rio r so ciety o f this
tim e , as is n o ted by L u ch aire , the h istorian o f th irte e n th -ce n tu ry French so ciety .
T h ere is little ev id en ce that things wrcre differen t in o th e r c o u n trie s o r in the
c e n tu rie s that follow ed . O u tb u rsts o f c ru e lty did n o t e x c lu d e on e from social life.
T h ey w ere n ot o u tlaw ed . T h e p le asu re in killin g and to rtu rin g o th e rs w as g re at, and
it w as a socially p e rm itte d p le asu re . To a certain e x te n t, the social stru c tu re even
push ed its m e m b e rs in this d ire c tio n , m akin g it seem n e c essa ry and practically
ad v an tageo u s to behave in this w ay.
W h at, for e x a m p le , ou gh t to b e don e wnth p riso n e rs? T h e re w as little m on ey
in this so ciety . W ith re g ard to p r iso n e rs w ho co u ld pay and w h o, m o re o v e r, w ere
m e m b e rs o f o n e ’s ow n c lass, on e e x e rc ise d so m e d e g re e o f re strain t. B ut the
o th e rs? To keep them m e an t to fe ed th em . To re tu rn them m e an t to enhance the
w ealth and fighting p o w e r o f the en em y. For su b je c ts ( i.e ., w o rk in g , se rv in g , and
fighting h an ds) w ere a p a rt o f the w ealth o f the ru lin g class o f that tim e . So
p r iso n e rs w ere killed o r sen t b ack so m u tila te d that they w ere un fitted fo r w ar
se rv ic e and w o rk . T h e sam e ap p lied to d e stro y in g field s, filling in wre lls, and cu ttin g
dow n tre e s. In a p re d o m in an tly ag rarian so c iety , in w hich im m o b ile p o sse ssio n s
re p re se n te d the m a jo r p a rt o f p r o p e rty , this to o se rv e d to w eaken the en em y. T h e
stro n g e r affectivity o f beh avior w as to a c e rtain d e g re e socially n e cessary . P eople
behaved in a socially u sefu l way and to o k p le asu re in d o in g so. And it is en tirely in
k eep in g w ith the le sse r d e g re e o f social c o n tro l and co n strain t o f in stin ctual life that
this joy in d e stru c tio n cou ld so m e tim e s give w ay, th rough a su d d en iden tification
w ith the v ictim , and d o u b tle ss also as an e x p re ssio n o f the fear and g u ilt p ro d u ce d
by the p e rm an e n t p re ca rio u sn e ss of this life; to e x tre m e s o f pity. T h e v ic to r o f
today w as d e fe ate d to m o rro w bv so m e accid e n t, c a p tu re d , and im p e rile d . In the
m id st o f this p e rp e tu a l risin g and falling, this alte rn atio n o f the hum an hunts o f
w artim e w ith the an im al h un ts o r to u rn a m e n ts that w ere the d iv e rsio n s o f “p e a c e
tim e ,” little cou ld b e p re d ic te d . T h e fu tu re wras relatively u n certain even fo r those
w ho had fled the “w o rld ” ; only G o d and the loyalty o f a few p e o p le w h o held
to g e th e r had any p e rm an e n c e . Fear reign ed e v e ry w h e re; on e had to be on o n e ’ s
gu ard all the tim e . And ju st as p e o p le ’ s fate could chan ge a b ru p tly , so th eir joy
cou ld turn in to fear and this fear, in its tu rn , cou ld give w ay, equally ab ru p tly , to
su b m issio n to so m e new p leasu re.
T h e m a jo rity o f the se cu lar ru lin g class o f the M idd le A g e s led the life o f
le ad e rs o f arm e d b an ds. T h is fo rm e d the taste and h abits o f in dividuals. R e p o r ts left
to u s by that so ciety yield by and larg e , a p ictu re sim ila r to th ose o f feudal so c ietie s
in o u r ow n tim e s; and they show a c o m p a ra b le stan d ard o f behavior. O n ly a sm all
e lite , o f w hich m o re w ill b e said later, sto o d ou t to so m e ex ten t from this n o rm .
T h e w a rrio r o f the M idd le A ges n o t only loved b attle , he lived in it. H e spent
his youth p re p arin g for b attle. W hen he cam e o f age he w as k n ig h ted , and w aged
w ar as lo n g as his stren gth p e r m itte d , into old age. H is life had no o th e r fun ction .
H is d w ellin g p lace w as a w atch tow er, a fo rtre ss, at on ce a w eapon o f attack and
d efen se. If by ac c id e n t, by e x c e p tio n , he lived in p eace, he n e e d e d at least the
0 N C H A N G E S IN A G G R E S S IV E N E S S 3 7
illu sio n o f w ar. H e fou gh t in to u rn a m e n ts, and th ese to u rn a m e n ts o fte n d iffered

little fro m real b a ttle s.4
“ For the so c iety o f that tim e w ar w as the n o rm al s ta te ,” says L uch aire of the
th irteen th ce n tu ry . And H uizin ga says of the fo u rte e n th and fifteenth ce n tu rie s:
“T h e ch ron ic fo rm w hich w ar w as w on t to take, the c o n tin u o u s d isru p tio n o f
tow n and co u n try bv every kind o f d a n g e ro u s rab b le, the p e rm an e n t threat
o f harsh and un reliab le law e n fo rc e m e n t . . . n ou rish ed a feelin g o f universal
u n c e rta in ty
J
.”’
In the fifteenth c e n tu ry , as in the ninth o r th irte e n th , the kn ight still gives
e x p re ssio n to his joy in w ar, even if it is no lo n g e r so open and in tact as
earlier.
“W ar is a jo y o u s th in g.” It is Jean de B ueil w ho says this. H e has fallen into
d isfavor w ith the king. A nd now he d ic ta te s to his se rv a n t his life sto ry . T h is is in
the y ear 1 4 6 5 . It is no lo n g e r the co m p le te ly fre e , in d e p e n d e n t knight w ho sp e ak s,
the little king in his d om ain . It is so m e o n e w ho is h im se lf in se rv ic e : “ W ar is a
jo y o u s thing. W e love each o th e r so m uch in w ar. If w e see that o u r cause is ju st and
o u r kin sm en fight b o ld ly , te a rs c o m e to o u r ey es. A sw eet joy rise s in o u r h e a rts, in
the feelin g o f o u r h on est loyalty to each o th e r; and se e in g o u r frien d so bravely
e x p o sin g his body to d a n g e r in o r d e r to k eep and fulfill the c o m m a n d m e n t o f o u r
C re a to r, w e re so lv e to g o fo rw ard and die o r live w ith him and n ever leave him on
accou n t o f love. This b rin gs such deligh t that anyon e w ho has n ot felt it can n ot say
how w on d erfu l it is. D o y ou think that so m e o n e w ho feels this is afraid o f death ?
N o t in the least! H e is so stre n g th e n e d , so d e lig h te d , that he d o e s n ot know w here
he is. T ruly he fe ars n oth in g in the w o rld !”
T h is is the joy of b attle , c e rtain ly , but it is no lo n g e r the d ire c t p le asu re in the
h um an h un t, in the flashing o f sw o rd s, in the n eigh in g of ste e d s, in the fear and
death o f the en em y — how fine it is to h ear them cry “ H e lp , h e lp !” o r see them lying
w ith their b o d ie s to rn o p en ! N o w the p le asu re lies in the clo se n e ss to o n e ’ s frie n d s,
the enth usiasm fo r a ju st cau se , and m o re than e arlie r w e find the joy o f b attle
se rv in g as an in to x ican t to o v e rco m e fear.
Very sim p le and p o w e rfu l feelin gs speak h ere. O n e kills, giv es o n e se lf up
w holly to the fight, se e s o n e ’ s friend fight. O n e fights at his side. O n e fo rg e ts w here
on e is. O n e fo rg e ts death itself. It is sp le n d id . W h at m o re ? [. . .]
It is the stru c tu re o f so ciety that d e m a n d s and g e n e ra te s a specific stan d ard o f
e m o tio n a l co n tro l. “ W e,” says L u ch aire, “w ith o u r p eacefu l m a n n e rs and h abits,
w ith the care and p ro te c tio n that the m o d e rn state lavishes on the p r o p e rty and
p e rso n o f each in d iv id u al,” can scarcely fo rm an idea o f this o th e r so ciety .
A t that tim e the cou n try had d isin te g rated in to p ro v in c es, and the
in habitants o f each provin ce fo rm e d a kind o f little nation that ab h o rred
all the o th e rs. T h e p ro v in ces w ere in tu rn d ivided in to a m u ltitu d e o f
feu d al e sta te s w h ose o w n e rs fou gh t each o th e r in cessan tly . N o t only
the gre at lo r d s, the b a ro n s, b u t also the sm alle r lo rd s o f the m an o r
lived in d e so late isolatio n and w ere u n in te rru p te d ly o c c u p ie d in
w agin g w ar again st th eir “so v e re ig n s,” th eir e q u a ls, o r th eir su b je cts.
In ad d itio n , there w as co n stan t rivalry b etw een tow n and to w n , village
and v illage, valley and valley , and co n stan t w ars b etw een n e igh b o rs
3 8 NORBE RT ELIAS
that seem ed to arise from the verv m ultiplicity o f these territo rial
un its.6
T his d escription helps to see m ore precisely som eth in g w hich so far has been
stated m ainly in general te rm s, n am ely, the con nection betw een social structure
and person ality stru ctu re. In this society there is no central pow er strong enough to
com pel peop le to restrain t. But if in this o r that region the pow er o f a central
authority g ro w s, if over a larger or sm aller area the peop le arc forced to live in
peace with each other, the m oldin g o f affects and the stan dards o f the econ om y o f
instincts are very gradually changed as w ell. As will be discussed in m o re detail
later, the reserv e and “ m utual con sideration ” o f peop le increase, first in norm al
everyday social life. And the discharge o f affects in physical attack is lim ited to
certain tem p oral and spatial enclaves. O n ce the m on opoly o f physical pow er has
passed to ccntral au th orities, n ot every stron g m an can afford the pleasure o f
physical attack. This is now re se rv ed to those few legitim ized by the ccntral authority
(e .g ., the police against the crim in al), and to larger n u m b ers only in exception al
tim es o f w ar o r revolution, in the socially legitim ized stru gg le against intern al or
extern al enem ies.
But even these tem p oral or spatial enclaves within civilized society in which
b elligerence is allow ed freer play— above all, w ars betw een nations— have becom e
m ore im person al, and lead less and less to an affective discharge having the im m e d i
acy and intensity o f the m edieval phase. The necessary restraint and tran sform ation
o f aggression cultivated in the everyday life o f civilized society cannot be sim ply
reversed , even in these enclaves. All the sam e, this could happen m ore quicklv than
we might su p p o se, had not the direct physical com b at betw een a man and his hated
adversary given way to a m echanized stru gg le dem anding a strict con trol o f the
affects. Even in w ar in the civilized w orld, the individual can no lon ger give free
rein to his pleasure, sp u rred on by the sight o f the en em y, but m u st fight, no m atter
how he may feel, accordin g to the com m an ds o f invisible o r only indirectly visible
lead ers, against a frequently invisible or only indirectly visible enem y. And im m ense
social upheaval and urgen cy, heightened by carefully con certed propagan d a, arc
n eeded to reaw aken and legitim ize in large m asses o f peop le the socially outlaw ed
instincts, the joy in killing and destru ction that have been rep ressed from everyday
civilized life.
A d m itted ly, these affects do have, in a “refin ed ,” rationalized fo rm , their
legitim ate and exactly defined place in the everyday life o f civilized society. And this
is very characteristic o f the kind o f tran sform ation through w hich the civilization
o f the affects takes place. For exam p le, belligeren ce and aggression find socially
perm itted exp ression in sp o rtin g con tests. And they are e xp re sse d especially in
“spectatin g” (e .g ., at boxin g m atch es), in the im aginary identification w ith a sm all
n um b er o f com batan ts to w hom m o d erate and precisely regulated scop e is granted
for the release o f such affects. And this living-out o f affects in spectatin g o r even in
m erely listening (e .g ., to a radio com m en tary ) is a particularly ch aracteristic feature
o f civilized society. It partly d eterm in es the developm en t o f book s and the theater,
and decisively inlluences the role o f the cinem a in o u r w orld. This tran sform ation
o f what m anifested itse lf originally as an active, often aggressive exp ression o f
pleasure, into the passive, m ore o rd ered pleasure o f spectating ( i e . , a m ere pleasure
0 N CH A N G E S IN A G G R E S S IV E N E S S 3 9
o f the eye) is already initiated in education , in condition in g p recep ts for young

p eop le. | . . .]
The muting o f drives: psychologization and rationalization
“ Life at c o u rt” , La B ruyere w rite s,7 “is a se rio u s, m elancholy gam e, w hich requires
o f us that we arran ge ou r pieces and o u r b atteries, have a plan, follow it, foil that o f
o u r ad versary, so m e tim e s take risks and play on im pulse. And after all our m easures
and m editations we are in check , som etim es ch eck m ate.”
At the c o u rt, above all at the great ab solutist c o u rt, there w as form ed for the
first tim e a kind o f society and hum an relationships having stru ctu ral characteristics
w hich from now on, over a long stretch of W estern history and through many
variation s, again and again play a decisive part. In the m idst o f a large populated area
w hich by and large is free of physical violen ce, a “go o d society” is fo rm e d . But even
il the use o f physical violen ce now reced es from hum an in terco u rse, if even duelling
is now forb idden , peop le now e x e rt pressu re and force on each oth er in a w ide
variety of different w ays. Life in this circle is in no way peaceful. Very many people
are continuously d epen den t on each other. C o m p etitio n for prestige and royal
favour is intense. “ A ffaires” , disputes over rank and favour, do n ot cease. If the
sw ord no lon ger plays so great a role as the m ean s o f d ecision , it is replaced by
in trigue, conflicts in which careers and social success arc con tested with w ords.
T hey dem and and p rodu ce other qualities than did the arm ed stru gg le s that had to
be fought out w ith w eapon s in o n e ’ s hand. C ontin uous reflection, foresigh t, and
calculation, self-con trol, precise and articulate regulation o f o n e ’s own effects,
know ledge o f the w hole terrain , hum an and non-hum an, in w hich one acts, b eco m e
m ore and m ore indispensable precond ition s o f social success.
Every individual b elon gs to a “clique” , a social circle w hich su p p o rts him when
n ecessary; but the grou p in gs change, lie en ters alliances, if possib le w ith people
ranking high at co u rt. But rank at co u rt can change very quickly; he has rivals; he
has open and con cealed en em ies. And the tactics o f his stru g g le s, as o f his alliances,
dem and careful con sideration . The degree o f aloofn ess o r fam iliarity with everyone
m ust be carefully m easu red ; each greetin g, each conversation has a significance over
and above what is actually said o r done. They indicate the standing o f a p e rso n ; and
they con tribu te to the form ation o f co u rt opinion on his standing:
“ Let a favourite pay close heed to h im self: for if he d oes not keep m e w ailing as
long as usual in his antecham ber; il his lace is m ore op en , if he frow ns less, il he
listens to m e m ore w illingly and accom panies m e a little further when show ing me
ou t, I shall think that he is beginning to fall, and I shall be rig h t.”1'
The co u rt is a kind of sto ck exch an ge; as in every “g o o d society ” , an estim ate
o f the “value” o f each individual is continuously bein g fo rm e d . But here his value
has its real foundation not in the w ealth or even the ach ievem ents o r ability of
the individual, but in the favour he enjoys with the king, the influence he has with
other m ighty o n es, his im portan ce in the play o f courtly cliques. All this, favour,
influence, im p o rtan ce, this w hole co m p lex and dan gerous gam e in which physical
force and d irect affective o u tb u rsts arc proh ibited and a threat to existen ce,
dem ands o f each participan t a con stan t foresigh t and an e x ac t know ledge o f every
4 0 NORBE RT ELIAS
other, o f his position and value in the n etw ork o f courtly opin ion ; it exacts precise
attu nem ent o f his ow n behaviour to this value. Every m istake, every careless step
d ep resses the value o f its p e rp e trato r in courtly opin ion ; it mav threaten his w hole
position at co u rt.
“ A man w ho know s the co u rt is m aster o f his ge stu re s, o f his eyes and his
e x p ressio n ; he is d eep , im pen etrab le. He dissim ulates the bad turn s he d o e s, sm iles
at his en em ies, su pp resses his ill-tem per, disguises his passion s, disavow s his h eart,
acts against his feelin gs.”‘l
The tran sform ation o f the nobilitv in the direction o f “civilized” behaviour is
unm istakable. H ere, it is not yet in ail re sp ects so profound and all-em bracing
as later in b o u rg e o is so ciety ; for it is only tow ards their p e e rs that the c o u rtie r
and the c o u rt lady need to su b ject them selves to such con strain t, and far less
so tow ards their social in ferio rs. Q u ite ap art from the fact that the pattern o f
drive- and affect-con trol is different in courtly from that in b o u rg eo is society , the
aw areness that this con trol is exercised for social reasons is m o re alive. O p p osin g
inclinations do not yet w holly vanish from w aking con scio u sness; self-con straint has
not yet b eco m e so com pletely an apparatus o f habits operatin g alm o st autom atically
and including all hum an relationships. But it is already quite clear how' human
beings are beco m ing m ore co m p le x , and internally split in a quite specific way.
Each m an , as it w ere, con fron ts him self. H e “con ceals his passions” , “disavow s his
h eart” , “acts against his feelin gs” . The pleasure o r inclination o f the m om en t is
restrain ed in anticipation o f the disagreeab le con sequ en ces o f its in dulgen ce; and it
is, indeed, the sam e m echanism as that by which ad ults— w hether parents o r other
p erso n s— increasingly instil a stable “su p e reg o ” in children. The m om en tary drive
and affect im pu lses are, as it w ere, held back and m astered by the fore know ledge
o f the later d ispleasure, by the fear o f a future pain, until this fear finally o p p o se s the
iorb idden behaviour and inclinations by force o f habit, even if no oth er p erso n is
directly presen t, and the energy o f such inclinations is channelled into a h arm less
direction not threatened by any displeasure.
In keeping with the tran sform ation o f society , o f in terp erson al relationships,
the affective m ake-up o f the individual is also re co n stru cted : as the series o f actions
and the n um b er o f pe o p le on w hom the individual and his actions constantly'
depend arc in creased, the habit o f foresight over lon ger chains g ro w s stronger. And
as the behaviour and personality stru ctu re o f the individual change, so d ocs his
m anner o f con siderin g others. H is im age o f them b e co m e s rich er in n uances, freer
o f spon tan eous em otio n s: it is “psy ch o lo gized".
W here the stru ctu re o f social functions allow s the individual gre ater scope for
actions un der the influence o f m om en tary im pulses than is the case at c o u rt, it is
neither necessary n or possible to con sider very deeply the nature o f an oth er p e r
so n ’ s con sciousness and affects, o r w hat hidden m otives may underlie his behaviour.
If at cou rt calculation m eshes w ith calculation, in sim pler societies affect directly
en gages affect. T his strength o f the im m ediate affects, however, binds the individual
to a sm aller num b er o f behavioural option s: som eon e is friend o r foe, go o d or evil;
and depen din g on how one p erceives another in term s o f these black and w hite
affective p atte rn s, so one behaves. Everything seem s directly related to feeling. That
the sun shines, o r lightning flashes, that som eon e laughs or knits his brow, all this
appeals m ore directly to the affects o f the perceiver. And as it excites him here and
0 N CH A N G E S IN A G G R E S S IV E N E S S 4 1
now in a friendly o r unfriendly w ay, he takes it as if it w ere m eant this way

especially for him . It d o es not en ter his head that all this, a flash o f lightning that
alm ost strikes him , a face that offends him , are to be explained bv rem o te c o n
nections that have nothing directly to do with h im self. People only develop a m ore
long-sigh ted view o f nature and other p eop le to the e xten t that the advancing
division o f functions and their daily in volvem ent in long human chains accustom
them to such a view and a g re ater restrain t o f the affects. O nly then is the veil which
the passions draw before the eyes slow ly lifted, and a new w orld co m e s into view —
a w orld w hose co u rse is friendly or hostile to the individual person w ithout being
intended to be so, a chain o f events that need to be con tem p lated dispassionately
over lon g stretch es if their con nections arc to be d isc lo se d .10
I.ike con duct gen erally, the p ercep tion o f things and peop le also b eco m es
affectively m ore neutral in the cou rse o f the civilizing pro cess. The “ w orld p ictu re”
gradually b e co m e s less directly d eterm in ed by hum an w ishes and fears, and m ore
strongly orien ted to w hat we call “ e x p e rie n c e ” o r “the em pirical” , to sequen ces
with their own im m an ent regularities. Ju st as today, in a further sp u rt in this
direction , the cou rse o f h istory and society is gradually em erg in g from the m ists o f
personal affects and involvem ent, from the haze o f collective longin gs and fears, and
begin n in g to appear as a relatively au ton om o u s n exu s o f events, so to o w ith nature
and— w ithin sm aller confines— w ith hum an beings. It is particularly in the circles
o f cou rt life that w hat we w ould today call a “p sy ch o lo gical” view o f m an d evelops,
a m ore precise ob servation o f oth ers and o n e se lf in term s o f lon ger series o f
m otives and causal con n ection s, because it is here that vigilant self-con trol and
p erpetu al ob servation o f others are am on g the elem entary p rerequ isites for the
preservation o f o n e ’s social position. But this is only one exam ple o f how w hat we
call the “ orien tation to e x p e rie n ce ” , the observation o f events w ithin a lengthening
and broaden ing n exus o f inter d epen den ce, slow ly begins to develop at exactly the
point w here the stru ctu re ol society itself com pels the individual to restrain his
m om en tary affects and tran sform his libidinal en ergies to a higher d egree.
Saint-Sim on in one place o b serv es som eon e with w hom he is on an uncertain
footing.
O
H e describ es his ow n behaviour in this situation as follow s: “1 soon noticed
that he w as grow in g co ld e r; I closely follow ed his con duct tow ards m e to avoid any
confusion betw een w hat m igh t be accidental in a man b urdened with prickly affairs,
and w hat I su sp ected . My suspicion s w ere con firm ed , causing m e to w ithdraw from
him entirely w ithout in the slightest ap pearin g to do s o .” "
This courtly a rt o f human ob serv atio n — unlike w hat we usually call “ psych
ology ” today— is never con cern ed with the individual in isolation, as if the essential
features o f his behaviour w ere indepen dent o f his relations to o th e rs, and as if he
related to o th e rs, so to speak, only retrosp ectively . The approach here is far closer
to reality, in that the individual is always seen in his social co n te x t, as a human being
in his relations to others, as an individual in a social situation.
It w as poin ted out ab ove13 that the p recep ts on behaviour o f the sixteenth
century differ from those o f the p recedin g cen tu ries less in term s o f their content
than in their ton e, their changed affective atm osph ere; psych ological insights, p e r
sonal ob servation s, begin to play a larger part. A com p arison betw een the p recep ts
o f E rasm us o r D ella C asa and the co rresp o n d in g m edieval ru les show s this clearly.
Investigation o f the social changes o f this tim e, the tran sform ation o f human
4 2 N O R B E R T ELIAS
relation sh ip s that lo o k p lace, p ro v id e s an e x p la n atio n . T h is “p sy ch o lo g iza tio n ” o f

ru le s o f c o n d u c t, or, m o re p re cise ly , th eir g r e a te r p e rm e atio n by o b se rv a tio n and
e x p e rie n c e , is an e x p re ssio n o f the acc e le ra te d co u rtiza tio n o f the u p p e r class and o f
the c lo se r in te gratio n o f all p a rts o f so ciety in this p e r io d . Sign s o f a chan ge in this
d ire ctio n arc certain ly n ot to b e foun d only in w ritin gs re c o rd in g the stan d ard o f
“g o o d b eh av io u r” of the tim e ; w e find them equally in w o rk s d e v o te d to the
e n te rtain m e n t o f this class. T h e o b se rv a tio n o f p e o p le that life in the c o u rtlv circle
d e m an d s finds its lite rary e x p re ssio n in an a rt o f hum an p o rtra itu re . [. . .]
Notes
1 A. I.uchaire, La societeJranfaise au temps de Philippe-Auguste (P aris, 19 0 9 ), p. 273.

2 Ib id ., p. 275.
3 Ib id ., p. 272.
4 Ib id ., p. 278.
5 I. H uzinga, Herbst des Mittelalters, Studien iiber Lebens und Geistesform des 14 und 15
Jahrhunderts in Trankreich und in den Niederlanden (M unich, 1924), p. 94.
6 Luchaire, La societeJranfaise, pp. 278f.
7 La Bruyere, Caracteres, ‘ D e la c o w ’ (P aris, H achette, 1922), Oeuvres, vol. 2,
p. 2 37, N o. 64 . . .
8 La Bruyere, op. cit., p. 2 4 7 , N o. 94.
9 Ib id ., p. 211, N o. 2; cf. Also p. 211, N o. 10: “The co u rt is like an edifice o f
m arble; I m ean it is com p o sed o f m en w ho are very hard, but very polish ed .”
C f. also n. 1 34.
10 See in this con text N o rb e rt Elias, “ Problem s o f Involvem ent and D etach m en t” ,
British Journal o f Sociology’, 7 (1 9 5 6 ), pp. 226 52. [Author’s note to the translation]
11 Saint-Sim on, Memoires (nouv. ed. Par A. de B oislisle) (P aris, 1910), vol. 22
(1 7 1 1 ), p. 63.
12 The History o f Manners, pp. 56ff, p a rtic .6 2 —3.
Chapter 3
Abram De Swaan
T H E P O L I T I C S OF A G O R A P H O B I A
E
a r n i n g s o f t h e i r o w n a n d a new occupation al prestige,
acquired independently o f husbands and lathers, m ade w orking w om en less
depen den t upon their husbands and thus the balance of d ep en den cies betw een
spou ses began to shift som ew hat in favour o f w om en . A round 1890, the lim itations
on public appearan ce by w om en w ere quickly disap pearin g (for exam p le, in the
N eth erlan d s). . . . And yet, at a tim e when restriction s on the m ovem en t o f w om en
in w est E uropean cities w ere decreasin g, psychiatric publications began to include
case d escription s o f Plalzschwindel: agoraph obia. A ctions that had been socially
prohibited b efore, rem ained unfeasible to som e even after they had b eco m e p e r
m issible, out o f an unreasoned anxiety a vague fear that had lost its su p p o rt in
con tem p orary public discussion and could now only be exp ressed in psychiatric
term s as a problem to be m anaged and treated by psychiatrists.
T h ese ob servation s do not im ply that con tem p orary agoraph ob ics directly
inherited these anxieties from their great-g ran d m oth ers w ho w ere prohibited from
goin g w here they now fear to tread. But they do convey that nin eteenth-century
society prod u ced circum stan ces in w hich b ou rgeois fam ilies, out o f con cern for
their safety and status, im posed restriction s on the m ovem en t o f their w om en folk ;
these p reoccu pation s soon acquired ad ded m eanings o f respectab ility, chastity, and
d epen den cy , w ere tran sform ed into collective fantasies about public order, se x u al
ity, and violence in the street and about the family as the ‘ haven in a h eartless
w o rld ’ . Such fantasies disap peared from public d iscou rse but survived in the
intim ate fam ily circle as available them es to be elab orated into a particular
4 4 A B R A M DE SWAAN
agoraph ob ic relationship. ‘Thus the uncon scious of m odern w om en contains many

rem nants of the con scious m isp ercep tion s of her g ran d m o th e r.’ O r, rather, all so rts
of ideas that w ere taken very seriously in one gen eration arc gradually abandoned as
sub jects o f adult discussion in another, but these notions con tin ue to be passed on as
jokes, n ursery talcs, inn uend oes, and threats and arc added to the cultural heritage
o fla t e r gen eration s. Ju st as som e p o e ts use the th em es o f h alf-forgotten legen ds and
folk talcs to co m p o se w orks o f art, oth er pe o p le select them es from this shadow v
childhood folklore to co n stru ct private fantasies that will guide them the m ore
com pulsively the m ore com pletely they have rep ressed them . In other w ords, there
is no collective u n con scio us, there are the abandoned opin ion s and idees revues o f
fo rm e r gen eration s surviving as in consequential and unverifiable prattle, elaborated
upon in infantile fantasy, rep ressed in a later stage. That may explain the striking
sim ilarity and constancy o f so many very private fantasies. A lthough the nineteenth-
century restriction s upon the m ovem en t o f b o u rg e o is w om en have re lax e d , and
her dependen cy on h er husband has b eco m e less on e-sid ed , the agoraph obic
relationship rep ro d u ces such restriction s w hile denying any other m otive ex ce p t an
in explicable anxiety.
It is now tim e to return to the gen eral question in this chapter: how global
developm en ts o f society may have altered the intim ate relation s betw een p eo p le, so
that the difficulties they e xp erien ce w ith them selves and one anoth er may have
b eco m e translatable into the vocabulary o f psychotherapy and suitable for treatm ent
as psychic prob lem s. R ather than dealing with the problem directly in its full and
form idable p ro p o rtio n s, it w as alluded to in an e xam p le: the restriction and re la x
ation of ru les tor the m ovem ent of w om en in public during the nineteenth century
and the sub seq uen t em ergen ce of agoraphobia.
The early developm en t ol capitalism resulted in a stron g lim itation on the
presen ce in public of urban b o u rg eo is w om en , w hereas b o u rg eo is m en could co n
tinue to m ove w herever they w ished and, possibly, could allow them selves greater
liberty than before tow ards w om en in public and w ith public w om en , since their
own daugh ters and w ives had disappeared from the streets. In the past hundred
y ears, however, w om en have begun to m ove m ore freely in public and, possibly,
b o u rg eo is m en have lost so m e o f their p riv ileges in approach in g w om en in public.
On balance, b o u rg eo is urban m en and w om en have b eco m e m ore equal, at least
in this resp ect. This partial equalization o f intim ate relations in the co u rse o f the
past hundred y ears, however, is not lim ited to this one aspect in the balance o f
depen den cies betw een m en and w om en , but covers alm o st all relation s betw een the
sexes. A d egree o f equalization has also occu rred in the relation s betw een parents
and children, or betw een young and old in gen eral. A sim ilar d ecrease in social
distance is developin g betw een adjacent ranks in organ ization s, betw een those who
used to be called ‘su p e r io r s’ and ‘in fe rio rs’ , and now often p re fe r to be view ed as
m em b ers o f a ‘te a m ’ . But even as social distan ces betw een adjacen t ranks within
organizations d e cre ase d , with the grow th o f these organizations the n u m b er o f such
ranks in creased, and with it the overall distance betw een the low est echelons o f
production w ork ers, co n su m ers, clien ts, and the lo p echelon o f com pany p re si
den ts, ch airm en , and so on. This double m ovem en t may explain the conflicting
re p o rts on ‘in fo rm alization ’ and ‘alien ation ’ , the fo rm e r go in g on am ong adjacent
ranks, the latter betw een the low er and the u p p e rm o st strata. Finally, the distance
T H E PO L I T I C S 0 F AG 0 R A P H 0 B I A 4 5
betw een go vern m en ts and their sub jects has been decreasin g, form erly in the lo n g
term process o f constitution al dem ocratization and m ore recently in the dealin gs of
particip atory citizen s’ action g ro u p s w ith local and national au th orities. . . .
A secon d line o f lon g-term developm en t in E uropean cou n tries con cern s the
increasing con trol o f infantile and bodily im pulses. M arx and his follow ers have
describ ed extensively how a relatively in depen den t agrarian population w as re g i
m ented and disciplined into the strict rhythm s and routin es o f the industrial w o rk
force. W eber has dem on strated the intim ate connection betw een a puritan abstin
ence and the en trepreneurial style o f life in early capitalism . Freud has argued that
the disconten ts o f civilization con stituted its very essen ce, because w ell-ordered
society exacts the renunciation o f drive satisfaction. T h e gradu al p rocess o f state
form ation and the increasing con trol o f d om estic violence im plied a m ore equable,
m ore flexible and lon g-term m an agem en t o f em o tio n s, as N o rb e rt Elias has
suggested in The Civilizing Process.
U n dou b tedly , the relations betw een peop le have b eco m e less volatile,
im pulsive, sp o n tan eo u s, and violen t since the M iddle A ges, and peop le have found
them selves com p elled to ste e r their im pulses m ore strictly, through extern al c o m
pulsion first, gradually through a social com pu lsion to self-com p u lsion , and finally
mainly through self-com p ulsion . By the end o f the nineteenth cen tury, this had
resulted in rath er strict and lim iting pattern s o f in tercou rse am on g the b ourgeoisie
and in severe and restrictive su p ereg o form ation s in m iddle-class citizens — very
m uch the type o f fam ilies and the type o f patients Freud w as fam iliar with.
U nm istakably, these p attern s have changed in the co u rse o f the tw entieth cen tury.
This p resen ts a theoretical problem to h istorical so cio lo gists con cern ed with
prob lem s o f societal change, fam ily life, and ch aracter form ation : how is this recent
shift in m anners to be in terp reted and how can it be explain ed in term s o f societal
tran sform ation s? . . .
A first survey o f co n tem p o rary m o re s su ggests that the m argins and the variety
o f acceptable behaviour have increased m arkedly since the First W orld W ar and
even m ore quickly since the Second W'orld War. E xam p les o f the relaxation o f
restriction s on the m ovem en t o f w om en in public arc onlv one case in point.
Many oth ers may be ad d ed , especially in the realm o f intim ate relation s: the
practice o f con traception , ab o rtio n , con cubinage, p rom iscu ity , divorce, h o m o
sexuality, p orn ograp h y , m asturbation . . . a w ide gam ut o f sexual relations with
o n e se lf and with oth ers has b eco m e m en tion able, acceptable in m any circles, think
able for m o st peop le. But this observation often leads to the conclusion that the
relaxation o f restriction s also applies to oth er sph eres o f life. A lthough m o st peop le
b elieve that violent behaviour is on the increase everyw here in the w orld, as a
gen eral statem en t this is unlikely to be tru e. [. . .]
The social acceptability o f violent behaviour has probably n ot in creased. In
m o st coun tries fratern ity initiation rites and bar braw ls are quickly disappearin g as
m ale rituals. O n the other hand, gangs o f so ccer su p p o rte rs have b eco m e alm ost
as violent as they used to be a b efore sp ectator sp o rts becam e organ ized and
broadcast. P aradoxically, an increased aversion am on g the public against violent
behaviour may result in an increased visibility o f such violence both in n ew spaper
rep o rtin g o f shocking incidents and in official statistics: indignant citizens are m ore
prone to re p o rt, police to investigate, and cou rts to convict in cases that before
4 6 A B R A M DE SWAAN
w ent unrem arked as routin e rough n ess. Increasing sexual toleran ce d oes not exten d
at all to violent fo rm s o f sexual con du ct such as rape o r flagellation; rather, the
con trary is tru e: m oun tin g indignation should not be in terp reted as increasing
incidence. People, including youn g, stron g, and volatile p eo p le, arc still being
pressured to su rren d er the advantages and p leasures o f physical strength and not
to lay hands on oth ers. Even as violence and to rtu re arc continually depicted in
novels and on the screen , these scen es arc w ithout exception accom pan ied by
m essages o f disapproval and by the pun ish m ent o f w hoever has abandoned h im self
to such lustful violence. This sim ultan eous excitation and its denial, this h ypocrisy,
used to be a ch aracteristic o f sexual porn ograp h y until recently; it conveys the
severity o f the prohibition and at the sam e tim e the effo rt it takes for p eop le to give
up these p leasures un der the m oral con dem nation by oth ers and their own c o n
science. T his in tertw in in g o f d isgrace and lust finally co m e s to characterize the
pleasure itself. . . .
People, then, arc n ot only su pp osed to contain their violen t im p u lses, but there
are other em otio n s they also m ust inhibit: all those m ann ers o f feeling and conduct
w ith w hich one puts o n e se lf above oth ers are increasingly b eco m in g un acceptable.
Scorn for the defects o f oth ers, fo r their uglin ess, disability, or indigence only
serv es to discredit the scoffer in the eyes o f m o st co n tem p o raries. The self-satisfied
aw areness and osten tatio us display o f o n e ’s su p e rio r social positio n, be it through
w ealth, descen t, rank, or education , do not necessarily add to the deferen ce one
w ill receive, but may be held against one. Even the aw areness that such rankings
play a role at all in o n e ’ s ow n and other p e o p le ’ s thoughts is m ore and m o re denied.
People preten d to be ‘colou r-b lin d ’ , not to n otice class diflerences in speech , d ress,
and dem ean ou r, not to p rescrib e behaviour but to arrive at a definition o f the
problem togeth er with the clien t, to discuss alternatives w ith co-w ork ers rath er
than o rd e r their assistants aroun d. D ifferen ces in social position are denied in every
possib le w ay, vet are betrayed in this very denial at the sam e tim e that the denial
also co n tribu tes to dim inishing the social distan ce. Equally, p eop le arc expected
not to apply th em selves in an effort to ou tdo o th ers, through am bition and c o m
petition , b ccausc o f a desire for fam e, glo ry , honour, pow er, o r the dom ination over
others. This is not to say that peop le in fact no lon ger attem p t to rise above oth ers,
but that they try to con trol the expression o f these strivings in th em selves, and
especially in oth ers, and that they attem p t to convey the im pression that they never
sought aggran dizem en t it ju st befell them . N o r is there m uch reason to suppose
that peop le have relaxed their m utual pressure and self-discipline con cernin g habits
o f pun ctuality, reliability, d iscretion , clean liness, hygiene, dietary re strictio n s, p r e
cision, and accuracy , w hereas their m cticu lou sn ess in operatin g and m aintaining
all so rts o f m achinery and in participatin g in au tom obile traffic has n ecessarily
increased (the sociologically in teresting developm en t is not the incidence o f road
acciden ts, but their relative rarity and the im position o f a deadly discipline in
traffic). A sm all m in ority o f Bohem ians and academ ics m ay have abandoned som e o f
these ‘anal v irtu e s’ to a d e gre e , and in so doin g they have b eco m e highly visible to
university p ro fesso rs com m en tin g on the spirit o f the epoch . But al the sam e tim e,
and alm ost un noticed, many m illions have each year join ed the rigidly tim ed and
regim en ted life in sch oo ls, facto ries, large organ izations, the w orld o f traffic, and o f
taxes.
T H E PO L I T IC S 0 F A G 0 R A P H 0 B I A 4 7
U n d en iab ly , the m an age m e n t o f affect is ch an gin g, but the w idely held a ssu m p
tion that, all things c o n sid e re d , re stric tio n s are lo o se n in g d o e s n ot h old ; n o t w hen it
c o m e s to the co n tro l o f v io le n ce, n or w ith re g ard to the co n tro l o f self-
a g gran d ize m e n t o r o f lax ity . It d o e s n o t even apply to the m an age m e n t o f se x u ality .
A s w ill b e c o m e ap p are n t from a se co n d look at the d e v e lo p m en t o f se x u al re la tio n s,
these have b e c o m e su b je c t to d ifferen t b u t certain ly no less re strictiv e co n tro ls.
R etu rn in g to the list o f se x u al m a n n e rs that o p e n e d this se c tio n on ch an gin g
m o ra ls, it ap p e ars to contain only th ose se x u al activ ities in volvin g n o d am ag e o r
d e grad atio n to o th e rs. (In the ab o rtio n d e b ate , the issu e is p re cise ly w h eth er
an oth er ‘p e r s o n ’ is in v o lv e d .) W h ere a relaxatio n o f re stric tio n s o c c u rs, it p e rta in s
to sexu al relatio n s b etw een p a rtie s co n sid e re d to b e equal and re sp o n sib le fo r their
action s. T h e d e sire s o f the p a rtie s involved m u st receive equal c o n sid e ratio n .
A ccep tan ce c o n c e rn s in te rc o u rse b etw een co n se n tin g ad u lts. L e ss than b e fo re these
relatio n s are defin ed by can on s o f b eh aviou r; w h e rev er the n e go tiatio n s b etw een
th ese relatively au to n o m o u s p a rtie s m ay lead th em has b e c o m e in creasin gly irr e le
vant, b u t th ese relatio n s m u st be n e g o tiated in m u tu al co n sid e ratio n and shaped by
m utual co n se n t, and they m ay n ot be im p o se d by u n ilateral c o m p u lsio n o r openly
se rv e the se lf-a g g ran d ize m e n t o f on e o f the p a rtie s. R ap e, ro u g h n e ss, sc o rn , and
d e g rad a tio n , so c o m m o n and ac ce p tab le fo r e m p lo y e rs to inflict u po n se rv a n ts and
facto ry g ir ls, o r c u sto m e rs upo n p ro stitu te s only a few ge n e ra tio n s ag o , have
b e c o m e m o re d ista ste fu l to the c o n te m p o ra ry pub lic. S e lf-a g g ra n d iz e m e n t and
violen ce have b e co m e less acce p tab le and are in creasin gly su b je c t to social c o m p u l
sio n , social co m p u lsio n to se lf-c o m p u lsio n , and se lf-c o n tro l, in that o rder. In se x u al
m a tte rs so m e can on s o f b eh aviou r have relaxed o r d isap p e are d , but p e o p le now
c o m p e l o th e rs and th em selv es to take in to co n sid e ratio n m o re asp e c ts o f m ore
p e o p le at m o re m o m e n ts, to arran ge th eir relatio n s accord in gly and to su b o rd in ate
th eir e m o tio n a l m an age m e n t to th ese co n sid e ratio n s. In this p r o c e ss, m any in tim ate
re la tio n s have b e c o m e less p re d ictab le fo r they no lo n g e r d e p e n d as m uch as b efo re
on the c o m m a n d s o f social can on s and p e rso n a l co n scie n c e , but are shaped in a
p r o c e ss of n ego tiatio n b e tw e en relatively equal and a u to n o m o u s p a rtie s. T h is
re q u ire s new and differen t fo rm s o f se lf-c o n tro l. It re q u ire s a d e g re e o f in sisten ce
and sin ce rity in voicin g o n e ’ s d e m an d s (now called ‘ a sse rtiv e n e ss’ ), the su rre n d e r
o f m ean s o f physical o r e co n o m ic c o m p u lsio n , and it re q u ire s a re a d in ess to c o n
sid e r the d e sire s o f o th e rs and iden tify w ith th e m , alo n g w ith a d e g re e o f patien ce
and in ven tiven ess to c o p e w ith th em . A t the very least, it re q u ire s the display o f
th ose q u a litie s, for, in the h istory o f m o ra ls, ap p e aran c e s are h alf the w ork .
R elatio n s b e tw e en p e o p le are in creasin gly m an aged th rough n ego tiatio n rath er
than th rough co m m a n d . T h is ap p lie s to relatio n s b e tw e en the se x e s, b e tw e en p a r
e n ts and ch ild ren , often to relatio n s b e tw e en p e o p le in ad jacen t ran ks w ithin
o rgan ization al h ie rarch ie s, and so m e tim e s to relation s b e tw e en local au th o ritie s and
citizen g r o u p s. T h is m ak es fo r a la rg e r variety o f p o ssib le o u tc o m e s, b u t the p ro c e ss
o f arran gin g th ese re la tio n s im p o se s o n e ro u s re stric tio n s u po n the p e o p le involved.
In a sen se, this tran sitio n from m a n a g e m e n t through co m m a n d to m an agem en t
through n ego tiatio n re p re se n ts an in crease in fre e d o m : fre e d o m b e in g taken to
m ean the p ossib ility to do w hat on e w ish es in so far as it d o c s not in terfere w ith that
p ossib ility in o th e rs. But that is n ot very far: such a definition o f fre e d o m m ay fit the
ro o m fo r m o v em en t in allo tm e n t g a rd e n s, but il d o e s n ot apply to m o st h um an
4 8 A B R A M DE S WA A N
relation s. D e sire s and righ ts are alm o st alw ays d e m an d s and claim s upon o th e r
p e o p le and th ere e x ists n o sp ace w hich is n ot o c c u p ie d also by the d e sire s and righ ts
o f o th e rs. T h at is why this m an age m e n t th rough n e g o tiatio n , even if it w ere to
be th ough t o f as fre e d o m , is so rarely e x p e rie n c e d as liberating. T h e shift from
m an age m e n t through co m m an d to m an age m e n t through n e go tiatio n has tied
p e o p le to on e an o th er even m o re in tricate ly , in m o re and m o re su b tle w ay s, in all
ph ases of life, at all m o m e n ts o f the day, w ith reg ard to m any m o re activities and
d e sire s. It c o m p e ls each p e r so n , in tu rn , to scru tin ize his ow n lo n g in g s and to speak
up for them an d, at the sam e tim e , to b e read y to abandon them if they clash w ith
the claim s o f o th e rs. N o w a co u p le m ay n e go tiate a p ro m iscu o u s relatio n sh ip , but
they m u st co n tro l je a lo u sy and the fear o f d e se rtio n , deny an g e r and rivalry w ith
the p a r tn e r ’ s p artn er, and fo rce th em selv es to play the g a m e a c co rd in g to the ru le s
im p o se d upon them by th eir ow n m utual c o n se n t. C le arly , in the c o u rse o f this
p ro c e ss so m e p e o p le have gain ed a la rg e r m argin o f m o v e m e n t, and o th e rs have
lo st. M u nicipal au th o ritie s have often lo st a co n sid e rab le am o u n t o f d iscretio n to
carry on b u sin ess alo n g lines o f ad m in istrative efficien cy ; b u t n eigh b o u rh o o d g ro u p s
have gain ed o p p o rtu n itie s. P aren ts have lost the m ean s to ch id e, c h astisc, and
c o m m an d ch ild ren , but y o u n g p e o p le can afford g r e a te r fre e d o m o f m o v e m e n t,
e x p re ssio n , and c o n su m p tio n . O rgan izatio n al s u p e r io r s find th e m se lv e s fo rc e d to
listen to th eir im m e d iate su b altern s, in stead o f ru n n in g the d e p a rtm e n t as they see
fit, and the low er e ch e lo n s can so m e tim e s e x a c t th eir d e m an d s. M en can afford less
lib e rtie s to w ard s w om en than they u sed to and w om en have gain ed in o p p o rtu n itie s
fo r physical and social m o v e m e n t. N o w o n d er that m any w h ite, m id d le -ag e d m ales
in high aca d e m ic p o sitio n s w ho p ro d u ce the social criticism o f the era show a
keen eye fo r the in creasin g o p p re ssio n in so ciety and w o rry ab o u t the decay and
d e cad e n ce that o th e rs w ou ld call fre e d o m .
T h e tran sition fro m m an age m e n t th rough co m m an d to m an age m e n t through
n ego tiatio n is the re su lt o f v ariou s so c ie tal d e v e lo p m en ts. T h e in creasin g and
ge n e ralizin g d e p e n d e n c e o f p e o p le upo n on e an o th er and the re su ltin g in crease in
equality b e tw e en them is on e such d e v e lo p m e n t. A n o th er p r o c e ss c o n sists in the
c o n se cu tiv e tid e s o f em an cip a to ry m o v e m e n ts: cam p aign s for un iversal su ffrage,
o rgan ized w o rk e rs’ stru g g le , m o v e m e n ts fo r w o m e n ’ s lib e ratio n , and the m any
eth n ic, racial, and re g io n al liberatio n m o v e m e n ts. Each m o v e m e n t le arn ed from a
p re ce d in g on e and each tim e in eq u alities that w ere c o n sid e re d n atural until then
w ere ab o lish e d , this in stilled d o u b t ab o u t the inevitability o f o th e r ty p es o f d is
crim in atio n . B ut a th ird , qu ite a u to n o m o u s p r o c e ss m ay b e d e tecte d in the
e m e rg e n c e and d e v e lo p m e n t o f large organ izatio n s. A s such organ izatio n s b ecam e
ever m o re c o m p le x and sh ifted from sim p le c le rical and p ro d u c tiv e task s to the
m a n a g e m e n t o f in creasin gly su b tle p e rso n a l re la tio n s, clear, re ctilin e ar lines o f
c o m m an d p ro v ed in ad eq u ate. T h e officials in such o rgan izatio n s n o lo n g e r p e r
fo rm e d w ell-defin ed ro u tin e s b u t en gaged in co m p licate d in teractio n s w ith c o l
le ag u e s, c lien ts, o r c u sto m e rs, usin g th eir p e rso n a litie s and ju d g e m e n tal cap acities
as o ccu p atio n al in stru m e n ts. Th ey co u ld n ot be m an aged w ith out a m o d icu m o f
co n sen t and they w ould n ot co n sen t w ith ou t th eir in te re sts and d e sire s b e in g taken
into c o n sid e ratio n . T h e se organ izatio n s have had a tw o fo ld effect on c o n te m p o ra ry
fam ily life. Hirst, m an age m e n t through n ego tiatio n w as c arrie d over by these
organ ization al m id d le -class w o rk e rs, often w o m e n , from the sph ere o f w ork to the
T H E PO L I T IC S 0 F AG 0 R A P H 0 B I A 4 9
sphere o f the fam ily. And it is this organizational, ‘ p rofession al-m an agerial’ m iddle
class that has em erged and expan ded in the co u rse o f this century and b eco m e the
arbiter o f con tem p orary life-styles and opinions. Secon d, a quickly increasin g p r o
portion of the population of m odern capitalist (and state capitalist) cou n tries has
b eco m e the clients of such organ izations, as pupils and stud ents in sch oo ls, as
patients in the health-care sy ste m , as claim ants and clients o f the social services.
The m o d e s of em otio nal and relational m an agem en t o f the organizational m iddle
class have been tran sferred ( ‘im p o se d ,’ savs Lasch) to these new clien tele. P ara
m oun t in the innovation o f m o d es o f relational and em otional m anagem en t is the
profession o f p sychoth erapy: the helping profession o f the helping p rofession s. To a
con siderable d e gre e , the transition o f m anagem en t through com m and to m an age
m en t through n egotiation w as eased by the extern al effects o f the psychotherapy
profession upon w iden ing circles, first o f related helping profession s, then o f
clients, and then o f the gen eral public o f poten tial clients: the process o f p r o to
profession alization .
The argum en t has com e full circle. People in this age define difficulties with
one anoth er in te rm s o f psychic p rob lem s that refer to profession al p sy ch o
therapeutic treatm en t. But these difficulties have changed as the relations betw een
peop le have changed w ithin a society un dergoin g global tran sform ation s. Increasing
and gen eralized depen den cy co rre sp o n d e d to som e increase in equality betw een
p eop le. E m ancipatory m ovem en ts helped to abolish many unequal relations. The
developm en t o f co m p le x arran gem en ts o f organizational care resulted within the
organization in m ore egalitarian relation s that spread from there to family relations.
The psychotherapy p rofession , especially, provided con cepts and stances for this
transition from m anagem en t through com m an d to m anagem en t through n e g o ti
ation. All things con sid ered , this developm en t has not resulted in broaden ing
m argin s of m ovem en t and exp ression lo r everyon e, but it has m ade relations less
predictable, because the outcom e is n ot being stru ctu re d by com m an d s, but the
pro c e ss of relational and em otio n al m anagem en t is bein g shaped by the re q u ire
m en ts of m utual con sideration and con sent, and o f the absten tion from violen ce and
self-aggran dizem ent.
The poin t has been rcachcd w here the lim its o f the argu m en t m ust be indicated
and the con clusion s draw n from it. The relaxation o f m anners in the tw entieth
century affects only a lim ited range o f activities. The restrain t on violent behaviour
has not lessen ed, the inhibition upon self-aggran dizem en t has probably in creased,
and the discipline in the handling o f tim e, m oney, go o d s, and the body has grow n.
W hat has broaden ed are the m argin s o f toleran ce in sexual m atters and in the
expression o f em otio n s and d esires, especially in intim ate circles. But even this
relaxation is conditional upon the con sideration o f the w ishes o f others and upon
their n egotiated con sent. . . . The burden s o f pov erty and tyranny may have
lessen ed, but in other rcsp ects w estern society has lost little o f its oppressive
character, and in many resp ects discipline has in creased. Yet, som e lim itations are
not im p o se d , but rather incurred in relations m anaged through negotiation .
Th ere is no gu aran tee w hatsoever that such n egotiations lead to dignified o r fair
arran gem en ts: ‘A uthenticity rep laced m orality and sincerity replaced ju d g e m e n t.’
W orse, n egotiators may even relinquish authenticity o r sincerity, and m islead
or m anipulate one another. M ore im p o rtan t, m anagem ent through n egotiation
5 0 A B R A M D E SWAAN
paralyses rebellion : the dissid en ts agree them selves to deal, o f their ow n free w ill,
after am ple consultation . T h us, the con tract theory o f citizenship and o f econ om ic
man is exten d ed to lovers, paren ts, and colleagu es: one may take them o r leave
them . And this points to the basic flaw in any view o f hum an relations as the
o u tco m e of negotiated con sen t: such n egotiations alw ays occu r w ithin a w ider
social co n te xt in w hich on e party generally holds b etter alternative option s than
another. W ithin their m arriage a man and w om en may be equal to each other, but
outside it job op p o rtu n ities or chances for rem arriage arc very different. M oreover,
the scope o f n egotiation s, o f w hat is n egotiab le, arc narrow ly p re scrib e d , not
by the p a rtn ers, but in the social c o n text in w hich they find them selves. T h us,
collab o rato rs in an agcncy may bargain with one an oth er for exam p le, over the
distribution o f caseloads until all o f them togeth er are tran sferred by the board
o f tru ste e s: then they may negotiate over wrho is to go first. The shift tow ards
m anagem en t through negotiation rep resen ts a change in the m anner in w hich
peop le con trol them selves and one another, especially in face-to-face relations. Seen
w ithin a larger social co n te x t such negotiations ap pear lim ited in sco p e , their
ou tcom e biased by the option s that each party has in society at large, w hereas the
very occu rren ce o f such n egotiation s legitim izes the social o rd e r in w hich such
m utual consent is being achieved. Ju d ged within its im m ediate c o n te x t, m an age
m ent through n egotiation seem s to allow a g re ater variety o f arran gem en ts, b etter
suited to the strivin gs o f the p artn ers that brin g about the arran gem en t. But even in
this co n text such a form o f relational and em otional m anagem ent forces peop le to
take one an o th er’s dem ands into con sideration and to relinquish som e o f their ow n.
Som e people forgo these option s and ste e r clear o f such threatening involvem ents,
or avoid the negotiation s and the ensuing en gagem en ts. They do not rebel but they
reject, not with so many w ords, but tacitly, im plicitly, with a strategy that denies
itself, until it is ex p re sse d in a vocabulary o f psychic prob lem s, as depersonalization ,
as a p leasu re-less prom iscu ity ( ‘tertiary im p o te n ce ’ ), o r as phobia. [. . .]
The transition to m anagem en t through negotiation is on ero u s and hazardous.
W h ere no com m an d can be heard from within o r w ith out, peop le may ad opt fears
and com pu lsion s to help them refrain from w hat they arc now allow ed to do bv
others but w hat they find to o difficult, too d an gerou s, and too lonely.
Chapter 4
Peter N. Stearns and Deborah C. Stearns
H I S T O R I C A L I S S U E S IN E M O T I O N S
RESEARCH
C a u s a tio n and tim in g
, specific
U
n q u e s t i o n a b l y e x p l a i n i n g c h a n g e s in
em otio n s o r em otional con stellation s to rm s the essen tial startin g point in
assessin g causation, lo r both analytical issues and evidence are m ost clear-cut at
this level. C hanges in particular em otional form u lations alm o st always follow
from som e causes peculiar to the em otion in questio n — a poin t to w hich we
m ust retu rn in dealing with the inescapability o f larger fram ew orks as w ell. In
addition, the facto rs involved in many specific em otio n s changes can be directly
traced through explicit referen ces in p rescrip tive literatu re or a close ch ro n o
logical ju x tap o sitio n — this latter connection slightly less definitive, but plausible
nevertheless.
R cccn t changes in em otional stan dards o r relation ships, though so m e tim e s
difficult to determ in e sim ply because o f their recen cy and the dan gers o f e x ag g e rat
ing con trasts w ith the p ast, provide unusually abundant evidence on causation,
because the em otional participan ts can be directly o b serv ed . Arlie H o ch sch ild’s
research on clashes over gratitu d e, in fam ilies w here m en and w om en both w ork,
leaves little dou b t as to why new con fusions have arisen (H och schild and M achung
1 9 8 9 ). The b asic correlatio n involves the alteration in w o m e n ’ s w ork pattern s and
resultan t tension s over family ob ligations, w hich began to take shape in the 1950s
but still reverberate. C o rrelatio n can be tested by the e xplicit observation o f family
dynam ics, w hen m en m ake clear their b e lie f that they are exceed in g , in their family
con tribu tion s, what their fathers did and deserve high praise, w hile w om en stress
the gap betw een m e n ’ s and w o m en ’s family involvem ent even as w ork roles have
considerably equalized. It w ould be hard to pretend that causation in this instance
involves many m ysteries.
Many changes in em otio n al stan dards in the m o re distant past may be explain ed
5 2 P ET ER N. S T E A R N S AND DEBORAH C. ST E A RN S
w ith alm ost the sam e d egree of certain ty , because o f the con nection s available in
the p rescrip tive evidence. It is true that im portan t shifts in em otional culture arc
not accom panied by lull aw areness o f the novelty in volved, w hich m eans that the
so u rces o f altered stan dards rarely rellect on causation ; but they may leave abundant
clucs n evertheless.
In the first edition ol his im m ensely p op u lar baby book issued in 1945, Dr.
Benjam in Spock rep eated standard advice about anger, o f the so rt that had been
characteristic o f childrearin g literatu re for alm o st a century. A nger required
parental m on ito rin g, for children m ust learn that so m e form s o f anger arc in app ro
priate and that som e targets, particularly in the fam ily, should be out o f boun ds. But
anger itse lf w as a vital m otivation fo r future com petitive b usin essm en o r farm e rs,
and parents should also be con cern ed not to discipline it ou t o f existen ce. A bit
m ore than a decade later S p o ck ’ s advice had changed. By the 1960s ch ild ren ’ s anger
should be firm ly con trolled in all circu m stan ces, for the em otio n w as both d an ger
ous and valueless. Rather than teaching children how to channel their aggressive
en ergies tow ard useful g o als, paren ts now should help children m inim ize anger,
talking it out h arm lessly and so redu cing its place in their em otio n al m akeup.
Revealingly, w hen Spo ck w rote in his su b seq u en t revisions about the w ork goals
tow ard which this new anger strategy should be directed , he now referred to
m an agers and salesm en , w here sm ooth p erso n alities and em otional self-control
held pride o f place (Stearn s and Stearn s 1986).
Spock did not carefully analyze his change o f view s con cern in g anger, and so we
are speculatin g slightly in su ggestin g that a key reason involved recognition that the
em otio n al req uirem en ts o f w ork w ere un dergoin g alteration and that childrearing
standards m ust follow suit. The m argin ol e rro r in this speculation is redu ced when
a variety o f additional evidence poin ts in the sam e direction: from as carlv as 1928
D ale C arn egie and a host o f w ork-advice pop u larizers had been urgin g anger
con trol on adults in the grow in g service se c to r of the econ om y. By the 1950s
studies o f actual A m erican paren ts dem on strated that the fam ilies m o st keen to pick
up on the new er kinds o f childrearin g advice, bent on m inim izing in terp erson al
friction s, cam e d ispro portion ately from the m anagerial m iddle class. H ere, then,
is an accum ulation o f evidence, including direct p rescrip tive referen ces, d e m o n
stratin g that a m ajor cause o f evolving anger stan dards follow ed from changes in the
stru ctu re o f the lab or force, as earlier en trepren eurial and production em phasis
gave way to c o rp o rate bureaucracies and service se c to r jobs.
In the d ecades around 1800, m iddle-class p eop le in France (and elsew h ere in
the W estern w orld) began to m anifest new levels o f d isgust at bodily o d o rs and
other sm ells. T h e change is fascinating, in that this changc involves both em otional
reaction s and a real shift in the evaluation o f the physical senses. Sm ells o f sw eat,
urine, and d efecation , previously tolerated o r even (in the case o f urin e) so m e
tim es w elcom e, now b ecam e nauseating. U rin e, used fo r tooth brush ing in
seventeenth -century H olland and as a m ark o f courtsh ip in seventeenth-century
W ales, now provided sickening sm ells in the c o rrid o rs o f urban slum s o r the
clothing o f ill-disciplined young children. N ew sanitary p ro ce d u re s, including
in door plum bin g and m ore rigorou s toilet training, follow ed from these new
em otional and visceral reaction s, ab etted o f co u rse by tech n ological innovations
(C orbin 1986).
HISTORICAL ISSUES IN E M O T I O N S RESEARCH 5 3
N on e o f the c o n te m p o rarie s w ho m anifested the new levels of disgu st explicitly

stated why they w ere b eco m in g, by traditional standards, so fastidious. Evidence
is m ore indirect than in the case of Spo ck and the anger training of children. But
tw o related causes sprin g out both from the com m on targets of the new d isgust,
and from correlatio n s with w id er social change. In the first place, grow in g urban iza
tion and industrialization created heightened an xieties ab out physical health. C ities
w ere traditionally less healthy than the cou n trvside, and the return o f fearsom e
plagues, like the cholcra epidem ic o f the 1830s, drove the dangers hom e quite
graphically. In advance o f the germ th eory, reaction to urban o d o rs both expressed
health fears and helped propel behaviors, including flight from the w o rst, sm elliest
m iasm as, that seem ed directly useful in redu cin g disease risk. R elated ly, incipient
industrialization heightened social class divisions. M iddle-class peop le feared the
w rath and the stran geness o f the urban poor, and at the sam e tim e needed ju stifi
cations for their acceptancc o f new, visible fo rm s o f inequality. The notion that
the p o o r w ere anim al-like, alm o st a different sp ecies, legitim ized avoidancc and
neglect. Fastidiousn ess w as an em otional and sen sory b ack drop to this social dif
ferentiation. (Interestingly, young children, fully as logical a disgu st targ et, w ere
increasingly idealized, though also bathed and p erfu m ed — suggestin g again the
selectivity o f disgust causation and its derivation, not from sm ells in gen eral, but
from the sm ells associated with new social divid es.) T h e p o o r sm elled bad, as part
o f their feck less, uncivilized habits m ore generally. They could be called to o rd e r by
classes who m aintained the p ro p e r standards o f em otion and hygiene, o r dam ned
if they refused to com e aroun d. E m otion al change w as, in sum , socially useful, in
respond in g to the novel and rath er Irightening social co n te xt o f in dustrialization,
becom ing m arkers of class standing. C orresp on d in gly , peop le w ho p ropou n d ed and
utilized the new stan dards of disgust explicitly targeted p rob lem s o f d isease and the
ill-governance o f the p o o r in e x p ressin g and illustrating the stan dards. T h e causal
link is clear.
O th er instances o f causation applied to p articu lar em otio n s depen d m ore
purely on chronological correlatio n s, as explicit referen ces arc largely absen t; and,
it m ust be ad m itted , correlation may be m isleadin g in that tw o ph enom ena may be
sim ultan eous w ithout being integrally con n ected. But the correlation betw een
reduction o f birth rate and new em otional attachm en t to individual children is
w idely accepted am ong historians, w ho find its traces around 1800 in the m iddle
class o f cou n tries like the U nited States, a bit later fo r the w orking class, and
recently again in areas undergoing dem ograph ic transition such as urban China. The
link is clear: large fam ilies in a tradition al d em ograph ic regim e p erm itted real
affection for children, but the intensity w as con strained by the sheer n u m b ers o f
children involved, the ten den cy o f children to bond as m uch with o ld e r siblings as
with paren ts, and the frequency o f infant m ortality w hich introduced som e caution
in attachm en ts ven tured in early childh ood. W hen the birth rate d ro p s, from six to
eight children p e r couple to four or five or less (as began to occur in a w ell-studied
case am on g Philadelphia Q u ak ers around 1800 ) (W ells 1 9 7 1 ), many o f these co n
straints dim inish. Parents have m ore tim e and em otional energy fo r the individual
children they do have. Sibling bonding dim inishes in favor o f ties directly
with parents. And efforts to provide b etter care for youn g children cut into
traditional resignation about young ch ildren ’ s deaths, prom otin g gre ater em otional
5 4 P ET ER N. S T E A R N S AND DEBORAH C. ST E A RN S
com m itm en t to infants (and ultim ately, a reduction in the infant death rate). The
only analytical p ro b lem , aside from the need (or careful statem en t of the change in
em otio n s itself lest the traditional parent-child tics be oversim plified, involves
p rio rity . It is very difficult to determ in e w hether so m e grou p s first cut their birth
rates for n on-em otion al reason s— econ om ics, for e x am p le — and then discovered
their co m m itm en t to their sm aller b ro o d s affected; o r w hether in so m e cases at
least an em otional redefinition occu rred first, pro m o tin g a new in terest in reducing
birth rates in o rd e r to be able to lavish m ore atten tion, care, and m oney on the
children (T rum bach 1978). Yet the d em ograph ic correlation stands w ith the only
co m p le x ity , not insignificant to be su re, w hether it m u st be supp lem en ted by other
facto rs, such as cultural redefinition o f children and their degree o f in n ocen ce, to
explain why em otio n al change m ight preced e new dem ograph ic behavior, serving
as cause then enhanced by effect (Sch cpcr-H u gh es 1985).
And a final correlatio n ease: around 1900, attitudes tow ard ch ild ren ’s e m o
tional resp o n se to death began to change (Fiore 199 2 ). D urin g m o st o f the nine
teenth cen tury, advice to parents (and many actual cerem on ies and com m en ts
associated with death) had stressed the im p ortan ce o f preventing ch ildren ’ s fear o f
death by associatin g children with death closely w hile enveloping death itse lf in a
positive and sen tim en tal aura. Beginning about 1880, and with grow in g intensity
early in the tw entieth cen tury, this tone began to change. A nxiety about preventing
fear escalated. Children w ere now seen as potentially m anifesting very co m p lex
reaction s to death that could not be diverted sim ply by religious and familial
assurance. Parents m ust now carefully m anage the presen tation o f death to children
w ith aw areness o f trau m atic response u p p e rm o st in their m inds. N ineteenth-
century stap les, such as the association betw een death and sw eet sleep , w ere now
attacked because ol their fear-inducing poten tial. G r id w as ack n ow ledged as a
problem am ong children, to be handled with outrigh t m anipulation including
con ccalm en t o f p arental feelings.
P sych ological studies ol the em otio nal com p lexities o f childhood played a role
in this new effo rt to distance children, em otio n ally, from death. Popularized
research findings m ade it increasingly difficult for m iddle-class A m erican s o r W est
European s to believe in childish innocence and em otional ease. But the m ost
strikin g correlation with the new approach to ch ildren ’ s fear and g r ie f involved
the huge changes occu rrin g in ch ild ren ’ s m ortality itself, and in the institutional
practices su rroun din g death. Im proved n utrition , b etter sanitation including
im plem en tation o f m easu res derived from P asteu r’ s ge rm th eory, and fuller use o f
trained m edical perso n n el in cases o f difficult b irth s, all com bined to drive infant
m ortality dow n from over 20 p ercen t o f all b irth s in 1800, to under 5 p crccn t by
1920. This m assive transition had tw o im pacts on adult treatm en t o f ch ild ren ’ s
em otio n s surroun din g death, the one ob vious, the other probably m ore im portan t.
It b ecam e increasingly likely that a child w ould n ot have to exp erien ce death in the
n uclear family (Stearn s and H aggerty 199 1 ). This change how ever explain s why a
new em otional cultu re w as possib le, but not why it took the anxious shape it did. At
this poin t, a secon d correlative facet m ust be introduced. The revolution in child
m orality w as accom pan ied by grow in g parental anxiety about ch ild ren ’ s health.
W atchfulness— against g e rm s, for ex am p le — b ecam e essential, but also fruitful in
that il could produ ce a death-free childh ood. As paren ts acquired new con cern s
HISTORICAL ISSUES IN EMOTIONS RESEARCH 55
ab ou t c h ild re n ’ s d ise ase s and a new aw aren ess o f th eir re sp o n sib ility in p rovid in g
m ed ical care, their ow n attitu d e to ch ild re n ’ s death p o te n tial b e ca m e m o re v u l
n erable. W h en thcv assim ilated new ad vice ab o u t the n eed to sh e lte r ch ild ren ,
e m o tio n a lly , from death , they w ere essen tially tran sp o sin g th eir ow n g ro w in g fears.
T h is is an ob v io u s c o rre latio n in on e sen se: a d e v e lo p m en t in child m o rta lity so
u n p re ce d e n te d as the tran sition b e tw e en 1880 and 1920 w'ould alm o st certain ly
re v e rb e rate in e m o tio n al c u ltu re . Yet it is n o t a c o rre latio n that can be directly
tra c e d , b c ca u sc none o f the so u rcc s o f new ad vice ab o u t c h ild re n ’ s fe ars and
g r ie f d rew the ob v io u s con n ectio n s. D e sp ite its tcn tativ cn css it su g g e sts again the
ex citin g p o ssib ilitie s, w hen a specific shift in e m o tio n al stan d ard s can b e iso late d , o f
e x p lo rin g ap plicab le cau sation directly .
P articu lar ch an ges in e m o tio n m ay, o f c o u rse , u n cover n o t a p rim ary b asic
cause b u t a con caten atio n o f fac to rs. A final e x a m p le w ill in dicate the p o ssib ilitie s
h ere. A rou n d 1 9 2 0 , A m erican p are n ts b egan to be tre ate d to a b arrag e o f co n ce rn
ab o u t je alo u sy b e tw e en sib lin gs, p articu larly involving the re actio n s o f a to d d le r to
the arrival o f a new' baby (S te arn s 1 9 8 9 ). N in ete e n th -c e n tu ry fam ily cu ltu re had
alm o st c o m p le te ly ign o re d siblin g ten sio n s, and th ere w as no p re ce d e n t fo r the
co n ce rn ab o u t c h ild re n ’ s je alo u sy that b egan to sw ell from the 19 2 0 s o n w ard , as
paren ts b egan to w orry both ab o u t je a lo u sy — in d u ced v iolen ce and ab ou t lon ger-
term p e rso n a lity d am ag e fo r the je alo u s child h im self.
W hy did this new featu re o f fam ilial e m o tio n a l cu ltu re su rface w hen it did?
T h re e p rim ary c au ses in te rtw in e d , the first directly d e m o n strab le , the o th e r tw o
in volving the m o re sp ecu lative kind o f c o rre latio n s already sketch ed in o th e r c o n
n ection s. F acto r 1: a new b re e d o f p o p u la riz e rs began to use p sy ch o lo gical research
on siblin gs to g e n e ra te a m uch less favorab le p ictu re o l c h ild re n ’ s n atural e m o tio n s
than had p revailed in the n in eteen th -cen tu ry m id d le class (W ish y 1 9 6 8 ; K ell and
A ld o u s 1 9 6 0 ; D un n 1 9 8 5 ). E x p e rts foun d a novel b asis for establish in g th eir
au th ority w ith p are n ts by callin g atten tio n to a p re v io u sly -u n d e te cte d but se rio u s
p ro b le m , and p ro v id in g so lu tio n s.
Facto r 2 (h elp in g to explain why p aren ts listen ed to the e x p e r ts ): several
ch an ges in fam ily life m ad e siblin g rivalry m o re likely than had been the case
previou sly. By the early tw en tieth cen tu ry the m id d le class had an average o f tw o
ch ildren . S m a ller fam ily size m ean t less b o n d in g am o n g sib lin gs, m o re con ten tio n
fo r d ire c t em o tio n al acc e ss to p are n ts (D un n 1 9 8 5 ). A t the sam e tim e , the p re se n ce
o f o th e r ad u lts in the h o u s e h o ld — live-in se rv a n ts and g ra n d p a re n ts— d e clin e d , in
the first case after 1 8 9 0 , in the se co n d after 1 9 2 0 . Finally, in creasin g e ffo rts to
p ro m o te c h ild re n ’ s in dividu ality, by e arm ark in g se p arate toys and in sistin g on
se p arate b e d ro o m s, in directly c n c o u ra g c d new levels o f e m o tio n a l ten sion am id a
siblin g c o h o rt, even as the new siblin g ad vice p ro m o te d fu rth e r in d ivid u ation . T h e
stro n g likelih ood then is that new c o n ce rn ab ou t c h ild re n ’ s je alo u sy follow ed from
new levels o f this sam e e m o tio n , deep ly tro u b lin g to p are n ts w ho now h an dled
children w ith less o u tsid e assistan ce.
F a cto r 3: ro u n d in g o u t e ssen tial cau sation w as the fact that by the 1 9 2 0 s
ad u lts w ere b e co m in g m o re c o n ce rn e d ab ou t th eir ow n je alo u s re actio n s (Lynd and
Lynd 1 9 2 9 ). R em oval o f re stric tio n s on so cializin g b e tw e en m en and w o m e n , the
rise o f datin g as an ad o le sc e n t behavior, and g r e a te r em p h asis on sexu ality all
p ro d u c e d a g ro w in g n u m b e r o f situ atio n s in w hich jealo u sy w as both likely and
5 6 P E T E R N. S T E A R N S AND D E B O R A H C. S T E A R N S
c o u n te rp ro d u c tiv e (B ailey 1988; M o d e ll 1 9 8 9 ). A ttack s on ad ult jealou sy

a b o u n d ed , but the fo cu s on ch ild re n ’ s jealou sy se rv e d as an o u tle t as w ell.
L o gically , by red u cin g ch ild re n ’ s jealo u sy ad u lts m igh t be lo r m e d w h o co u ld handle
h e te ro se x u a l socializin g m o re readily (C lan to n 1 9 8 9 ). L e ss co n scio u sly , an xiety
a b o u t c h ild re n ’ s je a lo u sy h elp ed ad u lts e x p r e ss u n ce rtain tie s a b o u t th eir ow n
re sp o n se s that they w ere e m b a rra sse d to state o pen ly . T h is ad u lt d isp lac e m e n t
fac to r re se m b le s, o f c o u r se , the c o rre latio n involved in e x p lain in g new co n c e rn s
a b o u t c h ild re n ’ s re actio n s to death ju st a sh o rt tim e b e fo re and like this fac to r
can n o t at le ast as y et be directly pro v ed .
G ro w in g k n o w led g e ab o u t ch an ges in sp ecific e m o tio n s has clcarly g e n e ra te d a
n u m b e r o f relatively p re cise p o in ts o f tran sition that can b e fruitfully analyzed in
te r m s o f cau satio n , d e sp ite variatio n s in precisio n o f p r o o f. T h e re su lts frequen tly
u n cover d ire ct relatio n sh ip s b etw een o th e r d e v e lo p m en ts and the inn ovation s in
e m o tio n al stan d ard s. Even seem in g ly as ch an ges in the lab o r fo rc e as they reach ed
in to fo rm u la tio n s a b o u t d ealin g w ith ch ild re n ’s an ger, can be d e m o n strate d w ith
high p ro b ab ility . O th e r relatio n sh ip s involve c o rre latio n s w h ose ch ro n o lo g ical
c o in c id en cc c o m b in es w ith p lau sib ility in exp lain in g n o t only n ew e m o tio n al
stan d ard s but the inten sity o f th eir im p a ct, in clu d in g u n ack n o w le d g e d ad u lt te n
sion s that spill over in to ch ildrearin g. W h ile so m e shifts in e m o tio n a l stan d ard s
d e p e n d p a rticu larly on on e p rim ary cau se o th e rs re su lt from a con fluen ce o f several
fa c to rs, w hich en rich es but also c o m p lic ate s an alysis. A m id the several sce n a rio s
involved the an alytical e x p lo ra tio n o f cau sation e x p a n d s u n d e rstan d in g o f the
chan ge itself, w ell b eyon d w hat sim p le d e sc rip tio n o f shifting stan d ard s can
provide.
R cfcrcnccs
Bailev, B. 1988. From Front Porch to Back Seat: Courtship in Twentieth-Century America.
Baltim ore, M D : The Johns H opkins U niversity Press.
C lanton, G. (1 9 8 9 ). “Jealousy in A m erican C ulture, 1945—1985: R eflections from
Popular C u ltu re .” In The Sociology o f Emotions, edited by David Franks and
E. D. M cC arthy. G reenw ich , C T : JA I Press.
C orbin , A. 1986. The Foul and the Fragrant: Odor and the French Social Imagination.
C am bridge, M A : H arvard U niversity Press.
D unn, J. 1985. Sisters and Brothers. C am bridge, M A : H arvard U niversity Press.
Fiore, D. 1992. Grandma's Through: Children and the Death Experience from the 18th Century
to the Present. U npublished paper, C arn egie M ellon U niversity.
H ochschild, A. R. and A. M achung. 1989. The Second Shift: Working Parents and the
Revolution at Flome. N ew York: Viking.
K ell, L. and J. A ldous. 1960. “Trends in Child C are over T h ree G en eration s.” Marriage
and Family Living 22: 176—177.
Lynd, R. S. and FI. M . Lynd. 1929. .Middletown: A Study in Contemporary American Culture.
N ew York: H arcou rt Bracc and Co.
M odell, J. 1989. Into One's Own: From Youth to Adulthood in the United States, 1920—1975.
Berkeley, C A : U niversity o f C alifornia Press.
Stearn s, P. N . (1 9 8 9 ) Jealousy: The Evolution o f an Emotion in American Flistory. Newr York
and London: N ew York U niversity Press.
HISTORICAL ISSUES IN EMOTIONS RESEARCH 57
Stearn s, C .Z . and Stearns, P.N. (1 9 8 6 ) Anger: The Struggle fo r Emotional Control in

America's History. C h icago: U niversity o f C hicago Press.
T rum bach , R. (1 9 7 8 ) The Rise o f the Egalitarian Family: Aristocratic Kinship and Domestic
Relations in Eighteenth-Century England. N ew York: A cadem ic Press.
W ells, R . V. (1 9 7 1 ) ‘Family Size and Fertility C on trol in E ighteenth-C entury A m erica:
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W ishy, B. W. (1 9 6 8 ) The Child and the Republic: The Dawn o f Modern American Child
Nurture. Philadelphia: U niversity o f Pennsylvania Press.
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2. Emotions and culture
HE QUESTION OF W H E T H E R OR in w hat ways emotions can be

T said to be universal has been articulated, perhaps most exactingly, in the domain
of anthropology. The field of relevant contributions spans several decades, and is
enormously rich and varied. As early as 1986, anthropologists Lutz and W hite pub
lished a comprehensive analytical review of cross-cultural research on emotions,
which we highly recommend as background reading to this complex problem-area.
The review cites just under 200 references and surveys the contribution of
ethologists, linguists, cross-cultural psychologists and psychiatrists, besides that of
physical, psychoanalytic and cultural anthropologists. For the purposes of this brief
introduction, it w ill suffice to say that Lutz and W hite identify four different
approaches positing cross-cultural universals in emotion, namely: e th o lo g ic a l a n d
e v o lu tio n a ry approaches, p sy ch o d yn a m ic a n d p s y c h ia tric perspectives, approaches
informed by what they call com m onsense n a tu ra lis m and, last but not least,
approaches that posit lan guag e u n iv e rsa ls (linguistic or cultural codes found across
cultures) as evidence of universal aspects of emotional experience. Lutz and W hite
then go on to present varieties of research on emotions as culturally and socially
constructed. In contrast to the form er set of approaches, these posit that different
cultural meaning systems have a p r im a r y role to play in the shaping (or, sometimes,
constituting) of emotional experience itself. The emphasis in this equally vast body of
work is therefore on cultural variation, mediated by cognitive categories of ethno-
p s y c h o lo g ic a l un d erstan d in g (such as that of the cu ltu rally constituted 'self'), by the
s o c ia l s tr u c tu r a l c o rre la te s of such understandings, and/or by ve rb a l c o m m u n ica tio n .
Generally speaking, this research tends to define emotion 'm ore as a socially validated
judgment than an internal state', and thus focuses largely on 'the translation of
emotion concepts and the social processes surrounding their use' (1986: 40 8). Lutz
and W hite im portantly stress that the relativism embraced by authors in these fields
6 0 U N I V E R S A L S AND P A R T I C U L A R S OF A F F E C T
involves different degrees of constructionism , as many of them do posit universals in

some aspects of emotions - for example, in the types of situations or social positions
associated with them.
An influential collection by the title The S o c ia l Construction o f Em otion
appeared in the same year as Lutz and W hite published their review (1986). This
collection, edited by Rom Harre, argued for a m ethodological agenda giving priority
to linguistic studies of emotion, with a view to illustrating cultural variation among
emotion systems. Such studies would pay p a rticu la r attention to how specific lin
guistic repertoires mediate local moral orders, and to the social functions that p a r
tic u la r emotion displays and emotion ta lk 'perform in the dram aturgically shaped
episodes of this or that culture' (H arre 1986: 13). Constructionist programs of
research gained ascendancy in the wake of these seminal publications, in the context
of what we have referred to as the textual turn in social science. M ore recently,
however, an increasing number of authors have articulated the lim itations of cultural
constructionism , and the need to develop theoretical and methodological tools
capable of eschewing the conceptual dichotomies of affect/cognition, individual/
society, body/mind, matter/discourse. If, in 1986, Lutz and W hite were able to write
that research positing cross-cultural universals was 'usually positivist in epistemo-
logical orientation' (408), a feature of the more recent critiques of constructionist
relativism is their re-framing of the question of universals in terms that do not rely on
positivist assumptions. On the one hand, it is argued that the way forw ard in the
study of 'emotions and culture' lies in adm itting the relevance of non-reductive form
of psychology, in order to address 'the enormous diversity in the way individuals
appropriate symbolic form s related to emotions and emotional experience' (Good
2004: 532; see also Good and Good 2005). On the other hand, it is argued that the
'ideational bias' in cultural accounts of emotions must be corrected through a focus
on embodiment and non-mechanistic biology (Lyon 1995; see also Csordas 1994;
W ilce 20 03 ). The backdrop to these developments in the study of emotion are new
and complex ways of thinking about 'culture', in response to processes of g lo baliza
tion and emergent, de- and reterritorialized cultural forms (Gupta and Ferguson
1992).
The first extract included in this section is by Cathrine Lutz, one of the best-
known exponents of the constructionist approach to the study of emotion. In this text,
Lutz examines the gendered dimensions of the construct of emotion in some sectors
of Am erican culture, through the analysis of interview conversations with both men
and women. This piece builds on an earlier a rticle (Lu tz 1986) where Lutz proposed
that Euroam erican conceptions of emotion, both lay and expert, should themselves be
subject to a deconstructive reading, for the purpose of translating between cultural
systems. If the cultural specificity of Euroam erican concepts of emotion is not
immediately apparent, she argued, this is in good part because of the (Western)
positivist assumption that it is possible to identify an 'essence' of emotion, and that
such an essence is universal. The meaning system that constitutes the Western
category of emotion associates this concept with a number of others (nature,
irrationality, subjectivity, femininity, chaos) that share a position of inferiority with
respect to their dichotomous counterparts (culture, reason, universality, masculinity,
order and control). In this extract, drawn from a chapter published in 1990, Lutz
E M O T 10 N S A N D C U L T U R E 6 1
focuses on the function of a 'rhetoric of control' in women's ta lk about emotion. She

argues that this rhetoric can be read as 'a narrative about the double-sided nature -
both weak and dangerous - of dominated groups' (1990: 70).
The second extract in this section is from an a rticle by W illia m Reddy, where the
author takes issue with the 'strong' constructionism he associates with the work of
Lutz, among others. W h ilst appreciating the reasons, both theoretical and political,
for refusing essentialist conceptions of subjectivity and emotions, Reddy draws
attention to some of the paralyzing features of the constructionist focus on 'cu ltu re'
(or language) at the expense of the individual (or feeling). Reddy proposes the term
'em otives' to characterize emotion statements, stressing that such statements are
themselves 'instrum ents for directly changing, building, hiding, intensifying [the inner
experience of] e m otion s'.'Em otives' are not representational, because there is always
a disjuncture between them and the feelings to which they are 'anchored'. But neither
do they simply perform emotion in the sense of constructing it from linguistic and
cultural conventions. Rather, 'em otives' perform feeling in the sense of shaping it (or
m oving it) in p a rticu la r directions. Understanding emotion statements in terms of
'em otives' allows theoretically for the existence of a 'residuum that is not satis
factorily shaped', and this residuum 'provides an initial reservoir or possibilities for
change' - the source of the possibility for deviance, resistance, or the generation
of alternative idioms. Reddy's approach draws on post-structuralist insights about
language and on reform ulations of classic psychodynamic concepts, to offer a post
positivist and non-essentialist account of feeling as what is 'universally human'.
One critique of Reddy's position is that it is pitched against an extreme version of
constructionism that is very rarely, in fact, espoused by researchers of emotion and
culture. In its original published form, Reddy's a rticle is followed by responses from
Brenneis, Garro, Howell, Hunt, Longman, and Lutz, as well as a reply from the author,
to which we refer readers who may want to deepen their understanding of this debate.
The author of our third extract is another ethnohistorian of emotions, M ichael
Harkin, who also draws on psychodynamic approaches in explicit contrast with dis
cursive ones. Harkin poses the methodological question of 'w hat role the emotions
can possibly play in our interpretations of cultures that were destroyed or radically
altered in the aftermath of contact with Euroam ericans'. One of the most interesting
features of this question is that it addresses simultaneously emotions as an aspect of
the culture(s) under study, and emotions as an aspect of the research process. Harkin
proposes that ethnopsychological approaches that rely on linguistic documentation -
bracketing out any assumptions concerning the nature of the human psyche - are
not helpful for the purposes of investigating emotional schemata in cultures and
languages that are now extinct. Psychodynamic approaches, on the other hand,
assume a degree of sim ilarity in the basic mechanisms through which humans
manage traum atic events and emotions. On this basis, an explication of the emotional
dimensions of specific ethnohistorical events can be offered, and this is illustrated in
this extract through examples from the Am erican Northwest Coast. Harkin argues
moreover that, in the classical tradition of anthropology, a professional reluctance to
think historically can be read as a psychologically defensive response to the 'searing
histories of genocide, culture loss, land appropriations, and immense cruelty per
petrated on indigenous peoples'. Among contem porary ethnohistorians, who no
longer think in terms of an 'ethnographic present', the unwillingness to consider the

emotional dimensions of the past persists, and can sim ilarly be regarded as an
unwillingness to face emotions of extreme distress - not only those of the peoples
studied, but also those that the practice of studying them may provoke in the
researcher.
The last extract in this section, by Johan Lindquist, is a recent contribution to the
vast body of anthropological research on emotions in Southeast Asia. This piece
follow s in the steps of seminal authors like Geertz and Rosaldo in looking at emotions
as a basis for theorizing social action; it departs from their classic studies, however,
in focusing on social change and cultural transition. The a rticle examines m alu -
approximately translated as shame or embarrassment - as a key emotional trope for
contem porary Indonesian migrants, by looking at the practices of two very different
groups of migrant women (factory workers and prostitutes). Unlike other possible
translations of 'shame-embarrassment', which remain tied to p a rticu la r ethnic
groups and languages, m alu has become especially salient as a concept that exists in
several Indonesian languages and, in the context of migration, as part of the Indone
sian lingua franca. As such, m alu functions as an experiential trope that links
the spaces of migration and expresses the (gendered) anxieties that emerge from the
tensions between them. A t the same time, m alu describes a relationship between
individuals and the cultural fram ew ork of the 'nation', beyond any one local
community.
References
Csordas, T. J . (ed.) (199 4) Em bodim ent and Experience: The E x iste n tia l Grounds o f
Culture and Self. Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press.
Good, B. J. (200 4) 'Rethinking "e m o tio n s" in Southeast A sia ', Ethnos, 69 (4): 5 2 9 -5 3 3 .
Good, B. J. and Good, M .-J. DelVecchio (200 5) 'On the "su b je c t" of culture: subjectivity
and cultural phenomenology in the w ork of C liffo rd Geertz', in R. Schweder and
B. Good (eds) C liffo rd Geertz by his Colleagues. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Gupta, A. and Ferguson, J. (eds) (1 9 9 7 ) A n th ro p o lo g ic a l Locations: Boundaries and
Grounds o f a F ie ld Science. Berkeley: University of C a liforn ia Press.
Harre, R. (ed.) (198 9) The S o c ia l C onstruction o f Em otion. Oxford: B lackw ell. Lutz, C.
and W hite, G. M. (1 9 8 6 ) 'The anthropology of em otions', A n n u a l Review o f
Anthropology, 15: 4 0 5 -4 3 6 .
Lutz, C. (198 6) 'E m otio n , thought, and estrangement: emotion as a cultu ral category',
C u ltu ra l Anthropology, 1 (3): 2 8 7 -3 0 9 .
Lyon, M. L. (199 5) 'M issin g emotions: the lim itations of cultu ral constructionism in the
study of em otion', C u ltu ra l Anthropology, 10 (2): 2 4 4 -2 6 3 .
W ilce, J. M . (ed) (200 3) S o c ia l and C u ltu ra l Lives o f Immune Systems. London:
Routledge.
Chapter 5
Catherine A. Lutz
ENGENDERED EMOTION
Gender, power, a n d th e rh e to ric o f e m o tio n a l c o n tr o l in
A m e r ic a n d is c o u rs e
W
ESTERN DISCOURSE ON EMOTIONS CONSTITUTES
them as p arad o xical en titie s that are both a sign o f w eakn ess and a pow erful
fo rc e . O n the on e h and, e m o tio n w eaken s the p e rso n w ho e x p e rie n c e s it. It d o e s
this both by se rv in g as a sign o f a so rt o f c h a ra c te r d e fe ct (e .g ., “ She c o u ld n ’ t rise
above her e m o tio n s”) and by b ein g a sign o f at least te m p o ra ry in trap sy ch ic d is
o rgan ization (e .g ., “She w as in a fragile sta te ” o r “ She fell a p a r t”). T h e p e rso n w ho
has “ fallen a p a r t,” n e e d le ss to say, is unable to fun ction effectively o r fo rc e fu lly . O n
the o th e r h and, e m o tio n s are literally ph ysical fo rc e s that push us in to v ig o ro u s
action . “She w as ch arg ed u p ,” w e say; “ W aves o f e m o tio n sh o ok his b o d y .” W om en
arc c o n stru cte d in a sim ilar c o n trad ic to ry fashion as both stro n g and w eak (e .g .,
Jo rd a n o v a I 9 8 0 ), and I w ill p re se n t eviden ce [. . .] that w hen A m erican w om en and
m en talk ab o u t e m o tio n , they draw on that sim ilarity to c o m m e n t on the n ature o f
g e n d e r and pow er. T h is featu re o f the em o tio n al and o f the fem ale p ro d u c e s
fre q u e n t d iscussion in the in te rv ie w s o f the p ro b lem o f co n tro llin g o n e ’ s feelin gs.
Such discu ssio n is fou n d in b oth m e n ’ s and w o m e n ’ s d isc o u rse , b u t m uch m o re
frequ en tly in the latter. I w ill show that this talk ab o u t c o n tro l o f e m o tio n s is
eviden ce o f a w id ely shared cu ltu ral view o f the d an g e r o f b oth w o m en and their
e m o tio n a lity . It is also talk that m ay m ean d ifferen t things to b oth the sp e ak e r and
the au d ien ce w hen it is u tte re d bvJ w om en and bvJ m e n , and this facto r w ill b e u sed
to h elp acco u n t for d iffe ren ce s in the rate o f use o f this rh e to ric o f c o n tro l.
A lth ough both w o m en and m en draw on a cultu rally available m o d e l o f e m o tio n as
so m eth in g in n eed o f co n tro l, they can be seen as often m akin g so m e d ifferen t kinds
o f sen se and claim s from it.
T h e m ate rial I tu rn to first w as c o llc c tc d in fo u r e x te n d e d in te rv ie w s on
e m o tio n w ith fifteen A m erican w ork in g- and m id d le -class w om en and m en . All
64 C A T H E R I N E A. L U T Z
w h ite , th ey ra n g e d in a g e fr o m th e e a rly t w e n tie s to th e m id - s e v e n t ie s an d in c lu d e d

a b a n k te lle r, fa c to r y w o r k e r , c o lle g e te a c h e r , r e t ir e e , h o u s in g c o d e in sp e c to r , an d
s to c k b r o k e r . M o s t w e r e p a r e n ts . T h e in te r v ie w s w e r e u su a lly c o n d u c t e d in p e o p l e ’ s
h o m e s , an d th e in te r v ie w e r s in c lu d e d m y s e lf an d a n u m b e r o f g r a d u a t e s tu d e n t s ,
m o s t o f th e m w o m e n . E ac h p e r s o n w a s in te r v ie w e d b y th e s a m e in d iv id u a l fo r all
fo u r s e s s io n s , an d a lth o u g h a sm a ll n u m b e r o f q u e s t io n s o r g a n iz e d e a c h s e s s io n ,
e v e r y a t t e m p t w a s m a d e to h ave th e in te r v ie w s a p p r o x im a t e “ n a tu ra l c o n v e r s a t io n .”
N o n e t h e le s s , it is d e a r l y im p o r t a n t to k e e p in m in d th e c o n t c x t o f th e d is c o u r s e to
b e a n a ly z e d , a s it w a s p r o d u c e d b y a g r o u p o f p e o p le w h o a g r e e d o n le t t e r and
p h o n e so lic ita tio n “ to talk a b o u t e m o t io n ” fo r an a u d ie n c e o f re la tiv e s t r a n g e r s w h o
w e r e a lso a c a d e m ic s an d m o s tly fe m a le s .
M a n y p e o p le m e n tio n e d a t o n e o r se v e ra l p o in t s in th e in te r v ie w s th a t th ey
b e lie v e w o m e n t o b e m o r e e m o t io n a l th a n m e n . O n e e x a m p le o f th e v a rie ty o f
w ay s th is w a s p h r a s e d is th e a c c o u n t o n e w o m a n g a v e t o e x p la in h e r o b s e r v a tio n
th a t s o m e p e o p le s e e m in h e r e n tly to b e “ n e r v o u s t y p e s .” Sh e r e m e m b e r e d a b o u t
h e r c h ild h o o d th at
th e fe m a le te a c h e r s h ad a te n d e n c y to re a lly h o lle r a t th e k id s a lo t , an d
w h e n I w a s in c la ss w ith th e m a le te a c h e r , it s e e m e d lik e h e ju s t le t
th in g s p a s s by an d it d i d n ’ t s e e m to g e t h is g o a t as fa s t, an d h e d i d n ’ t
sh o u t at th e s a m e tim e th e fe m a le m ay h ave in th e s a m e in sta n c e . . . .
I th in k e m o t io n a l p e o p le g e t u p s e t fa ste r. I d o . A n d like w ith m e n an d
w o m e n , th in g s th a t a r e s o r t o f im p o r t a n t o r b o th e r in g m e d o n ’ t b o th e r
m y h u sb a n d . . . . 1 th in k t h a t ’ s a d iffe r e n c e o f m a le an d fe m a le .
O n e th e m e th at fr e q u e n tly a r is e s in th e in te r v ie w s is w h a t can b e c a lle d

th e “r h e t o r ic o f c o n t r o l” ( R o s a ld o 1 9 7 7 ) . W h e n p e o p le a r c a s k e d to ta lk a b o u t
e m o t io n s , o n e o l th e m o s t c o m m o n s e t o f m e t a p h o r s u s e d is th a t in w h ic h s o m e o n e
o r s o m e th in g c o n t r o ls , h a n d le s , c o p e s , d e a ls , d is c ip lin e s , o r m a n a g e s e ith e r o r b o th
th e ir e m o t io n s o r th e s itu a tio n s e e n a s c r e a tin g th e e m o t io n . F o r e x a m p le :
I b e lie v e an in d iv id u a l can e x o r c is e a g r e a t d e a l o f control o v e r th e ir

e m o t io n s b y m a in ta in in g a m o r e p o s it iv e o u t lo o k , b y n o t d w e llin g on
th e n e g a tiv e , b y tr y in g to p u sh a sid e an u n p le a sa n t fe e lin g . I ’m g e t tin g
a n g r y an d lik e I s a id , h e ’ s o v e r b e in g a n g r y , m o r e o r le ss d r o p p e d it an d
h e e x p e c t s m e t o a lso . W e ll w e d o n ’t have th e s a m e t e m p e r , I ju s t c a n ’ t
handle it th a t w ay .
A n d in a m o r e p o e t ic t u r n , o n e p e r s o n m u s e d :
s a d n e s s . . . d ip p in g , d ip p in g in to th at . . . ju s t th e out-of-con tro/new o f
th in g s.
P e o p le ty p ic a lly ta lk a b o u t controlling e m o t io n s , h an dlin g e m o t io n a l s itu a tio n s as

w e ll a s e m o t io n a l fe e lin g s , an d dealin g w ith p e o p le , s itu a tio n s , an d e m o t io n s .
The n o tio n o f c o n tr o l o p e r a t e s v e ry sim ila rly h e re to th e w ay it d o e s in
W e s te r n d is c o u r s e s o n s e x u a lit y (F o u c a u lt 1 9 8 0 ) . B o th e m o t io n a lity an d s e x u a lity
E N G E N D E R E D E M OTIO N 65
arc dom ain s w hose understan ding is dom inated by a b iom edical m od el; both are
seen as un iversal, natural im p u lses; both arc talked about as existin g in “healthy” and
“ unhealthy” fo rm s; and both have com e under the con trol of a m edical o r q u asi
m edical profession (principally psychiatry and p sy ch o lo gy ). Foucault has argued
that p op u lar view s o f sexuality — as a drive that w as rep ressed during the V ictorian
era and gradually liberated during the tw entieth century arc m isleading because
they p osit a single essen ce that is m anipulated by social convention. Rather,
Foucault p o stu lated , m ultiple sexu alities arc constantly prod u ced and changcd. A
pop u lar discou rse on the con trol o f em otion ru ns functionally parallel to a d is
cou rse on the con trol o f sexuality; a rh eto ric o f con trol requires a psychophysical
essen ce that is m anipulated or w restled w ith and directs attention away from
the socially con stru cted nature o f the idea o f em otion (see A bu-Lughod and Lutz,
this volum e). In addition , the m etaph or o f con trol im plies som eth in g that w ould
otherw ise be out o f co n tro l, som eth in g w ild and un ruly, a threat to order. To
speak about con trollin g em otio n s is to replicate the view o f em otio n s as natural,
dan gerou s, irrational, and physical.
W hat is striking is that w om en talked about the con trol o f em otion m ore than
tw ice as often as did m en as a p ro p o rtio n o f the total speech each prod u ced in the
in terview s. To help account for this difference, we can ask what the rh eto ric o f
con trol m ight accom plish fo r the speak er and w hat it might say to several audiences.
. . . At least three things can be seen to be don e via the rh eto ric o f em otional
con trol: It (1 ) rep rod u ces an im portan t part o f the cultural view o f em otion (and
then im plicitly o f w om en as the m ore em otio nal gen d er) as irration al, w eak, and
dan gerou s; (2 ) m inim ally elevates the social status o f the p erso n w ho claim s the
need or abilitv to self-con trol em o tio n s; and (3 ) o p p o se s the view o f the fem inine
se lf as dan gerous when it is reversed , that is, w hen the speak er denies the need lor
or possibility of con trol o f em otio n . Each o f these suggestion s can only briefly be
exam in ed.
First, this rh eto ric can be seen as a rep ro d u ctio n , prim arily on the part of
w om en , o f the view o f them selves as m o re em otio n al, o f em otion as dan gerou s, and
hence o f them selves as in need o f con trol. It d ocs this first by setting up a boundary
that edge over w hich em otion that is uncontrolled can spill. A n um b er o f people
have noted that threats to a dom inant social o rd er arc som etim es articulated in a
concern with diverse kinds o f boun daries (w hether physical or social) and their
in tegrity (e .g ., M artin 1987; Sch eper-H ughes and L ock 1987). O n e o f the m o st
critical b oun daries that is con stituted in W estern psychological d iscou rse is that
b etw een the inside and the outside o f p e rso n s; individualism as ideology is funda
m entally based on the m agnification o f that p articu lar boundary. W hen em otion is
defined, as it also is in the W est, as som eth ing inside the individual, it provides an
im p ortan t sym bolic vehicle by which the problem o f the m aintenance o f social
o rd er can be voiced. A d iscou rse that is con cern ed w ith the e x p re ssio n , con trol, or
rep ression o f em otio ns can be seen as a d iscou rse on the crossing back and forth o f
that boundary betw een inside and ou tsid e, a discou rse we can ex p e ct to sec in m ore
elaborate form in p e rio d s and places w here social relation s ap pear to be im m inently
o vertu rn ed .
This rh etoric o f em otional con trol g o es further than defining and then d e fe n d
ing b o u n daries, however, il also su gg ests a set o f ro les — one stron g and defensive
6 6 C A T H E R I N E A. LUTZ
and the o th e r w eak but invasive — that are h ierarch ized and lin ked w ith g e n d e r
ro les. R o sald o (1 9 8 4 ) n o te s o f h ierarch ical so c ie tie s that thev se e m to evince
g r e a te r c o n ce rn than do m o re egalitarian o n es w ith how so ciety co n tro ls the in n er
e m o tio n a l se ll an d, w e can ad d , w ith how on e p a rt o f a b ifu rc ated and h ierarch ically
lavered sell co n tro ls anoth er. T h e b ody p o litic , in o th e r w o rd s, is so m e tim e s
re p lica te d in the social relation s o f the v ario u s h om un culi that p o p u late the hum an
m in d , a kind o f “m en tal p o litic .” W hen cogn itio n o u tre a so n s and su ccessfu lly m a n
ages e m o tio n , m a le -fe m ale ro le s arc rc p lic a tc d . W hen w om en sp eak o f c o n tro l,
they play the ro le s o f both su p er- and su b o rd in a te , o f c o n tro lle r and co n tro lle e .
T h ey iden tify th eir e m o tio n s and th em selv es as u n discip lin ed and d iscip lin e both
through a d isc o u rse on co n tro l o f feeling. T h e c o n stru ctio n o f a fem in in e self, this
m a te ria l m igh t su g g e st, in clu d es a p r o c e ss by w hich w o m en c o m e to c o n tro l th e m
selv es and so ob viate the n ecessity fo r m o re co c rciv c o u tsid e co n tro l.
T h e re is the e x am p le o f on e w om an in h er late th irties; she talked ab o u t the
hate she felt for h er e x -h u sb an d , w ho b egan an affair w hile she w as p re gn an t and
left h er w ith the in fan t, an o ld e r ch ild , and no paid e m p lo y m e n t:
So I think y ou try h ard n o t to b rin g it [the feelin g] o u t ’ cause y ou d o n ’ t

w ant that type o f thing at h om e w ith the k id s, you know. T h a t’ s very
b ad , very unhealthy, th at’ s n o way to gro w up. So 1 think now , m aybe
I’ ve ju st le arn ed to c o n tro l il and lim e has ch an ged the feelin g o f the
hate.
T h e w om an h ere d efin es h erse ll as so m e o n e w ith a feelin g o f hate and p o rtray s it

as d a n g e ro u s, p rim arily in te r m s o f the th reat it p o se s to h er ow n ch ild ren , a threat
she p h rases in b io m e d ica l te r m s ( i.e ., “ unh ealth y”). She re p lic a te s a view that
Sh ields (1 9 8 7 ) foun d p revalen t in a su rv ey of tw en tieth -cen tu ry E n glish -lan guage
ch ild -rearin g m an u als; this is the d a n g e r that m o th e r s ’ (and n ot fa th e rs’ ) e m o tio n s
arc th ough t to p re se n t to ch ild ren . In ad d itio n , this w o m a n ’ s d e scrip tio n o f her
feelin gs e sscn tializcs th em as sta te s; as su ch , they rem ain passive (se e C an cian 1987
on the fem in ization o f love) rath er than active m o tiv a to rs, a p o in t to w hich w e w ill
re tu rn .
In o th e r c ase s, p e o p le do n ot talk ab o u t th e m se lv e s, b u t rath er rem in d o th e rs
(u su ally w o m e n ) o f the n eed to co n tro l th e m se lv e s. T h e se in stan ces also se rv e to
rep licate the view o f w o m en as d an g ero u sly e m o tio n a l. A n o th er w om an spok e
a b o u t a fe m ale frien d w h o still g rie v e d fo r a son wrho had died tw o y ears p rev io u sly :
“Y ou’ ve g o t to p ick up and g o on . Y ou ’ ve g o t to try and g e t th ose feelin gs u n d er
c o n tr o l.” T h e “y o u ” in this sta te m e n t is a c o m p le x and m u ltiv o cal sign (K irk p a tric k
1 9 8 7 ), and d ire c ts the ad m on ition to co n tro l sim u ltan eo u sly to the g riev in g
w o m an , the fem ale in terv iew er, the sp e ak e r h erse lf, no on e in p articu lar, and
e very on e in a p o te n tial au dien ce.
A seco n d p rag m atic e ffect o f the rh e to ric o f e m o tio n a l co n tro l is a claim to
have the ability to “rise ab ov e” o n e ’ s e m o tio n s o r to ap p ro ve o f th ose w ho do.
W o m en, m o re than m e n , may sp e ak o f co n tro l b e cau sc they are co n c c rn c d ab out
co u n teractin g the cu ltu ral d e n igratio n o f th em selv es through an asso ciatio n w ith
e m o tio n . “ I think it’ s im p o rta n t to co n tro l e m o tio n s ,” they say, and im plicitly
rem in d a critical au d ien ce that they have the c o o le r stu ff it takes to be c o n sid e re d
E N G E N D E R E D E M OTIO N 67
m ature and rational. It is im p ortan t to note that, as academ ics, 1 and the gradu ate
students w ho con ducted the interview s may have been perceived as an audience in
special need o f such rem in ders. The speak ers w ould have been doing this, however,
by dissociatin g them selves from em otio n rath er than by questionin g the dom inant
view both o f them selves and o f em otion .
Although w om en may have less access to a view o f them selves as m asterful
individuals, a com m on asp ect o f the cultural sch cm e that is available paints them
as m asterfully effcctivc with oth ers on join t tasks, particularly in terp erson al or
em otional tasks (social scicn cc version s o f this includc C h odorow 1978, Parsons
and Bales 1955). This subtly alters the m eaning o f the rh eto ric o f con trol;
know ledge o f w hat the feelings are that “n eed ” con trol and o f w hat con trol should
be like is perceived and d escrib ed as a social rather than an individual process. For
exam p le, one w om an says: “ If y o u ’re tied in with a fam ily, . . . you have to use it for
guidan ce how you con trol your e m o tio n s.” This is the sam e w om an w hose ccntral
life problem during the in terview p erio d w as copin g w ith her h usban d’s ex-w ife
and fam ily, w ho lived across the stre et from her. T h e regular, friendly contact
betw een husband and ex-w ife has left her very unhappy but also unsure ab out w hat
to do. T h e am biguity over w ho ought to con trol o r regulate w hat is evident in her
description o f an argum ent she had w ith her husband over the issue.
I w as m ad. 1 w as m ad. And I said, “ I d o n ’ t care w hether you think I

should [inaudible w ord] o r slay in this at all, it’s too, and cause I’ m
go in g to say it.” And I said, “H ow dare you tell m e how I’m su pp osed to
fe e l,” you know. Bob [her husband] w ould say, you know, “You go t to
live with it” o r “ You go t to do this” o r “ How dare you tell m e this, I
d o n ’ t have to put up with anything” o r “ I d o n ’t have to feel this way
because you tell m e I have to feel this w ay.” You know, it w as, in that
case Robin is his ex-w ife, “and you have to just kind o f deal with it,” you
know, “all the p rob lem s that she p resen ts in your ow n w ay .” And it w as
alm ost so rt o f like saying “Y ou’re goin g to have to like it.” Well I d o n ’t. I
d o n ’t, you know. And for a year and a h alf he kept saying, you know,
“ You’re goin g to have to like it, this is the way it’s go in g to be, y o u ’re
go in g to have to do this, y o u ’ re goin g to have to have, lie, act, this
certain w ay,” you know, act everything hun ky-dory, and it w asn ’ t, you
know, and I w as beginning to resen t a w hole lot o f things. I, I, I resen ted
him for telling m e I had to feel that way w hen I, I w asn ’t real fond o f the
situation. I d id n ’t like it. W hen I w ould tell him that I d id n ’t like it, it
w as “ It’s your p ro b lem , you deal w ith it.” I d id n ’t like that, that m ade
m e really angry because I w as saying, “ H elp m e o u t here, I d o n ’t know
how to deal w ith th is.”
This w om an is fru strated w ith her husband for failing to join h er in a co llab o ra
tive p ro ject o f “dealing w ith” her feelings o f resen tm en t. H ere con trol is given away
to o r shared w ith others. This strategy o f control is m ore co m p le x and sub tle than
the sim ple self-im position describ ed in other parts o f the tran scripts so far; it aim s
to con trol both the em otio n s o f the se lf and the attention and assistance o f the other.
N o te also that she speaks o f “resen tin g” o r “not liking” (relatively m ild term s o f
displeasure) the overall situation but is m ost incensed (“ m ad, m ad, m ad”) about her
h usban d’ s assum p tion that she ought not to feel a certain way. She asse rts the right
to “feel” unhappy about her predicam en t but is clearly defining that feeling in the
standard con tem p orary sen se of a strictlv internal and passive event. N ow here in
the in terview d o es she explicitly state or ap p ear to im ply that she w an ts, inten ds, or
ought to act in co n ce rt with those feelings. W hat is bein g con trolled o r dealt w ith,
th erefore, has already been defined as a relatively inn ocuous feelin g rath er than an
action ten dency.
Finally, the rh eto ric o f em otional con trol can also be em ployed in both
idiosyncratic and “rev ersed ” ways that may intend o r have the effect o f at least
m inim ally resistin g the dom in ant view o f em otionality , and thus o f w om en. A few
p eo p le, for exam p le, spontaneously spoke about the problem o f em otional con trol,
thereby evoking the w hole schem a we have ju st been looking at. They w ent on,
however, to define “con trol” in a way that entailed relatively m inim al constraints on
em otional com m unication . O n e w om an, a tw enty-eigh t-year-old bank teller, said:
“ Let m e explain con trol. It’s not that you sit there and you take it [som e kind o f
abuse] and, you know, I think con trollin g them |em otion s] is letting them out in the
p ro p e r tim e, in the p ro p e r p la c e.” Perhaps m ore radically, so m e w om en (as well as
one o f the gay m en w ith w hom 1 spok e) denied that they had the ability to con trol
som e o r many o f their em otio n s. O n e m an in his tw enties critically d escrib ed a
previous tendency he had to over-intellectualize p rob lem s and explain ed that he
w orked against that tendency because
Il w asn ’t that I w anted to cut o lf my em otio n s, I just d id n ’ t, they w ould

get out o f co n tro l, and I found that the m ore I tried to su pp ress them ,
the m ore pow erful they w ould b ecom e. It w as like this big dam that
d id n ’t let a little out at a tim e, it w ould just e x p lo d e all of a sudden , and
I’d be totally out o f con trol.
The question rem ains, however, of the validity o f seein g these latter seem ingly
resistan t uses of the rh eto ric o f em otional con trol as “op p o sitio n al” fo rm s (W illiam s
1977) within that system . This is certain ly a dangerous rh etorical strategy , caught as
they (w e) arc w ithin a h cgcm on ic disco u rse not o f o ur own m aking. T h e opposition
to sclf-control w ill m o st likely be absorbed into the logic o f the existin g system
and so com e to equal not resistance but sim ple deficiency or lack (o f con trol). A
possibly oppositional intent may have collaborative o u tcom es to the exten t that the
denial o f self-con trol is taken by m o st audiences as a deficit and a confirm ation o f
ideas ab out w o m e n ’s irrationality.
The culturally con stru cted em otionality o f w om en is rife with con tradiction.
The em otio n al fem ale, like the natural w orld that is the cultural source o f both
affect and w om en , is con stru cted as both pliant (because w eak and a resou rce for
use by civilized m an) and ultim ately trem en dously pow erful and un con trollable
(Strath ern 1 9 8 0 ). Em otion ality is the source o f w o m e n ’s value, their e x p e rtise in
lieu o f rationality, and yet it is the origin o f their unsuitability for b ro ad er social
tasks and even a poten tial threat to their children.
T h ere arc vivid parallels betw een this and the cultural m eanings surroun din g
colonialism that Taussig (1 9 8 4 ) and Stoler (1 9 8 5 ) have d escrib ed . Look in g at early-
ENGENDERED EMOTION 69
tw entieth-century co lo n ists’ view s o f the local C olum bian lab or force, Taussig
d escrib es their alternation betw een fear and awe o f Indians w ho w ere perceived as
dangerous and pow erful figures, on the one hand, and disgust and den igration o f
their perceived w eakness and lack o f civilization, on the other. Taussig d escrib es
the p ro c e ss as one in w hich a “ colonial m irro r” “reflects back on to the colon ists the
barbarity of their ow n social relations” (1 9 8 4 :4 9 5 ). In a (certainly less system atic or
universally brutal) w ay, a “patriarchal m irro r” can be con ceptu alized as helping to
prod u ce the view o f w om en as em otional — as dangerously “ eru p tive” and as in the
p ro cess o f w eakly “breaking d o w n .” A “paradox o f w ill” seem s consistently to
attend dom in atin g relation ships w hether those o f gender, race, o r class as the
subordin ate other is ideologically painted as w eak (so as to need protection or
discipline) and yet periodically as threatening to break the ideological boun dary in
rio t o r hysteria. E m otion talk, as evident in these tran scrip ts, show s the sam e
contradictions o f co n tro l, w eakn ess, and stren gth . Given its definition as nature, at
least in the W est, em otion d iscou rses may be one o f the m o st likely and pow erful
devices by w hich dom ination p roceed s.
[. . .]
In all so cieties, body d iso rd ers — w hich em otion is con sidered to be in this
society — b eco m e crucial in dicators o f p rob lem s w ith social con trol and, as such,
arc m ore likely to occur o r em erge in a discou rse con ccrn in g social subordin ates.
Foucault has m ade the claim that pow er creates sexuality and its disciplining;
sim ilarly, it can be said to create em otionality. The cultural con stru ction o f
w o m en ’ s em otio n can thus be view ed not as the rep ression o r supp ression
o f em otion in m en (as many lay-people, th erapists, and oth er com m en tato rs
argue) but as the creation of em otion in w om en. B ecause em otio n is con stru cted
as relatively ch aotic, irrational, and antisocial, its existen ce vindicates authority
and legitim ates the need for co n tro l. By association with the fem ale, it vin di
cates the distinction betw een and hierarchv of m en and w om en. And the cultural
lo g ic conn ectin g w om en and em otion c o rre sp o n d s to and sh o res up the w alls
betw een the sph eres o f private, intim ate (and em otio n al) relation s in the (id e o lo g ic
ally) fem ale dom ain o f the family and public, form al (and rational) relation s in the
prim arily m ale dom ain o f the m arketplace.
Rubin has rem arked o f sexuality that “T h ere arc h istorical perio d s in w hich (it)
is m o re sharply con tested and m ore overtly politicized” (1 9 8 4 :2 6 7 ). E m otion ality
has the sam e h istorical dyn am ism , w ith shifting gen d er relations often ap pearin g
to be at the ro o t o f both academ ic and lay stru gg le s over how em otion is to be
defined and evaluated. In other w ords, the con tem p orary dom inant discou rse on
em otio n s - and particularly the view that they arc irrational and to be con trolled —
helps co n stru ct but d ocs not wholly d eterm in e w o m en ’s d isco u rse ; there is an
attem p t to recast the association o f w om en w ith em otion in an alternative fem inist
voice.
Fem inist treatm en ts o f the question o f em otion (e .g ., H ochschild 1983; Jagger
1987) have tended to portray em otio n s not as chaos but as a d iscou rse on prob lem s.
Som e have con tested both the irrationality and the passivity o f feelings by arguing
that em otio n s may involve the identification o f prob lem s in w o m e n ’s lives and
are th e re fo re p olitical. Talk ab o u t an ger, for e x a m p le , can be in te rp re te d as an

atte m p t to identify the e x iste n ce o f in ap p ro p riate re strain t o r in ju stice. Sad n ess is a
d isc o u rse on the p ro b lem o f lo ss, fe ar on that o f danger. By e x te n sio n , talk ab ou t
the co n tro l o f em o tio n s w ou ld b e, in this fe m in ist d isc o u rse , talk ab ou t the s u p p re s
sion of pub lic ac k n o w le d g m e n t of p ro b le m s. T h e e m o tio n a l fem ale m igh t then be
seen n ot sim ply as a m yth ic co n stru c tio n on the ax is of so m e arb itrary cultu ral
dualism b u t as an o u tc o m e of the fact that w o m en o ccu py an ob jectively m o re
p ro b lem atic p o sitio n than d o c s the w h ite, u p p e r-c la ss, N o rth e rn E u ro p e a n , o ld e r
m an w ho is the cu ltu ral e x e m p la r par e x c e lle n c e o f c o o l, e m o tio n le ss ration ality .
A cc o rd in g to a fe m in ist analysis, w h eth er o r n o t w om en e x p r e ss th eir p ro b lem s
(i.e ., arc em o tio n a l) m o re than m e n , th ose w o m e n ’ s au d ien ces m ay h ear a m e ssag e
that is an am algam o f the o rth o d o x view and its fem in ist co n te statio n : “ W e (th o se)
w om en are d an g ero u sly c lo se to e ru p tin g in to e m o tio n a lity /p o in tin g to a p r o b le m /
m ovin g to w ard a social c ritiq u e .”
References
C hodorow , N ancy. 1978. The Reproduction o f Mothering. Berkeley: U niversity o f

C alifornia Press.
Foucault, M ichel. 1980. The History o f Sexuality, Vol. 1. N ew York: Vintage.
H ochschild, A rlie. 1983. The Managed Heart: Commercialization o f Human Feeling.
Berkeley: U niversity of C aliforn ia Press.
Jagger, Alison. 1987. Love and K n ow ledge: E m otion as an E pistem ic R esou rce for
Fem inists. M s. in possession of author. D ep artm en t of Philosophy, U niversity o f
Cincinnati.
Jordan ova, L. J. 1980. N atural Facts: A H istorical Perspective on Science and Sexuality.
In Carol M acC orm ack and M arilyn Strathern, e d s., Nature, Culture, and Gender.
C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity P ress, pp. 4 2 —69.
K irkpatrick, John. 1987. R epresen ting the Sell as ‘You’ in A m erican D iscou rse. Paper
presen ted at the annual m eetin gs of the A m erican A nthropological A ssociation,
Chicago.
M artin, Em ily. 1987. T h e Ideology o f R epro duction : The R eproduction o f Ideology.
Paper presen ted to the U pstate N ew York Fem inist Sch olars’ N etw ork,
Septem ber.
Parsons, Talcott, and R o b e rt Bales. 1955. Family, Socialization, and Interaction Process.
G len coe, IL: Free Press.
R osaldo, M ichelle Z . 1984. Toward an A n th ropology o f Se lf and Feeling. In R . Shw eder
and R. LeV ine, e d s., Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion. C am bridge:
C am bridge U niversity P ress, pp. 1 37—57.
R osaldo, Renato. 1977. T h e R h etoric o f C on trol: Ilongots V iew ed as N atural Bandits
and W ild Indians. In B. B abcock, e d ., The Reversible World: Symbolic Inversion in Art
and Society. Ithaca, NY: C orn ell U niversity P ress, pp. 2 4 0 —57.
Rubin,’ Gavle.
J
1984. ThinkingO Sex: N o tes for a Radical Th eory J of the Politics o f
Sexuality. In C arol S. Vance, e d ., Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality.
B oston: R outledge & Kegan Paul.
Sch eper-H ughes, N ancy, and M argaret L ock. 1987. T h e M indful Body: A P ro
legom enon to Future W ork in M edical A nthropology. Medical Anthropology
Quarterly 1:6—41.
ENGENDERED EMOTION 7 1
Shields, Stephanie A. 1987. W om en, iMen and the D ilem m a o f E m otion . In P. Shaver
and C. H en drick, e d s., Sex and Gender. N ew bury Park, C A : Sage Publications,
pp. 2 2 9 - 5 0 .
Stoler, Anne. 1985. Perceptions o f Protest: D efining the D an gerous in Colonial
Sum atra. American Ethnologist 1 2 :6 4 2 —58.
Strath ern, M arilyn. 1980. N o N ature, N o C ulture: The Hagen C ase. In C arol Mac-
C o rm ac k and M arilyn Strath ern, e d s., Nature, Culture, and Gender. C am bridge:
C am bridge U niversity P ress, pp. 174—222.
Taussig, M ichael. 1984. C u ltu re o f T error — Space o f D eath. R o g er C ase m e n t’ s
Putum ayo R e p o rt and the Explanation o f Torture. Comparative Studies in Society
and History 2 6 :4 6 7 —97.
W illiam s, R aym ond. 1977. Marxism and Literature. O x fo rd : O x fo rd U niversity Press.
Chapter 6
William M. Reddy
AGAINST CONSTRUCTIONISM
The h is to r ic a l e th n o g ra p h y o f e m o tio n s
The persistent dilemmas o f relativism
T
HE ABSOLUTE PLASTICITY OE THE individual is a n ecessary
im plication o f stron g con stru ction ist stances on questions o f sexuality,
ethnicity, and identity. M ichel Foucault . . . argued for a view o f pow er so all-
pervasive and so insidious in its operation that there w as no relu gc w here the
individual could say, “This is m e, this is w here the tru e se lf lives.” E very space w as
su b jected to disciplinary determ in ation , so m uch so that the very e xp erien ce o f
being a su b ject w as, in F ou cau lt’s view, an o u tco m e o f p o w e r’s discursive w orkings.
. . . Foucault w as not a relativist— he d eplored this tyranny o f d isco u rse — b u t, as
he occasionally ack n ow ledged, his position w as in consisten t, for there w as nothing
in the nam e o f w hich he could justify his disapproval. In his last w orks he had begun
to distance h im self from this ex tre m e position (Foucault 1985). But it is im p ortan t
to recognize that his earlier notion o f pow er d oes n ot involve the sw ay, the p e r
suasive capacity, the au th ority, o r the coercion exercised by one p erso n over other
perso n s. It is not, in this sen se, a notion o f pow er that has any W estern p e d ig re e ; it
has nothing to do with w hat we norm ally call “p o litic s.” N o r d oes the type o f
resistan ce Foucault occasionally allud es to as a possibility rep resen t anything re se m
bling political action. Foucault is, in this sense, a relativist in all but nam e. . . .
A nother influential m od el w idely used to replace old er notions o f culture is
Pierre B o u rd ieu ’s (1 9 7 7 ) theory o f practice, built around the con cept o f habitus.
. . . T h e con cept helped B ourdieu to un derstand the gap betw een w hat in form an ts
say to eth n ograp h ers and the actual shape o f the actions they take. E xplicit principle
is never sim ply “ap plied” to social life, B ou rdicu argu es; in stead, the co m p le x
qualifications and reform ulatio n s that interven e arc them selves eth n ograp h y’ s (and
AG A I N S T C 0 N S T R U C T I 0 N I S M 73
h isto ry ’s) p ro p e r ob ject o f study. They are fo rm e d by an in articulate sense of

rightness and strategy (habitus) w hich cannot be com m un icated verbally.
B o u rd ieu ’s individual is not p lastic, b ecause he en dow s individuals w ith a desire to
pu rsu e advantage and a strategic sen se that drives them constantly to so rt out and
refo rm u late situations and action plans. H ow ever, this pu rsu it o f advantage m u st be
regarded eith er as em pty, the con ten t bein g com pletely determ in ed by cultural
co n te x t, o r else as predefined and therefore universal. In the fo rm e r case, practice
theory rem ains relativist and apolitical; in the latter, it may fall into the e c o n o m ist’ s
fallacy that advantage and in terest arc easily defined (in W estern te rm s). This fallacy
is presen t, although “c o rre c te d ” in various w ays, in B o u rd ie u ’ s (1 9 7 9 ) notion o f
“cultural c ap ital.” [. ■ ■]
In the debate over essen tialism , fem in ist th eorists have been stru gglin g w ith a
version o f the sam e problem that has con fron ted an th ropo lo gists and cultural h is
torian s, and ex tre m e relativism still arises as a con ceptu al n ecessity at ccrtain
jun ctures o f this deb ate. “E sscn tialists” m aintain that w om en arc endow ed with
universal ch aracteristics that distinguish them from m en , ch aracteristics in virtue o f
w hich they m ust, in ju stice, dem and fo r them selves a very different place in society
from that accord ed them in the con tem p orary W est. A n tiessen tialists insist that
claim ing special ch aracteristics for w om en is perp etu atin g the sam e e rro r that
ap ologists for m ale dom in ation have always m ade (for review s o f this d ilem m a, see
A lcoff 1 9 8 8 , Riley 1 9 8 8 , M iller 1 9 9 1 , Haraway 1 9 9 1 , M ohanty, R u sso , and Torres
1 99 1 ). W om an's difference has justified her disqualifications, an tiessentialists note,
and any argum en t based on difference can be turn ed against w om en . M oreover,
w om en need to be freed Irom any and all expectation s as to their “n atu re.” . . . The
argum en t that it is con straining to characterize w om en as nurturing o r as emotional
easily b e co m e s an argum en t against characterizing w om en and m en in any way. The
political go al of liberating m en and w om en from con strain ing exp ectatio n s or
assum p tion s can easily ge t lost in this refusal to characterize th em , since, if in di
viduals arc entirely em pty and w holly plastic, then there is nothing in virtu e of
w’hich liberation is g o o d .
Emotional constructionism as a form o f relativism
Th ese d ilem m as have com e into focus recen tly , and in a very com pellin g and
im p o rtan t w ay, in a n um ber o f eth n ographies o f em otion (A bu-Lughod 1986, Lutz
1988, G rim a 1 9 9 2 , see also pap ers collcctcd in Lutz and A bu-Lughod 1990 and
the im p o rtan t earlier w ork by R osald o 1980, 1 9 8 4 ). T h ese stud ies have draw n
inspiration from F ou cau lt’s notion o f d isco u rse, B o u rd icu ’s con cept o f practice, and
fem inist critiq ues o f essen tialism . In each case the ethnographer, a w om an, carried
out fieldw ork in an unusual w ay; each w as in tegrated into a local household as a
w om an and shared in the con strain ts on m ovem en t and interaction locally im posed
on w om en. Because o f this in tegration , A bu-Lughod and G rim a, w orking in M uslim
societies, had access to “priv ate” fem ale exp ression and practice that previous m ale
eth n ograp h ers had been barred from o r con sidered un im portan t. Lutz, w orking on
a Pacific atoll, found no public-private divide in exp ressin g em o tio n , contrary to
both W estern and M uslim n otions o f privacy and prop riety . [. . .]
7 4 W I L L I A M M. REDDY
T h e se o u tsta n d in g c o n trib u tio n s to the g ro w in g field o f the an th ro p o lo gy o f

e m o tio n arc n otab le lo r th eir ad am an t refu sal to allow fo r any p h y sio lo g ical,
p sy c h o lo g ic al, o r o th e r un iversal d e te rm in a n t o r influence in e m o tio n a l life. M any
o th e r c o n trib u tio n s to this field rem ain n eu tral o r ag n o stic ab o u t the relation
b etw een c o n stru c te d and d iscu rsiv e e m o tio n al e x p re ssio n and actual em o tio n al
e x p e rie n c e . Fred M v ers p r o p o se s to “ leave o p e n ” ( 1 9 8 6 :1 0 5 ) the relation b etw een
cultu rally c o n stru c te d e m o tio n s and in dividual p sy ch o lo gical d y n am ics. S im u l
tan eo u sly , he w ish es to avoid e x am in in g the qu estio n w h eth er an a c to r “really ” feels
e m o tio n s that arc cultu rally ap p ro p ria te in given c ircu m stan c e s ( 1 9 8 6 :1 0 6 7 ).
. . . W h eth er such e p iste m o lo g ic al caution is m o re a p p ro p ria te than the stron g
stan d o f G rim a , L u tz, and A b u -L u gh od is n o t the real p o in t, how ever. T h e stron g
c o n stru c tio n ist stan d is one that view s the in dividual as fully p la stic , and it is one
th at, as a re su lt, can n o t p ro v id e g ro u n d s fo r a p o litical c ritiq u e o f any given c o n
stru ctio n . G rim a (1 9 9 2 :1 6 3 —6 4 ) co n d e m n s the “o p p re ssio n ” o f w om en in Paxtun
so c ie ty , w hich is firm ly in the g rip o f a m a lc -c c n tc rcd “g e ro n to c ra c y ” ; she exp lain s
the firm n ess o f this g r ip by n otin g that fem ale id en tity and survival are entirely
w ra p p e d up in relation sh ip s to m ales. H ow ever, if, as she a sse rts, “ e m o tio n is
c u ltu re ,” then w e m u st a cc e p t that th ose w o m en w ho perform no e m o tio n a l n eed to
free th e m se lv e s fro m this o p p re ssio n have no n eed to do so. O n e can n ot have it both
w ays. U n le ss one sp ecifics the g ro u n d s— by saying w hat in fact un iversally ch a ra c
terize s the individual (w hich both the stro n g c o n stru c tio n ists and the ag n o stics w ish
to avoid d o in g )— on e can n ot have a p o litics o f e m o tio n o r a m ean in gful h istory
o f e m o tio n .
T h e re is, m o re o v e r, tro u b lin g eviden ce again st the stro n g c o n stru c tio n ist poin t
o f view from o th e r eth n o grap h ies o f e m o tio n — ev id e n ce su g g e stin g that individual
e m o tio n al life has a dyn am ic c h aracte r and that specific c o m m u n itie s strive to
sh ape, con tain , and channel (n o t c o n stru c t) e m o tio n a l e x p re ssio n . B re n n e is’ s
(1 9 9 0 ) w o rk on Fijians o f Indian d e sc e n t and W h ite ’ s (1 9 9 0 a , h) stud y of A ‘ ara
s p e a k e rs’ “disen tan g lin g” p rac tic e s b oth fo cu s on m e th o d s e m p lo y e d to e n co u rage
e x p re ssio n o f hidden o r p e n t-u p n egative feelin gs that th reaten c o m m u n ity so li
d arity and p e a ce . . . . B c sn icr (1 9 9 5 ) em p h asize s the strik in g c o n trast b etw een the
effusive e m o tio n a l stvlc o f le tte rs w ritte n by N u k u lae lac Islan d ers and their
re se rv e d style in p e rso n . . . . Both c o n trasts p o in t to an e ffo rt to organ ize or
o rch e strate rath er than c o n stru c t e m o tio n . . . . C og n itive a n th ro p o lo g ists have
foun d that in dividuals re sp o n d to e m o tio n -c h arg e d cu ltu ral “sc h e m a s,” such as
ro m an tic love o r class c o n sc io u sn e ss, in highly d iv erg en t w ays, d e p e n d in g upon
c o n te x t and p e rso n a lity ; this div ersity p o in ts to un d erly in g e m o tio n a l p ro cliv itie s
that such sch e m as m ay o r m ay n o t en gage (H o llan d 1 9 9 2 , S trau ss 1 9 9 2 ). . . . M any
p sy ch o lo g ists a sse rt that th ere are only a few basic varieties o f e m o tio n s; they
certain ly have g o o d eviden ce that a u to n o m ic n e rv o u s sy stem re actio n s and facial
e x p re ssio n s c o m e in a few b asic varieties ac ro ss the g lo b e , w ith an ap p aren t ge n e tic
b asis (E k m an 1 9 8 2 , E km an and D avidson 1 9 9 4 ; but see the im p o rta n t caveats o f
B arrett 1993 and the argu m en t o f O rto n v and T u rn e r 1 9 9 0 ). [. . .]
AG A I N S T C 0 N ST R U CTI 0 N I S M 75
B r i d g i n g the s p a c e b e tw e e n la n g u a g e ( p r a c t ic e ) a n d fee lin g
H e r e I w is h to p r o p o s e a s o lu t io n to th is p o litic a l d ile m m a , w h ic h is a t th e s a m e
t im e a d ile m m a a b o u t c o n c e p tu a liz in g h is to r y an d c u ltu r a l d iffe r e n c e . I p r o p o s e to
fin d w ith in th e v e ry p la stic ity o f th e in d iv id u a l g r o u n d s f o r m a k in g u n iv e rsa l
a s s e r t io n s th a t can m o tiv a te e th n o g r a p h ic an d h is to r ic a l an a ly sis th a t is p o litic a lly
m e a n in g fu l. G r o u n d in g u n iv e rsa l c la im s in e m o t io n a l life r a th e r th an in id e n tity ,
g e n d e r , c u ltu r e , o r d is c o u r s e s id e s t e p s th e th o rn y q u e s t io n s th at h ave re c e n tly
f o r m e d in s u r m o u n t a b le s tu m b lin g b lo c k s to an y u n iv e r s a lis m o r h u m a n is m . To say
s o m e th in g a b o u t th e in h e r e n t c h a r a c te r o f e m o t io n s o f f e r s a w ay o u t , a b a sis f o r
p o litic a l ju d g m e n t th a t is n o t a petitio prin cipii.
T h e d ile m m a o f e m o t io n a l c o n s tr u c tio n is m m ig h t b e r e f o r m u la t e d in the
f o llo w in g m a n n e r : T h e W e s te r n e th n ic v ie w (in c lu d in g th a t o f e x p e r t so c ia l
s c ie n c e ) o f s ta te m e n t s a b o u t e m o t io n s is th at th e y a re d e s c r ip t iv e in c h a r a c te r or, in
J. L . A u s t in ’ s t e r m s , “ c o n s t a t iv e .” T h e s tr o n g c o n s t r u c t io n is t v ie w o f G r im a , L u tz ,
an d A b u - L u g h o d m ig h t b e se e n as an in sis te n c e th a t s ta te m e n t s a b o u t e m o t io n s are
“ p e r fo r m a t iv e ” in A u s t in ’ s s e n s e . J u s t as say in g “ I d o ” a t a w e d d in g is t o w e d , so to
say “ I am a n g r y ” is , in th e c o n s tr u c tio n is t v ie w , t o he a n g r y . T o p e r fo r m a n g e r,
s a d n e s s , fe ar, sh a m e , is to b e a n g r y , s a d , fe a r fu l, a s h a m e d . G r im a ( 1 9 9 2 : 7 ) , fo r
e x a m p le , d e fin e s e m o tio n a s a c o m b in a tio n o f b e h a v io r an d e x p e c t a t io n s , d e n y in g
th a t th e re is an y “ in n e r ” r e s id u u m on w h ic h th e y a re b a s e d . A b u - L u g h o d say s th a t it
is b e t t e r “t o e x a m in e d is c o u r s e s r a th e r th an th e ir p u ta tiv e r e f e r e n t s ” ( 1 9 9 0 : 2 8 ) .
I w o u ld a r g u e th a t b o th v ie w s a r e m is ta k e n an d th a t s ta te m e n t s a b o u t e m o t io n s are
n e ith e r d e s c r ip t iv e (c o n s ta tiv c ) n o r p e r fo r m a t iv e — th e y n e ith e r a d e q u a te ly r e p r e
se n t n o r c o n s t r u c t ( p e r f o r m ) e m o t io n s . A n e m o t io n s ta te m e n t is n o t , as A u stin
s u g g e s t e d , a “ m e r e r e p o r t ” ( 1 9 7 5 : 7 8 - 7 9 ) . It is an e f fo r t by th e s p e a k e r to o ffe r an
in te r p r e t a tio n o f s o m e th in g th a t is o b s e r v a b le t o n o o t h e r a c to r . S u c h an e ffo r t is
e s s e n tia l to s o c ia l life , an in e sc a p a b le fa c e t o f o n e ’ s id e n tity , o n e ’ s r e la tio n s h ip s ,
o n e ’ s p r o s p e c t s . A s s u c h , it h as a d ir e c t im p a c t o n th e fe e lin g s in q u e s t io n . If a sk e d
th e q u e s t io n “ D o y o u fe e l a n g r y ? ” a p e r s o n m ay g e n u in e ly fe e l more a n g ry in
a n s w e r in g y e s, less a n g r y in a n s w e r in g n o . A c o m m o n s tr a t e g y in p s y c h o lo g ic a l
s tu d ie s o f e m o t io n an d m o o d is to in d u c e e m o t io n s in s u b je c t s by h av in g th e m re a d
s ta te m e n t s su c h as “ I am jo y fu l” o r “ I am s a d .” S u c h r e a d in g e x e r c is e s d e p e n d a b ly
p r o d u c e e ffe c ts in th e s u b je c t s c o n s o n a n t w ith th e m o o d o r e m o t io n in v o k e d , a s d o
e x e r c is e s in w h ic h s u b je c t s a re in s t r u c t e d to a d o p t c e r t a in la c ia l e x p r e s s io n s (s e e ,
e .g ., R h o lc s , R is k in d , an d L a n e 1 9 8 7 a n d , l o r a g e n e r a l re v ie w o f su c h r e s e a r c h ,
L a ird 1 9 8 7 ; o n in d u c in g a ffe c t w ith la c ia l m o v e m e n t s , s e e E k m a n , L e v e n so n , an d
F r ie s e n 1 9 8 3 ). M a n y o t h e r e ffe c ts a r c p o s s ib le , in c lu d in g th e o p p o s it e : e x p r e s s in g a
fe e lin g can e a sily r e s u lt in its r a p id d is s ip a t io n . S ta b le p a tt e r n s o f su c h s t a t e m e n t s ,
r e p e a te d o v e r y e a r s , h av e v e r y p r o f o u n d , sh a p in g e ffe c ts on o n e ’ s w h o le e m o tio n a l
m akeup.
I p r o p o s e t o c all e m o t io n s ta te m e n t s su c h as th e s e , in w h ic h th e s t a t e m e n t ’ s
r e f e r e n t c h a n g e s b y v ir tu e o f th e s ta te m e n t , “ e m o t iv e s .” P e r fo r m a tiv e u t te r a n c e s ,
by th e w ay in w h ic h th e y r e f e r to t h e m s e lv e s , a c tu a lly d o th in g s t o th e w o r ld . In th e
s ta te m e n t “ I a c c e p t y o u r n o m in a t io n ,” th e v e rb “ a c c e p t ,” u se d in th is w a y , r e f e r s to
o r n a m e s th e s ta te m e n t in w h ic h it a p p e a r s , m a k in g th e s ta te m e n t an a c c e p t
a n c e . T h e a c c e p t a n c e , a s an a c t o f th e s p e a k e r, c h a n g e s th e wro r ld in a w ay th a t a
76 W I L L I A M M. R E D D Y
d e s c rip tiv e sta te m e n t c a n n o t, b e c a u se it m a k e s the sp e a k e r in to a n o m in e e . An

e m o tiv e u tte ra n c e , u n like a p e r fo r m a tiv e , is n o t s e lf- r e fe re n tia l. W h en so m e o n e
say s, “ 1 am a n g r y ,” th e a n g e r is n o t the u tte ra n c e — n o t in th e w ay th a t, in “ I a c c e p t ,”
“ a c c e p t” is the a c c e p ta n c e . An e m o tiv e sta te m e n t se e m s at first g la n c e to have a real
e x te r n a l r e fe r e n t, to b e d e s c rip tiv e o r c o n sta tiv c . O n c lo s e r in sp e c tio n , h ow ever,
o n e re c o g n iz e s th at th e “ e x te r n a l r e fe r e n t” th at an e m o tiv e a p p e a r s to p o in t at is n o t
p a ssiv e in th e fo rm u la tio n o f th e e m o tiv e , and it e m e r g e s fro m the a c t o f u tte r in g in
a ch a n ge d sta te . E m o tiv e s arc in flu e n ce d d irc c tly by an d a lte r w h at th ey “ r e fe r ” to.
T h u s , c m o tiv c s arc sim ila r to p e r fo r m a tiv e s (and d iffe r fro m c o n sta tiv c s) in that
e m o tiv e s d o th in gs to th e w o rld . E m o tiv e s are th e m se lv e s in stru m e n ts fo r d ire ctlv
c h a n g in g , b u ild in g , h id in g, in te n sify in g e m o tio n s . T h e re is an “ in n e r” d im e n sio n to
e m o tio n , b u t it is n e v e r m e re ly “ r e p r e s e n te d ” by s ta te m e n ts o r ac tio n s. It is the
n e c e ssa ry (re la tiv e ) failu re o f all e ffo r ts to r e p r e s e n t fe e lin g th at m a k e s fo r (a n d se ts
lim its o n ) o u r p la stic ity . M any w ay s o f e x p r e ss in g fe e lin g w o rk e q u a lly w ell
(p o o r ly ); all fail to so m e d e g r e e . It is h e r e , ra th e r than in so m e p u tativ e s e t o f
g e n e tic a lly p r o g r a m m e d “b a sic ” e m o tio n s , that a u n iv e rsa l c o n c e p tio n o f th e p e r
s o n , o n e w ith p o litic a l re le v a n c e , can b e fo u n d e d .
Emotivcs a n d p o ststru c tu ra lism
T h is c o n c e p t o f e m o tiv e s b u ild s on p o s ts tr u c tu r a lis t in sig h ts a b o u t lan g u ag e but

g o e s b e y o n d th em .
In the first p la c e , th e e x is te n c e o f e m o tio n s is n o t d e p e n d e n t u p o n th e a c c u ra c y
o f o n e o r m o r e W e ste rn n o tio n s o f in te n tio n a lity o r o f the p e r s o n , w h ich p o s t
str u c tu r a lis ts have w id ely an d v e ry su c c e ssfu lly a tta c k e d . T h e e x is te n c e o f e m o tio n s
is n o t d e p e n d e n t on the a c c u r a c y , e ith er, o f W e stern c o n c e p tio n s of w h at e m o tio n s
are . E th n o g ra p h ic re se a r c h has re p e a te d ly d e m o n stra te d the n a r ro w n e ss an d p a r
tiality of this fam ily o f W e stern c o n c e p tio n s , a n a r ro w n e ss and p a rtia lity c lo se ly
a sso c ia te d w ith th e n o tio n s o f in te n tio n th at p o s ts tr u c tu r a lis m re je c ts . B u t it has
a lso re p e a te d ly c o n firm e d the e x is te n c e o f le x ic o n s and p r a c tic e s sign ifican tly
sim ila r to th o se W e ste r n e rs a sso c ia te w ith e m o tio n s (s e e , e .g ., M a n so n , S h o re , and
B lo o m 1 9 8 5 , H e id e r 1 9 9 1 ). O n the b a sis o f this re s e a r c h , e m o tio n s c an n o t be
r e g a r d e d — as th ey have b een in the W est— as a re sid u a l, s o m a tic , an tiratio n al
d o m a in o f c o n sc io u s life w h o se tu rb u le n c e is a c o n sta n t th re a t to th e fo rm u la tio n o f
c le a r in te n tio n s. In ste ad , I a r g u e , th ey m u st b e r e g a r d e d as the v e ry lo c atio n o f the
c a p a c ity to e m b r a c e , re v ise , o r r c je c t c u ltu ra l o r d isc u rsiv e s tr u c tu r e s o f w h a te v e r
k in d .1
E m o tio n s arc the re a l w o rld - a n c h o r o f sig n s. To re sta te this in p o s ts tr u c tu r a lis t
t e r m s , th e re is a fe e lin g th at g o e s w ith e v e ry sig n ; e m o tio n g e n e r a te s parole ag ain st
the b a c k d ro p o f lartgue. P h ilo so p h e rs an d r e s e a r c h e r s have n o t b e e n ab le to find
la n g u a g e ’ s an c h o r in th e w o rld w h en r e g a r d in g sign s o r lan g u ag e as r e fe r r in g o r
p o in tin g to a w o rld an d have w ro n g ly c o n c lu d e d that sig n s an d lan g u ag e m u st
th e re fo r e float fre e o f any p o ssib le w o rld . B ut th e w o rld they b e lo n g to is the w o rld
in w h ich fe e lin g s o c c u r, in w h ich u tte ra n c e s and te x ts g ro w d ire c tly o u t o f fe elin g s.
O n e d o e s n o t n e e d a q u e stio n a b le W e ste rn -sty le su b je c t to p r o v id e the link
b e tw e e n th e m .
AG A I N S T C0 NSTRUCTI 0 NISM 7 7
An em otive utteran ce is not self-referen tial like a perform ative but claim s by
definition to refer to som eth in g close to its o rigin , to its ow n w orld-anchor. Why
d oes this kind o f referen ce not fail, just as all other kinds o f referen ce to a “w orld ”
that is not alreadyJ signs
O
fail? T h e answ er is that it d oes lail. The em otive effect
derives from the failure. If the em otiv e did not fail, it w ould be a “ m ere r e p o r t,” an
accurate rep resentation . A statem en t about how one feels is always a failure to one
degree o r anoth er; like a p erform ative it is n either true n or false. E m otives c o n sti
tute a kind o f pledge that alters, a kind o f getting-through o f som eth in g nonverbal
into the verbal dom ain that could never be called an equivalence or a re p re se n ta
tion. The very failure o f representation is recogn ized and b rin gs an em otional
respo nse itself; this respo n se is p art o f the em otive effect. This is true w hether
o n e ’s “ in ten tion ” is to speak the “tru th ” ab out o n e ’s feelings o r n ot. This p ro b
lem atic link betw een em otive and em otio n , this dilem m a, is o u r activity as a
perso n . O n e m ight say that, ju st as a p erform ative can be happy o r unhappy, an
em otive brin gs em otional effects ap pro priate to its con ten t or effects that differ
m arkedly from its conten t. If it d o c s brin g ap p ro p riate cffccts, then the em otiv e, in
a W estern c o n te x t, m ight be said to be “sin ccrc” ; if it d o c s n ot, the em otive may be
claim ed, after the fact, to be h ypocrisy, an evasion, a m istake, a p rojection , o r a
denial. But all o f these ch aracterization s— including the notion o f sincerity— are
p rob lem atic, them selves fo rm s o f failed referen ce. [. . .]
Emotivcs, repression, and cultural styles
The con cept o f em otives can draw su p p o rt from recen t reform u latio n s o f the
notion o f rep ression . T h e question w hether rep ression really occu rs has inspired
debate am on g p sy ch o lo gists lo r decades. T h ere has been a recen t convergence
am ong contending view s, however, that offers su p p o rt for a reform u lated view of
rep ression con sisten t with the con cept of em otiv cs being elab orated h ere. . . .
In a rcccn t review , D avid S. H o lm es (1 9 9 0 ) argu es that there is no laboratory
evidence to su p p o rt the cxistcn cc of rep ressio n , despite sustained efforts over the
past 60 years to find em pirical p r o o f of its operation . H o lm es n otes that p sy ch o
therapists view ing v id eotap es o f therapy sessions often disagree as to w hen re p re s
sion is occu rrin g or how its operation is effectu ated. H o lm es con cedes w illingly that
laboratory research has yielded abundant evidence o f “selectivity in percep tion and
recall” (p. 9 7) and readily accepts the existen ce o f “d e n ial,” a related p ro cess which
he defines as a con scious decision to ign ore and fo rg et (p. 8 6 ). T h ese con cessions
are substantial. It is only because rep ression is deem ed to be an unconscious
m echanism that laboratory studies have failed to turn up conclusive evidence o f
it. M atthew Erdelvi (1 9 9 0 ), however, argues that there is no bar in psychoanalytic
theory to view ing rep ression as resultin g from a conscious decision to forget.
M em ory research — H o lm es and Erdelyi ag re e — has identified an array o f m ech an
ism s available for use in con scious su pp ression o f unpleasant thoughts o r feelings or
m e m o rie s. Such con scious su p p ression — any act o f con scious “d en ial,” in H o lm e s’ s
sense— may th erefore, in E rdely i’s view, be con sidered an instance o f “re p re ssio n .”
(N o r is there, he rem ark s, any reason that a p erso n cannot, in a second stage,
consciously decide to forget having consciously decided to forget som eth in g.) “ If
78 WILLIAM M . REDDY
r e p r e s s i o n ( d e f e n s iv e o r o t h e r w i s e ) can b e c o n s c i o u s , th e n s u d d e n l y it b e c o m e s an
o b v io u s and ub iq u itou s d e v ic e ” (E rd ely i 1 9 9 0 :1 4 ) . . . .
B v s o m e m o d e l s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , s u c h as D e n n e t t ’ s ( 1 9 9 1 ) “ m u l t ip l e d r a f t s ”
m o d e l , th e d is t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n c o n s c i o u s a n d u n c o n s c i o u s is n e v e r a s h a r p o n e in
any c a s e . A n y r e p o r t a p e r s o n m ig h t m a k e a b o u t an in n e r s ta te is, b y s u c h a m o d e l ,
o n ly o n e o f a n u m b e r o f i n c o m p l e t e “ d r a f t s ” that c o n t e n d f o r fo c u s . T h e a r g u m e n t
h e r e is th at e x p l i c i t e m o t i v e s t a t e m e n t s s u c h as “ I a m n o t a n g r y ” a re i n s t a n c e s o f
s u c h d r a f t s . F e e lin g s in v o lv e , a t o n c e , a c ti o n o r i e n t a t i o n s a n d th e u n f o r m u l a t c d
“ t h i c k ” th in k in g th a t b o n d s c o n t e n d i n g d r a f t s t o g e t h e r . T h e y a r c s u m m a t i o n s t a t e s , a
b a c k g r o u n d a g a in s t w h ic h fo ca l d is c u r s i v e s t r u c t u r e s e m e r g e .
T o c h a r a c t e r i z e s u c h s u m m a t i o n s t a te s is e x t r e m e l y d iffic u lt; in g e n e r a l a c t o r s
a r e c o m p e l l e d to fall b a c k o n c o n v e n t io n a l e x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t a p p r o p r i a t e e m o
t io n s . In a d d i t i o n , th e r e is s o m u c h at s ta k e in vital r e la t io n s h ip s th at e m o t i v e s o fte n
have the s ta tu s o f c o n t r a c t u a l c o m m i t m e n t s . (“ I fe e l like g o i n g to a m o v i e . ” “ H e
f r ig h t e n s m e . ” ) T h e s e e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d c o m m i t m e n t s d o n o t in v o lv e m e r e “ d is p la y
r u l e s , ” as E k m a n ( 1 9 8 0 , 1 9 8 2 ) a n d o t h e r s c o n t e n d , b u t n e i t h e r d o th e y “ c r e a t e ”
e m o t i o n s o u t o f w h o l e c lo t h as th e s t r o n g c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t s w o u l d h ave it. . . .
T h e in a d e q u a c y o f c o n v e n t io n a l e m o t i v e s t o c h a r a c t e r i z e th e c o m p l e x s u m m a
ti o n s t a t e s th e y “ d e s c r i b e ” c a n b e c o v e r e d ov er, to s o m e e x t e n t , b y th e e ffe c ts o f
h a b itu a l r e p e t i t i o n . Isen a n d D i a m o n d ( 1 9 8 9 : 1 4 4 ) , in a r e v ie w o f r e s e a r c h in t o
a ffe c t as an a u t o m a t i c p r o c e s s , a r r i v e a t a te llin g c o n c l u s i o n that is w o r t h q u o t i n g a t
le n g th :
T o th e e x t e n t that a ffe c t can have an in flu e n c e a u t o m a t i c a l l y — w it h o u t

a t t e n t i o n o r i n t e n t io n a n d s e e m i n g l y ir r e s i s t ib ly — it ca n b e u n d e r s t o o d
as a d e e p l y in g r a i n e d , o v e r l e a r n e d h a b it , o r a s a p r o c e s s o f c h u n k in g a n d
o r g a n iz in g the s itu a t io n . . . .
W e a r c r e m i n d e d o f th e w a y in w h ic h little b o y s have o f t e n b e e n
tau gh t to keep fro m cryin g by su b stitu tin g a n g e r fo r sad n ess: “ W h en
so m eth in g bad h appen s d o n ’t g e t sad , g e t m a d .” T h u s, p e o p le m ay be
a b le to r e g u l a t e th e ir f e e l in g s , t h r o u g h th e ir f o c u s a n d t h r o u g h c h a n g i n g
w h a t th e y l e a r n in g iv e n s itu a t io n s . . . . In th is w a y , p r o b l e m e m o t i o n s ,
e v e n th o u g h th e y fe el a u t o m a t i c an d u n c o n t r o l l a b l e , m a y b e a lt e r a b l e .
T h i s d o c s n o t m e a n th at u n w a n t e d a ffe c tiv e r e a c t i o n s w ill b e e a s y to
c h a n g e (o ld h a b it s d ie h a r d ) , b u t it d o c s s u g g e s t th at c h a n g e m a y b e
p o s s i b l e an d th a t th e v e r y s e n s e o f in e v ita b ilit y m a y b e m is le a d in g .
T h u s , t h e r e is g o o d r e a s o n to a t t r i b u t e e x t e n s i v e p o w e r to th e c o n v e n t io n a l
e m o t i v e s a u t h o r i z e d in a g iv e n c o m m u n i t y t o s h a p e m e m b e r s ’ s e n s e o f id e n tity a n d
s e l f - a w a r e n e s s , m e m b e r s ’ m a n n e r o f c o n f r o n t i n g c o n t i n g e n c i e s a n d r o u t in e . B u t
p o w e r to s h a p e is a v e r y d if fe r e n t m a t t e r f r o m th e c a p a c it y t o c r e a t e fr o m n oth in g.
T h e n a t u r e o f th e r e s i d u u m th at is n o t s a t is fa c t o r ily s h a p e d is an a l l - i m p o r t a n t
q u e stio n for un d erstan d in g w h a t is u n iv e r s a lly h u m a n and fo r u n d erstan d in g
th e p o l it ic s o f th at s h a p in g p o w e r . In any g iv e n field c o n t e x t , o n e w o u l d e x p e c t
to find a w i d e r a n g e o f d e v ia t i o n s , r e s i s t a n c e s , a n d a lt e r n a t iv e i d i o m s th a t p o i n t to
p o s s ib i li t ie s f o r c h a n g e t h r o u g h c r is is , d i s s o l u t i o n , o r a d a p t a t io n a n d th a t o f fe r
g r o u n d s f o r d r a w i n g c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t w h o h as p o w e r a n d w h o d o e s n o t .
AG A I N S T C 0 N S T R U C T I 0 N I S M 7 9
W h e r e e m o t iv e s h ave th e ir g r e a t e s t e ffe c ts an d a re s u b je c t to th e ir g r e a t e s t
fa ilu re s is in s itu a tio n s o f w h a t I w ill c a ll in te n s e a m b iv a le n c e . C u lt u r a l o r c o n
v e n tio n a l a c tio n p a tt e r n s o fte n c o m e in to play b o th in p r o d u c in g su c h s itu a tio n s an d
in h e lp in g a c t o r s n a v ig a te th e m . It is e s p e c ia lly b e c a u s e c o m m u n ity c o n v e n tio n s
r e c o m m e n d th e u s e o l e m o t iv e s to m a n a g e in te n s e a m b iv a le n c e th a t c o m m u n it ie s
m a yJ b e said to h ave e m o t io n a l s tv
J
le s o r to n e s .
To illu s tr a te , I w ill d r a w s o m e e x a m p le s fr o m G r im a ’ s ( 1 9 9 2 ) v iv id e th n o
g r a p h ic re v ie w o f P a x tu n e m o t io n a l c o n v e n tio n s . P a x tu n c o n v e n tio n d ic ta te s
a r r a n g e d m a r r ia g e s in w h ic h b r id e - p r ic e s can b e q u ite sig n ific a n t. A r e c e n tly w e d
w o m a n is c o n fin e d to th e h o m e , fo r c e d to c a r r y m o r e than h e r sh a re o f th e
h o u s e w o r k , an d r e q u ir e d to s u b m it to th e a u th o r ity an d u n d e r g o th e m is tr e a tm e n t
o f h e r h u s b a n d ’ s m o t h e r an d s is t e r s as w ell as an y s e n io r w iv e s p r e s e n t . M a r r ia g e
is t h e r e fo r e c o n v e n tio n a lly th e fir s t g r e a t s a d n e s s , o r gh am , in a w o m a n ’ s life . T h e
in te n sity o f a w o m a n ’s s u ffe r in g , th r o u g h th is an d o t h e r gh am e x p e r ie n c e s , as she
u n flin c h in g ly s u b m its t o th e r e q u ir e m e n t s o f h e r fam ily is h e r p r in c ip a l s o u r c e o f
h o n o r. A s a r e s u lt , th e b r id e , d r e s s e d in h e r b e s t an d d e c k e d o u t in je w e lr y an d
o th e r a d o r n m e n t s , is s u p p o s e d to a d o p t a d o w n c a s t e x p r e s s io n , t e a r f u l, q u ie t ; she
ta k e s n o p a r t in th e c e le b r a t io n s o f th e m a r r ia g e cerem o n y . H e r c re s tfa lle n
d e m e a n o r is said to b e “ b e a u t if u l.” B u t d o e s c u ltu r e c r e a te th e gham o f th e b r id e ?
S t r u c t u r a lly , th e tr a n s itio n s e e m s lik e ly t o b e e x p e r ie n c e d as b o th a s e v e r e lo s s ( o f
fa m ilia r p e r s o n s an d p la c e s , th e o n ly o n e s k n o w n sin c e b ir th ) an d a d r o p in s ta tu s
(fr o m d a u g h te r t o in - m a r r y in g b r id e , lo w e st in th e n e w h o u s e h o ld ’ s p e c k in g
o r d e r ) . W h a t th e e m o t io n a l c o n v e n tio n s o f th e w e d d in g c e r e m o n y d o is g iv e sh a p e
to th e lik ely e m o t io n s o f th e b r id e , ra th e r th an c r e a te th e m . T h e y d o so in a m a n n e r
th at a llo w s f o r a h ig h ly r e s t r a in e d d isp la y o f o p p o s itio n . B o th the r e s t r a in t an d the
d isp la y a c c r u e to th e b r i d e ’ s c r e d it , b e c a u s e th ey s u g g e s t th at sh e is m a s t e r in g
in te n s e n e g a tiv e fe e lin g s in o r d e r to re m a in o b e d ie n t to h e r m a le e ld e r s an d
a c q u ie s c e in th e m a r r ia g e . T h is is a c o n v e n tio n fo r m a n a g in g in te n s e a m b iv a le n c e
(th e d e s ir e to o b e y v e r s u s the d e s ir e n o t to m a r r y ) , a im in g at th e r e p r e s s iv e
tr a n s fo r m a tio n o f r e b e llio u s n e s s in to gh am .
C h a r a c te r is t ic o f P a x tu n w o m e n ’ s c o n v e n tio n a l e m o t io n a l sty le is th a t th ey
c a n n o t e x p r e s s an in te n s e e m o t io n o r in c lin a tio n p u b lic ly , e x c e p t in th e fo r m of
gh am . To d isp la y in fa tu a tio n w ith a sin g le y o u n g m a n is f o r b id d e n , b u t lo s s o f th at
m a n r e s u lt in g fro m a r r a n g e d m a r r ia g e t o a n o th e r t r a n s f o r m s th e in fa tu a tio n in to a
s o u r c e o f su ffe rin g . T h e s u ffe r in g n o t o n ly m ay b e e x p r e s s e d b u t , if e x p r e s s e d in
a r e s t r a in e d m a n n e r a s sile n t s o r r o w , is re w a r d e d w ith a d m ir a tio n an d r e s p e c t . To
d isp la y in te n se p r id e in a s o n ’ s e n e r g ie s , sk ills , an d a c c o m p lis h m e n ts r u n s th e risk
o f in su ltin g lis te n e r s . B u t i f th a t so n is h u r t in an a c c id e n t, fa lls ill, o r d ie s , th e
e x p r e s s io n o f gh am m a y b e in d u lg e d in — in d e e d it is r e q u ir e d th a t a m o t h e r e x p r e s s
e x t r e m e ly in te n se g r i e f , w ith o u t r e s t r a in t , in su c h situ a tio n s . T h e in te n sity o f g r i e f
is o fte n d isp la y e d by m o m e n t a r y la p se s in m o d e s t y : ru sh in g o u t o f th e h o u se
w ith o u t a v e il, s e e k in g h e lp fro m s tr a n g e m e n to g e t t o a h o s p ita l, b u r s t in g in to
t e a r s w h e n sp e a k in g . [. . .]
W h e n v ie w e d a s e m o t iv c s , e x p r e s s io n s o f s u ffe r in g by P a x tu n w o m e n f r e
q u e n tly d o le a d to e x t r e m e intensification (b u t, I w o u ld a r g u e , n o t c r e a tio n ) o f g r i e f
an d so r r o w . T h e w h o le p a tte r n o f r e s t r ic tio n s o f fe m a le b e h a v io r — in v o lv in g low
e s tim a tio n o f fe m a le c a p a c ity , fe a r o f th e ir m is b e h a v io r , s u b m iss io n o f w o m e n to
m a l e a u t h o r i t y — r e p r e s e n t s an i n d e p e n d e n t s o u r c e o f s o r r o w . T h e d e a th o f a s o n is
r e a s o n e n o u g h t o g r i e v e in m a n y s o c i e t i e s . B u t w h e n th at s o n w a s b o r n in a
m a r r i a g e n o t d e s i r e d ( w h i c h is th e normative c a s e in th is s o c i e t y ) a n d r a is e d th r o u g h
s e l f- d is c i p lin e , s e l f - a b n e g a t i o n , a n d s u b m i s s i o n t o fa m ily a u t h o r it y a n d th e n e e d s o f
m a l e h o n o r ( t h e s e a r c th e local w a y s o f ta lk in g a b o u t w o m e n ’ s d u t y ) , th e w o m a n ’ s
e x t r e m e a m b i v a l e n c e a b o u t h e r life o f p e r s o n a l lo s s e s m a y o f f e r d e e p e r r e a s o n s to
g r i e v e o v e r th e l o s s o f a s o n . . . . H e n c e th e w h o l e p a t t e r n o f e m o t i v e s d i s c u s s e d by
G r i m a s p e a k s o f e m o t i o n s managed n o t c r e a t e d . G r i m a h e r s e l f s p e a k s f r e q u e n t ly o f
e m o t i o n a l c o n t r o l r a t h e r than c o n s t r u c t i o n ( e . g . , p p . 8 9 , 1 4 1 , 1 6 3 ) . J u s t a s c o n
v e n tio n lays d o w n a h o s t o f r e s t r i c t i o n s on f e m a l e b e h a v i o r a n d c h o i c e (w h ich a rc
u n d e r s t o o d lo ca lly as h a r s h ) , s o c o n v e n t io n lays d o w n a s ty le f o r r e p r e s s i n g s o m e
f e e lin g s an d in t e n s ify in g an d p u b lic ly e x p r e s s i n g o t h e r s . . . .
T h e im p l ic a t i o n h e r e is n o t th a t c e r t a in f e e lin g s s u c h as g r i e f at d e ath a re
“ n a t u r a l ” o r u n i v e r s a l. S it u a t io n s o f in t e n s e a m b i v a l e n c e a re likely in m o s t so c ia l
o r d e r s b e c a u s e th e y a r r a n g e f o r a n d e n c o u r a g e e m o t i o n a l a t t a c h m e n t s o r h o p e s th a t
in e v ita b ly c o m e in to c o n flic t. A y o u n g P a x t u n w o m a n is e n c o u r a g e d by in s titu t io n a l
a r r a n g e m e n t s th a t o f f e r b o t h r e w a r d s a n d p e n a l t i e s to d e v e l o p a d e e p a t t a c h m e n t to
h e r m o t h e r . A t th e s a m e t i m e , m a r r i a g e is an e s s e n t ia l e l e m e n t o f th e n o r m a t i v e life
c y c le . T h u s a w e d d i n g is h igh ly lik e ly to g e n e r a t e in t e n s e a m b i v a l e n c e in a b r i d e .
I n t e n s e a m b i v a l e n c e ca n b e a n o d a l p o i n t o f in sta b ility in a n o r m a t i v e e m o t i o n a l
s ty le . By a ll o w in g w o m e n full e x p r e s s i o n o f sorrow * ( b u t n o t o t h e r f e e l i n g s ) a n d
b y t r e a t in g s o r r o w as a s o u r c e o f h o n o r f o r w o m e n , P a x t u n c o n v e n t io n t r i e s to tip
th e b a la n c e o f a m b i v a l e n c e t o w a r d g r i e f . T h i s is n o t c u lt u r e c r e a t in g g r i e f b u t
c o n v e n t io n p r o m o t i n g c e r t a in e m o t i v e s o v e r o t h e r s b e c a u s e , o v e r t i m e , t h e s e e m o
tiv e s s t r o n g ly in flu e n c e in d iv id u a l e m o t i o n in a m a n n e r th at a ll o w s f o r a c e r t a in
s ta b ility a n d i d e o l o g i c a l c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y in a c o m m u n i t y ’ s life.
T h e v a r ia tio n o f in d iv id u a l r e s p o n s e s ( s o m e fittin g e x p e c t a t i o n s w e l l , s o m e
g o i n g all th e w ay to c o m p l e t e d e v i a n c e ) p r o v i d e s an initial r e s e r v o i r o f p o s s ib i li t ie s
f o r c h a n g e , s o m e t h i n g th at c a n b e d r a w n u p o n w h e n i d e o l o g i c a l , e c o n o m i c , o r
p o lit ic a l f a c t o r s p u t p r e s s u r e o n th e s y s t e m (a s is, i n d e e d , h a p p e n i n g in th e l a r g e r
t o w n s o f the r e g i o n G r i m a s t u d i e d ) . T h o s e w h o fe e l m o r e f r u s t r a t e d o r e x c l u d e d
can m o r e re a d ily a d o p t n e w n o r m s th a t a r c c o n t e n d i n g f o r d o m i n a t i o n . A n i m p o r
ta n t q u e s t i o n f o r c o m p a r a t i v e a n aly sis w o u l d b e w h e t h e r c e r t a in e m o t i v e s t y l e s f o r c e
g r e a t e r n u m b e r s in to e m o t i o n a l d e v ia n c e than o t h e r s .
If w e c o n c e i v e o f c o m m u n i t y c o n v e n t i o n s a s s tip u la t i n g s ty le s o f e m o t i o n a l
c o n t r o l th a t e x p l o i t th e c a p a c it y o f e m o t i v e s to s h a p e e m o t i o n s , th e n p o w e r ,
p o l i t i c s , a n d l ib e r a t io n r e g a in th e ir m e a n in g . E m o t i o n a l c o n t r o l is th e re a l site o f th e
e x e r c i s e o f p o w e r : p o l it ic s is j u s t a p r o c e s s o f d e t e r m i n i n g w h o m u s t r e p r e s s as
il l e g i t i m a t e , w h o m u s t f o r e g r o u n d a s v a lu a b le , th e f e e l in g s a n d d e s i r e s th a t c o m e u p
f o r t h e m in g iv e n c o n t e x t s a n d r e la tio n s h ip s . [. . .]
N o te
1 T h is a ss e r t io n d e p e n d s on a b r o a d d efin ition o f e m o t i o n that c a n n o t b e fully

e x p l o r e d h ere b u t that d r a w s on the v ie w s o f p s y c h o lo g is ts su ch as L a ird ( 1 9 8 7 ) ,
O a tle y ( 1 9 9 2 ) , an d A verill ( 1 9 9 4 ) , w'ho r e g a r d e m o t i o n s as a f o r m o f, o r a sp e cts
AG A I N S T C 0 N ST R U CTI 0 N I S M 8 1
o f, th o u g h t o r c o g n itio n , and o f p h ilo so p h e rs su ch as S o lo m o n (1 9 8 4 , 1 9 9 2 ), D c

S o u sa ( 1 9 8 7 ) , and G re e n sp a n ( 1 9 8 8 ) , w h o a r g u e that e m o tio n re p re s e n ts a fo rm
o f ju d g m e n t th at can n o t b e re ad ily d istin g u ish e d fro m th o u g h t o r ra tio n a lity .
R eferen ces
A B U -L U G H O D , LILA . 1986. Veiled sentiments: Honor and poetry in a Bedouin society.

B e rk e le yJ : U n iv e rsity
J
o f C a lifo rn ia P re ss.
—. 1 9 9 0 . “ Sh ittin g p o litic s in B e d o u in love p o e t r y ,” in Language and the politics
o f emotion. E d ite d by C ath e rin e A . L u tz an d L ila A b u -L u g h o d , pp. 2 4 4 5 .
C a m b r id g e : C a m b r id g e U n iv e rsity P r e s s / P a r is : E d itio n s d e la M aiso n des
S c ie n c e s d e 1‘ H o m m e .
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— . 1984. “Toward an anthropology o f se lf and feelin g,” in Culture theory: Essays

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s o l o m o n , r o b k r t c. 1984. “G etting angry: T h e Jam esian theory o f em otion in an thro
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and R. LeV ine, pp. 2 3 8 —54. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press.
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m . 1990a. “M oral discou rse and the rh eto ric o f em o tio n s,” in
w h ite , G e o ffre y
Language and the politics o f emotion. Edited by C atherine A. Lutz and Lila
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Editions dc la M aison des Sciences dc l ’ H om m e.
— . 1990h. “ Em otion talk and social infcrcncc: D isentangling in Santa Isabel,
Solom on Islands,” in Disentangling: Conflict discourse in Pacific societies. Edited
by Karen Ann W atson -G egeo and G eoffrey M . W hite, pp. 53—121. Stanford:
Stanford U niversity Press.
Chapter 7
Michael E. Harkin
F E E L I N G A N D T H I N K I N G IN M E M O R Y
AND FORGETTING
T o w a rd an e th n o h is to ry o f th e e m o tio n s
[■ ■ ■]
E
THNOHISTORIANS SUCH AS R A Y M O N D FOGELSON have
lon g b een sen sitiv e to the p ro b lem ol e m o tio n . F o r F o g e lso n , eth n oh istory has
b e en , at least in p a rt, a tvpe o l em p ath y , in w hich w e can h ope to u n d e rstan d o u r
su b je c t only it w e e x e rc ise o u r lull hum an facu lties and n ot sim ply o u r analytic
on es. H is p resid en tial ad d re ss on the cth n o h isto ry o f “ n o n -ev en ts” m ad e the origin al
o b se rv a tio n that so m e even ts d isap p e ar from c o n sc io u sn e ss b e ca u se they arc to o
trau m atic to b e re m e m b e re d (F o gc lso n 1 9 8 9 : 1 4 3 ). . . . W e m igh t also take n ote o f
R o b e rt L e v y ’ s n otio n o f “h y p o c o g n itio n ,” in w hich cc rtain e m o tio n a l c x p c r ic n c c s
m ay n o t find e x p re ssio n sincc they lack an ap p ro p ria te cogn itiv e stru c tu ratio n in the
e u ltu re that w ould allow th em to b e co m e the su b jc ct o f d isc o u rse . In such e ases,
“th eir u n articu la tc d , un -n am ab lc, and ch ao tic q u a litie s” m ake them d istu rb in g and
d a n g e ro u s an d, I w ould arg u e , p o ten tially creative fo rc e s, in revitalization m o v e
m e n ts, for e x am p le (L evy 1 9 8 4 : 2 2 8 ). T h ese in sights re p re se n t an im p o rta n t c o n
trib u tio n to o u r m e th o d o lo g y . T h e aptly n am ed “trail o f te a r s ” o f the C h e ro k ee ,
w hich p ro v id e s F o g c lso n ’ s key e x a m p le o f a re p re sse d even t, g iv e s us a clue as to
the im p o rta n ce o f e m o tio n in the re p re se n tatio n o f h isto ry . If w e naively assu m e
that oral h istory can give us p riv ile g ed ac c css to the en tire ran ge o f a c u ltu re ’ s p a st,
w e risk p ro d u cin g in co m p le te e th n o h isto rie s, n ot m erely b e ca u se w e m ay om it
c e rtain even ts but also b e ca u se w e fail to take into ac co u n t the c o m p le x relation
that p e rta in s b e tw e en a c o n te m p o ra ry co m m u n ity and its p ast. T h at this re la tio n
ship is an e m o tio n a l on e is c c rta in ; how to g o ab ou t takin g th ese e m o tio n s into
acco u n t is still largely an open q u e stio n .
. . . Thom as Buckley (1 9 9 6 ) has n o ted how A lfred L. K ro c b c r avoided the
study o f C alifo rn ia e th n oh istory b e cau se il w as m erely the “ little h istory o f pitiful
e v e n ts.” M o re g e n e rally , an th ro p o lo gy has ten d e d to c o n stru c t the relatio n betw een
FE E L I NG AND THINKI NG IN M E M O R Y AND FORGETTING 8 5
culture and personality heavily in favor o f the form er, thus distinguishing itse lf from
psych ology, w hich it (rightly) criticized fo r excessive m eth od o logical individualism .
And yet the so rt o f culture and personality studies produced by Ruth B en edict,
M argaret M ead, G eoffrey G orer, and oth ers in m idcen tury virtually ignored the
individual along with the question o f em otio n s in favor o f the broad b rush strokes
o f configurationism and culture at a distance. Edw ard S a p ir’ s attem p t to introduce
a m ore ro bu st con cept o f the individual psyche failed to survive his death (D arn ell
1986). [. . . ]
Emotions and culture dissolution
From a m eth odo logical p ersp ectiv e, we m u st ask ourselv es w hat ro le the em otions
can possibly play in our in terp retation s o f cultu res that w ere destroyed or radically
altered in the afterm ath o f con tact w ith E uroam erican s. Lacking detailed eth
n ographies and linguistic d ocum en tation , we have no possible way o f know ing what
schem ata o f em otio n s may have existed in extin ct cultu res and languages o r what
the co n sequ en ces for h istorical events may have been . As Richard and N ora D auen-
hauer (1 9 9 5 ) have rem ark ed , the loss o f a language is a cultural death, and m em b ers
o f the ethnic gro u p go through predictable K iibler-R ossian stages o f reaction. W hile
the universality o f the phases o f death as outlined by Elisabeth K u b ler-R oss is
debatable, and their applicability to stages o f cthnocide un certain , we m ust turn to
som e psychodynam ic m odel to un derstan d this process.
N ow it is perhaps tim e to listen to the psychoanalytical an th ropo lo gists while
retaining skepticism about the overarching Freudian p ro ject. A great advantage o f a
psychoanalytic persp ective is that it assum es that the basic m echanism s hum ans
em ploy to deal with trau m a are sim ilar cross-cultu rally. T h us their m ean ings, while
ro oted in culturally specific idiom s, transcend that co n te xt and are available to all
w ho w ould read them carefully. E th n opsy ch ologists, on the oth er hand, often seem
to assum e that the hum an psyche is a tabula rasa and capable o f alm ost infinite
variation, despite the fact that their ow n resu lts su gg est a fairly m o d e st variation ol
em otion catego ries across cultu res. That the H ciltsuk schem a o f h il’ala is quite
sim ilar to the Ifaluk song o r the Flathead anger con ccp t is not su rp risin g, n or is
the fact that all three arc im m ediately rccogn izab lc to A m erican s, w ho p ossess a
som ew hat different m od el o f anger (L utz 1 9 8 8 ; O ’ N eil 1996).
It seem s that in ex tre m e circum stan ces the actions o f p erso n s to e x p re ss g rief,
w hile fam ously irrational, are the m o st tran sparen t to outside in terp retation . The
Sioux G h ost D ance o f 1892 is a case wrhere g r ie f and distress at the destru ction o f
the buffalo and the loss o f land, p e o p le, and freedom to live as they had in the past
p ro m p ted the Sioux to ad dress these trau m as ritually (D cM allic 1984: 2 5 6 —82 ;
M ooney 1965 [1 8 9 6 ]). Anthony W allace (1 9 7 0 ), the g re atest theoretician o f
religiou s respo nses to cultural disru p tion , ad dressed a sim ilar chain o f events
am ong the nineteenth century Seneca from a psychoanalytic p ersp ective. Ilis p a r
ticular con tribution wras linking stress — seen on the levels o f individual, g ro u p , and
ecosystem — and ritual (W allace 1956).
R esp o n ses to cultural dissolution arc h olistic, totalizing ph enom ena. The
H an dsom e Lake m ovem en t am on g the Seneca involved all asp ects o f Seneca culture
8 6 M I C H A E L E. HAR KI N
and its relation to the physical and social en v iro n m en t and w as fo cu sed equally
on the in dividual and on cu ltu ral p ractic e s. In d eed , such m o v e m e n ts establish a
m ic ro -m a c ro c o sm relation m o re exp licitly than m o st relig io n s and atte m p t to affect
the con d ition o f the u n iv erse by localized actio n s. In these p o in ts, W allace e x te n d s
and sh arp en s the eth n o -h isto rian ’ s u n d e rstan d in g o f cu ltu ral re actio n s to e x tre m e
stre ss. T h e p ro b lem w ith W allace’ s m o d e l is eviden t in the n am e usually attach ed to
such p h e n o m e n a: “revitalization m o v e m e n ts.” T h is p la c c s, a p r io ri, en tirely to o
o p tim istic a re ad in g on ev e n ts, su g g e stin g a n e ccssa ry tra je c to r y , even a te le o lo g y ,
in w hich the cu ltu re w ill e m e rg e “re v ita liz e d .” O f c o u r se , w e all kn ow o f cases
w h ere th ese have n o t b een su c c e ssfu l, and W allace did to o , fo r he w ro te an in tro
ductio n to a m o d e rn edition o f Ja m e s M o o n e y ’ s Ghost Dance (W allacc 1 9 6 5 ). H o w
ever, on this view , w e can only se e such even ts as tragically b lo c k e d revitalization s.
T h is ign o re s the m o re likely in te rp re tatio n that such m o v e m e n ts w'ere n ot
p ro p e rly ab o u t “rev italiza tio n ,” that they wrere ce n te re d n ot on the life driv e b u t the
death d riv e, n o t eros b u t, rath er, thanatos, in F reu dian te r m s. In the G h o st D an ces
g e n e rally , d e sp ite the w'idc variation in v e rsio n s, the e m p h asis on death and the
d e ad , and the se lf-d e stru c tiv e e le m e n ts o f ritu al p rac tic c , give us stro n g c lu cs that
it wras n o t so m eth in g p ro p e rly te r m e d a “revitalization m o v e m e n t.” N o r w-ere
they cu ltu ral “p a llia tio n ,” to borrow ' the D au e n h a u e rs’ su gg estiv e te r m . In stead ,
they w ere , fo r the m o st p a rt, ritu al e n ac tm e n ts o f c u ltu ral d isso lu tio n and death .
In so m e case s,’ such as the on e I e x am in e below ,1 thev
J
to o k on alm o st the ch aracter
o f ab rcactive u tte ran ces.
I w ill look at the G h ost D an ce as it ap p e are d in so u th w e ste rn O re g o n in the
1 8 7 0 s, w h ere it w as know n as the “ W arm H o u se ” cult (D u B o is 1 9 3 9 ). It w as
o rigin ally e x p o r te d from C alifo rn ia by Indians fro m the Sa cram e n to R iv er area. By
the 1 8 7 0 s, the situ ation in n o rth ern C alifo rn ia and so u th ern O re g o n w as even
W'orse, from the Indian p e rsp e ctiv e , than that on the Plains. In C a lilo rn ia , Indians
w ere b e in g hun ted dow n w ith the co m p lic ity and su p p o rt o f the state g o v e rn m e n t.
In the b o rd e rla n d s, in a sh o rt span o l v c a rs, the M o d o c had b een placcd on a
m u ltieth n ic re se rv a tio n , d e fe ate d in an all-o u t w ar, and e x ile d to Indian T e rrito ry
(N ash 1955 [1 9 3 7 ]). In O r e g o n , after the fe d e ral tre atie s of 1853 and 1 8 5 5 , w hich
c o n clu d cd the R o g u e R iv er W ars, a d isp arate a sso r tm e n t o f g ro u p s from the
P lateau w-crc g ro u p e d w ith several coastal g r o u p s, in clu din g the C o o s , A lsca, Silctz,
Siuslaw', T illa m o o k , L o w er U m p q u a , and T u tun i, at the G ran d R o n d c and Silctz
R e serv atio n s on the co a st (B eck h am 1 9 9 0 : 182 3; Ja c o b s n .d .) . T h e co n d itio n s in
these tw o re se rv atio n s w ere h arsh ; d u rin g 1857 8, 205 p e rso n s died o f d isease and
starv atio n at Siletz alo n e (B eck h am 1 9 9 0 : 1 8 3 ). T h is o c c u rre d am o n g a p op u lation
n u m b e rin g 5 5 4 p rio r to this (ib id .: 184). M o rtality w'as thus c lo se to 4 0 p e rce n t in
this tw o -y e ar p e r io d . B ecau se o f age and g e n d e r sk ew in g in the 1857 p o p u latio n
fig u re s, w e can su rm ise that p o p u latio n had d eclin ed significantly p r io r to that p o in t
(ib id .).
An in crease in in tereth n ic ten sion and organ ic and p sy c h o lo g ic al illn ess e n su e d .
T h e se fu rth e r in creased as m o re p e o p le and trib e s w ere c ro w d e d o n to re se rv atio n s
and as allo tm e n t and o th e r lan d g rab s fu rth e r re d u ce d Indian-held lan d. M elville
Ja c o b s (n .d .) n o te s in triguingly th at, afte r 1 8 5 7 , w hen the C o o s w ere first e xiled
from th eir lan d, p e o p le in g e n e ra l, and not only sh am an s, b ecam e in te re sted in
d rea m s and their in te rp re tatio n s. We do not know p recisely w hat these d ream s
F E E L I N G AND T H I N K I N G IN M E M O R Y AND F O R G E T T I N G 8 7
e n taile d , but it is qu ite likely that they w ere sim ila r to th ose that later b e ca m e the
fou n d ation o f the G h o st D an ce : d rea m s o f the dead in an idyllic se ttin g , w hich
p e rfe ctly e x p re sse d the trau m a o f cu ltu ral d isin te g ratio n , w ith th eir co m b in atio n o f
w ish fu lfillm en t and trau m atic re e n actm e n t.
In 1 8 7 3 , a Shasta p ro p h e t n am ed B o g u s Tom b ro u g h t a version of the G h ost
D an ce to the m u ltieth n ic Siletz and G ran d R o n d e re se rv atio n s o f w este rn O re g o n
(B eck h am et al. 19 8 4 : 9 6 ; D u B o is 1 9 3 9 ; T h o m p so n 1 9 3 5 ). It b e ca m e q u ite p o p u lar
and sp read rapidly a m o n g the native p o p u latio n s b oth on and off re se rv atio n s. T h is
d an ce, called the E arth L o d g e by the Sh asta and o th e r in te rio r O re g o n g ro u p s w ho
ad o p ted it, b e ca m e kn ow n as the W arm H o u se dance in w este rn O re g o n (N ash
1955 [1 9 3 7 ]). It involved several novel featu res b ro u g h t from C alifo rn ia , such as
se m isu b te rra n e an h o u se s w ith a cen tral p o le and the w earin g o f feath er cap es and
w 'oodpeck er quill h ead b an d s (D u B o is 1 9 3 9 : 25 2 7 ; B eckh am et al. 1 9 8 4 : 9 6 ). It
wras orig in ally b ase d on a variation o f the R o u n d D an ce , in w hich m en and w om en
d an ced in a circle arou n d a cen tral fire. Like p re v io u s v e rsio n s o f the G h o st D an ce ,
this ritu al p ro m ise d the re tu rn o f dead relativ es and the re sto ra tio n o f the pre-
c o n tact social and m o ral ord er. T h e m o ral and sp iritu al state o f the p a rticip a n ts w as
c ru cial to its su cce ss. P articip an ts trie d to d ream and see vision s o f the d e a d ; failure
re su lte d n o t only in the dead n ot re tu rn in g , b u t also in the d an ce r p o ssib ly b ein g
tra n sfo rm e d in to an an im al in the b argain (D u B o is 19 3 9 : 2 7 ).
S ep aration fro m the E u ro a m e ric an w o rld w as a cen tral value o f all v ersio n s
o f the G h ost D an ce in O re g o n and C alifo rn ia . It w as th ough t that living in the
w hite m a n ’ s way d e p riv e d Indians o f sp iritu al pow er. C o m m u n a lism w as an oth er
n o rm ativ e value. This w as said to be in k eep in g w ith the values o f trad ition al
c u ltu re , in w hich p e o p le “ w ere n ever stin gy ” (T h o m p so n 1 9 3 5 ). D an c e rs p o o led
th eir re so u rc e s so that th ose w ith ou t m on ey o r fo o d co u ld con tin u e to d ance,
so m e tim e s lo r as lo n g as ten days at a tim e.
B o g u s Tom con tin u ed su m m e r visits to O re g o n and W ashington fo r lo u r o r five
y e a rs, until the religion b egan to b e su p p re sse d by the au th o ritie s. In ab ou t 1878
the W arm H o u se d ance w’as taken up bv tw o Silctz R e serv atio n In dians, C o q u ille
T h o m p so n and C h e tc o C h arlie, w ho sp read the w ord am o n g the coastal g ro u p s.
Both m en w ere A th ab ask an , b u t T h o m p so n had a C o o s m oth er. T h e y b ro u g h t the
d ance to the n o n re se rv atio n co m m u n ity o f C o o s , Siuslaw', and L o w er U m p q u a w’ho
lived at the m outh o f the Siuslaw R iver, n ear F lo re n ce , O re g o n (B eck h am et al.
1 9 8 4 : 9 9 ; D u B o is 1 9 3 9 ; M ille r and S e ab u rg 1 9 9 0 ; T h o m p so n 1 9 3 5 ). T h o m p so n ’ s
C o o s con n ection an d, re p o rte d ly , the m e n ’ s o rato ric al and sin g in g skills m ad e th eir
m e ssa g e p o p u la r am o n g this c o m m u n ity . Both m en m a rrie d local w om en and b egan
to p ro se ly tize th ro u gh o u t so u th w e ste rn O re g o n .
T h e W arm H o u se d an ce to o k on specifically O re g o n ian cu ltu ral fe atu re s, such
as the id ea that the dead co u ld n o t re tu rn to earth b e ca u se the way w as b lo c k c d by
a g re a t rain b ow lik c stru c tu re (B eck h am et al. 1 9 8 4 : 1 0 0 ). T h is recalls the C o o s
vision o f the afterlife , alth ough n o rm ally the dead w ere striv in g to reach a secon d
level o f heaven rath e r than re tu rn to e arth (F rach te n b e rg 1 9 1 3 ; Ja c o b s 1 9 3 9 ).
N atu rally , the dance w as co n d e m n e d by au th o ritie s, but for a tim e it flo u rish ed . So
g re a t w as its ap p aren t su c c e ss that it p ro d u ce d varian ts as it sp read to differen t
c o m m u n itie s. P erson s w ho built w arm h ou ses b e ca m e the “b o sse s” and used their
au th o rity to in tro d u ce new p ractice s.
8 8 M I C H A E L E. HARKIN
O ne such practice w as the building up o f the fire and the blockin g of the sm ok e
h ole, creatin g a m iasm a o f sm oke in the h ouse, w hich m ade breathing difficult
(T h om p son 1935). M en w ere rolled in blankets and then placed upon a fire that had
been built up w ith fir boughs. Both of these practices wrerc design ed to facilitate
visions on the p art o f the m ale dancers (for it w as only m en w ho could have them )
but failed (ib id .). The lack o f visions wras frustratin g and caused the con gregan ts
to ge t “c razy ,” as T h om p son m uch later told M elville Jaco b s (ib id .). The real
“craziness” involved n ot only the building up o f the fire and the sm okin ess o f the
lodge but com m unal sex am on g men and w om en in the dark sm oky co rn e rs o f the
house. W hile n ot central to the ritu al, and, indeed, apparently uncon n ected writh
the attem p t to achieve visions, com m unal sex b ecam e an increasingly large p a rt o f
the W arm H ouse dance in its w aning days. Belowr is T h o m p so n ’s d escription o f the
d en ou em en t o f the W'arm H ouse religion as reco rd ed by Elizabeth Jaco b s:
A t that tim e m en and w om en w'erc gettin g crazy. They wrere copulating

w ith one anoth er (there in the dark sm oky w arm h ou se). L ots o f m en
copulated w ith the w om en , even m arried peop le copulated w ith others
because nothing could be seen; it had go tten to be dark (in there).
T h a t’ s the w'ay it h app en ed; when they danced it changed to a different
way. In the daytim e the w om en w ere around there naked. T h a t’s the
way they did. (H o xic [Steph ens, a G alice inform ant] says only 3 or 4
fam ilies, and som e bach elor fellow s, w ere in on this at the end. E very
body else kept aw ay.) T h a t’s why they finally set the W arm H ouse on
fire and it all burned up. (They baptized the peop le after this.)
(T h om p son 1935; parenthetical com m en ts by Jacob s?)
O b cv esck cre (1 9 9 0 : 2 6 —2 9 ), in his psychodynam ic w ork on Sri Lankan

religiou s e x p re ssio n , divides rituals into tw o types, dromena and cathartic rites. A
dromenon (G reek for “ thing p e rfo rm e d ”) is a solem n and stately cerem on y , in which
cultu ral, religio u s, and philosophical values arc rep resen ted in a fairly straigh t
forw ard m anner. Individual psychological p rob lem s arc not absen t, and indeed
provide a b asic m otivation for the ritual en actm ent, but they arc tran sform ed into
idealized cultural them es and “b rough t in line with higher cultural values” (ib id .:
27). That is, the relation to real em otio ns and dilem m as is rather atten uated.
D rom en a are “p ro gressiv e” in that they attem p t to resolve psych ological prob lem s
by p rojectin g them forw ard into the future and the level o f the n um inous. C athartic
rite s, by con trast, rep resen t these things m ore directly, although in doin g so they
tran sform the cultural th em es, often parodically. T h u s, the H indu go d s and
go d d e sse s portray ed in these rites p o sse ss, inter alia, large sexual ap petites and
organs. T h ese rep resen tation s are the pro d u ct o f sym bolic tran sform ation s that
O b ey esek ere (ib id .: 55) calls “the w ork o f c u ltu re .” It is like dream w ork in that it
tran sform s the original fo rm s into d isto rtio n s, the difference being that dream
w ork disguises uncon scious thoughts, while the w ork o f culture reveals them
(ib id .: 5 6 ). C ath artic rites arc thus regressive in that they dw ell upon psychological
conflicts w ithout attem p tin g to tran sform o r resolve them .
We are now in a b e tter position to address the “ crazin ess” that T h om p son
ob served in the latter days o f the W arm H ouse m ovem en t. The m ovem en t was
FE E L I NG AND THI NKI NG IN M E M O R Y AND FORGETTING 8 9
tran sform ed from a d ro m en o n , w hich attem p ted to resolve the conflicts that the
w estern O rego n Indians w ere exp erien cin g in the p ost-con tact p erio d by tran s
ferrin g them onto another plane, into a cathartic rite, in w hich these them es
w ere radically and parodicallv d isto rte d . Reunification with dead paren ts b eco m es
tran sfo rm ed into physical union with co n tem p o raries. [. . .]
Cathartic rites as a response to colonialism
T h ere can be little dou b t that religious m ovem en ts such as the W arm H ouse dance
should be seen as eth n oh istorical ph enom ena, that is, view ed within the m atrix o f
E uroam erican invasion and forced culture change (W alker 196 9 ). Further, it is clear
that they arc m echan ism s for dealing with collective stress and pow erful negative
em otio n s, and n ot always therapeutically. Rather, they offer em otional release from
the dreary reality o f death, d isease, starvation , and acculturation. W hat is m ore,
they rep lace the specific qualities o f each p e r so n ’ s sufferin g w ith a collective m ean
ing con stru cted in ritual. In this sense they allow for a certain forgettin g o f the
specific past o f m assacres and epid em ics, w hich is rep laced w ith the idealized
account (Fogelson 1 9 8 9 ). At first, such m ovem ents are optim istic and future
orien ted . They arc drom cn a in O b e y c se k c re ’s term in ology . H ow ever, over tim e, as
their participan ts arc repeatedly d iscom fited, the focus turn s away from future-
orien ted optim ism and m oves increasingly in the direction o f pure catharsis. At such
a point the gro tesq u e qualities o f the rite are elab orated and com e to prevail. [. . .]
Conclusion: for em otional ethnohistories
As Bucklev has n oted , K ro eb e r avoided ethnohistorical research because he could

not b ear all those tears. T h e invention o f the “ eth n ographic p re se n t” by K ro eb er
and other an th ropo lo gists o f the p ro fessio n ’ s “classic” (i.e ., late colonial) phase wras
perhaps above all a psych ological resp o n se to the scarin g h istories o f gen ocid e,
culture loss, land ap p ro p riation s, and im m en se cruelty p erp etrated on indigenous
p eo p les. K ro eb cr and others con stru cted an cpistem olo gical space in w hich such
questions have no p lace; they rem ain outside the paradigm . [. . .] Ethnographic
presen ts, reified and m echanistic cu ltu res, a detached view poin t: all are con ditioned
by o u r p rofession al avoidance o f unpleasant realities. O f cou rse, m uch has changed
in the past gen eration , but m uch has not. In particular, the unw illingness o f ethno-
historians to con sider the em otional dim en sions o f the past has changed little. This
resistan ce, w hether from fear o f co lle ag u e s’ censure for bein g to o subjective or
from an unw illingness to face all those tears, contin ues to deform ethnohistorical
research and w-riting.
In addition to these im pedim en ts o f ancient p ed ig ree, the rise o f p o st
m od ern ism has instilled a stance o f ironic detachm en t am on g its second gen eration
o f scholars (see Bracken 199 7 ). C olonial h istories arc seen as absurdist docum en ts.
W hile the po stm o d e rn ist positions h im self o r h e rse lf as rhetorically on the side o f
the su b altern , or at least as o p p osed to the colonial au th ority, such a stance has little
significance fo r the actual pro ject, w hich, after all, is seen as m erely anoth er textual
accretio n in an already te x t-satu ra te d field. T h e tex tu al ap p ro ach is n ot w ith out

m e rit, especially if on e c o n sid e rs that such te x ts w ere , in d e e d , w hat m ad e colon ial
ad m in istratio n p o ssib le. H ow ever, such a w h eels-w ith in -w h eels analysis is unlikely
to b rin g to light the “h id den h isto rie s” o f c o lo n ize d and e n cap su lated co m m u n itie s
(se e S ch n eid e r and R ap p 1 9 9 5 ).
I have argu ed that the p ro fessio n al aversion to such h isto rie s w as and rem ain s
in sep arab le from an u n w illin gn ess to lace e m o tio n s: o u r ow n in clu d e d . (A m o n g
th ese e m o tio n s arc u n d o u b ted ly a ccrtain p ro fessio n al gu ilt at o u r c o m p licity
w ith colon ial re g im e s .) T h e K urtzian h o rr o r o f E u rop ean colon ialism in A frica or
A m erican c o n q u e st o f C alifo rn ia , w ritte n ab o u t by n ovelists and jo u rn a lists, has
n ot gen erally been c o n sid e re d a fit su b je c t fo r a n th ro p o lo g ists o r h istorian s (but
se e T aussig 1 9 8 7 ; Fabian 2 0 0 0 ). In stead , w e have ten d ed to seek the c o m fo rtab le
g e n e ralitie s o f social organ ization o r m y th ology w hile avoidin g the h istorical
sp ecificity . . . . I w ou ld argu e that this view has thin gs e xactly re v e rse d : the u n iv e r
sals are to be fou n d in the colo n izin g so c iety b e cau se it is p a rtic ip a tin g in a glo b al
p ro c e ss c arrie d o u t in m uch the sam e m an n er ev ery w h ere. It is the in d igen ou s
re sp o n se s to colon ial e n co u n te r that rem ain to b e e x p lo re d in all th eir e m o tio n al
and h istorical specificity . It is to that specificity that e th n oh istory m u st now
tu rn .
R eferences
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1990 H istory o f W estern O regon since 1846. In H andbook of N orth A m erican
Indians. Vol. 7, T h e N orth w est C oast. Wayne Suttles, ed. Pp. 180—8.
W ashington, DC: Sm ithsonian Institution Press.
Beckham , Stephen Dow, Kathryn Anne Popel, and R ick M inor
1984 Native A m erican R eligious Practices and U ses in W estern O regon . U n i
versity o f O regon A nthropological Papers, N o. 31. Eugene: U niversity o f
O regon Press.
B racken, C h ristopher
1997 T h e Potlatch Papers: A C olonial C ase H istory. Chicago: U niversity o f
C hicago Press.
Bucklev, Th om as
1996 “T h e Little H istory o f Pitiful Events” : The E pistem ological and M oral
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Ethic: Essays on Boasian Ethnography and the G erm an A nthropological
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D arn ell, Regna
1986 Personality and C ulture: The Fate o f the Sapirian Alternative. In
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1995 O ral L iterature E m bodied and D isem b odied. In A spects of O ral C om m u n i
cation. U ta Q uasth off, ed. Pp. 9 1 - 1 1 1 . Berlin: W alter de G ruyter.
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D cM allie, Raym ond J.

1984 The Sixth Grandfather: Black E lk ’ s Teachings Given to John G. N cihardt.
Lincoln: U niversity of N ebraska Press.
D u B ois, C ora
1939 The 1870 G h ost D ance. A nthropological R ecords o f the U niversity o f
C alifornia 3 (1 ): 1—152.
Fabian, Johannes
2000 O u t o f O u r M inds: R eason and M adness in the E xploration o f Ccntral
A frica. Berkeley: U niversity o f California Press.
Fogelson, Raym ond
1989 The Ethnohistory of Events and N on-Events. Ethnohistory 36:
133—4 7 .
Frach tenberg, Leo
1913 C o o s Texts. C olum b ia U niversity C on tribution s to A nthropology 1. N ew
York: C olum b ia U niversity Press.
Ja c o b s, M elville
n .d. C o o s Fieldnotes. M elville Jaco b s C ollection , Box 9 9 , File 19, M anuscripts
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in A nthropology 7 (1 ): 1—27.
Levy, R o b e rt I.
1984 E m otion , K now ing, and C ulture. In C ulture T h eory: Essays on M ind, Self,
and E m otion. Richard A. Shw eder and R o b e rt A. Levine, eds. Pp. 2 1 4 —37.
L utz, Catherine
1988 U nnatural E m otions: Everyday Sentim ents on a M icronesian Atoll and
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Press.
M iller, Jay, and W illiam Seaburg
1990 Athapaskans of Southw estern O rego n . In H andbook o f N orth A m erican
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W ashington, DC: Sm ithsonian Institution Press.
M ooney, Jam es
1965 [1896] The G h ost D ance Religion and the Sioux O u tb reak o f 1890. Chicago:
U niversity o f C hicago Press.
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cultural C om m unity on Klam ath R eservation. In Social A nthropology o f
N orth A m erican T ribes. Fred Eggan, ed. Pp. 377—4 4 4 . C h icago: U niversity
o f Chicago Press.
O b ey esek ere, Gananath
1990 The W ork ol C ulture: Sym bolic T ransform ation in Psychoanalysis and
A nthropology. C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press.
O ’N eil, T h eresa
1996 D isciplined H earts: H istory, Identity, and D epression in an A m erican Indian
C om m u nity. Berkeley: U niversity o f C aliforn ia Press.
Schneider, Jane, and Ravna Rapp
1995 A rticulating H idden H isto ries: E xplorin g the Influence ol E ric R. Wolf.
Berkeley: U niversity o f C alifornia Press.
Taussio
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M ichael
1987 Sham anism , C olon ialism , and the W ild M an: A Study in T error and Healing.
C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press.
T h om p so n , C oquillc
1935 Ethnologic Text on R eligion : The G host D ance C u lt, Brought U p from the
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Walker, D ew ard
1969 N ew Light on the Prophet D ance C on troversy. Ethnohistory 16: 2 4 5 —55.
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Chapter 8
Johan Lindquist
N E G O T I A T I N G S H A M E IN T H E
INDONESIAN BORDERLANDS
UNEXPECTED IT MIGHT
A
S AS se e m , m igran t w om en so m e
tim es w ear M uslim veils o r take ecstasy (the pop ular term for m d m a or 3,4-
m cthylenedioxy-m etham ph etam in e) in the sam e places and for the sam e reason s;
reasons that are both com prehen sible and explicitly m oral. O n the Indonesian island
o f Batam — a place ch aracterized by rapid so cio-eco n o m ic change and dram atic
d em ograph ic shifts — fem ale m igran ts use these techniques in o rd e r to deal with
malu, m eaning ap proxim ately sham e, em b arrassm en t, shyness, or restrain t and p r o
priety (G o d d ard 1 9 9 6 :4 3 2 ; Peletz 1 9 9 6 :2 2 8 ). W hile veiling rein forces m oral
b ou n daries associated with malu, ecstasy use facilitates the tran sgression of those
sam e b o u n daries. W earing the veil, or jilbab, offers an identity that p ro te cts against
the dangers o f social interaction in the co n te xt o f m igratio n , w hile ecstasy use
allow s fem ale p ro stitu tes to en gage m ore easily in m orally am bigu ous fo rm s of
transactions. Both activities, however, can be tran sform ed into legitim ate m odels
o f personal developm en t (kemajuan), w hich may displace malu upon retu rn h om e;
one as a sign o f religiou s insight, the other as a m eans for creating econ om ic value.
Veiling and ecstasy use are therefore both directly connected w ith the dem ands
o f hom e and the expectation s o f m igratio n . In this co n te x t, it is the e x p erien ce o f
malu, or o f bein g identified as som eon e w ho should be malu, w hich b eco m es an
organizing prin ciple for social action and the m anagem en t o f appearan ces.
In other w ords, malu b e co m e s the em otional link betw een the kampung, the
village or h om e, and the rantau, the space o f m igratio n , as the dem ands o f w hat it
m eans to be a m oral person haunt the m igran t. This link su gg ests various fo rm s o f
exch ange that bind the individual to b ro ad er historically specific m oral and social
o rd e rs, m ost notably the Indonesian nation. [. . .]
. . . On B atam , ... it is not other possible translations of ‘sham e-
e m b a rra ssm c n t,’ such as the Balinese con cept o f lek — fam ously tran slated by
G e e rtz as ‘ stagefrigh t’ — or isin that have b eco m e key em otional tro p e s, but rather
9 4 JOHAN LINDQUIST
malu, a Malay w ord that exists in other Indonesian lan guages, but m ore im portan tly
in this co n te x t, a p art o f the Indonesian lingua franca. This also highlights an
im p ortan t difference betw een B atam , a place w here prim arily Indonesian is spok en,
and the kampung, w here it is not. As Siegel (1 9 9 7 :1 5 ) has argu ed , the form ation o f
the Indonesian national language ‘offers one the op p ortu n ity for a ccrtain excursion
if n ot into a new iden tity, at least away from an old o n e .’ R e fe rrin g to the sam e
qu o te, Spyer (2 0 0 0 :3 0 ) argues m ore strongly that it even ‘c o m p e ls’ this shift. In this
article, I argue that in the co n te x t o f the m ore literal excursion that m igration
entails, malu should be u n d erstood in relation to em ergen t identities con nected to
the nation.
This d oes not m ean , how ever, that malu is played ou t in the sam e w ays am ong
the tw o g ro u p s that I am discussing. O n e o f the m ain differences betw een fem ale
p ro stitu tes and factory w ork ers is education. W hile the latter arc required to have
a high school d egree, the fo rm e r usually have far m ore lim ited education . F u rth e r
m ore, w hile religious en gagem en t may be a legitim ate m odel o f kemajuan for som e
w om en , for others wrho m ust su p p o rt fam ilies, only econ om ic su ccess counts. In
other w o rd s, socioecon om ic differences stru ctu re life traje cto ries and lead malu to
b eco m e relevant in various w ays in the lives o f m igrants. ( . . . )
Batam has com m on ly been rep resen ted by the Indonesian go vern m en t as a
c o m p e tito r to Singapore — the new ‘ H o u sto n ’ or ‘ R o tte rd a m ’ o f South east Asia,
the ‘ lo c o m o tiv e ’ o f Indonesian national d evelopm en t. The island has a distinct
frontier-tow n atm osph ere: it is a place that has changed lo o quickly. G o lf c o u rse s,
m arin as, and gated com m un ities co -exist w ith facto ries, squ atter com m un ities,
karaoke b ars, and b roth els, w hile jungle still covers large p arts o f the island. A long
w ith the industrial estates that offer facilities lo r m ultinational corp o ratio n s,
prostitution has expan ded rapidly, serv in g the large n um b er of mainly Singaporean
m en w ho take the 40-m in u tc ferry ride across the Straits o f M alacca in search o f
inexpensive sex and dru gs. The econ om y of the day — based in the facto ries — and
the econ om y of the night — based on p rostitution and d ru g use — have developed
togeth er, both depen din g prim arily on fem ale lab or and foreign capital. In this
c o n te x t, national-cultural distinctions betw een m en as bread w in n ers and w om en as
tied to the d o m estic sphere arc easily disturbed (cf. Blackw ood 1 9 9 5 :1 2 6 ).
The day
It is ju st after 4 p.m . at the Batam indo Industrial E state, the flagship o f econ om ic
developm en t on Batam . [. . .]
The sidew alks and the gen eral sense o f o rd e r in the estate serve to strengthen
the feeling that Batam indo, w'hich is m anaged by a Singaporean c o rp o ratio n , is
organized accordin g to different prin ciples than those o f the W'orld that exists
outside its w alls. [. . .]
Batam indo h ouses ab out 100 m ulti-national corp oration s and over 6 5 ,0 0 0
w ork ers, and is generally con sidered to be the m ost successful developm en t project
on Batam . Eighty percen t o f the w ork ers are w om en betw een the ages o f 1 8 and 24,
with a high-school d egree being a prerequisite for em ploy m en t. F u rth erm o re, m ost
o f the w om en m ust sign a con tract prom isin g not to m arry or b eco m e pregnant
N E G OT I A T I NG S H A M E IN THE I N D O N E S I A N B O R D E R L A N D S 9 5
w hile w o rk in g th ere. A p p ro x im ate ly 50 p e rce n t o f the w o m en in the e state w ear

the jilb ab , an e x trao rd in arily high n u m b e r by In don esian sta n d ard s, even after the
re c e n t w ave o f Islam ization th ro u gh o u t the co u n try .
R e lig io u s activ ities arc stro n gly su p p o rte d by the m a n a g e m e n t and the local
g o v e rn m e n t on the islan d , and each facto ry has its ow n o rgan izatio n s for C h ristian s
and M u slim s. T h e con v erg en ce o f state and c o rp o ra te in te re sts can be se e n , for
in stan ce, in atte m p ts by the D e p a r tm e n t o f R e lig io u s A ffairs to p rovid e p re -m arital
co u n selin g fo r w o rk e rs. A t on e p o in t, the head o f the local office ex p lain e d the
reaso n in g :
By c o u n se lin g them [the w o rk e rs], w e h ope to p rev en t the possib ility

o f negative b eh aviors [in p a rtic u la r p re -m arital se x and pregn an cy
ou t o f w ed lock ] b ein g m a n ife ste d . If th ese p ro b le m s occur, w o r k e r s ’
p ro d u ctiv ity co u ld be re d u ce d .
(The Ja k a rta Post, D e c e m b e r 19, 1 9 9 2 ).
In c o n trast, y ou n g m ale m ig ran ts view B atam ind o as a p lace w h ere it is easy to find
a g ir lfr ie n d , and on Saturday n igh ts the d o r m ito r ie s are p ack ed w ith v isito rs lon g
in to the early h o u rs o f the m o rn in g , d e sp ite official ru le s statin g that g u e sts m ust
leave by m idn igh t. In in te rv ie w s w ith officials at B atam in d o , as w ell as w ith n u rse s
in the clin ic, issu es o f se xu ality aro se con stan tly . [. . .]
R e lig io n a p p e ars as n ot only the solu tio n to preven tin g im m o ral behavior, but
also to im p ro v in g w o rk e r p ro d u c tiv ity . T h e co n v e rg e n ce o f e c o n o m ic , n ation alist,
and re lig io u s d isc o u rse s co n ce rn in g y ou n g w o m en is recog n izab le from o th e r c o n
te x ts in the re g io n (e.g. O n g 1 9 8 7 , C h ap te r 8 ). . . .
T h e co m p lic ate d relation sh ip b etw een m a n a g e m e n t and se lf-m an age m e n t
b e c o m e s p a rticu larly in te re stin g in relation to veiling. In c o n v e rsatio n s writh w o rk
e rs w h o w o re the veil it w as clear that m o st o f them b egan to do so only after they
had arriv e d on B atam . T h e typical re sp o n se to m y en qu iry ab o u t this w as that
they had onlv ju st ‘b e c o m e aw 'are’ (baru sadar). For in stan ce, W idy a, from the city
o f Y ogyakarta in C c n tral Java, claim cd that she had alw ays w an ted to w ear a jilbab
b e fo re she cam e to B atam , b u t that it w as rare th ere. W h ile in Java it w as easy to be
b ran d ed fan atik (cf. B ren n er 1 9 9 8 :2 3 2 ), on Batam on e gain ed su p p o rt n ot only
from ro o m m a te s b u t also from the ag e n cie s and co m p a n ies that re c ru ite d th em .
. . . T h e in te re sts o f the w o rk e rs, the co m p a n ie s, and the local g o v e rn m e n t
ap p e ar to co n v e rg e , as the m o v e m e n t o f w 'orkers is re stric te d to the m o sq u e (o r the
c h u rc h ), the d o r m ito r ie s , and the fac to ry . T h e d e v e lo p m en t o f the in d u strial estate
is m atch ed by the sp iritu al d e v e lo p m en t o f the w orker. W h ile this m ay easily be
in te rp re te d as an ad d ed in stru m e n t in the discip lin in g o f w o rk e rs, in reality it is
m o re co m p lic ate d .
A lth ough ‘ b e co m in g aw a re ’ w as certain ly a key m o tif am o n g w o m en wrho w ear
the jilbab at B atam in d o , m any — away fro m h om e fo r the first tim e — readily
ad m itted that an o th er m a jo r reason fo r veiling w as to avoid m ale atten tio n and malu
in the stre ets. W earing a jilb ab p r o te c ts w om en from b e in g ap p ro ac h cd by m e n , or
o f b ein g iden tified as a lontong, a p ro stitu te . [. . .]
So m e re se a rc h e rs have argu ed that w earin g the veil can be u n d e rsto o d as a kind
o f ‘ sy m b o lic s h e lte r’ that allow s w om en to e n te r public sp a ce s (e.g. M a cleo d 1 9 9 2 ).
9 6 JOHAN LINDQUIST
Brenner (1 9 9 6 :6 7 4 ) claim s that this is not the case in Java, w here there is no clear
delineation betw een ‘ m a le ’ and ‘fe m ale ’ sph eres. O n B atam , however, this distin c
tion is far m ore prob lem atic, since the island has a reputation through -out Indonesia
as a place ol p rostitution and lim ited social co n tro l, m aking m ovem en t through
public space particularly sensitive for w om en . . . . V isiting go vern m en t officials
arouc
to
that fem ale w ork ers have too m uch free tim e and m av
J
easilv
J
be lured bv
J
the
potentially high earnings that prostitution offers.
T his is a boun dary , however, that w om en them selves arc often con ccrn cd with
policing. For instance, fem ale factory w ork ers who frequen t discos in the main tow n
o f N agoya m ake clear attem p ts to distinguish them selves from p ro stitu te s, both
spatially and in term s o f dress. M o st rem ain on one side o f the disco and are easily
distinguished by their un iform o f loose T -sh irts and jeans. Sim ilarly, many w om en
living in the d o rm ito ries avoid squatter housing around the estate, which often arc
associated w ith prem arital cohabitation and a lack o f social con trol. Veils serve a
sim ilar p u rp o se in creating social boun daries and form alizing iden tities. (. . .]
O n Batam the jilbab as a sign o f religiou s devotion and chastity w^as, however,
often doub ted by other p eo p le. R u m o rs o f w om en w ho w ore a jilbab during the
day but frequen ted discos by night w ere com m on . My n eigh b o r’s girlfrien d , w^ho
w orked at Batam indo and w ore a jilb ab , w ould frequently spen d the night in his
ro o m , trying to sneak in late at night while my h ousem ates chuckled from our
balcony across the street. O ne o f my neigh bors told m e that he ‘d id n ’t tru st jilbabs
an y m o re ’ because he thought m ost w om en w ore them to hide their unattractive
b od ies, anoth er m an claim ed that they w ere ‘m erely a fo rm a lity ’ (formalitas saja),
w hile a n urse at the Batam indo clinic revealed that ‘il a w om an co m e s into the clinic
and has a problem with som eth in g like sex and they arc w earin g a jilbab, I tell them
to take it off, that they should be m alu.'
The potential ironies arc evident. W hile veiling p ro te cts w om en from the
threats of pre-m arital sex or o f bein g h arassed by m en — thereby displacing potential
so u rccs of malu — and is con sidered a legitim ate m od el for perso n al d evelopm en t,
the veil is not alw avs read as a sign o f piety and dem ands a b ro ad er tran sform ation
o f subjectivity. [. . .]
The night
[. . .] W ith the em ergen ce o f the G row th Triangle in the early 1990s, prostitution
rapidly expan ded on Batam and n eigh boring islan ds, as prim arily Sin gaporean m en
began to take the sh o rt ferry trip across the border. This p ro c e ss reached its peak in
1998 at the height o f the Asian econ om ic crisis, as the Indonesian rupiah drop p ed to
as little as one sixth o f its previous value in relation to the Sin gapore dollar. W hile
Indonesian m en are m ainly found in the h alf dozen quasi-legal lokalisasi — low-
charge brothel villages — m ost prostitu tion on Batam is based in karaoke bars and
d iscos around the m ain tow n o f N agoya, which cater prim arily to foreign m en.
O n a busy night, O zon is nearly filled to its capacity o f 2 ,0 0 0 people by 1 1 p.m .
A l the back o f the disco, the dj plays techno versions o f Indonesian and w estern pop
son gs, but only a few peop le are on the sm all dance floor in the m iddle o f the club.
In co n trast, the high tables and b arsto o ls that surroun d the dance floor are packed
NEGOTIATING S H A M E IN T H E I NDONESIAN B O R D E R L A N D S 9 7
with peop le w ho can afford to buy drinks. M o st o f them arc con spicuously m oving
their heads back and forth to the beat o f the m usic — in m ost cases, such peop le arc
‘trip p in g ’ on ecstasy, the d ru g o f choice in Indonesian night-clubs during the late
1990s. Behind the d j, and at the entrance to the to ile ts, there arc young m en selling
d ru g s, offering their g o o d s to anyone w ho looks their way.
Lidya, w ho is in her m id tw enties and com es from M edan in N orth Sum atra,
w orks as a frcclan cc prostitu te and is search in g for a lam u, a clicnt - preferably
a Sin gaporean . The ccstasy that she has taken has n ot quite kicked in, and she is
indccisivc about w hom to approach . Lidya claim s that she feels malu about
approach ing clients, and she uses ecstasy to cross the barrier.
I like taking ecstasy because I am n ot as scared to approach a client. If I

d o n ’t take ccstasy , I feel in ferio r; I feel malu tow'ards the clicnts. Ecstasy
m akes m e feel brave.
M ost o f the freelance p ro stitu tes wrho w'ork in O zon use the d ru g on a regular
basis, m any o f them nearly every night. U nlike brothel areas, w hich are ‘closed
in stitution s' (C oh en 1 9 9 3 ), or p rostitu tes w ho have pim ps to n egotiate transactions
with clicn ts, Lidya and other frcclancc w om en m ust to a g re ate r degree perform
in o rd e r to attract clients. A ni, w ho co m e s from C cn tral Java, claim s that taking
ccstasy ‘ m akes everything easier. If I am at the disco and I d o n ’ t take it, I feel
con fused and I can ’t stand the m usic. I just keep asking m yself why I am here. Il is
also easier to act and dance in a seksi w ay .’ . . .
In O zon and other discos on Batam , ecstasy is crucial in the form ation of a
spacc w here appearan ces may be altered and sub jectivities may — at least te m
porarily — be tran sfo rm e d . . . . In the con text of the d isco, ecstasy allow s w om en
to tran sgress culturally pow erful m od es of bodily control and perform as p ro sti
tutes. It allow s them to forget their malu, by ‘distancing e m o tio n ’ (Sch cff 1977) and
to b eco m c the kind of w om an w hom a client w ill d esire, thereby facilitating
econ om ic transactions. In this co n te x t, there is a w'holc re p erto ire o f actions that is
learned through practical m im esis and which is facilitated by ccstasy : learning to
dance in a m anner that is seksi, o r be flirtatious w ithout ap pearin g overly ag gressive,
or change attitudes depen ding on the clicnt. T h e m o st successful frcclan cc p ro sti
tutes are not necessarily the ones w ho are con sidered m ost beautiful, but rather,
those w ho have m astered this re p erto ire .
To m erely u n derstan d ecstasy in relation to this specific use w ithin the con text
o f p rostitu tion , however, w ould be to underestim ate its poten tial m ean in gs and
uses. In the disco ccstasy gen erates distin ctions betw een clicnts and prostitu tes
alike by b eco m in g a sign that one is gengsi (hip). N o t being on, th erefore, can also
b eco m e a source o f malu in relation to other p ro stitu te s, since it can be seen as a
sign that one cannot access the d ru g, im plying that one cannot ge t a client o r afford
to buy it.
[. . .] Bloch and Parry (1 9 8 9 ) argue that all fo rm s o f econ om ic system s m ust
allow for an ideological spacc in which sh o rt-term econ om ic acquisition — which
often is m orally am bigu ous — is accepted in o rd e r to rep roduce a lon g-term m oral
order. In relation to this, con sider the follow ing quote from R osa:
9 8 J O H A N L I N D Q U I S T
o f c o u r se I feel m alu w h en I thin k a b o u t w h at I am d o in g — th o u g h it has

b e c o m e e a sie r — b u t it is n o th in g c o m p a r e d to the malu I w o u ld fe el if I
re tu r n e d h o m e w ith n oth in g. N ow , I can fe el p r o u d (ban gga) w h en 1
re tu rn h o m e . 1 am su re so m e p e o p le s u s p e c t that I w o rk as a p r o s titu te ,
b u t n o o n e e v e r ask s.
T h is m alu, sh e te lls m e , is m o r e p o w e rfu l than the malu that she e x p e r ie n c e s

in b e in g a p r o s titu te . In this c o n tc x t , th e c o m p le x ity o f th e m e a n in g s o f malu —
ra n g in g fro m p r o p r ie ty to sh a m e b e c o m c s e v id e n t in the d o u b le -b in d o f m o d e r n
ity (B a te so n 1 9 7 3 ). B e c o m in g a p e r so n is n o t on ly a b o u t a c tin g in a p a rtic u la r
m a n n e r and re c o g n iz in g o n e ’ s p o sitio n w ith in s o c ic tv ; o th e r d e m a n d s have b c c o m c
eq u a lly im p o r ta n t, n am e ly sig n s o f su c c e ss fro m th e rantau. H o w ev er, R o s a ’ s
m o v e m e n t fro m the sp a c e o f h o m e , the kampung, to the sp a c e o f m ig r a tio n , the
rantau, an d b a c k ag ain , fac ilitate s th is p r o c e ss . M alu, it a p p e a r s , can b e e ra se d and
fo rg o tte n .
T h e g r e a t e s t fe a r o f m any p r o s titu te s is — as the q u o te ab o v e s u g g e sts — that
n e w s o f th e ir w o rk w ill sp r e a d b a c k to th e kampung. T h e u se o f W e stern
p se u d o n y m s is o n e e x a m p le o f how’ id e n titie s are m a sk e d , w h ile n ew o n e s are
fo rg e d in re la tio n to a b r o a d e r w o rld . R e tu r n in g h o m e alw ay s m e a n s tra n sfo rm in g
o n e s e lf b a c k in to an id e a l, m o r a l p e r so n , p rim a rily th ro u g h m o r e c o n se rv a tiv e
fo r m s o f d r e s s . B e in g id e n tifie d as re fin ed ( halus) ra th e r than c ru d e ( kasar) is a n o th e r
sign that o n e k n o w s m alu. A s R o sa p u ts it:
W h e n e v e r I re tu rn to Java an d visit m y so n and m y m o th e r, I have to

sto p sm o k in g and s ta r t w e a rin g a sa ro n g ag ain . I have to re stra in m y se lf
w h en I sp e ak and n o t b e as kasar as I am on B a ta m .
F o r th o se w h o have p a r t n e r s o r ch ild re n liv in g on B a ta m , h ow ever, this ten sio n

b e c o m e s m o r e c o m p lic a te d . F o r in sta n c e , o n e day w h e n I w e n t o v e r to visit the
hall that I d e s c r ib e d in the b e g in n in g o f this se c tio n , D ia n a had a b lack ey e. H e r
b o y frie n d U m a r had hit h e r w hen she c a m e h o m e fro m O z o n on and w ith o u t any
m o n e y . A t the tim e D ia n a c o m p la in c d to m e th at U m a r :
alw ay s g e t s m a d if I c o m c b a c k w ith o u t any m o n e y cvrcn th o u g h it

s o m e tim e s is d iffic u lt to g e t a c lic n t. If he had any se n se o f re sp o n sib ility
(bertangungjaw ab), I w o u ld n ’ t have to w o rk like th is, b u t he alw ay s says
th a t it is d ifficu lt fo r m e n to find w o rk on B a ta m . W h at I really w an t is
to b e a h o u se w ife an d have c h ild re n , b u t if he k e e p s h ittin g m e I w ill
leave him sin ce I am the on ly o n e m a k in g any m o n e y .
U m ar, o f c o u r se , had a d iffe re n t sto ry . H e c la im e d th at th e first tim e he had h it h er

w as w h en she actu ally b ro u g h t a c lie n t b ac k to th e ir floor. E v e ry o n e w as sh o ck e d by
th is, and it m a d e U m a r fu rio u s.
I t ’ s b ad e n o u g h th at she has to w o rk as a p r o s titu te fo r us to su rv iv e , b u t

she d o e s n ’ t have to m a k e m e even m o r e malu by b rin g in g this gu y b a c k .
N o w sh e a lso s e e m s m o r e in te re ste d in tak in g d r u g s than she is in
N E G OT I A T I NG S H A M E IN THE I N D O N E S I A N B O R D E R L A N D S 9 9
m akin g m on ey . All I do is sit here and w ait fo r h er all nigh t, and w hen
she re tu rn s she is tripping and has no m on ey ! 1 w ish that 1 had n ever
c o m e to B atam . I had a g o o d jo b b e fo re in M edan [N o rth S u m atra], but I
ju st w an ted to o m uch and now I am stu c k here. I w ould rath er die than
re tu rn h om e malu w ith ou t any m o n ey .
In this p a rtic u la r situ atio n , the d istin ction b etw een the sh o rt-te rm and the lo n g
term sph ere d o c s n o t n ecessarily re p re se n t the distan ce b e tw e en the kampung and
the rantau. O n the c o n tra ry , the d istin ction is d e p e n d e n t on w hat each p e rso n
iden tifies as ‘h o m e ’ an d, th u s, the th resh old for w h ere the lo n g -te rm m o ral o rd e r
b e gin s. T h is is p e rh ap s a distin ction that m akes life b e ara b le: the c o m m o d ificatio n o f
the b o d y , and the sp a ce s w h ere this is allo w e d , are distin gu ish ed from p e rso n al
relation sh ip s and the sp a cc o f ‘h o m e .’ In the e con om y o f the night the d istin ction
b e tw e en ‘ p le a su r e ’ and ‘ la b o r ’ is n ever clear and co n stan tly a so u rc c o f con flict and
an xiety . T h e d istan cin g o f e m o tio n th rough the use o f ccstasy facilitates e co n o m ic
e x c h an ge , b u t also cre a te s p e rso n a l ten sio n s and m o ral d ile m m as. [. . .]
The m alu o f m odern ity
[. ..[I n relation to the sp read o f merantau as a cu ltu ral fo r m , it is n ot su rp risin g that

malu has e m e rg e d as a key e m o tio n a l tro p e fo r m ig ran ts on B atam . W h ile isin, lek,
and o th e r related e m o tio n al tro p e s rem ain b ou n d to a p a rtic u la r eth nic g ro u p and
lan gu age, malu travels and b e c o m e s the link b etw een the rantau and the kampung,
b e tw e en the citizen and the nation. A s I have n o ted th ro u gh o u t, p a rtic u la r m o d e r n
ist fo rm s asso ciate d w ith the nation and kemaiuan; m o st n otably e co n o m ic su cc e ss,
re lig io u s d e v e lo p m e n t, and the n u cle ar fam ily, arc at the h ea rt o f th ese an xieties.
O n e is malu to re tu rn ‘h o m e ’ w ith ou t having anything to show for the tim e one
has sp en t in the rantau. F or m ig ra n ts, th e re fo re , the links b etw een malu and merantau
effectively d e sc rib e the c o n trad ictio n s o f life on Batam and in the G row th T rian gle.
In this c o n te x t malu ap p e a rs as an em o tio n that d e sc rib e s the failures to live up to
the ideals o f the n ation . It o ffers m ig ran ts an e x p e rie n tia l tro p e as Indonesians in
the sh adow s o f the p ro m ise s o f Indonesian e c o n o m ic d e v e lo p m en t (cf. Siegel 1 9 9 7 ;
B o e llsto rff 2 0 0 2 ). [. . .]
T h ou gh the p e rfo rm a n c e o f p ro stitu tio n m ay ap p e ar as an in version o f the
p e rfo rm a n c e o f p ie ty , in fact they arc both cry stallizatio n s o f p a rtic u la r g e n d e re d
sty les. A lth ough th ere are certain ly varying d e g re e s o f reflexivity involved in these
acts, in all situ atio n s the p rim ary p ro b lem is n o t se lf-id e n tity , but rath er avoidin g
b e in g iden tified as so m e o n e w ho d o e s n ot b e lo n g (cf. R eddy 1 9 9 7 ). It is im p o rta n t,
how ever, to highlight the reflexive n ature o f this p r o c e ss; Batam is a p lace that not
only p ro d u c e s new kin ds o f p o w e r re la tio n s, b u t also o ffers new fo rm s o f freed o m
and agen cy fo r m ig ra n ts, m any o f w hom arc away from the kampung fo r the first
tim e. In the c o n te x t o f merantau, malu is an e m o tio n that leads w o m en to en gage
w ith , rath er than w ithdraw fro m , a new kind o f w orld and its c o n trad ic tio n s; a
p ro c e ss that d o e s n o t, how ever, n ecessarily gu aran te e su cc e ss. [. . .]
1 0 0 JOHAN LINDQUIST
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Michael G. Pclctz. Berkeley: University o f California Press.
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Brenner, Suzanne. 1996. Reconstructing Self and Society: Javanese Muslim Women and
the Veil. American Ethnologist, 23(4):673—697.
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J.G . Parnwell. New York: Routlcdge.
Goddard, Cliff. 1996. The ‘ Social Em otions’ of Malay (Bahasa Melayu). Ethos, 24(3):
4 2 6 -4 6 4 .
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Veiling as Accommodating Protest in Cairo. Signs, 17 (3 ):5 33—557.
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Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
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Berkeley: University o f California Press.
Reddy, William M. 1997. Reply. Current Anthropology, 38(3):346—348.
Schcff, Thomas J. 1977. The Distancing o f Emotion in Ritual. Current Anthropology',
18(3):48 3-505.
Siegel, James T. 1997. Fetish, Recognition, Revolution. Princeton, N J: Princcton University
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Spyer, Patricia. 2000. The ,Memory i f Trade: Modernity’s Entanglements on an Eastern
Indonesian Island. Durham: Duke University Press.
3. Emotions and society
ITH ANTHROPOLOGY, THE DISCIPLINE OF sociology has

W one of the longest records of research and debate on the extent to which,
and the processes whereby, emotions are shaped by socio-cultural factors. W hile
Am erican sociologists pioneered the field, today the Am erican, British and European
Sociological Associations all have them atic sections or study groups dedicated to the
emotions. The field of relevant publications spans more than three decades; some of
the concepts and analytical fram eworks developed during the 1970s and 1980s still
orient research today, as can be seen throughout this volume. Once regarded as an
area of specialist interest, the study of emotions is increasingly considered central to
the discipline and to the ways in which the discipline conceives of itself. As Barbalet
(2 0 0 2 :3 ) puts it, 'once the importance of emotions to social processes becomes clear,
the intellectual constitution of sociology, and therefore the history of sociology and
those who have contributed to it, have to be rethought/
Just as there is no singular theoretical or methodological fram ework that can
characterize sociology as a whole, so there is not a singular sociology of emotions but
rather many variants, each with its pa rticu la r inclinations and ways of proceeding.
Jonathan Turner and Jan Stets have recently published a book-length review of the
field (2005), to which we refer readers who are interested in a detailed discussion
of key theoretical and methodological differences. Turner and Stets identify seven
theoretical variants in the sociology of emotions: dram aturg ical and cultural', ritu a l;
sym bolic interactionist; sym bolic interactionist with psychoanalytical elements;
exchange theorizing; structural; and evolutionary. In this section we have tried to
provide a balanced selection from these variants, while including also a contribution
from a systems-theoretical perspective.
Our first reading is from the first chapter of Jack Barbalet's book Em otion,
S o c ia l Theory and S o c ia l Structure (2001) which presents a m acro-sociological
1 0 2 U N I V E R S A L S AND P A R T I C U L A R S OF A F F E C T
approach to the emotions. The book has two aims. To examine aspects social struc
ture by applying emotions categories (e.g. what role does resentment play in relations
of social class?), and to re-work sociological theory in the light of a focus upon
emotions. The extract we have chosen focuses on the latter, since this provides a useful
and concise introduction to questions such as: W hat is sociology's 'business' with the
emotions? How has it tackled them? How did emotions feature in the early origins
of sociology? To what extent are subsequent sociological approaches to emotion
themselves the expression of changes in broader social structural factors?
This latter question is of pa rticu la r interest with respect to B arbalet's picture
of the changing fortunes of emotions in sociology. W h ilst the founders of modern
sociology - including figures such as Adam Sm ith, Adam Ferguson, A lexis de Tocque-
ville, Gustave Le Bon, Em ile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto, Ferdinand Tonnies and
Georg Simmel - regarded emotions as im portant sociological variables, Barbalet
suggests that they effectively dropped out of the picture from about 1930 to 1970 as
a cognitive emphasis came to dominate sociological theory. In the U K context,
Barbalet relates this shift to changes in mass society such as the effective contain
ment and pacification of the working classes in the post-war period of reconstruction
and the relative rise in numbers of white-col lar workers in administrative, clerical and
sales positions which factors together 'enhanced the sense of a less passionate and
increasingly rational social order' (2001: 15). Barbalet goes on to associate the rise
of the social constructionist approach to the increased prominence, from the 1970s
onwards, of new social movements such as the Women's the Environmental and the
B lack Movements which served to politicize emotions through the foregrounding of a
politics of identity and a critique of 'n a tu ra listic' accounts of 'knowing one's place'.
The second extract is from Goffm an's classic a rticle 'Em barrassm ent and Social
Organization'. This a rticle was published in 1956 at a time when most of sociology
was committed to rather rational and calculative models of social organization.
Where emotion was considered, it tended to feature as a component of more prim itive
forms of social organization or in relation to its 'p ath o logical' expression (e.g. in
times of social crisis). The polarity affectivity / neutrality, for example, was one of
Talcott Parsons' 'pattern variables', and he associated affectivity with pre-modern
society and with the fam ily dynamics of modern social systems (cf. Fish 2004).
Goffman, by contrast, is unembarrassed in his dealings with the emotion of
embarrassment. This is perhaps because his 'd ram atu rgical' approach was more in
tune with ideas coming from the arts and humanities and with the power struggles
of psychiatric wards. Goffm an thus recognized that emotion is, in part at least, a
genuinely s o c ia l category by showing how embarrassment is part and parcel of
socially prescribed behaviour and not some prim itive and irrational biopsychological
force 'breaking through' the crust of orderly conduct. From Goffm an's dram aturgical
perspective, social action is sustained less by reasoned rule follow ing or hedonistic
self-interest than by a delicate dance of affective encounters whose emotional
qualities are, for the most part, carefully concealed.
The next four extracts are drawn from sociologists who made significant con
tributions from the second half of the 1970s, when explicit sociological interest in the
emotions was re-kindled. Thus Susan Shott begins her a rticle 'Em otion and Social
Life: a symbolic interactionist analysis' by pointing to the neglect of emotion amongst
E M OTI O N S A N D SOC I ET Y 1 0 3
contem porary sociologists with the exception of figures such as Goffman. Shott
provides a clear example of a constructionist account of emotion as a socialized
phenomenon mediated by sym bolically organized 'definitions of the situation' and
interactional factors such as 'role taking'. The indebtedness to Schachter and
Singer's (1 96 2 ) social psychological tw o-factor theory is explicit, as is the influence
of cultural anthropology, which also challenged prior thoroughly biological accounts
of emotion. Shott's concern is with the agency of social action, and it is argued that
social systems and th eir structures do not determine conduct but rather influence the
settings for conduct and the ways these are cognitively interpreted. It is also notable
that a decisive role is given to the concept of s o c ia l norm s as the key elements in a
social fram ew ork that shape and modify the acto rs' emotional experiences and
expressions by way of th eir influence on modes of interpretation or reality construc
tion. These norms are approached in two related ways: either through an emphasis
on how normative social reality constructs the actor through socialization, or on how
the actor constructs reality by way of their normative subjective definitions.
The extract from A rlie Russell Hochschild's a rticle 'E m otion Work, Feeling
Rules, and Social Structure' shares this focus on social norms and on the importance
of an order of interaction which mediates between the personality structures of
individuals and the social structures of a social system. Elsewhere in the article,
Hochschild distinguishes an organismic account of em otion-as-biological with the
interactive account associated with Schachter, Goffman and others. Hochschild
favours the latter because it offers a more deeply social account according to which
social norms and knowledge enter into the definition of emotion via interpretive
processes of labeling and attribution. Hochschild's specific contribution is to take
Goffm an's work further by arguing that actors do not simply manage the outward
'im pressions' they give off to others but also th eir inner feelings. Her 'emotions
management' approach is thus based upon the idea of deep acting through which
people struggle to actually alter their emotions to better fit social norms and expec
tations. Her concepts of 'emotion w ork' and 'feeling rules' thus extend the focus on
social norms. This move allow s Hochschild to connect emotions to broader questions
of power and social structure, since feeling rules can be thought of as the 'underside'
of ideology - the side that deals with emotions. A key difference between working
class and middle class socialization practices, for example, m ight well be the extent to
which they prepare children to control and manage their emotions. It is no surprise
that we now ta lk of 'em otional intelligence' as a quality necessary for work in econ
omies dominated by service and consumption rather than industrial production. For
Hoschschild, such economies require high levels of emotion work (interesting com par
isons with E lias's theory of the civilizing process could be made here, cf. Wouters
1989).
In contrast to Shott and Hochschild, Theodore Kemper offers a self-consciously
'p o sitivistic' interactional theory of emotions. The perspective presented in the
extract is part of a broader theory (cf. Kemper 1978) in which it is argued that 'a
very large class of emotions results from real, imagined or anticipated outcomes
in social relationships' (1978: 43). As this quotation indicates, Kemper is mostly
interested in the social causes of emotions, which are themselves considered to be
psychophysiological phenomena. He argues that two universal structural dimensions
1 0 4 U N I V E R S A L S AND P A R T I C U L A R S OF A F F E C T
of social interaction that he calls 'power' and 'status' can parsimoniously predict the
generation of many emotions. Happiness, for example, is caused by a gain in power
w hilst fear and anxiety result from its loss. Pride, to give another example, is caused
by a gain in status w hilst shame results from its loss. W h ilst social norms and cultural
knowledge may well mediate the relationships between structural relations and
emotions, Kemper's work suggests that it is possible both to overstate the causal role
of such factors and to overstate the 'cognitive' nature of emotions as fundamentally
related to local interpretations. He is interested in providing a more complete model
of the social environment (which naturally includes the macro aspects of social
systems) so that variations in that environment can be correlated with varying
emotional experiences.
The extract by Randall Collins illustrates his more general theory of interaction
ritual (Collins 1975). Under the influence of Durkheim, Goffm an and Darwinian
animal ethology, Collins deals as much with the social effects of emotions as with the
social causes. Em otions are tacitly mediated by interaction rituals and are viewed
as a form of 'social energy' which upholds social structures and gels groups into
coalitions with 'fe lt' hierarchies of dominance and solidarity. Collins is thus less con
cerned with specific namable emotional occasions (e.g. this moment of anger) than
with a constantly reproduced underlying emotional dynamic that is sometimes only
vaguely sensed. This emotional dynamic influences whether or not people feel they
'belong' in a p a rticu la r situation, group, institution or social relationship, how 'con
fident' they feel, and so on. From this perspective, property, for instance, is based
upon a sense of entitlem ent to occupy a p a rticu la r place or to access a p a rticu la r
thing and something like 'au th ority' is communicated via subtle cues that are affect
ively apprehended. L ittle things like 'ta lkin g shop' or 'name dropping' or remarks
about tasteless internal decoration serve to reproduce such emotional dynamics and
Collins is thus less interested in the content of such ritu a listic conversations than
in th eir unstated em otional effects, both individual and collective (e.g. how they
increase and decrease the confidence of the actors and how they reproduce or
challenge existing group boundaries).
The final extract is from the German systems theoretician, N ikla s Luhmann.
Luhmann offers an h istorically informed post-positivistic sociology grounded in
complexity theory (c.f. Stenner 2004, 2006). He draws upon the biological theory of
'autopoiesis' which examines how living organisms must constantly reproduce them
selves from out of th eir own elements. For autopoiesis to occur, a system must be fully
self-referential or operationally d o se d upon itself. In contrast to our other authors,
Luhmann thus makes a rather clear distinction between social systems (which are
systems of com m unication) and psychic systems (which are systems of consciousness
grounded in unconscious biological systems). Both systems face the task of repro
ducing themselves on an ongoing and self-referential basis either by continuing
to generate com m unication (in the case of social systems) or consciousness (in the
case of psychic systems). For Luhmann, the emotions prim arily concern psychic
systems and they arise whenever the autopoiesis (continuous self-referential repro
duction) of consciousness is in danger. Nevertheless, there is a close relationship of
'structural coupling' between psychic and social systems. The stream of conscious
ness, for instance, is endangered by interruptions and these can be caused by
E M O T I O N S AND S O C I E T Y 1 0 5
u n p red icta ble so cia l events. M o re sp ecifically, Luh m ann holds th a t em otion is the
process of a d ap ta tio n to m et or unm et cla im s. A cla im is m ore than a mere e xp e ct
ation, since a disappoin ted expectation can sim p ly be revised o r given up. W ith a
cla im , by co n trast, we have a sense of rig h t and so its disa p p oin tm en t o r fu lfillm e n t
is m ore of a shock to the psychic system and so generates e m otion a l responses. T his
s tru c tu ra l co upling a llo w s Luh m ann to co nn ect em otions to c u ltu ra l se m a n tics (e.g.
s o c ia lly prevalent ideas and rules about w ho can lay c la im to w h a t) and to relate
se m a n tics to sh ifts in so cia l stru ctu re (e.g. the s h ift from a feudal society to one th a t
is fu n c tio n a lly d iffe re n tia te d ). In a w o rld where our c la im s are ostensibly 'in d iv id u a l
ch o ice s' u nlim ited by so cia l d icta te s concerning ou r predefined 'p ro p e r p la ce', they
are less likely to be rou tinely m et and hence m ore likely to engender em otion.
References
Barbalet, J. (ed) (2 002) Em otions and Sociology. Oxford: Blackw ell Publishing.
Collins, R. (1 975) C o nflict Sociology: Toward an E x p lo ra to ry Science. New York:
Academ ic Press.
Fish, J. S. (2004) 'The neglected element of human emotion in Talcott Parsons's The
Structure of Social A ction ', Jo u rn a l o f C la ssica l Sociology, 4 (1): 115—134.
Kemper, T. D. (1 9 78 ) A S o c ia l Internation al Theory o f Em otions. New York: John Wiley.
Schachter, S. and Singer, J. E. (19 6 2) 'Cognitive, social and physiological determinants
of em otional state', P sych o log ica l Review, 69: 3 7 9 -9 9 .
Stenner, P. (20 0 6) 'A n outline of an autopoietic systems approach to em otion', Cyber
netics and Human Knowing, 12 (4): 8 -2 2 .
Stenner, P. (20 0 4) 'Is autopoietic systems theory alexithym ic? Luhmann and the socio
psychology of emotions', S ozia le Systeme, 10 (1): 1 5 9 -8 5 .
Turner, J. H. and Stets, J. E. (eds) (2 00 5 ) The S ociology o f Em otions. Cambridge:
Wouters, C. (19 8 9) 'The sociology of emotions and flight attendants: Hochschild's
"M a n a g e d H e a rt" ', Theory, Culture & Society. 6: 9 5 -1 2 3 .
C hapter 9
Ja ck Barbalet
E M O T I O N IN S O C I A L L I F E A N D
SOCIAL THEORY
E m o ti o n a n d s o c i o l o g y : th e o d d c o u p l e
W
HAT IS S O C I O L O G Y ’S BUSINESS WITH em o tion ? One
a n s w e r is th at s o c i o l o g y a t t e m p t s t o e x p l a in s o c ia l p h e n o m e n a , a n d e m o t i o n
is a s o c ia l p h e n o m e n o n . T h a t e m o t i o n h as a so c ia l n a t u r e is n o t i m m e d i a t e l y
o b v i o u s , h o w e v e r . A n i n d i v i d u a l ’ s e x p e r i e n c e o f e m o t i o n m o r e r e a d ily r e v e a ls th e
p e r s o n a l a n d in t im a t e s id e o f e m o t i o n than its c o l l e c t i v e o r s o c ia l d i m e n s i o n .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , it has b e e n s h o w n b y a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s , h is t o r i a n s , a n d s o c i o l o g i s t s ,
that th e p a t t e r n s o f e m o t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s a r c d if f e r e n t in d if f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s . In this
s e n s e e m o t i o n can b e r e g a r d e d as an o u t c o m e o r e ffe c t o f so c ia l p r o c e s s e s . A s a
so c ia l p r o d u c t , e m o t i o n is in p r i n c i p l e a m e n a b l e t o s o c i o l o g i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n an d
e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e r e is in fa c t a la r g e a n d g r o w i n g lit e r a t u r e w h ic h s h o w s , fr o m
a n u m b e r o f d if f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s , th a t e m o t i o n is a s o cial th in g ( K e m p e r 1 9 9 1 ;
M cC arth y 1989).
T h e r e is a n o t h e r a n s w e r to th e q u e s t i o n , “ W h a t is s o c i o l o g y ’ s b u s i n e s s w it h
e m o t i o n ? ” S o c i o l o g y m i g h t b e c o n c e r n e d w it h e m o t i o n b e c a u s e e m o t i o n is s o m e
h o w n e c e s s a r y t o e x p l a in th e v e r y f u n d a m e n t a l s o f s o c ia l b e h a v io r . T h i s id e a , th at
e m o t i o n is a s o c ia l c a u s e , is m o r e likely t o b e r e s i s t e d b y s o c i o l o g i s t s th an th e id e a
th a t it is a s o c ia l e ffe c t. A s th is is th e m o r e d iffic u lt t o a c c e p t o f th e t w o a n s w e r s
c o n c e r n i n g s o c i o l o g y ’ s b u s i n e s s w ith e m o t i o n , it is th e o n e th a t w e shall f o c u s on
h e r e . T h e o n ly g o o d r e a s o n t o o f f e r a s o c i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f e m o t i o n is if
e m o t i o n is i t s e l f sig n ific a n t in th e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f s o c i a l r e la t io n s h ip s , in s t i t u t io n s ,
a n d p r o c e s s e s . [. . .]
EMOTI ON IN SOCIAL LIFE AND SOCIAL T H E O R Y 1 0 7
Em otion in the o rigin s o f sociolo gy
T h e eigh teen th -cen tu ry Scottish o rig in s o f so c io lo g y have b een frequ en tly n o ted
(B ie rste d t 1 9 7 9 ; Sw in g e w o o d 1 9 9 1 ). A dam Sm ith , for in stan ce, in The Wealth o f
Nations ([1 7 7 6 ] 1 9 7 9 ), is c re d ited w ith an ticip atin g co m p arativ e h istorical so c io lo gy
and a m a c ro so c io lo g y o f in stitu tion s. A dam F e rg u so n , in An Essay on the History o f
Civil Society ([1 7 6 7 ] 1 9 6 6 ), is even m o re se cu re as a p r e c u rso r o f m o d e rn so c io lo gy
in his e x p lic it u n d e rstan d in g o f the social as d istin ct fro m the e co n o m ic c o n
se q u e n c e s o f the division o f lab o r and fo r his accou n t o f h isto ric d e v e lo p m en t.
W hat is se ld o m n o ted , how ever, but w hich is essen tial fo r an u n d erstan d in g o f each
o f th ese th in k ers, and fo r an ap p re ciatio n o f the in tellectu al fo rm a tio n o f the
S cottish E nligh ten m en t o f w hich they are a p a rt, is the im p o rta n ce they attach to
e m o tio n in m akin g sen se o f social relation sh ip s and as a fou n dation fo r th eir large r
social th e o rie s.
T h e re is a view that in The Wealth of Nations Sm ith d e v e lo p e d a line antith etical
to that o f his e arlie r b o o k , The Theory o f Moral Sentiments ([1 7 5 9 ] 1 9 8 2 ). It is held
that w h e reas on e p u rsu e s the th read o f eco n o m ic se lf-in te re st, the o th e r e x p a n d s on
sym path y as a b asis o f m o ral behavior. T h is read in g o f the relation sh ip b e tw e en
S m ith ’ s b o o k s m isin te rp re ts each o f them (M acfic and R aphael 1 9 7 6 , pp. 20 5).
W h at m u st b e em p h asized h ere is that the m uch n arro w e r focu s o f The Wealth o f
Nations, a d etailed w o rk in g o u t o f the c o n se q u e n c e s fo r e co n o m ic actio n s and
in stitu tion s o f “se lf-lo v e ,” d e riv e s from S m ith ’ s e arlie r th e o ry . Moral Sentiments
accou n ts for m o ral ju d g m e n t and social in teraction in te r m s o f p a rtic u la r e m o tio n s,
and a rg u e s that the cap acity fo r a sy m p ath etic echo o f th ese e m o tio n s in oth er
ac to rs is a fu rth e r d e te rm in an t o f social co n d u ct.
T h e u n d erp in n in g e m o tio n s fra m e w o rk o f F e rg u so n ’ s Essay on the History o f
Civil Society ([1 7 6 7 ) 1966) is unavoidable to its re a d e rs. T h e b o o k co n sists o f six
p a rts. T h e first and by far the lo n ge st is “ O f the G e n e ral C h arac te ristics o f H um an
N a tu re .” T h is fo rm s the m e th o d o lo g ic al and th e o retical b asis o f w hat follow 's, and
is largely c o n c e rn e d w ith the e m o tio n a l d isp o sitio n s asso ciate d w ith social and
p olitical relatio n s and organ ization .
T h e e x p la n ato ry value o f e m o tio n s c a te g o rie s can also be lo c ate d in the m a jo r
s o c io lo g ists o f the n in eteen th and early tw en tieth ce n tu rie s. A le x is de T o cq u ev ille,
G u stave Le B on , E m ile D u rk h e im , V ilfred o P areto , Ferdin and T o n n ie s, and G e o r g
S im m el are so m e o f the m o re n otab le. E u ro p ean so c io lo g ists w h o, in a n u m b e r o f
d ifferen t w ays, re g ard e d e m o tio n s c a te g o rie s as im p o rta n t e x p la n ato ry variab les.
D u rin g this sam e p e rio d A m erican so c io lo g y , in the w ork s o l such figu res as A lbion
S m all, W illiam G rah am Su m m n cr, and L e ste r Frank W ard, as w ell as E dw ard R o ss
and C h arles H o rto n C o o le y , fou n d e x p la n ato ry ro le s fo r e m o tio n s c a te g o rie s. A ll ol
this is m e n tio n e d h ere sim ply to indicate that d u rin g an e arlie r tim e it w:ou ld n ot
have b een n e c e ssa ry , as it is now , to show that a so cio lo g ic ally ro b u st u n d e rstan d in g
o f e m o tio n m akes g o o d sen se.
T h e ab sen ce o f M ax W eb er from the lists o f the p re ce d in g paragrap h is not
accid en tal. A n u m b e r o f c o m m e n ta to rs w ith p ro je c ts sim ila r to m y ow n have
re c ru ite d W eb er to th eir p u r p o se , argu in g that W eb er w as one so c io lo g ist wrho
re c o g n iz e d the e x p la n ato ry im p o rta n ce o f e m o tio n . W eb er did have an ideal type
c o n c e p tio n o f “affectual a c tio n ,” c e rtain ly ; b u t as T alcott P arso n s ([1 9 3 7 ] 1 9 6 8 ,
1 0 8 J A C K B A R B A L E T
pp. 6 4 7 —9 ), fo r in stan ce, has n o te d , this cate g o ry is prim arily re sid u a l, and w as not
positively u sed in W e b e r’s e m p irica l w o rk . P arso n s may e x a g g e ra te the ab sen ce
o f e m o tio n in W e b e r’ s e x p la n atio n s: it is n otio nally cen tral to (alth ough w holly
u n d evelop ed in) his ac co u n t o f ch arism atic au th o rity . T h e re are, in fact, m any
re fe re n ce s to e m o tio n in W e b e r’ s w o rk . H e in sists on the n ecessity o f passio n in the
callin g o f scien ce. T h e d iscu ssio n o f the ro le and p ractice o f the p rie sth o o d in
Ancient Judaism (W eb er [1 9 1 7 ] 1 9 6 7 ) in clu d es m uch on the gen eration o f e m o tio n
and its m an ip u latio n . E m o tio n is also im p o rta n t in W e b e r’ s discu ssio n o f the
P ro testan t eth ic and the sp irit o f c a p ita lism . A co n sid eratio n o f this latte r d iscu ssion
w ill be d e v e lo p e d in the fo llo w in g ch apter. It w ill be show n that W e b e r’ s acc o u n t o f
em o tio n is n ot only in itse lf se rio u sly flaw ed, but is associated w ith the exp u lsion
o f e m o tio n from so c io lo g y . It is this th em e w hich w ill be taken up h ere.
The exp u lsio n o f em otion from sociolo gy
[. . .]
C hanging fo rtu n e s o f m ass society
It is an e n d u rin g featu re o f political life that th ose wrho e x e rc ise p o w e r c x p c rie n c c

th eir en th u siasm s as re aso n ab le , b u t the en th u siasm s o f th ose w ho ch allen ge them as
u n reaso n ab le and e m o tio n a l. E ty m o lo g ic a lly , “en th u siasm ” is a state o f su p e rn atu ral
p o sse ssio n o r in sp iratio n , and in that sen se, as a state o f bein g m o v e d by an e x te rn al
c o n c e rn , it is inherently n on -ration al. T h e n in eteen th -cen tu rv th e o rists o f m ass
so c ie ty , fo r in stan ce, w ere at le ast p artly stim u late d in th eir acc o u n ts o f c o n te m
p o rary so ciety by a c o n ce rn for, if n o t a fear o f, the en th usiasm o f the p o p u lar
m a sse s fo r an arch ist, so cialist, and sy n d icalist id eas and en ga ge m e n ts. Social an alysts
do n ot n e cessarily e x p r e ss th em selv es th rough a political v ocab u lary . B ut the
salien ce o f an e m o tio n s te rm in o lo g y in the so c io lo g y o f the n in eteen th and early
tw en tieth c e n tu rie s re so n a te s w ell w ith the e m o tio n s w'hich the re se a rc h e rs th e m
selves e x p e rie n c e d d u rin g an h isto ric p e rio d o f un ruly c ro w d s, urban m a sse s, and
e c o n o m ic , p o litic a l, and social tran sfo rm a tio n s.
By the end o f the F irst W orld War, how ever, and certain ly by the 1 9 2 0 s, in
w estern E u ro p e and A m e ric a , the g e n e ra l im age o f a w holly th reaten in g seeth in g
social lan d scap e ap p e are d less ten able. T h e w ar itse lf had p e rm itte d p o litical states
to reg u late e c o n o m ie s and p o p u latio n s in a way w hich re in fo rc e d the c o n stitu tio n a l
ism that had b een d e v e lo p in g th ro u gh o u t E u ro p e d u rin g the n in eteenth c en tu ry . At
the sam e tim e , the in d u strial h eart-Iand co u ld by now b e re g ard e d as largely
p aciticd. In the p o st-w a r p e rio d o f re c o n stru c tio n , m ilitan t w o rk e rs and m a rg in al
ized radical e le m e n ts o l lab o r m o v e m e n ts w ere c alm e d by full e m p lo y m e n t (G allic
19 8 3 ; M id d le m as 1 9 7 9 ). W ith the c o n so lid atio n o f in dustrial o r d e r the w ork in g
classe s ceased to be re g ard e d as a th reat to “civilizatio n ” in the w ay that they had
p rev io u sly b een .
In ad d itio n , e c o n o m ic organ izatio n s w ere by this tim e in creasin gly large and
im p e rso n a l (B cn d ix 1 9 7 4 , pp. 21 1 2 6 ). An asso ciated d e v e lo p m e n t w as n o t only a
rise in the n u m b e r o f b lu e -c o lla r w 'orkers b u t at the sam e tim e th eir relative declin e
EMOTI ON IN SOCIAL LIFE AND SOCIAL T H E O R Y 1 0 9
as a p ro p o rtio n o f the w o rk fo rc e as a w h ole. T h is w as through a rise in the n u m b e rs

o f w h ite-co llar cle ric al, ad m in istrativ e, and sale s w o rk e rs w hich ac co m p an ie d
g ro w th in the size and im p o rta n ce o f o rgan izatio n s. T h e se fa c to rs to g e th e r
e n hanced the sen se o f a loss passion ate and an in creasin gly ration al social o rder.
O u t of th ese and asso c iate d d e v e lo p m e n ts, a new m o d e l o f social action gained
c u rre n cy , w hich se e m ed m o re c o m m e n su ra te w ith the e m e rg© e n t social and civic
J ’
e x p e rie n c e , and w hich gain ed p ro m in e n ce in so c io lo g ic a l thinking. It is from ab o u t
this tim e that e m o tio n c e ase s to find rcad v accc p tan cc as an e x p la n ato ry variable
in so c io lo g y . In fact, the te rm and co n ce p t cease to h old any real in te re st for
s o c io lo g ists at all. T h e se ch an ges w hich w e have acco u n ted for in political
e c o n o m ie s w ere su p p o rte d by in tellectu al d e v e lo p m en ts in allied discip lin es. (. . .)
The new rise o f em otion
. . . T h e o rth o d o x refu sal to a c c c p t the sign ifican ce o f e m o tio n in social p ro c e sse s

did find o p p o sitio n from the late 1 9 7 0 s, w hen a n u m b e r o f so c io lo g ic al w ork s
e x p re ssly d ealin g w ith e m o tio n in social p r o c e sse s b egan to appear. T h e creative
b u rst, from the late 1 9 7 0 s to the m id - 1 9 8 0 s, o f p a p e rs and b o o k s on e m o tio n in
social p ro c e sse s w as o f a sufficien t critical m a ss to ge n e ra te se rio u s discu ssio n and
d eb ate and to en co u ra g e o th e rs to join in. [. . .]
A s in all in tellectu al sea-ch a n g e s, e m e rg e n t tre n d s arc n ever con fin ed to a
single discip lin e. So it w as w ith the ren ew ed in terest in e m o tio n . H isto rical
sta rtin g -d ate s can only be in dicative, even sp e cu lativ e , o p e n in g s fo r d isc u ssio n ,
n ever definitive d e m a rc atio n s. T h e re fo cu s o f p sy ch o lo gy on to e m o tio n m igh t be
d ated as early as 1 9 6 4 , if Silvan T o m k in s’ s ag g re ssiv e “ In tro d u ctio n to A ffect
S y m p o siu m , APA 1 9 6 4 ” (T om kin s and Izard 1 9 6 6 , p. vii) can be taken as a gu id e.
C e rtain ly , from the 1 9 70s th ere w as e n o rm o u s g ro w th in p sy c h o lo g ic al research
on e m o tio n (L even th al and T om arken 1 9 8 6 ). In an th ro p o lo gy also, the early 19 7 0 s
sawr the b egin n in g o f new in te re st in e m o tio n (B rig g s 1 9 7 0 ; L evy 1 9 7 3 ), w hich
c on tin u ed to gain m o m e n tu m (L u tz and W h ite 1 9 8 6 ). Ph ilosoph y w as an oth er
d iscip lin e in w hich the ren ew ed in te re st in e m o tio n can be d ated from the 19 7 0 s
(N c u 1 9 7 7 ; S o lo m o n 1 9 7 6 ), although the p ro c e ss w as se t in m o tio n rath er earlier
(B e d fo rd 1 9 5 7 ; K enny 1 9 6 4 ; R y le 1 9 4 9 ). [. . .]
T h e notion that social agen ts arc sp o n tan e o u sly m oved by and su b je c t to e m o
tion is cen tral to the po sitio n that e m o tio n s are u n iv e rsal, ob jectively asce rtain ab le ,
and b io lo gically ro o te d . T h e idea that social ag en ts m ay c o n tro l o r m an age their
e m o tio n s is co re to the view that e m o tio n s are cu ltu ral artificats relative to p a r
ticu lar so c ie tie s, sign ifican tly su b je ctiv e, and p h e n o m e n o lo g ically g ro u n d e d . In
so cio lo g y th ese differen t asp ec ts o f e m o tio n arc differen tially em p h asized by d if
feren t ap p ro ac h es. T h e idea that e m o tio n is re sp o n sib le fo r social o u tc o m e s has
b een em ph asized by w 'riters such as T h o m a s S ch eff and T h e o d o re K em p er. T h e
o th er p o ssib ility , w hich se e m s to d om in ate ce rtain so c io lo g ic al acco u n ts o f em o tio n
at the p re se n t tim e , is that e m o tio n is prin cip ally a c o n se q u e n c e o f cu ltu ral and
cogn itiv e, as o p p o se d to so c ial-stru c tu ral and re la tio n al, p ro c e sse s. T h is is the
ap p ro ach w hich c o n c cn tra tcs on the “social c o n stru c tio n ” o f e m o tio n .
1 1 0 JACK B A R B A L E T
Constructionism and culturc
N ew Social M ovem en ts, from the 1970s, challenged prevailing political arran ge
m en ts and un derm in ed received conventions o f social status. T h ese M ovem ents,
w hich include the W o m en ’ s, the Environm ental, and the Black M ovem ents, also
con tribu ted to the new aw areness o f the significance o f em otio n in social and
cultural pro cesses. A m ajo r concern o f the N ew Social M ovem ents has been that o f
identity. The politics o f iden tity, in gettin g away from the idea that the political
standing o f perso n s is bequeathed to them by facto rs they are subordin ate to and
cannot influence, em phasized instead the conventional and custo m ary as opp osed
to the natural elem en ts o f being. That is, they em phasized the cultural and social
con stru ction o f the “p e rso n ” and their “ id en tity .” E m otion , too, can be seen in this
light. But if this is its only illum ination the im age is d isto rte d , and the value of the
co n cep t for sociological research and analysis is lost: in the con stru ction ist view
em otion rem ains a con sequen ce o f other forces and its capacity for influencing
social p ro ce sse s is neglected if not im plicitly denied. [. . .]
References
Bedford, Errol. 1957. “E m otions.” Proceedings o j the Aristotelian Society, n.s.

5 7 :2 8 1 - 3 0 7 .
Bendix, Reinhard. 1964. Nation-Building and Citizenship. N ew York: W ilev. 1974. Work
and Authority in Industry. Second edn. Berkeley: University o f California
Press.
Bierstedt, R obert. 1979. “Sociological Thought in the Eighteenth C entury.” Pp 3 38 in
A History o f Sociological Analysis, ed. Tom Bottom ore and R obert N isbet. London:
Heinemann.
Briggs, Jean I.. 1970. Never in Anger: Portrait o j an Eskimo Family. C am bridge, Mass.:
Harvard U niversity Press.
Ferguson, Adam. [1767] 1966. An Essay on the History o j Civil Society. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
Gallie, Duncan, 1983. Social Inequality and Class Radicalism in France and Britain.
C am bridge: Cam bridge University Press.
Kem per, Theodore D. 1991. “ An Introduction to the Sociology o f E m otions.”
Pp. 3 0 1 -4 9 in International Review o f Studies on F.motion, vol. 1, ed. K. T. Stong-
man. Newr York John W ilev.
Kenny, Anthony. 1964. Action, Emotion and Will. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
I.eventhal, Howard and Andrew'. J. Tomarken. 1986. “Em otion: Today’s Problem s.”
Annual Review o f Psycholog)', 37: 565 610.
Levy, R obert I. 1973. Tahitians: Mind and Experience in the Society Island. Chicago:
Chicago University Press.
Lutz, Catherine and Geoffrey M. W hite. 1986. “The Anthropology' o f E m otions.”
Annual Review o j Anthropology-, I 5: 405 36.
Macfie, A. L. and D. D. Raphael. 1976. “Introduction.” Pp. 1-5 2 in Adam Smith: the
Theory o f Moral Sentiments. O xford: O xford University Press.
M cCarthy, E. Doyle. 1989. “ Em otions are Social Things: an Essay in the Sociology of
Em otions.” Pp. 51 72 in The Sociology’ o f Emotions: Original Essays and Research
EMOTION IN SOCIAL LIFE AND SOCIAL T H E O R Y 1 1 1
Papers, eel. David Franks and E. D oyle M cC arthy. G reenw ich , C o n n .: JAI
Press.
M iddlem as, Keith. 1979. Politics in an Industrial Society: the Experience o f the British System
Since 1911. Lon don : A ndre D eutsch.
N eu , Jero m e. 1977. Emotion, Thought and Therapy: Hume and Spinoza, Theories o f Emotion
and Therapy. London: R outledge & Kegan Paul.
Parsons, Talcott. [1937] 1968. The Structure o f Social Action. N ew York: Free Press.
R yle, G ilb ert. 1949. The Concept o f Mind. London: H utchinson.
Sm ith, A dam . [1759] 1982. The Theory o f Moral Sentiments. O x fo rd : O x fo rd U niversity
Press.
[1776] 1979. An Inquiry in the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations. O x fo rd :
O x fo rd U niversity Press.
Solom on , R o b e rt C . 1976. The Passions. G arden C ity, N .Y .: A nchor Press and
D oubleday.
Sw ingew ood, Alan. 1991. A Short History o f Sociological Thought. 2nd edn. London:
M acm illan.
Tom kins, Silvan S. and C arroll E. Izard. 1966. Affect, Cognition, and Personality: Empirical
Studies. London: Tavistock.
Weber, M ax. [1904] 1949. “ ‘O b jectivity ’ in Social Scien ce.” Pp. 50—112 in The
Methodology o f the Social Sciences, ed. Edw ard A. Shils and H enry A. Finch. Newr
York: Free Press.
[1917] 1967. Ancient fudaism. Newr York: Free Press.
Chapter 10
Erving Goffman
E M B A R R A S S M E N T AND
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
Causes o f em barrassm ent
E
m b a r r a s s m e n t h a s t o d o w i t h unfulfilled expectation s
but not o f a statistical kind. Given their social iden tities and the setting, the
participan ts will sense w hat so rt of conduct ought to be m aintained as the ap p ro
priate thing, how ever m uch they may d espair o f its actually occurrin g. An individual
may firm ly ex p e ct that ccrtain others w ill m ake him ill at ease, and yet this
kn ow ledge may increase his discom fiture instead o f lessening it. An entirely
u n expected flash o f social en gin eerin g may save a situation, all the m ore effectively
for being unanticipated.
The exp ectation s relevant to em b arrassm en t arc m oral, then, but e m b arrass
m en t d oes not arise from the breach o f any m oral exp ectation , for som e infractions
give rise to resolu te m oral indignation and no un easiness at all. Rather we should
look to those m oral obligations w hich su rrou n d the individual in only one o f his
cap acities, that o f som eon e w ho c arrie s on social en cou n ters. The individual, o f
c o u rse , is obliged to rem ain c o m p o se d , b ut this tells us that things arc goin g w ell,
not w hy. And things go well or badly b ecause o f w hat is perceived about the social
identities o f those presen t.
D urin g interaction the individual is ex p e cted to p o ssess certain attribu tes,
cap acities, and in form ation wrhich, taken togeth er, fit togeth er into a s e lf that is at
once coherently unified and ap p ro p riate for the occasion. Through the expressive
im plications o f his stream o f con duct, through m ere participation itself, the in di
vidual effectively projects this acceptable se lf into the interaction , although he
may not be aw are o f it, and the others may not be aw are o f having so in terp reted his
conduct. At the sam e tim e he m ust accept and hon or the selves p rojected by the
E M B A R R A S S M E N T AND SOCIAL ORG ANIZAT ION 1 1 3
other participan ts. The elem en ts o f a social encounter, then, consist o f effectively
projected claim s to an acceptable sell and the confirm ation o f like claim s on the part
o f the oth ers. The con tribu tion s o f all are o rien ted to these and built up on the basis
o f them .
W hen an event throw s doub t upon or d iscredits these claim s, then the
en coun ter finds itse lf lodged in assum p tion s w hich no lon ger hold. The respo nses
the parties have m ade rcadv arc now out o f place and m u st be choked b ack , and the
in teraction m u st be re co n stru cted . [. . .]
Th ere arc many classic circum stan ces un der w hich the se lf p rojected by an
individual may be discred ited , causing him sham e and em b arrassm en t over w hat he
has or ap pears to have done to h im self and to the interaction . To exp erien ce a
sudden change in status, as by m arriage o r p ro m o tio n , is to acquire a se lf that other
individuals w ill not fully ad m it because o f their lingering attachm en t to the old self.
To ask for a job , as loan o f m oney, or a hand in m arriage is to p ro jec t an im age o f
se lf as w orth y , under con ditions w here the one w ho can discredit the assum ption
may have go od reason to do so. To affect the style o f o n e ’s occupational or social
b e tters is to m ake claim s that may w ell be discredited by o n e ’ s lack o f fam iliarity
w ith the role.
The physical stru ctu re o f an en coun ter itse lf is usually accorded certain
sym bolic im plication s, so m e tim e s leading a participan t against his w ill to project
claim s about h im self that are false and em barrassin g. Physical closen ess easily
im plies social closen ess, as anyone know s w ho has h appened upon an intim ate
gath erin g not m eant for him o r who has found il necessary to carry on fraternal
“ sm all talk” w ith som eon e lo o high o r low or stran ge to ever be a brother. Sim ilarly,
if there is to be talk, som eon e m ust initiate it, feed it, and term in ate it; and these
acts may aw kw ardly su gg est rankings and pow er w hich are out o f line w ith the
facts.
Various kinds ol recu rren t en cou n ters in a given society may share the assu m p
tion that participan ts have attained certain m oral, m en tal, and ph ysiognom ic
stan dards. The p e rso n w ho falls sh o rt may everyw here find h im self inadvertently
trap ped into m aking im plicit identity claim s w hich he cannot fulfil. C o m p ro m ised
in every en coun ter w hich he e n te rs, he trulv w ears the le p e r’ s bell. The individual
w ho m o st isolates h im self from social con tacts may then be the least insulated from
the dem and s o f society . A nd, if he only im agines that he p o sse sses a disqualifying
attribu te, his ju d gm en t o f h im self may be in error, but in the light o f it his w ith
drawal from contact is reason able. In any case, in decidin g w'hether an in dividual’ s
gro u n d s for shyness are real or im aginary, one should seek not for “justifiable”
disqualifications but for the m uch larger range o f ch aracteristics w'hich actually
em b arrass encoun ters.
In all these settin gs the sam e fundam ental thing o ccu rs: the expressive facts
at hand threaten o r discredit the assum p tion s a participan t finds he has projected
about his id en tity .7 T h ereafter those presen t find they can neither do w ith out the
assum p tion s n or base their ow n resp o n ses upon them . The inhabitable reality
shrinks until everyone feels “sm all” or out o f place. [. . .]
1 1 4 ERV1NG GO F FM A N
Domain o f em barrassm ent
Having started w ith psychological con sideration s, we have com e by stages to a

stru ctu ral sociological point o f view. P reced en t co m cs from social an th ropo lo gists
and their analyses o f joking and avoidance. O n e assum es that em b arrassm en t is a
n orm al p art o f n orm al social life, the individual b eco m in g uneasy not because he is
personally m aladjusted but rath er b ecause he is n ot; presum ably anyone with his
com bin ation o f statuses w ould do likew ise. In an em pirical study o f a particular
social sy stem , the first ob ject w ould be to learn what categories o f p erso n s becom e
em b arrassed in what recu rren t situations. And the second o b ject w ould be to
discover what w ould happen to the social system and the fram ew ork o f obligations
if em b arrassm en t had not com e to be system atically built into it.
An illustration may be taken from the social life o f large social establish
m en ts— office buildings, sch o o ls, h ospitals, etc. H ere, in elevators, halls, and cafe
terias, at new'sstands, vending m ach ines, snack co u n ters, and en tran ces, all
m em b ers arc often form ally on an equal il distant footing. . . . C uttin g across
these relationships o f equality and distance is another set o f relation ships, arising in
w ork team s w hose m e m b e rs arc ranked by such things as prestige and authority and
yet drawn togeth er by join t en terp rise and personal know ledge o f one another.
In many large establish m en ts, staggered w ork h ou rs, segregated cafeterias, and
the like help to insure that those w ho arc ranked and close in one set o f relations
will not have to find them selves in physically intim ate situations w here they arc
ex p e cted to m aintain equality and distance. The d em ocratic orien tation o f som e o f
our new er establish m en ts, however, tends to throw differently placed m em b ers
o f the sam e w ork team togeth er at places such as the cafeteria, causing them
uneasiness. T h ere is no w'ay for them to act that d ocs not disturb one o f the two
basic sets o f relation s in w hich they stand to each other. T h ese difficulties arc
especially likely to occu r in elevators, for there individuals w ho arc not quite on
chatting term s m ust rem ain for a tim e to o close togeth er to ign ore the opp ortu n ity
for in form al talk— a problem solved, o f co u rse , fo r som e, by special executive
elevators. E m b arrassm en t, then, is built into the establish m ent ecologically.
B ccausc o f p ossessin g m ultiple selves the individual may find he is required
both to be presen t and to not be presen t on certain occasions. E m barrassm en t
en sues: the individual finds h im self being torn ap art, how ever gently. C o r re
sponding to the oscillation o f his con duct is the oscillation o f his self.
Social function o f em barrassm ent
W hen an in dividual’s p ro jecte d self is threatened durin g interaction, he may with

poise su pp ress all signs o f sham e and em b arrassm en t. N o flu sterin gs, or efforts to
conceal having seen th em , ob tru d e upon the sm ooth flow o f the en cou n ter; p a rtic i
pants can proceed as if no incident has o ccu rred .
W hen situations arc saved, however, som eth in g im p ortan t may be lost. By
show ing em b arrassm en t when he can be n either o f tw o p e o p le, the individual leaves
open the possibility that in the future he may effectively be cither. H is role in
the cu rren t interaction may be sacrificed, and even the en coun ter itself, but he
E M B A R R A S S M E N T AND SOCIAL ORG ANIZAT ION 1 1 5
dem on strates that, w hile he cannot presen t a substainable and coh eren t se lf on this
occasion , he is at least d istu rb ed by the fact and may prove w orthy at another
tim e. To this e xten t, em b arrassm en t is not an irrational im pulse breakin g through
socially p re scrib e d behavior but p a rt o f this orderly behavior itself. Flusterin gs
arc an ex tre m e exam p le o f that im p o rtan t class o f acts w hich arc usually quite
spon tan eous and yet no less required and obligatory than on es self-con sciously
p e rfo rm e d .
Behind a conflict in identity lies a m o re fundam ental conflict, one o f organiza
tional prin ciple, since the self, for m any p u rp o se s, con sists m erely o f the application
o f legitim ate organizational prin ciples to o n e ’s self. O n e builds o n e ’s identity out
o f claim s w hich, if den ied, give one the right to feel righteously indignant. Behind
the ap p re n tice ’ s claim s for a full share in the use o f certain plant facilities there is
the organizational p rin ciple: all m e m b e rs o f the establish m en t arc equal in ccrtain
ways qua m em b ers. Behind the sp e cialist’s dem and for suitable financial recogn ition
there is the prin ciple that the type o f w ork, n ot m ere w ork, determ in es status. The
fum blings o f the appren tice and the specialist w hen they reach the C oca-C o la
m achine at the sam e tim e e xp re ss an incom patibility o f organizational prin ciples.
The principles o f organization o f any social system are likely to com e in conflict
at ccrtain points. Instead o f p erm ittin g the conflict to be e x p re sse d in an encounter,
the individual places h im se lf betw een the opp osin g prin ciples. H e sacrifices his
identity for a m om en t, and so m e tim e s the encounter, but the prin ciples are p re
served . He may be groun d betw een opp osin g assum p tion s, thereby preventing
direct friction betw een them , or he may be alm o st pulled ap art, so that prin ciples
with little relation to one anoth er may op erate together. Social stru ctu re gains
elasticity; the individual m erely loses com p o su re.
Chapter 11
Susan Shott
EMOTION AND SOCIAL LIFE

A s y m b o lic in te ra c tio n is t a n a ly s is
The socialization and construction o f feeling
S
OCIAL NORMS CLEARLY H A V E S U B S T A N T I A L im pact on the
in terp retation , e x p re ssio n , and arousal of em otio n , a point succinctly m ade
by C lifford G e e rtz (1 9 7 3 , p. 8 1 ): “ N o t only ideas, but em otio n s to o , arc cultural
artificats.” W h eth er em otional explan ations arc con sidered ap pro priate to a
given situation , and w hich em o tio n , if any, is w arran ted , arc suggested by social
n orm s. [. . .]
T h ere is a social fram ew ork that m odifies the a c to r’s e x p e rie n c e , in terp retation ,
and expression o f em otion. This p ro ce ss o f affective socialization can probably be
d escrib ed adequately by using b asic assu m p tion s about cultural and social influences
com m on to m o st sociological (and an th ropological) persp ectives. . . . But there is
another dim ension o f affective exp e rie n ce , the con struction o f em otion by the
actor, w hich I believe can be b est u n d erstood by applying a sym bolic interaction ist
persp ective. For this orien tation focu ses on the a c to r’s definitions and in te rp re t
ations and on the em erg en t, co n stru cted ch aracter o f m uch hum an behavior, both
o f w hich arc ccntral to the a c to r’ s c x p c ric n c c o f an em otio n : . . . M oreover, the
sym bolic interactionist analysis to be presen ted here ties togeth er a n um ber o f
em pirical studies o f affect by attribution theorists.
Four m ajo r ten ets o f sym bolic in teractionism are especially ap pro priate for
explicatin g the a c to r’ s co n stru ction o f affect:
1. Study o f the actor’s definitions and interpretations is essential fo r an understanding
o f human conduct (M anis and M eltzer 1978, p. 8). W hen reflective hum an action is
con cern ed , independent variables do not autom atically influence depen dent
variables. Instead, their im pact is m ediated by interp retation and definition, which
E M OTIO N A N D SOC I A L LI F E 1 1 7
arc n ot ju st in te rv en in g v ariab les but “ fo rm a tiv e o r creative p ro c e ss[e s] in [their]

ow n rig h t” (B lu m cr 1969 p. 1 3 5 ). H c n c c , d efin itio n s and in te rp re tatio n s arc
essen tial to social b eh avior and m u st be in clu ded in m o st so c io lo g ic al re se arch .
2. Human behavior is emergent, continually constructed during its execution (B lu m cr
19 6 9 , p. 8 2 ). T h e m ean in g o f an act is so m ew h at vo latile, sincc acts arc in te rp re ted
and defined con tin u ou sly (by the a c to r and o th e rs) w hile b e in g ca rric d o u t. C o n
se q u en tly , hum an c o n d u c t is actively c o n stru cte d and can b e tran sfo rm e d in its
m akin g through re in tc rp re tatio n and red efin ition .
3. The actions o j individuals are influenced by their internal states and impulses in
addition to external events and stimuli, for actors’ perceptions and interpretations are shaped
by theform er as well as the latter (H e w itt 1 9 7 6 , p. 4 7 ). P h y sio logical o r p sy ch o lo gical
im p u lse s, on ce n o tic e d , fo rm the b egin n in g o f an act and m o tiv ate the ac to r towrard
its c o n su m m atio n (M ead 1 9 3 8 , pp. 3—8, 2 3 —2 5 ). In n o sen se d o e s the im p u lse
d e te rm in e the act, b u t it is a sign ifican t co m p o n e n t o f action and ad ds to its dy n am ic
character.
4 . Social structures and normative regulation are theframework o f human action rather
than its determinant, shaping behavior without dictating it. S tru c tu ra l fe atu re s (cu ltu re ,
sy ste m s, stratification , ro le s, e tc .) shape b eh avior only in so far as they influence the
situ ation s that are the se ttin g o f action and p rovid e the sy m b o ls used to in te rp re t
situ atio n s; they do not d e te rm in e h um an c o n d u ct. |. . .]
Social co n tro l and the rolc-tak in g-cm o tio n s
11 th ere is any area in w hich the so c io lo g ic al relevan ce o f sen tim e n ts is m o st ev id en t,

it may be that o f so cial c o n tro l; and sy m b o lic in te ractio n ist th co rv is qu ite useful
h ere, as w ell. O n e s o r t of fe elin g s, w hich I shall call ro le-tak in g e m o tio n s, is really
the fou n dation for the large p a rt o f social co n tro l that is se lf-c o n tro l. U nlike
oth er feelin gs, w hich d o n ot require ro le takin g fo r th eir e v o catio n , ro le-tak in g
e m o tio n s can n ot o c c u r w ith ou t p u ttin g o n e se lf in an o th e r’ s p o sitio n and takin g that
p e r s o n ’ s p e r sp e c tiv e ; T h u s, an in dividual e x p e rie n c in g a ro le-tak in g se n tim en t
(e .g ., e m b a rra ssm e n t o r sh am e) has first cogn itiv ely taken the ro le o f so m e real or
im agin ary o th e r o r the g en eralized other, w hich M ead (1 9 3 4 , p. 154) d e sc rib e s
as “the organ ized co m m u n ity o r social g ro u p w hich giv es to the in dividual his unit
o f s e lf.” [T . .]
R o le -tak in g sen tim e n ts are o f tw o ty p e s: reflexive ro le-tak in g e m o tio n s, w hich
arc d irc c tc d to w ard o n e se lf and c o m p rise gu ilt, sh am e, e m b a rra ssm e n t, p rid e , and
vanity; and cm p ath ic ro le-tak in g e m o tio n s, w hich arc evok ed by m entally placin g
o n e se lf in an o th e r’ s p o sitio n and feelin g w hat the o th e r feels o r w hat on e w'ould feel
in such a p o sitio n . R eflexiv e ro le-tak in g feelin gs entail co n sid e rin g how o n e ’ s se lf
ap p e ars to o th e rs o r the g e n e ra lize d o th e r an d, un less e x p e rie n c e d em p ath etically ,
are d ire c ted to w ard o n e se lf. . . . B oth reflexive and em p ath ic ro le-tak in g e m o tio n s,
as I shall atte m p t to show in this se ctio n , arc sign ifican t m o tiv ato rs o f n o rm ativ e and
m o ral co n d u ct an d, h cn cc, facilitate social c o n tro l. [. . .]
T h re e fu n dam en tal p ro p o sitio n s o f sy m b o lic in teractio n ism are p articu larly
relevan t to this area:
1. Individuals have the capacity to treat themselves as objects (B lu m e r 1 9 6 9 , p. 8 2 ).
1 1 8 SUS AN SHOTT
T h ough t, in fact, is nothing m ore than internalized conversation with o n e se lf and

requires treatin g o n e se lf as a social o b ject. T h us, individuals can take them selves into
account as facto rs in the situation (H ew itt 1976) and evaluate their actions and selves.
2. The self-conceptions o f actors and their capacity f o r mental self-interaction are
derived largely from role taking (with specific others or the generalized other) H ence,
individuals often learn ab out, and exp e rie n ce , them selves indirectly, by taking
tow ard them selves the attitudes o f o th e rs; only in this m ann er can they b eco m e
ob jects to them selves
3. Social control is, in large part, self-control. Because peop le can view them selves
as others d o, social con trol can operate in term s o f se lf-criticism , e xertin g itself
“intim ately and exten sively over individual behavior [and] servin g to integrate
the individual and his actions w ith referen ce to the organ ized social p rocess o f
e xp erien ce and behavior in w hich he is im plicated” (M ead 1934, p. 2 5 5 ). The
gen eralized other is particularly im p ortan t for this kind o f social con trol, sincc it is
the m eans by w hich the attitudes o f the com m un ity or g ro u p arc in corpo rated
within individuals and influence their thinking and con duct (M ead 1934, p. 155).
I low' do the reflexive role-taking sen tim en ts facilitate social con trol? M ost
obviously, gu ilt, sham e, and em b arrassm en t check and punish deviant behavior;
each, however, is evoked by different circum stan ces. G uilt is the feeling that ac co m
panies the “negative self-evaluation which oc c u rs when an individual ack n ow ledges
that his behavior is at variance with a given m oral value to which he feels obligated
to c o n fo rm ” (A usubel 1955, p. 379). H en ce, it is evoked w hen one com m its or
con tem p lates so m e “ im m o ral” action , then takes the role o f the generalized other
(or so m e significant other) and accepts its perceived judgm en t o f o neself as m orally
inadequate. Sham e, however, d oes not stem from the sen se o f moral inadequacy that
is the foundation of gu ilt; rather, it results from “an actual or presu m ed negative
judgm en t o f [oneself] resulting in sclf-depreciation vis-a-vis the g ro u p ” (A usubel
1955, p. 3 8 2 ). R iczlcr (1 9 4 3 , p. 4 5 9 ) su ggests that sham e occu rs wrhcn on e is
fo rce d , by taking the ro le o f o th ers . . . to sec that others do not acccpt an idealized
self-im age that one has built up. Sham e is not the sam e as em b arrassm en t, even
though em b arrassm en t is often treated as a form o f sham e. . . . For sham e is
provoked by the realization that others . . . con sider o n e ’s self deficient, w hile
e m b arrassm en t arises from aw areness that others . . . view o n e ’s presentation o f self
as in ept. An inadequate se lf usually entails a bungled presentation o f self; hence,
sham e is generally accom pan ied by em b arrassm en t. The con verse, however, is not
tru e ; em b arrassm en t is n ot, as a ru le , follow ed by sham e. In M odiglian i’s (1 9 6 8 ,
p. 315) w ords, a “failure in sclf-prcscn tation . . . d oes not underm in e the indi
vidual’s general identity, rather, it discredits a m uch m ore re stricte d situational
identity which he is projectin g into the cu rrcn t in teractio n .”
U nlike oth er em otio n s that foster social con trol (such as fear), these em otio ns
are frequently evoked even w hen oth ers are not w atching, w'hen there is no threat
o f being caught in o n e ’s m isd eed . O f these feelin gs, em b arrassm en t seem s to be the
m ost closely linked with the actual presen ce o f oth ers, sham e seem s less con nected
to the presen ce o f oth ers, and guilt least tied to il. This may be due to the possibility
that em b arrassm en t is evoked m ost often by con siderin g how o n e ’ s se lf ap pears to
specific oth ers, guilt depen ds prim arily on taking the role o f the gen eralized other,
and sham e is in term ed iate in this resp ect. . . . In the final analysis, w ithout our
E M OT I O N A N D S OC I A L LI F E 1 1 9
capacity to exp erien ce these sen tim en ts, society as we know il w ould surely be
im possible.
The sam e is true o f pride and vanity, w hich olten rew ard n orm ative and m oral
con duct, and em pathy, w hich m oves us to leel joy o r g r ie f at an oth er’ s situation and
thereby tics us, at least m om en tarily , to that perso n . Pride and vanity accom pany an
enhanced self-con ception that co m e s from taking the role o f real or im aginary
others or the generalized other and discoverin g approbation . C ooley (1 9 6 4 , p. 2 3 2 )
d escrib es prid e as the “form social self-approval takes in the m o re rigid and sclf-
sufficicnt so rt o f m inds; the p erso n w ho feels it is assured that he stands well with
others w hose opinion he cares for.” Vanity, unlike p rid e, is an unstable and transient
em otio n ; it is the form social self-approval may take when one is not sure o f o n e ’ s
self-im age or the approval o f o th ers (C o o le y 1964, p. 2 3 4 ). Vain p erso n s are th ere
fore m ore im m ediately depen den t on oth ers for their self-con ceptio n s, which
change each tim e they take the role o f another. But, clearly, both prid e and vanity
may en courage n orm ative and m oral conduct (even w hen oth ers are not actually
presen t) by rew ardin g such behavior w'ith pleasurable feeling. As I shall show below1,
em pathy to o tends to p ro m p t m oral behavior.
R eturn ing to gu ilt, sham e, and em b arrassm en t, these feelings not only punish
deviant behavior but also con tribu te to social con trol in a m ore positive fashion.
A n u m b er o f exp e rim e n ts have shown that guilt and em b arrassm en t en courage
altruistic conduct by those experien cin g them . [. . .]
W hat seem s to be com m on to these altruistic o r reparative acts is an attem p t
to repair o n e ’ s self-con ception or self-presen tation and convince others o f o n e ’ s
m oral w orthin ess o r com p eten ce. G uilt is relieved when role taking w ith others
or the gen eralized other enables people to see them selves on ce again as m orally
adequate. ( . . . )
The m otivation p rom pting altru istic con duct by em b arrassed p erso n s is in all
likelihood, quite sim ilar. People suffering em b arrassm en t probably w ish to convince
others (o r them selves) that they arc really c om p eten t p eo p le, capablc enough to
assist oth ers, and not the clods indicated by their inept or foolish p erform an ce. By
rep airin g their situational iden tities in this fashion, they m itigate their unpleasant
feelings o f em b arrassm en t. And ju st as tran sg re sso rs arc reluctan t to interact w ith
their victim s, em b arrassed individuals attem p t to m inim ize interaction w'ith those
w ho have w itn essed their inept perfo rm an ce (Brow n and G arland 1971). [. . .]
All o f the role-taking em otio n s, then, further social con trol by encouragin g
self-con trol; they are largely respon sib le for the fact that a gre at deal o f p e o p le ’s
behavior accord s with social n o rm s even w'hen no e xtern al rew ards or punishm ents
are evident. T h e im portan ce o f this for social life is ob vious: since it is im possible
fo r a society to m on ito r and sanction ev ery o n e’ s behavior all the tim e, self-
regulation m u st be the basis o f m uch social con trol. W hile sym bolic intcraction ists
have lon g stressed this poin t . . . they have ten ded to focus only on the cognitive
asp ects o f self-con trol, particularly role taking and self-interaction . But even though
the abilities to take the role o f the other and treat o n e se lf as an ob ject m ake
role-takin g em otio n s possib le, these capacities arc nearly useless for social control
w ithout their affective accom panim en ts. . . .
1 2 0 SUSAN SHOTT
References
Ausubcl, David P. 1955. “Relationships between Shame and Guilt in the Socializing
Proccss.” Psychological Review 62 (Septem ber): 378—90.
Blumcr, H erbert. 1969. Symbolic Interactionism. Englewood Cliffs, N .J.: Prcnticc-Hall.
Brown, Bert R ., and Howard Garland. 1971. “The Effects o f Incompctcncy, Audience
Acquaintanceship, and Anticipated Evaluative Feedback on Face-Saving Behavior.”
Journal i f Experimental Social Psychology 7 (Septem ber): 490—502.
Cooley, Charles Horton, 1962. Social Organization. Ncwr York: Schockcn.
— . 1964. Human Nature and the Social Order. New' York: Schockcn.
G ccrtz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic.
Hewitt, John P. 1976. Self and Society. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Manis, Jerom e G ., and Bernard N. Mcltzcr, cds. 1978. Symbolic Interactionism. 3d cd.
Boston: Allvn
J
& Bacon.
Mead, George Herbert. 1934. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
— . 1938. The Philosophy i f the Act. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press.
Modigliani, Andre. 1968. “Embarrassment and Embarrassability.” Sociometry 31
(Septem ber): 313-26.
Riczlcr, Kurt. 1943. “Com m ent on the Social Psychology of Shame.” American Journal of
Sociology 48 (January): 457—65.
Chapter 12
Arlie Russell Hochschild
EMOTION WORK, F E E L I N G RULES,

AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
W
HY IS T H E EMOTIVE EXPERIENCE o f n orm al adults in daily
life as orderly as it is? W hy, generally speakin g, do p eop le feel gay at p arties,
sad at funerals, happy al w eddings? This question leads us to exam in e, n ot conven
tions o f appearan ce or outw ard c o m p o rtm e n t, but conventions o f feeling. C o n
ventions o f feeling b eco m e su rp risin g only when wre im agine, by con trast, what
totally u n p attern ed , un predictable em otiv e life m ight actually be like at p arties,
funerals,’ w ed dinOgs,7 and in the tamilvJ o r w ork life of n orm al adults.
Ervin g G offm an (1 9 6 1 ) su ggests both the su rp rise to be explain ed and p art of
the explan ation: “ . . . We find that participants will hold in check ccrtain p sy ch o
logical states and attitu d es, for after all, the very general ru le that one en ter into the
prevailing m ood in the en coun ter carrics the un derstandin g that con tradictory
feelings w ill be in abeyance. . . . So generally, in fact, docs one su pp ress unsuitable
affect, that w e need to look at offenses to this ru le to be rem in ded o f its usual
op eratio n ” (G offm an 1961, p. 2 3 ). If we take this passage seriou sly , as I urge we
do, we may be led back to the classic question o f social o rd e r from a particular
vantage point— that o f em otion m anagem en t. From this vantage poin t, ru les seem
to govern how' p eop le try to try n ot to feel in w ays “ap pro priate to the situ atio n .”
Such a notion su ggests howr profoundly the individual is “so c ia l,” and “socialized”
to try to pay tribu te to official definitions o f situations, with no less than their
feelings.
L et m e pause to poin t out that there are tw o possible approach es to the social
ord erin g o f em otive exp erien ce. O n e is to study the social facto rs that induce or
stim ulate prim ary (i.e ., n onreflective, though by definition con scious) em otio n s—
em otio n s passively undergone. T h e other is to study secondary acts p e rfo rm e d
upon the on goin g nonrcflective stream o f prim ary em otive exp e rie n ce . T h e first
1 2 2 A R LI E R U SS E L L H OC H S C H I L D
a p p r o a c h f o c u s e s on h ow s o c ia l fa c to r s a ffe c t w h a t p e o p le f e e l, th e s e c o n d on h ow
s o c ia l f a c t o r s a ffe c t w h a t p e o p le th in k an d d o a b o u t w h a t th ey fe e l ( i .e . , a c ts o f
a s s e s s m e n t an d m a n a g e m e n t) . T h o s e w h o ta k e th e fir s t a p p r o a c h m ig h t r e g a r d
th o se w ho ta k e th e s e c o n d as b e in g “ o v e rly c o g n it iv e .” B u t in la c t th e tw o
a p p r o a c h e s a r c c o m p a tib le , an d in d e e d th e s e c o n d , tak e n h e r e , r e lie s o n s o m e
a c c u m u la tio n o f k n o w le d g e g a r n e r e d fro m th e fir s t. [. . .]
E m o tio n w o rk
B y “ e m o t io n w 'ork ” I r e f e r to th e a c t o f tr y in g t o c h a n g e in d e g r e e o r q u a lity an
e m o tio n o r fe e lin g . To ‘\ v o r k o n ” an e m o t io n o r fe e lin g is , fo r o u r p u r p o s e s , th e
s a m e as “t o m a n a g e ” an e m o tio n o r to d o “ d e e p a c t in g .” N o t e th a t “ e m o t io n w o r k ”
r e f e r s to th e e f fo r t — th e a c t o f tr y in g — an d n o t t o th e o u t c o m e , w h ic h m a y o r m a y
n o t b e s u c c e s s fu l. F a ile d a c ts o f m a n a g e m e n t still in d ic a te w’h at id e a l f o r m u la tio n s
g u id e th e e f f o r t , an d on th a t a c c o u n t a r c n o le s s in te r e s t in g th an e m o t io n m a n a g e
m e n t th a t w o rk s.
T h e v e ry n o tio n o f an a t te m p t s u g g e s t s an a c tiv e sta n c e v is- a - v is fe e lin g . In m y
e x p lo r a t o r y stu d y r e s p o n d e n t s c h a r a c te r iz e d th e ir e m o t io n w o r k b y a v a r ie ty o f
a c tiv e v e rb f o r m s ; “ I psyched m yself up. . . . I squashed m y a n g e r d o w n . . . . I tried hard
n o t to fe e l d is a p p o in te d . . . . I m ade m y s e lf h ave a g o o d tim e . . . . I tried to fe e l
g r a t e fu l. . . . I killed th e h o p e I h ad b u r n in g .” T h e r e w a s a lso th e a c tiv e ly p a ssiv e
f o r m , as in , “ I let m yself fin ally fe e l s a d .”
E m o tio n w o r k d iffe r s fro m e m o t io n “ c o n t r o l” o r “ s u p p r e s s io n .” T h e la tte r tw o
t e r m s s u g g e s t an e f fo r t m e r e ly t o stifle o r p r e v e n t fe e lin g . “ E m o tio n w o r k ” r e f e r s
m o r e b r o a d ly to th e a c t o f e v o k in g o r sh a p in g , as w e ll as s u p p r e s s in g , fe e lin g in
o n s e lf. I a v o id th e t e r m “ m a n ip u la t e ” b e c a u s e it s u g g e s t s a s h a llo w n e s s I d o n o t
m e a n to im p ly . W e can s p e a k , th e n , o f t w o b r o a d t y p e s o f e m o t io n w o r k : evocation,
in w h ic h th e c o g n itiv e fo c u s is o n a d e s ir e d fe e lin g w h ic h is in itially a b s e n t, an d
suppression, in w h ic h th e c o g n itiv e fo c u s is o n an u n d e s ir e d fe e lin g w h ic h is in itially
p r e s e n t . O n e r e s p o n d e n t , g o in g o u t w ith a p r ie s t 2 0 y e a r s h e r s e n io r , e x e m p lifie s
th e p r o b le m s o f e v o c a tiv e e m o t io n w o r k : “ A n y w a y , I s t a r t e d t o tr y an d m a k e m y s e lf
lik e h im . I m a d e m y s e lf fo c u s o n th e w ay h e t a lk e d , c c r ta in th in g s h e ’d d o n e in th e
p a s t. . . . W h e n I w a s w ith h im I d id lik e h im b u t I w o u ld g o h o m e an d wrr it c in m y
jo u r n a l h o w m u c h I c o u ld n ’ t sta n d h im . I k e p t c h a n g in g m y fe e lin g an d a c tu a lly
th o u g h t I re a lly lik e d h im w h ile I w a s w ith h im b u t a c o u p le o f h o u r s a f t e r h e w a s
g o n e , I r e v e r te d b a c k to d iffe r e n t fe e lin g s . . . . ” A n o th e r r e s p o n d e n t e x e m p lif ie s th e
w o r k , n o t o f w o r k in g fe e lin g u p , b u t o f w o r k in g fe e lin g d o w n :
L a s t s u m m e r I w a s g o in g w ith a g u y o f te n , an d I b e g a n t o fe e l v e ry
s tr o n g ly a b o u t h im . 1 kn ew r th o u g h , th a t h e h ad ju s t b r o k e n u p w ith a
g ir l a y e a r a g o b e c a u s e sh e h ad g o tt e n t o o s e r io u s a b o u t h im , so I w a s
a fr a id t o sh o w an y e m o t io n . I a lso w a s a fr a id o f b e in g h u r t , so I
a t t e m p t e d t o c h a n g e m y fe e lin g s . I talked m yself into not carin g about Mike
. . . b u t 1 m u s t a d m it it d i d n ’ t wro r k fo r lo n g. To sustain th isfe e lin g 1 h ad to
alm ost invent b ad things about him an d concentrate on them or continue to tell
myself he d id n ’t care. It was a hardening of emotions, I’ d say . Il t o o k a lo t o f
EMOTION WORK, F E E L IN G RU LES, AND SOCIAL ST R U C T U R E 1 2 3
w ork and w as un pleasant, b ecause I had to concen trate on anything I

could find that w as irritating about him .
O ften em otion w ork is aided by settin g up an em otio n -w ork sy stem , for

exam p le, tellin g friends o f all the w orst faults o f the p erso n on e w anted to fall out
o f love w ith, and then goin g to th ose friends for rein forcem en t o f this view o f the
ex-b eloved. T his su ggests anoth er poin t: em otion w ork can be don e by the se lf
upon the self, by the se lf upon o th ers, and by others upon oneself.
In each case the individual is con scious o f a m om en t o f “p in ch ,” or discrepan cy,
betw een w hat one d o es feel and w hat one w'ants to feel (w hich is, in tu rn , affected
by w hat one thinks one ought to feel in such a situation ). In resp o n se, the individual
may try to elim inate the pinch by w orking on feeling. Both the sense o f d iscrepancy
and the respo n se to it can vary in tim e. The m anaging act, for exam p le, can be
a fivc-m inutc stopgap m easu re, or it can be a m ore long-range gradu al effort
suggested by the term “w orking th rou gh .”
Th ere are various techniques o f em otio n w ork. O ne is cognitive: the attem p t to
change im ag es, ideas, o r thoughts in the service o f changing the feelings associated
with them . A second is bodily: the attem p t to change som atic o r other physical
sy m pto m s o f em otion (e .g ., trying to breathe slow er, trying not to shake). T h ird,
there is expressive em otion w ork: trying to change expressive g e stu res in the service
o f changing inner feeling (e .g ., trying to sm ile, or to cry ). This differs from sim ple
display in that it is directed tow ard change in feeling. It differs from bodily em otion
w ork in that the individual tries to alter o r shape one or anoth er o f the classic public
channels for the expression ol feeling.
Th ese three tech niques arc distinct theoretically, but they often , of c o u rse , go
togeth er in practicc. For exam p le:
I wras a star halfback in high sch oo l. Before gam es I d id n ’ t feel the

u psurge o f adrenalin— in a w ord I wrasn ’ t “psyched u p .” (T his w as due
to em otional difficulties I wras experien cin g and still e x p e rie n c e — I wras
also an A stud ent w h ose grades w ere droppin g.) Having been in the past
a fanatical, em otio n al, intense player, a “h itter” recogn ized by coach es as
a very hard w orker and a player with “d e sire ,” this w as very upsetting.
I did everything I could to get myself “up." I would try to be outwardly “rah rah”
or get myself scared o j my opponents— anything to get the adrenalin flowing.
I tried to look n ervous and intense b efore gam e s, so at least the coach es
w ou ld n ’t catch on. . . . W hen actually I w'as m ostly b o re d , o r in any
event, n ot “u p .” I recall before one gam e w ishing 1 w as in the stands
w atching my cousin play for his sch oo l, rather than “out h ere .” [. . .]
The sm oothly wrarm airline h o stess, the ever-ch eerful secretary , the un irritated
com plaint clerk , the un disgusted p ro c to lo g ist, the teach er w ho likes every student
equally, and GolTman’ s unflappable p ok er player may all have to engage in deep
acting, an acting that g o es w ell beyond the m ere ord erin g o f display. W ork to m ake
feeling and fram e consistent with situation is w ork in which individuals continually
and privately engage. But they do so in obeisan ce to ru les not com pletely o f their
own making.
1 2 4 A R LI E R U SS E L L H OC H S C H I L D
Feeling rules
W e fe el. W e try to fe el. W e w an t to try to feel. T h e social gu id elin e s that d irect

how w e w ant to try to feel m ay b e d e sc rib ab le as a se t o f socially sh are d , alb eit often
laten t (n o t th ough t ab o u t un less p ro b ed at), ru le s. In w hat w ay, w e may ask , are
th ese ru le s th em selv es kn ow n and how arc they d e v e lo p e d ?
To b egin w ith , let us co n sid e r several co m m o n fo rm s o f eviden ce fo r feelin g
ru le s. In c o m m o n parlan ce, we often talk ab o u t o u r feelin gs o r th ose o f o th e rs as
if righ ts and d u ties ap p lie d directly to th em . F o r e x a m p le , we often sp e ak o f “having
the rig h t” to fe el an gry at so m e o n e . O r w e say w e “should feel m o re g r a te fu l” to a
b en elacto r. We chide o u rse lv e s that a frie n d ’s m isfo rtu n e , a re la tiv e ’ s death ,
“should have hit us h ard er,” o r that an o th e r’ s g o o d lu ck , o r o u r ow n , should have
in sp ired m o re jo y . W e know feelin g ru le s, to o , from how o th e rs react to w hat they
in fer from o u r e m o tiv e display. A n o th er m ay say to u s, “You shouldn't feel so gu ilty ;
it wra sn ’ t y o u r fa u lt,” o r “ You don’t have a right to feel je a lo u s, given o u r a g re e m e n t.”
A n o th er m ay sim ply d cc larc an opin ion as to the fit o f feelin g to situ atio n , o r m ay
cast a claim u po n o u r m an agerial sta n c e, p re su p p o sin g this o p in io n . O th e rs m ay
qu estio n o r call for an ac co u n t o f a p a rtic u la r feelin g in a situ atio n , w h ereas they do
n ot ask fo r an acco u n tin g o f so m e o th e r situ ated feelin g (L y m an and S c o tt 1 9 7 0 ).
C laim s and callin gs for an acc o u n t can be seen as rule reminders. A t o th e r tim e s,
a p e rso n m ay, in ad d itio n , ch id e, tea se, cajo le , sc o ld , shun— in a w o rd , san ction us
fo r “m is-fe e lin g .” Such san ction s are a clue to the ru le s they are m e an t to en fo rce.
R igh ts and d u ties se t o u t the p r o p rie tie s as to the extent (o n e can feel “t o o ”
angry o r “n o t an gry e n o u gh ”), the direction (o n e can feel sad w hen one sh o uld feel
h ap p y ), and the duration o f a feelin g, given the situ ation again st w hich it is set. T h ese
righ ts and d u ties o f feelin g are a clue to the depth o f social con ven tion , to one final
reach o f social c o n tro l.
T h e re is a d istin ctio n , in th eory at le ast, b e tw e en a feelin g ru le as it is kn ow n by
o u r sen se o f w'hat w e can expect to feel in a given situ atio n , and a ru le as it is knowrn
by o u r sen se o f w hat we should feel in that situ ation . F o r e x a m p le , on e may
realistically e x p e c t (k n o w in g o n e se lf and o n e ’ s n e ig h b o r’ s p a rtie s) to feel b o re d at a
large N ew Y ear’s Eve p arty and at the sam e lim e ack n o w le d g e that it w ould be
m o re fillin g to feel e x u b e ra n t. H ow ever, “ e x p e c t to fe el” and “ should ideally fe el”
often c o in cid e, as b elo w :
M a rria g e , ch a o s, u n real, c o m p le te ly d ifferen t in m any w ays than I

im ag in e d . U n fo rtu n a te ly w e re h e arse d the m o rn in g o f o u r w ed d in g at
eigh t o ’ c lo c k . T h e w ed d in g w as to be at eleven o ’ c lo c k . It w a sn ’ t like
I th ough t (e v e ry o n e w o u ld know wrhat to d o ). T h ey d id n ’ t. T h at m ad e
m e n e rv o u s. M y siste r d id n ’ t help m e g e t d resse d o r flatter m e (n o r did
an yon e in the d ressin g ro o m until I asked th e m ). I w as d e p re sse d . I
w an ted to b e so happy on o u r w ed d in g day. I n ever d rea m e d how
anyone w ould cry at th eir w edding. A w ed d in g is “the happy day” o f
o n e ’ s life. I c o u ld n ’ t b elieve that so m e o f m v b e st frien d s c o u ld n ’ t m ake
it to m y w ed d in g and that ad ded to a lo t o f little thin gs. So I sta rte d o u t
to the ch u rch and all th ese things that I alw ays th ough t w o u ld n ot
h appen at m y w ed d in g w en t through m y m in d . I b ro k e d ow n — I cried
EMOTION WORK, F E E L I N G R U L E S , AND SO CIAL S T R U C T U R E 1 2 5
g o in g d ow n . “ Be happy” I told m yself. Th in k of the frie n d s, and relatives

that arc p re se n t. (B u t I finally said to m y self, “ Hey p e o p le a r e n ’t ge ttin g
m a rrie d , you arc. It’ s fo r R ich [my h usband] and y o u .”) From dow n
the pretty lon g aisle w e lo o k e d at each o th e r’ s eyes. H is love fo r m e
ch an ged m y w h ole being. From that p o in t on w e join ed arm s. I w as
reliev ed and the ten sion w as g o n e . In one sen se it m e an t m ise ry — b u t in
the tru e sen se o f tw o p e o p le in love and w an tin g to share life— it m ean t
the w orld to m e . It w as b e au tifu l. It w as in d e scrib ab le .
In any given situ atio n , we o fte n invest w hat w e e x p e c t to feel w ith id ealization .
To a re m ark ab le e x te n t th ese id ealization s vary socially . If the “o ld -fash io n ed b rid e ”
above an ticip ates a “rig h t” to feel je a lo u s at any p o ssib le fu tu re infidelity, the y ou n g
“flow er ch ild” b elow re je c ts just this righ t.
. . . w hen I wras livin g d ow n so u th , I w as involved w ith a g r o u p o f

p e o p le , frien d s. W e used to sp en d m o s t even in gs after w ork o r sch o o l
togeth er. We u sed to do a lot o f d r u g s, acid , cok e o r just sm o k e d op e
and we had this ph ilosoph y that we w ere very c o m m u n al and did o u r
b est to share every th in g— c lo th e s, m o n ey , fo o d , and so on . I w as
in volved w ith this on e m an — and th ough t I w as “ in love” w ith h im . He
in turn had told m e that I w as very im p o rta n t to h im . A nyw ay, this one
w om an w ho w as a very g o o d frien d of m in e at on e tim e and this m an
sta rte d having a se x u al relatio n sh ip , su p p o sed ly w ith ou t my k n o w led g e.
I knew' though and had a lot o f m ix e d feelin gs ab o u t it. I th ou gh t,
in tellectu ally , that I had no claim to the m an ,' and b elieved in fact that
J ’
no o n e should ever trv to own an o th er p e rso n . I bclicvrcd also that it w as

n on e o f m y b u sin ess and I had n o reason to w o rry ab o u t th eir re la tio n
ship to ge th e r, for it had n othin g really to do w ith my frien dsh ip w ith
e ith er o f th e m . I also b elieved in sharing. But I w as h orrib ly h u rt, alone
and lon ely , d e p re sse d and I c o u ld n ’ t shake the d e p re ssio n and on to p o f
th ose feelin gs I felt gu ilty fo r having th ose p o sse ssiv ely je alo u s feelin gs.
A nd so I w ould con tin u e g o in g o u t w ith th ese p e o p le every n igh t, and
try to su p p re ss m y feelin gs. M y e g o w as sh atte re d . I g o t to the p o in t
w here I c o u ld n ’ t even laugh around th em . So finally I c o n fro n ted my
frien d s and left fo r the su m m e r and trav eled w ith a new frie n d . I
realized later w hat a heavy situ ation it w as, and it to o k m e a lon g tim e to
g e t m y se lf to g e th e r and feel w h ole again.
W h eth er the con ven tion calls for try in g joyfully to p o sse ss, o r try in g casually not
to , the in dividual co m p a re s and m e asu re s e x p e rie n c e again st an e x p e ctatio n often
idealized . It is left fo r m otivatio n (“w h at I w an t to fe e l”) to m ed iate b e tw e en feelin g
ru le (“w h at I sh o uld fe el”) and e m o tio n wro rk (“w hat I try to fe el”). So m e o f the
tim e m any o f us can live w ith a cc rtain d isson an ce b e tw e en “o u g h t” and “ w a n t,” o r
b e tw e en “ w an t” and “try t o .” But the atte m p ts to rc d u c c e m o tiv e d isson an ce arc o u r
p e rio d ic clu e s to ru le s o f feeling. [. . .]
1 2 6 A R L I E R U S S E L L H OC H S C H I L D
References
Goffman, Erving. 1956. “Embarrassment and Social Organization.” American Journal of

Sociology 62 (November): 264—71.
— . 1961. “Fun in G am es.” Pp. 17—84 in Encounters. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Lyman, S., and Marvin Scott. 1970. Sociology' o f the Absurd. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts.
Chapter 13
Theodore D. Kemper
POWER, STATUS, AND EMOTIONS

A s o c io lo g ic a l c o n trib u tio n to a p s y ch o p h y s io lo g ica l d o m a in
system atic
S
o c i o l o g i s t s h a v e g e n e r a l l y e s c h e w e d
inquiry into the em otio n s. This is u nderstandable, in as m uch as sociologists
ordinarily con cern them selves with pattern s o f grou p organization and social
stru ctu re. T h e em otio n s, on the other hand, are physiological and psychological
ph enom en a, experien ced-b y and m easured-in individual organ ism s. Even social
psychology— which deals w ith the effects o f social p attern s on individuals— has
con cern ed itself little with em otio ns per se, though many o f the results o f social
psych ological exp e rim e n ts are p ertin ent to the study o f em otio n s. [. . .]
. . . The ccntral con tribu tion of a sociological approach to em otio n s is the
specification o f a com prehen sive m odel o f the social environ m en t, as is detailed
below. This allow s for the form u lation o f em pirically-based h ypoth eses linking
variations in the social environm ent w ith varying em otio ns. . . .
Power and status as social environment
A rem arkable convergen ce o f theoretical and em pirical w ork in the social sciences
has gone relatively un rem ark ed. I refer here to the oft-rep eated findings that tw o
central dim ensions characterize social relationships betw een hum an actors. . . .
The tw o dim ensions arc variously nam ed but they refer unm istakably to relations o f
power and status. Power im plies the ability to overcom e the resistan ce o f others
w hen oth ers do not w ish to com ply (cf. W eber, 1946, p. 181). R elationsh ips can be
structured in term s o f pow er, so that there is a probability that in specified dom ains
each actor can achieve his o r her w ill to a certain exten t despite the resistan ce o f
the other. T h ere is also process pow er: this entails all the acts design ed to overcom e
the resistance o f the other, both actually and p rospcctively , including physical and
verbal assaults, deprivatio n s, threats, and the like.
1 2 8 T H E O D O R E D. K E M P E R
S ta tu s re fe r s to the c o m p lia n c e that a c t o r s v o lu n tarily a c c o r d each oth er,

u n a c c o m p a n ie d by th rea t o r c o e rc io n . A s w ith p o w e r th e re are s tr u c tu r a l and
p r o c e ssu a l a sp e c ts. S tatu s s tr u c tu r e in re la tio n sh ip in d ica te s the p ro b a b ility o f
v o lu n tary c o m p lia n c e w ith th e d e sire s an d w ish e s o f the o th e r, w h e th e r actu ally o r
p ro sp e c tiv e ly . A s p r o c e s s , sta tu s e n ta ils th e ra n g e o f frie n d ly , c o n g e n ia l, s u p p o r tin g ,
re w ard in g , u ltim ately , lovin g b eh av io r that a c to rs volu n tarily acc o rd each other. . . .
T h e p a r tic u la r u tility o f th e p o w e r and sta tu s d im e n sio n s is th at they p e r m it the
h e u ristic a ssu m p tio n th at a ll so c ial re la tio n s can b e lo c a te d in a tw o -d im e n sio n a l
p o w e r- sta tu s s p a c e , an d that c h a n g e s in so c ial re la tio n s m ay b e u n d e rs to o d as
ch a n g e s in th e p o w e r and sta tu s p o sitio n s o f a c to r s . A c to rs re la te to cach o th e r in
str u c tu r e s o f p o w e r and s ta tu s, and in th e ir in te ra c tio n s w ith cach o th e r e x p r e s s o r
ch an ge the re la tio n sh ip str u c tu r e by a c ts th at sign ify p a r tic u la r lev els o f p o w e r and
sta tu s.
G r a n te d this view o f re la tio n sh ip , the fo llo w in g p r o p o s itio n is p o ssib le : A very
large class o j human emotions results from real, anticipated, recollected, or im agined out
comes o f power and status relations (K e m p e r , 1 9 7 8 ). T h is m e a n s th at if w e w ish to
p r e d ic t o r u n d e rsta n d the o c c u r r c n c c o f m any h u m an e m o tio n s w e m u st lo o k at
the str u c tu r e and p r o c e ss o f p o w e r an d sta tu s re la tio n s b e tw e e n a c to r s . T h is
a p p ro a c h e n c o m p a ss e s b o th the d istr e ssfu l e m o tio n s — an g er, d e p r e ss io n , g u ilt,
sh a m e , a n x ie ty — as w ell as th e p o sitiv e e m o tio n s — h a p p in e ss, s e c u r ity , p r id e ,
r ig h te o u s n e s s , an d lo v e . . . .
O n e im p o r ta n t a ssu m p tio n a b o u t p o w e r an d sta tu s re la tio n s is that they arc
c ro ss-c u ltu ra lly valid (c f. T ria n d is, 1 9 7 2 ), h en ce u n iv ersally a p p lic ab le in the
p re d ic tio n o f e m o tio n s . H o w e v e r, th ree th in gs are n o t u n iv e rsa l:
1. T h e sp e c ific c u ltu ra l sig n ifie rs o f p a r tic u la r lev els o f p o w e r an d sta tu s o u t
c o m e s . F o r e x a m p le , K r o u t (1 9 4 2 , r e p r o d u c e d in H in d e , 1 9 7 9 , p. 6 0 ) in d ica te s IS
d iffe re n t w ay s, d istr ib u te d a c r o ss 2 0 d iffe re n t c u ltu r e s , o f d isp lay in g hum ility, a
c o n d itio n e x p r e ss in g v e ry low p o w e r-a n d -sta tu s fo r s e ll, o fte n in c o m b in a tio n w ith
ac c o rd o l v e ry high sta tu s (an d p ro b ab ly v e ry high p o w e r) to the oth er. H e n c c
d iffe re n t c o n c r e te b e h a v io rs in d iffe re n t c u ltu re s m ay e lic it and sign ify c e rtain
e m o tio n s.
2. A lso n o t u n iv e rsa l arc th e p o w e r and sta tu s levels o f p a r tic u la r so cial
p o s itio n s , e sp e c ia lly as d efin ed by a sc rip tiv e c a te g o r y . F o r e x a m p le , p r e litc r a tc
so c ie tie s ten d to r c s p c c t o ld e r m e n fo r th e ir w isd o m and k n o w le d g e o f the s o c ie t y ’ s
tra d itio n s. In m o d e r n s o c ie tie s, o ld e r m en arc c e d e d far le ss sta tu s.
3. F in ally , sp e cific so c ial o rg an iza tio n a l and so c ial s tr u c tu r a l p a tte rn s m ay
e x a c e r b a te o r in h ib it the p r o d u c tio n o f c e rta in e m o tio n s . M a rx ( 1 9 6 4 ) p r o p o s e d
the link b e tw e e n c ap italism an d alie n atio n . B la u n e r ( 1 9 6 4 ) sh o w e d h ow this link
is m e d ia te d by a p a r tic u la r fo rm o f te c h n o lo g y an d d iv isio n o f lab or. L evy (1 9 7 3 ) . . .
r e p o r t e d the “ h y p o c o g n itio n ” o f c c rta in e m o tio n s a m o n g T ah itian s (th is m e an s
th e re is a lim ite d v o c a b u la ry fo r th e se e m o t io n s ). D e p re ssio n is o n e o f th e hypo-
c o g n a te d e m o tio n s , ap p a re n tly ra re ly e x p e r ie n c e d a m o n g T ah itian s. W h y? B e c a u se ,
w e se e , in L e v y ’ s d isc u ssio n , that th e so c ia l o rg a n iz a tio n a l p a tte rn d o c s n ot
fre q u e n tly p r o d u c e the kin d o f sta tu s- lo ss o u tc o m e s that a rc a sso c ia te d w ith
d e p r e ss io n . . . .
U n iv e rsa lity o f e m o tio n d o e s n o t m e an that all so c ie tie s e x p e r ie n c e the sam e
a m o u n ts o f d iffe re n t e m o tio n s . T h a t w o u ld re q u ir e that the so c ia l o rg a n iz a tio n and
P 0 W E R, S T A T U S, A N D E M O T I O N S 1 2 9
the social stru c tu re o f the so c ietie s be the sam e. U n iversality o f e m o tio n s m ean s
that w hen p a rtic u la r social relatio n al o u tc o m e s o ccu r, the sam e e m o tio n s w ill
re su lt— re g a rd le ss o f how often such social relatio n al o u tc o m e s o c c u r in the so ciety
over-all.
I tu rn now b riefly to th ree so c io lo g ic ally relevan t co n sid e ratio n s ab ou t e m o
tion s: their e volu tion ary su rv iv al value, e m o tio n s in the so cietal social stru c tu re ,
and e m o tio n s in in te rp e rso n al and m ic ro -in te rac tio n .
A fu n dam en tal idea ab o u t e m o tio n s is that they have ev o lu tio n ary su rv iv al value
(D a rw in , 1 8 7 3 ; . . . P lu tch ik , 1 9 8 0 ). . . . B io lo g ical su rv iv al en tails n ot m e re ly the
survival o f o rg an ism s, b u t the p re se rv atio n o f p a tte rn s o f social o rg an iza tio n , o r
p erh ap s chan ge o f p attern to a m o re ad aptive fo rm . . . .
Fear and an g e r e n e rgize (light o r fight in the face o f d a n g e r o r th reat from
o th e rs. Love and attach m e n t e m o tio n s help sustain c o m m itm e n t to p regn an t
w o m en and to in fan ts w h o c a n ’ t fo ra g e o r p r o te c t th e m se lv e s; also to ag ed p aren ts
and o th e r e ld e r m e m b e rs o f the g ro u p w h o m ay have w isd o m to offer. R e sp e c t, and
loyalty p e r m it allegian ce to le ad e rs w ho m an ifest re sp e ct-w o rth y qualities that
au gm e n t the su rv iv al p r o sp c c ts o f the g ro u p . G u ilt and sham e allow for the e x e rcise
o f relatively u n su p e rv ise d se lf-c o n tro l o f im p u lse s to ag g re ssio n , m alfe asan ce , and
irresp o n sib ility .
D u rk h eim (1 9 6 5 ) em p h asized the im p o rta n ce o f re lig io u s sen tim e n ts (aw e,
re sp e c t, fe ar) in im p a rtin g a n e c essa ry fo rc e to m o ral c o m m itm e n ts to oth er
m e m b e rs o f so ciety . F u rth er, D u rk h cim valued the “e m o tio n a l c lfc r v c sc e n c c ” . . .
that sim p le physical c o m m u n io n and c o m m o n activity e n g e n d e r in p e o p le , givin g
them a sen se o f so lid arity , se cu rity and stren gth via the iden tification w ith a larger
social en tity. . . . H a m m o n d (1 9 7 8 ) su g g e ste d that fo r D u rk h e im , e m o tio n s rep lace
in h um an s the m issin g re g u lato ry m ech an ism o f in stin ct. W ith ou t e m o tio n s,
p re su m ab ly , h um an s w ould n ot bind th em selv es w ith sufficien t co n stan cy to any
p a rtic u la r so c ial-m o ral p a tte rn , shunn in g o th e rs even il these are im m ed iately
in stru m e n tal i.e ., im m ed iately re w ard e d . . . . H en ce it may be seen that e m o tio n s
have n ot sim p ly b io lo g ic a l, but social su rv iv al value.
A t the sam e tim e as w e se e the so c io lo g ic al facet o f the b io lo g ic al p h e n o m
e n on — the e m o tio n s— w e m u st n ot p ro c e e d as far as have the so c io b io lo g ists in this
area (e .g ., W ilso n , 1 9 7 5 ). S o c io b io lo g ists p re su m e to d iscover u n derly in g b io lo gical
p r o c e sse s and stru c tu re s that su p p o rt particular p a tte rn s o f social organ izatio n ,
e .g ., in relatio n s b e tw e en the se x e s, h ierarch y in so c ie ty , e tc. M y p ro p o sa l ab ou t the
so cio lo g ic al relevan ce o f the e m o tio n s is differen t. 1 view the e m o tio n s as cap ab le o f
su p p o rtin g e x tre m e ly b ro a d , even o p p o site , fo rm s o f social organ izatio n . D esp ite
the g re a t v ariab ility o f cu ltu ral p a tte rn s and fo rm s o f so cietal organ izatio n , the sam e
e m o tio n s u n d e rg ird th em . H en ce w e do n ot have d ire c t b io lo g ic al d e term in atio n
o f social p a tte rn s, b u t a case w h ere social p a tte rn s— o f w h atever ty p e — rely upon
e m o tio n s for stab ility and su p p o rt.
W e m ay define social structure in so ciety as a m o re o r less stab le d istrib u tio n
o f pow er, sta tu s, and re so u rc e s (usually w ealth ). So m e have m o r e , so m e less. M a rx
(1 9 6 4 ) and W eber (1 9 4 6 ) p o in ted ou t that th ese arc p o te n tial b ases o f g ro u p
fo rm a tio n , e .g ., social classe s and statu s g r o u p s, m o re o r less c o n sc io u s o f th eir
c o m m o n in te re sts and certain ly aw are o f th eir stan d in g relative to each o th e r in the
social stru c tu ral d im e n sio n s. Tw o kinds o f e m o tio n s are o f in te re st h ere : Integrating
130 THEODORE D. K E M P E R
e m o t i o n s , w h ic h b in d g r o u p s t o g e t h e r , e . g . , lo y a lt y , p r i d e , l o v e ; an d Differentiating
e m o t i o n s , w h ic h m a i n t a in th e d if f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n th e g r o u p s , e . g . , fear, a n g e r ,
c o n t e m p t , e n v y . [. . .]
A c t u a l o r t h r e a t e n e d c h a n g e in so c ia l s t r u c t u r e — th e p r e v i o u s a r r a n g e m e n t s o f
p o w e r , s t a t u s , a n d w e a l th — p r o d u c e s e x t r e m e l y in t e n s e e m o t i o n s . H i s t o r y r e c o r d s
s o m e o f th e m o s t t e r r i b l e c r u e l t i e s a n d , w e m u s t a s s u m e , h a t r e d s t o have o c c u r r e d
at s u c h t i m e s . T h r e a t e n e d g r o u p s a r e n o t o n ly fe a r f u l , the fe a r m a y b e c o m e a v ir tu a l
p a r a n o i a . G r o u p s o n th e r is e m a y in d u lg e t h e m s e l v e s in th e m o s t e x t r a v a g a n t
c o n f i d e n c e an d h o p e . N o s t a l g i a a n d d e p r e s s i o n a r c p e c u l ia r ly a p p r o p r i a t e fo r
g r o u p s w h o s e n s e th e ir d c c l i n c . C h c k o v w a s an e x q u i s i t e l it e r a r y r c c o r d c r o f th e
e m o t i o n s o f th is p h e n o m e n o n . T h o s e a lr e a d y d e c l a s s e m a in ta in s e l f - e s t e e m th r o u g h
p r iv a t e l y e x p r e s s e d c o n t e m p t fo r th e nouveaux riches. T h e s u c c e e d i n g c la s s o f p a r
v e n u s o r c o m m i s s a r s m u s t r id e fo r s o m e t i m e a c r e s t o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y o p t i m i s m
a n d s e l f - a g g r a n d i z e m e n t , e v e n m e g a l o m a n i a ( s e e K e m p e r , 1 9 7 8 , p. 5 4 5 ) . B e n s m a n
a n d V id ic h ( 1 9 6 2 ) d e ta il s y s t e m a t i c a ll y th e p o s s ib i li t ie s h e re .
A t the m i c r o i n t c r a c t i o n le v e l— i n t e r p e r s o n a l , m o m c n t - t o - m o m c n t , e t c . —
e m o t i o n s s h o u l d o p e r a t e b o t h t o in t e g r a t e a n d d if f e r e n t i a t e , j u s t as th e y d o in th e
l a r g e r s o c ia l s t r u c t u r e . T h i s is b e c a u s e th e s a m e d e s c r i p t i v e c a t e g o r i e s can b e
ap p lie d at b o t h lev els: p o w e r , s t a t u s , r e s o u r c e s . I n t e r a c t io n c o n s is t s o f d o i n g
te c h n ic a l th in g s t o g e t h e r ( c o o p e r a t i o n in s o m e f o r m o f d iv id e d l a b o r ) , a n d o f p o w e r
a n d s ta tu s r e la t io n s . E m o t i o n s flow f r o m the o u t c o m e s o f th e p o w e r a n d s ta tu s
r e la t io n s . . . .
M o m c n t - t o - m o m e n t in t e r a c t io n a n d th e e n s u i n g e m o t i o n s a p p e a r t o b e g u i d e d
by th r e e p r i n c i p l e s : F i r s t , th e r e is reciprocity. T h i s m e a n s th at b e h a v i o r s o f o n e kind
f r o m a c t o r A a r e likely to b e f o l l o w e d by b e h a v io r s o f a s p e c i fic k in d f r o m a c t o r B,
w ith g r e a t e r th an c h a n c e p r o b a b il it y . W e m a y in fe r th at th e e m o t i o n s e v o k e d in
B b y th e o r i g i n a l a c t i o n s o f A p r o v i d e s o m e p u s h f o r a c t o r B ’ s r e s p o n s e . T h a t
r e s p o n s e r e l e a s e s an e m o t i o n in t u r n in A , w h ic h l e a d s t o the s t a r t o f a n o t h e r r o u n d
in th e in t e r a c t io n c y c lc . [. . .]
. . . T h i s b r i n g s u s to th e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e : prior structure effects, th a t is th e in flu
e n c e on in t e r a c t io n a n d e m o t i o n s o f th e e x i s t i n g so c ia l a n d p e r s o n a l i t y s t r u c t u r e .
G o t t m a n et al. ( 1 9 7 7 ) fo u n d a m o n g d i s t r e s s e d c o u p l e s — t h o s e w ith a h is to r y
( i . e . , s t r u c t u r e ) o f h ig h - p o w e r , l o w - s t a t u s in t e r a c t i o n — th a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f d i s
a g r e e m e n t w a s a c c o m p a n i c d b y n e g a tiv e a ffe c t; a m o n g th e n o n d i s t r c s s c d b y n e u tr a l
a ffe c t. A m o n g d i s t r e s s e d c o u p l e s m e s s a g e s s e n t w ith p o s i t i v e in t e n t w e r e m o r e
likely to b e r e c e i v e d as n e g a ti v e . R a u s c h et al. ( 1 9 7 4 ) r e p o r t s im il a r fin d in gs.
A m o n g n o n - d i s t r e s s e d c o u p l e s , t h e r e w a s g r e a t e r c h a n c e o f p o w e r b e h a v io r f r o m
o n e p a r t n e r t o b e a n s w e r e d w ith c o n c i l i a t o r y o r s t a t u s b e h a v io r. A m o n g d i s t r e s s e d
c o u p l e s , p o w e r b e h a v io r w a s v i r tu a l ly a lw a y s m e t w it h c o u n t e r p o w e r . [. . .]
A th ir d p r i n c i p l e o f m i c r o i n t c r a c t i o n th a t a p p e a r s le s s d is tin c tly is th a t o f
devolution. In i n t e r a c t i o n , th in g s v e r y o f t e n s t a r t wrcll a n d e n d b a d l y , o r g o d o w n h ill.
R au sch (1965) fo u n d th a t in t e r a c t io n seq u en ces tended to d e v o l v e o v e r five
e x c h a n g e s f r o m a b o u t 9 0 % fr ie n d ly to a b o u t 7 0 - 7 5 % f r ie n d ly . L o e h l i n ’ s ( 1 9 6 5 )
c o m p u t e r s im u l a t io n o f d y a d ic in t e r a c t io n fo u n d th at e v e n w h e n his “ p e r s o n a l i t i e s ”
w e r e b o th e s s e n t ia lly “ p o s i t i v e ” they r e a c h e d a h a r m o n i o u s c o n c l u s i o n in a s e q u e n c e
o f i n t e r a c t io n s o n ly w ith s o m e d iffic u lty . . . . L o v e r e la t io n s a p p e a r to b e p a r t i c u
larly v u ln e r a b le to m o v e m e n t in to h ig h - p o w e r s e q u e n c e s . I n t e g r a tiv e e m o t i o n s
P 0 W E R, S T A T U S, A N D E M O T I O N S 1 3 1
ten d to be rep laced by differen tiatin g e m o tio n s in a som ew h at p red ictab le way
(H o u sek n e ch t & M ack e, 1 9 8 1 ; Sw en sen , Eskew , & K o h lh ep p , 1 9 8 1 ). [. . .]
R eferences
B ensm an, J., & V idich, A. Business cy cles, class, and personality. Psychoanalysis and
Psychoanalytic Review, 1 9 6 2 , 4 9 , 30—52.
Blauncr, R . Alienation and freedom. C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago P ress, 1964.
D arw in , C. The expression o f emotions in man and animals. N ew York: A p pleton, 1973.
D urkheim , E. The elementary form s i f the religious life. (Translated by Jo sep h Ward
Sw ain .) N ew York: Free P ress, 1965. (O riginally published 1915.)
G ottm an , J ., M arkm an, H ., & N o tariu s, C. The topography o f m arital conflict: A
sequential analysis o f verbal and nonverbal behavior. Journal o f Marriage and the
Family, 1977, 3 7 , 4 6 1 - 4 7 7 .
H am m on d, M . D u rk h cim ’ s reality con struction m odel and the em ergen ce of social
stratification. The Sociological Review, 1978, 26 (N ew S e rie s), 7 1 3 —7 2 7 .
H indc, R. A. Towards understanding relationships. N ew York: A cadem ic, 1979.
H ouscknech t, S. K ., & M acke, A. S. C om bin ing m arriage and career: The m arital
adjustm ent o f profession al w om en . Journal o f Marriage and Family 1981, 4 3 ,
651 661.
K em per, T. D. A social interactional theory o f emotions. N ew York: W iley, 1978.
Levy, R. Tahitians: Mind and experiences in the Society Islands. C hicago: U niversity o f
C hicago P ress, 1973.
Lochlin, J. C. ‘ In terperson al’ exp erim en ts with a com pu ter m odel o f personality.
Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 2 , 580—584.
M arx, K . Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy. T. B. B ottom orc and
M . R ubcl (E d s.), N ew York: M cG raw -H ill, 1964.
Plutchik, R. The emotions: A psycho-evolutionary synthesis. N ew York: H arp er and Row,
1980.
R ausch, H. L. Interaction sequen ces. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology', 1965,
2 ,4 8 7 - 4 9 9 .
Rausch, H. L ., B arrv, W A ., H e rtcl, R. K ., & Sw ain, M . A. Communication, conflict,
marriage. San Francisco. Jo sscy -B ass, 1974.
Sw ensen, C . PL, Eskew, R . W , & Kohlhcpp, K . A. Stage o f family life cycle, ego
developm en t, and the m arriage relationship. Journal o f Marriage and Family 1981,
43, 841-851.
Triandis, H. C . The analysis o f subjective culture. N ew York: W iley, 1972.
W eber, M . From M ax W eber: Essays in sociology'. H. G erth & C. W. M ills (E d s.), N ew
York: O x fo rd U niversity P ress, 1946.
W ilson, E. C . Sociohiology: The new synthesis. C am bridge: H arvard U niversity P ress,
1975.
Chapter 14
Randall Collins
T H E R O L E OF E M O T I O N I N
SOCIAL STRUCTURE
H OW I M P O R T A N T A R E T H E E M O T I O N S in society? I would
argue that they are cjuite fundamental. This is especially so if one conceives of
emotion as a form of social energy which can take any state ranging from com
pletely passive inactivity on through strong affectual arousal. The crucial mid-range
of this continuum is a scries of variations in social confidence, which manifest
themselves in feelings of solidarity— membership in social groups. At their stronger
levels, such feelings of confidence are important in the organization of property and
authority.
Emotional energy not only upholds the social structure, but is produced by it.
That is, social social structure is nothing more, on the most fine-grained empirical
level, than repeated patterns of facc-to-face interaction. These interactions have
a ritual quality, which reproduce, increase, or decrease the emotional energies
of individuals. Both the statics of repetitively reenacted social structure and
the dynamics of social change are crucially mediated by the social production of
emotions.
The following sociological theory of interaction ritual is based on the theories of
Emile Durkhcim (1947, 1954) and Erving Goffman (1959). I have suggested else
where (Collins, 1975, pp. 90—111) that it is consonant both with Darwinian animal
ethology and with rcccnt developments in cognitive micro-sociology, especially
ethnomethodology. I have also attempted to show (Collins, 1975, pp. 49-89) how a
variety of both hierarchic and egalitarian interactions produce the different emo
tional tones and cognitive propensities that make up the varieties of class cultures.
The “marketplace” of such ritual interaction makes up social networks.
A fuller version of this discussion may be found in Collins (1981b).
THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN SOCIAL ST R U C T U R E 1 3 3
Emotion as a m icro basis o f m acro-sociology
Both neo-rationalist self-criticism s (H eath , 1976) and m icro-sociological evidence

(G arfinkel, 1967) agree that co m p le x contin gencies cannot be calculated rationally,
and hence that actors m ust largely rely on tacit assum ption s and organizational
routin e. But the actual stru ctu re s o f the social w orld, especially as cen tered around
the n etw ork s upholding pro p erty and au th ority, involve con tin uous m on ito rin g
by individuals o f each o th e r’s gro u p loyalties. Because the social w orld can involve
quite a few lines o f authority and sets o f c oalition s, the task o f m on ito rin g them can
be extrem ely c o m p le x . How is this possib le, given p e o p le ’s inherently lim ited
cognitive capacities?
The solution m ust be that negotiation s arc carried out im plicitly, on a different
level than the use of con sciously m inipulatcd verbal sy m bols. I p ro p o se that the
m echanism is emotional rath er than cognitive.
©
Individuals m o n ito r o th e rs’ attitudes
tow ards social coalition s, and hence tow ards the degree of su p p o rt for ro u tin es, by
feeling the am oun t o f confidence and enthusiasm there is tow ards ccrtain leaders
and activities, o r the am oun t o f fear o f being attacked by a stron g coalition , o r the
am oun t o f con tem p t for a w eak one. T h ese em otio n al en ergies arc tran sm itted by
contagion am on g m em b ers o f a g ro u p , in flow s that operate very m uch like the set
o f n egotiation s that p rodu ce prices within a m arket.
The underlying em otional dynam ic, I p ro p o se , cen ters upon feelings o f member
ship in coalitions. Briefly put: p ro p e rty (access to and exclusion s from particular
physical places and things) is based upon a sense o f w hat kinds o f p erso n s do and do
not b elon g w here. This is b ased, in tu rn , upon a sense o f w hat g ro u p s arc pow erful
enough to punish violators o f their claim s. A uthority is sim ilarly organ ized : It rests
upon a sense o f which peop le are con nected to which g ro u p s, to coalitions o f w hat
exten siven ess and w hat capacity to en force the dem an d s o f their m em b ers upon
others. . . .
The m o st general explanation o f hum an social behavior en com p asses all o f
these. It should specify: W hat m akes som eon e a m em b er o f a coalition? W hat
determ in es the exten siven ess o f a coalition , and the intensity o f bonds within it?
How do peop le judge the pow er o f coalitions? The answ ers to these qu estio n s, I am
suggestin g, determ in es the way in which g ro u p s o f friends and other status g ro u p s
are fo rm e d ; the d egree to which authority and prop erty routin es are uph eld; and
w ho w ill dom inate others within these patterns. T h e basic m echanism is a p rocess
o f em otio n al gro u p identification that may be d escrib ed as a set o f interaction ritual
chains.
A theory o f interaction ritual chains
From a m icro-translation view point, all p ro cesses o f form in g and ju d gin g coalition
m em b ersh ip s m ust take place in interaction situations. The main activity in such
situations is con versation . But no one situation stands alone. Every individual go es
through m any situation s: indeed, a lifetim e is, strictly speaking, a chain o f in ter
action situations. (O n e m igh t also call it a chain o f co n versation s.) The peop le one
talks to also have talked to other peop le in the past, and w ill talk to oth ers in the
1 3 4 R A N D A L L C O L L I N S
fu tu re. H en ce an ap p ro p ria te im age o f the social w orld is a b un dle of individual

chains o l in teractio n al e x p e r ie n c e , c riss-c ro ssin g each oth er in sp ace as they flow
alo n g in tim e . T h e dy n am ics of co alitio n m e m b e rsh ip arc p ro d u c e d by the
e m o tio n al sen se in dividuals have at any on e p o in t in tim e , due to the to n e o f the
situation they arc c u rre n tly in (o r last re m e m b e r, o r sh o rtly an ticip ate ), w hich in
tu rn is influenced by the p re v io u s chains o f situ ation s o f all p a rtic ip a n ts.
T h e manifest c o n te n t o f an in teractio n is usually n ot the e m o tio n s it involves
Any co n v e rsa tio n , to the e x te n t that it is taken se rio u sly by its p a rtic ip a n ts, fo cu se s
th eir atten tion upon the reality o f its c o n te n ts, the thin gs that arc talked ab ou t
(G o ffm an , 1 9 6 7 , pp. 113 1 1 6 ). T h is m ay in clu de a focu s upon practical w ork that
is b ein g d o n e. W h at is sign ifican t a b o u t any con versation from the p o in t o f view
o f social m e m b e rsh ip , how ever, is n o t the co n te n t, but the e x te n t to w hich the
p a rticip a n ts can actually m ain tain a c o m m o n activity o f fo c u sin g upo n that co n ten t.
T h e c o n te n t is a vehicle fo r establish in g m e m b e rsh ip . From this v ie w p o in t, any
con v ersatio n may b e look ed upo n as a ritu al. It in vokes a c o m m o n reality , w hich
from a ritu al v iew p oin t m ay b e called a “m yth ” : in this c ase , w h eth er the c o n v e r
sation al “m yth” is tru e o r n ot is irrelev an t. T h e “m yth” o r c en ten t is a D u rk h eim ian
sacred o b je c t. It sign ifies m e m b e rsh ip in a c o m m o n g r o u p , fo r th ose w ho truly
rc sp e c t it. T h e p e rso n w ho can su ccessfu lly b e c o m e e n g ro sse d in a con versation al
reality b e c o m e s ac c e p te d as a m e m b e r o f the g ro u p o f th ose w ho b eliev e in that
con v ersatio n al en tity. In te r m s o f the D u rk h eim ian m o d e l o f re lig io u s ritu al,
(D u rk h e im , 1 9 5 4 / 1 9 1 2 ; cf. C o ffm an , 1 9 6 7 ), a con versation is a cult in w hich all
b e lie v e rs share a m o ral so lid arity . In fac t; il creates the re fe re n c e poin t o f m oral
so lid arity : th ose w h o b elieve are the g o o d ; d e fe n se o f the b e lie f and h en ce o f
the g r o u p is rig h te o u sn e ss; evil is d isb e lie f in, and even m o re so attack u p o n , the
cogn itiv e sy m b o ls that h olds the g ro u p togeth er. T h e cogn itiv e sy m b o ls— h ow ever
ban al, p a rtic u la riz e d , o r e so te r ic the con v ersatio n al c o n te n t m ay b e — arc im p o r
tant to the g r o u p , and d e fe n d ed by it, b e ca u se they arc the vehicle by w hich m ean s
the g ro u p is able to unify itself.
N o t all co n v e rsa tio n s, how ever, are equally su ccessfu l ritu als. So m e bind in d i
viduals to g e th e r m o re p e rm an e n tly and tightly than o th e rs; so m e c o n v e rsa tio n s do
n o t c o m c o ff at all. A m o n g th ose co n v e rsatio n s that d o su ccccd in evok in g a
c o m m o n reality , so m e o f th ese p ro d u c c a feelin g o f egalitarian m e m b e rsh ip am on g
the c o n v e rsatio n alists, w hile o th e rs p ro d u c e feelin gs o f rank d iffe ren c e s, in clu ding
feelin gs o f au th ority and su b o rd in atio n . T h e se ty p es o f v ariab ility , in fac t, are
e ssen tial fo r p ro d u cin g and re p ro d u cin g stratified social o rder. C on v ersatio n al
in teraction ritu al, th en , is a m ech an ism p ro d u c in g varying am o u n ts o f so lid arity ,
varying d e g r e e s o f p e rso n a l iden tification w ith c o alitio n s o f vary in g d e g re e s o f
im p ressiv e n e ss.
W h at, th en , m ak es a con versation al ritu al su c ce ed o r n o t, and w hat kinds o f
coalitio n s d o e s it invoke?
I su g g e st the fo llo w in g in g re d ie n ts. (1 ) P articip an ts in a su c ce ssfu l c o n
v ersation al ritu al m u st b e able to invoke a c o m m o n cogn itiv e reality . H en ce they
m u st have sim ilar conversational o r cultural resources. A su cc e ssfu l co n v ersatio n may
also b e in egalitarian , in that on e p erso n d o c s m o st o f the cu ltu ral reality -in vok in g,
the o th e rs actin g as an au d ien c e ; in this case we have a d om in ation -an d-
su b o rd in a tio n -p ro d u cin g ritu al. (2 ) P articip an ts m u st also be able to sustain a
THE ROLE OF E MOTION IN SOCIAL S T R U C T U R E 1 3 5
c o m m o n e m o tio n a l to n e. A t a m in im u m , they m u st all w ant to p ro d u c e at least

m o m e n tary so lid arity . A gain , the e m o tio n a l p a rticip a tio n m ay be stratifie d , dividin g
the g r o u p in to e m o tio n a l le a d e rs and fo llo w ers.
T h e se tw o in g re d ie n ts— cu ltu ral re so u r c e s and e m o tio n a l e n e rg ie s— c o m e
from in d iv id u als’ chain s o f p re v io u s in teraction al e x p e r ie n c e , and se rv e to r e p r o
d uce o r ch an ge the p a tte rn o f in te rp e rso n al relatio n s. A m o n g the m o st im p o rta n t
o f the things re p ro d u c e d o r ch an ged arc feelin gs ab o u t p e r s o n s ’ relatio n sh ip s to
physical p r o p e rty , and to the c o crc iv c co alitio n s o f au th ority . H ow in dividuals arc
tied to th ese is the cru cial d e te rm in an t o f w hich co alitio n s arc d o m in an t o r
su b o rd in ate.
Conversational Resources. P articu lar sty les and to p ic s o f co n v ersatio n im ply

m e m b e rsh ip s in differen t g ro u p s. A t any p o in t in tim e , the p re v io u s chain o f
in teractio n ritu als that have b een su ccessfu lly n e g o tiated have m ad e cc rtain c o n v e r
sation al co n te n ts in to sy m b o ls o f so lid arity . T h e ran ge o f th ese has b een d iscu sse d
elsew h ere (C o llin s, 1 9 7 5 , pp. 1 1 4 —1 31). F o r e x a m p le , shop talk invokes m e m b e r
ship in o ccu p atio n al g r o u p s , political and oth er id e o lo g ic a l talk invokes co n te n d in g
political c o alitio n s, e n te rtain m e n t talk in vokes g r o u p s w ith v ariou s ta ste s, gen eral
discu ssio n invokes d ifferen t in tellectu al and n o n in tcllcctu al strata, w hile g o ssip and
p e rso n al talk invoke specific and so m e tim e s qu ite in tim ate m e m b e rsh ip s. A gain , il
is not im p o rta n t w h e th e r w hat is said is tru e o r n o t, but that it can be said and
ac c e p te d as a c o m m o n reality fo r that m o m e n t, that m akes it an em b lem o f g ro u p
m e m b e rsh ip . [. . .]
Emotional Energies. E m o tio n s affect ritu al m e m b e rsh ip in several w ays. T h ere

m u st be at le ast a m in im al d e g re e o f c o m m o n m o o d am o n g in te ractan ts if a
con v ersatio n al ritual is to su cc e ed in in voking a sh ared reality . T h e stro n g e r the
c o m m o n e m o tio n a l to n e, the m o r e real the in voked top ic w ill se e m to b e , and the
m o re so lid arity w ill e x ist in the g ro u p E m o tio n al p ro p e n sitie s arc thus a p r e
re q u isite fo r a su cce ssfu l in te ractio n . But the in teraction also se rv e s as a m ach in e
for in ten sify in g e m o tio n , and fo r g e n e ratin g new e m o tio n al to n es and so lid aritie s.
T h u s e m o tio n al e n e rg ie s arc im p o rta n t re su lts o f in teractio n s at any p o in t in the
ritual chain. T h e e m o tio n al so lid arity , I w ould su g g e st, is the p ayo ff that favorable
con versation al re so u rc e s can p ro d u ce fo r an individual.
If su c ce ssfu l in teraction al ritu als (IR s) p ro d u c e feelin gs o f so lid arity , stratifica
tion both w ithin and am o n g co alitio n s is a fu rth e r o u tc o m e o f e m o tio n a l flow s
along 1R chains. A s n o te d , co n v ersatio n al ritu als can be cith er egalitarian or
asy m m e tric al. Both ty p es have stratify in g im p licatio n s. E galitarian ritu als arc
n e v e rth e le ss stratify in g in that in sid e rs arc ac ce p te d and o u tsid e rs arc re je c te d ;
h ere stratification e x ists in the form o f a coalitio n again st e x c lu d e d in dividu als, o r
possib ly the do m in atio n o f on e co alitio n over another. A sy m m e tric al co n v e rsatio n s,
in w hich on e individual se ts the en ergy to n e s (and invokes the cu ltu ral reality )
w hile the o th e rs arc an au d ien cc, arc in tern ally stratified.
T h e m o st basic e m o tio n a l in gred ien t in in te ra c tio n s, I w ould su g g e st, is a
m in im al ton e o f p o sitiv e se n tim en t to w a rd s the other. 1'he so lid arity se n tim e n ts
ran ge from a m in im al display o f n on h ostility , up to w arm m u tu al liking and
en th u siastic c o m m o n activity . W h ere d o such e m o tio n s c o m e fro m ? From p reviou s
1 3 6 R A N D A L L COLLINS
e x p erien ces in IR chains. An individual w ho is successfully accepted into an in ter

action acquires an increm en t o f positive em otional en ergy. This energy is m ani
fested as what we com m on ly call confidence, w arm th , and enthusiasm . A cquiring
this in one situation , an individual has m ore em otional reso u rces for successfully
negotiating solidarity in the n ext interaction . Such chains, both positive and
n egative, exten d throughout every p e r so n ’ s lifetim e.
Let us con sider the variations p ossib le w ithin this basic m o d e l. The main
con dition s w hich p ro d u ce em otional energy arc these:
1 . Increased em otional confidcncc is p rodu ced by every e xp erien ce o f su c c e ss
fully negotiatin g a m em b ersh ip ritual. D ecreased em otional confidcncc results from
rejection or lack o f success.
2. The m ore pow erful the group within which one successfully n e go ti
ates ritual solid arity , the gre ater the em otional confidence one receives from it. The
pow er o f a gro u p here m eans the am oun t o f physical p ro p e rty it successfully claim s
access to, the sheer size o f its adherents, and the am oun t o f physical force (n um b ers
o f fighters, in stru m en ts o f violen ce) it has access to.
3. The m ore intense the em otional arousal w ithin an IR, the m ore em otional
energy an individual receives from participatin g in it. A gro u p situation with a high
d egree o f enthusiasm thus gen erates large em otional in crem en ts for individuals.
High d egrees o f em otio nal arousal are created especially by IRs w hich include an
elem en t o f conflict against ou tsid ers: eith er an actual fight, a ritual punishm ent o f
o llcn d e rs, o r on a low er level o f intensity, sy m bo lic denunciation o f enem ies
(including conversation al gripin g)
4 . Taking a dom inant position within an IR increases o n e ’ s em otional en ergies.
Taking a subordin ate positions w ithin an IR redu ces o n e ’ s em otional en e rgie s; the
m ore ex tre m e the sub ordin ation , the g re ater the energy redu ction . [. . .)
References
Collins, R. Conflict sociology. N ew York: Academ ic Press, 1975.

Collins, R. On the m icro-foundations o f m acro-sociology. American Journal o f Sociology',
1981, 86 , 984—1014. (b)
D urkhcim , E. The division o f labor in society. G lencoc, Illinois: Free Press, 1947.
(O riginally published, 1893.)
D urkhcim , E. The elementary forms o f the religious life. G lencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1954.
(O riginally published, 1912.)
Garfinkcl, H. Studies in ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, N .J.: Prenticc-H all, 1967.
Goffman, E. The presentation of self in everyday life. N ew York: D oubledav, 1959.
Goffman, E. Interaction ritual. N ew York: D oubledav, 1967.
Heath, A. Rational choice and social exchange. C am bridge: Cam bridge University Press,
1976.
Chapter 15
Niklas Luhmann
I N D I V I D U A L I T Y OF P S Y C H I C
SYSTEMS
A N D U N D E R W H A T S O C I E T A L conditions can the
W
HETHER
individual’s insistence on individuality as self-description be perm itted or
even dictated?
With this question, one can return to the history o f how the sem antics o f indi
vidual/individuality/individualism developed. The hypothesis w ould be that the
history o f the concept m irrors a process in which individuals gradually becom e
capable o f referring to their individuality when describing them selves. H eroism
could be seen as a first attem pt at this— appropriate only to a few and perhaps
inclined to discourage the many. Then follow ed a cult o f genius, which no longer
distinguished individual w orks and utterances solely from the perspective o f their
greater or lesser perfection , but took into account individuality-conditioned d is
tinctions o f execution and innovative quality, and socially secured these by “taste.”
The hommc universcl and alignm ent to the human universal w as a transitional phase:
it allowed everyone to be included, but it was still bound to cultural conditioning,
which ultimately caused the individual to be subsum ed in the universal. A ccord
ingly, individuals that sought to conform to the individuality expected o f them were
forced into deviation: they identified their autopoiesis with a m ethodology o f evil,
with shocking norm ality, with avantgardism , revolution, a com pulsive critique of
everything established, and sim ilar self-stylizations. But this, too, has devolved into
imitablc gestures and has thereby becom e unsuitable as a form for the self-
description o f the individual as an individual. . . . D oes this history prove that the rise
o f the individual was a decline and that the expectation that the individual describe
him self as an individual leads to m eaninglessness? O r can we, blinded by the
cultural im perative o f value, not see correctly into which form s the individual
decays when the dillcrentiation o f psychic and social system s has been carried so far
that the individual can only use his individuality for self-description?
1 3 8 NIKLAS L U H M A N N
G en erally, an individual psychic system ex p o se s itse lf to the contingency o f its

environm ent in the fo rm o f expectation. . . . In con sequ en ce, the con cept o f e x p e c
tation m ust be in terp reted broadly to en com pass both a psychical and a social use,
as well as their in terd ep en d ence. We can, lo r the m o m en t, leave open the d e p e n d
ence o f exp ectation s on historical con dition s, w hich later the nexus o f the psychic
and social form ation o f e xpectation s. [. . .]
An expectation rcco n n o iters unknow n terrain using a difference it can
e xp erien ce within itself: it can be fulfilled or d isap poin ted, and this d ocs not
depend on itse lf alone.
The in determ in able en viron m ent, which d o c s not enter at all into the closed
operation o f pure au top oicsis, is brough t into the form o f exp ectation s so that it can
e x p re ss itse lf in a way that the system can understand and use operatively, in that
the system p ro jects an expectation and then re co rd s w hether w hat w as expected
actually occu rred or not.
Form ing exp ectation s is a prim itive technique pure and sim ple. It involves
alm o st no p resu pposition s. . . . It is only n ecessary fo r the expectation to be used
au topoietically, n am ely, for it adequately to p rcstru ctu re access to the connection
betw een thoughts. It then offers su b seq u en t exp erien ce as the fulfillm ent o r d is
ap poin tm en t o f the exp ectatio n , thereby p re stru ctu rin g a further re p erto ire o f
further behavioral possibilities. A fter a certain p erio d o f con scious life en riched
by social ex p e rie n c e s, com pletely random exp ectation s cease to occur. In the
n orm al succession that p ro gre sse s from one thought to another, one no longer
en coun ters anything p e rv e rse . O n e is forced to orien t o n e se lf to o n e ’ s ow n history
o f con scio usness, how ever unique il may be; and the determ in acy o f o n e ’s actual
exp erien ce at any m om en t m akes sure that arbitrary contrary exp ectation s cannot
be fo rm e d . T h erefore socially standardized types are at o n e ’ s disp osal, to hold on to
as a kind ol rough orien tation .
E xpectation s can be con den sed into claims. This oc c u rs by strength ening the
self-com m itm en t and vulnerability establish ed and put into plav in the difference
betw een fulfillm ent and d isap poin tm en t. This to o is possib le alm o st w ithout
involving pre-su p p osition s, though only w ith correspon din gly increased risk.
Sim ilarly, the p ro ccss o f internal adaptation to fulfillm ent o r d isap poin tm en t is
m ore co m p lex and ap pears within the svstem as emotion. The transition from
expectation s to claim s in creases the chance and the danger that em otion w ill fo rm ,
ju st as one can, con versely, cool dow n em otio n s by retreatin g to m ere expectation .
T h e boun dary is fluid and can shift during the p ro ce ss; this con cern s a single
dim en sion, w hich can assum e the quality o f an expectation or a claim depen ding on
howr many internal in terd ep end en cies are at stake.
The distinction betw een exp ectation s and claim s m akes it possib le to pursue
the question o f w hat occu rs psychologically w hen individually grou n ded claim s arc
increasingly socially legitim ated and w hen the social o rd e r finally incitcs individuals
to put forw ard even their individuality as a claim — as the claim to recognition and
as the claim to p rom otin g what m akes one happy. This “new right to be what one
pleases” ap pears largely self-evident today. But how is it possible and how d ocs it
com e about that an individual can groun d a claim to individuality— can, so to speak,
claim the droit de seigneur, “tel est m on plaisir”?
O ne m ust begin w ith the fact that claim s m ust be offset by m erits, because
I N D I V I D U A L I T Y OF P S Y C HI C S Y S T E M S 139
o t h e r w i s e th e b a l a n c e w o u l d b e u p s e t a n d n o s o c i a l a g r e e m e n t w o u l d b e p o s s ib l e .
[• • •]
B u t w h a t d o e s all this m e a n f o r th e in d iv id u a l? W e h ad sa id th at e x p e c t a t i o n s
o r g a n i z e e p i s o d e s o f a u t o p o i e t i c e x i s t e n c e a n d c l a i m s r e i n t e g r a t e s u c h e p i s o d e s in
the p s y c h i c s y s t e m . F o r o n e th in g , th is i m p l i e s th a t, i f c l a i m s c a n n o t b e m a d e
r o u t i n e , th e in d iv id u a l is in c r e a s i n g l y s u b j e c t t o th e in d i v i d u a l ’ s o w n e m o t i o n s .
T h u s m o d e r n s o c i e t y is m o r e e n d a n g e r e d b y e m o t i o n a l i t y than o n e u s u a lly th in k s.
For a n o th e r , in d iv id u a ls arc cncouragcd to talk about th em selv es and th e ir
p r o b l e m s . If o n e a c c c p t s th a t an in d iv id u a l can ju st ify c l a i m s n o t ju s t b y m e r i t b u t
by in d iv id u a lit y a lo n e , th en the in d iv id u a l m u s t p r o v i d e s e l f - d e s c r i p t i o n s . T h e
b lin d ly p r o g r e s s i n g a u t o p o i e s i s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s is in s u ffic ie n t f o r th is; it m u s t be
“ id e n t i fie d ” as a p o i n t o f r e f e r e n c e f o r s t a t e m e n t s — th a t is, it m u s t b e c a p a b l e o f
b e i n g h a n d l e d as a d if fe r e n c e f r o m s o m e t h i n g e ls e . [. . .]
A s i m p o r t a n t as th e lin g u is tic f o r m i n g o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s is so c ia l s y s t e m s
a ls o in flu e n c e p s y c h ic s y s t e m s in o t h e r , le s s m e d i a t e d w a y s. A b o v e a ll, o n e m u s t
r e m e m b e r th e fu lfillm e n t an d d i s a p p o i n t m e n t o f e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d c l a i m s b y w'hich
c o n s c i o u s n e s s ca n b e s o c ia lly d i r e c t e d , a lt h o u g h (a n d p r e c is e l y b e c a u s e ) it i t s e l f
p o s i t i o n s e x p e c t a t i o n s in o r d e r t o o r i e n t itse lf. In this w a y , f o r e x a m p l e , a k in d o f
c o n s c i o u s c e r t a in t y a b o u t ju d g i n g a n d fe e lin g c a n c o m c a b o u t , s o m e t h i n g like t a s te ,
w h ic h p r o v e s i t s e l f in th e o b j e c t s a n d th e s o c ia l r e s o n a n c e o f ju d g i n g . O n e m a y th e n
a ls o b e a w a r e o f the im p o s s i b i l i t y o f e x p r e s s i n g a j u d g m e n t , i n d e e d , m a y e n jo y this
as a k in d o f s u p e r i o r i t y .
G i v e n th e c o n c e p t u a l f o u n d a t i o n o f an a u t o p o i e s i s b a s e d o n c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,
it is e a s y to g a in a c c e s s to a s p h e r e o f p r o b l e m s th at un til n o w have p r o v e d q u it e
d ifficu lt f o r s o c i o l o g y ( a n d t h e r e f o r e have h a r d ly b e e n t r e a t e d ) , n a m e l y , th e w o r l d
o f e m o t i o n s . E m o t i o n s a r is e a n d g r i p b o d y a n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s w h e n th e a u t o p o i e s i s
o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s is in d a n g e r . T h i s m a y have m a n y k in d s o f c a u s e s , s u c h as e x t e r n a l
d a n g e r , th e d i s c r e d i t i n g o f a s e l f - p r e s e n t a t i o n , a n d e v e n n e w m o d e s o f c o n s c i o u s
c o m m i t m e n t th at ta k e c o n s c i o u s n e s s i t s e l f by s u r p r i s e , like lo v e . E m o t i o n s a r c n o t
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s th a t r e f e r t o the e n v i r o n m e n t b u t internal a d a p t a t i o n s to internal
p r o b l e m s it u a t io n s in th e p s y c h ic s y s t e m th at c o n c e r n th e o n g o i n g p r o d u c t i o n o f
the s jv s t c m ’ s e l e m e n t s b vj th e s jy s t e m ’ s e l e m e n t s . E m o t i o n s a r c n o t n e c e s s a r il y}
f o r m e d in an o c c a s i o n a l an d s p o n t a n e o u s m a n n e r ; o n e can b e m o r e o r le ss d i s p o s e d
to an e m o t i o n - l a d e n r e a c t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , e m o t i o n s a re u n s t a b l e b e c a u s e th e y
d ie aw a y w h e n o r d e r is r e s t o r e d in th e s e l f - c o n t in u a t io n o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . B o t h , dis-
p o s it io n a l it y a n d in s ta b ility , a r e i m p o r t a n t g iv e n s f o r s o c ia lly p r o c e s s i n g e m o t i o n s
w h e n th e y a r is e , b u t t h e s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f e m o t i o n r e s u l t f r o m its p s y c h i c , n o t its
s o cial f u n c tio n .
In terms o f their fu n ction , e m o t i o n s ca n b e c o m p a r e d t o i m m u n e s y s t e m s ; th e y
s e e m to a s s u m e an im m u n i z i n g r o l e fo r th e p s y c h ic s y s t e m . W it h u n u s u a l m e a n s ,
th e y s e c u r e th e c o n t in u in g p e r f o r m a n c e o f a u t o p o i e s i s — h e r e n o t the a u t o p o i e s i s o f
life b u t o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s — in th e fa c e o f p r o b l e m s th at a r is e , a n d in d o i n g s o th e y
u s e s im p lif ie d p r o c e d u r e s o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , w h ic h p e r m i t d e c i s i o n s w i t h o u t c o n
s id e r i n g th e c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h e y c a n a u g m e n t a n d w e a k e n w i t h o u t d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e
to o c c u r r c n c c s in th e e n v i r o n m e n t , d e p e n d i n g o n c o n s c i o u s n e s s ’ s o w n e x p e r i e n c e
o f itself.
P e r h a p s th e m o s t i m p o r t a n t in s ig h t, h o w e v e r, is th at all e m o t i o n s o c c u r as
140 NI K L A S L U H M A N N
e s s e n t ia lly u n ita r y a n d h o m o g e n e o u s . T h i s r e s u lt s n o t o n ly f r o m i n c r e a s e d i n t e r
d e p e n d e n c e w it h b o d ily o c c u r r e n c e s , t h r o u g h w h ic h o n e e x p e r i e n c e s e m o t i o n , b u t
a ls o from th e im m u n i z i n g f u n c t io n , w h ic h , to guarantee au to p o iesis a g a in s t
u n f o r e s e e a b l e d i s t u r b a n c e s , c a n n o t k e e p in s t o r e a s e p a r a t e e m o t i o n f o r e v e r y t h in g
that h a p p e n s . O n e can e s t a b lis h in the b i o c h e m i c a l d o m a i n that e m o t i o n s o c c u r as a
u n i ty , b u t e m o t i o n s a r c m o r e than i n t e r p r e t e d b i o c h e m i s t r y — th e y a r c th e p s y c h ic
s y s t e m ’ s s e l f - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w ith r e g a r d t o w h e t h e r its o p e r a t i o n can c o n t in u e .
T h e w e l l- k n o w n v a r ie t y o f d is t i n c t e m o t i o n s c o m e s a b o u t o n ly s e c o n d a r i l y ,
o n ly t h r o u g h c o g n i t iv e a n d lin g u is tic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; th u s it is s o c ia lly c o n d i t i o n e d ,
like th e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f all c o m p l e x i t y in p s y c h ic s y s t e m s . T h i s h o l d s e v e n m o r e fo r
e v e r y t h in g o n e c o u l d d e s i g n a t e a “ c u lt u r e o f e m o t i o n s ” : fo r r e f i n e m e n t s o f th e
o c c a s i o n s a n d th e f o r m s o f e x p r e s s i o n in w h ic h e m o t i o n s ta k e s h a p e . S u c h t r a n s
f o r m a t i o n s s e r v e , on th e o n e h a n d , to c o n t r o l e m o t i o n s s o c ia lly b u t , on th e o th e r ,
a r e b u r d e n e d w it h p r o b l e m s o f a u t h e n t ic it y . A n y o n e w h o ca n say w h a t he is s u f f e r
in g a lr e a d y find s h i m s e l f n o l o n g e r e n t ir e ly in th e s itu a t io n he w o u l d like t o e x p r e s s .
T h u s s p e c i a l p r o b l e m s o f i n c o m m u n i c a b i l i t y c o n i c in t o b e i n g — n o t o f th e e m o t i o n s
p e r s e , b u t o f th e ir a u t h e n t ic it y — w h ic h a ffe c t so c ia l s y s t e m s a n d m a y b u r d e n
p s y c h ic o n e s . [. . .]
PART TWO
Embodying affect
4. Emotions, selfhood and identity
S
OCIAL SCIENTISTS HAVE devoted much attention to questions con
cerning selfhood and identity. On the one hand, they have documented historical
changes as well as cultural relativity in the conceptualization of individuals and their
and identity (see, e.g. Heelas and Lock 1981; M o rris 1991, 1994; Hoffman, Sobel
and Teute 1997; Turkle 1997; Seigel 2005). On the other hand, some have high
lighted the p a rticu la r salience of the category of the self to late modern forms of
organization (e.g. Giddens 1991; Rose 1996). Selfhood and identity are intimately
related to affective life. D ifferent lived identity narratives, for instance, take up dif
ferent evaluative orientations to the emotions in general or to specific affects. To give
a stereotypical example, the warrior, the football hooligan and perhaps the city broker
are, exceptions notwithstanding, apt to value the kind of self that can laugh in the
face of danger, that is not sentimental in the face of the enemy pleading for pity, and
that abhors weakness and tim idity in general. An observer of their socialization
practices, their routine interactions, and their typical heroes and fantasies might see
that certain emotions and sentiments are elevated in value and encouraged (pride,
courage, excitement, anger, disgust) w hilst others are downgraded and scorned (fear,
shame, pity, distress). To 'live' an approximation of such an identity would thus be
to adopt p a rticu la r evaluative orientations towards pa rticu la r affective scenes of self
and other, or to strive towards a form of life in which the likelihood of such a pattern
ing of affects is enhanced. One might expect to find very different dynamics in
play amongst members of the peace movement, environm entalists and human rights
activists, again, exceptions notwithstanding. Em otions and our responses to them
thus play a role in reproducing forms of subjectivity and the relations of power in
which they are constituted.
S im ila r issues apply amongst those more 'elevated' form s of identity that touch
upon aesthetic orientations and philosophies. For the rom antic in the tradition of
1 4 4 E MB ODYI NG A F F E C T
Rousseau, Byron or Burke, the true self is associated with the deep, authentic feelings
that alone reveal one's true nature, long hidden by the insincere layers of social
pretentiousness. Salvation is not to be found in puny reason, but through follow ing the
passions. Here, em otionality in general plays the role of ethical source to the stream
of selfhood. The opposite applies to those who resonate with the more norm-centered
orientations of figures such as Hobbes and Kant. Here the true self is to be found
precisely in an avoidance of such 'irra tio n a l' impulses which are thought to speak
more of our animal heritage than of true, civilized humanity. Only a complete subjuga
tion of 'the em otions' in general by reason w ill lead to the peace, order and stability
that are prized. W hether our emotional experiences denote the truth of our being or
its degradation, or something else entirely, thus depends upon the ways in which we
narrate those encounters into wider scripts and narratives, and this in turn depends
upon the com plexities of our own experience and endowment, our socialization, our
(gendered, raced and classed) positioning within ongoing strips of interaction, our
relative power and status, and the broader social and cultural systems that provide
the context for these. In our 'postm odern' days of reflexivity, irony, m u ltip licity and
identity fragm entation, our evaluative (and em otional) relation to our affects has,
arguably, become even more salient and troubled. This is due to the relative absence
of explicit 'external' social dictates concerning who we are and should become (since
any such dictates are increasingly packaged as 'choices').
In the introductory essay we remarked that Silvan Tomkins, from whose work the
first extract in this sub-section has been drawn, is a key figure in the 'affective turn'.
From the 1960s until his death in 1991, Tomkins offered a comprehensive social
psychological theory grounded in a biological account of a sm all number of innate
affects both positive (excitement and enjoyment), negative (shame, distress, disgust,
fear, anger) and relatively neutral (interest). His work has been attractive to authors
of the affective turn because, despite the biological nature and triggering mechanisms
of these prim ary affects, Tom kins' theory holds that the affects can take on innumer
able social objects and come to be subject to a good deal of social m odification and
social causation. Tomkins also developed a comprehensive theory of personality
grounded in the m otivational structure of the affect system and it is from this - his
'scrip t theory' - that we have selected our extract. A ffects are m otivational since,
all else being equal, we strive to maximize our experiences of positive affect and
minimize the negative. But in the com plexities of reality, of course, we involve our
selves in a range of much more com plicated m otivational narratives, and it is these
that Tomkins calls 'scripts'.
A script is a regular way of organizing the relationships between a given number
of scenes. A scene is a pa rticu la r affective encounter: an infant smiles in pleasure at
the face of her mother; a child recoils in fear at the snarl of a dog. Given that we need
not in itially learn how to experience affects, within the first few years of life any
human being is likely to have experienced scenes of excitement and enjoyment as
well as surprise scenes, terrifyin g scenes; distressing scenes, and so forth. A script,
however, is a set of such scenes that has been co-assembled into a more complex form
that serves to am plify certain affective aspects over others and to be associated with
certain characteristic responses. An encounter with a snarling dog may be scripted
by one person as a transient scene unlikely to recur, w hilst for another it may be
E M O T I O N S, S E L F H 0 0 D A N D ! D E N T I T Y 1 4 5
developed into a full blown phobia generalizing to canines of all shapes and sizes, and
perhaps beyond. In the latter case, the fear scene is magnified through co-assembly
with other fearful scenes, w hilst in the form er case a different script is at play. We are
not neutral with respect to our scripts, since we tend to want to repeat and improve
enjoyable, interesting or exciting scenes and to avoid, escape or lim it the toxicity of
scenes which are distressing, shameful, disgusting, infuriating or terrifying (316). In
short, we aspire to command the scenes we wish to play. In practice, however, Tomkins
show us that it is often the other way around: our scripts can come to define us.
In their book Cool Rules, Dick Pountain and David Robins offer an 'anatom y of
an attitude'. Although they do not engage with Tom kins' work, the notion of 'co o l'
provides an interesting example of a script that has been highly influential in our
modern mass-mediatized world, perhaps because it has been projected so forcefully
via movies, jazz and pop-music, and the fashion industry. This indicates that scripts
can be formed in a 'top-down' manner (e.g. via the emulation of popular cultural
forms) as well as in a 'bottom -up' manner (e.g. via personal experiences), although it
is of the essence of cool to escape any accusation of the form er (since the 'tru ly co ol'
person just /scool). One of Pountain and Robins' definitions of cool is an oppositional
attitude expressing defiance to authority. In the face of scenes that would scare,
distress and humiliate others, the 'c o o l' individual shrugs their leather clad shoulders
and oozes an 'I don't give a dam n' nonchalance.
If the identity narrative of 'coolness' values a certain detachment from otherwise
predictable emotional reactions, then the paper by Charles M organ and James Averill
(1992) 'True Feelings, the Self, and Authenticity: a psychosocial perspective' deals
with the more rom antic but equally prevalent script in which feelings are construed as
the source of authentic identity. An unexpected episode of tearfulness may point the
way to an unacknowledged loss and a moment of m ystical rapture might reveal a
spiritual truth. But what are true feelings? The context for this extract is an em pirical
study in which the first author surveyed 195 college students from the University
of Massachusetts, Am herst using a series of questions about th eir experiences of
'getting in touch with true feelings'. In analyzing th eir findings, M organ and Averill
conclude that, according to their participants, true feelings can serve creative (e.g.
helping to modify or restore a coherent sense of self), practical (e.g. helping to
cla rify values and guide decision making) and social (e.g. helping to make sense of
relationships and one's place in society) functions. They also raise the issue of the
extent to which a clam orous concern about 'who we really are' is a typ ically North
Am erican preoccupation reflecting its history of individualism.
Agneta Fischer and Jeroen Jan sz's (1995) 'Reconciling Em otions with Western
Personhood' applies an anthropological lens to western culture. They pose the ques
tion of whether or not a tension exists between the Western ideal of rational and self-
contained personhood and what is often presented as the ordinary conception of
emotions as irrational and involuntary forces. Compared to the extensive scholarship
devoted by anthropologists to ordinary conceptions of emotion amongst so-called
'non-western' peoples, little is known about how ordinary westerners conceive of
th eir affective life. Drawing upon interviews with Dutch men and women undertaken
by Fischer, this a rticle explores the 'emotion narratives' that are drawn upon to
'account' for emotional episodes of fear and anger. Through such emotion narratives,
1 4 6 E MB ODYI NG A F F E C T
potentially discrediting episodes are rendered rationally intelligible and legitimate. In

this way, any possible deviation from the rational, responsible and self-determining
ideal of western personhood is mitigated by the image of rational, meaningful and
potentially controllable emotional responses.
A selection of social science readings on emotions, selfhood and identity would be
incomplete w ithout e xplicit consideration of the affect we call shame. This is because
shame is very much a 'self-conscious' affect (Tangney and Fischer 1995) im plicating
the role of a significant other into the self-conscious experience (Lew is 1992). As
Tomkins (1 9 6 3 :1 3 3 ) put it: 'In contrast to all other affects, shame is an experience
of the self by the self. A t the moment when the self feels ashamed, it is felt as a
sickness within the self'. W. Ray C rozier's (1998) a rticle 'Self-Consciousness in
Shame: the role of the "o th e r" ' begins by claim ing that shame involves adopting the
perspective of the other towards the self; that it is experienced on recognition that
one's actions are given a specific interpretation by the other (irrespective of whether
that interpretation is thought justified); and that it is distinct from embarrassment
because it involves core aspects of the self. W h ilst these propositions are by no means
firm ly established by the argument that follows, Crozier makes clear some of the
complex relations between the experience of self-consciousness and the perspective of
the other that have fascinated social theorists for many years.
References
Giddens, A. (199 1) M od e rn ity and Self-Identity: s e lf an d society in the late modern age.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Heelas, P. and Lock, A. (eds) (1 9 8 1 ) Indigenous Psychologies: an anthropology o f the
self, Burlington, M A : Academ ic Press Inc.
H offm an, R., Sobel, M . and Teute, F. J. (eds) (199 7) Through a Glass D arkly: reflections
on personal identity in e arly A m erica, Chapel H ill, NC: University of North Carolina
Press.
M o rris, B. (1 9 9 1 ) Western Conceptions o f the Individual, London: Berg.
M o rris, B. (199 4) A nthrop ology o f the Self: the in d iv id u a l in c u ltu ra l perspective,
London: Pluto Press.
Rose, N. (1 9 9 6 ) Inventing Our Selves: psychology, pow er and personhood. Cambridge:
Seigel, J. (200 5) The Idea o f the Self: thought an d experience in western Europe since
the seventeenth century, Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press.
Turkle, S. (199 7) L ife On the Screen: Identity in the Age o f the Internet, New York: Simon
& Schuster Inc.
Chapter 16
Silvan S. Tomkins
R E V I S I O N S IN S C R I P T T H E O R Y
S
C R I P T T H E O R Y , A S A T H E O R Y o f person ality, is built upon a p a r
ticular theory o f the innately endow ed nature o f the hum an being. Scrip t theory
assum es that the basic unit o f analysis tor un derstan din g p e rso n s, as distinguished
Irom hum an b ein gs, is the scene and the relationships betw een scenes, as o rd ered by
sets o f ru le s I have defined as scripts. [. . .]
O ne class I labeled affluent scripts. T h ese w ere basically scenes w hich wrere
aesthetic in nature. They wrere scenes w hich w ere rew ardin g in and o f them selves,
not defined by affect per se but by their quality. The ocean is beautiful; a person is
beautiful; m usic is w onderful; scien ce is w onderful - not defined in affect term s.
T h ese arc scenes o f affluence and the critical question in describ in g a hum an being
is w hat percen tage o f his lifc-spacc is taken up by affluent scripts. If it is sm all, it is a
pity. If it is large, he is lucky. M o st o f us fall som ew 'here in betw een .
Th e n ext class o f scrip ts w as one step away from heaven. I called these dam age-
reparation scripts. They w ere defined as scenes w hich changed from affluence to
dam age, w hich could be rep aired. O ne lost som eth in g o f value, it m ight be re co v e r
able; it m ight have been d am aged , and could be recoverable. That w as an optim istic
kind o f scrip t in that it assum ed that life could be beautiful, but som etim es it w as
dam aged and could be recovered.
Th e n ext kind o f scrip t I called lim itation -rem ediation . H ere you confront
those asp ects o f life w hich are less than ideal, but w hich m u st be con fronted and can
be con fron ted . Frequently, for m o st p eop le in the w orld, this con stitutes the realm
o f w ork. People think o f play as aesth etic, as affluent, w ork as en fo rced. For many
p eo p le, it is. They m ust w ork. They w ould rather n ot, o r they w ould rath er do
som eth in g else. People vary radically in their lim itation -rem edialion scrip ts, varying
all the way from what I call com m itm en t scripts to the resignation o f slavery. If you
1 4 8 SILVAN S. T O M K I N S
arc b o rn a slave, you also have to sc rip t y o u r life, and y ou resign y o u rse lf to b e as
g o o d a slave as y ou know how to be. T h at is n ot m u ch , but that is a lim itation w hich
y ou m ay face. M illion s o f p e o p le o v e r th ou san ds o f y ears have faced lives less than
p e rfe c t, to w hich they had to ad ap t in so m e w ay o r anoth er. T h is kind o f sc rip t g o t
at that large class o f h um an co n c e rn s.
T h e n e x t large class is w hat I called deco n tam in atio n sc rip ts. T h e se w ere sce n e s
in w hich so m e im p u rity is in tro d u c cd -in to a life. It m ay have b een go od b e fo re , o r it
may have alw ays b een b ad , but is re co g n ize d by the in dividual as, n o t a p e rm an e n t
lim itatio n , b u t an im p u rity , a co n tam in atio n . T h is w as the way H itler re g ard e d Je w s
in the life o f G e rm an y a co n tam in atio n , so m e h o w to be p u rified .
T h e final g ro u p o f sce n e s I call an tito x ic. N o w you can se e we are g o in g from
b ad to w o rse , w hich is the p sy c h o lo g ist’s w ay. In the an ti-to xic sc rip t, w e are
d ealin g w ith scen es o f in to le rab le p u n ish m en t, w hich m u st be eith er e lim in ate d ,
a tte n u a te d , e sc a p e d , o r avoided — som eh ow d e stro y e d . T h ese arc co n d itio n s that
hum an b ein g s find e x c e ssiv e ly to x ic for one reason o r anoth er. T h ey arc e x ile d from
th eir native lan d; they are p u t in to chains. T h e re are all kin ds o f c o n d itio n s w hich
they find in to lerab le. T h is is not th eir n o rm al lo t in life. It can h app en at any tim e ,
to any o f us. If w e g e t can cer, that is very to x ic . T h e re is n o way it can n ot b e. It is a
d ise ase that is very difficult to d eal w ith , very pain ful, very life threaten in g. T h at is
a to x ic sc e n e , and life is full o f to x icity .
All o f th ese ty p es o f sc rip ts, and th ere are m any differen t ty p es u n d e r cach o f
th ese classificatio n s, w ere d e sig n e d , . . . w ith no th ough t to affect. T h en one day a
light bulb w en t on in my h ead. I realized that each o f th ese typ es o f sc rip ts, w hile
very c o m p le x in affect stru c tu re and c o m p o sitio n , n o n eth eless had a p rim ary affect
w hich m atch ed e x trao rd in arily w ell m y u n d e rstan d in g o f the n ature o f each o f
the p rim ary affects. T h at w as a b on an za lo r m e , b e ca u se it w as alm o st like an
in d e p e n d e n t validation ol b oth the sc rip t th eory and the affect th e o ry that thcv
should hang to g e th e r so n icely. N ow that m ay b e an in san ity; it m ay b e a self-
d e lu sio n , b u t I tell it to y ou like it is in my m in d . It w as very exciting.
L e t m e tell you w hat th ose affects arc and how thcv m ap o n to th ese scrip ts.
O b v io u sly , w ith the affluen t sc rip t, w e arc talkin g ab o u t the tw o m a jo r p ositive
affects: e x c ite m e n t and en jo y m en t. N ow , o f c o u rse , e x c ite m e n t and e n jo y m en t arc
tw o very differen t kinds o f affluen ce. T h ey can c o m c in to very se rio u s con flict w ith
each other, as they d id , for e x a m p le , in T o lstoy , and as they did in any n u m b e r o f
p e o p le fo r w hom on e o r the o th e r o f them is seen to b e very d a n g e ro u s and the
o th e r very p u re. So I am n o t su g g e stin g that eith er on e o f them is n ecessarily
d efin ed as affluen t by all p e o p le , far fro m it. P u ritan s w ould n o t re g ard e x c ite m e n t
as affluent. It is p re tty c lo se to c o n so rtin g w ith Satan. B u t, n o n e th e le ss, the m ore
e x c ite m e n t a n d / o r e n jo y m e n t, the m o re afflu en ce, and that is g o o d .
W ith d a m ag e-re p arativ e scrip ts th ere is a very happy coin cid en ce w ith my
u n d e rstan d in g o f the n ature o f sh am e, b e cau se , in my view , sham e is an affect
au x iliary , w hich is trig g e re d by any p e rce iv e d im p e d im e n t to eith er e x c ite m e n t or
e n jo y m en t. I b elieve the toxicity o f sham e has b een m uch e x a g g e ra te d by sham e
th e o rists; sham e is an affluen t e m o tio n . It arise s only in the c o n te x t o f a stro n g bond
w ith the other. You can n ot be ash am e d , p e r se, u n less you find the o th e r e x c itin g or
lovable o r en joyable in so m e w ay, and you w ish to m aintain that b on d. B ecau se
if that is n ot the case, sham e readily tu rn s so u r in to d isgu st and d issm e ll and rage
R E V I S I O N S IN S C R I P T TH E O R Y 1 4 9
an d s o m e t im e s fear. B u t if y o u slay w ith sh a m e , if y o u s e e a fa c e w h e r e sh a m e

is d o m in a n t , o n e th in g y o u m ay b e su re o f is th a t th a t is a p o s itiv e ly o r ie n t e d
h u m a n b e in g , e ith e r o n e g iv e n t o m u c h lo v e o r m u c h e x c it e m e n t . T h e sh a m e
r e s p o n s e t e lls y o u th a t f o r th e tim e b e in g th e re h as b e e n an e x p e r ie n c e d i m p e d i
m e n t to th a t a fflu e n c e . T h u s the d a m a g e - r e p a r a t iv c s c r ip t s m a p e x t r a o r d in a r ily
w e ll to th e d y n a m ic s t r u c tu r e o f sh a m e as I u n d e r s t a n d th at a ffe c t to b e . S o if y o u
have a s c r ip t w h ic h s p e a k s o f a r e t u r n to a p r o m is e d la n d , a s wra s t r u e fo r M a r x , an d
as is t r u e in n u c le a r r e p a r a tiv e s c r ip t s b a s e d u p o n sib lin g r iv a lr y , th e n y o u k n o w
th a t b o n d , w h ich w a s d a m a g e d b y sh a m e , is a lw a y s b e lie v e d to b e r e p a r a b le an d
r e c o v e r a b le . . . .
W ith lim ita tio n - r e m c d ia t io n s c r ip t s w e a r c d e a lin g w ith p e r m a n e n t , s e r io u s
p r o b le m s , w h ic h , h o w e v e r, d e m a n d an d le n d th e m s e lv e s to r e m e d y . T h a t fits
r e m a r k a b ly w e ll w ith m y u n d e r s t a n d in g o f th e n a tu re o f d is tr e s s . I h ave c o n tr a s t e d
d is tr e s s w ith te r r o r . T e r r o r is an e m e r g e n c y r e s p o n s e w h ic h is u r g e n t an d c o s tly an d
n e e d s t o b e a tte n d e d to im m e d ia t e ly , w h e r e a s d is tr e s s h as th e v e ry fine p r o p e r t y o f
m o tiv a tin g y o u in a n e g a tiv e s c e n e b u t is n o t so p u n ish in g th a t y o u c a n n o t u tiliz e all
o f y o u r r e s o u r c e s t o c o p e w ith th a t d is tr e s s in g s ta te o f a ffa irs. T h u s it fits v e ry
b e a u tifu lly w ith th e d e fin itio n s o f s c r ip t s d e d ic a t e d to d e a lin g w ith lo n g - t e r m b ad
s itu a tio n s , b u t s itu a tio n s w h ic h d e m a n d an d w h ic h c an b e im p r o v e d .
W h e n w e c o m e to d e c o n ta m in a t io n s c r ip t s , w e a r e , o f c o u r s e , d e a lin g v e ry
p r e c is e ly w ith w 'hat I u n d e r s t a n d t o b e th e d y n a m ic s o f th e d r iv e a u x ilia r y r e s p o n s e
o f d is g u s t . D is g u s t is th e r e s p o n s e o f d is e n c h a n tm e n t. 1 s tr e s s b o th dis an d enchant
ment. W h e n y o u ta k e s o m e th in g in to y o u r m o u th w h ic h y o u th o u g h t w a s g o o d
e n o u g h to e a t , an d il tu r n s o u t to b e s o m e th in g y o u v o m it o u t , y o u a re d is
e n c h a n te d w ith th at fo o d an d w ith th a t o b je c t , i f y o u u se il m e ta p h o r ic a lly . T h e
s ta tu s o f d is g u s t , o f c o u r s e , is q u it e d iffe r e n t fro m th a t o f an a ffe c t. It is a v e ry
s tr a n g e s ta tu s , b e c a u s e i f 1 g iv e y o u a v e ry ta sty d ish w h ic h y o u e n jo y , an d a few
m in u te s la t e r I te ll y o u th a t it c a m e Iro m th e e n tr a ils o f y o u r n e ig h b o r , y o u a rc
d is e n c h a n te d an d y o u m ay v o m it . N o w th a t is an in n ate n a u se a r e s p o n s e to a
le a r n e d s tim u lu s — v e ry s tr a n g e . . . . It illu s tr a te s s o m e th in g o f th e a m b ig u ity o f . . .
d is g u s t , in th a t it can an d d o e s p lay a v e ry p o w e r fu l r o le in o u r liv e s b e c a u s e w e
r e a c t t o s c e n e s as i f th e y w e r e b a d f o o d , w h ic h o n c e h ad b e e n o r w e r e th o u g h t to b e
g o o d . T h a t is a v e ry p o w e r fu l m o t iv e .
W e s e e it, fo r e x a m p le , in an e x t r a o r d in a r y w ay in th e O ’ N e ill fam ily o f w h ich
E u g e n e O ’ N e ill, th e p la y w r ig h t, w a s a m e m b e r . T h e y w e r e all d is g u s t e d w ith c ac h
o th e r b e c a u s e th e m o t h e r b e c a m e a d o p e a d d ic t , th e fa th e r w a s te d h is t a le n t, th e
o ld e s t s o n w a s an a lc o h o lic , an d E u g e n e O ’ N e ill w a s sic k an d a t t im e s a lc o h o lic .
T h e y t o r e e a c h o t h e r a p a r t in d is g u s t , a g ain an d a g a in . Long D a y ’s Journ ey into N ight
p r o b a b ly w ill b e th e c la s s ic o f s h a r e d , fo u r- w a y d is g u s t fo r all tim e to c o m e . It is a
v e ry p o w e r fu l play in w h ic h th e m a jo r d y n a m ic is sh a r e d d is g u s t o f p e o p le in love
w ith c a c h o t h e r an d in d is g u s t w ith c a c h o th e r. . . .
F in a lly , w e c o m e t o th e a n t ito x ic s c r ip t s . T h e s e a re m a p p e d q u ite w e ll o n to
te r r o r , r a g e , an d d is s m e ll. W c k n o w th e t o x ic it y o f te r r o r . T h e b o d y w as n o t
d e s ig n e d lo liv e in t e r r o r . Il is a v e ry p u n ish in g r e s p o n s e , w h ic h w c h ave to g e t rid
o f as s o o n a s p o s s ib le . R a g e is n o t like d is tr e s s . . . . Il is su ffic ie n tly m o r e t o x ic so
th at it d o e s n o t le n d i t s e lf to fin e, lo n g - t e r m u se . If w e g e t in to a d e e p r a g e , o u r
to ta l r e s o u r c e s a re n o t a lw a y s a l o u r c o m m a n d . A m u te d r a g e m ay e m p o w e r an
1 5 0 SILVAN S. T O M K I N S
organized life, but a hot rage rarely. Sim ilarly, with d issm ell; in con trast to d isgust,
d issm ell is a very toxic response socially and o th erw ise, because it says the other is
unfit for hum an con su m ption , basically. . . .
In dissm ell you arc m oving y ou rself away from a bad-sm elling ob ject. . . . In
co n tem p t, . . . you m ove tow ard the ob ject. . . .H e m eans to h urt and he m eans to
reject. That is w hat co n tem p t is. It d e grad e s the other. It is m eant to. It is used in
severely hierarchical relation sh ips, w hen the one w ho has the p ow er judges that the
other is not only w eak and can be abused but d eserves to b e, m erits it, and asks for
it. It is a rather ugly com bination . It is the least attractive o f hum an resp o n ses and it
is very dan gerous. Lynchings in this coun try w ere based upon it. T h e w hites,
en dan gered, w ere goin g to show the blacks their place and did it by killing, as an
intim idation for other blacks, so that they should not be to o “u p p ity .” Th at is
con tem p t. The other is judged less than hum an. This w as also true in H itle r’ s
G erm an y. The Jew s w ere regarded as pollutin g the b lood o f the A ryan, and the only
way to deal w ith that w as to kill —six m illion o f them . . . . So these . . . affects, . . .
m ap extrem ely w ell on to sccn cs o f e xtrao rdin ary toxicity and danger for human
beings. They exem plify the life in extrem is. If you have to live your life te r ri
fied, dissm ellin g, and en raged, you are in big trouble and so are the p e o p le around
you. . . .
Let m e give you a little e xam p le, and I stress little, o f the kind o f illum ination
that one can get from the em ploym en t o f such a set o f categories and affects. I will
con trast tw o peop le, both distinguished at the d econ tam in ation , an titoxic end o f
the scale. I refer to the ph ilosoph er W ittgenstein and the novelist H em ingw ay.
Both, oddly enough, suffered from a very sim ilar problem o f gen d er identity. In
the case o f W ittgen stein , it w as h om osexu ality. In the case o f H em ingw ay, it was
that his m oth er often d ressed him as a girl and had him w ear long curls long
beyond the stage that might norm ally h appen, and caused a great confusion in
H em in gw ay ’s m ind. So he started out with a deeply con tam inated socialization.
D id his m oth er w ant a boy? D id she w ant a girl? It certainly looked m ore like she
w anted a girl, and he w as in terested in cro ss-sexed dressin g gam es m ost o f his
life.
H em in gw ay ’ s solution to the decon tam ination scrip t wras the gen eral strategy
o f purification . If you have go t an identity p ro b lem , one ol the w ays o f handling a
contam inated identity is to purify it. So he becam e ultram asculinc, as we all know.
A friend o f m ine, w ho w as a fine athlete, an all-A m erican football player, used to
know H em ingw ay in Paris. He said H em ingw ay w ould always be both erin g him
to b ox w ith h im , and that H em ingw ay could not b ox w orth a dam n. But he had to
show that he w as a man and used to bore my frien d, w ho w as, in fact, a very fine
boxer. H em in gw ay’ s w hole life h istory is an attem p t, sadly, to prove som ething
w hich he did n ot believe. . . .
The com parison w ith W ittgen stein is in terestin g because W ittgenstein also
suffered from gen d er confusion and he seriously con sidered suicide. T h ree o f his
b roth ers had already su icid ed , and he talked o f it m uch o f his life. So he m oved from
a decon tam ination scrip t to an an titoxic scrip t. He saw no way to purify h im self, so
he m oved over one rung on the scale to an an titoxic solution — he could destroy
him self. But the fascinating thing about W ittgenstein is that at one point he learned
about Freud. I do not know w hether he w as analyzed, o r w hether he just read it,
REVISIONS IN S C R I P T THEORY 151
b u t it r a d ic a lly c h a n g e d h im . It m o v e d th e s c r i p t , w h ic h h ad s t a r t e d as d e c o n t a m i n
a tio n a n d h a d m o v e d to a n t i - t o x i c , t o r e m e d i a t i o n at th e e n d , a n d th at sav e d h im . I
w ill r e a d to y o u his o w n a c c o u n t o f it.
W h e n e v e r y o u ’ r e p r e o c c u p i e d w ith s o m e t h i n g , w it h s o m e t r o u b l e , o r
w it h s o m e p r o b l e m w h ic h is a b ig th in g , as s e x is, f o r in s t a n c e , th e n
n o m a t t e r w h a t y o u s t a r t f r o m , th e a s s o c ia t io n w ill le a d finallv an d
in e v ita b ly b a c k t o th a t s a m e t h e m e . F r e u d r e m a r k s o n h o w a f t e r the
an aly sis o f it, th e d r e a m a p p e a r s s o v e r y lo g ic a l a n d o f c o u r s e it d o c s ,
an d w o r s e it o f te n has th e a t t r a c t i v e n e s s o f g i v i n g a s o r t o f t r a g i c p a t t e r n
to o n e ’ s life. It is all th e r e p e t i t i o n o f the s a m e p a t t e r n w h ic h w a s s e t tl e d
l o n g a g o , like a t r a g i c fig u r e c a r r y i n g o u t the d e c r e e s u n d e r w h ic h the
fa te s had p la c e d h im a t b i r t h . M a n y p e o p l e have at s o m e p e r i o d s e r i o u s
t r o u b l e in th e ir liv e s, s o s e r i o u s as to le a d t o t h o u g h t s o f s u ic id e . T h i s is
likely t o a p p e a r to o n e as s o m e t h i n g n a s t y , as a s itu a t io n w h ic h is t o o
fo u l t o b e a s u b j e c t o f a t r a g e d y . A n d it m a y th e n b e an i m m e n s e r e l i e f if
it ca n b e s h o w n th at o n e ’ s life h as th e p a t t e r n r a t h e r o f a t r a g e d y , the
tr a g i c w o r k i n g o u t a n d r e p e t i t i o n o f a p a t t e r n .
In o t h e r wro r d s , th is is a g iv e n lim it a t i o n o f th e life c o n d i t i o n o v e r w h ich y o u have

v e r y little c o n t r o l . B u t t h e r e is a d ig n it y in s e e i n g th at this is an e x i s t e n t i a l p r o b l e m ,
a n d th a t e n a b le d W i t t g e n s t e i n to m o v e f r o m d e c o n t a m i n a t i o n , t o a n t i t o x i c , to
r e m e d i a t i o n . It is n o t m u c h , b u t e n o u g h to sav e his life.
I g iv e y o u th e se t w o v e r y s m a l l e x a m p l e s o f th e il lu m i n a t io n th at c o m e s fr o m
th e in t e r a c t io n b e t w e e n k n o w i n g w h a t th e d o m i n a n t , p r i m a r y a ffe c ts a r e f o r la r g e
c l a s s e s o f s c r i p t s a n d h o w th e y m a y m o v e a r o u n d in d e v e l o p m e n t . T h o s e c h a n g e s
a r e v e r y d iffic u lt to d e a l w it h w i t h o u t s o m e c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k . I h ave f o u n d
th is f r a m e w o r k t o b e q u it e illu m i n a t in g in r e v e a l in g th e m a j o r o u t l in e o f a life
h is t o r y . T h i s is an e x a m p l e o f w h a t I m e a n w h e n I say, i f w e have p o w e r f u l e n o u g h
t h e o r y , w e ca n th e n g o to th e fa c e a n d say, i f y o u s e c th is a ffe c t is d o m i n a n t , l o o k
fo r s u c h a n d s u c h a c la s s o f p r e o c c u p a t i o n , a n d if it s h ifts , l o o k f o r a shift in s c r i p t
f o r m a t i o n . T h a t is th e u tility o f it.
Chapter 17
Dick Pountain and David Robins
COOL R U L E S
A n a to m y o f an a ttitu d e
[• ■ •]
H
ERE . .. IS A B A S I S FOR a rough w orking definition o f C ool that
may serve until m ore o f its p ro p erties are uncovered in later chapters. C ool
is an oppositional altitude ad opted by individuals o r sm all gro u p s to e x p re ss defi
ance to authority — w hether that o f the parent, the teacher, the police, the boss or
the prison w arden. Put m ore succin ctly, we see C o o l as a permanent state o f private
rebellion . Permanent because C o o l is n ot ju st som e ‘phase that you go th rou gh ’ ,
som eth in g that you ‘grow out o f ’ , but rather som eth in g that if once attained
rem ains fo r life; private b ecause C o o l is not a collective political resp o n se but a
stance o f individual defiance, w hich d o es not announce itse lf in striden t slogans but
con ceals its rebellion behind a m ask of ironic im passivity. This attitude is in the
p rocess o f b eco m in g the dom in ant type o f relation betw een p eop le in W estern
so cieties, a new secular virtue. N o-on c w ants to be good any m o re , they w ant to be
C o o l, and this desire is no lon ger confined to teen agers but is to be found in a
sizeable m inority even o f the over-50s w'ho w ere perm an ently affected by the ’ 60s
coun ter-culture.
T his brings us to a secon d difficulty in defining C o o l, nam ely its m utability. If
C o o l is n ot inherent in ob jects but in p eo p le, then w hat is seen as C o o l w ill change
from place to place, from tim e to tim e and from gen eration to gen eration . T h ose
m arketing m anagers at Levi Strauss desperately trying to ‘crack the code o f c o o l’
know that their jeans w ere gran ted C ool status by an accident o f h istory, and
advertisin g alone cannot recaptu re it for them .
In any epoch , although C o o l w ill have a particularly pow erful m eaning for
teen agers, as an an tidote to their ever-presen t fear o f bein g e m b arrasse d , being
C o o l fo rm s part o f a risky series o f n egotiations about b eco m in g an individual w hile
still being accepted into a gro u p — it’ s about both individuality and b elon gin g, and
COOL R UL E S 1 5 3
the ten sion betw een the two. O n ce acq u ired, C o o l d ocs not w ear oil quickly, and
since in its m o d ern form it appeared in the ’ 50s, there arc now at least lour
gen eration s alive w ho have their ow n — often seriously clashing — definitions of
w'hat is C o o l. R ecen t stud ies of u n d e r-30 d ru g u sers reveal that a significant n um ber
have paren ts w ho first exp erim en ted with dru gs in the ’60s and ’ 70s (w hen they
w ere C o o l them selves) and w ho arc now in a quandary ab out w hat to tell their
children. Each succeed in g gen eration feels that ‘re a l’ C ool is som eth in g pure and
existen tial known only to them - it w as founded in iheir tim e, in the jazz clubs o f
the ’ 5 0s, o r the hippy festivals o f the ’ 6 0 s, or the punk explosion o f the ’ 70s. O ne
com po n en t o f C ool is certainly a retarded ad olescen ce, inspired in p art by a m orbid
fear o f ageing anyone w ho has been to a party w here 50-som eth in gs g e t dow n to
the strains o f ‘ G e t O ff o f My C lo u d ’ have had a glim p se o f the danse macabre.
O n the other hand, C o o l is equally about teen agers behaving with p reco ciou s
m aturity (especially about sex and political cynicism ), and o ld e r h ip sters arc d is
covering that the behaviour they em ployed as provocation in the ’ 60s is now-
accepted as everyday routin e: city stre ets, cafes, m ovie theatres and clubs thronged
w ith exu b eran t youth fo r w hom w earin g hair long or sp o rtin g a nose ring is
con sidered quite a m ild social statem en t (it’s easy to forget that in ‘sw inging
L o n d o n ’ in the ’ 60s the b u rger join t w as the only place open after 1 0 .3 0 p m ). [. . .]
C o o l is a reb ellious attitude, an exp ression o f a b e lie f that the m ainstream
m ores o f your socicty have no legitim acy and do not apply to you. It’s a self-
contained and individualistic attitude, although it places high value on friendship
within a tightly defined p e e r g ro u p — indeed it strives to displace traditional family
ties, w hich are to o intim ate and intrusive to allow sufficient space fo r self-invention.
C o o l is profoun dly h edonistic but often to such a self-destructive degree that it
flirts w ith death: by acciden t, suicide or som e am bivalent ad m ix tu re ol the two
(for exam p le, a m o to rcy cle crash o r au to-ero tic stran gu lation ). C o o l w as once an
attitude fo stered by reb els and un d erd ogs — slaves, p riso n e rs, political dissidents —
for w hom open rebellion invited punish m ent, so it hid its defiance behind a w all of
ironic d etach m en t, distancing itse lf from the so u rce o f authority rath er than directly
confrontin g it. In the ’ 50s this attitude w as w idely ad opted by artists and in tel
lectuals w ho thereby aided its infiltration into p op u lar eultu re, with the result that
today it is b eco m in g the dom in ant attitude, even (o r perhaps especially) am on g the
rich and privileged w ho can w ield it as m erely the latest in a lon g line o f w eapons
writh which to put dow n their ‘ social in fe rio rs’ . C o n tem p o rary C o o l is equally at
hom e in the ten em en t b asem en t and the m illion-dollar loft con version . At its m ost
e x tre m e , C o o l can even be tu rn ed into a m anipulative strategy for separating
peop le from their fam ilies and en couragin g depen den cy: ‘control fre ak s’ such as
C h arles M anson, David K horcsh o f the Branch D ravidians (o f W aco n o to rie ty ), the
Reverend Jim Jones and gu ru s like the Bagw han Shri Rajneesh have all deployed
C o o l as an asp ect o f their m anipulative perso n as. [. . .]
The cool personality
. . . C ool is an attitude o r personality type that has em erg ed in many different

societies, durin g different h istorical ep och s, and w hich has served different social
1 5 4 DICK P OU NTAI N AND DAVID ROBINS
fu n ctio n s, but is n e v e rth e le ss reco g n izab le in all its m an ifestatio n s as a p a rticu la r

co m b in atio n of th ree c o re . . . traits, n am ely n arc issism , ironic d e tach m cn t and
h ed o n ism .
N arcissism m e an s an e x a g g e ra te d ad m iration fo r o n e se lf, p articu larly fo r p e r
son al ap p e aran ce , w hich g iv e s rise to the feelin g that the w o rld rev o lv es arou n d you
and sh ares y o u r m o o d s. A t its m o s t p o sitiv e such n arcissism is a healthy celeb ratio n
o f the se lf, w hile even in its m o re negative m an ife statio n s it can be an effective
ad ap tation to any o p p re ssiv e c ircu m stan c e s that sap se lf-e ste e m . Such c irc u m
stan ces w ould ap p e ar to in clu dc n ot only the ob v io u s c x p c r ic n c c o f p o v erty ,
political re p re ssio n and tyranny b u t even life in the c e leb rity -w o rsh ip p in g c o n su m e r
d e m o c ra c ie s o f the d e v e lo p e d w o rld . O f c o u rse to any pu ritan c u ltu re , narcissism
a p p e ars as the sin o f vanity.
Ironic d c tac h m cn t is a stratag em fo r co n cealin g o n e ’ s feelin gs by su gg e stin g
their o p p o site , fo r e x a m p le feign in g b o re d o m in the face o f dan ger, o r a m u sem en t
in the facc o f in su lt. P h ilo so p h ers distin gu ish several ty p es o f iron y , in clu ding
So cratic iro n y , w hich in volves saying less than one really m e an s to lull an op p o n e n t
in to false se c u rity , w hile actually d e liv e rin g a tellin g blow to his a rg u m e n t, and
R o m an tic iron y, a p ro fo u n d sce p ticism w hich q u e stio n s the validity o f everythin g
(as e x e m p lifie d in the ap h o rism s o f N ie tz sc h e ). C o o l irony p a rtak es o f b oth these
m e an in gs, m ak in g it a verb al w eapon equally effective in ag gre ssio n o r d e fe n ce , and
cru cial to the m ain tenan ce o f a p ro te ctiv e C o o l p e rso n a . Irony allow s one to give
d eep offen ce w hile o sten sib ly rem ain in g civil, as in the black A m erican trad ition
o f ‘ sh u ck in g’ sp e e ch u sed to ad d re ss w hite au th ority fig u re s, w hich o ffers a s u b
se rv ie n c e so e x a g g e ra te d that it b e co m e s in so len t. Je w ish h u m o u r has a sim ilar
trad ition of d e fe n siv e -ag gressiv e iron y, and it w as ’ 6 0 s c o m ic s such as M o rt Sahl
and Lenny B ru ce , co m in g o u t o f this trad itio n , w h o fo rg e d a new strain o f ‘ sick
h u m o u r’ , fo r e x a m p le by d e lib e rate ly usin g racial e p ith e ts as a w ay o f defu sin g
th eir p o w e r to h u rt. T h is typ e of iron ic h u m o u r now so suffuses m o d e rn C o o l that
display s o f sim p le sin cerity have b e co m e a lm o st im p o ssib lv U n co o l — Q u en tin
Taran tin o can m ake m o p p in g sp lattere d b rain s o ff a car scat seem gen uin ely funny.
H ed o n ism re q u ire s less e x p la n atio n , e x c e p t p e rh ap s to p o in t o u t that C o o l
h ed on ism ten d s tow ard the w o rld ly , ad ven tu rou s and even o rg iastic rath e r than
the p le asan t. A t its ligh test, C o o l h ed on ism is that p u rsu it o f h app in ess en shrin ed
in the A m erican C o n stitu tio n and d e sc rib e d so w ell by de T o cq u eville as ‘ a love
o f physical gratificatio n , the n otio n o f b e tte rin g o n e ’ s co n d itio n , the e x c ite m e n t o f
c o m p e titio n , the ch arm o f an ticip ated s u c c e ss ’ . [. . .]
The c w ord
A gre at so u rce o f con fu sio n in u n d e rstan d in g C o o l is the w o rd itse lf, w hich already
has several closely re la te d m e ta p h o rical u sa g e s, d eriv ed from its ph ysical m ean in g o f
low te m p e ra tu re . For e x a m p le , The Oxford English Dictionary o ffers this d efin itio n :
C o o l: to lose the heat o f e x c itc m e n t o r passion , to b c c o m c less zealo u s

o r ard en t. N o t affected by p assion o r e m o tio n , u n e x c ite d , d e lib e rate ,
c a lm .
COOL R U L E S 1 5 5
. . . w h ile Jo n a th o n G r e e n in h is D ictionary o f S lan g ( 1 9 9 8 ) g iv e s its v e r n a c u la r

u s a g e s a s:
C o o l : la te n in e te e n th c e n t u r y + : g o o d o r fin e o r p le a s in g ; tw e n tie th
c e n tu r y : c a lm , s e lf- p o s s e s s e d , a w a re an d s o p h is tic a t e d ; 1 9 4 0 + : fa s h io n
a b le , c h ic o r w ith it.
T h e s e m e a n in g s a c c u r a tc ly d e s c r ib e an i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t o f th e C o o l a t titu d e ,
b u t at th e s a m e t im e th e y c o n c e a l its u n d e r ly in g t r a n s g r c s s iv c e le m e n t s , th e iro n ic
an d d e fia n t c h a r a c te r th a t d is tin g u is h e s it fro m m a n y p r e v io u s v e r s io n s o f n o n
c h a la n c e an d s a v o ir - fa ire . [. . .]
‘ C o o l ’ in its m e a n in g o f ‘g o o d ’ , ‘ fin e ’ o r ‘ f a s h io n a b le ’ is n o w u s e d as a u n i
v e rs a l t e r m o f a p p ro v a l a m o n g th e y o u n g in N o r t h A m e r ic a an d th e U K (a s w e ll as
in m a n y n o n - E n g lis h - sp c a k in g c o u n t r ie s ) , r ig h t fr o m c h ild r e n in p r im a r y s c h o o l
p la y g r o u n d s u p to c o llc g c - a g e a d u lts . [. . .] D o c s th is th e n im p ly th a t ‘c o o l ’ is a
p r e c is e sy n o n y m fo r ‘g o o d ’ an d h as n o d e e p e r c o n te n t? O n th e c o n tr a r y , ‘ c o o l ’
alw ay s c a r r ie s an e x t r a , o fte n b a r e ly p e r c e iv e d , c o n n o t a tio n : d e s c r ib in g s o m e th in g
(a r e c o r d , a m o v ie , a s o ft d r in k ) as ‘ c o o l ’ r a th e r th an ‘ s w e ll’ o r ‘ d a n d y ’ m a k e s th e
s ta te m e n t , in h o w e v e r sm a ll a w a y , th a t th e p e r s o n w h o u t t e r s it is C o o l an d n o t a
n e r d o r a c o n f o r m is t . O f c o u r s e th e n in c - y c a r - o ld in p r im a r y s c h o o l w ill n o t
u n d e r s ta n d su c h c o n n o ta tio n s at fir s t, b u t th ey w ill g r a d u a lly a b s o r b p r e c is e ly w h at
it is th at m a k e s s o m e th in g s C o o l an d o t h e r s n o t in th e e y e s o f th e ir p e e r s , so
th at m e r e ly u sin g th e w o r d f o r m s p a r t o f an u n o ffic ia l, a lte r n a tiv e p r o c e s s o f
s o c ia liz a tio n . ( . . . )
T h e im p lic a tio n is th a t in m a n y c o n t e x t s ‘ c o o l ’ a c tu a lly m e a n s th e p r e c is c
o p p o s it e o f ‘ g o o d ’ . It s o m e o n e say s ‘ I t ’ s c o o l to d o c o k e ’ th ey d o n ’ t m e a n th at i t ’ s
good c itiz e n sh ip to ta k e c o c a in e , o r good fo r v o u r h ea lth to ta k e c o c a in c : th ey m e a n
it is in te n s e ly p le a s u r a b le to ta k e c o c a in e , an d th a t th e fa c t th a t i t ’ s ille g a l m a k e s
ta k in g c o c a in c m o r e e x c itin g an d m a k e s th e m C o o l e r in th e e y e s o f th e ir p e e r s .
T h is s o r t o f ir o n ic in v e rsio n o f v a lu e s u n d e r lie s m a n y o t h e r C o o l- s la n g t e r m s like
th e u se o f ‘ w ic k c d ’ o r tr a d itio n a llyJ u n c lc a n t e r m s like ‘ s h it ’ an d ‘ fu n k Jy ’ a s t e r m s o f
a p p r o v a l. [. . .]
In th e U S A c o n tr o v e r s y h as s u r r o u n d e d th e su b c u ltu r a l o r ig in s o f th e w o rd cool
r a th e r th an its e ty m o lo g y . S o m e h ave c la im e d th e e x p r e s s io n o r ig in a te d in th e ja z z
c lu b s c e n e o f th e ’ 3 0 s : ‘ W h e n th e a ir o f th e s m o k e - fille d n ig h tc lu b s o f th a t e ra
b e c a m e u n b r e a th a b le , w in d o w s an d d o o r s w e r e o p e n e d t o a llo w s o m e “ c o o l a ir ” in
... By a n a lo g y , th e s lo w an d s m o o t h ja z z sty le th a t w a s ty p ic a l o f th a t la te - n ig h t
sc e n e c a m e to b e c a lle d “ c o o l ” . C o o l w a s s u b s e q u e n tly e x t e n d e d t o d e s c r ib e any
p h y sic a lly a ttr a c tiv e m a le ja z z m u s ic ia n , o r a fic io n a d o w h o p a tr o n iz e d su c h c l u b s .’
T h is h as th e slig h tly b o g u s fe e l o f a ‘m y th o f o r ig i n s ’ , b u t w h a t is c e r ta in ly t r u e is
th a t m u s ic an d s e x p la y e d a m a jo r p a r t in th e d e r iv a tio n o f C o o l, as in th e b lu e s ly ric
‘ S o m e like th e ir m a n h o t, b u t I lik e h im c o o l . ’ In fa c t th e w o rd cool b e c a m e a tta c h e d
to o n e p a r t ic u la r sty le o f ja z z in th e la te ’ 4 0 s an d ’ 5 0 s , c o m p o u n d in g a c o n fu s io n
b e tw e e n th e m u s ic a l sty le an d th e a ttitu d e (w h ic h w a s e x h ib ite d by fa r m o r e jazz
m u s ic ia n s th an e v e r p la y e d th e s ty le ). B e s id e s , th e fin g e r - c lic k in g t e e n a g e r s o f West
Side Story p r o b a b ly b ro u g h t th e w o r d in to th e c o n s c io u s n e s s o f m o r e w h ite , m id d le -
c la ss A m e r ic a n s th an jazz e v e r d id . A m o n g th e ’ 6 0 s h ip p ie s ‘ c o o l ’ to o k o n a slig h tly
1 5 6 DICK POUNTAIN AND DAVID ROBINS
n arrow er m eaning — clo ser to its traditional im plication o f nonchalance — o f a

calm ing dow n to b etter deal with a p ro b lem , which has m etam orp h osed into the
cu rrcn t usage ‘to ch ill’ . H ow ever, it w as the hip-hop cultu re of the ’ 80s and ’ 90s
that resto red to ‘c o o l’ (o r ‘k o o l’ ) those tran sgressive and defiant conn otation s that
it still b ears for m any teen agers today. [. . .]
Wc w ould hypothesize further . . . that C ool is preciselv one such m echanism
that peop le use to sh o rt-circu it m aladaptive com parison s and avoid d ep ression .
Sociological th eories such as ‘strain ’ theory su p p o rt the idea that school students
w ho feel that thcv arc failing in the classro o m , or w ho do n ot ‘ fit in ’ socially,
ad opt a strategy o f disen gagem en t from school activities, and develop anti
academ ic cliques, o r su b cu ltu res, that provide an alternative ro u te to self-esteem .
By acting C o o l you declare y o u rse lf to be a n on-participant in the b igger race, for
if you d o n ’t share ‘straigh t’ so c ie ty ’s values then you can stop com parin g y o u rse lf
to them . C o o l cannot abolish social com parison s entirely, but it can re strict their
scope to your im m ediate p e e r grou p. M ods, ro ck e rs, skinheads, punks, h ippies,
c ru sties, goth s: for several successive gen eration s o f m arginalized and disaffected
youn g p eop le these su b cu ltu res, w ith their ow n ru le s, rituals and ob ligation s,
have provided a magical alternative to being w ritten off as a h opeless lo se r in the
rat race. In the language o f youth su b cu ltu res, ‘I’m c o o l’ equates to ‘ I’ m in
c o n tr o l.’
So what C o o l has offered to g ro u p s as disparate as field slaves, jazz m usicians,
disillusioned w ar veterans, D etro it street gan gs, teen age runaw ays and m iddle-class
high school dissen ters is a kind o f m ental em pow erm en t that their circum stan ces
otherw ise lail to supplv. In this sense C o o l is a subcultural altern ative to the
old notion ol perso n al dignity, since dignity . . . is a quality that is validated by
the establish ed institutions o f church, state and w ork. C o o l, on the other hand,
is a form of self-w orth that is validated prim arily by the way your perso nality ,
appearan ce and attitude arc ad jud ged by your ow n p eers. N everth eless, the asso c i
ation betw een C o o l,’ addiction and suicide suoggests
o
that as a real solution to living
o
in
a highly com petitive society , it is only partially effective. Studies continue to show
that the academ ic perfo rm an ce o f many boys d e terio ra te s rapidly betw een thirteen
and nineteen as they com e to see learn in g and academ ic su ccess as ‘girlish ' and
‘ u n c o o l’ , and this disabling ten den cy am ong boys is bein g accom pan ied by increases
in the rate o f suicide and attem p ted suicide. . . .
C o o l detach m en t if pu rsu ed to its limit w ould lead to sociopathy and total
isolation, but there is w ithin it a coun tervailing ten dency that unites close peer
g ro u p s through a shared idea about w hat ‘ c o o l’ m eans — precisely those self-
invented co d cs o f d ress, hairstyle, ritual, attitude and slang that M ajors and Mancini
Billson call ‘expressive sty lin g’ . But it is also this very tendency that open s the
loophole through w hich the advertisin g industry has colon ized C ool and used it to
sell go o d s to the young (and n ot-so-y oun g).
C o o l’s m echanism o f social coh esion, the counterbalan ce to its distancing
effect, involves sharing kn ow ledge o f so m e secret that is denied to m em b ers o f
respectable or m ainstream society. T his w as the original m eaning o f that synonym
for C o o l, ‘ h ip’ , w hich w as used as in ‘ I’ m hip to th a t.’ T h e content o f this shared
secret may be many different things, from the appreciation o f a certain style o f
m u sic, to predilection for a particular illegal d ru g, participation in crim e, o r so m e
COOL R U L E S 1 5 7
fo rb id d en se x u al p ractice . H ow ever, in the b ac k g ro u n d th ere is alw ays the hint o f a

b igger, se ld o m -v e rb a liz ed , m o re ab strac t se c re t, nam ely the p e rce iv e d h yp ocrisy o f
‘ straig h t’ so ciety . C o o l p e o p le share a b e lie f that so c ie ty ’ s tab o o s have no m oral
fo rc e lo r th em , and that th ese tab o o s are in any case regularly b rok en by even its
m o st su p p o sed ly re sp e c tab le m e m b e rs. [. . .]
T h is quality o f w orld ly kn o w in gn ess is ab so lu tely ccn tral to the C o o l p e r so n a l
ity , w hich alw ays w an ts to kn ow every th in g and loath es sc c rc c y , c o n c e alm e n t and
d u p licity . In essen ce then the p sy ch o lo g ical c o re o f C o o l is self-in ven tion co u p le d
to a h v p cr-acu tc aw aren ess o f such self-in ven tion by o th e r p e o p le . It am o u n ts to the
creation o f a calm psy ch ic m ask to hide in n er d istu rb an ce , w h eth er rage at racist
m istre atm e n t, an xiety in the face o f c o m p e titio n o r m erely a fu rio u s u rge for
sexu al c o n q u e st. It’s n o coin cid en ce that C o o l b e ca m e the d o m in an t attitu d e in a
H o lly w ood w h ere self-in ven tion is a w ay o f life. [. . .]
R eference
Tadesi, M . (1 9 9 4 ) Cool: the signs and meanings o f adolescence. Toronto. P. 37.

Chapter 18
Charles Morgan and James R. Averill
TRUE F E E L I N G S , THE SELF,

AND AUTHENTICITY
A p s y c h o s o c ia l p e rs p e c tiv e
[■ ■ ■]
I
N HIS HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF the idea o f the self,
B a u m e iste r (1 9 8 6 , 1 9 8 7 ) e x p lo r e s how a p e r so n ’ s identity in c o n te m p o ra ry
so ciety has b e c o m e in creasin gly d e p e n d e n t on overtly am b ig u o u s “m e ta c rite r ia .”
W h e re a s o n ce , fo r e x a m p le , p e o p le typically d e riv e d identity from cle ar-c u t
re lig io u s and class e x p e c ta tio n s, now p e o p le m o re often defin e w h o they arc in
relation to “ in n er” n eed s and cap ac itie s, lo o k in g inw ard fo r m a rk e rs o f “ au th entic
b e in g ” that m ay let them kn ow th em selves. “T ru e fe elin gs” are taken by m any as
e x e m p la ry m a rk e rs in this se arch . H ow ever, as p e rv asiv e as such feelin gs arc, w e
know very little ab o u t th em . [. . .]
The problem o f authenticity
True feelings are revealed from deep inside. Other experiences cover up jo u r true
feelings.
Truefeelin gs were more important . . . intense. They bothered me more.
They were kind o f scary. I wasn’t able to control them. They were going to happen
i f I wanted them to or not.
In the d om ain o f fe elin g, w e ch a ra c te riz e as “tru e ” that w hich w e e x p e rie n c e as

au th entic. W h at, th en , giv es “tru e fe elin g s” th eir au th enticity? In this se ctio n , wc
e x am in e so m e o f the c h a ra c te ristic fe atu re s that help distin gu ish “tru e fe e l
in gs” from other, m o re co m m o n p la c e e m o tio n a l e x p e rie n c e s. [. . .] A s the above
q u o tatio n s fro m the study by M o rgan (1 9 8 9 ) su g g e st, “tru e fe elin gs” are often
TRUE F E E L I N G S , THE SELF, AND A U T H E N T I C I T Y 1 5 9
ch aracterized as (1) d eep , (2 ) intense, and (3 ) passionate (in the literal sense o f
“beyond c o n tro l”). T h ese ch aracteristics ap pear sim ple enough , but their sim plicity
is deceptive.
1. For the m o st p a rt, as w e have seen . . . “tru e feelings” are p erceived not
only as arising from deep inside o u rselv es, but as arising from a d e e p e r sou rce than
the “ordinary” feelings ol everyday life. It is in the “d eep, dark reg io n s” o f ou r selves
that society is presu m ed not to reside, and so feelings that w e im agine as surfacing
from this so u rce arc felt to be m ore “ gen uine” and “ au th entic,” unvitiatcd by the
influences o f habit, exp ectatio n , and tradition. But, . . . the them atic content o f
“tru e-feelin g” e p iso d e s, as w ell as the exp erien ced feelings th em selves, arc draw n
from the m uch vaster pool o f cultural m eanings. Ironically, it is our questionable
percep tion o f them as deep dow n , hidden, that lends them credibility, that
“ auth enticates” them . As Trilling (1 9 7 2 , p. 161) n o tes, “to see society in ourselves
is to feel in authentic,” and so for “true feelin gs” to feel “tr u e ,” we m u st see them as
arising from som e culturally-devoid, socially-im m une w ellspring.
2. “T ru e-feelin g” episodes arc intense e x p erien ces and the feelings they c o m
prise arc, m ore often than n ot, con sidered painful. (In com parison to ordinary
feelin gs, 7 5 .7 % o f sub jects in the study ju dged “true feelin gs” as m ore inten se;
6 1 .3 % ju d ged them m ore painful.) It may be that intensity in this case reflects a
state o f disorganization , durin g w hich old p attern s o f thought and behavior are kept
in abeyance, allow ing the self-creative p ro ce ss to gain sway (Frank 1 9 7 4 ). But be
that as it m ay, intensity, painfulness, and stru ggle lend credibility to “tru e-feelin g”
ex p e rie n c e s, enhancing o u r faith in their truthfulness. A b e lie f in the authenticating
pow er o f suffering has a noble history that em b races e p iste m o lo g ie s as diverse
as Christianity and Freudian ism . Sennett (1 9 8 0 ) com m en ted on the tendency o f
peop le in con tem p orary A m erican society to seek m oral legitim acy through
suffering:
M o st o f all, the ennobling ol victim s m eans that in ordinary m iddle-class

life we are forced constantly to go in search o f som e in jury, som e
affliction, in o rd e r to justifv even the contem plation o f question s of
justice, right and en titlem en t in o u r lives. . . . The need to legitim ate
o n e ’s b eliefs in term s o f an injury o r suffering to which one has been
subjected attaches peop le m ore and m ore to the in juries them selves
(p. 150).
3. Finally, “true feelin gs” are felt to be authentic insofar as they arise outsid e o f
a p e r so n ’ s con trol. (In com parison to ordinary feelin gs, 6 0 .7 % o f sub jects claim ed
“true feelin gs” w ere “ less under [their] c o n tro l”). This p resen ts a p arad o x. H ow can
an cxp crie n c c that is free o f p erso n al con trol be con sidered true? Like many
p arad o xes, this one can be resolved at a higher level o f analysis. The p ercep tion o f
“tru e feelings” as out o f control can be seen largely as an artifact o f a larger idea: the
b e lie f in the prehum an, organ ic nature o f “tru e fe elin gs,” the belief, in sh o rt, in
their fundam ental “n atu raln ess.” [. . .]
In the R om an tic A ge, the glorification o f organ ic bein g achieved new heights
such that Sch illcr could w rite o f the soph isticated p e rso n ’s need for “ energizing
b e au ty ,” the source o f w hich is “the strength |man] brought w ith him from the state
1 6 0 C H A R L E S M O R G A N AND J A M E S R. A V E R I L L
o f sa v a g e ry .” T h is n otion o f a p rim o rd ia l in n er stren gth still c a rrie s g re at w eight in

o u r cu ltu re (as the c o n tin u e d p o p u larity o f Ju n gian p sy ch o lo gy atte sts, n o t to
m en tion the c u rre n t fascination w ith so c io b io lo g y ). In “tru e -fe e lin g ” e x p e rie n c e s
w e see re fle cte d the b e lie f in a tran sfo rm a tio n a l organ ic e n d o w m e n t. T h e search lo r
the tru e , the au th en tic, thus b e c o m e s a search tor the o rgan ic (a se a rch , it m u st
be n o te d , that acq u ires ever g re a te r u rgen cy as w e e x p e rie n c e the re le n tle ss d e m o
lition o f o u r organ ic en v iro n m e n t). In o u r e rro n e o u s p e rce p tio n o f “tru e fe elin gs”
as free from the im p in g e m e n ts o f social and in dividual p u r p o se , w e se e them
as n atural and organ ic and w e read in to them an o th e rw ise elusive au th en ticity , a
stay again st the fragm e n tatio n s o f e x iste n ce . In d e e d , in so far as “tru e -fe e lin g ”
e x p e r ie n c e s arc sclf-cn h an cin g, they fo ste r a sen se o f tran scc n d c n c c over the d is
orien tatio n and discon n ection o f o u r lives, that is, a sen se o f se a m le ss being. And
as w e have se e n , this can se rv e useful and ad aptive p u r p o se s. B ut to the e x te n t that
o u r e x p e rie n c e s o f fra g m e n ta tio n , alien ation , and d iso rie n tatio n are the p ro d u cts
o f cu ltu ral m ach in atio n s b eyon d the self-c o n stru ctiv e cap acities o f p e rso n a l
se n sib ilitie s, “tru e -fe e lin g ” e x p e r ie n c e s arc m erely on e a sp e c t o f a p e rsc v c ran t
cy cle o f loss and re c o v e ry , d am ag e and repair. A nd the u rgen cy in o u r search for
au th en ticity , as w ell as the p e rv asiv e n e ss o f “tru e -fe e lin g ” e x p e r ie n c e s th e m se lv e s,
m ay b e sp e a k , to parap h rase T rillin g, an in creasin g an xiety over the cred ib ility o f ou r
very e x iste n c e . By se v e rin g the au th en tic from the so cial, by seek in g tru e b e in g only
in the d ep th s o f o u r se lv e s, w e are den ied that sen se o f in te rsu b je ctiv ity w h ose
ab scn cc has p rovok ed th ese very scv crin gs and se e k in gs, and w h ose recovery alone
can re sto re lost m ean in g to o u r lives.
True feelin gs and the se lf
Swarmed with problems and people for six weeks straight made me aware that
I needed some time alone to pull myself together. 1 took a long walk by the fields
resolving certain feelings and ideas that had bothered me for so long. It was
enlightening.
I had a boyfriend . . . he constantly manipulated me. Anything 1 liked, he hated.

I thought we had some unbreakable commitment . . . [but] I realized I hcis
inside . . . 1 was losing energy. . . . 1 really realized that he didn’t love me, he
loved me only when I was what he wanted me to be. . . . / was waking up for the
first time. And when this true feeling really came out, 1 left him f o r good. Room.
That was it.
Truefeelings help to form some answer to the question, who am I?
T h e n ear c lam o ro u s c o n c e rn in o u r cu ltu re ab o u t “w h o w e really are ” has a lon g

and in trig u in g h isto ry (B a u m e iste r 1 9 8 6 , 1 9 8 7 ; E lle n b e rg e r 1 9 7 0 ; M arcu se 1 9 6 6 ;
T rillin g 1 9 7 2 ). And the ex ten t to w hich this c o n c e rn p e rv ad e s and c o lo r s all asp ec ts
o f c o n te m p o ra ry A m erican life is the su b je c t o f n u m e ro u s b o o k s and artic le s (se e ,
fo r e x a m p le , B ellah , M ad se n , Sullivan, Sw idler, and T ip to n 1 9 8 5 ). “T ru e -fe e lin g ”
e p iso d e s (le t alo ne this study itse lf!) arc on e m o re m an ifestation o f this c o n c e rn —
TRUE F E E L I N G S , THE SELF, AND A U T H E N T I C I T Y 1 6 1
an especially em blem atic m anifestation in that the question o f “true feelin gs” lies at
the core o f o u r beliefs about the self. We have presen ted evidence su ggestin g that
beyond their self-affirm ing attrib u tes, “true feelin gs” enable sell-adaptive p ro ce sse s,
providing, in a sen se, creative solutions to p rob lem s in self-m aintenance. In fact,
“ tru e-feelin g” ep isod es b ear striking parallels w ith creative p ro ce sse s in gen eral, and
an exam in ation o f these parallels may help further illum inate the nature o f “true
feelings” and their relation to the self.
G ordon (1 9 8 9 ) n oted that an essential distinguishing ch aracteristic o f e m o
tional exp erien ce may be the sense o f self-discovery. H e suggested that through
em otional e x p erien ce w e com e to realize previously unseen cap acitics, leading to
the expan sion o f o u r sense o f self. In the ex p c ric n c c o f “tru e feelin gs,” we have seen
a sim ilar relationship betw een self-discoverv through em otional expression and the
en largem en t o f self-adaptive capacities. We have suggested that the self-discovery
b orn in “tru e feelin gs” is, in p a rt, a creative solution to the tu rm o il, stasis, or
confusion in a p e r so n ’s life. M ay’s assertion (1 9 7 5 ) that “creativity is one o f the
essential ch aracteristics o f self-discovery” further su ggests the elose relationship
b etw een creative acts and “tru c-fcclin g” exp erien ces.
M o st accoun ts o f creativity (see May 1 9 7 5 ; R oth en b erg and H ausm an 1976;
Ste rn b erg 1988) hold that the basic creative m otivation is an innate need to m ake
o rd er out o f chaos. (S te rn ’s w ork [1985] provides em pirical su p p o rt for the
fundam ental p attern -seek in g, order-creatin g p ropen sities o f h um ankind.) C risis
and disord er, then, provide the stron gest occasion fo r both creative and “truc-
fcclin g” ep isodes. M oreover, in both kinds o f e p iso d e s, the m ost com m on affective
sequence is an early sense o f turm oil and an xiety, an ensuing intensity o f feeling,
and a subsequen t e xp erien ce o f re lie f and satisfaction. In creative acts the sense o f
ending o r resolve is provided by the gratification o f discovery. In “tru e-feelin g”
e p iso d es, it seem s to be the creation o r discoverv o f aspects o f se lf— and the
gratification that ensues from self-un derstan din g and change— that provides a sense
o f ending.
In o rd e r to m ake these ob servation s m o re p recise, w e refer to the lo u r stages of
the creative p ro ce ss en um erated by W allas (1 9 2 6 ), nam ely, prep aratio n , incubation,
illum ination, and verification. T h e first o r p reparatory stage entails the “hard,
con scio us, . . . and fruitless analysis” o f a prob lem . In “true fe elin gs,” this c o rr e
spon ds to the con scio u s, often d esp erate, and m ostly un successful attem p ts, in the
days and w eeks b efore an e p iso d e, to m ake sense o f inner conflict and find som e
m eans for resolvin g it. The second stage, incubation, is ch aracterized by an absence
o f conscious effort. In the days, h ours, o r m in utes ju st precedin g a “tru e-feelin g”
episod e, su b jects often d escrib ed a p e rio d o f stasis and frustration . U nable to
un derstan d their tu rm oil or effect change, they b ecam e passive, at least m o m e n tar
ily forgoin g con scious effort. In the e x p erien ce o f “tru e fe elin g s,” this stage, which
may be sim ilar to incubation, is follow ed by an often tum u ltu ou s sense o f discovery
and the exp erien ce o f understanding and change— that is, o f illum ination.
The e xp erien ce o f illum ination, w hether in creative o r “tru c-fcclin g” e p iso d es,
is m arked by a conviction o f validity that can be quite m isleading. In the precedin g
scction , we saw how “tru e feelin gs” arc often e x p erien ced as d eep , intense, and
beyond perso n al con trol. Features such as these lend the e xp erien ce an aura o f
authenticity. But no m atter how “ tru e ” an e xp erien ce may seem at the m om en t o f
illu m in ation , a fu rth e r step is re q u ire d — v erification . A creative discovery m u st be

teste d and refin ed in light o f socially ac c e p te d stan d ard s. Sim ilarly, “tru e fe elin gs”
req u ire a p e rio d o f verification , if only a m o m e n t in w hich the p e r so n ’ s new ly
re sto re d sell is teste d in the w aters o f cu ltu ral e x p e rie n c e and social relatio n s. T his
verification may c o m e from in tern alized sta n d ard s o r e x te rn a l e x p e rie n c e , but it is
im p o rta n t in c o rro b o ra tin g the “tru th ” o l the feelin gs. . . .
It is in A r ie ti’ s (1 9 7 6 ) elab o ratio n o l the p r o c e sse s o c c u rrin g b e tw e en stage s
tw o (in cu b ation ) and th ree (illu m in atio n ) o f the creative p r o c e ss that the relation
b etw een creativity and “tru e fe elin gs” is m o st in stru ctiv e. A rieti d e sc rib e s a kind o f
p rc co n sc io u s cogn itio n w hich he calls the c n d o c c p t and w hich he ch a ra c te riz es as “a
p rim itiv e organ ization o f p a st c x p c r ic n c c s, p e rc e p tio n s, m e m o ry tra c c s, and im ag es
o f thin gs and m o v e m e n ts” (p. 5 4 ). A c co rd in g to A rie ti, a rtists w ho feel im m ob ilized
by th eir c u rre n t fo rm s o f e x p re ssio n and w ho seek e scap e from the e x tern al
im p in g e m e n ts on th eir in n er lives m ay find creative su sten an ce in a re tre a t to
e n d o ce p tu al e x p e rie n c e . H is re se arch in dicates that a rtists and n o n -artists alike
m ove re gu larly b e tw e en c n d o c c p tu a l and co n ce p tu al e x p e r ie n c e , b u t it is in
m o m e n ts o f stru g g le that a p ro b le m -so lv in g rclian cc on c n d o c c p tu al stru c tu re s
b e c o m e s m o st m an ifest.
In the stru g g le ch a ra cte ristic o f “tru e -fe e lin g ” e p iso d e s th ere m ay be a sim ilar
re tre at from h ig h e r-o rd e r co n c e p tu al activity in to a passively re ce iv e d , p reverb al
e xp e rie n cin g. U n like W allas’ s stage o f in cu b ation , this re tre at (w hich m ay be
e x p e rie n c e d m o re as a “su cc u m b in g to ”) is n ot in to u n co n scio u s activity , b u t into
an alm o st p re co n sc io u s intensity o f im agery and feelin g, a se e m in g ju m b le o f
c o g n itio n s, feelin gs, and sen sation s. For so m e o f o u r su b je c ts, the e x p e rie n c e took
on “a dream y qu ality ” (1 7 .3 % o f su b je cts e n d o rse d this d e s c r ip to r ), fo r o th e rs it
w as “n igh tm are-lik e” (1 7 .9 % ) , and fo r o th e rs it in clu ded a sen se that “ som eth in g
false [w as] b e in g sh ed” ( 3 4 .7 % ) . For a m a jo rity , it w as d e e p , in ten se, su rp risin g , and
b eyon d c o n tro l. T h is c n d o c c p tu al realm o l e x p e rie n c e can b e seen as a kind o f te x t:
a h isto ry b o o k o f o n e ’ s se ll; a diction ary o f o n e ’ s p ast. It is a te x t of m e m o r ie s and
fe elin gs, the c o m p o n e n ts o f se lf. A nd from this te x t, p erh ap s through an associative
p ro c e ss im b u ed w ith p ro b le m -so lv in g in ten tio n , new selv es arc c o m p o se d , self-
en h an cem en t e n su e s, and m ean in gful u n d e rstan d in gs o f the p re cip itatin g con flict
arc d e riv e d . “To find and co n stitu te m e an in g ” (R o th e n b c rg 1 9 7 9 )— this is the
creative p r o c c ss, in feelin gs as in p o e try .
True feelin gs and the social o rd er
In high school I was a perfectionist. I was in a dance company. . . . 1 wanted to be

thinner than anyone else. . . . I had bulimia Jo r fo u r and a h a lf years because
o j this desire to look good. Then bulimia almost killed me. At that point the
[truefeelings] experience began and f o r thefir st time I went to my parents . . . wc
cried about it . . . and I realized people couldn’t really love me unless I loved
myself.
A couple o f months ago I was sitting in bed and myfrie n d called . . . myfrie n d
who I ’d had a relationship with f o r four years. lie told me that he met someone
TRUE FE E L I NGS , THE SELF, AND A U T H E N T I C I T Y 1 6 3
else . . . and did not want to see me anymore. After that . . . 1 was very mixed up
for days, hut after a while 1 got in touch with my true feelings about myself. I can
deal with people and relationships better now.
I was put into a situation between two friends . . . one o j which thought the other
had betrayed a trust. 1 had to decide for m yself. . . the truth . . . whether to
remain neutral or take a side. 1 had to let my good judgment and values decide
my stand, even i f that meant giving up a friendship or possibly two.
1 was in my room after my motherfirst explained to me that 1 was adopted. 1fe lt

like a “leftover” and that 1 wasn ’t really loved. I cried so hard. 1 was also angry.
. . . I he true feelings made mefe e l that 1 could go on to other things . . . and I
fe lt stronger.
C u rren t developm en tal research (e .g ., Belenky, C linchy, G o ld g crg cr, and Tarulc
19 8 6 ; Jordan and 1986; M iller 1976; Stern 1985) su ggests that o u r sense o f w ho we
are always ex ists w ithin the dialectic o f relation ships, that there is no such thing as a
se lf ap art from the intrapsychic w hisperings o f our individual social h istories and
the in terp erson al attu ncm cn ts o f our cu rrcn t lives. Wc are cach and alw ays a sclf-
in-rclationship; and the self-am endin g process o f “tru e-feelin g” e x p e rie n c e s, which
w e have seen as a kind o f creativity in the servicc o f the self, is al the sam e tim e a
process o f relocation , an attem p t to locale o n e ’s se lf within a dram atically shifted,
o r shifting, relational m atrix.
From inlancy we are taught the m eanings o f ou r em otio n s, at first by parents
and siblings and later by teach e rs, television , and frien ds. We are taught the general
cultural fo rm s o f in terp retin g o u r feelin gs, as w ell as m ore idiosyncratic, familial
form s. And w e en large and refine these m eanings within the co n te x t o f subsequent
e x p erien ces and relationships. Yet, how ever refin ed, our every em otion b ears with
it an im perative cultural h istory , a h istory w hich gu id es and govern s the choice and
expression o f our feelings. D u rin g “tru e-feelin g” e p iso d e s, w e im m e rse ou rselv es in
this h istory , in a sense “ru m m agin g aroun d” for a feeling or com bination o f feelings
that w ill be our respo nse to the tu rm o il, that will provide m eaning not only for
w hat has occu rrcd but for w hat can occur. If we ultim ately feel anger, it ’s not only a
ju d gm en t about precip itatin g o ccu rren ces, it ’s a co m m itm en t to a way o f u n d e r
standing the p resen t: for e x am p le , by seeing o n e ’s se lf as an injured p arty , by
con dem nin g a particular person or action , by assertin g o n e ’s b ou n daries in the face
o f shifting relation ships. All “tru e fe elin gs,” from self-love and p rid e to anger
and loss, establish the m eaning o f past and presen t events and create a c o n tcx t for
future con duct. By establishing m eaning they am eliorate con fusion , by creating new
con texts they enable com m itm ent.
My friends and I w ere at the su perm arket and there w as a picket line.
My frien ds started to go into the sto re and I said I d id n ’ t feel like it.
They started teasing m e and I just sto od there . . . first em b arrassed ,
then m ad. My feelings cam c to m e and I knew I w asn ’ t crossin g that
line.
T h e c o m m itm e n t is to a way o f b e in g , a w ay o f relatin g— in su m , to a se t o f

values ab o u t the w o rld , o th e r p e o p le , and o u rse lv e s. For this y o u n g m an w h ose
frie n d s w ere taun tin g him to c ro ss a p ic k c t line, the con flict and con tu sion he
initially e x p e rie n c e d w ere signals that a ch o ice w ou ld n eed to be m ad e n o t only
ab o u t his c o m m itm e n t to th ese frien d s b u t ab o u t his c o m m itm e n t to con flictin ©
g se ts
o f values. T h e an g e r he so o n e x p e rie n c e d (as a “tru e fe elin g”) h elped gu id e his
su b seq u e n t c o n d u c t, n ot only by givin g the even ts m ean in g (d elin eatin g his frien d s
as w orth co n d e m n atio n ), b u t by creatin g a c o m m itm e n t to a p a rtic u la r way o f b ein g
(as a p e rso n w ho c o m p lie s and c x p c c ts o th e rs to co m p ly to p a rtic u la r stan d ard s)
and way o f behaving (n o t c ro ssin g the p ick e t lin e).
In this case, the y ou n g m an ren ew ed his c o m m itm e n t to values w hich he
already h eld dear, p e rh ap s the values o f his father and fam ily. A n o th er y ou n g m an
m igh t ju st as easily have had a “tru c -fc c lin g ” e x p e rie n c e that in d u ced him to c ro ss
the p ic k c t line. If such w ere the ease, the y ou n g m an m igh t still e x p e rie n c e an initial
con fu sio n and con flict, even an g er; but his an ger m igh t now reflect a ju d g m e n t
ab ou t p ic k e te rs, and his c o m m itm e n t w ou ld b e to his frie n d s and th eir values an d,
m o re gen erally p e rh a p s, to frien dsh ip rath er than fam ily. In n eith er case, it should
be clear, w ou ld the “tru e fe elin gs” arise from the d ep th s o f so m e p re -so cial “tr u e ”
self. O n the c o n tra ry , “tru e fe e lin g s,” like all fe elin gs, em b o d y a h istory o f social
m ean in gs, and th eir p o w e r to gu id e is b ase d on that h istory . U ltim ately w e may
b reak w ith that h isto ry , w c may c o m m it o u rse lv e s to values o th e r than th ose w e had
previously held. But th ese new values, like o ld valu es, are still c irc u m sc rib e d by ou r
view o f w ho we are and w ho w e w ish to b e, a view defin ed and co n strain ed by w hat
w e have le arn e d , e x p e r ie n c e d , and felt as m e m b e rs of p a rtic u la r social o r d e rs in a
p a rticu la r c u ltu re . [. . .]
R eferences
A ricti, S. 1976. Creativity: The Magic Synthesis. N ew York: Basic Books.

Baum eister, R. F. 1986. Identity: Cultural Change and the Struggle for Self. N ew York:
O x fo rd U niversityJ Press.
— . 1987. “H ow the S e lf Becam e a Problem : A Psychological R eview of H istorical
R esearch .” Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology 52: 163—176.
Bellah, R. N ., R . M adsen, W. M . Sullivan, A. Sw idler, & S. M . T ip ton . 1985. Habits o f
the Heart. N ew York: H arper & Row.
Ellenberger, H. F. 1970. The Discovery o f the Unconscious. N ew York: Basic Books.
Frank, J. D. 1974. Persuasion and Healing (rev. e d .). N ew York: Schocken Books.
G ordon S. L. 1989. “Institutional and Im pulsive O rien tation s in Selectively A p p ro
priating E m otions to Se lt.” Pp. 115—135 in The Sociology o f Emotions: Original Essays
and Research Papers, edited by D. Franks and E. M cC arthy. G reen w ich , C T : JAI
Press.
Jo rd an , J. V. and J. L. Surrey. 1986. “T h e Self-in-relation: Empathy and the M other
D aughter R elationsh ip.” Pp. 81 —104 in The Psychology o f Today's Woman: New
Psychoanalytic Visions, edited bv T. Bernay and D. W. Cantor. N ew York: Analytic
Press.
M arcuse, H. 1966. Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud. Boston: Beacon
Press.
T R U E F E E L I N G S , THE SELF, AND A U T H E N T I C I T Y 1 6 5
M ay, R . 1975. The Courage to Create. N ew York: N o rto n .

M iller, J. B. 1976. Toward a New Psychology o f Women. Boston: Beacon Press.
M organ , C . 1989. True Feelings, the Self, and Authenticity: A Social Perspective. U npublished
M asters T h esis, U niversity o f M assachusetts, A m herst.
R othenberg, A. 1979. The Emerging Goddess. C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press.
R othenberg, A. and C .R . H ausm an, eds. 1976. The Creativity Question. D urh am , N C :
D uke U niversity Press.
Sennett, R. 1980. Authority. N ew York: K nopf.
Stern , D. 1985. The Interpersonal World o f the Infant. N ew York: Basic Books.
Stern b erg, R . J. ed. 1988. The Nature o f Creativity. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity
Press.
Trilling, L. 1972. Sincerity and Authenticity. C am bridge: H arvard U niversity Press.
W allas, G. 1926. The Art o f Thought. N ew York: H arcou rt, Brace.
Chapter 19
Agneta H. Fischer and Jeroen Jansz
R E C O N C I L I N G EMOTI ONS WITH

WESTERN PERSONHOOD
Emotions at odds with Western pcrsonhood?
W
ESTERN PHILOSOPHERS HAVE CHIEFLY TREATED
em otio n s or passions as being in opp osition to reason (cf. P ott, 1992;
Solom on , 197 6 ). In this dualist approach em otio n s have been d escrib ed as
irrational, involuntary or bodily fo rces, as ‘diseases o f the so u l'. Although not all
ph ilosoph ers have advocated this line o f thought, the dichotom y betw een passion
and ratio has un derlied W estern philosophical thought ever since Plato and
Socrates. . . .
This philosophical debate about the nature o f em otio n s raises the question o f
how W estern p eop le in everyday life think and talk about their em otio ns. T h ere is
relatively little known about the way in which W estern perso n s give m eaning to
their em otio n s in everyday life (e x am p le s o f excep tio n s arc C raw ford et al., 1992;
R ussell et a l., in p ress; Stearn s and Stearn s, 198 6 ), w hereas the n um ber o f studies o f
non-W estern folk psy ch o lo gies ab out em otio n s has increased en orm o u sly over the
past few years. . . . O ften , W estern everyday con ception s have been contrasted
with non-W estcrn m eaning sy stem s, assum in g that in W estern cultu re em otional
e x p erien ces are fram ed in term s o f in tern al, bodily en tities that d isru p t rational
behaviour (W h ite, 1 9 9 3 ). M ore specifically, em otio ns in W estern culture have been
associated with the follow ing ch aracteristics (cf. A verill, 1974, 1 9 8 2 , 199 0 ):
irrationality, corp oreality , involuntarity and anim ality. [. . .]
T h ese beliefs about the nature and w orkings o f em otio n s necessarily im ply that
em otio n s arc at odds w ith what is con sidered to be a n orm al and respectab le person
in W estern society . A lthough there are various m odels o f p crso n h ood in W estern
cultu re, there arc shared con ception s o f what a person is, as well as what a person
ought to be. . . . T h ese varieties o f public m od els offer us e xam p le s that may
inspire o r frighten us. M o st o f these public m od els o f being a person share three
R E C O N C I L I N G E M O T I O N S WITH W E S T E R N P E R S O N H O O D 1 6 7
fe atu re s that to g e th e r fo rm the d o m in an t versio n of W estern p e rso n h o o d (D e n n e tt,

1 9 7 8 ; H a rrc , 1 9 8 3 ; Ja n sz, 1 9 9 1 ). It is c h a ra c te rise d first bv rationality. P erso n s arc
assu m e d to , and have to be able to ac co u n t fo r th eir w o rd s and actio n s in w ays that
m e e t sta n d ard s o f ration al e x p la n atio n . T h e se co n d featu re is self-determination.
P erson s can d istan ce th em selv es from their c o n te x ts, and from th eir ow n im m e d i
ate e x p e rie n c e s. T h ey arc th e re fo re able to c o n sid e r alte rn ativ e s, and to plan their
action s acc o rd in g to th eir ow n p re fe re n c e s. . . . T h is se lf-d e te rm in in g featu re is
c losely linked to the third c h a ra c te ristic: Responsibility. T h e organ isation o f W estern
so c ietie s is such that hum an b e in g s arc held in dividually re sp o n sib le fo r w hat they
say o r do. . . . In su m , W estern p e rso n h o o d p ic tu re s p e rso n s as ration al ag e n ts, w ho
are in ch arge o f th eir ow n lives, are p re d ictab le and reliab le, and re sp o n sib le for
th eir actio n s. E m o tio n s, w ith th eir alleg ed irratio n ality , w ou ld seem to se rio u sly
u n d e rm in e this cu ltu ral ideal o f p c rso n h o o d . [. . .]
T h is b e in g the case, how arc p e o p le able to reco n cile th eir e m o tio n s w ith the
re q u ire m e n ts o f civilised b eh aviour in W estern cu ltu re? D o p e o p le in d eed ju d ge
th eir ow n o r o th e r s ’ e m o tio n al b eh aviou r as irratio n al? D o they think that they lack
c o n tro l over th eir e m o tio n s? D o they sim ply deny the p re se n c e o f e m o tio n s? [. . .]
The social fun ction s o f em otion narratives
N o t only b ecau se on e m igh t con ceiv e o f e m o tio n s as irratio n al, but also becau se
they d isru p t the o rd in ary c o u rse o f social in te ra ctio n , e m o tio n s a lm o st alw ays
d em an d an acco u n t. [. . .]
A cco u n tin g is d o n e in several w ays. A s a ge n e ra l ru le , a c to rs try to con vince
o th e rs that their b eh aviou r is n ot as irratio n al, in ap p ro p riate , stran g e , u n reason ab le,
o r ab n o rm al as it m ay ap p e ar at first sigh t. T h ey often do so by p re se n tin g socially
ac cc p tab lc , a g re e d -u p o n and con vin cin g reaso n s lo r their e m o tio n a l b eh aviou r in a
sto ry -lik e fashion (se e A n tak i, 1 9 9 4 ; Ja n sz, in p r e ss): they tell an emotion narrative.
E m o tio n n arrativ es arc ch a ra c te rise d as au th o re d , stru c tu re d sto rie s ab o u t e m o
tion al even ts. T h ey arc told from the p e rsp e ctiv e o f the n arrato r, w ho gen erally
em p lo y s a first p e rso n voice (Jan sz, 1 9 9 3 ; in p r e ss). N a r ra to r s p re se n t their
ow n p e rsp e ctiv e o f an em o tio n al even t and they try to con vin cc th eir au dien ce
o f the p o ten tial and p lau sib le c au ses o f th eir e m o tio n al re a c tio n . In this w ay the
p ro ta g o n ists set th eir ow n sto rie s again st the stan d ard s o f w hat is c o n sid e re d to
b e in telligib le and le g itim a te . An e m o tio n n arrative also has an o rd e re d n atu re , that
is, the e le m e n ts in the n arrative arc sequ en tially o rgan ise d . Stu d ie s o f e m o tio n
k n o w le d g e, b oth in W estern and n o n -W cstcrn c o u n trie s, show that th ere is large
co n se n su s a b o u t the se q u e n c e o f the m a jo r e le m e n ts in an e m o tio n n arrative.
T ypically, an e m o tio n n arrative en tails the follow in g b asic se q u e n c e : ev e n t—>
e m o tio n —^(so cial) re sp o n se (e.g. L u tz, 1 9 8 8 ; Shaver et a l ., 1 9 8 7 ; W h ite, 1 9 9 0 ).
T h is se q u en tiality gen erally re su lts in a p lo t: the sto ry en ds in a d e n o u e m e n t
b e ca u se the situ ation has b een re so lv e d , o r b e ca u sc the e m o tio n has b e en e x p r e sse d ,
o r b e ca u se on e has fou n d a way to c o p e w ith the even t o r o n e ’ s e m o tio n s. A n o th er
ch a ra c te ristic o f e m o tio n n arratives is th eir in telligib ility: they arc in telligib le in
the sen se that they p ro v id e re a so n s, a rg u m en ts and th ough ts that fit in the fra m e
w ork of shared cu ltu ral b e lie fs, ru le s and e x p e c tatio n s. [. . .]
1 6 8 A G N E T A H. F I S C H E R AND J E R O E N J A N S Z
T elling e m o tio n n arratives is the p rim ary strategy by w hich p e o p le try to solve
the ap p aren t con flict b etw een e m o tio n and p e rso n h o o d : e m o tio n n arrativ es not
only d e sc rib e e m o tio n a l ev en ts, but also exp lain it and m ake o n e ’ s e m o tio n s in te lli
gib le lo r o th e rs. H cn cc , the p rim ary fu n ction o f em o tio n n arratives is the re p a ir ol a
p e r so n ’ s sta tu s as a re sp o n sib le m e m b e r o f so ciety (Sh otter, 1 9 8 4 ), and m o re
specifically o f his o r h er th reaten ed iden tity . P eop le gen erally do n ot like to b e seen
as a c o w ard , a h o th ead , o r a childish p e rso n . W hen e x p e rie n c in g o r e x p re ssin g
e m o tio n s, p e o p le arc co n ce rn e d a b o u t how thcv w ill b e ev alu ated , and w h eth er
th eir b eh aviou r had go od o r bad c o n se q u e n c es fo r th eir iden tity . M o st p e o p le arc
gen erally aw are o f the fact that e m o tio n a l b eh aviou r m ay have eith er sh o rt- o r lo n g
te rm c o n se q u e n c es for the ch aracterisatio n and evaluation o f w ho on e is as a
p e rso n . W e p re su m e that p e o p le w ill gen erally try to in te rp re t and ju stify their
e m o tio n s in such a w ay that they d o n ot threaten the W estern ideal o f a p e rso n , or
th eir specific iden tity . K n ow in g w hat an a p p ro p ria te re actio n is, a p e rso n can
em p h asise th ose e le m e n ts in the sto ry that m ake the e m o tio n a l re a c tio n the m o st
n atural and ob v io u s on e that w as con ceiv ab le in that c o n te x t. P eop le w ill thus
preven t b ein g ju d g e d by o th e rs as irratio n al o r p rim itiv e b e in g s, o r as c o w ard s, or
w h in ers. O n the o th e r h an d, so m e e m o tio n n arratives are to ld so often and are so
co n siste n t ac ro ss tim e that they b e c o m e p a rt o f o n e ’ s id en tity . O n e m ay, for
e x a m p le , find o n e se lf a n e rv o u s, en th u siastic, o r h o t-te m p e re d p e r so n . A secon d
fun ction o f e m o tio n n arrativ es is re sto ra tio n o f the in te rru p te d in te ractio n . By
givin g ac c cp tab lc re a so n s, e x p la n atio n s, o r e x c u se s fo r o n e ’ s behaviour, the e m o
tion al and social balancc in in teractio n s is re co v e re d : every th in g is re tu rn e d to
n o rm al again. [. . .j
N arratives ab ou t an ger
A s e x p e c te d , an te c ed en t even ts w ere an in d isp en sable c le m e n t o f an g e r n arratives.

E very sto ry con tain ed a d e sc rip tio n of the even t that w as p e rce iv e d to be the just
cause o f o n e ’ s an g e r o r an g e r e x p re ssio n . T h is can be illu strate d by the follow in g
e x am p le . Im agin e a m an w h o is very an g ry , b e ca u se his w ife ’ s fam ily re p ro a ch c d
him and his w ife fo r n ot atten d in g the fun eral o f the w ife ’ s sister. Initially, one
m igh t think o f the m a n ’s an ger as b e in g in ap p ro p riate , and that he should have felt
gu ilty , o r sad in stead . C o n sid e r, how ever, the follow in g n arrative:
“I w as on holiday w ith m y fam ily , so m e w h e re in the m id d le o f Fran ce.

W e re n te d a holiday h o m e , the n e arest village w as 3 km fu rth e r on , the
n e arest train station w as 100 km aw ay. W h ile we w ere staying th ere, we
g o t the m e ssag e that m y w ife ’ s siste r w as very ill and ab o u t to die. A
siste r w ith w h om she w as n o t very c lo se , by the w ay. T h at sam e m o r n
ing the car b ro k e d o w n , and w e ju st had b ro u g h t it to the ga ra g e w hen
w e re ce iv e d this m e ssag e . T h en w e sta rte d callin g and d elib eratin g ,
are w e g o in g b ack , o r n o t, and w e d e cid e d to w ait and se e fo r the tim e
being. T h en the m e ssag e cam e that she had d ie d . M y w ife said: I w an t to
g o b ac k , but how (sh e d o c s n ot speak Fren ch )? T h en I said, then I w ill
g o w ith y ou. By the w ay, I m u st tell you that b e fo re this holiday w c had
R E C O N C I L I N G E MO T I ON S WITH W E S T E R N P E R S O N H O O D 1 6 9
a very busy p e rio d , I w ork ed m y se lf to death . N o , my w ife said , I d o n ’t

w ant th at, you n eed this h oliday. I w ill g o on my ow n . 1 did n ot w ant
that, fo r I w as afraid that she w ould end up in M o ro c co . T h en we called
the son o f the d e c e ase d sister, w e are rath er c lo se to h im , and he said he
cou ld u n d erstan d very w ell w hv w e w o u ld n ot c o m e to the funeral
(. . .): “You w ill b e late fo r the lun eral anyw ay” . It did leave a n egative
m ark on o u r h oliday,
J
o f c o u rse . But th en ,’ w e cam e h o m e,’ and an oth er
siste r did n o t even give us the chan ce to exp lain and she ju st w as very
m ean to us. W ell, then I e x p lo d e d , and I said , th at’ s en o u gh , w hen you
im m ed iately sta rt thin kin g the w o rst, if w c d o n ’ t even get the chance to
e xp lain that w e w ere in the m id d le o f n o w h ere, and that it w as a m iracle
that the p h on e w o rk e d , and that we did n o t know in advance that the
holiday h o m e w as in the m id d le o f n o w h ere! I w as terrib lv an g ry , and
now , tw o y e ars later, I still g e t an gry ab o u t i t .”
R ead in g this n arrativ e, it is easy to im agin e that this m an g o t m ad . T h is sto ry is not

m erely a d e sc rip tio n o f w hat h ap p en e d ; the d etails o f his sto ry build up a cred ib le
accou n t o f his anger. H e and p a rticu larly his w ife w ere tre ate d un fairly. T h is
u n fairn ess is stre sse d by pro v id in g v ario u s d etails o f the an te ced en t even ts in o rd e r
to con vin ce the p o te n tial liste n e r that he and his w ife co u ld n ot b e b lam e d fo r their
ab sen ce at the fu n eral: the car b ro k e d o w n , they w ere stayin g in the m id d le of
n o w h ere, and they did n ot know in advan ce that the place w as that iso late d ; she
did not sp eak the lan gu age, and they did co n su lt the w ife ’ s nephew . So , all in all,
th eir g o o d in ten tion s w ere m istru ste d and th ere should be no d o u b t that the w ife ’ s
fam ily ’s re p ro a ch e s w ere e x tre m e ly unfair. T h e fun ction o f this accou n t is to re p air
the p o te n tial threat o f his im ag e as a ration al and sen sib le m an , and it probably
rem o v es poten tially u n pleasan t feelin gs ab o u t his an g e r in that situ ation . T h e sto ry
k e e p s us fro m ju d g in g his an g e r as an irratio n al and u n co n tro lle d re a ctio n , and
p r e sse s us to re g ard his an g e r as a reaso n ab le re actio n that se rv e s the g o al o f p u ttin g
his w ife ’s fam ily m e m b e rs in th eir p r o p e r p lace.
An in te re stin g q u e stio n is w h e th e r his w ife ’ s sto ry w ould have b een sim ilar.
From o th e r stu d ie s w e know that w o m e n ’ s an ger sto rie s are differen t from
m e n ’ s (C a m p b e ll, 1 9 9 3 ; C raw fo rd et a l., 1 9 9 2 ). O n e v ery c o m m o n in gre d ie n t o f
w o m e n ’ s an g e r sto rie s is th eir crying. F u rth e rm o re , c o m p a re d to m e n , w om en
seem to be less exclu sively fo cu sed on the un fair and stu p id b eh aviou r o f oth er
p e r so n s, and seem to be m o re co n c e rn e d w ith (the c o n se q u e n ces o l) th eir own
fe elin gs, and the very fact that they m igh t lo se co n tro l. H ere is a typ ical e x am p le o f
a w o m a n ’ s an g e r n arrative:
“ I had so m e g o o d frie n d s fo r w hom I did all kinds o f th in gs, takin g care

o f th eir children and th eir an im als, m akin g clo th es fo r th e m , and so on.
O n ce I invited th em for d in n er; w ell I d o n ’ t w ant to have anything in
re tu rn fo r such th in gs, b u t then they b ro u g h t w ith them fo u r tw igs
o f flow ers they p ick e d fro m th eir ow n vase! I w as so an g ry . Isn ’ t that
h um iliatin g? L ast y e ar they w ere again on holiday and I had to g o to the
vet w ith th eir cat twice. H e w as already ill before they w en t on h olid ay, so
in the en d 1 had to let him co n sid e r lettin g him b e put to sleep . I w as
1 7 0 A G N E T A H. F I S C H E R AND J E R O E N J A N S Z
terrib ly an gry then. I lay aw ake fo r n igh ts, I c o u ld n ’ t sle e p , b ecau se I

d id n ’ t know w hat to do ab o u t the cat, and then I w en t to the vet, but it
w as such an agony fo r this an im al. I w as cry in g th e re , at the v e t’ s p lace,
te r r ib le .”
T h e co n te n ts o f this sto ry are p artly sim ila r to the m a n ’ s , in the sen se that oth er
p e o p le arc ac c u se d . H ere to o the an te c ed en t even ts ju stify h er anger. H ow ever,
th ere arc also so m e in te re stin g d iffcrcn ccs b etw een this and the p re v io u s n arrative
w hich seem illu strative fo r m o re ge n e ral g e n d e r d ifferen ces. W om en m o re often
d e sc rib e th eir feelin gs d u rin g the e p iso d e . In this c ase , fo r e x a m p le , she m en tio n s
the fact that she w as e x tre m e ly u p se t a b o u t the w h ole situ atio n , that she cou ld not
sle e p , that she did n ot kn ow w hat to d o , and that she had been crying. In m any oth er
sto rie s w om en also re fe r to th eir feelin gs o f p o w e rle ssn e ss, th eir con fu sio n ab ou t
the situ ation , th eir sen se o f in c o m p e te n ce and u n certain ty ab o u t w hat to do. T his
am bivalen ce in an ger situ atio n s is often o b se rv e d , and m ay b e re late d to an oth er
n o ticeab le g e n d e r differen ce in an g e r sto rie s: w o m e n ten d to e x p r e ss som e
em path y w ith the o b je c t o f th eir anger. T h ey try to lo o k at the even ts from the
p e rsp e ctiv e o f the o th e r ( ‘ he is so m ise ra b le ’ ), o r they play dow n the faults or
stu p id itie s o f the o th e r p e rso n (T kn ow she is like th at, and I sh o u ld n ’ t g e t angry
ab ou t i t ’ ). An im p o rta n t fun ction o f th ese e le m e n ts in w o m e n ’s sto rie s may be the
m itigation o f th eir ow n an ger: b ecau se stro n g an g e r re actio n s are n ot in k eep in g
w ith th eir fem in in e id en tity , they try to to n e it dow n by stre ssin g th eir con fusion
and am b ivalen ce w ith re sp e c t to th eir ow n an gry feelin gs.
D esp ite th ese g e n d e r d iffe ren c e s, how ever, both the m en and the w om en
in te rv ie w e d in this study gen erally provid ed ration al acco u n ts fo r their an ger
re actio n s in te r m s o f the an te c ed en t even ts. M o re o v e r, they c o n sid e re d their
e x p re ssio n s of an ger to be qu ite ap p ro p ria te , as w ell as their feelin gs. [. . .)
P eop le also m en tion o th e r ra tio n ales fo r their an g e r e x p r e ssio n s, w hich fu n c
tion as ju stificatio n s fo r an g e r e x p re ssio n s in th eir sto rie s. T h is is illu strate d in the
follow in g e x a m p le s given by tw o w o m en :
“W h en y ou arc very an g rv at a p e r so n , and w hen that is e x p r e sse d , that

is the tim e w hen it can be cleared u p .”
“ H e should know how I feel. T h at is qu ite n o rm al i f you have to

w ork togeth er. W hen you know how the oth er p e rso n feels and he
kn ow s w hat is b o th e rin g y o u , y o u g e t to kn ow each o th e r b e tte r .”
In both e x c e rp ts p o sitiv e c o n se q u e n ces o f w o m e n ’ s an ger e x p re ssio n se rv e as

acco u n ts for the fact that they e x p r e sse d th eir an g e r T h e first acc o u n t claim s that
an ger e x p re ssio n is righ t b e cau se it m ak es o n e ’s view s o r criticism o f an oth er
p e rso n m o re e xp licit. In the se co n d acco u n t the focus is m o re on the w o m a n ’ s
p e rso n a l relation sh ip w ith an oth er p e rso n and h er c o m m itm e n t to this p e r so n . In
su m , p e o p le c o m e up w ith a variety o f re a so n s w hy they e x p re ss th eir anger.
In terestin g in this re sp e c t is that the effects o f o n e ’ s an g e r e x p re ssio n n ot only seem
to b e e x p e c te d , but arc also intended. A n g e r e x p re ssio n s arc largely d e sc rib e d as if
they arc volun tary and in the se rv ic e o f p a rtic u la r g o als: on e e x p r e sse s o n e ’ s an ger
R E C O N C I L I N G E MO T I ON S WITH W E S T E R N P E R S O N H O O D 1 7 1
. . . in order to show o th e rs how you fe el, o r in order to im prove o n e ’ s relation sh ip

w ith an oth er p e rso n .
T h u s, the re sp e ctab ility o l both m en and w o m en is re sto re d by p re se n tin g
th e m se lv e s as a c to rs w ho arc in ch arg e: w hen they g e t an gry they have g o o d reason s
fo r d o in g so and they gen erally ap p e ar to b e in co n tro l o f th eir anger. In these
sto rie s, an g e r is seen as a fun ction al e m o tio n , w hich se rv e s ccrtain g o als. O u r
assu m p tio n that ration ality and se lf-d e term in atio n arc d om in an t ch a ra c te ristics
o f W estern p e rso n h o o d , in d e p e n d e n t o f gen d er, is su p p o rte d h ere: both m en and
w om en gen erally p re se n t th em selv es as ration al b ein g s w h o have th eir an ger u n d er
co n tro l, and e x p r e ss it in ten tion ally.
O f c o u r se , w e can also think o f in cid en ts in w hich o n e ’ s an g e r is m o re
e x tre m e , and m o re likely to b e in te rp re te d as irratio n al and in volu n tary . C o n sid e r
the fo llo w in g e x am p le .
“ I w as so an gry that I threw a cake at the m a n ’ s h ead. A ctually it w as

ab o u t nothing. (. . .) A t that tim e I w as m o re o v e r-stre sse d than an gry .
I g o t a m ist b e fo re my ey es, it w as a kind o f o u tb u rst in side m y se lf and I
ju st sta rte d to ran t and rave. I cou ld n ot think any lo n g e r w hat to d o o r
say, it w as ju st an e x p lo sio n . I did n o t have m y se lf u n d e r c o n tro l any
lon ger. (. . .) A fte rw ard s I still think I w as rig h t, b u t, w ell y ou d o n ’t g e t
any fu rth er, and m aybe I should n ot have acted that e x tre m e ly . But
I co u ld n ot h elp m y se lf.”
H e re, the p ro ta g o n ist ac k n o w le d g e s that the an te ced en t event w as a m in o r in ciden t

in w hich he w as unjustly ac cu se d o f som eth in g. H ow ever, he ag re e s that this is n ot a
sufficient reason fo r his e x tre m e b eh aviou r ( ‘actually it w as ab o u t n o th in g ’ ) and he
ad van ces his b ein g o v e r-stre sse d as the real reason fo r the e x p lo sio n . A p p aren tly ,
this m en tal state is lo r him a m o re con vin cin g acco u n t lo r th row in g cak cs than
an ger alone. It is also m ean t to exp lain why he co u ld no lo n ge r co n tro l his
b eh aviou r: p e o p le w h o are u n d e r stre ss m ay act in a rath er devian t w ay. T h e social
advan tage o f claim in g that on e w as o v e r-stre sse d , in stead o f an g ry , is that b ein g
o v e r-stre sse d re fe rs to a te m p o ra ry state o f m en tal d istu rb an c e , so that it is im p li
citly claim ed that he should n o t be re g a rd e d as fully accou n tab le at that tim e . [. . .]
N arratives ab ou t fear
A s in an ger sto rie s, an te ced en t even ts w ere the m a jo r in g re d ie n ts o f fear n arratives.

H ow ever, w h e reas the p r o ta g o n ist’ s iden tity is re p aire d by stre ssin g the faults o r
un fair b eh av io u rs o f other persons in an ger n arra tiv e s, in fear n arrativ es it is the
d an g er and in ability to do so m e th in g ab o u t the situ ation that is e m p h asise d in o rd e r
to ac co u n t for o n e ’ s fear. T h is is especially tru e i f at face value the th reat d o e s n ot
seem very se rio u s, as e x e m p lifie d in the fo llo w in g case.
“ O n ce I w as very sc are d ; it w as a kind o f un real fear. M y w ife had a kind

o f se b a ce o u s gla n d , ju st h ere, w hich had to b e cut away su rg ically . A t a
ccrtain m o m e n t I co u ld n ot help thinking ab o u t variou s sto rie s o f
172 AG NE TA H. FISC HE R AND JEROEN JAN SZ
someone who also had a cosmetic surgery in order to cut away some
lumps; and he never came to. I was really very worried that she would
not awake from the anaesthesia.”
This man accounts for his fear by referring to a true story of someone who died
following similar surgery. The narrator appears to consider his fear to have been
somewhat inappropriate ( ‘it was a kind of unreal fear’); however, he tries to
convince himself and the interviewer of the rationality of his fear by stressing the
reality and actuality of the threat. This type of narrative is illustrative of the
strategics used by men to protect their masculine identity (sec also Crawford et a l .,
1992): men try to justify their fears by claiming that the threat is real. However, we
did not find support for the suggestion that men exaggerate the danger in fear
episodes (Crawford et a h , I 992): men did not mention more dangerous events than
women, nor did they go more into the details in describing the danger.
Although the description of antecedent events was the major type of justi
fication given in fear stories, we also noticed another type of account, which is
illustrated by the following example. This is provided by a man who is always very
worried when his wife is late from her work.
“Well, she has to drive in heavy traffic, so then 1 ask myself, what has
happened? You don’t know what to do, you feel powerless, and, it is
quite ridiculous, but you are already worrying about the future. The
fear becomes stronger and stronger, but that happens automatically.
I did not do anything to reinforce it. And, what can you do? You can
take pills, or call other people, but I just let it go. 1 was the victim of my
own fear.”
The protagonist of the story blames the nature ol the emotion. The fear is presented
as an uncontrollable force that overwhelms him. As was the ease with the angry
outbursts, this involuntary and irrational nature of the fear is used to account for
the obvious fact that the intensity of the emotion is out of proportion with the
antecedent event. This man even admits that his reaction is ridiculous, but he
stresses that it cannot be helped and that the increase in his fear is an automatic
process that cannot be stopped. This accounting practice is far more typical of
fear than of anger, and is used by men as well as women. Because of this uncontrol
lability, fear seems to be less acceptable, especially for men. Indeed, men more
often maintained that there wrere no good reasons for their fear, although they
considered it to be a reaction that could happen to anyone. Women, on the other
hand, were more resigned and less upset; they clearly seemed to accept the
irrationality and uncontrollability of the fear ( ‘I just let it happen’ , ‘If it comes, it
comes’). [. . .)
All in all, the fear narratives, collected in this study, suggest that fear, to a
greater extent than anger, is conceived of as an irrational and uncontrollable
emotion. This applies more to men than to women. In the accounts of fear, no
rationales were given for its expression, except those referring to the involuntary
workings of the emotion. Hardly any positive consequences of fear expressions
were advanced; people just wanted to be rid of this emotion. Both men and women
R E C O N C I L I N G E M O T I O N S WI T H W E S T E R N P E R S O N H O O D 1 7 3
a r g u e d that they a lm o st alw ay s trie d to s u p p re s s th e ir fear, b e c a u se they co u ld

h ard ly see any p o sitiv e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f e x p r e ss in g th e ir fear. T h e on ly p o sitiv e
so c ia l c o n se q u e n c e that w as m e n tio n e d , large ly by w o m e n , w as g e ttin g s u p p o r t
fro m o th e r s.
W estern p e rso n h o o d , g e n d e r an d em o tio n s
In th is p a p e r w e have q u e stio n e d the a lle g e d c o n flict b e tw e e n the e x p e r ie n c e and

e x p r e ss io n o f e m o tio n s an d the n o rm a tiv e c h a ra c te ristic s o f W e ste rn p e r so n h o o d :
ra tio n a lity , se lf- d e te r m in a tio n , an d in d iv id u al re sp o n sib ility . T h e g e n e ra l p r e s u m p
tio n th at W e s te r n e r s , in c o n tr a st to so m e n o n -W e ste rn c u ltu r e s , c o n s id e r th eir
e m o tio n s to b e b o d ily , p r im itiv e im p u lse s that arc irr a tio n a l an d h ard to c o n tr o l is
d iffic u lt, if n o t im p o ssib le to m a in tain . W e a r g u e d that e m o tio n s arc n ot ab se n t
fro m W e stern p e r so n h o o d and that o u r c u ltu ra l id eal o f a p e r so n r e q u ir e s a fo rm o f
‘ b o u n d e d ’ e m o tio n a lity : e m o tio n s sh o u ld b e felt an d e x p r e ss e d w ith in the stric t
b o u n d a rie s o f the so c ia l c o n te x t. In c o n te x ts w h e re e m o tio n a l re a c tio n s are n o t
su ita b le , h ow ever, r e p a ir w o rk h as to b e d o n e . In o r d e r to r e s to r e p o te n tia l lo ss o f
p c r so n h o o d , p e o p le m u st d e m o n s tr a te that th e ir e m o tio n s are ra tio n a l, alth o u gh
th ey m ay a p p e a r irra tio n a l. T h is is d o n e by te llin g a w e ll- o r d e re d sto ry a b o u t the
e m o tio n a l e v e n t, in w h ich the n a r r a to r aim s to c o n v in ce the a u d ie n c e o f the
ra tio n a lity , n a tu ra ln e ss, o r o b v io u sn e ss o f his o r h er e m o tio n s . A n arra tiv e n o t on ly
m e e ts sta n d a r d s of ra tio n a lity by p r o v id in g re a so n s fo r o n e ’ s e m o tio n s , b u t th e v e ry
ac t o f n a r ra tin g also p ro v e s th at o n e is o n c e again in c h a rg c . . . .
T h e m a jo r ity o f n a r ra tiv e s in d e e d p ic tu re d a n g e r an d , to a le s se r e x te n t, fe a r as
q u ite ra tio n a l e m o tio n s : th ey a rc ratio n al first and fo r e m o s t b e c a u se r e sp o n d e n ts
gave g o o d re a so n s fo r th e ir e licita tio n . A n te c e d e n t e v e n ts w e re th e m o s t im p o r ta n t
c o m p o n e n ts in th e c o n str u c tio n o f a c o n v in c in g s to ry in w hich the p e r s o n ’ s ow n
v iew o n th e ‘ ra tio n a l o r lo g ic a l c a u s e ’ o f h is o r h er e m o tio n s is o u tlin e d . [. . .]
R eferen ces
A n t a k i , C . (1 9 9 4 ). Explaining and Arguing. The Social Organization o f Accounts. L on don :

Sage.
A v e r i l l , J. R . (1 9 7 4 ). A n analysis o f p sy ch o ph y siological sy m b o lism and its influence
on th e o rie s of e m o tio n . Journal for the Theory o f Social Behaviour, 4 , 147—190.
A v e r i l l , J. R . (1 9 8 2 ). Anger and Aggression. An Essay on Emotion. N e w York: Sp rin ge r
Verlag.
A v e r i l l , J. R . (1 9 9 0 ). Inner feelin gs, w ork s of the flesh, the b e ast w ith in , d ise ase s o f
the m in d , driv in g force, and pu ttin g on a show : six m e ta p h o rs of e m otio n and
their th eo retical exten sion s. In D. E. L eary (E d .), Metaphors in the History o f
Psychology. C am b rid g e : C am b rid g e U n iversity P re ss, pp. 104—132.
C a m p b e l l , A . (1 9 9 3 ). Out o f Control. Men, Women and Aggression. L o n d o n : Pan dora.
C r a w f o r d , J . , K i p p a x , S ., O n y x , J ., G a u l t , U . and B f.n t o n , P. (1 9 9 2 ). Emotion and
Gender. L o n d o n : Sage.
D e n n f .t , D . C . (1 9 7 8 ). C o n d itio n s of p e rso n h o o d . In D. C . D en n ct (E d .), Brainstorms.
H asso ck : H arv ester, pp. 2 6 7 , 2 8 6 .
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H a r r e , R . (1 9 8 3 ). Personal Being: A Theory for Individual Psychology'. O x fo r d : Blackw ell.

J a n s z , J . (1 9 9 1 ). Person, S e lf and Moral Demands. Individualism Contested hy Collectivism.
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J a n s z , J. (1 9 9 3 ). H ct n a rra tic f als b e te k e n isv e rle n e r [N arrative and m ean in g]. Psycholo
gic en M aatschappij, 6 4 , 2 1 2 —2 2 5 .
J a n s z , J. (in p re ss). Self-n arratives as p e rso n al stru ctu re s o f m eaning. In A. O o ste r-
vvcgel and R .A . W ick lu nd (E d s .), The S e lf in European and North American Culture:
Development and Processes. D o rd rc c h t: K luw er.
L u t z , C . A. (1 9 8 8 ). Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and
their Challenge to Western Theory. C h icago : U n iversity o f C h icago P ress.
P o t t , H . ( 1 9 9 2 ) . De liefde van Alcihiades. Over rationaliteit en moties [Alcihiades’ Love. On
Rationality and Emotions/. A m ste rd a m /M c p p c l: B oo m .
R u s s e l l , J. A ., W e l l e n k a m p , J ., M a n s t e a d , A. S. R . and F e r n a n d e z D o l s , J. M .
(E d s.) (in p re ss). Everyday Conceptions o f Emotion. D o rd rc c h t: K luw er.
S h a v e r , P., S c h w a r t z , J ., K i r s o n , D. and O ’ C o n n o r , c . (1 9 8 6 ). E m otion k n o w
le d g e : fu rth e r e x p lo ratio n of a p ro to ty p e ap p ro ach . Journal o f Personality and Social
Psychology, 52 , 1 0 6 1 - 1 0 8 6 .
S h o t t e r , J. (1 9 8 4 ). Social Accountability and Selfhood. O x fo r d : Basil Blackw ell.
S o l o m o n , R. C . (1 9 7 6 ). The Passions: The Myth and Nature o f Human Emotion. N o tre
D am e , Indiana: U n iversity of N o tre D am e Press.
S T E A R N S , P. N . and S t e a r n s , C . Z . (1 9 8 6 ). Anger: The Struggle for Emotional Control in
America’s History. C h icago : C h icago U n iversity P ress.
W h i t e , G. M . (1 9 9 0 ). M o ral d isc o u rse and the rh e to ric o f e m o tio n . In C . A. L u tz and
L. A b u -L u gh od (E d s .), Language and the Politics o f Emotion. C a m b rid g e : C am b rid g e
U n iversity P ress.
W h i t e , G. M . (1 9 9 3 ). E m o tio n s in side o u t: T h e an th ro p o lo gy o f affect. In M . L ew is
and J. M . H aviland (E d s .), Handbook o f Emotions. N e w York: T h e G u ilfo rd P ress,
pp. 2 9 - 4 1 .
Chapter 20
W. Ray Crozier
S E L F - C O N S C I O U S N E S S IN S H A M E
The ro le o f the 'o th e r'
Self and other in shame
O
NE W AY O F C O M P A R I N G DIFFERENT theoretical accoun ts o f
the role o f the sell in sham e is to con sider the em phasis thcv place upon self-
evaluation o f con duct relative to the in dividual’s aw areness ol o th e rs’ evaluations of
con duct. Som e accoun ts em ph asise the in dividual’s own assessm en t of his or her
behaviour. M ichael L ew is (1 9 9 2 ) p ro p o sed a cognitive attribution m odel that
defined sham e as ‘a con sequen ce o f a failure evaluation relative to the standards
when the p erso n m akes a global evaluation o f the se lf’ (p. 7 5 ). In sim ilar vein,
Sch crcr (1 9 9 3 ) offers a system for distinguishing am ong the fundam ental em otions
in term s o f a scries o f ‘stim ulus evaluation c h cc k s’ . W hether the individual ju d ges
him o r h e rse lf to be the cause o f a p articu lar action and w hether that action is
com patible w ith the individual’s self-im age are classed as tw o o f the evaluation
checks for sham e. A ccordin g to each o f these accoun ts, the p erso n co m p ares his
or her action with som e stan dard, and sham e ensues from the com bination o f
ju d gm en ts that the action falls sh o rt and that he or she has caused or is responsible
for it.
Each o f these accoun ts involves the dual role for the se lf . . . the self; evaluates
and is the ob ject o f evaluation. O th er accoun ts introduce a furth er com po n en t,
w here the p erso n perceives his o r her behaviour through the eyes o f another. This
accoun t is related to n otions that sham e is loss o f standing, loss o f face. It is linked to
ideas o f rep utation , honour, dignity. T his position has been ad opted by influential
philosophical accounts o f sham e, for ex am p le , those o f Sartre (1 9 4 3 / 1 9 5 6 ) and
Taylor (1 9 8 5 ). Taylor w rites o f ‘the ag e n t’ s becom ing aw are o f the discrepancy
betw een h er ow n assum ption about her state o r action and a possible detached
1 7 6 W. RAY CROZIER
o b serv er-d escrip tio n of this state or action , and o f h er being furth er aw are that she
ought not to be in a position w here she could be so seen, w here such a description
at least ap pears to fit’ (p. 2 6 ). Som e psych ological accounts also em ph asise the role
of the ‘o th e r’ , fo r e xam p le, the theory of H .B . L ew is, cited above. C astelfranchi
and Poggi (1 9 9 0 ) distinguish betw een ‘sham e b efore o n e se lf’ and ‘sham e b efore the
o th e r’ , w here the fo rm e r con cern s loss o f self-esteem and the latter loss o f esteem
in the eyes o f other. H arre (1 9 9 0 , p. 199) argu es that sham e is ‘ caused by the
realisation that others have b eco m e aw are that w hat one has been doing has been a
m oral infraction, a ju d gm en t w ith which I, as actor, c o n cu r’ . Tangney et al. (1 9 9 6 ,
p. 1 2 5 6 ) refer to ‘ public exp o su re (and disapproval) o f so m e im p ro p riety o r sh o rt
c o m in g ’ . Taylor (1 9 8 5 ) has argued that it is the a c to r ’s realisation how his or her
behaviour m ight be seen rather than the actual ju d gm en t m ade by another that is
im p ortan t. She provides the follow ing exam ple o f an a r tist’s m o d el (1 9 8 5 , p. 6 1 ).
A m odel w ho has been p osin g for an artist for som e tim e com es to feel
sham e w hen she realizes that he no lon ger regard s her as a m o d e l, but
regards her as a w om an.
The m od el d o c s not have to share any opinion ol her the artist m ight h old; she does
not have to take an adverse view o f her ap pcaran cc; n or d ocs she have to believe
that there is anything blam ew orthy in her action. The shift from her being c o m fo rt
able in the situation to being asham ed d oes not req u ire any change in eith er her or
the a r tist’s behaviour, but only a change in h er b e lie f as to how she is being seen.
W hile her exp o su re is to the artist in one sense (he is the only other p erso n th ere),
in the sense crucial for sham e her e x p o su re is to a particular view of her con duct. In
sham e, she identifies w ith that other view of h erself, and the adverse ju d gm en t
co m e s from h erself: ‘it [is] w ron g for her to be so seen , at least at this tim e and by
this au dien ce. Being seen as she is seen is to be in a position in w hich no decent
w om en should find h erscll . . . this is no fault o f h ers, but the question of re sp o n si
bility is irrelevant to feelings of sham e. H ow ever it may have com e ab ou t, she is now
in a false position and for this she is c o n d e m n e d ’ (Taylor, 1985, p. 6 1 ).
Som e psychological th eories also take the view that it is the a c to r’s in te r
pretation o f a potential o b se rv e r’s view that is im p o rtan t. Sem in and M anstcad
( 1981) distinguish the self-im age from the subjective public im age. An em otional
reaction is elicited by a discrepan cy betw een these im ages occasion ed by the
recogn ition that som e action unfairly reflects poorly on o n e ’ s subjective public
im age. H iggins (1 9 8 7 ) defines sham e as a discrepan cy betw een o n e ’s actual se lf and
o n e ’ s p ercep tion o f how an ideal other w ould evaluate the self.
A ccou nts o f sham e that em ph asise sclf-cvaluation o f b ehaviour relative to p e r
sonal stan dards have a num ber o f disadvantages. F irst, it is difficult in term s o f
their analysis to distinguish betw een sham e, on the one hand, and d epression and
alternative kinds o f negative self-evaluation, on the other; indeed, in one o f the
e xam p le s provided by M . Lew is to illustrate how the global se lf is involved in
sham e, a case w here a patient forccd his date to have se x , the patient actually says,
“ W h at’s w ron g w ith m e? I’ m d e p re sse d . D id n ’ t feel like gettin g out o f bed this
m orn in g.” (1 9 9 2 , p. 7 2 ).
Secon d, the accoun ts attach lo o m uch im portan ce to behaviour. As Sabini and
S E L F - C 0 N S C 10 U S N E S S I N S H A M E 1 7 7
Silver (1 9 9 7 , p. 6) have a rg u e d , it is n ot b eh aviou r itse lf but w hat the behaviour

e x p o se s to o th e rs ab o u t the sell that is cru cial lo r sh am e— an ap p aren tly trivial act
can p ro d u c e in ten se sh am e. T h ird , these acc o u n ts have difficulty in e x p lain in g eases
o f sh am e w h ere there is no se lf-a ttrib u tio n o f re sp o n sib ility fo r w ron g d oin g. In the
e x am p le o f the a r tis t ’ s m o d e l the shift from b ein g at case in the situ ation to feelin g
sh am e re q u ire s only a shift in aw are n e ss, to the realisation that an ad v e rse view o f
h er b eh aviou r can b e e n te rtain e d . C astclfran ch i and P oggi (1 9 9 0 , p. 2 3 8 ) o ffer a
sim ilar e x a m p le , o f a m an w ho has saved a w om an from drow n in g and w h o is giving
h er m o u th -to -m o u th resp iratio n w hen he re a lise s that he is b e in g o b se rv e d by a
p asse r-b y . T h e m an m ay feel sham e if he b e c o m e s aw are that he m igh t ap p e ar as
if he w ere tak in g ad van tage o f the w o m an . Such e x a m p le s are n o t difficult to
g e n e ra te . A p e rso n a l e x a m p le is w hen a fello w acad em ic w h om I did n o t know very
w ell left m e in ch arge o f h er bag. A fte r a w hile I felt the n eed to g o to the b ath room
and 1 b egan to lo o k through h er b ag to ch e ck if it co n tain ed anything valuable in
o rd e r to d c c id c w h eth er o r n o t it co u ld safely b e le ft, w hen she su dden ly re tu rn e d .
A lth ough she e x p re sse d n e ith er su rp rise n o r annoyance at my action I w as im m e d i
ately d isco m fite d that she m igh t think that I w as lo o k in g for m on ey or, p erh ap s even
m o re sh am in g, taking a p ru rie n t in terest in h er p riv ate b e lo n g in g s. In all o f these
e x a m p le s, the ac to r behaves in g o o d faith and th ere is no self-evalu atio n relative to
stan d ard s. W hat is cru cial is the a c t o r ’ s attrib u tio n to the au d icn cc , the re co g n itio n
and e n d o rse m e n t o f the fact that his o r h er b eh aviou r is b ein g , o r can b e, ju d ge d in a
m an n er that reflects badly upon him o r h erse lf. It is not n e c essa ry that an o b se rv e r
is actually p re se n t (in the case o f the a r tis t ’ s m o d e l) o r that an o b se rv e r actually
takes an ad verse view o f the a c t o r ’ s b eh aviou r (in all th ree c a se s). T h is p ap e r
p ro p o se s a Iram cw o rk that can acc o m m o d a te the d ifferen t m o d e ls that have been
o u tlin e d . T h e fra m e w o rk is b ased on the assu m p tio n that sh am e (and e m b a r ra ss
m e n t) en tails a shift in p e rsp e ctiv e on the se lf, a p e rsp e c tiv e that is d e sc rib e d in lav
p sy ch o lo gy as ‘ se lf-c o n sc io u sn e ss’ .
Self-con sciousn ess
T h e n otio n that p e o p le can shift p e rsp e ctiv e so that they seem to be view in g
th em selv es from o u tsid e is n o t, o f c o u r se , a new o n e. T h e C o n c ise O x fo rd
D ic tio n ary re fe rs in its definition o f se lf-c o n sc io u sn ess to a ‘ p e rso n e m b a rra sse d o r
u n n atu ral in m a n n e r from k n o w in g he is o b se rv e d by o th e r s ’ . H a rre (1 9 8 3 ) defin es
it as the state w h ere ‘the n o rm al in tcn tion ality o f actio n s in w hich they arc th ough t
o f as en ds o r o u tc o m e s is su sp e n d e d and the se lf-co n scio u s ac to r fo c u se s on the
action s he o r she is p e r fo r m in g ’ . T h e th eory o f o b jec tiv e sclf-aw arcn css originally
p r o p o se d by D uval and W ick lu n d (1 9 7 2 ) se e m s to en tail such a shift in p e rsp e ctiv e ,
and this is c ap tu re d in the c o n stru c t o f p u b lic self-aw aren ess d e v e lo p e d by C arv e r
and Sch eier (e .g ., C a r v e r & Sch eier, 1 9 8 7 ). T h is c o n stru c t w as linked to sh am e by
B uss (1 9 8 0 ). Su b sequ en tly th ere has b een criticism on lo g ical and e m p irical
g ro u n d s o f the assu m p tio n that p u b lic sclf-attcn tio n re su lts in the in dividual taking
an e x te rn a l p e rsp e c tiv e on the s e lf (F cn ig stc in , 1 9 8 8 , cited by C ro/.icr, 1 9 9 0 ;
F en igstein & A b ram s, 1 9 9 3 ). We p r o p o se here that th ere is a useful d istin ction to be
draw n b etw een tw o co n ce p tio n s o f s e lf evalu ation.
1 7 8 W. RAY CROZIER
The first entails an individual’s self-evaluation. We share the assum ption o f

con tem p orary th eories o f the self-con cept that it is m ultidim ension al and hence
any one o f a n um b er o f discrim inable asp ects o f the se lf can serve as the ob ject o f
evaluation. T h ese can includc the kinds o f evaluations w hich arc em ph asised bv
cognitive and attributional m od els o f sham e and related em otio n s o f shyness and
em b arrassm en t, such as the evaluation o f the se lf as a social actor and also the
ju d gm en t that the in dividual’s behaviour is discrepan t from any standards that arc
relevant to him or her. An adverse self-evaluation gives rise to negative feelin gs, like
re g re t, d isap poin tm en t, depression . In everyday language such e x p erien ces can
be labelled as sham e, for e x am p le , one m igh t e xp re ss sham e that one had arrived
late for an ap poin tm en t o r had failed an exam in ation.
H ow ever, it is p ro p o sed here that the self-con scious em otio n s are characterised
by a shift in p ersp ective w here the individual view s his o r her own behaviour as
if through the eyes o f another. Many situation s— w alking across a public stage,
arrivin g late at a social function, bein g (o r feelin g) con spicuous in appearan ce or
d ress, beco m in g aw are that one is b ein g talked ab out (including bein g p raised,
com plim en ted o r thanked), being in the presen ce o f an authority figure, drivin g in
front o f a police car— p rodu ce self-con sciousn ess o f this kind. This often (perhaps
alw ays) has a distinctive ph en om en ological quality (including feelin g ‘sm all’ ). It
seem s often to be accom pan ied by blushing, even in the absence o f adverse self-
evaluation. Psych ological th eories need to con sider the circum stan ces in w hich
this state b eco m es sham e, or em b arrassm en t, o r p rid e, or any o f the other self-
con scious em otio n s. Il is p ro p o sed here that three facto rs arc relevant lo sham e: the
attribution lo the oth er; the corresp on d en ce betw een the in dividual’ s ju dgm en t o f
behaviour and his or her percep tion o f the o th e r’s judgm en t o f that behaviour; the
aspect o f the se lf that is being ju d g e d , specifically w hether so m e core asp ect o f the
sell is evaluated.
The other perspective
Wc have already indicated so m e theoretical accoun ts that include the n otion o f

another p ersp ectiv e on the self. Furth er discussion in the literatu re has con cerned
w hether sham e is onlv experien ced in an actual social situation , and w hether the
presen ce o f an audicn cc can help to distinguish sham e from em b arrassm en t. Buss
(1 9 8 0 ) claim ed that no one is publicly sclf-focuscd unless there arc oth ers to
ob serve them : ‘ E m b arrassm en t and sham e are both reaction s to specific events in
a social c o n te x t’ (1 9 8 0 , p. 162). Evidence and argum en t suggest the contrary
position ab out sham e. A survey re p o rte d by Tangney et al. (1 9 9 6 ) found that
participan ts recalled experien cin g sham e w hen they w ere alone. The analysis o f
sham e provided by Taylor (1 9 8 5 ) concluded that it w as not essen tial that the
ob se rv e r w as an actual o r particular p e rso n , w hether presen t or absent; the actor
b e co m e s aw are o f a p articu lar view o f his o r her behaviour, and not n ecessarily o f
any p articu lar individual holding that view.
Tangney et al. (1 9 9 6 ) also re p o rte d that the presen ce o f an ob se rv e r helped
differentiate sham e and em b arrassm en t. R ecalled ep isod es o f sham e w ere signifi
cantly m ore likely than episodes o f em b arrassm en t to refer to occasion s when the
individual w as on his o r her ow n; that em b arrassm en t clicilcd higher ratings on a
S E L F - C 0 N S C 10 U S N E S S I N S H A M E 1 7 9
scale asse ssin g the e x te n t to w hich p a rtic ip a n ts felt that o th e rs w ere lo o k in g ; that
sham e w as m o re likely than e m b a rra ssm e n t to be e x p e rie n c e d in the p re se n ce o f
th ose w ho w ere c lo se rath er than acq u ain tan ces o r stran g e rs. N e v e rth e le ss, these
arc d ifferen ces o f e m p h asis, rath er than c ate g o rica l differen ces. W c p ro p o se that
sham e and e m b a rra ssm e n t both req u ire the ad o p tio n o f an oth er p e rsp e ctiv e , and
that this can take p la c c w h eth er the in dividual is alo n e o r in co m pan y and w h eth er
the co m p an y is p sy ch o lo gically c lo se o r m o re d istan t. [. . .]
R eferen ces
B u ss, A .H . (1 9 8 0 ). Self-consciousness and social anxiety. San Francisco: Freem an.

C a r v e r , C . S . & S c h f . i e r , M .F. (1 9 8 7 ). T h e blind m en and the elephant: Selective
exam ination o f the public-private literature gives rise to a faulty perception.
Journal o f Personality, 5 5 , 525 540.
C a s t e i . f r a n c h i , C . & P o g g i , I. (1 9 9 0 ). Blushing as a d iscou rse: Was D arw in w rong?
In Shyness and embarrassment: Perspectives from social psychology (ed. W R . C rozier)
pp. 230 251. N ew York: C am bridge U niversity Press.
C R O Z IE R , W .R. (e d .) (1 9 9 0 ). Shyness and embarrassment: Perspectivesfrom social psychology.
N ew York: C am bridge U niversity Press.
D u v a l , S. & W i c k l u n d , R .A . (1 9 7 2 ). A theory o f objective self-awareness. N ew York:
A cadem ic Press.
F e n i g s t e i n , A . & A b r a m s , D. (1 9 9 3 ). Self-attention and the egocen tric assum ption o f
shared persp ectives. Journal o f E xperim ental Social Psychology, 2 9 , 287 303.
H a r r e , R . (1 9 8 3 ). Personal being. O x fo rd : Blackw ell.
H a r r e , R. (1 9 9 0 ). E m barrassm en t: A conceptual analysis. In Shyness and embarrassment:
Perspective from social psychology (ed. W .R. C rozier) pp. 181 204. N ew York:
C am bridge U niversity Press.
H i g g i n s , E.T. (1 9 8 7 ). Self-discrepancv: A theorv relating se lf and affect. Psychological
Review, 9 4 , 3 1 9 340.
L e w i s , H .B . (1 9 7 1 ). Shame and guilt in neurosis. N ew York: International U niversities
Press.
L e w i s , M . (1 9 9 2 ). Shame: The exposed self. N ew York: Free Press.
S a b i n i , J. & S i l v e r , M . (1 9 9 7 ). In defence o f sham e: Sham e in the con text o f guilt and
em b arrassm en t. Journ alfor the Theory o f Social Behaviour, 2 7 , 1 15.
S a r t r e , J.-P. (1 9 4 3 /1 9 5 6 ). Being and nothingness (trans. H .E . B arn es). N ew York:
Pocket Books.
S c h e r e r , K .R . (1 9 9 3 ). Studying the em otion-an teceden t appraisal process: An e x p e rt
system approach. Cognition and Emotion, 7, 325 355.
T a n g n f . y , J . P , M i l l e r , R .S ., F l i c k e r , L . & B a r l o w , D .H . (1 9 9 6 ). Are sham e, guilt,
and em b arrassm en t distinct em otions? Journal o f Personality and Social Psychologyr,
7 0, 1256 1264.
T a y i . o r , G. ( 1 9 8 5 ) . Pride, shame, and guilt: Emotions i f self-assessment. O x fo rd : Clarendon
Press.
5. Emotions, space and place
I S T O R I C A L LY, I S S U E S O F space and place have been neglected by

H natural and social scientists of emotion. Like objects, space and place have a
tendency to fade unnoticed into the background in favour of more obvious figures
such as the pa rticu la r individuals experiencing p a rticu la r feelings, expressing them
via their frowns, sighs, postures and gestures, or by talking about them. And yet, when
writing about love and jealousy, a great novelist such as Proust draws our attention to
the places in which Swann's feelings are played out and to the settings in which his
encounters with Odette unfold (cf. Brown and Stenner 2001). Swann's jealousy is
played out around the Verdurin salon and we sense that things 'feel different' outside
of that pa rticu la r milieu. He feels its pangs when it dawns on him how frequently
Odette is now away from Paris. Some places are 'haunted' by Odette and some are the
haunts of the 'young Swann' who predates the affair. Likewise, Proust shows us how
the m aterial objects populating spaces are woven into the relations configured by
jealousy. The flowers accompanied by a note from Odette become so unbearable
that Swann makes a detour to avoid them 'whenever he went in or out of the room'.
When we begin to attend to them, space and place reveal themselves to be decisive
ingredients in a social scientific understanding of affect.
Fortunately, this fa c t has not escaped geographers, who in recent years have
contributed significantly both to the textual turn and to the affective turn by taking
the spatial aspects of affect and emotion seriously. There are now, for instance, a
number of editorials and special issues discussing 'em otional geographies' and
'spatializing affect' (Anderson and Sm ith 2001; Davidson and Bondi 2004; Davidson
and M illig an 2004), and no shortage of heated debate (Thien 2005; Anderson and
Harrison 2 006) This move has required what M acK ia n (2004) calls a 're-
subjectivization of space', since in what she ca lls 'sim ple modernity', space had been
characterized by the removal of a ll subjectivity in favour of the objective space
1 8 2 E MB ODYI NG A FF ECT
typified by the grid of the map. Some of this work has been spurred by practical and
political interests such as fem inist critique of masculine detachment and the spatial
mediation of dynamics of inclusion and exclusion which have emotional impacts of
relevance to class, race, disability and sexuality (Sibley 1995; Pain 1997; Dwyer
1999; Listerborn 2002). This work is often based upon the notion of space as a site of
discursively mediated shared sym bolic meaning. Geographical work in the affective
turn, by contrast, sees in affect the possibility of attending to spatial encounters with
'a life and a force before and beyond . . . deliberative and reflective . . . repre
sentational thinking' (M cC o rm ack 2003: 490; see also M cCorm ack 2 0 07). This
has spurred some geographers to articu late 'non-representational' theories of the
spacing of affect that aim to 'engage with questions of m ateriality' and 'provoke
a rethinking of the nature of . . . subjects . . . and the emergence of subjectivities
from more or less unwilled affectual . . . assemblages' (Anderson and Harrison
2006: 334).
Our first extract is from Nigel T hrift's (2004) a rticle 'Intensities of Feeling:
towards a spatial politics of affect'. T hrift exemplifies the attempt to develop 'non-
representational' theory proper to an 'affective tu rn ' capable of moving beyond a
discursive version of social constructionism . This paper is as much about politics as it
is about space, but we include it in this sub-section because T hrift discusses issues he
claim s to be specific to the life of cities. Namely, he argues that the systematic
engineering of affect is now central to the political life of Euro-Am erican cities. If so,
one can no longer understand politics in relation to a discursive or 'id e olog ica l' plan
or regime, since the engineering of affect bypasses such higher order cognitive and
linguistic processes. He examines four such 'developments' that enroll affect directly
into the political life of cities: the proliferation of neo-liberal 'agencies of choice';
the enhanced mediating role of the 'screen'; the increased use of technologies of
'calcu latio n in sensory registers' which permit a kind of corporeal communication;
and the careful design of urban space to shape affective responses.
The second extract from Rani Kawale (2004) 'Inequalities of the Heart'
exemplifies a social constructionist concern to challenge the 'naturalness' of hetero
sexuality through an analysis of the ways in which everyday places are 'fe lt'. She
explores the notion of 'sexualized' emotional spaces through an examination of the
accounts of the performance of emotion work given by a sample of lesbian and
bisexual women in London. Heterosexuality, she points out, is an institutionalized
phenomenon that regulates emotional expression through the mediation of law,
religion and other institutions such as marriage. This regulation occurs in everyday
spaces and places which thus take on emotional connotations that result in the
'spatial supremacy of heterosexuality'.
Our third extract from M im i Sheller (2 004) is also about the 'feeling' of every
day spaces, but in this case the focus in on what Sheller calls 'Autom otive Em otions':
feeling the car. Autom otive emotions are about what it feels like to be 'in ' the car,
but such feelings are also influenced by the broader cultural and social meanings that
pa rticu la r types of car afford. Em otional investments in cars thus go beyond simple
rational and economic calculations of costs and benefits since - as spaces embedded
in broader personal, fam ilia l and national spaces - they include embodied experiences
which often have deep affective resonances. This is something well understood by
E M O T I O N S, S PAC E A N D P L AC E 1 8 3
those w ho sell ca rs, w ho rou tin ely dw ell on the feeling of the drivin g experience and
other passions th a t haunt our a utom ob iles.
The fin a l e x tra ct in th is sub-section is fro m Ben A n d e rso n 's (2 0 0 5 ) a rticle ,
'D o m e stic G eographies o f A ffe c t'. A n derso n explo res some of the a ffe ctiv e d ynam ics
involved in the operation o f m aking judgem ents in m undane dom estic spaces. He
conducted research in 17 low er m id d le -cla ss households in Sheffield , England. P a rt
of th is research involved e licitin g acco u n ts of how householders decide w h ich m usic to
play in th e ir home. Denis, fo r exam ple, selects a song w h ich 'en e rg ize s' him a fte r
returning home from w o rk. H is p a rtn er Jen n y d oesn 't like the song and leaves the
room . On the b asis of such seem ingly m undane data, A n de rso n suggests th a t such
judgem ents are m ade on the basis of w h a t 'fe e ls rig h t' a t a given m om ent and th a t
w h a t is 'fe lt' is based on how 'b o d ie s' com pose w ith other bodies (e.g. how a 'b o d y ' of
m u sic fits w ith p a rtic u la r people in p a rtic u la r m oods in p a rtic u la r spaces and tim es).
F o r Anderso n , th is shows th a t o rd in a ry d om estic space and tim e is brou gh t into being
by 'm u ltip le , in tersecting to p olo g ies of a ffe c t'.
References
Anderson, K.an d Sm ith, S. (2 001) 'E m o tio n al geographies', Transactions o f the Institute
o f B ritish Geographers, 26: 7 -1 0 .
Anderson, B. and Harrison, P. (2 006) 'Questioning affect and em otion', Area, 38 (3):
3 3 3 -3 3 5 .
Brown, S. and Stenner, P. (2 001) 'Being affected: Spinoza and the psychology of emotion,
Internation al Jo u rn a l o f Group Tensions, 30 (1): 8 1 -1 0 5 .
Davidson, J. and Bondi, L. (2 00 4 ) 'S p a tia lisin g affect; affecting space: an introduction',
Gender, P la ce and Culture, 11: 3 7 3 -4 .
Davidson, J. and; M illigan, C. (20 0 4) 'E d ito ria l: Embodying emotion sensing space: intro
ducing em otional geographies', S o c ia l and C u ltu ra l Geography, 5 (4): 5 2 3 -5 3 2 .
Dwyer, C. (1 99 9 ) 'Con tradiction s of community: questions of identity for young British
M uslim women, Environm ent and Plann in g 4 ,3 1 : 5 3 - 6 8 .
Listerborn, C. (2 00 2 ) 'Understanding the geography of women's fear: toward a recon
ceptualization of fear and space', in L. Bondi, H. Avis, R. Bankey, A. Bingley,
J. Davidson, R. Duffy, V. I. Einagel, A. M. Green, L. Johnston, S. Lilley, C. Listerborn,
S. M cEw an , M. Marshy, N. O'Connor, G. Rose, and B. Vivat, (eds) Subjectivities;
Knowledges and Fem in ist Geographies: the subjects and ethics o f so c ia l research.
London and Lanham, M D: Rowman and Littlefield.
M acK ia n , S. (2 0 04 ) 'M a ppin g reflexive communities: visualizing the geographies of
emotion', S o c ia l and C u ltu ra l Geography, 5 (4): 6 1 5 -6 3 1 .
M cC orm ack, D. P. (2 0 03 ) 'A n event of geographical ethics in spaces of affect', Trans
a ctions o f the Institute o f B ritish Geographers, 26: 4 8 8 -5 0 7 .
M cC orm ack, D. P. (2 0 07 ) 'M o le c u la r affects in human geographies', Environm ent and
Plann in g A, 39: 3 5 9 -3 7 7 .
Pain, R. (1997) 'S o cia l geographies of women's fear of crim e', Transactions o f the
Institute o f B ritish Geographers, 22: 2 3 1 -2 4 4 .
Sibley, D. (19 9 5) Geographies o f Exclusion. London: Routledge.
Thien, D. (2 00 5 ) 'A fte r or beyond feeling? A consideration of affect and emotion in
geography', Area, 37 (4): 4 5 0 -4 5 6 .
Chapter 21
Nigel Thrift
I N T E N S I T I E S OF F E E L I N G
T o w a rd s a s p a tia l p o lit ic s o f a ffe c t
[• ■ •]
b een a key e le m e n t o f p olitics
O
F C O U RSE, AFFECT HAS ALWAYS
and the su b je c t o f n u m e ro u s p ow erfu l p olitical te c h n o lo g ie s w hich have
k n o tted thinking, tech n iqu e and affect to g e th e r in v ariou s p o te n t co m b in atio n s.
O n e e x am p le is the m arsh allin g o f ag g re ssio n through v ario u s fo rm s o f m ilitary
train in gs such as d rill. [. . .]
Sim ilar p ro c e sse s have b een h app en in g in m any o th e r aren as o f social life,
w h eth er on a d o m e stic o r larg e r sc alc, sufficient to su g g e st that the e n velop e o f
w hat w c call the political m u st in creasin gly e x p a n d to take n ote o f ‘ the w ay that
p olitical attitu d e s and sta te m e n ts arc p a rtly co n d itio n e d by in ten se au to n o m ic
b odilv re a c tio n s that do n ot sim p ly re p ro d u c e the trace o f a p olitical in ten tion and
can n o t b e w h olly re cu p e rate d w ithin an id e o lo gic a l re g im e o f tr u th ’ (Sp in k s, 2 0 0 1 ,
p. 2 3 ). In this section I w an t to illu strate how this e n velop e is e x p a n d in g in cities bv
re fc rc n c c to fou r d e v e lo p m en ts. T h e first o f th ese d e v e lo p m e n ts c o n sists o f the
ge n e ral ch an ges in the form o f such p o litics w hich are takin g p lace in the c u rre n t
e ra , ch an ges w hich m ake affcct an in creasin gly visible e le m e n t o f the p o litic a l. In
particu lar, I w an t to p o in t to w a rd s so -called ‘ ag cn cics o f c h o ic e ’ and ‘ m ix cd -actio n
r e p e r to ir e s ’ in line w ith a g e n e ra l m ove to m ake m o re and m o re areas o f life
the su b je c t o f a new se t o f re sp o n sib ilities called ‘ c h o ic e ’ . A s N o r ris (2 0 0 2 , p. 22 2)
p u ts it:
. . . R isin g levels o f h um an cap ital and so c ic tal m o d e rn iz atio n m ean

that, tod ay , a m o re ed u cate d citizcn ry . . . has m oved increasin gly from
ag c n cics o f loyalty to ag en cies o f ch o ice, and from e le cto ral re p e r to ir e s
to w ard m ix e d -actio n re p e r to ir e s co m b in in g e le cto ral activities and p r o
test p o litics. . . .
I N T E N S I T I E S OF F E E L I N G 1 8 5
M any o f these new form s o f choice politics rely on an expan sion o f w hat has been
conventionally regarded as the urban political sphere. For e xam ple, the political n ow
adays routinely takes in all m anner of fo rm s o f culture—nature relation (e.g. environ
m ental politics, anim al rights politics, pro-choice or anti-life politics). In turn , this
redefinition o f what counts as political has allow ed m ore ro om for explicitly affective
appeals w hich arc heavily depen dent upon the m edia, as w ell as sim ilar appeals w hich
endeavour to redu ce these affective im pacts (e.g. by referrin g to scien ce, by various
m eans o f decon struction o f the ‘ reality’ o f an im age and so on). . . .
T h is b rin gs m e to the secon d d e v e lo p m en t w hich is the heavy and con tin u in g
mediati/.alion o f p o litics. W c live in so cietie s w hich arc en velop ed in and satu rated by
the m e d ia: m o st im p o rta n tly , it is difficult to c sc ap c the influen ce o f the screen
w hich now sta re s at us from so m any m u n dan e lo catio n s from alm o st every ro om
in the h ou se to d o c t o r s ’ w aitin g ro o m s, from a ir p o r t lo u n g es to sh o p s and sh o p p in g
m a lls, fro m b a rs to m any w o rk p lace s . . . from the in sides o f ele v ato rs to w hole
b uild in gs — that it is p o ssib le to argu e that the scrccn has taken on a n u m b e r o f the
ro le s fo rm e rly ascrib e d to p a re n t, lover, tea ch e r and blan k sto o g e , as w ell as ad d in g
a w-hole se rie s o f ‘p o s ts o c ia l’ relatio n s w hich seem to lie so m e w h e re b e tw e en early
film th e o r y ’s b ru te tran slation o f scre e n -ic fo rc e (K racau e r, 1 9 6 0 ; B alasz, 1 9 7 0 ) and
cogn itiv e film th e o r y ’ s later, m o re n u an ced in te rp re tatio n in w hich cogn itive
p ro c e sse s arc strain ed th rough v ariou s con ven tion s and sty les (se c B o rd w cll and
C a r ro ll, 1 9 9 6 ; T h rift, 2 0 0 4 b ). This m ed iatization has had im p o rta n t effects. As
M cK en zie (2 0 0 1 ) has p o in ted o u t, its m o st im p o rta n t effect has b een to en shrine
the p e rfo rm ativ e prin cip le al the h eart o f m o d e rn E u ro -A m e rican so c ie tie s and
th eir p o litic a l to rm s. T h is has o c c u rre d in a n u m b e r o f w ays. To b egin w ith , the
tech n ical fo rm o f m o d e rn m edia ten d s to fo re g ro u n d e m o tio n , both in its c o n
c en tration on key affective sites such as the face o r voice and its m agn ification o f
the sm all d e tails o f the b ody that so o fte n signify e m o tio n . Political p re se n tatio n
n ow adays o fte n fixes on such sm all d ifferen ces and m ak es them stand fo r a w h ole.
O n e line of m o v e m e n t can b e co m e a p ro g re ssio n of m ean in g, able to b e actu alised
and im p lan ted locally . [. . .]
T h u s, political presen tation c o n fo rm s increasingly to m edia n o rm s o f p re se n ta
tion which em ph asize the perfo rm an ce o f em otio n as bein g an in dex o f credibility.
Increasingly, political legitim ation arises from this kind o f p erfo rm an ce (T h o m p so n ,
2 0 0 1 ). A nd, as a final poin t, these kinds o f presen tation chim e w ith the increasingly
‘th e rap e u tic’ fo rm o f selfh ood w hich is b e co m in g com m on in E u ro-A m erican so ci
eties (cf. G id d en s, 1991; R o se , 1996). Indeed, N olan (1 9 9 8 ) argu es that this th e ra
peu tic o r ‘ e m o tiv ist’ eth os is em b ed d in g itse lf in the stru ctu re s o f the A m erican state
to such a d e gre e that it is b eco m in g a key tech n ology o f go vern an ce, both challenging
and to so m e e x ten t rep lacin g the affectivc b ack gro u n d o f o ld er b ureaucratic
‘ m ach in e’ tech n o lo gies, by, for ex am p le , recogn isin g em otional labour, em otion
m anagem en t and em otio n al learn in g as key skills (Sm ith , 2 0 0 2 ). [. . .]
T h u s, a se rie s o f h e te ro g e n e o u s k n o w le d g es o f p e rfo rm a n c e m ove to cen tre
stage in m o d e rn so c ietie s w hich co n stitu te a new ‘d isa g g re g a te d ’ m o d e o f d iscip lin e,
an e m e rg e n t stratu m o f p o w e r and k n o w led g e. These k n o w le d g es c o n stru c t p o w e r
in a n u m b e r o f w ays - by d e liv e rin g m e ssag e s w ith p a ssio n , fo r e x am p le (in d e e d , il
is often the fo rce w ith w hich p assion is d eliv ered w hich is m o re im p o rta n t than the
m e ssa g e ), by p rovid in g a new m in u te lan d scap e o f m an ip u lation (D o a n e , 2 0 0 2 ), by
1 8 6 NIGEL THRIFT
adding new possibilities for m aking sign s, and generally by adding new openin gs out
o f the event. But, m ost im portan tly , they provide a new m ean s o f creating ‘fractal’
sub jects challenged to p erfo rm across a se rie s o f different situations in a way w hich
dem ands not so m uch open n ess as con trolled flexibility. As M cK enzie (2 0 0 1 , p. 19)
puts it:
The desire p rodu ced by p erform ative pow er and kn ow ledge is not
m ould ed by distinct disciplinary m echanism s. It is n ot a rep ressive
d esire: it is instead ‘e x c e ssiv e ’ , in term itten tly m odu lated and pushed
across the thresholds o f various lim its by overlappin g and som etim es
com p etin g system s. Further, diversity is not sim ply in tegrated, for in te
gration is itse lf b eco m in g diversified. Sim ilarly, deviation is not sim ply
n orm alised , for n orm s operate and tran sform them selves through their
ow n tran sgression and deviation. We can un derstan d this developm en t
b e tter w hen we realise that the m echanism s o f p erform ative pow er are
nom adic and flexible m ore than sedentary and rig id , that its spaces
are netw orked and digital m ore than en closed and physical, that its
tem p oralities are polyrhythm ic and non-linear and not sim ply sequential
and linear. O n the p erform ative stratu m , one shuttles quickly betw een
differen t evaluative g rid s, sw itching back and forth b etw een divergent
challenges to perform — o r else.
A third developm en t is closely linked to m ediatization and the rise o f p erform an ce

kn ow ledges. It is the grow th o f new fo rm s o f calculation in sen sory re g iste rs that
w ould not have previously been deem ed ‘p o litical’ . In particular, through the
advent of a w hole se rie s of tech n o lo gies, sm all spaces and tim es, upon which
aflcct thrives and out of w hich it is often con stitu ted , have b eco m e visible and arc
able to be enlarged so that they can be know ingly operated upon. Though it w ould
be possib le to argue that o u tp osts w ere already bein g con stru cted in this continent
o f ph enom enality back in the seventeenth century w ith, for exam p le, the grow th o f
in terest in condition in g the m ilitary body through such practices as d rill, I w ould
argue that the main phase o f colonisation dates from the m id-nineteenth century
and rests on four developm en ts (T h rift, 2 0 0 0 ). First, there is the ability to sense the
sm all spaces o f the body through a w hole array o f new scientific in stru m ents which
have, in tu rn , m ade it possible to think o f the body as a se t o f m icro-geo graph ies.
Secon d, there is the related ability to sense sm all bodily m ovem en ts. Beginning with
the ph otograph ic w ork o f M arcy, M uybridge and oth ers and m oving into our
currcn t age in w hich the cam cra can im pose its ow n politics o f tim e and sp acc, we
can now think o f tim e as m inutely segm en ted fram es, able to be sp eed ed up, slow ed
dow n, even frozen for a w hile. T h ird, n um ero us body practices have com e into
existen ce w hich rely on and m anage such know ledge o f sm all tim es and spaces,
m ost especially those con n ected with the p e rfo rm in g arts, including the ‘under-
p e rfo rm in g ’ o f film acting, m uch m od ern dancc, the insistent cross-hatched tem p o
o f m uch m od ern m usic, and so on. Special perform an ce notation s, like Labanota-
tion and other ‘ ch o rco -grap h ics’ , allow this m inute m ovem en t lo be re co rd e d ,
analysed and re co m p o se d . Th en , finally, a se rie s o f disco u rses con cernin g the
slightest gestu re and utterance o f the body have been d eveloped, from the elaborate
I N T E N S I T I E S OF F E E L I N G 1 8 7
tu rn -tak in g o f con versation al analysis to the in tim ate sp aces o f p ro x e m ic s, from the
analysis o f g e stu re to the m ap p in g o f ‘b od y lan g u ag e ’ . [. . .]
A lo u rth d e v e lo p m en t w hich in volves aHect is the carefu l d esign o l urban space
to p ro d u c c p o litical re sp o n se . In creasin gly , u rban sp a cc s and tim e s arc b ein g
d e sig n e d to invoke affective re sp o n se a c c o rd in g to practical and th eo retical k n o w
le d Oge s that have b e en d eriv ed from and c o d e d bv
J
a h ost o f so u rce s. It co u ld be
claim ed that this has alw ays been the case — from m o n u m e n ts to triu m p h al p r o c e s
sio n s, from th eatrical aren as to m ass b ody displays — and I w ou ld ag re e . In the
tw en tieth c c n tu ry , it cou ld be argu ed that m uch o f the activity o f the d esign o f
sp acc w as p o w e re d up again , b e co m in g en tan gled w ith the evolution of k n o w le d g es
o f shaping the b o d y (such as the m ic ro b io p o litic s re fe rre d to ab o v e), often in a
p o litics o f the m o st frigh ten in g so r t. B ut w hat 1 w ould argu e is differen t now is
both the sh eer w eight o f the gathering to geth er o f form al kn o w ledges o f affective r e s
p o n se (w h eth er from highly fo rm a l th e o retical b ac k g ro u n d s such as psy ch o an aly sis
o r practical th eo retical b ack g ro u n d s like p e r fo r m a n c e ), the vast n u m b e r o f practical
k n o w le d g es o f affective re sp o n se that have b e co m e available in a se m i-fo rm al gu ise
(e.g . d e sig n , ligh tin g, even t m a n a g e m e n t, lo g istics, m u sic , p e r fo r m a n c e ), and the
e n o rm o u s d iv ersity o f available cu es that are able to be w o rk ed w ith in the shape o f
the p ro fu sio n o f im ag e s and o th e r sign s, the w ide sp e c tru m o f available te c h n o lo
g ie s , and the m o re ge n e ral archive o f even ts. I'he re su lt is that affective re sp o n se
can be d e sig n e d into sp a c c s, often o u t o f w hat se e m s like very little at all. Though
affective re sp o n se can clearly n ever be g u a ra n te e d , the fact is that this is n o lo n g e r a
ran d om p ro c e ss either. It is a fo rm o f lan d scap e e n g in e e rin g that is grad u ally p u llin g
itself in to e x iste n c e , p ro d u c in g new fo rm s of po w er as it g o e s. [. . .]
R eferences
B A LA Z S, B. (1 9 7 0 ): Theory o f the Film. Character and Growth o f a New Art. N ew York:

D over Press.
B O R D W E L L , D ., C A R R O L L , D. (ed s) (1 9 9 6 ): Post-Theory. Reconstructing Film Studies.
M adison: U niversity o f W isconsin Press.
D O A N E , M .A . (2 0 0 2 ): The Emergence o f Cinematic Time. Modernity, Contingency, The
Archive. C am bridge, M A : M IT Press.
K R A C A U E R , S. (1 9 6 0 ): Theory o f Film. The Redemption o f Physical Reality. N ew York,
M C K E N Z IE , J. (2 0 0 1 ): Perform or Else. From Discipline to Performance. N ew York:
R outledge.©
N O L A N , J .I ..(1 9 9 8 ): The Theurapeutic State. Justifying Government at Century's End.

Albany, NY: N ew York U niversity Press.
N O R R IS , P. (2 0 0 2 ): Democratic Phoenix. Reinventing Political Activism. C am bridge:
SM IT H , P. (e d .) (2 0 0 2 ): ‘ R egim es o f em o tio n ’ , Special Issue o f Soundings 20: 9 8 —217.
SP IN K S, T. (2 0 0 1 ): ‘Thinking the posthum an: literature, affect and the politics o f
sty le ’ , Textual Practice, 15: 23—46.
TH R IFT , N .J. (2 0 0 0 ): ‘ Still life in nearly presen t tim e: the ob ject o f n ature’ , Body and
Society, 6: 3A—57.
TH R IFT , N .J. (2 0 0 4 b ): ‘ Beyond m ediation ’ , in M iller, D. (e d .): Materialities. D urham ,
N C : D uke U niversity Press.
Chapter 22
Rani Kawale
I N E Q U A L I T I E S OF T H E H E A R T
The p e rfo rm a n ce o f e m o tio n w o rk by le sb ia n and b ise xu a l w om en
in L o n d o n , E n g la n d
Feeling everyday places
E
V E R Y D A Y P L A C E S C L E A R L Y I N C L U D E T H E h om e. A ccordin g
to Valentine (1 9 9 3 a ), Joh n ston and Valentine (1 9 9 5 ) and Elvvood (2 0 0 0 ), the
‘ h eterop atriarch al’ parental hom e is a place w here sexuality is under surveillance
and lesbians do not alw ays e xp erien ce em otio n al co m fo rt. Lesbians often actively
con ceal or su pp ress their identity o r find discreet ways o f resisting their invisibility
in the hom e. Lesbian h ou seh old s, however, while n ot n ecessarily elim inating
survcillan cc o f sexu ality, can offer lesbians em otional co m fo rt. In my research ,
ap proxim ately 59 p e r ccnt o f questionnaire respo nd en ts and 80 per ccnt o f in te r
view ees w ere out ab out their sexualityJ at h om e. T h cvJ wrcre likely
J
to live alone or
with sam c-sex p artn ers a n d /o r friends. H ow ever, 41 p er ccn t o f questionnaire
resp o n d en ts and 75 p e r ccnt o f in terview ees actively con cealed their sexuality from
their paren ts at h o m e .' The in terview ees describ ed their h om es in em otional term s
and it wras clear that Edw ina (w hite Irish, lesbian, aged late tw en ties), Sunita (South
Asian, lesbian, aged late tw en ties) and Sharada (South A sian, lesbian, aged late
tw en ties) w ere con cern ed about the feelings and em otio ns o f their paren ts:
My parents w ou ld n ’t approve [o f m e bein g a lesbian) so therefore I’ m

‘ in ’ at hom e . . . the only issue is n ot u psettin g m y parents. I’m living in
their house ren t-free because I’m a student and th at’ s a cou rtesy that
I’ve go t to respect and [being out] w ould m ake m e very unhappy so why
bother? T h e only reason [why] I [w ould] w ant to tell them is to m ake
them happy for m e, that I’ ve found som eon e o r whatever. T h e y ’re not
goin g to be, [so| why both er? . . . |T |h e y ’ ll think I’ ll’ ve gone a w rong
I N E Q U A LIT I E S 0 F T H E H E A RT 1 8 9
path . . . they w ou ld n ’t be able to stand w hat I’ m doin g, I’ d be deviant,

w ron g and it’ d be ‘their fau lt’ and that’ s n ot fair. (Edw ina)
Rekha (South A sian, lesbian, aged late tw en ties) lived alone and explain ed that her
girlfrien d Sunita lived w ith her paren ts w ho w ere unaw are of her lesbian sexuality.
They did not allow Sunita to spend nights away from hom e so Rekha and Sunita m et
regularly on the scene to share som e of their em otio n s and feelings for cach other.
Like Edw ina, Sunita w as eager to m aintain an em otionally balanced atm osph ere
w ith her paren ts at hom e so she kept her sexuality a secret from them . They both
p erfo rm ed surface acting such as deliberately changing topics o f conversation s with
their parents away from their social lives, p artn ers and m arriage, and hiding lesbian
and gay m aterial. This helped them to avoid the fear o f bein g accidentally ‘found
o u t’ by their parents and also to p ro te c t their parents from feelin g angry and upset.
Many o f m y research participan ts lived in lesbian o r bisexu al (frien dly) h ouseh old s,
but wrhether they visited their p a re n ts’ o r other relativ es’ at h om e, or w ere visited
by them in their own h om es, the m ajority continued to conccal their sexuality from
them even if they had already com e out to them . Sharada lived w ith her b rother
w ho accepted her lesbian identity, and she w as out to her m other. Yet she continued
to hide her sexuality from her parents when they visited b ecau se, as she explain ed
to m e, ‘they d o n ’t w ant lo see il o r know about it’ . So a lesbian (friendly) h ou se
hold may o ile r em otional co m fo rt but the feeling ru les change accordin g lo who
is present. H ow ever, w hether a hom e is lesbian (friendly) or n ot, it certainly can be
a site o f em otional c o m fo rt for lesbians w ho, like Edw ina, Sunita and Sharada,
perform the em otion w ork o f concealing their sexuality in the in terest of their
p are n ts’ feelin gs, and their ow n feelings.
M o st em ploym ent organizations in corpo rate gen dered perfo rm an ces and scxu-
alizcd in teraction s am on g em ploy ees such that h egem on ic h eterosexuality rem ains
pow erful in them , and sexual m in orities rem ain invisible (B u rrell and H earn 1989;
H alford and L eonard 2 0 0 1 ; Hall 1989; M cD ow ell 1995; Sch neider 1984; Valentine
1993a, 1993b ; W itz, H alford and Savage 1 996). L esbian s and gay m en often pass as
h eterosexual in these environ m en ts by m anagin g and negotiatin g m ultiple sexual
identities (Valentine 1993b ). The m ajority o f my research participan ts negotiated
and m anaged sexual identities at w ork and p erfo rm ed em otion w ork to avoid, for
exam p le, fear, anxiety and em b arrassm en t o f bein g found out o r rejected by their
colleagues. They wrere selective about w ho they cam e out to in o rd e r to avoid or
m inim ize unw anted em otio n s in their colleagu es and in them selves. W hether out
or n ot, they often en coun tered aw kw ard situations w hen colleagu es e x p ressed
h om oph ob ic thoughts and opin ion s, hcncc the participan ts con cealed and su p
pressed feeling offen ded, upset and angry by w hat may be regarded as surface
acting. For e xam p le, Sujata (South A sian, lesbian, aged early tw en ties) ad opted a
‘lib eral’ stance at w ork w hen pointing out to colleagu es that their h om oph obic
com m en ts w ere as unacceptable as they believed racist com m en ts to be. U pset,
an ger o r offence have no inherent m ean in gs but exp ressin g these em otio n s in
respo nse lo h om oph obic com m en ts at w ork w as no option for Sujata as this w ould
have effectively e xp o se d her sexuality, som eth in g she con sidered to be unsafe.
C om in g out to ‘gay-frien dly’ colleagu es d oes not necessarily gu aran tee a
lesbian o r bisexu al w om an can then e xp re ss her sexuality at w ork in the sam e ways
1 9 0 RANI K A WA L E
that h eterosexual w om en can. Again, the p erform an ce o f em otion w ork is required.

For e xam p le, Kelly (w hite A ustralian, lesbian, aged m id-tw en ties) had been out at
w ork for m ore than a year and developed a friendly rap p o rt w ith h er colleagues.
She explain ed to m e that tw o h eterosexu al fem ale colleagu es regularly describ ed to
her their w eekends flirting with different m en in pubs and bars. Kelly eventually
decided to tell them about her night flirting w ith a w om an in a lesbian bar and w as
‘sh o ck c d ’ by their facial and verbal e xp ressio n s of disgust. It w as n ot K elly ’ s
sexuality that w as reacted to unfavourably but her challenge to h eterosexual n orm s
around em otio n s and feelings. H er c o lle ag u e s’ sto rie s relied on acts, ge stu re s,
em otio n s and feelings that adhered to h eterosexu al n o rm s thus con tribu tin g to the
h ctcroscxuaiization o f the w ork place. K elly’ s sto ry , however, ru ptu red this space.
So she interven ed in her c o lle ag u e s’ ‘ s u rp rise ’ and disgu st and su pp ressed her own
‘sh o ck ’ and ‘u p se t’ by em ploying surface acting. She calm ly respo n d ed to them
Every w eekend you guys go o u t and . . . try and pull . . . and I d o n ’t say
anything about w hat I think. W hy is it so g ro ss that I m ight sn og a
w om an? . . . I m ight think it gro ss to sn og m en all the tim e and I d o n ’t
say anything, I d o n ’t go “ E R R R ! T h a t’s really g ro ss” like a 5-year-old.
(Kelly)
Like Sujata, Kelly frequently p e rfo rm e d em otion w ork lo m aintain and (re)creale
an em otionally balanced w orking atm osph ere for her c o lle ag u e ’ s sake and her own
w hen sim ilar con versations occu rred at w ork.
Lesbians olten hide their sexualitv and pass as h eterosexu al in the streets
(G re en 1 9 9 7 ; Valentine 1993a, 19 9 3 b ), and the p erlo rm an ce o f surface acting helps
to con ceal em otio ns that w ould oth erw ise challenge h eterosexu al n o rm s, as
ex p re sse d to m e by M egan (w hite Irish, lesbian, aged late tw en ties):
[Lesbians] m ake so many allow ances for straight peop le all the tim e.
Wc d o n ’t hold hands on the ro ad , w e d o n ’t kiss in fron t o f them , we
d o n ’t snog in front o f th em , wc d o n ’ t talk about ou r relationship. I
m ean so many [lesbians] d o n ’t talk ab out their relationship for fear o f
em b arrassin g other [p eople], m aking other peop le feel aw kw ard.
(M egan )
This con trasts w ith M eg an ’s on e-off sto ry about kissing her girlfrien d outsid e a busy
pub and bein g ch ccrcd on by so m e m ale p u n ters. The act o f tw o (in this ease
drun ken ) w om en kissing did not n ecessarily ru ptu re the h ctcro-sexu alizcd street
bccausc o f the m ultiple wrays in w hich it could be read. M eg an ’s and her g irlfrie n d ’ s
feelings and em otio n s w ere not read by the on look ers as bein g directed solely to
each other but as tran sferable to h eterosexu al m e n .4 How'cvcr, when p e rfo rm e rs
believe their em otional behaviour m ight be read as challenging h eterosexu al n o rm s,
they may also feel other em otio n s:
[My girlfrien d and I] now openly hug . . . have standing hugs in the
m iddle o f Tottenham C o u rt R oad and occasionally kiss cach other as
w e’ re saying ‘ B y e’ , d o n ’ t sn og or w hatever, and yet every tim e I split
IN E QU A LIT I E S 0 F T H E H E A RT 1 9 1
from h er I have this fleeting [thought] ‘ Shit! Is anyone ready to b eat m e

up on the stre e t fo r d o in g th a t?’
(R ek h a)
R e k h a’ s feelin gs o l love and affection fo r h er g irlfrie n d w ere en tw in ed w ith fear and

an xiety o f n ot b e in g read as h ete ro se x u a l by h o m o p h o b ic o n lo o k e rs, and re m in d e d
h er of n o t ad h erin g to h ctcro sc x u a lize d feelin g ru le s in the stre e t. T h is is n o t to
su g g e st that sam e -se x co u p le s can n ever feel o r e x p r e ss love free o f fear o r an xiety
b u t that h ctc ro sc x u a liz c d feelin g ru le s m e an s that such en tw in ed e m o tio n s are
likely to o c c u r am o n g th ose w ho ch allenge these ru le s. In o r d e r fo r R ckh a and h er
g irlfrie n d to rem ain safe from e x te rn al fo rm s o f h o m o p h o b ia th eir e m o tio n s w ere
n ot to b e read as ru p tu rin g the h ete ro se x u a lize d sp ace. So rath er than kissin g
passion ately they h u gg ed , p erh ap s like siste rs o r b e st frien d s. ‘ [T]he id en tity o f
th ose p re se n t in a sp a ce , and thus the id en tity o f the sp ace b e in g p ro d u c e d , can
so m e tim e s b e co n stru c te d by the gaze o f oth e rs p re se n t rath er than the p e r fo r m e r s ’
(V alentine 1 9 9 6 : 1 4 9 ). T h u s, sp a c c s arc n o t n ecessarily scx u aliz cd only by physical
behaviour, but by the re ad in g o f e m o tio n s attach ed to th ose b od ily acts by
o n lo o k e rs. Iden tities and e m o tio n s m ay not be re c o g n iz e d c o rre c tly by o n lo o k e rs
and in n eith er R c k h a ’ s n o r M e g a n ’ s case w ere they know ingly u n d e r in creased
threat from h o m o p h o b ic attack . Yet, the u n certain ty o f the p o ssib le read in gs m ean s
that lesbian s rarely overtly e x p r e ss th eir se xu ality physically o r em otio n ally in
everyday pub lic places. [. . .]
R eferences
B urrell, G. and H earn , J. (1 9 8 9 ) Sexuality o f organ isation , in H earn , J ., Sheppard, D. L .,

Tancred-Sheriff, P. and Burrell, G. (eds) Sexuality o f Organisation. London: Sage,
pp. 1 -2 7 .
Elw ood, S. A. (2 0 0 0 ) Lesbian living spaces: m ultiple m eanings o f h om e, in Valentine, G.
(e d .) From Nowhere to Everywhere: Lesbian Geographies. N ew York: H arrington Park
Press, pp. 11—27.
G reen , S.F. (1 9 9 7 ) Urban Amazons: Lesbian Feminism and Beyond in the Gender, Sexuality and
Identity Battles o f London. London: M acm illan.
H alford, S. and Leonard P. (2 0 0 1 ) Gender, Power and Organisations. B asingstoke: Palgrave.
Hall, M . (1 9 8 9 ) Private exp erien ces in the public dom ain: lesbians in organisations,
in H earn , ]., Sheppard, L ., Tancred-Sheriff, P. and B urrell, G. (ed s) The Sexuality
o f Organisation. London: Sage, pp. 125—1 38.
John ston , L. and Valentine, G. (1 9 9 5 ) W h erever I lay my girlfriend, that’ s my hom e:
the p erform an ce and surveillance o f lesbian identities in d o m estic environm ents,
in Bell, D. and Valentine, G. (cds) Mapping Desire: Geographies o j Sexualities.
London: R ou tledge, pp. 9 9 —11 3.
M cD ow ell, L. (1 9 9 5 ) Body w ork: h eterosexual gen der p erform an ces in city w o rk
places, in Bell, D. and Valentine, G. (cds) Mapping Desire: Geographies o f Sexualities.
London: R ou tledge, pp. 7 5 —95.
Schneider, B. (1 9 8 4 ) Peril and p rom ise: lesbians’ w orkplace participation, in N ardi,
P.M. and Schneider, B.E. (1 9 9 8 ) (cds) Social Perspectives in Lesbian and Gay Studies:A
Reader. London: R outledge, pp. 377—389.
1 9 2 RANI K A WA L E
Valentine, G. (1993a) (H ctcro)scxin g spacc: lesbian perceptions and experiences of

everyday spaccs, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 1 1: 395—41 3.
Valentine, G. (1993b) N egotiating and managing m ultiple sexual identities: lesbian
tim e-space strategics, Transactions o j the Institute o f British Geographers 18: 237—248.
Valentine, G. (1996) (Re)ncgotiating the ‘heterosexual street’ : lesbian production
o f space, in Duncan, N. (cd .) BodySpace: Destabilizing Geographies o f Gender and
Sexuality. London: R outledge, pp. 146—155.
W itz, A ., H alford, S. and Savage, M. (1996) O rganised bodies: gender, sexuality
and em bodim ent in contem porary organisations, in Adkins, L. and M erchant, V.
(cds) Sexualising the Social: Power and the Organisation o f Sexuality. Basingstoke:
M acmillan, pp. 173—189.
Chapter 23
Mimi Sheller
AUTOMOTIVE EMOTIONS
Fe eling the c a r
C
A R S E L I C I T A W I D E R A N G E o f feelin gs: the p leasures o f driving, the
ou tb u rst o f ‘ road ra g e ’ , the thrill o f sp eed , the security en gen dered by driving
a ‘ safe ’ car and so on. They also gen erate intensely em otional politics in w hich som e
peop le passionately m obilize to ‘stop the traffic’ and ‘ reclaim the str e e ts’ , while
others vociferously defend their right to cheap p etrol. C ars are above all m achines
that m ove peop le, but they do so in many sen ses o f the w ord. R ecen t ap pro ach es to
the ph en om en ology of car-use have highlighted ‘ the drivin g b o d y ’ as a set o f social
p ractices, em b odied disposition s, and physical aftordanccs (Sh eller and U rry , 2 0 0 0 ;
D ant and M artin , 2 0 0 1 ; Edcnsor, 2 0 0 2 ; O ld ru p , 2 0 0 4 ; D ant, 2 0 0 4 ; T h rift, 2 0 0 4 ).
M ore en com passin g ap proach es to the an thropology o f m aterial cultu res have also
rcsitu atcd the car as a social-tech nical ‘h yb rid’ (M ich ael, 2 0 0 1 ; M iller, 2 0 0 1 a ) .1
This article builds both on this w ork and on recen t ap proach es in the sociology
o f em otio n s (H och schild, 1983, 1997, 2 0 0 3 ; Bendelow and W illiam s, 1998; K atz,
2 0 0 0 ; G oodw in ct al., 2 0 0 1 ; A h m ed, 2 0 0 4 ) to e xp lo re the wavs in w hich the
‘dom inant eulture o f au to m o b ility ’ (U rry , 2 0 0 0 ) is im plicated in a deep c o n tcx t o f
affective and em bodied relations betw een p e o p le, m achines and spaces o f m obility
and dw elling, in wrhich em otio n s and the senses play a key part.
Social co m m en tato rs have lon g ad dressed the problem o f car cultu res in an
explicitly n orm ative m ann er con cern ed w ith the restitution o f ‘public g o o d s ’ (the
cnvironcm nt, hum an health, the social fabric o f citics, d em ocratic public cultu res)
that have been erod ed by con tem p orary car and road sy stem s (Jaco b s, 1 9 6 1 ; N ader,
1965; Sen n ett, 1990; K unstler, 1 9 9 4 ; D unn, 199 8 ). At stake in such d eb ates is not
sim ply the future o f the car, but the future o f the entire ‘car cu ltu re ’ (and w ider
tran spo rtation system ) in w hat m ight be ch aracterized as ‘ societies o f au to m o b ility ’
in wrhich the ‘coercive fre e d o m ’ o f d rivin g shapes both public and private spaces o f
all scales and kinds (Sh eller and U rry , 2 0 0 0 ; U rry , 2 0 0 4 ). Yet m ost practical efforts
at prom otin g m o re ‘eth ical’ fo rm s o f car con sum ption have been debated and
1 9 4 MIMI S H E L L E R
im plem en ted as if the intense feelin gs, passions and em b odied e x p erien ces asso c i
ated w ith au tom obility w ere n ot relevant.
C ar cultu res have social, m aterial and above all affective dim en sions that are
overlooked in cu rren t strategics to influence car-drivin g decision s. T h e in dividual
istic ‘rational c h o ic e ’ m od el, w hich is so influential as to be taken lor granted in
tran spo rtation policy deb ates, d isto rts o u r un derstan din g o f how peop le (and their
feelings) arc em b ed d ed in historically sedim en ted and geograph ically etched
p attern s o f ‘quotidian m o b ility ’ (K aufm an, 2 0 0 0 ). Paying attention to the e m o
tional con stituen ts o f car cu ltu res, however, need not im ply re so rtin g to black-box
causal explan ation s such as the pop u lar yet ill-dcfincd n otions o f ‘au tom obile
ad d ictio n ’ or a ‘love affair’ writh the car (M otavalli, 2 0 0 1 ). Ncwr ap proach es both to
car cultu res and to em otional cultu res can aid us in shifting attention away from the
counter-factual ‘rational a c to r’ w ho supposedly m akes carefully reason ed econ om ic
ch o ices, and tow ards the lived e xp erien ce o f dw elling w ith cars in all o f its
co m p lexity , am biguity and con tradiction. [. . .]
Feeling the car
[. . .] Pleasure, fear, fru stration , euph oria, pain, envy: em otional respo n ses to cars
and feelings about driving are crucial to the perso n al in vestm en ts p eop le have in
buying, drivin g and dw elling with cars. C ar m anu factu rers, o f co u rsc, m anipulate
brand desire through the em otional rcson an cc o f their advertising cam paigns; yet
the ‘th rill’ o f driving, the ‘jo y ’ o f the ro ad , the ‘p assio n ’ o f the collector, the
nostalgia for retro designs are not sim ply lexicon s o f the advertising im agination.
The ‘feelin gs’ being gen erated around cars can be pow erful in dicators o f the e m o
tional cu rren ts and su b m erged m oral econ om ies o f car cultures. T his affective
relationship with cars is not only about pleasure-seek in g, but also feed s into our
d eep est fears, an xieties and frustration s. The sto m ach -turn in g feeling of w itnessing
a car crash o r the te rro rs and perm an en t anxiety prod u ced by bein g in an accident
arc the dark u n derside o f ‘au to -fre e d o m ’ . The very passions that feed into ccrtain
kinds o f love for the car o r joy in driving may equally elicit opp osite feelings o f
hatred for traffic, rage at other d riv ers, b oredo m with the sam e ro u te or anger at
go vern m en t tran sp o rt policies (see M ichael, 2001 for a discussion o f road rage in
te rm s o f ‘hum an non-hum an h yb ridity’ ).
An advertisin g cam paign for the L exu s IS200 unsurprisingly p roclaim s: ‘It’s the
feeling in sid e’ . E m phasizing the leather scats, the autom atic clim ate con trol and the
digital audio sy stem , the te x t m akes d e a r that this slogan re fe rs both to the ‘fe e l’ o f
the car in terior and the feeling it produ ces inside the body that dw ells within the
car. The feel o f the car, both inside and ou tsid e, m ovin g o r stationary, sensuously
shapes and m aterially p ro jects how m o to rists feel not only about cars but also about
them selves and w ithin them selves. T h ese con cern s can be traced back to Roland
B arth e s’ reading o f the m ythology o f the C itroen D S, in w hich he recogn ized the
m ateriality o f this p articu lar car as m arking a shift in the dom in ant car culture.
W ritin g o f the m agic and spirituality o f its lighter, less aggressive design , he
d escrib es a clear cultural shift from ‘an alchem y o f speed lo a gourmandise o f d riv in g’
(B arth es, 1957: 1 52). [. . .j
A U T O M O T I V E E M O T 10 N S 1 9 5
O f c o u rse , view ing cars as prosth etic exten sion s o f d riv e rs’ bodies and fantasy
w orlds (F reun d, 1993: 9 9 ; B ran don , 2 0 0 2 : 4 0 1 —2) is the standard fare not only o f
m o to r show s and advertisin g, but also o f youth cu ltu res, pin-up calen dars, pop
lvrics and hip-hop videos. T h e ‘love alla ir’ w ith the car (M otavalli, 2 0 0 1 ; Sachs,
2 0 0 2 ), its sexualization as ‘w ife ’ or lover (M iller, 1997 [1994]: 2 3 8 ), su gg ests a kind
o f libidinal econ om y around the car, in w hich particular m o d els b e co m e ob jects of
d esire to be collected and co sse te d , w ashed and w orsh ip ped . W h eth er phallic
or fem inized, the car m aterializes p erso n ality and takes p a rt in the ego-form atio n of
the owrncr o r driver as co m p e te n t, pow erful, able and sexually desirable. [. . .]
Being (in) the car
It felt alive beneath my hands, som e m etal creature b red for w ind and
speed . . . . It ran like the w ind. I ran like the w ind. It w as as though I
bccam c the car, o r the car b ecam e m e , and which w as w hich d id n ’t
m atter anym ore.
(L esley H azleton cited in M osey, 2 0 0 0 : 186)
M acnaghten and U rry argue that there are am bivalent and con tested ‘afford an ces’
that ‘stem from the reciprocity betw een the environm ent and the organ ism ,
deriving from how peop le are kinaesthetically active within their w o rld ’ (2 0 0 0 :
169; sec also C o stall, 199 5 ). D riving can be included am on g the active co rp orcal
engagem en ts o f hum an b odies with the ‘ se n se d ’ w orld. Like other m od es o f
m obility, such as w alking, bicycling o r riding trains, m od es o f d riving also arise out
o f ‘ a specific tim e and place, and they have often developed in con trast to each
other. They tend to have a history of both gen derin g and c lass’ (L o fgren , 1999: 4 9 ).
D rivin g, then, su gg ests many different kinds o f affordanccs betw een varied b o dies,
cars and spaces. [. . .) For so m e the m otion produ ces feelings o f h appin ess, e x c ite
m en t or an ticipation; others b eco m c fearful, anxious o r sick to the stom ach . T h ese
feelings arc n either located solely within the p erso n n or p rodu ced solely by the car
as a m oving o b jcct, but occu r as a circulation o f affccts betw een (different) p e rso n s,
(different) c ars, and historically situated car cultu res and geograph ies of
autom obility.
In w hat sense might we have ‘em b odied d isp o sitio n s’ towrards the feeling o f
driving? At 6 w eeks old m y baby already ex p re sse s an excited anticipation o f car
rides. As I placc her in the car scat (w hile still in the h ouse) her countenance
brigh tens and she look s around in exp ectation . As I fasten the scat into the back o f
the car she turn s her facc tow ard the w indow and looks expectan tly for the show to
begin as the car m oves. D urin g a ride she w atch es the w indow intently for as long
as she can, until lulled to sleep. It is clear that many infants take pleasure in the
kinaesthetic e x p erien ce o f the car rid e, and develop an early orientation tow ards
four-w h eeled m obility within a car eulture that soon enables them to play with toy
cars, ride on child-sized cars, and learn lo identify different kinds and brands o f
m o to r vehicles by the age o f 2 years. At the sam e tim e, this seem ingly ‘ in stin ctual’
disposition is tightly cou pled with a very particular car culture in w hich any m oving
vehicle is an extrem ely high-risk environm ent for children, shot through with legal
interven tion s. T h e parent w ho places their infant in a car seal is faced w ith a
w arning o f dire co n sequ en ces (w ritten in 11 languages in E u ro p e): ‘ D O N O T place
rear lacing child seat on front seat w ith airbag. D EA TH O R S E R IO U S IN JU R Y can
o c c u r.’ This w arnin g is an unnerving yet routine rem in d er o f the need to cultivate a
prccisc drivin g disposition orien ted tow ards defensiven ess, safety and security .
Installing the child and the scat in the car correctly induccs a sense o f having taken
security m e asu re s; it is a self-discipline that m akes paren ts fe e l b e tter about being in
the car, as discussed in the follow in g section on family cars and carin g p ra c tic e s.’
M otion and em o tio n , w e could say, arc kinaesthetically in tertw in ed and p r o
duced togeth er through a conjunction o f b o d ies, tech n ologies and cultural practices
(that arc always historically and geograph ically loeated ). D raw in g on the research o f
Jack K atz on driv ers in L os A ngeles, T h rift su ggests that w e should:
. . . understan d drivin g (and passen gerin g) as both profoundly

em b odied and sensu ous ex p e rie n c e s, though o f a particular kind, w hich
‘requires and occasion s a m etaphysical m erger, an intertw inin g o f the
identities o f the driv er and car that gen erates a distinctive on tology in
the form o f a perso n -th in g, a hum anized car or, alternatively, an au to
m obilized p e rso n ’ (K atz, 2 0 0 0 : 33) in w hich the identity o f p erso n and
car kinaesthetically intertw ine.
(T h rift, 2 0 0 4 : 4 6 - 7 )
H um an b odies physically respond lo the thrum o f an engine, the gen tle glide
through a ge a rb o x , o r the w hoosh o f effortless acceleration , and in som e cases the
driver b eco m es ‘o n e ’ w ith the car (as in the quotation al the start o f this section ).
D ifferent em otio n al re g iste rs are produced through the variations in the em b odied
driving exp e rie n ce , w hich also have national variations. Som e Iccl con ten t w ith a
sm ooth and silen t ride (historically aligned with ideas o f lu xu ry , privilege and
w ealth), others prefer an all-w heel drive that shakes the bon es and fills the n ostrils
with diesel and engine oil (h istorically aligned w ith ideas o f adven ture, m asculinity
and challenge). Although p eop le also have ‘em b odied d isp o sitio n s’ tow ards w alk
ing, bicycling o r riding a h orse, it is the ways in which these disposition s b cco m c
‘ culturally sc d im c n tc d ’ , as T h rift puts it, that m a tter.’ [. . .]
Today a further key change in the em b odied feeling o f cars is due to d evelop
m en ts in digital con trol o f the car and in m obile inform ation tech n ologies, which
further tran sform the very ways in which we ‘se n se ’ the w orld. T h ere is grow ing
em phasis on the integration o f in form ation and com m un ication tech n ologies into
the car (especially luxury c ars), leading to a lacing o f tech n ologies o f m obility with
capacities for conversation, en tertain m en t and in form ation access (Sheller, 2 0 0 4 ).
Many asp ccts involved in directin g the car as a m achinc have been co m p u terized ,
w hile, sim ultaneously, car-dw cllcrs have been insulated from the risky and dangerous
environ m ents through w hich they pass, seem ingly p ro tected by se atb e lts, airbags,
‘ cru m p le zo n e s’ , ‘roll b a r s ’ and ‘bull b a r s ’ . Features such as autom atic g e arb o x e s,
cruise co n tro l, voice-activated entry and ignition, G P S-navigation, digital m usic
sy stem s and hands-free m obile ph ones all ‘fr e e ’ driv ers from d irect m anipulation o f
the m ach inery, w hile em b eddin g them m ore deeply in its sociality, p roducin g what
m ight be d escrib ed as a ‘ cy b e rca r’ (Sh eller and U rry, 2 0 0 0 , 2 0 0 4 ; Sheller, 2 0 0 4 ).4
The m arketing o f so-called ‘sm a r t’ cars em ph asizes not only their sm aller size but
also their enhanced capabilities for inform ation or entertainm ent in con gested urban
areas, w hich w ill increasingly be design ed as ‘intelligent en viron m en ts’ . 5 [. . .]
Family cars, caring and kinship
[. . .] A key overlooked asp cct o f car cultu res is the em otional investm ents people
have in the relationships betw een the car, the self, fam ilv and frien d s, creating
affcctivc co n te xts that arc also deeply m aterialized in particular types o f vehicles,
h om es, neigh bou rh oods and cities. A rcccn t advertisin g cam paign for the Toyota
Yaris points out that, ‘You could end up loving it too m u ch ’ ; the Yaris is then show'n
in a variety o f absurd yet believable social scenarios in which love is taken a bit too
far (receiving p o stcard s, bein g treated to a candle-lit bath, m on op olizin g a huge
em pty garage, e tc .). C learly cars have been deeply integrated into the affective
netw ork s o f fam ilial life and d o m estic sp accs, as w ell as friendship netw ork s and
public sociability. As Sim on M axw ell argu es, policy discussion s have n cglcctcd the
‘ positive social fram es o f m eaning o f car use associated w ith care and love for
im m ediate o th e rs, as w ell as care for oth ers w ithin w id er social n e tw o rk s’ (M a x
w ell, 2 0 0 1 : 2 1 7 - 1 8 ). H e finds that ‘there are plural ethics associated w'ith car use in
everyday life, and intense negotiation s betw een these ethical stan ces’ (2 0 0 1 : 2 1 2 ).
Such fram es o f m eaning and ethics gen erate som e o f the feeling ru les that govern
the em otio n al cultu res o f car use, in which needs to m anage personal iden tity,
fam ilial relationships, and sociability can easily override any ethical qualm s about
driving.
For exam p le, driving offers many peop le a feeling o f liberation, em pow erm en t
and social inclusion, while inability to drive may lead to feelings o f social exclusion
and d isem p o w crm cn t in cultu res o f au tom obility . A study o f young suburban
driv ers in Britain su ggests that ‘the car is p art of pattern s o f sociab ility ’ and the
anticipation o f new p ossib ilities for such sociability gen erates ‘an extrao rdin ary and
excitin g m om en t o f co n su m p tio n ’ for young driv ers (C arrab in c and L on gh urst,
2 0 0 2 : 192 3). In a largc-scalc survey study o f the expressive dim en sions o f car use
am ong English d riv ers, Stephen Stradlin g found that feelings o f p ro jectio n , p rid e,
pow er, self-expression or in dependen ce, vary by age, class and gen der: ‘different
kinds o f p erso n s obtain different kinds o f psych ological benefit from car use.
D rivin g a car is particularly attractive to the young and the p o o r because o f the
sense o f displayed p erso n al identity it con veys’ (Stradlin g c t a l., 2 0 0 1 ; Stradling,
2 0 0 2 : I I ) . A long sim ilar lines, G ilroy su gg ests that A frican -A m erican flam boyant
public use o f cars m akes up for feelings o f status injury and m aterial deprivation
through ‘ com pen satory p re stig e ’ (G ilro y, 2 0 0 1 : 9 4 ). [. . .]
Notes
1 The concept o f hybridity has a com plex history which ranges from colonial
theories o f race (Young, 1995) to debates about diasporic identities and multi -
culturalism (W erbner and M odood, 1997) and the human—nonhuman hybrids
o f studies o f tech noscience (H araw ay, 1997), actor-netw ork theory (Law and
H assard, 1999) and critical geograph y (W h atm ore, 2 0 0 2 ). This is n ot the place
to discuss fully the im plications o f this theoretical gen ealogy, but it is w orth
noting that the discou rse o f hybridity is a pow erful one writhin techno-cultures
o f au tom obilitv and is itself in need o f carcful analysis vis-a-vis its effects o f
denaturalization and rcnaturalization.
2 In other car cultures a blessing or a hidden charm m ight serve the sam e function
o f m aking the occupants o f a vchicle feel they have taken appropriate safety
precautions (sec V crrips and M eyer, 2001 on p rotectin g cars from w itchcraft
and gh osts in G hana). R cccn t research carried out for the A A M o torin g Trust
suggests that up to tw o-thirds o f child car scats used in the U K arc in any case
installed incorrectly thus providing little protectio n in accidents (h tt p :/ /w w w .
a a tr u s t.c o m /n e w s /re le ase _ v ie w .c fm ?id = 6 2 1).
3 Thus it is argued that electric m o to r vehicles and cars with fuel cclls o r hybrid
pow er sources w ill have to feel like conventional cars and to deliver the sam e
pleasures o f driving: quick acceleration, speeds over 65 m ph, and the capacity to
drive at least 350 m iles w ithout rech arging (M otavalli, 2 0 0 1 ). It is for this reason
that G eneral M o to rs’ electric EV-1 and F o rd ’ s Think are thought to have failed
(A pcar, 2 0 0 2 ; D uffy, 2 0 0 2 ).
4 The T o yo ta/Son y Pod con cept car even prom ises that it will:
. . . m easure your pulse and persp iration levels to gauge your stress
levels. If you are beco m in g aggressive it w ill calm you w ith cool air
and soothing m usic. It w ill even wrarn other drivers about your
m ental state by changing the colou r o f the strip-lights on the bonnet!
(R/1C Magazine, 2002: 14—15)
5 Such developm ents w ere already prefigured in the subcultures ol car custom iza
tion critizcd by Paul G ilroy (2 0 0 1 : 9 8 —9 ), w hich p rodu ced ‘road m o n ste rs’ such
as the G M C h evrolet Suburban ‘m ackcd o u t’ with TV, video library, tem perature
con trolled cup h olders, digital com pass and th erm om eter, invisible speakers in
so u n d p ro o f w alls and a satcllitc-controllcd security svstem .
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2 5 -3 9 .
Chapter 24
Ben Anderson
DOMESTIC GEOGRAPHIES
OF A F F E C T
Feeling the m aking o f a judgem en t
AKING A JUDGEMENT I S A N e v e r-p re sen t p a rt o f th ose in tim ate
M c n c o u n tc rs w ith the m a te ria lities o f re c o rd e d m u sic that fram e, and en liven ,

a ran ge o f p u b lic and p riv ate sp a ce -tim es.
To b egin to attu ne to how such p rac tic c s o f ju d g e m e n t e m e rg e from w ithin
the day to day lives o f specific h o m e s 1 w an t to d iv e rt in to the first event. D en n is, a
4 1 -y ear-old e n g in e e r w ho lives w ith his p a rtn e r and daugh ter, d e sc rib e s in a diary
e x tra c t re tu rn in g h om e fro m w ork on a w eek day even ing and m ak in g a se rie s o f
ju d g m e n ts ab o u t w hat m u sic to listen to.
G o t h om e from w o rk — d c c id c d to play so m e m u sic for a w hile b e fo re

pu ttin g on su p p e r— Jen n y w as b usy in the garden so had so m e tim e to
my
J
self. P u t on this album o f folk so n Ogs b u t tu rn ed them off -d id n ’ t feel
rig h t. Sk ip ped it fo rw ard to this on e w'ith a gre at m e lo d y , difficult to
d e sc rib e w hat it d id — g u e ss it e n e rg iz ed m e a b it, really like that song.
D ccid c d to flick o n to the ra d io — h eard so m e shit so n g on R ad io Tw o so
sw itch ed that off. F.nd up listen in g to a b rillian t album by a M o d ern
artist Ja m e s G reen w hich is go o d fo r takin g away the stre ss and m akin g
tea to : it m oves ab o u t.
(L iste n in g d iary e x tra c t: p u n ctu atio n un ch an ged)
D en n is and I listen to the m u sic d e sc rib e d in the diary c x tra c t d u rin g a jo in t

in terv iew several days later:
I played this, you know' I’ d b een fe elin g a bit tire d , lo n g day at w o rk we

had load s o f o r d e rs . . . and it ’ d tired m e o u t so I n e e d e d so m e th in g to
b o o st m e up. T h is so n g is g o o d for that load s o f . . . u m m m . . . en ergy .
2 0 2 BEN A NDE RSON
We listen to the end o f the song. D ennis then sw itches the CD.
I w ou ld n ’ t norm ally play this but tor so m e reason it, 1 w as in a good

m ood as I w as m aking tea and this m akes m e laugh and ju st . . . you
know helped lighten the m ood even m ore and ge t on and enjoy being at
hom e after w ork.
( ‘ Listen in g-w ith ’ , 17 D ec e m b e r 2 0 0 0 )
D ennis hints at the presen ce o f n u m ero u s practices o f ju d gem en t that cach serve to
crcatc a set o f (d is)con n cction s betw een h im self and the different m usic he h e a rd /
listened to. Initially, on return ing h om e, m usic is played and then turn ed off. It docs
not Je e l right’ . He then skips forw ard to a different song and sings along. This
'energizes' him . D issatisfied w ith the n ext son g he sw itches to the radio. This is
turn ed o ff and he m ention s how m uch he dislikes a son g he had ju st heard. Finally,
he settles on an album because it 'is good Jo r taking away the stress and making tea to’ .
Practiccs o f ju d ge m e n t arc here bound up w ith thought-im bued Jeelings and emotions
that cnact the in scription , o r m odification, o f value to a range o f m usic. It is this
form of spon tan eous im m ediate ju d gem en t, m ixed into the incorporeal-
c o rp o rcalities o f the b ody, that is m o st critical to understanding how ju d gem en t is
o f everyday life. Feeling a son g in evaluative term s is not based on an already
decided p refcren cc, o r taste, but instead is b odicd-fo rth w ithout deliberation from
within the ‘im m ediacy o f a given situ atio n ’ (Varela 1999: 9 ). M aking a judgem ent
d oes, o f co u rse , exten d out from the im m ediate now into incipient feelings that
rem em b er both latencies o f what has-been and ten den cies o f what has not-yet
com e to be. It is also em b edded in the m ore distanced circulation s that told
togeth er to m ake up specific ‘everyday lives’ : in the above ease D ennis return s
hom e and p repares fo r an evening m eal.
Feeling a ju d gem en t, em bodying an evaluative stance that p ro d u ces value,
therefore w orks through a n um b er o f proxim ate m odification s o f the body. In the
case o f D ennis one song is, in his w o rd s, ‘pretty boring, it’s just slow . . . doesn’t move
m e'. This changc in the sense o f m ovem en t folds into an cffcct in the visccral
register. T h e m usic co m c s to Je e l souless’ . It d ocs not touch him . Given the proviso
that ch oicc, and ju d gem en t, m ust always occu r Jrom within the p attern s o f ‘ everyday
life ’ , wre can specify that recorded m usic b e co m e s entangled w ithin the space-tim e
o f the hom e through types o f ‘m undane m e ta m o rp h o sis’ that em erge in ‘responsive
recogn ition o f the invisible dim en sions that groun d routine social in teractio n ’
(K atz 1999: 3 2 3 ). T h ese arc passages in con du ct specific to the m ovem en ts o f ‘daily
life ’ that, in K atz’s (1 9 9 9 : 3 35) w o rd s, arc based on ‘a sensual turn in g o f o n e ’ s
attention to region s o f the body that, outside o f o n e ’s ow n direct aw aren ess, had
been em ployed to co n stru ct b eh avior’ . E xam p les from this case include a side-
p ercep tion o f a need to ‘ to take away the stress' or ‘ to be energized’ . Bonds are th ere
fore fo rm e d , responsively, from w ithin a given situation betw een the m aterialities
o f m usic and the body. This ‘turnin g in ’ to an aw areness o f the body takes a num b er
o f different fo rm s and p o ssesses a range o f different forces. Each m etam orph osis
is bound to, and e m erg es out of, the dem an d s o f the here and now. M usic is
thereafter en cou n tered , and ju d ged , as ‘a p p ro p ria te ’ only if it ‘p ro m ise s’ lo create,
in Sp in oza’ s te rm , ‘g o o d e n c o u n te rs’ . In the above case m usic ‘fits’ with ‘everyday
D O M E S T IC G E O G R A P H I E S 0 F A F F E C T 2 0 3
life ’ b e c a u se it a llo w s an a u g m e n ta tio n : it g iv e s e n e rg y o r a b o o s t (s e e D e le u z e

1 9 8 8 ).
N e g a tiv e ju d g e m e n ts, in c o m p a r is o n to the re la tio n s o f a g r e e m e n t b e tw e e n
the m a te ria litie s o f m u sic an d his b o d y that D e n n is d c s c r ib c s , o c c u r d u e to the lack
o f m a tc h b e tw e e n the m a te ria litie s o f m u sic and the m a n n e r in w h ich ‘as e m o tio n s
e b b and How in e x p e r ie n c e , the p e r so n is a b s o r b e d in to an d w ith d ra w s fro m given
re g io n s an d fe a tu re s o f the w o r ld ’ (K a tz 1 9 9 9 : 3 3 5 ). T h e c o n v e rsa tio n s, p e r io d s o f
play in g m u sic to g e th e r and m o r e fo rm a liz e d in te r v ie w s , w e re fre q u e n tly e n liv en e d
w ith e v alu ativ e p r a c tic e s o f talk that e x p r e ss e d a d im in ish in g re la tio n w ith m u sic a
d im in ish m c n t th at fo llo w s fro m the p rin c ip le th at ‘ w h en a b o d y “ c n c o u n tc r s ”
a n o th e r b o d y , o r an id ea a n o th e r id e a , it h ap p e n s that the twro re la tio n s s o m e tim e
c o m b in e to fo rm a m o r e p o w e rfu l w h o le , an d s o m e tim e s o n e d e c o m p o se s the
o th e r, d e stro y in g th e co h e sio n o f its p a r t s ’ (D e le u z e 1 9 8 8 : 19).
To d e s c r ib e this p r o c e s s o f d e c o m p o sitio n w e d iv e rt in to a se c o n d e x a m p le o f
how ju d g e m e n t is fc c lin g - im b u c d . B e lo w is an e x tr a c t in w h ich Je n n y , D e n n is ’ s
p a rtn e r, d isc u sse s the ev e n t ab o v e. She liste n s to m u sic that e n a b le s a ‘ p le a s a n t’
e n v iro n m e n t. Je n n y and I have b e en talk in g a b o u t th e m u sic w e d islik e . She b e g in s
to talk a b o u t h e r h u sb a n d ’ s love o f ‘ d is c o r d a n t ’ m u sic , h ow sh e fe e ls at tim e s w-hen
he p lay s it, an d w h at m u sic she d o c s ‘ lik e ’ :
Je n n y : 1 d o n ’ t like m u ch o f the m o d e r n stulT . . . like . . . w ell 1 d o n ’ t

kn ow . . . I d o n ’ t kn o w w h at y o u ’ d call it e v e n , an d I d o n ’ t like . . .
m o d e r n c o m p o s e r s e ith e r actu ally • • • i t ’ s to o d isc o rd a n t, 1 d o n ’ t like
the o d d sq u e a k s an d b an gs an d . . .
B en : n o n o , th a t’ s w'hat 1 w as g o in g to ask y o u . . . y o u like tu n e s (y eah )

and y o u like . . .
Je n n y : y es I like so m e th in g that m a k e s m e feel n icc and d isc o rd a n t

so u n d s d o n ’ t. L ike D e n n is ’ m u sic that he had on y e ste rd a y w h en he g o t
b a c k fro m w o rk . . . 1 m e an I’ m a b it o f a n e rv o u s so u l an yw ay . . . I
m e a n , I ju m p w h en th e p h o n e rin g s . . . so . . . all . . . o d d . . . n o ise s
. . . th ey [sh iv e rs an d screw 's facc up]
B en : th ey . . • m a k e y o u . . .?
Je n n y : n e rv o u s . . . Y E S , m a k e s m e v e ry u n c o m fo r ta b le , d o n ’ t like it at
all . . . I fe e l really on e d g e . . . u n se ttle s m e , I d o n ’ t like . . . b e in g
u n s e ttle d , I like . . . c a lm , h avin g a n icc calm level.
(In d iv id u a l in te rv ie w , 19 D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 0 )
In a se p a ra te in te rv ie w D e n n is e x p r e ss e s h ow h is ju d g e m e n t c o n tr a s ts w ith Je n n y ’ s
talk o f the m u sic he d e s c r ib e d in th e p r e v io u s d iary e x tr a c t an d Jen n y d c s c r ib c s
ab o v e:
I g u e s s I liste n e d to that then b e ca u se . . . w ell I’ d had a d u ll day a l w o rk

and w an te d to liven th in gs up a b it . . . I like the w ay il m o v e s y o u
2 0 4 BEN A N D E R S O N
arou n d load s . . . like you d o n ’ t know w h a t’ s co m in g n e x t . . . il just

like . . . it ’ s e x c itin g and in te re stin g . . . you keep n o ticin g it.
( ‘ L iste n in g -w ith ’ , 17 D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 0 )
Both p o sitiv e and negative ju d g e m e n ts ab o u t the relatio n b e tw e en m u sic and the

im m e d iate situ ation b egin from the sam e p la ce: the affection of m u sic , as so u n d , on
the (im )-m ate rial b ody by v irtu e o f the en v elo p in g function o f the se n se s. Jen n y
d e sc rib e s how she ju d g e s the ‘ fit’ o f m u sic through e m b o d ie d affection s. She d is
likes D e n n is’ s m u sic b c ca u sc it in d u ce s an ‘ uncomfortable’ b ack g ro u n d e m o tio n that
leaves h er ‘ unsettled’ . N e gativ e ju d g e m e n ts b egin from such d im in ish m cn ts, i.e . a
real chan gc in the d istrib u tio n o f in ten sities that w ork s on and through the b o d ie s o f
th ose tra n sfo rm e d . In c o n trast, for D en n is, fu n ction in g to alleviate a ‘ d u lle d ’ b o d y ,
the m a te ria lities o f the sam e m u sic re so n ate w'ith a re-in ten sification o f ‘ everyday
life ’ : ‘ i t ’s exciting and interesting . . .you keep noticing it ’ .
T h e m o st c o m m o n ty p es o f ju d g e m e n t that establish a d isco n n ectio n w ith
m u sic arc th o se n ear co n stan t p ractic cs o f n o t-c h o o sin g a so n g , o r alb u m , b c ca u sc it
d o e s n ot ‘ fit’ o r ‘ m a tc h ’ the im m e d iate situ atio n : so D en n is, fo r e x a m p le , d o e s not
ch o o se m u sic that d o e s n o t en able him to ‘ lighten the mood . . . and enjoy being at home
after work’ . T h e se p rac tic e s o f ju d g e m e n t c o -e x ist w ith o th e r p ractic e s o f ju d ge m e n t
that by co n trast involved d e lib erately ch o o sin g -n o t-to listen lo a defin ed ge n re o f
m u sic o r n am ed a r tis ts /b a n d s . E ach p a rtic ip a n t, fo r e x a m p le , co u ld n am e a ccrtain
ge n re o f m u sic that they w ould n ever listen lo. O n ly occasio n ally , in re sp o n se to
certain p ro x im ate affection s, do p rac tic e s o f ju d g e m e n t take the fo rm o f such a
ju d g e m e n t-o v e r m u sic that is e x p re sse d in the act o l n am ing m u sic as ‘g o o d ’ or
‘ b a d ’ . Key to such an e n co u n te r is that a relation is p ro d u c e d in w hich the affcction
of m u sic , and the dy n am ics of the situ atio n , are felt to su m m o n listen in g as an
even t of ju d ge m e n t-o v e r. N e gativ e ju d g e m e n ts-o v e r m u sic , rath er than sim ply
n o t-c h o o sin g m u sic , w ere n otably b ou n d up w ith the p ro d u ctio n o f a ran ge o f
affects that act to en able d istin ction by e x p re ssin g a relation that is su sp en d ed or
cu t. N o te , fo r e x a m p le , the irritatio n that is e x p r e sse d through Je n n y ’ s talk o f the
‘ discordant sounds’ o f ‘ modern music’ o r the in d iffcrcn cc that an im ates D e n n is’ talk o f
‘shit music’ . ( . . . )
R eferences
D eleuze, G. (1 9 8 8 ) Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. H urley, R. San Francisco: City

Lights Books.
Katz, J. (1 9 9 9 ) How Emotions Work. Chicago: C hicago U niversity Press.
Varela, F. (1 9 9 9 ) Ethical Know-how: Action. Wisdom, and Cognition. Stanford, CA : Stanford
U niversity Press.
6 . Emotions and health
HERE I S A long history of research on emotion in connection to various

T aspects of health and disease. As is the case for the study of emotion more
generally, the contribution of social scientists to this field is relatively recent. It is
beyond the scope of this volume to review the diversity of medical, psychiatric and
psychological approaches to the relation between emotions and health. It is worth
mentioning, however, that these have ranged widely. A t one end of the spectrum we
find experimental research on the psychophysiology of stress and immune responses
(e.g. Vedhara and Irwin 2005; Evans et al. 2000); at the other end we find psycho
analytic approaches, informing hypotheses on organic disease as the affect-mediated
expression of sym bolic meanings (e.g. Chiozza 1998; Anzieu 1989). As we stressed in
our introduction, there is no single uncontested way of constructing emotion: the
medical, psychiatric, and psychological research in this sub-field reflects the diversity
of meanings associated with the concept of 'em otion' itself. Im portant variations are
equally evident in how social scientists have approached the connection between
emotions and health. The variation occurs along different lines, and reflects different
ways of relating to the work of clinical and experimental disciplines. Some social
science research offers commentary, critique, and contextualization of medical con
structs (of the role of emotion in health and disease), in the interest of facilitating an
understanding of the norms and values these im plicitly reflect and promote (e.g.
Riska 2000; Greco 2001). Additionally, research by social scientists may seek
to complement, and eventually feed into, clinical expertise (e.g. W ilce 20 0 3). The
'c ritic a l' and the 'com plem entary' orientations need not be m utually exclusive, and
in many instances researchers in this field have a background in both social and
clinical disciplines (e.g. Kleinm an and Good 1985; Kleinman 1989). A further way in
which social scientists have related to medical research on emotions and health is
as a resource for the purpose of developing social theory, in the effort of revising
2 0 6 E MB ODYI NG A FF ECT
assumptions concerning, for example, what a 'b o d y ' is (e.g. W ilson 2004; Lyon 1993).
Selecting extracts for this section has been especially difficu lt in light of the richness,
and indeed diversity, of m aterials available. W hile we have tried to provide a sense of
this diversity through our selections, these should invite readers to explore further
afield.
The first extract in this section is from a much cited a rticle by Peter E. Freund,
arguing for the relevance of an existential-phenom enological perspective in under
standing the link between emotions and health. This a rticle is a relatively early
example of the 'affective turn', in the sense that it takes issue with the dichotomy
opposing positivism and (social) constructionism as the only epistem ological alterna
tives. Freund argues that sociologists of health and illness have either accepted a
biom edical/m echanistic view of bodies, or treated biological and m aterial processes
as irrelevant - focusing instead on the study of medical knowledge (or ideas about
bodies). The sociology of emotion, on the other hand, has been dominated by a 'pure'
constructionism resulting in a very disembodied view of human emotions. Freund
is also critica l of so-called biopsychosocial approaches, in that they 'present very
m echanistic . . . and . . . static views of mind, body and society', rather than offering
'textured descriptions of embodied subjectivity and the part played by the whole living
body interacting in p a rticu la r social networks'. In the biopsychosocial literature,
attention to the body is characterized by an 'alm ost exclusive focus on neuro-
hormonal activity', at the expense of other aspects of bodilyness, such as movement
and facia l expression (1990: 45 5 ). Against this background, Freund proceeds in
this extract to outline some general features of what he calls the 'expressive body'.
He defines a new agenda for the sociological study of distressful feelings, society,
and health, focusing on key concepts such as those of 'dram aturgical stress' and
'em otional false consciousness'.
Our next selection is from a text by A lan Radley, a pioneer in the study of
biographical, narrative and cultural aspects of the illness experience. Radley's text is
included here as an example of a now vast body of literature in medical humanities.
Already incorporated as an aspect of medical training in many programmes across
the US, the U K and Australia, research in this area, broadly speaking, is intended
to complement biomedical 'objectivism ' through the interpretive analysis of the
experience of suffering. Arguably, a longer-term am bition of the field as a whole is
to contribute towards a tranform ation of medical culture and practice, towards a
greater ability to address the emotional components of health and disease processes.
The extract included here explores the affective dynamics im plicit in visual portrayals
of suffering. W hat is it about certain images of suffering that leads the viewer to
turn away? Or, conversely, what types of image succeed in reaching the viewer, and
with what consequences? In this extract, Radley argues that the process whereby
images of suffering achieve communication, overcoming horror and anxiety, binds the
observer and the bearer of suffering into a 'reciprocal loop' that, if com m unication is
successful, is transform ative for both. Radley's piece is useful in highlighting how
engagement with the affective dimensions of suffering always involves an ethical
dimension.
The extract from W ilce and Price is drawn from a volume, edited by Wilce,
entitled S o c ia l and C u ltu ra l Lives o f Immune Systems. In this book, medical
E M OTIO N S A N D H E AL T H 2 0 7
anthopologists engage in a rare form of dialogue with medical researchers in

psychoneuroimmunology ( P N I ), offering a form of critique that is designed to feed
into and improve (rather than deconstruct or contextualize) P N I hypotheses on the
role of emotions in health and illness. The chapter from which this extract is drawn
outlines an agenda for the research of 'lo cal biologies', based on the premise that
culturally variable images of bodies and healing are 'variably embodied within and
across societies'. Their argument builds on experimental research that has demon
strated the immune-boosting efficacy of guided imagery and/or verbal disclosure,
proposing that these interventions, and their effects, enact metaphors that are cu l
tu rally specific. Contrasting examples are offered from a range of Asian contexts,
to suggest that psychoneuroimmunology cannot proceed on the assumption of a
'universal, preconceptual, precultural human body that responds in predictable ways
to the "sa m e " emotions, meta-emotions, and behaviors'.
Our next extract is from an a rticle entitled 'D isorders W ithout Borders? The
expanding scope of psychiatric practice', a text that N ikolas Rose originally presented
as the 18th Aubrey Lewis Lecture at the Institute of Psychiatry (K in g's College,
London). In this piece Rose examines a number of hypotheses that might account
for a seemingly uprecedented expansion in the prevalence of mental disorders (and
pa rticu la rly anxiety disorders, mood disorders, and impulse control disorders) in
European and US societies. In an adm irably synthetic presentation, Rose considers
first the notion that there is simply 'm ore' mental disorder around today than in
previous times; secondly, he considers the proposition that, through developments
in psychiatric expertise, we have become better at recognizing existing mental
disorder; thirdly, he examines the notion that the 'm oral entrepreneurship' of the
psychiatric profession may be the reason behind the perception of an increased rate
of mental disorder; next, he considers 'today's favourite cu lprit - " B ig P h a rm a "',
and the idea that in pursuing market share, profit and stakeholder value, the industry
may be distorting our perception and treatm ent of mental disorder; finally, Rose
presents the case that an increase in the rate of mental disorder may arise from the
fact that, in what he calls our 'A ge of Freedom', vague discontents that are inherent in
the human condition are being reshaped in a psychiatric form. This text is usefully
read alongside the one by De Swaan on agoraphobia (see section 1, above).
The final extract in this section, by Elizabeth W ilson, exemplifies one of the ways
in which engagement with the (natural) science of emotion can be productive of
innovation in social theory. W ilson argues that the anti-biologism that characterizes
most contem porary fem inist theory has resulted in a premature dismissal of every
thing 'b io lo g ica l' as individualizing and reductive. In contrast to this orientation,
W ilson proposes that 'effective p olitical engagement with the contem porary life
sciences requires ongoing intim acy with their data', and that such data holds the
potential for rethinking 'conventional models of biological substrate and psycho
logical m alady'. Focusing on the example of 'new generation' antidepressants (S S R Is
and SN RIs), she demonstrates how these drugs, contrary to the assumption that sees
them as targeting the brain as if in a vacuum, actually im plicate the whole body.
Fem inist historians and philosophers of the biosciences have critic a lly claim ed that
these sciences espouse and reinforce problem atic conceptual schemata, in so far as
they privilege the centre over the periphery, or draw radical distinctions between
2 0 8 E M B O D Y I N G A F F E C T
(a ctive) agents and (passive) vessels. If th is can be said of the n e u ro lo g ica l and
p h a rm a co lo g ica l sciences, w rite s W ilso n , 'it seems to be despite the d ata they are
generating, not because of th em '. In re la tio n to the brain, fo r exam ple, the d ata
suggest th a t th is organ 'is alw ays, n ecessarily im p lica ted in re la tio n s w ith other
organs and other extra -b o d ily system s'. W ils o n 's a n a ly sis m akes room fo r the possi
bility, ra re ly avowed o r explo red in the literature, th a t there m ay be su bstan tia l
areas of m e ta -th eo re tica l c o m p a tib ility between b io -m e d ica l research and
approach es tra d itio n a lly considered very d ista n t fro m it, such as psychoanalysis.
References
Anzieu, D. (19 8 9) The S kin Ego. New Haven, M A : Yale University Press.
Chiozza, L. A. (19 9 8) Hidden A ffe cts in S om atic Disorders. M adison, Connecticut: The
Psychosocial Press.
Evans, P., Hucklebridge, F. and Clow, A. (eds) (2 0 00 ) M ind, Im m unity and Health: the
science o f psychoneuroim m unology. London: Free Association Books.
Greco, M. (2 001) 'Inconspicuous anomalies: "a le xith ym ia " and ethical relations to
the self', Health, 6 (4): 4 7 1 -4 9 2 .
Kleinm an, A. and Good, B. (1 985) Culture and Depression: studies in the anthropology
and cro ss-cu ltu ra l psychiatry o f affect and disorder. Berkeley: University of
C alifo rnia Press.
Kleinm an, A. (1 989) The Illness N arratives: suffering, healing, and the human condition.
New York: Basic Books.
Lyon, M. (19 9 3) 'Psychoneuroim m unology: the problem of the situatedness of illness and
the conceptualization of healing', Culture, M edicin e and Psychiatry, 17 (1): 7 7 -9 7 .
Riska, E. (2000) 'The rise and fall of Type A man', S o c ia l Science and M edicine,
5 1 :1 6 6 5 - 7 4 .
Vedhara, K. and Irwin, M . (eds) (2 0 05 ) Human Psychoneuroim m unology. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
W ilce, J. M. (ed) (2003) S o c ia l and C u ltu ra l Lives o f Immune Systems. London:
Routledge.
W ilson, E. (2 004) Psychosom atic: fem inism and the n e uro log ical body. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press.
Chapter 25
Peter E. S. Freund
THE EXPRESSIVE BODY

C o m m o n g ro u n d f o r th e s o c io lo g y o f e m o t io n s a n d h e a lth a n d illn e s s
E m otion al m o d e s o f b ein g
[. . .] T r IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND that the ‘ sc h e m a ta ’ o r

‘c a t e g o r ie s ’ by w h ich w e ‘ u n c o n sc io u sly ’ m ak e se n se o f fe e lin g are n o t
sta tic e n titie s that sim p ly re sid e in m in d . T h e se m o d e s o f e x p e r ie n c in g fe e lin g
o r ig in a te in the b o d y ’ s e n c o u n te r w ith th e w o rld — in the sa m e w ay th at m u ch
c o g n itio n is an o u tc o m e o f th is p r o c e ss .
Jo h n so n (1 9 8 7 ) a r g u e s th at the b o d y is in the m in d an d that c o g n itio n a r ise s o u t
o f this b o d ily e x p e r ie n c e . W h ile it is th e str u c tu r e o r m e an in g o f fe e lin g th at c o m e
o u t of the re la tio n sh ip o f the a c to r w ith e x is te n c e , th e se m e an in g s and s tr u c tu r e s
arc n o t to b e seen as p r o c e s s e s o r e n titie s d iv o r c e d fro m b o d ily n e ss.
T h e m e an in g o r s tr u c tu r e s o f fe e lin g s o r ig in a te p rc -lin g u istic a lly , th o u g h late r
in life th ey arc re fin ed by sy m b o lic c o m m u n ic a tiv e a c tiv ity . A s Jo h n so n n o te s:
It is im p o r ta n t to se e th at w e are n o t c o n sid e rin g h ere and h o w w e

m ig h t talk a b o u t o u r e m o tio n s , n o r on ly h ow w e m ig h t conceptualise
o u r e m o tio n a l e x p e r ie n c e . W e are a lso d e sc rib in g the structure o f our
experience o f e m o tio n s.
( 1 9 8 7 :8 9 )
[. . .] T h e c c n tr a l n e rv o u s sy ste m in w hich su ch p a tte rn s arc e m b o d ie d in volve an

a ctin g b o d y and h ig h er co g n itiv e fu n c tio n s, th e lim b ic and o th e r c o m p o n e n ts o f
th e n e rv o u s sy ste m and ‘ m e c h a n ism s ’ that re g u la te m o v e m e n t. W e arc ab le lo
p e r c e iv e m e an in g th ro u gh a v a rie ty o f se n so ry m o d a litie s (in c lu d in g p r o p r io c e p
tio n ). In fo rm a tio n fro m o n e m o d a lity m ay at tim e s b e tra n sp o se d to a n o th e r on e
2 1 0 P E T E R E. S. F R E U N D
(D re y fu s 1 9 7 9 :2 4 9 ). T h u s w e have the p o ten tial lo ‘ s e e ’ vo ices and ‘ h e a r’ co lo u rs

(M erleau -P o n ty 1 9 6 2 ). [. . .]
T h e p ro b lem o f a pu re c o n stru c tio n ism (o r w hat Jo h n so n [1 9 8 7 ] w ou ld call
‘ id e a lism ’ ) o r po sitiv ism (wrhat he calls ‘ o b je c tiv ism ’ ) is that thcv ‘ both assu m e that
the o rgan ism and its en v iro n m en ts arc tw o w holly se p a ra te th in gs, and then ask how
the tw o are re la te d , and w hich one is re sp o n sib le to r the stru c tu re o f the w o r ld ’
(Joh n son 1 9 8 7 :2 0 7 ). In the ease o f c o n stru c tio n ism , it is d ise m b o d ied talk and
th ou gh t; in the ease of po sitiv ism it is a n e u ro p h y sio lo g ic al ‘ su b stra te ’ . T h u s the
qu estio n o f w hat c o n ie s first n c u ro h o rm o n al arou sal o r the e m o tio n al m ean in gs
that we c x p c r ic n c c in en v iro n m en ts is so m ew h at m islead in g (B u yten d iik
1 9 7 4 :1 7 3 ).
A u n iversal e x p e rie n c e that ac co m p an ie s e m b o d im e n t is a sen se o f co n ta in
m e n t. T h is e x p e rie n c e that o u r b o d ie s are th ree d im en sio n al co n ta in ers e m e rg e s
in o u r e n c o u n te rs w ith the e x te rn a l w o rld o f o b je c ts and p e rso n s w h o re sist u s, give
w ay, etc.
F rom the b egin n in g w e e x p e rie n c e c o n stan t ph ysical co n tain m en t in

o u r su rro u n d in g s (th ose thin gs that en velop u s). We m ove in and out
o f ro o m s, c lo th e s, vch iclcs and n u m e ro u s kin ds o f b o u n d e d sp a cc s. Wc
m an ip u late o b jc c ts, placin g th em in co n ta in ers. In cach o f th ese cases
th ere arc rep eatab le sp a tial-tem p o ra l organ isatio n s. In o th e r w o rd s,
th ese are typ ical sch em ata for physical c o n tain m en t.
(Jo h n so n 1 9 8 7 :2 1 )
t h us, m any o f o u r cogn itiv e sch em ata e m e rg e o u t ot bodily activities ot e n gagin g

the en v iro n m en t. Sim ilarly , o u r w ays o f ap p re h e n d in g fe elin g s, the b asis o f e m o
tio n , e m e rg e in e n c o u n te rs w ith o th e rs. O n e m igh t argu e that th ere are structural
iso m o rp h ism s on the level of m ean in g in o u r e x p e rie n c e o f the w orld o f physical
and social ‘ o b je c ts ’ (M cC a rth y 1 9 8 4 ).
Initially o u r e n co u n te rs w ith o th e rs co n sist o f n on -verbal g e stu re s, tou ch in g
and m irro rin g the o th e r ’s e x p re ssio n (ic e n gagin g in activities in w hich w e align
o u r rh yth m s w ith the b odily e x p re ssiv e n e ss o f o th e rs) (Joh n son 1 9 8 7 ; Levin 1 9 8 5 ).
O u r c x p c r ic n c c o f physical c o n tain m e n t leads us to d e v e lo p an ‘ in sid c -o u tsid c ’
orien tatio n (the d e g re e and quality o f this e x p e rie n c e w ill vary h istorically and
so cio cu ltu rally ) (E lias 1 9 7 8 ). So grad u ally o u r in teraction w ith o th e rs also lead s us
to d e v e lo p a sen se o f se lf and o f e m o tio n a l b o u n d a rie s that e m e rg e o u t o f o th e r s ’
re sp o n siv e n e ss o r n o n -re sp o n siv e n e ss. Such c x p c r ic n c c s fo rm the gro u n d o f ou r
sen se o f o n to lo g ical se c u rity o r in secu rity (L ain g 1 9 6 5 ; Levin 1 9 8 5 ). V arious fe e l
ings o f b od ily e m o tio n a l and spatial b o u n d e d n e ss arc the b asis o f such m e ta p h o rs as
‘ I feel v u ln e ra b le ’ , T feel su rro u n d e d by frie n d s’ , ‘ I’ m tou ch ed by y o u r e x p re ssio n
o f lo v e ’ , o r ‘ I feel sm o th e red by y o u r lo v e ’ . Feelin gs can b e d e sc rib e d in te r m s o f
the b o d y ’ s o rien tatio n in sp a ce , such as in the case o f e m o tio n a l b alan ce. ‘ I feel on
an even k e e l’ . [ . . .]
B u y tcn d ijk (1 9 5 0 ) su g g e sts a n u m b e r o f m o d e s o f feelin g ‘ p le a sa n t’ o r
‘ u n p le a sa n t’ . T h e se m o d e s arc the o u tc o m e o f d ifferen t o n go in g c o n d itio n s o f
e x iste n c e . M o d e s o f feelin g may be b roadly ch a ra cte rise d as the e x p e rie n c e
o f eith er o b stru c tio n s o r e x p a n sio n s in o n e ’ s e x iste n ce (in te rm s o f ac c e ss to the
T H E EX P R E SSI V E B 0 DY 211
ob jects o f ou r in tention). Being pleased includes being with som eb od y o r so m e

thing — a felt sense o f unity betw een se lf and other. It may be felt as a surging
outw ard o r m ovem ent outw ard o f o n e ’s existen ce and an expan sion o f sell. This
m ode may also be cxp c ric n c e d as a p ro cess o f assim ilating o b jccts outside of
oneself.
In con trast, fou r m o d es o f feeling unpleasant includc (1) bein g throw n back or
en coun terin g resistance in o n e ’ s cn cou n tcr w ith o th ers, (2 ) bein g su b du ed, (3)
bein g in jured, (4) losing a p a rt o f on eself, o r abandoning all o r a p art of oneself.
In effect, these arc different felt w ays o f feeling em pow ered or d isem pow ered.
Th ese feelings arc very m uch related to the conditions o f cxistcn cc cn coun tcrcd
through out o n e ’ s biograph y. ‘ E x te rn a l’ social structural facto rs such as o n e ’ s
position in differen t system s o f hierarchy o r various form s o f social con trol can
influence the con ditions o f o u r existen ce, how we respond and apprehend these
conditions and our sense o f em b odied self. T h ese con dition s can also affect our
physical functioning (Freund 1982).
Em bodied subjectivity and physiological functioning
[. . .] E m otion s are always in so m e ways em b od ied . It is one thing to argue that it is

not essential for an em otion to be accom pan ied by ‘fe lt’ psychophysical sensations
and quite another to argue that m o o d s and em otio n al states do not have bodily
accom p an im en ts (Buytendijk 1974: 188).
The body may e xp re ss em otio n s o r em otionality through n eu roh orm on al,
m usculo skeletal physiological changes o r through those asp ects o f bodilyness that
involve exch an ges o f nutrients and other substances with the e xtern al environm ent
(eg breath in g). A ltered n euro-h orm onal reactivity, an inability to return to a
state ol rest or eq uilibrium , m ight affect blood p ressu re, coron ary a rte rie s,
ch o lesterol levels and perhaps the im m une svstem . M u scular ten sion and postural
accom p an im en ts m ight facilitate o r aggravate o rth o p e d ic p rob lem s. A nxiety and
related irregu larities in p attern s o f respiration could am plify resp iratory p rob lem s.
A person may e x p re ss a sublim inal grasp o f the w orld as overpow erin g,

the se lf as inadequate before it, by assum in g a sto oped body postu re.
Years later the chronic back prob lem s that result com e before an o rth o
pedic su rgeon . A nother body takes up the classic p o st o f fight or flight
in a stressful officc situation . O v er tim e the internal h ypcrm obility
leads to gastritis, high b lood p ressu re, perhaps a h eart attack. The ovcr-
sccrction o f acid, the con stru ction o f an artery exh ibits the e x p re ssiv e
ness o f bodily m ovem en t no less than m otion s extern ally m anifested.
(Leder 1 9 8 4 :3 9 )
Many o f these paths fo r exp ression are being studied in b io-psych osocial research.
Yet even these ‘h olistic’ p ositivist approach es ‘find them selves leaping from one
level o f d iscou rse to another, describ in g the cortical-cpin cph rin c pathways al one
m o m en t, the n ext the beneficial effects o f spiritual b e lie f (L e d e r 1 9 8 4 :3 8 —39).
2 1 2 P ET ER E. S. F R E U N D
Since the body is a m eans o f e x p ressin g m eaning, including socio cultural

m ean in gs, it is not unrealistic to su pp ose that peop le m ight e x p re ss som atically the
con dition s of their existen ce. Pain, lo r instance, can e x p re ss a sense o f an existen ce
that w eighs heavily on one o r a sense o f pow erlessn ess. Kleinm an defines som atisa-
tion (the exp ressio n of painful existen ce som atically) as ‘the com m un ication o f
personal and in terp erson al p rob lem s in a physical idiom o f distress and a pattern
of behaviour that em ph asizes seeking m edical h elp ’ (1 9 8 8 :5 7 ). The fact that
som atisation is the b o d y ’s wav o f saving som eth in g about life d o e sn ’t m ean that
there aren ’ t m any w ays to say the sam e thing ‘physically’ . C ultural (as one o f m any)
factors can shape the language o f the b ody. A p ersp ective w hich argues that we can
som aticisc social-cm otion al cxistcn cc d o c s not n cccssarily lead to a specificity
theory o f psy ch o so m atics (eg A lexan der 1 9 5 0 ). Em otion al respo n ses to m aternal
rejection in early childhood will not necessarily be e xp re sse d as asthm a, and may
not be physically e xp re sse d at all. [. . .]
Social status, control and physiology
T h ere are no con dition s that universally and autom atically ‘elicit’ specific em otional
respo nses. Individuals respond to situations on the basis o f individual and cultural
appraisals o f ‘w hat is goin g o n ’ . T h ere are, however, a n um b er o f social structural
features that con tribu te to the likelihood that situations w ill evoke ‘ p leasan t’ or
‘ un pleasan t’ em otio n al m o d es o f being. O n e ’ s position in a system o f social
hierarchy and the activities involved in insuring social con trol are tw o features o f
social stru ctu re that influence feelings. T h ese featu res may influence o u r physiology
as well (Freund 198 2 ).
A nim al stud ies (and a few hum an on es) show an interplay betwreen social
stru ctu ral position and pattern s o f n euro-h orm on al reactivity o r levels ol n eu ro
tran sm itters such as seroton in (Freund 1988; K em p er 1987; M azur 1985; M adsen
1985; Sapolsky 198 2 ). A ‘top banana’ show s a different pattern o f reactin g to stress
than a low status anim al. ( . . . )
A study by M adsen (1 9 8 5 ) claim s to distinguish hum an ‘pow er se e k e rs’ (those
show ing Type A behaviour) from oth ers on the basis o f biochem ical m arkers
(serotonin levels). Yet, m o st stud ies are drawn from animal sub jects and involve
studying the activity o f one chem ical. In hum ans if there are biocultural correlates
o f status they probably involve co m p le x and m o re subtle balances betw-een a
n um ber o f n cu ro h orm on al activities that dynam ically interact with the in dividual’s
self-organisin g activities (F austo-Stcrlin g 1 9 8 5 :1 3 1 ). H ow ever, should these studies
have anything to say about hum ans, the im plication s w ould be that o n e ’ s position
in any system o f social hierarchy and the m anner in w hich social relationships are
m anaged both affect (and are affected by) biochem ical states and other asp ects o f
bodilyn ess. C ertainly such h ypoth eses are w ell w orth pursuing. [. . .]
A p e rso n ’s social position will determ in e the reso u rces he o r she has to protect
the boun daries o f their se lf and how they w ill com e to define them selves. [. . .)
The stru ctu re o f feelings is shaped by activities occu rrin g w ithin the con text
o f socially organised em otional ‘ sp a ce s’ . C o ffm an s’ use o f spatial m etaph ors to
describ e this space and the politics o f social com m un ication (1 9 5 9 ) are illustrative
T H E EX P R E SSI V E B 0 DY 213
o f one way lo conceive o f ihe topography o f extern al and subjective social

em otional space. D ram aturgical strategies o f im pression m anagem en t, the sending
o f w hat others eith er intentionally or unconsciously m ake visible to us, are p art o f
this topography that affects o u r con scious and un conscious subjective relationship
to sell and others. How: d ocs the display and con cealm en t from others (and Irom
on eself) o f em otio n s by acto rs and their use of dram aturgical space interact with
em otional m o d es o f bein g and psyche som a? [. . .]
D ram aturgical stress
Self-presentational and role playing activities and the em otion w ork that ac co m
panies th em , can, in and o f them selves, be stressful. If this stress is chron ic, it may,
for in stance, affect n euroh orm on al regulation (Freund 1982). I have called this kind
o f stress d ram aturgical stress (1 9 8 2 ). O n e ’ s social status affects the degree to w hich
one has status shields available to one to p ro te ct the terrain o f the s e lf (H och schild
198 3 ). Status shields p ro te c t us against attacks on our self-esteem . A lack o f status
shields is a structural sou rce o f not feeling em pow ered (Franks 198 9 ). T h ose who
lack such shields are relatively p ow erless against the resistan ces and in trusions o f
others and have a decreased capacity to resist. Status shields p ro te ct one against
an o th er’s aggression . T h e feelings o f a low er status p erso n are not accorded the
sam e w eight o r taken as seriously as those o f a higher status actor (Franks 1989) and
thus they lack the status shields to p rotcct them selves (H och schild 1 9 8 3 :1 7 4 ).
Having o n e ’ s feelings ignored or term e d as irrational is the analogue o f having
o n e ’s p ercep tion s invalidated (H och schild 1 9 8 3 :1 7 3 ). Both are m ore likely to be
exp erien ced by low er status p erso n s and to be inflicted by those in pow er. The
invalidation o f o n e ’ s leclin gs, however, may be m ore threatening than the invalida
tion o f p ercep tio n s, since feelings as a form of inform ation arc e x p erien ced as
the deeply authentic, existen tial ground o f w ho w e are. In gen eral, the threats to
on tological security arc gre ater for those in depen d en t, subordinate position s. The
lack o f reso u rces to p ro tcct o n e se lf or to legitim ate o n e se lf further co n tribu tes to
status-related in security. Less pow erful peop le face a structurally built-in handicap
in m anaging social and em otional inform ation and this handicap may con tribu te to
existential fear and anxiety.
Emotional false consciousness
The political use o f status shields has con sequen ces other than sim ply enhancing the
stress o f those w ho lack such shields. Such shields may be used by m ore pow erful
actors as a m eans o f social con trol in various situations. The absence o f shields
for low er status actors m eans that they b eco m e m ore vulnerable to bein g socially
redefin ed as the kind o f peop le those in pow er ex p e c t them to be. They b eco m e
m ore open to bein g ‘c o n stru c te d ’ as the kind o f em otio n al bein gs, for instance, who
ge t ‘w hat they d e se rv e ’ . Status shields o f the m ore pow erful may be used to shift
the blam e for the unpleasant em otionality exp erien ced by, for instance, a su b
ordinate away from them selves on to that less pow erful perso n . Fran ks’ pilot study
2 1 4 P E T E R E. S. F R E U N D
(1 9 8 9 ) o f b atte re d w om en illu strate s the w ays in w hich th ese w om en defined

situ ation s in such a w ay as to blam e th em selv es. To the e x te n t to w hich they have
in tern alised trad ition al g e n d e r e x p e c ta tio n s, they can be m ad e to feel that it is they
w ho have p rim ary re sp o n sib ility fo r w hat h ap p en ed and fo r co n tin u in g the
relation sh ip , in o r d e r to , fo r e x a m p le , k eep the fam ily togeth er. Frank (1 9 8 9 ) and
H o ch sch ild (1 9 8 3 ) thus su g g e st that a p e r s o n ’ s statu s in fluen ces how statu s shields
arc used to validate the m o re pow erfu l and invalidate su b o rd in a te a c to rs as w ell
as m u te th eir atte m p t to re sist. E g o ’ s invisibility to m o re p ow erfu l o th e rs m ean s
that alte r n eed n o t re co g n ise b o u n d a rie s an d, in fact, ego can b e m ad e to feel
re sp o n sib le fo r such tre atm e n t.
S e lf b lam e and in validation lead to d e p re ssio n and an xiety . B ccau sc o f the
g r e a te r ability o f th ose in p o w e r to defin e situ a tio n s, in clu d in g e m o tio n al o n e s,
d e p re ssio n and an xiety often c o m e to re p la c e an g e r in the e x p e rie n c e o f s u b
o rd in ate ac to rs. T h e se e m o tio n a l state s m ay , in tu rn , be ph ysically e x p re sse d in,
fo r in stan ce, se ro to n in levels. S e ro to n in , a n e u ro tra n sm itte r, along w ith such
su b stan ce s as m elaton in have b een im p licated in fo rm s o f d e p re ssio n (W u rtm an
and W u rtm an 1 9 8 9 ). I d o n o t in ten d to re d u ce d e p re ssio n as a feelin g to on e o r
m o re n e u ro tra n sm itte rs. R ath er I w an t to su g g e st a m o re lim ited b u t n o n eth eless
im p o rta n t ro le fo r b io c h e m istry in e m o tio n s. Is it p o ssib le that the physical a c c o m
pan im en ts o f re p ea te d e x p e r ie n c e s ol d e p re ssio n even tually acq u ire so m e d e g re e o f
‘ fu n c tio n al’ au ton om y ? [. . .]
D ram atu rg ica l stre ss is p a rticu larly inten se w hen there is a g re at discrep an cy
b etw een a stro n gly h eld sen se o f se lf that on e w ish es to e x p r e ss and the displays o f
s e lf that social relatio n sh ip s fo rc e on on e (F reu n d 1 9 8 2 ). E x tre m e d issociation
b e tw e en provok ed feelin gs and th eir e x p re ssio n arc su b je ctiv e p sy c h o so m atic
w ays o f co p in g w ith ten sio n s foun d in social relatio n sh ip s. W ork, fo r in stan ce, may
d em an d civility and often even ‘ sin c c r c ’ displays of frie n d lin e ss in the facc o f m o st
uncivil c o n d itio n s of e x p lo itatio n and in validation . O rg a n isa tio n al p re ssu re s on
w o rk e rs (e sp ecially o n es caugh t b etw een the d e m an d s from c u sto m e rs fo r c o u r te
ou s civility and the d e m a n d s to be n icc to a p re ssu rin g b o ss) m ay be d e alt w ith by
sp littin g e m o tio n al physical ap p e aran ce s and the e x p e rie n c e d stru c tu re o f feelin gs.
S o c io lo g ical m in o ritie s, such as w o m e n , b lack p e o p le , gays and o th e r m in o ritie s
(such as p e o p le w ith d isab ilitie s) m u st often facc situ atio n s in w hich they arc
ig n o re d , p atro n ised o r ab used but as a m a tte r o f survival o r b e ca u se o f their
so cialised g u ilt (o r fear) a b o u t display in g h ostility , display a ‘ p le a sa n t’ accep tab le
face. D o such c o n d itio n s e n g e n d e r d e p re ssio n (Z o la 1 9 8 2 ) even on ph ysical sy m p
to m s such as elevated b lo o d p re ssu re (H a rb u rg et a l 1 9 7 9 ; H a rb u rg et a l 1 9 7 3 )?
C o n te m p o ra ry fo rm s o f social co n tro l p la c c d e m an d s on an a c t o r ’ s ability
to m an age n o t only e m o tio n a l displays but in creasin gly th eir su b je ctiv ity as w ell
(S te arn s and S te arn s 1 9 8 6 ). Such e m o tio n w o rk in volves not only su rface acting
but w hat Ilo c h sch ild calls ‘d e e p a c tin g ’ . ‘ D e e p a c tin g ’ m ay b e c o m e a p a rt o f
o n e ’ s w o rk p lace skills. It m ay b e u se d to p rovid e a se rv ice to a clien t o r as a w ay o f
n avigatin g the e m o tio n a l w aters o f a tightly knit b u re a u c ratic str u c tu r e . Su b ord in ate
a c to rs m u st also m a ste r the skills o f an ticip atin g, via e m o tio n a l c u e s, the m ore
p ow erful a c t o r ’ s e m o tio n al d isp o sitio n . T h e re is evid en ce th at, in fact, lo w e r statu s
a c to rs b e co m e m o re ad ep t at such skills (F ran k s 1 9 8 9 ; H en ley 1 9 7 7 ) — perh aps
m akin g them m o re vu ln erab le to iden tifyin g w ith the o th e r (F ran k s 1 9 8 9 ).
T H E EX P R E SSI V E B 0 DY 2 1 5
E m o tio n al displays (a ‘ sin c e r e ’ sm ile ) may be the c o m m o d ity that the ac to r

p ro d u c e s as a se rv ice in the c o n te x t o f b ein g a w aiter, ste w ard e ss o r bank teller.
Such w o rk , it is im p o rta n t to e m p h asise , in volves the m an agem en t n ot only o f
physical displays but o f in tern al p sy ch o -p h y sical feelin gs. T h e se lf-reg u latio n o f
e m o tio n s is e x p r e sse d through the b od y and fu rth e r m o re this reg u latio n in turn
m ay affect o n e ’ s relation sh ip to o n e ’ s b o d y . H o ch sch ild sp e c u late s that the n eed to
re w o rk o n e ’ s v isceral re sp o n se s lead s on e to ‘ d isc o n n e c t’ o n e s e lf from em o tio n al
sign als. H o w is the stre ss o f e m o tio n w o rk so m a ticise d u n d e r in validatin g o r an gcr-
clicitin g situ ation s in w hich displays and su b jectiv ity m u st b e re w o rk e d ? T h e se kinds
o f q u e stio n s p rovid e in terestin g p o ssib le areas o f in vestigation fo r both a so cio lo gy
o f e m o tio n s as w ell as a so c io lo g y o f health . ( . . . )
R eferences
Alexander, F. (1 9 5 0 ) Psychosomatic Medicine. N ew York: W. W. N o rto n and C om pany,

Inc.
Buytendijk, F. J. (1 9 5 0 ) T h e ph en om en ological approach to the problem o f feelings
and em otio n s, in Feelings and Emotions: The Mooseheart Symposium in Cooperation
with the University o f Chicago, M artin C. R ey m ert, e d ., N ew York: M cG raw -H ill
C om pan y, Inc.: 127—141.
Buytendijk, F. J. (1 9 7 4 ) Prolegomena to an Anthropological Physiology, Pittsburgh:
D uquesnc U niversity Press.
D reyfus, H. L. (1 9 7 9 ) What Computers Can’t Do: The Limits o f Artificial Intelligence. N ew
York: H arper and R ow Publishers.
Elias, N. (1 9 7 8 ) The Civilizing Process, Volume I. N ew York: U rizcn Books.
Fausto-Stcrling, A. (1 9 8 5 ) Myths o f Gender, N ew York: Basic B ooks, Inc.
Franks, D. D. (1 9 8 9 ) Pow er and role taking: a social behavioralist’ s synthesis o f
K e m p e r’s pow er and status m o d el, in The Sociology-■ o f Emotions: Original Essays
and Research Papers, D. D. Franks and E. D. M cC arth y, (c d s.), G reen w ich ,
C on n ecticut: JA I P ress: 1 53—177.
Freund, P. E. S. (1 9 8 8 ) Bringing society into the body: understanding socialized human
nature, Theory and Society, 1 7 :8 3 9 —864.
Freund, P. E. S. (1 9 8 2 ) The Civilized Body: Social Domination, Control and Flealth.
Philadelphia, PA: Tem ple U niversity Press.
G offm an , E. (1 9 5 9 ) The Presentation o f Self in Everyday Life. G arden C ity, N ew Jersey :
D oubleday-Anchor.
H arburg. E ., B lakelock, E. FI. and R ocpcr, P. J. (1 9 7 9 ) Resentful and reflective
copin g w ith arbitrary authority and b lood p ressu re, Psychosomatic Medicine 4 1 ,
1 89 -2 0 2 .
H arburg, E. T ., H aunstcin, L ., Chare, C ., Schull, W. and Shork, M . (1 9 7 3 ) Socio-
ecological stress, supp ressed hostility, skin co lo r and black-w hite m ale blood
p ressu re: D etro it, Psychosomatic Medicine, 3 5 :2 7 6 .
H enley, N. M . (1 9 7 7 ) Body Politics. Englew ood Cliffs, N J: Prentice Hall.
H ochschild, A. (1 9 8 3 ) The Managed Heart: Commercialization o f Human Feeling. Berkeley:
Johnson, M . (1 9 8 7 ) The Body in the Mind. Chicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press.
K em per, T. D. (1 9 8 7 ) H ow many em otions are there? W edding the social and the
autonom ic com po n en ts, American Journal o f Sociology, 93, 263—289.
2 1 6 P E T E R E. S. F R E U N D
K leinm an, A. (1 9 8 8 ) The Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing and the Human Condition.
N ew York: Basic B ooks, Inc.
Laing, R. D. (1 9 6 5 ) The Divided Self. B altim ore, M I): Penguin B ooks, Inc.
Lcder, D. (1 9 8 4 ) M edicine and paradigm s o f em b odim en t, The Journal o f Medicine and
Philosophy, 9, 29—43.
Levin, D. M . (1 9 8 5 ) The Body Politics: political econom y and the human body, Human
Studies, 8 :2 3 5 - 2 7 8 .
M adsen , D. (1 9 8 5 ) A biochem ical p ro p erty relating to pow er seeking in hum ans,
American Political Science Review, 7 9 , 4 4 8 —457.
M azur, A. (1 9 8 5 ) A biosocial m odel o f status in facc to facc prim ate g ro u p s, Social
Forces, 6 4 , 3 7 7 - 4 0 2 .
M cC arth y, E. (1 9 8 4 ) Tow ards a sociology of the physical w orld: G eorge H erbert
M ead on physical ob jects, in Studies in Symbolic Interaction, N. K. Denzin (c d .),
G reenw ich , C T : JA I P ress: 105—121.
M erleau-Ponty, M . (1 9 6 2 ) Phenomenology o f Perception. N ew York: H um anities Press.
Sapolskv, R. M . (1 9 8 2 ) The endocrine stress-resp on se and social status in the w ild
b ab oon , Hormones and Behavior, 1 :2 7 9 —292.
Stearns, C . Z . and Stearn s, P. N. (1 9 8 6 ) Anqer: The struggle for Emotional Control in
America’s History. C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press.
W urtm an, R. J. and W urtm an , J. J. (1 9 8 9 ) C arbohydrates and d epression , Scientific
American, 260, 6 8 —7 5 .
Z ola, I. K. (1 9 8 2 ) Missing Pieces: A Chronicle o f Living with a Disability. Philadelphia:
Tem ple U niversity Press.
Chapter 26
Alan Radley
P O R T R A Y A L S OF S U F F E R I N G
On lo o k in g away, lo o k in g at, and the co m p re h e n sio n o f illn e ss exp erien ce
Pain, horror and looking away
I
N ORDER TO D EA L WITH the question o f w hat pictu res o f illness or
suffering portray , it is n ecessary to ask about w hat they do not depict and what
peop le avoid look in g at. T h ese tw o issues are closely related. Im ages o f w oun ds, the
ravages of disease and the effects o f radical surgical treatm en t are e xam p le s o f these
exclusion ary features. They con stitu te, in so m e sen se, the stigm a of disease that
m ark o u t sufferers as different. W hat those w ho have suffered bodily trau m a do not
wish to show and w hat other peop le do not w ish to sec coalesce in the fact that ill
peop le live silently w ith the effects o f serio u s disease. B efore w e can e xp lo re how
portravals o f illness m ight break this silen ce, it is n ecessary to exam in e w hat it is
that peop le arc frightened o f in depictions o f the diseased or treated body. From
w hat do w e turn o u r ey es, and w hom do w e deny un derstan din g beyond the pity
that such pictu res m ight evoke? [. . .]
Th ere is a ph otograph o f D oroth ea Lynch (n ot rep rod u ced h ere), taken by her
colleague Eugene R ichards, show ing her lying in a hospital bed shortly after having
u ndergone a m astectom y . T his ph otograph is one o f a n um ber in a b o o k chronicling
her stay in hospital for treatm en t for b reast cancer (Lynch and R ich ards, 198 6 ).
She lies on her b ack , naked to the w aist, a d o c to r holding up her bandaged left
arm so that the sutu red w ound is open to view. T h ere are ban dages covering a
drainage tube in her side. W hat do wc see in this ph otograph ? A t oncc to o m uch
and too little. By too m uch 1 m ean that wc sec, in a literal sen se, the body
uncovered and the body d e fo rm e d — a bare breast and the gash w here a breast once
w as. This is a difficult pictu re lo look at, and one that probably many w ould be
pleased to cover by the turn o f the page. It is not h orrific by som e stan dards, and
2 1 8 ALAN RA D L E Y
yet the A m erican C an cer Society refused lo give such im ages to Lynch when
she con tacted them follow ing her diagnosis because ‘ book s w ith pictu res o f cancer
treatm en ts are n ’t con sidered suitable fo r non-m edical p e o p le ’ (Lynch and R ichards,
1986: 16).
The ‘un suitability’ o f such pictu res — the fact that they arc rcstrictcd — also
gives them a fascination,’ so that one looks to sec,' to see m ore than one is norm allyJ
O
able, o r to sec behind. B ecau se o f this, and b ccau sc o f D oroth ea Lynch’s partlv
cloth ed state and forced passivity, that looking soon feels intrusive and violen t. It is
a kind o f looking w ith out understan ding that, in its frustration , draw s the ob se rv e r
again and again to see w hat is not norm ally show n. H ow ever, the violcn cc o f the
o b se rv e r’ s gaze p ro m o te s (is repaid w ith) a pow er in the im age so that it ‘calls t o ’
the eye. As F.lkins (1 9 9 6 ) puts it, in these cases ‘the ob ject stares b a c k ’ .
W hat happens when wre turn away from an exp licit im age o f this kind? In
turnin g away from the im age the ob se rv e r co m p letes in one p articu lar way
the act o f in terp retation , inasm uch as it is developed at all. W hen w e do this we
rem ove the depiction from ou r view so that w ith its rem oval the ‘difficulty’ o f its
appearan ce is su p p re ssed , if not entirely extin guish ed. In recogn izing this, w e are
also ack n ow ledging that the pain and the im agination involved are o u r ow n, that w e,
as o b se rv e rs, are caught up in the terrain that lies betw een the in expressibility o f
pain and what is there pictured for us. The problem o f the ph otograph o f D oroth ea
Lynch — as with any ph otograph — is that we arc used to reading these as if they
w ere direct qu o tes from reality. C learly, the ph otograph d epicts Lynch’s suffering,
and it w ould ap pear to be her pain that is at issue. And yet the fo rm o f this suffering
is not sim ply given in the p h otograph , is not there to be read out from its pattern in g
o f light and shade. The ‘u n m ed iatcd ’ form of the ph otograph with its stark p re se n
tation of the m undane w orld dep icts her pain at the site o f the surgical cutting o f
her body. And vet the w ound in itse lf is insufficient to explain the o b se rv e r’ s
reaction , b ecau sc it signifies (by the p resen ce of ‘the healthy b re ast’ ) the absence o f
the p art o f the body that w as. It is the presentational form o f the depiction that
evokes the horror, not m erely the revelation o f w hat is rem oved or d e fo rm e d . To
react to a ph otograph ‘ with h o rr o r’ is to respond not only to a visual im age, but to
reg ister in that denial the o th e r’s sufferin g in o n e ’ s bodily shudder. That shudder
can be seen as the reciprocatin g asp cct o f the dcpiction how ever unintended
that reveals the com plicity o f the o b server in the situation o f the sufferer. We do not
turn from the im age as such, but from the depiction o f that w'hich exem plifies
unbearable suffering. This poin ts up a m o d e o f representation that involves the
‘settin g fo rth ’ o f the su ffe rer’s situation. Such im ages do not ‘refer aw ay’ to their
significant ob ject (pain) but arc presentational in their standing as ex e m p lars o f
this con dition. (Ju st as one cannot [prim arily] substitu te the sem an tic content o f
the w ords ‘I love y o u ’ for the saying [w riting] o f the w o rd s, so the sam e is true
o f the exp ression o f suffering.)
W hy, though, should peop le turn away from the difficult ph otograph ? Put
sim ply, it is unbearable. H ow ever, from w hat we have just said, it is not the visual
im age that is unbearable, but the appreh ension o f suffering that is instantiated in the
ob se rv e r who lacks the im aginative fram ew ork w ithin which this pain can be given
form . The ph otograph ic depiction o f suffering stands as an exam ple o f pain silence,
in the sense that il is in articulate w ithout an im aginative fram ew ork to give il fo rm .
P OR TRAY AL S OF S U F F E R I N G 2 1 9
We m ight say, paradoxically, that such im ages evoke a silent scream in the observer,
fo r w hom this inarticulacy is m ade real. U nable to give form to the appreh en sion o f
sutiering, the ob se rv e r might have no reco u rse but to turn away from the im age.
And this often w orks precisely b ccausc the depiction o f a w oun d, un elaborated by
accom panying narrative o r oth er presentational form at, is trap ped by its in articu
lateness into the m om en t o l viewing. We look and are h orrified; w e turn away and
the im age, and the feeling, are gon e. This d o es n ot m ean that ph otograph ic im ages
arc altogeth er forgettab le. W hat is forgettab le is an im age that is prcscn tationally
in articulate, or one that through lack o f narrative com m en tary con dem n s it to the
condition o f b ein g an instance, loeked in tim e and spacc.
The idea o f givin g form to pain su ggests that, w henever this is achieved, then
the situation o f the o b se rv e r can be alleviated. We can then look with u n d erstan d
ing. Howrever, a caveat is in o rd e r here. For this p roposal is m isleading to the exten t
that it su ggests that fo rm lessn ess is the only prob lem . In fact, the presen tation o f the
unw anted in the gu ise o f the m undane (cloaked in ordinary ob jects) can actually
heighten the sen se o f h o rro r (R ad ley, 1 9 9 9 ). The allusive portrayal o f the unw anted
and the feared unknow n provides fo rm for the exp ression o f horror. In this
situation, the con ceptu al dim ension o f the portrayal also provides its tan gibility, its
exten siven ess out o f the m om en t, so that (w h eth er w’C wish it o r n ot) the sense o f
that h orror can be brought back lo us at another tim e. Wc can less easily turn away
from ideas ( ‘ in o u r h ead s’ ) than from physically ren dered im ages.
The issue o f what is bearable in ‘ difficult’ pictures o f illness is therefore m ore
than a question o f what is seen. T h e reaction to the pictu rin g o f pain o r to d is
figurem ent associated with surgical treatm en t is not com prehen sible as a visual
issu e, fo r the sim ple reason that the p ow ers o f h orror invoke the absen t, the unseen.
W hat the o b se rv e r turns away from is the visual im age, but d o es so in the cause
o f tu rn in g off the fo rm less lears and anxiety that the im age open s up. T h e lack ol
m ediation — the cultural fram ew orks o f co n stru ction — that allow the ob se rv e r to
establish a coh erent subjectivity arc m issing. T h ese fram ew orks enable the im ag e ’ s
m eaning and the o b se rv e r’s p ercep tion through the rep ression o f d esires and fears,
which w ould oth erw ise prevent any ‘co m fo rtab le view in g’ taking placc.
‘ D ifficu lt’ im ages rem ain so, as one retu rn s again to look at th em , if they arc
deprived o f fram ew orks that w ould enable the view er to fashion a position with
re sp e c t to them . This need not be a facile or com fortab le positio n , b ut one that the
a r tist/a u th o r m ight have fab ricated. In the case o f D oroth ea Lynch’ s treatm en t for
b reast cancer, her p artn er Eugene R ichards (h im self a profession al p h otograph er)
presen ts this photo-essay in the c o n tcx t o f Lynch’ s own diary. This m eans that the
ph otograph s stand both as w orks in them selves and as illustrations o f the te x t which
re fe rs to them . The narration around and w ith re sp e ct to the im ages releases cach
instan ce, each painful m o m en t, from its tim e and space as it enables the v ie w e r/
read er to establish a position tow ard Lynch’s illness exp erien ce. As we understan d
w here, how and why things happen in her treatm en t — and in her actions — so the
im age o f the m astectom y scar b e co m e s bearable. That is, it b e co m e s bearable for us
insofar as we arc able to com prehen d how she bore il.
All this g o es to show that pictu rin g sufferin g is m ore than a m atter o f visual
depiction , m ore than resem blan ce and revelation. W hat is at issue is the possibility
o f the ob se rv e r sustaining a look , a look that is not overw h elm ed by the stare o f the
ob ject p ortray ed. This stare is the pow er o f the im age lo overw h elm , lo suffuse
the o b se rv e r w ith pity, h orror or revulsion. How the look o f the o b se rv e r m ight be
sustained is a question o ( re presenting the suffering o f the ill p e rso n , allow ing pain to
be given expressive lorm and thereby enabling the o b se rv e r to recip ro catc in
the establish m en t o f a com passio n ate un derstan din g of the sick. How this
re-presen tation is achieved is the su b ject o f the section to follow.
Picturing, possession and the transform ation o f suffering
In this scction I shall discuss tw o im ages o f individuals w ho have rccovcrcd from

cancer, b ut w hose b od ies b ear the m arks o f their surgical treatm en t. In doin g this, I
w ant to exam in e w hat it is that such im ages m ight achieve, w hat it is that they
com m un icate and how they do so. For if pictu res show ing m astectom y scars are
d e em ed h orrific, then how can pictu res w ith apparently sim ilar con ten t transcend
this ju d gem en t? [. . .]
The self-p o rtrait by Elissa H ugcn s A leshire is draw n from the collcction
Art.Rage. Us. published by the Breast C an cer Fund o f A m erica (1 9 9 8 ). It show s four
im ages o f her, three partial figures and on e, cen tre-fron t, a com plete figure. It is this
figure that com m an ds attention as it show s her naked to the w aist, the scar o f her
m issin g right breast alongside the ‘healthy’ left b reast. She looks straight ahead, into
the m irro r that (she tells us) she used in o rd er to crcate the painting. It is an open
look, w hat she term s in the accom panying co m m cn t ‘the first real look at m y self
after su rg e ry ’ . To the side and behind this central figure are three oth ers. They are
partly h idden, and in each case hide the m issing b reast. To the view er’ s left she is
show n w earing a blouse. To the righ t, and behind, w e sec only her facc and a bare
shoulder, her ch cst ob scu red by the tw o im ages in front. She holds her fingers to
her chin, giving the im pression ol a quizzical attitude. The fourth figure, to the
view er’ s right, is only h alf in the p ictu re, holding up her hand to cover the site o f
the m issin g right b reast. By this device w e arc shown three part-figu res w hose
anatom ical c o m p leten ess is preserved (bv o b scu ration ), and one w hole figure w ho
reveals that she is anatom ically in com plete. The total picturc w orks to su gg est the
achievem ent o f self-recognition against the b ack groun d o f fear o f revelation. In the
co u rse o f this p ortray al, the m astectom y scar so clearly depicted is given a different
co n te x t. It is re-figured along w ith the artist as sufferer. This d oes n ot m ean that its
original (on e m ight say, ab-original) pow er to evoke h o rro r is entirely rem oved.
(T hat this is not so can be dem on strated by show ing the pictu rc afresh to different
view ers.)
Rather, the sufferin g that is indicated by the w ound is given fo rm , rc-
contextualizin g the scar and giving it new' m eaning. The picture w as not created by
attem p tin g to displace attention from the scar, but in con trast by facing it and
refiguring it. As Elissa A leshire com m en ts:
A w eek before the su rgery , I had draw n a ‘b e fo re ’ pictu rc, and I p ro m

ised m y self I w ould do an ‘a fte r’ . It took about three m onths to w ork up
lo it. This painting w as the first real look at m y self after my su rg ery , and
at first I w as em b arrassed to even show anyone. But in fact, the p rocess
healed m e, siltin g in front o f a m irro r looking al an im age that scared

m e.
(B reast C an cer Fund, 1988: 101)
This com m en t show s the act o f painting to involve confrontation w ith the m a st
ectom y scar in o rd e r that it m ight be tran sfo rm ed . In o rd e r to look beyond the scar,
she had first to look at it. T his indicates that h orror is not dism issed in the cou rsc of
such portrayals but that its p ow ers arc dim inished in the co u rsc o f being given a
fo rm , a shape. H ow ever, painting is not an objectification o f h orror as such (fo r then
it could n ot ‘h eal’ ) but the projection o f the a r tist’s recovery o f h erse lf from the
grip o f illness and its te rro rs. W hat the im age achieves using m ultiple figures is
a sense o f coh crcn cc for Flissa A lcshirc through an expressive portrayal o f that
recovery. The pictu re is an exem plification o f her position it stands forth as an
open ack n ow ledgem en t and acceptan ce o f w hat is - w hile also bein g an expression
o f qualities that are elusive to specification. This is a key feature o f all artistic w orks,
in that they sensuously relate asp ects o f exp erien ce by settin g forth p ro p e rtie s that
are m etaph orically p o ssessed (G o o d m an , 196 8 ). The idea o f m etaph orical p o sse s
sion refers here to the figurative projection o f a w orld (o f illness) o f w hich the
im age stands as if a fragm en t. As a fragm en t o f such a figurative w orld (w hich in
its assem blage o f feelings is as real as any literal dep iction ), the im age is b ounded by
a spacc-lim c o f e x p erien ce (look ing al the pictu re, painting the pictu rc) that sets il
o ff from the m undane w orld. This d ocs not imply a separation from the w orld o f
disease and su rgery , but the fabrication o f a way o f being in relation to things, so
that they are im bued with m eanings that previously did not belon g lo them .
Although it is the im age that m etaphorically p o sse sses the qualities o f a re co v e r

ing patient, it is the p erso n (or in this case the artist) w ho is credited with those
qualities. W hat co m e s to be possessed is possessed bv her, and is achieved in the act
of painting. Elissa A lcshire spells out this last point in her com m en t that ‘ the p roccss
healed m e ’ . ( . . . )
The im aged w orld o f recovery (o f illn ess-as-b orn e) is a fabricated on e, dealing
in m etap h ors, but it is n ot an ethereal on e, in the sense o f bein g w holly tran s
cendent. It is fabricated by m ean s o f paint, and by virtu e o f rem aining engaged with
the m undane w orld that our b od ies occupy. N o tran sform ation o f suffering could
be achieved by a portrayal that had wholly lost touch w ith the possibility of pain. To
portray a ‘w orld o f su ffcrin g -as-b o rn c’ it is necessary that the pictu rc rem ains an
exem p lar o f pain, that it con tinues to show forth those features (the m astectom y
scar) in the cou rse o f exp ressin g the self-possession referred to above. T his should
not be thought o f as the projection o f any ‘s e lf’ at all, but is an aesthetic ju dgem en t
based upon the fact that the painting (as o f Elissa A lcshirc) d ocs tw o things. It is
exp erien ced as a restoration o f coh eren ce, and as the expression o f feelings that
w ere previously inchoate. T his e xp erien ce is to be sought both in the act o f painting
(w hich ‘h eals’ ) and in the con tem plation o f the im age by others. Inasm uch as it is
seen as coh eren t, the im age is com preh en ded as a totality, and as such a fragm en t o f
the w orld to w hich it refers (i.e . it is a sam p le o f ‘ illn css-as-b o rn e’). The im age thus
stands both in the m undane w orld (o f paint, o f m edia, o f spaccs o f o b servation ) and
in the figurative w orld w hich il fabricates. And because the fabrication o f this w orld
requires w ork on the p art o f the artist, and the con tem plative effort on the part o f
the viewer, its expressive potential is realized as the achievem ent o f distance from
h orror and pain. That distan ce — w hich is com m on to all ascctic practice — is
created by the practices of objectification (the skills o f the artist) through w hich
pain and h orror can both be given com m unicative fo rm .
To help ad d ress this issue o f tran sform ation wre can exam in e anoth er artw ork ,
this tim e a ph otograph , taken by a third party (h e rse lf a can cer su rv iv or) for an
exhibition ‘I’m so lu ck y ’ (O g o n o w sk a-C o ate s and R o b e rtso n , 199 8 ). T his photo-
cxhibition w as o f canccr su rv iv ors and included this im age o f a man — Stefan
W ahrlich standing on a bcach near a lake against the b ack drop o f a m ountain
range. He faces dircctly to cam cra, w earin g only a pair o f sh o rts, arm s outstretch ed
and standing on one leg. The other leg is visible only as a stum p below his sh o rts,
w here it w as rem oved as treatm en t for cancer o f the bon e. In the exhibition this
im age wras displayed above a b rie f com m en tary explain in g the b ack groun d to his
illness and his reaction s to it.
Unlike the painting o f Elissa A lcshirc, Stefan W ahrlich’ s im age is different in
that its ph otograph ic form reveals this as a m om en t in tim e. A t one level, the im age
is a re co rd , an instance. And yet the pose is counterfactu al by virtue o f it both
revealing the absent leg and defying that absence. This is a pose that is m ore than an
alignm ent w ith w7hat G offm an (1 9 7 6 ) called ‘sch e d u le s’ for bein g pictu red in such
situations. Ph oto-sch edules for can ccr patients (especially with one leg am putated)
do not e x ist, so that the portrayal in this im age m ust m ake use of, in o rd e r to
transcen d, som e o f the conventions by w hich individuals m ight be pictu red standing
on a beach. In Stelan W ahrlich’s case, the im age conveys its m eaning through
this tran scen den ce, w herein the achievem ent o f balance, o f the sym m etry o f his
arm s, ovcrcom cs the literal instability that m ust follow from his having had a leg
am putated. In this picturc he d o c s not ju st pose for the cam cra, but asse rts his
position vis-a-vis the w orld and the c am e ra/o b se rv e r. T his im age to o is coh erent
and expressive, in that it exem plifies a w orld o f ‘ su fferin g-as-bo rn e’ alluded to by
qualities that it m etaph orically p o ssesses. It is these ch aracteristics that entitle this
ph otograph — along w ith Elissa A lesh ire’s self-p o rtrait — to be called w ork s, in that
they achieve their m eaning through figurative portray al, w hich is the condition for
any w ork to be deem ed ‘a rtistic ’ .
Scarry is helpful in defining such w ork and its artefacts as ‘n am es that are
given to phenom ena o f pain and the im agination as they begin to m ove from being
a self-con tained loop within the body to b eco m in g the equivalent loop now-
projected into the extern al w o rld ’ (S c a rry , 1985: 170). This m ean s that the
private agony o f suffering b e co m e s social and sharable, resulting in the possibility
o f a collective o u tcom e. Equally relevant to the argum en t here is her p roposal that
an artefact (e.g. a painting, a p h otograph ) ‘is a fragm en t o f w orld alte ratio n ’
(1 9 8 5 : 171). In the previous way that 1 have used the w o rd , the artefact is a
fragm en t o f the w orld rc-figu rcd , not m erely o f a m undane w orld that has u n d e r
go n e change.
I in troduce the con cept o f w ork here n ot only to identify once m ore the
on tological status o f im ages o f suffering, but also to underline that the fabrication
o f such im ages is an ach ievem ent (w e m ight call them ‘w orks o f illn ess’ ). It is in the
act o f making that the pictu rc o f ‘ su ffcrin g -as-b o rn c’ is given shape and fo rm . This is
m ore readily appreciated in re sp ect o f the painted p o rtrait, w here the laying on o f
paint and the con struction o f the im age take tim e and rely upon the a r tist’ s skill.
W hile the ph otograph er clearly uses her skill in the assem blage o f the pictured
scene, we m ight see less easily how the ph otograph objectifies in the sense o f a
p ro cess o f fabrication.
In o rd er to try to unravel this p ro b lem , wc need to see such w ork as involving
both artist and m o d e l, for it is in the fo rm o f the pose captured by the cam cra that
Stefan W ahrlich’ s w orld is to be appreh en ded. Instead o f seein g it as a ‘ m ere p o s e ’ ,
we should recogn ize its m im etic pow er as a kind o f static dance, in that the various
countervailing tensions are held in a dynam ic equilibrium in his balancing p osture.
C on sid ered as a (static) dance, w hat w as originally an inchoate response to disease

and its treatm en t is m ade visible; con sidered as the cap turin g o f that dance, the
ph otograph b eco m es the artefactu al stru ctu re of this com m un icable act. We can
understand Stefan W ahrlich’ s ‘d an cc’ as one that gives shape to his w orld o f
‘su fferin g-as-b o rn e’ , that says ‘this, precisely, this, is how it is’ . T h ere arc, th erefore,
tw o possib le levels o f tran sform ation , one con cern in g the bodily style in w hich the
p e r so n ’s illness w orld is m ade visible, and one w here this is given ob jective form in
the m aterial o f paint o r light-sensitive film . And b ecau se, as G oodm an (1 9 6 8 )
points o u t, expressive paintings deal not in shapes and co lo u rs but in sounds and
feelin gs, so the p o rtrait m akes som eth ing else tangible through the m edium o f
visual rep resen tation .
From h orror to com prehension
W hile there can be no gu aran tee that any given o b se rv e r w ill look in a co n tem p la
tive way at cith er o f the im ages discusscd in the previous section , their expressive
form provides the stru ctu re that m akes this possib le. A pprehension o f the o th e r’ s
w orld o f suffering ( ‘su fferin g -as-b o rn e’ ) is the result o f w ork by the ob server, who
m ust produce fo r h im self or h erse lf those stru ctu re s that enable them to touch what
the artist is able only to show. This is m ade difficult to the exten t that the ob se rv e r
may recoil w ith h o rro r from the sight o f disease and its radical treatm en t. C o m
prehension can only follow from the transccn den ce o f h orror, m ade possible by the
com m unicable tran sform ation o f pain as ‘sufferin g b o rn e ’ .
Portraits and ph otograph s o f suffering, con sidered as the objectification o f
ideas-w ith-feelin gs, are invested w ith the pow er to recreate in the o b se rv e r that
p rocess o f structuration . This ‘reciprocal lo o p ’ co m p le te s the act o f m aking, o f
extern alizin g sufferin g, on e that is im plicit in the act o f productio n . That is, the
com preh en sion of the su ffe rer’ s w orld is the logical con clusion (il that is not too
final a w ord) of the a r tist’s m o d e l’ s p ortray al. The question then is w hat form does
this act o f com prehen sion take? And by attem p tin g a description o f it, can we say
m ore ab out the form o f signification involved in such portrayals?
W hat the o b se rv e r com preh en ds when con tem p latin g the pictu rc is the illness
w orld o f the sufferer. O r rather, it is the world re-made by virtue o f the su ffe rer’s way
o f con fron ting the inevitability o f disease and its treatm en t. For that reason , it is
not pain o r an objectified ph enom enon that is grasp ed in these pictu res, but rather
the figuration o f the sufferer by virtue o f their role as au th ors o f their w orld. It is
suffering as an expressive form that is g rasp e d , as signified through the m etaph orical
p ossession o f qualities that the im age exem plifies. This is achieved in the o b se rv e r’s
act o f sense-m akin g, w hich is less a ‘reading o f the p ic tu re ’ than a w illingness to
engage their ab-original respo n se to disease to its various fo rm s o f pictorial re p re
sentation . For it is only by en gaging his or her fear and anxiety to the im agined
o b jects fashioned in the portrayal that the ob se rv e r can m ove from a position o f
h o rro r to one o f appreh ension . To com preh en d an oth er’ s sufferin g is not sim ply to
see it ‘ for what il is’ , but to be brought w ithin the relationship o f arlist-and-her-
w orld that the pictu re ex p re sse s. It is only in the grou n ds o f the o b se rv e r’ s fear,
anxiety and delight that such im ages achieve their poten tial. We are dealing here
then, with a form o f signification w here the m eaning ap pears elusive not because it
is vague, but because it cannot be d elim ited. T h e elusory asp ect o f o u r em b odim en t
as perso n s — w hich is the w id er aspect o f ou r ab original shudder in the lace o f
disease and death — is as n ecessary to explan ations of com preh en sion as it is to
explanation s of h orror (R ad ley , 1995). N o adequate reason can be loeated on the
canvas o r in the prin t fo r w hat wc see, b ccausc w hat we ‘ se e ’ is grou n d ed in our
activity as o b se rv e rs. The en gagem en t o f the o b se rv e r’ s fears, their tran sform ation
with resp ect to the figured w orld e xp re sse d bv the im age, is the n ecessary w ork
for con tem plation through w hich the reciprocatin g loop o f com prehension is
established. [. . .]
Rcfcrcnccs
Breast Cancer Fund (1998) Art.Rage.Us.: The An and Outrage of Breast Cancer. San
Francisco: Chronicle Books.
Elkins, J. (1996) The Object Stares Back: On the Nature of Seeing. San D iego, CA : H arcourt
Brace.
Goffm an, E. (1976) ‘ Gender A dvertisem ents’ , Studies in the Anthropology' o f Visual
Communication 3(2): 69—154.
G oodm an, N. (1968) Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-M errill.
Lynch, D. and E. Richards (1986) Exploding into Life. New York: Aperture Foundation/
Many Voices Press.
O gonow ska-Coates, H. and 1. R obertson (1 998) I Feel Lucky: Interviews and Photographs
Celebrating Cancer Survivors. Booklet to accompany photo exhibition ‘I Feel
Lucky’ , Palm erston N orth , New Zealand, February—March.
Radley, A. (1995) ‘The Elusory Body and Social C onstructionist T h eory’ , Body &_Society
1(2): 3 -2 3 .
Radley, A. (1 999) ‘The Aesthetics o f Illness: Narrative, Florror and the Sublim e’ ,
Sociology of Health and Illness 2 1: 7 78—96.
Scarry, E. (1 985) The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. New York:
O x ford University Press.
Chapter 27
James M. Wilce Jr and Laurie J. Price
M E T A P H O R S OUR B O D Y M I N D S
L I V E BY
C ulture, im ages, and im agination
I
MAGINE A VERY SICK PERSON. Im agin e h er u n d e r the care o f
so m e o n e w ho h elp s h er relax by su g g e stin g she en vision h e r se lf lying on a sunny
b each . P ictu re an o th er p e rso n su g g e stin g that she im ag in e h er T -c e lls killin g, doin g
b attle w ith , o r just go b b lin g up bad cells — g e rm s o r can ce r cells. We m igh t even
overh ear such a gu id e tellin g the patien t that if she d o e s so , it w ill help h er b ody to
fight oH h er illn ess. N ow im agin e a w om an in a less clinical se ttin g , say, a self-h elp
w o rk sh o p c e n te re d on in tensive p e rso n a l jou rn alin g . T h e w ork sh op le a d e rs tell the
w om an there is evid en ce su g g e stin g physical health b en efits c o m e to th ose w h o b reak
through inn er b lo c k s and m ove b eyon d silen t ru m in atio n on lo ss, stre ss, o r trau m a,
by b rin g in g th em selv es to w rite th eir m o st in tim ate feelin gs ab o u t the event.
M any re a d e rs w ill b e able to en vision such sc e n a rio s; so m e w ill have p a rtic i
pated in sim ilar on es. So, if w e now p ro p o se to define “c u ltu re s,” in p a r t, as aids to
the im ag in atio n , you m igh t a c c c p t this as tru e in several sen ses. Sh aring a p a rtic u la r
cu ltu re m e an s shared fam iliarity w ith a se t o f sc e n a rio s like th ose d e sc rib e d above.
It also m e an s that p a rtic ip a n ts in such even ts b rin g to them — a n d / o r ach icve w ithin
them — the im agin ation that the claim s o f c are g iv e rs and e x p e r ts (e.g . a b o u t im ag es
and th eir th e ra p e u tic effe cts) m ake sen se. Scien ce in volves the im ag in atio n , and the
hard scien ce and p o p u lar scie n ce invoked in the first p aragrap h involve p le n ty . But
all scien ce is cu ltu ral activity . It fe ed s u po n and n o u rish e s cu ltu ral im ag e s. Even
te x tb o o k s in im m u n o lo g y draw u po n im ag e s o f such ob viou sly so cio c u ltu ral
p h en o m en a as class stratification , n atio n -state s, and w ar (M artin 1 9 9 4 ). And scien ce
p ro d u c e s im ag es that e n te r the p o p u lar im agin ation . In the last several d e c ad e s,
through a tric k lin g dow n o f im m u n o lo g ical re se arc h , the A m eric an p u b lic has co m e
lo im agin e a ran ge o f d iv erse e le m e n ts — the skin, IgA , and C D - 4 s — as a single
sy ste m , the “ im m u n e sy ste m .”
M ET A P H 0 R S 0 U R BO D Y M I N D S LI V E B Y 2 2 7
C u ltu re s are n ot only aids to the im agin ation . We live by w hat w e im ag in e; this
m ust in clu de o u r m e ta p h o rs (L ak o ff an d Jo h n son 1 9 8 0 ). In this ch a p te r w e m ake
the even stro n g e r claim that cu ltu re s help to shape actual b o d ie s, partly by m e an s of
w idely h eld m o d e ls, im ag e s, and m e ta p h o rs. K irm a y cr has arg u e d (1 9 9 2 ) that
m e tap h o r n ot only arise s o u t o f e m b o d ie d e x p e rie n c e b u t, co n v e rse ly , b e co m e s
e m b o d ie d . T h u s he calls fo r an in vestigation o f “the p sy ch o p h y sio lo gy o f m e ta p h o r”
(3 3 6 ). M uch earlier, M o erm an (1 9 7 9 ) so u g h t in m e ta p h o r at least a partial e x p la n
ation fo r the efficacy o f sy m b o lic healing: “T h e co n stru c tio n o f h ealin g sy m b o ls is
h ealing.” T h is shapin g poten tial o f signs (im a g e s, m e ta p h o rs, sy m b o ls) involves
c ultu rally p a rtic u la r m u ltisto ry , reflexiv e, m etalevel p h en om en a e.g. feelin gs
ab o u t feelin gs (m c ta sc n tim c n t, m e ta -e m o tio n ; G o ttm an et al. 1 9 9 6 ), and im ag e s o f
how im ag e s w ork . Im agin e w e “ k n ew ” that gu id ed im ag e ry had high cu rative effi
cacy w ith can cer and had re d u ce d this “fin d in g” to the re la x in g effect o f the im ag e ,
w hich in tu rn w as due to its asso ciatio n w ith so u rce s o f rea ssu ran c e . T h is is to say
that the im age “re la x e s” p e o p le in p a rt b cca u sc o f a m eta-im agin atio n o f the efficacy
o f im ag e s and sy m b o ls (L e v i-S trau ss 1 9 6 3 ), the assu ran ce that c e rtain im ag e s o r
im agin ative acts c arrie d th e rap e u tic b en efit. W e p ro p o u n d ju st such a m o d e l o f
c u ltu re -a s-m u ltisto ry /m e ta le v e l p h e n o m e n o n , and thus e xp lain c u ltu re s’ ro le s in
m o b ilizin g im m u n e re sp o n se and healing. To do so , we draw on eth n o grap h ic as
w ell as e x p e rim e n ta l evid en ce.
[The] claim that im m u n e sy ste m s have cu ltu ral and social lives is an in feren ce
from o th e r s o rts o f e v id e n ce, too. N o on e w ho acc e p ts the n otio n o f the im m un e
sy stem d en ies that the life o f such sy ste m s is e m b e d d e d in the life o f h um an
p o p u latio n s. A t one level, o u r claim that hum an im m u n e sy ste m s (and psycho-
im m u n e sy ste m s) e x ist in relation to the e m p irica l and sy m b o lic life o f so c ie tie s is
fou n d ed on the m o st fu n dam en tal in sights of e p id e m io lo g y — that health and d isease
have social co n te x ts. T h e relation sh ip is n o t on e-w ay b u t m u tu al. Wc se e the im p act
o f im m un ityJ on social organ
O
ization w hen w c co n sid e r the d iso rd e r and cultu ral
tu rm o il cau se d by d e p o p u latin g p la g u e s, in clu din g th ose b ro u g h t on by colon ial
c o n tact. O n the o th e r h an d, the effects o f su b siste n ce and h ou sin g p a tte rn s on social
n e tw o rk s and thus on p a tte rn s o f d ise ase and im m u n ity arc w ell know n to e p id e m i
o lo g ists. P h y sio logical so c io lo g y (B arch as 1976) and an th ro p o lo gical field stu d ies
(P art II, this v o lu m e) have given us evid en ce that key im m u n e m e d iato rs in the
e n d o crin e sy stem m ay reflect social statu s and social e x p e rie n c e . B ut hum an
n e u ro im m u n o lo g ic al p ro c e ss m u st be m e d iate d by p sy ch o lo gy an d, th e re fo re , by
facto rs like cu ltu re that shape in dividual p sy c h o lo g y . M easu rab le im p acts o f id e o l
ogy and o th e r d im e n sio n s o f cu ltu ral life on im m u n e fu n ction are less w ell stu d ied
than the m o re p u rely so c io lo g ic al fac to rs - like the c o rre latio n b e tw e en high stre ss
and low so c io -c c o n o m ic statu s — in hum an e n d o c rin o lo g y . . . .
P o pu lar n otio n s o f the se lf and its b o u n d a rie s are n o t only sp e cific to cu ltu re s,
to political e c o n o m ie s, and to the so rts o f im m u n e scien ce g e n e ra te d th erein . [. . .]
T h ese c o n stru ctio n s o f se lf, e m o tio n , and e x p re ssiv ity m igh t also b e n on arb itrarily
related to m e asu rab le p ro c e sse s in p a rtic u la r b o d ie s in p a rtic u la r so cial fo rm a tio n s.
T h at en tails a p re ssin g re se arch ag e n d a, one foresh ad ow ed by F ran k c n b e rg ’ s (1 9 8 6 )
call for a re -v isio n in g o f sick n c ss as cu ltu ral p e rfo rm an c e (se e L o ck 1 9 9 3 : 1 4 2 ).
We w ould su g g e st a re co n sid e ra tio n o f health and healing, to o , as p e rfo rm a n c e s
o f cu ltu ral p o te n tialitie s. C u ltu re — social e x p e rie n c e and e x p e c ta tio n s as w ell as
2 2 8 J A M E S M. WILCE JR AND LAURIE J. PRICE
b eliefs, im ages, m etaph ors, and m eta-im ages — is em b odied (C so rd as 1 9 9 0 , Farnell

1996).
O u r discussion to this point assu m es that cultu res have som e degree o f in te
gration . We assum e that m em b ers o f social gro u p s define them selves by a com m on
orien tation ol their actions to a cultu re, a sem i-sh arcd, sem i-in tegrated system o f
values and ideas. M oreover, evidence poin ts to the im p o rtan ce, to those social
a cto rs, o f feeling them selves to be in consonance w ith dom in ant cultural values and
n o rm s (D e ck e r et al., this v o lu m e). D re ssie r et al. (1 9 9 8 ) have found evidence o f
a correlation betw een feeling, on the one hand, that one is achieving a successful
lifestyle as it is defined locally, and o n e ’ s physical and m ental health on the other.
“W hen the individual is continuously chcckin g his o r her own cultural consonancc
and finds it w anting, it is likely to be a frustratin g and depressin g circum stan ce. This
is a p ro c e ss that is also exp ressed som atically” (D re ssie r et al. 1998: 4 4 0 ). [. . .]
M etaphor, m inds, and bodies
W hen John son (1 9 8 7 ) and Lakofif and K ovecses (1 9 8 7 ) say that w e live by certain
m etaph ors o f the b ody, they m ean that cultural m etap h ors reflect innate b iological,
em b odied exp erien ces. C on versely , som e psy ch o n eu roim m u n ologists — including
those w ho have en cou raged gu ided im agery to fight cancer (H all and O ’ Grady
1991) — go beyond this to hypothesize that im ages change som atic pro cesses. Wc
pro p o se a revision o f even that m o d e l, adding the proviso that culturally variable
im ages o f body and healing are variably em b odied within and across societies. What
we are proposin g is “local b io lo gies” (L o c k 1 998). [. . .]
The body is a rich m etaph or fo r society (Sch eper-H ugh es and L ock 1987).
Body m etaph ors — including those w hose surface stru ctu re refers to individual
som atic p ro ce ss — conventionally and m o st relevantly point to social processes.
C ogn itive linguists and an th ropo lo gists have carried out a large p ro p o rtio n of the
studies of cultural m etaph or to date (Lakofi and Johnson 1980). H ow ever,
e m b o d im en t th eorists w ho arc n ot so w ed to cogn itivist m o d els have con tribu ted
to the area as well (Farncll 1996; Lyon, this v olu m e). Wc do not need to p osit a
con scious cognitive processin g o f cultural sym bols through ritual, ctc. in o rd e r to
im agine that cultural m etaph ors are both enacted and enfleshed in individuals’
bodies. It may be m ore accurate to pictu re actors doin g w ith their b od ies things
that m ake sense in m etap h oric w ays b ecause o f a shared bodily gro u p o f action,
cogn ition , and cultu re (C so rd as 199 0 ). M etaphor thus b e co m e s an analytic tool - a
way for an th ropo lo gists to talk about iconicity betw een bodily p ro c e ss or action
on the one hand and cultural values on the other — rath er than a trop e to accuratcly
rep resen t the con sciousn ess o f actors.
W ritin g about traum a has a therapeutic efficacy that has been w ell d e m o n
strated. Pennebaker and oth ers (P ennebaker et al. 1989; E sterlin g et al. 1994; Petrie
et al. 1995) have studied the benefits o f w ritin g (in private journ al en tries) about
trau m atic exp e rie n ce . Such in terven tion s, and their effects, enact particular
cultural m etaph ors that research ers have not m ade explicit as such. W riting
e x e rcise s, and the con clusion s draw n from them , reflect a w id e-spread vision
W estern ers have o f how language (w ritten o r spoken ) com m un icates — a vision
focusing on referentiality and neutrality that w e can sum up with “the conduit
m etaph or.” T h e title o f a Pennebaker article, “ Putting stress into w o rd s,” m e ta
phorically takes stress as a fluid-like thing that can be put in w ords as container-like
things.
W ords achieve many things, including p e rfo rm in g and reshaping selves and
social realities, as Booth and D avison im ply (this v olu m e). Yet W estern folk
and philosophical im ages o f language tend to redu ce its function to referen ce to
p re-existin g o b jects, including em otio n s m etaph orized as (fluid) things. This
im agination o f com m unication also separates m essage form from m essage function,
treatin g form as a n eutral, n on -ob stru ctin g conduit through w hich sem antic
notions How unaffected (R eddy 1993). The m etaph or rep rodu ced in studies o f
trau m a-w ritin g by Pennebaker (this volum e) and colleagues (Booth and D avison,
this volum e) is that o f b odies as con tain ers and em otio n s as fluids to be pou red out
into neutrally referrin g w ords b efore their pressu res dam age the container. We
view language differently. W ords arc n ot neutral conduits for objcctifiable fluid-likc
feelings. Rather, w ords and g e stu res perform quite m agically; the p erform ative (as
o p p osed to m erely referen tial or reflective) powrer o f language is certainly central
to ritual o f all so rts, including healing ritual (Tam biah 1 9 7 9 ). It is precisely the
perform ative pow er o f w ords and other hum an signifying acts to unite b odies and
cultural im ages that m ust be studied in an investigation o f PN I-relcvant therapeutic
in terven tions across cultures.
P sy ch on eu roim m un ology , or PN I, has taken for gran ted a universal, precon-
ceptual, precu ltural hum an body that resp o n d s in predictable ways lo the “sam e”
em o tio n s, m eta-em o tio n s, and behaviors. Such behaviors include rep rocessin g
trau m a by w ritin g it, or participatin g in a gu ided im agery intervention fo r cancer
patients — on e centering on m ilitary im ages o f the im m un e sy stem . By co n trast, we
p ro p o se that sociocu ltu ral co n te xts that discou rage verbalizing of trau m a or paying
any attention at all to cancer (even through “positive” im agery ) m ight en gen der
local psy ch o im m u n ologies for w hich such acts have a neutral or even negative
im pact on im m une function.
“ Healthy” expressive “ release” o f negative affect: a cultural

m etaphor in com parative perspective
I.akoff and John son (1 9 8 0 ) pion eered a useful exam p le o f an approach to culturally
particu lar im ages and m etap h ors though their w ork generally fails to draw on
actual o ccu rren ces in natural d iscou rse. They e xp lo red in som e detail the “body as
con tain er” m etaph or com m on in E uropean languages. L ak off and K ovecses (1 9 8 7 )
link this m aster m etaph or w ith specific English m etaph ors fo r anger. The idiom s
“bu rstin g w ith an ger” and “barely containable rage” evoke the con tain er m etaphor,
w hile indirectly su p p o rtin g n otions that it is b e tter to “ let it o u t” in a con trolled
way. L ak off and K ovecses claim that the association o f an ger w ith m etaph ors o f
contained heat reflects e m b odied e xp erien ce and is thus likely to prove universal at
least in outline (ib id .: 2 2 Of). G iven a m o d e l that holds idiom s to be p art o f an
in tegrated sem antic netw ork (G o o d 1 9 7 7 ), we could take it as a w orking hypothesis
that anyone w ho ex p e rie n ce s an ger as threatening them w ith “bu rstin g” might
2 3 0 J A M E S M. WILCE JR AND LAURIE J. PRICE
exp e rie n ce , along with anger, an oth er tension over the risk such anger posed to
their “con tain er.” We can also hypothesize that those w ho “ live” such m etaph ors
m ight leel the release o f tension and anger to be health-inducing.
We arc not arguing that A m erican s share con scious n otions linking catharsis
with immune function p e r sc, though that m ight be tru e (M artin 1994). Rather, we
are assertin g tw o things: first, we claim that b ro ad er im ages that im plicitly link a
“con tain ed” em otion w ith risk , and expression w ith health are culturally salient.
Secon d, w e poin t to the likelihood that such trop es arc them selves em bodied in
a p ro cess w hereby cultural signs (m etap h o rs, id io m s, im ages) som eh ow join
with physiology (M o crm an 1979; D ow 1986; C so rd as 1988, 1990; C so rd as and
K lcinm an 1990; K irm avcr 1 9 9 2 ; and cf. Barchas 1976, Lyon 1993).
Re-evaluation C oun selin g (R C , also called “ C o-cou n selin g”) is a popular
m ovem ent in the U S based on the conviction that em otional discharge is essential
for psych ological and social w ell being. Founded in the 1960s, R C is now practiced
by many thousands o f N orth A m ericans (including co-auth or P rice), and has
organizations in many other locales around the w orld. A fter a m ultiw eek training
p ro g ram , peop le learn how to be both cou n selor and coun selee. They exchange
roles on a regu lar basis, typically halfway through a given session . In R C theory,
when peop le have distressin g ex p e rie n c e s, they need to discharge the distress with
the attention o f anoth er individual, som eon e w ho is listening carefully and su pp or-
tively, but not “telling them what to d o .” “ D isch arge” is signaled extern ally w hen the
person bein g coun seled begin s to cry o r sob, trem b le w ith cold p ersp iration , laugh
loudly, shout, talk in a fully engaged w ay, or m ove around vigorously. R C offers
a cultural m odel that explicitly m andates exp ressio n ot em o tio n s, and perio dic
catharsis, a m odel en d orsed by at least a portion ot the gen eral population in N orth
A m erica.
A n th ropo lo gists argue that such cultural m o d els need to be seen in b road,
global, com parative p ersp ectiv e. T h eoretical links betw een local m o d els o f sell and
em otion on the one hand and social stru ctu re on the other, w ere m ade bv M ichelle
R osaldo (1 9 8 4 ). A rguing that “cultural idiom s provide the im ages in te rm s o f which
our sub jectivities arc fo rm e d , and . . . these idiom s them selves arc socially ordered
and co n strain ed ,” R osaldo left us a stron g form o f the social con stru ction ist
argum en t in relation to m etap h ors o f em otio n and con tain m ent o r con trol. She
prop osed that the expression o f anger is view ed as destru ctive in “b rid e se rv ice ” or
hun ter-gatherer so cieties, w hereas in “m ore c o m p le x , tribal . . . ‘b rid ew ealth ’
g ro u p s . . . ‘an g e r’ held w ithin may w ork to other p e o p le ’s harm in hidden,
w itchlike w ays.” E xten din g this, it seem s clear that in the p ostin d ustrial W est — and
perhaps in classical G rcc cc , given A risto tle ’ s vision o f catharsis - it is the one with
“un resolved ” or “re p re ssed ” anger and g r ie f w ho feels at risk. T his an thropology o f
se lf m u st be taken into con sideration in any accoun t o f PNI — specifically, any
accoun t o f how- w ritin g ab out traum a m igh t enhance im m une function — that
presu m es to cover the diversity o f hum an societies.
M etap h ors and im ages that involve the activity o f im m une system s arc a
subset o f m etaph ors for the body and em otio n that have been well studied
(Sch cper-FIughcs and L ock 1987; D csjarlais 1 992). We focus on a particular
m etaph or that seem s lo have pow er over our con ception s and even our physiologies
(Pennebaker et al. 198 9 ): “ Rid the b o d y /c o n tain e r o f dangerous rep ressed e m o tio n ”
(L ak off and K ovecses 198 7 ). It exem plifies the sub set o f cultural m odels that link
body and em otio n vis-a-vis health and im m unity, and on another im plicit m e ta
im age, n am ely, that active, assertive im aging can en gen der positive em otio n s and
bodily states (K ie co lt-G lase r et al. 198 5 ). Both involve som eth in g like “cath arsis,”
an ancicnt notion in the W est (Sch cff 1979) w ith new m anifestations in pop ular
health and im m un e m etaph ors.
Hall and O ’ G rady, review in g exp erim en tal psychosocial in terven tions
designed to cnhancc im m u n ocom p ctcn cc, m ention a general benefit from re la x
ation o r sim ply from the relaxation dim ension o f a guided im agery ex e rcise , a
benefit m easurable in several clinical p op ulation s. T h e con tcn t o f the im agery also
counts for som ething. Som e im ages may have “n o xio u s” cffccts on som e p a rtic i
pan ts; but this is tru e , m ore gen erally, o f psychological in terven tion s in conditions
like cancer - they run the risk o f burden ing the patient with a sense o f re sp o n si
bility for a condition that is in fact a cultural m etaph or for that w hich is out o f
con trol (Balshcm 1 9 9 1 ). Hall and O ’ G rady cite such potential noxious co n
sequen ces as the induction o f a sense o f b u rden som e responsibility for the disease
or healing (cf. Son tag 1 9 7 8 ). Particu lar individuals may resist particular im ages,
recoiling at the aggressiven ess o f im agining “the se lf’ s” cells killing “ oth er” cells.
O ne C ath olic p riest in a study o f the effects o f im agery in can ccr treatm en t su b
stituted a w eed-pullin g im age for it (H all and O ’ Grady 1 9 9 1 ). T h e poten tial for
peop le to gen erate any such im ages arises in the p o st-1 9 7 0 s’ sociocultural
environm ent in w hich the notion o f an “ im m une system" p er se has gelled and has
captured the p op u lar im agination (M artin 1 99 4 ). M oreover, the poten tial for
em bodying the very im ages that im m une sciences present us (as they trickle dow n
through National Geographic and Time (H araw ay 1993; M artin 1994) — including the
com m only m ilitaristic on es — is real (N ap ier 1996: 3 3 5 f).
T h e body and em otio n s provide am ple su b jects and ob jects for cultu re-specific
tropin g o r im age-building. . . . Such tro p es or im ages arc often invented and p ro p a
gated through public d iscou rse. W hatever else they m ight b e, scientific discussion s
o f “ e m o tio n s” arc also d isc o u rse s, and thus cultural p rod u cts. T h e e x p e rie n ce o f an
em otion is not prccu ltu ral, not ultim ately separable from cultural disco u rses about
it, including social evaluations o f the em otion (R oscm an et al. 1995). And the
expression o f em otion cannot be u n derstood ap art from the h istories o f resp o n se to it
predictable and therefore exp ected verbal and gestural resp o n ses to equally
stereo ty p ed verbal and nonverbal expression s. [. . .]
Disharm ony, distress, and coping: Western and Asian m odels
L itera ry sources o f Western m e ta-im agery o f coping
If o u r read ers share a sense that it is a go o d thing to cry o r to tell o n e ’s w oes, the
notion m ight w ell be traced back to Poetics, in w hich A ristotle m eta-im agines
enacted im ages o f tragedy exercisin g a purifying or cathartic effect on the audience.
Sch eff (1 9 7 9 ) links A risto tle ’s reflections on dram a w ith psych oth erapeu tic theories
o f “em otion w o rk .” The historiography o f m ore reccn t W estern cultural th eories o f
em otional im agery and the m eta-im age o f therapeutic rc -cx p c ricn c c o r expression
2 3 2 J A M E S M. W I L C E JR AND L A U R I E J. PRICE
m u st in clu de the w ork o f Sh ak esp eare. S o m e p sy ch o lo gical an th ro p o lo g ists reg ard

him as a so u rce o f insight into “ u n iv ersal” h um an n ature and e m o tio n s. M o re
likely, his w o rk re so n a te s w ith us b ecau se he h elp ed to re p ro d u c e o r re p resen t
fu n d am en tal W estern cu ltu ral th em es. C o n sid e r S h ak e sp e a re ’ s T h irtieth So n n et:
W h en to the se ssio n s of sw eet silen t thought

O
I su m m o n up re m e m b ra n c e o f things p ast,
I sigh the lack o f m any a thing I sou gh t
A nd w ith old w o e s new w ail my d e ar tim e ’ s w aste :
T h en can I drow n an eve, u n u sed to flow
For p re c io u s frien d s hid in d e ath ’ s d a teless n igh t,
And w eep afresh lo v e ’ s lo n g -sin c e-c a n c e ll’ d w oe,
And m oan the e x p e n se o f m any a vanisht sight:
Then can I grieve at griev an ce s fo re g o n e ,
A nd heavily from w oe to w oe tell o ’ e r
The sad account o f fo rc -b c m o a n c d m o an ,
W h ich I new' pay as if n ot paid b e fo re .
But if the w hile I think on th ee, d e ar frien d
All lo sse s are re sto re d , and so rro w s en d.
(1 9 3 8 : 1 2 2 8 , em p h asis ad d e d )
T h e son n et e m b ra c e s the n eed to “g riev e al g rie v an c e s” — and not fo re g o o r re p re ss

g riev in g — and “heavily fro m w oe to w oe tell o ’ e r the sad accou n t o f fo re -b e m o an e d
m o a n s.” We find the sam e m e ta se n tim e n t in Alacbeth (IV, iii).
M acduff is finally to ld the truth ab o u t the m u rd e r o f his w ife and ch ildren .
M a lc o lm , stan d in g by, says:
M ercifu l heaven! —
W h at, m an! n e ’ e r p u ll y o u r hat u po n y o u r b ro w s;
Give sorrow words: the g r ie f that d o e s n o t speak
W h isp e rs the o ’ e r fraugh t h e a rt, and b id s it b reak .
(1 9 3 8 : 8 7 9 , em p h asis ad d e d )
Sh ak esp eare in h erited b u t, m o re salien tly , p assed on to co u n tless W estern

au d ien ces a cu ltu ral m e ta-im age o f cath artic d isc lo su re o f im ag e s and feelin gs
to o aw'ful to b e ar w ithin. H is p o e m s and his d ram a tic ch a ra cte rs co u n se l verbal
d isclo su re — givin g so rro w w o rd s. T h e im ag e s o f in tc rio rity (o n e ’ s in sid es as the
sc at o f fe elin g), o f h earts that can b reak u n less relieved o f e m o tio n o b je c ts /flu id s
over-filling th em , and o f n arrative as c a th a rsis/th e r a p y , c o m c dow n to us as p o w e r
ful cu ltu ral affirm ation s. Sh ak esp eare leaves m o st o f the re sp o n sib ility fo r cop in g
w ith the su ffe rer h im self. A s m uch as th ese m e ta se n tim e n ts stir u s, w e m ust
reco g n ize that they are n o t u n iversal. T h at is m ad e clear by c o n trastin g m eta-
scn tim c n ts from o th e r trad itio n s.
C oping with can cer: a J a p a n e s e oncology m a n u a l
C o n sid e r Ja p a n ese o n c o lo g ists, w h o se w ritin gs invoke id io m s o f con flict and

s u p p o rt in d e sc rib in g g e n tle d isc lo su re o f can ce r d iag n o se s. We W estern re a d e rs
m igh t skip to the end of the scrip t and p re su m e that the Ja p a n ese idiom parallels
A m erican o n c o lo g y ’s e x p e r im e n ts w ith g u id ed im ag e ry in w hich patien ts m ay be
le ft alone w ith their im ag in atio n s, but n ot left w ith o u t gu id an ce — m ay in fact b e
e n c o u ra g e d to u se ag g re ssiv e im ag e s. A m erican c an c e r p atie n ts arc to ld to re la x ,
turn inward, and draw on and enhance in n er stren gth by en vision in g th eir go o d cells
d efeatin g the invading can cc r cells (H all and O ’ G rad y 1 9 9 1 ). In co n trast, the
Ja p a n ese o n c o lo g is ts ’ /Manual o f Terminal Care f o r Cancer Patients g u id e s physicians
th us: “ [I]n form y ou r patients you are a co-fighter in this process . . . [Say ,] ‘ P rob ab ly ,
we have a lo n g term fig h t.’ ” A late r “ le sso n ” su g g e sts, “ A n o th er e x am p le o f
d e m o n stratin g em path y and b ein g a ‘ c o -fig h te r’ is to tou ch the ab d o m in al area,
p erh aps th us in dicatin g a v isceral co re , and ask ‘how is the common e n e m y ?’ . . . or
[su ggest] ‘ We deal w ith the en em y w ith d c lib c r a tc n c ss’ ” (citc d by G o o d et al. 1 9 9 4 :
8 5 9 , em p h asis ad d e d ; and sec G o o d et al. 1 9 9 3 ). W h ile A m erican rc sc a rc h c rs
re co g n ize the th e ra p e u tic value o f social su p p o rt, a gre at gap se p arate s those
Ja p a n ese m e ta -im ag e s o f jo in t social e ffo rt from the in d ividu alistic m e ta p h o rs
go v e rn in g the A m eric an m e ta c o m m u n icativ e p rac tic e o f gu id ed im ag e ry . P ron ou n s
help m ark the co n trast — Ja p a n ese physicians arc told to say “ w e” lo convey a subtly
different m ilitary m e ta p h o r su g g e stin g common e n gage m e n t in the stru g g le again st
cancer.
C osts a n d b en efits o f w ith h o ld in g w ords in Sou th A sia
T h e Ban gladesh i u se o f the m e ta p h o r “h oldin g so m e th in g in y o u r ab d o m e n ” invites

o u r atten tio n fo r its d e ce p tiv e ap p e aran ce to W e stern e rs. A vcrv situ ated e x am p le
arises from a m o o t, co u n try “c o u r t ,” o r c o n flict-re so lu tio n m e e tin g that W ilce
atten d ed and re co rd e d d u rin g his Bangladesh i fieldw ork (W ilce 1 9 9 6 ). As I (W ilc c)
listen ed to n e go tiatio n s that follow ed a violen t co n fro n tatio n n e e d in g re d re ss in my
field villag e, I sen sed the ten sio n s w ere still palp ab le and violen ce w as still p o ssib le.
A t one p o in t, my cu rio sity w as piq u ed w hen m y friend Jalu M iah gave his testim o n y
and the m e d ia to rs o f the co n fron tation re sp o n d e d : they fram ed his revelation as
so m e th in g that had e m e rg e d from his ab d o m en ! W h at Ja lu revealed w as that he had
b een th reaten ed w ith a gu n . M y m in d qu ite naturally — and m istaken ly — h eard his
testim o n y and the m e d ia to r ’ s rcfra m in g th e re o f in te rm s o f cath artic d isclo su re o f
his p e rso n al trau m a. M y m isim p rc ssio n aro se , in particu lar, from the q u estio n one
o f the m e d ia to rs asked Ja lu : “ H ow co u ld you have held the w o rd o f testim o n y in
y o u r pet (a b d o m e n ) so lon g?” B ut the South Asian e th n oth eory im p licit therein
m e tap h o rically casts the ab d o m en as a re p o sito ry fo r se c re ts. T h u s the ch airm an
ch ides the ag grie v e d Jalu for his tard in e ss in speaking. But the B an glad esh i b od y
m e ta p h o r is not a p arallel to o u r ow n eth n o th co ry o f e m o tio n w hich m ak es the
b od y a d a n g e ro u s p lace lo sto re an g e r o r g r ie f as reified c m o tio n -lh in g s. R ather,
the m e d iato r u p b raid ed Jalu fo r im p ed in g the “p h y siological p r o c e sse s” o f the body
p o litic by w ith h oldin g his testim o n y until that poin t. A l least from the p e rsp e ctiv e
o f th ose m ed iatin g the d isp u te , fo r Jalu to h old in his pet in fo rm atio n n ee d e d lo
“d ise n tan g le ” a prob lem (W a tso n -G e g eo and W h ite 1 9 9 2 ) w as a social offen se; Jalu
had b een p a rt o f the social p ro b lem rath er than co n trib u tin g to its social re so lu tio n .
T h is m e ta p h o r is n ot iso lated . L ocally , it ap p e a rs in B engali lite ra tu re , w h ere
w om en are so m e tim e s ch a ra c te riz ed as b ein g unable to sto re se c re ts in their pet. We
find a p arallel even m o re relevan t to the co n sid e ratio n o f e m o tio n and its sto rab ility
— though it c o m e s from the w este rn side of South A sia — in id io m s u sed by w om en
w ho have sp ok en w ith V ccna D as a b o u t b ein g v ictim s o f to rtu re and rap e du rin g
co m m u n a l vio le n ce in the Punjab. D o they tell the sto rie s again and again in an
atte m p t to clean se th e m se lv e s by d isc lo sin g o r verb ally “refin in g” th eir trau m atic
c x p c r ic n c c ? Q u ite the c o n trary . D as says the w om en co n sid e r m e m o r ie s o f rape a
kind o f “p o iso n o u s k n o w le d g e ” m e m o r ie s that dare n ot be re tra c ed “ |N ]o n c o f
the m e ta p h o rs used to d e sc rib e the se lf that had b e co m e the re p o sito ry o f p o iso n
ou s k n o w le d g e em ph asized the n eed to give e x p re ssio n to this hidden k n o w le d g e ”
(1 9 9 6 : 8 4 ). R ather, th ese w om en k eep the pain and its sto ry in side th eir ab d o m e n s,
h idin g the sto rie s as b ab ie s arc hidden in the w om b . T h e “re p re ssio n ” hardly su g
g e sts agen cy at all, let alo ne v irtu e . T h e P unjabi m e ta p h o r su g g e sts b oth . A gen cy is
su g g e ste d in tw o se n se s, first in te r m s o f the w o m e n ’ s ch o ice and v isceral stru g g le
to h old thin gs in side. T h en , ac c o rd in g to D as the ab d o m en is also m ad e to re p re se n t
a un iquely fem ale bodily p o w e r — the ability to tran sfo rm a g e rm in to som eth in g
safe o r even g o o d , so m eth in g such as o c c u rs in prcgn an cy (1 9 9 6 : 8 5 ). T h e p e r
sp ectiv e distilled in the m e ta p h o r o f th ese P unjabi w om en c o n trasts starkly w ith
p o st-F re u d ia n (but pre-F o u cald ian ) W estern sen sib ilities ab o u t re p re ssio n .
W h en w e c o m p a re South A sian ab d o m en m e ta p h o rs w ith W estern m e ta p h o rs
that involve sim ilar “h id in g” o f w o rd s “ in sid e ,” w e see d ifferen ces in the “t e x t ,”
“ u p sh o t,” o r id e o lo g ica l shading o f the m e ta p h o rs. T h e value p o la ritie s arc sw itch ed
w hen w e m ove from W estern tro p e s o f “g e ttin g it all o u t” to the P u njabi w o m e n ’ s
h ope to keep it “in” and tran sfo rm “ it.” Even w hen d isclo sin g w as v alo rized as it
w as in the co u n try c o u r t d isc o u rse re c o r d e d by W ilce , it w as fo r the sake o f the
health o f the b ody p o litic , n ot Ja lu ’ s b o d y . A d m itted ly , w e lack even e th n ograp h ic
evid en ce as to w h eth er the ph y sio lo g ical and im m u n o lo g ica l p r o c e sse s o f these
w om en reflect th eir sen se o f the p o sitiv ely tran sfo rm a tiv e p o ten tial o f h oldin g
s c c rc ts , o r w h eth er they w ould at least feel th em selv es to b e at risk if they b ro u g h t
th eir sc c rc ts o u t o f th eir ab d o m en s.
E viden ce o f that s o r t c o m e s from eth n o grap h ic w ork in In donesia.
S etre s, a b d o m en s, a n d sorcery in In d o n e sia
B e r m a n ’ s fieldw ork in Java (1 9 9 8 ) sh o w s howr m en and w om en e x c rc isc careful

c o n tro l, especially w hen sp eak in g Jav an ese, over how they e x p re ss e m o tio n . Javanese
use the te r m , setres, b o rro w e d from English (str e ss), to design ate a ph en o m en o n so
dread fu l that it is able to kill, at le ast in the case o f very y o u n g ch ild ren . P aren ts are,
o b v io u sly , m otiv ate d to p ro te c t th eir ch ildren from this th reat. T h u s, Javan ese and
A m erican s share the w ord “ s tr e s s ,” a b e lie f that it can d am ag e o n e ’ s h ealth , and a
co n ce rn to m an age it. T h e re the sim ilarity en ds. W h ere at least m id d le class
A m eric an s (se e K u ssero w 1 9 9 9 ) c n c o u ra g e th eir ch ild ren , as Sh ak esp eare w ro te , to
“g iv e so rro w w o r d s ,” Javanese p aren ts w ork hard to d e sen sitize ch ildren to sudden
ch an ges. T h at is, in stead o f train in g them to be aw are o f and e x p r e ss fe elin g s, they
train them early to m aintain poise and equan im ity, to rise above em otional lability
(B erm an 199 8 ).
For d ecad es, an th ropo lo gists con cern ed w ith cu ltu re ’ s role in relation to illness
and health have d escrib ed “culture-bound sy n d rom es” (Sim on s and H ughes 1 9 8 5 ), a
con cept useful in theorizing A m erican and Indonesian illness pattern s. M o st so-
called culture-boun d sy n d rom es — like amok and latah — p resen ted in the literature
lend them selves to psychological or behavioral rather than som atic in terp retation .
E xception al accounts includc an orexia n ervosa in the U S (Sw artz 1985) and
Balinese “pregnan cy with sto n e s.” W ikan (1 9 9 0 ) d cscrib cs the Balinese syndrom e
involving a bloating o f the abdom en with very hard lum ps. It is u n d ersto o d to be
causcd by sorccry and can lead to death. Key to un derstandin g it, however, is a set
o f im ages we could con sider m etap h oric if they w ere n ’t so real to the Balinese. The
first is a body-ideal-im age in which a flat stom ach rep resen ts discipline and self-
con trol, linchpins o f a Balinese value sy stem . The bloated sto m ach , by con trast, is
the very im age o f failure to live up to Balinese ideals o f hard w ork and sclf-dcnial
(W ikan 1990: 2 5 8 ). It is feared, not only because o f those m oral-aesth etic con n ota
tion s, but also because o f its in terp retab ilitv as a sign o f a so rc e r e r’s attack. That is,
the ab dom en b e co m e s the site in w hich Balinese m ight involuntarily be m ade to
em body status-conflict and social tensions as they boil over in that curse called
“pregnancy w ith sto n e s.” W ikan w rites:
If, as Hahn and Kleinm an [1983] asse rt, the m indful body [Scheper-
Flughes and L ock 1987] respo n d s to its biopsych osocial environm ent in
term s o f cultural expectation s and beliefs that facilitate or im pede
n oceb o [noxious beliefs] and placcbo effects, then pregnancy with
stones m ight be seen as peculiarly Balinese: a culturally con stru cted
exp ression o f p articu lar fears and despairs. It em b od ies basic Balinese
con cepts o f b eau ty, m orality , and in terp erson al evil. The physical
em b od im en ts o f fears w ork , to qu o te Hahn and K lcin m an , to retard
“ integrated biopsych ical p ro c e sse s, d em oralizin g, reducing immunological
competence and physiological activation” . . . C on versely , con tact w ith a
kalian [traditional healer] m ight activate h ope, and w ith it, the p e r so n ’s
internal th erapeutic system .
(W ikan 1990: 2 5 8 f, em phasis added)
W ik an ’s evidence that b odies take on local shapes reflecting local em otio n s points
to the link betw een ph ysiological (and (p sy ch o )im m u n c) processes and societies
that we arc claim ing is m ediated by cultural m etaph ors. [. . .]
Conclusion
A nth ropology can enhance u n derstandin gs o f im m une function to the e xten t that
it convinces various publics o f the relevance o f ethnography along writh other fo rm s
o f research . Together, the several fo rm s o f research w e have drawrn on help us
envision a cultural psy ch oim m un ology . They illum ine how variable are cultural
m od els o f self, illness, healing, and im m un ological function. They point to possible
e m b o d im e n ts o f th ese d iv erg en t m e ta p h o rs. We have argu ed fo r a d e e p cultu ral

co n so n an ce , a m o d e l that joins tw o seem in gly in co m p arab le s o rts o f findings. It
joins e th n ograp h ic acco u n ts o f cu ltu ral m e ta p h o rs and verb al im ag e s that body-
m in ds “ live bv” on the on e h an d, w ith e x p e rim e n ta l ev id en ce from the U S that
in dicates that in te rv en tio n s can teach patien ts a th e rap e u tic e m b o d im e n t o f im ag es
(even o f the c o n d u it m e ta p h o r). F u rth e r re se arch to find m e asu rab le im m u n o
lo gical re fle ctio n s o f cu ltu rally c o n stru c te d m e ta p h o rs of b o d y and e m o tio n is a
p ro je c t w orth pu rsu in g. A lth ough such re se arc h re m ain s to be d o n e , w e have put
fo rw ard a h yp oth esis that re fle cts and m o v e s b eyon d the e x p e rim e n tal eviden ce o f
P cn n cb ak cr and c o lle a g u e s, and the se t o f e th n ograp h ic ease stu d ie s w e rev iew ed .
T h at h yp oth esis is that acts (e.g . w ritin g , d isc lo sin g , o r hiding w o rd s in o n e ’ s
ab d o m en ) that are felt to be co n so n an t w ith d o m in an t values o f o n e ’ s cu ltu re are
stre ss-re d u c in g and thus b en eficial.
T h is h yp oth esis is a ste p to w ard a cu ltu ral im m u n o lo g y . A cu ltu ral m o d e l o f
(p sy c h o )im m u n o lo g y h elp s c o rr e c t im b alan ce s and could thus be p a rt o f clinical
in te rv en tio n s aim ed at en han cing h o p e. Such a m o d e l re sp o n d s critically to the
m e ta p h o ric al lin kin g (in the self-h elp lite ra tu re , fo r in stan ce) o f can ce r (o r illn ess in
ge n e ra l) w ith p e rso n a l failure (S o n tag 1 9 7 8 ; D iG ia c o m o 1 9 9 2 ; M artin 1 9 9 3 ), a link
that re p ro d u c e s W estern in dividualism and reifies agen cy to the p o in t o f blam in g
the victim fo r d ise ase . Yet, even critical m cd ical an th ro p o lo gy has the o p p o rtu n ity
to b u ild , with hope, a so rt o f m u ltisto ry cdificc on its ow n partly p h e n o m e n o lo gical
ro o ts. The first “sto ry to be b u ilt” is to d e m o n strate links b etw een b o d y , m in d ,
so c iety , and p o litical e con om y and h ealing in c u ltu ral specific w ays, w ith out
co llap sin g on e in to an o th er (b od y into so ciety , e tc .; C o n e and M a rtin , this v o lu m e).
But a se co n d sto ry can be ad d e d to this b u ild in g; a critical an th ro p o lo gy can also
be clinically relevan t in shapin g th e ra p e u tic p ra c tic e , e.g. g u id in g the train in g o f
ph ysician s w ho arc faccd w ith c h o iccs ab o u t m e ta p h o riz in g can ccr, A ID S, o r the
c o m m o n c o ld . T h e d ile m m a fo r such an a p p lie d /c r itic a l an th ro p o lo gy b e c o m e s
that o f su p p o rtin g p a tie n ts’ h o p e s w h ile avoiding an u n critical re p ro d u c tio n o f the
hope in technology w hich d efin es U S o n c o lo g y ’ s “d isc o u rse on h o p e ” (G o o d et al.
1 9 9 0 ). A PN I that takes cu ltu ral variab ility se rio u sly could n o t su ccu m b so to a
highly p a rtic u la r cu ltu ral m o d e l (h ope in te c h n o lo g y ). It is a m a tter o f reco g n izin g
the sen se in w hich self-h ealin g is both re sista n ce to and a reflection o f oth er
tec h n o lo g ie s o f the s e lf and health . [. . .]
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1 8 8 -2 2 2 .
Chapter 28
Elizabeth A. Wilson
T H E W O R K OF A NT I D E P R E S S A N T S
P re lim in a ry notes on how to b u ild an a llia n c e betw een fe m in is m and
p s y ch o p h a rm a co lo g y
O
N E O F T H E C E N T R A L D I F F I C U L T I E S in gen eratin g a useful
dialogue betw een fem inism and psych oph arm acology is the anti-
biologism o f co n tem p o rary fem inist theory. It has b eco m e axiom atic that eulture
rather than nature is the p ro p e r sphere for fem inist politics. This presu m ption
underpinned the success o f social con struction ism as the p rem ier m ode o f fem inist
analysis in the social sciences in the 1990s. Indeed, the turn against b iological
explanation w as so conceptually lucrative for fem inism that it now seem s a n o n
sense to think o f biology as a site o f tran sform ation or innovation (W ilson , 2 0 0 4 b ).
This schism betw een p olitics and biology rem ains a significant ob stacle lo r fem inist
w ork in the cu rren t psychocu ltural clim ate. W ithout con ceptu al in terest in how
biology invents, tran sfo rm s, crafts, re d istrib u te s, in corp o rates and bequeath s, fe m
inists w ill rem ain p e rp le xe d by the ch aracter o f p sych o-ph arm aceu tical events.
In this co m m en tary , I offer a prelim in ary analvsis o f how fem inism and
psych oph arm acology could be brough t into a m ore dynam ic and fruitful alliancc.
I w ill argue that close attention to p h arm acological data opens up new avenues for
analysing the em b odim en t o f m elancholy.
Pharm acokinetics
L et m e begin w ith a prosaic but im portan t datum about the new antidcprcssant
m edication s: they are all adm in istered o ra lly .1 That is, they are m anufactured in
tablet fo rm , and they are sw allow ed. W hile it is the case that m o st pharm aceuticals
are adm inistered orally, there is p articu lar significance in the oral adm in istration o f
an tidepressants: there is an intim ate connection betw een the gu t and depression ,
m aking interven tion via the gu t an especially felicitous m eans o f treatm ent
for depressed m ood (W ilson , 2 0 0 4 a). W hile conventional ncuroscicn tific and
T H E W 0 R K 0 F A NT ID E P RE S S A NT S 2 4 1
psy ch iatric te x ts often p o sit a d irect link from d ru g to b rain , clo se atten tio n to the
details o f d ru g a b so rp tio n , d istrib u tio n , m e ta b o lism and e x c re tio n (w hat is called
the d r u g ’ s p h arm ac o k in e tics) show s that the v iscera are also essen tial to how
d iso rd e rs ol m o o d b e co m e in stan tiated and how thcv can b e tre ate d . R ath er than
validatin g a sin gle, cen tral site o f d e te rm in atio n tor m o o d (the b ra in ), the p h a r m a
co k in e tics o f an tid e p re ssan t d ru g s shed light on how d e p re ssio n is d istrib u te d , in
both o rgan ic and p sy ch ic re g is te r s , all through the b o d y .
W h at arc the p h arm aco k in ctic tra je c to r ie s o f an an tid e p rcssan t? F o r anv orally
ad m in istered d r u g , the ga stro in te stin al (G I) tract is the site at w hich the d ru g is
ab so rb e d in to the b o d y , and GI d istre ss (n au sea, delayed g a stric e m p ty in g and
co n stip a tio n ) is a c o m m o n ly c x p c r ic n c c d ad verse cffcct. B ccau sc oral ad m in istra
tion o f d ru g s is so w id e sp re a d , m a n a g e m e n t o f the g u t ’s re sp o n se to d ru g s has
b e c o m e a cru cial p a rt o f p h arm ace u tical re se arc h . F o r e x a m p le , th ere are n u m e ro u s
tec h n o lo g ie s available for co n tro llin g w h ere in the G I tra c t d ru g s are re le ase d .
T ab lets can b e specially c oated so that they d o n ’ t d issolve in the sto m ach b u t w ill
dissolve in the in te stin e ; o r p ills can b e m an u factu re d to float on the g a stric ju ic e s,
thus e x ten d in g th eir tim e in the sto m ach (Jan tzen and R o b in so n , 2 0 0 1 ). In m o st
case s, the gu t itse lf is n o t the targ e t o f th e ra p e u tic actio n ; the d r u g is b e in g released
in to the b ody so m e distan ce from its in ten d ed site o f action (K a tzu n g , 2 0 0 1 ). T h e
pathw ays from the gu t to that ta rg e t site arc often c irc u ito u s, and it is these
pathw ays that have arre ste d my critical in terest.
A d ru g like an an tid e p re ssan t that is in ten ded for the cen tral n e rv o u s system
(C N S ) m u st first pass from the gu t lu m en into the b lo o d stre am . O n c e it has p assed
though the g u t m u c o sa , the d ru g is tra n sp o rte d via the p o rta l vein to the liver
w h ere e n zy m e s rem o ve a certain am o u n t o f the d ru g (this is called first-p ass
cle ara n c e ). F rom the liver, the re m ain in g p e rce n tag e o f the d ru g m oves into ge n e ral
(sy ste m ic ) circu lation in the b o d y , w h ere it is d istrib u te d in to the fluid in side and
b e tw e en the ce lls o f the b o d y ’ s tissu e s and o rgan s. T h e brain is targ e te d rap id ly , as
arc the liver, kidn eys and o th e r o rgan s that arc w ell su p p lied w ith b lo o d . E ven tually
(this can take an yw here from several m in u te s to several h o u rs) m u scle tissu e , the
rem ain in g v iscc ra, the skin and the b o d v ’ s fat w ill also b e infused w ith the d ru g
(W ilk in so n , 2 0 0 1 ) .’ T h e first thing to n o te, th en , is that the ph y siolog ical itin erary
o f an an tid cp rc ssan t takes in every organ o f the b o d y . M ight w e n o t w o n d e r ab ou t
an tid cp rc ssan t cffccts o f d ru g action at th ese o th e r sites?
T h e p a ssa g e o f a d ru g from sy ste m ic circulation in to the brain is also quite
in tricate. T h e brain is p ro te cted by a b a rrie r that p re v e n ts the tran sit o f large
m o le c u le s and p o ten tially to x ic so lu tes from the b lo o d into the brain itse lf (B e g ley ,
2 0 0 3 ). S e ro to n in , for e x a m p le , can n o t p ass the b lo o d -b rain b a rrie r (it is to o larg e ).
Even though th ere are sign ifican t re se rv o ir s o f se ro to n in in the re st o f the b o d y ,5 the
brain m u st syn th esize its ow n se ro to n in from oth er, sm alle r m o le c u le s that arc able
to c ro ss the b lo o d -b rain b arrie r. To p u t this in qu o tid ian fo rm : it isn ’ t p o ssib le to
in crease sero to n in levels in the brain sim ply by in gestin g m o re se ro to n in . O n e o f
the w ays in w hich the b lo o d -b rain b a rrie r fu n ction s is sim p ly o b str u c tiv e — the cells
that m ake up the wralls o f the b ra in ’ s c ap illarie s are so tightly p ack ed to g e th e r that
d ru g s are n ot able to p ass betwreen th ese cells in to brain tissu e , as they w o u ld in
oth e r p a rts o f the b od y (B e g ley , 2 0 0 3 ). P reven ted from p assin g between ce lls, d ru g s
m u st pass through the cc lls, and to do this they req u ire so m e assistan ce from a
2 4 2 E L I Z A B E T H A. W I LSO N
ch em ical tra n sp o rt sy ste m . O n e o f the m o st w id ely used m e th o d s fo r g e ttin g d ru g s

ac ro ss the b lo o d -b rain b a rrie r is to m ake them lip id -so lu b le — the m o re lipoph ilic a
d ru g is, the m o re readily it w ill c ro ss the b lo o d -b rain b a rrie r (W ilk in so n , 2 0 0 1 ).
SSR Is are sm all m o le c u le s that are lip o p h ilic, and thcv readilv p ass ac ro ss the blood-
brain b a r rie r (B ro sc n and R asm u sse n , 1 9 9 6 ).
O n c e inside the b rain , SSR Is (selectiv e sero to n in re u p ta k e in h ib itors) are
th ough t to in crease the am o u n t o f se ro to n in that is available fo r n e u ro tra n sm issio n
(bv inhibiting its rcu p ta k e in the sy n a p se ); and in turn this incrca.se in seroton in
is th ou gh t to elevate m o o d . It has been con ven tion al (in both b io p sy ch iatric te x ts
and the p olitical lite ra tu re s that ag itate again st th em ) to focu s on this p a rtic u la r
destin ation o f an a n tid cp rc ssan t— as though the c crcb ral sy napse w ere an an ti
d e p r e ssa n t’s natural o r m o st im p o rta n t co alface. M y in te re st has been d iv erted
e lsew h e re — to the m any b io lo g ic al sites and p ro c e sse s im p licated in the in gestion o f
an an tid e p re ssan t pill. It se e m s to m e that to o n arrow a fo cu s on the brain oc clu d e s
o th e r im p o rta n t even ts in an tid cp rc ssan t m e ta b o lism , m akin g it difficult to think
an ew ab o u t the n ature o f b o d y -m in d relation s.
Body an d brain
T h e re are tw o issu es I w ou ld like to draw o u t o f th ese data that m ay h elp in form

fem in ist th e o rie s o f b ody and m in d.
F irst, d ru g s w ork w ith the w hole b o d y . W h ile an tid e p rc ssan ts may be in ten ded
for the b rain , th eir th e ra p e u tic effects are gle an e d from a w id e variety o f re sp o n se s
in o th e r organ s. G iven that SSR Is and S N R Is (se ro to n in -n o re p h in e p h rin e reu p take
in h ib itors) are w idely d istrib u te d in the b od y by sy ste m ic circu lation and that they
w o rk effectively on sy n ap ses in the C N S , it w ou ld seem likely that thev are also
targ e tin g the sy n ap se s o f the n e rv e s in the pe rip h e ral n e rv o u s sy ste m , esp ecially the
gu t. Any p h arm ac cu tic a l alleviation ol dy sth y m ic sy m p to m a to lo g y , th en , can n o t be
attrib u te d solely to effects in c o rtic al and su b c o rtic a l stru c tu re s in the b rain , it m u st
also in clu dc the so o th in g and an im atin g effects on the v iscera (W ilso n , 2 0 0 4 a ,
2 0 0 4 b ). P h arm aco k in etic data su p p o rt m o d e ls o f the b o d v in w hich sim p le lin es o f
cau se and cffcct (d ru g to brain to m o o d ) are rc fra c tc d ; and th ese data arc
im m en sely valuable for fe m in ism , as it argu e s for m o re dy n am ic and e xpan sive
acc o u n ts o f the b o d y . C lo se o b se rv a tio n o f th ese data finds n o t b io lo gical d e t e r
m in ism b u t b io lo g ical o v e rd e te rm in ism .
Even though the v iscera are n ot m e n tio n e d as ta rg e t sites fo r SSR I action in
p sy c h ia tric o r p h arm ac o lo g ic al t e x ts , the effective p h arm acc u tica l tre atm e n t o f
d e p re ssio n re q u ire s e n g a g e m e n t w ith the organ ic p e rip h e ry as w ell as the brain .
Perh aps b e cau se the g u t is the delivery sy stem for th ese d r u g s, it has been thought
o f as sim ply a c o n d u it fo r d ru g action and not as a p a rtic ip a n t in the d r u g ’ s
th e rap e u tic effects. C o n c e p tu al sch e m ata that p riv ile g e the cen tre over the p e r
iph ery , o r that draw radical distin ction s b e tw e en (active) ag en ts and (p assiv e)
v essels have b een the targ e t o f o n go in g fem in ist in terv en tion (e .g ., K eller, 1 9 9 5 ). If
the n e u ro lo g ical and p h arm ac o lo g ic al scic n c cs have b een p a rticu larly forcefu l sites
for rein fo rcin g th ese p ro b lem atic c o n ce p tu al str u c tu r e s, it se e m s to be d e sp ite
the data they are g e n e ra tin g , n ot b e cau se o f th em . In d eed , the n e u ro lo g ic al and
T H E W 0 R K 0 F A N T I D E P R E S S A N T S 2 4 3
pharmacokinetic data on anti-depressants strongly indicate that the body as a

whole is implicated in depressive states. The viscera aren’t mere transfer stations
for agents that will have their effects elsewhere. Rather, the liver and the gut
provide the bioaffectivc tone of depressions: if your depressions are agitated, or
soporific, or angry, or anorectic that is due in no small part to the attitude of the
visceral organs. It appears that the co-assembly of these traits with cognitive and
ideational schemata (suicidality, hopelessness, guilt) is what generates a depressive
condition serious enough to warrant intervention and treatment.
O
The second issue I would like to consider in the pharmacokinctic data conccrns
the brain and its intcrfacc with cxtra-ccrcbral systems. Just how isolated and auto
cratic is the brain? Arc the biological bases of dysthymic states exclusively ccrcbral?
Neurological and pharmacological descriptions of the blood-brain barrier often
stress the sequestration of the brain: ‘a major function of the [blood-brain barrier] is
that of neuroprotection. Over a lifetime the CNS will be exposed to a wide range of
ncurotoxic metabolites and acquired xcnobiotics, which may cause cell damage and
death’ (Begley, 2003: 84). Notions of the brain as an autonomous, self-contained
organ are common enough in both the scientific and popular imaginary. However,
the pharmacological work on the blood-brain barrier seems less interested in the
defensive and segregating nature of the barrier, than in its function as a system
of transportation and communication with the outside. As wc follow these data, wc
find that the brain is always, necessarily implicated in relations with other organs
and other extra-bodily systems; the blood-brain barrier is one particularly intensive
site for such xenobiotic transmissions.
For example, the brain doesn’t manufacture serotonin internally and inde
pendently of the body. Rather, the synthesis of serotonin requires ongoing com-
mcrcc bctw'ccn the brain and the gut and the cultural milieu. The basic building
block of serotonin is tryptophan, an amino acid that is small enough to cross the
blood-brain barrier. Tryptophan is an essential amino acid, which means it cannot
be manufactured by the body— it must be supplied to the body as part of the diet.
Chocolate, bananas, milk, meat and fish arc all high in tryptophan. The production
of CNS serotonin is further complicated by the amount of carbohydrate that is
ingested in the diet. If the diet is heavy in carbohydrates (bread, cakc, icecream), the
body will producc insulin in order to control high blood sugar. The insulin will
remove most of the other amino acids from the blood, reducing competition at
the blood brain barrier, and allowing a disproportionate amount of tryptophan to
pass from the blood to the brain (Wurtman et al., 2003). This means that levels of
serotonin in the brain arc dependent on a number of cxtra-ccrcbral systems: for
example, enzymes in the liver, conditions in the gut lumen, and the psychocultural
milieu governing diet. No one of these systems entirely governs serotonin traffic.
Rather, serotonergic activity is an overdetermined network of relations among
organs, and among biological and cultural and psychological systems.
Any regulation of the serotonergic system— including the ingestion of SSRIs to
regulate mood— must grasp this network logic in order to be succcssful. A narrow
focus on the brain as the sole biological source of psychological malady will
obstruct the lines of conncction that tic organ to organ, and that underpin the
biological possibility of recovery. To paraphrase Winnicoll (1964)— there is no
such thing as a brain, there is always a brain and another system. My hypothesis is
2 4 4 E L I Z A B E T H A. W ILSO N
ih is: the b io lo gical d isin te gratio n o f m o o d is a b reak d ow n not o f the brain per se, or
o f the liver o r the g u t— it is a b reak d ow n o f the relatio n s am o n g o rgan s. T h e
p h arm aceu tical tre atm e n t o f d e p re ssio n has to be the m a n a g e m e n t— n ot of a place
o r a cen tre o r even a n e u ro lo g ic al path w ay— but of an organ ic cap acity to co n n ect.
W h en they w o rk , SSR Is re iterate the se ro to n e rg ic n e tw o rk s that trav erse the b ody
and rean im ate the n atural affinities a m o n g organ s. E ffectively ad m in istere d , SSR Is
can p ro m o te a p ro fo u n d , lo n g-lastin g, o rgan ic em path y.
B io lo gical p o litics
O f c o u r se , fem in ists have argu ed that p sy c h o p h a rm a ce u ticals are often n o t e ffe c t

ively ad m in istere d . T h e re is also e xten siv e d e b ate in the fem in ist and affiliated
lite ra tu re s ab o u t w h eth er a n tid e p re ssan ts, in particu lar, w o rk in the m an n er p r o
m o te d by p h arm ac cu tic a l m a n u fa c tu re rs (e.g. H caly, 2 0 0 4 ). T h ese critics ten d to
em p h asize the social m o tiv atio n s fo r k e e p in g w o m e n m c d ic a tc d ; they arc critical o f
the p ractic e s o f p h arm ace u tical co m p a n ies and the d o c to rs w h o c o llu d e w ith th em ,
and they rem ain d u b io u s ab ou t the efficacy o f p h arm ace u tical tre atm e n ts fo r c o n
dition s they d iag n o se as essen tially cu ltu ral in o rig in (e.g . G r ig g e rs , 1 9 9 7 ; Z ita,
1 9 9 8 ). In this sh o rt c o m m e n tary , I have taken a d ifferen t ap p ro ach to the n e x u s o f
fem in ism and p sy ch o p h a rm a cc u tic als— on e that is m o re directly en gaged w ith the
b io lo gical su b strata o f p sy ch o lo gical d ise q u ilib riu m . This o rie n tatio n is go v e rn e d
by my con viction that effective political e n g a g e m e n t w ith the c o n te m p o ra ry life
scien ces re q u ire s o n go in g in tim acy w ith th eir d ata. Il is my e x p e c tatio n that c lo se ,
co n cep tu ally rig o ro u s atten tio n to b io lo gical d etail w ill p ro c u re m o re dynam ic
m o d e ls o f d e p re ssio n than we have h ith erto su sp e c te d .
Notes
1 The new gen eration antideprcssants includc the selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSR Is) P ro zac/flu o xetin e, Z o lo ft/se rtra lin e , P axil/p aro xetin e,
C c lc x a /c ita lo p ra m , and L u vox/flu voxam in e. As w ell as the SSR Is there are new
‘atypical’ an tideprcssan ts that cam e onto the U S m arket around the sam e tim e:
Serzo n e/n efazo d o n e, E ffexor/ven lafax in e and Wei Ibutr in /b u p ro p io n . These
drugs are m o re h eterogen eous in their pharm acological action— they arc less
specific to the seroton in system and act on other n eurotran sm ittcr system s,
specifically nor-epincphrine (P otter and H ollister, 2 0 0 1 ). Thcv arc som etim es
called third generation , heterocyclic o r seroton in -norepin ephrine reuptake
inhibitors (SN R I) antidepressants. P ro zac/flu o xetin e is m anufactured in liquid
and oral form . The other SSR Is and the other atypical antidepressants are only
m anufactured in oral form (P otter and H ollister, 2 0 0 1 ). Som e o f the well-
established tricyclic an tidepressan ts (e.g. E lavil/am itrip ty line and Tofranil/
im ipram ine) can be adm inistered by injection: ‘ Intram uscular adm inistration
o f som e tricyclic antidepressants (notably am itriptyline and clom ipram ine
[Anafranil]) can be p erfo rm ed under special circum stan ces, particularly with
severely d ep ressed , an orexic patients w ho may refuse oral m edication o r E C T ’
(Baldessarini, 2 0 0 1 : 4 6 3 ).
T H E W 0 R K 0 F A N T I D E P R E S S A N T S 2 4 5
2 Each of the SSRI an tidcprcssan ts varies in term s o f how m uch o f the d ru g reaches
system ic circulation. This is called a d r u g ’s bioavailability. T h e bioavailability o f
P axil/p aro xetin e is around 50% , for exam ple, P rozac/flu oxetin e has a reasonably
high bioavailability (7 0 % ) and L u vox/flu voxam in c is even higher (greater than
90 % ) (P otter and H ollister, 2 0 0 1 ). T h e differences in bioavailability arc further
am plified bv the fact that the m etab olites o f the SSRIs (i.e. the substan ces p r o
duced by m etabolism o f the d ru g in the liver and elsew h ere) can also have anti-
depressan t effects. The m etabolite o f fluoxetine (n orfluoxctin e), for e xam ple, is
four tim es m ore poten t as a serotonin rcuptakc inhibitor than is fluoxetine itself.
3 N inety-five percen t of the b o d y ’ s serotonin is stored outside the C N S— in the
blood and in the extensive n etw ork o f n erves that encases the gu t (W ilson,
2 0 0 4 b ). In fact, serotonin w as first discovered in the b lood , w here it w as u n d er
stood to be a vaso co n stricto r (thus the nam e sero-ton in: a scrum agent affecting
vascular ton e). It w as som e years b efore it w as located in the brain and acccptcd
as a neurotran sm itting substance, in both the ccntral and peripheral system s
(G crsh on , 1998).
R eferences
Baldessarini, R. (2 0 0 1 ). D rugs and the treatm ent o f psychiatric disorders: D epression and
anxiety d isord ers. In H ardm an, J. & L im bird, L. (E d s), Goodman and Gilman’s The
pharmacological basis o f therapeutics, 10th edn, 4 4 7 4 8 3 . N ew York: M cG raw -H ill.
Begley, D. (2 0 0 3 ). U n derstan ding and circum venting the blood-brain barrier. Acta
Paediatrica Supplement, 4 4 3 , 83—91.
G ersh on , M .D . (1 9 9 8 ). The second brain. N ew York: H arper-Perennial.
G rig ge rs, C. (1 9 9 7 ). Becoming woman. M inneapolis: U niversity o f M innesota Press.
Jantzen, G. & R obinson, J. (2 0 0 1 ). Sustained- and con trolled-release drug-delivery
system s. In G. Banker, & C. R h odes (E ds) Modern pharmaceuticals, 4th edn,
5 0 1 - 5 2 8 . N ew York: M arcel Dekker.
K at/un g, B. (2 0 0 1 ). Basic and clinical pharmacology', 8th edn. N ew York: M cG raw -H ill.
Keller, E.F. (1 9 9 5 ). Refiguring life: Metaphors o f twentieth-century biology. N ew York:
C olum bia U niversity Press.
Potter, W. & H ollister, L. (2 0 0 1 ). A n tidepressan t agents. In B. Katzung, (E d .), Basic and
clinical pharmacology, 8 edn, 4 9 8 —51 1. N ew York: M cG raw -H ill.
W ilkinson, G. (2 0 0 1 ). Pharm acokinetics: T h e dynam ics o f d ru g ab sorption , d istri
bution, and elim ination. In H ardm an, J. & L. Lim bird (E ds) Goodman and Gilman's
The pharmacological basis o f therapeutics, 10th edn , 3—29. N ew York: M cG raw -H ill.
W ilson, E .A . (2 0 0 4 a ). G ut fem in ism , differences: A Journal o f Feminist Cultural Studies,
1 5 (3), 6 6 - 9 4 .
W ilson, E .A . (2 0 0 4 b ). Psychosomatic: Feminism and the neurological body. D urh am , N C :
D uke UP.
W innicott, D.W. (1 9 6 4 ). The child, the family and the outside world. H arm ondsw orth :
Penguin.
W urtm an, R . W urtm an , J. R egan, M . M cD e rm o tt, J. T say, R. & Breu, J. (2 0 0 3 ).
Effects o f norm al m eals rich in carbohydrates or protein s on plasm a tryptophan
and tyrosine ratios. American Journal o f Clinical Nutrition, 77, 128—1 32.
Z ita, J. (1 9 9 8 ). Body talk: Philosophical reflection on sex and gender. N ew York: C olum bia
U niversity Press.
Chapter 29
Nikolas Rose
DISORDERS WITHOUT BORDERS?

The e xp an ding scope o f p s y c h ia tric p ra c tic e
An expan ding problem
(W H O )
I
N 2001 THE WORLD HEALTH O RGANIZATION
published Mental health: New understanding, new hope, to draw attention to
the public health issues raised bv rates o f m ental d iso rd ers across the w orld. It
estim ated that m o re than 25 per ccnt o f peop le are affected by m ental d iso rd ers at
so m e point in their lives. It claim ed that d epression affects over 340 m illion peop le
w orldw ide. It pred icted :
By the year 2 0 2 0 , if curren t tren ds fo r d em ograph ic and cpidcm i-

ological transition continue, the burden o f d epression w ill increase to
5 .7 % o f the total burden o f disease, b eco m in g the sccon d leading causc
o f DAI.Ys [disability adjusted life years] lost. W orldw ide it w ill be
second only to isch em ic h eart disease for DAI.Ys lost for both sexes. In
the developed reg io n s, d epression will then be the highest ranking cause
o f b urden o f disease.
(W H O , 2 0 0 1 : 30)
O th er re p o rts paint a sim ilar picture. In the U S, in Ju n e 2 0 0 5 , K essler and his

colleag u es, on the basis o f a h ousehold survey o f over 9 ,0 0 0 p eo p le, using a diag
nostic interview , re p o rte d that, in any one year, 26 .2 per ccnt o f adult A m ericans
re p o rte d having sy m p to m s that w ould qualify them for a DSM-IV diagnosis o f
m ental disord er, with the anxiety d iso rd ers leading at 18. 1 per cen t, follow ed by
m ood d iso rd ers, notably d ep ressio n , at 9 .5 per cent and im pulse con trol d isord ers
DISORDERS WITHOUT BORDERS? 2 4 7
at 8 .9 per cen t— a total o f over 57 m illion A m erican s diagnosable w ith m ental

diso rd er in any one year (K e ssler et a l., 2 0 0 5 ). . . . And they con cluded that ‘A bout
h alf o f A m erican s w ill m eet the criteria fo r a DSM-IV d iso rd er som etim e in their
life, w ith first on set usuallv in childhood o r ad o le sc e n c e ’ (K e ssler et al., 2 0 0 5 a).
The b e lie f that around half of the population w ill m eet the criteria for a m ental
d iso rd er at so m e tim e in their life w as originally p ro p o se d by K essler and his
colleagues a decade ago (B lazer et al., 1994; K essler et a l., 1994; W ittchen et al.,
1994). It is n ot a peculiarly A m erican p crccp tio n . In 2 0 0 5 , a Task Force of the
E uropean C ollege o f N cu ro p svch op h arm acologv on ‘The Size and Burden o f
M ental D iso rd e rs in E u ro p e ’ re p o rte d the results o f a series o f stud ies that aim ed
‘ to rcach a con sensus on w hat w e know ab out the size, burden and cost o f “d is
o rd e rs o f the brain" in each European coun try and— ultim ately— in E urope as a
w h o le ’ for a total o f 20 m ental and n eurological d iso rd ers (W ittchen et a l., 2 0 0 5 :
3 5 5 ). The results w ere truly alarm ing. . . .
Som e 27 per ccn t o r 8 2 .7 m illion o f the adult E uropean U nion (E U ) p o p u la
tion (1 8 - 6 5 years o f age):
. . . is o r has been affected by at least one m ental d iso rd er in the past 12

m onths. Taking into accoun t the con siderable degree o f com orbidity
(about one third had m ore than one d iso rd er), the m ost frequen t d is
o rd e rs arc anxiety d iso rd ers, d epressive, som atoform and substance
depen dency d iso rd ers. . . . Only 26% o f cases had any con sultation with
profession al health care se rv ice s, a finding suggestin g a considerable
degree o f u nm et need.
(W ittch en and Jaco b i, 2 0 0 5 : 357)
And the editorial o f this special issue su m m ed up the situation thus:
Even though only a restricted range of all existin g m ental and n e u ro

logical d iso rd ers from the ICD 10 o r the DSM-IV w as con sid ered , there
is d e a r cvidcn cc that m o re than onc-third o f the adult EU population is
or has been affcctcd by at least one d iso rd er in the past year, or 50% o f
the F.U population . . . if lifetim e risk is con sidered. . . . [M ]cntai d is
o rd e rs are associated with im m en se co sts o f over 290 billion E u ros, the
m ajority o f w hich w ere not healthcare costs.
(W ittch en et al., 2 0 0 5 : 355—356)
The m essage is self-eviden t— w c need m ore rcscarch , earlier d iagn oses, b etter
treatm en t, and education and training o f policy m akers and the public about this
public health prob lem . This re p o rt w as one basis for the E uropean C om m ission
(E C ) G reen Paper, Improving the mental health o f the population: Towards a strategy on
mental health fo r the European Union, w hich estim ated that ‘m ental ill health co sts the
EU an estim ated 3% —4% o f GDP, mainly through lost p rod u ctiv ity ’ (E C H ealth and
C o n su m e r P rotection D ircc to ratc-G cn cral, 2 0 0 5 : 4 ) and p ro p o sed a strategy lo
p rom ote the m ental health o f all (2 0 0 5 : 8). It w ould be difficult to disagree. But
how has this p ercep tion arisen at the start o f the tw en ty-first century? A perception
o f a E u rop e, indeed a w orld, so ravaged by m ental ill health that a diagnosable
2 4 8 NIKOLAS ROSE
m ental d iso rd er afflicts every third person each year, o f w hom probably tw o-thirds
rem ain undiagnosed and untreated. Is it, perh aps, som eth in g to do with those ‘ risk
fa c to rs’ identified by the W H O and rep eated in that G reen Paper— access to drugs
and alcoh ol; displacem en t; isolation and alienation; lack o f education , tran sp o rt,
housing; neighbourhood disorgan ization ; p e e r rejectio n ; p o o r social circu m stan ccs;
p o o r n utrition ; pov erty ; racial injustice and discrim in ation; social disadvantage;
urbanization; violen ce and delin quen cy; w ar; w ork stre ss; un em ploym en t (W H O ,
2 0 0 4 b : 2 1 ). A doleful and fam iliar list, it is tru e. But can these travails have rcallv
b eco m c m ore in ten se, in this, the m o st wealthy and healthy o f all p arts o f this
plan et in the m o st wealthy and healthy cen tury o f human c xistcn cc. If not that, then
w hat? Has the population o f E u rop e, indeed the w orld, alw ays been so b e se t by
undiagnosed m ental illness? O r, as 1 w ill su ggest, do these figures arise from so m e
thing else? [. . .]
Accounting for expansion
H ow should w e m ake sense o f such data? Can it really be that h alf o f us, over our
lifetim es, w ill suffer from a m en tal disord er? O f c o u rse , w e w ou ld n ’t be su rp rised
if h alf o f us, in o u r lifetim es, suffered from a physical d iso rd er— indeed we w ould
be su rp rised if this w as n ot so. And w e w ould w ant to m ake health serv ices available
to all and be scandalized if only a q u arter o f those con ditions w ere treated . Yet vvc
arc trou b led by such a p crccp tion o f prcvalcncc o f m ental d iso rd ers. Why? Is this a
residue o f an earlier age o f stigm a? A throw back to an earlier age o f anti-psychiatry?
A suspicion o f the very idea o f a m ental disord er? A b elief that this perception
serv es som e interests but not others? A specific w orry about d ru g treatm en t? O r is
it, perhaps, the sense that the verv idea o f n orm ality o r m ental health is at stake.
In w hat follow s, I w ould like to e xp lo re five interlinked h ypoth eses that might
account for the p ercep tion s o f the rates o l m ental d iso rd er that I have sketched.
• first, that, in reality, there is m ore m ental d iso rd er today than in previous
tim es;
• second, that w e arc m o re awrarc o f m en tal d iso rd er and b etter at recogn izing it;
• third, that this arises from w'hat the so cio lo gists term ‘m oral e n tre p re n e u r
sh ip’ on the p art o f psychiatrists as passionate advocates for a cause they
believe in: a n eglected source o f m isery only they can identify and con quer;
• fourth , to d ay ’s favourite cu lprit, ‘ Big P h arm a’— that it is the pharm accutical
com pan ies, in a cynical scarch for m arket share, profit and shareh older value,
w ho, in a m ultitude o f w ays, arc d isto rtin g o u r pcrccp tion and treatm en t o f
m ental disord er;
• fifth , that this arises from a reshaping o f ou r disconten ts in a psychiatric
fo rm — perhaps even a psychiatrization o f the hum an condition itself.
H ypoth esis 1: There is ju s t m ore o f it ab o u t
The percep tion that m ental d iso rd er is on an alarm in g upw ard trend because o f the
condition s o f m od ern life has been a recu rren t them e since al least the birth o f
D I S O R D E R S WI T H O U T B O R D E R S ? 2 4 9
psy ch iatry in the n in eteenth ce n tu ry . A ubrey L e w is h im se lf p o in ts this ou t in his

classic p a p e r on Social P sy ch iatry, w hich he d eliv e re d in 19 5 7 :
It has lo n g b een c u sto m ary to asse rt that m en tal d iso rd e r is on the

in cre ase , b e ca u se o f the m o re and m o re c o m p le x strain s w hich society
im p o se s on its m e m b e rs. A h u n dred and th irty y ears ago the psy ch iatrist
E sq u iro l read a p a p e r in P aris on the q u e stio n : ‘A rc th ere m o re m ad m e n
today than th ere w ere fo rty y e ars a g o ? ’ T h e re w as then w id esp read
alarm at ‘ the [fjrigh tful in crease o f in san ity ’ , w hich p e o p le said m en aced
Fran ce w ith calam ity . In his ad m irab le review E sq u iro l show ed that the
alleg ed in crease wras sp u rio u s; m o re p e o p le had c o m e in to h o sp ita ls,
b ut . . . the rep u tatio n o f the asy lu m s had ch an ged from that o f cru e l
p riso n s to h um anely co n d u c ted h osp itals. M any q u ie t patien ts w ho
w ou ld n ot fo rm e rly have b een sen t to th ese in stitu tion s w'cre now
ad m itted and c am c w illin gly. H cn cc the ap p aren t in crease.
(in L e w is, 1 9 6 7 a: 2 6 3 )
M o st social scie n tists are sim ilarly u n con vin ced that the rise in psy ch iatric
d iag n o se s re fle cts a ‘ frigh tful in c re a se ’ in m en tal d iso rd er. There is g o o d eviden ce
that p o v e rty , p o o r h ou sin g, stre ssfu l w ork in g e x p e rie n c e s and the like are a sso c i
ated w ith in creased rates o f p sy ch iatric m o rb id ity . But I d o n ’ t think we can e x t r a
polate h isto ric al tren d s fro m th is, o r ag re e that c o n te m p o ra ry so cial co n d itio n s
arc m o re path o gen ic than th ose o f e a rlie r tim e s. To be b lun t, the q u e stio n ‘ Is there
m o re m en tal d iso rd e r today than b e fo r e ? ’ is im p o ssib le to an sw er b c ca u sc o u r ow n
n o tio n s o f n o rm ality and m en tal d iso rd e r arc in escapab ly h istorically and cultu rally
specific.
H y p o th esis 2: We a r e ju s t b e tte r a t re co g n izin g it
Do m en tal d iso rd e r s sim ply aw ait th eir re co g n itio n by ad eq u ate d iag n o stic
sch e m e s? I d o n ’ t think so. O u r p e rce p tio n o f ‘ m en tal d is o r d e r ’ today b e ars little
relation to that in oth er tim e s and p laces. From the m id -n in eteen th to the m id-
tw en tieth c c n tu ry , the w'alls o f the asylum m ark ed a d istin ction b etw een tw o
e m p ire s, that o f m a d n ess and that o f n e rv o u s d is o rd e r s, the p r o p e rty o f differen t
ex p la n ato ry sy ste m s, differen t in stitu tio n s, d ifferen t cu ltu ral u n d e rstan d in g s,
differen t au th o ritie s. T h is distin ction w eaken ed in the m id tw en tieth ce n tu ry , w ith
the u n lo ck in g o f w a rd s, day h o sp ita ls, o u t-p atie n t pro v isio n and so fo rth . F rom the
1 9 8 0 s, co m m u n ity p sy ch iatry m u ltip lied the sites fo r the p rac tic c o f p sy ch iatry —
in psy ch iatric w'ards in ge n e ra l h o sp ita ls, sp ecial h o sp ita ls, m e d iu m sc c u rc u n its,
day h o sp ita ls, o u t-p atie n t clin ics, child gu id an ce clin ics, p riso n s, c h ild re n ’s h o m e s,
sh eltered h ou sin g, drop-in c e n tre s, co m m u n ity m en tal health c e n tre s, dom iciliary
care by co m m u n ity psy ch iatric n u rse s, sc h o o ls an d, o f c o u r se , in the ge n e ral p r a c ti
t io n e r ’ s su rg e ry . T h is b lu rred the d istin ction betw-een psy ch iatric p ro fessio n als w7ho
tre ate d the m entally ill and th ose w ho tre ate d w hat on ce w ere te rm e d ‘n e u ro s e s ’—
the co m p la in ts o f th ose w ho w ere unable lo function ac c o rd in g lo the n o rm s and
e x p e c ta tio n s o f the v ariou s d e p a rtm e n ts o f life. In sh o rt, m o re and m o re p eo p le
and p ro b lem s w ere o p e n e d up to the d iag n o stic gaze and th e rap e u tic in terv en tio n s
o f psy ch iatry (R o se , 1 9 8 6 ).
2 5 0 NIKOLAS ROSE
T his changing territo ry o f psychiatry has been em b odied in diagnostic m anuals

and classifications across the secon d half o f the tw entieth cen tury. Many o f a
psychoanalytic p ersu asion in the U S, and many social psychiatrists in the U K ,
argued that that there w as no clear distinction betw een n orm ality and m ental
illness, that, as Karl M cn nin ger put it, ‘ m ost peop le have som e d egree o f m ental
illness at som e tim e, and many ol them have a d egree of m ental illness m o st of the
tim e ’ (M enn in ger et al., 1965: 33). T his expan sion o f the psychiatric gaze,
em bodied in the first and sccond Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals published in 1952
and 1968, w as one clem en t in criticism s that psychiatry w as sim ply m edicalizing
dififcrcncc and w as an apparatus o f social con trol. Som e su gg est that the publication
o f DSM-I11 in 1980 w as a respo n se to that criticism (W ilson , 199 3 ). It stressed that
that diagn osis m u st be based on a pattern o f sy m pto m s that w as not m erely an
expectab le respo n se to an event, but a m anifestation o f a dysfunction in the perso n :
‘ N eith er deviant behavior . . . n or conflicts that are prim arily betw een the in di
vidual and socicty arc m ental d iso rd ers unless . . . a sym ptom o f a dysfunction in
the p e r so n ’ (A m erican Psychiatric A ssociation, 198 0 ). In a m om en t I w ill question
the success o f that attem p t to avoid psychiatrizing p rob lem s o f living. But DSM -lll
d o es not re strict the scope o f m ental disorder. Its claim s to provide neutral
em pirical description s o f sym ptom p attern s did quite the reverse. It im plied that
psychiatrists could diagn ose as m ental d iso rd e rs, things ranging from troub lesom e
con duct in children to m e n ’ s p rob lem s in gettin g an crcction . The diagnostic
m anuals o f o u r own age are an alogous to those that arose from the nineteenth-
century asylum s— they su ggest som e fundam ental conn ection s betw een all those
under the gaze of the psychiatrist in our ow n A ge o f Freed om .
Th ese changcs w ere accom pan ied by an oth er— a con tested and partial unifica
tion o f treatm en t in the form of psychiatric d rugs. This is not the placc to tell that
history, o r the w ays in which d ru gs b ecam e p art o f the treatm en t for alm ost all
con dition s w ithin the expan ded psychiatric sy stem . N o t is it the place to discuss
the im plication s of the new brain scien ces and the suggestion that variations in the
n eu rotran sm ittcr system underpin not only frank m ental d iso rd ers but also vari
ations in p erso n ality , as well as transien t fluctuations in m ood o r conduct. H ere
I w ant to note ju st one con scqucn cc. Wc now have a gro u p o f loosely related drugs
that claim to treat not ju st m ajo r psychotic break dow n s, but the m inor trou b les that
im pair p e o p le ’s capacity to think, feel o r act in the ways in w hich they or others
w ould w ant them to. T his m akes it possib le to believe that all these con ditions have
a ‘fam ily re se m b lan ce ’— that con dition s from autistic d iso rd er to zoophilia are
varieties o f the sam e so rt o f thing.
H ypoth esis 3: P sy ch ia trists a s ‘m o ral en trep re n e u rs’
U n doubtedly proclam ation s by public health b odies about the p erso n al and social
harm from untreated m en tal d iso rd ers stem from genuine con cern s. Frank A y d’ s
1961 b o o k Recognizing the depressed patient has often been cited as contribu ting both
lo the increase in diagn oses o f depression and to its fram ing as a condition treatable
w ith dru gs. Ayd had carried out the clinical trials for am itryptiline as an anti-
depressan t for M erck w ho held the patent, and M erck d istrib uted his book w idely.
As Emily M arlin (2 0 0 5 ) has pointed o u t, draw ing on his in terview w ith David
H ealy, Ayd w as a passion ate believer in the need for psychiatric d ru gs to alleviate
m ental illness: in 1957, he ‘spoke o f the em erg in g psych oph arm acology as a
“ blessing fo r m ankind” ’— and his w ife so m e tim e s com pared him to John the
Baptist prcach ing the com in g thing (H ealy, 1996: 8 5 ). In those days, ph arm accutical
com pan ies w ere view ed as ethical allies w ith public health profession als in the
defeat o f disease: on the evidence o f the recen t success o f new dru gs for physical
con dition s, their p ro sp e c ts to im prove the hum an con dition , in alliance with
p sy ch iatrists, seem ed en orm o u s.
The so cio lo gist H ow ard B cck cr coincd a term for such cam paign s— ‘m oral
en trep ren eu rsh ip ’ (B cckcr, 1963). This is not m eant to disparage them , but m erely
to describ e their evangelical quality and the many ch aracteristics shared by such
cam paigns for righting w ron gs. Today, after years in the d o ld ru m s, b iological
psychiatrists and psy ch o ph arm acologists are e xcite d , perhaps with go od reason ,
about their capacity to treat and perh aps even to cure. T his excitem en t go es hand in
hand w ith endeavours to convincc us o f the seriousn ess o f the prob lem to which
these treatm en ts are a solution. But we need to in terrogate this w ay o f form u latin g
the prob lem and its solution.
I have su ggested that these alarm in g figures arise, in part at least, from the
m eth ods o f inquiry th em selves— ep id em iological surveys using diagn ostic in te r
view s. W H O asse rts that psychiatric d iagn oses, today, arc not just reliable but
also valid. The debate over diagnosis in psychiatry has run for cen tu ries, and so have
argum en ts over its desirability, reliability and validity. C ritics su ggest that many
d iagn oses, especially those ‘on the b o rd e r s’ , are ju dgem en ts o f social deviance or
prob lem s o f living that have no place in psychiatry, o r that they m isrecogn ize
intelligible resp o n ses to social situations as sy m p to m s o f individual p sy ch o
pathology (D o u b le , 2 0 0 2 ; W akefield, 1992). DSMs from the 1980s claim ed to
answ er this criticism . But their criteria fo r person ality d iso rd er and many other
diso rd ers explicitly require an assessm en t of the con d u ct, m o o d or thoughts in
question against a n orm o f social functioning, or a norm o f ap p ro p riate re sp o n ses to
a p articu lar situation such as sexual attraction o r bereavem en t. T h ese diagnostic
m anuals thus capturc behaviour that, as Je ro m e W akefield puts it, ‘need not
originate in dysfu n ction s’ and som e that is ‘ clearly the resu lt o f conflict with others
or w ith so c ic ty ’ (1 9 9 7 : 6 3 5 ).
DSM-IV stipulates that diagn oses should not be m ade w here p attern s o f
behaviour are re sp o n ses to extern al con dition s, rather than reflecting a dysfunction
within the individual. W akefield h im self, in his research on con duct disorder,
su ggests that clinicians can m ake that distinction . But he also poin ts out that while
DSM-IV says this, the item s in its diagn ostic ch cck list, for con duct d iso rd er and
many other d iso rd ers, con ccrn only the behaviour o f the individual (W akefield
et al., 2 0 0 2 ). IIovv, then, can those using such checklists avoid ‘ false p o sitiv es’ ?
DSM-IV tries to deal w ith this by adding a ‘ clinical significance c rite rio n ’ , o f the
form ‘The sy m p to m s cause clinically significant distress o r im pairm en t in social,
occupation al, or other im portan t areas o f fun ction in g’ (Sp itzcr and W akefield,
1999: 1857). But the cpid cm iolog ical surveys that gen erate such high prevalence
rates are not con du ctcd by clinicians in clinical settings. Even in clinical settings,
evidence show s that initial m edical diagn oses depen d a great deal upon the b ac k
grou n d expectation s and beliefs o f the doctor, and are shaped by such issues as the
2 5 2 NIKOLAS ROSE
gender, age, race, social b ack groun d and d em ean o u r o f the patient. T h e sam e is true
in psychiatry, w here diagnoses may also be shaped by prio r in form ation available to
the diagnostician as to the b ack groun d o f the proto -p atien t, their pathway to the
clinic, their previous historv and so forth . Further, in sites outsid e the clinic there
are often incentives to diagn ose, rather than not to diagnose.
C on sider, for e x am p le , A D H D . [O lfson and colleagues] su gg est that the overall
ob served increase m ight have arisen as a resu lt o f the recogn ition by the U S
D ep artm e n t of E ducation , in 1991, that A D H D w as a disabilitv that con ferred
eligibility for spccial education. T h is, com bined with awrarcn css cam paigns and the
activities o f A D H D advocacy g ro u p s, in creased the w illingness o f school tcach crs
and oth ers to identify the con dition , the use o f sch ool-b ascd clinics to diagn ose it
and the take-up o f assessm en t in stru m ents to m ake the diagnosis (O lfson et al.,
2 0 0 3 ). [. . .]
Psychiatric diagn oses today take place in a clim ate w here ideas o f risk, p re
caution , prevention arc in the asccndant. Wc know' from other e xam p le s— for
instance, screen in g p ro gram m e s for b reast can cer or prostate cancer— that the
health con sequen ces o f screen ing are am bigu ous— w id esp read screen in g gen erates
false positives, leading to many bein g brough t w ithin the scope o f treatm en t and
started on the career o f patient w ho w ould never, in fact, su llcr from o r be troubled
by that con dition . H istorian s o f m edicine identify many sim ilar exam ples o f
'diagn ostic c rc e p ’ , often clicitcd by the tech n ology itself— diagnostic to o ls elicit
signs that are taken as evidence o f p ath ologies that w ould previously have been
invisible, and these ‘ p ro to -d ise ase s’ are them selves taken lo require treatm en t
(R o sen b erg, 2 0 0 3 ). N o w onder, then, that many are so con cern ed w ith the w id e
spread use o f diagn ostic tests that tran sform m alaise into psychiatric classifications
requiring treatm en t. Such tests are now found in sell-help form on in tern et w eb
sites, in checklist form in sch oo ls and clinics, and in screening p ro gram m e s such as
those p ro p o sed by G e o rg e W. B ush ’ s N ew Freedom C om m ission on M ental H ealth.
And such screen in g and testin g is often p ro p o se d o r su p p o rte d by ph arm aceutical
com pan ies (L cnzcr, 2 0 0 4 ).
H y po th esis 4: B ig P h a rm a
This leads m e naturally to my fourth hypothesis— Big Pharm a is to blam e. The

in du stry, it is claim ed, uses its w ealth, its lobbyists, its tam e psy ch iatrists, the
cunning o f the m arketing p rofession to influence go vern m en ts, reg u lato rs,
re search ers, m edical p ractition ers and patients. Its aim is sim ply to increase
m arkets, n ot m erely by selling new curcs for old diseases, but con structin g new
diseases to fit the prod u cts that claim to treat them . T h ere has, o f co u rsc, been
m uch con troversy over the safety and efficacy o f the new- generation o f p sy ch o
ph arm aceuticals. C ritics also su ggest that the ph arm aceutical com panies p rom ote
the illusion that their different dru gs are each targeted to a specific con dition , a
claim that has m ore to do with m arketing prod u cts to fit d iscrete DSM-IV diagnoses
than any actual evidence o f such specificity. This is not the place to evaluate these
argum en ts: 1 w ant to m ake som e different points.
P h arm aceutical com pan ies certainly seek to increase the use o f their products
through influencing the prescrib in g practices o f d o c to rs, though m ost d o cto rs claim
to resist this influence. They also act directly on potential patients as co n su m ers o f
their products. In the U nited States, the use o f ‘direct to c o n su m e r’ advertisin g for
p sych oph arm aceuticals has com e under particular scrutiny— especially ad v e rtise
m en ts relating to m ild to m oderate d ep ressio n , anxiety d iso rd ers, con dition s such
as p rc-m en stru al dysph oric diso rd er and even b ipolar disord er. Such advertisin g
seeks n ot just to m arket a d ru g, but to reshape the potential patien t’ s un derstan din g
and presentation o f their condition to their d o cto r in the form o f a particular DSM
diso rd er fo r w hich a specific d ru g has been licensed and m arketed. D iso rd e r and
rem edy arc m utually aligned. T h ere is so m e evidence that that physicians today feel
un der p ressure from patien ts to prescrib e particular dru gs. C ertain ly, in m cdicinc
as in con sum ption m ore gen erally, w e arc seeing a phenom enon that is driven , in
p art at least, by the reshaping o f d em and.
Pharm aceutical com panies seek to increase dem and for their prod u cts in
many w ays. They fund, and so m e tim e s se t up, cam paigning g ro u p s for particular
conditions. They su p p o rt and som etim es initiate disease aw areness cam paigns for
conditions w here they have the paten t for the treatm en t. T h ese cam paigns point to
the m isery caused by the apparent sy m pto m s o f this un diagnosed o r un treated
con dition, and in terp ret available data so as to m axim ize beliefs about prevalen ce,
shaping m alaise into a specific clinical fo rm . Such cam paign s often involve the use o f
public relation s firm s to place sto ries in the m edia, providing victim s— som etim es
celeb rities— w ho w ill tell their sto rie s and supplying e x p e rts w ho w ill explain
them in term s o f the new disorder. For exam ple R o ch e ’ s 1997 cam paign for
its an tidepressan t A u roxix (m o clo b em id e) fo r the treatm en t o f social phobia in
A ustralia involved the use o f the public relations com pany to place sto rie s in the
p ress, an alliancc w ith a patients gro u p called the O b sessive C om p ulsive and
A nxiety D iso rd e rs Federation o f V ictoria, funding a large con feren ce on social
phobia and pro m o tin g m axim al estim ates of prevalen ce (M oynihan, H eath et a l.,
2 0 0 2 ). T h ese arc not covert tactics— as a quick glance at the ‘ Practical G u id e s’
published on the w eb by the m agazine Pharmaceutical Marketing w ill show.
Th ere is, th erefore, som e evidence for H ypothesis 4 — that Big Pharm a is
responsib le. But I think this is only p art o f the pictu rc. This is not to say that there is
not c o rru p t p racticc, to con don e the n on -disclosu rc or m anipulation o f the results
o f clinical trials, o r to deny that som e d o c to rs, and som e public health officials,
and all ph arm aceutical com pan ies, have a vested in terest in pro m o tin g the beliefs in
the w id esp read prevalence o f d iso rd ers, the dam age w rought to individuals and
society by their inadequate or partial treatm en t, and their ready and effective tre at
ability by dru gs. But I think that we n eed, at the very least, to situate it in a w ider
con text.
H y p o th e sis 5: T h e p s y c h ia tr ic r e s h a p in g o j d isc o n te n ts
The shaping o f discon ten t today certainly has novel featu res, including the role
o f the ph arm accutical industry and the m assive capitalization o f ill health. But at
any tim e and place, hum an disconten ts arc inescapably shaped, m ou ld ed , given
e x p ressio n , ju dged and respo n d ed to in term s o f ccrtain languages o f description
and explan ation , articulated by e x p e rts and au th orities, leading to specific styles
and fo rm s o f in terven tion . W hat, then, is specific to today?
2 5 4 NIKOLAS ROSE
As Sim on W essely points ou t, exp erien cin g sy m p to m s is the ru le, not the
exception :
In one early survey 14% of a com m unity sam ple re p o rte d having no
sy m p to m s at all. . . . An A m erican studv of healthy university students
taking no m edication found that no levvcr than 81% had exp erien ced at
least one som atic sym ptom durin g the previous three days. . . . O v er a
six w eek p erio d 4 3 % o f n orm al A m erican w om en re p o rte d at least one
som atic sym ptom . . . w hilst w om en in South London experien ced
sy m p to m s on one day out o f three, chicfly hcadachc and fatigue. . . . A
population based survey o f the N o rd ic cou n tries w ill re p o rt that up to
75% o f subjects experien ced at least one subjective health com plaint in
the last 30 days— with m ore than 50% experien cin g tired n ess, and 33%
m uscular pain.
(1 9 9 7 )
He is review in g cvidcn cc on som atic sy m pto m s. But as he recogn izes, e x p e r i

encing a sym ptom is n ot, as it w ere, a ‘raw fe e l’ . And perhaps at least a p art o f the
poo l o f m alaise available to be reco d ed as physical illness is also available to be
recod cd in psychiatric term s. Il m ight be reco d ed by those carryin g out public
heath surveys with a gaze attuned to the sy m ptom atic. It can be recoded by proto-
patients them selves, once catego ries such as gen eralized anxiety d iso rd er or p r e
m enstrual dysph oric d iso rd er b eco m e available lo them . It can be reco d ed by
m edical m arket research agen cies seekin g to chart and delineate poten tial m arkets
lo r their p rod u cts. And it can be re co d cd by psychiatrists and gen eral p ractition ers.
Such recod in g d epen ds on tw o things— a n orm against w hich cx p c ric n c c can
be judged as ab n orm al, and a set o f b eliefs and w ords to enable it to be un d erstood
and com m un icated. T h ese d iso rd ers on the b o rd e rs, I su ggest, are exp erien ced and
coded as such, by individuals and their d o c to rs, in relation to a cultural n orm of the
active, respo n sib le, ch oosin g self, realizing his or her potential in the w orld though
shaping a lifestyle. And they arc given form by the availability o f catego ries such as
depression , pan ic, social anxiety d iso rd er and A D H D .
For o u r d iso rd ers on the b o rd e rs, we can think o f a term such as depression
which exists in a zone o f transaction betw een e x p e rts and lay p e o p le — as a
‘p ro b le m /so lu tio n c o m p le x ’ : it sim ultan eously ju d ges m o o d against certain desired
stan dards, fram es discon tents in a certain w ay, ren d ers them as a prob lem in need
o f atten tion, establishes a classification fram ew ork to nam e and delineate them ,
scrip ts a pattern o f affccts, cogn itions, d esires and ju d ge m e n ts, w rites a narrative
for its origin s and destiny, attribu tes it m eaning, identifies som e au th orities w ho can
speak and act w isely in relation to it and p re scrib e s som e resp o n ses to it. These
are pow erful con den sations, w ays o f m aking aspects o f existen ce intelligible and
practicable.
It is to o sim ple to see actual o r potential patien ts as passive b ein gs, acted upon
by the m arketing devices o f Big Pharm a who invent m edical conditions and m anipu
late individuals into identifying w ith them . The process is m ore sub tle. C om p an ies
e xp lo re and chart the exp erien ced discon ten ts o f individuals, link these with the
p ro m ises held out by their d ru g s, and in corpo rate those into narratives that give
those dru gs m eaning and value. It is this intertw in in g o f pro d u cts, exp ectation s,
ethics and fo rm s o f life, that 1 think is involved in the developm en t and spread o f
psychiatric dru gs. In en gaging with these im ages and n arratives, in the h opes,
an xieties and discon tents they shape and foster, individuals play their ow n part in
the m cdicalization o f p rob lem s o f living.
Today, health has b eco m e a ccn tral ethical p rin ciple, and it is not su rp risin g that
discon ten ts so often find their expression in m edical or psychiatric term s. O v er the
first 60 years or so o f the tw entieth cen tury, hum an beings cam e to understand
them selves as inhabited by a deep in terior psychological space, to evaluate th e m
selves and to act upon them selves in term s o f this belief. But over the past h alf
ccn tury, human beings have also co m c to see them selves as ‘b io lo g ic al’ crcatu rcs—
to understan d o u rselv es, speak ab out ourselv es and act upon ourselv es as the kinds
o f bein gs w hose ch aracteristics are shaped by our b iology. This developm en t— I call
it som atic individuality— is reshaping the b o rd e rs o f norm ality and path ology, o f
m ental illness and m ental health. Wc arc com in g to think o f o u rselv es as individuals
w hose m o o d s, desires, con duct and perso n alities are shaped, in p a rt, by the p a r
ticular configuration o f o ur n eu roch em istry , and w hich can therefore be m od erated
or m odu lated by acting upon that n eu roch em istrv , acting upon our brains through
drugs.
This new way o f thinking has n ot effaced o ld er religiou s o r psychological styles
o f thought about o u r discon ten ts. U nlike in many other d iso rd ers, the claim that
psychiatric d iso rd ers have a biological basis is hotly con tested . O n the one hand,
many individuals refuse to think o f their con ditions in these term s. O n the other
hand, there is m uch evidence to su gg est that many still see m ental d isord ers as
different in kind from physical illn ess, exclu d ed and stigm atized. But n on eth eless, I
think these changcs that I have tried to d ocu m en t, shaped by many different facto rs,
do indicate that w c arc w itn essin g a ‘psych iatrization ’ of the hum an con dition. In
shaping ou r cthical re g im es, our relations to ou rselv es, o u r ju d gem en ts o f the kinds
o f p erso n s w e w ant to b e, and the lives w e w ant to lead, psychiatry, like the rest of
m edicine is fully engaged in m aking us the kinds o f p eop le w ho w e have b ecom e.
Conclusion
The b ord erlin es o f illness have long been su b ject to debate: arc hcadachc, insom nia,
back pain and the like diseases, sy m p to m s o f diseases o r inescapable conditions o f
life itself? W ho should d ecide— d o c to rs, m edical ad m in istrators, patients th em
selves? W h ere are the b oun daries betw een condition s for w hich an individual is to
be accorded responsib ility, and those fo r w hich responsibility is to be located else
w here— in the organ s, in fate, in heredity (R o se n b e rg , 2 0 0 3 )? And m edicine has
always practised beyond disease— in childbirth, in fertility, g r ie f and m uch m ore.
W hy d o es the exten sion o f m edicine trouble us for so m e prob lem s and n ot oth ers?
W hy is it preferable to place som e asp ects o f life un der one d e scrip tio n — as a
p rob lem o f living for ex am p le — rather than anoth er— as a condition that can be
alleviated by drugs?
I have taken my distance from som e critics. But I do still think that, for these
d iso rd ers on the b o rd ers and their treatm en t w ith d ru gs, there arc grou n d s for
2 5 6 N I K O L A S ROSE
c o n c e rn . T h ey arise from a p a rtic u la r way in w hich th ese differen t p ro c e sse s

are in terlin ked in c u rre n t c o n d itio n s— the e x ten sio n o f d iag n o stic c a te g o r ie s, the
p e rce p tio n o f the pub lic health p ro b lem s g e n e ra te d by u n treated m en tal d iso rd er,
the d e m an d s lo r d ise ase re c o g n itio n , m o v e s to scre e n in g , fe a rs o f risk and h op es fo r
p reven tion bv early in terv en tio n at a p rc sy m p to m a tic level, and the w id esp re ad use
o f the sim p le p re sc rip tio n o f p h arm accu tical re m e d ie s. All th is, I thin k, se rv e s to
lo w e r the thresh old at w hich in dividuals arc d e fin e d , and define th e m se lv e s, as
suitable c ase s fo r tre atm e n t. It in cre ase s the n u m b e rs o f th ose w h o e n te r upon
a ‘ m o ral c a r c e r ’ as a p e rso n su fferin g from a treatab le co n d itio n , and re d u ce s
the age at w hich m any e n te r upon this carccr. T h e se arc pow erfu l m ech an ism s
fo r rc c ru itin g in d ivid u als, tu rn in g them from n on -p aticn ts to p ro to -p a tic n ts, to
actual patien ts. T h ey are p ow erfu l m ech an ism s for retain in g in dividuals w ithin
this d o m ain . N o w alls are now' n eed ed to sustain a life tim e c a re e r u n d er the
p sy ch iatrist. W h eth er o r n o t the d ru g s cau se m o re d am ag e than they c u re , w h eth er
o r n ot this g e n e ra te s c a r c c r s fo r p sy ch iatric rc sc a rc h e rs, d e m a n d s for psy ch iatric
p ro fe ssio n als, satisfaction for p u b lic health p ro fessio n als o r p ro fits for p h a rm a
c e u tical co m p a n ie s, w e have y et to c o u n t the c o sts o f this w ay o f organ izin g and
re sp o n d in g to d isc o n te n ts in o u r ow n A ge o f F re e d o m . [. . .]
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W ilson, M . (1 9 9 3 ). DSM-11I and the tran sform ation of A m erican psychiatry: A history.
American Journal o f Psychiatry, 1 5 0(1): 399—410.
W ittchen, H .U ., & Jaco b i, F .(2 0 0 5 ). Size and burden o f m ental disord ers in E urope— a
critical review and appraisal o f 27 studies. European Neuropsychopharmacology,
15(4): 3 5 7 - 3 7 6 .
W ittchen, H .U ., Jo n sso n , B ., & O leso n , J. (2 0 0 5 ). Tow ards a b etter un derstanding o f
the size and burden and cost o f brain d iso rd ers in E urope. European Neuropsycho-
pharmacology, 15 (4 ): 355—356.
W ittchen, H .U ., Knauper, B ., & Kessler, R .C . (1 9 9 4 ). Lifetim e risk o f depression.
British Journal o f Psychiatry, 165: 16—22.
PART T H R E E
Political economies of affect

7. Emotion in work and organizations
NE OF T H E A R E A S W H E R E the sociological and socio-psychological

O study of emotions has been most readily embraced and most keenly developed is
that of research on work and organizations. Contrary to the assumption, prevalent
until recently, that emotional expression is incom patible with the instrumental goal
orientation of work life — and thus 'deviant' when and where it occurs — it is now
increasingly acknowledged that emotion 'is not sim ply an adjunct to work; rather, it is
the process through which members constitute their w ork environment by negotiating
a shared reality' (Putnam and Mumby, 1993: 36). A rlie Hochschild's seminal book
The M anaged H eart (1983) is widely credited with laying the ground for subsequent
research on emotions in organizations. In this much-cited work, Hochschild proposed
that feelings themselves are the object of 'm anagem ent' in both private and com
mercial contexts, and that the capacity for managing feeling through 'emotion w ork'
could be com m ercially exploited as 'em otional labour' to produce surplus value. From
this initial impetus, research on the role of emotion in the context of different insti
tutional and corporate enviroments, and/or in relation to pa rticu la r occupations has
flourished and diversified, not only them atically but also m ethodologically (Fineman
2005; Fisher and Ashkanasy 2000; Domagalski 1999). The study of emotion
management as part of work roles is only one of a whole range of issues addressed by
this research. Broadly speaking, research may vary through a focus on the structural
determinants and behavioral consequences of transient moods (W eiss and Cropan-
zano 1996), as distinct from dispositional affect (or 'tra it affectivity') (Staw et al.
1996). Alternatively, the focus may be on the emotional repertoires of specific occu
pational or corporate cultures, to suggest that p a rticu la r emotional orientations to
the world, or 'affective subject positions', can be institutionally produced (see,
e.g. Watson 1999 on the police). Research may also adopt a them atic focus on issues
like conflict, in connection with negotiating organizational change, work/life balance,
262 P 0 LI T I C A L ECO N 0 M I E S 0 F A F F EC T
among other situations or variables (Jordan 2006). A significant amount of research

has explored the gendered dimensions of emotion at work (see, e.g. Lewis and
Simpson 2007; Hochschild and Ehrenreich 2002).
The first extract in this section addresses the relatively neglected topic of emo
tion work in connection with 'race'. Kiran M irchandani's argument draws on anti
racist fem inist theory to propose not only a focus on 'ra cia l silences' in the literature
on emotion work, but also a m ethodological critique of dominant approaches in the
field. The argument is based on M irchandani's review of the abundant literature on
emotion work in its gendered dimensions, and on her analysis of the experiences
of an ethnically diverse group of women who are small-business owners (the latter
not included in this extract from her a rticle). Contem porary debates on emotion
work, she proposes, tend to rely on racially homogenous samples and on the im plicit
methodological assumption that workers are, by default, white. They also tend to
assume that interactions themselves are racially homogenous. This norm alization of
whiteness, argues M irchandani, is sym ptom atic of a more fundamental problem.
Norms of emotional display and management relative to race, class, and gender
hierarchies are studied as a function of (static and fixed) identities, whereas they
should be analysed as a function of specific locations that are 'relational and
shifting'.
The following extract, by Stephen Fineman, also offers a set of critica l method
ological reflections, this time directed at the recent growth in quantitative techniques
for the study of emotion at work. The extract outlines the reasons for the increasing
appeal of psychometric techniques in this area of research, and some negative con
sequences of 'boxing' emotion through m etrication. W hile numbers tend to convey an
impression of dispassionate objectivity and order, the practice of measuring emotion
in an organizational context, Fineman argues, is 'no neutral act'. The extract focuses
on the discussion of the construct of 'em otional intelligence', as an illustration of how
experts use measurements to ascribe positive and negative value to individuals on the
basis of their emotional intelligence quotients (EQ). In the concluding section of
the article, not included here, Fineman presents alternative ways of 'know ing'
emotions that are at risk of being m arginalized by the field's 'moving hegem onically'
in the direction of quantification. He points to narrative and discursive methods
(otherwise well represented in social scientific research on the emotions — and
elsewhere in this volume) as ways of addressing the com plexities and nuances of
affective experience that quantification tends to reduce and exclude.
Our third extract in this section illustrates a different use for quantitative investi
gation in the study of emotion at work. Using survey techniques, Reeves and
colleagues explore the psychological ram ifications of euthanasia-related work
in the context of animal shelters. A p a rticu la r point of interest of this piece lies in
addressing the relatively neglected dimension of emotion in situations of interaction
across species, rather than exclusively among humans. The result of the study by
Reeves and colleagues indicate that 'perceived euthanasia-related strain is prevalent
among shelter employees' and is associated with a number of other dimensions of
stress, conflict, and ill-being. The extract concludes with a wide range of indicative
suggestions for future research.
The fourth and final extract in this section is by Allen Smith and Sherry I
E M O T I O N IN W O R K AND O R G A N I Z A T I O N S 2 6 3
K lein m a n , and lo oks a t em otion m anagem ent in the co ntext o f the profession o f
m edicine. The ph ysical in tim a cy involved in m edical w o rk can be associated w ith
strong e m otion a l experiences, ranging from feelings o f sexual a rou sa l to disgust and
revulsion. T his is countered by a p rofessio nal ideology of 'a ffe c tiv e n e u tra lity '. The
a u th o rs begin by considering that, w h ile th is ideology is strong in m edicine, em otion
m anagem ent is neither e x p lic itly ta u g h t nor co lle ctiv e ly ta lk e d a b ou t by students in
tra in in g . Based on e th no gra ph ic fie ld w o rk in a m edical school, S m ith and K le in m a n
then illu s tra te the resources students em ploy to m anage th e ir feelings. The 'a ffe ctiv e
s o c ia liz a tio n ' of d o c to rs relies on m ostly im p lic it and in fo rm a l strategies th a t both
illu s tra te and reproduce the cu ltu re of m odern W estern m edicine.
References
Dom agalski, T. A. (1 999) 'E m otion s in organizations: main currents', Human Relations,
52 (6): 8 3 3 -8 5 2 .
Fineman, S. (2 005) 'A pp reciatin g emotions at work: paradigm tensions', International
Jo u rn a l o f W ork, O rganization and Em otion, 1 (1): 4 -1 9 .
Fisher, C. D. and Ashkanasy, N .M . (2 0 00 ) 'The emerging role of emotions in work life: an
introduction', Jo u rn a l o f O rganization al Behavior, 21 (2): 1 2 3 -1 2 9 .
Hochschild A. R. (1 98 3 ) The M anaged Heart: co m m ercializatio n o f human feelings.
Berkeley, CA.: University of C a lifo rn ia Press.
Hochschild, A. R. and Ehrenreich, B. (eds) (20 0 2) G lo b al Woman: nannies, m aids and sex
workers in the new economy. New York: M etropolitan Press.
Jordan, P. J. (20 0 6) 'E d ito ria l: emotions and coping with co n flict', Jo u rn a l o f M an age
ment and Organization, 12 (2): 9 8 -1 0 0 .
Lewis, P. and Simpson, R. (eds) (20 0 7) Gendering Em otions in Organizations. New York:
Palgrave M acm illan .
Putnam , L .L ., Mumby, D.K. (19 9 3) 'O rganizations, emotion and the myth of rationality',
in S. Fineman (ed.), Em otion In Organizations. London: Sage.
Staw, B .M ., Bell, N .E., Clausen, J.A . (19 8 6) 'The dispositional approach to job attitudes:
a lifetime longitudinal test', A d m in istra tive Science Quarterly, 31: 5 6 -7 7 .
Watson, S. (1 99 9 ) 'P o licin g the affective society: beyond governmentality in the theory
of social control', S o c ia l and L e g a l Studies, 8 (2): 2 2 7 -2 5 1 .
W eiss H .M ., Cropanzano R. (19 9 6) 'A ffective events theory: a theoretical discussion of
the structure, causes and consequences of affective experiences at w ork', Research
in O rg anization al Behavior, 1 8 :1 -7 4 .
Chapter 30
Kiran Mirchandani
CHALLENGING RACIAL SILENCES

I N S T U D I E S OF E M O T I O N W O R K
C o n trib u tio n s fro m a n t i-ra c is t fe m in is t th e o ry
[• ■ •]
H
O CH SCH ILD’S STUDY OF THE EMOTION w ork o f flight
attendants m arks the beginning o f the developm en t o f a m ultifaceted litera
ture on the em otion w ork w hich is required in many paid w ork jobs. As su m m a r
ized in Tables 1 and 2, there have been three distinct types o f w ork that have been
ch aracterized as ‘em otion w o rk ’ : the m anagem ent o f self-feeling, the w ork o f
m aking oth ers feel a certain way, and the effort involved in giving definition to
o n e ’ s w ork. T h ese three fo rm s o f em otion w ork are in tercon n ected . For exam p le,
m aking© oth ers l e d a ccrtain wav
J
mav
J
be a way
J
fo r a w ork er to define her or his
w ork. Sim ilarly, pro m o tin g ccrtain definitions o f o n e ’ s w ork may be a way o f
m anagin g o n e ’s ow n feelings.
H ochschild term s em otion w ork don e for a w age as ‘em otion lab o u r’ and
defines this as ‘the act o f tryin g to changc in degree o r quality an em otion or
feelin g’ (1 9 7 9 : 5 6 1 ). The em otion labour o f flight attendants thus involves ‘trying
to feel the righ t feeling for the jo b ’ (H och schild 1983: 118). As Finem an n otes,
‘em otio n al “ lab ou r” is the buying o f an e m p lo y e e ’s em otional dem ean or; the
individual is being paid to “ look nicc” , sm ile, be caring, be p o lite ’ (1 9 9 6 : 5 4 6 ).
T h eo rists also provide evidence o f the fact that w ork ers may c x p cricn cc stress and
inauthenticity w hen there is a disju ncture betw een the way in w hich they are
ex p e cted to feel and the way in w hich they actually feel (A shforth and H um phrey
1993; Finem an 1995; E rickson and W h arton 1997; T h oits 1990).
A ccordin g to H ochschild (1 9 8 3 ), many job s require w orkers to p rodu ce a
p articu lar em otional state in another perso n . Bill co lle cto rs, for exam p le, do e m o
tion labour lo deflate c u sto m e rs’ status and evoke gratitu de o r fear in clicnts.
Building on the w ork o f H och schild, D aniels (1 9 8 7 : 109) n otes that em otion w ork
involves fou r in terrelated behaviours: ‘ (1) attending carefully to how a sellin g
C H A L L E N G I N G R ACI A L S I L E N C E S IN S T U D I E S OF EMOTION WORK 2 6 5
affects o th e rs in it . . (2 ) focu sin g atten tio n through ru m in atin g ab o u t the

p ast and plan ning fo r the fu tu re ; (3 ) asse ssin g the re aso n ab le n e ss o f p relim in ary
ju d g e m e n ts . . .; (4 ) creatin g a c o m fo rta b le a m b ie n c e ’ . D a n ie ls’ definition su g g e sts
that e m o tio n w o rk involves n ot only m o n ito rin g o n e ’s ow n re actio n s to situ atio n s,
but also carin g fo r o th e rs and establish in g links b e tw e en p e o p le and even ts. Ja m e s
(1 9 8 9 ) sim ilarly argu e s that e m o tio n al lab o u r is a social p ro c e ss w hich is involved in
d ealin g w ith o th e r p e o p le ’ s feelin gs. E x a m p le s in clu d c b ein g available fo r o th e rs,
in te rp re tin g th eir n e e d s and p ro v id in g a p e rso n a l re sp o n se .
O th e r th e o rists have fo cu scd on the e m o tio n lab o u r involved in defining o n e ’ s
w ork . N e lso n and B ariev ( 1 9 9 7 ), fo r e x a m p le , e x am in e the e m o tio n w o rk o f paid
and v o lu n te e r e m e rg e n c y m cd ical sy ste m s p e rso n n e l. Paid w o rk e rs em ph asized
the highly sk ille d , co m m o d ifiab le qu alities o f e m e rg e n c y m ed ical w'ork, w hile
v o lu n te e rs stre sse d the h um an itarian and c arin g n ature o f the sam e w ork . Fine
(1 9 9 6 ), in a sim ila r w ay, d e m o n strate s the stra te g ie s u sed by re stau ran t co o k s to
defin e th eir w ork as w orth y o f re sp e c t and p ro fessio n alizatio n .
C arin g , p ro fe ssio n alism a n d actin g: g e n d e r d im e n sio n s o f

em o tion w ork
R c sca rc h c rs have d o c u m e n te d the n uan ccd w avs

J
in w hich em o tio n w ork is stru c-
tu rcd by g e n d e r p ro c e sse s. T h e focu s o f this literatu re is on the g e n d e re d a ssu m p
tion s im p licit in ccrtain jo b s, and the m e ch an ism s through w hich w o m e n ’ s w ork is
often dev alu ed . A s S te in b e rg and F ig a rt (1 9 9 9 : ! 7 ) n o te, se rv ic e organ izatio n s w hich
re q u ire the con stan t display o f frie n d lin e ss often hire w o m en to fill th ese ro les on the
assu m p tio n that w om en are b e tte r at display s o f w arm th . T h e o rists n ote that do in g
e m o tio n w o rk is fu n dam en tally an act o f d o in g g e n d e r in the c o n te x t o f ‘ w o m e n ’ s
alleged ly g r e a te r facility w'ith e m o tio n s — the fem in ine cap acity to co n so lc and
c o m fo rt, Hatter, cajo le , p e rsu a d e and s e d u c e ’ (F rith and K itzin g cr 1 9 9 8 : 3 0 0 ). P ierce
sim ilarly argu e s that paraleg al w o rk , w hich involves d e fe re n ce and caretak in g, is
fe m in ize d ; this is ‘n ot sim ply b e ca u se w o m en do it but b e cau se takin g care o f oth e rs
is c o n stru c te d as so m e th in g that w o m en are w ell c o n stru c te d to d o ’ (1 9 9 5 : 2 4 ).
T ab le 1 Types of Emotion Work Explored in the Literature
Theorist Sample Examples oj 7ypes of Emotion Work Explored
Aronson (1992) Women who care -internalizing resentment that their affection for
lor their elderly mothers is questioned by service providers
m others -drawing boundaries in relation to m others about
the extent lo which it was possible for them to
provide care
-dealing with inner conflicts as a result o f the
incongruence between their ability to provide
care and expectation that it is their responsibility
to do so
Aronson and Ilom e-care -breaking rules in official job descriptions by
Neysmith (1996) workers giv ing gifts, providing after-hours care,
personalizing relations with care receivers
2 6 6 K I R A N M I R C H A N D A N I
T a b le 1— Continued
Theorist Sample Examples o j Types o f Emotion Work Explored
Bellas (1 9 9 9 ) A cadem ics -p erfo rm in g in the classroo m

-relating p erso n al e xp e rie n ce s in classroo m s
-displaying positive em otio ns and con trollin g
negative em o tio n s vis-a-vis stud en ts
-diffusing volatile situations
-advising stud en ts
C lark (1 9 9 0 ) T h eoretical -using em otio n s strategically to elicit em otio n s in
oth ers d uring face-to-face interactions in o rd e r
to m ark o n e ’s place in the in teraction
Fine (1 9 9 6 ) R estaurant -justifying and legitim atin g their w ork to the
kitchcns public
Finem an (1 9 9 5 ) H elping -m aintaining an em otion al distan ce from the client
profession als in o rd e r to ap p ear profession al
(th eoretical) -creating the d esired em otion al im pression or
expression
Finem an (1 9 9 6 ) T h eoretical -su ppressin g or rep resen tin g private feelin gs to
achieve a socially acceptablc em otional facc
-looking nice, sm iling, bein g polite
Ghidina (1 9 9 2 ) C u stod ial w orkers -assertin g the value o f the w ork
-redefining w ork traditionally known as ‘ d irty ’
w ork
G u b riu m (1 9 8 9 ) C are giv e rs o f -m an agin g self-feelin g against audience
A lzh eim er’ s expectation s
patients
Hall (1 9 9 3 ) W aiters and -sm iling, d e fe rrin g to cu sto m e rs
w aitresses
H eim er and Social w orkers in a -tran sform in g p eo p le into clinical m aterial
Stevens (1 9 9 7 ) neonatal unit (in tegratin g paren ts into the hospital routine)
-coping w ith variability
-helping paren ts deal w ith the strain o f having a
prem atu re child
-m an agin g the risk o f law suits by paren ts or the
state against the hospital
H ochschild Flight attendants -feeling the right feeling for the job
(1 9 7 9 , 1983, and bill c o lle cto rs -m an agin g/ch an gin g feelings through surface and
1990) deep acting
Jam e s (1 9 9 3 ) D o c to rs, n urses -anticipating, planning, pacin g, tim etabling and
and relatives o f troub lesh ootin g
can ccr patients -m an agin g negative feelings in a way that results in
a n eutral or positive ou tcom e
-ongoing
inw wor k o f m anaging em otio n s is done bv
relatives, n urses and jun ior d o c to rs
Kahn (1 9 9 3 ) Social science -caregiving
agency -balancing attachm en t and detach m en t from
others
C H A L L E N G I N G R A C I A L S I L E N C E S IN S T U D I E S OF E M O T I O N W O R K 2 6 7
Theorist Sample Examples oj 7ypes of Emotion Work Explored
Kunda and Van M anagers and -building a m arket o f their own

M aancn (1 9 9 9 ) profession als
L cid n er (1 9 9 9 ) Interactive service -sm iling, m aking eye con tact, rem aining calm
w ork ers -being enthusiastic
(M cD on ald s -trying to p ersu ad e cu sto m e rs to listen to the sales
se rv e rs and pitch
insurance
salesp eo p le)
L ois (2 0 0 1 ) High risk takers -accepting the unknow n
(volu n teer search -suppressin g feelings in high-risk situations
and rescue gro u p ) -releasing and redefining feelings
K e lso n and Paid and volunteer -differential con stru ction o f em ergen cy m edical
Barley (1 9 9 7 ) em ergen cy te a m s’ w ork (as co m m o d ity o r com m un ity
m edical team s focus)
-p rom otin g ow n poin t o f view through
m argin alizing others
Pierce (1 9 9 S ) L itigato rs and -dom in atin g through intim idation (litigato rs)
paralegals -using strategic friendliness (litigato rs)
-show ing deferen ce and providing em otional care
to attorn eys (paralegals)
-m anaging resen tm en t ab out bein g treated as if
one is stupid (paralegals)
Ralaeli and Bill c o lle c to rs and -using a m ixtu re o f positive and negative
Sutton (1 9 9 1 ) crim inal em otion al displays to co n stru ct five ‘em otional
in terro gato rs con trast stra te g ie s’
Rac (1 9 9 8 ) Paid c arcgiv crs o f -m anaging ow n em otio n s in relation to
p erso n s with rc c e ip ie n ts’ inability to con trol their em otio n s
A ltze im e r’s -m anaging guilt
-m anaging tension in family life o f patient
T h oits (1 9 9 0 ) T h eoretical -coping with em otion al deviance (w hen feelings
deviate from what is e x p e cted in a given
situation)
Van M aanen D isneyland -participatin g in organizational rituals.
and Kunda em ploy ees and -con fo rm in g to p articu laristic stan dards o f
(1 9 8 9 ) em ploy ees o f a ap pearan ce, bein g nice.
high tech firm
W h arton and Serv ice se cto r -binding the g ro u p to ge th e r through integrating
E rickson (1 9 9 3 ) w ork ers em otio ns
(professional -convoying auth ority through m asking em otio ns.
and non- -provoking clien t com plian ce through displays of
p rofcssion al) anger, irritation
W isely and Fine P o rtrait painters -recognizing the ch aracter o f the clien t being
(1 9 9 7 ) portray ed
-negotiating the w ork er-clien t relationship
W olkom ir Gay and ex-gay -redefining situation and authenticating se lf
(2 0 0 1 ) Christian su p p o rt -p rom otin g participation in gro u p s
gro u p s -sustaining m e m b e rs’ com m itm en t
T h e o r is t s a lso n o te th at m a le - anti f e m a le - d o m in a t e d o c c u p a tio n s r e q u ir e

w o r k e r s to p e r fo r m d iffe r e n t k in d s o f e m o t io n w o r k . F lig h t a t te n d a n ts , t h e r e f o r e ,
m ay fe e l a n n o y a n c e an d t ir e d n e s s , b u t a re e x p e c t e d to h ave a ‘sincere s m i l e ’ w h e n
s e r v in g p a s s e n g e r s (H o c h s c h ild 1 9 8 3 : 1 2 0 ) . D o c t o r s o r c o u n s e llo r s m ay fe e l d e e p ly
a b o u t a c lie n t ’ s s itu a tio n , b u t th e y a r c r e q u ir e d to b e c o o l an d c o n tr o lle d in th e ir
r e s p o n s e (F in e m a n 1 9 9 4 : 1 9 ). E m o tio n w o r k is , t h e r e f o r e , n e e d e d to d e a l w ith the
o u t c o m e o f th e g a p b e tw e e n re a l an d r ig h t fe e lin g , an d in d iv id u a ls o fte n h ave to
m a n a g e th e r e s e n t m e n t (P ie r c e 1 9 9 5 ) o r c o n flic t (A r o n s o n 1 9 9 2 ) w h ic h th e y fe e l as
a r e s u lt o f th is g a p .
T a b le 2 D im ensions o f Em otion Work
Management o f self-feeling Making others feel a certain way Defining one’s work
A ronson (1 99 2 ) Bellas, (1 9 9 9 ) A ronson (1 9 9 2 )

Bellas (1 9 9 9 ) C lark (1 9 9 0 ) A ronson and N eysm ith (1 9 9 6 )
Fincm an (1 9 9 5 , 1996) Fine (1 9 9 6 ) Fine (1 9 9 6 )
G ub rium (1 9 8 9 ) Finem an (1 9 9 5 , 1996) Ghidina (1 9 9 2 )
H och schild (1 9 7 9 , 1983, H eim er and Stevens (1 9 9 7 ) H eim er and Stevens (1 9 9 7 )
1990) H ochschild (1 9 7 9 , 1983, Jam es (1 9 9 3 )
L cid n cr (1 9 9 9 ) 1990) N elson and Barley (1 9 9 7 )
Lois (2 0 0 1 ) Jam es (1 9 9 3 ) W isely and Fine (1 9 9 7 )
Pierce (1 9 9 5 ) Kahn (1 9 9 3 )
R ac (1 9 9 8 ) N elson and Barley (1 9 9 7 )
Stein b erg and Figart Pierce (1 9 9 5 )
(1 9 9 9 ) R afeli and Sutton (1 9 9 1 )
T h oits (1 9 8 9 ) Stein b erg and F igart (1 9 9 9 )
Van M aanen and Van M aanen and Kunda
K unda (1 9 8 9 ) (1 9 8 9 )
W h arton and E rickson W h arton and E rickson
(1 9 9 3 ) (1 9 9 3 )
W olkom ir (2 0 0 1 ) W isely and Fine (1 9 9 7 )
A c c o m p a n y in g th e g e n d e r in g o f e m o t io n w o r k is a f r e q u e n t d e - s k illin g o f th is
w o r k . H o c h s c h ild d is tin g u is h e s e m o t io n w o r k fro m e m o t io n la b o u r in t e r m s o f pay
an d lo c a t io n , th a t is , e m o t io n w o r k is u n w a g e d w o r k d o n e in th e p r iv a te s p h e r e ,
w h ile e m o t io n la b o u r is wro r k in th e p u b lic s p h e r e d o n e fo r a w a g e . A n u m b e r o f
o t h e r t h e o r is t s , h o w e v e r, h ave n o te d th a t th e re is o fte n c o n s id e r a b le o v e r la p
b e tw e e n th e se tw o c a t e g o r ie s , an d th a t it is n o t alw ay s e a sy t o s e p a r a t e th e p a id an d
u n p a id , o r p u b lic an d p r iv a te p a r t s o f a jo b ( s e e , f o r e x a m p le , G u b r iu m 1989;
M ir c h a n d a n i 1 9 9 8 , 1 9 9 9 , 2 0 0 0 ; U tt a l an d T o u m in e n 1 9 9 9 ) . T a n c re d n o t e s th a t it is
o fte n a s s u m e d th a t ‘ w o m e n a r c b o r n w ith c c r t a in “ n a tu r a l” s k ills w h ic h r e q u ir e
n e ith e r ta le n t n o r tra in in g , an d w h ic h a r c m e r e ly p a r t o f th e ir “n a t u r a l,” “ fe m in in e ”
b e h a v io u r ’ ( 1 9 9 5 : 1 7 ). H a ll a r g u e s th at m u c h o f th e s e r v ic e w o r k d o n e by w o m e n is
c o n s id e r e d an e x t e n s io n o f w o m e n ’ s r o le s in th e h o m e . R e s ta u r a n t s , fo r e x a m p le ,
c o n s tr u c t an d le g itim a te a g e n d e r e d im a g e o f th e s e r v e r as d e fe r e n tia l s e r v a n t (H a ll
C H A L L E N G I N G RACIAL S I L E N C E S IN STUDIES OF EMOTION WORK 2 6 9
1993: 4 5 5 ). A dkin s’ s study of hotel m anagers sim ilarly illustrates the ways in which
m anagers are ex p e cted to be m ale, but m arried m anagers are seen to be m ore
reliable because it is assum ed that m en cannot be coun ted on to carrv out m anv o f
the essen tial, routin e tasks required fo r the job. T h ese tasks arc the hidden and
unpaid respon sib ilities o f m an age rs’ w ives (1 9 9 5 : 7 6 ).
Th ese discussion s o f em otion w ork have allow ed w rite rs to illum inate the
relationships betw een d isco u rse s o f rationality and gen d ered stru ctu res within
organizations. T h e o rists note that the em phasis on rationality within organizations
has resulted in the fact that e m o tio n s have often been ‘w ritten ou t' (Fincm an
1994: I), treated as ‘handicapped appcn dagc[s] to re a so n ’ , or u n d erstood as c o m
m odities (M um by and Putm an 1992: 4 7 1 ; Ja m e s 1989: 130). Swan argues that
given the historical association betw een w om en and em otion ality, this discou rse
o f rationality within organizations has unique effects on w om en m an agers: ‘to be
a “p ro p e r” m anager requires that a w om an re p ro d u ce s an accoun t o f h erse lf in
term s o f attribu tes w hich com m only rep resen t a type o f m asculin ity’ (Sw an 1994:
105; Seron and Ferris 1995). For exam p le, w om en cite cryin g as an unprofessional
and a ‘g ir lie ’ thing to do (Sw an 1994: 105). T h oits sim ilarly n otes that individuals’
feelings may deviate from their required em otional displays, giving rise to
‘ em otional devian ce’ (1 9 9 0 : 1 81). Such deviance is likely when individuals hold
m ultiple ro les ‘that have m utually con tradictory feelin g e x p e ctatio n s’ (T hoits
1 990: 188). In so far as w o m e n ’s professional w ork requires em otional m asking,
w hile their family em otion w ork requires integrative em otio ns (W h arton and
E rickson 1993: 4 7 1 ), em otional deviance fo r w om en in profession al jobs in likely
to be high.
Th e insights gen erated through the studies discussed above have furth ered our
un derstandin g of the gen d er dim en sions o f em otion w ork as well as d ocu m en ted
the nature o f the em otion w ork done by w om en in a variety o f co n texts. In m uch
o f this analysis, there is an attem p t to m ove away from b iological un derstandin gs
o f gender. [. . .] At the sam e tim e, . . . m uch o f the analysis has been based on a
con cept o f a ‘universal w o m an ’ . Little attention is paid to the wavs in w hich w om en
arc socially loeated within a m ultitude o f hierarchies which coin cide with and
co n stru ct gen d er differences.
Racial silences and the norm alizing o f whiteness
C o n tem p o rary debates on em otion w ork, as outlined in the section s above,

norm alize w hiteness in tw o w ays: first, through the reliance on racially h o m o
gen eou s sam p les in em pirical stud ies, and secon d, through the assum ption that
w ork ers arc, by d efau lt, w hite.
W hile em pirical know ledge on em otion w ork has increased substantially in
the past tw o decad es, studies continue to draw on sam p les that are only, or p re
dom inantly w hite (see, for e xam p le, Bulan et al. 1997; Lois 2 0 0 1 ; Pierce 1995;
Seery 2 0 0 0 ; W h arton 1993; W olkom ir 2 0 0 1 ). This has led to the m asking o f a
n um b er o f im portan t fo rm s o f em otion w ork. L ee-T rew eek ’ s (1 9 9 7 ) analysis o f
nursing auxiliary w ork, for e xam p le, provides a nuanced and co m p le x u n d erstan d
ing o f the ways in w hich w ork ers deal with the often violent and dem ean in g
tre a tm e n t they re c e iv e fro m p a tie n ts and n u rse s. G iven w h at w e kn o w a b o u t the

p re v a le n c e o f ra c ism in the h ea lth -c are s e c to r (C a lliste 1 9 9 6 ), it w o u ld b e w o rth
e x p lo r in g how a u x ilia ry w o rk e rs w h o are w o m e n o f c o lo u r d o e m o tio n w o rk to
d e al sim u lta n e o u sly w ith the low sta tu s o f th e ir w o rk and the ra cia l s te r e o ty p e s o f
th e ir b a c k g ro u n d . S im ila rly , R afae li an d S u t to n ’ s (1 9 9 1 ) d isc u ssio n o f th e w o rk
d o n e by b ill c o lle c to r s an d c rim in al in te r r o g a to r s to u n d e rm in e th e ir v ic tim s ’
e m o tio n a l d e fe n c e s by b e in g n asty is likely to have b e e n d iffe re n t if th eir an alysis
h ad in clu d e d m a le b lac k in te r r o g a to r s (in the c o n tc x t o f th e s te r e o ty p e o f ‘ the
v io le n t b la c k m a n ’ ). P ie r c e ’ s (1 9 9 5 ) a c c o u n t o f the n u rtu r in g d o n e b y fe m ale
p a ra le g a ls ra ise s q u e stio n s a b o u t how this w o rk w o u ld b e d iffe re n t if e ith e r the
p a ra le g a ls o r th e a tto rn e y s th ey w e re c a r in g fo r w ere o f A sian , A frican o r H isp a n ic
d e s c e n t; an d h e r re se a rc h on the tre a tm e n t o f p e o p le o f c o lo u r in law firm s su g g e sts
th a t c h a lle n g in g the d e e p ly ra c ia lize d n atu re o f this se ttin g in v o lv e s c o n sid e ra b le
e m o tio n w o rk (P ie r c e , 2 0 0 3 ).
N o t on ly have stu d ie s re lie d p rim a rily on w h ite s a m p le s , b u t m u ch o f the
an aly sis o f e m o tio n w o rk to d a te h as b e e n b ase d on th e assumption o f racially
h o m o g e n e o u s in te ra c tio n s, an d on the a ssu m p tio n th at the d o m in a n t e th n ic g r o u p
d o e s n o t p o s s e s s a ‘ r a c e ’ (A n th ias 1 9 9 8 ). T h e o r is ts fre q u e n tly d o n o t p ro v id e the
ra c ia l c h a ra c te ristic s o f sa m p le s on w h ich an a ly se s o f e m o tio n w o rk arc d e v e lo p e d
(s e c , fo r e x a m p le , F in e 1 9 9 6 ; H all 1 9 9 3 ; R ac 1 9 9 8 ), m a k in g it d ifficu lt to th e o riz e
the w ays in w hich this w o rk is ra c ia liz e d . F o r e x a m p le , in the in tr o d u c tio n to a
re c e n t sp e cial issu e on e m o tio n w o rk in the Annals o f the American Academy o f Political
and Social Science, S te in b e rg an d F ig a rt c o m m e n t on the w ays in w h ich c u ltu ral
n o r m s o fte n s tr u c tu r e the a llo c a tio n o f p e o p le to d iffe re n t jo b s. T h e y n o te :
‘ G e n d e r is im p lic a te d w ith in th e se so c ia l n o r m s , w h ich vary by c u ltu re .

In the U n ite d S ta te s , fo r e x a m p le , w h e re s e r v ic e o rg a n iz a tio n s
e m p h a siz e e m o tio n a l d isp lay s o f frie n d lin e ss, w o m e n are m o r e likely
to b e h ired to w o rk in th e se o rg a n iz a tio n s b c c a u sc it is b e lie v e d th at, on
a v e ra g e , th ey sm ile an d d isp lay m o r e w a rm th than m e n d o. Yet, in
M u slim e u ltu re , su ch d isp lay s arc r c s tr ic tc d by e m p lo y e e s b c c a u s c they
w o u ld p ro v o k e a se x u a l r e s p o n s e .’
(S te in b e r g and F ig a rt 1 9 9 9 : 1 7 - 1 8 )
W h ile this is an in te re stin g an a ly sis, it d o e s n o t p r o v id e m u c h in sig h t in to the

e m o tio n w o rk d o n e by M u slim w o m e n w h o m ay b e w o rk in g in se rv ic e o rg a n iz a tio n s
in the U S A , o r by n o n -M u slim w o m e n w o rk in g in o rg a n iz a tio n s w ith s o m e M u slim
c u s to m e r s . A s G le n n a r g u e s , th is n o rm a liz in g o f w h ite n e ss in stu d ie s o f g e n d e r
o c c u r s w h en w h ite w om en arc p o sitio n e d as the ‘ u n iv e rsa l fe m ale s u b je c t ’
( 1 9 9 9 : 3 ). [. . .]
In te rlo c k in g h ie rarch ie s: race , class a n d g e n d e r
[. . .] R a th e r than id e n tify in g the se p a r a te im p a c t o f ra c e , g e n d e r an d c lass on

in d iv id u a ls’ liv e s, fe m in ist an ti-racist th e o ry str e ss e s the n e e d to d e v e lo p u n d e r
sta n d in g s o f h ow th e se fo r m s o f stratific atio n in tc rsc c t and o v e rlap . [. . .]
C H A L L E N G I N G RACIAL S I L E N C E S IN STUDIES OF EMOTION WORK 2 7 1
Friedm an argu es, for exam p le, that individuals do not hold fixed race, gen der
and class iden tities, n or do they con fron t static social divisions. She provides the
follow ing exam p le to illustrate h er point:
‘ In relation to w hite p eo p le, Leslie M arm on Silko and Paula Gunn Allen
are w om en o f colour, N ative A m erican s and partially w hite. In relation
to w om en o f colour, they arc N ative A m erican . In relation to N ative
A m erican s, they arc m e m b e rs o f the Laguana Pueblo. In relation to cach
other, they arc individual w om en w ho characterize the Laguna Pueblo
eulture in startlingly different w ay s.’
(Fried m an 1996: 125)
[. . .] The focus on the interlocking nature o f race, class and gen d er raises two
issues w hich can be used to exten d our understan din gs o f em otio n w ork. F irst,
rather than possessin g p articu lar eth nicities, class positions and gen der traits, in di
viduals occupy social locations w hich arc relational and shifting. The w ork o f re c o g
nizing, m anagin g and participatin g in these shifting relation s o f difference requires
em otion w ork w hich is done in con jun ction w ith the w ork o f m anaging o n e ’ s own
feelin gs, m aking oth ers feel a certain way and defining o n e ’ s w ork. Secon d, both
racial m ajority and racial m in ority g ro u p s do em otion w ork w hich is racialized, that
is, which is situated within hierarchies o f racial privilege and disadvantage. As
Razack argu es, ‘ it is vitally im portan t to e x p lo re in a historically and site specific-
way the m eaning o f race, econ om ic status, class, disability, sexuality, and gen d er as
they com e togeth er to stru ctu re w om en in different and shifting positions of pow er
and p riv ile g e ’ (1 9 9 8 : 12). W om en do em otio n w ork to m aintain privilege o r to
challenge disadvantage in con jun ction with the em otio n w ork they do as part of
their jo b s. [. . .]
Conclusions
[. . .] T h e focus on the gen dered nature o f em otion w ork n eeds . . . to be u n d erstood

in the co n text o f the in teraction s betw een gen dered p ro ce sse s and other processes
o f stratification. Two types o f projects w ould further facilitate this e xploration .
F irst, it w ould be useful to d ocum en t the ways in which past un derstandings
o f the em otion w ork done by flight attendan ts, service w o rk ers, n u rses, law yers,
and so on change w hen racially diverse g ro u p s o f these w ork ers are placed at the
centre o f analysis. W hile m uch o f the research to date has been con cern ed w ith
the conn ections and distinctions betw een ‘ em otion la b o u r’ (that is, the m an age
m en t o f feelings w hich arc done as p a rt o f o n e ’s jo b ) and ‘em otion w o rk ’ (fam ily
or unpaid w ork ), the e x p erien ces o f racially diverse g ro u p s o f peop le is likely
to reveal that the em otion w ork o f dealing w ith inequity is seldom rem u nerated
and yet a fundam ental part o f paid w ork. Th rough such an analysis, new u n d e r
standings o f em otion w ork (based not only on pay o r location o f w ork) can be
advanced.
A second set o f projects which w ould exten d ou r understan ding o f em otion
w ork could focus on processes o f racialization w hich may be presen t even in racially
2 7 2 KIRAN M I R C H A N D A N I
h om ogen eou s occupation s. Rather than an absence o f stratification, w ork ers in

h om ogen eou s w ork settin gs m ay, in fact, do em otion w ork to e x e rt privilege and
exclu sion , which w ould be w orthy of furth er study. T h ese exp loration s w ould
con tribu te to the theoretical and em pirical un derstan din g of the em otion w ork
involved in living and w orkin g in con tem p orary urban societies with coexistin g,
m ultiple and in terlock in g fo rm s o f stratification.
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Chapter 31
Stephen Fineman
G E T T I N G T H E M E A S U R E OF E M O T I O N
- A N D T H E C A U T I O N A R Y T A L E OF
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
[• ■ •]
o f the processes
E
m o t i o n p e n e t r a t e s a n d d e f i n e s m a n y
and co n sequ en ces o f organizing. T h ese include the subjective m eanings o f w ork,
leadersh ip, decision m aking, n egotiation , m otivation , ethical conduct, com m u n ica
tion , gen d er and ethnic relationships. M ore sharply, em otion draw s attention to the
psychological injuries o f w orking, such as h arassm ent, bullying, violen ce, stress and
em otio nal lab our (e.g. see Finem an, 2 0 0 3 a). E m o tio n ’s potential m ultifacetedn ess
su gg ests that any one approach to un derstan din g ‘it ’ w ill be ju st that — one
approach . It is n ecessarily p artial, m eaningful only in term s o f the philosophy that
in fo rm s it, the m edium through w hich it is conveyed and the receiving audicnce.
. . . Such strictu res have been broadly side-stepped by m ainstream organ iza
tional re se arch e rs o f e m o tio n , schooled principally in redu ction ist research (e.g. see
Ashkenasy et al., 2 0 0 0 ; D ien cr ct a l., 1999; P arrott & H crtcl, 1999; W eiss & B rief,
2 0 0 1 ). M etrication is a principal hallm ark o f their en deavours, reflecting a long
history o f p sy ch o m etrics the tran sform ation o f psychological qualities into
quantities. T h eir aim is to m ake the inchoate tangible through quantification. Size
m atters. E m otion is ‘ u n ro lle d ’ and divided into convenient units, w hich are then
susceptible to different fo rm s o f statistical m anipulation. As a ‘variab le’ , em otion
can then be co rrelated , o r causatively linked, w ith other variables — such as pride
w ith job satisfaction , fear w ith lab our turnover, anxiety w ith absen teeism (e.g. see
de D reue et a l., 2 0 0 1 ; W eiss & B rief, 2 0 0 1 ). [. . .]
N o academ ic discipline has exclusive rights to em otio n . It has been differently
colonized by b io lo gists, an th rop o lo gists, historians, so cio lo gists, psychoanalysts,
n eu rolo gists and several different branches o f psychology (e.g. clinical, evolution
ary, education al, organ ization al, p sy ch olin gu istics). And em otion is n ot, by any
m ean s, the sole province o f the sciences. Poetry, creative literature, m u sic, dram a
G ETTI N G T H E M E A S U R E 0 F E M OTIO N 2 7 7
an d the visu al a r ts have lo n g b e en c u sto d ia n s o f e m o tio n — b e in g at the v e ry so u l o f

th e ir e n d e a v o u rs. Su ch an im p r e ssiv e array re v e a ls so m e th in g o f the c e n tra lity o f
e m o tio n in h u m an affairs. M e a s u r e m e n t, o f c o u r s e , m a rk s o u t so m e o f th e m , b u t
n o n - m e a s u r e m e n t c h a ra c te riz e s m an y o th e r s. In the la tte r w e have r e p o r t e d s to r ie s
an d s p e e c h , c o n te x tu a liz e d o b se rv a tio n s o f b e h av io u r, p a r tic u la r o b s e r v a tio n s ,
e th n o g r a p h ie s, fre e - fo r m d ia r ie s , d r a w in g s, in te rp re ta tio n s o f sy m b o ls , te x tu a l
an aly ses o f se c o n d a r y d a ta (e .g . a u to b io g r a p h ie s, le tt e r s , official r e p o r t s ) , actio n
re se a r c h an d p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l an a ly sis (D o m a g a ls k i, 1 9 9 9 ; F in e m a n , 1993b,
2 0 0 0 b ; R e aso n & B ra d b u r y , 2 0 0 0 ) . T h e se ail g e n e ra te ‘b ro a d b a n d ’ d a ta , r e p r e
se n tin g fe e lin g an d e x p r e ss e d e m o tio n in d y n a m ic , so cially s itu a te d , f o r m . T h ey
c o n tr a s t to the m e a s u r e ’s in clin atio n to p r e - b o x , o r fre e z e , e m o tio n .
E m o tio n , th e n , h as m an y p o ssib le r e p re se n ta tio n s, o f w hich r e c o n s tru c te d
fe e lin g on re se a r c h e r -le d sc a le s are o n e b u t a d o m in a n t o n e . A s S tu rd y (2 0 0 3 )
p o in ts o u t, this te n d s to p r iv ile g e o n e fo rm o f e m o tio n k n o w le d g e (e .g . sta tistic al
tr e n d s , n u m e ric a l p r o file s) an d sile n c c s o th e r s (e .g . p e r so n a l m e a n in g s, in te r
p e r so n a l d y n a m ic s). E ven if the re p re se n ta tio n f e e l s / a p p e a r s c r u d e , r e m o te fro m
the daily c irc u its o f ‘ r e a l- t im e ’ fe e lin g an d its a m b iv a le n c e s (Vim l a 1, 2 or 3 on this
item? ‘I ’m sometimes a bit o f each ’; 7 can 't really remember how I “f e lt last week” ’), the
sc a le , n e v e rth e le ss, sp e a k s a u th o ritativ e ly fo r itse lf. T h e c o n v e n tio n s o f validity and
re lia b ility , an d th e ir n u m e ric a l sig n ific rs ('in tern al consistency r — . 7 8 ’, ‘correlation with
other, similar, measure r = .4 2 ') , tak e on a life, and ju stific a to ry r h e to r ic , o f th e ir o w n .
T h e re is a so cially c o n s tr u c te d , c o llu siv e , c o m f o r t in n u m b e rs. T h ey are
a b stra c tio n s that sy m b o liz e a u th o rity an d ‘ f a c t ’ in w ays that o th e r r e p re se n ta tio n s
o fte n fare le ss w ell in so c ia l scie n tific an d o th e r p r o fe ssio n a l c o m m u n itie s (Ie d e m a
et a l., 2 0 0 3 ) . [. . .] T h e d o u b tin g o r u n e asy re s e a r c h e r ev e n tu a lly c e a se s to d o u b t o r
fe el u n e a sv : ‘ It's just how we do i t ’; ‘i t ’s what my supervisor recommends’, 'it’s the only way
to get published'. T h e r e s e a r c h e r s ’ u n d e rsta n d in g o l th e ir o w n fe e lin g s an d e m o tio n s ,
th e ir o w n p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l re a ltie s , a rc sp lit-o ff fro m th e ir ‘s u b je c t s ’ , via m e a s
u r e m e n t. R e fle x iv e n e ss and e x p e r ie n tia l v alid ity arc sq u e e z e d o u t. W h at is lo st —
the fine te x tu r e , th e te n sio n s, the h ea t, the c o n tr a d ic to ry se n sa tio n s, th e su b tle
p o s t u r e s , the n e g o tia tio n s, the in te rc o n n e c tio n s b e tw e e n re s e a r c h e r and re se a r c h e d
arc n e ith e r n o tic e d n o r m o u r n e d , at le a st n o t p u b lic ly .
. . . Such issu e s arc c o m p o u n d e d w h en e m o tio n m e a su r e m e n t and c o n tro l
sp ills b e y o n d th e r e s e a r c h e r ’ s ow n c o m m u n ity tan gib ly to affe ct th e o r d e r in g and
v a lu in g o f o th e r p e o p le ’ s w o rk lives. E m o tio n b e c o m e s d e fin e d as a v a lu ab le , and
in str u m e n ta l, ‘ i t e m ’ fo r c o m m e r c ia l s u c c e ss. T h e re is, fo r e x a m p le , the p riz in g o f
p e o p le w ith high s e lf- e ste e m in the w o rk p la c e — ‘ the prime determinant o f organiza
tional an d personal success in the Information Age’ (B r a n d e n , 1 9 8 8 , b a c k c o v e r). In
c u s to m e r - s e r v ic e in d u str ie s (fa st fo o d , a irlin e s, h o te ls, th e m e p a rk s, call c e n tr e s ),
e m p lo y e e ‘ e n th u sia sm ’ , an d ‘ s m ile s ’ have b e c o m e p a r t o f the p r o d u c t, to b e
m o n ito r e d an d m e a su r e d (e .g . I lo c h sc h ild , 1 9 8 3 ; L e id n e r, 1 9 9 1 ; T alw ar, 2 0 0 2 ;
W ask o , 2 0 0 1 ) . H a p p in e ss h as fo llo w e d a sim ila r ro u te (L u b y o m ir s k i & L e p p e r,
1 9 9 9 ), n ow in c o r p o r a te d in to the o ffe rin g s o f m a n a g e m e n t c o n su lta n ts — as on e
c o n su lta n c y a d v e rtis e s :
M e a su re w o rk e r h a p p in e ss an d im p ro v e b u sin e ss s u c c e ss. S e e k in g o r g a n
iz a tio n s w h o value w o rk e r h a p p in e ss. T h is lo n g - te rm p r o c e s s / t o o l can
2 7 8 S T E P H E N F I N E M A N
be the catalyst for positive change in organizations and im prove

com m unication .
T h e point here is not that self-esteem , enthusiasm and happiness are unw orthy
pursuits (although all reflect a cultural valuation o f p articu lar em otio n states). The
con cern is about en capsulating w hat m ight plausibly be regard ed as c o m p le x ,
shifting and m icro-con tex tu al ph en om en a, on m easuring in stru m ents, and the
pow er that this invests in the m easu rers o r their sp o n so rs. W h at, w e may ask, arc
the effects on those w ho fail to 'm easu re u p ’ on the em otio ns prescrib ed ? [. . .]
W hen a dynam ic social or psych ological phenom enon is fram ed as a quantity or
positio n , it acquires p articu lar political force b ccau sc o f the sym bolic significance
attached to n um b ers. T h ere are, for instance, the life op p o rtu n ities o r constraints
that tend to follow an individual’s level o f m easured intelligence or academ ic
grad es (K am in , 1997; M ontague, 1 999). [. . .] C oun tin g, p e r se, creates a conveni
en t, durable, and often seductive, shorthand o f value o r w orth . Its auth ority ap pears
to derive from several so u rces: a redu ction in am biguity, m aking the co m p lcx and
inchoate ap pear m eaningful and m anageable; the pervasiveness o f natural sciences
w here n u m b ers are com m on ly taken as an indication o f precision and truth ; and a
cultural prcdilcctio n to arran ge peop le (organizations, pro d u cts, events, services) in
hierarchical o rd e r lo id e n lify /c re a lc w inners and lo se rs, high status and low status,
eligible and non-eligible.
Together, these influences can lock people into n u m b ers —and hold them there.
[. . .] E m otion , when e x p o se d to such m easu rem en t, along w ith m arketplace
dem ands and consultant in terv en tion s, is precariously p oised as a com m od ity to
exp lo it. It also creates con dition s o f self-fulfilling proph ecy, w here the authority o f
the m easure and its catego ries ( ‘low se lf-e ste e m ’ , ‘unhappy’ , ‘n e u ro tic ’ , ‘an x io u s’ ,
‘stre sse d ’) can p erm eate individuals’ self-percep tion s in ways they find hard to
con test or resist. E m otional intelligence illustrates this particularly w ell. [. . .]
Em otional intelligence has em erged from a challenge to the suprem acy o f
cogn itive, T Q ’ , intelligence. It has early ro o ts in the idea o f ‘m u ltip le ’ intelligences,
w hich includes ‘em otional sen sitivity ’ (G ardn er, 1 993), and from findings from
brain scien ces on the role o f em otion in thinking and problem solving (Bcchara
ct a l., 2 0 0 0 ). M ayer and colleagues have been prom in ent in developin g these
insights into a con ception o f em otional intelligence as,
an ability to recognize the m ean in gs o f e m otio n s and their relationships,

and to reason and p rob lcm -solve on the basis o f them .
(M ayer ct a l., 1999: 267)
From relatively quiet and cautious beginn in gs, em otional intelligence has rapidly
been ad opted by academ ic practition ers, heavily p ro m o te d by m anagem en t c o n
sultants and extensively e xto lled in trade m agazines and n ew sp apers. ( . . . )
All em otional intelligence m easu res arc based on au th or-con trived dom ains
and respo nse c ate go rie s, each one reflecting its ow n, particular, rendition o f e m o
tional in telligence. Som e au th ors attem p t to gauge em otional intelligence through
hypothetical events. For exam p le, a test item in the M u ltifactor E m otional
Intelligence Scale (M ayer et a l., 1988) d e scrib es a car hitting a d o g and asks the
G E T T I N G T H E M E A S U R E 0 F E M OTIO N 2 7 9
testee to d ecide ‘how likely the ow ner felt asham ed about not being able lo have
b etter trained the d o g ’ . O th er item s require the rating o f em otio n s portrayed in
p icto rial faces, and m aking em otio nal ju dgem en ts on w hat, fo r e xam p le, som eon e
feels ‘when their em otion grow s even past h appiness and they arc out ol co n tro l’
. . . (see review in C iarroch i ct al., 2 0 0 1 ).
The m o st com m on m easu res o f em otio n al intelligence arc of the se lf-rep o rt
kin d, how peop le perceive their ow n em otional abilities, com p eten ce or sensitivity.
In C o o p e r and Saw af’ s (1 9 7 7 ) ‘ EQ M a p ’ w e have, for exam p le, ‘I change my
em otional expression depen din g upon the person I am w ith ’ and, T can recogn ise
em otio n s in others by w atching their ey es’ (pp. 3 31—2 ). Total scores arc su m m a r
ized as ‘optimal’ , ‘proficient’ , ‘ vulnerable’ o r ‘cautionary’ . The Boston Ei Q u estio n
naire (C h apm an , 2 0 0 1 ) asks 25 qu estio n s, including ‘ How well can you con centrate
w'hen you are feeling an xiou s?’ and ‘ Are you able to d em on strate em pathy with
o th e rs’ feelin gs?’ . For C h apm an, a high total score is an indication that ‘you seem to
shape up pretty well’ , but a low score m ean s ‘ oh dearl’ . B a r-O n ’s E Q i scale contains
item s such as ‘ I have go o d relations with o th e rs’ and ‘ I’m fun to be w ith ’ , ‘ I’ m
sensitive to the feelings o f o th e rs’ (B ar-O n , 199 7 ). B ar-O n in cludes three factors
con sidered as ‘facilitato rs’ o f em otional intelligence —h appin ess, optim ism and self-
actualization (B ar-O n , 2 0 0 0 ; B ar-O n 8c Parker, 2 0 0 0 ). The E m otion al C om p eten ce
Inventory (Boyatzis ct al., 2 0 0 0 ) is based on re p o rts o f ‘ self-aw aren ess’ , ‘ self-
m an agem en t’ , ‘ social aw aren ess’ and ‘social sk ills’ . In addition lo the above
m easures there are n um erous self-rep o rt questionn aires on the Web offering instant
‘ E Q ’ read o u ts, typically coupled with the p rom otio n o f a con sultan cy service. An
exten sive review ol available m easures bv M atthew s et al. (2 0 0 2 ) fails to find
evidence ol con vergent validity (trian gulation ).
All such tech n iques arc highly ab stracted rep resentation s ol the m ulticu cd ,
real-tim e settin gs w here ‘em otionally in telligen t’ ju dgem en ts may occur. They
also assum e that reportable em otional kn ow ledge, ju d ge m e n t o r decision s are p r e
d icto rs o f em otionally intelligen t action . In a real-tim e event w e m ay, fo r instance,
intuitively act in an ‘em otionally in telligen t’ m anner, but be unable to re p o rt on our
own or o th e rs’ em otio n s, especially on questio n s that arc gen eral, h ypoth etical, or
both. Fu rth erm o re, if we acccp t a psychoanalytic p o rtrait o f reality, there is reason
to believe that we often do not know w hat feelings im pel w hat action s, how ever
hard we try. And when we do think we know, there is now con siderable evidence
that o u r thinking is rarely, if ever, em otion free: cognition and affect in terpenetrate
(Bechara et al., 2 0 0 0 ; de Sousa, 1 9 8 7 ; Fin em an , 1996, 2 0 0 3 a; Forgas, 2 0 0 0 ).
. . . M easuring em otio n al in telligen ce, and assigning p eop le an ordinal value o f
their w orth , is no n eutral act. A lthough em otional intelligence research ers m ight
argue the niceties o f their p articu lar ap proach , and claim im partiality in m appin g an
‘ in terestin g fie ld ’ , em otional intelligence has now b eco m e ap p ro p riate d , heavily
im pregn ated w ith a value stance o f the so rt: ‘high em otional intelligence is g o o d ;
low em otio n al intelligence is not g o o d ’ (Finem an , 2 0 0 0 a; Paul, 199 9 ). The
m apm ak er and m ap user arc com plicit in shaping the direction o f the field. This is
baldly revealed in the caveats and evaluations that attend the sum m ary o f results on
E Q -ty pe m easu res, and in the aggressive propagation o f the view that positive
em otio n s p rodu ce ‘ w in n e rs’ and ‘sta rs’ . For G olem an , em otionally intelligent
m anagers are en th usiastic, o p tim istic, hon est, e n ergetic, hopeful and persisten t;
they also exu d e em pathy, co m p o su re and self-assuran ce (G o le m an , 1966, 1988) —

an A m ericanized p ortrait o f ‘positive m ental attitu d e’ , o r as M atthew s et al. (2 0 0 2 )
su gg est, ch aracteristics that are ‘ . . . little m ore that a dating-agency o f desirable
qu alities’ (p. 531).
U niversal prescrip tion s tor m anagerial su ccess have eluded research ers tor
many d e cad e s, and it w ould be pru den t to regard em otional in telligen ce in such
historical light. In cu rren t, popular, ren ditions o f em otional in telligen ce, the place
o f ‘b a d ’ feelin gs, such as rage, jealo u sy , an xiety, guilt, b o re d o m , reven ge, disgust
and h urt arc given little voice, even though these feature in many political po rtraits
o f co rp o rate life and have, on occasion s, produced rem arkably successful business
or organizational results evidenced in the reputation of, for instance, H enry Ford,
Sam G oldw in , and Jack ‘N e u tro n ’ W elch o f G eneral F.lectric. A rguably, it w ould
som etim es be em otionally intelligent to be an gry , p essim istic, h urtfu l, envious or
vengeful. M ayer reflects:
W hen, in the dark days o f W orld W ar II, W inston Churchill ottered the
British p eop le ‘ B lood, sw eat and te a rs ’ , he w as not nice and it w as not
optim istic b ut it w as arguably quite em otionally in telligent. It is for
these reason s (and the fact that a century o f p erso nality research c o n tra
dicts the likelihood) that El research ers w ho hope to som eh ow live up
to the p op u lar claim s ab out su ccess by studying the positive asp ects o f
personality arc likely to be disappoin ted.
(M ayer, 2 0 0 1 : I 6)
Paul’s sen tim en ts accord w ith this view : ‘ Should a child from a m in ority ethnic or
religious gro u p be forced to en gage in trust-building activities with classm ates who
tease him ? Should kids from abusive h om es teel com pelled to “share their feelings”
with the entire class?’ (1 9 9 9 : 7 ).
The em otional in telligence lens otters little insight into how em otio n s arc
valued perfo rm ato rilv in different national cultu res and across ethnicity and gender.
C u rren t applications o f em otional intelligence can be seen as a ‘discou rse tec h
n o lo g y ’ (Fairclough , 1 9 8 9 ), ap pro priatin g social scicntific, o r quasi-scicn tific, kn ow
ledge, to p ro m o te a particu lar value sy ste m , or doctrin c, on em otio n s. It is the
coun tin g o f certain em otio n s that, su pp osed ly, count. Its ‘c ap tu re ’ is well described
by one enthusiastic devotee — a sen ior executive in a global financial services
organization:
El [em otional intelligence] . . . is an evolutionary path tow ards gettin g

a blend betw een acting and execu tin g tasks in a p articu lar w ay, with a
spirit that pervad es everything that the organisation d oes . . . it is about
gettin g peop le in the organisation to deliver the c o rp o rate values, to feel
go od ab out th em selves, about cach other and m o re im portan tly , to
p ro jcc t that passion to sell prod u cts in a sinccrc way.
(C h apm an , 2 0 0 1: 102)
The su b text here is that the em otionally less intelligent need correctin g in som e
way (typically through training). E m otional intelligence is a leverage point for m ore
sales. [. . .]
G ETTI N G T H E M E A S U R E 0 F E M OTIO N 2 8 1
T h e ‘ le s s ’ e m o tio n a lly in te llig e n t are e x p o s e d to the a p p a re n t a u th o rity o f

‘ t h e ir ’ te s t s c o re — an d to a s c o r e r w h o h as a v e ste d in te re st in d e m o n stra tin g that
e m o tio n a l in te llig e n c e ‘ w o r k s ’ . E m o tio n a l in te llig e n c e m e a su r e m e n t c re a te s a fo rm
o f k n o w le d g e th ro u g h w h ich the w o rk e r is d e fin e d , an d can also c o m e to defin e him
o r h e r se lf. It re n d e r s the e m o tio n a lly in te llig e n t, an d ‘ u n in te llig e n t’ , v isib le and
m o r e g o v e rn a b le (M ille r & R o s e , 1 9 9 0 ). [. . .]
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Chapter 32
Charlie L. Reeve, Steven G.Rogelberg,

Christiane Spitzmiiller and
Natalie DiGiacomo
THE CARING-KILLING PARADOX

E u th a n a s ia -re la te d s tra in a m on g a n im a l-s h e lte r w o rk e rs
It’ s very difficult w hen we are inundated from spring until fall. Every
single p erso n who w alks through the d o o r has one m ore litter o f kittens.
And you only have X n u m b er o f cages in your facility, and they arc
already full. So the anim al may com e in the front d o o r and go out the
back d o o r in a b arrel.
(Sh elter em ploy ee, as re p o rte d in Arluke & Sand ers, 1996)
I think it’ s [anim al euthanasia] m ade m e an angry p e rso n . I w ant to be

alone m o st ol the tim e. I drink som etim es to num b the stress o f the day.
I eat and sleep m o re than I feel I need. I used to feel that my w ork w as
helping “ save” the w orld. N o t anym ore. It d o e sn ’ t seem to end.
Although I believe that euthanasia isn ’t the w orst thing that can happen
to an an im al, it’ s taking a toll on my life!
(A non ym ous shelter em ploy ee, perso n al com m un ication,
A pril 6, 2 0 0 2 )
in the U nited
T
HE M A GN ITU DE OF PET OVERPOPULATION
States ap pears to m ake anim al euthanasia a tragic and n ecessary reality. Each
year, an estim ated 4 to 12 m illion com pan ion anim als are euthanized (cf. “ H SU S pet
overpopu lation e stim a te s,” 2 0 0 0 ; N assar, Talboy, & M o ulton , 1992; O lso n , 199 0 ).
Although som e have m edical p rob lem s severe enough to preclu de ad option and
w arran t euthanasia, m any o f the anim als euthanized are healthy but unw anted.
M o st typically, the job o f perfo rm in g euthanasia on unw anted anim als falls in
the hands o f anim al-sh elter w ork ers. Though no large-scale effort has been m ade
to investigate this p op u lation , n um erous eth nographic investigations and m edia
re p o rts have suggested that individuals perfo rm in g anim al euthanasia are at
increased risk o f em otional m ism an agem en t, physical ailm ents such as high blood
2 8 4 C H A R L I E L. RE E VE , ET AL.
pressure and u lcers, unresolved g rie f, depression , as well as substance abuse and
even suicide (e .g ., A rluke, 1994; A rluke & Sand ers, 1996; Fogle & A brah am son,
1 990; F ro m m e r & A rluke, 1999; H art & M ader, 1 9 9 5 ;R o llin , 1986; San d ers, 1995;
“Sh elter w o rk e rs,” 2 0 0 0 ).
T h ese an ecdotal re p o rts certainly seem to su gg e st that sh elter w ork ers are
experien cin g a severe form o f w ork strain stem m in g from w hat A rluke (1 9 9 4 ) calls
a caring—killing paradox. That is, il suitable hom es arc n ot found in a tim clv m anner,
shelter w ork ers arc cxp cctcd to euthanize anim als for which they have been p rovid
ing carc and p ro te ctio n . C on sisten t with this notion, Rollin (1 9 8 6 ) argued that
shelter w ork ers arc e x p o sed to a type o f stresso r qualitatively different from the
typical types o f physical, task, and ro le-p rocess stre sso rs studied in the w ork -stress
literature: a “m o ral” stressor. N am ely , shelter w ork ers, m o st o f w hom en ter the
occupation because they w ant to help anim als (R ollin , 1 9 8 6 ), are faced with a daily
con tradiction betw een their ideal occupation al selves (i.e ., p ro te c to rs o f anim als)
and the reality o f having to kill healthy but unw anted anim als. The cffects o f this
stre sso r are likely to be am plified given the social stigm a attached to the killing o f
com panion anim als.
T h ere is reason to believe that the thousands o f peop le charged with p e r fo r m
ing anim al euthanasia in the U nited States arc a potentially at-risk population. In
view o f the m agn itude o f the pet overpopu lation p ro b lem , lim itations on g o v e rn
m ental and private funding for the creation o f shelter facilities, and the persistence
o f pet abandonm en t and relin quish m en t, the need for p erform in g euthanasia is
unlikely to d ecrease in the n ear future. Taken together, it behooves applied psy ch o l
ogists to ad dress the dearth o f substantive em pirical research aim ed at u n d erstan d
ing and helping individuals and sh elter m anagem en t deal with euthanasia-related
issues.
As the first quantitative investigation o f this top ic, the p u rp o se o f the currcn t
study is to gain prelim in ary em pirical eviden ce of the prevalen ce and co rrelates o f
euthanasia-related strain am on g shelter w ork ers. As any single field study in a new
area o f inquiry can m ake only lim ited advances, a secon dary p u rp o se o f this study is
to sensitize the applied research com m un ity to this unique population and to
provide a stepp ing stone for the additional research required to understand fully the
psych ological ram ifications o f perfo rm in g anim al euthanasia. [. . .]
D iscussion
The cu rren t study show s evidence that anim al euthanasia is an im p ortan t source
o f jo b strain for anim al-sh elter em ploy ees. F irst, w hen asked, m o st em ployees
re p o rte d feelin g strain as a result o f their involvem ent w ith euthanasia. The
prevalence o f these E R S p ercep tion s su p p o rts the suggestion by p rio r qualitative
studies that euthanasia is a significant stre sso r for anim al-sh elter em ployees.
Further, am on g a grou p o f peop le w ho all w ork in the sam e gen eral sheltering
en vironm en t, the resu lts show a clear pattern o f differences in stress and w ell-being
betw een those w ho are involved directly w ith euthanasia and those w ho are not
directly involved. M ost notably, those w ho are directly involved in euthanasia
re p o rte d significantly higher levels of w ork stre ss, stress-related som atic
TH E C A R I N G - K I L L I N G P A R A D O X 2 8 5
complaints, and WFC, and lower levels of satisfaction with the work that they
actually do. Likewise, among those who are engaged in euthanasia, the results
demonstrate that perceived ERS was correlated significantly to a number of
well-being-related outcomes beyond that resulting from the variance shared with
generalized work stress.
Taken as a whole, these results, which are summarized in Table 1, indicate that
among individuals for whom conducting animal euthanasia is part of their job, it is a
salient, unique source of work stress that has a negative impact on their w'cll-bcing.
These findings should be of additional importance to shelter management in that
poor physical and affective well-being can lead to absenteeism and turnover
(Chen & Spcctor, 1992; Hendrix Ovallc, & Troxlcr, 1985; Wright & Cropanzano,
1998).
It is interesting to note that there was variability on ERS and the well-being
indexes for employees involved in euthanasia activities. This suggests that not all
employees arc affected by euthanasia involvement to the same extent. The observed
diversity of reactions to a common stressor is not surprising and is consistent
with a body of research from differential psychology in general, and work stress in
particular, showing that the appraisal of a stressor as a threat depends on one’s
T a b le 1 Sum m ary o f H ypotheses and R esults
Hypothesis cant findings
Individuals involved in euthanasia activities, M ostly su p p o rte d ; significant

com p ared to shelter w ork ers not involved in differences in gen eral job stress,
euthanasia activities, w ill e x p e rie n ce m ore w ork-to-fam ily conflict, overall job
w ork-to-fam ily con flict, som atic satisfaction , and satisfaction with
com plain ts, substan ce use, w ork stre ss, and w ork itself, but not substan ce use
less job satisfaction
Perceived F R S w ill be associated positively Fully su p p orted

with w ork-to-fam ily con flict, som atic
com plain ts, and substan ce u se ; and
negatively w ith overall job satisfaction.
Individuals w ho perceive higher levels o f Fully su p p o rte d

E R S w ill re p o rt higher overall stress.
Perceived E R S w ill be associated positively M ostly su p p o rte d ; significant

with w ork-to-fam ily con flict, som atic correlatio n s w ith overall job
com plain ts, and substance u se ; and satisfaction , w ork-to-fam ily conflict,
negatively w ith overall job satisfaction after and som atic com p lain ts, but not
con trollin g for the variance as a resu lt o f substance use
overall w ork stress.
A ttitudes tow ard the n ecessity o f euthanasia M ostly su p p o rte d ; significant

(scored positively) will be correlated correlatio n s w ith E R S , overall job
negatively w ith E R S and positively w ith satisfaction , w ork-to-fam ily conflict,
in dicators o f w ell-being. and som atic com p lain ts, but not
substance use
Note. ERS = cuthanasia-relatcd strain.

personal resou rces (L azarus & Folkm an, 198 4 ). A variety o f personal and organ iza
tio n al/situ atio n al facto rs have reliable and im portan t influences on the propensity
to e x p erien ce stress and the ability to cope with stre ss, presum ably by buffering or
depletin g o n e ’s p erso n al reso u rces.
The cu rrcn t analyses su ggest that variance in E R S and w ell-being is associated
w ith individual, w ork , and organizational differences. For instance, we found that
e m p lo y e e s’ attitudes towrard euthanasia w ere associated significantly writh perceived
E R S. Individuals w ho arc m o re apt to evaluate euthanasia as n ecessary and ac c e p t
able, given the m agn itude o f the overpopu lation o f unw anted p e ts, appear to
p crccivc experien cin g less strain from their euthanasia involvem ent. It is possible,
however, that this association is a con sequen ce, rather than an an teced en t, o f differ
ences in the euthanasia respo n se. That is, those w ho have difficulty dealing with
euthanasia may eventually develop negative attitudes tow ard it, w hereas those who
do n ot e x p erien ce E R S may com e to hold a m ore positive evaluation o f the ac ce p t
ability o f euthanasia.
C learly, the ro les o f m any m ore individual differences in explain in g variation in
E R S necessitate investigation. For p ragm atic reason s, the curren t study w as lim ited
in the n u m b er o f scales that could be adm in istered to participan ts w ho w ere “ on the
fly” at these con feren ces. This is clearly a lim itation o f the cu rrcn t study. H ow ever,
we m ade the decision to forgo the assessm ent o f many o f these variables in the
in terest o f increasing o u r respo nse rale , believing it m ore im portan t to gain reliable
inform ation about a little rather than unreliable inform ation about a lot. Future
research should continue to investigate association s betw een individual ch aracte r
istics and E R S. For e xam p le, the gen eral w ork stress literatu re has indicated that a
n um b er o f personality ch aracteristics (e .g ., h ardiness, locus o f con trol) arc related
to differences in susceptibility to em otional and psy ch o lo gical strain, as w ell as
copin g re sp o n ses (C o sta , Som erfield, & M cC rae, 1996; H ahn, 2 0 0 0 ; H avlovic &
K cnnan, 1995; K obasa, 1982; K rohn e, 1996; L e fc o u rt, 1992). Inform ation such as
this poten tially could be used to identify em ployees w ho may be m o re resilien t (or
altern atively, to screen for those w ho may be especially susceptib le) to the adverse
effects o f p e rfo rm in g animal euthanasia.
O u r investigation o f the w ork-related factors and w ell-being su ggests that there
is a difference betw een the total am oun t o f tim e a p erso n is engaged in euthanasia
and how this tim e is distributed over the cou rse o f the w ork w eek. For exam p le, the
results show that the n u m b ers o f h ours engaged in euthanasia per w eek w as asso ci
ated w ith increased substance use. Sim ilarly, the frequency o f con ductin g euthanasia
w as associated positively w ith W F C . T h ese results su gg est that the m ore a p erso n is
engaged in euthanasia overall, the w orse the im pact on w ell-being.
O n the other hand, am ong those w ho perform euthanasia, the im pact on w ell
being ap pears to be associated w ith differences in how sh elters schedule this tim e.
That is, those w ho engage in fewer, lon ger session s re p o rt less substance use and
W F C com pared to those w ho con duct m ore frequ en t, sh o rter session s. T his may
suggest that frequen t, sh o rt euthanasia sessions arc m ore em otionally taxin g in the
aggregate than in frequen t, but lon ger sessions. Findings such as these clearly indi
cate the need for further, m ore detailed investigations o f the ram ifications o f vari
ations in euthanasia w ork p rocesses.
The results also indicate that organizational differences are associated with
TH E C A R I N G - K I L L I N G PARADOX 2 8 7
differences in well-being. Specifically, the pattern o f results indicated that shelter

type (private vs. g o v e rn m e n t/m u n icip al) w as associated with differences prim arily
in w ork satisfaction in dicators, w hereas sh elter size w as associated prim arily with
stress-related indicators (e .g ., E R S, overall stre ss, W F C ). W hile the cu rrcn t study
is not able to investigate the specific shelter facto rs that arc associated w ith these
differen ces, the finding that organizational size w as inversely associated with
stress-related indicators of w’ell-bcing is consisten t with o u r initial suggestion that
larger sh elters may have m ore social and financial re so u rce s to help em ploy ees deal
effectively with E R S (e .g ., shelter size m ay act as a proxy for variables that may
m od erate or directly influence the cx p c ric n c c o f stre ss). H ow ever, future research
w ill be needed to identify specific ch aracteristics associated w ith these ou tcom es.
As stated earlier, this study w'as seen as an effort to lay a foundation for further
study, rather than an attem p t for a com prehen sive assessm en t o f all euthanasia-
related influences. Although a full discussion o f potential future research in this area
is w ell beyond the scope o f this paper, wc provide a fcwr su ggestion s for general
directions. F irst, staying w ithin the organizational psychology fram ew ork from
wrhich w'e ap proach ed this study, future research can be thought o f as em phasizing
either breadth or depth. That is, one stream o f future research n eeds to expan d the
breadth o f the n exus o f variables associated with E R S. For in stance, a variety o f
organizational-level variables m ight be related to differen ces in the am bient level o f
E R S across organizations. Likew ise, as pointed out earlier, future studies need lo
b etter sam ple the dom ain o f individual differences lo b e tter understand the full
range o f an teced en ts o f E R S. M oreover, the potential fo r interactions and p e rso n —
environm ent co rresp o n d en ce requires investigation.
O n the oth er hand, rath er than casting a w ide n et, it also w ould be useful (or
future stud ies to take a m o re focu sed , in-depth approach by focusin g on a sm aller
sam ple (e .g ., a single sh elter) across tim e and using a full range o f research tech
niques (e .g ., su rv ey s, in terv iew s, w ork place ob servation , ex p e rie n ce sam pling
tech niques, exp erim en tal d esign s). As one e xam p le, additional in terview s w'ith
som e o f the participan ts regardin g how m anagem en t can help em ploy ees su ggests
that the follow ing interventions may be w orth studying for their poten tial to redu ce
E R S o r its effects: (a) establishing internal su p p o rt o r discussion g ro u p s; (b ) provi
sion o f profession al coun selin g; (c) m anagem ent sp on sorsh ip o f self-care behaviors
(e .g ., vouch ers o r discoun ts to health clubs, spon sored non-wrork gath erin gs or
en tertain m en t, scheduling “quiet tim e” into w o rk e rs’ sch ed u les); (d) job redesign
(e .g ., rotation o f d u ties); (e) increased euthanasia technical training; and (f) public
aw areness initiatives (e .g ., in creased focus on the prevention o f anim al o verp op u la
tion , gen eral public education o f euthanasia policies and p ro ce d u re s). A focused
approach , though lim ited in other rc sp c c ts, is an ap p ro p riate way to evaluate the
effectiveness o f in terven tion s such as these.
Secon d, w'e believe that the investigation o f anim al-sh elter em ployees affords an
opp ortu n ity to apply a variety o f theoretical persp ectives. To take but a single
exam ple from the m anagem en t literatu re, A shlorth and K re in e r’ s (1 9 9 9 ) m o d el o f
dirty w ork w ould seem highly applicable lo this population . In addition to the
personal stru gg le lo deal with and recon cile the carin g— killing p arad o x, shelter
w ork ers as a gro u p are often confronted with the social stigm a o f doing dirty work;
that is, w ork that is m and ated , yet m orally stigm atized by society (H u gh es, 1951,
196 2 ). By engaging in w ork that is regarded as m orally tainted (e .g ., “sinful”) by

society , negative attribu tions likely may be attached to shelter w ork ers them selves,
w hich, in tu rn , may add m ore strain by fru stratin g their desire to co n stru ct a
positive sense o f sell and to seek social validation (A sh forth & K rciner, 1999). The
point here is that this is m erely one o f many valuable th eoretical p ersp ectiv es that
poten tially could be b rough t to b ear on this issue to b etter un derstand the ram ifica
tions o f euthanasia-related w ork.
Finally, over the past three decad es, anim al-w elfare issu es ap pear to have
m oved from the fringe into the m ainstream o f social con science. This m akes salient
questions such as w hether increased social aw areness increases or decreases the
stress o f euthanasia-related w ork. O n the one hand, perhaps increased aw areness
alleviates stress as a resu lt o f gre ater public understan ding o f the role that shelter
w ork ers play and the p rob lem s they face, as well as increasing don ation s and
volun teer help. O n the other hand, perhaps gre ater aw areness enhances the stress
by increasing the saliency o f the social stigm a attached to this w ork. Likew ise,
shelter w ork ers m ight e xp erien ce a sense o f h opelessn ess if they perceive increased
social con cern , but fail to ob serve a con com itan t decrease in pet overpopu lation.
We believe that the m yriad o f research questions that rem ain w ill require
m ulti-disciplinary answ ers. Many o f these questio n s require an in tegrated co n sid er
ation and understan ding o f social p ro b lem s, w orkplace dynam ics, individual m ental
health, death and dying, anim al handling, and hum an-anim al in teractions. C learly,
this requires exten din g the um brella o f participation lo fields outside o f psychology,
such as socio lo gy , thanatology, and ethics. A lbeit based on lim ited e x p o su re , we
believe that our colleagues across psychology and other social sciences w ill be
pleasantly su rp rise d with how w illing the anim al-sh eltering com m unity is to
e m b racc re se arc h e rs’ ideas and to participate in substantive research endeavors.
This study is the first system atic attem p t to investigate quantitatively the im pact
ot animal euthanasia on shelter w o rk e rs’ w ell-being. T h e findings d em on strate that
euthanasia-related w ork is significantly related to a n u m b er o f w ell-being ou tcom es
o f accepted im p ortan ce in applied psych ology. Further, the com parative analyses
betw een those w ho arc and those w ho arc n ot subjected to euthanasia-related
activities at w ork show substantial ditfcrences in various indicators o f well-being.
Taken together, these results suggest that un derstan din g and w orking to am eliorate
or cope with E R S is o f im p ortan ce, not only for individual w ell-being, but for
organizational effectiveness as w ell.
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w w w .h su s.o rg /p r o g r a m s/c o m p a n io n / o v e rp o p u la tio n /o p_faq.h tm l
H ughes, E. C . (1 9 5 1 ). W ork and the self. In J. H. R oh rcr & M . Sh erif (E d s.), Social
psychology at the crossroads (pp. 31 3—323). N ew York, NY: H arper and Brothers.
H ughes, E. C. (1 9 6 2 ). G ood peop le and dirty w ork. Social Problems, 10, 3—11.
K obasa, S. C. (1 9 8 2 ). The hardy personality: Toward a social psychology o f stress and
health. In J. Suls & G. S. Sanders (E d s.), The social psychology o f health and illness
(pp. 3—32). H illsdale, N J: Law rence Erlbaum .
Krohne, H. W. (1 9 9 6 ). Individual differences in coping. In M . Z cid n cr & N. S. Endlcr
(E d s.), Handbook o j coping: Theory, research, applications (pp. 381—4 0 9 ). N ew York,
NY: John W iley and Sons.
Lazarus, R . S ., & Folkm an, S. (1 9 8 4 ). Stress, appraisal, and coping. N ew York, NY:
Springer.
L cfco u rt, H. M . (1 9 9 2 ). Perceived con trol, personal effectiveness, and em otional
states. In B. N. C arp en ter (E d .), Personal coping: Theory, research, and application
(pp. 111—11 3). N ew York, NY: Praegcr.
N assar, R ., Talboy, J., & M oulton, C. (1 9 9 2 ). Animal shelter reporting study: 1990.
E nglew ood, N J: A m erican H um ane A ssociation.
O lso n , P. N. (1 9 9 0 ). C on cern ed about euthanasia of healthy h om eless anim als. Journal of
the American Veterinary Medical Association, 196, 10.
R ollin, B. E. (1 9 8 6 ). Euthanasia and m oral stress. Loss, Grief, and Care, 7 , 1 1 5—126.
Sand ers, C. R . (1 9 9 5 ). K illing with kindness: Veterinary euthanasia and the social
con struction o f perso n h ood . Sociological Forum, 10, 195—214.
Shelter w ork ers suffer from dealing in death. (2 0 0 0 , May 15). The Washington Times,
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Chapter 33
Allen C. Smith, III and Sherryl Kleinman
M A N A G I N G E M O T I O N S IN
M EDICAL SCHOOL
S tu d e n ts ' c o n ta c ts w ith the living and the dead
H ow do I set aside 25 years o f living? E xp erien ce w hich m ade close

contact w ith so m e o n e ’s body a sensual event? M aybe it’ s attraction ,
m aybe disgust. But it isn ’t su p p osed to be part o f what I feel w hen I
touch a patient. 1 feel som e o f those things, and I w ant lo learn not to.
(T hird-year, m ale m edical stu d en t.)
T
HE IDEOLOGY OF AFFECTIVE NEUTRALITY is stron g in
m edicin e; vet no co u rses in the m edical curriculum deal directly with em otion
m an agem en t, specifically learnin g to change o r elim inate in app rop riate feelings
(H ochschild 1983). Rather, tw o years o f participan t observation in a m edical school
revealed that discussion o f the stu d e n ts’ feelings is tab oo; their developm en t tow ard
em otional n eutrality rem ains p art o f the hidden cu rricu lu m . U n der great pressure
to prove them selves w orthy o f en terin g the p rofession , students are afraid to adm it
that they have u n com fortab le feelings about patien ts or p ro ced u res, and hide those
feelings behind a “cloak o f co m p e te n ce ” (H aas and Shaffir 1977, 1982). Beneath
their surface p resen tatio n s, how do students deal w ith the “un profession al” feelings
they brin g over from the perso n al realm ? B ccausc faculty m e m b e rs do n ot address
the p ro b lem , students are left with an individualistic ou tlook : they c x p c c t to get
con trol o f them selves through sheer w illpow er.
D esp ite the silence surroun din g this to p ic, the faculty, the cu rricu lu m , and the
organization o f m edical school do provide stud en ts with resou rces for dealing with
their prob lem . T h e cultu re o f m edicine that in form s teaching and provides the
feeling ru les also offers unspoken su p p o rts for dealing with unw anted em otio ns.
Students draw on asp ects o f their e xp erien ce in m edical sch ool to m anage their
M A NA G I NG EMOTIONS IN M E D I C A L SCHOOL 2 9 1
em otio ns. T h eir strategies include tran sform in g the patient o r the procedure
into an analytic ob ject o r event, accentuating the co m fo rtab le feelings that com e
from learning and practicin g “ real m ed icin e,” blam ing patients, em pathizing with
patients, joking, and avoiding sensitive con tact. [. . .)
The studen ts’ problem
As they en coun ter the hum an b ody, stud en ts c x p cricn cc a variety o f u n com fortab le
feelings including em b arrassm en t, disgu st, and arousal. M edical sch oo l, however,
offers a b arrie r against these feelings by providing the anesthetic effect o f long
h ours and academ ic pressure.
You know the sto ry . O n call every third night, and stay in the hospital
late m o st other evenings. I d o n ’t know how y o u ’re su p p o sed to think
w hen y o u ’re that tired , but you d o, plod through the day insensitive to
everything.
(T hird-year m ale)
W ell before en tering m edical sch oo l, students learn that their training w ill involve
constant pressure and continuing fatigue. Popular sto ries prepare them for social
isolation, the im possibility o f learn ing everything, long h ou rs, test anxiety, and
the fact that m edical school w ill perm eate their lives (B ecker, G eer, H ugh es, and
Strauss 1961). T h ese difficulties and the sacrifices that they entail legitim ate
the special status o f the p rofession the students are entering. They also blunt the
stu d e n ts’ em otio n al responses.
Yet u n com fortab le feelings break through. T h rough out the p ro g ram , students
face provocative situations— so m e p redictab le, oth ers surprising. They find p arts of
their training, particularly dissection and the au top sy , bizarre o r im m oral when
seen from the persp ective they had “ for 25 y e ars” b efore enterin g m edical school.
D oing the pelvis, w e cut it across the w aist. . . . Big saw s! The m ad
scientist! People w ou ld n ’ t believe w hat w e did in there. The cracking
sound! T h at day w as m ore than anxiety. We w ere really violating that
p erso n . . . D raw n and qu artered .
(First-year m ale)
I did my autopsy 10 days ago. That shook m e o ff m y feet. N othin g could

have prepared m e for it. The person w as my age . . . She ju st looked
(pause) asleep. N o t like the cadaver. Fluid, b lo o d , sm ell. It sm elled like a
butch er shop. And they handled it like a butch er shop. The technicians.
Slice, m ove, pull, cut . . . all the organ s, insides, pulled out in 10
m in utes. I know it’ s ab surd, but what if sh e ’s not really dead? She
d o e sn ’ t look like it.
(Secon d-y ear fem ale).
The “ m ad scien tist” and the “b utch er” violate the stu d e n ts’ im ages o f m edicine.
2 9 2 A L L E N C. S M I T H , III AND S H E R R Y L K L E I N M A N
Even in m ore routine kinds o f con tact, the students so m e tim e s feel that they are
ign orin g the sanctity o f the body and breaking social taboos.
M uch o f the stu d e n ts’ d isco m fo rt is based on the fact that the b odies thev
have con tact with arc or w ere people. Suddenly stud ents feel un certain ab out the
relationship o f the p erso n to the b ody, a relationship they had previously taken tor
g ran te d .
O
It felt tough when wc had to turn the w hole body over from tim e to
tim e (during d issection ). It felt like real peop le.
(First-year fem ale)
O K . M aybe he w as a father. But the father p art is go n e. This is just the

body. That sounds religious. Maybe it is. How else can I think ab out it?.
(First-year m ale).
W hen the p erso n is som eh ow recon n ected to the b ody, such as w hen data about
the living patient w ho died is brough t into the autopsy ro o m , students feel less
confident and m ore uneasy.
Studen ts find con tact w ith the sexu al body particularly stressful. In the
anatom y lab, in practice session s w ith other stu d en ts, and in exam inin g patien ts,
students find it difficult to feel neutral as contact approach es the sexual parts o f the
body.
W hen you listen to the heart you have to w ork around the b reast, and
m ove it to listen to one spot. I tried to do it with m inim um con tact,
w ithout starin g at her tit . . . b reast . . . T h e different w ords (pause)
show s I w as feeling both things at oncc.
(Secon d-y ear m ale)
Though they arc rarely arou sed , students w orry that they w ill be. They feel guilty,
know ing that sexuality is p ro scrib ed in m cdicinc, and they feel em b arrassed . M ost
con tact involves som e feelin gs, but contact with the sexual body p resen ts a bigger
p ro b le m . [. . . ]
Studen ts also feel d isgust. They see feces, sm ell vom it, touch w ounds, and hear
bone saw s, en coun terin g m any repulsive details w ith all o f their senses.
O n e patient w as really g ro ss! He had som eth ing that kept him standing,
and coughing all the tim e. C oughin g ph legm , and that really b oth ers
m e. G ro ss! Ju st som eth in g I d o n ’t like. Som e sm elled real bad. I d id n ’t
w ant to exam ine their axillae. Stinking arm p its! It w as just not so m e
thing I w anted to do.
(Secon d-y ear fem ale).
W hen the ugliness is tied to living patients, the aesthetic problem is especially
difficult. O n open ing the bow els o f the cadaver, for exam p le, students perm it
them selves som e silent exp ressio n s o f d isco m fo rt, but even a w ince is unacceptable
w ith repugn an t living patients.
To m ake m atters w orse, stud en ts learn early on that they are not supp osed
to talk about their feelings w ith faculty m em b ers o r other students. Feelings
rem ain private. T h e silence en courages students to think about their problem as an
individual m atter, extran eou s to the “real w ork” o f m edical school. They speak of
“screw in g up your co u rag c ,” “gettin g con trol o f y o u rse lf,” “being tough en o u gh ,”
and “putting feelings asid e .” They w orry that the faculty w ould con sider them
in com peten t and unprofession al if thcv adm itted their prob lem .
I w ould be em b arrassed to talk ab out it. You’re su pp osed to be p r o

fessional here. Like th e re ’s an un w ritten rule about how to talk.
(First-year fem ale)
The “un w ritten ru le ” is relaxed enough so m e tim e s to p erm it discussion, but the
privacy that su rrou n ds these rare occasion s su ggests the d egree to w hich the taboo
exists. At tim e s, stud ents signal their un com fortab le feelin gs— rolling their eyes,
turning aw ay, and sw eating— but such con firm ation is lim ited. E xem plifyin g plu ral
istic ignoran ce, each stud ent feels unrealistically inadequate in com parison with
peers (yet an oth er u n com fortab le feelin g). Believing that other students are hand
ling the problem b e tter than they are, each student m anages his or her feelings
privately, only vaguely aw are that all students face the sam e prob lem . [. . .]
Emotion m anagem ent strategies
How do stud ents m anage their u n com fortab le and “in app rop riate” feelings? The
deafening silcn cc surroun din g the issue keeps them from defining the problem as
shared, or from w orking out com m on solutio n s. They cannot develop strategics
collectively, but their solutions arc not individual. Rather, students use the
same b asic em otion m anagem en t strategics b ccausc social n o rm s, faculty m o d e ls,
cu rricu lar p rio ritie s, and official and unofficial exp ectation s provide them with
uniform guidelines and re so u rc e s for m anagin g their feelings.
Transform ing the contact
Students feel u n com fortab le b ecause they are m aking physical con tact w ith people
in ways they w ould usually define as ap p ro p riate only in a p erso n al co n te x t, o r as in
ap pro priate in any co n te x t. T h eir m o st com m on solution to this problem is cogn i
tive (H och schild 1979; Th oits 198 5 ). M entally they tran sform the body and their
contact w ith it into som eth in g entirely different from the con tacts they have in their
perso nal lives. Students tran sform the p erso n into a set o f eso teric body p arts and
change their intim ate con tact w ith the body into a m echanical or analytic prob lem .
I just told m yself, “ O K , d o c, y o u ’re here to find out w h at’ s w ron g, and
that includes the axillae (a rm p its).” And I detach a little, redu ce the
p erso n for a m om en t . . . Focus real hard on the detail al hand, the
fact, o r the p roced u re o r the question. Like w ith the cadaver. Focus
on a vessel. Isolate dow n to w hatever y o u ’re doing.
(Secon d-y ear fem ale)
[. . .] Students also tran sform the m om en t o f con tact into a co m p lex intel
lectual puzzle, the kind o f challenge they faced successfully during previous years o f
schooling. They in terp ret details accord in g to logical pattern s and algorith m s, and
find answ ers as thev m aster the ru les. [. . .)
The patient is really like a math w ord prob lem . You break it dow n into
little pieces and put them together. The facts you get from a history and
physical, from the labs and chart. They fit togeth er, on ce you begin to
see how to do it . . . It’s an in tellectual challenge.
(T hird -year fem ale)
D efining con tact as a part o f scientific m edicine m akes the students feel safe.
They are fam iliar w ith and confident about science, they feel su p p o rte d by its
cultural and cu rricu lar legitim acy, and they enjoy rew ards fo r dem on strating
their scientific know-how. In effect, scien cc itself is an em otion m anagem en t
strategy . By c o m p etin g fo r years for the highest grad e s, these stud en ts have
learned to separate their feelings from the substance o f their classes and to
con ccn tratc on the im person al facts o f the sub ject m atter. In m cdical school they
use these “educational skills” not only for academ ic su ccess b ut also for em otion
m anagem en t. [. . .]
The scientific, clinical language that the students learn also su p p o rts intel-
lectualization. It is c o m p le x , e so te ric, and devoid o f perso nal m eanings. “ Palpating
the ab do m en ” is less p erso nal than “feelin g the b e lly .” [■ ■ ■]
Further, the stru ctu re o f the language, as in the stan dard fo rm at for the p re se n
tation o f a case, helps the stud ents to think and speak im personally. Sccon d-ycar
students learn that there is a routine, acccptablc way to su m m arize a patient: ch icf
com plain t, h istory o f presen t illn ess, past m edical history, family history, social
history, review o f sy stem s, physical findings, list o f p ro b lem s, m edical plan. In many
situations they m ust redu ce the sequen ce to a tw o- o r three-m inute sum m ary.
Faculty m e m b e rs praise the students for their ability to presen t the details quickly.
M edical language labels and conveys clinical in fo rm ation , and it leads the students
away from their em otion s.
Tran sform ation so m e tim e s involves changing the body into a nonhum an ob ject.
Students think o f the body as a m achine or as an anim al sp ecim en , and recall earlier,
com fortab le e x p erien ces in w orking on that kind o f ob ject. T h e body is no longer
provocative b ecause it is no lon ger a body.
A fter we had the skin o ff (the cadaver), it w as pretty m uch like a cat or
som ething. It w asn ’t pleasan t, but it w asn ’ t hum an either.
(F irst-year fem ale)
(The pelvic exam ) is pretty m uch like checking a broken toaster. Il

isn ’ t a prob lem . I’ m go o d at that kind o f thing.
(Secon d-year m ale)
You can ’ t tell w hat’ s w ron g w ithout looking under the hood. It’s d if
ferent w hen I’m talking w ith a patient. But when I’m exam ining them
it ’s like an au tom o bile engine . . . T h e re ’ s a bad con n otation with that,
but it’ s literally what I m ean.
(T hird-year m ale)
[. . .] T h e curriculum su p p o rts these dehum anizing tran sform ation s by

elim inating the person in m o st o f the stu d e n ts’ con tact w ith the b ody. C on tact is
usually in direct, based on ph otograph s, X -rays (and several new er tech n o lo gies),
clinical re c o rd s, d iag ram s, and w ritten w ords. Studen ts w ould have to m ake an
effo rt to recon n ect these im ages to the peop le they rem otely rep resen t. [. . .]
A ccen tu atin g the positive
As we hinted in the previous section , tran sform in g body contact into an analytic
event d o c s not m erely rid stud ents o f their un com fortab le feelings, producin g
n eutrality. It often gives them op p o rtu n ities to have good feelings ab out what
they are doing. T h eir com fortab le feelings include the excitem en t o f practicin g
“real m ed icin e,” the satisfaction o f learn in g, and the prid e o f living up to m edical
ideals.
Students identify m uch o f their con tact w ith the body as “real m e d icin e ,”
assertin g that such con tact separates m edicine from other profession s. As contact
begin s in dissection and contin ues through the third-year clinical clerksh ips,
students feel excited about their p rogress. [. . .]
This (dissection ) is the p art that is really m cdical school. N o t like any
other school. It feels like an initiation rite, som eth in g like when I joined
a fraternity. We w ere really go in g to w ork on peop le.
(First-vcar m ale)
[. . .] Eventually stud en ts see con tact as their responsibility and their right, and
forget the sen se o f privilege they felt at the beginning. Still, som e excitem en t
retu rn s as they take on clinical responsibility in the third year. All o f these feelings
can displace the d isco m fo rt which also attends m o st contact.
C on tact also provides a com pellin g basis fo r several kinds o f learnin g, all o f
w hich the stud ents value. They sense that they learn som eth in g im p ortan t in co n
tact, som eth in g rich cr than the “dry facts” o f tex tb o o k s and lcctu rcs. Physicians,
they believe, rely on tou ch , not on te x t. [. . .]
L a u g h in g ab o u t it
[. . .] By redefining the situation as at least partially h u m oro u s, students reassure

them selves that they can handle the challenge. They believe that the problem can ’t
be so serio u s if there is a funny side to it. Jokin g also allow s them to relax a little
and to set ideals aside for a tim e.
W here do students learn lo joke in this way? The faculty, including the
residen ts (w ho are the real teach ers on the clinical team s), participate freely,
leach in g the stud ents that h um or is an acceptable way to talk about uncom fortable
en cou n ters in m edicine. [. . .]
Unlike the stu d e n ts’ other strate gie s, jok in g oc cu rs prim arily w hen they are
alone w ith other m edical p rofession als. Jo k es arc acccptable in the hallw ays, over
coffee, o r in ph ysicians’ w o rk ro o m s, but usually are un acceptable w hen ou tsid ers
m ight overhear. Jo kin g is b ackstage behavior. Early in their training, students
so m e tim e s m ake jok es in public, perhaps to strengthen their identity as “m edical
stu d e n t,” but m o st h um or is in-house, reserv ed fo r those w ho share the problem
and have a sen se o f h um or about it.
Avoiding the contact
Students som etim es avoid the kinds o f con tact that give rise to unw anted em otions.
They con trol the visual field during con tact, and elim inate o r abbreviate particular
kinds o f con tact. [. . .]
K eepin g perso nal body p arts covered in the lab and in exam in ation s prevents
m old , m aintains a sterile field, and p rotects the p atien t’s m odesty. C overs also
elim inate disturb in g sites and p ro te c t students from their feelings. Such non-
profession al p u rp o se s are som etim es m ost im p o rtan t. Som e stu d en ts, for exam p le,
exam ine the b reasts by reaching under the p atien t’s gow n , b ypassing the visual
exam in ation em ph asized in training. [. . .]
Conclusion
M edical students som etim es feel attracted to o r d isgusted by the hum an body.
They w ant to do som eth in g about these feelin gs, but they find that the topic is
taboo. Even am on g th em selves, stud en ts generally refrain from talking about
their prob lem . Yet despite the silen ce, the culture and the organization o f m edical
school provide stud en ts with su p p o rts and guidelines lo r m anaging their em otions.
A ffective socialization p ro ce ed s w ith no d eliberate co n tro l, but with profoun d
effect. [. . .]
The . . . em otion m an agem en t strategies used by the stud en ts illustrate the
cultu re o f m odern W estern m cdicinc. In relying on these strate gics, the students
rep rod u ce that cultu re (Foucault 197 3 ), creating a new generation o f physicians
w ho will su p p o rt the biom edical m odel o f m edicine and the kind o f d octor-patien t
relationship in w hich the patient is too frequently dehum anized. Studen ts so m e
tim es criticize their teach ers for an apparen t insensitivity to their p atien ts, but they
turn to desensitizing strategies them selves in their effo rt to con trol the em otio ns
that m edical situation s provoke. T h ese strategies exclu d e the p atien t’s feelings,
values, and social co n te x t, the im p ortan t psychosocial asp ects o f m edicine (Engel
1977; G orlin and Z u ck er 198 3 ). C on trad ictin g their previous values, students
rein force biom edicin e as they rely on its em otion m anagem en t effects. ( . . . )
It w ould be unfair to con clude that m edical training is uniquely responsible
for the specific character o f the stu d e n ts’ em otion m anagem en t problem and for its
unspoken solution. The basic features o f the culture o f m edicine are con sistent with
the w id er cultural con text in w hich m edicine exists. B iom edicine fits with the
em phasis in W estern cultu re on rationality and scientific “ob jectiv ity .” In W estern
societies the m ind is defined as su p e rio r to the body, and thoughts are defined
as su p e rio r to feelings (M ills and K leinm an 1988; Tuan 1982; Turner 198 4 ). N ot
surp risingly, stud en ts know the feeling ru les o f p rofession al life b elo rc they arrive
at m edical sch oo l. C hildhood socialization and form al education tcach them to set
aside their feelings in public, to m aster “ the fa c ts,” and to presen t them selves
in intellectually defensible ways (B o w ers 1984). M edical situations provide vivid
challenges, but stud ents co m e equipp ed w ith em otion m anagem en t skills that they
need only to stren gth en . [. . .]
References
Becker, II., B. Geer, E. Hughes and A. Strauss. 1961. Boys in White. N ew Brunswick,
N J: Transaction.
Bow ers, C. 1984. The Promise o f Theory: Education and the Politics o f Cultural Change. New
York: Longmans.
Engel, G. 1977. “The N eed for a New Medical M odel: A Challenge for Biom edicine.”
Science 196(4286): 129—36.
Foucault, M. 1973. The Birth o j the Clinic: An Archaeology ( j Medical Perception. N ew York:
Pantheon.
Gorlin, R. and II. Zucker. 1983. “ Physicians’ Reactions to Patients: A Key to Teaching
1Iumanistic M edicine.” New England Journal o j Medicine 308(18): 1 0 5 9 -6 3 .
1Iaas, J. and W. Shaffir. 1977. “The Professionalization o f Medical Students: Developing
Com petence and a Cloak o f C om peten ce.” Symbolic Interaction 1:71—88.
— . 1982. “Taking on the Role o f D octor: A D ram aturgical Analysis o f Professional
ization.” Symbolic Interaction 5 :1 8 7 —203.
lloch sch ild, A. 1979. “Em otion W ork, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure.” American
Journal o j Sociology 8 5 (3 ):5 5 1 —75.
— . 1983. The Managed Heart. Berkeley: University o f California Press.
M ills, T. and S. Kleinm an. 1988. “Em otions, Reflexivity, and Action: An Interactionist
Analysis.” Social Forces 66(4): 1009—27.
Thoits, P. 1985. “Self-Labeling Processes in Mental Illness: The Role o f Emotional
Deviance.” American Journal o j Sociology 91:2 21 —49.
Tuan, Y.-F. 1982. Segmented Worlds and Self: Group Lije and Individual Consciousness.
Minneapolis: University o f M innesota Press.
Turner, B. The Body and Society. 1984. N ew York: Basil Blackwell.
8 . Emotions, economics and consumer culture
MOTIONS ARE CENTRAL to economic processes of production and

E consumption and, more generally, to processes of decision-making. This is
increasingly recognized among theorists of economic behaviour, an area trad ition ally
dominated by models that assume a rational, self-interested actor as their norm.
Recent years have seen a proliferation of studies of emotion, for example in
connection with buying behaviour for marketing purposes (O'Shaughnessy and
O'Shaughnessy 2002); in relation to the management of uncertainty in the context of
global financial institutions ( Pixley 2004); or for the purpose of revising theoretical
models of risky choice behaviour ( P ilz 2007). Theorists of consumer culture, on
the other hand, have long recognized that com m odities are invested with symbolic
meaning; practices of consumption are em otionally significant in so fa r as they bear
on the construction of individuals' identity and forms of belonging (D ittm ar 2007;
Sassatelli 2007; Slater 1997).
The first extract in this section is drawn from Colin Cam pbell's The Rom antic
E th ic and the S p irit o f M odern Consumerism (1987). Campbell is one of a number
of scholars who have argued against 'produ ctivist' historical narratives - namely
narratives that im plicitly privilege the historical role of production, and that present
consumer culture as emerging only at the beginning of the twentieth century, as a
consequence of the industrial revolution. Campbell builds on Weber's thesis relating
the protestant ethic of rationality, industry and emotional control to the rise of
capitalism . He argues that a second 'ethic' associated with Sentim entalism and then
Rom anticism proper (both with roots in eighteenth-century English Puritanism ),
combined with the former to facilitate the industrial revolution. Cam pbell's longer
term view thus suggests that this more 'em otionalist' Puritan strand is a key cause of
the modern economy and not, as typically thought, merely its effect. He thus attempts
to explain the consumer revolution of eighteenth-century England in terms of the
300 P 0 LI T I C A L ECO N 0 M I E S 0 F A F F EC T
spread of an 'em otionalist' ethic. Campbell sees in this ethics the origins of more
recent forms of hedonism based on the endless creation of 'w ants' through the
imputation of ultim ately illusory meanings and images onto a mass-produced
procession of commodities.
The second extract is drawn from Danny M ille r's A Theory o f Shopping (1998)
and was selected as something of a counterbalance to those w riters who stress the
illusory, shallow and hedonistic values associated with consumption. It is based on
anthropological fieldw ork conducted in London and informed by the idea that, if we
are to ta lk of the meaning of everyday consumption practices, then we had better talk
to those doing the consuming. Drawing on the example of M rs Wynn, M ille r makes
the case that much ordinary, working class supermarket shopping can be construed as
a form of 'love m aking'. That is to say, the minutiae of daily purchasing decisions and
actions are framed within broader and higher aims and values, such as sensitive care
for one's family.
Love figures also in our third extract, from Daniel Lefkow itz's a rticle 'Investing
in Emotion: love and anger in financial advertising' (2003). In this piece Lefkow itz
examines the television com m ercials for financial services companies that were shown
during the late 1990s in the US. Lefkow itz finds that these ads frame and construct
the financial services by way of discourses and images associated either with loving
nurturance and care, or with anger and violence. He adopts a discursive approach
that sees emotions as cu ltu rally constructed within 'perform ative texts', such as these
T V com m ercials.
Our last extract is from an a rticle by Jon Elster published in 1998, a pioneer in
attempting to bridge the gap between emotion theory and economic theory - two
fields, Elster wrote, 'that seem to exist in near-complete isolation from each
other'. The a rticle as a whole accordingly proposes 'a general way of incorporating
emotion into the to o lk it of economics'. Elster reviews the psychology of emotion
and extracts a 'cost-benefit model of emotions'; this model concentrates on the
m otivational dynamics of affects such as shame and guilt and promises to be of use in
explaining and predicting behaviour. He suggests that emotions can shape the 'reward
param eters' for 'ration al choice' (e.g. by changing people's preferences or acting as
psychic costs or benefits). However, he also suggests that emotions can shape the very
ability to make rational choices, either on a short term (a brief episode of anger) or a
long term (a lifelong hatred) basis.
References
Dittmar, H. (200 7) Consum er Culture, Identity and W ellbeing: the search fo r the 'good
lif e 'a n d the 'body perfect'. Hove: Psychology Press.
O'Shaughnessy, J. and O'Shaughnessy, N. J. (2 0 0 2 ) The M a rk e tin g Pow er o f Em otion.
New York: Oxford University Press.
P ilz, F. (200 7) E m otions and R isk y Choice: an experim ental and theoretical study from
the econom ic psycholog ical perspective. Saarbriicken: V D M Verlag
Pixley, J. (200 4) E m otions in Finance: distrust and uncertainty in g lob al m arkets.
Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press.
S assatelli, R. (2 0 0 7 ) Consum er Culture: history; theory and politics. London: Sage.
Slater, D. (199 7) Consum er Culture and M odernity. Cam bridge: Polity.
Ch a p t e r 34
C o lin C a m p b e ll
T H E R O M A N T I C E T H I C and T H E
S P I R I T OF M O D E R N C O N S U M E R I S M
Most attempts to describe the general development of modern thought

tend to pay exclusive attention to the growth of rationalism. The result
is a picture quite incompatible with historical facts and the world as we
know it.
Karl Mannheim
T
H E O X F O R D E N G L IS H D IC T IO N A R Y DEFINES the word ‘romantic’ as
meaning ‘marked by or suggestive of or given to romance; imaginative,
remote from cxpcricncc, visionary, and (in relation to literary or artistic method)
preferring grandeur or passion or irregular beauty to finish and proportion’ . None
of these connotations would appear to have much to do with those activities which
are generally covered by the heading ‘consumption’ . The selection, purchase and
use of goods and services arc all forms of everyday action which, on the contrary,
we commonly tend to view as rather dull and prosaic matters, except perhaps on
those rare occasions when we purchase a major item like a house or a car. It would
appear, therefore, that consumption, being a form of economic conduct, should be
placed at the opposite pole of life from all that we generally regard as ‘romantic’ .
The reasonableness of this contrast is deceptive, however; something which
becomes apparent once we recognize that there is one significant modern
phenomenon which docs indeed directly link the two.
This, of course, is advertising, for even the most cursory examination of the
pages of glossy magazines and the contents of television commercials will serve to
reveal how many advertisements are concerned with the topic of ‘romance’ , or
with images and copy which deal with scenes which are ‘remote from everyday
experience’ , ‘imaginative’ or suggestive of ‘grandeur’ or ‘passion’ . And it is not
just romance in the narrow' sense which features so prominently in conjunction
with perfume, cigarettes or lingerie advertisements —it is also that the pictures and
3 0 2 COLIN C A M P B E L L
sto rie s used are typically ‘ ro m a n tic ’ in the b ro a d e r sen se o f b ein g e x o tic , im ag in a
tive and id e alize d ; w h ilst the very p u rp o se o f ad v e rtise m e n ts, o f co u rse , is to in duce
us to buv the p ro d u c ts w hich are fe atu re d : in o th e r w o rd s, to c o n su m e .
T h e fact that basically ‘ ro m a n tic ’ cu ltu ral m aterial is c o m m o n ly u sed in
a d v e rtise m e n ts in this fashion has often been n o ted and h ence on e cou ld sav that a
ge n e ral aw aren ess of the link b e tw e en ‘ro m a n tic ism ’ and ‘c o n su m p tio n ’ already
e x ists. T h e assu m p tio n w hich has largely prevailed am o n g social sc ie n tists, h ow
ever, in deed a m o n g aca d e m ics and in te lle ctu als in ge n e ra l, has b een that it is the
a d v e rtise rs w h o have ch o scn to m ake u se o f this m aterial in an atte m p t to p ro m o te
the in te re sts o f the p r o d u c e rs they re p re se n t, and c o n seq u en tly that the relation sh ip
should be seen as one in w hich ‘ ro m a n tic ’ b e lie fs, asp iratio n s and attitu d e s arc
p u t to w o rk in the in te re sts o f a ‘ c o n su m e r so c ie ty ’ . T h at view is ch allenged in the
p ages that follow (alth ough n ot d ism isse d ) w h ere it is argu ed that the rev erse
relation sh ip should also be taken se rio u sly , w ith the ‘r o m a n tic ’ in gre d ie n t in
cu ltu re re g ard e d as having had a cru cial p a rt to play in the d e v e lo p m en t o f m o d e rn
c o n su m e rism itse lf; in d e e d , sin ce co n su m p tio n m ay d e te rm in e d em an d and
d e m an d su p p ly , it co u ld be arg u e d that R o m a n tic ism itse lf played a critical ro le in
facilitatin g the In du strial R ev o lu tio n and th e re fo re the c h aracte r o f the m o d e rn
econom y, f. . .]
The p ro b lem p o se d at the b egin n in g o f this b o o k w as that o f acco u n tin g fo r the
c o n su m e r revo lu tion w hich acco m p an ie d the on set of in du strialization in
e igh teen th -cen tu ry E n glan d. N o tin g that e c o n o m ic h istorian s had iden tified the
im p o rta n ce o f risin g d em an d as a cru cial fa c to r initiatin g that re v o lu tio n , and
lo cate d its p rin cipal cau se in a ‘ new p ro p e n sity to c o n su m e ’ , the o rig in s o f this
p ro p e n sity w ere then taken as the fo c u s o f d iscu ssio n . W h ilst the eviden ce show ed
that this ste m m e d from ch an ges in values and a ttitu d e s, b e in g in so m e way related
to such in novations as the rise of m o d e rn fash io n, ro m an tic love and the n ovel, it
so o n b e ca m e cle ar that e x istin g acc o u n ts of these ch an ges w ere cith e r re d u ctio n ist
o r circular. T h is p ro b lem w as then show n to b e a ge n e ral featu re o f those
th e o rie s o f c o n su m e r b eh aviour c u rrc n t w ithin the social scie n c e s, w ith n eith er the
in stin ctivist, m an ip u latio n ist n or V cblcn csqu c p e rsp e ctiv e s su p p ly in g satisfactory
ex p la n atio n s o f that dyn am ic g e n e ratio n o f new w an ts w hich is so c h aracte ristic
o f m o d e rn c o n su m e rism . In d eed , th ese p e rsp e c tiv e s w ere seen to be serio u sly
d eficien t in th eir ah istorical tre atm e n t o f the su b je c t, as w ell as in th eir co m m o n
ten d en cy to re g ard w an tin g as an irratio n a l, in voluntary and ‘ u n w o rth y ’ fo rm o f
behaviour.
It th e re fo re proved n c c cssa ry , in o rd e r to re so lv e this h isto rical p ro b le m ,
n ot only to p ro v id e a m o re ad eq u ate c o n cep tu alizatio n o f the n ature o f m o d e rn
c o n su m e rism , b u t to d e v e lo p a th e o ry w h ich , w hile n o t re d u cin g this asp e c t o f
hum an co n d u ct to a m a tte r o f in stin ctive im p u lsiv e n e ss o r en viron m en tal m a n ip u la
tio n , n e v e rth e le ss c o m p e n sate d fo r the inability o f u tilitarian ism to c o n sid e r the
q u e stio n o f the orig in o f w an ts. T h e so lu tio n ad o p ted w as to tu rn to a h ed on istic
m o d e l o f hum an actio n , and esch e w in g the m islea d in g habit o f treatin g this te rm as
a synonym fo r utility, focu s upon that featu re o f h um an co n d u ct in w hich pleasu re
and not satisfaction is the g o al. R e c o gn itio n o f the fu n dam en tal and ex ten siv e
d iffe ren ce s b etw een b eh aviou r d ire c ted to w ard th ese tw o e n d s, and h ence the fact
that in dividuals livin g above the level o f su b siste n ce are likely to be faced w ith a
THE ROMANTI C ETHIC & THE SPIRIT OF MODERN C O N S U M E R I S M 3 0 3
choice betw een them , m ade it possible to distinguish traditional from m odern
h edon ism . The fo rm e r w as identified as a preoccu pation with sensory exp erien ce,
with ‘ p le asu re s’ regarded as d iscrete and standardized events, and in the pursuit o f
which there is a natural tenden cy for the h edonist to seek desp otic pow ers. M o dern
hedonism is m arked, in co n trast, by a preoccu pation with ‘p le asu re ’ , envisaged
as a potential quality o f all exp erien ce. In o rd e r to ex tract this from life, however,
the individual has to su b stitu te illusory fo r real stim uli, and by creatin g and m an ip u
lating illusions and hcncc the em otive dim ension o f con scio u sn ess, con stru ct his
own pleasurable en vironm en t. This m o d e rn , au ton om o u s, and illusory form o f
hedonism com m on ly m anifests itse lf as day-dream ing and fantasizing. [. . .]
H edonistic self-interest and rom antic idealism
The m ann er through w hich genuinely idealistic or m oral action m igh t decay over
tim e into a m ere h edon istic self-con cern is readily ap preciated, and has already been
referred to in discussing the decline o f the cult o f sensibility. T h ere it w as su ggested
that an exaggerated display o f sen tim en tality m igh t not indicate eith er genuine
feelings o f pity or co n cern , nor lead to ap p ro p riate benevolent o r sym pathetic
action, being m ainly a sym ptom o f self-love. Joyce Tom pkins provides a go o d
description o f this ph en om en on :
again and again we find that en orm ity o f self-con gratulation w ith which
the w eep er al once luxuriates in the beguiling softn ess o f tears and
com plim en ts h im self on his capacity for shedding them , seein g in his
m in d ’s eye not only the ob ject o f his attention [that is w hatever
p ro m p ted the display ol em otion] but him sell in a suitable attitude in
fron t o f it.
Even earlier, w e had occasion to note w hat David Fordyce called that ‘ self-
approving jo y ’ w hich is open to the benevolent m an, and w hich Isaac Barrow
dubbed ‘virtu o u s v o lu p tu o u sn e ss’ . C rane labelled it ‘egoistic h edonism ' of the kind
that leads individuals to ‘entertain th em selves w ith pleasan t R eflections upon their
own W o rth ’ It is especially easy to see how Puritanism m ight lead to this kind o f
h ypocrisy and self-love, given the rep eated injunctions to exam ine o n e ’ s spiritual
con dition, cou pled w ith the urgent need to have con firm ation o f o n e ’ s status as a
m e m b e r o f the elect. Such continual reflection 011 o n e se lf and o n e ’ s con duct w as
bound to provide am ple op p o rtu n ities for self-adm iration.
It generally req u ires a g re ater e ffo rt, on the other hand, to recogn ize how it
is that action o f an essentially h edonistic kind may also develop into ethical and
idealistic fo rm s. H ere it is critically im p ortan t to recogn ize that ideals are
n ecessarily im plicated in that variety o f im aginatively m ediated h edonism w hich has
been taken to con stitute the spirit o f co n su m erism , and this for the sim ple reason
that perfected o r ‘id ealized ’ im ages naturally offer the greatest pleasure. T his is
clearly revealed in both W alter M itty ’ s and Billy L iar’ s fantasies for in each case
idealized self-im ages are the central m eans through w hich pleasure is attained.
O b viously, if il is pleasant to con tem p late p erfect im ages, then il is especially
pleasant lo con tem p late ourselv es as em bodying that perfection . W aller M itty
obtain s pleasure from his fantasies because he envisages h im self as a dare-devil flying
ace or w orld-fam ous su rgeon , w hilst the heroine o f V irginia W o o lfs story ‘ se e s’
hersclt as the epito m e of beauty. We may choose to regard such day-dream s as
evidence o f self-love, or even childishness, but on e cannot escape the fact that thcv
do involve the im aginative realization o f ideals, and, as such, can, un der ap pro priate
circu m stan ces, b e co m e the basis for self-idealistic activity in reality. C on duct
directed at realizing perfection in o n e se lf arising out o f im aginative exercises o f this
kind thus m anifests a m ixtu re o f h edonistic and idealistic features. Striving to m ake
o n eself beautiful is perhaps the m o st obvious and com m on exam ple o f such
behaviour, and although it can justifiably be labelled ‘se lf-in te reste d ’ , it also c o n
stitutes ‘ id ealism ’ in the sen se o f bein g activity aim ed at fulfilling an ideal. Such
self-directed idealism b e co m e s especially im p o rtan t, however, w hen the m oral
rather than the aesthetic dim en sion is the focus o f attention.
M orally idealized self-im ages can be just as m uch sou rces o f pleasure as
aesthetic o n es, as Sim on e de B eauvoir revealed in her autobiography. T h ere she
disclosed how, as a child, she played fantasy gam es w ith her sister, using exem plary
figures as the basic p ro p s for their h edon ism . She d escrib es how, in the co u rse o f
playing these ch aracter gam es, she often im agined h e rse lf to be M ary M agdalen e,
‘dryin g C h rist’ s feet w ith her long h air’ , o r alternatively, a heroine such as Joan o f
A rc, or G enevieve dc Brabant, w om en who ‘only attained lo bliss and glory in
this w orld o r in the n ext after sufferin gs inflicted on them by m a le s’ . T h ese roles
enabled her to enjoy all m anner o f im aginary sufferin gs, and ‘revel in the delights o f
m isfo rtun e and hum iliation’ , her ‘p ie ty ’ disposin g her ‘tow ards m aso ch ism '. H ere
we can see how en couragin g children to em ulate ‘sain tly’ figures provides am ple
opp ortu n ity tor self-illusory h edon ism . A lthough Sim on e dc B eauvoir shared these
gam es w ith her sister it is also clear that she could easilvJ have acted them out in
O
isolation, o r even covertly; the pleasure itse lf derivin g from the ‘ fatefu ln ess’ of the
situations accom panying the achievem ent o f saintliness, as w ell as the sim ple c o n
tem plation o f on eself in an idealized perso na.
H ow ever, w hilst the habit o f identifying with ideal im ages may be em barked
on in the first instance largely bccausc o f the op p o rtu n ities which this provides for
im aginative p leasure-seek in g, the h ed o n ist’s sen se o f identity can easily b cco m c so
m ould ed by this p ro cess as to com e to depend upon a b e lie f in a real sim ilarity.
A lthough the e lem en t o f pretence rem ains - there is usually no desire to be the
p erso n im agined, and certainly not to actually exp erien ce their fate — the pleasure
gained from con tem plation o f the idealized self-im age en courages the b e lie f that
one p osse sses sim ilar qualities. This can only be regarded as tru e , how ever, if the
individual obtains som e extern al proof, and this m ust n ecessarily take the form o f
con duct in the w orld. In o rd er to b o lste r and p rotect the idealized self-im age the
individual m ust now en gage in som e ch aracter-confirm ing con d u ct; it b eco m es
n ecessary to ‘do g o o d ’ in o rd e r to retain the conviction that one is g o o d . H ence
the irony by w hich ‘d isin te re ste d ’ , idealistic action eventually b e co m e s required
in o rd e r lo p ro te ct the ideal self-im age which the pursuit o f pleasure has been
in stru m ental in constructing.
A sim ilar result can occu r if im agination is put to w ork realizing the ideal in
all those w ith w hom one co m e s into con tact, thereby casting oneself in the role
THE ROMANTI C ETHIC & THE SPIRIT OF MODERN C O N S U M E R I S M 3 0 5
o f a pathetic and w orth less perso n . The em otional satisfactions provided by such
self-den igration and d eb asem en t are sim ilar to those w hich w ere noted earlier to
derive from C alvinism G oethe m akes the m elanch olic young W erther declare that
‘ O u r im agination , im pelled by nature to assert itself, n ourish ed by the fantastic
im ages o f the p o e t’ s art, invents a hierarchy o f bein g of w hich w e arc the low est,
w hile everyone else ap pears m ore splen d id , m ore p e rfe ct. A lthough there may be a
p e rv e rse ten dency in so m e peop le for con duct to be d irected to the ‘realizatio n ’
o f such ‘m aso ch istic’ an ti-ideals, the use o f im agination in this way typically
w orks to assist the developm en t o f idealism for it is the real se lf w hich is judged
unfavourably as con sequen ce o f these com parison s. The d ream er realizes only too
well how he is failing to live up to his ow n ideal im age, w hilst on the other hand,
‘ everyone else ap pears m o re splen did, m ore p e rfe c t’ . In either case, however,
w hether the ideal is p rojected onto the se lf o r on to oth ers, aw areness o f the ever-
w idening gap betw een that ideal and the nature o f the real se lf b e co m e s a critical
feature o f life.
A central problem for the im aginative h edonist, th erefore, is his aw areness
o f this w idening disjunction betw een the con stru cted ideal and the e x p erien ced
reality; the m ore the h edon istic im pulse causes im ages to be idealized, the gre ater
the discrepan cy b e co m e s betw een these and the real-self. It is as if the pleasures
gained by dream in g on the ideal arc ‘taken o u t’ o f those ex p e rie n ce d in reality,
which is judged to be m ore and m o re unsatisfactory in con sequen ce. In this case,
however, the reality w hich is thus ‘d e g ra d e d ’ is the individual’ s percep tion o f
h im self as a virtu ou s perso n , leading lo a deepen in g sense o f w orth lessn ess and
dem oralization . Indeed, for the m orally sensitive, in ner-directed p erso n the p o w e r
ful feelings of guilt w hich are gen erated may spark off intense self-con dem nation.
Th is, then, in tu rn , adds an extra intensity to the need for reassu ran ce that one is
indeed g o o d .
It can be seen from this analysis how fo rm s o f self-illusory hedonism can link up
w ith a self-cen tred , m oral idealism ; while the search for pleasure may itself lead to
the generation o f guilt and a con sequen t need for signs o f o n e ’s go o d n e ss. It m erely
rem ains to ob serve that since virtue is usually defined in term s o f con duct which
d ocs transcend con cern with the self, or at least involves som e subordin ation o f se lf
to a higher g o al, it is nearly alw ays n ecessary actually to p e rfo rm som e genuinely
disinterested act in o rd er to obtain such reassu ran ce. Self-in terested hedonism
and altruistic idealism are thus con nected via im ages o f the se lf as ‘v irtu o u s’ , w ith,
in both cases, character-con firm in g con duct acting as the critical fulcrum around
which behaviour turns.
The con ccpt o f ch aractcr fo rm s a com m on thread running through the m u lti
tude o f m od ern vocabu laries w hich arc applicable to hum an actions. U sed to refer
to that asp ect o f behaviour for w hich individuals accept respon sib ility, it enables all
action to be view ed as m o ral, w ith ju d gem en ts m ade ab out the ‘g o o d n e ss’ o f each
individual actor in the light o f prevailing ideals. It is not suggested h ere, however,
that it is p e o p le ’ s direct desire to ‘do the go od th in g’ w hich is m ost affected by
changes in con ception s o f the g o o d , the tru e and the beautiful, so m uch as the
indirect cffect e x e rte d via the need for ch aracter con firm ation. It is the need people
have to be convinced that they are go o d w hich is cru cial, som eth ing which is
especially relevant in the case o f those social g ro u p s w hich have inherited a tradition
o f m o ral in n er-d ire ctio n , and h en ce are attu n ed lo the im p o rta n c e o f m e m b e rsh ip
o f a m o ral elite o r ‘ e le c t’ .
By re co g n iz in g that social co n d u c t is typically a c o m p o site p ro d u c t o f
h ed on istic se lf-in te rest and altru istically in clin ed id e alism , w ith an o v e rrid in g c o n
ce rn w ith self-im ag e se rv in g to artic u la tc the tw o , it b e co m e s p o ssib le to see how
the sp irit o f m o d e rn c o n su m e rism and the ro m an tic eth ic m igh t b e c o n n e cte d ;
h ed on istic c o n c e rn s leadin g in to self-id ealism and ethical p re o c cu p atio n s creatin g
o p p o rtu n itie s fo r h ed o n ism . In d e e d , the tw o fo rm s arc n ot m erely co n n e cte d but
m u st be seen as in cxtricab ly in te rlo ck e d , b o u n d to g e th e r by p ro c e sse s through
w hich a d e sire for p le asu re d e v e lo p s in to a gen uin e co n ce rn for id e als, and ethical
im p u lse s ‘d e g e n e ra te ’ in to m e re n arcissism . If, th en , such in dividual p r o c e sse s arc
ag g re g ate d and view ed in m a cro -so cial te r m s as so c io -cu ltu ral m o v e m e n ts, it
b e c o m e s p o ssib le to pe rce iv e how a m o d e rn c o n su m e rist o u tlo o k and a ro m an tic
ethic m ay b e linked in both g en erativ e and d e ge n e ra tiv e d ire ctio n s; that is to say,
by ten d e n cie s fo r p e r io d s o f co m m c rcia l dyn am ism to d evelop in to idealistic
‘ re fo r m a tio n s’ , and id ealistic uph eavals to d e ge n e ra te in to se n tim e n talistic self-
seeking. A s th ere is no g o o d re aso n fo r assu m in g that a one-w ay tren d g o v e rn s such
ch an ges, it w ould seem re aso n ab le to p o stu late a recurso p a tte rn o f gen eratio n -
d e g c n cra tio n -rcg e n e ratio n to have typified the past tw o h un dred y e ars. T h u s, if
R o m an ticism did originally m ake m o d e rn h ed on ism p o ssib le , then the spirit
o f h ed on ism has su b seq u en tly also fu n ctio n ed to give rise to fu rth e r o u tb u rsts o f
ro m an tic fervour.
T h is is a co n clu sio n w hich allow s us to o b se rv e that the R o m a n tic s w ere not
n ecessarily w ro n g in assu m in g that p e o p le cou ld be m orally im p roved through the
provisio n o f cu ltu ral p ro d u c ts that y ield ed p le asu re . N o r in d eed w ere they w ro n g in
se e in g this p r o c e ss as on e w hich re lie d upo n in d ivid u als d rea m in g ab o u t a m o re
p e rfc c t w o rld . Such activity can reaso n ab le be view ed as c re atin g o p p o rtu n itie s
fo r the g e n e ratio n o f id ealism . T h is is only on e p o ssib le o u tc o m e , how ever, o f
en c o u ra g in g p e o p le to p u rsu e im aginative p le asu re , and w ould seem to d e p e n d for
its su c ce ss upon the p r io r acc e p tan ce o f a m o re ge n e ral ro m an tic o u tlo o k . For it is
also cle ar that w h ere this is ab se n t, and largely m a te ria listic and utilitarian b eliefs
p revail, then it se e m s only to o likely that ro m an tic p o e m s, n ovels and m u sic , w ill be
e m p lo y ed as little m o re than the raw m aterial for a leisu re and re creatio n in d u stry ;
w ith d rea m s used less to raise the vision o f an im aginatively ap p reh en d ed ideal
w o rld w ith w hich to c o u n ter this o n e, than to o v e rco m e b o re d o m and alien ation .
A s w e have had o ccasio n to n o te, how ever, irony p e rv a d e s the hum an c o n d itio n ,
c o n n e ctin g in ten tion and c o n se q u e n c e in stran ge and u n an ticip ated w ays, h ence
w hile ro m an tic s m ay so m e tim e s have assiste d c o m m e rc ia lism , c o m m c rcia l in te re sts
m ay also have un w ittin gly actcd so as to p ro m o te ro m an ticism .
C h a p t e r 35
Danny Miller
A T H E O R Y OF S H O P P I N G
F
OR M ANY PURPO SES THE M AIN d iv is io n in th e s t r e e t w h e r e I
c o n d u c t e d f i e l d w o r k lies b e t w e e n the c o u n c il e s t a t e s o n o n e s id e a n d the
p r iv a t e h o u s in g o n th e o th e r . B u t th e s ig n ific a n c e o f this d iv is io n c a n n o t a lw a y s be
a s s u m e d . A lt h o u g h she lives in an o w n e r - o c c u p i e d m a i s o n e t t e , M r s W y n n c o m e s
a c r o s s i m m e d i a t e l y as q u in t e s s e n t i a l ly w o r k i n g c la ss. H e r h u s b a n d is an e le c t r i c ia n
b u t h as b e e n u n e m p l o y e d f o r s e v e r a l m o n t h s o w i n g to a n in ju r y . She is a c h i l d
m in d e r , ta k i n g in to h e r h o m e o t h e r p e o p l e ’ s c h il d r e n w h ile th e y are o u t w o r k in g .
B e t w e e n his in ju r y a n d th e fa c t th at s o m e o n e r e c e n t ly ra n in to th e ir c a r w h ile it w a s
p a r k e d o u t s i d e th e ir h o u s e , th e y w e r e n o t h av in g an e a s y t i m e o f it. N e v e r t h e l e s s ,
as o f t e n p r o v e d to b e the c a s e , h e r c o n c e r n s in s h o p p i n g b e a r little u p o n the
c o n t i n g e n c i e s o f the m o m e n t , an d r e la t e m o r e to l o n g e r - t e r m i s s u e s s u r r o u n d i n g
th e p e r s o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t o f c a c h m e m b e r o f th e fa m ily . S h e w a s p r e t t y fe d u p
writh th e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e s e u n e x p e c t e d e v e n t s , b u t s h o p p i n g as a t o p i c d r e w h e r
b a c k t o th in g s th at a t o n e lev el w e r e m o r e m u n d a n e . B u t th e s e w e r e r e la tio n s h ip s
w h ic h she c a r e d a b o u t a g r e a t d e a l a n d w a s c o n s t a n t ly th in k in g a b o u t a n d f o r m i n g
s t r a t e g i e s t o d e a l w it h . In c o n v e r s a t i o n sh e n o t e s :
A M y h u s b a n d is q u it e fu ss y v e g e t a b l e w i s e a n d h e ’ s a b i g m e a t e a te r, b u t y e s
I’ ve b e e n d o i n g a l o t o f s tir f r ie s b e c a u s e I f o u n d I c o u l d g e t h im to c a t a l o t m o r e
v e g e t a b l e s if I d o s tir f r ie s , a n d he likes C h i n e s e . l i e lik e s s p ic y stu ff. H e ’ s g o t a lo t
b e t t e r th an w h e n I first m e t h im b e c a u s e his m u m ’ s Irish a n d o v e r c o o k e d e v e r y
th in g a n d w a s p r e t t y b a s ic a n d h e ’ s g o t s o m u c h b e t t e r in th e y e a r s .
Q D o th e k id s e a t th e s a m e as h im ?
A N o . J a c k m y s o n ’ s g o t v e r y fu s s y , d e fin ite ly in th e l a s t year. I w o u l d say h e ’ s a
g o o d v e g e t a b le a n d fr u it e a t e r b u t h e ’ s th e b a s ic c h ip s a n d b u r g e r a n d I’ m a fr a id so.
Q D o y o u c o o k s e p a r a t e ly f o r t h e m ?
A P a sta he lo v e s p a st a . Yes, a n d s e p a r a t e t i m e s a s w e ll.
L a t e r o n in th e s a m e c o n v e r s a t i o n she n o t e s :
3 0 8 DANNY M I L L E R
A I try not to buy a lot o f convenience [foods], 1 do buy m eat that is m arinated
and stuff like that and then think what can 1 do w ith it, but now and again 1 w ill sit
dow n and g e t my book s out and have a look . I did it last w eek just because 1 w as
gettin g a bit tired o f things. But also w hat I w ill do is buy the sauces and the stirlry
things, stuH like that, and then ju st add it to everything so it m akes a bit o f
difference, but I seem to ge t stuck doing the sam e things over and over again. So,
every now and then, I’ve go t to ge t my book s out to rem ind m y self o r think of som e
new things.
Q Is it you th at’s b ored?
A N o. He w ill say as w ell, w e ’ ve had this a bit too m uch. I’ m a great chickcn
eater and he says chickcn again!
L ater still she starts discussing the purchase o f clothing for the fam ily, m akin g it
clear that she buys her h usban d’ s clothes. She n otes that out o f preferen ce he w ould
ju st w ear som e old T -sh irts, and often w ould then go on to use these as cloths
during his w ork. It’ s n ot ju st his clothing she buys. In practice she p re fe rs not to let
him do any o f the shopping. She feels that if she lets him shop, then he m isses things
on the list she has m ade, or buys, h im self things like biscuits on a w him .
A So it’ s m ore hard w ork. I’d rather him stay here and look after the children
and I’ll do it. Then it ’s a break for m e and you know. T h ese view s w ere reiterated
w hen we w ere out shoppin g in a local su p erm ark et. She again noted the prob lem s
w ith gettin g her children to cat w hat she w ants them to eat rather than w hat they
w ould choose for them selves. She claim ed lo be quite strict w ith the children that
she w as paid to look after, but w ith resp ect to her ow n children, she ten ded to be
m uch m o re lenient — ‘anything for a bit o f peace and q u ie t.’ Again and again her
actual purch ases are related back to household p referen ces. W hen she buvs mint-
flavoured Iamb at the b u tch er’ s she n otes in passin g that this had go n e dow n really
well the w eek before and that she had been asked to ge t it again. Equally, so m e jam
tarts purchased previously b ecause they w ere un der offer (goin g cheap) had been
well received. The only excep tion s to this orien tation to the h ousehold in her
shopping com e w ith the purchase o f so m e bread rolls and fran k fu rters for a friend
w ho will be com in g round for tea. Also at anoth er point in o u r expedition she buys
a fancy ice cream called V icn ctta w hich she d eclares is ‘a treat for h e rse lf’ .
By no m eans all the sh o p p ers I accom pan ied w ere like M rs W ynn, but she is
representative o f a core o f households. She should anyway be quite a fam iliar figure
from many previous fem in ist studies o f the h ousew ife. The fem in ist persp ective on
such housew ives w ill be discussed below, but m any research ers have ackn ow ledged
that w hich w ould be clearly evident h ere. H ow ever opp ressive the outside o b server
m ight find this sub sum ptio n o f the individual to her husband and children, the
housew ife h erse lf insists that she m erely e x p resses thereby a sc rie s o f re sp o n si
bilities and con cern s with w hich she strongly identifies and o f w hich she is generally
prou d.
M rs Wynn ack n ow ledges that she is constantly m on ito rin g, even researchin g,
the desires and preferen ces o f her h ousehold. T h ese includc both foundational
g o o d s w hich are ex p e cted to be constantly presen t and available in the h ouse, but
also transient d esires which arise from a preferen ce for at least a subsidiary elem ent
o f change and innovation. But she w ould by no m eans regard h erse lf as m erely the
passive rep resentative o f these desires. Indeed if she m erely bought w hat the other
A T H E O R Y OF SHOPPI NG 3 0 9
m em b ers o f her h ousehold asked for, shopping w ould be relatively easy. The
problem is that she w ishes to influence and change her husband and children in
quite a num b er o f w ays. She is constantlv con cern ed that they should eat healthier
fo o d s than those thcv w ould ch o ose lo r them selves. By the sam e token she w ants
them to w ear either b etter quality or at least m o re respectab le cloth es than those
they prefer. She sees her role as selecting go o d s w hich are intended to be educative,
uplifting and in a rather vague sense m orally superior. It is precisely their unw illin g
n ess to be uplifted by her shopping choices that creates the an xieties and battles of
shopping. In vindicating their d ecision s, such h ousew ives often lay claim to a w ider
persp ective than that o f other family m e m b e rs. They see them selves as having the
foresigh t to prevent the em b arrassm en t and disdain that others m ight feel if they
let their fam ilies dress as they ch o ose, or determ in e their own food choices.
O f c o u rse , all these efforts could be redu ced to her in terests. It could be argued
that she is buying b e tter clothes because she feels she w ill be m ade to suffer the
opp rob riu m o f criticism by others if she d o e sn ’t. She buys healthier foods bccausc
she w ould have to look after the p erso n w ho otherw ise b e co m e s ill. But for us to
try to figure out w hether the constant hassle o f arguing w ith her fam ily, in ord er
to persu ad e them to ad opt her preferen ces, actually pays som e kind o f lon g-term
dividend is the kind o f daft calculation we may safely leave to eco n o m ists, so c io
b iologists and their ilk. "I'herc is no reason lo supp ose that M rs Wynn engages in any
such w eighing up o f cost o r benefit. As far as she is co n ccrn ed , the reason s that she
research es their preferen ces and equally that she then tries lo im prove upon them
are the sam e. Both are assum ed by her lo rep resent the o u tco m e o f a responsibility
so basic that it d o es n ot need to be m ade explicit o r reflected upon. In sh o rt, her
shopping is prim arily an act o f love, that in its daily con scien tiousn ess b e co m e s one
o f the prim ary m eans by w hich relationships o f love and carc arc co n stitu ted by
p ractice. That it is to say, shoppin g d o es not m erely reflect love, but is a m ajor form
in which this love is m anifested and re p ro d u ce d . This is w hat I m ean to im ply when
I say that shoppin g in su p erm ark ets is com m on ly an act of m akin g love.
O n e could use oth er term s than love. C arc, co n cern , obligation , responsibility
and habit play their roles in these relationships. So also may resen tm en t, frustration
and even h atred. Can these latter be the in gred ien ts o f som eth in g we may properly
term love? As long as it is clear that wc un derstan d by this term ‘love’ a norm ative
ideology m anifested largely as a practice within lon gterm relationships and n ot just
som e rom an tic vision o f an idealized m om en t o f c ourtsh ip , then the term is entirely
ap pro priate. Love as a practice is quite com patible w ith feelings o f obligation and
responsibility. [. . .] The term is certainly justified by ethnography in as m uch as
these sh o ppers w ould be h orrified by the suggestion that they did n ot love the
m em b ers o f their family o r that there w as not a b ed ro ck o f love as the foundation
o f their care and con cern , though they m ight w ell ackn ow ledge som e o f these other
attribu tes as w ell.
I never knew M rs Wynn w ell enough to be able to gain a sense o f the m ore
intim ate m om en ts within her h ousehold. I d o n ’t know how free she felt about
exp ressin g her love in explicit form s. In gen eral, a reticen ce w ith regard lo m ore
overt exp ression s o f em otion is regarded as a typically British ch aracteristic, and
w as com m en ted upon by those b orn elsew h ere. But this reticence about love need
n ot im ply its absen ce, so m uch as its being essentialized as so natural that it b eco m es
3 1 0 DANNY M I L L E R
em b arrassin g to feel the need to e x p re ss it. O n e con sequen ce o f this reticen ce is

that love has com e to be prim arily objectified through everyday practices o f co n
c e rn , care and a p articu lar sensitivity to o th e rs, w ithin w hich shopping plays a
ccn tral role.
D urin g the co u rse o f this essay the term ‘ love’ , w hich first ap pears here as the
com m on term by w hich relationships arc legitim ated w ill b e co m e used to rep resen t
a value that leads us tow ards the p ro b lem s o f co sm o lo g y and transcenden ce. These
te rm s arc n ot intended to obfuscate or m ake co m p le x som e sim ple ph enom enon.
They m erely rem ind us that w ithin a largely secular society alm o st all o f us still sec
ou rselv es as living lives directed to goals and values which rem ain in som e sense
higher than the m ere dictates o f in stru m entality. Daily decision s arc constantly
w eighed in term s o f m oral questions ab out good and bad action indicated in traits
such as sensitivity as against style, or gen erosity as against jealousy. Though these
may n ot be m ade exp licit, the accoun ts we use to un derstand each o th e rs’ actions
depen d on the continued existen ce o f cosm olog y as a realm o f tran scenden t value.
The term s ‘co sm o lo g y ’ and ‘tran scen d en t’ su gg est values that are long lasting
and o p p osed to the con tin gen cy o f everyday life. They are intended to im ply that
although we focus upon the p articu lar p e rso n s, children, p artn ers and friends who
occupy o u r con cern s at a given m om en t o f tim e, the way wc relate to them is m uch
influenced by m ore gen eral b eliefs about w hat social relations should look like and
how they should be carricd ou t. At one level then, love is a m od el o f one particular
type o f identification and attachm ent. Il is one w e are socialized into and constantly
in form ed ab out. This ideal is then triggered by an individual, such as a family
m em b er w ho m akes it m anifest. A relationship then builds its own specificity
and nuance w hich (so m etim es) g o es w ell beyond the tran scen den t m odel with
w hich w e starte d . W hen the term ‘lo v e ’ is u se d , as h ere, in a m ore gen eral sen se,
actual relationships arc found to develop on the basis o f m uch w id er n orm s and
exp ectatio n s which p re-exist and rem ain after the relationship itself.
The term ‘lo v e’ then in dicates m ore than a claim to affection m ade during
courtsh ip. It stands for a m uch w id er field o f that to w hich life is seen as properly
d evoted. In later p arts of this essay it will be m o re closely related back to devotional
practices in w hich the term ‘c o sm o lo g y ’ is m ore obviously ap p ro p riate since the
co n te x t is m o re clearly that o f religion . The ethnography su ggested that ju st as
devotion is the taken -for-gran ted b ack drop to the carryin g out o f religiou s rites
in other tim es and p laces, so in N orth Lon don love rem ains as a pow erful taken-
for-gran ted foundation for acts o f shopping w hich w ill be argued to con stitute
devotional rites w hose p u rp o se is to crcatc desirin g subjects.
I w ould call M rs Wynn a h ousew ife, even though for the presen t she is the sole
w agc-carn cr o f the fam ily, b ccau sc, for her, housew ifery is her principal raison
d ’etre. As fem inist research has m ade clear, a p erso n such as M rs Wynn is m ore
likely to view her earnings as sim ply p art o f her h ousew ifery than as a job equivalent
to that w hich her husband w ould be engaged in w ere he fit. As som eon e who
identifies with being a h ousew ife, the req u ests m ade by her fam ily fo r particular
foods are not view ed with resen tm en t but are in fact d esired by her. [. . .|
Chapter 36
Daniel Lefkowitz
I N V E S T I N G IN E M O T I O N
Love and a n g e r in fin a n c ia l a d v e rtisin g
On the Structure o f Com m ercials
I
N ANALYZING THE D ISC O U RSE O F television co m m e rcials, it is
im p o rtan t to note that m o d ern ads focalizc em otion rather than in form ation .
As Tony Sch w artz ob serves:
If you are selling a kitchen drain cleaner, the advertisin g effort might
involve building an association in the liste n e r’ s m ind betw een the real
annoyance o f a sto pped -u p sink and the real re lie f o f un clogging it, in the
con text o f the product.
[Sch w artz 1 9 7 3 :7 1 )
A d vertisem en ts thus ob scu re how they function— and they do so in m ultiple ways.
In W illiam son ’ s (1 9 7 8 ) Freudian te rm s, view ers fail to recogn ize an a d ’s latent
m essage because they are kept busy thinking about its m anifest con ten t. Ads w ork
bccausc view ers respond em otionally to ideas suggested by the ad, w hile believing
that they arc respond in g to in form ation actually stated in the ad. [. . .)
Finance and Family: Love
The ju xtaposition o f love and an ger w as a striking pattern in advertisin g for financial
services at the turn o f the m illenn ium . Individual com m ercials rarely them atized
both em otio n s togeth er, but when advertisin g for the industry as a w hole is co n
sid ered , the ju xtap osition stands ou t. Many com m ercials from that tim e period
3 1 2 D A N I E L L E F K O W I T Z
s itu a te d in v e stin g in th e h o m e an d th e fam ily by r e p r e s e n t in g in v e s tm e n t a s lo v e.

By c o n t r a s t , m a n y o t h e r c o m m e r c ia ls s itu a te d in v e stin g in v io le n c e , c o n flic t, an d
r e v o lu tio n by r e p r e s e n t in g in v e s tm e n t as a n g e r. A s 1 e x p la in f u r t h e r b e lo w , the
th e m e o f a n g e r la te r d is a p p e a r e d fr o m f in a n c ia l- s c r v ic c s a d s , w h e r e a s th e th e m e
o f lo v e r e m a in e d p r o m in e n t . In o r d e r to a d e q u a te ly c o n te x t u a liz e th e d is c o u r s e
o f in v e stin g - a s- a n g e r, I w ill b e g in b y lo o k in g at an ad th at r e p r e s e n t s in v e stin g as
lo v e .
T h e R a y m o n d Ja m e s c o m m c r c ia l c a lle d “ P la y g r o u n d ” fe a tu r e s an e ld e r ly w h ite -
h a ire d m a n ta k in g a little g ir l to th e p la y g r o u n d . T h e ad b e g in s w ith a c lo s e - u p
im a g e o f tw o c la s p e d h a n d s— o n e la r g e , o n e s m a ll. T h e c a m e r a th e n p u lls b a c k to
re v e a l th e fa c c o f a y o u n g g ir l. T h e g ir l le ts g o o f th e la r g e r h a n d , t u r n s h e r b a c k
to th e c a m e r a , an d r u n s to w a r d a p la y g ro u n d w h e r e o t h e r c h ild r e n a re play in g. A t
th e p la y g r o u n d , th e g ir l p la y s h a p p ily w ith o t h e r c h ild r e n . T h e ad th en sh o w s the
g ir l r e t u r n in g , r u n n in g t o w a r d th e c a m e r a an d a p p r o a c h in g an e ld e r ly m a n w h o is
sittin g o n a sw in g . T h e g ir l c m b r a c c s th e o ld m a n in a w a r m h u g , an d h e t u r n s a
c o n te n t e d s m ile to w a r d th e c a m e r a , th e final s h o t, th e c a m e r a p a n s u p w a r d an d to
th e r ig h t , o v e r th e m a n ’ s s h o u ld e r , s e tt lin g o n an im a g e o f b lu e sk y an d w h ite c lo u d ,
w h e r e th e c o m p a n y ’ s n a m e , “ R a y m o n d J a m e s , ” an d th e a d ’ s ta g lin e , “ Y ou f ir s t ,” are
d is p la y e d .
L ik e th e A m c r it r a d c ad . . . , th is c o m m e r c i a l’ s a p p e a l lo th e v ie w e r is e n tire ly
in d ir e c t— th r o u g h th e m e c h a n ism o f d e s ir e . L ittle in th is ad d ir e c tly r e la te s to the
s e r v ic e s R a y m o n d Ja m e s p r o v id e s o r a s s e r t s th at R a y m o n d J a m e s p r o v id e s su c h
s e r v ic e s b e t t e r th an o t h e r c o m p a n ie s . R a th e r, th e a d v e r t is e m e n t d e p ic ts a m o r a lly
c h a r g e d site o f d e s ir e (su n n y d a y , lo v in g g r a n d c h ild , c a r e fr e e r e t ir e m e n t , e t c .) an d
e sta b lis h e s in th e v ie w e r ’ s m e m o r y a r e s o n a n t a s s o c ia t io n b e tw e e n h is o r h e r d e s ir e s
an d th e c o m p a n y ’ s n a m e (S c h w a r t z 1 9 7 3 ).
T h e “ P la y g r o u n d ” c o m m c r c ia l can b e s e e n as a p a r a b le th a t s u g g e s t s a s im p le
m o r a l m e s s a g e : In v e stin g w ith R a y m o n d Ja m e s k e e p s fa m ilie s to g e th e r . T h is m o r a l
is c o m m u n ic a t e d th r o u g h th e a d ’s t h r e e - p a r t s t r u c t u r e : s e p a r a tio n a s d ile m m a :
re u n ific a tio n as s o lu tio n (th r o u g h r e t ir e m e n t p la n n in g w ith R a y m o n d J a m e s ) : an d
fa m ilia l lo v e a s th e d e s ir e d o u t c o m e . A b r i e f a n a ly sis— d ia g r a m m e d in T a b le 1 —
h ig h lig h ts th e c o m p le x p o c t ic s o f th is ad .
T h e t h e m a tic o p p o s itio n o f s e p a r a tio n an d u n ity is e s ta b lish e d th r o u g h th e
im a g e r y o f m a k in g an d a b r e a k in g p h y sic a l e m b r a c e (h an d h o ld in g an d h u g g in g ).
T h e ad b e g in s an d e n d s w ith im a g e s o f p h y sic a l e m b r a c e ; in b e tw e e n are im a g e s o f
s e p a r a t io n . T h e v isu a l im a g e o f s e p a r a t io n c o in c id e s w ith th e o n s e t o f n a r r a tio n .
T h e d e e p , s o n o r a n t m a le v o ic c o f th e n a r r a to r r e in f o r c e s th e r e p r e s e n t a t io n o f
s e p a r a t io n b y b r e a k in g th e p r im a l s ile n c e o f th e e a r lie r im a g e s . T h e v o ic c o v c r
n a r r a tio n r e in f o r c e s th is im a g e a s w e ll.
T a b le I Parable structure o f Raym ond Jam es com m ercial “The P layground.”
Episode Narrative Function Themes Imagery (plot elements)
A ct O ne D ilem m a Separation —> Fear H ands p a rt; girl leaves caretaker.

A ct Two Solution U nity —> Security G irl retu rn s: tension ends.
Act T h ree M ythical R esult Family —> Love G irl and gran dfath er hug.
IN V E S T I N G IN E MOTI ON 3 1 3
In a w orld o f o p p o rtu n ity .

H ow d o y o u find the financial ad v iso r w h o ’ s right fo r you.
T h e w o rd s in a world of opportunity establish the ten sion at the ro o t o f the p a ra b le ’ s

d ile m m a. T h e idea o f o p p o rtu n ity su g g e sts a ten sion b e tw e en d e sire (lo r so m e th in g
g o o d to h app en ) and fear (o f the risk in v o lv ed ). T h e ad se ts up a p arallel b etw een
the o p p o rtu n itie s and risk s facin g a y ou n g child (m ak in g new Irien d s on the play
g ro u n d , but having to leave the fam ilial e m b ra c e ) and th ose facin g an in vestor
(m ak in g m o n e y , b u t having to take financial risk s). T h e ad then re in fo rc e s this
sy m b o lic con n cction b e tw e en the (c h ild ’ s) p lay g ro u n d sccn e and the (a d u lt’ s)
in vestm en t w orld by d e sc rib in g the scarch for a financial ad viso r in te r m s o f
p erso n al relation sh ip (right f o r you).
N arratio n and au d io effects c o n stru c t risk by p e rfo rm in g fear. T h e ad b egin s
in silen ce. T h e first soun d w e h ear (b e fo re the n arration b e g in s) is a rh yth m ic
sq u eak that co n tin u e s in the b ac k g ro u n d th ro u gh o u t m uch o f the co m m e rcia l. T h e
sq u eak is a gratin g , un p leasan t soun d that establish es ten sio n . V oicing over im ag e s o f
(u n h eard ) ch ildren at play, the n a rra to r con tin u es:
D o y ou w ant on e w ho w ork s fo r the o ld e st com pan y?

O r the y o u n ge st.
D o y ou w ant on e w ith the faste st g ro w in g com pan y?
O r the m o st deeply ro o te d in trad itio n .
T h e se ph rases are p aired as c o u p le ts. T h e pairin g is acco m p lish e d through the

p arallelism o f ju x tap o sin g an to n y m o u s m ean in gs (o ld —young, g ro w in g —trad itio n al),
the altern atio n o f risin g and falling in ton ation s (m ark ed in the tran sc rip t by the
q u e stio n m ark and c o m m a re sp e c tiv e ly ), and the sy ste m atic alig n m en t of the vocal
p h rases w ith cu ts in the visual im ag e s o f ch ildren at play. T h e w orld of o p p o rtu n ity
(g ro w in g up and m akin g m o n e y ) is thus p o rtray e d as sim u ltan eo u sly d e sirab le and
threaten in g.
T h e third p a rt o f the c o m m crcia l su g g e sts a re so lu tio n to the ten sio n . T h e
n arration co n tin u es:
O r do y ou sim ply w an t on e w h o listen s to y ou.

L ike you.
A re the only in vestor in the w o rld .
R ay m on d Ja m e s.
You first
T h is n arrative re so lu tio n c o in cid es w ith several o th e r se m io tic re so lu tio n s. T h e

g irl re tu rn s to h ug h er gran dfath er. T h e sq u e a k , w hich b egan w hen the g irl left
the g ra n d fa th e r’s h an d, sto p s p recisely at the m o m e n t w hen g irl and gran d fath er
e m b ra ce . A t this ju n ctu re the v iew er can re co g n ize fo r the first tim e that the squ eak
c o m e s from the sw in g the g ran d fath er is sittin g on . The c h ild re n ’s play, w hich until
that poin t had been seen b u t not h ea rd , is now h eard but n ot seen.
T h is c o m m e rcia l e lab o rate s the p e rfo rm a n c e o f the e m o tio n s o f h ap p in ess,
fear, and love. H ap p in e ss is p e rfo rm e d through re p e a te d visual im ag e s o f ch ildren
3 1 4 DANIEL LEF K O W IT Z
sm iling, laughing, playing, and o f the gran dfath er sm iling tow ard the cam era. Fear,
enacted through the audio channel, is p erfo rm ed through the un pleasan t, rhythmic
squeak. Love is p e rfo rm e d by the hand holding and hugging that iram e the a d ’ s
beginning and end. T h e ad v e rtise m e n t’s im plied analogy, that R aym ond Jam es
financial ad visors carc lo r their clicnts ju st as a gran dfath er cares for his g ran d
daughter, c o m p letes the m oral: Investing w ith the sp o n so r enables parental love,
keeps fam ilies togeth er, and m akes children value their fam ily.
Finance and Anger
The Raym ond Jam es com m ercial describ ed above is typical o f a w ide range o f
financial serv ices ads that situate investing in the fam ily by linking investm ent to
n u rtu rin g love. A longstan din g ad cam paign for the A llstate Insurance C om p an y had
as its tag line “Y ou’re in good hands w ith A llstate.” Banks often advertise their
loans by su ggestin g that they help send the v iew er’s children to college. In a survey
o f seventy financial-services com m ercials that aired in M arch and A pril o f 2 0 0 1 ,
roughly h alf co n fo rm ed to this general pattern . [. . .]
References
Schw artz, Tony

1973 The Responsive Chord. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press.
W illiamson, Judith
1978 D ecoding Advertisem ents: Ideology and Meaning in Advertising. London:
M arion Boyars.
Chapter 37
Jon Elster
EMOTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY
E m o t i o n s a n d in te r est
F
ROi Vl T H E POINT OF VIEW o f e c o n o m i c t h e o r y , th e m o s t i n t e r e s t in g
is s u e c o n c e r n i n g th e e m o t i o n s m a y b e th e n a t u r e o f th e in t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n
e m o t i o n a n d o t h e r m o t i v a t i o n s . A m o n g th e latte r, I sh all o n ly c o n s i d e r m a t e r i a l
s e l f - i n t e r e s t (“ i n t e r e s t ” fo r s h o r t ) , a lt h o u g h s im il a r p r o b l e m s a r is e f o r th e re la tio n
b etw een em o tion s and im p artial m otivation s. For in s ta n c e , a w e a lth y lib e ra l
m ig h t o n i m p a r t i a l g r o u n d s p r e f e r to s e n d his c h il d r e n to a p u b li c s c h o o l , b u t his
e m o t i o n a l a t t a c h m e n t t o th e c h il d r e n m i g h t in d u c e a p r e f e r e n c e f o r a b e t t e r - q u a l i t y
p r iv a t e e d u c a t i o n .
The cost-ben efit m odel o f em otions
By fa r th e m o s t c o m m o n w ay o f m o d e l i n g th e in t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n e m o t i o n s a n d
i n t e r e s t s is to v ie w th e f o r m e r as p s y c h ic c o s t s o r b e n e fit s th at e n t e r in to the
u tility f u n c t io n o n a p a r w it h s a t is fa c tio n s d e r i v e d f r o m m a t e r i a l r e w a r d s . In this
p e r s p e c t i v e , th e o n ly r e le v a n t a s p c c t o f th e e m o t i o n s is th e ir valence. W e m a y u se
B e c k e r ’ s a n aly sis o f b e g g a r - i n d u c e d g u il t t o illu s t r a t e t w o w a y s in w h ic h the
p l e a s u r e a n d p a in a s s o c i a t e d w it h th e e m o t i o n s m a y e n t e r in t o th e u tility f u n c tio n .
F i r s t , the g u il t i t s e l f is a c o s t . E v e n i f I d o n o t have any m o n e y w ith m e , I m a y c r o s s
th e s t r e e t to avo id c o m i n g fa c c t o fa c c w ith a b e g g a r w h o s e v isib le m i s e r y w o u ld
in d u c e th e u n p l e a s a n t fe e l in g o f g u il t . S e c o n d , th e g u i l t m a y i n d u c e b e h a v io r th at is
c o s t ly in the m a t e r i a l s e n s e . If I d o have m o n e y writh m e , I k n o w th a t i f I c o m e face
t o fa c e writh the b e g g a r I w'ould g iv e h im s o m e t h i n g t o a lle v ia te m y g u il t . M o r e
a c c u r a t e l y , I w o u l d g iv e u p t o th e p o i n t w'here th e m a r g i n a l u tility o f m o n e y in
3 1 6 JON E L S T E R
alleviatin g my gu ilt equ als its m argin al utility fo r o th e r p u rp o se s. (If c ro ssin g the
stre e t is c o stly , this w ou ld also have to be taken into a c c o u n t.)
In o th e r an alyses, the e n c o u n te rs that trig g e r the e m o tio n is taken lo r given and
n ot su b je c t to ch o ice. T h e q u e stio n o f ch o ice arise s only b e ca u se the agen t has
to w eigh e m o tio n a l satisfactio n again st o th e r satisfactio n s, as in the ch o ice o f the
am o u n t to give to the b eggar. In m o d e lin g envy, w e m ay assu m e that the ag e n t is
w illin g to invest re so u r c e s in m akin g the rival w o rse o f! up to the p o in t w h ere he
d e riv e s m o re utility from m ak in g h im self b e tte r off (H irsh lc ifc r 1 9 8 7 ). In m o d e lin g
a ltru ism , w e can m ak e a sim ilar assu m p tio n (B e c k e r 1 9 7 6 , chs. 12 and 13).
E co n o m ic an alyses o f r e g re t (D avid Bell 1 9 8 2 ; G rah am L o o n ie s and R o b e rt Sugden
1 9 8 2 ) also assu m e that ag en ts w eigh satisfaction from actual o u tc o m e s and e m o
tion s g e n e ra te d by c o u n terfactu al b eliefs. Strictly sp eak in g, n on e o f th ese an alyses
n eed to rely on valen ce, in the sen se o f su b jectiv e feelin gs o f p le asu re and pain. All
that is n e e d e d is that w e can draw in differen ce c u rv e s that re fle ct the trad eo ffs
involved. W c m ay think o f e m o tio n a l valen ce as the un d erly in g m ech an ism behind
th ese trad e o ffs, but it n eed not b e d irectly re fle cte d in the fo rm a l analysis. In a
m o d e lin g p e rsp e c tiv e , “ e m o tio n a l a ltru ism ” is indistin guish ab le from “re aso n -b ase d
a ltr u is m .” In the fo llo w in g I asse ss the u se fu ln e ss o f this ap p ro ach w ith re sp e c t to
gu ilt, sh am e, envy, in dign ation , love, vin d ictiv en ess, h atre d , and c o n te m p t.
Guilt
L et us assu m e that a p e rso n is te m p te d lo steal a b o o k from the lib rary . If he feels

gu ilty a b o u t do in g it, he m ay abstain . If he ste a ls the b o o k and then feels gu ilt, he
may re tu rn the b o o k to the lib rary . O n the B eck er-F ran k assu m p tio n that g u ilt is
to be m o d e le d as a c o st, both the ab sten tio n from ste alin g and the re tu rn o f the
b o o k w ou ld b e exp lain e d by a sim p le c o st-b e n c fit an alysis. T h is ap p ro ach has the
g re at advan tage that it allow s us to acco u n t for the u n den iab le e x iste n ce o f a
trad eo ff b etw een m o ral e m o tio n s and se lf-in te re st. T h e w orld is n o t m ad e up o f
tw o e xclu siv e and e xh au stiv e c a te g o rie s, th ose w ho w ould steal a b o o k w h en ever
th ere w as n o risk o f d e tec tio n and th ose w ho w ould n ever do so. M any p e o p le
w ould g o ahead and steal the b o o k if b u t only if its value to them w as sufficiently
high o r its value to o th e rs sufficiently sm all. To m o d e l such behavior, w e cou ld talk
“as i f ’ g u ilt and in te re st add up to an in clu sive u tility, w ith the m argin al disutility
from g u ilt b e in g an in creasin g fun ction o f (say) the n u m b e r o f p e o p le on the w aitin g
list fo r the b o o k and the m argin al utility from in te re st a d e cre a sin g fun ction o f (say)
the tim e the ag e n t e x p e c ts to use the b o o k .
W 'hcthcr o r not this m o d e l o f the in te ractio n b e tw e en e m o tio n and in te re st
is p red ictiv ely ad eq u ate , I su b m it that it is basically flaw ed. If gu ilt w ere n othing but
an an ticip ated o r e x p e rie n c e d c o st, an agen t w h ose gu ilt d e te r s him from stealin g or
retain in g the b o o k should b e w illin g to buy a g u ilt-erasin g pill if it w as sufficiently
cheap. I submit that no person who is capable o f being deterred by guilt would buy the pill. In
fact, he w ould fe el gu ilty ab o u t buying it. For h im , takin g the pill in o rd e r to e scap e
gu ilt and be able to steal the b o o k w ould b e as m orally b ad as ju st stealin g it. He
w ould n ot sec any m o ral relcv an cc b e tw e en stealin g the b o o k in a tw o -step
o p e ratio n (tak in g the pill to steal the b o o k ) and stealin g it in a o n e ste p o p e ratio n .
T h e re is a strict an alogy b etw een this argu m en t and a poin t that I have m ade
E M O T 10 N S A N D E C O N 0 M I C T H E O R Y 3 1 7
elsew here (E lsle r 1 9 9 7 ), viz. that a person w ho discoun ts the future very highly
w ould not be m otivated to buy a pill that w ould redu ce his rate o f tim e discounting.
To w ant to be m otivated by rem o te con sequen ces of presen t behavior is to be
m otivated by re m o te con sequen ces of presen t behavior. Sim ilarly, to w ant to be
im m oral is to be im m oral. A p erso n w illing to take the gu ilt-erasing pill w ould not
need it.
We n eed, th erefore, a m odel that can accoun t for the tradeoff betw een Oguilt
and in terest and yet d o es not im ply that a reluctant agent w ould buy the gu ilterasing
pill. I con jecture that the m odel w ould involve som e kind o f non-intentional
psychic causality rather than d eliberate choice. To illustrate w hat I have in m ind, I
shall sketch a m odel draw n from catastroph e th eory, along the lines o f a m odel o f
the relation betw een personal opinion and con form ism proposed by Abraham
Tesser and John Achee (1 9 9 4 ). In a catastroph e m o d e l, the surface describ in g the
behavior o f a d epen den t variable as a function o f tw o in depen den t variables folds in
on itse lf in a cusp. W ithin a ccrtain range, a given constellation o f the in depen dent
variables is thus consisten t w ith several values o f the depen den t variable.
Sup pose that the agen t is initially unw illing to steal the b o o k , but that as its
value to him in creases he finally decides to do so. Suppose conversely that the agent
has stolen the b ook , but that as its value to others in creases he finally retu rn s it to
the library. In the first case, su pp ose that its value to others is 10 and that he decides
to steal it just when its value to him rcachcs 15. In the second case, su pp ose that
its initial value lo him is 1 5 and the initial value to oth ers is 6. O n the cost-ben efil
m od el, he w ould retu rn il w hen its value to others reaches 10. O n the catastrophe
m od el, he might not do so until its value to others reached 15. The reason for this
asy m m etry is found in the m echanism of disson an ce redu ction (L eon Festinger
1957). An individual who is sub ject to several m otivation s that point in different
direction s w ill l e d an unpleasant feeling o f ten sion. W hen on balance he favors one
action, he w ill try to redu ce the tension by looking for cogn itions that su p p o rt it;
when he favors another, he will look fo r cogn itions w hich stack the balance of
argum en ts in favor of that action . . . . Thus the tim ing o f the sw itch in behavior w ill
be path-depen den t.
D issonance theory is m ore realistic than the cost-bcn cfit m odel in that it view s
individuals as m aking hard choices on the basis o f reasons rather than on the basis o f
in trospection s ab out how they feel. Although the person w ho has stolen the book
but feels guilty about it may try to alleviate his gu ilt, he w ould do so by com in g up
w ith ad ditional reason s that justify his behavior rath er than by accepting a guilt-
erasing pill. It is a fundam ental feature o f hum an bein gs that they have an im age o f
them selves as acting f o r a reason. G uilt, in this p e rsp ectiv e, acts not as a cost but as
a psychic force that induces the individual to rationalize his behavior. Beyond a
certain point, when the argum en ts on the other side b eco m e to o stron g and the
rationalization breaks dow n , a sw itch in behavior o ccu rs. Although we may w ell say
that the sw itch occu rs w hen the gu ilt b e co m e s unbearable, we should add that
the point at w hich it b eco m es unbearable is itse lf influenced and in fact delayed by
the gu ilt. This dual role oj emotions in decision making is an im portan t ph enom enon lo
which I shall return .
As in dicated, the “ten sion” in this exam ple w ould be guilt if the person
on balance preferred to steal the b ook , and perhaps regret if he preferred lo
ab stain fro m ste a lin g it. A s p s y c h o lo g ists have n o t c o n sid e re d e m o tio n s as s o u r c e s

o f c o g n itiv e d isso n a n c e an d o f d isso n a n c e re d u c tio n , the a r g u m e n t in v o lv e s an
e x te n sio n o f d isso n a n c e th e o r y as u su allv sta te d . Yet th e re s e e m s to b e n o re a so n
w hy e m o tio n s c o u ld n o t be s o u r c e s o f d isso n a n c e . A lth o u g h it is d e sc rip tiv e ly
a c c u r a te that d isso n a n c e th e o ry p la c e s the “ e m p h a sis on the in d iv id u a l’ s c o n c e p t o f
what he is ra th e r than h is c o n c e p t o f what he should he” (F e stin g e r an d D an a B ram e l
1 9 6 2 , p. 2 7 1 ) , this lim ita tio n on th e s c o p e o f th e th e o rv s e e m s a rb itra ry . A s
e c o n o m is ts arc n ow in c o rp o ra tin g d isso n a n c e th e o ry in to th e ir fra m e w o r k (G e o r g e
A k e r lo f and W illiam D ic k e n s 1 9 8 2 ; R ab in 1 9 9 4 ), the in c o rp o ra tio n o f g u ilt and
o th e r se lf-e v a lu ativ e e m o tio n s (E . T ory H ig g in s 1 9 8 7 ) in to d isso n a n c e th e o r v w ou ld
a lso lead to th e ir in c o rp o ra tio n in e c o n o m ic s.
Shame
A n an alysis o f sh am e w ill allo w m e to s u g g e st fu rth e r a lte rn a tiv e s to the sim p le

c o st-b e n e fit m o d e l. E m p iric a lly , w e k n o w that p e o p le can tak e e x t r e m e ac tio n s
w h en ta r g e te d by so c ial o s tr a c is m . T h e c ase o f the N av y A d m ira l w h o k ille d h im se lf
w h en it w as sh o w n that he w as n o t e n title d to d e c o ra tio n s he w a s w e a rin g (P e te r
B o y e r 1 9 9 6 ) is o n e e x a m p le . T h e five F re n c h m e n w h o k ille d th e m se lv e s in Ju n e
1 9 9 7 a fte r they had b e e n c au g h t in a c ra c k d o w n on p e d o p h ilia is an oth er. The
tw o e x p la n a to ry issu e s that a r ise a r c , first, w h e th e r th e d e c isiv e fa c to r w as fe ar o f
m a te ria l sa n c tio n s o r ra th e r an e m o tio n o f sh a m e ; an d , s e c o n d , a ssu m in g il w as
sh a m e , w h e th e r it can sim p ly b e m o d e le d as a c o st.
In th e se d r a m a tic c a se s few w o u ld d isp u te that the e m o tio n o f sh am e m u st have
b e e n a d e c isiv e facto r. It is n o t g e n e ra lly a c c e p te d , h ow ever, th at so c ia l n o r m s in
g e n e ra l o p e r a te th ro u g h the e m o tio n o f sh a m e . M an y w r ite r s (A k e r- o f 1 9 7 6 ;
R o b e r t A x e lr o d 1 9 8 6 ; D id ie r A b re u 1 9 8 8 ; Ja m e s C o le m a n 1 9 9 0 ) have a rg u e d that
so cial n o r m s w o rk th ro u g h m a te ria l s a n c tio n s, in v o lv in g h ig h e r - o rd e r sa n c tio n s o f
th o se w h o fail to san ctio n n o r m - v io la to r s o r n o n - sa n c tio n e rs. [. . .]
I w o u ld like to g o b e y o n d m y e a r lie r a r g u m e n ts , h ow ever, to a s s e r t th at the
m a te ria l sa n c tio n s th e m se lv e s arc b e st u n d e r s to o d as v e h ic le s o f the e m o tio n o f
c o n te m p t, w h ich is the d ire c t t r ig g e r o f sh a m e . W h en a p e r so n re fu se s to d e al w ith
s o m e o n e w h o h as v io late d a so cial n o r m , the la tte r m ay su ffe r a financial lo ss. M o re
im p o r ta n t, he w ill se e the san c tio n as a v eh icle fo r th e e m o tio n s o f c o n te m p t o r
d isg u st, an d su ffe r sh am e as a re su lt. T h e m a te ria l a sp e c t o f the san c tio n that
m a tte r s is how much it costs the sanctioner to penalize th e t a r g e t, n o t how m u c h it c o sts
th e ta r g e t to b e p e n a liz e d . (T h u s th e p h ra se “ T h is h u rts m e m o r e than it h u rts y o u ”
m ay b e in te n d e d to ad d to the p u n ish m e n t, n o t to so fte n it.) T h e m o r e it c o s ts the
s a n c tio n c r to re fu se to d e al w ith the ta rg e t p e r s o n , the s tr o n g e r w ill the la tte r feel
the c o n te m p t b e h in d th e re fu sal and th e m o r e a c u te w ill b e his sh a m e . A lth ou gh
h igh c o s ts to th e sa n c tio n e r o fte n g o to g e th e r w ith h igh c o s ts fo r the ta r g e t, as w h en
th e s a n c tio n e r re n o u n c e s on th e o p p o r tu n ity fo r a m u tu ally p ro fitab le b u sin e ss
tra n sa c tio n , this n e e d n o t b e th e c a se ; an d even w h en it is th e c a se , m y claim is that
the c o s ts to the s a n c tio n c r a rc w h at m a k e s th e sa n ctio n really pain fu l to the ta rg e t.
It te lls him that o th e r s se e him as so bad that they arc w illin g to fo re g o valu ab le
o p p o r tu n itie s ra th e r than have lo d eal w ith h im .
The se c o n d q u e stio n c o n c e rn s th e m o d e o f o p e r a tio n o f sh a m e in sh ap in g
E M O T 10 N S A N D E CO N 0 M IC T H EO R Y 319
b eh avior. A c c o r d in g to the c o st m o d e l, p re se n t and fu tu re sh a m e e n te r s in to the

u tility fu n c tio n on a p a rt w ith m a te ria l c o s ts and b e n e fits. A p e r so n w h o h as b e en
p u b licly e x p o s e d to c o n te m p t m ig h t c o m p a re th ree o p tio n s: su ic id e , m o v in g e ls e
w h e re to tak e up a n ew p r o fe s s io n w ith a n ew n a m e , an d stic k in g it o u t in the
e x p e c ta tio n that the c o n te m p t o f o th e r s and the fe e lin g o f sh a m e w ill fade a fte r a
w h ile . II th e im m e d ia te fe e lin g o f sh a m e is im m e n s e , su ic id e m ig h t w ell b e p r e fe r
ab le to the d isc o u n te d p r e se n t valu e of th e o th e r o p tio n s. It w o u ld b e h ard to re fu te
this a c c o u n t, as the d isu tility o f sh a m e can alw ay s b e stip u la te d to b e arb itra rily
h igh . I b e lie v e it is at le a st e q u a lly p la u sib le , h ow ever, to a ssu m e that sh a m e in d u c e s
a t e m p o r a r y h eig h te n in g o f the d isc o u n tin g ra te . W ith r e s p e c t to d r u g s , B c c k c r
( 1 9 9 6 , p. 3 2 9 ) a r g u e s th at “ A h ab it m ay b e ra ise d in to an ad d ictio n by e x p o s u r e to
the h ab it itse lf. C e rta in h ab its, like d r u g u se and h eavy d rin k in g , m ay re d u c e the
a tte n tio n to fu tu re c o n s e q u e n c e s — th e re is n o re a so n to a ssu m e d isc o u n t ra te s on
the fu tu re are ju st g iv e n an d f ix e d .” T h e a r g u m e n t s e e m s e q u ally a p p lic a b le to
s tr o n g e m o tio n s. A lte rn a tiv e ly , w e m ig h t fo llo w L o c w e n stc in (1 9 9 6 ) and arg u e
th at sh a m e , like o th e r v isc e ral fa c to r s , u n d e rm in e s o u r ab ility to p r e d ic t fu tu re
su b je c tiv e sta te s. W h en o n e is in in te n se pain o r su ffe rin g fro m in te n se sh a m e , it is
h ard to im a g in e that th e sta te w ill n ot last fo r e v e r .11 T h e o v e rw h e lm in g d e sire is fo r
im m e d ia te re le a se . By c o n tin u ity , a sh am e o f le ss in te n se stre n g th w ill also have a
cau sa l e ffe c t on the ev alu atio n and p e r c e p tio n o f o th e r re w a r d s over and above its own
role as a (negative) reward. T h is is a n o th e r in stan ce o f the d u a l ro le o f e m o tio n in
d e c isio n m akin g. [. . .]
R eferen ces
A b r e u , D i d i e r . “ O n the T h e o ry o f Infinitely R ep e ate d G a m e s w ith D isc o u n tin g ,”

Econometriea, M ar. 1 9 8 8 , 5 6 (2 ), pp. 383—96 .
A k f .r l o f , G e o r g e . “ T h e E co n o m ics o f C aste o f the R at R ace and O th e r W oeful T a le s,”
Quart. J. Econ., Nov. 19 7 6 , 9 0 (4 ), pp. 5 9 9 - 6 1 7 .
A k f . r l o f , G f.o r g f . A . a n d D i c k e n s , W i l l i a m T. “T h e E co n o m ic C o n se q u e n ce s o f
C og n itive D isso n a n c e ,” Amer. Econ. Rev., Ju n e 1 9 8 2 , 7 2 (3 ), pp. 3 0 7 —19.
A x e l r o d , R o b e r t . “ A n E v o l u t i o n a r y A p p r o a c h t o N o r m s , "Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev., D e c .
1 9 8 6 , <S0(4), pp . 109 5 —1 111.
B e c k e r , G a r y S . The economic approach to human behavior. C h icago: II. o f C h icago P re ss,
1976.
B e l l , D a v i d . “ R e g r e t in D ecisio n M aking U n d e r U n ce rta in ty ,” Operations Research,
S e p t ./ O c t . 198 2 , i 0 ( 5 ) , pp. 9 6 1 - 8 1 "
B o y e r , P e t e r . “ A d m iral B o o rd a ’ s W ar,” The New Yorker, Se p t. 16, 1996.
C o l f .m a n , J a m e s S. Foundations o f social theory. C am b rid g e , M A : H arvard U . P r e ss.,
1990.
E l s t e r , J o n . R e v i e w o f B e c k e r (1 9 9 6 ), IJ. o f Chicago Law Rev., 199 7 , 6 4 , pp. 7 4 9 —6 4 .
F e s t i n g e r , L e o n . A theory o f cognitive dissonance. S t a n f o r d , C A : S t a n f o r d U . P re ss,
1957.
F e s t in g e r , L e o n and B r a m e l, D a n a . “T h e R eactio n s o f H u m a n s t o C ogn itive
D i s s o n a n c e , ” in Experimental foundations o j clinical psychology. E d . : A r t h u r J.
B a c h r a c h . N e w York: B a s i c B o o k s , 1 9 6 2 , pp. 254—7 9 .
H i g g i n s , E . T o r y . “ Self-d iscrep an cy : A T h e o rv R elatin g S e lf and A ffe c t,” Psychological
Review, Ju ly 1 9 8 7 , 9 4 (3 ), pp . 3 1 9 —4 0 .
H lR S H L E IF E R , J a c k . “ O n the E m o tio n s as G u a ra n to rs o f T h reats and P ro m ise s,” in

The latest on the best. E d .: J o h n D upre . C am b rid g e , M A : M IT P re ss, 1987,
pp. 3 0 7 - 2 6 .
L o e w e n s t e i n , G e o r g e . “ O u t o f C o n tro l: V isceral Influences on B eh avior,” Orqaniza-
tional Behavior &^Human Decision Processes, M ar. 19 9 6 , 6 5 ,(3 ) pp. 2 7 2 —9 2 .
L o o m e s , G r a h a m a n d S u g d e n , R o b e r t . “ R e g re t T h e o ry : An A ltern ative T h e o ry o f
R ation al C h oice u n d e r U n ce rta in ty ,” Econ. J., D e c . 1 9 8 2 , 9 2 (3 6 8 ), pp. 8 0 5 —24 .
R a b i n , M a t t h e w . “ C og n itive D isso n an ce and Social C h an g e ,” ]. Econ. Behav. Organ.,
M a r . 1 9 9 4 , 2 3 (2 ), pp. 1 7 7 - 9 4 .
T esse r , A brah am and A s c h e e , J o h n . “ A g g re ssio n , Love, C o n fo rm ity , and O th er
Social P sych ological C a ta stro p h e s,” in Dynamical systems in social psychologyr. E d s.:
R o b i n R . V a l l a c h e r a n d A n d r z e j N o w a k . N e w York: A cad em ic P re ss, 1994,
pp. 9 6 - 1 0 9 .
9. Emotions and the media
N 1 9 5 0 , I N H I S landm ark study of Am erican character, David Riesman wrote

I that '[in c re a s in g ly , relations with the outer world and oneself are mediated by
the flow of mass com m unications' (1950: 21). Fifty years later German sociologist
N iklas Luhmann confirms Riesm an's proposition: 'whatever we know about our
society, or indeed about the world in which we live', he writes, 'we know through the
mass m edia' (2000:1). By extension we might say that, today, the mass m e d ia -th o s e
institutions which disseminate com m unication widely via copying technologies such
as printing and broadcasting - mediate not only what we know but, on that basis, also
much of what we feel. A number of prominent social theorists interested in the
relationship between culture and capitalism have addressed the media as a key factor
in the emergence of what is variously called a 'culture of narcissism ' (Lasch 1979), an
existential 'waning of affe ct' (Jameson 1991), or a clim ate of 'post-em otionalism '
(MeStrovic 1997). W hat these accounts have in common is the view that the massive
impact of the media on our lives is associated with new forms of psychological
depthlessness. Lasch proposed that the media and advertising industries, along other
'agencies of mass tuition', had taken over many of the socializing functions previously
performed by the family. Through its cult of celebrity, and by translating everything
into a form of entertainment, the media had played a substantial role in fostering
'narcissistic dreams of fame and glory', encouraging 'the common man to identify
himself with the stars and to hate the "h e rd " ', making it 'm ore and more d ifficu lt for
him to accept the banality of everyday existence' (1979: 21). For Jameson, the
'waning of affe ct' is associated with a dream -like life of 'pseudo-events', sustained
by the a rtificia l stim uli of televised experience. M estrovic's 'post-em otional' type is
one whose capacity for experiencing genuine emotions has ostensibly given way to
the consumption of 'vica riou s' (or second-hand) emotions, useless feelings that bear
no relation to action.
3 2 2 P 0 LI T I C A L ECO N 0 M I E S 0 F A F F EC T
M ore recently, media theorists have argued that emotions have become more
conspicuous in media culture, suggesting a global trend towards 'em otionalization'.
As we noted in our general introduction, this trend is associated with the emergence
of 'factual television' and its sub-genres (talk shows, docu-soaps and docu-dramas,
and reality T V ), and with an erosion of the distinction between information and
entertainment. A gainst this background, an im portant focus of interest for
researchers has been the media portrayal of human suffering (both individual and
collective), and its social significance. Do media images of distant suffering generate
'compassion fatigue', or do they facilitate the emergence of a progressive hum anitar
ian conscience (see e.g. M oeller 1999; Tester 2001; Cohen 2001; Boltanski 1999)?
Are tabloid talkshows and docu-dramas a modern form of 'freakshow', or do they
offer platform s for subjects whose voices would otherwise remain unheard (see
e.g. Dovey 2000; Shattuc 1997; Gamson 1998; Lunt and Stenner 2005 )?
In our first extract, B irg itta Hoijer (2004) examines Swedish and Norwegian
audience reactions to television news and documentary reporting of human suffering
in the Kosovo war. She is interested not just in the extent of voiced compassion for
victim s of such conflicts, but also in how 'w orthiness' for compassion is worked up
in practice via notions and images of 'id e a l' victimhood. Although she finds some
support for the cynical view of post-emotional spectators expressing 'kitsch
emotional reactions to serious problem s' (M estrovic 1997), her participants - and
especially the women - also appeared to express genuine 'm oral compassion at a
distance' (H oijer 2004: 528).
The emotions evoked and shaped by the mass media are, of course, not only the
worthy and fine ones of which we are proud. In the second extract 'Chav Mum, Chav
Scum: class disgust in contem porary B rita in ', Imogen Tyler (2008) examines the
emotional characteristics - and disgust in p a rticu la r - associated with the figure of
the 'chav' in British newspapers, T V comedy and internet fora. It is likely that
relations of social class were mediated by emotions like disgust long before modern
mass media came upon the scene. M ass media, however, contribute to the generation
and circulation of highly condensed forms that Tyler refers to as 'figures'. Like
'the immigrant', 'the terro rist' or 'the pedophile', the chav is a sym bolically over
determined figure expressive of a dense knot of class-based emotional reactions.
Comparable to M oscovici's 'social representations', such highly mediatized figures
make for rapid and easy com munication at the cost of the reinforcement of class
distinctions and the scapegoating of abject groups.
In the third extract 'Talking Alone: reality TV, emotions and authenticity'
(2006), M inna Aslam a and M ervi Pantti look at the various ways in which 'real life'
emotional encounters are staged within reality T V shows. Very often this staging
takes the form of a monologue in which an individual expresses their innermost
feelings, while alone with the camera. The authors draw attention to the paradox
involved in the idea that the more authentically one can express true emotions, the
more saleable they are as a media commodity.
The final extract is from F ilm Structure and the Em otion System by Greg Smith
(2003). He draws upon a growing tradition of work which analyses the relationship
between motion pictures and emotion (C arroll 1990; Tan 1996; Grodal 1997). Ed
Tan (1996), for instance, defines film as an 'emotion machine'. Deriving a model of
E M OTIO N S A N D T H E M E D IA 3 2 3
em otion fro m co gnitive and n e uro p sycho logical research, S m ith argues th a t the
stru ctu re of successful film s is co ndition ed by the need to engage the hum an em otion
system . H is 'm o o d -cu e ' app roach attends to the u sually unnoticed w ays in w h ich
co ord in a te d sequences o f film ic cues (fa c ia l expressions, m usic, costum e, lighting,
ca m e ra technique, set design, etc.) invite the cre a tio n of a general m ood state th a t in
turn m akes the e licitin g of sh o rter-te rm intense e m otion a l states m ore likely. The key
is thus the e sta blish m e nt of re cip ro ca l re la tio n s between m ood (a longer term state o f
diffuse p re p a ration fo r sp ecific em otion a l experience) and the experience o f specific
em otions.
References
Boltanski, L. (19 9 9) D istant suffering: m orality, media and politics. Cambridge:

Cohen, S. (2 001) States o f D enial: knowing about a trocities and suffering. Oxford: Polity.
Dovey, J. (2 000) Freakshow : first person m edia and factu al television. London: Pluto
Press.
Gamson, J. (1 99 8 ) Freaks Talk Back. Tabloid shows and sexual non-conform ity.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Jameson, F. (1 991) Postm odernism , Or, the C u ltu ra l L o g ic o f Late Capitalism . Durham,
North Carolina: Duke University Press.
Lasch, C. (1 97 8 ) The Culture o f N arcissism . New York: W. W. Horton.
Luhmann, N. (2 00 0 ) The R e a lity o f the M ass M edia. Cambridge: Polity.
Lunt, P. and Stenner, P. (2 00 5 ) 'The Jerry Springer Show as an Em otional Public Sphere',
M edia, Culture and Society, 27 (1): 5 9 -8 1 .
Mestrovic, S. (1 997) P ostem otional Society. London: Sage.
Moeller, S. D. (1999) Com passion Fatigue: how the media se ll disease, famine, w ar and
Riesman, D .(2 0 0 1 [1 9 5 0 ]) The Lon ely Crowd: a study o f changing A m erica n character.
New Haven, M A : Yale University Press.
Shattuc, J. M. (1 997) The Talking Cure. T V ta lk shows and women. New York:
Routledge.
Tester, K. (2 001) Compassion, m o ra lity and the media. Buckingham : Open University
Press.
Chapter 38
Birgitta Hoijer
THE AUDIENCE AND MEDIA

R E P O R T I N G OF H U M A N S U F F E R I N G
Audicncc reactions
I
N T H E F O L L O W I N G , T H E D I S C U S S I O N w ill be based on tw o sets
o f em pirical stud ies o f audience reaction s. O n e set o f studies focused on violent
new s in gen eral and com bined b rief teleph one in terview s carried out w ith a
representative sam p le ol Sw edes (in total 500 in terview s) with in-depth personal
in terview s with a variety o f individuals (H oijer, 1994, 199 6 ). The other set o f
stud ies con sisted o f focus gro u p interview s ab out the K osovo War w ith different
grou ps o f citizens in N orw ay and in Sw eden (H o ije r and O lau sson , 2 0 0 2 ). T h irteen
gro u p s w ere run in N orw ay and 1 1 in Sw eden , and the fem ale and m ale in form an ts
w ere recru itcd from different occupational secto rs and age levels. K osovo-A lbanian
and Serb im m igran ts w ere also interview ed.
E xtent o f com passion
A lthough it is a risky and un certain task to d eterm in e the ex ten t o f com passion for
victim s o f distant suffering am ong the audience in gen eral, I shall here presen t som e
figures indicating a division o f the audicncc into those w ho e x p re ss so m e type o f
com passion and those w ho arc m ore o r less indifferent. Further, there arc different
reaction s am ong different segm en ts o f the audience.
T h e results in Tabic 1 arc based on teleph on e in terview s in which the public
answ ered open -en ded question s about their reaction s to pictu res o f victim s for
violence (conflicts, w ar and so on) in n ew s re p o rts. Table 1 show s that h alf o f the
respo n d en ts (51 percen t) said that they often or quite often do react to the pictures
o f distant sufferin g.1 A bout a q u a rte r o f the public (23 percen t) said they w ere
THE AUDIENCE AND MEDIA REPORTING OF HUMAN SUFFERING 325
Tabic 1 Audience’s reactions to pictures o f suffering on television news (% )
Gender Age in years
Total M W 15 19 20 29 3 0 -39 40 49 50 64 65 99
R eact often or quite 51 41 59 28 37 49 49 54 68

often
React only som etim es 14 17 12 22 14 16 17 13 9
D o not react at all 23 32 16 4! 31 22 19 25 14
O th er answ ers or do 7 6 8 4 6 7 12 7 5
not know
Notes:
N u m b e r o f re sp o n d en ts: 554.
Sourcc: From H o ije r (1 9 9 4 ).
totally indifferent and do not react at all, and 14 p ercen t said thcv react so m e
tim es but very seldom . Som e (7 percen t) gave unclcar answ ers that could not be
categorized . The table also show s gen dered differences and differences am on g age
g ro u p s. W om en react with com passion m o re often than m en , and elderly people
m uch m ore often than you n ger p eo p le. Feelings o f pity, sadn ess and anger w ere
re p o rte d , and w om en especially also said that they som etim es crie d , had to close
their eyes o r look away, b ccau sc the pictu res touched them em otionally. [. . .]
C om passion is depen d en t on v isu als
The com passion that the audience ex p re sse s is often directly related to the d o cu
m entary pictu res they have seen on television . W hen asked about their spon tan eous
im pression s o f the K osovo W ar m o st o f the au dicn cc gro u p s in terview ed started to
talk about the television pictu res o f stream s o f refu g ees or pictu res o f crying people
in refugee cam p s, especially pictu res o f children and elderly peop le:
‘ It was what I saw o f live pictu res on television that m ade the stron gest
im pression , all the innocent p e o p le, all those who c r ie d .’
‘ I have terrib le m e m o rie s o f children stepp in g on board buses and

sitting by the w indow s cry in g.’
‘ I rem em b er that I saw crying peop le on television. They had lost

som eon e in their familvJ and thev
J
could not find them again.
O
T h ere w ere
a lot of peop le and it w as very crow ded on the gravel ro ads along which
they w ere w alkin g.’
P ictures, or m ore precisely ou r in terp retation s of p ictu re s, can m ake indelible

im pression s on o u r m inds, and as a distant audience we b eco m e b earers o f inner
p ictu res o f human suffering. Especially when em otional pictu res are shown
repeatedly over tim e, as for instance the pictu res o f the refugees from K osovo, they
have a lon g-term im pact on our collective m e m o rie s. W hen the audience say
3 2 6 BIRG ITTA HOIJER
‘ You n ever g e t rid o f all the cry in g children and the e ld e rly ’ they em p h asize the
pen etrative p o w e r o f p ictu res.
T h e im p act o f p h o to grap h ic p ic tu re s is not least due to the tru th -claim c o n
n ected w ith th em . T h ev arc p e rce iv e d as tru th fu l ey e-w itn ess re p o r ts o f reality .
T h e au d ien ce very rarely q u e stio n s the realitv statu s o f d o c u m e n tary p ic tu re s, o r
sees them as c o n stru c tio n s o f situ ation s o r even ts (an e x c e p tio n from this is d is
cu ssed u n d e r the h eadin g ‘ d ista n tiatio n ’ ). D o c u m e n ta ry p ictu re s are in stead
e x p e rie n c e d as if they give d irc ct ac ce ss to reality and they th e re fo re in sist upon
b ein g taken se rio u sly . It is hard to den y the b u rn t c o rp se s from the m a ssa cre in
Stupni D o , the sw ollen b o d ie s floating in the riv e rs o f R w an d a and B u ru n d i, the
cry in g children in re fu g ee cam p s, the e n d le ss lin es o f re fu g e e s fo rced to leave their
h o m e s in K o so v o , in jured p e o p le from the con flict in the M id d le F a st lying on the
grou n d o r b e in g c arrie d away on stre tc h ers.
C om p assion is d e p e n d en t on id e a l victim im a g e s
T h e au d icn cc a c c e p t the d o m in an t victim c o d e o f the m ed ia and re g ard ch ild ren ,

w om en and the eld erly as ideal v ictim s d e se rv in g c o m p a ssio n . W h en d e sc rib in g their
e m o tio n a l re actio n s the g r o u p s in te rv ie w e d ab o u t the K o so v o W ar un an im ou sly
talked ab ou t th ese c a te g o rie s o f civilian p e o p le :
‘ It m akes a really stro n g im p ressio n to se e ch ildren and eld erly p e o p le,

and w o m e n , infirm ly w an d erin g ab o u t. You sta rt thinking ab o u t how it
is fo r t h e m .’
‘ I felt so terrib ly so rry for th em . [. . .] Se e in g all the eld erly p e o p le and

the ch ild ren . T h cv are so tired that thcv can hardly w a lk .’
‘ I saw a n ew s item from an e m p ty village and th ere w as an o ld , old

w om an left th ere. She cou ld n ot go on any lon ger. I th ough t it w as so
te rrib le for her. ’
A con dition for b e in g m oved is that w e as au d icn cc can re g ard the victim as h elp less
and in n o cen t, and this w as so m e tim e s also e x p licitly p o in ted o u t by p articip an ts in
the stu d y : ‘ I w as m o st affected by the fact that in n ocen t p e o p le w ere s tr ic k e n .’
A n ew s item ab o u t a cry in g m id d le -ag e d m an in a re fu g ee cam p in M aced on ia
w h o, in fro n t o f the telev isio n c a m c ra , b e g g e d to be b ro u g h t to N o rw ay ch allen ged
this cu ltu ral c o n cep tu alizatio n o f a w orth y v ictim . In m o st o f the in terv iew ed
g ro u p s they c o n sid e re d the m an d istaste fu l and selfish and they ch arg ed him w ith
bad behaviour. T h ey also th ough t he w as n ot behaving in a m anly w ay:
I th ough t it w as a sham e to behave as he did w hen y ou think a b o u t all

the p regn an t w om en and sick p e o p le . T h ey n eed to b e h elp ed and he
should have b e g g e d fo r th em . H e should have said: ‘ P lease help t h e m !’
A m an in his p rim e is n ot w orth y o f o u r co m p a ssio n since w e do n ot re g ard him

as h elp less and in n ocen t e n ou gh . Instead he should be active in fighting the enem y
THE A U D I E N C E AND MEDIA REPORTI NG OF HUMAN S U F F E R I N G 3 2 7
or helping the h elpless ones. Elderly m en are con ceptu alized differently since they
are con sidered w eak and have a right to be cared for. In one o f the gro u p s this w as
underlined by an utteran ce about the m iddle-aged man w ho b egged to be taken to
N orw ay: ‘ If he had been an old man over seven ty ’ .
W itn essing rem o te sufferin g on television w e arc thus especially m oved by
p ictu res o f children, w om en and elderly as victim s. A child is, however, the m o st
ideal victim in the persp ective o f com passio n . W hen a child show s h is/h e r feelings
by crying o r looking sad, w e may feel pity both through our ow n m em o ry o f being
open and vulnerable to the trcach erv of ad ulth ood, and in te rm s o f our adult
identity our desire to p ro tcc t the child. W hen the child stares into the p h o to
g ra p h e r’ s cam cra she or he may be perceived as looking directly at you as an
audience, rem in din g you o f h er o r his vulnerability and innocence.
Form s o f com passion
Boltanski (1 9 9 9 ) distinguishes betw een three fo rm s o f em otio n al co m m itm en t in

relation to distant suffering: the m ode o f den un ciation , the m ode o f sen tim en t, and
the aesthetic m ode. The first refers to a persp ective in w hich com passion (pity in
B oltan sk i’ s term in ology ) is com bin ed with indignation and anger and turn ed into
an accusation o f the perp etrator. T h e sufferin g is con sidered as unjust. In the m ode
o f sentim ent there is no search for a p e rp e trato r to accuse. Instead attention is
focused on the victim and a benefactor. The suffering is e x p erien ced as touching
and com passion is ten der-h earted and sym pathizes w ith the v ictim ’s gratitu de at
receiving help from a doctor, a nurse or hum anitarian w orkers. The aesthetic m ode
is d e scrib ed by Boltanski (1 9 9 9 : 1 1 5) as a third possib ility, w hich ‘e m e rg es Irom
the criticism o f the first tw o. It consists in con siderin g the u n fo rtu n ate’s suftering as
n either unjust nor as touchin g, but as su b lim e .’ As exam p les he d iscusses paintings,
for instance those by G oya, in w hich the h orrible and the gro tesq u e sides o f the
u n fo rtu n ate’s suffering is revealed.
L ook in g at au d ien ces’ re sp o n ses to televised distant sufferin g wc may quite
clearly recogn ize the m o d e o f denunciation and the m ode o f sen tim en t. It is harder
to identify the aesthetic m ode as a form o f com passionate reading. T h ere arc,
however, tw o oth er fo rm s o f co m p assio n , w hich may be identified. In on e, c o m
passion is com bin ed with feelings o f sham e and in the other w ith feelings o f
pow erlessn ess. T his gives us four fo rm s o f com passion identified in audience
reaction s. Below' they are nam ed ten der-h earted com passio n, blam e-filled
com passio n , sham e-filled com passion and pow erlessn ess-filled com passio n :
Tender-hearted compassion focu ses on the sufferin g o f the victim s and the
resp o n ses o f pity and em pathy it gives rise to in o n e se lf as a sp e ctato r: ‘ It breaks my
h eart when I see refugees. They are com in g in thousands and they tell w hat they
have been through. It’s so te r rib le ’ ; ‘I felt pity for them w hen they sto od there in
the m ud and the cold w eather. They had very little food and you could see the fear
in their e y e s.’
Blame-filled compassion brings up the suffering o f the victim s in com bination
w ith indignation and anger: ‘ I becam e angry w hen I saw the many innocent people
and civilians who died and w ere stricken by the c o n flic t.’ T h e indignation may be
directed tow ards som eon e seen as respon sib le for the e xcesses. In political conflicts
3 2 8 BIRGITTA HOIJER
it is often a person in pow er m ore than the specific p e rp e trato r who execu ted the
violent act. In the K osovo C onflict M ilosevic w as an ideal enem y to accuse. He was
conceived o f as having an evil disposition , o f being dan gerou s, pow erful and
inhum an both bv the m edia and bv the au diencc (H o ije r ct a l., 2 0 0 2 ): ‘ He is evil,
m anipulative, and stark m a d ’ ; ‘ He is a terrib le m an, a p sy ch o p ath .’
Shame-filled compassion brings in the am bivalence con n ected with w itn essin g the
suffering o f oth ers in our own com fortab le lives and the cosin ess o f our living
ro o m . Sham e is ‘an em otio n al state p rodu ced bv the aw areness that one has acted
dishonourably or rid icu lo u sly ’ and ‘kn ow ledge o f the tran sgression by o th e rs’ is
p art o f the em otio n al state (R cb cr, 1985: 31 3, 6 9 5 ). C on cern in g distant suffering
you know that you have tran sgressed the m oral obligation to help suffering others.
‘ I had such a bad con scien ce and I alm ost did not m anage to w atch any m ore
terrib le scenes on television . And they w ere n ’t ju st scen es, it w as re a lity .’
In the feelings o f sham e there may also be a com po n en t o f anger or den un ci
ation directed at o n e se lf for being passive and not en gaging in the destin ies o f the
rem o te victim s: ‘I get furious w ith m y self because I do nothing. You can ’t say that
you do not have tim e. It’s a question o f prio rity . C ertainly there is m ore to d o .’
Being an im m igran t from an area in conflict m akes the sham e even m ore
p ron oun ced. In relation to the K osovo conflict im m igran ts from the Balkans
e x p erien ced a specific deep sham e related to questio n s o f identity and solidarity:
We helped our relatives w ith m oney as best as we cou ld. But you
constantly had the feeling that it w asn ’t en ough . The only right way to
help w as to go dow n there. But I d id n ’ t and I really feel that I failed. 1
left my peop le in the lurch and I can ’t look them in the eye.
Powerlessness-filled compassion arises from a subjective aw areness o f the lim its o f

the m edia sp e c ta to r’ s possibilities to alleviate the suffering o f the victim s. It brings
forth sen tim en ts of im p oten ce and pow erlessn ess: ‘You feel so h elpless and there
is so little you can do. You can o f cou rse give som e m on ey but that w ill n ot stop
the w a r’ ; ‘I got a feeling that it w ould never stop and I experien ced so m uch
im p o tc n c y .’
The various fo rm s o f com passion may take different fo rm s in the individual
spectator, and they may also be rep resented sim ultan eously in the sam e p e rso n . A
sp ectator may for instance feel ten der-h earted com p assio n , blam e a p e rp e trato r
and e xp erien ce p ow erlessn ess in relation to the sam e newrs story o r re p o rte d
en croach m en t. In the representative teleph on e interview study, 62 p ercen t
re p o rte d that they often or quite often had sen tim en ts o f sadn ess w hen w atching
new s pictu res ab out violence against civilians, and the sam e n um ber, 62 percen t,
re p o rte d sen tim en ts o f anger. This study w as n ot totally com patible w ith the face-
to-face in terv iew s, how'ever, so one should not draw too stron g con clusion s about
the exten sion o f different types o f com passion .
D ista n tia tio n fro m com passion
f a r from everyone in the audien ce feels com passion w ith the victim s o f w ar and
other conflicts. T h ere are also different ways o f turning o n e ’s back on the suffering
THE A U D I E N C E AND MEDIA REPORTI NG OF HUMAN S U F F E R I N G 3 2 9
o f distant oth ers. O n e strategy , though not a com m on on e, is to reject the truth
claim o f the new s reportin g. C riticizin g the n ew s in gen eral may also be a way o f
shifting focus away Irom the hum anitarian tragedies. A nother strategy is to
dehum anize the victim s in som e w ay, or just to b cco m c num b o r im m une
to rem o te hum an suffering. [. . .]
S o m e tim e s, . . . a critical propagan d a persp ective may be stron g and take
over. T his w as the case w hen the in terview ed Serbian im m igran ts, especially the
m ale g ro u p s, saw the new s about Kosovo-A lbanian refu gee stream s. The new s
pictu res w ere regarded as have been staged for propagan d a p u rp o se s:
On television all pictu res may be arran ged. They show the sam e stron g
pictu res over and over again. They show ed dreadful p ictu res, for
instance they b roadcast the sam e fam ily on a h orse-draw n cart several
tim es. And they said that thousands o f Kosovo-A lbanians w ere hiding in
the forest. But to m e the pictu res seem ed in credible, arranged.
A m ore com m on critical p ersp ectiv e, w hich creates a distance from the hum an
suffering, is to criticize the newrs in general for com m ercialism and sen sation alism .
N ew s m edia give a d isto rte d p ictu re, accordin g to this view, by paying to o m uch
attention lo violence and hum an m isery:
The new s rep o rtin g is focusing m ore and m ore on dead b odies and acts
o f violence. It seem s to be the only thing o f n ew s value, and that can be
quite disturbing. Especially when they are rep o rtin g from h otb eds o f
war. II nobody has been shot o r blow n to pieces there are no re p o rts. It
m akes you quite critical o f the m edia.
A nother way to form a distance is to apply an us-them persp ective in w hich the
cultu re, m entality and way o f living and behaving o f the oth ers, that is, the suffering
pe o p le, arc dehum anized. W ith stereo ty p ed thought figures such as ‘In the Balkans
they think onlv o f v en d etta’ , ‘It is a totally different culture from o u r s ’ , ‘It is
som eth in g about their te m p e ram en t’ , em pathy is turned away and the lack o f
involvem ent is rationalized and legitim ized. W hy b oth er ab out peop le who
are prim itive and uncivilized and not like us, civilized citizens in d em ocracies?
‘ Personally I felt no com passion for the peop le dow n th e re ’ , as one m an w ho w as
in terview ed about the K osovo W ar said, ‘ I think they only have them selves to
blam e. T h ere have been p rob lem s in the Balkans ever since W orld W ar I. They arc
no a n g e ls!’
Ju st b eco m in g num b or im m une to the pictu res and re p o rts about human
suffering on a large scale is also quite a com m on reaction : ‘ I cannot engage in it any
longer. A dead body no lon ger touch es m e .’ Being fed with new s about suffering
may in the end lead to feelings o f satiation and num bn ess. A com m on reaction
am ong the audicncc o f the K osovo W ar was that pity fo r the victim s gradually
decreased over the p erio d o f the grow in g hum anitarian disaster. A ccordin g lo
N A TO propagan da, the w ar w as goin g lo last for just a few days. Instead it lasted
for 78 days and during this period the audience w ere repeatedly e x p o se d to im ages
o f seem ingly en dless stream s o f refugees. The pow erlessn ess over the situation , the
3 3 0 BIRGITTA HOIJER
never ending n u m b er o f victim s, the difficulty o f un derstan din g the Balkan situation
and ethnic conflicts, and the inability o f the m edia to give a b ack gro un d, m ade
the audience less in terested , num b and even im m une to the hum an suffering. ‘ In the
end you could not m anage it any m o r e ’ , w as one way o f exp ressin g how tim e
un derm in ed the leeling ol com passio n . [. . .)
References
Boltanski, L. (1999) Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics. C am bridge: Cam bridge
U niversity Press.
Hdijer, B. (1994) Valdsskildringar i TV-nyheterna. Produktion, utbud, publik. Stockholm
U niversity: D epartm ent o f Journalism , Media and Com m unication, No. 5.
Hoijer, B. (19 96) ‘The D ilem m as o f D ocum entary Violence in Television’ , Nordicom
Review 1 : 5 3 61.
H oijer, B ., S.A . N ohrstcdt and R. O ttoscn (2 002) ‘The Kosovo War in the Media
Analysis o f a Global D iscursive O rd e r’ , Conflict Communication Online 1(2):
w w w .cco.regener-online.de
Reber, A .S. (1985) The Penguin Dictionary o j Psychology. London: Penguin Books.
Chapter 39
Imogen Tyler
"CHAV MUM CHAV S CU M"

C la s s d isg u st in co n te m p o ra ry B rita in
The reason Vicky Pollard caught the public im agination is that she
em b odies with such fearful accuracy several o f the gre at scou rg es o f
con tem p orary Britain: aggressive all-fem ale gan gs o f e m b ittered , h o r
m on al, drunken teen agers; gym slip m um s w ho choose lo get pregnant
as a career option ; pasty-faced, lard-gu tted shippers w h o ’ ll drop their
kn ickers in the blink o f an eye . . . these peop le do exist and are every
bit as ripe and just a target fo r social satire as w ere, say, the raddled
w orkin g-class drunks sent up by H ogarth in Gin Lane.
(Jam es D elin gp ole 2 0 0 6 , p. 25)
D isgu st and co n te m p t m otivate and sustain the low ranking o f things,

p eo p le, and actions deem ed disgustin g and con tem p tib le.
(W illiam M iller 1997, p. xiv)
Introduction
I
N TH E LAST THREE YEARS a new vocabulary o f social class has
em e rg ed in Britain. T h e w ord “ chav,” alongside its various synonym s and
regional variation s, has b eco m e a ubiquitous term o f abuse fo r w hite w orking-class
sub jects. This article e x p lo re s the em ergen ce o f the g ro tesq u e and com ic figure o f
the chav w ithin a range o f con tem p orary British m edia: prim arily television c o m
edy, Intern et fora, and n ew sp apers. Bringing togeth er curren t so ciological research
on social class and recent fem inist theoretical w ritin g on em otio n s, I con sider how
social class is em otionally m ed iated , focusin g on the role played by disgust reactions
in the gen eration and circulation o f the chav figure. . . . C on cen tratin g on the figure
o f the fem ale chav and the vilification o f youn g w hite w orking-class m o th ers, I
3 3 2 IMOGEN TY LE R
e xp lo re how the “chav m um ” is produced through disgust reaction s as an intensely

affective figure that em b odies historically fam iliar and con tem p orary an xieties
about sexuality, rep rodu ction and fertility and “racial m ixin g.” . . . 1 argue that the
level of disgust d irected at the chav is suggestive o f a heightened class antagonism
that m arks a new episode in the dirty on tology o f class stru gg le in Britain. [. . .]
The figure o f chav
Chav, and its various synonym s and region al variations (including Pikey, Tow nie,
C h arvcr, C h avcttc, Chavstcr, D u m b o, G azza, H atchy, H ood R at, Kcv, Knacker,
N e d , R atboy, Scally, Scum bag, Shazza, Sk an ger), have b eco m e ubiquitous term s
o f abuse for the w hite p o o r within con tem p orary British cultu re. Since 2003 we
have seen the em ergen ce o f an entire slang vocabulary around chav, w hich includes
te rm s such as chavellers cheques (giro and benefit paym en ts), chavtastic, chaving
a laugh (laugh ter at chavs), chavbaiting, chavalanchc (large gro u p o f chavs),
chavalicr (chav car), chavspeak, chavspotting and acronym s, such as “ C ouncil
H oused And V io len t,” “ Council H oused And V ile,” and “ Council H ouse A ssociated
V erm in .” Polk ety m olog ies have sprun g up to explain the term : som e sources
suggest that the term chav m ight derive from a distortion o f a Rom any w ord for
a child, (chavo or chavi), o r that it may have originated in the M edw ay tow n
o f C hatham . O th ers argue that chav is an h istorical Hast End o f Lon don term for
child, w hile oth ers su ggest it e m e rg es from the term charver, long used in the
north east o f England to describ e the disenfranchised w hite p o o r (see Nayak 2 0 0 3 ).
As crim in ologists H ayw ood and Yar argue, all these ety m ological accoun ts
su ggest that the term chav “has always been con n ected w ith com m u n ities w ho
have exp erien ced social deprivation in one form or an oth er” (2 0 0 6 , p. 16). In
curren t parlan ce, the term chav is aligned “w ith stereo ty pical n otions of low er-
class” and is, above all, “a term o f intense class-based ab h orren ce” (H ayw ood & Yar
2 0 0 6 , p. 16).
Chav news
O n e o f the prim ary sites w ithin which the chav figure has been con stituted is
n ew sp apers. W ritin g in The Edinburgh Evening News in 2 0 0 4 , the year in which
disgust and fascination w ith chavs peaked in the British p ress, jou rn alist Gina
D avidson p ron oun ces:
And w'e will know them by their dress . . . and trail o f fag ends,
sparkling w hite train ers, baggy track suit tro u se rs, b randed sp o rts to p ,
go ld-h oop ed earrin gs, “sovvy” rin gs and the ubiquitous B u rberry b ase
ball cap. T h row them togeth er, along w ith a pack o f R egal, and you have
the un iform o f w hat is bein g describ ed as the U K ’s new un derclass—
the chav. C all them w hat you w ill, identifying them is easy. They are the
sullen youths in h ooded top s and spanking-new train ers who loiter
listlessly on street c o rn e rs and shopping m alls, displaying an apparent
" C H A V M UM CHAV S C U M " 3 3 3
lack o f ed u catio n and an all too ob v io u s taste fo r fighting; the slack-

jaw ed g irls w ith enough go ld o r go ld -p late d jew ellery to put H Sam uel
o u t o f b u sin ess. T h ey are the d o le -sc ro u n g e rs, petty crim in als, fo otball
h ooligan s and tee n age p ram -p u sh e rs.
(2 0 0 4 , p. 14)
D av id so n ’ s invocation o f “d o le -sc ro u n g e rs, p e tty crim in als, fo otball h oo ligan s and

teen age p ram -p u sh e rs” illu strate s how the chav figure c o m e s to e m b o d y in a c o n
d en sed fo rm a se rie s o f o ld e r ste r e o ty p e s o f the w h ite poo r. In p a rtic u la r, the use
o f ph rases such as “p etty crim in al” and “ d o lc - s c ro u n g c rs ,” c o n ju re s up d e b ate s from
the 1 9 80s and 9 0 s a b o u t the rise o f a socially e x clu d e d “u n d e rc la ss.” H ow ever, one
o f the things that d istin gu ish es the figure o f the chav from p re v io u s acco u n ts o f the
u n d erclass is the em p h asis on the e x c e ssiv e co n su m p tio n o f c o n su m e r and b ran d ed
g o o d s. In d eed , w ith in n ew s m ed ia acco u n ts o f the chav, this figure is p rim arily
identified by m ean s o f his o r her “b a d ,” “v u lg ar” and ex c e ssiv e c o n su m e r c h o ic e s—
ch eap b ran d s o f cig a re tte s, cheap je w e lle ry , b ran d ed s p o r ts to p s, g o ld -h o o p e d
e a rrin g s, so v e re ig n -rin g s, B u rb erry b aseb all cap s. A s H ayw ard and Yar argu e “the
‘ ch av’ ph en o m en o n re ca p itu la te s the d iscu rsiv e creation o f the u n d e rcla ss, w hile
sim u ltan eo u sly rec o n fig u rin g it w ithin the sp acc o f c o m m o d ity co n su m p tio n ”
(2 0 0 6 , p. 16). C e rtain ly , il is argu ab le that ch an ges in the con figu ration o f social
c lass in B ritain and shifts in trad ition al m a rk e rs o f social class (such as accen t o r
e d u catio n ) have m ade it m o re difficult to asce rtain class differen ce. In the c o n te x t o f
shifting class defin itio n s, the vilification o f the chav can be in te rp re te d as a sy m p to m
o f a m id d le -class d e sire to re -d e m a rc ate class b o u n d a rie s w ithin the c o n te x t o f
c o n te m p o ra ry co n su m e r cu ltu re . H ow ever, the atte m p t to d e m a rc ate class differen ce
through p ractic e s o f co n su m p tio n is n ot a new ph e n o m e n o n . M o reo v er, it is
im p o rta n t to n ote that d e p ic tio n s o f the w hite w o rk in g class have alw ays p iv o te d on
a p p e aran ce an d, in p articu lar, on a p e rce iv e d e x c e ss o f (b o d ily ) m a te ria lity . In deed,
n e w sp ap e r acco u n ts o f chavs vividly recall V ictorian and E dw ardian acco u n ts o f the
d a n g e ro u s, im m o ra l, and libidinal lo w er classe s. As K eith H ayw ood and M ajid Yar
n o te:
ju st as w as the case in the 19th ce n tu ry , w hen te r m s such as “ m oral

w re tc h ,” “d e g e n e ra te p o o r,” “d ep rav ed n o m a d ,” and “savage o u tc a st”
all u ltim ately cam e to be in c o rp o rate d u n d er the u m b re lla term
“ d a n g e ro u s c la s s ,” the w o rd “chav” is in creasin gly acting as a u b iq u ito u s
s tru c tu ral ca te g o ry — a soft sem an tic ta rg e t fo r th ose keen to reb ad ge
the u n d e rp riv ile g e d and socially e x c lu d e d am o n g us as a new' fo rm o f
fe ck le ss u n d erclass.
(2 0 0 6 , p. 17)
W ithin n ew s m ed ia acc o u n ts o f ch avs, o ld e r ic o n o g rap h ie s o f the e x c e ss and h o rro r

o f the low er classes arc rean im ated w ithin a ru sh o f d e scrip tio n s o f sullen , h o o d e d ,
lo ite rin g , u n e m p lo y e d , pram -p u sh in g, in to x icated y outh s. T h ro u gh the figure o f
chav a new publicly san ction ed w ave o f m id d le -class c o n te m p t fo r the low er classes
is b o d ie d fo rth . C o n sid e r fo r in stan ce, the follow in g e x tra c t from a Sunday Telegraph
artic le tille d “ In D efe n ce o f S n o b b e ry ” :
It’s official: the classless society is finished. A fter d ecades in rem ission ,
the m ost infam ous o f British vices— sn ob bery — is m aking a com eb ack
. . . They are the n on -respectable w orking classes: the do le-scro u n g ers,
petty crim in als, football hooligans and teenage pram -pu sh ers. They arc
also the kind o f peop le one w ould not dare m ock facc-to-facc . . . Chavs
are often poor, but they are not w eak: on the con trary, thev are in the
cultural asccndant. They arc tough enough to take a little ribbing. And
for the rest of us— to o frightened to take them on in p e rso n — there is a
delicious release to be had from laughing at them .
(Jem im a L ew is 2 0 0 4 , p. 23)
In this article, jou rn alist Lew is argu es that m ock ery o f chavs m arks the return o f
traditional sn obbery. Identifying h erse lf as m iddle class she identifies the chav as
“the n on-respectable w orking c lasse s.” C on trary to claim s that “directly articu lated ”
class distinctions have d isap peared , this overt class-nam ing dem on strates how the
em ergen ce o f the figure o f the chav is p art o f a resurgen ce o f the explicit nam ing o f
social class w ithin British m edia. L e w is’ s article is indicative o f the many thousands
o f d escription s o f chavs published within British n ew sp apers since 2 0 0 3 , accoun ts
in which class differences arc not seen as irrelevan t, o u tm o d ed or sham eful to
articulate but are openly and aggressively e x p lo re d through virulent un ap ologelic
stereotyping. [. . .]
Broadsheet n ew sp aper articles on chavs tend to fall into tw o g ro u p s: articles by
journ alists such as Burchill that are highly critical o f the new vilification o f the
w orking classes and articles by jou rn alists such as L ew is that overtly celeb rate this
“new sn ob bery ” and offer vivid description s of the “ delicious release” afforded bv
class disgust. From 2003 on w ards, these tw o op p o sin g broadsh eet p osition s on
chavs have been played out in an ever grow in g series o f articles w hich— through
resp o n se and cou n ter-resp on se— stru ggle over and sim ultaneously invent the figure
o f the chav.
In a 200 6 The Times article titled, “ A con spiracy against chavs? C ou n t m e in”
D elin gp ole m ock s the “h and-w ringing p ro se ” o f “h u m ou rless, Polly Toynbcc-stylc
L efties” w ho defend chavs. D elin gp ole d cscrib cs chavs as “disgustin g, selfish, violent
underclass sp e cim cn js]” and articulates his class disgust in te rm s o f “a socially
n ecessary ” snobbery. As he w rites:
As a m em b er o f probably the m o st discrim inated-again st subsection in

the w hole o f British society — the w hite, m iddle-aged, public-sch ool-
an d -O xb rid gc cducatcd m iddlc-class m a le — 1 sec no reason why . . .
the Vicky Pollards and the W aynes and W aynettas o f our w orld have
go t it com in g to them . If they w ere n ’t quite so rep ellen t, we w ou ld n ’ t
need to m ake jokes about th em , w ould w e? The function o f satire is not
only to m ake us laugh, but also, w ith luck, to draw ou r attention to
the things that arc w ron g with the w orld and help m ock them into
extin ction.
(Jam es D elin gp olc 2 0 0 6 , p. 25)
"CHAV MUM CHAV S C U M " 3 3 5
M enninghaus argu es that laughing al som eth in g is “an act o f exp u lsion ” that
closely resem b les the rejectin g m ovem ent o f disgust reactions. D isgust and laughter
are, he n otes “com plem en tary ways of adm ittin g an alterity ” (2 0 0 3 , p. 11). Like
d isgust, laughter is com m u n ity-form in g, it is often con tagiou s and it gen erates
proxim ity . Laughter is always shared with a real or im agined com m un ity. [. . .) In
the ease o f laughter at those o f a low er class, laughter is boun dary-form ing. It
crcates a distance betw een “ them ” and “ u s ,” assertin g m oral ju d gm en ts and a
su p e rio r class position. As M iller n o tes, “ Laughing habits turn out to be one o f the
crucial clues w e use to ge t a fix on a p e rso n ’ s m oral and social co m p e te n ce ”
revealing an in dividual’ s “social p lace” and their aspiration s, w here they w ould like
to be placed (1 9 9 7 , p. 8 3 ). . . . Laughing at chavs is a way o f nam ing, m anaging
and auth orisin g class d isgust, co n tem p t, and anxiety. The expression o f class
disgust within n ew sp aper articles on chavs is deliberate and self-con scious, it is a
feigned disgu st p e rfo rm e d both for our en tertain m en t and as a m eans o f assertin g
m iddle-class identity claim s. In the online vocabulary o f chav-hatc, w e can further
discern the w ays in w hich class disgust is p e rfo rm e d in w ays that are com m unity-
form ing.
Chav online
The w eb site, urbandictionary (n .d .) is an online slang dictionary that functions as an

unofficial online authority on English language slang. Urbandictionary w as created
and is ow ned by a fo rm e r c o m p u te r science stud ent Aaron Peckham , w ho launched
the site in 1999 to com pare slang used by students in C aliforn ia. Urbandictionary is
m od elled on an in tern et forum in w hich (un reg istered ) u sers p o st definitions o f
new o r existin g slang term s, w hich arc then review ed by volunteer ed itors before
bein g published. V isitors to the site vote on definitions (w'hich can includc im ages
and soun ds) by clicking a thum b-up or thum b-dow n icon and these postin gs arc
then ranked accordin g to the votes they have accured: T h e tag line o f urbandictionary
is “ D efine your W o rld.” The w ebsite currently hosts 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 definitions o f slang
term s and is ranked as one o f the 2 ,0 0 0 highest w eb traffic sites in the w orld. The
site profile states that 65 p er cent o f the u sers arc un der 25. T h ere w ere 368
definitions o f the term chav posted on the site at the tim e o f w ritin g this article,
and I have listed below a sm all num b er o f indicative phrases taken from som e o f the
m ost highly ranked posts.
Chavs . . . the cancer o f the U nited K ingdom

©
They live in estates, feedin g off ou r taxes through benefits, w hich they
spend on coun tless rin gs, thick gold chains, cigarettes and alcohol.
Chav: a type o f person w ho lacks the intelligence to be able to speak

or w rite p ro p er cnglish, uses w ords, if they arc p ro p e r w ords such as
« i_ l •
• n u • • » .
blingin, m ingin etc
Favourite jo b s o f chavs: d ru g dealer, M cD on alds w orker, prostitu te,

page 3 “m o d e l.”
D isgustin g, d irty , loud, ugly, stupid arseh oles that threaten , fight,
cause troub le, im pregnate 14 year o ld s, ask fo r m on ey, ask for fags, . . .
steal your phones, w ear crap sp o rts w ear, drink cheap cider and g e n e r
ally spread their hate.
A social un derclass par excellen ce. The ab solute dregs o f m odern

civilization
The only go od chav is dead one. T h e only thing b e tter than that is a
m ass grave full o f dead chavs and a 24 hour w ork crew m aking way for
m ore.
All chavs are disgustin g scum .

( urbandictionary n .d .)
As A hm ed n otes, “to nam e som eth in g as disgustin g is p erfo rm ativ e” in that “it
gen erates the o b ject that it n am es” (2 0 0 5 , p. 9 3 ). Wc can see how disgust is both
perform ative and p erfo rm ed in the in tern et forum urbandictionary. T his disgust
speech gen erates a set o f effects, w hich adhere to, p ro d u ce, and em bellish the
disgusting figure o f the chav: chavs are w hite, live on council estates, eat junk fo o d ,
steal your ph on es, w ear crap sp o rts w ear, drink cheap cider, they are the absolute
dregs o f m odern civilisation; a social un derclass par excellence, chavs are disgusting.
T h e dictionary form at is significant here becau se— like the accom panying veneer o f
irony— it gran ts a strange authority to the dehum anising bigotry of the posts.
Urbandictionary illustrates how class disgust is n ot sim ply felt but actively gen erated
through rep etition . Th rough the rep etition of this d isgusted re sp o n se , the negative
p ro p e rtie s attributed to chavs m ake this figure m aterialise as rep resentative of a
group that em b odies those disgusting qualities, a grou p that is “ low er than human
o r civil life” (A hm ed 2 0 0 5 , p. 9 7 ). As u sers add to and build a com prehen sive
definition o f “the chav” w ithin the urbandictionary site, they in teract with one
another and a conversational environ m ent em erg es. The voting system w orks on
this site as a form o f p e e r authorisation that en cou rages u sers to invoke m ore and
m ore intense and affective d isgu st reaction s. As N gai su gg ests, disgu st involves an
expectation o f con cu rren ce, and d isgust reaction s seek “to include o r draw others
into its exclusion o f its o b ject, enabling a strange kind o f sociab ility” (2 0 0 5 , p. 336).
This sociability has a p articu lar specificity w ithin online com m un ities in w hich
anonym ity gives com m un ity m e m b e rs license to e x p re ss their disgu st in extrem e
and viru len t w ays. The in teractivity o f these in tern et fo ru m s, and the real and
illusory im m ediacy they tran sm it, m akes online forum s intensely affective
com m unal sp a c e s/p la c e s w ithin which disgust reaction s can be rapidly shared and
accru ed. [. . .]
Chav mum
T h ere is a rep eated em phasis within n ew s m edia and in tern et forum s on the sluttish
behaviour and m ultiple pregn an cies o f the fem ale chav. Many o f the urbandictionary
(n .d .) p osts focus on the spectacle o f the ch avette’ s excessively rep roductive body.
"CH AV MUM CHAV S C U M " 3 3 7
H um an equivalent o f verm in . . . M o st rep rod u ce by the age o f 14,

som etim es younger.
[Chavs] are alm o st always w hite, and very skinny, w here the chavettes
are usually overw eigh t, with large stretch m arks on their stom ach s from
excessive baby having, a chavette w ill have one baby every year from the
age o f 13.
The chavettes have . . . a large 3 seater second hand pushchair, w ith 3

different coloured children in, all at different stages in the chav d e v e lo p
m en t, w ith caps already fitted and cars p ierced.
W hilst young unw ed w orking-class m oth ers have alw ays been a target o f social
stigm a, h atred, and an xiety, the fetishisation o f the chav mum within pop ular
culture has a con tem p orary specificity and m arks a new ou tp ou rin g o f sexist class
disgust. The gossip w ebsite popbitch fam ously determ in ed celeb rity chav m oth ers as
“p ram face .” N ow a p op u lar term o f ab use, urbandictionary (n .d .) defines pram face
as, “a w om an w ho looks so youn g she ought to be pushing a pram around a council
estate in the shittiest p a rt o f to w n .” The chav m um o r p ram face, w ith her hoop
earrin gs, sp o rts cloth es, pony tail (“ C roydon facelift”) and gaggle o f m ixed race
children, is the quintessential sexually excessive, single m other: an im m oral, filthy,
ign orant, vulgar, tasteless, w orking-class w hore. This figure o f chav m um circulates
within a w ide range o f m edia, celcbrity m edia, reality television , com cdy p r o
gram m in g on British television , con su m er cultu re, print m edia, literature, new s
m edia, film s, and “chav hate” w ebsites. [. . .]
The m ass vilification and m ock ery o f the chav m um can be un d erstood in
relation to what W ilson and H untington (2 0 0 5 , p. 5 9) have argued is the em ergen ce
ol a new set ol n o rm s about fem ininity, in w hich the ideal life trajectory ol m iddle-
class w om en co n fo rm s to the cu rrcn t govern m en tal objectives o f e con om ic grow th
through higher education and increased lem ale w ork fo rce participation . We can
clearly ascertain how the chav m um figures m iddle-class values through disgust for
the sexuality and excessive rep roduction o f the low er classes within this thread of
co m m en ts, take this p o st: “ If Y O U think th at’ s an acceptable life and am bition for a
young girl in this day and age o f supposed equality, you m ight as w ell just lie in the
g u tter and open your legs right now .” The chav m um rep resen ts a thoroughly dirty
and disgusting on tology that op erates as a constitutive lim it for clean, w'hitc, m iddle-
class, fem inine respectab ility: “an acceptable life and am bition for a young girl in
this day and age o f su p p osed e q u ality .” H ow ever, the com ic and disgustin g chav
m um is haunted by another figure, that o f the infertile w hite m iddle-class m iddle-
aged w om an. For w hilst the chav m um rep resents a highly undesirable rep roductive
b ody, this figure can also be read as sy m pto m atic o f an e xplosion o f anxiety about
droppin g fertility rates am on gst the w hite m iddle classes. Indeed, the disgust for
and fascinated o b session w ith the chav m u m ’ s “easy fertility ” is bound up w ith a set
o f social angst about infertility am on gst m iddle-class w om en , a grou p continually
chastiscd for “putting c arccr over m oth erh oo d ” and “ leaving il lo o late” too have
children. The figure o f the chav m um not only m ock s p o o r w hite teenage m oth ers
but also challenges m iddle-class w om en to face their “ rep roductive resp o n sib ilities.”
3 3 8 I MOGE N T Y L E R
R eferences
u a v id so n , G in a (2 0 0 4 ) ‘ Sites to chcck out if you chav w hat it tak e s’ , The Edinburgh

Evening News, 4 Feb., p. 14.
d e l i n g p o l e , j a m e s (2 0 0 6 ) ‘A conspiracy against chavs? C oun t m e in ’ , The Times,
13 A pril, p. 25.
h a y w a rd , k e ith & y a r , m a jid (2 0 0 6 ) ‘The “ Chav” ph enom enon: C on sum p tion , m edia
and the con struction o f a new u n derclass’ , Crime, Media, Culture, vol. 2, no. 1,
pp. 9 - 2 8 .
le w 'i s , je m m ia (2004) ‘ In defence o f sn ob b ery ’ , The Daily Telegraph, 1 Feb., p. 2 3 .
m e n n i n g h a u s , W IN F R IE D (2 0 0 3 ) Disgust: Theory and History o j a Strong Sensation, trans.
H ow ard Eiland & Joel G olb, State U niversity o f New1 York P ress, N ew York.
m il l e r , w i l l i a m (1 9 9 7 ) The Anatomy o f Disgust, H arvard U niversity P ress, C am bridge,
M A.
nayak, an o o p (2 0 0 3 ) Race, Place and Globalization: Youth Cultures in a Changing World,
B erg, O x fo rd .
n g a i, sia n n f, (2 0 0 5 ) Ugly Feelings Literature, Affect, and Ideology% H arvard U niversity
Press, C am bridge.
Chapter 40
Minna Aslama and Mervi Pantti
TALKING ALONE
R e a lity T V , e m o tio n s and a u th e n tic ity
Introduction
I
NTEREST IN T H E EMOTIONS OF other peop le seem s to be very
m uch a part o f con tem p orary cultu re, as is a p ressu re to reveal em otio n s and talk
about them in both private and public fo ru m s (L u p ton , 199 8 ). We are supposedly
living in a ‘c on fession al’ (Foucault, 1978) o r ‘th erap eu tic’ cultu re (F u redi, 2 0 0 4 )
that celeb rates individual feelin gs, intim ate revelations and languages of therapy.
The role of the m edia and particularly television as a central public site for c o n
fessing o n e ’s in n erm ost feelings has been rightly stressed by m edia sch olars (e.g.
D ovey, 2 0 0 0 ; G am so n , 1998; Living-stone and Lunt, 1994; Shattuc, 1997; W hite,
1992, 2 0 0 2 ). A fter all, rcccn t decades have seen an eye-catching rise o f gen res and
p ro gram m e s that offer op p ortu n ities for the public display of on ce-private feelings.
A ccordin gly, w e have w itn essed an increase in the n um ber o f ordinary people
w ho arc w illing to speak in a confessional voice (W h ite, 2 0 0 2 ). C on fession al and
therapeutic strategies arc perhaps m ost prom in ent in reality television although
certainly they are not absent from inform ative gen res such as the new s either
w here the outbreaks o f raw em otio n figure prom inently in the attraction and
pop ularity o f the gen re (see G rindstaff, 199 7 ). [. . .]
T h e prom in en ce o f free-flow ing, confessional talk in talk show s has attracted
con siderable attention (e.g. Livingstone and L unt, 1 9 9 4 ; Lunt and Stenner, 2 0 0 5 ;
M asciarotte, 1991; Shattuc, 1 9 9 7 ; W h ite, 1992) but the study o f the strategies used
in displaying ‘real e m o tio n s’ through confessional disco u rses in reality T V is still
relatively u n exp lo red . We hope to con tribu te to the understan ding o f the p r o
duction o f sclf-disclosu rc through a form al analysis o f selected international and
d om estic dating, com petition and lifestyle-orien ted reality show s b roadcast on
Finnish television betw een 2002 and 2 0 0 4 . W hen con ductin g the study in early
2 0 0 4 , w e w ished to review the array o f p ro gram m es aired at that tim e on the four
3 4 0 M I N N A AS L A M A A N D M E R V I PA N TT I
Finnish n ationw ide TV channels (tw o public broadcastin g channels, YLE1 and
Y L E 2; tw o com m ercial channels, M T V 3 and N e lo n e n ). The perio d s sam p led c o m
prised the last w eek o f O c to b e r 2003 (w eek 4 3 ; 26 O c to b e r—1 N ovem b er 2 0 0 3 )
and the last w eek of January 2 0 0 4 (w eek 4 ; 25—31 January 2 0 0 4 ). Wc also w anted
to includc one entire season of a Finnish adventure show b roadcast in su m m er
2 0 0 2 . We have exam in ed altogeth er 39 ep isod es of reality p ro g ram m e s, as follow s:
• The Bachelor (U S A );
• The Bachelorelte (U S A );
• Expedition Robinson (Sw eden );
• Extreme Escapades (Suuri seikkailu, Finland, all 30 e p iso d e s);
• Faking It (U K );
Fat Club (U K );
• Idols (Finland);
• Popstars (Finlan d);
• Shipmates (U S A ); and
• Temptation Island (U SA ).
It should be noted that the so-called m akeover reality show s appeared en masse
on Finnish screens only in late 2 0 0 4 . G en re labels such as ‘dating sh o w ’ , ‘ lifestyle
sh o w ’ o r ‘ com petition sh o w ’ , w hich are quite vague, draw attention to the fact that
reality TV is an extrem ely co m p le x con cept that unites a variety o f p ro gram m es
and su b categories (see H o lm es and Jerm y n , 2 0 0 4 ). All o u r p ro gram m e s belong to
the ‘ third ph ase’ of reality pro gram m in g, m ixin g the earlier ‘a c tio n /in c id e n t’ p r o
gram m es (e.g. the B B C ’ s 999) and ‘d o c u so a p ’ form ats (e.g. the B B C ’ s Hotel and
Airport) with gam cshow in terest in tests and challenges and in corpo ratin g elem ents
of the talent con test (C o rn er, 2 0 0 4 ). [. . .]
Reality television in the age o f commodified and

managed emotions
Right now I’m so sad. My h eart is brok en . I go from a lim o tow ards the
man I ’m in love with thinking I’m going to spend the re st o f my life
w ith him . N e x t m inute I w as w alking away with nothing. I’ m ju st so
mad and shocked and really sad. I feel so alone.
(Kelly Jo , The Bachelor (U S A ), b roadcast in Finland, 2 0 0 3 )
Reality telev isio n ’s rise to prom in en ce am on g con tem p orary television form ats
reson ates w ith the validation o f em otional talk in politics and culture. A ttribu tes
such as ‘con fession al’ , ‘th erap eu tic’ and paradoxically ‘p o stcm o tio n a l’ (M estrovic,
1997) that have been ascribed to the tim es in w hich we are living are related to
the notion that we are w itn essing an em ergen t preoccu pation w ith em otio n s and
authenticity o f the s e lf (see Furedi, 2 0 0 4 ; G idden s, 199 1 ). A ccording to Furedi
(2 0 0 4 : 30), ‘therapeutic cultu re p ro m o te s n ot sim ply em otionalism but e m o
tionalism in an intensely individualized fo rm '. C ertain ly, an essential part o f the
strategics o f finding the authentic se lf is the con fession o f o n e ’s in n erm ost feelings
T A L K I N G A L O N E 3 4 1
to o th e r s. In d e e d , M e stro v ic ( 1 9 9 7 : 71 —1 0 0 ) c la im s that th ere is a sp e cial in d u stry

to d a y , th e a u th e n ticity in d u str y , by w h ich o rd in a ry p e o p le as w ell as c e le b r itie s —
su ch as ‘ th e p o s te m o tio n a l P r e sid e n t C lin to n ’ — can d isc lo se in tim ate fe e lin g s.
T e le v isio n , a c c u ra te ly n am e d as a ‘ th erap y m a c h in e ’ (W h ite , 2 0 0 2 ) , is the m a jo r
in stitu tio n a m o n g th e se th e ra p e u tic m e c h a n ism s in c o n te m p o r a r y so c ie ty . [. . .]
It is n o t d iffic u lt to se e re a lity T V as a p a r t o f this au th e n tic ity in d u stry . It
m u st u se s tr a te g ic s th at e n c o u ra g c p e o p le to e x p r e s s an d m a n a g e th e ir e m o tio n s
an d p r o b le m s, sin c e it d e p e n d s on the b e lie f that ‘ r e a l’ e m o tio n s and co n flic ts w ill
a r ise . [. . .]
In te re stin g ly , alth o u gh m o s t re a lity p r o g r a m m e s in volve s c o r e s o f p a rtic ip a n ts ,
they in te ra c t su rp risin g ly little in la r g e r g r o u p s and th e m u ltip a r ty situ a tio n can
b e d iv id e d ro u g h ly in to tw o m ain c a te g o r ie s . O n e is the casu al ‘ d in n e r-ta b le t a lk ’
o r o th e r sim ila r sm a ll-sc a le talk in g th at o c c u r s w h en a g r o u p is p la n n in g a w o o d -
g a th e rin g e x c u r s io n , o r w a itin g fo r the n e x t c o m p e titio n to b e g in . T h is c o m m u n i-
cativ c situ a tio n is c o m m o n in p r o g r a m m e s su ch as Survivor o r in its S w e d ish and
Finn ish s iste r p r o g r a m m e s , th e Expedition Robinsons. T h e on ly p r o g r a m m e in o u r
sa m p le w h e re su ch c o n v e rsa tio n has a c e n tra l r o le is the Fat Club ( U K , b ro a d c a s t in
Fin lan d in 2 0 0 2 ) : in that show , p a rtic ip a n ts are o fte n film e d w h ile d in in g to g e th e r
fo r th e sim p le re a so n that fo o d an d d ie tin g arc the m a in in g re d ie n ts o f the show .
T h e se c o n d m u ltip a r ty situ a tio n is the to w n hall m e e tin g o f the n ew m ille n
n iu m , the T rib a l C o u n c il (a n d its m u ltip le e q u iv a le n ts), w h ich fe atu re in Survivor
an d its m any c lo n e s. T h e se situ a tio n s c o n sist o f a q u ic k a s s e s s m e n t, g u id e d by the
h o s t, o f the e p is o d e ’ s e v e n ts (as w ell as o f p e r so n a l p lo ttin g and p o litic iz in g ),
fo llo w e d by s o m e kin d o f c e re m o n y . T h e c o u n c il m e e tin g s e e m s to b e a ce n tral
c le m e n t o l re ality te le v isio n , sin c e it also a p p e a r s in s in g le s ’ sh o w s su ch as Paradise
Hotel an d in the w eig h in g se ssio n in Fat Club. T h e m ain p u r p o s e , e v id e n tly , is to
c re a te su sp e n se o v e r the p r o s p e c t o f w in n in g and losin g. P e rh ap s n o t d r a m a tic and
in tim ate e n o u g h o n th e ir o w n , th e se se g m e n ts are re la tiv e ly s h o r t c o m p a r e d to the
d u ratio n o f m o s t re a lity T V e p is o d e s . A lth o u gh s ta te m e n ts w ith s tr o n g fe e lin g s arc
u tte re d w h en o n e o f the p a rtic ip a n ts is v o te d o u t, in a m u ltip a r ty situ a tio n verb al
c o m m e n ts arc k e p t s h o r t w h ile the c a m c r a sh o w s the te a r s in c lo se -u p . A fte r all, it is
u su ally th e fo llo w -u p o f the situ a tio n fe a tu rin g p a rtic ip a n ts talk in g alo n e th at is the
p o in t o f h ig h e st d ra m a : o n c -b y -o n c the p a rtic ip a n ts ste p in fro n t o f the c a m c r a and
p ro c laim th e ir d iffic u lt d e c isio n s , b ro k e n h e a rts o r re m a rk on the joy o f re v e n g e .
T h e m u ltip a r ty c o n v e rsa tio n m ay b e t o o p u b lic and o fficial a situ a tio n o r sim p ly
to o h ard to c o n tr o l fo r the p u r p o s e o f m o s t re a lity sh o w s. In ste ad , the d ia lo g u e —
the v e ry fo u n d a tio n o f the te le v isio n d ra m a — e m e r g e s in se v e ra l v a rian ts. M any
re a lity p r o g r a m m e s , d a tin g sh o w s in p a rtic u la r, in c lu d c tw o - p a rty c o n v e rsa tio n s
th at have little to d o w ith the c arn iv alistic s h o c k c r figh ts o f s o m e talk sh o w s; in ste ad
they fo llo w the m e lo d r a m a tic sc e n e s k n o w n fro m so a p o p e r a s — even to the e x te n t
o f v isu aliza tio n b y m e a n s o f tra d itio n a l s h o t/ r e v e r s e - s h o t c a m e r a w o rk . T h e se
talk situ a tio n s in volve d e c la r a tio n s o f lo v e , h o n e sty , frie n d sh ip an d th e lik e; they
con vey a se m i-o ffic ia l to n e o f d e c la r in g s o m e kin d o f a vow w h ile th e o th e r p a rty
silen tly liste n s, th u s c o m in g c lo se to the m o n o lo g u e situ a tio n and its m u ltip le
m o d ific a tio n s.
F irst, the c o n fro n ta tio n a l d ia lo g u e : a kin d o f v e rb al d u e l is cle arly in p la c e lo
s u p p o r t the c o m p e titiv e a s p e c t in the sh o w s. C o n s id e r the fo llo w in g e x a m p le :
Annelie: We m eet again, [tries lo hug Charlie]
C h arlie: D o n ’t you hug m e. It’s a Ju das kiss. L e t’s not preten d. You
deceived m e, voted m e out . . . you stabbed m e in the back and now we
should p reten d to be friends?
A nnclie: This d o e sn ’ t have to be this hard. I d id n ’ t like you either.

But th e re ’ s such a thing as go od m ann ers. I follow my way and you,
vours.
C h arlie: I think honesty is w hat m atters.
A nnelie: D o n ’t you w ant to hear the new s [from the cam p]?
C h arlie: You talk if you w ant. I’m not in terested in chatting. I’ve
m anaged to be away from all that p lottin g fo r a few days now. T h ere is
no room here for intrigues and lies. This is a duel. It started from the
first m om en t on. [Charlie w alks away]
A nnelie [alone]: W hat an asshole. I knew it from the beginning. The

p o o r man w o n ’t have it easy.
(Expedition Robinson (Sw ed en ), b roadcast in Finland, 2 0 0 3 )
At the core, the underlining pu rp ose o f con fron tation s seem s to be to allow the
display o f anger, rage, accusations and all kinds o f negative em otio ns. In dating
show s, the con fron tation may have little to do with w inning or losin g but is
included sim ply to facilitate the m elodram atized presen tation of leelin gs, a propos
of Jerry Springer. Toni gives a prim e exam p le in h er discussion with Keith alte r a
dinner at the Paradise Hotel:
Toni: If you ever d isre sp e ct a w om an again like you did ton ight, so help
m e G o d , I’m gonna flare up on you.
K eith: This can ’t be true.

(Paradise Hotel (U S A ), b roadcast in Finland, 2 0 0 4 )
B esides these tw o typ es that seem to dom inate the dialogue in reality television ,
other su p p o rtin g dialogue conventions can be found. O n e is a ncw's-like interview ,
con ducted by the host. The Finnish adventure show Extreme Escapades (Suuri
seikkailu, 2 0 0 2 , 2 0 0 3 ) m ade an art o f m aking referen ces to sp o rts in terv iew s: after
challenges, the host questions participan ts w ith cliches such as: ‘I low' do you feel
n ow ?’ Interestingly, the in terv iew ees’ role as ‘p rofession al ath letes’ evoked som e o f
the m ost colou rfu l exp ression s o f joy o r disappoin tm en t from Finns, otherw ise
som ew hat lacking in em otio n al e x p re ssio n , since em otio n s w ere con n ected to
factual statem en ts about how hard it w as lo clim b a hill o r what kind o f strategy was
used when crossing a stream (A slam a and Pantti, forth com in g 2 0 0 6 ). In a sim ilar
vein, the Finnish version o f Popstars (2 0 0 2 ) included ‘p rofession al interview
T A L K I N G A L O N E 3 4 3
s e s s io n s ’ in th e r e c o r d in g s tu d io d u r in g w h ic h th e m e m b e r s o f th e g ir l b a n d - to - b e
s e e m e d to try t o c o n s t r u c t th e ir im a g e fu r io u s ly as s e r io u s m u sic ia n s.
A lth o u g h in te r v ie w s r e m a in m o r e th e e x c e p t io n th an th e r u le in re a lity s h o w s ,
th e y a lso p lay a r o le in d a tin g sh o w s su c h as The B achelor, w h e n th e h o s t p o s e s
s im p le q u e s t io n s : ‘ A r c y o u r e a d y ? ’ ; ‘ H o w d id y o u a r r iv e a t th is d e c is io n ? ’ In
th is c o n t e x t , th e in te r v ie w b r in g s a m o r e fa c tu a l c o n tr a s t t o th e m e lo d r a m a t ic
d e c la r a t io n . A lth o u g h n o d e a r lin e can b e d r a w n b e tw e e n a m o r e fa c tu a l o r o ffic ial
an d a m o r e in tim a te in te r v ie w s itu a tio n , a n o th e r s u p p o r t in g tv p e o f in te r v ie w
d ia lo g u e th a t e m e r g e s c o u ld b e c a lle d th e ‘th e r a p y i n t e r v ie w ’ . T h is k in d o f talk
s itu a tio n h as b e e n m a d e f a m o u s a lr e a d y b y talk s h o w s ( B r u u n , 1 9 9 4 ; M u r d o c k ,
2 0 0 0 ) : h e r e , th e jo u r n a lis t g iv e s s u b tle , s u p p o r t in g c u e s to th e p a r t ic ip a n t , so
th a t th e y can w o r k th ro u g h d iffic u lt s itu a tio n s . In th e F in n ish v e rs io n o f Survivor,
Robinson ( 2 0 0 4 ) , th e th e ra p y talk w a s g iv e n its o w n w e e k ly 3 0 m in u te s . A s the
sh o w h ad been reco rd e d so m e s ix m o n th s in a d v a n c e , th e p r o d u c e r s c o u ld
s ta g e t h c r a p c u t ic in te r v ie w s in w h ic h th e p a r t ic ip a n t v o t e d out in a g iv e n
w e e k a p p e a r e d in th e ir o w n w ay t o a n a ly se th e ir k ey s t r a t e g ie s an d e m o t io n s in
h in d sig h t.
Yet a n o th e r fo r m o f d ia lo g u e is th e o n e b e tw e e n th e e x p e r t a s s e s s o r an d th e
a s s e s s e d . S h o w s su c h as Idols a r c b u ilt la r g e ly o n th is w ay o f ta lk :
I’ m y o u r fan . Y o u ’ ve b e e n d a m n g o o d fro m th e s t a r t . A n d I, so m e h o w
... I w a n t to th an k y o u . . . y o u r w h o le a t tit u d e , th at h u m ility th at
y o u ’ v e h ad all a lo n g th e w ay . . . I th in k i t ’ s in c re d ib ly g r e a t . T h e m a n
c o m e s h e r e , s in g s , le a v e s. T h a t re a lly h its m e , d e e p d o w n in sid e . I’ m
g o n n a c ry s o o n , b u t y o u g e t all th e p o in ts b c c a u s c o l th a t h u m ility an d
th e a t tit u d e , h o w y o u a p p r o a c h sin g in g . R o c k ’ n ’ r o ll!
(H a n n u , m u s ic p r o d u c e r an d m e m b e r o l th e ju r y ,
Idols (F in la n d ), 2 0 0 3 )
T h e a b o v e e x a m p le p o ig n a n tly illu s tr a te s th e k in d o f a s s e s s m e n t r e q u ir e d in
re a lity p r o g r a m m e s : e m o t io n a l e x p r e s s io n th a t d o c s n o t s o lic it a r e p ly . O f t e n ,
situ a tio n s th a t a p p e a r t o b e d ia lo g u e s a r c c ith e r w c llp r c p a r c d , w itty o n c - lin c r s
s o lic ite d b y th e h o s t, o r m o n o lo g u e s w h e r e th e o t h e r p a r t ic ip a n ts s e r v e m e r e ly as
an a u d ie n c e , w a itin g fo r th e ir o w n m o n o lo g u e . R e g a r d le s s o f th e ty p e o r o r ig in o f
th e re a lity sh o w a n d , a c c o r d in g ly , o f th e a c tio n ta k in g p la c e (b e it a w o r m - e a t in g
c o m p e t itio n o r a h o t d a t e ) , th e d r a m a tic c u lm in a tio n c o m e s w h e n p a r t ic ip a n ts fac e
th e c a m c r a a lo n e .
T alk in g a lo n e
U p to n o w I h ave k e p t m y m o u th sh u t a b o u t 9 5 p e r c e n t o f th e e v e n ts in
o u r c a m p [i.e . h a v e n ’ t ta lk e d a b o u t th e m t o th e t e a m m a t e s ] a n d , in
t u r n , t o ld 9 5 p e r c e n t o f e v e ry th in g d ir e c tly to th e c a m e r a . T h e first
tim e I sa id s o m e th in g d ir e c tly to s o m e b o d y h e re I r e a liz e d th a t I sh o u ld
have k e p t q u ie t e v e n th e n .
( K in a , Extreme Escapades (F in la n d ), 2 0 0 2 )
T rad ition ally , in d ram a as w ell as p ro se , sin g le -p e rso n sp eech situ atio n s have se rv e d
to reveal the in n er life, se cre t th ough ts and feelin gs o f the c h a ra c te rs. In terestin gly ,
reality sh o w s have re in tro d u c e d this o u t-o f-d ate sta g e d talk situ ation into the
c o n te x t o f tele v isio n . In d eed , it can be argu ed that it is p rccisclv the m o n o lo g u e
that is at the c o re o f reality tele v isio n , as it p ro v id e s for th ose m o m e n ts w hen
e m o tio n s ru n free and a p e r s o n ’ s tru e self a p p e ars. W e arg u e that the specific
m o m e n ts o f talkin g alone arc u sed on the w h ole as a tru th -sign o f d ire ct access to
the ‘ r e a l’ .
R eality television has p ro d u c e d a m u ltitu d e o f variation s o f the m o n o lo g u e .
T h e m o st ob v io u s m ay b e the staged co n fessio n , w hich is illu strated by K risten in
the fo llow in g:
[C ryin g] It’ s kind o f all se t in . . . like things m igh t g e t to the en d. And

it really b o th e rs m e a lo t b ecau se I m e t lo t o f tru e frie n d s and I d o n ’ t
w an t, I d o n ’ t w an t to leave. I crie d ton igh t kn ow in g th at T om m y w as the
only p e rso n I ever w an ted tru ly to kn ow w hat I w as ab o u t. I love him to
death fo r b ein g that p e rso n .
(K r iste n , Temptation Island (U S A ), b ro a d c ast in Fin lan d, 2 0 0 2 )
This is a talk situ ation that The Real World m ade fam o u s in the early the 1 9 90s
and w hich has figured su b seq u en tly in m o st reality television fo rm a ts w o rld w id e.
T h e co n fessio n clearly b o rro w s its vid eo -d iary e x p re ssio n from factual g e n re s,
specifically from ‘ p e rfo rm ativ e d o c u m e n ta ry ’ (e.g . N ic h o ls, 2 0 0 1 ). In d eed , a form
ot m o n o lo g u e co u ld be called the ‘ diary c o n fe ssio n ’ , as it is used in a d o cu m e n tary
m an n er to e n c o u n te r even ts rath er than reveal the s p e a k e r ’s in n er se c re ts, as fo r
e x am p le in Faking It. In the fo llo w in g , 2 2 -y ea r-o ld Sian , a stu d e n t o f classical m u sic ,
is to be tra n sfo rm e d into a to p D J:
I’ ve alw ays felt that m ayb e I’ m e n te rin g in to an old p ro fe ssio n . So yeah,

I think i t ’ s quite an ad van tage for m e to actually e x p lo re vouth and w hat
y o u n g p e o p le arc en jo yin g d o in g . . . W h en I w oke up this m o rn in g
I felt sick and th ou gh t ab o u t n o t co m in g . . . fo r a scc o n d . Th en I ju st
th ou gh t, yeah w ell, le t ’ s d o it now, I’ ve g o t to do this now. And I’ m
qu ite e x c ite d .
(Sian , Faking It (U K ), b ro a d c ast in Fin lan d, 2 0 0 4 )
If d istin ctio n s arc to b e m a d e , a v ideo diary in clu d es a n arrative p u r p o se : it

d e v e lo p s the sto ry . In c o n tra st, a co n fessio n m ay look the sam e visually , b u t the
c o n te n t and fo rm o f talk re se m b le m o re closely the m e lo d ram a tic d e claratio n — as
th eir m ain co n te n t, c o n fessio n s featu re e m o tio n al rev elatio n s, sp e c u latio n s and
an alyses.
A rgu ab ly, a co n fessio n re se m b le s th erapy talk , b u t a distin ction can be m ad e:
c lcarly , the th e rap e u tic situ ation is co n d u cted w ith so m e o n e (even if the ‘ th e ra p
is t’ s ’ q u e stio n s may b e o m itte d in the final v e rsio n ), w h ereas the co n fessio n is a sclf-
in duccd exam in atio n o f o n e ’ s p rio r actio n s an d , even m o re im p o rta n tly , o f o n e ’ s
th ou g h ts, feelin gs and relation sh ip s w ith o th e rs. C h risty , w ho has taken p art in a
datin g c ru ise w ith R o g e r on Shipmates, illu strate s this:
TALKING ALONE 3 4 5
R o g er likes m e and I w ould bet my life on the fact that he d oes. If you
like m e, you like m e. You need to be upfront with m e and tell m e that
you like m e. D o n ’ t play gam es with m e; leave that back in elem entary
sch oo l, w here you learn ed it. R o g er d o es not have w hat it takes to be a
part o f m e.
(C h ristv , Shipmates (U S A ), b roadcast in Finland, 2 0 0 3 )
A dialogical variant o f the confession is the video greeting. It differs from

con fession in that the fo rm e r is directed to the audience directly, w hereas the latter
m akes them eavesd rop p ers on a m on ologu e targeted at a certain som eon e within
the p rogram m e (be it an oth er participant o r relative, e tc .). The analysis that Christy
offers alone in the confcssion al m on ologu e takes the follow ing form w hen directed
al som eon e special:
R oger, I just w ant to say to you, w hile it h asn’t (or these haven’t)
been the best davs o f my life, I have had a d cccn t tim e. I think it could
have been b etter had you been m o re h on est, m o re upfron t and m ore
frank with your feelings. I think that you like m e; you told m e that you
do.
(C h risty , Shipmates (U S A ), b roadcast in Finland, 2 0 0 3 )
A talk situation that M u rdock (2 0 0 0 ) defines as the ‘sales p itch ’ also resem b les
the confession : olten the pitch is presen t m ore or less explicitly in reality television
show s, especially in the kind in w hich audiences have the pow er to vote fo r or
against co m p e tito rs. T h e p u rp o se o f pitching in this co n text is to en sure o n e 's
en rolm en t (such as the sh o w recls of the aspiring inm ates o f Paradise Hotel) or o n e ’ s
survival, to p ro m o te o n e se lf as the m o st socially, psychologically a n d /o r physically
c om p eten t con testan t. The Finnish Idols provides an exam ple that is both typical for
the situation and typically su b du ed, rep resen tin g Finnish com m un icative culture
(sec A slam a and Pantti, forth com in g 2 0 0 6 ):
I like to teach and I like that line o f w ork , but som eh ow I feel I’m not
living to my full poten tial doin g that. I w ant som eth ing else still. I’m no
lon ger IS years old, I have life exp erien ce. And I believe that I have
go o d prerequ isites to endure this [com petition and stress] and enjoy
everything this brin gs along. The thing is, regardless o f everything, I
have my feel on the grou n d .
(M aria, teacher, Idols (Fin land), broadcast 2 0 0 3 )
Rcfcrcnccs
Aslama, M. and M. Pantti (forthcom ing 2006) ‘Flagging Finnishness: Reproducing

National Identity in the Reality Television Scries Extreme Escapades’ , Television and
New Media.
Bruun, H. (1994) ‘Snakkeprogram m et. Inkrcdsning av cn TV -gen re’ [‘Talk Show.
Incarnation o f a TV G en re’ ], working paper. Aarhus: University of Aarhus.
C orner, J. (2 0 0 4 ) ‘A fterw ord: Fram ing the N e w ’ , in S. H olm es and D. Jerm yn (eds)
Understanding Reality Television, pp. 2 9 0 —9. London: R outledge.
D ovey, J. (2 0 0 0 ) Freakshow: First Person Media and Factual Television. London: Pluto Press.
Foucault, M . (1 9 8 1 (1 9 7 6 ]) The History o j Sexuality: Volume 1, an Introduction. H arm onds-
w orth: Penguin.
Furedi, F. (2 0 0 4 ) Therapy Culture: Cultivating Vulnerability in an Uncertain Age. London:
R outledge.
G am son , J. (1 9 9 8 ) Freaks Talk Back. Tabloid Shows and Sexual Nonconformity. C hicago, IL:
U niversity o f C hicago Press.
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C am bridge: Polity Press.
G rindstaff, L. (1 9 9 7 ) ‘ Producing Trash, C lass and the M oney Sh o t’ , in J. Lull and
S. H inerm an (cds) Media Scandals, pp. 164—201. C am bridge: Polity Press.
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S. H olm es and D. Jerm yn (eds) Understanding Reality Television, pp. 1—32. London:
R outledge.
Livingstone, S. and P. Lunt (1 9 9 4 ) Talk on Television. Audience Participation and the Public
Debate. London: R outledge.
Lunt, P. and P. Stenner (2 0 0 5 ) ‘ The Jerry Springer Show as an Em otional Public Sp h ere’ ,
Media, Culture and Society 2 7 (1 ): 59—82.
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Talk’ , Genders 11 (Fall): 8 1 - 1 1 0 .
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G. M urdock and P. D ahlgrcn (cd s) Television Across Europe: A Comparative
Introduction, pp. 198—220. London: Sage.
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Shattuc, J.M . (1 9 9 7 ) The Talking Cure. TV Talk Shows and Women. N ew York: R ou tlcdgc.
W hite, M . (1 9 9 2 ) Tele-advising: Therapeutic Discourse in American Television. Chapel Hill:
U niversity o f N orth C arolina Press.
W hite, M . (2 0 0 2 ) ‘Television, Therapy and the Social Sub ject; or, T h e TV Therapy
M achine’ , in J. Friedm an (e d .) Reality Squared. Televisual Discourse on the Real,
pp. 313—21. N ew Brunsw ick, N J: R u tgers U niversity Press.
Chapter 4 1
Greg M. Smith
T H E MOOD C U E A P P R O A C H
G
I V E N T H E F L E X I B I L I T Y O F T H E em otion sy stem , it w ould seem
difficult for a m ass-m edia form to clicit em otional respo n ses w ith any degree
o f con sistency across a w ide range o f view ers. If social and cultural differences
create diverse em otion scripts and p ro to ty p e s, then audience m em b ers can be using
very different p roto ty pes w hen em otionally assessin g the sam e stim uli. [. . .]
How can film s be stru ctu red to elicit depen dable resp o n ses from a w ide variety
of audience m e m b e rs, as n oted in the desiderata? [. . .]
The central assertion: the interaction between mood

and emotion
I argue that the prim ary em otive cffcct o f film is to crcatc m o o d . G en eratin g b rief,
intense em otio n s often req uires an orien tin g state that asks us to in te rp re t our
surroun din gs in an em otional fashion. If w e arc in such an em otionally orien ting
state, we are m uch m ore likely to exp erien ce such em otio n , accordin g to my
theory.
Film stru ctu re s seek to increase the film ’s chances o f evoking em otion by first
creating a predisp osition tow ard experien cin g em otio n : a m o o d . Film s rely on
bein g able to clicit a low er-level em otional state, w hich can be establish ed w ith less
con cen trated cuing than w ould be req uired for em otio n . The first task for a film is
to create such an em otional orien tation tow ard the film.
To sustain a m o o d , we m u st exp erien ce occasion al m om en ts o f em otio n . Film
m u st therefore provide the view er with a p e rio d ic diet o f b rie f em otional m om en ts
if it is to sustain a m o o d . T h erefo re, m o o d and em otion sustain each other. M ood
en courages us to c x p c ric n c c em o tio n , and experien cin g em otio ns cn cou ragcs us to
continue in the present m ood .
348 GREG M . S M I T H
Film s t r u c t u r e s a t t e m p t i n g t o e lic it m o o d ca n ta k e a d v a n t a g e o f the v a r io u s

m e a n s o f a c c e s s t o the e m o t i o n s y s t e m . [. . .] F i lm ic c u e s th at c a n p r o v i d e e m o
tio n a l i n f o r m a t i o n i n c l u d e facial e x p r e s s i o n , fig u r e m o v e m e n t , d i a l o g u e , v o c a l
e x p r e s s i o n a n d t o n e , c o s t u m e , s o u n d , m u s i c , lig h tin g , m i s c - c n - s c c n e , s e t d e s i g n ,
e d it i n g , c a m e r a ( a n g l e , d i s t a n c e , m o v e m e n t ) , d e p t h o f fie ld , c h a r a c t c r q u a li t ie s a n d
h i s t o r i e s , a n d n a r r a t iv e s it u a t io n . E a c h o f t h e s e c u e s ca n p la y a p a r t in c r e a t i n g a
m o o d orien tation o r a stro n g e r e m o tio n .
F i l m s , h o w e v e r , c a n n o t d e p e n d a b l y r e ly o n u s in g s in g le e m o t i o n c u e s . T h e r e is
c o n s i d e r a b l e v a r ia tio n a m o n g in d iv id u a l v i e w e r s ’ e m o t i o n s y s t e m s , a n d s in g le c u e s
m ig h t b e r e c e i v e d b y s o m e v i e w e r s an d m i s s e d by o t h e r s . F i lm s t h e r e f o r e p r o v i d e a
v a r ie ty o f r e d u n d a n t e m o t i v e c u e s , in c r e a s i n g th e c h a n c e th at d if f e r i n g a u d i c n c c
m e m b e r s (w ith th e ir d if fe r i n g p r e f e r e n c e s o f e m o t i o n a l a c c e s s ) wrill b e n u d g e d
t o w a r d an a p p r o p r i a t e e m o t i o n a l o r i e n t a t i o n .
A s a b r i e f a n d s i m p l e e x a m p l e o f h o w film c u in g w o r k s , l e t u s e x a m i n e h o w
A lf r e d H i t c h c o c k c o o r d i n a t e d e m o t i o n c u e s in a fa m ilia r s c e n e f r o m Psycho. W h e n
M a r i o n a n d N o r m a n s h a r e a m e a l in N o r m a n ’ s p a r lo r , r e d u n d a n t c u e s b e g i n to
a l e r t u s th a t s o m e t h i n g is w r o n g w it h th is y o u n g m a n a n d th a t w e s h o u ld b e g i n to
f e a r f o r M a r i o n ’ s s a f e t y . D i a l o g u e c o n n e c t s M a r i o n ( w h o “ e a t s like a b i r d ” ) a n d th e
b i r d s th at N o r m a n s t u l fe d a n d p l a c e d o n the w a ll, s u g g e s t i n g th a t p e r h a p s M a r i o n
m ig h t r e c e i v e th e s a m e fa te as th e b i r d s . T h e n a r r a t iv e s itu a t io n p la c e s M a r i o n a lo n e
in the h o t e l w ith N o r m a n , a m a n w h o m sh e o n ly b a r e ly k n o w s . L o w a n g l e s m a k e
N o r m a n m o r e m e n a c i n g , p a r t ic u la r l y w h e n he is f r a m e d w ith th e b i r d s (lit fr o m
b e l o w to c r e a t e e l o n g a t e d s h a d o w s ) . H is s t u t t e r i n g , g iv e n th e n o r m o f p e r f e c t
H o l l y w o o d d ic t i o n , ca n b e s e e n a s a h in t o f d e e p e r t r o u b l e s . T h e c l o s e - u p o f
N o r m a n w h e n he b it t e r l y d e s c r i b e s a m a d h o u s e , a lo n g w ith th e o r c h e s t r a l m u s ic
in a m i n o r k e yJ ,7 f u r t h e r a l e r t s u s th at N o r m a n is a m a n to b e fe a r e d . T h e c u e s a r c
n o t s o f o r e g r o u n d e d th at w e a r e c c r t a i n N o r m a n w ill d o s o m e t h i n g e v il, b u t th cv
a r c c o o r d i n a t e d e n o u g h t o sig n al to the v i e w e r th a t th e y s h o u l d b e fe a rfu l.
R e d u n d a n t c u e s c o l l a b o r a t e to in d ic a te to th e v i e w e r w h ic h e m o t i o n a l m o o d is
c a lle d for. T h e v i e w e r n e e d n o t f o c u s c o n s c i o u s a t t e n t i o n o n c a c h o f t h e s e e l e m e n t s .
S o m e o f t h e s e c u e s a c tiv a te the a s s o c ia tiv e n etw o r k o f th e e m o t i o n s , an d th is c r e a t e s
a lo w lev el o f e m o t i o n . I f a film p r o v i d e s a v i e w e r w it h s e v e r a l r e d u n d a n t e m o t i v e
c u c s , th is in c r e a s e s th e l ik e lih o o d o f m o v i n g th e v i e w e r t o w a r d a p r c d i s p o s i t i o n a r y
m o o d sta te .
O n c e th at m o o d is c r e a t e d , it h as a t e n d e n c y to s u s ta in itse lf. A m o o d is
n o t e n t ir e ly s e l f - p e r p e t u a t i n g , h o w e v e r. If w e d o n o t find any o p p o r t u n i t i e s to
e x p e r i e n c e th e s e b r i e f e m o t i o n s , o u r p a r t i c u l a r m o o d w il l e r o d e a n d c h a n g e
to a n o t h e r p r e d i s p o s i t i o n a r y s ta te . It r e q u i r e s o c c a s i o n a l m o m e n t s o f s t r o n g e m o
ti o n to m a in ta in th e m o o d . A c r it ic s h o u l d l o o k fo r th e s e o c c a s i o n a l m o m e n t s o f
s t r o n g c u in g th a t b o l s t e r an a u d i e n c e ’ s e m o t i o n a l o r i e n t a t i o n . [. . .]
T h e first s t e p f o r th e m o o d - c u e a p p r o a c h is f o r th e c r it ic t o p a y c l o s e a t t e n t i o n
t o th e w a y th a t e m o t i o n c u e s a c t t o g e t h e r to c r e a t e m o o d a t th e b e g i n n i n g o f a film .
T h e a p p r o a c h a s s u m e s th at th e film w ill u s e c o o r d i n a t e d s e t s o f c u e s to s ig n a l an
e m o t i o n a l o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d th e film as a w h o le . |. . .)
T H E M 0 0 D C U E A P P RO A C H 3 4 9
C o o r d in a t e d c u in g : th e e m o tio n m a r k e r
N a rra tiv e p ro v id e s a s e r ie s o f d ic g c tic g o a ls an d o b s ta c le s , and g o a l a c h ie v e m e n ts

an d o b sta c le s fre q u e n tly p ro v id e the n e c e ssa ry m o o d -r e in fo r c in g payoff's. W c
re jo ic e w h e n the p r o ta g o n is t ach ie v e s a g o a l o r s u b g o a l; w e are sa d , fe a rfu l, o r
a n x io u s w h e n a g o a l is fr u s tr a te d . G o a ls an d o b sta c le s are h ighly fo r e g r o u n d e d in
the n a rra tiv e , an d so they c re a te h ighly m a rk e d o p p o r tu n itie s fo r m o m e n ts that are
sign ifican t b o th n arra tiv e ly an d e m o tio n a lly .
A lm o st e v e ry n arra tiv e ly sign ifican t m o m e n t h as the p o te n tia l to p ro v id e so m e
e m o tio n a l pay o ff, b u t n o t e v e ry e m o tio n a l p a y o ff is n arra tiv e ly sig n ific an t. T h e
c lassic al H o lly w o o d c in e m a fre q u e n tly u se s w h at I call “ e m o tio n m a r k e r s ,” c o n
fig u ra tio n s o f highly visib le te x tu a l c u e s fo r the p r im a ry p u r p o s e o f e lic itin g b r ie f
m o m e n ts o f e m o tio n . T h e se m a r k e r s sign al to an a u d ie n c e trav e lin g d o w n th e g o al-
o r ie n te d path o f a n a rra tiv e , c u in g th em to e n g a g e in a b r ie f e m o tio n a l m o m e n t.
T h e e m o tio n m a rk e r is n o t th e re sim p ly to ad v an ce o r r e ta r d the n a r r a tiv e 's
p r o g r e ss . N e ith e r is the e m o tio n m a rk e r an in fo rm a tiv e d e v ic e o ffe r in g m o r e d etail
a b o u t the sto ry o r o ffe rin g au th o ria l c o m m e n ta r y on the d ic g c sis. T h e p r im a ry
p u r p o s e o f an e m o tio n m a rk e r is to g e n e ra te a b r ie f b u r s t o f e m o tio n . O fte n such
m o m e n ts c o u ld b e c x c is c d fro m a film w ith little o r n o im p a c t on the ac h ie v e m e n t
o f n a rra tiv e g o a ls o r the sta te o f sto ry in fo rm a tio n .
T h e se m a r k e r s d o fulfill an im p o r ta n t e m o tiv e fu n ctio n in the t e x t, h ow ever.
F o r th e v ie w e r e n g a g e d in an a p p r o p r ia te m o o d , th ey g iv e a re w a r d th at h elp s
m a in tain that p r e d isp o s itio n to w a rd e x p r e ss in g e m o tio n . Few t e x t s can rely on ly on
n arra tiv e ly sig n ific an t m o m e n ts to p ro v id e m o o d -su sta in in g e m o tio n . M o st have to
p ro v id e m a rk e r s to sh o re u p th e m o o d th e t e x t has c re a te d , even if the m a rk e r s
have little o r n o e ffe c t on th e o v e r t d ie g e tic a im : the c h a r a c te r ’ s ac h ie v e m e n t o f a
g o a l.
A n e x a m p le w ill h elp illu stra te th is, an d I have se le c te d the o p e n in g o f a film
that d e n se ly p a c k s o b sta c le s to the ste a m ro llin g fo rw a r d p r o g r e s s o f its actio n -
o r ic n te d , p r o ta g o n is t- c c n te r e d n a rra tiv e : Steven S p ie lb e r g ’ s Raiders o f the Lost Ark.
Raiders is an c x e r c is c in p u ttin g o n e o b sta c le a fte r a n o th e r in fro n t o f Indiana J o n e s ’ s
(H a r r is o n F o rd ) a tte m p t to find the A rk o f the C o v e n a n t an d save the w o rld . T h e se
re ta r d in g m o m e n ts e n d a n g e r the h e r o , ally in g the a u d ie n c e w ith him and p ro v id in g
the a u d ie n c e w ith tra d itio n a l ad v e n tu re se ria l p le a su r e s su c h as fe a r and e x c ite m e n t.
Yet even a film w ith as m any e x c itin g h airp in e sc a p e s as Raiders u se s e m o tio n
m a rk e r s to p ro v id e ev e n m o r e e m o tio n a l pay o ffs.
T h e o p e n in g s c q u e n c c o f the film fo llo w s Jo n e s th ro u g h the ju n g le and in to
a b o o d y - tr a p p e d cave in se arch o f a g o ld e n sta tu e . T h e m o o d is s u s p e n se fu l,
a p p re h e n siv e o f th e im m in e n t atta c k s of ju n g le sa v a g e s o r the sw ift tr ig g e r in g o f
h id d e n death tra p s. T h e m u sical s c o re is an u n se ttlin g m ix of u n u su a l m e lo d ic
in te rv a ls an d p e r c u ss io n ; the e n v iro n m e n t is full o f d e e p sh a d o w s, and the c a m c r a
tra c k s b eh in d Jo n e s . O n e o f J o n e s ’ s trail g u id e s trie s to sh o o t him fro m b e h in d ,
and Jo n e s saves h im se lf w ith a q u ick lash o f his w h ip , e sta b lish in g his c h a r a c te r ’ s
skill w ith the w e a p o n . T h a t w h ip h elp s Jo n e s an d h is re m a in in g g u id e c r o s s o v e r a
d e e p p it, on ly to have th e ir s u p p o r t slip , a lm o st p lu n g in g the g u id e to his d eath .
T h is w h ip -a n d -p it o b sta c le m u st b e c r o s s e d again on th e ir w ay o u t o f th e cave.
T h e se o b sta c le s u se m u ltip le e m o tio n c u e s (m u sic a l s tin g e r s , facial c lo s e -u p s , e tc .)
3 5 0 GREG M. S MITH
to signal e m o tio n a l e x p re ssio n o f fear, both se rv in g im p o rta n t n arrative fun ction s

(im p e d in g p r o g r e ss to w ard the go al and pro v id in g the se tu p fo r fu tu re n arrative
o c c u rre n c e s) and p rovid in g e m o tio n a l payoffs.
A lo n g the w ay th ere arc m o m e n ts that arc ju st as em o tio n ally m ark ed w ith ou t
se rv in g such significant g o a l-o rie n te d n arrative fu n ctio n . O n e o f the g u id es
traveling through the thick jun gle u n c o v e rs a g r o te sq u e sto n e idol and sc re a m s,
ac c o m p an ie d by the lou d flapp in g of a flock o f flushed b ird s and a m u sical stinger.
C learly this is a co n c e n tra te d organ ization of e m o tio n cu e s co o rd in a te d to p r o m p t a
sta rtle reflex in the view er, y et unlike the previou sly d iscu sse d e m o tio n al c lic ito rs,
this e m o tio n m a rk e r n eith er h in d ers n o r h elp s the p r o ta g o n ist’ s p r o g r e ss tow ard his
g o al, n o r d o c s it p rovid e new sto ry in fo rm atio n . W h at this m o m e n t d o cs do is
p ro v id e a reliab le b u rst o f c o n g ru e n t e m o tio n that h elp s m ain tain the s e q u e n c e ’ s
su sp en sefu l m o o d . T h is is the p rim ary p u r p o se o f the sto n e idol scare.
It is difficult to arg u e , given the in te rc o n n e cte d n ature o f n arrativ e , that any
m o m e n t has ab so lu te ly no b e arin g on go al p r o g r e ss o r sto ry in fo rm atio n . T h e sto n e
idol scare m ay have so m e m in o r c o n trib u tio n to the state o f sto ry in fo rm ation
(le ttin g us kn ow that Jo n es is n ear the place w h ere the g o ld e n tre asu re is h o u se d ),
but clearly the fu n ction ality o f this n arrative in ciden t e x c e e d s its n arrative
in fo rm ativ e n e ss. T h e m ain p u r p o se o f the sto n e idol is to shout “ B o o !” at the
au d ien ce. It is a so rt o f red h errin g that m arks this m o m e n t as fe a rso m e , b o lste rin g
the m o o d ’ s p re d isp o sitio n to w ard e m o tio n (a n c c cssa ry fun ction given the
stru c tu re o f the e m o tio n sy ste m ).
T h e ap p earan ce o f taran tu las on Jo n e s ’ s and the g u id e ’ s back s in the cave is
an oth er e m o tio n m arker. H ere the case is a bit less cle ar-cu t. O n e co u ld argu e that
the taran tu las are an o b sta c le to Jo n e s ’ s p r o g r e ss , but th eir fun ction as o b sta c le s
is m in o r c o m p a re d w ith the e m o tio n a l effect called for. Jo n e s m erely b ru sh e s the
sp id e rs off , m akin g them an e x tre m e ly m in o r o b sta c le (and the only o b sta c le that
is n o t rc e n c o u n te re d w hen Jo n e s and the gu id e ra c c b ack o u t of the cave). T h e
ta ra n tu a ls’ p rim ary fun ction is to elicit d isgu st o r fear in the au d icn c c , relying on
co m m o n so cietal asso ciatio n s w ith hairy sp id e rs. T h e ir e m o tio n al fun ction greatly
c x c c c d s th eir g o a l-o ric n tc d fu n ction .
N o te that both o f th ese e m o tio n m a rk e rs arc fairly sim p le and reliab le devices.
T h e sta rtle reflex w hen h earin g a loud n oise is im p o ssib le to su p p re ss, even if one
b e c o m e s acc u sto m e d to h earin g artille ry fire daily. T h e d isg u st reaction at se e in g a
hairy sp id e r is as w id e sp re a d and d ep en d ab le today as it w as on m y ele m e n tary
sc h o o l p lay g ro u n d . W h en c h o o sin g e m o tio n m a rk e rs to buoy the m o o d , the film
m a k e rs relied on so m e o f the m o re d e p e n d ab le and sim p le e m o tio n a l c licito rs.
E m o tio n m a rk e rs in g e n e ra l ten d to be u n c o m p lic ate d and d ircct.
A lso n ote that th ese m a rk e rs n eed n o t clicit exactly the sam e e m o tio n s for
them to con tin u e the m o o d . T h e sto n e idol m ay p ro m p t a fearful sta rtle re fle x ,
and the taran tu las may elicit d isgu st. W h at is re q u ire d is that the e m o tio n m a rk e rs
p ro m p t e m o tio n s that are c o n g ru e n t w ith the su sp e n se fu l m o o d . E m o tio n s are not
sharply d iscre te e n titie s; one can n ot argu e that a cu c m u st clicit c ith e r fear or
d isgu st and not b oth . D isg u st is asso ciate d w ith fear, and w hen one pathw ay is
activ ate d , the o th e r is often trig g e re d as w ell. F ilm m ak e rs n eed not be c o n c c rn e d
that they elicit p recisely the sam e e m o tio n th rou gh ou t a se q u e n ce . B ecau se o f
e m o tio n a l in te rc o n n e ctio n s, re la te d e m o tio n s se rv e to m ain tain the m o o d . [. . .]
T H E M 0 0 D C U E A P P RO A C H 3 5 1
C u e s are the sm alle st unit for analyzing a t e x t ’ s e m o tio n al ap p e als. E m o tio n

c u e s are the b u ild in g b lo ck s that are u sed to cre ate the larg e r stru c tu re s such as
e m o tio n m a rk e rs. M o o d is su stain ed by a su cce ssio n o f c u e s, so m e o f w hich are
o rgan ized in to larg e r stru c tu re s (n arrative o b sta c le s, e m o tio n m a rk e r s), so m e o f
w hich arc n ot. | . . . ]
B rie f prototypes: mixing genre m icroscripts
G e n re s arc c o m p o se d o f n arrative and ic o n o grap h ic p a tte rn s, b u t they also spccify

p a tte rn s o f e m o tio n a l a d d re ss, p ro v id in g the view er w ith sc rip ts to use in in tcrp c t-
in g a ge n re film . H ow d o e s a p a rtic u la r g e n re stru c tu re its use o f em o tio n c u e s,
m o o d , and em o tio n m a rk e rs?
T h e m o st significant ge n re sc rip ts w ith relation to e m o tio n are n o t the b ro a d
e x p e c ta tio n s fo r the overall shape and fo rm o f a film , b u t ge n re m ic ro sc rip ts,
in tc rtc x tu a l e x p e c tatio n se ts fo r se q u e n ce s and scc n cs. W c ap p ro ach a film w ith an
e n o rm o u s c o lle c tio n o f m ic ro sc rip ts w e have ga th e re d from re al-w o rld c x p c r ic n c c
and from e n co u n te rs w ith o th e r ge n re te x ts , sc rip ts fo r feudin g lo v e rs, sh o w d o w n s,
fight se q u e n c e s, ro m an tic re c o n c iliatio n s, ch ase s, and stalk in gs. T h e se m ic ro sc rip ts
e n co u ra g e the v ie w e r to an ticip ate w hat w ill h app en n e x t n arrativ ely , sty listically ,
and em o tio n ally . B ecau se e m o tio n s ten d to b e b r ie f m icro lev el p h e n o m e n a, sm alle r
g c n c ric un its ten d to be m o re u sefu l g u id es fo r the e m o tio n sy ste m .
W c do n ot in te rp re t the m o o d o f the Raiders o f the Lost zlr/t o p e n in g b ased solely
on its e m o tio n cu e s. In stead w e re co g n ize it as a se q u e n ce in w hich w e follow
a p ro ta g o n ist into h ostile te r rito ry . T h e threat o f o ff-screen savages is ro o te d in
e x p e rie n c e s w ith o th e r ju n g le ad ven tu re m o v ie s o r w ith w e ste rn s and stalk er film s.
G e n re sig n p o sts o f m ise -e n -sc e n e (d ark ju n g le ), cin em ato grap h y (trac k in g cam e ra
follo w in g the p ro ta g o n ist as he w a lk s), and so forth quick ly o rie n t us tow ard
the ap p ro p ria te e m o tio n ally p ro to ty p ic al sc rip t to use in this p a rtic u la r n arrative
situ ation . T h e sch e m ata fo r g c n c ric se q u e n ce s contain in fo rm atio n ab o u t the kinds
o f e m o tio n cu cs usually u sed in such sc q u c n c c s and how th ose cu cs arc a rra n g e d ,
and th ese sch e m ata g u id e us in m akin g h yp oth eses c o n cc rn in g w hat em otio n al
even ts w ill soon occur. E m o tio n cu cs con firm o r q u estio n o u r initial ch o icc o f a
s c rip t, m o d ify in g o r su p p o rtin g o r escalatin g o u r m o o d .
Such ge n re m ic ro sc rip ts are p rim arily to o ls to h elp us re co g n ize w hich
e m o tio n a l re sp o n se s are called for. By th e m se lv e s, such sc rip ts can se rv e a purely
cogn itive fu n ction : cuing u s to identify an a p p ro p ria te e m o tio n . R e co gn izin g and
lab elin g an e m o tio n arc n o t the sam e as e x p e rie n c in g it, b u t co n scio u sly lab elin g an
e m o tio n state is an im p o rta n t facto r in shaping m o st e m o tio n a l e x p e rie n c e s b ccau sc
c o n scio u s th ough t is on e o f the p rim ary in puts in to the e m o tio n sy ste m ou tlined in
the p re v io u s chapter.
By c o m b in in g such ge n re m ic ro sc rip ts w ith c o o rd in a te d p a tte rn s o f e m o tio n
cu in g, how ever, a film can m ake an e m o tio n a l ap p eal to its au d icn cc that e x c e e d s
the purely cogn itiv e. C o o rd in ate d e m o tio n cu cs associatively c n co u ra g c the view er
tow ard a m o o d , and w hen we n ote ge n re m ic ro sc rip ts that arc con son an t w ith o u r
m o o d , w e are e n c o u ra g e d lo d o m o re than sim ply re co g n ize th ese e m o tio n scrip ts.
We are e n c o u ra g e d to fe e l, lo e x e cu te th ese scrip ts in o u r ow n e m o tio n sy ste m s.
3 5 2 GREG M. S MITH
A gain , a te x t p ro v id es only an invitation to fe el, n ot an irresistib le p re sc rip tio n . If

m ish an d led , ge n re m ic ro sc rip ts can d erail the e m o tio n a l ap p eal establish ed by the
m o o d . W h en used in con ju n ctio n w ith o th e r e m o tio n cuin g p a tte rn s, how ever, they
can m ake c o m p lic ate d e m o tio n a l ap p e als, as the fo llo w in g ease study illu strate s.
S e q u e n c e s d o n ot alw ays u se cu e s that arc c o n so n an t w ith trad ition al gen re
e x p e c tatio n . A film can leave o u t cu e s that w e w ou ld n o rm ally an ticip ate o r use
e m o tio n c u e s that arc asso ciate d w ith o th e r g e n re s. In this w ay film m ak ers can play
w ith the e m o tio n a l p o ssib ilitie s o f a g e n re , so m e tim e s b len d in g c o m p o n e n ts o f
d ifferen t g e n re s in to a c o m p le x e m o tio n a l m ix .
Ivan R e itm a n ’ s Ghoslbusters is an e x a m p le o f such a ge n re b len d . Ghostbuslers
is osten sib ly a co m cd v that con tain s n u m e ro u s e le m e n ts from the h o rro r film .
E xam in in g se q u e n ce s from this film illu strate s how an in dividual film m ak es a
u n ique e m o tiv e m ix o u t o f o u r v ario u s g e n e ric e x p e c tatio n s. T h is sh o rt case study
is m e an t to be in dicative o f how a c ritic m igh t e x am in e the c o m p le x in teractio n s
am o n g gen re m ic ro sc rip ts.
T h e first scen e in Ghostbusters is a re co g n iz ab le on e from the h o r r o r /s ta lk e r
ge n re. A lon e w om an is b ein g fo llo w ed from behind by a d olly in g cam e ra. W'hen
the cam e ra fo llo w s such ch a ra c te rs p e rfo rm in g ord in ary actio n s (the kind o f action s
usually elid ed in n arrative film ), w c arc e n c o u ra g c d to h yp oth esize that o ffscreen
fo rc c s arc g o in g lo th reaten h er (o th e rw ise such in sign ifican t action w ould n ot be
sh o w n ).
And yet this p a rticu la r track in g shot d o e s not lit perfectly into the gen re
p ro to ty p e . T h e w om an is clearly m id d le -ag e d , n o t young. T h e ligh tin g in the library
stack s is high key w ith no m en acin g sh adow s (un like the d ark jun gle in the open in g
of Raiders). T h e n o n d ic g c tic m u sic is b ou n cy and playful, although the o b o e
m elod y m ain tain s so m e asso ciatio n s w ith u n settlin g m u sic ge n e rally heard in such
se q u e n c e s (like the m u sic in Raiders’ s o p e n in g ).
In ad d itio n , v ie w e rs have p rob ab ly b ro u g h t so m e ge n re e x p e c ta tio n s for
c o m e d v w ith them to the film . P u b licity , p r o m o tio n , p re v iew s, re v ie w s, and the
sta r im ag e s o f Bill M u rray , D an A c k ro y d , and H arold R am is all signal that an
ap p ro p ria te m o o d fo r Ghostbuslers is a c o m c d ic on e.
G iven this m ix o f c o m p e tin g gen re sc h e m a ta , it is difficult to d c cid c w hich
m o o d is callcd for. So m e e m o tio n cu cs (c in em ato g rap h y , fo r e x a m p le ) p o in t to a
ten se m o o d from a h o rro r film . So m e cu e s (ligh tin g and castin g) u n d e rm in e those
e x p e c ta tio n s, and so m e cu es (m u sic ) p o in t sim u ltan eo u sly to w ard h o rro r and a
ligh ter m o o d like the co m ic . T h e scen e en ds w ith so m e p o lte rg e ist activity , the
w om an ru n n in g to w ard the cam cra w hile sc rc am in g , a qu ick fade to w h ite, and
the lou d b egin n in g o f the u p b e at title m u sic , pro v id in g a co o rd in a te d b u rst o f cu cs
to signal the end o f the sccn c w ith little defin ite in fo rm atio n on the e m o tio n a l state
ap p ro p ria te for this se q u e n ce .
T h is scen e is follow-ed by a b ro ad ly c o m ic scen e in w hich P eter V enkm an (Bill
M u rray ) trie s to se d u ce a y o u n g w om an d u rin g an E SP e x p e rim e n t. H ere the cuing
is d e a r : we are e x p c c tc d to laugh. O n c c w e have this d e a r m o o d in fo rm atio n , the
p a ra p sy c h o lo g ists arc callcd to the library sla c k s w e ’ ve ju st seen in the p reviou s
se q u cn cc to in vestigate a gh ost sighting.
O n c e again w e are show n the sta c k s, and the differen ce b etw een this scen e and
the p re v io u s library stack scene is in stru ctiv e . T h e film p re se n ts us on ce again w ith
T H E MOOD C U E A P P R O A C H 353
t h e s a m e m i x o f e m o t i o n c u e s a s b e f o r e — lig h t o b o e m u s i c , h ig h - k e y l ig h t in g ,
c a m e r a f o l l o w i n g c h a r a c t e r s t h r o u g h th e s t a c k s — b u t a c o m i c m o o d h a s b e e n
e s t a b l i s h e d , a n d th is i n f l u e n c e s h o w w e r e a d th e s c e n e . In a d d i t i o n , V e n k m a n m a k e s
r e g u la r h u m o r o u s r e m a r k s , f u r th e r r e in fo r c in g th e c o m i c m o o d .
N o w t h a t a c o m i c m o o d is c l e a r l y s i g n a l e d , t h e t e x t is f r e e t o p r e s e n t m o r e
s t r o n g l y m a r k e d h o r r o r c u e s th a n b e f o r e , k n o w i n g t h a t th e c o m i c m o o d s t r o n g l y
p r e d i s p o s e s u s t o w a r d l a u g h t e r , n o t fe a r. U n l i k e th e p r e v i o u s l i b r a r y s t a c k s c e n e ,
t h is s c e n e a c t u a l l y s h o w s th e g h o s t ( a c c o m p a n i e d b y a g e n e r i c a l l y e x p e c t e d z i t h e r
s o u n d ) . M o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e s c e n e e n d s w i t h th e l a d y l i k e g h o s t s u d d e n l y t r a n s
f o r m i n g i n t o a d e a t h ’ s h e a d t h a t r u s h e s t o w a r d t h e c a m c r a . T h e e f f e c t is b r i e f l y
h o r r ific , in d u c in g a d e p e n d a b le s ta r tle r e fle x , b u t th e p r e d is p o s itio n to lau gh th at
h a s b e e n r e i n f o r c e d m a n y t i m e s o v e r th e l a s t t w o s c e n e s r e a s s e r t s it s e l f . W e a r e
c u e d t o l a u g h o v e r t h e u p b e a t m u s i c t h a t f o l l o w s , l a u g h i n g a t o u r s e l v e s f o r fl in c h in g
a f t e r s o m e o n e s a y s “ B o o ! ” [. . .]
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PART FOUR
Affect, power and justice

10. Emotions and politics
N T H I S S E C T I O N W E H A V E gathered examples of work that addresses

I emotion in the context of p olitical action and communication. A s Goodwin, Jasper
and Polletta remark in their introduction to a recent collection entitled Passionate
P o litics (2001), emotions were once at the centre of the study of politics, but only
in so far as their 'irra tio n a l' character might explain the behaviour of those who
engaged in political action outside form al political institutions. Em otions were
invoked in connection with the transforming influence of the 'm ob' or 'crow d' on
individuals otherwise presumed rational, or to account for the type of personality
that might be susceptible to 'brainw ashing' or recruitm ent into subversive political
activism. A more sympathetic stance towards protest movements, evident among
many academic political analysts from the 1970s, only meant that they turned away
from the study of emotions in politics altogether, to produce accounts based on
structural, rationalistic and organizational models. Even the recent cultural turn 'has
taken a cognitive form, as though political participants were computers m echanically
processing sym bols' (Goodwin et al. 2 0 0 1 :1 ). The collection edited by Goodwin and
colleagues testifies to an emerging trend in the opposite direction. One of the effects
of the engagement with questions of emotion on the part of social scientists
more generally has been to highlight that emotions cannot simply be regarded as the
opposite of rationality - the construction of emotion as the opposite of reason, as
Lutz (1986) among other anthropologists has argued, is cu ltu ra lly specific and itself
ideologically laden. Once emotions are acknowledged as not only com patible with, but
as an active ingredient of rational action, they also become recognizable as a central
factor in political analysis, and no longer as a residual one. Goodwin and colleagues
highlight that emotions have been, in fact, im plicit in many of the key concepts
employed by scholars to theorize social movements, such as the concepts of frame
and fram ing (including m otivational framing), that of so cia l networks (which consist
3 5 8 A F F ECT, P 0 W E R A N D J U ST IC E
of affective bonds as well as shared ideologies and beliefs) and of collective identity
(likewise, consisting of affective bonds as much as of ascribed characteristics such as
sexual preference, nationality, race, class, or gender).
The first extract in this section is by B arry Richards, and addresses a broad
change in the forms of political communication in recent years, towards what he calls
an 'em otionalization' of politics. This em otionalization, Richards argues, stems partly
from the increasing influence of popular culture on the sphere of politics (among
others), and from the tendency for people to relate to politics in the 'mode of con
sumption'. If the domain of popular culture has always, to some extent, been associ
ated with passion and with and emotional release, the contem porary em otionalization
of politics is characterized by reflexivity as much as by emotional expression. This
concern with the need to acknowledge and reflect upon often complex feelings
distinguishes contem porary 'em otion alization ' from carnivalesque catharsis, on the
one hand. On the other, this concern with reflecting upon feelings also disinguishes
contem porary 'em otion alization ' from the traditional ways in which politicians
have invoked emotions to influence public opinion in the context of political appeals.
Elsewhere in the article, Richards examines how this insight may be applied in
the em pirical study of p olitical communications, proposing that political ads and
campaigns may be studied, as have com m ercial ads, as forms of emotional com m uni
cation. He argues that, although emotions and their management are ubiquitous in
the conduct of politics, this is rarely an explicit item in the discourse of politicians.
P olitica l com m unication could be developed to better convey the com plexity and
ambivalence of the emotional labor involved in the conduct of politics, in the interest
of facilitatin g 'supportive and creative relationships' that are crucial to a 'vigorous
and enabling dem ocratic ethos'.
In the second extract, Anne-M arie Fo rtier examines the role of emotions in the
press media response to the publication of the Parekh Report on 'The Future of
M u lti-E th n ic B rita in ' (2000). The Report recommended that Britain should rethink
its 'national sto ry' and identity in light of the historical legacies of im perialism , and
triggered a controversy played out through the emotional categories of pride and
shame. Instead of focusing on questions of history and reckoning with the past, the
debate effectively became a tug-of-war for the claim to legitimate patriotism . Fortier
examines how, in the context of this controversy, shame was 'evoked, rejected and
projected on to p a rticu la r subjects' deemed 'u n p a trio tic' and thereby construed as
targets of legitimate anger. This refusal and externalization of shame, she argues,
facilitates a 'sanitized' attachm ent to the nation through the maintenance of a guilt-
free national story. A t the same time, however, it precludes the possibility of regarding
'dissent' from such a story as an act of national attachm ent and thus produces new
forms of exclusion from the national collective. The notion of a 'happy' (sanitized)
m ulticulturalism thus relies on deflecting the anger that may be justifiably
experienced and expressed by dissident subjects towards the nation (or collective
self), by making these the object of legitimate anger on account of their alleged lack
of patriotism . A t the same time, it relies on deflecting accusations of h isto rica l racism
and collective shame by attributing racism to individual extremists. In this way,
paradoxically, the (dissident) subjects who are ashamed a rt positioned alongside the
(racist) subjects who are the source o f 'our'sham e, outside the national community.
E M OT I 0 N S A N D P 0 L I T I C S 359
In the second part of the article, not included here, Fortier goes on to examine how
membership of the m ulticultural collective for individuals from ethnic m inorities is
conditional on their declarations of pride, whereas membership is taken for granted
for those (white Britons) assumed to be racially neutral. It is only through such
declarations that the ethnic m inority subject achieves 'unm arked' status. Yet the
m ulticultural collective relies on the embodied 'otherness' of ethnic m inority subjects,
which 'm ust stay in place as "o th e r" in order to claim the m u lti o l m ulticulturalism '.
The very recognition of 'others' as legitimate speaking subjects, in other words,
'reconstitutes them as "o th e r" through a double process of de-racialization and
re-racialization'.
The third extract in this section examines hope as a 'technology of governance',
namely a collective sensibility that can be steered in various directions by governing
agencies. Authors Shearing and Kempa focus on the example of Robben Island
Museum - a form er prison to the political opponents of apartheid, situated on a small
island off the coast at Cape Town - as a device for celebrating and promoting public
hope for a new South A frica . Based on interview and ethnographic data gathered
between 1998 and 1999, the analysis examines the M useum's educational aim to
offer an 'authentic and relatively unmediated experience' of the hopeful mindset
experienced by the political prisoners, which is regarded as essential to their eventual
success in overturning the apartheid regime. The methods employed by the manage
ment team and by tour guides - for example, the refusal to exclusively use profession
ally trained guides, or to provide them with scripts - reflect the emphasis placed
on facilitating personal engagement, as distinct from trasm itting a uniform message.
The authors propose an interesting contrast between Robben Island Museum and
the Museum of Tolerance that commemorates the Holocaust in Los Angeles. Their
informants, who themselves invoked the contrast, likened the Museum of Tolerance to
an 'em otions fa cto ry ' where visitors are manipulated into experiencing p a rticu la r
feelings. The experience of visitors to Robben Island, by constrast, is constructed
to suggest the possibility of personal reinvention, through which the collective
reinvention of South A frica n s is imagined as possible.
In the fourth extract, Deborah Gould examines the role of emotional ambivalence
in shaping lesbian and gay responses to the A ID S crisis in the US, and the emergence
of m ilitant A ID S activism . Her study refers to Reddy's concept of 'em otives' (see
Reddy in section 2, above) and offers an em pirical illustration of how emotional
experience itself, as residually but significantly distinct from emotional discourse,
provides a 'reservoir of possibilities for change'. In this case, lesbian and gay am biva
lence - oscillating between pride and shame, feelings of attraction and rejection vis-a-
vis mainstream society - mediated the possibility of a range of responses to the crisis,
each of which can be read as a 'resolu tio n' to the ambivalence itself. Gould traces the
transition from an emphasis on self-sufficiency and volunteerism, associated with
feelings of defiant pride, towards forms of m ilitant activism that mobilized feelings
of indignation, anger, and grief for the purposes of a more confrontational politics.
A t a theoretical level, the study offers a significant contribution to the study of
social movements, contradicting the dominant model in this field according to which
the emergence of social movements is linked to moments of expanded political
opportunity. M ilita n t A ID S activism , she argues, emerged with the tightening of
p o litic a l op p o rtu n itie s, fuelled by the em otion a l im p a ct of th a t very tightening.

S im ila rly , she proposes th a t a tte n tio n to em otions enhances understanding of how
d iffe re n t w ays of in terpretin g or 'fra m in g ' a problem m ay o r m ay not resonate w ith
in d ivid u als, and thereby succeed (or not) in m otivating them fo r action.
References
Goodwin, J., Jasper, J. M . and Polletta, F. (2001) 'Introduction: why emotions m atter', in
J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper and F. Pol letta (eds) Passionate P o litic s: em otions and
so c ia l movements. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Lutz, C. (1 986) 'E m otion , thought, and estrangement: emotion as a cultural category',
C u ltu ra l Anthropology, 1 (3): 2 8 7 -3 0 9 .
C h a p t e r 42
Barry Richards
T H E E M O T I O N A L D E F I C I T IN
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
O
NE C O N T R IB U T IO N THAT SO CIO LO G Y CAN m a k e to the
s tu d y o f p o l it ic a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n is t o id e n tify b r o a d s o c ia l a n d c u lt u r a l
c h a n g e s w h ic h a r c in flu e n c in g th e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s a n d s o a rc likely to have
e ffe c ts o n p o lit ic a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h i s i m p a c t m a y b e i n d i r e c t , via c h a n g e s in
th e s o c i e t a l c o n t e x t w ith in w h ic h c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ta k e p la c e , o r m o r e d i r e c t , by
a ffe c tin g th e a im s o r c o n t e n t o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . [. . .]
D r a w i n g u p o n the s o c i o l o g y o f e m o t i o n , this a r t ic le w ill a r g u e th at a c u lt u r a l
t r e n d th at m a y b e c a ll e d “ e m o t i o n a l i z a t i o n ” h as a lr e a d y t r a n s f o r m e d the c o n t e x t f o r
p o l it ic a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , a n d th at th e s ty le o f m a n y o f th e s e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s n e e d s
to b e a d a p t e d t o this n e w c o n t e x t , w it h i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r th e ir a im s a n d c o n t e n t .
In s u m m a r y , th e a r g u m e n t is as f o l l o w s . F i r s t , a s a c o n s e q u e n c e o f social
changes w h ic h — as a key fe a t u r e o f th e “ p o s t m o d e r n ”— have w eakened the
b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n d if f e r e n t s p h e r e s o f life, p o l it ic s is n o w in t e r w o v e n w ith
p o p u l a r c u lt u r e . By th is, I m e a n th at m o d e s o f e n g a g e m e n t a n d j u d g m e n t w h ic h
c h a r a c t e r iz e o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f p o p u l a r c u lt u r e are now' in c r e a s in g ly a p p l i e d to
o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f p o l i t i c s , t h o u g h o u r a w a r e n e s s o f th is d e v e l o p m e n t a n d o f its
im p l i c a t i o n s f o r p o l it ic a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n is as y e t l im it e d .
S e c o n d , s in c e p o p u l a r c u lt u r e is s u b s ta n tia lly a b o u t fe e lin g , a b o u t th e e x p r e s
s io n a n d m a n a g e m e n t o f e m o t i o n ( R i c h a r d s , 1 9 9 4 ; E lia s & D u n n i n g , 1 9 8 6 ) , the
i n c u r s i o n in to p o lit ic a l e x p e r i e n c e o f th e v a l u e s o f p o p u l a r c u lt u r e m e a n s th a t w e
n o w s e e k c e r t a i n k in d s o f e m o t i o n a l i z e d e x p e r i e n c e f r o m p o l it ic s th a t w e have
n o t d o n e in th e p a s t . T h i s c a n have o n e o f t w o c o n s e q u e n c e s . E it h e r p o l it ic s , a n d
p a r t ic u la r l y the c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f p o l it ic s t o th e p u b l i c , b e g i n s t o o f fe r m o r e o f
t h e s e e x p e r i e n c e s in t u n e w it h the c o n c e r n s o f p o p u l a r c u lt u r e , o r it b e c o m e s
in c r e a s in g ly a lien to the p r e o c c u p a t i o n s o f th e m a j o r i t y o f th e p u b li c , a n d the
d e m o c r a t i c d e fic it g r o w s .
T h e d e m o c r a t i c d e fic it h as b e e n th e o b j e c t o f m u c h c o m m e n t a r y a n d an aly sis in
3 6 2 B ARRY RICH ARDS
recent years. H ere it is u n derstood as a grow in g disin terest in o r distaste for

politics, and is seen to be in p art a function o f an em otional deficit in political
com m un ication s— that is, the failure o f these com m un ications to satisfy the c o n
tem p orary taste for certain kinds of affective e x p e rie n ce . The revitalization o f
dem ocracy therefore req u ires that the everyday business of political debate at
all levels, and o f presen tin g politics to the public, acquires som eth in g of the e m o
tionally com p ellin g narratives offered by, for exam p le, television soap operas.
To the objection that d em ocracy should be a rational co n test, and that e m o
tionality is antithetical to a balanced and m ature political p ro ce ss, there is a sim ple
rejoin d er (though follow ing it through in practice may be very c o m p le x ). This
is that m uch co n tem p o rary psy ch o lo gy , and m uch com m on sense, rccogn izcs that
far from being an opposition al dichotom y, the relationship betw een feeling and
reason is one o f deep in terconn ection and com plem en tarity. To invite em otional
en gagem en t is to facilitate rational d isco u rse, n ot to banish it.
Sociologically, this argum en t posed so far in term s o f popular culture can be put
in anoth er w ay, w hich is that w e inhabit a consumer culture in w hich there is a
cultivated prom in ence o f feeling (C a m p b e ll, 1987; Feath erstone, 199 1 ). Form s
o f social participation w hich do not em b race and build on this key feature o f
con tem p orary e x p e ricn cc w ill decline. M arketin g— especially ad vertisin g— has
developed in part as an e x p e rtise in ad dressin g the em otionality o f the consum er,
often via highly aestheticized im agery, with the aim o f giving g o o d s and serv ices the
pow er lo gen erate stron g and attractive em otional resonance in the public m ind.
“ Political m ark etin g,” if it is to achieve its am bitions, w ill need to do the sam e with
politics, both gen ericallv for the w hole dom ain o f politics and for the particular
“brands” available within it. [. . .)
Politics, popular culture, and emotion
M uch recen t con troversy about political com m unication has tended to focus around
the nature and con sequen ces o f p rom otio n al tech n iques in con tem p orary politics
(e .g ., W ernick, 1991; Franklin, 1994; Scam m ell, 1995; A nsolabeh ere & Iyengar,
1997; Jo n es, 1999). The high profile critiques o f spin, m edia m anipulation, and
presen tational packagin g take us directly to questions ab out the fundam ental nature
o f politics in the presen t day. As Street (1 9 9 7 ) has pointed o u t, they require us to
ask about the relationship betw een culture and politics. How is politics influenced
by culture? It may be su ggested that politics has been influenced by a culture o f
m arketing. In a sense that is tru e , but this is too narrow a way o f puttin g it. It is not a
case o f one specific cultural influence— m arketing or pro m o tio n alism — im pacting
from “ ou tsid e” on politics as a p articu lar sphere w hich, in theory at least, could
resist this influence.
Instead, as R vfe (2 0 0 1 ) and Schudson (2 0 0 1 ) rem ind us, politics is cultu re. It
is therefore a case o f broad cultural changes unfolding partly within politics, as in
many other sph eres o f life. [. . .|
The b road cultural changes w hich arc tran sform in g politics can be describ ed
and analyzed in various w ays. T h e specific feature to be taken here as a startin g
point— because il is assum ed to be a fundam ental on e— is, crudely put, the
THE EMO T ION A L DEFICIT IN POLIT ICAL CO M MU NICATIO N 3 6 3
increasing influence in politics (though it affects other sph eres also) o f popular
culture (S tre e t, 2 0 0 1 ; D orn er, 2 0 0 3 ). T h ere are co m p le x driv ers o f this trend,
which I cannot go into h ere: the proliferation o f m ass m edia; the vigor and
creativity of pop ular culture in areas such as m usic, sp o r t, hum or, and other form s
o f en tertain m en t; and perhaps m ost basically a deep h istorical trend tow ard the
dem ocratization o f life.
C om m o n p lace illustration s o f this influence as it affects p olitics abound.
Political b road casts, rallies, so m etim es w hole cam paigns take them e tun es from
pop m usic. . . . The m ore televisual the political p ro cess has b eco m e, the m ore “we
‘re a d ’ o u r politicians through their g e stu res and their faces, in the sam e way that we
read p e rfo rm e rs on television ” (S tre e t, 2 0 0 1 , p. 5). . . . O verall, the d em ocratic
p rocess is now played ou t on a stage w h ere— alongside traditional resou rces from
id eo lo gy , ritual, and the values o f o ld e r civic cu ltu res— there are scrip ts, acto rs,
and p ro p s w hich could be seen as “b o rro w ed ” from pop ular cultu re (though in fact
they soon b eco m e p art o f the political fabric itself). . . .
From the point o f view o f individual politicians o r p a rtie s, this process brin gs
ten sions and possibilities fo r failure. The son g may not be right fo r som e target
au dien ces, or the stylistic gestu re may backfire (as in the d erision w hich gre e te d the
public ap pcaran ce o f then C on servative Party leader W illiam H ague in a baseball
cap). Indeed, it m ight be argu ed , draw ing on these negative e x am p le s, that popular
culture cannot really be infusing politics as su gg ested , b ecausc if it w ere then
politics w ould be m uch m ore pop ular than it is. The problem we face is, after all,
the unpopularity o f electoral politics.
Th is, however, takes us to the m ain point: The unpopularity of politics can be
attribu ted in p art to the failure o f political acto rs (from national leaders and their
advisors to local activists), and of the p rofession al com m u n icators they w ork w ith,
to respo n d and adapt sufficiently to the w ays in w hich p op u lar culture has now
tran sfo rm ed society . W hile the exp erien ce o f citizens has been tran sfo rm e d , the
m o d es of political ad dress to them have n ot always m atched these tran sform ation s.
D esp ite all of the hype about spin and about p olitician s’ en slavem ent to the m edia,
and despite the undoubted energy with which con trol o f m edia agendas has been
p u rsu ed , political com m unication s often rem ain unattuncd to som e key dim ensions
o f this new cultural reality. In particular, there is an emotional deficit in con tem p orary
political com m un ication s, a lack o f crafted , sustained attention to the em otional
needs o f the audience. T h ere is at b e st only an im plicit and patchy recogn ition that
pop ular culture is an em otionalized culture dense w ith d esires and an xieties.
The p op u lar has always to som e ex ten t been a dom ain o f passion , and o f
em otional release. T h ere arc, however, p articu lar qualities to the presen t p re
occupation w ith fe elin g It is not a carn ivalesque festival o f pure expression or
catharsis. It is m ore reflective, and is as m uch con cern ed w ith the m an agem en t o f
feelings as w ith their exp ression . It is therefore b e tter d escrib ed as a “th erapeutic”
rath er than “em otio nalized” cultu re, since in its m o st positive and d eveloped fo rm s
it is ch aracterized by rcflexivity as well as by expressivity , by the conjoining o f
em otion w ith thought (R ichards & Brow n, 2 0 0 2 ). This is what differentiates it from
earlier types o f public em otionality. In som e re sp e cts, the rise o f pop ular culture
has involved a sim ple o r quantitative em otionalization o f everyday life, as may
be ob served in, fo r exam p le, asp ects o f the uninhibited m ourn in g seen after the
3 6 4 BARRY RICHARDS
death o f P rincess D iana. But typically this em otionalization is qualitatively different

from earlier fo rm s, and is ch aracterized by particular con cern s w ith ackn ow ledging
and reflecting upon feelin gs, both in private and in public (e .g ., W alker et al.,
1995).
The distinctive nature of this developm en t can be highlighted if w e con sider it
in term s of E lias’ s theory of the “civilizing p ro ce ss” (e .g ., W o uters, 1986). T h e ra
peutic cultu re is not a rem issive reversal o f the increasing restrain t placed upon us
by the civilizing tren d, but on the con trary a fu rth er stage of the internalization o f
restrain t through the capacities for self-m on itorin g and self-m an agem en t w hich it
p ro m o te s. The expressive, disinhibitory asp ects w hich arc required for this— and
which may so m e tim e s appear, at least on the surface, to be the m ajor com p o n en t o f
the tren d— are b est thought o f as a “ controlled de-con trollin g ,” a psychic loosening
necessary in o rd e r to build firm er stru ctu res overall. [. . .]
D esp ite . . . the profusion o f com m en tary on these tren ds, the com in g o f the
therapeutic is not m uch ack n ow ledged in political d iscou rse. O ne im plicit patch o f
recognition is in the rise o f political m arketing. As noted earlier, the developm en t
o f p op u lar culture is inseparable from the developm en t o f con su m er cultu re, and
con tem p orary em otionalization is both cause and effect o f m arketing co m m u n i
cations. D esp ite the influence o f som e ration alistic m od els in m arketing, m ost
m arketers have always known their audience to be em otio n al, in the sense o f being
influenced by paralin guislic cues and nonrational m essage conten t.
It is im portan t to note that this is a m atter o f hum an nature, not n ecessarily o f
hum an w eakness. Paying deliberate and system atic attention lo facto rs such as
the d ress, dem ean or, and gen eral personality im age o f political figures is a much-
d erided practice. It may indeed not be a m ost edifying contribu tion to political
cultu re, but it is a recogn ition o f the im portan ce now o f the im pression that
politicians as p erso n s m ake on citizens as perso n s. Policy alternatives co m c with
p e rso n s attached to th em , and the public arc quite legitim ately in terested in
the em otional qualities of these perso n s. At ro o t here is an old qu estio n , that o f
tru st: Can this person be tru sted ? Wc now' ask this question in ways in fo rm ed bv
psy ch o lo gical un derstan din gs, and w e seek answ ers that tell us about the p erso n as
an em otional being. In a prom otio n al cultu re, there w ill inevitably be so m e overlap
or con vcrgcn cc o f political cam paigning with em otionally orien ted m arketing
tech niques in the effort to win tru st in individual politicians, and this should not be
sum m arily d ism issed as superficial o r cynical m anipulation. [. . .]
Political communications as emotional labor
O f c o u rsc , it has long been recogn ized that voters choose lead ers on the basis partly
o f their perso n alities, though the o ld e r term “ch aracter” w ould for som e be a m ore
acceptable way o f stating this. We know that w e are presen ted w ith choices betw een
candidates as ob jects o f tru st as w ell as betw een parties w ith different policies, and
tru stw orth iness is a question o f individual character. H ow ever, this factor o f tru st is
now' b eco m in g increasingly perso n alized , as alternative bases o f tru st in party
traditions (w hether based in econ om ic in terest, id eology , o r vague sentim ent)
b eco m e ever weaker.
THE E MOT I ONA L DEFICIT IN POLITI CAL COMMU NI CATI ON 3 6 5
We now need m ore than the capacity to tru st p olitician s’ role, since we can rely
less on cultural and institutional role stru ctu res (w hether patrician, tech n ocratic,
dem o cratic, o r w hatever). So political leaders have, to an increasing e xten t, the task
of presen tin g them selves as persons to be tru ste d for their intrinsic qualities.
This d o es not m ean that we arc at the end of id eology , but that we are am idst a
cultural tran sform ation in w hich id eology and politics in the traditional sense are
b eco m in g m ore enm eshed w ith the p erso n al, with psych ological con sideration s and
em otionality. E m otional qualities arc increasingly reg istered and scrutin ized , and
judgm en t o f them is p a rt o f the political process. T h ose involved in com m un icating
with the public m ust do so in ways cognizant o f the new em otionality.
Traditional political con sideration s arc not now o cclu d cd , nor is public
life being asym m etrically invaded by the private and perso n al. T h e public is not
n ecessarily d e grad e d , nor any less capable o f participatin g in a hum ane and inclusive
civic cultu re. But tradition al separations betw een dom ain s are no lon ger viable.
T h ere is a com pression togeth er in the sam e social and psychic sp accs o f the
perso n al, feeling sub ject and the public figure. The personality o f the politician is
bound up w ith the policies she o r he rep resen ts, and voting is a co m p le x choice
b etw een packages o f p ragm atic, id eological, and em otional values.
O n e asp cct o f this developm en t is that politicians now have a clear and m ajo r
piece o f “em otional labor” (lo use the term in troduced by H och sch ild, 1 9 8 3 ; sec
also, e .g ., Sm ith, 1992) to p e rfo rm . They m ust present them selves as individual
perso n s o f a p articu lar em otional m akeup, who (to use term in ology developed
earlier in the study o f g ro u p dynam ics, as in, e .g ., Parsons & Bales, 1 9 SS) can offer
them selves as social-em otion al, expressive leaders as well as task-orien ted leaders.
M ore is dem and ed of lead ers than previously. They m u st now be seen as attuned to
newly dom inant values of expressivity and spon tan eity. But our con tem p orary
cultural con cern s are not just w ith the exp ressio n of em otio n s but also w ith the
management of em otio n s. So politicians m ust also be seen to offer so m e con tain m ent
o f the em otio n s o f their public. Like other social institutions and cultural fo rm s,
politics is draw n into the circulation o f feelings and has to con tribu te to the
em otional lab or o f containing the feelings circulating in the public dom ain.
In one sen se, this has always been the case; the historical shift is co m p lcx , and
leadership has alw ays been an exercise in feeling m an agem en t, as has so m e tim e s
been apparent (one thinks, for e x am p le , o f Churchill in the U .K . and Eisenhow er
in the U .S .). N ow , however, there is pressu re to offer such leadersh ip very
deliberately. M uch effort is expen d ed in presen tation to achieve this, to encom pass
within it all asp ects o f the le a d e r’s life and self, and to en sure that these in turn
en com pass the relevant therapeutic agendas in personal philosophy and policy
values. M oreover, there is a fundam ental ncwf quality to the em otional ro le o f
political leaders. T his lies in the m uch g re ater potential for aw areness o f the
em otional dim en sions o f everyday life, and in the increased self-question ing and
self-exam in ation characteristic o f our therapeutic tim es. A ck n ow ledgm en t o f e rro r
and vulnerability, and honesty about failure and d isap poin tm en t, fo r exam p le, arc
now m ore w idely recognized as im p ortan t in the con duct o f everyday life, but arc
still rem arkably rare in the disco u rse o f politicians.
W ith this aw areness com es gre ater scope for choice, and for the deliberate
m anagem en t o f feelings in certain ways to achieve certain ou tcom es. Politicians are
3 6 6 B A R R Y R I C H A R D S
m a n a g e r s, n o t on ly in the te c h n o c ra tic se n se o f th e ir m a n a g e m e n t o f th e n ation al

e c o n o m y b u t also in th e se n se that they (a m o n g o th e r p u b lic fig u re s) are c h a rg e d
w ith the m a n a g e m e n t o f m a ssiv e n atio n al re s e r v e s o f feelin g.
To re c o g n iz e th is, and to sp e a k of the p o ssib ility th at this e m o tio n a l m a n a g e
m e n t m ig
O
h t b e c o n d u c te d a r tfu lly , is n o t to in voke a n ig
J ’ o
h tm a re o f so c ia l e n og in e e r-
ing. A s in sm all fa c e -to -fa c e g r o u p s , an d as in o r g a n iz a tio n s, so it is at the level
o f n atio n al c u ltu re : T h e e ffe c tiv e m a n a g e m e n t o f e m o tio n a l d y n am ic s can lead to
the d e v e lo p m e n t o f su p p o r tiv e and c re a tiv e re la tio n sh ip s, and t o a v ig o r o u s and
e n ab lin g d e m o c r a tic e th o s. T h e a r g u m e n t is n o t fo r a ru sh in to “ p e r so n a lity
p o lit ic s ,” b u t fo r the e n ric h m e n t o f p o litic s w ith c o m m u n ic a tio n p r a c tic c s that
c a r ry e m o tio n a l n a rra tiv e s.
O n e th in g th at w a s n ew a b o u t “ N e w ” L a b o u r (R ic h a rd s, 2 0 0 0 ) w a s the
atte n tio n paid to the e m o tio n a l task s o f p o litica l le a d e r sh ip , to in tu itin g the
a n x ie tie s o f the p u b lic an d se e k in g to re s p o n d to th e m . S o m e o f th e e m o tio n a l
a tte n tiv e n c ss c o m e s fro m Tony B la ir ’ s ow n se lf. l i e is the first U . K . le a d e r w ith a
so c ia l s e lf fo r m e d d u r in g the 1 9 6 0 s , and so h as sty le s o f th o u g h t an d sp e e ch that
are a ttu n e d to th e re fle x iv e an d e m o tio n a liz e d m o d e s o f to d a y . A n d so m e o f this
a tte n tiv e n e ss c o m e s fro m th e m u ch c ritic iz e d p r a c tic e s o f c o m m u n ic a tio n and
im ag e m a n a g e m e n t. E v alu a tio n s o f th e se d iffer, fro m left an d rig h t c o n d e m n a tio n s
o f th e c y n icism o f sp in to o th e r, m o r e c o m p le x and p o te n tially fav o rab le a s s e s s
m e n ts. B u t b e n e a th th e se a r g u m e n ts w e can se c w id e a c c e p ta n c c that the p o litica l
sc e n e is m o r e a b o u t e m o tio n s and th e ir m a n a g e m e n t than il u se d to b e , and that
p o litic ia n s an d th e ir a d v iso rs are in te n se ly in v o lv ed in c e rta in k in d s o f e m o tio n a l
lab o r, p a rtic u la rly the m a ss- m e d ia te d m a n a g e m e n t of p u b lic feelin g. T h is la b o r at its
b e st fo s te r s a c re a tiv e a p p ro a c h to p o litic a l c o m m u n ic a tio n , o n e that in v e rts the
19 6 0 s slo g a n that “ the p e r so n a l is p o litic a l” an d re d e fin e s p o litic s as in te rw o v e n
w ith the d o m a in s of the p e r so n a l and w ir e d in to the e m o tio n a l c irc u itr y of p o p u la r
c u ltu re .
R eferen ces
A n solab eh ere, S ., & Iyengar, S. (1 9 9 7 ). Going negative: How political advertisements shrink
and polarize the electorate. N e w York: Free P ress.
C am p b ell, C . (1 9 8 7 ). The romantic ethic and the spirit o f modern consumerism. O x fo r d :
B lackw ell.
D o rn c r, W. (2 0 0 3 ). Political iden tities in the U S and G erm an y . Media Tenor, 3, 7 4 —7 7 .
E lias, N ., & D un n in g, E. (1 9 8 6 ). Quest for excitement: Sport and leisure in the civilising
process. O x fo r d , E ngland: B lackw ell.
F cath ersto n e, M . (1 9 9 1 ). Consumer culture and postmodernism. L o n d o n : Sage.
Fran klin, B. (1 9 9 4 ). Packaging politics: Political communications in Britain's media democracy.
L on d on : E dw ard A rn o ld .
H och sch ild , A. (1 9 8 3 ). The managed heart: The commercialisation o f human feeling.
B erkeley: U n iversity of C alifo rn ia P ress.
Jo n e s, N . (1 9 9 9 ). Sultans o f spin. L on d on : V ictor G ollan cz.
P arso n s, T ., & B ales, R . (E d s .). (1 9 5 5 ). Family, socialization and interaction process. N ew
York: Free P ress.
THE E M O T I O N A L DEF I CI T IN P O L I T I C A L C O M M U N I C A T I O N 3 6 7
R ichards, B. (1 9 9 4 ). Disciplines o f delight: The psychoanalysis o f popular culture. London:

Free A ssociation Books.
R ichards, B ., & Brow n, J. (2 0 0 2 ). T h e therapeutic culture hypothesis: A critical d iscus
sion. In T. Johansson & O. Sern h cde (E d s.), Lifestyle, desire and politics: Contemporary
1identities (pp. 9 7 —114). G oth en burg: D aidalos.
R ichards, B. (2 0 0 0 ). The real m eaning o f spin. Soundings, 14, 161 —170.
R yfc, D. M . (2 0 0 1 ). H istory and political com m unication: An introduction. Political
Communication, 18, 4 0 7 —4 1 7 .
Scam m ell, M . (1 9 9 5 ). Designer politics: How elections are won. Basingstoke: M acm illan.
Sch udson, M . (2 0 0 1 ). Politics as cultural practice. Political Communication, 18, 4 2 1 —4 3 1 .
Sm ith, P. (1 9 9 2 ). The emotional labour o f nursing. Basingstoke: M acm illan.
Street, J. (1 9 9 7 ). Politics and popular culture. C am bridge, England: Polity.
Street, J. (2 0 0 1 ). Mass media, politics and democracy. B asingstoke: Palgrave.
Walker, T ., Littlcw ood , J., & Pickering, M . (1 9 9 5 ). D eath in the new s: The public
invigilation o f private em otio n . Sociology, 29, 579—596.
W ernick, A. (1 9 9 1 ). Promotional culture: Advertising, ideology and symbolic expression.
Lon don : Sage.
W outcrs, C. (1 9 8 6 ). Form alisation and inform alisation: Changing tension balances in
civilising p rocesses. Theory, Culture and Society, 3, 1—18.
Chapter 4 3
Anne-Marie Fortier
PRIDE POLITICS AND

M U LTICU L T U R A L I S T C I T I Z E N S H I P
[• ■ •]
A
NEO-ETHNIC VERSION OF NATIONAL identity has em erged
in Britain: one based as a com m on hybridity. G erd B aum ann’ s rem ark about
the U S can be paraphrased h ere: ‘ It is the m ultiethnic hybridity o f many [British]
citizens that is used to argue for a shared neoethnic en d orsem en t o f national unity.
If e v ery o n e’s ancestry w ere “m ix e d ” , then ev ery o n e’s presen t identity w ould be the
sam e: supercthnically [B ritish ].’ (1 9 9 9 , p. 34) Still prim arily ethnicizcd, the new
nation is now rc-im agincd as the result o f a tim eless m ixing o f cu ltu res, in a typical
m eltin g-p ot assim ilationist stew w here differences are dissolved and assim ilated
into a palatable diversity (see H age 1 998). Follow ing Sara A h m ed ’s lead (2 0 0 0 ,
p. 9 7 ), this article is fram ed by a w id er in terest in w hat h appens to the definition
o f ‘national c u ltu re ’ w hen ‘m inority c u ltu re s’ are not only let in, but redefined
as integral to the nation itself? W ith resp ect to my im m ediate con cern s h ere, a
corollary question is: who arc the legitim ate m ulticultural sub jects entitled to
b elon g to the national com m un ity and to speak in its nam e? [. . .]
A key aim o f this article is to con sider the role o f em otio n s in policin g the
te rm s o f belon gin g and en titlem en t to citizenry. 1 con sider em otio ns as they arc
taken up and circulated in the p re ss, that is, I discuss the effects o f displays o f
em otio n s on the kind o f national com m un ity, and national sub ject, that is being
im agined. W hat I am in terested in here is the way in w hich the re so rt to the
em otio nal re g iste r o f sham e in terp ellates peop le in a particular way. By tracing how
sham e is evoked, rejected and p rojected on to p articu lar su b je cts, I trace how
sham e is linked to the p ro cess o f identity form ation not only o f ‘se lf’ , but also o f
‘ o th e r’ , within the national collective. [. . .]
PRIDE POLITICS AND M U L T I C U L T U R A L I S T C I TI Z E NSHI P 3 6 9
The politics o f pride and shame
The Parekh R e p o rt w as the resu lt o f the w ork o f ‘the C o m m issio n on the Future o f
M ulti-Ethnic B ritain ’ , established in January 1998 by the R unnym ede T ru st, an
independen t think-tank devoted to pro m o tin g racial justice. ‘The C o m m issio n ’ s
rem it w as to analyse the cu rren t state o f m ulti-ethnic Britain and to p ro p o se ways o f
coun terin g racial discrim ination and disadvan tage’ (R unnym ede T rust 2 0 0 0 , p. viii).
The r e p o r t ’s m ain intervention w as in areas o f social policy , offering extensive
recom m en dation s for policy d evelopm en ts in a range o f areas, from policing
through to education , the arts and im m igratio n , to nam e a few. This w as, then, an
exten sive and com prehen sive docu m en t. Yet the response to the re p o rt ignored
all m atters o f social policy and rath er focused on ‘the r e p o r t’ s questioning o f the
exclusion ary im plication s o f the category “ British” . ’ (N eal 2 0 0 3 , p. 6 0 ). T h us, when
the 373-page re p o rt w as released in O c to b e r 2 0 0 0 , one short passage w as the focus
o f m uch m edia attention:
Britishn ess, as m uch as E nglishncss, has sy stem atic, largely unspoken,

racial conn otations. W h iteness now here features as an e xplicit condition
o f being B ritish, but it is w idely u n derstood that E nglishncss, and th ere
fore by extension B ritishn ess, is racially coded . . . U n less these deep-
ro oted an tagon ism s to racial and cultural difference can be defeated in
practice, as w ell as sym bolically w ritten out o f the national sto ry , the
idea o f a m ulticu ltural post-nation rem ains an em pty prom ise.
(R unn ym ede T ru st 2 0 0 0 , pp. 3 8 - 9 )
Because o f its association w ith w hite su p rem acy , w hite p riv ilege, im perialism , and
its h istorical position at the centre o f British political and cultural life, the Parekh
R e p o rt re je cts Englishness as an ap pro priate label for the re-im agin ed m ulti-ethnic
nation. In tu rn , it reluctantly takes on Britishness as the b est available term to
designate the com m on terrain o f belon gin g that ‘c o m m u n itie s’ share. ‘ Britishness
is not id eal’ , the re p o rt states, ‘but al least il ap pears acceptab le, particularly
when suitably qualified — black British, Indian British, British M u slim , and so o n .’
(R un nym ede T ru st 2 0 0 0 , p. 38)
[. . . ] The Parekh R e p o rt w as calling fo r an ack n ow ledgem en t o f the historical
legacies of im perialism in the con stitution of a racially con n oted idea of B ritishness,
as w ell as in shaping presen t con dition s o f racism w ithin b road er social relations and
social in equalities. Im plicit in this p ro p o sal, w as the ack n ow ledgem en t that we are
not only sub jects o f history, but also agents o f h istory — revisiting the past m ight
allow for the creation o f different futures. But critiq u es w ere quick to seize this and
sec it as an ‘assault on national p r id e ’ , a ‘p r o m o tio n of] national g u ilt’ , a ‘b rain
w ashing exercise designed to destroy ou r sense o f n ation h oo d’ , an ‘attem p t to
destroy our cen turies-old e u ltu re ’ , and ‘to rew rite o u r h isto ry ’ . In resp o n se, they
endeavoured to rccov cr the glo ries o f British h istory , and its n um ero us achieve
m ents. B oadicea, the M agna C arta , the abolition ist m ovem en t, W aterloo, VE Day:
these events w ere indiscrim inately listed and hailed as evidence o f the enduring
British values o f fairn ess, resilien ce, toleran ce, d em ocracy and decency. [. . .]
The Parekh R e p o r t’s call to revise the national sto ry , as w ell as the outcry this
3 7 0 A N N E - M A RI E F 0 R T I E R
has trigg ere d , w ere both w edded lo the p ro ject o f assertin g a ‘n e w ’ Britain, but
w ith different ways o f relating to the ‘o ld ’ one. W hat is the ro le o f the ‘n e w ’ as a
way of w ritin g history? W hat is it that peop le are trying to recover, fo rg e t, o r erase?
W hat is at stake in refusing to ackn ow ledge the te rro rs of the past? C lu es may be
found in prid e p olitics that dom in ated the con troversy . Indeed, the public outcry
against the re p o rt evacuated question s o f h istory and reck on in g w ith the p ast, and
rather cen tred on the search for, and prosecu tion o f, those w ho m ight be held
accoun table fo r w hat w as perceived as a generalized loss o f prid e and patriotism
am on g Briton s. The re p o rt w as thus seen as p art o f a w id er prob lem . The question
o f prid e and patriotism dom inated m uch o f the deb ate, which w as m arked by
m utual b lam in g and sham ing in a tug-of-w ar over w ho held the highest patriotic
m oral groun d.
At one end, con servative rightists accused L ord Parekh and the com m issio n ers
o f the re p o rt, along w ith the L abour go vern m en t, the ‘chatterin g classe s’ and the
‘Islingtonian in telligen tsia’ , for being ‘asham ed o f o u r h istory and feel the need to
a p o lo g ise .’ At the oth er end, Jack Straw, then H om e Secretary , reacted by d is
tancing h im self and the go vern m en t from the Parekh R e p o rt in the face o f criticism
that he and his L abour colleagu es w ere un patriotically asham ed o f being British. ‘I
am proud to be English and proud to be B ritish ’ , lie declared . ‘ I am proud o f what I
believe lo be the best o f British values’ . And he added that ‘ Unlike the R unnym edc
Trust, I firm ly believe that there is a future for Britain and a future for B ritish n ess.’
He then joined the collective adm on ition o f blam e by pointing the accusative finger
for lack o f patriotism to the political left: ‘ Given the L e ft’s tendency to w ash their
hands of the notion of nation h oo d’ , he w rote in The Observer, ‘ it’s un surp rising our
p crccp tion o f B ritishness becam e a conservative o n e .’
Pride in B ritishness becam e a resonating m antra that rang through the argu
m en ts against the recom m en d ation s o f the Parekh R e p o rt that Britain should
rethink its ‘ national sto ry
J
’ and identity.
J
L e tters and articles su ccccd ed each other
in claim ing love and p rid e in Britain, and disclaim ing any sham e o r guilt w hatsoever.
‘I am a Sri Lankan Tamil w ho cam e here thirty years ago. I show my British passp o rt
with p rid e, n ot sh am e’ ; ‘In Sydney it felt great bein g British, and that should never
be taken away . . . to com p cte for your coun try is about taking pride in w here you
com e fro m ’ ; ‘I’ m proud to be British and call m yself British. If y o u ’re n ot proud to
be British then y o u ’re living in the wrro n g p la ce ’ ; ‘I am proud to be British. I have
done w ell by bein g in Britain. We are still the coun try that everybody re sp e c ts’ ;
‘I am prou d o f being British. I have no guilt about i t . ’
Running through these exh ortatio n s o f prid e is one refrain: the rep ellin g o f
sham e and o f national gu ilt. The politics o f prid e deployed in respo n se to the
Parekh R e p o rt seek to eradicate shame: prid e in ‘o u r ’ history, in ‘ o u r’ coun try , in
‘o u r ’ p a ssp o rts, is repeatedly reh earsed by way o f sanitising the attachment to the
nation under a veneer o f guiltless pride, one w hich know s no sham e or gu ilt. Thus both
sham e and guilt are closely linked, and the attacks on L ord Parekh and his c o
co m m issio n ers treat sham e and guilt equally: as rep ulsive, unw anted and illeg iti
m ate affects lo be eradicated from the collective b ody. Som e th eorists, such as
A xel H onnelh (1 9 9 2 ) or Elspeth Probvn (2 0 0 0 , follow ing Silvan Tom kins) have
discussed how the repellin g o f sham e is about self-affirm ation w hereby the once
sham ed su b je c t/b o d y is now declarin g its self-pride — fo r e xam p le, in L e sb ian /
PRIDE POLITICS AND M U L T I C U L T U R A L I S T C I TI Z E NSHI P 3 7 1
G a y /B ise x u a l/T ra n sg e n d e r P ride, o r the Fat Pride m ovem ent (Probyn 2 0 0 0 ,

pp. 125—4 3 ). But h ere, in co n trast, the refusal o f sham e is also a refusal to m ake it
‘ o u r s’ in the first place, a refusal to in teriorize it in the national b od y , a refusal to
con sider that sham e might be a feature of the attachm ent to the nation. Sham e is not
evoked as som eth in g ‘w e ’ no lon ger w ant to feel; it is rejected as som eth in g ‘ w e ’
have n ot — and should n ot have — internalized in the first place. Sham e, h ere, is
e x terio rize d , re je cte d , pushed o u t, and projected on to those w ho are guilty of
un patriotic feelings o r acts. Sham e is rep laced by an ger e xp re sse d against ‘th e m ’
w ho arc seen as bein g asham ed o f ‘u s ’ -the-nation, and against ‘th e m ’ w ho sham e
‘u s’ -the-nation. Invested in the p rocess o f eradicatin g sham e from the collective
body is, paradoxically , a p ro cess o f splitting the national collcctivc, betw een patriots
and u n patriotic culprits.
First, the ‘u n p atrio tic’ liberal and leftist w ho questions the national sto ry and
the n otion o f a historically fair, just and inclusive Britain. [. . .]
By turn in g dissent into a sham eful act, the very possibility o f thinking o f dissent
not only as a d em ocratic act, but as an act o f national attach m en t, is un derm in ed.
The issue at stake in dism issin g dissent as an u n patriotic act is the preservation o f
the sto ries o f a national iden tity; dissen t, here, should n ot be tied to ideas that shake
the national story.
In addition , the scorn against the un patriotic dissiden t is also about the
m aintenance o f a guilt-free national sto ry . As stated earlier, the Parckh R e p o r t’ s
recom m en dation to rew rite the national story o f Britain as an im perial force was
rejected by critics as ‘ prom otfin gj national g u ilt’ . R eckon in g w ith the history o f
racism — that is, reckonin g with Britain as historically racist — could potentially clear
a spacc tor the exp ression of an ger by many of B ritain ’s citizens. W hat is th reaten
ing to the w hite su b ject, as G unaratm an and L ew is (2001) su gg e st, is the black
su b je c t’s anger. The sham e ot w hite p e o p le ’s history o f racism is averted through
anger against those su b jects, w hite or black, w hose ow n anger is threatening to
effect ‘w hite g u ilt’ (G un aratm an and L ew is 2 0 0 1 , p. 143). T h us, w e could begin to
m ake sense o f the predom in an ce o f black faces that w ere seen to dcclarc their pride
in Britishness in O c to b e r 2 0 0 0 : the refusal o f sham e is also about silencing their
anger. . . .
To be su re, the positio n s alluded to above (the angry black su b ject and the
sham ed w hite su b ject) are n ot com plete o r static. But in the press debates around
the Parekh R e p o rt, the rejection o f sham e w as in extricably related to the rejection
o f perceived accusations o f racism . A sanitized ‘h appy’ m ulticulturalism requires
the eradication o f unw an ted unhappy su b jects, including those w hose anger m ight
be justified but w hich can be m anaged and re-directed away from the nation (the
collcctivc self) and on to individualized selves. T h us, a secon d u n patriotic culprit
hovered in the b ack groun d o f the p rid e /sh a m e deb ate: the intoleran t racist thug,
em blem atically rep resen ted by the flag w aving w hite BN P activist’ s ‘ ugly face o f
p a trio tism ’ . This figure, however, w as m o re often explicitly evoked by politicians
them selves, rath er than jou rn alists o r other co m m en tato rs. In the m idst o f the
‘ patriotism tu g-o f-w ar’ m en tion ed above, Jack Straw' felt com p elled to urge the
British left ‘not [to] leave patriotism to [the] far rig h t’ , and to ‘reclaim national
pride from racists and xenoph obic football th u gs’ . So, the p rid e /sh a m e debate
w as in p art a stru gg le betw een politicians and activists over w ho lays claim s to ‘real
3 7 2 A N N E - M A RI E FO RTI E R
p a tr io tis m ’ an d , c ru c ia lly , lo the rig h t to ‘a u th o r ’ the n atio n ; a s tr u g g le b e tw e e n

p o litic ia n s and a c tiv ists. B ut the sa m e th re a te n in g fig u re w as e v o k e d w h en c o m
m e n ta to r s re p e a te d lv r e je c te d th e P arek h R e p o r t ’ s sta te m e n t a b o u t the racial c o n
n o ta tio n s o f B ritish n e ss. T h o u g h ra c ism w a s re c o g n iz e d by s o m e as p a rt o f B ritish
life and in stitu tio n s, the g e n e ra l o u tc ry wras ag ain st the a s su m p tio n th at individual
B rito n s are ra c ists. B ein g B ritish is N O T b e in g ra c is t, w e w e r e in siste n tly to ld ,
because ‘ w e ’ are to le r a n t: ‘ w e ’ have b la c k frie n d s an d have w e lc o m e d and a b so r b e d
m ig r a n ts and th e ir c u ltu re s fo r c e n tu r ie s.
A s R o b in W ie g m a n has n o te d , the w e ll-in te n tio n e d lib e ra list tu rn to w a rd s
to le r a n c e , in c lu sio n and d iv e rsity is c h a ra c te riz e d bv a d isaffiliatio n fro m th e m o re
o v e r t fo rm s o f ra c ism and racial v io le n c e (in Chow r 2 0 0 2 , p. 1 3 ), a sso c ia te d h ere
w ith the w h ite w o rk in g -c la ss B N P a c tiv ist o r fo o tb a ll h o o lig a n . T h e d a rk e r sid e o f
h isto ry is e v ac u a te d by a sc rib in g the o r ig in s and s o u r c e s o f ra c ism and in to le ra n c e
to in d iv id u al a c ts, sin g u la r b o d ie s , o r w ith in sp e c ific lo c a litie s and su b - c u ltu r e s. T h e
sh a m e fu l su b je c t, the b ad c itiz c n s, the ra c is ts , arc h eld so le ly a c c o u n ta b le fo r hate
c rim e s. E x h o r ta tio n s o f p r id e p r o je c t sh a m e on to o u tc a st s u b je c ts w h o are a so u r c e
o f re v u lsio n fo r the ‘ d e c e n t m a jo r ity ’ . T h e y , the r a c ists, are the s o u r c e o f ‘ o u r ’
sh a m e : the m e a n in g s o f sh am e are seen to originate fr o m , and reside in , the actio n s
o f th e se s u b je c ts (B u tle r 1 9 9 7 ). C o n v e r se ly , the c o n fin e m e n t o f sh am e an d g u ilt
on to in d iv id u al b o d ie s a llo w s fo r the n atio n an d its ‘d e c e n t m a jo r ity ’ to e m e rg e
as n atu rally to le ra n t and in c lu siv e . W id e r q u e stio n s o f c o llc c tiv c ac c o u n ta b ility
an d se lf-e x a m in a tio n are c o n c e a le d , in d e e d e v ac u a te d in the cre a tio n o f in ju rio u s
s u b je c ts (B u tle r 1 9 9 7 ). [. . .]
R eferen ces
A H M E D , SA R A 2 0 0 0 Strange Encounters. Embodied Others in Postcoloniality, L on d on ,

R o u tle d g e
B A U M A N N , G E R D 1999 The Multicultural Riddle, L o n d o n : R o u tle d g e
B U T L E R , JU D IT H 1997 Excitable Speech. A Politics o j the Performative, L on d on :
R o u tle d g e
CH O W ' R EY 2 0 0 2 The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit o f Capitalism, N e w York: C o lu m b ia
U n iversity P ress
G U N A R A T M A N , YA SM IN and L E W IS, G A IL 2001 ‘ R acialisin g em o tio n al lab o u r and
e m o tio n alisin g racialised lab ou r: anger, fear and sham e in social w elfa re ’ , Journal
o f Social Work Practice, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 131—4 8
H A G E, G A SSA N 1998 White Nation. Fantasies o f White Supremacy in a Multicultural
Society, A n n an dale (A u s.) and W est W hikham (U K ): P lu to and C o m e rfo rd &
M iller
H O N N E T H , A X E L 1992 ‘ In tegrity and d isre sp e c t. P rin cip les o f a co n cep tio n o f
m orality b ased on the th eo ry of re c o g n itio n ’ , Political Theory, vol. 2 0 , no. 2,
pp. 1 8 7 -2 0 1
N E A L , SA R A H 2 0 0 3 ‘T h e Scarm an R e p o r t, the M acp h erson R e p o r t and the M edia:
how n e w sp ap e rs re sp o n d to ra ce -cc n tre d social p o licy in te rv en tio n s’ , Journal o f
Social Policy, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 55—74
P R O B Y N , E L S P E T H 2 0 0 0 Carnal Appetites. FoodSexldentities, L o n d o n : R o u tle d g e
PRI DE POLITI CS AND M U L T I C U L T U R A L I S T C I T I Z E N S H I P 3 7 3
R U N N Y M E D E T R U S T 2000 The Future o f Multi-ethnic Britain. The Parekh Report,

Lon don : Profile Books
T O M K IN S , SILVAN 1995 ‘ Sham e-hum iliation and con tem p t-d isgu st’ , in E. K osofsky
and A. Frank (c d s), Shame and its Sisters, D urham , N C : D uke U niversity Press,
pp. 1 3 3 -7 8
Chapter 4 4
Clifford Shearing and Michael Kempa
A M U S E U M OF H O P E :
A S T O R Y OF R O B B E N I S L A N D
[• ■ •]
been published
A
SIZABLE A M O U N T OF LITERATURE HAS
about the cultivation o f collective sensibilities. The authors o f these w orks
have w idely ack n ow ledged that liberal m od es o f governance that attem p t to govern
through the freedom o f sub jects are d epen den t upon constitutin g political actors
w ho are capable o f exercising such freedom responsibly (G arlan d 2 0 0 1 ; O ’M alley
1992; O ’ M alley and Palm er 1996; R o se 1996; R ose and M iller 1992). T h us, liberal
go vern m en ts arc constantly engaged in con stitutin g sen sibilities in their citizens
that w ill enable them to govern w ith efficiency and a light touch — although Barry
H indcss (2 0 0 1 ) rem in ds us that this light touch can quickly b cco m c a heavy fist
when go vern m en ts arc faccd with those actors w ho have failed to assim ilate the
req uisite sensibilities. As sch olars draw ing upon the w ork of M ichcl Foucault have
detailed so w ell, the cultivation o f sensibilities for responsib le liberal citizenship is
often achieved through governm en tal m echan ism s such as sy stem s o f surveillan ce,
sanctions, and rew ards that shape the m ind through shaping con duct and that,
con versely, shape con du ct through shaping con sciousness (e .g ., B urchcll, G o rd o n ,
and M iller 1991; D ean 1999; Foucault 1977, 199 1 ). O th er thcorctical trad ition s,
such as that inspired by the w ork o f Pierre B ou rdicu, in taking up the them e o f the
shaping o f con duct through shaping sensibilities rem ind us o f the im portan ce for
liberal govern an ce o f tech n ologies that seek to act on the figurative plane to shape
con scio u sn ess— through m obilizing such sym bolic reso u rces as sto rie s and iconic
im ages with the intention o f p rom otin g desired ways o f thinking and feelin g (e .g .,
B ourdieu and W acquant 1992; Sh usterm an 1999; see also other tradition s such as
those rep resen ted by Boal 2 0 0 0 ). [. . .J
In e xp lo rin g Peter D rah o s’s (2 0 0 4 ) question o f w hether con stituted h ope—
and in p articu lar a politically con stituted hope in the fo rm we have just outlined—
A M U S E U M OF HOPE: A STORY OF ROBBEN ISLAND 3 7 5
can be a positive force, w e exam ine the w ork that is being undertaken al the
R obben Island M useum in South A frica. . . . T h e R obben Island M useum is one o f
the initiatives that the South A frican govern m en t is su p p o rtin g to p ro m o te a hope
sensibility within South A fricans in the co n text o f that co u n try ’s on goin g political
transition from apartheid to what is h oped w ill be a fully establish ed, inclusive, and
p ro sp e ro u s d em ocracy .
Like m o st m u seu m s, R obbcn Island is a site for the p reservation and exhibition
o f ob jects thought to be o f lasting value. But as a site design ed to p ro m o te a hope
sensibility, it is also m ore than that. It b elon gs to a class that we m igh t think
o f as “ governance m u seu m s”- that is, m u seu m s that arc con ccrn cd with p r o
m otin g sensibilities rath er than with sim ply exh ibitin g valued ob jccts. In these
m u seu m s, the exh ibits are intentional vehicles for shaping con sciousn ess. A nother
exam ple o f a govern an ce m u seu m , w hich we will have m ore to say ab out later, is
the M useum o f Tolerance in L os A n geles that exh ibits and in terp rets the H o locaust.
If w e think beyond m useum s to sym bolic sites m ore gen erally, we might think
o f R obben Island as a site o f “ figurative go vern an ce”— that is, as an instance o f
figurative sites design ed to shape sensibilities that it is hoped w ill p ro m o te a desired
future by p rom otin g certain ways o f thinking and therefore acting across the
pop ulation . [. . .]
Robbcn Island and the Robben Island M useum
R obben Island has a long history as a place o f exclu sion , having served a variety
o f carceral p u rp o ses over its h istory including the confinem en t o f m utinous
sailors, lep ers, the m entally ill, and tribal lead ers w ho fought against the
colonization of southern A frica (see Buntm an 1996a, 1996b, 1997; D eacon 1996;
Strange and K em p a 2 0 0 3 ). T h e aparth eid go vern m en t put the site to use as a prison
w here it attem p ted to isolate the leading political opp on en ts o f aparth eid. This
is w here N elson M andela spent eighteen of his tw'cnty-sevcn years as a political
prison er.
R obbcn Island, as a priso n , w as designed as a placc that w ould cultivate a
sensibility o f h o p elessn ess am on g those w'ho resisted , o r w ho m ight resist, apartheid
go vcrn an cc. It is w orth n otin g that apartheid in A frikaans m ean s “ sep arate n ess.” . . .
The technique o f isolating the political o p p on en ts o f apartheid at R obbcn Island can
be u n d erstood as con sistent with a b road er ideology o f governin g through sep arate
n ess— in this case, by isolatin g the lead ers o f the resistance to ap arth eid , the
go vern m en t sought to “crush the sp irit o f the p e o p le ” by “ crushing the struggle
its e lf’ (A hm ed K athrada, perso n al com m un ication , A ugust 1998). [. . .]
As history has show n, the strategy o f govern in g through separaten ess has
proven to be a spectacular failure. The h istory o f the island through the aparth eid
y ears is one o f sustained resistan ce and su rp risin g political activity am on g the
p riso n ers and, surreptitiou sly, betw een the prison ers and the stru gg le m ovem ent
back on the m ainland (for academ ic accou n ts, sec Buntm an 1996a, 1996b, 1997;
D eacon 1 9 9 6 ; H utton 1994; R ioufol 1999, 2 0 0 0 ; for p riso n e rs’ accoun ts, see
A lexan der 1994; D lam ini 1984; M andela 199 4 ). E m bodyin g the slogan o f “each
one teach o n e ,” the prison gained the m oniker o f the “ U niversity o f R obben Island”
3 7 6 CLI FFORD S H E A R I NG AND M I C H A E L K E M P A
am ong those involved in the stru gg le as many peop le learned to read and w rite,
w hile others w ent on to attain “d ip lo m as” in h istory, eco n o m ics, and law signed by
N elson M andela. The island rem ained throughout a cen ter fo r political deb ate—
and it is w idely re p o rte d by fo rm e r inm ates and ack n ow ledged in academ ic
accoun ts that the philosophy o f inclusive govern an ce that eventually cam e to form
the basis o f the new d em ocratic South A frica w as refined betw een g ro u p s at R obbcn
Island (see Buntm an 1996a, 1996b ).
. . . As w e w ill elab orate in a m o m e n t, R obbcn Island M useum celeb rates and
builds upon the failure of the apartheid d e sig n e rs’ plans and p ro gram s to crcatc
the sense o f h o p elessn ess and acccptan cc o f separaten ess betw een racial g ro u p s that
w as in tended, as well as the trium ph o f an inclusive vision for govern an ce that w as
refined within the w alls o f the prison .
It is im p ortan t to note that the tran sform ation o f the site into a m useum
w as largely a foregon e conclusion w ithin resistan ce circles as apartheid began to
crum blc in the late 1980s. The African N ational C o n g ress go vern m en t established
the “ Future o f R obben Island C o m m itte e ” in 1 9 9 5 , chaired by Ahm ed K athrada,
w hich review ed so m e tw o hundred public subm issions as to the fate o f the island.
In resp o n se, . . . the com m ittee re p o rte d to the cabinet in S ep tem b er 1996 and
rcco m m cn d cd that the island b cco m c a m useum . The go vern m en t ag reed . A long
w ith an additional m ajor initiative— T h e Truth and R econciliation C o m m issio n —
R obben Island w as to be developed as a ccntral pillar in the go v e rn m e n t’s program
o f renew al, nation building, and recon ciliation . [. . .]
The m useum displays n ot sim ply the physical artifacts o f the island but also,
m uch m ore im p o rtan t, the lives and e x p erien ces o f the political prison ers. It is
these lives and e x p e rie n ce s, as m uch as the physical featu res of the island, that
con stitute the pre se rv e d and exh ibited ob jects thought to be of lasting value by the
South African go vern m en t and the m u se u m ’ s d ire cto rs and em ployees.
M andela’s hope
Wc turn now to elaborate upon the hope o f the political p riso n ers o f R obbcn
Island, nam ely, a hope for a N ew South A frica that M andela has com e to epito m ize.
A critical feature o f this hope w as w hat a New' South A frica should not be. . . . This
negative vision w as a key elem en t in the resistan ce by p riso n e rs to the tech n ologies
o f apartheid designed to p ro m o te h opelessn ess that is now' celebrated in and
through the m u seum . W hat South A frica should not be is a place that resp o n d s in
kind to aparth eid by m irro rin g aparth eid.
The culture o f political resistan ce that the m useum celeb rates cen ters on a
deliberate refusal by the political p riso n ers to respo n d in kind to the actions o f
w ard ers and their su p e rio rs. They refused to respond to hatred with hatred. They
refused, as they have e xp re sse d it, to be less as hum an beings than they could be— a
total rejection o f the notion o f separaten ess along lines o f “difference” draw'n across
(im aginary) racial gro u p s. It is this refusal, m ore than anything else, that M andela
has com e to rep resent.
It is perhaps this refusal to respond to hatred with h atred, m ore than any
other single factor, that m ade a n egotiated transition in South A frica possible
(D eegan 2 0 0 0 ). It is this refusal that now stands at the cen ter o f the vision o f a New
South A frica. This refusal is w hat the R obben Island M useum has been , and is being,
design ed to exhibit and, through this, to celebrate as a “ way o f bein g” w orthy o f
South A fricans. It is the hope that this sensibility w ill indeed b eco m e a defining
sensibility o f South A fricans and a sensibility that w ill spread and found a new
n onracist, h arm on io u s, and p ro sp e ro u s so ciety ; that is the hope of R obben Island.
This sensibilityJ that the R obben Island M useum has been designed
O
to con stitute
has been beautifully e xp re sse d by Ahm ed K athrada (1 9 9 7 ), in a statem en t m ade at
the tim e that the Future o f R obbcn Island C o m m itte e re p o rte d to the governm en t
in 1996:
We will not w ant Robben Island to be a m on um en t to o u r hardship and

suffering. We w ould w ant it to be a m on um en t reflecting the trium ph o f
the hum an spirit against the forces o f evil, a trium ph o f freedom and
hum an dignity over rep ression and h um iliation; a trium ph o f w isdom
and largen ess o f spirit against sm all m inds and pettin ess; a trium ph o f
courage and determ in ation over hum an frailty and w eakn ess; a trium ph
o f non-racialism over bigotry and in toleran ce; a trium ph o f the new-
South A frica over the old.
(pp. 1 0 - 1 1 )
As this statem en t m akes clear, both a positive and a negative side are on the
coin o f m eaning that R obben Island as a m useum seeks to em body and exp ress. This
positive side that the refusal n oted above draw s forth is nicely captured by a
southern African con cept that ex p re sse s the “ largen ess of sp irit” to w hich K athadra
refers. This is the con cept o f uhuncu— a con ccp t that is deeply ro o te d in N guni
eulture (i.e ., the culture o f southern A fricans w ho speak linguistically sim ilar
languages, including X h osa and Z ulu).
. . . U buntu . . . m eans that we all b elon g to a unified “bundle o f life”— a
p erso n w ith ubuntu “is dim inished when oth ers arc to rtu re d or o p p re sse d , or
treated as if they w ere less than w ho they arc” (Tutu 1999, 3 4 - 3 5 ).
W hat is im p o rtan t to note h ere, and this is som eth in g w'c w ill com c back to,
is that the hope o f R obbcn Island is deeply groun ded in the c x p c ric n c c o f South
A fricans— both through N guni culture and through the exp erien ce o f the islanders.
M an dela’s hope thus in tegrates a w id esp read African sensibility w ith a m ore specific
sociopolitical one that is orien ted tow ard a New' South A frica.
This brin gs us b ack to the question o f authentic hope and the possibility o f
authenticity w here sensibilities arc deliberatively con stituted through govern m ental
p ro gram s. D o cs a politically cultivated sensibility that draw's upon deeply ro oted
cultural sensibilities discredit these sen sibilities, o r d oes this cultural em beddin g
p rom ote authenticity? Is it p ossib le to con stitute a sensibility that strives for a public
vision, for a public h ope, w ith out dim inishing the autonom y and freedom o f those
w hose sensibility is bein g shaped? M ore gen erally, can a public hope be constituted
tow ard political reinvention that is norm ativcly desirable?
[. . .] T h e tech n ologies em ployed by the m useum w ere founded on a single
overridin g assu m p tion — n am ely, that the m ost persu asive reason that South
Af ricans can have for m aintaining a sensibility o f h ope and a vision o f ubuntu during
3 7 8 CLI FFORD S H E A R I NG AND M I C H A E L K E M P A
the difficult tim es that lie ahead is the fact that the prison ers who stru ggled against
aparth eid under extraordin arily difficult con dition s w ere able to cultivate, sustain,
and practice a sensibility of ubuntu and a hope for a new South A frica that
em b raced this. From this assum ption follow s the prem ise that a m useum
cx p crie n cc that sim ply e x p o se d South A fricans to this prison reality— rath er than
im posin g it upon them — w ould be a pow erful force in cultivating a hope sensibility
for a N ew South A frica. Given this con clusio n , the m useum design ers and m anagers
have sought to stru ctu re visits to the island to p ro m o te as m uch as possible a direct
c xp crien ce o f the p riso n e r s’ hope sensibility and its accom panying way o f being.
W hat is req u ired , from this poin t o f view, is an authentic and relatively
unm cdiatcd c x p cricn cc o f the hopeful life that w as regarded as essential to the
e xp erien ce o f the political p riso n e rs— the exp erien ce o f M andela being the totem ic
instance. A critical reason for sim ply m aking the reality o f p riso n e rs’ sensibilities
available to v isitors w as also that to do otherw ise w ould u n derm ine the freedom
and largeness o f m ind that ubuntu requires. To m anipulate an acccptan cc o f ubuntu
w ould be to con tradict the sp irit o f u buntu. [. . .]
The idea o f facilitating a direct and un m ediated exp erien ce ap p e ars, ju dgin g by
other academ ic accoun ts, to be in sharp con trast to the exp erien ce design ed by
the m anagem ent o f the M useum o f Tolcrancc w here, as Lisus and E ricson (1 9 9 5 )
o b se rv e , gu id es anticipate the v isito rs’ e x p erien ce w ith a voice-over design ed to
in terpret what they see before they e x p erien ce il. G uid es, they w rite, provide
“m oral in terp retation s o f the exh ib itry ” in ways that parallel the “jo u rn a list’s v o ice
over in television ” (L isu s and E ricson 1995, 3). Indeed, the d irecto r o f the R obben
Island M useum m ade clear that his team w as aw are o f other m useum s that seek to
shape a future rather than sim ply exhibit a past. O n e o f these m u seu m s m entioned
explicitly in our interview 's with R obbcn Island m anagem en t w as the M useum o f
T olcrancc. The d irecto r of the R obbcn Island M useum and his staff appear to share
the con clusion s draw n by N icola Lisus and Richard E ricson that at the M useum o f
Tolerance v isitors w ere being “en tertain ed into sub m ission ” (p. 8) and that the
site had b cco m c an “em otio n s factory” (p. 18). The R obbcn Island M useum staff
stood firm in the b e lie f that this un derm in ed the freedom to choosc that thcv
believed w as essential to tran sm ittin g the m essage o f hope in a gen tle m anner that
reflected ubuntu values. . . .
In com m en tin g on lessons learn ed for the Robben Island M useum from their
in terp retation s o f the M useum o f Tolerance, the d irector o f R obben Island noted
that for him , the other e x p erien ce is
like a tun nel, you follow the story o f the H o lo cau st and there is no way
o f escaping out o f the story . You com e in the tunnel and you had to go
out the other side and, if one is not feeling em otionally stron g that day
o r you w ant out o f it, you can ’t. And I think th at’s a lesson fo r m e about
R obben Island: you m u stn ’t force a sto ry onto peop le. You m ust allow
peop le to opt out depen din g on w here they arc at.
(P ersonal com m un ication , D ece m b e r 1999)
C on sisten t with this ap pro ach , the m anagem ent o f the R obben Island M useum
had, al the tim e o f the research , refused lo provide scripts for tou r gu id es. F u rth e r
m ore, rather than use exclusively professionally trained gu id es, the m useum has
undertaken an outreach program to em ploy ex -p riso n e rs as gu id es and sim ply
encouraged them to tell their sto ries. The use o f ex -p riso n e rs as gu id es has m ade, in
the w ords o f the director,
con crete our vision o f m aking [R obbcn Island] a living m useum and a
new kind o f m u seu m — a place o f en gagem en t and education rather than
it being a fixed narrative [for] a passive observer.
(P erson al com m un ication , D c c cm b cr 1999)
[. . ,|
In outlining the m eth ods they w ere em ploying to inspire v isitors into adopting
a hope sen sibility, the to u r gu id es spoke o f the im p ortan ce o f dram a in their
p resen tation s and the need to tailor their narratives to their au dien ce— to their
political con scio usncss and their h istorical sophistication as these b ecam e apparent
in the cou rsc o f tou rs. O ne had, they em ph asized, to talk to p eop le w ho had
su p p o rte d aparth eid (w ho w ere so m e tim e s reluctant to acknow ledge the brutality
o f aparth eid) differently to foreign ers w ho w ere often ap ocalyptic in expectation s
about South A frica’s future. So too one needed to speak to black South A fricans,
w ho continue to live in the afterm ath o f ap arth eid , differently. A to u r guide and
fo rm e r political p rison er elab orates,
[Som e A frikaners] com e with a totally negative attitude, and you can
see it, because the body language tells you. Instead of listening to you,
the guy w ould turn his back, you know, o r sneer, or w alk away— show
d isin terest— o r talk w hile y o u ’re talking. T h ese arc the tell-tale signs,
and your question is now, “I w ant to reach that p e rso n , w hat am I going
to do?” If it m eans alterin g slightly, so you actually snare that p e rso n ,
then you do so. Y ou’re not just like a p a rro t— that vou turn on and
then ju st babble. You learn to read your audicn cc. Y ou’re not goin g
to alter the facts, but you presen t the facts in such a way that you arc
able to send over . . . positive m essages, b ccausc the negative is always
there.
(Tour G uide 2, p erso n al com m un ication , D ece m b e r 1999)
W hile the line may at tim es be fine betw een a p ro ccss o f invitation and an
“em otio n s fac to ry ,” R obbcn Island, we su gg e st, rem ains consistently on the side o f
en gagem en t and education at a pace ap pro priate to the state o f prepared n ess o f an
individual visitor.
The understan ding o f the history that in form s the m u se u m ’s objectives o f
assem bling an inclusive narrative is o f great im portan ce in evaluating the nature
o f their p rogram fo r inspiring hope. As the m useum d evelops, it is very crucial to
R obbcn Island that it
rem ains a platform for critical debate and lifelong learning. Because
that’ s one o f the big legacies that we inherited from M andela and all
3 8 0 C L I F F O R D S H E A R I N G AND M I C H A E L K E M P A
th ose th ou san d s o f p riso n e rs w ho arg u e d am o n g st each o th e r w ithin

[political] o rgan izatio n s, b etw een organ izatio n s and ob viously they
c o n te ste d the w h ole ap arth eid ru lin g class version o f h isto ry . . . . So
that n otio n o f critical d e b ate , c o n te statio n is very im p o rta n t.
(D ire c to r, p e rso n a l c o m m u n ic atio n , D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 9 )
T h is in sistcn cc on the island as a sp a cc fo r d elib eratio n that m ay and d o e s lead to

d ifferen t c o n clu sio n s is critical to the issu e o f c o n stru c tin g a sen sib ility that is
au th entic in the sen se that P e te r D rah o s (2 0 0 4 ) se cs p riv ate and co llcc tiv c h op es
as b ein g au th en tic. A u th en tic h ope in D ra h o s’ s sen se is h ope that “lead s into a cycle
o f e x p e c ta tio n , plan n in g, and action that se cs the agen t e x p lo re the p o w e r o f her
a g e n cy .” [. . .]
W h ile a “ p ilg r im a g e ” to R o b b en Island m ay n o t be as o rch e strate d an
e x p e rie n c e as a visit to the M u seu m o f T o leran ce is re g ard e d as b ein g , it is clearly
n ot an entirely u n m c d iatcd c x p c r ic n c c cither. In d eed , the very n otio n o f a c o m
p letely u n m cd iatcd e x p e rie n c e is an ideal ty p e — th ere arc very few if any such
e x p e rie n c e s. R ather, the idea o f an u n m cd iatcd c x p c r ic n c c stan ds at an end o f a
con tin u u m w h ere the o th e r end is a c o m p le te ly m an ip u lated e x p e rie n c e . E v e ry
w h ere alo n g the c o n tin u u m , o u r e x p e rie n c e is c o n stru c te d to vary in g d e g r e e s. So
the q u estio n is n ot w h eth er o u r e x p e rie n c e is c o n stru c te d but rath er how it is
c o n stru c te d and to w ard w hat en ds? Is w hat is h app en in g facilitation , . . . o r is it
ab ou t the c o n stitu tio n o f a su b m issiv e co n scio u sn e ss?
Perhaps at this p o in t, it m igh t be useful to rcflcct on w hat w e take to be
F o u ca u lt’ s co n ce p tio n o f freed o m as a sp ace for p e rso n a l reinven tion (F o u cau lt
1 9 9 7 ). [. . .]
T h e h ope b ein g c o n stitu te d on the islan d, as w ell as the co n d itio n s and
te c h n o lo g ie s u se d , has d e e p d e lib e rativ e ro o ts in the h istory of the p riso n itse lf,
the b ro a d e r stru g g le m o v e m e n t again st ap arth e id , and the in d igen o u s sou th ern
A frican cu ltu re m o re gen erally . In D ra h o s’ s (2 0 0 4 ) te r m s , the p u b lic h ope is deep ly
ro o te d in individual and co lle ctiv e h ope. T h is is re fle cte d in the w o rk o f the
m u se u m sta ff in th eir in sisten ce that v isito rs should b e in vited (b u t n ot c o m p e lle d )
to share in the in sp iration o f the island and to c x p c r ic n c c the ran ge o f v o ice s that
c o m p rise d the islan d e rs. To re tu rn to Fo u cau lt (1 9 9 7 ), w e co n c lu d c that the
R ob b cn Island M u seu m has b e e n , and is b ein g , co n stitu te d as a sp a cc that invites
the p o ssib ility o f p e rso n a l rcin vcn tion an d, through th is, the c o llcctiv c reinven tion
o f South A frican s.
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M avibuvc Books.
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Rohhen Island timeline, edited by Flarrict D eacon , N igel Penn, A ndre O dcn daal,
and Peter D avison. C ape Town, South A frica: M ayibuye Books.
Lisus, N icola A ., and Richard V. E ricson . 1995. M isplacing m em ory: The effect o f
television form at on H olocaust rcm cm b ran cc. British journal o f Sociology' 46
(1 ): 1 -1 9 .
M andela, N elson . 1994. I-ong walk to freedom. Lon don : Abacus.
O ’M allcv, Pat. 1992. R isk, pow er, and crim e prevention. Economy and Society
2 1 :2 5 2 - 7 5 .
O ’M alley, Pat, and D arren Palmer. 1996. Post-Keynesian policing. Economy and Society
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com m em oration o f R obbcn Island. M aste r’ s thesis. D ep artm en t o f Political
Studies, U niversity o f C ap e Town, South A frica.
— . 2000. Behind telling: Post-apartheid representation s of R obbcn Islands past.
Kronos 2 6 :2 2 —41.
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3 8 2 C L I F F O R D S H E A R I N G AND M I C H A E L K E M P A
R ose, N ikolas, and Peter Miller. 1992. Political pow er beyond the state: Problem atics o f
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Sh usterm an, R ichard, cd. 1999. Bourdicu:A critical reader. O x fo rd , U K : Blackw ell.
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Tutu, D esm on d . 1999. No future without forgiveness. London: Rider.
Chapter 45
Deborah Gould
R O C K T H E BOAT, D O N ' T R O C K T H E
BOAT, B A B Y : A M B I V A L E N C E A N D
T H E E M E R G E N C E OF M I L I T A N T
AIDS ACTIVISM
D
ARRELL YATES RIST SUGGESTS A co n n ectio n b e tw e en w hat I
am callin g am bivalen ce and lesbian and gay p o litics:
W h atever the state o f o u r ‘gay p r id e ,’ o u r p o lite n e ss stick s to us all. It

o o z e s from a w ell o f acq u ie sce n ce d e e p w ith in , dow n w h ere we still
c a n ’ t quite b elieve that w e ’re as g o o d as straigh ts and d e se rv e a ll o f the
h ete ro se x u a l p re ro g ativ e s: kissin g lovers on the stre e t, h oldin g h ands in
fron t of M om and D ad . . ., marrying. T h is p o lite n e ss, w hich w e n u rtu re
as though it w ere a v irtu e , e m an ate s from dark c o n v ictio n s— lying
d o g m as w e g re w up w ith— that tell us w e a r e n ’ t qu ite righ t. . . . W hen
it c o m e s to takin g hold o f fre e d o m , o u r p o lite n e ss shuts us ou t.
(R ist 1 9 8 7 : 54)
R ist in tim ate s that lesbian and gay self-h atred and se lf-d o u b t em an ate fro m , and
an im ate, a d e e p co n c e rn w ith social ac ce p tan c e that tran slates in to political
q u ie sce n ce . In argu in g that gay sh am e p e rsists and so m e tim e s tru m p s gay p rid e , R ist
re m in d s us that p r io r to m ak in g p o litical d e m a n d s, lesbian s and gay m en m u st
b elieve that they d e se rv e to b e tre ate d b etter. Sham e and se lf-d o u b t poten tially
gnaw away at any such con viction even w h ile gay p rid e and in dign ation ab out
h o m o p h o b ia m igh t b o lste r it. A m bivalen ce ab ou t d om in an t so ciety also in tro d u ce s
u n certain ty in to any political c o u r sc o f actio n ; lesbians and gay m en w ant to
a cc o m m o d ate to , but also to co n fro n t, so c ie ty ’ s n o rm s, valu es, and in stitu tion s.
L esbian and gay p olitical d isc o u rse reveals a relation sh ip b e tw e en lesbian and
gay p o litics and am bivalen ce ab ou t se lf and so c iety . A s is tru e o f m o st identity-
b ased p o litics, lesbian and gay p o litics in large p a rt revolve arou n d q u e stio n s o f
3 8 4 DEBORAH GOULD
lesbian and gay selves in relation to society— w ho are we and how are we treated in
relation to o th e rs; w here do we fit in this society and w here do we w ant to fit; how
m ight we best achieve o u r goals? Given such con cern s it is no su rp rise that the
language o f lesbian and gay politics is saturated with em otio n s ab out se lf and
society . E m otion s justify and explain lesbian and gay political actions (e .g ., “our
rage m ade us turn to civil d iso b ed ien ce”); arc blam ed fo r and credited with
lesbian s’ and gay m e n s’ political stands vis-a-vis dom in ant society (e .g ., “ our sham e
m akes us too accom m odatin g in the political realm ”); are invoked to advocate one
strategy over another (e .g ., “ if w e ’re p ro u d , w e ’ ll act responsibly and take care o f
our ow n”); arc evoked to con dem n and d iscourage those w ho engage in a politics
o f respectab ility as well as those w ho disregard such politics (e .g ., “gay m en who
con dem n prom iscu ity are self-hating” ; “ p rom iscu ou s gay m en are self-hating”);
are linked to specific political acts (e .g ., “our lead ers should feel asham ed about
grovelin g for c ru m b s”); are credited w ith political su ccesses (e .g ., “ou r calm ,
reasonable tone m ade them respon d to our d em an d s”).
In sh o rt, em otio n s suffuse lesbian and gay political d isco u rse, proclaim in g how,
in light o f specific political action s, lesbians and gay m en supp osed ly feel, should
feel, should not feel, w ill feel, about them selves and about society . V arious, and
som etim es conflicting, em otio n s arc incessantly reiterated , indicating both an
instability in how lesbians and gay m en feel about them selves in the con text o f a
hostile society as well as con scious and less than fully con scious attem p ts to alfcct
those feeling stales and thereby influence lesbian and gay politics. It seem s clear that
this highly em otional language o f po litics— in its focus on the relationship o f lesbian
and gay selves to society — is centrally engaged with lesbian and gay am bivalence,
with all ol its instabilities. ( . . . )
Ambivalence and early lesbian and gay responses to AIDS
T h ro ugh out the A ID S ep id e m ic, the evocation and expression of ccrtain em otio ns
have prod u ced constellation s o f feelings and o f em otion ru les and n o rm s that have
effectively, if only tem p o rarily , helped to “resolve” lesbian and gay am bivalence;
these p ro cesses helped to shape lesbian and gay resp o n ses to A ID S. For exam p le,
during the first years o f the A ID S cp id cm ic, the prevalent and already existin g
am bivalent em otion eulture anim ated feelings and articulation s o f sham e (“our
p erv erted sexual practices are killing u s”) linked to fear (“w e now will surely be
rejected by fam ily, frien ds, and society” ), and su b m erged the few early articulation s
o f an ger d irected at the go vern m en t. In b o lsterin g negative feelings about h o m o
sexuality and appealing to a stron g desire fo r social acceptan ce, this con stellation o f
em otio n s heightened lesbian and gay co n ccrn s about rcspcctab ility and assim ilation
into socicty , providing a “resolu tion ” to lesbian and gay am bivalcncc that cn couragcd
a non con fron tation al political respo n se to A ID S that con sisted m ostly o f service
provision and lobbying.
D urin g the m id -1 9 8 0 s, this em otion culture shifted slightly. T h ere w as an
increase in exp ression s o f anger about the g o v e rn m e n t’ s inadequate respo nse to
A ID S. H ow ever, lesbian and gay am bivalence w orked to delink that anger from
m ilitant political activism and channeled it instead in the direction o f an internally
A M B I V A L E N C E AND E M E R G E N C E OF M I L I T A N T AIDS A C T I V I S M 3 8 5
o rie n te d co m m u n ity p rid e that e n c o u ra g e d lesbian s and gay m en to con tin u e on the
c o m m e n d a b le path o f n ob ly, re sp o n sib ly , and quietly takin g care o f th eir ow n in
the lace o f little o u tsid e help. T h is co n ste llatio n o f e m o tio n s d isc o u ra g e d m ilitant
ac tiv ism , p o in tin g in stead to w ard v o lu n tc c rism , c o m m u n ity -b ase d sc rv ic c p r o
visio n , and lobbying. T h e follo w in g e x a m p le , w h ere an ger w as artic u la te d and
e licite d , but quickly d e fu se d and d ire cted to w ard co m p assio n rath e r than activ ism ,
illu strate s th ese d y n am ics. A t an A ID S m e m o ria l can d leligh t p ro c e ssio n in C h icago ,
on e sp e ak e r asked the c ro w d , “ A rc you m ad? A rc you an g ry ?’’ H e con tin u ed by
saying that he w as “p isse d ” b cca u sc no on e o u tsid e the lesbian and gay com m u n ity
w as do in g anything ab o u t A ID S. T h e cro w d loudly ag re e d w ith h im . H e then
c o n clu d e d by ad visin g: “Take y o u r an g e r and turn it into love fo r y o u r b r o th e r s .”
Perhaps follow in g his su g g e stio n , the p ro ce ssio n co n clu d ed w ith m a rc h e rs singin g
the refrain “W e are a ge n tle , an gry p e o p le ” from H olly N e a r ’s so n g , “ Sin gin g fo r o u r
L iv es” (C o tto n 1 9 8 5 ). In this p e r io d , e d ito rials in C h ic a g o ’ s le sb ia n /g a y n e w sp ap e r
Gay Life c o n sisten tly c ritic ize d the g o v e rn m e n t’ s h o m o p h o b ic and n egligen t
re sp o n se to A ID S, but rath er than callin g for ac tiv ism , the e d ito rials all sim ply
c o m m e n d e d the co m m u n ity fo r its stren gth in the face o f such ad versity . A typical
e d ito rial an grily in d icted the g o v e rn m e n t, but issu ed n o activist call and in stead
fo c u se d on an in w ard -d irecte d p rid e : “W h ere o th e rs m igh t have caved in u n d e r the
p re ssu re o f the k iller A ID S, o u r com m u n ity has gro w n in stren gth d u rin g this
tre m e n d o u s crisis. . . . Ju n e is Gay and L esbian P ride M o n th , and in C h icago w e can
truly be p ro u d ” (“O ff to a G o o d S t a r t,” 1 9 8 5 ).
T h e re p e a te d in vocation s to feel p rid e m igh t have b een an im ated by a desire
to b o lste r lesbian and gay se lf-e ste e m and to fight the g r e a te r stig m a attach ed to
h o m o se x u a lity in the c o n te x t o f A ID S ; they also m igh t have b een m o tiv ate d by a
need to in crease the re so u rc e and v o lu n te e r b ase to fight A ID S. E qually im p o rta n t,
how ever, se e m s to be the ro le that such elicitatio n s o f p r id e played in su b m e rg in g a
g ro w in g an g e r; each tim e an ger b egan to be a rticu la te d , p rid e ab o u t the c o m
m u n ity 's re sp o n se to A ID S w as im m e d iate ly evok ed and affirm ed as the p ro p e r
em o tio n to feel am id st this dire crisis. R e g a rd le ss o f th eir in ten t, the p o litical cffcct
o f th ese e x p re ssio n s o f p rid e w as to su b m e rg e an ger and to c n co u ra g c an inw ard
o rien tatio n that tru m p e te d v o lu n tccrism and co m m u n ity self-h elp rath er than
a m o re e x tern ally o rie n ted activ ist re sp o n se . W hen “gay p r id e ” w as first coin ed as a
slogan by lesbian and gay lib e ratio n ists in I 9 6 9 , it w as linked to m ilitan t activ ism . In
the m id - 1 9 8 0 s, it had an alto g e th e r differen t flavor. In a m o m e n t w hen a pub lic
health e p id e m ic intensified gay sham e and fear o f social re je c tio n , and w hen g o v e rn
m e n t re sp o n se to A ID S w'as n e g lig e n t at b e st and pun itive at wro r st, gay p rid e now
c n co u ra g c d v o lu n tc c rism , rc m c m b ra n c c o f the d e ad , relative q u ie tu d e d e sp ite the
g o v e rn m e n t’ s g larin g failu res, and a sto ic nobility in the facc o f a dead ly c p id c m ic ,
rath er than con fron tation al o r o p p o sitio n al politics.
A cc o rd in g to R e d d y , b e ca u se e m o tiv es can alte r fe elin g s, e m o tiv e con ven tion s
stron gly influence in dividual and c o m m u n ity -w id e e m o tio n s over tim e. T h e
eviden ce su g g e sts that lesbian and gay c o m m u n itie s’ e m o tiv e con ven tion s very
m uch affected feelin gs ab o u t A ID S , largely su b m e rg in g an g e r fo r the first fou r or
five y ears o f the crisis by rech an n clin g it to w ard fear o f social rc jc c tio n , sh am e,
com m u n ity p rid e , and tran q uil nobility w h en ever it th reaten ed to su rface. T h e
p ro m o tio n o f certain e m o tiv e s over o th e rs, how ever, did n ot rid lesbian and gay
3 8 6 D E B O R A H GOULD
c o m m u n itie s o f an g e r; it sim p ly re d u ce d its e x p re ssio n and seem in gly re d u ce d the

feelin g itself. B ut as R ed d y p o in ts o u t, in dividuals vary in th eir re sp o n se s to e m o tiv e
con ven tion . T h at variation “p ro v id e s an initial re se rv o ir o l p o ssib ilitie s fo r change
. . . that can b e draw n u po n w hen id e o lo g ic a l, e c o n o m ic , o r political fac to rs
put p re ssu re on the sy ste m ” (R e d d y 1 9 9 7 : 3 3 4 —3 5 ). In o th e r w o rd s, em o tiv e
con ven tion s arc su b je c t to c o n te statio n , p a rtic u la rly in tim e s o f crisis.
The m anagem ent o f a grow in g an ger
Specific even ts in San F ran cisco and N ew York and c o m m e n ts o f lesbian and gay
le ad e rs at the end o f 1985 reveal the b egin n in g o f a shift in the m o o d o f lesbians
and gay m e n . At the end o f O c to b e r, nine in dividuals cam p ed o u t in fro n t o f the
old F ed eral B uildin g in San F ran cisco to p r o te st the g o v e rn m e n t’ s re sp o n se to
A ID S. Tw o gay m en w ith A ID S chain ed th em selv es to the d o o rs. T h e ir co n tin u o u s
vigil gre w over the su c c ccd in g m on th s (H ip p ie r 1 9 8 6 : 4 2 —4 7 ). M ean w h ile, activists
in N ew York C ity w ho w ere “fe arfu l, an gry and fru strate d over m u sh ro o m in g
A ID S h y ste ria” (F re ib e rg 1 9 8 5 : 14) fo rm e d the Gay and L esb ian A n ti-D efam ation
L eagu e (G L A D L ). M o re than six h u n d red lesb ian s and gays atte n d e d a m ass
m e e tin g called by G L A D L to d iscu ss A ID S h ysteria stirre d up by the m e d ia and
p o litician s; the n ext day on e h u n dred p ro te ste d o u tsid e C ity H all d u rin g a c o m
m itte e h earin g on c lo sin g gay se x e stab lish m en ts. In D ec e m b e r, five h un dred
lesbians and gay m en jo in ed G L A D L in a d e m o n stratio n again st the se n satio n alistic,
antigay A ID S co v erage o f the New York Post (F re ib e rg 1 9 8 5 , 1 9 8 6 a ). T h e se m ore
o p p o sitio n al p o litics w ere n o t y et w id e sp re ad , but their o c c u rre n c e in dicated
a shiftin g e m o tio n a l clim ate and the g ro w in g in stability o f ac c o m m o d atio n ist
politics.
C o m m e n ts m ad e at a m e e tin g o f e le cte d and ap p o in te d lesbian and gay officials
by the e x e c u tiv e d ire c to r o f the N atio n al G ay Task F o rce, V irgin ia A p u zzo, and by
M assach u se tts re p re se n tativ e B arney Frank revealed th eir aw aren ess o f ru m b lin gs
am o n g so m e lesbian s and gay m en fo r m o re m ilitan t action . A p u z z o ’ s c o m m e n ts
in dicated h er p c rcc p tio n that w id esp re ad am bivalen ce a b o u t s e lf and so ciety had
tran slated in to an xiety a b o u t lesbian and gay e x p re ssio n s o f an g e r and m ilitan t
political p rac tice s. She a tte m p te d to alleviate lesbian and gay an x ie tie s ab ou t
ro ck in g the b o at:
F o r th ose o f us w ho have e arn e d . . . the r c sp c c t and re g ard o f [the

p olitical] sy ste m , w e m u st b e w illin g to spen d it on this issu e. Wc m u st
be w illin g to m o u n t a m u ltip le offen sive on w h at is co m in g dow n on us.
Yes, w e m u st n e g o tiate. Yes, w e m u st lob b y. Yes, w e m u st litigate. . . .
But w e m u st also re m e m b e r w h ere w e co m e fro m , and re tu rn to
allow in g that rage to b e e x p re sse d and n ot think fo r a m in ute that there
is so m e th in g n ot re sp e c tab le ab o u t that.
(W alter 1 9 8 5 : 1 1)
Fran k, in co n trast, trie d lo d am p e n the an ger and steady the b o at: “T h e political
sy ste m has re sp o n d e d b e tte r [to the A ID S crisis] at this point than I w ould have
A M B I V A L E N C E AND E M E R G E N C E OF MI L I TANT AIDS ACTIVISM 3 8 7
h oped. . . . [Thai m eans] in my ju d gm en t, that the political cou rse o f action that has
been chosen [by the lesbian and gay com m unity] is c o rre ct” (W alter 1985: 1 3).
A lthough there w as m ovem ent tow ard g re ater m ilitance, Fran k ’ s cautionary
note w as the m ore typical e xp ressio n durin g this p erio d . [. . .]
Events and a new constellation o f em otions
In the m iddle o f 1986, there w as a m arked and w id esp read shift in lesbian and
gay rh etoric about the A ID S crisis. In the c o n text o f cvcrin crcasin g A ID S death s,
go vern m en t failure to ad dress the crisis, and grow in g calls for m o re repressive
A ID S legislation, the U .S . Sup rem e C o u r t ’s Bourn v. Hardwick d ecision , announced
in Ju n e 1986, w as a turn in g poin t, an event that, prim arily as a resu lt o f its
em otional effects, anim ated a tran sform ation in lesbian and gay political respo nses
to A ID S.
C o m p arin g gay se x to “ad ultery , in ccst, and oth er sexual c rim e s,” the C o u rt
upheld a G e o rgia statute that denied h om osexu als the con stitution al right to engage
in con sen sual, private sexual acts (W alter 1 9 8 6 ). Lesbians and gay m en exp erien ced
the decision as “a declaration o f w ar” (D eitch er 1995: 140). D eitch er w rite s that
“new s o f the Hardwick decision w as enough to awaken the radical in m ost apolitical
q u eers. . . . P rotests eru p te d in cities across the coun try as the new s reached
com m un ities in which frustration and rage had been m oun ting over the loss o f
lovers and frien ds, the acceleratin g rate and intensity o f bias-related violence, and
the un precedented challenge to q u e e r social identity that the epidem ic p o se d ”
(1 4 8 —4 9 ). A ccou nts o f the dem on stration s rem ind one of D u rk h eim ’ s notion of
“collective e fferv escen ce,” b rim m in g w ith the em otional energy gen erated by the
am assing of large n u m b ers of peop le w ho sec them selves as in so m e way con n ected.
In N ew York C ity , lesbians and gay m en “ took to the streets for tw o angry, m ilitant
d e m o n stratio n s,” the largest since the 1970s; m any engaged in civil disob cdicn cc.
[. . .] Lesbians and gay m en across the country angrily callcd for “active re sistan ce ,”
“r io ts ,” “m assive p ro te sts,” “ law -breaking,” an oth er “Sto n ew all,” a “retu rn to the
stre e ts.” The shift in lesbian s’ and gav m e n ’ s em otional and political discou rse is
rem ark ab le; m ilitant language like this alm o st never appeared in the lesbian and gay
m edia during the first five years o f the A ID S epidem ic.
The new m ilitance grew quickly, delineating a politics that linked em otions
such as indignation, anger, self-resp ect, fear o f death and in action, and g r ie f to
m ilitant, con fron tation al A ID S activism . This new eluster o f em otio n s prevailed
over the previous evocations o f prid e ab out the com m u n ity ’s self-help, faith in the
go v e rn m e n t’s go o d w ill, and stoicism in the facc o f death. Lesbian and gay n ew s
papers both reco rd ed and helped to gen erate the shifting em otion cultu re, running
ever m ore op-eds and articles that indicted the go vern m en t, articulated a grow in g
anger, e xp re sse d dissatisfaction with the lesbian and gay com m u n ity ’s m oderate
resp o n se to A ID S, and su ggested the need for m ore con frontational A ID S activism .
M ilitant A ID S activist g ro u p s began lo em erg e. [. . .]
Why did the Hardwick rulin g— w hich, follow ing M cA dam (1 9 8 2 ), we should
con sider as a tightening in political o p p o rtu n itie s— provoke such a m ilitant
respo nse by lesbians and gay m en , and why did the rulin g p rom pt lesbians and
gay m en to e m b ra ce m ilitant A ID S activism ? For y e a rs, lesbians and gay m en had

su ffered through pun itive A ID S le g islatio n , in ad eq u ate A ID S fun din g, calls to tatto o
and qu aran tin e p e o p le w ith A ID S (P W A s), and so o n ; in re sp o n se , they had stron gly
c ritic ize d , lo b b ie d , h eld can dleligh t v igils, and so m e tim e s p r o te ste d , but lesbian and
gay m ilitan ce afte r Hardwick w as m uch m o re p ro n o u n c e d , w id e sp re a d , and lasting.
O n e exp lan atio n fo r the re sp o n se to Hardwick m ay be foun d in Ja s p e r ’ s (1 9 9 7 )
c o n c e p t o f “ m o ral s h o c k .” Hardwick w as e x p e rie n c e d as an unexpected and outrageous
legal d e c isio n , p a rtic u la rly to lesbian s and gay m en w h o b elieved in A m erican
d e m o c r a c y ’ s p ro clam a tio n that equality w as the law o f the lan d. In denyin g them
b asic rig h ts, the ru lin g co n fro n ted lesbians and gay m en w ith the e x te n t o f their
o u tsid e r sta tu s, fo rcin g them to rc co n ce p tu alize the U .S . as the land o f ju stic e for
ail— e x c e p t “q u e e r s .” In tan dem w ith the g o v e rn m e n t’ s in ad eq u ate re sp o n se to
A ID S, the ru lin g co n fo u n d ed the se n se o f b e lo n g in g to d o m in a n t so ciety and
the sen se o f e n title m e n t to citizen righ ts and p riv ile g e s felt by m any m e m b e rs o f
the lesbian and gay c o m m u n ity , p a rticu larly th ose w h o w ere w h ite, m ale, and
m id d le class. Th ey w ere new ly in dignan t that th eir righ ts cou ld be so thorough ly
a b ro g a te d . A s Ja sp e r arg u e s, a m o ral sh o ck “h elp s a p e rso n think ab ou t h er basic
values and how the w o rld d iv e rg e s from th e m ” (1 0 6 ) and can p ro p e l that p e rso n
in to political activ ism . Tw o p re ssin g q u e stio n s rem ain u n an sw ered , how ever. F irst,
given th eir past e x p e r ie n c e s w ith n u m e ro u s in d ign ities, why did lesb ian s and gay
m en e x p e rie n c e Hardwick as a m o ral shock? S e c o n d , why did they re sp o n d w ith
m ilitant activism ? A s Ja sp e r w rite s, “ re sp o n se s to m o ral sh o ck s vary g re atly . M ost
p e o p le , in m o st case s, resign th em selves to un pleasan t ch an ge s” (1 0 6 ) and do not
e m b ra ce m ilitan t activism even in the face o l such a shock.
To u n d e rstan d le sb ia n s’ and gay m e n ’ s e x p e r ie n c e s ol and political re actio n s to
Hardwick, th en , w e m u st c o n sid e r the c o n te x t in w hich the ru lin g o c c u rre d as w ell
as the alreadyJ shifting
O
e m o tio n cu ltu re that both d e riv e d from and re in fo rce d
lesbian and gay u n d e rstan d in g s o l that c o n tc x t. By the m id d le o f 1 9 8 6 , lesbians and
gay m en w ere facin g a h o rrific and devastatin g so c ial, p o litic a l, and health crisis.
Hardwick w as an n ou nced five y ears in to the A ID S c p id c m ic w hen the n u m b e r o f
A ID S eases r e p o rte d to the C e n te r s fo r D ise a se C o n tro l ( C D C ) had su rp asse d
3 0 ,0 0 0 , m o re than h alf o f w hom had already died (C D C 1997: 14). P resid en t
R eagan had y e t to u tte r the w o rd “ A ID S ” in p u b lic. I.yndon I.a R o u c h c ’s initiative
to q uaran tin e p e rso n s testin g H IV -positive had recen tly g a rn e re d w ell over the
re q u ire d 3 9 4 ,0 0 0 sign atu res to b e p laced on the C alifo rn ia b allo t, and oth er state
leg islatu re s w ere in creasin gly co n sid e rin g sim ila r law s (F re ib e rg 1 9 8 6 c : 10; Fall
1 9 8 6 : 9 ). E m an atin g fro m the h ighest ech elo n s o f the state and am id st increasin gly
re p re ssiv e le gislatio n , g o v e rn m e n t n cg lig c n c c, and the c v cr-in crcasin g A ID S death s,
the Hardwick ru lin g sh o ck cd lesbian s and gay m en into a g r e a te r re co g n itio n o f the
life-th reaten in g n ature o f sta te -sp o n so re d and socially san ction ed h o m o p h o b ia. A s I
have a rg u e d , in the y ear p r io r to Hardwick, lesb ian s and gay m en w ere in creasin gly
feelin g an g e r to w ard the g o v e rn m e n t; the shift in the e m o tio n cu ltu re then reign in g
in lesbian and gay c o m m u n itie s w as o c c u rrin g qu ite grad u ally , how ever. T h e H ard
wick ru lin g greatly qu ick en ed the p a ce, sh atterin g the p re v io u s “ re so lu tio n ” to
am b ivalen ce and the c o n co m itan t con stellatio n o f e m o tio n s that had p revailed in
lesbian and gay co m m u n itie s d u rin g the first y ears o f the A ID S e p id e m ic . T h e ru lin g
radically tra n sfo rm e d le sb ia n s’ and gay m e n ’ s feelin gs ab ou t s e lf and so ciety ,
ac ce le ra te d a shift in th eir e m o tio n n o rm s and ru le s, and provok ed a new “r e s o

lu tio n ” to lesbian and gay am b ivalen ce, all o f w hich stim u late d new u n d erstan d in gs
o f the A ID S crisis and e n co u ra g e d m ilitan t activ ism . To u n d erstan d why Hardwick
an im ated lesb ian s and gay m en to e m b ra ce m ilitant A ID S ac tiv ism , th en , re q u ire s an
in vestigation o f the ru lin g ’ s e m o tio n a l effects.
First and fo re m o st, Hardwick am plified shifts in lesbian and gay com m u n ity
em o tio n c u ltu re s that had already b egu n to o c c u r as a re su lt o f the m o u n tin g death s
and the g o v e rn m e n t’ s n e glige n t and punitive h andling o f the A ID S crisis. A new
con figuration o f e m o tio n s is ap p aren t in lesbian and gay activist d o c u m e n ts and
n e w sp ap e rs after Hardwick. In dign ation , b o rn from a sen se o f e n title m e n t b e tray e d ,
w as p ro n o u n c e d , c o m p le m e n tin g freq u en t e x p re ssio n s o f sc lf- r c sp c c t; an g e r and
an im osity tow ard the g o v e rn m e n t w ere in creasin gly a rtic u la te d ; fear ab o u t the
c o n se q u e n c es o f lesbian and gay inaction w as h eigh ten ed . E m o tio n s like sh am e,
prid e in the c o m m u n ity ’ s se lf-h e lp , fear o f social re je c tio n , and tran q u il n ob ility in
the facc o f death and g o v e rn m e n t n e glige n c e , w hich had previou sly d o m in ated and
had e n c o u ra g e d co m m u n ity -b ase d se rv ice p ro v isio n , v o lu n te e rism , candleligh t
v ig ils, and lob b yin g, w ere rarely e licited o r artic u la te d d u rin g this p e rio d . T h e now -
n o rm ativ e e m o tio n cu ltu re offered a new co n ste llatio n o f e m o tio n s ab o u t se lf and
so ciety — i.e ., a new “re so lu tio n ” to lesbian and gay am b iv alcn cc— that c n c o u ra g c d
m ilitan cc and pro fo u n d ly sh o ok up the o rth o d o x y o f political m o d e ratio n and
acc o m m o d atio n that had d o m in ate d lesbian and gay p o litics since the m id -1 9 7 0 s.
A lth ough itse lf not d irectly ab o u t A ID S, Hardwick pu n ctu ate d and gave new
m ean in g to the o n go in g e p id e m ic ; it c ry stallize d and h eigh ten ed feelin gs ab o u t and
in te rp re tatio n s o f the e p id e m ic that had previou sly been m o re o r less in ch oate. By
e x p o sin g the s ta te ’ s w illin gn e ss, even e a g e rn e ss, to e x c lu d e an en tire class o f p e o p le
from c o n stitu tio n al p ro te c tio n s, the Hardwick ru lin g e n c o u ra g e d a m o re p o litic ize d
analysis o f the g o v e rn m e n t’ s re sp o n se to A ID S , m ak in g it in creasin gly difficult to
re d u ce the e p id e m ic to a strin g o f in dividual death s and to iso lated feelin gs o f g rie f.
B efore the ru lin g , a n u m b e r o f lesb ian s and gay m en had b egu n argu in g that the
g o v e rn m e n t’ s re sp o n se to the A ID S crisis w as p r o o f that gay m en w ere seen as
e x p e n d a b le ; as the h ighest c o u r t in the land w as now w illin g to e sp o u se h om o-
ph ob ic ju stification s in den yin g priv acy righ ts to a g r o u p o f citizen s, w ho w as to say
that q uaran tin e o f H IV -positive p e o p le w ould n ot now b e im p le m e n te d ? If state and
so ciety saw h o m o se x u a l love (and thus h o m o se x u a l lives) as c rim in al, they certain ly
w ou ld n ot sudden ly b e c o m e c o n ce rn e d a b o u t h o m o se x u a l death s. A fter Hardwick,
fram in g s o f A ID S that invoked the N azi h o lo cau st and accu se d the g o v e rn m e n t o f
g c n o c id c by in ten tion al n e g le ct b e ca m e m o re re so n a n t. L e sb ia n s’ and gay m e n ’ s
g ro w in g fear, g r ie f, and an g e r su p p o rte d an in te rp re tatio n o f A ID S as g c n o c id c ,
an d, at the sam e tim e , this n ew and ap o caly p tic fram in g am plified th ose very
e m o tio n s. ( . . . )
It should be cle ar that th ere w as n oth in g in evitable ab o u t the re sp o n se o f
lesbian s and gay m en to the Ilardwick d e c isio n , and th ere w as no n e c essa ry c o n n e c
tion b etw een Ilardwick and the e m e rg e n c e o f m ilitant A ID S activ ism . To u n d e rstan d
why Ilardwick am plified lesbian and gay an g e r at slate and society rath er than
sham e ab o u t h o m o se x u a lity , and w hy it e n c o u ra g e d con fron tation al p o litics rath er
than m o re lobbyin g o r paralysis b o rn o f d espair, w e n eed lo co n sid e r the c o n te x t
o f shifting e m o tio n s and political su b je c tiv ities that lesb ian s and gay m en w ere
e x p e rie n c in g w hen the ru lin g o c c u rr e d . A s stated ab ov e, the C o u r t ’ s decision

w as an n ou nced at a m o m e n t w hen the prevailing lesbian and gay e m o tio n cu ltu re
wras already shiftin g as a re su lt o f other, m o re g rad u al p ro c e sse s and o c c u rre n c e s— a
steady (alth ough o f c o u rse alarm in g) in crease in cases and d eath s, g o v e rn m e n t
in action , and re p re ssiv e le gislatio n — that had by then sp ann ed five y ears. Sim ilarly,
p o c k e ts o f m o re m ilitan t A ID S activism w ere already slow ly b egin n in g to e m e rg e to
p ro te st the c lo sin g o f gay b ath h o u ses, the g ro w in g A ID S h ysteria in the m e d ia , and
g o v e rn m e n t in action . Hardwick, th en , had the im p a ct that it did b c ca u sc it o c c u rre d
at a m o m e n t w hen an g e r to w ard the g o v e rn m e n t wras in creasin gly b e in g articu lated
and fe lt, and b c c a u sc so m e lesbian s and gay m en w ere b egin n in g to channel that
an ger into m o re m ilitan t p o litic s. [. . .]
In co n clu sio n , I’ d like to su g g e st howr my analysis o f the e m e rg e n c e o f A C T U P
m igh t assist o u r stu d ie s o f social m o v e m e n ts m o re g e n e rally . F irst, an e x p lo ratio n
o f the ro le played by e m o tio n s and e m o tiv es in the n e go tiatio n o f an inten se
am b ivalcn cc am o n g a m argin alized g ro u p o f p e o p le h elp s to exp lain w hy and how
a m o v em en t can e m e rg e in the c o n te x t o f few political o p p o rtu n itie s, and perh aps
even in re sp o n se to such a c o n te x t. S e c o n d , my analysis su g g e sts the im p o rta n t ro le
that e m o tio n s and th eir e x p re ssio n play in in te rp re tiv e p r o c e sse s, in clu d in g fram in g
as w ell as less p u rp o siv e activities. Sch o lars p o in t to the im p o rta n t ro le that fram in g
activ ities play in m o v e m e n t e m e rg e n c e and d e v e lo p m e n t, but th eir acco u n ts
typically em ph asize the cogn itiv e rath er than e m o tio n a l c o m p o n e n ts o f fram ing.
M o reo v er, sch o la rs tend to define fram in g as a stra te g ic , p u rp o siv e activity and
fail lo link it to b ro ad er, less in ten tion al, in te rp re tiv e p ro c e sse s. Perhaps as a
resu lt o f both th eir cogn itive bias and the e m p h asis they p lace on strate g ic behavior,
the cru c ia l q u e stio n o f fram e re so n an ce often rem ain s un an sw ered . W h at se e m s
to be m issin g in the c u rre n t c o n cep tu alizatio n o f fram in g is a co n sid e ratio n o f
in te rp re tiv e p r o c e sse s that in clu dc c o n sc io u s, strate g ic thinking as w ell as less than
fully c o n sc io u s o r p u rp o siv e p r o c e sse s, all o f w hich arc alw ays satu rate d w ith
e m o tio n s; w e n eed to c o n sid e r how p e o p le m ake sen se o f th e m se lv e s, th eir situ
atio n s, and th eir p o litical o p tio n s and then e x p lo r e how th ose e m o tio n -sa tu rated
u n d e rstan d in gs affect th eir political actio n s. [. . .]
R eferences
C otton , J. (1 9 8 5 ) ‘M arch ers re m e m b e r losses to A ID S’ , Gay Life, 30 (1 ): 5.

D citchcr, D. (1 9 9 5 ) ‘ Law and d e sire ’ , in D. D eitch cr (e d .) The Question o f Equality:
lesbian and gay politics in America since Stonewall. N ew York, NY: Sim on and
Schustcr.
Fall, J. A. (1 9 8 6 ) ‘ L aR ouchc gro u p seeks A ID S quarantine referen dum ; gay and
lesbian com m unity form s coalition to defeat m e asu re ’ , New York Native, 16 Ju ne:
9-10.
Freiberg, P. (1 9 8 5 ) ‘ Gay anti-defam ation league form s in N ew York: activists outraged
by C u o m o ’ s p olicies, m edia sensationalism ’ , Advocate, 24 D ecem b er: 14—1 5 .#
Freiberg, P. (1 9 8 6 a) ‘ Gays p rotest N. Y. Post h om oph ob ia’ , Advocate, 7 January: 16—17.
Freiberg, P. (1 9 8 6 c ) ‘ L aR ouch c AID S initiative’ , Advocate, 19 A ugust: 10—11, 20.
H ippier, M . (1 9 8 6 ) ‘The vigil: a profile in gay co u rage ’ , Advocate, 1 5 A pril: 4 2 —47.
Jasper, J. M . (1 9 9 7 ) The Art o f Moral Protest: culture, biography, and creativity in social
movements. C h icago: U niversity o f C hicago Press.
R eddy, W. M . (1 9 9 7 ) ‘Against con struction ism : the historical ethnography o f
e m o tio n s’ , Current Anthropology', 38: 327—351.
R ist, D. Y. (1 9 8 7 ) ‘D raw in g b lo o d ’ , Advocate, 14 A pril: 5 2 - 5 9 , 108-1 11.
W alter, D. (1 9 8 5 ) ‘O penly gay elected and appointed officials hold “h istoric” m e e tin g’ ,
Advocate, 24 D ecem b er: 10—13.
W alter, D. (1 9 8 6 ) ‘ High co u rt upholds sodom y law ’ , Advocate, 5 A ugust: 10.
11. Emotions and law
O T H I N G C O U L D S E E M further from the topic of emotion than the dis

N course of the law, with its highly form al normative procedures and its traditional
respect for neutrality, rationality and objectivity. When lawyers write of emotions in
legal processes, they typically construe them as a 'm essy' contrast to the hard legal
categories and rules that, in a sense, tackle the im portant job of 'containing' and
regulating this mess. Cool and neutral justice can thus be contrasted with hot
vengeance (Solom on 1999), and the cla rity of a form al decision with respect to legal
guilt can be contrasted with the unpredictable perturbations of moral guilt. This
perceived distance from affect, of course, is itself relevant to social scientists, since it
results from what is actually a rather intimate relation between law and emotional
scenes (e.g. of conflict and violence). Much of law, it might be said, processes and
sorts out conflicts which are often highly emotional. Em otions are thus, in a sense, at
the origins of law, and are ever present at its borders (e.g. at the interface between
legal processes and the broader society). Stenner (2005a, 2005b) thus writes of the
'em otional cooling' that is effected when what might otherwise be purely personal
disputes and conflicts are shifted into the register of the norms of legal discourse, and
he shows how legal right is in intimate dialogue with the sense of moral right.
Research into law and emotions has proliferated in the last decade or so. From
the mid 1990s there has been a steady stream of publications addressing both the
general relationships between law and emotion (e.g. Bandes 1999; Posner 200 1 ) and
more specific matters such as the emotional content of victim im pact statements
(Bandes 1996), the role of pa rticu la r emotions such as disgust (M ille r 1997),
sympathy (Feigenson 1997), or shame (M assaro 1997) in legal judgement and/or
punishment (Nussbaum 2004). In a recent special issue of the journal L a w and
Human Behaviour on the topic of emotion in legal judgement and decision making,
M aroney (2006) argues that the subject of law and emotion now has a sufficient
critica l mass of activity (special issues, conference symposia, etc.) to be given the
status of a distinct research field equivalent to others such as 'la w and psychology'.
Taking stock of this movement, Maroney identifies a number of distinct strands
of interest. Some scholars, for example, analyze how p a rticu la r emotions might
be reflected in law, as in arguments over whether disgust is a legitimate basis for
legal rule making ('em otion-centred' approach). Others apply a p a rticu la r theory of
emotions to some legal issue (an 'em otion-theory' approach). Others find p a rticu la r
theories of emotion im plicitly embedded in p a rticu la r legal theories (a 'theory-of-
law' approach), and still others explore how the performances of pa rticu la r legal
actors might be influenced by emotions (a 'legal a cto r' approach), and so on.
Our first extract is from Kathy Laster and Pat O 'M a lley's 'Sensitive New Age
Law s'. Published in 1996, the full paper begins by identifying two broad social
'tendencies' that have influenced late twentieth-century legal processes. On the one
hand, processes of adm inistrative rationalization and proceduralization that reflect
neo-liberal concerns with optim izing resource efficiency have resulted in an increased
depersonalization and bureaucratization of justice. On the other hand, there has also
been an increased emphasis on questions of emotionality, spirituality and the value of
the non-rational associated with a world organized around personal lifestyle choices,
self-expression and emotional fulfillm ent. Currently, they argue, both technocratic
and emotional tendencies co-exist and compete for discursive space with the old
enlightenment vision of a rationally governed legal system playing a decisive role in
social progress. In the selected extract, Laster and O 'M a lle y illustrate the reassertion
of em otionality in law in relation to rape, domestic violence, and psychological dis
tress in Australian crim inal law.
In addressing law and the emotions we should thus always keep in mind that we
are concerned with the very practical and worldly enterprise of regulating conduct.
Subjecting human conduct to rules is not just a matter of shaping behaviour but also
involves the regulation of values and feelings, and hence the generation and manage
ment of emotional experience and expression. This theme is picked up in the second
extract drawn from Bettina Lange's (2002) a rticle 'The Em otional Dimension in
Legal Regulation'. Lange sees emotions as a crucial 'lin k concept' between the legal
realm and society more generally. She examines the sense in which emotions can be
both at the source of legal regulation and its effect. These relationships, she argues,
are becoming more im portant in today's 'em otionalized' societies. Consider, for
example, the em otionalized crim inal justice debates that took place around the
release of the young killers of the toddler James Bulger in the UK.
'A ffective Versus Effective Ju stice' by A rie Freiberg (2001) deals with the
broader question of crime prevention policies and argues that successful policies
must address the deeper affective aspects of the social place and meaning of crime.
Any response to crime, it is argued, contains instrumental and emotional dimensions,
and also expressive dimensions involved in the production of social cohesion.
Rationalist approaches tend to ignore that latter two elements and hence fail to
compete with crime prevention policies designed to emotively resonate with the deep
seated psychosocial needs of the public. In the extract included, Freiberg endorses
such an affective turn by contrasting instrumental approaches to crime policy with
sym bolic/affective approaches.
EMOTIONS AND LAW 3 9 5
The fourth extract is from an a rticle by anthropologist Yael Navaro-Yashin,

entitled 'M ake-B elieve Papers, Legal Forms and the Counterfeit: affective inter
actions between documents and people in Britain and Cyprus' (2007). In a version of
the affective turn inspired by the tradition of A cto r Network Theory, Navaro-Yashin
studies the affective circulations enabled and enacted by way of identity verification
and travel documents. Documents, of course, are the life-blood of legal and adm inis
trative process, but are not usually associated with emotions. Based on a study of the
interactions which Turkish Cypriots have with legal form s and papers, this a rticle
suggests that they can be psychically charged phenomena involved in the flow of
emotional energy within and between collectives.
The final extract by Susanne K a rste d t,'E m o tio n s and Crim inal Ju stice ' (2002)
c ritica lly develops the theme of the 'em otionalization of law'. She describes it as a
process which has transformed crim inal justice globally in the last decade. Em otions
such as anger, disgust and shame, for example, have been re-introduced into crim inal
procedures and are increasingly recognized as 'barom eters' of social morality.
Karstedt is deeply concerned with some of these developments, and p a rticu la rly with
the idea that legal institutions might require the expression of 'authentic emotions'
from the individuals caught up with them. This notion gives a new political urgency to
the question of whether or not p a rticu la r emotions are 'n a tu ra l' responses and to the
relations between emotions and evaluative judgment more generally.
References
Bandes, S. (199 6) 'Em pathy, narrative, and victim im pact statem ents', U niversity o f
Chicago L a w Review, 63, 361, 365, 371, 372.
Bandes, S. (ed) (1 9 9 9 ) The Passions o f Law. New York: New York University Press.
Feigenson, N. R. (1 9 9 7 ) 'Sym pathy and legal judgment: a psychological analysis',
Tennessee L a w Review, 65, 1 ,1 5 ,1 6 , 68, 69.
Maroney, T. A. (200 6) 'L a w and emotion: a proposed taxonom y of an Emerging Field',
L aw & Hum an Behavior, 3 0 :1 1 9 -1 4 2
M assaro, T. (1 9 9 7 ) 'The meanings of shame: im plications for legal reform ', Psychology,
P u b lic Policy, an d Law, 3: 645.
Miller, W. I. (199 7) The A natom y o f Disgust. Cambridge, Massachussetts: H arvard
University Press.
Nussbaum, M . C. (200 4) H iding from H um anity: Disgust, shame, and the law. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Posner, E. A. (200 1) 'L a w and the em otions', The Georgetown L a w Journal, 89, 1977.
Solom on, C. (199 9) 'Ju stice v. vengeance: on law and the satisfaction of em otion', in
S. Bandes (ed) The Passions o f Law. New York: New York University Press.
Stenner, P. (200 5a ) 'R ig h ts and emotions, or: on the im portance of having the right
em otions', H isto ry an d Philosophy o f Psychology, 1 (1).
Stenner, P. (200 5b ) Em otions and rights: On the interpenetration of the psychic and the
social. In A. Gulerce, I. Steauble, A. Hofmeister, G. Saunders and J. Kaye (Eds),
Theoretical Psychology. Toronto: Captus Press.
Chapter 4 6
Kathy Laster and Pat O’ Malley
SENSITIVE NEW-AGE LAWS

The re a sse rtio n o f e m o tio n a lity in la w
[• ■ •]
T
HE I N C O R P O R A T I O N O F T H E E M O T I O N A L into law and legal
rh etoric is m anifest in an w ide array o f areas o f law, som e o f w hich we will
turn to later in the paper, but it is perhaps best illustrated by dram atic re fo rm s to
the law o f rape. In A ustralia, and elsew h ere, rape law is now predicated on a
con cern w ith hum an dignity. H istorically , rape w as a pro p erty crim e and ac c o rd
ingly treated seriously (Sm art 1989). H usbands and fathers w ere entitled to ex tract
due com pen sation and punishm ent fo r their loss. For a w om an to o , the c o n
sequ en ces of rape wrcre devastating since m arriage p ro sp e cts largely d eterm in ed
her future. R ape also su b jected w om en to the risk o f pregnancy and hence risk to
their lives, either through unsafe ab ortion or death in childbirth. The birth of an
illegitim ate child destroyed not only a w o m an ’s social standing but her econ om ic
viability (L astcr 1989, 1994; Allen 1990). Now , however, in law the social harm is
to a far greater e xten t envisaged in te rm s o f the harm to the em otional w ell-being
o r con sciousn ess o f se lf o f the individual w o m an . C hanges in attitudes to sexuality
have been linked to the m uch g re ater w eight placed on em otional w'cll-bcing.
Ironically, the law' now treats rape as a devastating crim e at a point in history w hen
the effect o f the crim e is materially least injurious.
The legal definition o f rape now focuses not on the physical or m aterial harm to
the victim , but on the affront to hum an dignity o f n on-consensual sex. The unequal
position o f w om en is ack n ow ledged both in lawr and in com m unity education
cam paigns w ith the onus on the m ore pow erful p artn er (usually m en ) to establish
that the w om an did, in deed, ‘ freely ’ or happily participate in sexual relations. T h us,
the new definition o f rape holds physical harm to be irrelevant — the only valid
basis for establishing the crim e is the absence o f ‘ free co n se n t’ to an act o f p e n e
tration. The new gen eration o f legislation explicitly requires the judge in a rape trial
S E N S ITI V E N E W - A G E L AW S 3 9 7
to d irect the ju ry that ab sen ce o f physical injury should n ot be re g ard e d as eviden ce

o f co n se n t [see for e x a m p le , Crimes Act 1958 (V ic), Section 3 7 (b )(ii)j and any
p sy ch o lo gical p re ssu re e x e rte d on the victim “ b ecau se o f tear o f h arm o f any
ty p e ” to them o r so m e o n e e lse (e.g. Se ctio n 36) is sufficien t to vitiate co n se n t. In
re c o g n iz in g the p o ssib ility o f rape w ithin m a rria g e , the legislatio n p la c es a p re m iu m
on the se x u al au to n o m y o f w om en [Section 6 2 (2 )]. W om en are, u n d e r the new
defin ition o f ra p e , also en titled to ch an ge th eir m in d . R efu sal to “w ith draw from a
p e rso n w ho is n o t co n se n tin g on b e co m in g aw are that the p e rso n is n o t c on sen tin g
o r m igh t n o t b e c o n se n tin g ” , is a sign ifican t c o n c cssio n to the sen sib ilities o f
(u sually ) w om en even d u rin g the sex act [Section 3 8 (2 )(b )].
A t the sam e tim e , the id e o lo gical ju stification fo r ad vcrsial p ro c e ss in crim inal
c ases w as u n d e rm in e d inter alia by accu satio n s from the fem in ist m o v e m e n t that
w om en w ere sy stem atically d e g rad e d and d e m e an e d by the legal sy ste m , m o st
n otably in rap e trials. T h e arg u m en ts are by now w ell-k n ow n , w ith m any case
stu d ie s illu stratin g the ‘se co n d ary v ic tim iza tio n ’ (e.g . G re e n b e rg & R u b ack 1 9 8 5 :
6 1 1 ) e x p e rie n c e d by w om en su b je c te d to the trau m a o f givin g eviden ce in c o u r t.
T h e A u stralian Law R e fo rm C o m m issio n , ju stify in g the in tro d u c tio n o f new
m e asu re s fo r re ce iv in g eviden ce in se x u a l assau lt c ase s, gave on e w o m a n ’s acco u n t
o f h er e x p e rie n c e g iv in g eviden ce at a c o m m itta l again st tw o o f h er co lle ag u e s w ho
had alleged ly rap ed h er after leaving th eir annual C h ristm a s p arty .
In the c o u r t ro om I gave evid en ce for fou r h ou rs. Th ey ask ed m e why

I did n ot fight b ack , why I had so m any d rin k s, why I had ask ed them
to h elp m e find a taxi and n o t so m e o n e e lse. A p art from the (sexu al
assau lt) co u n se llo r . . . I w as the only w om an in the ro o m . W h en th eir
b a r riste r ask ed m e w h eth er I am a v e ge taria n , I w as c o n fu se d , and
u p se t. I said , “N o ” . H e then asked m e il I ate m e at. I said, “ Yes” . W h en
he then ask ed m e w hy I did n ot b ite off their p e n iscs, I b e ca m e d is
tre sse d and look ed aroun d the c o u r t ro o m . A t that m o m e n t I realised
that this w as n ot th eir trial. T h e m a g istrate , like all the o th e rs, look ed at
m e , w aitin g for m y re sp o n se .
(A ustralian Law R e fo rm C o m m issio n 1 9 9 4 : 2 8 ).
In su b se q u e n t law' r e fo r m s, d e fe re n c e to the e m o tio n al w ell-b ein g o f victim s

and w itn e sse s w'as allow ed to o v e rrid e c o n c e rn s that ad v ersarial tru th -c e rtify in g
m e ch an ism s w ere n e c essa ry to e n su re fair o u tc o m e fo r d e fe n d an ts. In V icto ria ,
fo r e x a m p le , legislativ e am en d m en ts now allow children u n d e r the age o f 18 y e ars,
in tellectu al d isab led p e o p le , as w ell as v ictim s in se x u al offen ce c ase s, to give
eviden ce through altern ative a rra n g e m e n ts w h e re, in the view o f the c o u r t, the
w itn e ss in g iv in g eviden ce is likely to “suffer severe e m o tio n a l trau m a; o r to b e so
in tim id ated o r stre sse d as to b e severely d isad v an taged as a w itn e ss” [Section 37C o f
the Crimes Act 1958 (V ic) (as a m e n d e d )]. T h e se ch an ges in clu de givin g eviden ce
through c lo se d circu it tele v isio n , usin g sc re e n s to re m o v e the defen d an t from the
w itn e ss’ s d ire ct sigh tlin e, allow in g a p e rso n lo sit b e sid e the w itn e ss lo provide
em o tio n a l s u p p o rt, re q u irin g cou n sel lo be se ate d , o r not ro b e d , w hile e x am in in g or
cro ss-e x am in in g the w itn ess and ex c lu d in g n on -essen tial p e rso n n e l from the c o u rt
ro o m w hile the w itn e ss is givin g evid en ce [Section 3 7 C (3 ) Crimes Act 1958 (V ic)].
3 9 8 K AT H Y L AS T E R A N D PAT 0 ' M A LL E Y
T h e sam e c o n c e rn w ith v ic tim s’ sen sib ilities has also brou gh t new re stric tio n s
on the n ature o f q u e stio n s w hich can be p u t to w itn e sse s in se x u al assau lt cases.
T h u s, fo r e x a m p le , eviden ce relatin g to g e n e ra l rep u tatio n o f the c o m p la in a n t’ s
ch astity can n ot be ad m itte d , n o r can co m p lain an ts be c ro ss-e x a m in e d ab ou t
th eir se x u al activ ities w ith ou t leave of the c o u r t [Section 3 7 A (1 ) and (2 ) Crimes
Act 1958 (V ic)]. T h e e m o tio n a l state o f v ictim s after e x p e rie n c in g se x u al assault
is now taken into ac co u n t in the ju d g e ’ s in stru ctio n s to the ju ry in sexu al assault
cases.
In this new e ra , the in dign ity e x p e rie n c e d by w o m e n b cca u sc o f th eir p o w e rle ss
po sitio n has also led to the legislativ e d e v e lo p m e n t o f new civil h arm s, notably
se x u al h arassm en t. From the late 1 9 7 0 s, se x u al h arassm e n t cam e to b e defined
b road ly and su b jectiv ely as “any re p eate d and un w an ted se x u al c o m m e n ts, lo o k s,
su g g e stio n s o r physical co n ta ct that you find o b jec tio n ab le o r offen sive and that
c au ses y ou d isc o m fo rt on y ou r jo b ” (E van s 1 9 7 8 : 2 0 3 ). Such b eh aviou r m u st be
d ealt w ith by law b c ca u sc like all fo rm s o f v ic tim h o o d , it is a c o llcctiv c p h e n o m e n a,
a con d ition o f the relation sh ip b e tw e en the p ow erfu l and the p o w e rle ss w hich is
relation al and socially c o n stru c te d , rath er than the provin ce o f the individual
w om an . T h e re is, in law, no n eed to rely on p r o o f o f v iolen ce o r in d eed o f any loss
su ffered by the w om an as a c o n scq u c n c c o f the h arassm en t. R ather, the em p h asis is
on the im p lied e m o tio n a l h arm and h u rt to feelin gs and the sen se o f dignity w hich
such b eh aviou r e n g e n d e rs (Stan k o 1 9 9 5 ).
In V icto ria , se x u al h arassm en t is ac c o m m o d ate d w ithin the civil law through
equal o p p o rtu n ity le gislatio n . It is lin ked to d isc rim in ato ry b eh aviour in the c o u rse
o f e m p lo y m e n t, in the provisio n o f g o o d s and se rv ic e s and ac c o m m o d atio n . In the
c o n te x t o f e m p lo y m e n t, it is unlaw ful for an e m p lo y e r ‘ k n o w in gly ’ to p e rm it an
e m p lo y e e to be h arassed w ith se x u al ad van ces; o r to be im p o rtu n e d o r h arassed
w ith p e rsiste n t se x u al su g g e stio n s o r in n uen d o w h ilst acting in the c o u rse o l their
e m p lo y m e n t [Equal Opportunity Act 1 9 8 4 (V ic ), Se ctio n 2 0 ( l ) ( b ) ( i ) and (ii)]. H e re,
as e lsew h e re , the legal p roh ib ition on se x u al h arassm e n t has allow'ed w o m e n , for
the first tim e , to defin e w o m e n ’ s in ju rie s (M acK in n o n 1 9 8 7 ). As in the U n ited
States ( H arris v. Forklift Systems (1 9 9 3 ) 114 S. C t. 3 6 7 ), the E qual O p p o rtu n ity
C o m m issio n and the Equal O p p o rtu n ity B oard have been p re p are d to a c cc p t that
h arm n eed n ot b e m aterial n o r do the c ircu m stan c cs need to be so severe so as to
cause a n e rv o u s b reak d ow n .
O th e r asp e c ts o f p ro c e d u re have also b een ch an ged in te r m s o f this rethinkin g
o f e m o tio n a lity . For e x a m p le , the arb itrary legal c u t-o ff p o in t fo r ‘ h a r m ’ has been
ch allenged in the light o f ‘ late o n s e t’ d ise a se s, in clu ding e m o tio n a l o r p sy ch o lo gical
d am ag e. C o u r ts have b een p re sse d to ac k n o w le d g e the lo n g -te rm effects o f c h ild
h ood se x u al ab u se, and the ‘ re p re sse d m e m o ry s y n d ro m e ’ is b e in g u sed to b rin g
both civil and crim in al actio n s w hich w ou ld o th e rw ise b e sta tu te -b a rre d b e cau se o f
the S tatu te o f L im itatio n s. T h e C an adian S u p re m e C o u r t in the case o f KM v. HM
(9 6 D .L .R . 4th 2 8 9 ) ap p lied a m o re liberal in te rp re tatio n argu in g that a cause
o f action ac c ru e s at the m o m e n t w hen the victim b e c o m e s fully cogn isan t o f
the ab use and m ak es the co n n ectio n b etw een past acts and p re se n t in ju ries. T h e
le g islatu re in B ritish C o lu m b ia acted sw iftly lo abolish the S tatu te o f L im itation s
in cases o f se x u al ab u se. T h e p sy ch o lo gical effects o f child se x u al ab use is also
in creasin gly b ein g ac ce p te d as a m itig ato r fo r later, ad u lt behaviour. In V icto ria for
S E N S ITI V E N E W - A G E L AW S 3 9 9
e x a m p le , a 2 1 -year-old w om an physically and sexu ally ab used as a child by her

ste p fath e r w as given a su sp e n d e d jail sen ten ce fo r ru n n in g him dow n w ith h er
car. T h e ju d ge ack n o w le d g e d that she had b een trau m atized b y h er ch ildh ood
e x p e rie n c e and w as still ‘ su ffe rin g ’ w hen she c o m m itte d the offen ces (Melbourne Age
4 .1 1 .9 3 ) .
W om en arc n o t the only g ro u p to m ake such new d e m a n d s. F rom the 1 9 6 0 s,
c o m b atin g racial d iscrim in atio n and in equality have b een the m ain cataly sts fo r a
ran ge o f law s w hich seek to ch an ge p u b lic attitu d e s and behaviour. In A u stralia,
im m in e n t fed eral legislatio n to am en d the R acial D iscrim in atio n A ct w ill b rin g
u n d e r its u m b re lla “ e x tre m e b eh aviou r in p u b lic w hich o ffen d s, in su lts o r in tim i
d ates an o th er p e rso n b cca u sc o f th eir ra c e , c o lo u r o r n ation al o r cth n ic o rig in ”
Sim ilar legislatio n e x ists already in th ree o th e r A ustralian sta te s (Melbourne Age
I . I 1.9 4 ). In su p p o rtin g parallel m e asu re s d esign ed to deal w ith ‘ hate p ro p a g a n d a ’ ,
the S u p re m e C o u r t o f C an ad a d e sc rib e d such p u b licatio n s as “a se rio u s attack on
p sy ch o lo g ical and e m o tio n a l h ealth ” (R v. Zundel (1 9 9 2 ) 95 D L R (4 th ) 2 0 2 ). [. . .j
A b o rigin al p e o p le to o have m ad e u se o f the c o m m o n la w ’ s e x ten sio n o f a right
to re m e d y re su ltin g from p sy ch o lo g ical d istre ss. In V icto ria , p o lice recen tly shot
dead a 41 y ear-o ld A b o rigin al w om an w ith a p sy ch iatric h isto ry . T h e relatives o f
the d e ad victim arc now p u rsu in g an action fo r n e rv o u s sh o ck b ased on the
insensitivity o f the p o licc in the way in w hich they w ere in fo rm e d o f the death . In
an iron ic tw ist, the Police A ssociation has also d e c lare d its su p p o rt fo r co m m o n
law action fo r n egligen ce brou gh t by the p o lice o ffic e rs involved in the shootin g.
T h e ac tio n , again st the G o v e rn m e n t, claim s a failure to train them ad equately
and seek s c o m p e n sato ry d a m ag es fo r the e m o tio n a l h arm cau sed to them by the
pub licity asso ciate d w ith the case (Melbourne Age 7 .1 0 .9 4 ) . L itigation by both
sid es has b een facilitated by a sc rie s o f A u stralian c ase s e x p a n d in g the class o f
p e rso n s en titled to claim fo r n e rv o u s sh o ck (M u llan y & H an d fo rd 1 9 9 3 ). It is
significant that w hile these tw o g ro u p s lin ked their claim s to b ro a d e r c o n c e rn s (on
the on e hand the tre atm e n t o f A b origin al p e o p le by the crim in al ju stic e sy ste m ,
on the other, the co n d itio n s o f w ork for p o lice o ffic e rs), e m o tio n a l h arm has
b een ch osen as the u m b re lla fo r the legal airin g o f the p olitical g ricv an cc s o f both
g ro u p s.
In the p a st d c c ad c, such c o n c crn s have given rise to the c o m p arativ ely new
to r t o f in ten tional infliction o f e m o tio n al d istre ss. In the U .K ., Section 57 o f the
R ace R e latio n s A ct 1976 allow ed that ‘d a m ag es in re sp e c t o f any unlaw ful act o f
d iscrim in atio n m ay in clu de co m p e n satio n fo r injury to fe elin gs” , and in Alexander v.
The Home Office ([1 9 8 8 ] IR L R 1 9 0 , at 193) it w as argu ed that aw ard s fo r d a m ag es for
injury to feelin gs u n d e r the A ct, should n o t be trivial in c o m p a riso n to d a m ag es for
any m aterial h arm . T h is c o n trasts qu ite m arkedly w ith p re v io u s co n d itio n s w here
the old to r t o f ‘ n e rv o u s sh o c k ’ re q u ire d ‘ reco g n izab le psy ch iatric illn e ss’ and w as
se t ab ou t by all m an n er o f arb itrary lim itatio n s such that d istre ss and g r ie f w-ere not
action ab le per se (e .g . Ilin z v. Berry [1 9 7 0 ] 2 Q B 4 0 at 4 2 ). [. . .]
R eferen ces
Allen, J. (1 9 9 0 ) Sex and Secrets. O x fo rd U niversity Press: M elbourne.

4 0 0 K AT H Y L A ST E R A N D PAT 0 ' M A LL E Y
Australian Law R eform C om m ission (1 9 9 4 ) Equally Before the Law: Justice for Women,
R e p o rt N o 6 9 , Part 1. AG PS: C anberra.
Evans, L. (1 9 7 8 ) Sexual harassm ent: w om en ’ s hidden occupational hazard. In The
Victimisation o f Women (R ob erts-C h ap m an , J. & G ates, M ., E ds). Sage: Beverley
Hills.
G reen b erg, M . & R uback, B .R . (1 9 8 5 ) A m odel o f crim e victim decision-m aking.
Victimology: An International Journal 10, 6 0 0 —616.
Laster, K. (1 9 8 9 ) Infanticide: a litm us test for fem inist crim inological theory. Australian
and New Zealand Journal o f Criminology> 2 2 (3 ), 151 —166.
Laster, K . (1 9 9 4 ) A rbitrary chivalry: w om en and capital punishm ent in V ictoria,
1842—1967. In A Nation o f Roques: Crime, Law and Punishment in Colonial Australia
(Philips, D. & D avies, S ., E ds). M elbourn e U niversity Press: M elbourn e,
pp. 1 6 6 - 1 8 6 .
M acK innon, C. (1 9 8 7 ) Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law. H arvard
U niversity Press: London.
M ullany, N. & H an dford, P. (1 9 9 3 ) Tort Liabilityfor Psychiatric Damage. The Law o f Nervous
Shock. Allen & U nw in: Sydney.
Sm art, C . (1 9 8 9 ) Feminism and the Power i f Law. R ou tledge: London.
Stanko, E. (1 9 9 5 ) Reading danger: sexual harassm ent, anticipation and self-protection .
In Violence Against Women (H ester, M ., Kcllv, L. & R ad ford, J. E d s.),
(forthcom in g).
Chapter 47
Bettina Lange
THE EMOTIONAL DIMENSION

IN L E G A L R E G U L A T I O N
T
H IS ARTICLE SUGGESTS THAT EMOTIONAL p ro c e sse s are
on e asp ect o f l e g a l re g u latio n . S o cio lo g ic a l analysis has m ad e im p o rta n t c o n tri
bu tion s to the u n d e rstan d in g o f re g u lato ry p ro c e sse s. It has show n the significance
o f a ran ge o f co n te x tu a l fac to rs, b eyon d fo rm a l law, in shapin g the d esign and
im p le m e n tatio n o f legal re g u latio n . Il has, how ever, b een lim ited by fo c u sin g on
cogn itiv e asp e c ts and by n e g le c tin g e m o tio n a l dy n am ics o f social actio n . [. . .]
An analysis o f e m o tio n s allow s to iden tify c lo se in te rre latio n sh ip s b etw een a
legal and a so c ial realm b e cau se e m o tio n s arc a c ru c ia l ‘link c o n c e p t’ . O n the one
h and, e m o tio n s are clearly an ch ored in a p riv ate sph ere o f civil so c ie ty , b u t, on the
oth e r h and,’ thcvJ arc also involved in the creation o f social str u c tu r e s,y such as fo rm s
o f go v e rn an ce and law'. . . . F irst, legal reg u latio n can be the so u rce o f e m o tio n s.
Seco n d ly , legal reg u latio n can be the o u tc o m e o f e m o tio n al p ro c e sse s. T h ird ly ,
‘re g u lato ry law in a c tio n ’ can b e u n d e rsto o d as the in teraction b etw een re g u lato ry
state law and the ‘ law's o f e m o tio n s’ .
1. L e g a l r e g u l a t i o n a s t h e o u t c o m e o f e m o t i o n a l p r o c e s s e s
In W estern legal sy ste m s legal reg u latio n is often co n sid e re d as the o u tc o m e o f

cogn itiv e p ro c e sse s. R ation al d iscu ssio n is usually fo cu se d upo n in acco u n ts o f the
p ro d u ctio n o f legal re g u latio n . For e x a m p le , p olitical lob b yin g, an im p o rta n t a sp e ct
o f the creation o f legal re g u latio n , is often d e sc rib e d as a p r o c e ss in w hich v ariou s
ac to rs try to asse rt th eir se lf-in te rests and in that sen se act ration ally . Even w here
po litician s act as ad v o cates on b eh alf o f o th e r g r o u p s, this b eh aviou r can still be
d e sc rib e d as ratio n al. A c co rd in g to pu b lic-ch o ice th e o rie s o f re g u latio n , politician s
acting on b e h a lf o f in terest g ro u p s act ration ally b c ca u sc they can c x p c c t to m a in
tain o r be voted into p o sitio n s o f p olitical po w er in re tu rn .
4 0 2 B E TTINA LANGE
Fu rth erm o re, institutions for the production o f legal regulation , such as
parliam ents and their specific procedural ru les for debate, are m eant to en sure that
legal regulation is p rodu ced on the basis o f rational criteria. [. . .]
N o t just cognitive but also em otional p ro ce sse s are im p ortan t in the form ation
of legal regulation. Both from a ‘to p -d o w n ’ and a ‘b o tto m -u p ’ p ersp ectiv e, e m o
tions arc significant for explainin g how legal regulation is p ro d u ced . . . . Legal
regulation ‘ in ac tio n ’ is co m p o sed o f sm all-scale, social o rd e rs w hich arc established
during the practical im plem en tation of state legal regulation . So far, the literature
on legal regulation has focused on the cognitive dim ension o f these sm ail-scalc
social o rd e rs. For exam p le, acto rs' in terp retation s o f form al legal regulation feed
into the establish m en t o f these social ord ers. M undane social o rd e rs, however, can
also be an elem en t o f these sm all-scale social o rd e rs. Som e so cio lo gists have argued
that em otional p ro cesses are key to un derstan din g how such m undane social
o rd e rs b e co m e establish ed. C ollin s, in analysing G arfink el’s w o rk ,1 su ggests that the
lim its o f hum an cognitive abilities are essen tial for an explan ation o f how the m icro
elem en ts o f m undane social order, such as ru les govern in g conversations or
en coun ters betw een fam ily m e m b e rs, arc established. Social actors em ploy a range
o f practices in o rd er not to recogn ize that m undane social o rd e r is established in a
rather arbitrary fashion. H ence social acto rs keep up conventions because em otio n s
b uttress th em , not because they have evaluated these conventions as valid and
consciously su p p o rt them . This insight w as gen erated through exp e rim e n ts c o n
ducted by Garfinkcl. D u rin g these, participan ts show ed stron g negative em otio n s
w hen the e x p e rim e n t revealed lo the respo n d en ts that they w ere con stru ctin g their
ow n social w orld in an arbitrary and conventional w ay, rath er than respond in g to an
exterio r, ob jective reality. . . .
A lso, from a ‘top d o w n ’ persp ective legal regulation can be perceived as the
ou tcom e o f em otional processes. In this approach legal regulation is equated with
fo rm al, regu latory state law. O n the m o st sim ple level the feelings that social actors
have about the issues w hich are legally regulated can influence the form and con tcn t
o f legal regulation . For exam p le, the exp ression o f em o tio n s, such as fear about
health o r aversion to in terferen ce with the ‘law s o f n atu re’ , arc p a rt o f debates
about the regulation o f G M O s and can feed into its design. M oreover, em otion can
feed into the establish m ent o f cognitive con stru cts on the basis o f which a law
m aking debate is con du cted . For e xam p le, notions o f ro m an tic love can help to
explain the different legal regulation o f sam e-sex and h eterosexu al relationships.
. . . E m otion s also inhere in large-scale social stru ctu re s, such as the state and
sy stem s o f governan ce. L egal regulation , in tu rn , reflects the nature of these largc-
scalc social stru ctu res. For e xam p le, . . . resen tm en t is a key ingredien t o f class
stru ctu res. E co n om ic stru ctu re s, such as a differential distribution o f re so u rce s, or
cognitive c o n stru cts, such as class con scio usn ess, are not sufficient to explain the
social phenom enon o f class. E m otion s, such as resen tm en t, also co n stru ct class.
Fu rth erm o re the con trol and m anagem en t o f em otio n s can be im portan t for the
m aintenance o f sy stem s o f governan ce. . . . Sch cff has e x p lo re d how sham e and
an ger sequen ces can inform collcctivc behaviour and influence international rela
tions betw een sta te s.3 A lso, an th ropo lo gists have argued that states can b eco m e
involved in the con struction and strategic m anagem en t o f em otio n s and legal re g u
lation b ears the im print o f the ‘em otional eco n o m y ’ o f a s ta te .1 To con clude, this
THE E M O T I O N A L D I M E N S I O N IN L E G A L R E G U L A T I O N 4 0 3
section has argu ed that legal regu latio n can be the o u tc o m e o f em o tio n al p ro ce sse s.
T h e n e x t sectio n w ill su g g e st that legal reg u latio n can also give rise to em o tio n al
p ro c e sse s.
2. Legal regulation as giving rise to em otion al p ro cesses
T h e idea that legal reg u latio n can give rise to e m o tio n a l p r o c e sse s has been d is
c u ssed in p a rtic u la r in the c o n te x t o f e n fo rc e m e n t. P articu lar ty p es o f law m ay lead
to sp ecific e m o tio n s. R e g u la to ry o r c o e rciv e law m ay clicit fear. For e x a m p le , . . .
the p o w e r o f sch o o l in sp e c to rs to re c o m m e n d sch oo l c lo su re s ge n e rate d levels o f
fear a m o n g the re g u late d unknow n in b u sin ess re g u latio n . [. . .]
T h is section su g g e sts, how ever, that any legal regu latio n can give rise to the full
ran ge o f e m o tio n s, n o t ju st n egative e m o tio n s, such as sh am e and fear. A cco rd in g to
K e m p e r ’ s so cial in teraction al th e o ry , e m o tio n s are a re sp o n se to en viron m en tal
stim u li. T h ese stim u li arc p ro d u c e d in social relatio n sh ip s b e tw e en individuals.
K e m p e r c o n sid e rs p o w e r and sta tu s d istrib u tio n s as key a sp cc ts o f th ese re la tio n
ships. C h an ge s in th eir d istrib u tio n lead to the p ro d u c tio n o f em o tio n s. T h e feelin gs
p ro d u c e d vary d e p e n d in g if the s e lf o r the o th e r p e rso n are seen as the so u rce o f
o n e ’s e x c e ssiv e , sufficien t o r in su fficien t statu s o r pow er. For e x a m p le , if on e ac to r
p e rce iv e s the statu s o th e rs g ran t to him o r h er as ad eq u ate then this ac to r w ill feel
se c u re . W hen a p e rso n , how ever, thinks that lo o m uch statu s is allo cate d to them
by an o th er p e rso n then the e m o tio n p ro d u c e d is sham e. T h is, how ever, can be
‘ e x t r o je c te d ’ in the fo rm o f h ostility o r an g e r to w a rd s the other.
L egal re g u latio n can im p act directly on the d istrib u tio n o f p o w e r and statu s
a m o n g so cial a c to rs. For in stan ce, co m m a n d -an d -c o n tro l re g u latio n , can enhance
the p o w e r o f re g u la to rs, o r w h ere d ev ices o f ‘ creative c o m p lia n c e ’ arc successfu lly
u sed it can enhance the p o w e r o f the re g u late d . Even w h ere legal re g u latio n is
n ot e n fo rce d in p ra c tic e , sim plv its e x iste n c e can affect the d istrib u tio n o f po w er
and statu s b e tw e en social acto rs. For e x a m p le , b argain in g b e tw e en re g u la to rs and
re g u late d can o c cu r in the shadow o f the ‘ b ig s tic k ’ o f san ction s. A cco rd in g to
K e m p e r, statu s e x ists w hen social a c to rs p o sse ss positiv e attrib u te s in re sp o n se
to w hich o th e r social a c to rs g ra n t v olu n tary co m p lia n c e w ith the d e m an d s o f such
a c to rs. For e x a m p le , re g u la to rs are so m e tim e s p e rce iv e d as p ro v id e rs o f e x p e r t
con su ltan cy ad vice by the re g u late d . T h e re g u late d at tim e s co m p ly volu n tarily w ith
re g u la to r s ’ d e m an d s b e ca u se re g u la to rs are attrib u te d sta tu s on the b asis o f th eir
k n o w led g e and e x p e r tise . L egal reg u latio n can affcct the d istrib u tio n o f statu s
b e tw e e n the re g u late d and re g u la to rs. For e x a m p le , the invocation o f crim in al
san ction s can lead to statu s loss. A cc o rd in g to K em p er, the p c rc c p tio n o f the
d istrib u tio n o f statu s b e tw e en social a c to rs as ad eq u ate , insufficien t o r e x c e ssiv e , in
tu rn , lead s to the p ro d u c tio n o f e m o tio n s. U n d e rsta n d in g how legal reg u latio n
g e n e ra te s e m o tio n s is im p o rta n t b e ca u se e m o tio n s can h elp to e xp lain social
d y n am ics b e tw e en the re g u late d and the re g u la to rs. F o r e x a m p le , an g e r m igh t lead
to b eh aviou r w hich is d irc ctcd at ch an ge, w hile se cu rity m igh t un d erp in b eh aviour
w hich is aim ed at the p re se rv atio n o f the statu s q u o b e tw e en re g u late d and
re g u la to rs. [. . .]
4 0 4 B E T T I N A L A N G E
N otes
1 H. G arfinkcl, Studies in Ethnomethodology (1 9 6 7 ).

2 T. Schcff, Microsociologyr: Discourse, Emotion, and Social Structure (1 9 9 0 ) 7 6 —8.
3 H. Jenkins and M . Valicntc, ‘ Bodily Transactions o f the Passions: El C alo r am ong
Salvadorean W om en R e fu ge e s’ in Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Ground
o f Culture and Self, cd. T. C sord as (1 9 9 4 ) 163—8 2 ..
Chapter 48
Arie Freiberg
AFFECTIVE VERSUS EFFECTIVE

JUSTICE
In s tru m e n ta lis m a n d e m o tio n a lis m in c r im in a l ju s tic e
I
MPRISONMENT RATES IN A U S T R A L I A , ENGLAND and the
U n ited States are now at th eir h ighest levels in d e c ad e s. A lth ough crim c rates in
the U n ited States have fallen over the last d e c a d c , the rate o f im p riso n m e n t in that
co u n try c o n tin u e s to ac c e le ra te , w ith no signs o f its d im in u tion (T on ry, 1 9 9 9 a). In
A u stralia, alth ough the ra le o f so m e c rim e s is in creasin g, p a rticu larly so m e c rim e s
o f violen ce and b u rg lary , the in crease in the rate o f im p riso n m e n t far e x c e e d s
in cre ase s in c rim e rate s. P o p u lar o pin ion ten ds to b e su p p o rtiv e o f this tre n d , if n ot
to have c reated it. P o litician s, ad ep t at sen sin g and am plify in g p u b lic m o o d s, have
en co u ra g e d the view that a risin g pu n itiv e se n tim e n t is an ap p ro p ria te and u n d e r
stan dab le p u b lic re sp o n se to c rim e . W h ile the p o licy of fighting c rim e by in creasin g
im p riso n m e n t ra te s has b een d e sc rib e d as fo o lish , m isg u id e d , irratio nal or
u n in fo rm e d , it has, n o n e th e le ss, c ap tu re d the p u b lic im ag in atio n .
A lth ough w hat so m e te rm a ‘ ra tio n a l’ c rim c p o licy that is, on e d ire c ted at
finding and im p le m e n tin g effective c rim e preven tion o r c rim e co n tro l p o licies —
plays an im p o rta n t ro le in g o v e rn m e n t p o lic y , such a re sp o n se a p p e ars to have
failed to strik e a ch o rd in the h eartlan d o f the c o m m u n ity . E ith er the m e ssag e is
w ro n g o r it has n o t b een n o t b een so ld w ell e n ou gh . D e sp ite gro w in g in vestm en ts
in such p o licie s crim c prevention p o licie s arc re g ard e d by m any as defen sive,
reactive o r irrele v an t. N o tin g the d o m in an ce o f lawr and o r d e r rh e to ric in p u b lic
d isc o u rse , Su tton (1 9 9 7 ) has argu ed that the p rim ary ch allen g e facin g c rim e p r e
ven tion stra te g ie s is to seize the o p p o rtu n ity to ‘ d e v e lo p p h ilo so p h ies and p ro g ra m s
w hich co u ld c o m p e te w ith law and o rd e r at b oth the sy m b o lic and the p ractical
le v e ls’ (S u tto n , 1 9 9 7 : 1 7 ). H is arg u m en t is that the search for, o r even the attain
m en t o f, tech n ical p e rfe c tio n in c rim c preven tion p o lic ie s w ould n ot m ake them
politically o r p o p u larly su c ce ssfu l b c ca u sc tech n ical o r ration al c rim e con trol
p o licies fail to ad d re ss so m e o f the d e e p e r e m o tio n al o r affective d im en sio n s o f
crim e and its p lace in o u r so c iety . T h e failure o f c rim e p re v e n tio n , the argu m en t
4 0 6 A R IE F R EI B E RG
ru ns, w ill lie not so m uch in a failure to prevent crim e, but in its failure lo capture
the public im agination , to tap into the d e e p e r psycho-social forces w hich have
driven the recen t wave ol p op u lar punitiveness and which underlie the crim inal
justice system generally.
R ecen t c o m m e n tato rs have noted that in the latter p art ol the 20th cen tury, an
em otio n al, non -rational, expressive tren d in law and society has em erg ed in co n tra
diction to the fo rm al, rational, adm inistrative and routinized fo rm s o f law w hich
cam e to be term e d ‘tech n ocratic ju stic e ’ (L astcr and O ’ M alley, 1996; G arlan d,
2 0 0 0 ). The p u rp o se o f this article is to argue that . . . crim c prevention strategies
arc m o re likely to be successful if they recogn ize and deal with the ro les o f e m o
tion s, sy m bo ls, irrationalism , e xp re ssio n ism , non-utilitarianism , faith, b e lie f and
religion in the crim inal justice system . The article con ten ds that crim in ology
m ust deal w ith the affective as well as the effective, with both the instrum ental and
sentim ental asp ects o f penal policy (G arlan d , 2 0 0 0 ).
R ational/instrum en tal approaches to crim e policy

M o dern penal po licy , a produ ct of the E nlightenm ent, seeks to u n derstan d crim e
and its con trol in a scientific, dispassion ate manner. It requires an exam in ation o f
the nature and ex ten t o f crim e, re p o rte d and u n re p o rte d , its econ om ic and social
im pact, the m ean s used to com bat it: in particular their effectiveness and cost.
Sentencing policy looks to utilitarian m atters such as d eterren ce and incapacitation,
although non-utilitarian asp ects such as d e se rt arc m ajo r featu res, reflecting a
con cern with abstract con cepts o f ‘fairn ess’ and ‘ju stice ’ . As G arland sum m arizes
it, in a rational sy stem , scicn cc rep laces belief, calculation rep laces com m itm ent
and kn ow ledge rep laces tradition and sen tim en t as leading d eterm in an ts o f action.
He states: ‘ In con sequen ce, social practices and in stitutions b eco m e m ore instru-
m entally effective, but at the sam e tim e they b eco m e less em otionally com pelling
or m eaningful for their hum an ag e n ts’ (G arlan d , 1990: 179).
C rim e prevention seem s to be the quintessen tial ‘ration alist’ approach to crim e
policy. W h eth er it be early intervention strate gics, social o r situational approach es
or routine activities th eories and the like, crim c prevention ap pears prim arily as a
technical approach to social p rob lem s. Find the p ro b lem , invent the solution:
identify ‘the problem ch ild ’ o r fam ily and provide m ore paren tal, educational or
m edical su p p o rt; im prove street lighting, design b etter sub urb s, cars o r locks;
ensure b e tter access to education and health serv ices; create a neighbourhood
w atch system and so on (H o m el ct a l., 199 9 ). D ry , functional, w orthy and basically,
unexciting. In W eberian term s, the transition is from the charism atic to the
bureaucratic (G arlan d , 1990: 183).
Sym bolic/affective approaches
[. . .]
Sym bols
C rim in al justice policy not only has an instru m ental dim ension, but also contains
sym bolic and expressive elem en ts (Sch ein gold, 1984: xiii; G usfield , 1986: 180). At
A F F E C T I V E V E R S U S E F F E C T I V E J USTI CE 4 0 7
the sy m bo lic level, go vern m en t actions sym bolize pow er, status and value positions.
C on ten tiou s issu es such as crim e, d ru g s, alcoh ol, civil rights, religion , sex and
others gen erate considerable heated and em otional re sp o n se s, often regarded as
‘ irratio n al’ , but they are only so if they arc only seen as pragm atic rath er than
sym bolic issues. G u sfic ld ’s w ork on tem p eran ce m ovem en ts con cluded that
political decision s in relation to these m atters could best be u n d ersto o d in term s
o f social dram as in w hich the o u tcom es w ere statem en ts o r sy m bo ls o f changes in
p ow er or status (G u sfield , 198 6 ). Sym bolic acts — legislation, co u rt decision s,
sentencing arc essentially fo rm s o f rh e to ric , functioning to organize the p e r c e p
tion s, attitudes and feelings o f o b se rv e rs, a se rie s o f p ersu asive devices. Preference
for one o u tco m e over an oth er con fcrs status upon one gro u p and possibly
degradation upon another.
U n der this non-instrum ental ap proach , political stru gg le is not ju st about
conflicts o f in terest but b eco m e ‘vehicles o f cath arsis’ taking on alm o st m agical
aspects. It is not a case o f classifying action as ‘ration al’ o r ‘irratio n al’ but m ore o f
un derstandin g it as an expression o f em otion arising from decision s m ade ab out the
distribution o f pow er, p restige, re sp e ct and h onour in society. In the 1930s, Ilaro ld
Lassw ell d escrib ed politics as the p rocess by w hich the irrational bases o f society
arc brought out into the open (citcd in G usfield , 1986: 182). This m o d el o f politics,
term e d psychological e xp ressiv ism , secs the political p ro cess as an arena into which
‘ irratio n al’ im pulses arc p ro jected . C rim in al justicc policy is but one player in this
area w hich also ‘ trades in im ages, archetypes and an x ie tie s’ , rep resen tin g what
G arland calls ‘ a politicized d iscou rse o f the u n co n scio u s’ (G arlan d , 1996: 4 6 1 ).
Em otions
[. . .] T h e urge to punish the crim inal is d eep-seated and probably universal (Tyler
and B oeck m ann , 1997: 2 3 8 ). Public vengeance may be disapproved of, but it has
not disappeared as a private em otion (G arlan d , 1990: 2 7 ). D urkhcim argued that
the shock o f violation o f social n orm s ou trages peop le and pro d u ces in them the
em otio n s o f an ger and indignation togeth er with a desire for revenge which
m o d e rn , tcch n icist resp o n ses to crim e fail to recogn ize o r acknow dcdgc. As G arland
w rites:
To think o f punish m ent as a calculated in stru m en t for the rational

con trol o f con duct is to m iss its essen tial character, to m istake
superficial form fo r tru e con ten t. The essen ce o f punish m ent is not
rationality o r in stru m ental con trol — though these ends arc su p e r
im posed upon it — the essen ce o f pun ish m ent is irrational, unthinking
em otion fixed by a sense o f the sacred and its violation.
(G arlan d , 1990: 32)
But the punishm ent respo nse is m ore co m p lc x than sim ply the urge to avenge
(N ew m an , 199 5 ). Punishm ent can give pleasure to those inflicting it w hile in others
it may evoke respo n ses o f pity and com passio n . Freudian accoun ts o f punishm ent
point to the roles o f ag gressio n , d isplacem en t and sublim ation w hile socio-
psychological theorists o f crim e and cultu re note the em otio n al am bivalence
4 0 8 A R IE F R E I B E R G
w e show to w a rd s c rim e w hen w e both c o n d e m n , anti are attracted to , c rim e

and pu n ish m en t and th eir re p re se n tatio n s in b o o k s, film s, plays, n ew s b ro ad casts
and the like. We show sim ila r c o m p le x am bivalen ce to w a rd s crim in als and re v o
lu tio n a rie s, the ‘ ro m an tic o u tla w ’ p h en o m en o n (D u n c an , 1 9 9 6 ; G o o d ric h , 1 9 9 9 :
118) w hich n ot only re fle cts o u r d e sire fo r c x c itc m e n t, the se d u c tio n s of c rim c , as
K atz te rm e d it (K a tz , 1 9 8 8 ), b u t o u r am bivalen ce to w a rd s au th o rity , o u r a d m ir
ation for th ose w ho step b eyon d the b o u n d s and o u r m ix e d feelin gs a b o u t re sp o n si
b ility, fre e d o m , ro u tin e and ab o u t the sacrcd and p ro fan e (D u n can , 1 9 9 6 ).
T h e p sy ch o lo gical and p sy ch o an aly tic literatu re in dicates that th ese e m o tio n s,
b e lie fs and assu m p tio n s, often u n co n scio u s, influence o u r actio n s in w ays that w e
arc un aw are. E m o tio n s can b e ch an n elled , aro u se d and organ ized by ritu als and
c e re m o n ie s: the ritu als o f the c o u r tr o o m , the scaffold and the p riso n , w hat G arfin-
kel called ‘ d e g rad a tio n c e re m o n ie s’ . A s G arlan d o b se rv e s: ‘ T h e penal p ro c e ss . . .
m u st b e seen as a m ean s o f evok in g, e x p re ssin g , and m o d ify in g p a ssio n s, as w ell as
an in stru m e n tal p ro c e d u re for ad m in isterin g o ffe n d e r s’ (G a rlan d , 1 9 9 0 : 6 7 ). [. . .]
P u b lic opin ion
It ap p e ars that in m any w este rn c o u n trie s p u b lic o pin ion has b c co m c m o re punitive
o v e r rcc c n t y ears. Previously unthinkable p u n ish m en t p o licies arc now not only
th ou gh t, but cn actcd in le gislatio n (T on ry , 1 9 9 9 b : 1 7 5 2 ). S u p p o rt fo r m o re p u n i
tive m e asu re s such as th ree strik e s law s, m an d ato ry and m in im um se n te n c e s,
in definite se n te n c e s, se x u al psy ch o path law s, truth in sen ten cin g , b o o t cam p s and
cap ital p u n ish m en t ap p e a rs to be g ro w in g (T yler and B o e ck m an n , 1 9 9 7 : 2 3 8 ). In
1965 4 8 p e rce n t of A m eric an s p o lle d th ough t that the c o u r ts w ere n o t harsh
en ough on c rim in als. In the follo w in g d e c ad e this in creased to 78 p e rc e n t and has
stayed th ere (G a u b atz, 1 9 9 4 : 2 ). A n o th er asp ec t of p u n itiv cn e ss is the w illin gn ess to
ab and on p ro c e d u ra l safe g u a rd s d e sign e d to p ro te c t the in dividual (T yler and
B o e ck m an n , 19 9 7 : 2 4 3 ).
To re co g n iz e the grow th in pu n itiv e p o lic ie s, is n o t, o f c o u r se , to co n cc d e that
all o f the p e o p le su p p o rt all o f th ese p o licie s at all tim e s. Pu blic o pin ion is n eith er
m o n o lith ic n o r stab le. T h e re is a significant b od y o f re se arch w hich su g g e sts that
‘the p u b lic' has c o m p lc x and m u ltifacctcd v iew s on p u n ish m en t and that th ere arc
sign ifican t g ro u p s in the co m m u n ity w h o, at any tim e , are in te re sted in reh ab ilita
tio n , re m o rse and re p aratio n (C u lle n , 1 9 8 2 ). T h e w o rk o f Ju lian R o b e rts and
o th e rs has con sisten tly fou n d that w hen p ro v id ed w ith d etails o f in dividual cases
w hich se t o u t the c irc u m stan ce s o f the offen ce and the offen der, re sp o n d e n ts to
su rv ey s arc often m o re len ien t than the sc n tc n c c rs w h o se se n te n ce s w ere c o n
d e m n e d in the ab strac t (R o b e r ts , 1 9 9 2 ; H o u gh , 1 9 9 6 ). T h e re is also eviden ce that
su p p o rts the n otion that ste re o ty p e s play a ro le in pub lic su p p o rt for tou gh san c
tio n s: as p e o p le learn m o re ab o u t the o ffen d e r than ju st the c rim e , they b e co m e
m o re w illin g to e m b ra ce n on -pun itive san ction s.
T h e relation sh ip b e tw e en the pub lic and the political p ro c e ss is a c o m p lc x on e.
‘ Populist p u n itiv e n e ss’ that is, the ability o f politician s to draw fro m , feed u p o n ,
am plify and shape pub lic attitu d e s and feelin gs is re g ard e d as a cynical e x e rc ise in
vote b uy in g o r p o w e r m ain ten an ce, but this exp lan atio n tells only p a rt o f the sto ry
(B o tto m s, 1 9 9 5 ). W h ile politician s and o th e rs gain ac ce ss to the m ass m e d ia, this
A F F E C T I V E V E R S U S E F F E C T I V E J US T I C E 4 0 9
d o e s n ot gu aran te e su c c e ss in shaping p u b lic op in ion . T h e claim s o f political c o n

testan ts m u st re so n ate w ith the p u b lic , w ho w ill n ot alw ays be re sp o n siv e to every
c laim . Fu rth er, re sp o n siv e n e ss w ill chan ge w ith the tim es. An im p o rta n t q u estio n is
‘ w hy are so m e p o lic ie s su p p o rte d at on e tim e and n o t a n o th e r1 (T on rv, 19 9 9 b :
1 7 5 2 )? P e o p le 's c ircu m stan ce s shape th eir b e lie fs: p e o p le w ill b elieve differen t
things u n d e r differen t c irc u m stan ce s. W h at is e n d u rin g and tim e le ss and w hat is
sen sitive to ch an ge (T o n ry , 1 9 9 9 b : 1755)?
G arlan d has re ce n tly argu ed that the in crease in p o p u la r su p p o rt for punitive
p o licie s is ro o te d in m a jo r social ch an gcs w hich in clu dc the w id e r e x p o su re o f
the p ro fessio n al m id d le classcs to c rim e , the d eclin in g influence o f social e x p e rtise
and a co n se q u e n t lo ss o f faith in crim in al ju stic e p ro fe ssio n als, the gro w th and
legitim atio n o f the v ic tim s’ m o v e m e n t, w hich R o b e rt H u g h es has ch aracte rized as
the ‘ cu ltu re o f c o m p la in t’ (H u g h e s, 1 9 9 4 ), the ch an ges in everyday life o f the
m id d le classe s re su ltin g from in creases in c rim e as w ell as the im p a ct o f the m ass
m edia u po n p o p u lar p e rce p tio n s o f crim e (G a rlan d , 2 0 0 0 ). l i e su g g e sts that these
p ro fo u n d ch an ges have led to alteratio n s in social ro u tin e s, cu ltu ral p rac tic e s and
c o lle ctiv e se n sib ilitie s and have p ro d u c e d a m o re in ten se e m o tio n a l in vestm en t in
c rim e and crim in al ju stice p o licy . [. . .]
R eferences
C ullen , Francos T. (1 9 8 2 ) Reaffirming rehabilitation. Cincinnati, O H : A nderson Publish

ing Co.
D uncan, M artha G. (1 9 9 6 ) Romantic outlaws, beloved prison: The unconscious meanings o j
crime and punishment. N ew York: N ew York U niversity Press.
G arlan d, D. (1 9 9 0 ) Punishment and modern society. O x fo rd : C larendon Press.
G arlan d, David (1 9 9 6 ) ‘The lim its o f the sovereign state: Strategics o f crim c control in
con tem p orary so ciety ’ , British Journal o f Criminology 36: 445 71.
G arlan d, David (2 0 0 0 ) ‘The culture o f high crim c societies: Som e precondition s o f
“ law and o rd e r” p o licies’ , British Journal o j Criminology 4 0 : 347 75.
G aubatz, Kathivn (1 9 9 4 ) Crime in the public mind. Ann Arbor, MI: U niversity o f
Michigan Press.
G oo d rich , Peter (1 9 9 9 ) ‘Book review ’ , Punishment and Society 1 : 1 1 8 21.
G usficld, Jo sep h R. (1 9 8 6 ) Symbolic crusade: Status politics and the American temperance
movement, 2nd cdn. U rbana, II.: U niversity o f Illinois Press.
H o m cl, R oss ct al. (1 9 9 9 ) Pathways to prevention: Developmental and early intervention
approaches to crime in Australia. C an b erra: N ational C rim c Prevention, Attorncy-
G cn e ral’s D ep artm en t.
H ough, M ichacl (1 9 9 6 ) ‘People talking about pun ish m ent’ , The Howard Journal 35:
191-214.
H ughes, R o b e rt (1 9 9 4 ) The culture o f complaint: The fraying o j America. N ew York:
W arner Books.
K atz, Jack (1 9 8 8 ) Seductions o j crime: Moral and sensual attractions in doing evil. N ew York:
Basic Books.
fa ste r, Kathy and Pat O ’ M alley (1 9 9 6 ) ‘ Sensitive new -age laws: T h e rcasscrtion o f
em otionality in law ’ , International Journal o j the Sociology■o f I.aw 24: 21 40.
N ew m an , G raem e (1 9 9 5 ) Just and painful: A case fo r the corporal punishment o f criminals,
2nd cdn. N ew York: H arrow & H eston.
4 1 0 A R IE F R E I B E R G
R o b e rts, Julian (1 9 9 2 ) ‘ Public opinion, crim c and crim inal ju stic e ’ , in M ichael Tonry
(c d .) Crime and justice: A review o f research, Vol. 16. C h icago, IL: U niversity o f
Chicago Press.
Scheingold, Stuart (1 9 8 4 ) The politics o f law and order: Street crime and public policy. N ew
York: Longm an.
Sutton, Adam (1 9 9 7 ) ‘ C rim e prevention: The policy dilem m as — a personal accou n t’ ,
in Pat O ’ M alley and A dam Sutton (cds) Crime prevention in Australia. Sydney: The
Federation Press.
Tonry, M ichael (1 9 9 9 a) ‘ Why arc LIS incarceration rates so high?’ , Overcrowded Times
1 0 (3 ): 1, 8 - 1 5 .
Tonry, M ichacl (1 9 9 9 b ) ‘ Rethinking unthinkable punishm ent policies in A m erica’ ,
(1CLA Law Review 4 6 : 1751.
Tvlcr, Tom R . and R o b e rt J. Boeckm ann (1 9 9 7 ) ‘T h ree strikes and you are out, but
why? The psychology o f public su p p o rt for punishing ru le b re ak e rs’ , Law and
Society Review 31: 2 3 7 —65.
Chapter 49
Yael Navaro-Yashin
M AKE -BE LIEV E PAPERS, LEGAL

FORMS AND THE COUNTERFEIT
A ffe c tiv e in te ra c tio n s between d o cu m e n ts and people in B rita in
and C y p ru s
T
H IS ARTICLE IS A B O U T THE affective in teraction w hich a grou p
w ith a specific history has fashioned w ith various co m p le xe s o f law and state
craft. 1 study T urkish -C yp riots as they relate to and transact docu m en ts p rodu ced
by several different adm inistrative stru ctu res and practices. The focus on Turkish-
C y p rio ts is significant, as they have been sub jects and ‘ citizen s’ , since 1983, o f an
unrecogn ized state, the ‘Turkish R epublic o f N orth ern C y p ru s’ (T R N C ), w hich is
con sidered illegal under international law D ocu m en ts produced by this ‘sta te ’ for
identity verification and travel, then, form a cen trep iece of my enquiry h ere, w here
I e xp lo re what it m ean s, affectively, to deal with internationally un recogn ized
fo rm s o f certification. Identity cards and p a ssp o rts issued by the ‘T R N C ’ are
technically not recogn ized anyw here outsid e N o rth ern C y p ru s, and yet there have
been a set o f state practices in place w hereby peop le have had to organize their lives
w'hilst verifying it through these docum en ts.
But there is som eth in g peculiar about ‘T R N C ’ docu m en ts in that they arc both
real and un real, present and absent. O n the one h and, they e xist and there is an
adm inistrative practice in place in N orth ern C y p ru s that requires them . O n the
other hand, these d ocu m en ts m ean little once one leaves N o rth ern C y p ru s, as they,
like the state w hich m anu factures th em , arc not rccogn izcd . Follow ing my Turkish-
C y p rio t inform ants w ho often callcd their polity a ‘m ake-believe sta te ’ (uyduruk
devlet), I nam e the p ap ers o f the ‘T R N C ’ m ake-believe p a p e rs, w ith the intention o f
em phasizing their perform ative and phantasm atic quality. [. . .] I do not introduce
the category o f the ‘m ake-believe’ just as a device to distinguish the illegal regim e
in the ‘T R N C ’ away from its legal c o u n terp arts, but in o rd er to illum inate the
phantasm atic asp cct o f politics, including those in legal re g im es, m ore generally.
People believe in the fictions that they m ake, o r fictions have poten cy and real
effects. U n der the ‘T R N C ’ , an illegal state, this phantasm atic aspect o f politics is
only m o re evident because this state practice is not recogn ized by the international
4 1 2 YA E L N AVA RO- YA S H I N
sy stem : everyone draw s attention to the m anufactured aspect o f reality here. H ow

ever, my argum ent is that such ‘m ake-believe’ styles can be stu d ied , if with m ore
careful ob servation , in legal regim es and other adm inistrative p ractices, too.
... I am then in terested in con trastin g these docu m en ts w ith fo rm s and
p ap ers prod u ced by three oth er adm inistrative entities w ith w hich T u rkish -C ypriots
interact in the con tem p orary p erio d . T h ese are: Britain, w here they have travelled
as im m igran ts or asy lu m -seekers; the R epublic o f C y p ru s, from w here they have
rcccn tly been reclaim in g their righ ts, as citizen s, to obtain legally rccogn izcd
identity cards and p a ssp o rts; and the un dergrou n d p assp o rt m afia in w hich Turkish-
C y p rio ts arc involved, along with o th e rs, w here they produ cc and sell forged
docum en tation and p a ssp o rts to citi'/cns o f Turkey o r oth ers w ho w ould otherw ise
be blocked from access to the E uropean U nion. [. . .]
A gainst the conn otations which the term ‘le g a l’ m ight invoke, docum en tary
practices in Britain do not entice affects o f calm , security and quietude am ong
Turkish -C ypriots. In other w o rd s, the legal pro ced u res and regulation s o f w estern
E u rop e, o r the E uropean U nion m o re b roadly, incite affectivities am on g those at
its m argin s, w hich are not rep resen ted o r im agined in form al portrayals o f ‘the law ’
in E urop e. In tu rn , w hat I have called the ‘m ake-believe’ docum en ts o f the illegal
state in N o rth ern C y p ru s, against what the category ‘illeg al’ m ight im ply, brin g out
feelings o f fam iliarity am on g T urkish -C yp riots in the vein o f what M ichael H erzfeld
(1 9 9 7 ) has called ‘cultural in tim acy ’ . [. . .]
Legal form s: Britain
. . . I begin my story o f the affective life o f docu m en ts through . . . the sto ry o f a

T u rkish -C ypriot m an, Fuat, w ho felt fear and panic w henever he received a letter in
the post from a local British adm inistrative body. H e w ould not open the envelopes
on his ow n ; rather, he attended one o f the com m un ity ccn tres w here Turkish
tran slators w ould deciph er for him the con ten ts o f the letter. M ost of the tim e, the
con tents w ould be m undane: a rem in der to renew a parking p e rm it from the local
council o r a blank form from the Inland R evenue asking ab out the ages o f children
in the h ousehold in o rd er to provide child tax credit. In a rush o f an xictv, Fuat
w ould go to the C y p rio t com m un ity centre in H ackncy, w here a Turkish-speaking
social w orker w ould, through the act o f translating, m ediate betw een the British
state apparatus and the local T u rkish -C ypriot com m un ity. T h ere w as nothing m ore
piercin g in Fu at’ s psychical exp erien ce o f the political than those m om en ts o f
enforced accountability to the apparently rationalized stru ctu re o f the British
w elfare state. [. . .] He said he felt ru sh es o f panic each tim e he had to fill out
anoth er d ocu m en t o r w rite an oth er letter to a British authority. He did not fill in
the fo rm s, n or did he learn to w rite letters the way a ‘p r o p e r’ British citizen w ould
learn to do. He asked the tran slators to do this for him in p erio d ic attem p ts to
contain his anxiety. The letters to the local au th orities w ould be posted straight
from the com m unity centre and the original corresp on d en ce w ould be kept in a file
un der Fu at’s nam e in a filing cabinet at the centre. T h ose pieces o f p aper prod u ced ,
as if by m agic, such pow erful psychical effects in Fuat’ s subjective exp erien ce o f the
British state apparatus that he did not dare brin g them back hom e. Filed away in
M A K E - B E L I E V E PAPERS, L EG AL FORMS AND THE C O U N T E R F E I T 4 1 3
the com m unity cen tre to pacify their phantasm atic pow er w ere ail o f Fu at’ s c o r
respon d en ce w ith the H o m e O ffice, social benefit fo rm s, as w ell as h ousehold
electricity , gas and w ater bills, all kept for him by the tran slators in a safe b o x . [. . .)
. . . W hat is im p ortan t to o b se rv e , having taken the British exam ple on b oard,
is the psychical and phantasm atic quality of docu m en ts as they are used and
exch anged in w est E uropean co n te x ts. C o rre sp o n d e n ce with state b od ies through
the m eans o f le tte rs in the p o st, the practice o f letter-w ritin g in itself, as w ell as the
filing and saving of such d ocu m en ts for future rcfcrcn cc may ap pear like a n eutral,
m un dan e, as well as benign activity from the poin t o f view o f those acculturated
w ithin the dom ains o f wrcst E uropean co m p le xe s o f lawr and statecraft. It may even
ap pear that nothing could be m ore rem oved from the spcctru m o f afifcct than the
clerical side o f statecraft. Scholarly w'orks on bureaucracy w ould have it as such as
w ell, crafting p o rtraits o f rationalized w estern adm inistrative ap paratu ses, leaving
no space for the study o f affect. For exam p le, in recen t an th ropological w ork on
policy d ocu m en ts and their im plem en tation s, organization s, ‘n etw o rk s’ and ‘audit
cu ltu re s’ , adm inistrative p ro ce d u re s in w est E uropean and other con texts are stu d
ied as em ergen t fo rm s o f rationalized practice (see R iles, 2 0 0 0 ; Strath ern , 2 0 0 0 ).
C on sid er the im age o f the filing cabinet in the C y p riot com m un ity centre
h olding co rresp o n d en ce with state b od ies for T u rkish -C ypriots. Such ro o m s, full o f
files kept for im m igran ts who do not know how to engage, in w ritin g, with bodies
o f British au th ority, abound in the gh ettos o f London . They arc n ot, in this ease,
n ecessarily specific to T u rkish -C yp riots. But the filing cabinet in the com m unity
cen tre, in my analysis, em b lem atizes a containm ent and m anagem en t o f explosive
affectivity in im m igran ts’ interaction s with the co m p le x o f British law and sta te
craft. The Turkish translator, em ployed as a social w orker, endeavours to m ediate the
relation betw een the T u rkish -C ypriot im m igran ts and the d ocu m en ts from British
state institutions. In the practicc o f translation by social w o rk ers, there is an attem p t
to pacify and calm the affects tran sm itted bv the d ocu m en ts or the w ays in which
they are taken in by im m igran t subjectivities. The tran slators assist im m igran ts in
coping with British m o d es o f statecraft by handling their docum en ts for them . The
filing cabinet in the com m unity cen tre, as an o b ject this tim e, serves a sim ilar
pu rp o se. Its seem ingly rationalized ap pearan ce, gray and containing b o rin g file
d ocum en tation , g o es against its psychical w eight and phantasm atic quality for the
im m igran ts. I therefore p ro p o se to bear this file cabinet in m ind as an analytical
m o tif, a sym bol for the study o f contained affectivity in the dom ains o f E uropean
statecraft and b ureaucracy. D ocu m en ts prod u ced by this specific co m p le x o f w est
E uropean law, ‘ legal fo rm s’ as I have tentatively labelled th em , gen erate nervous
affcctivity w hen they arc held and tran sacted by im m igran t T u rkish -C ypriots. It is to
this ‘n on -ration al’ u n derside o f apparently rationalized state functions (sec A rctxaga,
2 0 0 5 ; N avaro-Y ashin, 2 0 0 2 ) that I w ould like, again, to draw attention here. [. . .]
M ake-believe docum ents: the ‘Turkish R epublic o f

N orthern C yprus’
[. . .] Sincc 1963, the m om en t o f the break-up o f the R epublic o f C y pru s

into ethnically segregated enclaves follow ing in ter-com m un al conflicts with
G ree k -C y p rio ls, T u rkish -C yp riots have been govern ed by several con secutive
adm inistrative p ractices, none o f w hich w as recognized as a ‘sta te ’ under in te r
national law. The m ost recent of these co m p le x e s o f law and adm inistration is the
‘Turkish R epublic o f N o rth ern C y p ru s’ , declared in dependent in 1983, to the
alarm o f the R epublic o f C y p ru s (the G reek sid e). The ‘T R N C ’ is called a ‘p se u d o ’ ,
‘illeg al’ , o r ‘p ira te ’ state in international legal d ocum en ts. In this section , I study
the w id er n exus o f docum en tary practices o f the successive T u rkish -C ypriot ad m in
istration s, w ith specific attention to the ‘T R N C ’ .
In its soph isticated m im icry o f other state p racticcs, the ‘T R N C ’ acts as g o v e rn
ing body and sovereign pow er over a population o f about 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 peop le. As in
other state p ractices, tran sactions under this polity arc verified by rcfcrcn cc to
docum en ts. In all o f its institution s, including, for exam p le, the O ffice o f T itle
D ee d s, the E lectricity U nit, the Tax O ffice, the M aps D ep artm e n t, the Post O ffice,
and the Im m igration O ffice, the illegal state has created docu m en ts o f so rts bearing
its logo. T h ese docu m en ts arc highly loaded sym bolically b ccau sc, at cach instance
o f their use and exch an ge, they do not only rep resen t specific iden tities and tran s
action s, but also declare the legitim acy o f the ‘T R N C ’ .
U n recogn ized by the U N and isolated , to a great d e gre e , from international
tran saction s, T urkish -C yp riots who have rem ained as subjects o f the 'T R N C ’ , or
w ho continue to have in terests in C y p ru s, have had lo organize their lives by using
and em ployin g internationally unrecognized docu m en ts now for decades. . . . M ost
o f these d ocu m en ts, and especially the m ost sym bolically significant ones like the
title d eed s, identity card s, p assp o rts, and stam p s, are not recognized o r considered
‘le g a l’ anyw here in the w orld outside N o rth ern C y p ru s or Turkey. From the point
o f view o f international law, these docu m en ts are con sidered fabrications. Thev
certainly do not carry the sym bolic status, w eight, and legitim acy o f ‘ le g a l’ d o c u
m ents. They do not provide access to ccrtain practiccs and transactions outsid e
N o rth ern C y pru s the way ‘le g a l’ d ocu m en ts do. In other w ords, they d o n ’t p e r
form the m agic w hich docum en ts effect when they arc recogn izcd as internationally
valid. T h ese docum en ts w ork as rcfcrcn cc poin ts for b ureaucratic tran saction s only
within the confincs o f N orth ern C y pru s. B ccau sc they are not con sidered ‘ le g a l’
(and th erefore ‘ re a l’ ) outsid e the zones o f this self-declared p o lity , I con stru e them
as ‘m ake-believe’ docu m en ts for the p u rp o se s o f this analysis.
Im agine a population internally com m un icatin g w ith one anoth er through the
m edium o f m ake-believe d ocu m en ts for several decades and an econ om y organized
around these docum en ts. For exam p le, and m o st significantly, after the flight o f
G rcck -C v p rio ts from the north o f the island with the arrival o f Turkish tro o p s in
1974 and the arrival o f T u rkish -C yp riot refu gees from the south o f the island which
b ecam e ‘the G reek sid e ’ , the m akeshift T u rkish -C ypriot adm inistration o f the
period allocated h ou ses, land and p ro p e rty legally belon gin g to G ree k -C y p rio ts to
T u rkish -C ypriots w ho had arrived from villages and tow ns in the south. This w as
done through w hat w as called a ‘point sy ste m ’ , w here a council o f elderly m en
from cach tow n and village design ated the value o f the p ro p e rty cach family should
be allocated on the basis o f the size o f their previous belongin gs in the south. But
the T u rkish -C ypriot adm inistrative body did not only con sider itse lf lo be
tem p orarily settlin g dow n the refugees o r providing sh elter for them . Know ingly
defying in ternational law1 on pro p erty and se ttlem en t, il con sidered the transaction
perm an en t and, by allocating p ro p e rty to Tu rkish -C ypriot refu gees, il m ade its
sub ject population party to its operation s. In return for the h ouses and land that
w ere allocated to them — p ro p e rty w hich, still, un der international law belongs
to G ree k -C y p rio ts — T u rkish -C ypriots w ere gran ted ‘title d e e d s’ by the Turkish-
C y p rio t govern in g body. R ecently these title deed s have been bearin g the logotype
o f the ‘T R N C ’ , standing as sym bols for the unrecogn ized state, but also operatin g as
vehicles for assertin g its existen ce. Since 1974, there has been a w hole econom y
around ‘m ake-believe’ title d eeds. P ro p erty b elon gin g to G ree k -C y p rio ts has been
b ough t, sold , ren ted , and transacted through the use o f these ‘m ake-believe’ d eed s,
which arc treated as valid docu m en ts by the ‘T R N C ’ . So there is a reality, ccrtainly
a physicality, to ‘m ake-believe’ docum en ts.
. . . W hat I w ant to drawr attention to . . . is the T u rk ish -C yp riots’ co n scio u s
ness or aw areness o f the ‘m ake-believe’ quality o f the d ocu m en ts they em ploy for
identity verification, econ om ic, o r transaction al p u rp o ses. T h ese d ocu m en ts, like
oth ers, gen erate specific kinds o f affectivity am on g the p e rso n s w'ho em ploy
them . If many T u rkish -C ypriots inhabit G rcc k -C y p rio t p ro p e rty and hold ‘T R N C ’
brand title d e e d s, they are n ot content o r at peace w ith this. They hold these
deeds w ith trepidation . Many T u rkish -C yp riots are acutely con scious that they
arc living on other p e o p le ’ s p ro p e rty and do not feci that they really own it, in spite
o f the ‘T R N C ’ deeds. In other w ords;' thcvJ hold the ‘T R N C ’ deeds and have
con ducted transactions with them , and y et, they do not feel at case with these
d ocum en ts. They know that these deed s are not con sidered legal outsid e the
confines o f N o rth ern C y p ru s, and they are even both ered by and despise these
docum ents.
. . . D ocu m en ts are ideological artefacts; they are not neutral. But if in certain
situations the ideology of docu m en ts is not eviden t to their tran sactors, un der the
internationally u n recognized adm inistration in N o rth ern C y p ru s, the sym bolic c o n
tent o f docu m en ts is known to its users. [. . .] O n the occasion , particularly , of
docum en ts w hich do not carry o u t their function, such as ‘T R N C ’ p a ssp o rts,
T u rkish -C yp riots ridicule the docu m en ts in their hands. [. . .]
D o cu m en ts o f the ‘illeg al’ adm inistration incite co n tem p t, evoke uncase and
cn couragc w it am on g T u rkish -C ypriots. Rem arkably they do not instigate fear,
panic or anxiety. Having been used and tran sacted now under various transitional
adm inistration s, d ocu m en ts o f the governin g en tities in N orth ern C y p ru s are
fam iliar grou n d for T u rkish -C ypriots. T u rkish -C ypriots have been using version s o f
such ‘m ake-believe’ docum en ts now' for d ecad es, for all so rts o f adm inistrative and
other p u rp o se. They know how to in terp ret and m anipulate, or, if n cccssary , to
reverse the undesirable effects o f these docu m en ts. Wc could say that through their
w it and irony about it, T u rkish -C ypriots have m ade the T urkish -C yp riot polity a
so rt o f ‘h o m e ’ . . . . And the ironic stance o f the T u rkish -C ypriots vis-a-vis their
‘sta te ’ and its physical rep resen tation s, as w ell as their sharp criticism s o f it, are
possible w ithin a co n te x t o f n orm alization and fam iliarity.
Legal form s: the R epublic o f Cyprus
Im agine a situation w here a gro u p o f peop le w as forced to abandon their rights to

internationally rccogn izcd and legal citizenship and assum e certificates issued by an
unrecogn ized adm inistrative body. Indeed, T u rkish -C yp riots, having been blocked
from access to southern C y p ru s from the tim e o f T u rkey’s invasion in 1974, and
facing trem en d ou s difficulties in internation al m obility due to the unrecognized
status o f their p a ssp o rts, n ever forgot their en titlem en ts to citizenship rights un der
the R epublic o f C y pru s. It could be argued that in their in teraction s with ‘T R N C ’
docu m en ts, T u rkish -C ypriots enact an im plicit com parison with R epublic o f
C y pru s papers w hich they know are fully and internationally valid. [. . .]
T u rkish -C yp riots have m aintained, to this day, a con sciousn ess o f their en title
m en ts to R epublic o l C y p ru s docum en ts. In other w ords, their am biguous relation
w ith ‘T R N C ’ pap ers has developed with a su b text of kn ow ledge about their rights
to legal citizenship of the R epublic of C y p ru s. Though technically in G reek -C y p rio t
hands, the R epublic of C y p ru s, un der international lawr, is the only recogn ized state
rep resentin g both G ree k -C y p rio ts and T u rkish -C ypriots. . . .
Through the d ccad cs when acccss across the b o rd er w ith south C y pru s wras
banned, T u rkish -C yp riots found w ays to apply for p a ssp o rts from the R epublic o f
C y pru s either through m iddlem en w'ho secretly operated across the b o rd er o r by
applying for p a ssp o rts through C y p rio t em b assies and consulates in oth er coun tries.
[. . '.)
In T u rkish -C ypriot folk language, R epublic o f C y p ru s p a ssp o rts are called
‘ G reek p a ssp o rts’ ( ‘ Rum pasaportu’ ). T u rkish -C ypriots know that they have rights
to obtain R epublic o f C y p ru s docu m en ts b ccausc the R epublic w as m eant, sincc its
foundation, for both the G reek and Turkish com m u n ities in C y p ru s. And
the m assive m ove to apply for updated R epublican docum en tation is a way o f
reclaim ing these rights as citizens o f the R epublic. O n the one hand this rush could
be in terp reted as a way o f retrievin g a lo st, yet ‘au th entic’ iden tity, while at the
sam e tim e obtaining ‘ le g a l’ fo rm s to replace o r com plem en t the unrecognized and
‘ illeg al’ docu m en ts o f the ‘T R N C ’ . H ow ever, I w ould argue that aside from the
elderly population o f T u rkish -C ypriots who w ould have a m em ory o f interacting
with R epublican p ap ers, for m ost T u rkish -C ypriots o f the younger gen eration s,
R epublican docu m en ts felt less ‘au th en tic’ (even if ‘le g a l’ and internationally valid)
than their ‘T R N C ’ d ocu m en ts w hich have been m uch n orm alized through decades
ol use in N o rth ern C y p ru s. T h e term ‘ G reek p a ssp o rt’ precisely ex p re sse s this
feeling o f rem ove from the docu m en ts in the very practice o f claim ing them . As
they rush to obtain p a ssp o rts from state offices in south C y p ru s, T u rkish -C ypriots
feel that the R epublic o f C y p ru s b elon gs to G ree k -C y p rio ts. The p a ssp o rt has been
personified and allocated an ‘eth n icity’ . The passionate desire to obtain ‘ G reek
p a ssp o rts’ , as well as other R epublican docu m en tatio n , should n ot be sim ply in te r
p reted as a pragm atic and econ om ical m ove on the p art o f T u rkish -C ypriots. In
other w o rd s, T u rkish -C ypriots arc not neutrally lining up to ge t R epublican
p assp o rts sim ply b ecause the R epublic is a m em b er o f the E uropean U nion and
these p a ssp o rts gu aran tee international access w ithout visa req uirem en ts. For a
grou p o f peop le w hose access to the w orld w as b locked for d ecades — due to the
bord er, em b argo es on the ‘T R N C ’ , and its lack o f recogn ition — ‘ G reek p a ssp o rts’
sym bolized an ‘open ing u p ’ or a liberation. ‘This place has open ed u p ’ many
T u rkish -C yp riots w ould say, in referen ce to the freeing o f access across checkpoin ts
through the b o rd er after d ecades o f bans on m ovem en t. The p assp o rts also signified
a reunion with a tim e past, with rep ressed m e m o rie s and a bifurcated life. T h e re
fore we could in terp ret that, though branded ‘ G r e e k ’ and held at so m e distance,
R epublican d ocu m en ts have been claim ed bv T u rkish -C vpriots as a way o f o v e rco m
ing d ecad es o f b locks and rep ressio n . We could even go as far as saying that for
T u rkish -C yp riots, application s for ‘ G reek p a ssp o rts’ arc a political act, a w illing or
unw illing com m en tary , through a relation with o b jects, on their state o f disconten t
as sub jects o f an unrccogn izcd regim e in the N o rth . [. . .]
Affective docum ents: conclusions
[. . .] In this article, I have stud ied n ot rep resen tation s, but o b jects, physical things,
as ph enom ena w hich gen erate affect. I argue that state-like stru ctu res m ake th em
selves evident to the perso n s w ho inhabit their dom ains in the form o f m aterialities.
D ocu m en ts are one o f the m o st tangible ph en om en a w hich induce state-like affects.
H ere I use the w'ord ‘ tan gib le’ on p u rp o se , to m ean both ‘that [w'hich] can be
clearly seen to e x ist’ and ‘that [which] you can touch and fe e l’ (Orford Advanced
Learner's Dictionary, 2 0 0 4 : 1 3 28). I carry the study o f affect and the political, then,
to yet an oth er dom ain , to the study o f ob jects. [. . .]
References
Aretxaga, B. (2005) States of Terror: Bcgona Aretxaga's Essays. Reno, NV: Center for
Basque Studies.
H erzfeld, M. (1997) Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State. London and New
York: Routledge.
Navaro-Yashin, Y. (2002) Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey. Princeton,
N J: Princeton University Press.
Riles, A. (2000) The Network Inside Out. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Strathern, M ., ed. (2000) Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics and
the Academy. London: R outledge.
Chapter 50
Susanne Karstedt
EMOTIONS AND CR IMI NAL JUSTICE
E m o tio n s a n d p e n a l law
E M O T I O N S P E R V A D E P E N A L LAW A N D the criminal justice sys

tem. Offenders, victims and witnesses bring their emotions to the courtroom,
criminal courts deal with crimes of passion, and their decisions can occasion public
outrage and anger, or feelings of vengeance among victims. Offenders feel shame
and remorse when they have transgressed the laws, and offences provoke feelings
of moral disgust. At the same time, victims as well as offenders elicit our compas
sion and sympathy.
Law has by no means been blind to this invasion of emotions into its very realm.
It explicitly references and grants legitimacy to emotions through legal defences
(as in crimes of passion); by establishing specific categories of behaviour like ‘hate
crimes’ , or by restricting the admission of evidence that might influence the
emotions of jury members and judges (as, for example, in victim statements— sec
Posncr, 2000). Legal institutions and in particular the criminal justice system arc
the very institutions in society that are designed to deal with the most intense
emotions and emotional conflicts, with individual as well as collective emotions.
The criminal courts and procedures arc a prominent institutional spacc and
institutional mechanism for emotions in society.
The particular position of penal law and the criminal justice system in the
emotional space delineated by societies has long since captured the imagination of
social theorists, and figures prominently in the work of Durkheim and Elias. Both
realized that penal law was deeply embedded in the emotional culture of societies,
and intricately linked to the structural and institutional patterns of society. Con
sequently, decisive changes in the ‘morality’ (Durkhcim) and ‘mentality’ (Elias) of
societies are at the roots of the historical development of penal law and punishment,
and criminal justice illuminates— or more technically, indicates— subterranean
E M OT ! 0 N S A N D C R I M I N A L J U ST I C E 4 1 9
sh ifts in the e m o tio n a l c u ltu re o f so c ie tie s. In te restin g ly , b oth o f th e se th e o r ists

in te r p r e te d the h isto ric a l c h a n g e fro m tra d itio n a l to m o d e r n so c ie ty as a path w ay
th at c o n tin u o u sly and c o n siste n tly lim ite d an d c h a n g e d the ro le o f e m o tio n s in the
p u b lic sp h e re , a n d , as a r e su lt, m o d e s o f p e n al law an d p u n ish m e n t. M o d e rn
so c ie tie s, highly d iffe re n tia te d an d in te rd e p e n d e n t, rely on o th e r and m o r e su b tle
m e c h a n ism s to e n su re c o m p lia n c e w ith n o r m s than th e c r u d e and sim p le a ro u sa l of
m o r a l and c o lle c tiv e e m o tio n s by c rim in a l p r o c e e d in g s and the (p u b lic ) e x e c u tio n
o f san ctio n s.
In ju r is p r u d e n c e , the h isto ry o f p e n al law and c rim in al ju s tic e is in fac t c a st as
a p r o c e ss that h as m o r e str ic tly co n fin e d and m o r e p re c ise ly o u tlin e d the sp a c c o f
e m o tio n s , and lim ite d the a m o u n t o f e m o tio n a lity th at is a d m itte d in c o u r ts . T h e
c o n v e n tio n a l sto ry o f m o d e r n pen al law p o r tr a y s a n a rro w ly d e lin e a te d list and
p r o p e r ro le s fo r e m o tio n s in the legal re a lm , so th at e m o tio n s d o n o t in tru d e
in to the tru e p r e se r v e o f law : re a so n (B a n d e s, 1 9 9 9 a : 2 ). Su ch a ju x ta p o s itio n o f
re a so n an d e m o tio n , o n e d e e p ly e m b e d d e d in m o d e r n th o u g h t, s e e m s w ith in the
n o rm a tiv e fra m e w o rk o f ju r is p r u d e n c e to ig n o re vital fa c e ts o f th e actu al r o le o f
e m o tio n s in law an d le g a l p r o c e d u r e s (se e D o u g la s , 1 9 9 3 ). T h e e d ifice o f p e n a l law
its e lf is e r e c te d on a s tr o n g u n d e rc u rre n t o f e m o tio n s : the fe a r o f sa n c tio n s, that
sh o u ld in stil c o m p lia n c e , o r v e n g e a n c e that is to b e c h a n n e lle d by le g a l p r o c e d u r e s
(E lste r, 1 9 9 9 ). P o p u lar w isd o m as w ell as c rim in o lo g ic a l th e o ry have b o th e s ta b
lished fe ar o f sa n c tio n s as a c o r n e r sto n e an d p o w e rfu l m e ch a n ism o f the c rim in al
ju stic e s y ste m , the th in g that m a k e s it w o rk .
F ar fro m p r e c lu d in g ra tio n a l a c tio n , e m o tio n s m ay fac ilitate a ‘ ratio n al
r e s p o n s e ’ — fo r e x a m p le , to the e x p e r ie n c e o f in ju stice . T h e ‘h an d lin g o f e m o t io n s ’
w ith in the c rim in a l ju stic e sy ste m is n o t a p r io r i ‘ ra tio n a l’ , n e ith e r in its p r o c e d u ra l
a r ra n g e m e n ts n o r w ith re g a r d to its final o u t c o m e s , b u t d e sig n e d a c c o r d in g to
sp e c ific fu n c tio n s. B oth o ffe n d e r s an d v ic tim s re a c t b y n o m e an s in p rin c ip le
e m o tio n a lly , b u t m a k e ‘ ra tio n a l d e c is io n s ’ w h en d e a lin g w ith the c rim in al ju stic e
sy ste m : o ffe n d e r s try to find w ay s o f b e a tin g the sy ste m , o r v ic tim s w eig h the
ad v an tag e s and d isa d v a n ta g e s o f in v o k in g the law (P o lc tta , 2 0 0 1 ).
D u rin g the last d e c a d e , th e se c u la r p r o c c s s o f r e s tr ic tin g the sp a cc o f e m o tio n s
in th e p e n al re a lm se e m s to have tak en a tu rn to w a rd s b rin g in g e m o tio n s b ac k in. A
p r o c c ss o f ‘rc -e m o tio n a liz a tio n o f la w ’ o r th e ‘ rc a s sc r tio n o f e m o tio n a lity in la w ’
( f a s t e r and O ’ M a lle y , 1 9 9 6 ) sp r e a d aro u n d th e g lo b e , and h as ch a n ge d the c rim in al
ju stic e sy ste m in m an y w ay s. T h e ‘re tu rn o f e m o t io n s ’ to c rim in a l ju stic e and pen al
p o lic ie s h as o c c u r r e d in tw o are n as: the e m o tio n a liz a tio n o f p u b lic d is c o u r s e a b o u t
c r im c an d c rim in a l ju s tic e , and th e im p le m e n ta tio n o f san c tio n s in th e crim in al
ju s tic c sy ste m th at arc e x p lic itly b a se d o n — o r d e sig n e d to a r o u s e — e m o tio n s. B oth
d e v e lo p m e n ts c o r r e s p o n d e d to the c h a n g in g sp a c e o f e m o tio n s and the e m o tio n a l
c u ltu re o f late m o d e r n s o c ie tie s, and it can b e a ssu m e d th at th e se p r o c e ss e s have
fu e lle d o n e an o th er. [. . .]
T h e ‘r e tu r n o f e m o t i o n s ’
‘T h e R e tu r n o f S h a m e ’ — as d e s c rib e d in a Newsweek a r tic le in 1 9 9 5 — h as b ro u g h t

b ac k an e m o tio n lo th e c rim in al ju stic c sy ste m that had b e e n d ism isse d as h o p e le ssly
4 2 0 S U S A N N E K A R S T E D T
old -fash io n ed d u rin g p re v io u s d e c ad e s. Ju d g e s in the U n ited S tale s w ere the first to

rem ak e the c o u rts and the crim in al ju stice sy ste m as a p u b lic sp ace o f e m o tio n s.
O ffe n d e rs w ere o rd e re d by c o u r ts to w ear T -sh irts in p u b lic that iden tified them as
thieves. Young o ffen d e rs had to ap o lo g iz e on th eir kn ees to th eir v ictim s w ith
m e m b e rs o f the c o m m u n ity p re se n t. S exu al o ffen d e rs had to e re c t sign s on their
fron t law n w arn in g the pub lic ab o u t the inhabitan t; an o th er c o u r t o r d e r sen t the
v ictim s o f a b u rg lary to the h o u se o f the o ffen d e r to take from it w hat they liked
(see M assaro , 1 9 9 1 , 1 9 9 7 ; A n d erso n , 1 9 9 5 ; K a r stc d t, 1 9 9 6 ). W h at is strik in g ab o u t
these sc n tc n c e s, is n ot only the e x p lic it use o f e m o tio n , b u t the w ay it is d o n e , the
g re at e m p h asis p laccd on th eir p u b licn css. T h e thin line b e tw e en sh am e, h u m ili
ation and stigm atizatio n w as c o n sisten tly ig n o re d , and the q u estio n o f w h eth er
sham e has the im p a ct in ten ded i f im p o se d in such w ays n ever ask ed . . . . T h e effects
o f co n stan t and p u b lic terro rizatio n o f n o rm -v io la to rs by an em o tio n al m ech an ism
(w hich the ju d g e s assu m e d to b e sh am e) on the o ffen d er a n d / o r w atch in g sp e c ta
to rs w as n ever q u e stio n e d in th ese cases. T h e revival o f sh am e in the first in stance
cam e w ith ‘ e p iso d ic , a lm o st w h im sical b u rsts o f ju d icia l, legislativ e o r p ro se cu to ria l
in sp iratio n ’ (M a ssaro , 1 9 9 1 : 1 9 4 0 ), w hich w ere n o n e th e le ss the first and m o st
visible sign s o f the re tu rn o f e m o tio n s.
T h e influential m o v e m e n t o f re sto ra tiv e ju stic c in crim in o lo g y and crim in al
ju sticc is b ased in co n trast on a th eo retical c o n c e p t. In his b o o k Crime, Shame and
Reintegration (1 9 8 9 ), B raith w aite carefully d e v e lo p e d a th eo retical arg u m en t to
the effect that sh am in g the offen ce, but n ot the offen der, w ill re in te g ra te the
o ffen d e r in to the c o m m u n ity . In in d igen o u s p ro c e d u re s o f ‘c o n fe re n cin g ’ from
N e w Z ealan d and A u stralia he foun d se ttin g s in w hich sh am in g and re in te g ratio n
co u ld sim u ltan eo u sly w ork . In particu lar, he gave the victim s a stro n g ro le and
p re se n ce in th ese p r o c e d u re s. T h e ir p articip atio n should m ake the p ro c e ss o f
sh am in g pow erfu l and lasting. T h e c o n fe re n ce s w ere d e sign e d to allow fo r e m o
tional e x p e r ie n c e s and e x p re ssio n s o f sh am e, re m o r s e , gu ilt and anger, but also o f
sym path y and fo rg iv en e ss. T h e fact that p ro c e d u re s of re sto ra tiv e ju stice have
b e co m e the m o st su cc e ssfu l re fo rm m o v e m e n t in crim in al ju stic e w orld w id e
sh o w s that the re tu rn o f e m o tio n s has stru ck a c o rd in the crim in al ju stic e sy stem
and w ith the p u b lic. In in stan ces as d iv e rse as d ru n k d riv in g , tee n age sh o p liftin g and
d o m e stic violen ce (as w ell as in the T ruth and R econ ciliation C o m m issio n s for
p e r p e tr a to rs o f p ast re g im e s) e m o tio n s w ere b ro u g h t b ack into legal p ro c e d u re s
and m ad e an essen tial p a rt o f th em . W h ile re sto ra tiv e ju stice b ro u g h t v ictim s to
c e n tre -sta g e , it m ad e it p e rfe c tly clear that ju stice is re la tio n al, so m e th in g that
estab lish es an e m o tio n a l co n n ectio n b e tw e en the v ictim , the o ffen d e r and the often
n e g le c te d a c to rs w ho actually im p o se the pu n ish m en t. [. . .)
D i s g u s t , a n g e r , s h a m e : s o m e c a u t i o u s n o t e s o n th e u s e o f
e m o t i o n s in c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e
T h e recen t d isc o u rse ab ou t law and e m o tio n s has b e en d o m in ated by three

e m o tio n s— d isg u st, an g e r and sh am e. T h o u g h this d isc o u rse lin ge rs b e tw e en c o n
stru c tio n ist p e rsp e ctiv e s and assu m p tio n s ab o u t ‘ p r im o rd ia l’ e m o tio n s, b e tw e en a
c o n stitu tiv e , fu n ction alist and in dicative ro le o f e m o tio n s fo r law and m o rality ,
E M OT ! 0 N S A N D C R I M I N A L J U S T I C E 4 2 1
th ere is n o n e th e le ss a stro n g co n se n su s that e m o tio n s cou ld and should be used in

the legal sph ere and in law m akin g m o re than in the past.
A s n o ted ab ov e, legal th e o rists have iden tified d isg u st as a le g itim a te and
valuable b a ro m e te r o f so c ie tal m o rality (B a n d c s, 1 9 9 9 a: 4 ; K ah an, 1 9 9 9 ; Posner,
1 9 9 9 , 2 0 0 0 ). D isg u st should and cou ld have a le gitim ate placc in the legal aren a. It
has b een argu ed that law sh o uld shape the cogn itiv e c o n te n ts o f the e m o tio n by
leadin g us to feel d isg u st fo r h ein ous but n o t sufficiently p u n ish ed acts like racial
vio le n ce o r hate c rim c s (K ah an , 1 9 9 9 ; see P o letta, 2001 fo r a c ritiq u e ). In p a r tic u
lar, the latte r— m o re c o n stru c tio n ist— p e rsp e ctiv e is in line w ith c o n clu sio n s from
e m o tio n th e o ry . N o n e th e le ss, it has to b e stre sse d here that u n iversal c o m p o n en ts
in the e m o tio n p r o c c ss arc e m b e d d e d in to c o n c re te cu ltu ral se ttin g s w hich define
the co n te n t o f m o ral ru le s, and thus the situ ation s w hen d isg u st is elicite d . C ro ss-
c ultu ral stu d ie s in m o re than 35 c o u n trie s show that feelin gs o f d isg u st are m ostly
and u n iversally re la te d to m o ral evalu ation s and even ts o f violation o f m o ral n o rm s,
in co n trast to an ger, w hich is re late d to e x p e rie n c e s o f in ju stice (Sch e re r, 1 9 9 1 ,
1 9 9 7 ).
H ow ever, the fu ellin g o f e m o tio n s o f d isgu st has led so c ietie s to treat m a rg in a l
ized g r o u p s as if they w ere less than h u m an , and in p a rtic u la r has in stigated racial
v iolen ce am o u n tin g to g e n o c id e (N u ssb a u m , 1 9 9 9 ). In his b o o k Ordinary Men,
B row n in g (1 9 9 2 ) show s how the m e m b e rs o f a p o lice b attalion in o cc u p ie d Poland
v oiced th eir d isgu st ab o u t the Je w ish p o p u latio n , and how they used this e m o tio n in
th eir m o ral legitim ation o f the m ass m u rd e r in w hich they p a rtic ip a te d . T h ese
e m o tio n s had b een con sisten tly fuelled a m o n g the p o p u latio n d u rin g the N azi
R e g im e (and b e fo r e ), and this p ro c e ss w as related to law s that step -b y -step
d e p riv e d the Jew ish p o p u latio n in G e rm an y o f th eir civil and finally hum an statu s.
M o st in fam ou s in this p ro c e ss w ere the N u re m b e rg L aw s issu ed in 1 9 3 6 , w hich
p ro h ib ite d m a rria g e s b e tw e en Je w s and oth er G e rm a n s, and b arre d Je w s Irom
e m p lo y in g G e rm an g irls in th eir h o u se h o ld s and b u sin e sse s w ith accom p an y in g
p ro p agan d a that Je w s w ere p a e d o p h iles. E x istin g m o ral n o rm s and the e m o tio n s
attach ed to them w ere thus u sed to d ire c t e m o tio n a l re a c tio n s o f d isg u st to w a rd s
the m argin alized gro u p . D isg u st is ‘brazen ly and u n c o m p ro m isin g ju d g m e n ta l’
(N u ssb a u m , 1 9 9 9 : 2 1 ) and th e re fo re c o m c s w ith a p ow erfu l p o ten tial fo r d isru p tiv e
and v io le n t c o n se q u e n c es. A s m uch as it m igh t be ‘n e cessary . . . fo r p e rce iv in g and
m o tiv atin g o p p o sitio n to c r u e lty ’ (N u ssb a u m , 1999: 2 1 ), d isg u st is also heavily
im p licate d in the c o m m issio n o f c ru e lty . U sin g it in the legal realm as a ‘b a ro m e te r
o f social m o r a lity ’ d e p riv e s the law o f m uch o f its ow n p o ten tial o f establish in g
ju sticc and fairn ess.
A n g er is the e m o tio n m o st clearly linked to c o n c e rn s and values ab o u t ju sticc
and fair tre atm e n t (F rijd a , 1 9 9 6 ; M csq u ita c t a l., 1 9 9 7 ; Sch erer, 1 9 9 7 ). N o tw ith
stan din g cu ltu ral d ifferen ces w ith re g ard to the in ten sity and the display o f anger,
the e m o tio n a l link se e m s to be u n iversal. W e g e t an gry w hen w e and o th e rs are n ot
tre ate d fairly, o r are h u m iliate d , o r w hen o u r social p o sitio n and se lf-e ste e m are
h u rt. L egal p ro c e d u re s have a c cn tral ro le in so ciety as they p rovid e ju stic e , both
chan n elling such feelin gs and sim u ltan eo u sly aro u sin g th em . A n g e r o f v ictim s o f
c rim c m igh t be linked to such a sen se o f ‘ u n fair’ tre atm e n t by fellow citizen s. But il
is m uch less clear how ‘an g e r ab o u t c r im e ’ is aro u se d in th ose w ho have n ot b een a
victim and w ho have no p e rso n a l e x p e rie n c e o f crim e (F a rrall, 2 0 0 1 ). W hat kind o f
4 2 2 S U S A N N E K A R S T E D T
c o n c e rn s and e m o tio n al e x p e rie n c e s are in volved, and w hat are the un derlyin g
e m o tio n c o m p o n e n ts and p r o c e sse s, w hen a m a jo rity o f the p o p u latio n d e clare s
that they are ‘ an gry ab o u t c r im e ’ ? B e fo re design in g ‘ affective c rim e p reven tion
p o lic ie s’ (F re ib e rg , 2 0 0 1 ) that take in to acco u n t such e m o tio n a l p r o c e sse s, w e n eed
to establish w hich kind o f e m o tio n and e m o tio n p r o c e ss arc in volved, if at all.
Sh am e, r e m o rse and gu ilt are e m o tio n s m o st closely linked to the crim in al
ju stic e sy stem and the c o m m u n ity it re p re se n ts. A m o n g them sh am e is defin ed
as the e m o tio n that is e m b e d d e d in the b o n d s to g ro u p s and c o m m u n itie s, and
th e re fo re a visible ph y sio lo g ical re a ctio n — b lush in g— is attach ed to it. Sh am e is a
tre m e n d o u sly c o m p lc x e m o tio n , d e p e n d e n t on specific c o n te x ts, related to a ran ge
o f o th e r e m o tio n s, and actio n s (L e w is, 2 0 0 0 ). V iolatio n s o f se lf-e ste e m , h um iliation
and stig m atizatio n cause sham e as w ell as an ger, varying w ith the c o n te x t and the
c o n c e rn s. O b v io u sly , legal p ro c e d u re s have the poten tial to evoke sh am e in
o ffen d e rs, b u t like o th e r m o d e rn in stitu tio n s they do n o t require p a rtic u la r e m o
tion al re actio n s. T h e re tu rn o f sham e m igh t have co u n tc rp ro d u c tiv c co n se q u e n ces
w hen sham e in te rfe re s w ith p ro c e d u ra l ju stic e and fairn e ss, and cau ses an g e r and
defiance.
L egal in stitu tion s are not b ased on a sm all n u m b e r o f b asic e m o tio n s, b u t on
d ifferen t and co n trad icto ry on es. P ro c e sse s o f pu n ish m en t are linked to feelin gs o f
d isg u st as w ell as b e in g e m b e d d e d in e m o tio n s o f sym path y. Any e ffo rts to b rin g
on e o f th ese lo the fo re fro n t, and m ake it the fou n dation o f crim in al ju sticc
p ro c e d u re s, w ill n ecessarily ign ore the ran ge o f m o ral sen tim e n ts w hich are
in volved in the in dividual as w ell as in the c o lle c tiv e . T h e fact that e m o tio n al
re a ctio n s are attach ed to m o ral n o rm s d o e s n ot n ecessarily im ply the strate g ic
use o f e m o tio n s in, fo r e x a m p le , d efin in g law s again st hate c rim e s o r violation s o f
hum an rig h ts. T h e c o m p le x and c o m p lic ate d ro le and sp acc o f e m o tio n s w ithin the
legal sy ste m d o e s n o t allow for easy so lu tio n s.
R eferen ces
A n d erson , D igby (c d .) (1 9 9 5 ) This Will Hurt. The Restoration o f Virtue anti Civic Order.
L ondon: The Social Affairs U nit.
Bandes, Susan A. (1 9 9 9 a ) ‘ In troduction’ , in S. Bandes (c d .) The Passions o f Law. N ew
York: N ew York U niversity Press.
Braithw aite, John (1 9 8 9 ) Crime, Shame and Reintegration. C am bridge: C am bridge
U niversity Press.
Brow ning, C h ristop h er (1 9 9 2 ) Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final
Solution in Poland. N ew York: H arperC ollins.
D ou glas, M ary (1 9 9 3 ) ‘ Em otion and C ulture in T h eories of Ju stic e ’ , Economy and Society
2 2 (4 ): 5 0 1 - 1 5 .
Elstcr, Jon (1 9 9 9 ) Alchemies o f the Mind. Rationality and Emotions. C am b rid ge: C am bridge
U niversity Press.
Farrall, Stephen (2 0 0 1 ) ‘ Anger, Fear and V ictim isation: E m otional R espon ses w ithout
E m o tio n s’ , paper presen ted at joint m eetin gs o f Law and Society A ssociation
and R esearch C o m m ittee on the Sociology o f Law (ISA ), C cntral European
U n iversity, Bud apest, July.
E M OT ! 0 N S A N D C R I M I N A L J U S T I C E 4 2 3
Freiburg, A rie (2 0 0 1 ) ‘Affective Versus Effective Ju stice. Instrum entalism and

E m otionalism in C rim inal Ju stic e ’ , Punishment and Society 3 (2 ): 2 6 5 —78.
Frijda, N ico H . (1 9 9 6 ) ‘Passions: Em otion and Socially C onsequential Behavior’ , in R.
Kavanaugh, B. Z im m erb erg and S. Fein (eds) Emotion. Interdisciplinary Perspectives,
pp. 1—27. Mahwah: Law rence Erlbaum .
Kahan, Dan M . (1 9 9 9 ) ‘The Progressive A ppropriation of D isg u st’ , in S. Bandes (e d .)
The Passions o f Law, pp. 6 3 —7 9 . N ew York: N ew York U niversity Press.
K arstcd t, Susannc (1 9 9 6 ) ‘ R ccht und Sch am ’ , Neue Kriminalpolitik 8 (4 ): 22—5.
Laster, Kathy and Pat O ’ M alley (1 9 9 6 ) ‘ Sensitive N ew -A ge Law s: T h e R eassertio n o f
E m otionality in L aw ’ , International Journal o f the Sociology o f Law 2 4 (1 ): 21—4 0 .
L ew is, M ichacl (2 0 0 0 ) ‘ Self-C on scious E m otions: E m barrasscm cn t, Pride, Sham e and
G u ilt’ , in M . Lew is and Jean ette M . H aviland-Joncs (ed s) Handbook o f Emotions,
2nd edn, pp. 6 2 3 —36. N ew York: G uilford Press.
M assaro, Toni M . (1 9 9 1 ) ‘Sham e, C ulture, and A m erican C rim inal L aw ’ , Michigan Law
Review 8 9 (6 ): 1 8 8 0 -9 4 4 .
M assaro, Toni M . (1 9 9 7 ) ‘The M eanings o f Sh am e’ , Psychology, Public Policy, and Law
3(4): 6 4 5 - 7 0 4 .
M esquita, Batja, N ico H. Frijda and Klaus R . Sch erer (1 9 9 7 ) ‘ C ulture and E m o tio n ’ ,
in J.W . B erry , P R . D ascn and T.S. Saraswathi (cd s) Basic Processes and Human
Development. Handbook o f Cross-Cultural Psychology, vol. 2, pp. 255—97. B oston , MA:
Allyn & Bacon.
N ussbaum , M artha C. (1 9 9 9 ) ‘ “Sccrct Sew ers of V ice” : D isgu st, Bodies and the L aw ’ ,
in S. Bandes (e d .) The Passions o f Law, pp. 19—62. N ew York: N ew York U niversity
Press.
Polctta, Franccsca (2 0 0 1 ) ‘T h e Law s o f Passion. Review ing B an des’ s The Passions of
Law’ , Law and Society Review 3 5 (2 ): 4 6 7 —94.
Posner, R ichard A. (1 9 9 9 ) ‘ Em otion Versus E m otionalism in L aw ’ , in S. Bandes (e d .)
The Passions o f Law, pp. 309—29. N ew York: N ew York U niversity Press.
Posner, R ichard A. (2 0 0 0 ) Law and the Emotions. John M . O lin Law and E con om ics
W orking Paper N o. 103. C hicago, IL: The Law Sch ool, U niversity o f Chicago.
Scherer, Klaus (1 9 9 1 ) ‘ D ie Em otionalen G rundlagcn dcs G erech tigkcitsgefuch ls’ ,
in D. Frcv and G. Koehnkcn (cds) Bericht ueber den 37. Kongress der Deutschen
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Scherer, Klaus (1 9 9 7 ) ‘The R ole of C ulture in E m otion -A ntcccdcn t A p praisal’ , Journal
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12. Compassion, hate, and terror
HE T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y was a century of profound suffering.

T Rummel (1996) estimates that 170 m illion people were murdered by govern
ments, and by the end of the century around 2,800 m illion people were living below
the W orld Bank's $2/day poverty line, with 18 m illion dying each year from poverty
related causes (Pogge 2002). The start of the twenty-first century looks no better,
with inequalities widening globally and w arfare rife. In this context, non
governmental organizations struggle to draw public attention to the mass suffering
caused by war, m aterial scarcity, oppression and natural disasters and human rights
organizations strive to document and disseminate a seemingly endless flow of a troci
ties (Cohen 2001). Compassion, hate, and terror are emotional terms that frequently
appear in the media today, p a rticu la rly after the 9/11 events. There can be little doubt
they have become key metonyms for aspects of contem porary geo-political reality,
and this fact has not escaped the attention of social scientists (Nussbaum 1996;
Kleinman et al. 1997; Das 1997; M oeller 1999; Das et al. 2000; W ilkinson 2005).
There is something uniquely modern about the mutual im plication of compassion,
hate, and terror in a distinctly political form. In her classic book On Revolution
(1963: 79) Hannah Arendt argues, for instance, that the realities of the French
revolution 'cannot be understood w ithout taking into account the crucial role com
passion had come to play in the minds and hearts of those who prepared and those
who acted [in it]'. Compassion, she argues, became the driving force of the revo
lutionaries once the Jacobins, led by Robespierre, had seized power. The notion of
consent as a prerequisite of government gave way, she argues, to Rousseau's notion
of the volonte generate (general w ill) and, for Robespierre, the unifying principle of
the general w ill 'was the compassion of those who did not suffer with those who were
malheureux', namely, the 'people' (the phrase le peuple became an equivalent for
misfortune and unhappiness). Legitim ate political power thus became identified with
'the capacity to suffer with the "immense class of the poor", accompanied by the w ill
to raise compassion to the rank of the supreme political passion and of the highest
political virtue' (1963: 75). Since compassion was associated with uncorrupted
human nature, self-interest became cast as the source of a ll depravity and of an ever
present inhuman enemy within. In this context, far from being an openness to the
concrete suffering of p a rticu la r others, compassion transformed into the abstract
form of pity which, as Arendt puts it, 'has proved to possess a greater capacity for
cruelty than cruelty itself' (1963: 89). She thus controversially traces a direct line
from a politics of pity to the hatred of the reign of terror enacted in the name of
Robespierre's 'Republic of V irtu e ' (cf. Boltanski, 1999; Barker, 2007).
Compassion towards the suffering of others 'in general' can, it seems, lead to a
re-doubling of suffering through the provision of a w arrant for hate and terror. W hat
appears to be the highest good thus merges with, and becomes seemingly indissociable
from, the gravest bad. This frustrating Orwellian confusion in which words appear to
take on the opposite of th eir ordinary meaning is, unfortunately, an all too common
experience amongst those who have lived and died on the wrong side of regimes of
terror. This is the very theme of M arguerite Feitlow itz's (1998) book A Lexicon o f
Terror: Argentina and the legacies o f torture, from which our first extract is drawn.
Regimes such as the one that came to rule Argentina during the mid 1970s invariably
construe themselves as operating in the name of virtue, and have a powerful interest,
not just in construing the targets of terror as 'delinquent', 'crim in a l', 'subversive' and
otherwise 'im m o ra l' and deserving of th eir fate, but also in convincing their victim s
that this is the case. Language itself thus becomes a painful and fraught minefield of
confusion, as when the word 'persuasion' becomes identified with acts of torture.
Feitlow itz thus sets about constructing a lexicon of terror which bears witness to
some of the perversions of language that were wrapped up in the suffering inflicted
upon so many victim s of the regime. 'I am convinced', writes Feitlow itz, 'th a t we w ill
not begin to grasp what happened in Argentina unless we gain a sense of how these
words were lived.'
In the second extract, Lauren Berlant (2004) scrutinizes some of the issues at
stake in the recent re-branding of the US Republican Party as 'compassionate
conservatism '. Berlant associates the rise of this rhetoric of compassion with the
shrinkage of state welfare provisions and their replacement with neo-liberal notions
such as the 'dignity' of labour (associated with welfare-to-work programmes) and
tax cuts. Berlant draws attention to the selective nature of this supposed 'humane
recognition', which prioritizes, for example, conventional fam ily structures and
religious orientations. Berlant thus suggests that compassion might be better thought
of as a 'social and aesthetic technology of belonging' rather than some authentic,
organic emotion.
This theme is picked up in our third extract from Judith Butler's (2004) book
Precariou s L ife : The Powers o f M ourning and Violence. Butler is interested in
whether a basis for community can be found in our responses to loss and our sense of
vulnerability, p articu larly in the context of political violence. Through loss, Butler
suggests, we gain a tenuous sense of a 'w e' that binds humanity together. She wishes
to challenge the notion of a self-contained and intact individual with no fundamental
need of others, and in this sense her w ork chimes with a long tradition of others, such
C O M P A S S 10 N, H A T E, A N D T E R R 0 R 4 2 7
as Turner (1993), who argue for the legal, political and moral importance of a
conception of 'human fra ilty '. The definition of 'hum anity' is thus at issue in such
arguments, and a contrast is implied between a m ilita ristic conception based on a
fantasy of independent mastery (and the subsequent denial of vulnerability) and
a fem inist conception in which the 'I ' is nothing w ithout its relations to the 'Other'.
B utler thus raises im portant questions such as, practically speaking, 'W h a t counts as
human?', 'W hose lives count as lives?' and 'W h a t makes for a grievable life ?'
The extract from social psychologists Elaine Hatfield and Richard Rapson is
concerned to address the part played by what they call 'prim itive' forms of 'em otional
contagion' in the forms of hatred now associated with words such as 'S e rb ia and
Bosnia', 'Cam bodia', 'Rw anda', 'Palestine and Israel' and 'Kenya'. This is a contro
versial topic, since notions such as emotional contagion are still associated, by many
academics, with the conservative sentiments of early crowd psychology (cf. Blackm an
and Walkerdine 2001). Hatfield and Rapson agree that the cultural, historical and
political factors informing the calculative and rational considerations of combatants
are always very relevant. They argue, however, that the analysis of such rational
motives needs to be supplemented with a recognition of the emotional dynamics
involved. They are pa rticu la rly interested in the tendency for people to 'ca tch '
and 'm im ic' the emotions of those around them, and they provide some interesting
historical examples of the ways in which collectivities can be swept up into what used
to be called mass 'hysteria'.
The final extract is from Natan Sznaider's The Compassionate Temperament
(2001). For Sznaider, compassion as an organized effort to lessen the suffering
of strangers is a distinctly modern form of moral sentiment. However, Sznaider
seeks to challenge the view that it can thus be 'unm asked' as an insidious form of
power and control. He asserts instead that being able to recognize barbarism
and to sympathize with its victim s is an im portant part of modern society that
can be observed in a range of modern developments (the book deals at length with
responses to cruelty against children). Sznaider thus offers a counternarrative to
the more typical academic stories of the erosion of moral solidarity under modernity,
and seeks to avoid what he thinks of as the nihilistic and cynical rejection of
compassion.
References
Arendt, H. (196 3) On Revolution. Harm ondsw orth: Penguin.

Barker, V. (2 0 0 7 ) 'The politics of pain: a p o litical in stitu tio n a list analysis of crim e
v ictim s' m oral protests', Law & Society Review, 41 (3): 6 1 9 -6 6 4 .
B lackm an, L. and W alkerdine, V. (2 0 0 1 ) Mass Hysteria: critica l psychology and media
studies. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.
B oltanski, L. (1 9 9 9 ) Distant Suffering: morality, media and politics. Cambridge: Cam
bridge University Press.
Cohen, S. (2 0 0 1 ) States of Denial: knowing about atrocities and suffering. Cambridge:
Polity.
Das, V. (1 9 9 7 ) 'Sufferings, theodicies, disciplinary practices, appropriations', Inter
national Journal of Social Science, 49: 5 6 3 -7 2 .
Das, V., Kleinm an, A., Ramphele, M. and Reynolds, P (eds) (2 000) Violence and
Subjectivity. Berkeley: University of C a lifo rn ia Press.
Kleinm an, A., D as,V .an d Lock, M. (eds) (1 997) S o c ia l Suffering. Berkeley: University of
C alifo rnia Press.
Moeller, S. D. (1 9 99 ) Com passion Fatigue: how the media se ll disease; famine, w ar and
Nussbaum, M . C. (1 996) 'Com passion: the basic social em otion', S o c ia l Philosophy
and P olicy, 13 (1): 2 7 -5 8 .
Pogge, T. (2 0 02 ) W o rld Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity.
Rummel, R. J. (1 99 6 ) 'The H olocaust in com parative and historical perspective, in
A. J. Jongman (ed) Contem porary Genocides: causes, cases, consequences, Leiden:
P I0 0 M .
Turner, B. (1 9 93 ) 'Outline of a theory of human rights', Sociology, 27 (3): 4 8 9 -5 1 2 .
W ilkinson, I. (2 00 5 ) Suffering: a so cio lo g ica l introduction. Cambridge: Polity. Geography
and emotion.
Chapter 5 1
Marguerite Feitlowitz
A LEXICON OF T E R R O R
A r g e n tin a a n d th e le g a c ie s o f to r tu r e
‘ T HAT W O RD S CAN YOU NO lo n ge r to le rate ? W h at w ord s do you

T * no lo n ge r say?” In this w ay, I gath ered e n trie s for “A L e x ico n o f T e rro r,” a
re co rd o f the ch an ges w ro u g h t in the A rgen tin e lan guage by the p e r p e tr a to rs o f the
D irty War. [. . .]
L an gu age as it w as used in the cam p s w as a fo rm o f to rtu re . W hat fo llo w s are
e n trie s fo r a lexico n o f te rro r, b ased on in te rv ie w s I co n d u cted o r from testim on y
given at the trial ol the e x -c o m m a n d e rs o r to hum an righ ts o rgan izatio n s. T h is
le x ico n giv es a d etaile d pictu re o f daily life in the cam p s and the thinking that w en t
in to th eir creatio n . It is no accid en t that official “g e rm th e o rie s” co n ce rn in g “su b
v e rsio n ” y ielded a h ost o f to rtu re s b e arin g m ed ical n am es. T h e acco u n ts are
h arrow in g. B ut testim o n y fulfills the sac red ob ligation to b e ar w itn e ss, and h ow ever
d isco m fitin g it m ay be for u s, o u r pain, though g r e a t, is m in o r co m p a re d w ith that
o f the victim s. W c lack the rig h t to turn aw ay. A fte r y e ars o f takin g testim o n y , I am
con vin ced that w e w ill n o t b egin to g ra sp w hat h ap p en ed in A rgen tin a u n less we
gain a sen se o f h o w th ese w o rd s w ere lived. . . .
Desaparecido / a (n. Som eth in g that o r so m e o n e w ho d isa p p e a re d ). T h e c o n c e p t o f

in dividuals m ad e to vanish o rig in a te d w ith the N az is, as p a rt o f the d o c trin e o f
N igh t and Fog. “T h e p r iso n e rs w ill disappear w ith ou t a trace. It w ill b e im p o ssib le
to glean any in fo rm atio n as to w h ere they are o r w hat w ill b e th eir fa te .”
(M arsh all K e ite l, exp lain in g H itle r ’ s d c c rc c to his su b o rd in a te s.) In A rgen tin a
the m o d e l sccjuencc w as d isap p e aran ce , to rtu re , death . “ The first thing they to ld
m e w as to fo rg e t w ho I w as, that as o f that m o m e n t I w ould b e know n only by
a n u m b er, and that for m e the o u tsid e w orld sto p p e d th e re .” (Jav ie r A lvarez,
c o n a d k p file no. 7 3 3 2 ) M o st desaparecidos sp e n t day and night h o o d e d , h an d
4 3 0 M A R G U E R IT E F E IT LO W I TZ
c u ffed , sh ack led , and b lin d fold ed in a cell so cra m p e d it w as called a “tu b e .”
So m e w ere given jo b s. W hen th eir shifts w ere over, they w ere re tu rn e d to their
tu b es w h ere again they w ere h o o d e d , c u fled , sh a c k le d , and b lin d fo ld e d . O r they
w ere sen t to b e to rtu re d . O r they w ere m u rd e re d .
Ana M arla C arc ag a w as sixte e n at the tim e o f h er d isap p e aran c e . She w as
rcccn tly m a rrie d and th ree m o n th s’ p regn an t. “ A s so o n as w e arriv e d at the
c am p , they str ip p e d , and b egan to rtu rin g m e. T h e w o rst to rtu re wras w ith the
e le ctric p r o d — it w en t on fo r m any h o u rs, w ith the p ro d in m y vagin a, an us,
b e lly , ey es, n o se , c a r s, all over m y b o d y . T h ey also p u t a p lastic b ag over m y head
and w o u ld n ’t take it o ff until I w as suffocatin g. W h en I w as on the v e rg e o f
c ard iac a rre st, they callcd in a d o c to r w ho gave m e p ills. Th en I had co n v u lsio n s,
lo st c o n sc io u sn e ss. So he gave m e so m e th in g else and that b rou g h t m e ro u n d .
I w an ted to die, but they w o u ld n ’ t let m e . T h ey ‘sa v e d ’ m e only so they could go
on to rtu rin g m e.
“T h ey w ere alw ays saying, ‘ Wc have all the tim e in the w o r ld .’ ‘ You d o n ’ t
e x ist. Y ou’re no o n e. If so m e o n e cam e lo o k in g fo r you (and no on e has) do
y ou think th e y ’d ever find y ou here?’ ‘ N o on e re m e m b e rs y ou a n y m o r e .’ T h e
im pun ity they h ad. O n e w o u ld go eat, an o th er w ou ld take his p la c e, then he
w ould take a b re ak , and an oth er w ould re p la c e h im .”
“T h e w o r s t,” she told m e , “— so often I find m y se lf saying ‘ the w o r s t’ ; it w as
all ‘the w o r s t’ — w as afte r they m oved m e to the in firm ary. The cam p 1 w as in
w as in the b ase m e n t o f the S u b -P re fe c tu re o f the F ederal Police in the n eigh
b o rh o o d o f La B o ca, B u en os A ire s. A b ig p o lice station in a busy n e igh b o rh o o d .
T h e re w ere sm all air h o les b etw een the ceilin g and the w alls, from w hich I cou ld
h ear p e o p le w alkin g by, c ars and b u ses p assin g, life g o in g on as u su al— w ith us
d isap p e ared in a to rtu re center. In the a fte rn o o n , w hen the sun w as at a ccrtain
an gle, I co u ld se e on the flo o r the sh ad ow s o f the p e o p le p assin g by, g e ttin g in
and o u t o f th eir c ars. Yes, that I think wras the w o rst. To be so clo se to th e m , for
them to b e so clo se to u s, and y et so far aw ay.”
Trasladar (v. to tran sfer, to m o v e ). To take p riso n e r s away to be k ille d . Traslado / a

(n. tran sfe r). Trasladado / a (n . on e w ho had been tra n sfe rre d , on e w ho w as a
tran sfer, on e w ho had “g o t his tic k e t”). “You quick ly le arn ed that you w ere in the
pit for only a lim ited p e rio d o f tim e , difficult to p re d ict. T h e n , transfer.
“T h e m o st te rrib le thing w as that this p e rio d w as in d e te rm in a te . It w as
im p o ssib le to co n q u e r the fatalism and to u n d e rstan d that the visible end o f the
ro ad w as a d ark p o in t, a leap in to the v o id , tran sfer. . . .
“T h e re w ere variou s in dication s that a tran sfe r w ould b e h app en in g so o n . A
w eek b e fo r e , th ere w ould be a lo t m o re in telligen ce o ffice rs co m in g and go in g ,
filling o u t fo rm s. A t first w e d id n ’ t kn ow w hat th ese fo rm s w ere ab ou t.
“ A n o th er sign had to do w ith w o m e n . T h e y ’ d ch eck ou t all o f them to see if
they w ere p re g n an t; p regn an t w o m en w ere [usually] not tran sfe rre d .
“T h e tran sfe rs d id n ’ t h appen on sch e d u le , but they h ap p en ed in the sam e
w ay. M o v e m e n t b egan arou n d tw o o r th ree in the aftern o o n . And th ere w as a
special crew (all o f w hom w ere callcd P e te r— Pedro— afte r the saint w ho has the
keys to h eaven).
“T h e ‘ lo c k ’ called ou t the c o d e n am es o f th ose c o m p a n e ro s w ho had been
A L E X IC O N OF TE R R O R 4 3 1
se le c te d . T h ey had to [exit th eir cells] and fo rm a single-file line in the p a ssa g e

w ay, still sh ackled and ‘ w alled u p ’ [tabicados, see b elow ]. Th ey had to leave
behind any c lo th e s: ‘ W h ere y o u ’ re g o in g every on e g e ts the sam e u n ifo r m ,’ or
‘ Y ou’re g o in g N o rth , you d o n ’ t n eed all th ose c lo th e s .’ [The n o rth ern zo n es o f
South A m eric a are w arm er.] M any c o m p a n e ro s w ere tran sfe rre d in the dead
o f w in te r in onlv
J
their un derw ear.
“ A d o c to r . . . alw ays acco m p an ie d the transfer. . . . All o f the tran sfe rs w ere
in jcc ted w ith P en-N aval, a stro n g sed ativ e. Th en they w ere lo ad e d o n to tru c k s,
from th ere in to an airplan e from w hich they w ere throw n alive, though
u n c o n sc io u s, into the s e a .” (F rom testim o n y given to A m n esty In tern ation al by
O sc a r A lfred o G o n z ale z and H o racio G u ille rm o Cid dc la Pa/.)
I.isan d ro C u b a s, a su rv iv o r o f the N avy M ech an ics S c h o o l, testified th at, “ In
g e n e ra l, w h ere the fate o f tran sfe rs w as c o n c e rn e d , the o ffic e rs fo rb ad e it b ein g
m e n tio n e d . . . . [The crew ] said previou sly [b efore the use o f airp lan es] the
m eth od had b een to sh o ot p e o p le and b u rn the c o rp sc s in the N avy M ech an ics
Sch ool ovens o r b ury them in c o m m o n grav e s in c e m e te rie s in the provin ce o f
B u en os A ir e s.” (co n ad kp file no. 6 9 7 4 )
Fo r su rv iv o rs o f the clan d estin e cam p s, trasladar ca rrie s m o re terro r, m o re
g r ie f, than any o th e r single w o rd . “Tension reach ed u n to ld h eights fo r m o st o f
the p riso n e rs. It p ro d u ce d a stran ge m ix tu re o f fear and re lie f, given that one
both d rea d e d and lon ged fo r the tran sfe r that on the on e hand sp elt certain
death , and on the o th e r m ean t the end o f to rtu re and agon y. O n e [also] felt . . .
fe ar o f d eath , though n ot the fear o f any death — w hich m o st o f them cou ld
have faced w ith dign ity— but o f that p a rtic u la r death w hich is dyin g w ith ou t
d isap p e arin g , o r d isap p e arin g w ith ou t dying. A death in w hich the p e rso n dying
had no p a rt w h atso e v e r . . . as though dyin g b ein g already d e ad , o r like n ever
dying at a ll.” (c o n a d e p file no. 2 8 1 9 ) A t the trial o l the e x -c o m m a n d e r s a
su rv iv o r on the stan d to ld the ju d g e , “ Sir, it is very hard for m e to u se the w ord
‘tra n sfe r,’ b ccau sc it w as e m p lo y ed w hen they to o k so m e o n e w e w ould n ever
sec again . So I w ill u se the w o rd only to re fe r to th ose p e r so n s, and in all oth er
e ase s, m u st u se the w ord ‘ m o v e .’
Asado (n . b a rb e c u e ). T radition ally clo sely asso ciate d w ith p arrilla. F rom the te s ti
m on y o f Jo r g e C arlo s T o rre s, a seam an statio n ed at the N avy M ech an ics Sch o o l:
“ I kn ew that the b o d ie s o f the dead p r iso n e rs w ere taken away from the sch o o l in
g re e n tru c k s to the s p o r ts field at the far e n d , the o th e r side o f the A venida
L u g o n c s, on the riv er ban k. Tw o p e o p le w ere in ch arg c o f cach tru c k and I on cc
heard them say to the N C O on g u ard duty that they had c o m e ‘to have a
b a r b c c u c ,’ w hich w as a way o f d e sc rib in g the job. . . . A t night the b on fires o f
b u rn in g b o d ie s cou ld be seen . D u rin g the day this area w as filled in w ith earth lo
e x te n d the sp o r ts g ro u n d ; I im agin e this w as how the rem ain s o f the b onfires
w ere covered over. T h is is the field w h ere I fou n d a blue plastic bag. W hen I
op e n e d it I saw th ere w as a fe tu s and so m e liquid in sid e .”
[. . .]
Botin de Guerra (n. w ar b o o ty ). B e lo n g in g s, in clu din g cars, h o u se s, and lan d, taken

from desparecidos and d etain ees.
4 3 2 M A R G U E R IT E F E IT LO W I TZ
La Cacha n. nicknam e for La C achavacha, a television w itch who m ade people

disappear. The nam e o f a cam p in Buenos A ires Province.
[. .]
Enfcrmeria (n. in firm arv). In El V csubio, a ccntral hall w ith three o r four sm all
to rtu re ch am b ers, all decorated w ith sw astikas. In C am po dc M ayo, the in firm
ary w as near the operatin g theater. A lthough m edical attention wras given to the
b odies o f desaparecidos, they w ere psychically to rtu re d : “T h ere one w ould have to
w itness the to rtu re and even death o f oth ers, as they tried to force prison ers
to talk. T h e length o f to rtu re depen ded on how far the in terro gato r w ished to
g o .” (Juan C arlos Scarpati, c o n a d f .p file no. 2 8 1 9 )
[. . .]
La Favela (n. P o rtuguese for “shantytow n”). C am p in the u p p er story o f the

Provincial Policc h ead qu arters in Santa Fc. At the tim e, Brazil had m ore
shantytow ns than A rgentina. M oreover, many o f the inhabitants o f the
favelas w ere black o r o f m ixed race, w hich further incited prejud ice am ong
A rgentines.
Grupo de Tareas (n. task fo rce ). G rou p that carried out kidn appin gs, to rtu re , and
other te rro r operation s. Syn. la patota (the gang).
Huevera (n. egg c arto n ). T orture cham ber in the esm a w hose w alls w ere lined with
egg carton s to blunt the sounds.
Inmobilaria (n. real estate agen cy). A gency in the esm a that falsified p ro p e rty deeds
and defrauded p riso n e rs o f land, h ouses, and ap artm en ts w hose ow nership w as
then tran sferred to navy p erso n n el.
[. . .]
l.conera ( 11. lion ’s cag e ). “ So callcd bccausc it w as the place w here new arrivals w ere
‘soften ed up. ’ It wras like a collective cell w here five to ten com pan eros w ould
be lying on the floor in very bad shape after to rtu re . The first h our they used
the electric prod w ithout asking us anything. To quote th em : ‘This is to soften
you up so we understan d cach o th e r.’ ” (O sc a r A lfredo G onzalez and H oracio
G u illerm o Cid dc la Paz)
Maicadores (n. m ark ers). P rison ers w ho had “ brok en ” un der to rtu re and who then
agreed to cruise (see crucero) w ith their e n fo rce rs, and m ark (identify) in di
viduals (acquain tan ces, frien ds, intim ates) for kidnap.
[. . .]
Numeros (n. pi. n u m b ers). La Perla slang for low er-ranking personn el w ho assisted
A L E X IC O N OF TE R R O R 4 3 3
in o p e ratio n s and o th e r ty p es o f w ork . Th ey gen erally cam e from oth er

p ro v in c es, notably La R io ja and C atam arc a . Patricia A ste larra re m e m b e re d
certain numeros staying on to w atch to rtu re se ssio n s “o u t o f m o rb id p le a su r e .”
[. . j
Pacto de Sangre (n. b lo o d p a c t). Pact am o n g o ffic e rs, all o f w h om had p a rtic ip a te d in
acts o f kidn ap, to r tu r e , and / o r m u rder.
Quirojano (n . o p e ratin g th e ate r). T o rtu re ch am b er. . . .
Rectoscopo (n. r c c to s c o p c ). A nal to rtu re d cvicc invented by Ju lio S im o n , the

e x tre m e ly sad istic an ti-S em ite kn ow n as Ju lian the Turk.
Submarine* (n . su b m arin e ; trad ition al A rgen tin e c h ild re n ’ s tre at co n sistin g o f a

ch o co latc b ar slow ly m e ltin g in a cup o f w arm m ilk ). F orm o f to rtu re in w hich
the p r is o n e r ’ s head w as held u n d e r w ater b e fo u led w ith urin e and feces. W hen
the victim w as on the v erg e o f su ffo catio n , his head w ould be raised and then
dun k ed again . A fte r h o u rs o f b ein g to rtu re d by five m e n , T eresa C e lia M esch iati
“ trie d to kill [h erself] by d rin k in g the fou l w ater in the tub . . . but [she] did n ot
su c c e ed .
[. . .[
Tubo (n . tu b e ). T in v, n arrow , p r is o n e r s ’ cell. Too low to stan d , to o low for so m e to

sit up straigh t, to o sh o rt fo r so m e p riso n e r s to stre tc h o u t.
I.os Verde (n. the gre e n o n e s). Young N C O s assign ed to gu ard the p r iso n e r s; usually
1 6 - 2 0 y ears o ld .
Zona Libre (n . free zo n e ). A rea cleared and scc u rc d by p o lic e and m ilitary in
p re p aratio n for an operacion. Syn. hiz rerde (g re e n ligh t); zona liberada (lib erated
area).
C h a p t e r 52
Lauren Berlant
COMPASSION (AND WITHHOLDI NG)
T
HERE IS N O T H IN G CLEAR ABOUT com passion e x ce p t that it
im plies a social relation betw een sp ectato rs and sullfcrers, with the em phasis
on the sp e c ta to r’s e xp erien ce o f feeling com passion and its su b seq u en t relation
lo m aterial practice. [. . .] In the con text o f the U nited Slates w here these essays
are w ritten , the w ord compassion carries the w eight o f on going debates about the
ethics o f priv ileg e— in particular about the state as an eco n o m ic, m ilitary , and
m oral actor that rep resen ts and establishes collective n orm s of obligation , and about
individual and collective obligations to read a scene o f distress not as a ju d gm en t
against the d istressed but as a claim on the sp ectator to b eco m e an am eliorative
actor.
This national dispute about com passion is as old as the U nited States and has
been organized m ainly by the gap betw een its d em ocratic p rom ise and its h istoric
class h ierarch ies, racial and sexual pen alties, and handling of im m igran t population s.
The cu rrcn t debate takes its p articu lar shape from the p op u lar m em ory o f the
w elfare state, w hose avatar is Lyndon Jo h n so n ’s G reat Society, w ith its focus on
redressin g those legal, civic, and econ om ic inequities that acted, effectively, like
disen franchisem en t. N ow the R epublican Party o f the tw enty-first century brands
itse lf w ith the phrase “com passionate con servatism ” and insists that there is a m oral
im perative to changc our im age o f the kinds o f state and person al actions that
d em on strate com passion for those pe o p le w'hose sufferin g can be deem ed to be
social.
In particular, its advocates seek to rep lace the gran d gestu res o f the G reat
Society w elfare state with a m elodram a o f the overtaxed and the un derem p loy ed ,
those w hose dignity m ust be restored lo them by tax cuts and w clfare-to-w ork
program s. If an expan ding liberal slate used laws and p rogram s to anim ate the
tech n ology o f am elioratio n, the com passionately conservative slate w ants to limit
these m echan ism s severely and in particular to shift its econ om ic obligations from
C 0 M P A S S 10 N ( A N D W I T H H O L D I N G ) 4 3 5
re d re ssin g p ov erty to p ro te c tin g in com e by takin g less from and givin g less b ack lo
w o rk e rs and citizen s. C o m p assio n can be said to be at the h eart o f this sh rin kage,
b ecau se the atten d an t p o lic ie s re lo c a te the tem p late o f ju stic e from the collective
con d ition of specific p o p u latio n s to that o f the in d iv id u al, w h ose e c o n o m ic
sovereign ty the state vow s to p r o te c t.
G rea t So cie ty id e o lo g y had p re su m e d that the social re alitie s o f p riv ile g e did
n ot req u ire individual in ten tion s and p ra c tic e s to c o n trib u te directly to in equ ality.
N o r w ere o n e ’ s p a rtic u la r e x p e rie n c e s d e e m e d au th entic eviden ce o f w h eth er
u n d e m o c ratic p ractic e s w ere o rgan izin g life. In stead , the Jo h n son ad m in istration
argu ed that u n ju st in eq u alities w ere o b jectiv e and en ab led by state san ctio n , such
that the sta te m u st alte r its e c o n o m ic , ju rid ic a l, and b u re au cratic ru le s and p rac tic e s
tow ard equality w hile also placin g d e m an d s on sm alle r in stitu tion s to m ake the
sam e ch an ges.
In c o n tra st, c u rre n tly reign in g R ep u b lican th ough t re situ ate s wrho the su b je c t o f
c o m p a ssio n a te action o u gh t to b e. N o lo n g e r is the icon o f stru c tu ral d am ag e any
m e m b e r o f a h istorically and stru c tu rally su b o rd in ate d p o p u latio n b u t rath er the
w o rk in g citizen — that is, the p e rso n w h o w o rk s fo r a livin g, esp ecially fo r his
fam ily ’ s living. (By “h is” I p o in t to the c risis o f p ate rn al value that this p a rticu la r
state id e o lo g y seek s to am e lio ra te .) But w hat h ap p en s to th ose w ho do n ot w ork , do
n ot w o rk stead ily , o r do n ot b e lo n g to h e te ro se x u a l n u clc ar fam ilies? T h e aim o f
c u rre n t state policy is to im pel th ese p e o p le to w ork h ard er and to e n te r n u clear
fam ilie s, al w hich poin t slate e n title m e n ts w ill step in to p ro te c t th eir e co n o m ic
in te re sts. T h e m o re su c c e ssfu l on e is at th ese p r a c tic e s, the m o re on e is p ro te c te d
bv the state p u t fo rw ard bv this ad m in istration .
In o th e r w o rd s, c o m p a ssio n a te co n se rv a tism ad v o cates a sen se of dignity to be
d e riv e d fro m lab o r itse lf— o l a p a rtic u la r so r t. N o lo n g e r castin g a living w ag e ,
p u b lic e d u c atio n , afford ab le h o u sin g , and u n iversal ac ce ss to e c o n o m ic re so u rc e s
as the foun dation o f the individual and c o lle c tiv e g o o d life in the U n ited S tates, the
c u rrcn t state id e o lo g y san ctifies the p e rso n a l lab o r o f re p ro d u c in g life at w o rk , at
h o m e , and in c o m m u n itie s. T h at is, in c o m c -p ro d u cin g lab o r is d e e m e d valuable
chicfly in the c o n tc x t o f its p a rt in m ak in g sm a llcr-scalc, face -to -facc p u b lics. The
R epu b lican view su p p o rts the am assin g o f c o rp o ra te w ealth on the th eory that such
w ealth w ill p ro d u c e in v estm en ts that m ake the jo b s that w o rk e rs n eed to m aintain
th eir zo n es o f in tim acv .
W h at links th ese zo n es co n cep tu ally is n o lo n g e r the A m erican D re am o f
social m o b ility as such but faith, faith in the highly sy m b o liz ed , relatively im m o b ile
stru c tu re s o f in tim ate attach m en t from the fam ily and the nation to G o d . Faith in
such a p r o jc c t o f social m e m b e rsh ip is seen to p rovid e the m o ral ton e o f a state and
a n ation ; at the sam e tim e , w hen co m p a ssio n a te action is n c cessa ry to alleviate
social su ffe rin g , it is seen as at b e st a local re sp o n se p u t o u t by in d ivid u als and
sm alle r in stitu tio n s tovvard p e o p le w ho live so m e w h e re, sh arin g an everyday life.
T h e p ro b lem o f so cial in te rd ep e n d e n c e is n o lo n g e r d e e m e d stru c tu ra l but lo cate d
in the faith that binds to itse lf a visible, lived-in c o m m u n ity .
In this view all o ccu p a n ts o f the U n ited States arc lo cal: w e cultivate c o m p a s
sion fo r th ose lack in g the fou n d ation s fo r b e lo n gin g where we live, and w here we live
is less the U n ited S late s o f p ro m ise and p ro g re ss o r righ ts and re so u rc e s than il is a
c om m u n ity w h ose fu n d am en tal asse t is h um an e re co g n itio n . O p e ra tin g pow erfully
4 3 6 LAURE N B E R L A N T
is a presu m ption that the local is the sam e thing as the com m u n al, both experientially
and institutionally. This rem ediation o f national life away from the federal state does
not blank out the nation but sees p atrio tism as a feeling o f ab stract intim acy
practiced from the grou n d up. In asking individuals and local institutions to take
up the obligation to am eliorate the suffering that used to be ad d ressed by the
state, com passio nate con servatives see them selves as m oral ac to rs: for rath er than
im posin g solutions from on high, as it w ere, com passio n ate con servatives believe
that local institutions w ill b est be able to serv e the less fortunate p erso n s who come
forward for help. All social m em b ersh ip is voluntary in this view. By insisting that
so c iety ’ s p o o re st m e m b e rs can achicvc the go od life through w ork, fam ily, c o m
m unity p articipation , and faith, com passio n ate con servatives rephrase the em bodied
indignities o f stru ctu ral inequality as o p p o rtu n ities for individuals to reach out to
each other, to build con crete human relations.
In the new go od life im agined by the con tractin g state, the capitalist requirement
that there be a population o f p oorly rem u nerated laborcrs-in -w aiting o r those who
cobble togeth er tem p orary w ork is not deem ed p a rt o f a structural problem but
rather a prob lem o f w ill and ingenuity, and if pov erty b eco m es severe enough for
action to be asked for, the individuals caught in that bind are left to them selves and
to their com m un ity. [. . .]
In op eratio n , com passio n is a term den otin g p riv ilege: the sufferer is over there.
You, the com passion ate one, have a resou rce that w ould alleviate som eon e c ls e ’ s
suffering. But if the obligation to recognize and alleviate suffering is m ore than
a dem and on con scio u sn ess— m ore than a dem and to feel right, as H arriet Beecher
Stow e e xh o rted ot h er w hite read ers— then it is crucial to appreciate the m ultitude
ot conventions around the relation ot teeling to practice w here com passio n is
co n cern cd . In a given scene o f suffering, how do wc know w hat d o es and w hat
should con stitute sym path etic agency?
N o t only is this volum e about the presen t m o m en t, but the presen t m om en t
haunts its investigations of the com passio n ate em o tio n s, their aesthetic conventions,
their place in political th eories, and their cen trality to m odern subjectivites. This is
a peculiarly m od ern to p ic, b ccausc m e m b e rs o f m ass society w itn ess sufferin g not
just in con crctcly local spaccs but in the clscw h crcs brough t h om e and m ade
intim ate by sen sation alist m ed ia, w here docum en tary rcaln css about the pain o f
stran gers is increasingly at the cen ter o f both fictional and nonfictional events. The
Freudian notion o f Schadenfreude, the pleasure one takes in the pain o f another, only
begins to tell the unfinished story o f the m o d e rn in citem ent to feel co m p assio n
ately— even while being en tertain ed.
Som e read ers m ight feel that to think ab out com passion as a social and acsthctic
tech nology o f belon gin g and not an organic em otion is to dem ean its authenticity
and its centrality to social life. N o one in this volum e says that com passion is m erely
stup id, naive, or a narcissistic m irro r in w hich the priv ileged can e x p ress to th em
selves their w orthin ess. This w orry — that critique seeks to b efou l its o b je c t— is
especially acutc in response to w ritin g on what we m ight call the hum anizing
em otio n s: com passio n, sentim en tality, em pathy, love, and so on. But scholarly
critiquc and investigation do not necessarily or even usually entail nullifying the
value o f an affirm ative phrase or relation o f affinity. It is m ore likely that a project o f
critique seeks n ot lo destroy its ob ject but to explain the dynam ics o f its optim ism
C 0 M P A S S 10 N ( A N D W I T H H O L D I N G ) 4 3 7
and e x c lu sio n s. If w e ch allen g e the affirm ative fo rm s o f cu ltu re , it is n ot to call

affirm ation w ro n g but to see how it has w o rk ed that fo rm s o f p r o g r e ss also and at
the sam e tim e s u p p o rt d e stru c tiv e p ractic e s o f so c ial an tag o n ism . Social o p tim ism
has c o sts w hen its con ven tion al im ag e s involve e n fo rcin g n o rm ativ e p r o je c ts of
o rd e rlin e ss o r tru th . T h is kind o f b argain in g d e m a n d s scru tin y , in that d e sire s fo r
p r o g r e ss in so m e p laces are so o fte n acc o m p an ie d by c o m fo rt writh oth er social
w ro n g s. Such c o n trad ic tio n s wrc rc as m uch a p a rt o f the G rea t S o ciety as o f the
c om p a ssio n a te ly co n se rv ativ e one.
N o n e th e le ss, it m akes sen se that p e o p le o b je c t w hen an alysis o f the in tim ate
e m o tio n s m akes th ose d e sire s fo r attach m e n t seem equally like in stru m e n ts o f
suffering. In the liberal so c iety that san ction s in dividuality as so v e re ign , w c like o u r
p ositiv e e m o tio n s to feel wrell in ten tion ed and wre like o u r g o o d in ten tion s to
c o n stitu te the m ean in g o f o u r acts. W e do n o t like to h ear that o u r g o o d in ten tion s
can so m e tim e s be said to be ag g re ssiv e , alth ough anyone v e rse d in, say, the h istory
o f love o r im p e ria lism kn ow s v o lu m es ab o u t the w ays in w hich gen uin ely g o o d
in ten tio n s have involved fo rm s o f o rd in ary te r r o r (think a b o u t m issio n ary e d u c a
tio n ) and co n tro l (think o f state m ilitary , c a rc e ra l, and p o lice p r a c tic e s). W e do not
like to be h eld re sp o n sib le fo r c o n se q u e n ces w e did n ot m ean to en act. W e can feel
b ad ab o u t it; wc can feel c o m p assio n ate ly to w ard th ose w ho suffer: why isn ’ t it
enough to have m e an t w ell, o r n ot to have m e an t badly? |. . .]
N o d o u b t m any re a d e rs o f this volu m e w ill n ot feel c o m fo rta b le in the faith-
b ased so c iety that is now bein g o ffere d as the g ro u n d o f the g o o d . But this d o e s not
m ean that they are som eh ow su p e r io r to o r un tou ch ed by the co n te m p o ra ry cu ltu re
o f tru e feelin g that places su fferin g at the c e n te r o l b ein g and organ izes im ag e s ot
eth ical o r h on orab le so ciality in re sp o n se . W h en the re sp o n se to su ffe rin g ’ s scen e
is c o m p a ssio n — as o p p o se d to , say, p le asu re , fascin atio n , h o p e le ssn e ss, o r re se n t
m e n t— co m p assio n m e a su re s o n e ’ s value (o r o n e ’ s g o v e rn m e n t’ s valu e) in te rm s
o f the d e m o n strate d cap acity n ot to turn o n e ’ s head away b u t to e m b ra ce a se n se of
o b ligation to re m e m b e r w hat on e has seen an d, in re sp o n se to that hauntin g, to
b e c o m e involved in a sto ry o f re sc u e o r am elio ratio n : to take a sad so n g and m ake it
b etter. [. . .]
T h e ae sth e tics o f c o m p a ssio n — the cultivation o f the se n se s tow ard a m o re
n uan ccd and cap acio u s e n g a g e m e n t w ith sc cn e s o f hum an activity — o p e n s a
h o r n e t’ s n est o f p ro b le m s ab o u t w hat re sp o n se s should be d esired and w hen
p riv ate re sp o n se s are n o t only insufficien t b u t a p a rt o f the p ractic e o f in justice.
C o m p assio n tu rn s ou t n ot to be so effective o r a g o o d in itself. It tu rn s o u t m erely
to d e sc rib e a p a rtic u la r kind o f social re la tio n , as I su g g e ste d in this e ssay ’ s first
sen ten ce. In d eed , it w ou ld be p o ssib le to m ake an arg u m en t ab o u t the im age o f the
hum an the co m p assio n archive p ro v id e s for us that co u ld b rin g dow n on o u r h eads
the w h ole p ro je c t o f feelin g c o m m itte d to co m p a ssio n .
A s I have w o rk e d th rough this v o lu m e, I have b e en stru c k by an u n d e rto n e
accom p an y in g the p e rfo rm a n c e o f co m p a ssio n : that sce n e s o f v u ln erab ility p ro d u ce
a d e sire to w ith hold co m p a ssio n a te atta c h m e n t, to be irritate d by the sccn c o f
su fferin g in so m e w ay. R e p e ate d ly , w e w itn ess so m e o n e ’ s d e sire to n ot c o n n cc t,
sy m path ize, o r re co g n ize an ob ligation to the su ffe rer; lo refu se e n g a g e m e n t w ith
the scen e o r lo m in im ize its e ffe cts; lo m isread it con ven ien tly; to sn u ff o r drow n it
ou t w ith pedan tically sh aped p h rases o r carefully d e sign e d ap arth e id s; n o t to rescu e
4 3 8 LAURE N B E R L A N T
or h elp; to go on blithely w ithout con scien ce; lo feel bad for the su fferers, but only
so that they w ill go away quickly. In this b o o k ’s archive, the aesthetic and political
spectacle o f suflerin g vulnerability seem s to bring out som eth in g terrib le, a drive
not to feel com passio n o r sym pathy, an aversion to a m oral claim on the sp ectator
to en gage, when all the sp e c ta to r w ants to do is to turn away quickly and harshly.
I thought about calling this volum e Coldness and Cruelty, but that title has been
taken and it m ight con fuse the issue by m aking com passion seem like a bad thing.
Yet the relation o f com passion to sadism seen generally cannot be overlooked.
T h ere w as no way to call this volum e Withholding, either: there is no clastic enough
affcctivc term for the variety o f refusals archived here. [. . .]
W hat is the relation betw een b eco m in g capaciously com passio n ate and b e co m
ing distant from responsibility for w hat one e x p erien ces directly and indirectly
ab out the populations relegated to social negativity? W hat if it turn s out that
com passion and coldn ess are n ot op p osite at all but are tw o sides o f a bargain
that the su b jects o f m od ern ity have stru ck with stru ctu ral inequality? N orm ativ ely ,
the bargain w ould go like this: the c x p c ric n c c o f pain is p rc-id co lo gical, the uni
versal sign o f m em b ersh ip in hum anity, and so w e arc obligated to be responsible
to it; but since som e pain is m ore com pellin g than som e other pain, w e m ust m ake
judgm en ts about which eases deserve atten tion . Ju sticc is ob jective; it seeks out the
cold, hard facts against the incoherent m ess o f feeling. But we m ust be com p elled to
feel right, lo overcom e o u r aversions to o th e rs’ suffering by training o u rselv es in
com passionate practice. This discipline is a discipline o f our ju dgm en t, phrased
as the cultivation o f o u r visceral sense o f right. This logic only seem s circular.
Actually, the m oral elevation o f com passio n is reversed when w e raise questions
about the scalc ot sutlering, the m easures ot justicc, or the fault ot the sufferers. The
m odern social logic ot com passio n can as easily provide an alibi fo r an ethical or
political betrayal as it can initiate a circuit of practical relief.
Th is, then, is a book not ju st about the optim ism o f fellow feeling n or the
privileged p e d ago g ies o f social coldn ess. It is about an em otional c o m p le x that has
pow erfully m aterial and personal con sequen ces. As G e o rge E liot d em on strates in
Middlemarch:
Som e disco u ragem en t, som e faintness o f h eart at the new real future
which rep laces the im aginary, is n ot unusual, and we do not exp ect
peop le to be deeply m oved by w hat is n ot unusual. T h e elem en t o f
tragedy w hich lies in the very fact o f frequen cy, has not yet w rought
itse lf into the coarse em otio n o f m ankind; and perhaps our fram es could
hardly b ear m uch o f it. If wc had a keen vision and feeling o f all ordinary
human life, it w ould be like hearing the grass grow and the sq u irre l’ s
h eart b eat, and wre should die o f that ro ar w hich lies on the other side
o f silence. As it is, the quick est o f us w alk about w ell w'added w ith
stupidity.
Chapter 53
Judith Butler
VIOLENCE, MOURNING, POLITICS
I
P R O P O SE TO C O N S ID E R A dim ension o f political life that has to do
with our exp o su re to violence and ou r com plicity in it, w ith our vulnerability to
loss and the task o f m ourn in g that follow s, and with finding a basis for com m unity
in these con dition s. [. . .]
. . . 1 propose lo start . . . with the question o f the hum an. . . . We start here
not because there is a hum an con dition that is universally shared— this is surely not
yet the case. The question that p reoccu pies m e in the light o f recent global violence
is, W ho counts as hum an? W h ose lives count as lives? A n d, finally, W hat makes for a
grierable life? D esp ite ou r differen ces in location and h istory , my gu ess is that it is
p ossib le to appeal to a “w e ,” for all o f us have som e n otion o f w hat it is to have lost
som eb ody . Loss has m ade a ten uous “w e” of us all. And if wrc have lo st, then it
follow s that w e have had, that w e have desired and loved, that we have stru ggled to
find the con dition s for our desire. Wc have all lost in rcccn t d ecades from A ID S, but
there arc other losses that afflict us, from illness and from global conflict; and there
is the fact as well that w om en and m in orities, including sexual m in orities, are, as a
com m un ity, su b jected to violen ce, e x p o sed to its possib ility, if n ot its realization.
T his m eans that cach o f us is con stituted politically in p a rt by virtue o f the social
vulnerability o f o ur b o d ies— as a site o f desire and physical vulnerability, as a site o f
a publicity at oncc assertive and e x p o se d . Loss and vulnerability seem to follow
from ou r bein g socially constituted b o d ies, attached to oth ers, at risk o f losing those
attach m en ts, e x p o se d to oth ers, at risk o f violence by virtue o f that e xp o su re.
I am n ot sure I know w hen m ourn in g is successfu l, o r w hen one has fully
m ou rn ed anoth er hum an being. Freud changed his m ind on this sub ject: he su g
g ested that successful m ourn ing m eant bein g able lo exch an ge one ob ject for
another, he later claim ed that in corpo ration , originally associated with m elanch olia,
w as essential to the task o f m ourning. F re u d ’s early hope that an attachm ent might
be w ithdraw n and then given anew im plied a certain interchangeability o f ob jects as
4 4 0 J UDIT H B U T L E R
a sign o f h o p e fu ln ess, as if the p ro sp e c t o f e n te rin g life anew m ade use o f a kind o f

p ro m iscu ity o f libidinal aim . T hat m igh t be tru e , but 1 do n ot think that su cce ssfu l
g riev in g im p lie s that on e has fo rg o tte n an o th er p e rso n o r that so m eth in g e lse has
c o m e alo n g to take its p la c c, as if full su b stitu tab ility w ere so m e th in g fo r w hich we
m igh t striv e.
P erh aps, rath er, on e m o u rn s w hen on e a cc e p ts that by the loss on e u n d e rg o e s
on e w ill be c h a n g c d , p o ssib ly fo r ever. Perhaps m o u rn in g has to do w ith ag re e in g to
u n d e rg o a tran sfo rm a tio n (p e rh a p s on e should say submitting to a tran sfo rm a tio n )
the full re su lt o f w hich on e can n o t know in advance. T h e re is lo sin g , as w e know,
b u t th ere is also the tran sfo rm a tiv e cffcc t o f lo ss, and this latte r can n ot be ch artcd
o r plan n ed . O n e can try to ch o o se it, b u t it may b e that this c x p c r ic n c c o f
tran sfo rm a tio n d e c o n stitu te s ch o ice at so m e level. I do n ot think, for in stan ce, that
on e can invoke the P ro testan t eth ic w hen it c o m e s to lo ss. . . . 1 think one is hit bv
w aves, and that on e sta rts o u t the day w ith an aim , a p r o je c t, a plan , and finds
o n e se lf fo iled . O n e finds o n e se lf fallen . O n e is ex h au sted b u t d o c s n o t know w hy.
Som eth in g is la rg e r than o n e ’ s ow n d e lib e rate plan , o n e ’ s ow n p r o je c t, o n e ’ s ow n
kn ow in g and choosin g.
S o m e th in g tak es h old o f y ou: w h ere d o e s it co m e fro m ? W h at sen se d o e s it
m ake? W h at claim s us at such m o m e n ts, such that w e arc n ot the m a ste rs o f
o u rselv es? To w hat arc w e tied ? And by w hat arc w e seized ? F reud re m in d e d us that
w hen w e lose so m e o n e , w e d o n ot alw ays know w hat it is in that p e rso n that has
been lost. So w hen on e lo se s, one is also faced w ith so m eth in g en igm atic: s o m e
thing is hiding in the lo ss, so m e th in g is lo st w ithin the re c e sse s of loss. If m o u rn in g
involves k n o w in g w hat one has lo st (and m elan ch olia o rigin ally m e an t, to a certain
e x te n t, n ot k n o w in g ), then m o u rn in g w ould be m ain tain ed by its en igm atic
d im e n sio n , by the e x p e rie n c e of n ot k n o w in g incited by losin g w hat w e can n ot fully
fa th o m .
W h en w e lose certain p e o p le , o r w hen we arc d isp o sse sse d from a p la c e , o r a
c o m m u n ity , w c m ay sim ply feel that w e arc u n d e rg o in g so m eth in g te m p o ra ry , that
m o u rn in g w ill b e over and so m e re sto ra tio n o f p r io r o r d e r w ill be ach ieved. But
m aybe w hen w e u n d e rg o w hat w e d o , so m e th in g a b o u t w ho w c arc is re v e aled ,
so m e th in g that d elin eates the tics w e have to o th e rs, that sh o w s us that th ese tics
c o n stitu te w hat w e arc , tic s o r b o n d s that c o m p o se us. It is n ot as if an “ I” e x ists
in d ep en d en tly over h ere and then sim ply lo se s a “y o u ” over th ere, esp ecially if the
attach m e n t to “y o u ” is p a rt o f w h at c o m p o se s w ho “I” am . If I lo se y o u , u n d er these
co n d itio n s, then I n o t only m o u rn the lo ss, b u t I b e co m e in scru tab le to m y self.
W h o “am ” I, w ith ou t you? W h en w e lo se so m e o f th ese tic s by w hich w e arc
c o n stitu te d , w e do n o t know w ho w e arc o r w hat to do. O n one level, I think 1 have
lo st “y o u ” only to d isco v e r that “ I” have g o n e m issin g as w ell. A t an oth er level,
p erh ap s w hat I have lo st “in” y o u , that fo r w hich I have no ready v o cab u lary , is a
relation ality that is c o m p o se d n eith er exclu sively o f m yself n o r y o u , but is to be
co n ceiv ed as the tie by w hich th ose te r m s are differen tiated and re late d .
M any p e o p le think that g r ie f is p riv atizin g, that it re tu rn s us to a solitary
situ ation and is, in that se n se , depoliticizin g. But 1 think it furn ish es a sen se o f
political co m m u n ity o f a c o m p lc x o rd er, and it d o c s this first o f all by b rin gin g to
the fo re the relation al ties that have im p licatio n s for th eo rizin g fu n dam en tal
d e p e n d e n cy and eth ical re sp o n sib ility . If my fate is n ot o rigin ally o r finally sep arab le
V IOLENCE, MOURNING, POLITICS 4 4 1
from y ou rs, then the “ w e” is traversed by a relationality that we cannot easily argue
against; or, rather, we can argue against it, but we w ould be denying som eth in g
fundam ental about the social con ditions o f ou r very form ation . [. . .]
W hat grief displays . . . is the thrall in w hich our relation s w ith others hold us,
in w ays that wc cannot always recou n t or explain , in ways that often in terru p t the
self-con scious accoun t o f ourselv es we m ight try to provide, in ways that challenge
the vervJ notion o f o u rselv es as au ton om o us and in con trol. I m ight
fc>
tryJ to tell a
story here about w hat I am feelin g, but it w ould have to be a sto ry in which the very
“ I” w ho seeks to tell the sto ry is sto pped in the m idst o f the tellin g; the very “ I” is
callcd into question by its relation to the O ther, a relation that d ocs not precisely
redu ce m e to sp ccch lcssn css, but d ocs n everth eless clu tter my spccch with signs
o f its undoing. I tell a story about the relations I ch o ose, only to e x p o se , som ew h ere
along the w ay, the way I am grip p ed and undone by these very relations. My
narrative falters, as it m ust.
L e t’s facc it. W e’re undone by cach other. And if w c ’rc not, w e ’re m issing
som ething.
This seem s so clearly the case w ith g rie f, but it can be so only b ecause it w as
already the case w ith desire. O n e d o es not always stay intact. O n e may w ant to, o r
m anage to for a w hile, but despite o n e ’s b est clTorts, one is undone, in the facc
o f the other, by the touch , by the sccnt, by the feel, by the prospect o f the tou ch , by
the m em ory o f the feel. And so, w hen we speak about “ my sexuality” or “ my
gen d er,” as we do and as we m ust, we n evertheless m ean som eth ing com plicated
that is partially concealed by o u r usage. As a m ode o f relation , n either gen d er nor
sexuality is precisely a p o ssessio n , but, rather, is a m ode of being d isp o ssessed , a
way o f being for an oth er or by virtue of another. It w o n ’t even do to say that I am
p ro m o tin g a relational view of the self over an au ton om o u s one o r trying to
re d escrib e autonom y in term s of relationality. D esp ite my affinity for the term
relation ality, w e may need oth er language to approach the issue that con cern s us, a
way of thinking about how we arc n ot only constituted bv o u r relations but also
d isp ossessed by them as w ell.
Wc tend to narrate the history o f the fem inist and le sb ian /gay m ovem en t, for
instance, in such a way that ccstasy figured prom in ently in the sixties and seventies
and m idw ay through the eighties. But m aybe ccstasy is m o re p ersisten t than that;
m aybe it is w ith us all along. To be ec-static m ean s, literally, to be outsid e on eself,
and thus can have several m eanin gs: to be tran sp o rte d beyond o n eself by a passion,
but also to be beside oneself w ith rage or grief. I think that if I can still address a “w e ,”
or include m y self within its term s, I am speaking to those o f us w ho arc living in
ccrtain w ays beside ourselves, w hether in sexual passion , o r em otional g rie f, or
political rage.
I am arguin g, if I am “arguing” at all, that we have an in terestin g political
p red icam en t; m o st o f the tim e w hen we hear about “rig h ts,” we understan d them
as pertain in g to individuals. W hen we argue fo r protectio n against discrim in ation,
we argue as a gro u p or a class. And in that language and in that co n te x t, we have
to presen t ourselv es as b ounded bein gs— d istin ct, recognizable, d elin eated, subjects
b efore the law, a com m un ity defined by som e shared features. Indeed, we m ust be
able to use that language to secure legal protectio ns and en titlem en ts. But perhaps
we m ake a m istake if we take the definitions o f w ho we are, legally, to be adequate
4 4 2 JUDITH B UTL E R
description s o f w hat we are ab out. A lthough this language may well establish our
legitim acy within a legal fram ew ork ensconced in liberal versions o f human
on tology , it d o es not do justice to passion and g rie l and rage, all o f w hich tear us
from o u rselv es, bind us to oth ers, tran sp o rt us, undo us, im plicate us in lives that
are n ot arc ow n, irreversibly, it not fatally. (. . .]
To griev e, and to m ake g r ie f itse lf into a re so u rce for politics, is n ot to be
resigned to in action , but it may be un d erstood as the slow p ro cess by w hich we
develop a point o f identification w ith suffering itself. The disorien tation o f g r ie f—
“W ho have I b cco m e ?” or, in deed, “ W hat is left o f m e ?” “ W hat is it in the O th er that
I have lost?”— posits the “I” in the m ode o f unknow ingness.
But this can be a point o f d ep artu re for a new understan ding if the narcissistic
preoccu pation o f m elan ch olia can be m oved into a consideration o f the vulnerability
o f others. Then we m igh t critically evaluate and op p o se the con ditions under which
certain hum an lives are m ore vulnerable than o th e rs, and thus certain hum an lives
arc m ore gricvab lc than others. From w here m ight a prin ciple em erge by w hich wc
vow to p ro te ct oth ers from the kinds o f violence we have suffered , if not from an
appreh ension o f a com m on hum an vulnerability? I do not m ean to deny that
vulnerability is differentiated, that it is allocated differentially across the globe. I do
not even m ean to presu m e upon a com m on notion o f the hum an, although to speak
in its “nam e” is already (and perhaps only) lo fathom its possibility. |. . .]
Chapter 54
Elaine Hatfield and Richard L. Rapson
E MOT IONAL CONTAGION

R elig io u s and E th n ic H a tre d s and G lo b a l T e rro rism
“" I I T H Y C A N ’ T T H E P A L E S T I N I A N S A N D Israelis craft a peaceful

T t solution to the cu rrcn t crisis?” political co m m en tato rs ask. To m any, the
accords seem so straigh tforw ard. In the end — w hether the peace proccss takes 1
year, 10 y ears, o r 1 ,0 0 0 years — Palestinians and Israelis m ust find som e way lo
share the Prom ised Land. [. . .]
It is our h ope to provide a few insights into the pow erful forces that unite
peop le and divide them from their fellow s. We hope to provide a b e tter u n d erstan d
ing ol the facto rs that provide a shared vision, push em otio n s to a fever pitch , and
con tribu te to p e o p le ’s p e rp le xin g and un relen tin g w illingness to engage in Holy
W ars — no m atter how w'asted the e ffo rt, h orren d ou s the co sts, and how devastated
a suffering hum anity. . . .
Defining© emotional contagion

©
Em otional con tagion is defined as:
The ten dency to autom atically m im ic and synchronize e xp re ssio n s,

vocalizations, p o stu re s, and m ovem en ts with those o f another p erso n
and, con sequen tly, to converge em otionally.
(H atfield, C acio p p o , & R ap son , 1993, p. 5)
Mechanisms of emotional contagion
The p ro ccss o f em otional contagion is thought to involve three ste p s: (1 ) M im icry,

(2) Feedback , an d, con sequen tly, (3 ) the E xp erien ce o f Em otion al C on tagion .
444 E L A I N E H A T F I E L D AND R I C H A R D L. R A P S O N
Step 1: m im icry
Proposition 1: In conversation, people autom atically and continuously mimic and synchronize
their movements with the fa c ia l expressions, voices, postures, movements, and instrumental
behaviors of others.
Step 2:fe e d b a c k
Proposition 2 : Subjective emotional experience is affected, moment-to-moment by the

activation a n d /o r feedback from fa c ia l, vocal, postural, and movement mimicry.
[. . .]
Step 3: em otio n al contagion
Proposition 3: Consequently, people tend, from moment-to-moment, to “catch” others’

emotions.
[. . .] S in c e in th is p a p e r w e are fo c u sin g on the im p a c t o f c o n ta g io n on
r e lig io u s an d e th n ic h a tre d s and g lo b a l t e r r o r is m , w e b rie fly re v ie w a sa m p lin g o f
the h isto ric al re se a r c h on “ h y ste rical c o n ta g io n ."
I I
The dancing manias o f the M iddle Ages
In the M id d le A g e s, in the w ak e o f the B lack D e a th , d a n c in g m a n ia s, r e d o le n t o f

m a ss h y ste ria , sw e p t th ro u g h o u t E u ro p e . H a ro ld K law an s (1 9 9 0 ) se t th e sc e n c
o f g e n e ra liz e d “ so rr o w and a n x ie ty ” that d ro v e p e o p le “ lo the p o in t o f h y ste ria ” :
[T h e b u b o n ic p la g u e , the in fa m o u s B la c k D eath ] a p p e a r e d [in th e 12th

c c n tu r y ,] an illn ess far w o rse than any o f th e o th e r s. . . . It w as an
c p id c m ic o f u n p r e c e d e n te d p r o p o r tio n s th at b ro k e o v e r E u ro p e in a
g r e a t w ave. E n tire v illa g e s w ere e x te r m in a te d . F ie ld s b e c a m e n e g le c te d .
S o o n fam in e c o m p lic a te d th e p e stile n c e . A n d ju s t as the p la g u e re c e d e d
an d th e p o p u la tio n an d e c o n o m y b e g an to re c o v e r, a n o th e r w ave s tr u c k .
F ro m I 119 to 1 3 4 0 - a p e r io d o f 2 21 y e a rs — the p la g u e ra v ag e d Italy six te e n

tim e s. N o w o rd s can fully d e s c r ib e its h o r r o r s , b u t the p e o p le w h o w itn e sse d th e m ,
w h o lived in th o se days so full o f the u n c e rta in ty o f life , o f so rr o w , and o f a n x ie ty ,
w ere d riv en to th e p o in t o f h y ste ria.
It w as at that p o in t th at the d a n c in g m a n ia b e gan and sp re a d like a c o n ta g io n .
T o d ay , m o s t h isto ria n s view this p h e n o m e n o n as a fo rm o f m a ss h y ste ria (K la w a n s,
1990, pp. 2 3 6 - 2 3 7 ) .
O n e w r ite r (r e p o r t e d in H e c k e r, 1 8 3 7 / 1 9 7 0 ) d e s c r ib e d the tw 'elfth -cen tu ry
sc e n e th is w ay:
EMOTION AL CONTAGION 4 4 5
The effects o f the Black Death had not yet subsided and the graves o f
m illions o f its victim s w ere scarcely clo sed , when a stran ge delusion
arose in G erm an y , w hich took p o ssessio n o f the m inds of m en , and, in
spite o f the divinity o f ou r n ature, h urried away body and soul into the
m agic circle o f hellish su p erstition . It w as a convulsion w hich in the
m o st extrao rdin ary m anner infuriated the hum an fram e, and excited the
astonish m en t o f co n te m p o rarie s for m ore than tw o cen tu ries, sincc
w’hich tim e it has never reap p eared . It w as called the dance of St. John
or o f St. V itus, on accoun t of the Bacchantic leaps by which it w as
characterized , and which gave to those affcctcd, w hile p e rfo rm in g their
wild dancc, and scrcam in g and foam ing with fury, all the ap pcaran cc o f
p erso n s p o sse ssed . It did n ot rem ain confined to p articu lar localities,
but w as propagated by the sight o f the sufferers, like a dem oniacal
ep id em ic, over the w hole o f G erm an y and the n eigh borin g coun tries
to the n orth w est, w hich w ere already prepared for its reception by the
prevailing opinions o f the tim es.
So early as the year 1 374, assem b lages o f m en and w om en w ere
seen at A ixla-C h apelle w ho had com e out o f G erm an y , and w ho, united
by one com m on delusion , exh ibited to the public both in the streets and
in the church es the follow ing strange sp c c ta c lc . They fo rm ed circlcs
hand in hand, and appearing to have lost all con trol over their sen ses,
continued dancing, regard less o f the by stan d ers, for h ours togeth er in
w ild d e liriu m , until at length they fell to the grou n d in a state o f
exh austion. They then com plain ed o f ex tre m e op p ressio n , and groan ed
as if in the agonies ot death , until they w ere sw athed in cloths bound
tightly roun d their w aists, upon w hich they again recovered , and
rem ained free from com plaint until the n ext attack. This practice of
swathing w as re so rte d to on accoun t of the tym pany w hich follow ed
these spasm od ic ravings, but the by stan ders frequently relieved patients
in a less artificial m anner, by thum ping and tram p lin g upon the p arts
affcctcd. W hile dancing they neither saw n or h eard, being insensible to
extern al im pression s through the sen ses, b ut w ere haunted by visions,
their fancies con ju rin g up spirits w hose nam es they shrieked o u t; and
som e o f them afterw ard asserted that they felt as if they had been
im m ersed in a stream o f b lo o d , w hich obligated them to leap so high.
O th ers, during the p aro xy sm , saw the heavens open and the Saviour
en throned w ith the V irgin M ary, accordin g as the religiou s n otions o f
the age w ere strangely and variously reflected in their im aginations.
W here the disease w as com pletely d eveloped, the attack co m m cn ccd
w ith epileptic convulsions.
(pp. 1 - 2 )
The dancing m ania spread from tow n to tow n. In C o lo g n e, 500 join ed the w ild
revels; in M etz, 1 ,1 0 0 danced. P riests tried lo c x o rcisc the devils. Sufferers trav
eled to the Tom b o f Saint Vitus in southern France lo be cu red. Paracelsus, a
sixteen th -century physician and alch em ist, devised a harsh but effective treatm en t
for the dancing m ania: He dunked the victim s in cold w ater, forced them to fast,
4 4 6 E L A I N E H A T F I E L D AND R I CH ARD L. RA P SON
and c o n d e m n e d them to solitary co n fin em en t. T h e h ysterical o u tb re ak s began to

su b sid e.
T h e h isto ric al re co rd ab o u n d s in d e sc rip tio n s of m ass e m o tio n a l effusion s
in sp ired by su p e rstitio n and ch aristm atie d e m a g o g u e s. (M o d e rn -d ay ten t and TV
ev an g elists are m a ste rs o f the a rt o l co n ta g io n , as w ere such o r a to rs as A d olph
H itler.) H ow ever, even su p p o sed ly “re a so n ab le ” folk are n o t im m u n e to the sp read
— w itn e ss the n e x t ease from “T h e A C
ge
> o f R e a s o n .”
The great fear o f 1789
In the eigh teen th ce n tu ry , the philosophes o f the E n lig h ten m en t ch am p ion ed the cause
o f scien ce and reason over ign o ran ce , su p e rstitio n , and tyrann y. M uch in tellectual
lead ersh ip cam e fro m such French w rite r s as V oltaire, M o n te sq u ie u , R o u sse a u , and
D id e r o t, w h o ch allen ged the trad ition al le gal, m o ra l, h ierarch ical, and re lig io u s
fou n d atio n s o f French so c icty . By 1 7 8 9 , large se c tio n s o f F ra n c e ’s p ro fessio n al and
m id d le classe s had b een co n v e rte d to th ese rev o lu tio n aryJ id e as,’ and thcv
J
b e ca m e
active in try in g to ach ieve the ch an ges in French so ciety that they th ou gh t n e cessary .
In fact, so m e o f th ese ad v o cates o f re aso n b egan to try to fo rce so cial change.
R easo n and p e rsu asio n so o n gave way to hate and terro r. R u m o rs began to
c ircu late that the R oyal C o u r t and aristo c ra c y w ere p lo ttin g to take over Paris by
c o u n tc rfo rc e . P eop le fled P aris in fear. A s they tru d g e d alo n g cou n try ro ad s on
th eir way to the Fren ch c o u n try sid e, they sp rea d ru m o rs o f an im p en d in g assault
on the pro v in ces by a m e rc e n ary arm y o f crim in als and fo re ig n e rs in the pay o f the
aristo c ra c y .
Fran ce b e ca m e g r ip p e d by an alm o st u n iversal pan ic. Fear b red fear. L ocal
au th o rities and citizen s b c ca m c con v in ccd that the crim in al arm y w as n ot ju st on
the m arch , b u t w as at the d oo r. T h is led to the b reak d ow n o f local g o v e rn m e n t, the
a rm in g o f the p o o r, and fo o d rio ts , and furn ish ed a d ram a tic im p e tu s to revo lu tion
in the p ro v in ces (B e rn ste in , 1 9 9 0 ; C o o k , 1 9 7 4 ; H e a d le y , 1 9 7 1 ; L e fe b v re , 1 9 7 3 ).
A fter the sto rm in g o f the B astille in 1 7 8 9 , h istorian s d e sc rib e d the y e ars that
later en su ed as the R eign o f T e rro r a term su g g e stin g that e m o tio n al con tagion
m ay have a life w ell b eyon d the w alls o f the lab o rato ry .
The New York City draft riots o f 1863
N e w York C ity , in the h ot su m m e r o f 1 8 6 3 , wras a p lace o f e x tre m e s. T h e C ivil W ar

had b ro u g h t ever g r e a te r w ealth to a few and in creasin g p o v erty to m an y . W artim e
inflation e ro d e d the b uy in g p o w e r o f the poo r. T h e c ity ’ s stru g g lin g im m igran t
p o p u latio n lived in ru n -d o w n , cro w d cd te n e m e n ts. Im m ig ran ts, cspccially the Irish,
w ere o u tra g e d at the u se o f b lack s to re p la c e strik in g Irish lo n gsh o re m e n .
N ew York w as an an tiw ar city, c o n tro lle d by a lo cal D e m o c ra tic p olitical
m ach in e, w hich had lo st p o w e r and in fluence to the n ation al R ep u b lican “w a r”
p a rty . T h e c ity ’ s D e m o c ra tic p re ss and p o litician s skillfully played up the them e
that N o r th e r n w hite w o rk e rs w ere b etray in g th eir ow n b e st in te re sts by fighting to
free slaves w ho w ou ld then c o m p e te fo r th eir jo b s.
E M O T I O N AL C O N T A G I O N 4 4 7
In the m id st o f th is, a n ation al m ilita ry d ra ft c o m m e n c e d d u r in g th e su m m e r

o f 1 8 6 3 . T h e n ew law p e r m itte d a c o m m u ta tio n o f m ilita ry s e r v ic e fo r an y on e
w h o c o u ld pay a S 3 0 0 fee. T h is se t the sta g e lo r v ie w in g the d ra ft as a sy m b o l o f
R e p u b lic a n o v e r D e m o c r a t , n atio n al o v e r lo cal g o v e r n m e n t, n ativ e o v e r im m ig r a n t,
an d rich o v e r p o o r.
T h e first 1 ,2 3 6 n a m e s o f N e w Y ork C ity d r a fte d m e n a p p e a r e d in the m o r n in g
p a p e rs at the sa m e tim e that casu a lty lists fro m G e tty s b u rg (th e b lo o d ie s t b attle
e v e r fo u g h t on th e N o r th A m e ric a n c o n tin e n t) w e re p o ste d aro u n d th e c ity . E arly
th e n e x t m o r n in g , m e n , w o m e n , and b o y s b e g an to m o v e a lo n g s tr e e ts c a r ry in g the
w e a p o n s o f th e p o o r c ro w b a r s and clu b s. M o b s q u ick ly fo r m e d an d g re w , cau g h t
u p in and c a r rie d aw ay w ith an ger.
F o u r d ay s o f s u b se q u e n t u n c o n tro lle d v io le n c e in clu d in g th e ly n ch in g and
b u rn in g o f 12 b lac k s — le ft 119 p e r so n s d ead and 3 0 6 in ju r e d . F o rty -th re e
re g im e n ts o f u n io n tr o o p s h ad to b e sta tio n e d in an d a ro u n d th e city to e n su re
o r d e r (C h u r c h , 1 9 6 4 ; M c C a g u c , 1 9 6 8 ).
The era o f mass media
R e se a rc h on e m o tio n a l c o n ta g io n has fo c u se d on th e e ffe c t o f in te r p e r s o n a l in te r

a c tio n s; th e re is, h ow ever, h isto ric a l e v id e n c e to s u g g e st that the d isse m in a tio n o f
e m o tio n s d o c s n o t alw ay s re q u ir e d ire c t p h y sical c o n ta c t o r p r o x im ity . A s r u m o r s
s p r e a d , e m o tio n s m ay a c c o m p a n y th e m . M a ss c o m m u n ic a tio n s — film s, n e w s p a p e r s,
ra d io , an d (p a rtic u la rly ) te le v isio n — can tra n sm it p e o p le ’ s e m o tio n s far b e y o n d
th e ir g e o g ra p h ic a l p e r im e t e r s . O u r v e ry im a g e o f th e m o b is lin ked in e x tric a b ly
w ith n o tio n s o f the sp re a d o f an g e r, le a d in g to the o u t- o f-c o n tro l b e h a v io rs o f
m u r d e r, lv n c h in g s, and la r g c - sc a lc d e s tr u c tio n . W c se c daily on te le v isio n the
p ic tu re s o f w e e p in g an d a n g ry c ro w d s m o u r n in g th e death o f a P alestin ian g u e r r illa
o r an Israeli c h ild , a m u r d e re d le a d e r and h er m o u r n fu l fo llo w e r s, o r the d efian t
and a n g ry o p p o s itio n . W'e re p la y th e w ee k e n d o f m o u r n in g by an e n tire n ation
(p e r h a p s even the e n tire w o rld ) on th e assa ssin a tio n o f Jo h n F. K e n n e d y . A re th ese
in sta n c e s o f e m o tio n a l c o n ta g io n , o r are th e se p h e n o m e n a to o c o m p lic a te d to b e so
la b e le d ? H isto ric a l e x a m p le s c a n n o t b e t e s te d in th e la b o r a to r y , b u t they d o h in t at
the re a lity o f e m o tio n a l c o n ta g io n and su g g e st that it m ay have o c c u r r c d on a large
scale in m an y h isto ric a l e ra s. T h e y also s u g g e st that th e m a ss m e d ia o f o u r day m ay
p o s s e s s p o w e r even g r e a t e r than g e n e ra lly re a liz e d b e c a u se o f th e ir p o te n tia l to
p r e c ip ita te th e sp re a d n o t ju st o f in fo rm a tio n an d e n te r ta in m e n t, b u t also o f
e m o tio n s. ( . . . )
References
B ern stein , I. (1 9 9 0 ). The New York City draft riots. N e w York: O x fo r d U n iversity P ress.
C h u rch , W. F. (E d .). (1 9 6 4 ). The influence o f the enlightenment on the French revolution:
Creative, disastrous or non-existent? L e x in g to n , M A : D. C . H eath.
C o o k , A . (1 9 7 4 ). The armies o f the streets: The New York City draft riots o f 18 6 3 . L e x in g to n ,
KY: U n iversity o f K en tuck y P ress.
4 4 8 E L A I N E H A T F I E L D AND R I CH ARD L. RA P SON
H atfield, E ., C aciop po, J. T ., & R ap so n , R . L. (1 9 9 3 ). Emotional contagion (p. 5). N ew

York: C am bridge U niversity Press.
H eadley, J. T. (1 9 7 1 ). The great riots o j New York 1712 to 1873. N ew York: Dover.
L cfebvre, G. (1 9 7 3 ). The great fear o f 1789 (trans. J. W h ite). N ew York: Pantheon.
M cC ague, J. (1 9 6 8 ). The second rebellion: The story o f the New York City draft riots o f 1863.
N ew York: Dial Press.
Chapter 55
Nathan Sznaider
THE COMPASSIONATE
TEMPERAMENT
C
O M P A S S I O N — T H E O R G A N I Z E D C A M P A I G N T O lessen the
suffering o f stran gers— is a distinctly m o d e rn form o f m orality . It played a
historically im portan t role in the rise o f m odern society , and it con tin ues to play an
im portan t role today. And if we understand the nature o f com passion and its
con n ection to social stru ctu re, we can explain many social m ovem en ts today that
oth erw ise seem acciden tal, u n preceden ted, and p o stm o d e rn .
Th e idea that the sight o f suffering im p oses a duty to am eliorate it seem s like it
should be a very old notion but is in fact a very recen t on e. T h ere is a big distance
betw een a duty that once bound saints and one that is now con sidered incum bent
on all reasonable peop le. So little w as sufferin g con sidered an evil before the
nineteenth cen tury that the guardians o f m orality paraded the spectacular suffering
o f evildoers b efore the public as a m ean s of im provem en t. Public hangings c o n
tinued until the end of the eighteenth ccn tury. And during the R efo rm atio n , often
thought o f as the first turning on the road tow ard m od ern ity , people w hose
only crim es w ere doctrin al w ere routinely b urn ed in the city squares o f E u ro p e ’ s
capitals.
T h e m ovem en t to refo rm such cruelties reflected a change in the con ception o f
hum an nature. N o lon ger w ere public displays o f cru clty thought to be salutary.
T hey w ere thought rather to be brutalizin g— to the peop le w ho w atched them . The
idea that w e m ust rem ove “b rutalizin g” con dition s in o rd er to “ civilize” people
developed in tandem w ith the developm en t o f capitalism . C oeval w ith the rise o f
capitalism and its “dark satanic m ills,” as W illiam Blake d escrib ed it, w as a qualita
tively new ou tp ou rin g o f com passion .
C om p assion is the m oral self-organization o f society . Il is the first m oral
cam paign not organ ized by the church or the state. The stru ctu res o f m odern ity arc
what m ake this self-organization o f society possible. And the m oral sentim en ts that
result from this p rocess con stitute qualitatively new social bonds.
4 5 0 NATHAN SZ NAI DE R
My argum ent in a nutshell is that it is in the nature o f m od ern ity to foster

com passion . D esp ite the h istorical re co rd , this is a m in ority view am on g to d ay ’s
in tellectuals. M o st tend to think o f m odern ity as corro siv e o f m oral sen tim en ts.
Thev sec clearly the way in which m odern ity breaks dow n old er social b on ds, but
they are m uch less attentive to the wav in which it builds new ones. And when
w aves o f com passio n break ou t into dem ands for political action , they are forced to
con sider it an atavism , an c x c u sc, a su b terfu g e, or an irrelevan cy. [. . .]
I have tried to show that com passion as m oral sen tim en t and as hum anitarian
praxis exists. I used the exam p le o f children and the cm crg cn ce o f com passion
tow ard them . But can w e really claim that m odern society is a com passion ate
society? Has our ccn tury n ot been the cen tury o f h orror, m ass exterm in ation ,
gen ocide, the c ru e le st and m o st callous con du ct m ankind has ever seen? D o not the
ovens o f the exterm in ation cam ps in the 1940s cry out that com passion is not a
feature o f m od ern ity , especially argued by those w ho see the H o lo cau st even as the
logical con scqu cn cc o f m odern ity? I low can the attem p t to curb violcn cc against
children com pare to these h o rro rs? Is it enough to just have a language that gives us
the opp ortu n ity to recognize these h o rro rs as such and cry out in lam entation about
evil? Is that all that is left?
Clearly this has been the ccntury o f cru elty, and it also has been the ccntury
o f com passion. If w e understand the m oral foundations o f m odern society as the
interplay betw een com passion and barbarism that results from the w o rld ’s m oving
betw een a com m un al m orality and a universal on e, then we w ill be able to see not
only the breakdow n o f ethics but also its con struction and the processes that
accom pany both o f them . T h e French R evolution also played a key role in the
history ol com p assio n . It produced the D eclaration o f the R ights o f M an, perhaps
the founding d ocum en t in the history o f hum an rights, and in its arm ies the ideal
of equality literally con quered E urop e. But the French Revolution w as also the
site o f h orrific cru elty . H ow can these tw o things be recon ciled? Hannah A rendt
gives a d irect answ er: com passion has no placc in politics, and w hen it e n te rs, it
leads to cru cltv. She believes that m odern ity begin s with the m ob s o f the Frcnch
R evolution, and clim axcs in the m o b s o f totalitarianism (A ren dt 1963). For her,
com passion is not politics. I have shown that it is. C om p assion abolishes distance
betw een p e o p le, so says A rendt (sec also Canovan 1992 and Hansen 199 3 ), but it is
exactly distance that can create the kind o f public com passion that A rendt w ould
con sider an oxy m oron . Suffering p e o p le, children, anim als do not have to be turn ed
into ab stract m asses. The danger e x ists; sen tim entality alw ays lurks in the back o f
com passio n, but it is not intrinsic to it. For A ren dt, at the base o f com passion is
disdain for the real suffering o f peop le. It is the cause that b cco m c s im p o rtan t, the
first step to totalitarianism . C om p assion cannot m ake one free. A ren dt m ight be
right here. C om p assion w as not m ean t to m ake one free. But d oes it im prison us?
H er theoretical influence em pow ered an entire tradition suspicious o f m od ern
fo rm s o f politics that do not share the highm indedness o f the Athenian polis.
A rcn d t’s line o f thought con ics to its con scqu cn cc by tryin g to show not only how
m uch totalitarianism is a sign o f m od ern ity , but even m o re: that the realm con
sidered the evilcst o f all by m ost peop le, N azi G erm an y and the concentration
cam p s, the w orld w here com passion en ded, is a consequence o f m odern ity . The
en terin g o f com passion into politics b egot the m ost cruelty o f all, the w orld o f the
T H E C 0 M PA SS I 0 N A T E T E M P E R A M E N T 451
co n cen tratio n cam p. D o e s that m ean that the m o d e rn te m p e ra m e n t is rath er

b arb arian , as M e stro v ic (1 9 9 3 ) arg u e s? C an the H o lo ca u st be co n sid e re d the
b reak d ow n o f c o m p a ssio n ? Is b arb arism the tru e face of m o d e rn ity ? T h u s, the
c ritics of m o d e rn ity arg u e , the b reak d ow n of civilization is p a rt and p a r e d o f
the p ro c e sse s o f ration alizatio n and b u re au cratizatio n . A ren d t hinted to this view ;
H o rk h e im c r and A d o rn o rad icalized it in their Dialectics o f the Enlightenment
(1 9 7 1 ). F ou cau lt and B aum an con tin u ed this view o f m o d c rn itv . For F ou cault
(1 9 6 5 , 1 9 7 7 ), h um an itarian actio n s, w hich I analyzed ab ov e, arc e x p re ssio n s of
d iscip lin e and violen ce. For B aum an (1 9 8 9 ), the atte m p t in m o d c rn itv to create
o r d e r— and p u b lic co m p assio n d o c s, o f c o u r sc , cx ac tlv th at- is a fo rm o f violcn cc
w ith the w o rst co n sc q u c n c c s. B ut is this tru e ? Can it n ot b e argu ed that m o d e rn ity
is a form o f c o n sc io u sn e ss and b e in g that is aw are o f its poten tial for cru e lty
and that trie s to o v e rco m e it in a p ro c e ss o f civilization? But in o r d e r to do this, it
n e e d s c o n c e p ts o f civility , w hich in tu rn ask fo r the re co g n itio n o f o th e r p e o p le ’ s
su fferin g ( i.e ., c o m p a ssio n ). In co m p le te as it m igh t be w hen faccd w ith the
c ru e ltie s o f this w o rld , this state o f m in d and action is only p o ssib le in a m o d e rn ity
o f a sp ecial k in d, n am ely in a d e m o c ra tic m a rk e t so ciety .
T h e q u e stio n re m ain s w h eth er w e talk a b o u t “m o d e rn ity in g e n e ra l” o r
w h e th e r wc talk ab o u t “ p e cu liar G e rm an h isto ry ” w hen talkin g ab o u t the
H o lo ca u st. 1 w ould like to su g g e st that “m o d e rn ity ” the way B aum an u n d e rstan d s il
is to o w eak a c o n c e p t to try to e n c o m p a ss such an event as the H o lo ca u st. T h is
c o m p le te b reak d o w n o f civilization , and w ith it the b reak d ow n o f c o m p a ssio n , w as
first o f all an even t that involved G e rm a n s and Je w s. T h e G e rm an N azis iden tified
th em selv es w ith the h eroic life, w hich thev co n traste d w ith “Je w ish p a ra site s” and
m u n dan e everyday life. N o th in g scared them m o re than the p e rce iv e d declin e o f
h ero ic e th ics, w hich they id en tified — and rightly so — w ith the rise o f co m m e rcia l
c ap italism . But for th em , co m m c rcia l cap italism w as e m b o d ie d in the Jew . T h e
d eclin e o f h ero ic eth ics im p lie d at the sam e tim e a “fem in ization ” o f cu ltu re . B ut the
“ fem in ization ” o f eu ltu re very often m e an t to the N azis the Ju d aizatio n of eu ltu re as
w ell. A n ti-S em itic im ag e ry n o t only iden tified the Je w w ith the so u lle ss sp irit o f
c ap italism , b u t also as an in c o m p le te m an , a w om an actually. H cn cc , for m any w ho
identified the c o m m c rcia l sp irit w ith a d cclin c o f m anly h e ro ism , the iden tification
o f Je w s and w om en w as a lm o st c o m p le te . In m o re so p h isticated fo rm s, on e can
o b se rv e th ese ten d e n c ie s in G e rm an so c io lo g y as w ell. T h e h atred o f the b o u rg e o is
and his sp irit w as cle ar in the w o rk s o f G e rm an social th in kers like T o n n ie s,
S o m b a rt, and Sch eier, often m ix e d w ith an ti-S em itism as w ell.
E lias, in his study titled The Germans (1 9 9 6 ), p o in ts o u t that even d u rin g the end
o f the n in eteen th and b egin n in g o f the tw en tieth cc n tu ry , the so cial statu s o f rich
b an k ers and m e rch an ts w as significantly lo w er than that o f high civil se rv a n ts and
m ilitary m e n . T h e p re d o m in an ce o f the d uel in G e rm an so ciety is a case in p oin t.
E lias talks ab ou t the b o u rg e o isifie d w a rrio r eth os o f W ilh elm in e G e rm an so ciety .
T h is m ilitary eth os w as also d om in an t in the in d u strial sp h e re s o f lives. M any
w ritten te stim o n ie s sp e ak ab o u t the p a ra lle ls o f ru n n in g a facto ry w ith the sam e
m ilitary d iscip lin e as ru n n in g an arm y cam p . T h is m ay n ot have b een typ ical only for
G e rm an y , but th ere it w as h eg e m o n ic. O p p o se d to this n otio n o f G c rm a n n c ss
ro o te d in the so il, d e fe n d ed by w a r rio rs e v e r w illin g lo die an h o n o rab le death
and fight w ith ou t m e rc y and c o m p a ssio n , w as the “h o m e le ss,” the g lo b a l, the
4 5 2 N A T H A N S Z N A I D E R
c o m m e rcia l, in sh o rt, the “ fem in in e” Jew . R em ain in g in the fram ew o rk o f Elias

and his d istin ctio n b e tw e en “ Kultur" and “Zivilisation,” the Jew w as rep re se n tativ e
of civilization and the G e rm an o f cu ltu re. T h e Jew re p re se n te d m on ey and
ab stractio n ; in sh o rt, in the an ti-S em itic G e rm an m in d , the Jew sto o d fo r ro o tle ss
cap italism . I have show n that on e can think of m on ey and “alie n ate d ” relatio n s also
in te rm s o f im p e rso n a l relatio n s b e tw e en p e o p le . O b lig a tio n s arc an o n y m o u s and
are tu rn ed in to se rv ic e s. M on ey th e re fo re ten ds to e x ten d a c o n c e p t o f eq u ality ,
in so far as the p e rce p tio n of in equ ality b c c o m c s b ased u po n d ifferen ces in p e rso n .
T h is m e an s that the p re d o m in an c e o f m o n ev relatio n s can u n in ten tion ally also
fo ste r m o ral relatio n s like co m p a ssio n b etw een stran g e rs. T h e an alysis o f the
m e tro p o lis is a ease in p o in t. W h ile it w as S im m el (1 9 0 0 ) w ho analyzed the
“m e tr o p o lis” as the site o f freed o m fo ste re d by c o m m e rcia liz e d and d e p e rso n a lize d
relation s b etw een p e o p le , the very sam e “ m e tr o p o lis” w as analyzed by G e rm an
so c io lo g ists like S o m b a rt (1 9 1 1 ) and T o n n ie s (1 9 6 5 ) as the site o f alien ated and
cold re la tio n s, as the site w h ere Je w s ru le . T h u s S o m b a rt, in his Jews and Capitalism ,
w ro te , “ N o w the m o d e rn city is n oth in g else but a g re at d e s e r t, as far rem o ved
from the w arm earth as the d e se rt is, and like it fo rcin g its in habitan ts to b e co m e
n o m a d s” (191 1, 4 2 3 , tran slation m in e ). A n d , o f c o u r se , S o m b a rt b elieved the Je w s
to b e n atu ral in habitants o f the d e s e r t, and by e x te n sio n o f the city. D u rin g W ord
W ar I, S o m b a rt, in his Handler und Ilelden (M e rch an ts and H e ro e s; 1 9 1 5 ), to o k
E ngland lo be the m erch an t n ation ( i.e ., civilization ) par c x c c llc n c c , w hile the
G e rm a n s re p re se n te d c o n c re te h eroism ( i .e ., cu ltu re ).
In d eed , so m e th in g d ifferen t w as g o in g on in G e rm an y . In The Germans (1 9 9 6 ),
E lias sp eak s ab ou t fun ction al d e m o c ratiz atio n , the e m e rg e n c e n ot only of a m id d le
c lass, but ol m id d le -class values. In G e rm an y , the a risto c ra tic c o n c e p t ol h o n o r and
glo ry o u tw eig h ed b o u rg e o is c o n c e p ts o f se lf-in te reste d e c o n o m ic behavior. W hat
I trie d to show above is that a m o d e rn n o tio n o l c o m p a ssio n arise s o u t of these
b o u rg e o is, so -called se lf-in te re ste d actio n s. Can w e, th e re fo re , speak o f a G e rm an
“special path ” to h isto ry , a n otion that se e m s to be in creasin gly d iscre d ite d am on g
h istorian s and social scien tists? I b elieve w e should n ot d ism iss G e rm a n y ’ s “ special
path ” rig h t aw ay. E lias (1 9 9 6 ) talked a b o u t “h o n o r” in the c o n tc x t o f the d u e l, a
h abit that in creasin gly b e ca m e d iscre d ite d in c o u n trie s o u tsid e o f G erm an y as an
atavistic re sid u e o f aristo c ra tic c o n d u c t, w hile in G e rm an y itse lf (as show n by
F re v e rt 1991 and M cA le er 1 9 9 4 ) d u e lin g b e ca m e p a rt o f the habitus o f a feudalized
b o u rg e o isie . C le arly , h on or and death are very m uch co n n e c te d in the n otio n o f the
“h on orab le d e a th .” H o n o r is a p o sitio n a l g o o d (in the w o rd s o f C h arles Taylor
1 9 9 2 ); m y h on or is a n o th e r’ s d isg rac e . M y h o n o rab le death is so m e b o d y c ls e ’ s
d isg rac e fu l death . C a ssire r (1 9 4 6 ) has show n how this a risto c ra tic thinking is the
b rid g e to racism and an ti-S em itism . A s E lias p o in ted o u t often en ough in The
Germans, the way from a risto cra tic to N ation al So cialist c o n c e p ts w as sh o rt en ou gh .
W h ile m id d le classe s in o th e r c o u n trie s, esp ecially in the A n g lo -Sax o n c o n te x ts,
d e v e lo p e d n otio n s o f in stitu tion alized c o m p a ssio n , co u n terac tin g in m any w ays the
b ru talitie s and e x c e sse s o f m o d e rn life and co lo n ialism , in G erm an y the b ru taliz a
tion o f the m id d le classe s p reven ted this n otio n o f c o m p a ssio n from e m e rg in g as a
cu ltu ral value.
The m a jo r ch allenge lo this view has b een launch ed by Z y g m u n t B aum an . For
L evinas ( 1 9 9 0 ), the social is an e x ten sio n o f the in te rp e rso n a l. B aum an (1 9 8 9 )
T H E C 0 M PA SS I 0 N A T E T E M P E R A M E N T 4 5 3
m isre ad s L evinas as p ro p agatin g a p reso cial m o rality , a m orality that w ith stan ds
socializatio n , that w ith stan ds so c iety . L e v in a s’s “b ein g w ith o th e rs” is tra n sfo rm e d
in B aum an to a m o ral p rin cip le that o p p o se s socialization . Bv th at, B aum an look s
at the in dividual as o u tsid e o f so c ie ty , even as o p p o se d to so c iety . T h is view is
ah isto rical. It o v e rlo o k s the h istorical and stru c tu ral p re co n d itio n s fo r the e m e r
g e n c e o f in dividualism (as w as don e by Elias 1 9 7 8 ). L evinas (1 9 9 0 ) sp e ak s ab ou t the
e xisten tial m o d a lity o f in teraction b etw een p e o p le , a view that has b een treated
so cio lo gically by M ead (1 9 6 2 ), E lias (1 9 7 8 ), and H a b e rm a s (1 9 6 2 ). B aum an also
“ d c -Ju d a iz c s” L evin as, n e g le ctin g c o m p le te ly the p o in t that fo r L evinas eth ics is
Jew ish eth ics. Je w ish n e ss is the p a rtic u la ristic iden tity that is by nature uni-
v crsa listic. It is ab o u t re lig io u s iden tity . It is a b o u t iden tifyin g the d e e p e st ro o ts
o f Je w ish n e ss w ith m o d e rn ity , n ot as so m e th in g fo re ig n , b u t as so m e th in g the Je w s
in ven ted. It is the an tith esis to the above m en tio n ed G e rm an habitus. R ecall how
S o m b a rt c o m p a re d the city to the d e se rt and located the Je w in both th ose site s. As
o p p o se d to this, the G e rm a n lives in the c o n c rc tc fo re st. F o rest and d e s e r t have
b een the arch etyp al o p p o site s o f G e rm a n s and Je w s. T h is is tru e n o t only in the
an ti-S em itic m in d . L evinas in Difficult Freedom (1 9 9 0 ) tells us that the Jew ish p e rso n
d isco v e rs o th e r p e o p le b e fo re he d isc o v e rs lan d scap es. H e is at h o m e in a society
b e fo re he is at h o m e in a h ou se. To be a Jew m ean s to be fre e , to be d isc o n n cc tc d , to
b e w ith ou t ro o ts. In the w o rd s o f L evinas: “M an is no tre e and m ankin d no fo re st”
(3 6 ). T h is ab stract relation to the o th e r is c o n fu sed by Baum an w ith an aso cio lo g ical
poin t o f view. S im m e l, M e a d , and E lias knew o th e rw ise . And so did the N azis.
W h at I w ant to say w ith all this is that it w as n ot m o d e rn ity that killed the Je w s
d u rin g the H o lo ca u st in the m o st b ru tal m anner. W hat killed the Je w s w as the
d irect o p p o site to th eir b ein g , n am ely the G e rm a n s. To be a G e rm an m ean t first o f
all to be n ot a Jew . For G e rm a n s to be G e rm a n s, the Je w had to d ie , and n o t only
die the n o rm al death o f an en e m y , b u t a death w ith ou t h onor. A death w ith ou t
co m p a ssio n . Th ink ab o u t how Je w s w ere c a rrie d in w ago n s all over E u ro p e for
w eek s ju st fo r the sole p u rp o se of b e in g killed . T h ey w ere den ied an “h on orable
d e a th .” I think G old h agcn (1 9 9 6 ) in his very co n tro v ersial study has p u t his fin ger
on that. It w as n o t “in d ifferen ce” that killed the Je w s , b u t an active, v olu n taristic
dem and to to rtu re and to annihilate th em . Think o f A u sch w itz as a co sm o p o litan
so cicty o f u p ro o te d Je w s , sp eak in g d o z e n s o f lan g u ag es, having n o t m uch in c o m
m on b e sid e s b e in g Je w s. T h is w as the n igh tm arish civilization that G e rm an cu ltu re
cre a te d . A w o rld w ith ou t c o m p a ssio n and w ith o u t eth ics. T h e very an tith esis o f
m o d e rn ity . To b e m o d e rn m ean s n o t to be b arb a ric . To be m o d e rn m ean s to be
able to re c o g n iz e b arb a rism as su ch , to have a c o n c e p t o f it, to b e able to n am e it.
C o m p assio n is key to this.
References
A rendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition. C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press.
------ . 1963. On Revolution. N ew York: Viking.
Baum an, Z ygm unt. 1989. Modernity and the Holocaust. C am bridge: Polity Press.
Canovan, M argaret. 1992. Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation o f Her Thought. C am bridge:
4 5 4 N A T H A N S Z N A I D E R
C assirer, E rn st. 1946. The Myth o f the State. N ew Haven: Yale U niversity Press.
Elias, N o rb e rt. 1978. The Civilizing Process. Edm und Jep h cott, trans. R eprin t, N ew
York: Pantheon. O rig. pub. 1939.
------ . 1996. The Germans. C am bridge: Polity Press.
Foucault, M ichel. 1965. Madness and Civilization. N ew York: Random H ouse.
F rcvcrt, Lite. 1991. “ B ou rgeois H onor: M iddle Class D uelists in G erm an y from the
Late Eighteenth C cntury to the Early Tw entieth C cn tu ry .” In The German
Bourgeoisie, cd. David B lackbourn and Richard J. Evans. London.
G oldhagen, D aniel Jon a. 1996. Hitler’s IYilling Executioners. N ew York: Random
H ouse.
H aberm as, Ju rgen . 1962. Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit. D arm stad t: N euw ied.
H ansen, Phillip. 1993. Hannah Arendt: Politics, History and Citizenship. Stan dford: Stanford
U niversity Press.
H orkheim er, M ax, and T h eod or A dorno. 1971. “Ju liette o d cr Aufklarung und M o ral.”
In Dialektik der Aufklarung. R eprin t, Frankfurt: Fischer. 93. O rig. pub. 1944.
Levinas, E m m anuel. 1990. Difficult Freedom. B altim ore: Johns H opkins U niversity
Press.
M cA leer, Kevin. 1994. Duelling: The Cult o f Honor in Fin-de-Siecle Germany. Princeton:
Princeton U niversity Press.
M cstrovic, Stjepan. 1993. The Barbarian Temperament. London: R outlcdge.
Sim m el, G eorg. 1900. Philosphie des Geldes. Berlin: H um bolt.
So m b art, W erner. 1911. Die fuden und das Wirtschaftslehen. Leipzig: D uncker.
Guide to further reading
This collcction of annotated rcfcrcn ces is intended as a resou rce for fu rth er study on cach o f
the areas ad dressed in the diff erent Parts o f the R eader. Wc have also included a section
specifically devoted to the ‘affective tu rn ’ . As the literatu re in cach of these areas is rapidly
expan ding, the list aim s to be suggestive and illustrative rath er than com prehen sive.
General
A rm on Jo n e s, C . (1 9 9 1 ) Varieties o f Affect. L on don : H arv ester W heatsheaf. (A sustained

argum en t ab out the intentionality and rationality o f em otion al states by an influential
figure in the developm en t o f a social con stru ction ist accoun t o f affect.)
A verill, J. (1 9 8 2 ) Anger and Aggression: an essay on emotion. N ew York: Springer-V crlag. (Based
on em pirical and theoretical w ork on anger, this volum e is also a classic ex am p le o f a
social con stru ction ist approach to em otio n in g e n e ra l.)
C alh oun , C. and S o lo m o n , R. (ed s) (1 9 8 4 ) What is an Emotion? Classic readings in philosophical
psychology. O x fo rd : O x fo rd U niversity P ress. (A collcction draw ing to ge th e r classic
readin gs on em otio n by A risto tle, D e sc a rte s, Spinoza, H um e, D arw in , Jam e s and Freud;
the last tw o section s includc readin gs by tw en tieth-century E uropean and Anglo-
A m erican p h ilosop h ers.)
D am asio, A. R . (1 9 9 9 ) The Feeling of What Happens: body and emotion in the making of
consciousness. N ew York: H arcou rt Brace. (An influential n euroscientific accoun t based
on the distin ction betw een ‘e m o tio n ’ as physical p ro cc ss and ‘fe elin g’ as con scious
e x p e rie n c e .)
D e Sousa, R . (1 9 8 7 ) The Rationality o f Emotion. C am b rid ge, M A : M IT Press. (An in terestin g
and influential philosoph ical argu m en t from w ithin a b roadly cognitive tradition co n
cern in g the w ays in w hich em otional vocabu laries arc learned via the application o f
paradigm atic scen arios from early life c x p c ric n c c .)
4 5 6 G U I D E TO F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
F rijda, N. (1 9 9 3 ) The Emotions. C am b rid ge : C am b rid ge U niversity Press. (A classic and

highly influential te x t in the psychology o f em o tio n s that takes a cognitive ‘ inform ation
p ro c e ssin g ’ approach to em otio n s as events related to con cern -b ased ap praisals that
m odify states o f action -readin ess.)
G riffith s, P. (1 9 9 7 ) What Emotions Really Are: the problem o j psychological categories. C h icago:
U n iversity o f C h icago P ress. (T his te x t presen ts a psychoevolution ary approach to
em otio n w ith a critical review o f altern ative existin g m o d els. O n e ch apter is dedicated
to the discussion o f social co n stru ctio n ism .)
K agan , ]. (2 0 0 7 ) What is Emotion? History, measures and meanings. N ew Haven: Yale U n iversity
Press. (An overview o f em otio n s by a H arvard em eritu s p ro fesso r o f psych ology,
in tegrating findings from an th ropology , b io lo gy , and psy ch o lo gy .)
K atz, J. (2 0 0 0 ) How Emotions Work. C h icago: U niversity o f C h icago P ress. (T his b ook
com b in es h erm en eu tic, p h en om en ological and in teraction ist accoun ts o f em otion with
evolution ary theory and is particularly stron g w ith re sp e ct to the com m unicative fu n c
tions o f em otio n al scenes. C h apters con centrate on anger, laughter, crying and sham e
through a se rie s o f im aginative stud ies involving ‘ pissed o ff’ d riv ers, fun-fair distortin g
m irro rs, w hinging children and con fessin g m u rd e re rs.)
L c D o u x , J. (1 9 9 9 ) The Emotional Brain. Lon don: Phoenix. (An influential tex t on the
neurophysiology o f em otio n s draw ing upon a w ealth o f exp erim en tal data in su p p o rt o f a
thesis for the prim acy o f affect w ith rc sp c ct to ‘h igh er’ fo rm s o f cognitive pro cessin g).
N u ssb au m , M . (2 0 0 1 ) Upheavals o f Thought: the intelligence o f emotions. C am b rid ge:
C am b rid ge U n iversity P ress. (A provocative con tribu tion to the debate around the
rationality o f e m otio n s by a prom in en t U S ph ilosoph er.)
O atlcy , K. and Jen k in s, J. M . (1 9 9 6 ) Understanding Emotions. O x fo rd : B lackw ell. (A te x t
book w ritten by tw o w ell-establish ed psy ch o lo gists that im pressively spans across a
broad range o f disciplin es and con sid ers em otio n s as functional elem en ts in a broadly
developm en tal c o n te x t.)
Panksepp J. (1 9 9 8 ) Affective Neuroscience: thefoundations o j human and animal emotions. O x fo rd :
O x fo rd U n iversity Press. (An attem p t to define a new field o f n euroscien ce based on the
study o f affect.)
Parkinson, B ., Fischer, A. H. and M an stead , A. S. R . (2 0 0 5 ) Emotion in Social Relations:
cultural, group, and interpersonal processes. H ove: P sych ology P ress. (A n overview and
in tergration o f a large am oun t o f em pirical data dem on stratin g the im plication o f
em otio n s in social events and in the allignm en t o f relation ships bew teen p e o p le .)
P arrott, C . W. (2 0 0 1 ) Emotions in Social Psychology: key readings. Philadelphia: Psychology
Press. (A collection o f inlluential articles on the nature o f em otio n s and th cr ro le in
social psy ch o lo gical ph en om en a.)
R o rty , A. O . (c d .) (1 9 8 0 ) Explaining Emotions. Berkeley: U niversity o f C aliforn ia Press.
(An edited collcction w ith co n tribu tion s from n um erous influential auth ors that tackles
the classification o f em otio n s from n europ h vsiological, p sy ch o lo gical and philosophical
p e rsp e ctiv e s.)
Sch crcr, K . and E km an, P. (cd s) (1 9 8 4 ) Approaches lo Emotion. H illsdale, N J: E rlb aum . (A
classic collcction edited by tw o prom in ent psy ch o lo gists o f em otion which brings
togeth er the w ork o f m any o f the m o st influential psy ch o lo gists o f em otion o f the
tw entieth cen tu ry .)
S o lo m o n , R. (1 9 7 6 ) The Passions. N ew York: A n ch o r/D o u b led av . (An influential accoun t
o f the passion s w hich takes issue with their con stru ction in con tradistin ction to
ration ality.)
S o lo m o n , R. (e d .) (2 0 0 4 ) Thinking about Heeling: contemporary philosophers on emotion. O x fo rd :
O x fo rd U niversity P ress. (A collection o f essays by co n tem p o rary A n glo-A m erican
ph ilosoph ers w ith in terdisciplin ary in terests.)
G U ! D E TO F U RT H E R R E A D I N G 4 5 7
Affective turn
Ball, K . and R cstu ccia, F. (cd s) (2 0 0 7 ) Traumatizing Theory: the cultural politics o f affect in and
beyond psychoanalysis. N ew York: O th er Press. (A collection o f essays that go beyond
psychoanalysis in rethinking the cultural significance of trau m atic an xiety, m elan ch oly,
and the rep resen tation o f sufferin g in testim on y, self-n arration , and p o litics.)
Blackm an, L. and C ro n ib v, J. (2 0 0 7 ) International Journal o f Critical Psychology. Special issue
on ‘ A ffect and F eelin g’ . 21. (A collection o f essays from au th ors critical o f m ainstream
e x p erim en tal psy ch o lo gy .)
Brennan, T. (2 0 0 3 ) The Transmission o f Affect. Ithaca: C o rn ell U niversity Press. (T his b ook
ad dresses the b e lie f that the em otio n s and en ergies o f one perso n o r g ro u p can be
ab sorbed by o r can e n ter directly into another. The au th or details the relationships
am on g alTcct, en ergy , and “new m aladies o f the so u l," including attention deficit
disord er, chronic fatigue sy n d rom e, co d cp cn d en cy , and fib rom yalgia.)
D cleu/.e, G . (1 9 8 8 ) Spinoza: practical philosophy. San Fran scisco, C A : City Lights Books.
(A uthoritative discussion o f Sp in oza’s con ception o f affect that decisively influenced the
affective tu rn .)
M assum i, B. (2 0 0 2 ) Parables o f the Virtual: movement, affect, sensation. D u rh am , N C : D uke
U niversity Press. (A key referen ce for the ‘ affective tu rn ’ , M assum i ren ew s and assesses
W illiam Ja m e s’ s radical em piricism and H enri B e rg so n ’s philosophy o f p crccp tion
through the filter o f the post-w ar French philosophy o f D eleu ze, G u attari, and F ou cault.)
M iller, W. I. (1 9 9 8 ) The Anatomy oj Disgust. C am b rid ge : H arvard U niversity Press. (P resen ts
disgust in relation to the draw ing o f b oun daries and poin ts to the d epen den cy o f
d em ocracy upon class b oun daries organ ised via d isgu st.)
N gai, S. (2 0 0 5 ) Ugly Feelings: literature, affect and ideology. C am b rid ge : H arvard U niversity
Press. (M akes the case that ‘ u n p re stigio u s’ negative affects such as envy, irritation and
paranoia are particularly diagn ostic o f late m odern cultu re and discu sses cu riou sitics
such as ‘an im ated n ess’ and ‘stu p lim ity ’ .)
R eddin g, P. (1 9 9 9 ) The Logic o f Affect. Ithaca: C o rn ell U n iversity Press. (M akes a h istorical
case for the relevance o f the idealism and G erm an Naturphilosophie to the con tem p orary
psychology o f affect).
R ilev, D. (2 0 0 5 ) Impersonal Passion: language as affect. D urh am , N C : D uke U niversity
Press. (A fem inist th eo rist and p o e t, Riley exam in es the em otion ality o f everyday
lan guage.)
Sed gw ick, E. K . and Frank, A. (e d s) (1 9 9 5 ) Shame and its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader.
D u rh am , N C : D uke U n iversity Press. (A collection o f the w ork o f Silvan Tom kins with
som e original essays from oth er au th ors using his w o rk .)
Sed g w ick , E. K . (2 0 0 3 ) Touching Feeling: affect, pedagogy, performativity. D urh am , N C : D uke
U n iversity Press. (B est know n for her w ork in q u eer th eory, this author dravvns upon the
ph en om en ology o f em otio n and the w ork o f Tom kins to develop the notion o f affects as
m o tiv ato rs o f p erfo rm ativ ity .)
Terada, R . (2 0 0 3 ) Feeling in Theory: emotion after the 'death o f the subject'. N ew Haven M A :
H arvard U niversity Press. (A p o ststru ctu ralist and decon stru ctive p e rsp ectiv e on the
relation betw een em otion and su b jectiv ity , en gagin g deb ates in ph ilosoph y, literary
criticism , psychology and cognitive scicn cc.)
T icin eto C lou gh , P. and H ailey, J. (2 0 0 7 ) The Affective Turn: theorizing the social. D urh am ,
N C : D uke U niversity Press. (A collcction of essays on the ‘affective tu rn ’ , ad dressin g the
im plication s o f this m ovem en t fo r theorizing new con figurations o f b o d ies, tech n ologies
and m atter.)
Em otions, h istory an d civilization
Bound A lb erti, F. (cd ) (2 0 0 6 ) Medicine, Emotion and Disease, 1700 1950. L on don : Palgravc
M acm illan. (An edited collection o f co n tribu tion s from sch olars w ork in g on the history
of m edicine w ho ad dress m edical co n stru ctio n s o f the relation betw een em otion and
d isease.)
B ou rk e, J. (2 0 0 6 ) Fear: a cultural history. Sh oem ak er and H o ard . (A survey o f fear in the ‘long
tw entieth c e n tu ry ’ ).
C u b b itt, C . (2 0 0 1 ) Early Medieval Europe. Special issue on ‘The history o f e m o tio n s: a
d e b ate ’ . 10 (2 ). (A collcction o f five articles along w ith an in troduction dealing with
broadly h istoriograph ical issu es around the study o f e m otio n s in M edieval E u ro p e.)
Jam e s, S. (1 9 9 9 ) Passion and Action: the emotions in seventeenth-century philosophy. O x fo rd :
O x fo rd U n iversity Press. (T his b o o k exam in es the role o f em otio n s in seventeenth-
century philosophical u n derstan din gs o f the m in d-body relation and o f the reason in g /
action interface. It provides a grou n d in g in A ritotclian and T h o m ist con ception s of passion
and action b efore con cen tratin g on D csc a rtc s, M eleb ran ce, H o bb es and Spin oza.)
O atley , K . (2 0 0 4 ) Emotions: a brief history. O x fo rd : B lackw ell. (An attem p t to synthesize
ancient and m o d ern accoun ts of affect by a p rom in en t cogntive psy ch o lo gist. C om b in es
a conventional notion o f h istory w ith evolutionary and developm en tal ‘h isto rie s’ .)
R eddy , W. (2 0 0 1 ) The Navigation oj Feeling: a framework for the history of emotions. C am b rid ge:
C am b rid ge U n iversity Press. (A theory o f em otio n s and historical chan gc, draw ing on
m ultidisciplinary so u rce s, and critical o f stron g con stru ction ist ap pro ach es to em otio n .
The theory is applied in an investigation o f R evolutionary Fran ce).
R osen w ein , B. H. (e d .) (1 9 9 8 ) Anger’s Past: the social uses o f an emotion in the Middle Ages.
Ithaca: C o rn ell U n iversity Press. (A collection o f essays on the m eaning and u ses of anger
in m edieval E u ro p e).
R osen w ein , B. H . (2 0 0 6 ) Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages. Ithaca: C orn ell
U niversity P ress. (A study o f em otion al d isco u rse in the Early M iddle A ges and a
con tribu tion to the d eb ates am on g h istorians and social scien tists ab out the nature o f
hum an e m o tio n s. The author p ro p o se s the notion o f ‘em otio n al c o m m u n itie s’ and
e x p lo re s it through various case stu d ies.)
S o rab ji, R . (2 0 0 0 ) Emotion and Peace o f Mind: from Stoic agitation to Christian temptation.
O x fo rd : O x fo rd U niversity Press. (A study o f ancicnt G reek view s on passions and their
influence on the subsccjuen Christian tradition o f sch olarsh ip .)
Stearn s, C. and Ste arn s, P. (1 9 8 6 ) Anger: the struggle fo r emotional control in America's history.
C h icago: U n iversity o f C h icago P ress. (T he te x t in augurating ‘ e m o tio n o lo g y ’ as a field o f
study fo r h istorians. The auth ors trace the developm en t o f an ger over tw o cen turies
beginn in g w ith p rcm o d c rn colonial A m erica, draw ing on diaries and p op u lar advice
literatu re.)
Stearn s, P. (1 9 8 9 ) Jealousy: the evolution oj an emotion in American history. N ew York: N ew
York U niversity Press. (P articularly in terestin g w ith re sp cct to the ro le played by p sy ch o
logical kn ow ledge in tran sform in g the cultu ral m eanin gs o f jealousy to suit early
tw entieth-cen tury social arran gem en ts.)
Stearn s, P. (1 9 9 4 ) American Cool: constructing a twentieth-century emotional style. N ew York and
L on don : N ew York U n iversity P ress. (An in terestin g application o f S te arn s’ notion o f
shifting fo rm s o f cm o tio n o lo gy to the n otion o f ‘c o o l’ .)
Stearn s, P. (2 0 0 6 ) American Fear: the causes and consequences o f high anxiety. N ew York:
R ou tle d ge . (A study o f how A m ericans have traditionally coped w ith and m anaged their
an xieties in the p ast, and how the m edia, b u sin esses, and the go vern m en t have h isto ric
ally used fear to m anipulate the co n su m e rs and the public. Stearn s argues that c o n tro l
ling fear has b e co m e a significant problem in A m erican so c iety .)
G U I D E TO F U R T H E R R E A D I N G 4 5 9
Z e ld in , T. (1 9 8 2 ) A History o j French Passions. O x fo r d : C lare n d o n P ress. (An atte m p t to

exp lain the id io sy n cracics o f the Fren ch w ith re sp e c t to a ran ge o f issu es su ch as national
id en tity , taste in a r t, n o tio n s o f h ap p in e ss, frien d sh ip and quality o f life, e tc .)
E m otions an d culture
A b u -L u g h o d , L . ( 1 9 9 9 ) Veiled Sentiments: honour and poetry in a Bedouin society. B erk eley :

U n iv e rsity o f C h icago P re ss. (A p o ststr u c tu r a list in fo rm e d social c o n stru c tio n ist acco u n t
b ase d on e th n o grap h ic w o rk in a B e d o u in s o c ie ty .)
B o e lsto rff, T. and L in d q u ist, J. (e d s) (2 0 0 4 ) Ethnos. Sp ecial issu e on ‘ B o d ie s o f e m o tio n :
reth in k in g cu ltu re and e m o tio n th ro u gh Sou th ea st A sia ’ . 6 9 (4 ). (A c o lle c tio n o f
a rtic le s illu stratin g the ro le o f e m o tio n s in the tu rn to e m b o d im e n t a m o n g st an th ro
p o lo g ists.)
B rig g s, J. L . (1 9 7 0 ) Never in Anger: portrait o j an Eskimo family. C a m b r id g e : H a rv a rd U n i
v e rsity P re ss. (A n influen tial an th ro p o lo g ic al stud y o f the Inuit w ith so m e o b se rv a tio n s
ab o u t the c u ltu ral p re ssu re to con tain a g g r e ssio n .)
G r im a , B. (1 9 9 2 ) The Performance o f Emotion among Paxtun Women. A u stin : U n iv e rsity o f T exas
P ress. (B a sed on e th n o grap h ic field w ork am o n g an Islam ic, P a x to -sp cak in g g ro u p
living in both A fghan istan and Pakistan . C o n c e n tra te s on ritu alistic sto rie s o f g r ie f and
sa d n e ss.)
H ard m an , C . ( 2 0 0 0 ) Other Worlds: notions o f se lf and emotion among the Lohorung Rai. O x fo r d :
Berg. (A n e th n o grap h ic stud y o f the L o h o ru n g R ai o f E aste rn N e p a l.)
H a rre , R . (e d .) (1 9 8 9 ) The Social Construction o f Emotion. O x fo r d : B lack w ell. (A m u ch cited
in te rd iscip lin ary co lle c tio n o f essay s on the social c o n stru c tio n o f e m o tio n .)
H o vlan d , I. (c d ) ( 2 0 0 7 ) Anthropology Matters. Sp ecial issu e on ‘ Field in g E m o tio n s’ . 9 (1 ).
(A co lle ctio n o f a rtic le s d ealin g w ith v a rio u s m e th o d o lo g ic al and th e o retical issu es
c o n c e rn in g the stud y o f e m o tio n and the ro le o f e m o tio n in the re se arch p r o c e ss.)
K itay am a, S. and M a rk u s, H . R . (e d s) (1 9 9 4 ) Emotion and Culture: empirical studies o j mutual
influence. W ash in gton , D C : A m erican P sy ch o lo gical A sso c iatio n . (A n ap p ro ach to e m o
tion and cu ltu re draw n from the e m p iric a l trad itio n s o f c ro ss cu ltu ral p sy c h o lo g y .)
L u tz, C . A . (1 9 8 8 ) Unnatural Emotions: everyday sentiments on a Alicronesian atoll and their
challenge to Western theory. C h ic a g o : U n iv ersity o f C h icago P re ss. (A n eth n ograp h y
o f e m o tio n a l life on a Pacific islan d and an e x e m p la ry stud y in the c o n stru c tio n ist
tra d itio n .)
Lynch , O . M . (e d .) (1 9 9 0 ) Divine Passions: the social construction o f emotion in India. B erk eley :
U n iv e rsity o f C alifo rn ia P re ss. (A c o llc c tio n o f p a p e rs largely sp ecializin g on th e ro le
played by re lig io n in sh apin g e m o tio n a l e x p re ssio n in In dia.)
M a n stcad , A . S. R . and Fischer, A. H . (c d s) ( 2 0 0 2 ) Cognition and Emotion. Sp e cial issu e on
‘ C u ltu re and e m o tio n ’ . 16 (1 ). (E igh t a rtic le s p re se n tin g c ro ss-c u ltu ral an alyses o f
v ario u s asp e c ts o f e m o tio n . T h e in tro d u c to ry essay by the e d ito r s re v ie w s key p o sitio n s
on the ‘ u n iv e rsa lity -sp c c ific ity ’ d ic h o to m y .)
M ilto n , K . and S v a sck , M . (c d s) ( 2 0 0 5 ) Mixed Emotion: anthropological studies o f feeling.
O x fo r d : Berg. (T h is b o o k a tte m p ts a co n c ise in tro d u ctio n to the a n th ro p o lo g y o f e m o
tio n s w hich is sen sitiv e to the co n n e c tio n s b e tw e en e m o tio n s, m e m o r y , c o n sc io u sn e ss,
id en tity and p o litic s.)
M ilto n , K . (2 0 0 2 ) Loving Nature: towards an ecology' o f emotion. L o n d o n : R o u tle d g e . (A
so cial an th ro p o lo g ist e x p lo r e s the m e an in gs o f n atu re in W estern so c ie tie s and cu ltu re ,
p a rtic u la rly in relation to how e m o tio n a l c o m m itm e n ts to w a rd s n atu re are d e v e lo p e d .)
O ’ N e il, T. D. (1 9 9 8 ) Disciplined Hearts: history, identity and depression in an American Indian
community. Berkeley and I.os A n geles: U n iversity o f C aliforn ia Press. (An enthopsycho-
logical study o f d epression am on g the Flathead Indian p eo p le o f M ontan a, by a m edical
an th ro p o lo gist.)
R osaldo , M . Z . (1 9 8 0 ) Knowledge and Passion: llongot notions o f se lf and social life. C am b rid ge:
C am b rid ge U n iversity P ress. (An ethnography o f a g ro u p o f h un ters and h orticu ltu rists
from N o rth ern Luzon in the Philippines with a focus on the practice o f headhunting.)
Shw eder, R . A. and L cV inc, R . A. (c d s) (1 9 8 4 ) Culture Theory: essays on mind, self and emotion.
C am b rid ge: C am b rid ge U n iversity P ress. (An influential collcction o f articles articu lat
ing the relationship betw een cultu re and psychology w ith a particu lar em ph asis on
e m o tio n .)
Ste w art, K . (2 0 0 7 ) Ordinary Affects. D urh am , N C : D uke U niversity Press. (A n exam p le o f
the ‘affective tu rn ’ in an th rop o lo gy .)
W ierzbick a, A. (1 9 9 9 ) Emotions across Languages and Cultures: diversity and universals.
C am b rid ge: C am b rid ge U niversity P ress. (A con tribu tion to the debate on the u n i
versality or cultural specificity o f em otio n s from a linguistics ap p ro ach .)
W ulff, H . (c d .) (2 0 0 8 ) The Emotions: A Cultural Reader O x fo rd : Berg. (A collcction o f w ork
that highlights so m e o f the theoretical and m eth od o logical issu es at play in the cultural
con struction o f em o tio n .)
Em otions an d society
Barbalet, J. (2 0 0 1 ) Emotions, Social Theory, and Social Structure. C am b rid ge : C am b rid ge U n i

versity Press. (A study o f the role o f em otio n s such as fear, resen tm en t, sham e and
confidence in social p ro ce sse s.)
Barbalet, J. (c d .) (2 0 0 2 ) Emotions and Sociology. O x fo rd and M alden, M A: W iley-Blackw ell.
(A collection o f eigh t essays on em otio n s by so cio lo g ists from five co u n tries, cach
focusin g on a specific subfield including political so cio lo gy , econ om ic sociology and the
sociology o f scien ce.)
Becker, D. (e d .) (2 0 0 4 ) Soziale Systeme. Special issue on ‘Wo/.u G efiih le?’ . 10 (1 ). (A special
issue critically ad dressin g Luhm annian theory in relation to em otio n s w ith articles in
G erm an and E nglish.)
Bcndclow , G. and W illiam s, S. J. (ed s) (1 9 9 8 ) Emotions in social Life: critical themes and
contemporary issues. L on don : R o u tlcd gc. (An edited collcction design ed to illustrate the
value o f taking an em otio n s p ersp ectiv e in socio lo gical research and social th e o ry .)
D enzin, N . (1 9 8 4 ) On Understanding Emotion. San Fran cisco: Jossey-B ass. (A p h en om en o
logical approach to the study o f e m o tio n .)
E lliott, A. and L c m e rt, C . (2 0 0 6 ) The New Individualism: The Emotional Costs o f Globali/.ation.
London and N ew York: R o u tlc d gc . (A im in g to challenge the o rth o d o xy w hereby g lo b a l
ization c o rro d c s private life, this tex ts exam in es p e o p le ’ s em otio n al ex p e rie n c e s o f
copin g w ith new in dividualism .)
Fish, J. S. (2 0 0 5 ) Defending the Durkheimian Tradition: religion, emotion and morality. A ld ersh ot:
A shgatc. (An im portan t con tribu tion to the study o f D urkhcim and the D urkheim ian
trad ition , this book argues that religion is an essen tial back drop for un derstan din g
e m o tio n .)
Fran ks, D. D. (c d .) (1 9 8 5 ) Symbolic Interaction. Spccial issue on ‘The sociology o f e m o tio n s’ .
8 (2 ). (Includes articles by D enzin, Scheff, Baldw in, Loflan d, Z urch er, W asielew ski,
H arris and Sand reski.)
K em per. T. (e d .) (1 9 9 0 ) Research Agendas in the Sociology o f Emotions. N ew York: State
U niversity o f N ew York Press. (A collection o f essays by so cio lo gists o f em otion
exem plifyin g ap pro ach es that range from positiv ist to social co n stru ctio n ist).
G U I D E TO F U R T H E R R E A D I N G 4 6 1
Sch cff, T. (1 9 9 4 ) Microsociology: discourse, emotion, and social structure. C h ic a g o : U n iv e rsity o f

C h icago P re ss. (A th e o ry o f the m icro fo u n d a tio n s o f social stru c tu re b ase d on the
analysis o f m o tiv atio n al sy ste m s, to w hich e m o tio n s are c e n tr a l.)
Scheflf, T. J. ( 1 9 9 7 ). Emotions, the social bond, and human reality: Part/whole analysis. N ew
Y ork: C a m b rid g e U n iv e rsity P ress. (A sy n th esis o f social th e o ry , m ic ro so c io lo g y and
p sy c h o lo g y by on e o f the p io n e e rs o f the so c io lo g y o f e m o tio n that y ield s a p ro m isin g
m e th o d o lo g ic al o r ie n ta tio n .)
S te ts, J. E. and T u rn er, J. II. (e d s) (2 0 0 6 ) Handbook o j the Sociology o j Emotion. Sp rin ger.
(A n e ar-c o m p re h e n siv e review' o f d e v e lo p m e n ts in the so c io lo g y o f e m o tio n o v e r the
last th irty y e ars. In cludes a se ctio n o rg an ise d by fo c u s on sp e cific e m o tio n s — and m u ch
m o r e .)
T u rn er, J. H . and S te ts, J. E. ( 2 0 0 5 ) The Sociology o f Emotions. C a m b r id g e : C a m b rid g e
U n iv ersity P re ss. (R e v ie w s th e o retic al and e m p iric a l w o rk in the so c io lo g y o f e m o tio n ,
grou ped into seven b asic ap p ro a c h e s: c u ltu ra l, d r a m a tu rg ic a l, in te ractio n ritu a l,
sy m b o lic in te ra c tio n ist, e x c h an g e , stu c tu ra l, and b io lo g ic a l.)
W illiam s, S. (2 0 0 1 ) Emotions and Social Theory: corporeal reflections on the (ir)rational. L o n d o n :
Sage. (A n o v e rv iew o f so cial th e o retical w o rk on e m o tio n s w ith a c o n c e rn to c ritiq u e the
r e a s o n /e m o tio n d istin c tio n .)
E m otion, self an d identity
B o sm a , H . A . and Sask ia K u n n en , E. (e d s) (2 0 0 8 ) Identity and Emotion: development through

self-organization. C a m b r id g e : C a m b rid g e U n iv e rsity P re ss.(A c o lle c tio n o f a u th o rs takin g
a d y n am ic sy ste m s ap p ro ac h to s e lf and id en tity as se lf-o rgan iz in g p r o c e sse s ro o te d in
e m o tio n a l d y n am ic s.)
C a m p b e ll, J. R . and R ew , A . (1 9 9 9 ) Identity and Affect: experiences o f identity in a globalising
world. L o n d o n : P lu to P re ss. (B a sed on case stu d ie s o f local id e n titie s and th eir affective
asp e c ts in South A sia, E ast A frica , M elan esia and E u ro p e .)
C ra w fo r d , J . , K ip p a x , S ., O n y x , J ., G a u lt, U . and B e n to n , P. (1 9 9 2 ) Emotion and Gender:
constructing meaning from memories. L o n d o n : Sage. (E x p lo r e s the relatio n s b e tw e en e m o
tio n , m e m o ry and iden tity in situ atio n s o f fear, an g e r and h ap p in ess u sin g ‘ m e m o ry
w o rk ’ m e th o d o lo g y .)
Fisher, A . ( c d .) (2 0 0 0 ) Gender and Emotion: social psychological perspectives. C a m b rid g e :
C a m b rid g e U n iv e rsity P re ss. (A c o lle c tio n o f essay s in vestigatin g the ste re o ty p e o f
w o m e n as the ‘ e m o tio n a l s e x ’ , su rv ey in g a w id e ran ge o f sp ecific e m o tio n s on the b asis
o f so cial p sy c h o lo g ical re se a rc h .)
L c tw in , O . ( 1 9 8 7 ) Ethics, Emotion and the Unity o f the Self. N e w York: M eth u en . (A p h ilo
soph ical ex am in a tio n and c ritiq u c o f the ro le o f s e lf in ro m a n tic ism .)
L u p to n , D. ( 1 9 9 8 ) The Emotional Self: a sociocultural exploration. L o n d o n : Sage. (A social
c o n stru c tio n ist analysis o f the re la tio n s b e tw e en s e lf and e m o tio n s that draw’s u p o n a
b road ly p o ststr u c tr u c tu r a list n o tio n o f d isc o u rse .)
M u n t, S. R . (2 0 0 7 ) Qiieer Attachments: the cultural politics of shame. L o n d o n : A sh gate. (D e a ls
w ith the ro le o f sh am e in tran sfo rm a tio n a l n arrativ es as p o rtray e d in p o p u la r and p u b lic
c u ltu re s, w ith a p a rtic u la r e m p h asis on L G B T id en tity issu e s.)
N ath an so n , D. L . ( 1 9 9 4 ) Shame and Pride: ajfect, sex, and the birth oj the self. N e w York:
N o r to n . (A n e x te n sio n and ap p licatio n o f T o m k in s’ th eo ry o f affect w h ich m ak es the
case fo r the ce n trality o f affect to the e m e rg e n c e and fo rm a tio n o f se lf.)
P ro b y n , E . (2 0 0 5 ) Blush: Faces o f shame. M in n e ap o lis: U n iv e rsity o f M in n eso ta P re ss. (An
co n fro n tatio n o f T o m k in s’ co n c e p tio n o f sh am e and B o u rd ie u ’s n otio n o f h abitus
d e v e lo p e d as a re so u rc e fo r reth in k in g ‘ w h o w e arc and w ho we w an t to b e ’ .)
462 G U I D E TO F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
Sch ocm an , F. (c d .) (1 9 8 7 ) Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: new essays in moral
philosophy. (An edited volum e o f essays on m oral philosophy w hich ad d ress the relation
ship betw een em otio n s and the responsibility individuals have for their actions and
c h aracters.)
Sh ields, A . S. (2 0 0 2 ) Speaking from the Heart: gender and the social meaning o f emotion.
C am b rid ge: C am b rid ge U n iversity Press. (A study o f how culturally shared b eliefs about
em otio n are used lo shape o u r iden tities as w om en and m e n .)
T om kins, S. and I/./.ard, C . (cd s) (1 9 6 5 ) Affect, Cognition and Personality. N ew York: Springer.
(An early collection o f psych ological w ork on the cognitive scrip tin g o f affect into
personality stru c tu re s.)
Em otion, space an d place
A n d erson , K. and Sm ith, S. (c d s) (2 0 0 1 ) Transactions of the Institute o f British Geographers.

Special issue on ‘ E m otion al g e o g ra p h ie s’ . 26. (A collcction o f essays illustratin g the
affcctive turn in geo g rap h y .)
Brandstattcr, H . and E liasz, A. (cd s) (2 0 0 1 ) Persons, Situations and Emotions: an ecological
approach. O x fo rd : O x fo rd U niversity P ress. (A collcction that e xam in es the ro le o f
tem p e ram en t, person ality and situation variables in everyday em otion al c x p c ric n c c in
real-w orld settin gs, using tim e-sam p lin g diaries.)
B run o, G. (2 0 0 2 ) Atlas o f Emotion. L on don : Verso. (An in terestin g attem p t to m ap the
cultu ral history o f the visual a rts w hich tou ch es upon a range o f fields including
geograph y, arch itectu re, film and d e sign .)
C atald i, S. I.. (1 9 9 3 ) Emotion, Depth and Flesh: a study o f sensitive space. A lbany, NY: State
U n iversity o f N ew York. (F.xplorcs the to p ic o f em otional depth draw ing on the w ork o f
ecological p sy ch o lo gist J. J. G ibson and ph en om en ologist M . M crlcau-P o n ty .)
D avidson , J. (2 0 0 3 ) Phobic Geographies: the phenomenology' and spatiality o f identity. A ld ersh ot:
A shgale. (A geograph ical study o f agoraph obia that expan ds the understan din g o f the
relation betw een gen der, em b o d im en t, space and m ental health .)
D avidson , J. and B ondi, L. (cds) (2 0 0 4 ) Gender, Place St^Culture. Special issue on ‘ Spatialising
affect; affecting sp a c e ’ . 11. (T h eoretical and m eth od o logical reflection s on the relation
ship betw een spacc and aflect.)
D avidson , J ., B ondi, L. and Sm ith, M . (e d s) (2 0 0 7 ) Emotional Geographies. A ld ersh ot:
A shgate. (An interdisciplin ary collection gath ering w ork by ge o g ra p h ers and so c io lo
gists, this b o o k e x p lo re s key in tersection s betw een em otio n s and co n cep ts o f spacc and
em b o d im e n t.)
D avidson , J. and M illigan, C . (cd s) (2 0 0 4 ) Social and Cultural Geography. Spccial issue on
‘ E m otion al g e o g ra p h ie s’ . 5 (4 ). (A collcction o f articles on different asp ects o f em otion
in relation to spacc, place, and e m b o d im e n t.)
T h rift, N. (2 0 0 8 ) Non-representational Theory: space/politics/affect. L ondon: R o u tlcd gc. (A
collcction o f T h rifts essays on w hich presen ts an approach to the politics o f everyday life
grou n ded in the notion of affcct.)
E m otion a n d health
A nzieu, D. (1 9 8 9 ) The Skin Ego. N ew H aven, M A : Yale U niversity Press. (A psychoanalytic

approach to em b od ied affect and h ealth.)
C hiozza, I.. A. (1 9 9 8 ) Hidden Affects in Somatic Disorders. M adison, C on n ecticu t: The
P sychosocial Press. (P resen ts an overview o f the path obiograph ical technique for
accessin g the uncon scious m ean ings o f illness as developed at the W eizsackcr C e n te r in
Buenos A ries.)
G rec o , M . (1 9 9 8 ) Illness as a Work o f Thought: a Foueaultian perspective on psychosomatics.
L on don : R ou tle d ge . (A gen ealo gy o f p sy ch o so m atic d isco u rse that com b in es Foucaultian
and Eliasian influences. Particularly relevant is the historical and theoretical focus on the
inability to e x p e r ie n c e /e x p re s s em otio n s that is labeled ‘alexith y m ia’ .)
Jam e s, V. and G abe, J. (e d s) (1 9 9 7 ) Health and the Sociology o f Emotions. O x fo rd and M alden ,
M A : W iley-B lackw ell. (A collection o f essays e x p lo rin g the poten tial for m utual c o n
tribu tion betw een the fields o f the sociology o f em o tio n , and the sociology o f health and
illness.)
K lcin m an , A. and G o o d , B. (1 9 8 5 ) Culture and Depression: studies in the anthropology and
cross-cultural psychiatry o f affect and disorder. Berkeley: U n iversity o f C aliforn ia Press. (An
edited collcction that m akes an an thropologically gro u n d ed in terven tion into the debate
con cern in g the cultu ral relativity versu s un iversality o f d epression and d y sph oria.)
K leinm an , A . (1 9 8 9 ) The Illness Narratives: suffering, healing, and the human condition. N ew
York: Basic B ooks. (A H arvard psych iatrist and an th ropo lo gist en deavours to cnhance
the sensitivity to the em otional dynam ics and oth er relation s at play betw een d o cto r and
patien t.)
Pcnncbakcr, J. W. (c d .) (2 0 0 2 ) Emotion, Disclosure and Health. W ashington, D C : A m erican
Psych ological A ssociation . (A collection o f essays exam in ing the health benefits o f se lf
d isclosu re and em otio n al e x p re ssio n .)
R o u sseau , G. (2 0 0 4 ) Nervous Acts: essays on literature, culture and sensibility. N ew York: Palgrave
M acm illan. (A collection o f cssavs ab ou t the role o f m edical accounts o f the n ervous
system in the rise o f eighteenth cen tury literatu re and sen sib ility.)
Scheff, T. J. (1 9 7 9 ) Catharsis in Healing, Ritual and Drama. Berkeley: U n iversity o f C alifornia
Press. (Sch eff argues that the healing pow er o f catharsis lies in facilitating a form o f
distancin g through w hich individuals can sim ultan eously be p articipan ts and o b se rv e rs.)
Spiro, H. (1 9 9 8 ) The Power o f Hope: a doctor’s perspective. N ew H aven: Yale U niversity
Press. (An argu m en t that the em otion al re lie f o btained from hope and from a con ccrn ed
focus upon p atien t’s feelings o f pain and anxiety can lessen the sufferin g causcd by
illness.)
V ingerh oets, A ., N y klicek, I. and D en o lle t, J. (2 0 0 8 ) Emotion Regulation: conceptual and
clinical issues. N ew York: Springer. (A d d resses the health im plications o f copin g styles and
aggression , alexithym ia, em otion al in telligen ce, em otio n al exp ression and d ep ression ,
em otion al exp ression and anxiety d iso rd e rs, in addition to the em otion al co m p cte n cc in
ch ildren .)
W ilce, J. M . (ed ) (2 0 0 3 ) Social and Cultural Lives oj Immune Systems. London : R ou tlcd gc.
(In troduces the hypothesis that im m un e sy stem s function as cultu ral sym bols as
w ell as m aterial en tities and hence that im m unity and disease arc in part socially
c o n stitu te d .)
E m o t i o n in w o r k a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n s
Ashkanazi, N . M ., H a rte l, C. E. J. and Z e rb e , W. J. (e d s) (2 0 0 0 ) Emotions in the Workplace:

research, theory and practice. W e stp o rt, C T : G reen w ood P ress. (An interdisciplin ary co lle c
tion e x p lo rin g the facto rs that provoke em otio n s in the w ork place, their effects, and how
they should be m anaged, startin g from the prem ise that organ ization s arc em otional
p laces.)
464 G U I D E TO F U R T H E R R E A D I N G
E M O N E T . An em ail list that facilitates sch olarly d isc u ssio n o f all m a tte rs rela tin g to the
stu d y o f e m o tio n in organ ization al se ttin g s. A vailable at: h t t p :/ / w w w .u q .e d u .a u /
e m o n e t/
F in em an , S. ( e d .) (1 9 9 3 ) Emotions in Organizations. L o n d o n : Sage. (A c o lle ctio n o f essays
ex am in in g the relevan ce o f e m o tio n s to the th e o ry o f o rg an iza tio n s, d raw in g on a
n u m b e r o f case stu d ie s.)
Fisher, C . D. and A sh kan asy , N . iM. (c d s) (2 0 0 0 ) Jo u rn al o f Organizational Behavior. Special
issu e on ‘ E m o tio n s in o rg a n iz a tio n ’ . 21 (2 ). (A c o lle c tio n o f essay s on v a rio u s asp e c ts o f
e m o tio n s in o rg an iza tio n s.)
G o le m a n , D. ( 1 9 9 5 ) Emotional Intelligence. N e w Y ork: B antham B o o k s. (A n au th oratative
su m m a ry o f the state o f the field o f E L )
H o ch sch ild , A. R . (1 9 8 5 ) The M anaged H eart: commercialization o f human feelin g. B erk eley :
U n iv e rsity o f C alifo rn ia P re ss. (A c lassic , in fluential stud y o f the e ffe c ts o f e m o tio n a l
lab o r on w o rk e rs as seen in the o c cu p a tio n s o f flight atten d an t and bill c o llc c to r .)
H o ch sc h ild , A . R . (2 0 0 3 ) The Commercialization o f Intimate Life: notes from home and work.
B crk e le vj : U n iv e rsityj o f C alifo rn ia P re ss. '(A co llc c tio n o f cssav
j
s w ritte n bv
j
H o ch sch ild
o ver the span o f th ree d e c a d e s.)
Jo rd a n , P. J. (c d .) ( 2 0 0 6 ) Journal o f Management and Organization. Sp ecial issu e on ‘ M an agin g
e m o tio n s and con flict in the w o rk p la c e *. 12 (6 ). (Six a rtic le s on d ifferen t asp e c ts o f the
e m o tio n a l d im e n sio n s o f con flict at w o rk and th eir m a n a g e m e n t.)
L e w is, P. and S im p so n , R . (e d s) (2 0 0 7 ) Gendering Emotions in Organisations. B a sin g sto k e:
Palgrave M acm illan . (A c o lle ctio n o f essay s e x p lo r in g the c o n n e ctio n s b e tw e en g e n d e r
and e m o tio n in o rg an iza tio n s, fo c u sin g on tw o sp e cific areas: e m o tio n a l la b o u r and the
g e n d e re d n atu re o f the e x p re ssio n o f feelin gs at w o rk .)
R a m ire z -F c rrc ro , E . ( 2 0 0 4 ) Troubled Fields: men, emotions, and the crisis in American farm in g .
N e w Y ork: C o lu m b ia U n iv e rsity P re ss. (T h e au th o r g o e s b eyon d the trad itio n al focu s on
p o litical and e c o n o m ic in te rp re tatio n s o f the A m erican farm c risis o f the 1 9 8 0 s and
1 9 9 0 s, u sin g g e n d e r and e m o tio n as m o d e s o f analysis to e x p lo r e the cau se s o f su icid e
and o th e r re sp o n se s to the c risis a m o n g m ale fa r m e r s .)
R az , A . E. (2 0 0 2 ) Emotions at Work: normative control, organizations, and culture in Jap an and
America. N ew H aven: H arv ard U n iv e rsity P re ss. (A c ro ss-c u ltu ral stud y o f e m o tio n s as
ro le re q u ire m e n ts in the w o rk p la c e .)
Em otion, eco n o m ic s an d c o n su m e r culture
A g rc s, S. J . , E d c ll, J. A . and D u b itsk y , T. M . (e d s .) (1 9 9 0 ) Emotions in Advertising: theoretical

and practical explorations. W e stp o rt, C T : G re e n w o o d P ress. (A co llc ctio n e x p lo r in g the
relation sh ip b e tw e en e m o tio n and ad v e rtisin g.)
D ittm ar, H . ( 2 0 0 7 ) Consumer Culture, Identity and Wellbeing: the search f o r the 1good life*
and the 'body perfect’ . H o v e: P sy c h o lo g y P re ss. (A p ro m in e n t so cial p sy c h o lo g ist
e m p iric a lly d o c u m e n ts so m e o f the p sy ch o lo g ic al d y sp h o ria asso c iate d w ith c o n su m e r
c u ltu rc .)
E re v e lle s, S. and G ran fie ld , M . (c d s) (1 9 9 8 ) Journal o f Business Research. Sp e cial issu e on ‘T h e
ro le o f affect in m a rk e tin g ’ . 42 (3 ). (Ten a rtic le s on d iffe ren t a sp e c ts o f the ro le o f affect,
e m o tio n , fan tasy and m e m o ry in m ark e tin g .)
M a rtin , B ., A n le u , R . A. an d Z ad o ro z n y j, M . (e d s) Jo u rn al o f Sociology. Sp ecial issu e on
‘ C o m m e rc ia liz in g e m o tio n s ’ . 39 (4 ). (In clu d e s a rtic le s on e - c o m m e rc e , self-h elp b o o k s,
sign c o n su m p tio n , the h o m e , the w ed d in g.)
O ’ Sh au gh n essy, J. and O ’ Sh au g h n cssv , N . J. (2 0 0 2 ) The Marketing Power o f F.motion. N ew
York: O x fo rd U n iversity Press. (An analysis o f the significance o f em otion in m arketing

and co n su m er e x p e rie n c e .)
Pilz, F (2 0 0 7 ) Emotions and Risky Choice: an experimental and theoretical study from the economic
psychological perspective. Saarbriicken : V D M Verlag (A data-grou nd ed argu m en t that an
accoun t o f the em otio n s m ust be in corp o rated into any p ro p e r un derstan din g o f risky
econ om ic behaviour.)
Pixlcy, J. (2 0 0 4 ) Emotions in Finance: distrust and uncertainty in global markets. C am b rid ge:
C am b rid ge U n iversity Press. (A study o f the view s o f e x p erien ced elites in the financial
w o rld , offering an account o f the influence o f em o tio n and speculation on the w o rld ’s
increasingly volatile financial sector.)
R ick, S. and L oew en stein , G. F. (2 0 0 7 ) The Role o f Emotion in Economic Behavior. Available at
S S R N : h t t p :/ /s s r n .c o m / a b s t r a c t = 9 5 4 8 6 2 (An article p repared for the forth com in g
third edition o f The Handbook o f Emotion w hich review s behavioral eco n o m ic and ncuro-
econ om ic rcscarch on em otion al influences on risky decision m aking, in tertem p oral
ch oice, and social p re fe ren ce s.)
Strasser, S ., M cG o vern , C . and Ju d t, M . (c d s) (1 9 9 8 ) Consuming Desires: consumption, culture,
and the pursuit o f happiness. C am b rid ge : C am b rid g e U n iversity P ress. (An edited
collcction e x p lo rin g the relation ship betw een sub jectiv ity and con su m er cu ltu rc.)
Em otion an d politics
A h m ed, S. (2 0 0 4 ) The Cultural Politics o f Emotion. L on don : R ou tled ge. (An analysis o f the
role o f em otio n s in deb ates on international te rro rism , asylum and m igratio n , and
recon ciliation and rep aration , with reflection s on the ro le o f em otio n s in fem in ist
and q u eer p o litics.)
C larke, S ., H o ggctt, P. and T h o m p so n , S. (c d s) (2 0 0 6 ) Emotion, Politics and Society. L ondon:
Palgravc M acm illan. (A psychosocial approach aim ing for an in tegration o f rationalism
and em otio n in an un derstan din g o f p olitical issues such as racism , pop u lism , p ro te st and
terro r.)
Flam , H . and K ing, D. (e d s) (2 0 0 5 ) Emotions and Social Movements. L on don : R ou tledge.
(An edited collection o f p ap e rs on the em otio n al dim en sions and dynam ics o f social
m ovem en ts and p ro te st.)
F ro g g c tt, L. (2 0 0 2 ) Love, Hate and Welfare: psychosocial approaches to policy and practice, Bristol:
Policy Press. (An argum en t for a psy ch osocial con ception o f w elfare practice w hich
cen tres on hum an affectivity.)
Furedi, F. (2 0 0 5 ) Politics o f Fear: beyond left and right. C on tin uum P ress. (A rgu es that m odern
p olitics has com e to revolve around personal topics. A ntagon istic to the pcrceivcd
en fccb lcm cn ts o f ‘therapy c u ltu rc ’ , it m akes the ease that human are m ore resilien t and
adaptive than is so m etim es th ough t.)
G andhi, L. (2 0 0 6 ) Affective Communities: anticolonial thought, Jin-de-siecle radicalism, and the
politics oj friendship. N ew H aven, M A : H arvard U n iversity Press. (A study o f cross-
cultural collaboration betw een o p p re sso rs and o p p ressed in late n inteenth-century
e m p ire .)
G irlin g, J. (2 0 0 6 ) Emotion and Reason in Social Change: insights from fiction. N ew York:
Palgravc M acm illan. (A study o f the em otion al asp ects o f glo balizatio n , n eo-im p erialism ,
m odern izatio n and oth er political issu es through the m edium o f w orks o f fiction .)
G oo d w in , J. and Jasper, J. M . (2 0 0 4 ) (ed) Rethinking Social Movements: structure, meaning and
emotion. Totow a, N J: R om an and L ittlefield. (A volum e w hich gath ers the key players
in social m ovem en t th corv and strives to overco m e the theoretical divide betw een
stru ctu ral and cultural ap p ro ach es.)
M arcu s, G. E. (2 0 0 0 ) ‘ E m otion s in p o litics’ . Annual Review o j Political Science, 3: 221 SO.

(A review articlc coverin g research on em o tio n s in politics up to the y ear 2 0 0 0 ).
R edlaw sk, D. P. (e<l.) (2 0 0 6 ) heeling Politics: emotion in political information processing. L on don :
Palgrave M acm illan. (T his volum e ad opts a conventional cogn itive approach to the role
o f alTect in political action and decision m aking.)
Satterfield, T. (2 0 0 3 ) Anatomy o j a Conjlict: identity, knowledge and emotion in old-growth jorests.
V ancouver: U niversity o f British C olu m b ia Press. (An eth n ographic study o f the dispute
betw een activist lo g ge rs and en vironm en talists over the fate o f O r e g o n ’s tem p erate rain
fo re st.)
Svasek, M . (e d .) (2 0 0 6 ) Postsocialism:politics and emotions in central and eastern Europe. O x fo rd :
Berghahn. (A collection o f essays on the political use o f em otio n s and the em otion al use
o f politics in ccntral and eastern E u ro p e.)
Em otions an d the m edia
A lth cide. D. L. (2 0 0 2 ) Creating Fear: news and the construction o f crisis. N ew York: A ldinc dc
G ruyter. (A d o p ts a social con stru ction ist approach and ch arts the grow th o f a fear
d isco u rse in U S n ew sp apers sincc the n in eteen-eigh ties.)
B oltanski, L. (1 9 9 9 ) Distant Suffering: morality, media and politics. C am b rid ge: C am b rid ge
U niversity Press. (A study exam in in g the m oral and political im plication s for a spectator
o f the distant suffering o f oth ers as presen ted through the m e d ia.)
C arro ll, N . (1 9 9 0 ) The Philosophy o j Horror, or Paradoxes o j the Heart. L on don : R ou tledge.
(A pplies insights from cognitive philosophy to the prob lem o f how em otio n s are
provoked in au dien ces by film s. A consideration o f the nature o f the ‘ m o n stro u s’ in the
h o rro r film ge n re.)
C houliaraki, L. (2 0 0 6 ) The Spectatorship o j Suffering. L o n d o n : Sage. (An analysis o f the cod es
and fo rm ats o f new s coverage ot distant sufferin g, and an exploration o f its political,
m oral and cultural effects on sp e cta to rs.)
G ro d al, T. (1 9 9 7 ) Moving Pictures: a new theory o jfilm genres, jeelings and cognition. O x fo rd :
O x fo rd U n iversity P ress. (An explan ation o f film ic em o tio n s based on cognitive
psychology that cen tres on p ro ce sse s o f iden tification .)
M cstrovic, S. (1 9 9 7 ) Postcmotional Society. L on don : Sage. (C ritiq u e o f the ro le o f the m edia
in gen eratin g depthless ‘q u a si-e m o tio n s’ w ith no relation to actio n .)
M oeller, S. D. (1 9 9 9 ) Compassion Fatigue: how the media sell disease, jam ine, war and death.
London and N ew York: R o u tled ge. (A series o f case stu d ies exam in in g n ew spaper,
n ew sm agazine and television coverage o f international c risc s.)
Plantinga, C . and Sm ith, G. M . (1 9 9 9 ) Passionate Views:jlm, cognition and emotion. Baltim ore:
John H opkins U n iversity Press. (A collcction o f essays by sch olars in film stu d ies,
philosophy and psy ch o lo gy , e x p lo rin g the em otio n al appeal o f the cin em a.)
Sm ith, M . (1 9 9 S ) Engaging Characters: fiction, emotion and the cinema. O x fo rd : C laren don
P ress. (A study o f em otio n al re sp o n ses to film s, in tegrating them into a theory o f
en gagem en t, o r identification w ith, ch aractcrs in cinem atic and literary fiction s.)
Tan, E. (1 9 9 6 ) Emotion and the Structure o j Narrative Film: film as an emotion machine. M ahw ah,
N J: Law rence E rlb au m . (D raw s upon N ico F rijd a’ s [sec above] cognitive accoun t ol the
‘law s o f e m o tio n ’ to explain the capacity o f film to shape the affective virtual action
tenden cies o f their au dien ces.)
Tester, K. (2 0 0 1 ) Compassion. Morality and the Media, Buckingham : O p en U n iversity
Press. (W ritten in the tradition o f E uropean critical th eory, this volum e e x p lo re s the
‘som eth in g has to be d o n e ’ respo nse to h orrific m edia presen tatio n s.)
G U I D E TO F U R T H E R R E A D I N G 467
E m o tio n s a n d law
B a n d c s, S. (c d .) ( 1 9 9 9 ) The Passions o f Law. N e w Y ork: N e w York U n iv e rsity P re ss. (An

an th o lo gy on the fun ction o f e m o tio n in legal th e o ry and p rac tic e that d e als w ith d ig u st,
sh am e, r e m o r s e and the d e sire fo r re v e n g e, as w ell as love, fo rg iv e n e ss and the p assion
fo r ju stic e .)
B o rn stc in , B. H . and W ien er, R . L . ( c d s .) (2 0 0 0 ) Law and Human Behaviour. Sp ecial issu e
on ‘ E m o tio n in legal ju d g m e n t and d e cisio n m a k in g ’ . 30 (2 ). (An in terd iscip lin ary
c o llc c tio n at the in te rface o f law and p sy ch o lo g y d ealin g w ith the ro le o f e m o tio n in
ju rid ical d ecisio n m ak in g p r o c e sse s.)
D e H aan , W. and L o a d e r (e d s) ( 2 0 0 2 ) Theoretical Criminology. Sp ecial issu e on ‘T h e
e m o tio n s o f c rim e , p u n ish m e n t and social c o n tr o l’ . 6 (3 ). (A special issu es aim in g to
stim u late d e b ate on the relation sh ip b e tw e en e m o tio n s and social re g u la tio n .)
D o u zin as, C . (1 9 9 8 ) Law and the Emotions: prolegomena f o r a psychoanalytic approach to legal
study. F lo re n ce : E u ro p ea n U n iv ersity In stitu te P re ss. (A im s to b rin g c o n te m p o ra ry
p sy ch o an aly tical n o tio n s o f affect in to relatio n sh ip w ith c ritic a l legal stu d ie s.)
D u n can , M . G . (1 9 9 6 ) Romantic Outlaws, Beloved Prisons: the unconscious meanings o j crime and
punishment. N e w York: N e w York U n iv ersity P re ss. (A d o p ts a psy ch o an aly tical ap p ro ach
to u n d e rstan d the am b iv alen ce o f pu b lic feelin g to w a rd s c rim in ality .)
H o p e , T. and S p a rk s, R . (c d s) (2 0 0 0 ) Crime, Risk and Insecurity: law and order in political
discourse and everyday life. L o n d o n : R o u tlc d g c . (A n analysis o f the fear o f c rim c in late
m o d e rn so c iety and how’ this im p a c ts u p o n the lives o f citize n s.)
N o r m a n , J.,F in k c l, N . J. and P a rro tt, W. G. (2 0 0 6 ) Emotions and Culpability: how the law is at
odds with psychology, jurors, and itself. W ash in gton , D C : A m e ric an P sy c h o lo g ical A sso c i
atio n , (A rg u e s that U .S . law sh ould take m o re acc o u n t o f the p sy ch o lo g y o f em o tio n if it
is to be in to u ch w ith the c o m m o n sc n sc ju stic c e m p lo y e d by ju r o r s .)
N u ssb a u m , M . C . ( 2 0 0 4 ) H iding from Humanity: disgust, shame, and the law. P rin ce to n , N J:
P rin ceto n U n iv e rsity P re ss. (A d e taile d e x am in a tio n o f the re la tio n s b e tw e e n the law and
d isg u st, sh am e, an d c o n c e p tio n s o f the h um an by a p ro m in e n t U S p h ilo so p h e r.)
P osn er, E . A . ( 2 0 0 1 ) Law and the Emotions. C h ica g o : U n iv e rsity o f C h ica go P re ss. (A
c o m p re h e n siv e su rv e y o f the d ifferen t w ays in w hich law and e m o tio n s have been
b ro u g h t to g e th e r in a c a d e m ic lite ra tu re .)
S o lo m o n , R . (1 9 9 5 ) A Passion j o r Justice: emotions and the origins o f the social contract.
L an h am : R o w m an and L ittle fie ld . (A n a rg u m en t that ju stice is g ro u n d e d in the p e rso n a l
c h a ra c te ristic o f v irtu e and that sen sib ility n e e d s to be cu ltivated rath er than b lo c k e d .)
C o m p assio n , hate an d terro r
A n le u , S. R ., M a rtin , B. and Z ad o ro zn y j, M . (c d s) (2 0 0 4 ) Journal o f Sociology. Sp e cial issu e

on ‘ Fear and loath in g in the n ew c e n tu r y ’ . 4 0 (4 ). (In clu d e s a rtic le s on the re fu g e e c risis,
im m ig ratio n and m u ltic u ltu ralism , everyday in civility , te rro r.)
B crlan t, L. ( 2 0 0 4 ) Compassion: the culture and politics o j an emotion. L on d on and New’ York:
R o u tle d g e . (A c o llcc tio n o f ten essays on c o m p a ssio n by sc h o la rs d raw in g on lite ra tu re ,
psy ch o an aly sis and social h isto ry .)
B o ltan sk i, L. ( 1 9 9 9 ) Distant Suffering: politics, morality and the media. C a m b r id g e : C a m b rid g e
U n iv ersity P re ss. (A n influential stu d y o f the v a rio u s w ays in w hich sp e c ta to r s c o m e to
be affected by im ag e s and n arra tiv e s o f su ffe rin g con vey ed by the m e d ia .)
Butler, J. ( 1 9 9 4 ) Excitable Speech: a politics o j the perjormative. L o n d o n : R o u tle d g c . (A social
th e o retical analysis o f hate sp e e ch by a p ro m in e n t U S p h ilo so p h e r.)
468 G U I D E TO F U RT H E R R E A D I N G
C oh en , S. (2 0 0 1 ) States o f Denial: knowing about atrocities and suffering. C am b rid ge : Polity.

(An exam in ation o f the psy ch o lo gical and social fo rm s o f denial that prevent full reco g n i
tion o f the effects o f a tro citie s.)
Eng, D. and Ka/.anjian, D. (ed s) (2 0 0 3 ) On I.oss: the politics o j mourning. Berkeley: U n iversity
o f C aliforn ia P ress. (E dited collection e x p lo rin g the ethical, political and identity-based
dim en sio n s o f suffering from lo ss.)
M oeller, S. D. (1 9 9 9 ) Compassion Fatigue: how the media sell disease, jam ine, war and death.
L on don : R o u tlcd gc. (A sustained argu m en t about the em otio n al n um bing that is thought
to resu lt from the oversaturation o f m edia re p o rts o f suffering and atro city .)
W ilkinson, I. (2 0 0 5 ) Suffering: a sociological introduction. C am b rid ge : Polity. (An effort to
inaugurate a new field o f sociology devoted to the un dertan din g and alleviation o f
suffering.)
Index
a b d o m e n : Bali 2 3 5 ; se c re ts 2 3 3 —4 A ID S : g o v e rn m e n t re sp o n se 3 8 6 ;
A b u -L u g h o d , L ila: d efin es e m o tio n s 7 5 ; h o m o se x u a lity 3 8 5 ; le g islatio n 3 8 7 8 ;
e th n o g ra p h ie s o f e m o tio n 73 lesbian an d gay re sp o n se s 3 8 4
ac c o u n tin g : e m o tio n s 1 6 7 ; fe ar n arra tiv e s 172 A lesh ire sec I lu g e n s A le sh ire , Elissa
A c h e e ,J o h n 3 17 alien ation 4 4
A d k in s, L isa 2 6 9 allian ces 39
A d o rn o , T h e o d o r : Dialectics o f the Enlightenment altru ism 119
451 am b iv a le n c e : P axtun e m o tio n a l co n v e n tio n s 80
ad v e rtisin g : d r u g s 2 5 2 —3 ; e m o tio n s 3 1 1 ; A m e rican C a n c e r S o c ie ty 2 1 7 —18
n arratio n 3 1 3 ; ro m an c e 3 0 1 —2 A m erican C ivil W ar 4 4 6
affe ct: b e h av io r 4 0 - 1 ; c a rs 1 9 4 ; c o n tr o l 34 ; A n d e r so n , B en : P rac tic e s o f ju d g e m e n t and
and e m o tio n 10—1 2; e n g in e e rin g 1 8 2 ; d o m e s tic g e o g ra p h ie s o f a ffe c t 183
m a n a g e m e n t 4 7 ; m o tiv atio n 144; an g e r: c o n tro l 1 7 1 ; m e ta p h o rs 2 2 9 —30 ;
o b je c ts 4 1 6 ; p o litic s 1 8 4 ; sc rip ts 148; n arra tiv e s 16 8 —71
urban sp a ce 187 an im al sh e lte r w o rk e rs 2 8 7 —8
affe c tio n s: p sy c h o lo g ic al sta te s 30 ; w ill 31 anim al w elfare 28 8
affective b e h av io r 36 a n th ro p o lo g y : c u ltu re b o u n d sy n d ro m e s 2 3 5 ;
affective life: e m o tio n talk 8 ; e n g a g e m e n t 5 ; e m o tio n s 1; im m u n e fu n ction 2 3 5 - 6 ;
id en tity 1 4 3 ; so c ial sc ie n c e s 1 u n iv e rsal e m o tio n s 5 9 ; w e ste rn c u ltu re 145
affective n e tw o rk s 197 a n tid c p re ssa n ts: a b so rp tio n 2 4 1 ; e fficacy 2 4 4 ;
affective n e u tra lity : id e o lo g y 2 6 3 ; m e d ical o ral ad m in istratio n 2 4 0 ; SS R Is 245 n 2
stu d e n ts 2 9 0 a p a rth e id : h o p e 3 8 0 ; tran sitio n 375
affective so c ializa tio n 116 A p u zz o , V irgin ia 386
affective so c ie ty 2 A q u in as, Sain t T h o m a s 3 0 —1
affective tu rn 6 , 9—10, 1 81—2 A re n d t, H annah 4 5 0 —1; On Revolution 4 2 5
A frican N atio n al C o n g re s s: R o b b en Island A rge n tin a 4 2 9
M u se u m 3 7 6 A r ie ti, S. 162
ag g re ssio n 38 A rlu k c, A . 2 8 4
a g o ra p h o b ia 4 3 - 4 A rn o ld , M . 8
A h m e d , Sara 368 A sh fo rth , B .E . 2 8 7
47 0 I NDEX
Aslam a, Minna 322 biology 1

attitude 155 birth rates 5 3 - 4
audience reactions: com passion 324; Blauner, R. 128
telephone interview s 324 Bloch, M aurice 97
Augustine o f H ippo, Saint 30—1 blood pact: Argentina 432
Austin, J.L . 75 body: cultural heritage 212; em otions 21 1, 231
Australia 399 body contact: analytic event 295; avoidance 296
authenticity: hope 377; true feelings 1 58 60 body politic: health 2 3 3 - 4
authenticity industry 341 Boltanski, L. 327
authority 133 B ottom s, A. 3
autopoiesis: consciousness 1 3 9 - 4 0 ; B ourdicu, Pierre: liberal governm ent 374;
individualism 1 37 8 theory o f practice 7 2 - 3
Averill, Jam es 8—9; True feelings, the se lf and brain 243
authenticity: a psvchosocial perspective 145 Braithw aite, John: Crimc, Shame and Reintegration
Ayd, Frank: Recognizing the depressed patient 420
250 1 breast cancer: Hugens Aleshire, Elissa 22 0 —1;
m astectom y 217
Bain, A lexander 32 Brenneis, Donald 74
Bali 235 Brenner, Suzanne 9 5 - 6
Balieiro, M .C . 228 Brow n, Th om as: Lectures on the Philosophy oj the
Bar-O n, R .: F Q i scale 279 Human Mind (1820) 31—2
Barbalet, J.: Emotion, Social Theory and Social Brow ning, C hristopher: Ordinary Men 421
Structure 101 Buckley, T h om as 84
barbecue: Argentina 431 Bueil, Jean de 37
Barley, Stephen R. 265 Burchill, Julie 334
Barlow, D .H .: public exposure 176; shame 178 business 3—4
Barrow, Isaac 303 Buss, A .H . 155
Barry, W.A. 130 Butler, Joseph 31
Barthes, Roland 194 Butler, Judith: Precarious Life: The Powers o j
Batam : freedom s 99; jilbab 96; m igrant women Mourning and Violence 426
9 3; prostitution 94 , 9 6 - 9 Buytendijk, F.J. 210—11
Batam indo Industrial Estate: m igrant men 95;
m igrant
O
w om en 9 4 —6 ;1 sexualitvJ 95 C am pbell, Colin: Romantic Ethic and the Spirit o j
Baum an, Zygm unt: m odernity 4 5 1 ; m orality Modern Consumerism. The 299
452-3 canccr 227
Baumann, G erd 368 Cannon, W alter 7
Baum eister, R.F. 158 capitalism : com passion 4 4 9 ; G erm any 4 5 1 ;
Beauvoir, Sim one de: self-im ages 304 restrictions on w om en 44
Bcckcr, G ary S. 315, 319 car culturc: em otional investm ent 197; future
Becker, Howard 251 1 9 3 -4 ; infants 1 9 5 -6
Beecher Stow e, H arriet 436 C arn egie, Dale 52
beggars 31 5 cars: custom ization 198n5; electric 198n3;
behavior: acceptable 4 5 ; character 305; cultural em otional investm ent 182—3, 194; em otions
heritage 128; life at cou rt 3 9 - 4 0 ; reason 193; hybridity 1 9 7 n l; sexualization 195;
317; restraint 4 0 ; shame 318—19; social sociability 197; technology 196
n orm s 1 19 Carver, C .S . 177
B ell, Sir Charles 32 Cassirer, Ernst 452
Benedict, Ruth 85 C astelfranchi, C. 176, 177
Bengali literature 234 cathartic rites 88—9
Bensm an, J. 1 30 causal links 53
Bergson, Henri 10 causation 51
Berlant, Lauren 426 central n ervous system 2 0 9 , 241
Besnier, N iko 74 C h alm ers, T h om as 32
Big Pharm a 252—3 Chapm an, M .: Boston Ei Q uestionnaire 279
bigotry 336 chavs: behavior 336—7; term o f abuse 331—2
INDEX 471
Chekov, A. 130 crim inal justicc system 422

children: desensitized 234 5; em otional Crozier, W.Ray: Self-consciousness in shame:
attachm ent 53; em otions 103; sibling the role o f the O th er 146
bonding 53 cultural differences 347
choice: responsibility 184; satisfactions 316 cultural discourses 231
Christian m orality 3 1 cultural heritage: conversations 134; em otions
citizenship 50, 368 163, 212; pow er and status 1 28
civilization 41 cultural styles 77—80
civilized nations 34, 38 culturalism : cultural heritage 4 4 ; em otional
class 271, 333 change 28; em otives 78—9
clinical language 294 culture: em bodim ent 227—8; em otions 339;
clinicians 2 5 1 2 integration 228; therapeutic 364
clothing 308 culturc dissolution 85—6
coalitions: dynam ics 134; interaction ritual
chains 133—6 D am asio, A. 12
Collins, Randall 104 dancing mania 4 4 4 - 6
colonialism 89—90 D aniels, A .K . 2 6 4 -5
com m unalism : Ghost D ance 87; sexual D arw in, Charles 32
relations 88 D as, Veena 234
com m unication: im agination 2 2 9 ; political 358; D auenhauer, N ora 85
reality TV 341 D auenhauer, Richard 85
com m unity 4 4 1 - 2 D avidson, Gina 332—3
com passion: audience reactions 324—5; dc Born , Bertran 35
distantiation 328—30; form s 327—8; gender death 5 4 -5
differences 325; local action 4 3 5 —6; D eclaration o f the Rights o f Man: French
m odernity 4 4 9 ; pity 4 2 6 ; suffering 4 3 4 , 4 4 9 ; Revolution 450
terro r 425 dehum anization: em otion m anagem ent 2 9 4 —5;
com passionate conservatism 436 medical students 296; victim s 329
com prehension 224 D eitcher, D. 387
confessions 344—5 D eleuze, Gillcs 10, 11
confrontation 221, 341—2 D clingpolc, Jam es 334
constitutional dem ocratization 45 dem ocracy 361, 451
constructionism : individual plasticity 74; D ennett, D .C . 7 7 —8
organism s 21 0 ; sexuality 72 depression: in the body 241; treatm ent 244;
constructivism 10 viscera 243
consum er culture 299 diagnosis: depression 250; mental disorders
consum erism 31 2 249, 252, 2 5 5 - 6 ; W orld Health
consum ption 307—8 Organization 251
containm ent 210 Diagnostic and Statistical Alanuals 250, 25 1
contem pt 1 50 D iam ond, G regory Andrade 78
control 63 D irty W ar: Argentina 429
conversational resources 1 35 disappeared: Argentina 4 2 9 —30
conversations 1 3 3 - 4 discontent 25 3 —5
cool: defined 152, 154—5; history 155—6; discrim ination 399
personality 153—4 disease: em otions 205—8; recognition 256;
C ooley, Charles H orton 107, 119 social con text 227; stigm a 217
C ooper, R .A .: EQ Map 279 disease aw areness: pharm accutical industry
C ornelius, R. 7 253
cost-benefit m odel 315—19 disgust: disenchantm ent 149; m edical students
court 39, 41 292; m oral legitim ation 421
creativity 161 dissm ell: toxicity 1 4 9 -5 0
crim e prevention: am bivalence 4 0 7 - 8 ; public dissonance theory 3 1 7 -8
su p p ort 4 0 5 —6 ; strategies 406 D ixon , Thom as 12, 26
crim inal justice: em otional investm ent 4 1 0 ; docum entation: affect 4 1 6 ; T R N C 4 1 1 ,4 1 4
em otionality 4 1 9 —20; em otions 4 1 8 , 4 0 7 —8 D os Santos, J.E . 228
47 2 INDEX
D ra h o s, P e te r 3 7 4 , 38 0 e m o tio n a l e n e rg ie s: co n fid en c e 136; ritual

D re ssie r, W.W. 2 28 m e m b e rsh ip 135
d riv in g 1 9 5 , 196 e m o tio n a l e x p e r ie n c e : cu ltu ral h e rita g e 59
d r o m e n a 88 9 e m o tio n a l in te llig e n c e : b u sin e ss 3;
d r u g s: b lo o d -b ra in b a r r ie r 2 4 1 —2 ; m a rk e tin g c o n su m p tio n e c o n o m ie s 103; d isc o u rse 280;
254 5; sp e c ific d iag n o sis 2 5 2 ; sy ste m ic m e a su r e m e n ts 262, 2 7 8 —9, 2 8 0 —1
c irc u latio n 2 42 e m o tio n a l re sp o n se s: b lu n te d 291
D u rk h c im , E m ile : a n g e r 4 0 7 ; c rim in al ju sticc e m o tio n a l sta n d ard s: ch a n g e s 51; shifts 56
4 1 8 ; e m o tio n s c a te g o r ie s 1 0 7 ; m o ra l e m o tio n a lityj : Og e n d e r re la tio n s 69
c o m m itm e n ts 1 2 9 ; m yth 1 3 4 ; so c io lo g ic a l e m o tio n a liz atio n : p o litic s 361; tre n d 322
th e o ry 1 32 e m o tio n s: as a n c h o rs 7 6 ; c laim s 1 38; as
D u v a l, S. 177 c o n se q u e n c e s 110; c o n stru c tio n 357;
c o n stru c tio n ism 7 5 ; c o n ta in ed 230; c o n tro l
E arth L o d g e : G h o st D an ce 87 64, 69, 8 0 ; c o n v e rsa tio n s 134—5;
e c o n o m ic b e h av io r 2 99 c ro ss-c u ltu ra l 128; c u ltu re d isso lu tio n 85—9;
e c o n o m ic th e o ry 31 5 d a n g e r 66; d iffe ren tiatin g 130; e m b o d im e n t
e c stasy (M D M A ): d ile m m a s 9 9 ; m alu 9 7 ; 21 1 ; e v o lu tio n aryJ su rv iv al 1 29;1 in teOg ratin Og
p ro stitu tio n 93 129—30; legal re g u latio n 4 0 1 —2; lin gu istic
ed u c atio n 4 , 9 4 stu d ie s 60; m e an in gs 163; m u sic 203;
E d w a rd s, Jo n ath an 31 n arra tiv e s 1 4 5 - 6 ; p o w e r re la tio n s 143;
e g g c a r to n : A rgen tin a 4 3 2 p sy ch ic s y ste m s 1 39—4 0 ; ra tin g 279;
E k m a n , Paul 78 re a so n 157, 357; re n e w e d in te re st 109;
E lias, N .: a g g re ssiv e n e ss 2 7 ; civilizin g p r o c e ss 5, re p re se n ta tio n o f h isto ry 84; ritu a ls 4 08;
3 6 4 ; Civilizing Proccss, The 2 6 —7 , 4 5 ; crim in al sign ifican ce 110; so c ia l cau se 106; so cial
ju sticc 4 1 8 ; Germans, The 4 5 1 —2 e n e rg y 132; so cial p h e n o m e n o n 106; so cial
E lk in s, J. 2 1 8 re la tio n sh ip s 107; so c ie ty 132; so c io -c u ltu ral
E lster, Jo n 3 0 0 fa c to rs 1 0 1 ; stu d y o f 1 0 1 ; sy m b o lic
E lw o o d , S .A . 188 in te ra c tio n ism 1 16; te r m in o lo g y 31;
e m b a r ra ssm e n t: altru ism 1 1 9 ; au d ie n c e 1 7 8 —9 ; u n iversality 1 28—9; as w eak n ess 63;
ch an ge in sta tu s 1 1 3 ; e x p e c ta tio n s 11 2; w o rk p lac e 276
se lf-p re se n tatio n 1 1 8 ; so c ial fu n ction e m o tiv e c u e s: e m o tio n m a rk e rs 3 5 1 ; film s 348;
114—15; social life 114 m u ltip le 349
e m o tio n c u ltu re 3 8 4 , 38 9 e m o tiv e d isso n an cc 125
e m o tio n d isc o u rse s 6 9 e m o tiv e sty le s 80
e m o tio n lab o r 2 7 1 - 2 e m o tiv e s: am b iv a len c e 7 8 - 9 ; e x te r n a l re fe re n ts
e m o tio n m a n a g e m e n t: m e d ic al stu d e n ts 2 9 0 , 7 5 - 6 ; failu re o f r e p re se n ta tio n 7 7 ; Paxtun
2 9 6 ; str a te g ie s 2 9 3 - 6 e m o tio n a l c o n v e n tio n s 7 9 —80;
e m o tio n m a rk e r s 3 4 9 —50 p o ststr u c tu r a lism 7 6 —7; re p re ssio n 7 7 - 8 0
e m o tio n n arra tiv e s: am b iv a len c e 1 7 0 ; an g e r e m p lo y e e s 2 7 7 —8
1 68—9 ; so cial fu n ction 1 6 7 —8 e m p lo v e r s: se x u a lity 189
e m o tio n sta te m e n ts: in te rp re ta tio n 75 e n c o u n te r s 2 0 2 —3
e m o tio n sy ste m s: c u ltu ral v ariation 6 0 E rd e ly i, M atth ew 77
e m o tio n w o rk : d e e p actin g 1 2 3 ; e ffo r t 1 2 2 ; E ric so n , R ich ard V. 378
e m o tio n a l la b o r 2 6 1 ; g e n d e r 2 7 1 ; g e n d e r e sse n tialism 73
d im e n sio n s 2 6 5 , 2 6 9 ; g e n d e rin g 2 6 8 ; race eth ics 26, 4 5 4
2 6 2 ; racial h o m o g e n e ity 2 6 9 ; ra c ialize d 2 7 1 ; e th n o g rap h y 75
se x u ality 1 8 8 , 1 89—9 0 ; s tr e ss 2 1 3 ; sy stem e th n o h isto ry : c o lo n ialism 8 9 —90; e m o tio n a l
1 2 3 ; tab les 2 6 5 —8 ; w o rk p la c e 2 6 4 d im e n sio n s 6 1 —2; e m o tio n s 8 9 - 9 0 ;
E m o tio n a l C o m p e te n c e In ven tory : re p re ssio n 84; W arm H o u se re lig io n 89
m e a su re m e n ts 2 7 9 e th n o p sy c h o lo g y 85
e m o tio n a l c o n ta g io n : defin ed 4 4 3 ; m a ss m e d ia E u ro p ea n C o m m issio n : Improving the mental
4 4 7 ; m e c h a n ism s 4 4 3 —4 health o f the population: Towards a strategy on
e m o tio n a l c u ltu rc : c h an ge s 5 2 , 5 3 ; infant mental health f i r the European Union 247
m o r ta lity 5 4 —5 E u ro p ea n U n io n : d o c u m e n ta tio n 4 1 2 ; m en tal
e m o tio n a l d y n am ic s: e ffe c ts 104 d is o r d e r s 2 47; R e p u b lic o f C y p ru s 4 16
INDEX 473
euthanasia 262 Garfinkcl, H. 4 0 2 ,4 0 8

euthanasia-related strain (E R S) 2 8 3 - 4 , 285 6, Garland, David: crim e 4 0 6 ; penal process 40 8 ;
287 punishm ent 4 0 7 ; punitive policies 410
evocation 122 Gay Life: AID S 385
expectations 1 38 gay m ovem ent: history 441
experien ce 125 gay pride 383, 385
G eertz, Clifford 116
factual television 3 gender 63 ; differences 161, 164; roles 6 5 —6
faith 435 generations 175
family life 51 genres 351—2
fear narratives 171—3 G erm any 4 5 1 —2, 453
feeling rules: cars 197; changes 189; m edical G host D ance 8 6 - 7
school 290; m edical students 2 9 6 ; social Gilroy, P. 197
guidelines 124-5 Glenn, Evelyn-Nakano 270
feelings: conditions o f existence 21 1 ; global violence 439
idealization 125; identity 145; invalidation goals 349
21 3 ; m anagem ent 2 6 1 ; orientation 210; G offm an, E .: affect 121; cognition and
rights 124; talking alone 344 em otions 8; Em barrassm ent and social
Feitlow itz, M arguerite: Lcxicon o f Terror: organization 102; social com m unication 212;
Argentina and the Legacies of Torture, A sociological theory 132
4 26 G olcm an, D. 279—80
fem inism : em otions 69 70; history 4 4 1 ; G oodm an , N. 223
psvchopharm aceuticals 244; G oodw in, J: Passionate Politics 357
psychopharm acology 240 G ordon , S .L . 161
fem inist theory: culture 2 4 0 ; cssentialism 73; G orer, Geoffrey 85
research 207—8 G ottm an, J. 130
Ferguson, Adam : Essay on the History of Civil G ou ld, D eborah 359, 360
Society, An 107 governance m useum s: Robben Island M useum
fertility rates 337 375
Figart, D eborah M. 265, 270 governm ent policy 405
film structures 347, 348 G reat Britain: chavs 331; docum entation 395,
films 347 4 1 2 ; identity 368; racism 371
financial advertising 311 —12, 314 great fear (1 7 8 9 ): France 446
Fineman, Stephen 2 6 2 , 264 G reat M igrations 34
Fischer, Agncta: Reconciling em otions with G reat Society 435
w estern personhood 145 green ones: Argentina 433
Flicker, L. 176, 178 grief: in children 54; dependency 4 4 0 —1;
Fogelson, Raymond 84 expression 232; interpretation 85 ; Paxtun
Fordvce, David 303 em otional conventions 7 9 —80 ; politics 442
Fortier, Ann-M arie 358 G rim a, Benedicte: defines em otions 75;
Foucault, M .: freedom s 380; liberal citizenship ethnographies o f em otion 7 3 ; oppression o f
374; m odernity 4 5 1 ; pow er 7 2 ; relativism w om en 74; Paxtun em otional conventions
7 2 ; sexuality 65, 69 7 9-80
Frank, Barney 3 8 6 - 7 Growth Triangle 96
Frankenberg, R. 227 guilt: altruism 1 19; cost-benefit analysis 316—8;
Franks, D.D. 2 1 3 - 1 4 criminal justice 4 2 2 ; deviant behavior 1 18;
free zone: Argentina 433 self-condem nation 305
French Revolution 450 G unaratm an, Yasmin 371
Freud, Sigmund 27, 4 5 , 440 G usficld, Joseph R. 407
Freund, Peter, E. 206
Friedm an, Susan S. 271 Hall, Elaine J. 268
functional m agnetic resonance im aging (FM RI) Hall, N .R .S . 231
7 Ilam m on d, M . 129
functionalism 28 Hardw ick decision 389—90
Furcdi, F. 340 H arkin, M ichacl 61
474 INDEX
H a rr e , R o m : e m o tio n s 8 ; se lf-c o n sc io u sn e ss 7 5 ; p sy ch ic sy ste m 1 3 7 —8 ; se lf-p e rc e p tio n s

1 7 7 ; sh am e 1 7 6 ; Social Construction o f 2 7 8 ; so cial c o n te x t 4 1 ; so cial in te ractio n
Emotion, The 6 0 1 1 2 —1 3 ; so cial lo c atio n s 2 7 1 ; tacit
Ila tfie ld , E lain e 4 2 7 a ssu m p tio n s 133
H ay w ard , K eith 3 3 2 —3 In d o n e sia: e m o tio n s 2 3 4 —5; malu 9 9
h ealth : c arc 2 7 0 ; ch ildren 54 5; e m o tio n s In don esian m ig ra n ts: malu 6 2 , 93
2 0 5 —8 ; m e n ta l d iso rd e r s 2 5 5 ; so cial c o n te x t In d u strial R e v o lu tio n 302
227 in d u strializatio n 53
h ed o n ism : c o n su m e rism 3 0 2 —3; c o o l 1 5 3 ; in firm arvJ : A rg
O
e n tin a 4 3 2
defin ed 1 54 in fo rm aliz atio n 2 7 , 4 4
H e m in g w ay , E r n e s t 150 in te ractio n ritu al ch ain s 1 3 3 - 6
H e r te l, R .K . 130 in te ra ctio n ritu a ls (IR s) 1 3 2 , 1 3 5 - 6
H e r/.fe ld , M ich ael 4 1 2 International Journ al o f Work, Organization and
h e te ro se x u a lity 182 Emotion 4
H ig g in s, E .T . 176 in te rp e rso n a l re la tio n s: d e v e lo p m e n ts 4 4 ;
H in d c ss, B arry 37 4 n e g o tia tio n 4 7 —9 ; p a tte rn s 1 3 5 ; stab ility
H o b b e s, T h o m a s 1 4 4 ; Leviathan 1 3 45
H o ch sc h ild , A rlie R u sse ll sec R u sse ll in te rp re ta tio n 2 18
I Io c h sc h ild , A rlie iro n ic d e ta c h m e n t 1 5 3 , 154
H o ije r, B irg itta 322 Isen , A lice M . 78
H o lm e s, D avid S. 7 7
H o lo c a u st 4 5 0 , 4 5 3 Ja c o b s , E lizab eth 88
h o m o se x u a lity 3 8 7 , 388 Ja c o b s , M e lv ille 88
H o n n e th , A x e l 3 7 0 —1 Ja m e s- L a n g e th e o ry o f e m o tio n 7
H o rk h c im c r, M a x : Dialectics o f the Enlightenment Ja m e s , N ic k y 265
451 Ja m e s, W illia m : W h at is e m o tio n ? 7 , 32
h o rro r 2 1 8 - 1 9 Ja m e so n , F. 321
H u g e n s A le sh ire , E lissa: se lf- p o r tr a it 2 2 0 - 2 Ja n sz, Je r o e n 145
H u g h e s, R o b e r t 4 0 9 Ja p a n 2 33
H u izin g a, I.: w ar 37 Ja sp e r, J.M . 3 8 8 ; Passionate Politics 3 57
h um an n atu re 2 3 1 —2 Jav a 2 3 4 —5
h um an re la tio n sh ip s 4 0 je a lo u sy 56
H u m e , D av id : Treatise o f Human Nature Je w s 4 5 3
( 1739- 40 ) 31 jilb ab 9 3 , 95
hum or 2 9 5 -6 jo b strain 2 8 4
H y m a n , S. 7 Jo h n so n , L y n d o n : G r e a t S o cie ty 4 3 4
Jo h n so n , M . 2 0 9 , 2 2 8 , 2 2 9
id ealism 3 0 3 —6 Jo h n sto n , L . 188
id e n tity : am b igu ity 1 5 8 ; c a rs 1 9 7 ; c laim s 1 13; ju d g e m e n t 2 0 1 , 2 0 2 , 2 0 4 , 2 7 9
con flict 1 15 ; c o o l 1 4 5 ; e m o tio n n arra tiv e s ju s tic e : affective 3 9 4 ; an g e r 4 2 1 ;
1 6 8 ; e m o tio n s 7 5 , 1 3 3 ; h yb rid ity 3 6 8 ; b u re a u cratiza tio n 3 9 4 ; c o m p a ssio n 4 3 8
p o litic s 1 10; p r o te c tio n 9 3 ; re lig io u s 4 5 3 ;
se lf-p re se n tatio n 1 1 8 ; se lfh o o d 1 4 3 ; K ath rad a, A h m e d : F u tu re o f R o b b en Island
se x u ality 1 8 9 ; sh am e 328 C o m m itte e 3 7 6 ; R o b b e n Island M u se u m
im ag e s: re c o v e ry 2 2 1 ; so m a tiza tio n 2 2 8 ; 3 77
th erap y 2 2 7 ; u n su itab ility 2 1 8 ; w o u n d s 2 1 7 K a tz , J 2 0 2 , 2 0 3 , 4 0 8
im ag in a tio n 2 2 7 , 3 0 4 —5 K aw a le , R an i 182
im m ig
Ora n ts 41 3 K e m p e r, T h e o d o r e 1 03—4 , 1 0 9 ,4 0 3
im m u n e sy ste m s 2 2 7 , 2 3 0 —1 K e ssle r, R .C . 2 4 6
im p e ria lism 369 K irm a y er, L .J. 2 2 7
im p re ssio n m a n a g e m e n t 2 1 2 —13 K law an s, H a ro ld 4 4 4
im p riso n m e n t 4 0 5 K le in m a n , A . 2 12
in d iv id u als: ac tio n s 1 1 7 ; d e p e n d e n c e on each K o so v o W ar 325
o th e r 3 4 ; e x p e c ta tio n s 1 3 8 - 9 ; in d ire ct K o v ecses, Z . 2 2 8 , 229
e x p e r ie n c e 1 1 8 ; as o b je c ts 1 1 7 ; p la stic ity 7 4 , K rc in cr, G .E . 2 8 7
INDEX 475
Kroeber, Alfred L. 84; ethnohistory 89 management: emotional intelligence 279—80;

Kiiblcr-Ross, Elisabeth 85 emotions 365; negotiation 47—50
Mandela, Nelson: Robbcn Island Museum
La Bruyere 39 375—6; South Africa 376-80
La Cacha: Argentina 43 1 Mannheim, Karl 301
Lakoff, G. 228,229 markers: Argentina 432
Lange, Carl 7 marketing: emotions 362, 364; politics 362,
language 426, 429 364; role of emotion 4; study of emotions
LaRouche, Lyndon 388 299
Lasch, C. 321 Markman, H. 130
Lasswell, Harold 407 Maroney, T.A. 393-4
law: emotionality 394; emotionali/.ation 395, Martin, Emily 250
419; emotions 393, 420-1, 406, 396; Marx, Karl 45, 128
fear 403 mass hysteria 427, 444-6
Law and Human Behaviour 393 mass media: AIDS hysteria 386; confessions
Lc Bon, Gustav: emotions categories 107 339; democracv 363; dominant victim code
LeBon,G. 5 326; emotionalization 3; emotions 321, 322,
Lee-Treweek, Geraldine 269 70 339; manipulation 362; mass communication
Lefkowitz, Daniel: Investing in emotion: love 447
and anger in financial advertising 300 Massumi, Brian 11
legal forms 412—3, 416 mastectomy: Ilugens Aleshire, Elissa 220—1
legal reforms: Statute of Limitations 398 material sanctions 318
legal regulation: creative compliance 403; Matthews, G. 279, 280
emotional processes 401—3; emotions 394 Maxwell, Simon 197
legitimacy 418 May, R. 161
lesbian movement 441 Mayer, J.D. 280
lesbians 188, 383 McCarthy, Doyle 14
Levinas, Emmanuel 452-3 McCormack 11
Levy, Robert 84, 128 McKenzie, J. 185
Lewis, Gail 371 Mead, George Herbert 117
Lewis, H.B. 176 Mead, Margaret 85
Lewis, Jemima 334 measurements 277—8
Lewis, Michael 175, 176 media 3
Lindquist, Johan 62 medical students: sexual body 292;
lion’s cage: Argentina 432 uncomfortable feelings 291, 296
Lisus, Nicola A. 378 medicine 255, 262-3
Loehlin, J.C. 130 medieval society 35
Loewenstein, George 319 Menninger, Karl 250
loss 439 Menninghaus, Winifried 334—5
love 309-10 mental disorders: Americans 246—7; biology
Luchaire, A. 36—7 255; disabilities 252; global rates 246;
Luhmann, Niklas 104-5, 321 increased 207, 248—9; stigma 248
Lutz, C.: cross-cultural research 59; emotions Mestrovic, S.: authenticity industry 341;
26, 357; ethnographies of emotion 73; barbarism 451; emotions 4-5, 321
gendered emotion 60—1 metaphors: Bangladesh 233—4; body 228;
Lvnch, Dorothea: breast cancer 219; cultural heritage 236; psychophysiology 227
mastcctomv•/ 217—18 Middle Ages 36, 444
middle class 52, 53-4
MacKian, S. 181-2 migrant women: Batam 93; Batamindo
Macnaghten, R 195 Industrial Estate 94—6; dual identity 98;
Madsen, D. 212 malu 99; prostitution 96
make-believe papers: TRNC 411,41 3-4 militance: AIDS activism 387, 388—9, 390
malu: Batam 93; identity 94; Indonesian Miller, Danny: Theory oj Shopping, A 300
migrants 62; jilbab 95; migrant women 93; Miller, R.S. 176, 178
prostitution 97—8 Miller, William 335
47 6 INDEX
M irchandani, Kiran 262 organizations: euthanasia schedules 286; gender

m ockery 337 differences 2 6 9 ; m iddle class 4 8 —9 ; pressures
M odigliani, Andre 1 18 2 1 4 ; study o f em otions 261
M oerm an , D .E . 227 O rw ell, G eorge 15
m onologue 344—5
m ood 347, 348 pain 218, 2 1 9 , 222
m ood-cues 323, 348 Panksepp, J. 7
m ood disintegration 244 Pantti, M ervi 322
M ooney, Jam es: Ghost Dancc 86 Parekh R ep ort: Runnym ede T rust 369
m oral judgm ent 107 Pareto, V ilfredo 107
m oral self-organization 449 parliam ents 402
m oral sentim ents 31; psychological states Parry, Jonathan 97
30 Parsons, Talcott 5, 102, 107—8
m oral solidarity 1 34 passions 30
m orality 26, 449 patients 292
M organ, C harles 1 58 60; True feelings, the self patriotism 370
and authenticity: a psychosocial perspective Paul, A .M . 280
145 penal law 419
m ortality 5 3 - 4 penal policy 406
m otivation 317 Pennebaker, J.W . 2 2 8 - 9
m ourning 4 3 9 —40 perform ance 185—6
m ulticulturalism 358; sanitized 371 personal resources 286
M urdock, G. 345 pcrsonh ood 168
M useum o f Tolerance: em otions 359; perspective 178
em otions factory 378; governance m useum s pets 283, 284
375 pharm aceutical industry 252—3
m usic 2 0 1 - 3 , 204 philosophy 166
M uslim veil 93 photography 2 2 2 -3
M yers, Fred 74 physiology 230
Pierce, Jennifer 265, 270
N agoya 96 place 181
narcissism 153, 154 Poggi, I. 176, 177
national identity 371 policies 394, 435
national pride 369 political action 450
nations 34 political activism 384
natural sciences 6 political broadcasts 363
negotiation 4 7 —50 political com m unications 362, 363
n egotiations 133 political discourse 384, 387
N elson , Bonalyn J. 265 political pow er 4 2 5 —6
N ew York City: draft riots 1863 4 4 6 —7 political resistance 376
New York Post: AIDS coverage 386 politicians: crim e policy 4 0 5 ; em otional labor
Newsweek: Return o f Shame, The 365; as m anagers 365—6; m ass m edia 4 0 8 —9;
4 1 9-20 personalities 364 5
N gai, Sianne 336 politics: affect 184; com m unication 361;
N olan , J.L . 185 com passion 4 5 0 —1; em otional intelligence 4;
N o rris, P. 184 em otional talk 340; em otionalization 358;
N orth W hitehead, Alfred 10 em otions 13, 357, 366, 384; lesbian and gay
N otariu s, C. 1 30 politics 383—4 ; m ediatization 185; pride 370
num bers: Argentina 432 Polletta, F.: Passionate Politics 357
popular culture 361, 363—4
O b eyesekere, Gananath 88 positivism 9, 210
O ’ G rady, M.P. 231 Pountain, D ick: Cool Rules 145
oncology 233 pow er: coalitions 133; cross-cultural 128; legal
O ’N eill, Eugene 149 regulation 4 0 3 ; social environm ent 127—31
operating theater: Argentina 432 pow er relations 27 , 143
INDEX 477
presentation 185 relationships 51, 127, 163

Price, L .J .: Social and Cultural Lives o f Immune relativism 73—4
Systems 206 religious activities 95
pride 118 1 9 ,3 8 5 Republic o f C ypru s 395; docum entation 4 1 2 ;
p rison ers 36 passports 4 1 6 —7
Probyn, Elspeth 370 1 Republican Party 4 3 4
productivity 247 research: animal shelter w orkers 288;
propaganda 329 constructionism 60; em otions 2 0 5 ; em otions
property: T R N C 4 1 4 —5 at w ork 262; historical 25; mental disorders
prostitution: ecstasy (M D M A ) 96 7 247; study o f em otions 261
psychiatry: m ental disord ers 207, 249 50; reservations: Indian tribes 86
moral entrepreneurs 250 1 resistance 375
psychobiological sciences 8 responsibility 158, 315
psychoim m unology 2 3 5 - 6 restorative justice 420
psychological category 29 Richards, Barry 10, 358
psychological research 55 R ichards, Eugene 217, 219
psychology: cultural heritage 2 2 7 ; em otions 7, R icsm an, David 321
7 5 ; em otions research 1, 109; secularization Riezler, Kurt 118
30; will 31 rituals: cathartic rites 8 8 - 9 ; cerem onies 88—9;
psychom etrics 2 7 6 - 7 em otions 4 0 8 ; healing 229; myth 1 34
psychoncuroim m unology (P N I): cultural Robben Island: as a prison island 375—6
variability 236; em otions 207, 2 2 9 ; traum a Robben Island M useum : m anagem ent 378—80;
230 South Africa 359, 374—5; ubuntu 377—8
psychotherapy 4 4 , 49 R o b erts, Julian 409
public discourses 231 R o b erts, R .D . 279, 280
public opinion 4 0 8 —9 Robins, David: Cool Rules 145
punishm ent 422 role taking em otions 117
Punjab 234 Rollin, B.E. 284
Rom anticism 302
race 271 R osaldo, M ichelle Z . 64—5, 230
racism 358, 371, 372 R ose, N ikolas: D isorders w ithout bord ers 207
Radley, Alan 206 R oss, Edw ard 107
Rafaeli, Anat 270 Round D ance 87
rape 396—7 Rubin, Gayle 69
rape trials 3 9 7 -8 rules o f conduct 41
Rapson, Richard 427 R um m el, R .J. 425
rating 279 Runnym ede Trust: C om m ission on the Future
rationality 167 o f M ulti-Ethnic Britain 369
R ausch, H .L . 130 Russell H ochschild, Arlie: Em otion w ork,
Raym ond Jam es: Playground advert 312—14 feeling rules and social structure 103;
Razack, Shercnc 271 em otional labor 26 4 ; em otions 8, 215;
Re-evaluation C ounseling (R C ) 230 feeling ru les 26; gratitude 51; Managed Heart,
Reagan, President Ronald 388 The 261; status 2 14
real estate agency: Argentina 432 Ryfe, D .M . 362
reality T V 339; interview s 342—3; managed
em otions 340—3; talking alone 343—5 Sabini, J. 176
reason 166, 357 Sapir, Edward 85
rebellion 152—3 Sarbin, Th eodore 8
reciprocity 1 30 Sartre, J.-P. 175
recognition 249 Sawaf, A .: EQ M ap 279
recovery: breast cancer 221—2 Scarry, E. 223
rectoscope: Argentina 432 scenes 1 4 4 - 5 ,1 4 7 - 9
R eddy, W illiam 6 1 , 385—6 Schachter, S. 8, 103, 175
reflex 353 Scheff, Thom as 109, 2 3 1 , 402
R eid, Thom as 31 Scheier, M .F. 177
47 8 INDEX
schemata 209, 210, 351-2 Singer, J.E. 8 , 1 03

Scherer, K.R. 7 8 Small, Albion 107
Schudson,M. 362 Smith, Adam: Theory o j Moral Sentiments. The
Schwartz, H.S. 15 1 0 7 ; Wealth o f Nations, The 1 07
science 226, 294 Smith, Greg: Film Structure and the Emotion
script theorv 147 9 System 3 2 2
scripts 144, 151 social activity 3
secondary victimization 397 social actors 4 0 2
sccrcts 233—4 social behavior 1 0 6
Sedgwick, E.K. 11 social change 5 3
self 175 social classes 3 31
self-aggrandizement 47; acceptability 49 social cohesion 1 56
self blame 2 14 social conduct 1 0 7 , 3 0 6
self-consciousness 177, 178 social constructionism 8
self-control 41, 66, 68, 117, 118 social context 1 7 3 , 2 2 7
self-determination 167 social control: emotion work 214-15; feeling
self-discovery 161 rules 124—5; self-control 118, 119; symbolic
self-evaluation 177 8 interactionism 117
self-images 176, 304 social environment 127—31
self-interest 303-6 social interaction 210
self-invention 157 social intercourse 45, 50, 130
self-maintenance 161 social interdependence 435
self-projection 11 3 social morality 395, 421
self-regulation 21 5 social networks 357—8
selfhood 144 social norms 116, 119, 318
Sennett, R. 159 social optimism 437
serotonin: in the brain 241—2; brain 243; social order 1 2 1
central nervous system 245n3; depression social organization 102, 129
214 social patterns 129
service organizations 270 social policy 369
sexual harassment 398 social position 46, 212
sexual relations 45—7, 49 social relationships 214, 310
sexuality: attitudes 396; concealed 189; social sciences 2, 6, 14—15
jealousy 55—6; parental home 188—9; streets social status 227
190-1; surveillance 188 social structures: behavior 1 1 7 ; changes 1 3 0 ;
Shakespeare, William 232 interaction ritual 1 3 2 ; prior structure effects
shame: afTcct 146; anger 328; audience 178—9; 1 3 0 ; self 2 3 0
cost-bencfit analysis 318—9; identity 368; social svstems 1 39
Parekh Report 358; perspective 177; pride social taboos 2 9 1 —2
370; refusal 371; responsibility 176; revival social world 1 33
420; role of self 175; scripts 148—9; self- society: criminal justicc 4 1 8 —9 ; developments
depreciation 118; self-doubt 383; self- 4 4 , 4 8 ; emotional culture 4 1 8 —9 ; emotions
evaluation 176 1 0 6 , 1 3 9 ; life at court 3 9 ; power and status
shantytown: Argentina 432 1 2 8 ; restraint 3 8 ; restrictions on women
Sheller, Mimi 182—3 4 3 —4 ; social order 1 0 8 —9 ; transformation
Shields, Stephanie, A. 66 4 0 ; wars 37
shopping: act of love 309—10; household sociological theory 1 56
preferences 308—9; relationships 307 sociology 1, 1 0 2 , 2 0 6 , 361
Shott, Susan: Emotion and social life: an Solomon, Robert: Passions: Emotion and the
interactionist analysis 102—3 Meaning o f Life, The 2 9 - 3 0
sibling rivalry 55 somatic symptoms 2 5 4
Siegel, James T. 94 Sombart, Werner: Jews and Capitalism 4 5 2
Sighcle, S. 5 Southeast Asia 62
Silver, M. 176 space 1 8 1 , 1 8 6 , 191
Simmcl, Georg 107, 452 Spencer, Herbert 32
INDEX 479
Spinoza, Baruch 11 term inology: affect and em otion 1 1—12;

Spock, D r Benjamin 52 changes 30; em otions 31—2; secularization
sports 38 32; theological and secular 25
Spvcr, Patricia 94 Tesser, Abraham 317
SSRIs (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors): textual turn 9—10, 181
serotonin 242, 244n l theory 2 6 - 7
statistics 276 theory o f em otions 12—13
status 127 3 1 ,4 0 3 theory o f practice 73
status shields 21 3 T h oits, Peggy A. 269
Stearns, C .Z . 26 Th rift, N. 11, 182, 196
Stearns, D. 28 Times, The 334
Stearns, P.N. 26, 28 Tocqueville, A lexis de 107
Steinberg, Ronnie J. 265, 270 Tom kins, Silvan 10, 11, 109, 144, 145
Stenner, P. 393 Tom pkins, Joyce 303
Stets, Jan 101 T on nies, Ferdinand 107, 452
stigm a 385 tour guides: R obben Island M useum 378—80
Stoler, Anne 68 transfer: Argentina 430
Stradling, Stephen 197 transport policies 194
strategics 2 9 3 - 4 traum a 2 2 8 - 9
Straw, Jack 370 Trilling, L. 159
Street, J. 362 true feelings: authenticity 158—9 ; cultural
stress 23 6 , 264, 288 heritage 164; self 1 6 0 -2 ; social order 1 6 2 -4
structural patterns 128 truth 3 2 8 - 9
Sturdy, A. 277 tube: Argentina 433
subculture 156 Turkish-Cypriots: forged docum ents 4 1 2 ; in
subm arine: Argentina 433 G reat Britain 41 2—3; property 4 1 5 ; Republic
suffering: audience reactions 324; com passion o f C ypru s 416
4 3 7 - 8 ; com prehension 2 2 4 ; expression 224; Turkish Republic o f N orth ern C ypru s (T R N C ):
h orror 224; im ages 206; m edia im ages 322; docum entation 4 1 1 ; illegal state 41 3 - 4
n um bness 329—30; presentation 21 9 —20; Turner, B. 427
rem ote 327; representation 218; sociable Turner, Jonathan 101
2 2 3 ; twentieth century 425 Tyler, Im ogen: Chav m um , chav scum : class
suicide 156 disgust in contem porary Britain 322
Sumner, W illiam Graham 107 typology 29
suppression 122
Sutton, Adam 405 ubuntu 377
Sutton, R o b e rt J. 270 urbandictionarv 335—6
Swaan, Abram De 27—8 urbanization 53
Swain, M .A . 130 U rry , J. 195
Swan, Elaine 269
sym bolic interactionism 116, 117, 119 valence 31 5
sym bolism 4 0 6 —7 Valentine, G. 188
Sznaider, N atan: Compassionate temperament. The values 1 6 3 -4
4 27 vanity 118—19
victim s 326—7, 397—8
Tan, Ed 322 video diary 344
Tancred, Pcta 268 Vidich, A. 1 30
Tangney, J.P. 153, 155 violence 45—7 , 49
task force: Argentina 432 viscera: SSRIs 242
Taussig, Michael 6 8 —9 visions: Ghost Dance 88
Taylor, G .: sham e 175, 176, 178 vocabulary 30
techniques 123
television com m ercials 300 W ahrlich, Stefan: cancer survivor 222—3
television genres 3 W akefield, Jerom e 251
television pictures 325—6 W allace, Anthony 85—6
480 INDEX
W allas, G. 161 W ilson, Elizabeth 207—8

w ar 3 5 - 6 W innicott, D.W. 243
W ard, L ester Frank 107 W ittgenstein, Ludw ig 150—1
Warm Mouse: G host Dance 87 w om en: am bivalence 80; anger narratives
w arriors 36—7 160—1; anticssentialism 73; Batam 93 ;
W eber, M .: Ancient Judaism 107 8; capitalism Batamindo Industrial Estate 9 4 —6; blame
4 5 , 299; rationality 5; social classes 129 213—14; control o f em otions 6 4 , 65—6;
welfare state 434 dependence on each other 4 3 ; em otionality
W cssely, Sim on 253—4 6 8; em otions 6 3 , 2 6 5 ; family life 4 8 —9;
w estern culturc 166 7 , 173 freedom s 4 4 ; Paxtun em otional conventions
w estern m edicine 296 7 9 - 8 0 ; self-control 67; service organizations
White 59 270; w ork patterns 51
W hite, Geoffrey 74 w orkplace 190, 261, 276
W hitehead, Alfred N orth see N orth W hitehead, W orld Health O rganization 247—8; Mental
Alfred health: New understanding, new hope 246
W icklund, R .A . 177 w riting 236
W iegm an, Robin 372
W ikan, U. 235 Yar, Majid 3 3 2 -3
W ilce, J.M .: Social and Cultural Lives o j Immune Yates Rist, D arrell 383
Systems 206
W illiam son, Judith 311 Z eider, M. 2 7 9 , 280
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Emotions

A social science reader

A re emotions becoming more conspicuous in contem porary life? A re the social

Universals and p a rticu la rs of affect

Each main part comprises three sections dedicated to substantive themes,

M onica Greco is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at Gold­

Paul Stenner is Professor of Psychosocial Studies at the University of

Series Editor: Chris Jenks, Professor o f Sociology, Goldsmiths College,

Already in this Series:

T heor ie s of Race and Rac ism: A Reader

Gender: A S o cio lo g ic a l Reader

The S o c io lo g y of Health and Illness: A Reader

So cial Research M eth od s: A Reader

T h e I nform a ti o n So cie ty Reader

The Body: A Reader

So cial M ovem en ts : A Reader

E m o tio n s : A So cial Sc ie n ce Reader

A social science reader

Edited by M onica G reco and

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada

Routlcdge is an imprint of the Taylor Francis Group, an informa business

Typeset in Perpetua and Bell Gothic by

All rights reserved. N o part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

ISBN 10: 0 - 4 1 5 - 4 2 5 6 3 - 8 (hbk)

ISBN 13: 9 7 8 - 0 - 4 1 5 - 4 2 5 6 3 -6 (hbk)

Notes on co n trib u to rs xiii

Monica Greco and Paul Stenner

Emotions, history and civilization 25

4 Peter N. Stearns and Deborah C. Stearns

Emotions and culture 59

Emotions and society 101

12 Arlie Russell Hochschild

Emotions, selfhood and identity 143

17 Dick Pountain and David Robins

18 Charles Morgan and James R. Averill

19 Agneta H. Fischer and Jeroen Jansz

Emotions, space and place 181

Emotions and health 205

27 James M. Wilce Jr and Laurie J. Price

Em otions in w ork and organizations 261

32 Charlie L. Reeve, Steven G. Rogelberg,

33 Allen C. Smith, III and Sherryl Kleinman

Emotions, economics and consumer culture 299

Emotions and the media 321

40 Minna Aslama and Mervi Pantti

Emotions and politics 357

43 Anne-M arie Fortier

44 Clifford Shearing and Michael Kempa

Emotions and law 393

Compassion, hate, and te rror 425

54 Elaine Hatfield and Richard L. Rapson

Guide to further reading 455

Ben A N D E R S O N is a L e c tu re r in H um an G e o g rap h y at the U n iv ersity o f D u rh am .

M inna A SL A M A is the P ro g ram O ffice r for the N e c e ssa ry K n o w le d g e fo r a

Ja m e s R . A V E R IL L is P ro fe sso r o f P sy ch ology at the U n iv ersity o f M assach u se tts,

Jack B A R B A L E T is P ro fe sso r o f S o cio lo g y at the U n iv ersity o f L e ic e ste r and

L auren B E R L A N T is G e o r g e M . P ullm an P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f E nglish at

Anatomy of N ational Fantasy (C h ica g o , 1 9 9 1 ), The Qitcen of America Goes to Washington

Ju d ith B U T L E R is M axin e E llio t P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n ts o f R h eto ric and

C olin C A M P B E L L is p r o fe sso r o f so c io lo g y at the U n iversity o f York. H e has

R an dall C O L L IN S is the D o ro th y Sw ain e T h o m a s P ro fe sso r in S o c io lo g y at the

M onica Greco is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at Gold

Jo n E L S T E R is the R o b e rt K . M e rto n P ro fe sso r o f Social S cien ces w ith a p p o in t

A ric F R E IB E R G is Fou nd ation C h air o f C rim in o lo g y at the U n iversity o f M e l

D anny M ILLE R is P rofessor o f M aterial C ulture in the D ep artm e n t o f A n th ro