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Symposium Studying Policy Advocacy Through Social Network Analysis
Symposium Studying Policy Advocacy Through Social Network Analysis
*Corresponding author.
Abstract
Social Network Analysis (SNA) conceptualizes a policy-making process as a
network of actors. It can assess if an interest group (IGs) occupies a leading
central position within this policy network, if it belongs to various ad hoc
coalitions or if it plays a brokering role between different stakeholders. Such
network variables are crucial to capture how IGs mobilize and gain access to
policymakers, and to explain their goal achievements and potential policy
influence as well. This article reviews recent studies applying the methodo-
logical tools of SNA. It then proposes an innovative research design to
investigate how IGs seek to influence the course of a policy-making process
across many institutional venues.
(322 – 336) © 2016 European Consortium for Political Research. 1680- 4333/17 www.palgrave.com/journals
institutional, political and economic envir- ‘… network variables
onment. This is a noticeable improvement
in comparison to Baumgartner and Leech’s are crucial to capture
(1998: 174) rather critical evaluation of the how groups mobilize
context insensitivity in most IGs research and gain access to
published between 1950 and 1995. At that
time, most studies about IGs advocacy policy-makers …’
tactics were conducted in isolation from
the specificities of the policy-making pro- policymakers, and to explain their goal
cess. Nevertheless, Hojnacki et al (2012) achievements and potential policy influ-
conclude that future studies should con- ence as well. We do not mean that SNA
tinue to link IGs strategies, the policy pro- offers new theoretical hypotheses about
cess and politics even more strongly (see the policy influence of IG. But we claim that
also, Beyers, 2008: 1206–1207; Halpin SNA is a valuable method to empirically
and Binderkrantz, 2011: 207). assess key variables, such as the IGs posi-
One promising research avenue point- tion within a policy-making network, which
ing in that direction is the application of influence the likelihood of being successful
Social Network Analysis (SNA): ‘Newly during the policy-making process.
emerging work (much of which is not We focus on three core aspects any
included in our sample) that explicitly policy network consists of (Wasserman
analyses organizations’ network affilia- and Faust, 1994; Pappi and Henning,
tions, including the strength of their ties 1998): actors, relations and the overall
within broader partisan networks (Heaney network structure. Those core elements,
2006; Heaney and Rojas 2008, 2011; their identification and definition are on
Koger et al, 2009, 2010), has the poten- one side strongly driven by theory, and on
tial to contribute important information to the other side directly influenced by the
a systematic understanding of groups’ (institutional) context of the empirical
policy-making activities. Similarly con- cases under investigation. The aim here
structive are studies that consider both is to embed those three elements in IG
organizations and policymakers as colla- and policy network literature. This helps
borators in advocacy (Mahoney, 2008; us to highlight how SNA measures can
Baumgartner et al, 2009)’ (Hojnacki et al, fruitfully inform researchers to under-
2012: 11). The present article follows this stand IG activities and success.
research dimension and proposes that
SNA offers several methodological tools TYPE OF ACTORS AND NETWORK
for putting IGs advocacy activities and BOUNDARIES
success into their policy context.
In a nutshell, SNA conceptualizes a pol- The first step in empirical network studies
icy-making process as a network of policy is always to answer the question about
actors and allows empirical measuring of which actors to include (as ‘nodes’) in
IG positions in this policy network. SNA the SNA. Different theoretical, but also
tools can thus assess if an IG occupies a institutional elements are driving the
leading central position within collabora- definition of network boundaries. One
tive or adversarial policy networks, if it fundamental difference between decision
belongs to different ad hoc coalitions makers and IGs is that the first have final
and/or if it plays a brokering role between decisional control, whereas the second
different stakeholders, for example. Such can only try to impact decisions by acces-
network variables are crucial to capture sing decision makers and institutional
how IGs mobilize and gain access to arenas (Pappi and Henning, 1999).
frédéric varone et al european political science: 16 2017 323
Stokman and van den Bos (1992) there- ‘… network ties can be
fore distinguish between an influence
stage and a voting stage in the policy- conceived as exchange
making process. In the influence stage, relations …’
IGs enter into an exchange relationship
with formal authorities. IGs provide infor- between actors to look at. In the classical
mation and expertise to decisions makers resources exchange models also devel-
(MPs, a regulatory agency, a court, etc.) in oped in the literature on IGs (e.g.,
exchange of access to a formal venue Hansen, 1991; Wright, 1996; Berkhout,
(a parliamentary committee, a rule-making 2013), lobbying is for instance interpreted
procedure, an audition by judges, etc.) as a transaction where relevant infor-
(see also, Binderkrantz and Pedersen, mation, technical expertise or another
2016). Derived from that, network bound- ‘access good’ (Bouwen, 2002) is
aries are strongly driven by institutiona- exchanged for venue access. Thus, when
lised power devices and would typically be thinking conceptually about this exchange
drawn around all active IGs as well as the between actors, network ties can be
responsible decision makers (e.g., MPs, conceived as exchange relations or
elected officials, high civil servants, ‘channels’ within which flow those goods
judges, head of regulatory agencies, etc). or resources. It is not a direct relationship
A SNA can be even more restrictive and engaging two actors, but rather a directed
only consider those IGs that have effec- tie (going from one actor to the other) that
tively been successful in accessing to the does not – a priori – have to be recipro-
targeted venue. While some venues might cated or mutually activated by both par-
be open to a broader range of politically ties. From a lobbying perspective, this is
active actors (e.g., a pre-parliamentary important, as IGs can try to exchange
consultation procedure), other venues are resources, but are not necessarily suc-
rather closed (e.g., hearings in parliamen- cessful (e.g., by receiving anything in
tary committee). Furthermore, and return such as venue access). One promi-
depending on a country’s political system, nent example is Pappi and Henning’s
some venues remain informal (e.g., a tem- (1999) study in European agricultural
porary working group led by the adminis- policy where they convincingly demon-
tration, a self-regulation body, neo- strate that the provision of knowledge and
corporatist arrangements, etc.), even support (operationalised as resource
though they might play a key role in the exchange relations) does not have to be
policy-making process and, thus, intro- perceived in equal terms between IGs on
duce an important bias in the actors’ repre- one side, and the European Commission
sentation (Culpepper, 2011). Therefore, on the other. And going one step further,
the policy network literature mostly draws Henning (2009) then relates this resource
boundaries very broadly, and includes all exchange relations to IGs political influ-
sorts of public or private actors, formal and ence at the micro level and to policy out-
informal venues, and at all jurisdictional comes at the macro level (Henning,
levels (Kenis and Schneider, 1991; Klijn 2009). Leifeld and Schneider (2012) also
and Koppenjan, 2000). focus on information exchange relations,
and thus on networks as dependent vari-
TYPE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ables. They come to the conclusion that
ACTORS exchange relations among political actors
are strongly driven by institutional oppor-
The theoretical background of any SNA tunity structures and transaction costs. All
drives the choice about which relations those studies show, in a different way,
324 european political science: 16 2017 studying policy advocacy through SNA
how exchange relations between IGs sup- institutional venue (as ‘second mode’) if
plying an access good and the targeted this IG gained access to this institutional
policymakers (e.g., MPs, bureaucrats, venue. Besides venues, such ‘events’ or
judges) impact IG activity, institutional ‘second modes’ can also consist of formal
access,1 or lobbying success. or ad hoc coalitions, as IGs have the
Some governance and network scholars tendency to pool their resources and
conceptualise decision making less as a share the advocacy costs (see Gray and
conflict driven game, but rather as a col- Lowery, 1998; Holyoke, 2003; Mahoney,
laborative network and cooperative set- 2007). For example, IGs can share the
ting (Calanni et al, 2015). In such a financial costs for hiring an external lob-
perspective, direct collaborative relations byist or for funding a voting campaign or
rather than resource exchange seem to be they combine their legal expertise for
the appropriate structural device. But writing an amicus curiae brief to be
similar to the above, these studies help to sent to the Supreme Court. To answer
identify political actors’ embeddedness in research questions about the extent or
the overall policy process (Ibarra, 1993; intensity two IGs coordinate actions and
Henry et al, 2011), or to assess what co-participate within the same venues or
impact collaborative structures have on coalitions, a co-occurrence network can
network performance and outputs (Lubell then be created where a relation indi-
and Fulton, 2007). cates the number of shared events
While exchange relations are very much between two IGs.
driven by formal institutions and decision
rules, collaborative network structures NETWORK STRUCTURES AND
seem to be more informally driven. Simi- ACTORS’ POSITIONS
lar to the former, the choice of institutional
venue(s) by IGs is always constrained by Depending on the underlying theory, one
institutional access rules, cognitive bar- may wish to assess specific network con-
riers and resource availability. IGs select a figurations or single actors’ positions in
venue or set of venues depending upon its order to answer research questions about
receptiveness to the IGs policy claims single or multiple IGs activity in policy
(Pralle, 2006: 26–27). ‘Venue shopping’ networks, or about their lobbying success.
occurs not only horizontally (e.g., IGs Typically, researchers might be interested
lobbying the administration, the govern- in the identification of so-called ‘advocacy
ment, the parliament or courts), between coalitions’ driving policy change (Sabatier
branches of power, but also vertically, and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In contrast to
between levels of government. The IGs formal IGs coalitions discussed above,
strategic choice of the relevant advocacy they include a much broader range of
level is one key issue in multi-level gov- policy actors (IGs, decisions makers, poli-
ernance in general, and in Europeanized tical parties, experts, journalists, etc.)
public policies in particular (Pappi and and try to impact decision making deci-
Henning, 1999; Beyers and Kerremans, sively based on shared beliefs and policy
2012; Bolleyer and Börzel, 2010). preferences. To identify such advocacy
When assessing such strategic choice coalitions, IGs and other actors in the
as a network relation, researchers tend to network can be grouped into clusters or
rely on so-called two-mode network data. blocks based on similar attributes
More concretely, a network can be created (homophily2) or similar structural posi-
between IGs on one side, and ‘events’ on tions (structural equivalence3). When
the other. For example, a tie is created further assuming that coalition members
between an IG (as first ‘mode’) and an display a certain degree of coordination
frédéric varone et al european political science: 16 2017 325
(Henry, 2011), clique analysis allows But to what extent can future IG studies
controlling direct and indirect relations apply SNA further and benefit from analy-
among IGs within the same coalition tical and methodological strength? To
(Fischer, 2014; Box-Steffensmeier and bring first answers to this question, the
Christenson, 2014). The here cited next section reviews three new SNA appli-
authors then explained, based on coali- cations in IG research and published after
tion identification, IG success, policy the meta-analysis of Hojnacki et al
change and outputs. (2012). They were selected for their illus-
In addition, classical indicators of SNA tration of innovative conceptual and
may also be used to identify the roles methodological combinations of actors,
played by some IGs either within a coali- relations and network structures to study
tion or across coalitions. For instance, an IG activity and success.
IG might be the leader of a coalition,
occupy a ‘bonding position’ and represent
the coalition’s homogeneous policy pre- EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE:
ferences. By contrast, an IG linking differ- POSITION IN POLICY
ent coalitions (i.e., bridging or brokering NETWORK MATTERS
position) is able to stimulate information
exchanges between heterogeneous A study by Heaney (2014) argues that the
policy positions and, so doing, produce embeddedness of IGs in multiplex net-
new ideas about problem-solving or even works pays off in terms of their influence
negotiated agreements (Beyers and reputation. On the basis of document
Braun, 2013; Ingold and Varone, 2012). analysis and personal interviews, the
In one word, SNA offers many opportu- author operationalises influence reputa-
nities to assess the strength of strong ties tion and various network relations of IGs
within a coalition, and the strength of within the US health policy domain.
weak ties between coalitions (Carpenter Besides direct relations among IGs such
et al, 1998). as communication, indirect relations
Our review of the three network core through joint participation in coalitions
elements – actors, relations and struc- and common issues are also assessed
tures – has demonstrated that the (for coalitions’ participation, see also
design of network analysis for IG studies Heaney and Lorenz, 2013). Heaney
strongly depend upon research ques- (2014: 78) concludes that being con-
tions, theoretical assumptions and insti- nected through communication, coalition
tutional or context-related factors of the and issue overlap, significantly impacts
empirical cases. Some of the presented whether one IG cites another IG as being
researchers applied SNA in a rather influential.
descriptive way (see typically Pappi and In contrast to Heaney (2014) who
Henning, 1998; Ingold, 2011), whereas is predominantly interested in tie crea-
others developed network modeling tion and activity among IGs, Box-
further (see typically Henry, 2011; Steffensmeier et al (2013) highlight the
Leifeld and Schneider, 2012). Further- impact of IG activity on IG advocacy suc-
more and again mostly driven by cess. The authors assess how the position
research questions, networks can be of an IG within the network of all IGs co-
defined as a driver of policy change and signing amicus curiae briefs (from 1946 to
thus conceptualized as an independent 2001) has an impact on the US Supreme
variable, or network can be seen as the Court’s decisions. It claims that IGs who
aim and output, thus conceived as the are more connected to other IGs, who
dependent variable. collaborate with other well-connected IGs
326 european political science: 16 2017 studying policy advocacy through SNA
and, who frequently co-sign amicus cur- ‘… to be influential, a
iae briefs have a greater effect on the
probability that a justice vote in their group needs first of all to
favor. In other words, the network posi- be situated between
tion of an IG is more important, for influ- other (well-connected)
encing judicial decisions, than the
number of briefs it signs and the number groups …’
of IGs filling these briefs. Empirically,
‘eigenvector centrality’ of actors is used increases access to the bureaucratic
to capture pivotal IGs in the amici net- venue.
work.4 This study is limited to the judicial These three remarkable studies
venue: However, the authors suggest focus on alternative institutional venues
that, if networks of amici are also active (Court, Legislature, Government and
in other policy-making venues (i.e., leg- Administration), two very different politi-
islature or government), then one might cal systems (the United States and The
reasonably expect a disproportionate Netherlands), specific IGs advocacy stra-
policy impact of well-connected IGs tegies (litigation and lobbying) and differ-
within these venues also. ent policy domains and time frame (all
The third study reviewed here focuses judicial issues since World War II, health-
on network positions as well, which should care and trade policy of the last decades).
foster strategic information gathering and However, they share SNA as the main
policy brokerage activities. In the Eur- approach and methodology, even if they
opean context, Beyers and Braun (2013) use different indicators (i.e., centrality,
look at how IGs coalition membership structural equivalence, density, recipro-
impacts their respective access to deci- city and transitivity) to capture the IGs
sion makers. They measured both strong network position and test different
ties between IGs belonging to the same research hypotheses (see summary in
coalition and weak ties bridging more Table 1). It is noteworthy that they lead
distant IGs that are members of alterna- to the same overall conclusion: quality
tive coalitions. Interviews with represen- (i.e., the centrality in amici or coalitions
tatives of IGs, MPs and Government network) is much more important than
agencies participating to the Dutch trade quantity (i.e., the number of amicus cur-
policy (2003–2006) were conducted to iae briefs and co-signers, or the number
identify exchange relations between and size of coalitions) to explain venue
actors. A block-modeling procedure is access and policy influence exerted by
then applied to identify coalitions of struc- IGs. To be influential, an IG needs first of
turally equivalent actors, and indicators of all to be situated between other (well-
density, reciprocity and transitivity,5 both connected) IGs and not necessarily to
within and between coalitions, are mea- participate in many and large coalitions
sured to grasp the IGs network positions. or to have a disproportionate endowment
The overall findings demonstrate that IGs of internal resources. Taking into account
positions within the coalition network are the very diverse research designs of the
as important as IGs internal resources three studies compared here, the external
(e.g., members and staff) to explain IGs validity of their common findings should
access to elected MPs or administrative be high.
officials. Furthermore, being a central Table 1 highlights where the three stu-
node within a coalition is important for dies systematically apply SNA tools to
gaining access to MPs, while occupying operationalize the dependent and inde-
a bridging position between coalitions pendent variables and how they apply the
frédéric varone et al european political science: 16 2017 327
three dimensions (actors, relations and venues and, eventually, the policy out-
structure) presented above. This com- come reflecting their influence efforts.
parison demonstrates that none of these
studies fully capture the IGs advocacy
activities and success during the entire TRACING GROUPS’
policy-making process. For instance, ADVOCACY DURING AN
Box-Steffensmeier et al (2013) focus on ENTIRE POLICY PROCESS
one institutional venue only. By con-
trast, Heaney (2014) compares different The research design proposed here tries
venues involved during US health policy to better capture how IGs seek to influ-
formulation. However, he neither sys- ence the course of a policy across many
tematically compares the relative influ- institutional venues. It encompasses
ence of IGs across venues, nor does he seven steps and starts with the selection
aggregate the policy impacts of IGs of several most different policy issues, for
through their network position within the example, economic, social, environ-
three networks (communication, venue mental, individual rights or moral issues
and issue overlap). Finally, Beyers and (Step 1). For each policy issue, a docu-
Braun (2013) aim at capturing simulta- mentary analysis shall reconstruct the
neously the ties between IGs on one entire policy-making process and lead to
hand, and elected politicians and bureau- the precise identification of all binding
crats on the other hand. However, they policy decisions that were made in the
retain venue access, and not policy influ- different institutional venues over the
ence, as dependent variable. Of course, years: e.g., laws adopted by the Legisla-
these limitations do not reduce the rele- ture, popular initiatives accepted by the
vance and highest quality of these stu- voters, rulings by judicial courts, vetoes
dies, nor do they question the added by the Governor or regulatory decisions
value of adopting a social network by executive agencies (Step 2). In addi-
approach in IGs research. tion, the case study shall make a sys-
Nevertheless, we propose hereafter tematic inventory of all IGs that have
to broaden the perspective by looking at tried to influence these binding decisions,
IGs mobilization, coalition participation for example, through reported lobbying of
and network position across all institu- the Legislature, funding a voting cam-
tional venues activated during an entire paign, writing an amicus curiae brief to
policy-making process. The following support a party in a suit, sending a letter
proposal shows how SNA measure- to the Governor to request or oppose a
ments can be used in a research design, veto, or formulating comments to pro-
which aims at capturing the policy con- posed rules (Step 3) (on identifying
text of IGs advocacy, as suggested by actors, see also Eising, 2016). Steps 1–3
Baumgartner and Leech (1998). This are thus informing network boundary
tentative proposal is also compatible with definition, while Step 3 more specifically
the recommendation of Lowery and identifies IGs as nodes and actors in the
Gray (2004: 169): their neo-pluralist network.
approach distinguishes various interde- For the definition of relations, the pro-
pendent steps in the ‘influence produc- posed research design adopts the above-
tion process’, namely the formation and introduced two-mode approach where a
political mobilization of IGs, the competi- relation is identified when an IG is a
tion between IGs belonging to the popula- member of a formal coalition and this for
tion of active interest organizations, the each decision in each venue. Formal coa-
advocacy strategies they follow across lition membership can be empirically
328 european political science: 16 2017 studying policy advocacy through SNA
Table 1: Summary of three SNA studies on IGs’ advocacy activities
Author of the study Heaney (2014) Box-Steffensmeier et al (2013) Beyers and Braun (2013)
Research question Does the embeddedness of an Does the position of an IG within the Does the exchanges within and
IG in multiplex networks affect its amici network impact on justice between coalitions affect the
influence reputation? votes? likelihood of access to policymakers?
Independent (a) IGs only (a) IGs only (a) IGs, MPs, Government agencies
variables: SNA tools (b) One-mode network: each IG is a (b)Two modes network transformed (b) One-mode network: each IG or
used to capture the node and an edge is created if an IG in one-mode network: each IG policymaker (elected politician or
network position of IGs communicates with another IG co-signing an amicus curiae brief bureaucrat) is a node in the decision
(a) actors/boundaries Two-mode network of coalition and is a node in the network of amici making network
(b) relations issue overlap: each IG, coalition or An edge is created between two An edge is created if an IG exchanges
(c) positions and issue is a node and an edge is IGs co-signing the same amicus information or tries to collaborate
network structures created between two IGs linked curiae brief with another IG or a policymaker
through the same coalition or the (c) Eigenvector centrality is used (c) Blocks of structural equivalent
same issue, respectively to identify central IGs actors form coalitions. Density,
(c) Exponential random graph reciprocity and transitivity measures
model (ERGM) assessing if are used to identify IGs within and
relational activity or homophily across coalition activities
leads to reputational power relations
Dependent variable: Indirect measures of political IGs influence on justice’s vote IGs access to policymakers (SNA;
political influence influence through IGs influence access relations as network)
reputation (SNA; influence
reputation as network)
Empirical basis US health policy between 2001 and US Supreme Court cases from Dutch trade policy between 2003 and
2003 1946 to 2001 2006
Major findings IGs tied through communication Well-connected IGs collaborating IGs with a bonding position within a
relations, coalition and issue with other well-connected IGs have coalition gain more access to elected
overlap tend to evaluate each a greater effect on the probability politicians, while IGs with a bridging
other as influential that a justice votes in their favor position between coalitions gain more
access to bureaucrats
Notes
1 To convincingly show that such exchanges occur for both access and influence, an empirical study
should always try to gather empirical data about the (reported or observed) behavior of both sides of the
exchange relationships (e.g., IGs and policymakers). This methodological challenge can be very well
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Karin Ingold is Professor of Political Science and a member of the Oeschger Center for Climate
Change Research at the University of Bern. She is also affiliated to the Swiss Federal Institute
of Aquatic Science and Technology (EAWAG). Her research focuses on policy process
theories, the sustainability of natural resource management and social network analysis.
Charlotte Jourdain is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Geneva and a visiting student
researcher at UC Berkeley, Institute of Governmental Studies. Her doctoral thesis investi-
gates the advocacy strategies and policy success of interest groups in California.
334 european political science: 16 2017 studying policy advocacy through SNA
comment on: studying policy
advocacy through social
network analysis
volker schneider
Chair of Empirical Theory of the State, University of Konstanz, Fach D 81 Konstanz
D-78457, Germany
Email: volker.schneider@uni-konstanz.de
336 european political science: 16 2017 studying policy advocacy through SNA