DALE SANDERS, AND A.S.

MOREAU, JR, petitioners,

vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Zambales, Olongapo City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS,
respondents.

FACTS
Petioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station
(NAVASTA) in Olongapo City and Petitioner Moreu was the commanding
officer in the Subic Naval Base. Private Responder Rossi and Wyer were
both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department
of NAVSTA.

On October 3, 1975, Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment
has been converted from permanent full time to permanent part time,
effective on October 18, 1975. They protested this conversion and to
institute grievance proceedings to the rule and regulations of the U.S.
Department of Defense. They got a recommendation from the hearing
officer to be switched back to permanent full-time status plus backwages.

On May 17, 1976, Sander disagreed with the letter addressed to Moreau,
and asked for the rejection of the recommendation. The letter contained
statements that A.) Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and
supervisors B.) Rossi and Wyers are proven to be difficult employees c.)
Even though they were underoath to not discuss the case to anyone, they
placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case
could hear.

On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a letter

allegedly from Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining
the change of Rossi and Wyer’s employment status and requesting an
agreement therewith.

The private respondent’s filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City
for damages against the petitioners on November 8, 1976, They claimed
that the letter contained defamatory statements that caused them mental
anguish and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an
invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.

Sanders and Moreau argued that the acts complained of were performed by
them in the discharge of their official duties and that the court should have
no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.
ISSUE Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties

RULING Yes, the petitioners were indeed performing within their official duties.
Sanders, a director of the special services department of NAVSTA, had
complete supervision over their personnel, including Rossi and Wyer, and
had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and
other related matters.It is undisputed that the letter he wrote was in
response to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more
information regarding the case of the private respondents.Furthermore, even
in the absence of such a request, he was within his rights in responding to
the hearing officer's criticism—in effect, a direct attack on him—that Special
Services was practicing "an autocratic form of supervision."

Moreau, on the other hand, is said to have written to the Chief of Naval
Personnel seeking approval for the conversion of the private respondents'
kind of employment even before the grievance proceedings began. For the
time being, disregarding the question of its timeliness, this act is clearly
official in nature, performed by Moreau as Sanders' immediate superior and
directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving NAVSTA's
special services department. In fact, the letter dealt with the department's
financial and budgetary problems and contained recommendations for their
resolution, including the re-designation of the private respondents. It had
nothing to do with anything personal or private.

The petitioners were being sued as federal government officers. Because

they acted on behalf of that government and within the limits of their
authority, it is the government, not the petitioners, who is liable for their
actions. If the trial is allowed to proceed and it is proven that the claimants
have a right to compensation, any award must be met not by the petitioners
in their individual capacities, but by the United States government as their
principal. This will necessitate an affirmative act by that government to meet
the judgment, namely the allocation of the required sum to cover the
damages awarded, effectively turning the action into a litigation against that
government without its permission.

The petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated March 8,1977,

August 9,1977, and September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE. The respondent
court is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 2077-O. Our Temporary
restraining order of September 26,1977, is made PERMANENT. No costs.