Labor and Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not

Nitto Enterprise v. NLRC (1995) instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.

G.R. No. 114337 | 1995-09-29
Capili should rightly be considered as a regular employee of Nitto as defined by
Subject: Prior approval by the DOLE of the proposed apprenticeship program is a Article 280 of the Labor Code since the employee has been engaged to perform
condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
into; The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of the employer.
due process
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements
Facts: of due process

Nitto Enterprises hired Roberto Capili sometime as an apprentice machinist, molder The twin requirements of due process, substantive and procedural, must be complied
and core maker. As evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement for a period of six (6) with, before valid dismissal exists. Without which, the dismissal becomes void. The
months with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due
wage. process.

Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was working on, The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed
accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a nearby with two written notices before termination of employee can be legally effected:
hospital. He also entered a workshop within the office premises which was not his
work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority
and in the process injured his left thumb. The following day, Roberto Capili was asked
(1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for
to resign in a letter. Capili executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of Nitto.
which his dismissal is sought; and
Capili filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits.
(2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's
The Labor Arbiter held that Capili’s dismissal was valid. The NLRC reversed the
decision to dismiss him. (See Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC)
decision of the Labor Arbiter and declared that Capili was a regular employee since
no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved at the time the
In this case, Capili filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only three
agreement was executed.
days after he was made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such resignation
was not voluntary and deliberate. He further asserted that Nitto "strong-armed" him
Held:
into signing the resignation letter and quitclaim without explaining to him the contents
thereof. 
Prior approval by the DOLE of the proposed apprenticeship program is a
condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly
entered into

The apprenticeship agreement between Nitto and Capili was executed on May 28,
1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care
maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by Nitto
and submitted to the DOLE. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only
on June 7, 1990. Thus, Nitto did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is
mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and
apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly
approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. (See Article 61 of the Labor
Code)

Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national
apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and
government and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship
standards for the protection of apprentices." Thus, prior approval by the Department
of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a
condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered
into. The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of
Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company vs. NLRC (1997)
G.R. No. 118978 | 1997-05-23
Subject: The Company’s policy of disqualifying women from work is against Labor
Laws and the Constitution; The Policy against married woman workers would be valid
provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance; Parties to a contract may establish any agreements but should not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy
Facts:
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by PT&T as a reliever and a probationary
employee. In the job application form, she indicated in the portion for civil status that
she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier.
When PT&T learned about the same later, she was required to explain the
discrepancy and was reminded about the company’s policy of not accepting married
women for employment. In defense, Grace stated that she was not aware of PT&T’s
policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not
deliberately hidden her true civil status.
The NLRC modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ruled that private
respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by
her employer, PT&T. Thus, ordering for the reinstatement of private respondent in her
employment with PT&T.
Held:
The Company’s policy of disqualifying women from work is against Labor Laws
and the Constitution
An employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business
judgment, all aspects of employment, “from hiring to firing,” except in cases of
unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law.
In the case at bar, PT&T’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from
work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right
against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less
than the Constitution. Grace’s tenure with the company was dissolved principally
because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for
employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty or
insubordination.
Grace’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be
properly characterized as willful or in bad faith. She was practically forced by that very
same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being
disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of
employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty
committed by the employee and not on the employer’s caprices. Furthermore, it
should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or
unjustified.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by
PT&T. (See Art. 136 of the Labor Code)
The policy of the firm to consider female employees in the project it was undertaking
as separated the moment they get married due to lack of facilities for married women
is void. Such policy of the employer is an example of “discriminatory chauvinism”
tantamount to denying equal employment opportunities to women simply on account
of their sex, and must be struck down as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the
Civil Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 and the Constitution. (See Gualberto vs.
Marinduque Mining)
The Policy against married woman workers would be valid provided it reflects
an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance
It is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just against
married women. And, where the employer discriminates against married women, but
not against married men, the variable is sex and the discrimination is unlawful. Upon
the other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could
be justified as a “bona fide occupational qualification,” or BFOQ, where the particular
requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a general
principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement
of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance.
Parties to a contract may establish any agreements but should not be contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy
PT&T’s policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor
Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage
in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public
policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a
privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable
right. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should
not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to
its logical consequences, it may even be said that PT&T’s policy against legitimate
marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the
sacrament of marriage.
The Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations between the
parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they are
with so much public interest that the same should yield to the common good. And that
neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair
the interest or convenience of the public.