Journal of Radiation Research and Applied Sciences 15 (2022) 149–162

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Journal of Radiation Research and Applied Sciences

journal homepage: www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-radiation-research-and-applied-sciences

Sensitivity study of risk to future generations associated with the Geological

Disposal of Radioactive Waste in the Jebel-Al-Dhanna salt dome
Abdulla H. Al Nuaimi *, Laurence G. Williams OBE FREng
Centre for Nuclear Engineering, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: The disposal of Higher Activity Wastes, particularly long lived Heat Generating High Level Waste (HG-HLW) such
Higher activity waste as Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) is one of the biggest challenges encountered by the peaceful civil nuclear energy
Geological disposal facility industry. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emplaced laws and instituted a policy in which geological disposal
Performance assessment
is a potential choice for SNF disposal. Available geological data in the public domain provide initial indications of
Risk analysis
geological environments that might be suitable to host a Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) in the UAE. This
paper aims to present an indicative preliminary Performance Assessment (PA) demonstrating radiological dose
and risk estimations from hosting a GDF in the Jebel al Dhanna (JAD) location consisting of an Evaporite
geological environment in the form of a Salt Dome (Diapir) that protrude above the surface. Modelling the
dispersion of harmful radionuclides from the GDF hosted at the JAD location is achieved by utilising GoldSim’s
Contaminant Transport code, which has successfully provided an evaluation of radiological risks to current and
future generations from the disposal of the UAE’s forecasted SNF inventory. The developed GoldSim model
highlights the migration of radionuclides from within disposed waste packages, past the engineered barrier
system (EBS), through the surrounding geosphere or the Natural Barrier System (NBS), reaching a reference
receptor. Due to the lack of detailed and site specific data, analyses presented in this paper are to be viewed as
generic and are not to be utilised directly as a site selection tool. The analyses presented are expected to go
through several revisions and development stages once sufficient site specific data is made available and will
then be presented in, and be a part of a UAE site specific safety case report. The analyses presented in this paper
are not meant to be used in site selection decision making or in the assessment of the suitability of the location to
host a GDF for nuclear waste. The selection of a site for a GDF in the UAE is a matter for the UAE Government and
depend upon a more detailed analysis of site-specific conditions.

1. Introduction
The main objective of deep geological disposal as depicted by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to protect nearby pop­
ulations and environments from the hazardous effects of ionizing radi­
ation generated from disposed radioactive waste packages. The Emirates
Nuclear Energy Corporation’s (ENEC) Radioactive Waste Management
Organisation (RWMO) is the entity responsible for implementing the
UAE’s long-term radioactive waste management policy. Currently, only
Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) is designated as Higher Activity Wastes (HAW)
produced from the UAE’s civil nuclear energy program. As decreed by
Chapter 8, Article 40–42 of the UAE Nuclear Law set in 2009, regula­
tions and policies are to be produced by the UAE’s government to
address the long-term management plan for the disposal of SNF and
other radioactive wastes (UAE, 2009). The Federal Authority of Nuclear
Regulation (FANR), identifying as the regulatory body for the UAE’s
nuclear sector, has produced regulatory document FANR-REG-27 titled
“Regulation on Disposal of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste”
(FANR-REG-27 “Disposal of Radioactive Waste ”, 2019), which iden­
tifies geological disposal as possible choice for the disposal of SNF (UAE,
2017). FANR-REG-27 also identifies sets of requirements to be addressed
by the RWMO, in which scientific and accurate evidence needs to be
presented to prove that, for the time period specified by FANR, radio­
logical hazards and risks to the population and the environment are
below set thresholds.
Based on a sound scientific approach, performance safety analyses,

Peer review under responsibility of The Egyptian Society of Radiation Sciences and Applications.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: a.alnuaimi19@imperial.ac.uk (A.H. Al Nuaimi).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrras.2022.05.022
Received 26 April 2022; Received in revised form 25 May 2022; Accepted 30 May 2022
Available online 13 June 2022
1687-8507/© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of The Egyptian Society of Radiation Sciences and Applications. This is an open access
article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
A.H. Al Nuaimi and L.G. Williams OBE FREng
where radiological hazards are analytically assessed and compared with
potential radiation dose and other risk criteria, facilitates conversations
between the GDF delivering entity (RWMO) and relevant stakeholders
(i.e. Regulator, Public). In order to achieve this, GoldSim’s Contaminant
Transport code, which is a dynamic, probabilistic simulation package
developed by the GoldSim Technology Group was utilised. Specifically,
the GoldSim Contaminant Transport code was used to model the
dispersion of radioactivity in the event of a breach in a UAE GDF
following degradation of designed engineered barriers. The developed
GoldSim model highlights the transport of radionuclides from within
disposed waste packages, past the engineered barrier system (EBS),
through the surrounding geosphere or the Natural Barrier System (NBS),
reaching a reference receptor either via ingestion or inhalation either via
ingestion or inhalation or both.
The identification of a site for geological disposal in the UAE is yet to
be decided on, with available geological data being mostly relating to
the oil and gas industry with insufficient detail in the public domain.
However, available geological sources provide an indication of possible
rock formations that might be suitable for the hosting of a GDF. Evap­
orite environments consisting of rock salts are available in seven
different locations in the UAE in the form of salt domes, with six loca­
tions being on salt islands (Delma, Sir Bani Yas, Arzana, Qarnain, Zirku
and Sir Bu Nair) and one being on an on-land salt dome at the Jebel Al
Dhanna (JAD) location. The preliminary indicative Performance
Assessment (PA) presented in this paper for a UAE GDF assumes that the
disposal system evolves as expected, without the occurrence of natural
or human induced disruptive events for the assessment duration.
A simplified approach was taken in modelling the distribution of
geological features at the JAD location based on data that was made
available by the UAE’s Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure (MoEI) and
the Environmental Agency of Abu Dhabi (EAD). The design of the GDF
disposal concept in the developed indicative PA is based on the design
presented by the German Gorleben disposal facility, as it is similarly
hosted in a salt dome.
As stated in Article 6, Clause 8 of the FANR-REG-27 document, a UAE
GDF must present features that “aim to provide isolation for at least
several thousands of years for intermediate and high-level Radioactive
Waste” (FANR-REG-27 “Disposal of Radioactive Waste ”, 2019). This
statement indicates that FANR expects the RWMO’s GDF to co-locate
SNF, Intermediate-Level Waste (ILW), and some Long-Lived Low-Level
Waste (LLW) in a future GDF. However, in the developed indicative PA
presented in this paper, only SNF produced from the UAE’s nuclear
energy program is considered. This was done as it is expected in the
long-term that safety challenges, risks and hazards associated with the
disposal of SNF are much more significant that other waste classifica­
tions due to factors such as radioactivity, half-life and associated heat
generation rates of disposed inventories. Additionally, only considering
SNF in the PA analysis limits facility design and assists in further
simplifying the safety analysis.
The analyses produced from the developed PA model are mostly
generic, where although not being related to a specific site in the UAE,
site properties entered into the model are realistic and relevant to the
considered disposal system. Due to the lack of detailed and site specific
data, analyses presented in this paper are therefore to be viewed as
generic and are not to be utilised directly as a tool used to make infor­
mative site selection decisions. The presented analyses are meant to
mainly quantify and indicate preliminary risk to current, and more
importantly, future generations from hosting a GDF with the salt dome
located at the JAD site in an evaporite environment. The analyses pre­
sented are expected to go through several research and development
stages once sufficient site specific data is made available and will then be
presented in and be a vital part of a UAE site specific safety case report.
Section 5 of this paper presents results that are produced from the
developed indicative PA model, with a general conclusion that while
considering conditions and generic data in the performed simulation,
annual dose and annual risk from having a GDF at the Jebel Al Dhanna
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Journal of Radiation Research and Applied Sciences 15 (2022) 149–162
site is way below regulatory limits, which is expected due to the absence
of a significant driving force in an evaporite environment that can
release radionuclides into the biosphere suggesting that, with the
available input parameters used, a GDF being constructed and safely
operated in the UAE is possible.
2. Evaporite environment as GDF host
Evaporites are classified as sedimentary rocks forming a unique
stratum. Evaporites are mainly formed from dissolved minerals that are
contained by ancient saline bodies (seas, lake etc.) by the recurring
process of evaporation and precipitation. Large, thick formations of
evaporite deposits generally exist in enclosed seawater basins. Many of
the significant evaporite deposits found are the world were formed
during the Permo-Triassic era (195–280 Million years ago) (Thomas &
Pharaoh, 2014a).
Rock salt, also known as Halite, is the most abundant evaporite
mineral in geological records. Halite consists mainly of sodium chloride
(NaCl), which comprises around 75% of seawater salts. Evaporite min­
erals do not usually enclose free water, hence providing a dry environ­
ment that is devoid of groundwater flow. Halite is also mechanically
weak compared to most Higher Strength Rocks (HSR) and Lower
Strength Sedimentary Rocks (LSSR), however, rock salt creep properties
reassures that fractures in this environment cannot be sustained for long
time durations. Rock salts also have higher thermal conductivity prop­
erties when compared to HSR and LSSR environments, however, this can
be addressed in the design of the disposal system by having greater
waste package separation distances (Nuclear Decommissioning Au­
thority, 2016).
Evaporites are usually located in dry regions that are separated from
the ocean. Layers of evaporite deposits are laid down in confined basins.
The first mineral to precipitate is usually Calcium Sulphate in the form of
gypsum. Progressing through further evaporation, precipitates of Halite
are formed along with gypsum, followed by anhydrite until finally
forming highly soluble salts of potassium and magnesium in the form of
Sylvite, Carnallite and Polyhalite (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority,
2016). The recurring processes of these minerals depositing through
precipitation and sedimentation can eventually results in a very thick
sequence of evaporite minerals at the base of a marine basin. Water is
then flushed out of the structure matrix due to the immense cumulative
weight of the overlying sediment. Following re-crystallization of the
minerals, a very low permeability and porosity homogeneous crystalline
rock is formed (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, 2016). The
mechanism of transport of groundwater and solutes through an evapo­
rite environment will be mainly via diffusion in regions of inter­
connected pore space along formations of brine, however, it is unlikely
that such a connection exists over significant distances in a evaporite
environment (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, 2016). This makes
an evaporite environment one of the most stable and hence suitable
environments to host a GDF, as is seen from the selection made by the
US’s Department of Energy in the construction of the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico in a salt bed environment, and the
German DBE in the construction of a GDF in a salt dome environment at
Gorleben.
The British Geological Survey (BGS) have identified nine salt domes
within the UAE. It is reported by the BGS that the most prominent rock
type making up the identified salt domes in the UAE is grouped in a
lithostratigraphic unit known as the Hormuz Complex (Thomas & Pha­
raoh, 2014a). The Hormuz Salt Series contains evaporites, in addition to
varied groups of shales, dolomites and volcanics. Four main groups are
identified at the outcrop of salt dome locations and they include evap­
orites, sedimentary rocks, pyroclastics and intrusive igneous rocks
(Thomas, Ellison, & Goodenough, 2012). Evaporites present at these
locations are mostly made up of crystalline rock salt with soft gypsif­
erous surfaces (Thomas et al., 2012). Table 1 illustrated the composition
of two rock samples analysed via the X-Ray Diffraction (XRD) method.
A.H. Al Nuaimi and L.G. Williams OBE FREng Journal of Radiation Research and Applied Sciences 15 (2022) 149–162

Table 1 illustrates the Salt Domes that were geologically surveyed including the
XRD analyses from Two samples taken from UAE Salt Domes (Thomas et al., Delma, Sir Bani Yas, Sir Bu N’Air, Zirku, Arzana, Qarnain and Jebel Al
2012). Dhanna salt domes.
Sample Location Quartz Gypsum Anhydrite Halite Mica Chlorite

Jebel Al Dhanna 1.7 7.8 83.7 5.6 <0.5 <0.5

Sir Bani Yas 1.2 11.2 80.5 4.3 <0.5 <0.5
From the nine salt dome locations that were identified, a preliminary
suggestion is made by this paper that is based on ease of access from a
transport perspective, where the Jebel Al Dhanna location becomes the
most appealing due to it being on the main land and the most easily
accessible location that is in close proximity to the existing BNPP facility
(~40 km to the east, can be accessed via road). Another location to be
considered is Sir Bani Yas island, located ~5 km north of the Jebel Al
Dhanna salt dome and can be accessed via sea. The salt dome located at
the Island of Sir Bani Yas is larger (~3.6 km horizontally, ~3 km
vertically at outcrop) than that seen at the Jebel Al Dhanna location
(~2.2 km horizontally, ~4.1 km vertically at outcrop). Although access
to the Island of Sir Bani Yas is more difficult when compared to the Jebel
Al Dhanna location, the island has the required transportation infra­
structure allowing for easier access (seaport, airport, roads). Fig. 1
3. Considered SNF inventory
In the preliminary PA presented in this paper, SNF is the only
considered waste to be disposed in the modelled GDF. The Standardized
Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation (SCALE) 6.2.4 code from
the US’s Oak Ridge National Laboratories (ORNL) was used. The Oak
Ridge Isotope Generation Automatic Rapid Processing (ORIGEN-ARP)
package within the SCALE 6.2.4 computer code was utilised to calculate
the most prominent SNF radionuclide inventory produced from the
operation of the UAE’s APR-1400 nuclear reactors at the Barakah Nu­
clear Power Plant (BNPP). APR-1400 spent fuel data provided by the
Kora Electric Power Corporation and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co.
Ltd. (KEPCO/KHNP) was utilised in the inventory analysis. The esti­
mated inventories are illustrated in in Table 2 per Spent Fuel Assembly
(SFA). It is estimated that the operation of the BNPP for 60 years will
produce 16,564 SFAs which is also considered in the JAD model. Data
obtained from these calculations was used to provide the source term in
the GoldSim “JAD model”.

Fig. 1. Satellite images of the seven salt domes. a) Delma. b) Sir Bani Yas. c) Sir Bu N’Air. d) Zirku. e) Arzana. f) Qarnain and g) Jebel Al Dhanna salt dome (Thomas
and Pharaoh, 2014b). © 2022 Google, Image © 2022 Digital Globe.

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Table 2 Transport (CT) package was used to model the dispersion of radioac­
Estimate Inventory of the most significant Radionuclides in APR1400’s SFA. tivity released from a JAD site GDF following the breakdown of engi­
Nuclide Half-life (Yrs.) Activity (Bq) Mass (kg)/SFA neered barriers. In the development of the JAD model, several steps
APR1400 [SCALE 6.2.4] were followed to develop the contaminant transport model. These steps
C14 5.70E+03 3.30E+11 1.04E-07 can be summarized as seen in Fig. 3 illustrating the JAD model devel­
Se79 3.27E+05 1.08E+10 2.84E-03 opment methodology.
Sr90 2.88E+01 1.16E+15 0.265 Therefore, the JAD model was comprised of three major components,
Tc99 2.11E+05 1.92E+12 0.471 the source term, the near-field surrounding the SNF package and the far-
Sn126 2.30E+05 8.79E+10 0.013
I129 1.57E+07 4.33E+09 0.098
field. The near-field component of the JAD model includes crushed
Cs135 2.30E+06 8.08E+10 0.209 halite rock salt encompassing the SNF canister, which welds and com­
Cs137 3.00E+01 1.98E+15 0.656 bines together via creep with time, with diffusion as the mechanism of
U233 1.59E+05 5.16E+07 1.53E-06 transport through it. The conceptual layout of the GDF and the config­
U234 2.46E+05 1.70E+11 0.065
uration of waste canisters is addressed in the near-field region. The far-
U235 7.00E+08 7.36E+08 2.046
U236 2.34E+07 3.25E+10 2.054 field component of the JAD model addresses the vertical far-field con­
U238 4.47E+09 2.44E+10 373.342 sisting of the lithological layers above the GDF to simulate the transport
Np237 2.14E+06 6.50E+10 0.270 of radionuclides in the vertical direction.
Pu238 8.80E+01 4.16E+14 0.149 Together, the evaluation of the near and far-field components allows
Pu239 2.41E+04 3.03E+13 2.354
Pu240 6.56E+03 6.39E+13 1.226
for the demonstration of capability in the presented indicative perfor­
Pu241 1.40E+01 2.03E+14 0.565 mance assessment. An overview of the structure of the JAD model is
Pu242 3.75E+05 4.34E+11 0.422 illustrated by Fig. 4 presenting the GoldSim boxes constructed for the
Am241 4.32E+02 4.92E+14 0.174 analysis.
Am243 7.36E+03 7.25E+12 0.102
Total Mass (kg) 384.49
4.1. Radionuclide Transport Pathways
4. GoldSim JAD model
The transport box in the GoldSim code as illustrated in Fig. 4 defines
the pathways considered for the transport of radionuclide species
This subsection discusses the development of the Jabel Al Dhanna
released from the waste canisters through the near and far-fields, to a
(JAD) preliminary model. Fig. 1 (g) illustrate a satellite image of the JAD
receptor as illustrated by Fig. 5. The location of the GDF is assumed to be
site. This coastal GDF is mined into a salt dome/diapir overlain by
mined into the Jebel Al Dhanna Salt Dome, into the halite dominated
anhydrite and sand. Borehole investigations of groundwater availability
layer starting at a depth of around 50m onwards (Environment Agency,
and salinity in the vicinity of the salt dome by the EAD illustrate that
2018). A single pathway has been incorporated into the JAD model,
groundwater only exists at shallow depths from 12 to 18m, and at
being in the upwards/vertical direction. This was assumed due to the
further depths groundwater is extremely sparse or non-existent. Fig. 2
location of the JAD site being downgradient from the closest receptor to
illustrates stratigraphical layers that were identified by the EAD inves­
the JAD site. Additionally, borehole investigation of groundwater and
tigation, and were used as the bases for the geological description of the
well in the vicinity of the JAD site indicate to the presence of shallow
JAD model.
hyper-saline wells, with a maximum depth of around 22m (Environment
In order to evaluate risk at the JAD site, the GoldSim computational
Agency, 2018). Moreover, borehole investigation around a similar salt
code was utilised. GoldSim is a Monte Carlo simulation code that can be
dome that is 5 km north of the JAD site, on the island of Sir Bani Yas,
utilised for the modelling of complex dynamic systems. The code has the
indicate that at depths of around 50m and deeper, halite is present.
ability to model advective and diffusive transport using one-dimensional
Additionally, the nearest receptor is up-gradient from the JAD site,
compartment model elements. Specifically, the GoldSim’s Contaminant
hence the idea of presence of groundwater lateral flow was disregarded.

Fig. 2. Stratigraphical Layers in the vicinity of the JAD site. Fig. 3. JAD model development methodology flow chart.

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Fig. 4. Overview of JAD model Structure.

Fig. 5. a) Overview of JAD Model’s Radionuclide Transport Pathways considered, b) JAD Model Upwards Pathway.

Therefore, the JAD site, being a surface salt dome with a peak of around
100 m was modelled as a “stack”, releasing radionuclides in gaseous
form upon migration to the surface of the dome.
The conceptual design considered for the JAD model is illustrated in
Fig. 6, where it is assumed that SNF canisters are to be oriented hori­
zontally, in rows with the long axis of the canisters oriented perpen­
dicular to the direction of the modelled diffusive flow, similar to the
conceptual disposal design proposed by Gorleben Germany as illustrated
in Fig. 6b. The JAD model contains the estimated SNF inventory as
discussed in Section 2. Assemblies of SNF are packaged into copper
canisters and in accordance to the SKB waste canister design.
Degradation of the waste package starts only when the copper
canister fails due to corrosion. Therefore, the cast iron inserts only start
to corrode when the surrounding copper canister is breached. Once all
barriers are breached, the SNF starts degrading, releasing radionuclides
to the surrounding near-field Halite. Radionuclides are initially released
via the Instant Release Fraction (IRF) mechanism after which the
degradation of the SNF is assumed to have a fractional degradation rate
of 2 × 10− 5/yr. The transport mechanism by which radionuclides
migrate through the near-field and far-field is via diffusion only, due to
the absence of any fluid flow, and any cracks in the NBS.
Once at the surface, radionuclides diffuse into the atmosphere and
particulates enter air via resuspension. Atmospheric dispersion carries
radionuclides to the receptor. The SNF is modelled as a matrix source
that degrades on its own time. As the SNF matrix degrades, radionu­
clides are released and partitioned onto the surround near-field halite.
Some are entrained in the attenuated near- and far-fields, and others
diffuse upward towards the ground surface.
4.2. Exposure calculations
The exposure box as illustrated in Fig. 4 holds values and calculations
for the assessment of exposures to humans. Human health effects eval­
uated in the JAD Model include radiological effects related to ionizing

Fig. 6. a) Waste Canister Emplacement in JAD Model without a Buffer Surrounding Copper Canister b) Gorleben Facility Conceptual Design, c) JAD Model
Layout Dimensions.

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radiation, to reference receptor who is a resident that grows some of
their own food.
The off-site exposure scenario assumed for the JAD facility is focused
on the closest residential area, located 9 km South East of the evaluated
facility location. Due to the receptor location being relatively upgradient
to the JAD site, it is expected that there is no complete groundwater
pathway from the JAD GDF. And hyper-saline water, as shown by the
EAD data in the vicinity of the JAD site, is not suitable for agricultural
purposes. Therefore, exposure via direct ingestion through drinking
water and food has not been considered, and only the exposure through
air dispersion was modelled. This include:
• Inhalation of ambient air that contains dust and radionuclides
transported from site via atmospheric dispersion.
In order to quantify dose received via inhalation by a reference re­
ceptor, conversion factors were used to convert radionuclide concen­
trations in the air to dose. These include pathway-specific dose
conversion factors (DCFs). The source of DCFs that were used can be
found from the US’s DOE report, DOE-STD-1196-2011 (DOE-STD-1196-
2011, 1196).
The concentration of radioactivity in air near an exposed receptor
was calculated by utilising off-site calculation similar to those performed
by nuclear power facilities, by adopting Relative Concentration Factors
(X/Q) (DOE. DOE-DR-506 and Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, 2006).
The X/Q factor (also known as “Chi over Q”) is usually used to simplify
dose calculations, where it represents the concentration of radioactivity
in air, at a known location, divided by the release rate of radioactivity.
Due to the absence of data representing the X/Q values for the radio­
nuclides escaping vertically from the JAD site, X/Q data from the close
by BNPP nuclear power plant was used to predict airborne concentra­
tions for input into the JAD Model (Emirates Nuclear Energy Corpora­
tion. Nawah Energy, 2012).
As a radioactive plume moves from a release point, radioactivity is
deposited on the ground and/or on vegetation due to the contact of the
plume on these surfaces. This was considered in the JAD model by using
Relative Deposition Factor (D/Q) values, which were also obtained from
BNPP data (Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation. Nawah Energy,
2012). Data and JAD atmospheric dispersion input values provided by
the BNPP are based on historical averages of atmospheric conditions
from 2008 to 2011 for 16 compass-direction sectors (i.e., N, NNE – S,
SNE) (Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation. Nawah Energy, 2012),
reflecting the fraction of time that wind blew into each sector and the
distribution of wind speeds and atmospheric stability during that time.
Relative concertation (X/Q) and deposition (D/Q) factors are affected by
the same parameters, which include meteorological conditions, release
characteristics and location.
JAD Model input parameters. The key parameters used in the JAD Model
base case scenario is summarized in Table 3. Due to the lack of extensive
site specific data, some of the input parameters used to characterise the
base case scenario of the JAD Model were taken from the DoE’s Generic
Disposal System Modelling report for a similar salt environment (Freeze
et al., 2013).
The base case JAD Model assumes:
• The GDF is located 200m below the surface;
• The Jebel Al Dhanna Salt Dome consists mostly of a simple salt mass;
• Undisturbed and homogeneous geological conditions;
• No advective flow as the location of the GDF is downgradient to the
nearest receptor;
• No occurrence of natural or human induced disruptive events for the
assessment duration.
• Minimal contribution from the EBS;
• No effect from the Disturbed Rock Zone (DRZ) from prior excavation;
• I129 is in a gaseous state after release from Salt Dome and is mobile
via air dispersion (although unlikely, this is to show the worst case
scenario);
• Complete degradation occurs after 50,000 years, causing all waste
packages (Containers) to fail instantaneously;
• No sorption conditions applied from the near-field surrounding the
source term to the far-field;
• The dose receptor is 9 km to the South East of the GDF location;
• An assessment period of 100 million years; and
• A conversion factor of 0.06 Sv− 1 to convert calculated dose to
radiological risk (Environment Agency and Northern Ireland Envi­
ronment Agency, 2009) (ICRP Publication 60, 1991).
The deterministic annual dose over 100, 000, 000 years is shown in
Fig. 7 (a), while Fig. 7 (b) converts received dose to annual radiological
risk by following the RWM approach based on the ICRP method in using
a conversion factor of 0.06 Sv− 1 to convert calculated dose to a risk.
The contribution from Iodine-129 (I129) dominates the modelled
received dose. This was expected, as I129 has a very long half-life of 15,
700, 000 years, and is assumed to virtually have no sorption capabilities
(kd = 0 mL/g) in all regions of the disposal system, with unlimited
solubility. The maximum predicted risk is several orders of magnitude
below the current UK regulatory guidance level (RGL) of 1 × 10− 6/yr,
which is lower than the IAEA’s set limit at 1 × 10− 5/yr. The RGL is
considered in this paper due to it being a more conservative threshold.
The international consensus towards the depth of a GDF is consid­
ered to be 200m to 1000m. This is mainly to account for climate change
and the movement of glaciers through the geological environment.
However, as the UAE lies close to the Tropic of Cancer, these effects are

5. Risk analysis Table 3

Summary of the JAD base case scenario model.
This section goes through results produced from applying the base Feature JAD Model Baseline Scenario Representation
case scenario discussed in Section 3 to the JAD indicative safety
Source Inventory Spent Nuclear 7,132 MTHM (60 yr. Operation of
assessment model. For the given base case, source term, near-field, far- Fuel BNPP)
field and biosphere properties, the deterministic simulations of base case Waste Form Spent Nuclear 2 × 10− 5/yr fractional
scenarios for the JAD model provide preliminary indications of esti­ Fuel degradation rate
mated dose and hence radiological risk. Sensitivity analyses were also Depth - 200 m
Near Waste Waste Package Instantaneous failure of 1% of
performed. One-off deterministic simulations were executed on the base
Field Package waste packages
case scenarios of the JAD model in order to provide a preliminary un­ Buffer/ Crushed rock Diffusive transport with sorption
derstanding on parameters that might contribute to the overall perfor­ Backfill salt (Halite) Bulk Density, Porosity: 2170 kg/
mance of the disposal system in containing and isolating harmful SNF m3, 0.039
radionuclides from accessing the biosphere while following base case Far Field Host Rock Halite (250m) Diffusive Transport
Bulk Density, Porosity: 2170 kg/
conditions. m3, 0.039
Receptor Surface/ Dose Conversion DCF from US’s Department of
5.1. Base case scenario Biosphere Factors (DCF) Energy (DOE. DOE-DR-506 and
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual,
2006).
A base case was developed to reflect the current best estimates of the

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A.H. Al Nuaimi and L.G. Williams OBE FREng
Fig. 7. Base Case Scenario, a) Annual Dose, b) Annual Risk, received by Receptor.
not expected to occur, hence a shallow depth of 200m is considered for
the base case.
Based on the deterministic results presented in Fig. 7, observations
with regards to the safety performance of the modelled JAD disposal
system under base case conditions include:
• Release of radionuclides to the closest receptor can be considered as
minimal, and is well below background radiation. Dose received
from I129 is effectively negligible for the modelled period of 100, 000,
000 years, with a peak dose of 2.28 × 10− 12 mSv/yr, equating to a
risk factor of 1.37 × 10− 16 at 760,000 years.
• The migration of radionuclides through the EBS and NBS is
extremely slow due to:
o The absence of groundwater flow, leading to diffusion dominated
transport.
o The absence of any significant cracks in the NBS due to the plastic
behaviour of salt (creep), again limiting transport to diffusion
only.
o Sorption of radionuclides in the near-field, and mainly in the far-
field.
5.2. Sensitivity analyses
For a better understanding of a disposal system performance
assessment, consideration needs to be taken in addressing uncertainty in
input parameters. The subject of uncertainty in a geological disposal
system evolves and matures with the development of the disposal pro­
gram. Usually, probabilistic analyses are performed in order to quantify
uncertainty. However, due to the lack of site specific data, the effects of
uncertainties in the JAD model’s performance assessment is investigated
via sensitivity analyses, by performing one-off deterministic
simulations.
By identifying single uncertain parameters in the base case scenarios
performed, a one-off simulation changes a single base case value to a
reasonable bounding value in order to observe the effect it has on overall
system performance, hence deduce the sensitivity of that parameter. By
performing these one-off simulations and sensitivity analyses, further
insight into the influence of different parameters and features on the
overall disposal system capability in isolating and impeding the release
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Journal of Radiation Research and Applied Sciences 15 (2022) 149–162
of radionuclides to the biosphere under base case conditions. These one-
off deterministic simulations provide a better understanding of the
limitations of the disposal system, and are hence a vital component of
the safety assessment.
The sensitivity analyses performed on the JAD model, along with
their accompanying results are presented in the following subsections.
The following one-off sensitivity simulations were performed to observe
the effects on the dose received by a receptor, and hence the associated
risk:
• Depth of the GDF (Fig. 8),
• Receptor distance (Fig. 9),
• Waste canister lifetime (Fig. 10),
• Waste form fractional degradation rate (Fig. 11),
• Diffusion of I129 (Fig. 12), and
• Host Rock Sorption of I129 in the geosphere (Fig. 13).
• Atmospheric Dispersion Coefficients (Fig. 14).
5.2.1. Depth of the GDF
The effect of different GDF depths on annual dose and risk is illus­
trated in Fig. 8. The sensitivity analysis investigates four depth cases:
• Shallow depth at 200m,
• Intermediate depth at 500m,
• Maximum depth at 1,000m, and
• Further increased depth at 2,000m.
Observations from Fig. 8 indicate that at greater depths, peak annual
dose and risk are reduced significantly due to radionuclides taking
significantly longer to reach the surface due the greater travel distance,
which allows more time for radionuclides to decay, causing a reduction
in activity with time. A summary of peak value results from Fig. 8 are
presented in Table 4.
5.2.2. Receptor distance
The effect of different distances from the GDF to the receptor on
annual dose and risk is illustrated in Fig. 9 respectively. This sensitivity
analysis investigates three cases:
A.H. Al Nuaimi and L.G. Williams OBE FREng Journal of Radiation Research and Applied Sciences 15 (2022) 149–162

Fig. 8. JAD model GDF Depth Sensitivity Analysis, a) Annual Dose, b) Annual Risk, received by Receptor.

Fig. 9. JAD model Receptor Distance Sensitivity Analysis, a) Annual Dose, b) Annual Risk, received by Receptor.

• Base case Distance, representing the distance to a receptor at
9,000m,
• Reduced distance to a receptor at 5,000m, and
• Decreased distance to a receptor at 1,000m.
By reviewing satellite images, and looking at any suitable topog­
raphy allowing comfortable life in the vicinity of the JAD site, a sensi­
tivity analysis was performed to assess for annual dose and risk for a
reduced distance of 5,000m and an further reduced distance of 1,000m.
Observed results from Fig. 9 illustrate that, as expected, the farther the
receptor is from the JAD site, the less annual risk and dose received.
Exposure calculations performed by the JAD model focus only on the
dispersion of radionuclides through the atmosphere by utilising the
Relative Concentration Factor (X/Q) from a radioactive plum emanating
from the salt dome to a considered reference receptor. Peak annual dose
and risk are register at the same time for all distance cases due to the
time radionuclides released to the atmosphere being unaffected as the
vertical distance (which is the only transport pathway modelled for the
JAD site) remains unchanged, and only the lateral distance from the
facility is altered. A summary of peak value results from Fig. 9 are
presented in Table 5.
5.2.3. Waste canister lifetime
The effect of different canister degradation rates, and hence failure

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Fig. 10. JAD model, Waste Canister Degradation Sensitivity Analysis, a) Annual Dose, b) Annual Risk, received by Receptor.

Fig. 11. JAD model, Waste-Form Fractional Degradation Rate Sensitivity Analysis, a) Annual Dose, b) Annual Risk, received by Receptor.

time on annual dose and risk is illustrated in Fig. 10. The sensitivity
analysis investigates four cases:
• Base case waste canister degradation rate of 1000 nm/yr, and com­
plete failure at 50,000 years,
• Moderate waste canister degradation rate of 500 nm/yr, and com­
plete failure at 100,000 years,
• Slow waste canister degradation rate of 100 nm/yr, and complete
failure at 500,000 years, and
• Very slow waste canister degradation rate of 50 nm/yr, and complete
failure at 1,000,000 years.
Observations from Fig. 10 lead to the deduction that the effect of the
waste canister degradation rate, and hence the lifetime of the waste
canister, on annual dose and risk is the delay of radionuclide release, and
the reduction in peak values due to the extended time allowing for ac­
tivity reduction through radioactive decay. Table 6 summaries peak
values registered from Fig. 10.
5.2.4. Waste-form fractional degradation rate
The effect of waste-form degradation rates on annual dose and risk is
illustrated in Fig. 11. This sensitivity analysis investigates three frac­
tional degradation rate cases:

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Fig. 12. JAD model, I129 Diffusivity Sensitivity Analysis, a) Annual Dose, b) Annual Risk, received by Receptor.

Fig. 13. JAD model, Host Rock Sorption of I129 Sensitivity Analysis, a) Annual Dose, b) Annual Risk, received by Receptor.

• Base case waste-form degradation rate at 2 × 10− 5/yr,

dm
• Faster waste-form degradation rate at 4 × 10− 5/yr, and = m(t) . (ω + λ) (1)
• Slow waste-form degradation rate at 1 × 10− 7/yr.
dt

m(t): Mass of radionuclide at time t, ω: Fractional degradation rate, λ:

The release and mobilisation of radionuclides is highly dependent on /
Decay constant. (ln(2) t )
waste-form degradation rate. The annual fractional degradation rate (ω 1/2

[/yr]), defines waste form degradation in a disposal system once Therefore, solving Equation (1) for m(t) gives:
groundwater comes into contact with the disposed SF after a container m(t) = m0 . e− (ω+ λ)t
(2)
breach event. The mass of radionuclides usually decrease with time in a
disposal system due to decay and release, the reduction rate of this mass where mo [kg] represent the initial inventory at the time of repository
can be mathematically defined as: closure.

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Fig. 14. JAD model, Host Atmospheric Dispersion Coefficients Sensitivity Analysis, a) Annual Dose, b) Annual Risk, received by Receptor.

Table 4 Table 7
Summary of Peak Values from JAD model GDF Depth Sensitivity Analysis. Summary of Peak Values from JAD model WFDR Sensitivity Analysis.
JAD Site Depth [m] Peak Dose [mSv/yr] Peak Risk [/yr] Time [yrs.] Waste Form Peak Dose Peak Risk Time [yrs.] m(t) of I129
Degradation Rate [mSv/yr] [/yr] [g]
[Base case] 200 2.275E-12 1.365E-16 760,000
[yr− 1] t = 1x106yrs
500 6.181E-13 3.708E–17 3,800,000
1000 1.866E-13 1.120E–17 11,000,000 [Base 2E- 2.275E-12 1.365E-16 760,000 9.94E-07
2000 2.96E-14 1.776E-18 26,000,000 case] 05
4E- 2.279E-12 1.367E-16 720,000 2.05E-15
05
1E- 9.302E-13 5.580E-17 12,000,000 436.32
Table 5 07
Summary of Peak Values from JAD model Receptor Distance Sensitivity
Analysis.
per canister, and a half-life (t1/2) of 1,570,000 years, the mass m(t) of
Receptor Distance [m] Peak Dose [mSv/yr] Peak Risk [/yr] Time [yrs.]
I129 remaining in the waste-form following a period of, for example,
[Base case] 9,000 2.275E-12 1.365E-16 760,000
1,000,000 years, is also presented in Table 7 for each considered waste-
5,000 5.446E-12 3.879E-15 760,000
1,000 6.466E-11 3.268E-16 760,000 form degradation rate. It can be seen that for the highest considered
waste form degradation rate that hardly any I129 is contained in the
waste form after 1 million years. Similarly, the case of 4 × 10− 5/yr also
indicates a miniscule presence of I129 in the waste form. However, for
Table 6
Summary of Peak Values from JAD model Waste Canister Degradation Sensi­
the slowest considered degradation rate of 1 × 10− 7/yr, for the same
tivity Analysis. analysed time period, it can be seen that around 87% of the I129 in­
ventory within the waste form still remains, which explains the
Canister Degradation [nm/yr] Peak Dose [mSv/ Peak Risk Time
yr] [/yr] [yrs.]
decreased annual dose and risk.

[Base 1000, (50,000 2.275E-12 1.365E-16 760,000

5.2.5. Diffusion of I129
case] yrs)
500, (100,000 2.270E-12 1.362E-16 810,000 The effect of the diffusion coefficient of I129 on annual dose and risk
yrs) is illustrated in Fig. 12. This sensitivity analysis investigate three diffu­
100, (500,000 2.227E-12 1.336E-16 1,200,000 sion coefficient cases:
yrs)
50, (1,000,000 2.174E-12 1.305E-16 1,800,000
yrs)
• Base case free water diffusion coefficient of 2.3 × 10− 9 m2/s,
• Increased free water diffusion coefficient of 1.025 × 10− 8 m2/s, and
• Reduced free water diffusion coefficient of 4.1 × 10− 10 m2/s,
Looking at Fig. 11, it can be deduced that, the lower the waste-form
degradation rate, the longer it takes for radionuclides to be released I129 is the greatest contributor to long-term annual dose and risk from
from the disposal system, therefore, reducing peak annual dose and risk a GDF, hence, the diffusion coefficient of I129 is only considered. Setting
as radionuclides are allowed more time to decay. Table 7 summarises the Diffusivity value of I129 to 1.025 × 10− 8 m2/s results in a corre­
peak value results. Further understanding can be achieved by solving sponding effective diffusion coefficient for I129 in each simulated region
Equation (2), as it is known that I129 is the highest contributor towards that is a factor of 5 larger than the base case value. The factor-of-5 in­
annual dose and risk, considering an initial inventory of around 502 g crease in diffusion coefficient has a significantly increase dose. This is

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due to the corresponding factor-of-5 increase in diffusive flux rate in a
diffusion-dominated system, which shifts the dose curve to the left
indicating earlier release.
Setting the Diffusivity value of I129 to 4.1 × 10− 10 m2/s results in a
corresponding effective diffusion coefficient for I129 in each region that
is a factor of 5 lower than the base case value. The factor-of-5 decrease in
diffusion coefficient has significantly decreases dose. This is due to the
corresponding factor-of-5 decrease in diffusive flux rate in a diffusion-
dominated system, which shifts the dose curve to the right indicating
a delay in release. A summary of peak value results from Fig. 12 is
presented in Table 8.
5.2.6. Host Rock Sorption of I129
The effect of varying sorption of I129 through the disposal system on
annual dose and risk is illustrated in Fig. 13. The sensitivity analysis
investigates three I129 sorption cases:
• Base case I129 sorption, with a kd value of 0.00 mL/g, corresponding
to a Rf of 1.0.
• Increased I129 sorption, with a kd value of 0.1 mL/g, corresponding to
a Rf of 2.12.
• Increased I129 sorption, with a kd value of 1.00 mL/g, corresponding
to a Rf of 12.16.
The sorption capabilities of I129 can vary depending on site-specific
characteristics, hence introducing uncertainty in results. Increasing
the sorption coefficient kd of a radionuclide increases the retardation
factor by which the radionuclide is sorbed more readily in the natural
geosphere. The retardation factor (Rf), in terms of the sorption coeffi­
cient, can be calculated via the following Equation:
ρb
Rf = 1 + . kd (3)
ne
where, ρb: porous media bulk density (g/cm3), ne: effective porosity of
the media at saturation.
Kd: Sorption Distribution coefficient.
Therefore, increasing the sorption coefficient kd of a radionuclide
increases the retardation factor by which the radionuclide is sorbed
more readily in the natural geosphere. Using Equation (3), and assuming
a bulk density (ρb) of 2170 kg/m3 for Halite, with a porosity (ne) average
of 0.19 (nhalite 0.039, nanhydrite 0.35), for the three I129 sorption cases, the
retardation factors for kd coefficients of 0.00 mL/g, 0.1 mL/g and 1.0
mL/g is calculated to be 1.0, 2.12 and 12.16 respectively. Observing
Fig. 13, it can be seen that changing I129 kd values have a significant
effect on annual dose and risk. This is mainly due to the increase
retardation of I129 transport that is associated with the increased kd
value. In comparison to the Base case scenario, for the case when kd is
0.1 mL/g with an Rf of 2.12, the annual dose and risk curves shift to the
right by a factor of 2.56 on the time axis. Similarly, for the case when kd
is 1.0 mL/g with an Rf of 12.16, the annual dose and risk curves shift to
the right by a factor of 12.16 on the time axis. Annual dose and risk
decrease significantly with an increase in kd due to the allowance of
radioactive decay with time as it takes much longer for I129 to reach the
receptor in the biosphere. A summary of peak value results from Fig. 13
is presented in Table 9.
5.2.7. Atmospheric dispersion
The effect of varying the atmospheric dispersion coefficients, Rela­
tive Concentration Factor (X/Q) and Relative Deposition Factor (D/Q)
on annual dose and risk is illustrated in Fig. 14. The sensitivity analysis
investigates the following multiplication factor cases:
• Base case atmospheric dispersion, with a multiplication factor of 1.
• Increased atmospheric dispersion, with a multiplication factor of 10.
• Extreme increase in atmospheric dispersion, with a multiplication
factor of 100.
• Reduced atmospheric dispersion, with a multiplication factor of 0.2.
As it can be seen from Fig. 14 an increase by an order of magnitude in
the relative concentration and deposition factors in the JAD model in­
creases peak annual dose and risk by the same order of magnitude. The
JAD model only address the transport of radionuclides vertically from
the disposal facility, and exposure to a receptor is only assumed via
atmospheric dispersion, which is the main reason for the JAD model
being sensitive towards changes in atmospheric dispersion coefficients.
Albeit being sensitive, the extreme case simulated illustrates that annual
dose and risk remains several orders of magnitude below the maximum
acceptable threshold. Table 10 summarise peak values registered for
each simulated case.
6. Discussion
Although some of the assumptions made in the presented analyses
are very conservative for the sake of simplicity, it is important to note
that the analyses presented in this paper are not meant to be used in site
selection decision making or in the assessment of the suitability of the
location to host a GDF for nuclear waste. There are many aspects that
were ignored in the JAD model and if addressed will increase the
complexity of the model, which will do it justice as the modelling of a
GDF is a highly technical and complex task.
Although it makes the modelling easier, assuming that present con­
ditions persist for the next 100 million years is unrealistic. This is
especially so for the case of small islands or near-coastal locations such
as the JAD location, in a time when rising sea levels are inevitable in the
near future. There is also the fact that salt diapirs are inherently dy­
namic, so gravity-driven halo-kinesis and uplift can be significant on a
millions of years timescale. These are such fundamental issues, that were
not considered, where the assumption of “the disposal system evolves as
expected without the occurrence of natural or human induced disruptive
events for the assessment duration” was made to simplify the analysis.
This is especially critical for a salt host rock as its performance is very
high so as integrity is maintained, where the natural barrier system can
fail catastrophically if any scenario can lead to contact with great vol­
umes of flowing groundwater.
Considering the above, reviewing the overall performance analysis of
a GDF at a Salt environment in the UAE, it can be said that while
considering the assumptions, conditions and generic data entered in the
performed simulations, annual dose and annual risk from having a GDF
at the JAD sites is well below regulatory limits, suggesting that, with the

Table 8 Table 9
Summary of Peak Values from – JAD model I129 Diffusivity Sensitivity Analysis. Summary of Peak Values from JAD model Host Rock Sorption of I129 Sensitivity
Analysis.
I129 Diffusivity [m2/ Peak Dose Peak Risk Time Release
s] [mSv/yr] [/yr] [yrs.] Time [yrs.] Host Rock I129 Peak Dose Peak Risk Time [yrs.] Retardation
Sorption (Kd) [mSv/yr] [/yr] Factor [Rf]
[Base 2E-09 2.280E-12 1.368E-16 710,000 27,000
[mL/g]
case]
1.025E- 1.156E-11 6.933E-16 330,000 5,400 [Base 0 2.275E-12 1.365E-16 760,000 1
08 case]
4.10E- 1.763E-18 2.488E-17 2,500,000 140,000 0.1 1.993E-12 1.196E-16 2,900,000 2.12
10 1.0 9.771E-13 5.863E-17 13,000,000 12.16

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Table 10
Summary of Peak Values from JAD model Host Dispersion Coefficients Sensi­
tivity Analysis.
Air Dispersion Peak Dose [mSv/yr] Peak Risk [/yr] Time [yrs.]
Multiplication Factor
[Base case] 1 2.28E-12 1.368E-16 760,000
10 2.28E-11 1.368E-15 760,000
100 2.28E-11 1.368E-14 760,000
0.2 4.55E-13 2.734E-17 760,000
available input parameters used, a GDF being constructed and operated
in the UAE is possible.
However, to add additional safety margins to the considered loca­
tions, regulatory control can be focussed on considered parameters that
have illustrated sensitivity to risk in the presented analyses. Based on
results obtained from the seven sensitivity analyses performed on the
JAD model, observations with regards to the performance of key pa­
rameters of a geological disposal system in a Salt Dome environment in
the UAE can be made.
For the simulated Salt Dome’s 9 km far-fields, as expected, key pa­
rameters directly affecting radionuclide transport have a significant
impact on annual dose and risk. Parameters and processes include fa­
cility depth, receptor distance and sorption of radionuclides into the host
rock.
Waste canister lifetime has a notable effect on annual dose and risk.
In which increasing the lifetime of the canister offsets radionuclide
release, hence allowing for more radionuclide decay. The analysis per­
formed when changing the rate by which waste canisters degrade in the
JAD model can be synonymous with considering different canister ma­
terials, other than copper, including Titanium and potentially cheaper
alternatives such as Carbon or Stainless Steel Canisters. Although
extreme degradation cases were considered for the assumed canister
design, the annual risk threshold was not exceeded and was many orders
of magnitude below the considered RGL. However, it can be deduced
that considering different corrosion rates in a salt environment can be
insignificant due to the lack of any interactions with a flowing fluid that
will inherently cause corrosion.
Processes that affect waste form factional degradation have a slight
effect on annual dose and risk. Increasing the degradation rate has a
trivial effect on annual dose and risk, however decreasing the degra­
dation rate decreases annual dose and risk.
For the JAD model, in absence of an advective gradient, the increase
or decrease of the simulated diffusive fluxes also corresponds to the
increase and decrease of annual dose and risk respectively.
Increasing atmospheric dispersion coefficients (X/Q and D/Q) has a
significant increase on annual dose and risk. This is mainly due to the
model only considering a vertical pathway for radionuclide transport
and exposure to a receptor is only assumed via atmospheric dispersion.
However, even with extreme simulated conditions, annual dose and risk
is several orders of magnitude below the assumed regulatory threshold.
7. Conclusion
It is vital to emphasize that the safety performance analysis pre­
sented in this paper for a future GDF at the Jebel Al Dhanna salt dome in
the UAE is primarily preliminary and indicative only, with a high level of
uncertainty, where site specific data is unavailable and data from a
similar environment was considered for most parameters. However,
with that in mind, the analyses illustrated in this paper demonstrate
that, based on generic data available for the UAE’s JAD geological
environment, with the presented indicative safety assessment model,
development of a geological disposal system in a Salt environment in the
UAE is possible, where safe isolation of SNF from current and future
public populations can be achieved.
While the developed JAD model in this paper is not entirely site
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Journal of Radiation Research and Applied Sciences 15 (2022) 149–162
specific, and is greatly simplified, an effort was made in order to ensure
that the presented analyses are thorough and hence are indicative of
performance. Validation of the GoldSim code has proven to be difficult
due to the lack of open access data available for the public to compare
results. The DoE developed a Salt General Disposal System (SGDS)
model, however, the SGDS was used to simulate a GDF in a salt bed,
unlike the JAD model modelling a salt dome structure. Data is limited
with regards to geological disposal models in salt domes, the only case
study that can be considered for comparison is the Gorleben salt dome
disposal system in Germany, however, open access to data with regards
to the Gorleben disposal system performance assessment is not available
and the project was formally abandoned in 2020. Hence, the extent of
validation for the JAD model was done numerically by using the equa­
tions presented in the sensitivity analyses, where results produced from
inputting parameters into Equations (2) and (3) all agree with results
that were produced by the JAD model. Uncertainty in input parameters
was addressed by performing sensitivity analyses to examine the range
of performance potential by altering the most uncertain parameters.
Results presented in Section 5 are mostly generic, however, dis­
tances, depths and most geological data is representative of the JAD site.
The analyses in this paper provide preliminary indication of whether it is
appropriate to perform a more comprehensive siting analysis of the JAD
location before any decision is made. It needs to be emphasised that
analyses presented in this paper are not meant to be used to directly
assist in site selection decision making and any assessment for the
suitability of a proposed location to host a GDF for nuclear waste.
Although not fully representing the JAD site, the JAD model identify
crucial processes that can affect GDF safety performance, in addition to
successfully identifying inventories to be disposed of in the proposed
disposal system. Therefore, it can be concluded that the developed
model presented in this paper can be used by the UAE’s RWMO as a
foundation for the development of a more robust, accurate and site-
specific performance assessment model. Additionally, the developed
model can be altered so as to also provide a performance assessment of a
Near Surface Disposal Facility (NSDF), for radioactive wastes other than
SNF. Future revisions of work done in this paper will focus on:
• A systematic scenario analysis, where it is essential to guide the
process of developing a comprehensive safety case together with
structuring multiple lines of reasoning based on a variety of evidence
that become available as the disposal program evolves.
• Addressing concerns from stakeholders, decision-makers and any
other interested parties,
• Including site-specific characterization data,
• Evaluating design modifications that can arise from new techno­
logical advances and international best practices,
• Focusing on key areas of concern identified in previous analyses or
raised by newly available information,
• Responding to any changes in regulations from FANR, EAD or any
other interested government entity, and
• Finally, providing evidence of compliance to facilitate regulatory
and managerial decision making.
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