Layer of Protection Analysis

SIMPLIFIED PROCESS RISK ASSESSMENT

CHAPTER-2
 Engineering and Administrative controls often called safeguards
 LOPA provides an order of magnitude approximation of the risk of a scenario.
 LOPA is limited to evaluating a single cause–consequence pair as a scenario.
 LOPA can also be used as a screening tool prior to a more rigorous quantitative risk assessment
(CPQRA) method


 LOPA complements HAZOP or other hazard identification methodologies.
 Layer of Protection Analysis

SIMPLIFIED PROCESS RISK ASSESSMENT

CHAPTER-3
 The most common scenario of interest for LOPA in the chemical process industry is loss of containment of
hazardous material or energy
 In case of immediate ignition of a pressurized gas or two-phase release, jet fires may ensue
 In the absence of immediate ignition, material may disperse to form a vapor cloud with delayed ignition as a
flash fire or explosion. Liquid spills may burn as pool fires if ignited
 The radiation flux from fires, overpressures from explosions, and toxic concentrations from toxic releases are
called physical effects
 Layer of Protection Analysis

SIMPLIFIED PROCESS RISK ASSESSMENT

CHAPTER-4
 Layer of Protection Analysis

SIMPLIFIED PROCESS RISK ASSESSMENT

 Layer of Protection Analysis

SIMPLIFIED PROCESS RISK ASSESSMENT

CHAPTER-5
 Initiating events are grouped into three general types:
i) External events
ii) Equipment failures, and
iii) Human failures (also called inappropriate actions)
 Layer of Protection Analysis

SIMPLIFIED PROCESS RISK ASSESSMENT

 In some scenarios, the initiating event may not be obvious. As the PHA or
LOPA team identifies scenarios that lead to safety consequences, some will be
developed where the initiating or triggering event is not clear. In such complex scenarios, there may be other
factors that are neither failures nor protection layers. These factors are called enabling events or conditions,
and
consist of operations or conditions that do not directly cause the scenario, but
which must be present or active in order for the scenario to proceed. Enabling
events are expressed as probabilities, and can include such things as the
mode of operation (startup or shutdown) or the operation being in a specific
phase or step. In such cases, the initiating event may be the combination of an
enabling event (probability) and a subsequent failure or inappropriate action
(frequency
 Failure data are sometimes expressed as PFD., the initiating event frequency must be derived by estimating the
number of times per year and multiplying by PFD Or, it may be as complex as using fault tree techniques to
estimate the number of challenges per year to which the system is subjected. LOPA is a simplified approach, and
the analyst should move on to more rigorous techniques if the scenario is overly complex or more precision is
desired
 Layer of Protection Analysis

SIMPLIFIED PROCESS RISK ASSESSMENT

 Consider a frequently used unloading hose. The hose has an in-service base failure rate of1×10–2/yr, but is only
subject to failure and release of hazardous material or energy during unloading. The loading process takes 2
hours and is carried out 40 times per year, so the failure rate becomes:
F = (1×10–2/yr hose failure rate) × (40/yr × 2 hr) / 8000 hr/yr) /yr=1×10–4
 Preventive IPLs, mitigation IPLs and are intended to reduce the severity of the consequence of the initiating
event. Mitigation IPLs reduce the frequency of the original high consequence scenario, but permit a less severe
consequence to occur. Examples of preventive IPLs are SIFs, Examples of mitigation IPLs are pressure relief
devices