Labor Relations Process 11th Edition Holley Solutions Manual Download

Solution Manual for Labor Relations Process 11th
Edition Holley Ross Wolters 1305576209

9781305576209
Full download link at:
Solution manual: https://testbankpack.com/p/solution-manual-for-labor-relations-process-11th-edition-
holley-ross-wolters-1305576209-9781305576209/
Test bank: https://testbankpack.com/p/test-bank-for-labor-relations-process-11th-edition-holley-ross-
wolters-1305576209-9781305576209/
CHAPTER 6
Negotiating the Labor Agreement
Outline
I. Collective Bargaining: Definition and Structure
i. Collective Bargaining is an activity whereby union and management officials
attempt to resolve conflicts of interest by exchanging commitments in a manner
intended to sustain and possibly enrich their continuing relationship.
ii. Interest disputes
a. Bargaining Structure
i. Two general dimensions
b. Employee groups
c. Pattern Bargaining
i. Pattern bargaining is used to describe a situation where union or management
negotiators informally attempt to extend a negotiated settlement from one group
to another.
d. Whipsawing
i. Whipsaw bargaining strategy
ii. Lock-in agreement
iii. Coordinated bargaining
e. Leapfrogging
i. This strategy attempts to use the most recent contracts in the industry, even if not
your own, as the starting point for extracting further concessions.
f. The Bargaining Unit
i. Refers to the employees and employers who will be bound by a negotiated labor
agreement.
ii. Appropriate bargaining unit (ABU) (First example in Exhibit 6.1
g. Single Employer, Multiple ABUs
i. Single contract, multiple groups (Second example in Exhibit 6.1)
ii. Nonmandatory subject of bargaining
iii. Mandatory subjects of bargaining
h. Multiple Employers, Multiple ABUs
i. Centralized bargaining (industry-wide bargaining) (Third example in Exhibit 6.1)
ii. Multi-employer bargaining units
iii. Council bargaining (Fourth example in Exhibit 6.1)
iv. Degree of labor intensiveness
© 2017 Cengage Learning®. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part.
II. Negotiation Preparation Activities
a. Selection of the Negotiating Team and Related Bargaining Responsibilities
i. Characteristics of an effective negotiator (Exhibit 6.2)
ii. Personality factors
iii. How many negotiators?
iv. Management considerations
v. Union considerations
b. Proposal Determination and Assessment
c. Formulating Proposals
i. Analyzing contract language
ii. Examining prior arbitration decisions
iii. Economic and legal information
d. The Bargaining Range
i. A one-issue example
1. Resistance point
2. Target point
3. Bargaining range (Exhibit 6.4)
4. Contract zone
ii. A multi-issue example
1. Utility
2. Package proposals
e. Costing Contract Proposals
i. Cents-per-hour cost
ii. Roll-up factor
III. Understanding Collective Bargaining Behavior: A Framework

i. Walton and McKersie’s four bargaining processes
a. Distributive and Integrative Bargaining: Two Different Approaches
i. Distributive bargaining
ii. Integrative bargaining (interest-based bargaining, mutual gains bargaining or
win-win negotiations)
iii. Resistance point
b. Strategies and Tactics
i. Persuasive arguments
ii. Objective evidence
iii. Painting a picture
iv. Summarizing bargaining progress
v. Presenting a bargaining proposal in writing
vi. Nonverbal cues
vii. Bargaining caucus
viii. Use of positive reinforcement
ix. Linking issues (package proposals) (Example in Exhibit 6.4)
x. Matching concessions and splitting-the-difference
c. The bargaining Power Model
d. Factors Potentially Affecting Both Bargaining Power Equations
e. Factors Affecting a Union’s Disagreement and Agreement Costs
i. Claims of proponents and opponents of public aid
f. Factors Affecting Management’s Agreement and Disagreement Costs
g. Complexities Associated with the Bargaining Power Model
h. Attitudinal Structuring
i. Walton and McKersie suggestions
i. Intraorganizational Bargaining
IV. Ethical and Legal Considerations in Collective Bargaining

a. The Legal Duty to Bargain in Good Faith
i. Good faith bargaining
b. Type of Bargaining Subject
i. Illegal bargaining subjects
ii. Mandatory bargaining subjects (Exhibit 6.7)
iii. Mid-term bargaining
iv. Good faith bargaining impasse
c. Effects Bargaining
i. Voluntary bargaining subjects
d. Specific Bargaining Actions
i. Per se violations
1. Inability to pay
2. Unwillingness to pay
3. Requirements of information request
e. Totality of Conduct
i. Totality of conduct doctrine
ii. Boulwarism
iii. Examples of bad faith bargaining
f. Bargaining over Managerial Rights
i. Reserved rights doctrine
ii. Short-form management’s rights clause
iii. Long-form management’s rights clause
g. Successor Employer Bargaining Obligations
i. New employer
ii. Successor employer
iii. Successorship clause
h. Collective Bargaining under Bankruptcy Proceedings
i. Approval of bankruptcy conditions
i. Legal Remedies Associated with Violations of the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith
i. Board remedial orders
j. Proposed Labor Law Reforms
k. Contract Ratification
i. Contract ratification vote
l. Explanation of Voting Behavior
m. Reasons for Rejection of Tentative Contract Agreements
Discussion Questions
1. What are some situations in which management or the union would prefer centralized
bargaining? In what situations might both prefer centralized bargaining? Discussion should
take into account specific legal considerations affecting centralized bargaining.
This question can be directly answered from the material on "The Bargaining Unit" on
pages 270-271.
2. During an economic recession, discuss how management’s or a union’s bargaining power

might be affected. Give an example to illustrate what you mean.
During an economic recession management may make an actual or implied threat to close
down a plant, unless the union makes concessions on labor rates and work rules.
During a recession a union may have greater incentive to consolidate operations in offshore
locations. Workers during a recession may also experience a larger pool of out-of-work
laborers which also reduces the competitive position of the workers in searching for
alternative employment.
3. Assume that you are a management negotiator and the union presents the following
proposal: “Any overtime assignment will be guaranteed a minimum of two hours at time-
and-a-half the base hourly rate for the classification.” Previously, employees working
overtime received time and one-half pay for the hours they worked but no two-hour
guarantee. Indicate in some detail how you would cost out this proposal. Also, discuss some
arguments the union might use to make it easier for management to accept this proposal (i.e.,
to reduce management’s agreement costs).
The cost of this proposal could be estimated from last year's manpower scheduling records.
More specifically the number of overtime assignments less than two hours would be isolated.
You would then obtain for each case the difference between the two hours and the actual
time worked (e.g., if an employee worked 15 minutes overtime, the difference would be 105
minutes). You would then multiply this total by 1.5 times the hourly rate for the classification
(either last year's actual figures or an estimate, which would also include the company's
proposed wage increase in current negotiations). The sum total is based on past, not present
experience, relies on the availability of accurate information, and is time consuming.
Union arguments to reduce the cost of this proposal might include:

 More efficient operations—management would then think twice before assigning less
than two-hour assignments. Indeed, management might take steps to eliminate overtime
assignments (reducing the employer's costs) by more efficient use of employees during
the eight-hour day.
 Possible reduction of employee refusals to work overtime assignments. Employees will
be more likely to work if they know they will receive at least two hours at time-and-one-
half. Under the old system, the employees might be reluctant to work for only 15
minutes, particularly if it disrupted their car pool arrangements.
4. Identify some sources of information a union or management negotiator could consult to get
timely and relevant information about the following:
a. recent bargaining settlements in a particular industry
b. current wage rates for specific types of labor in a specific geographic area
c. health care cost and bargaining trends
d. pension benefits plans and trends
Sources of information: news reports, business and industry magazines, publications and
web sites for academic institutions, industry/trade organizations, unions, and government
agencies (e.g., DOL, NLRB, OSHA, BLS, and Census Bureau).
5. Good and bad faith bargaining might be easier to define than implement. Discuss different
types of evidence that might be used prove or disprove a charge of bad faith bargaining.
Violation of good faith bargaining come from nature of bargaining issues (wanting to
include an illegal term in the contract like paying less than federal minimum wage for
covered employees), specific bargaining action like refusing to meet with the union to
negotiate, totality of conduct (e.g., unilateral change in conditions, surface bargaining,
imposing unreasonable conditions), and successor employer not honoring successorship
clause of the contract. On the other hand it is not bad faith bargaining to refuse to negotiate
illegal or permissive bargaining subjects or for management to not negotiate over a
business decision that will change the nature, scope, or direction of the firm. One has to
look at the situation carefully to make a judgment on bad faith bargaining. For example, in
some situations, delay tactics might be necessary to adequately prepare counter proposals.
6. Briefly define each of Walton & McKersie’s four bargaining processes. Pick two of the
processes and discuss how they are similar and different. How might they be related?
 A distributive bargaining approach, (also referred to as interest-based bargaining,

mutual gains bargaining, or win–win negotiation) tends to view the two parties’
interests as being in conflict, making the negotiation process a win–lose (zero sum)
exercise. Gains for one party’s interests come at the expense of the other party because
there is a finite amount of resources available to the parties with which to meet
bargaining goals.
 Integrative bargaining takes a “win–win” problem-solving approach.
 Attitudinal structuring focuses more on attending to the emotions of the other side, to
create a harmonious context for negotiations.
 Intraorganizational bargaining is concerned with the discussion that takes place within
the union or within management.
Distributive negotiation is appropriate in "divide the pie" situations, when there is a fixed
amount of resources and whatever one party gains, the other party loses. Usually it's
employed when the parties don't know each other and don't believe they will need to develop
a relationship with each other for use in the future. An integrative bargaining situation
occurs when it's possible to produce a greater outcome together than either could reach on
its own. It's used when the parties have a relationship or want to establish one, and when
cooperation benefits both parties.
7. Are current legal remedies for bad faith bargaining adequate to promote compliance with the
LMRA’s goal of good faith bargaining? Why or why not? What recommendations would
you suggest for improving compliance with the goal of promoting good faith bargaining?
The biggest problems in implementing good faith bargaining are the lack of penalties for
violations (the current "cease and desist" order amounts to nothing more than a slap on the
wrist), and lengthy appeal procedures. Improvements could be made in these areas as well
as in clarifying and clearly defining what constitutes good faith. For example, in the
"totality of conduct" doctrine, how many of the items can management and the union violate
(and to what degree), and still be found to be bargaining in good faith.
Exploring the Web
Collective Bargaining
1. Duty to bargain.
2. Bankruptcy and collective bargaining.
3. Using a research database such as LexisNexis or ABI/INFORM, explore the issue of labor
contract rejections during the bankruptcy process.
4. Auto Industry and collective bargaining.
5. Visit the home page of the UAW Union and learn about the National Collective Bargaining
Departments of the UAW.
Students should use an internet search engine (e.g., Google) to locate the relevant web pages for
these exercises. Specific URL address links for the exercises are not listed because they are
rendered nonfunctional when link-associated web sites and pages are updated.
Suggested Readings and Term Paper Topics

1. How can computers be used in collective bargaining?
Possible references:
Barnett, V. (2003). The use of information technology in a strike. Journal of Labor Research, 24, 1, 55-72.
Carnevale, P. J., Probst, T. M. (1997). Conflict on the internet. In Kiesler, S. (Ed.) Culture of the internet
(pp. 233-255). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Fraser, N. M., & Hipel, K. W. (1984). Conflict analysis: Models and resolutions. New York: North-
Holland.
Winter, F. W. (1985). An application of computerized decision tree models in management-union
bargaining. Interfaces, 15, 74-80.
2. What do either (your choice) management science or management information systems

have to offer our understanding of negotiation and/or mediation?
Brehmer, B. and Joyce, C. R. B. (Eds.) (1988). Human Judgment: The SJT Approach. Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
Mumpower, J. L. (1991). The judgment policies of negotiators and the structure of negotiation problems.
Management Science, 37, 1304-1324.
Nahorski, Z., & Owsinski, J. W. (1994). Support for decision and negotiation processes. Basel,
Switzerland: J.C. Baltzer.
Yildiz, M. (2003). Bargaining without a common prior-an immediate agreement theorem.
Econometrica, 71, 3, 793-811.
3. Some people say that it is essential to behave ethically when negotiating. Others argue
that there is no such thing as "ethics" when negotiating, because no one expects their
opponent to behave in an honest, trustworthy fashion--"let the negotiator beware" is
their motto. What do you think? Analyze the role of "ethics" in negotiations,
supporting your position.
Lewicki, R. J., & Robinson, R. J. (1998). Ethical and unethical bargaining tactics: An empirical study.
Journal of Business Ethics, 17, 665-682.
Miller, M. (2003). Negotiations: To be or not to be … at the table. Social Policy 33, 3, 12-18.
Post, F. (1990). Collaborative collective bargaining: Toward an ethically defensible approach to labor
negotiations. Journal of Business Ethics, 9, 495-508.
Provis, C. (2000). Ethics, deception, and labor negotiation. Journal of Business Ethics, 28, 145158.
Schweitzer, M. E., Croson, R. (1999). Curtailing deception: The impact of direct questions on lies and
omissions. International Journal of Control Management, 10, 225-248.
4. What effects do personality/individual difference variables (e.g., need for achievement,

locus of control, Machiavellianism) play in (either) negotiating or mediation? How
important are personality/individual difference variables in bargaining or mediation?
De Dreu, C. K., Weingart, L. R., & Kwon, S. (2000). Influence of social motives on integrative negotiation:
A meta-analytic review and test of two theories. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 78, 889-905.
Gilkey, R. W., & Greenhalgh, L. (1986). The role of personality in successful negotiating. Negotiation
Journal, 2, 245-256.
Lewicki, R., Saunders, D., Minton, J. (1999). Negotiation. Irwin/McGraw-Hill.
Miller, M. (2003). Negotiations: To be or not to be … at the table. Social Policy 33, 3, 12-18.
Morris, M. W., Larrick, R. P., & Su, S. K. (1999). Misperceiving negotiation counterparts: When
situationally determined bargaining behaviors are attributed to personality traits. Journal of Personality &
Social Psychology, 77, 52-67.
5. Assume that I am a union negotiator. You are a consultant, hired to teach me to be

more persuasive. What advice do you have to make me a more persuasive negotiator?
Be sure to support your position with scientific evidence.
Chaiken, S. L., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Judd, C. M. (2000). Persuasion in negotiation and conflict situations. In
M. Deutsch & P. T. Coleman (Eds.) The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice (pp. 144-
165). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
O'Keef, D. J. (1990). Persuasion: Theory and Practice. Newbury Park, California: Sage.
Rubin, J. Z., and Brown, B. R. (1975). The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation. NY:
Academic Press.
Wall, J. A., Jr. (1991). Impression management in negotiations. In R. A. Giacalone, & P. Rosenfeld (Eds.)
Applied impression management: How image-making affects managerial decisions. Newbury, Park, CA:
Sage.
6. Since the late 1950s people have been studying "risk" in a variety of situations. For
example, social psychologists have conducted a great deal of research on the "risky
shift" phenomenon. Janis discussed how political groups (e.g. presidential advisors)
make risky decisions in his book Groupthink. Cognitive psychologists have examined
how people evaluate alternatives and information to arrive at risky decisions. What
does this eclectic field of research offer the labor-management negotiator (if anything)?
Does it have any implications for managerial or union preparation for negotiation?
Support your position by citing research.
Bernstein, P. L. (1996). Against the gods: The remarkable story of risk. NY: Wiley.
Bottom, W. P. (1998). Negotiator risk: Sources of uncertainty and the impact of reference points on
negotiated agreements. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 76, 89-112.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values, and frames. American Psychologist, 39, 341-350.
Lopes, L. L. (1987). Between hope and fear: The psychology of risk. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.) Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 20. Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 255-295.
Molm, L. D., Takahashi, N., & Peterson, G. (2000). Risk and trust in social exchange: An experimental test
of a classical proposition. American Journal of Sociology, 105, 13961427.
Thompson, L. L. (1998). The mind and heart of the negotiator. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
7. Many collective bargaining studies rely upon laboratory experiments using "games."
Billig has criticized this approach. Others (e.g., Locke) defend this approach. What do
you think?
Billig, M. (1976). Social psychology and intergroup relations. London: Academic Press (London).
Brams, S. J. (1992). Negotiation games: Applying game theory to bargaining and arbitration. New York:
Routledge.
Gordon, M. E., Schmitt, N., & Schneider, W. G. (1984). Laboratory research on bargaining and
negotiations: An evaluation. Industrial Relations, 23,218-233.
Locke, E. (1985). Generalizing from laboratory to field settings. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington.
Rapoport, A. (1990). Experimental studies of interactive decisions. Norwell, MA: Kluwer.
8. What does the research on "anger" and "aggression" offer labor-management

negotiators? What is the appropriate role of anger in collective bargaining?
Allred. K. G. (1999). Anger and retaliation: Toward an understanding of impassioned conflict in
organizations. In R. J. Bies, & R. J. Lewicki (Eds.) Research on negotiation in organizations, 7 (pp. 27-58).
Stamford, CT: JAI Press. Part of a special section in this volume on research on this topic.
Averill, J. R. (1989). Anger and aggression: An essay on emotion. NY: Springer-Verlag.
Fisher, R., & Davis, W. H. (April, 1987). Six basic interpersonal skills for negotiators. Negotiation Journal,
3, 117-122.
Parkinson, L. (Jan., 2000). Mediating with high-conflict couples. Family and Conciliation Courts Review,
38, (1), 69-76.
9. Assume that I am a management negotiator. You are a mediator, trying to teach me to

be "more creative." What advice do you have to make me a more creative negotiator?
(Why is creativity even important?) Be sure to support your position with scientific
evidence from the vast research on creativity.
Achterkamp, M. and Akkerman, A. (2003). Identifying latent conflict in collective bargaining.
Rationality & Society, 15, 1, 15-43.
DiGenio, J. (2002). Negotiating for success. Armed Forces Comptroller 47, 4, 21-24.
Runco, M. A, and Albert, R S. (1990) Theories of creativity. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Head, T. C., Garvin, C, & Sorensen, P. F. (1991) Contemporary trends in OD. Organizational Development
Journal, 9, 11-32.
Gittell, J.H., Nordenflycht, A. V., and Kochan, T.A. (2004). Mutual Gains or Zero Sum? Labor Relations
and Firm Performance in the Airline Industry. Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 57, 2, 163-180.
Glassman E (1992) The creativity factor: Unlocking the potential of your team. San Diego: Pfeiffer.
Kurtzberg, T. R. (1998). Creative thinking, cognitive aptitude, and integrative joint gain: A study of
negotiator creativity. Creativity Research Journal, 11, 283-293.
10. In the 1990s, several researchers in Communication Departments at major universities

have become interested in communication that occurs during negotiation and conflict.
Briefly summarize the major findings of this stream of research. What have they
learned? Argue for or against the relevance of their discoveries to labor and
management negotiators.
Burnett, K., & McKinley, E. G. (1998). Modelling information seeking. Interacting With Computers, 10,
285-302.
Donohue, W. A Diez, M. E., & Weider-Hatfield, D (1984). Skills for successful bargaining: A valence
theory of competence mediation. In R. N Bostrom (Ed ) Communication with competence. Beverly Hills:
Sage.
Putnam, L. L., and Roloff, M. E. (1992). Communication and Negotiation. Newbury Park: Sage.
Reardon, K. K. (1991). Persuasion in practice, second edition. Newbury Park: Sage.
Tanis, M. and Postmes, T. (2003). Social Cues and Impression Formation in CMC. Journal of
Communication, 53, 4, 676-693.
11. Interview someone (e.g., a corporate lawyer) who has negotiated a labor contract. Ask
them to describe one case from initial planning through negotiations to an agreement.
Later, analyze their case in terms of effective and ineffective planning and bargaining
techniques. Does their experience match the material described in the course? How do
you reconcile any differences?
12. Suppose you were going to give me advice as to how to negotiate. Should I be "tough"?
"Conciliatory"? Should I make small or large concessions? Should my negotiating
style change as negotiations progress? In other words, how should I bargain?
Bulach, C. (1991). The Collective Bargaining potpourri: Is there a right way? Journal of Collective
Negotiations in the Public Sector, 20, (4), 281-292.
Chertkoff, J. M., & Conley, M. (1967). Opening offer and frequency of concessions as bargaining
strategies Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 181 - 185.
Gittell, J.H., Nordenflycht, A. V., and Kochan, T.A. (2004). Mutual Gains or Zero Sum? Labor Relations
and Firm Performance in the Airline Industry. Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 57, 2, 163-180.
Pruitt, D. G., Carnevale, P. J (1993). Negotiation in social conflict. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks-Cole.
Shell, G. R. (1999). Bargaining for advantage: Negotiation strategies for reasonable people. NY: Viking.
13. Mary Parker Follett, Dean Pruitt, and Alan Filley have all written about integrative
bargaining. How are their approaches, viewpoints, and suggestions similar? How are
they different?
Filley, A. C. (1975). Interpersonal conflict resolution. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, & Co
Follett, M. P. (1940). Constructive conflict. In Metcalf, H C., & Urwick, L. (eds.) Dynamic administration:
The collected papers of Mary Parker Follett. NY: Harper & Brothers.
Pruitt, D. G. (1983). Integrative agreements: Nature and antecedents. In Bazerman, M. H., & Lewicki, R. J.
(eds) Negotiating in organizations. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 35-50.
14. Compare any three of the following books on power. Although not every book was
written for the field of labor-management relations, each has some degree of
applicability to this field. Which perspective seems to be the most accurate and useful
for understanding union-management relations?
Boulding, K. (1989). The three faces of power. Newbury Park: Sage.
Pfeffer J (1981). Power in organizations. NY: Pittman.
Blalock, H. M. Jr. (1989). Power and conflict: Toward a general theory. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Clegg, S. R. (1989). Frameworks of power. Newbury Park: Sage.
15. Critique one of the following popular books on negotiating:

a. Cohen, H. (1980) You can negotiate anything. NY: Bantham.
b. Buskirk, R. (1989). Frontal attack, divide & conquer, the fait accompli, and 118 other
tactics managers must know. NY: Wiley Books.
c. Bernstein, A. J., & Rozen, S. C. (1989) Dinosaur Brains: Dealing with all those
impossible people at work. New York: Wiley.
Critique the techniques of your chosen book in light of scientific evidence supporting
or refuting these techniques.
Lewicki, R., Saunders, D., & Minton, J. (1999). Negotiation. Homewood IL: Irwin/McGraw-Hill.
Mannix, E. A., Thompson, L. L., & Bazerman, M. H. (1989). Negotiation in small groups. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 74, 508-517.
Academic Press.
Thompson, L. (1998). The mind and heart of the negotiator. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
16. Blake & Mouton have been called, "the founding fathers of the field of Conflict
Management." Critique their writings dealing with bargaining and conflict at work.
What are the strengths and weaknesses of their perspective?
Blake, R. R., & Mouton, J.S. (1964). The managerial grid. Houston, TX: Gulf Publishing.
Blake, R. & Mouton, S. (1984). Solving costly organizational conflicts. San Francisco: JosseyBass.
Rahim, M. A. (1986). Managing conflict in organizations. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Van de Vliert, E. & Kabanoff, B. (March, 1990). Toward theory-based measures of conflict management.
Academy of Management Journal, 33, (1), 199-209.
17. How has power been studied in bargaining research and in the field of labor-
management relations and collective bargaining? What effects do different types of
power have upon the bargaining relationship?
Deutsch, M., & Schichman, S. (1986). Conflict: A social psychological perspective. In M. G. Hermann
(ed.) Political psychology: Contemporary problems and issues. San Francisco, CA:Jossey-Bass. 219-250.
Drory, A. & Ritov, I. (1997). Effects of work experience and opponent's power on conflict management
styles. International Journal of Control Management, 8, 148-161.
Kramer, R. M., & Neale, M. A. (Eds.) (1998). Power and influence in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Mannix, E. A., Thompson, L. L., & Bazerman, M. H.(1989). Negotiation in small groups. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 74, 508-517.
Academic Press.
18. When some people bargain, they seek only to achieve their own goals. When others
bargain, they seek to "beat" their opponents. Still others cooperate. Using the scientific
evidence, tell me: When should I be cooperative, competitive, or individualistic?
Achterkamp, M. and Akkerman, A. (2003). Identifying latent conflict in collective bargaining. Rationality
& Society, 15, 1, 15-43.
Bettenhausen, K. L., & Murnighan, J. K. (1991). The development of an intragroup norm and the effects of
interpersonal and structural challenges. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, (1), 20-35.
Carnevale, P. J. D., & Lawler, E. J. (1986). Time pressure and the development of integrative agreements
in bilateral negotiations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 30, 636-659.
Johnson, D. W., Maruyama, G., Johnson, R., Nelson, D. Y., Skon, L. (1981). Effects of cooperative,
competitive, and individualistic goal structures on achievement: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin,
89, 47-62.
Ramundo, B. A. (1992). Effective Negotiation: A guide to dialogue management and control. Westport,
CT: Quorum Books.
19. In their book Getting to YES (1981, Boston: Houghton Mifflin), Fisher & Ury argue
that negotiators should set aside "trust." They seek to offer a model in which trust is
not a necessarily important aspect of the bargaining relationship. McCarthy (1985,
Negotiation Journal, 1, 59-66) believes trust is essential. Using the scholarly and
research literature, present your opinion on the importance of trust in bargaining.
Deutsch, M. (1973). The resolution of conflict. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Kramer, R. M. (1999). Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, enduring questions.
Annual Review of Psychology, 50, 569-598.
Ross, W. H., & LaCroix, J. (1996). Multiple meanings of trust in negotiation theory and research: A
literature review. International Journal of Control Management, 7, 314360.
Also see the July, 1998 special issue of Academy of Management Review devoted to "trust in and between
organizations." It is full of literature reviews on this topic.
20. How do situational factors (e.g., bargaining power) affect bargaining behavior? Why?
Brislin, R. W. (1991). The art of getting things done: A practical guide to the use of power. Westport, CT:
Praeger Trade Books.
Druckman, D. (1971). The influence of the situation in interparty conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
15, 523-555.
Ross, W. H., Jr. (1988). Situational factors and Alternative Dispute Resolution. Journal of Applied
Behavioral Science, 24, 251-262.
Smith, D. L., Pruitt, D. G., & Carnevale, P. J. D. (1982). Matching and mismatching: The effect of own
limit, other's toughness, and time pressure on concession rates in negotiation. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 42, 867-883.
21. Most models of bargaining assume that people's bargaining behavior is governed by
economic motives. Contrast this traditional approach with the human judgment model
offered by psychologist K. R. Hammond and associates.
Achterkamp, M. and Akkerman, A. (2003). Identifying latent conflict in collective bargaining. Rationality
& Society, 15, 1, 15-43.
Arkes, H. R., & Hammond, K. R. (1986). Judgment and decision making: An interdisciplinary reader.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Brehmer, B. (1976). Social judgment theory and the analysis of interpersonal conflict. Psychological
Bulletin, 83, 985-1003.
Blake, W. M. Hammond, K. R., & Meyer, G. D. (1973). An Alternative Approach to Labor-Management
Relations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 18, 311-327.
Hammond, K. R. (1973). The cognitive conflict paradigm. In L. Rappoport, & D. A. Summers (eds.)
Human Judgement and Social Interaction. NY: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 188-205.
Neale, M. A., & Bazerman, M. H. (1985). Perspectives in understanding negotiations: Viewing negotiation
as a judgmental process. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29, 33-55.
22. What does "game theory" offer negotiators? What can this discipline (field of study)
offer to the field of collective bargaining?
Brams, S. J. (1990). Negotiation games: Applying game theory to bargaining and arbitration. NY:
Routledge.
Budescu, D. V., Erev, I., & Zwick, R. (1999). Games and human behavior: Essays in honor of Amnon
Rapoport. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Hamburger, H. (1979). Games as models of social phenomena. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co.
McGrath, J. E. (1984). Groups: Interaction and Performance. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Prasnikar, V., & Roth, A. E. (1992). Considerations of fairness and strategy: Experimental data from
sequential games. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, (3), 865-888.
23. Compare and contrast the following models of bargaining. Does the scientific evidence
support one of these in particular? Is any one theory more practical than any other?
Riaffa, H. (1982). The art and science of negotiation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Schelling, T. C. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Walton, R. B., & McKersie, R. E. (1965). A Behavioral theory of labor relations. NY: McGraw-Hill.
24. Reed C. Richardson (1985) argues for a "collective bargaining by objectives" approach
to contract negotiations in a book by the same title. Evaluate his approach and either
argue for or against it.
Morrison, W. F. (1985). The pre-negotiation planning book. NY: Wiley.
Odiorne, G. S. (1969). Management by objectives. NY: Pitman. Pervin, L. A. (ed., 1989). Goal concepts in
personality and social psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates.
Richardson, R. C. (1985). Collective bargaining by objectives. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
25. During the past 20 years, numerous political scientists have done case studies of
coalition formation within political organizations (e.g., Parliaments). Meanwhile, social
psychologists have conducted precise, well-controlled studies of coalition formation
within larger groups. What have these years of coalition formation research
discovered? How are these findings relevant, if at all, to labor management relations?
How are they relevant to relationships within labor unions (what Walton and
McKersie call, "intraorganizational bargaining”)?
Komorita, S.S. (1984). Coalition bargaining. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social
psychology, vol. 18. NY: Academic Press.
Lewicki, R. J., Sheppard, B. H., & Bazerman, M. H. (Eds.) (1986). Research on negotiations in
organizations. Greenwich, CT: JAI.
Murnighan, J. K. (1978). Models of coalition behavior: Game theoretic, social psychological, and political
perspectives. Psychological Bulletin, 85, 1130-1153.
Rapoport, A. (1970). N-person game theory: Concepts and applications. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan
Press.
van Assen, M., Stokman, F., and van Oosten, R. (2003). Conflict measures in cooperative exchange models
of collective decision-making. Rationality & Society, 15, 1, 85-112.
26. How can research done on nonverbal behavior be used in labor-management

negotiations?
Drolet, A., & Morris, M. W. (2000). Rapport in conflict resolution: Accounting for how face-to-face
contact fosters mutual cooperation in mixed-motive conflicts. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
36, 26-50.
Feldman, R. (Ed., 1992). Applications of nonverbal behavioral theories and research. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum & Associates.
Jones, T. S., & Remland, M. S. (1993). Nonverbal communication and conflict escalation: An attribution-
based model. International Journal of Control Management, 4, (2), 119- 137.
Tanis, M. and Postmes, T. (2003). Social Cues and Impression Formation in CMC. Journal of
Communication, 53, 4, 676-693.
27. Is there really a personality type that can be called “Machiavellian”? Or is

Machiavellianism really a trait that lies within each of us, that emerges only under
certain circumstances (as generally argued by Mischel, 1968)? Put another way, do
specific people have some traits and others have different traits that determine people's
behavior? Or is behavior determined more by the situation? What are the implications
of this argument generally, and Machiavellianism specifically, for collective
bargaining? When possible, support your position with empirical evidence.
Burnsted, B. (1973). The manipulator: A Psychoanalytic view. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Dieter-Meyer, H. (1992). Norms and self-interest in ultimatum bargaining: The prince's prudence. Journal
of Economic Psychology, 13, (2), 215-232.
Pervin, L. A. (1985). Personality: Current controversies, issues, and directions. In Rosenzweig, M.R., &
Porter, L. W. (Eds.) Annual Review of Psychology, 36, 83- 114.
Singer, J. E. (1964). The use of manipulative strategies: Machiavellianism and attractiveness. Sociometry, 2
7, 128- 150.
28. How do "attribution" and "self-fulfilling prophesy" errors affect day-to-day labor
management relations? What role do they have in collective bargaining? What are the
effects? How can these effects be used to your advantage when negotiating?
Brewer, M. B., & Kramer, R. M. (1985). The psychology of intergroup attitudes and behavior. In
Rosenzweig, M. R., & Porter, L. W. (Eds.) Annual Review of Psychology, 36, 219-243.
Graham, S., & Folkes, V. S. (1990). Attribution theory: Applications to Achievement, mental health, and
interpersonal conflict. Hillsdale,NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates.
Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970). Social interaction basis of cooperators' and competitors' beliefs
about others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 6-91.
Miller, D. T. & Turnbull, W. (1986). Expectancies and interpersonal processes. In Rosenzweig, M.R., &
Porter, L. W. (Eds.) Annual Review of Psychology, 37, 233-256.
29. What are "decision frames”? How are they important for understanding collective
bargaining and/or labor mediation?
Bazerman, M. H., & Neale M. A. (1991). Negotiating Rationally. NY: Free Press.
Bottom, W. P., & Studt, A. (1993). Framing effects and the distributive aspect of integrative bargaining.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 56, 459-474.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values, and frames. American Psychologist, 39, (4), 341-
350.
Putnam, L. L., & Holmer, M. (1992). Framing, reframing, and issue development. In L. Putnam & M.
Roloff (Eds.) Communication and negotiation (pp. 128-155). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
30. What role does "impression management" play in labor-management relations? In

collective bargaining?
Giacalone, R. A., & Rosenfeld, P. (Ed., 1990). Impression management in the organization. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates.
Graham, J. L. (1987). A theory of interorganizational negotiations. Research in marketing, 9, 163-183.
Krarner, R. M., & Neale, M. A. (Eds.) (1998). Power and influence in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Tedeschi, J. T. (ed.) (1981). Impression management theory and social psychological research. NY:
Academic Press.
31. Using writings from the fields of "debate" and "interpersonal communication," offer
advice on how to be more persuasive when bargaining.
Suggested references:
Branham, R. J. (1991). Debate and critical analysis. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Cupach, W. R. & Spitzberg, B. H. (Eds., 1994). The dark side of interpersonal communication. Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Daly, J. A., & Wiemann, J. M. (Eds., 1994). Strategic interpersonal communication. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Miller, G. (1993). Deceptive communication. Newbury Park: Sage.
Whalen, D. J. (1995). I see what you mean: Persuasive business communication. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
32. Analyze the contributions of Morton Deutsch to our understanding of conflict and
bargaining. What is his greatest contribution? Do you agree or disagree with his
theories? Support your position.
Bunker, B., & Rubin, J. (Eds.)(1995). Conflict, cooperation, & justice. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Deutsch, M. (1973). The resolution of conflict: Constructive and destructive processes. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Deutsch, M. (1985). Distributive Justice: A social psychological perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale.
Deutsch, M. (1993). Educating for a peaceful world. American Psychologist, 49, (5), 510-517.
Deutsch, M. (1990). Sixty years of conflict. International Journal of Control Management, 1, (3), 237-263.
van Assen, M., Stokman, F., and van Oosten, R. (2003). Conflict measures in cooperative exchange
models of collective decision-making. Rationality & Society, 15, 1, 85-112.
Case Study 6-3: The Influenza Work Rule
This case is based on the Virginia Mason Hospital and Washington State Nurses Association
(see Case 19–CA–030154; Case 19-CA-30154; 357 NLRB No. 53).
This is a very complex case, with numerous issues bouncing back and forth between the
Administrative Law Judge and the Board. The Administrative Law Judge twice ruled for the
Hospital, but the Board modified his decision, effectively ruling against the Hospital. The final
outcomes (as of 2012) are as follows:
 The Union had waived its right to use grievance arbitration to object to the new flu-
prevention policy. This decision was based on the history of the labor-management
relationship (i.e., the Union had acquiesced to a previous facemask rule) and the specific
wording of the Managerial Rights clause.
 The Hospital argument that the facemask policy was required by the federal Centers for
Disease Control (and therefore not subject to labor laws) was rejected. This flu-
prevention policy went far beyond CDC guidelines.
 The argument that the Hospital made that a flu policy was a “fundamental business
decision” reflecting the “core purpose” of a hospital was rejected as without merit. A
proposed policy over whether and where nurses had to wear facemasks was an
employment issue that could be modified through negotiation without harming the core
purpose of a hospital.
 The Administrative Law Judge ruled that true bargaining had not taken place. Most of
what the Hospital called “bargaining” was merely the Hospital explaining its new policy
to union representatives on a labor-management committee that was not even tasked with
negotiating new contract clauses or policies. Even so, the ALJ ruled that the Union had
waived its right to bargain over this matter by agreeing to the specific terms of the
Management Rights clause.
 The Hospital was found to violate the “good faith bargaining” requirements by not
providing the Union with requested information about employee reactions to the policy.
The NLRB has repeatedly ruled that a union should be given the information it needs to
do its job to represent its members. The failure to provide information, coupled with
changing and evasive answers to Union questions about the new policy implementation
led the Board to rule against the Hospital on this matter.
Thus, although the Hospital “won” on the arbitration issue, it “lost” on the issue of whether it had
bargained in good faith with the union. The Hospital was ordered to provide the Union with
relevant requested information and to post notices that it would abide by the NLRB ruling.

Labor Relations Process 11th Edition Holley Solutions Manual Download

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Labor Relations Process 11th Edition Holley Solutions Manual Download

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Solution Manual for Labor Relations Process 11th

Edition Holley Ross Wolters 1305576209

Negotiating the Labor Agreement

III. Understanding Collective Bargaining Behavior: A Framework

IV. Ethical and Legal Considerations in Collective Bargaining

2. During an economic recession, discuss how management’s or a union’s bargaining power

Union arguments to reduce the cost of this proposal might include:

 A distributive bargaining approach, (also referred to as interest-based bargaining,

Exploring the Web

Suggested Readings and Term Paper Topics

2. What do either (your choice) management science or management information systems

4. What effects do personality/individual difference variables (e.g., need for achievement,

5. Assume that I am a union negotiator. You are a consultant, hired to teach me to be

8. What does the research on "anger" and "aggression" offer labor-management

9. Assume that I am a management negotiator. You are a mediator, trying to teach me to

10. In the 1990s, several researchers in Communication Departments at major universities

15. Critique one of the following popular books on negotiating:

26. How can research done on nonverbal behavior be used in labor-management

27. Is there really a personality type that can be called “Machiavellian”? Or is

30. What role does "impression management" play in labor-management relations? In

You might also like