Globalisation, Societies and Education

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Time to negotiate Singapore’s meritocracy?

Getting ready for the future of work and education

A. A. Johannis, Mark C. Baildon, Mary Anne Heng & Jefferson K. Rajah

To cite this article: A. A. Johannis, Mark C. Baildon, Mary Anne Heng & Jefferson K. Rajah
(2022): Time to negotiate Singapore’s meritocracy? Getting ready for the future of work and
education, Globalisation, Societies and Education, DOI: 10.1080/14767724.2022.2121688

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Published online: 20 Sep 2022.

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GLOBALISATION, SOCIETIES AND EDUCATION
https://doi.org/10.1080/14767724.2022.2121688

Time to negotiate Singapore’s meritocracy? Getting ready for the

future of work and education
A. A. Johannis , Mark C. Baildon *, Mary Anne Heng and Jefferson K. Rajah
National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Singapore has prospered since independence by developing its human Received 7 February 2022
resources under a distinctly Singaporean meritocratic system. Recent Accepted 2 September 2022
developments in public discourse, and findings from interviews with
KEYWORDS
leading Singaporean personalities, however, point towards the system’s Singapore; meritocracy;
increasing undesirability. Among other problems, our study participants purposeful education; future
blame the system for worsening class divisions in society; for damaging of education; future
the mental well-being of students; and for leading to a narrowing of economy
society’s definitions of success while leaving Singaporean workers
unprepared for challenges of the future economy. Our paper shows
that for Singaporeans to be ready for these challenges and to find
purpose and meaning in the future economy, the current meritocratic
systems require reform. We argue for a new kind of political decision-
making to allow Singaporean society to reorder its basic values and
priorities towards a more democratic, inclusive and compassionate
meritocracy.

Introduction
Meritocracy, as a principle of governance, has widespread international affirmation today despite its
numerous drawbacks and challenges. Many countries around the world claim to be meritocracies
even if on closer inspection their implementation of this principle is fraught with issues. The desire
to be a meritocracy is strong in large part because it is vouched as an effective principle of both
efficiency and fairness (as equal opportunity) for modern capitalist economies – even if meritoc-
racy, in its current highly neoliberal form, is not always aligned with liberal democratic principles
(Bell 2015). The result has been rising contestation in both public and academic discourses around
the world and in Singapore in particular. This paper is intended to contribute to the academic dis-
course on meritocracy by introducing a novel way of evaluating it against the normative search for
purpose and meaning in life and by suggesting ways to rehabilitate it towards more a compassionate
and more democratic form.
The term ‘meritocracy’ was coined in the twentieth century and its use is closely related to mod-
ern capitalist states, although the use of theories of merit as a principle of governance has a much
older vintage. In the Republic, Plato recommended to his readers the use of a ‘Noble Lie’: a founding
civic myth meant to create citizen loyalty to each other and the state (Plato, Bloom, and Kirsch
2016). A part of the myth describes how the gods filled all men’s souls with iron, silver or gold
and how consequently this made them suitable to be farmers, civil servants or members of the

CONTACT A. A. Johannis johannis.aziz@nie.edu.sg Office of Education Research, National Institute of Education,

Nanyang Technological University, 1 Nanyang Walk, Singapore 637616, Singapore
*Present address: UAE University
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
© 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 A. A. JOHANNIS ET AL.

governing class respectively (Plato, Bloom, and Kirsch 2016). This is literally untrue, of course, but
what makes this lie noble is that it is a useful narrative that justifies social hierarchy and inequities,
thus maintaining social stability.
Comparatively, in The Analects, Confucius viewed society as consisting of five important
relationships: emperor and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder brother and younger
brother, and between two friends (Confucius and Waley 1938). The first four were relationships
between a superior and a subordinate, but the superior is responsible for the protection of the sub-
ordinate and must set a virtuous example for the subordinate. In particular, the emperor must rule
the people with propriety, rightness, and trustworthiness (Confucius and Waley 1938). For Confu-
cius, the superior only maintain his superiority if they exhibit virtues and abilities.
In the case of Singapore, both Plato’s and Confucius’ ideas are useful in describing the merito-
cratic system that has developed. For one, meritocracy was consciously adopted as one of the core
founding principles of the modern postcolonial Singaporean state. Meritocracy has become a part
of its society’s culture and national identity (Hong and Lugg 2016; Teo 2019). Second, meritocracy
has been part of a justificatory narrative told by the ruling class to explain and justify all manner
of pro-market, pro-growth economic policies and the strict, highly competitive, credentialist edu-
cation system that supports those policies (K. P. Tan 2008). This justificatory narrative includes
the claim that the meritocratic system, as a principle of allocative efficiency, was needed to maxi-
mise the potential of Singapore, a tiny resource-poor country, under which, each is given accord-
ing to his or her personal achievement (or the lack thereof) (Tan 2014; Tan 2016). Third,
Singapore’s governance is based on deference to an elite class who have not only excelled
under its credentialist meritocracy but are required to publicly exhibit moral virtues (Kamaludeen
and Turner 2013).
Nevertheless, since the 1990s, Singaporeans have increasingly been questioning, in the public
square, the adequacy and indeed the fairness of meritocracy as it is practiced domestically. This con-
testation culminated as a hot election issue during the 2011 general elections, manifesting itself in
several related points of contention (Tan 2016; Tan and Dimmock 2015; Yahya 2011).
One point of contention was overcrowding in the public transportation system, which was in
part blamed on a second point of contention – the high rates of immigration then. The latter
was also exerting a downward pressure on wages in a country with very high cost of living
(Yahya 2011). All this led to the increasing public perception that government ministers of the
time were out of touch because they tend not to live in public housing or depend on public trans-
portation (Oon 2011; Wong 2011). Their meritocratic education in elite schools and subsequent
upper-class lifestyles afforded by their occupation were blamed for their ignorance of the struggles
of the average Singaporean.
Another point of contention was social stratification and the decreasing social mobility that
results. There was a growing belief that the meritocratic system was no longer delivering the
high levels of social mobility it did in the first few decades after independence but was instead repro-
ducing the educated elite. Children from the lower socio-economic classes were no longer able to
climb the social ladder simply by working hard or being naturally talented because their families
lacked the financial resources and social capital to enable them to compete with peers from better
to do families (Tan and Dimmock 2015; Yahya 2011). These topics of public discourse continue to
be relevant today.
The academic literature on Singapore meritocracy thus far, has captured this development in
public discourse mainly in terms of issues of elite political control, socio-economic and educational
inequalities and decreasing social mobility. However, while these issues are pertinent, there has
been little discussion on the holistic cultural and existential aspects of this contestation; how and
why the meritocratic system, once wildly successful, has become an obstacle to continued progress;
and how we can possibly rehabilitate the system without relying on piecemeal reforms.
This paper is part of a larger study concerning the general prospects for Singaporeans finding
meaning and purpose in the future of work and education. We sought to uncover suggestions as
 GLOBALISATION, SOCIETIES AND EDUCATION 3

to the necessary and desirable changes to our society and politics that will support that search. Thus,
in that larger study, we collected data on a wide range of themes including detailed views on school
systems, the role of teachers, Singapore’s political history and culture, etc. To obtain this deep and
rich dataset, we interviewed leading personalities from Singapore’s various societal segments.
One of the most prominent and salient threads of discussion was the particular practice of mer-
itocracy in Singapore and how it has affected Singaporeans’ prospects for finding purpose and
meaning. The thrust of the data suggests that while Singaporean meritocracy had brought many
benefits to society in the first few decades after independence, it is becoming increasingly instru-
mental, narrow, materialist and attached to a highly limited number of pathways in life’s journey.
As a consequence, it is a growing obstacle for finding meaning and purpose: an obstacle to edu-
cation and work being more fulfilling. This paper takes a closer look at these concerns and what
suggestions can been made to ameliorate the current situation. The research question that frames
this paper is: What do society leaders perceive as the societal and educational changes needed to
renegotiate Singaporean meritocracy?
To answer this research question, we must evaluate Singaporean meritocracy not simply in terms
of elitism and equity but also through the lens of the virtues and values that promise more purpose-
ful and meaningful lives for Singaporeans (see Bundick et al. 2021; Damon 2008; Quinn 2017). And
so, the answers will be those that go beyond the surface structure of education or economy policy
into the heart of Singapore’s governing philosophy writ large. These two aspects of the paper break
new ground for academic discussion on Singaporean meritocracy, but also contribute to the current
national and international conversation during the COVID19 pandemic about what is important in
life.
The pandemic has been a disruptive time, not only for the economy but also for the way we lead
our personal lives. We have come to question more about what we need as individuals and societies.
Facing a new world of uncertainty, the education system can no longer exclude human virtues and
skills like empathy, judgment, social skills, curiosity and creativity. Facing a new world of vulner-
ability, society can no longer continue to discount the views and contributions of those who do not
fit the traditional definitions of Singaporean meritocracy.

Meritocracy in other contexts

The word ‘meritocracy’ was coined by British sociologist Michael Dunlop Young in his 1958 book
The Rise of the Meritocracy. In it, he describes a dystopian future Britain where the rule of the her-
editary aristocratic system has been replaced by the rule of an elite class of the most intellectually
talented. The disenfranchised underclass remains downtrodden, except now their situation is jus-
tified by apparently objective terms. This dystopian picture provided Young the hypothetical con-
text to question the objectivity of measuring merit solely by apparent intelligence or academic
achievement.
Despite Young’s socialist politics, the term meritocracy entered the general English lexicon with-
out any of the negative connotations he had intended. By the 1970s and 80’s, meritocracy had been
adopted by neoliberal public policy intellectuals, leaning heavily on economic stratification theory
(see Watson and Barth 1964; Wiley 1967) to justify the rising socio-economic inequality in late-
capitalist Western economies.
Nevertheless, in the United States, the modern meritocratic system that coincided with the rise of
women’s and minority rights in the 1950s and 60’s was at first very inclusive. It helped unseat the
old white Anglo-Saxon Protestant patriarchy in favour of women, racial minorities and the LGBT
community (Hayes 2012). A hierarchy of merit replaced the old hierarchy of birth and among other
things, this buttressed societal belief in the American Dream: that no matter your starting point, if
you work hard enough in the US, you can achieve socio-economic success (Hayes 2012). However,
American meritocracy, as a commitment to equal opportunity, also created major inequalities of
outcome later on. American meritocracy disguised how uneven the playing field was and how
4 A. A. JOHANNIS ET AL.

large an effect this would have, especially over several generations. It thus allowed elite groups to
reproduce themselves across generations and helped create a permanent meritocratic ruling class
(Ibid).
Once modern American meritocracy got going, it started to seem inevitable and necessary as a
principle of allocation in a rugged individualist capitalist society (Markovits 2020). Elites have been
able to promote an ideology of merit that conveys beliefs about how society should operate, what is
valued, and the roles individuals should play in society (Hayes 2012; Howlett 2021; Markovits
2019). Meritocratic ideals shape views about meaning and purpose in people’s lives, perpetuate
elite interests and reinforce the status quo in societies (Howlett 2021). As Markovits (2020, 15)
argued, ‘Meritocratic practice projects meritocratic ideals onto everyday existence to build the set-
tings in which people live and narrate their lives and the fixed points around which their life stories
revolve.’ The meritocratic hierarchy thus presents itself as something rational and natural.
Nevertheless, by the turn of the millennium, this hierarchic meritocratic system has started to
show cracks in its foundation. At the individual level, while the educated elite continued to justify
their high salaries and social status through their hard work and intelligence, the maintenance of
their position and the reproduction of their class has not been a painless process. Ironically, Amer-
ican meritocracy, taken to the limits of its rugged individualist logic, has started to harm the elite as
well (Ibid). The logic of American meritocracy has created a hypercompetitive environment at the
top levels. Top level professionals and executives must work longer and longer hours to justify their
renumeration. Gone are the traditional mores of the leisured classes. The educated elite must also
spend more and more time, effort, and money to ensure their children receive their meritocratic
inheritance, as competition for elite level education has reached hyper levels. In a reversal of Marx-
ism, the elite have to exploit their own human capacities to abominable levels in order to rise up and
then maintain their position in the meritocratic system, leaving no room to pursue interests or
passions.
Cracks have also been showing at the system level since the turn of the millennium. Since 2000,
historical events such as the fraudulently sold war in Iraq, the Enron scandal, the Katrina hurricane
debacle, and the great recession of 2008, have led to a ‘crisis of authority’ in American society
(Hayes 2012). There has been a general feeling that since the meritocratic elite are supposed to
know what they are doing because they are the smartest and most knowledgeable people in society,
then there must be something wrong with the whole system if those seemingly avoidable events can
happen. Public trust in traditional institutions like the government (especially the US Congress),
major corporations, universities, scientists, the media and even professional sports are at historical
lows (Hayes 2012).
In the context of China, meritocracy has unsurprisingly not developed in the same way as in the
US or other mature capitalist democracies, though there are some points of similarity. While China
remains an authoritarian, one-party government state, it has embraced capitalism for some decades
now. So, in the general economy, Chinese meritocracy does resemble many other capitalist societies
that have embraced educational credentialism.
In China, the Gaokao or China’s nationwide college entrance examination has very high socio-
economic salience. One’s score in the Gaokao determines how highly ranked a college a high school
student can get into, which in turn determines his or her employment prospects and how likely he
or she can acquire official permission to migrate from rural to urban places. These economic out-
comes in turn have a major influence on social outcomes such as marriage, childbirth and eldercare
(Howlett 2021).
Also resembling many other societies is the fact that despite the Gaokao’s reputation as merito-
cratic institution, the playing field is far from level. Outcomes in the Gaokao are highly determined
by class and geographical region (Ibid). This implies that just like many other meritocratic edu-
cation systems, educational outcomes are highly influenced by the contribution of financial, social
and cultural capital from parents and the uneven regional distribution of public resources. Just like
the US today, grades in China are not determined by individual merit alone.
 GLOBALISATION, SOCIETIES AND EDUCATION 5

What is very different is the high regard the Chinese people still hold for the Gaokao as a fair
competition. Despite the uneven playing field described above and despite the well-known wide-
spread economic salience of guanxi, or personal relationships, the Chinese people still hold on to
the Gaokao as a student’s best chance to achieve something in life (Ibid). In fact, once individual
character and ability, and parental resources are factored in, for the Chinese, what remains is simply
luck (Ibid). In this way, the Gaokao also plays a similar role to exams in other meritocracies: it con-
tributes to the meritocratic systems’ justification of the socio-economic status quo.
At the system or political level, China is not experiencing the crisis of authority that the US is. In
fact, trust in the Chinese leadership remains high despite its authoritarian ways. However, as a one-
party state, the fact is that the Chinese leadership has long separated meritocracy from democracy.
Daniel Bell (2015) has observed that the Chinese political model consists of meritocracy at the top,
experimentation in the middle, and democracy at the bottom. While democratic elections take place
at the local level, Chinese political leaders at the top are chosen for their exhibition of the Confucian
ideals of abilities and moral uprightness. Like de Tocqueville, Mansfield, and Winthrop (2000)
before them, the Chinese government does not believe in democracy as a good way of identifying
the best people to govern.

Singaporean meritocracy
The brand of meritocracy that has historically been in practice in Singapore, has its roots in the
economic survivalist policies of its early years of independence. As the now well-known story
goes, given Singapore’s lack of natural resources, the first generation of post-independence poli-
ticians decided to invest heavily in its human resource. Using meritocracy as a principle of allocative
efficiency, the founding leaders helped build an attractively skilled workforce (for foreign investors)
and a competent civil and political leadership (K. P. Tan 2008). Consequently, meritocracy has
widely been credited as a pillar of Singapore’s early socio-economic success (Bellows 2009; Poon
2018; Quah 2018; Tan 2013).
Notably, Singaporean meritocracy was also instituted as a governing principle of political fair-
ness. The founding of Singapore as an independent state was heavily coloured by its leaders’ rejec-
tion of both the racialised (nativist) affirmative policies of the Malaysian Federation (of which
Singapore had been part), as well as communism and its principle of equality of condition (Poon
2018; Teo 2019). Singaporean meritocracy is thus at once a principle of (pro-capital) allocative
efficiency, a principle of equality of opportunity (but not outcome), and a principle of (ethno-reli-
gious) non-discrimination. In these ways, Singaporean meritocracy is not that much different from
American meritocracy writ large. Its main purpose is to provide a measure of fairness in the context
of economic success in generally capitalist modern economies and a fair chance of having compe-
tent leaders at the top.
Over the decades, while Singaporean meritocracy has developed its own local flavour, intricacies
and issues, some features are not too dissimilar to the experiences in other places. For example,
similar to the American experience, inequalities in outcome have been legitimised by the underlying
assumption that giving better opportunities to the talented or meritorious and designating the less
talented to less rewarding educational and vocational pathways is good for the capitalist economy
and yet still inclusive and therefore generous to the less talented (Talib 2021). Nevertheless, again
similar to the US, in the last two decades or so there has been an increasing public perception that
the meritocratic system has been reproducing class differences across generations as income
inequality increased in the 2000s (Tan and Tan 2016; Yahya 2011). This naturally led to an increas-
ing worry about stagnant social mobility as Singaporeans worried that entrenched class inequalities
systematically disadvantage those from lower socio-economic backgrounds (Yahya 2011; Yip 2019).
In maturing economies exposed to globalisation, the growth of domestic opportunities will
inevitably become highly limited and any strictly meritocratic education policy will impose struc-
tural limits for social mobility since the playing field is not flat to begin with (Talib 2021). And it was
6 A. A. JOHANNIS ET AL.

because this neoliberal economic milieu could not deliver equality of outcome that Singaporean
educational policy has sought to rationalise that inequality and the sorting of students (e.g., through
streaming) for the occupational hierarchy deemed necessary for economic growth (Ibid). Neoliberal
logic has prioritised economic growth above all other priorities.
This metastacising of the meritocratic system has had its psycho-social ill effects as well. For one,
since Singaporean meritocracy was modelled on an individualist neoliberal ethos, the legitimised
rise of inequalities of outcome has led to social alienation despite Singapore’s core communitarian
values (Teo 2018). Singaporeans have been increasingly incentivised not only to compete intensely
with others for grades, positions and status, but to ultimately tend only to their own socio-economic
prospects.
Second, the meritocratic system has developed a very narrow definition of merit by fetishising a
strict credentialism that may not even translate to the real needs of employers (Yip 2019). Schools
and employers have become dependent on narrow indicators of scholastic and job performance
(Mauzy and Milne 2002). Third, the meritocratic system has also developed a narrow range of
rewards defined by a narrow understanding of success in life (Yip 2019). The system centres on
rewarding academic achievement with entry to prestigious schools at every level, lucrative govern-
ment and private scholarships and high-paying jobs in the civil service or largest corporations. Not
only does this further entrench class hierarchies, but the corollary is that the system perpetuates a
too simplistic vision of the good life that constrains and restricts variations in Singaporeans’ life
plans and stigmatises those who fail by its narrow metrics (Ibid). Much of this is consonant with
Markovits’s (2020) account of how American meritocracy does disservice even to the winners of
the system.
Hence, Singaporean meritocracy was not only aimed at creating an effective workforce in the
globalised economy, it was also aimed at creating a competent civil service and political leadership.
To this end, the system has been successful. Singaporean meritocracy has been credited for the
establishment of a world-class civil service generally free from corruption (Mauzy and Milne
2002). Nevertheless, Singaporean meritocracy at this level has been criticised as an elitist ideology
that covers for socio-economic and ethnic inequality (Ibid; Ng 2017), while it also preserves the pos-
ition of the governing elite (Ho and Zhang 2021; K. P. Tan 2008).
After more than five decades of remaining in power, the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) has
shaped Singaporean meritocracy to suit its own purpose in preserving its position (K. P. Tan 2008).
After a long successful hegemony on local politics, the PAP has been able to create a monopoly on
good policy ideas and impose its own understanding and definition of what constitutes merit in
Singaporean society (Ibid). This has allowed the PAP to dominate parliament and dismiss opposi-
tion ideas as lacking substance or of trying to score political points (Ibid).
Critics have observed that this long hegemony was made possible by the successive generation of
like-minded new recruits graduated from a narrow set of prominent high schools, groomed by gov-
ernment scholarship programmes (Ho and Zhang 2021). The further problem is that because the
playing field is not even in the first place, the following generations of political leaders also tend
to be male, ethnic Chinese from upper class families, further reinforcing the PAP’s ranks with a
narrow elite who think and feel in the same ways (Ibid). This picture of Singaporean politics is gen-
erally more congruous with meritocratic maintenance and reproduction of the ruling elite in China
where one political party dominates, than with the US with its two-party system. Meritocratic pro-
motion to the political leadership in Singapore is due to intra-party and not inter-party
competition.
As discussed earlier, while public discourse questioning the meritocratic system had been going
on since the 1990s, things came to a head in 2011, when meritocracy became a hot topic of national
discussion during that year’s general election (Tan 2016; Tan and Dimmock 2015). Inequality of
outcome, stagnant social mobility and the perception of out of touch ministers and civil servants
were some of the most hotly debated issues. The last of which faintly echoing just some of the suspi-
cions behind the US’s current crisis of authority.
 GLOBALISATION, SOCIETIES AND EDUCATION 7

At the same time, the Life Beyond Grades movement, started by a group of young parents, have
begun to lobby the government and public opinion against the high levels of stress put on Singa-
porean students and towards a redefinition or a broader view of what it means to be successful in life
(Tan 2018). Recent public discourse reveals a national period of self-questioning, as more and more
Singaporeans are re-evaluating the neoliberal narrative and whether it serves the purposes of living
a good life in Singapore.

Research context of the study

The above concerns about the neoliberal approach to meritocracy are not exclusive to Singapore.
Relatively recent international educational research has uncovered evidence of some of the ways
in which meritocratic education systems, while outwardly promoting accountability and perceived
equality of opportunity, have in fact helped legitimise structural inequality (Au 2016; Clycq, Nou-
wen, and Vandenbroucke 2014; Jin and Ball 2020) and suppressed and segregated those judged to
lack merit under its rubric (Anderson 2015; Lim and Tan 2020).
To its credit, the PAP government has instituted changes to public and educational policy to
soften its instrumentalist and narrow form of meritocracy since this national discussion began.
In 2011, the education system moved on from its prior ability-based, aspiration-driven phase to
a student–centric, values-driven phase that is still ongoing (Heng 2015). And in 2018, the Ministry
of Education (MOE) launched a reform movement of the education system, called ‘Learn for Life’,
which was designed to inculcate the joy of learning and lower student stress levels by eliminating
some mid-year exams, eliminating streaming in secondary schools and refreshing curricula with an
emphasis on character and citizenship education (Ong 2020).
Despite these steps, however, the logics of instrumentalism, high-stakes exams and credentialism
still persist in the overall structure and practice of the education system and the marketplace for
jobs. Singapore’s education system has historically been designed with the country’s economic
development needs in mind (Goh and Gopinathan 2008) and frankly, many of these changes
have been made in response to expectations regarding the future of work. This dovetailing with
economic needs notwithstanding, the reforms so far can still be described as gradual and piecemeal.
Much of the educational reforms and indeed the impetus for our study was based on the cur-
rently experienced and further expected disruptions created by the ongoing Fourth Industrial
Revolution (4IR). Epitomising Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction, the 4IR will continue
to disrupt the way we live and work in the foreseeable future and beyond (Gleason 2018; Li,
Hou, and Wu 2017; Schwab 2016; Schwab and Davis 2018). The twenty-first century global
economy has been and continues to be marked by accelerated innovations in the realm of
cyber-physical systems, artificial intelligence, machine learning, automation, data analytics and
robotics. Gleason (2018) predicts that nearly a third of the Singaporean workforce could be dis-
placed given that 44 per cent of present-day jobs in Singapore can be automated. In general, the
archetypal twenty-first century worker is expected to be a fast-paced and complex problem-sol-
ver; a critical, creative and adaptable thinker; an emotionally intelligent team-player and
decision-maker; a digital-technological savant; and a self-initiated lifelong learner (Gleason
2018; World Economic Forum 2016).
Already, we are learning much from the impact of these technological disruptions, accelerated by
the COVID19 pandemic, on the way we work (Vyas and Butakhieo 2021); on our leisure activities
(Panarese and Azzarita 2021); and on gender inequalities (Reichelt, Makovi, and Sargsyan 2021)
among many other aspects of life. Leading world experts, economists and policymakers alike, are
warning of more severe disruptions to come (Gleason 2018; Li, Hou, and Wu 2017; Schwab
2016; Schwab and Davis 2018). Our study is directed at learning the prospects of building purpose-
ful and meaningful lives under this daunting techno-economic milieu and much of what our study
participants had to say revolve around the importance and the possibilities of reforming the neo-
liberal meritocratic system for both intrinsic and instrumental purposes.
8 A. A. JOHANNIS ET AL.

Methodology
This study used a multiple case study design with a qualitative approach (Stake 1995; Yin 2014). It
involved over a year of study in the field by the principal investigator, two co-principal investi-
gators, and one research assistant, who together interviewed 15 adult individuals who have been
or currently are leading personalities from various social and economic segments of Singaporean
society, namely business, education, public policy, religious organisations, volunteer organisations
and the arts. Each societal segment was represented by 2 or 3 participants. Participants were ident-
ified from their prominence in public discourse on various socio-economic or political topics and
were contacted via publicly available contact details or through known mutual acquaintances. Some
participants were recommended and referred by those interviewed earlier in the data gathering
process.
We decided on a cross-section of varied societal segments to draw commonalities and make sure
that the acquired data would not be specific to any particular sector or career pathway. We also
interviewed 2 or 3 participants from each segment so as to avoid singularly dominant views
from any given segment. We decided to keep to a small group of participants at the top of their
professions in order to obtain informed opinions on a deep and complicated topic that requires
advanced knowledge and experience, and a high societal vantage point. As leading senior figures
in their segments, participants have a commanding view of Singapore’s economic, social, and pol-
itical development. As such, the participants are from the more senior generations, with ages ran-
ging from the late forties to the late seventies at the time of interview.
At the same time, these participants are not limited in their perspectives as many of them have
had significant experience in at least one other segment; most have children or even grandchildren
who have or are currently negotiating Singapore’s education system; and a good number with cur-
rent or past dealings with young people or children in the scope of their current or previous occu-
pation or volunteer experiences.
See Table 1 for the pseudonyms assigned to our study participants and relevant background
information. Further details have been withheld to maintain their anonymity.
Data were collected from semi-structured interviews. Additional biographical data about the
participants were collected from publicly available internet reference and news sources and fol-
low-up correspondence with participants. Each participant was interviewed once at a place of
their choosing, for approximately 60–120 min. Each interview was conducted by at least 2 if not
all 3 of the PIs and Co-PIs. Participants answered questions regarding their personal education
experiences in Singapore; the choices they made behind their career trajectories; their views on Sin-
gapore’s educational system in regard to purpose and meaning and preparation for the future; what
they anticipate the future of work to be like; and their views on the current social and political
milieu with reference to the above. Additional questions were asked to prod participants for
more elaboration or deeper answers even where the participants might have veered to other less
central topics as long as the substance offered could still generally fall under the rubric of our
research questions.
Consequent analysis of the data was inductive and shaped largely by grounded theory and its
attendant constant comparative method (Glaser and Strauss 1999). The raw data were first read
multiple times by all four researchers for possible interpretations and thereafter hand-coded and
aggregated into categories (Miles and Huberman 1994). Researchers searched for patterns
among these aggregated categories and then generated themes. Examples of codes would be ‘life-
long learning’, ‘elitism and inequality’, ‘performance-based meritocracy’, ‘pre-developmental Singa-
pore’, ‘cultural shift’, ‘experiential learning’, ‘teacher autonomy’, ‘parental roles’, ‘school leadership’
and many others. Researchers then grouped such codes under larger themes, such as public policy,
pedagogy and the Singaporean social and political context.
The data were then preliminarily coded by the research assistant. After that, all four researchers
independently analysed samples of the coded interview data and then met over several occasions to
 GLOBALISATION, SOCIETIES AND EDUCATION 9

Table 1. Details about the study participants.

Assigned
Participant Societal Segment
Pseudonym Represented
A Business
B Business
C Business
D Education
E Education
F Education
G Public Policy
H Public Policy
I Religious
Organisations
J Religious
Organisations
K Volunteer
Organisations
L Volunteer
Organisations
M Volunteer
Organisations
N The Arts
O The Arts
Other Segments of
Significant Experience Further Details
Volunteer A successful entrepreneur and angel investor in the tech
Organisations sector. Co-founded a charitable foundation and a
social enterprise.
Education A successful entrepreneur in the hospitality sector.
Serves on the board of governors of several major civil
society and educational institutions
Volunteer A prominent retired financier at both public and private
Organisations institutions. A prominent fund-raiser for charity and
has co-founded one.
Public Policy A retired career senior academic in education.
Concurrent appointments in two different policy think
tanks.
– A retired career senior public school educator. Currently
consults for early childhood education organisations.
Business An academic studying the future of work and education.
A former civil servant with significant private industry
experience
Volunteer A retired career senior civil servant. Founded an NGO.
Organisations
Volunteer An elder statesman in Singaporean broadcast media and
Organisations journalism. Has extensive experience in several major
NGOs.
Education A director of an interfaith organisation. A former public
school educator and officer in one of Singapore’s
major Islamic organisations.
– A senior clerical member of one of Singapore’s largest
Christian churches.
Business A social entrepreneur who has founded several social
enterprises and projects. A former education and
technology consultant with significant experience in
finance.
Business A winner of several state honours for three decades of
voluntary service in several of Singapore’s major NGOs.
Formerly a career accountant.
Business A winner of two national awards for helming leadership
positions in several charities. A business leader who
founded her own consultancy.
– An internationally renowned and state honour winning
theatre producer and director. The artistic director of
one of Singapore’s most prominent theatre
companies.
Education A multi-award and state honour winning poet. A career
civil servant and former public school educator.

reach inter-coder agreement on the meanings and definitions of the codes used. The preliminary
coding was consequently revised by the research assistant. However, no inter-coder agreement
scores were taken in this process.
We conducted multiple interviewers within and across social segments to improve data validity.
As part of a larger study, the conversations with the participants covered a wider range of topics. In
the larger study, we collected data on a wide range of themes including detailed views on pedago-
gical practices, school systems, the role of teachers, Singapore’s political history and culture, the
effectiveness of its political leadership, and of course, what purpose and meaning generally mean
for Singaporeans in various fields of occupation. In this paper, we will focus our findings on
some of the most salient threads of discussion: the practice and principle of meritocracy in Singa-
pore, its related problems such as elitism and inequality, how these affect the prospects of Singapor-
eans finding purpose and meaning in education and work, and what are the practices of governance
that make it harder to pursue meaning and purpose. These threads will speak to what our
10 A. A. JOHANNIS ET AL.

participants perceive as the necessary societal and educational changes to renegotiate the practice
and principle of meritocracy.

Findings
We have organised our findings around four major themes concerning the Singaporean merito-
cratic system: societal issues, psycho-social issues, career issues and governance issues. These cat-
egories are not hard and fast, of course, with many related and even overlapping concerns and
subtopics across them. These categories serve the thematic purpose of addressing four central
myths of the meritocratic system that have hitherto, been part of its justificatory narrative.

Societal issues
Under this theme, we looked into findings related to societal issues such as social mobility, class
divisions and the social stigma arising from such hierarchical cleavages. These issues are often
related to the myth about the meritocratic system that all you need to succeed in this system are
talent and hard work, because the system effectively levels the playing field.
In the first few decades after independence, when the Singapore economy was still developing,
the meritocratic system did evidently provide high levels of social mobility. However, today, the
system seems to favour those who are already high achievers or the offspring of high-resource
parents. Subject O, a former public school educator, claimed that the education system currently
provides more opportunities for academic high achievers because they are intentionally being
‘groomed for greatness’ in very selective elite schools with more resources. Subject O also observed
that students from more affluent families have more opportunities for extra-curricula enrichment.
As he colourfully described it, ‘They get more rolls of the dice to get it right.’ Subject I argued that
the meritocratic system has become self-replicating since those who succeed in it go on to become
decision makers. As he puts it, ‘They become policy makers. They reflect on their boring experience,
and they replicate the same system, thinking that … it has worked for them and it should work for
everyone else.’
Our study participants also pointed out that the meritocratic system has created an educational
hierarchy that has a negative impact on students at both ends of the hierarchy. Subject H observed
that higher achieving students often lack the spark of intellectual curiosity. ‘Interestingly,’ he said, ‘I
see the spark more in the neighbourhood [non-elite, fully government-funded] schools.’ At the
other end, lower-progress students are often punished and stigmatised for their perceived lack of
achievement. Subject M complained that the system is ‘not very forgiving for slower developers
or developers who did not follow that standard way.’

Psycho-social issues
Under this theme, we look into findings related to psycho-social issues concerning mental health
issues and their effects on a person’s relationship with other people. These issues are often related
to the myth about the meritocratic system that all you need to lead a good life is material attainment
and social status.
Many of our study participants shared their concerns about the present over-competitive mer-
itocratic culture. Subject M complained about the ‘lack of compassion’ on the part of some teachers
and she also noted ‘that a lot of parents were also equally guilty because all they wanted was for their
kids to do well in school so that they can have a good job’. Even worse, Subject K, who has had
contact with a number of bereaved parents, related that they, ‘ … have lost children to suicide before
their kids turned 20 and everyone has cited academic stress.’ Subject N, however, opined that things
are not great even for young adults. He said that while Singapore is, ‘a very practical society …
people are beginning to realise that there’s quite a lot of mental illness, depression.’
 GLOBALISATION, SOCIETIES AND EDUCATION 11

Our study participants were also concerned that the current milieu of over-competition means
that students today are not being prepared to live more socially conscious lives. Subject E, a former
senior public school educator. Complained that students today are not mindful of the plight of
those less fortunate. She suggested to, ‘expose the kids to the reality at a young age and not grow
up thinking that life is so smooth you know.’
Subject J and E, related to us how long-lasting friendships were a hugely rewarding part of their
experiences in their schooling years. Subject J opined, ‘ … in some sense, the memories of friends
are a lot more’ meaningful than what was learnt in class. Subject E added, ‘You know when you have
enjoyed your education, you want to give back.’

Career issues
Under this theme, we look into findings related to the perceived narrowness of societal definitions
of success for life, the need for greater self-actualisation for local youths and concerns about their
readiness for the real-world economy of the future. These issues are often related to the myth that in
meritocratic Singapore, success in life is guaranteed by high academic performance.
Many participants opined that parents from the past were not closely involved in their children’s
educational experiences, but as competition intensified under the meritocratic system, parents
started to direct their children towards more limited academic and career pathways that offer larger
potential economic rewards. Subject D, a former academic in education, admitted that Singapor-
eans, ‘ … will still value a certain academic track, notwithstanding what they say about broader
competencies and all the rest of it.’ Subject E added, ‘So, the kids, they hate studies because there’s
no creating the “I want to”’.
Consequently, more and more young Singaporeans are investing larger and larger parts of their
self-identity and self-worth in their academic performance. Subject B, who sits on the board of two
major educational institutions, described the current situation: ‘teachers generate a sense of self-
worth to the students on the basis of how students are ranked in terms of their ability to pass
the exams and how good they are.’ Subject A described this lack of student agency as ‘living life
according to other people’s expectations’.
Several of our participants were also concerned with the irony that the education system has
become so narrowly focused on exam performance that it is not preparing students for the realities
of the world of work. Subject E put it starkly, ‘Our education system is a false world, you know.’
Several of our participants would therefore like to see the education system focus on the individual
learner as a whole human being with social and moral needs as well economic ones. Subject C,
describes this direction as, ‘ … it must come back to I suppose, more than ever, valuing students
as individuals and not as educational production units.’

Governance issues
Under this theme, we look into findings related to the features and conditions of Singaporean gov-
ernance in both schools and workplaces, that have been blamed for the negative developments in
the Singaporean meritocratic system discussed above. These issues are often related to the myth that
in meritocratic Singapore, the most efficient and accountable way to manage the system is with an
ethos of close supervision and quantified assessments.
Many of our participants feel that the practices of governance as well as the work ethos in both
schools and workplaces in Singapore are too restrictive and controlling to foster the search for pur-
pose and meaning. As Subject I described the effects, ‘You don’t see any more drive in their eyes, no
more passion.’ In fact, as Subject G pointed out, the older generations of Singaporeans, ‘ … grew up
in a time when their success depends on following the handbook, following the rules, pleasing the
bosses.’ So much so, that as Subject B opined, ‘We’ve become very bureaucratic and process
oriented.’
12 A. A. JOHANNIS ET AL.

According to our participants, one of the most objectionable aspects of this restrictive ethos of
governance is the way it quantifies all aspects of work and education. It does this in order to add an
element of predictability and control. Subject D opined that with this quantification, ‘[t]here’s a cer-
tain predictability. There’s a certain forecasting you’re able to do.’ However, Subject M reminded us
of what is at stake when she said, ‘ … if the end goal is so quantitative, you will never achieve any
purpose because purpose is not quantitative. It’s fluid. It’s aspirational.’
This restrictive ethos of governance has also stifled humanistic values and meaning in Singapor-
ean lives. One example is how creativity and innovation are limited as the system suppresses self-
expression. As Subject H complained, ‘ … creativity is not going to happen unless something drastic
happens in the social political environment which you know is highly punitive and highly restric-
tive.’ Similarly, Subject N opined that this type of governance has stifled our knowledge of the pur-
poses of life: ‘We are educated on the very, very minute management details but not on the basics of
why or what do we need to do.’ Consequently, our participants think that change is necessary going
forward. As Subject I puts it, ‘You cannot have that generation of innovative thinkers without allow-
ing people to make mistakes, allowing people to challenge the system.’

Discussion and conclusion

Singapore’s meritocratic system had served its purpose for a time. At a time when survival mattered
most, Singaporean meritocracy leveraged the one resource Singapore could develop and grow econ-
omically: its human resource. However, our findings point to Singaporean meritocracy’s increasing
undesirability. Our study participants have pointed out several major societal and education pro-
blems arising from the meritocratic system which they wish to see resolved as well as the proble-
matic practices of governance they believe need to be changed in order to renegotiate the
meritocratic system in support of increasing the prospects of Singaporeans finding more purposeful
and meaningful pathways in their educational and working lives.
First, our participants hold the increasingly common belief that meritocracy alone no longer
guarantees social mobility in Singapore and in fact seems to be worsening class divisions and the
social ill effects that result (see Tan and Tan 2016; Yip 2019). Several empirical studies in the
past decade have found evidence for this socio-economic phenomenon (Koh 2014; Lim 2013; Ng
2014). For example. Aaron Koh (2014) found that the top schools in Singapore have normalised
elitism to the extent that their students form a distinct class in relation to students from less pres-
tigious schools. Additionally, Leonel Lim (2013) found that children from families who can afford
expensive learning centres and private tutors perform better in exams than their less well-of peers as
early as the first and second grades. These concerns about widening inequalities and limited social
mobility have also been found in the US, which contribute to the increasing collective anxiety that
the American Dream may be dying (Hayes 2012). Also similar to the US experience, our partici-
pants worry that the governing elite are maintaining their power by perpetuating a system that
is defined by their own specific strengths and ways of thinking (see Ho and Zhang 2021;
K. P. Tan 2008).
Second, our participants agree with the growing concern in Singapore society for the mental
well-being of students under the current stressful milieu and this includes a concern for their
under-realised ability to forge fulfilling relationships. In a system that disciplines rather than liber-
ates, Singaporean students, and indeed, even working adults are turned inward towards their own
personal interests, with little leftover bandwidth to care about their fellow Singaporeans. This sup-
ports Teo You Yenn’s (2018) observations regarding the alienation of her students from the well-
being of their peers.
Third, our participants agree with the notion that Singaporeans are increasingly desirous of
more plural life pathways that tolerate more risk-taking aimed at broader aspirations and
definitions of success in life (See Yip 2019). At the same time Singaporeans are concerned that
the current educational system is not preparing students for the real world of work. This is
 GLOBALISATION, SOCIETIES AND EDUCATION 13

congruous with Charlene Tan’s (2008) discussion of how despite trying to meet to the challenges of
the future economy for education, the Singaporean education ministry has been unable to let go of
its commitments to competition, efficiency, accountability and performativity measures such as sys-
tem-wide examination scores that determine admissions to secondary schools, international edu-
cation benchmarking (e.g., Programme for International Student Assessment [Pisa] and Trends
in International Mathematics and Science Study [TIMSS]), and peer-ranked work appraisal scores.
These findings are not a rejection of efficient governance per se, but the real question as Gert Biesta
(2019) has noted, ‘ … is not whether particular educational processes are effective and efficient, but
what they are effective and efficient for’ (659). Our participants wish to see a general re-ordering of
priorities in education and in lifepaths in Singapore.
Fourth, our participants complained that the quantitative-based system of assessment and
appraisals is too reductionist to account for the proper pursuit of meaning and purpose in school
and at work. Even in Chinese society, there is a similar concern that academic examinations do not
do justice to the full range of human potential and experiences and only ‘ … devalues humanistic
pursuit, causing people to worship performance over authenticity and utility over wisdom,’ (How-
lett 2021, 37–38). Our participants have also identified the technocratic ‘performativity’, as Stephen
J. Ball (2003) calls it, which governs the meritocratic system, as the crucial site of renegotiation if we
are to create a more democratic and compassionate meritocracy that can better support Singapor-
eans’ pursuit of purpose and meaning in their lives.
The underlying technologies and modes of regulation that define and operate the meritocratic
system have become too dependent on measurable albeit reductive and narrow results such as
‘key performance indices’ and crude rankings of personnel. These rubrics of meritocratic evaluation
‘encapsulate or represent the worth, quality or value of an individual or organisation within a field
of judgement’ (ibid., 216). As seen in our findings above, this system of performativity tends to
encourage over-competition over a narrow set of variables (i.e., grades and rankings) in service
of a narrow set of goals (i.e., economic security and social status). All in order for individuals to
display their merit within the system, to the exclusion or detriment of other human goods such
as personal health (both physical and mental), personal relationships, personal aspirations and pas-
sions, and many other things that bring meaning and purpose to well-rounded lives.
The above strict regime of evaluation also becomes a regime of practices of control or what Fou-
cault called ‘governmentality’ (Foucault [1978] 1991). The Singaporean regime of meritocratic
evaluation, based on a reductive performativity, also becomes at once a panoptic regime of constant
inspection, monitoring and judgment. Under this governmentality, Singaporeans are turned into
what Nikolas Rose (1999) calls ‘calculable persons’, whose individualities are ‘no longer ineffable,
unique and beyond knowledge, but can be known, mapped, calibrated, evaluated, quantified, pre-
dicted and managed’ (93). Under this meritocratic governmentality, Singaporeans are generally too
busy self-monitoring to be fully able to appreciate the suppression of their fuller selves, and their
dissent is also calibrated and managed as they practise self-restraint. This meritocratic governmen-
tality is self-preserving as Singaporeans buy into it and identify their own self-interests with it.
However, no hegemony is complete in itself and some small-scale negotiations have already
started. Our study participants, public commentator Brandon Yip, the parents from the Life Beyond
Grades movement and many others are all part of a renegotiation of the prevailing meritocratic sys-
tem in Singapore. To the PAP government’s credit, its ministers have been part of that public con-
versation for a few years now (see Ong 2016). Nevertheless, the PAP government has been criticised
for its thus far gradual and piecemeal approach to education reform. Gradual and piecemeal
approaches do little to overturn the overall structure of incentives in the prevailing system or to
reorder the basic values and priorities of society. One of the general thrusts of our conversations
with our study participants was that in order to both ameliorate the negative outcomes of the mer-
itocratic system and to prepare ourselves for the future economy, Singaporean society needs to
redirect the technologies and practices of its meritocratic governance towards life-sustaining values
and goals. This is so as to better enable individuals to ground their education and work with a larger
14 A. A. JOHANNIS ET AL.

purpose and meaning for themselves and for the larger social good. Especially since personal pur-
pose is often most meaningful and fulfilling when it is directed beyond the self (Bundick et al. 2021;
Damon 2008; Quinn 2017).
However, changing a self-preserving system will require some deep and fundamental changes in the
way Singaporeans commit to and renegotiate their idea of the common good. Perhaps most obviously,
it will first take the relinquishing of the hierarchy of control and monitoring in favour of practices of
governance that support the autonomy of learners and workers. Diffusing authority and flattening the
hierarchy will allow for the recognition of a broader set of life-sustaining values and goals as well as
generate more trusting, supportive and reciprocal citizen relationships. This, in turn, encourages a
more participatory form of decision making that will more likely take into serious account a broader
range of ideas of the common good and a wider range of contributions from the varied talents of the
whole population. This is a likelier path towards the goal of a more inclusive and compassionate mer-
itocracy that accounts for both personal growth and the common good.
A more compassionate meritocracy is in turn a likelier path towards the kind of ‘whole person
education’ that our study participants were gesturing towards: One that takes care of students’
social, moral and personal growth needs as well as their economic ones. Indeed, the overall goal
is to put our students on the path of leading altogether more productive and satisfying lives (see
Damon 2008; Quinn 2017). Schools in Singapore can go beyond academic achievement and
focus on helping students find meaning and purpose in their education.
Additionally, Singaporeans also need to be careful that in producing a more inclusive and com-
passionate meritocracy, they do not reproduce the ideals and beliefs of dominant groups in society
that have hitherto shaped the current meritocratic system. They have to be mindful of the detailed
characteristics of the implicit, privileged and hegemonic structures of the prevailing system. Thus,
beyond macro policy and general curricula, school leaders and teachers need to be trained and
empowered to make alternative arrangements to support the relevant social and cultural differences
they find on the ground. There is evidence that teachers in schools have already begun to contest
and negotiate these tensions and contradictions for the benefit of their marginalised students (Lim
and Tan 2020).
As the COVID19 global pandemic enters its third year at the time of writing, Singaporeans have
already experienced changes and accommodations that are bound to be part of life moving forward.
Some of these changes have also added impetus to the national renegotiation of the meritocratic
system. One example is how Singaporean workers, having been able to keep up their productivity
despite working and meeting remotely, are proving much of the monitoring and supervision regime
unnecessary. In more general terms, the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic measures may have
created the impetus for Singaporeans to think about what is actually important in life and to ques-
tion whether a reordering of priorities is called for. This creates opportunities for Singaporeans to
transform the ways they deliberate about the common good, and to create new narratives about
society they might find more purposeful and more meaningful.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding
This work was supported by the Ministry of Education Singapore [grant number PG 06/19 JAA].

Data availability statement

Due to the nature of this research, participants of this study did not agree for their data to be shared publicly, so
supporting data is not available
 GLOBALISATION, SOCIETIES AND EDUCATION 15

ORCID
A. A. Johannis http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4955-9396
Mark Baildon http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7366-0892
Mary Anne Heng http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0890-2159
Jefferson K. Rajah http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8365-0428

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