UK DEFENCE POLITICAL ECONOMY – HELICOPTER PROCUREMENT

The Defence Political Economy (DPE) of a nation can be examined through the utilisation of
a number of theoretical methods normally based on either conventional economic or political
science theory. Because defence matters can be construed to have a number of
contributing actors, both internal and external to the core policy making process, this
examination will undertake a more comprehensive approach based on political science
theory, as suggested by Gilpin 1 in his examination of the International Political Economy.
Any DPE will contain a wide variety of structures and processes, which could be individually
analysed, and when one adds the complexity of time, certain boundaries are required in
order that issues might be bounded. The consideration and selection of the particular area
of analysis must therefore take these issues into account and in the case of UK battlefield
helicopter procurement has sought to bound the issue from a capability and timeframe
perspective, in order to both limit the scope and to provide a framework for the analysis of
other countries and capabilities in the future.

In this examination of the DPE policy decisions will be evaluated from two perspectives,
which utilise both a structure and agency process. The first of these and perhaps the most
important considers where in a particular defence policy framework capability decisions are
made, where they interface with government and departmental structures, and who within
those structures is making the decision. The second area determines how those within such
structures act as agents driving requirements and decisions in order that capability decisions
are made and whether such decisions are in the interests of the requirement or those agents
within the structure concerned.

The following diagram is an attempt to encapsulate the structural part of the process by
drawing on Hartley, Ross and Gilpin, whilst illustrating it through a distinctive representative
decision structure. Having been drawn from a broad examination of DPE models and
examples it does provide, in this particular case, a readily usable tool for the analysis of the
UK MoD in general, and battlefield helicopters in particular, across a the period between
1986 and 2009. However, the general structure is not specific to this examination and the
variation between bounded and unbounded decisions and the boundary between those
decisions based on political principals and agency interactions remains extant from previous
examinations2. The various levels of decision shown in the model are indicative, and
certainly not fixed, providing for a broad conceptual analysis where one can note the level at

1
Gilpn 2000.
2
Chapter 1.

1
which politicians and the various DPE agents might have a comparative advantage in terms
of influence.

DEFENCE DECISION POINT MODEL

Although the model, in this examination, will be used to identify both the level and style of
interaction through the decision making process, it does not provide us with a methodology
of how the different actors might effect the final outcome. In order to achieve this previous
investigations3 have shown that a second model might be used in trying to understand ‘how’
the various actors interact to deliver an outcome and their relative effects upon that outcome.
This issue is primarily one of relative influence, and how to demonstrate this feature within
the DPE context.

The outline boundary of the DPE must be construed as being the structural nature of it, from
a national perspective. This will, by necessity, include both political and bureaucratic entities
who are actually make decisions and the other agents who might attempt to influence them.
Such external agents might include industry, international and non-governmental
organisations all of which may wish to influence a particular policy decision to follow their
own agenda or policy perspective. Since such models can vary according to both the
decision involved and the time it took place the following example is one used later in this
chapter to explain the Westland’s Affair

3
Chapter 1.

2
 DOMESTIC
INDUSTRIAL
INFLUENCE

EXECUTIVE
POWER

GOVERNMENT
BUREAUCRACY

INTERNATIONAL
INFLUENCE

DECISION

WESTLAND’S AFFAIR DECISION AREA MODEL

In this model the large structural boundary encapsulates the totality of the areas of
government, executive and bureaucracy involved in the decision process that led to the
effective takeover of Westland helicopters by Sikorsky. Executive and government overlap
is mainly fed by the influence of the Prime Minster on the Cabinet and Ministers to make a
policy decision based on her own policy baseline, whereas the overlap into the bureaucracy
is based on Ministerial direction to departments. But this is not only a one way flow of either
influence or information as the overlaps also indicate where subordinate elements may try to
influence the others. Industrial influence is shown affecting decisions by a one way flow of
information which although shown as a discrete element here may be affecting the full range
of agents within the DPE structural envelope.

These two models, then, will form the basis of this investigation into how decisions affecting
battlefield helicopter procurement were taken over the period 1986-2009. By viewing core
decisions by using this methodology it is hoped that the utility of the process can be
demonstrated, certainly from a UK DPE perspective

Air Staff Target 404 was a battlefield helicopter procurement requirement that acted as a
catalyst for a number of key decision points within the UK DPE over a 25 year period.

3
Centred around the provision of replacing two 1960s aircraft designs4 the original
programme and its successors drew into play almost all elements of the DPE at one point or
another and whilst seemingly out of overt public sight for small period never ceased to return
as a controversial political issue. iAs an example of the fundamental nature of the DPE in
the United Kingdom, there is probably no better example of the interplays between the
various elements of executive power, government, industry and the bureaucracy that
surrounds all decisions within the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD). This chapter seeks to
understand these events and decisions through the two-stage decision point and area
framework, focussing on the levels at which decisions were made, why they were made
there and the interplay between the elements that brought about the final outcome.

From an industrial perspective, although primarily feeding from US developments in Korea

and Vietnam, the UK has never been slow to capitalise on its own aerospace expertise,
seeing the growth of Westland Helicopters based in Yeovil, South West England, as its sole
manufacturer. Although other manufacturers (notably Bristol and Saunders Roe) came and
went, Westland have maintained their prima face leadership of the UK military helicopter
market through a series of mergers (most recently with Agusta in 1999) and partnerships
(with Boeing on the Apache and Aerospatiale on the Lynx , Gazelle and Puma). It is
seemingly only in the area of very large helicopters, such as the Boeing CH47 Chinook, that
the MoD has chosen to go elsewhere, despite the wide range of international competition
that exists in the military helicopter sector and the willingness of other competitors wishing to
tender for MoD programmes.

The importance of battlefield helicopters to UK military effectiveness has steadily grown

since their inception at the close of World War 2. In fact the National Audit Office,
Battlefield Helicopters report of 2004 described succinctly their importance within the
modern operating environment:

Battlefield helicopters play a major role in the United Kingdom's military

operations. The battlefield helicopter fleet, arguably the most capable helicopter
force in Europe, has recently operated in a wide variety of theatres, including
urban and rural areas in Northern Ireland, the Iraqi desert, the mountains of
Afghanistan, and the jungles of Sierra Leone.5

Despite these facts the capability has struggled to gain prominence within the MoD
programme, leading to reduced platform numbers and overstretch on the front line, not least

4
Westland Wessex and Westland-Aerospatiale Puma.
5
HC 486 Session 2003-2004 Ministry of Defence - Battlefield Helicopters 7 April 2004.

4
of which was that seen in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2009. Battlefield helicopters have
struggled for investment when placed up against major single service equipment
programmes6, and command coherence (through the formation of the Joint Helicopter
Command in 1998) has only been a relatively recent addition. It could appear to the casual
observer until recently, that the wider Defence and Political community has seen support
helicopters at the lower end of the interest spectrum, not nearly as important as Fighter Jets,
Warships and Main Battle Tanks. The following explanation will seek to show why this may
be the case, and how modelling the process through a decision point and area system may
serve to uncover the core factors that periodically have brought battlefield helicopters into
both the public psyche and thus policy agenda. From a UK perspective there are few other
issues which have either such a long modern historical lineage or indeed some distinctive
perspectives with which to test the models’ philosophy.

CASE STUDY OVERVIEW

The timeline of events provided above illustrates the ‘what’ of this investigation from an
historical perspective but does not give us the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ required of a case study
as explained by Yin 7. In order to achieve this each core decision point in the timeline will be
examined by utilising both the decision point and then decision area models adjust the latter
as required in order to illustrate the relative importance of each actor in the process.

The first element in the timeline will be a discussion of the “Westland’s Affair’ of 1986 which
in addition to gaining national press coverage provoked a full parliamentary enquiry after the
resignation of the then Defence Secretary, Michael Heseltine. These events, which
eventually resulted in the partial sell-off of Westland’s, will also be shown to have been
driven by underlying agency issues within the bureaucracy that served to accentuate political
disagreements at the time. How these elements interacted and affected the final outcome
should provide a useful test of both models.

The subsequent, and arguably lower level, decisions made over the EH101 and NH90
programmes through the later part of the 1980s will then be used as a vehicle to examine the
more mechanistic elements of the UK Defence procurement structure. In this area the
importance of party political activity and intra-departmental discussions in the derivation of
policy outcomes will be highlighted and probably a lack of direct executive interest. Again
the mixed bureaucratic messages will be shown to have salience within the decision space
and a notable absence of industrial lobbying.

6
Private Discussions Jan 10.
7
Yin references.

5
The post Cold War changes in defence policy precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet
Union should have then provide for a more detailed review of both battlefield helicopter
requirements and industrial capacity. However, by using the decision framework it is hoped
to show how political stasis on Defence policy was evident which was then over-taken by the
events of the conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia. With many ‘Cold War’ programmes
continuing unabated bureaucratic effects will be shown to have significant influence in
maintaining the status quo whilst accepting the inevitable ‘peace dividend’.

High level political influence returned in 1995 with the decision to procure the EH101 as a
battlefield helicopter seemingly went against the advice of the bureaucracy. With significant
industrial lobbying over a delayed decision to procure a new aircraft it will show how a
looming, and tightly contested ,general election might alter the decision area model and the
relative importance of the actors involved.

The Strategic Defence Review of 1998 8, which provided a new policy baseline, could be
construed as a point where the models are re-examined from both a decision point and area
perspective. With a new MOD structure , especially in the area of battlefield helicopter
Command and Control, it should provide further evidence on the importance of the various
agents operating within the models albeit with nascent single service issues still present.
These issues, taken forward through the examination of both the Future Amphibious Support
Helicopter (FASH) and Support Amphibious Battlefield Reconnaissance (SABR) will show
that helicopters still struggled within the ‘policy space’ in gaining sufficient relevance,
especially when those affecting financial decisions had a a seemingly poor appreciation of
the issues.

The government published Defence Industrial Strategy of 2006 9 was an overt attempt to try
and delineate a policy road map for Defence procurement that made due consideration of
the core industrial capacity of the UK. From a battlefield helicopter perspective it will again
be possible to overlay the respective decision and area model components on to it and show
where discrete elements were affected by the various actors. In this case the successful
lobbying carried out by Agusta Westland helicopters should be readily apparent when
examining its outputs from the decision area model perspective.

Although the decision area model should be able to deal with externalities the affect of the
media and other actors will be discussed in relation to the arguments over helicopter

8
SDR
9
Defence Industrial Strategy : Defence White Paper, Cm 6697, 15 December 2005.

6
provision on operations by the UK in Afghanistan. These served to quickly elevate
bureaucratic concerns into the executive sphere, seemingly driving decision making. This
will be shown, however, to be a short term palliative to an issue which had still failed to gain
either bureaucratic or governmental agency engagement for a longer term solution. This
was an issue that , in the context of this discussion, was finally settled in late 2009 early
2010 when the government published a new blueprint for battlefield helicopters called Vision
2020. Examination of this issue should serve to illustrate how agents, even within the middle
level of the UK Defence establishment, can, through deliberate policy formulation drive a
new argument to execution, although it will be shown that the previous discussions
surrounding externalities certainly had a significant effect within the executive.

7
AST404 AND THE WESTLAND’S AFFAIR

This investigation starts post the UK’s engagement in the Falkand’s conflict of 1982 where
support helicopters had been used so effectively, but had been heavily hampered by the loss
of all but one of its Chinook fleet10. Whilst replacements for those aircraft had been ordered,
this hid an ageing fleet issue with respect to the RAF’s Wessex and Puma aircraft some of
which had been in Service for over 20 years.

Air Staff Target (AST) 404 was written in order to seek a replacement for the ageing Wessex
and Puma aircraft in the timeframe 1985-1990. The Sikorsky Blackhawk, Westland WG30
and Aerospatiale Super Puma seemed to be the main contenders for this requirement 11.
The problem with the AST 404 was that the RAF, as the provider of battlefield support, and
the Army, as the receiver on the ground, could not agree on what was required 12. In fact it
would appear that on the basis of Operational Analysis and a number of major exercises that
the Army felt it needed an aircraft bigger than the Chinook13 (not that there was one in
NATO). This issue can be observed first through the paradigm of the decision point model,
shown below.

These two agents were therefore engaged, from the model’s perspective, in the capability
choice area of the model providing evidence for and trying to influence the bounded choices
on aircraft size. The disagreement in requirement would then feed into the higher decision

10
Chinook in the Falklands (1990), Airplane 30, 30/1990, P835-835.
11
AST404: A Three Horse Race accessed at http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1984/1984%20-%201036.html 1 Feb
10.
12
Hansard 26 March 1985 Column 205-6.
13
House of Commons Defence Committee, 518, Session 1985-86, Third Report, The Westland's Affair.

8
points leaving the MoD with an additional complexity when trying to make higher level
decisions on how to take forward the requirement, which were affected by another two
factors. The first of these was on affordability; the department was faced with some difficult
financial issues post the Falkland’s Conflict that had overturned a number of strategic
assumptions made in the Nott Review14. Second was on industrial capacity as Westland
helicopters were running out of work, with existing Sea King and Lynx production coming to
an end and the next big project, EH 101, having some 5-10 years to run (as a minimum)
before orders would be forthcoming 15.

The conflicting advice and requirements from the two services concerned made such high
level decision making exceptionally difficult, especially in a department which was very
bound by single service decision making processes. At the time capability management for
each service was run by an operational requirements directorate, funded and managed
completely separately and lacking a coherent (joint) outlook. This split of funding meant that
cross service boundary issues such as battlefield helicopters struggled for prominence in
fiscally tight decision terms as each service seemed to be focussed on those core
capabilities over which it had full control. As an example the RAF might consider that fighter
aircraft would be higher up the priority list than battlefield helicopters, and for the Army core
ground manoeuvre systems like tanks were likely to be pre-eminent. In the case of this 16.
Indeed this is one reason why in the 1998 SDR that the operational requirements areas in
the MoD were merge into a single joint capability management system.

Such a system then creates issues within the decision point model, as it becomes unclear
who is making the decision and how it might move from the lower, bounded, area and up to
those points in the system where political principals might become engaged. More
importantly if one considers the decision area model the flow of information from agents
within the bureaucracy becomes incoherent as it passes to government and eventually to the
executive.

In addition to these issues of capability requirements it is apparent that this period marked
the beginning of an argument on who should own and control the support helicopter
programme, as the Army were becoming increasingly aware of their importance to the
battlefield (through Exercise Lionheart in 1984 17) and the positive impact that capability
ownership was having on NATO partners such as the US Army.

14
Nott Review 1981.
15
Flight International 16 Feb 1985, p.11.
16
Critchley, J., 1987, Heseltine: The Unauthorised Biography, [Coronet: London], p.138.
17
House of Commons Defence Committee, 518, Session 1985-86, Third Report, The Westland's Affair

9
An illustration of the RAFs lack of interest in the support helicopter argument over a
sustained part of the 1970s is that the original requirement for the Chinook helicopter was
issued in 1967 and it was only an underspend in their equipment programme during 1978
that led to the initial order for 38 aircraft18. Therefore the leadership of the MoD found itself
with an ill-defined requirement for an aircraft to replace the Puma and the Wessex and
financial issues making the apparently better-defined Tornado and Nimrod AEW
programmes19 a higher priority for the Royal Air Force. This lack of clarity and apparent
single service commitment to the programme could be construed to therefore result in the Air
Staff recommending a delay of AST404 in order to further refine the requirement before
proceeding to a procurement recommendation 20. These difficulties ignited significant issues
between the General and Air Staffs over the provision of helicopter support to the Army and
Major General Goodman’s statement in early 1986 that,

Closer integration of the Army Air Corps and Royal Air Force [would help to eliminate]
the piecemeal and uncoordinated approach [that sees helicopters as] a second tier
force element with no proper requirement.21

The fact that a MoD study was initiated into the issue of ownership, still did not satisfy those
from the Army involved in the arguments, especially when one of its findings was that aircraft
such as Wessex and Puma were too complex for the Army Air Corps to operate 22.

This inter-bureaucracy rivalry does create an issue for the decision point model in that it
begins to skew the concept that decisions made on capability, can be bounded by the agents
concerned, in a discrete and unemotional manner. However when looked at from a Decision
Area perspective it can be shown that such issues can start to alter the dynamic of the
various interfaces within it. In this case the following decision area model may indeed have
been in play at the very outset of the Westland’s affair, even before the high politics that was
to follow.

18
Freedman, L., (1987), The Case of Westland and the Bias to Europe, International Affairs, Vol 63 1987 No1 Winter.
19
Dorman, A., (2002) Defence Under Thatcher [Pallgrave Macmillan:London].
20
HC 518 Op Cit p.xx.
21
Interview with Major General Goodman, Beaver, P., British Helicopter Needs in the 1990s, Defence Helicopter World Feb-
Mar 1986 pp.6-10.
22
Man S(Org) Study 611, Support Helicopters – Future Responsibility and Management’ June 1987.

10
 DOMESTIC
INDUSTRIAL
INFLUENCE

EXECUTIVE
POWER ARMY

GOVERNMENT

RAF

INTERNATIONAL
INFLUENCE

DECISION

The split of the bureaucratic part of the model into two discrete elements could be seen as
providing an indiscrete input into both government and the executive. Such inputs, even if
trying to illuminate the same issues might not actually deliver the same coherency to any
capability argument and might, perhaps provide an opportunity for other agents within
government to utilise the disparity to their own advantage. Such a diverse structure was one
which had seemingly beset MoD capability arguments from its original formation in 1964
(before 1964 each service had its own ministry and the structural issues were different).
Because of this inherent ‘split’ the rationality or otherwise of a decision within the
government or executive sphere was not guaranteed, as agents within these areas (whether
political or not) might see a benefit to their taking a particular approach which might benefit
another project or policy but no the one under discussion. This might be therefor construed
as a weakness in both models, but perhaps more evident in the decision point one, as the
rationality of actors might be construed as a baseline requirement.

Unfortunately for Westland helicopters the decision to delay (or perhaps cancel later) AST
404 was exactly during the period that the company was struggling for orders from both the
UK MoD and other International customers. Although the development of the EH101 was
funded, the company were in debt by about £80m and faced the prospect of foreclosure if it
could not gain orders for its WG30 aircraft – the prima face candidate for AST404 from their
perspective23. Thus Westland helicopters were not about to take the delay to the

23
Croft, S., (1987) 'The Westland helicopter crisis: Implications for the British defense industry', Defense & Security Analysis, 3:
4, p. 294.

11
programme (and its potential effect on the company) without discussion with Ministers 24. In
the area model this sort of input can be seen as an external agent acting independently on
both the government and executive circles in order to influence the final decision. Since the
Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) had installed its own nominee as chairman (Sir
John Cuckney) the previous year, this then placed the whole issue of AST404 well with the
agency of another government department and the whole Westland helicopters well into the
public domain. From a decision model perspective such an external interaction is perhaps
difficult to input as it sits well within the political principal area and is more readily examined
from the decision model perspective.

In the case of the Westland’s crisis the failure (or perhaps survival) of one of the core
Defence Industrial organisations (the sole UK manufacturer of helicopters) was at stake,
because of a decision made within the bureaucracy area to delay the AST404 programme.
Because of the parlous state of the Westland order book (as previously stated nominally
reliant upon MoD orders) the company sought to apply influence to both the executive and
wider government (MoD and DTI) in order to engineer a takeover by the US helicopter
manufacturer Sikorsky25. The influence that such Industrial entities apply to the political
appointees within both government and executive might be seen as aberration within
democratic societies or, perhaps more realistically, an extension of it. In the case of
Westland’s at the time it was a sizeable engineering firm employing some 12,500 people
within a political constituency area typified by small majorities (in 1983 Lord Ashdown was
elected MP for Yeovil with a majority of 3406, overturning the significant 1979 Conservative
majority of some 11,000)26. With all the surrounding constituencies still Conservative,
Westland were quite clearly able to make the case that the political effects of an failure of the
company would not be good for either Conservative votes or the government itself. This
affects the strength of any lobbying or advice that is fed into the decision area model and its
potential to have an effect when it reaches those areas of government that might be making
such decisions.

The influence that Sir John Cuckney was able to bring on the final outcome of the affair
seemingly has more to do with his personal relationship with Prime Minister Thatcher rather
than any deep seated influence within the Department of Trade and Industry(DTI) 27. It is
therefore important to recognise the nature of Executive Power within the Conservative
Government of the period. As mentioned by Hurd 28the Cabinet of the period were very much

24
House of Commons Defence Committee, 519, Session 1985-86, Fourth Report, The Westland's Affair.
25
Freedman, L., The Case of Westland and the Bias to Europe, International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Winter, 1986-1987), pp.1-
19.
26
House of Commons Library (2004) RESEARCH PAPER 04/61 - UK Election Statistics: 1918-2004.
27
HCDC 519, Op Cit, p.xv.
28
Hurd, D., (2003), Memoirs, [Little, Brown: London] pp.358-361.

12
subservient to the Prime Minister (PM) who had developed a more ‘Presidential’ directive
style with her ministerial team. So whilst the DTI initially did not have a strong view on which
consortia was to bail out Westland, their Secretary of State, Leon Brittan, quickly moved in
support of an American based solution (with United Technologies(UTC)) as had been the
direction from the PM. In fact during the subsequent House of Commons Defence
Committee enquiry they went so far as to say that the government had ‘identified no
compelling policy reason for a European link to Westland either on national interest or
industrial grounds’29.

The counter arguments placed by Heseltine were therefore in complete opposition to that
provided by the company and eventually cabinet as a whole, and he was placed in a very
difficult position as he tried to engineer a takeover that involved European helicopter
manufacturers30. His pro-European stance seemingly fitted with Westland’s current
helicopter programmes, but did not sit well with a PM at pains to show her strong Trans-
Atlantic allegiances. Indeed he was even able to provide some convincing arguments on the
benefits of European collaboration 31 in subsequent hearings, but these had not found
purchase with either the Company (who were progressing well with the UTC bid) or the rest
of his cabinet colleagues. What is noticeable here is a distinct lack of bureaucratic
involvement within the decision-making system, or indeed any apparent cost benefit
analyses, which could have drawn out the facts. This complicates the model as it is clear
that most of this agent activity was being conducted within the governmental and executive
spheres of the model with little or no input from the bureaucracy. This almost creates an
internal sub-model of agent interaction but one with a very flat and perhaps incoherent
perspective that is not being driven by rational activity. Inevitably, however, the decisive
intervention of the executive (in this case Cabinet) under the control that the PM. was able to
direct across a broad swathe of government seemingly delivered the required outcome.

Therefore, it appears that, the issues and constraints placed upon the decisions surrounding
Westland’s financial problems were centred around a number of intra governmental issues
that could be construed as being highly politicised in nature. Whether this was as a result of
individual bias toward a particular outcome cannot be positively determined, but there can be
little doubt of the Prime Ministerial view of the importance of the US defence relationship.
Whether this was as a result of the UK’s strategic aims of the period and its probable over-
reliance on the ‘special relationship’ remains a point of discussion; events such as the basing
of nuclear-armed cruise missiles and the permission for attacks on Libya from the UK may
indicate that this was the case. That the Prime Minister was able to control almost the whole

29
HCDC 518, Op Cit, p.xli.
30
Heseltine, M., 2000, Life in the Jungle [Hodder & Stoughton]pp.237-273.
31
HCDC 518 Op Cit pp.xxvii-xxix.

13
system of government to achieve it may show that the representation of Executive Power
within the Area model is correct, in that it completely directs the final decision with little input
from the bureaucracy or indeed the rest of government. This might affect our view of the
model, in that it could show the executive as bypassing advice from the various areas, but
this would be to over-simplify the issues. I would ignore two key points in the whole cycle of
events, one that Heseltine left the government of his own accord, and two, that if the
company had been left to their own devices by government the UTC takeover would have
happened anyway32.

The two models do, therefore, provide us with a tool for examining where the decisions on
AST404 were initially problematic for the bureaucracy. The initial decision points were very
much split over a number of MoD areas and individual services, with a high level of disparity
between their individual outputs. This lack of coherence whilst complicating the use of the
decision point model, does not overtly derail it, but examination through this paradigm is
complicated by the input of another government department. Such coherence issues
inevitably complicate the direction of policy and it has shown that where the bureaucracy
fails to make a coherent decision or recommendation, the transfer of such incoherence into
the area model can introduce political agency issues that are likely to rapidly involve higher
levels of the executive, often with unpredictable and perhaps irrational outcomes. The
decisions surrounding AST 404 could have very much remained within the MoD, if the
bureaucracy had recognised the industrial and political significance of is decisions, and
provided coherent arguments and alternative routes to solutions which recognised core
political imperatives. Whether this was due to a general ambivalence toward support
helicopters is not clear, but the political outcomes were catastrophic for the two Ministers
involved. The area model did prove useful in defining the factors driving the decision, but
have shown that where the interaction of executive power and government is concerned, it is
easy to overplay the final outcome in order to fit the model. What is of interest is the degree
to which a supposedly collegiate system of government, can rapidly become one based on
executive power based on a single individual (PM) empowered by a significant Parliamentary
majority 33. That Heseltine called the whole process an ‘unvirtuous cycle 34’ is little surprise,
and the necessity for it questionable at least. For the area model in particular this creates a
difficult conundrum in determining the relative position and effectiveness of each element
and, perhaps what is contained within it. The juxtaposition of the elements could also be
argued to be incorrect but the general nature of the model with the discrete feeds of
information remains pertinent, and this particular example demonstrates how the internal

32
HCDC 519 Op Cit pp. xii-xxviii.
33
Meny, Y. & Knapp, A. 'Government and Politics in Western Europe' [Oxford University Press: Oxford] Pp.221-258.
34
Heseltine, M., op cit, p.273.

14
workings of government and executive need further explanation when dealing with discrete
decisions rather than general principles.

NH90 AND EH101 - Political Manoeuvring and False Dawn; Electioneering Through
Defence

The final political outcome of the Westland’s Affair seemingly had little effect on either the
company's eventual sale of stock to UTC, or the MoD and its support helicopter user
community. With the new Defence Secretary, George Younger, in post and Westland now
more stable with a MoD Sea King order for 9 aircraft35 (delivery 1989-90) and an apparent
promise from UTC for some 2 million man hours of Blackhawk licence production and other
sub component contracts36, the political pressure for additional contracts was initially to
ease. The issue of support helicopters was therefore, in 1986, very much back within the
decision model framework (Figure 2.3 below), albeit limited by the previously identified,
requirement of the UK government for a sovereign helicopter manufacturing capability
(although the CH47 was seemingly excluded from this policy).

Within this context, and continuing bureaucratic agent structure where the individual services
remained responsively for capability decisions, there was a need to redefine the AST404
requirement, whilst coming under pressure from the Treasury to reduce costs. Having
accelerated defence spending in line with a NATO requirement to increase by 3% since
1980, there was now a need to rein in costs on a number of projects (the cancellation of
Nimrod AEW being the most notable example) 37 and thus the decision point model elements
of overall affordability and capability choices were coming in to play. What is not clear is
how these issues were being developed and examined during the second half of 1986,
although the Army and RAF had moved closer on the requirement for the Wessex/Puma
replacement at the medium/large end of the helicopter size spectrum (albeit with a Westland
produced Blackhawk still a prospect 38).

35
Allen, P., (1993) Sea King [London: Airlife] Page 92-94.
36
Flight International 18 Jul 1987, p.37.
37
Smith, A. (1996) 'Michael Heseltine and the Reorganisation of Defence 1983-1984' [Hambledon Press: London] p.301.
38
Flight International 1 Mar 86, p32-p.37.

15
FIGURE 2-4 SUPPORT HELICOPTER DECISION MODEL 1986

Whilst the bureaucracy had, through the top down processes of the decision model,
seemingly begun to define a revised and bounded requirement for the Puma/Wessex
replacement, the General Election of 1987 again seemed to prompt a shift into the area
model for government. Conservative held seats surrounded the Yeovil constituency that
contained the Westland’s Plant, which was taken by the Liberals in 1983,39, and the
significant political fallout from the Westland’s affair; arguably the negative effect on the
government had also been added to by significant (1442) job losses in the company, at both
the Yeovil and Weston Super Mare sites40. Whilst the order books for the company were
now in a much better state than during the latter half on 1985, the rescue by UTC had
started to unravel Westland involvement with the European NH90 project41 and had not yet
begun to yield the additional man-hours of work it had promised. Additionally the MoD’s own
investigation into the NH90 requirement was about to report (having commenced in 1985).
The potential concurrent culmination of these issues, thus began to increase the level of
political interest in the support helicopter area even though, as it seems, no firm
recommendations had yet been made by the bureaucracy on the accepted way ahead 42.

There may be a case that increased political interest in a particular project, system or
manufacturer might move the examination of a decision straight to the area model. However,
this would be ignore the decision basis framework that overlays the point model in that the
bounding of a particular decision might be affected by the level of the agent concerned.

39
United Kingdom Election Results accessed at www.election.demon.co.uk on 2 Januray 2010.
40
Ibid, p.32.
41
Flight International, 15 February 1986, p.9.
42
Cmnd.9763-1, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986.

16
Thus whilst the model shows the bounding of a decision reducing as one becomes more
politically focussed, that does not mean that unbounded political factors are not also present
in the agency area. How one would feed in such issues remains difficult to conceptualise and
this is the primary reason of shifting to the area model as political elements are introduced
into a particular decision. Without doing this, it could be assumed that top down imposition of
a political decision might prove to be the simplest approach for a government but this would
seem to ignore the position of agents within the process.

DOMESTIC
INDUSTRIAL
INFLUENCE

EXECUTIVE
POWER
GOVERNMENT
BUREAUCRACY

INTERNATIONAL
INFLUENCE

DECISION

Figure 2.4 Decision Area Model 1987 EH101 and NH90 Announcement

Using this principal, the decision area model above can now be applied to George Younger
statement to Parliament on 9 April 198743 where he committed the MoD to a purchase of the
utility model EH101 helicopter, announced the UK’s withdrawal from the NH90 project and
an additional order for 16 Battlefield variant Lynx aircraft. From the Defence Secretary’s
statement it is clear that some sort of review had taken place (although as previously
discussed this would appear to have happened prior to the Westland’s Affair) and that the
requirement for a larger helicopter had been accepted by those within the bureaucracy and
government. Thus the smaller NH90 had been written out of any future short or medium
term procurement plans that seemingly suited the government, who needed to save money,
and the Executive, who had never favoured closer European collaboration. It would appear
here that, unlike the Westland’s Affair, that the ability for industry both inside and outside the

43
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 9 April 1987 Column 470-81

17
UK to influence the government had waned as the Chairman of Westland was clearly very
keen to have remained in the programme 44 and the potential European sales that it might
drive.

The decision to announce an order for the EH101, which was only in the development
phase, also seemed to slip project costs back by a number of years and therefore gave no
immediate injection of work into the company. However, from a political principle
perspective it was understandable move, prior to an election, to focus on the potential
superiority of a UK manufactured aircraft over that provided from the US in the form of the
CH47. Younger’s statement that ‘the government have decided’ is an overt reference to
their own perception of strength within the political environment, and also played to a UK
public smarting from the damage being done to its pride by the failure of the Nimrod AEW
aircraft45. Thus the government had seemingly contrived to save money whilst at the same
time showing its support for British industry and the UTC link-up by announcing its intention
to make an order at some indeterminate time in the future for a requirement which had
seemingly yet to be finalised.

The problem for the government post this apparently positive announcement (which later
turned out to be a false dawn) was that Westland Helicopters almost immediately made a
further 1,155 workers redundant. Whilst the election was a landslide victory for the
Conservative party the Yeovil constituency, and those surrounding it, bucked the trend
showing an increased majority for Mr Ashdown and reduced majorities for his Conservative
neighbours.

Options and Studies; Fighting the End of the Cold War – The Long Wait for AST440

One of the most enduring complaints about the Conservative Government of the early 1990s
was its failure to conduct a formal Defence Review as a result of the end of the Cold War
and the fall of the Iron Curtain in Europe 46. Whilst the Options for Change process began in
1990 47 could have seemingly provided for a review of force levels across all three services it
was carried out as part of the annual Statement on the Defence Estimates (SDE) system
and outwardly had little in the way of overarching foreign policy baseline or threat
assessment to work from. Thus its output in the 1991 SDE 48 is thin on definitive strategic
statements concentrating instead on a general reduction in force elements and little change
to the substance of the defence equipment programme outside of stating that most major

44
Flight International, 18 July 1987, pg.37.
45
‘Thatcher rejects calls for Nimrod inquiry: DEFENCE’, Travis, Alan. The Guardian (1959-2003) [London (UK)] 17 Dec 1986:
27.
46
Lawrence Freedman, The Politics of British Defence Policy 1979-98, 1999, p.95.
47
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 25 Jul 1990 Column 468.
48
Cm 1559-1 Statement on the Defence Estimates: Britain’s Defence for the 90s. HMSO: London.

18
projects started during the Cold War would continue. Against this backdrop support
helicopters and the Puma/Wessex 49 replacement programme could be construed as a falling
priority, as each service attempted to maintain core capabilities and programmes such as
Challenger and Eurofighter. Even the announcement of the outcome of the later Defence
Costs Studies50 process in 1993, failed to provide any indication on a probable way forward
for support helicopters, as it concentrated on the mantra of ‘Front Line First’ and attempts to
save support costs by brigading as many units as possible under ‘Joint’ or ‘Defence’
umbrellas51. The fact that this excluded battlefield helicopter provision is a notable point
given that the SDR 4 years later made a point of how inefficient previous command and
control of helicopters had been. Whilst one might use the two models to examine this
decision stasis this period perhaps illuminates one of the limitations of using them; you need
a decision to examine and the evidence surrounding the decision even to be able to enter
the policy space examination.

The next major announcement with respect to Support Helicopters procurement came on 10
March 1995 when the then Defence Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, announced an order for 36
Support Helicopters in a mix of 22 EH101s and 14 Chinooks52. From a press perspective
this was a rather controversial decision 53, in that it seemed to go against both the Financial
advice of a senior defence official and that the RAF and Army has actually wanted the
Boeing Chinook instead 54. But this realisation of the original George Younger commitment to
purchase the utility EH101 some 8 years earlier, does provide another area for examination
using both decision point and decision area models.

49
No mention in SDE 91 of programme or orders for the replacement of these aircraft.
50
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 5 Jul 1993 Column 19-31.
51
‘Joint’ for tri-service organisations and ‘Defence’ for those where some civilian involvement i.e. PFI might be required or
necessary.
52
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 9 Mar 1995 Column 461.
53
Evans, M.,The Times, London (UK): Mar 10, 1995, p.1.
54
Jane's Defence Weekly, 2 Jul 1994, p.3.

19
FIGURE 2-5: SUPPORT HELICOPTER DECISION POINT MODEL 1987-1993

Whilst George Younger's announcement in 1987 did result in an immediate order for
additional Lynx aircraft the same cannot be true of the EH101. It would appear that the
department had in fact not made a firm capability choice on the selection of the
Wessex/Puma replacement, and this is shown by a report from the House of Commons
Defence Committee on the EH101 published in 1990 55. In evidence taken by the Committee
from both Westland Helicopter Ltd and the MoD, it was stated that the contract for the project
definition phase of the proposed purchase was not issued until some 2 years after the initial
announcement. More significantly it was also stated, by the MoD that under the project
definition process, other helicopter types would also be considered to fulfil the requirement.
Thus Younger's original statement that the government 'had decided' to purchase the EH101
was definitively countered and this evidence also indicates that, if using the decision point
model, there was a clear disconnect between the political elements and the agents below.
Why these disconnect should have occurred, and in fact persisted until 1995, will be the
subject of the next section.

The disconnect between the areas of policy direction and enaction from an agency
perspective, if one uses the point model to examine them, are indicative of the enduring
problem with sponsorship of the support helicopter capability, in that the service which was
providing the programme sponsorship (RAF) was not the real customer for it – the direction
of troops around the battlefield sitting definitively within the Army domain. Over the 1987-
1990 period the Air Staff had a number of major procurement issues (AEW Nimrod has

55
House of Commons Defence Committee Report 145, The Procurement of EH101 Helicopters and the Light Attack Helicopter,
17 Jan 1990, Session 1989-90, 3rd Report.

20
already been mentioned) and Support Helicopters could be argued as being insufficiently
high up on the spending priority list for them. When this is coupled with the continuing
arguments over ownership, clearly illustrated in both specialist press reports56 and
comments made later in the House of Commons57, it is unsurprising that little headway was
being made in fully defining the requirement that could be passed to political agents and thus
to Industry. This illustrates a problem with the decision point model in that it assumes that
the capability decision process will serve to influence the higher level political policy makers
or is indeed correctly structured to do so. In fact there could be a case, in this particular
examination, of showing two parallel structures of capability decision making, one being
driven by the Air Staff and one being drive by the General Staff. The fact that the Army Air
Corps order for 16 Lynx aircraft, announced at the same time as the EH101 order, went
ahead without significant delay could be taken as a validation of this methodology.

The major externality affecting this protracted decision and procurement process is that it
was almost certainly heavily disturbed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold War. With the effective collapse of the communist bloc in August 1989, which was
preceded by a significant thawing of East-West relations, the ability for planners across
NATO to make any sense of the strategic environment was thrown into flux. From the
decision model perspective this meant that the upper portion of the diagram thereby entered
a period of stasis and the flow of direction and guidance down to the capability area was very
much stymied. Therefore it can be construed that those projects already started continued
because of such stasis and new or uncommitted projects, such as the Puma/Wessex
replacement programme, fell very much into abeyance even though the initial Project
Definition phase had ended 58. The fact that such issues had been a factor at the time was
succinctly stated in a parliamentary answer in 1991, made by the then Procurement Minister
Alan Clark, who said that:

Decisions on support helicopters have been delayed by the need to take

into account the implications of changes in Europe. I hope that the
position will be clearer in some months' time 59.

Interestingly this statement was made after the Options for Change 60 announcements, which
had made sweeping changes to force levels without any general change in the direction of
defence policy. More noticeable, if one considers the procurement section of the Options for
Change document, was that the purchase or even budgeting for new support helicopters is
56
Waddy, J., Defence Helicopter World Apr-May 1988, The Great British Helicopter Muddle, pp.31-34.
57
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 26 Jul 1993, Col 906-26.
58
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 4 Dec 1989, Vol 163 61W.
59
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 22 Jan 1991, Col 156-157.
60
Cm. 1022 I (1990), Statement on the Defence Estimates 1990.
HMSO, London.

21
not included. Thus the affordability section of the decision point model was seemingly part of
the agency process, as politicians sought to obtain the ‘peace dividend’ from the end of the
Cold War. It can thus be argued that the subject of support helicopter procurement had
stayed very much out of the decision area model, as the Ministry of Defence grappled with
the twin effects of complete strategic change and also the rather more immediate effects and
lessons of the first Gulf War and its aftermath. These effects made clear policy formulation
difficult to achieve, as the various agents within the bureaucracy were faced with a paradigm
shift in strategic concepts, and a war which had been fought on an almost unique (for the
period) coalition basis. Additionally the political imperative to support the Westland group of
companies was reduced as their financial situation had improved markedly as it shifted its
focus towards an aero structures business and the remaining MoD projects61.

The problem with this “wait and see” approach from the support helicopter perspective was
that the collapse of communism in Europe had begun to ignite a series of smaller conflicts,
that seemingly required a more air mobile concept of operations62. Even the Cold War style
war to remove Iraq from Kuwait had made substantial use of support helicopters, even
requiring the transfer of some Royal Navy aircraft to support the task. It is informative to
note that whilst the support helicopter argument was in this position of stasis, that the Royal
Navy’s procurement of the EH101 (Merlin) and an upgrade to its Lynx helicopter was very
much proceeding as planned (from a capability management perspective) and was
repeatedly reflected in the annual Statements on the Defence Estimates and by actual
aircraft orders63 64
. One could argue that this unstitches the decision model, but that would
assume that the model is generic to the MOD at the time and that the policy gap noted
previously would apply to all capability decisions in whatever area. But this would be to over
simplify the use of the decision point model, because if capability decisions could be
substantiated against clear requirements and policy direction – in the case of Merlin to
provide a replacement medium maritime helicopter – then the policy of maintaining a global
Naval capability could be sufficient to carry the argument. Additionally, a single service
agent, committed to its own project in support of its core capability, was better able to make
the argument for procurement as opposed to the split between armed forces sponsorship
within the utility helicopter world 65. It could be argued in this case, that both the policy stasis
and capability arguments over the Puma/Wessex replacement were continuing despite

61
Jane’s Defence Weekly 10 Feb 1990 p.272.
62
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 2 May 1991 Col 495.
63
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 14 Oct 1991 col 82.
64
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 19 Feb 1992 col 331
65
Private Discussions.

22
pressure from Parliament 66 and comment within the specialist press67 on the need for a
solution.

The first formal mention of a revision to the utility helicopter replacement programme came
with the issuing of two Air Staff Requirements in June 1992, one for a Light Support
Helicopter (LSH) to replace some 110 Wessex/Puma aircraft (SRA432) and one for a
Medium Support Helicopter (MSH) to support the existing Chinook force (SRA434)68.
However, funding for these two programmes was not mention in SDE 1992 and by SDE
1993 was only commented on by a need to modernise the support helicopter force ‘around
the turn of the century’69. From the model perspective this provided the policy direction (and
funding) required to take the procurement process forward but what it hid were still some
distinct bureaucratic agent disagreement into what the capability was. It would appear that
this policy direction had been driven forward by the increasing commitment of British troops
to the Former Yugoslavia in support of the UN, an activity that due to the terrain, and overt
threat of military action, had greatly increased the requirement for support helicopter
assets 70. Of note, however, was the fact that Air Vice Marshall Timothy Garden had recently
taken up his post as Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Programmes); as a support helicopter
pilot he was a key agent who wished to raise the profile of the support helicopter force away
from its ‘Cinderella’ position within the MoD71.

These factors did not resolve the problem of getting the RAF and Army to agree on the exact
requirement, stretching back to the original Lionheart 86 report, whereby the Army wanted
an all heavy helicopter force that could carry 30 troops. The twin requirements issued by the
Air Staff assumed there was still a Light requirement and this was further backed up by the
continual mention across the press of the RAF favouring the Blackhawk over and above the
EH10172. In fact this mix of aircraft was formally endorsed as the way ahead in a RUSI
Journal article from 1994 when AVM Macfayden from Operational Requirements (Air) stated
that both Light and Medium support helicopters were required in the RAF Support Helicopter
force, but notably commented that the replacement options were now only focussed on the
Wessex, with Puma being retained 73. Whether this was an acceptance of the Army
argument for larger aircraft is not clear, but it was a further complication in the process and
may well have reflected departmental cost issues rather than an overt change of single
service agent policy. In fact some of this may be construed from the evidence provided to

66
Op Cit Hansard 2 May 91 Col 522.
67
Barrie, D., Hovering Decisions, Flight International 21 Oct 1992
68
Gaines, M., RAF Splits up Helicopter Requirement, in Flight International 3-9 Jun 1992, p.4.
69
Ministry of Defence, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1993, Cm. 2270, Session 1992-1993.
70
Janes Defence Weekly, Vol 19 Issue 12, 20 Mar 1993, p.12.
71
AVM Garden quoted in ‘Support Helicopter Conference Report’, Defence Helicopter, June-July 1993, pp.32-33.
72
Beaver, P., Air Forces Monthly, June 1993, p.39.
73
The RUSI Journal, Volume 139, Issue 2 April 1994 , pages 51-55.

23
the House of Commons Defence Committee for their report on RAF equipment funding,
when evidence given to them stated that it intended to utilise ‘spare’ Lynx airframes from the
RN and Army to replace the Wessex and that the Puma replacement would be a Medium
helicopter 74. This seemingly illustrates confusion within the department on what was being
replaced, although other sources provide evidence that a Puma upgrade programme was
also under serious consideration at the time 75.

With the detail above seemingly fitting into the decision model process, additional issues are
apparent which cannot be explained by using it. Much of this centres around the MoD
decision to ask for a No Acceptable Price, No Contract (NAPNOC) bidding process for the
MSH project(Air Staff Target 440) from Boeing and Westland’s, whilst making it clear that the
MoD was likely to ask for an undefined mix of the two aircraft76. Cost and logistic simplicity
examinations alone would have probably led to a decision to only purchase one aircraft, and
it is therefore quite unusual for such a split to be quoted as a possibility from the start.
Indeed serious misgivings had been made known to ministers on the overall affordability of
the EH101 variant proposed for the MSH project by the Chief of Defence Procurement
(CDP), Malcolm Macintosh, in 1993 77. All of this discussion was thus taking place within the
capability choice are of the decision point model and in order to further examine why this
rather unusual state of affairs came about and led to the mixed order of Merlin and Chinook
it is now necessary to transition to a Decision Area model.

DOMESTIC EXECUTIVE
INDUSTRY POWER
ARMY
GOVERNMENT

RAF

INTERNATIONAL
INDUSTRY

DECISION

Figure 2.6 - Medium Support Helicopter (1995) Decision Area Model

74
House of Commons Defence Committee Report 252, RAF Commitments and Resources , 4 May 1994, Session 1993-94, 4th
Report.
75
Beaver, Op Cit, p.39.
76
Cook, N., Flight International, Jun 1994, p.3.
77
Beaver, Op Cit, p.39.

24
Over the period from 1991 to 1995 much had changed for the UK from an international
relations perspective, especially with regard to the quoted ‘end of history78’ and the setting of
a new world order. Conflicts that had previously been suppressed by the Cold War
protagonists began to proliferate and more worryingly for European nations, such as the
United Kingdom, were very much closer to home. Thus the period saw an increased
involvement in military operations that involved peacekeeping tasks with the deployment of
forces to the Former Yugoslavia under United Nations auspices being particularly
problematic. Within this environment British forces were regularly required to operate in
areas of high threat from the different factions and the use of helicopters for the safe
transport of troops and materiel became commonplace. In addition to this operations in
Northern Ireland had become increasingly reliant on support helicopters for both the
movement of troops and the collection of intelligence.

Outside of these direct draws on support helicopter tasks the increasing unpopularity of the
Conservative regime (opinion polls at the time gave labour a 28% lead79) were placing
increasing political pressure on the Executive, and perhaps upon their desire to provide a
solution to the enduring Support Helicopter issue. Political capital was being made across
the political spectrum on the issue, which was a traditionally strong area for the Conservative
party80, and the consistent harrying by the House of Commons Defence Committee 81
provided much ammunition for critics8283. When this is coupled with close results for the
Conservative Party in the 1992 general elections, for those constituencies surrounding the
Westland Helicopters plants at Yeovil and Weston Super Mare, there can be little doubt
surrounding the political imperative for a form of UK manufacturing solution for the MSH
project.

The differences previously identified between the Army and the RAF therefore seemed to
provide the government with an ideal opportunity to fudge the issue; a NAPNOC tender
process with a premeditated mixed type outcome 84
. That this was not the desire of the MoD
is clear from both the previous comments of CDP and from other sources who were involved
in the formulation of the project85. It is however, apparent that by the time of the
announcement many of these differences had be ironed out, most likely under the guidance
of AVM Garden, but this was to be too late to make any definitive change of political mind.
Therefore this shows as a disconnect in the area model between bureaucracy and
78
Fukuyama, F., (1992). The End of History and the Last Man [Penguin:London].
79
Cowling, D., Poll watch: Election number crunching, accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7379958.stm on 20
Apr 2010.
80
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 19 Feb 1992 Column 331-334.
81
HCDC 252, op. cit.
82
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 5 Jul 1993 Column 19-31.
83
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 26 Jul 1993 Column 910.
84
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 5 Jul 1993 Column 19-31.
85
Private Discussions.

25
government whereby the ability of the former to influence the decision of the latter on MSH
had been significantly eroded.

The strong domestic industrial influence shown in the diagram relates to the position of the
EH101 programme at the time. Whilst WHL was a profitable organisation it was struggling to
find export orders for the aircraft outside of the maritime aircraft already purchased by the
Royal Navy and Italian Navy. With the Canadians having cancelled their EH101 order 86 the
prospects for the aircraft were not good and it is apparent that there were significant worries
as to whether further significant procurements of the aircraft could be guaranteed if the UK
did not commit to the utility variant on which the MSH proposal was based 87. From an
international perspective Boeing, who were teamed with Westland for the Attack Helicopter
competition, were clearly unlikely to upset their relationship over an order for aircraft with a
significantly lower price tag.

Of interest is the apparent lack of clear executive input into this process outside of desire to
reduce costs as far as possible albeit with a UK slant88. Whether their had been some
agreement in cabinet over the way forward on this project is not clear, but with treasury
approval required for such a large project it is unlikely that there had not been some form of
discussion either at full cabinet or in the 3 way meetings between the PM, Defence Secretary
and Chancellor that occurred at the time 89.

The area model thus shows us that with a breakdown in the feed of information from the
bureaucracy to the government and with a significant industrial political input, the final
decision to buy a mix of CH47 and EH101 was inevitable. The former on the basis of
operational requirements and demonstrable operational delivery and the latter on the basis
on industrial capability and political expedience. Other sources have also indicated that the
order for 22 MSH Merlin was the absolute minimum in order for effective fleet management,
stores support and Command and Control (C2)90. That this order only replaced the ageing
Wessex aircraft and left the Puma still in its Mark One format is an illustration of the lack of
money available to defence at the time, rather than the overriding need to replace an aircraft
already some 25 years old. Additionally the mix of the CH47 order into different types and
the methodology that surrounded it is an area, which will need to be returned to.

86
O’Toole, K., Flight International, 15-21 Dec 1993, p.19.
87
Evans, M., The Times. London (UK): Mar 10, 1995. pg. 1
88
Private Discussions.
89
Interview Rt Hon Malcolm Rifkind MP, 12 Sep 09.
90
Private Discussions.

26
1998 STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW – LOFTY GOALS, MEAGRE FUNDING

When the Labour Party won its landslide victory in 1997 it embarked upon a much presaged
Strategic Defence Review (SDR), aiming to define the ‘commitments [required of the UK
Armed Forces] and deciding how our [they] should be structured, equipped and deployed to
meet them’ 91. Much of the review was centred around how the forces should be structured
to meet the emerging post cold war challenges of failing states and the development of a
more ‘expeditionary’ posture to replace the rather piecemeal changes that had occurred as a
result of the two previously mentioned ‘monetary’ focused reviews (Options for Change and
Defence Cost Study)92. The review envisaged an expanded role for support helicopters, but
the document does not mention anything of a Puma replacement programme, only stating
that the Merlin HC 3 (EH101) and CH47 orders, from 1995, were confirmed and would
provide a much needed increase in lift capability when in service. The SDR could be seen
as the very epitome of the top down decision point methodology whereby bureaucratic
agents formulated a detailed bounded plan of capabilities, based on the clear political
direction that it had received from ministers. Although much argument and discussion will
have been had within the bureaucracy over the relative priorities of different military tasks
and roles many commentators, both inside and outside of the process, have commented on
the veracity of the review93, even though they may not have agreed with its outcome.

A major element of the SDR, which affects the both models, is the Smart Procurement
Initiative (SPI), which was announced before the SDR was published, in July 1997 94, but
became formal policy direction under it. Under this reorganisation the single service
Operational Requirements organisations were replaced by Equipment Capability managers,
responsible to a 2-star Head of Equipment Capability. This was a fundamental change in the
way equipment was to be sponsored and procured within the MoD and was designed to
assist in the removal of single service bias within the overall equipment programme. By
drawing equipment funding lines away from the single services it was designed so that trade-
offs could be made across wide boundaries (ie ships for tanks) thus potentially removing the
parochial nature of bureaucratic agents in the previous structure. From a model perspective,
it should have provided a more coherent method of passing advice to government, in order
that considered decisions could be taken on which equipment would provide the best
solution to a required military outcome. From discussions across a wide range of MoD
officials, it is clear that the military staffs within the Capability Areas still appear, on occasion,
to be driven by both their own single service allegiances, and external pressure from the still

91
Lords Hansard 15 May 1995 Col 33.
92
Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review, Cm 3999 , July 1998.
93
McInnes, C., ‘Labour’s Strategic Defence Review’, International Affairs, 1998, p.828.
94
Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence (10 February 2000) to HCDC 10th Report 28 Jun 00.

27
powerful single service staffs95. Additionally, even when trade-offs were presented to the
Joint Capabilities Board 96, the Chiefs of Staff from each service remained highly influential in
pressuring for equipment outcomes, regarded as important to their own service. Thus the
departmental and funding decision issues of the bureaucracy shown in the decision point
diagram, could still be affected by single service priorities albeit in a more overt form than
under the previous system.

Another area of the SDR which affects this discussion, was the announcement of the
formation of the Joint Helicopter Command (JHC). This particular move, stated as being
based on operational experience since the end of the cold war, was to provide a single
organisation for the operational use of support (and other battlefield) helicopters under the
command (and thus financial control) of the Army. Although the individual elements97,
would remain within their own service administrative areas and bases (called Full
Command),JHC would provide;

a single focus for the ready transfer of best practice from Service to Service and for
removing, over time, differences in current operating procedures98.

This, then, seemed to answer the previous discussions and arguments over who which
agent from within the bureaucracy would have control over the capability and it was hoped,
over time, to reduce inter service issues, especially between the Army and the RAF over the
management of battlefield helicopter assets. The problem remained, however, that JHC
would still have to fight for funding with other elements of the Army, who may have
competing priorities and less clarity on the whole methodology of helicopter based air power.
From the decision point model perspective the formation of JHC certainly provide an
opportunity for more departmental coherence with respect to the procurement of support
helicopters. This was, however, reliant on the respective Capability Manager 99 being able to
effectively press their case with the Joint Capabilities Board.

Outside of the core support helicopter area the SDR also had an effect on industry, since it
saw the cancellation of further orders for the maritime version of the Merlin helicopter and a
slight increase in the number of maritime Lynx aircraft converted to the improved Mk8
version. This was a longer-term issue for Westland helicopters who would now have to find
other orders (nominally from exports) to sustain its production facilities beyond 2010.

95
Private Discussions Jul-Dec 09.
96
The primary decision making organization of the equipment capability area.
97
Royal Navy Sea Kings; Army Lynx, Gazelles and Apache; Royal Air Force Chinooks, Pumas and Wessex/Merlin Mk3.
98
Op Cit, The Strategic Defence Review, Essay 8, Para 27.
99
Air Littoral Manoeuvre.

28
The core problem with SDR was the fact that it had effectively committed the MoD to a
wholesale upgrade of its 10 year equipment programme without a guarantee from the
Treasury of its future spending profile. Lilleker cited this sustainability issue as a providing a
serious threat to the ability of the MoD in achieving the stated goals of the Labour
Government’s ethical foreign policy100. From an area model perspective this would be
observed to be an issue sitting within the Government agency part of the diagram whereby
individual ministers would be conducting cross departmental financing negotiations either
within cabinet sub committees or indeed within full cabinet, should the decisions be at that
level. Thus the MoD moved forward into the turn of the century with a definitive strategic
posture, proven in both Sierra Leone and Kosovo, but with an ever-increasing equipment
programme and finance mismatch having being highlighted to ministers101.

A NEW HOPE-DASHED: FASH AND SABR

A hidden element that was not stated in the SDR published document was a requirement to
renew the Royal Navy's Sea King HC4 utility helicopters which had, throughout the 1990s
seen constant service alongside their RAF colleague on deployed, predominately land-based
operations. Whilst the HC4 was ostensibly of the same vintage as the CH47 aircraft in the
RAF inventory, it did not actually meet the lift requirements of the Royal Navy's amphibious
forces; which were significantly enhanced with the introduction of the helicopter carrier HMS
Ocean in 1998.

The requirement to replace the HC4 was stated as a requirement under the Future
Amphibious Support Helicopter (FASH) feasibility study, geared around an in service date of
2008 and a £1bn 102 price tag. The intention to issue a contract by 1999 was quickly
overtaken by changes surrounding the formation of the new Equipment Capability area and
the requirement for FASH was combined with the Puma replacement programme, and a
need to replace the Search and Rescue aircraft of the Royal Navy and RAF. The
machinations of this new programme, entitled Support Amphibious Battlefield Rotorcraft
(SABR), will again be investigated using both the decision point and decision area models.

100
Lilleker, ‘Labour’s Defence Policy’ in Little and Wickham-Jones, New Labour’s Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade?,
2000, p.229.
101
Interview Rt Hon Adam Ingram 15 Dec 09.
102
Hansard Written Answer, FASH Feasability 7 Dec 99, vol340 452w.

29
FIGURE 2-7: DECISION POINT MODEL FOR SABR PROJECT
For the initial part of SABR project the clarity of policy derived from the SDR left the decision
making within the department, with an accepted service requirement for some 70 aircraft at
an estimated cost of £6.5 bn to be delivered in 2010 103. Having been given the requirement
MoD Capability Manager and JHC began to formulate the options for a possible requirement
and as in the early 1990's had begun to look at a mix of aircraft types rather than just a
single procurement104. That the previously 'unneeded' NH90 appeared in this list105 could
perhaps be seen as a movement within the department away from politically derived national
purchases; later events counter this view. In this mix of types there was again a 'heavy' and
'light' variant to be considered 106 and there would seem again to have been some cross-
service disagreement (even with JHC involvement) on how best to fulfil it. This time the
disagreements centred upon whether larger aircraft such as the CH47 or CH53 would be
better suited to the 'heavy' element of the project (bearing in mind the aircraft due for
replacement were almost 1/2 the size) or whether an aircraft such as the Merlin HC3 could
be uprated enough to achieve the requirement107.

Whilst these discussions and arguments between agents within the bureaucracy were taking
place there was seemingly little political interest in the support helicopter replacement issue,
even with high profile operations such as disaster relief in Kenya in 2000 or the invasion of
103
DPA SABR Integrated Project Team archived page at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/tna/+/http://www.mod.uk:80/dpa/projects/sabr.htm
104
Howard, J., SABR Rattling,Flight International, 27 March - 2 April 2001, p.41.
105
Jasper, C., NH Industries Weighs Up Market as Key Contract Signing Moves Closer, Flight International 23 - 29 May 2000,
p.20.
106
Beedall, R., Support Amphibious and Battlefield Rotorcraft, accessed at http://navy-matters.beedall.com/sabr.htm, 13 Feb
2010.
107
Private Discussions, Dec 2009.

30
Afghanistan in late 2001. What there was of political debate within Parliament was
seemingly couched on the general principal of the requirement being necessary108 or that
there was some obligation to adopt a national manufacturing strategy in order to support
AWHL 109. There was however, a growing mood that some form of payback was required for
the significant investment made by the UK government into the EH101 (Merlin) project and
its RTM322 engines which, of course chimed with those within the MoD who saw the revised
Merlin HC3 platform as an 'easy' political choice 110.

The relative outward calm surrounding both the post SDR policy direction and the seemingly
relentless sequence of MoD equipment programmes, hid a gradual realization within the
MoD that its financial resources could not deliver them 111. Whilst these concerns were
presented to Ministers, very few changes were seemingly made and the rather endemic
MoD process of slipping programmes into the next budget period (the so-called 'bow-wave'
effect112) continued 113. In this process senior managers and ministers, rather than cutting a
project, would delay its introduction to service in order to shift the funding requirements later
in the spending period. With the MoD typically looking 4 years out on capital spending (at
that time) this would see a peak in funding at the 5 year point which, although unaffordable,
would leave the project intact until the next year's spending round when other projects or
programmes might be slipped. Within the decision point model much of this 'bow wave' type
movement of projects would have managed by agents within the departmental capability
management area. However for high value programmes agents within the bureaucracy were
not empowered to make such decisions and they would need to be passed to ministers.
This would seem to mark the point of transition between the two models as such decisions
would invariably have elements regarded by political agents, as having a degree of political
capital involved, which might then be expected to passed on to agents within the executive
either through a formal political committee or perhaps even to cabinet.

With a consistent issue of affordability underlying the process during this period, it is no
surprise that Ministers within the MoD began to plan a rebalancing programme, which
according to press reports would see significant cuts to major projects114. Framed as a
reprioritisation of existing equipment projects it is apparent that this was an attempt to deal
with the funding bow-wave issue, and that none of the major projects would be excluded
from it. Whilst clearly being driven in in the executive and government parts of the area
108
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 28 Feb 2000 : Column 89
109
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 4 May 2000 : Column 370
110
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 15 Jun 2000 : Column 1093
111
Interview with Adam Ingram, 15 Dec 09.
112
Gray, B., Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of State for Defence, October 2009.
113
Private Discussions Jul 09.
114
Clark, J., 'Ministers Plan Big New Defence Cuts, Sunday Times, 3 Jun, 2001. pg. 26.

31
model, the timing of the decisions, at the end of the 3 year Comprehensive Spending Review
(CSR) period might be an indication that the MoD was beginning the top level work in
advance of the new financial settlement with the Treasury due in 2002. That nothing overt
seemed to come from this review, is probably a reflection on the events of 11 Sep 2001, the
subsequent invasion of Afghanistan (including UK forces) and the reframing of the global
security environment that resulted from it.

The effect of this stalemate as regards major projects could be seen as a reason why Agusta
Westland sought to restructure its business in Jan 2002, causing the loss of some 950
jobs115. When coupled with the economic downturn which resulted from the Sep 11 attacks,
this sort of announcement began to increase political pressure on the government with
unions making the case for MoD sponsored orders 116. This enduring factor thereby can be
seen as further tipping the balance away from the decision model apparatus and, although
not overt in nature, could be construed as increasing the pressure for a UK solution to the
SABR requirement. In fact such pressure was becoming more overt in Parliament as MPs
representing constituencies around the AWHL facilities began to make this point117.

Political agency was prevalent over this period as statements by the Defence Secretary118
indicate that the focus of MoD work at the time was still on how to deal with the immediate
threat that Al Qaeda represented to the UK. That helicopters are overtly mentioned as being
in tool for this task, should have provided the guidance to bureaucratic agents for action, but
funding issues were seemingly still pushing resolution of the SABR requirement to the right,
whilst individual small scale programmes were being used to fill the gap, such as the
procurement of 6 Pumas from South Africa, and the conversion of some ex ASW Sea King
aircraft to the support helicopter role 119. With the SDR New Chapter, indicating the utility of
helicopters for operations in Afghanistan and wider anti-terrorist operations120 the direction
from the higher level strategy and risks area of the decision point model seemed to be
further strengthening operational arguments. Additionally the plan for new aircraft still clearly
existed within the defence programme, but mention of other projects with apparently similar
priorities121 indicated a burgeoning helicopter procurement plan across the 3 services that
were all bereft of funding from within the defence budget. It is unusual, therefore, that in the
following year, and post the invasion of Iraq that had seen such heavy use of helicopter

115
Nicoll, A., ‘Axe Falls on 950 Jobs at AgustaWestland as Helicopter Orders Near Completion’, Financial Times. London (UK):
Jan 11, 2002. Pg. 05.
116
Macalister, T., ‘Warships Contract Saves Clydeside Jobs: Ministry of Defence Gives Glasgow Yards Biggest Boost in 40
Years £2bn Order for 6 Destroyers’, The Guardian, Feb 19, 2002, pg. 23.
117
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 17 Jul 2002, Column 351
118
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 18 Jul 2002 : Column 463
119
House of Commons Hansard Written Answer for 28 Oct 2002 Column 707W.
120
Ministry of Defence, SDR New Chapter, Volume 1, CM5566, 2002.
121
House of Commons Hansard Written Answer for 2 Jul 2002 : Column 230W.

32
borne forces, the Defence White Paper made no mention of helicopters whatsoever 122. This
examination has so far shown that from a policy perspective, the need for a coherent
helicopter programme was apparently clear, so how can the area model serve to further
illuminate events that were taking place around the SABR project in 2003-04.

FIGURE 2-7: DECISION AREA MODEL FOR SABR PROJECT 2003-04

In March 2003 the UK was involved in invasion of Iraq (Op Telic) as part of a Coalition led by
the United States and deployed some 100 helicopters, of various types and roles to support
the operation 123. This major operation, termed as medium scale within the previous SDR
New Chapter 124, was very much part of the new strategic culture drawn from the events of
Sep 11, 2001, whereby the policy of preventative military action against potentially hostile
states could be taken at significant distance from national borders. That this would involve
mobile forces would seem to have been accepted, but in the area of the UK support
helicopter force few problems seemed to have been encountered which were outside the
capability of the existing fleet.

The mood of the MoD (or most certainly the Army) on this matter can be illustrated by 2
answers given to the House of Commons Defence Committee on Wednesday 25 June

122
Ministry of Defence, Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper, Cm 6041-I, 2003.
123
HC 57-I, House of Commons Defence Committee, Lessons of Iraq, Third Report of Session 2003–04, Volume I: Report, 3
Mar 2004.
124
Op Cit, SDR New Chapter p.14.

33
2003 125. Answering the Question:
Q639 Chairman: On air support, did the support of the helicopter fleet meet all of the
logistics needs you had; any changes there that might be made?

The two replies given are:

Major General Brims : The support helicopters met a number of different needs for us
on the logistics side.

Brigadier Cowlam: We did not use support helicopters a great deal, primarily because
the distances and the quality of the terrain and roads that we were operating over
really did not require us to use them.

With Brims as the overall Land Forces Commander for Op Telic and Cowlam as his Logistics
Commander the message does not seem to reinforce the arguments for a support helicopter
programme already under financial pressure. With the report also coming out in praise of
the Sea King helicopter’s contribution to the initial stages of the invasion, there could be
perceived to be a operational disconnect for those agents within the bureaucracy (either
within JHC or the RN) trying to drive through the SABR programme. In fact the most telling
of comments for helicopters within the report is in its critical review of the availability and
supportability of the Lynx helicopters, in both its maritime and land variants126. It is therefore
possible to suggest that in reviewing programmes in the monetary constrained period
following both the 2002 CSR and Op Telic that the MoD Bureaucracy was, by nature of its
post conflict lessons process, more likely to prioritise the Lynx upgrade programme over
SABR.

During this period of review post Op Telic, the Littoral Manoeuvre (LitM) capability area
responsible for support helicopters continued to refine the requirement it had been set under
the SABR programme, utilising the lessons of Op telic in the process. Broad agreement had
been achieved between the services on the size of aircraft required, with the Sikorsky CH53
and an upgraded CH47 becoming the major contenders 127. Clearly of note here is the lack
of any AWHL product and there was continual Parliamentary 128, and direct industrial
lobbying, in support for a new version of the Merlin to fill at least part of the requirement129.
Additionally, the requirement for replacement support helicopters had been reinforced by a
timely report, in April 2004, by the National Audit Office130, which had identified a maximum

125
Op Cit, HC57-I, Minutes Of Evidence - Volume II.
126
Op Cit HC57-I, Paras 210 & 241.
127
Private Discussions Jan 10.
128
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 23 Oct 2003 : Column 849
129
Private Discussions Feb 10.
130
National Audit Office, HC 486, 2003-4, Battlefield Helicopters, Apr 2004.

34
38% shortfall in lift capability (a 20% shortfall was also quoted)131. What was working
against the LitM team was the Maritime element of the requirement, with CH53 having been
written out on weight grounds, and the CH47 having never been optimised for ship borne
operations and thus not fitted with folding rotor blades. To overcome this issue Boeing
offered to provide a bespoke blade folding solution to the MoD with the additional sweetener
of a UK build solution 132, but this was a risky proposition for a department who had been
severely criticised over a recent catastrophic CH47 special version procurement133.

From the area model perspective the government in the centre were asking the MoD to find
significant savings and the overheated number of helicopter programmes must have seemed
to offer a rich target. But before considering this, it is pertinent to ask what role the Joint
Helicopter Command were playing, as seemingly they should have been providing the
singular front line focus for the SABR project. Having seen the Army evidence given
surrounding the Helicopter support to Op Telic it is possible that the Army had decided that
its high profile Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) land combat vehicle needed to be
prioritised over SABR especially given the increasing number of IED related casualties in
Iraq. Additionally the Army also had the Battlefield Light Utility Helicopter (BLUH) project to
deal with, which after the other criticisms detailed above by the HCDC might have been a
higher priority. What is clear is that JHC did not provide necessary political weight to the
SABR project at the time, thus increasing the uncertainty over the project134.

In this environment, and even with a business case ready to take to ministers, the project
was rejected by the Chief of Defence Procurement, thus consigning it to the annual costs
saving round without effective support135. The effect was to remove £3.5bn instantaneously
from the LitM helicopter procurement budget, forcing a reorganisation and reprioritisation of
all helicopter programmes and increasing the dilemma over which projects should have
primacy 136. The effect of this enormous cut in expenditure received scant coverage in the
2004 White paper, which stated:

2.23 Helicopters provide a key capability in the battlefield and maritime environments,
and their flexibility means that they contribute to the majority of the Military Tasks. The
recent report on battlefield helicopters by the National Audit Office assessed that the
UK helicopter fleet was arguably the most capable in Europe. …Over the next ten
years, we plan to invest some £3bn in helicopter platforms to replace and enhance our

131
The problem of course with this data is that it was almost certainly provided by the same capability area that was trying to
push forward the SABR project.
132
Dominic O'Connell, ‘MoD set to buy 20 more Chinooks’, Sunday Times, Apr 11, 2004. pg. 3.
133
National Audit Office Report HC 512 Session 2007-2008 , Ministry of Defence: Chinook Mk3 Helicopters, 4 June 2008.
134
Private Discussions Feb 10.
135
Private Discussions Jan 10.
136
Beaver, P., Future Battlefield Helicopters: A Procurement Dilemma RUSI Defence Systems, Spring 2005, pp54-55.

35
 existing capability. In light of the improved security situation in Northern Ireland we plan
to make some reductions in overall helicopter numbers137.

From evidence given in the Iraq enquiry by Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary at the time,
there was indeed pressure on the MoD as a whole to save money but this was not strictly
directed at the SABR programme 138. Indeed it was Mr Hoon who had lauded the £3bn
investment in the new Future Rotorcraft Capability programme in his statement to the House
of Commons announcing the White Paper139. This could show how in the decision area
model that the government had taken the recommendation (or lack of it) from the
bureaucracy at face value and announced its outcome.

More notable, in this examination of the differing priorities within the MoD at the time, is the
way in which the reorganisation was further explained in the it's evidence to the House of
Commons Public Accounts Committee on the new FRC 140. The first comment is surrounding
numbers of aircraft where the following statement is used:

'in line with our wider policy, on the effects required rather than on types and
numbers of platforms'

This is a tacit indication of the intention to reduce aircraft numbers, which given that larger
aircraft were being envisaged in the programme might be a fair assessment, but this would
be to ignore the fact that this is no longer just talking about the SABR programme. Indeed
there are some 6 separate aircraft programmes mentioned in the same document, filling very
diverse roles and what is not clear is how the department, at this stage, intended on dividing
the limited resources between them. There is some mention of 'holistic' approaches
indicating a degree of synergy between some programmes but, as we have already
discussed, the SABR programme had already discounted some of these (particularly the
Merlin), and their re-inclusion would be sure to ignite further partisan input as regard the UK
industrial base (and AWHL in particular).

This phase of the battlefield helicopter saga was driven almost entirely from a decision point
model agency basis, but is has been shown that Treasury demands on the bureaucracy to
save money, when coupled with a programme that externally seemed to offer little to the UK
defence industry, led to an output which was sub-optimal to all the helicopter programmes of
137
Ministry of Defence, Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities, Cm 6269, 2004, p.9.
138
Iraq Enquiry evidence of Rt Hon Geoff Hoon, Tuesday 19th January 2010.
139
House of Commons Hansard debates for 21 Jul 2004 : Column 368.
140
House of Commons Public Accounts Committee Minutes of Evidence 25 Oct 2004, Memorandum submitted by the Ministry
of Defence.

36
the period. Moreover, it is clear that the much vaunted JHC was unable to press home its
own case for renewal of the battlefield helicopter fleet, when the Land Forces Commanders
were clearly stating that their availability was adequate for such a major war fighting
operation. Indeed even the HCDC enquiry that took place into the conflict placed a heavier
emphasis on a Lynx replacement, thus giving that programme added priority from a political
context. That these aircraft were being operated by the RN and Army Air Corps (who were
defending the Apache programme) rather than the RAF, might again offer some indication of
the relative priority given to helicopters across the services. What is of note is that this initial
post Iraq assessment of the relative priority of battlefield helicopters, was to be turned on its
head by later events, both in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Defence Industrial Strategy; Overt Politicisation of Procurement Decision

Making?

Although there we could be an argument to restrict further investigation to the events of

2008-09, further understanding of how the MoD and Government agencies moved forward
on the support helicopters issue can be gained from understanding other FRC and industry
activity in the interim. Whilst a new decision model framework could be applied to this
phase, the wide ranging nature of the programmes concerned and the stage at which each
project entered the FRC programme, would make this unnecessarily complex, failing to add
to the final output of this research.

From an AWHL perspective the decision to move to the FRC programme was both a positive
and a negative, the fact that the potential external order for SABR had not been made meant
that the Merlin was now firmly back in the competition. It was however, the reduction in the
finance available for helicopter orders that was the main worry and AWHL lost little time in
making this known to both the political elite and the wider financial markets141. This, when
coupled with the previously identified RN and Army focus on the Lynx replacement, started
to increase the political pressure for a solution especially when one bears in mind the
upcoming General Election of May 2005. Thus it comes as no surprise that the MoD
announced that the Future Lynx had been selected to fufill this requirement in April 2005 142.
There must, therefore, be some doubt attached to the timing of this decision, although there
can be little doubt that the Capability area had built a strong case for the aircraft from within
the FRC programme. The problem however, was one of cost, when one recalls that the total

141
Carl Mortished, Threat to Westland jobs 'if Super Lynx deal is blocked', The Times. London, Oct 7,
2004. p. 62.
142
Mark Milner 'AgustaWestland given boost with MoD's pounds 1bn order for Lynx', The Guardian,
London, Mar 25, 2005. p. 20.

37
amount available to the FRC project was £3bn and that the announced figure of £1bn could
be regarded as being highly speculative 143 even after the introduction of the Smart
Procurement process. Clearly some form of balancing decisions within the bureaucracy
must have been undertaken over the relative priority of these narrow set of programmes, and
indeed how much headway had been made in defining the requirements. A number of
sources have indicated that it was the Royal Navy, as agents, who were driving this project
forward, and had the clearest capability requirements whilst the AAC were not clear, at the
time, on which role they were trying to fill or indeed, whether the Lynx was the right platform
to fulfil it144. Effective agency issues therefore again seem to be playing a role, as they did in
previous discussions, on how effective each service was at defining requirements or their
relative commitment to a project; the Royal Navy staffs of the mid 2000's were highly
successful in getting this aspect absolutely right, whilst tapping into the political mood.

The Defence Industrial Strategy 145 was an attempt to try and overcome these sorts of difficult
defence procurement issues, that had begun to result from both a shrinking national market
and a pressurised MoD budget. On balance, the document was widely welcomed by both
the UK Defence Industry and wider academia146, and even received praise in the highly
political Gray report on MoD acquisition 147. In the latter’s view the Rotary Wing Sector
strategy was:

[S]uccessful in implementing a number of innovative solutions, particularly focusing

on through life cost savings, for helicopter support, future upgrade and development.

Although he also said:

[T]o a certain degree, DIS militates against the effective operation of competition in
key areas of equipment acquisition with the consequence of increasing costs by
deliberately moving to ensure sustained, efficient, onshore industrial capability

The problem, from the FRC perspective, was that the strategy was far too closely focused on
individual projects rather than the overall spectrum of the programme and its mix of aircraft.
Whilst an acceptance of a UK manufacturing base was a clear political commitment to
AWHL, it effectively cornered the MoD in to placing orders at particular times in order to

143
Private Discussions Sep 09.
144
Private Discussions Jul 09 - Feb 10.
145
Defence Industrial Strategy : Defence White Paper, Cm 6697, 15 December 2005.
146
Norton-Taylor, R., & Milner, M, Arms and the Man: New Defence Strategy Unveiled: Government Says Industry Faces Big
Shift in Priorities: Contractors Say Initiative Gives Much-Needed Clarity, The Guardian, London 16 Dec 2005, p.25.
147
Op Cit, Gray, Section 5.4.

38
guarantee the continued existence of the Yeovil factory. At the time the strategy was
published AWHL had effectively completed all UK Merlin orders, was well on the way to
completing its Apache provision and had very few export orders on the books. It is therefore
not surprising that the industrial and political pressure began to increase, as has previously
been identified for Lynx, and was now to take place for Merlin. From a model perspective
the DIS sits within the area framework from a policy derivation perspective, as external
agents (nominally national) pushed for their own agendas in the political sphere and also
whilst the bureaucracy was feeding the government with information and recommendations
(with Lynx as an example). However, as policy direction the DIS also sits at the top of the
point model in framing future policy decisions.

Although the collapse of SABR and the formation of the FRC programme had not removed
the requirement for the replacement of Puma and Sea King support helicopters, the start of
yet another study, in this case called Land Advanced Concept Phase (LACP)148, had shifted
any projected replacement significantly right. With continuing financial pressures within the
equipment programme, the lack of a firm list of requirements and specifications would
seemingly have placed the FRC programme at the bottom of the MoD’s capability priority list.
Into this void stepped the Merlin Capability Sustainment Programme (Merlin CSP) which had
all of its requirements fully defined, and had apparently been identified as approaching
obsolescence only 5 years after its introduction into service 149. With a notional initial value of
some £900m this project fell into number of DIS policy boxes, in that it sustained the UK
technological base (an innovative electric flight control system had been proposed) and it
would help to fill a gap in the AWHL order books. With the RN providing significant high-
level impetus to the project, negotiations were made direct between the Defence
Procurement Minister of the time (Lord Drayson) and the lead negotiator for Lockheed Martin
in order to gain the best deal possible for the MoD150. This subsequently led to the signing of
a contract for some £750m for 30 aircraft, with an additional option for a further 8 should the
MoD deem them necessary151 (or indeed be able to afford them). If this particular project
was applied to the area model the project would show how all of the interfaces between the
bureaucracy, government and industry came together in line with extant policy in order to
make the decision. However, in this investigation of the support helicopter issue one can
see that the original £3bn for the 6 projects within FRC had now been significantly denuded
with the 4 remaining projects (including SABR) now only having £1bn available.

148
Defence Industrial Strategy Paragraph B.5.6.
149
Merlin CSP from http://frn.beedall.com/merlin.htm accessed 12 Apr 10.
150
Private Discussions Oct 08.
151
Lockheed Martin UK Awarded £750 Million Merlin Upgrade Contract from http://www.lockheedmartin.co.uk/news/264.html
accessed 12 Feb 10.

39
Outside of these major programme decisions, those dealing with FRC in the LitM capability
area, also had to deal with issues surrounding protracted difficulties with the original CH47
order from 1995. In that mixed order 8 aircraft had been built to a new specification,
ostensibly designed for Special Forces operations, but problems with the cockpit, software
and flight control system had prevented them from being introduced to service 152. These
aircraft were in storage as various options were considered, but it is apparent from a number
of sources, that this was going to cost a significant proportion of the remaining funds from
the FRC project153. This drives us into the next section where the summation of financial
difficulties, war fighting operations and industrial issues was to become a substantial political
problem.

THE INFLUENCE OF WAR; WHEN BUDGETS AND BODIES COME HEAD TO HEAD

In May 2006 the UK commitment to the on-going NATO operation in Afghanistan changed,
with a move, at brigade level to the Southern district of Helmand. Although the UK had
deployed troops in Afghanistan since the invasion of 2001 this was a very much larger affair
designed to address, with a number of other NATO deployments to the South of the Country,
a declining security situation that saw a resurgent Taliban threatening the stability of the
country. This increasing commitment was to quickly become a drain on the UK’s helicopter
forces, especially with concurrent operations in Iraq, and this was to be the trigger for a
change of policy focus on the support helicopter issue. Additionally, it was becoming clear
that the MoD’s financial position was becoming increasingly fragile as changes and cuts
previously detailed surrounding the 2004 CSR154, which resulted in the cancellation of SABR
and FRC programme, had failed to allow the MoD to balance its equipment plans with its
budget155. Thus the MoD faced some difficult decisions on helicopters well in both the
political and public gaze.

152
Op Cit National Audit Office HC 486.
153
Op Cit National Audit Office HC 512.
154
HM Treasury Spending Review 2004 from http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/spending_review/spend_sr04/spend_sr04_index.cfm, accessed 11 May 10.
155
Defence Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2007-08, Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2006–07, HC 61.

40
FIGURE 2-8;DECISION POINT MODEL FOR FUTURE MEDIUM HELICOPTER AND VISION
2020
The LitM capability area at the time was running with the follow-on to SABR now entitled the
Future Medium Helicopter programme, which still aimed at producing replacements for the
Puma and Sea King support helicopters. Thus from a decision point perspective they were
facing discretely bounded affordability and capability decisions within an environment where
existing projects had already subsumed much of the budget. This left the newly refined in-
service date for the FMH programme at 2018, affectively in a new budgetary period for the
MoD (who operate on a rolling 10 year basis) but of course adding to the previously
described bow wave effect. The problem for both the MoD and government was that this
programme was not going to address the pressing operational need for support helicopters
in the near term especially in the highly demanding Afghanistan operating area 156. The fact
that it submitted proposals to industry for the lease of aircraft to fill the gap is an indication of
the increasing difficulties the department was facing 157 in addressing this balancing act.

Whilst one could remain using the decision point model the increasing calls for helicopter lift
in Afghanistan to be increased began to pile on the political pressure, therefore bringing
direct political influence to bear upon the department. This influence , widening the effective
boundaries of the decision, and the agency of other actors upon the debate and decision
process can therefore only be truly be represented by the area model.

156
The Helmand operating presented all existing helicopters, except the Chinook with severe operating limitations due to its
high density altitude and summer temperatures.
157
Ripley, T., UK Mod Looks to Lease More Lift, Flight International, 15/08/06.

41
FIGURE 2-9; DECISION AREA MODEL FOR FMH AND VISION 2020

This representation of the area model now begins to show how the politicised atmosphere
surrounding the support helicopter issue had begun to increase the influence and interest of
both the executive and the government in affecting decisions. Thus in early 2007 and with
overriding evidence on the requirement for increased helicopter support, an Urgent
Operational Requirement158 was endorsed by the Cabinet and Treasury for the provision of
additional support helicopters159. Beyond this decision, which was eventually to lead to the
transfer of 6 Merlin aircraft from a previous Danish order, it is clear that the political will for a
more enduring solution to the shortage of helicopter lift identified all the way back to 1985
was increasing.

From a bureaucracy perspective the problem was not made any better by the 2007 CSR160
which gave a real terms increase to the Defence budget of some 1.5% in the period 2007-
11. This was significantly below what had been requested in view of the difficulties the
department had with cost overruns, overdue estate renewal and the element of funding
required supporting the Iraq and Afghanistan operations that was not covered by the
158
Urgent Operational Requirements are funded from the Treasuries’ Conflict Prevention Fund (CPF) and therefore sit outside
normal MoD funding processes. Equipment provided under this process is normally only available for current operations and
will need to be ‘bought back’ into the main MoD equipment programme should it be further required beyond the operation it was
procured for.
159
Private Discussions Jul 09 – Jan 10.
160
Comprehensive Spending Review 2007 accessed at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/pbr_csr07_repindex.htm 12 May 2010.

42
CPF 161162. Thus the pressure on programmes such as FMH was to increase rather than
reduce, creating pressure on the bureaucracy to provide a solution which could deliver
outcomes quicker than the previously envisaged 2018 timeframe.

2008 was to prove the tipping point in the argument over support helicopter provision as
stories began to emerge from the Afghanistan theatre over the enhanced IED risk to British
soldiers having to use motor transport163. In fact during the Parliamentary Session that
covers the first 9 months of 2008, there are no less than 200 separate statements and
questions across both the House of Commons and House of Lords with respect to helicopter
provision in Afghanistan 164. With each of these and the creeping stories that were beginning
to emerge from the country on the risks that were being taken it was clear that further
executive input was inevitable. Although these factors were playing on the executive and
government elements of our model it is notable that in July of 2008, the Armed Forces
Minister stated in a written House of Commons answer that it was ‘ far too early’ to comment
on the numbers of Future Medium Helicopters required’ or indeed their delivery timescale
citing a need to further clarify the requirement165. After all of the previous investigations,
studies and surveys this was probably one of the most politically naïve outputs from the
government of day, especially in regard to current circumstances and public interest.

All of these factors, coupled with the wider financial challenge of Planning Round 09 166, led
to the Defence Secretary, Des Browne to order an “Equipment Examination’167. During this
process a number of high value programmes was subjected to scrutiny and while no overt
statements were made about the Future Medium Helicopter, it is clear from the output of the
report that the shortage of helicopters in Afghanistan was one of the key drivers. During this
examination the previous order for Lynx Wildcat helicopters, whose price had escalated to
some £2bn came under extreme scrutiny168 as it was becoming widely acknowledged that
the original requirement was far too narrow for both RN and Army Air Corps variants169.
Thus a complete re-costing was required with baseline comparisons made against a more
generic common specification and air platforms available from other manufacturers170. It is
clear that during this process, significant pressure was being placed on government from

161
Private Discussions Jul 09.
162
Leader, Flattering to Deceive on Defence Spending, Britain's Military Ambitions are Out of Line With its Budget; Financial
Times, 12 Dec 2007, pg.14.
163
Rayment, S., Refusal To Send Extra Chinooks To Afghanistan Could Put Soldiers' Lives At Risk, Defence Correspondent.
The Sunday Telegraph 17 Feb 2008, pg. 017.
164
House of Commons Hansard Debates Session 2007-8.
165
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 21 July 2008, Column 833W.
166
The MoD’s annual re-costing and book balancing exercise.
167
MoD announces outcome of its equipment examination accessed at http://www.whitehallpages.net/news/archive/157184 on
12 May 10.
168
Private Discussions Jul 09-Feb 10.
169
Private Discussions Feb 10.
170
Private Discussions Sep 09.

43
both AWHL and foreign manufacturers trying, in the formers case, to maintain its orders and
in the latter case, to gain a new market. Whilst the outcome was in AWHL’s favour171 it is
clear from a number of sources that previously spent funds, contractual cancellation clauses
and overt UK plc lobbying made the UK option the only one which was politically acceptable.
That is not to say that the bureaucracy was not recommending the same course of action but
merely that they were pushing on an open political door 172.

During the same period as the Equipment Examination, and announced at the same time,
the LitM capability area was able to negotiate a UOR funded upgrade to the existing Army
AH9 Lynx that would enhance its capability for all year operations in Afghanistan. With a
lead time of less than 13 months from contract signature to aircraft deployment, this is
probably one of the most successful short term projects of the Afghanistan project to date,
serving as a highly effective de-risking programme for the Wildcat programme whilst building
on an existing AWHL Lynx upgrade. Whilst not sitting strictly within our area model it does
show how a strong bureaucratic will coupled with both a willing industrial partner and a
government desperate for immediate action can yield results.

Although the Equipment Examination had helped to drive some costs out of the MoDs
overplayed budget, it was still some £3bn over budget in the first 4 years of its 10-year
plan 173. This led to the formation of a MoD sponsored independent review into acquisition by
Bernard Gray which when it reported, in late 2009, showed a massive mismatch in the
desired spending of the department and the projected amount that was available, even
before the next CSR. Thus the FMH programme was not placed in a good position and
there was a need to find some cost effective alternatives to purchase, that could extend the
life of the Puma and Sea King support helicopter fleets.

Much of the detail of these plans came into the public domain rather earlier than anticipated,
during the evidential proceedings for the HCDC’s Helicopter Capability report174. During
these proceedings all agents represented in the area model gave evidence to the committee
on the relative merits of Life Extension Programmes (LEP) and the new build of helicopters.
It is notable that during this process the Minister for Defence Procurement (Quentin Davies)
seemingly seemed to advocate a change in policy whilst being questioned, by stating that:
‘There is the possibility of dispensing with those two life-extension programmes and bringing
forward the Future Medium Helicopter procurement’ 175

171
House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 18 Dec 2008, Column 66WS.
172
Private Discussions Jul 09- Feb 10.
173
Private Discussions Jan-Feb 09.
174
HCDC 434, Eleventh Report Session 2008-09, Helicopter Capability.
175
Ibid, Ev 28, Question 159.

44
Although the Minister was clearly being placed under considerable pressure from the
committee on a need to deliver newer aircraft, this might perhaps indicate that the
recommendations within the bureaucracy were not as firm as they might have been with
respect to the LEP programmes. Additionally, it is clear from the evidence provided by
industry to the same HCDC evidence sessions and submissions, that there were significant
‘offers’ available from a sector desperate to see some forward motion in this protracted
support helicopter saga. But this was not the only pressure that industry was applying, as it
sought to push for an outcome that did not involve an LEP programme delivered in Romania
(the favoured Puma option). External to the bureaucracy, all the major manufacturers were
also putting their case to government through a number of different channels including face
to face meetings with ministers 176. This overt pressure within the area model is a clear
indication of how the closely bounded and balanced decisions of the bureaucracy, in the
form of the capability team, can be undermined (or indeed enhanced) by external agency.

The output from the HCDC was typically scathing about the lack of investment into the
helicopter programme, but the change of direction indicated by the Minister did partially
occur. Having gained the support of the Afghan military equipment team in the Cabinet
Office177 he directed that the capability area to see if there was another way of improving
support helicopter capability without having to resort to expensive short term LEP’s178. This
led directly to Defence Borad Acceptance of the ‘Vision 2020’ helicopter programme, which,
whilst providing savings of some £1bn finally seemed to deliver an increase to Support
Helicopter capability relatively quickly (first additional CH47 deliveries in 2012). Additionally,
its proposed move of Merlin support helicopters from the RAF to the Royal Navy, seemingly
provided for the complete elimination of the now expensive to operate Sea King from the
MoD inventory, whilst providing significant synergies for the RN with the existing ASW Merlin
force. From an area model perspective it would seem that having been given rather firm
direction to provide an answer from both the Executive and the Government, the LitM
capability area was able to provide an outcome of logical simplicity difficult to countenance,
although it is clear that AWHL in particular were unhappy not to receive an order for new
aircraft179.

176
Private Discussions Jul 09 – Jan 10.
177
Interview Cdre R Harding RN 4 Sep 09.
178
Private Discussions Dec 09.
179
Private Discussions Jan 10.

45
Conclusion

This paper has sought to investigate UK support helicopter procurement from AST404 to
Vision 2020 through the paradigm of a complimentary set of decision point and decision area
models. In doing so it has shown how the tightly bounded decisions and recommendations
of those agents within, initially the single service OR staffs and latterly the MoD’s Capability
Area, can be modified and altered by broad strategic changes and the political preference of
the government of the time.

In the case of the Westland’s crisis it is clear that when devoid of firm recommendations from
the bureaucracy, narrow political disagreements across government departments and with
the executive, can create problems for bureaucracies affecting both the MoD’s wider
interests and sometimes the politicians concerned. Fallout from such decisions have
significantly affected the number of jobs within the UKs sole helicopter manufacturer, whilst
political decisions, again made because of conflicting departmental advice, can reduce the
scope for future capability development.

The on and off nature of support helicopter programmes through the late 80s and early 90s
programme appears to have been heavily affected by internecine arguments over
responsibility between bureaucratic agents within both the Army and RAF. In fact this
investigation has shown how the dogged determination of the Naval OR Staff to see its
Merlin and Lynx programmes through the end of the Cold War and significant cuts that
followed, as a classic example of how firm bureaucratic agency direction delivers results
within a decision area model. Additionally, the ability of the government to override
bureaucratic recommendations, as demonstrated by the 1995 NAPNOC purchase of Merlin
support helicopters, again serves to emphasise how closely tuned to political reality those
agents who work in the capability area must be.

Although the SDR of 1997 was widely lauded at the time we have shown that the
governments failure to adequately fund the programme, through a lack of credible financial
agreements within government, significantly affected the later Puma/Sea King replacement
programmes (FASH/SABR). That this programme failed and was drawn into a Treasury
driven savings measure by the effective inaction of JHC coupled with the CDPs rejection of
the business case, again shows how important it is to have a strong single agent advising
on the procurement of equipment capability.

Throughout these case studies the interaction of the three services as agents, in promoting
their own projects, has been seen to have both reinforcing and undermining effects.
Although the reorganisation that occurred during the introduction of SMART procurement

46
should have eliminated these issues, Gray’s report showed that they were never far from the
Surface and often overtly in evidence. Again such arguments and disagreements remove
the consensus of bureaucratic recommendations as they pass though the levels and areas
of government, damaging the cohesiveness of core messages. From our models’
perspective the effect is to fragment the different component elements, making coherent
decision-making, based on requirement, cost and time, much more difficult to achieve.

Perhaps one notable lesson from the final example is that whilst the decision model provides
for top down decision making, the more overlap that can be gained in the area model, the
more likely it is that the outcome will result in a positive and coherent decision.
Disconnected lines of advice, and the subsequent confused messaging that such gaps
create, has been shown to be enduring factor in the failure of the UK MoD to deliver the
support helicopter requirement that was first identified in AST404 in the early 1980s. Only
after the large degree of public engagement, supported by effective political agency by the
HCDC over Afghanistan, that the UK Defence Bureaucracy seemed to finally push a
coherent message to decision makers in both the Government and the Executive.

47