COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC.

, ASPAC MULTI-
TRADE, INC., (formerly ASPAC-ITEC PHILIPPINES, INC.) and
FRANCISCO S. AGUIRRE, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
ITEC INTERNATIONAL, INC., and ITEC, INC., respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC.,
(CMDI, for brevity) and ASPAC MULTI-TRADE, INC., (CASPAC, for
brevity) are both domestic corporations, while petitioner Francisco S.
Aguirre is their President and majority stockholder. Private
Respondents ITEC, INC. and/or ITEC, INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC, for
brevity) are corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of
the State of Alabama, United States of America. There is no dispute that
ITEC is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines.
ITEC entered into a contract with petitioner ASPAC referred to as
“Representative Agreement” wherein ITEC engaged ASPAC as its
“exclusive representative” in the Philippines for the sale of ITEC’s
products(Electronic products). Through a “License Agreement” entered
into by the same parties they were able to incorporate and use the name
“ITEC” in its own name. Thus, ASPAC Multi-Trade, Inc. became legally and
publicly known as AS-PAC-ITEC (Philippines).
One year into the second term of the parties’ Representative
Agreement, ITEC decided to terminate the same, because petitioner ASPAC
allegedly violated its contractual commitment as stipulated in their
agreements.
ITEC charges the petitioners and another Philippine Corporation,
DIGITAL BASE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (DIGITAL, for brevity), the
President of which is likewise petitioner Aguirre, of using knowledge and
information of ITEC’s products specifications to develop their own line
of equipment and product support, which are similar, if not identical to
ITEC’s own, and offering them to ITEC’S former customer.
In the RTC, the stand of Plaintiff (ITEC) are as follows:
(1) defendants DIGITAL, CMDI, and Francisco Aguirre and their agents and
business associates, to cease and desist from selling or attempting to sell to
PLDT and to any other party, products which have been copied or
manufactured “in like manner, similar or identical to the products, wares and
equipment of plaintiff,”
(2) defendant ASPAC, to cease and desist from using in its corporate name,
letter heads, envelopes, sign boards and business dealings, plaintiff’s
trademark, internationally known as ITEC
The Defendants Stand are as follows:
(1) That plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue as it is a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines without the required BOI authority and SEC
license,
(2) that plaintiff is simply engaged in forum shopping which justifies the
application against it of the principle of “forum non conveniens.”
The RTC ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs(ITEC) denying the motion
to dismiss by the defendants stating that:
(1) the motion to dismiss is devoid of legal merit with a rejection of both
grounds relied upon by the defendants in their motion,
(2) directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the same
day.
CA merely affirmed the lower Court’s decision.
Foreign Elements:
- Private respondents (ITEC) is a foreign corporation and that
petitioners allege that they are doing business in the Philippines
without the requisite authority and license from the Board of
Investments and the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
thus, disqualified from instituting the present action in our courts.
Issue:
Whether or not Forum non-conveniense shall be applied? No
Ruling:
Such Ruling on the principle of forum non-convenience is
deemed premature by the Supreme Court. Petitioner’s insistence on the
dismissal of this action due to the application, or non-application, of the
private international law rule of forum non conveniens defies well-settled
rules of fair play. According to petitioner, the Philippine Court has no
venue to apply its discretion whether to give cognizance or not to the
present action, because it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly having no personality to
sue before Philippine Courts. This argument is misplaced because the
court has already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the suit, by
virtue of his filing the original complaint. And as we have already
observed, petitioner is not at liberty to question plaintiff’s standing to sue,
having already acceded to the same by virtue of its entry into the
Representative Agreement referred to earlier.
Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine
Court, based on the facts of the case, whether to give due course to the
suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non conveniens. Hence, the
Philippine Court may refuse to assume jurisdiction in spite of its having
acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the court may assume jurisdiction
over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following
requisites are met:
1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to;
2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law and the facts; and,
3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision.
The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the
court’s disposition to give due course to the questioned action, the
matter of the present forum not being the “most convenient” as a
ground for the suit’s dismissal, deserves scant consideration.
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs STOCKTON W. ROUZIE
Facts:
Respondent Stockton Rouzie, an American citizen, entered into a
contract with Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of State of Connecticut, whereby
BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services
in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration
of 10% of the gross receipts. In 1992, respondent secured a contract with
the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers
affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.
In 1994, respondent Rouzie filed before the Arbitration Branch of
NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc., (RUST), Rodney
Gilbert and Walter Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment contract. The Labor Arbiter rendered
judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s money claims. Upon
appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed
respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The case was
elevated to the Supreme Court but it was dismissed.
In 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action
for damages before the RTC of Bauang, La Union. The complaint named as
defendants petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and
RUST, and reiterated the allegations in the labor case. The complaint also
averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner Raytheon itself had
combined and functioned as one company.
In its answer, petitioner alleged that it was a foreign corporation duly
licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering into any
arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. It
denied combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of assuming the
alleged obligation of the said companies and referred to the NLRC decision
which disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent and
BMSI and RUST, denominated as “Special Sales Representative
Agreement,” the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Connecticut.
 Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure
to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens.
[Note: foreign elements in the dispute - namely, the parties and witnesses
involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be
presented is located outside the Philippines]
RTC:
The RTC denied petitioner’s omnibus motion and held that the factual
allegations in the complaint, assuming the same to be admitted, were
sufficient for the trial court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled
that the principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial
court could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation
licensed to do business in the Philippines.
CA:
On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit; hence,
the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens
Held:
No, the Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err in refusing to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens.
In Hasegawa vs. Kitamura, the Court outlined three consecutive
phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of laws problems, namely:
jurisdiction, choice of law and recognition and enforcement of judgment.
Thus, in the instances where the Court held that the local judicial machinery
was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign element, the following
requisites had to be proved:
(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort;
(2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law and the facts;
 (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce
its decision.
On the matter of jurisdiction over conflicts-of-laws problem where the case
is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case
even if the rules of conflicts-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point
to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country
where the case is filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature subject matter of an action is conferred by
the Constitution and the law and by the material allegations in the
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. The instant
case is an action for damages arising from an alleged breach of
contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of
damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over herein respondent Rouzie (as party plaintiff) upon the
filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person
of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary
appearance in court.
That the subject contract included stipulation that the same shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that
the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are
precluded from hearing the civil action.
Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this
state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties. The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the
substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the
merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-law
cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most
“convenient” or available forum and the parties are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements
in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction
over the case and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of
forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more
properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion
of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should
do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the court’s desistance.
NAVIDA VS. DIZON
Facts:
During the year 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different
Texas state courts by citizens of 12 foreign countries, including the
Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they
allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a
chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23
foreign countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and
consolidated in, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
Houston Division. The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the
dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
In a Memorandum Order, the Federal District Court conditionally granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss provided the defendants:
(1) participated in expedited discovery in the United States
(2) either waived or accepted service of process and waived any other
jurisdictional defense in any action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions
in his home country or the country in which his injury occurred.
(3) waived any limitations-based defense that has matured since the
commencement of these actions in the courts of Texas;
(4) stipulated that any discovery conducted during the pendency of these
actions may be used in any foreign proceeding to the same extent as if it had
been conducted in proceedings initiated there; and

(5) submitted an agreement binding them to satisfy any final judgment

rendered in favor of plaintiffs by a foreign court.
In the event that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an action commenced by a plaintiff in these
actions in his home country or the country in which he was injured, that
plaintiff may return to this court and, upon proper motion, the court will
resume jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never been dismissed
for Forum of Non Conveniens.
RTC of General Santos City
 A total of 336 plaintiffs from General Santos City filed a Joint Complaint
in the RTC of General Santos City. Petitioners Navida, et al., prayed for the
payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive
systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP.
Without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos
City issued an Order dismissing the complaint.
First, the trial court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear
the case because the substance of the cause of action as stated in the
complaint against the defendant foreign companies cites activity on their part
which took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial
domain of the Philippines.
Second, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that Navida, et al.,
were coerced into submitting their case to the Philippine courts, merely to
comply with the U.S. District Court’s Order and in order to keep open to the
plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the U.S. District Court.
Third, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary
appearance of the defendant companies.
Fourth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of the
Petitioners Navida, et al., of filing the case in the Philippine courts violated
the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia.
RTC of General Santos City declared that it had already lost its
jurisdiction over the case. Hence, this petition for review.
RTC of Davao City
Another joint complaint for damages was filed before Branch 16 of the RTC
of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City. They alleged that as workers
in the banana plantation and/or as residents near the said plantation, they
were made to use and/or were exposed to nematocides, which contained the
chemical DBCP. According to Abella, et al., such exposure resulted in
“serious and permanent injuries to their health, including, but not limited to,
sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities.” The RTC of
Davao City, however, junked the Civil Cases filed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the RTC of GenSan and Davao have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
Affirmative.
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law, on
a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature
through the enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in
civil cases under BP Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of
the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand,
exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00).
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states: The
exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg.
129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages
are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of
action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. It is clear that the claim
for damages is the main cause of action and that the total amount sought in
the complaints is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff
claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in
General Santos City and Davao City.
The allegations of the plaintiffs in the complaints constitute the cause of
action of plaintiff claimants a quasi-delict, which under the Civil Code is
defined as an act, or omission which causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant
companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for
damages filed by Navida, et al., and Abella, et al., with individual claims of
approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls
within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.
The factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all point to
their cause of action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines. The RTC
of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City obviously have
reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases.
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they
dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken
assumption that the cause of action narrated by Navida, et al., and Abella,
et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial
boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., “the manufacture of the pesticides, their
packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition,
resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce,” and, hence,
outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of
Navida, et al., and Abella, et al., are available only in the Philippines. Plaintiff
claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City
or in Davao City. Also, the specific areas where they were allegedly exposed
to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo
wherein Navida, et al., and Abella, et al., initially filed their claims for
damages. And, the testimonial and documentary evidence from important
witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers, family members and other members
of the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines.
Moreover, the RTC of GenSan and Davao validly acquired jurisdiction
over the persons of all the defendant companies.
In the case Meat Packing Corp. of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan,
the court held that “jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases
is acquired by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its
authority or by service of summons.. x x x …active participation of a party in
the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of court’s jurisdiction and
willingness to abide in the resolution of the case”.
 Jurisdiction is different from “exercise of jurisdiction”. Jurisdiction refers
to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered
therein. Where a court has jurisdiction over persons of the defendants and
the subject matter, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is the
exercise of jurisdiction.
HASEGAWA V. KITAMURA
FACTS:
Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd., a Japanese consultancy firm
providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects of
foreign governments, entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement
with Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the
Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamura will extend professional
services to Nippon starting April 1, 1999. Following Nippon’s consultancy
contract with the Philippine Government, Kitamura was assigned as the
project manager of the STAR Project.
When the STAR Project was almost complete, DPWH engaged the
consultancy services of Nippon for the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement
Project. Kitamura was again assigned as the project manager.
On February 2000, Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon’s General Manager for its
International Division, informed Kitamura that the company will no longer
automatically renew the ICA and they will only engage his services up to the
substantial completion of the STAR Project on March 31, 2000.
Kitamura, through his lawyer, requested a negotiation conference and
demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI Project but Nippon refused to
negotiate for the renewal of the ICA as it was for a fixed term which already
expired.
Kitamura then initiated a Civil Case for specific performance and damages
with the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon and Hasegawa contended that the ICA
had been perfected in Japan and executed by and between Japanese
nationals, and moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
asserting that following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex
contractus, the case could only be heard in the courts of Japan.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Nippon and Hasegawa then filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of statement of material
dates and insufficient verification and certification against forum shopping.
Nippon and Hasegawa then filed a second Petition for Certiorari complying
with the said findings.
CA then rendered a decision finding that there was no grave abuse of
discretion in the RTC’s denial of the motion to dismiss. It ruled that the
principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because the
validity of the written agreement was not put in issue in the pleadings, and
the RTC is correct in applying lex loci solutionis. Nippon and Hasegawa’s
motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground that the RTC of
Lipa City has no jurisdiction over cases involving contracts executed outside
the country by foreign nationals?
RULING:
No. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases
are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of
judgments.
Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this
state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state
constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice
of the lex fori will often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for one do not
always provide the necessary “significant contacts” for the other. The
question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is
different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction
to enter a judgment.
In this case, only the first phase is at issue—jurisdiction. In assailing the trial
court’s jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to subject matter
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is
conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the
court. It is given only by law and is determined by the allegations of the
complaint.
In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that
the trial court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject
controversy. What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter
jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and
the “state of the most significant relationship rule.”
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law
applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the second phase, the
choice of law. They determine which state’s law is to be applied in resolving
the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue
in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable
but also not yet called for.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to
deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis
for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
does not include it as a ground. Second, whether a suit should be entertained
or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts
of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. Third, the
propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a
matter of defense.
Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and
hear the civil case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners
to assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts
correctly denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA, INC. v. JOSEPH BASSO
Facts:
Petitioner Continental Micronesia, Inc. (CMI) is a foreign corporation
organized and existing under the laws of and domiciled in the United States
of America (US). It is licensed to do business in the Philippines. Basso, a US
citizen, resided in the Philippines prior to his death.
Mr. Braden Managing Director-Asia of Continental Airlines (Continental),
offered Basso the position of General Manager of the Philippine Branch of
Continental. Basso accepted the offer.
It was not until much later that Mr. Braden, who had since returned to the
US, sent Basso the employment contract8 dated February 1, 1991, which
Mr. Braden had already signed. Basso then signed the employment contract
and returned it to Mr. Braden as instructed.
CMI took over the Philippine operations of Continental, with Basso retaining
his position as General Manager. Basso received a letter from Mr. Schulz,
who was then CMI's Vice President of Marketing and Sales, informing Basso
that he has agreed to work in CMI as a consultant on an "as needed basis.”
Basso wrote another letter addressed to Ms. Woodward of CMI's Human
Resources Department inquiring about the status of his employment. Ms.
Woodward responded that pursuant to the employment contract dated
February 1, 1991, Basso could be terminated at will upon a thirty-day notice.
Ms. Woodward also reminded Basso of the telephone conversation between
him, Mr. Schulz and Ms. Woodward where they informed him of the
company's decision to relieve him as General Manager. CMI offered Basso
a severance pay, in consideration of the Php1,140,000.00 housing advance
that CMI promised him.
Basso filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Moral and Exemplary
Damages against CMI. CMI filed a Motion on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of CMI and the subject matter of the controversy Labor
Arbiter granted the Motion to Dismiss. Applying the doctrine of lex loci
contractus, the Labor Arbiter held that the terms and provisions of the
employment contract show that the parties did not intend to apply our Labor
Code The Labor Arbiter also held that no employer-employee relationship
existed between Basso and the branch office of CMI in the Philippines, but
between Basso and the foreign corporation itself.
On appeal, the NLRC REMANDED the case to the Labor Arbiter for the
determination of certain facts to settle the issue on jurisdiction.
Labor Arbiter's Ruling:
Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of merit and jurisdiction.
The Labor Arbiter agreed with CMI that the employment contract was
xecuted in the US "since the letter-offer was under the Texas letterhead and
the acceptance of Complainant was returned there." Thus, applying the
doctrine of lex loci celebrationis, US laws apply. Also, applying lex loci
contractus, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the parties did not intend to apply
Philippine laws.
NLRC's Ruling:
Reversed and Set aside LA ruling.
It ruled that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the case when CMI
voluntarily submitted to his office's jurisdiction. On the merits, the NLRC
agreed with the Labor Arbiter that Basso was dismissed for just and valid
causes on the ground of breach of trust and loss of confidence.
The Court of Appeal's Decision:
Denied and Dismissed Continental’s petition. Granted Basso’s petition and
declared the dismissal illegal.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in ruling that the labor arbiter
and the nlrc had jurisdiction to hear and try the illegal dismissal case.
2. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in finding that basso was not
validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust or confidence
Held:
1.
No.
In Hasegawa v. Kitamura, we stated that in the judicial resolution of conflict-
of-laws problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice
of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. In resolving the
conflicts problem, courts should ask the following questions:
A. "Under the law, do I have jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties to this case?
B. "If the answer is yes, is this a convenient forum to the parties, in light
of the facts?
C. "If the answer is yes, what is the conflicts rule for this particular
problem?
D. "If the conflicts rule points to a foreign law, has said law been
properly pleaded and proved by the one invoking it?
E. "If so, is the application or enforcement of the foreign law in the
forum one of the basic exceptions to the application of foreign law? In short,
is there any strong policy or vital interest of the forum that is at stake in
this case and which should preclude the application of foreign law?
A. This case stemmed from an illegal dismissal complaint. The Labor Code,
under Article 217, clearly vests original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases involving termination disputes to the Labor Arbiter. Hence, the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case. As regards jurisdiction over the parties, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the person of Basso,
notwithstanding his citizenship, when he filed his complaint against CMI. On
the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of CMI was acquired through the
coercive process of service of summons. We note that CMI never denied
that it was served with summons.
B. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a
conflict-of-laws case may assume jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided,
that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to
which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is
in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its
decision.46 All these requisites are present here. Basso may conveniently
resort to our labor tribunals as he and CMI lad physical presence in the
Philippines during the duration of the trial. CMI has a Philippine branch, while
Basso, before his death, was residing here. The labor tribunals can make an
intelligent decision as to the law and facts. The incident subject of this case
(i.e. dismissal of Basso) happened in the Philippines, the surrounding
circumstances of which can be ascertained without having to leave the
Philippines.
C. In Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of Appeals, we emphasized that an
essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting
factor" or "point of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual
relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting fact or
point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the
place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. Pursuant to Saudi Arabian
Airlines, we hold that the "test factors," "points of contact" or "connecting
factors" in this case are the following:
(1) The nationality, domicile or residence of Basso;
(2) The seat of CMI;
(3) The place where the employment contract has been made, the locus
actus;
(4) The place where the act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties;
(5) The intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern
their agreement, the lex loci intentionis; and
(6) The place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or
done.
Applying the foregoing in this case, we conclude that Philippine law the
applicable law. Basso, though a US citizen, was a resident here from the
time he was hired by CMI until his death during the pendency of the case.
CMI, while a foreign corporation, has a license to do business in the
Philippines and maintains a branch here, where Basso was hired to work.
The contract of employment was negotiated in the Philippines. A purely
consensual contract, it was also perfected in the Philippines when Basso
accepted the terms and conditions of his employment as offered by CMI. The
place of performance relative to Biasso's contractual duties was in the
Philippines. The alleged prohibited acts of Basso that warranted his
dismissal were committed in the Philippines. Clearly, the Philippines is the
state with the most significant relationship to the problem. Thus, we hold that
CMI and Basso intended Philippine law to govern, notwithstanding some
references made to US laws and the fact that this intention was not expressly
stated in the contract. If the foreign law is not properly pleaded or proved,
the presumption of identity or similarity of the foreign law to our own laws,
otherwise known as processual presumption, applies. Here, US law may
have been properly pleaded but it was not proved in the labor tribunals.
2.
No. Basso was illegally dismissed.
The dismissal of Basso was not founded on clearly established facts and
evidence sufficient to warrant dismissal from employment. While proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not required to establish loss of trust and
confidence, substantial evidence is required and on the employer rests the
burden to establish it. There must be some basis for the loss of trust, or that
the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is
responsible for misconduct, which renders him unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded by his position. We find that CMI failed to discharge
its burden to prove the above acts. CMI merely submitted affidavits of its
officers, without any other corroborating evidence
UNITED AIRLINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS et. al.
G. R. No. 124110. April 20, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.
Facts:
Private respondent Aniceto Fontanilla purchased from petitioner
United Airlines, through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila, 3 “Visit the
U.S.A.” tickets for himself, his wife and his minor son Mychal for the routes
to San Francisco, Washington, Chicago, and Los Angeles. All flights had
been confirmed previously by United Airlines. The Fontanillas proceeded to
the United States as planned, where they used the first coupon from San
Francisco to Washington. Aniceto then bought 2 additional coupons each for
his family from petitioner at its office in Washington Dulles Airport. After
paying the penalty for rewriting their tickets, the Fontanillas were issued
tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words “CHECK-IN
REQUIRED,” for United Airlines Flight No. 1108, set to leave from Los
Angeles to San Francisco at 10:30 a.m. They were set to leave but were
denied boarding because the flight was overbooked. The cause of the non-
boarding makes up the bone of contention in this controversy.
The lower court ruled in dismissing the case, to which the CA ruled
otherwise, stating that there was an admission on the part of petitioner that
the Fontanillas did in fact observe the check-in requirement and further ruled
that even assuming there was failure to observe the check-in requirement,
petitioner failed to comply with the procedure laid down in cases where a
passenger is denied boarding, applying the the Code of Federal Regulation
Part on Oversales by the law on United States. It likewise gave credence to
the claim of Aniceto Fontanilla that petitioner’s employees were discourteous
and arbitrary and, worse, discriminatory. Thus, Fontanillas were entitled to
moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent court is correct in applying the laws of the
United States of America.
Held:
 NO. In the case at bar, Philippine law is the applicable law. Although,
the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets
were purchased through petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets
were “rewritten” in Washington, D.C. However, such fact did not change the
nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in
Manila.
In the case of Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals, this Court applied the
doctrine of lex loci contractus. According to the doctrine, as a general rule,
the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into governs with
respect to its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation. This has been
said to be the rule even though the place where the contract was made is
different from the place where it is to be performed, and particularly so, if the
place of the making and the place of performance are the same. Hence, the
court should apply the law of the place where the airline ticket was
issued, when the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum
and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline.
The law of the forum on the subject matter is Economic Regulations
No. 7 as amended by Boarding Priority and Denied Boarding Compensation
of the Civil Aeronautics Board, which provides that the check-in requirement
be complied with before a passenger may claim against a carrier for being
denied boarding:
SEC. 5. Amount of Denied Boarding Compensation.—Subject to the
exceptions provided hereinafter under Section 6, carriers shall pay to
passengers holding confirmed reserved space and who have presented
themselves at the proper place and time and fully complied with the carrier’s
check-in and reconfirmation procedures and who are acceptable for carriage
under the Carrier’s tariffs but who have been denied boarding for lack of
space, a compensation at the rate of: x x
Private respondents’ narration that they were subjected to harsh and
derogatory remarks seems incredulous. However, this Court will not attempt
to surmise what really happened. Suffice to say, private respondent was not
able to prove his cause of action, for as the trial court correctly observed:
x x x plaintiffs claim to have been discriminated against and insulted in the
presence of several people. Unfortunately, plaintiffs limited their evidence to
the testimony [of] Aniceto Fontanilla, without any corroboration by the people
who saw or heard the discriminatory remarks and insults; while such limited
testimony could possibly be true, it does not enable the Court to reach the
conclusion that plaintiffs have, by a preponderance of evidence, proven that
they are entitled to P1,650,000.00 damages from defendant.
CADALIN ET AL VS. POEA ET AL

FACTS :

This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the

Supreme Court for Certiorari. Cadalin et al.are Filipino workers recruited by
Asia Int’l Builders Co. (AIBC), a domestic recruitment corporation, for
employment in Bahrain to work for Brown & Root Int’l Inc. (BRII) which is a
foreign corporation with headquarters in Texas.

On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf and on
behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a class suit by filing an “Amended
Complaint” with the POEA for money claims arising from their recruitment by
AIBC and employment by BRII.

The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the
employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily,
the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund;
interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay;
fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS;
refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing
prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and
the accreditation of BRII.

It was revealed that His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain,
issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1976, otherwise known as the
Labour Law for the Private Sector. Complainant contends some of the
pertinent provisions of the Decree that are relevant to their claims.

Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon
termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his
employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days’ wages for each year of
the first three years of service and of one month’s wages for each year of
service thereafter.

Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon a

quantum merit in proportion to the period of his service completed within a
year.”
Complainants contends that the prescription period should be10 years as
provided by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code as their claim arise from a violation
of a contract.

The POEA Administrator holds that the 10 year period of prescription should
be applied but the NLRC provides a different view asserting that Art 291 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines with a 3 years prescription period should
be applied. The Solicitor General expressed his personal point of view that
the 1 yr period provided by the Amiri Decree should be applied.

ISSUE:

Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri

Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the
governing law

RULING :

THE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD BE APPLIED.

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum
(local court), Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of
actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the
laws of the forum.

This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
However, an exception to the rule is that Philippines may adopt foreign
procedural law under the Borrowing Statute such as Sec. 48 of the Civil
Procedure Rule stating “if by the laws of the State or country where the cause
of action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines.

However, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it

ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976. The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any
foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy.

To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of

1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy
on the protection to labor. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies,
the 1987 Constitution emphasized that:“The state shall promote social
justice in all phases of national development” (Sec. 10). ‘The state affirms
labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare” (Sec. 18). In Article XIII on Social Justice and
Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides: “Sec. 3. The State shall afford
full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.”
Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION VS. HON.
BLAS F. OPLE
GR NO. 61594, SEPTEMBER 28, 1990
Contracts; Conflicts of Law; When the relationship between the parties is
much affected by public interest, the otherwise applicable Philippine laws
and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon
some other law to govern their relationship.
FACTS:
On December 2, 1978, the petitioner Pakistan International Airlines
Corporation or PIA, a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines, executed two (2) separate contracts of employment in Manila,
involving Ethelynne Farrales and Ma. MC Mamasig.
The contracts provided for the duration of the employment which is three (3)
years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of parties. Such
employment contract also provides that the applicable laws under the same
would be the laws of Pakistan and only the courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall
have jurisdiction over any matter arising out of or under the employment
agreement.
The private respondents commenced their training in Pakistan, and after the
said training, they began their jobs as flight attendants. On August 2, 1980,
a year and four (4) months prior the expiration of their employment contract,
PIA, through its counsel, sent the private respondents separate letters
indicating that their services would be terminated.
The private respondents jointly instituted a complaint against PIA for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE). After several attempts of
conciliation between parties, MOLE ordered the parties to submit their
position papers and evidence supporting their respective positions.
PIA submitted its position papers, but there is no evidence given. PIA
claimed that both private respondents were habitual absentees. It also
claimed that the services of private respondents were terminated pursuant
to the provisions of the employment contract.
The Regional Director, Francisco Estrella ordered the reinstatement of
private respondents with full back wages or the payment to them of the
amounts equivalent to their salaries for the remainder of the fixed three (3)
year period of their employment contracts. The said order states that the
private respondents had attained the status of regular employees after they
had rendered more than a year of continued service. On appeal, Hon.
Leogardo, Deputy Minister of MOLE, adopted the findings of fact and
conclusion of the Regional Director.

PIA filed a petition for certiorari, assailing that the award of the Regional
Director and the order of the deputy minister is without jurisdiction; for having
been rendered without support in evidence of record since, it was alleged
that there was no hearing conducted, and for having been issued in disregard
and in violation of the petitioner’s right under the employment contracts with
private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Law of Pakistan have jurisdiction and should govern
over the case?
RULING:
No, the Law of Pakistan have no jurisdiction and should not govern
over the case.
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in Par.
10 of the employment contract, which specifies that the law of Pakistan as
the applicable law of the agreement, and that the same lays the venue for
settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement,
“only (in) courts of Karachi, Pakistan.”
The first clause of Par. 10 cannot be invoked to prevent the application of
Philippine labor laws and regulations to the subject matter of the present
case. It is said that the relationship is much affected with public interest and
that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be
rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their
relationship.
Neither may petitioner invoke the second clause of Par. 10, specifying the
Karachi courts as the sole venue for the settlement of disputes between the
contracting parties.
Relevant circumstances of the present case show the multiple and
substantive contacts between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on the
other hand, and the relationship between the parties, upon the other; the
contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here,
at least partially; private respondents are Filipino citizens and residents;
while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business
and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based
in the Philippines in between their assigned flights.
All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative
agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contract disputes between
parties. Under these circumstances, Par. 10 of the employment contract
cannot be given effect so as to oust the Philippine agencies and courts of
the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law.

In conclusion, the private respondents were illegally dismissed. The petition

for certiorari is dismissed.
Zalamea vs CA

Facts:

• Petitioners spouses Zalamea and their daughter purchased 3 airline

tickets from the manila agent of respondent Transworld Airlines. This
is for a flight from NA to LA and the said purchase was discounted
except for their daughter. After sometime, petitioners was notified of
the reconfirmations of the said flight. On the appointed date however,
they were waitlisted. Mr. Zalamea was allowed to board the plane via
the full-fare ticket and the other two was denied.

• In order for them to board, they had to purchase another two tickets
which costed them much more. On arrival to PH, petitioners filed for
damages arising from breach of contract of air carriage with the RTC
of makati. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the payment
of damages and attorneys fees as well as the reimbursement of the
subsequent ticket purchases.

• Respondent appealed the case with CA wherein it removed the award

for moral damages and stated that there is no bad faith or fraud
involved as overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice
of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the
Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board.

• Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was no fraud
or bad faith on the part of respondents as to their overbooking and wait
listing.

Ruling:

Affirmative. CA erred.

Primary Issue: Pertinent ruling to Conflict of Laws

It was wrong for the court of appeals to rule that there was no bad faith or
fraud by relying to the fact that overbooking of flights is a common and
accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed
under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board.

Well settled is the rule that Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can
the courts take judicial notice of them. They must first be alleged and proved
which can be done through an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officers having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody.

In this case, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence.

Another thing to note is that even if such code of federal regulations exists
and is presented, it is not applicable in this case. This is because he principle
of lex loci contractus which requires that the law of the place where the airline
ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are
residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by
the defendant airline.

In this case, the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, hence the
applicable law would be Philippine law.

Sub Issue: As to the award of moral damages

The supreme court ruled that it is proper. Jurisprudence provides that

overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an
award of moral damages and that Award of damages is proper where a
confirmed passenger included in the manifest was denied accommodation
in such flight.

Even if overbooking is allowed, TWA airline is still guilty of bad faith if it did
not properly inform passengers that it could breach the contract of carriage
even if they were confirmed passengers.

TWA is evidently in bad faith when it failed to inform the passengers of its
policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets and for placing self -interest
over the passengers, they are indeed liable.
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
Conflict of Laws; It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among
those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.
FACTS: Respondent Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. Two
years later, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was
issued by an Austrian family court.
In 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen. Then, in 1994, he married
petitioner Grace J. Garcia, a Filipina, in Cabanatuan City. In their application
for a marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”
In 1995, Recio and Garcia were living separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While they were in their conjugal assets were
divided in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
In 1998, Garcia filed for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before RTC
Cabanatuan City on the ground of bigamy: alleging that she learned of
Recio’s marriage to Samson only in 1997.
Recio answered that he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia
in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to many petitioner in 1994.
In the same year (1998), Recio was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia.
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce
issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. The
Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital
union to nullify or annul.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the divorce between Recio and Editha Samson (1st marriage)
was proven.
(2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to many
petitioner.
RULING:
1. Divorce was proven because Garcia failed to object to the admissibility
of the divorce decree when it was presented in the trial court. In Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., the SC ruled that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. Therefore, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.

Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when the divorce decree of May

18, 1989, was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected,
not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered
in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that
it was admissible, subject to petitioner’s qualification. Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioner’s failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

2. No conclusion, case remanded to trial court. It is well-settled in our

jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian
marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to
know by reason of their judicial function. The legal capacity to contract
marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned.

In this case, there is absolutely no evidence that proves Recio’s legal

capacity to marry Garcia.
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a Malaysian corporation
while private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a
Filipino corporation. Sometime in 1983, petitioner filed a suit for collection
against private respondent before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur
which ruled in favor of petitioner ordering private respondent to pay petitioner
in the sum of $5.1M plus interest.
Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private respondent
under the judgement, petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC Pasig to
enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya. On his part, private
respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, lack
of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud and mistake of law of
fact. It was denied and petitioner contended that High Court of Malaya had
acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent by its voluntary
submission to the court’s jurisdiction thru its appointed counsel.
However, after trial, the court dismissed petitioner’s complaint. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the lower court. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya is enforceable in
the Philippine courts
Ruling:
Affirmative.
The SC held that generally, in the absence of a special compact, no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country; however, the rules of comity, utility and
convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by
which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that
may vary in different countries.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from
which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of
regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum.
Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the party
attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its
presumptive validity.
In this case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money
judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered including a
testimonial evidence of petitioner’s counsel who handled the case before the
High Court of Malaya, and documentary evidence showing among others,
the certified and authenticated copy of the judgment promulgated by the High
Court of Malaya.
Hence, having proven the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment,
aid foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell
upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to prove
otherwise. Private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden fell
upon it to prove by clear and convincing evidence the ground which it relied
up to prevent the enforcement of the said judgement. This being the case,
the petition was granted and private respondent was ordered to pay the
petitioner.