Dipidio Earth Savers Multipurpose Association, et. al. vs. Gozun, et. al.

,
485 RA 586

Power of Eminent Domain:

 Power to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation.
 Results on the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated
property.
 The taking to be valid must be for public use. Public use as a requirement for the valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain is now synonymous with public interest, public
benefit, public welfare and public convenience.
Requisites:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period.
3. The entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
4. The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust the owner
and deprive him if beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Police Power:
 power to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property.
 Property condemned under police power is usually noxious (dangerous) or intended for a
noxious purpose, hence, no compensation shall be paid.
 Property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
Ex:
1. The ordinance prohibiting theaters from selling tickets in excess of their seating capacity
was upheld valid as this would promote the comfort, convenience and safety of the
customers.
2. U.S. v. Toribio – the court upheld a statute regulating the slaughter of carabao for the
purpose of conserving an adequate supply of draft animals, as a valid exercise of police
power, notwithstanding the property rights impairment that the ordinance imposed on
cattle owners.
3. People v. De Guzman – a zoning ordinance prohibiting the operation of a lumber yard
within certain areas was assailed as unconstitutional in that it was an invasion of the
property rights of the lumber.
4. City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta – an ordinance requiring private cemeteries to
reserve 6% of their total areas for the burial of paupers was a valid exercise of the police
power under the general welfare clause. This court did not agree in the contention, ruling
that property taken under police power is sought to be destroyed and not, as in this case,
to be devoted to a public use. Being an exercise of eminent domain without provision for
the payment of just compensation, the same was rendered invalid as it violated the
principles governing eminent domain.
 5. Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila – it was held that the imposition of burden over a
private property through easement was considered taking; hence, payment of just
compensation is required.

Note: Where a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be
injurious to public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its continued existence would
be injurious to public interest, THERE IS NO COMPENSABLE TAKING.
However, when a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose,
THERE IS COMPENSABLE TAKING.
The evolution of mining laws gives positive indication that mining operators who are qualified to
own lands were granted the authority to exercise eminent domain for the entry, acquisition, and
use of private lands in areas open for mining operations.

 The question on the judicial determination of just compensation has been settled in the
case of Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay wherein the court declared that the
determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Even
as the executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations, the
same cannot prevail over the court’s findings.
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759

Three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights:
1. Police Power: It is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote
general welfare.
a. The owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in
consequence thereof.
b. It is the most ESSENTIAL OF GOVERNMENT POWERS, AT TIMES THE
MOST INSISTENT, AND ALWAYS ONE FO THE LEAST LIMITABLE
OF THE POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
c. Embraces the whole system of public regulation.
d. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a
few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to
destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the
general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article,
such as opium and firearms.
e. Inherent and plenary power in State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full
to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.
2. Eminent Domain
3. Taxation

Note: These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of
sovereignty.

Ermita-Manila Hotel and Motel Operators, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
L-24693, July 31, 1967

 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a

standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.

QUESTION: What then is the standard of due process?

ANSWER: It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to dictates of justice.
Arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official
action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer
oppression.
 Freedom from arbitrariness.
 It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.
 It exacts fealty “to those strivings for justice” and judges the act of officialdom of
whatever branch “in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect
traditions of legal and political thought.
In the case of Lutz v. Araneta, this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the
American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state’s police power.
Persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by
the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which
may result from the legal exercise of that power.

Justice Malcolm: Liberty as understood in democracies, is not license; it is “liberty

regulated by law”. Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for
the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. NO MAN CAN
DO EXACTLY AS HE PLEASES. EVERY MAN MUST RENOUNCE UNBRIDLED
LICENSED.

Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail
over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve
the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and
order and happiness for all.

US vs. Toribio
Police Power: is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the
Constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and
restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights
of the public. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so
used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interest of the
community.

Rights if property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable
restrain and regulations establish by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling
power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.

Eminent Domain: the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public
use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can be done only on condition of providing
a reasonable compensation therefor.

Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co: general police power of the State, persons and
property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no
question ever was, or upon acknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so far as
natural persons are concerned.

And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says: 

It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power is or may
be exercised, because the various cases in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may
conflict with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the public order or safety, are
infinite in number and in variety. And there are other cases where it becomes necessary for the
public authorities to interfere with the control by individuals of their property, and even to
destroy it, where the owners themselves have fully observed all their duties to their fellows and
to the State, but where, nevertheless, some controlling public necessity demands the interference
or destruction. A strong instance of this description is where it becomes necessary to take, use, or
destroy the private property of individuals to prevent the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a
pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any other great public calamity. Here the individual
is in no degree in fault, but his interest must yield to that "necessity" which "knows no law." The
establishment of limits within the denser portions of cities and villages within which buildings
constructed of inflammable materials shall not be erected or repaired may also, in some cases, be
equivalent to a destruction of private property; but regulations for this purpose have been
sustained notwithstanding this result. Wharf lines may also be established for the general good,
even though they prevent the owners of water-fronts from building out on soil which constitutes
private property. And, whenever the legislature deem it necessary to the protection of a harbor to
forbid the removal of stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish regulations to
that effect under penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the soil equally with other
persons. Such regulations are only "a just restraint of an injurious use of property, which the
legislature have authority" to impose.

So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of

circumstances, and without the fault of the power, that which was once lawful, proper, and
unobjectionable has now become a public nuisance, endangering the public health or the public
safety. Milldams are sometimes destroyed upon this grounds; and churchyards which prove, in
the advance of urban population, to be detrimental to the public health, or in danger of becoming
so, are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery purposes.

DECS vs. San Diego

Police power is validly exercised if:
a. The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State, and
b. The means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to
be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

Police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to
be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the
closer he ink, the longer the bridge to one’s ambition.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who
wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of
course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry
into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be
shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.
While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless
love.

We cannot have society of square pegs in round holes, of dentist who should never have left the
farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as
merchants.

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education
by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and
evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes,
not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits. 

Exception to the “right to quality education”:

 The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or
course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.

A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Consitution:
one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise.

Equal Protection: Equality among Equals

Taxicab Operators vs. Board of Transportation

 To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear,

categorical and undeniable.
 Indeed, the State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also
regulate property rights. Evident then is the conclusion that the Circulars do not suffer
from any constitutional infirmity because to declare a law unconstitutional, the
infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable. 

Ynot vs. IAC,

148 Phil 659
Immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but hear me first!"

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their
invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall,
and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to
hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in
judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be
considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the
issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the
bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or
the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on
the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance
or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking,
may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.
It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich
with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient
rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome
power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost
two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before
it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so
if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken
zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general
welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as
the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of
the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is
hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still
after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in practically everything he does or
owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so,
as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation
under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the
venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater
number.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to
invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like
expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise
of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free
society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.

Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272 

Requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use:
1. Necessity for the taking
 2. Legal authority to effect the taking

Note: The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution,
but not without payment of “just compensation”

Right of Eminent Domain

Republic vs. CA, 
G.R. No. 146587

Curative Statutes: by their very essence, are RETROACTIVE.

 enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would
otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. (Erectors, Inc.
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 256 SCRA 629).
 Intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities, and curb certain evils.
 They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed or
intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory
disability or irregularity in they own action.
 They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid.
 Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing
laws, as if existing laws have been complied with.
Section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court
 The failure of petitioner to execute the judgment, within five years after it had become
final and executory, rendered it unenforceable by mere motion.
Note:
1. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a
public purpose.
2. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by
the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of tis
presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power.
3. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old
case so puts it, all separate interests of individual in property are held under a tacit
agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the
possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it.
4. Ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest IN THE NATURE OF THE
EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS.
Expropriation Proceedings: are not adversarial (argumentative) in the conventional sense, for
the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property.
- By filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and
possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not
to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.
 - Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits:
o  first, the taking must be for public use, and 
o second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property.
These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for
achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other
hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter.
In determining "public use," two approaches are utilized – the
 first is public employment or the actual use by the public, and the 
second  is public advantage or benefit. It is also useful to view the matter as being
subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon the
individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the
individual may be devoted.
Alfonso vs. Pasay City – where the recovery of possession of property taken for public used
prayed for by the unpaid landowner was denied even while no requisite expropriation
proceedings were first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of recovering
compensation for his property computed at its market value at the time it was taken and
appropriate by the State.
just compensation: to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
describe to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary cause of
legal action and compensation or the fair value of the property as between the one who receives
it, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.
- The final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the
time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited
with the court.
Article 1250 Civil Code: In case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the
currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment
when no agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual
obligations.
Contractual Obligations: needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into
account to alter the value of the currency.

Napocor vs. Gutierrez

193 SCRA 1
Note: A simple right-of-way easement (for the passage of transmission lines) transmits no rights,
except that of the easement.
The acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power of
eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of easement of right-of-way
where the SC sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for
public use (NPC vs. CA)

Just compensation: has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the
loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation
(Province of Tayabas vs. Perez, 66 Phil. 467 1998)
Note: No matter how laudable NPC’s purpose is, for which expropriation was sought, it is just
and equitable that they be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which
is the measure of indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity.

Reyes vs. NHS

G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003

Note:

In Republic, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court imposed interest at 12% per
annum in order to help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of
the currency over time, thus:

"The constitutional limitation of 'just compensation' is considered to be the sum

equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the
seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair
value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it being fixed at
the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final
compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property
is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine,
between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place
the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking
occurred.

This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the
time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help
eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over
time. Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or
deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the
basis for the payment when no agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only
to contractual obligations. In other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of
extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency."

The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a
literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must
be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of
eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove
any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this
power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that
at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use."
The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public
benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience."8 The rationale for this new approach is well
explained in the case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona, et al. vs. Reyes, et al.,9 to wit:

"The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes
the scope of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and
correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public
purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have never been a laissez
faire State. And the necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too
often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources.

Manosca vs. CA

Notes: National landmarks are places or objects that are associated with an event, achievement,
characteristic, or modification that makes a turning point or stage in Philippine History.
- Places invested with unusual historical interest is a public use for which the power of
eminent domain may be authorized.

Seña v. Manila Railroad Co., 19 that:

. . . A historical research discloses the meaning of the term "public use" to be one of
constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual increase and each
demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. . . . for
"whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use.

Black summarizes the characterization given by various courts to the term; thus:

Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by
eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, "public use" is one which confers same
benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is
measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is
sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many
members of public, a "public advantage" or "public benefit" accrues sufficient to
constitute a public use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P. 2d 769, 772, 773.

Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take private
property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community as
distinguished from particular individuals. But each and every member of society need not be
equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if the object is to
satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient. 

The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond
question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such
traditional uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public"
has long been discarded. This Court in Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes,18 quoting
from Berman v. Parker (348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27), held:

We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable. The
concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. See DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, 342 US 421, 424, 96 L. Ed. 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. The values it represents are
spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case,
the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account
a wide variety of values. It is no for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the
District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as
sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.

Lagcao vs. Judge Labra

Note: Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random

expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters is certainly
not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution. This is depriving a citizen
of his property for the convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the public.

Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay

148 SCRA 325
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party
claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for
public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its
own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded
from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.

Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and
full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.

The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a
matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.

City of Cebu vs. Spouses Dedamo

G.R. No. 142971, May 7, 2002
In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just
compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation
shall be determined as of the time of actual taking. The Section reads as follows:

SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for
public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and
such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent
(15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated: Provided finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market
value at the time of the taking of the property.

Pascual vs.  Secretary of Public Works

110 Phi. 331

Facts:

It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything
but a public purpose. . . . It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which
must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected
nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare,
may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which
results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or
business, does not justify their aid by the use public money. (25 R.L.C. pp. 398-400; Emphasis
supplied.)

The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following language:
In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only,
discussed suprasec. 14, money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and
not for the advantage of private individuals. (85 C.J.S. pp. 645-646; emphasis supplied.)
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum states:
Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution, public funds may be used
only for public purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its
right to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes and
prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another
purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made for other than for a public purpose.

Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

14 SCRA 292
It is a cardinal rule in taxation that exemptions from payment thereof are highly disfavored by
law, and the party claiming exemption must justify his claim by a clear, positive, or express
grant of such privilege by law. (Collector vs. Manila Jockey Club, G.R. No. L-8755, March 23,
1956; 53 O.G. 3762.)
The phrase "exempt from taxation" as employed in Section 22(3), Article VI of the Constitution
of the Philippines, should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. Statutes
exempting charitable and religious property from taxation should be construed fairly though
strictly and in such manner as to give effect to the main intent of the lawmakers. (Roman
Catholic Church vs. Hastrings 5 Phil. 701.)

Philex Mining vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 125704, August 28, 1998
The power of taxation is sometimes called also the power to destroy. Therefore it should be
exercised with caution to minimize injury to the proprietary rights of a taxpayer. It must be
exercised fairly, equally and uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the "hen that lays the golden
egg" And, in order to maintain the general public's trust and confidence in the Government this
power must be used justly and not treacherously.
Section 1. Bill of Rights – Due Process/Equal Protection

Simon, Jr. vs. Commission on Human Rights

The right to earn a living is a right essential to one’s development, to life and dignity.

 Human Rights – basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity;

o entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his
humanity… Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State
but can only be recognized and protected by it;
o rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural
birth, right, innate and inalienable.
o Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive
displays of placards at street corners.

Republic. Vs. Sandiganbayan

 Human Rights – based on the assumption that each individual person was entitled
to an equal degree of respect as a human being.
o Universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is
generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing
almost all aspects of life.
 Universal Declaration of Human rights (UDHR) as a systematic attempt to secure
universal recognition of a whole gamut of human rights. The Declaration affirmed the
importance of civil and political rights such as the rights to life, liberty, property; equality
before the law; privacy; a fair trial; freedom of speech and assembly, of movement, of
religion, of participation in government directly or indirectly; the right to political
asylum, and the absolute right not to be tortured.
 Human Right – Right which inheres in persons from the fact of their humanity; broadest
as it encompasses a human person’s natural rights and civil rights created by law.
 Civil Rights – those that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider
sense, to all inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of
government.
o They include the rights to property, marriage, equal protection of the laws,
freedom of contract, etc.
o Rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.

Ermita-Manila Hotel and Motel Operators, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila

 Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical,
unjust or unreasonable – a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
QUESTION: What then is the standard of due process?
ANSWER: It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to dictates of justice.
Arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official
action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer
oppression.
 Freedom from arbitrariness.
 It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.
It exacts fealty “to those strivings for justice” and judges the act of officialdom of whatever
branch “in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect traditions of legal
and political thought.

Note: Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness;
freedom from arbitrariness; embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play; decisions based on
such a clause requiring a close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society.

 Liberty as understood in democracies, is not license; it is liberty regulated by law.

Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater
good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.
 The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for
the common good.
 The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the
public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power.

SECTIONG 5, 6, and 7

Freedom of Religion

Section 5: No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

Gerona v. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 2

 The realm of belief and creed is infinitive and limitless bounded only by one’s
imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless
and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and
unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales
of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards.
  If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society
and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The Government
steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.
 One may believe in polygamy because it is permitted by his religious, but the moment he
translates said religious belief into an overt act, such as engaging or practicing plural
marriages, he may be prosecuted for bigamy and he may not plead or involve his
religious belief as a defense or as matter of exemption from the operation of the law.
– To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to
the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become law unto himself.
 Again, one may not believe in the payment of taxes because he may claim that according
to his religious belief, the payment of taxes means service to one other than God. As long
as he confines himself to mere belief, well and good. But when he puts said belief into
practice and he actually refuses to pay taxes on his property or on his business, then the
States steps in, compels payment, and enforces it either by court action or levy and
distraint.

Note: The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of
national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the
Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in
our system of governments, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the
flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute, particularly the
recital of the pledge of loyalty is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of
office by a public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar. In said oath, taken while his
right hand is raised, he swears allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, promise to defend
the Constitution and even invokes the help of God; and it is to be doubted whether a member of
Jehovah's Witness who is a candidate for admission to the Philippine Bar would object to taking
the oath on the ground that is religious ceremony.

Singing of National Anthem: It speaks only of love of country, of patriotism, liberty and the
glory of suffering and dying for it. It does not even speak of resorting to force and engaging in
military service or duty to defend the country, which service might meet with objection on the
part of conscientious objectors.

 In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion
involved, and for their failure or refusal. To obey school regulations about the flag salute
they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under
threat of penal sanction.
 If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public
education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. They
could take it or leave it.
 Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute they forfeited
their right to attend public schools.

Hamilton vs. University of California: University required military science and tactics in the
Reserve Officers Training Corps.
Supreme Court of the United States: California has not drafted or called them to attend the
University. They are seeking education offered by the State and at the same time insisting that
they be excluded from the prescribed course solely upon their grounds of their religious beliefs
and consicientious objections to war, preparation for war and military education.

If they elect to resort to an institution for higher education maintained with the state’s moneys,
then they are commanded to follow courses of instruction believed by the state to be vital to its
welfare.

Note: One who is a martyr to a principle – which may turn out in the end to be a delusion or an
error – does not prove by his martyrdom that he has kept within the law.

Minersville School District vs. Gobitis: On the ground that the requirement of participation of all
pupils in the public schools in the flag ceremony did not infringe the due process law and liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution, particularly the one referring to religious freedom and belief.

We have a law (Republic Act 896) requiring compulsory enrollment of children of shcool
age, but said law contains so many exceptions and exemptions that it can be said that a
child of school age is very seldom compelled to attend school, let alone the fact that almost
invariably, there is school crisis every year wherein the pupils applying for admission in
public schools could not be accommodated, and what is equally important is that there is
no punishment or penal sanction either for the pupil who fail to attend school or is expelled
for failure to comply with school regulations such as the compulsory flag salute ceremony,
or his parents.

If a man lived, say on an island, alone and all by himself without neighbors, he would normally
have complete and absolute rights as to the way he lives, his religion, incuding the manners he
practices his religious beliefs. There would be no laws to obey, no rules and regulations to
follow. He would be subject only to Nature's physical laws. But man iis gregarious by nature and
instinct and he gravitates toward community life, to receive and enjoy the benefits of society and
of social and political organization. The moment he does this and he becomes a member of a
community or nation, he has to give rights for the benefit of his fellow citizens and for the
general welfare, just as his fellow men and companions also agree to a limitation of their rights
in his favor. So, with his religion. He may retain retain his freedom or religious belief, but as to
practising the same, he would have to give up some of those practices repugnant to the general
welfare and subordinate them to the laws and sovereignty of the State. In order words, the
practice of religion or religious belief is subject to reasonable and non-discrminatory laws and
regulations by the state.

Note: In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of
Education was not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It
was merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether
Christian, Moslem, Protestant or Jehova’s Witness. The State was merely carrying out the duty
imposed upon it by the Constitution which charges it with supervision over ad regulation of all
educational institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public
education, and see to it that all schools aim to develop among other things, civic conscience and
teach the duties of citizenship.
The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean
exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and
regulations promulgated by competent authority. As was said by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in h is
dissent in West Virginia vs. Barnette, supra:

The constitutional protection of religious freedom ... gave religious equality, not civil
immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from
conformity to law because of religious dogma. Religious loyalties may be exercised
without hindrance from the State, not the State may not exercise that which except by
leave of religious loyalties is within the domain of temporal power. Otherwise, each
individual could set up his own censor against obedience to laws conscientiously deemed
for the public good by those whose business it is to make laws. (West Virginia State
Board vs. Barnette, supra, at p. 653; emphasis supplied)

DIGEST:
Gerona v. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 2

Facts:

On June 11, 1955, Republic Act No. 1265 was approved and went into effect authorizing
and directing the Secretary of Education to issue rules and regulations for the proper conduct of
the flag ceremony, said Secretary issued then Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 on July 21
which quotes R.A. No. 1265, An Act making Flag Ceremony Compulsory in all Educational
Institutions.

On the other hand, petitioners, thru their counsel wrote to the Secretary of Education
petitioning that in the implementation of this flag ceremony, they and their children attending
school be allowed to remain silent and stand at attention with their arms and hands down and
straight at the sides and they be exempting from executing the formal salute, singing of the
National Anthem and the reciting of the patriotic pledge, as they belong to what is called the
Jehovah’s Witness. In their teaching, the obligation imposed by law of God is superior of that
laws enacted by the State and therefore they should not bow down nor serve any graven image or
any likeness of anything. Upon which, they consider that the flag is an “image within this
command”, there refuse to salute it as freedom of their religion.

Issue:

Whether or Department Order No. 8, s. 1955 quoting Republic Act No 1265 violates the
freedom of religion.

Ruling:

No. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot
mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and
regulations promulgated by competent authority. According to Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his
dissent in West Virginia vs. Barnette, the constitutional protection of religious freedom gave
religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious
dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.

Also, the Filipino Flag is not an image that requires religious veneration, rather a symbol
of Republic the Philippines. Therefore, the Department Order No. 8, does not violate the
Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion but a compliance with
the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201

Direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of
adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that
our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and
state is prejudi cial to both, doe occasions might arise when the estate will use the church, and
the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their recognized this principle of
separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development.

Note: It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty,
not mere religious toleration.

 Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound

reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs.
 When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid
of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals,
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and
secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of
justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides
the destinies of men and nations
 There are certain general concessions that are indiscriminately accorded to religious
sects, etc., because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial
moral results.

DIGEST:

Petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent

Church, seeks the issuance a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic
Congress under the provisions pf Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.

It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 23,
subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines stating that “no public money or
property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for
the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.”

Issue:

Whether or not there was a violation of the freedom of religion.

Ruling:

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound

reverence of religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs, Religion as a profession
of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognize.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view and because the phrase
“advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. The
stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money
derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church.

People v. Cayat 68 Phil. 12

Sections 2 and 3 of Act NO. 1639: to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to
facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture.

Throughout the Spanish regime, it had been regarded by the Spanish Government as a sacred
“duty to conscience and humanity” to civilize these less fortunate people living “in the obscurity
of ignorance” and to accord them the “moral and material advantages” of community life and the
“protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.”

Equal Protection of Laws (reasonable classifications)

1. Must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. Must be germane to the purposes of the law;
3. Must not be limited to existing conditions only;
4. Must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Non-Christian Tribes – refers not to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area, and
more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in
tribal relationship apart from settled communities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro)

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive,
have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any
kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have
been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably
designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad
experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly
intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes,
thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

Note: The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment.
It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist.

And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer,
the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est
lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain
practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from
providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of
the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount
interests of the nation

DIGEST:

Facts:

The accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province was sentenced by
the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos or suffer imprisonment in case
of insolvency in violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639, asserting that it shall be unlawful
for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive,
have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any
kind that the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been
accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of the act. Thus, the accused challenged the
constitutionality of the Act.

Issue:

Whether or not Act No. 1639 is violates the rights of non-Christian tribes.

Ruling:

No. In the case of Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, non-Christian tribes was
referred not to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area, and more directly, to
natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship
apart from settled communities. Also, the Act is to secure for them the blessings of peace and
harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture
since it has been experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the
free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in
lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard
of life and civilization.
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

SEC. 6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law.

Digest

Facts:

On behalf of his cousin, Estelita Flores, who worked for Julia Salazar’s Far Eastern
Employment Agency, Bartolome Caunca submitted a habeas corpus petition. Estelita has already
received an advance payment from the employment agency in exchange for her services as a
cleaner. Estelita wanted to move to a different house, but the job agency refused to let her. She
was also jailed and her freedom was restricted. The job agency demanded that Estelita pay the
advance payment, which was used to cover her out-of-province transportation costs, before she
was permitted to leave.