REID vs. COVERT, 354 U.S.

1 (1956)

FACTS

Mrs. Clarice Covert killed her husband, a sergeant in the United States Air Force, at an airbase in
England. Mrs. Covert, who was not a member of the armed services, was residing on the base with
her husband at the time. She was tried by a court-martial for murder under Article 118 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The trial was on charges preferred by Air Force personnel,
and the court-martial was composed of Air Force officers. The court-martial asserted jurisdiction
over Mrs. Covert under Article 2(11) of the UCMJ.

The counsel for Mrs. Covert contended that she was insane at the time she killed her husband, but
the military tribunal found her guilty of murder and sentenced her to life imprisonment. The
judgment was affirmed by the Air Force Board of Review. While Mrs. Covert was being held, her
counsel petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to set her free on the ground that the Constitution
forbade her trial by military authorities. Construing this Court's decision in United States ex rel. Toth
v. Quarles, "a civilian is entitled to a civilian trial," The District Court held that Mrs. Covert could not
be tried by court-martial, and ordered her released from custody thus the Government appealed
directly to this Court.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the constitution supersedes international treaties thereby not stripping US
citizens of their constitutional protections under Article 3 and the 5 th and 6th Amendments.

RULING

1. At the time of Mrs. Covert's alleged offense, an executive agreement was in effect between
the United States and Great Britain which permitted United States' military courts to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed in Great Britain by American
servicemen or their dependents. For its part, the United States agreed that these military
courts would be willing and able to try and to punish all offenses against the laws of Great
Britain by such persons.

Even though a court-martial does not give an accused trial by jury and other Bill of Rights
protections, the Government contends that Art. 2 (11) of the UCMJ, insofar as it provides for
a military trial of dependents accompanying the armed forces in Great Britain, can be
sustained in a legislation to carry out the United States' obligations under the international
agreements made with those countries. It is true that the Constitution expressly grants
Congress power to make all rules necessary and proper to govern and regulate those
persons who are serving in the "land and naval Forces." But it cannot extend military
jurisdiction to any group of persons beyond that class described in Clause 14. If the language
of Clause 14 is given its natural meaning, the power granted does not extend to civilians --
even though they may be dependents living with servicemen on a military base. The term
"land and naval forces" refers to persons who are members of the armed services and not to
their civilian wives, children and other dependents. The obvious and decisive answer to this,
of course, is that no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or
on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution.
Article 6 of the Constitution declares the supremacy of the Constitution over treaties.

In summary, since their court-martial did not meet the requirements of Art. III or the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments, we are compelled to determine if there is anything within the
Constitution which authorizes the military trial of dependents accompanying the armed
forces overseas. When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the
shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life
and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888)
US Supreme Court
FIELD, J.

FACTS
The plaintiffs are merchants from San Domingo who are doing business in New York who claimed
that in their treaty with the United States, they have similar terms between the treaty of the US and
the Hawaiian Islands. The sugars produced in the Hawaiian Islands are admitted free of duty under
the treaty. When the plaintiffs reached the port of New York, they claimed that, by the treaty
between the US and Republic of San Domingo, the goods should be admitted on the same terms,
that is, free of duty similar to the terms with the Hawaiian islands. The defendant, who was at the
time collector of the port, refused to allow this claim and treated the goods as dutiable articles
under the acts of congress, and exacted duties on them to the amount of $21,936. The plaintiffs
appealed from the collector's decision to the secretary of the treasury, by whom the appeal was
denied.

The plaintiffs then paid, under protest about the duties exacted from them then brought the present
action to recover the amount. The complaint set forth the facts as to the importation of the goods;
the claim of the plaintiffs that they should be admitted free of duty, because like articles from the
Hawaiian islands were thus admitted; the refusal of the collector to allow the claim; the appeal from
his decision to the secretary of the treasury, and its denial by him; and the payment, under protest,
of the duties exacted; and concluded with a prayer for judgment for the amount. The defendant
demurred to the complaint, the demurrer was sustained, and final judgment was entered in his
favor; to review which the case is brought here.

ISSUE
Whether or not an international treaty will prevail over a constitution

RULING
The plaintiffs rely for a similar exemption of the sugars imported by them from San Domingo upon
the ninth article of the treaty with the Dominican republic, which is as follows: 'No higher or other
duty shall be imposed on the importation into the United States of any article, the growth, produce,
or manufacture of the Dominican republic, or of her fisheries; and no higher or other duty shall be
imposed on the importation into the Dominican republic of any article, the growth, produce, or
manufacture of the United States, or their fisheries, than are or shall be payable on the like articles,
the growth, produce, or manufacture of any other foreign country, or its fisheries.'

The act of congress under which the duties were collected, authorized their exaction. It is of general
application, making no exception in favor of goods of any country. It was passed after the treaty with
the Dominican Republic, and, if there be any conflict between the stipulations of the treaty and the
requirements of the law, the latter must control.

By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of
legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior
efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will
always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating
the language of either; but, if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other:
provided, always, the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.