Paradise Lost: The Ordeal of Kashmir

Author(s): Alexander Rose

Source: The National Interest , Winter 1999/2000, No. 58 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 88-96
Published by: Center for the National Interest

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42897224

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 Paradise Lost
The Ordeal of Kashmir

Kashmir is sacrificed on the altar of region-

spring exercises" - as the more al stability. This predicament may be
IN worldlyworldly
spring local
KASHMIR, exercises"likelocal commentators this - year's as the "annual more like
commentators unfair, but it lends a semblance of order
to joke - escalated into the most severe and balance to South Asia.
and sustained bout of fighting since 1971, How did tiny, paradisiacal Kashmir
when India and Pakistan clashed for the end up in this terrible position? History
third time since Partition. In the Kargiland geography go a long way toward pro-
Mountains, at an altitude of 17,000 feet,viding an answer. Indeed, for centuries
where the air is so thin the trajectory ofbefore the current dispute began in 1947,
artillery shells cannot be predicted andgeography alone practically foreordained
helicopter rotors have difficulty generat- that Kashmir would become a pivotal
ing lift, Pakistani-backed "freedom fight- space on the earth's surface.
ers", mostly imported from Afghanistan, In 1320, after twenty-one dynasties of
battled with Indian troops. After eightruling Hindus, Zoroastrians, Buddhists
weeks of fighting, many hundreds ofand Jains, and five centuries after Hamim
deaths, and international alarm over athe Syrian brought Islam to Kashmir, the
possible nuclear exchange, the ceasefirefirst Muslim sultan of Kashmir ascended
line remains basically where it had been the throne, and over the next few genera-
before the fighting began, and Kashmirtions most of the population converted to
stays partitioned. their lords' religion. The Muslim sultans
Divided between three nuclear-armed
were replaced in 1586 by the Moghul
powers - India, Pakistan and China - Emperors, who were in turn supplanted
Kashmir remains one of the great unsolved,by the Afghans in 1753. Then in 1819 the
perhaps insoluble, questions in world poli- martial Sikh Empire of Lahore - the cre-
tics. In this Himalayan Kosovo, Kashmir'sation of the one-eyed Maharajah Ranjit
owners cannot give an inch for fear of set-Singh - turned Kashmir into a tributary.
ting off a chain reaction of ethno-religious One of those who marched in the Sikh
turmoil within their own countries and thearmy was an illiterate twenty-seven year-
surrounding region. Indeed, all but the old Hindu chieftain, Gulab Singh,
unfortunate Kashmiris (and even they are described by a contemporary as
divided between Muslims, Hindus and
Buddhists) may emerge better off if a fine tall portly man. . . . To all appearance
the gendest of the gende, and the most sin-
Alexander Rose is an editorial writer and columnist cere and truthful character in the world . . .
on foreign affairs at the National Post (Canada). but he is the cleverest hypocrite in existence,

88

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 acknowledge
"the supremacy
of the British
Government."
It was laid
down in the
1846 Treaty of
Amritsar that
Gulab Singh's
annual rent to
the governor-
general, Sir
Henry Har-
dinge, was to
be a horse,
twelve perfect
goats and three
pairs of cash-
mere shawls.
Hardinge
was no fool:
there was now
Mark Stein Studios
a powerful, pro-
as sharp and acute as possible, devoured by British ruler with a proven army sitting
avarice and ambition and when roused horri- on the Sikhs' flank. At the time, the fact
bly cruel. that the ruler was a Hindu and most of
the people he ruled were Muslim did not
He had already distinguished himself in seem particularly important. After Gulab's
battle, and as reward in 1820 or there- death in 1857, his son extended Jammu
abouts the Maharajah conferred upon him and Kashmir's border northward into
the small, hilly principality of Jammu. Gilgit. Maharajah Ranbir Singh was, in
By 1840 the freshly minted Raja had many ways, a typical Victorian, in that he
brought most of the surrounding princi- built schools and funded public works.
palities and kingdoms under his sway. But unfortunately his tax reforms failed
Gulab Singh's expanding empire brought miserably, and corruption set in among
him into contact with the British, who the ruling Hindu bureaucratic class.
were equally intent upon expanding theirs. Within four years of Ranbir's death in
In December 1845 a Sikh army crossed 1885, Kashmir was bankrupt.
the Sutlej and, after fighting four battles Nevertheless, Ranbir's son, Pratab
in fifty-four days, was finally defeated by Singh, held a trump card that ensured
the British and their Indian sepoys. As a continued British support for the Singh
prize for remaining neutral during the dynasty: Kashmir's strategically unique
Anglo-Sikh war, the East India Company position as the guardian of the ancient
allowed Gulab Singh, now raised to invasion routes into British India at a time
Maharajah, to purchase the Sunni when the Great Game - the struggle for
Muslim-populated Vale of Kashmir for a supremacy in Central Asia between the
knockdown price - on condition that he jostling Russian and British Empires -
"and the heirs male of his body" was in full swing.

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 ideas. They were determined to unite a
succeeded by his nephew, Hari country that had in fact never been con-
IN succeededSingh,
Singh,whose1925timewhose the byhadchildless time his in nephew, England Pra tab Hari was had
in England ceived by its British overlords as a bona fide
not been wholly unremarkable (he was country. Particularly galling to them were
blackmailed over his love life). During comments by such luminaries as Sir John
Hari's reign two Kashmiri men came to Strachey, a veteran Imperial administrator,
prominence in India: the first was a who in the 1880s had counseled:
Hindu, Jawaharlal Nehru, who issued a
call for Purna Swaraj (Indian indepen- this is the first and most essential thing to
dence from Britain) at the 1929 Indian learn about India - that there is not and never

National Congress; the second, Sir was an India, or even any country of India,
Mohammad Iqbal, was a Muslim intellec- possessing, according to European ideas, any
tual who in 1930 declared the millions of sort of unity, political, physical, social or reli-
Muslims throughout the subcontinent a gious: no Indian nation, no 'people of India',
distinct political, cultural and religious of which we hear so much.

entity. Iqbal's goal of creating a separate,

post-Raj Muslim state was excitedly pur- At bottom, however, Nehru was a
sued in Kashmir, where Hindu rule was thoroughly Anglicized Brahmin (educated
becoming more onerous. By the summer at Harrow and Cambridge, he even served
of 1931, Muslim agitation against the time in His Majesty's prisons), and he
Maharajah was rife. Even when the found the British way of administration
Maharajah offered concessions, such as a crucial to his conception of building a
state constitution, it was too late to stop centralized and unified state, clothed, as
the ethno-religious contagion spreading he said, in the "garb of modernity." Taken
throughout India. with the West's traditions of democracy
Liberated by the Maharajah's conces- and socialism, Nehru was less enamored
sions, a Kashmiri Muslim Conference was with Europe's cultural homogeneity.
formed. In the winter of 1933, a pamphlet, Imposing one cultural tradition -
Now or Never , was distributed advocating inevitably Hindu - on an India of, as
the creation of "Pakistan" (an acronym Congress literature now trumpets, "920
supposedly formed from the first letters of million people, 4200 communities, 1652
Punjab, Afghania, Kashmir, Sind and the dialects, 26 states, 18 official languages
"tan" from Baluchistan) as a Muslim [and] nine major religions" in the hope of
homeland hived off from Hindu-dominat- creating a single form of Indian-ness
ed India. Then in 1940 Muhammad Ali would invite dissolution. So, to evolve a
shared Indian national identity, Nehru
Jinnah and the Muslim League unani-
mously resolved that, after the war, strove to balance a democratic framework,
overwhelmingly loaded in the Hindus'
no constitutional plan would be acceptablefavor in terms of votes, with religious, eth-
[unless] geographically contiguous units are nic, linguistic and cultural equality for all.
demarcated into regions [where] the areas in In a kind of preview of contemporary
which the Muslims are numerically in themulticulturalism, moreover, minorities
majority . . . should be grouped to constitutewere encouraged to buy in to the Indian
Independent States. dream with legal exemptions, economic
breaks, recognition of linguistic bound-
Nehru and other leaders of the Indianaries and assorted other benefits (for
National Congress, the party founded in instance, Section 370 of the Indian consti-
1885 to promote independence, had othertution limits the power of the federal par-

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liament to make laws for Kashmir). In the a Muslim-majority state ruled by a
Nehruite conception, India's Muslims Hindu; it was geographically contiguous
would be protected from Hindu domina- to both India and Pakistan; and its strate-
tion, and Pakistan, therefore, was a need- gic location was highly prized, convincing
lessly divisive extravagance. both the Muslim League and the
Congress party that possession of it was a
non-negotiable national interest. Nehru,
The Departure of the British
for instance, explained to Clement Attlee
that "Kashmir's northern frontiers . . . run
World War, the Attlee govern- in common with those of three countries,
AT World ment THEment
set War, ENDset
in thein
motionmotion
of Attlee the a govern- hurried Second
a hurried Afghanistan, the USSR and China.
British withdrawal from the Raj, ending Security of Kashmir ... is vital to the
350 years of imperial rule. To fill the security of India." Liaquat Ali Khan, the
immense vacuum, there were to be two Pakistani Prime Minister, offered similar
new independent states - India and reasons why "the security of Pakistan is
Pakistan - created, Big Bang-like, at the bound up with that of Kashmir", but paid
same instant on August 15, 1947, when special attention to the Indian menace
Hindu-majority and Muslim-majority from the south.
areas would be partitioned. The task of The man chosen in February 1947 to
leaving the directly administered British carry out the British "exit strategy" was
areas, which accounted for about two- Lord Mountbatten of Burma, the last
thirds of the subcontinent, and transfer- Viceroy of India and a man composed of
ring power to Indian or Pakistani authori- colossal vanity, grinding snobbery and
ties proved relatively simple; what was dia- vaulting ambition in equal, but compet-
bolically intricate were the arrangements ing, parts. On June 3 he presented a plan
pertaining to the 565 or so Princely States conceding the right to the creation of an
taking up the remaining third. independent Pakistan "on the basis of
These Princely States were spread ascertaining the contiguous majority areas
of Muslims and non-Muslims." He soon
from the 200 states of Kathiawar or a score of established two Boundary Commissions
states of Rajputana in the west, to the Manipur (one for the northwestern Punjab, and the
and a score of Khasi chieftainships in the other for northeastern Bengal) to deter-
extreme east, from Kashmir and minute Simla mine the new borders. Their chairman
Hill states in the north, the Mysore and was an eminent British barrister, Sir Cyril
Madras province states in the south, a limidess Radcliffe, who had never been to India
miscellany of hundreds of states of every shape before he was chosen for the job of divid-
and size . . . with a total area of 712,000 square ing the Raj. Making sure he kept himself
miles and a population of 81 million (1931 strictly aloof from Indian and Pakistani
census) or nearly one-quarter of the Indian pressure, Radcliffe was to present his
population. They ranged from states like hand-drawn map to Mountbatten a few
Hyderabad, as large as Italy, with 14 million of days before the handover.
population, to petty states like Lawa with an As Auden's penetrating lines on
area of 19 square miles, or the Simla Hill hold- Radcliffe in the poem "Partition" attest, the
ings, which were little more than small holdings.1 chairman's mission was a thankless one:

Kashmir, of course, was one of these ^.D. Chopra, Genesis of Indo-Pakistan Conflict on
autocratic Princely States. But a combina- Kashmir (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1990),
tion of three factors made it unique: it was p. 12.

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 Shut up in a lonely mansion, with police night
and day / Patrolling the gardens to keep assas-
sins away, / He got down to work, to the task
of settling the fate / Of millions. The maps at
his disposal were out of date / And the Census
Returns almost certainly incorrect, / But there
was no time to check them, no time to inspect /
Contested areas. The weather was frightfully
hot, / And a bout of dysentery kept him con-
stantly on the trot, / But in seven weeks it was
done, the frontiers decided, / A continent for
better or worse divided. / The next day he
sailed for England, where he quickly forgot /
The case, as a good lawyer must. Return he
would not, / Afraid, as he told his Club, that
he might get shot.
Indeed, as soon as his job was done,
Radcliffe destroyed all his papers relating
to the Boundary Awards, departed for
England, and never returned to India. He
left behind a gnawing Kashmir problem.
While the Boundary Commission was sup-
posed to rely on majority geographical
contiguity in its map-making, the June 3
92
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plan added that "in doing so, it will also
take into account other factors" - which
were left unspecified. This was done for
leeway's sake, for, as Mountbatten recalled,
he told Radcliffe, "It's up to you, but basi-
cally I hope that you are going to get the
right population on the right side of the
line. But the line must make some sense
[because] if you make it an impossible line
to work along, there'll be trouble."2
Unfortunately, one such "impossible
line", one requiring Radcliffe to take
"other factors" into account, was situated
on the southern intersection of Kashmir,
Pakistan and India: the Gurdaspur
District, a Muslim area of 1.4 million
people. On both geographical and reli-
gious grounds, Gurdaspur was destined
for Pakistan, but Radcliffe awarded three
out of its four sub-districts to India. Of
those three, two were substantially
Muslim-majority, making the decision
even more bewildering.
Radcliffe later explained that "there
[were] factors such as the disruption of
railways, communica-
tions and water systems
that ought in this
instance to displace the
primary claims of con-
tiguous majorities." It is
true that Radcliffe's deci-
sion kept these systems
intact, and, more impor-
tant, ensured that the
Sikh Holy of Holies,
Amritsar, was not sur-
rounded by hostile
Muslim territory, but for
the outraged Pakistanis
this was self-justification
ex post facto. The real rea-
son, they felt, was that
Nehru had leaned on
Mountbatten (already,
and rightly, suspected of
pro-Indian leanings), who
in turn had leaned on
Radcliffe to alter the boundary: it was no option, independence, though technically
coincidence that the only road and rail- permissible, was frowned on). Almost
way linking India with Kashmir ran without exception the choice was an obvi-
through the new Indian sub-districts of ous one, so that by the mid-August han-
Gurdaspur. dover 552 out of 565 princes had made up
"Had the Gurdaspur District not been their minds. One of the few exceptions
awarded to India", judged the soldier was Kashmir.
Lord Birdwood, "India could certainly For more than two months after the
never have fought a war in Kashmir", August 15 deadline, Maharajah Hari
since it would have been nearly impossible Singh dithered. Then, so the Indian ver-
to send troops to Srinagar, Kashmir's sum- sion goes, in late October "thousands" of
mer capital. Mountbatten, who himself rowdy Pathan tribesmen - semi-nomadic
had a great deal of military experience, Afghan warriors from the northwest
was certainly aware that without frontier - crossed into Kashmir.
Gurdaspur India could wave goodbye to Capturing Muzaffarabad on October 2
Kashmir. For decades, nonetheless, the they advanced - razing, raping and pillag
Pakistanis were accused by Mountbatten 's ing - toward Srinagar. Alarmed, Singh
defenders of slandering the Viceroy. Then appealed to New Delhi. Mountbatte
in 1992 the last British official with inti- and Nehru decided on October 25 to
mate knowledge of the Partition process, send a detachment of airborne troops
Christopher Beaumont (Radcliffe's private (using the Gurdaspur road would have
secretary), revealed that Radcliffe had orig- taken too long), but they did not mobi-
inally allotted two contiguous sub-districts lize until the next day, when, as the price
to Pakistan, but at lunch Mountbatten for New Delhi's rapid intervention, the
successfully prevailed upon him to change Maharajah voluntarily signed the
the Award. The result is that Pakistan Instrument of Accession assenting to
Kashmir's transfer to India. On October
remains bitterly convinced that Nehru, in
collaboration with the deceitful 27, as the airborne troops landed at
Mountbatten, defrauded the Muslims out
Srinagar airfield and proceeded to beat
of their rightful property. (It mayback the marauders, Mountbatten for-
or may
not be relevant that Mountbatten mally
's wife,
accepted the Maharajah's decision
Edwina, and Nehru were intimate friends
and Kashmir officially became part of
and possibly lovers.) India.
The Indian version of events hinges
The Accession Question on dates, but the Pakistanis pick gaping
holes in the chronology. They say, first,
that far from being disinterested saviors,
the Indians took advantage of the
Gurdaspur
Gurdaspur that several
that continue to several
continuebones bones
to of isrela-
poison poison of contention
just contention one rela- of Maharajah's panic to impose the
tions between India and Pakistan. More Instrument of Accession by telling him
substantial is the Accession question, the Pathans were organized by Pakistan,
which today forms the basis for each whereas they were actually acting on
country's allegation of the other's illegal their own accord. Second, the Pakistanis
occupation of Kashmir. ask how Hari Singh could have signed
As Radcliffe's writ did not apply to the
Princely States, their rulers (not the peo- 2Alastair Lamb, Incomplete Partition : The Genesis of the
ple) were given the stark choice of acced- Kashmir Dispute , 1947-1948 (Hertingfordbury,
ing to either India or Pakistan (a third UK: Roxford Books, 1997), p. 56.

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the Instrument on October 26 when it is India agreed and indeed suggested a plebiscite
known he was travelling that day by at the time, but on condition that the State
motorcade from Srinagar, which he had was first cleared of the invader [Pakistan] and
abandoned, to Jammu, his winter capital, peace restored. . . . Since this basic condition
and was therefore incommunicado. was never fulfilled by Pakistan, there could be
Hence, Indian troops were on their way
no question of a plebiscite. . . . Any plebiscite
to Kashmir even before the Instrument today would by definition amount to ques-
had been signed and accepted, indicating tioning the integrity of India. It would raise
that the Maharajah's assent was obtained the question of secession. . . . We cannot and
under duress. will not tolerate a second partition of India on
It is easy to see both how Pakistan religious grounds. It would destroy the very
can regard Kashmir as having been stolen basis of the Indian State.
from underneath its nose, and how the
Indians can claim they were saving it
from Pakistani aggression. Though it isHardened Positions
clear that the Pathan invasion was not
spontaneous (it seems to have been a
covert operation cooked up by several to appease the "Pakistani
zealous Pakistani colonels), the Indians THUS, invaders" toinvaders"
appease INDIA in the Kashmir. cannot "Pakistani afford
in Kashmir. Nor Nor
still have a lot of explaining to do. Theycan it even acknowledge that Kashmir is
have never, for instance, been able to"disputed territory" without stoking the
produce the original copy of thefires of religious secessionism in its other
Instrument of Accession. states. From the Indian perspective, then,
It seems that neither side acted hon- Kashmir is the key to holding the subcon-
orably or entirely honestly that October. tinent together, especially in this era of
But instead of allowing the Indo- increasing ethno-religious nationalism.
Pakistani enmity to simmer down,Consider that, according to the 1991 cen-
Mountbatten's letter accepting thesus, there are Christian, Sikh or Muslim
Instrument of Accession brought themajorities in five Indian states. Further,
inflammatory principle of self-determi-consider that in another six states Hindus
nation into conflict with the Indian coexist with significant Christian and
Muslim minorities. There are already
desire for territorial integrity. In his let-
ter, Mountbatten stated that, "It is my Sikh separatists in Punjab fighting for an
Government's wish that, as soon as law
independent "Khalistan", and virtually
and order have been restored in the entire east of India (bordering
Kashmir and its soil cleared of the Bangladesh, Myanmar and China) is over-
invader, the question of the State'swhelmingly non-Hindu and may agitate
to depart from New Delhi's rule if
accession should be settled by a refer-
ence to the people." Kashmiris are allowed to secede.
At first, the Indians were willing toIndians of every political color pro-
foundly fear the consequences that would
grant such a plebiscite, but they dropped
follow Kashmiri independence. Atal
the idea when it was realized that a non-
Behari Vajpayee, leader of the "Hindu
Hindu majority was unlikely to vote their
nationalist" BJP, and current prime minis-
way. In 1966, drawing upon Nehru's con-
ter of India, warned Pakistan in 1990 that
cept of Indian identity, his daughter,
Indira Gandhi, uncompromisingly
"if it is asking for four million Kashmiri
Muslims,
explained New Delhi's eternal policy on it should be ready to receive 120
the matter: million Indian Muslims in case Kashmir

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secedes from India." Though the BJP has
since moderated its tone, it continues to
reject the Nehruite "salad bowl" philoso-
phy where all creeds assimilate into a
newly invented Indian identity that glo-
ries in, and legally protects, their diversi-
ty. Rather, the BJP demands that these dis-
criminatory legal and political protections
(such as Kashmir's exemptions provided
for in Section 370 of the constitution, as
well as the promise of a plebiscite) be dis-
mantled for the sake of the Hinduist
Partition "perfidiousness." Indeed, the
Pakistani military believed its own govern-
ment had been perfidious when Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif pulled the insur-
gents out of Indian-held Kashmir. The
commander of the armed forces and the
strategist behind this year's "spring exer-
cises", General Pervez Musharraf, was
reportedly concerned about the withdraw-
al, which contributed to his decision to
oust Sharif. As in India, there is a great
deal of ethnic strife within Pakistan that

Corbis/Bettmann
Creating the Problem.
Lord Mountbatten, with Nehru on his right and Jinnah on his left, 1947.

"melting pot." Hence, mindful that reli- could explode if Islamabad falters in what
gious difference casts aspersions on theirBenazir Bhutto called a "thousand-year
loyalty, Muslim groups have lately been war." In the province of Sind, for example,
vociferous in asserting their allegiance. the native Hindu Sindhis and newly
For Pakistanis as well, Kashmir is arrived Pathans and Punjabis are at odds
essential to maintaining national identity. with the socially and economically domi-
Ceding control of the third of the country nant Mohajirs (Muslim settlers who came
it occupies to the Indians would be from India in 1947), leading to secession-
regarded as a betrayal of Pakistan's historic ary fears.
portrayal of itself as a pan-Islamic home- There is also the China factor. From
land. Currently exulting in the Middle the 1950s onwards, Beijing has laid claim
East's adoration owing to its possession of to an eastern portion of Kashmir named
nuclear weapons, Pakistan risks its stand- Aksai Chin, which lies between the
ing if the Indians were to profit from their Chinese province of Xinjiang and Tibet.

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In 1957 the Indians were infuriated to into western Xinjiang. So for China, main-
discover that the Chinese had secretlytaining the status quo between India and
built a road between Xinjiang and TibetPakistan is a necessity, even if it comes at
running through Aksai Chin, which India Kashmir's expense.
regards as sovereign territory. China's Similarly, while India's and Pakistan's
defeat of India in the 1962 border war acquisition of nuclear weapons may be
confirmed Beijing's say in any future decried, there is something to be said in
negotiations regarding Kashmir's status. favor of the South Asian nuclear triangle
Whereas during the 1960s and early as it now stands. India's overwhelming
1970s China was very close to Pakistan conventional superiority, which might
(which it regarded as anti-Soviet), in otherwise have tempted New Delhi into
recent years the Chinese have shelvedconquering Kashmir, has been neutralized
their traditional support for "Kashmiri by Pakistan's reservation of the right to
self-determination" (a pro-Pakistan code first-use. Moreover, Pakistan would be
for a plebiscite) in favor of bilateral Indo- foolish to launch a surprise nuclear attack,
Pakistan negotiations. given Indian efforts to build a deterrent
It was not just the fall of the Soviet capable of surviving a first strike. Finally,
empire, or the rise of India as the regional China will retaliate if its territory -
superpower, that brought the change in including Aksai Chin - is attacked by
Chinese foreign policy. Since the late either side.
1980s - contemporaneous with the birth of To be sure, this is not an overly reas-
the Kashmiri independence movement -suring picture. But if the fighting in
there have been numerous uprisings Kashmir can be kept at the relatively low
among Turkic separatists in predominantlylevel we saw earlier this year, there is a pos-
Muslim Xinjiang, which shares a long bor- sibility that, in time, the anger and distrust
der with Kashmir. In such a remote region of Partition and four wars will slowly ebb
the last thing Beijing desires is more dan- away. For the moment, the most inflamma-
gerous talk of plebiscites and the possible tory thing the West could do is try to
spread of Muslim unrest from Kashmirimpose a peace where it is not wanted. □

There is nothing mo
socialism is inexorab
today makes a socialis
The Nineties will no
market, but its failur

- Tony Blair
London Review of B

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