Case 3:17-cv-00118-TSL-RPM Document 129 Filed 08/16/23 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

SCOTT CRAWFORD PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17CV118TSL-RPM

HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI DEFENDANTS

ORDER

This cause is before the court on the motion of plaintiff

Scott Crawford to enforce the Consent Judgment entered in this

cause on October 20, 2021. Defendant Hinds County has responded

in opposition to the motion, and in its response, has requested

modification of the Consent Decree. The court, having considered

the motion and response, concludes that the motion to enforce

should be granted in part, and that the County’s request to modify

should be granted, in part.

In his motion, Crawford asserts that Hinds County has failed

to renovate the Historic Courtroom and construct a unisex

accessible bathroom on the first floor of the courthouse within

one and a half years, as required by the Consent Decree. He notes

that the court specifically retained jurisdiction to enforce the

Consent Judgment and requests that the court find Hinds County in

contempt and order it to (1) remedy its breach by completing the

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required work within ninety days; (2) pay plaintiff damages of

$7,500, the amount the County originally agreed to pay him as

damages for injuries he sustained as a result of the County’s

violation of its obligations under the Americans With Disabilities

Act; and (3) pay plaintiff’s costs and reasonable attorney’s fees

in bringing this motion to enforce.

To hold Hinds County in contempt, plaintiff must demonstrate

by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that a court order was in

effect; (2) that the order required certain conduct by the

respondent; and (3) that the respondent failed to comply with the

court's order.” Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford Enters., Inc.,

826 F.2d 392, 401 (5th Cir. 1987). In its response, Hinds County

expressly acknowledges that “[p]er the Consent Judgment, the

County was required to ... renovate the Historic Courtroom and

construct a unisex accessible bathroom on the 1st floor within 1.5

years”; it concedes that this work was to have been completed by

April 20, 2023; and it admits that “it has not renovated the

Historic Courtroom, nor constructed the unisex accessible

bathroom.”

Once a violation of the court’s order is demonstrated, the

burden shifts to the violating party to “show either mitigating

circumstances that might cause a district court to withhold the

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exercise of its contempt power, or a substantial compliance with

the consent order.” Whitfield v. Pennington, 832 F.2d 809, 914

(5th Cir. 1987) (citing Louisiana Educ. Ass’n v. Richland Parish

School Bd., 421 F. Supp. 873, 977 (W.D. La. 1976), aff'd 585 F.2d

518 (5th Cir. 1977)). Hinds County has not contended that any

mitigating circumstances exist for its noncompliance; in fact, it

has offered no explanation for its failure to comply with the

referenced requirements of the Consent Decree. Moreover, it has

not contended that there has been substantial compliance with its

obligations with respect to these specific mandates or with the

overall requirements of the Consent Decree. Nevertheless, it

opposes plaintiff’s efforts to have it held in contempt and urges

the court to instead modify the Consent Decree pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b).

As the County points out in its response, under Rule 60(b), a

“court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or

proceeding” when, among other reasons, “applying [the judgment]

prospectively is no longer equitable; or any other reason that

justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5)(6). Rule 60(b)(5)

does not provide relief “when it is no longer convenient to live

with the terms of a consent decree,” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk

Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383, 112 S. Ct. 748, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867

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(1992); rather, it “provides a means by which a party can ask a

court to modify or vacate a judgment or order if ‘a significant

change either in factual conditions or in law’ renders continued

enforcement ‘detrimental to the public interest.’” Horne v.

Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 174 L. Ed.2d 406

(2009) (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384, 112 S. Ct. 748). The

movant “bears the burden of establishing that changed

circumstances warrant relief.” Id. at 447, 129 S. Ct. 2579.

“Ordinarily, ... modification should not be granted where a party

relies upon events that actually were anticipated at the time it

entered into a [consent judgment].” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 385, 112 S.

Ct. 748.

Here, the County has not suggested why it would be

inequitable to hold it to the terms of the Consent Decree, and it

has otherwise offered no reason why the court should modify the

Consent Decree. It merely acknowledges that the work has not been

done and states that it “has obtained an updated estimate on the

Phase I Renovations from architect, Richard McNeel,” that it “is

in the process of obtaining a contractor for the project[,]” and

once that occurs, “the project will take eight (8) to ten (10)

months to complete.”

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In light of the foregoing, the court finds that the County is

in contempt, having failed, without any demonstrated cause, to

comply with that part of the Consent Decree requiring renovation

of the Historic Courtroom and construction of a unisex accessible

bathroom on the first floor of the courthouse. While plaintiff

has requested that the court order the County to complete the

required renovations within 90 days, the County objects that it

would be “impossible” to complete the work within that time frame

and asks that the court extend the deadline for completion of the

work to April 20, 2024. Despite the lack of evidence to show that

the County could not possibly complete the required work within

the 90 days suggested by plaintiff, the court considers it

unlikely that the work could be performed in that limited amount

of time. Neither is the court persuaded, however, that the County

should be given an extra year to complete the work, when it has

not even bothered to explain why it failed to complete the work in

a timely manner in the first place.

Accordingly, the court finds that the County is in contempt,

and it is therefore ordered that the deadline for completion of

the work at issue is extended for a period of six months from the

date of this order. It is further ordered that the County shall

be assessed a penalty of $500 per day for each day beyond six

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months that the work in not complete, which amount after 30 days

shall increase to $750 per day for each day the work remains

incomplete.1

It is further ordered that this order shall constituted a

Final Order of Noncompliance, as required by the terms of the

Consent Decree to support an award of plaintiff’s attorney’s fees

and expenses.

SO ORDERED this 15th day of August, 2023.

/s/ Tom S. Lee___________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1 Plaintiff has requested an award him damages of $7,500 for

the County’s noncompliance. However, in the court’s opinion,
plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages for the County’s
violation of the terms of the Consent Decree, including for the
disrespectful manner in which it has acted toward him in relating
to the violation.