Contents

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Briones-Blanco, G.R. No. 213199, March 27, 2019....................2
Estate of Jimenez v. PEZA, G.R. No. 137285, January 16, 2001....................................................4
Landbank of the Philippines v Alcantara, GR 187423, February 28, 2018.....................................7
Republic of Indonesia v Vinzon, GR No. 154705, June 26, 2003...................................................9
US v Guinto, 182 SCRA 644.........................................................................................................11
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 141254, Aug. 15, 2000
Puno, C.J. separate opinion............................................................................................................16
Cudia v. PMA, G.R No. 211362, February 24, 2015.....................................................................18
PHILJA v. Prado, 298 SCRA 756..................................................................................................22
National Transmission Corp. v. Heirs of Marasigan, G.R. No. 243076 (Notice), May 14, 2021..24
Barangay v. Court of Appeals, 518 SCRA 649..............................................................................26
National Transmission Corporation v Lacson-deLeon, GR 221624, July 4, 2018........................28
Lasco v. UN Revolving Fund, 241 SCRA 681..............................................................................31
Republic v Villasor, 54 SCRA 84..................................................................................................33
People v Lagman and Zosa, 66......................................................................................................34
Phil 13 University of San Agustin, Inc. v. CA, 230 SCRA 761.....................................................35
Zabal v Duterte, GR No. 238467, February 12, 2019...................................................................37
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Paliza, Sr., G.R. Nos. 236772-73, June 28, 2021.......................41
Sps. Mercado vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196707, June 17, 2015......................44
Republic of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon, G.R. No. 165354, Jan. 12, 2015. 46
Maravilla v. Bugarin, G.R. Nos. 226199 and 227242-54, October 1, 2018..................................49
City of Bacolod v. PHUTURE VISIONS CO., INC., January 17, 2018.......................................51
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Briones-Blanco, G.R. No. 213199, March 27, 2019

Doctrine:
Just compensation in expropriation cases is defined "as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The Court repeatedly stressed that the true
measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word 'just' is used to modify the meaning
of the word 'compensation' to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to
be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample."
Facts:
Respondents were the co-owners of an agricultural land (subject land), covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2583, with an area of more or less 55.9729 hectares situated at
Barangay Bueno Voluntad, Municipality of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental.
The subject land was compulsorily placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or Republic Act (RA) No.
6657.
Under the valuation guidelines of RA No. 6657 and DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 5,
series of 1998, DAR and Land Bank of the Philippines (petitioner) valuated the subject land at
₱18,284.28 per hectare for the 53.099 hectares of coco land portion and ₱8,738.50 per hectare
for the 2.8738 hectares of rice land portion. Said valuation translates to an average price of about
P1.80 per square meter.
Subsequently, a Board of Commissioners was constituted for the purpose of assisting the court in
fixing the amount of just compensation composed of Atty. Rico Tan, as chairman, and three
commissioners. Atty. Rico Tan pegged the value of the subject land at ₱30,000.00 per hectare;
James Butalid valued the same at ₱8,000.00 per hectare, while Engr. Leo Catane pegged the
same at P18,284.94 per hectare for the coco land, and ₱8,738.50 per hectare for the rice land,
mirroring those of the DAR and petitioner.
The RTC fixed the amount of just compensation at P4.00 per square meter or ₱40,000.00 per
hectare. In making such valuation, the RTC found a median on the figures arrived at by the
Agrarian Reform Operations Center, Cuervo Appraisers, Inc., and local real estate brokers.
In affirming the ruling of the RTC, the CA held that strict adherence to the formula provided by
DAR AO No. 5 is not required, as relevant evidence of the parties and reasonable factors may be
used to determine just compensation.
Issue:
Whether or not, the disregard of the DAR AO No. 5 as guidelines for determining just
compensation, is proper in this case.
Ruling:
The courts may relax the application of the DAR formula, if warranted by the circumstances of
the case and provided the RTC explains its deviation from the factors or formula.
Courts are not confined to rigorously and faithfully comply with the same. To do so would
deprive the courts of their judicial prerogatives and reduce them to the bureaucratic function of
inputting data and arriving at the valuation.
It is clear that the circumstances of each case would determine as to whether the RTC would
deviate from the guidelines set forth; and reasons for the same must be clearly set forth.
In this case, the RTC veered away from the guidelines. It based its valuation on the following: (a)
valuations of the Agrarian Reforms Operations Center, Region 10 which pegged the price at
P1.40 per square meter on coco land and ₱0.50 on rice land; (b) Cuervo Appraisers, Inc, which
based its valuation on the Bank Appraiser of the Rural Bank of Oroquieta City, which valued the
subject land at P10.00 per square meter and the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which set the value
at ₱9.00 per square meter; and (c) local real estate brokers, which made a valuation of ₱7.00 to
P8.00 per square meter. After which, the RTC proceeded to set the amount of just compensation
to ₱4.00 per square meter as it was determined to be just, reasonable, and fair.
In setting the valuation at P4.00 per square meter, it bears stressing that the RTC merely made an
estimate as these valuations were based in the prevailing prices in 2006, whereas the subject land
was taken in 2000.
Moreover, there was neither explanation as to why the RTC opted to deviate from the rules nor
stated circumstances which would warrant the same. All the RTC did was to consider the rules
and concluded that just compensation should be the value above-stated.
As the RTC failed to comply with the foregoing pronouncement, the remand of the case is
deemed proper.
Estate of Jimenez v. PEZA, G.R. No. 137285, January 16, 2001

Doctrine:
For the acquisition of rights of way, or of any property for the establishment of export processing
zones, or of low-cost housing projects for the employees working in such zones, or for the
protection of watershed areas, or for the construction of dams, reservoirs, wharves, piers, docks,
quays, warehouses and other terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto, the Authority
shall have the right and power to acquire the same by purchase, by negotiation, or by
condemnation proceedings. Should the authority elect to exercise the right of eminent domain,
condemnation proceedings shall be maintained by and in the name of the Authority and it may
proceed in the manner provided for by law.
Facts:
On May 15, 1981, private respondent Philippines Export Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as
the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), initiated before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite expropriation proceedings5 on three (3) parcels of irrigated riceland in Rosario, Cavite.
One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, with an
approximate area of 29,008 square meters, is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez under TCT
No. T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.
More than ten years later, the said trial court in an Order dated July 11, 1991 upheld the right of
private respondent PEZA to expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B). Reconsideration of
the said order was sought by petitioner contending that said lot would only be transferred to a
private corporation, Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a public
purpose.
Meanwhile, petitioner wrote a letter to private respondent offering two (2) proposals, namely:
1. Withdrawal of private respondent's appeal with respect to Lot 1406-A I consideration of the
waiver of claim for damages and lass of income for the possession of said lot by private
respondent.
2. The swap of Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772 since private respondent
has no money yet to pay for the lot.
Private respondent's Board approved the "proposal" and the compromise agreement was signed
by private respondent through its then administrator Tagumpay Jadiniano assisted by
Government Corporate Counsel Oscar I. Garcia.
However, private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to petitioner inasmuch as it
was not the registered owner of the covering TCT No. T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate,
Inc. Thus, on March 13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed a "Motion to Partially Annul the Order
dated August 23, 1993."
In the Order dated August 4, 1997, the trial court annulled the said compromise agreement
entered into between the parties and directed private respondent to peacefully turn over Lot
1406-A to the petitioner.
On December 4, 1997, the trial court, at the instance of petitioner, corrected the Orders dated
August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and Lot 1406-A that
should be surrendered and returned to petitioner.
On November 27, 1997, respondent interposed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3,
1997 of the court. Petitioner filed its Comment17 on January 16, 1998.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in interpreting the phrase “original demand” contained in Article 2041 of
petitioner estate, is the return of the subject lot (lot 1406-B) which is sought to be expropriated
and not the determination of just compensation for the lot. Furthermore, even if the interpretation
of the CA or the interpretation of the phrase in question is correct, it is Article 2039 of the civil
code and not Article 2041 which is applicable to compromise agreements.
WON the non-performance of the respondent to the compromise agreement entitled petitioner
for the return of his expropriated lot?
Ruling:
Petitioner assails the interpretation by the Court of appeals of the phrase "original demand" in
Article 2041 of the New Civil Code vis-à-vis the case at bar. Article 2041 provides that, "if one
of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his "original demand" According to
petitioner, the appellate court erred in interpreting "original demand" as the fixing of just
compensation. Petitioner claims that the original demand is the return of Lot 1406-B as stated in
petitioner's motion to dismiss. the complaint for expropriation inasmuch as the incorporation of
the expropriation order in the compromise agreement subjected the said order to rescission. Since
the order of expropriation was rescinded, the authority of respondent to expropriate and the
purpose of expropriation have again become subject to dispute.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the incorporation of the expropriation order in the
compromise agreement did not subject said to rescission but instead constituted an admission by
petitioner of respondent's authority to expropriate the subject parcel of land and the public
purpose for which it was expropriated. This is evident from paragraph three (3) of the
compromise agreement which states that the "swap arrangement recognizes the fact that Lot
1406-B covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is considered
expropriated in favor of the government based on the Order of the Honorable Court dated July
11, 1991." It is crystal clear from the contents of the agreement that the parties limited the
compromise agreement to matter of just compensation to petitioner. Said expropriate order is not
closely intertwined with the issue of payment such that failure to pay by respondent will also
nullify the right of respondent to expropriate. No statement to this effect was mentioned in the
agreement. The Order was mentioned in the agreement only to clarify what was subject to
payment.
This court therefore finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in interpreting "original demand"
to mean the fixing of just compensation. The authority of respondent and the nature of the
purpose thereof have been put to rest when the Expropriation Order dated July 11, 1991 became
final and was duly admitted by petitioner in the compromise agreement. The only issue for
consideration is the manner and amount of payment due to petitioner.
The applicability of Articles 2038, 2039 and 1330 of the New Civil Code will not change the
outcome of the subject of the rescission. Since the compromise agreement was only about the
mode of payment by swapping of lots and not about the right and purpose to expropriate the
subject Lot 1406-B, only the originally agreed form of compensation that is by cash payment,
was rescinded.
Respondent capriciously evaded its duty of giving what is due to petitioner. In the case at bar, the
expropriation order was issued by the trial court in 1991. The compromise agreement between
the parties was approved by the trial court in 1993. However, from 1993 up to the present,
respondent has failed in its obligation to pay petitioner to the prejudice of the latter. Respondent
caused damage to petitioner in making the latter to expect that it had a good title to the property
to be swapped with Lot 1406-B; and meanwhile, respondent has been reaping benefits from the
lease or rental income of the said expropriated lot.
In view of all the foregoing, justice and equity dictate that this case be remanded to the trial court
for hearing of the expropriation proceedings on the determination of just compensation for Lot
1406-B and for its prompt payment to the petitioner.
Landbank of the Philippines v Alcantara, GR 187423, February 28, 2018

Doctrine:
First, in determining just compensation, courts are obligated to apply both the compensation
valuation factors enumerated by the Congress under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the basic
formula laid down by the DAR.
Second, the formula, being an administrative regulation issued by the DAR pursuant to its rule-
making and subordinate legislation power under R.A. No. 6657, has the force and effect of law.
Unless declared invalid in a case where its validity is directly put in issue, courts must consider
their use and application.
Third, courts, in the exercise of their judicial discretion, may relax the application of the formula
to fit the peculiar circumstances of a case. They must, however, clearly explain the reason for
any deviation; otherwise, they will be considered in grave abuse of discretion.
Facts:
Respondents, Edna Mayo Alcantara and the heirs of Cristy Mayo Alcantara, were the registered
owners of the subject agricultural land, which is located in Barangay Tamisian,11 Municipality
of Tiaong, Quezon Province.
DAR issued a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition over 22.6762 hectares of the land. LBP,
the financial intermediary of the CARP, thus gave its valuation for the acquired portion, namely
P1,210,252.96, in accordance with DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 6, series of 1992, as
amended by A.O. No. 11, series of 1994 (DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, as amended). The
amount was deposited in respondents' name on 24 March 1998.
Respondents did not question their land's acquisition but disagreed with its valuation. They filed
a protest with the DAR Adjudication Board, Region IV (DARAB), which then began to conduct
summary proceedings for the preliminary determination of just compensation, in accordance
with the primary jurisdiction conveyed unto DAR by Section 16 (d)17 of R.A. No. 6657.
On 16 August 1999, the DARAB rendered a decision upholding the valuation of LBP. With the
administrative determination not in their favor, respondents sought the judicial determination of
just compensation. They filed a complaint, dated September 8, 1999, before the Special Agrarian
Court (SAC), naming the DAR and LBP as defendants. In the complaint, they reiterated that just
compensation for their agricultural land should be based on its fair market value and fixed at
P2,267,620.00.
After trial, the SAC ruled in respondents' favor. The valuation of [respondents'] property by the
Land Bank in the amount of P1,210,252.96 based on the income approach is hereby set aside and
valuation therefor based on the fair market value, is fixed at P2,267,600.00 for the 22.6762
hectares as the just compensation for [respondents'] property.
Unsatisfied with the SAC's determination of just compensation, LBP filed an appeal with the
appellate court. The CA affirmed the SAC's ruling on the amount of just compensation but
modified the ruling on the payment of interest.
Issue:
Does the valuation proposed by LBP for respondents' land is the just compensation contemplated
by law for CARP lands?
Ruling:
As its decision and order make plain,57 the SAC deviated from, nay rejected, the formula set by
the DAR in the subject administrative orders. The CA joined the SAC in the rejection.
In the main, the SAC presents two explanations for the deviation: first, that respondents' land is
"no longer productive, as the trees are over 100 years old and are more productive if utilized as
coconut lumber,"61 and, second, that the land has already been converted into a subdivision,
increasing its value "three hundredfold." These circumstances, the SAC reasoned out, render the
use of the DAR formulas in the valuation of respondents' land anomalous as well as
disadvantageous to landowners.
The court are unable to accept these explanations. They are neither well-reasoned nor supported
by the evidence on record. the SAC failed to present a well-reasoned justification, as supported
by the evidence on record, for why it deviated from the DAR formula. Hence, it ruled in blatant
disregard of the factors spelled out in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657. The SAC's valuation in this
case must be struck down as illegal and set aside.
However, the Court cannot readily adopt LBP's valuation as the just compensation in this case.
The court is unable to confirm from the available records that the data LBP had used for its
valuation are timely data, i.e., data reasonably obtaining at the time of the taking of the property.
In this case, there was no delay in the payment. To recall, the Notice of Land Valuation and
Acquisition was issued over the subject property on 9 February 1998.72 On 24 March 1998, LBP
deposited the said amount in respondents' name. Hence, the order for LBP to pay interest is not
warranted and must be annulled and set aside.
The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, sitting as Special Agrarian
Court, to determine the just compensation.
Republic of Indonesia v Vinzon, GR No. 154705, June 26, 2003

Doctrine:
International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and
equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. As enunciated in Sanders
v. Veridiano II, the practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can
be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case
of foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as
expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of
nations."
Facts:
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a
Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of
Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a
consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex
Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The
equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets,
electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the
agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless
cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry.
When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March
2000, he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance
with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated
the agreement.
On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful.
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners as Civil Case.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign
sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the
Philippines. The said motion further alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor
Kasim are diplomatic agents as defined under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity.
In turn, respondent filed an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia
has expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in
the Maintenance Agreement:
"Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according to the
laws of the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines."
The trial court denied herein petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss. It likewise denied the Motion for
Reconsideration subsequently filed.
The trial court’s denial of the Motion to Dismiss was brought up to the Court of Appeals by
herein petitioners in a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision denying the petition for lack of merit. On August
16, 2002, it denied herein petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using its basis the
provision in their Maintenance Agreement.
Ruling:
The rules of International Law, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change. The increasing
need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the
discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity.
This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only
with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis.
The existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the
agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the
Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit.
It was not a waiver of their immunity from suit but a mere stipulation that in the event they do
waive their immunity, Philippine laws shall govern the resolution of any legal action arising out
of the agreement and the proper court in Makati City shall be the agreed venue thereof.
The act of petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim in terminating the
Maintenance Agreement is not covered by the exceptions provided in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
The Maintenance Agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of
its governmental functions. In such a case, it cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity
from suit.
The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
complaint in Civil Case No. 18203 against petitioners is DISMISSED.
US v Guinto, 182 SCRA 644

Doctrine:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section
3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that
we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision
merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended
to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community.
Facts:
These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The
United States of America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss
on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. It is now
contesting the denial of its motions by the respondent judges.
G.R. No. 76607
Private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in
connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base.
On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S.
Air Force, solicited bids for such contracts through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw. Among
those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C.
Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar. Valencia had been a concessionaire inside Clark for 34 years; del
Pilar for 12 years; and Tanglao for 50 years.
The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private respondents, who
claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which
was not included in the invitation to bid.
The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX). The latter,
through its representatives, petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse explained that
the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon as a result of the February 24,
1986 solicitation. Dizon was already operating this concession, then known as the NCO club
concession, and the expiration of the contract had been extended from June 30, 1986 to August
31, 1986. They further explained that the solicitation of the CE barbershop would be available
only by the end of June and the private respondents would be notified.
Private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual
petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop
concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue
operating the concessions pending litigation.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on
the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the United States of America, which had not
waived its non-suability.
The trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss.
G.R. No. 79470
Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo
Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force
Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City.
It had been ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa Cartalla and Orascion,
that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the
club customers.
Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of
arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between the Center and its
employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.
Genove's reaction was to file complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City against the
individual petitioners.
The defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint,
alleging that Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force stationed at John Hay Air Station, was
immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity. They argued that the suit was
in effect against the United States, which had not given its consent to be sued.
This motion was denied by the respondent judge on June 4, 1987.
G.R. No. 80018
Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O' Donnell, an extension of Clark
Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners
herein, namely, Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the U.S. Air
Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI).
An information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was
filed against Bautista in the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac. The above-named officers testified
against him at his trial. As a result of the filing of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his
employment.
He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners herein claiming that it
was because of their acts that he was removed.
On May 7, 1987, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, having been retained to represent the
defendants, filed with leave of court a motion to withdraw the answer and dismiss the complaint.
The ground invoked was that the defendants were acting in their official capacity when they did
the acts complained of and that the complaint against them was in effect a suit against the United
States without its consent.
The motion was denied by the respondent judge which held that the claimed immunity under the
Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases. Moreover, the defendants
had come under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer.
G.R. No. 80258
A complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein petitioners
(except the United States of America), for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result
of the acts of the defendants.
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on
them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them.
The defendants deny this and claim the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the
dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest, The defendants stress that the dogs were
called off and the plaintiffs were immediately taken to the medical center for treatment of their
wounds.
In a motion to dismiss the complaint, the United States of America and the individually named
defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United States, which had not given
its consent to be sued. The defendants were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases
Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official functions.
The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the following suit are suit against another state, which had not given its consent
to be sued.
Ruling:
It is clear from a study of the records of G.R. No. 80018 that the individually-named petitioners
therein were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust
operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial.
The said petitioners were in fact connected with the Air Force Office of Special Investigators and
were charged precisely with the function of preventing the distribution, possession and use of
prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty of such acts.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is
liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.
Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the
state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it
can, that the defendant is liable.
The government may be held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through
any of the accepted forms of consent.
The SC rejects the conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of the
Office of the Sheriff Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base was a submission by the United States
government to its jurisdiction.
Express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but must be
effected through a duly-enacted statute.
As per the contradictory factual allegations in G.R. No. 8025, a closer study of what actually
happened to the plaintiffs must first be established. The record is too meager to indicate if the
defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority
when the incident in question occurred. Lacking this information, this Court cannot directly
decide this case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and
resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of the evidence that has yet to be
presented at the trial.
Only after it shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the
incident in question will this Court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity
is applicable.
In G.R. No. 79470, private respondent Genove was employed as a cook in the Main Club located
at the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center, also known as the Open Mess Complex, at John Hay Air
Station. As manager of this complex, petitioner Lamachia is responsible for eleven diversified
activities generating an annual income of $2 million.
Under his executive management are three service restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a Class VI
store, a coffee and pantry shop, a main cashier cage, an administrative office, and a decentralized
warehouse which maintains a stock level of $200,000.00 per month in resale items. He
supervises 167 employees, one of whom was Genove, with whom the United States government
has concluded a collective bargaining agreement.
From these circumstances, the Court can assume that the restaurant services offered at the John
Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States
government in its proprietary capacity.
Such services are not extended to the American servicemen for free as a perquisite of
membership in the Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it appear that they are
exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they are available
to the general public as well, including the tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a
point to visit John Hay for this reason. All persons availing themselves of this facility pay for the
privilege like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants. Although the prices are concededly
reasonable and relatively low, such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial
and not a governmental activity.
The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state
immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense will
not prosper even if it be established that they were acting as agents of the United States when
they investigated and later dismissed Genove.
For that matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such immunity. The
reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its
proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
But these considerations notwithstanding, the court hold that the complaint against the
petitioners in the court below must still be dismissed. While suable, the petitioners are
nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be allowed on the strength
of the evidence, which the court have carefully examined.
The dismissal of the private respondent was decided upon only after a thorough investigation
where it was established beyond doubt that he had polluted the soup stock with urine. The
investigation, in fact, did not stop there. Despite the definitive finding of Genove's guilt, the case
was still referred to the board of arbitrators provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.
This board unanimously affirmed the findings of the investigators and recommended Genove's
dismissal. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings. The petitioners acted quite
properly in terminating the private respondent's employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.
Concerning G.R. No. 76607, we also find that the barbershops subject of the concessions granted
by the United States government are commercial enterprises operated by private persons.
They are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a
matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming
needs of their customers and offer not only the basic haircut and shave (as required in most
military organizations) but such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure and other
similar indulgences. And all for a fee. Interestingly, one of the concessionaires, private
respondent Valencia, was even sent abroad to improve his tonsorial business, presumably for the
benefit of his customers.
No less significantly, if not more so, all the barbershop concessionaires are under the terms of
their contracts, required to remit to the United States government fixed commissions in
consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their respective areas.
This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the
private respondents in the court below, the contracts in question being decidedly commercial.
The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is not before
us. This means that, as in G.R. No. 80258, the respondent court will have to receive that evidence
first, so it can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they
seek. Accordingly, this case must also be remanded to the court below for further proceedings.
After considering all the above premises, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to
proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order
dated December 11, 1986, is LIFTED.
2. In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 829-R(298) is DISMISSED.
3. In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 115-C-87 is DISMISSED.
The temporary restraining order dated October 14, 1987, is made permanent.
4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent court is directed to proceed
with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4996. The temporary restraining order dated
October 27, 1987, is LIFTED.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 141254, Aug. 15, 2000
Puno, C.J. separate opinion

Doctrine:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires
it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Facts:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the "Marines")
to join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings
and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct
joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of
National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the "AFP"), the
Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute
and implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief,
through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000
(the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force
Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the
Police Chief of Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines
in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the
PNP Chief. In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and
order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including
increased police patrols. The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the
metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-
Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of
Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of
the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally,
the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely
temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall
have improved.
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to
annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and
unconstitutional, arguing that:
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has legal standing;
Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces
is subject to judicial review; and,
Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates
the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of
the PNP.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to
raise the issues in the petition. Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian
supremacy clause of the Constitution.
The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold
the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no
other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve
the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in this case.
It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the
petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action.
To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the
issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the
petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the
questioned governmental act.
The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to
obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of
such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires
it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it
infringe the civilian character of the police force.
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions
of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is
noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times,
the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall
leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required
in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no "insidious incursion" of the military in
civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in
Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the
assistance of the military in the implementation and execution of certain traditionally "civil"
functions.
Cudia v. PMA, G.R No. 211362, February 24, 2015

Doctrine:
The Honor Committee is a body of cadets who are entrusted by the Cadet Corps to preserve the
sanctity of the Honor Code and conduct the procedural aspect of the Honor System. It is
composed of representatives from the first, the second and the third classes in each company, the
Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, and the Cadet First Captain, who is an Ex-Officio member (The
Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, p. 29 [Rollo, p. 167]).
The true test of a cadet's character as a leader, rests on his personal commitment to uphold what
is morally and ethically righteous at the most critical and trying times, and at the most
challenging circumstances. When a cadet must face a dilemma between what is true and right as
against his security, well-being, pleasures and comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is his honor
and those that [define] his values. A man of an honorable character does not think twice and
chooses the fore. This is the essence of and. the Spirit of the Honor Code - it is championing
truth and righteousness even if it may mean the surrender of one's basic rights and privileges.
Facts:
Cadet 1CL Cudia is a student of the PMA. His 4th period class under Dr. Costales was from
1:30-3:00pm while his 5th period class was from 3:05-4:05pm. Prof. Beron of the 5th period
class issued a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cudia because he was late for two minutes in his
5th period class.
In Cudia’s defense he came directly from his 4th period class. They were dismissed a bit late by
the instructor. Major Hindang meted Cudia the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Maj.
Hindag clarified with Cudai that the basis of the punishment was the result of his conversation
with Dr. Costales, who responded that she never dismissed her class late and followed the
protocol to dismiss the calss 10-15 minutes earlier than scheduled.
Cudia sought a reconsideration of his punishment and addressed his request for reconsideration
to Ma. Benjamin L. Leander asserting that he was not in control of the circumstances on why he
was late. Maj. Leander asked Maj. Hindag to submit his reply. Maj. Hindag in his reply that
based on his investigation, the 4th period class was not dismissed late. As a result, the penalty
was sustained. Maj. Hindag reported Cudia to the HC for Violation of the Honor Code on the
basis of lying where Cudia states that his 4th period class ended at 3:00 that made him late in the
succeeding class.
Cudia clarified the matter with Dr. Costales. Costales said that when Hindag had asked her on
whether or not she dismissed the class late, She and Hindag were not in the same time reference.
Cadet Cudia in his letter of explanation on the Honor Report averred that his understanding of
the “Class” covers not just a lecture in a typical classroom instruction but includes every
transaction and communication a teacher does with her students and in their case, some cadets
were asked for queries and he was given instruction by which were directly related to their class.
Dr. Costales transaction and communication with other classmates may have already ended but
his and Dr. Costales extended for a little bit.
The PMA Honor Committee found Cudia guilty for violating the Honor Code. Cudia was placed
on indefinite leave of absence without pay and allowances pending approval of his separation by
the AFP barring him from future appointment and/or admission as cadet, and not permitting him
to qualify for any entrance requirements to the PMA.
CRAB (Cadet Review and Appeals Board) reviewed the case of Cudia. Pending review, Special
order No.1 was issued directing all PMA cadets to ostracize Cudia. Cudia and his family engaged
the services of the PAO. The CRAB Chariman informed Cudia that it could not favourably
consider his request for copies of the HC minutes, relevant documents, and video footages and
recordings of the HC hearings since it was neither the appropriate no the authorized body to take
action thereon.
Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter complaint before the CHR-Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) Office against the HC members and Major Garcia for alleged
violation of the human rights of Cudia.
CRAB submitted a report to the AFP General Headquarters upholding the dismissal of Cudia.
The CHR-CAR came out with its preliminary findings recommending that the PMA and the HC
pronounce Cudia as not guilty of the charge filed against him before the Honor Committee, to
restore Cudia’s rights and entitlements as a full-fledge graduating cadet and allow him to
graduate.
The AFP Chief of Staff affirmed CRAB’s denial of Cudia’s appeal. AFP Headquarters resolved
to deny the appeal for lack of merit.
THE CHR moved to conclude and recommend that there existed probable cause for Human
Rights Violations against the officers and members of the PMA Honor Committee and certain
PMA officials for violations of the rights of Cudia to dignity, due process, education, privacy of
communication and good life. The CHR recommended that authorities should investigate several
PMA officials.
The office of the president sustained the findings of the AFP Chief of Staff and the CRAB. And
that the initial recommendations of the Commission on Human Rights cannot be adopted as basis
that Cudia’s due process rights were violated.
Issue:
I. Does the power of the Commission on Human Rights to investigate include the power to
adjudicate?
II. Did Guzman entirely do away with the due process requirements outlined in Ang Tibay? Is
Cudia guaranteed the right to have his counsel not just in assisting him in the preparation for the
investigative hearing before the HC and the CRAB but in participating fully in said hearings?
III. Pending President Aquino’s resolution of Cudia’s appeal, should the Court decline
jurisdiction for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?
IV. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.
Ruling:
I. NO. The CHR is only a fact-finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is
not empowered to adjudicate claims on the merits or settle actual case or controversies. The
power to investigate is not the same as adjudication. The findings of facts and the conclusions of
law of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) are merely recommendatory and, therefore not
binding to the Supreme Court. The reason is that the CHR’s constitutional mandate extends only
to the investigation of all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
Fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
II. YES. Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong already settled the issue as it held that
although both Ang Tibay and Guzman essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the
latter case is more apropos since it specifically deals with the minimum standards to be satisfied
in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. That Guzman is the authority
on the procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases was reaffirmed by the Court in the fairly
recent case of Go v. Colegio De San Juan De Letran.
Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a party
in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer,
while desirable, is not indispensable. Further, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, the
Court held that “a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent’s capacity to represent himself,
and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.” Hence, the
administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of
counsel is not an absolute requirement.
III. NO. In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until
the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. In the U.S. case of Ringgold v. United
States, which was cited by respondents, it was specifically held that in a typical case involving a
decision by military authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his remedies within the military before
appealing to the court, the doctrine being designed both to preserve the balance between military
and civilian authorities and to conserve judicial resources.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a party may directly resort to
judicial remedies if any of the following is present:
when there is a violation of due process;
when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
when there is irreparable injury;
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear
the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal of Cadet 1CL Cudia from the
PMA. Thus, it may be a ground to give due course to the petition despite the non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Yet more significant is the fact that during the pendency of this case,
particularly on June 11, 2014, the Office of the President finally issued its ruling, which
sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and the CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this
supervening event bars any objection to the petition based on failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
IV. Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is still
worthy to be part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this case, the investigation of
Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the
PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then given the
opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire
process that the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after
he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team
submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC
thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for
formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal
investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and given the right to enter his
plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present
evidence in his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to
have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the
Academy level – from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the
Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also
conducted by the HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ
(AFP-General Headquarters) to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB.
Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the
PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he
had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.
And there is no reason for the SC to disturb the findings of facts by these bodies.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by
the PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that Honor Code
violation is not among those listed as justifications for the attrition of cadets considering that the
Honor Code and the Honor System (manner which PMA conducts investigation of Honor Code
violations) do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically terminated or dismissed from service.
Such argument is not valid. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory
authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a law (Commonwealth Act
No. 1) authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such power by the President may be
delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision and control over the
cadets.
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic freedom. Academic
freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher
learning has been enshrined in the Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;
b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its academic freedom. If it
determines that a cadet violates it, then it has the right to dismiss said cadet. In this case, based
on its findings, Cudia lied – which is a violation of the Honor Code.
But Cudia’s lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a minor lie. It punishes any
form of lying. It does not have a gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of the PMA as
to what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia enrolled at PMA, he agreed to abide by the Honor
Code and the Honor System. Thus, while the punishment may be severe, it is nevertheless
reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process -also considering that
Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of these.

PHILJA v. Prado, 298 SCRA 756

Doctrine:
The presumption of the constitutionality of statutes is that as the joint act of the Legislature and
the Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be
constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is
constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld.
To doubt is to sustain.
Facts:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of
Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required
readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not
distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on
the independence of the Judiciary.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
Ruling:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.
I. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title
fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not
calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to
the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more
efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a
repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
II. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was
not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this
paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI,
Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have
differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive
upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and
nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme
Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and
that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both
the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least,
a becoming courtesy.
III. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution
providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled
corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public
service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself
from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise
extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among
the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the
government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
National Transmission Corp. v. Heirs of Marasigan, G.R. No. 243076 (Notice), May 14,
2021

Doctrine:
The general rule in eminent domain proceedings is that the just compensation to which the owner
of the condemned property is entitled is the market value of the property. But the rule is modified
where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. There is also taking in the exercise of the
power of eminent domain where the government not only actually deprives or dispossesses the
property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also causes a practical destruction or
material impairment of the value of the property.28 In such a case, the owner is not restricted to
compensation for the portion actually taken. In addition to the market value of the portion taken,
he is also entitled to recover the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the
property.
Facts:
On July 31, 2000, the National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a Complaint for eminent domain
with the RTC. The complaint alleged that in view of the construction of the San Pascual
Cogeneration Transmission Line Project, it is necessary and urgent for NPC to acquire an
easement of right-of-way over portions of the parcels of land owned by respondents comprising a
total area of 11,915 square meters. Later, with leave of court, NPC filed an Amended Complaint,
5 reducing the area sought to be acquired as right-of-way to 6,235 sq. m.
On December 27, 2013, the RTC rendered its Decision. It sustained the BOC-recommended just
compensation in the amount of Pl 30.00 with legal interest, which it held to have also been
accepted by the parties.
The RTC also required NPC to pay respondents the full value of the property, not only the
easement fee, and to pay just compensation on the entire land areas owned by respondents, not
only on the portions affected by the easement of right-of-way.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that it should be required to pay just
compensation only for the portion of respondents' properties that would be traversed by the
transmission lines.
The motion, however, failed to convince the RTC. Hence, petitioner was compelled to seek
recourse with the CA. On February 20, 2018, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Is petitioner liable to pay just compensation for the entire landholding of respondents -heirs of
Antonio Marasigan and heirs of Vicente Cabral - and not just for the area subject of the
expropriation?

Ruling:
No, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator.25 The rule is that the owner of private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend
beyond his loss or injury. Compensation must be just not only to the individual whose property is
taken, but to the public, which is to pay for it.26 In this case, the property taken from respondents
is only the combined 6,235-sq. m. portion of their total landholding of 22,071 sq. m.. Hence, they
should be compensated only for this area. Anything more than that is no longer just to the public
which bears the cost of compensation.
Besides, just compensation is not the proper recompense for any adverse effect of expropriation
on the remainder of respondents' properties.
In view of the foregoing settled rulings, consequential damages, not just compensation, are
awarded if, as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from an
impairment or decrease in value.30 To be compensable, however, there must be evidence of
consequential damage to the landowner's property. The damage must be alleged and proved. 31
In this case, there is no such evidence adduced by respondents. Notably, the Commissioner's
Report recommended the payment of just compensation only for the "subject affected portions of
the property," and made no mention whatsoever of consequential damages suffered by
respondents. Notably, the parties have not taken exception to this report.
Barangay v. Court of Appeals, 518 SCRA 649

Doctrine:
Expropriation, if misused or abused, would trench on the property rights of individuals without
due process of law.
Facts:
On April 8, 1983, pursuant to a resolution passed by the barangay council, petitioner Barangay
Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, represented by Barangay Captain Ismael Gutierrez, filed a
Complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Jose Magtoto III and Patricia
Sindayan, the registered owners of a parcel of land.
Petitioner sought to convert a portion of respondents' land into Barangay Sindalan's feeder road.
They claimed that respondents' property was the most practical and nearest way to the municipal
road. Pending the resolution of the case at the trial court, petitioner deposited an amount
equivalent to the fair market value of the property.
On the other hand, respondents stated that they owned the 27,000 - square meter property, a
portion of which is the subject of this case. In their Memorandum, they alleged that their lot is
adjacent to Davsan II Subdivision privately owned by Dr. Felix David and his wife. Prior to the
filing of the expropriation case, said subdivision was linked to MacArthur Highway through a
pathway across the land of a certain Torres family. Long before the passage of the barangay
resolution, the wives of the subdivision owner and the barangay captain, who were known to be
agents of the subdivision, had proposed buying a right-of-way for the subdivision across a
portion of respondents' property. These prospective buyers, however, never returned after
learning of the price which the respondents ascribed to their property.
Respondents alleged that the expropriation of their property was for private use, that is, for the
benefit of the homeowners of Davsan II Subdivision. They contended that petitioner deliberately
omitted the name of Davsan II Subdivision and, instead, stated that the expropriation was for the
benefit of the residents of Sitio Paraiso in order to conceal the fact that the access road being
proposed to be built across the respondents' land was to serve a privately owned subdivision and
those who would purchase the lots of said subdivision.
RTC held that plaintiff is hereby declared as having a lawful right to take the property
hereinabove described and sought to be condemned for the public purpose or use as aforestated.
However, the CA are convinced that it is the duty of the subdivision owner to provide the right of
way needed by residents of Davsan II Subdivision as provided for in Section 29 of P.D. 957.
Records show that Purok Paraiso, which is supposed to benefit from this [sic] expropriation
proceedings is in reality Davsan II Subdivision.
The CA REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Complaint for Eminent Domain is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.

Issue:
Petitioner imputes errors to the CA for (1) allegedly violating its power of eminent domain, (2)
finding that the expropriation of the property is not for public use but for a privately owned
subdivision, (3) finding that there was no payment of just compensation, and (4) failing to accord
respect to the findings of the trial court. Stated briefly, the main issue in this case is whether the
proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain would be for a public purpose.
Ruling:
The Court held that their petition lacks merit.
In general, eminent domain is defined as "the power of the nation or a sovereign state to take, or
to authorize the taking of, private property for a public use without the owner's consent,
conditioned upon payment of just compensation."
It is acknowledged as "an inherent political right, founded on a common necessity and interest of
appropriating the property of individual members of the community to the great necessities of the
whole community."
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two constitutional provisions: (1)
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation under Article III
(Bill of Rights), Section 9 and (2) that no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or
property without due process of law under Art. III, Sec. 1.
In the case at bar, petitioner harps on eminent domain as an inherent power of sovereignty
similar to police power and taxation. As a basic political unit, its Sangguniang Barangay is
clothed with the authority to provide barangay roads and other facilities for public use and
welfare.
Petitioner's delegated power to expropriate is not at issue. The legal question in this petition,
however, is whether the taking of the land was for a public purpose or use. In the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, it is basic that the taking of private property must be for a public
purpose. A corollary issue is whether private property can be taken by law from one person and
given to another in the guise of public purpose.
In this regard, the petition must fail.
Based on the foregoing transcript, the intended feeder road sought to serve the residents of the
subdivision only. It has not been shown that the other residents of Barangay Sindalan, San
Fernando, Pampanga will be benefited by the contemplated road to be constructed on the lot of
respondent’s spouses Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan.
The intended expropriation of private property for the benefit of a private individual is clearly
proscribed by the Constitution.
National Transmission Corporation v Lacson-deLeon, GR 221624, July 4, 2018

Doctrine:
If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property
are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue
an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought
to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of
just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first.
Facts:
On 28 February 2002, NAPOCOR filed with the trial court a complaint against Maria Teresa
Lacson De Leon for the expropriation of a parcel of land. NAPOCOR wanted to acquire an
easement of right-of-way over the property for the construction and maintenance of the Bacolod-
Cadiz 138 KV SC/ST Transmission Line for the Negros IV-Panay IV Project.
Invoking failure to state a cause of action, Maria Teresa Lacson De Leon filed on 20 March 2002
a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the registered owner of Lot No. 1074-B is not her, but her nine
children (respondents). On 3 July 2002, the trial court issued an Order, directing NAPOCOR to
amend its complaint by impleading the real parties-in-interest.
However, summons was successfully served upon Jose Ma. Leandro L. De Leon only as the
whereabouts of the other respondents were unknown. Jose Ma. Leandro L. De Leon filed an
Answer. Meanwhile, the trial court caused the service of summons by publication to the
remaining respondents.
the eight respondents whose whereabouts were initially unknown, filed an Answer and
Manifestation, alleging that they were adopting the responsive pleading filed by Jose Ma.
Leandro L. De Leon. In their Answer, respondents argued that the Amended Complaint failed to
establish public use for which expropriation was being sought. Further, respondents claimed that
the expropriation was confiscatory because the property was valued as agricultural
notwithstanding its classification as residential by both national and local governments.
On 12 December 2003, the trial court, upon motion by NAPOCOR, issued an Order directing the
issuance of a Writ of Possession in favor of NAPOCOR upon proof that an amount equivalent to
100% of the value of the property based on the current zonal valuation by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) was deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines in the name of respondents.
On 2 February 2004, the delivery of possession of the property was made by the trial court
sheriff.
The board of commissioners filed a Manifestation in both the case concerning respondents'
property and Civil Case No. 01-11482. Attached was a Narrative Report containing their findings
based on their ocular inspection and research personally made on the two properties subject of
expropriation, as well as comparable properties within the five-kilometer vicinity. Citing Section
7(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 8974,8 the commissioners
gave more credence to the Certification dated 27 July 1995 issued by the City Planning and
Development Office classifying respondents' property as residential over the tax declarations
classifying it as agricultural.
Further, the commissioners did not consider the zonal valuation by the BIR and recommended
instead PhP722.50 per square meter as the fair market value of the property based on the average
raw land value of the following three subdivisions: (a) Montinola Subdivision, whose highest
and best use is residential, and with a raw land value of PhP600.00 per square meter; (b)
Victorina Heights Subdivision, whose highest and best use is residential and commercial, and
with a raw land value of PhP890.00 per square meter; and (c) Green Acres Subdivision, whose
highest and best use is residential and commercial, and with a raw land value of PhP677.50 per
square meter.
On the consequential benefits and damages, the commissioners found that there was "very little
or none at all of consequential benefits but rather more o[f] consequential damages to the
owners" due to the construction of high-tension transmission lines shunning prospective buyers
for perceived radiation and electrocution risks. The commissioners estimated that about one-third
of the total area was prejudiced, but left the determination of the actual consequential damages to
a licensed geodetic engineer.
Adopting the findings of the board of commissioners, the trial court ordered NAPOCOR to pay
respondents just compensation (P28,428,207.50 & P28,428,207.50), consequential damages and
attorney's fees (P100,000.00).
NAPOCOR filed a Notice of Appeal, and subsequently, a Record on Appeal, both of which were
duly approved by the trial court. NAPOCOR raised just compensation as the sole issue before the
Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision dated 15 October 2007 of the trial
court by deleting the award of attorney's fees and imposing an interest at the rate of 12% per
annum on the award of just compensation from 2 February 2004 until full payment.
Issue:
Whether the determination of just compensation has factual basis.
Whether the amount on consequential damages is justified; and
Whether the imposition of interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the just compensation is
proper.
Ruling:
Just compensation must be based on the selling price of similar lands in the vicinity at the time of
taking.
While the Narrative Report was undated, the valuation of the property could safely be presumed
to have been made by the commissioners no later than 7 October 2004, or two years and seven
months after the filing of the complaint. Assuming that the valuation of the property was not
made on the date of filing of the complaint, to the mind of the Court, no significant change in the
fair market value could have happened between 28 February 2002 and 7 October 2004, or less
than three years. Hence, the Court sees no reason to deviate from the recommendation and
factual findings of the board of commissioners.
As regards the land classification of the property, both the Court of Appeals and the trial court
correctly gave more credence to the Certification dated 27 July 1995 by the City Planning and
Development Office and two city council resolutions over the tax declarations and actual use of
the property.
As for the amount of just compensation fixed at PhP722.50 per square meter, the Court agrees
with petitioner that the rate is not supported by evidence. While the use of the current selling
price of similar lands in the vicinity finds basis in Section 5(d) of RA 8974, the commissioners
erred when they computed for the average of three nearby subdivisions to determine just
compensation.
The award of consequential damages is limited to 50% of the BIR zonal valuation of the property
segregated by the electric transmission lines.
Petitioner assails the award of consequential damages for being speculative. On the other hand,
respondents maintain that the award is justified because of the reduction in the value of the land
owing to the electric transmission lines traversing the middle of the lot, which the property
subject of expropriation forms part of.
Consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of
the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value.
In their Narrative Report, the board of commissioners justified the award of consequential
damages to respondents because of the insignificant consequential benefit, if at all, and the harm
posed by the electric transmission lines. In the estimate of the commissioners, about one-third of
the total area was prejudiced, but the determination of the actual consequential damages was left
to a licensed geodetic engineer after the conduct of a survey.
While the award of consequential damages is proper, the Court finds the amount of 10% of the
fair market value of the segregated property without basis. Rather, the more reasonable
computation is the one laid down in NAPOCOR v. Marasigan,26 which is 50% of the BIR zonal
valuation of the affected property.
Legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed on the unpaid balance of the just
compensation and amount of consequential damages from the date of actual taking on 2 February
2004 to 30 June 2013, and 6% per annum henceforth until full payment.
As regards the imposable interest, petitioner invokes Circular No. 799, series of 2013 issued by
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), reducing the rate of interest to 6% per annum for the
forbearance of money. Respondents argue otherwise and claim that the legal interest of 12% per
annum is the prevailing rate because the complaint was filed prior to the effectivity of BSP
Circular No. 799.
Here, the Writ of Possession was issued on 12 December 2003, but petitioner only took actual
possession of the property on 2 February 2004. Because the total amount of just compensation
remains unpaid, legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum shall accrue from 2 February 2004 to
30 June 2013. Further, pursuant to BSP Circular No. 799, the reduced legal interest of 6% per
annum shall be the applicable rate from 1 July 2013 until full payment.
Lasco v. UN Revolving Fund, 241 SCRA 681

Doctrine:
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at
bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion
by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General or other officer acting under
his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their
jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the
government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the judicial
department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass
the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.
Facts:
Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United Nations
Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and
subsidiary organ of the United Nations.
In its Motion to Dismiss, private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no
jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity pursuant to the 1946
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.
On November 25, 1991, respondent Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing the complaints on
the ground that private respondent was protected by diplomatic immunity. The dismissal was
based on the letter of the Foreign Office dated September 10, 1991.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, an appeal was filed with the NLRC,
which affirmed the dismissal of the complaints in its Resolution.
Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari without first seeking a reconsideration of the
NLRC resolution.
In the case at bench, petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration is fatal to the instant
petition. Moreover, the petition lacks any explanation for such omission, which may merit its
being considered as falling under the recognized exceptions to the necessity of filing such
motion.
Issue:
Did private respondent waived its diplomatic immunity when it engaged in exploration work and
entered into a contract of employment with petitioners.
Whether or not an international organization is entitled to diplomatic immunity?
Ruling:
As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine Government adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being a
member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine Government adheres to the
doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Both treaties
have the force and effect of law.
The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by the letter of the
Department of Foreign Affairs, recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE in
accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations where
the Philippine Government was a party.
The issue whether an international organization is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a "political
question" and such determination by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and quasi-
judicial agencies.
Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly waived its
immunity, which is not so in the case at bench (Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, Art. III, Sec. 4).
Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence here is
by virtue of a joint project entered into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for
mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is not to exploit our natural resources and gain
pecuniarily thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the people, including that of
petitioners.
Republic v Villasor, 54 SCRA 84

Doctrine:
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty
that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent.
Facts:
On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in favor of P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino inchuan, and
International Construction Corporation against the Republic of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP). On June 24, 1969, Judge Guillermo Villasor issued an order declaring the that
the decision for the AFP to pay Php1,712,396.40 was final and executory. The Alias Writ of
Execution was served by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, Quezon City, on several banks. The
funds sought to be garnished were allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and
allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP.
Issue:
Can the funds be validly levied upon?
Ruling:
No. The State may not be sued without its consent. From this, public funds cannot be the object
of garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law. Even if the money sought to be garnished is due to government employees,
the fact that it is in the hands of public officers makes it not liable to the creditors in the process
of garnishment. To subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is
prohibited directly.
People v Lagman and Zosa, 66

Doctrine:
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go
against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The
duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To
leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the
Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
Facts:
In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He was being compelled by Section 60 of
Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do
so because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be
killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law.
Issue:
Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an
army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty
of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does
not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance
therewith. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.
Phil 13 University of San Agustin, Inc. v. CA, 230 SCRA 761

Doctrine:
Every school has a right to determine who are the students it should accept for enrolment. It has
the right to judge the fitness of students.
Facts:
Private respondents Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elaine Magante, Roy D. Sancho, Michael Kim So
and Bernardita Cainoy were third year Nursing students of petitioner University of San Agustin
(USA) who were refused re-admission in the summer classes of 1989 and last two semesters of...
school year 1989-1990 on the alleged ground that they failed to obtain grades of not lower than
80% in Nursing 104 (Nursing Practice II with Related Learning Experience). Its persistent
refusal to re-admit them prejudiced their right to freely choose their field of study and... finish a
college degree and worse, no other school within the city and nearby areas is willing to accept
them due to the difference in the curriculum and school residency requirement. Thus, they filed a
petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, to command petitioner
USA to re-admit them. Aside from the prayer for re-admission, they also prayed for actual and
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each of them.
Submitting a joint answer to the petition, petitioner USA and the other petitioners, Dean
Concepcion Cajilig and Clinical Instructors Nenalyn Abioda, Mary Espino, Rhodora Azucena,
Ma. Dulce Socorro Posa and Cosette Monteblanco admitted having barred private respondents
from finishing their Nursing course but justified the decision not to re-admit them as being in
pursuance of the school's policy that only students with grades of at least 80% in any major
Nursing subject, including Nursing 104, and two minor subjects, are allowed enrollment in the
following year. Private respondents were duly informed and forewarned of their below 80%
performance rating. To buttress petitioners' stance, they placed reliance on Section 9(2) of the
Education Act of 1982 (B.P. Blg. 232) which recognizes the right of students to freely choose
their field of study subject to existing curricula, and to continue their course up to graduation,
except in cases of academic deficiency or violation of disciplinary regulations; and Section 13(2)
thereof vesting in institutions of higher learning the... right to determine on academic grounds
who shall be admitted to study, who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of study and
research.
Additionally, petitioners contended that private respondents have no cause of action for
mandamus under the premises because there is no clear and well-defined right of the latter which
has been violated neither do the former have a corresponding ministerial duty to re-admit them,
since petitioner USA is a private educational institution not performing public functions and
duties. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, petitioner USA enjoys the right to
academic freedom.

Issue:
Whether or not the students can compel the school to allow them to complete their course?
Ruling:
While it is true that an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a
fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue, since a contract creates reciprocal
rights and obligations, the obligation of the school to educate a student would imply a
corresponding obligation on the part of the student to study and obey the rules and regulations of
the school. When a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the
required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right. In this connection, this Court
recognizes the expertise of educational institutions in the various fields of learning. Thus, they
are afforded ample discretion to formulate reasonable rules and regulations in the admission of
students, including setting of academic standards. Within the parameters thereof, they are
competent to determine who are entitled to admission and re-admission.
The court find the challenged regulation of petitioner USA reasonable and relevant to its
objective, namely: to produce graduates of proven competence and aptitude in a demanding
profession, for which it is responsible to society-at-large, not only nationally but also
internationally, considering the good fame and reputation of Filipino nurses abroad. Although
private respondents did not flunk in Nursing 104 but on the contrary earned credits therefor,
nevertheless, their performances are still academically deficient for failure to meet the standards
set by petitioner USA. Besides, it is worthy to note that they were apprised fully beforehand
about the rules and regulations of petitioner USA.
Zabal v Duterte, GR No. 238467, February 12, 2019

Doctrine:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution
or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can
be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be
freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only
one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge
of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily
impairs the operation of the Government.
Facts:
On April 26, 2018, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 475 (PN 475), formally declaring
a state of Calamity in Boracay and ordering its closure for six (6) months. Zabal builds
sandcastles for tourists while Jacosalem drives for tourists and Bandiola is a tourist that
occasionally visits Boracay for business and pleasure.
Zabal et al.’s Arguments:
Zabal et al., filed a petition on April 25, 2018 praying:
I. that a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction be
immediately issued restraining and/or enjoining the respondents;
II. if the respondents enforce the enclosure after the instant petition, a Status Quo Ante be issued
restoring and maintaining the condition prior to such closure;
III. After proper proceedings, a judgment be rendered permanently restraining and/or enjoining
the respondents, to declare the closure of Boracay Island or ban against petitioners, tourists, and
non-residents to be unconstitutional
Zabal et al., assert that PN 475:
I. Presents constitutional issues (whether President Duterte acted within the scope of powers
granted him by the Constitution, whether the measures implemented infringes upon the
constitutional rights to travel and to due process of petitioners); and
II. President Duterte exercised a power legislative in nature, unlawfully excluding the legislative
department from the assertion of power.
Zabal et al., also argue that:
(1) PN 475 is an invalid exercise of legislative power and must be struck down;
(2) PN 475 is unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional rights to travel (it has not been
shown that the presence of tourists in the island poses any threat or danger to national security,
public safety, or public health) and to due process (covers the right to work and earn a living);
(3) The closure of Boracay could not be anchored on police power.
Thereafter, on May 18, 2018, the petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition averring that PN
475impinges upon the local autonomy of affected Local Government Units (LGUs) since it
orders the said LGUS to implement the closure of Boracay and the ban of tourists and non-
residents therefrom. Lastly Zabal et al., state that this case does not simply revolve on the need to
rehabilitate Boracay, but rather, on the extent of executive power and the manner by which it was
wielded by President Duterte. To them, necessity does not justify the President’s abuse of power.
Respondents’ Arguments
I. President Duterte must be dropped as a party-respondent in this case because he is immune
from suit;
II. The petition should be dismissed for lack of basis;
III. The issuance of writ of prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that has already been fait
accompli;
IV. Mandmus is obviously inappropriate;
V. There is no real justiciable controversy in this case since there is no clash between the right
ofthe State to preserve and protect its natural resources and the right of petitioners to earn
aliving;
VI. PN 475 is a valid exercise of police power;
VII. PN 475 was issued pursuant to President’s executive power under Section 1 of the Article
VII of the Constitution, which were residual and implied from the grant of executive power as
held in Marcos v. Manglapus;
VIII. PN 475 is within the ambit of the powers of the President;
IX. The right to travel is not absolute right;
X. The violation of the right to due process – Zabal as sand castle maker and Jacosalem as driver
are freelancers and belong to the informal economy sector, meaning, their source of livelihood is
never guaranteed and is susceptible to changes in regulations and the overall business climate.
XI. PN 475 does not unduly regress upon the local autonomy of the LGUs. Under RA 10121, it
is the Local Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council that is tasked to take the lead in
situation when a state of calamity is declared.
Issue:
I. Is President Duterte a respondent in this case?
II. Were Zabal et al., correct in filing for a petition for writ of prohibition and mandamus?
(a)Was there an actual controversy in this case?
III. Does PN 475 constitute an impairment to right to travel?
IV. Is PN 475 a valid exercise of police power?
V. Do Zabal et al., have vested rights on their sources of income to be entitled to due process?
VI. Was there an intrusion into the autonomy of the concerned LGUs?
Ruling:
I. NO. In Professor David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, it was held that it is a settled doctrine
that the President, during the tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil
or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
II. NO. The petition must be subjected to four (4) exacting requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial review
there must be an actual controversy;
the petitioners must possess locus standi;
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case
It is not enough that this petition mounts a constitutional challenge against PN 475. It is likewise
necessary that it meets the aforementioned requisites before the Court sustains the propriety of
the recourse.
(a) Is there an actual controversy in this case?
YES. The actual controversy is evident in this case. PN 475 was issued by President Duterte on
April 26, 2018 and Boracay was temporarily closed on the same day. Certainly, the
implementation of the proclamation has rendered legitimate concern of petitioners that
constitutional rights may have possibly been breached by this governmental measure.
(b) Is there a legal standing?
NO. Like in Galicto v. Aquino, what Zabal and Jacosalem could lose in this case are mere
projected earnings which are in no way guaranteed, and are sheer expectancies characterized as
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. Concomitantly, an assertion of direct injury on
the basis of loss of income does not clothe Zabal and Jacosalem with legal standing.
As to Bandiola, he utterly failed to demonstrate that he possesses the requisite legal standing to
use by merely claiming direct injury on the premise that his right to travel was affected by the
proclamation without providing specifics as to how.
However, even if there was a lack of locus standing, the Court will allow this petition to proceed
to its ultimate conclusion to its transcendental importance.
After all, the rule on locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, which the Court, in a long
line of cases involving subjects of transcendental importance, has waived or relaxed, thus
allowing non-traditional plaintiffs such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters and legislators to
sue incases of public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by a government
act.
As to the two other requirements, their existence is indubitable. Clearly, the filing of the petition
and the supplemental petition signals the earliest opportunity that the constitutionality of the
subject government measure could be raised. There can also be denying that the very lis mota of
his case is the constitutionality of PN 475.
III. Does PN 475 constitute an impairment to right to travel?
NO. There is no showing that PN 475 deliberately meant to impair the right to travel. Hence, if at
all, the impact of PN 475 on the right to travel is not direct but merely consequential; and the
same is only for a reasonably short period of time or merely temporary.
IV. Is PN 475 a valid exercise of police power? (Whether the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and unduly oppressive upon individuals).
YES. The Court held in Oposa v. Factoran that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are given continuing importance and the State assumes it solemn
obligation to preserve and protect them, the time will come that nothing will be left not only for
this generation but for the generations to come as well.
Allowing tourist into the island while it was undergoing necessary rehabilitation would be
therefore be pointless as no establishment would cater to their accommodation and their other
needs. Further, the petitioners totally failed to counter the factual bases of, and justification for
the challenged executive action.
V. Do Zabal et al., have vested rights on their sources of income to be entitled to due process?
NO. The Court in Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. DSWD, the court elucidated on vested
rights, these are rights which are fixed, unalterable, irrevocable. Here, Zabal et al., asserted right
to whatever they may earn from tourist arrivals in Boracay are merely an inchoate right or one
that has not fully developed and therefore cannot be claimed as one’s own.
Besides, PN 475 does not strip Zabal and Jacosalem of their right to work and earn a living. They
are free to work and practice their trade elsewhere. That they were not able to do so in Boracay,
at least for the duration of its closure, is a necessary consequence of the police power to measure
to close and rehabilitate the island.
VI. Was there an intrusion into the autonomy of the concerned LGUs?
NO. RA 10121 recognizes and even puts a premium on the role of the LGUs in disaster risk
reduction and management as shown by the fact that a number of the legislative policies set out
in the subject statute recognize to aim and to strengthen the powers decentralized to LGUs.
The fact that other government agencies are involved in the rehabilitation works does not create
the interference that the powers and functions of the LGUs are being encroached upon.
The Court sustains the constitutionality and validity of PN 475. Wherefore, the Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus is DISMISSED.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Paliza, Sr., G.R. Nos. 236772-73, June 28, 2021

Doctrine:
The time-honored principle is that just compensation is the fair and full equivalent of the
property at the time of taking. The time of taking is the time when the landowner was deprived of
the use and benefit of their property, such as when the title is transferred in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, or when the Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) are
issued in favor of farmer-beneficiaries.
For purposes of determining just compensation in agrarian reform cases, courts are bound to
consider the factors in Section 17, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 1 and the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) formulas in effect at the time of taking, subject to the guidelines set
forth by the Court in Alfonso v. Land Bank of the Philippines.
Facts:
Ignacio Paliza, Sr. (Ignacio) is the owner of two coconut lands, known as Lot 5763 and Lot 5853,
with areas of 3.2208 hectares and 0.5028 hectares respectively, both located in Mauraro,
Guinobatan, Albay. The lands were placed under the compulsory acquisition scheme of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), with representatives from the DAR, the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, and the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council conducted the
required field investigation for Lot 5763 and Lot 5853 on March 23, 1994 and November 12,
1997, respectively.
Pursuant to its mandate under R.A. No. 6557, Land Bank computed the land valuation of the
lands. It used the two-factor formula under DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1998
(DAR AO No.5) for Lot 5763 and the single-factor formula for Lot 5853. Thus, Land Bank
submitted claims valuation and processing forms to prove that the valuations of the lands are
P105,666.81 for Lot 5763 and P9,290.54 for Lot 5853.
Unsatisfied with Land Bank's preliminary determination of just compensation, Ignacio filed a
case with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The DARAB
issued a decision, fixing the just compensation at Pl,399,821.70 for Lot 5763 and P134,216.68
for Lot 5853.
Land Bank contested the DARAB' s determination of just compensation. It filed a complaint
before the RTC and prayed for the trial court to adopt the preliminary determination of just
compensation that it formulated.
On April 24, 2012, the RTC rendered its Decision, the just compensation for the agricultural
lands owned by the private respondent, Ignacio Paliza, Sr. is hereby fixed in the amount of
Php331 ,113.03. [For] Lot No. 5763 and Php43,477.74 for Lot No. 5853 or the total amount of
Php374,590.77.
The petitioner is hereby directed to compensate private respondent in the aforesaid sum minus
the amount actually received by him, if anything, within a period of thirty (30) days from notice
of this decision free of any interest, and with interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum if not
compensated within the 30-day period herein mandated, which payment of interest shall
commence on the 31st day from notice of the decision until the amount of just compensation is
fully satisfied or received by the private respondent.
Land Bank20 and Ignacio21 filed separate petitions for review before the CA. In a consolidated
decision,22 the CA affirmed the RTC's determination of just compensation. It held that the RTC
based its determination of just compensation on the report made by the commissioner, which was
in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, DAR AO No. 5 and DAR AO No. 1. The CA
also affirmed the RTC's imposition of 12% per annum legal interest on the just compensation,
but modified it by ruling that beginning July 1, 2013, the interest rate shall be at 6% per annum
until the amount is fully paid.
Issue:
Whether the CA committed erred in upholding the RTC's valuation fixing the just compensation
at P331,113.03 for Lot No. 5763 and P43,477.74 for Lot No. 5853; and (2) whether the CA
committed reversible error in affirming the RTC' s imposition of legal interest on the just
compensation.
Ruling:
In the present case, the RTC held that in determining just compensation, the court shall be guided
by the applicable formula prescribed by the DAR, subject only to the determination of the date of
taking. In the determination of the date of taking, it held that the court is not strictly bound by
Section 16 and 17 and other provisions of R.A. No. 6657, and it can apply, by analogy, any
administrative issuance of the DAR. The RTC then declared that DAR AO No. 1 effectively
amended the presumptive date of taking to June 30, 2009. Thus, it relied on the report of the
appointed commissioner, which used the production data and values within the 12-month period
preceding June 30, 2009.
It is now settled that for valuation of land acquired by the government under R.A. No. 6657, as in
this case, '"the time of taking' is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit
of [their] property. Thus, there is taking when the title is transferred in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines, or when the CLOAs are issued in favor of farmer-beneficiaries.
To reiterate, just compensation must be valued at the time of taking. On this score, the CA erred
in sustaining the RTC' s valuation of the lands in accordance with DAR AO No. 1.
In the present case, the claim folders were received by Land Bank on May 10, 1996 for Lot 5763
and on November 17, 1998 for Lot 5853, also before R.A. No. 9700 and DAR AO No. 1 took
effect. Thus, the lands should have been valued in accordance with the factors laid down in
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 before its amendment, and in accordance with the relevant DAR
regulations in effect at the time of taking.
In the present case, the Court agrees with Land Bank that the applicable DAR regulations in the
valuation of Ignacio's lands.
The RTC's reasoning was not sufficient to warrant the deviation from the applicable DAR
formulas. In fact, in applying the formula under DAR AO No. 1 and using the production data
and values within the 12-month period preceding June 30, 2009, it was the RTC that did not take
into account the date of taking of the lands in determining just compensation. It disregarded the
fundamental principle in eminent domain proceedings that just compensation shall be determined
at the time of taking.
To repeat, the taking in this case occurred on January 20, 1997 for Lot 5763 and on March 16,
1999 for Lot 5853. To be sure, the nature, character, and condition of the lands since the time of
taking have vastly changed over the years. By using production data within the 12-month period
preceding June 30, 2009, the RTC failed to capture the true value of the lands at the time of
taking. This cannot be sustained.
Despite our pronouncement that the RTC's determination of just compensation, as affirmed by
the CA, is erroneous, this Court cannot automatically adopt Land Bank's own calculation as
prayed for in the petition.
At this point, the Court deems it proper to remand the case to the RTC
for the determination of just compensation in accordance with this decisionwith due
consideration to the factors in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the formulas under DAR AO No.
11 for Lot 5763 and DAR AO No. 5 for Lot 5853. If the RTC finds that there is sufficient basis to
relax the application of the formulas, it may, in the exercise of judicial discretion, deviate from
applying these. However, it must clearly discuss in its decision the reasons for doing so,
supported by the evidence on record.
A final note on the imposition of interest. It is already a settled principle that legal interest may
be granted in expropriation proceedings where there is delay in the payment of just
compensation, which was deemed to be "an effective forbearance on the part of the State. " 72 If
upon remand of the case, the Land Bank is found to be in delay, it shall pay interest at 12% per
annum computed from the date of taking until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1,
2013 until fully paid,73 on the just compensation to be ascertained by the RTC.
Sps. Mercado vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196707, June 17, 2015

Doctrine:
In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of the like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social
and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government
to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.
Facts:
Petitioners’ spouses Nilo and Erlinda Mercado (petitioners) were the registered owners of 9.8940
hectares of agricultural land in Kilate, Toril, Davao City. Respondent, on the other hand, is a
government financial institution organized and existing by virtue of RA 3844, and is the financial
intermediary for the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Thru a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO)
of Davao City informed petitioners that 5.2624 hectares of their aforesaid property (subject
portion) shall be placed under the CARP coverage, for which petitioners were offered 287,227.16
as just compensation.
In his letter dated October 27, 2002, petitioner Nilo A. Mercado (Nilo) rejected respondent’s
valuation. He claimed that the fair market value of their property is ₱250,000.00 per hectare; that
they sold the remaining 4.6316-hectare portion, which is hilly and uncultivated, compared to the
subject portion which is flat, suited for agriculture and has improvements, for such price; and,
that said property is adjacent to "Eden," an eco-tourism area, and likewise suitable for housing
and other uses.
On May 21, 2004, petitioners filed a Complaint14 for payment of just compensation before the
RTC acting as SAC which was docketed as Civil Case No. 30,373-04. Petitioners prayed that the
DAR and respondent be ordered to pay them ₱250,000.00 per hectare as just compensation for
the subject portion. In addition, they prayed that the farmer-beneficiaries of the subject portion
who had been enjoying the fruits of the property be made to pay ₱200,000.00 as rentals.
The farmer-beneficiaries, namely, Daisy Monilla (Monilla) and Rosario Cadotdot, and the DAR
filed their respective Answers. They averred that the farmer-beneficiaries are no longer tenants of
the subject portion but are now the qualified beneficiaries thereof; that the sale of a portion of the
landholding, as claimed by petitioners, was not recorded in the PARO; that the farmer
beneficiaries had been religiously paying their rentals amounting to 30% of the proceeds of their
harvest; and, that the issue of non-payment of rentals is vested with the DARAB and not with the
SAC.
During the proceedings before the RTC, Perla M. Borja,Revenue Officer of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, testified that as of December 22, 2002, the zonal value of the properties in
Kilate, Davao City was ₱40.00 per square meter. Such zonal value was based on the data from
the Department of Finance and on the capital gains tax of the properties in the area.
Nilo, for his part, testified that sometime in 1999, the subject portion was planted with coconut,
mango, banana and coffee and that there was also a farmhouse built in the premises. He added
that there were improvements and plants on the property which were, however, removed when it
was leased and converted into a banana farm. Anent the lease of the subject portion to Apo Land,
Nilo claimed that the former paid advance rentals for five years in favor of the farmer-
beneficiaries.
Respondent presented its Agrarian Affairs Specialist, Engr. Marilyn Rojo (Engr. Rojo), who
testified that there was no comparable sales information on the property of petitioners or on the
adjoining properties in the area. Engr. Orlando Arceo (Engr. Arceo), respondent’s Property
Appraiser, also testified.
RTC observed that petitioners sold 4.6316-hectare portion of their property, which is less
productive and with uneven terrain, for ₱1,020,000.00. In contrast, the subject portion is flat,
easier to cultivate and suitable for agriculture; moreover, as of 2005, the adjacent properties were
valued at more than ₱40.00 per square meter due to the fully productive pineapple and banana
plantations of Apo Land in the area.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Review35 before the CA arguing that the RTC did not
show how it arrived at its valuation of 25.00 per square meter; that it erred in lending credence to
petitioners’ allegation that they were able to sell 4.6316 hectares at 25.00 per square meter as no
evidence was presented to prove the same; and, that the RTC should have applied the formula
under DAR A.O. No. 5 and considered the factors under Section 17of RA 6657 in determining
just compensation.
In its April 20, 2011 Decision,36 the CA emphasized the mandatory nature of complying with the
formula, as set forth under DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, in computing just compensation. It
held that the RTC not only disregarded the formula but it likewise failed to show how it arrived
at the 25.00 per square meter valuation.
Issue:
WON there was error committed by the special agrarian court in fixing the just compensation.
Ruling:
In the recent cases of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Peralta, and Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Diosdado Sta.
Romana and Resurreccion O. Ramos, the Court has made declarations as to the determination of
just compensation.
the rule is that the RTC must consider the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA 6657 and as
translated into a formula embodied in DAR A.O.No. 5. However, it may deviate from these
factors/formula if the circumstances warrant or, as stated in Sta. Romana, "if the situations before
it do not warrant its application." In such a case, the RTC, as held in Yatco, must clearly explain
the reason for deviating from the aforesaid factors or formula.
Essentially in this case, the RTC in determining just compensation, considered the alleged value
of land in Kilate, Davao City in 2002 at ₱40.00 per square meter and the supposed sale made by
Nilo of the remaining 4.6316 hectares of his land at ₱25.00 per square meter in 2001.
The Court finds that both parties failed to adduce satisfactory evidence of the property’s value at
the time of its taking. Thus, it is premature to make a final determination of the just
compensation due to petitioners. And as the Court cannot receive new evidence from the parties
for the prompt resolution of this case,47 its remand to the RTC is deemed proper. Suffice it to
state that "[w]hile remand is frowned upon for obviating the speedy dispensation of justice, it
becomes necessary to ensure compliance with the law and to give everyone – the landowner, the
farmers, and the State – their due."
As a final note, we remind the RTC to observe the following guidelines for the proper
determination of just compensation: (1) just compensation must be valued at the time of taking
of the property expropriated, or the time when the owner was deprived of the use and benefit of
his property;49 (2) interest may be awarded as may be warranted by the circumstances of the
case;50 and, (3) just compensation must be arrived at pursuant to the guidelines set forth in
Section 17 of RA 6657 and outlined in a formula provided in DAR A.O. No. 5. If the RTC finds
these guidelines inapplicable, it must clearly explain the reasons for deviating therefrom and for
using other factors or formula in arriving at the reasonable just compensation for the property
expropriated

Republic of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon, G.R. No. 165354, Jan. 12,
2015

Doctrine:
In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, there is a "taking" when the
owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction
or a material impairment of the value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use
thereof. There is a "taking" in this sense when the expropriator enters private property not only
for a momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the
property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof.
Facts:
NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City in order to
construct and maintain transmission lines. Respondents’ heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the
property. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the Regional Trial Court in Batangas
City (RTC), seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the property.
The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before
entering the property and that the entry was done without their consent; nonetheless, they
tendered no objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just compensation not only
for the portion sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was greatly
diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project.
During the pendency of an appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue
Expropriation Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement; that
the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose because of the
intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed on the respondents’ property; that
because the public purpose for which such property would be used thereby ceased to exist, the
proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was now duty-bound to
return the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation
proceedings was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending
appeal.
Ruling:
The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but,
conformably with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or discontinuance of
the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just and equitable.
Before anything more, we remind the parties about the nature of the power of eminent domain.
The right of eminent domain is “the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not
only the public but the private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to public
purpose.” But the exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should
underlie the Government’s exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that it is for a
particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These
requirements partake the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the
condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
Public use, in common acceptation, means “use by the public.” However, the concept has
expanded to include utility, advantage or productivity for the benefit of the public. “Public use”
has now been held to be synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,” and “public
convenience.”
It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained throughout the
proceedings for expropriation. The effects of abandoning the public purpose were explained in
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr., to wit:
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to
use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing
which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the
expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the
same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the
particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private
property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property
owner’s right to justice, fairness and equity.
It is not denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to acquire the land in question for public use.
The fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the expropriation of lands, under the power
of eminent domain, is public use. That being true, the very moment that it appears at any stage of
the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and
should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at all except when the
expropriation is for some public use. That must be true even during the pendency of the appeal or
at any other stage of the proceedings. If, for example, during the trial in the lower court, it should
be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that the expropriation is not for some public
use, it would be the duty and the obligation of the trial court to dismiss the action. And even
during the pendency of the appeal, if it should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the
appellate court that the expropriation is not for public use, then it would become the duty and the
obligation of the appellate court to dismiss it.
Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings
of the element of public use. To continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the definite
cessation of the public purpose of the project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment
in favor of the expropriator due to the absence of the essential element of public use.
Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue the proceedings subject to the conditions
to be shortly mentioned hereunder, and requires the return of the property to the respondents.
Having said that, we must point out that NAPOCOR entered the property without the owners’
consent and without paying just compensation to the respondents. Neither did it deposit any
amount as required by law prior to its entry. The Constitution is explicit in obliging the
Government and its entities to pay just compensation before depriving any person of his or her
property for public use. Considering that in the process of installing transmission lines,
NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants without payment, and the installation of the
transmission lines went through the middle of the land as to divide the property into three lots,
thereby effectively rendering the entire property inutile for any future use, it would be unfair for
NAPOCOR not to be made liable to the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights
from the time of entry until the time of restoration of the possession of the property.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the
respondents, there is no need to pay “just compensation” to them because their property would
not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR
should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of
entry until the time of restoration of the possession by paying to them actual or other
compensatory damages.
This should mean that the compensation must be based on what they actually lost as a result and
by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use, including the value of the fruit
trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s construction of the transmission lines.
Considering that the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings is a development occurring
during the appeal, the Court now treats the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as
producing the effect of converting the case into an action for damages. For that purpose, the
Court remands the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. The court of origin shall
treat the case as if originally filed as an action for damages.
Maravilla v. Bugarin, G.R. Nos. 226199 and 227242-54, October 1, 2018

Doctrine:
In ejectment cases, the judgment of the RTC against the defendant-appellant is immediately
executory, and is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the RTC,
or in the appellate court's discretion, suspended or modified, or supervening events occur which
have brought about a material change in the situation of the parties and would make the
execution inequitable.
Facts:
The instant case stemmed from separate complaints for unlawful detainer (ejectment cases) filed
by petitioners Rosita Tuason Maravilla and Corazon Tuason Miranda, through their attorney-in-
fact, Rubencito M. del Mundo (petitioners), before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
(MeTC) between November 16 to 25, 2011, seeking to eject respondents Marcelino Bugarin,
Angelita Contreras, Benjamin Lazatin, Lourdes Maniquiz, Edelberto Padlan, Remedios Navarro,
Jose Pangan, Eduveges Reyes, Alexander Cruz, Priscilla Cortez, Mila Laja, Antonio Daanay,
Generosa Sison, Perfecto Dela Vega, and all other persons claiming rights under them
(respondents), from the portions ofthe parcel of land located in San Andres, Manila, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 316976 (subject land) in the name of petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest, Carlos Tuason. The complaints commonly claimed that: (a) respondents have been in
physical possession of the subject land and paying monthly rentals until November 10, 2010; (b)
petitioners decided to terminate the leases effective March 17, 2011; (c) respondents refused
petitioners' demands to pay and to vacate; and (d) the complaints were filed within one (1) year
from the last demand.
The complaints were consolidated before the MeTC, Branch 29 which rendered a Decision8
dated May 28, 2013 in favor of petitioners, ordering respondents to vacate the subject land and
surrender its possession to petitioners, and to pay: (a) their respective unpaid rentals as of the
termination of the lease on March 17, 2011; (b) P5,000.00 each as reasonable monthly
compensation for the use and occupation of the subject land every month thereafter; (c)
attorney's fees; and (d) the costs of suit.
In an Order20 dated April 20, 2015, the court a quo directed the issuance of a writ of execution
of the Consolidated Decision, holding that respondents failed to substantiate their claim of the
existence of a supervening event. Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was
denied in an Order22 dated June 30, 2015.
Respondents filed an Amended Motion to Deny/Suspend Issuance of Writ of Execution23 dated
January 28, 2016, raising the filing by the City of Manila before the RTC-Manila of an
expropriation case over the subject land.
Meanwhile, the CA rendered a Decision denying respondents' appeal in CA-G.R. SP. No.
138449. On February 17, 2017, a Decision was rendered by the RTC-Manila, Branch 42 in the
expropriation case declaring the City of Manila to have the lawful right to take the subject land,
and ordering it to pay the amount of P31,262,000.00 less the amount of initial deposit, as the just
compensation for the subject land.
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in suspending the issuance of the writ of execution of its
decision against respondents in the ejectment cases on the ground of the existence of a
supervening event.
Ruling:
There is no dispute that at the time the assailed Orders were issued the City of Manila had filed
an expropriation case to acquire the subject land, and in fact, obtained a ruling in its favor. These
occurrences notwithstanding, records fail to show that the City of Manila had either: (1) priorly
posted the required judicial deposit in favor of petitioners in order to secure possession of the
subject land, in accordance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991;38 or (2)
paid the original landowners, i.e., Carlos Tuason's living heirs (the petitioners herein),39 the
adjudged final just compensation for the subject land so as to consider the expropriation process
completed and consequently, effectuate the transfer of ownership to it. Thus, at the time the
assailed Orders were issued, petitioners remained the owners of the subject land, and therefore
were entitled to all the rights appurtenant thereto.
A final point. The Court is not unaware of the fact that subsequent to the issuance of the assailed
Orders, the City of Manila has already been issued a writ of possession in the expropriation case,
which therefore authorizes it to take actual possession of the subject land. However, the Court
discerns that the City of Manila is not a party to this case, given that it sprung from the ejectment
cases which essentially involve a dispute on the mere material possession of the subject land
only between the petitioners and respondents herein. As earlier mentioned, respondents have no
direct interest and hence, should not benefit from any ruling favoring the City of Manila in the
expropriation case. Thus, under this limited context, the Court finds it proper to completely
reverse the assailed Orders, and allow full execution of the Consolidated Decision insofar as the
parties herein are concerned. Suffice it to say that nothing precludes the City of Manila from
enforcing the writ of possession it obtained in the expropriation case to acquire physical
possession of the subject property, which circumstance the Court, however, cannot presume at
this point nor, in fact, properly consider without going beyond the parameters of this case.
The Orders dated March 18, 2016 and July 28, 2016 issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 47 (court a quo) in Civil Case Nos. 13-130387-130400, suspending the issuance
of the writ of execution of its Consolidated Decision dated November 17, 2014 against
respondents Marcelino Bugarin) Angelita Contreras, Benjamin Lazatin, Lourdes Maniquiz,
Edelberto Padlan, Remedios Navarro, Jose Pangan, Eduveges Reyes, Alexander Cruz, Priscilla
Cortez, Mila Laja, Antonio Daanay, Generosa Sison, Perfecto Dela Vega, and all other persons
claiming rights under them, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE based on the reasons stated
in this Decision. The court a quo is directed to issue a writ of execution of the Consolidated
Decision dated November 17, 2014.
City of Bacolod v. PHUTURE VISIONS CO., INC., January 17, 2018

Doctrine:
The principle of immunity from suit is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which states that "[t]he State cannot be sued without its consent." The
purpose behind this principle is to prevent the loss of governmental efficiency as a result of the
time and energy it would require to defend itself against lawsuits. The State and its political
subdivisions are open to suit only when they consent to it.
Facts:
Phuture was incorporated in 2004. In May 2005, its Articles of Incorporation (AOI) was
amended to, among others, include the operation of lotto betting stations and/or other gaming
outlets as one of its secondary purposes. Eventually, it applied with the Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (P AGCOR) for an authority to operate bingo games at the SM City
Bacolod Mall (SM Bacolod), as well as with SM Prime Holdings (SM Prime) for the lease of a
space in the said building. Phuture was issued a provisional Grant of Authority (GOA) on
December 5, 2006 by P AGCOR, subject to compliance with certain requirements, and received
an Award Notice from SM Prime on January 10, 2007.
Thereafter, Phuture processed, completed and submitted to the Permits and Licensing Division of
the City Mayor of Bacolod City its Application for Permit to Engage in Business, Trade or
Occupation to operate bingo games at SM Bacolod and paid the fees therefor. It was then issued
a claim slip for its permit on February 19, 2007, which was to be claimed on March 16, 2007.5
In the meantime, Phuture further amended its AOI on February 27, 2007 to reflect its
engagement in bingo operations as its primary purpose.
Phuture claimed that the closure of its bingo outlet at SM Bacolod is tainted with malice and bad
faith and that petitioners did not have the legal authority to shut down said bingo operations,
especially since PAGCOR itself had already issued a provisional GOA in its favor.
On March 7, 2007, the RTC conducted a summary hearing to determine the sufficiency of the
form and substance of the application for the issuance of a temporary mandatory order and/or
preliminary mandatory injunction to remove the padlock installed at respondent's place of
business at SM Bacolod and allow it to conduct unhampered bingo operations.
On March 19, 2007, petitioners filed their Comment and Answer with Counterclaim.
On January 10, 2007, Phuture applied for the renewal of its mayor's permit with "professional
services, band/entertainment services" as its declared line of business, providing the address of
the business as "RH Building, 26 Lacson Street, Barangay 5" instead of SM Bacolod where
respondent's bingo operations were located.
Upon submission of the requirements on February 19, 2007 and while the application was being
processed, Phuture was issued a "claim slip" for it to claim the actual mayor's permit on March
16, 2007 if the requirements were found to be in order.
Also, without waiting for the release of the mayor's permit, respondent started the operation of its
bingo outlet at SM Bacolod. This prompted the former City Legal Officer, Atty. Allan Zamora, to
issue a Closure Order dated March 2, 2007, pursuant to City Tax Ordinance No. 93- 001, Series
of 1993, which declares unlawful for any person to operate any business in the City of Bacolod
without first obtaining a permit therefor from the City Mayor and paying the necessary permit
fee and other charges to the City Treasurer.
The Closure Order was presented by petitioners' representative to respondent's lawyers to
negotiate a possible peaceful solution before its implementation. However, respondent simply
ignored the information relayed to them and thus, at around 6:00 a.m. on March 3, 2007, the
Composite Enforcement Unit under the Office of the City Legal Officer implemented the
Closure Order.
Petitioners contended that the claim slip so heavily relied upon by respondent was a mere
oversight or human error of the City Government's employee who processed the same, who was
likewise duped by the tampered entries that respondent's application was for a permit for bingo
operations when, in tn1th, it was only for the renewal of a previously-issued permit albeit for a
different line of business, i.e., "professional services, band/entertainment services."
In a Decision16 dated March 20, 2007, the R TC denied the prayer for the issuance of a
temporary mandatory order and dismissed the case for lack of merit.
The CA pronounced that the issue of whether the RTC erred in dismissing the prayer for
temporary mandatory order for the removal of the padlock allegedly installed illegally at
respondent's place of business at SM Bacolod, as well as the prayer ordering petitioners to allow
respondent to conduct unhampered bingo operations during the pendency of the case, had
already been rendered moot since, with the onset of another year, it was necessary to apply for
another business permit with the Mayor's Office.
Petitioners timely interposed a Motion for Reconsideration, protesting the CA's order to remand
the case to the R TC for trial on the aspect of damages. The CA, however, maintained its
position, issuing the now assailed Resolution. Aggrieved, petitioners brought the matter before
this Court through the present recourse.
Petitioners again limit their argument to the CA's order to remand the case to the R TC for trial
on the aspect of damages.
Issue:
Stripped of the verbiage, the sole issue in this case is whether petitioners can be made liable to
pay respondent damages.

Ruling:
As this Court has repeatedly held, waiver of immunity from suit, being in derogation of
sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. Moreover, it deserves mentioning that the City of
Bacolod as a government agency or instrumentality cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake
or error of its officials or agents. Estoppel does not also lie against the government or any of its
agencies arising from unauthorized or illegal acts of public officers. Hence, we cannot hold
petitioners estopped from invoking their immunity from suit on account of having raised it only
for the first time on appeal.
Petitioners are not liable for damages.
As to the primary issue of whether petitioners are liable to respondent for damages, respondent
Phuture alleged that petitioners are guilty of surreptitiously padlocking its SM bingo outlet in a
"patently arbitrary, whimsical, capricious, oppressive, irregular, immoral and shamelessly
politically motivated" manner and with clear discrimination since the majority owners of the
company are the sons of petitioner Mayor Leonardia's political rival, then Congressman Monico
Puentevella. Such contention is clearly but non sequitur, grounded as it is in pure conjecture.
Certainly, respondent's claim that it had applied for a license for bingo operations is questionable
since, as it had admitted in its Petition for Mandamus and Damages, the primary purpose in its
AOI was only amended to reflect bingo operations on February 14, 2007 or more than a month
after it had supposedly applied for a license for bingo operations with the Office of the Mayor. It
is settled that a judicial admission is binding on the person who makes it, and absent any
showing that it was made through palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset such
admission.40 This admission clearly casts doubt on respondent's so-called right to operate its
business of bingo operations.
Petitioners, in ordering the closure of respondent's bingo operations, were exercising their duty to
implement laws and ordinances which include the local government's authority to issue licenses
and permits for business operations in the city. This authority is granted to them as a delegated
exercise of the police power of the State. It must be emphasized that the nature of bingo
operations is a form of gambling; thus, its operation is a mere privilege which could not only be
regulated, but may also very well be revoked or closed down when public interests so require
In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that injury alone does not give respondent the right
to recover damages, but it must also have a right of action for the legal wrong inflicted by
petitioners. In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, there must be
damnum et injuria that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.