Social Security Commission and Social Security System v.

Teresa Favila

G.R. No. 170195, March 28, 2011

J. Del Castillo

DOCTRINE:

A spouse who claims entitlement to death benefits as a primary beneficiary under the

Social Security Law must establish two qualifying factors, to wit: (a) that s/he is the legitimate

spouse; and (b) that s/he is dependent upon the member for support.

FACTS:

Respondent, Teresa G. Favila filed a Petition before the Social Security Commission

(S.S.C.) in which Favila averred therein that she was married to Florante Favila (Florante) on

January 17, 1970, and the latter designated her and their three children as beneficiaries before

petitioner Social Security System (SSS). Moreover, Teresa also averred that when Florante died,

his pension benefits under the SSS were given to their only minor child at the time, Florante II,

but only until his emancipation at the age of 21.

As the surviving legal wife, Teresa Avila believed that she was entitled to receive

Florante’s pension from the SSS. She subsequently filed her claim for said benefits before the

SSS. The SSS denied this claim which was later affirmed by the Social Security Commission

(SSC) pursuant to the provisions cited in Sections 8 (k) and 13 of R.A. No. 1161 as amended

otherwise known as Social Security (SS) Law. The SSC held that the surviving spouse’s

entitlement to an SSS member’s death benefits is dependent on two factors which must concur at

the time of the latter’s death, to wit: (1) legality of the marital relationship; and (2) dependency

for support.

Despite Teresa being the legal spouse and one of Florante's named beneficiaries, the SSC

decided that she was ineligible to receive death benefits because she was determined not to be

dependent on Florante for support at the time of his death in light of their marital infidelity.

Teresa seeked recourse in the Court of Appeals and the C.A. reversed the decision of the

SSC claiming that Teresa was eligible to receive the pension benefits from her late husband on

the grounds that she is Florante's legally recognized surviving spouse regardless of the integrity

of their marriage. The C.A. also found that the SSS unilaterally added to the requirements of the
law the condition that a surviving spouse must be actually dependent for support upon the

member spouse during the latter’s lifetime by virtue of their interpretation of the said SS Law.

Teresa, along with the C.A. mainly contended that courts (or quasi-judicial agencies for that

matter), may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein

situations not provided nor intended by lawmakers.

ISSUE:

Is Teresa Favila entitled to the death benefits accruing from the death of Florante, in

contemplation of the Social Security Law?

RULING:

No, Teresa Favila is not entitled to the death benefits accruing from the death of Florante,

in contemplation of the Social Security Law.

Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from

ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This

plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animo sermo est (speech is the

index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a

statute correctly expresses its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba

legis non est recedendum, or, from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

In this case, Paragraphs (e) and (k) of Section 8 of RA 1161 provides the statutory

construction of the definitions of “Dependent” and “Beneficiaries” very clearly. There is no

question that Teresa was Florante’s legal wife. However, with her bare claim that she was

dependent upon her husband for support along with her misplaced reliance on the presumption of

dependency by reason of her valid and then subsisting marriage with Florante, Teresa had not

presented sufficient evidence to discharge her burden of proving that she was indeed dependent

upon her husband for support at the time of his death.

Additionally, the fact of dependency is a mandatory requirement of the law and as further

prevailing jurisprudence would state, a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband

cannot be said to be ‘dependent for support’ upon the husband without evidence to the contrary.

Therefore, Teresa’s failure to show that she was dependent upon Florante for support at the time
of his death disqualifies her as a primary beneficiary of Florante’s pension by virtue of not

satisfying the necessary requirements provided in paragraphs (e) and (k) of Section 8 of RA

1161.

Thus, Teresa Favila is not entitled to the death benefits accruing from the death of

Florante.