Summer school on Plato’s Laws, first session A.

Laks June 19 2023

B. Centrone, La seconda polis. Introduzione alle Leggi di Platone. Carrocci editore 2021
H.S. Versnel, Coping with the gods. Wayward readings in Greek theology, Brill 2011.

Expanded bare bones

I. Prologue. Three old men, an anonymous Athenian, a citizen of Knossos in Crete
(Clinias) and a Lacedemonian (Megillos), are on their way to the cave of Zeus, where
according to a Cretan tradition, Minos the legendary king who gave Crete its laws, received
his father's words/phêmas (‘pronouncements’) every nine years (cf. Homer, Od. 19. 178s.). In
tune with the purpose of their walk, the three old men will talk about the constitution and
laws (peri te politeias... kai nomôn), a subject that is said to be appropriate for their age.
Book 1.624a1-625c5. [Interesting: there is a discussion about whether Plato thinks at
7.811b6–c2 that the Laws can serve as an educational handbook to be taught in class at
7.811b6–c2 Cf. n. 66 to chap.2, p. 190]
II. The ultimate aim of legislation: human] excellence, or ‘virtue’). Book 1.625c6 - end
of Book 2. [Interesting: do we still think in those terms, too?]
III. Fundamental features of a constitution adapted to this aim (now extended to three
targets : wisdom, friendship and freedom). Analysis of mixed constitution that correspond to
this model : Sparta (still a contemporary reality), Cyrus' Persia, and ancient Athens (both of
which belong to the past): Book 3. At the end of the book, Clinias discloses that his city,
Cnossos, prepares the foundation of a new Cretan colony, which later in the work will be
called Magnesia, so that the present conversation has an immediate actuality. [interesting: so
we have to do with a concrete case, which does not mean that what follows is meant to be
Magnesia’s constitution, a fundamental point]
IV. First series of (meta-legislative) preliminaries to any legislation worth this name.
Among these preliminaries there are two especially important sections. One of them deals
with the name of the future constitution with I shall mention in my second part (4.702a2-4;
712b4-715e2 Cf. Chap. 1, p. 18s., «The first theologico-political treatise »); the other bears
on the notion of preamble to the laws (4.722b4-c7, cf. Chap. 1, p. 17, «The great divide »).
Book 4 to 5.734e.
V. Second series of preliminaries, including economic laws (5.736c5– 738b1 and
739e8– 747e11) and cultural institutions (5.738b2-8), as well as another essential
metalegislative section concerning ‘retreat from the sacred’ and the two/three cities (see
5.739a1–e7). Book 5.734e4-747e11.
VI. The projected constitution (also called "constitutional laws"). Book 6.751a1-
768e7.67.
VII. The rest of the legislation (most of it criminal laws, but also includes rules of good
social behavior). Book 6.769a1-12.960b5.
VIII. The ‘head if the constitution’, called 'Watch' (formerly 'Nocturnal Council'). Book
12.960b5-969c2.
IX. Epilogue: Invitation to the Athenian stranger to join the committee for the
foundation of Magnesia. Book 12.969c3-d3 (cf. 6.751d8-752a1).
 Aristotle Politics 2.6, 1265a1-4
« In the Laws there is hardly anything but laws; not much is said about the constitution.
This, which he had intended to make more of the ordinary type, he gradually brings
round to the other form [i.e., that of the Republic]” (trans. Ross).

Laws 5.734e3-6 and 735a5-6

«At this point let’s put an end to the prelude (prooimion) to the laws that has been dealt
with in my exposition. After the prelude the ‘tune’ (nomos) must necessarily follow, isn’t, or
rather, to speak truly, an outline of the laws of the constitution (nomous politeias) (5.734e3-
6).

« Let’s posit two species of constitution (politeia) the organization of the

offices/officeholders (arkhôn katastasis), and the laws that are given to the
offices/officeholders ».

9.874e8–875d5
[. . .] it is necessary for human beings to have laws established and to live according to laws,
or not to differ in any way from the beasts that are the most savage in all respects. The cause
of this is that there is no nature (phusis) of any human beings that is capable (hikanê) both of
knowing what is useful to human beings as far as a constitution is concerned and, knowing
this, of being able and willing to always to do what is best.».

4.715d7–e1 «(Clinias:) [. . .] Acute is your sight, given [better : in agreement with?] your age.
(The Athenian Stranger:) As a matter of fact, every human being, when he is young, sees
these matters in a way that is much hazier than he is capable of, whereas when he is old, his
gaze is most acute».

Rousseau
« Granted that it is easy to make better laws. It is impossible to make laws
which men’s passions do not abuse, as they have abused the earlier ones. To anticipate and to
weigh all these future abuses is something which perhaps even the most consummate
Statesman may find it impossible to do. Putting the law over man is a problem in politics that
I liken to that of squaring the circle in geometry. Solve this problem satisfactorily, and the
government based on this solution will be good and free from abuses. But until then, you may
be sure that wherever you believe you have made the law rule, it will be men who will be
ruling. »

Part 2. Plato’s theology. From gods to reason

1.624a1-2
[The Athenian] “Is it a god or some human being,” asks the Athenian, “whom you take to be
responsible for organizing your laws?” 
Theos ê tis anthrôpôn humin, ô xenoi, eilêphe tên atian tês tôn nomôn diatheseôs ?

4.712e9–713a2
[each of the so-called constitutions (politeiai)] “receives as a name the power (kratos) of the
ruling despot. If one had to give to our city the name of such a master (despotês), then it
should be the name of the god who in truth rules as a master over those who possess reason
(nous)”.

4.715e7–716a2
« The god (ho theos) [. . .], just as the ancient saying asserts, holds the beginning, end, and
middle of all things that are, completing his revolution in a straight line, according to nature [.
. .] »

10.897b1–2

Saunders « These are the instruments soul uses, whether it cleaves to divine reason (soul
itself being, if the truth were told, a divinity), and guides everything to an appropriate and
successful conclusion, or allies itself with unreason and produces completely opposite
results».

Brisson « C’est en se servant de tout cela que l’âme, aussi longtemps qu’elle s’adjoint
l’intellect divin, puisqu’elle est à juste titre une divinité [theion orthôs theos ousa Eusebius,
Arethas = A3 O3], guide toutes choses dans la rectitude et le bonheur. Mais quand elle
s’associe à la déraison, elle produit tous les effets contraires aux précédents».

Schöpsdau : «die Seele, wenn sie die Vernunft hinzunimmt, die ein Gott mit Recht für Götter
ist [theon orthôs theois AO], dann immer zum Rechten und zum Glück hinleitet, während sie
dann, wenn sie sich mit Unvernunft verbindet, in allem das Gegenteil davon bewirkt ».

i.e soul, if it takes up reason, which is, [to speak] correctly, a god for gods [theon orthôs
theois AO], then always leads to the right and to happiness, while then, if it joins with
unreason, it causes in everything the opposite of it.

4.714a1–2 nomos is the “(sur)name that we give to the distribution of (or: operated by)
reason” (tên tou nou dianomên eponomazontas nomon).

4.716c4–6 « The god, for us, would be most of all the measure of all things (metron), and
doubtless far more so than some human being, as they say ».