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The Debate About Luxury in Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century French Political Thought Author Jeremy Jennings
The Debate About Luxury in Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century French Political Thought Author Jeremy Jennings
Thought
Author(s): Jeremy Jennings
Source: Journal of the History of Ideas , Jan., 2007, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Jan., 2007), pp. 79-
105
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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access to Journal of the History of Ideas
Jeremy Jennings
An early draft of this article was presented at the 2004 Annual Conference o
In its final form it has benefited greatly from conversations with Matthew W
Clark, Sheryl Kroen, Mihaela Bacou, and Vincent Michel. Research for this
aided by a Visiting Fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Study at Indiana
Bloomington, where I was able to make use of the wonderful collection of
century material belonging to the Lilly Library, and by a six-month visiting p
at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris. With regard to th
thank in particular Ivona Hedin, Stephanie Lookenbill, and Aurelien Craiutu;
to the latter I thank especially Patrick Le Gales and Lucien Jaume. Finally,
anonymous reviewers for their extremely useful comments on the first subm
article and Warren Breckman for his sound advice and editorial encourageme
S"Last Reply by J.J. Rousseau of Geneva," in The Discourses and other ea
writings, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University P
63-85.
Copyright 0 by Journal of the History of Ideas, Volume 68, Number 1 (January 2007)
79
people and wretches, that is to say for wicked people in either event."" The
2 Ibid., 84. For Rousseau's views of luxury, see Renato Galliani, Rousseau, le luxe et
I'ideologie nobiliare: etude socio-historique (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1989). The
treatment of Melon, however, is limited to one page of text: see 244-45.
3Jean-Francois Melon, Essai politique sur le commerce (Rouen: no publisher, 1734). The
edition of the text referred to is Collection des Principaux Economistes (Osnabruck: Otto
Zeller, 1966), 1: 701-835.
4 Christopher J. Berry, The Idea of Luxury: A Conceptual and Historical Investigation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Melon, Essai politique, 709.
6 Ibid., 742-49.
80
See "Discourse which won the prize of the Academy of Dijon in the year
question proposed by the Academy: Whether the restoration of the Science
has contributed to the purification of morals," in Rousseau, Discourses, 1-2
on the Origins and the Foundations of Inequality Among Men," in Disco
and "Discourse on Political Economy," in Rousseau, The Social Contract an
political writings, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni
1997), 3-38.
1 Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Argum
talism before its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977
Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the E
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001), Pierre Force, Self-In
Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Istvan H
of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Pers
bridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2005).
81
82
years 1736 and 1786 over 100 texts were published that dealt with the
issue of luxury.'5
Nevertheless, some scholars suggest that by the time of the French Rev-
olution these passionate disputes had come to an abrupt and decisive end.
Jennifer Jones provides a sense of the arguments that have been brought
into play to explain this occurrence. Drawing upon earlier work by Ellen
Ross, she first contends that the Revolution "extinguished" the debate on
luxury in two ways. It revealed that the problems associated with luxury,
rather than being mysterious and rooted in human nature, had "compre-
hensible political causes and solutions." Next, the debate on luxury had
been a "primary form" of criticism of the ancien regime. The Revolution
allowed men and women to abandon such coded strategies and engage
overtly in political forms of opposition. To this, Jones herself adds a third
explanation. "By the late eighteenth century many of the problems which
women's luxury had been accused of causing in society had been 'solved'
through the ascendancy of a new conception of women, fashion and taste
which naturalized women's interest in clothing: the frenzy for fashions was
no longer considered a sinful state, harmful to the general health of society
and the maintenance of social hierarchies, but rather a natural aspect of
femininity, necessary for marital harmony and domestic bliss."16 By way of
summary, therefore, Jones concludes that "[t]his formerly serious debate
had been transformed into frivolous, bantering literature alternatively de-
ploring or upholding women's right to adorn themselves and their homes
lavishly.""17
All three arguments can be challenged. It did not require the onset of
the Revolution to demonstrate that the issues and problems arising from
luxury had political causes and solutions. Numerous writers (including
Montesquieu) had concluded that the effects of luxury varied according to
the political regime, especially with regard to monarchies and republics.
Secondly, the majority of those who wrote in the luxury debate were not
critics of the ancien regime but defenders of the hierarchy and stability of
the old order. Finally, Jones's own explanation is only convincing if the
luxury debate was limited to a consideration of the issue of women and
fashion. This was not the case. For example, Gabriel Senac de Meilhan's
83
18 Gabriel Senac de Meilhan, Considerations sur les richesses et le luxe (Amsterdam and
Paris: Valade, 1787).
19 Jacques Necker, De l'Administration des Finances de la France (Paris: no publisher,
1784). Chapter XI, Vol.III, 57-75 is devoted to "Considerations sur le luxe et sur le
progres."
20 Senac de Meilhan, Considerations sur les richesses et le luxe, 144-45.
21 Ibid., 174.
22 Antoine-Prosper Lottin, Discours contre le luxe: Il corrompt les moeurs et detruit les
Empires (Paris: Belin, 1783).
84
the luxury debate was certainly not a frivolous and ephemeral matter of
taste and fashion.
Melon was not the first person in France to address the issue of
Montesquieu rejected the argument against luxury in Letter 106 of
sian Letters.24 "For one man to live in luxury," he wrote, "a hund
must work without respite." The passion for getting rich, combi
the enthusiasm for work, was being transmitted from class to cla
transforming the French nation; the "scene was one of universal
and ingenuity." Conversely, a nation where everyone worked the
where "to produce fancy goods and luxury was banned" would
most wretched on earth."
85
2 Montesquieu., The Spirit of the Laws, trans. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller,
and Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 340.
26 Ibid., 101.
2- See Oeuvres comrpletes de Voltaire (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2003), 16: 273-313.
86
28 Ibid., 276-81.
2 Diderot, Political Writings, trans. R. Wokler and J. Hope Mason (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1992), 124-25, 130-31.
'0 See Oeuvres completes de Diderot (Paris: Briere, 1821), 17: 235-77. This text can be
found in translation in Commerce, Culture and Liberty: Readings on Capitalism Before
Adam Smith, ed. Henry C. Clark (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003), 477-501.
-' Oeuvres completes de Diderot, 17: 247.
87
cape boredom they sought ever more indulgent and extraordinary forms of
gratification.
Saint-Lambert also detailed the conditions in which luxury could bene-
fit society as a whole. There would be no sudden fortunes. Extreme poverty
and extreme wealth would be rare. Luxury would not be detached from
usefulness. All classes would appreciate and enjoy the fine arts. Most im-
portantly, "luxury and the passions leading to it must be subordinated to a
spirit of community and to the goods of the community."'2 The first objec-
tive therefore had to be to put "luxury back in order." As Saint-Lambert
concluded, "I beg my readers to rid themselves alike of the prejudices of
Sparta and of Sybaris."33
As Christopher Berry has commented, it is apparent from his text that
Saint-Lambert was aware that the debate about luxury now took a predict-
able and standard form.34 What is also apparent is that Saint-Lambert mir-
rored the wider concern (to be found in the writings of Montesquieu,
Diderot, Helvetius and Condillac) to distinguish between the good and bad
uses of luxury and to specify that luxury could not be divorced from consid-
erations of social utility. Whereas Melon seemed unconcerned about either
the source of wealth or how it was used-it mattered only that money was
spent rather than hoarded-later writers were acutely aware that displays
of ostentatious, frivolous, and unearned wealth could deeply corrupt and
divide a society. Thus, while Melon was content simply to assert that "the
equality of man is a chimera"3" and to affirm that all consumption was
inherently beneficial, some of those who followed him were far from san-
guine about a society characterized by gross inequalities of fortune and
doubted the merits of exaggerated consumption.
If, however, the lines of the debate about luxury had now been drawn,
there was no lessening of the dispute between the pro- and anti-luxury
camps. Moreover, this debate would run right up to the outbreak of the
Revolution. Two texts in particular provide evidence for this claim: Butel-
Dumont's Thborie du luxe, ou traite dans lequel on entreprend d'dtablir
que le luxe est un ressort non seulement utile mais memne indispensablement
ndcessaire a la prosperite des Etats, first published in 1771,-6 and the Abbe"
12 Ibid., 250.
33 Ibid., 276.
14 Berry, The Idea of Luxury, 137.
3 Melon, Essai politique, 724.
36 Butel-Dumont, Theorie du luxe, ou traite dans lequel on entreprend d'etablir que le
luxe est un ressort non seulement utile mais mhme indispensablement ndcessaire a la
prosperite des Etats (Paris: J-F. Bastien, 1771), 2 Vols.
88
Did the French Revolution and the fall of the Jacobins elicit a
attitude towards luxury in particular and towards commerce m
ally? The Abbe' Sieyes, the principal ideologue and architect of th
of the Revolution, had been fully aware that the distinctive feat
ern society was that it rested upon the division of labor, an in
he applied to his understanding of both politics and economics
wrote, "every individual concerned himself with all the objects
his own consumption, all individuals would be the same, and so
not depart from its state of infancy."41 Where Sieyvs diverge
physiocratic school was that he concluded that there was no fu
difference in productive potential between agriculture and man
and thus that the exclusive focus of the physiocrats upon the
misplaced. From this it followed that the privileged position ac
89
advocated by Sieyes and, to that extent, the dominant tendency was broadly
favorable to the further development of commerce. The feudal regime, with
its restrictions upon the free movement of goods and persons, was abol-
ished. Property rather than privilege was to be the basis of the new order
and was to define a person's status. The loi Le Chapelier of 1791 made
illegal all forms of restrictive trade corporations. But did this mean that
concerns about the potentially damaging consequences of gross inequality
and unbridled luxury had been forgotten?
The advent of foreign war and internal revolt opened the door to a
revival of the rhetoric of classical republicanism and with it not merely a
return to the notion of the virtuous, frugal citizen of ancient Greece and
Rome but also the victory of austerity and simplicity over ostentation and
display. The reintroduction of economic controls from 1793 to 1794
amounted to what Judith A. Miller has described as "the Economy of Ter-
ror."42 National price ceilings were introduced for grain and flour, and to
this were later added price ceilings on all "goods of first necessity." The
General Maximum of September 1793 was, according to Colin Jones and
Rebecca Spang, a "shibboleth of overt consumer renunciation," providing
"a snapshot of what Revolutionary Government regarded as prime necessi-
ties."43 Yet, by the same token, they argue, "it was a shimmeringly indeter-
minate document," revealing that "[d]espite their best attempts to look and
sound like Athenians and Romans, the French found it altogether more
difficult than their classical forbears to draw a hard-and-fast line between
the realms of necessity and luxury." In short, denouncing luxury was easy
but defining it proved well-nigh impossible, and constructing an economic
policy upon the basis of its eradication showed itself to be both catastrophic
and repressive.
With the fall of the Jacobins, the General Maximum was abolished.
This is how Rebecca Spang accounts for what followed and for what she
42 Judith A. Miller, Mastering the Market: The State and the Grain Trade in Northern
France, 1700-1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 155.
41 Colin Jones and Rebecca Spang, "Sans-culottes, sans cafe, sans tabac: shifting realms
of necessity and luxury in eighteenth-century France," in Consumers and Luxury: Con-
sumer Culture in Europe, 1650-1850, ed. Maxine Berg and Helen Clifford (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1999), 55.
90
describes as "the end of luxury."44 The political debate over the designation
of some goods as necessities and others as luxuries subsided after 1794,
such that, by the end of the decade, "both terms, though not completely
abandoned, had lost much of their explanatory efficacy." In the world of
the Thermidorian republic, frivolous consumption ceased to be the moral
failing of the individual and was seen as integral to the flourishing of the
French economy. The broader social and moral ramifications associated
with luxurious consumption were increasingly forgotten, only to be re-
placed by "the personalized category of 'pleasure' " that made "individual
desires the basis (rather than the bane) of social organization." Spang con-
cludes that "By the middle of the nineteenth century, luxury was of analytic
usefulness for those interested in studying medieval sumptuary laws or cat-
aloguing the books collected by connoisseurs."45
Again, there is much of merit in these accounts and they capture espe-
cially well the fluid quality of what was understood by luxury in a society
that was increasingly characterized by commodity production. Yet, it
would be a mistake to believe that reflections on the nature of commercial
activity were suddenly divested of moral and political concerns and thus
that the question of luxury was now forgotten altogether.46 Indeed, as Mar-
tin S. Staum has argued, "concepts of public virtue remained indelibly
linked to economic theory despite efforts to construct a value-neutral sci-
ence based on private interest."'
44 Rebecca Spang, "The frivolous French, 'liberty of pleasure' and the end o
Taking Liberties: Problems of a new order from the French Revolution to N
Howard G. Brown and Judith A. Miller (Manchester: Manchester Univ
2002), 110-25.
4S Ibid., 125.
46 See James Livesey, Making Democracy in the French Revolution (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 2001).
4 See Martin S. Staum, Minerva's Message: Stabilizing the French Revolution (Mon-
treal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1996), 192; and Cheryl B. Welch,
Liberty and Utility: The French Ideologues and the Transformation of Liberalism (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 70-96.
91
92
duced."54 Nor did luxury keep people alive. It was, Say argued, "only in a
country where there is no luxury, or very little, that one sees everyone well-
dressed, well-housed, well-nourished, and content."'s Accordingly, copious
praise was heaped upon Lycurgus and the institutions of Sparta, while the
fates of Carthage, Venice, and the Dutch Republic were cited as examples
of the dire consequences that followed from the exclusive concentration
upon the pursuit of wealth.
Conventional wisdom has it that the transition from Olbie to the Traite
54 Ibid., 125-26.
s1 Ibid., 126.
56 See Richard Whatmore, Republicanism and the French Revolution: An Intellectual Bi-
ography ofJean-Baptiste Say (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). See Evelyn L.
Forget, The Social Economics of Jean-Baptiste Say (London: Routledge, 1999). Forget's
text includes a translation of Say's Olhie: see 196-241.
57 Say, Traite d'Economie Politique, in Collection des Principaux Economistes (Osna-
brock: Otto Zeller, 1966), 9: 22-23.
93
,x Ibid., 454.
I lbid,, 457.
6" Ibid., 458.
'i Ibid., 459.
6' Ibid., 462.
94
6B Destutt de Tracy, Commentaire sur l'Esprit des lois de Montesquieu (Paris: Delauney,
1819), 87-114 and Traite d'economie politique (Paris: Bouguet & L&vi, 1823), 232-65.
64 Ibid., 243.
6 Destutt de Tracy, Commentaire, 96-97.
95
who enjoyed it, but also upon all those who admired it and who served to
provide it."66
Moreover, Destutt de Tracy found himself agreeing with Montes-
quieu's original contention that luxury was appropriate to monarchies;
however, he added that representative governments had no need to pander
to "the natural tendency of man to give himself up to superfluous expendi-
ture." Did this mean that governments, in whose interest it was to combat
the advance of luxury, should resort to sumptuary laws? Not only were
they an abuse of authority and an attack on property, but they served no
purpose "when the spirit of vanity is not incessantly excited by all institu-
tions; when the misery and ignorance of the lowest class are not so great as
to encourage a stupid admiration for ostentation; when the opportunities
to make fast and excessive fortunes are rare; when wealth is dispersed
promptly through the equal division of inheritance; when finally everything
leads us in another direction and towards real pleasures; in a word, when
society is arranged." There, he concluded, were "the true means to combat
luxury."' 6
66 Ibid., 109.
67 Ibid., 112.
68 Maxime Berg and Elizabeth Eger, "Introduction," in Luxury in the Eighteenth Century:
Debates, Desires and Delectable Goods, ed. M. Berg and E. Eger (Houndmills: Palgrave,
2003), 5.
69 See Perrot, Le Luxe, 38; and Serge Latouche, "Luxe et &conomie," Revue de MAUSS
16 (1985): 71-72.
96
97
71 Ibid., 221.
76 Ibid., 222. Constant had made the same point in his earlier Principes de politique.
Filangieri discussed luxury at some length, making the standard distinction between "use-
ful" and "dangerous" luxury and believing that it was not luxury that corrupted morals
but bad morals that corrupted luxury. See Oeuvres de G. Filangieri (Paris: Aillaud, 1840),
1: 256-69.
77 Martin S. Staum, "French Lecturers in Political Economy, 1815-1848: Varieties of Lib-
eralism," History of Political Economy 30 (1998): 95-120.
78 Frederic Bastiat, Oeuvres completes (Paris: Guillaumin, 1862), 5: 383-94.
98
luxury was combined with one resting primarily upon economic considera-
tions. In contrast to that articulated by Rousseau, however, Bastiat's was a
critique of luxury that quite happily sat beside an endorsement of private
property and inequalities of wealth.
Beyond this, it is relatively easy to find evidence of a continuing con-
cern about the social and psychological dimensions of luxury. Unsurpris-
ingly, the literature of utopian socialism frequently displayed the hope that
the workers would avoid a taste for opulence and ostentation and limit
their consumption to the satisfaction of "real" needs. This was certainly
the view of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Recognizing the divisions within so-
cialism on this issue-Proudhon described the Fourierists as "supporters of
luxury and of lust"-he contended that the error of socialism, be it "epicu-
rean or ascetic," with regard to luxury derived from "a false conception of
value." This led to a conception of community as "the religion of misery."
M. Cabet, Proudhon wrote, "has banned luxury. No more luxury! Down
with fashions and finery! Women will wear artificial feathers; diamonds
will be replaced by glass baubles; fine carpets and expensive furniture will
belong to the State, so that no one becomes jealous. Clothing will be de-
cided upon once and for all by a sovereign council."17
Yet, no better proof can be found of the continuing concern with the
social and moral implications of luxury than in the work of the legitimist
political economist, Alban de Villeneuve-Bargemont's Economie politique
chretienne, ou Recherches sur la Nature et les Causes du Pauperisme en
France et en Europe et sur les Moyens de le soulager et de le prevenir.x"
Although now largely forgotten, Villeneuve-Bargemont was no minor fig-
ure in his day. For example, his ideas had a major influence upon Alexis de
Tocqueville."' Villeneuve-Bargemont contended that the question of luxury
had never properly been resolved. The origin of the problem had to be
sought not in the form of government but within the nature of man himself.
Citing both Adam Smith and Jean-Baptiste Say against unproductive lux-
ury, he nevertheless concluded that all was error and confusion in the "En-
glish school" of political economy. Not only were the conclusions of the
99
"English School" false but they were also dangerous, "because it tended,
on the one hand, to produce the most excessive luxury and, on the other,
the most profound and fearful misery." In contrast, the school of Christian
political economy "condemns excessive luxury as damaging to the social as
much as the moral order." However, it gave its approval to "reasonable
luxury," a luxury that spread gradually through all the ranks of society and
that was the fruit of honest labor. Such luxury was the product of an indus-
trial system that sought "to distribute the profits of work more fairly and
to bring about the disappearance of gross inequalities in conditions." Ac-
cording to this view, if "excessive luxury" arose from materialism, "inno-
cent luxury" was indissolubly tied to Christian charity and duty.82 With its
concern to moderate luxury and to avoid both inordinate wealth and grind-
ing poverty, thereby preserving the foundations of the social and moral
order, there was little in Villeneuve-Bargemont's analysis that could not
have been found in many of the anti-luxury tracts of the ancien regime.
100
wrote, "is that it is possible to enrich all classes at the expense of one an-
other-to make plunder universal under the pretext of organizing it." These
concerns likewise lay at the heart of the dispute between two of the tower-
ing figures of 1848, Adolphe Thiers and Louis Blanc, over the issue of the
right to work.'s In such circumstances, advocates of a moralized commerce
gave ground to the enthusiasts for a more overtly liberal conception of the
economy, a conception grounded upon a new vision of politics appropriate
to a post-revolutionary and post-Napoleonic order. It is this, in part, which
explains why Jean-Baptiste Say was later misread as a theorist of liberal
political economy.
Nevertheless, evidence of the enduring character of republican argu-
ments against luxury and, by extension, of republican hostility to the com-
mercial model embodied by England is not difficult to identify. In 1848
Charles Renouvier published his Manuel Republicain de l'Homme et du
Citoyen.86 This was a text commissioned by the Ministry of Public Instruc-
tion and was intended to be a civic catechism for the new (Second) Repub-
lic. If the text itself sought above all to define the rights and liberties to
be enjoyed by the citizen of the Republic, it clearly indicated Renouvier's
conviction that the Republic should embody "justice" and "fraternity" and
that its goal was to produce virtuous citizens. Complications arose when
Renouvier considered liberties associated with the right of property. "The
most important outcome of a well-ordered Republic," he wrote, "is to
guarantee for each citizen the protection of his person, of his rights and
of everything which belongs to him."87 This included a citizen's property,
described as "the fruits of a man's work." Equality of conditions was to be
rejected because "it could be established only by depriving citizens of their
liberty." How, then, could equality be made compatible with liberty? Re-
nouvier's answer, in true quarante-huitard fashion, was to call upon the
sentiment of fraternity. Therefore, towards the end of the dialogue that
makes up the text the questioning turned to the desirability of luxury.18 The
most striking aspect of what followed is that Renouvier addressed the topic
in terms which were almost identical to those deployed in the exchange
between Rousseau and Melon.
8S See Adolphe Thiers, De la proprie't (Paris: Lheureux, 1848); and Louis Blanc, Le Socia-
lisme: Droit au travail: Reponse M. Thiers (Paris : Librairie du progrds, 1848).
86 References are to the Paris: Armand Colin, 1904 edition.
7 Ibid., 161.
88 Ibid., 265-80.
101
who lived off its production? Was it not the case that great wealth "spent
ostentatiously serves at least to maintain workers?" Renouvier's reply was
to accept that at present the luxury of the rich provided livelihood for the
poor, but he then added that the poor would only die of hunger if the
abolition of luxury was not accompanied by an acknowledgement of the
right to work. Accompanied by such a reform, the worker would pass from
the production of luxury goods to the production of something of use and
of practical value. In addition, the "idler" who had previously paid for
luxury would now turn his reduced resources in the direction of something
more useful. Was luxury to be abolished altogether? Renouvier echoed the
very arguments deployed at the height of the 1789 Revolution89 when he
contended that there was a place for "collective luxury" in the shape of
libraries, theatres, museums, and so on, all of which could be regarded as
expressions of fraternity and civic education. There was even a place for
luxury in the hands of private individuals; but such luxury was scandalous
when so many people were denied the necessities of life. "In a Republic,"
Renouvier wrote, "where the solidarity between men is recognized, I find it
repugnant that luxury should spread before ease of circumstance has been
attained and that the caprices of men should be satisfied while the needs of
others cry out before Providence.""o To this he appended two further famil-
iar refrains. Renouvier declared that he trembled when he thought of those
nations-and in particular of England-whose wealth and prosperity con-
sisted in the perfect comfort of a few thousand families whose actions con-
demned millions to live on bare necessities. Secondly, the greater majority
of rich people were "enervated" by luxury, "debased" by dissolute living,
and "consumed" by boredom. However, this was "just punishment" for
those who had sought the "refinement" of their lives through "the exploita-
tion of their brothers." It was only in "an age of corruption," he asserted,
that such behavior was not condemned. For good measure, Renouvier then
concluded his discussion by asserting that it was not true that the arts and
sciences would perish with the end of luxury. Rather, both would flourish
when allied to the advance of human well-being. "Nothing is beautiful,
nothing is noble," Renouvier remarked, "which is not also useful."91
Republican arguments against luxury, inaugurated in the eighteenth
century, clearly retained their vitality and held center stage in the ferment
of ideas that followed the fall of the July Monarchy. Moreover, in the con-
102
text of 1848, the rhetorical force of these arguments had far more appeal
than liberal calls to commerce and individual liberty.
103
CONCLUSION
96 Ibid., 29.
97 See Rosalind H. Williams, Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Late N
Century France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
104
article, however, is that the debate which began in the eighteenth century
did not peter out before the revolution of 1789, did not end with the advent
of the Thermidorian Republic, and did not lose substance in the first half
of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the contest over luxury lost little of its
vitality in these years and remained an issue that was addressed by many of
the leading political thinkers and political economists of the period. Perhaps
even more remarkably, the contours of the debate changed relatively little
over time. To that extent, luxury can be described as a relatively stable
concept that was regularly deployed in the political thought of a relatively
unstable society. From Rousseau to Renouvier, the voice of classical repub-
licanism could be heard denouncing the injustice of luxury and the iniqui-
ties of inequality it entailed. From Melon to Feydeau, there were those
prepared to endorse the utility of our natural propensity to luxury and to
embrace the individual liberty through which it could be procured.
Throughout there was not only the repeated attempt to define and identify
the specific manifestations of luxury but also the effort to distinguish be-
tween useful and dangerous luxury, and to assess the virtues required of
individuals in societies characterized by increasing wealth and commerce.
Quite remarkably, very few were prepared to put aside all moral
qualms when faced with a world of expanding personal consumption and
seemingly needless luxury. Frugality and the productive use of resources
frequently remained the prevailing maxims, even for those who had aban-
doned the chimera of equality and the Spartan ideal. Beneath this lay a
constant engagement with England and the kind of social order it was
thought to represent. There is much that could be said about this fascinat-
ing theme.98 It was ever present in the political writings of eighteenth and
nineteenth-century France. At stake, however, were two very different mod-
els of society. It is tempting to suggest, over a century and a half later, that
similar concerns inform today's debate over the comparative merits of the
"modele social frangais" and what is usually referred to (with thinly dis-
guised hostility) as the "modele anglo-saxon."
98 See Jeremy Jennings, "France and the 'Anglo-Saxon' Model: Contemporary and Histor-
ical Perspectives," European Review 14 (2006): 537-54.
105