0301.

847 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

GOVT . PUBLS . DEPT.

9/1
Ma aintenance
9
B JAN /MAR 1984

D30 1.8454
INDIANA UNIVERSITY

JUN 3 1985
LIBRARY - DEPOSITORY
 THE

REX RILEY
Transient Services Award

LORING AFB Limestone, ME VANCE AFB Enid , OK

MCCLELLAN AFB Sacramento, CA LAUGHLIN AFB Del Rio, TX
MAXWELL AFB Montgomery, AL FAIRCHILD AFB Spokane, WA
SCOTT AFB Belleville, IL MINOT AFB Minot, ND
McCHORD AFB Tacoma, WA VANDENBERG AFB Lompoc, CA
MYRTLE BEACH AFB Myrtle Beach , SC ANDREWS AFB Camp Springs, MD
MATHER AFB Sacramento, CA PLATTSBURGH AFB Plattsburgh , NY
LAJES AFB Azores MACDILL AFB Tampa, FL
SHEPPARD AFB Wichita Falls, TX COLUMBUS AFB Columbus, MS
MARCH AFB Riverside, CA PATRICK AFB Cocoa Beach , FL
GRISSOM AFB Peru , IN WURTSMITH AFB Oscoda, MI
CANNON AFB Clovis NM WILLIAMS AFB Chandler, AZ
RANDOLPH AFB San Antonio, TX WESTOVER AFB Chicopee Falls, MA
ROBINS AFB Warner Robins, GA EGLIN AFB Valpariso, FL
HILL AFB Ogden , UT RAF BENTWATERS UK

YOKOTA AB Japan RAF UPPER HEYFORD UK

SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB Goldsboro, NC ANDERSEN AFB Guam
KADENA AB Okinawa HOLLOMAN AFB Alamogordo, NM
ELMENDORF AFB Anchorage, AK DYESS AFB Abilene, TX
SHAW AFB Sumter, SC AVIANO AB Italy
LITTLE ROCK AFB Jacksonville, AR BITBURG AB Germany
OFFUTT AFB Omaha, NE KEESLER AFB Biloxi , MS
KIRTLAND AFB Albuquerque, NM HOWARD AFB Panama

BUCKLEY ANG BASE Aurora , CO GEORGE AFB Victorville, CA

RAF MILDENHALL UK PETERSON AFB Colorado

WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB Fairborn , OH CLARK AB RP

POPE AFB Fayetteville, NC MOODY AFB Valdosta , GA

TINKER AFB Oklahoma City, OK RHEIN -MAIN AB Germany
DOVER Dover, DE RAF LAKENHEATH UK

GRIFFISS AFB Rome, NY ZARAGOZA AB Spain

KI SAWYER AFB Gwinn , MI TORREJON AB Spain
REESE AFB Lubbock , TX ZWEIBRUCKEN AB Germany

:: U.S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1984-783-026 /1003

 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE

Maintenance
AIR FORCE RECURRING PUBLICATION 127-3 JAN /MAR 1984 VOLUME 9 NUMBER 1

HON VERNE ORR LT GEN ROBERT W. BAZLEY

Secretary of the Air Force The Inspector General , USAF
GEN CHARLES A. GABRIEL MAJ GEN GERALD D. LARSON page 2 page 10 page 18
Chief of Staff, USAF Commander , Air Force Inspection
and Safety Center

BRIG GEN GORDON E. WILLIAMS

Director of Aerospace Safety

COL WARREN L. BUSCH

Chief , Safety Education Division
MAJ BRIAN D. HUDSON
Editor SPECIAL FEATURES
CMSGT BURTON E. MATTSON
☆ Keeping it Clean

N
Technical Editor
DAVE RIDER
Art Director ☆ 82-83 Update ... 6
MARIA E. HERNANDEZ
Editorial Assistant ☆ Self Retaining Bolts .... 10
ROBERT KING
Staff Photographer
☆ Have We Got A Deal for You ! ....... 17

☆ Ground Mishaps – A Birds-Eye View 18

-

REGULAR FEATURES
☆ NDI .. .... 22

a ☆ Tech Topics .. ... 24

* Explosives Safety ... 28

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, USAF

SUBSCRIPTION - Maintenance is available on subscription for $ 10.00 per year domestic . $ 12.50 foreign, through the
Superintendent of Documents . Government Printing Office, Washington , DC 20402. Changes in subscription mailings should
be sent to the above address. No back copies of the magazine can be furnished . Use of funds for printing this publication has
been approved by Headquarters. USAF. The contents ofthis magazine are intended to support commanders' safety programs
and promote personal awareness of safe maintenance procedures. Information should not be construed as directive or
regulatory unless so stated . Facts, testimony and conclusions of aircraft accidents printed herein may not be considered
incriminating under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice . All names used in accident stories are fictitious .
Contributions are welcome as are comments and criticism . however, no payment can be made for manuscripts submitted for
publication. Address all correspondence to Editor . Maintenance Magazine , Air Force Inspection and Safety Center . Norton Entered as a controlled circulation rate publi
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improve the material without altering the intended meaning. Air Force organizations may reprint articles from Maintenance Postal Service, 1331 So. E St. , San Bernardino ,
without further authorization . Non -Air Force organizations are requested to contact the editor prior to any reprint and advise CA 92403
intended use of the material . Distribution rate is 1 copy for every 10. military and civilian , aircraft missile avionics munitions
maintenance personnel
 Keep It Clean
This article on keeping aircraft free of frost, ice and snow emphasizes the extremely small amount of con
tamination required to seriously effect safe operation. Boeing has quantified some of the reasons for cleaning
aircraft of cold weather contaminants, and the results strongly support our -1 requirements calling for removal
of all ice and snow . This article was extracted from Boeing's Oct.- Dec. Airliner - Editor.

roughly equivalent to 16- to

.06 24-grit sandpaper. Typical surface
FROST A .04
characteristics of these contamina
HEIGHT ABOVE
WING SURFACE tion levels can be observed from
~ DUCHES .02
the measured profiles shown in
.00
Figure $ and the actual photo
graphs shown in Figure 3. The
simulated Frost A contamination
was created by spreading epoxy
.12 potting compound over 3M Brand
.10 general-purpose safety walk and
.08
then roughening the surface with a
FROST B texture paint roller to create peaks
HEIGHT ABOVE .06
WING SURFACE
~ INCHES
.04

.02
w and valleys . A second coat of
epoxy potting compound was ap
plied and further roughened to
achieve the Frost B surface .
.00
Figures 2 and 4 illustrate the
wing areas that were covered by
the simulated contaminations. The
-

Figure 1 — Simulated frost profiles. areas noted as “ CLEAN ” are not

A.R. Mulally , Technology Chief
Engineer
M.D. Shirkey , 737 Stability and
Control Lead Engineer
C.R. Higgins, 727 Aerodynamics
Staff Lead Engineer
INTRODUCTION
Airplane contamination has been
the topic of many articles by in
dividual airlines, certification agen
cies , The Boeing Company, and
others in the past . This article ex
pands on the effects of frost,
snow , or ice contamination on
airplane performance and handling
characteristics using data obtained
with the 737. Boeing has con
on airplane performance and flight
characteristics . The results of these
studies indicate that contamination
significantly reduces wing lift
capability, increases stall speeds
and decreases climb capability .
Consequently , a pilot may en
counter buffet, pitch and roll pre
stall flight characteristics before
stick shaker warning during a nor
mal takeoff maneuver as a result
of wing and tail contamination .
Contamination configurations
that can be detected, and should be
removed prior to takeoff, were
simulated and tested . Two levels
of contamination are discussed and
6
exposed when the flaps are
retracted , and since it is common
practice in adverse weather to taxi
to the takeoff point with the flaps
retracted , these areas are not sub
jected to contamination on the
ground.
CONTAMINATION DEGRADES
LIFT, STALL SPEEDS, DRAG
AND RATE OF CLIMB
Figures 5 through 9 summarize
the effects of contamination on the
lift and drag characteristics . The
flight test data shown are generally
for Flap position 5. Flap positions
1 and 15 were also tested and
showed similar trends. Figure 5
presents the test results for percent
loss in maximum lift capability due

ducted wind tunnel , flight, and are identified as " Frost A ," and to contamination for Frost A and
simulator tests with the 737 to bet “ Frost B." Frost A is roughly B. Frost A reduced maximum lift
ter understand the effects of wing equivalent to sandpaper in the 40 capability by EIGHTEEN PER
and horizontal tail contamination to 60 -grit range . Frost B is CENT whereas Frost B reduced

2 MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN/MAR 1984

 maximum life capability by LEADING EDGE FLAPS
THIRTY - TWO PERCENT . FLAPS 5
Figure 6 presents the lift loss in CLEAN AREAS
terms of increased stall speeds . SIMULATED
CONTAMINATION
The maximum lift loss at Flaps 5
equates to 13 knot increase in stall LEADING EDGE SLATS
speed for Frost A and 24 knot in
crease for Frost B. The adverse ef
fect of contamination on stall
speeds decreases with increasing TRAILING EDGE FLAPS
SPOILERS
flap setting
Figure 8 shows the effect of ENTIRE TAI2 TAI1
AILERONS SLAT
contamination on the stall speed LEADING EDGE
margin remaining at stick shaker SLAT CONTAMINATION
14 "
12 "

CONFIGURATIONS
activation for Flaps 5. With a nor TESTED

mal, clean wing , the stick shaker

activates approximately 7 knots
prior to reaching the stall speed ,
Figure 2 - Simulated contamination configurations tested. ( A) entire slat con
-

providing margin for ilot reaction . taminated, ( B ) TAlz effect at 0 ° F ambient, (C) TAL effect at 20° F ambient.
In the case of Frost A , this margin
is reduced to less than 1 knot . For
Frost B , stall occurs before the
stick shaker is actuated .
The increased drag due to con
tamination manifests itself in Simulated frost close up.
Figure 3 -

reduced climb capability at a given

speed (Figure 9) . The increased
drag results in a 100- to 350 -feet
per minute reduction in all-engine
climb capability . The effect of
contamination is much more pro
nounced on the one-engine in
STERLING
operative climb capability. The
one-engine- inoperative climb
capability is reduced by about 50 Dit EL 21 8

percent by Frost A. The airplane one

cannot maintain altitude at V2
( Velocity ) with one- engine Frost A - Approximately equivalent to 40-60 grit sand
inoperative when contaminated paper.
with Frost B.
CONTAMINATION MAY RESULT
IN IMPENDING STALL FLIGHT
CHARACTERISTICS BEFORE Frost B - Approximately equivalent to 16-24 grit sand
-

paper.
STICK SHAKER WARNING
During any winter takeoff, when gjigjeniti
atmospheric conditions are con
ducive to contamination , the pilot
should be aware that increasing
buffet, pitch, and roll activity may
be an indication of premature stall
caused by wing contamination .
These indications are an immediate
signal to recover from an impend
ing stall consistent with ground
proximity regardless of whether or
not the stick shaker has activated .

MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN /MAR 1984 3

 FLAPS 5

This situation can be understood

10 by reviewing the general character
PERCENT
Figure 5 - Contamina
-
istics of airplane stalls.
LOSS IN
MAXIMUN 20 E FROST
tion degrades maximum “ STALL ONSET’ is the region
UFT
CAPABILITY lift preceding a full stall where the
airplane's flight is characterized by
FROST
B
ever increasing buffet, pitch, and
6

roll activity . The “ STALL

40

ONSET'' sequence typically con

sists of four distinct events . Usual
ly , the first sign of an impending
40
FLAPS 1 FLAPS 5 FLAPS 15
stall on a modern jet transport is
the activation of an artificial warn
FROST
30 B
FROST
ing device as shown in Figure 10 .
INCREASE IN
OTALL SPEED
B
FROST
Activation of this stall warning
DUE TO
CONTAMINATION
20
FROST
B stick shaker is based on a preset
~ KNOTS FROST
A
FROST
A
angle of attack. Second , as the
10
airspeed is further reduced (and
angle of attack is increased)
toward stall, the airflow cannot re
main attached over the entire wing
Figure 6 Contamination increases stall and will begin to momentarily
speeds. separate near the wing trailing
edge. A buffeting, or mild shaking
of the aircraft, results as the lift
FROST A
force on the aircraft begins to fluc
FLAPS 5
40 tuate . The buffet intensity will in
crease as the airspeed is decreased
30 further (and angle of attack is in
INCREASE IN Figure 7 - Effect of
-
creased ) and the areas of separated
STALL SPEED
DUE TO 20 ground operable TAI on
CONTAMINATION
~ KNOTS WING AND
ENTIRE SLAT
stall speed increases.
TAI TAI
2 1
10

Figure 8 Contamina
tion reduces stick shaker Figure 9 - Contamination decreases rate of climb capa
-

margins. bility.

• FLAPS 5
• FLAPS 5
CLEAN FROST
A FROST
B
CLEAN

2
SPEED MARGIN
ABOVE STALL
FOR STICK RATE OF CLIMB
SHAKER 4 ~ 1000 ft /min , ALL ENGINE V2 +15 ENGINE OUT V2
ACTUATION
KNOTS

CLEAN
FROST
N

A
FROST FROST
А FROST 0 B
B
0

now !
mw

4 MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN /MAR 1984


flow expand . Third, as the stall
progresses, and the separated flow
region further expands , the center
of lift moves forward, requiring
less control force from the pilot to
continue raising the nose and
decreasing the airspeed . This pitch
activity , which indicates " STALL
ONSET. " is typically referred to
as a reduced pitch stability or
stock - force -lightening by flight test
pilots. A fourth characteristis of
“ STALL ONSET ’ is a noticeable
increase in roll activity and a cor
responding increase in the lateral
control action required by the pilot
to maintain wings level . Initially ,
this roll activity and the associated
lateral control action are caused by
asymmetries in the fluctuating
separation patterns on each wing .
.
However, as the " STALL
ONSET” progression continues ,
the lateral control action required
to keep the wings level increases
as the separated flow regions ex-
pand to include the ailerons and
spoilers, causing them to be less
effective.
When the wing is contaminated ,
Figure 10 - Contamination results in " stall onset" flight characteristics before stick shaker.
V2
V2 +1
CLEAN NORMAL MANEUVER ENVELOPE
AIRPLANE BELOW STICK SHAKER
1 WING
10° 12 ° ANGLE OF 14 °
ATTACK
CONTAMINATED
AIRPLANE
V2 + 15
2
the " STALL ONSET" buffet,
pitch , and roll activity flight
characteristics are similar to a
clean wing . However, these
" STALL ONSET' flight charac-
teristics may now occur within the
clean airplane normal maneuvering
envelope, before stick shaker ac
“ CONCLUSIONS
These test results provide further
insight into the importance of a
comprehensive winter operations
maintenance program that results
in clean airplanes during takeoff.
Proper ground maintenance pro-
cedures and pilot awareness need
to be emphasized . Frost or ice on
the aircraft can seriously reduce
climb and maneuvering capabilities
and expose the pilot to STALL
ONSET flight characteristics dur-
ing the critical phase of
STICK SHAKER
ACTUATES
STICK SHAKER
16 °
INCREASING WING LIFT
STALL ONSET
tvV2a STALL
tivation , as is shown in figure 10 .
This is a result of the early flow
separation caused by contamina
tion . Consequently , the stick
>
shaker may not provide warning of
" STALL ONSET“ flight charac
teristics for the contaminated
airplane.
takeoff without a normal stick
shaker stall warning. If contamina
tion is suspected at any time prior
to the takeoff roll , particularly if
lengthy delays occur after deicing
is completed, the aircraft should
be returned to maintenance for
clean-up prior to takeoff. Safe
winter operations will be assured
with continued alertness to poten
tial icing conditions , and rigorous
adherence to the Keep it Clean
ground maintenance philosophy .
STALL
STALL ONSET
18 ° 20 °
MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN /MAR 1984 5
FOD IS SC

Major Brian D. Hudson

Directorate of Aerospace Safety
There is evidence that Air Force
foreign object damage (FOD)
prevention has made a significant
turn for the better in the last 2
years ( Chart 1 ) . While there was a
general upward trend in FOD
mishap rates per 100,000 engine
hours from 9.44 in 1979 to 10.73
in 1981 , it has declined to 8.81 in
1983 (through October) . In this ar
ticle , we will cover some of the
factors involved and the aircraft
that remain our major problems.
The charts we've included cover
the overall USAF picture , a sum
mary of FOD sources by category ,
and the six aircraft with the
highest numbers of FOD mishaps
(plus several others) .
percent drop in the AF FOD rate
since 1981 , and the intensive train
ing and efforts of line and shop
personnel must be credited with
the bulk of the increasing success .
In our second chart (Chart 2) ,
we've divided FOD sources into
five categories for mishaps which
occurred during intent for flight.
The percentages reveal a general
reduction in the Undetermined and
Metal Object categories which
potentially indicates a slight im
provement in our investigations.
This is reflected int he growing
percentage of mishaps positively
identified to Hardware. The last
two categories, Equipment and
Ramp Debris , sustained notable in
creases in percentages especially in
1982. Through October 1983 there
appeared to be relatively constant ,
however, the total numbers of
mishaps have been cut by one-half
to two - thirds. In reviewing our
1981 experience and relating it to
1982 , the F- 15s and T-38s ac
counted for an increase of 10
equipment mishaps in 1982 ( Chart
3) while the others held steady or
dropped by one or two. However ,
since 1982 (Chart 4) , the T-38s
and F- 15s have sharply reduced
their actual number of equipment
mishaps while the declining total
of all sources has caused the
percentage to remain stable . Ramp
continued on page 8

In reviewing the All USAF Air

craft Chart it should be noted that
it is based on FOD mishaps per ALL USAF AIRCRAFT
100,000hours, and the downward ENGINE FOD RATES
trend since 1981 has two signifi 1 JAN 79 -
30 JUN 83
cant influences aside from fewer 20

actual mishaps . First, our flying

CEW

18
time has risen slowly , but steadily A
T
since 1981 , and second , the 16+

minimum dollar threshold for 14+

Р
reporting Class C mishaps (which E
‫ס‬
OOOOO

are the bulk of all FOD mishaps ) R 127

rose from $ 300 to $ 1,000 in 1982 . 10+

Both factors should have in
8+
fluenced the rate downward .
However, the last factor must be
UDIT

tempered by the significant number

F 4
(a majority ) of pre- 1982 FOD H
2

mishaps that exceeded $ 1,000 cost . R

S
These mishaps qualify under both
+
the new and old standards and AFISC / SER
79 80 81 82 83
(O2NOV83 )
tend to support the validity of the ALL ALL

declining rate . In total, these fac CHART 1

tors still do not account for the 18

6 MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN/MAR 1984

 8
FOD

ENGINE FOD SOURCES

1979 thru 1983 (Oct)

(Discovered during intent for flt;

ice, birds, ricochet not included)

Equipment
Hardware (headsets ,
Undeter ( screws, rivets, Metal pins, flags, Ramp
Year mined nuts, wire) objects cords , tools) Debris Total
-
1979 % 38 % 24% 18% 7% 3% 100 %
No. 137 125 64 26 11 365

1980 % 46% 33% 12% 8% 1% 100 %

No. 155 111 42 28 3 339

1981 % 40% 36% 13% 8% 3% 100 %

No. 146 128 48 28 11 361

1982 % 28 % 36% 16 % 10% 10% 100 %

No. 83 106 48 28 30 295

1983 % 33 % 38 % 12 % 10% 7% 100 %

No. 50 56 18 15 10 149
(thru
Oct )

CHART 2

1982 ENGINE FOD SOURCES

(High Six Aircraft)

UNDETER HARD METAL EQUIP RAMP

MDS MINED WARE OBJECTS MENT DEBRIS TOTAL

FLT GRD FLT GRD FLT GRD FLT GRD FLT GRD FLT GRD
F-4 19 240 419 7 38 94 8
A - 10 9 21 18 1 38 2
C- 130 17 102 3 1 214 26 13
F- 15 8 113 13 3 37 134 6
T-38 4 34 14 14 61 17 11
F- 1111 4 217 116 12 113 22 4

FLT: Discovered during intent for flight.

GRD : Discovered during ground maintenance .

CHART 3

MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN /MAR 1984 7

 $
E
FOD AZ
3

1983 ENGINE FOD CAUSES

(High Six Aircraft thru Oct 83)
UNDETER- HARD- METAL EQUIP- RAMP
MDS MINED WARE OBJECTS MENT DEBRIS TOTALS
FLT GRD FLT GRD FLT GRD FLT GRD FLT GRD FLT GRD
F -4 13 127 45 5 11 151 7
C - 1309 52 73 4 25 119 19
F- 15 4 41 4 11 1 10 6
T-38 2 12 12 21 3 17 8
A-10 2 7 3 2 14
F - 111 2 1 2 10 3
CHART 4

USAF FRF - 4 USAF C - 130

ENGINE FOD RATES ENGINE FOD RATES
JAN 02 JUN 83 JAN 82 JUN 83
RISCOS
FEB

FISC SER
( OZNOVOD ) ( Q2NOVI )
KEBEDEEEE2121BETE
MD
R 1 R 1
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CHART 5 CHART 6

debris experienced a similar rise trend holds through 1983 , flight majority of mishaps are associated
from 1981 to 1982 , with the F - 4 , related FOD mishaps may total with fighter type aircraft where the
F- 15 and F- 111 as the major con 200 to 225 , which would be an exposure to the stress of landings,
tributors . So far since 1982 , the exceptional achievement . takeoffs , and maintenance action
F - 4s have dropped by six mishaps , Moving on to the remaining frequencies are highest .
the F- 15s by eight, the T-38s are charts, we decided to present data Looking at 1982 and 1983
holding at one and the F- 111s developed from FOD mishaps per ( through October) , it appears that
have dropped to zero . 1000 sorties. The figure of 1000 we're doing many of the things
While the category percentages sorties approximates a fighter necessary to motivate our people
give us a view of where our ex wing's monthly sortie count , and in FOD prevention. Although
posure and problems may exist , each sortie represents what we some units or weapons systems ex
the actual FOD mishap totals might call a “ maintenance cycle . " perience reversals in a given year,
(Chart 2) are also important. Our Each “ cycle ” includes all the ex the movement is definitely toward
reported FOD mishaps (intent for posure to inadequate or improper decreased FOD mishap rates . The
flight) dropped from 361 in 1981 maintenance which an aircraft reductions in total numbers reflect
to 295 in 1982 , and they appear to might experience between flights the hard work of managers , train
be headed for an even greater and which could lead to in -flight ers , quality assurance , FOD
drop, possibly 25 to 30 percent, in FOD . Of course , operating hours NCOs , and most of all , aircraft
1983 ( 149 through October ). If the contribute to FOD potential, but a technicians Air Force wide .

8 MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN /MAR 1984

FON
USAF F - 15 USAF T - 38
ENGINE FOD RATES ENGINE FOD RATES
JAN 82 JUN 03 JAN 82 - JUN 83

PFISCASER AFISC / SER

( OZNOVA 3 ) ( OZNOVO 3 )

CEW
R 1 R 1
A
T .9 T .9+
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2 2
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1

TREND
0
0
0
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2 2 0
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2
. 0

CHART 7 CHART 8

USAF A - 10 USAF F - 111

ENGINE FOD RATES ENGINE FOD RATES
JAN 82 JUN 83 JAN 82 - JUN 83
JANI

RFISCASER RISC SER

FEB

( O2NOVB3 ) ( O2 NOVEJ)
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PORTE TRENO STT TOKO

CHART 9 CHART 10
USAF FB - 111 USAF F - 16
ENGINE FOD RATES ENGINE FOD RATES
JAN B2 JUN 83 JAN 82 JUN 83

RISC SER FISCSER

( OZNOVIO ) ( 02NOVEJ )
R 10 R 1
A
D
M
-

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.6
2
.
2 ТАА
1
.2
2

TOO
2
.31.1 0 0
2
.3
3
4
2
.2 0
1

CHART 11 CHART 12

MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN/MAR 1984 9


S E L F
E T A I N I N G
R remain on the bolt .
BÓ L T S
During the late 1950's and early
1960's, we were losing USAF Air
craft and experiencing incidents
due to critical flight control hard
>
ware " failures. " Although these
reports usually made mention of
the dubious facts that the nut cot
ter pin " wore out" or the threads
in the nut were “ 'defective and
stripped out," it become painfully
obvious that a flight control
linkage attaching bolt, especially if
>
installed vertically with the head
down , requires a retaining nut to
remain in position . And as BEN
HUR said as his chariot wheel
came off on the first turn , " I'LL
GET COTTER'S BLEEP FOR
THIS ! ” (HORATIO COTTER
tried out his experimental wheel
nut retainer pin on Ben's wagon .
... That is why today, we call it
a COTTER PIN . ) So ... enough
of history
It did not take long before the
official determinations were made,
mechanics were failing to install
cotter pins, were straightening and
reusing them , bending the retain
ing ends improperly , using an
undersize diameter, or all of the
10 MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN /MAR 1984
Harold Poehlmann
Fairchild Republic Company
above . An unsecured castellated
nut in a non-maximum tension
condition as is found in some
flight control connections , when
subjected to afterburner vibrations,
will back off before you can open
the lock on your tool box . The
fastener industry countered with a
combination castellated and
" fiber" (nylon) lock nut. The
theory being , if the cotter pin was
not installed , the nut would remain
in position. Wrong ! The nuts
JUNE
were usually reused repeatedly un
til they lost their locking force or
the wrong bolt grip was used so
that the locking section was in
contact with the imperfect and
threads and the nut again became
at the mercy of the cotter pin to
In the 1950's an experimental
F -86H was attempting an emergen
cy landing at Edwards AFB with a
serious flight control problem . The
pilot thought a landing might be
possible on the dry lake , but cer
tain aerodynamics changed rapidly
and he perished. The precrash con
ditions drew attention to a certain
control area and early in the in
vestigation a bolt was found to be
missing . Marks on the clevis
showed a bolt had been in position
but had worked out , leaving tell
tale signs . ( The epitome of deter
mination was displayed at this
crash scene . The entire sand area
was screened and sifted for weeks ,
adn the bolt was found !)
This was probably the incident
that showed the need for a special
safety connection device in critical
flight controls. You may ask ,how
can these omissions take place?
It's not hard to do ... human
frailties, the ever- rush to complete
a task , either production pressure
or self-produced reasons , plus the
reluctance to review and be critical
of one's own work . Some flight
control checks and adjustments
procedures once called for removal
of bolts, and with controls fixed
you would adjust the rods for easy
insertion of the bolt. That techni
que would cause three or four
bolts to be in position without
security . Luckily, that technique is
now frowned upon and rig pin
holes are usually provided. Even
so, this situation is still sometimes
present and can trap you . When
working on flight controls you
must keep written record of what
you disconnect and allow sufficient
time for a thorough flashlight-and
mirror final inspection along with
" closing out your books.
 IED . WUP CLASS
5
usa ( )

BELL CRAIO SO DODOUT

WASHER (1 ) La

-PLARIO , w

BRI DUINC SPACEA ( 6 )

1 OTTER PII COTTER PIN

TAININO
LOL

II
RETA DINO
RLDCAT
RELUSS
BUTTON ( O )
( 6 )COUNTER BORRD
CASTELLATED NUT BLINIC RUSTAINING
WITH ROTAINED WASHER CON DENT
BRINU
REASE ROD ZND
BUTTON ( 0 ) SLOITED OR
- ROD UND CASTELLTED NUT

PA NAVY - AS TITLE
Oman Cust
MILITARY STANDARD
BOLTS , SELF - RETA IN INC , AIRCRAFT RELIABILITY AND MAINTA DUABILITY
USAP - 1 DESIGN AND USACZ REQUIREMENTS FOR
MS33602ASG)
PROCUREMENT SPECIFICATION SUPERSEDES: SHEET 2

Figure 1

Regardless of your inspection although not a member of the SRB beveled expansion spring located
system , always insist on another family , the PERMANENT fastener just outboard of its grip dimension
set of eyes to perform a final safe can be found on some aircraft and point . In order to accommodate a
ty inspection ! you must be aware of their use . castellated nut , the early positive
From the above you can see that Figure 2 shows an assembly of bolt designs required the use of a
the early days" were plagued various manufacturers ' products . “ bridge spacer." The “ real early"'
?

with problems. Please don't be The IMPEDANCE-type bolts impedance bolt design used AN
misled – 1983 is “ sprinkled”' have a self- contained simplistic continued

with similar reports .

The fastener industry , along with Figure 2
the Air Force and airframe
manufacturers, developed and
stipulated the use of self-retaining
bolts in flight controls, throttles
and any other positions judged to
be critical to flight. Figure 1 Rexnord specially fostener
Division

shows the Military Standard

MS-33602 Bolts , “ Self -Retaining
Aircraft Reliability and Maintain
ability , Design and Usage Re
quirements For.” Actually the
bolts, at least experimentally, were
available before the requirement
specification was finalized.
There are two basic types of
self-retaining bolts (SRB) , IM
PEDANCE , which push in and out
TIT AVK
IIII

sps
AEROSPACE PRODUCTS DIVISION
STANDA.DESSED

hi- shear
CORPORATION

AVIBANK
SITE.CO

with a specified hand force , and

POSITIVE LOCKING which re
quire the actuation of a plunger to
internally retract or release the
locking device. A third method ,

MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN/MAR 1984


COUNTER BORE CASTELLATED
SELF -RETAINING
BOLTS
continued
" PERCUSSION INSTRUMENTS ” CAN diameter. While depressing the
SPELL DOOM TO FRAGILE
FLIGHT CONTROL MECHANISMS
washers to keep the nut away from
the spring clip or ball locks in the
case of the positive lock styles. It
sometimes caused a FOD problem .
This was subsequently solved by
the introduction of the MS21224
special nut for SRBs. In addition
to having a counterbore that clears
the impedance spring or ball locks ,
the nut has a built-on washer. See
Figure 3 for a close up cross sec-
tional view of the MS21224 nut .
An interesting sideight is that there
is a nut available that has the in-
side diameter of the washer sized
so that when used with a positive
lock bolt , you must depress the
plunger in order to install the nut .
This produces an additional feature
where the locks extends inside the
washer lip and prevents the nut
from backing off unless the bolt
lock release is actuated.
Figure 4 shows some general
design specification date for both
12 MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN/MAR 1984
CASTELLATED WITH
NYLON LOCK INSERT
Figure 3
the impedance and positive locking
types . Notice also in Figure 4, the
design removal forces which you
may encounter pushing the SRBs
in and out. (Note
( also they give
two values with the impedance bolt
depending on the hole size . )
As you can see in Figure 2 ,
there are many SRB design varia-
tions , both in design concept,
style, tooling. In moving flight
controls , clearance is at a premium
so a low profile head or even a
flush head may be called for by
the airframe manufacturer. Notice
the bolt that has the lock release
plunger on the threaded end - this
facilitates removal and can produce
maximum head clearance . An in-
teresting available SRB design is
the Standard Pressed Steel Com-
pany positive locking retaining
bolt, P/N 72688 , which has a
loose fitting round cross sectional
locking ring . This design does no
possess any internal locking
mechanisms. When the bolt is in
stalled , the retaining ring will cen
tralize, collapse and pass through
the assembly . When going in the
opposite direction , the ring will
ride up the opposite conical bolt
groove diameter and spread the
lock ring, preventing removal.
This bolt requires the use of a
special removal tool which holds
the ring over the small diameter of
the bolt groove and compresses the
spring as the removal force is ap
plied . See figure 5 for pictorial
details .
Another clever design in the in
dustry is the REXNORD (positive
lock) “ BOYD BOLT.” As you
can see again from figure 5 , the
BOYD BOLT has a special nut
with axial ridges on the inside
locking plunger, the nut can be
tightened. When the plunger is
released , not only are the ball
locks in a position to prevent bolt
loss , they also protrude into the
nut grooves and lock the nut . This
special nut can be a plain or
castellated type . Obviously the lat
ter must be safetyed with a cotter
pin regardless of its novel nut
locking design.
As you can see, there are many
self-retaining bolt systems
available; however, you must use
the type designated by your air
craft illustrated parts breakdown
listings .
Regardless what type SRB you
encounter , you should be able to
identify its application and unders
tand the procedures. As noted by
the charts in Figure 4 , there are
installation forces involved with
both types of SRB. This is not
license to use percussion in
struments " or other shock
producing techniques that will
spell doom for fragile flight con
trol mechanisms . When (hand)
pushing bolts in or out make cer
tain the mating parts are in axial
 MIL - 3-23964C
BOLT, SELF RETAINING , POSITIVE LOCKING
TABLE rv . Perfomance Characteristics

RELEASE MS 21224
BOLT RETAINING MECHANISM LOCUING
DOUBLE BOLT DEVICE ACTUATING BOLT BALL
SITLAR TEXSILE TENSIL FORCE REMOVAL PUSHOUT
COUNTERTORED NUT
STRENGTX LOADS LOADS ( LBS . ) FORCE FORCE
NOUTAL MINIMUM MIN . MAX . MIN . MUST BE USED
SIZE ( LBS . ) ( LBS . ) ( LBS . ) MIN . Max . ( LBS . ) ( LBS . ) IN INOTALLATION
APPROX .

3603nnn
.1900-32 110 S 4 S
S , 150 1,110
.2500-28 9,200 2,040 230 1 S 10 .010 X 49 CHAMFER
.3125-24 14,400 3,250 $ 10 2 7 10 BOTH SIDES
.3750-24 20,600 Soso S75 2 7 10
.4375-20 28,000 6,800 710 3 10 11 20
.S000-20 9,250 1,160 3 10 11 20
36,800
.5625-18 46,000 11,800 1,420 3 10 11 20
.6250-18 2,070 4 12 13 25
NOTE: USE OF BRIDGE SPACER OR AN 960
57,500 15,050
.7500-16 82,500 22,000 2,950 S 14 is 30 WASHERS IS NO LONGER ACCEPTABLE ...
USE SPECIAL MS 21224 NUT.

BOLT, SELF RETAINING , IMPEDENCE MIL - B -83050C

TABLS III . Lemnl forn .

louinal Hol . A lọ hoa1 Holo B Bolt Removal

Ⓡuuooou

Bolt Dianter Torce Por Diasetar Foro . Por

EANNA:

Size ( in . ) Hol A ( Max ) ( In . ) Hol B ( Min )

( LD ) ( LO )

0.190 0.1897 0.1920 3

0.250 0.5795 17 0.2520 5
0.3125 0.3120 20 0.3145 8
0.375 0.3745 22 0.3770 10
0.375 0.1370 22 0.1395 10
0.500 0.1995 20 0.5020 15
28 15 RETAINING RING MUST NOT
0.5625 0.5620 0.5645 CONTACT CLEVIS
0.625 0.6245 35 0.6270 20

Figure 4

alignment . Washers , spacers, bear back of the head and depress the bolt unless the connection was
ings , and bushings that dislodge or plunger as finger pressure is ap designed and designated for its
slip out of position will raise plied to the opposite end for initial use .

havoc with the designated insertion removal movement . While on this There are two other precautions
forces. Never use a sharp steel subject it is important that bolts be that should be mentioned with
drift to align the assembly . The installed in the direction dictated SRBs. . . . PROPER GRIP selec
airframe manufcturer did not by the aircraft technical instruc tion and adherence to the assembly
design for scarring or tions . Also , do not substitute for TORQUE VALUES . If the bolt
“ mutilating the close tolerance the designated bolt part number. grip dimension is too short for the
holes used in flight control connec Many flight control connections re installation , the locking /impedance
tions . If a spherical aligning bear quire close tolerance (ground) devices will not clear the bell
ing is a part of the installation, a bolts , and a minor deviation in the crank or bearing edge . If it is too
slightly undersize aligning “ follow part number will cause the incor long , and not correctable by add
drift " made from soft aluminum , rect bolt usage. Flight control con ing the allowable washer under the
phenolic or high density plastic nections that are designed for self head, ( there goes the head
will help . Figure 6 shows some retaining impedance bolts have a clearance) the bolt will not draw
tool ideas that will aid in the in pronounced 45 ° chamfer on the up, and it might be possible for
stallation and removal of positive edges of the hole . This chamfer the locking devices to bottom in
retention bolts which require the acts to compress the spring ring the nut counterbore (I suspect the
depressing of the release plunger . during installation and removal bolt cotter pin hole will also be
A “ pointed object” or a small force. Using an impedance bolt in out by its lonesome" ....)
screw driver usually slips off or a bellcrank or yoke that does not Make certain you consult your air
causes a wedge force. A custom have this chamfer could result in a craft illustrated parts information
designed device to fit the slot or locked bolt and/or one that will re manual for the correct type, size ,
the recess will prove useful. quire a removal force likely to and grip lengths. The grip length
Depending on the position of the cause damage . Do not arbitrarily dimension is shown on Figure 4 .
head , the tools can reach to the use an impedance self-retaining continued

MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN /MAR 1984 13

 SELF -RETAINING
BOLTS
SPS POSITIVE RETAINING BOLT P / N 72688
continued
INSTALLATION REMOVAL
1
now tool
thredu tout
stion . Tool local
Marting at me
dlamour of thparts
When

theo
ingur mund
Non Spring
odk
den hon
3
baby od As with regular bolts , the grip
Ny formu
pih designation is the last two digits of
0 com
1
Spring has been
the part/MS number and indicates
nien una

two
THE BOYDBOLT® FASTENING SYSTEM
SPS MS27576 TYPE IMPEDENCE STYLE BOLT
1. Push the bolt
homme
Finger pressure is all you
need . Bovend spring
cannot hang up inside
joint, anape back (audibry)
to original OD as it
clean hala
comprend and
bok to backed out
in increments of sixteenths of an
force is applied
inch . TORQUE ... When dealing
with special fastener devices , you
cannot make assumptions with
tightening (torque) values . Most
flight control connections are not
structural applications and may
have lower than the standard bolt
size torque values . As you can see
from the attached pictures, the
typical positive lock bolt is hollow
and filled with various parts, and
the impedance bolt has a sizable
groove in its diameter . The SRB
nut shown in figure 3 has the
added feature of a “ fiber lock in
sert. This nut has a minimum of
steel threads and is certain to strip
if the designated assembly torque
is exceeded . There are still some
flight control attachments that re
quire finger tight or be able to
finger rotate the bolt after
assembly . Do not tighten any of
these devices without consulting
your aircraft maintenance manuals .
2. Spin the nut on 3. Tighten with 4. Insert the cotter
MS 21244 nut provides standard wrenches pin
Use a torque wrench when called
necessary counterton to
wat over spring without
No pin to dopreas , no
special tools needed
System is still fall- cate,
however, even if pin is
for. . . . It is usually for a good
comprousing it No worry System is really removed omited or nut lost reason .
about nut Jamming against for maintenance and
retaining elements la roueble
As with all aircraft assembly
work , do not tighten a flight con
trol clevis or fork -type connection
IBANK if there is excessive clearance be
tween the rod bearing and the
clevis inside surfaces, see figure 7 .
To do so could subject the yoke to
bending the strain resulting in a
type failure called stress /corrosion .
If you are confronted with this
situation , the parts are not com
patible or shimming washers or
bushings are missing . As a rule
Figure 5 the mating parts should have a

14 MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN/ MAR 1984

 t
作

Lo
close, no - force fit.
Earlier in the text we mentioned
" Permanent" Flight Control Link
age Fasteners. As indicated , they
are PERMANENT ... usually
used in areas requiring special
clearances and/or areas that are
not readily exposed for easy in
spection. Figure 8 depicts typical
installations that use " HI
SHEAR ' rivets. The Hi-Shear
system is a high strength grooved
steel pin that is drawn up and
swagged by squeezing and forming
a dural collar around the grooved
section of the pin . This process re
quires special knowledge and tool
ing; and in -aircraft removal or
replacement is not authorized . As
of this writing , if removal
becomes necessary , the attached
OOOO
assembly must be removed as a Figure 6 - Special Tool Ideas.
unit and structural repair persons
will remove and replace the
fasteners. These can be identified Figure 7 - Improper clearance and improper installation .
by their typical H560 through
H562 part numbers in your Il
lustrated Parts Breakdown manual
and pictorially by their
characteristic flat head and dome
shaped retaining collar.
In Summary ...
• This is just a quick treatment
of the subject. In order to be
awarded the self-retaining bolt
" EXPERT" badge , it will be
necessary to read the additional
material listed at the end .
• Some aircraft do not advertise
the locations of SRBs, so you must
be able to identify their special
visual indicators . By checking the
aircraft parts catalog , it is possible
to locate all the positions that con
tain SRBs or permanent fasteners.
continued

MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN /MAR 1984 15

 36
T.0 . 1A - 10A -4-27

PL

15

14

50

34

38

DETAIL G

SELF -RETAINING Figure 8

4
BOLTS
continued

DO NOT SUBSTITUTE COMMON

FASTENERS . . . CHECK THE T.O.s!
• Do not substitute common MIL-B-83050C Bolt MS 21244 Nut ,
fasteners in locations that had Self-Retaining Impedance Type Castellated Bored /Captive
original SRB installation or were MIL - B -23964C Bolt Washer
added by Time Compliance Self-Retaining Positive Locking MS 27576 Bolt
Technical Orders.
Self-Retaining Impedance Hex
• Do not use metal surface Head
damaging claw grip " tools . In MS 27577 Bolt
spect the bolts prior to installation Self-Retaining Impedance Flush
for condition and proper moving Head
part locking action . MS 3369 Bolt
• Be able to detect an SRB that Self-Retaining Positive Hex
is not functioning or damaged. Head
Check to see if spare bolts are MS 21125 Bolt
available in supply . . . . Do not Self-Retaining Positive Round
wait until the need arises . Head
• Use the designated torque MS18115 Bolt
values . . . . Do not guess ! Self-Retaining Positive Hex
Head
• Remember that cotter pins
(new and bent correctly) are still MS21130 Bolt
required . Self-Retaining Positive Flush
Head
• Be an SRB " EXPERT ” .
( Partial Listing of additional TO 1-1A- 8 Page 44
study data) Pin Rivet " permanent ' '

16 MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN /MAR 1984

 Have
we got
Xe
A
DEAL
for
You!
Maintenance
MAGAZINE

Combikutaú Cup

If you've got something to say about maintenance safety and would like to tell other folks about it , now is your
chance. All you have to do is send us your original article material or manuscript with plenty of pictures or drawings
if you have them . When we publish it , not only will you get publicity for your article, but we will also send you
a Maintenance magazine contributor's cup. If you don't want your name on the article that's fine too, but we will
have to have your name and address for the record and to send you the contributor's cup . Address : Editor,
Maintenance Magazine , HQ AFISC/SEDM , NORTON AFB , CA , 92409 .

Ta
GROUND
MISHAPS
‫ܐ‬
CMSgt Burton E. Mattson
Directorate of Aerospace Safety
The Air Force Inspection and
Safety Center here at Norton daily
receives Air Force -wide mishap and
accident reports. Data from these
reports are then fed into a computer-
maintained data base where they are
available for historical and analytical
purposes .
In this article we will use a seg-
ment of this data which deals with
aircraft -related ground accidents ,
specifically those which caused an
individual to be absent from duty
due to the injury .
It is apparent from the outset that
you cannot focus your safety
resources on all areas of your unit
18 MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN/MAR 1984
all the time . So , we are going to
give you a bird's eye view of where
the majority of accidents have been
happening Air Force-wide in the
hopes that your being aware of
where to look , your unit may be
able to find some potential accident
areas before they happen and get
them straightened away . There are
always areas within your unit which
will draw the attention of com
manders, supervisors, and safety
personnel strictly because of their
constant exposure to hazards . These
are generally the sections directly in
volved with aircraft sortie generation
on the flight line .
1
A
BIRDS- EYE
VIEW
During 1982 two of these hazar
dous areas showed a marked
decrease : ( chart A) the aircraft
maintenance ground crew and (chart
B) aircraft weapons loading .
However , the statistics for 1983 tell
another story . If the current trend
continues through 1983 there will be
an 8.6 percent increase for weapons
loading , so you can see that we are
on the upward swing again . There
are some non- flight line areas that
need to be looked at also . Chart B
indicates aircraft maintenance docks
experienced a sharp 85 percent in
crease in 1982. This is an area that
continued on page 20
 1982-83 UPDATE - WORK CENTER DISABLING INJURIES
-

1978-81 % CHANGE
1978-81 AVG 1982 1982 vs78-81 1983
WORK CENTER TOTAL (ROUNDED) TOTAL AVG ROUNDED ( 5 MONTHS)
AC Maintenance Ground Crew 830 208 139 -33 % 63
Food Services 610 153 130 -

-15% 44
Supply Warehouse 575 144 192 + 33 % 48
CE Roads and Grounds 541 135 121 - 10% 52
Open Messes 491 123 191 + 55% 71
AC Maintenance Engine Shop 415 104 122 + 17% 56
Vehicle Maintenance 410 103 105 + 2% 46
CE Fire Department 404 101 95 -6% 32
Billeting 304 76 92 + 21 % 40
300 75 103

乃 乃 88
Commissary Butcher Shop + 37 % 41
Commissary Warehouse 285 72 64 - 10% 50
CE Carpenter Shop 274 69 85 + 25% 32
CE Heating/Air Cond 270 68 76 + 12% 13

CHART A

1978-81 % CHANGE
1978-81 AVG 1982 1982vs78-81 1983
WORK CENTER TOTAL ( ROUNDED) TOTAL AVG ROUNDED (5 MONTHS)
AC Maintenance AGE 254 64 63 - 2% 23
Recreational Services 220 55 37 -33% 6
CE Power Production 215 54 10 -81 % 6
CE Electric Shop IN /Out 206 54 58 + 7% 16
AC Maintenance Docks 156 39 72 + 85 % 15
AC Weapons Loading 151 38 22 - 42% 12

CHART B
magtto

INJURY PRODUCING, ON DUTY, INDUSTRIAL MISHAPS

1978 - 1981 MILICIV
50mon

Aircraft Maintenance '78 '79 '80 '81

Gnd Crew
na

93 109
00

64 81 108 147 158

ono

30 37
tate+=

68 38
gOMMO^=

Engine 42 88 80
Age 39 25 52 28 30 23 24
Sup/Adm 25 30 20 30 20 20
Docks 20 10 22 45 40
Weapon Loading 8 37 12 29 15 10
Accessory 26 7 42 22 5
Metal Shop 24 4 33 25 23
Paint Shop 15 9 19 31 24
Fuel 13 ‫וו‬ 23 17 14
Pneu/Hyd 18 3 19 26 17
Elect 8 19 6 31 6 17 0 il
Mach Shop 5 15 1 28 0 28 1 17
Other 53 142 118 157 120 210 85 111
Subtotal 281 456 401 605 381 675 382 554
Unidentified 40 33 43 0
Mil /Civ Total 777 1039 1099 937

21 % Increase 1978-81

CHART C

MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN /MAR 1984 19

 1981 INJURY PROFILE
AGE SHOPS
57 INJURIES
3 PROPERTY
DAMAGE
TYPE INJURY
SPRAIN /STRAIN 23 40% OF TOTAL
CONTUSION /LACERATION 12
FRACTURE 7
CHEM BURN 4
ANATOMICAL LOCATION
BACK 18 30% OF TOTAL
NECK, HEAD, FACE, EYES, SKULL 11
TOE, FOOT, ANKLE, LEG, KNEE 11
FINGER, HAND, WRIST, FOREARM 6
EQUIPMENT MOST FREQUENTLY INVOLVED
TOW BARS
AIR COMPRESSORS
SERVICING CARTS

CHART D

1981 INJURY PROFILE

A / C MAINTENANCE
GROUND CREW
305 INJURIES
127 PROPERTY
DAMAGE
27 SPV
TYPE INJURY
SPRAIN /STRAIN 150 49 % OF TOTAL
CONTUSION /LACERATION 59
FRACTURE 35
CHEM BURN 6

ANATOMICAL LOCATION
BACK 92 30 % OF TOTAL
NECK, HEAD , FACE, EYES, SKULL 38
TOE, FOOT, ANKLE, LEG, KNEE 71
FINGER, HAND, WRIST, FOREARM 40
EQUIPMENT INVOLVED MOST FREQUENTLY
AIC LADDERS
MAINT STANDS
WHEEL/ TIRE
TOW BAR
TOOL BOX

CHART E

has a fairly constant workload and centers accounted for one-half of all
routinely does the same type work reported injuries for the years 1978
day after day . Because of this the through 1981. It is significant to see
docks are often overlooked as a where the top (or bottom ) half of the
problem area ; however , a closer safety scoreboard accidents are hap
look could pay real dividends. pening, and knowing this you should
As you have noticed, charts A and be able to get some pointers on where
B contain a lot of nonmaintenance to look and also find out how your
work centers , but these 19 work unit lines up with the Air Force

20 MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN /MAR 1984

 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

29% OF THE INJURIES

29 % OF THE FATALITIES
21 % INCREASE IN INJURIES 1978-81
THE BIG THREE OF 1978-81
GROUND CREW 830 INJURIES
4 FATALITIES
ENGINE SHOP 415 INJURIES
3 FATALITIES
AGE SHOP 254 INJURIES
0 FATALITIES

THESE THREE SHOPS ACCOUNTED FOR :

38 % OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE INJURIES
58% OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE FATALITIES

GROUND CREWS AND
ENGINE SHOP PERSONNEL
ARE INVOLVED IN ONE
THIRD OF MAINTENANCE
INJURIES/FATALITIES
overall .
When you break down the aircraft
maintenance area (chart C) , you can
easily see where the hot spots are . A
quick look at chart C will show you
that two areas accounted for one
third of all maintenance accidents ;
these are ground crew and engine
maintenance . This trend has changed
little since the 1981 time frame.
Historically , the third most hazar
dous maintenance area is AGE
(chart D) . In all aircraft mainte
nance-related accidents (chart E) , the
most frequent cause was the
strain /sprain, with back and legs be
ing the number one and two body
parts affected.
I would also like to mention a few
other interesting facts . As previously
mentioned , the 19 work centers
listed on charts A and B accounted
for nearly 50 percent of all Air
Force accidents . Chart F gives you a
snapshot of the maintenance big
three. Additionally , as you can see
on chart G , only a few work centers
account for a large percentage of all
fatalities.
CHART F
FATALITIES BY SHOP -
- MIL /CIV COMBINED
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
Engine Shop
Fuel Shop
Ground Crew
Maint Docks
Metal Shop
Munitions
Other
CHART G
With these figures in mind, we
hope both shop/line supervisors and
safety personnel will be able to in
sure their programs emphasize the
areas with the highest mishap poten
tials . Of course , we have high
hazard areas that deal with ex
plosives and toxic chemicals , but our
preventive measures are highly visi
ble and successful. It is the work in
volving less critical tasks where we
must learn to exercise additional
caution .
In identifying trends, an additional
hint might be to check your unit's
first aid cases . They are actually an
accident that didn't quite happen .
But remember, the potential was
there . When you revicw these cases ,
'78 '79 '80 '81
2
1
1 2 1
1 1
1
1
1
if you should sec a trending or
grouping of cases from one shop or
section , check it out and see if you
can determine what is causing the
problem . If you can , the solution
should be apparent and you may be
able to prevent the next first aid
casc as well as a morc scvcrc mis
hap .
In summary , the charts and words
should give you an idea of where
the majority of Air Force accidents
are occurring within your span of
control. If you do scc one of your
sections listed , take a few minutes
and study your section's opcration
from a safety point of view. It
could be a most profitable few
minutes for you and your unit . *
21

MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN /MAR 1984

 ( 141

NDI & 电

THINGS ABOUT

The following article “ Insulating Floor Matting " by MSgt Scarbrough , HQ MAC /LGMWB and articles “'Explosive
Proof Locking Fixtures, " " What About This Process Control" by CMSgt Dorgan, SA-ALC /MMGIare reprinted from
the September 1983 issue of the “ NDI Newsletter. " -- Editor

INSULATING FLOOR MAT .

TING . Paragraphs 5.a. (8) and
5.b. ( 1 ) require insulating floor
matting for your stationary pene
trant and magnetic particle equip
ment . Some NSNs that you can
use to order this matting are listed
in the GSA catalog , page 62 :
NSN COLOR
7220-00-255-0765 Black
7220-00-267-4630 Blue
7220-00-913-8751 Green
WIDTH UI
24 " RL
36 " RL
36 " RL
This matting is rated at 3,000
volts . Don't forget the matting
must be replaced when worn to 12
its original thickness . Also , in
bedded metallic chips and
deterioration caused by oil or
ultraviolet rays will affect the safe
ty of insulating matting. One sug
gestion , it's not required, but you
might stencil the NSN on the bot
tom of the matting too; it would
help you when the matting needs
to be replaced.

22 MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN/MAR 1984

---
 - .

NDI WH

EXPLOSIVE -PROOF LOCKING

FIXTURES. If you need the ex
plosive -proof locking fixtures to
hold the extension cord to the
power cord of equipment in hazar
dous locations (para 4.g(2) (a)) ,

AUSTRATIONS

INVENTO.com
OPERATING

OWS
AOSATT
Mr. Brian Wasko of Dover AFB

OMRt

ON
sen

‫مااوهر‬
‫هنه‬DO
au ۱
All

in
(MAC ) has found some good

CONTACT

‫وب‬، NI
o
AUG

tons
t
Ofcom
NSNs for us . The female side of

CT
11
the plug is stock listed as : NSN
5935-00-315-3871 and the male
side is NSN 5935-00-257-8272 .
G.
They have to be ordered separately
and come in unit of issue of each .

Maintenance supervisors and For your information , the L-25135/QPL-25135-13

nondestructive inspection (NDI) following is a clarification of c. In-use material's strength ,
technicians are going to start to terms that the AF NDI Program contamination sensitivity , age and
hear a lot more about process con- Office has come up with for pro manufacturer
trol . It's an area that we (AF NDI cess control. d . Black light capabilities (inten
Program Office ) have found lack sity and wavelength)
ing and, in a lot of cases, not PROCESS CONTROL – A e . Dwell times for materials
understood in some NDI shops. general term used to encompass f. Using prescribed materials
Process control, in fact, ranks high the actions and documentation as g. Cleanliness and preparation of
on the list when it comes to im- required by established directives item being inspected
proving the effectivenss of NDI in- and logic that are necessary for a h . Dryer oven /part temperature
spections, regardless of method. nondestructive inspection (NDI) i . General equipment operator
There are already established pro- method to be effective in detecting maintenance
cedures for process control, but conditions of interest (e.g. , cracks Each area and requirement
they are scattered in such things as foreign objects, corrosion , align should be documented for other
DOD documents, equipment TOs ment of parts , thickness of part NDI personnel's reference and to
and 33B- 1-1 . An effort is being and pressure/vacuum leaks). conform to established periodic
made to consolidate these pro The stationary fluorescent pene- requirements.
cedures into a single document, trant inspection method can be If you have some suggestions
probably 33B- 1-1 . The first stab at used as an example. A sampling of concerning it, drop it in the mail
this will concern penetrants , the minimum actions and re
(Chapter 6, TO 33B- 1-1 ) and will to us (Dir Mat Mgt/MMEI , Kelly
quirements for this method are : AFB , TX 78241 , Attn : CMS
be available early calendar year
a. Personnel training and Dorgan ). We would like to hear
1984. Plus, we are going to sug from you .
gest that this subject becomes a capability
high interest item to inspection b . New materials qualify in ac- Reprinted from Sep 1983 NDI
teams. cordance with MIL Newsletter

MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN /MAR 1984 23

 €CH
The relatively simple tasks of
maintaining and servicing aircraft
oxygen systems are not as safe as
they might appear . While your
particular unit may not have ex
perienced an oxygen - related
mishap recently , there have been
quite a few others that have .
One mishap that occurred recent
ly could have destroyed an aircraft
had it not been for an alert ground
crew . Because of this close call we
decided to check into the history
of similar mishaps . Since 1978
there have been 44 recorded
ground oxygen handling mishaps,
and 12 of these resulted in explo
sions and/or fire . Of the 44 , six
have occurred so far in 1983 , and
half of these resulted in explosions
and fires . The most recent is
recapped below .
The hot liquid oxygen (LOX )
purge kit ( figure A) was checked
prior to use as required by the air
craft -2-3 technical order . During
the purge, the maintenance crew
had little to do but monitor the
operation and wait for the purge to
be completed. Ten minutes into
the operation one of the
maintenance personnel heard a
loud “ popping " noise, and look
ing toward the direction of the
noise , he saw the purging unit
erupting into a ball of fire. Seeing
24 MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN /MAR 1984
Figure A
this the individual immediately
disconnected the purging unit from
the aircraft and threw it across the
ramp while the other two mainten
ance troops extinguished the fire
using Co, fire bottles . What re
mained of the purging unit is
shown in figures B and C.
Due to the alertness and
presence of mind of those
maintenance personnel, damage
was confined to the purging unit.
However, the potential for aircraft
damage or loss of apparent .
When it was discovered that this
was not the first such incident in
volving a LOX hot purge unit,
message traffic flowed in all direc
tions requesting answers and
guidance. Meanwhile , a material
deficiency report (MDR) was sub
mitted on the failed purge unit .
Figure B
Figure C
The results of that MDR revealed
there were inherent design defi
ciencies . One of these involved the
heater element coating which
deteriorated rapidly resulting in
oxidation . An SA -ALC /MMIRGA
message (R261600Z , Jul83) stated
that continued use of the hot purg
ing kit, (Part Number 2101 NSN
1730-01-057-4863) could result in
personnel injury and/or aircraft
damage .
Currently the manufacturer of
the hot LOX purge kit has been
tasked to re -design the unit and
after satisfactory first article
testing the item manager indicates
all outstanding requirements will
be filled .
Until a newly designed unit is
approved and available for us in
the field , SA-ALC/MMIRGA
states all hot purge units other than
the one listed are safe for use . The
key to insure safe operation is to
insure all applicable technical
order checks are compiled with
prior to use .
The B-52 has an alternate
nitrogen purge method authorized.
IF your weapons system has a
DICED
ROTOR
After completing a rescue com
bat mission at a deployed location ,
an HH-53 , the number two of a
threeship formation , was being
marshalled into an unmarked park
ing spot . During the course of tax
iing in , a small can blew into the
aircraft's path . The Aircraft Com
mander (AC) gestured to the mar
shaller to pick up the can . The
gesture was misunderstood and the
marshaller assisted by a line chief
removed the can , a tool box and a
fire bottle from the vicinity of the
parking spot . The marshaller then
returned to his previous position to
continue parking the aircraft. Up
to this point , because of the un-
marked ramp and close proximity
of a previously parked HH-53 air-
craft, the ground and air crew had
planned on shutting down the heli-
copter and towing it onto the park-
ing spot . This was part of the
briefed parking procedure .
However, due to the noise of the
operating helicopter, the mar-
shaller misunderstood his line
similar alternate procedure you
may elect to use it . However, be
sure you follow and complete all
steps listed in your TO . We know
of one instance where this wasn't
done. The nitrogen was not
evacuated from the oxygen system
after purging , and it caused the
pilot to black out in flight when
chief's comments about parking
the aircraft and this, coupled with
the previously misinterpreted
pilot's gestures, convinced the
marshaller that he should have the
aircraft continue to taxi to its park- copilots side was marginal. This
ing spot . When they were ready to prompted him to jump out of the
proceed, the copilot remarked on
how tight the taxi operation was ,
so the AC took over the controls
and resumed taxiing . As the taxi-
ing continued , the HH-53 executed
two right turns which placed the
marshaller where he couldn't
observe the blade clearance , and
he did not reposition himself.
The taxiing continued despite the
copilot's remarking again that
clearance looked awfully close on
using his oxygen system – breath
-
ing pure nitrogen will do it to you
every time .
If you haven't checked your
LOX purging equipment , it would
be well worth the effort to insure
your unit is using safe equipment
and insure you too don't have
" great balls of fire. ” *
et
*/
his side.
Meanwhile, the Ops officer was
in his radio - equipped jeep observ
ing the parking operation also
noticed that clearance on the
jeep and attempt to stop the mov
ing aircraft. However, realizing he
was too late, he turned around and
returned to the jeep. Investigation
revealed he did not use his radio
because excessive radio chatter
was strongly discouraged. At this
moment, the copilot once again
told the AC it looked too close to
make it then contact, the rotors
of the taxiing aircraft struck the
continued
MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN /MAR 1984 25
TECH Salon al
DICED ROTOR continued parked aircraft rotors . Blade
fragments from seven rotor blades
were thrown in a fan - shaped pat
tern behind the mishap aircraft,
one fragment passing through the
fuselage of a KC- 135 parked 690
feet away . The taxiing helicopter
was immediately shut down , and
the incident concluded with the
struck HH-53 aircraft commander
radioing , " Two, you hit me. "
The causes which led to this
mishap are as varied as the
Parked HH -53 Rotor Tip
fragments thrown. They were in
part:
Schrapnel Hole Near KC -135 • Taxi lines and parking spots
Oxygen Bottle not marked (which may be
unavoidable at a deployed site) .
• Use of mobile radios was
o discouraged -
too much radio
traffic already (although stopping
an unsafe operation is always
appropriate )
• Twenty -five - foot rotor taxi
clearance was not maintained .
The AC taxied the aircraft
without use of wing walkers or
• The ops officer, previously
Mishap Scene
26 MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN MAR
/ 1984
parked HH -53 aircraft commander
and copilot all noticed the impen
ding collision ; however, no one
stopped the plane
• The marshaller did not posi
tion himself correctly , and a
review of training records in
dicated he was not qualified .
It is essential, especially during
deployments when you have mini
mum manning and the pace gets
hectic to insure all means of com
munication available are used ,
that's why we have them . Also ,
sticking to what everyone has been
briefed and expects to happen will
lessen the confusion and create a
much smoother operation – don't
change course midstream unless
it's well coordinated . Other factors
to remember when planning de
ployment are to determine the
qualifications which each member
will likely require, emphasize that
only qualified people are used on
assigned tasks, insure hazards are
identified and insure your safety
staff is in the airfield sur
vey/deployment planning loop . *
 JOPICS
BUILDING A BETTER BENCH
The servicing of lead acid batteries
is always a potentially hazardous Oppo
operation. However, we have
found a suggestion from TSgt
Robert D. McCaughey, 354 CRS,
Myrtle Beach AFB , South
Carolina , which can make the
operation safer. The suggestion,
MYR 83-536 , has been approved
for AF -wide use by HQ
AFISC / SEGO and submitted to
3/4 " PLYWOOD (ACT
SM -ALC /MMI for possible inclu 164
sion as an optional work bench
design in TO 8D2-1-31. We hope
2
you can use the design to provide ALL MATERIAL FOR LEAD -ACID x
23 % "

a safer work environment. If you BATTERY BENCH ARE LOCATED

AT CES PAINT BENCH A LIGHT
do, please pass the credit back to COLOR , ACID RESISTANT.
TSgt McCaughey. -
Tech Editor T
32
GIYA

The work benches are 8 feet U 75%

- RO
3/4 " PLYWOOD (AC )
1
-234
long , with work levels at 34 in
ches and 61/4 inches in height . AA 2°* 6 "
MATERIAL
STAINLESS STEEL
The main work surface has a FSN 9SIS 00-2318623 see
A -A
34 "
10-degree angle, sloping toward IGAL 9% see
TIN CAN B -B
the front. This allows any run -off fosil
NOTE :
acid to flow down into a stainless FILL CAN
APPROX 1/3 +64 324 2'6 " T
steel trough which is angled FULL OF
BAKING SODA 972
B -B
toward the center of the bench . It
then flows into a l -gallon can con 8
taining sodium bicarbonate (ap MATTING ON TOP
OF BENCH TYP
proximately one - third of the can)
which neurtalizes the sulphuric
acid . The trough can be painted on TYP OUTLET POWER
the outside with green and white FSN 5935.00-198-3971
NOUN : RECEPTACLE

striping to show a caution area .

The top shelf of the bench holds MATTING ON TOP OF BENCH
NOUN FLOOR COVERING
a battery charger and has power NSN 7220-01-024-9039
outlets installed . This will allow
control of the battery charger wir
ing and will prevent the wiring
from hanging down around the
STRIPES PAINTED
batteries . See attached drawings
for sizes , material , and NSN . The
STAINLESS STEEL TROUGH
BOLTED TO BENCH o BAKING
SODA
GREEN & WHITE
FOR CAUTION

bench meets AFOSH standards ,

and I feel it is the safest and best
way to service lead-acid batteries .
The safety benefits are high . *

MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN/ MAR 1984 27


THOROUGH
INVESTIGATIONS
BRING
RESULTS
A recent explosives mishap in
volved the inadvertent release of
BDU -33 practice bombs from an
F -4D aircraft . The same aircraft
had previously experienced an in
advertent release about a month
earlier . At that time, the cause was
felt to be a defective inter
valometer in the MER . The inter
valometer was replaced , and the
aircraft passed the AWM - 13
check . The aircraft had flown
several range missions with
BDU -33 release without any fur
ther problems .
The unit investigating team per
formed another AWM - 13 check
after the last mishap and no defi
ciencies were found . The team
could very well have settled for an
undetermined cause at this time as
the aircraft had passed a check of
the release system . However, they
knew that something had to be
wrong and continued the investi
gation.
Two of the pilots in the forma
28 MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN / MAR 1994
EXPLOSIVES
SAFETY
tion had observed smoke in a
treeline about 3,000 meters short
of the target on range property ,
but had thought nothing of it . But ,
by comparing the position of the
smoke with the sequence of actions nly and should have been cut and
in the cockpit during the passes capped . When weapons release
when the inadvertent release occur-
red , the team was able to correlate
the position of the smoke with the
fact that the bit button had been
depressed during each pass at that
time.
Further checking of the aircraft
revealed that activation of any
WRCS bit made with the release
system armed resulted in a 28V
release signal to all selected sta-
tions . This led the team to
discover a miswired connector
( 89P805B ) to the ballistic com-
puter . Research of the technical
order indicated that the wiring er-
ror probably occurred during in-
stallation and integration of the
AN / ARN 92 Loran set because :
( 1 ) wire TZ705R20 wasn't cut
Maj Tom E. Nicholson
Directorate of Aerospace Safety
from connector 89P8058 , pin E ,
and rerouted to connector
117P442 , pin Z. Pin E of the
>
ballistic computer provides a DC
voltage for bench check purposes
switched were selected for direct
release , depressing the WRCS bit
button provided DC voltage to pin
P of the MISC relay panel and
then via normal wiring to the
weapons stations .
This mishap has two important
lessons . First , an in-depth in
vestigation of a mishap by
maintenance and safety personnel
can identify specific causes which
may have been overlooked by a
more superficial investigation . Se
cond , a problem has been iden
tified which might exist at other
units that possess the F-4 aircraft
can preclude a similar mishap
from occurring . *

TE
Major Tom E. Nicholson
Directorate of Aerospace Safety
During weapons load crew train
ing an inert MK-82 bomb was
removed from a trailer using an
MJ- 1 . The load crew chief rotated
the bomb parallel to the lift arms.
With the crew chief stabilizing the
weapon , the MJ- 1 was backed up
to position thc bomb in front of
the aircraft station to be loaded .
When the jammer came to a full
stop , the bomb slid across the
metal rollers and the nose fuze hit
the front of the MJ - 1 .
Inspection of the MJ- 1 revealed
an unusual tilt in the MJ- 1 table .
There was a 3 - inch difference be
tween the aft and forward ends of
the table which caused the bomb
to slide when the MJ- 1 was
stopped. The unusual tilt of the
MJ- 1 table was found to be caused
by the shaft forward arm being out
COS
of adjustment. The unit then in
spected their fleet of MJ- Is and
found three other jammers with the
same problem .
Lessons? First, thorough pre- use
inspections of equipment are im
portant. Second, an inspection of
the MJ- 1 fleet at your unit for this
problem could prevent a repeat of
this mishap . *
MAINTENANCE MAGAZINE • JAN /MAR 1984 29
 duals
DO
V.

80XC60

SUPERVISORS
MOLD ATTITUDES
By Colonel George F. Myers
832d Air Division
Deputy Commander for Resource Management
All of us, I'm sure, have seen someone breaking the rules, but we chose to
ignore it for one reason or another.
By our actions, we have contributed to an attitude that someday could lead
to more serious infractions.
That same person you have allowed to get away with reporting late for work
might just be the one who will embarrass you during the next infraction .
Or the person you didn't correct for driving a little too fast might be the one
who rams a flight line vehicle into a parked aircraft.
Good supervisors and managers lead by example. You influence the men and
women who work for you whether you realize it or not.
You are a molder of attitudes. Your supervision and your influence are directly
reflected in the way your people think and act. Their actions tell others " This
is the way your people think and act . Their actions tell others " This is the way
I was taught.”
Take the time to correct mistakes, no matter how small. It will be time well
spent. Not only will you improve efficiency in your unit, but you will help to mold
attitudes that will create the desire to excel. *
Courtesy of TAC News Service, 30 July 1982