CHAPTER 4

A GAME THEORETICAL COMPUTATIONAL MODEL

FOR SAFE AND ECONOMICAL DRIVING
On one hand, driving safety is an essential concern for automobile industry. On the other
hand, eco-driving is equally important for reducing vehicular emissions and operating costs.
Sometimes eco-driving might lead to a safety hazard if safety aspects are ignored [40]. For
example, drifting and not slowing down during an intersection or pedestrian crossing or
traffic congestion may be fuel-efficient but dangerous. Eco-safe driving training helps to
train drivers to do eco-driving without compromising safety. Prediction of neighbouring
driver’s characteristics and actions is difficult under real-time driving conditions. Driver’s
wrong perception and judgement of the aggressiveness of a neighbouring driver can lead to
inefficient and dangerous driving manoeuvres. It is important to control and monitor driving
behaviour and actions in accordance with environment contextual parameters and driver’s
interaction with neighbouring drivers.
In this Chapter, a game theory based computational model has been framed that evaluates
utility for a driver from multiple perspectives of safety, fuel economy, and comfort and use
multi-objectivity so formed for evaluation of different gaming strategies. Game theory based
model applies a heuristic mechanism to maintain equilibrium among interacting drivers for
optimizing their multi-objectivity utility. An optimal strategy for driver is defined
dynamically so that it gives optimal benefits to driver as per random distribution of actions
by different types of neighbouring drivers. It also helps to do appropriate response and action
planning by each driver. Section 4.1 discusses issues in existing approaches for eco-safe
driver’s engagement. Section 4.2 explains how driving can be modelled as a game and
describes various factors that have been used for driving utility computation. Section 4.3
formally defines the mixed Bayesian Nash gaming model and strategy distribution for
problem at hand. It further elaborates the computational process for comfort, mileage, and
interaction utilities. Individual utilities have been aggregated to derive driving net utility. It
also explains how an optimal strategy profile is achieved by iteratively eliminating
inefficient strategies. In Section 4.4 driving utilities achieved before and after applying the
gaming model have been compared. The proposed approach has also been compared against
existing similar approaches in the current problem domain. The practical limitations and

48
constraints encountered during this study have been detailed out in Section 4.5. Section 4.6
concludes and highlights the benefits of the proposed multi-objective mixed gaming
approach.

4.1 Existing approaches for maintaining eco-safe driving engagement and

associated challenges
Driving is a complex real-time event that is influenced by how the driver drives and interacts
with other drivers for speed and acceleration adjustment. It has been observed that most
prominent reason for safety hazard is driver’s distraction caused either by boredom, fatigue,
cognitive impairment, or engagement in secondary activities. Another aspect for driving
safety is pertaining to overspeed and driving aggressiveness. Driving response to external
events and resulting actions directly affect safety. Driving behaviour affects safety as well
as fuel consumption. Drivers can save fuel up to 25% by adopting efficient driving practices
and behaviour.
4.1.1 Effect of driving behaviour on driving safety and fuel economy
When a driver harshly accelerates or decelerates, takes a sharp turn at high speed, or
overspeed, or applies frequent acceleration or deceleration, this is referred to as aggressive
driving. Duration of various kinds of driving aggressiveness is measured for each sub-trip of
trip by detecting the start and end time for driving events. Road conditions, travelling during
peak hours, congestion flow, along with driving aggressiveness affect driver’s safety, fuel
economy, and comfort, as elaborated in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Effects of Driving Behaviour on Safety, Fuel Economy and Comfort

Aggressive Driving Behaviour Fuel Safety Comfort

Economy

Harsh Acceleration

Harsh Deceleration

Speeding beyond the permitted speed limit

Sharp Turn

Frequent acceleration/deceleration

Few scenarios may lead to conflict in fuel economy and safety as following eco-driving
practices under different contextual conditions may not be safe. Alternatively, while

49
following safety practices, driver may need to apply frequent brakes or may need to adjust
his speed, leading to more fuel consumption.
• While a vehicle is drifting near intersections or crossings and avoids applying
brakes in order to save fuel consumption, it may land up into unsafe driving.
• Stopping a vehicle at a traffic light helps fuel economy. However, sudden stop of a
vehicle may lead to a crash if the following driver does not maintain lead space and
hits the leading vehicle.
4.1.2 Main issues for eco-safe driving engagement
As driving behaviour and continuous engagement is key towards maintaining eco-safe
driving, it is important to understand issues encountered to maintain eco-safe driving
behaviour. Main issues in current approaches for maintaining eco-safe driving are
highlighted as follows: -
1. Driver might not be aware or conscious about its own driving behaviour
practices and might need learning reinforcement to boost positive driving behaviour.
The efficacy of existing training based approaches is not satisfactory. Drivers may
tend to forget driving concepts or apply them practically once training is completed
[40]. Training based methods are not customized or tailored as per driver’s behaviour
and style.
2. Law regulations to enforce safe driving such as imposing fine for unsafe driving
such as drunken driving, overspeed, use of mobile phone while driving may be
ineffective and reactive measure. Drivers may still engage in unsafe driving practices
in a covert manner.
3. Collision avoidance system of modern cars such as emergency braking or air bag
deployment are reactive in nature. Though these measures reduce impact of crash,
but these lack proactive alerting driver to improve their risky driving behaviour.
4. Drivers with some cognitive impairment may not be focused and engaged
actively on driving. Other factors such as fatigue, stress, driving aggressiveness or
engagement in secondary activities are impediments to continuous driving
engagement.
Providing appropriate and timely feedback is important for maintaining driving interest
and engagement towards eco-safe driving. Passive feedback acts as reactive mechanism
just to notify drivers about their bad driving behaviour on occurrence of unsafe driving

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 event. Active feedback and driving engagement involve maintaining appropriate driving
actions and behaviour to avoid any safety hazards and excessive fuel consumption.
Telematics data from connected car can be analysed to provide effective driving
assistance for maintaining eco-safe driving.
4.1.3 Existing approaches for eco-safe driving engagement and their limitations
Knoefel et al provided feedback to improve cognitive assistance for older drivers. considered
the effects of the driver, vehicle, and lane-keeping on driving risk [16]. Providing visual or
audio feedback or haptic paddle for improving driving safety has been proposed in [19][40].
Although, these approaches provided feedback to driver, but reactive or repetitive feedback
made either made driver non-receptive to feedback or distracted then from driving.
Training based mechanisms or awareness campaigns [2][39][40] might not address
personalized awareness gaps and may not result in long term learning retention. Drivers may
lack motive or incentives to adopt positive driving practices.
Gamification based approaches [39] motivate drivers by displaying their competitive
ranking as compared to other drivers on leader board. Gamification is preferred one as
compared to traditional training methods because it has been found to positively affect the
driver’s inclination and motivation. However, excessive gamification may distract driver on
negative side, hence it must be used with caution.
Wen-Tai et al proposed a reward mechanism to enforce positive driving behaviour[49].
Rewards based mechanism encourage learning reinforcement and positive driving behaviour
by providing extrinsic motivation. It is practically impossible to sustain use of extrinsic
reward for long-term driving engagement. There is need to motivate drivers towards good
driving by providing intrinsic motivation factors.
Liu et al developed Temporal Reasoning Block model(TRB) for learning causal reasons
for certain unsafe behaviour[28]. The objective of this approach is to understand reasons
behind multiple causes of unsafe actions; however, it did not proactively alert driver for
correction of his behaviour.
Car-following approaches [9][21] [42] estimated leading vehicle’s speed and maintained a
safe distance with leading vehicle. A threshold for safe distance is decided based on leading
vehicle speed, driving pattern for acceleration, and vehicle’s mechanical capability. Though
this approach considered safety aspects by adjusting speed of vehicle by driver for car-
following scenarios, it lacked comprehensive utility evaluation considering safety and fuel-

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economy as a generic approach. Approach[9] suggested a theoretical car-following model
based on driver’s attention span and perception response corresponding to driving event
using cognitive modelling and state transition model. Though it suggests driver’s action
response planning, but it lacked considering aspects of interaction with other drivers beyond
speed adjustment.
To summarize, training based methods helped in providing awareness about eco-safe
driving, but it lacked long term retention. Feedback based methods, state-transition models
and other car-following models provided mechanism to improvise individual driving
behaviour without considering interaction with other drivers. Game theory based methods
must thus be investigated for appropriate decision support system and driver response
planning for driving interaction with other drivers. Michieli et al applied game theoretical
model to analyse strategic interaction between cyclist and driver [10]. However existing
gaming models do not support driver’s decision for scenarios when information about
aggressiveness and actions of fellow drivers is lacking. Existing game approaches focused
on limited scenarios, generic approaches that address driving scenarios where driver’s
aggressiveness and actions is unknown need to be devised. Game theory helps in increasing
intrinsic motivation of drivers by measuring driving gain or loss in terms of utility to drivers.
The driving utility helps to measure payoff of drivers from different perspectives such as
safety, fuel economy or comfort.
Existing approaches either define driving utility for safety or fuel economy and lack defining
multi-objective utility. Game theory can help to increase intrinsic motivation of driver by
objectively measuring and defining driving utility. Feedback for improving individual
driving behaviour and decision control system may be integrated for strategic driving
interactions with other drivers. It helps to design an optimal gaming strategy that optimizes
driving utility for all drivers. Game theory is a proactive approach to keep drivers
appropriately engaged without causing excessive distraction. As part of this Chapter, a game
theory based model is defined to address missing information about fellow drivers.
Significant features of the proposed model are mentioned below.
• Driving utility has been designed after considering aspects of safety, fuel
economy and comfort, hence it is referred to as multi-objective utility.
• Missing information about the aggressiveness of opponents and their actions
is addressed based on beliefs for mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium model

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 distribution of driver’s types and associated actions. An optimal strategy is
framed using belief modelled by mixed BNE approach, and utility for players
is thus maximized.
• Gaming strategy recommends optimal actions to a driver that maximizes the
utility for the driver under simultaneous gameplay. It helps to build a
mechanism for driver’s decision and response planning as per driving
interaction with other drivers. Interactive models increase intrinsic motivation
by continuously engaging drivers.
• Driving assistance gaming model effectively improves the driver’s utility for
all drivers under equilibrium, reinforcing positive driving behaviour. It helps
to engage drivers towards eco-safe driving by increasing awareness,
knowledge, and motivation via gaming models.

4.2 Modelling driving as a game

Driving is a multiplayer game in which a driver must act optimally in response to external
driving events and interaction with other road players. Game modelling for driving will help
drivers to make rational decisions by optimizing their respective strategies. Subsequent
Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 introduce the concept of Game theory and its relevance to driving
as a game respectively.
4.2.1 Introduction to game theory
Game is multiplayer interaction where game outcome gets affected by number of players,
their strategies, and actions. A gameplay may result in gain or loss to the player depending
upon game possible outcomes. The utility represents economical value to the player for a
particular game outcome and acts as a measure of a player’s preference and motivation to
prefer a particular outcome. The economic value in terms of utility can be evaluated from
different perspectives of safety, fuel economy, and comfort. As higher utility gets assigned
to a more preferred outcome, inefficient outcomes are eliminated as part of the utility
optimization process by application of game theory.
The decision support system of the game is governed by actions that result in optimization
of the player’s utility. When a player takes a decision under a particular game situation or
position, it is called player’s move or action. All players take rational decisions that optimise
their utility and are aware that other players would also attempt to optimize their utility.

53
4.2.1 Classifications of games
A game can be classified into different categories according to several criteria:
Order of moves - Sequential or Simultaneous, in simultaneous game, each player
moves simultaneously whereas in sequential game, players take turn to move.
Information availability – Complete or Incomplete, in complete games, players
have complete information about opponent’s moves and utility value. Incomplete
games lack having all information about player’s move and utility value as in case of
real-world scenarios.
Strategic actions and motive - co-operative, non-cooperative, in co-operative game
models, players negotiate and make agreements with each other and maximize utility
by exploring all possible strategies. In non-cooperative games, players cannot
interact and must assume their opponent’s actions.
4.2.1 Representation of games
Games can be represented in different ways such as normal form, matrix form, and extensive
form. The details about few game representations have been mentioned as follows:
Normal form game can be represented by a tuple G = < N , A, {ui} > where
o Players: N = {1,2,3, . . . . , } represents a finite set of n players
o A = ×i N Ai , { A 1 … A n } where Ai is a finite set representing action
corresponding to playeri N such that Ai { a 1 …a k } represents any action
aj
o The utility u = { (ui) i N} is a set of utility functions where ui represents
the utility function for playeri. The playeri × a ui(a) represents the utility
for the player corresponding to joint action set a A .
Matrix representation for a game presents the utilities for different players
corresponding to different actions in a matrix form. This kind of notation helps in
visualizing utilities in easy-to-understand representation.
Table 4.2: Matrix Notation for Two Player’s Game

Player 2
Action Type
a2_1 a2_2 a2_3

a1_1 U1_11 U2_11 U1_12 U2_12 U1_13 U2_13

Player 1
a1_2 U1_21 U2_21 U1_22 U2_22 U1_23 U2_23

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 a1_3 U1_31 U2_31 U1_32 U2_32 U1_33 U2_33

It also helps in identification and elimination of inefficient strategies. Details on

process for identification of best and in-efficient strategies are presented in Sub-
section 4.2.1.3. Two player’s game can be represented by a matrix as depicted in
Table 4.2.
a. Row denotes player 1, and column denotes player 2
b. Row corresponds to actions a1 S1, and column corresponds to actions a2
S2
c. Each cell lists a pair of utilities denoted as Ui_xy for player with ID i and
action of player 1 and player 2 corresponds to x and y action identifiers.
Extensive form representation for a game is presented in a tree format where nodes
correspond to the player’s type and edges represent the actions taken by the player.
Final outcome of the game is represented by leaves representing the utilities for each
player corresponding to each branch. Each player can be represented by a different
node colour.
4.2.2 Gaming Strategies
A game consists of multiple players where each player uses an independent strategy to plan
their best response taking into consideration possible actions by other players.
Best Response(BR)
Let A-i represent actions of other players except player i.e. A-i = <A1,…,Ai-1,Ai+1,…, An>.
If actions for other players i.e. (A-i) are known, then best response of driver i against other
players’ actions is denoted by ( ).Let action ai represent action taken by driver i that
results in maximum utility as compared to utility derived by taking any other possible
actions(ai') i.e.
( ) i , ( , ) ( , )
Gaming strategies help players to plan their best response to other player’s actions and
optimize their utility. Players might have some actions which are not efficient and result in
lower utility. Players attempt to eliminate in-efficient action strategies, also referred to as
dominated strategies. The player’s actions that result in better utility irrespective of other
player’s actions are referred to as dominant or dominating strategies. There are two different
kinds of gaming strategies depending on strategic action taken by a player, pure strategy,

55
and mixed strategy.
Pure strategy defines only one strategic action a player takes in response to chosen actions
by other players. If any strategy (ai i) and achieves the
maximum utility, it is referred to as the dominant strategy. Here, ( , ) represents the
utility for action ai of player i in response to a-I actions of other players.

ai strictly dominated a i , ( , )> ( , )

ai weakly dominated a i , ( , ) ( , )

As shown in Table 4.3, let us consider an example of a subject driver and fellow driver who
can take either of actions, acceleration, deceleration, and maintenance of speed. Irrespective
of actions taken by fellow drivers, the subject driver will plan to only choose deceleration as
his action as if he takes any other action, his utility gets reduced. For example, if a fellow
driver accelerates, and the subject driver attempts to deviate from the dominant strategy of
deceleration by accelerating, his utility becomes equal to 0.5 which is less that utility
corresponding to action deceleration.
Table 4.1: Dominant Strategy Representation – 2 Driver’s Game

Fellow Driver
Driver Type / Action Type
Matrix Acc Dec Maint

Acc 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.3 0.25

Subject Driver Dec 1 0 0.6 0.5 0.55 0.75
Maint 0.25 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.5

A strategy profile where all players follow dominant strategies is said to be in Nash
equilibrium. The A = <A1,…, An> represents pure strategy Nash Equilibrium ,
( ).
Mixed strategy allows randomization of different actions a player can takes as per
probabilistic distribution and is represented by distribution i on Si, where i(Si) is the
probability of choosing action represented by Si. The mixed Bayesian strategies assign
conditional Bayes probabilistic distribution against each action.
1 n) attains Nash equilibrium if no mixed
strategy can offer better utility to a player than mixed strategies chosen in strategy profile

56
for that player,

, , ( ) , ( ) ,

The players maximize their utility by achieving equilibrium among their strategic
actions. Nash equilibrium is used for simultaneous games, whereas the Stackelberg
algorithm is used for leader-follower games. In Nash equilibrium, all players know
each other’s optimal strategy and players cannot increase utility by changing their
strategies for all possible actions by other players.
Equilibrium can be achieved by assuming a set of pure or mixed strategies for each
player. Pure strategy can map to only one action corresponding to each possible
gaming outcome whereas mixed strategy maps gaming outcome to a probability
distribution over actions.
Bayesian games represent a set of games where players choose their strategies according to
Baye’s rules and information about other players is uncertain and incomplete. Players are
not aware about other player’s preferences or strategies. Uncertainty and incomplete
information about the opponent’s behaviour can be addressed by beliefs represented by a
distribution of player’s type and actions in Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Each player’s type is derived based on prior probability distribution denoted as
p( 1,… n) k) denotes the probability for type of player k.
Player i can estimate his utility according to other player’s conditional distribution
-i i -i 1 i-1 i+1 n) represents type distribution for
all players other than player i.
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium represents Nash equilibrium achieved for player’s pure
strategies for a Bayesian game so that it maps type to a single action ai : i i. Utility for
player i in k player game for an action ai is denoted by ui(ai , a-i) where a-I represent actions
taken by players other than player i.
Mixed Bayesian Nash Equilibrium represent Nash equilibrium achieved for player’s mixed
strategies for a Bayesian game so that it maps type to distribution of actions i.e.
i( i , Ai) : i i Where i include probabilistic distributions of actions over pure
action strategy set Ai according to different player types and is computed via simplex
= [0,1] ( ) . The utility for

57
player i is derived based on probability distribution of player types and actions as per mixed
strategy.
The proposed work applies the mixed Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) and estimates the
driver’s aggressiveness type and actions. Each player follows an optimal mixed strategy
against mixed strategies taken by other players. Players have incomplete information about
their opponents, and mixed BNE helps frame certain beliefs about other player’s types,
actions, and distribution. These beliefs can be represented by an optimal mixed distribution
over driving actions and type in a Bayesian game. A virtual player “nature” can choose a
player’s type as per the optimal distribution of player’s types and actions under BNE
equilibrium. In the Bayesian mixed BNE approach, the driver’s comfort, safety, and mileage
utility is optimized, irrespective of their opponent’s driving characteristics and actions. The
driving behaviour and resulting manoeuvring actions are vital factors for determining driving
multi-objective utility. The proposed approach increases driver engagement and motivation
and sustains long-term positive driving behaviour to ensure safe, comfortable, and
economical driving.

4.3 Design of mixed BNE based gaming model

Driving is a simultaneous game where each driver acts, and joint actions of all drivers
determine their individual utility. The model denotes the vehicle under study as the subject
vehicle and the driver under study as the subject driver. Adjacent opponent vehicles and
drivers are referred to as target vehicles and target drivers. Gaming strategy helps to decide
the best possible action a driver can take to optimize its utility during their interaction with
other drivers. Information about other player’s aggressiveness and actions is not known
practically, Bayesian game model helps to address this problem by adopting mixed gaming
strategy and optimizes utility by attaining Nash equilibrium. The application of Bayesian
game theory produces a set of strategies for each player such that they provide an optimal
response to other players irrespective of any strategies followed by them. The game model
is defined and represented formally below.
Definition : A mixed Bayesian Nash Equilibrium based gaming model for driving is
denoted by a tuple =< , ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ) > under assumptions set
below.
1. Players: D = { , ,... } represents a finite set of n drivers.
2. Set of type of driveri: Ti such that {“ ”, “ ”} for i = 1, . . . , , “A” represents

58
 aggressive driver type, and “NA” represents non-aggressive driver type.
× …× denotes simultaneous combination of type sets for all drivers.
Let × …× × ×…× be known types for all other drivers except the
driveri as per beliefs of driveri i: Ti .
3. Pure action strategies of driveri are termed as Si, { , , }, and
acceleration is referred to as “A”, deceleration of a vehicle is denoted by “D”, and “M”
represents speed maintenance by driver.
4. pi is the probability function so that drivers are labelled as aggressive or non-aggressive
with a probability of p and (1-p) respectively. A pure strategy for driveri maps driver
type to a single action si : Ti i. A mixed strategy for driveri i : Ti i

i depicts the mixed strategy for playeri as per player’s type and action distribution.

i include probabilistic distributions of actions over pure action strategy set Si

way i.e.
= [0,1] ( )
5. The utility ui(t,s): Ti R is a function of driver’s type and actions where (t,s)
T x S, ui(t,s) specifies the utility for driver type t and action s.
= ( ). ( ) + ( ). ( ) (4.1)
= ( ). ( ) + ( ). ( ) (4.2)
= ( ). ( ) + ( ). ( ) (4.3)
The distribution of mixed driving actions strategy of driveri i: Ti i, are represented by
Equations 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 where , , represent the distribution of acceleration,
deceleration, maintenance of speed. The p(A) represents the probability of aggressiveness
whereas p(NA) represents the probability of non-aggressiveness.
4.3.1 Overall process flow for mixed BNE
In a real driving system, it is difficult to assess whether fellow players are aggressive or non-
aggressive and what kinds of action the player would be taking accordingly. Mixed BNE
gaming models hold common prior assumptions that define probability distribution about a
player’s aggressive type and actions. These beliefs are useful for computation of different
types of utilities for drivers, i.e., comfort, mileage, and interaction utility.
Comfort utility helps to determine the percentage duration of trip that requires minimal

59
driving efforts. The larger percentage for cruising results in better comfort. Value for comfort
utility for a sub-trip is derived by taking the ratio of fuel consumed during cruising to the
ratio of fuel consumed for a sub-trip. Subsequently, it is assessed if any of driving strategical
actions results in desired mileage. Mileage utility helps to determine the percentage ratio of
fuel consumption for duration with desired mileage to total fuel consumed. Interaction
utility helps to determine what actions a driver must plan according to fellow driver’s type
and action distribution.
Once driving utilities are computed corresponding to a particular outcome, mixed BNE helps
in optimization of utilities for all drivers. This is achieved by eliminating all dominated
strategies for all drivers and achieving mixed Nash equilibrium. At equilibrium conditions,
drivers will not deviate from gaming strategies suggested by mixed BNE algorithm as doing
so will reduce its utility to lower value irrespective of any actions of fellow drivers. Figure
4.1 elaborates broad level steps followed as part of the mixed BNE gaming approach.

START

Current Driving Data

Derive duration for ACC, DEC, STOP, Cruise for a sub-trip

Estimate fellow driver’s type and actions for an interaction

Compute utility matrix for both driver’s actions and types

Optimize BNE & frame gaming strategies

Decide subject driver’s action as per optimal BNE strategy

END

Figure 4.1: Driving Utility Optimization using Mixed BNE

60
 1. Driving behaviour data is analysed to detect aggressive driving events such as
harsh acceleration, deceleration, cruising, and their duration.
2. The target driver is classified aggressive with p as probability. Mixed action
distribution ( ), ( ), ( ) for target driver is derived using pure action and
driver’s types of distribution using Equations 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
3. Utility for interaction actions for a driver is calculated by aggregating interaction
utility corresponding to all fellow drivers during a trip. Details about the same have
been explained in Sub-section 4.3.1.1.
4. Utility for Comfort and mileage utility is computed subsequently and aggregated
with interaction utility to determine driving net utility. The details for the same
have been specified in Sub-section 4.3.1.2
5. BNE finds optimal strategy by removing all strictly dominated strategies one by
one, thereby establishing mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The optimal
distribution of types and actions of the driver derives optimized driving strategic
profile under mixed BNE. Driver’s response can be planned as per optimal gaming
strategies.
4.3.1.1 Driver’s Interaction Utility formulation
Driving interaction utility for subject driver represents the utility value derived as per his
interaction with fellow drivers. Subject driver knows about his own aggressiveness type, but
he is not aware about the aggressiveness type of fellow drivers. Based on dynamic conditions
of the subject vehicle and driving behaviour, the subject driver decides his relative utility
corresponding to actions by fellow drivers. Figure 4.2 explains complete process of
computation for driving interaction utility step by step as explained below: -
During each interaction of the subject driver with fellow driver, fellow driver’s type
is estimated as per probability for driver’s type. The fellow driver is assumed to be
aggressive with probability P(A) and non-aggressive with probability p(NA) such
that p(A) + P(NA) =1.
The action distribution of fellow driver corresponding to actions, acceleration
(ACC), deceleration (DEC), maintenance of speed (Maint) is derived based on fellow
driver’s type using Equations 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
The utility for acceleration Usubject(A), deceleration Usubject(D), and speed

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 maintenance Usubject(M) are computed as per Equation 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 respectively.
The different actions of the target driver, such as acceleration, deceleration, and
speed maintenance, are distributed acc Atarget Dtarget Mtarget. A1-A3
represents the utility value for the subject driver corresponding to acceleration action
taken by target drivers. A4-A6 and A7-A9 represent the driver’s utility for the
deceleration and speed maintenance actions of target drivers, respectively.
( )= 1+ 4+ 7 (4.4)

( )= 2+ 5+ 8 (4.5)

( )= 3+ 6+ 9 (4.6)

Aggregated Utility for Subject Driver Usubject

Eq 4.7, 4.8

Acc Utility for Subject Dec Utility for Subject Maint Utility for Subject
Driver Usubject(A) Eq 4.5 Driver Usubject(D) Driver Usubject(M)

Eq 4.4 Eq 4.6

Acc Distribution A Dec Distribution D Maint Distribution M

Eq 4.1 Eq 4.2 Eq 4.3

Aggressive Non-Aggressive
Fellow driver Fellow driver

p(A) p(NA)

Estimated type of fellow driver

Figure 4.2: Computation for Driving Interaction Utility – Subject Driver

The interaction utility for a sub-trip is computed by taking the weighted average of
interaction utilities for all interactions during a sub-trip. The driving utility for kth
iteration of driver Dj is calculated as the weighted average of Ujk(A), Ujk (D), Ujk(M)

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 as specified in Equation 4.7, where Ujk(A), Ujk (D), Ujk(M) are utilities for
acceleration, deceleration, and speed maintenance during k th interaction of driver Dj
during sub-trip.
× ( ) × ( ) × ( )
= (4.7)

where k represents kth interaction done by the subject driver, z being the number of
total interactions during sub-trip.
+ + = 1
0 , , 1
The subject driver’s aggregated interaction utility is defined as the ratio of
FuelConsumedj multiplied by interactionUtilj to the sum of FuelConsumedj for all
sub-trips during a trip as per Equation 4.8.
×
= (4.8)

where j denotes sub-trip index and FuelConsumedj is the fuel consumed for sub-trip
j.

4.3.1.2 Procedure for computing Driver’s Utility

Driving net utility is computed as a weighted average of mileage, comfort, and driver
interaction during a trip, hence it is also referred to as multi-objective utility. Different kinds
of utilities are computed below.
1. Comfort utility for a driver defines percentage fuel consumption for cruising
duration to total fuel consumed for the subject driver using Equation 4.9.

= (4.9)

where j represents jth sub-trip by subject driver, and FuelConsumedj is the fuel
consumed for the associated sub-trip.
2. The ratio of fuel consumption while driving with desired mileage during sub-
trip to total fuel consumed during sub-trip is defined as mileage utility for the subject
driver as specified in Equation 4.10 .

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 ×

= (4.10)

where j represents jth sub-trip by subject driver, and FuelConsumedj is the fuel
consumed for the associated sub-trip.
3. The aggregated interaction utility of the subject driver for multiple interactions
during a trip is denoted as aggInteractionUtil subject as defined by Equation 4.8.
4. Driver’s net utility Usubject is calculated as the weighted average of different
utilities for comfort, mileage, and interaction using Equation 4.11.
= × + × +
× (4.11)
where u, v and w represent respective weights for comfort, mileage, and interaction
utility and + + = 1 and 0 , , 1.

One example scenario elaborates the driver’s utility computation for subject and target
drivers as part of the game matrix of Table 4.4. The utility for subject driver for
acceleration, deceleration, and maintenance actions can be computed using Equations
4.12, 4.13, and 4.14 by substituting values for Equations 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 respectively.

( )= 0.5 (4.12)

( )= + 0.6 + 0.55 (4.13)

( ) = 0.25 + 0.5 + 0.5 (4.14)

Similarly, utility for target driver can be computed by evaluating Equations 4.4, 4.5,
4.6 according to type and action distribution for subject driver.

Table 4.2: Matrix Notation for Sample Driving Game

Target Driver
Driver Type / Action Type
Matrix Acc Dec Maint

Acc 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.3 0.25

Subject Driver Dec 1 0 0.6 0.5 0.55 0.75
Maint 0.25 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.5

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At equilibrium, a mixed strategy will ensure that the utility for the subject driver will remain
the same irrespective of the actions of the target driver. The probability distribution for type
and actions is selected optimally to derive an optimal strategy profile for all drivers.
Actions of both drivers affect the relative distance between their vehicles. The probability of
a crash or a dangerous situation arises if an appropriate safe distance is not maintained, as
explained below by a few example scenarios: -
• During car following, if the following driver’s speed exceeds the leading driver’s
speed, both continue to maintain the same speed.
• In a scenario where the leading driver applies brakes to reduce speed, the
following driver continues to drive with same speed, thereby reducing the inter-
vehicle space.
• When both drivers speed up at the same time, but the following driver accelerates
at a higher rate, it may hit the leading vehicle.
Safe distance between two vehicles can be maintained or compromised depending on
multiple interactions between drivers. It is essential to control resulting driving actions or
strategies for optimization of driving interaction utility.
4.3.1.3 Game Strategy – Mixed BNE Optimization
Bayesian Nash equilibrium gaming model works with certain beliefs and assumptions for
how drivers act and what kind of behaviour is demonstrated by them. The strategy profile
for all drivers is planned so that any deviation from the planned strategy leads to a decrease
in utility and becomes independent of any strategies adopted by other drivers. The strategy
for a driver remains unaffected by the actions of opponents under equilibrium conditions. A
um if Ui(Ti i) > Ui (Ti -i) holds for all drivers where
i -i. Driveri cannot adopt
i and is independent of other drivers’ mixed
strategies. The optimal distribution of actions and aggressiveness of drivers is determined
according to optimal strategies under BNE equilibrium for the reference population under
study.
The game tree of Figure 4.3 shows a scenario of an aggressive driver with a probability of p
and non-aggressive as (1-p) at level 1 and level 2 as per certain beliefs of the BNE game[47].
The four possible game trees are defined based on various combinations of driver pair types,

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and there are nine possibilities of different actions by subject and target drivers, making it
36 combinations combined. At each level, a driver can either accelerate (A), decelerate (D),
or maintain speed (M). A red circle depicts the subject driver, and a blue circle indicates the
target driver. The mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium ensures that all drivers maintain a
dominant strategy profile that enables them to maximize their utility as compared to other
strategies, irrespective of strategies adopted by the opponent. BNE equilibrium is achieved
under certain assumptions and beliefs about the opponent’s behaviour and actions as per the
optimal strategy profile.

Figure 4.3: Driving Utility under Bayesian Network

After the iterative elimination of in-efficient strategies, an optimal strategy profile solution
is found for all drivers, denoted by the game tree[48].
4.3.1.4 Example Scenarios
Example scenarios denoted by Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 explain the process of elimination
of inefficient dominated strategies and reduction of the game tree.
Figure 4.4 elaborates an interaction scenario between two non-aggressive drivers where both
drivers accelerate but maintain a safe distance between them. Strictly Dominated strategies
are removed iteratively to reach an optimal solution [47]. The highlighted portion of the left
game tree describes an optimal solution where both drivers accelerate with a safe distance
between them.

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 Figure 4.4: BNE – Non-Aggressive Subject Driver, Non-Aggressive Target Driver

If the target driver deviates from optimal action and either decelerates or maintains speed
instead of accelerating, it reduces driving utility for the target driver. Hence, Dtarget does not
get any incentive to deviate from the optimal action of acceleration. On the other hand, if
Dsubject decelerates, then also Dtarget achieves better utility via acceleration, but utility for
Dsubject reduces, hence Dsubject will not change his action to deceleration. Similarly, if Dsubject
maintains speed, the utility of Dsubject gets reduced as compared to acceleration action.
Hence, both drivers stick to the optimal acceleration action as per optimal strategy under
BNE.

Figure 4.5: BNE – Aggressive Subject Driver, Aggressive Target Driver

Figure 4.5 elaborates a scenario of driving interaction between 2 aggressive drivers where
the subject Driver Dsubject accelerates, and the target driver adjusts his speed by decelerating.
The equilibrium is achieved when target driver Dtarget decelerates to avoid crashes. If any
driver deviates from their respective strategic actions, it results in a reduction of utility.
Optimal BNE strategy profile under equilibrium helps to plan the response of the driver.

4.4 Results and discussion

4.4.1 Experiment design
Table 4.4 describes naturalistic data of various trips taken by nine drivers in 23 cities at

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different times for highway and urban areas. The experiment is conducted in 2 different
stages, baseline utility computation is done as part of the first stage, and game model is
applied to optimize driving utility for all drivers.
Table 4.3: Details of Trips by Different Drivers

Maximum Average
Distance Duration
No. of value of value of
ID Covered of trip
trips speed speed
(KM) (Hour)
(KM/Hour) (KM/Hour)
Driver 1 424 4846 79 24 201
Driver 2 415 10755 64 31 276
Driver 3 524 6202 66 25 208
Driver 4 82 1279 82 30 36
Driver 5 169 2419 77 25 76
Driver 6 274 4641 74 25 149
Driver 7 281 3300 64 23 146
Driver 8 90 1385 70 27 45
Driver 9 58 1051 70 26 32

Table 4.4: Description of Driving Behaviour Features

Variable Range (in
Variable Units Description
Name msecs)
AccDUR Milliseconds 0-438000 Duration of high or frequent acceleration
DecDUR Milliseconds 0-38000 Duration of high or frequent deceleration
StopDUR Milliseconds 0-27673 Duration of stopping the vehicle
CruiseDUR Milliseconds 0-5007000 Duration of cruising

Table 4.5 captures the duration of harsh acceleration or deceleration, cruising and stopping
driving behaviour. The data analysis helps in the assessment of the optimal distribution of
driving aggressiveness and actions. The action response of the driver is planned according
to type and action distribution using equations 7,8,9. At equilibrium, drivers do not prefer to
deviate from dominant action strategy as it would further reduce driving utility.
4.4.2 Findings
Utility data of 9 drivers for 1175 trips from stage 1 is compared against driving scores for
1140 trips after applying the mixed BNE model. The driving net utility of drivers is
computed as per equations 6 and 11, taking the weighted average of comfort, mileage, and
interaction utilities. The utilities for comfort, mileage, and interaction are evaluated using
equations 4, 5 and 11. The driving net utility can be represented as a percentage value from

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0%-100% as its value is within the range of 0-1.

Figure 4.6: Driving Utility Comparison – Pre-Gaming and Post-Gaming

Figure 4.6 indicates an improvement of 5% to 17% in aggregated driving net utility score.
Few drivers 2,4,5,6 showed higher improvement (10% to 17%) in aggregated driving net
utility.
Table 4.5: Driving Net Utility – Comfort, Mileage, Interaction Utility
Comfort Utility Mileage Utility Interaction Utility Driving Net Utility
ID Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Driver1 64% 71% 57% 72% 6% 10% 39% 47%
Driver2 57% 89% 92% 99% 7% 8% 47% 60%
Driver3 73% 75% 96% 99% 6% 13% 53% 58%
Driver4 68% 77% 67% 86% 7% 12% 43% 54%
Driver5 54% 81% 72% 93% 4% 10% 39% 56%
Driver6 52% 84% 78% 94% 6% 7% 42% 56%
Driver7 79% 81% 83% 95% 5% 9% 50% 56%
Driver8 77% 83% 83% 99% 4% 9% 50% 58%
Driver9 83% 84% 74% 91% 3% 8% 48% 56%

Table 4.7 shows details about different scores pre and post-gaming. The mixed BNE Gaming
model had improved all scores for comfort, mileage, and interaction. Few drivers(2,5,6)
demonstrate up to 30% improvement in comfort scores, whereas the rest show up to 10%
improvement. Interaction score was increased by 4%-7% while mileage score improved in
the range of 10%-20% post application of gaming model. Improved utilities achieved by
drivers clearly demonstrate that mixed BNE helped in encouraging drivers to drive in eco-
safe manner; four drivers showed significant improvement, five drivers moderately

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improved the scores.
4.4.3 Discussion
The proposed mixed BNE algorithm helped to meet the following research objectives: -

4.4.3.1 Evaluation of driving utility

The mixed BNE game-theoretical model assesses the driving comfort in terms of cruising
duration when the driver takes minimal action and is calculated as percentage cruising
duration as evaluated in equation 4. It also reduces driving fatigue as the driver does not have
to accelerate or decelerate, leading to driving comfort. Results have indicated up to 30%
improvement in comfort utility after applying the mixed BNE gaming model. Similarly,
mileage utility computed using equation five also improves up to 10%-20% after applying
the gaming model. The driving interaction utility represented by equation 11 helps to provide
appropriate driving assistance to balance safety and economy. It helps to minimize driving
aggressiveness, thereby assisting the driver to maintain optimal steady-state speed.
Interaction utility increased up to 5%-7% after applying the mixed BNE model. The
proposed approach can configure different weights to balance all mileage, comfort, and
safety as per different driving scenarios. Overall driving net utility increases due to
improvement in mileage, reduction of driving fatigue, and violations.
4.4.3.2 Planning optimal driving action by addressing missing information about
fellow driver’s behaviour and strategic action
The aggressiveness of fellow players is estimated using the correct mix of a probability
distribution of driving aggressiveness and actions. The conditional Bayesian probability is
applied to derive the subject driver’s utility for a specific type of subject driver assuming a
specific distribution actions and aggressiveness of drivers. A mixed Bayesian gaming model
achieves equilibrium across the strategy profile of all drivers by removing inefficient
strategies for drivers one by one. An optimal action response can be suggested under
equilibrium conditions. Results indicated that driving net utility for drivers improved up to
5% to 17%.
4.4.3.3 Long term behavioural changes of the driver towards eco-safe driving
If the driver can complete the trip in a fuel-economical and safe manner without feeling
fatigued, it provides a utility value and boosts the driver’s intrinsic motivation. As part of
optimal strategies recommendation from the BNE model, firstly, driver’s fatigue is reduced
due to increased cruising duration; secondly, fuel economy is improved, thirdly driver’s

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overall aggressiveness is reduced, and drivers maintain steady-safe speed. Steady speed
maintenance, maintaining safe lead distance and avoiding overspeed improve overall driving
safety. Furthermore, adopting an optimal strategy also reduces overall travel time and
comfort for the driver. The driver is more inclined to adopt fuel-economical and safe driving
behaviour. Hence, application of game theory retains long-term eco-safe driving behaviour
adoption by the drivers and keeps them engaged in active driving.
4.4.4 Comparison with existing approaches
The mixed BNE is compared against Stackelberg, and Decision tree gaming approaches
under different congestion flow[12] as per Figure 4.7.

Figure 4.7: Comparison of % Violation Rate – Various Congestion Types

It had been observed that application of mixed BNE resulted in reduction of aggressive
driving behaviour, drivers maintained steady-state speed more often, did less frequent speed
violation, less observed harsh acceleration, or deceleration. According to Figure 4.7, the
violation percentage rate for the mixed BNE gaming model is lowest among all approaches.
As per Figure 4.8, the mixed BNE approach resulted in lower average vehicle speed than
Stackelberg and Decision Tree approaches. One explanation for the same is that the current
study includes data for urban and highway areas, whereas the Stackelberg and decision tree
approaches [12] considered driving data for highways only with an assumed uniform
velocity distribution.

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 Figure 4.8: Comparison of Average Speed – Various Congestion Types

Hence, it is difficult to compare vehicle speed data of mixed BNE, Stackelberg, and Decision
tree-based approaches due to non-identical contextual environments such as road type, lane
width.

4.5 Conclusions
The mixed BNE approach for the driving game has appropriately determined underlying
beliefs about driving aggressiveness and actions. The approach reduced driving
aggressiveness and improved all drivers’ comfort, mileage, and interaction utility. Compared
to Stackelberg and Decision Tree approaches, the mixed BNE approach led to fewer
violations for driving negative behaviour. Furthermore, it also improves drivers’ awareness,
motivation, and compliance towards eco-safe driving behaviour. This approach helps reduce
driving aggressiveness, fuel consumption, operating maintenance, and driver’s fatigue. It
can also be helpful for the comparison and evaluation of different drivers as per their eco-
driving and safe-driving practices. Fleet management companies can utilize this approach
for the effective selection of drivers and structure their compensation accordingly.
Furthermore, auto-reseller and insurance companies can use driver behaviour and utility
evaluation for evaluation of car’s condition and fair-market price. In future, a study can be
used to develop an autonomous response for providing driving assistance in multiple
scenarios such as lane-keeping, navigational assistance, or driving manoeuvre across
crossings or red lights.

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