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Mood effects on decision making strateges

Article  in  Australian Journal of Psychology · February 2011

DOI: 10.1080/00049538908260083

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 Mood Effects on Decision
Making Strategies
Joseph P. Forgas
University of New South Wales,
Sydney, Australia

Are social decisions influenced by mood? In this study, subjects feeling happy, sad, or
neutral were asked to select a partner from eight potential candidates, either for themselves
(personally relevant condition) or for another subject (persoilally irrelevant condition).
Each target was described in a detailed ”personnel file,”covenng both task and interpersonal
skills. Decision sequences and outcomes were carefully recorded and analysed. Results
showed that (a) mood influenad decision outcomes, with sad subjects preferring rewarding
choices more than did happy or control subjects; (b) positive mood resulted in faster
and more efficient decisions, but only when the outcome was not personally relevant:
(c) sad subjects concentrated more on interpersonal information, took longer to reach
a decision. and were less likely to use an elimination by aspects strategy. Mood effects
were generally dependent on the personal relevance of the decision. The results are discussed
in terms of contemporary theories of mood effects on cognition, and the need for taking
social and motivational as well as cognitive variables into account in such models is
considered. The implications of the findings for everyday decisions are discussed.

Most social decisions require us to selectively deal with complex, multidimensional

information. Choosing a work partner, selecting an employee, or deciding whether
to accept a weekend invitation are examples of social decisions usually carried
out under considerable information overload. Does temporary mood influence
the kind of information we consider, the decision making strategies we employ,
and the outcome of such decisions? Despite growing evidence that affective states
can play an important role in the way people learn, interpret, and remember
social information (Bower, 1981, 1983; Clark, & Isen, 1982; Forgas, & Bower,
1987,1988a, 1988b; Forgas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984; Forgas, Burnham, & Trimboli,
1988; lsen & Means, 1983; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Mayer, & Volanth,
1986), little work has been done on mood effects o n realistic social decisions.
In particular, the influence of variables such as the social context, personal
relevance, goals and attitudes on cognitive strategies have often been bypassed
in contemporary social cognition research (Ross,& Ellard, 1986; Wyer, & Srull,
1986). The few existing studies largely focused o n the effects of mild positive
moods on superficial or uninvolving decisions only. This study assessed the
influence of both good and bad moods o n the information selected and the
decision strategies preferred by people in personally relevant or irrelevant choices.

Support from the Australian Research Grants Commission and the German Research
Foundation (Deutsches Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) is gratefully acknowledged.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Joseph P. Forgas. School of Psychology,
University of New South Wales, Kensington, N.S.W.2033, Australia
Australian Journal of Psychofogy Voi. 41, No. 2, 1989 pp. 197-214
I98 J. P. Forgas
Although decision making is by definition an intensely cognitive activity (Janis
& Mann, 1977). the influence of affect on this process is not at present clearly
understood. Most contemporary theories account for mood effects on cognition
in terms of such basic and automatic principles as priming (Bower, 1981, 1983:
Clark, & Isen. 1982; Forgas. & Bower, 1988a. 1988b). accessibility (Wyer. &
Srull. 1981). or the various schema (Beck. 1976) formulations. These models
haw limited applicability to decision making research for at least two reasons.
First. most current mood theories are essentially memory models, which have
more to say about information storage and availability than about the way
information is actually used in decisions. Priming theories. for example, focus
o n the role of mood states in selectively influencing the availability of mood-
consistent information in learning. memory and judgments (Bower, 1983; Clark
& hen. I 9 8 2 Isen et al.. 1978). but say little about how information, once available.
is combined and used.
Second, the kind of simple. automatic processing implied by these basic models
can no longer fully account for all the available empirical evidence (Bower. 1985;
Rower & Mayer. 1985: Forgas & Bower, 1987: Forgas et al., 1988). It appears
that social. cultural. and contextual variables, such as personal relevance. goals.
social norms and the like often moderate mood effects on cognition (Wyer ,&
Srull. 1986). with negative moods particularly subject to such constraints (Forgas.
1981. 1983; Forgas et al., 1984). Numerous extensions and qualifications of basic
mood theories. more sensitive to the social context of cognition. have been
proposed in recent years (Bower & Cohen, 1982; Branscombe, 1988; Broadbent.
1986: Clark & Isen, 1982; Clore. 1985).
In this study we assessed the influence of mood states on (a) the information
considered. (b)the deckion making strategy adopted. and (c) the decisions reached
by subjects. There are seberal models dealing with how decision making problems
are approached by people (Payne. 1982). A particular decision strategy may be
chosen because it requires the minimum elfort to arrive at an acceptable decision
(the cost, benefit model: Beach & Mitchell, 1978). Alternatively, the initial
perception and framing of the problem may guide decision strategies. sometimes
in suboptimal directions (the perceptual model; Kahneman & Tversky. 1979).
Finally. a rule-based model proposed by Pitz (1977) suggests that the choice
of decision strategies is triggered by the presence of particular conditions. in
a manner similar to a system of productions (condition-action pairs; Newell &
Simon. 1972). Mood effects on decisions have largely been considered in cost,
benefit terms in existing empirical studies, yet there may be considerable advantages
of extending the rule-based production model to this domain. For example.
common affective states such as depression (Pietromonaco. & Rook. 1987) or
stress (Keinan. 1987) may influence decision making processes in ways which
are inconsistent with either mood-priming or cost, benefit models.
In a series of innovative recent studies, Isen and others explored 'how affect
influences not only the material that one thinks about. but the procedures and
strategies that one employs in solving problems and reaching decisions" (Isen
& Means, 1983. p. 19). The major expectation of reduced effort in good moods
was consistent with the cost 'benefit model: "a person in a positive affective state
who is asked to make a judgment or solve a problem will tend to reduce the
complexity of the. . . task and engage in speedy. simplified kinds of processing"
(Isen, Means. Patrick. & Nowicki, 1982. p. 246). Positive affect can also lead
to a tendency to organise information into larger, more inclusive units (Isen
& Daubman. 1984). to rely more on heuristic devices and other shortcuts in

Ausrralian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41. No. 2. 1989 pp. 197-214

Mood and Decision-IMaking 199
judgments and decision making (Isen et al.. 1982), and to give more unusual
and diverse associations to words as "cognitive processes . . . become more flexible
as a function of positive affect" (Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985, p.
1424).
Even in quite complex tasks, lsen and Means (1983) found that subjects who
felt good reached decisions faster, were less likely to return to information already
looked at, and were more likely to eliminate alternatives than were control subjects.
Isen. et al. (1982) suggest that simplified and more !lexible decision making in
positive moods may occur because (a) "positive affect may increase the load
on working memory," or (b) because "it makes people more sensitive to strain
and more strain-avoidant" (p. 247). Neither of these explanations is entirely
satisfactory, however. I t is hard to see why positive affect should impose greater
loads on working memory than, say. negative affect, nor is it clear why cognitive
strain per se should be more likely to be avoided in happy rather than sad
moods.
An alternative model based on the rule-based production systems approach
of Pitz (1977) may be helpful to account for mood effects on complex and
personally relevant social decisions. In terms of this model, decision making may
be seen as a complex and contextdependent social action. Particular decision
making strategies are automatically chosen when certain antecedent conditions,
including affective states, are present. For example, a common condition-action
pair may be that 'when feeling bad, select alternative most likely to lead to
rewarding outcomes,"or"when stressed, reduce information input"(Keinan. 1987).
Such productions are stored in long-term memory in a priority-ordered list, and
the highest priority decision strategy satisfying the existing conditions is
automatically selected. Although the production system framework is very general,
it has the considerable advantage of being able to account for the highly context-
dependent. rule-based character of many everyday social decisions. A better
understanding of the links between particular antecedent conditions, such as affect
or personal relevance, and subsequent decision strategies is a major objective
of this experiment.
Personal relevance in particular is likely to be an important condition influenc-
ing mood effects on decision making. There is strong evidence suggesting that
"information processing in decision making, as in other areas of cognition, is
highly contingent on the demands of the task" (Payne, 1982, p. 383; Ross &
Ellard, 1986). Personal relevance has been found to play an important role in
mediating various affective reactions. For example, bogus feedback about heart
rate can influence feelings in unimportant, but not important person perception
judgments (Taylor, 1975). Other studies also showed that mood effects on risk-
taking decisions may be quite different depending on whether the consequences
are "real" or merely hypothetical (Isen & Patrick, 1983). To control for personal
relevance, we incorporated two parallel decision conditions in this study: subjects
had the task to select a partner for themselves or for another person from several
potential candidates difiering in several task and interpersonal qualities.
The aim of this study was thus to show that temporary moods do influence
the strategies used, and choices made by people in realistic social decisions. We
also hypothesised that such mood effects need not be either simple or universal
across moods and conditions. Rather, the social characteristics of the task, the
personal relevance of the outcome and the quality of the mood may jointly
influence the particular decision making strategies people adopt ( Wyer & Srull,
1986; Ross & Ellard, 1986). Our first expectation was that Isen and Means'

Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No. 2, 1989 pp. 197-214

200 J. P. Forgas
( 1983) finding of decision shortcuts in good mood would be restricted to personally
irrelevant decisions only. Effort minimisation may be a more dangerous decision
strategy when the outcome is personally relevant. In terms of a cost/benefit
model, positive moods should be less likely to result in "simplified" decision
strategies when a reduction in decision making effort may lead to personally
unfavourable outcomes.
On the basis of previous research on the consequences of negative moods
on social judgments (Forgas et al., 1984, 1988; Forgas & Bower. 1987. 1988a.
1988b). we also expected that the effects of negative mood on decision making
are more likely to be influenced by normative and motivational factors. In
particular, negative moods should preferentially trigger information search and
decision strategies directed towards rewarding outcomes. In other words, subjects
in a sad mood would be more likely to employ a 'directed search" strategy,
preferentially looking for a 'rewarding" partner. and concentrating on "social"
rather than "task" information. In contrast, subjects in good or neutral moods
may be more inclined to use undirected decision strategies, and give equal weight
to social and task characteristics.
A strong pattern of interaction between mood and personal relevance was
also expected. Such a pattern of selective and contextdependent mood effects
on decision making strategies is consistent with the emerging view that "decision
making is a highly contingent form of information processing" (Payne. 1982,
p. 395). Depending on the degree of awareness, contextdependent decision
behaviours are predicted by both the unconscious "production systems" model
proposed by Pitz (1977). and the notion of "controlled." motivated and conscious
processing advanced by Clark, & Isen (1982). Experience and reactions to negative
moods in particular were found to be subject to internalised cultural rules and
norms (Forgas et al., 1984: Forgas & Bower, 1988a, 1988b). which form part
of the antecedent conditions for particular decision making strategies to be adopted
(Pitz, 1977). We also expected that as a result of functional associations. positive
mood and high personal relevance would be more likely to lead to some of
the more effective decision making strategies in complex tasks, such as the
elimination by attributes strategy. than would depressed mood or low personal
relevance. In order to evaluate these predictions, the present study involved the
factorial manipulation of three mood conditions and two personal relevance
conditions in a realistic social decision task.

Method
Overview. and Design
Positive and negative mood was induced through manipulated feedback about
subjects' performance on a bogus test. Next, in an allegedly separate experiment.
they were asked to select a research partner from eight potential applicants, each
described in terms of 10 information categories presented in a 'personnel file."
Subjects either expected to meet and personally work with their choice. or assumed
that the person selected would work on a future study. The decision strategies
and outcomes were carefully analysed as a function of mood (positive, control,
negative) and decision context (personal, impersonal) in a 3 x 2 between-subjects
factorial design.

Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 11, No. 2. 1989 pp. 197-21.1

 Mood and Decision-Making 201
Subjects
Seventy-two undergraduates (36 males and 36 females) participated in the study
either for course credit or for money, with 12 subjects (six males and six females)
in each of the six conditions.

Stimulus Materials
The eight potential partners were each described in t e r m of these ten features
printed on separate cards in "personnel files": ( I ) sex, (2) age, (3) IQ,(4) high
school graduation results, ( 5 ) marks on a research project, (6) work reference
by a faculty member, (7) rating of interpersonal skills by an interviewing panel,
and ratings of (8) dominance, (9) friendliness, and (10) likeability by colleagues.
Thus, four characteristics (nos. 3,4,5,6) had to do with task competence, and
four (nos. 7,8,9,10) covered interpersonal qualities. (Sex and age information
was randomly combined with these details, such that four male and four female
targets ranging between 18 and 25 years were included in each subject's file.)
A range of eight comparative values was defined on each of these categories
ranging from the most to the least desirable. Each "personnel file" contained
different information, but the average rank value of the descriptions was the
same. Assuming equal weighting of all information categories, there was no rational
basis for choosing one partner rather than any other. For example, a 'personnel
file" may consist of the following items: "Mr D is 21 years old. He matriculated
with an average result of 67 out of 100. His research project was marked 10
out of a possible 25 points. His 1Q is 116. He received 8 out of a possible
10 points on ratings of dominance. He was rated fourth on friendliness. He
was rated fifth on likeability. His work reference by a faculty member was the
third best in the group, He was ranked sixth in terms of interpersonal skills
by an interviewing panel."

Mood Manipulation Marerials

Mood was manipulated by giving subjects bogus feedback about their "good"
or "bad" performance on a test. This technique requires particularly careful
debriefing (see below), but is highly effective in producing both negative and
positive moods with few demand characteristics and without any carry-over effects
to the decision making task (Forgas & Bower, 1987, 1988a, 1988b). A 50-item
questionnaire assessing "social adjustment and personality" was used as the basis
of the false feedback manipulation. Items were selected from published scales
dealing with constructs such as social skills, loneliness, shyness, self-monitoring,
etc.

Procedure
Subjects were required to sign up for two short, unrelated studies by two different
experimenters over a one-hour session, described as "a questionnaire study of
personality and social adjustment" and an "experiment in cooperative
performance." On amval, they were greeted by the first experimenter, who led
them to a room equipped with chairs and tables, and piles of blank or completed
questionnaires. She again explained that in order to save subject time, they would
be asked to participate in two separate studies during the next hour, the first
of which involved the administration of a questionnaire. This was described as
measuring "general social adjustment and personality in a student population

Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No. 2, 1989 pp. 197-214

202 J . P. Forgas
that was found to be an extremely reliable and valid measure of these constructs
in the past. Most people find it very useful in gaining a more objective and
balanced view of themselves." The questionnaire was then administered, and
completed by most subjects in 8-10 minutes. The experimenter, who was previously
blind to the mood condition, then informed subjects according to a random
schedule that she would score their answers immediately and give some feedback
about their performance. She then proceeded to "score" the questionnaire using
a prepared scoring template, jotting down several sub-scores, and consulting an
impressive-looking bound "scoring manua1"periodically. As the first scores became
available, she would emit increasingly strong signals indicating approval (head
nods, smiles, mumbled "yes, yes, good, very good, excellent" comments),
disappointment (head shakes, frowns, mumbled "no,"'bad,""pity,""this is terrible"
comments), or no signals at all, depending on the mood condition the subject
was assigned to.
Once the scoring was completed, she would turn to the subject, informing
him,'her "This is very good [very bad; about average]. You have done much
better [much worse; much the same] than the average score for students in your
age group. You obviously have an excellent [problematic; reasonable] personality,
and you find most social situations very easy [quite difficult; as difficult as others]
to handle. If you have any more questions about this study, I will discuss it
with you later, but right now our time is up, and you will have to go to another
room to participate in the second study you have to do today." In addition
to this verbal information, the interpersonal behaviour of the experimenter was
also carefully manipulated to communicate liking and admiration, dislike and
condescension, or a neutral attitude in the three mood conditions.

Procedure in rhe Decision ,Making Task

Following the mood manipulation, subjects were sent to an adjacent room, where
a second experimenter introduced the experimental task. First they were asked
to complete a mood rating scale hidden among several other bogus scales, in
order to provide a manipulation check. Subjects were then told that in this study
they will be required to closely work together with another person, and it was
therefore very important that subjects should choose the partners themselves.
They were told that a number of people currently present in the department
have volunteered to help out with the experiment. Confidential information about
each of these potential partners has been carefully collected and summarised
in a brief 'personal file" for each of the potential partners. In the "personally
relevant decision" condition, subjects were informed that their task was to select
the person they would most like to work with from the potential applicants
described in the files.
In the alternative "personally irrelevant decision" condition, subjects were told
that 'it is obviously very desirable that partners be found who are not chosen
by the experimenter, but by the students themselves. However, because of
difficulties in scheduling partners, we decided to ask each subject to select a
partner for the subject scheduled for the next experimental session, in order
to give us time to notify the person in question. So your task is to choose
the partner for the next subjects, and you will work with a partner chosen for
you by the previous subject."
All personnel files were placed in front of subjects simultaneously, but the
order of the personnel files, as well as the information contained within them,
was randomised for each subject. The starting time and finishing time of each
Auslralirur Journal of Psychology Vol. 11, No. 2, 1989 pp. 197-211
 Mood and Decision-Making 203
subject was recorded by the experimenter. Subjects in both conditions were also
told that in order to better understand how such choices are made, they should
sequentially number each of the information cards as they come to deal with
them, and also mark how relevant they think that piece of information will
be to their decision by placing a + (relevant), - (irrelevant), or 0 (uncertain)
on the card. Subjects were instructed that they were free to examine any piece
of information in any order as often as they liked in order to reach their decision.
This procedure to record decision strategies was previously successfully pilot-
tested with a group of 26 students, and was found to be both less intrusive
and more reliable than other methods such as recorded verbal commentary (e.g.,
Isen & Means, 1983) or other forms of written records. Finally, the mood
manipulation check was repeated at the end of the procedure. On the average,
the decision making task took about 25-30 minutes to complete.

Debriefing
Because of the deceptive nature of the mood manipulation, an extensive and
carefully designed debriefing session concluded the procedure. Care was taken
to create a friendly and informal atmosphere in which the aims and rationale
for the study were fully explained. The possible perseverance of the effects of
the false feedback was described (cf. Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975), and subjects
were invited to inspect all the materials used. All subjects understood and accepted
the rationale of the procedure, and we found no evidence of any residual negative
effects. The debriefing also revealed that the mood manipulation procedure was
accepted at face value by all subjects, and none of the subjects suspected a link
between the mood manipulation and the decision task.

Results and Discussion

Mood Manipulation Check
The effects of the mood manipulation were established by asking subjects to
rate their mood on 7-point happy-sad scales both before and after the decision
taks. Analyses of variance of the average rating showed that there were significant
difference between the happy - control - sad groups both before (2.69 vs. 3.31
vs. 4.42) and after (3.11 vs. 3.59 vs. 4.03) the decision making task; F(1,46)
= 6.75,p < .01, and (F(I,46) = 5.23; p < .05 for the happy-control comparisons,
and fl1,46)= 5.27;p < .05, and fl1,46)= 4.97;p < .05, for the sad-control
comparisons. These results confirm that our mood manipulation procedure was
indeed effective in establishing siginficantly different, and enduring positive and
negative mood states in the two experimental groups.

Decision Outcomes
Decision outcomes were assessed in terms of subjects’ preference for task or
interpersonal qualities in their choice of partners., Although target descriptions
were counterbalanced so that no target was overall preferable, targets did in
fact differ from each other in their relative task or interpersonal qualities. For
each target, their average rank on the four task (IQ, matriculation, project grade,
faculty reference) and four interpersonal (friendliness, interpersonal skills,
likeability, and lack of dominance) characteristics was calculated. Each subject’s
choice was then quantified in terms of the difference between the chosen partner’s
task score minus his/ her interpersonal score. In this index, positive values indicate
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No. 2, 1989 pp. 197-214
204 J. P. Forgas
preference for task qualities. and negative values indicate preference for
interpersonal qualities.
Results showed that there was a significant overall mood effect on preferences,
42,69) = 6.19: p < .Ol: sad subjects were more likely to choose partners with
rewarding interpersonal qualities, while happy and control subjects preferred
people with superior task skills (see Figure I for details). Separate tests showed
that choices by both the happy, F(1,46)= 5.02: p < .05, and the sad, F(l,46)
= 6.87; p < .05, subjects were significantly different from choices by the control
group.
There was no overall difference in partner choice due to the personal relevance
of the decision. nor did we find a significant sex difference here. or in any of the
other analyses. As a result. male and female subjects were pooled for all subsequent
analyses. There was, houever. a significant mood by decision type interaction.
R2.69) = 8.57; p < .Ol. Sad subjects were more likely to prefer interpersonal
quiilities over task qualities when making a personal rather than impersonal choice
(-.592 vs. -. I 12). F( I .22) = 6.38;p< .05. The personal relevance of the choice made
no signiticant difterence to happy or control subjects' preferences. who preferred
task competent candidates irrespective of whether a personal meeting was expected
or not (Figure I .)
These differences in decision outcomes provide rare evidence of the way mood
states may motivate interpersonal decisions. Little previous research has been
done on negative mood effects on decision outcomes. Although lsen and Means
(1983) found that positive mood had no effect on choosing between fictitious
cars, we suspect that in real life, just as in this study, mood states do in fact
motivate and influence the outcome of decisions. As expected, negative mood
was more likely to lead to a preference for. rewarding choices here, and this
occurred more in personally involving than uninvolving decisions. This pattern
could be the result either of a conscious, controlled mood-management strategy
employed by subjects (Clark & Isen, 1982). or the unconscious, automatic reliance
on reward-oriented decision strategies in terms of a rule-based production systems
model (Pitz, 1977). People probably learn to automatically apply a reward-
maximising decision strategy whenever the antecedent conditions of negative
mood, exacerbated by personally relevant outcomes are present. The greater
influence of sad moods on self-relevant choices is also consistent with several
studies demonstrating the self-specific effects of negative moods (Forgas et al.,
1984). Such an asymmetry between good and bad moods is hard to reconcile
with purely cognitive. information processing theories. Social, cultural, and
motivational factors (cf. Forgas. 198 I) are probably particularly important in
defining and chanelling the consequences of negative mood states.

Ana!ws of the Decision Siraregies

Subjects' decision strategies could be precisely determined from their sequential
numbering of the information cards, and their rating of the potential relevance
of each information unit as it was considered. From these data a number of
indices measuring information selectivity and decision strategy were constructed.
Our raw data for each subject included the following: - (a) time taken to reach
I
1
I
. .
,
. .. ~

a decision (as recorded for each subject by the experimenter); (b) total number
of information units considered to reach a decision (number of steps to reach
a decision as recorded by subjects on the information cards): (c) number of
information units eliminated (not considered at all); (d) average number of times
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, NO.2, 1989 pp. 197-214
 Mood and Decision-Making 205

H PERSONAL DECISION
0 IMPERSONAL DECISION

--7 I I I I

HAPPY NEUTRAL SAD

MOOD STATE
Fig. 1 The effects of happy, neutral. and sad moods on choice of partner for self, or
another for a cooperative task. (Positive numbers correspond to a preference for task-
competent partners, and negative numbers indicate a preference for interpersonally skilled
partners.)

each unit was dealt with (rate of repetition); (e) proportion of information units
rated relevant; (0 irrelevant, and (g) neutral of those considered; (h) ratio of
information units judged relevant to those judged irrelevant and neutral; (i) average
relevance rating for interpersonal and 03 task competence categories; (k) average
number of consecutive steps for the same target character (high values indicate
a tendency of dealing with all features of a single character before progressing
to the next one); and (1) average number of consecutive steps dealing with one
information category (high values indicate a strategy of directly comparing targets
across a single characteristic).
Obviously these indices are not independent from each other. In order to create
a smaller set of meaningful and mutually independent measures of decision strategy,
a factor analysis of these 12 indices across all subjects was carried out, specifying
the Varimax rotation of all factors with Eigenvalues > 1. Results showed that
a four-factor solution, accounting for 63.8% of the variance, represented the
AustraIian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No. 2, 1989 pp. 197-214
206 J. P. Forgas
most suitable combination of these measures. All factor loadings are shown in
parentheses below. The first factor was labelled decision latency, and was marked
by two indices: time taken (.63),,and number of steps used (3). The second
factor was labelled decision efficiency, and was marked by the following indices:
average rate of repetition (-.67); average number of units eliminated (39);ratio
of units rated relevant as against irrelevant or neutral (.477); and proportion
of information units considered relevant (.46);the third factor reflected a person's
informarion prflerence for task or interpersonal details in making a judgment,
and was marked by two indices: average relevance rating for interpersonal
information ( 3 9 ) ; and average relevance rating for task information (-49).
Finally, the last factor was labelled decision stmregy, reflecting a judge's preference
for cross-person rather than crosscategory comparisons. This factor was marked
by two indices: average number of consecutive steps within the same category
(.66);and average number of consecutive steps within the same person (-.47).
Two indices, proportion of information units considered irrelevant, and neutral,
could not be readily assigned to any factor and were not considered further.
Following the factor analysis, the 10 indices retained were re-scaled to fall
within a 0-1.0 range, and four new dependent variables corresponding to the
four factors above were created from the linear combination of these 10 measures,
using the factor score coefficients as weighting factors. These four new combined
variables were then subjected to a series of analyses of variance, evaluating the
main and interaction effects of mood and decision type.
Decision larency. On the first composite dependent variable, we found a
significant mood effect, F(2,69) = 5.74 p < .01: happy subjects reached a decision
faster and in fewer steps than did sad (F(1,42) = 8.04; p < .01) or control (F(1,46)
= 5.33; p < .01) subjects, but there was no difference between these last two
groups. Personal relevance had no effect on decision latency, and there was no
interaction between mood and personal relevance. This finding confirms the
conclusions reached by lsen and Means (1983) and others, suggesting that faster
and shorter decision processes are used by people in happy moods. However,
greater overall speed does not necessarily indicate faster cognitive processing as
implied by these theorists.
There are two principal methods of increasing decision speed: by dealing with
each information unit faster, or by considering fewer information units. Both
in our study, and in the previous study by lsen and Means (1983) faster speed
by happy subjects was due to the latter process. In the absence of any evidence
for faster processing per information unir, which could indicate a purely cognitive
processing advantage in positive moods (i.e., Forgas & Bower, 1987), the
willingness by happy subjects to disregard more information is more plausibly
explained in terms of the greater self-confidence and decisiveness associated with
a good mood. Whether greater speed achieved at the cost of eliminating
information impairs decision quality depends on what is ignored. Isen and Means
(1983) found that the information bypassed was irrelevant information, and
ignoring it did not in fact impair the decision efficiency of happy subjects. Our
results suggest otherwise: the average relevance rating of information eliminated
was similar to the average relevance rating of information retained, 471) = 0.1 1;
NS).
Decision efficiency. The second dependent variable was again significantly
influenced by mood, (F(2,69)= 5.65; p < .025. Sad subjects were less efficient,
eliminated fewer units, repeated themselves more often and considered more
"irrelevant" information than did control, 01.46)= 4.77; p < .05, or happy,

A u s t r d h Journal of Psychology Vol. 41. No. 2, 1989 pp. 197-214

 Mood and Decision-Making 207
F(1.46) = 5.21; p < .05) subjects. There was no difference between the happy
and control conditions. Personal relevance had no significant influence on decision
efficiency, but there was a highly significant mood by personal relevance
interaction, (fl2,69) = 11.24; p < .01, suggesting that mood had a far greater
effect on decision efficiency when making impersonal rather than personal
decisions. Sad subjects were less efficient in dealing with impersonal rather than
personal decisions (F(1.22) = 11.23; p < .Ol), while happy subjects were less
efficient when making personal rather than impersonal decisions, (F( 1,22) = 4.88;
p < .05; (see Figure 2).

PERSONAL DECISION
0 IMPERSONAL DECISION

I I I

HAPPY NEUTRAL SAD

MOOD STATE
Fig. 2 The effects of happy, neutral, and sad moods on decision making efficiency in
personal and impersonal choices. (Higher values correspond to greater decision efiiciency.)

Decision efficiency was thus strongly influenced by mood, and personally

irrelevant choices wen more affected than personal decisions. This pattern is
particularly interesting in the light of the greater mood effects on self-relevant
choices found earlier (Figure 1). It seems that sad mood resulted in slower and
less efficient decision strategies when dealing with impersonal than personal

Australian J o u r d o j P ~ & o b g yVol. 41, NO.5 1989 pp. 197-214

208 J. P. Forgas

information (Figure 2), yet decision outcomes were more influenced by sad moods
(in the direction of rewarding rather than competent partners) when making
personal rather than impersonal decisions. In other words, greater decision
efficiency was associated with clearly mood-motivated decision outcomes, and
vice versa. This is contrary to previous findings by Isen and Means (1983) with
fictitious choices, but makes considerable sense in our case. Feeling sad and
lacking self-confidence probably motivated subjects to prefer rewarding rather
than competent penonal partners, thus simplifying their decision strategies. No
such motivational bias helped to make shortcuts when making choices for others,
and the detrimental effects of sad mood on decision efficiency were fully realised.
There are several other lines of evidence suggesting that affect has a more
limited influence on cognitive and behavioural processes which are more motivated,
demanding (Kirschenbaum, Tomarken, & Humphrey, 1985), or entail real personal
risks (Isen & Patrick, 1983). When people are personally involved in the outcome
of their decisions, mood effects are much reduced. Previous research with non-
social and largely hypothetical decisions found increased efficiency in positive
moods. Our results confirm this pattern only for the personally irrelevant decisions.
When the decision was personally important to subjects, good mood had no
significant influence on efficiency, while bad mood resulted in considerable
impairment. This result is also consistent with various earlier studies suggesting
the relatively weak influence of affective manipulations when it comes to highly
motivated or important choices (Taylor, 1975). Indeed, it may well be that making
decisions personally relevant by requiring people to personally justify them is
one of the best ways of counteracting mood-based distortions in judgments
(Branscombe. 1988). The interaction of mood and personal relevance strongly
suggests that mood effects are highly contingent on the social and motivational
characteristics of the decision. This may explain why people sometimes make
motivated or distorted decisions more efficiently than unmotivated ones, as was
the case here.
Information preference. The third dependent variable indicates the kind of
information sought out and considered important by subjects during the decision
process. Consistent with the finding that sad subjects were more likely to choose
a partner in terms of interpersonal rather than task qualities, a significant mood
effect on information preference was also found here, F(2,69) 8.02; p < .01.
Sad subjects were more likely to focus on interpersonal information than were
happy subjects, F(1.46) = 4.43; p < .05), while the last two groups did not differ
from each other. Decision type also affected information preference: there was
an overall tendency for task-related information to be preferred in personally
relevant rather than irrelevant decisions, Q1,69) = 5.76; p < .025 (see Figure
3). However, there was no interaction between these two variables. This pattern
again clearly demonstrates the functional and motivated character of the decision
process. It seems that our subjects selectively looked for information about a
potential partner’s interpersonal qualities when feeling sad (Figure 3), did so
quite efficiently (Figure 2), and ultimately selected partners on the basis of such
biased information (Figure I).
Decision strategy. Mood also had a significant effect on the last dependent
variable, F(2,69) = 6.21. p < .01. Happy subjects were more likely to use the
strategy of directly comparing several candidates on a single characteristic
(elimination by attributes) than were sad subjects, el,&)
= 8.33; p < .01. There
were no significant differences between either the control-happy or control-sad
groups in this regard. Subjects engaging in a personally relevant decision were

Australian Journal of Psychoiogy Vol. 41, No. 2, 1989 pp. 197-214

 Mood and Decision-iMaking 209

PERSONAL DECISION
0 IMPERSONAL DECISION

HAPPY NEUTRAL SAD

MOOD STATE
Fig. 3 The effects of happy, neutral. and sad moods on subjects' preference for task
or interpersonal information in making personal or impersonal choices. (Higher values
correspond to preference of task over interpersonal information.)

also significantly more likely to adopt such a critical, comparative strategy (looking
at several candidates in terms of a single characteristic) than were subjects making
an impersonal decision, fl1,69) = 7.25;p < .O1. Finally, there was also a significant
interaction between mood and decision type, fl1,69) = 6.35; p < .01, indicating
that it was mainly subjects in the happy condition who used divergent decision
strategies for personally relevant and irrelevant decisions, f l l , 2 2 ) = 12.21; p <
.01. Control or sad subjects used similar decision Strategies irrespective of the
personal relevance of their choices (Figure 4).
A recent experiment by Ross and Ellard (1986) employed somewhat similar
methods, and found that decision strategies differed as a function of the value
of the choice. We can observe a similar pattern with our happy subjects here,
who clearly relied on critical, comparative decision strategies more often when
making important personal, rather than impersonal, decisions (Figure 4). It is

Australian Journalof Psychology Vol. 41, No. 2, 1989 pp. 197-214

 J. P. Forgas

PERSONAL DECISION
0 IMPERSONAL DECISION

HAPPY NEUTRAL SAD

MOOD CONDITION
Fig. 4 The effects of happy, neutral, and sad mood on the decision strategies used in
making personal and impersonal choices. (Higher values correspond to a tendency to
use across-target rather than within-target decision strategies.)

interesting to note that although mood had a greater effect on decision strategy
for personal rather than impersonal choices (Figure 4), the opposite is the case
when it comes to decision efficiency. For example, happy subjects making a
personal choice were more Likely than control or sad subjects to use what appears
to be a strategy well suited to such a task, that is, comparing persons across
features (Figure 4), yet they did so using a less efficient process. involving more
repetitions and irrelevant details than when dealing with impersonal decisions
(Figure 2). It seems that the potential personal relevance of the choice may have
motivated subjects to try to use a more critical, comparative approach, but at
the same time could have resulted in a reduction in overall efficiency in the
way this strategy was implemented. This anomaly suggests that mood effects
on decision processes are by no means universally beneficial or restrictive; rather,
various aspects of the decision process may be influenced by different moods

Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No. 2, 1989 pp. 197-214

 Mood and Decision-Making 21 1
in different ways. It may thus be misleading to suggest that moods can have
a uniform positive or negative effect on decisions.

Conclusions
Overall, this study was successful in showing that temporary mood states play
an important and subtle role in the decision strategies used, and the eventual
outcome of both personally relevant and irrelevant decisions. By looking at both
positive and negative mood states, and by analysing the effects of the personal
relevance of the decision task, our results offer a more detailed insight into the
effects of mood on realistic interpersonal decisions than was possible in earlier
studies (Isen et al., 1982; Isen & Means, 1983; Isen & Patrick, 1983). We found
that mood states had a significant effect on decision outcomes, decision latency,
decision efficiency, information preference and decision strategies employed. Sad
moods in particular, although typically associated with slower, less efficient decision
processes, were also found to trigger highly motivated and selective decision
strategies and information preferences in search of rewarding outcomes. In the .
majority of cases, however, the nature of the decision (personal vs. impersonal)
significantly interacted with mood effects, suggesting the important role contextual
and interpersonal variables play in mediating mood effects on cognitive activity
(Martin, Argyle, & Crossland, 1986). In particular, our results show that (a)
people in sad moods tended to make qualitatively different and more reward-
oriented decisions, (b) the effects of sad moods were overall stronger and more
unexpected than the effects of previously studied good moods, (c) in contrast
with prior studies, mood influenced decision efficiency only for impersonal, but
not for highly relevant personal choices. .
The effects of mood and personal relevance on decision outcomes found here
strongly suggest the motivated and socially controlled character of such choices.
This is consistent with the adaptive production systems model of decision making
(Pitz, 1977). The tendency by subjects in a sad mood to select interpersonally
rewarding rather than competent partners appears to be an example of such
rule-based decision making. There is supporting evidence for such strategies in
social psychology suggesting that sad, depressed, or anxious people often tend
to prefer others who are most likely to be friendly, rewarding, but not necessarily
highly competent. Such affiliative choices are often made in order to control
negative affective states (Schachter, 1959), and the present findings may best
be understood as illustrating the apparently automatic use of such a well rehearsed
strategy option. Such a clear preference for a particular partner may help to
make self-relevant decisions relatively more “efficient” than irrelevant decisions
(Figure 2), guiding sad subjects to selectively look for particular kinds of
information only (Figure 3), without necessarily employing a critical, comparative
decision strategy (Figure 4), ultimately leading to potentially rewarding
interpersonal choices (Figure 1).
Consistent with prior research, happy moods overall tended to lead to faster
and more truncated decision processes - an effect which has probably less to
do with the intrinsic cognitive facilitatory effects of good mood than with the
greater self-confidence and boldness of people to ignore or ‘skip” information
seen as less important. This is consistent with the finding that one of the major
influences of mood is on people’s perceived self-confidence and selfefficacy
(Kavanagh & Bower, 198I). We found no overall evidence of the supenor efficiency
of decision making by happy as against control subjects as predicted by Isen
Australian JourndofPsycholOgv Vol. 41, No. 2, 1989 pp. 197-214
212 J. P.Forgas
et al. (1982) and others. The beneficial effects of good mood were also limited
to irrelevant decisions - for personally involving choices, positive mood held
few advantages.
Nor did mood influence different aspects of the decision process uniformly.
For example, positive moods were associated with more adaptive decision strategies
for personal choices (Figure 4), which were carried out less efficiently and with
more repetitions than were impersonal choices (Figure 2). Sad subjects focused
more on interpersonal rather than task information (Figure 3), but dealt with
this information overall less efficiently and more slowly than did happy or neutral
subjects. Taken together, these results suggest that sad mood is characterised
not only by motivated and directed decision outcomes, but also by rather inefficient
and wasteful decision strategies. The effects of positive moods are more complex,
and are more likely to depend on the decision context and the personal relevance
of the outcome. In contrast with prior research where only positive moods were
manipulated, our results indicate that it is of considerable importance to study
the effects of both good and bad moods if the role of affect in realistic decision
situations is to be understood.
The critical influence of the personal relevance of the decision in mediating
mood effects was particularly interesting. n e r e was a significant interaction of
mood and decision type on most of the dependent variables. Decision efficiency
was greater for impersonal rather than personal choices for both happy and
control subjects, but exactly the opposite happened for sad mood subjects, who
were less efficient in dealing with penonally relevant rather than irrelevant decisions
(Figure 2). Happy subjects were far more likely to use a directxompanson strategy
across candidates for personally relevant rather than irrelevant decisions, while
decision strategies by sad and control subjects were little influenced by the personal
relevance of their choices.
Interpersonal decisions of the kind we studied here form an important part
of many everyday tasks. Selecting an employee, deciding on which person to
promote, comparing individual students in terms of several criteria of performance
are all tasks requiring just the kind of decision strategies we studied here. All
of these situations are characterised by information overload, and intrinsic time
and capacity limits necessitating highly selective decision strategies. In contrast
with prior studies which only looked at the effects of good mood on hypothetical
decisions (lsen & Means, 1983). we found that mood influences decision processes
and outcomes in a complex fashion, in interaction with the social characteristics
and the motivational requirements of the decision situation itself. Theoretically,
these effects probably reflect the existence of an adaptive condition-action system
of decision strategies (Pitz. 1977). the characteristics of which deserve further
serious study. More generally, it appears that future research on the effects of
moods on everyday social behaviour will need to devote more attention to the
social, cultural and motivational, as well as the cognitive consequences of moods.

Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No. 2, 1989 pp. 197-214

 Mood and DecisionMaking 213
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