EN BANC

[A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005]

RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S.

SORREDA.

RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:

In a letter  to the Chief Justice bearing date February 21, 2005, with
[1]

copies thereof furnished all the Associate Justices of the Court and other
government entities, RTC judges and counsels listed thereunder, Atty. Noel S.
Sorreda, who identified himself as member, Philippine Bar, expressed his
frustrations over the unfavorable outcome of and the manner by which the
Court resolved the following cases filed by him, to wit:
1. UDK-12854, Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
2. G.R. No. 149334, Artemio Dalsen vs. Commission on Elections
3. G.R. No. 148440, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
4. G.R. No. 152766, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
5. G.R. No. 154310, Noel Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
6. G.R. No. 155446, Allan Reynold Cu vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
7. G.R. No. 156630, Ronilo Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
8. G.R. No. 157046, Ronilo Sorreda vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al.
9. G.R. No. 164163, Glenn Caballes vs. People, et al.
10. G.R. No. 164677, Marissa Macarilay vs. Hon. Alba-Estoesta, et al.
In said letter, Atty. Sorreda recounted the alleged circumstances
surrounding the dismissal on February 7, 2000  of the very first case he filed
[2]

with the Court, UDK-12854, entitled Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et

al. Frustrated with the adverse ruling thereon, Atty. Sorreda had previously
written a letter  dated April 2, 2001 addressed to the Chief Justice, copy
[3]

furnished all the Associate Justices of this Court, the Court of Appeals and the
Office of the Solicitor General, denouncing the Court, as follows:

Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the manner the Court comported itself in the
aforesaid case is totally execrable and atrocious, entirely unworthy of the majesty
and office of the highest tribunal of the land. It is the action not of men of reason
or those who believe in the rule of law, but rather of bullies and tyrants from
whom might is right. I say, shame on the High Court, for shoving down a hapless
suitors throat a ruling which, from all appearances, it could not justify.

Reacting to the above, the Court, in an en banc Resolution dated August

14, 2001,  required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he should not be
[4]

properly disciplined for degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme

Court by using vile, offensive, intemperate and contemptuous derogatory
language against it.
In response to the show cause order, Atty. Sorreda addressed two (2)
more letters to the Court dated December 2, 2001  and June 16, 2002,
[5]

 arguing for the propriety of his action and practically lecturing the Court on
[6]

his concepts of Legal and Judicial Ethics and Constitutional Law. In its
Resolutions of January 15, 2002  and August 27, 2002 , the Court merely
[7] [8]

noted said two letters.

Quoted from his earlier communications are the following statements of
Atty. Sorreda disparaging the Court with intemperate, insulting, offensive and
derogatory language, to wit:

SOMETHING HAS GOT TO BE SERIOUSLY AND TERRIBLY WRONG WITH

THE COUNTRYS JUSTICE SYSTEM [9]

WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THIS COUNTRY, MR.

CHIEF JUSTICE?

xxx xxx xxx

I therefore deplore and condemn in the strongest term such strong-handed actuations
as the Honorable Court has displayed. They are as one might expect in a dictatorship
or authoritarian regime.[10]

Persistent in imputing to the Court and its Justices offensive and uncalled
remarks, Atty. Sorreda again went on a rampage in his subject letter of
February 21, 2005:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Chief Justice, I do not doubt that these ten cases are among the most palpably
meritorious cases that have ever been brought before the Supreme Court, or any court
of justice for that matter. I cannot doubt that were it not for the Sollegue miscounting,
and the other incidents that ensued from it, at least some of these ten cases would have
met with entirely different endings, so obvious and patent are their merits to any
reasonable and impartial mind.

In short, Mr. Chief Justice, it is obvious that the High Court has taken it
personally against me. To the detriment of my innocent clients. And of justice.

Mr. Chief Justice, why should this be? If the Court had anything against me, I stood
ready to have the ax fall on my own neck, if it came to that. As I had stated in one
communication-

[I]f there is one thing I agree with in the High Courts position, it is that x x x if indeed
I had wronged the Court in the way it had described, and if indeed my explanations
and arguments lack merit, I should indeed be disciplined; and surely no less than
DISBARMENT will do. It should also be done as swiftly as possible, given the
gravity of the charge and the high dignity and importance of the institution attacked.
Now on January 22, 2002 and May 7, 2002, the Court has resolved to deny to the
undersigned the full opportunity for self-defense that he request therefore he is now
left without any defense, and he can only wonder why no sanction has come down
until the present time.

Might it be because I had continued, Of course, I shall also only expect that such
judgment, when it does come, will be a fully-reasoned one, as thoroughly discussed
perhaps as that in In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562, for the proper guidance of all
concerned- and the Court knows that it is not able to give such a fully-reasoned
judgment as I ask? But rather than admit it has done wrong and rectify the same, it
would rather get back at me by means of unfavorable rulings in the cases I elevate to
it- let the innocent litigants, whose only mistake was to hire me as their counsel, and
the cause of justice suffer as they may.

Mr. Chief Justice, that is not only unjust; that is craven cowardice, to deal with
an adversary like that. It is not something I would have expected from the
supreme judges of the land.

I can only view other happenings in the Honorable Court in such light. The same
verifications that were previously unfaulted, suddenly became course for dismissal.
What other interpretation can I give it, than that the court had run out of excuses to
dismiss, since I was being careful not to repeat the same adjudged shortcomings; and
was now scrounging every which way for one, just so to make sure I continue to get
my comeuppance.
That of the first nine cases, not one was assigned to the Third Division- only either to
the Second Division, then chaired by Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, which handled
the Sollegue case; or the First Division, chaired by the Chief Justice, to whom I have
directly written afterwards. Could it be only a coincidence - or is it a more likely
explanation that the powers-that-be in the Court wanted to be very sure I never get
favorable ruling? Especially when it is considered that, following Justice Bellosillos
retirement on November 12, 2003, for the first time in the history of the nations
judiciary a vacancy in the Supreme Court was filled up way beyond the
constitutionally prescribed period of 90 days- and after so much mystery and intrigue
has surrounded the appointment of his successor, Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario. In
fact Justice Nazario was sworn in on July 14, 2004, just one day before a new
retirement took place, this time of Justice Jose C. Vitug. It was only following this
latest retirement, that for the first time this counsel had a case assigned to other than
the First and Second Division. Could it be that Justice Vitug, then Chairman of the
Third Division, and Justice Nazario, erstwhile presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan,
had redoubtable reputations for independent-mindedness; and the powers-that-be in
the court exercised their utmost influence to at least prevent the both of them sitting in
the bench at the same time, lest together they should buck the system and divide the
Court, if not successfully sway the Court to favorably rule on the undersigned
counsels cases before it?

xxx xxx xxx

But this time, in these ten cases I have recounted, I am wholly convinced that the
court is in the wrong. I cannot but thus be filled with both acute sadness and burning
indignation. Sadness as counsel, to come to the realization that the high institution
of which I am an officer has sunk to such a low. Indignation as a citizen, that the
public officers who are supposed to serve him and help him find justice, should
instead give judgments that so insult the intelligence and glare with iniquity.

Mr. Chief Justice, whatever gave the Court the notion that it could pronounce 29 days
as greater than 60 days, and not to have to account for it? Who can believe that the
supposedly most illustrious legal minds of the land, would miss seeing grave abuse of
discretion in the actions of an agency that directly contravened numerous laws and
rules all at once? How could democracys vaunted last bulwark suffer a widow and her
children to thereafter live in their toilet, by sanctioning the plainly void sale and
illegal demolition of their erstwhile family home? Did the court pause for even three
minutes to put itself in the shoes of an evidently innocent man kept locked up for three
years now on a manifestly false and fabricated charge, before it so blandly invoked its
discretion not to entertain his appeal at all? Where did the Court get such
brazenness, such shameless boldness, as to dismiss on the ground that the docket
fees had not been paid, when the evidence clearly show they in fact were? What
manner of men are you- even challenging the citizenry to inform on the corrupt,
and the bar to become like Frodo in the fight against societys evils in your public
speeches and writings, and yet you yourselves committing the same evils when
hidden from public view. Are all these rulings in the ten cases not the clearest
manifestation that the supreme magistrates have bought into the What-are-we-
in-power-for mentality? (Underscoring ours)

Upon instructions of the Chief Justice, Atty. Sorredas aforesaid letter of 21

February 2005 was included in the March 15, 2005 en banc agenda of the
Court.
In an en banc Resolution  dated March 15, 2005, the Court again required
[11]

Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or
held in contempt for maliciously attacking the Court and its Justices.
By way of compliance to the second show cause order, Atty Sorreda, in
his letter of May 10, 2005 , again with copies thereof furnished the Justices,
[12]

judges and lawyers thereunder listed, states that he does not see the need to
say any more because the cause has already been shown as clear as day in
his earlier letter of 21 February 2005, adding that [T]he need is for the High
Tribunal to act on the instant matter swiftly and decisively. While admitting the
great seriousness of the statements and imputations I have leveled against
the Court, he dared the Court whether it is capable of a judgment that will be
upheld by the Supreme Judge.
After going over the records of the cases in which Atty. Sorreda accuses
the Court of being unfair in the resolution thereof, the Court stands by its
rulings thereon. Atty. Sorreda mockingly stated that the Court does not know
how to count when it dismissed the Sollegue case on ground of failure to file
the petition therein within the reglementary period. For the enlightenment of
the good counsel, the Court dismissed the petition in Sollegue not only for
failure to have it filed within the period fixed in Sec. 4, Rule 65 but also for
failure to submit the duplicate original or certified true copy of the questioned
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 28, 1999 in accordance with
Sec. 1, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule 46, in relation to Sec. 2, Rule 56.  In another
[13]

case, Ronilo Sorreda vs. CA, Atty. Sorreda claimed that said case was
dismissed on the mere ground of insufficient verification. Again, Atty. Sorreda
must be reminded that the petition was dismissed not merely for defective
verification but more so because the petition was evidently used as a
substitute for a lost remedy of appeal.  We see no need to belabor the
[14]

grounds for the dismissal of the other cases enumerated by counsel, said
grounds having been stated in the respective minute resolutions which were
plain, clear, simply worded and understandable to everyone, even to those
who do not have a formal education in law. Suffice it to say that the dismissal
of those petitions was the result of a thorough deliberation among members of
this Court.
Atty. Sorredas imputation of manipulation in the assignment and raffle of
cases is utterly baseless and at best a mere figment of his imagination.
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the
court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their
employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct
contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyers
oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Ang vs. Castro , this Court held that if a pleading containing derogatory,
[15]

offensive and malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in

which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt, equivalent as it is to
a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to
interrupt the administration of justice. Direct contempt is punishable
summarily. [16]

Atty Sorredas conduct likewise violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility, specifically -

CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

xxx

Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the courts.

Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record
or having no materiality to the case.

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full
devotion to his clients genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his clients rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability,  he must do so only within the bounds of the law.  A lawyer is entitled
 [17] [18]

to voice his criticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of

freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right
carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from
responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyers fidelity to his client
must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of
justice. It must be done within the confines of reason and common sense. [19]

Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, is entitled to

criticize the rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may
have lapsed with error. But, certainly, this does not give him the unbridled
license to insult and malign the Court and bring it into disrepute. Against such
an assault, the Court is duty-bound to act to preserve its honor and dignity
and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession. [20]

The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in Rheem of

the Philippines vs. Ferrer  are enlightening:
[21]

By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really, there
could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b),
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: To
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. As
explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that [i]t is the duty of the
lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance. That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon
lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. And more. The
attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity
xxx to the courts. Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can
only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial
office which he is bound to uphold.

In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel,  Justice Sanchez

[22]

further elucidated:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration
of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of
the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of
the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily
that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.

Likewise, in Zaldivar vs. Gonzales,  we held:

[23]
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one
seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware
of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs an occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirement of equally important public interests. One of
these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antimony between free
expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection
and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the
context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, with the context, in
other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are
accepted by the general community.

As officer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of
justice.  No less must this be and with greater reasons in the case of the
[24]

countrys highest court, the Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and
democracy
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to
the administration of justice, to which his clients success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant
of law and ethics. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascription can
hardly be justified nor can it have a place in the dignity of judicial forum.
Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that
must at no time be lost to it. [25]

Here, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair

comment and constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Free expression, after all, must not be used as a
vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and
even destroy this Court and its magistrates. [26]

We have constantly reminded that any gross misconduct of a lawyer,

whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in
serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law. [27]

In the very recent similar case of Tacardon, et al vs. Ponce Enrile,  we [28]

imposed on the respondent therein the penalty of suspension from the Bar.
Here, as in Tacardon, we find the exclusion of Atty. Sorreda from the Bar a
fitting sanction until he proves himself worthy to enjoy the privileges of
membership to the profession. It is imperative to instill in him sense of
discipline that should teach him anew of his duty to respect courts of justice,
especially this Tribunal. This rehabilitation must be done outside the
brotherhood he has dishonored and to which he will be allowed to return only
after he has purged himself of his misdeeds. [29]

WHEREFORE, ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of

contempt of court and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
amounting to gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the
Bar. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED as a member of the Bar and is
prohibited from engaging in the practice of law until otherwise ordered by this
Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Court Administrator to be
distributed to all courts for their information. This Resolution shall be spread in
his personal record and is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

MARIA ELENA MORENO VS. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA

A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005

Facts: Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which amounts to P11,
000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored because the account against which is drawn is
closed. Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court. The Commission recommended the suspension from the practice of law for three
(3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted the
records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. Thereafter,
the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further
made mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for having been
convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. 

Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against a closed
account.

Held: The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he
or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we
held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year’s suspension from the
practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. In the instant case,
however, herein respondent has, apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru
falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been
indefinitely suspended. Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that
this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact,
we have long held that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime
involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N.
Jaramillo, “the review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has
become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy
of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the
respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.”
Spouses OLBES VS. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE
AC-5365. April 27, 2005

Facts: Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for security of a loan. After
the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre filled up four of the five checks for P50, 000 with
different maturity date. All checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a case for estafa against
the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment case against Atty. Deciembre
with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. In the report, Commissioner Dulay recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 

Issue: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault.

Held: Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. “A
lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of
law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he
has sworn to be a fearless crusader.” By taking the lawyer’s oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth
and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice.
Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in
order to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code of
Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks
by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondent’s full knowledge that
the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification
of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and
dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. Considering the depravity of the
offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two
years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation
is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is
loathsome. Thus, he is sentenced suspended indefinitely from the practice of law effective immediately.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A. NICOLAS vs. Atty. MACARIO D. ARQUILLO
A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005

Facts: Atty. Macatrio D. Arquillo represented opposing parties in one a case before the before the National
Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch in San Fernando, La Union. Herein,
complainants accuse Atty. Arquillo of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and/or violation of his oath as
attorney by representing conflicting interests. The case was filed with the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline which found Atty. Arquillo guilty of the charge and recommended a penalty of suspension for 6
months. The governors of the IBP increased the penalty for 2 years.

Issue: Whether or not the acts of Arquillo merits his suspension from the practice of law.

Held: The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall not represent
conflicting interests, except with all the concerned clients’ written consent, given after a full disclosure of
the facts. When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests, the
existence of which is determined by three separate tests: (1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer
is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2) when
the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect
the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any knowledge acquired
through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of an attorney’s duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance of that duty. An attorney cannot represent adverse
interests. It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a lawyer’s representation of both sides
of an issue is highly improper. The proscription applies when the conflicting interests arise with respect to
the same general matter, however slight such conflict may be. It applies even when the attorney acts from
honest intentions or in good faith.
In accordance with previous rulings from this court Atty. Arquillo is suspended for 1 year from the
practice of law.

RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA.

A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC July 22, 2005

Facts: Atty. Noel S. Sorreda wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice over his frustrations of the
outcome of his cases decided by the Supreme Court. The letter contained derogatory and malignant
remarks which are highly insulting. The Court accorded Atty. Sorreda to explain, however, instead of
appearing before the court, he wrote another letter with insulting remarks as the first one. The court was
thus offended with his remarks.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Sorreda can be held guilty of contempt due to the remarks he has made in his
letters addressed to the court.

Held: Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into
disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they
constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a
transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As officer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty
to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of
justice.[24] No less must this be and with greater reasons in the case of the country’s highest court, the
Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and democracy
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice,
to which his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascription can hardly be
justified nor can it have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal
profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it. Hence, Atty. Sorreda has transcended
the permissible bounds of fair comment and constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Free expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one’s irrational
obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates. Thus, ATTY.
NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of contempt of court and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility amounting to gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.

Heirs of Herman Rey, represented by ARACELI Vda. DE ROMERO vs. Atty. Venancio Reyes, Jr.
A.C. No. 6192 June 23, 2005

Facts: Atty. Venancio Reyes is counsel for Heirs of Herman Rey for which they are intervenors in a civil
case involving multiple sale of a piece of land. There were three buyers however, and to settle the case,
they had agreed to a Compromise Agreement. The Compromise Agreement, dated June 16, 1995, was
signed in three stages, first by Elizabeth Reyes and her husband, then by complainants and their counsel,
Atty. Renato Samonte Jr., and last, by Antonio Gonzales, Veronica Gonzales for and on behalf of V.R.
Credit Enterprises, Inc. and by herein respondent. Later, the RTC which houses the records of the case
was destroyed by fire, thus The complainants filed a motion for reconstitution of the records of the case,
which was granted by the RTC of Bulacan. The documents attached to the motion were the basis for the
reconstituted records. Because of the circumstances of signing of the Compromise Agreement, the copy
submitted to the RTC bore only the signatures of Elizabeth Reyes, her husband, complainants, and that of
their counsel, Atty. Renato Samonte. After a lapse of two (2) years from the date of the Compromise
Agreement, V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc. still has not complied with its obligation toward complainants.
Hence, complainants filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution against V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc.
for such failure. Atty. Reyes filed a motion for the case was premature. Later he raised the issue that the
Compromise Agreement was not valid since it was not signed by Veronica Gonzales. Hence, the RTC rued
that the Compromise as unenforceable. Thus, herein, complainants filed this administrative case against
Atty. Venancio Reyes Jr. charging him with willful and intentional falsehood, in violation of his oath as a
member of the Philippine bar. IBP investigating commissioner found him guilty of violation of his oath. 

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Venancio Reyes is administratively liable.

Held: Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their professional oath,
they become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they appear before a tribunal, they act
not merely as the parties’ representatives but, first and foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty
to protect their clients’ interests is secondary to their obligation to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. In assailing the legality of the Compromise Agreement, he claims good faith. He
maintains that he should not be faulted for raising an allegedly valid defense to protect his client’s
interests. The records show, however, that his actions bear hallmarks of dishonesty and doublespeak.
Atty. Reyes is one of negotiating panel in the compromise agreement. He impressed upon the parties and
the trial judge that his clients were bound to the Compromise Agreement. Then, suddenly and
conveniently, he repudiated it by falsely alleging that one of his clients had never signed it. True, lawyers
are obliged to present every available remedy or defense to support the cause of their clients. However,
their fidelity to their causes must always be made within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the
expense of truth and justice. In Choa v. Chiongson this principle was explained thus: “While a lawyer owes
absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must
do so only within the bounds of the law” Thus, herein, Atty. Venancio Reyes, was ordered suspended for 1
year.

JESUS M. FERRER vs. ATTY. JOSE ALLAN M. TEBELIN

A.C. No. 6590. June 27, 2005

Facts: Ferrer obtained the services of Atty. Tebelin in a case against Global Link as a result of a vehicular
accident through the falut of Global Link’s driver. Ferrer paid Atty. Tebelin P5, 000.00 as acceptance fee
and gave him all pertinent documents. However, Ferrer filed an administrative case against Atty. Tebelin
alleging that the said lawyer abandoned his case. However, Atty. Tebelin expressed his willingness to
return the money and denied having abandoned the case. However, during the proceedings, herein Ferrer
died. Atty. Tebelin was nowhere to be found in his given address.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Tebellin may still be held liable despite the death of the complainant. 

Held: The court held that Atty. Tebelin may still be held liable despite the death of the complainant. The
death of a complainant in an administrative case notwithstanding, the case may still proceed and be
resolved. As in the case of Tudtud v. Colifores, the court ruled that “The death of the complainant herein
does not warrant the non-pursuance of the charges against respondent Judge. In administrative cases
against public officers and employees, the complainants are, in a real sense, only witnesses. Hence, the
unilateral decision of a complainant to withdraw from an administrative complaint, or even his death, as
in the case at bar, does not prevent the Court from imposing sanctions upon the parties subject to its
administrative supervision.” This Court also finds respondent, for ignoring the notices of hearing sent to
him at his address which he himself furnished, or to notify the IBP-CBD his new address if indeed he had
moved out of his given address. His actuation betrays his lack of courtesy, his irresponsibility as a lawyer.
This Court faults respondent too for welting on his manifestation-undertaking to return the P5,000.00,
not to mention the documents bearing on the case, to complainant or his heirs. Such is reflective of his
reckless disregard of the duty imposed on him by Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 22.02 – A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retaining lien, immediately turn
over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the
orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.
Thus, the court suspended Atty. Jose Allan M. Tebelin from the practice of law for Two (2) Months and is
ordered to return to complainant’s heirs the amount of P5, 000.00, with legal interest.

JUDGES; UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING JUDGMENT , A VIOLATION OF RULE 70 SECTION 11 OF

THE RULES OF COURT
DORCAS PETALLAR VS. JUDGE JAUNILLO PULLOS
A.M. No. MTJ-03-1484. January 15, 2004

Facts: Complainant Dorcas Petallar averred that after the preliminary conference in a case for forcible
entry, he, as plaintiff and the defendants were ordered to submit their respective position papers and
evidence. Two months from the submission of their position papers, complainant personally went to the
Court to verify the judgment had been rendered. He caused his lawyer to file a motion for rendition of
judgment which was duly received by the court on August 6, 2001 but still no judgment was rendered on
December 27, 2001 when the complaint was filed. Hence, complainant Petallar charged Judge Juanillo
Pullos, former presiding judge of the MCTC of Surigao del Norte of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.02 & Canon
3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as well as Rule 140, Section 4 & Rule 70, Section 10 & 11 of
the Rules of the Court for undue delay in rendering a decision in a case for forcibly entry.

Issue: Whether or not respondent be held liable for undue delay in rendering judgment.

Held: Respondent is guilty of undue delay in rendering judgment. The records show that the parties had
filed their respective position papers as early as February 2, 2000. thus, respondent had until March 4,
2000. Had there been circumstances which presented him from handling down his decision within the
prescribed period, respondent should have at least requested from the Court for an extension within
which to render judgment. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decisions within the period fixed by law
constitutes serious violation of Article III, section 16 of the Constitution. Judges must perform their
official duties with utmost diligence if public confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved. A judge cannot
by himself prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. Without any order of
extension granted by the court, failure to decide a case within the prescribed period constitutes gross
inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.

COMPLAINTS FOR DISBARMENT; FORMAL INVESTIGATION

MERCEDES NAVA VS. ATTY. BENJAMIN SORONGON
AC No. 5442. January 26, 2004

Facts: Respondent Atty. Sorongon had been the counsel of complainant Mercedes Nava for years. The
former informed her of his intention to withdraw as her counsel in two of her cases due to a stroke that
paralyzed his right body but proposed to be retained in two other criminal cases with lesser paper works.
He filed his withdrawal on December 4, 1996 and was granted by the court. Complainant alleged that
while she continuously paid for the respondent’s services, the latter represented other clients with hostile
interests and cases filed against her. Complainant cried that respondent assisted one Francisco Atas in
filing a formal complaint for 11 counts of violation of B.P. 22 against her. She sent a letter to respondents
expressing her disbelief and reminding him of his ethical and moral responsibility as a lawyer.
Complainant prayed that an investigation be conducted regarding this unfortunate actuation and
deplorable behavior as well as respondent’s double standard attitude.
Thereafter, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued a resolution suspending respondent from the
practice of law for one year considering his clear violation of the prohibition against representing
conflicting interest.

Issue: Whether or not a formal investigation is mandatory in complaints for disbarment.

Held: In complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement. The court may
dispense with the normal referral to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines if the records are complete and
the question raised is simple. Similarly, if no further, factual determination is necessary, the court may
decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleading on record.
Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the Court. If, at the outset, the
Court finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it out rightly dismisses the case. If, however, the
Court deems it necessary that further inquiry should be made, such as when the matter could not be
resolved by merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral is made to the IBP for a formal
investigation of the case during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard. An ex parte
investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice.

ABANDONMENT OF LAWFUL WIFE AND MAINTAINING ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP AS GROUND FOR

DISBARMENT
JOVITA BUSTAMANTE-ALEJANDRO VS. ATTY. WARFREDO TOMAS ALEJANDRO and MARICRIS
VILLARIN
AC No. 4256. February 13, 2004

Facts: Complainant submitted a photocopy of the marriage contract between her and respondent Atty.
Alejandro in support of her charge of bigamy and concubinage against the latter and Villarin. She also
submitted a photocopy of the birth certificate of a child of the respondent and also stated that they were
married in May 1, 1990 in Isabela, Province.
The Supreme Court directed respondents to file their comment on the complaint within 10 days but they
failed to comply. Copies of the resolution, complaint and its annexes were returned to both respondents
unserved with notation “moved”, same as when served personally. Complainant was required anew to
submit the correct, present address of respondents under pain of dismissal of her administrative
complaint. She disclosed respondent’s address at 12403 Develop Drive Houston, Texas in a handwritten
letter.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that both respondents be disbarred. The
Supreme Court ordered Atty. Alejandro to be disbarred while the complaint against his co-respondent
Atty. Villarin was returned to the IBP for further proceedings or it appears that a copy of the resolution
requiring comment was never “deemed served” upon her as it was upon Atty. Alejandro.

Issue: Whether or not abandonment of lawful wife and maintaining an illicit relationship with another
woman are grounds for disbarment.

Held: Sufficient evidence showed that respondent Atty. Alejandro, lawfully married to complainant,
carried on an illicit relationship with co-respondent Atty. Villarin. Although the evidence was not
sufficient to prove that he co0ntracted a subsequent bigamous marriage, that fact remains of his
deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as member of the bar. A disbarment proceeding
is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with
another woman who had borne him a child. We can do no less in this case where Atty. Alejandro even fled
to another country to escape the consequences of his misconduct.
Therefore, Atty. Alejandro disbarred from the practice of law while the complaint against Atty. Villarin
was referred back to the IBP.
VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; FAILURE OF COUNSEL TO FILE
BRIEF
BIOMIE SARENAS-OCHAGABIA VS. ATTY. BALMES OCAMPOS
AM No. 4401. January 29, 2004

Facts: Complainant Biomie Sarenas-Ochagabia and her aunts engaged the services of respondent Atty.
Balmes Ocampos in a civil case for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land. An adverse
decision was rendered against complainants. Atty. Ocampos filed a Notice of Appeal at their behest. The
Court of Appeals gave them 45 days from notice to file their brief but Atty. Ocampos was granted a 90-day
extension. The extended period lapsed without an appellant’s brief being filed, hence their appeal was
dismissed. The dismissal was not challenged, but complainants filed a complaint contending that
respondent violated his duty to inform them of his failure to file appellant’s brief and of the dismissal of
the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not respondent has exercised due diligence for the protection of the client’s interests.

Held: A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s
interest with utmost diligence. By failing to file appellant’s brief, respondent was remiss in the discharge
of such responsibility. He thus violated the Code of Professional which states:
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after attaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let
the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
That respondent accepted to represent complainants gratis et amore does not justify his failure to exercise
due diligence in the performance of his duty. Every case deserves full attention, diligence, and competence
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free.
Until his final release from the professional relation with a client, a counsel of record is under obligation
to protect the client’s interest. If a party has a counsel of record, a court does not recognize any other
representation in behalf thereof unless in collaboration with such counsel of record or until a formal
substitution of counsel is effected. Since respondent had not then withdrawn as counsel as he in fact filed
a motion for extension of time to file brief, he was under obligation to discharge his professional
responsibility.