Who Is Eligible Should Affirmative Action Ashwini Deshpande

Who Is Eligible?
Should Affirmative Action

be Group- or Class-Based? ajes_770 238..268
By WILLIAM DARITY, Jr., ASHWINI DESHPANDE, and

THOMAS WEISSKOPF
ABSTRACT. We explore the consequences for eligibility of members of

subaltern groups for affirmative action (AA), when AA policies are
based on social class criteria rather than on group affiliation (race,
ethnicity, or gender), by means of a general model with simplifying
assumptions. The model is developed first for the case where every-
one eligible for AA becomes a beneficiary, and then for the case
where beneficiaries are only those eligibles who are able to meet
minimum qualification requirements for the positions at issue—an
ability that is (reasonably) assumed to be correlated with socioeco-
nomic status. The model demonstrates that class-based affirmative
action cannot provide as many subaltern-group beneficiaries as group-
based affirmative action, especially when access to the desired posi-
tions hinges on performance qualifications. Data on AA-targeted
subaltern groups in rural India and in the United States are used to
illustrate the conclusions of the model.
Introduction
Affirmative action (AA) consists of a set of anti-discrimination mea-

sures intended to provide access to preferred positions in a society for
members of groups that would otherwise be excluded or under-
represented. It provides a mechanism to address contemporary exclu-
sion,1 particularly a mechanism to desegregate elites. AA can be
utilized to change the demography of elite position holders, making
those positions more representative of the ethnic/racial/caste/gender
composition of the society as a whole.2
Policy-makers who contemplate positive discrimination policies on
behalf of marginalized ethnic/racial groups grapple with the issue of
whether such policies should be “class-based” or “group-based.” By
“group” we mean any ethnic or racial identity group, including caste
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 70, No. 1 (January, 2011).
© 2011 American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.
Who Is Eligible? 239
groups. Group-based programs benefit only members of the targeted

groups. Class-based programs require a means test of some type,
usually an income cut-off above a poverty line. When members of
marginalized groups are vastly over-represented among the poor, they
will be more likely than others to benefit from a class-based program,
but such a program obviously also will benefit members of non-
marginalized groups.
The purpose of this article is to explore the impact of group- versus
class-based AA on increasing access to under-represented groups. The
article demonstrates that the access of the under-represented groups
to preferred positions gets diluted, as group-based AA is substituted by
class-based AA. Intuition suggests that color-blind criteria for prefer-
ences (such as class-based affirmative action) would not do as well as
group-based criteria in making opportunities available to members of
an under-represented group, for as long as there are any people in the
class-preferred category other than members of the preferred group,
the access of the latter is diluted. Our article demonstrates systemati-
cally that the intuitive belief is indeed valid, and further explores how
the amount of the dilution is greater (a) the smaller is the group as a
proportion of the overall population and (b) the less group status is
correlated with class status.
Group- Versus Class-Based AA
We will not summarize here the entire body of literature on the “class
versus race” debate in the context of AA (see Weisskopf 2004: Chapter
16, for a discussion of some key arguments). Nevertheless, it would be
useful to restate a few aspects of the debate. The advocates of class as
the basis of AA believe that socioeconomic status captures the variety
of kinds of disadvantage most comprehensively (see, for example,
Kahlenberg 1996) and that, hence, socio-economic integration is a
better means of promoting social and economic justice than racial
integration. Magnus and Mick (2000) advocate class-based AA in
admissions to medical schools. They believe that lower-class status is
a present handicap, not an intergenerational one, and it can be
assessed at the individual level, not just in the aggregate. However, as
Darity, Dietrich, and Guilkey (2001) demonstrate, inter-generational
240 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology
handicaps can be assessed at the individual level, quite apart from the
fact that an inter-generational handicap also is a present handicap.
Magnus and Mick further argue that doctors who are originally from
poorer backgrounds are more likely to be sensitive and responsive to
the needs of poorer patients. However, the latter is at least as true for
ethnic or racial groups as it is for class; additionally, a medical student
who comes from poverty may eventually become a rich doctor,
which may reduce his or her sensitivity to those who continue to be
poor.
It has also been argued that, given the large overlap between race
and class, these might be two alternate ways of capturing essentially
the same set of individuals. Fryer and Loury (2005) contend that “for
a fixed distribution of traits, any color-blind affirmative action policy
is less efficient than the optimal color-sighted policy calibrated to
achieve the same degree of racial diversity,” thus providing support to
our hypothesis. However, they also argue that, if race is ruled out as
a criterion, “group representation goals can be sought tacitly under
color blindness: selectors can favor a targeted racial group by over-
emphasizing the non-racial factors that are relatively more likely to be
found among members of that group” (2005: 151). Of course, these
non-racial factors need not be related to SES or class. Also, as Cancian
(1998) demonstrates, the degree of overlap between the two catego-
ries varies sharply depending on which definition of class/
disadvantage is used (parental education, household income, single
parent, and so on). This then raises the question of which criterion
might be most appropriate for measuring class status? Information on
income in countries like the U.S. generally is more reliable than in
developing countries, where it is notoriously difficult to define
“income.”
Rarely, if ever, is a wealth cut-off used in designing class-based
policies—even though wealth is arguably a better indicator of class
status than income (see, for instance, Kochhar 2004; Conley 1999;
Oliver and Shapiro 1995). The main argument in favor of wealth as a
better indicator of class status is that it cumulates the advantages (or
deprivations) of the past, rather than only focusing on the present.
There is no question that wealth is everywhere far more unequally
distributed than income. However, for most countries, obtaining
adequate information about family wealth or net worth is much more

difficult than obtaining information about family income. Parental
educational status is sometimes suggested as the best measure of class;
but the ability of parental education to predict class status will vary
widely across countries.
Fryer and Loury (2005) also are concerned with the “efficiency”
implications of different kinds of affirmative action—not only the issue
of good performance by the beneficiaries, but the issue of distorted
incentives over the long run for applicants to acquire various
performance-enhancing traits. They propose that, in fact, color-blind
policies change the distribution of incentives in the long run so that
the applicant pool will become one that is less promising. However,
one could just as easily argue color-sighted policies will increase
incentives for members of targeted groups to acquire performance-
enhancing traits. The net response of people affected by AA is an
empirical question. In at least one case, Deshpande and Newman
(2007) find a response to the incentives provided by caste-based AA
consistent with applicant pool improvement. In their study of elite
labor markets in New Delhi, India, Deshpande and Newman (2007)
find that the presence of caste-based AA in institutions of higher
education created positive incentives for potential beneficiaries to
acquire the prerequisites for success in the desired program.
Regardless, as stated at the outset, our view is that a central
objective of AA is to increase diversity in prestigious institutions and
desirable occupations so that they become more representative of the
racial composition of a society. Although there are potential redis-
tributive effects of AA, it is not primarily a redistributive policy. The
redistributive dimensions become sharper as the number of preferred
positions becomes scarcer relative to the number of applicants.
As we show below, for a given magnitude of an AA policy, a
group-based policy achieves the objective of desegregation of elites
far better than a class-based one. Also, given the presence of stigma-
tized groups in societies across the world, the rationale for group-
based policies (specially targeted at the groups subjected to
discrimination) is compelling, if only to reverse the discriminatory
practices and consequent exclusion. There is sufficient trans-national
evidence to suggest that discrimination might not diminish with
improvements in class status; on the contrary, it might actually

increase.3 This is the “turf protection” argument; discrimination might
become more intense for more prestigious positions, as the stakes are
higher.
Having said all this, we should note that class-based and group-
based policies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, Brazil-
ian AA uses racial criteria in conjunction with the type of high school
attended to determine eligibility. And recently the Indian Supreme
Court, in connection with the extension of quotas in higher educa-
tional institutions by another 27 percent for Other Backward Castes
(OBCs), recommended excluding from eligibility a “creamy layer”
defined as exceeding a specific high level of any one of several
measures of wealth—such as land ownership, parents’ annual income,
and parents’ occupational status.
Group- vs. Class-Based AA in India and the United States
Even as AA has become more restricted in the U.S., several countries

in the world are actively maintaining AA or pursuing variants of it, e.g.,
India, South Africa, Brazil, Northern Ireland, Malaysia, Colombia,
Ecuador. The international picture is one of diversity, both in terms of
group types eligible for AA (racial, caste, religious, ethnicity-based, or
nationality-based), as well as in terms of the methods used, ranging
from India’s constitutionally mandated quotas for Scheduled Castes
(SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs)4 in government jobs, educational
institutions, and seats at all levels of government, to the more direct
interventions aimed at altering the ownership of industrial wealth by
increasing the proportion of capital owned by ethnic Malays in
Malaysia.
Our objective in this article is not to undertake a detailed exami-
nation of different kinds of AA around the world, but to compare the
effects of group- versus class-based AA in a way that is applicable to
any national context. Before developing a general theoretical model
comparing group-based and class-based AA policies, we first consider
how group-based AA compares with class-based AA in two specific
cases: rural India and the U.S. These examples are intended to be
illustrative; we could as well have used examples from other coun-
tries. We do not provide an in-depth comparative analysis of caste-

based discrimination in India and race-based discrimination in the
U.S.,5 because our purpose here is simply to provide a numerical
illustration that motivates the model below.
Rural India
India has had constitutionally mandated quotas for SC and ST groups

in all government jobs, in educational institutions, and at all levels of
government since 1947.6 Subsequently, quotas have been extended to
OBCs by another 27 percent in educational institutions and some
government jobs. The extension of quotas has been marked by
another wave of controversy and (often violent) protests, and serious
debates over who should be eligible for AA, and whether AA should
be group-based or class-based, thus putting many of the issues that we
have raised in this article firmly at center stage.
Chart 1 below shows the distribution in rural India7 of India’s broad
caste groups—ST, SC, OBC, and Others—by monthly per capita
expenditure (MPCE) deciles in 2004–05. Reliable income data are hard
to find for India, so MPCE is routinely used as a proxy for income. The
right-hand column shows the MPCE deciles for all of rural India in
2004–05. To put these numbers in perspective, the all-India rural
poverty line for 2004–05, as calculated by the Planning Commission,
was Rs. 356. This MPCE level falls near the top of the third all-India
rural decile, so our calculations suggest that a little less than 30 percent
of rural Indians were considered to be living below the poverty line.
We can also see from Chart 1 that the MPCE distribution varies widely
between rural caste groups.
If India were to have a class-based AA policy, the placement of the
cut-off MPCE would be critical to determination of the proportion of
each group that would be eligible. Suppose that the cut-off were set
at Rs. 321. It is readily apparent from Chart 1 that the “class-based
eligibility proportion” for each group would then equal the proportion
of its population in the bottom two deciles (whose upper bound is Rs.
321). These proportions would be: ST—38 percent, SC—27 percent,
OBC—18 percent, Others—10 percent.
Chart 1
Distribution by MPCE Deciles, Rural India, 2004–2005

100%
90%
80%
70% >888.4
686.3-888.4
60% 580.7-686.3
MPCE deciles
511.5-580.7
455.8-511.5
50%
407.8-455.8
363.6-407.8
40% 320.9-363.6
270.8-320.9
30% <270.8
20%
10%
0%
ST SC OBC ERS
OTH
Caste Groups
Source: Authors’ calculation based on National Sample Survey (NSS), 61st round,
Schedule 1 (consumption expenditure survey).
In order to compare the implications of a class-based AA policy with

those of a group-based policy, we need to select an MPCE cut-off level
such that the total number of persons eligible for class-based AA is the
same as the total number eligible for group-based AA. We will assume
here that the two most disadvantaged groups in rural India—STs and
SCs—are targeted for group-based AA. Their rural population shares
(according to the National Sample Survey, 2004–2005) were 10 percent
and 21 percent, respectively, in 2004–2005—summing to 31 percent.
Thus we need to set the MPCE cut-off level so as to include 31 percent
of the overall rural population.8 This corresponds to the bottom three
deciles of the population, plus the bottom 10 percent of the fourth
decile; so we set the cut-off level at an MPCE of Rs. 368—the upper
bound of the third decile plus 10 percent of the next one.
We can now read off of Chart 1 the proportion of each group that
would be eligible for AA under a class-based system. These class-
based eligibility proportions are approximately: ST—50 percent,
SC—40 percent, OBC—29 percent, Others—17 percent. As one would

expect, the proportion is highest for the most disadvantaged group
and lowest for the most advantaged group. Thus, if rural India were
to move to a class-based AA policy of the same size as the group-
based AA policy targeting STs and SCs, 50 percent of STs and 60
percent of SCs would lose their eligibility and be replaced by 29
percent of OBCs and 17 percent of Others.
Let us now consider STs+SCs together as the single disadvantaged
group eligible for group-based AA in rural India. Weighting the ST and
SC class-based eligibility proportions (50 percent and 40 percent) by
their population shares (10 percent and 21 percent), we can estimate
the combined ST+SC class-based eligibility proportion as approxi-
mately 43 percent. Thus under a class-based AA policy in rural India,
the eligibility of STs+SCs for AA would be less than half of its level
under a group-based policy.
United States
Chart 2 shows the distribution in the U.S. of four broad racial/ethnic

groups—black, white, Hispanic, and Asian—by household income
quintiles in the year 2006, compiled from U.S. census tables.9 At this
point, it is useful to remind ourselves that these omnibus categories
mask a great deal of heterogeneity within the groups. The reason
we use these is that from the standpoint of U.S. public policy, for
better or worse, these are the categories used by Congress and the
Census Bureau. Hence they are the categories that would be mobi-
lized most immediately in the context of modifications in affirmative
action policy. Again, our intent is illustrative with respect to the
policy regimes, not to deconstruct the entire treatment of class and
race in social policy design. If the U.S. were to have group-based
AA policy targeting black and Hispanic households, then a total of
27.3 million black and Hispanic households would be eligible for
AA, constituting roughly 24 percent of all households. Now,
suppose this group-based policy were to be replaced by a class-
based AA policy of the same size. This would imply choosing a
cut-off income level such that 24 percent of all households become
eligible.
Chart 2
Distribution of household income by group in the United States
Source: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/...
We can now calculate the class-based eligibility proportion of each

of the four groups. From the quintile distribution for all households,
we see that the maximum income of the bottom 20 percent of the
population is $20,603. In order to include 24 percent of all house-
holds, the cut-off level of income would have to be one fifth of the
way up the second quintile, corresponding to roughly $24,000.
Given that the cut-off level is roughly $24,000, we can estimate from
Chart 2 the proportion of each group that would be eligible for AA
under a class-based system. These class-based eligibility proportions
are approximately: blacks—37 percent, Hispanics—30 percent,
whites—20 percent, Asians—18 percent. Thus, if the U.S. were to
move to a class-based AA policy of the same size as the group-based
AA policy targeting blacks and Hispanics, 63 percent of black and 70
percent of Hispanic households would lose their eligibility and be
replaced by 20 percent of white and 18 percent of Asian households.
Let us now consider blacks and Hispanics together as the single
target group eligible for group-based AA in the U.S. Weighting the
black and Hispanic class-based eligibility proportions (37 percent and
30 percent) by their relative population shares (12.4 percent and 11.2
percent), we can estimate the combined class-based eligibility pro-
portion as approximately 34 percent. Thus under a class-based AA
policy in the U.S., the eligibility of blacks plus Hispanics for AA would
be just slightly over one-third of its level under a group-based policy.
We turn now to the presentation of a general theoretical model to
analyze differences between a race-based and a class-based AA policy.
A Theoretical Analysis
In this section we go beyond the specific examples of the previous

section to show in general terms how group-based and class-based AA
policies differ in their ability to provide opportunities to members of
a marginalized and thus disadvantaged group. We do so by develop-
ing an algebraic model in which the context for AA—i.e., the distri-
bution of different groups within the population, and the degree of
inequality between these groups—is characterized by key parameters
that can be varied according to the actual situation in any given
country. Thus our model offers an easy way to compare the effec-
tiveness of group-based and class-based AA policies (in providing
opportunities for a marginalized group) in different concrete historical
circumstances.
Basic Characteristics of the Population
Let P be the total population of a country;10 and let that population be

divided into racial/caste/ethnic groups k = 1, . . . ,m, each with popu-
lations Pk and population shares pk; so that:
Pk = p k ∗ P, where ∑p k = 1. (1)
k
All we need to know to determine the number of persons eligible for

group-based AA is the population of the groups designated for AA.
To analyze eligibility for class-based AA, however, we need to know
the frequency distribution of members of each population group
across some indicator of class. We assume here that income levels are
the class indicators; later we will consider the implications of choosing
wealth levels instead. Let Y stand for income; and let Yik denote the
income of the i’th individual in group k.11
We need to find a way to characterize the distribution of income
among members of each group within the country. To make the
analysis very simple, we assume that the income frequency distribu-
tion for each group can be represented in terms of a histogram with
two equal-area rectangles—each representing one half of the
population—as shown in Diagram 1. The income level that separates
Diagram 1
Income Frequency Distribution for Group k
Density
DL k
DH k
0 Mk Y*k
Income
the two halves of the population of group k is the median income

level for that group, which we denote by Mk.
Thus the members of group k are divided into a lower-income half
(whose incomes Yik < Mk) and a higher-income half (whose incomes
Yik > Mk). Within the lower-income half, the number of individuals at
any given income level from Y = 0 to Y = Mk is assumed to be the
same; that is reflected in the constant “density level” DLk from Y = 0
to Y = Mk. And within the upper-income half, the number of
individuals at any given income level from Y = Mk to Y = Yk* is
assumed to be the same; that is reflected in the constant “density level”
DHk from Y = 0 to Y = Yk* , where Yk* is the maximum income level
of any member of group k. We assume that [Yk* − M k ] is greater than
[Mk - 0] for all groups k; it follows that DLk is greater than DHk for all
groups k.
Our simple way of characterizing an income frequency
distribution—reflected by the histogram in Diagram 1—is a highly
approximate, but mathematically easily manageable, characterization
of actual income frequency distributions. Income frequency distribu-
tions are almost always skewed to the left with a long right tail (which
means that the median is well to the left of the mid-point and the
average density level is considerably higher to the left than to the right
of the median). Our two-rectangle approach has the advantage of
enabling the income frequency distribution for any group k to be

summarized in just two statistics: Mk and Yk* .
Eligibility for Affirmative Action
If AA is wholly group-based, then eligibility for AA simply depends on

group status. Thus, if a particular group k is designated for AA, every
one of its members is eligible for group-based AA; otherwise, no
member of the group is eligible.12 Letting Gk denote the number of
members of group k eligible for group-based AA, we have:
(2) Gk = Pk = pk * P if group k is a group designated for AA, k 僐 T

Gk = 0 in the case of all other groups, k ∉ T
The total number of persons eligible for group-based AA can then be

expressed as:
G= ∑G k = ∑P k (2)
k ∈T k ∈T
What about the total number of persons eligible for class-based AA?
This depends on the cut-off income level at or below which everyone
is eligible (irrespective of group status) and above which nobody is
eligible. Let Yc be the cut-off income level, and consider how many
members of any given group k are below or at that level. There are
two possible cases, as follows:
Case 1: Yc ⱕ Mk.
Since Yc is no greater than the median income level Mk, and the
density level DLk of group k members is constant for incomes from 0
through Yc to Mk, the group k members whose incomes are at or
below level Yc constitute a fraction Yc / Mk of the lower-income half
of the group k population; this means that they constitute a fraction
half that size of the total group k population. Letting sk denote the
fraction of the total group k population with incomes no greater than
Yc, hence eligible for class-based AA, we have:
s k = 0.5 ∗ [ Yc M k ] (4-1)
Thus if Yc is less than or equal to Mk, the proportion of class-based-

AA-eligible members of group k varies directly with the income cut-off
level and inversely with the median income of the group.
Case 2: Yc > Mk.
Since Yc is greater than the median income level Mk, the entire
lower-income half of the population of group k is eligible for AA. In
addition, a proportion of the upper-income half of group k members
is eligible—i.e., those whose incomes are between Mk and Yc. Since
the density level DHk of group k members is constant for incomes
from Mk through Yk* , this upper proportion is equal to:
⎡ Yc − M k ⎤
⎢ ⎥.
⎣Yk* − M k ⎦
In this case the overall fraction of group k members eligible for
class-based AA is therefore:
⎡Y − Mk ⎤ ⎪⎧ ⎡ Yc − M k ⎤ ⎫⎪
s k = 0.5 + 0.5 ∗ ⎢ c ⎥ = 0.5 ∗ ⎨1 + ⎢ ⎥⎬ (4-2)
⎣Yk* − M k ⎦ ⎩⎪ ⎣Yk* − M k ⎦ ⎭⎪
In this case, with Yc greater than Mk, the proportion of class-based-

AA-eligible members of group k is a negative function of the maxi-
mum income level Yk* . It is also, as in case 1, a positive function of
the income cut-off level Yc and a negative function of the median
income of the group Mk.
We can calculate the total number of group k members eligible for
class-based AA simply by multiplying the fraction sk by the population
of group k. Denoting the number of group k members eligible by Ck,
we get for cases 1 and 2:
{ ⎛Y ⎞
} ⎛ p ⎞
Ck = s k ∗ Pk = 0.5 ∗ ⎜ c ⎟ ∗ p k ∗ P = 0.5 ∗ P ∗ Yc ∗ ⎜ k ⎟
⎝ Mk ⎠ ⎝ Mk ⎠
(5-1)
⎧⎪ ⎡ Yc − M k ⎤ ⎫⎪
Ck = s k ∗ Pk = [0.5 + ⎨0.5 ∗ ⎢ ⎥ ⎬ ∗ pk ∗ P
⎪⎩ ⎣Yk* − M k ⎦ ⎪⎭
(5-2)
⎧⎪ ⎡ Yc − Mk ⎤ ⎫⎪
= 0.5 ∗ P ∗ p k ∗ ⎨1 + ⎢ ⎥⎬
⎩⎪ ⎣Yk* − M k ⎦ ⎭⎪
The total number of persons eligible for class-based AA is simply the

sum of the Ck for each group k, with the Ck determined by Equation
(5-1) if Yc ⱕ Mk or Equation (5-2) if Yc > Mk.
Class-Based vs. Group-Based Eligibility for Affirmative Action
We wish to compare the number of members of groups designated for

AA who will be eligible for AA under a class-based policy with the
number who will be eligible under a group-based policy, as we did in
previously with data from rural India and from the United States. To
make such a comparison meaningful, the class-based policy must be
of the same size as the group-based policy; i.e., it must make the same
overall number of persons AA-eligible. To keep things simple, we will
assume that all marginalized groups designated for AA are combined
into a single disadvantaged group “D,” and we will treat the rest of the
country’s population as a single advantaged group “A” without access
to AA.13 In this case the number of people eligible for group-based AA
is equal to the overall population of group D, i.e., Pd. Therefore we
need to investigate a class-based policy of the same size Pd, which
means that the income cut-off level Yc must be set so as to assure an
overall eligibility of Pd persons.
The comparison can be made most easily if the relevant income
cut-off level is no higher than the median income of either group,
which is very likely to be the case unless the disadvantaged group D
constitutes a very large fraction of the overall population. We can then
use the equations developed for case 1 in the previous subsection.
Denoting the total number of persons in the overall population
eligible for class-based AA by C, and utilizing Equation (5-1), we get:
pk
C= ∑C k = [0.5 ∗ P ∗ Yc ] ∗ ∑
k k Mk (6-1)
( with k covering just groups D and A )
The same-size stipulation needed to render group- and class-based
AA-eligibility comparable calls for the number of class-based-AA-
eligible persons in the overall population (C) to be set equal to the
number of persons eligible under a group-based AA policy (G). In the
simple case under consideration, with one composite group desig-

nated for AA, G is equal to the population of that group (Pd). Now we
can easily derive the “class/group eligibility proportion” for group D
(cgerd), defined—as above—as the ratio of the number of group
D members eligible under a class-based policy of size Pd to the
number of group D members eligible under a group-based policy of
size Pd:
⎡⎛ p ⎞ ⎛ p ⎞ ⎤
cgerd = Cd Pd = Cd C = [ pd M d ] ⎢⎜ a ⎟ + ⎜ d ⎟ ⎥
⎣⎝ M a ⎠ ⎝ M d ⎠ ⎦
(7-1)
⎡ ⎛ p ⎞ ⎛ M ⎞⎤
= 1 ⎢1 + ⎜ a ⎟ ∗ ⎜ d ⎟ ⎥
⎣ ⎝ pd ⎠ ⎝ M a ⎠ ⎦
From Equation (7-1) it follows the proportion of members of a

disadvantaged group D who would lose AA-eligibility as a result of a
shift from a group-based AA policy to a class-based AA policy would
be all the greater,
• the smaller is the group D population relative to that of group A
• the greater is the group D median income relative to that of
group A.
A numerical example can help illustrate the above analysis of the
two-group case. Suppose that the total population of the country is P
= 100 million, and that the population shares of group D and group
A are pd = 25 percent and pa = 75 percent. (This would be roughly true
for countries such as India, where Scheduled Castes and Tribes
constitute a little less than 25 percent of the total population, or the
U.S., where African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans add up
to a little more than 25 percent.14) Further, suppose that the median
incomes of group D and group A are Md = $50K and Ma = $100K, that
the maximum incomes of group D and group A are Yd* = $200K and
Ya* = $300K, and that the cut-off income level for class-based AA is
initially set at Yc = $20K. It follows that:
• the population of group D: Pd = 25 m.
• the population of group A: Pa = 75 m.
• the number of group D members eligible for group-based AA: Pd
= 25 m.
• the number of group A members eligible for group-based AA: Pa

= 0 m.
• the share of group D members with incomes below Yc: sd =
0.5*20/50 = 0.20
• the share of group A members with incomes below Yc: sa =
0.5*20/100 = 0.10
• the number of group D members eligible for class-based AA: Cd
= 25 m*0.20 = 5 m.
• the number of group A members eligible for class-based AA: Ca
= 75 m*0.10 = 7.5 m.
• the total number of class-based-AA-eligible members of the
population: C =12.5 m.
Thus at the initial cut-off income level of Yc = $20K, the total number
of class-based-AA-eligible persons is 12.5 million, whereas the total
number of group-based-AA-eligible persons is 25 million. It is easy to
see from the equations that, in order to increase the number of
class-based-AA-eligible persons to 25 million, it would be necessary to
set Yc = $40K. In that case we would have the following results (in lieu
of those provided above for Yc = $20K):
• the share of group D members with incomes below Yc=$40: sd =
0.5*40/50 = 0.40
• the share of group A members with incomes below Yc=$40: sa =
0.5*40/100 = 0.20
• the number of group D members eligible for class-based AA: Cd
= 25 m*0.40 = 10 m.
• the number of group A members eligible for class-based AA: Ca
= 75 m*0.20 = 15 m.
• the total number of class-based-AA-eligible members of the
population, C = 25 m.
The class/group eligibility proportion for group D can now be deter-
mined from Equation (7-1) as:
cgerd = 1 [1 + ( 75 25) ∗ (50 100 )] = 1 [1 + 1.5] = 0.4
It should be noted that if we had used wealth rather than income

as the indicator of class, the class/group eligibility ratio would have
been significantly higher. This is because wealth is everywhere dis-

tributed much more unequally than income. Suppose, for example,
that the Md/Ma ratio were 10/100 instead of 50/100. In that case the
value of the class/group eligibility ratio for group D—as determined
by Equation (8-1d)—would be: 1 / [ 1 + 0.3 ] = 0.77. A ratio of 0.1 is
indeed an accurate representation of black-white median wealth ratios
in the U.S. (Kochhar 2004).
Potential Beneficiaries of Affirmative Action
The fact that a person is eligible for AA does not mean that the person
will actually have an opportunity to be selected by an institution
implementing the AA policy. Whether the objective is to attain a seat in
an educational institution or a job in an organization or an enterprise,
certain minimum qualifications are normally required—such as a
minimum score on an entry test.15 The number of people who are
actually in a position where they could benefit directly from a given AA
policy (by being selected for a seat or a job) will depend not on the
number of persons eligible for AA, but on the number of those eligible
who can meet the relevant minimum qualification requirements. We
will call such persons “potential beneficiaries” of AA.16 We use the term
“potential” to indicate that those persons are in a position where they
could possibly benefit directly from an AA policy, but whether or not
they will actually do so depends on the circumstances—e.g., whether
they actually apply for the seat or job, and whether there are as many
seats or jobs available as there are applicants.17
In this section we take account of the fact that the potential
beneficiaries of an AA policy generally constitute only a subset of all
persons who are AA-eligible, because of the presence of minimum
qualifications that must be met in order for one to be selected for entry
into an educational institution, an organization, or an enterprise. We
address this issue by introducing into our earlier analysis a
“probability-of-success function,” which models the likelihood that an
AA-eligible person will actually be in a position to benefit directly
from a given AA policy.
To keep the analysis tractable, we propose a very simple
probability-of-success function in which an individual’s likelihood of
being able to meet the minimum necessary qualifications for a posi-

tion is a positive function of the person’s class background. As we did
above, we use income as a measure of class. We then express the
probability of success of any AA-eligible individual in meeting
minimum qualification requirements as a rising function of the income
level of the individual—no matter what group k the individual may
belong to—as follows:
rik = a + b ∗ Yik (8)
where: rik is the probability of success of individual i in group k;

Yik is the income level of individual i in group k;
a [0 < a < 1] is the minimum probability of success, achieved
when Y = 0; and
b [0 < b < 1] is the rate at which r rises per unit of Y.
To assure that no individual can have a probability of success greater

than 1, we will assume that b = (1 - a) / Y*, where Y* is the highest
of the values of Yk* (i.e., the maximum level of income reached by a
member of any group). Thus the probability-of-success function starts
out at the level “a” (for a level of individual income Yik = 0) and then
rises steadily—with a slope of “b”—until it reaches 1 at the maximum
possible level of individual income Yik = Y*.
Now we can analyze not only how many members of each group
k would be AA-eligible under a class-based and a group-based policy
(as before), but also how many members of each group k would turn
out to be potential AA beneficiaries. It is important to note first,
however, that we have simplified our model by assuming that the
parameters of the probability-of-success function are identical across
all groups. This amounts to an implicit assumption that there is no
ongoing discrimination in admissions or in hiring against members of
disadvantaged groups designated for AA. In the real world it is likely
that there will be some such discrimination, so members of the
disadvantaged groups would need greater family resources in order to
attain the same level of success as members of other groups. A more
realistic model would assign lower values for the coefficients “a”
and/or “b” in the case of disadvantaged groups than for other groups.
Our model is therefore likely to over-estimate the extent to which

members of groups designated for AA would actually qualify to
become AA beneficiaries.
With this important caveat in mind, consider first the case of a
group-based AA policy for a disadvantaged group D. All members of
the group would be AA-eligible; but how many would be successful?
To analyze this, we need to divide the AA-eligible population into two
subgroups according to income level:
• subgroup 1: those with incomes between 0 and Md

• subgroup 2: those with incomes between Md and Yd* .
Subgroup 1 consists of the half of the group-D population with
incomes up to the median income Md. Equation (8) indicates that the
probability of success for this subgroup would rise from [a] to [a +
b*Md] as incomes rose from 0 to Md, averaging ⎡a + b ∗ ⎛ d ⎞ ⎤ .
M
⎣⎢ ⎝ 2 ⎠ ⎦⎥
Subgroup 2 consists of the half of the group-D population with
incomes above the median Md. Equation (8) indicates that the prob-
ability of success for this group would rise from [a + b*Md] to
[a + b ∗ Yd* ] as incomes rose from Md to Yd* , averaging
⎡ ⎛ M d ⎞ + b ∗ ⎛ Yd* ⎞ ⎤ .
⎢a + b ∗ ⎜ ⎟⎥
⎢⎣ ⎝ 2 ⎠ ⎝ 2 ⎠ ⎥⎦
We can now express the overall average probability of success for
group D, rgd, as the weighted sum of the average probabilities of
success for each equal-sized subgroup, as follows:
⎡ ⎛Y * ⎞ ⎤
rg d = 0.5 ∗ ⎡⎢a + b ∗ ⎛ d ⎞ ⎤⎥ + 0.5 ∗ ⎢a + b ∗ ⎛ d ⎞ + b ∗ ⎜ d ⎟ ⎥
M M
⎣ ⎝ 2 ⎠⎦ ⎢⎣ ⎝ 2 ⎠ ⎝ 2 ⎠ ⎥⎦
(9)
⎡ ⎛Y * ⎞ ⎤ ⎛Y * ⎞
= 0.5 ∗ ⎢2a + b ∗ M d + b ∗ ⎜ d ⎟ ⎥ = a + b ∗ ⎛ d ⎞ + b ∗ ⎜ d ⎟
M
⎢⎣ ⎝ 2 ⎠ ⎥⎦ ⎝ 2 ⎠ ⎝ 2⎠
Since b = (1 - a)/Y*, we can rewrite Equation (9) as:
⎡ ⎛Y * ⎞ ⎤
rg d = a + (1 − a ) ∗ ⎢0.5 ∗ ⎛ d ⎞ + 0.25 ∗ ⎜ d ⎟ ⎥
M
⎝Y*⎠ (9′)
⎢⎣ ⎝ Y * ⎠ ⎥⎦
Md/Y* must be less than .5 (because the right half of the two-rectangle
income frequency distribution is always longer than the left half), and
Yd* /Y* is at most equal to 1 (because Y* is the highest of all Yk* ); so
the right-hand expression in Equation (9′) must be less than .5. It
follows that the average probability of success rgd must be less than 1
and that it varies positively with a, with Md/Y* and with
Yd* /Y* —except in the trivial case where a = 1 and also rgd = 1.
Equation (9′) is a rather complex expression, but we can render it
more comprehensible by drawing on the numerical example intro-
duced earlier, in which disadvantaged AA-designated group D had a
median income Md = $50K and a maximum income Yd* of $200K,
while the overall maximum income level Y* = $300K. Let us assume
also that the minimal probability of success a = 0.1, which implies that
b = (1 - a)/Y* = 0.9/$300K = 0.003 per $K of income. Thus the
probability of success for members of group D rises from .1 (at income
Y = $0K) to 0.7 (at income Y = Y* = $200K).
Substituting the above values into Equation (11′) yields:
rg d = 0.1 + 0.9 ∗ [0.5 ∗ 0.25 + 0.25 ∗ 0.667 ]

(10d)
= 0.1 + 0.9 ∗ [0.125 + 0.167 ] = 0.3 363
We can calculate the average probability of success for the

AA-ineligible group A in exactly the same way, substituting into
Equation (9′) the same value of a = .1 and the values of Ma = $100K
and Ya* = Y* = $300K . Note that the probability of success for
members of group A rises from .1 (at income Y = $0K) to 1 (at income
Y* = $300K).
Substituting the above values into Equation (9′) yields:
rg a = 0.1 + 0.9 ∗ [0.5 ∗ 0.333 + 0.25 ∗ 1]

(10a)
= 0.1 + 0.9 ∗ [0.167 + 0.25] = 0.475
In order to determine the total number of successful persons in each

group, RGk, we need only multiply the average probability of success
by the total population of the group:
RG k = rg k ∗ Pk (11)
Substituting into Equation (11) the values of rgk (just above) and Pk
(from the earlier numerical example), we get:
RGd = 0.363 ∗ 25m. = 9.1 m. (11d)
RGa = 0.475 ∗ 75m. = 35.6 m. (11a)
Turning now to the case of a class-based AA policy, with an income

cut-off rate Yc, we can calculate the probability of success rck for each
group k that benefits from class-based AA-eligibility. As noted above,
there are two possible cases:
Case 1: Yc ⱕ Mk.
In this case there is only one subgroup to consider, namely all those
with incomes between 0 and Yc. They constitute a fraction of the
lower half of the group’s income frequency distribution. The prob-
ability of success for this subgroup rises from [a] to [a + b*Yc] as
incomes rise from 0 to Yc. Averaging the two end-point values, and
utilizing the equivalence b = (1-a)/Y*, we can express the average
probability of success as:
rc k = a + b ∗ ⎛ c ⎞ = a + (1 − a ) ∗ ⎛ c ⎞
Y Y
⎝ 2⎠ ⎝ 2Y * ⎠ (12-1)
Since Yc < Mk < Yk ⱕ Y*, the last term in parentheses in Equation

(12-1) is well below 1. Thus the average probability of success in this
case 1 is a strongly positive function of a.
Case 2: Yc > Mk.
In this case there are two subgroups to consider: the lower half of
the group population with incomes between 0 and Mk and the fraction
of the upper half of the group’s population with incomes between Mk
and Yc. Since the density level of group k members is constant for
incomes from Mk through Yk* , this latter fraction is equal to
( Yc − M k ) /( Yk* − M k ) . The probability of success for the first
subgroup rises from a to a + b*Mk as incomes rise from 0 to Mk; so it
averages [a + b*(0 + Mk)/2]. The probability of success for the second
subgroup rises from [a + b*Mk] to [a + b*Yc] as incomes rise from Mk
to Yc, so it averages [a + b*(Mk + Yc)/2].
To determine the overall average probability of success in this case,

we need to weight each subgroup of group k by its propor-
tion of the group population. The proportions are 0.5 and
0.5 ∗ [( Yc − M k ) /( Yk* − M k )] , respectively; each of these prop-
ortions needs to be divided by their sum in order to get the
weights to sum to unity. Applying the resultant weights to the corre-
sponding probabilities of success, and utilizing the equivalence b = (1
- a)/Y*, we can express the average probability of success in case 2
as:
0.5 [a + (1 − a ) ∗ ( M k 2Y * )]
+ 0.5[(Yc − M k ) /(Yk* − M k )] ∗ [a + (1 − a ) ∗ ( M k + Yc ) 2Y * ]
rck =
0.5 + 0.5 ∗ [(Yc − M k ) /(Yk* − M k )] (12-2)
Equation (12-2) is a very complex expression; but note that when Yc

equals Mk, it reduces to Equation (12-1). Since Mk < Yc < Yk <= Y*, we
know that each fraction with Y* in the denominator must be less than
1; thus the average probability of success in this case 2 is also a
strongly positive function of a.
Class-Based vs. Group-Based Potential Beneficiaries of AA
As we did in the case of a group-based AA policy, we will now

illustrate the implications of a class-based AA policy by drawing on the
numerical example introduced earlier for the case of two groups—a
relatively disadvantaged group D and a relatively advantaged group A.
It is reasonable to assume that the income cut-off level is below the
median income of the richer group A but above the median income
of the poorer group D, so Md < Yc < Ma. Thus the average probability
of success is determined by Equation (12-1) for group A and by
Equation (12-2) for group D.
Substituting into Equations (12-1) and (12-2) the values Md =$50K,
Ma =$100K, Yd* = $200K , Ya = Y* = $300K, setting a again equal to .1,
and assuming Yc = $75K, we get:
rc a = 0.1 + 0.9 ∗ ( 75 600 ) = 0.1 + 0.9 8 = 0.223 (13a)

rc d = {0.5 ∗ [0.1 + 0.9 ∗ (50 600 )] + 0.5 ∗ [25 150 ]

∗ [0.1 + 0.9 ∗ 125 600 ]} [0.55 + 0.5 ∗ (25 150 )]
= [0.5 ∗ (0.1 + 0.075) + 0.5 ∗ (1 6 ) ∗ (0.1 + 0.1875)] [0.55 + 0.5 6 ]
= [0.5 ∗ 0.175 + 0.5 ∗ 0.167 ∗ 0.2875] [0.5 + 0.5 ∗ 0.167 ] (13d)
= 0.1115 0.583 = 0.191
Thus the average probability of success of group A members eligible

for class-based AA (rca = 0.223) is well below the average probability
for the group as a whole (rga = 0.475), which is due to the fact that the
AA-eligible members are concentrated in the lower reaches of the
group’s income distribution. For the same reason, the average prob-
ability of success of group D members eligible for class-based AA
(.191) is well below the average probability for the group as a whole
(rgd = 0.363).
In order to determine the total number of potential beneficiaries RCk
in each group under a class-based AA policy, we need to multiply the
total number of eligible persons from each group by their average
probability of success:
RCk = rc k ∗ Ck (14)
The number of eligible persons in each group is given by Equations

(5-1) (for case 1) and (5-2) (for case 2). In our numerical example case
1 applies to group A and case 2 applies to group D. Setting Yc = $75K,
and using the previously given values of P = 100 m., pa = 0.75, pd =
0.25, Ma = $100K and Md = $50K, we get:
Ca = 0.5 ∗ pa ∗ P ∗ Yc M a = 0.5 ∗ 75m. ∗ 75 100 = 28.1 m. (5a)
Cd = 0.5 ∗ pd ∗ P ∗ [1 + ( Yc − M d ) /( Yd* − M d )]
(5d)
= 0.5 ∗ 25m. ∗ [1 + 25 150 ] = 14.6 m.
Using Equation (14), we get the following values for the total number
of potential beneficiaries in each group:
RCd = 0.191 ∗ 14.6 m. = 2.8 m. (14d)
RCa = 0.223 ∗ 28.1 m. = 6.3 m. (14a′)

It is interesting to compare these results with the outcome of a group-

based AA policy in which all members of group D, but no members of
group A, are eligible for AA. According to Equation (11d), for the same
values of all the relevant variables, such a policy would yield:
RGd = 0.363 ∗ 25m. = 9.1 m. (11d)
Thus the class-based AA policy with an income cut-off level of Yc = $75K

would result in a number of group D potential beneficiaries amounting
to less than a third of the number of group D potential beneficiaries
under a group-based policy (without any income cut-off). On the other
hand, the class-based AA policy would generate a number of group A
potential beneficiaries equal to more than two-thirds the number of
group D potential beneficiaries under a group-based policy.
As it happens—a sheer coincidence!—the total number of potential
beneficiaries under the class-based AA policy with a cut-off income
level of Yc = $75K comes to 2.8 + 6.3 = 9.1 m., which is (within a
decimal point) precisely the same as the number of potential benefi-
ciaries under the corresponding group-based AA policy. It follows that
the class/group potential beneficiary ratio for group D is roughly 0.3
(2.8/9.1), which is somewhat lower than the corresponding class/
group eligibility ratio of 0.4 calculated above.
*****
The key results of the numerical exercises in this section of the
article can be summarized as follows:
– Group-based AA would make all 25 million members of the
designated group D eligible for AA (and no members of the other
group A eligible).
– Class-based AA (constrained to produce the same total number of
AA-eligible persons) would make 10 million members of group D
eligible for AA and 15 million members of group A eligible for
AA.
– Group-based AA would result in 9.1 million potential beneficia-
ries from group D.
– Class-based AA (constrained to produce the same total number of
potential beneficiaries) would generate 2.8 million potential ben-
eficiaries from group D and 6.3 million from group A.
Thus, a class-based AA policy not only makes considerably fewer

members of a designated group AA-eligible than does a comparable
group-based AA policy; it also decreases even further the extent to
which members of a designated group become potential beneficiaries
of AA.
An Approximate Test of the Model
Earlier, we developed a formula for the “class/group eligibility pro-

portion” cgerd, which measures the extent to which a disadvantaged
group designated for AA retains eligibility under class-based AA, as
compared with group-based AA. This formula, based on a very simple
representation of the income frequency distributions for the disadvan-
taged group D and the advantaged group A (the rest of the popula-
tion), is given by Equation (7-1):
⎡ ⎛ p ⎞ ⎛ M ⎞⎤
cgerd = 1 ⎢1 + ⎜ a ⎟ ∗ ⎜ d ⎟ ⎥ , (7-1)
⎣ ⎝ pd ⎠ ⎝ M a ⎠ ⎦
where the pk are population shares and the Mk are median incomes for
each group distinguished in the overall population.
We will now explore how well our simple theoretical representation
of income frequency distributions can model the more detailed fre-
quency distributions reflected in the data compiled for rural India and
the United States. We can do this by substituting into Equation (7-1)
values of pk obtained from standard demographic sources and values
of Mk reflected in Charts 1 and 2, treating STs and SCs together as the
single disadvantaged group in rural India and treating Blacks and
Hispanics together as the single disadvantaged group in the U.S.
Note that Equation (7-1) only can be expected to provide a very
rough approximation of the class/group eligibility proportion derived
from the decile and quintile information in Charts 1 and 2, because in
that equation income frequency distributions are characterized solely
by their medians. Thus, in effect, our equation reduces the detail of a
ten-decile and a five-decile chart to just two “duociles.”
For rural India, as noted, national census data indicate that the ST
and SC population shares (pk) in 2004–2005 summed to roughly 31
percent. The best available estimate of the OBC population share is

from the Indian National Sample Survey, which puts the share at 42
percent in 2004–2005; this leaves a residual of 27 percent for the share
of Others. From the decile data in Chart 1 we can read off (from the
50 percent line) the level of median MPCEs (Mk) for each of the four
groups; we have also calculated the exact medians from the raw data:
ST—Rs. 367, SC—Rs. 406, OBC—Rs. 458, Others—Rs. 548. Weighting
the ST and SC median MPCEs by their relative population shares (10
percent and 21 percent), we can estimate the combined median MPCE
for ST and SC in rural India as Rs. 395. We can now calculate the
class/group eligibility proportion for the AA-designated ST+SC group
using Equation (7-1): it comes to (31/395) divided by (31/395) +
(42/458) + (27/548) = 36 percent. This estimated class/group eligibility
ratio of 36 percent is not too far from the 43 percent figure obtained
above (from the detailed Chart 1) for ST+SC as a single group.
For the U.S., the data in Chart II indicate that the Black and Hispanic
population shares (pk) in 2006 were 12.4 percent and 11.2 percent,
summing to roughly 24 percent; the White share was roughly 71
percent and the Asian share roughly 4 percent. The median money
incomes for each household group in 2006 were as follows:18
Blacks—$ 31,969, Hispanics—$ 37,781, Whites—$ 52,423, Asians—$
64,238. Weighting the Black and Hispanic median incomes by their
relative population shares (12.4 percent and 11.2 percent), we can
estimate the combined median income for Blacks plus Hispanics in
the U.S. as $ 34,727.
We can now calculate the class/group eligibility proportion for the
AA-designated Black+Hispanic group using Equation (7-1): it comes to
(24/34727) divided by (24/34727) + (71/52423) + (4/64238) = 33
percent.19 This estimated class/group eligibility proportion is very
close to the 34 percent figure obtained above (from the detailed
Chart 2) for Blacks and Hispanics as a single group.
Concluding Comments
Increasing attention has been given to the possibility of basing affir-

mative action on social class position, rather than on race, ethnicity, or
gender, as a mechanism for including members of marginalized
groups in arenas where they would otherwise be excluded or under-

represented. Indeed, when group-based affirmative action comes
under fire, some proponents view a change to class-based criteria as
the best means of preserving affirmative action policies. In the United
States, in particular, judicial decisions limiting or ending race-based
affirmative action have often implied that the use of socioeconomic
status as the criterion for eligibility for affirmative action would be
acceptable.
We have sought to develop a comparative analysis of who is likely
to get included in desired arenas under each type of affirmative action
policy—group-based versus class-based. We have found that, under a
wide range of conditions, the two approaches yield significantly
different distributions of beneficiaries. If affirmative action policies,
such as those designated for subaltern groups in India and the United
States, were to be based on criteria such as family income or con-
sumption, they would benefit far fewer members of the subaltern
groups than a group-based approach. Our analysis suggests that the
same is likely to prove true of affirmative action policies in other
countries, such as Brazil. Using family wealth rather than income as a
measure of socio-economic class would benefit more members of
subaltern groups under a class-based AA policy; but reliable data on
wealth are hard to come by. In general, it is very difficult to manipu-
late class-based criteria for affirmative action in such a way as to
function as an indirect means of benefiting members of subaltern
groups designated by group-based affirmative action.
An important goal of affirmative action is to desegregate and
diversify the upper strata of a society. Much evidence suggests that the
ability to meet qualifying criteria in desired positions—such as a seat
in an elite college or a job in an elite profession—depends signifi-
cantly on social class position. Our analysis demonstrates that substi-
tuting class-based for group-based, affirmative action can compound
the marginalization of a subaltern group by screening out of consid-
eration the more class-advantaged members of the group, who are the
ones most likely to qualify for elite positions. Thus, class-based
affirmative action is even more likely to reinforce beliefs about the
inferiority of the subaltern group than race-based affirmative action.
Of course, the underlying problem is the interaction of race and class
stratification, conditions that motivated the development of policies of

affirmative action in the first place.
Notes
1. Even though we make the claim that AA primarily addresses
contemporary exclusion, we are fully aware that historical factors such
as the history of slavery in the U.S. or that of caste-based discrimination in
India have been instrumental in making AA politically feasible in the two
countries and that there are similar historical factors relevant to other countries
pursuing AA.
2. To understand AA as a means of changing the demography of the elite,
see Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (1998).
3. There is evidence from the U.S. (Tomaskovic-Devey, Thomas, and
Johnson 2005), Brazil (Arias, Yamada, and Tejerina 2004), and India (Dhesi
and Singh 1988) that the degree of measured wage discrimination against
individuals and groups actually rises with increased educational attainment.
4. Official data by individual jati (caste) are not collected in India. The
numerous castes (jatis), estimated to be between 2–3000, are collapsed into
broad categories, based on the needs of the AA program: Scheduled Castes
(SCs), formerly untouchable jatis, estimated to be about 16 percent of
India’s population and Scheduled Tribes (STs), tribal groups or indigenous
people that have been marginalized like SCs, estimated to be 7–8 percent
of India’s population. For these two groups, there is a quota of 22.5 percent
in government jobs, educational institutions, and electoral constituencies. In
many Indian states, and more recently at the national level, quotas have
been extended also to Other Backward Castes (OBCs), which are jatis
considered to be low enough in the caste hierarchy to demand special
treatment, but that have not suffered the stigma of untouchability like the
SCs
5. For such analyses, see Darity and Deshpande (2000) and Weisskopf
(2004).
6. The quota system for what were then called Depressed or Backward
Classes was first put in place in certain parts of present day India by the British
long before Indian independence in 1947. The current all-India quotas for SCs
and STs are 15 percent and 7.5 percent, respectively.
7. A similar distribution for urban India is available with the authors.
Rural-urban disparities are substantial in India, so the two distributions are
quite different. We discuss only the rural distribution here, for illustrative
purposes, because 72 percent of India’s population is rural. Discussion of the
urban distribution would be analogous.
8. The actual AA policy in India has identical SC and ST quotas for rural
and urban populations, summing to 22.5 percent. We are using current
rural population shares because our illustrative example focuses on rural
India.
9. Note that these four groups do not encompass the entire population;
there is a small group of others (mainly Native Americans) not included in the
chart.
10. P could alternatively be the total population of a particular region of
interest and/or some relevant demographic subset of total population, such as
people within a specified age group.
11. The income we associate with a given individual could be defined as
the level of her/his own income, but it is probably most reasonable to define
it as the household income divided by the number of persons in the
household (excluding children).
12. To be “eligible” for AA does not mean that one will necessarily benefit
from an AA policy by attaining a desired position that would otherwise have
been unattainable. Eligibility for AA means that, if one chooses to compete for
a position covered by AA, then one’s chances for attaining the position are
increased by the AA policy.
13. It is perfectly possible to carry the analysis forward with multiple
groups eligible for AA; but this is not necessary in order to draw key
conclusions from the analysis.
14. Based on census data from the two countries.
15. Indeed, an AA policy may take the form of lowering the minimum
qualifications required of members of AA-eligible groups to gain admission or
a job.
16. We hasten to add that, in a broader context, the beneficiaries of AA are
not limited to those individuals from AA-eligible groups whose opportunity to
gain a seat or a job is increased by an AA policy. There are important respects
in which all members of a marginalized group benefit indirectly from AA,
whether or not they are direct beneficiaries. Indeed, all members of a society
arguably benefit indirectly from AA on behalf of marginalized groups. On the
indirect benefits of AA, see Omar Khan (2008).
17. Another reason why a “potential beneficiary” of AA might not actually
benefit from an AA policy is that s/he might be so well qualified that s/he does
not need any boost from AA in order to get the seat or job.
18. The source of these data is: http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032007/
altinc/newinc03_000.htm.
19. The population shares of the four groups add up to only 99 percent,
because of the omission of the small group of others. Including them in the
calculation, with a reasonable estimate of their median income, lowers the
estimated class/group eligibility ratio for Blacks and Hispanics by less than a
percentage point.
References
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Who Is Eligible Should Affirmative Action Ashwini Deshpande

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Who Is Eligible Should Affirmative Action Ashwini Deshpande

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Who Is Eligible?

Should Affirmative Action

By WILLIAM DARITY, Jr., ASHWINI DESHPANDE, and

ABSTRACT. We explore the consequences for eligibility of members of

Affirmative action (AA) consists of a set of anti-discrimination mea-

groups. Group-based programs benefit only members of the targeted

Group- Versus Class-Based AA

adequate information about family wealth or net worth is much more

improvements in class status; on the contrary, it might actually

Group- vs. Class-Based AA in India and the United States

Even as AA has become more restricted in the U.S., several countries

tries. We do not provide an in-depth comparative analysis of caste-

India has had constitutionally mandated quotas for SC and ST groups

Distribution by MPCE Deciles, Rural India, 2004–2005

In order to compare the implications of a class-based AA policy with

SC—40 percent, OBC—29 percent, Others—17 percent. As one would

Chart 2 shows the distribution in the U.S. of four broad racial/ethnic

Distribution of household income by group in the United States

We can now calculate the class-based eligibility proportion of each

In this section we go beyond the specific examples of the previous

Basic Characteristics of the Population

Let P be the total population of a country;10 and let that population be

All we need to know to determine the number of persons eligible for

Income Frequency Distribution for Group k

the two halves of the population of group k is the median income

enabling the income frequency distribution for any group k to be

Eligibility for Affirmative Action

If AA is wholly group-based, then eligibility for AA simply depends on

(2) Gk = Pk = pk * P if group k is a group designated for AA, k 僐 T

The total number of persons eligible for group-based AA can then be

Thus if Yc is less than or equal to Mk, the proportion of class-based-

In this case, with Yc greater than Mk, the proportion of class-based-

The total number of persons eligible for class-based AA is simply the

Class-Based vs. Group-Based Eligibility for Affirmative Action

We wish to compare the number of members of groups designated for

simple case under consideration, with one composite group desig-

From Equation (7-1) it follows the proportion of members of a

• the number of group A members eligible for group-based AA: Pa

cgerd = 1 [1 + ( 75 25) ∗ (50 100 )] = 1 [1 + 1.5] = 0.4

It should be noted that if we had used wealth rather than income

been significantly higher. This is because wealth is everywhere dis-

Potential Beneficiaries of Affirmative Action

being able to meet the minimum necessary qualifications for a posi-

rik = a + b ∗ Yik (8)

where: rik is the probability of success of individual i in group k;

To assure that no individual can have a probability of success greater

Our model is therefore likely to over-estimate the extent to which

• subgroup 1: those with incomes between 0 and Md

Since b = (1 - a)/Y*, we can rewrite Equation (9) as:

rg d = 0.1 + 0.9 ∗ [0.5 ∗ 0.25 + 0.25 ∗ 0.667 ]

We can calculate the average probability of success for the

rg a = 0.1 + 0.9 ∗ [0.5 ∗ 0.333 + 0.25 ∗ 1]

In order to determine the total number of successful persons in each

RGd = 0.363 ∗ 25m. = 9.1 m. (11d)

RGa = 0.475 ∗ 75m. = 35.6 m. (11a)

Turning now to the case of a class-based AA policy, with an income

Since Yc < Mk < Yk ⱕ Y*, the last term in parentheses in Equation

To determine the overall average probability of success in this case,

Equation (12-2) is a very complex expression; but note that when Yc

Class-Based vs. Group-Based Potential Beneficiaries of AA

As we did in the case of a group-based AA policy, we will now

rc a = 0.1 + 0.9 ∗ ( 75 600 ) = 0.1 + 0.9 8 = 0.223 (13a)