RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
in favor of the right of the individual intended to be served." (Pascual v. BOME)
The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding.
The right is not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. It secures to a witness, whether he
be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the
answer to which tends to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only
when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be
claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, decline to
appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness
receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer
questions. (Chavez v. CA) *Note: Right to refuse to answer incriminating questions vs refusal to take
the witness stand
No obligation on part of the judge or any other officer to inform the accused of his right against
self-incrimination
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge,
or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a
witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in
accordance with the well-known axiom that everyone is presumed to know the law, that ignorance
of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the
witness can be expected to know in advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the
latter.
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be
claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It
follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the
appropriate time.
Right against self-incrimination shall be construed liberally in favor of the person invoking it
"This Court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may
prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad
interpretation favorable to the person invoking it." As phrased by Justice Laurel in his concurring
opinion: "The provision, as doubtless it was designed, would be construed with the utmost liberality
Right against self-incrimination involves only testimonies that may be extracted from the accused
himself
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to
be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. (US v. Tan Teng)
The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of
prisoners before trial. or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or
declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime. (US v. Tan Teng)
Right against self-incrimination does not include the use of the body of the accused as an evidence
if material
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in principle, would
forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and compare his features with a photograph in proof.
Moreover, we are not considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself,
for when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the
evidence if material, is competent. (US v. Tan Teng)
Evidence procured through subjecting a person’s body for examination must be material
to the crime for which he/she is being arrested
We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutang are clearly different from the circumstances
of petitioner in the instant case. First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug case.
Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were other pieces of evidence that
point to his culpability for the crimes charged. In the present case, though, petitioner was
arrested for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine
sample was the only available evidence that was used as basis for his conviction for the use
of illegal drugs. (Dela Cruz v. People)
Taking pictures of an accused even under custodial investigation does not violate his right against
self-incrimination
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not
required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the
giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman
charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her
pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a
substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from
gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the
outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed
or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the
foregoing things to be done. (People v. Gallarde)
Mandatory Drug Testing of an Accused declared as Unconstitutional
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's
office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The
operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the
case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can
never be random or suspicionless. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged,
they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact
of being hailed before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing,
if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical
test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in
this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. (SJS v.
Dangerous Drugs Board)
Person arrested through entrapment operation for committing extortion was subjected to drug
testing and was charged thereafter with use of dangerous drugs
Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15 applicable to all
persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other
crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any
crime. To overextend the application of this provision would run counter to our pronouncement in
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board. The drug test is not covered by allowable non-
testimonial compulsion. (Dela Cruz v. People)
Requiring an accused to make specimens of handwriting is a violation of the right against self-
incrimination
Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands,
or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of
intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to
furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent
fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of
producing documents or chattels in one's possession.
There is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is
compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to
furnish evidence against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of
documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the
act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. (Beltran
v. Samson)
Accused was tricked into signing an inventory containing items seized by the police officers
What the records show is that appellant was informed of his constitutional right to be silent and that
he may refuse to give a statement which may be used against him, that is why he refused to give
such a written statement unless it is made in the presence of his lawyer as shown by the paper he
signed to this effect. However, he was made to acknowledge that the six (6) small plastic bags of
dried marijuana leaves were confiscated from him by signing a receipt and to sign a receipt for the P
20.00 bill as purchase price of the dried marijuana leaves he sold to Pat. Mangila.
Obviously, the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign these alleged receipts
which in effect are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the offense. Indeed, it is unusual
for appellant to be made to sign receipts for what were taken from him. It is the police officers who
confiscated the same who should have signed such receipts. No doubt this is a violation of the
constitutional right of appellant to remain silent whereby he was made to admit the commission of
the offense without informing him of his right. Such a confession obtained in violation of the
Constitution is inadmissible in evidence. *He was compelled to be a witness against himself by
signing such receipt. (People v. Policarpio)
has been held, however, to partake of the nature of a penalty. A forfeiture, as thus
defined, is imposed by way of punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, but
by the lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of conduct.
As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and,
hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses
against themselves are applicable thereto.

Compelling an accused to take the witness stand compared to an ordinary witness
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an
ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each
question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, and accused may altogether refuse to
take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the purpose of
calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him.
Exception: a person may invoke his right to refuse to take the stand in other proceedings even if
not a criminal case
The right to refuse to take the stand does not generally apply to parties in administrative cases or
proceedings. The parties thereto can only refuse to answer if incriminating questions are
propounded. This Court applied the exception – a party who is not an accused in a criminal case is
allowed not to take the witness stand – in administrative cases/proceedings that partook of the
nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. It is likewise the opinion of
the Court that said exception applies to parties in civil actions which are criminal in nature. As long
as the suit is criminal in nature, the party thereto can altogether decline to take the witness stand. It
is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. (Rosete v.
Lim)
As already observed, the various constitutions provide that no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition against compelling a
person to take the stand as a witness against himself applied only to criminal, quasi-criminal,
and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by
reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty
recoverable is civil or remedial in nature. (Cabal v. Kapunan)
Administrative proceedings filed for Medical Malpractice that would result in the
revocation of medical license (practice of profession is a privilege but the SC also extend
the right to such cases aside from properties)
To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus distinguished, it suffices to refer to an
American Supreme Court opinion highly persuasive in character. In the language of Justice
Douglas: "We conclude ... that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has
been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other
individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment
and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it." We reiterate that such a
principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the
privilege to practice the medical profession. (Pascual v. BOME)

Administrative proceeding filed for Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices that
would result in forfeiture of certain properties

It seems, likewise conceded that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law,
which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee
which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such for forfeiture