ISSN 2455-4782

BELAIRE OWNERS VS. DLF PVT. LTD-TOOLS OF INTERPRETATION

OF A STATUTE

Authored by: Diya Mehta*

* 2nd Year LLB student, O.P Jindal Global University

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Legislature’s creation
subject to judicial interpretation

Varied philosophies, rules and presumptions

forms the part of entire junction

While Scalia asserts to stick to text like a glue

Breyer contends Justice, Justice shall you pursue

Eskridge’s philosophy is based on being practical

using a funnel he asks to be rational

Rule skeptics in state of obliviousness

exclaims, oh wait! what rules are we talking about
It is the interpreters’ morning meal or the sleep cycle
that will help us scout

Let’s not forget the rules of literal, golden and mischief

Well oh well ! they are after all the commanders in chief

Solving the ambiguity is the said duty

so whatever approach they shall adopt will do the deed, duly!

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The statutes enacted and the provisions therein, are neither perfect nor unambiguous. Hence
numerous philosophers have written as to how Judges interpret laws and there are various tools
that have been recognized to be used by Judges, in judicial pronouncements. One such case is that
of Belaire Owners vs Dlf Limited & ors where I through this paper will try to decode as to how
the said statute was interpreted by the Judges in this case.

The case is a competition law matter and comes under the Competition Act of 2002. The
informants in the said case aggrieved by the unconscionable terms of a real estate contract by the
renowned construction company DLF Limited approached the Commission with its grievances.
The Commission on finding a prima facie case referred the matter to Director General for inquiry
and on the basis of the report submitted by the Director General, the Commission pronounced its
final order. The Commission dealt with the matter by interpretation of statute in three broad issues,
as to hold the Company liable under the Act it was necessary to prove that the Company enjoyed
a “dominant position” in the “relevant-product market” and “relevant geographic market” and
abused such “dominant position”. Therefore, the interpretation in the case revolves around
interpretation of what meanings words like “dominant position”, “relevant-product market” and
“relevant geographic market” hold under the Competition Act.

Issue 1: The issue one at the disposal was whether the Competition Act, 2002 apply to the facts
and circumstances of the case.
The judges dealt with the issue by using the internal aid of “definitions” and tried to decode
whether services under the act will include the real estate services as provided by the opposite
party to the informant. Going by the plain meaning of the definition of services as given under
section 2(u) of the act, definition of services as under Consumer Protection Act and MRTP Act,
the Commission came to the conclusion that the real estate service as provided by Dlf company
will come under ambit of “services” in the Competition Act. Therefore, the Judges here used “other
legislations” and external aid of “Parliament history” as MRTP Act was an old act which was
repealed by the Competition Act of 2002, to interpret the definition of “services”.
The judges also dealt with the contention of the Company that since the Act came after the contract
was entered into, it cannot come under the purview of the Act. The Judges here, following the
presumption of prospectiveness of an Act, held that only those provisions of the contract that were
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invoked after the enforcement of the act, will come under its purview. Thus neither impairment of
vested rights nor imposition of a new obligation or duty will take place because of the said act.
Dealing with both the contentions, the judges came to the conclusion that the matter will come
under the lens of the Competition Act.

Issue 2: In the second issue Commission interpreted meaning of “relevant market” with respect to
section 4, 2(r), section 19(5), (6) and (7) while dealing with this issue the Commission resorted to
internal aid of definitions to construe the meaning of relevant market, relevant product market and
relevant geographic market and also by reading the statute as a whole [definitions and factors as
laid down under section 19(6) and (7)] came to the conclusion that the relevant product market is
the “high end residential market” (reading the definition of relevant product market as under
section 2(t) with factors of physical characteristics or end-use of goods; price of goods or service
and consumer preferences as embodied under 19(6) of the Act )and the relevant geographic market
is “Gurgaon”(reading the definition of relevant geographic market as under 2(s) with the factors
of specific requirements and consumer preferences as enumerated in 19(6) of the Act) . The
Commission came to this result by analyzing various factors as laid down in 19(6) and 19(7) as
the literal reading of these section implied that Commission can base its result with regard to all
or any of the factors.

Issue 3: Whether DLF Ltd. is a dominant, in context of section 4 read with 19(4)?
According to explanation to section 4 of the act dominant means to exercise strength in a relevant
market and 19(4) lays down factors to evaluate the dominant position. The Commission here
adopted a frivolous approach by considering the factors not only in relevant market but also outside
the relevant market by stating it to the “intent” of the legislature to adopt a pragmatic approach.
However, on the plain reading of meaning dominant in the act only the factors in relevant factor
should have been considered as following the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, express
inclusion of relevant market in the provision implies the express exclusion of factors outside the
relevant market. Not only this Commission also expanded the scope of 19(4) by using a liberal
approach where in section 19(4) the legislature has laid certain specific factors that can be
considered to examine dominance , those factors are followed by clause (m) which lays down that
Commission may consider any other relevant factor. According to me the factors laid down in the
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section forms a genus that deals with economic factors of an enterprise. The genus is followed by
a general term which should have been construed in accordance with the genus as per the rule of
ejusdem generis, however the Commission went on to analyze profile, presence and achievements
and also the historical developments of Dlf ltd. in order to ascertain its dominant position. Section
4 lays down under what circumstance can an enterprise be said to be in a dominant position and
the Commission construed those circumstances under the light of the Preamble of the act where
“protection of the interests of the consumers" is the mandate.

Therefore, in this case the Judiciary mostly resorted to primary rule of literal interpretation in
majority of circumstances but while dealing with the third issue it expanded the meaning of the
provisions that were laid in the Act by claiming it to be the “intention of the legislature”. However,
this cannot be said to be a correct approach especially when the meaning of legislature on plain
reading is clear and unambiguous. As a result of the interpretation of the statute made in this case
judgment was pronounced against DLF Ltd. and was made to pay damages.

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