Shahzad Ahmad

BS IR 4 A
Reg No: 1442

Feedback

First of all we have our classes from different department teachers and have the
opportunity to learn from them to build our own understanding about various
aspects including the community service. Working as a team, raising fund,
distribution and letting people know through social media was a great experience.
Plantation which was part of the project and need of the day was a great initiative.
But students like me who were from far flung area faced some kind of issues
among them the most I myself faced is the issue that we basically worked on
intersex people. Raised fund for them and distribute both by the name of Eid gifts
and Ramzan ration which was a great initiative to bring up the deprived
community but I have no such community in my area so I participated only by
contribution money though I want a full participation. We can partially blame the
Covid-19 situation and centrality of the project. From here I can only contribute
and raised awareness in social media. It will be better if we choose a project where
everyone has the same opportunity to participate like the plantation project we did.
Secondly I want to continue the initiative after the semester as well with the same
motivation. I mailed to an Organization with the name of CIVICUS which is
working in 175 countries on civil society and they are ready for any possible area
of collaboration. Continuation of the initiative after the semester will be great and
will benefit everyone.

It was a great experience to work with team members and was a great opportunity
to learn from great teachers.

Thank you Teachers

Thank you Team member

Stay safe.
Shahzad Ahmad

BS IR 4 A

Reg No: 1442

Instead making it resource competition or power cause economy is directly link to power
somehow if it was done through more scientific method environment should
This specific rsearch is about environment and migration due to environment which we have

read in the previous smanester of IPE course as well . the issue of environment and
migration due toto environment is real and I think we are on the brink of a such state if we

don’t take it as serious as it eserve it will lead to non reversible situation . last week I
attended an online conference of international diplomacy where the Canadian ambassador

Robert Rae argue about the migration tpuching the environment ha said that we need more
constructive and wise policy framework for immigrant due to environment .he said my

country is more open toward immigrant both diue to war or enviroment. the problem of
enviroemtal migration ( one the topic of conference) is is the biggest challenge to the

world even more than terrorism and covid 19 bacause it is time consuming and need extra
passion and commitment to deal with.

there are several global environmental changes which may cause

human migration. Climate change is, of course, a major factor. Sea level rise, changes in
storm or cyclone frequency, changes in rainfall patterns, forest fires, increases in temperature
and ocean acidification may result in loss of homes or livelihoods.

It has been estimated that by 2050, one in every seven people in Bangladesh will be displaced
by climate change. Up to 18 million people may have to move because of sea level rise alone.

Coastal areas in Bangladesh are on the 'front line' of climate change, directly affected by

storm surges, drainage congestion, and sea level rise. Most of Bangladesh is less than ten
metres above sea level, with almost ten per cent of the country below 1 metre, making it
extremely vulnerable to increasing high tides.

"Freshwater availability in Central, South, East and Southeast Asia particularly in large river basins is
projected to decrease due to climate change which, along with population growth and increasing
demand arising from higher standards of living, could adversely affect more than a billion people by the
2050s." (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007.

I think nature work at particular condition set by nature , any variation either decrease or increase from
that specific setup lead to different variation such as due to air pollution acid rain is the result which lead
to extinction of species which are not ready for the new environment both physically and genetically. So
any variation from the specific condition directly or indirectly effect the rest on world ina different
manner .

Among the most effected are the Maldives, Tuvalu, and Papua New Guinea. In Africa, many
countries have had major crises caused in part by severe drought, increased desertification, and
famine. Hard-hit countries and areas have included Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan (which includes
Darfur).

We will start by defining the political community. I will define what I think a political

community is . but before that we will see what a community is

A community is a social unit (a group of living things) with commonality such as norms,

religion, values, customs, or identity. Communities may share a sense of place situated in a
given geographical area (e.g. a country, village, town, or neighbourhood) or in virtual space
through communication platforms

In biological term we can define community as the set of all populations that inhabit a certain
area. Suppose same and different trees found in a specific forest.

according to my understanding

A political community is a group of like-minded people who share common political goals
and values such as social justice, lowering taxes, improving educational policy, etc. The

definition could be as broad as voters who belong to the same party or as narrow as an
organization of activists pursuing a particular agenda

Politics exist in all such communities because members do not have identical views about
collective goals or about how to realize them. In modern states, for example, sharp divisions
exist between those who think that governments should redistribute wealth and those who
believe that unfettered markets should allocate resources. Like states, religious communities
have their politics, but they may not be political communities according to the definition used
here. The desire to worship with others is an essential part of belonging to a religious
community, but it is the aspiration for self-rule-to be free from the dominion of others-that turns
religious and other groups of people into political communities.

The American political community is called a republic, which is derived from the Latin
expression res publica. The term res publica refers to a public-legal community different in kind
from nonpolitical communities and associations such as families, churches, businesses, and
many kinds of voluntary organizations. States need not have a republican form of government,
however, to be just public-legal communities. Our republic and other legitimate states should be
communities of citizens whose governments have the right and the power to enforce public laws
for the good of all.

There are essentially seven issues associated human security. These are economic security,
food security, health security environmental security, personal security, community security,
and political security.

Human security is a human right; it refers to the security of people and communities, as

opposed to the security of states. Human security recognises that there are several
dimensions related to feeling safe, such as freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom
from indignity.

Css( critical security studie:

, CSS differs from the Copenhagen School in two ways. Firstly, CSS scholars criticise the Copenhagen
School for sectoralizing (thereby objectifying) the objects of security; claiming that not only threats, but
also these objects are social constructs. Secondly, CSS differs from the Copenhagen School in that it has
an emancipatory intend. CSS scholars, such as Booth, are concerned with questions like: “how threats
and appropriate responses are constructed; how the ‘objects’ of security are constructed; and what the
possibilities are for the transformation of ‘security dilemmas’”.[30] They are, in contrast to the
Copenhagen School, straightforwardly political: “the established realism is blamed for the hostility,
instability, and injustice that unfortunately are part of world politics”.[31] The aim of the analyst is to
speak on behalf of the voiceless, always pointing to the fact that the world we inhabit is not working for
the majority of people.[32] Thus, CSS scholars emphasize the possibility of major change in world politics
because things are socially constructed.
Cophengan school of securitization.

a core theme animates the Copenhagen School, it is a primary concern with how security is constructed
and ‘works’ in world politics. This approach developed in the context of post-Cold War calls to broaden
security to include a range of pressing and hitherto neglected concerns such as environmental change,
poverty and human rights on state security agendas. according to weaver the central concept of
cophengan school of thought is secter “regional security complexes” ’. Building on Buzan’s earlier work
(1991), sectors are defined as arenas entailing particular types of security interaction (Buzan et al. 1998:
7–8). Including military, political, economic, societal and environmental fields, for the Copenhagen
School these sectors encourage different forms of relationships between relevant actors to develop and
generally encourage different definitions of referent object (who or what is to be secured). Regional
security complexes are defined as sets of units whose security processes and dynamics ‘are so
interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one
another’. These security complexes are defined in terms of mutually exclusive geographic regions such
as Europe, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and Africa. They also argue that the regional level of
analysis is becoming increasingly important for global security dynamics but has been poorly theorized.
these are all important ideas, the central contribution of the Copenhagen School is the concept of
‘securitization’. This was first outlined in depth by Wæver in 1995 as referring to the discursive
construction of threat. More specifically, securitization can be defined as a process in which an actor
declares a particular issue, dynamic or actor to be an ‘existential threat’ to a particular referent object. If
accepted as such by a relevant audience, this enables the suspension of normal politics and the use of
emergency measures in responding to the perceived crisis

Facilitating conditions: particular contexts (including the form of the speech act; position of the speaker;
and historical conditions associated with threat) that enable the acceptance of a particular securitizing
move by the relevant audience.

z Securitizing move: an actor’s attempt to construct an issue or actor as an existential threat to a

particular group through a security ‘speech act’. z Securitization: the process whereby a securitizing
actor defines a particular issue or actor as an ‘existential threat’ to a particular referent object and this
move is accepted by a relevant audience.

z Desecuritization: the process whereby particular issues or actors are removed from the security realm
and (re-)enter the realm of ‘normal politics’.

z Regional security complex: a set of units in a particular geographical area whose security processes
and dynamics are interlinked to the extent that their security problems need to be understood or
addressed in conjunction with each other.
 z Security sectors: fields of activity or arenas (military, societal, political, economic and environmental)
that entail particular forms of security interactions and particular definitions of referent objects.

Frankfurt school of thought ;

The Frankfurt School (German: Frankfurter Schule) was a school of social theory and critical

philosophy associated with the Institute for Social Research, at Goethe University Frankfurt.
Founded in the Weimar Republic (1918–33), during the European interwar period (1918–39), the
Frankfurt School comprised intellectuals, academics, and political dissidents dissatisfied with the
contemporary socio-economic systems (capitalist, fascist, communist) of the 1930s. The Frankfurt
theorists proposed that social theory was inadequate for explaining the turbulent political
factionalism and reactionary politics occurring in 20th century liberal capitalist societies. Critical
of capitalism and of Marxism–Leninism as philosophically inflexible systems of social organization,
the School's critical theory research indicated alternative paths to realizing the social development of
a society and a nation.[1]

 the Frankfurt School concerned themselves with the conditions (political, economic, societal) that
allow for social change realized by way of rational social institutions.[6] Their emphasis on the critical
component of social theory derived from their attempts to overcome the ideological limitations
of positivism, materialism, and determinism by returning to the critical philosophy of Kant and his
successors in German idealism – principally the philosophy of Hegel, which
emphasized dialectic and contradiction as intellectual properties inherent to the human grasp
of material reality.

Constructivists argue that their approach enables a more sophisticated and

complete understanding of dynamics traditionally associated with generally realist

approaches to security, from that of the nature of power to the security dilemma and the balance of
power. constructivist approaches is that security is a social construction.

Karin Fierke SAYS that ‘to construct something is an act which brings into being a subject or object that
otherwise would not exist. Which means according to my understanding is that the formation the
construction is an act and that act of construction bring into being a subject or object , that subject or
object without the act of contruction would never be into beings. Arnold wolfer have a classis definition
of security that security could be understood as the preservation of a group’s core values but But such a
broad definition of security tells us little about who constitutes the group; what its core values are;
where threats to those values may come from; and how the preservation or advancement of these
values might be achieved.

For Hopf, state political leaders designate other states as ‘friend’ or ‘enemy’ – and approach them as
such – on the basis of conceptions of identity. An example of that is the US and USSR during the cold
war. e USA interpreted the actions of the USSR as if it was an ‘evil empire’ eager to expand its power
relative to the United States and challenge the spread of liberty and democracy that Americans viewed
as central to their own national identity. This played a significant part in the American interpretation of
Soviet attempts to supply Cuba with nuclear capabilities in 1962 as aggressive rather than defensive in
intent

Ir since 1945 presentation:

Slide 7,8

The war in Syria has shown that the shadow of Realism is yet to disappear from the global
politics. Syrian crisis can be explained well through neorealist perspective. Neorealism was first
articulated by Kenneth Waltz in 1979 in his book “the theories of International Relations”.
Realists consider states as the main actors which are concerned with their own security, act in
pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power. According to neorealist
perspective, the world is in state of anarchy which does not means complete chaos but lake of
central government to govern the behavior of states. With no global authority that provides
security and stability in international relations, world politics is not formally and hierarchically
organized.
1
Kenneth waltz claimed that he primary concern of state is to secure its structural position in
anarchic international world. Structural position in a broader term, that entails overall national
economic strength, security, and interests in other regions.

Neorealism assumes that at time, the states secure their structural position through helping their
allies. The assumption seems to fitting in the case of Syria because the global powers US and
Russia never took time to reach the camps of their allies in Syria. Moreover, Syria has been the
biggest arm dealer of Russia so the continuous war in Syria means continuous business with
Russia.

Neorealists believe that the primary goal of the state is survival. Economic prosperity, human
rights are secondary that comes after survival. 2Every state involve in Syrian war has its own
interest and survival. For Iran it’s important to have influence in the region. Saudi Arabia wants
to topple Shia Alwite minority government to de-escalate the Iranian influence over there
because as long as Shia Alwite Asaad is there, Iran is there. Turkey is there to crush Kurdish
(Ethnic group hold large areas in the north of Syria) group whom it considers threat to its
security and stability. For Israel again, Iran is an existential threat. To counter the threat its
prerequisite for Israel to get rid of Bashar Al-Asaad and other Shai militias there in Syria.

Even this power politics made liberal institution United Nations established with the aim of
peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts, paralyzed. UN security council and the power of
veto, the anachronistic part of the organization, has been used to legitimize an illegitimate acts
and blatant violations of human rights in Syria. Since the start of Syrian crisis, Russia has vetoed
11 out of 20 resolution condemning the atrocities carried out by Syrian government against
civilians and the halt of the bombardment by Syrian government.

According to neorealism, the states should be extremely careful about relative gains made by
rival states. The friendly states in Middle East means a lot to the regional and global powers. Iran
one by losing friendly regimes and cannot afford anymore so does Russia. Similarly, Saudi
Arabia wants to cripple Shia regimes to uproot the influence of regional competitor Iran because

1
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979)
2
Mustafa Salama, “The Middle East: Gone as we know it”, Al-Jazeera, December 29, 2014, accessed, 19 December
2018
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/12/middle-east-gone-as-know-it-2014122911351266247.html
according to earlier realist Thucydides “Confrontation between an established power and a
rising power is almost always inevitable.”

Neorealism can be applied in the conflict of Syria. Whereas classical realism can the needs of the
people, or individual Syrians, and lead us to the question; what do you want from your
government, neorealism can be applied to the Syrian government as a more inclusive theory
which explains the states actions and therefore may lead us to the answer to the question to the
state; why do you want to maintain power? Middle east is in turmoil and day by day going
towards more chaos and instability. 3Amidst of such situation every state in middle east has a
fear of survival especially the two regional competitor Iran and Saudi Arabia. In such
environment the balance of power is the key priority of every state.

There are two distinct theorists of neorealism with conflicting viewpoints, which can be defined
as the philosophical division in neorealism. We have defensive realist such as Kenneth Waltz
and Offensive realist, both of which could be applied to the Syrian conflict.

From the perspective of Waltz, “it is unwise for states to try to maximize their share of world
power, because the system will punish them if they attempt to gain too much power.” In case of
Syria Bashar Al Asaad with support of Iran maximizing power and thereby the opposition forces,
are punishing the Al-Assad regime for gaining too much power and thereby abusing it. Asaad
needs power to survive and Iran needs a powerful ally in Middle East, so powerful Asaad means
powerful Iran in Syria. This neorealist perspective of seeking more power than the system will
allow, is arguably a very good possibility for present day civil war.

Slides 9:

The Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict, sometimes also referred to as the Middle Eastern Cold
War,[100] is the ongoing struggle for influence in the Middle East and surrounding regions

3
Kareem Shaheen, “Saudi Arabia and Iran's rivalry is key to the Middle East in 2018”, The Guardian, January 1,
2018, accessed 20 December, 2018
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/04/2018-saudi-arabia-iran-rivalry-key-middle-east-year-ahead
between Iran and Saudi Arabia.[101] The two countries have provided varying degrees of support to
opposing sides in nearby conflicts, including the civil wars in Syria[102][103][104] and Yemen

in what has been described as a cold war, the conflict is waged on multiple levels over geopolitical,
economic, and sectarian influence in pursuit of regional hegemony.[120][121] American support for Saudi
Arabia and its allies as well as Russian and Chinese support for Iran and its allies have drawn
comparisons to the dynamics of the Cold War era, and the proxy conflict has been characterized as
a front in what former Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev(
duh·mee·tree muhd·vyeh·duh ) has referred to as the "New Cold War".[122][123][124][125] However,
Russian and Chinese support for Iran has mostly been political in nature, and even where support
included arms sales or technology transfer, it has generally not been as significant as Western
support for Saudi Arabia, with both Russia and China being more involved economically (and
sometimes military) with Saudi Arabia and Sunni powers than they are with Iran due to international
sanctions on the iran.

Slides 10:

Research Methodology
The methodology used for it is associated with positivist view and based on explanatory and
qualitative method. The study has been done through the lens of neorealist perspective.
Neorealism or structural realism is a theory of international relations that says power is the
most important factor in international relations. It was first outlined by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979
book Theory of International Politics.

Some core assumption of neorealist related to the topics are

states are unitary, functionally similar actors. They are the only important actors in international
politics; (2) the international system is characterised by anarchy; (3) the distribution of power
capabilities is the main, system-level variable to explain state behaviour.

The data collectd through secondary data. The sources used for this study are journals,
documentaries, articles, magazines and newspapers. To know what led to the unrest in Syria
historical events and causes of the unrest were also analyzed.

The positivist tradition stresses the importance of doing quantitative research such as large

scale surveys in order to get an overview of society as a whole and to uncover social trends

RESEARCH PURPOSE

At the heart of this external struggle has been a battle between Iran, which has firmly
backed the government of Bashar al-Assad, and Saudi Arabia, for a long time the
mainstay of opposition support. For both countries the conflict was never principally
centred on Syrian grievances but rather a wider struggle for regional hegemony.

A Regional Reordering

The regional nature of the Syrian conflict stems from the US-led invasion of Iraq in
2003, which upended Baghdad’s longstanding position as a buffer against Iran’s
regional influence. Tehran exploited the invasion to become the dominant power in Iraq,
and thereafter strengthened its position in Syria and Lebanon. For Saudi Arabia, this
threatened the hitherto ascendant pro-Western regional order. It also posed a perceived
security threat given possible linkages between Iran and its own Shi’a minority
population, as well as those of neighbouring states such as Bahrain, which Riyadh
feared could be incited to rebellion.

Slides 11:

Research limits

In Syria protests calling for the resignation of Pres. Bashar al-Assad broke out in

southern Syria in mid-March 2011 and spread through the country. The Assad regime
responded with a brutal crackdown against protesters, drawing condemnation from
international leaders and human rights groups. A leadership council for the Syrian
opposition formed in Istanbul in August, and opposition militias began to launch
attacks on government forces. In spite of the upheaval, Assad’s hold on power appeared
strong, as he was able to retain the support of critical military units composed largely of
members of Syria’s ʿAlawite minority, to which Assad also belonged. Meanwhile,
divisions in the international community made it unlikely that international military
intervention, which had proved decisive in Libya, would be possible in Syria. Russia and
China vetoed UN Security Council resolutions meant to pressure the Assad regime in
October 2011 and February 2012 and vowed to oppose any measure that would lead to
foreign intervention in Syria or Assad’s removal from power. The arrival of a delegation
of peace monitors from the Arab League in December 2011 did little to reduce violence.
The escalation of violence, fed by funding and arms from several rival countries
interested in the outcome of the situation, culminated in a devastating civil war and a
massive refugee crisis affecting millions

Slides 13:

Russia has significant economic interests in Syria. Its investments in the country were valued at
$19.4 billion in 2009, according to The Moscow Times, and its exports to Syria were worth $1.1
billion in 2010.[38][39]
The Soviet Union’s military sales to Syria in the 1970s and 80's accounted for 90% of all Syrian
military arms imports, according to a United States Congressional Research Service Report
released in 2008.[40] The report noted that Syria purchased several billions of dollars' worth of military
equipment from the Soviets, including SS-21 "Scarab" short-range missiles (range 70 km).[40]
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Syria found itself deprived of arms imports, but
continued to seek them through former Soviet satellite states. [40] The establishment of the Russian
Federation in 1992 saw the re-introduction of the patron-vendor relationship and the cancellation of
almost 73% of Syria's debt.[40] According to reports, 2.4% of Russia's total exports come from
defense-related sales.[41]
From 2000 to 2010, Russia sold around $1.5 billion worth of arms to Syria, making Damascus
Moscow's seventh-largest client, according to Dmitri Trenin in the New York Times.[18]
In 2008, Syria agreed to purchase modern weapons including modern anti-tank and anti-air missile
systems from Russia, including MiG-29SMT fighters, Pantsir S1E air-defense systems, Iskander
tactical missile systems, Yak-130 aircraft, and two Amur-1650 submarines. Russia's foreign
minister Sergei Lavrov said his country's sale of weapons to Syria would not upset the balance of
power in the Middle East. The sales he stated are "in line with the international law" and "in the
interests of strengthening stability and maintaining security" in regions close to Russian borders,
Lavrov told reporters.

Key international actors:

These include: Action Aid, CARE, Danish Church Aid, Danish Refugee Council,
Handicap International, HelpAge International, Intersos, International Medical Corps,
International Catholic Migration Commission, International Rescue Committee, Medair,
Medecins du Monde, Mennonite Central Committee, Oxfam
Key actors:
Russia , Iran, Hezbollah and Assad
USA, tURkey, golf state Jorden and rebel group
Kurds
ISIS

As you mentioned gaza and Israel don’t you think although there is cease fire which is great step but I
think it not the ultimate goal if the main issue remianed unadressed it gonna risk a new escalation one
way or other the civilian on both will effect once againg.. what kind of constructive measures except
from the history are required which will be acceptable for both

I think the developed nation need a more conmprehensive policies regarding the third world states
cause if they not it gonna increase the already gap even more .. the third world countries are not able to
lockdown the country as whole as one mine state such as Paksitan . we are connected in the globalized
world eradicating that from one part idt gonna work…what your coment on that…

Thank you very much ambassador my name is …….i have the undle of question but I am gonna ask just
2.my question is About refuges we are having the problem since the USSR invasion of AFG. I am not
gonna say a problem on humanitarian basisi but being a third world country I can say that a problem,
but the main question is that the withdrawel of US now once again have setteled the ground for more
refuges cause somehow civil war once again gona broke out as brikes as a result of ussr withdrawl …
what your coment on that the way US withdrawel and refuges of AFG …

In this specific paper the author define the dieffrence and interconnectedness among ethnicity culture
and identity. He argue that anthropologists recognize that peoples exist, that they form visible
communities and practice materially documentable beliefs, customs and lifestyles, which is usually what
ethnicity refers to. He says that Ethnicity can be seen in some sense as overlapping with questions of
culture, it is at the same time viewed as a distinct phenomenon to some degree. Anthropologists have
different view about how the ethnicity and ethnic relation may be continued as a social process but they
agree that ethnicity refers to a set of materially existing practices especially when practiced by the
majority of that group.

He argue that culture is as compare somehwhat different and about a century of discourse about
culture anthropologists still don’t know what it is as being the object of endless discussion.
Anthropologists aside, however, culture as a phenomenon can always transcend material notions of
ethnicity. There can be difference in ethnicity of same culture. China might be viewed as the integration
of local, even mutually incompatible, ethnic traditions within a higher order unity. He say that it is
possible to be westernized culturally without being the citizen of west. social processes ultimately
influence how ethnicity and culture “should” interact”
 Identity is a problem of a different order altogether. In contrast to both ethnicity and culture, identity is
essentially a subjective or pragmatic relationship: I identify, therefore I am. In the service of the nation-
state, identity is in the first instance rarely a question of who one is an individual but rather who we are
as a group, with assumed bonds to an abstract community of citizens. Identity is also less about the fact
of who we are than about the perception of those facts. Because one is dealing with perceptions, one
should emphasize too that they are selective and strategic by nature. Discourses of identity produced by
the state or cultural mainstream always make claims about the nature of identity as though they are
based on natural facts, when in actuality they are just claims or representations that must be constantly
legitimated.

 25th Anniversary 

 Journals 

 Information 

 Author Services 

 Initiatives 

 About
Sign In / Sign Up   Submit

Search for Articles:

                                                                                                                                                

Law s

Laws

 All Journals
 Acoustics
 Actuators
 Administrative Sciences
 Adolescents
 Aerospace
 Agriculture
 AgriEngineering
 Agronomy
 AI
 Algorithms
 Allergies
 Analytica
 Animals
 Antibiotics
 Antibodies
 Antioxidants
 Applied Mechanics
 Applied Microbiology
 Applied Nano
 Applied Sciences
 Applied System Innovation (ASI)
 AppliedChem
 Architecture
 Arts
 Atmosphere
 Atoms
 Audiology Research
 Automation
 Axioms
 Batteries
 Behavioral Sciences
 Beverages
 Big Data and Cognitive Computing (BDCC)
 BioChem
 Bioengineering
 Biologics
 Biology
 Biomechanics
 BioMed
 Biomedicines
 BioMedInformatics
 Biomimetics
 Biomolecules
 Biophysica
 Biosensors
 BioTech
 Birds
 Brain Sciences
 Buildings
 Businesses
 C
 Cancers
 Cardiogenetics
 Catalysts
 Cells
 Ceramics
 Challenges
 ChemEngineering
 Chemistry
 Chemistry Proceedings
 Chemosensors
 Children
 CivilEng
 Clean Technologies (Clean Technol.)
 Climate
 Clinics and Practice
 Clocks & Sleep
 Coatings
 Colloids and Interfaces
 Compounds
 Computation
 Computers
 Condensed Matter
 Conservation
 Construction Materials
 Corrosion and Materials Degradation (CMD)
 Cosmetics
 COVID
 Crops
 Cryptography
 Crystals
 Current Issues in Molecular Biology (CIMB)
 Current Oncology
 Dairy
 Data
 Dentistry Journal
 Dermatopathology
 Designs
 Diabetology
 Diagnostics
 Digital
 Disabilities
 Diseases
 Diversity
 DNA
 Drones
 Dynamics
 Earth
 Ecologies
 Econometrics
 Economies
 Education Sciences
 Electricity
 Electrochem
 Electronic Materials
 Electronics
 Encyclopedia
 Endocrines
 Energies
 Eng
 Engineering Proceedings
 Entropy
 Environmental Sciences Proceedings
 Environments
 Epidemiologia
 Epigenomes
 European Burn Journal (EBJ)
 European Journal of Investigation in Health, Psychology and Education (EJIHPE)
 Fermentation
 Fibers
 Fire
 Fishes
 Fluids
 Foods
 Forecasting
 Forensic Sciences
 Forests
 Fractal and Fractional (Fractal Fract)
 Fuels
 Future Internet
 Future Transportation
 Galaxies
 Games
 Gases
 Gastroenterology Insights
 Gastrointestinal Disorders (GastrointestDisord)
 Gels
 Genealogy
 Genes
 Geographies
 GeoHazards
 Geomatics
 Geosciences
 Geotechnics
 Geriatrics
 Healthcare
 Hearts
 Hemato
 Heritage
 Histories
 Horticulturae
 Humanities
 Hydrogen
 Hydrology
 Immuno
 Infectious Disease Reports
 Informatics
 Information
 Infrastructures
 Inorganics
 Insects
 Instruments
 International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (IJERPH)
 International Journal of Financial Studies (IJFS)
 International Journal of Molecular Sciences (IJMS)
 International Journal of Neonatal Screening (IJNS)
 International Journal of Turbomachinery, Propulsion and Power (IJTPP)
 Inventions
 IoT
 ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information (IJGI)
 J
 Journal of Cardiovascular Development and Disease (JCDD)
 Journal of Clinical Medicine (JCM)
 Journal of Composites Science (J. Compos. Sci.)
 Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy (JCP)
 Journal of Developmental Biology (JDB)
 Journal of Functional Biomaterials (JFB)
 Journal of Functional Morphology and Kinesiology (JFMK)
 Journal of Fungi (JoF)
 Journal of Imaging (J. Imaging)
 Journal of Intelligence (J. Intell.)
 Journal of Low Power Electronics and Applications (JLPEA)
 Journal of Manufacturing and Materials Processing (JMMP)
 Journal of Marine Science and Engineering (JMSE)
 Journal of Molecular Pathology (JMP)
 Journal of Nanotheranostics (JNT)
 Journal of Nuclear Engineering (JNE)
 Journal of Open Innovation: Technology, Market, and Complexity (JOItmC)
 Journal of Otorhinolaryngology, Hearing and Balance Medicine (OHBM)
 Journal of Personalized Medicine (JPM)
 Journal of Respiration (JoR)
 Journal of Risk and Financial Management (JRFM)
 Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks (JSAN)
 Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research (JTAER)
 Journal of Xenobiotics (JoX)
 Journal of Zoological and Botanical Gardens (JZBG)
 Journalism and Media
 Land
 Languages
 Laws
 Life
 Liquids
 Livers
 Logistics
 Lubricants
 Machine Learning and Knowledge Extraction (MAKE)
 Machines
 Macromol
 Magnetism
 Magnetochemistry
 Marine Drugs
 Materials
 Materials Proceedings
 Mathematical and Computational Applications (MCA)
 Mathematics
 Medical Sciences
 Medicina
 Medicines
 Membranes
 Merits
 Metabolites
 Metals
 Methods and Protocols (MPs)
 Metrology
 Micro
 Microbiology Research
 Micromachines
 Microorganisms
 Minerals
 Mining
 Modelling
 Molbank
 Molecules
 Multimodal Technologies and Interaction (MTI)
 Nanoenergy Advances
 Nanomanufacturing
 Nanomaterials
 Network
 Neuroglia
 Neurology International
 NeuroSci
 Nitrogen
 Non-Coding RNA (ncRNA)
 Nursing Reports
 Nutraceuticals
 Nutrients
 Obesities
 Oceans
 Onco
 Optics
 Oral
 Organics
 Osteology
 Parasitologia
 Particles
 Pathogens
 Pathophysiology
 Pediatric Reports
 Pharmaceuticals
 Pharmaceutics
 Pharmacy
 Philosophies
 Photochem
 Photonics
 Physchem
 Physics
 Physiologia
 Plants
 Plasma
 Pollutants
 Polymers
 Polysaccharides
 Proceedings
 Processes
 Prosthesis
 Proteomes
 Psych
 Psychiatry International
 Publications
 Quantum Beam Science (QuBS)
 Quantum Reports
 Quaternary
 Radiation
 Reactions
 Recycling
 Religions
 Remote Sensing
 Reports
 Reproductive Medicine (Reprod. Med.)
 Resources
 Risks
 Robotics
 Safety
 Sci
 Scientia Pharmaceutica (Sci. Pharm.)
 Sensors
 Separations
 Sexes
 Signals
 Sinusitis
 Smart Cities
 Social Sciences
 Societies
 Soil Systems
 Solids
 Sports
 Standards
 Stats
 Stresses
 Surfaces
 Surgeries
 Sustainability
 Sustainable Chemistry
 Symmetry
 Systems
 Taxonomy
 Technologies
 Telecom
 Textiles
 Thermo
 Tomography
 Tourism and Hospitality
 Toxics
 Toxins
 Transplantology
 Trauma Care
 Tropical Medicine and Infectious Disease (TropicalMed)
 Universe
 Urban Science
 Uro
 Vaccines
 Vehicles
 Veterinary Sciences
 Vibration
 Viruses
 Vision
 Water
 Women
 World
 World Electric Vehicle Journal (WEVJ)

                                          
All Article Types

Search

Advanced
Journals 
 
Laws 
 
Volume 3 
 
Issue 1 
 
10.3390/laws3010012 

shareannouncementthumb_up
0

textsms
1

last_page
settings
Open AccessArticle

The Aegean Dispute in the Context of Contemporary Judicial Decisions on

Maritime Delimitation
by 

Petros Siousiouras
 and

Georgios Chrysochou
 *

Department of Shipping, Trade and Transport, University of the Aegean, Korai 2a Street, Chios 82100, Greece
*

Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.

Laws 2014, 3(1), 12-49; https://doi.org/10.3390/laws3010012
Received: 19 October 2013 / Revised: 4 December 2013 / Accepted: 6 January 2014 / Published: 14 January
2014
Download PDF  
 Browse Figures
 
Citation Export

Abstract
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the principal international law document,
which regulates the establishment of the maritime economic zones, namely the Continental Shelf (CS) and the
Exclusive Economic Zone (ΕΕΖ) as well as any issues that may come up during their delimitation. Maritime
delimitation issues are settled either through state agreements or through legal redress before the respective
international tribunals. In this context, the aim of this paper is to elaborate on the delimitation prospect concerning a
Greek CS/EEZ based on contemporary conventional and customary international law of the sea, in addition to
contemporary judicial decisions. More specifically, the analysis focuses on dispute issues in the region of the Aegean
Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, between Greece and its neighboring country Turkey, concerning the CS/EEZ
delimitation. An attempt is made to critically compare this case to the outcome of recent relevant international judicial
decisions by highlighting not only the common points but also any differences and complexities. The main purpose is
to render the reader aware of the special treatment needed for the case in question, with the expectation for a fair
future delimitation of the Greek maritime economic zones.
Keywords: Maritime Delimitations; Greek Continental Shelf; Greek EEZ; Turkey; UNCLOS; International Court
of Justice (ICJ)

1. Introduction: The Aegean Maritime Dispute

The Aegean dispute is a set of interrelated controversial issues between Greece and Turkey over sovereignty
and pertinent rights in the area of the Aegean Sea. This set of conflicts has had a large effect on Greek-Turkish
relations since the 1970s. It has twice led to crises coming close to the outbreak of military hostilities: in 1987 and
once again in early 1996. The issues in the Aegean fall into several categories, including among them the
delimitation/expansion of the Greek territorial waters from 6–12 nautical miles (nm), along with the delimitation and
exploitation of the Continental Shelf (CS). The latter has been lately approached closely linked, yet in controversy,
from the need of EEZ delimitation between the two countries in the general context of the EEZ delimitation in the
Eastern Mediterranean. Since 1998, the two countries have been getting closer to overcoming the tension through a
series of diplomatic measures, particularly with a view to ease Turkey’s accession to the European Union. However,
up to date, differences over an applicable solution remain unresolved.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the delimitation prospect of a Greek EEZ/CS through the provisions of
the modern International Law of the Sea and the recent relevant judicial decisions of competent international law
courts. To accomplish that, it was considered prudent to start with a notional combined approach of the maritime
economic zones and their delimitation procedure before analyzing the relevant issues between Greece and Turkey in
the light of international jurisprudence. Finally, some useful conclusions will be drawn. The reason for making this
combined approach is firstly the confidence of the authors that the modern state and judicial practice necessitates in
its majority the simultaneous delimitation of both EEZ and CS up to the limit of 200 nm in a single maritime boundary,
where possible. Secondly, the introduction of the EEZ in International Law through the provisions of UNCLOS has in
a certain degree provided a supplementary field to the CS legal regime, constituting a unique field of law related to
the maritime zones of sovereign rights.

2. Notional Combined Approach of the EEZ and the Continental Shelf

According to UNCLOS, the EEZ is a maritime zone which can extend up to 200 nm. Hereinto, the coastal state
can exercise its sovereign rights upon the continental shelf up to 200 nautical miles (nm) for research and exploitation
purposes [1], except when the Continental Shelf extends beyond 200 nm [2]. Furthermore, it can exercise a series of
exclusive rights, such as fishing and preservation of the natural resources of the EEZ waters, as well as the
production of energy by water tides, currents and winds [3]. It is noted however that, despite the advantages coastal
states gained with the introduction of the EEZ, all third states, coastal and landlocked maintained the rights dictated
by articles 58(1) and 87, namely the freedom of navigation, right of over-flight, laying of submerged cables, fishing
and conducting scientific research. It is noteworthy that the extension of coastal state jurisdiction in the EEZ limited by
36% the open sea, accumulating in their favor 95% of world fishery [4]. Along with the adoption of the EEZ came the
problem of its delimitation, given the close linkage of the Continental Shelf and the EEZ. According to UNCLOS
article 74(1), the EEZ delimitation between states with adjacent or opposite coasts, is regulated following an
agreement, aiming to achieve a fair solution (equitable result). In cases where reaching an agreement is not possible,
according to UNCLOS Part XV, the interested parties must resort to conciliation for the settlement of the difference
(article 74(2)).
The EEZ delimitation line needs to identify with the corresponding line of the Continental Shelf (CS), to the
degree that the same sovereign rights in the seabed and the submerged lands of the continental shelf are recognized
in favor of the coastal state [5]. Self-evidently, having in mind the obscurity of the clauses concerning the EEZ
delimitation and given the overlap of the CS zone and the EEZ, the international application and the corresponding
case-law, the clauses on the CS delimitation are applied mutatis mutandis for the EEZ, with the following highlights:
the equity provided by UNCLOS for the delimitation of overlapping CSs [6], results in the median line being the main
delimitation line (as a general customary delimitation rule). It is also necessary to point out that the principle of equity
as a delimitation method has a technical character, when compared to the median line or to equidistance [ 7]. The
above are much more valid in the case of the EEZ; to the degree the standard of the distance from the land deadens
the corresponding geological standard (natural prolongation) of the CS. At this point, it is reminded that the Geneva
Convention (1958) on the Continental Shelf (CSC) defines the legal CS by emphasizing on the geological standard,
an emphasis based on the Truman Declaration influence, particularly for the point referring to the geological linkage
of the coastal state and the bottom of the sea [8]. On the other hand, UNCLOS by introducing invariable standards for
the EEZ and Continental Shelf delimitation (in particular the equidistance standard), limited to a minimum any
controversies its estimation could cause [9], while fortifying the equidistance rationale during delimitation [10]. In favor
of this reasoning is the fact that the distance standard is the decisive one for the CS measurements well until the 200
nm, whereas the geological standard maintains its importance only for the CS extending beyond the 200 nm margin
[11].

3. The Continental Shelf/EEZ Issue between Greece and Turkey and the Respective National
Positions
The particular dispute issue has come into question since November 1973, when the Turkish government
allotted fuel research zones to the Turkish State Petroleum Company in the area located among the Greek islands of
Lesbos, Skiros, Limnos and (west of) Samothrace. In July 1974, it issued new permits extending this zone to the
West and claimed a new narrow portion of the continental shelf located between the Greek island clusters of the
Dodecanese and the Cyclades. Greece strongly protested against these two decisions. The positions of the two
countries concerning the issue in question are of significant interest for the maritime delimitation law.
Greece’s positions on the Continental Shelf issue are claimed to be based on the following applicable
provisions of the Law of the Sea, both Conventional and Customary:
i. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides for exclusive rights  ipso
facto and ab initio of a coastal state on its continental shelf which has a minimum breadth of 200 nm, provided the
distance between opposing coasts allows for this. Greece ratified this Treaty in 1995 (Law 2321/1995), which
according to the Constitution supersedes any provision to the contrary and as the newest law takes precedence over
the older.
ii. In accordance with the UNCLOS all islands have a right to territorial waters, a contiguous zone, an Exclusive
Economic Zone and a Continental Shelf [12]. These zones are determined in accordance with the general provisions
of UNCLOS, as those are implemented in mainland regions. This general rule is customary law as well and is thus
binding even for non-signatory states to the Convention. Therefore, all Greek islands are entitled to a continental shelf
according to the Law of the Sea.
iii. Within this framework, a Continental Shelf delimitation issue can only be raised between the coast of Greek
islands across Turkey and the Turkish coast.
iv. With regard to the delimitation method, Greece has firmly argued that this delimitation must be based on
international law, governed by the principle of equidistance/median line [13].
The above stance for the delimitation principle is in accordance with the Hellenic position well before the
ratification of the UNCLOS by her side, since it is relied on Article 6(1), (2) of the Continental Shelf Convention (CSC)
of 1958 (in which Greece has also been a party), which states that:
‘Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each
other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between
them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the
boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental
shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary
line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of
equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is
measured.’
[14]
 The above argument is depicted in Figure 1. According to Turkey, Greek islands do not have rights to exert
jurisdiction on the continental shelf, because they are located on the Turkish continental shelf. The special
circumstances mentioned by the CSC (which Turkey has never signed) [15] justified, according to the Turkish opinion
(See Figure 1), the non-application of the median line method. Noting that the different positions were not being
bridged, Greece submitted the controversy to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in August 1976, but Turkey
refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court, leading the latter to declare itself incompetent. Since then, the
maritime issue has remained unsolved and has been aggravated by certain arguments on territoriality [16]. The
contemporary Turkish positions on the issue in question comprise a composite agenda [17] as follows:
i. The dispute according to the Turkish view concerns continental shelf areas beyond the 6 mile territorial sea in
the Aegean.
ii. Turkey claims to stand ready to engage in a dialogue with Greece aiming to achieve an  equitable
settlement to the best interest of both countries.
iii. Turkey highlights the arguably ‘binding’ character of the Bern Agreement on November 11, 1976 with
Greece, where the parties decided to hold negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement on the delimitation of the
Continental Shelf. Under the terms of this Agreement, the two governments have, inter alia, assumed the obligation to
refrain from any initiative or act concerning the Aegean Continental Shelf.
iv. Furthermore, despite her denial of the ICJ jurisdiction in 1976, Turkey claims to positively examine the
solution of the ICJ, by invoking its decision taken in 1982 in the Tunisia-Libya case, stating that ‘ delimitation is to be
effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles and taking into account all relevant circumstances’
[18].
Figure 1. The Turkish Continental Shelf according to the Greek view (in orange) and the Turkish view (intermittent
line).

In order to justify her claimed delimitation line of Figure 1 as equitable, Turkey has argued that the Aegean Sea
is a semi-enclosed sea with many Greek islands located all around a small area, with many of them located very near
the Turkish mainland, some just 3 miles off it [19]. It is apparent that attributing them continental shelf areas would,
according to Turkey, create an inequitable result as it would deprive the Turkish mainland almost completely of a
continental shelf area of its own. In addition, many other factors have been reported by Turkish officials as further
justification of their official position. It was argued that the balance of interests which was established between Turkey
and Greece in the Aegean Sea by the Lausanne Peace Treaty [20] should not be disturbed by granting continental
shelf areas to the said Greek islands. In fact, the term ‘balance of interests’ implies a comprehensive list of relevant
circumstances such as security, navigational and commercial interests. Moreover, geomorphologic factors, as
analysed further down, are considered by Turkey as another justification for its suggested delimitation line.
 Over and above, according to the Turkish approach, the CS issue in the Aegean constitutes only a part of the
Aegean Issue. In this way, Turkey seems to implement a diplomatic maneuver in order to present a number of extra
dispute issues of a debatable legal nature, such as territorial arguments and ‘grey-zones’, along with the CS issue for
which, as she claims, is ready to either negotiate with Greece or to mutually resort to an international court [21].
As previously highlighted, the concept of the Continental Shelf is closely connected to the one of the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ), with the latter referring to a littoral state’s control over fishery and other similar rights [ 22].
Thus, the essence of the dispute between Turkey and Greece refers to the degree that the Greek islands off the
Turkish coast should be taken into account for determining the Greek and the Turkish Economic Zone.
Turkey argues that the notion of the Continental Shelf, by its very definition, implies that distances should be
measured from the continental mainland, meaning that the sea-bed of the Aegean geographically forms a natural
prolongation of the Anatolian land mass [23]. In the same context, according to the Turkish aspect the delimitation of
the EEZs in the Eastern Mediterranean should follow the principle of natural prolongation, thus not awarding any EEZ
effect or CS effect to the islands of the Eastern Aegean and especially to the Dodecanesian small island of
Kastelorizo, which is vital for the Greek national interests, as its influence, if recognized, can connect the Hellenic
EEZ to the Cypriot EEZ (See Figure 2).

Figure 2. The Turkish view with regard to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) delimitations in the Eastern
Mediterranean [24].
 Greece, on the other hand, claims that all islands must be taken into account on an equal basis for a full effect
when it comes to maritime economic zones (See Figure 3) [25]. In this matter, Greece claims to have the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on its side, as mentioned above at the introduction of her
official position. Indeed, UNCLOS provides that islands (with the exception of ‘rocks’) have the right to generate all
the maritime zones recognized under international law regardless of their size [26]. However, this capacity to
generate their own maritime zones should not be confused with the effect accorded to them in maritime delimitation
cases judged by the international competent tribunals. In the latter case, the impact of an island will usually depend
on various factors, such as the special circumstances of a case and the achievement of an equitable result through
the drawing of the maritime boundary between the States concerned [27]. In this context, the Law of the Sea
Convention seems to have kept a certain degree of silence as far as the methods of delimiting maritime spaces are
concerned. UNCLOS provisions on maritime delimitation issues offer predictability and flexibility up to a certain
degree. The Convention provides some basic principles, such as the achievement of an equitable result and leaves
to the judges to deal with the particularities of each case.

Figure 3. The Greek view for a speculative Greek EEZ with full effect of the Greek Islands.
 Moreover, the fact that Turkey is not a signatory party of the UNCLOS further complicates the situation. Turkey
decided to vote UNCLOS down because she failed to pass her positions during the Third Conference of the United
Nations, which took place before the final formulation of UNCLOS provisions. In detail, Turkey’s stance at the Third
Conference reflected its anxiety to validate its fixed geopolitical claims at the Aegean Sea. At first, Turkish diplomats
attempted to pass at the conference specific ad hoc regulations for the semi-closed seas. When they failed, they
focused their arguments on the Aegean Sea. According to Turkey, as already mentioned above, the Aegean Sea is a
semi-closed sea [28] with particular geographic and geologic features, a large number of islands, islets androcks very
close to the Asia Minor shores in addition to the shape of the sea bottom in general [29]. The combination of all these
characteristics constituted according to the Turkish view a ‘special circumstance’ which necessitated special
treatment which in turn dictated that Turkey should be excluded from all general regulations of the Law of the Sea.
Any issues had to be tackled by applying ad hoc agreements, which would take under consideration this ‘special
circumstance’. For Turkey, the ideal solution based on the aforementioned circumstances was and still remains, the
median line between the Greek shores (Thessaly, Central Greece and Peloponnesus) and the Turkish shores, which
would mean splitting the Aegean along the 25th meridian. [30].

4. Principles and Factors Influencing Maritime Delimitations with Regard to the Greek-Turkish
Case
The silence of the Convention on the methods of delimiting maritime spaces has been progressively covered by
the jurisprudence of the ICJ and more recently of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which
have established applicable principles; the Courts have thus defined the notions of equidistance/special
circumstances for the delimitation of the territorial sea, and of equitable principles/relevant circumstances for the
continental shelf and the EEZ, which involve—to simplify matters—tracing a provisional median line to check if the
result is equitable. Considering the many special circumstances presented by the Turkish claims for the Aegean Sea,
an analyst may suppose that the result in this case would not be equitable. However, several decisions regarding
contentious cases highlight useful guidelines for the delimitation of the maritime spaces. In that sense, the applicable
law and jurisprudence developed in recent years may thus determine the main principles in delimiting the maritime
space of the Aegean Sea, while taking into consideration the fundamental concerns of the two states (equity,
security).
In more detail, according to UNCLOS, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, states may not extend their
territorial seas beyond the median, or equidistance line, unless there are historic or other ‘special’ circumstances that
dictate otherwise’[31]. This ‘equidistance [32] / special circumstances’ [33] rule has been accepted by the ICJ as
customary international law within the judgments produced throughout its recent judicial history [34] and it seems
clear that only in exceptional cases will the equidistance line not form the basis and the starting point of the boundary
between overlapping territorial seas. The emergence of the distance principle gives pertinence in normal situations to
the equitable method of the equidistance/median line. However, the terms equidistance and median line have
disappeared from the text of the Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS (1982), which concern the delimitation basic
provisions for the EEZ and CS, respectively, and state that:
i. ‘The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone/(continental shelf) between States with opposite or adjacent
coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution’.
ii. ‘If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States concerned shall resort to the
procedures provided for in Part XV’ (UNCLOS provisions for dispute settlement).
The aforementioned terms have remained only in Article 15 of UNCLOS, which concerns the delimitation of the
Territorial Sea, as previously mentioned. Nevertheless, in spite of its diminishing role, equidistance found its way into
State practice. The majority of bilateral treaties on maritime delimitation still use a line based on simplified or modified
equidistance. In fact, in most ICJ cases and arbitral awards, judges found it convenient to use the equidistance line
as the starting point of the delimitation process [35]. The same approach had been adopted by the Geneva
Convention for the Continental Shelf (CSC) (1958) [36] concerning the delimitation of overlapping continental
shelves, but its application in this context has been proven blurred, debatable and prone to modification during the
relevant cases of the following years [37]. To start with, in the North Sea case, Denmark and the Netherlands argued
that Article 6 CSC represented customary law and that should have been the reason for legally binding Germany, a
non-state party to the Convention. The result of that claim, if applied, would have meant that Germany’s concave
coastline, trapped between Denmark and Norway, would have restricted Germany to a modest area of continental
shelf. Therefore, the ICJ decided that Article 6 did not reflect customary law and the delimitation of the Continental
Shelf had to be conducted on the basis of equitable principles, taking account of the relevant circumstances [38].
Thus, a period of confrontation started between the supporters of the more formulaic equidistance/special
circumstances approach and the supporters of the arguably more flexible ‘equitable principles/relevant
circumstances’ [39] view. However, relevant circumstances have never been the sole disseminator and self-sufficient
factor in delimitation. They often appeared to operate only within a framework of equitable principles or equidistance
[40]. This led, at a premature stage, to a first consideration that although Article 6 CSC and custom were different, the
practical result of their application would be the same [41]. That confrontation continued during the sessions of the
Third United Conference on the Law of The Sea (1973–1982), where groups of states championed the approach they
considered best suited for their interests. The last days of the Conference, as no consensus could be found, thanks to
the head of the Greek government delegation [42], an anodyne formula (short formula) was adopted, applicable to
both EEZ and Continental Shelf: such delimitations are to be ‘…effected by agreement on the basis of international
law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an ‘equitable
solution’ [43]. This provision, which is included in Article 83(1) UNCLOS III, defines the three cornerstones of the
continental shelf delimitation basic rule between states with opposite or adjacent coasts: a) delimitation by
agreement, b) delimitation based on international law and finally c) delimitation which constitutes (aiming at) an
equitable (fair) solution. By the formulation of the third element—delimitation which constitutes an equitable solution—
it is becoming evident that the equitable solutions do not constitute a shelf-inclusive (autotelic) principle, but only a
final result which must be attained infra (secundum) legem, as it is proclaimed by the reference of the aforementioned
provisions to Article 38(1) ICJ Statute. In that sense, and, avoiding mentioning the notions equidistance, equitable
principles and special or relevant circumstances, a widely accepted provision has been established. This however
seems to be devoid of content, emphasizing the result and its equitableness rather than the method, the principles or
the judicial methodology, when there is no agreement in place [44].
However, in 1993 and 1999 in the Jan Mayen and Eritrea-Yemen cases, respectively, the ICJ ended up in a
very important statement: ‘Prima facie, a median line delimitation between opposite coasts results in general in an
equitable solution’ [45]. As for the adjacent coasts, although the above mentioned position is not quite clear
concerning the use, in analogy, of the equidistance as the starting point for the delimitation, however, the relatively
recent judgments of the ICJ in the Qatar v Bahrain ([34], p. 230) and the Cameroun v Nigeria [46] cases suggest that
this has been thereafter the most common position. This position, concerning the equidistance as the sole starting
method, was further solidified in the 2006 Arbitration Award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) concerning
the case of Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, when it stated that ‘[W]hile no method of delimitation can be
considered of and by itself compulsory, and no court or tribunal has so held, the need to avoid subjective
determinations requires that the method used start with a measure of certainty that equidistance positively ensures,
subject to its subsequent correction if justified’ [47].
Nevertheless, despite the view that equidistance should provide the starting point, this does not necessarily
mean it will be the finishing line as well. The whole field of formulations of that rule suggests that it can be modified to
take into account certain other factors. That was also noted in the aforementioned PCA Award by stating that ‘ The
determination of the line of delimitation thus normally follows a two-step approach. First, a provisional line of
equidistance is posited as a hypothesis and a practical starting point. While a convenient starting point, equidistance
alone will in many circumstances not ensure an equitable result in the light of the peculiarities of each specific case.
The second step accordingly requires the examination of this provisional line in the light of relevant circumstances,
which are case-specific, so as to determine whether it is necessary to adjust the provisional equidistance line in order
to achieve an equitable result’ ([47], para. 242). Among the relevant factors whose categories may vary accordingly to
the specific case, close attention is usually paid to setting clear that areas appertaining to each state are not
disproportionate to the ratio between the lengths of their relevant coasts adjoining the area. In addition, the existence
of islands that can generate claims to maritime economic zones of sovereign rights, such as the continental shelf or
the EEZ, constitutes a complicating factor and their impact upon the equidistance line can be reduced or discounted
in numerous ways [48]. In general, along the whole field of relevant circumstances, the quest for neutral criteria of a
geographical character has eventually prevailed over area-specific criteria such as geomorphologic aspects or other
factors of economic nature such as resource-specific criteria (i.e. distribution of fish stocks), with some exceptions
([47], para. 228). Therefore, judicial practice has shown that non-geographical factors, such as economic factors,
state-practice of the Parties or historic rights [49], security concerns, etc. have played so far a modest role in maritime
delimitation cases [50]. Additionally, the geological factor, which used to be considered relevant when the distance
between the coasts was more than 400 nm, for distances less than this limit, it is not consider relevant lately [51].
Consequently, the aforementioned evolution of the maritime delimitation law, has resulted in the genesis of a
contemporary formulaic concept of maritime delimitations between opposite and adjacent states, arguably creating a
kind of a step-based methodology and a clearer, as much as possible, aspect of the factors affecting delimitation—
yet not a common applicable rule [52]. The very recent cases of ICJ and ITLOS (International Tribunal for the Law Of
the Sea), namely the cases Nicaragua v. Honduras (ICJ) in 2007, Romania v Ukraine (ICJ) in 2009, Nicaragua v
Colombia (ICJ) in 2012 and Bangladesh v Myanmar (ITLOS) in 2012, are characteristic examples for the
aforementioned evolution. Three of them will be shortly analyzed further down. These case-studies have been
intentionally selected to be analyzed and then linked to the Greek case due to their relevance and applicability to the
general legal context of a potential maritime delimitation in the Aegean (applicable law, maritime zones to be
delimited, impact of geography and islands, potential relevant circumstances, type of methodology to be used etc) as
well as due to the relevant disputing positions and arguments of Greece and Turkey. The general aim is to link the
Greek-Turkish maritime dispute and the prospect of maritime zone delimitation between Greece and Turkey to the
contemporary legal regime for maritime delimitations.
5. First Case-Study: The ICJ Decision in the Black Sea (Romania v Ukraine) and the Effect of
Serpent Island
An issue of great interest as far as delimitations are concerned [53] is the one related with the Ukrainian island
of Serpent, which lies in a distance of approximately 30 nm from the Ukrainian-Romanian land borders, in a way that
significantly affects the median line between the two states (see Figure 4). Because of this island, in September
2004, Romania appealed to the ICJ against Ukraine for the delimitation of their maritime border. The Court stressed
that the dispute between the two countries concerned the establishment of a single maritime boundary delimiting the
CSs and EEZs of the two states in the Black Sea [54]. As for the applicable law and relevant delimitation principles,
the Court stated that ‘The entry into force of UNCLOS as between the Parties in 1999 means that the principles of
maritime delimitation to be applied by the Court in this case are determined by paragraph 1 of Articles 74 and 83
thereof” [55]. The Court also noted that on the basis of determining what constitutes the relevant coasts, the ratio for
the coastal lengths between Romania and Ukraine is approximately 1:2.8 and that the coast of Serpent Island is so
short that it makes no difference to the overall length of the relevant coasts of the Parties ([55], para. 77–105).
Figure 4. The maritime zones claimed around Serpent Island ([55], p. 69).

Concerning the exact delimitation methodology to be followed by the Court, the ICJ stated that when called
upon to delimit the Continental Shelf or Exclusive Economic Zones, or to draw a single delimitation line, the Court
proceeds in defined stages. Thus, at first the Court would establish a provisional delimitation line, using methods that
are geometrically objective and also appropriate for the geography of the area in which the delimitation is to take
place. As for the delimitation between adjacent coasts, an equidistance line would be drawn unless there were
compelling reasons that make it unfeasible in the particular case [56]. As far as opposite coasts are concerned, the
provisional delimitation line would consist of a median line between the two coasts. No legal consequences would
follow from the use of the terms ‘median line’ and ‘equidistance line’ since the delimitation method is the same for
both ([55], para. 115–22).
Following the first stage, the course of the final line should result in an equitable solution according to Articles
74 and 83 of UNCLOS. Therefore, the Court considered at a second stage whether there were factors calling for the
adjustment or shifting of the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable result as in previous cases
([46], p. 441). The Court also made clear that when the line to be drawn covers several zones of coincident
jurisdictions, ‘the so-called equitable principles/relevant circumstances method may usefully be applied, as in these
maritime zones this method is also suited to achieving an equitable result’ [57]. Hence, this was the second part of
the delimitation exercise to which the Court turned, having first established the provisional equidistance line. Finally,
at a third stage, the Court checked if the line (a provisional equidistance line which may or may not be adjusted by
taking into account the relevant circumstances) leads to an inequitable result because of any marked disproportion
between the ratio of the respective coastal lengths and the ratio between the relevant maritime area of each State
compared to the delimitation line [58].
Regarding the effect of Serpent Island in the delimitation procedure, the issue was rather complex, given the
size and the position of Serpent off the Romanian coast (Serpents’ island extents to an area of 0.17 square
kilometers, it is 662 meters long and 440 meters wide, populated for the first time in 2004 by 100 inhabitants. What is
very interesting is that ICJ, to which both countries appealed, did not proceed to the legal characterization of the
small feature as an island or a rock. It is noted that in the first case (island) Serpent would have been entitled,
according to UNCLOS, to full rights concerning the maritime zones, as provided by the Convention, whereas in the
second case (rock) it would have been entitled only to a territorial zone. In its decision, the Court did not characterize
it by merely referring to it as a ‘natural feature called Serpents’ Island’. However, it attributed to it the right of a 12 nm
territorial zone without awarding any effect to the shift of the single maritime boundary line of EEZ and CS
(see Figure 5). The philosophy behind this is simple: should it be explicitly characterized as an island, it would
potentially translate this status into economic zones. On the other hand, it could not be characterized as a rock, given
that a permanent human population resides on it.
In detail, during the selection phase of base points the Court made clear that Serpent Island’s calls for specific
attention to determine the provisional equidistance line. In connection with the selection of base points, the Court
observed that there have been instances when coastal islands have been considered to be parts of a State’s coast
and in particular when a coast is made up of the fringe islands’ cluster [59]. Nevertheless, the important statement of
the Court was that ‘Serpents’ Island, lying alone and some 20 nautical miles away from the mainland, is not one of a
cluster of fringe islands constituting ‘the coast’ of Ukraine. To count Serpent Island as a relevant part of the coast
would amount to grafting an extraneous element onto Ukraine’s coastline; the consequence would be a judicial
refashioning of geography, which neither the law nor practice of maritime delimitation authorizes’ [60]. The Court thus
decided that Serpent cannot be taken to form part of Ukraine’s coastal configuration, considering it inappropriate to
select any base points on Serpent Island for the construction of a provisional equidistance line between the coasts of
Romania and Ukraine. ([55], para. 123–49). Moreover, checking for the relative circumstances that may call for the
shifting of the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an ‘equitable solution’ as required by Articles 74,
paragraph 1, and 83, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS, neither the disproportion between the lengths of relevant coasts nor
the enclosed nature of the Black Sea or the presence of any cutting off effect justified any such of a shifting. In
addition, neither the conduct of the Parties (oil and gas concessions, fishing activities and naval patrols) nor their
security considerations justified for an adjustment of the provisional equidistance line ([55], para. 155–204). Finally,
ascertaining whether the presence of Serpent Island in the delimitation area constitutes a relevant circumstance
calling for an adjustment of the provisional equidistance line or not, the Court decided that it does not, due to the fact
that Serpent could not serve as a base point for the construction of that line between the coasts of the Parties, which
was drawn in the first stage of this delimitation process, since it did not constitute part of the general configuration of
the coast. Hence, it concluded that ‘in the context of the present case, Serpents’ Island should have no effect on the
delimitation in this case, other than that stemming from the role of the 12-nautical-mile arc of its territorial sea ’ ([55],
para. 179–88).
Figure 5. The ICJ decision for the Serpent Island case ([55], p. 133).

6. Second Case-Study: The ITLOS Decision in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v Myanmar) and the
Methodology Followed by the Tribunal for a Single Maritime Boundary
In March 2012, the ITLOS delivered a judgment in its first maritime delimitation case: Dispute concerning
delimitation of the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal
(Bangladesh/Myanmar). That case is part of a couple of maritime delimitation cases involving Bangladesh and its
neighboring countries [61]. It may be noted that ITLOS set out a single maritime boundary delimiting the territorial
seas, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves of the abovementioned States. Thus, both parties had
something to gain from the decision. A short view at the map of the region (See Figure 6) will bring immediately in
the reader’s mind the geographical context of the North Sea continental shelf case, decided by the ICJ in 1969. In
fact, there are at least three similarities between the two cases. The first is the concavity of the coast of one of the
litigant parties. In the North Sea case it was Germany, in this case it is Bangladesh. The second is the role of geology
and the relevance of the natural prolongation concept. The third is the necessity for the judge assigned to the dispute
to exercise law-making functions, something absent from any judicial precedent [62]. Moreover, one of the most
important denotations made by the Tribunal was the prevalence of one maritime zone on another. The Tribunal made
clear that the territorial sea will prevail upon the EEZ: ‘…the Tribunal recognizes that Bangladesh has the right to a 12
nautical miles territorial sea around St. Martin’s Island in the area where such territorial sea no longer overlaps with
Myanmar’s territorial sea. A conclusion to the contrary would result in giving more weight to the sovereign rights and
jurisdiction of Myanmar in its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf than to the sovereignty of Bangladesh
over its territorial sea…’ [63] and that a state may exercise rights in an overlapping area that does not pose
impediments to the other state rights exercised [64].
Figure 6. Geography of the area between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal ([63], p.20).

As far as it concerns the sequence of delimitation, the above is in full accordance to the methodology followed
by ICJ in the Black Sea, plus the delimitation of CSs beyond 200 nm. Accordingly, the Tribunal first divided the
boundary line to be drawn into three parts [65]: the first delimited the territorial seas of the parties; the second
designated their exclusive economic zones and their continental shelves up to 200 nm, while the third mapped out
the continental shelves beyond 200 nm. The reasons for doing this clearly differ. In the case of the territorial sea, the
applicable rule is different from the one applied to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental
shelf [66]. Thereupon, the stages of the ITLOS judicial procedure were the following ones:
At first, the ITLOS delimited the territorial sea between the parties. This delimitation took place according to
Article 15 UNCLOS, which requires that an equidistance line be adopted, unless there are special
circumstances or historic title justifying another delimitation line, thus causing deviation from the common rule [67].
This first provisional equidistance line became the final boundary for this area, since according to ITLOS’ view there
were no special circumstances to justify divergence from it (see Figure 7). St Martin’s Island, part of Bangladesh,
was afforded full effect and was suitably used for plotting the equidistance line ([63], para. 169). This upshot is in
analogy with previous decisions of the ICJ more specifically and with the established State practice, which in its turn
generates customary law. Thus, both customary and conventional international law favors equidistance in the
delimitation of the territorial sea and grants full effect when it comes to islands’ territorial sea rights.
Figure 7. The Tribunal’s territorial sea delimitation ([63], p.57).

Secondly, concerning the delimitation of the single boundary for the EEZ and the Continental Shelf within 200
nm, the applicable law according to the Tribunal denotation, is to be found in the UNCLOS [68], the customary
international law ([63], para. 183) and the respective case-law (judicial decisions) ([63], para.184). Therefore, the
ITLOS adopted the three-step method recently used by the ICJ in the Black Sea [69], according to which it first drew
an equidistance line, it then checked its equitableness in the light of relevant circumstances and finally assessed the
result on the basis of proportionality. The provisional line actually is a modified equidistance line, (see Figure 8) since
ITLOS selected and treated accordingly certain base points to be used ([63], para. 241). Nevertheless, an issue of
great importance is that the Tribunal decided (in analogy with ICJ and the Serpent Island) not to use St Martin’s
Island as a base point, because of the alleged cut-off effect on the projection of Myanmar’s coast ([63], para. 265).
Then, turning to relevant circumstances, the Tribunal accepted Bangladesh’s contention that its concave coast is
relevant [70].
Figure 8. The ITLOS’ provisional equidistance line for the delimitation of EEZ/Continental Shelf ([63], p. 86).

Therefore, it decided to revise accordingly the provisional line, by drawing a geodetic line starting at an azimuth
of 215 from a point on the provisional line close to the coast ([63], para. 331–34). While this was in principle
considered as a relevant circumstance for the purpose of the international law on maritime delimitations, ITLOS did
not attribute any effect with regard to EEZ or Continental Shelf to St Martin’s Island in the end, asserting practical
reasons, namely the alleged cut-off effect ([63], para. 318–19). Geology of the seabed, on the other hand, was
considered to be irrelevant both in law and practice [71]. Favoring this reasoning, the ICJ in the Continental Shelf
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) Judgment stated that the distance standard is the decisive one for the continental
shelf measurements well until the 200 nm limit, whereas the geological standard maintains its importance only for the
continental-self extending beyond the 200 nm margin [51]. This is because the delimitation of a single maritime
boundary is to ‘be determined on the basis of geography and not geology or geomorphology’ ([63], para. 322). The
resulting final line is depicted in Figure 9.
The next assignment of the Tribunal concerned the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm
(extended continental shelf). It was the first time that an international court or tribunal had to address the law and
practice for delimiting such an area. Therefore, ITLOS set the principles and rules not only for this case, but also for
future use. Firstly, it made clear that a court or tribunal having jurisdiction on the basis of UNCLOS XV (1982) can
delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm even in the absence of recommendations by the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and that there are no reasons to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction ([ 63],
para. 363–94). Secondly, the ITLOS defined that natural prolongation for the purposes of Article 76 UNCLOS [72] is
very much the same as the continental margin, as defined in the same article. Thus, only geomorphology (which
describes the seabed) and not geology (which describes the composition of the subsoil) is relevant in determining
whether there is an overlapping of entitlements and thus there is the need to draw a boundary. This is essentially a
confutation of natural prolongation as a geological concept. In that way and with respect to relevant circumstances,
the Tribunal did not accept Bangladesh’s argument on the most natural prolongation. The Tribunal concluded as well
that a significant geological discontinuity is not relevant for determining entitlement ([63], para. 434–38) and that the
geographic origin of the sedimentary rocks is similarly irrelevant ([63], para. 447). On the contrary, concavity of the
coast was considered to be a relevant circumstance ([63], para. 460–61). A worth mentioning part of the ITLOS
judgment is that entitlement to the continental shelf does not rely on any procedural requirements [73]. Thirdly, the
method to be applied for the delimitation of this area was the same as for the single boundary (equidistance/special
circumstances) ([63], para.455). This part of the delimitation is suitably completed by a reference to the
notorious grey area issue. Regarding this, the ITLOS authoritatively affirmed that when, by reason of the employment
of a delimitation method other than the equidistance line, the extended continental shelf of a state, as delimited by a
boundary line, is beneath the EEZ of the other, the latter still exercises all its rights over the water column. In such a
situation, each state, in exercising its rights and obligations, is under an obligation to have due regard to the rights
and obligations of the other ([63], para. 474–76) (see Figure 10).
Figure 9. The ITLOS’ final delimitation line for the EEZ/Continental Shelf ([63], p. 146).
Figure 10. The EEZ/Continental Shelf ‘grey area’ ([63], p. 138).

Finally, in the concluding proportionality test, appropriately stated in the Court’s decision as ‘disproportionality

test’, the Tribunal measured the relevant coasts and the relevant area to be delimited and remarked that
mathematical precision is not needed in delivering the concrete task. Consequently, it supplemented the delimitation
case stating that a ratio of 1:1.42, which is the length of the coasts of each party, to 1:1.54, which is the attributed
area to each one, is not essentially disproportionate ([63], para. 477).

7. Third Case-Study: The ICJ Decision in the Nicaragua v Colombia Case and the ‘Bizarre’ Final
Boundary Line
Following the same concept as in the Black Sea decision, the ICJ reached in November 2012 a decision for
the Nicaragua v Colombia maritime delimitation case. The decision concerned the simultaneous delimitation of the
EEZ and the Continental Shelf between the two states. Nicaragua had appealed to the ICJ against Colombia with the
demand to acquire the sovereignty rights over some islands allegedly claimed to be under Colombia’s sovereignty,
and consequently to proportionately expand its maritime boundaries. The Court finally decided that Colombia would
be the state to have total sovereignty rights over the islands in question (islands Alburquerque, East-Southeast Cays,
Roncador, Serrana, Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo), while at the same time it refused to give to the majority
of them any EEZ or Continental Shelf rights, thus enclaving them in the EEZ of Nicaragua. However, those islands
were eligible to claim territorial sea up to 12 nm [74]. Figure 11 reflects the relevant maritime area as identified by the
Court. The lengths of the relevant coasts were 531 km (Nicaragua) and 65 km (Colombia), a ratio of approximately
1:8:2 in favor of Nicaragua [75].
Figure 11. Relevant maritime area in the Nicaragua v Colombia case as identified by the Court [76].

In detail, the evidence regarding Colombia’s administration acts with respect to the islands and the absence of
any evidence for acts à titre de souverain on the part of Nicaragua provided very strong support for Colombia’s
sovereignty claim over the maritime features in the dispute. The Court also noted that, while not having evidence of
sovereignty, Nicaragua’s conduct with regard to the disputed maritime features, the practice of third states and maps
afford some support to Colombia’s claim. Thus, the Court concluded that Colombia, and not Nicaragua, has
sovereignty over the islands of Albuquerque, Bajo Nuevo, East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Roncador, Serrana and
Serranilla [76].
With regard to the next task of the Court, ICJ noted that there was an overlap between Nicaragua’s entitlement
to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone extending up to 200 nm from its mainland coast and adjacent
islands and Colombia’s entitlement to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone due to the islands over which
the Court has held that Colombia has sovereignty. Thus, the Court was called upon to effect delimitation between the
overlapping maritime entitlements of Colombia and Nicaragua within 200 nautical miles of the Nicaraguan coast ([75],
p. 4). The law applicable to that delimitation was customary international law since Colombia was not a UNCLOS
party. The Court considered that the principles of maritime delimitation enshrined in Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS
and the legal regime of islands set out in UNCLOS Article 121 reflect customary international law ([75], p. 4).
With respect to the entitlements generated by the maritime features, the Court found that Colombia was entitled
to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles around QS 32 at Quitasueño. At the same time, it observed that it had not been
suggested by either Party that QS 32 was anything other than a rock thus incapable of sustaining human habitation
or economic life of its own under Article 121, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS and therefore this feature generated no
entitlement to a continental shelf or exclusive economic zone ([75], p. 7). Accordingly, as for the selection of base
points for the determination of the provisional delimitation line the, the Court held that Quitasueño Island was
unsuitable to be used for the construction of the provisional median line. As stated: ‘The part of Quitasueño which is
undoubtedly above water at high tide is a minuscule feature, barely 1 sq m in dimension. When placing base points
on very small maritime features would distort the relevant geography, it is appropriate to disregard them in the
construction of a provisional median line’ ([75], p. 7). Moreover, it decided not to place a base point on Serrana or
Low Cay Islands. The base points on the Colombian side were therefore located on Santa Catalina, Providencia and
San Andrés islands and on Albuquerque Cays ([75], p. 7).
Although the Court touched upon the issues raised by the Article 121(3) UNCLOS regarding the distinction
between rocks which are entitled only to a territorial sea and all other islands, which are entitled to an EEZ and a
continental shelf, the decision does not fully engage with the distinction as one might have hoped. For example, in the
case of the Serrana Island feature, the Court held that it was unnecessary to determine whether it was an Article
121(3) rock, since it lay within 200 nm of Providencia Island (a non-rock island) and its entitlements, if any, beyond a
territorial sea would entirely overlap with those of Providencia [77]. While the continental shelves of Providencia and
Serrana islands would overlap if both were given a 200nm entitlement, the Court did not award Providencia a full 200
nm entitlement. It is suggested that this should have brought the status of the feature of Serrana back into play;
instead the Court concluded that ‘…its small size, remoteness and other characteristics mean that, in any event, the
achievement of an equitable result requires that the boundary line follow the outer limit of the territorial sea around
the island’([77], para. 238). Thus, although the Court cites its decision in Qatar v Bahrain case that islands,
regardless of their size, generate the same maritime rights as other land territory [34], it relies on the size and other
characteristics of Serrana to deny it any entitlements beyond a territorial sea, whilst at the same time it avoids the
question of whether it is in fact a rock, and thus is only entitled to a territorial sea.
As for the delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf, Nicaragua had requested in its final submission that the
Court delimited the continental shelf including areas beyond 200 nm off the Nicaraguan coast, meaning an extended
or outer continental shelf. As Colombia is not a UNCLOS party, the case had to be decided in accordance with
customary international law. The parties disagreed on the customary law nature of rules regarding the continental
shelf beyond 200 nm [78]. The Court concluded that the claim contained in the final submission by Nicaragua was
admissible ([77], p. 3). However, the court held a neutral half-stance. According to its statement, as the Court was not
presented from the Nicaraguan side with any further official information, except a preliminary one to the Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), it found that, in the proceedings, Nicaragua had not established that it
had a continental margin extending far enough to overlap with Colombia’s 200-nm entitlement to continental shelf,
measured from Colombia’s mainland coast. The Court thus stated it was not in a position to delimit the boundary
between an extended continental shelf for Nicaragua and a Continental Shelf for Colombia [79]. Nevertheless, while
the Court avoided handling the issue of Nicaragua’s extended continental shelf, if the recommendations of the CLCS
eventually indicate that Nicaragua has a continental shelf extending beyond 200 nm, the status of the line indicated
by the Court as the eastern limit of the relevant area will have to be reevaluated.
Regarding the methodology for the maritime zone delimitation followed by the Court, the recent jurisprudence
both of the ICJ (Romania v Ukraine case) and of the ITLOS (Bangladesh v Myanmar case) suggest that the
overlapping continental shelf and EEZ entitlements are to be delimited using a single maritime boundary through the
previously mentioned three-step approach, More analytically, at a first stage, the Court selected the base points and
constructed a provisional median line between the Nicaraguan coast and the western coasts of the relevant
Colombian islands, which are opposite the Nicaraguan coast ([77], pp. 184–204) (see Figure 12).
Secondly, the Court examined the relevant circumstances which may require an adjustment or shifting of the
provisional median line to produce an equitable result. It noted that the substantial disparity between the relevant
Colombian coast and the Nicaraguan one (1:8), as well as the need to avoid any cut-off effect caused by the
delimitation line vis-à-vis the Parties’ coastal projections, were such circumstances. The Court further noted that,
while legitimate security concerns will be borne in mind in determining whether the provisional median line should be
adjusted or shifted, the conduct of the parties, issues of access to natural resources and delimitations already
effected in the area, were not relevant circumstances in the present case. Having thus identified the relevant
circumstances applicable in the specific case, the Court proceeded by way of shifting the provisional median line. In
this context, the Court drew a distinction between that part of the relevant area which lies between the Nicaraguan
mainland and the western coasts of Alburquerque Cays, San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina (opposite
coasts) and the part which lies to the east of those islands (more complex relationship). In the first western part of the
area, the relevant circumstances called for the provisional median line to be shifted eastwards. For this purpose, the
base points located on the Nicaraguan and Colombian islands respectively should have had different weights,
namely, one to one for the Colombian base points and three to one for the Nicaraguan base points. The weighted
line, constructed on this basis, had a curved shape with a large number of turning points ([77], pp. 205–38)
(see Figure 13).
Figure 12. The provisional median line in the Nicaragua v Colombia case ([77], p. 76).
Figure 13. The weighed line in the Nicaragua v Colombia case ([77], p. 86).

The Court considered, however, that to extend that line further north and south would not lead to an equitable
result because it would still leave Colombia with a significantly larger share of the relevant area compared to
Nicaragua, notwithstanding the fact that Nicaragua’s relevant coast is more than eight times the length of Colombia’s
one. This would cut Nicaragua off from areas east of the principal Colombian islands into which the Nicaraguan coast
projects. The Court considered that an equitable result can be achieved by continuing the boundary line along the
parallels of latitude to 200 nm from the Nicaraguan coast. In the north, this line follows the parallel passing through
the northernmost point of the 12-nm territorial sea of Roncador. In the south, the maritime boundary first follows the
12 nm territorial sea of Albuquerque Cays and East-Southeast Cays and then, from the most eastward point of the
latter’s territorial sea, the parallel of latitude. As Quitasueño and Serrana would consequently be left on the
Nicaraguan side of the boundary line, the line of the maritime boundary around each of these features follows the 12
nm territorial sea around them ([77], pp. 229–38) (see Figure 14 and Figure 15).
Figure 14. The simplified weighed line in the Nicaragua v Colombia case ([77], p. 87).

The Court, therefore, reduced the number of turning points and connected them by geodetic lines ([77], pp.
229–38) (see Figure 15).
Figure 15. The final result of the maritime boundary in the Nicaragua v Colombia case ([77], p. 89).

At the end, the Court noted that the boundary line divided the relevant area between the parties in a ratio of
approximately 1:3.44 in Nicaragua’s favor, while the ratio of relevant coasts is approximately 1:8.2. The question
therefore is whether, in the circumstances of the present case, this disproportion was great enough to render the
result inequitable. The Court concluded that, taking account of all the circumstances of the case in question, the
result achieved by the maritime delimitation does not entail such a disproportionality so as to create an inequitable
result ([77], pp. 239–47).
The final result is that in shifting the median line, the Court effectively introduced two parallel lines, enclosing
the larger Colombian islands and enclaving Quitasueño and Serrana islands, with the areas falling outside these lines
awarded to Nicaragua. Consequently, Colombia was granted significantly less maritime entitlements than the ones it
had claimed [80].

8. The Linkages of the Recent ICJ and ITLOS Decisions to the Greek-Turkish Dispute for the
EEZ/Continental Shelf
The aforementioned ICJ and ITLOS decisions have drawn the attention of the Hellenic law and foreign affairs
community due to the Greek-Turkish dispute concerning the impact of the Greek Islands to the Continental Shelf/EEZ
of the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Nevertheless, the parallelism between the three cases and the
Greco-Turkish case sets off some common points as well as significant particularities and differences in case the
dispute is ever judged before an international jurisdictional institution. Firstly, concerning the applicable law, this
would be found in international custom, given that Turkey is not a UNCLOS signatory party. However, due to the fact
that the vast majority of the UNCLOS provisions have assimilated custom and state practice, thus constituting
customary law, the applicable law may also be found in this global Convention, favoring up to a certain degree a
signatory party that complies with its provisions. Secondly, concerning the applicable principles to be taken into
account, the recent judicial practice favors the application of equitable principles/relevant circumstances rather than
the principle of equidistance/special circumstances for the delimitation of CS and EEZ following the general
provisions of UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83. In that sense, the Greek claim for the application of equidistance principle
seems to be more difficulty accepted compared to the respective Turkish claim. However, it is almost certain that the
delimitation process will start with the equidistance/median line rule for the construction of the provisional line for all
maritime zones between Greece and Turkey.
In addition, in relation to the islands’ impact issue, the majority of the islands of the abovementioned cases had
the characteristics of very small maritime features or rocks. For example, Serpent, or some of the rock-shape islands
of Colombia are tiny (Serpent for example is 10 times smaller than the most southeastern Greek island, Kastelorizo,
which may play an important role regarding the extent of Greek and Turkish EEZ and CS in South-Eastern Med.).
Thus, Kasterolizo itself, being a relatively small island, compared to other islands in the Aegean, overtops Serpent
and some of the Colombian islands by much [81]. Similarly, it hardly justifies the same criteria with Serrana Island
(small size and remoteness) not to be selected as a base point for the construction of a provisional equidistance line.
Nevertheless, it may be argued by the Turkish side that Kastelorizo causes a cut-off effect to the opposite coast and
therefore there is the possibility that it is not selected as a base point and potentially awarded with a reduced effect
concerning the economic zones since it could seem to be situated relatively far from the main volume of
Dodecanesian Islands—but in a significantly shorter distance than the ‘wronged’ islands of the aforementioned
cases’. However, such a reduced effect will probably be partially covered by the effect produced by the arc of Crete
and Dodecanese. All the same, the majority of the abovementioned cases’ islands was sparsely populated (Serpent
for example is inhabited by 100 residents), whereas the grand majority of the Greek islands is much larger in terms of
size and population (even the ‘small’ Kastelorizo has the quadruple number of residents since antiquity).
Furthermore, the position of the Greek Islands in the Aegean Sea calls forth a stronger effect due to their projection
on the opposite Turkish coast because of the archipelagic form of the Aegean. Furthermore, this stands true because
although the Aegean is not an archipelago according to the definition of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), so Greece is not considered to be an archipelagic state; however, the archipelagic shape of the
Aegean Sea is a reality which needs to be taken under consideration in favor of the coastal state which has this
archipelago. This is much more the case since this archipelagic form ensures the political and economic unity of the
insular space with the mainland which lay in a very close distance leaving small spaces of open seas [ 82]. This is
particularly evident in comparison to the Nicaragua v Colombia case where the small islands of Colombia are
completely cut-off the mainland in a comparatively long distance from it. Consequently, there is no room for great
similarities in that sense.
It could generally be said that the ICJ recognition of a 12 nm territorial zone for the tiny Serpent Island
combined to its small population, offers some gratification to the Greek arguments. This gratification however is not
great for Greece, given that there was a permanently situated population on the island, it was thus proven that it can
sustain human population and therefore is an island. Consequently, it should arguably be selected as a base point for
the construction of the provisional equidistance line as well as be entitled to economic zones in a certain degree.
 Besides, the fact that the ICJ did not link its decision to refuse the establishment of an EEZ for Serpent on the
reasoning that the Black Sea is a semi-enclosed sea, is of great interest for Greece, given that if that was the case, it
could create in a way res judicata in favor of the Turkish position in the Aegean Sea. A position which does not
recognize EEZ rights or continental shelf zones for the Greek Islands due to the alleged semi-enclosed character of
the Aegean Sea, despite the fact that the Aegean is not a semi-enclosed sea per se but belongs to the
Mediterranean, which in its turn is a semi-enclosed one. Nevertheless, the Court did not deviate from the general
provisions of UNCLOS, which handles semi-enclosed seas with no differentiation when it comes to the economic
zones’ rights of the islands. However, the claim by the Turkish side for consideration of its alleged security and
legitimate concerns in the Aegean might reflect a relevant circumstance in the opinion of a Court. Nevertheless, the
degree of the respective effect in the construction of a boundary line will probably be low as it derives from the
treatment of this particular factor in the majority of the relevant recent judicial cases.
Moreover, the very concise treatment of relevant circumstances issue in the Bangladesh v Myanmar case by
ITLOS is surprising. Relevance of concavity is discussed in the light of previous case law for the purpose of the
respective effect made by the coastal projection, although the conclusion of the Tribunal on this point is very terse.
On the other hand, geology and the argument of natural prolongation are very hurriedly dismissed. This is justified
since the majority of the recent judicial cases’ geography overtops geology or other geomorphologic factors in terms
of their determination as relevant circumstances, at least up to the limit of the 200 nm from the baselines. In that
sense, the argument of natural prolongation, raised by the Turkish side may not be consider to be a relevant
circumstance.
Finally, both the ITLOS Bangladesh v Myanmar case and the ICJ Nicaragua v Colombia cases have generally
highlighted that concerning the single maritime boundary for the delimitation of the EEZ and the Continental Shelf up
to 200 nm, the line finally drawn does appear to be somewhere in between the claims of the two parties and does not
seem particularly inequitable for either. However, that practice might not be the rule in a potential delimitation of a
Greek-Turkish EEZ since the Aegean Islands together with the mainland constitute a length of coasts that by far
outflanks the length of the opposite Turkish coast. However, if there was a likelihood to be applied in proportion, the
12 nm territorial sea—instead of 6 nm which is currently the boundary—that the Greek Islands should be legitimately
be entitled to, would create a large ‘Greek Aegean territorial sea’ (see Figure 16) and EEZ/CS, respectively.
Figure 16. Greek and Turkish territorial sea width in the Aegean in the context of 6 and 12 nm Greek territorial sea
limit, respectively [83].

Nevertheless, these recent cases pointed out that although the delimitation of the territorial sea seems to follow
the provisions of Article 15 UNCLOS in almost every recent judicial case, at the same time every delimitation case
concerning the Continental Shelf or the EEZ (or the total package of EEZ-CS) is unique, rendering the formulation of
a general applicable rule impossible, thus leaving no room for a confident prediction regarding the Greek-Turkish
case.

9. The Prospect of a Greek Exclusive Economic Zone and its Delimitation Aspects
Taking into account the previously noted international jurisprudence details for maritime delimitations, it is
reasonable to think that Greece arguably has a strong legal position concerning the delimitation of its Continental
Shelf and that the delimitation of an EEZ and the Continental Shelf in a single maritime boundary basis is a viable
method of resolving its dispute with Turkey in the Aegean Sea. A Greek EEZ in the Aegean Sea is favored by the fact
that Greece has a total of 3,100 islands, of which 2,463 are in the Aegean. By comparison, Turkey only has three
islands in the Aegean. A reason that most coastal states have unilaterally adopted the 200 nm EEZ is to counteract
overexploitation of their coastal fish stocks. A large part of the Greek fishing fleet has traditionally operated in waters
outside the Greek coasts and especially in the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. Now that many states are
establishing EEZs of their own, Greek fishermen have lost access to traditional fishing grounds. A Greek EEZ,
therefore, would be beneficial to the fishing sector of the country as well [84]. Moreover, up to date, there are 127
nations that already possess either an EEZ or an Exclusive Fishing Zone (EFZ) of 200 nm, while UNCLOS provides
for an EEZ regime in which there are no restrictions prohibiting islands from having such a zone [85].
 Over and above, at the end of 1986, Turkey unilaterally proclaimed a 200 nm EEZ in the Black Sea. This move
was in accordance with the provisions of the UNCLOS, which Turkey has not signed so far. Concurrently, Turkey
reached an agreement on the delimitation of the EEZ with the Soviet Union. Ankara agreed that the CS boundary,
which was established by the Soviet-Turkish Delimitation Agreement of 1978, was also valid for delimitation of their
EEZs [86]. This agreement used the equidistance method; there were no provisions of special circumstances or any
reference to enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. Thus Turkey, by accepting through this practice the concept of the
EEZ, as developed through UNCLOS, has complicated its position vis-a-vis Greece, because the Black Sea is a
semi-enclosed sea with many similarities to the Aegean. [87]. Turkey reached similar agreements with Bulgaria and
Romania concerning the delimitation of their respective EEZs in the Black Sea (see Figure 17). In the discussions
between Turkey and Bulgaria, the Turkish side argued that no special circumstances apply to the Black Sea [88].
Turkey appears to implement a double standard position regarding the treatment of two seas (Black and Aegean),
which is probably difficult to defend; it is rather an attempt to make a clear differentiation between delimitation of its
maritime boundaries in the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea according to national interest commands and the alleged
‘security concerns’ [89]. The same stands for the territorial sea limit of Turkey, which extends up to 12 nm in the Black
Sea region as well as in South-Eastern Mediterranean, while it is 6 nm in the Aegean in order to ground the threat of
war (casus-belli) against Greece, should the latter state extent its territorial sea limit from 6–12 nm [90]. However, it is
hard for a state to construct a convincing argument by selectively choosing parts of the UNCLOS according to its
liking, combined with implied acts of aggression against a state which merely wants to apply the provisions of the
Convention regarding its legitimate right to territorial sea.

Figure 17. The EEZ delimitations in the Black Sea among Turkey and the neighboring countries based on the
equidistance method.
 However, if the issue of the expansion of Greek territorial waters is raised before an International Court of Law,
the Court would probably follow the pattern of arbitration applied between France and the United Kingdom, in which it
awarded a zone of 12 nm around the Channel Islands even though the UK had maintained a 3 nm territorial sea
since 1878 [91]. Although one cannot conclude that a 12 nm zone around islands is the rule of thumb for further
delimitations, it is clear that the Continental Shelf or EEZ of an island cannot be less than the internationally
recognized maximum territorial sea [92]. If a zone of 12 miles is awarded to the eastern Greek Islands, Turkey’s
Continental Shelf would also be limited. Turkey would approximately receive only 2–4 percent of the total area of the
Aegean continental shelf under the 1982 Convention. However, since the ICJ has lately given emphasis to equity
principles, the maximum area that Turkey could receive would arguably be 10–15 percent of the total Continental
Shelf area of the Aegean, assuming that the Greek islands are entitled at least to a 12 nm zone, which should be the
case.

10. Conclusions
As it derives from the analysis, a single maritime boundary is a very reasonable solution for most states, thus
for Greece and Turkey as well. In reality, it could prove to be a negotiation nightmare to first reach a settlement
through a difficult process of compromises for one maritime boundary and then start another process in order to
negotiate a settlement for the next maritime boundary/zone. Therefore, the single maritime boundary solution seems
to be a reasonable outcome of the coastal state jurisdiction extension over the resources of the EEZ and the
alignment of the jurisdiction with preexisting rights over the continental shelf. Also, the ICJ in its judgment in the
Libya-Malta case asserted that ‘…the two institutions—continental shelf and exclusive economic zone—are linked
together in modern law. Since the rights enjoyed by a state over its continental shelf would also include the seabed
and subsoil of any exclusive economic zone which it might proclaim, one of the relevant circumstances to be taken
into account for the delimitation of the continental shelf is the legally permissible extent of the exclusive economic
zone appertaining to that same state’ [93]. Furthermore, the court stated: ‘…it follows that, for juridical and practical
reasons, the distance criterion must now apply to the continental shelf as well as to the exclusive economic zone; and
this quite apart from the provision as to distance in paragraph 1 of Article 76 UNCLOS’ [51].
Unlike the continental shelf, the EEZ does not exist ipso facto but has to be proclaimed and a request to delimit
the EEZ entails the delimitation of both elements [94]. Therefore, if the Aegean dispute finally reaches the ICJ, a
request has to be made by Greece that the court’s judgment should be directed to the delimitation of both the
continental shelf and the EEZ. This prerequisite should be put in a future agenda for the delimitation of maritime
zones between Greece and Turkey, either through a bilateral agreement, arbitration or better through resorting to the
jurisdiction of the respective International Tribunals; the latter being the designated choice of the authors. Hence,
assuming that the Greco-Turkish differences are of a legal context—and that is the reality—then, according to the
international experience, practice and, moreover, according to the international law, their settlement should take
place before a jurisdictional Court of Justice or another relevant institution [95].
Political methods like negotiations may lead to deviations from the implementation of international law
regulations. The history of such negotiations, like the Continental Shelf agreement between Italy and Greece, does
not apply in the Aegean case due to the long-term tension between Greece and Turkey. Tension that has been
triggered not only by maritime zones issues but perhaps more importantly due to sovereignty claims concerning some
of the Aegean islands Turkey unduly contests. Moreover, the contribution of ICJ in international peace and security is
worth noting, notwithstanding the critique it has received for its questionable decisions enhanced by the
suspiciousness by many states regarding political motivation. Therefore, the national interest of Greece lines up with
the support of the international justice and its institutions [96]. On the other hand, the persistent, denial of Turkey,
counting almost 40 years, to consent to the resolution of the Continental Shelf dispute with Greece before the ICJ
arguably shows an unaccountable state practice in legal and diplomatic terms. The continuant slides into negotiations
that may lead to an agreement for the resolution of the difference in Hague, may demonstrate desire on behalf of
Turkey to enclose Greece in endless dialogues and negotiations as well as in an increasingly widening agenda of
differences, so as to gain numerous collateral profits [97].

Acknowledgements
The authors of this paper would like to acknowledge the contribution of the recent ICJ and ITLOS decisions to
the continuous effort towards a formulation of a progressively more consistent framework of applicable rules with
regard to the maritime zones delimitations, namely the delimitation of EEZ and Continental Shelf. We also thank the
reviewers and the editor of this paper for their generous and thoughtful feedback.

Author Contributions
 Mr. Petros Siousiouras, Assistant Professor of Geopolitics and International Law at the Department of Shipping,
Trade and Transport of the University of the Aegean, contributed in depth to the research and writing process of this
paper by examining and analyzing the legal regime of maritime zones, especially that of Continental Shelf and EEZ in
the conventional and customary international sea law context. His relevant academic and research background to the
discipline of International Law of the Sea as well as his latest research and publishing activity with regard to the
notional approach of EEZ in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, constituted the guiding template for the structure
of the paper.
Mr. Georgios Chrysochou, Lieutenant Commander of the Hellenic Navy and Lecturer of Naval Sciences at the
Hellenic Naval Academy, has been finishing his PhD studies in the domain of International Law of the Sea at the
Department of Shipping, Trade and Transport of the University of the Aegean. He contributed to the research and
writing process of this research paper by analyzing the relevant judicial practice and context on maritime delimitation
cases, with a particular view to their potential linkages to the so-called Aegean Dispute.

Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.

References and Notes

1. UNCLOS, 1982, Articles 56(3), 57 and Part VI on the Continental Shelf.
2. Κostas Oikonomidis. “Primal Regulations of the New Law of the Sea.” International Law and International Politics 9 (1985):
182. (in Greek). [Google Scholar]
3. UNCLOS, 1982, Article 56(1a).
4. Veniamin Karakostanoglou. “Coastal State Rights in the EEZ: Challenges and Perspectives for the Aegean Sea.” In Paper
presented at the Conference proceedings The Aegean Sea and the New Law of the Sea, Rhodes, 4–6 November 1994. (in
Greek).
5. Malcolm D. Evans. Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1989. [Google Scholar]
6. UNCLOS, 1982, Article 83.
7. Christos Rozakis. 1923–1987 Greek-Turkish Relations: The International Legal Regime of the Aegean Sea and the Greek-
Turkish Crisis. The Bilateral and the International Institutional Issue. (in Greek). Athens: Gnosi, 1988, p. 326. [Google
Scholar]
8. Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (CSC), 29 April 1958, Article 1.
9. UNCLOS, 1982, Article 76(1).
10. Anastasia Strati. “The Exclusive Economic Zone.” In The Law of the Sea and Its Application in Greece. Edited by Charitini
Dipla and Christos Rozakis. Athens: Sideris, 2004, p. 176. (in Greek) [Google Scholar]
11. The fundamental turn of the case law was made in the 1985 decision of the International Court on the Case of the Malta-Libya
Continental Shelf, with this turn already apparent in the 1982 International Court decision for the Tunisia-Libya Continental
Shelf (para. 47), where the distance standard was mentioned, following the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, it modified
the geological standard of the rights over the continental shelf. See ILM, Vol. XXIV, no.5, September 1985.
12. “UNCLOS, 1982, Article 121(2). ”
13. For an analytical view on the Hellenic positions regarding the maritime dispute issues in the Aegean see “the Hellenic Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.” Available online: http://www.mfa.gr (accessed on 20 November 2013).
14. Thus, each of the islands of the Aegean Sea has its continental shelf, and the frontiers with Turkey should be defined on the
basis of the median line. See CSC, 29 April 1958, Article 6(2).
15. CSC, 29 April 1958, Article 6(2).
16. Turkey claims in effect that Greece can exercise sovereignty only on the islands that have been nominally ceded by the Treaties
in Force and questions the sovereignty of Athens on the islet of Imia and on the island of Gavdos. This claim was formulated
only in 1996.
17. For an analytical view on the Turkish positions regarding the maritime dispute issues in the Aegean see “the Turkish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. ” Available online: http://www.mfa.gov.tr (accessed on 20 November 2013).
18. “Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya Arab Jamahiriya).” ICJ, Summary of Judgments. 24 February
1982. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/63/6269.pdf.
19. Usel Acer (U.S.A.K.). “The Aegean Issue: Parties and Arguments and the Relevant Delimitation Law.”  The Journal of Turkish
Weekly, 2013. http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/223/the-aegean-issue-parties-arguments-and-the-relevant-
delimination-law-1.html. [Google Scholar]
20. It was stated that: ‘The balance established by the Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1923 still continues to be the basis of the relations
between Turkey and Greece. The continental shelf concept is a new concept in international law which was not foreseen at the
time of the Lausanne Peace Treaty. While trying to give full-effect to this new concept, our present endeavors should be
directed towards the maintenance of the balance so established by the Lausanne Treaty’ (Turkish Ambassador
Bilge. Pleadings, Berne, 31 January 1976, pp. 167–68) as well as that ‘The search for a comprehensive and lasting solution will
 be conducted on the basis of respect for international law and the international agreements which determine the status quo in
the Aegean’ (Prime Minister Yılmaz. BBC SWB, EE/2570 B/9, 26 March 1996).
21. As it is formally stated in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website: ‘Greece advocates that there is no problem
in the Aegean between Turkey and Greece other than the delimitation of the continental shelf which should be resolved only
through recourse to ICJ. This position of Greece namely "one problem-one solution" does not reflect the reality at all.
Therefore, acknowledging only one problem and neglecting the others as well as advocating only one means for a solution in a
selective manner is not a viable option for the peaceful settlement of all these issues. To opt for such a course of action would
no doubt leave the other outstanding issues aside unresolved. With this understanding, Turkey believes that all problems should
be addressed as a whole and stands ready to continue to work towards settlement of the Aegean issues through peaceful means
in accordance with international law… Turkey does not rule out from the outset any peaceful settlement method contained in
the UN Charter Article 33, including having recourse, if necessary, to International Court of Justice or other third party
solutions based on the mutual consent of the both countries’, see supra note 17.
22. Both concepts were developed in the context of international law from the middle of the 20th century, and were codified in the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982.
23. This would mean for Turkey to be entitled to economic zones up to the median line of the Aegean (leaving out, of course, the
territorial waters around the Greek islands in its eastern half, which would remain as Greek exclaves.)
24. Ozturk Bayram, and Sertaç Hami Başeren. “The Exclusive Economic Zone in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and
Fisheries.” Journal of the Black Sea/Mediterranean Environment 14 (2008): 77–83. [Google Scholar]
25. This would mean that Greece would gain the economic rights to almost the whole of the Aegean.
26. UNCLOS, 1982, Article 121(3).
27. Furthermore, neither the size nor the inhabitability of an island is regarded as a special circumstance that calls for an adjustment
of the equidistant line. In fact, the disproportionate effect that the presence of an (small) island produces on the delimitation
line, if taken into account, is what is regarded as a special circumstance. Accordingly, the impact of this maritime feature would
be modified in order to obtain an equitable result.
28. UNCLOS, Articles 122, 123.
29. Κostas Oikonomidis. “The New Convention on the Law of the Sea and Greece: Pros and Cons.”  Greek Institute for Defence
and Foreign Policy 2 (1996): 34. (in Greek). [Google Scholar]
30. Grigoris Tsaltas. “The regime of the Continental Shelf according to the New Convention (1982) on the International Law of the
Sea and the Greek Interest.” International Law and International Politics 9 (1985): 201–02. (in Greek). [Google Scholar]
31. “UNCLOS, 1982, Article 15 (emphasis added). ”
32. The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention defines equidistance as ‘the line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest
points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each of the two States is measured’. See Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1958), Article 12. In addition, the Continental Shelf Convention
(1958) contains a similar definition. This Convention employs the term median line for an equidistant line between opposite
States and refers only to a boundary determined by application of the principle of equidistance in the case of adjacent States.
See CSC, 1958, Article 6.
33. According to the 1958 Conventions, the use of the equidistance method was obligatory in the absence of an agreement,
historical titles or special circumstances. This was called the combined equidistance/special circumstances rule. See Alexander
M. Lewis. “The delimitation of maritime boundaries.” Political geography quarterly, 1986, 22. [Google Scholar]Leonard
Legault, and Blair Hankey. “Method, oppositeness and adjacency, and proportionality in maritime boundary delimitation.”
In International Maritime Boundaries. Edited by Jonathan I. Charney and Alexander M. Lewis. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1993, p. 204. [Google Scholar]Barbara Kwiatkowska. “Equitable maritime delimitation—A legal
perspective.” International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 3 (1988): 300. [Google Scholar] and Prosper Weil. The Law
of Maritime Delimitation-Reflections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 205. [Google Scholar]
34. Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits,
Judgment, ICJ Reports. 16 March 2001, 175–76.
35. A. M. Lewis, L. Legault, B. Hankey, B. Kwiatkowska, and P. Weil. “supra note 10. ”
36. CSC, 1958, Article 6.
37. See more extensively Malcolm D. Evans. Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press,
1989. [Google Scholar] and Prosper Weil. The Law of Maritime Delimitation—Reflections. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989. [Google Scholar]
38. “North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 101(c)1, at 3. ”
39. The study of relevant circumstances has been dominated by perceptions of the role that they play within the delimitation
process. The subject is dominated by the view that relevant circumstances have an effect upon delimitation and that ‘ it is
virtually impossible to achieve an equitable solution in any delimitation without taking into account the particular relevant
circumstances of the area’. See “Tunisia/Libya, Judgment, ICJ Reports.” 1982, 71–72, (emphasis added).
40. Malcolm. D. Evans. “Maritime delimitation and expanding categories of relevant circumstances.” International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 40, no. 1 (1991): 3. [Google Scholar]
41. See the Anglo-French Arbitration, Cmnd 7438, 18 ILM 397 (1977) that generally considered leaning towards the  equitable
principle school of thought.
42. That person was Mr Stavropoulos, who proposed that the delimitation should be doneby an agreement, based on international
law, with the purpose of finding an equitable solution. See Krateros Ioannou, and Anastasia Strati. The Law of the Sea.
Komotini: Sakkoulas, 2003, pp. 351–52. (in Greek) [Google Scholar]
43. UNCLOS, 1982, Article 83(1) (emphasis added).
44. Around that time, the ICJ issued a number of judgments, all of which emphasized the role of equity at the expense of
equidistance, though in a different degree each one. See characteristically Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya),
Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1982, at 18, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment, ICJ Reports,
1984, at 246 and Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1985, at 13.
45. See characteristically Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1993,
para. 64, at 316 and Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, Second phase, Award, 17 December 1999, at 131.
46. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria:Equatorial Guinea Intervening), Merits,
Judgment, ICJ Reports, 2002, at 288.
47. Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration, PCA Award, 11 April 2006, para. 306.
48. For the regime of islands in the International Law of the Sea and their effect in maritime delimitations see extensively Hector
W. Jayawardene. The Regime of Islands in International Law. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990. [Google
Scholar]Jonathan I. Charney. “Rocks that cannot sustain Human Habitation.” The American Journal of International Law 93,
no.4 (2000): 863. [Google Scholar]Faraj A. Ahnish. The International Law of Maritime Boundaries and the Practice of States
in the Mediterranean Sea. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1993. [Google Scholar]Rainer Lagoni, and Daniel Vignes,
eds. Maritime Delimitation. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006.
49. For an example of the irrelevance of the state-practice or the historic title factors as relevant circumstances see  Territorial and
Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, ICJ Reports, 8
Oct 2007.
50. Yoshifumi Tanaka. “Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago maritime delimitation commentary.” The Hague Justice Portal. 5
December 2006. Available online: http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php (accessed on 22 November 2013).
51. Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1985, para. 39, at 13.
52. It has been apparent that courts and tribunals in their judicial procedure have been increasingly refrained from indicating how—
or—why the factors considered relevant combine with the chosen methodology to produce the final line of delimitation,
especially with regard to the delimitation of continental shelf and the EEZ. This has led some theorists to observe that some
judgments do little more than split the difference between competing claims. See characteristically Robin R. Churchill, and
Alan V. Lowe. The Law of the Sea, 3rd ed. Manchester: Manchester University, 1999, p. 191. [Google Scholar]
53. For the maritime delimitations in the Black Sea, see Petros Siousiouras. “The delimitations of Exclusive Economic Zone in the
Black Sea: Law and Geopolitical Dimensions.” In Paper presented at the Conference proceedings Aegean and South-Eastern
Mediterranean. Contemporary Challenges and Perspectives of Sub-Sea Energy Natural Resources Exploitation, Panteion
University, European Centre of Environmental Research and Training, Hellenic Centre of Maritime Research, Athens, 19–20
November 2010. (in Greek).
54. “Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), ICJ Summary of Judgment 2009/2, 3 February 2009, at 3. ”
55. “Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), ICJ Decision No. 2009/9, 3 February 2009, para. 31–42. ”
56. In accordance with its latest jurisdictional decisions and more specifically the Territorial and Maritime Dispute between
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), ICJ, op. cit. para. 281.
57. This was in accordance to its recent decision in the Caribbean. See supra note 56 para. 271.
58. A final check for an equitable outcome entails a confirmation that no great disproportionality of maritime areas is evident by
comparison to the ratio of coastal lengths. This is not to suggest that these respective areas should be proportionate to coastal
lengths—as the Court has said ‘the sharing out of the area is therefore the consequence of the delimitation, not vice
versa’. Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, ICJ Reports,
1993, at 67.
59. “Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Stage of the Proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime Delimitation.”
17 December 1999, RIAA. Vol. XXII, 2001, 367–68.
60. See for example the analogy for the islet of Filfla in the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/Malta), ICJ, op. cit. at 13.
61. The other case is one between Bangladesh and India, which has been submitted to arbitration under Annex VII of the
UNCLOS.
62. In the North Sea case, the ICJ had to determine the rules for the delimitation of the continental shelf according to custom (since
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf was not applicable whereas in the 2012 case ITLOS had to determine the
method for delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200 nm as it was mentioned above. Apart from that, the Tribunal has taken
care to add its little bit to the existing case law and to move it one step forward. The two most evident examples are the
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm and the regime applicable in the so-called grey areas.
63. Dispute concerning delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of
Bengal, (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Case No 16, Judgment, ITLOS, 14 March 2012, para. 169 (emphasis added).
64. As in the case of the EEZ, water column overlapping the continental shelf. See Art. UNCLOS.
65. As it was previously mentioned, this trend has been very common in the recent cases of single maritime boundary delimitations
between adjacent or opposite states after 1993, starting with the Jan Mayen case.
66. In the case of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm, the Tribunal had to first to address the contention by Myanmar that it does
not have jurisdiction and that, even if it had, it should not exercise it. ITLOS then proceeded to delimit each segment on the
basis of the applicable rules and principles. Finally, it evaluated the proportionality of the boundary thus reached in the light of
the ratio between the relevant coasts of the two States and the ratio between the areas attributed to each one of them.
67. For the genesis of the principle of equidistance/special circumstances see analytically the work of International Law
Commission (ILC) from 1951 to 1958 (21 November 1947:foundation of the Commission with the decision 174(II) of UN
General Assembly) for the codification of International Law of the Sea as it is cited in Yves Daudet. “L’article 13, para. 1(a).”
In La Charte des Nations Unies. Edited by Jean P. Cot and Alain Pellet. Paris: Economica, 1985. [Google Scholar] and in
Theodoros Christodoulidis, and Dimitris Mpourantonis, eds. “The Contribution of the UN to the formulation of International
Law of the Sea Rules.” In The United Nations at the Threshold of the Post-Cold War Era. Theodoros Christodoulidis, and
Dimitris Mpourantonis, eds. Athens: Sideris, 1998, pp. 365–79. (in Greek)
68. Particularly for the delimitation of the EEZ between states with adjacent or opposite coasts, according to UNCLOS Article
74(1), it is regulated following an agreement, aiming to achieve a fair solution. In case reaching an agreement is not possible,
according to UNCLOS Part XV, the interested parts must resort to conciliation for the settlement of the difference (Article
74(2)). Anyhow, the EEZ delimitation line needs to identify with the corresponding line of the continental shelf, to the degree
that the very same sovereign rights in the seabed and the submerged lands of the continental shelf are recognized in favor of the
coastal states. See Malcom Evans. Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation, op. cit.
69. According to that concept, maritime delimitation should be effected by taking into account the ratio between the water and CS
areas attributed to each party and the length of their respective coastlines. See ITLOS,  supra note 63, para. 240. See also
analytically Jonathan. I. Charney. “Progress in international maritime boundary delimitation law.”  The American Journal of
International Law 88, no.2 (1994): 241. [Google Scholar]
70. According to the Tribunal’s judgment, it was not concavity itself that was relevant, but it was rather the  cut-off effect that the
concave coast produced. See supra note 63. para. 292.
71. CSC, 1958, Article 1 defines the legal continental shelf by highlighting the geological standard. On the contrary, UNCLOS,
1982, Article 76(1) by introducing unvaried standards for the EEZ and Continental Shelf delimitation—especially the
equidistance standard—has limited to a minimum any controversies its estimation could cause while it has fortified the
equidistance rationale during delimitation. See in detail A. Strati, commenting on the Libya-Malta, ICJ Decision, 1985, para. 33
in the “The Exclusive Economic Zone.” The Law of the Sea and its application in Greece. (in Greek), op. cit. at 176.
72. Therefore, from a legal perception, according to the definition of Continental Shelf (CS) of the UNCLOS (1982), the regulating
element of CS is the criterion of distance when the continental margin extends to a distance less than 200 nm and the geological
criterion when the continental margin extends to a distance more than 200 nm.
73. Thus, giving support to the opinion that submission to the CLCS is not a necessary prerequisite for claiming a continental shelf
beyond 200 nm—notwithstanding it is potentially required to fix the outer limit.
74. Naomi Burke. “Nicaragua v Colombia: An unusual delimitation.” Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law.
Blog Archive. 4 January 2013. Available online: http://www.cjicl.org.uk/index.php/cjicl-blog/nicaragua-v-colombia-a-
return-to-more-flexibledelimitation (accessed on 14 March 2013).
75. “Territorial Dispute and Maritime Delimitation (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Summary of Judgment, ICJ, 19 Nov 2012, at 5. ”
76. “Press Release for the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia), ICJ Press Release No 2012/33, 19 November
2012, at 2–3. ”
77. “Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia), Judgment, ICJ Reports, 2012, para. 180. ”
78. During oral proceedings Judge Bennouna addressed the following question to both parties: ‘Les règles posées à l’article 76 de
la convention des Nations Unies de 1982 sur le droit de la mer, pour la détermination de la limite extérieure du plateau
continental au-delà des 200 milles marins, peuvent-elles être considérées aujourd’hui comme ayant le caractère de règles de
droit international coutumier?’ Nicaragua submitted that Article 76(1)–76(7) had the status of customary law while Colombia
submitted that while 76(1) was customary law, there was no evidence that 76(4)–76(9) had customary law status. See supra
note 77.
79. ICJ noted that in its recent jurisprudence, it had stated that ‘any claim of continental shelf rights beyond 200 miles (by a State
party to the UNCLOS) must have been in accordance with Article 76 UNCLOS and reviewed by the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf. Given the object and purpose of UNCLOS, as stipulated in its Preamble, the fact that Colombia is not
a party thereto did not relieve Nicaragua of its obligations under Article 76. The Court noted that Nicaragua had submitted to
the Commission only Preliminary Information which, by its own admission, fell short of meeting the requirements for the
Commission to be able to make a recommendation. See supra note 80 at 3.
80. Distinct from any analysis of the equitable nature of such delimitation is the question of whether the lines drawn can really be
described as an "adjustment" of the provisional median line. The issue of methodology was raised by Judge Xue and Judge
Keith in their Declarations and by Judge Abraham in his Separate Opinion.
81. Kastelorizo or Megisti occupies an area of 9.1 sq. km, having a coast length of 19.5 km and 406 people population. (Official
2001 Census).
82. Κostas Oikonomidis. International Law and Greek Foreign Policy Issues. Athens: Sakkoulas, 1998, p. 53. (in Greek) [Google
Scholar]
83. Made by the authors with the maps provided from: http://www.el.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Aegean (accessed on 26 May
2011).
84. Byron Theodoropoulos. “The So-Called Aegean Dispute: What Are the Stakes? What Is the Cost? ” In Greece and the Law of
the Sea. Edited by Theodore C. Kariotis. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, pp. 325–31. [Google Scholar]
85. United Nations. Maritime Claims.
86. Robert W. Smith. Exclusive Economic Zone Claims: An Analysis and Primary Documents. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1986. [Google Scholar]
87. Though the latter is not considered a semi enclosed sea but a part Med which is a semi enclosed sea.
88. Therefore, Turkey contended that applying the equidistance principle to delimit the Turkish-Bulgarian boundary would lead to
an equitable position, although Bulgaria believed exactly the opposite.
89. See complementary Petros Siousiouras. “Exclusive Economic Zone: The Delimitations in the Black Sea and Cyprus Sea
Region.” In Contemporary Views in the Legal and Political Aspects of International Organizations. Edited by Stelios Perrakis.
Athens: Sakkoulas, 2009. (in Greek) [Google Scholar]
90. In 1994 the Turkish Prime Minister Mrs. Ciller stated that in the case that Greece extent its territorial sea limit to 12 nm, this
will be consider as a casus belli (cause of war). That threat was made firm officially with the decision of the Turkish Parliament
on the 8th of June 1995, a few days after the ratification of UNCLOS by Greece.
91. Ken Booth. Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985, p. 34. [Google Scholar]
92. For further analysis of the rule see characteristically “Judicial and Similar Proceedings: France-United Kingdom: Arbitration on
the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf.” International Legal Materials 18, no.2 (1979): 397–494.
93. The possibility of combining delimitation of the Continental Shelf and the EEZ by a single boundary is not unreasonable,
especially since the 1982 convention indicates that the legal basis for jurisdiction over the continental shelf and the EEZ within
two hundred miles rests not on any geophysical concept of prolongation but on geographical adjacency measured by distance.
See Mark D. Blecher. “Equitable Delimitation of the Continental Shelf.” American Journal of International Law 73, no. 1
(1979): 60–88. [Google Scholar]
94. Phaedon J. Kozyris. “Equity, Equidistance, Proportionality at Sea: Status of Island Coastal Fronts and a Coda for the Aegean.”
In Greece and the Law of the Sea. Edited by Theodore C. Kariotis. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, pp. 21–65.
[Google Scholar]
95. See extensively Krateros Ioannou. The Jurisdictional Factor in the Greco-Turkish Relations, in International Law and in
Hellenic Foreign Policy. Komotini: Sakkoulas, 1989. (in Greek) [Google Scholar]
96. At this point one should not forget the role of international justice system in the case of the Republic of Cyprus. See extensively
the relevant decisions of the ECHR and the recent position of ICJ concerning the violent partition of the false-state of Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus, mentioned in the Advisory opinion for Kosovo, ICJ Recueil, 2010, para. 114.
97. If the reader recurs to the Greek appeal of 1976 to the ICJ concerning the delimitation of the Greco-Turkish Continental Shelf,
he/she will find out that there’s a hugedifference between what were considered to be at that time (1976) the legal Greco-
Turkish differences in the Aegean and what are claimed to be at the present by Turkey. See characteristically the statements of
the Turkish Foreign Minister during its recent visit in Athens in “Turkish Foreign Minister’s Visit to Athens.”  Kathimerini. 14
October 2012. Available online: http://www.kathimerini.Gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_kathremote_1_10 /10 /
2012_465395 (accessed on 15 October 2012).
© 2014 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
Laws, EISSN 2075-471X, Published by MDPI Disclaimer
RSS Content Alert

Further Information
Article Processing ChargesPay an InvoiceOpen Access PolicyContact MDPIJobs at MDPI

Guidelines
For AuthorsFor ReviewersFor EditorsFor LibrariansFor PublishersFor Societies

MDPI Initiatives
Institutional Open Access Program (IOAP)SciforumPreprintsScilitSciProfilesMDPI
BooksEncyclopediaJAMSProceedingsMDPI Blog

Follow MDPI
LinkedInFacebookTwitter
Subscribe to receive issue release notifications and newsletters from MDPI journals
                                                                                                
Acoustics
Select options
 Subscribe
© 1996-2021 MDPI (Basel, Switzerland) unless otherwise stated
Disclaimer Terms and Conditions Privacy Policy
We use cookies on our website to ensure you get the best experience.
Read more about our cookies here.
Accept
Back to Top

In general terms, “sex” refers to the biological differences between males and females, such as
the genitalia and genetic differences. In general term we can also define sexuality as “A person's
behaviors, desires, and attitudes related to sex and physical intimacy with others”. Important to note such
behavior are universal and natural

“Gender” is more difficult to define, but it can refer to the role of a male or female in society,
known as a gender role, or an individual's concept of themselves, or gender identity.

Feminism is a social and political movement. Feminism is about changing the way that people
see male and female rights (mainly female), and campaigning for equal ones. Somebody who
follows feminism is called a feminist. Feminism began in the 18th century with the
Enlightenment. The third wave of feminism such as racism and classism started as 1990s.
important to note that it is not only about female cause in economical term male are also
deprieved of right as Karl Max ideology of class in society.

social constructionism can be applied to any issue of study pertaining to human life, including gender. Is
gender an essential category or a social construct? If it is a social construct, how does it function? Who
benefits from the way that gender is constructed? A social constructionist view of gender looks beyond
categories and examines the intersections of multiple identities and the blurring of the boundaries
between essentialist categories. This is especially true with regards to categories of male and female,
which are viewed typically as binary and opposite. Social constructionism seeks to blur the binary and
muddle these two categories, which are so frequently presumed to be essential.