SPE-175437-MS

Overcoming the Perceived Risk of Multilateral Wells

Ben Butler, Andreas Grossmann, Joe Parlin, and Chet Sekhon, Halliburton

Copyright 2015, Society of Petroleum Engineers

This paper was prepared for presentation at the SPE Offshore Europe Conference and Exhibition held in Aberdeen, Scotland, UK, 8 –11 September 2015.

This paper was selected for presentation by an SPE program committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents
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Abstract
Multilaterals are often cited as technology that can be implemented to maximize reservoir recovery rates.
However, few operators have been willing to put multilaterals into practice. The most frequently cited
reason for not considering multilaterals is risk. This paper presents a study of data from 22 years of actual
multilateral well applications that demonstrate the reliability of the technology.
For the purpose of this study, failure has been defined as the loss of either the lateral or main bore or
the loss of the junction (and therefore access to both legs). In the context of this study, reliability has been
defined as the ability to successfully construct and complete the multilateral junction. Where failures have
occurred, a study to determine root cause(s) has been undertaken. The records of one multilateral service
provider have been analyzed from more than 800 actual multilateral installations to determine success and
failure rates. The reliability of multilaterals has been compared to the reliability rates of other wellbore
completion and construction technologies.
Multilateral technology (MLT), which was first implemented by Alexander Grigoryan in 1953, came
into modern practice in the 1990s. Although it is not failure-free, the reliability of multilateral wells has
improved remarkably during the past 22 years. This improvement in reliability has occurred as the
complexities of multilateral installations have increased. This paper shows that successful completion
rates of multilateral junctions have improved from slightly more than 87% for the period of 1995 to 1999
(with more than 100 junctions completed) to slightly more than 98% for the current five-year period (with
more than 220 junctions completed). This improvement is the result of continuous planning, development
of and adherence to procedures, management of change, communication, and continuous improvement.
This is the first known study of multilateral reliability that encompasses a large body of data over a
significant time period. The results presented should enable operators to make fact-based decisions about
the reliability of MLT and about whether or not this technology should be considered for implementation
into resource development plans.

Background
Alexander Grigoryan, a Russian drilling engineer, drilled the first known multilateral well (Bashkiriaf,
Russia, Well 66/45), with nine branches (Fig. 1) in 1953. Drilled to a maximum of 660 meters measured
depth (MD), this first multilateral well produced 17 times more oil (slightly more than 700 barrels of oil
per day) than other wells in the field at only 1.5 times the cost. These first multilateral junctions would
2 SPE-175437-MS

be considered Technical Advancement of Multilaterals (TAML) Level 1 junctions (open hole main bore
and open hole lateral) (Fig. 2) in today’s accepted multilateral junction classification system. Grigoryan
went on to drill 30 of the more than 100 early Russian multilateral wells (Bosworth et al. 1997, Ghiselin
2009).

Figure 1—First multilateral well-1953. (Bosworth et al.1997)

SPE-175437-MS 3

Figure 2—TAML Level 1 junction.

The modern era of MLT began around 1993 when the technology moved beyond TAML Level 1 and
TAML Level 2 (cased main bore and open hole lateral) (Fig. 3) junctions to more complex solutions
(TAML Levels 3, 4, 5, and 6) (Fig. 4 through Fig. 7). With the renewed interest in multilaterals, the
industry group TAML was formed in 1997, which led to the standardized classification of multilateral
systems (Bonner 2007).

Figure 3—TAML Level 2 junction.

4 SPE-175437-MS

Figure 4 —TAML Level 3 junction.

Figure 5—TAML Level 4 junction.

SPE-175437-MS 5

Figure 6 —TAML Level 5 junction.

Figure 7—TAML Level 6 junction.

In the 1990’s, MLT was still viewed as emerging, and thus risky. With limited actual data available,
much of the risk analyses performed in through the 1990’s and the first few years of the past decade were
necessarily based on mathematical models or on other analytical methods as attempts to quantify risks. In
these theoretical models, assumptions were often required regarding the probabilities of the occurrence of
events that could lead to failures (Droguett et al. 2006, Waddell 1999).
The authors are not proposing that analytical models be ignored today, but rather that actual data should
be used in conjunction with analytical models to make informed decisions about the reliability of MLT
6 SPE-175437-MS

for specific applications. This paper presents the only known study of a large database of multilateral
installations over a significant period (22 years). The data presented is from the internal records of one
service company.
The Dataset
To obtain and study the dataset, it was necessary first to collect all available end of well records belonging
to a service company pertaining to all of its multilateral operations performed globally. The records
include 951 junction installations in 778 individual wells in several geographical locations in various
formats.
After they were collated, the records were then rigorously audited, with 38 critical data points for each
installation captured for each well. Among others, these data points included system type, TAML level,
casing size, and number of junctions. For each audited well, a determination was also made and recorded
about the final status of the well. Fig. 8 shows the status of the wells, and the following list defines the
status designations:

Figure 8 —Full dataset categories.

● Success – The well was classified as a complete success from a MLT operational standpoint; it was
completed in accordance with the design.
● Partial Success – The well was completed with two or more producing laterals; however, it was
not in accordance with the design. For example, the well was completed as a TAML Level 2, rather
than Level 5, as a contingency.
● Failure – The well could not be completed in accordance with the design, with either a lateral, main
bore, or both permanently lost.
● Not Complete – MLT operations did not begin or were abandoned because of reasons unrelated
to MLT operations (e.g., a plan to drill a lateral was abandoned as a result of poor hydrocarbon
showing in main bore). These wells are not factored into the reliability data.
● Insufficient Data – Insufficient records were available to determine the well outcome. These wells
are not factored into the reliability data.
For the purpose of this study, records that had a status of Not Complete or Insufficient Data were
omitted. Records of installations in test wells were also omitted. These omitted records represent 14% of
the total dataset, leaving a total of 822 junction installations to be analyzed (Fig. 9).
SPE-175437-MS 7

Figure 9 —Analyzed dataset categories.

Overall MLT Reliability

The overall multilateral well construction success rate across a total of 669 wells (822 junctions) is 96%.
For simplicity, the success rate of 96% is taken as the sum of the percentages of junctions with a status
of Success (95%) and Partial Success (1%). This number represents the sum of experience spanning 22
years and a total of 11 unique junction construction systems. Although it provides a very broad view of
MLT reliability, it is important to note that this is an average that spans a long time period. Grouping the
data into five-year segments shows that the reliability of the technology has improved over time and is at
98.2% for the current five-year period. (Fig. 10). In the context of this study, reliability has been defined
as the ability to successfully construct and complete the multilateral junction and should not be construed
as the sole measure of a well’s overall performance.

Figure 10 —Multilateral historical success rates.

A literature search was conducted to compare the reliability of MLT to other accepted well construction
and completions technologies. As shown in Table 1, MLT is as reliable as many other accepted
technologies. This comparison is not intended to show exact quantitative results, but rather to provide a
8 SPE-175437-MS

relative comparison (Ageh et al. 2010, Armentor et al. 2007, Capderou and DiLorenzo 2012, Ismail and
Geddes 2014).

Table 1—COMPARISON OF VARIOUS WELL COMPLETION TECHNOLOGIES

Technology Reliability Remarks

Expandable sand screens 84% More than 350 applications

Intelligent wells 86% Electronics failures most prevalent
Sand control 92.9-100% Various techniques reported for more than 2,200 wells
Multilaterals 96% Dataset of 822 junctions
Open hole gravel pack 97% 121 wells

Reliability by MLT System

Of the 11 junction construction systems represented in the data, more than half have been retired as the
technology has evolved. Generally, for the source service company, three multilateral well construction
systems are the primary systems in use today. Each of these three systems, referred to in this paper as
System A, B, and C, differ in application and therefore differ in operational steps and equipment. These
variations are non-trivial and are important to factor into anssessment of MLT reliability. For example,
some applications require a cemented junction; therefore, cementing operations are performed in these
systems. Consequently, reliability rates vary from other non-cemented junction systems.
System reliability is one of many factors to consider when determining which system is best suited for
a particular application. The reliability must be reviewed along with the overall development strategy,
reservoir characteristics, new or existing well, likely need for wellbore re-entry, and many other factors.
Just as MLT is not necessarily right for every well, not every MLT system is necessarily the best for a
given MLT application.

System A Description
In System A applications, a latch coupling is placed in the main bore casing, which provides a landing
profile for service tools. The casing is run and cemented in the hole. After the lower main bore is drilled
and completed, a track-guided milling assembly is installed in the latch coupling, and a first pass window
is created in the casing. The assembly is pulled out of the hole, then a whipstock is installed in the latch
coupling, the window is opened up, and a rathole is drilled with a second milling assembly. The lateral
is then drilled with a drilling assembly. After it is drilled, a lateral liner is run in the hole. The top of the
lateral liner has a transition joint, which lies across the whipstock. The lateral liner is cemented in place,
with the cement coming into the main bore approximately 100 m above the whipstock. A drill bit is then
run to clean out the cement down to the whipstock. A second, smaller bit is then run to drill out the cement
in the transition joint and the next lateral hole section. After the lateral section is drilled and completed,
a washover is performed over the transition joint and the whipstock, and both it and the transition joint
remnant are retrieved. The final result is a TAML Level 4 junction (Fig. 5). System A has an overall
reliability of 93% (Fig. 11).
SPE-175437-MS 9

Figure 11—System A reliability.

System B Description.
System B is similar to System A, with the difference being that a pre-milled aluminum-wrapped window
and a latch coupling are placed in the main bore casing. The casing is run in the hole, oriented (to align
the pre-milled window in the desired orientation), and cemented in the hole. After the lower main bore
is drilled and completed, a whipstock is installed in the latch coupling, and the window and rathole are
milled with a milling assembly. The remaining operations are similar to System A, creating a TAML
Level 4 junction (Fig. 5). The overall reliability of System B is 95% (Fig. 12).

Figure 12—System B reliability.

System C Description.
Like System B, a pre-milled window and a latch coupling are placed in a liner section. The liner is oriented
and cemented in the hole. After the installation of screens in the main bore reservoir section, a whipstock
is installed in the latch coupling, and the window and rathole are milled. The lateral is then drilled. To
complete the well, the whipstock is retrieved and replaced by a completion deflector; a multilateral
10 SPE-175437-MS

junction system is then installed as an integral part of the lateral bore completion. The main component
is a flexible hanger with D-shaped legs. This component is attached to the lateral liner on one leg and has
a stinger on the other leg. The stinger is oriented and lands in a seal stack in the main bore completion
deflector, creating a TAML Level 5 junction (Fig. 6). Screens are typically installed in the main and lateral
bores, and the lateral liner is not cemented across the junction (Berge et al. 2001). The reliability of
System C is 99.6% with one failure in 234 installations (Fig. 13).

Figure 13—System C reliability.

Reliability Improvement over Time

In the same way that it is important to observe that various systems will have differing reliability as a
result of operational differences, it is also important to observe that the reliability of these systems will
change over time. The expectation is that reliability will improve, as a consequence of improvements in
procedure, technology, and competency.
Overall, the data shows reliability trends to 100% for each of the three systems (Fig. 14). Fig. 10 shows
this same improving trend for the overall data. This trend is discussed further in the analysis of failure root
causes.
SPE-175437-MS 11

Figure 14 —System reliability trends.

Subsea vs. Non-Subsea Reliability

The reliabilities of Systems A, B, and C were compared between installations in two different environ-
ments: installations on floating rigs or drillships (subsea installations) and on fixed rigs, including
onshore, platform, or jackup rigs (non-subsea installations). Operationally, there are two primary differ-
ences between these types of installations that affect multilateral procedures. For subsea installations,
these are the presence of heave and a riser.
Heave can obscure work string surface indications, such as weight and depth, both of which are crucial
for the safe and effective conduct of multilateral operations. Downhole equipment placement, milling,
stinging seals into seal bores, and shearing shear rings or pins are all depth- and weight-sensitive
operations. These operations are also common tasks in multilateral well construction and require careful
control. For example, in the presence of heave, the inability to accurately control weight during milling
operations can result in the application of excessive loads, potentially damaging the milling bottomhole
assembly or causing the mills to depart the whipstock early, resulting in a shorter milled window than
desired.
The presence of a riser affects wellbore cleanout operations, particularly during milling. As a result of
the larger annular space between the riser and the work string, annular velocity is reduced in the riser for
an equal flow rate in casing. This lower fluid velocity prevents milling debris from being circulated from
the wellbore. This can be of particular concern when milling steel; steel milling debris can be difficult to
circulate from the wellbore. One method of addressing this issue has been the use of pre-milled, aluminum
wrapped window joints. However, subsea wellheads can also prevent the orientation of a casing string
when installing pre-milled windows. Therefore, it is generally required in subsea wells that pre-milled
windows be installed on a liner, and if necessary, a tieback liner installed later.
Table 2 shows the comparison of reliability rates for Systems A, B, and C in subsea and non-subsea
environments. System B has not yet been installed in a subsea environment; therefore, a comparison
cannot be made. A total of seven subsea System A installations have been performed, one of which was
a failure. Inadequately managed heave was identified as a primary contributor to this failure. System C
12 SPE-175437-MS

has a total of 190 installations subsea, one of which was a failure. This System C failure was unrelated
to the presence of heave or a riser. Of all three systems, the single failure related to heave occurred in 2003
with System A. The root cause of this failure was that the equipment design did not sufficiently account
for the effect of heave. Procedures, milling parameters, and equipment design have since changed
dramatically to mitigate the chances of the recurrence of this failure.

Table 2—SUBSEA VS. NON-SUBSEA SUCCESS

System A System B System C

Subsea installations 7 0 190

Subsea success rate 86% NA 99%
Non-subsea installations 146 342 36
Non-subsea success rate 94% 95% 100%

Given all of the previous discussion, it can be said that broadly that, for the data analyzed here, subsea
environments have had no statistically relevant effect on reliability. This is not intended to trivialize the
complexity and significant challenges of subsea multilateral applications, but rather to show that the risks
can be effectively managed.

Failure Root Causes

Of the 822 junctions with sufficient records to determine success or failure, failures were reported in 35
instances. As previously discussed, within the context of this paper, failures are defined as a loss of the
main bore, loss of a lateral, or loss of both lateral and main bore. The records of these reported failures
were examined to determine, where possible, the root cause of the failure. Of the 35 failures, there were
sufficient records in 31 instances to determine a root cause of the failure.
In most of the end of well reports for these 31 cases, the root causes were explicitly stated and fully
explained. When the root causes were not stated, the root cause was determined based on a detailed review
of the end of well reports, a comparison of the failure to the end of well reports from similar applications,
a review of other records (where available), and when possible, discussions with personnel who were
involved in the projects. The following list specifies the categorization of the root causes, and Fig. 15
shows the percentages of these categories:
● Associated operations
● Operational decisions
● Planning
● Procedures
● Personnel competency
● Equipment usage
● Equipment design
SPE-175437-MS 13

Figure 15—Failure root causes.

Associated operations were determined to be the cause of 9.7% of the failures. Examples of associated
operation failures included drilling problems in the lateral, cementing issues of the junction or lateral, and
excessive drawdown causing junction collapse.
Operational decisions (25.8% of reported failures) were the result of either the service company or the
operator making the conscious decision not to follow procedures or best practices. Inadequate planning
resulted in 22.6% of the reported failures. These planning failures occurred when the basic practices of
drilling the well on paper (DWOP) or completing the well on paper (CWOP) were not conducted at all,
the DWOP and CWOP were not sufficient, or the DWOP and CWOP were not revisited when the well
plans changed.
Procedural failures occurred in 9.7% of the reported failures. Procedural failures were defined instances
in which procedures were missing or inadequate. This root cause is different from operational decisions
in which procedures existed but were not followed. Personnel competency was determined to be a factor
in 3.2% of the failures, which was a direct result of personnel receiving inadequate training or lacking
experience for the roles in which they were placed.
Equipment usage failures resulted from the use of equipment outside of the intended design parameters
or intended use. This resulted in 19.3% of the failures. Poor equipment designs resulted in 9.7% of the
failures. An equipment design failure is one in which the equipment design did not meet the design intent.
An equipment usage failure occurs when the equipment design met the design intent, but the equipment
was used in an application not covered by that design intent.
Organizational/Personnel Issues
In total, 71% of the failures were related to something other poor equipment design or equipment usage.
In other words, most of the failures were attributable to organizational or personnel issues. In those
instances in which the root causes resulted from insufficient planning or in operational decisions, many
of these failures were caused by not recognizing that issues potentially existed. This lack of knowledge
could frequently be attributed to the applications of new technology, extending operational envelopes
beyond what has been previously accomplished, or encountering situations not previously anticipated.
There were instances, however, in which the poor operational decisions were repeated in similar
applications. This was, more often than not, the result of dependence upon “tribal knowledge” in the early
years of the multilateral operations. This reliance upon the experience and knowledge of individuals in the
organization, rather than on formal processes for communicating proper procedures and best practices, can
14 SPE-175437-MS

be effective when an organization is small. However, as an organization grows, and with the passage of
time, there comes a point at which lessons learned can no longer be effectively shared across the entire
organization or “tribal knowledge” is simply lost. Without a change in the organization reporting and
training methods, the lessons are only learned by individuals directly involved, and perhaps a few others,
rather than by the organization as a whole.

Formal Communication Processes

As an example of how an organization can grow to a point at which lessons learned can no longer be
effectively communicated, a lesson learned was captured in the end of well report for a failure that
occurred in 1999. The lesson learned was properly documented in the end of well report by the personnel
involved, with a recommendation about how to correct the problem. This lesson was “re-learned” in 2011
when analyzing a pattern of operational issues in another region (described further in the Management of
Change section). Fortunately, in the second application, the re-emergence of the same problem led to
uncovering a larger underlying issue.
The operators in the first instance had performed their due diligence in documenting what they had
observed and had recommended a best practice to prevent its recurrence. At the time, the organization was
growing dramatically, but did not yet have the structure in place to capture the lesson and share it globally.
Effective training programs, the use of standardized processes and procedures, a practice of conducting
repeated reviews (such as DWOPs and CWOPs), and a practice of performing a centralized review of end
of well reports can help to ensure that the organization, rather than only individuals, continues to learn.

Management of Change
From 2009 to 2010, an increase of approximately 30% in the number of wells with non-productive time
(NPT) in multilateral installations with a single operator was observed. This NPT increase was related to
systems that had been used for 10 years in similar applications. A detailed study was conducted by the
operator and service company to determine the possible root cause of the increase in NPT instances. It was
determined that the root cause for the problems observed was the use of systems outside of their original
design intent (equipment usage).
This use of the equipment had been going on for the entire previously reported 10 years without a
serious incident. When these systems were first designed, tested, and released for field use, a compre-
hensive management of change process had not yet been established. As a result, the original design intent
of the systems was not properly documented and communicated across the organization. The first few
installations of these systems were effective (even though they were in applications outside of the original
design intent); therefore, there was no alarm to indicate that something was potentially wrong.
A subsequent, seemingly minor, operational change by the operator was the catalyst that magnified the
issue. This operational change recreated the lesson learned described in the Formal Communication
section. There was no formal communication and review of the operational change between the operator
and service company (i.e., a management of change process). After the operator implemented the
operational change, the NPT pattern emerged. The operator and service company worked together to
conduct a thorough review that enabled them to identify and resolve the issues.
The review of this increase in NPT resulted in the discovery of the root cause of the problem. Changes
were consequently made to the design of milling assemblies, debris tolerance of whipstock retrieval
systems, and operational parameters. These changes brought the design intent into alignment with the
actual use. The depth placement of barriers used to isolate the lower main bore from the lateral legs during
the lateral milling, drilling, and completion operations was changed. The operator’s seemingly minor
operational change was revised and communicated within both organizations with the bigger picture now
more clear.
SPE-175437-MS 15

Since the implementation of these changes (30 junctions with the same operator through April 2015),
there have been no recurrences of the prior issues. In addition, the changes were captured and commu-
nicated across the organization and included in training as a case study of why management of change is
important.
This discussion serves as an example of historical data analysis, management of change, and improve-
ment of procedures and equipment design, all of which were used effectively to increase service quality.
Each of these items considered individually can, at times, appear to not be high priority tasks, particularly
when on the whole, the system works. This is also true in organizations in which resources are limited and
always assigned to the “most urgent” work. This sense of priority, however, can be misleading; as shown
by the NPT saved in the previously described example, a moderate amount of effort by the service
company and operator prevented further NPT, potentially saving hundreds, thousands, or even millions of
dollars.

Perceived Increased Risk of Multiple Junctions in Single Well

Several arguments exist against creating multiple junctions (three or more legs) in the same wellbore.
These arguments are that increased complexity results in increased risk and that failure of upper junctions
could result in the loss of lower junctions. Because the creation of one junction is generally independent
of the other junctions in the same wellbore, the probability of the overall success in the well is the product
of the probability of success for each junction. For example, if the probability of success for each junction
(independently) is 90%, then the probability of success for a well with two junctions would be 81% (0.9
⫻ 0.9⫽ 0.81), the success probability for three junctions would be approximately 73% (0.9 ⫻ 0.9 ⫻ 0.9
⫽0.729), and so on. However, the data analyzed does not support the idea of increased risk for multiple
junctions in a single well. Table 3 shows that the overall success rate of creating a single junction (two
legs) in a single well was 94.7% for 532 wells. For a well with two junctions (three legs) in a single well,
the success rate was 94.2% for 120 wells. For three junctions (four legs) and four junctions (five legs) in
a single well, the success rate was 100% for 13 wells and four wells respectively.

Table 3—MULTIPLE JUNCTIONS IN SAME WELLBORE.

Junctions per Well Number of Wells % Success

1 532 94.7%
2 120 94.2%
3 13 100%
4 4 100%

The root causes of the few failures in these multiple junction applications were not different from those
reported previously (planning, operational decisions, and following procedures). The trend of the increas-
ing success rate over time indicated for the data overall continued to be obvious when looking only at data
for wells with multiple junctions in a single wellbore. With experience, the success rates of multi-junction
wells improved. Operations are undoubtedly more complex when multiple junctions are placed in the
same wellbore; however, the data shows that the risk can be managed.
In one long-term multilateral field development, the trend has shifted from single junctions to two and
three junctions per well to reduce the cost per meter of reservoir exposed and to improve the recovery rate
and ultimate (total lifetime) recovery. As shown in Table 4, the development of a multibranch MLT
completion system that enables intelligent completion control of each branch of the multiple junctions in
a single well has dramatically changed the field development strategy.
16 SPE-175437-MS

Table 4 —INCREASE IN MULTI-JUNCTION WELLS.

Junctions per Well Before Multibranch System With Multibranch System

1 63% 10%
2 32% 57%
3 5% 33%

Each of these multijunction wells has been successful. Arguably, these are some of the most complex
multilateral wells attempted. The data indicates that, with constant communication, thorough planning,
fully vetted designs and procedures, and effective competency management of the service company and
operator personnel, the probability of success and economic benefits far outweigh the risks.

Reliability vs. Efficiency

Reliability must be balanced with efficiency. A perfect multilateral installation with zero NPT is of no
value to an operator if the number of steps and the cost to reduce risk to an acceptable level outweigh the
savings gained from the multilateral. In other words, if a multilateral junction requires too many trips and
costs too much to create safely, there may be no economic benefit as compared to drilling two separate
single-bore wells. The most effective method of balancing risk and improved efficiency is one of continual
improvement, which requires beginning simple to ensure success, adding complexity incrementally (when
warranted), and continuing to monitor and review results.
The development of System C resulted in a stepped increase in efficiency from a “best of” record of
direct, multilateral time of 14.6 days per junction for a prior system to just less than six days per junction
in the first installation of System C (Berge et al. 2001). After nearly 230 installations and 15 years of using
System C, the efficiency has continually improved and the reliability has remained high (99.6%) as more
complex installations have evolved. The complexity evolution has included a move to multiple junctions
per well, intelligent completion monitoring, control of each branch, and extended reach applications, with
lateral TDs in excess of 8000 m MD. The result is that 10,000 to 15,000 m of reservoir exposure is
achieved regularly in a single well with the current systems.
A dual lateral well (single junction) well in 2001 required more than five days of multilateral
installation time with System C. A slot recovery of that same well as a trilateral (two junctions in a well)
was completed in less than six days in 2014 with the latest version of System C. This 2014 well included
intelligent completion monitoring and control of each branch, adding more complexity. A quad-lateral
well (three junctions in a single well) using System C required less than 11.3 days in 2003. In 2014, a
quad-lateral well with intelligent monitoring and control of each branch required slightly less than six days
with the latest version of System C.

Conclusions
MLT has emerged into a mature, reliable well construction method. Like any new technology, MLT has
had a learning curve with many lessons learned, which resulted in improvements in designs and methods,
leading to the high reliability of the technology today. The current systems of one service company have
overall reliabilites ranging from 93 to 99.6% with the reliabilies trending toward 100%. This increase in
reliability has developed with an increase in installation efficiencies of the technology, even as the
complexity of the applications has increased dramatically. In fact, some of the most complex applications
(subsea and multiple junctions in the same wellbore) have the highest reliability rates.
This presentation of a large population of data related to the application of MLT indicates that it is as
reliable as other technologies used in well construction today with the following:
SPE-175437-MS 17

● Proper planning
● Personnel who are trained and whose competency is continually monitored
● Open lines of communication
● Management of change processes
● Processes and procedures that are continually refined
Although multilaterals are not necessarily appropriate for all applications, the decision of whether or
not to use the technology should be based on actual risk vs. reward, rather than on perceived risk.
The consolidation of data from various sources and basic analyses discussed in this paper has not been
trivial to conduct. The information yielded, however, highlights the importance of the effort, as well as
of good data management systems and maintaining them in a permanent manner. This is critical to the
service quality of an organization.
As the analyses of multilateral data continue, the anticipated path forward includes the following:
● Continue to track and share data across the organization, and when appropriate (when operator
confidential information will not be compromised), across operators.
● Make the effort an organizational effort, rather than an individual effort, to provide for its
continued success.
● Look for data trends to prevent failures. The data presented in this paper has only focused on
failures and the lessons learned. Analyses of NPT and field personnel data can likely yield further
information to help identify additional opportunities for improvement.
● Determine what additional data that may be used in the on-going pursuit of zero failures.

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