IN THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

I.A. No. of 2022

IN

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) 1246 of 2020

IN THE MATTER OF:

Ashwinl Kumar Upadhyay Petltioner

Versus

Union of Indla &Ors. Respondents

AND IN THE MATTER OF:

MPLBI Trust . . .Applicant

I.A. No. of 2022

APPLI€JATION POR IMPLEADMENT

PAPER BOOK

(FOR INDEX KINDLY SEE IITSIDE)

ADVOCATE FOR APPLICANT: Mls. AHMADI LAW OFFICES

 INDEX

Sr. No. PARTICULARS PAGE

No

1. I.A. No. of 2022

AppliCatlon for lmpalement wlth AffidaVlt

2. VAKALATNAMA
 IN THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

I.A. No. of 2021

IN

WRIT PETTION (CIVIL) NO. 1246 of 2020

IN THE MATTER OF:

Ashw1R1 Kumar Upadhyay Petltioner

Versus

UnloR of Indla&Ors. Respondents

AND IN THE MATTER OF:

MPLBI Trust, a registered

Trust through its Gen. Secretary IYIuin Ahamad

haVlRQ lts Offlce at 290/511

Pandey Ka Talab, Malviya Nagar

Lucknow 226001, UP

.A]3;3l1CaRt

APPLICATION FOR IMPLEADMEN'F

TO,
THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA AND
HIS COMPANION HON’BI.E JUDGES OF THE
HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
THE APPLICANT MOST HUMBLY AND RESPECTF'ULLY
SUBMITS AS UNDEIt:

1. That the present application 1s being filed by the Appllcant seeking

leave of this Hon'ble Court to intervene in the above-mentioned

Writ Petition No. 1246 of 2020 which is pending adjudication

before this Hon'ble Court.

2. That the Applicant is a reglstered charitable trust engaged in

promotion o1” social, educational, cultural and religious activities

including those pertainlng to communal harmony, unit and

integrity of India and national securitywhlCh, inter alia, are its duly

approved objectlves. The Applicant is seeking permission to

intervene to assist this Hon'ble Court. The registered trust deed of

the Applicant is in hindi and shall be filed before this Hon'ble

Court if this Hon'ble Court so requires at any stage.

3. That the Applicant seeks to opposes the instant Writ PetltioR which

seeks to challenge Section 2, 3 and 4 of Places of Worship (Special

Provisions) Act, 1991 [“the Act” henceforth] on the ground that

the Act interferes wlth the right of freedom of religion of the

Petitionersand runs counter Io the basic feature of secularism. The

Act ensures that normativity and positive law regulates the conduct

of parties to maintain peace in the society. But for the Act,

normatl¥'itj w'oUld be lost to sub;ecti1•ity. constitutional drity

 »oril‹J transformed into lroral ordering and legal reasolilng is

cllspe-nse‹â » iih 1i›i‘ per cci i ed n‹itio1is o1 historical wi ongs. and

unnecessary :itteitipts tc cci lcct the pOrtl aj al of the past.

I. Preliminary Objection

(a) Locus Standi and Credential.

4. The Petitionel” has suppressed that he has affiliation to a political

party that in fact has the largest party holding majority in the

Parliament and can well take the legislative route. The Applicant

would like to bring to the notice of the Hon'ble Court that the

petitloner herein is a recognized functionary of a political party. It

may be noted that thousands of dockets remain pending and the

Petltioner's malafide and motivated petition ought not to be

permitted to use the valuable judicial time. That it is pertinent to

note that even the Petitioner himself was once involved in Aug

2021 in an event where persons had been invited who indulged in

hate speech, and wherein persons had raising divisive slogans at

.Iantar Mantar in New Delhl. The Petitioner‘ was arrested and then

enlarged on bail on a bond of Rs. 50,000/- by the Ld Magistrate

observing that there is nothing on record to show that the alleged

hate speech to promote enmity between different groups was done

in the presence or at the behest of the accused but also noting that
 investigation was at a nascent stage. That as per ANI’s media

report available at https.//www.aninews.iUnews/national/general-

news/chargesheet-filed-against-ashwini-upadhyay-in-jantar-antar-

hate-speech-case-says-delhi-police20211103194729/, on Nov 3,

2021 , the Petitioner was also charge-sheeted along with others.

Further details are not available in public domain and the Petitioner

may be directed to place them on record. The Applicant does

understand that while being arrested may itself not be sufficient for

establishing the guilt, but the association of the Petitioner at a hate

speech event itself is sufficient to disentitle him to invoke the

jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court in the instant matter or PIL

jurisdiction generally. Therefore, to keep the stream of justice pure,

the instant Petition may kindlybe dismissed, and thus may not be

head much less at the instance of the Petitioner. It is further stated

that the l°etitioner is a serial public interest litigant and is a busy

body.

5. The Applicant would also like to bring to the notice of the Hon'ble

Court that the Petitioner has filed various Writ Petitions on

frivolous ground some of which have even been dismissed by this

Hon'ble Court and most of the writ petitions filed pertain to the

avowed agenda. The Petitioner‘s motive to file the present Petition,

being questionable, ought to be dismissed.

 6. The Petitloner's repertoire of PILS lnclude those seeklng ban on

“deceltful religious conversions", to making yoga compulsory in

schools for chlldrcn betu•een 6 and 14 years of age, maklRg

Anthem compulsory lR schools and even maklng Hlndl ,

a compulsory language ln schools across the country. Many of hls

PILs have been dlsmlssed by this Hon'ble Court. In fact, none of

the Petitloner's professed PILs are actually for the down-trodden

masses of Índia - whlCh is the móin reason for which the rules of

locus standi had been relaxed by this Hon'ble Court. The Petitioner

ls a meddlesome interloper.

7. That such frivolous petitlons are puiely political and part of a

larger design to keep allVethe communal and sensitive lssues allve

ln the country to serve the political lnterests of certalR iRdividuals

and organisations. The Petltlon, is therefore, filed for an oblique

motive.

8. It lS most respectfully stated that the motive of flling the current

writ petition ls mala flde and purely polltlCal and is part of a larger

and devious design to keep alive the communal and religiously

sensitive issues ln the country to serve the political interest of

certaln indlvlduals and orgaRiSätlOns as contended in Paragraph 7.

In State of UYaranchal v. Balwant Singli, (2010) 3 SCC 402,

 various guidelines were issued by this Hon'ble Court in order to

preserve the purity and sanCtltOy f the Public Interest Litigations.

9. That in Paragraph 26 of the Writ Petition, the Petitioner boldly

states that “ . anJ peaceful agitation may become violent, if they

are not allowed to avail ju‹:1icial remedy.” It is humbly contended

that the use of such language is nothlng but an attempt to threaten

and scandallze the court and that a contempt must be issued against

the petitloner for the same. The instant petition 1s a serious abuse

of process of law. It is stated that the Misuse of publlc interest

litigation is a serious matter of concern for the judicial process.

Frivolous or motivated petitions, ostensibly invoking the publlC

interests detract from time and attention which courts must devote

to genuine causes. It is stated that the Petitioner has an oblique

motlve and motive for personal-political gain, and that the motive

of the Petitioner is to asceitained by this Hon'ble Court. There is

no larger public interest involved in the matter, as the affected

partles can very well take the grievance at an appropriate forum in

an appropriate case.

(b) Subjećt matter

10. That it is stated that the subject matter of the present case is not a

public interest case and is not capable of being raised in a public

 lnterest lltlgatloR. The subject matter is not fit to be adjudicated ln

a PIL. Merely because, thls Hon'ble Court has jurisdiCtlOn does not

necessarily mean that the jurisdiction is tobe exerclsed in PIL

jurlsdlCtlOH. It lS Stated that just as consistently that has held that

PIL 1s not permlsslble ln servlce matters. slmllarly, some subject

matters — llke ln the present case, ought not to be entertained ln

publlC lnterest lltigatloR. In any event, the fact that the outcome

may affect the members of the publiC is not a publlc interest case

and lR fact, lt 1s 'anti-public interest’. The case seeks to invert the

jurlsprudence of thls Hon'ble Court since ln 1970s and use lt

foment sectarlaR dlVlSlORS. It lS Stated that the issues ralsed ln the

petltlon are abstraCt and have no pleadlRg aRd no evidence. In fact

tfils Sort of publlclty interest petltlon prejudlces the case of actual

parties as and when raised. Thls Hon'ble Court has dealt with many

cases, where groups have been pre-empted and quietus has been

attalned only become of the legislatlon challenged herein. The

AppllCant craves for leave and liberty to cite the same at the time

of oral hearlng to assist this Hon'ble Court.

II. Legislative History of the Impugned Act

11. That on August 23.08.1991, (available at

htt S://parllamentofindla.RlC.ln/ls/lsdeb/1s10/ses l/1323089101.htm

?fbclid—IwAR2MdbnEiTj42 XahzyZZ 36EOlk2edKnkjeAEAgm

Y2fNac zQHzWIL3BKg) while replying to a question in the Lok

Sabha regarding the resolution introduced by a Member to protect

the religious places of worship and shrines, the erstwhile Minlster

of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs asserted that,

.considering oll the aspects prevailing in this country, taking the

cultural heritage anJ tlze background of this great nation, the

culture vve have emulated and evolved from the Vedas and

Upanishads of this country, and valuing the greatness of the human

beings, our leader Shri Rajiv Gandhi rightfully thought that a bill

has to be introduced; a legislation has to be brought in this

country, to protect the places of worship.” The Minister further

stated that, " This is a country where the messenger of peace was

assassinated, this is a country where peace-loving persons had to

die for o cause of the nation,’ this is a country where Lord Buddha

sacrificed his kingdom and everything for restoring ponro and

harmony among people. In such a country of ours, the Constitution

of India rightfully laid down Articles 23, 24, 25, 26 and so on.

Especially Article 26 emphasizes that the religious right of

everyone to follow one’s own religion and the right to maintain the

religious places of worship should be protected.” In respect of the

lntroduction of the Bill to protect the places of worshl , the

 Minister further said that, *... the simple factor is that emanating

from the Constitution, arising out of the distress of the millions

and millions of people who want to live peacefully in this country,

rim! great leader Shri Rajiv Gandhi thought that tlse Government

i›iust take up the responsibility of initiating a dialogue for the

peaceful settlement of the issue.” The Mlnister further refeized to

the President's Address where the Presldent said that, “Government

i‹!ill make evetj› effort to find a negotiated settlement to

Ramjanmabhumi-Babri Mosjid issue with due regards to the

sentiments of both the communities involved. In the case of all

other places of worship, a Bill will be introduced to maintain the

status qua as on 15th August, 1947 in order to foreclose ony new

12. That when the impugned Act was being introduced in the Lok

Sabha OR 09.09.91, (available at

https://parliamentofind1a nic.in/1s/lsdeb/1s10/ses1/2?O9099l0l.htm

?fbc1id=IwARl dqVSMVRZW2haM9hTESHmPU9hd3C9TFloqG

h0WHPxadRpKX0ldJiZE9z0) the then Union Minlster for Home

AffairS, Sald that, “It is considered necessary to adopt these

nsensures in view of the controversies arising fi-om time to time

with regard to conversion o[places ofivorship which tend to vitiate

the communal atmosphere.” He further said on the floor of the

 house that, “I am sure that enactment of this Bill will go a long way

in helping to restore communal amity and goodwill. I, therefore,

commend this Bill to Hon'ble Klemhers of this House and seek their

cooperation in passing it.”

13. In3f. Ismail Faruqui (Dr) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360, in

para 139, Justice Bharucha (Minority view) has taken notice of the

argument that the instant legislation stands between peace and

communal disharmony. In the said case, this Hon'b1e Coun

(Majority view) was pleased to hold that any religious group has no

vested right to a religious place and keeping it away from State

intervention. It was held that:

135. That secularism is a part of the basic features of the

Constitution was held in Kesa ananda Bharati v. State of
Kerala (Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4
SCC 225 : 1973 Supp SCR 1] . It was unanimously
reaffirmed by the nine-Judge Bench of this Court in S.R.
Bommaf V. Union of India [(1994) o SCC 1] . Sawant, J.
analysed the Preamble of the Constitution and various
articles therein and’ held that these provisions, by
implication, prohibited the establishment of a theocratic
State and prevented the State from elther ldentifylng itself
Wlth or favouring any particular religion. The State was
enjoined to accord equal treatment to all religions. K.
Ramaswamy, J. quoted the words written by Gandhiji that
are as apposite now as they were when he wrote them: “The
Allah of MuslimS ls the same as the God of Christians and
Ishwara of Hlndus." B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. Sald: (SCC p.
233, para »04)

“While the citizens of this country are free to

profess. practise and propagate such rellgion,
faith or belief as they choose, so far as the State
ls concemed, l.e., from the polRt Of vlew of the
State, the rellgioR, faith or bellef of a person ls
llTlmaterlal. TO lt, all are equal and all are
entltled to be treated equally. How’ lS this equal
treatment possible, if the State were to prefer or
promote a particular religion, race or caste,
which necessarily means a less favourable
treatment of all other religlons, races and
castes. How are the constitutional promises of
soClal justlce, liberty of belief, fälth or v•orship
and equality of status and of opportunity to be
attalned unless the State eschews the religloR,
fälth or belief of a person from its consideratloR
altogether while dealing with him, his rights,
hls duties and his entitlements? SeculariSIT1 lS
thus more than a passive attitude of religious
tolerance. lt is a positive concept of equal
treatment of all religions. This attitude ls
descrlbed by some as one of neutrality towards
rellgion or as one of benevolent neutrallty. This
may be a concept evolved by Western liberal
 thought or it may be, as some say, an abiding
faith with the Indian people at all points of
time. That is not material. What is material is
that it is a constitutional goal and a basic
feature of the Constitution as affirmed in
Kesavanandci Bharati v. State of Kerala
[Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,
(1973) 4 SCC 225 : 1973 Supp SCR 1] and
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain [1975 Supp
SCC 1 : (1976) 2 SCR 347] . Any step
inconsistent with this constitutional policy is, in
plain words, unconstitutional.”

The State has no religion. The State is bound to honour and

to hold the scales even between all religions. It may not
advance the cause of one religion to the detriment of
another.”

14. The Ismail Faruqui (supra) is clear that the State can regulate the

rights pertaining to structures clalmed as religious and such a right

of the State flows not only from Seventh Schedule but from various

provisions of the Constitution including the principle of equality. It

is stated that the impugned law prohibits all religions equally and it

is lncorrect to state that the impugned Act restrict rights of hindus,

budhdhist, jains and sikhs. The restriction is also liar Muslims,

 jews. and Christians and a legal claim for many of their religious

structure are also barred by the impugned legislation.

15. The above highlights the de1"inite intent of the legislature to bring

about such a law. It is apparent that the aspiration of introducing

the said Bill was to put an end to controversles and communal

tension prevailing in the country and fcr ever as it realised that it is

not only futile but impossible to correct the historical wrongs

committed by rulers of previous centurles who may have acted for

their own reasons.

/h. That while extending his support to the Bill and lauding its

objective at the time of its introduction in the Lower House, the

erstwhile Member of Parliament from Rosera said, “ Such a

legislation had to brought J'orward because India is the home of

people belonging to many i-eligious denominations. Our country is

like a garden and here not one but oll the fioivers n'iil be given the

opportunity to blossom. People belonging to many communities

made India their home. When Babur invaded India, which Hindu

King was rullHg the country? It was Ibrahim Lodhi, who was

rulitig tlze countt jr' ct that time. Who came to India be]’ore Babur?

The Arvans. There was no Hindu-Muslim clash at that time.

According to the religious people, there was war between lhe Gods
 and demons r hen churning of the ocean took place. Now, who

were these demons? Why was tJiere a fight between Vishnu and

.Shiva? Ifwe go deep into the history of all this, we won't be able to

safeguard the unity arid integrity of this country. Therefore, this

chapter has to be closed somewhere. We have far more important

problems before us- the problem of imemployment, that of

illiteracy, that of rural water supply. This country cannot afford to

squabble over issues like Mandir or Masjid. ”

III. Response to Grounds & Pleas in the Petition

17. The Applicant respectfully avers that the purpose of the Act is

directly opposite to what the Petitioners contend. The very purpose

of the Act is to enable citizens to exercise their right to freedom of

religion as enshrined in Article 25-28 in a peaceful manner. The

Act does so equally for all the religions by providing for equal

protection to places of worship of all the religions. Thus, it is in

consonance with the secular character of the Constitution which is

a basic feature of the Constitution. The same has been emphasised

by this Hon’ble Court in M. Siddique (D) ThrLrs vs Mahant

Suresh has &Ors (2020—1 SCC 1).

“In providing a guarantee for the preservation of the

religious character of places of public worship as they
existed on 15 August 1947 and against the conversion of
 places of public worship, Parliament determlned that
independence from coloillal rule furnishes a constltutl0rlal
basis for heallng the injustlces of the past by provldlng the
confldence to every religlOus communlty that thelr places of
worshlp Will be preserved and that their character will not be
altered. The law addresses ltself to the State as much as to
every citizen of the nation. Its noms bind those who govern
the affalrs of the nation at every level. Those norms
lmplement the Fundamental Dutles under Artlcle 5lA and
are hence posltive mandates to every citizen as well. The
State, has by enactlng the law, enforced a constltutional
commltment aild operatlonalized lts constltutioRal
obligatlOllS tO uphold the equallty of all rellglons and
secularlsm whlCh is a part of the baslc features of the
Constltutlon. The Places of Worship Act imposes a non-
derogable obllgatloR towards enforcing our commitment to
secularlsm under the Indlan Constltutlon. The law 1s hence a
leglslative instrument deslgned to protect the secular features
of the Indian polity. whlCh 1s one of the baslc features of the
Constltution. Non-retrogression is a foundatlonalfeature of
the fundamental constltCtional prlilClples of whlCh
secularism 1s a core component. The Places of Worship Act
lS thus a legislatlve lntervention v°hich preserves non-
retrogression as an essential feature of our secular t'alues.”

18. That the Act reaffiniis Independence as the moment when India

commltted ltself tO a constitutlonal democracy from authoritarlan

state of being. The Act contributes towards equal treatment of all

 rellgions and enables free practice and profession of religion. Thus,

the Act enforces non-retrogression of one of the foundational

features of constitutionalism i.e. secularism.

19. That the Act, recognises that the Independence provides a new

constitutional basis for equality of religion and pre-empts repetition

of the injustices of the past. The Act, in fact, allows a clean slate

for the Society to move forward.

20. That it is stated that there are actual and anecdotal evidence of

many places of worships being desecrated or demollshed in the

past. The Applicant reserves its right to place on record historical

material at the time of oral hearing. Thus, any attempt at ‘undoing’

such an occurrence shall open pandoras box of history and is not

only impracticable but may also result in chaos and anarchy known

to ancient and medieval times. Thus the idea of constitutionalism

and modem constitutions including Constitution of India provides

a basis of the societies and generations to move ahead together.

21. That the Act is also rooted in the realisation that the need to protect

rellglous places and to maintain its character as a sine qua non to

avoid religious conflagrations was one of the contributory factors

towards evolutlon of secularlsm as an essential feature of the

 modern constltutlons. It lS to be noted that the rellgious wars and

conltontatlons of Europe proVlded an lmpetus to develop secular

natlon-states ln the elghteenth and nineteenth centurles.

22. That the plea of the Petltloner to invalidate Places of Worshlp Act

and allow conversion (or re-conversion) of certain places through

Sults, petltlons or otherwise is thus not only antithetical to the

fundamental values and express provislons of the ConstltCtiOn but

undoes the clvilisatlonal gains of humanlty in terms of secularlsm

beilig a slne qua non of peaceful and progressl+'e sOclety. It lS

stated that the judlciary cannot be burdened further with such

lltlgatlons and that lt defeats the legislative policy to allow further

Clalms to come up in court.s. The public policy is to enforce laches

and brlng about finality.

23. The preventlon of such ITllSChief is essential to enforce the baslC

features of the constltutlon like llberty, equality, fraternity and

secularlsm, and ensure effectlve functlonlng of the Constitution. It

1s to be noted that the destruction of religious places has been one

of the tools ot imposing the authority of upcoming totalitarian

reglmes as mentioned above. This tradition runs antithetical to the

 notion of constitutionalism and is baleful for the working of the

Constitution.

24. That this Hon'ble Court is deeply cognizant of this historical

reality and of the need to avoid the same is evident from the

judgement in M. Siddique (D) Thr Lrs vs Mahant Suresh Das

&Ors(2020-1 SCC 1):

“.... There is a purpose underlying the enactment of the

Places of V'orship Act. The law speaks to our history and to
the future of the nation. Cognizant as we are of our history
and of the need for the nation to confront it, Independence
was a watershed moment to heal the wound of the past.
Historical wrongs cannot be remedied by the people taking
the law in their own hands. In preserving the character of
places of public worship, Parliament has mandated in no
uncertain terms that history and its wrongs shall not be used
as instruments to oppress the present and the future.”

25. That this Court piohibits any such attempt in no uncertain terms in

the judgement in M. Siddique (D) ThrLrs vs Mahant Suresh Das

&Ors dt 09.11.2019 as follows:

997. This Court cannot entertain claims that stem

from the actions of the Mughal rulers against Hindu
places of worship in a court of law today. For any
person who seeks solace or recourse against the
 actions of any number of ancient rulers, the law is not
the answer. Our hlstory is replete with actions that
have been judged to be morally incorrect and even
today are liable to trigger vociferous ldeological
debate. however. the adoption of the Constitution
marks a watershed moment where We, the People of
India, departed from the determination of rights and
liabilltles on the basis of our ideology, our rellglon,
the colour of our skin, or the century when our
ancestors arrived at these lands, and submitted to the
rule of law. Under our rile of law, this Court can
adjudicate upon private property claims that were
expressly or lmplledly recognised by the British
Sovereign and subsequently not interfered with upon
Indian Independence.”

26. It 1s important to understand how the notion of secularism in India

came to be shaped in modern tlmes. The founding father of this

nation, Mahatma Gandhl's visioR Of a secular democratic state has

been brought out Bipan Chandra in ’Gandhfi“i, Secularism and

Communalism’,

“M K Gandhl WaS basically and fully secular despite

being deeply religious is well-known, as also that he
wanted India to be a secular democratic state. And he
asserted on 9 August 1942: “Free India will be no
Hindu Raj, it will be Indian raj based not on the
majority of any religious sect or community but on the
 representatives of the whole people without
dlstlnction of religion.“

27. That,model of secularism based on equal treatment to all religions

and no State religion is reflected in the Indian Constitution. This

model of secularism is in consonance with Mahatma Gandhi's

vision of pluralistic society where people of dlfferent faiths and

creed lixed together in toleration, peace and harmony.

28. The Delhi High Court ln Surt?Sh Chandra v. Cnion of India, 1975

SCC OnLine Del 24 observes that the source of Indian secularism

ls the freedom movement which assured protection to the

minorities and neutrality o] the State in regard tO all religiOnS!

“The evolution of the concept of secularism in modern

India has a very different background. Inspired by the
spirit of toleration and liberalism which characterised
the Hindu thought from ancient times, the Indian
National Congress developed a non-communal
approach in politics leaving religion as being a
matter of the conscience of the individual. The
secularism in India developed as a part of nationalism
and Freedom Movement which assured protection to
the minorities and neutrality of the State in regard to
all reliQ,iOnS. This policy was embodied in the
resolution of the Congress passed in 1931 at Karachi.
 As observed by Setalvad, this i-esolution furnishes a
key to the understanding of the attitude adopted by the
framers of the Indian Constitution in deoling with the
guarantee Of religious neutrality. The Debates in the
Constituent Asse.inbly show that “what was intended
by the Constitution wos not the seculai-isation of the
State in the sense of its con:plete’“ dissociation }i p ›i
religion, but rathei- an attitude of religious neutrality,
with equal treatiTlent tO all religions and religious
minorities.”

29. That the Act contrlbutes towards strengthenlng the rlghts reglmes

as enshrlned ln Part III Of the Constitution as these rlghts comprlse

a compOslte fabrlc textured on baslC human rights. Justice,

Liberty, Equality 1s reallsed through Part III of the ConstltutloR

and blnds varlous provlslons of Part III of the Constltutlon ln a

slngle thread. In Maneka GnnJlii vs Union of India AIR 1978 SC

597 lt was held:

“Articles dealing with different funda:nental rights

contained in Part III of the Constitution do not represent
entirely sepai-ate streams of rights which do not mingle at
many points. The are all an inte rated scheme in
the Constitution. Their waters must mix to constitute that
rand ow eded and
(social, economic and political), Freedom (not only of
thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, but also of
 association, movement, vacation or occupation as well as of
acquisition and possession of reasonable property), of
EqualiN (of status and of opportunity, which imply absence
of unreasonable or unfair discrimination beMeen
individtials, groups and classes), and ofFraterniV (assuring
dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation), which
or:r Constitution visualises. Isolation of various aspects of
huirian freedom, for purposes of their protection, is neither
realistic nor beneficial but would defeat the very objects of
such protection. ”

30. That any attempt at invalidating the Act or the norms enshrined

therein shall not only jeopardise the secular character of the

Constitution but comprise a threat to the whole fabric of our

society, citizen's fundamental rights and indeed the very

constitutional form of government in our country. Hence, any

attempt at subversion of the Act must be nipped in the bud.

» l. Hence, even without the Act, any attempt at conversion of

religious places would run counter to freedom of religion as well as

to the values of liberty, equality and fraternity which are the basic

features of the Constitution. Even without the Act the remedy

would be barred. The Act expressly enunciates and delineates what

is inherent in the Constitution, thus any such articulation cannot

even remotely be unconstitutional.That the Act attempts at

 reconciliatlon and promotes communal harmony ln the nation. It lS

stated that the causes of action for such litigation, which the

Petltloner seeks to enable, by repeal of the bar of the Places of

\\ orship Act would anyway be barred by limitation.

32. That theof ‘Hindus. Jalns, Buddhist, and Slklis’ to restore their

‘places of worshlp and pilgrlmages’, however, the Act nowhere

mentions any specific religion, people belonging any speclfic

religion, any specific rellgious denomination or any speclflC

religious communlty. The flavour of the Petitlon is clearly towards

only a select group of religions. Therefore the aforementioned

contention of the Petitioner is absolutely baseless and is nothing

but an attempt and misleadlng the Court as the law was enacted

keeping in mind the peace and tranquillity of the soclety and the

natlon and hence the law universally applles to places of worship

of all rellgious communities including Muslims, Parsis, Jews and

all others and not only Hindu, Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs as

contended by the Petitioner. It is stated that the issue of violation

of Articles 14 and Article 25 would arlse in the event of pick and

choose, and since the State has treated all religious equally for a

legltlmate objective the same is not violatlve of the Places of

Worship Act. It may be noted that there are many mosques as well
 in many parts of India, especially Punjab region that, aher the

partition have been converted lnto religious places of worship of

otherreligions. It is stated that the impugned legislation gives a

quletus to all such claims, and bars them for maintaining peace and

harmony.

33, That the plea of the Petitioners runs counter to the provisions of

freedom of religion, which is subject to, inter alia, morality. The

tcrrr. morality needs to be understood based on the ‘haim

principle’.

»4. In Nationnl Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5

SCC 438 : 2014 SCC OnLine SC 328 at page 506, the Court

observed that the internal morality of the Constitutio1ns based on

dignity and equality of all human beings:

“129. As we have pointed out above, our ConstitutiOn

inheres liberal and substantive democracy with the rule of
law as an important and fundamental pillar. It has its O5Ain
internal morali based on di and e
beings. The rule of law demands protection of individual
human rights. Such rights are to be guaranteed to each and
every human being. These TGs, even though insignificant in
numbers, are still human beings and therefore they have
every right to enjoy their human rights. ”
35. The plea ln the aforementionedPetition runs counter to such

equality and contends that the rlghts of person belonging to a

certaln denomination, or a sectlon thereof is to be preferred over

the others, and thus violates all norms of constitutional morality.

Thus, even wlthout the Act, the plea of the Petitloners cannot be

granted as lt enables discrlmlnatlon in freedom of religlOR and runs

counter to other fundamental rights as well as constltutional

morality.

JUDICIAL REMEDY
36. No person has absolute right to access the judicial remedy, as per

hls or her own whims and fancles. Such rlght 1s Contingent upon

due process and procedure requlred by law. Thus, the impugned

Act does not curtail judlclal remedy for any guaranteed rightAnd

only bars the claims. Even the Limitation Act, 1963 does that,

along wlth host of other legislatlons. A person's right to approach

the court is not taken away, but the remedy is barred. It is germane

to note that the right to freedom of religion is guaranteed to all

persons equally. Right of one person to freely practice her religion

lS subject tO Flght of another person to exercise the aforesald

freedom In Acliarya Mnlinrajsliri Narendra Prasadji vs State of

Gujarat(1975) 1 SCC, the Sriprelne Court has observed:

 ‘...No rights in an organlsed society can be absolute.
Enjovment of one's rights must be consistent with the
en ment of ri hts also b others. Where in a free
play of soClal forces it is not posslble to bring about a
voluntary harmony, the State has to step in to set right
the imbalance between competlRg interests aRd there
the Directive Principles of State Policy, although not
enforceable in courts, have a definlte and positive role
introducing an obligation upon the State under Artlcle
37 in making laws to regulate the conduct of men and
their affairs.

37. In this regard the Act is based on the prlnCiple of “equal

entltlement”of persons belonging to any religious denomination or

section thereof as the Act protects places of worship of all the

denominationasn d sections thereof equally. The Act thus puts into

practice a constitutional mandate, and it is unimaginable to tem it

as unconstitutloRal.

38. That there cannot be a judlCial remedy to enforce claims of one

party in derogation of the guaranteed rights of another party. The

plea of the Petitioner for the aforementioned judlcial remedy is in

essence a plea to provide remedy for vlOlatl0Il Of the freedom of

religion of persons belonglng to other denominations or sections

thereof. Such a plea to violate fundamental rights is grossly

 unconstitutional to begin with. and ought to be dismissed forthwith.

It is incorrect to say that judicial remedy is barred. The Parliament

is within its rights to regulate the right, subject to fundamental

freedoms.

39. Also, the contention that the Act bars any remedy against illegal

encroachment is factually wrong. The remedy for illegal

encroachment on the property of any such place of worship is

available under the relevant laws. In fact, the Act protects the

places of worship of any religion against encroachments which are

in the nature of conversion of such places to places of worship of

other religious denominations or other sections of the same

denomination.

40. The Act protects religious places not only in form but in substance

as well. ‘Character’ is what the Act of 1991 therefore recognises.

PILGRIMAGE

41. The Act falls squarely w'ithin the competence of Parliament as the

same finds mention in List III — Concurrent List as Item No. 28 as

“Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious

endowments and religious institutions”. Places of worship are

institutions of this nature as also mentioned in article 26 (a) of the

constitution of India. Hence to say that it is outside the competence

of Parliament is contrary to the provisions contained in the

constitution. The Petitioner's argument based on pilgrimage is

untenable as the right to pilgrimaJ is anyway a statutory right and

not a fundamental right. There is ono evidence placed on record by

the Petitioner to assert that the there was any pilgrimage to any

specific place of worship and the said argument cannot be taken or

permitted to be taken in abstract on a hypothetical basis. There is

nothing in the petition as to what is the basic dictum of hindu law

that is being violated; and as such the necessary pleadings for

satisfaction or claiming a right under Article 25 is not

substantiated. Further, the communal harmony, brotherhood, unity

etc. all are relatable to values of the Constitution and certainly to

the residuary entry. *Peace and Harmony” is traceable and relates

to various subject matters in List II and III which affect the lives of

persons/citizens. Duty of the State emanates from various

provisions to take preventive action for non-discrimination

(Articles 14, 15, 16, 17) and to protect religious and cultural rights

(Articles 25-30) and the dignity of an individual or a group

(Articles 21).
42. That the other relevantentrles for I.ist III are Entry 1 (CFlminal law

other than offences in List I and II, Crlminal procedure), 3,

(preventive detentlon and maintenance of public order,

maintenance of supplles and services essential to the community),

8 (actionable wrongs), 12 (evidence and oaths), 15 (vagrancy), 16

(lunacy and mental dlsease), 20 (economic and social plannlng), 23

(soClal security and social insurance, employment and

unemployment), 25 education, 28 (charities and charitable

instltution includlng religlous endowments and religious

lnstltutlons), 3» (trade and commerce), 38 (electriclty), 39

(newspapers), 40 (archaeological sltes). These are entrles that are

relatable to peace and harmony in the society.issues of “peace and

harmony” affect the Governance of the Country whlCh if disrupted

will affect governance itself and any remedies related to allevlating

the dlsruption. The duty to prevent rlots and destructlon of public

propertles is alsO aVallable to the Unlon.

43. That the State must support the duty of every citizen in Articlcs

5 l A (e) (to promote harmony and the spirit of common

brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religlous,

linguistic and regional or sectlonal dlverslties, to renounce

practlces derogatory to the dlgnity of women) and (f) (to valuc and
 preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture.) The duties and

DPSPs are available for deciding whether the legislation furthers a

valid objective.

44. It is trite to mention that the Parliament has plenary power to make

laws on entries within its competence. In this case places of

woi ship shall fall within the above mentioned entries even if it

were to be read narrowly. In any event, incidental encroachment is

permissible in law. 4 his Hon'ble Court observed in E1e1 Hotels

and Investment Ltd. V Union of India (1989) 3 SCC 698 as

follows:

“The cardinal rule of interpretation is that the entries in the

legislative lists are not to be read in a narrow or restricted
sense and that each general word should be held to extend to
all ancillaryor subsidiary matters which can fairly and
reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. The widest
possible construction, according to the ordinary meaning of
the words in the entry,must be put upon them. Reference
to legislative practice may be admissible in reconciling two
conflicting provisions in rival legislative lists. In construing
the words in a constitutional document conferring
legislative power the most liberal construction should be put
upon words so that the same may have effect in their
widest amplitude.”
45. The contentlon that the Parliament cannot enact thls 71ct Slnce

pilgrlmage falls under state llst as Entry 7. “Pilgrlmages, other than

llgrlmages to places outslde Indla.” 1s entirely contrary to express

provisions of the constltutlon. AccOrding to Oxford Learners

DlCtlonary, pllgrlmage means: “a journey to a holy place for

rellgious reasons”. Cambrldge Dictionary defines it as: “a speclal

journey made by a pilgrllTl.” The focus is on the ‘journey of the

llgrlm , not on the lranagement of the destlnation l.e. holy place.

Management of such a holy place shall Stlll lle in the hands of the

rellglous denomlnatlon or a section thereof to whlCh lt belongs.

Furthermore, not all rellgious or Charltable institutions are

destinations of pllgrimage. So, pilgrimage as a head can reasonably

be separated from religious and charitable institutions as a head.

The same has been recognised by the Constitution of Indla and

placed under dlfferent heads ln different list, Wlth the latter lylng ln

concurrent llst. In any event, there 1s no pleadlng as tO whlch

pilgrlmage, to WhlCh place 1s the Petitloner referrlllg to. It may be

noted that merely the rlght to pray is not the same as the rlght to

llgrlmage. It lS stated, the petitioner has not claimed that there was

any hlStOrlcal evldence of pllgrimage of the kind known for

temples Sabrlmala, Tlrupatl etc. Therefore, the question cannot be

 decided in vacuum. In fact, on the contrary, there has been no

pilgrimage to any place pleaded in the Petition.

46. To remove any doubt it must be emphasised that Article 246

secures the predominance of Union List over the other two lists and

of Concurrent List over State List. Hence, under all circumstances

the Parliament is within its competence to enact this Act.

47. That in one of the grounds of the petition, it is stated that the Act

affects the rights of Hindus, Jains, Buddhists, Sikhs and snubs their

voice against illegal inhumane barbarian action committed in the

pre-independence period. It is stated that such an allegation is

bereft of any legal principles and averments, and as such does not

deserve any reply. It is stated that the Constitution of India adopted

by the People of India on 26.11.1949 is the guiding document and

it is not open to any person to invoke alleged historical wrongs in

abstract before a court of law. The necessary pleadings in this

regard are lacking in the Petition. The Applicant most humbly

submits that this contention of the Petitioner is completely baseless

and m"alafide as it is common understanding that the alleged

historical blunders and wrongdoings committed 500 years ago

cannot be undone by filing litigations now. The Applicant reserves

 his right to refer to works of historians in the course of oral

arguments if required. Be that as it may, the only way forward for a

society with various cultural, religious and ideological differences,

io flourish is to reconcile and strengthen what unites them instead

of what divides them and that is exactly what the intent and object

of this Act was.

48. That it is stated that the Petitioner has wrongly contended that the

impugned legislation violates the fundamental rights of Hindus,

.lains, Buddhists and Sikhs on the false assumption that places of

worship of only the Hindus, Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs have been

converted into Muslim places of worship. It is important to bring to

the notice of this Hon'ble Court that there were numerous Mosque

that were converted into Temples and Guruduwaras after Partition

took place in 1947. It is a historical fact, widely recorded.

However, whatever is a thing of history must be read as history and

be confined to the books. No person should be allowed to use the

history to destroy the future of our nation and common heritage.

49. That the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991

consisting of just eight sections forms an express of the basic

structure of the Constitution as it is a product of secularism as

 declared ln the preamble and emanates from Article 25 of our

ConstitutloR. It is the expression of the soverelgn function of the

State that treat all Citizens equally and does not patronize any

rellgion. That it 1s incorrect contentloR Of the Petitioner that the

lmpugned Act vlolates the fundamental right to profess, practice

and propagate religlon under Artlcle 25. The Petitloner fails to

produce any argument to prove his clallTl aS tO in what manner the

law takes away the rlght to profess or practlce any religlon. The

Petitloner lacks materlal pleadlRg, and no essentlal religious

practlce has been shoWn Wlth respect to any partlcular place.

Therefore, firstly,there are no reasons for strlklng down of the

lmpugned LeQlSlation; tvhich anyway, will literally open

floodgates for motivated litlgation all across the country — not only

inter-f3lth, but alSO Wlthln the groups of the same falth but dlfferent

sects.

50. That lt is stated that there 1s no violation of Artlcle 25 as alleged

and even otherwlse, because there 1s no pleadlng ln the Wrlt

Petltlon to explain how the same 1s vl0lated. It lS Stated that what lS

protected under Artlcle 25 is the essential religlous practlce. It is

stated that Petltloner whlle pleadlng the case of Hlndus, Slkhs,

JalrlS and Buddhist, has not pleaded the tenets of the sald rellgion
 and as to how the speclflc tenet is viOlated by the lmpugned

leglslation; and no speclfic location has been mentloned. The

burden regardlng essential religlous practlce is to be discharged by

the one who claims a tenet to be essentlal religlous practice. It lS

stated that, the Appllcant has done hls own research, and has not

come across any tenet in any of the sald religion that ONLY

requlre worship ln those places covered by the Places of Worshlp

Act, 1991.

51. That the Appllcant crax'es leave of this Hon'ble Court to file

written submisslons and adduce arguments as and when requlred

by thls Hon'ble Court. The Applicant 1s a necessary and proper

party as it wlshes to contest and oppose the prayer on behalf of a

group of cltizens who beliex'e that the 1991 Act actually is a strong

wall between dlVlslve methodology and the gullible people of India

that also seeks to not allow judlCial system to be abused for

]3OlltlCal gains.

52. That the present AppllCatlon has been preferred boi:a fide and ln

the lnterests Of |i.lStlCC.

 PRAYER

In light of the facts and circumstances stated herein above, it is most

humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to:

A. allow the Applicant to be impleaded as party Respondents in Writ

Petition (Civil) No. 1246 of 2020; and/or

B. pass any such further orders and/or directions that this Hon'ble

Court may deem fit and proper in the interests of justice.

AND F“OR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE APPLICANT AS IS

DUTY BOUND SHALL EVER PRAY.

FILED BY:

Drawn On: 26.08.2022

(M/s Ahmadi Law Offices]

Advocate for the Applicant

New Delhi
Filed on: 01.09.2022
 IN I HE SUPREME HON'BLE COURT OF INDIA
CIVII. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
I.A. No. of 2022
In
WItI I PU ITION (G IVIL) Ix 0. 1246 OF 2020
IN "}“IlL MA'FTEJ1 OF:

ASI I WI.YI KUMAR I/PADHYAY . . .. PETITIONER

VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA . . . .RESPONDENT

And in the Matter of:

MPLBI TRUST .APPLICANT
AF£ IDAVIT
I, i'v1uln Ahamad, Aged about 47 years, S/o Shrl Raees Ahamad,
Office Addl ess: House No. 290/511, Pandey Ka Talab, Malvlya
1'idgai, 1.ucknow, U.P. do hereby solemnly affirm and declare on
oath as under:

1. I hat I am the General Secretary of the Appllcant whlCh lS flllng the

present AppllCatlon and as srich aware of the facts and clrculnstances
of the case, and therefore competent to swear thls affldavit on behalf
of Applicant.

? I hat I have gone through a copy of the Applicatlon for Inipleadnient

and I sta:c that thc conten.is thcrcof are tl”ue and cor cci Its hiy
knoz'!cdge and bellCl. $']g$

DEPONNN F

VPRIFICATION:-

I, above r.amcd deponent do hereby verify that the contents of the- foregoing
Para Nos. 1 & 2 are true and coiTect to iiiy knowledge and I believe the
same to be true and that nothing materlal lfas been concealed therefrom.

, OU lJllS tllc day of September, 202?.

Db.fiO?s ENT
 Iî$ '1“IJI‹. SL PRN.MN. COURT OF INDIA
Civil Original JuriSdiction
I.A. No. of 2022
In
W.P. ((?) 1246 No. of 2020

Aslivt'ini Kulviar Upadhyay . PetÎt ÎOlâCf

Versus
Union ofi India Respondent

Aitd in the Matter of:

N1PLI3I Trust Applicant
VAKALA I'NAMA
I, Muin Ahamad, Genei”d1 Seci etary & Authorized Signatory of the Applicant in the
above Pctition do lici cby appo int and retain
Mls Ahmadi Law Offices
AdvoCate-OU-ltcCord, Supreme Court of India
Ad\()Ctlt«- of the Supreme Gourt of India, to act and appear for me/’ as in the above
1 fill11f)l1 AQ tdJ illl Oh ley/oui” behalf to conduct and pi osecute (or defend) the satire
to rilhdi aw oi to coinpi oinise tlic same and all proceeding that may be taken in
rcspcct of any application connected with the same or any decree or order passed
ther cin including pi ocecding in taxation tend applications for Review to file and
obtain return of documents and to deposit and receive money on my/our behalf in the
said Petition/Appeal and in application for Review, and to represent me/us and to
take al necessary steps on my/our behalf in the above matter. I/we agree to ratify, all
acts done by the aI'orcsaid Advocate in pursuance of this authority.
Dated this the day of August, 2022
Acccpte-d, Certii5ed & Ident llied by

14 s Ahiviadi I.aw O t”Liccs

.Advocalc Sriprcinc Cou<
13-Sf»4, l Cil-, ?sew lui icnds Co lony

Viob: OtJ654S b 7654

1:lzai1 ld: sliariqcounscl2005@gmail.coivi
Goăe No.3108 'ipp1icanr(s)/Itespondent(s)

MEMO OF APPEARANCE
ÎO
TliC Rcgislrar
Stipi cmc Coun of India
fi i‘
Fleasc enter my appeaianccs for the above-named Applicant/s in tliC abovc-
lzentioned Ap llCat ioe/Petition/Appeal.
Yours faithfully
Datcc.: .5.2022 f

?vIe s â!u+iadi 1.aw Officcs

Advocatc, Supi cine Court
i'1acc: cw Dell2l OFF/ces
•** Â VO Cpț@
Supreme On-Regg rd-3108
GF, New OÎ India
Ne w D e I h i Friengg CO
NtObile 1.1.0.0.2.5
96 54 88 76 84