Name of Case: Tanada v. Yulo G.R. No.

43575 (1935)
 upxateneo Uncategorized September 22, 20182
Minutes
Division: En Banc
Citation Date:   May 1935
Caption / Parties JUAN TAÑADA, petitioner, vs.JOSE YULO, Secretary of Justice,
EDUARDO GUTIERREZ DAVID, Judge of First Instance of the Thirteenth Judicial
District,
and SANTIAGO TAÑADA, Justice of the Peace of Alabat, Tayabas, respondents.

Pedro Ynsua for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for respondents.
Kind of Issuance
Ponente MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS: Facts. 1911, Dec.: Tanada appointed justice of peace in Alabat, Tayabas by
Governor-General with consent of Philippine Commission
1931, Nov.: Act No. 3899 providing 65 y.o. as retirement age of judges approved
1933, Jan.: date for cessation from office as per Act No. 3899
1934, Sept.: Tanada transferred to Municipality of Perez, Tayabas but same
position
1935, Oct.: Tanada reached 65 years of age
1935: DOJ, through CFI Judge, ordered Tanada to surrender office

ISSUE: Does Act. No. 3899 apply to Tanada? -No

(2) Does the transfer denote a new appointment? -No
Desicions Ratio: (1) Tanada has not reached 65 when the Act was approved. The law
provides that judges who are already 65 years old upon the time the Act No. 3899
takes effect should surrender their offices. In this case, Tanada was only 64 when
said Act gained approval. Although Tanada did reach 65 later, such is immaterial
as the law only includes those who have reached said date on approval and not
after its approval.

(2) The transfer is not a new appointment because it does not meet the elements of
an appointment. Appointments necessarily has two things: appointment by
Governor-General and consent of Philippine Senate. Transfer only needs the word
of the Governor-General. As applied to Tanada, his transfer is not an appointment
because his second reassignment did not have the consent of Philippine Senate. As
well, by definition, transfer is the enlargement or change of jurisdiction grounded
on the original appointment. It being grounded on the original appointment, no
new appointment is necessary.

Doctrine: The relevant statutory doctrine for this case can be seen in Ratio 1.
Defense argues that the relevant provision is “defective and does not convey the
legislative intent.” Later, it was learned that the defense was actually seeking for
the insertion of a phrase in the provision which would then explicitly disqualify
Tanada from office. To address this argument, the court differentiates between
liberal construction, which the court is allowed to do, and judicial legislation,

1
which is beyond the court’s jurisdiction. Liberal construction allows courts to find
out the true meaning of a provision through legislative intent. Judicial legislation,
meanwhile, is when the court adds certain elements/words in a provision that has
been omitted. In short, the defense sought judicial legislation, an act which courts
cannot do.

Significance in Statutory Construction: Tanada v. Yulo is significant in the

field of statutory construction because it involves the interpretation of
constitutional principles such as the non-delegation of legislative powers
and due process. The case established the principle that the delegation of
legislative power is allowed as long as there is a sufficient standard or
guideline provided in the law. This decision influenced subsequent cases
and discussions about the limits of delegated powers and the importance
of maintaining a balance between the different branches of government.