Chapter 3 Chinese Armies in The Second Sino-Japanese War (PDFDrive)

Revised Edition: 2016
ISBN 978-1-280-19830-4
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Table of Contents
Chapter 1 - Second Sino-Japanese War
Chapter 2 - Sino-German Cooperation (1911–1941)
Chapter 3 - Chinese Armies in the Second Sino-Japanese War
Chapter 4 - Japanese War Crimes
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Chapter 5 - Introduction to Attack on Pearl Harbor
Chapter 6 - Events Leading to the Attack on Pearl Harbor
Chapter 7 - Infamy Speech
Chapter 8 - Results of the Attack on Pearl Harbor
______________________________WORLD TECHNOLOGIES______________________________
Chapter 1
Second Sino-Japanese War
The Second Sino-Japanese War (July 7, 1937 – September 9, 1945) was a military conflict
fought primarily between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan. From 1937 to 1941,
China fought Japan with some economic help from Germany, the Soviet Union (1937–1940) and
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the United States. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941), the war merged into the
greater conflict of World War II as a major front of what is broadly known as the Pacific War.
The Second Sino-Japanese War was the largest Asian war in the 20th century. It also made up
more than 50% of the casualties in the Pacific War if the 1937–1941 period is taken into account.
Although the two countries had fought intermittently since 1931, total war started in earnest in
1937 and ended only with the surrender of Japan in 1945. The war was the result of a decades-
long Japanese imperialist policy aiming to dominate China politically and militarily and to
secure its vast raw material reserves and other economic resources, particularly food and labour.
Before 1937, China and Japan fought in small, localized engagements, so-called "incidents". Yet
the two sides, for a variety of reasons, refrained from fighting a total war. In 1931, the Japanese
invasion of Manchuria by Japan's Kwantung Army followed the Mukden Incident. The last of
these incidents was the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, marking the beginning of total war
between the two countries.
Nomenclature
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Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Allied Commander-in-Chief in the China theatre from 1942–1945
In the Chinese language, the war is most commonly known as the War of Resistance Against
Japan (simplified Chinese: 抗日战争; traditional Chinese: 抗日戰爭), and also known as the
Eight Years' War of Resistance(八年抗战/八年抗戰), simply War of Resistance (抗战/抗戰), or
Second Sino-Japanese War (第二次中日战争/第二次中日戰爭).
The Name
In Japan, the name "Japan–China War" (日中戰爭 Nitchū Sensō?) is most commonly used
because of its perceived objectivity. In Japan today, it is written as 日中戦争 in shinjitai. When
the invasion of China proper began in earnest in July 1937 near Beijing, the government of Japan
used "The North China Incident" (華北事變 Kahoku Jihen?), and with the outbreak of the Battle
of Shanghai the following month, it was changed to "The China Incident" (支那事變 Shina
Jihen?).
The word "incident" (事變 jihen?) was used by Japan, as neither country had made a formal
declaration of war. Japan wanted to avoid intervention by other countries, particularly the United
Kingdom and the United States, which were her primary source of petroleum; the United States
was also her biggest supplier of steel. US President Franklin D. Roosevelt would have been
legally obliged to impose an embargo on Japan in observance of the US Neutrality Acts had the
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fighting been formally escalated to "general war".
Other Names
In Japanese propaganda however, the invasion of China became a "holy war" (seisen), the first
step of the Hakkō ichiu (八紘一宇?, eight corners of the world under one roof). In 1940,
Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe launched the Taisei Yokusankai. When both sides
formally declared war in December 1941, the name was replaced by "Greater East Asia War"
(大東亞戰爭 Daitōa Sensō?).
Although the Japanese government still uses the term "China Incident" in formal documents,
because the word Shina is considered a derogatory word by China, the media in Japan often
paraphrase with other expressions like "The Japan–China Incident" (日華事變 Nikka Jihen?,
日支事變 Nisshi Jihen), which were used by media even in the 1930s.
In addition, the name "Second Sino-Japanese War" is not usually used in Japan, as the First Sino-
Japanese War (日清戦争 Nisshin–Sensō?) between Japan and the Qing Dynasty in 1894 is not
regarded to have obvious direct linkage to the second, between Japan and the Republic of China.
Background
First Sino-Japanese War
The origin of the Second Sino-Japanese War can be traced to the First Sino-Japanese War of
1894–95, in which China, then under the Qing Dynasty, was defeated by Japan and was forced to
cede Taiwan to it, and to recognize the independence of Korea in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The
Qing Dynasty was on the brink of collapse from internal revolts and foreign imperialism, while
Japan had emerged as a great power through its effective measures of modernization.
The Republic of China
The Republic of China was founded in 1912, following the Xinhai Revolution which overthrew
the Qing Dynasty. However, the nascent Republic was even weaker than its predecessor due to
the predominance of Chinese warlords. Unifying the nation and repelling imperialism seemed a
very remote possibility. Some warlords even aligned themselves with various foreign powers in
an effort to wipe each other out. For example, the warlord Zhang Zuolin of Manchuria openly
cooperated with the Japanese for military and economic assistance.
Twenty-One Demands
In 1915, Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands to extort further political and commercial
privilege from China. Following World War I, Japan acquired the German Empire's sphere of
influence in Shandong (Shantung), leading to nationwide anti-Japanese protests and mass
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demonstrations in China, but China under the Beiyang government remained fragmented and
unable to resist foreign incursions. To unite China and eradicate regional warlords, the Kuo-
mintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party) in Guangzhou launched the Northern Expedition
of 1926–28.
Jinan Incident
The Kuomintang's National Revolutionary Army (NRA) swept through China until it was
checked in Shandong, where Beiyang warlord Zhang Zongchang, backed by the Japanese,
attempted to stop the NRA's advance. This battle culminated in the Jinan Incident of 1928 in
which the National Revolutionary Army and the Imperial Japanese Army were engaged in a
short conflict that resulted in Kuomintang's withdrawal from Jinan.
Zhang Zuolin and Chiang Kai Shek
In the same year, Zhang Zuolin was assassinated when he became less willing to cooperate with
Japan. Afterwards Zhang's son Zhang Xueliang quickly took over control of Manchuria, and
despite strong Japanese lobbying efforts to continue the resistance against the KMT, he shortly
declared his allegiance to the Kuomintang government under Chiang Kai-shek, which resulted in
the nominal unification of China at the end of 1928.
Communist Party of China
However in 1930, a large scale civil war broke out between warlords who fought in alliance with
Kuomintang during the Northern Expedition and central government under Chiang. In addition,
the Chinese Communists (CCP, or Communist Party of China) revolted against the central
government following a purge of its members by the KMT in 1927. Therefore the Chinese
central government diverted much attention into fighting these civil wars and followed a policy
of "first internal pacification before external resistance"((Chinese): 攘外必先安内).
Course of the war
Invasion of Manchuria, interventions in China
WTKwantung Army entering Shenyang during the Mukden Incident
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek announced the Kuomintang policy of resistance against Japan at Lushan
on July 10, 1937, three days after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.
The situation in China provided an easy opportunity for Japan to further its goals. Japan saw
Manchuria as a limitless supply of raw materials, a market for her manufactured goods (now
excluded from many Western countries by Depression era tariffs), and as a protective buffer state
against the Soviet Union in Siberia. Japan invaded Manchuria outright after the Mukden Incident
(九一八事變) in September 1931. After five months of fighting, the puppet state of Manchukuo
was established in 1932, with the last emperor of China, Puyi, installed as a puppet ruler.
Militarily too weak to directly challenge Japan, China appealed to the League of Nations for
help. The League's investigation was published as the Lytton Report, condemning Japan for its
incursion into Manchuria, and causing Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations entirely.
Appeasement being the predominant policy of the day, no country was willing to take action
against Japan beyond tepid censure.
Incessant fighting followed the Mukden Incident. In 1932, Chinese and Japanese troops fought a
short war in the January 28 Incident. This battle resulted in the demilitarisation of Shanghai,
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which forbade the Chinese from deploying troops in their own city. In Manchukuo there was an
ongoing campaign to defeat the anti-Japanese volunteer armies that arose from widespread
outrage over the policy of non-resistance to Japan.
In 1933, the Japanese attacked the Great Wall region, the Tanggu Truce taking place in its
aftermath, giving Japan control of Rehe province as well as a demilitarized zone between the
Great Wall and Beiping-Tianjin region. Here the Japanese aim was to create another buffer
region, this time between Manchukuo and the Chinese Nationalist government in Nanjing.
Japan increasingly used internal conflict in China to reduce the strength of her fractious
opponents. This was precipitated by the fact that even years after the Northern Expedition, the
political power of the Nationalist government was limited to just the area of the Yangtze River
Delta. Other sections of China were essentially in the hands of local Chinese warlords. Japan
sought various Chinese collaborators and helped them establish governments friendly to Japan.
This policy was called the Specialization of North China (Chinese: 華北特殊化; pinyin:
húaběitèshūhùa), more commonly known as the North China Autonomous Movement. The
northern provinces affected by this policy were Chahar, Suiyuan, Hebei, Shanxi, and Shandong.
This Japanese policy was most effective in the area of what is now Inner Mongolia and Hebei. In
1935, under Japanese pressure, China signed the He–Umezu Agreement, which forbade the
KMT from conducting party operations in Hebei. In the same year, the Chin–Doihara Agreement
was signed expelling the KMT from Chahar. Thus, by the end of 1935 the Chinese government
had essentially abandoned northern China. In its place, the Japanese-backed East Hebei
Autonomous Council and the Hebei–Chahar Political Council were established. There in the
empty space of Chahar the Mongol Military Government (蒙古軍政府) was formed on May 12,
1936, Japan providing all necessary military and economic aid. Afterwards Chinese volunteer
forces continued to resist Japanese aggression in Manchuria, and Chahar and Suiyuan.
Full scale invasion of China
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Casualties of a mass panic during a June 1941 Japanese bombing of Chongqing. More than 5000 civilians
died during the first two days of air raids in 1939
Most historians place the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937 at the
Marco Polo Bridge Incident, when a crucial access point to Beijing was assaulted by the Imperial
Japanese Army (IJA). Because the Chinese defenders were the poorly equipped infantry
divisions of the former Northwest Army, the Japanese easily captured Beiping and Tianjin.
The Imperial General Headquarters (GHQ) in Tokyo were initially reluctant to escalate the
conflict into full scale war, being content with the victories achieved in northern China following
the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. However, the KMT central government determined that the
"breaking point" of Japanese aggression had been reached and Chiang Kai-shek quickly
mobilized the central government army and air force under his direct command to attack the
Japanese Marines in Shanghai on August 13, 1937, which led to the Battle of Shanghai. The IJA
had to mobilize over 200,000 troops, coupled with numerous naval vessels and aircraft to capture
Shanghai after more than three months of intense fighting, with casualties far exceeding initial
expectations.
Building on the hard won victory in Shanghai, the IJA captured the KMT capital city of Nanjing
(Nanking) and Southern Shanxi by the end of 1937, in campaigns involving approximately
350,000 Japanese soldiers, and considerably more Chinese. Historians estimate up to 300,000
Chinese were mass murdered in the Nanking Massacre (also known as the "Rape of Nanking"),
after the fall of Nanking on December 13, 1937, while some Japanese deny the existence of a
massacre.
At the start of 1938, the Headquarters in Tokyo still hoped to limit the scope of the conflict to
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occupying areas around Shanghai, Nanjing and most of northern China. They thought this would
preserve strength for an anticipated showdown with the Soviet Union, but by now the Japanese
government and GHQ had effectively lost control of the Japanese army in China. With many
victories achieved, Japanese field generals escalated the war and finally met with defeat at
Taierzhuang. Afterwards the IJA had to change its strategy and deploy almost all of its armies in
the attack on the city of Wuhan, which by now was the political, economic and military center of
China, in hopes of destroying the fighting strength of the National Revolutionary Army (NRA)
and forcing the KMT government to negotiate for peace. But after the Japanese capture of the
city of Wuhan on October 27, 1938, the KMT was forced to retreat to Chongqing (Chungking) to
set up a provisional capital, with Chiang Kai-shek still refusing to negotiate unless Japan agreed
to withdraw to her pre-1937 borders.
With Japanese casualties and costs mounting, the Imperial General Headquarters decided to
retaliate by ordering the air force of the navy and the army to launch the war's first massive air
raids on civilian targets in the provisional capital of Chongqing and nearly every major city in
unoccupied China, leaving millions dead, injured and homeless.
From the beginning of 1939 the war entered a new phase with the unprecedented defeat of the
Japanese at Changsha and Guangxi. These outcomes encouraged the Chinese to launch its first
large-scale counter-offensive against the IJA in early 1940. However, due to her low military-
industrial capacity and limited experience in modern warfare, the NRA was defeated in this
offensive. Afterwards Chiang could not risk any more all-out offensive campaigns given the
poorly-trained, under-equipped, and disorganized state of his armies and opposition to his
leadership both within the Kuomintang and in China in general. He had lost a substantial portion
of his best trained and equipped men in the Battle of Shanghai and was at times at the mercy of
his generals, who maintained a high degree of autonomy from the central KMT government.
From 1940 on the Japanese encountered tremendous difficulties in administering and garrisoning
the seized territories, and tried to solve its occupation problems by implementing a strategy of
creating friendly puppet governments favourable to Japanese interests in the territories
conquered, the most prominent being the Nanjing Nationalist Government headed by former
KMT premier Wang Jingwei. However, the atrocities committed by the Japanese army, as well
as Japanese refusal to delegate any real power, left them very unpopular and largely ineffective.
The only success the Japanese had was the ability to recruit a large Collaborationist Chinese
Army to maintain public security in the occupied areas.
By 1941 Japan held most of the eastern coastal areas of China and Vietnam, but guerilla fighting
continued in these occupied areas. Japan had suffered tremendous casualties from unexpectedly
stubborn Chinese resistance, and neither side could make any swift progress in a manner
resembling the fall of France and Western Europe to Nazi Germany.
Chinese resistance strategy
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Muslim General Ma Fushou in a show of solidarity with Chiang Kai-Shek
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Chinese soldiers in house-to-house fighting in Battle of Taierzhuang
The basis of Chinese strategy before the entrance of Western Allies can be divided into two
periods:
First Period: 7 July 1937 (Battle of Lugou Bridge) – 25 October 1938 (Fall of Wuhan).
Unlike Japan, China was unprepared for total war and had little military-industrial strength, no
mechanized divisions, and few armored forces. Up until the mid-1930s China had hoped that the
League of Nations would provide countermeasures to Japan's aggression. In addition, the
Kuomintang (KMT) government was mired in a civil war against the Communist Party of China
(CCP), as Chiang Kai-shek was quoted: "the Japanese are a disease of the skin, the Communists
are a disease of the heart". The Second United Front between the KMT and CCP was never truly
unified, as each side was preparing for a showdown with the other once the Japanese were driven
out.
Even under these extremely unfavorable circumstances, Chiang realized that to win support from
the United States and other foreign nations, China had to prove it was capable of fighting. A fast
retreat would discourage foreign aid so Chiang decided to make a stand in the Battle of
Shanghai. Chiang sent the best of his German-trained divisions to defend China's largest and
most industrialized city from the Japanese. The battle lasted over three months, saw heavy
casualties on both sides and ended with a Chinese retreat towards Nanjing. While this was a
military defeat for the Chinese, it proved that China would not be defeated easily and showed
China's determination to the world, which became an enormous morale booster for the Chinese
people as it ended the Japanese taunt that Japan could conquer Shanghai in three days and China
in three months.
Afterwards the Chinese began to adopt the strategy of "trading space for time" ((Chinese):
以空間換取時間). The Chinese army would put up fights to delay Japanese advance to northern
and eastern cities, to allow the home front, along with its professionals and key industries, to
retreat west into Chongqing. As a result of Chinese troops' scorched earth strategies, where dams
and levees were intentionally sabotaged to create massive flooding, the consecutive Japanese
advancements and conquests began to stall in late 1938.
Second Period: 25 October 1938 (Fall of Wuhan) – December 1941 (before the Allies' decla-
ration of war on Japan).
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National Revolutionary Army soldiers march to the front in 1939
During this period, the Chinese main objective was to prolong the war as long as possible,
exhausting the Japanese resources and building up the Chinese military capacity. American
general Joseph Stilwell called this strategy "winning by outlasting". Therefore, the National
Revolutionary Army adopted the concept of "magnetic warfare" to attract advancing Japanese
troops to definite points where they were subjected to ambush, flanking attacks, and encirc-
lements in major engagements. The most prominent example of this tactic is the successful
defense of Changsha in 1939 and again in 1941 while inflicting heavy casualties on the IJA.
Also, local Chinese resistance forces, organised by the Chinese communists and KMT continued
their resistance in occupied areas to pester the enemy and make their administration over the vast
lands of China difficult. In 1940 the Chinese Red Army launched a major offensive in north
China, destroyed railways and blew up a major coal mine. These constant harassment and
sabotage operations deeply frustrated the Japanese army and led them to employ the "Three Alls
Policy" (kill all, loot all, burn all) (三光政策, Hanyu Pinyin: Sānguāng Zhèngcè, Japanese On:
Sankō Seisaku). It was during this time period that the bulk of Japanese war crimes were
committed.
By 1941, Japan had occupied much of north and coastal China, but the KMT central government
and military had successfully retreated to the western interior to continue their resistance, while
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the Chinese communists remained in control of base areas in Shaanxi. Furthermore, in the
occupied areas Japanese control was limited to just railroads and major cities ("points and
lines"), but they did not have a major military or administrative presence in the vast Chinese
countryside, which was a hotbed of Chinese partisan activities. This stalemate situation made a
decisive victory seem impossible to the Japanese.
Relationship between the Nationalists and Communists
After the Mukden Incident in 1931, Chinese public opinion strongly criticized the leader of
Manchuria, the "young marshal" Zhang Xueliang, for his nonresistance to the Japanese invasion,
even though the Kuomintang central government was indirectly responsible for this policy.
Afterwards Chiang Kai-shek assigned Zhang and his Northeast Army the duty of suppressing the
Red Army of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Shaanxi after their Long March. This
resulted in great casualties for his Northeast Army, and Chiang Kai-shek did not give him any
support in manpower and weaponry.
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Eighth Route Army Commander Zhu De with KMT Blue Sky White Sun Emblem cap
On 12 December 1936 a deeply disgruntled Zhang Xueliang decided to conspire with the CCP
and kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek in Xi'an to force an end to the conflict between KMT and CCP.
To secure the release of Chiang, the KMT was forced to agree to a temporary end to the Chinese
Civil War and the forming of a United Front between the CCP and KMT against Japan on 24
December 1936. The cooperation took place with salutary effects for the beleaguered CCP, and
they agreed to form the New Fourth Army and the 8th Route Army which were nominally under
the command of the National Revolutionary Army. The Red Army of CCP fought in alliance
with the KMT forces during the Battle of Taiyuan, and the high point of their cooperation came
in 1938 during the Battle of Wuhan.
However, despite Japan's steady territorial gains in northern China, the coastal regions, and the
rich Yangtze River Valley in central China, the distrust between the two antagonists was scarcely
veiled. The uneasy alliance began to break down by late 1938 as a result of the Communists
efforts to aggressively expand their military strength through absorbing Chinese guerrilla forces
behind enemy lines. For Chinese militia who refuse to switch their allegiance, the CCP would
call them "collaborators" and then attack to eliminate their forces. For example, the Red Army
led by He Long attacked and wiped out a brigade of Chinese militia led by Zhang Yin-wu in
Hebei in June, 1939. Starting in 1940, open conflicts between the Nationalists and Communists
became more frequent in the occupied areas outside of Japanese control, culminating in the New
Fourth Army Incident in January 1941.
Afterwards, the Second United Front completely broke down and Chinese Communists leader
Mao Zedong outlined the preliminary plan for the CCP's eventual seizure of power from Chiang
Kai-shek. Mao began his final push for consolidation of CCP power under his authority, and his
teachings became the central tenets of the CCP doctrine that came to be formalized as "Mao
Zedong Thought". The communists also began to focus most of their energy on building up their
sphere of influence wherever opportunities were presented, mainly through rural mass
organizations, administrative, land and tax reform measures favoring poor peasants; while the
Nationalists attempted to neutralize the spread of Communist influence by military blockade of
areas controlled by CCP and fighting the Japanese at the same time
Foreign support for China
At the outbreak of full scale war, many global powers were reluctant to provide support to
China; because in their opinion the Chinese would eventually lose the war, and they did not wish
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to antagonize the Japanese who might, in turn, eye their colonial possessions in the region. They
expected any support given to the Chinese might worsen their own relationship with the
Japanese, who taunted the Chinese with the prospect of conquest within three months. However,
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union did provide support to the Chinese before the war escalated
to the Asian theatre of World War II, with the United States and Allies lending support to China
afterwards.
German support
Prior to the outbreak of the war, Germany and China had close economic and military
cooperation, with Germany helping China modernize its industry and military in exchange for
raw materials. More than half of the German arms exports during its rearmament period were to
China. Nevertheless the proposed 30 new divisions equipped and trained with German assistance
did not materialize when Germany withdrew its support in 1938, because Adolf Hitler wanted to
form an alliance with Japan against the Soviet Union.
Soviet support
I-16 with Chinese insignia. I-16 was the main fighter plane used by the Chinese Air Force and Soviet
volunteers.
With the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union
wished to keep China in the war to hinder the Japanese from invading Siberia, thus saving itself
from the threat of a two-front war. In September 1937, the Soviet leadership signed the Sino-
Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, began aiding China, and approved Operation Zet, a Soviet volu-
nteer air force. As part of the secret operation, Soviet technicians upgraded and handled some of
the Chinese war-supply transport. Bombers, fighters, military supplies and advisors arrived,
including Soviet general Vasily Chuikov, later to become victor at the Battle of Stalingrad. Prior
to the entrance of Western allies, the Soviet Union provided the largest amount of foreign aid to
China, totalling some $250 million of credits in munitions and supplies. In 1941, Soviet aid
ended as a result of the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact and the beginning of the Great Patriotic
War. This pact enabled the Soviet Union to avoid fighting against Germany and Japan at the
same time. 3,665 Soviet advisors and pilots fought for the Chinese side In total, 227 Soviets died
fighting in China. The Soviets breached the pact with China by invading the Xinjiang province
during the Islamic rebellion in Xinjiang (1937) and fought directly against Chinese Nationalist
troops during the Ili Rebellion during the war against Japan.
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Allied support
A "blood chit" issued to AVG pilots requesting all Chinese to offer rescue and protection
Flying Tigers Commander Claire Lee Chennault
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From December 1937 events such as the Japanese attack on the USS Panay and the Nanking
Massacre swung public opinion in the West sharply against Japan and increased their fear of
Japanese expansion, which prompted the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to
provide loan assistance for war supply contracts to the Republic of China. Furthermore, Australia
prevented a Japanese government-owned company from taking over an iron mine in Australia,
and banned iron ore exports in 1938. Japan retaliated by invading and occupying French Indo-
china (present-day Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) in 1940, and successfully blockaded China
from the import of arms, fuel and 10,000 tons/month of materials supplied by the Allies through
the Haiphong-Yunnan Fou railway line.
In mid-1941, the United States government financed the creation of the American Volunteer
Group (AVG), or Flying Tigers, to replace the withdrawal of Soviet volunteers and aircraft. Led
by Claire Lee Chennault, their early combat success of 300 kills against a loss of 12 of their
shark painted P-40 fighters earned them wide recognition at the time when Allies were suffering
heavy losses, and soon afterwards their dogfighting tactics would be adopted by the United
States Army Air Forces. Furthermore, to pressure the Japanese to end all hostilities in China, the
United States, Britain, and the Dutch East Indies began oil and/or steel embargos against Japan.
The loss of oil imports made it impossible for Japan to continue operations in China. This set the
stage for Japan to launch a series of military attacks against the Allies when the Imperial
Japanese Navy raided Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
Entrance of Western Allies
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Chiang Kai-shek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill met at the Cairo Conference in 1943
during World War II.
1942, Burma.
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Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his wife Madame Chiang with Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell in
Within a few days of the attack on Pearl Harbor, China formally declared war against Japan,
Germany and Italy, and almost immediately the Chinese troops achieved another decisive victory
in the Battle of Changsha, which earned the Chinese government much prestige from the Allies.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt referred to the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union
and China as the world's "Four Policemen", elevating the international status of China to an
unprecedented height after a century of humiliation at the hands of various imperialist powers.
Chiang Kai-shek continued to receive supplies from the United States as the Chinese conflict
was merged into the Asian theatre of World War II. However, in contrast to the Arctic supply
route to the Soviet Union that stayed open most of the war, sea routes to China and the Yunnan–
Vietnam Railway had been closed since 1940. Therefore between the closing of the Burma Road
in 1942 and its re-opening as the Ledo Road in 1945, foreign aid was largely limited to what
could be flown in over "The Hump".
Most of China's own industry had already been captured or destroyed by Japan, and the Soviet
Union refused to allow the United States to supply China through Kazakhstan into Xinjiang
because the Xinjiang warlord Sheng Shicai turned anti-Soviet in 1942 with Chiang's approval.
For these reasons, the Chinese government never had the supplies and equipment needed to
mount major counter-offensives. Despite the severe shortage of materiel, in 1943, the Chinese
were successful in repelling major Japanese offensives in Hubei and Changde.
Chiang was appointed Allied commander-in-chief in the China theater in 1942, while American
general Joseph Stilwell served for a time as Chiang's chief of staff, and at the same time
commanding American forces in the China Burma India Theater. However, relations between
Stilwell and Chiang soon broke down for many reasons. Many historians (such as Barbara W.
Tuchman) suggested it was largely due to the corruption and inefficiency of the Kuomintang
(KMT) government. However, other historians (such as Ray Huang) and Hans van de Ven found
that it was a more complicated situation. Stilwell had a strong desire to assume total control of
Chinese troops and pursue an aggressive strategy, while Chiang preferred a patient and less ex-
pensive strategy of outwaiting the Japanese. Chiang continued to maintain a defensive posture
despite pleads from the other Allies to actively break the Japanese blockade, because China had
already suffered tens of millions of war casualties and believed that Japan would eventually
capitulate to America's overwhelming industrial output. Due to these reasons the other Allies
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gradually began to lose confidence in the Chinese ability to conduct offensive operations from
the Asian mainland, and instead concentrated their efforts against the Japanese in the Pacific
Ocean Areas and South West Pacific Area, employing an island hopping strategy.
Long standing differences in national interest and political stance among China, the United
States, and the United Kingdom did not disappear. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was
reluctant to devote British troops, the majority of whom had been routed by the Japanese in
earlier campaigns, to reopen the Burma Road. On the other hand, Stilwell believed that the
reopening of the Burma Road was vital to China as all the ports on mainland China were under
Japanese control. The Allies' "Europe First" policy obviously did not sit well with Chiang, while
the later British insistence that China send in more and more troops into Indochina in the Burma
Campaign was suspected by Chiang as an attempt by Britain to use Chinese manpower to defend
British colonial holdings and prevent the gate to India from falling to Japan. Chiang also
believed that China should divert their crack army divisions from Burma to eastern China to
defend the airbases of the American bombers and defeat Japan through bombing, a strategy that
American general Claire Lee Chennault supported but Stilwell strongly opposed. In addition,
Chiang voiced his support of Indian independence in a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi in 1942,
which further soured the relationship between China and the United Kingdom.
American and Canadian-born Chinese were recruited to act as covert operatives in Japanese-
occupied China (Canadian-born Chinese having not yet been granted citizenship were trained by
the British army). Employing their racial background as a disguise, their mandate was to blend in
with local citizens and wage a campaign of sabotage. Activities focused on destruction of Japa-
nese transportation of supplies (signaling bomber destruction of railroads, bridges).
The United States saw the Chinese theater as a means to tie up a large number of Japanese
troops, as well as being a location for American airbases from which to strike the Japanese home
islands. In 1944, as the Japanese position in the Pacific was deteriorating fast, the IJA mobilized
over 400,000 men and launched their Operation Ichi-Go, their largest offensive in World War II
to attack the American airbases in China and link up the railway between Manchuria and
Vietnam. This brought major cities in Hunan, Henan and Guangxi under Japanese occupation.
The failure of the Chinese forces to defend these areas encouraged Stilwell to attempt to gain
command of the entire Chinese army, and his subsequent showdown with Chiang led to his
replacement by Major General Albert Coady Wedemeyer.
However, by the end of 1944 Chinese troops under the command of Sun Li-jen attacking from
India and those under the command of Wei Lihuang attacking from Yunnan joined forces in
Mong-Yu, which succeeded in driving out the Japanese in North Burma and securing the Ledo
Road, a vital supply route to China. In Spring 1945 the Chinese launched offensives and retook
Hunan and Guangxi. With the Chinese army progressing well in training and equipment,
Wedemeyer planned to launch Operation Carbonado in summer 1945 to retake Guangdong, thus
obtaining a coastal port, and from there drive northwards toward Shanghai. However, the atomic
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Soviet invasion of Manchuria hastened Japanese
surrender and these plans were not put into action.
Intrusion into other Theatres
WT
The Chinese Kuomintang also supported the Vietnamese Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang in its battle
against French and Japanese imperialism.
In Guangxi Chinese military leaders were organizing Vietnamese nationalists against the
Japanese. The VNQDD had been active in Guangxi and some of their members had joined the
KMT army. Under the umbrella of KMT activities, a broad alliance of nationalists emerged.
With Ho at the forefront, the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Vietnamese Independence
League, usually known as the Viet Minh) was formed and based in the town of Chinghsi. The
pro-VNQDD nationalist Ho Ngoc Lam, a KMT army officer and former disciple of Phan Boi
Chau, was named as the deputy of Pham Van Dong, later to be Ho's Prime Minister. The front
was later broadened and renamed the Viet Nam Giai Phong Dong Minh (Vietnam Liberation
League).
The Viet Nam Revolutionary League was a union of various Vietnamese nationalist groups, run
by the pro Chinese VNQDD. Chinese KMT General Zhang Fakui created to league to further
Chinese influence in Indochina, against the French and Japanese. Its stated goal was for unity
with China under the Three Principles of the People, created by KMT founder Dr. Sun and oppo-
sition to Vietnamese and French Imperialists. The Revolutionary League was controlled by
Nguyen Hai Than, who was born in china and could not speak Vietnamese. General Zhang
shrewdly blocked the Communists of Vietnam, and Ho Chi Minh from entering the league, as
Zhang's main goal was Chinese influence in Indo China. The KMT utilized these Vietnamese
nationalists during World War II against Japanese forces. Franklin D. Roosevelt, through
General Stilwell, privately made it clear that they preferred that the French not reacquire French
Indochina (modern day Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) after the war was over. Roosevelt offered
Chiang Kai-shek control of all of Indochina. It was said that Chiang Kai-shek replied: "Under no
circumstances!".
After the war, 200,000 Chinese troops under General Lu Han were sent by Chiang Kai-shek to
northern Indochina (north of the 16th parallel) to accept the surrender of Japanese occupying
forces there, and remained in Indochina until 1946, when the French returned. The Chinese used
the VNQDD, the Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Kuomintang, to increase their influence in
Indochina and to put pressure on their opponents. Chiang Kai-shek threatened the French with
war in response to manoeuvering by the French and Ho Chi Minh's forces against each other,
forcing them to come to a peace agreement. In February, 1946 he also forced the French to
surrender all of their concessions in China and to renounce their extraterritorial privileges in
exchange for the Chinese withdrawing from northern Indochina and allowing French troops to
reoccupy the region. Following France's agreement to these demands, the withdrawal of Chinese
troops began in March 1946.
Contemporaneous Wars Being Fought by China

The Chinese were not entirely devoting all their resources to the Japanese, because they were
fighting several other wars at the same time.
WT
The Soviet Union attacked the Republic of China in 1937 during the Xinjiang War (1937). The
Muslim General Ma Hushan of the Kuomintang 36th Division (National Revolutionary Army)
resisted the Soviet Invasion, which was being led by Russian troops commanded by Muslim
General Ma Zhanshan, previously one of Chiang Kaishek's suboordinates.
General Ma Hushan was expecting some sort of help from Nanjing, as he exchanged messages
with Chiang regarding Soviet attack. Both the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Xinjiang war
erupting at the same time left Chiang and Ma Hushan on their own to face the Japanese and
Soviet enemies.
The Republic of China government was fully aware of the Soviet invasion of Xinjiang province,
and Soviet troops moving around Xinjiang and Gansu, but was forced to mask these manoeuvers
to the public as "Japanese propaganda" to avoid an international incident and for continued
military supplies from the Soviets.
The Kuomintang Pacification of Qinghai was being waged by the Kuomintang Muslim General
Ma Bufang against Tibetan rebels, and several border crisis with Tibet erupted that required
troops.
Since the Pro Soviet governor Sheng Shicai controlled Xinjiang, which was garrisoned with
Soviet troops in Turfan, which bordered Gansu, the Chinese government had to keep troops
stationed there as well.
The Muslim General Ma Buqing was in virtual control of the Gansu corridor at this time. Ma
Buqing had earlier fought against the Japanese, but since the Soviet threat was great, Chiang
made some arrangements regarding Ma's position. In July 1942 Chiang Kai-shek instructed Ma
Buqing to move 30,000 of his troops to the Tsaidam marsh in the Qaidam Basin of Qinghai.
Chiang named Ma Reclamation Commissioner, to threaten Sheng Shicai's southern flank in
Xinjiang, which bordered Tsaidam.
After Ma evacuated his positions in Gansu, Kuomintang troops from central China flooded the
area, and inflitrated Soviet occupied Xinjiang, gradually reclaiming it and forcing Sheng Shicai
to break with the Soviets. The Kuomintang ordered Ma Bufang several times to march his troops
into Xinjiang to intimidate the pro Soviet Governor[Sheng Shicai. This helped provide protection
for Chinese settling in Xinjiang.
The Ili Rebellion broke out in Xinjiang when the Kuomintang Chinese Muslim Officer Liu Bin-
Di was killed while fighting Turkic Uyghur Rebels in November 1944. The Soviet Union
supported the Turkic rebels against the Kuomintang, and Kuomintang forces were fighting back.
Use of chemical and bacteriological weapons
WT
Japanese soldiers wearing gas masks and rubber gloves during a chemical attack in the Battle of
Shanghai
Despite Article 23 of the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907), article V of the Treaty in Relation
to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, article 171 of the Treaty of Versailles
and a resolution adopted by the League of Nations on May 14, 1938, condemning the use of
poison gas by the Empire of Japan, the Imperial Japanese Army frequently used chemical
weapons during the war.
WT
Japanese troops stage a poison gas attack in China
According to historians Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, the chemical weapons were
authorized by specific orders given by Japanese Emperor Hirohito himself, transmitted by the
Imperial General Headquarters. For example, the Emperor authorized the use of toxic gas on 375
separate occasions during the Battle of Wuhan from August to October 1938. They were also
used during the invasion of Changde. Those orders were transmitted either by Prince Kan'in
Kotohito or General Hajime Sugiyama.
Bacteriological weapons provided by Shirō Ishii's units were also profusely used. For example,
in 1940, the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force bombed Ningbo with fleas carrying the bubonic
plague. During the Khabarovsk War Crime Trials the accused, such as Major General Kiyashi
Kawashima, testified that, in 1941, some 40 members of Unit 731 air-dropped plague-
contaminated fleas on Changde. These attacks caused epidemic plague outbreaks.
Ethnic Minorities
WT
Chiang Kai-shek (right) meets with the Muslim Generals Ma Bufang (second from left), and Ma Buqing
(first from left) in Xining at August 1942.
Muslim Jihad against Japan
Japan attempted to reach out to ethnic minorities to rally to their side, but only succeeded with
certain Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, and Uyghur elements. Their attempt to get the Muslim Hui
people on their side failed, as many Chinese generals such as Bai Chongxi, Ma Hongbin, Ma
Hongkui, and Ma Bufang were Hui and fought against the Japanese army. The Japanese
attempted to approach Ma Bufang but were unsuccessful in making any agreement with him. Ma
Bufang ended up supporting the anti Japanese Imam Hu Songshan, who prayed for the des-
truction of the Japanese. Ma became chairman (governor) of Qinghai in 1938 and commanded a
group army. He was appointed because of his anti Japanese inclinations and was such an
obstruction to Japanese agents trying to contact the Tibetans that he was called an "adversary" by
a Japanese agent.
Even before the war began, the Chinese Muslim General Ma Zhanshan was fighting and severely
mauling the Japanese army in Manchuria. The Japanese officer Doihara Kenji approached him in
an attempt to make him defect. He pretended to defect to the Japanese, then used the money they
gave him to rebuild his army and fought them again, leading a guerilla campaign in Suiyuan. The
Japanese themselves noted that Chiang Kaishek relied upon Muslim Generals like Ma Zhanshan
and Bai Chongxi during the war.
The Japanese planned to invade Ningxia from Suiyuan in 1939 and create a Hui puppet state.
The next year in 1940, the Japanese were defeated militarily by the Kuomintang Muslim General
WT
Ma Hongbin, which caused the plan to collapse. Ma Hongbin's Hui Muslim troops launched
further attacks against Japan in the Battle of West Suiyuan. Muslim Generals Ma Hongkui and
Ma Hongbin defended west Suiyuan, especially in the Battle of Wuyuan in 1940. Ma Hongbin
commanded the 81st corps and had heavy casualties, but eventually repulsed the Japanese and
defeated them.
The Japanese attempted to justify their invasion to the Muslim Chinese with promises of
liberation and self-determination. Chinese Muslims rejected this, and Jihad (Islamic Holy War)
was declared to be obligatory and sacred for all Chinese Muslims against Japan. The Yuehua, a
Chinese Muslim publication, quoted the Quran and Hadith to justify submitting to Chiang Kai-
Shek as the leader of China, and as justification for Jihad in the war against Japan. Xue Wenbo, a
Muslim Hui Chengda School member wrote the: "Song of the Hui with an anti-Japanese
determination". A Chinese Muslim Imam, Hu Songshan, was instrumental in his support of the
war. When Japan invaded China in 1937, Hu Songshan ordered that the Chinese Flag be saluted
during morning prayer, along with an exhortation to nationalism. He invoked Quranic authority
to urge sacrifice against Japan. A prayer was written by him in Arabic and Chinese which prayed
to Allah for the defeat of the Japanese and support of the Kuomintang Chinese government. Hu
Songshan also ordered that all Imams in Ningxia preach Chinese nationalism. The Muslim
General Ma Hongkui assisted him in this order, making nationalism required at every mosque.
Hu Songshan led the Ikhwan, the Chinese Muslim Brotherhood, which became a Chinese
nationalist, patriotic organization, stressing education and independence of the individual. Ma
Hushan, a Chinese Muslim General of the 36th Division (National Revolutionary Army), spread
anti-Japanese propaganda in Xinjiang and pledged his support to the Kuomintang. Westerners
reported that the Tungans (Chinese Muslims) were anti-Japanese, and under their rule, areas
were covered with "most of the stock anti-Japanese slogans from China proper", while Ma made
"Resistance to Japanese Imperialism" part of his governing doctrine. The Chinese Islamic
Association issued "A message to all Muslims in China from the Chinese Islamic Association for
National Salvation" in Ramadan of 1940 during the Second Sino-Japanese War.
"We have to implement the teaching "the love of the fatherland is an article of faith" by the
Prophet Muhammad and to inherit the Hui's glorious history in China. In addition, let us
reinforce our unity and participate in the twice more difficult taks of supporting a defensive war
and promoting religion.... We hope that ahongs [imams] and the elite will initiate a movement of
prayer during Ramadan and implement group prayer to support our intimate feeling toward
Islam. A sincere unity of Muslims should be developed to contribute power towards the
expulsion of Japan."
During the war against Japan, the Imams supported Muslim resistance in battle, calling for
Muslims to participate in the Jihad against Japan, and becoming a shaheed (islamic term for
martyr). Later in the war, Ma Bufang sent cavalry divisions composed of Hui, Dongxiang
Mongols, Salars, all of them Muslims, and Tibetans to fight Japan. Ma Hongkui seized the city
of Dingyuanying in Suiyuan and arrested the Mongol prince Darijaya in 1938, because Doihara
Kenji, who was a Japanese officer of the Kwangtung Army, visited the prince. Darijaya was
exiled to Lanzhou until 1944. At the Battle of Wuyuan, the Hui Muslim cavalry led by Ma
Hongbin and Ma Buqing defeated the Japanese troops. Ma Hongbin was also involved in the
offensive against the Japanese at the Battle of West Suiyuan.
WT
The Muslim Generals Ma Hongkui and Ma Bufang protected Lanzhou with their cavalry troops,
and put up resistance, the Japanese never captured Lanzhou during the war. Ma Bufang sent the
Muslim Brigade commander Major General Ma Buluan (马步銮), who led the 1st Regiment of
the nationalist Reorganized 8th Cavalry Brigade, which was originally known as the nationalist
1st Cavalry Division and was later renamed as the 8th Cavalry Division during the Second Sino-
Japanese War. The brigade was stationed in eastern Henan, and fought a number of battles
against the Japanese invaders who grew to fear the nationalist cavalry unit, calling it “Ma’s
Islamic Division”.
The Qinghai Chinese, Salar, Chinese Muslim, Dongxiang, and Tibetan troops Ma Bufang sent
fought to the death against the Imperial Japanese Army, or committed suicide refusing to be
taken prisoner, instead, they committed suicide when cornered by the enemy. When they
defeated the Japanese, the Muslim troops killed all except for a few prisoners to send back to
Qinghai prove that they were victorious. In September 1940, when the Japanese made an
offensive against the Muslim Qinghai troops, the Muslims ambushed them, forcing the Japanese
to retreat.
After World War II, the unit returned to Qinghai and was subsequently reorganized as the 1st
Regiment of the Reorganized 8th Cavalry Brigade of the nationalist Reorganized 82nd Division.
WT
Chinese Muslim Cavalry
Chinese Muslim soldiers
Chiang Kai-Shek also suspected that the Tibetans were collaborating with the Japanese. Under
orders from the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-Shek, Ma Bufang repaired the Yushu
airport to prevent Tibetan separatists from seeking independence. Chiang also ordered Ma
Bufang to put his Muslim soldiers on alert for entry into Tibet in 1942. Ma Bufang complied,
and moved several thousand troops to the border with Tibet. Chiang also threatened the Tibetans
with bombing if they did not comply.
Ma Bufang was openly hostile towards the Tibetans and Buddhist Mongols (despite that he also
had Muslim Mongols in his army). His Muslim troops launched ethnic cleansing against the
Tibetans and Buddhist Mongols in northeast and eastern Qinghai during the war, and also
destroyed Tibetan Buddhist Temples.
During the war, the American Asiatic Association published an entry in the text "Asia: journal of
the American Asiatic Association, Volume 40", concerning the problem of whether Chinese
Muslims were Chinese or a separate "ethnic minority". It tackled the question of whether all
muslims in China were united into one race. It came to the conclusion that the Japanese military
spokesman was the only person who was propagating the false assertion that "Chinese Moham-
medans" had "racial unity", which was disproven by the fact that muslims in China were
composed of multitudes of different races, separate from each other as were the "Germans and
WT
English", such as the Mongol Hui of Hezhou, Salar Hui of Qinghai, Chan Tou Hui of Turkistan,
and then Chinese muslims. The Japanese were trying to spread the false claim that Chinese
muslims were one race, in order to propagate the claim that they should be separated from China
into an "independent political organization".
Conclusion and aftermath

End of Pacific War and surrender of Japanese troops in China
On August 6, an American B-29 bomber, the Enola Gay, dropped the first atomic bomb used in
combat on Hiroshima. On August 9, the Soviet Union renounced its non-aggression pact with
Japan and attacked the Japanese in Manchuria, fulfilling its Yalta Conference pledge to attack
the Japanese within three months after the end of the war in Europe. The attack was made by
three Soviet army groups.
In less than two weeks the Kwantung Army, which was the primary Japanese fighting force,
consisting of over a million men but lacking in adequate armor, artillery, or air support had been
destroyed by the Soviets. On August 9, a second atomic bomb was dropped by the United States
on Nagasaki. Japanese Emperor Hirohito officially capitulated to the Allies on August 15, 1945,
and the official surrender was signed aboard the battleship USS Missouri on September 2.
WT
Japanese troops surrendering to the Chinese
After the Allied victory in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur ordered all Japanese forces
within China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa and French Indochina north of 16° north latitude
to surrender to Chiang Kai-shek, and the Japanese troops in China formally surrendered on
September 9, 1945.
Post war struggle and resumption of civil war
WT
Commander-in-chief of the China Expeditionary Army Yasuji Okamura presenting the Japanese Instru-
ment of Surrender to general He Yingqin at Nanjing on 9 September 1945.
In 1945 China emerged from the war nominally a great military power but economically weak
and on the verge of all-out civil war. The economy was sapped by the military demands of a long
costly war and internal strife, by spiraling inflation, and by corruption in the Nationalist
government that included profiteering, speculation and hoarding.
Furthermore, as part of the Yalta Conference, allowing a Soviet sphere of influence in Man-
churia, the Soviets dismantled and removed more than half of the industrial equipment left there
by the Japanese before handing over Manchuria to China. Large swathes of the prime farming
areas had been ravaged by the fighting and there was starvation in the wake of the war. Many
towns and cities were destroyed, and millions were rendered homeless by floods.
The problems of rehabilitation and reconstruction from the ravages of a protracted war were
staggering, and the war left the Nationalists severely weakened, and their policies left them
unpopular. Meanwhile, the war strengthened the Communists both in popularity and as a viable
fighting force. At Yan'an and elsewhere in the liberated areas, Mao Zedong was able to adapt
Marxism–Leninism to Chinese conditions. He taught party cadres to lead the masses by living
and working with them, eating their food, and thinking their thoughts.
The Chinese Red Army fostered an image of conducting guerrilla warfare in defense of the
people. Communist troops adapted to changing wartime conditions and became a seasoned
fighting force. With skillful organizational and propaganda, the Communists increased party
membership from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945.
WT
The Chinese return to Liuzhou in July 1945
Mao also began to execute his plan to establish a new China by rapidly moving his forces from
Yan'an and elsewhere to Manchuria. This opportunity was available to the Communists because
although Nationalist representatives were not invited to Yalta, they had been consulted and had
agreed to the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in the belief that the Soviet Union would deal only
with the Nationalist government after the war.
However, the Soviet occupation of Manchuria was long enough to allow the Communist forces
to move in en masse and arm themselves with the military hardware surrendered by the Japanese
army, quickly establish control in the countryside and move into position to encircle the
Nationalist government army in major cities of northeast China. The Chinese Civil War broke
out between the Nationalists and Communists following that, which concluded with the
Communist victory in mainland China and the retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan in 1949.
Peace treaty and Taiwan
WT
The Taiwan Strait and the island of Taiwan
Taiwan and the Penghu islands were put under the administrative control of the Republic of
China (ROC) government in 1945 by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration. The ROC proclaimed Taiwan Retrocession Day on October 25, 1945. However,
due to the unresolved Chinese Civil War, neither the newly established People's Republic of
China (PRC) in mainland China nor the Nationalist ROC that retreated to Taiwan was invited to
sign the Treaty of San Francisco, as neither had shown full and complete legal capacity to enter
into an international legally binding agreement. Since China was not present, the Japanese only
formally renounced the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan and Penghu islands without specifying
to which country Japan relinquished the sovereignty, and the treaty was signed in 1951 and came
into force in 1952.
In 1952, the Treaty of Taipei was signed separately between the ROC and Japan that basically
followed the same guideline of the Treaty of San Francisco, not specifying which country has
sovereignty over Taiwan. However, Article 10 of the treaty states that the Taiwanese people and
the juridicial person should be the people and the juridicial person of the ROC. Both the PRC
and ROC governments base their claims to Taiwan on the Japanese Instrument of Surrender
which specifically accepted the Potsdam Declaration which refers to the Cairo Declaration.
Disputes over the precise de jure sovereign of Taiwan persist to the present. On a de facto basis,
sovereignty over Taiwan has been and continues to be exercised by the ROC. Japan's position
has been to avoid commenting on Taiwan's status, maintaining that Japan renounced all claims to
sovereignty over its former colonial possessions after World War II, including Taiwan.
Aftermath
WT
China War of Resistance Against Japan Memorial Museum on the site where Marco Polo Bridge Incident
took place.
The question as to which political group directed the Chinese war effort and exerted most of the
effort to resist the Japanese remains a controversial issue.
In the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan Memorial near the Marco Polo Bridge
and in mainland Chinese textbooks, the People's Republic of China (PRC) claims that the
Nationalists mostly avoided fighting the Japanese to preserve their strength for a final showdown
with the Communist Party of China (CCP or CPC), while the Communists were the main
military force in the Chinese resistance efforts. Recently, however, with a change in the political
climate, the CCP has admitted that certain Nationalist generals made important contributions in
resisting the Japanese. The official history in mainland China now states that the KMT fought a
bloody, yet indecisive, frontal war against Japan, while the CCP engaged the Japanese forces in
far greater numbers behind enemy lines. For the sake of Chinese reunification and appeasing the
Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, the PRC has begun to "acknowledge" the Nationalists and
the Communists as "equal" contributors, because the victory over Japan belonged to the Chinese
people, rather than to any political party.
WT
Other scholars document quite a different view. Such studies find evidence that the Communists
actually played a minuscule role in the war against the Japanese compared to the Nationalists,
and preserved their strength for a final showdown with the Kuomintang (KMT). This view point
gives the KMT credit for the brunt of the fighting, which is confirmed by Communists leader
Zhou Enlai's secret report to Joseph Stalin in January 1940. This report stated that out of more
than one million Chinese soldiers killed or wounded since the war began in 1937, only 40,000
were from the Communists Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army. In other words, by the
CCP's own account, the Communists had suffered a mere three percent of total casualties half
way into the war.
This is because the Communists were not the main participants in any of the 22 major battles
between China and Japan (involving more than 100,000 troops on both sides) and usually
avoided open warfare (the Hundred Regiments Offensive and the Battle of Pingxingguan are
notable exceptions), preferring to fight in small squads to harass the Japanese supply lines. In
comparison, right from the beginning of the war the Nationalists committed their best troops
(including the 36th, 87th, 88th divisions, the crack divisions of Chiang's Central Army) to defend
Shanghai from the Japanese, and continue to deploy most of their forces to fight the Japanese
even as the Communists changed their strategy to engage mainly in a political offensive against
the Japanese and declared that the CCP should "save and preserve our strength and wait for
favorable timing" by the end of 1941. The Japanese considered the KMT rather than the
Communists as their main enemy and bombed the Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing to
the point that it was the most heavily bombed city in the world to date.
Chinese/Japanese relations
To this day the war is a major point of contention between China and Japan. The war remains a
major roadblock for Sino-Japanese relations, and many people, particularly in China, harbour
grudges over the war and related issues.
Issues regarding the current historical outlook on the war exist. For example, the Japanese
government has been accused of historical revisionism by allowing the approval of school
textbooks omitting or glossing over Japan's militant past. In response to criticism of Japanese
textbook revisionism, the PRC government has been accused of using the war to stir up already
growing anti-Japanese sentiments in order to spur nationalistic feelings.
Chinese Communists Party Declarations
On 30 September 1931, two weeks after the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) invaded Manchuria,
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued this manifesto:
Only Chinese Communist Party, who is the absolute leader of all the workers, peasants,
“ students of China, to attack the KMT.This incident, in which Japan had invaded Manchuria,
would not slow down the Chinese Communist Party's attack towards the KMT regime. On
WT
the contrary, Chinese Communist Party would double it's effort and work harder to
overthrow this KMT regime, which is the tool of foreign imperialism in China.
”
In 1972, when the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Japan established formal diplomatic
relationship, Mao Zedong met the then Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. When Tanaka
personally apologized to Mao for invading China, Mao responded:
(You) don't have to say sorry, your country had made a great contribution to China. Why?
“ Because if Imperial Japan did not start the war, how could we communists become mighty
and powerful? How could we overthrow KMT? How could we defeat Chiang Kai-shek? No,
we are grateful and do not want your war reparations! (Translated from Tanaka Kakuei
Biography, original in Japanese).
”
Aftermath in Taiwan
While the People's Republic of China (PRC) government has been accused of greatly
exaggerating the Communist Party of China (CCP or CPC)'s role in fighting the Japanese in
mainland China, the aftermath of the war is more complicated in Taiwan.
Traditionally, the Republic of China government has held celebrations marking the Victory Day
on September 9 (now known as Armed Forces Day) and Taiwan's Retrocession Day on October
25. However, with the power transfer from Kuomintang (KMT) to the pro-Taiwan independence
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2000 and the rise of desinicization, events commemo-
rating the war have become less commonplace. Many supporters of Taiwanese independence see
no relevance in preserving the memory of the war of resistance that happened primarily on
mainland China. Some 120,000 Taiwanese even volunteered for or were drafted into the Imperial
Japanese Army.
On the other hand, many KMT supporters, particularly veterans who retreated with the
government in 1949, still have an emotional interest in the war. For example, in celebrating the
60th anniversary of the end of war in 2005, the cultural bureau of KMT stronghold Taipei held a
series of talks in the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall regarding the war and post-war developments,
while the KMT held its own exhibit in the KMT headquarters. Since the KMT won the
presidential election in 2008, the ROC government resumed commemorating the war.
Casualties assessment
The conflict lasted for eight years, a month and three days (measured from 1937 to 1945).
Chinese casualties
• Chinese sources list the total number of military and non-military casualties, both dead and
WT
wounded, at 35 million. Most Western historians believed that the total number of casualties
was at least 20 million.
• The official PRC statistics for China's civilian and military casualties in the Second Sino-Japanese
War from 1937–1945 are 20 million dead and 15 million wounded. The figures for total military
casualties, killed and wounded are: Nationalist 3.2 million; Communist 500,000.
• The official account of the war published in Taiwan reported the Nationalist Chinese Army lost
3,238,000 men (1,797,000 WIA; 1,320,000 KIA and 120,000 MIA.) and 5,787,352 civilians
casualties. The Nationalists fought in 22 major engagements, most of which involved more than
100,000 troops on both sides, 1,171 minor engagements most of which involved more than
50,000 troops on both sides, and 38,931 skirmishes.
• An academic study published in the United States estimates military casualties: 1.5 million killed
in battle, 750,000 missing in action, 1.5 million deaths due to disease and 3 million wounded;
civilian casualties: due to military activity, killed 1,073,496 and 237,319 wounded; 335,934 killed
and 426,249 wounded in Japanese air attacks
• According to historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta, at least 2.7 million civilians died during the "kill all,
loot all, burn all" operation (Three Alls Policy, or sanko sakusen) implemented in May 1942 in
north China by general Yasuji Okamura and authorized on 3 December 1941 by Imperial
Headquarter Order number 575.
• The property loss suffered by the Chinese was valued at 383 billion US dollars according to the
currency exchange rate in July 1937, roughly 50 times the gross domestic product of Japan at
that time (US$7.7 billion).
• In addition, the war created 95 million refugees.
Japanese casualties
The Japanese recorded around 1.1 to 1.9 million military casualties (which include killed,
wounded and missing). The official death-toll according to the Japan Defense Ministry is
480,000 men, which some historians claim is an understatement due to the length of the war. The
combined Chinese forces claimed to have killed at most 1.77 million Japanese soldiers during
the eight-year war.
Another source from Hilary Conroy claim that a total of 447,000 Japanese soldiers died in China
during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Of the 1,130,000 Imperial Japanese Army soldiers who
died during World War Two, 39 percent died in China.
Then in "War Without Mercy", John Dower claim that a total of 396,000 Japanese soldiers died
in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Of this number, the Imperial Japanese Army lost
388,605 soldiers and the Imperial Japanese Navy lost 8,000 soldiers. Another 54,000 soldiers
also died after the war had ended, mostly from illness and starvation. Of the 1,740,955 Japanese
soldiers who died during World War II, 22 percent died in China.
Current Japanese statistics, however, lack complete estimates for the wounded. From 1937–
1941, 185,647 Japanese soldiers were killed in China and 520,000 were wounded. Disease also
incurred critical losses on Japanese forces. From 1937–1941, 393,000 were killed in China and
430,000 Japanese soldiers were recorded as being sick. In North China alone, 18,000 soldiers
were evacuated back to Japan for illnesses in 1938, 23,000 in 1939, and 15,000 in 1940. Chinese
WT
forces also report that by May 1945, 22,293 Japanese soldiers were captured as prisoners. Many
more Japanese soldiers surrendered when the war ended.
Both Nationalist and Communist Chinese sources report that their respective forces were
responsible for the deaths of over 1.7 million Japanese soldiers. The Communist claim, which
almost equate total Japanese deaths in all of World War II, was ridiculed by Nationalist autho-
rities as propaganda since the Communist People's Liberation Army was outnumbered by the
Japanese Army by approximately 3 to 1. Nationalist War Minister He Yingqin himself contested
the claim, finding it impossible for a force of "untrained, undisciplined, poorly equipped"
guerrillas to have killed so many enemy soldiers.
The National Chinese authorities ridiculed Japanese estimates of Chinese casualties. In 1940, the
National Herald stated that the Japanese exaggerated Chinese casualties, while deliberately
concealing the true amount of Japanese casualties, releasing false figures that made them appear
lower. The article reports on the casualty situation of the war up to 1940.
Number of troops involved
Chinese forces
National Revolutionary Army
WT Flag of the National Revolutionary Army
The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) throughout its lifespan employed approximately
4,300,000 regulars, in 370 Standard Divisions (traditional Chinese: 正式師), 46 New Divisions
(traditional Chinese: 新編師), 12 Cavalry Divisions (traditional Chinese: 騎兵師), eight New
Cavalry Divisions (traditional Chinese: 新編騎兵師), 66 Temporary Divisions (traditional
Chinese: 暫編師), and 13 Reserve Divisions (traditional Chinese: 預備師), for a grand total of
515 divisions.
However, many divisions were formed from two or more other divisions, and many were not
active at the same time. The number of active divisions, at the start of the war in 1937, was about
170 NRA divisions. The average NRA division had 4,000–5,000 troops. A Chinese army was
roughly the equivalent to a Japanese division in terms of manpower but the Chinese forces
largely lacked artillery, heavy weapons, and motorized transport.
The shortage of military hardware meant that three to four Chinese armies had the firepower of
only one Japanese division. Because of these material constraints, available artillery and heavy
weapons were usually assigned to specialist brigades rather than to the general division, which
caused more problems as the Chinese command structure lacked precise coordination. The
relative fighting strength of a Chinese division was even weaker when relative capacity in
aspects of warfare, such as intelligence, logistics, communications, and medical services, are
taken into account.
The National Revolutionary Army can be divided roughly into two groups. The first one is the
so-called dixi (traditional Chinese: 嫡系, "direct descent") group, which comprised divisions
trained by the Whampoa Military Academy and loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, and can be considered
the Central Army (traditional Chinese: 中央軍) of the NRA. The second group is known as the
zapai (traditional Chinese: 雜牌, "miscellaneous units"), and comprised all divisions led by non-
Whampoa commanders, and is more often known as the Regional Army or the Provincial Army
WT
(traditional Chinese: 省軍).
Even though both military groups were part of the National Revolutionary Army, their
distinction lies much in their allegiance to the central government of Chiang Kai-shek. Many
former warlords and regional militarists were incorporated into the NRA under the flag of the
Kuomintang, but in reality they retained much independence from the central government. They
also controlled much of the military strength of China, the most notable of them being the
Guangxi, Shanxi, Yunnan and Ma cliques.
The National Revolutionary Army expanded from about 1.2 million in 1937 to 5.7 million inn
August 1945, organized in 300 divisions.
Communist Chinese forces
Although during the war the Chinese Communist forces fought as a nominal part of the NRA,
the number of those on the Communist side, due to their guerrilla status, is difficult to determine,
though estimates place the total number of the Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army, and
irregulars in the Communist armies at 1,300,000.
The People's Liberation Army expanded from about 92,000 in 1937 to 910,000 in 1945.
Japanese forces
Imperial Japanese Army
WT Flag of the Imperial Japanese Army
The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) had approximately 3,200,000 regulars. More Japanese troops
were quartered in China than deployed elsewhere in the Pacific Theater during the war. Japanese
divisions ranged from 20,000 men in its divisions numbered less than 100, to 10,000 men in
divisions numbered greater than 100.
At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the IJA had 51 divisions, of which 35 were in China,
and 39 independent brigades, of which all but one were in China. This represented roughly 80%
of the IJA's manpower.
Collaborationist Chinese Army
The Chinese armies allied to Japan had only 78,000 people in 1938, but had grown to around
649,640 men by 1943, and reached a maximum strength of 900,000 troops before the end of the
war. Almost all of them belonged to Manchukuo, Provisional Government of the Republic of
China (Beijing), Reformed Government of the Republic of China (Nanjing) and the later Nanjing
Nationalist Government (Wang Jingwei regime). These collaborator troops were mainly assigned
to garrison and logistics duties in their own territories, and were rarely fielded in combat because
of low morale and Japanese distrust. They fared very poorly in skirmishes against both Chinese
NRA and Communist forces.
Military equipment
National Revolutionary Army
The Central Army possessed 80 Army infantry divisions with approximately 8,000 men each,
nine independent brigades, nine cavalry divisions, two artillery brigades, 16 artillery regiments
and three armored battalions. The Chinese Navy displaced only 59,000 tonnes and the Chinese
Air Force comprised only about 700 obsolete aircraft.
Chinese weapons were mainly produced in the Hanyang and Guangdong arsenals. However, for
most of the German-trained divisions, the standard firearms were German-made 7.92 mm
WT
Gewehr 98 and Karabiner 98k. A local variant of the 98k style rifles were often called the
"Chiang Kai-shek rifle" a Chinese copy from the Mauser Standard Modell. Another rifle they
used was Hanyang 88. The standard light machine gun was a local copy of the Czech 7.92 mm
Brno ZB26. There were also Belgian and French LMGs. Surprisingly, the NRA did not purchase
any of the famous Maschinengewehr 34s from Germany, but did produce their own copies of
them. On average in these divisions, there was one machine gun set for each platoon. Heavy
machine guns were mainly locally-made Type 1924 water-cooled Maxim guns, from German
blueprints. On average every battalion would get one HMG. The standard sidearm was the 7.63
mm Mauser M1932 semi-automatic pistol
Some divisions were equipped with 37 mm PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns, and/or mortars from
Oerlikon, Madsen and Solothurn. Each infantry division had 6 French Brandt 81 mm mortars and
6 Solothurn 20 mm autocannons. Some independent brigades and artillery regiments were equip-
ped with Bofors 72 mm L/14, or Krupp 72 mm L/29 mountain guns. They were 24 Rheinmetall
150 mm L/32 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1934) and 24 Krupp 150 mm L/30 sFH 18 howitzers
(bought in 1936).
Infantry uniforms were basically redesigned Zhongshan suits. Leg wrappings are standard for
soldiers and officers alike since the primary mode of movement for NRA troops was by foot.
The helmets were the most distinguishing characteristic of these divisions. From the moment
German M35 Stahlhelm helmets (standard issue for the Wehrmacht until late in the European
theatre) rolled off the production lines in 1935, and until 1936, the NRA imported 315,000 of
these helmets, each with the 12-ray sun emblem of the ROC on the sides. Other equipment
included cloth shoes for soldiers, leather shoes for officers and leather boots for high-ranking
officers. Every soldier was issued ammunition, ammunition pouch/harness, a water flask, combat
knives, food bag and a gas mask.
On the other hand, warlord forces varied greatly in terms of equipment and training. Some
warlord troops were notoriously under-equipped, such as Shanxi's Dadao (大刀, a one-bladed
sword type close combat weapon) Team and the Yunnan clique. Some, however, were highly
professional forces with their own air force and navies. The quality of the New Guangxi clique
was almost on par with the Central Army, as the Guangzhou region was wealthy and the local
army could afford foreign instructors and arms. The Muslim Ma clique to the northwest was
famed for its well-trained cavalry divisions.
Imperial Japanese Army
Although Japan possessed significant mobile operational capacity, it did not possess capability
for maintaining a long sustained war. At the beginning of the war, the Imperial Japanese Army
comprised 17 divisions, each composed of approximately 22,000 men, 5,800 horses, 9,500 rifles
and submachine guns, 600 heavy machine guns of assorted types, 108 artillery pieces, and 600
plus of light armor two-men tanks. Special forces were also available. The Imperial Japanese
Navy displaced a total of 1,900,000 tonnes, ranking third in the world, and possessed 2,700
aircraft at the time. Each Japanese division was the equivalent in fighting strength of four
Chinese regular divisions (at the beginning of the Battle of Shanghai).
WT
Chapter 2
Sino-German Cooperation (1911–1941)
Between 1911 and 1941, cooperation between Germany and China was instrumental in
modernizing the industry and the armed forces of the Republic of China prior to the Second
Sino-Japanese War. The Republic of China, which succeeded the Qing Dynasty in 1912, was
WT
fraught with factional warlordism and foreign incursions. The Northern Expedition of 1928
nominally unified China under Kuomintang (KMT) control, yet Imperial Japan loomed as the
greatest foreign threat. The Chinese urgency to modernize the military and its national defense
industry, coupled with Germany's need for a stable supply of raw materials, put the two countries
on the road of close relations from the late 1920s to the late 1930s. Although intense cooperation
lasted only from the Nazi takeover of Germany in 1933 to the start of the war with Japan in
1937, and concrete measures at industrial reform started in earnest only in 1936, it had a
profound effect on Chinese modernization and the capability of the Chinese to resist the Japanese
in the war.
Early Sino-German relations

The earliest Sino-German trading occurred overland through Siberia, and was subject to transit
taxes by the Russian government. In order to make trading more profitable, Germany decided to
take the sea route and the first German merchant ships arrived in China, then under the Qing
Dynasty, as part of the Royal Prussian Asian Trading Company of Emden, in the 1750s. In 1861,
following China's defeat in the Second Opium War, the Treaty of Tientsin was signed, which
opened formal commercial relations between various European states, including Prussia, with
China.
WT
The Beiyang Army in training
During the late 19th century, Sino-foreign trade was dominated by the British Empire, and Otto
von Bismarck was eager to establish German footholds in China to balance the British
dominance. In 1885, Bismarck had the Reichstag pass a steamship subsidy bill which offered
direct service to China. In the same year, he sent the first German banking and industrial survey
group to evaluate investment possibilities, which led to the establishment of the Deutsch-
Asiatische Bank in 1890. Through these efforts Germany was second to Britain in trading and
shipping in China by 1896.
During this period, Germany did not actively pursue imperialist ambitions in China, and
appeared relatively restrained compared to Britain and France. Thus, the Chinese government
saw Germany as a partner in helping China in its modernization. In 1880s, German shipyard AG
Vulcan Stettin built two of the most modern and powerful warships of its day—pre-dreadnought
battleships Zhenyuan and Dingyuan—for the Chinese Beiyang Fleet that would see considerable
action during the First Sino-Japanese War. After China's first modernization efforts apparently
failed following its defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, Yuan Shi-kai requested German help
in creating the Self-Strengthening Army (Chinese: 自強軍; pinyin: Zìqiáng Jūn) and the Newly
Created Army (新建陸軍; Xīnjìan Lùjūn). In addition, German assistance not only concerned the
military, but also industrial and technical matters. For example, in the late 1880s, the German
company Krupp was contracted by the Chinese government to build a series of fortifications
around Port Arthur.
Germany's relatively benign China policy as shaped by Bismarck changed under post-
Bismarckian chancellors during the reign of Wilhelm II. After German naval forces were sent in
response to attacks on missionaries in Shandong province, Germany negotiated in March 1898 at
the Convention of Peking a ninety-nine year leasehold for Kiautschou Bay and began to develop
the region. The period of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 proved the low point in Sino-German
relations and witnessed the assassination of the imperial minister to China, Baron Clemens von
Ketteler and other foreign nationals. During and in the aftermath of the campaign to defeat the
Boxers, troops from "each and all" participating nations engaged in plundering and looting and
other excesses, but "the prime movers of the more aggressive faction were the Germans," who,
with only a tiny contingent of troops then in North China wanted to exact retribution for the
murder of their diplomat. On 27 July 1900, Wilhelm II spoke during departure ceremonies for
the German contribution to the international relief force. He made an impromptu, but in-
temperate reference to the Hun invaders of continental Europe, which would later be resurrected
by British propagandists to mock Germany during World War I and World War II.
Germany, however, had a major impact on the development of Chinese law. In the years
preceding the fall of the Qing Dynasty, Chinese reformers began drafting a Civil Code based
largely on the German Civil Code, which had already been adopted in neighboring Japan.
Although this draft code was not promulgated before the collapse of the Qing dynasty, it was the
WT
basis for the Civil Code of the Republic of China introduced in 1930, which is the current civil
law on Taiwan and has influenced current law in mainland China. The General Principles of
Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, drafted in 1985, for example, is modeled after the
German Civil Code.
In the decade preceding World War I, Sino-German relations became less engaged. One reason
for this was the political isolation of Germany, as evident by the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance
and the Triple Entente of 1907. Because of this, Germany proposed a German-Chinese-American
entente in 1907, but the proposal never came to fruition. In 1912 Germany granted a six million
German Goldmark loan to the new Chinese Republican Government. When World War I broke
out in Europe, Germany offered to return Kiautschou Bay to China in an attempt to keep their
colony from falling into Allied hands. However, the Japanese preempted that move and entered
the war on the side of the Triple Entente and invaded Kiautschou during the Siege of Tsingtao.
As the war progressed, Germany had no active role or initiative in conducting any purposeful
actions in the Far East as the country was preoccupied with the war in Europe.
On 14 August 1917, China declared war on Germany and recovered the German concessions in
Hankow and Tientsin. As a reward for joining the Allies, China was promised the return of other
German spheres of influence following the defeat of Germany. However, at the Paris Peace
Conference, Japan's claims trumped prior promises to China and the Treaty of Versailles
assigned the modern and up-to-date city of Tsingtao and the Kiautschou Bay region to Japan.
Subsequent recognition of this Allied betrayal sparked the nationalistic May Fourth Movement,
which is regarded as a significant event in modern Chinese history. As a result, the Beiyang
government refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles.
World War I dealt a severe blow to Sino-German relations. Long established trade connections
had been destroyed, financial structures and markets wrecked; of the almost three hundred
German firms conducting business in China in 1913, only two remained in 1919.
Sino-German cooperation in the 1920s
The Treaty of Versailles severely limited Germany's industrial output. Its army was restricted to
100,000 men and its military production was greatly reduced. However, the treaty did not
diminish Germany's place as a leader in military innovation, and many industrial firms still
retained the machinery and technology to produce military hardware. Therefore, to circumvent
the treaty's restrictions, these industrial firms formed partnerships with foreign nations, such as
the Soviet Union and Argentina, to legally produce weapons and sell them.
After the death of Yuan Shi-kai, the central Beiyang Government collapsed and the country fell
into civil war, with various warlords vying for supremacy. Therefore, many German arms
producers began looking to reestablish commercial links with China to tap into its vast market
for weapons and military assistance.
WT
The Kuomintang government in Guangzhou also sought German assistance, and the German-
educated Chu Chia-hua (朱家驊; Zhū Jiāhuá) emerged as the most prominent and had his hands
in arranging almost all Sino-German contact from 1926 to 1944. There were several reasons
other than Germany's technological expertise that made it the top candidate in Sino-foreign
relations. First was that Germany, having lost all of its spheres of influence following World War
I, had no imperialistic interest in China anymore, and the 1925–1926 anti-foreign protests were
mainly directed at Great Britain. In addition, unlike the Soviet Union, which helped with
Kuomintang reorganization and opened party membership to communists, Germany had no
political interest in China that could have led to confrontations with the central government.
Also, Chiang Kai-shek saw German history as something that China should emulate, as the
German unification was something that Chiang thought would provide valuable lessons to his
own unification of China. Thus, Germany was seen as a primary force in the "international
development" of China.
In 1926, Chu Chia-hua invited Max Bauer to survey investment possibilities in China and the
next year Bauer arrived in Guangzhou and was offered a post as Chiang Kai-shek's adviser. In
1928, Bauer returned to Germany to make appropriate industrial contacts for China's
"reconstruction" efforts and began recruitment for a permanent advisory mission to Chiang Kai-
shek in Nanking. However, Bauer was not entirely successful as many industrial firms hesitated
because of China's unstable political situation, and because Bauer was persona non grata for his
participation in the 1920 Kapp Putsch. In addition, Germany was still constrained by the Treaty
of Versailles, making direct investment involving the military impossible. Max Bauer contracted
smallpox seven months after his return to China and was buried in Shanghai. Bauer's short time
in China provided the foundation for later Sino-German cooperation, as he advised on the
modernization of Chinese industry and army to the Kuomintang government. He argued for the
reduction of the Chinese army to produce a small but elite force, and supported opening up the
Chinese market to spur German production and exports.
Sino-German cooperation in the 1930s
However, Sino-German trade slowed between 1930 and 1932 because of the Great Depression.
Furthermore, Chinese industrialization was not able to progress as fast as it could because of
conflicting interests between various Chinese reconstruction agencies, German industries,
German import-export houses and the German Army (Reichswehr) of the Weimar Republic, all
of which wanted to profit from the development. Things did not pick up speed until the 1931
Mukden Incident, in which Manchuria was annexed by Japan. This incident created the need for
a concrete industrial policy that aimed to create the military and industrial capability to resist
Japan. In essence, it spurred the creation of a centrally planned, national defense economy. This
both consolidated Chiang's rule over the nominally unified China and hastened industrialization
efforts in China.
The 1933 seizure of power by the Nazi Party further accelerated the formation of a concrete
WT
Sino-German policy. Before the Nazi rise to power, German policy in China had been
contradictory, as the Foreign Ministry under the Weimar Government urged for a policy of
neutrality in East Asia and discouraged the Reichswehr-industrial complex from involving
directly with the Chinese government. The same feeling was shared by the German import-
export houses, for fear that direct government ties would exclude them from profiting as the
middleman. On the other hand, the new Nazi government's policy of Wehrwirtschaft (war
economy) called for the complete mobilization of society and stockpiling of raw materials,
particularly militarily important materials such as tungsten and antimony, which China could
supply in bulk. Thus, from this period on, the main driving force behind Germany's China policy
became that of raw materials.
WT
Sturmabteilung and Hitlerjugend in China, invited by the Kuomintang government
WT Hitlerjugend in China, invited by the Kuomintang government
In May 1933, Hans von Seeckt arrived in Shanghai and was offered the post of senior adviser to
oversee economic and military development involving Germany in China. In June of that year,
he submitted the Denkschrift für Marschall Chiang Kai-shek memorandum, outlining his
program of industrializing and militarizing China. He called for a small, mobile, and well-
equipped force as opposed to a massive but under-trained army. In addition, he provided a
framework that the army is the "foundation of ruling power," that the military power rests in
qualitative superiority, and that this superiority derives from the quality of its officer corps.
Von Seeckt suggested that the first steps toward achieving this framework was that the Chinese
military needed to be uniformly trained and consolidated under Chiang's command, and that the
entire military system must be subordinated into a centralized network like a pyramid. Toward
this goal, von Seeckt proposed the formation of a "training brigade" in lieu of the German
eliteheer which would propagate training to other units to create a professional, competent army,
with its officer corps selected from strict military placements directed by a centralized personnel
office.
WT
This Heinkel 111A, one of 11 bought by the Aviation Ministry, later found its way to the CNAC
In addition, with German help, China would have to build up its own defense industry because it
could not rely on buying arms from abroad forever. The first step toward efficient Indus-
trialization was the centralization of not only the Chinese reconstruction agencies, but also
German ones. In January 1934, the Handelsgesellschaft für industrielle Produkte, or Hapro, was
created to unify all German industrial interests in China. Hapro was nominally a private
company to avoid oppositions from other foreign countries. In August 1934, "Treaty for the
Exchange of Chinese Raw Materials and Agricultural Products of German Industrial and Other
Products" was signed in which the Chinese government would send strategically important raw
material in exchange for German industrial products and development. This barter agreement
was beneficial to Sino-German cooperation since China had a very high budget deficit due to
military expenditures through years of civil war and was unable to secure monetary loans from
the international community. The agreement that led to massive Chinese export of raw material
also made Germany independent of international raw material markets. In addition, the agree-
ment expedited not only Chinese industrialization, but also military reorganization. The
agreement also specified that China and Germany were equal partners and that they were both
important in this economic exchange. Having accomplished this important milestone in Sino-
German cooperation, von Seeckt transferred his post to General Alexander von Falkenhausen
and returned to Germany in March 1935, where he died in 1936.
WT Chinese ambassador in Berlin
Finance minister of China and Kuomintang official H.H. Kung and two other Chinese
Kuomintang officials visited Germany in 1937 and were received by Adolf Hitler. Kung and a
Chinese delegation took part in King George VI's coronation in 1937 (Kung was by then vice
prime minister, secretary of treasury and president of Central Bank of China). After the
coronation they visited Germany, invited by Hjalmar Schacht and Werner von Blomberg.
The Chinese delegacy arrived at Berlin on June 9, 1937. Kung met Hans von Mackensen on June
10 (von Neurath was visiting eastern Europe); during the meeting, Kung pointed out that Japan
was not a reliable ally for Germany, as he believed that Germany had not forgotten the Japanese
invasion of Tsingtao and the Pacific Islands during World War I. China was the real anti-
communist state and Japan was only "flaunting". Von Mackensen promised that there would be
no problems in Sino-Germany relationship so far as he and Neurath were in charge of the
Foreign Ministry. Kung also met Schacht on the same day. Schacht explained to him that the
anti-Comintern pact was not an German-Japanese alliance against China. Germany was glad to
loan China 100 million Reichsmark and they would not do so with Japanese.
WT JU 52 Eurasia airliner in China
Kung visited Hermann Göring on June 11, Göring told him he thought Japan was a "Far East
Italy" (referring to the fact that during World War I Italy had broken its alliance and declared war
against Germany), and Germany would never trust Japan. Kung asked Göring "Which country
will Germany choose as her friend, China or Japan?", and Göring said China could be a mighty
power in the future and Germany would take China as friend.
Kung met Hitler on June 13. Hitler told Kung Germany had no political or territorial demands in
Far East, Germany was a strong industrial country and China was a huge agricultural country;
Germany's only thought on China is business. Hitler also hoped China and Japan could cooperate
and Hitler could mediate any disputes between these two countries, as he mediated the disputes
between Italy and Yugoslavia. Hitler also told Kung that Germany would not invade other
countries, and was also not afraid of foreign invasion. If Russia dared to invade Germany, one
German division could defeat two Russian corps. The only thing he (Hitler) worried about was
bolshevism in eastern European states, being a threat to German interests and market. Hitler also
said he admired Chiang because he built a powerful centralized government.
Kung met von Blomberg on the afternoon of June 13 and discussed the execution of 1936
HAPRO Agreement. Under this agreement, the German Ministry of War loaned China 100
million Reichsmarks to purchase German weapons and machines. In order to repay the loan,
China provided Germany with tungsten and antimony.
Kung left Berlin on June 14 to visit the US, and returned to Berlin on August 10, one month after
Sino-Japanese War broke out. He met von Blomberg, Schacht, von Mackensen and Ernst von
Weizsäcker, asking them to mediate the war.
Germany and Chinese industrialization
WT
Chinese Minister Chiang Tso-pin and entourage visiting a German factory, 1928
In 1936, China had only about 10,000 miles (16,000 km) of railways, far lower than the
100,000 miles (160,000 km) that Sun Yat-sen had envisioned for his ambition of a modernized
China. In addition, half of these were in Manchuria, which was already lost to Japan and out of
Kuomintang control. The slow progress of modernizing China's transportation was because of
conflicting foreign interests in China, such as the 1920 New Four-Power Consortium of British,
French, American, and Japanese banking interests. This consortium aimed to regularize foreign
investment in China and unanimous approval was required before any of the four could provide
credit to the Chinese government for building railways. In addition, other foreign countries were
hesitant to provide funding because of the depression.
However, a series of Sino-German agreements in 1934–1936 greatly accelerated railway

construction in China. Major railroads were built between Nanchang, Zhejiang, and Guizhou.
These fast developments were made possible because Germany needed efficient transportation to
export raw materials, and because the railway lines served the Chinese government's need to
build an industrial center south of the Yangtze, in the south-central provinces. In addition, these
railways served important military functions. For example, the Hangzhou-Guiyang rail was built
to facilitate military transport in the Yangtze delta valley, even after Shanghai and Nanking were
WT
lost. Another similar railway was the Guangzhou-Hankou network, which provided trans-
portation between the eastern coast and the Wuhan area. This railway would later prove its worth
in the early stages of the Second Sino-Japanese War.
The most important industrial project from Sino-German cooperation was the 1936 Three-Year
Plan, which was administered by the Chinese government's National Resources Commission and
the Hapro corporation. The purpose of this plan was to create an industrial powerhouse capable
of resisting Japan in the short run, and to create a center for future Chinese industrial deve-
lopment for the long run. It had several basic components such as the monopolization of all
operations pertaining to tungsten and antimony, the construction of the central steel and machine
works in provinces such as Hubei, Hunan, and Sichuan, and the development of power plants
and other chemical factories. As outlined in the 1934 barter agreement, China would provide raw
materials in return for German expertise and equipment in setting up these ventures. Cost
overrun for these projects was partly assuaged by the fact that the price of tungsten had more
than doubled between 1932 and 1936. Germany also extended RM 100 million line of credit to
the Chinese government. The Three-Year Plan also introduced a class of highly educated
technocrats who were trained to run these state-owned projects. At the height of this program,
Sino-German exchange accounted for 17% of China's foreign trade and China was the third
largest trading partner with Germany. The Three-Year Plan had many promises, but unfortu-
nately much of its intended benefits would eventually be undermined by the breakout of full-
scale war with Japan in 1937.
Germany and Chinese military modernization
WT
German-trained Chinese NRA troops wearing German M1935 helmets
Alexander von Falkenhausen was responsible for most of military training conducted as part of
the deal. Original plans by von Seeckt called for a drastic reduction of the military to 60 well-
equipped and well-trained divisions based on German military doctrines, but questions as to
which factions would be axed remained a problem. As a whole, officer corps trained by the
Whampoa Academy up until 1927 were of marginally better quality than the warlord armies, but
they remained valuable to Chiang Kai-shek for sheer loyalty. Nonetheless, some 80,000 Chinese
troops, in eight divisions, were trained to German standards and formed the elite of Chiang's
army. These new divisions might have contributed to Chiang's determination to escalate the
skirmish at Marco Polo Bridge to full-scale war. However, China was not ready to face Japan on
equal terms, and Chiang's decision to pit all of his new divisions in the Battle of Shanghai,
despite objections from his staff officers and von Falkenhausen himself, would cost him one-
third of his best troops that took years to train. Chiang was suggested to preserve his strength to
maintain order and fight later.
Von Falkenhausen recommended that Chiang fight a war of attrition with Japan as Falkenhausen
calculated that Japan could never hope to win a long term war. He suggested that Chiang should
hold the Yellow River line, but not attack north of that until much later in the war. Also Chiang
should be prepared to give up a number of regions in northern China, including Shandong, but
the retreats must be made slowly; Japan was to pay for every advance it made. He also recom-
mended a number of fortifications to be constructed, near mining areas, coastal, river locations,
and so on. Falkenhausen also advised the Chinese to establish a number of guerrilla operations
(which the Communists were adept at) behind Japanese lines. These efforts would help to
weaken an already militarily challenged Japan.
Von Falkenhausen also believed that it was too optimistic to expect the Chinese National
Revolutionary Army (NRA) to be adequately supported by armor and heavy artillery in the war
against Japan. Chinese industry was just starting to modernize and it would take a while to fully
equip the NRA in the fashion of the German Army (Wehrmacht Heer). Thus, he emphasized on
the creation of a mobile force that relied on small arms and adept with infiltration tactics, similar
to the stormtroopers near the end of World War I. German officers were called into China as
military advisers, like Lt. Col. Hermann Voigt-Ruscheweyh, who acted as adviser to the Artillery
Firing School in Nanjing from 1933 to 1938.
German assistance in the military realm was not limited to personnel training and reorganization,
WT
but also involved military hardware. According to von Seeckt, around eighty percent of China's
weapons output was below par or unsuitable for modern warfare. Therefore, projects were
undertaken to expand and upgrade existing armories along the Yangtze River and to create new
arsenals and munitions plants. For example, the Hanyang Arsenal was reconstructed during
1935–1936 to bring its standards up to date. The arsenal was to produce Maxim machine guns,
various 82 mm trench mortars and the Chiang Kai-shek rifle (中正式; Zhōngzhèng Shì), which
was based on the German Karabiner 98k rifle. The Chiang Kai-shek and Hanyang 88 rifles
remained as the predominant firearm used by Chinese armies throughout the war. Another
factory was established to produce gas masks, with plans to construct a mustard gas plant that
was eventually scrapped. In May 1938, several arsenals were built in Hunan to produce 20mm,
37 mm, and 75 mm artilleries. In late 1936 a plant was built near Nanking to manufacture
military optical equipment such as binoculars and sniper rifle scopes. Additional arsenals were
built or upgraded to manufacture other weapons and ordnances, such as the MG-34, pack guns of
different calibers, and even replacement parts for vehicles of the Leichter Panzerspähwagen
series serving in the Chinese army. Several research institutes were also established under
German auspices, such as the Ordnance and Arsenal Office, the Chemical Research Institute
under the direction from IG Farben, and others. Many of these institutes were headed by
German-returned Chinese engineers. In 1935 and 1936, China ordered a total of 315,000 of the
M35 Stahlhelm, and also large numbers of Gewehr 88, 98 rifles and the C96 Broomhandle
Mauser. China also imported other military hardware, such as a small number of Henschel,
Junkers, Heinkel and Messerschmitt aircraft, some of them to be assembled in China, and
Rheinmetall and Krupp hwitzers, anti-tank and mountain guns, such as the PaK 37mm, as well as
AFVs such as the Panzer I.
These modernization efforts proved their usefulness with the outbreak of the Second Sino-
Japanese War. Although the Japanese, in the end, were able to capture the Nationalist capital at
Nanjing, the process took several months with a cost far higher than either side had anticipated.
Japanese frustrations at strong Chinese resistance were vented out during the Rape of Nanking
(Nanjing Massacre). Despite this loss, the fact that Chinese troops could credibly challenge
Japanese troops boosted the morale of the Chinese. In addition, the cost of the campaign made
the Japanese reluctant to go deeper into the Chinese interior, allowing the Nationalist govern-
ment to relocate China's political and industrial infrastructure into Sichuan.
End of Sino-German cooperation

The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937 destroyed much of the progress
and promises made in the nearly ten years of intense Sino-German cooperation. Besides the
destruction of industries in the war, Adolf Hitler's foreign policy would prove the most
detrimental to Sino-German relations. In essence, Hitler chose Japan as his ally against the
Soviet Union, because Japan was militarily far more capable to resist Bolshevism. In addition,
the Sino-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 21, 1937 definitely did not help to change Hitler's
mind, despite persistent protests from the China lobby and German investors. However, Hitler
did agree to have Hapro finish shipments already ordered by China, but did not allow any more
orders from Nanking to be taken.
WT
There were plans of a German-mediated peace between China and Japan, but the fall of Nanking
in December 1937 effectively put an end to any mediation acceptable to the Chinese govern-
ment. Therefore, all hope of a German-mediated truce was lost. In early 1938, Germany
officially recognized Manchukuo as an independent nation. In April of that year, Hermann
Göring banned the shipment of war materials to China and in May, German advisors were
recalled to Germany at Japanese insistence.
This shift from a pro-China policy to a pro-Japan one was also damaging to German business
interests, as Germany had far less economic exchange with either Japan or Manchukuo than
China. Also, pro-China sentiment was also apparent in most Germans in China. For example,
Germans in Hankow raised more money for the Red Cross than all other Chinese and foreign
nationals in the city combined. Military advisors also wished to honor their contracts with
Nanking. Von Falkenhausen was finally forced to leave at the end of June 1938, but promised
Chiang that he would never reveal his work to aid the Japanese. On the other hand, Nazi Party
organs in China proclaimed Japan as the last bulwark against communism in China.
WT
Wang Jingwei of the puppet government meeting with Nazi diplomats in 1941
Germany's newfound relationship with Japan would prove to be less than fruitful, however.
Japan enjoyed a monopoly in North China and Manchukuo, and many foreign businesses were
seized. German interests were treated no better than any other foreign interests. While
negotiations were going on in mid-1938 to solve these economic problems, Hitler signed the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the Soviet Union, thereby nullifying the German-Japanese Anti-
Comintern Pact of 1936, destroying further negotiations. The Soviet Union agreed to allow
Germany to use the Trans-Siberian Railway to transport goods from Manchukuo to Germany.
However, quantities remained low, and the lack of established contacts and networks between
Soviet, German, and Japanese personnel further compounded the problem. When Germany
attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, Germany's economic goals in Asia were conclusively put to
an end.
Contact between China and Germany persisted to 1941, with elements from both sides wishing
to resume the cooperation, as German-Japanese alliance was not very beneficial. However,
Germany's failure to conquer the United Kingdom in the Battle of Britain in mid-1940 steered
Hitler away from this move. Germany signed the Tripartite Pact, along with Japan and Italy, at
the end of that year. In July 1941, Hitler officially recognized Wang Jingwei's puppet
government in Nanking, therefore extinguishing any hope of contact with Chiang's Chinese
government which had relocated to Chungking. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, China
formally joined the Allies and declared war on Germany on December 9, 1941.
Legacy
WT
Chiang Wei-kuo, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's adopted son, received military training in Germany
Sino-German cooperation of the 1930s was perhaps the most ambitious and successful of
President Sun Yat-sen's ideal of an "international development" to modernize China. Germany's
loss of territories in China following World War I, its need for raw materials, and its lack of
interest in Chinese politics, advanced the rate and productiveness of their cooperation with
China, as both countries were able to cooperate on the basis of equality and economic
dependability, without the imperialist undertones that marred much of other Sino-foreign
relations. China's urgent need for industrial development to fight an eventual showdown with
Japan also precipitated this progress. Furthermore, admiration of Germany's rapid rise after its
defeat in World War I and its Fascist and militaristic ideology also prompted some Chinese
within the ruling circle to fashion Fascism as a quick solution to China's continuing woes of
disunity and political confusion. In sum, although the period of Sino-German cooperation
spanned only a short period of time, and much of its results and promises were destroyed in the
war with Japan that China was far from prepared for, it had some lasting effect on China's
modernization. After Kuomintang's defeat in the Chinese Civil War, the central government
relocated to Taiwan. In the Republic of China on Taiwan, many government officials and
ministers were trained in Germany, as were many faculties, research personnel, and military
officers, such as Chiang's own adopted son Chiang Wei-kuo. Much of Taiwan's rapid post-war
industrialization can be attributed to the plans and goals laid down in the Three-Year Plan of
1936.
WT
Chapter 3
Chinese Armies in the Second Sino-Japanese

War
The Second Sino-Japanese War was fought between the Chinese and Japanese armies, mostly
WT
on Chinese soil, during the late 1930s and early 1940s. Western historians generally view the
Second Sino-Japanese War as a theater of World War II. During this war, the Chinese Army had
two severe handicaps. First, the Chinese army was ill-equipped, with significantly less advanced
military technology than the Japanese and its allies. Second, the Chinese army lacked political
unity. Because the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party had not reconciled before
1937, when Japanese troops invaded Chinese territory, these two groups were forced to paper
over important differences for the duration of the war, occasionally leading them to destructively
hinder each other's efforts to defeat the Japanese.
Degree of success
Early stages of the war
Despite these handicaps, the Chinese Army were moderately successful in the early stages of the
war. They repulsed the Japanese army's tentative offensive in Shandong, Hebei and Shanghai,
causing Japanese forces heavy losses. The second battle of Shanghai almost ended similarly, but
Japanese reinforcements arrived. While defending Nanjing, Chinese infantry forces with very
little equipment destroyed the notorious Japanese Army Special Forces units "Shikaya" and
"Kisarazu". During the battle of Suzhou, the Japanese 2nd Corps suffered some 30,000
casualties. Finally, in the battle of Wuhan, 100 Japanese aircraft were shot down, many Japanese
patrol boats were sunk, and Japanese land forces suffered further casualties.
After the outbreak of World War II
General Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the Communist Army, published a message to his
nation on July 7, 1942. In this message, he noted that the 8th Route Army had not received
money or munitions from the government in three years. Between 1941 and 1942, the 8th Route
and New 4th Route Armies had to combat more than 24 Japanese divisions, comprising 44% of
the total Japanese Armed forces dispatched in China. During the same period, the 8th Route
Army suffered heavy casualties, including 65 high-ranking officers. In total, 23,034 soldiers died
and 10,856 were wounded.
General Chu estimated that the number of casualties inflicted by the Chinese Communist armies
was more than 24,000; this number includes both the Japanese soldiers and their Chinese
collaborators. The Chinese armies captured a total of 38,985 prisoners, together with a great
quantity of war equipment. The New 4th had captured 15,721 rifles, 301 machine guns (light and
heavy) and many other articles, including clothing, food, and medicine.
Other testimonies reported the New 4th Route Communist Army "had withstood 231 battles,
captured 1,539 rifles, 32 light machine guns, 4 heavy machine guns, 48 sub-machine guns,
50,000 munitions for light weapons, 22,738 occupation Yen money in Japanese bank notes,
radios, horses, mules, flags, 200 trucks and railway wagons, 20 km of rail lines, 7 km of roads,
95 bridges, 20 km of electric lines and captured others, 38 Japanese officers and 613
collaborationist soldiers and wounded 3,253 of the enemy".
General Chung Yee
WT
On May 9, 1940, several Chinese units under the command of Chinese General Chung Yee
fought to the death against a well-equipped Japanese armored division. All the Chinese soldiers
who entered battle were killed, but Chung Yee, with two members of his personal escort,
retreated to the forest and searched for reinforcements. To his misfortune, a second Japanese
force outside the village of Tsuan Tai Chen had killed potential reinforcements.
On May 18, General Chung Yee, his second-in-command General Fang Chih-an, and the units
they controlled fought the Japanese Army in the Tsaoyang area. General Chang's two regiments
were surrounded by 6,000 enemy cavalry and infantry units in the Fengjiang area. The ensuing
battle lasted eight hours causing terrible losses to the defenders; Chung Yee was wounded in the
right arm. Chinese officers petitioned for a strategic retreat, but Commander Yee overruled them,
ordering a last stand to defend the land. He saw this as a debt owed to his country, and a
dishonour if left unpaid before his death. The enemy advanced with reinforcements. During the
battle, a round of machine gun fire reached the party of General Chang and wounded one of his
officers.
Only a few hours later, General Fang Chih-an encountered the same Japanese force, and his
army defeated it. Among the corpses, he found the enemy commander. Subsequent Japanese
radio broadcasts glorified the late Japanese commander and stated his remains would be sent to
Shantung.
The Chinese left with the remains of the enemy commander, as well as the corpse of Major
General Chung Yee, and conducted funerals in Peipei, 50 km from the Capital. When news of
this reached the Japanese, they dispatched bombers to strike the area. The funerals continued
even as these attacks occurred, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek conferred high honours upon
the dead chiefs. Honours were bestowed upon the General Chung Yee for his role as Chinese
supreme commander.
Other Chinese engagements
Chinese General Chang Yun-ee, chief of the Fourth Detachment, was killed in combat during the
spring of 1942. There were approximately 500,000 soldiers left in the Chinese army.
In the Second Changsha battle, Chinese forces destroyed advancing Japanese forces. During the
ensuing Japanese retreat, the Chinese pursued and destroyed the remaining Japanese groups who
fled the battle.
A Chinese expeditionary force annihilated the entire Japanese 33rd Division in the Battle of
Yenangyaung, of the first Burma campaign. They liberated around 7,000 British prisoners, took
roughly 1,000 horses, and freed 500 other prisoners, which included American journalists and
missionaries captured by the Japanese forces.
After the Battle of Kweshan, Chinese forces captured 10 soldiers of the Manchukuo Imperial
WT
Forces, two 9.3 cm pieces of heavy artillery, and a plaque which read "Manufactured in Tokyo,
1940". In Juikwotan, Chinese forces confiscated two American trucks from the Japanese, one of
which was full of packages of hand grenades. The Chinese general headquarters was filled by
Japanese flags, parts for trucks and cars, tools, rifles, pistols, revolvers, munitions, mortars with
munitions, covers, and raincoats. One secret peasant society, "Hwang Shih Hwei", helped
capture Japanese troops and the aforementioned equipment during combat.
The Chinese mourned the loss of the young officer Loh Hun-ping, in the battle near the enemy
position of Miaoerpu, who had led one offensive unit against the enemy.
In the Chekiang-Kiangsi skirmish, Chinese forces rescued members of the American Doolittle
Raid. When they arrived at Chekiang, they encountered Japanese and collaborationist armies.
During intense skirmishes, the Chinese forces killed approximately 17,000 of the enemy forces.
After these skirmishes, Chinese forces engaged in guerrilla combat, impeding Japan's first
attempt to organize the large number of Japanese units needed for a pincer attack, which the
Japanese planned to use during their invasion of Sichuan province. The Chinese were aided by
the U.S. Navy, which defeated the Japanese Navy in the Midway, and by the U.S. Army, which
defeated the Japanese Army in the Solomon Islands campaigns; these defeats prevented the
Japanese forces from sending adequate reinforcements to the Chinese mainland for their
previously planned invasion of Sichuan, and also deprived the Japanese of control over important
sea routes. Finally, Chinese forces joining the Anglo-American "Flying Tigers" destroyed the
new Japanese divisions slated to invade Sichuan during the Battle of Hubei.
In the Battle of Changteh, the Japanese were defeated by the New Fourth Chinese forces, even
when the Japanese used chemical warfare against the population and the Chinese forces.
End of the war
During the last offensive, Japanese forces were again defeated in North Hupei, West Hunan,
Hsihsiaoko, Laohoku, Ninhsiang, Yiyang, Wuyang, Liuchow-Kweilin, Nanning, Kwangsi, and
Yuehcheng Shan.
On May 22, 1945, Chinese forces took prisoner "17 Japanese officers, 230 soldiers and captured
347 horses, 24 cannons of various caliber, 100 light and heavy machine guns, 1,333 rifles, and
20 tonnes of assorted equipment".
Chinese forces launched a fierce counter-offensive against the last Japanese positions in Canton
and Kwangsi. They also took part in other counter-offensives with the Allied Forces in the South
China area against the remaining Japanese forces in the area.
WT
Chapter 4
Japanese War Crimes
WT Chinese prisoners being buried alive
Japanese war crimes occurred during the period of Japanese imperialism, primarily during the
Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II. Some of the incidents have also been described as
an Asian Holocaust and Japanese war atrocities. Some war crimes were committed by military
personnel from the Empire of Japan in the late 19th century, although most took place during the
first part of the Shōwa Era, the name given to the reign of Emperor Hirohito, until the military
defeat of the Empire of Japan, in 1945.
Historians and governments of some countries officially hold Japanese military forces, namely
the Imperial Japanese Army,the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Imperial Japanese family, espe-
cially Emperor Hirohito, responsible for killings and other crimes committed against millions of
civilians and prisoners of war. Some Japanese soldiers have admitted to committing these
crimes.
Japan officially maintains that no international law nor treaties were violated. Many leaders in
the Japanese government, including former prime ministers Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe,
have prayed at the Yasukuni Shrine, which includes convicted Class A war criminals in its
honored war dead. Some Japanese history textbooks controversially downplay Japanese actions
in World War II, and Japanese officials as high as prime minister Shinzo Abe have denied that
atrocities occurred.
Definitions
WT
Hsuchow, China, 1938. A ditch full of the bodies of Chinese civilians, killed by Japanese soldiers
War crimes have been defined by the Nuremberg Charter as "violations of the laws or customs of
war," which includes crimes against enemy civilians and enemy combatants. Military personnel
from the Empire of Japan have been accused or convicted of committing many such acts during
the period of Japanese imperialism from the late 19th to mid-20th centuries. They have been
accused of conducting a series of human rights abuses against civilians and prisoners of war
(POWs) throughout East Asia and the western Pacific region. These events reached their height
during the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45 and the Asian and Pacific campaigns of World
War II (1941–45).
International and Japanese law
Although the Geneva Conventions did not come into effect until 1949, the crimes committed fall
under other aspects of international and Japanese law. For example, many of the crimes
committed by Japanese personnel during World War II broke Japanese military law, and were
subject to court martial, as required by that law. The Empire also violated international agree-
ments signed by Japan, including provisions of the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) such as
a ban on the use of chemical weapons and protections for prisoners of war. The Japanese
government also signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1929), thereby rendering its actions in 1937-45
liable to charges of crimes against peace, a charge that was introduced at the Tokyo Trials to
prosecute "Class A" war criminals. "Class B" war criminals were those found guilty of war
WT
crimes per se, and "Class C" war criminals were those guilty of crimes against humanity. The
Japanese government also accepted the terms set by the Potsdam Declaration (1945) after the end
of the war, including the provision in Article 10 of punishment for "all war criminals, including
those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners."
In Japan, the term "Japanese war crimes" generally only refers to cases tried by the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East, also known as the Tokyo Trials, following the end of the
Pacific War. However, the tribunal did not prosecute war crimes allegations involving mid-
ranking officers or more junior personnel. Those were dealt with separately in other cities
throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
Japanese law does not define those convicted in the post-1945 trials as criminals, despite the fact
that Japan's governments have accepted the judgments made in the trials, and in the Treaty of
San Francisco (1952). This is because the treaty does not mention the legal validity of the
tribunal. Had Japan certified the legal validity of the war crimes tribunals in the San Francisco
Treaty, the war crimes would have become open to appeal and overturning in Japanese courts.
This would have been unacceptable in international diplomatic circles. Former Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe has advocated the position that Japan accepted the Tokyo tribunal and its judgements
as a condition for ending the war, but that its verdicts have no relation to domestic law.
According to this view, those convicted of war crimes are not criminals under Japanese law. This
view may have been accepted by Japanese courts.
Historical and geographical extent
Outside Japan, different societies use widely different timeframes in defining Japanese war
crimes. For example, the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 was enforced by the Japanese
military, and was followed by the deprivation of civil liberties and exploitation of the Korean
people. Thus, some Koreans refer to "Japanese war crimes" as events occurring during the period
of 1910 (or earlier) to 1945.
By comparison, the Western Allies did not come into military conflict with Japan until 1941, and
North Americans, Australasians, South East Asians and Europeans may consider "Japanese war
crimes" to be events that occurred in 1941-45.
Japanese war crimes were not always carried out by ethnic Japanese personnel. A small minority
of people in every Asian and Pacific country invaded or occupied by Japan collaborated with the
Japanese military, or even served in it, for a wide variety of reasons, such as economic hardship,
coercion, or antipathy to other imperialist powers.
Japan's sovereignty over Korea and Formosa (Taiwan), in the first half of the 20th century, was
recognized by international agreements—the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) and the Japan-Korea
Annexation Treaty (1910)—and they were considered at the time to be integral parts of the
Japanese Empire. However, the legality of these treaties is in question, as the native populations
were not consulted, there was armed resistance to Japan's annexations, and war crimes may also
be committed during civil wars.
WT
Background
Japanese military culture and imperialism
Military culture, especially during Japan's imperialist phase had great bearing on the conduct of
the Japanese military before and during World War II.
Centuries previously, the samurai of Japan had been taught unquestioning obedience to their
lords, as well as to be fearless in battle. After the Meiji Restoration and the collapse of the
Tokugawa Shogunate, the Emperor became the focus of military loyalty. During the so-called
"Age of Empire" in the late 19th century, Japan followed the lead of other world powers in
developing an empire, pursuing that objective aggressively.
As with other imperial powers, Japanese popular culture became increasingly jingoistic through
the end of the 19th century and into the 20th century. The rise of Japanese nationalism was seen
partly in the adoption of Shinto as a state religion from 1890, including its entrenchment in the
education system. Shinto held the Emperor to be divine because he was deemed to be a
descendant of the sun goddess Amaterasu. This provided justification for the requirement that the
emperor and his representatives be obeyed without question.
Victory in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) signified Japan's rise to the status of a major
military power.
Unlike many other major powers, Japan had not signed the Geneva Convention (1929)—also
known as The Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva July 27, 1929—
which was the version of the Geneva Convention that covered the treatment of prisoners of war
during World War II. Nevertheless, an Imperial Proclamation (1894) stated that Japanese
soldiers should make every effort to win the war without violating international law. According
to historian Yuki Tanaka, Japanese forces during the First Sino-Japanese War, released 1,790
Chinese prisoners without harm, once they signed an agreement not to take up arms against
Japan again. After the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), all 79,367 Russian Empire prisoners were
released, and were paid for labour performed, in accordance with the Hague Convention. Simi-
larly the behaviour of the Japanese military in World War I (1914–18) was at least as humane as
that of other militaries, with some German POWs of the Japanese finding life in Japan so
agreeable that they stayed and settled in Japan after the war.
WT
Two Japanese officers, Toshiaki Mukai and Tsuyoshi Noda competing to see who could kill (with a
sword) one hundred people first. The bold headline reads, "'Incredible Record' (in the Contest To Cut
Down 100 People—Mukai 106 – 105 Noda—Both 2nd Lieutenants Go Into Extra Innings".
The events of the 1930s and 1940s
By the late 1930s, the rise of militarism in Japan created at least superficial similarities between
the wider Japanese military culture and that of Nazi Germany's elite military personnel, such as
those in the Waffen-SS. Japan also had a military secret police force, known as the Kempeitai,
which resembled the Nazi Gestapo in its role in annexed and occupied countries. As in other
dictatorships, irrational brutality, hatred and fear became commonplace. Perceived failure, or
insufficient devotion to the Emperor would attract punishment, frequently of the physical kind.
In the military, officers would assault and beat men under their command, who would pass the
beating on to lower ranks, all the way down. In POW camps, this meant prisoners received the
worst beatings of all, partly in the belief that such punishments were merely the proper technique
to deal with disobedience.
Crimes
The Japanese military during the 1930s and 1940s is often compared to the military of Nazi
Germany during 1933–45 because of the sheer scale of suffering. Much of the controversy
regarding Japan's role in World War II revolves around the death rates of prisoners of war and
civilians under Japanese occupation. The historian Chalmers Johnson has written that:
WT
It may be pointless to try to establish which World War Two Axis aggressor, Germany or Japan,
was the more brutal to the peoples it victimised. The Germans killed six million Jews and 20 mil-
lion Russians [i.e. Soviet citizens]; the Japanese slaughtered as many as 30 million Filipinos,
Malays, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Indonesians and Burmese, at least 23 million of them ethnic
Chinese. Both nations looted the countries they conquered on a monumental scale, though Japan
plundered more, over a longer period, than the Nazis. Both conquerors enslaved millions and
exploited them as forced labourers—and, in the case of the Japanese, as [forced] prostitutes for
front-line troops. If you were a Nazi prisoner of war from Britain, America, Australia, New
Zealand or Canada (but not Russia) you faced a 4% chance of not surviving the war; [by
comparison] the death rate for Allied POWs held by the Japanese was nearly 30%.
According to the findings of the Tokyo Tribunal, the death rate among POWs from Asian
countries, held by Japan was 27.1%. The death rate of Chinese POWs was much higher
because—under a directive ratified on August 5, 1937 by Emperor Hirohito—the constraints of
international law on treatment of those prisoners was removed. Only 56 Chinese POWs were
released after the surrender of Japan. After March 20, 1943, the Japanese Navy was under orders
to execute all prisoners taken at sea.
Mass killings
R. J. Rummel, a professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, states that between
1937 and 1945, the Japanese military murdered from nearly 3,000,000 to over 10,000,000
people, most likely 6,000,000 Chinese, Indonesians, Koreans, Filipinos, and Indochinese, among
others, including Western prisoners of war. "This democide was due to a morally bankrupt
political and military strategy, military expediency and custom, and national culture." According
to Rummel, in China alone, during 1937-45, approximately 3.9 million Chinese were killed,
mostly civilians, as a direct result of the Japanese operations and 10.2 millions in the course of
the war. The most infamous incident during this period was the Nanking Massacre of 1937-38,
when, according to the findings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, the
Japanese Army massacred as many as 300,000 civilians and prisoners of war, although the
accepted figure is somewhere in the hundreds of thousands. In Southeast Asia, the Manila
massacre, resulted in the death of 100,000 civilians in the Philippines. It is estimated that at least
one out of every 20 Filipinos died at the hand of the Japanese during the occupation. In the Sook
Ching massacre, Lee Kuan Yew, the ex-Prime Minister of Singapore, said during an interview
on with National Geographic that there were between 50,000 and 90,000 casualties while
according to Major General Kawamura Saburo, there were 5000 casualties in total. There were
other massacres of civilians e.g. the Kalagong massacre.
Historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta reports that a "Three Alls Policy" (Sankō Sakusen) was imple-
mented in China from 1942 to 1945 and was in itself responsible for the deaths of "more than 2.7
million" Chinese civilians. This scorched earth strategy, sanctioned by Hirohito himself, directed
Japanese forces to "Kill All, Burn All, and Loot All."
Additionally, captured allied service personnel were massacred in various incidents, including:
WT
• Laha massacre
• Banka Island massacre
• Parit Sulong
• Palawan massacre
• SS Tjisalak massacre perpetrated by Japanese submarine I-8
• Wake Island massacre
• Bataan Death March
Human experimentation and biological warfare
Shiro Ishii, commander of Unit 731
Special Japanese military units conducted experiments on civilians and POWs in China. One of
the most infamous was Unit 731 under Shirō Ishii. Victims were subjected to vivisection without
anesthesia, amputations, and were used to test biological weapons, among other experiments.
Anesthesia was not used because it was believed to affect results.
To determine the treatment of frostbite, prisoners were taken outside in freezing weather and
left with exposed arms, periodically drenched with water until frozen solid. The arm was later
amputated; the doctor would repeat the process on the victim's upper arm to the shoulder. After
both arms were gone, the doctors moved on to the legs until only a head and torso remained.
The victim was then used for plague and pathogens experiments.
According to GlobalSecurity.org, the experiments carried out by Unit 731 alone caused 3,000
deaths. Furthermore, according to the 2002 International Symposium on the Crimes of
Bacteriological Warfare, the number of people killed by the Imperial Japanese Army germ
WT
warfare and human experiments is around 580,000. According to other sources, "tens of
thousands, and perhaps as many as 400,000, Chinese died of bubonic plague, cholera, anthrax
and other diseases...", resulting from the use of biological warfare. Top officers of Unit 731 were
not prosecuted for war crimes after the war, in exchange for turning over the results of their
research to the United States. They were also reportedly given responsible positions in Japan's
pharmaceutical industry, medical schools and health ministry.
One case of human experimentation occurred in Japan itself. At least nine out of 12 crew
members survived the crash of a U.S. Army Air Forces B-29 bomber on Kyūshū, on May 5,
1945. (This plane was Lt. Marvin Watkins' crew of the 29th Bomb Group of the 6th Bomb
Squadron.) The bomber's commander was sent to Tokyo for interrogation, while the other
survivors were taken to the anatomy department of Kyushu University, at Fukuoka, where they
were subjected to vivisection or killed.On March 11, 1948, 30 people, including several doctors
and one female nurse, were brought to trial by the Allied war crimes tribunal. Charges of
cannibalism were dropped, but 23 people were found guilty of vivisection or wrongful removal
of body parts. Five were sentenced to death, four to life imprisonment, and the rest to shorter
terms. In 1950, the military governor of Japan, General Douglas MacArthur, commuted all of the
death sentences and significantly reduced most of the prison terms. All of those convicted in
relation to the university vivisection were free after 1958. In addition, many participants who
were responsible for these vivisections were never charged by the Americans or their allies in
exchange for the information on the experiments.
In 2006, former IJN medical officer Akira Makino stated that he was ordered—as part of his
training—to carry out vivisection on about 30 civilian prisoners in the Philippines between
December 1944 and February 1945. The surgery included amputations. Ken Yuasa, a former
military doctor in China, has also admitted to similar incidents in which he was compelled to
participate.
Use of chemical weapons
According to historians Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Kentaro Awaya, during the Second Sino-Japanese
War, gas weapons, such as tear gas, were used only sporadically in 1937 but in the spring of
1938, however the Imperial Japanese Army began full-scale use of phosgene, chlorine, Lewisite
and nausea gas (red), and from summer 1939, mustard gas (yellow) was used against both
Kuomintang and Communists Chinese troops.
According to Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, Emperor Hirohito signed orders specifying the use of
chemical weapons in China. For example, during the Battle of Wuhan from August to October
1938, the Emperor authorized the use of toxic gas on 375 separate occasions, despite Article 23
of the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) and article V of the Treaty in Relation to the Use of
Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare A resolution adopted by the League of Nations on
May 14 condemned the use of poison gas by Japan.
Another example is the Battle of Yichang in October 1941, during which the 19th Artillery
Regiment helped the 13th Brigade of the IJA 11th Army by launching 1,000 yellow gas shells
and 1,500 red gas shells at the Chinese forces. The area was crowded with Chinese civilians
unable to evacuate. Some 3,000 Chinese soldiers were in the area and 1,600 were affected. The
WT
Japanese report say that "the effect of gas seems considerable".
In 2004, Yoshimi and Yuki Tanaka discovered in the Australian National Archives documents
showing that cyanide gas was tested on Australian and Dutch prisoners in November 1944 on
Kai Islands (Indonesia).
Torture of prisoners of war
Japanese imperial forces employed widespread use of torture on prisoners, usually in an effort to
gather military intelligence quickly. Tortured prisoners were often later executed. A former
Japanese Army officer who served in China, Uno Shintaro, stated:
The major means of getting intelligence was to extract information by interrogating prisoners.
Torture was an unavoidable necessity. Murdering and burying them follows naturally. You do it
so you won't be found out. I believed and acted this way because I was convinced of what I was
doing. We carried out our duty as instructed by our masters. We did it for the sake of our
country. From our filial obligation to our ancestors. On the battlefield, we never really considered
the Chinese humans. When you're winning, the losers look really miserable. We concluded that
the Yamato [i.e., Japanese] race was superior.
Cannibalism
Many written reports and testimonies collected by the Australian War Crimes Section of the
Tokyo tribunal, and investigated by prosecutor William Webb (the future Judge-in-Chief),
indicate that Japanese personnel in many parts of Asia and the Pacific committed acts of
cannibalism against Allied prisoners of war. In many cases this was inspired by ever-increasing
Allied attacks on Japanese supply lines, and the death and illness of Japanese personnel as a
result of hunger. However, according to historian Yuki Tanaka: "cannibalism was often a syste-
matic activity conducted by whole squads and under the command of officers". This frequently
involved murder for the purpose of securing bodies. For example, an Indian POW, Havildar
Changdi Ram, testified that: "[on November 12, 1944] the Kempeitai beheaded [an Allied] pilot.
I saw this from behind a tree and watched some of the Japanese cut flesh from his arms, legs,
hips, buttocks and carry it off to their quarters... They cut it [into] small pieces and fried it."
In some cases, flesh was cut from living people: another Indian POW, Lance Naik Hatam Ali
(later a citizen of Pakistan), testified that in New Guinea:
the Japanese started selecting prisoners and every day one prisoner was taken out and killed and
eaten by the soldiers. I personally saw this happen and about 100 prisoners were eaten at this
place by the Japanese. The remainder of us were taken to another spot 50 miles [80 km] away
where 10 prisoners died of sickness. At this place, the Japanese again started selecting prisoners
to eat. Those selected were taken to a hut where their flesh was cut from their bodies while they
were alive and they were thrown into a ditch where they later died.
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Perhaps the most senior officer convicted of cannibalism was Lt Gen. Yoshio Tachibana
(立花芳夫,Tachibana Yoshio), who with 11 other Japanese personnel was tried in August 1946
in relation to the execution of U.S. Navy airmen, and the cannibalism of at least one of them,
during August 1944, on Chichi Jima, in the Bonin Islands. The airmen were beheaded on
Tachibana's orders. As military and international law did not specifically deal with cannibalism,
they were tried for murder and "prevention of honorable burial". Tachibana was sentenced to
death, and hanged.
Forced labor
The Japanese military's use of forced labor, by Asian civilians and POWs also caused many
deaths. According to a joint study by historians including Zhifen Ju, Mitsuyoshi Himeta, Toru
Kubo and Mark Peattie, more than 10 million Chinese civilians were mobilized by the Kōa-in
(Japanese Asia Development Board) for forced labour. More than 100,000 civilians and POWs
died in the construction of the Burma-Siam Railway.
The U.S. Library of Congress estimates that in Java, between four and 10 million romusha
(Japanese: "manual laborer"), were forced to work by the Japanese military. About 270,000 of
these Javanese laborers were sent to other Japanese-held areas in South East Asia. Only 52,000
were repatriated to Java, meaning that there was a death rate of 80%.
According to historian Akira Fujiwara, Emperor Hirohito personally ratified the decision to
remove the constraints of international law (Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907)) on the
treatment of Chinese prisoners of war in the directive of August 5, 1937. This notification also
advised staff officers to stop using the term "prisoners of war". The Geneva Convention
exempted POWs of sergeant rank or higher from manual labour, and stipulated that prisoners
performing work should be provided with extra rations and other essentials. However, Japan was
not a signatory to the Geneva Convention at the time, and Japanese forces did not follow the
convention.
Comfort women
The terms "comfort women" (慰安婦 ianfu?) or "military comfort women" (従軍慰安婦 jûgun-
ianfu?) are euphemisms for women in Japanese military brothels in occupied countries, many of
whom were recruited by force or deception, and regard themselves as having been sexually
assaulted or sex slaves.
In 1992, historian Yoshiaki Yoshimi published material based on his research in archives at
Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies. Yoshimi claimed that there was a direct link
between imperial institutions such as the Kôa-in and "comfort stations". When Yoshimi's
findings were published in the Japanese news media on January 12, 1993, they caused a
sensation and forced the government, represented by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato Koichi, to
acknowledge some of the facts that same day. On January 17, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa
presented formal apologies for the suffering of the victims, during a trip in South Korea. On July
6 and August 4, the Japanese government issued two statements by which it recognized that
"Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military of the day", "The
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Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of
the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women" and that the women were "recruited in
many cases against their own will through coaxing and coercion".
The controversy was re-ignited on March 1, 2007, when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
mentioned suggestions that a U.S. House of Representatives committee would call on the
Japanese Government to "apologize for and acknowledge" the role of the Japanese Imperial
military in wartime sex slavery. However, Abe denied that it applied to comfort stations. "There
is no evidence to prove there was coercion, nothing to support it." Abe's comments provoked
negative reactions overseas. For example, a New York Times editorial on March 6 said:
These were not commercial brothels. Force, explicit and implicit, was used in recruiting these
women. What went on in them was serial rape, not prostitution. The Japanese Army's involve-
ment is documented in the government's own defense files. A senior Tokyo official more or less
apologized for this horrific crime in 1993... Yesterday, he grudgingly acknowledged the 1993
quasi apology, but only as part of a pre-emptive declaration that his government would reject
the call, now pending in the United States Congress, for an official apology. America isn't the
only country interested in seeing Japan belatedly accept full responsibility. Korea, China, and the
Philippines are also infuriated by years of Japanese equivocations over the issue.
The same day, veteran soldier Yasuji Kaneko admitted to The Washington Post that the women
"cried out, but it didn't matter to us whether the women lived or died. We were the emperor's
soldiers. Whether in military brothels or in the villages, we raped without reluctance."
On April 17, 2007, Yoshimi and another historian, Hirofumi Hayashi, announced the discovery,
in the archives of the Tokyo Trials, of seven official documents suggesting that Imperial military
forces, such as the Tokeitai (naval secret police), directly coerced women to work in frontline
brothels in China, Indochina and Indonesia. These documents were initially made public at the
war crimes trial. In one of these, a lieutenant is quoted as confessing having organized a brothel
and having used it himself. Another source refers to Tokeitai members having arrested women
on the streets, and after enforced medical examinations, putting them in brothels.
On May 12, 2007, journalist Taichiro Kaijimura announced the discovery of 30 Netherland
government documents submitted to the Tokyo tribunal as evidence of a forced massed
prostitution incident in 1944 in Magelang.
In other cases, some victims from East Timor testified they were forced when they were not old
enough to have started menstruating and repeatedly raped by Japanese soldiers.
A Dutch-Indonesian "comfort woman", Jan Ruff-O'Hearn (now resident in Australia), who gave
evidence to the U.S. committee, said the Japanese Government had failed to take responsibility
for its crimes, that it did not want to pay compensation to victims and that it wanted to rewrite
history. Ruff-O'Hearn said that she had been raped "day and night" for three months by Japanese
soldiers when she was 19.
To this day, only one Japanese woman published her testimony. This was done in 1971, when a
former "comfort woman" forced to work for showa soldiers in Taiwan, published her memoirs
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under the pseudonym of Suzuko Shirota.
There are different theories on the breakdown of the comfort women's place of origin. While
some Japanese sources claim that the majority of the women were from Japan, others, including
Yoshimi, argue as many as 200,000 women, mostly from Korea and China, and some other
countries such as the Philippines, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, Netherlands, and Australia were
forced to engage in sexual activity.
On 26 June 2007, the U.S. House of representatives Foreign Affairs Committee passed a
resolution asking that Japan "should acknowledge, apologize and accept historical responsibility
in a clear and unequivocal manner for its military's coercion of women into sexual slavery during
the war". On 30 July 2007, the House of Representatives passed the resolution, while Shinzo
Abe said this decision was "regrettable".
Looting
Many historians state that the Japanese government and individual military personnel engaged in
widespread looting during the period of 1895 to 1945. The stolen property included private land,
as well as many different kinds of valuable goods looted from banks, depositories, temples,
churches, other commercial premises, mosques, museums and private homes.
Sterling and Peggy Seagrave, in their 2003 book Gold Warriors: America's secret recovery of
Yamashita's gold—report that secret repositories of loot from across Southeast Asia, were
created by the Japanese military in the Philippines during 1942–45. They allege that the theft was
organized on a massive scale, either by yakuza gangsters such as Yoshio Kodama, or by officials
at the behest of Emperor Hirohito, who wanted to ensure that as many of the proceeds as possible
went to the government. The Seagraves also allege that Hirohito appointed his brother, Prince
Chichibu, to head a secret organisation called Kin no yuri (Golden Lily) for this purpose.
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General Tomoyuki Yamashita (second right) was tried in Manila between October 29 and December 7,
1945, by a U.S. military commission, on charges relating to the Manila Massacre and earlier occurrences
in Singapore, and was sentenced to death. The case set a precedent regarding the responsibility of
commanders for war crimes, and is known as the Yamashita Standard.
War crimes trials

Soon after the war, the Allied powers indicted 25 individuals as Class-A war criminals, and
5,700 individuals were indicted as Class-B or Class-C war criminals by Allied criminal trials. Of
these, 984 were initially condemned to death, 920 were actually executed, 475 received life
sentences, 2,944 received some prison terms, 1,018 were acquitted, and 279 were not sentenced
or not brought to trial. These numbers included 178 ethnic Taiwanese and 148 ethnic Koreans.
The Class-A charges were all tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, also
known as "the Tokyo Trials". Other courts were formed in many different places in Asia and the
Pacific.
Tokyo Trials
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was formed to try accused people in Japan
itself.
High ranking officers who were tried included Koichi Kido and Sadao Araki. Three former
(unelected) prime ministers: Koki Hirota, Hideki Tojo, and Kuniaki Koiso were convicted of
Class-A war crimes. Many military leaders were also convicted. Two people convicted as Class-
A war criminals later served as ministers in post-war Japanese governments.
• Mamoru Shigemitsu served as foreign minister both during the war and in the post-war
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Hatoyama government.
• Okinori Kaya was finance minister during the war and later served as justice minister in the
government of Hayato Ikeda. However, these two had no direct connection to alleged war
crimes committed by Japanese forces, and foreign governments never raised the issue when
they were appointed.
Hirohito and all members of the imperial family implicated in the war such as Prince Chichibu,
Prince Asaka, Prince Takeda and Prince Higashikuni were exonerated from criminal
prosecutions by MacArthur, with the help of Bonner Fellers who allowed the major criminal
suspects to coordinate their stories so that the Emperor would be spared from indictment. Many
historians criticize this decision. According to John Dower, "with the full support of MacArthur's
headquarters, the prosecution functioned, in effect, as a defense team for the emperor" and even
Japanese activists who endorse the ideals of the Nuremberg and Tokyo charters, and who have
labored to document and publicize the atrocities of the Showa regime "cannot defend the
American decision to exonerate the emperor of war responsibility and then, in the chill of the
Cold war, release and soon afterwards openly embrace accused right-winged war criminals like
the later prime minister Nobusuke Kishi." For Herbert Bix, "MacArthur's truly extraordinary
measures to save Hirohito from trial as a war criminal had a lasting and profoundly distorting
impact on Japanese understanding of the lost war."
Other trials
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October 26, 1945, Sandakan, North Borneo. During the investigation into Sandakan Death Marches and
other incidents, Sergeant Hosotani Naoji (left, seated), a member of the Kempeitai unit at Sandakan, is
interrogated by Squadron Leader F. G. Birchall (second right) of the Royal Australian Air Force, and Ser-
geant Mamo (right), a Nisei member of the U.S. Army/Allied Translator and Interpreter Service. Naoji
confessed to shooting two Australian POWs and five ethnic Chinese civilians.
Between 1946–51, the United States, the United Kingdom, China, the USSR, Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the Philippines all held military tribunals to try
Japanese indicted for Class B and Class C war crimes. Some 5,600 Japanese personnel were
prosecuted in more than 2,200 trials outside Japan. Class B defendants were accused of having
committed such crimes themselves; class C defendants, mostly senior officers, were accused of
planning, ordering, or failing to prevent them.
The judges presiding came from the United States, China, the United Kingdom, Australia, the
Netherlands, France, the Soviet Union, New Zealand, India and the Philippines. Additionally, the
Chinese Communists also held a number of trials for Japanese personnel. More than 4,400
Japanese personnel were convicted and about 1,000 were sentenced to death.
The largest single trial was that of 93 Japanese personnel charged with the summary execution of
more than 300 Allied POWs, in the Laha massacre (1942). The most prominent ethnic Korean
convicted was Lieutenant General Hong Sa Ik, who orchestrated the organization of prisoner of
war camps in south east Asia. In 2006, the South Korean government "pardoned" 83 of the 148
convicted Korean war criminals.
Post-war events and reactions
The parole-for-war-criminals movement
In 1950, after most Allied war crimes trials had ended, thousands of convicted war criminals sat
in prisons across Asia and across Europe, detained in the countries where they were convicted.
Some executions were still outstanding as many Allied courts agreed to reexamine their verdicts,
reducing sentences in some cases and instituting a system of parole, but without relinquishing
control over the fate of the imprisoned (even after Japan and Germany had regained their status
as sovereign countries).
An intense and broadly supported campaign for amnesty for all imprisoned war criminals ensued
(more aggressively in Germany than in Japan at first), as attention turned away from the top
wartime leaders and towards the majority of "ordinary" war criminals (Class B/C in Japan), and
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the issue of criminal responsibility was reframed as a humanitarian problem.
On March 7, 1950, MacArthur issued a directive that reduced the sentences by one-third for
good behavior and authorized the parole of those who had received life sentences after fifteen
years. Several of those who were imprisoned were released earlier on parole due to ill-health.
The Japanese popular reaction to the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal found expression in demands
for the mitigation of the sentences of war criminals and agitation for parole. Shortly after the San
Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect in April 1952, a movement demanding the release of B-
and C-class war criminals began, emphasizing the "unfairness of the war crimes tribunals" and
the "misery and hardship of the families of war criminals." The movement quickly garnered the
support of more than ten million Japanese. In the face of this surge of public opinion, the
government commented that "public sentiment in our country is that the war criminals are not
criminals. Rather, they gather great sympathy as victims of the war, and the number of people
concerned about the war crimes tribunal system itself is steadily increasing."
The parole-for-war-criminals movement was driven by two groups: those from outside who had
'a sense of pity' for the prisoners; and the war criminals themselves who called for their own
release as part of an anti-war peace movement. The movement that arose out of 'a sense of pity'
demanded 'just set them free (tonikaku shakuho o) regardless of how it is done'.
On September 4, 1952, President Truman issued Executive Order 10393, establishing a

Clemency and Parole Board for War Criminals to advise the President with respect to
recommendations by the Government of Japan for clemency, reduction of sentence, or parole,
with respect to sentences imposed on Japanese war criminals by military tribunals.
On May 26, 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles rejected a proposed amnesty for the
imprisoned war criminals but instead agreed to "change the ground rules" by reducing the period
required for eligibility for parole from 15 years to 10.
By the end of 1958, all Japanese war criminals, including A-, B- and C-class were released from
prison and politically rehabilitated. Hashimoto Kingorô, Hata Shunroku, Minami Jirô, and Oka
Takazumi were all released on parole in 1954. Araki Sadao, Hiranuma Kiichirô, Hoshino Naoki,
Kaya Okinori, Kido Kôichi, Ôshima Hiroshi, Shimada Shigetarô, and Suzuki Teiichi were
released on parole in 1955. Satô Kenryô, whom many, including Judge B. V. A. Röling regarded
as one of the convicted war criminals least deserving of imprisonment, was not granted parole
until March 1956, the last of the Class A Japanese war criminals to be released. On April 7,
1957, the Japanese government announced that, with the concurrence of a majority of the powers
represented on the tribunal, the last ten major Japanese war criminals who had previously been
paroled were granted clemency and were to be regarded henceforth as unconditionally free from
the terms of their parole.
Official apologies
The Japanese government considers that the legal and moral positions in regard to war crimes are
separate. Therefore, while maintaining that Japan violated no international law or treaties, Japa-
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nese governments have officially recognised the suffering which the Japanese military caused,
and numerous apologies have been issued by the Japanese government. For example, Prime
Minister Tomiichi Murayama, in August 1995, stated that Japan "through its colonial rule and
aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, parti-
cularly to those of Asian nations", and he expressed his "feelings of deep remorse" and stated his
"heartfelt apology". Also, on September 29, 1972, Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka
stated: "[t]he Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that
Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself."
However, the official apologies are widely viewed as inadequate or only a symbolic exchange by
many of the survivors of such crimes or the families of dead victims. On October 2006, while
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed an apology for the damage caused by its colonial rule and
aggression, more than 80 Japanese lawmakers from his ruling party LDP paid visits to the
Yasukuni Shrine. Many people aggrieved by Japanese war crimes also maintain that no apology
has been issued for particular acts or that the Japanese government has merely expressed "regret"
or "remorse". On 2 March 2007, the issue was raised again by Japanese prime minister Shinzo
Abe, in which he denied that the military had forced women into sexual slavery during World
War II. He stated, "The fact is, there is no evidence to prove there was coercion." Before he
spoke, a group of Liberal Democratic Party lawmakers also sought to revise Yohei Kono's 1993
apology to former comfort women. However, this provoked negative reaction from Asian and
Western countries.
On 31 October 2008, the chief of staff of Japan's Air Self-Defense Force Toshio Tamogami was
dismissed with a 60 million yen allowance due to an essay he published, arguing that Japan was
not an aggressor during World War II, that the war brought prosperity to China, Taiwan and
Korea, that the Imperial Japanese Army's conduct was not violent and that the Greater East Asia
War is viewed in a positive way by many Asian countries and criticizing the war crimes trials
which followed the war. On 11 November, Tamogami added before the Diet that the personal
apology made in 1995 by former prime minister Tomiichi Murayama was "a tool to suppress free
speech".
Some in Japan have asserted that what is being demanded is that the Japanese Prime Minister or
the Emperor perform dogeza, in which an individual kneels and bows his head to the ground—a
high form of apology in East Asian societies that Japan appears unwilling to do. Some point to
an act by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, who knelt at a monument to the Jewish victims
of the Warsaw Ghetto, in 1970, as an example of a powerful and effective act of apology and
reconciliation similar to dogeza, although not everyone agrees.
Citing Brandt's action as an example, John Borneman, associate professor of anthropology at

Cornell, states that, "an apology represents a non-material or purely symbolic exchange whereby
the wrongdoer voluntarily lowers his own status as a person." Borneman further states that once
this type of apology is given, the injured party must forgive and seek reconciliation, or else the
apology won't have any effect. The injured party may reject the apology for several reasons, one
of which is to prevent reconciliation, because, "By keeping the memory of the wound alive,
refusals prevent an affirmation of mutual humanity by instrumentalizing the power embedded in
the status of a permanent victim."
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Therefore, some argue that a nation's reluctance to accept the conciliatory gestures that Japan has
made may be because that nation doesn't think that Japan has "lowered" itself enough to provide
a sincere apology. On the other hand, others state their belief that that particular nation is
choosing to reject reconciliation in pursuit of permanent "victimhood" status as a way to try to
assert power over Japan.
On 13 September 2010, Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada met in Tokyo with six former
American POWs of the Japanese and apologized for their treatment during World War II. Said
Okada, "You have all been through hardships during World War II, being taken prisoner by the
Japanese military, and suffered extremely inhumane treatment. On behalf of the Japanese
government and as the foreign minister, I would like to offer you my heartfelt apology."
Compensation
There is a widespread perception that the Japanese government has not accepted the legal
responsibility for compensation and, as a direct consequence of this denial, it has failed to
compensate the individual victims of Japanese atrocities. In particular, a number of prominent
human rights and women's rights organisations insist that Japan still has a moral or legal
responsibility to compensate individual victims, especially the sex slaves conscripted by the
Japanese military in occupied countries and known as comfort women.
The Japanese government officially accepted the requirement for monetary compensation to
victims of war crimes, as specified by the Potsdam Declaration. The details of this compensation
have been left to bilateral treaties with individual countries, except North Korea, because Japan
recognises South Korea as the sole legitimate government of the Korean peninsula. In the Asian
countries involved, claims to compensation were either abandoned by their respective countries,
or were paid out by Japan under the specific understanding that it was to be used for individual
compensation. However, in some cases such as with South Korea, the compensation was not
paid out to victims by their governments, instead being used for civic projects and other works.
Due to this, large numbers of individual victims in Asia received no compensation.
Therefore, the Japanese government's position is that the proper avenues for further claims are
the governments of the respective claimants. As a result, every individual compensation claim
brought to Japanese court has failed. Such was the case in regard to a British POW who was
unsuccessful in an attempt to sue the Japanese government for additional money for com-
pensation. As a result, the UK Government later paid additional compensation to all British
POWs. There were complaints in Japan that the international media simply stated that the former
POW was demanding compensation and failed to clarify that he was seeking further
compensation, in addition to that paid previously by the Japanese government.
A small number of claims have also been brought in US courts, though these have also been
rejected.
During the treaty negotiation with South Korea, the Japanese government proposed that it pay
monetary compensation to individual Korean victims, in line with the payments to western
POWs. The Korean government instead insisted that Japan pay money collectively to the Korean
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government, and that is what occurred. The South Korean government then used the funds for
economic development. The content of the negotiations was not released by the Korean
government until 2004, although it was public knowledge in Japan. Due to the release of the
information by the Korean government, a number of claimants have stepped forward and are
attempting to sue the government for individual compensation of victims.
There are those that insist that because the governments of China and Taiwan abandoned their
claims for monetary compensation, then the moral or legal responsibility for compensation
belongs with these governments. Such critics also point out that even though these governments
abandoned their claims, they signed treaties that recognised the transfer of Japanese colonial
assets to the respective governments. Therefore, to claim that these governments received no
compensation from Japan is incorrect, and they could have compensated individual victims from
the proceeds of such transfers. However, others dispute that Japanese colonial assets in large
proportion were built or stolen with extortion or force in occupied countries, as was clearly the
case with artworks collected (or stolen) by Nazis during World War II throughout Europe.
The Japanese government, while admitting no legal responsibility for the so-called "comfort
women", set up the Asian Women's Fund in 1995, which gives money to people who claim to
have been forced into prostitution during the war. Though the organisation was established by
the government, legally, it has been created such that it is an independent charity. The activities
of the fund have been controversial in Japan, as well as with international organisations sup-
porting the women concerned. Some argue that such a fund is part of an ongoing refusal by the
Japanese government to face up to its responsibilities, while others say that the Japanese govern-
ment has long since finalised its responsibility to individual victims and is merely correcting the
failures of the victims' own governments. California Congressman Mike Honda, speaking before
U.S. House of Representatives on behalf of the women, said that "without a sincere and
unequivocal apology from the government of Japan, the majority of surviving Comfort Women
refused to accept these funds. In fact, as you will hear today, many Comfort Women returned the
Prime Minister's letter of apology accompanying the monetary compensation, saying they felt the
apology was artificial and disingenuous."
Intermediate compensation
The term "intermediate compensation" (or intermediary compensation) was applied to the
removal and reallocation of Japanese industrial (particularly military-industrial) assets to Allied
countries. It was conducted under the supervision of Allied occupation forces. This reallocation
was referred to as "intermediate" because it did not amount to a final settlement by means of
bilateral treaties, which settled all existing issues of compensation. By 1950, the assets
reallocated amounted to 43,918 items of machinery, valued at ¥165,158,839 (in 1950 prices).
The proportions in which the assets were distributed were: China, 54.1%; the Netherlands,
11.5%; the Philippines 19%, and; the United Kingdom, 15.4%.
Compensation under the San Francisco Treaty
Compensation from Japanese overseas assets
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Japanese overseas assets refers to all assets owned by the Japanese government, firms,
organisation and private citizens, in colonised or occupied countries. In accordance with Clause
14 of the San Francisco Treaty, Allied forces confiscated all Japanese overseas assets, except
those in China, which were dealt with under Clause 21. It is considered that Korea was also
entitled to the rights provided by Clause 21.
Japanese overseas assets in 1945
Country/region Value (1945, ¥15=US$1)
Korea 70,256,000,000
Taiwan 42,542,000,000
North East China 146,532,000,000
North China 55,437,000,000
Central South China 36,718,000,000
Others 28,014,000,000
Total ¥379,499,000,000
Compensation to Allied POWs
Clause 16 of the San Francisco Treaty stated that Japan would transfer its assets and those of its
citizens in countries which were at war with any of the Allied Powers or which were neutral, or
equivalents, to the Red Cross, which would sell them and distribute the funds to former prisoners
of war and their families. Accordingly, the Japanese government and private citizens paid out
£4,500,000 to the Red Cross.
According to historian Linda Goetz Holmes, many funds used by the government of Japan were
not Japanese funds but relief funds contributed by the governments of USA, UK and Netherlands
and sequestred in the Yokohama Specie Bank during the final year of the war.
Allied territories occupied by Japan
Clause 14 of the treaty stated that Japan would enter into negotiations with Allied powers whose
territories were occupied by Japan and suffered damage by Japanese forces, with a view to Japan
compensating those countries for the damage.
Accordingly, the Philippines and South Vietnam received compensation in 1956 and 1959
respectively. Burma and Indonesia were not original signatories, but they later signed bilateral
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treaties in accordance with clause 14 of the San Francisco Treaty.
Japanese compensation to countries occupied during 1941-45
Country Amount in Yen Amount in US$ Date of treaty
Burma 72,000,000,000 200,000,000 November 5, 1955
Philippines 198,000,000,000 550,000,000 May 9, 1956
Indonesia 80,388,000,000 223,080,000 January 20, 1958
Vietnam 14,400,000,000 38,000,000 May 13, 1959
Total ¥364,348,800,000 US$1,012,080,000
The last payment was made to the Philippines on July 22, 1976.
Debate in Japan
Until the 1970s, Japanese war crimes were considered a fringe topic in the media. In the
Japanese media, the opinions of the political centre and left tend to dominate the editorials of
newspapers, while the right tend to dominate magazines. Debates regarding war crimes were
confined largely to the editorials of tabloid magazines where calls for the overthrow of
"Imperialist America" and revived veneration of the Emperor coexisted with pornography. In
1972, to commemorate the normalisation of relationship with China, Asahi Shimbun, a major
liberal newspaper, ran a series on Japanese war crimes in China including the Nanking Massacre.
This opened the floodgates to debates which have continued ever since. The 1990s are generally
considered to be the period in which such issues become truly mainstream, and incidents such as
the Nanking Massacre, Yasukuni Shrine, comfort women, the accuracy of school history
textbooks, and the validity of the Tokyo Trials were debated, even on television.
As the consensus of Japanese jurists is that Japanese forces did not technically commit violations
of international law, many right wing elements in Japan have taken this to mean that war crimes
trials were examples of victor's justice. They see those convicted of war crimes as "Martyrs of
Shōwa" (昭和殉難者 Shōwa Junnansha?), Shōwa being the name given to the rule of Hirohito.
This interpretation is vigorously contested by Japanese peace groups and the political left. In the
past, these groups have tended to argue that the trials hold some validity, either under the Geneva
Convention (even though Japan hadn't signed it), or under an undefined concept of international
law or consensus. Alternatively, they have argued that, although the trials may not have been
technically valid, they were still just, somewhat in line with popular opinion in the West and in
the rest of Asia.
WT
By the early 21st century, the revived interest in Japan's imperial past had brought new
interpretations from a group which has been labelled both "new right" and "new left". This group
points out that many acts committed by Japanese forces, including the Nanjing Incident (they
generally do not use the word "massacre"), were violations of the Japanese military code. It is
suggested that had war crimes tribunals been conducted by the post-war Japanese government, in
strict accordance with Japanese military law, many of those who were accused would still have
been convicted and executed. Therefore, the moral and legal failures in question were the fault of
the Japanese military and the government, for not executing their constitutionally-defined duty.
The new right/new left also takes the view that the Allies committed no war crimes against
Japan, because Japan was not a signatory to the Geneva Convention, and as a victors, the Allies
had every right to demand some form of retribution, to which Japan consented in various treaties.
However, under the same logic, the new right/new left considers the killing of Chinese who were
suspected of guerilla activity to be perfectly legal and valid, including some of those killed at
Nanjing, for example. They also take the view that many Chinese civilian casualties resulted
from the scorched earth tactics of the Chinese nationalists. Though such tactics are arguably
legal, the new right/new left takes the position that some of the civilian deaths caused by these
scorched earth tactics are wrongly attributed to the Japanese military.
Similarly, they take the position that those who have attempted to sue the Japanese government
for compensation have no legal or moral case.
The new right/new left also takes a less sympathetic view of Korean claims of victimhood,
because prior to annexation by Japan, Korea was a tributary of the Qing Dynasty and, according
to them, the Japanese colonisation, though undoubtedly harsh, was "better" than the previous rule
in terms of human rights and economic development.
They also argue that, the Kantōgun (also known as the Kwantung Army) was at least partly
culpable. Although the Kantōgun was nominally subordinate to the Japanese high command at
the time, its leadership demonstrated significant self-determination, as shown by its involvement
in the plot to assassinate Zhang Zuolin in 1928, and the Manchurian Incident of 1931, which led
to the foundation of Manchukuo in 1932. Moreover, at that time, it was the official policy of the
Japanese high command to confine the conflict to Manchuria. But in defiance of the high
command, the Kantōgun invaded China proper, under the pretext of the Marco Polo Bridge
Incident. However, the Japanese government not only failed to court martial the officers
responsible for these incidents, but it also accepted the war against China, and many of those
who were involved were even promoted. (Some of the officers involved in the Nanking
Massacre were also promoted.)
Whether or not Hirohito himself bears any responsibility for such failures is a sticking point
between the new right and new left. Officially, the imperial constitution, adopted under Emperor
Meiji, gave full powers to the Emperor. Article 4 prescribed that "The Emperor is the head of the
Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the
provisions of the present Constitution" and article 11 prescribed that "The Emperor has the
supreme command of the Army and the Navy".
WT
For historian Akira Fujiwara, the thesis that the emperor as an organ of responsibility could not
reverse cabinet decisions is a myth (shinwa) fabricated after the war. Others argue that Hirohito
deliberately styled his rule in the manner of the British constitutional monarchy, and he always
accepted the decisions and consenses reached by the high command. According to this position,
the moral and political failure rests primarily with the Japanese High Command and the Cabinet,
most of whom were later convicted at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal as class-A war criminals,
apart all members of the imperial family such as prince Chichibu, prince Yasuhiko Asaka, prince
Higashikuni, prince Hiroyasu Fushimi and prince Takeda.
Controversial reinterpretations outside Japan
Some activists outside Japan are also attempting controversial reinterpretations of Japanese
imperialism. For example, the views of a South Korean ex-military officer and right wing
commentator, Ji Man-Won, have caused controversy in Korea and further abroad. Ji has praised
Japan for "modernising" Korea, and has said of women forced to become sex slaves: "most of
the old women claiming to be former comfort women, or sex slaves to the Japanese military
during World War II, are fakes."
Later investigations
As with investigations of Nazi war criminals, official investigations and inquiries are still
ongoing. During the 1990s, the South Korean government started investigating some individuals
who had allegedly become wealthy while collaborating with the Japanese military. In South
Korea, it is also alleged that, during the political climate of the Cold War, many such individuals
or their associates or relatives were able to acquire influence with the wealth they had acquired
collaborating with the Japanese and assisted in the covering-up, or non-investigation, of war
crimes in order not to incriminate themselves. With the wealth they had amassed during the years
of collaboration, they were able to further benefit their families by obtaining higher education for
their relatives.
Non-government bodies and individuals have also undertaken their own investigations. For
example, in 2005, a South Korean freelance journalist, Jung Soo-woong, located in Japan some
descendants of people involved in the 1895 assassination of Empress Myeongseong (Queen
Min), the last Empress of Korea. The assassination was conducted by the Dark Ocean Society,
perhaps under the auspices of the Japanese government, because of the Empress's involvement in
attempts to reduce Japanese influence in Korea. Jung recorded the apologies of the individuals.
As these investigations continue more evidence is discovered each day. It has been claimed that
the Japanese government intentionally destroyed the reports on Korean comfort women. Some
have cited Japanese inventory logs and employee sheets on the battlefield as evidence for this
claim. For example, one of the names on the list was of a comfort woman who stated she was
forced to be a prostitute by the Japanese. She was classified as a nurse along with at least a dozen
other verified comfort women who were not nurses or secretaries. Currently, the South Korean
government is looking into the hundreds of other names on these lists.
WT
Sensitive information regarding the Japanese occupation of Korea is often difficult to obtain.
Many argue that this is because the Government of Japan has gone out of its way to cover up
many incidents that would otherwise lead to severe international criticism. On their part, Koreans
have often expressed their abhorrence of Human experimentations carried out by the Imperial
Japanese Army where people often became fodder as human test subjects in such macabre
experiments as liquid nitrogen tests or biological weapons development programs. Though some
vivid and disturbing testimonies have survived, they are largely denied by the Japanese
Government even to this day.
Today cover-ups by Japan and other countries such as Britain are slowly exposed as more
thorough investigations are conducted. The reason for the cover-up was because the British
ministers wanted to end the war crimes trial early in order to maintain good relations with Japan
to prevent the spread of communism.
Tamaki Matsuoka's documentary "Torn Memories of Nanjing" includes interviews with Japanese
veterans who admit to raping and killing Chinese civilians.
Chapter 5
Introduction to Attack on Pearl Harbor
WT
Photograph from a Japanese plane of Battleship Row at the beginning of the attack. The explosion in the
center is a torpedo strike on the USS Oklahoma
The attack on Pearl Harbor (called the Hawaii Operation or Operation Z by the Japanese
Imperial General Headquarters, and the Battle of Pearl Harbor by some Americans) was a
surprise military strike conducted by the Imperial Japanese Navy against the United States naval
base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on the morning of December 7, 1941. The next day the United
States declared war on Japan resulting in their entry into
WT
A Japanese Mitsubishi A6M2 "Zero" fighter airplane of the second wave takes off from the
aircraft carrier Akagi on the morning of December 7, 1941.
World War II. The attack was intended as a preventive action in order to keep the U.S. Pacific
Fleet from influencing the war that the Empire of Japan was planning in Southeast Asia, against
Britain and the Netherlands, as well as the U.S. in the Philippines. The base was attacked by
Japanese aircraft (a total of 353, in two waves) launched from six aircraft carriers.
WT
Zeroes of the second wave preparing to take off from Shokaku for Pearl Harbor
Four U.S. Navy battleships were sunk (two of which were raised and returned to service later in
the war) and all of the four other battleships present were damaged. The Japanese also sank or
damaged three cruisers, three destroyers, an anti-aircraft training ship and one minelayer. 188
U.S. aircraft were destroyed, 2,402 personnel were killed and 1,282 were wounded. The power
station, shipyard, maintenance, and fuel and torpedo storage facilities, as well as the submarine
piers and headquarters building (also home of the intelligence section) were not attacked.
Japanese losses were light, with 29 aircraft and five midget submarines lost, and 65 servicemen
killed or wounded. One Japanese sailor was captured.
WT
A Japanese Nakajima B5N2 "Kate" torpedo bomber takes off from Shokaku.
The attack was a major engagement of World War II and came as a profound shock to the
American people. Domestic support for isolationism, which had been strong, disappeared.
Germany's ill-considered declaration of war on the U.S., which was not required by any treaty
commitment, moved the U.S. from clandestine support of Britain (for example the Neutrality
Patrol) into active alliance and full participation in the European Theater. Despite numerous
historical precedents for unannounced military action, the lack of any formal warning by Japan,
particularly while negotiations were still apparently ongoing, led to President Franklin D.
Roosevelt proclaiming December 7 "a date which will live in infamy".
Background to conflict
Anticipating war
The naval strike was intended to neutralize the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and hence protect Japan's
advance into Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, where Japan sought access to natural resources
such as oil and rubber. Both the U.S. and Japan held long-standing contingency plans for war in
the Pacific which were continuously updated as tensions between the two countries steadily
increased during the 1930s, with the Japanese expanding into Manchuria and mainland China.
Japan spent considerable effort trying to isolate China and achieve sufficient resource
independence to attain victory on the mainland; the "Southern Operation" was designed to assist
these efforts.
WT
Japanese Aichi D3A1 "Val" dive bombers of the second wave preparing for take off. Aircraft
carrier Soryu in the background.
In 1940, following Japan's invasion of French Indochina and under the authority granted by the
Export Control Act, the United States halted shipments of airplanes, parts, machine tools, and
aviation gasoline, which was perceived by Japan as an unfriendly act.[ The U.S. did not stop oil
exports to Japan at that time in part because prevailing sentiment in Washington was that such an
action would be an extreme step, given Japanese dependence on U.S. oil, and likely to be
considered a provocation by Japan.
WT Battleship USS California sinking
Japanese planning staff studied the 1940 British attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto intensively.
It was of great use to them when planning their attack on U.S. naval forces in Pearl Harbor.
Following Japanese expansion into French Indochina after the fall of France, the U.S. ceased oil
exports to Japan in July 1941, in part because of new American restrictions on domestic oil
consumption. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had earlier moved the Pacific Fleet to Hawaii and
ordered a military buildup in the Philippines in the hope of discouraging Japanese aggression in
the Far East. Because the Japanese high command was (mistakenly) certain any attack on the
British Southeast Asian colonies would bring the U.S. into the war, a devastating preventive
strike appeared to be the only way to avoid U.S. naval interference. An invasion of the
Philippines was also
WT Battleship USS Arizona explodes
WT
Destroyer USS Shaw exploding after her forward magazine was detonated
considered to be necessary by Japanese war planners. The U.S. War Plan Orange had envisioned
defending the Philippines with a 40,000 man elite force. However, this was opposed by Douglas
MacArthur, who felt that he would need a force ten times that size, and was never implemented.
By 1941, U.S. planners anticipated abandonment of the Philippines at the outbreak of war and
orders to that effect were given in late 1941 to Admiral Thomas Hart, commander of the Asiatic
Fleet.
WT
Battleship USS Nevada attempting to escape from the harbor
War between Japan and the United States had been a possibility each nation had been aware of
(and developed contingency plans for) since the 1920s, though tensions did not begin to grow
seriously until Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria. Over the next decade, Japan continued to
expand into China, leading to all-out war in 1937. In 1940, Japan invaded French Indochina in an
effort to control supplies reaching China, and as a first step to improve her access to resources in
Southeast Asia. This move prompted an American embargo on oil exports to Japan, which in
turn caused the Japanese to initiate their planned takeover of oil production in the Dutch East
Indies. Furthermore, the transfer of the U.S. Pacific Fleet from its previous base in San Diego to
its new base in Pearl Harbor was seen by the Japanese military as a preparation for conflict.
WT Pearl Harbor on October 30, 1941
Preliminary planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor to protect the move into the "Southern
Resource Area" (the Japanese term for the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia generally) had
begun very early in 1941 under the auspices of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, then commanding
Japan's Combined Fleet. He won assent to formal planning and training for an attack from the
Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff only after much contention with Naval Headquarters,
including a threat to resign his command. Full-scale planning was underway by early spring
1941, primarily by Captain Minoru Genda. Over the next several months, pilots trained, equip-
ment was adapted, and intelligence collected. Despite these preparations, the attack plan was not
approved by Emperor Hirohito until November 5, after the third of four Imperial Conferences
called to consider the matter. Final authorization was not given by the emperor until December 1,
after a majority of Japanese leaders advised him the
WT
Battleship USS West Virginia took two aerial bombs, both duds, and seven torpedo hits, one of
which may have come from a midget submarine.
"Hull Note" would "destroy the fruits of the China incident, endanger Manchukuo and under-
mine Japanese control of Korea." Though by late 1941 many observers believed that hostilities
between the U.S. and Japan were imminent, and U.S. Pacific bases and facilities had been placed
on alert on multiple occasions, U.S. officials doubted Pearl Harbor would be the first target.
They expected the Philippines to be attacked first, due to the threat bases there would pose to sea
lanes, hence supplies to and from territory to the south, which were Japan's main objective. They
also believed (wrongly) that Japan was not capable of mounting more than one major naval
operation at a time.
Objectives
The attack had several major aims. First, it intended to destroy important American fleet units,
thereby preventing the Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japanese conquest of the Dutch East
Indies and Malaya. Second, it was hoped to buy time for Japan to consolidate its position and
increase its naval strength before shipbuilding authorized by the 1940 Vinson-Walsh Act erased
any chance of victory. Finally, it was meant to deliver a severe blow to American morale, one
which would discourage Americans from committing to a war extending into the western Pacific
Ocean and Dutch East Indies. To maximize the effect on morale, battleships were chosen as the
main targets, since they were the prestige ships of any navy at the time. The overall intention was
to enable Japan to conquer Southeast Asia without interference.
WT A destroyed B-17 after the attack on Hickam Field
Striking the Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor carried two distinct disadvantages: the
targeted ships would be in very shallow water, so it would be relatively easy to salvage and
possibly repair them; and most of the crews would survive the attack, since many would be on
shore leave or would be rescued from the harbor. A further important disadvantage—this of
timing, and known to the Japanese—was the absence from Pearl Harbor of all three of the U.S.
Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers (Enterprise, Lexington, and Saratoga). Ironically, the IJN top
command was so imbued with Admiral Mahan's "decisive battle" doctrine—especially that of
destroying the maximum number of battleships—that, despite these concerns, Yamamoto
decided to press ahead.
WT
Japanese confidence in their ability to achieve a short, victorious war also meant other targets in
the harbor, especially the navy yard, oil tank farms, and submarine base, could safely be ignored,
since—by their thinking—the war would be over before the influence of these facilities would be
felt.
Approach and attack
WT Route followed by the Japanese fleet to Pearl Harbor and back
On November 26, 1941, a Japanese task force (the Striking Force) of six aircraft carriers (Akagi,
Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku) departed northern Japan en route to a position to
northwest of Hawaii, intending to launch its aircraft to attack Pearl Harbor. In all, 408 aircraft
were intended to be used: 360 for the two attack waves, 48 on defensive combat air patrol
(CAP), including nine fighters from the first wave.
The first wave was to be the primary attack, while the second wave was to finish whatever tasks
remained. The first wave contained the bulk of the weapons to attack capital ships, mainly
specially adapted Type 91 aerial torpedoes which were designed with an anti-roll mechanism and
a rudder extension that let them operate in shallow water. The aircrews were ordered to select the
highest value targets (battleships and aircraft carriers) or, if either were not present, any other
high value ships (cruisers and destroyers). Dive bombers were to attack ground targets. Fighters
were ordered to strafe and destroy as many parked aircraft as possible to ensure they did not get
into the air to counterattack the bombers, especially in the first wave. When the fighters' fuel got
low they were to refuel at the aircraft carriers and return to combat. Fighters were to serve CAP
duties where needed, especially over US airfields.
WT Hangar in Ford Island burns
Before the attack commenced, two reconnaissance aircraft launched from cruisers were sent to
scout over Oahu and report on enemy fleet composition and location. Another four scout planes
patrolled the area between the Japanese carrier force (the Kido Butai) and Niihau, in order to
prevent the task force from being caught by a surprise counterattack.
Submarines
Fleet submarines I-16, I-18, I-20, I-22, and I-24 each embarked a Type A midget submarine for
transport to the waters off Oahu. The five I-boats left Kure Naval District on November 25,
1941, coming to 10 nm (19 km) off the mouth of Pearl Harbor and launched their charges, at
about 01:00 December 7. At 03:42 Hawaiian Time, the minesweeper USS Condor spotted a
midget submarine periscope southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy and alerted the
destroyer USS Ward. The midget may have entered Pearl Harbor. However; Ward sank another
midget submarine at 06:37 in the first American shots fired in World War II. A midget on the
north side of Ford Island missed the seaplane tender Curtiss with her first torpedo and missed the
attacking destroyer Monaghan with her other one before being sunk by Monaghan at 08:43.
WT
A third midget submarine grounded twice, once outside the harbor entrance and again on the east
side of Oahu, where it was captured on December 8. Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki swam ashore and
was captured, becoming the first Japanese prisoner of war. A fourth had been damaged by a
depth charge attack and was abandoned by its crew before it could fire its torpedoes. A United
States Naval Institute analysis of photographs from the attack conducted in 1999 indicated a
midget may have successfully fired a torpedo into USS West Virginia. Japanese forces received a
radio message from a midget submarine at 00:41 December 8 claiming damage to one or more
large war vessels inside Pearl Harbor. The submarine's final disposition has been unknown, but
she did not return to her "mother" sub. On December 7, 2009 the Los Angeles Times reported
that
WT
Aftermath: USS West Virginia (severely damaged), USS Tennessee (damaged), and the USS
Arizona (sunk).
there is circumstantial evidence that three pieces of a submarine discovered three miles south of
Pearl Harbor between 1994 and 2001 could be that of the missing submarine. The publication
also reported that there is strong circumstantial evidence that the submarine fired two torpedoes
at Battleship Row. The debris was dumped outside the harbor as part of an effort to conceal the
West Loch Disaster, a 1944 ammunition explosion that destroyed six tank landing ships
preparing for the secret invasion of Saipan.
Japanese declaration of war
The attack took place before any formal declaration of war was made by Japan, but this was not
Admiral Yamamoto's intention. He originally stipulated that the attack should not commence
until thirty minutes after Japan had informed the United States that peace negotiations were at an
end. The Japanese tried to uphold the conventions of war while still achieving surprise, but the
attack began before the notice could be delivered. Tokyo transmitted the 5,000-word notification
(commonly called the "14-Part Message") in two blocks to the Japanese Embassy in Washington,
but transcribing the message took too long for the Japanese Ambassador to deliver it in time. (In
fact, U.S. code breakers had already deciphered and translated most of the message hours before
he was scheduled to deliver it.) The final part of the "14-Part Message" is sometimes described
as a declaration of war, but in fact it "neither declared war nor severed diplomatic relations". A
declaration of war was printed on the front page of Japan's newspapers in the evening edition of
December 8, but not delivered to the U.S. government until the day after the attack.
WT
For decades, conventional wisdom held that Japan attacked without any official warning of a
break in relations only because of accidents and bumbling that delayed the delivery of a
document to Washington hinting at war. In 1999, however, Takeo Iguchi, a professor of law and
international relations at the International Christian University in Tokyo, discovered documents
that pointed to a vigorous debate inside the government over how, indeed whether, to notify
Washington of Japan's intention to break off negotiations and start a war, including a December
7 entry in the war diary saying, "our deceptive diplomacy is steadily proceeding toward success."
Of this, Iguchi said, "The diary shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper
declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of negotiations ... [a]nd they
clearly prevailed."
First wave composition
WT
The Japanese attacked in two waves. The first wave was detected by U.S. Army radar at 136 nautical
miles (252 km), but was misidentified as USAAF bombers arriving from mainland U.S.A.
Top:
A. Ford Island NAS B. Hickam Field C. Bellows Field D. Wheeler Field
E. Kaneohe NAS F. Ewa MCAS R-1. Opana Radar Station R-2. Kawailoa RS R-3. Kaaawa RS
G. Haleiwa H. Kahuku I. Wahiawa J. Kaneohe K. Honolulu
0. B-17s from mainland 1. First strike group 1-1. Level bombers 1-2. Torpedo bombers 1-3. Dive bombers
2. Second strike group 2-1. Level bombers 2-1F. Fighters 2-2. Dive bombers
Bottom:
A. Wake Island B. Midway Islands C. Johnston Island D. Hawaii
D-1. Oahu 1. USS Lexington 2. USS Enterprise 3. First Air Fleet
WT
<21 feet (6.4 m) 22–23 feet (6.7–7.0 m) 29 feet (8.8 m) 30–32 feet (9.1–9.8 m) 33–34
feet (10.1–10.4 m) 34–35 feet (10.4–10.7 m) 36–37 feet (11.0–11.3 m) 38–39 feet (11.6–11.9
m) 40–41 feet (12.2–12.5 m) 42–48 feet (12.8–14.6 m) >49 feet (14.9 m) City Army base
Navy base Attacked targets:
1: USS California
2: USS Maryland
3: USS Oklahoma
4: USS Tennessee
5: USS West Virginia
6: USS Arizona
7: USS Nevada
8: USS Pennsylvania
9: Ford Island NAS
10: Hickam field
Ignored infrastructure targets:
A: Oil storage tanks
B:CINCPAC headquarters building
C: Submarine base
D: Navy Yard
The first attack wave of 183 planes was launched north of Oahu, commanded by Captain Mitsuo
Fuchida. It included:
WT
• 1st Group (targets: battleships and aircraft carriers)
o 50 Nakajima B5N bombers armed with 800 kg (1760 lb) armor piercing bombs, orga-
nized in four sections
o 40 B5N bombers armed with Type 91 torpedoes, also in four sections
• 2nd Group — (targets: Ford Island and Wheeler Field)
o 54 Aichi D3A dive bombers armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general purpose bombs
• 3rd Group — (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber’s Point,
Kaneohe)
o 45 Mitsubishi A6M fighters for air control and strafing
Six planes failed to launch due to technical difficulties.
A destroyed Vindicator at Ewa field, the victim of one of the smaller attacks on the approach to Pearl
Harbor
As the first wave approached Oahu a U.S. Army SCR-270 radar at Opana Point near the island's
northern tip (a post not yet operational, having been in training mode for months) detected them
and called in a warning. Although the operators, Privates George Elliot Jr. and Joseph Lockard,
reported a target, a newly-assigned officer at the thinly manned Intercept Center, Lieutenant
Kermit A. Tyler, presumed the scheduled arrival of six B-17 bombers was the source. The
direction from which the aircraft were coming was close (only a few degrees separated the two
inbound courses), while the operators had never seen a formation as large on radar; they
neglected to tell Tyler of its size, while Tyler, for security reasons, could not tell them the B-17s
were due (even though it was widely known).
Several U.S. aircraft were shot down as the first wave approached land, and one at least radioed a
somewhat incoherent warning. Other warnings from ships off the harbor entrance were still
being processed or awaiting confirmation when the attacking planes began bombing and strafing.
Nevertheless it is not clear any warnings would have had much effect even if they had been
interpreted correctly and much more promptly. The results the Japanese achieved in the
WT
Philippines were essentially the same as at Pearl Harbor, though MacArthur had almost nine
hours warning that the Japanese had already attacked at Pearl and specific orders to commence
operations before they actually struck his command.
The air portion of the attack on Pearl Harbor began at 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian Time (3:18 a.m.
December 8 Japanese Standard Time, as kept by ships of the Kido Butai), with the attack on
Kaneohe. A total of 353 Japanese planes in two waves reached Oahu. Slow, vulnerable torpedo
bombers led the first wave, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important
ships present (the battleships), while dive bombers attacked U.S. air bases across Oahu, starting
with Hickam Field, the largest, and Wheeler Field, the main U.S. Army Air Force fighter base.
The 171 planes in the second wave attacked the Air Corps' Bellows Field near Kaneohe on the
windward side of the island, and Ford Island. The only aerial opposition came from a handful of
P-36 Hawks, P-40 Warhawks and some SBD Dauntless dive bombers from the carrier USS
Enterprise.
Men aboard U.S. ships awoke to the sounds of alarms, bombs exploding, and gunfire, prompting
bleary-eyed men into dressing as they ran to General Quarters stations. (The famous message,
"Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not drill.", was sent from the headquarters of Patrol Wing Two,
the first senior Hawaiian command to respond.) The defenders were very unprepared.
Ammunition lockers were locked, aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip in the open to deter
sabotage, guns unmanned (none of the Navy's 5"/38s, only a quarter of its machine guns, and
only four of 31 Army batteries got in action). Despite this low alert status, many American
military personnel responded effectively during the battle. Ensign Joe Taussig, Jr., the only
commissioned officer aboard USS Nevada, got the ship underway during the attack but lost a
leg. The ship was beached in the harbor by the Senior Quartermaster. One of the destroyers, USS
WT
Aylwin, got underway with only four officers aboard, all ensigns, none with more than a year's
sea duty; she operated at sea for four days before her commanding officer managed to get back
aboard. Captain Mervyn Bennion, commanding USS West Virginia (Kimmel's flagship), led his
men until he was cut down by fragments from a bomb which hit USS Tennessee, moored
alongside.
Second wave composition
The second wave consisted of 171 planes: 54 B5Ns, 81 D3As, and 36 A6Ms, commanded by
Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki. Four planes failed to launch because of technical
difficulties. This wave and its targets comprised:
• 1st Group — 54 B5Ns armed with 550 lb (249 kg) and 132 lb (60 kg) general purpose bombs
o 27 B5Ns — aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island, and Barbers Point
o 27 B5Ns — hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field
• 2nd Group (targets: aircraft carriers and cruisers)
o 81 D3As armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general purpose bombs, in four sections
• 3rd Group — (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber’s Point,
Kaneohe)
o 36 A6Ms for defense and strafing
The second wave was divided into three groups. One was tasked to attack Kāneʻohe, the rest
Pearl Harbor proper. The separate sections arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously,
from several directions.
Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over. 2,386 Americans died (55 were civilians,
most killed by unexploded American anti-aircraft shells landing in civilian areas), a further 1,139
wounded. Eighteen ships were sunk or run aground, including five battleships.
WT USS Arizona (BB-39) during the attack
Of the American fatalities, nearly half of the total were due to the explosion of Arizona's forward
magazine after it was hit by a modified 40 cm (16 in.) shell.
Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire forward, Nevada attempted to exit the harbor. She was
targeted by many Japanese bombers as she got under way, sustaining more hits from 250 lb
(113 kg) bombs, and she was deliberately beached to avoid blocking the harbor entrance.
California was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might have kept her afloat, but
were ordered to abandon ship just as they were raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from
Arizona and West Virginia drifted down on her, and probably made the situation look worse than
it was. The disarmed target ship Utah was holed twice by torpedoes. West Virginia was hit by
seven torpedoes, the seventh tearing away her rudder. Oklahoma was hit by four torpedoes, the
last two above her belt armor, which caused her to capsize. Maryland was hit by two of the
converted 40 cm shells, but neither caused serious damage.
WT
Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest vessels present), they did not
ignore other targets. The light cruiser Helena was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast
capsized the neighboring minelayer Oglala. Two destroyers in dry dock, Cassin and Downes
were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel bunkers. The leaking fuel caught fire; flooding
the dry dock in an effort to fight fire made the burning oil rise, and both were burned out. Cassin
slipped from her keel blocks and rolled against Downes. The light cruiser Raleigh was holed by a
torpedo. The light cruiser Honolulu was damaged but remained in service. The repair vessel
Vestal, moored alongside Arizona, was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane tender
Curtiss was also damaged. The destroyer Shaw was badly damaged when two bombs penetrated
her forward magazine.
Of the 402 American aircraft in Hawaii, 188 were destroyed and 159 damaged, 155 of them on
the ground. Almost none were actually ready to take off to defend the base. Of 33 PBYs in
Hawaii, 24 were destroyed, and six others damaged beyond repair. (The three on patrol returned
undamaged.) Friendly fire brought down some U.S. planes on top of that, including five from an
inbound flight from Enterprise. Japanese attacks on barracks killed additional personnel.
Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the action, and one was captured.
Of Japan's 414 available planes, 29 were lost during the battle (nine in the first attack wave, 20 in
the second), with another 74 damaged by antiaircraft fire from the ground.
Possible third wave
Several Japanese junior officers, including Mitsuo Fuchida and Minoru Genda, the chief
architect of the attack, urged Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to destroy as much of
Pearl Harbor's fuel and torpedo storage, maintenance, and dry dock facilities as possible.
Military historians have suggested the destruction of these would have hampered the U.S. Pacific
Fleet far more seriously than loss of its battleships. If they had been wiped out, "serious [Ame-
rican] operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year"; according to
American Admiral Chester Nimitz, later Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, "it would
have prolonged the war another two years." Nagumo, however, decided to withdraw for several
reasons:
• American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and
two thirds of Japan's losses were incurred during the second wave. Nagumo felt if he launched a
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third strike, he would be risking three quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the
remaining targets (which included the facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses.
• The location of the American carriers remained unknown. In addition, the Admiral was
concerned his force was now within range of American land-based bombers. Nagumo was
uncertain whether the U.S. had enough surviving planes remaining on Hawaii to launch an
attack against his carriers.
• A third wave would have required substantial preparation and turnaround time, and would have
meant returning planes would have had to land at night. At the time, only the Royal Navy had
developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk.
• The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor
much longer, since he was at the very limits of logistical support. To do so risked running
unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home.
• He believed the second strike had essentially satisfied the main objective of his mission — the
neutralization of the Pacific Fleet — and did not wish to risk further losses. Moreover, it was
Japanese Navy practice to prefer the conservation of strength over the total destruction of the
enemy.
At a conference aboard Yamato the following morning, Yamamoto initially supported Nagumo.
In retrospect, sparing the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and oil depots meant the U.S.
could respond relatively quickly to Japanese activities in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted
Nagumo's decision to withdraw and categorically stated it had been a great mistake not to order a
third strike.
Salvage
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Captain Homer N. Wallin (center) supervises salvage operations aboard USS California, early 1942
After a systematic search for survivors, formal salvage operations began. Captain Homer N.
Wallin, Material Officer for Commander, Battle Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, was immediately
retained to lead salvage operations.
Around Pearl Harbor, divers from the Navy (shore and tenders), the Naval Shipyard, and civilian
contractors (Pacific Bridge and others) began work on the ships that could be refloated. They
patched holes, cleared debris, and pumped water out of ships. Navy divers worked inside the
damaged ships. Within six months, five battleships and two cruisers were patched or refloated so
they could be sent to shipyards in Pearl and on the mainland for extensive repair.
Intensive salvage operations continued for another year, a total of some 20,000 man–hours under
water. Oklahoma, while successfully raised, was never repaired. Arizona and the target ship Utah
were too heavily damaged for salvage, though much of their armament and equipment was
removed and put to use aboard other vessels. Today, the two hulks remain where they were sunk,
with Arizona becoming a war memorial.
Aftermath
WT
USS Pennsylvania, behind the wreckage of the USS Downes and USS Cassin
In the wake of the attack, 16 Medals of Honor, 51 Navy Crosses, 53 Silver Crosses, four Navy
and Marine Corps Medals, one Distinguished Flying Cross, four Distinguished Service Crosses,
one Distinguished Service Medal, and three Bronze Stars were awarded to the American
servicemen who distinguished themselves in combat at Pearl Harbor. Additionally, a special
military award, the Pearl Harbor Commemorative Medal, was later authorized for all military
veterans of the attack.
In Europe, Nazi Germany and the Kingdom of Italy subsequently declared war on the United
States immediately after they began operations against a fellow Axis member, with Hitler stating
in a delivered speech:
The fact that the Japanese Government, which has been negotiating for years with this man [Franklin D.
Roosevelt], has at last become tired of being mocked by him in such an unworthy way, fills us all, the
German people, and all other decent people in the world, with deep satisfaction ... Germany and Italy
have been finally compelled, in view of this, and in loyalty to the Tripartite Pact, to carry on the struggle
against the U.S.A. and England jointly and side by side with Japan for the defense and thus for the
maintenance of the liberty and independence of their nations and empires ... As a consequence of the
further extension of President Roosevelt's policy, which is aimed at unrestricted world domination and
dictatorship, the U.S.A. together with England have not hesitated from using any means to dispute the
rights of the German, Italian and Japanese nations to the basis of their natural existence ... Not only
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because we are the ally of Japan, but also because Germany and Italy have enough insight and strength
to comprehend that, in these historic times, the existence or non-existence of the nations, is being
decided perhaps forever.
Though the attack inflicted large-scale destruction on US vessels and aircraft, it did not affect
Pearl Harbor's fuel storage, maintenance, submarine, and intelligence facilities.
The attack was an initial shock to all the Allies in the Pacific Theater. Further losses
compounded the alarming setback. Three days later, the Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk
off the coast of Malaya, causing British Prime Minister Winston Churchill later to recollect "In
all the war I never received a more direct shock. As I turned and twisted in bed the full horror of
the news sank in upon me. There were no British or American capital ships in the Indian Ocean
or the Pacific except the American survivors of Pearl Harbor who were hastening back to
California. Over this vast expanse of waters Japan was supreme and we everywhere were weak
and naked".
Fortunately for the United States, the American aircraft carriers were untouched by the Japanese
attack, otherwise the Pacific Fleet's ability to conduct offensive operations would have been
crippled for a year or so (given no diversions from the Atlantic Fleet). As it was, the elimination
of the battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice but to rely on its aircraft carriers and
submarines—the very weapons with which the U.S. Navy halted and eventually reversed the
Japanese advance. Six of the eight battleships were repaired and returned to service, but their
slow speed limited their deployment, serving mainly in shore bombardment roles. A major flaw
of Japanese strategic thinking was a belief the ultimate Pacific battle would be fought by
battleships, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain Alfred Mahan. As a result, Yamamoto (and
his successors) hoarded battleships for a "decisive battle" that never happened.
Ultimately, targets not on Genda's list, such as the submarine base and the old headquarters
building, proved more important than any battleship. It was submarines that immobilized the
Imperial Japanese Navy's heavy ships and brought Japan's economy to a standstill by crippling
the transportation of oil and raw materials. Also, the basement of the Old Administration
Building was the home of the cryptanalytic unit which contributed significantly to the Midway
ambush and the Submarine Force's success.
One further consequence of the attacks on Pearl Harbor and its aftermath (notably the Niihau
Incident) was that Japanese American residents and citizens were relocated to Japanese
American internment camps. Within hours of the attack, hundreds of Japanese American leaders
were rounded up and brought to high-security camps. Later, over 110,000 Japanese Americans,
including United States citizens, were removed from their homes and transferred to internment
camps.
Strategic implications
Admiral Hara Tadaichi summed up the Japanese result by saying, "We won a great tactical
victory at Pearl Harbor and thereby lost the war." While the attack accomplished its intended
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objective, it turned out to be largely unnecessary. Unbeknownst to Yamamoto, who conceived
the original plan, the U.S. Navy had decided as far back as 1935 to abandon 'charging' across the
Pacific towards the Philippines in response to an outbreak of war (in keeping with the evolution
of Plan Orange). The U.S. instead adopted "Plan Dog" in 1940, which emphasized keeping the
IJN out of the eastern Pacific and away from the shipping lanes to Australia while the U.S.
concentrated on defeating Nazi Germany.
Controversy
Allegations have been made by historians such as Charles Beard and Charles T. Tansill and
former armed forces personnel that some members of the Roosevelt administration, including
Roosevelt himself, had advance knowledge of the attack, but purposefully ignored it in order to
gain public and Congressional support for America entering the war on the side of the Allies, or
that they deliberately exposed Pearl Harbor to attack in order to force American entry into the
war.
Chapter 6
Events Leading to the Attack on Pearl

Harbor
A series of events led to the attack on Pearl Harbor. War between Japan and the United States
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had been a possibility that each nation's military forces planned for since the 1920s, though real
tension did not begin until the 1931 invasion of Manchuria by Japan. Over the next decade,
Japan expanded slowly into China, leading to all out war between the two in 1937. In 1940 Japan
invaded French Indochina in an effort to embargo all imports into China, including war supplies
purchased from the U.S. This move prompted the United States to embargo all oil exports,
leading the Imperial Japanese Navy to estimate that it had less than two years of bunker oil
remaining and to support the existing plans to seize oil resources in the Dutch East Indies.
Planning had been underway for some time on an attack on the "Southern Resource Area" to add
it to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere that Japan envisioned in the Pacific.
The Philippine islands, at that time an American territory, were also a Japanese target. The
Japanese military concluded that an invasion of the Philippines would provoke an American
military response. Rather than seize and fortify the islands, and wait for the inevitable US
counterattack, Japan's military leaders instead decided on the pre-emptive Pearl Harbor attack,
which they assumed would negate the American forces needed for the liberation and reconquest
of the islands.
Planning for the attack had begun in very early 1941, by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. He finally
won assent from the Naval High Command by, among other things, threatening to resign. The
attack was approved in the summer at an Imperial Conference and again at a second Conference
in the fall. Simultaneously over the year, pilots were trained, and ships prepared for its execution.
Authority for the attack was granted at the second Imperial Conference if a diplomatic result
satisfactory to Japan was not reached. After final approval by Emperor Hirohito the order to
attack was issued at the beginning of December.
Background to conflict
Tensions between Japan, on the one hand, and the prominent Western countries (the United
States, France, Britain, and the Netherlands), on the other, increased significantly at the
beginning of the increasingly militaristic Showa era, as Japanese nationalists and military leaders
exerted increasing influence over government policy, adopting creation of a Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere as part of Japan's alleged "divine right" to unify Asia under Emperor
Shōwa's rule, threatening already-established American, French, British, and Dutch colonies in
Asia.
WT
Emperor Shōwa /Hirohito
Over the course of the 1930s, Japan's increasingly expansionist policies brought it into renewed
conflict with its neighbors, Russia and China (Japan had fought the First Sino-Japanese War with
China in 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War with Russia in 1904-05; Japan's imperialist
ambitions had a hand in precipitating both conflicts). In March 1933, Japan withdrew from the
League of Nations in response to international condemnation of its conquest of Manchuria and
subsequent establishment of the Manchukuo puppet government. On January 15, 1936, Japan
withdrew from the Second London Naval Disarmament Conference because the United States
and Great Britain refused to grant the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) parity with their navies. A
second full-scale war between Japan and China began with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in
July 1937.
Japan's 1937 attack on China was condemned by the U.S. and several members of the League of
Nations including Britain, France, Australia, and the Netherlands. These states had economic and
territorial interests, or formal colonies, in East and Southeast Asia; they were increasingly
alarmed at Japan's new military power and its willingness to use it, which threatened their
control in Asia. In July 1939, the U.S. terminated its 1911 commercial treaty with Japan. But
these efforts failed to deter Japan from continuing its war in China, or from signing the Tripartite
Pact in 1940 with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, officially forming the Axis Powers.
Japan would take advantage of Hitler's war in Europe to advance its ambitions in the Far East.
The Tripartite Pact guaranteed each of the signee nations assistance if attacked by any country
then considered neutral. This message pointed directly to the United States, and gave Japan more
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power on the geo-political stage. The Tripartite Pact now threatened the U.S. on both shores of
its continental span—Hitler and Mussolini on the Atlantic Ocean, and Japan on the Pacific. The
Roosevelt administration believed the American way of life would be at risk if Europe and the
Far East were to fall under military dictatorship. Roosevelt committed to help the British and the
Chinese; he loaned monies and materiel to both countries and pledged that U.S aid would be
enough to ensure their survival of war. Doing so would slowly move the United States from a
neutral country to one preparing for war.
On October 8, 1940, Admiral James O. Richardson, commander of the Pacific Fleet, provoked a
confrontation with President Roosevelt, repeating his earlier messages to Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark and to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox—that Pearl
Harbor was the wrong place for his ships. Roosevelt replied that having the fleet in Hawaii was a
"restraining influence" on Japan.
Richardson asked the president if the United States was going to war. In Richardson's account
the president responded: "At least as early as October 8, 1940, President Roosevelt believed that
affairs had reached such a state that the United States would be come involved in a war with
Japan. ... 'that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies
we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we
would enter the enter, but that they (the Japanese) could not always avoid making mistakes and
that as the war continued and that area of operations expanded sooner of later they would make a
mistake and we would enter the war.' "
In 1940, Japan moved into northern Indochina. This invasion, added to the Tripartite Pact, war
with China, increasing militarization, and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations led the
U.S. to embargo scrap metal shipments to Japan and to constrain its foreign policy actions and
close the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping. In 1941, Japan moved into southern Indochina.
The U.S. responded by freezing, on 26 July 1941, Japan's assets in the U.S. and, on 1 August
1941, embargoing all oil and gasoline exports to Japan. Oil was Japan's most crucial imported
resource; more than 80 percent of Japan's oil imports at the time came from the United States To
secure oil supplies, and other resources, Japanese planners had long been looking south,
especially the Dutch East Indies. The Navy was certain any attempt to seize this region would
bring the U.S. into the war and was reluctant to agree with other factions' plans for invasion. The
complete US oil embargo changed to the Naval view to support of expansion toward support for
an invasion of the Dutch East Indies and seizure of its oil fields.
After the embargoes and the asset freezings the Ambassador of Japan in Washington and the
secretary of State Cordell Hull held multiple meetings in order to discuss a solution to the Japan-
American problems. No solution could be agreed upon because of three key reasons: Japan's
alliance to Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy through the Tripartite Pact; Japan wanted
economic control and responsibility for southeast Asia; and Japan refused to leave mainland
China (without Manchoukuo). Feeling the economic squeeze from the U.S embargoes, Japan had
a sense of urgency, either it had to agree to Washington's demands and restore normal trade, or
use force to gain access to the resources available throughout the Pacific.
Per General Douglas MacArthur's address on May 3, 1951 to the U.S. Congress:
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You must understand that Japan had an enormous population of nearly 80 million people,
crowded into 4 islands. It was about half a farm population. The other half was engaged in
industry. Potentially the labor pool in Japan, both in quantity and quality, is as good as anything
that I have ever known. Some place down the line they have discovered what you might call the
dignity of labor, that men are happier when they are working and constructing than when they
are idling. This enormous capacity for work meant that they had to have something to work on.
They built the factories, they had the labor, but they didn't have the basic materials. There is
practically nothing indigenous to Japan except the silkworm. They lack cotton, they lack wool,
they lack petroleum products, they lack tin, they lack rubber, they lack a great many other things,
all of which was in the Asiatic basin. They feared that if those supplies were cut off, there would
be 10 to 12 million people unoccupied in Japan. Their purpose, therefore, in going to war was
largely dictated by security.
War
WT Prime Minister of Japan Hideki Tojo
In July 1941, the IJN headquarters informed Hirohito that its reserve bunker oil would be
exhausted within two years if a new source was not found. In August 1941, Japanese Prime
Minister Fumimaro Konoe proposed a summit with President Roosevelt to discuss differences.
Roosevelt replied Japan must leave China before a summit meeting could be held. On September
6, 1941, at the second Imperial Conference concerning attacks on the Western colonies in Asia
and Hawaii, Japanese leaders met to consider the attack plans prepared by Imperial General
Headquarters, one day after the emperor had reprimanded General Hajime Sugiyama, the Chief
of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) General Staff, about the lack of success in China, and the
speculated low chances of victory against the United States, British Empire, and their allies.
Prime Minister Konoe argued for more negotiations and possible concessions to avert war.
However, military leaders like Sugiyama, Minister of War General Hideki Tojo, and Chief of the
IJN General Staff Admiral Osami Nagano asserted that time had run out and that additional
negotiations would be pointless. They urged swift military actions against all American and
European colonies in Southeast Asia and Hawaii. Tojo opined yielding to the American demand
to withdraw troops would wipe out all the fruits of the Second Sino-Japanese War, depress Army
morale, endanger Manchukuo, and jeopardize control of Korea; hence, doing nothing was the
same as defeat and a loss of face.
On October 16, 1941, Konoe resigned and proposed Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, who was also
the choice of the Army and the Navy, as his successor. Hirohito choose Hideki Tojo instead,
worried (as he told Konoe) about having the Imperial House being held responsible for a war
against Western powers.
WT Prince Takamatsu
On November 3, 1941, Nagano presented a complete plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor to
Hirohito. At the Imperial Conference on 5 November, Hirohito approved the plan for a war
against the United States, Great Britain and Holland, scheduled to start at the beginning of
December if an acceptable diplomatic settlement were not achieved before then. The following
weeks, the military regime of new Prime Minister Tojo offered a final deal to the United States.
They offered to leave only Indochina, but in return for large American economic aid. On the 26th
of November, the Americans rejected the offer and demanded that in addition to them leaving
Indochina they must leave China (without Manchoukuo) and agree to an Open Door Policy in
the Far East. Japan refused.
WT Kōichi Kido
On 30 November 1941, Prince Nobuhito Takamatsu warned his brother, Hirohito, that the Navy
felt the Empire could not fight more than two years against the United States and wished to avoid
war. After consulting with Koichi Kido (who advised him to take his time until he was
convinced) and Tojo, the Emperor called Shigetaro Shimada and Nagano who reassured him war
would be successful. On December 1, Hirohito finally approved a "war against United States,
Great Britain and Holland", during another Imperial Conference, to commence with a surprise
attack on the US Pacific Fleet at its main forward base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.
Prelude to battle
Intelligence gathering
WT
Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa, a spy in Pearl Harbor for Imperial Japan
On February 3, 1940, Yamamoto briefed Captain Kanji Ogawa of Naval Intelligence on the
potential attack plan, asking him to start intelligence gathering on Pearl Harbor. Ogawa already
had spies in Hawaii, including Japanese Consular officials with an intelligence remit, and he
arranged for help from a German already living in Hawaii who was an Abwehr agent. None had
been providing much militarily useful information. He planned to add 29-year-old Ensign Takeo
Yoshikawa. By the spring of 1941, Yamamoto officially requested additional Hawaiian
intelligence, and Yoshikawa boarded the liner Nitta-maru at Yokohama. He had grown his hair
longer than military length, and assumed the cover name Tadashi Morimura.
Yoshikawa began gathering intelligence in earnest by taking auto trips around the main islands,
and toured Oahu in a small plane, posing as a tourist. He visited Pearl Harbor frequently, ske-
tching the harbor and location of ships from the crest of a hill. Once, he gained access to Hickam
Field in a taxi, memorizing the number of visible planes, pilots, hangars, barracks and soldiers.
He was also able to discover that Sunday was the day of the week on which the largest number
of ships were likely to be in harbor, that PBY patrol planes went out every morning and evening,
and that there was an antisubmarine net in the mouth of the harbor. Information was returned to
Japan in coded form in Consular communications, and by direct delivery to intelligence officers
aboard Japanese ships calling at Hawaii by consulate staff.
In June 1941, German and Italian consulates were closed, and there were suggestions Japan's
should be closed, as well. They were not, because they continued to provide valuable infor-
mation (via MAGIC) and neither President Roosevelt nor Secretary Hull wanted trouble in the
Pacific. Had they been closed, however, it is possible Naval General Staff, which had opposed
the attack from the outset, would have called it off, since up-to-date information on the location
of the Pacific Fleet, on which Yamamoto's plan depended, was no longer available.
Planning
WT
Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto
Expecting war, and seeing an opportunity in the forward basing of the US Pacific Fleet at
Hawaii, the Japanese began planning in early 1941 for an attack on Pearl Harbor. For the next
several months, planning, and organizing a simultaneous attack on Pearl Harbor and invasion of
British and Dutch colonies to the South occupied much of the Japanese Navy's time and
attention. The Pearl Harbor attack planning arose out of the Japanese expectation the U.S. would
be inevitably drawn into the war after a Japanese attack against Malaya and Singapore.
The intent of a preemptive strike on Pearl Harbor was to neutralize American naval power in the
Pacific, thus removing it from influencing operations against American, British, and Dutch
colonies to the south. Successful attacks on colonies were judged to depend on successfully
dealing with the American Pacific Fleet. Planning had long anticipated that a battle between the
two Fleets would happen in Japanese home waters after the US Fleet traveled across the Pacific,
under attack by submarines and other forces all the way. The US Fleet would be defeated in a
climactic battle, just as had the Russian Fleet in 1905. A surprise attack posed a twofold
difficulty compared to long standing expectations. First, the US Pacific Fleet was a formidable
force, and would not be easy to defeat or to surprise. Second, for aerial attack, Pearl Harbor's
shallow waters made using conventional air-dropped torpedoes ineffective. On the other hand,
Hawaii's isolation meant a successful surprise attack could not be blocked or quickly countered
by forces from the continental U.S.
Several Japanese naval officers had been impressed by the British Operation Judgement, in
which 21 obsolete Fairey Swordfish disabled half the Regia Marina. Admiral Yamamoto even
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dispatched a delegation to Italy, which concluded a larger and better-supported version of
Cunningham's strike could force the U.S. Pacific Fleet to retreat to bases in California, thus
giving Japan the time necessary to establish a "barrier" defense to protect Japanese control of the
Dutch East Indies. The delegation returned to Japan with information about the shallow-running
torpedoes Cunningham's engineers had devised.
Japanese strategists were undoubtedly influenced by Admiral Togo's surprise attack on the
Russian Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur in 1905, and may have been influenced by U.S. Admiral
Harry Yarnell's performance in the 1932 joint Army-Navy exercises, which simulated an
invasion of Hawaii. Yarnell, as commander of the attacking force, placed his carriers northwest
of Oahu and simulated an air attack. The exercise's umpires noted Yarnell's aircraft were able to
inflict serious "damage" on the defenders, who for 24 hours after the attack were unable to locate
his force.
Yamamoto's emphasis on destroying the American battleships was in keeping with the Mahanian
doctrine shared by all major navies during this period, including the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy.
Planner Commander Minoru Genda stressed surprise would be critical
In a letter dated January 7, 1941 Yamamoto finally delivered a rough outline of his plan to
Koshiro Oikawa, then Navy Minister, from whom he also requested to be made Commander in
Chief of the air fleet to attack Pearl Harbor.
A few weeks later, in yet another letter, this time directed at Takijiro Onishi—chief of staff of
the Eleventh Air Fleet—Yamamoto requested Onishi study the technical feasibility of an attack
against the American base. After consulting first with Kosei Maeda, an expert on aerial torpedo
warfare, and being told the harbor's shallow waters rendered such an attack almost impossible,
Onsihi summoned Commander Minoru Genda. After studying the original proposal put forth by
Yamamoto, Genda agreed: "the plan is difficult but not impossible". During the following weeks,
Genda expanded Yamamoto's original plan, highlighting the importance of it being carried out
early in the morning and in total secrecy, employing an aircraft carrier force and several different
types of bombing.
Although attacking the US Pacific Fleet while it was at anchor in Pearl Harbor would achieve
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surprise, it also carried two distinct disadvantages: The targeted ships would be sunk or damaged
in very shallow water, meaning that it would quite likely they could be salvaged and possibly
returned to duty (as six of the eight battleships eventually were); and most of the crews would
survive the attack, since many would be on shore leave or would be rescued from the harbor
afterward. Despite these concerns, Yamamoto and Genda pressed ahead.
By April 1941, the Pearl Harbor plan became known as Operation Z, after the famous Z signal
given by Admiral Tōgō at Tsushima. Over the summer, pilots trained in earnest near Kagoshima
City on the Japanese island of Kyūshū. Genda had chosen it because its geography and
infrastructure presented most of the same problems bombers would face at Pearl Harbor. In
training, each crew flew over the 5000-foot (1500 m) mountain behind Kagoshima, dove down
into the city, dodging buildings and smokestacks before dropping to an altitude of 25 feet (7 m)
at the piers. Bombardiers released torpedoes at a breakwater some 300 yards (270 m) away.
Yet even skimming the water did not solve the problem of torpedoes bottoming in the shallow
waters of Pearl Harbor. Japanese weapons engineers created and tested modifications allowing
successful shallow water drops. The effort resulted in a heavily modified version of the Type 91
torpedo which inflicted most of the ship damage during the attack. Japanese weapons technicians
also produced special armor-piercing bombs by fitting fins and release shackles to 14 and 16
inch (356 and 406 mm) naval shells. These were able to penetrate the lightly armored decks of
the old battleships.
Concept of a Japanese Invasion of Hawaii
During the early planning stages, Japan's military leaders, including Yamamoto, gave some
thought to trying to launch an invasion to seize control of the Hawaiian Islands; this would
provide Japan with a strategic base in the central Pacific while denying American forces any
bases beyond the west coast of North America and further isolating Australia and New Zealand.
Although this proposal initially gained some support, it was soon dismissed for several reasons:
• Japan's ground forces and resources were already fully committed not only to the Second Sino-
Japanese War but also for offensives in Southeast Asia that were planned to occur immediately
after the Pearl Harbor attack.
• The Japanese Imperial Army (JIA), which insisted on focusing on operations in China and the
Southeast Asia, refused to supply any troops.
• Several senior officers of the Combined Fleet, most notably Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano
(永野修身), believed that an invasion of Hawaii was too risky.
With an invasion ruled out, it was agreed that a massive carrier-based airstrike against Pearl
Harbor to cripple the American Pacific Fleet would be sufficient. Japanese planners knew that
Hawaii, with its strategic location in the Central Pacific, would serve as a critical base from
which the United States could extend its military power against Japan; However, as before, the
confidence of Japanese leaders that the conflict would be over quickly and that the United States
would accept Japanese control of the Western Pacific (or negotiate a compromise) rather than
fight a long, bloody war overrode this concern.
WT
The strike force
Admiral Chuichi Nagumo
On November 26, 1941, the day the Hull note was received from United States Secretary of State
Cordell Hull, which the Japanese leaders saw as an unproductive and same old proposal, the
carrier battle group under the command of then Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, already
assembled in Hitokappu Wan in the Kurile Islands, sortied for Hawaii under strict radio silence.
The Kido Butai, the Combined Fleet's main carrier force of six aircraft carriers carriers (the most
powerful carrier force with the greatest concentration of air power in the history of naval warfare
at the time), embarked 359 airplanes, organized as the First Air Fleet. The carriers Akagi (flag),
Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, and the newest, Shōkaku and Zuikaku, had 135 Mitsubishi A6M Type 0
fighters (Allied codename "Zeke", commonly called "Zero"), 171 Nakajima B5N Type 97
torpedo bombers (Allied codename "Kate"), and 108 Aichi D3A Type 99 dive bombers (Allied
codename "Val") aboard. Two fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, nine
destroyers, and three fleet submarines provided escort and screening. In addition, the Advanced
Expeditionary Force included 20 fleet and five two-man Ko-hyoteki-class midget submarines,
which were to gather intelligence and sink U.S. vessels attempting to flee Pearl Harbor during or
soon after the attack. It also had eight oilers for underway fueling.
The execute order
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Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano
On December 1, 1941, after the striking force was en route, Chief of Staff Nagano gave a verbal
directive to commander of the Combined Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, informing him:
Japan has decided to open hostilities against the United States, United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands early in December...Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations
will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostilities, it is understood that
all elements of the Combined Fleet are to be assembled and returned to their bases in accordance
with separate orders.[The Kido Butai will] proceed to the Hawaiian Area with utmost secrecy
and, at the outbreak of the war, will launch a resolute surprise attack on and deal a fatal blow to
the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area. The initial air attack is scheduled at 0330 hours, X Day.
Upon completion, the force was to return to Japan, re-equip, and re-deploy for "Second Phase
Operations".
Finally, Order number 9, issued on 1 December 1941 by Nagano, instructed Yamamoto to crush
hostile naval and air forces in Asia, the Pacific and Hawaii, promptly seize the main U.S.,
British, and Dutch bases in East Asia and "capture and secure the key areas of the southern
regions".
On the home leg, the force was ordered to be alert for tracking and counterattacked by the
Americans, and to return to the friendly base in the Marshall Islands, rather than the Home
Islands.
WT
Lack of preparation
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, commanding general of the Army post at Pearl Harbor
U.S. civil and military intelligence had, amongst them, good information suggesting additional
Japanese aggression throughout the summer and fall before the attack. At the time, no reports
specifically indicated an attack against Pearl Harbor. Public press reports during summer and
fall, including Hawaiian newspapers, contained extensive reports on the growing tension in the
Pacific. Late in November, all Pacific commands, including both the Navy and Army in Hawaii,
were separately and explicitly warned war with Japan was expected in the very near future, and it
was preferred that Japan make the first hostile act as they were apparently preparing to do. It was
felt that war would most probably start with attacks in the Far East: the Philippines, Indochina,
Thailand, or the Russian Far East. The warnings were not specific to any area, noting only that
war with Japan was expected in the near future and all commands should act accordingly. Had
any of these warnings produced an active alert status in Hawaii, the attack might have been
resisted more effectively, and perhaps resulted in less death and damage. On the other hand,
recall of men on shore leave to the ships in harbor might have led to still more being casualties
from bombs and torpedoes, or trapped in capsized ships by shut watertight doors (as the attack
alert status would have required), or killed (in their obsolete aircraft) by more experienced
Japanese aviators. When the attack actually arrived, Pearl Harbor was effectively unprepared:
anti-aircraft weapons not manned, most ammunition locked down, anti-submarine measures not
implemented (e.g., no torpedo nets in the harbor), combat air patrol not flying, available scouting
aircraft not in the air at first light, Air Corps aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip to reduce
sabotage risks (not ready to fly at a moment's warning), and so on.
By 1941, U.S. signals intelligence, through the Army's Signal Intelligence Service and the Office
of Naval Intelligence's OP-20-G, had intercepted and decrypted considerable Japanese
diplomatic and naval cipher traffic, though nothing actually carrying significant information
about Japanese military plans in 1940-41. Decryption and distribution of this intelligence,
WT
including such decrypts as were available, was capricious and sporadic, some of which can be
accounted for by lack of resources and manpower. At best, the information available to decision
makers in Washington was fragmentary, contradictory, or poorly distributed, and was almost
entirely raw, without supporting analysis. It was thus, incompletely understood. Nothing in it
pointed directly to an attack at Pearl Harbor, and a lack of awareness of Imperial Navy capa-
bilities led to a widespread underlying belief Pearl Harbor was not a possible attack target. Only
one message from the Hawaiian Japanese consulate (sent on 6 December), in a low level
consular cipher, included mention of an attack at Pearl; it was not decrypted until 8 December.
In 1924, General William L. Mitchell produced a 324-page report warning that future wars
(including with Japan) would include a new role for aircraft against existing ships and facilities.
He even discussed the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, but his warnings were ignored.
Navy Secretary Knox had also appreciated the possibility of an attack at Pearl in a written
analysis shortly after taking office. American commanders had been warned that tests had
demonstrated shallow-water aerial torpedo attacks were possible, but no one in charge in Hawaii
fully appreciated this. And a war game surprise attack against Pearl Harbor in 1932 had been
judged a success and to have caused considerable damage.
Nevertheless, because it was believed Pearl Harbor had natural defenses against torpedo attack
(e.g., the shallow water), the Navy did not deploy torpedo nets or baffles, which were judged to
inconvenience ordinary operations. And as a result of limited numbers of long-range aircraft
(including Army Air Corps bombers), reconnaissance patrols were not being made as often or as
far out as required for adequate coverage against possible surprise attack; they improved con-
siderably, with far fewer remaining planes, after the attack. The Navy had 33 PBYs in the
islands, but only three on patrol at the time of the attack. Hawaii was low on the priority list for
the B-17s finally becoming available for the Pacific, largely because General MacArthur in the
Philippines was successfully demanding as many as could be made available to the Pacific
(where they were intended as a deterrent). The British, who had contracted for them, even agreed
to accept fewer to facilitate this buildup. At the time of the attack, Army and Navy were both on
training status rather than operational alert.
There was also confusion about the Army's readiness status as General Short had changed local
alert level designations without clearly informing Washington. Most of the Army's mobile anti-
aircraft guns were secured, with ammunition locked down in armories. To avoid upsetting
property owners, and in keeping with Washington's admonition not to alarm civil populations
(e.g., in the late November war warning messages from the Navy and War Departments), guns
were not dispersed around Pearl Harbor (i.e., on private property). Additionally, aircraft were
parked on airfields to lessen the risk of sabotage, not in anticipation of air attack, in keeping with
Short's interpretation of the war warnings.
Chester Nimitz said later, "It was God's mercy that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941.". Nimitz believed if Kimmel had discovered the Japanese approach, he would have sortied
to meet them. With the American carriers absent and Kimmel's battleships at a severe dis-
advantage to the Japanese carriers, the likely result would have been the sinking of the American
battleships at sea in deep water, where they would have been lost forever with tremendous
casualties (as many as twenty thousand dead), instead of in Pearl Harbor, where the crews could
WT
easily be rescued, and six battleships ultimately raised.
Breaking off negotiations

Part of the Japanese plan for the attack included breaking off negotiations with the United States
30 minutes before the attack began. Diplomats from the Japanese Embassy in Washington,
including the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, and special representative
Saburo Kurusu, had been conducting extended talks with the State Department regarding the
U.S. reactions to the Japanese move into Việt Nam in the summer (see above).
In the days before the attack, a long 14-part message was sent to the Embassy from the Foreign
Office in Tokyo (encrypted with the Type 97 cryptographic machine, in a cipher named PURPLE
by U.S. cryptanalysts), with instructions to deliver it to Secretary of State Cordell Hull at 1 p.m.
Washington time. The last part arrived late Saturday night (Washington time) but due to
decryption and typing delays, and to Tokyo's failure to stress the crucial necessity of the timing,
Embassy personnel did not deliver the message breaking off negotiations to Secretary Hull until
several hours after the attack.
The United States had decrypted the 14th part well before the Japanese Embassy managed to,
and long before the Embassy managed a fair typed copy. The final part, with its instruction for
the time of delivery, had been decoded that night, but was not actioned until the next morning;
according to Clausen, who also denied the claim by Bratton that General Marshall couldn't be
found (as he was out for a morning horseback ride).
It prompted General George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, to send that morning's warning
message, with assurances that it would be received by all recipients by 1 pm Washington time.
There were delays in the message sent to Hawaii because of trouble with the Army's long
distance communication system, a decision not to use the Navy's parallel facilities despite an
offer to permit it, and various troubles during its travels over commercial cable facilities (some-
how its "urgent" marking was misplaced, adding additional hours to its travel time). It was
actually delivered to General Walter Short, by a young Japanese-American cycle messenger,
several hours after the attack had ended.
There were Japanese records, admitted into evidence during Congressional hearings on the attack
after the War, that established that the Japanese government had not even written a declaration of
war until hearing news of the successful attack. The two-line declaration of war was finally
delivered to U.S. Ambassador Grew in Tokyo about 10 hours after the attack was over. He was
allowed to transmit it to the United States where it was received late Monday afternoon
(Washington time).
WT
Chapter 7
Infamy Speech
WT
President Franklin D. Roosevelt
WT A first draft of the Infamy Speech, with changes by Roosevelt
The Presidential Address to Congress of December 8, 1941 (known as the Infamy Speech or
Day of Infamy Speech) was delivered at 12:30 p.m. that day to a Joint Session of Congress by
United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt, one day after the Empire of Japan's attack on
Pearl Harbor Naval Base, Hawaii. The name derives from the first line of the speech: Roosevelt
describing the previous day as "a date which will live in infamy".
Within an hour of the speech, Congress passed a formal declaration of war against Japan and
officially brought the U.S. into World War II. The address is regarded as one of the most famous
American political speeches of the 20th century.
Commentary
WT The wreckage of the USS Arizona ablaze after the attack
FDR delivers the speech to Congress. Behind him are Vice President Henry A. Wallace (left) and Speaker
of the House of Representatives Sam Rayburn. To the right, in uniform in front of Rayburn, is Roosevelt's
son James, who escorted his father to the Capitol.
The Infamy Speech was brief, running to just six and a half minutes. Secretary of State Cordell
Hull had recommended that the president devote more time to a fuller exposition of Japanese-
American relations and the lengthy but unsuccessful effort to find a peaceful solution. However,
Roosevelt kept the speech short in the belief that it would have a more dramatic effect.
The wording of Roosevelt's speech was intended to have a strong emotional impact, appealing to
the anger felt by Americans at the nature of the Japanese attack. Roosevelt purposefully framed
the speech around the perceived low moral character of the Japanese government. He drew a
sharp contrast between the "righteous might" of the American people and the aggressive and
deceitful nature of the Japanese regime. He deliberately avoided the Churchillian approach of an
appeal to history. Indeed, the most famous line of the speech originally read "a date which will
live in world history"; Roosevelt crossed out "world history" and replaced it with "infamy", as
seen in the annotated copy of the original typewritten speech from the National Archives.
His revised statement was all the stronger for its emphatic insistence that posterity would forever
WT
endorse the American view of the attack. It was intended not merely as a personal response by
the president, but as a statement on behalf of the entire American people in the face of a great
collective trauma. In proclaiming the indelibility of the attack and expressing outrage at its
"dastardly" nature, the speech worked to crystallize and channel the response of the nation into a
collective response and resolve.
The first paragraph of the speech was carefully worded to reinforce Roosevelt's portrayal of the
United States as the innocent victim of unprovoked Japanese aggression. The wording was
deliberately passive. Rather than taking the more usual active voice—i.e. "Japan attacked the
United States"—Roosevelt chose to put in the foreground the object being acted upon, namely
the United States, to emphasize America's status as a victim. The theme of "innocence violated"
was further reinforced by Roosevelt's recounting of the ongoing diplomatic negotiations with
Japan, which the president characterized as having been pursued cynically and dishonestly by the
Japanese government while it was secretly preparing for war against the United States.
Roosevelt consciously sought to avoid making the sort of more abstract appeal that had been
issued by President Woodrow Wilson in his own speech to Congress in April 1917, when the
United States entered World War I. Wilson had laid out the strategic threat posed by Germany
and stressed the idealistic goals behind America's participation in the war. During the 1930s,
however, American public opinion had turned strongly against such themes and was wary of—if
not actively hostile to—idealistic visions of remaking the world through a "just war". Roosevelt
therefore chose to make an appeal aimed much more at the gut level—in effect, an appeal to
patriotism rather than to idealism. Nonetheless, he took pains to draw a symbolic link with the
April 1917 declaration of war; when he went to Congress on December 8, 1941 he was
accompanied by Edith Bolling Wilson, the widow of the late president.
The "infamy framework" adopted by Roosevelt was given additional resonance by the fact that it
followed the pattern of earlier narratives of great American defeats. The Battle of the Little
Bighorn in 1876 and the sinking of the USS Maine in 1898 had both been the source of intense
national outrage and a determination to take the fight to the enemy. Defeats and setbacks were on
each occasion portrayed as being merely a springboard towards an eventual and inevitable
victory. As Professor Sandra Silberstein observes, Roosevelt's speech followed a well-
established tradition of how "through rhetorical conventions, presidents assume extraordinary
powers as the commander in chief, dissent is minimized, enemies are vilified, and lives are lost
in the defense of a nation once again united under God."
The overall tone of the speech was one of determined realism. Roosevelt made no attempt to
paper over the great damage that had been caused to the American armed forces, noting (without
giving figures, as casualty reports were still being compiled) that "very many American lives
have been lost" in the attack. However, he emphasized his confidence in the strength of the
American people to face up to the challenge posed by Japan, citing the "unbounded deter-
mination of our people". He sought to reassure the public that steps were being taken to ensure
their safety, noting his own role as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy" (the United
States Air Force was at this time part of the US Army) and declaring that he had already
"directed that all measures be taken for our defense".
WT
Roosevelt also made a point of emphasizing that "our people, our territory and our interests are
in grave danger" and highlighted reports of Japanese attacks in the Pacific between Hawaii and
San Francisco. In so doing, he sought to silence the isolationist movement which had cam-
paigned so strongly against American involvement in the war in Europe. If the territory and
waters of the continental United States—not just outlying possessions such as the Philippines—
was seen as being under direct threat, isolationism would become an unsustainable course of
action. Roosevelt's speech had the desired effect, with only one Representative voting against the
declaration of war he sought; the wider isolationist movement collapsed almost immediately.
The speech's "infamy" line is often misquoted as "a day that will live in infamy". However,
Roosevelt quite deliberately chose to emphasize the date—December 7, 1941—rather than the
day of the attack, a Sunday, which he mentioned only in the last line when he said, "...Sunday,
December 7th, 1941,...". He sought to emphasize the historic nature of the events at Pearl
Harbor, implicitly urging the American people never to forget the attack and memorialize its
date. Ironically, the misquoted term "day of infamy" has become widely used by the media to
refer to any moment of supreme disgrace or evil.
Impact
Roosevelt's speech had an immediate and long-lasting impact on American politics. Thirty-three
minutes after he finished speaking, Congress declared war on Japan, with only one Repre-
sentative, Jeannette Rankin, voting against the declaration. The speech was broadcast live by
radio and attracted the largest audience in US radio history, with over 81 percent of American
homes tuning in to hear the President. The response was overwhelmingly positive, both within
and outside of Congress. Judge Samuel Irving Rosenman, who served as an adviser to Roosevelt,
described the scene:
It was a most dramatic spectacle there in the chamber of the House of Repre-
“ sentatives. On most of the President's personal appearances before Congress,
we found applause coming largely from one side—the Democratic side. But
this day was different. The applause, the spirit of cooperation, came equally
from both sides. ... The new feeling of unity which suddenly welled up in the
chamber on December 8, the common purpose behind the leadership of the
President, the joint determination to see things through, were typical of what
was taking place throughout the country.
”
The White House was inundated with telegrams praising the president's stance ("On that Sunday
we were dismayed and frightened, but your unbounded courage pulled us together."). Recruiting
stations were jammed with a surge of volunteers and had to go on 24-hour duty to deal with the
crowds seeking to sign up, in numbers reported to be twice as high as after Woodrow Wilson's
WT
declaration of war in 1917. The anti-war and isolationist movement collapsed in the wake of the
speech, with even the president's fiercest critics falling into line. Charles Lindbergh, who had
been a leading isolationist, declared:
Now [war] has come and we must meet it as united Americans regardless of our
“ attitude in the past toward the policy our Government has followed. ... Our
country has been attacked by force of arms, and by force of arms we must
retaliate. We must now turn every effort to building the greatest and most
efficient Army, Navy and Air Force in the world.
”
Roosevelt's framing of the Pearl Harbor attack became, in effect, the standard American
narrative of the events of December 7, 1941. Hollywood enthusiastically adopted the narrative in
a number of war films. Wake Island, the Academy Award-winning Air Force and the films Man
from Frisco (1944), and Betrayal from the East (1945), all included actual radio reports of the
pre-December 7 negotiations with the Japanese, reinforcing the message of enemy duplicity.
Across the Pacific (1942), Salute to the Marines (1943), and Spy Ship (1942), used a similar
device, relating the progress of US–Japanese relations through newspaper headlines. The theme
of American innocence betrayed was also frequently depicted on screen, the melodramatic
aspects of the narrative lending themselves naturally to the movies.
The President's description of December 7 as "a date which will live in infamy" was borne out;
the date very quickly became shorthand for the Pearl Harbor attack in much the same way that
September 11 became inextricably associated with the 2001 terrorist attacks. The slogans
"Remember December 7th" and "Avenge December 7" were adopted as a rallying cry and were
widely displayed on posters and lapel pins. Prelude to War (1942), the first of Frank Capra's
Why We Fight film series (1942-1945), urged Americans to remember the date of the Japanese
invasion of Manchuria, September 18, 1931, "as well as we remember December 7th 1941, for
on that date in 1931 the war we are now fighting began." The symbolism of the date was
highlighted in a scene in the 1943 film Bombardier, in which the leader of a group of airmen
walks up to a calendar on the wall, points to the date ("December 7, 1941") and tells his men:
"Gentlemen, there's a date we will always remember—and they'll never forget!"
Sixty years later, the continuing resonance of the Infamy Speech was demonstrated following the
September 11, 2001 attacks, which many commentators compared with Pearl Harbor in terms of
its impact and deadliness. In the days following the attacks, author Richard Jackson notes in his
book Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism that "there [was]
a deliberate and sustained effort" on the part of the George W. Bush administration to
"discursively link September 11, 2001 to the attack on Pearl Harbor itself", both by directly
invoking Roosevelt's Infamy Speech and by re-using the themes employed by Roosevelt in his
speech. In Bush's speech to the nation on September 11, 2001, he contrasted the "evil, despicable
acts of terror" with the "brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity" that America represented
in his view. University of Washington Professor and author Sandra Silberstein draws direct
parallels between the language used by Roosevelt and Bush, highlighting a number of
similarities between the Infamy Speech and Bush's presidential address of September 11.
WT
Similarly, Emily S. Rosenberg notes rhetorical efforts to link the conflicts of 1941 and 2001 by
re-utilizing Second World War terminology of the sort used by Roosevelt, such as using the term
"axis" to refer to America's enemies (as in "Axis of Evil").
Chapter 8
Results of the Attack on Pearl Harbor
The results of the attack on Pearl Harbor are many and significant.
American response
WT
President Franklin D. Roosevelt signing the Declaration of War against Japan on the day following the
attack
On December 7, 1941, the Japanese launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and hastened the
entry of the United States into World War II on the side of the Allies.
The day after the attack, President Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed a joint session of United
States Congress. Roosevelt called December 7 "a date which will live in infamy". Congress
declared war on the Empire of Japan amid outrage at the attack and the late delivery of the note
from the Japanese government breaking off relations with the U.S. government, actions
considered treacherous. Pacifist Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin, a Republican from Montana,
cast the only dissenting vote. Roosevelt signed the declaration of war later the same day.
Continuing to intensify its military mobilization, the U.S. government finished converting to a
war economy, a process begun by provision of weapons and supplies to the Soviet Union and
Great Britain.
The Pearl Harbor attack immediately galvanized a divided nation into action. Public opinion had
been moving towards support for entering the war during 1941, but considerable opposition
WT
remained until the attack. Overnight, Americans united against Japan in response to calls to
"Remember Pearl Harbor." American solidarity in the war effort probably made possible the
unconditional surrender position later taken by the Allied Powers. Some historians, among them
Samuel Eliot Morison, believe the attack doomed Japan to defeat simply because it awakened the
"sleeping beast", regardless of whether the fuel depots or machine shops had been destroyed or
even if the carriers had been caught in port and sunk. U.S. industrial and military capacity, once
mobilized, was able to pour overwhelming resources into both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters.
Others, such as Clay Blair, Jr., and Mark Parillo believe Japanese trade protection was so
incompetent that American submarines alone might have strangled Japan into defeat.
Perceptions of treachery in the attack before a declaration of war sparked fears of sabotage or
espionage by Japanese sympathizers residing in the U.S., including citizens of Japanese descent
and was a factor in the subsequent Japanese internment in the western United States. Other
factors included misrepresentations of intelligence information (none) suggesting sabotage,
notably by General John DeWitt, commanding general of Western Defense Command on the
Pacific Coast, who had personal feelings against Japanese Americans. In February 1942,
Roosevelt signed United States Executive Order 9066, requiring all Japanese Americans to
submit themselves for an internment.
Communications from survivors

The following text was printed on the message (non-address) side of standardized postcard
"Subron 4 Standard Form No. F14 471-A-S/M Base. PH-7-15-41-20M." distributed to naval
personnel at Pearl Harbor to communicate with their families following the attack:
• NOTHING is to be written on this side except to fill in the data specified.

• Sentences not required should be crossed out.
• IF ANYTHING ELSE IS ADDED THE POSTCARD WILL BE DESTROYED.
• I am well (sick
• I have been admitted to hospital as (wounded
• -(Serious -(not serious
• Am getting on well. Hope to return to duty soon.
• I have received your (Letter dated_______ (Telegram dated_______ (Parcel dated_______
• Letter follows at first opportunity.
• I have received no letter from you (for a long time (lately.
• Signature___________________________
• Date_______________________________
Japanese views
WT
Japanese depiction of nine midget submarine crewmembers lost during the attack, excluding the POW,
Kazuo Sakamaki.
On December 8, 1941, the Empire of Japan declared war on the United States and Britain. The
belated Japanese document discussed world peace and the disruptive actions of the United States
and Great Britain. The document claimed all avenues for averting war had been exhausted by the
Government of Japan.
Although the Imperial Japanese government had made some effort to prepare their population for
war via anti-U.S. propaganda, it appears most Japanese were surprised, apprehensive, and
dismayed by the news they were now at war with the U.S., a country many Japanese admired.
Nevertheless, the people at home and overseas thereafter generally accepted their government's
account of the attack and supported the war effort until their nation's surrender in 1945.
Japan's national leadership at the time appeared to have believed war between the U.S. and Japan
had long been inevitable. In any case, Japanese-American relationships had already significantly
deteriorated since Japan's invasion of China beginning in the early '30s, of which the United
States strongly disapproved. In 1942, Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese ambassador to the United
States, gave an address in which he talked about the "historical inevitability of the war of Greater
East Asia." He said war had been a response to Washington's longstanding aggression toward
Japan. For example, provocations against Japan included the San Francisco School incident, (the
United States' racist policies on Japanese immigrants), Naval Limitations Treaty, other Unequal
treaties, the Nine Power Pact, constant economic pressure against Japan, culminating in the
"belligerent" scrap metal and oil embargo in 1941 by the United States and Allied countries to
contain and/or reverse the actions of the Empire of Japan especially in IndoChina during her
expansion of influence and interests throughout Asia. In light of Japan's dependence on imported
WT
oil, the trade embargoes were especially significant. These pressures directly influenced Japan to
go into alliance with Germany and Italy through the Tripartite Pact. According to Kurusu,
because of these reasons, the Allies had already provoked war with Japan long before the attack
at Pearl Harbor, and the United States was already preparing for war with Japan. Kurusu also
states the United States was also looking for world domination, beyond just Asia, with "sinister
designs". Some of this view seems to have been shared by Adolf Hitler, when he called it one of
the reasons Germany declared war on the United States. He also had mentioned European
imperialism toward Japan many years before. Therefore, according to Kurusu, Japan had no
choice but to defend herself and so should rapidly continue to militarize, bring Germany and
Italy closer as allies and militarily combat the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands.
Japan's leaders also saw themselves as justified in their conduct, believing that they were
building the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. They also explained Japan had done
everything possible to alleviate tension between the two nations. The decision to attack, at least
for public presentation, was reluctant and forced on Japan. Of the Pearl Harbor attack itself,
Kurusu said it came in direct response to a virtual ultimatum from the U.S. government, the Hull
note, and so the surprise attack was not treacherous. Since the Japanese-American relationship
already had hit its lowest point, there was no alternative; in any case, had an acceptable
settlement of differences been reached, the Carrier Striking Task Force could have been called
back.
Germany and Italy declare war
WT Hitler declares war on the United States, 11 December 1941
On December 11, 1941, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy declared war on the United States, and
the United States reciprocated, formally entering the war in Europe.
German dictator Adolf Hitler and Italian dictator Benito Mussolini were under no obligation to
declare war on the United States under the mutual defense terms of the Tripartite Pact. However,
relations between the European Axis Powers and the United States had deteriorated since 1937.
Earlier in 1941, the Nazis learned of the U.S. military's contingency planning to get troops in
Continental Europe by 1943; this was Rainbow Five, made public by sources unsympathetic to
Roosevelt's New Deal, and published by the Chicago Tribune. Moreover, with Roosevelt's
initiation of a Neutrality Patrol, which in fact also escorted British ships, as well as orders to U.S.
Navy destroyers first to actively report U-boats, then "shoot on sight", American neutrality was
honored more in the breach than observance.
Having been unaware of Japanese plans, Hitler was initially furious that the United States had
been dragged into the war at a time when he had not yet acquired full control of continental
Europe. Hitler, who had previously declared the Japanese "Honorary Aryans" claimed that this is
what happens when your allies are not Anglo-Saxons. However, he decided war with the United
States was unavoidable, and the Pearl Harbor attack, the publication of Rainbow Five, and
Roosevelt's post-Pearl Harbor address, which focused on European affairs as well as the situation
with Japan, probably contributed to the declaration. Hitler underestimated American military
production capacity, the nation's ability to fight on two fronts, and the time his own Operation
BARBAROSSA would require. Similarly, the Nazis may have hoped the declaration of war, a
showing of solidarity with Japan, would result in closer collaboration with the Japanese in
Eurasia, particularly against the Soviet Union. Regardless of Hitler's reasons, the decision was an
enormous strategic blunder and allowed the United States to enter the European war in support
of the United Kingdom and the Allies without much public opposition.
Hitler awarded Imperial Japanese ambassador to Nazi Germany Hiroshi Oshima the Grand Cross
of the Order of the German Eagle in Gold (1st class) after the attack, praising Japan for striking
hard and without first declaring war.
Investigations and blame
WT
President Roosevelt appointed an investigating commission, headed by U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Owen Roberts to report facts and findings with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor. It
was the first of many official investigations (nine in all). Both the Fleet commander, Rear
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and the Army commander, Lieutenant General Walter Short (the
Army had been responsible for air defense of Hawaii, including Pearl Harbor, and for general
defense of the islands against hostile attack), were relieved of their commands shortly thereafter.
They were accused of "dereliction of duty" by the Roberts Commission for not making reaso-
nable defensive preparations. None of the investigations conducted during the War, nor the
Congressional investigation afterward, provided enough reason to reverse those actions. The
decisions of the Navy and War Departments to relieve both was controversial at the time and has
remained so. However, neither was court-martialed as would normally have been the result of
dereliction of duty. On May 25, 1999, the U.S. Senate voted to recommend both officers be
exonerated on all charges, citing "denial to Hawaii commanders of vital intelligence available in
Washington".
Rise of anti-Japanese sentiment and historical significance
WT
United States WW2 propaganda poster depicting Adolf Hitler and Hideki Tojo
WT Damage to the headquarters building at Hickam, still visible
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor coupled with their alliance with the Nazis and the ensuing
war in the Pacific fueled anti-Japanese sentiment, racism, xenophobia, and anti-Axis sentiment in
the Allied nations. Japanese, Japanese-Americans, and Asians having a similar physical appea-
rance were regarded with deep seated suspicion, distrust and hostility. The attack was viewed as
having been conducted in an extremely underhanded way and also as a very "treacherous" or
"sneaky attack".
The attack, the subsequent declarations of war, and fear of "Fifth Columnists" resulted in
internment of Japanese, German, and Italian populations in the United States and others, for
instance the Japanese American internment, German American internment, Italian American
internment, and Japanese Canadian internment. The attack resulted in the United States fighting
the Germans and Italians among others in Europe and Japan in the Pacific.
The consequences were world-changing. Prime Minister Winston Churchill, on hearing of the
attack, wrote, "Being saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept
the sleep of the saved and thankful." By opening the Pacific War, which ended in the uncon-
ditional surrender of Japan, it broke the power of an Asian check on Soviet expansion. The
Allied victory in this war and subsequent U.S. emergence as a dominant world power, eclipsing
Britain, have shaped international politics ever since.
Pearl Harbor is generally regarded as an extraordinary event in American history, remembered as

the first time since the War of 1812 America was attacked on its home soil by another country.
While this assertion is technically erroneous, as Hawaii was not a state at the time, it was widely
regarded as "home soil". It was the first decisive defeat for the United States in World War II. It
has become synonymous with "surprise attack" ever since in the U.S. Unfortunately, the
mistakes of intelligence collection, sharing, and analysis leading to the Japanese success at Pearl
Harbor did not, in the end, lead to lessons.
Perception of the attack today

Some Japanese today feel they were compelled to fight because of threats to their national
interests and an embargo imposed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands. The most important embargo was on oil on which its Navy and much of the
economy was dependent. For example, the Japan Times, an English-language newspaper owned
by one of the major news organizations in Japan (Asahi Shimbun), ran numerous columns in the
early 2000s echoing Kurusu's comments in reference to the Pearl Harbor attack.
WT
In putting the Pearl Harbor attack into context, Japanese writers repeatedly contrast the
thousands of U.S. servicemen killed there with the hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians
killed in U.S. air attacks later in the War, even without mentioning the 1945 atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States.
However, in spite of the perceived inevitability of the war by many Japanese, many also believe
the Pearl Harbor attack, although a tactical victory, was actually part of a seriously flawed
strategy for engaging in war with the U.S. As one columnist eulogizes, "The Pearl Harbor attack
was a brilliant tactic, but part of a strategy based on the belief that a spirit as firm as iron and as
beautiful as cherry blossoms could overcome the materially wealthy United States. That strategy
was flawed, and Japan's total defeat would follow." In 1991, the Japanese Foreign Ministry
released a statement saying Japan had intended to make a formal declaration of war to the United
States at 1 p.m. Washington time, 25 minutes before the attack at Pearl Harbor was scheduled to
begin. This officially acknowledged something that had been publicly known for years.
Diplomatic communications had been coordinated well in advance with the attack, but had failed
delivery at the intended time. It appears the Japanese government was referring to the "14-part
message", which did not actually break off negotiations, let alone declare war, but did officially
raise the possibility of a break in relations. However, because of various delays, the Japanese
ambassador was unable to deliver this message until well after the attack had begun.
Imperial Japanese military leaders appear to have had mixed feelings about the attack. Fleet
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was unhappy about the botched timing of the breaking off of
negotiations. He is rumored to have said, "I fear all we have done is awakened a sleeping giant
and filled him with terrible resolve". Even though this quote is unsubstantiated, the phrase seems
to describe his feelings about the situation. He is on record as having said, in the previous year,
"I can run wild for six months ... after that, I have no expectation of success."
The first Prime Minister of Japan during World War II, Hideki Tojo later wrote, "When
reflecting upon it today, that the Pearl Harbor attack should have succeeded in achieving surprise
seems a blessing from Heaven."
Yamamoto had said, regarding the imminent war with the United States, "Should hostilities once
break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the
Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. We would have to march into Washington and
sign the treaty in the White House. I wonder if our politicians (who speak so lightly of a
Japanese-American war) have confidence as to the outcome and are prepared to make the
necessary sacrifices?"
Analysis
WT
Posters like Allen Saalberg's strengthened American resolve against the Axis powers
Tactical Implications
The attack was notable for its considerable destruction, as putting most of the U.S. battleships
out of commission was regarded—in both navies and by most military observers worldwide—as
a tremendous success for Japan. Influenced by the earlier Battle of Taranto, which pioneered the
all-aircraft naval attack but resulted in far less damage and casualties, the Japanese struck against
Pearl Harbor on a much larger scale than did the British at Taranto.
The attack was a great shock to all the Allies in the Pacific Theater, and it was initially believed
that Pearl Harbor changed the balance of power, similar to how the Battle of Taranto did so in
the Mediterranean, both in the attackers' favor. Three days later, with the sinking of Prince of
Wales and Repulse off the coast of Malaya, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill exclaimed
"In all the war I never received a more direct shock. As I turned and twisted in bed the full horror
of the news sank in upon me. There were no British or American capital ships in the Indian
Ocean or the Pacific except the American survivors of Pearl Harbor who were hastening back to
California. Over this vast expanse of waters Japan was supreme and we everywhere were weak
and naked".
However, Pearl Harbor did not have the crippling effect on American operations as it was
initially thought. Unlike the close confines of the Mediterranean, the vast expanses of the Pacific
limited the tactical value of battleships for sea control. Furthermore, unlike new fast battleships
such as the Iowas, the slow battleships were incapable of operating with carrier task forces, so
once repaired they were relegated to delivering pre-invasion bombardments during the island
WT
hopping offensive against Japanese-held islands. These Pearl Harbor veterans were later part of a
force that defeated IJN battleships at the Battle of Surigao Strait, but that engagement was
largely lopsided in the USN's favour. A major flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was a belief
the ultimate Pacific battle would be between battleships of both sides, in keeping with the
doctrine of Captain Alfred Mahan. Seeing the decimation of battleships at the hands of aircraft,
Yamamoto (and his successors) hoarded his battleships for a "decisive battle" that never
happened, only committing a handful to the forefront of the Battles of Midway and Guadalcanal.
One of the main Japanese objectives was to destroy the three American aircraft carriers stationed
in the Pacific, but they were not present: Enterprise was returning from Wake, Lexington from
Midway, and Saratoga was under refit at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Had Japan sunk the
American carriers, the U.S. would have sustained significant damage to the Pacific Fleet's ability
to conduct offensive operations for a year or so (given no further diversions from the Atlantic
Fleet). As it was, the elimination of the battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice but to place
its faith in aircraft carriers and submarines—the very weapons with which the U.S. Navy halted
and eventually reversed the Japanese advance.
Lexington (CV-2)
Battleships
WT
Carrier Striking Task Force two-way route. Legend: Kido Butai USS Enterprise (CV-6)
Despite the perception of this battle as a devastating blow to America, only three ships were
permanently lost to the U.S. Navy. These were the battleships Arizona, Oklahoma, and the old
battleship Utah (then used as a target ship); nevertheless, much usable material was salvaged
from them, including the two aft main turrets from Arizona. The majority of each battleship's
crews survived; there were exceptions as heavy casualties resulted from Arizona’s magazine
exploding and the Oklahoma capsizing. Four ships sunk during the attack were later raised and
USS
returned to duty, including the battleships California, West Virginia and Nevada. California and
West Virginia had an effective torpedo-defense system which held up remarkably well, despite
the weight of fire they had to endure, resulting in most of their crews being saved. Maryland and
Tennessee suffered relatively light damage, as did Pennsylvania, which was in drydock at the
time.
Chester Nimitz said later, "It was God's mercy that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941.". Nimitz believed if Kimmel had discovered the Japanese approach to Pearl Harbor, he
would have sortied to meet them. With the American carriers absent and Kimmel's battleships at
a severe disadvantage to the Japanese carriers, the likely result would have been the sinking of
the American battleships at sea in deep water, where they would have been lost forever with
tremendous casualties (as many as twenty thousand dead), instead of in Pearl Harbor, where the
crews could easily be rescued, and six battleships ultimately raised. This was also the reaction of
Joseph Rochefort, head of HYPO, when he remarked the attack was cheap at the price.
Many of the surviving battleships were heavily refitted, including the replacement of their
outdated secondary battery of anti-surface 5"/51 caliber guns with more useful turreted dual-
purpose 5"/38 caliber guns, allowing them to better cope with the new tactical reality. Addition
of modern radar to the salvaged vessels would give them a marked qualitative advantage over
those of the IJN.
Carriers
The attack on Pearl Harbor failed to sight, or destroy, any of the Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers;
they had been designated as primary targets along with the battleships. The carriers Lexington
and Enterprise were ferrying additional fighters to American bases on the islands of Wake and
Midway. At the time of the Japanese attack, the US was expecting imminent war with Japan,
WT
beginning in any of several places, such as the Philippines or Allied bases in Borneo. Nagumo's
hesitation, and failure to find and destroy the American carriers, may have been a product of his
lack of faith in the attack plan, and of the fact he was a gunnery officer, not an aviator. In
addition, Yamamoto's targeting priorities, placing battleships first in importance, reflected an
out-of-date Mahanian doctrine, and an inability to extrapolate from history, given the damage
German submarines did to British trade in World War I. In the end, Japan achieved surprisingly
little for all her daring and apparent success.
Cruisers, essential to carrier task forces later in the war, had been considered tertiary targets and
only three suffered damage. Of 27 destroyers present, only two were lost: Cassin and Downes
were total losses as ships, but their machinery was salvaged and fitted into new hulls, retaining
their original names, while Shaw was raised and returned to service.
Shore Installations
Tank farms, containing 140 million U.S. gallons (530 million liters) of bunker oil, were
unscathed, providing a ready source of fuel for American submarines at the submarine base.
These were vital to the initial phase of the War, and to commerce raiding throughout, and
illustrate the deficiencies of Japanese planning for the attack. The Navy Yard, critical to ship
maintenance, and repair of ships damaged in the attack was undamaged. The engineering and
initial repair shops, as well as the torpedo store, were intact. Other items of base infrastructure
and operation, such as power generation, continued to operate normally. Also critical to the way
the Pacific War was actually fought was the cryptanalysis unit, Station HYPO, located in the
basement of the old Administration Building. It was undamaged and even benefited by gaining
staff from unemployed ship's bands.
The Army Air Force's loss of aircraft must be balanced against the fact that many of them were
obsolete, such as the P-40's predecessor, the P-36. Japan might have achieved a good deal more
with not much additional effort or loss.
Of the 22 Japanese ships that took part in the attack, only one survived the war. As of 2006, the
only U.S. ships in Pearl Harbor during the attack still remaining afloat are the Coast Guard
Cutter Taney and the yard tug USS Hoga. Both remained active over 50 years after the attack
and have been designated museum ships.
Strategic Implications
A common view is that the Japanese fell victim to victory disease because of the perceived ease
of their first victories. It has also been stated by the Japanese military commanders and
politicians who visited and lived in the United States, that their leadership (mostly military
personnel) took the war with the United States relatively lightly, compared to them. For instance,
Yamamoto's quote and Battle of Iwo Jima commander Tadamichi Kuribayashi's opinions
expressed the views and concerns about the greater industrial power of the United States in
comparison to Japan.
WT
The politics of a "Europe First" strategy, loss of air cover over Pearl Harbor, and subsequent loss
of the Philippines, meant the U.S. Army and Army Air Corps were unable to play a significant
role in the Pacific War for several months. Japan was temporarily free of worries about the major
rival Pacific naval power, which was at least part of the intention for the attack. Because
Australian, New Zealand, Dutch and most British forces were already in Europe, Japan
conquered nearly all of Southeast Asia, the Southwest Pacific, and extended her reach far into
the Indian Ocean, without significant interference. The various Japanese advances were a nearly
complete tactical success.
In the long term, the attack on Pearl Harbor was a grand strategic blunder for Japan. Indeed,
Admiral Yamamoto, who conceived it, predicted even success here could not win a war with the
United States, because American productive capacity was too large. It spurred the United States
into a determination to fight to complete victory. The War resulted in the destruction of the
Japanese armed forces, the Occupation of the Home Islands (a state never before achieved in
Japan's history), and the loss of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands to the United States until 1972,
while the Soviet Russian re-annexation of the Kurile islands and Sakhalin Island's southern part,
and China's seizure of Formosa (Taiwan), and the loss of Korea have not been reversed to this
day.

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Chapter 1 - Second Sino-Japanese War

Chapter 2 - Sino-German Cooperation (1911–1941)

Chapter 3 - Chinese Armies in the Second Sino-Japanese War

Chapter 4 - Japanese War Crimes

Chapter 6 - Events Leading to the Attack on Pearl Harbor

Chapter 7 - Infamy Speech

Chapter 8 - Results of the Attack on Pearl Harbor

Second Sino-Japanese War

Zhang Zuolin and Chiang Kai Shek

Communist Party of China

WTKwantung Army entering Shenyang during the Mukden Incident

Chinese resistance strategy

Relationship between the Nationalists and Communists

Foreign support for China

Intrusion into other Theatres

Contemporaneous Wars Being Fought by China

Use of chemical and bacteriological weapons

Muslim Jihad against Japan

Chinese Muslim soldiers

Conclusion and aftermath

Chinese Communists Party Declarations

National Revolutionary Army

WT Flag of the National Revolutionary Army

Communist Chinese forces

Imperial Japanese Army

WT Flag of the Imperial Japanese Army

Collaborationist Chinese Army

Imperial Japanese Army

Sino-German Cooperation (1911–1941)

Early Sino-German relations

Germany and Chinese industrialization

However, a series of Sino-German agreements in 1934–1936 greatly accelerated railway

End of Sino-German cooperation

Chinese Armies in the Second Sino-Japanese

After the outbreak of World War II

General Chung Yee

Japanese War Crimes

WT Chinese prisoners being buried alive

International and Japanese law

Historical and geographical extent

The events of the 1930s and 1940s

Human experimentation and biological warfare

Shiro Ishii, commander of Unit 731

Use of chemical weapons

Torture of prisoners of war

War crimes trials

On September 4, 1952, President Truman issued Executive Order 10393, establishing a

Citing Brandt's action as an example, John Borneman, associate professor of anthropology at

Compensation under the San Francisco Treaty

Compensation from Japanese overseas assets

Japanese overseas assets in 1945

Country/region Value (1945, ¥15=US$1)

North East China 146,532,000,000

North China 55,437,000,000

Central South China 36,718,000,000