MODULE 17.

RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED

Presumption of Innocence

256) People vs. Sumili (G.R. No. 212160, February 4, 2015)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DENNIS SUMILI, Accused Appellant.

FACTS: On June 7, 2006, a buy-bust operation was organized by SPO2 Englatiera

against appellant Dennis Sumili. After the sale has been consummated and the team
stormed Sumili’s house, the appellant allegedly escaped by jumping through the
window. Thereafter, the sachet of suspected shabu was turned over by the poseur-
buyer to SPO2 Englatiera who in turn instructed NUP Ong to bring the sachet and the
request for laboratory examination to the PNP Crime Laboratory however, NUP Ong
failed to do so since the lab was already closed; he was only able to submit it for
examination on June 9, 2006, or two days after the buy-bust operation.

Sumili on the other hand denied the accusation. He alleged that on the date and time of
the buy-bust, he was at the market buying ingredients as he was a fishball vendor.

ISSUE: Whether Sumili’s conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165

should be upheld.

RULING: As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that
the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would
ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the
prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone
who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it
was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it
was received, and the condition in which it was delivered, and the condition in which it
was delivered to the next link in the chain.

After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to
establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from Sumili due to
unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus, militating against a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
257) People of the Philippines vs. Umipang (G.R. No. 190321, April 25, 2012)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
SAMMY UMIPANG y ABDUL, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS: Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a person named Sam was
selling drugs along Cagayan de Oro Street in Maharlika Village, Taguig City, a buy-bust
team from the [Station Anti-Illegal Drugs – Special Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF)]
of the Taguig City Police was dispatched on April 1, 2006 at around 6:00 in the evening.
[Police Officer (PO) 2] Gasid was assigned to act as poseur buyer and he was given a ₱
500.00 marked money. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

Upon arrival at the area, PO2 Gasid and the confidential informant sauntered the length
of the street while the other members of the team strategically positioned themselves.
The confidential informant saw the man called Sam standing near a store. The
confidential informant and PO2 Gasid then approached Sam. Straight off, the
confidential informant said "Sam, pa-iskor kami." Sam replied "Magkano ang iiskorin
nyo?" The confidential informant said "Five hundred pesos." Sam took out three (3)
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with various price tags–500, 300,
and 100. After making a choice, PO2 Gasid handed the marked ₱ 500.00 to Sam who
received the same.

Upon receipt by Sam of the marked money, PO2 Gasid took off his cap as the pre-
arranged signal that the sale had been consummated. Sensing danger, Sam attempted
to flee but PO2 Gasid immediately grabbed and arrested Sam. In a few seconds, the
rest of the buy-bust team [comprised of their team leader, Police Senior Inspector
(PS/INSP.) Obong, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Mendiola, PO3 Hajan, PO3 Maglana,
PO3 Salem, and PO1 Ragos] joined them. PO1 Ragos handcuffed Sam. Five (5) more
plastic sachets containing the same white crystalline substance were recovered from
Sam. PO2 Gasid marked the items with the initials "SAU" [which stood for Sammy A.
Umipang, the complete name, including the middle initial, of accused-appellant]. Sam
was forthwith brought to the police station where he was booked, investigated and
identified as accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul. PO2 Gasid then brought the
confiscated items to the crime laboratory for testing. The specimens all tested positive
for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution witnesses were sufficient to convict accused-appellant of
the alleged sale and possession of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which are
violations under Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of R.A. 9165.

RULING: A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of
operation has been proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal transactions that
are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust operation has a significant
downside that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law. It is susceptible
to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion.

Indeed, the absence of these representatives during the physical inventory and the
marking of the seized items does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible
in evidence. However, we take note that, in this case, the SAID-SOTF did not even
attempt to contact the barangay chairperson or any member of the barangay council.
There is no indication that they contacted other elected public officials. Neither do the
records show whether the police officers tried to get in touch with any DOJ
representative. Nor does the SAID-SOTF adduce any justifiable reason for failing to do
so – especially considering that it had sufficient time from the moment it received
information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest.

Thus, there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the apprehending police
officers to look for the said representatives pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. A
sheer statement that representatives were unavailable – without so much as an
explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other
representatives, given the circumstances – is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse. We
stress that it is the prosecution who has the positive duty to establish that earnest
efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under Section
21(1) of R.A. 9165,or that there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so.

Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically
exonerate an accused from the crimes of which he or she was convicted.This is
especially true when the lapses in procedure were "recognized and explained in terms
of justifiable grounds."There must also be a showing "that the police officers intended
to comply with the procedure but were thwarted by some justifiable
consideration/reason."However, when there is gross disregard of the procedural
safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty is
generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in
evidence.This uncertainty cannot be remedied by simply invoking the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate
disregard of the procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the
performance of official duties.As a result, the prosecution is deemed to have failed to
fully establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the
criminal liability of the accused.

For the arresting officers’ failure to adduce justifiable grounds, we are led to conclude
from the totality of the procedural lapses committed in this case that the arresting
officers deliberately disregarded the legal safeguards under R.A. 9165. These lapses
effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti,
especially in the face of allegations of frame-up. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we
must resolve the doubt in favor of accused-appellant, "as every fact necessary to
constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt."
“To exert greater efforts in combating the drug menace using the safeguards that our
lawmakers have deemed necessary for the greater benefit of our society." 45 The need to
employ a more stringent approach to scrutinizing the evidence of the prosecution –
especially when the pieces of evidence were derived from a buy-bust operation –
"redounds to the benefit of the criminal justice system by protecting civil liberties and at
the same time instilling rigorous discipline on prosecutors."

WHEREFORE, the appealed 21 May 2009 CA Decision affirming the 24 July 2007 RTC
Joint Decision is SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul is hereby
ACQUITTED of the charges in Criminal Cases No. 14935-D-TG and No. 14936-D-TG on
the ground of reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby
ORDERED to immediately RELEASE accused-appellant from custody, unless he is
detained for some other lawful cause.

258) People of the Philippines vs. Quintal (G.R. No. 184170, February 2,
2011)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JERWIN QUINTAL y BEO, VICENTE BONGAT y TARIMAN, FELIPE QUINTAL y
ABARQUEZ and LARRY PANTI y JIMENEZ, Accused.

FACTS: On 2 May 2001, appellant Vicente, together with 15-year-old Jerwin Quintal,
16-year old Felipe Quintal, and Larry Panti were charged in Information for Rape. The
victim is a 16-year-old girl, AAA. Of all the accused, only Felipe and Jerwin were
arrested. The victim testified that in August 2002, as she was leaving awake at around
10 pm, she noticed that Jerwin was following her. She recognized Jerwin because he
was her schoolmate. As AAA was about to go into her grandmother s House, the both
of the accused invited her to go to a birthday party, to which she acceded. She was
then led to a rice field where the other accused were and all four of them took turns
raping her.AAA reported the incident after 2 days. The parents of Jerwin accompanied
their son and there were talks of Jerwin proposing marriage to the victim and there was
an admission of the rape put in writing. For the defense, Jerwin claimed that the victim
was his girlfriend and they had sexual intercourse before. In 2006, the RTC convicted
all the accused of rape and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
but mitigated the penalty imposed on Jerwin and Felipe for they were minors. Pursuant
to R.A. No. 9344, the judgment of conviction against Jerwin Quintal and Felipe Quintal
was suspended and they were confined at the Home for Boys in Naga City for
rehabilitation. In 2009, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the cases against Jerwin and
Felipe upon reconsideration upon the recommendation of the DSWD. The only
appellant, in this case, is Vicente, who was not a minor at the time of the commission of
the crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence for a conviction.

HELD/RATIO: No. The credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as
well as the inconclusive medical finding, tends to create doubt if AAA was indeed raped.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals relied largely on the testimony of AAA that she was
raped. The SC doubted the credibility of AAA s testimony, which was inconsistent with
the testimonies she told the barangay tanod and barangay kagawad, the purported
confession put into writing and signed by all the accused; and the subsequent incidents
relating to the case. The combination of all the circumstances is more than sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt as to whether first, rape was actually committed and second,
whether the accused were the perpetrators.

Omine asked Angel Pulido permission to open a new road through the plantation.
According to Omine, Pulido did give his permission that's why he began working on the
new road. But according to Pulido, he refused to grant this request because there was
already an unfinished road. As Pulido and his son along w/ 2 others

were returning home from a cockpit, they noticed that a considerable number of hemp
plants were destroyed by the construction of the new road. Angered by this, they went
to the defendant's house and there happened a violent altercation resulting in the
owner Pulidos death from a wound by a bolo struck in his breast.

HELD: Although it is alleged that Kiichi Omine uttered words of inducement to Eduardo
Autor, it would be insufficient to make him a principal by induction. Eduardo Autor
though working under the direction of Omine was still being paid by Pulido. Moreover, it
is necessary that inducement is made directly w/ the intention of procuring the
commission of the crime and that such inducement is the determining cause of the
commission of the crime. It must precede the act induced and must be so influential in
producing the criminal act that w/o it the act wouldn't have been performed. Moreover,
as words of direct inducement, it is essential that such advice or words have great
dominance and great influence over the person who acts, that they are as direct, as
efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion, or as violence itself. Hence, the 3
co-defendants of Autor are not responsible for the injury inflicted by him on Angel
Pulido. Judging from the nature of the wound, w/c was abt 11 inches in length, it is
probable that it was caused by the point of the bolo on a downward stroke. It was not a
stab wound and was probably given during a commotion and w/o being aimed at any
particular part of the body. Moreover, as Autor struck the offended only once, it is
indicative that it was not his intention to take the offended party's life. Wherefore,
Eduardo Autor is guilty of lesiones graves w/ a sentence of 1yr 8 mos & 21 days of
prision correccional, since the offended party was incapacitated for the performance of
his usual work for a period of more than 90 days, and not of frustrated homicide. The
rest of the codefendants are acquitted.

259) People vs. Tumambing (G.R. No. 191261, March 2, 2011)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JENNY TUMAMBING y TAMAYO, Appellant.

Facts: The city prosecutor charged the accused Jenny Tumambing (Tumambing) with
rape. DK, the complainant, testified that at around 2:00 a.m. on June 26, 2004, she
went to sleep, leaving the lights on, in her cousin's rented room. She was startled when
somebody entered the room after she had turned off the lights. The intruder, a man,
poked a knife at DK and threatened to kill her if she made any noise. He removed DKs
clothes and undressed himself. He then succeeded in ravishing her. When the man was
about to leave, DK turned the light on and she saw his face. DK recognized him as the
same person who passed by her cousin's room several times in the afternoon of the
previous day, June 25, 2004. Later, she identified the accused Jenny Tumambing as her
rapist. The RTC found Tumambing guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
Tumambing appealed the decision to the CA but it only affirmed the previous ruling of
the RTC, hence this petition.

Issue: Won the accused was properly identified

Held: A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two

things: the identification of the author of the crime and his actual commission of the
same. An ample proof that a crime has been committed has no use if the prosecution is
unable to convincingly prove the offenders identity. The constitutional presumption of
innocence that an accused enjoys is not demolished by an identification that is full of
uncertainties.

In the case at bar the testimonies of the complainant and the testimonies of the neutral
party which complainant affirmed is not consistent in rightfully identifying the accused.
There were several instances wherein the complainant was asked to pin point the
person who raped her and it did not point out the accused, only in open court did she
pin point that the accused is Tumambing. With such serious doubts regarding the true
identity of DKs rapist, the Court cannot affirm the conviction of accused Tumambing.

260) People of the Philippines vs. Paloma (G.R. No. 178544, February 23,
2011)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
MANUEL PALOMA y ESPINOSA Appellant.

FACTS: The public prosecutor charged the accused Manuel Paloma (Paloma) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Criminal Case Q-03-116898 with violation
of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
At the trial, PO2 Bernard Amigo testified that at about 1:00 p.m. on April 23, 2003 the
Batasan Police Station got a tip from an informant that accused Paloma was selling
illegal drugs at Pacomara Street in Commonwealth, Quezon City. The station chief
directed PO2 Amigo and PO1 Arnold Peñalosa to conduct a buy-bust operation involving
Paloma. The police officers went to Pacomara Street with the informant and brought
with them a ₱100.00 bill marked with the initials "AP."

When the buy-bust team arrived at Pacomara Street at around 3:15 p.m., they saw
Paloma standing beside a man and a woman. PO1 Peñalosa and the informant
approached them; PO2 Amigo, the witness, stood as back-up some 15 meters away.
From where he stood, he saw PO1 Peñalosa talking to Paloma. Momentarily, PO1
Peñalosa waved his hand, signifying that he had made the purchase. On seeing the pre-
arranged signal, PO2 Amigo approached and arrested Paloma; PO1 Peñalosa for his
part arrested Paloma’s companions, later on identified as Noriel Bamba (Bamba) and
Angie Grotel (Grotel). PO2 Amigo recovered from Paloma’s pants pocket a plastic sachet
with a white crystalline substance and the marked ₱100.00 bill.

After the police officers informed Paloma, Bamba, and Grotel of their rights during
custodial investigation, they brought them to the police station and turned them over to
the desk officer. The arresting officers also turned over the three sachets of suspected
shabu that they seized. According to PO2 Amigo, two of these sachets were those that
PO1 Peñalosa bought from Paloma. The police eventually let Bamba and Grotel go for
the reason that the police officers found no illegal drugs in their possession.

In his defense, Paloma denied that such a buy-bust operation took place. He claimed
that at the time of the alleged buy-bust, he was with his 80-year-old mother at their
house on Pacomara Street, taking a nap. Suddenly, five armed men in civilian clothes
barged into the house and woke him up. Two of them held him by the arms while the
others searched the house. Although the men found nothing, they handcuffed him and
brought him to the police station.

On June 10, 2005 the RTC found Paloma guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal
Case Q-03-116898 of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.

On February 13, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. HC CR 01289 affirmed the
RTC’s ruling intoto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the prosecution succeeded in
proving beyond reasonable doubt that Paloma sold prohibited drugs to PO1 Peñalosa.

RULING: To prove the crime of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A.
9165, the prosecution is required to prove (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller as
well as the object and consideration of the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment given for the same. Further, the prosecution must present in court
evidence of corpus delicti.1
Here, the proof of the sale of illegal drugs is wanting.

One. Under the "objective" test set by the Court in People v. Doria, 2 the prosecution
must clearly and adequately show the details of the purported sale, namely, the initial
contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise
or payment of the consideration, and, finally, the accused’s delivery of the illegal drug
to the buyer, whether the latter be the informant alone or the police officer. This proof
is essential to ensure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit the
offense

While law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties, this presumption is disputable by contrary proof and cannot prevail over the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent. 7 The totality of the
evidence presented in this case does not support Paloma’s conviction for violation of
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense.8

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. HC CR 01289 dated February 13, 2007 as well as the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, in Criminal Case Q-03-116898, and
ACQUITS the accused-appellant Manuel Paloma y Espinosa of the crime of which he is
charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Court orders his immediate RELEASE
from custody unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.

261) People of the Philippines vs. Santiago (G.R. No. 191061, February 9,
2011)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ROSELLE SANTIAGO y PABALINAS, Appellant.

FACTS: The public prosecutor of Makati charged the accused Roselle Santiago y
Pabalinas alias Tisay (Roselle) with violation of Sections 5 and 15 of Republic Act (R.A.)
9165 for selling drugs at her house.

After a buy-bust operation, police officer Esguerra turned over Roselle and the seized
sachet to the investigator. When the contents of the first and second sachets (with “@
Tisay” and “RPS” markings) were examined, these were confirmed to be
methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). A confirmatory test also found Roselle
positive for the use of shabu.
In her defense, Roselle denies that she sold shabu to Esguerra. She claims that the
case was a product of mistaken identity, as she was not known as Tisay in the area but
Roselle. She narrated how she was forcibly taken from her house and into custody.

ISSUES: Whether or not the police conducted a valid arrest in Roselle’s case.

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s finding that the prosecution
evidence established her guilt of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

Waiver of right to question legality of arrest

Roselle claims that the police did not make a valid arrest in her case since they arrested
her without proper warrant and did not apprise her of the rights of a person taken into
custody as the Constitution and R.A. 7438 provide. But Roselle raised this issue only
during appeal, not before she was arraigned. For this reason, she should be deemed to
have waived any question as to the legality of her arrest.

Chain of custody

Although the prosecution established through Esguerra the acts constituting the crime
charged in the drug-pushing case (Section 5), it failed to provide proper identity of the
allegedly prohibited substance that the police seized from Roselle.

The request for laboratory exam reveals that it was not Esguerra who delivered the
specimen to the crime laboratory. It appears that Esguerra gave it to a certain SPO3
Puno who in turn forwarded it to a certain PO2 Santos. No testimony covers the
movement of the specimen among these other persons. Consequently, the prosecution
was unable to establish the chain of custody of the seized item and its preservation
from possible tampering.

CA decision is REVERSED.

262) People of the Philippines vs. Andongan (G.R. No. 184595, June 29,
2010)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.

SAPIA ANDONGAN y SANDIGANG, Appellant.

FACTS:Sapia Andongan y Sandigang (appellant) was charged with violation of Section
5, Article II of the Republic Act (R.A.) No. 916 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila.

On or about June 25, 2004 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not
being authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver, or give away to another any dangerous
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale ZERO
POINT ONE HUNDRED FORTY SIX (0.146) grams of white crystalline substance known
as "shabu" placed in a transparent plastic sachet marked as "SSA" containing
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a dangerous drug.

Culled from the evidence for the prosecution consisting, in the main, of the testimony of
PO2 Elymar Garcia (PO2 Garcia), a police officer assigned at the Station Anti-Illegal
Drugs (SAID) Office of the Moriones, Tondo Police Station, is the following version:

On the information of a confidential informant, the SAID Office formed a team to

conduct a buy-bust operation against appellant for her alleged illegal drugs trade. With
a P500.00 bill on which "RR," representing the initials of team leader SPO3 Rolando del
Rosario (SPO3 del Rosario), was marked. The team, together with the confidential
informant, met appellant at Abad Santos Avenue along Bambang Street at around 7:50
p.m. of June 25, 2004.

Informed that PO2 Garcia wanted to buy shabu, appellant inquired how much, to which
PO2 Garcia replied P500.00 worth. As PO2 Garcia handed that amount to appellant, the
latter drew from her pocket a plastic sachet of white crystalline substance which she
gave to him. At that instant, PO2 Garcia introduced himself as a police officer, apprised
appellant of her constitutional rights and, together with the team members, arrested
her.

The seized item was submitted for laboratory examination and found positive for shabu
(Exhibit "C"), hence, appellant's indictment.

At the Pre-trial, the defense counsel from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) declared
that it was interposing a negative defense and that it was not entering into any
stipulation other than on the trial court's jurisdiction and appellant's identity.

During the trial, the parties stipulated on the qualification of forensic chemist, P/Insp.
Elisa G. Reyes (Elisa), and on the genuineness and due execution of the documents
brought over by her. The prosecution admitted though that Elisa had no personal
knowledge as to the source of the specimen which she subjected to laboratory
examination. Her testimony was thereupon dispensed with.
RULING: It bears noting from the foregoing testimony that there is no claim or
indication that the shabu allegedly seized from appellant was the sameshabu subjected
to laboratory examination.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody

rulerequires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link
in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time
it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where
it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession,
the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it
was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would
then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in
the chain to have possession of the same.

Parenthetically, there is also no showing that the buy-bust team complied with the
procedural requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

With the flawed evidence for the prosecution, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty by the prosecution witness-police officer does not arise.

People v. Santos instructively tells us that the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence
nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Without the presumption of regularity, the evidentiary gap in identifying the seized
evidence from its turnover by the poseur-buyer, its handling and custody, until its
turnover to the forensic laboratory for analysis, stands out in bold relief. This gap
renders the case for the prosecution less than complete in terms of proving the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

For, among other things, it is incredible for an allegedly known drug-peddler to be

standing at a corner of a street at 7:50 in the evening instead of plying her trade
secretly, and with only a 0.146-gram sachet worth P500.00 of prohibited drugs in her
possession the value of which happens to be what a poseur-buyer wants to buy.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02467 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant, Sapia
Andongan y Sandigang, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and her immediate
release from custody is ordered, unless she is being lawfully held for another cause.
263) Agustin vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 158788, April 30, 2008)

ELY AGUSTIN, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS: On October 1, 1995, at 7:20 in the evening, armed men robbed the house of
spouses George and Rosemarie Gante in Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, forcibly
taking with them several valuables, including cash amounting to P600,000.00.3
Forthwith, the spouses reported the matter to the police, who, in turn, immediately
applied for a search warrant with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabugao, Ilocos
Sur.4 The MTC issued Search Warrant No. 5-95, 5 directing a search of the items stolen
from the victims, as well as the firearms used by the perpetrators. One of the target
premises was the residence of petitioner, named as one of the several suspects in the
crime.

On October 6, 1995, armed with the warrant, policemen searched the premises of
petitioner's house located in Sitio Padual, Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. The
search resulted in the recovery of a firearm and ammunitions which had no license nor
authority to possess such weapon, and, consequently, the filing of a criminal case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 1651-K, for violation of P.D. No. 1866 or Illegal
Possession of Firearms, against petitioner before the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution established the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt; and in the determination thereof, a factual issue, that is, whether a gun was
found in the house of petitioner, must necessarily be resolved.

RULING: Weighing these findings of the lower courts against the petitioner's claim that
the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to the material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of its witnesses, the Court finds, after a meticulous
examination of the records that the lower courts, indeed, committed a reversible error
in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime he was charged with.

As held in United States v. Estraña,25 a material matter is the main fact which is the
subject of inquiry or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact or any
fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony
relative to the subject of inquiry or which legitimately affects the credit of
any witness who testifies.

Such inconsistencies on the material details of the firearm's discovery are so glaring
that they ought not to have been ignored or brushed aside by the lower courts. The
contradictions of the prosecution witnesses not only undermine all efforts to reconstruct
the event in question, but altogether erode the evidentiary value of the prosecution
evidence.
Although the Court has held that frame-up is inherently one of the weakest defenses,as
it is both easily concocted and difficult to prove, in the present case, the lower courts
seriously erred in ignoring the weakness of the prosecution's evidence and its failure to
prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The rule requiring a claim of
frame-up to be supported by clear and convincing evidence[63] was never
intended to shift to the accused the burden of proof in a criminal case. As the Court
held in People of the Philippines v. Ambih:

[W]hile the lone defense of the accused that he was the victim of a frame-up is easily
fabricated, this claim assumes importance when faced with the rather shaky nature of
the prosecution evidence. It is well to remember that the prosecution must rely, not on
the weakness of the defense evidence, but rather on its own proof which must be
strong enough to convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be
punished. The constitutional presumption is that the accused is innocent even
if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to
convict him.(Emphasis supplied)

In People of the Philippines v. Gonzales, the Court held that where there was material
and unexplained inconsistency between the testimonies of two principal prosecution
witnesses relating not to inconsequential details but to the alleged transaction itself
which is subject of the case, the inherent improbable character of the testimony given
by one of the two principal prosecution witnesses had the effect of vitiating the
testimony given by the other principal prosecution witness.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt

264) People vs. Webb, et. al. (G.R. No. 176864, December 14, 2010)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN,
HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and
GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.

Facts: On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years
old, and xxx, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an
intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave
detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered
them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery
especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what
everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it
had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers,
who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P.
Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as
the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory
after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public
prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.

The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, presided over by Judge Amelita G.
Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart
remained at large.

The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her
testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the
victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of
the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde,
Estrellita’s husband.

Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean
in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as
documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented
witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her
testimony.
But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it,
the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations.

On January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered
judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on
Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to
twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the
penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and
increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde.

The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the
trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered
Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part
in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a
Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen
specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under
the safekeeping of the NBI.

The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence to
give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want
to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.

Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has
custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial
record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the
prosecution offered in evidence in the case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground
that the government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial
of his right to due process.

Controlling Issues:

1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying
Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the
persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut
Alfaro’s testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.

Other Issues:

1. Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the government’s failure
to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus
depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence; and

2. Whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez,

Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her
mother and sister.

Held:

The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss of DNA Evidence

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the
ground of violation of his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on
order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken
from Carmela.

When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist,
the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine
precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence.

Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court
rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-
accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.

Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he
allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken
against him and the other accused.

They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error
committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused
filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of
their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules
allowing such test. Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having such test done,
the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to
produce the semen specimen at some future time.

Suspicious Details
Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an
"asset." She supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and other
criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug
pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest
of the leader of the "Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer. Because of her talent,
the task force gave her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed
the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and
she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone
who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest.
Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not
happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as well
assume the role of her informant.

Webb’s U.S. Alibi

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi through (a) the travel
preparations; (b) the two immigration checks; (c) details of US sojourn; (d) the second
immigration check; and (e) alibi versus positive identification; and (f) a documented
alibi.

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence
that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime,
and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy
of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of
departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been
impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on
March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the
Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines,
said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.

Effect of Webb’s alibi to others

Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect
to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and
Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the
crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the
anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily
fall.
Conclusion

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains
doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all
possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For,
it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt
hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the
testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the
witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?

The Supreme Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005
and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano,
Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and
Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED
from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.

265) Lejano vs. People (G.R. No. 176389, December 14, 2010)

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts: On June 30, 1991, Estrelita Vizconde and her daughter Carmela nineteen and
Jennifer seven were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense
investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed
confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them
discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially
to the public whose interest were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody
referred to as the Vizconde massacre. Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star witness
Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed ghat she witnessed the crime. She
pointed to the accused Herbert Jeffrey Webb, Antonio “Tony Boy” Lejano, Artemio Dong
Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Pyke Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Ging
Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged police officer Gerardo Biong
as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro’s testimony, on August 10,
1995, the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb
etal. The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating
her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the
victims, the security guard of Pitong Daan subdivision, the former laundry-woman of
the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro Vizconde,
Estrelita’s husband.

Issue: Whether or not failure to conduct a DNA test on the semen specimen found on
Carmela is a ground for Webb’s acquittal.

Held: No. The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and,
consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified
Webb in her testimony, as Carmela’s rapist and killer but serious questions had been
raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exist a possibility that Alfaro had
lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen was taken from Carmela cannot possibly
lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two
persons have the same DNA finger print, with the exception of identical twins. If, on
examination, the DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did
not rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the court would have been able to determine
that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did. Still, Webb is not entitled to
acquittal for failure of the state to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For
one thing, the ruling in Brady vs Maryland that he cites his no longer long been
overtaken by the decision in Arizona vs Youngblood, where the US Supreme Court held
that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it
might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of
the prosecution or the police. Here, the state presented a medical expert who testified
on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact, sought to have the same subjected
to DNA test.

For another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not
yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test and no
Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence.

266) People vs. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59 (1971)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PABLEO DRAMAYO, PATERNO ECUBIN, PRIOLO BILLONA, FRANCISCO
BILLONA, MODESTO RONQUILLA, CRESCENCIO SAVANDAL and SEVERO
SAVANDAL, defendants; PABLEO DRAMAYO and PATERNO ECUBIN,
defendants-appellant.

Facts: On the morning of January 9, 1964, the two accused Pablo Dramayo and
Paterno Ecubin in the company of the deceased Estelito Nogaliza saw its chief of police.
Their purpose was to shed light on a robbery committed in the house of the deceased
five days before by being available as witnesses. The response was in the negative as
they themselves were prime suspects having been implicated by at least two individuals
who had confessed. At about 7:00 of the same day, while they were in the house of co-
accused Priolo Billon, the accused Dramayo invited all those present including the other
accused of a drinking session at a place at the back of the schoolhouse. Dramayo
brought up the idea of killingEstelito Nogaliza so that he could not satisfy in the robbery
case. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubinto to ambush Estelito who was returning
from Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby. Soon the unfortunate victim
was sighted. He was accosted by Dramayo with a request for a cigarette and was hit by
Ecubin with a piece of wood. Dramayo stabbed the accused repeatedly and warned the
rest of the group to keep their mouths sealed. He went to the house of the deceased
and informed the deceased widow Corazon that he had just seen the cadaver of
Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police were duly notified. The latter,
upon noticing the bloodstains on their trousers of Dramayo asked him to explain. It was
on the basis of the above testimony offered by the prosecution that the court reached
its decision. It found the accused Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Reference was likewise made in such a
decision as to why the other co-accused was not convicted. The lower court was hardly
impressed with the defense of alibi interposed by now appellantsDramauyo and Ecubin
and it must have been their persuasive character that must have led to the able brief.

Issue: Whether or not the presumption of innocence will apply to the accused over the
evidence presented

Held: It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it

must be, according to the Constitution.5 That is a right safeguarded by both appellants.
The accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is
incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not
even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeited if the
requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt is shown
beyond a reasonable doubt. It is understandable why the stress should be on the
absence of sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of appellants beyond a reasonable
doubt, the defense of alibi interposed hardly meriting any further discussion. It cannot
be denied though that the credible and competent evidence of record resulted in moral
certainty being entertained not only by the trial judge but by us as to the culpability of
appellants. The force of the controlling doctrines, on the other hand, required that the
other three accused be acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of appellants, the
requisite quantum of proof to show guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not present.
There is no question as to the other two who testified for the state being likewise no
longer subject to any criminal liability. "Upon the other hand, there are certain facts
which if taken together are sufficient to raise in the mind of the court a grave doubt as
to the guilt of the defendant-appellant, 'that doubt engendered by an investigation of
the whole proof and an inability after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon
the certainty of guilt. The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any
surprise on the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest
credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of
innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by
the proof that was offered by the prosecution

267) Short Title: Alejandro vs. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322 (1988)

Facts:

During arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the Crime of Homicide.
Respondent Judge issued an order stating that the accused admits in open
court that he killed the deceased but that he acted in self-defense hence the
defense counsel should first prove evidence in self-defense and then
prosecution to present its evidence to disprove the same.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration contending that the Court action was violative of
Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which establishes the sequence in the
presentation of evidence by the parties in criminal cases, first by the prosecution and
then by the defense, and not vice versa. Additionally, petitioner claimed that the
procedure adopted by respondent Judge is prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the accused in the sense that the same would give rise to the
presumption that the prosecution had already established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt when what is only on record is the
accused’s admission that he had killed the victim in self defense.

Issue: Whether or not the judge’s order requiring the defense to present first after the
accused entered a plea of guilty was violative of the latter’s right to be presumed
innocent?

Ruling: YES. Enshrined in our Constitution as a protection to accused persons

in criminal cases is the requirement that no person shall be held to answer
for a criminal offense without due process of law. That requirement simply
requires that the procedure established by law shall be followed. Section 3 of Rule 119
lays down the order of trial when an accused entered a plea of not guilty- the
prosecution first and then defense.

The procedure outlined safeguards and protects the fundamental right of the
accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. That right is
founded on the principle of justice and is intended not to protect the guilty
but to prevent as far as human agencies can, the conviction of an innocent
person. Indeed, the form of a trial is also a matter of public order and interest; the
orderly course of procedure requires that the prosecution shall go forward and present
all of its proof in the first instance.
It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Gaoiran, 17 Phil.404 (1910), relied upon by the
prosecution and the trial Court, the defense had produced its proofs before the
prosecution presented its case, and it was held that no substantial rights of the accused
were prejudiced. There is one radical difference, however, since in that case, no
objection was entered in the Court below to the procedure followed in the
presentation of proof. In this case, the change in order of trial made by
respondent Judge was promptly and timely objected to by the defense.

268) Short Title: Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980)

Full Title: PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
Patricio Dumlao is the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from
his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits. He filed for re-election to
the same office for the January 30, 1980 local elections. Meanwhile, Romeo
Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such,
has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.
Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of
San Miguel, Iloilo. Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was passed (paragraph 4 thereof)
providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the
Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared
as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any
retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5
years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has
retired.
Dumlao assailed the B.P. averring that it is based on purely arbitrary grounds
and therefore class legislation. Hence, he claims it is unconstitutional. 
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection of law
Ruling: NO.
The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would
never have been merged. Dumlao’s cause is different from Igot’s. They have
separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be
eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the
exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: 1. the existence of an
appropriate case; 2. an interest personal and substantial by the party raising
the constitutional question; 3. the plea that the function be exercised at the
earliest opportunity; 4. the necessity that the constitutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite
was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes
may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.

Substantive Aspect: Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52

is discriminatory against him personally is disproven by the fact that several
petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based
on the challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC (as listed in p.
15, respondent's Comment). The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to
the safer guard of equal protection is neither well taken.

The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to

rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from
another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age,
have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of
younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In the case of a 65-year old
elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal
office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from
which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for
new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is
present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already
declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by
virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that
inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision.

Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does it permit
of such denial. The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to
the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the same class. There is an
additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the
questioned provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
equivocal breach. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws
shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond
reasonable doubt.
269) Short Title: People vs. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 857 (1953)

Full Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AQUINO MINGOA, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal

treasurer of Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund
amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the provincial auditor, the defendant
Aquino Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds in
the Court of First Instance of Romblon, and having been found guilty as charged and
sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals.
But that court certified the case here on the ground that it involved a
constitutional question.

The evidence shows that it is not disputed that upon examination of his books and
accounts on September 1, 1949, defendants, as accountable officer, was found short in
the sum above-named and that, required to produce the missing fund, he was not able
to do so. He explained to the examining officer that some days before he had,
by mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he took with him to
show and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore when he
returned. But he did not testify in court and presented no evidence in his
favor.

Issue: Whether or not  the constitutional right of the accused on presumption of

innocent was violated.

Ruling:

We agree with the trial judge that defendant's explanation is inherently

unbelievable and cannot overcome the presumption of guilt arising from his
inability to produce the fund which was found missing. As His Honor observes, if
the money was really lost without defendant's fault, the most natural thing for him to
do would be to so inform his superiors and apply for release from liability. But this he
did not do. Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse
that he preferred to do his own sleuthing, he even did not report the loss to the police.
Considering further as the prosecution points out in its brief, that defendant had at first
tried to avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to examine his accounts, and that for
sometime before the alleged loss many teachers and other employees of the town had
not been paid their salaries, there is good ground to believe that defendant had really
malversed the fund in question and that his story about its loss was pure invention.
The contention that this legal provision violates the constitutional right of
the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be
sustained. The question of the constitutionality of the statute not having
been raised in the court below, it may not be considered for the first time on
appeal. 

The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain
facts are proved. It makes the failure of public officer to have duly
forthcoming, upon proper demaand, any public funds or property with which
he is chargeable prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use. The ultimate fact presumed is that officer has malversed
the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise
from proof that he has received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming
upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact
proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two.
Furthermore, the statute establishes only a   prima facie presumption, thus giving the
accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable
and will stand the test of validity laid down in the above citations.

270) Short Title: Feeder Int’l Line vs. CA CR 942 62, May 31, 1991

Full Tutle: G.R. No. 94262             May 31, 1991

FEEDER INTERNATIONAL LINE, PTE., LTD., by its agent, FEEDER

INTERNATIONAL (PHILS.) INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Fourteenth Division, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, and
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondents.

Facts:

The instant petition seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
dated May 8, 1990, affirming the decision rendered by respondent Court of Tax Appeals
which found the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" liable under Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines (Presidential Decree No. 1464), as amended, and its
cargo of 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil liable under
Section 2530(a), (f), and (1-1) of the same Code and ordering the forfeiture of the said
vessel and its cargo.

The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated
by Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on May 6,
1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil
consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines.

On May 14, 1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in
Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the
vessel only came to the knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by information of
the civilian informer in the area. Acting on said information, the Acting
District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team on May 19, 1986 to
verify the report.

The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the
required ship and shipping documents, except for a clearance from the port
authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for "Zamboanga."

In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention over the same was issued after due investigation. The petitioner then filed its
Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure and Detention which the
District Collector denied in his Order dated December 12, 1986.

Issue: Whether or not there was an illegal importation committed, or at least an

attempt thereof, which would justify a forfeiture of the subject vessel and its cargo.

Ruling:

Petitioner avers that respondent court erred in finding that an illegal importation had
been committed on the basis of circumstantial evidence, erroneously relying on Section
5 (now Section 4), Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. As earlier stated, forfeiture
proceedings are not criminal in nature, hence said provision of Rule 133 which involves.
such circumstantial evidence as will produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt does
not apply.
Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation
begins when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the
Philippines with intention to unload therein. It is clear from the provision of
the law that mere intent to unload is sufficient to commence an importation.
And "intent," being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must
ordinarily be inferred from the facts, and therefore can only be proved by unguarded,
expressions, conduct and circumstances generally.
In the case at bar, that petitioner is guilty of illegal importation, there having
been an intent to unload, is amply supported by substantial evidence as
clearly demonstrated by this comprehensive discussion in respondent court's
decision:
It is undisputed that the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" entered the jurisdiction of the
Philippines. The issue that calls for Our resolution is whether or not there was an
intention to unload. The facts and circumstances borne by the evidence convince
 Us that there was intent to unload. The following circumstances unmistakably
point to this conclusion.
1. Considering that the vessel came from Singapore, the route to Zamboanga
was shorter and Iloilo lies further north. 1âwphi1 It is not logical for the sailing
vessel to travel a longer distance to get the necessary repairs.
2. When the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" anchored at Guiuanon Island, Guimaras,
Iloilo, it did not notify the Iloilo port or Customs authorities of its arrival. The
master of the vessel did not file a marine protest until 12 days after it had
anchored, despite the supposed urgency of the repairs needed and
notwithstanding the provision (Sec. 1016) of the Code requiring the master to
file protest within 24 hours.
3. At the time of boarding by the customs personnel, the required ship's and
shipping documents were not on board except the clearance from Singaporean
port officials clearing the vessel for Zamboanga. Petitioner claims that these were
turned over to the shipping agent who boarded the vessel on May 15, 1986.
However, this claim is belied by the sworn marine protest (Exhibit "E") of the
master of M/T "ULU WAI" Mr. Romeo Deposa.
It was only on or about the 20th of May when I instructed one of the crew
to: get down of (sic) the vessel and find means and ways to contact the
vessel's representative.
Moreover, in such Sworn Statement (Exhibit "G"), ship agent, Antonio Torres,
stated that he did not know the buyer of the oil, which is impossible if he had the
Local Purchase Order of the alleged buyer, Pogun Construction SDN. Torres also
swore that his knowledge came from the vessel's owner, without mentioning the
shipping documents which indicate such data. He also said that he did not know
the consignee of the oil which would have been patent from the documents.
Lastly, as also pointed out by the court a quo, the captain of the vessel M/T "ULU
WAI" Romeo Deposa, in his sworn statement to custom authorities on May 26,
1986, enumerated the documents he allegedly gave to Mr. Antonio Torres, but
did not mention as among them the Local Purchase Order of Pogun Construction
SDN and the Bill of Lading.
4. When the vessel was inspected, the tugboat M/T "CATHEAD", and the large
M/T "SEMIRANO NO. 819" were alongside it. A fixture note revealed that the
barge and the tugboat were contracted by Consignee Far East Synergy to load
the cargo of the vessel into the awaiting barge and to discharge the same to
Manila (Exhibits "I" and "I-1").
It is of no moment that the fixture note did not expressly mention the vessel M/T
"ULU WAI" Government witnesses, Asencio and Lumagpas, testified that it was
the vessel's cargo which was to be unloaded and brought to Manila by them. 13
The aforequoted findings of fact of respondent Court of Appeals are in
consonance with the findings of both the Collector and the Commissioner of
Customs, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals. We, therefore, find no
compelling reason to deviate from the elementary principle that findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies for that matter, are entitled to great weight and are conclusive and
binding upon this Court absent a showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

271) Short Title: People vs. Martos, 211 SCRA 805 (1992)
Full Title: G.R. No. 91847 July 24, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CARLITO MARTOS, accused-appellant.

Facts:

In an ordinary appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53 of
Rosales, Pangasinan, herein petitioner seeks the reversal of the same, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Carlito Martos guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the offense of selling marijuana, defined and penalized under
Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua  and a fine of P30,000.00, and to pay the
costs.

A team from the First Narcotics Regional Unit went to Bgy. Carmen East,
Rosales, Pangasinan in pursuit of a certain “Lito” who was engaged in selling
marijuana to students and adults alike. Acting as poseur-buyer, the officer
after the alleged ‘sale’ arrested Lito.
Court finds Carlito Martos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of selling
marijuana or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In his appeal, Carlito Martos’ alleged that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
are highly improbable, self-contradictory and contradictory. Thus, they outlined several
inconsistencies and irreconcilable differences in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses.

Issue: Whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not sufficient to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime he was convicted of.

Ruling:

There is no question that persons who sell prohibited drugs deserve the severest
sanctions of the law for the misery they caused our people, especially the youth, many
of whom have lost their future because of the evil influence of drugs. While this Court
strongly commends the efforts of the law enforcement officers who are engaged in the
difficult and dangerous task of apprehending and prosecuting drug traffickers, the Court
cannot simply disregard the many reports of false arrest of innocent persons for
extortion and blackmail. 
There is no dispute that the findings of facts of the trial courts deserve great weight
and respect for they have the privilege of examining the demeanor of the witnesses
while on the witness stand and determine the veracity of their testimonies. The rule,
however, admits of certain exceptions, such as (1) when the conclusion is a
finding based entirely on speculations; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and
(5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and
the appellee. 
The case at bar calls for a careful scrutiny of the records due to the
irreconcilable differences in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
which weakens the case for the People. We cannot but observe that the trial
judge did a poor analysis and synthesis of the facts as to deserve admonition.
Our Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a "judge should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence."  He is expected to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary such that he
is likewise expected to be studious and cautious in making decisions. He should exhibit
an industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed upon him. Sadly,
the same is wanting among the virtues of the trial judge in the case at bar.
In prosecuting a case for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, the
prosecution must be able to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person
charged at a particular time, date and place committed any of such unlawful acts.  As it
is, We are not convinced that the evidence of the prosecution could stand
ground sufficient to convict herein appellant. We cannot even presume that
official duty was regularly performed by the arresting officers, for it cannot
by itself prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded
an accused person. "If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction."  The accused is not even called
upon to offer evidence on his behalf. His freedom is forfeited only if the requisite
quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence.

272) Short Title: People vs. Zafra (G.R. No. 174369, June 20, 2012)
Full Title: G.R. No. 174369               June 20, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ZAFRA MARAORAO y MACABALANG, Accused-Appellant.
Facts:
Before us is an appeal from the March 1, 2006 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 35, convicting appellant Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang of
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise
known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Appellant was charged under an Information dated January 4, 2001 filed before the
RTC of Manila as follows:
That on or about November 30, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, without being authorized by law to possess or use regulated drug, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control one (1) transparent plastic sachet containing ONE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED EIGHTY POINT ZERO EIGHT ONE (1,280.081) grams of white crystalline
substance known as "shabu" containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated
drug, without the corresponding license or prescription thereof.
In affirming the RTC Decision, the CA held that there was no showing that
the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied a fact or
circumstance of weight and substance which would have affected the case. It
gave credence to the testimony of PO3 Vigilla and found appellant's defense of denial
inherently weak. Furthermore, the CA held that appellant was lawfully searched as a
consequence of his valid warrantless arrest.
Hence, this present recourse.
In his Supplemental Brief, appellant stresses that PO3 Vigilla testified that
when they first saw appellant, he was talking with a certain person. It was
appellant’s companion who scampered away upon seeing the police. PO3 Vigilla further
testified that appellant tried to flee but they were able to arrest him before he could do
so. Appellant argues that his alleged attempt to flee does not constitute a crime that
should have prompted the police to arrest him. Since his arrest was illegal, he contends
that the subsequent search made by the police was likewise illegal, and
the shabu supposedly recovered from him is inadmissible in evidence.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution was able to overcome accused- appellants
presumption of innocence
Ruling: NO
We have repeatedly held that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have
reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the case.
It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review. This
Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not
raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in arriving at a just disposition of
the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in
keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent
unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the crime charged and the complicity or participation of the accused. While
a lone witness’ testimony is sufficient to convict an accused in certain instances, the
testimony must be clear, consistent, and credible—qualities we cannot ascribe to this
case. Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be believed,
it must both come from a credible witness and be credible in itself – tested
by human experience, observation, common knowledge and accepted
conduct that has evolved through the years. Clearly from the foregoing, the
prosecution failed to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was
indeed in possession of shabu, and that he freely and consciously possessed the same.
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic
constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the
prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense
charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must
rest on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. In this case, the prosecution’s evidence failed to overcome the presumption of
innocence, and thus, appellant is entitled to an acquittal.
Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway
judgment.1âwphi1 Where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted
even though their innocence may not have been established. The Constitution
presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long standing
that the presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a
matter of right.

273) Short Title: Corpuz vs. People, 194 SCRA 73 (1991)

Full Title: G.R. No. 74259             February 14, 1991

GENEROSO P. CORPUZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower court’s decision finding him guilty for malversation
of public funds. The accused was the acting supervising cashier at the
Provincial Treasurer’s office. He denied having misused the whole amount
of P72,823.08 which was discovered to be a shortage from the government
funds contending that the P50,000.00 was the unliquidated withdrawal made
by their paymaster Pineda thru the 4 checks he issued while the petitioner
was on leave and that he was forced by their Provincial Treasurer Aluning to
post said amount in his cash book despite not actually receiving the amount.
He insists, however, that he is not guilty of the charge because the shortage imputed to
him was malversed by other persons.
His claim is that the P50,000.00 constituting the bulk of the shortage represented the
unliquidated withdrawal made by Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through one of four
separate checks issued and encashed while the petitioner was on official leave of
absence. He avers he was later made to post the amount in his cash book by Acting
Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo C. Aluning and he had no choice but to comply
although he had not actually received the said amount.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of innocence of the
accused of the charge against him
Ruling:
The above findings are mainly factual and are based on substantial evidence. There is
no reason to disturb them, absent any of the exceptional circumstances that will justify
their review and reversal. On the contrary, the Court is convinced that the facts as
established point unmistakably to the petitioner's guilt of the offense charged.
The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a fatal
omission.1âwphi1 That is not a preliminary requirement to the filing of an information
for malversation as long as the  prima facie guilt of the suspect has already been
established. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use
The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold him
responsible for a crime he has not committed is less than convincing. His
attempt to throw the blame on others for his failure to account for the missing money
only shows it is he who is looking for a scapegoat. The plaintive protest that he is "a
small fry" victimized by the "untouchables" during the Marcos regime is a mere
emotional appeal that does not impress at all. The suggestion that the supposed
injustice on the petitioner would be abetted by this Court unless his conviction is
reversed must be rejected as an warrant presumptuousness.
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the
evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There
is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming
and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of
persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must
yield to the positive finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the
prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His conviction
must be affirmed.

274) Short Title: Dizon Paminatuan v. People, (G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994)
Full Title: [G.R. No. 111426. July 11, 1994.]

NORMA DIZON-PAMINTUAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
The fact that a crime of robbery has been committed on February 12, 1988 is
established by the testimony of private complainant Teodoro T. Encarnacion
who immediately reported the same to Parañaque Police Station of the
Southern Police District (TSN, Hearings of October 3, 1988, November 9, 1988 and
January 11, 1989; Exh. A) and submitted a list and sketches of the jewelries robbed,
among other things, from their residence located at Better Living Subdivision,
Parañaque, Metro Manila (Exh. C, C-1 to C-4 and D).

The second element is likewise established by convincing evidence. On February 24,

1988, Accused-appellant was found selling the jewelries (Exhs. C-2, C-3 and C-4) which
was displayed in a showcase in a stall located at Florentino Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila
[Testimonies of Teodoro Encarnacion (id. supra); Cpl. Ignacio Jao (TSN, Hearing of
February 13, 1989) and Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez (TSN, Hearing of June 4, 1989)].

On the element of knowledge that the items are derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery and of intent to gain for herself or for another
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals was of the opinion that there was not
enough evidence to prove the value of the pieces of jewelry recovered, which
is essential to the imposition of the proper penalty under Section 3 of P.D.
No. 1612. It opined that the trial court erred in concluding that "the value of
the recovered jewelries is P93,000.00 based on the bare testimony of the
private complainant and the self-serving list he submitted
Issue: whether the prosecution proved the existence of the third element: that the
accused know or should have known that the items recovered from here were the
proceeds of the crime of robbery of theft.
Ruling:
One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance,
consciousness or awareness thereof, of is aware of the existence of
something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within
the mind’s grasp with certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a
particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is
aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not
exist. On the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his
duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists.
Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot
penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it
must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. And given
two equally plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose
the one which sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that" mere possession of any good,
article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is
presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were
the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or
logical inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the presumption of
innocence enshrined in the fundamental law
"It has been frequently decided, in case of statutory crimes, that no
constitutional provision is violated by a statute providing that proof by the
state of some material fact or facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of
guilt, and that then the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of
showing that such act or acts are innocent and are committed without
unlawful intention. 
The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied
solely on the testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the
presumption, and, on the contrary, even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in
the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo.

275) Short Title: People vs. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752 (1950)

Full Title: G.R. No. L-2809             March 22, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRISCO HOLGADO, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the CFI of Romblon with slight
illegal detention. According to the information, he did "feloniously and without
justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero
Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal
liberty." Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty to the information above
described.
It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the
judgment, the offense charged is named slight illegal detention while in the
body of the judgment it is said that the accused "stands charged with the
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention." In the information filed by the
provincial fiscal it is said that he "accuses Frisco Holgado of the crime of slight illegal
detention." The facts alleged in said information are not clear as to whether the offense
charged is merely "slight illegal detention" as the offense is named therein or the capital
offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial judge in his
judgment. Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence
appears to have been presented by either party, the trial judge must have
deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the information
Issue: Whether or not the accused was sufficiently given the right to counsel?
Ruling:
Under rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, when a defendant appears without
attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with: 1 — It must
inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being
arraigned; 2 — After giving him such information the court must ask him if he
desires the aid of an attorney; 3 — If he desires and is unable to employ
attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio  to defend him; and 4 — If
the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant
him a reasonable time therefor.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record
discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an
attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to
inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable
time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio. The question asked by the court to the
accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did
such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney
before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so framed that it could have
been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilt if he
had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process
clause contained in our Constitution.
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that
"no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given
the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if
it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to
be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right
and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him
whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de oficio  if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to
procure an attorney of his own.
It must be added, in the instant case, that the accused who was unaided by counsel
pleaded guilty but with the following qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr.
Ocampo." The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of this qualification. the
record does not show whether the supposed instructions was real and whether it had
reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No
investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused
and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good
defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became
satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found
that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong
for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome
a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the
accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the qualified plea given by him and
the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.

276) Short Title: Delgado vs. CA, 145 SCRA 357 (1986)
Full Title: G.R. No. L-46392 November 10, 1986
EMMA DELGADO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
Emma R. Delgado, herein petitioner, together with Gloria C. Tortona, Celia
Capistrano and Catalino Bautista alias Atty. Paulino Bautista were charged
for estafa causing the frustration of one medical student. Delgado was assisted
by one Atty. Yco. The said lawyer has filed for multiple postponement of trial and one
time he failed to appear in court by reason of him being allegedly sick. No medical
certificate was furnished. The court was not impressed with such actuation and had
considered the same as Delgado’s waiver of her right to trial. The lower court
convicted her and the others. She appealed before the CA and the CA
sustained the lower court’s rule. Delgado later found out that Yco is not a
member of the IBP.
Issue: Whether or not  due process was observed.
Ruling:
NO.
The main thrust of petitioner's arguments is that she is entitled to a new trial and
therefore, all the assailed orders of respondent courts should be vacated and set aside,
because her "lawyer," Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, is not a lawyer.
This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a
member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional
Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that
any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal
perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly
be a denial of due process.

277) Short Title: People vs. Baluyot, 75 SCRA 148 (1977)

Full Title: G.R. No. L-32752-3 January 31, 1977
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MIGUEL BALUYOT y DULAY, PABLO PINCA y NARCA and ANTONIO
BALINJARI y NAVAL, alias TONY BALUYOT, defendants-appellants.
Facts:
This is an automatic review of the decision rendered on October 7, 1970 by the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Fifth Judicial District holding sessions in Malolos Bulacan (Judge
Abelardo M. Dayrit, presiding), convicting the defendants Miguel Baluyot y
Dulay, Pablo Pinca y Narca and Antonio Balinjari y Naval, alias Tony Baluyot,
of the crime of robbery with homicide
Upon arraignment on September 28, 1970, all the accused, assisted by
attorney de oficio, Atty. Oscar Torres, pleaded not guilty to the information.
The following day — September 29 —when the case was called for trial, the
prosecution started presenting its evidence. The accused were assisted by
the same attorney de officio, Atty. Oscar Torres, who manifested that he was
appearing as counsel for the accused in that day's trial only. The prosecution
thereupon called, as its first witness, Dr. Ricardo V. Evangelists, a medicolegal officer of
the Provincial Hospital of Malolos, Bulacan. Among other things, Dr. Evangelista
Identified the post-mortem findings on the deceased Marcelino Carceles y Abasola alias
Gerry Surete and the diagram he prepared in connection with the said post-mortem
findings.
The accused were this time assisted by another counsel de oficio, Atty.
Godofredo Linsangan. At this hearing, the prosecution called on its second
witness, one Democrito Mendoza. a corporal of the police force of Malolos,
Bulacan. Among other things, Corporal Mendoza Identified the first accused
Miguel Baluyot and the statement given by the latter to the police. The same witness
also Identified the third accused Antonio Balinjari y Naval, alias Tony Baluyot, and the
statement given by said accused to the police. The last witness presented by the
prosecution on this day was Guillermo R. Cruz, patrolman of the Malolos Police Force.
Among other things, this witness Identified the second accused Pablo Pinca y Narca and
the statement given the police
Thereafter. the continuation of the trial was reset for October 7, 1970. At this
hearing, the accused were assisted by another counsel de oficio, Atty.
Eduardo Villafuerte, who was appointed by the trial court after the accused
informed it that. they had no lawyer. Then the trial court asked the new counsel
de oficio what his pleasure was, and the latter requested that he be given a few
minutes within which to confer with the accused. The trial court gave him twenty (20)
minutes within which to "consumate" his conference. Accordingly, when the session
was resumed, Atty. Villafuerte manifested that "after conferring with the accused, they
intimated . . . their desire to withdraw their former plea of not guilty and to substitute
in lieu thereof the plea of guilty to the offense charged."
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused appellants and
imposing the supreme penalty on the basis alone of their plea of guilty to the
information
Ruling: YES
The court a quo cannot plead ignorance of the prevailing injunction directed
towards trial judges to exercise patience and circumspection in explaining to
the accused not only the nature and meaning of the accusation and the full
import of their plea of guilty but also the meaning — in layman's language — of
the aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime, because not
very long before the rendition of the decision under review, this COURT and thereafter
set out in See. 5, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Plea of guilty — Determination of punishment. — Where the
defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or information, if the
 court accepts the plea and has discretion as to the punishment
for the offense, it may hear witnesses to determine what
punishment shall be imposed.
Furthermore, the court a quo did not even consult the testimonies of the three
State witnesses — namely, the doctor and the police officers who took down
the statements of the accused — who testified during the first and second
hearings, at least with the end in view of ascertaining the degree of the
penalty that should be imposed after accepting the plea of guilty of the
accused. What the court a quo did was only to ask the accused whether they were
ready to receive their sentence after they had affirmed the "truthfulness and
correctness" of their counsel's manifestation on their change of plea. In short, the
court a quo did not even inform the accused that their plea of guilty might mean death
for all of them.
WE deeply lament this attitude of the court a quo. Be that as it may, however, WE only
hope that hereafter trial courts would strictly comply with the rigid standard set in the
following cases after Apduhan, Arpa and Solacito, all of which have invariably,
consistently and firmly established and stressed the duty of trial courts before accepting
the plea of guilty of an accused to a capital offense. 
The latest case of People vs. Hondolero (G.R. No. L- 40633 August 25, 1976), where
WE reiterated the rule long established since the Talbanos, Rota and Agcaoili
cases, supra, that since there is no law prohibiting the taking of testimony
after a plea of guilty, where a grave offense is charged, this Court has
deemed such taking of testimony the prudent and proper course to follow for
the purpose of establishing not only the guilt but as well as the precise
degree of culpability of the defendant."

278) People vs. Magsi, 124 SCRA 69 (1983)

FACTS:
Eloy Magsi, Juan Ponce, Perfecto Arce, Gerardo Flores, Opring Olazo, Teodoro del
Rosario and Peter Doe where accused of attacking, assaulting and shooting Jesus
Gallardo causing the latter’s death. On August 20, 1970, defendant-appellant was
apprehended and was scheduled for arraignment. Altogether, this case was set and
rescheduled for six (6) times. Of the six hearing dates, accused at two instances
entered a qualified plea of guilty. Recorded proceedings showed that de officio counsel
Atty. Rivera and the accused were hardly afforded by the Court any opportunity to
discuss the case together, and the qualified plea of guilty resulted from the Court’s
prodding rather than from accused's spontaneous volition. At the second instance the
Court knew accused's prior plea of guilty by alleged duress employed on him by the
other accused. Accused's allegation of duress prompted his lawyer to move for the
resetting of the case for the study and presentation of possible mitigating
circumstances. Subsequently, several resetting of the hearing of the case happened
until October 19, 1970 when Atty. Cariaso outrightly informed the Court that the
accused was ready to enter an unqualified plea of guilty and hearing was conducted
that day. Based on accused's plea of guilty without any evidence for the prosecution on
any of the alleged aggravating circumstances nor accused's evidence on duress, the
Court rendered its decision the next day finding the accused guilty of the offense
charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Trial Court erred in not making an inquiry as to the extent of the
force applied by Eloy Magsi and his companions upon the accused Teodoro del Rosario,
when they ordered him to kill Jesus Gallardo, thus, not affording the accused the right
to be heard.
RULING:
In a long line of cases, the Court has long been commenting on the necessity for strict
and substantial compliance with every court’s obligation to an accused. Thus, “while
there is no law requiring it, yet in every case under the plea of guilty where
the penalty may be death, it is advisable for the court to call witnesses for
the purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the
defendant” and “the Court should be sure that the defendant fully
understands the nature of the charges preferred against him and the
character of the punishment to be imposed before sentencing him...”.

In the case at bar, the Court could have complied, as it failed to do so the
first time, with its bounden duty to apprise and advise the accused of the
seriousness of the charges, the meaning of the qualifying and modifying
circumstances, and gravity of the penalty that may be imposed on him
despite the plea of guilty, as well as received prosecution's evidence on the
alleged aggravating circumstances attendant to the commission of the
offense charged. But these considerations notwithstanding, sans any
evidence whatsoever from the prosecution nor from the defense, after Atty.
Cariaso's manifestation, and its trite queries addressed to the accused
whether he confirmed the same or not, the Court proceeded to decide the
case. The conduct of the court a quo taken in the light of the foregoing
decisions clearly established the fact that it had been remiss in its duties to
the herein accused, who was convicted on an improvident plea of guilty. The
case is remanded to the Court a quo for rearrangement and further
proceedings.

279) People vs. Besonia, G.R. No. 151284-85, February 5, 2004

G.R. Nos. 151284-85 February 5, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee Vs. JONATHAN BESONIA, appellant.

FACTS:

Besonia was charged with murder in two separate informations. On 6 March 2001,
before the start of the trial, Besonia, through his counsel Atty. Calixto Perez, manifested
that he would enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. Thereafter, the
trial court ordered the prosecution to begin presenting its evidence. On 29 May 2001,
Besonia manifested his desire to enter a plea of guilty to murder. Re-arraignment was
then scheduled on 5 June 2001. On his re-arraignment, Besonia pleaded guilty to the
two charges of murder. The trial court forthwith conducted a searching inquiry to
determine the voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea. After the prosecution
had rested its case, the defense manifested that it would not present any evidence. On
26 June 2001, the trial court promulgated judgment which is now the subject of this
automatic review.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred by violating the constitutional right of [the]
accused not to be compelled to testify against himself, and having so compelled him,
rendered judgment sentencing him to death.

RULING: Besonia argues that the finding of guilt by the trial court was based mainly
on his confession, which is inadmissible for having been obtained in gross violation of
his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Moreover, the prosecution endeavored
to prove the charges for murder by evidence other than the testimonies of the
proclaimed eyewitnesses. In the absence of evidence proving his guilt, he should be
acquitted. Besonia claims that his re-arraignment was "notoriously flawed" in that
despite his endeavor to plead guilty to the lesser crime of homicide, the trial court paid
no attention to it, thus depriving him of the opportunity to make such plea. We do not
find anything irregular in the re-arraignment on 5 June 2001. It complied
with Section 1 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended. Before Besonia pleaded guilty to both charges, the two informations for
murder were first read and translated to Ilonggo dialect, which was the language
known to him. The two informations, to which Besonia pleaded guilty, allege that the
killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation and the
aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm, which if proved would
warrant the penalty of death. With such a plea of guilty to a capital offense,
Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure will apply. A
searching inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full
comprehension by the accused of the consequences of the plea so that the
plea of guilty can truly be said to be based on a free and informed judgment.
The trial court has substantially followed the aforementioned parameters for
the conduct of a searching inquiry. We cannot subscribe to Besonia’s claim
that his confession and admissions during the searching inquiry were elicited
in violation of his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against
himself.
The right against self-incrimination is intended to prevent the State, with all
its coercive powers, from extracting from the suspect testimony that may
convict him and to avoid a person subjected to such compulsion to perjure
himself for his own protection. It does not apply where, as in these cases, the
testimony was freely and voluntarily given by the accused himself without
any compulsion from the agents of the State. There is nothing in the records
that would indicate that Besonia was forced, intimidated, or compelled by
the trial court or by anybody into admitting the crimes. At any rate, his plea
of guilty and confession or admissions during the searching inquiry cannot be
the sole basis for his conviction.

It must be stressed that a plea of guilty is only a supporting evidence or

secondary basis for a finding of culpability, the main proof being the
evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Once an accused charged with a capital offense enters a
plea of guilty, a regular trial shall be conducted just the same as if no such
plea was entered. The court cannot, and should not, relieve the prosecution
of its duty to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability by the requisite quantum of evidence. In these cases, the trial
court did not comply with the second requisite mentioned in Section 3 of
Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is to order the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability. It only required the prosecution to present evidence "to prove the
guilt or degree of culpability of the accused for the use of [an] unlicensed
firearm." Thus, the evidence presented by the prosecution were merely the
testimonies of the police officers on the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm in the commission of the crime, apart from those of the doctors on the injuries
sustained by the victims. Doubtless, they are insufficient to establish the guilt of
Besonia. Apparently, the trial court and the prosecution unduly relied on Besonia’s plea
of guilty and his admissions made during the searching inquiry. The prosecution did not
discharge its obligation as seriously as it would have had there been no plea of guilt on
the part of Besonia. Its presentation of its case was lacking in assiduity that is
necessarily expected in a prosecution for a capital offense; it was too meager to be
accepted as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a
human life. It has been held that where the plea of guilt to a capital offense
has adversely influenced or impaired the presentation of the prosecution’s
case, the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings is
imperative

280) People vs. Murillo, G.R. No. 134583, July 14, 2004

G.R. No. 134583 July 14, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, Vs. FREDDIE MURILLO, appellant.

FACTS:
Freddie Murillo was convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder against his aunt Paz Abiera and was sentenced to the penalty of
Death. Murillo confessed that he stabbed his aunt and dimembered her body
and hid the parts inside the septic tank and the head was placed on a red and
white striped plastic bag and was disposed at a canal near the service road of
the South Super Highway. Appellant argues that his plea of guilt was
improvident since there was no indication that he fully understood that the
qualifying circumstances charged in the information would result to the
penalty of death. He only admitted the killing but not the circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation. There could be no evident
premeditation since he stabbed Paz only after losing his senses. There could
also be no treachery since it cannot be determined with certainty whether or
not the wounds inflicted on the victim were made before or after her death.
The aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at his person or
corpse cannot be appreciated in this case since it was not alleged in the
information.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an improvident plea of guilt.

HELD:
Yes, there was an improvident plea of guilt. Courts must necessarily proceed
with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form death
for the reason that the execution of such sentence is irrevocable. Experience
has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty in the hope of
a lenient treatment, or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express
remorse. An accused might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus
forfeit his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning,
significance and consequences of his plea. The judge therefore has the duty
to ensure that the accused does not suffer by reason of mistaken
impressions. Requiring the trial court to take further evidence would also aid
this Court on appellate review in evaluating the propriety or impropriety of
the plea. While our jurisdiction does not subscribe to a per se rule that once a
plea of guilty is found improvidently he is at once entitled to a remand, the
circumstances of this case warrant that a remand to the trial court be made.
To warrant a remand of the criminal case, the Court has held that it must be
shown that as a result of such irregularity there was inadequate
representation of facts by either the prosecution or the defense during the
trial. Where the improvident plea of guilty was followed by an abbreviated
proceeding with practically no role at all played by the defense, we have
ruled that this procedure was just too meager to accept as being the
standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life.
What justifies the remand of the criminal case to the trial court is the
unfairness or complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the
proceedings a quo as occasioned by the improvident plea of guilt. In this
case, apart from the testimony of appellant, the prosecution does not have
any other evidence to hold him liable for the crime charged. In view of the
foregoing, we find that it is imperative to remand the case for the proper
arraignment and trial of the accused, considering not only the accused's
improvident plea of guilt but also his lawyers neglect in representing his
cause.

Right to Lawyer of Choice

281) People vs. Malunsing, 63 SCRA 493 (1975)
FACTS: Appellant Manuel Villegas was convicted of murder, hence the petition seeking
reversal of his conviction on the ground that the lower court failed to respect appellant’s
constitutional right to counsel.
As therein shown, Attorney Geronimo Pajarito explicitly manifested in the opening of
the trial that appellant intimated to him that he had his own lawyer. There was an
admission that he did appear for him in the preliminary investigation but only because
there was no other counsel. Thereafter, appellant had a change of mind in choosing
Atty. Pajarito as his counsel but failed to notify the latter. As a result, the lower court
said that they would provide appellant a lawyer. Atty. Pajarito was appointed as counsel
de officio. When asked if the lawyer wanted to confer with the appleant, Atty. Pajarito
answered that he thinks he knows the case. The court then proceeded with the
hearing. During the trial, prosecution presented its witnesses and all the defendants
took the witness stand and presented their defense, except Manuel Villegas. In
conclusion, there was no evidence for and in behalf of Manuel Villegas. The appellant is
a very old man, ignorant and unlettered; during the entire proceedings in the case, the
appellant while present did not know what was going on; the trial court never apprised
the appellant of his fundamental right to be assisted by a lawyer; the trial court did not
even bother inquiring why the appellant Manuel Villegas did not take the witness stand,
[something out of the ordinary as] all defendants, except the appellant, had testified;
and the trial court went on throughout the proceedings of the case without knowing
why the appellant did not testify.

ISSUE: Whether appelant was deprived of his right to counsel.

HELD: Yes.
It is not enough that a counsel de oficio was appointed, especially so as here,
where the accused had indicated that he wanted a lawyer of his choice, a
decision prompted moreover by the fact that he had lost confidence in the
member of the bar thus designated. Nor is it to manifest respect for this right
if the counsel de oficio, instead of conferring with the accused, would just
blithely inform the judge that he was already fully prepared for his exacting
responsibility. It was unintended, of course, but the result could not rightly
be distinguished from pure travesty. Appellant could then rightfully invoke
this constitutional guarantee. Inasmuch as it is intended to assure a just and
fair proceeding, he is entitled at the most to a new trial where he can be duly
represented either by a counsel of his choice or by one appointed de oficio,
one who would discharge his task in a much more diligent and conscientious
manner and would not readily assume that he need not bother himself
unduly with familiarizing himself further with all aspects of the case. For only
in such a way may there be an intelligent defense. If the matter be viewed
thus, there is no unfairness to the state either. It can still see to it that a
person against whom a probable cause had been found would have to stand
trial, but, to repeat, with all the constitutional safeguards.

The court adds that "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be
heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel,
he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know
how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons
who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be
assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of
procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to
have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an
attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him
if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an
attorney of his own."

Even at the stage of custodial interrogation when the police agencies are
investigating a man's possible connection with a crime, he is already entitled
to counsel. This is "perhaps the privilege most important to the person
accused of crime.”
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of December 4, 1967 insofar as it
found Manuel Villegas guilty of the crime of murder is reversed and a new
trial ordered forthwith for such accused. This decision is immediately
executory. No costs.

282) Libuit vs. People, G.R. No. 154363, September 13, 2005
Joel P. Libuit vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 154363, September 13, 2005
469 SCRA 610
FACTS: In May 1993, private complainant Domingo del Mundo brought his car to the
motor shop owned by petitioner Joel Libuit for repair. The car was received by a
mechanic in the presence of the petitioner who assured the private complainant that it
would be safe in his motor shop.
Eight months later, private complainant returned to the motor shop but the repair work
was not finished yet and he was assured that they would finish and deliver the car after
two weeks. However, the petitioner failed to deliver the car to the owner. Private
complainant gave him another two weeks to finish the repairs. Thereafter, the private
complainant returned to the motor shop and found that his car was already missing. He
reported the matter to the police, who discovered that the petitioner had sold the car’s
differential and cylinder head, while the engine could no longer be found. He filed a
complaint for estafa.

On arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty.

On trial, petitioner testified on direct examination. However, his defense counsel

withdrew from the case after his initial cross-examination. On motion of the petitioner,
the continuation of his cross-examination was reset to give him time to engage the
services of another counsel. The petitioner eventually secured the services of a new
counsel.

At the subsequent hearings, his new counsel failed to appear despite notices. On
motion of the prosecution, the trial court issued an Order striking from the records the
petitioner’s direct testimony and declaring the case submitted for decision on the basis
of the evidence already on record.

After further proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. The
petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.
Petitioner’s contention: the trial court should have appointed a counsel de oficio when
his counsel consistently failed to appear for his cross-examination

RULING:

NO. The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who
has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one is
mandatory only at the time of arraignment. No such duty exists where the
accused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his
own choice. Worth noting, when the time for the presentation of evidence for
the defense arrived, and the defendant appeared by himself alone, the
absence of his counsel was inexcusable.

In the present case, since the petitioner was represented by counsel de parte
at the arraignment and trial, the trial court could not be deemed duty-bound
to appoint a counsel de oficio for the continuation of his cross-examination.
After his initial cross-examination, the trial court granted the petitioner’s
motion to postpone, giving him sufficient time to engage the services of
another counsel. The failure of his newly hired lawyer to appear at the
subsequent hearings without reason was sufficient legal basis for the trial
court to order the striking from the records of his direct testimony, and
thereafter render judgment upon the evidence already presented. In fact, the
repeated failure to appear of defendant’s counsel at the trial may even be
taken as a deliberate attempt to delay the court’s proceedings.

Deprivation of Right to be Heard

283)Moslares vs. CA, 291 SCRA 440 (1998)

FACTS:
On 19 February 1991, Honor P. Moslares purchased three units of Toyota Corolla 1600
from Toyota Bel-Air, Inc. which were thereupon registered under his name, under the
name of Manila Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines, and under the
name of Austra-Phil Homes Inc. In payment thereof, Moslares issued Philippine Bank of
Communications Check 841644 dated 24 May 1991 in the amount of P1,425,780.00.
When presented for payment, said check was dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds. Thus, Moslares was charged for violation of Batas Pambansa
22 and for Estafa. The hearings of the case were postponed several times either at the
instance of Moslares or the prosecution, or motu proprio by the court. On 13 September
1995, the scheduled date of the presentation of evidence by Moslares, he failed to
appear, but was represented by a newly retained lawyer, Atty. Dionisio Landero, who
claimed that he was not ready to proceed with the trial as he was not yet familiar with
the case. As a result, the trial court set the promulgation of the decision on 30 October
1995. On 9 October 1995, Moslares filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Re-Trial.
However, on 26 October 1995 the trial court issued its decision, stating that "Moslares
did not attend during the presentation of evidence for the prosecution nor for the
defense. The Court set the presentation of evidence for the defense 19 times, 4 of
which were cancelled on the ground that there was a typhoon and the public prosecutor
was 'indisposed'. But the accused did not even testify and presented only one witness,
a certain Sixto Avila. Subject cases were submitted for decision 4 times for failure of the
accused to present evidence but was lifted in the interest of justice upon motion of the
accused. He changed his lawyer four times everytime the Court ordered the case
submitted for decision for failure of the accused to present his evidence in order to gain
a delay." The court therein found Moslares guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of BP 22 (Criminal Case 92-0099 and Criminal Case 92-0100), and sentenced him to
suffer an imprisonment of 1 year for each criminal case. On 30 October 1995, the trial
court proceeded to promulgate in absentia the 26 October 1996 decision. On 14
November 1995, Moslares filed a notice of appeal which was denied due course by the
lower court in its assailed order dated 1 February 1996. The lower court, relying on the
case of People vs. Mapalao (197 SCRA 79 [1991]), considered Moslares to have waived
his right to appeal. On 14 February 1996, Moslares filed a petition for relief from
judgment which was likewise denied by the trial court. On 14 March 1996, Moslares
filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which treated the petition as one
for certiorari. Moslares also filed on 3 October 1996, a petition to post bail, later
supplemented. On 29 November 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
dismissing the petition for review and denying the petition to post bail. Motions for
reconsideration subsequently filed by Moslares were denied. Moslares filed the petition
for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether Moslares has waived his right to present evidence

HELD: No. While it is true that the right to present evidence may be waived
expressly or impliedly, it cannot be said that Moslares had waived said right
in the present case. The postponements sought by Moslares and counsel
appear to be justified and were not vexatious and oppressive. The intention
and the willingness of Moslares to present evidence can be gleaned from the fact that
he had already presented one witness and has other witnesses ready for presentation,
although this was delayed, but for meritorious reasons, such as illness of Moslares and
his counsel, Moslares' confinement at a hospital, ongoing negotiations between the
parties, and substitution of counsel. The rights of an accused during trial are
given paramount importance in our laws and rules on criminal procedure.
Among the fundamental rights of the accused is the right to be heard by
himself and counsel. Verily, this right is even guaranteed by the Constitution
itself. This right has been recognized and established in order to make sure
that justice is done to the accused. Further, the constitutional right of the
accused to be heard in his defense is inviolate. No court of justice under our
system of government has the power to deprive him of that right. It would
have thus been more befitting and seemly of the Court of Appeals had it
ordered the trial court to reopen the case for the reception of Moslares'
evidence. Granting that Moslares had sought a number of postponements,
the requirements of substantial justice mandate that he should have been
given his day in court. The grant of a reasonable continuance would have
been sounder judicial discretion to ferret out the truth, than to have a speedy
disposition of the case but at the expense of a fundamental right. Hence, it
was error for the trial court to have proceeded with the promulgation of
decision on the premise that Moslares had waived his right to appear in court
to present his evidence. Likewise, the Court of Appeals, in affirming said
decision, gravely abused its discretion as it sustained a decision of the lower
court rendered in violation of Moslares' right to due process.

17.6. Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation

284) People of the Philippines vs. Manansala (G.R. No. 175939, April 3, 2013)

G.R. No. 175939 April 3, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, Vs. CHAD MANANSALA y

LAGMAN, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

The information filed on October 20, 1994 against the accused alleges: “That on or
about the nineteenth (19th) day of October, 1994, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without being lawfully authorized did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to
another and distributing more or less 750 grams or ¾ kilo of marijuana dried leaves
placed in a small wooden box inside the cabinet, which are prohibited drugs,
found in his possession and control.

CONTRARY TO LAW. “

To substantiate the charge, the Prosecution showed that on October 18,

1994 the Philippine National Police in Olongapo City (PNP) conducted a test-buy
operation against Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same date,
following the test-buy, the PNP applied for and obtained a search warrant from
the RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City (Search Warrant No. 8-94) to authorize the
search for and seizure of prohibited drugs in Manansala‘s residence located at No. 55
Johnson Extension, Barangay East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City. SPO4 Felipe P. Bolina
and other elements of the PNP, accompanied by Barangay Chairman Reynaldo
Manalang of Barangay East Bajac Bajac, conducted the search of Manansala‘s
house at around 5:30 a.m. on October 19, 1994. The search yielded the 750grams
of dried marijuana leaves subject of the information, which the search team
recovered from a wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also seized was the
amount of P655.00 that included the two marked P50.00 bills bearing serial
numbers SNKJ812018 and SNMN426747 used during the test buy.

After trial, accused was convicted of ―possession of marijuana only under Section 8 of
RA No. 6425 instead of Section 4. The said decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:

Was his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him violated when he was charged of ―sale of marijuana under Section 4 of RA
No. 6425 but was convicted of ―possession under Section 8 of the same law---
which entitles him to acquittal?

HELD:

The crime charged in the information was clearly for violation of Section 4
of Republic Act No. 6425 or ―sale‖ of prohibited drugs, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659. Arraigned under such information, Manansala pleaded not guilty to it.
But instead of finding him guilty of the crime charged after trial, the RTC
convicted him for violation of Section 8, of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The accused now questions said
conviction based on the alleged violation of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. While no
conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be had under
the present circumstances, the established principle is that possession of
Marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further
apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not
covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for
some future dealings or use by the seller. In this case , it has been
satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of Marijuana confiscated from
accused-appellant were the same prohibited drugs subject of the original
Information. In this light, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in convicting the accused - appellant of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 8, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. To properly resolve the appeal,
therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the conviction of
Manansala for a violation of Section 8, which the information did not allege,
instead of for a violation of Section 4, which the information alleged,
was not in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation brought against him. The rule is that
when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the
offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged.
According to Section 5, Rule 120,

Rules of Court (1985), the rule then applicable, an offense charged

necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter

285) Abellana vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 174654, August 17,
2011)
FACTS:
In 1985, Felixberto Abellana (petitioner) extended a loan to Spouses Alonto secured by
Real Estate Mortgage Subsequently, Abellana prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale
conveying the property subject to mortgage. It was signed by the spouses and allegedly
notarized without the spouses appearing before the notary. Thereafter, petitioner sold
the lots to 3rd persons Abellana was charged with Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Document for allegedly feigning the signature of the spouses to cause the sale
Ruling of the RTC: Petitioner did not intend to defraud the spouses That after the
spouses failed to pay their obligation, Abellana prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale which
the spouses actually signed but the Deed was notarized without the spouses appearing
before the notary. Hence, petitioner can only be held guilty of Falsification of a Public
Document by a private individual. On appeal, the CA ruled: Petitioner who was charged
with and arraigned for estafa thru falsification of public document could not be
convicted of falsification of public documents by a private individual; Conviction of the
petitioner for an offense not alleged in the information or one not necessarily included
in the offense charged violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him o Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the RTC’s finding
with respect to petitioner’s civil liability

ISSUE: Could Abellana be still held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal?

RULING: NO. It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment

of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilty of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt In either case, the judgment shall determine if the
act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. When
the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the court shall award the civil liability in favor of the offended party
in the same criminal action. In other words, the extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact form which the
civil liability might arise did not exist . Civil liability arises when one, by reason of
his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another .
Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouse Alonto, it must be proven
that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses. Based on the
records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the
petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto . First, the information
charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear that the spouses affixed their
signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby facilitating the transfer of the subject
properties in his favor.
However, after presentation of the parties’ respective evidence, the trial
court found that the charge was without basis as the spouse Alonto indeed
signed the document and that their signatures was genuine and not forged.
Second, even assuming that the spouse did not personally appear before the
notary public for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same
does not necessarily nullify or render void ab intio the parties transaction.
Such non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the
truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed And since the defective
notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale, the
transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid
Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused
the cancellation of spouses’ title, and the issuance of new ones under his
name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted.
There is therefore absolutely no basis for the trial court and the CA to hold petitioner
civilly liable.

17.7. Lack of Arraignment

286) Borja vs. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977)

Facts:
Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he
was not arraigned. That notwithstanding, respondent Judge Senining
proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a decision finding
petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed to the Court of
First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged
that the failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights. It was
also alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him
to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered
The Solicitor General commented that the decision should be annulled
because there was no arraignment.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when he was not
arraigned.

Held: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so
that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense
he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence
against him. It is also not just due process that requires an arraignment. It is
required in the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the
opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative
that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then,
he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is
mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the
constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent Judge Senining
convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. With
the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel
being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with
petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being
null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the
requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge
Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime
of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent
Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of
Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of
Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect and
observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of
petitioner.
287) People vs. Alcalde, G.R. 139225, May 29, 2002

G.R. Nos. 139225-28 May 29, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Vs. ARNEL ALCALDE y

PASCASIO, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

ARNEL was convicted of two counts of parricide committed against his wife and his 11-
month-old son and two counts of frustrated parricide committed against his two
daughters.

Upon his arraignment, ARNEL, who was assisted by a counsel de parte, acted strangely
in a manner as if he was out of touch with the world and would not utter any word. The
trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty in each of the cases. On the same
occasion, the defense waived pre-trial. The cases were then consolidated and jointly
tried.

After the prosecution finally rested its case, Defense counsel for ARNEL, Atty. Vasquez
Sr., informed the trial court of his inability to communicate with ARNEL because of
ARNEL’s “out of touch of the world” behavior. Atty. Vasquez manifested that the
defense was constrained to submit the case for decision.

In these cases neither accused nor his counsel de parte asked for the suspension of the
arraignment on the ground of mental incapacity. The OSG maintains that such failure
was tantamount to an admission that ARNEL was not suffering from any mental
disorder or to a waiver of the right to move for suspension of arraignment.

ISSUE: Whether or not ARNEL’s arraignment was valid (as he was in a questionable
mental state).

HELD: No. it is Invalid.

It must be recalled that ARNEL’s arraignment was on 22 October 1997. At

the time, what was applicable was Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Nowhere in that Section was it required that a
motion by the accused be filed for the suspension of arraignment. Hence, the
absence of such motion could not be considered a waiver of the right to a
suspension of arraignment.

Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was invoked
by the OSG, requires a motion by the proper party. This new requirement of
“motion by the proper party” could not be applied to these cases because the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which prescribes such requirement,
took effect only on 1 December 2000.

Besides, a waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made by the person

possessing such right. Unfortunately, ARNEL was apparently deprived of such
mental faculties. Thus, no waiver, impliedly or expressly, could have been
made by ARNEL at the time of his arraignment by reason of his mental
condition.
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him under the Bill of Rights carries with it the correlative
obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him
to effectively prepare for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial.
While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on
the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings,
the trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial
with the assistance the law secures or gives.

Even if Atty. Vasquez’s zeal for ARNEL’s cause fell short of that required of
him, that is, for him to have asked the court to suspend the arraignment of
ARNEL on the ground of the latter’s unsound mental health, the greater
demand of due process overwhelms such inadequate zeal.

288) People vs. Dy, G.R. No. 1152-36-37, January 16, 2003

G.R. Nos. 115236-37 January 16, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Vs. BRYAN FERDINAND DY y LA MADRID and GIOVAN BERNARDINO y

GARCIA, accused-appellants.

FACTS:

Accused-appellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Bernardino were found guilty of

rape and acts of lascivousness by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5.
Bryan and Giovan refused to be arraigned and enter a plea; hence, a plea of “not
guilty” was entered on their behalf. Separate appeals for reconsideration were filed by
accused-appellants.

Accused-appellant Bernardino contended that they were not accorded their right to fair
and unbiased resolution. He contended that they were not arraigned properly and that
such right cannot be simply waived by estoppel. Also, the erroneous decision of the trial
judge to hold an expedited trial effectively deprived them of proper preparation for and
presentation of an adequate defense.

ISSUE: whether accused-appellants were not afforded valid arraignment

HELD: No. there was a valid arraignment.The allegation that there was no valid
arraignment is misleading and betrays a lack of comprehension regarding the
procedural requirements of arraignment in the context of the constitutional
right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. The court stated that the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation may not be waived. Indeed, the defense may waive
their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of "not guilty" in their
behalf. However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the accused
themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them. The defense can not hold hostage the court by their refusal to
the reading of the complaint or information.

On the part of expediting the decision, While the proceedings might have been of short
duration than usual, they were nevertheless conducted with due regard to the right of
each party to due process. The trial court should even be commended for conducting a
speedy trial, which should be the rule, rather than the exception. What is of prime
consideration is not the speed by which the trial was conducted but the manner by
which the procedural and substantial requirements were complied with. The records
show that these requirements were adequately met.

Sufficiency of the Information

289) People v. Sadiosa, 290 SCRA 82 (1998)
Facts: That on or about and during the period comprised from January 1992 to March
1992, in Pasay City, the above named accused Delia Sadiosa y Cabenta, well knowing
that she is not a duly licensed job recruiter, by means of false representations and
fraudulent allegations to the effect that she could secure employment as domestic
helpers abroad for Benilda Sabado y Domingo, Marcela Tabernero y Manzano, Erly
Tuliao y Sabado and Cely Navarro y Manzano, did then and there wilfully (sic),
unlawfully and feloniously recruit aforesaid persons and collected from them the
amount of P8,000.00 each, which amount were given to the accused by the aforesaid
complainants upon receipt of which, far from complying with her obligation aforestated,
accused appropriated for herself the said amount and failed to deploy complainants
abroad.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The trial court found accused-
appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.
Issues:
1. The lower court erred in not dismissing motu proprio the information for not
conforming substantially to the prescribed form, particularly as to the designation
of the offense and cause of the accusation;
2. The lower court erred in not dismissing motu proprio the information in view of
its inconsistent and contradictory, conflicting and irreconcilable charges of illegal
recruitment, estafa under article 315, paragraph 1(b) and estafa under the same
article but under paragraph 2(a) of the revised penal code and in conducting trial
thereunder.
Ruling:
1. It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that the information is sufficient where it
clearly states the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. However, there is no need
to specify or refer to the particular section or subsection of the statute that was
violated by the accused. No law requires that in order that an accused may be
convicted, the specific provision penalizing the act charged should be mentioned
in the information. What identifies the charge is the actual recital of the facts and
not that designated by the fiscal in the preamble thereof. It is not even
necessary for the protection of the substantial rights of the accused, nor the
effective preparation of his defense, that the accused be informed of the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. He must look to the
facts alleged.
In the instant case, the information filed against accused-appellant sufficiently shows
that it is for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b) of
the Labor Code and penalized in Art. 39 of the same Code although it is designated as
for illegal recruitment only.
In the instant case, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that accused-appellant
was fully accorded the right to be informed of the charges against her. The fact that
she put up the defense of having accepted the money only in her capacity as an officer
of the recruitment agency shows that she fully understood the nature and cause of the
accusation against her.
2. Furthermore, it is incorrect for accused-appellant to maintain that the
information filed against her contained conflicting and irreconcilable charges of
illegal recruitment, estafa under Article 315 par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code
and estafa under the same article but under par. 2 (a) thereof. While on its face
the allegations in the information may constitute estafa, this Court agrees with
the Solicitor General that it merely describes how accused-appellant was able to
consummate the act of illegal recruitment - through false and fraudulent
representation by pretending that she was a duly-licensed recruiter who could
secure employment for complainants in Kuwait. These allegations in the
information therefore do not render the information defective or multiplicitous.

290) People vs. Perez, G.R. No. 122764, September 24, 1998
Facts: Accused-appellant was charged for rape. The information alleged that the victim
was his stepdaughter but did not allege that the victim was only 13 years old at the
time of the rape.
During arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the accusation against him. During
trial it was proved that the victim was the stepdaughter of the accused and was in fact
13 years old at the time the crime of rape was committed. Accused was then convicted
of qualified rape and was meted out the penalty of death.
Issue: Whether the information filed against appellant in the present case support or
justify the penalty of death imposed upon him by the trial court.
Ruling: No. The information filed against appellant in the present case does not
support or justify the penalty of death imposed upon him by the trial court. A reading
of the information discloses that, contrary to the findings of said court, only
the crime of simple rape was charged against appellant and no attendant
special circumstance, which would in effect qualify the crime, was alleged as
such in the information.
While the fact that appellant is the stepfather of complainant was pleaded in the
information, it was mentioned therein merely as the basis for the allegation that
appellant acted with grave abuse of confidence. On the other hand, and of significant
importance, the circumstance that Maribel was less than eighteen years of age at the
time of the rape was never, in any manner, stated in the information. For that matter,
the allegations in the victim's complaint are substantially the same as those in the
information, including the omission of her age at the time of the rape.
As we have explained in People vs. Garcia, it would be a denial of the right of
the accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a
denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of
its qualified form punishable by death, although the attendant circumstance
qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in
the indictment on which he was arraigned. Procedurally, then, while the
minority of Maribel and the relationship of appellant and his victim were
established during the trial, appellant can only be convicted of simple rape
because he cannot be punished for a graver offense than that with which he
was charged.
It may be contended that such a rule, if applied to the instant case would appear to be
unduly resorting to sheer technicality.The requirement for complete allegations
on the particulars of the indictment is based on the right of the accused to be
fully informed of the nature of the charge against him, so that be may
adequately prepare for this defense pursuant to the due process clause of the
Constitution. But, then, herein appellant cannot be unaware that he is the stepfather
of the complainant and that the latter was only thirteen years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime charged. It then seems to be illogical to fault the information
for not stating that the victim here was less than eighteen years old, a fact known to
and even admitted by appellant, hence he could not have been denied the right to be
informed of the real nature of the charge.

291) People vs. Lozano, G.R. 125080, September 25, 1998

Facts: On August 29, 1990 at about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, private complainant,
Lilia Montederamos, was requested by her mother, Catalina Montederamos to buy rice
at the neighboring barangay of Ibarra. On her way to Ibarra, Lilia passed by the
coconut plantation of Luding Bandibas where she saw appellant Temestocles
Lozano.When Lilia resumed walking to her destination, Lilia noticed that appellant was
following her. As she was alone, Lilia got frightened and started to run. Eventually,
however, appellant caught up with Lilia.
Once astride each other, appellant suddenly covered Lilia's mouth, poked a sharp-
pointed stick on her side and warned her not to make any noise or else she [would] die.
Lilia pleaded to appellant not to do anything to her because she was pregnant but the
plea fell on deaf ears. Instead, appellant forcibly brought her to a banana plantation at
the lower portion of the road.
When Lilia tried to shout, appellant boxed her thrice on her right cheek causing her to
feel dizzy. After delivering the fist blows, appellant ordered Lilia to take off her clothes
and threatened her with death if she refused. When Lilia finished undressing, appellant
took off his clothes but his pants and brief[s] were only pulled down . . . to his knees.
He then ordered Lilia to [lie] down on the stony ground after which, he lay on top of
Lilia and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Thereafter, appellant pulled out his penis from the vagina of Lilia, wound it up with
banana fiber and inserted it again [in] to Lilia's vagina. Then, he pulled out again his
penis and forced Lilia to suck it.
After he was through, appellant brought Lilia with him. As they proceeded to the
Bodega of Montalbo, Lilia saw persons coming towards their direction. Lilia seized this
as an opportunity for escape especially so that the left arm of appellant was no longer
holding her neck. She then pushed appellant and ran to the persons coming towards
their way. She recognized these persons as Aniceto Malasaga, Diony Malasaga and
Juanito Bandibas.
Lilia ran directly to Diony Malasaga and told his group that somebody wanted to kill her.
The three (3) brought Lilia home and upon arrival thereat, she informed her parents
that appellant raped her. On the same night, Lilia's father reported the incident to the
Maasin Police Station.
On the following day, August 30, 1990, Lilia went to [the] Maasin Police Station to
report the incident; there she executed a sworn statement.
Lilia subjected herself to physical examination at the Integrated Provincial Health Office,
Maasin, Southern Leyte. Dr. Evelyn Cabal conducted the physical examination and
issued a medical certification
Issue: Whether Lozano is liable to one count of rape only even if the evidence showed
that he had carnal knowledge with the victim at least twice.
Ruling:Although the prosecution's evidence tended to prove that appellant had carnal
knowledge of the victim at least twice, he cannot he held liable for two counts of rape,
because the Information charged him with only one count.
This Court has ruled that "an accused cannot be convicted of an offense,
unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Constitutionally,
he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the
complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional right."
In People v. De Guzman, appellant was convicted of only one count of rape because the
Information charged him with only one, despite the fact that evidence presented during
the trial showed that there were at least two acts of attempted rape and one
consummated rape:
What is clear to us is that there were, at least, two acts of attempted rape and one
consummated rape, dommitted in light of the testimony of... The information, however,
charged the accused with only one act of rape; hence, consistent with the constitutional
right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, he cannot be held liable for more than what he was charged [with]. There can
only be one conviction of rape if the information only charges one offense, even if the
evidence shows three separate acts of sexual intercourse.
292) People vs. Ladrillo, G.R. No. 124342, December 8, 1999
Facts: Jane Vasquez, the eight (8) year old complaining witness, could not state the
month and year she was supposedly abused by her cousin Edwin Ladrillo. She could
narrate however that one afternoon she went to the house of accused-appellant in
Abanico, Puerto Princesa City, which was only five (5) meters away from where she
lived. There he asked her to pick lice off his head; she complied. But later, he told her
to lie down in bed as he stripped himself naked. He removed her panty and placed
himself on top of her. Then he inserted his penis into her vagina. He covered her mouth
with his hand to prevent her from shouting as he started gyrating his buttocks. He
succeeded in raping her four (4) times on the same day as every time his penis
softened up after each intercourse he would make it hard again and insert it back into
her vagina. After successively satisfying his lust accused-appellant Edwin Ladrillo would
threaten to "send her to the police" if she would report the incident to anyone.
The trial court found accused-appellant Edwin Ladrillo guilty as charged, sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to indemnify Jane Vasquez the amount of
P100,000.00, and to pay the costs.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in not finding that the prosecution failed to
sufficiently establish with particularity the date of commission of the offense
Ruling: The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11,
Rule 110, of the Rules Court which requires that the time of the commission of the
offense must be alleged as near to the actual date as the information or complaint will
permit. More importantly, it runs afoul of the constitutionally protected right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The
Information is not sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform accused-appellant
of the date on which the criminal act is alleged to have been committed.
The phrase "on or about the year 1992" encompasses not only the twelve (12) months
of 1992 but includes the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for
which accused-appellant has to virtually account for his whereabouts. Hence, the failure
of the prosecution to allege with particularity the date of the commission of the offense
and, worse, its failure to prove during the trial the date of the commission of the
offense as alleged in the Information, deprived accused-appellant of his right to
intelligently prepare for his defense and convincingly refute the charges against him. At
most, accused-appellant could only establish his place of residence in the year indicated
in the Information and not for the particular time he supposedly committed the rape.
Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness' testimony that
militates heavily against its being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court.
Considered independently, the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial court's
judgment of conviction, but assessed and weighed in its totality, and in relation to the
testimonies of other witnesses, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a powerful
compulsion towards reversal of the assailed judgment.
Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in the Information that
accused-appellant raped complainant in 1992 manifestly shows that the date of the
commission of the offense as alleged was based merely on speculation and conjecture,
and a conviction anchored mainly thereon cannot satisfy the quantum of evidence
required for a pronouncement of guilt, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
crime was committed on the date and place indicated in the Information.

293) People vs. Valdesancho, G.R. 137051, May 30, 2001

Facts: That on or about August 15, 1994 at Sitio Mahabang Parang, Barangay
Nanguma, Municipality of Mabitac, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd designs and by means of force
and violence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with one Elvie B. Basco, 15 years old, single (,) against her will and consent
and to her damage and prejudice.
The prosecution evidence shows that the accused Valdesancho is the husband of Elvie's
sister, Erlinda Valdesancho. Elvie and her two younger brothers, Erick and Eddie, lived
with their brother in the mountains of Barangay Minayutan, Famy, Laguna. In 1994,
however, Elvie's mother, Leonida Basco, requested the spouses Erlinda and the accused
Valdesancho to let Elvie, Erick and Eddie live in their house in San Antonio, Mabitac,
Laguna. The three were going to study in Barangay San Antonio. They resided with the
accused from June 24, 1994 to June 1995. Elvie was then fourteen years old and in
Grade 1 at the Barangay San Antonio School.
Issue: Whether the lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant on two (2)
counts of rape alleged in the information to have been committed on the 15th and 16th
of August 1994 whereas the decision stated that the two (2) counts of rape were
committed on the 15th and 16th of August 1993, thus depriving the accused of the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
Ruling:We agree.Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no
person shall be held liable for a criminal offense without due process of law. It further
provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel. Similarly, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which
took effect on December 1, 2000, provides that in all criminal prosecutions, it is the
right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. To convict an accused for an offense not alleged in the complaint or information
violates such right.
Without doubt, the accused was not given any chance to prove where he was
on August 15 and 16, 1993. What he did was to prove where he was on
August 15 and 16, 1994 for the informations charged him with rapes on
those specific dates. He had no opportunity to defend himself on the rapes
allegedly committed on the earlier dates. This is plain denial of due process.

294) People vs. Alcalde, G.R. Nos. 139225-28, May 29, 2002
Facts: ARNEL convicted of two counts of parricide committed against his wife and his
11-month-old son and two counts of frustrated parricide committed against his two
daughters.
Upon his arraignment, ARNEL, who was assisted by a counsel de parte, acted strangely
in a manner as if he [was] out of touch with the world and would not utter any word.
The trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty in each of the cases. On the same
occasion, the defense waived pre-trial. The cases were then consolidated and jointly
tried.
After the prosecution finally rested its case, Defense counsel for ARNEL, Atty. Vasquez
Sr., informed the trial court of his inability to communicate with ARNEL because of
ARNEL’s “out of touch of the world” behavior. Atty. Vasquez manifested that the
defense was constrained to submit the case for decision.
In these cases neither accused nor his counsel de parte asked for the suspension of the
arraignment on the ground of mental incapacity. The OSG maintains that such failure
was tantamount to an admission that ARNEL was not suffering from any mental
disorder or to a waiver of the right to move for suspension of arraignment.
Issue: Whether ARNEL’s arraignment was valid (as he was in a questionable mental
state).
Ruling: Invalid. It must be recalled that ARNEL’s arraignment was on 22 October
1997. At the time, what was applicable was Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure. Nowhere in that Section was it required that a motion by the
accused be filed for the suspension of arraignment. Hence, the absence of such motion
could not be considered a waiver of the right to a suspension of arraignment.
Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was invoked by the
OSG, requires a motion by the proper party. This new requirement of “motion by the
proper party” could not be applied to these cases because the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which prescribes such requirement, took effect only on 1 December 2000.
Besides, a waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made by the person possessing
such right. Unfortunately, ARNEL was apparently deprived of such mental faculties.
Thus, no waiver, impliedly or expressly, could have been made by ARNEL at the time of
his arraignment by reason of his mental condition.
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him under the Bill of Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to
effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare
for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the
mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify
suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused
would have a fair trial with the assistance the law secures or gives
Even if Atty. Vasquez’s zeal for ARNEL’s cause fell short of that required of him, that is,
for him to have asked the court to suspend the arraignment of ARNEL on the ground of
the latter’s unsound mental health, the greater demand of due process overwhelms
such inadequate zeal.

295) People vs. Ostia, G.R. No. 131804. February 26, 2003
Facts: The Spouses Ponciano Onato and Edita Onato resided with their four-year old
daughter, Beverly Onato, in Samar. On May 13, 1995, a Saturday, at about 7:00 p.m.,
Rufo was seated near his house and resting before retiring for the evening.
Momentarily, Rufo saw Roberto, with Beverly perched on his right shoulder, walking
towards the direction of the poblacion. Roberto’s left hand was holding the right hand
of Mary Donoso, a nine-year old playmate of Beverly. The trio were in animated
conversation on their way towards the poblacion.
After the lapse of an hour or so, Edita noticed that Beverly had not yet returned to their
house. She went out of the house to look for her daughter. Rufo told Edita that earlier
he saw Beverly perched on the shoulder of Roberto on their way towards the direction
of the poblacion. Thereafter, Roberto sauntered by. However, Beverly was no longer
with him. Puzzled, Edita inquired from Roberto where Beverly was. Instead of
responding, Roberto fled. Edita was flustered. Rufo, who witnessed the incident,
advised Edita to report the incident to the police authorities. Edita rushed back home
and woke up Ponciano. She told her husband that Beverly had been taken by Roberto
and that Beverly had not yet returned home. They found Beverly sprawled in a grassy
portion. Beverly was already dead.
On the date set for his arraignment, Roberto appeared without counsel. The court
issued an order appointing Atty. Artemio Apostol as counsel de oficio of Roberto. Said
counsel prayed for the resetting of the arraignment to January 30, 1996 to enable him
to secure a copy of the necropsy report and study the case intelligently. The court
granted the motion.
During the arraignment of Roberto on January 30, 1996, he, through his counsel de
oficio, manifested to the court that he was willing to plead guilty to the lesser offense of
murder. However, the public prosecutor prayed for a continuance so that he could
consult the provincial prosecutor and the father of the victim, Ponciano, on the offer of
Roberto.
The arraignment of Roberto was reset to February 29, 1996, on which date, he,
through his counsel de oficio, moved that a reinvestigation be conducted by the public
prosecutor. The motion was granted by the trial court. However, despite notice from
the office of the public prosecutor, Roberto failed to adduce controverting evidence. On
motion of the prosecution, the arraignment of Roberto was set on August 9, 1996.
When arraigned on said date, Roberto, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio,
entered a plea of Not Guilty to the charge of rape with homicide. Trial ensued.
During the trial Roberto, through counsel, moved that he be allowed to withdraw his
plea of not guilty to rape with homicide and to enter a plea of guilty to murder. The
prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence. The court admitted all the
prosecution’s documentary evidence without any objection from Roberto. The latter did
not anymore adduce any testimonial and documentary evidence in his behalf and on
said date, the court issued an order declaring that the case was submitted for its
decision.
On August 25, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment finding Roberto guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder with the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation
and with the generic aggravating circumstances of (a) abuse of confidence considering
that Roberto and Ponciano were co-workers, (b) nighttime considering that Beverly was
killed in the evening and (c) despoblado considering that the nearest house to the situs
criminis was fourteen meters.
Issue: Whether the trial court failed to comply with its mandatory duties when
appellant pleaded guilty to murder.
Ruling: Yes. When an accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, the trial
court is mandated to: 1.) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea
and the accused’s fullcomprehension of the consequences thereof; 2.) require the
prosecution to present evidence to prove the guild of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability; and 3.) ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his
behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.

296) People vs. Flores Jr., G.R. No. 128823-24, December 27, 2002
Facts: Criminal Case No. U-9185: CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
The undersigned, FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old, grade three pupil
and a resident of Sitio Buenlag, Brgy. Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
under oath, hereby accuses PEDRO FLORES, JR., Y FLORES, ALIAS "PESYONG",
Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, under oath, hereby accuses PEDRO
FLORES, JR., Y FLORES, ALIAS "PESYONG", committed as follows:
That on the 28th day of December 1996, in the evening at Sitio Buenlag, the above-
named accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force and deliberate intent and
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally
and feloniously \ sexually abused herein complaining witness FILIPINA FLORES, an 11
years old and daughter of the accused with the use of sharp pointed bladed weapon
and all against her will.
Issue: Whether or not the information are null and void for being violative of the
constitutional right of accused-appellant Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias "Pesiong," for
Rape, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Ruling: The Court declared the information in both criminal cases null and void. It is at
once apparent, from a reading of the above-quoted complaints, that accused-appellant
was denied the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. This right has the following objectives:
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make the defense against him as will enable him to make the defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further
prosecution for the same cause;
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction if in law to support a conviction if one should be
had. The information does not cite, it is readily apparent that the facts charged in said
information do not constitute an offense. The information does not cite which among
the numerous sections or subsections of R.A. No. 7610 has been violated by accused-
appellant. Moreover, it does not state the acts and omissions constituting the offense,
or any special or aggravating circumstances attending the same, as required under the
rules of criminal procedure. Section 8, Rule 110 thereof provides:
Designation of the offense.—The complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statue, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
The allegation in the information that accused-appellant "willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie Ann] either by raping her or
committing acts of lasciviousness on her" is not a sufficient averment of the acts
constituting the offense as required under Section 8, for these are conclusions of law,
not facts. The information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is therefore void for being
violative of the accused-appellant’s constitutionally guaranteed righto be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As held by this Court in People v.
Cruz, the allegation in the information that the therein accused-appellant sexually
abused the therein private complainant by either raping or committing acts of
lasciviousness on her "is not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting the offense
as required under Section 8 of Rule 110, for these are conclusions of law, not facts.
“Nothing less can be said of the criminal complaints in the cases at bar. They are void
for being violative of the accused-appellant’s constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
297) People v. Cachapero, G.R. No. 153008, May 20, 2004
Facts: Sometime in March 1998, complainant Anna Toledo, who was seven (7) years
old, went to play with Lorena Cachapero and Dino Cachapero at a nearby house in
Barrio Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac.
During that occasion, appellant Larry Cachapero, brother of Lorena, made her lie down
and removed her shorts and panty. He inserted his penis into her sexual organ and she
felt pain. Larry told her not to tell her parents because he might be scolded.
On September 2, 1998, witness Conchita Donato was conducting a remedial class in
Reading to her Grade I and II students. While they were reading the word ‘tagtuyot’ or
‘saluyot,’ one of her students Jocelyn Meneses told her that Anna was sexually abused
by ‘Manong Larry.’
She then ordered the students to leave the room and asked Jocelyn and Anna to stay
behind. She confronted Anna and asked her the truth. Anna covered her face with her
two hands, cried, and said yes. The teachers had a conference, after which they
decided to report the matter to the parents of Anna.
On September 3, 1998, Anna’s mother brought her to the Camiling District Hospital
where she was examined. Dr. Mercedes B. Gapultos, a Medico Legal Officer, examined
Anna
Issue: Whether the court a quo erred in not considering the Information as insufficient
to support a judgment of conviction for failure of the prosecution to state the precise
date of commission of the alleged rape[,] it being an essential element of the crime
charged
Ruling: It is well-established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally given full
weight and credit, more so if she is a minor. The revelation of an innocent child whose
chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble
and the humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her
complaint. In so testifying, she could only have been impelled to tell the truth,
especially in the absence of proof of ill motive.

In this case, the victim was a young girl of seven years when she came forward to
declare that appellant had raped her. At age nine, she narrated to the court the
violation of her person.
We must remember, however, that it was the narration of a minor who barely
understood sex and sexuality. Hence, in assessing her testimony, it would not be fair to
apply the standards used for adults. Indeed, she fully understood the defilement of her
person, even if she was at a loss for the right words with which to describe the horrid
details. It was for this reason that the prosecutor had to ask leading questions, which
are allowed under Section 10 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

17.8. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial

298) Acevedo vs. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247 (1970)
Facts: Respondent Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a
criminal information for damage to property through reckless imprudence against
petitioner and a certain Chi Chan Tan. As there were no further proceedings in the
meantime, petitioner moved to dismiss the criminal charge. Respondent Judge was not
in agreement as shown by his order of denial. Then, after two more years, came the
trial with the complainant having testified on direct examination but not having as yet
been fully cross-examined. The provincial fiscal moved for postponement due to the
non-attendance of the witness. Counsel for petitioner, however, not only objected but
sought the dismissal of the case based on the right of the accused to speedy trial.
Issue: Whether the petitioner can invoke his right to a speedy trial.
Ruling:Yes. It was all too evident that petitioner could rely on his constitutional right to
a speedy trial. For more than six years the threat of his being subjected to a penal
liability did hang over his head, with the prosecution failing to take any step to have the
matter heard. The right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be
freed from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his
guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. The remedy in the
event of a non-observance of the right to speedy trial is by habeas corpus if the
accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the
final dismissal of the case.

299) People vs. Judge Laya, 161 SCRA 327 (1988)

Facts: Upon arraignment on February 13, 1980, the accused pleaded "NOT GUILTY."
In an order dated the same day, the trial of the case was set on March 14 and 25, 1980
both at 8:30 in the morning "as requested by the prosecution and defense."
Representing the prosecution during the arraignment was Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Sotero R. Camello, the prosecutor assigned to the sala of the respondent judge.
Fiscal Camello inhibited himself from prosecuting the case because when he originally
investigated the case, he recommended its dismissal. However, he was reversed by the
Provincial Fiscal. The case was, therefore, assigned to Assistant Provincial fiscal Potot.
On March 12, 1980, Fiscal Potot received notice of the hearing scheduled for March 14,
1980. On this same day, Fiscal Potot filed an urgent ex-parte motion for postponement
stating among others that before learning of the scheduled March 14, 1980 hearing, he
was already committed to appear in Branch 3 and Branch 12 of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu and that on March 14, 25, and 26, 1980, all in the afternoon, he, as
special prosecutor of the Tanodbayan, had already set for clarificatory examination the
Toledo City Highways Engineering District cases for estafa and violation of Republic Act
3019.

On the scheduled March 14,1980 hearing, the defense counsel objected to the
postponement on the ground that the prosecution represented by Fiscal Camello had
agreed to the scheduled hearings of March 14 and 25,1980 and manifested that on said
dates Fiscal Potot will be available.
The Court granted the motion for postponement of the scheduled March 14,1980
hearing but ordered the hearing on March 25, 1980 at 8:30 in the morning to be held
as scheduled "on the ground that if other lawyers from Cebu City taking the ordinary
means of transportation can appear in this Court during its morning session and still
have sufficient time to return to Cebu City for their afternoon court engagements, then
there is no reason why Fiscal Potot cannot return on time for his afternoon hearing in
the City." The Court also stated in its order granting the postponement. "However, if
Fiscal Potot cannot really make it and considering that there are many assistants in the
Provincial Fiscal's Office, then, any of the Assistant Provincial Fiscals must appear on
said date and hour."
On March 18, 1980, Fiscal Potot requested the Provincial Fiscal that the case be
assigned to Assistant Provincial Fiscal Andres Amil. The case was transferred to Fiscal
Amil on March 21, 1980. Fiscal Amil prayed that the hearing of the case be transferred
to another date in the month of May, 1980. During the scheduled healing of March 25,
1980, the accused objected to the motion for postponement. The accused also
manifested their readiness for trial. They insisted on proceeding with the hearing. In an
order dated March 25, 1980, the court, finding the grounds advanced by the accused
meritorious, denied the motion for postponement and sustained the objections of the
accused. The case was ordered dismissed for failure to prosecute.
A motion for reconsideration filed by the People of the Philippines was denied. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: Whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in the
exercise of its judicial functions by reason of which, the prosecution without due
process of law was deprived of its day in court-which would be a stall (sic) in the
machinery of justice.
Ruling: The case was a simple one. It did not need lengthy and tedious preparation for
trial. This familiar ground for postponement — previous and tight schedules of the
prosecuting fiscal — is so hackneyed and overused that it is time the Prosecution
Service takes remedial measures. The excuse should be used sparingly and proof must
be adduced that every honest effort to avoid botching the court's schedule has been
taken. The provincial fiscal was aware of the court's order denying the motion to
postpone the March 25, 1980 hearing. The trial court stated in its March 14, 1980
order" ... if Fiscal Potot cannot really make it and considering that there are many
assistants in the provincial fiscal's office, then any of the assistant provincial fiscals
must appear on the said date and hour."
The two-months' delay of the trial from March 25, 1980 to May 1980, if requested for
sound reasons may not be unreasonable. However, owing to the nature of the case, the
reasons for the postponements, and the fact that one of the accused is a municipal
mayor, who had to leave his work everytime he was haled to court only to be told to
return another day, the delay became vexatious because the lower court stated — "the
delay is not only prejudicial to him but also to the people of Santander, Cebu."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The order of the then
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 15 dismissing Criminal Case No. AR-645 is
AFFIRMED.

300) Conde vs Rivera

G.R. No. L-21741             January 25, 1924
AURELIA CONDE, petitioner, vs. PABLO RIVERA, acting provincial fiscal of
Tayabas, and
FEDERICO M. UNSON, justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, respondents.

Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been

forced to respond to no less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors,
has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different
occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the
Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than one year from
the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a definite
resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial
trial.

Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like
all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may
go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay down the
legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable
period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief
by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be
restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.

301) Dacanay vs People.

G.R. No. 101302. January 25, 1995.
JAIME C. DACANAY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

Facts:
In 1985, Jaime C. Dacanay was the vice-president of the National Sugar Trading
Corporation (NASUTRA). In 1986, a criminal complaint for economic sabotage through
smuggling, with regard to the importation of raw sugar in 1983 and 1984 by NASUTRA,
was filed with the Tanodbayan against the principal officers of the said corporation
including Dacanay.
On 10 October 1986, the Tanodbayan approved the resolution of the team of Special
Prosecutors who investigated the case. It found sufficient prima facie evidence against
Dacanay and his co-accused to warrant the filing of an information with Sandiganbayan
for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended. The corresponding
information was filed with the Sandiganbayan.
On November 20, Dacabat filed a motion to quash but he later withdrew the same.
On 14 October 1988, a resolution was issued by Special Prosecutors Margarito P.
Gervacio and Robert E. Kallos, recommending the dismissal of the complaint against
Dacanay and his co-accused for lack of sufficient evidence and the withdrawal of the
information filed in court. The resolution was approved by Acting Special Prosecutor
Jose Ferrer.
On 6 January 1989, the resolution issued by Prosecutors Gervacio and Kallos was
reviewed by special Prosecutor Wilfredo Orencia, who recommended its disapproval.
The recommendation of Prosecutor Orencia was approved by Acting Special Prosecutor
Jose F. Guerrero and by Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez.
On February 22, Jose Unson, Dacanay's co-accused, filed a motion to quash the
information in the Sandiganbayan. The motion was adopted by Dacanay.
On December 12, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. Likewise, the motion
for reconsideration filed by Unson and adopted by Dacanay was denied. On 3 April
1991, Dacanay filed a motion for immediate and separate trial invoking his
constitutional right to a speedy trial.
On April 23, the People of the Philippines opposed the said motion on the ground that a
separate trial for Dacanay would entail a lengthy and repetitious proceeding. In a
resolution dated 24 April 1991, the Sandiganbayan denied Dacanay's motion.
On June 6, Dacanay filed a motion for reconsideration setting forth as grounds therefor
his advanced age and the protection of his reputation.
On July 9, the People of the Philippines filed a comment to Dacanay's motion for
reconsideration and alleged that the parties should first await the resolution of the
petition for certiorari filed by his co-accused Jose Unson with the Supreme Court. In a
resolution dated 6 August 1991, the Sandiganbayan denied Dacanay's motion for
reconsideration. Dacanay filed the petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether Dacanay is entitled to a separate trial.

Held:
Section 8, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly states: "When
two or more accused are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly,
unless the court in its discretion upon motion of the fiscal or any accused orders
separate trials for one or more accused." The resulting inconvenience and expense on
the part of the Government (due to a repetition of the presentation of the same
evidence) cannot be given preference over the right to speedy trial and the protection
to a person's life, liberty or property accorded by the Constitution. This is particularly
true in Dacanay's case where the prosecutors' opposition to the request for separate
trial was based on the ground that the principal accused in the case, the former
President of NASUTRA, was abroad and was not yet arrested. If an accused cannot be
placed under arrest because he remains outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines, with more reason should his co-accused, who are under arrest, be entitled
to a separate trial. A separate trial is in consonance with the right of an accused to a
speedy trial as guaranteed to him by the 1987 Constitution, more specifically under
Section 14(2) of Article III thereof. Herein, it has been 8 years since the information
against Dacanay was filed, but the case against him has yet to be tried. The long delay
has clearly prejudiced Dacanay, who is now more than 73 years of age.
302) People vs Rivera
G.R. No. 139180. July 31, 2001 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. ROLANDO RIVERA, accused- appellant.

FACTS:
 Rolando Rivera was charged of willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and maliciously
having carnal knowledge of his 13 year old daughter, Erlanie D. Rivera, against the
latter’s will and without her consent. During arraignment, the accused pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged and trial was held. The prosecution presented as its
witnesses complainant Erlanie, her aunt, Marietta, and Dr. Barin, who conducted the
physical examination of complainant. The defense also presented its evidence and
accused, his sister, Concepcion Sayo, and Natividad Pinlac, Records officer of the
Escolastica Romero District Hospital were presented as witnesses. Accused denied that
he raped Erlanie Rivera, alleging that the rape charge was filed against him because his
wife had a paramour and resented him because he hurt her. The defense presented a
letter to accused written by his wife, asking him to sign a document so that she could
attend to it before he got out of prison. Defense also offered as evidence a document
designated as Waiver of Rights, signed by accused, in which he acknowledged that he
was a tenant of a parcel of land and that he waived and voluntarily surrendered his
right over the said landholding to a certain Miguel, a cousin of his wife. He said that he
signed the document because his wife’s relatives promised him that he would get out of
prison after signing the document. Concepcion Sayo, accused’s sister, who testified that
accused stayed in their house during the entire month of March, except on the 11 th. 
The last defense witness was Pinlac Records Officer of the Escolastica Romero District
Hospital, who identified a certification, in which it was stated that Zaira Rivera was
confined at that hospital from March 1-2, 1999. Eventually, the trial court rendered a
decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as
charged.
Issue:
WON the court failed to consider the evidence of the accused and ruled with
partiality in violation of the accused’s right to be heard.
Held:
No. Accused-appellant insists that his counsel should have been allowed to ask
questions in relation to the sworn statement executed by complainant. He cites Rule
132, 17 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which provides that: When part of an act,
declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole
of the same subject matter may be inquired into by the other. This rule cannot be
invoked to justify the questioning of complainant which the trial court did not allow. As
the above provision states, this rule applies to parts of an act, declaration, conversation,
writing or record which is given in evidence. Indeed, the records show that after Erlanie
had finished with her direct examination on November 25, 1997, the trial judge granted
the motion made by Atty. Anselmo Mangalindan, accused-appellants private counsel, to
postpone Erlanie Riveras cross-examination to allow him time to secure copies of the
transcript of stenographic notes of Erlanies testimony and thus enable him to fully
question complainant. Erlanie was first cross-examined on December 2, 1997, but
several postponements, namely, on January 13, 1998, February 10, 1998, March 12,
1998, March 31, 1998, April 7, 1998, May 12, 1998, May 26, 1998, May 28, 1998, and
June 11, 1998, on Erlanies cross-examination took place because of the failure of Atty.
Mangalindan to appear on the said trial dates. Erlanies cross-examination was
continued on July 14, 1998 and July 23, 1998. Her cross-examination by accused-
appellants counsel was thorough and covered various subjects, such as the nature of
the relationship between her parents, who were present during the execution of her
sworn statement, whether the same had been executed by her voluntarily, the date
when she was raped by accused-appellant the reason for her delay in reporting the
rape committed by accused-appellant, her understanding of Tagalog, who were with
her in the house at the time of the rape, the details surrounding the rape committed
against her, and her age. It is evident that accused-appellant and his counsel were
given ample opportunity to conduct the cross-examination of Erlanie Rivera in order to
test her truthfulness.

303) Solar Team Entertainment vs HOW

G.R. No. 140863               August 22, 2000
SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. HON. ROLANDO HOW, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch 257 of Parañaque and MA.
FE F. BARREIRO, respondents.

FACTS:
The City Prosecutor of Parañaque filed an information for estafa against Ma. Fe
Barreiro, herein private respondent, based on the complaint filed by Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc., herein petitioner.
Before the scheduled arraignment on August 5, 1999 could take place, respondent
judge Rolando How issued an order resetting the arraignment on the ground that
private respondent had filed an appeal with the Department of Justice. The case was
further reset twice but before the scheduled hearing on November 18, 1999, private
respondent again asked for the deferment of the arraignment. Due to this motion,
respondent judge issued an order further deferring the arraignment until such time that
the appeal with the DOJ is resolved. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration to the
order, but the same was denied.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus questioning the orders
issued by respondent judge regarding the indefinite suspension of the arraignment of
the accused until the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice has been
resolved. Petitioner further submits that this instant petition raises "a pure question of
law of first impression" since "it involves the application and interpretation of a law of
very recent vintage, namely Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy
Trial Act of 1998." Petitioner mainly relies on Section 7 of said law that states that:
"SECTION 7.Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and
Between Arraignment and Trial. — The arraignment of an accused shall be held
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the
accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is
pending, whichever date last occurs. . . ."
By issuing the assailed order, respondent court allegedly committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court can indefinitely suspend the
arraignment of the accused until the petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice has been resolved.
HELD:
Yes. Petition devoid of merit. The Court ruled that the decision to suspend arraignment
to await the resolution of appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of such
discretion. A court can defer to the authority of the prosecution arm to resolve, once
and for all, the issue of whether or not sufficient ground existed to file information.
This is in line with the pronouncement in the Crespo case that courts cannot interfere
with the prosecutor's discretion over criminal prosecution. Thus, public respondent did
not act with grave abuse of discretion when it suspended the arraignment of private
respondent to await the resolution of her petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
We are not unmindful of the principle that while the right to a speedy trial secures
rights to the defendant, it does not preclude the rights of public justice. However, in
this case, petitioner as private complainant in the criminal case, cannot deprive private
respondent, accused therein, of her right to avail of a remedy afforded to an accused in
a criminal case. The immediate arraignment of private respondent would have then
proscribed her right as accused to appeal the resolution of the prosecutor to the
Secretary of Justice since Section 4 of DOJ Order No. 223 of June 30, 1993 forestalls an
appeal to the Secretary of Justice if the accused/appellant has already been arraigned.
Hence, in this case, the order suspending the arraignment of private respondent merely
allowed private respondent to exhaust the administrative remedies available to her as
accused in the criminal case before the court could proceed to a fullblown trial.
Conversely, in case the resolution is for the dismissal of the information, the offended
party in the criminal case, herein petitioner, can appeal the adverse resolution to the
Secretary of Justice. In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court aptly pointed out that:
"the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's motion for
review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers
the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing
the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only
upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken therefrom
to the Department of Justice." The fact that public respondent issued the assailed order
suspending the arraignment of private respondent before the "Motion to Defer
Arraignment" of private respondent could be heard is not tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion. It was well within the power of public respondent to grant the continuance
since Section 10 (f) of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 clearly confers this authority.

304) VALENCIA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 165996 October 17, 2005
RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, Petitioner vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
ISSUE Whether Valencia’s motion for leave to file a demurrer was premature
(YES)FACTS
Valencia, the Governor of Mindoro, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by giving unwarranted benefits to
one Cresente Umbao, a candidate who won and lost in the 1992 elections. Umbao was
disqualified to be appointed within a period of one year after having lost the 1992
elections. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty.
The parties then submitted a joint stipulation of facts; however, Valencia did not sign.
The prosecutor rested the case based on such stipulation and waived presentation of
testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution.
Valencia then filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence since the
prosecution failed to present, mark, or offer evidence that would substantiate the
charge against him. The prosecution filed an opposition alleging that such motion for
leave is premature since they have yet to formally offer the joint stipulation of facts.
HELD/RATIO
Rule 119 (23) provides that after the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss
the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence either (a) on its own initiative after
giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard, or (b) upon a demurrer to evidence
filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
A demurrer to evidence tests the sufficiency or insufficiency of the prosecution’s
evidence. As such, a demurrer to evidence or a motion for leave to file the same must
be filed after the prosecution rests its case. But before an evidence may be admitted,
the rules require that the same be formally offered, otherwise, it cannot be considered
by the court. A prior formal offer of evidence concludes the case for the prosecution
and determines the timeliness of the filing of a demurrer to evidence.
Aquino v. Sison: The motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence filed by the accused
after the conclusion of the cross-examination of the witness for the prosecution, is
premature because the latter is still in the process of presenting evidence. The
chemistry report relied upon by the court in granting the motion to dismiss was
disregarded because it was not properly identified or formally offered as evidence.
Verily, until such time that the prosecution closed its evidence, the defense cannot be
considered to have seasonably filed a demurrer to evidence or a motion for leave to file
the same.
Petitioner’s motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence is premature because the
prosecution had yet to formally rest its case.
When the motion was filed on January 19, 2004, the latter had not yet marked nor
formally offered the Joint Stipulation of Facts as evidence.
The motion and formal offer found in the records are those attached as Annex B to
petitioners Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration and not copies filed by the
prosecution. Under Section 12, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, the filing of a pleading or
paper shall be proved by its existence in the case records.
The absence of the motion to rest the case in the records of the Sandiganbayan and
the failure to offer the Joint Stipulation of Facts prove that the prosecution did not
formally rest or conclude the presentation of its evidence, rendering petitioners motion
for leave to file demurrer to evidence, premature.

305) DOMONDON VS SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 129904. March 16, 2000
DIRECTOR GUILLERMO T. DOMONDON, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN.
Doctrine of the Case: While the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 sets the time limit for the
arraignment and trial of a case, these however do not preclude justifiable
postponements and delay when so warranted by the situation. Section 2 of SC Circular
38-98 provides that the period of the pendency of a motion to quash, or for a bill of
particulars, or other causes justifying suspension of arraignment, shall be excluded.
FACTS:
The case arose from the investigation initiated by a letter-complaint of then Police Sr.
Superintendent Romeo M. Acop to the Ombudsman where it appears that payrolls of
2,000 enlisted men of the Cordillera Regional Command (CRECOM), who were allegedly
recipients of the P20,000,000 appropriated for combat, clothing, and individual
equipment (CCIE) allowance, were falsified.
1. May 4, 1994 - an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging
petitioners Domondon and Luspo, and the above-named accused, with violation
of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
2. December 3, 2003 - a motion to dismiss claiming that the failure to arraign
them within the period set under Republic Act (RA) No. 8493 or the Speedy Trial
Act of 1998 have resulted in denial of their rights to speedy trial.
 3. September 13, 2004 - Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion to dismiss.
4. January 11, 2005 – Sandiganbayan dismissed petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: Petitioners allege that speedy trial is not a flexible
concept. They explained that prior to the enactment of RA 8493, as implemented by
Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 38-98, the concept of speedy trial was deemed flexible
because the number of days to determine whether an accused is deprived of his
constitutional right to speedy trial, was not specified. The courts were given enough
latitude to make a judicial determination of whether the delays could be considered as
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive to constitute a violation of the right to speedy
trial. Petitioners claim that with the enactment of RA 8493, any delay in excess of the
allowable number of days within which trial should be conducted will give rise to the
violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to speedy trial of the petitioners were
denied. – NO
HELD:
Petitioners’ contention lacks merit. While the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 sets the time
limit for the arraignment and trial of a case, these however do not preclude justifiable
postponements and delay when so warranted by the situation. Section 2 of SC Circular
38-98 provides that the period of the pendency of a motion to quash, or for a bill of
particulars, or other causes justifying suspension of arraignment, shall be excluded. The
Supreme Court ruled in a preceding case that the right to a speedy trial is deemed
violated only when: 1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays; 2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and
secured; 3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient.
In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of
cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case. The Court further explained that in determining whether the constitutional
right to speedy trial of petitioners has been violated, the factors to consider and balance
are the duration of the delay, reason therefor, assertion of the right or failure to assert
it and the prejudice caused by such delay.
IN THE PRESENT CASE, the denial of petitioners’ motion to dismiss is justified that
although the scheduled arraignments were postponed several times, they were
however postponed for valid reasons.
The respondent court cited a number of justifiable causes of postponements, thus:
One of the postponements was due to the request of one of the accused to reset the
arraignment since the counsel of record is not available on the scheduled date. To
proceed with the arraignment despite the noted absence of one of the counsels would
result in inequity on one of the accused-movants co-defendants. Another
postponement, as pointed out by the accused-movants, was the time given by the
Court to allow the prosecutor to file an opposition to Brizuelas Bill of Particulars. The
comment made by accused-movants is discriminatory and unjust. They claim that the
delay caused by the filing of a motion for bill of particulars by a co-accused should not
be attributable to them as they did not join the same, and consequently such is a
violation of their right to speedy trial. They have forgotten that they themselves had
caused a long delay in this case by filing a motion for reinvestigation and the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Honorable Supreme Court, which is, if such
reasoning is to be followed, to the detriment of the other accused in this case.
The Court find no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the
respondent court. A careful examination of the records would show that the
postponements were caused by numerous pending motions or petitions. The delays
caused by the filing and resolution of these motions and petitions cannot be categorized
as vexatious, capricious or oppressive. After all, it is the judicious and deliberate
determination of all the pending incidents of a case, with a genuine respect for the
rights of all parties and the requirements of procedural due process, that should be the
primordial consideration in the full resolution of a case, more than the mere
convenience of the parties or of the courts, so that justice and fairness would be served
thereby.
There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements
unjustifiably sought, we concur with the conclusion reached by the
Sandiganbayan that petitioners right to speedy trial had not been violated.
Hence, the dismissal of petitioners’ motion to dismiss must be upheld.

306) GARCIA VS DOMINGO

HON. GREGORIO N. GARCIA City Court of Manila, and FRANCISCO
LORENZANA, vs. HON. FELIX DOMINGO.

FACTS:
In Branch I of the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there were
commenced, all dated January 16, 1968 eight criminal actions respondents Edgardo
Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner Lorenzana. The trial for the cases was
jointly held on 14 trial dates. All the fourteen trial dates fell on a Saturday. This was
arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and
Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the
same to be terminated as soon as possible as, Saturday as agreed upon as the
invariable trial day for said 8 criminal cases. The trial of the cases in question was held
with the conformity of the accused and their counsel in the chambers of Judge Garcia.
It is worthy to note that said respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not objected to any
supposed irregularity of the proceedings thus far; Then Carbonnel thru their counsel,
filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction alleging jurisdictional
defects. The respondent judge acting on such petition forthwith issued a restraining
order causing the deferment of the promulgation of judgment. There was an order from
him declaring that ‘the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused had been
violated, adversely affecting their right to a free and impartial trial noting that the trial
of these cases lasting several weeks were held exclusively in chambers and not in the
court room open to the public.
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and
of the city court Judge, it was in the latter’s air-conditioned chambers that the trial was
held. Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative of this right?

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial conducted in the chambers of the Judge
suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative of the right to Public trial.
HELD:
No. The answer must be in the negative.
There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to admit that the size of
the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present.
Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are
not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others.
Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to
satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could “have his friends,
relatives and counsel present, not matter with what offense he may be charged.” Then
too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had
been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of
respondent policemen should erase any doubt as to the weight to be accorded.
Thus, in one case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid prison. The accused,
invoking his right to public trial, assigned the procedure thus taken as error. The
Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record that the accused
offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was held his right is
deemed waived.
The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains. The
Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. What does it signify? Off
hand it does seem fairly obvious that there is an instance where language is to be given
literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be
public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a
judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on
such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship
to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief
that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be
conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety.
Where the trial takes place, as is quite usual, in a courtroom and a calendar of what
cases are to be heard is posted no problem, arises. It is the usual course of events that
individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There is the well-recognized
exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be
characterized as “offensive to decency or public morals.”

307) PEREZ VS ESTRADA

FACTS:
On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association
representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout
the country, sent a letter requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of
the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of
full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The
request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief
Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On
17 April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the petition.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estrada’s trial to the public.
HELD:
NO. In Estes v. Texas,  US  The Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial
proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process rights of the criminal defendant:
"Witnesses might be frightened, play to the cameras, become nervous. They are then
subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences that might affect their testimony.
Telecasting increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the
defendant. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects
him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from an effective presentation of his
defense. Finally, the television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or
inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the public."
The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be installed in
the courtroom. This right might be fulfilled by less distracting, degrading and more
judicial means. In a criminal case, a life is at stake, and the due process rights of the
accused shall take precedence over the people's right to information. The accused has
the right to a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to make, because it is
his life and liberty that is in the balance. A public trial is not the same as a publicized
trial.
IBP: "TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion of the witness intended to
ensure a fair trial...could allow the 'hooting throng' to arrogate upon themselves the
task of judging the guilt of the accused...will not subserve the ends of justice, but will
only pander to the desire of publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers."
Court is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but to chance forthwith the
life and liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample
safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is
a price too high to pay.

308) TUMEY VS OHIO

FACTS:
Plaintiff Tumey was arrested and brought before Mayor Pugh, of the Village of North
College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his
dismissal because of the disqualification of the Mayor to try him, under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Mayor denied the motion, proceeded to the trial, and convicted
plaintiff. The conviction was reversed by the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton
County.
On appeal by the State, the Court of Appeals of the first appellate district of Ohio
affirmed the judgment of the Mayor. The State Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s
petition. In this current petition for certiorari, plaintiff contended that he was denied
due process of law when he was convicted of violating the state's Prohibition Act
because the mayor who convicted him had a direct, pecuniary interest in his conviction.
Specifically, the mayor could only be paid for his services as a judge if he convicted
those who were brought before him, and the mayor had an interest in generating
revenue for his village by convicting and fining those before him.

ISSUE: Whether the plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment

violated?
HELD:
Yes. The Court held that the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights and due
process rights were violated when his liberty or property was subjected to
the judgment of a court the judge of which had a direct, personal,
substantial, and pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in
his case. According to the court, plaintiff had a due process right to be tried
by an impartial judge.
All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity.
Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest,
would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion. But it
certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment and deprives a defendant in a
criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty or property to the
judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial,
pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.

309) SORIANO VS ANGELES

G.R. No. 109920               August 31, 2000
CEFERINO A. SORIANO, petitioner, vs. HON. ADORACION C. ANGELES, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Caloocan City, Regional Trial Court, Branch
CXXI, and RUEL GARCIA, respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondent Ruel Garcia and his uncle, Pedro Garcia, were members of the
Caloocan police. Shortly after midnight on November 7, 1991, they barged into the
barangay hall of Barangay 56, Zone 5 in Caloocan City, looking for petitioner Ceferino A.
Soriano, the barangay captain. Private respondent gave petitioner fist blows on the face
four times with his left hand, while he poked a gun at him with his right hand, at the
same time cursing him, “Putang ina mo cabeza” (“You son of a bitch chief”). Although
there were four barangay tanods (Manuel Montoya, Arturo del Rosario, Ramiro Samson,
and Francisco Raton) in the barangay hall, they could not come to the aid of petitioner
because they were held at bay by Pedro Garcia. The Garcias then left with their
companions who had been waiting outside the hall. Petitioner was treated for his
injuries in the hospital.
Private respondent denied petitioner’s allegations. He testified that he went to the
barangay hall in the evening of November 6, 1991 because his younger brother had
been reportedly arrested and beaten up by petitioner. (It appears that the younger
Garcia was involved in a brawl with Dennis Mones and a certain Ocampo. They were
arrested and taken to the barangay hall. One of the boys, who was apparently drunk,
vomitted while their names were recorded. Petitioner, therefore, ordered the three boys
to be taken to the Ospital ng Kalookan for a check-up.) As private respondent saw
petitioner near the door of the barangay hall, he asked for the whereabouts of his
brother and the reason for the latter’s arrest. Apparently thinking that private
respondent was trying to intervene in the case he was investigating, petitioner angrily
told private respondent to lay off: “Walang pulis pulis dito” (“Your being a policeman
doesn’t pull strings here”). When private respondent insisted on going inside the
barangay hall, petitioner blocked him and then pushed him on the chest. Private
respondent also pushed petitioner, causing him to fall on a pile of nightsticks and injure
himself. All the time, private respondent claimed he had his gun tucked at his waist.
Private respondent’s uncle, Pedro Garcia, then arrived and took him home.
In acquitting private respondent, respondent Judge Adoracion C. Angeles found it
incredible that petitioner did not resist or even say anything when private respondent
allegedly assaulted him and that none of the four barangay tanods who were near him
came to his aid. She thought that if petitioner had indeed been attacked, he would have
suffered more serious injuries than a contusion on the forehead, erythema on the
chest, and a lacerated wound on the lower lip. Respondent judge also excluded from
the evidence the testimonies of petitioner and barangay tanod Manuel Montoya on the
ground that their testimonies had not been formally offered in evidence as required by
Rule 132, §§34 to 35 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

ISSUE: W.O.N. the decision is void because it was not rendered by an

impartial tribunal.
HELD:
No, the SC stated that it was not rendered by an impartial tribunal and
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
A perusal of the judgment of the trial court showed that the parties were heard
conformably to the norms of due process, evidence was presented by both parties and
duly considered, their arguments were studied, analyzed, and assessed, and judgment
was rendered in which findings of facts and conclusions of law were set forth. These
conclusions of fact or law cannot in any sense be characterized as outrageously wrong
or manifestly mistaken or whimsically or capriciously arrived at. The worst that may
perhaps be said of them is that they are fairly debatable and may even be possibly
erroneous. But they cannot be declared to have been made with grave abuse of
discretion. Clearly, there was no mistrial in this case which would warrant the nullity of
the assailed judgment.
The court explained that it is pertinent to cite certain principles laid down by the Court
regarding the disqualification of a judge for lack of the objectivity that due process
requires. It is settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties is
not enough; there should be evidence to prove the charge. Bias and prejudice cannot
be presumed, especially weighed against a judge’s sacred allegation under oath of
office to administer justice without respect to any person and do equal right to the poor
and the rich. There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an
extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis other than what
the judge learned from his participation in the case.

RIGHTS TO CONFRONT WITNESSES.

310) SPOUSES DELA CRUZ VS RAMON PAPA IV
G.R. No. 185899               December 8, 2010
SPOUSES REUBEN DELA CRUZ AND MINERVA DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, vs.
RAMON C. PAPA IV, in his capacity as Co-Administrator of the Estate of
ANGELA M. BUTTE, Respondent.

FACTS:
In 1994, the Intestate Estate of Angela M. Butte (the Estate) filed an action for
cancellation of titles, recovery of properties, and damages against several defendants,
including petitioner spouses Reuben and Minerva Dela Cruz (the Dela Cruzes) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City in Civil Cases 94-3447 and 95-3816. On
October 21, 1999 the Estate presented Myron C. Papa (Myron), its executor, to testify
on the substance of the complaint. At the conclusion of Myron’s testimony on that day,
the RTC required the Estate and the latter agreed to present Myron anew at the next
scheduled hearing to identify the originals of certain exhibits, after which counsels for
the defendants, would begin to cross-examine him.
But the Estate never got around recalling Myron to the witness stand. He was taken ill
and diagnosed as suffering from stage four colon and liver cancer, prompting
respondent Ramon C. Papa IV (Ramon), the Estate’s co-administrator, to seek repeated
postponements of hearings in the case to allow Myron undergo intensive treatment.
Later, the Estate filed a motion for leave to have the defendants cross-examine Myron
by deposition at the hospital where he was confined. The RTC granted the motion on
February 22, 20011 and eventually set the deposition-taking on September 7, 2001 but
Myron passed away on August 16, 2001.
On November 15, 2001 one of the defendants moved to expunge Myron’s direct
testimony. The Dela Cruzes for their part moved to dismiss the case for failure of the
Estate to prosecute it. On March 13, 2002 the RTC issued an order, denying the two
motions based on the ground that the Estate had no control of the circumstances that
caused the delay in the case.
On December 3, 2003 the Estate asked leave of court to file its formal offer of exhibits.
On December 5, 2003 the Dela Cruzes filed a motion to strike out Myron’s testimony on
the ground of failure to cross-examine him. Meanwhile, the Estate filed its formal offer
of evidence.
In a March 4, 2005 Order, 2 the RTC granted the Dela Cruzes’ motion to strike out
Myron’s testimony on the ground that, due to the Estate’s fault, such testimony was
never completed, depriving the defendants of the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Because the RTC denied the Estate’s motion for reconsideration, 3 it filed a special civil
action of certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
91074, assailing the March 4, 2005 Order. Meanwhile, on August 16, 2005 the RTC
admitted the Dela Cruzes’ demurrer to evidence.
On July 25, 2008 the CA rendered a Decision, 4 granting the petition and setting aside
the RTC’s order that struck out Myron’s testimony. The CA denied the Dela Cruzes’
motion for reconsideration.
Although the CA likewise set aside the RTC’s denial of the respondent’s documentary
evidence and its admission of the Dela Cruzes’ demurrer, it held that the RTC may not
be compelled by mandamus to admit the documentary exhibits in issue, since the
matter of admitting them is discretionary upon it. Because the CA declined to
reconsider,5 the Dela Cruzes filed this petition for review, seeking reinstatement of the
RTC’s Order dated March 4, 2005.

ISSUE: whether or not the CA erred in reinstating Myron’s testimony after

the RTC ordered the same stricken out for depriving the defendants of the
opportunity to cross-examine him.

HELD:
The CA said that the defendants were guilty of unreasonable delay in objecting to
Myron’s testimony. Myron died on August 16, 2001 yet the other defendants moved to
expunge his testimony only on November 15, 2001. On the other hand, the Dela Cruzes
filed a similar motion only in December 2003. Citing Section 36, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court,6 the CA held that they should have objected to Myron’s testimony when it was
offered or soon after the reason for objecting to its admission became apparent. When
they failed to do so, said the CA, the defendants waived their right to object to the
same.
The CA characterized the defendants’ actions as betraying an "intention to defeat the
(Estate’s) action through a technicality." 7 Because Myron’s testimony was expunged
after the respondent Estate had rested its case, it could no longer present other
witnesses who may testify on and identify its documentary evidence, thus resulting in
its inadmissibility. The CA ruled that as a result of the RTC’s error in sustaining the
defendants’ actions, the Estate was thus "effectively deprived of an opportunity to meet
the consequences of the expunction of Myron’s testimony."8
But it is evident that the defendants’ right to cross-examine Myron did not yet come up
when he finished his direct testimony on October 21, 1999. The Estate undertook to
return him to the witness stand to identify for it the originals of certain documents.
Consequently, when Myron was taken ill, the obligation to move the case forward
continued to be on the Estate’s side. Rather than move it, however, the Estate
repeatedly asked for the deferment of Myron’s testimony on the chance that he could
recover and return to court. It took the Estate more than a year to remedy the situation
by asking the RTC to allow the cross-examination of Myron in the hospital where he
was confined. Thus, only when the Court granted this motion on February 22, 2001 did
it become evident that the Estate was waiving the additional direct examination that it
reserved on October 21, 1999. Thus, the turn of the Dela Cruzes to cross-examine
Myron came only after February 22, 2001.
But having their turn to cross-examine Myron is different from their being accorded an
opportunity to cross-examine him. The RTC set the deposition taking on September 7,
2001 but Myron died before that date, on August 16, 2001. Consequently, it was not
the defendants’ fault that they were unable to cross-examine him.
The CA appears too hasty in blaming the defendants for the further delays that
followed. When Myron died on August 16, 2001, the obligation to close his aborted
testimony and proceed with its other evidence remained with the Estate. But it did
nothing, prompting one of the defendants to ask the RTC on November 15, 2001 to
strike down Myron’s testimony on the ground of the defendants’ failure to cross-
examine him. The Dela Cruzes themselves asked that the case be dismissed for the
Estate’s failure to prosecute after such a long time.
Still, wanting to give the Estate the chance to present additional evidence, on March 13,
2002 the RTC denied the defendants’ motions. But the Estate did nothing for about a
year and eight months until December 3, 2003 when, rather than present additional
evidence, it asked leave to close its case with a formal offer of its documentary exhibits.
Clearly, it was only at this stage that the Estate signaled its intention to still avail itself
of Myron’s unfinished testimony. And the Dela Cruzes did not lose time to act. On
December 5, 2003 they renewed the defendants’ earlier motion to expunge such
testimony. And this time, the RTC granted the motion. It did so correctly since the
Estate showed a lack of interest in offering a substitute testimony for that of Myron’s.
Since the Estate presented its documentary exhibits and had the same authenticated
through Myron’s testimony, it stands to reason that the striking out of the latter’s
testimony altogether wiped out the required authentication for those exhibits. They
become inadmissible unless the RTC, in its discretion, reopens the trial upon a valid
ground and permits the Estate to rectify its mistakes.

311) U.S. VS JAVIER

G.R. No. L-12990            January 21, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LAZARO JAVIER, ET
AL., defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
Doroteo Natividad fastened his carabao in his corral. On the following morning when he
went to look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and that the
carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary and a patrol of
the Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa, now deceased. On the 20th of
November following, encountered the accused Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and
Placido de Chavez leading the carabao. When the ladrones saw the Constabulary, that
scattered in all directions. On the following day, the Constabulary found this carabao
tied in front of the house of one Pedro Monterola. The carabao was identified by
Doroteo Natividad and by the Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of the
accused. Although the persons who unlawfully took a certain carabao are not
recognized at the time, and their identity remains entirely unknown, nevertheless, if the
stolen animal is found in the possession of the accused shortly after the commission of
the crime and they make no satisfactory explanation of such possession they may be
properly convicted of the crime. In the present instance, the attempt of the accused to
insinuate that one of the Constabulary soldiers testified against them falsely because of
enmity is hardly believable. Appellant's argument is predicated on the provision of the
Philippine Bill of Rights which says, "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to meet the witnesses face to face."

ISSUE:
Whether the sworn statement, which was executed by a person now
deceased, is inadmissible In as much as the accused is not given the
opportunity to cross-examine the author thereof.

HELD:
Philippine Bill of Rights which says, "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right... to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), which says that "In all criminal prosecutions the
defendant shall be entitled:…to be confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the
witnesses against him." With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we
have quoted, Justice Day said in a case of the Philippine origin that it "intends to secure
the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are
concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their
testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination.
It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon deposition or ex parte
affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of
the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination."
The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under
circumstances which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. xxx
We can rely on the old and historic case of R. vs. Paine (1 Salk., 281 [King's Bench
Div.]) occurring in the year 1696. It appears that a deposition of B., examined by the
Mayor of Bristol under oath, but not in P's presence, was offered. It was objected that
B, being dead, the defendant had lost all opportunity of cross-examining him. The
King's Bench consulted with the Common Pleas, and "it was the opinion of both courts
that these deposition should not be given in evidence, the defendant not being present
when they were taken before the Mayor and so had lost the benefit of a cross-
examination." Although we are faced with the alternative of being unable to utilize the
statements of the witness now deceased, yet if there has been no opportunity for cross-
examination and the case is not one coming within one of the exceptions, the mere
necessity alone accepting the statement will not suffice. In fine, Exhibit B was
improperly received in evidence in the lower court.
With such a resolution of this question, we could, as has been done in other cases,
further find this to be reversible error and remand the case for a new trial. We are
convinced, however, that this would gain the accused nothing except delay for the
testimony of the owner of the carabao and of the two Constabulary soldiers, rebutted
by no reasonable evidence on behalf of the accused, is deemed sufficient to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.

17.10. Right to secure attendance of witnesses

312) U.S. vs. Garcia, 10 Phil. 384 (1908)

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICENTE GARCIA GAVIERES, Defendant-
Appellant.
FACTS: Accused was charged in the RTC for calumniating, outraging, and insulting by
word of mouth, and in his presence, a public official, an agent of the authorities, in the
exercise of his office.

The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of double
jeopardy.

It appears that accused was charged and convicted in the MTC for violation of a city
ordinance which provides: “No person shall be drunk or intoxicated, or behave in a
drunken, boisterous, rude, or indecent manner in any public place, or place open to
public view; or be drunk or intoxicated, or behave in a drunken, boisterous, rude, or
indecent manner in any place or premises, to the annoyance of another person.”

Both charges arose from the same acts of the accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not a conviction for a violation of an ordinance bars a prosecution
for a separate offense arising from the acts for which he was previously convicted?

HELD: NO. By comparing the alleged offense with which the defendant was punished in
the municipal court with the offense charged in the complaint in the present case, it will
be seen that they were separate and entirely distinct offenses. It is possibly true that
the offense for which the defendant was convicted in the municipal court resulted from
the same acts which constituted the offense for which he was prosecuted in the Court
of First Instance, but this court has held that the mere fact that a person is prosecuted
twice by different governmental entities for different offenses resulting from the same
acts does not justify the plea of former jeopardy.

An act may be a penal offense under the laws of the State, and other
penalties under proper authority may be imposed for its commission by a
municipal ordinance, and the enforcement of one penalty by the State would
not preclude the enforcement of the other by the municipality.

Where the same act constitutes an offense against each of two governmental
entities exercising jurisdiction over the same territory, a prosecution brought
by one does not necessarily bar a prosecution by the other.

313) People vs. Sandal, 54 Phil. 883 (1938)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. SANDAL, ARIMAO,
LONSING, MAMA, and PAMPANG, Defendants-Appellants.

Facts: In Abaga, District of Monungan, Province of Lanao, Inambar, a Moro

woman, heard the appellant Sandal call the deceased, and later saw them
engaged in conversation. While the two were talking, appellant Pampang
went up to them and with a hammer struck the deceased on the back of the
neck, felling him to the ground. Sandal and the rest of the appellants,
Lonsing, Arimao, and Mama, then closed in on the fallen man beating him to
death.

Moro Dimaponong testified that early in the morning of that day, he saw Eleno, the
deceased, in Tomas Permites’ warehouse, while the appellants were nearby
constructing a house. When witness returned to the warehouse, he saw neither the
deceased nor the defendants where he had seen them before. On that night as he was
going home, witness saw appellants near a sawmill, carrying the corpse of Eleno, which
they threw into the river. During the inquiry made by the Constabulary lieutenant into
Eleno’s disappearance, Dimaponong testified to this effect, and the corpse was found in
that part of the river indicated by him.

Doctor Pablo Hamoy in the post-mortem examination found numeration injuries

sustained by the victim. The following facts of record explain the motive of the assault:
When Tomas Permites went to Manila to look after certain matters, he left Eleno in
charge of his interests in Monungan. While Permites was in Manila, the appellants
caused some injuries to his (Permites) carabaos, as a result of which Eleno had a
dispute with them. Eleno sent word of what had happened to Permites in Manila, and
when the latter returned to Monungan, he verified the facts and filed a complaint
against the appellants. Eleno was to be the principal witness, and the defendants knew
it.

The appellants denied the facts set forth and attempted to prove an alibi.

Upon consideration of the evidence for both sides, we agree with the conclusion of the
trial court that the appellants killed Eleno in the manner described above. The court
below did not err in weighing the evidence.

Issue: WON the trial court’s refusal to admit a witness presented by the defense is
proper?

Held: Yes! The court took this stand for the reason that this witness had been present
during the hearing notwithstanding the court’s order that all witnesses leave the court
room. Under such circumstances it lies within the court’s discretion to admit or reject
the testimony of the witness. And although we are of opinion that the court
below should have admitted the testimony of this witness, especially when
he stated that he did not hear what the other witnesses testified, yet there is
nothing to show that this error has affected the appellants’ defense. There is
nothing to show what this witness would have testified if admitted, and so it
cannot be held that his failure to testify has materially affected the
appellants’ defense.

314) People vs. De Luna, 174 SCRA 204 (1989)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PATRICK DE LUNA, defendant-appellant.
Facts: The Lower Court Regional Trial Court of Cebu City finds accused Patrick de Luna
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty plus his manifestation to this court that he did not
intentionally want it to happen that way, the court hereby sentences accused Patrick de
Luna to Reclusion Perpetua (life imprisonment) and to indemnify the heirs of Tricia the
sum of P 30,000.00.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the defendant-appellant entered a valid plea of guilty to the
offense as charged in the information; and (2) Assuming that there was a valid plea of
guilty, whether the accused may waive the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution.

Held: Resolution of the Supreme Court In order to be valid, the plea must be an
unconditional admission of guilt. It must be of such nature as to foreclose the
defendant's right to defend himself from said charge, thus leaving the court no
alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law.

Under the circumstances of this case, the appellant's qualified plea of guilty is not a
valid plea of guilty.

Thus, this Court has ruled that: An accused may not enter a conditional plea of guilty in
the sense that he admits his guilt, provided that a certain penalty be imposed upon
him. In such cases, the information should first be amended or modified with the
consent of the fiscal if the facts so warrant, or the accused must be considered as
having entered a plea of not guilty. Even assuming that the plea was in fact to the
lesser offense of Homicide and not Murder, as stated by appellant in his appeal, this
Court cannot sustain appellant's earnest request for an immediate reduction of the
penalty imposed by the trial court. This procedure would run contrary to the explicit
provisions of Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
which states:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.-The accused, with the consent of the offended
party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is
cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (Emphasis supplied.) The consent of the fiscal
and the offended party is necessary. If the plea of guilty to a lesser offense is made
without the consent of the fiscal and the offended party, the conviction of the accused
shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the
offense charged in the former information.

On the second assigned error, it is the contention of appellant that the trial court, after
a plea of guilty to a capital offense (Murder), should have required the prosecution to
present its evidence to determine the proper penalty to be imposed.

The Court sustains the appellant on this score.

In People vs. Camay, this Court has ruled that: The procedure to be followed in a
situation like this where the accused, with assistance of counsel, voluntarily pleads
guilty to a capital offense is explicitly laid down in Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure promulgated by the Court, and which went into effect on January 1,
1985. This new rule states: When an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the
court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the
precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf.

Thus, notwithstanding the waiver made by the appellant as to the

presentation of evidence by the prosecution, the presentation of evidence
should be required in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the
mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility
that there might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the
accused as to the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to
ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which
justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the
imposition of the prescribed penalties.

This rule is, therefore, mandatory.

17.11. Right to be present during trial

Trial in absentia
Rule 115, Sec. 1 (c)
315) People vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140285, September 27, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (15th Division) and WILFRED N. CHIOK, respondents.
Facts:

Wilfred Chiok was the stockbroker of Rufina Chua for several years. However, after
entrusting to him the amount of P9,563,900.00 for the purpose of buying stocks, Chiok
spent the money and failed to return the same to her. Rufina Chua then caused the
filing of an information for estafa against Wilfred Chiok with the Regional Trial Court.
During the arraignment, Chiok, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty and
posted bail. Trial ensued. Chiok denied the charge against him. The trial court rendered
a Decision convicting respondent of estafa and sentencing him to suffer twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. During the promulgation of the judgment, Chiok and his counsel failed to
appear despite notice. Consequently, the prosecution filed a Motion for
Cancellation of Bail on the ground that there is an indication that Chiok might flee or
commit another crime. The trial court grants the motion issuing Omnibus Order
directing Chiok to surrender within 5 days. Chiok filed with the Court of Appeals a
Special Civil Action for Certiorari with Very Urgent Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Injunction assailing the trial court's Omnibus Order
canceling his bail. Meanwhile, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest against Chiok for
the reason that "he has not surrendered despite the lapse of the given period (five
days) as provided in the Omnibus Order. The CA then issued a TRO enjoining the
implementation of the trial court's Omnibus Order, holding that the latter
should not be deprived of his liberty pending resolution of his appeal as the offense for
which he was convicted is a non-capital offense; and that the probability of flight by
Chiok during the pendency of his appeal is merely conjectural. Hence, the present
petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it directed the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of Chiok.

Held:
Yes. The Court of Appeals certainly erred in enjoining the arrest of Chiok. Its
declaration that Chiok might flee or commit another crime is conjectural utterly lacks
merit. Chiok already demonstrated that he is a fugitive from justice. The trial court
correctly cancelled Chiok's bail because of his failure to appear during the
promulgation of judgment despite notice. He violated the condition of his bail
that he must appear before the proper court whenever so
required by that court or the Rules.
As such, his arrest, as ordered by the trial court, is proper. This is in accordance with
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides in part,
thus:

SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment.

- The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any
judge of the court in which it was rendered. XXX
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his
bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of
the decision. xXX
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the
judgment and the court shall order his arrest Within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for
leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at
the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
(Underscoring supplied)

17.12. When presence of the accused is a duty

Arraignment and plea

Rule 116, Sec. 1 (b)
During trial for identification

316) Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 63 SCRA 546 (1975)

BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY COMMISSION 2, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
and SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT, and SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,

Facts: In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and
was placed under custody. He was brought Fort Bonifacio. He filed for the issuance of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus which was denied by the SC. Aquino then questioned the
validity of such denial and the declaration of martial law; at the same time he
questioned the authority of the military court [No. 2] created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to
try him and his other companions. He was being charged for illegal possession of
firearms, ammunition and explosives. He was also being charged for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All were filed before the military court. Aquino
argued that the military court has no jurisdiction or civilian courts are still operational
and that being a civilian, his trial by a military commission deprives him of his right to
due process. He filed for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus which was denied
by the SC. Ninoy then questioned the validity of the denial as well as the declaration of
martial law; at the same time he questioned the authority of the military court [No. 2]
created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his other companions. He was being
charged for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives. He was also
being charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All were filed
before the military court. Ninoy argued that the military court has no jurisdiction for
civilian courts are still operational.

Issue:
A. Whether or not Ninoy can be validly charged before the military court.
B. Whether or not Aquino was afforded due process in a military court.

Held:
(a) YES. The SC upheld the power of the president to create military tribunals
or military courts which are authorized to try not only military personnel but
also civilians even at that time civil courts were open and functioning. The SC
basically rejected the “open court” theory observed in the USA.
(b)YES. According to Schwartz, “The immunity of civilians from military
jurisdiction must, however, give way in areas governed by martial law. When
it is absolutely imperative for public safety, legal processes can be
superseded and military tribunals authorized to exercise the jurisdiction
normally vested in court.”
Neither are We impressed with petitioner’s argument that only thru a judicial
proceeding before the regular courts can his right to due process be preserved. The
guarantee of due process is not a guarantee of any particular form of tribunal in
criminal cases. A military tribunal of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form,
notice and opportunity to defend and trial before an impartial tribunal, adequately meet
the due process requirement. Due process of law does not necessarily means a judicial
proceeding in the regular courts. 14 The guarantee of due process, viewed in its
procedural aspect, requires no particular form of procedure. It implies due notice to the
individual of the proceedings, an opportunity to defend himself and “the problem of the
propriety of the deprivations, under the circumstances presented, must be resolved in a
manner consistent with essential fairness.” It means essentially a fair and impartial trial
and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense.
Here, the procedure before the Military Commission, as prescribed in Presidential
Decree No. 39, assures observance of the fundamental requisites of procedural due
process, due notice, an essentially fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for
the preparation of the defense Section 11 of the Manual for Courts-Martial specifically
provides that the “rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in
the courts of the Philippines shall be applied by courts-martial.” This is applicable to
trials in the military commission . There is, therefore, no justification for petitioner’s
contention that such military tribunals are concerned primarily with the conviction of an
accused and that proceedings therein involve the complete destruction and abolition of
petitioner’s constitutional rights.

317) People vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986)

FACTS:
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CF of Cebu but before he
could be
arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the
reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which
he
pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner, taking
advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in o granting him bail and
ordering his release; and so he escaped. The respondent judge, learning later of the
trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered bong's re-arrest. But he was gone.
Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the
constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances.
The respondent judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until
the return of the accused. The order of the trial court is now before us on certiorari and
mandamus.

ISSUE: WON the trial judge erred in suspending the case?

HELD:
The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which
now allows trial in absentia. The prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart
his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only
that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified ofthe trial; and
c) his failure to appear is unjustified.
The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the old doctrine when he ruled that
trial in
absentia of the escapee could not be held because he could not be duly notified under
Section
19. He forgets that the fugitive is now deemed to have waived such notice precisely
because he
has escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial
unjustified
Escape can never be a legal justification. Under the present rule, his escape will, legally
speaking, operate to disadvantage by preventing him from attending his trial, which will
continue even in his absence and most likely result in his conviction.
The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage
where the
prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. Under Section
19, the
defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court
to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his
trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will
make his failure to
appear unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and
protection, of the law.

Promulgation of sentence
Rule 120, Sec. 6
Exception: Light offenses

MODULE 18.
MODULE 18 - PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
18.1. Art. IIl. Sec. 17
Scope covers compulsory testimonial incrimination

318) Dela Cruz vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014)
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:
Jaime Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito Escobido that Ariel, the
live-in partner of Corazon and Charito was picked up by unknown male persons
believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs.
An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and when the latter gave the
number a ring,they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office located
along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City.
In the said police office, they met "James" who demanded from them P100,000, later
lowered to P40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel.
A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation.
Petitioner was required to submit his urine for drug testing to which a
positive result for presence of dangerous drugs was found.
Petitioner claimed that when he was in the NBI Office, he was required to
extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be
done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the
NBI and such request was denied.
He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his
urine sample, to no avail.

ISSUE:
Whether the drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against
self-incrimination.

RULING:
Yes. The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the
accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be
material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak of his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding
hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-
incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence
against himself through a testimonial act. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both
erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug
testing was merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial
investigation. In the present case, though, the petitioner was arrested for extortion; he
resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample was the only
available evidence that was used as basis for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all
arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.
Law enforcement agents, must, however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits
of their authority, because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge society of
its lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the
protected rights of its citizens including even members of its own police force.

319) People vs. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, December 9, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DELFIN RONDERO, accused-appellant.

Facts: On the evening of March 25, 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio
fiesta. When he noticed that his nine year old sister, Mylene, was not around, he woke
up his parents to inquire about his sisters whereabouts. Realizing that Mylene was
missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the help of a neighbor. Maximo, who was
then carrying a flashlight, saw herein accused-appellant Delfin Rondero pumping the
artesian well about one (1) meter away. Accused-appellant had an ice pick clenched in
his mouth and was washing his bloodied hands. After some time, a restless Maximo
began to search anew for her daughter. He again sought the help of Andong and the
barangay secretary. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they found
Mylenes lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the canteen. She was naked
from the waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on different parts of her
body. Tightly gripped in her right hand were some hair strands. Half an hour later, five
(5) policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. Maximo led the
policemen to the artesian well where he had seen accused-appellant earlier washing his
hands. The policemen found that the artesian well was spattered with blood.
Meanwhile, on March 30, 1994, accused-appellant was formally charged with the
special complex crime of rape with homicide. The NBI sent a fax message to the
Dagupan City Police Station saying that it could not conduct an examination on the hair
strands because the proper comparative specimens were not given. The NBI suggested
that hair strands be pulled, not cut, from the suspect and from the victim on the four
regions of their heads so that all parts of the hair strands, from root to tip, may be
presented. The trial court rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant of the crime
of murder and sentencing him to death. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether the taking of some hair strands from the accused without his consent
and submitted to the NBI for investigation, in violation of his right against self
incrimination.

Held: No, right against self incrimination actually proscribed is the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-
appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be
material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may
be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and
morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as
evidence against him. Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair
samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in
nature acquired from the accused under duress.

320) People vs. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RADEL GALLARDE, Accused-
Appellant.
Facts: In the evening of May 26, 1997, at the house of spouses, their neighbors
converged. Among them were appellant and others. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old
daughter of spouses Talan. A fluorescent lamp illuminated them as they partook beer.
Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime
followed her and asked where she was going. Editha answered that she would look for
appellant. Soon Editha left enroute to where appellant. Moments later, Roger arrived
and informed them that Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her.
The searchers found appellant squatting with his short pants. His hands and knees were
covered with soil. Asked where Editha was, appellant replied: “I do not know, I did not
do anything to her.” The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses. Along the
way, they saw a wide hole among the disheveled grass. They found the dead body of
the victim. Mindful of appellant’s safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring
appellant to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on board
a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of appellant, saying that
he is the suspect in the disappearance of the little girl. The policemen together with
appellant proceeded to where the people found Editha. One of the policemen shoved
more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked when she was recovered. The
cause of Editha’s death as revealed in the post-mortem examination showed
“suffocation of the lungs as a result from powerful covering of the nose and mouth,
associated with laceration of the vagina and raptured hymen. The trial court found the
appelant guilty of homicide. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether the photographs taken of the accused immediately after the incident is
inadmissible as evidence in court on the ground that “the same were taken while the
accused was already under the mercy of the police.” and the taking of pictures of an
accused even without the assistance of counsel is a violation of his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.

Held: No, The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of
counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused
against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body
in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included
in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the
assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the
right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving
of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held
that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit
to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical
determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by
his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to
determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or
his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the
foregoing things to be done.

321) United States vs. Tan Teh, 23 Phil. 145 (1912)

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TAN TENG, Defendant-Appellant.
Facts: Oliva Pacomio, a girl seven years of age, after having taken a bath, returned to
her room; that the defendant followed her into her room and asked her for some face
powder, which she gave him; that after using some of the face powder upon his private
parts he threw the said Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and
remained in that position for some little time. Several days later, the sister of Oliva
Pacomio discovered that the latter was suffering from a venereal disease known as
gonorrhea. It was at the time of this discovery that Oliva related to her sister what
happened upon the morning of the 15th of September. The sister at once put on foot
an investigation to find the Chinaman. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who
had abused her. Later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who had
attempted to violate her. Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken
to the police station and stripped of his clothing and examined. The policeman who
examined the defendant swore from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The
policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and
turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis
made of the same. The result of the examination showed that the defendant was
suffering from gonorrhea. In the trial, The offended party testified that the defendant
had rested his private parts upon hers for some moments. The defendant was found to
be suffering from gonorrhea. The medical experts who testified agreed that this disease
could have been communicated from him to her by the contact described. the lower
court found the defendant guilty of the accused crime. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether objects obtained from the body of the accused cannot be used as
evidence to incriminated him in the said crime as it violates section 5 of the Philippine
Bill.

Held: No, The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a
person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant’s own lips,
against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main purpose of the provision
of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners
before trial. or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions
or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime.

The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection, the
examination was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that the
defendant was suffering from said disease. The prohibition of compelling a man in a
criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence, when it may be material. Such an inspection of the bodily features by the
court or by witnesses, can not violate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill,
because it does not call upon the accused as a witness — it does not call upon the
defendant for his testimonial responsibility. That evidence obtained in this way from the
accused, is not testimony but his body itself. The accused was not compelled to make
any admission or answer any questions, and the mere fact that an object found upon
his body was examined seems no more to infringe the rule invoked than would the
introduction of stolen property taken from the person of a thief.

322) United States vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 (1917)
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ONG SIU HONG, Defendant-Appellant.

Facts:

Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional question that the accused was compelled
to be a witness against himself. The contention is that this was the result of forcing the
accused to discharge the morphine from his mouth.

Issue:

Is forcing an accused to discharge morphine from his mouth compelling him to be a

witness against himself?

Held:

No. To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the
same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in
evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of an accused in his
absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking a substance from the body of the
accused to be used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced construction of
the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any
article, substance, or thing taken from a person accused of crime could not
be given in evidence. The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit
testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from
prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime. (United States vs. Ong Siu
Hong, G.R. No. 12778. August 3, 1917)

323) People vs. Otadura, 86 Phil. 244 (1950)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO OTADORA, ET AL., defendants.
HILARIA CARREON, appellant.

Facts: Early in the morning of June 16, 1947, Leon Castro and his wife Apolonia
Carreon were shot dead in their house in the City of Ormoc, Leyte. In the afternoon of
June 21, 1947, Antonio Otadora was arrested in Ormoc City while preparing to escape
to Camotes Island, Cebu. The next day he confessed in an extra-judicial statement
(Exhibit 1) wherein he implicated the herein accused and appellant Hilaria Carreon
asserting that, with offers of pecuniary gain, the latter had induced him to commit the
crime. On June 25, 1947, a complaint for double murder was filed against both
defendants in the justice of the peace court of Ormoc, Leyte. Preliminary investigation
was waived and the record was forwarded to the court of first instance, where on
September 3, 1947, Otadora pleaded guilty with the assistance of counsel. Hilaria
Carreon pleaded not guilty, and asked for a separate trial, which was immediately held,
with Otadora as the first witness for the prosecution. Prior the commission of the crime,
Antonio Otadora met Hilaria Carreon sometime in April, 1947, through Amando Garbo.
Hilaria Carreon offered 1/3 of P10,000 plus carabaos, plus P300 to assassinate the
victim spouses. She gave him a revolver, a bolo, a pair of trousers of her husband
Francisco Galos, a hat, and a flashlight. In August, 1947 in the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Antonio Otadora and Hilaria Carreon were charged with
the murder of the spouses Leon Castro and Apolonia Carreon. Otadora
pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Denying her guilt,
Hilaria Carreon was tried, found guilty and sentenced to death and other
accessory penalties. Her attorney filed here a voluminous brief wherein he
attempted painstakingly to break down the position of the prosecution and
to expound the theory that Antonio Otadora is the only person responsible
for the slaying, and that Hilaria Carreon is just “the unfortunate victim of a
vicious frame-up concocted against her. The Attorney assailed that the
possession by Otadora of the pants of Francisco Galos and his hat. It appears
that when Francisco Galos denied ownership of the pants he was ordered to
put it on; and the judge found that it fitted him perfectly. This incident gave
the defense opportunity for extended argument that the constitutional
protection against self-incrimination had been erroneously disregarded.
Issue: Whether the order to Carreon’s husband to put on the pants used by the
Otadura during the assassination of the victims constitute a violation of the privilege
against self incrimination.

Held: No, Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege against self-
incrimination. Nor is the removal or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the
requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
Further corroboration of appellant's criminal connection with the bloody affair is the
undisputed possession by Otadora of the pants of Francisco Galos and his hat. It
appears that when Francisco Galos denied ownership of the pants he was ordered to
put it on; and the judge found that it fitted him perfectly. This incident gave the
defense opportunity for extended argument that the constitutional protection against
selfincrimination had been erroneously disregarded. But we discover in the record no
timely objection upon that specific ground. And it is to be doubted whether the accused
could benefit from the error, if any. Furthermore, and this is conclusive,
"measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege" (against
selfincrimination). "Nor is the removal or replacement of his garments or
shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to enable the
foregoing things to be done."

324) Long Title: G.R. No. 16444           September 8, 1920

EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, petitioner,

vs.
RICARDO SUMMERS, sheriff of the City of Manila, respondent.

Short Title: Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)

Facts: In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of
adultery. On this case coming on for trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of
First Instance, upon the petitioner of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court
ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor, nor become the petitioner herein, to submit
her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if
she was pregnant or not. 

The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her
person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-
incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be
committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by
the court.

RTC

Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an infringement of the
constitutional provision; the representative of the city fiscal contends that it is not an
infringement of the constitutional provision. The trial judge in the instant case has held
with the fiscal; while it is brought to our notice that a judge of the same court has held
on an identical question as contended for by the attorney for the accused and
petitioner.

Issue:  Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be

examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion
of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure
which find their origin in the Constitution of the United States and practically all state
constitutions and in the common law rules of evidence,providing that no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

Ruling: No. The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness

against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
material. The constitutional limitation was said to be "simply a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his
guilt.
But here before us is presented what would seem to be the most extreme case which
could be imagined. While the United States Supreme Court could nonchalantly decree
that testimony that an accused person put on a blouse and it fitted him is not a
violation of the constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court of Nuevada could go
so far as to require the defendant to roll up his sleeve in order to disclose tattoo marks,
and while the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands could permit
substances taken from the person of an accused to be offered in evidence,
none of these even approach in apparent harshness an order to make a
woman, possibly innocent, to disclose her body in all of its sanctity to the
gaze of strangers.We can only consistently consent to the retention of a principle
which would permit of such a result by adhering steadfastly to the proposition that the
purpose of the constitutional provision was and is merely to prohibit
testimonial compulsion.

Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a
prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary
to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible. The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall
within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as
cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested
physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient
any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical
examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same
sex can be seen.

325) Long Title: Prec. Rec. No. 714-A             July 26, 1937

MARIA BERMUDEZ, complainant,

vs.
LEODEGARIO D. CASTILLO, respondent.

Short Title: Bermudez vs. Castillo, 64 Phil. 

Facts:In the course of the investigation which was being conducted by the office of the
Solicitor-General against the respondent, in connection with this administrative case,
said respondent filed, in addition to other evidence in support of this defense, the
six letters which, for purposes of identification, were marked as Exhibits 32, 34,
35, 36 and 37. He then contended, as he now continues to contend, that said six letters
are the complainant's, but the latter denied it while she was testifying as a witness in
rebuttal. she admitted, however, that the letters marked as Exhibits 38, 39 and 40
were in her own handwriting.

As the respondent believed that the three letters admitted by the complainant to be
hers were insufficient for purposes of comparison with those questioned in this case
and as he was determined to show that said Exhibits 38, 39 and 40 were the
complainant's, he required her to copy them in her own handwriting in the
presence of the investigator. 

The complainant, upon advice of her attorney, refused to submit to the trial
to which it was desired to subject her, invoking her right not to incriminate
herself and alleging that Exhibits 38, 39 and 40 and the other letters already in the
respondent's possession, were more than sufficient for what he proposed to do. The
investigator, upholding the complainant, did not compel her to submit to the trial
required, thereby denying the respondent's petition. As respondent did not agree to this
decision of the investigator, he instituted these proceedings praying that the
investigator and the Solicitor-General in whose representation he acted, be ordered to
require and compel the complainant to furnish new specimens of her handwriting by
copying said Exhibits 32 to 37 for that purpose.

Issue: Whether the complainant is entitled to the privilege of the right to self-
incrimination.
Ruling: Yes.The privilege against self-crimination is a personal one. . . . But
the privilege is an option of refusal, not a prohibition of inquiry. Hence, when
an ordinary witness is on the stand, and self-criminating act relevant to the
issue is desired to be shown by him, the question may be asked, and then it
is for the witness to say whether he will answer it or claim its privilege, for it
cannot be known beforehand what he will do.

It further state that "the proper place in which to claim the privilege is in the
trial court, when the question is propounded, not here." This is exactly the case of the
herein complainant. She opportunely invoked the privilege when it was desired to
subject her to trial by copying the six letters in question.

It is no invasion of the constitutional guaranty against self-crimination to

compel the witness to answer questions relating to the truthfulness of his
previous testimony." This court, however, is of the opinion that the foregoing is not
applicable to the case of the herein complainant, firstly, because she has made no
disclosure; she confined herself to denying the letters in question were hers when the
respondent, appressing in court with them, said rather than insinuated, that they were
hers, presenting in support of his statement, other letters which, by reason of the
handwriting, were to all appearances similar thereto; and secondly, because her
testimony, denying that she was the author of the letters in question, may be attacked
by means of other evidence in the possession of the respondent, which is not precisely
that coming from the complaint herself.
The reason for the privilege appears evident. The purpose thereof is positively to
avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly
inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to
furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is its purpose,
then the evidence must be sought elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence in
the person himself, then he must be promised and assured at least absolute immunity
by one authorized to do so legally, or he should be asked, one for all, to furnish such
evidence voluntarily without any condition. This court is the opinion that in order that
the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and
not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the
person invoking it.
In view of the foregoing consideration and holding, as it is hereby held, that the
complainant is perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked by her, the respondent's
petition is denied. So ordered.

326) Long Title: G.R. No. 32025           September 23, 1929

FRANCISCO BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District, and FRANCISCO JOSE,
Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, respondents.

Short Title: Beltran vs. Samson, 53 Phil. 570 (1929)

Facts: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains
that the respondent judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal
to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given
upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting
and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified.

There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaint filed in these proceedings;
but the respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy
applied for, inasmuch as the order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and later granted
by the court below, and again which the instant action was brought, is based on the
provisions of section 1687 of the Administrative Code and on the doctrine laid down in
the cases cited by counsel for the respondents, and in the case of Villaflor vs. Summers
(41 Phil., 62) cited by the judge in the order in question.
Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the
proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at
the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor.But this power must be exercised
without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. And the
petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the
constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders,
No. 58.

Issue: Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the
purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote
certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself
within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under
examination.

Ruling: No,writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the
fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of
intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner
herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the
petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. 

The court said that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity
between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to
furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to
furnish evidence against himself.

It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of

the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering
the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it
should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens
of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or
specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for
trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be
true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such
cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This
constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

327) Long Title: [G.R. No. 110357. August 17, 1994.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARLOS TRANCA Y

ARELLANO, Accused-Appellant.

Short Title: People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 (1994)

Facts: In an information filed on 10 May 1991 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Accused Carlos Tranca y Arellano was charged with the violation of Section 15,
Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972.

On 6 May 1991 at 11:00 p.m., a “confidential agent” or informer went to the

office of the NCRNU and told them that the informer had revealed that a
certain “Jon-Jon” (later identified as the accused) was selling shabu. Capt.
Miano then formed a buy-bust team with himself as the team leader, Sgt. Latumbo as
the poseur-buyer, and the rest, including the informer, forming the support group.
Capt. Miano gave to Sgt. Latumbo a P100 bill with serial number SN886097 (Exhibit
“B”) and which had been dusted with fluorescent powder to be used in the buy-bust
operation. 

The informer introduced Sgt. Latumbo to the accused and told the latter that
his companion was interested in buying shabu. The informer then asked the
accused if he had any for sale. The accused answered in the affirmative and
asked for the quantity to be bought. 

The accused momentarily left the pair and entered his house. When the accused
emerged, he gave a package to Sgt. Latumbo who in turn handed to the accused the
P100 marked money. Sgt. Latumbo examined the package he received and upon
ascertaining that it was really shabu, gave the pre-arranged signal by scratching his
head. Capt. Miano and the rest of the police officers then closed in on the
accused. They introduced themselves as NARCOM agents and arrested the accused.
Upon interrogation by Capt. Miano, the accused voluntarily surrendered one plastic bag
of shabu and the P100 marked money. The accused was handcuffed and taken to the
NARCOM headquarters. 

The accused denied the allegations against him and contended that he was
framed by the police officers. The trial court promulgated its decision finding the
accused guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P30,000.00. The accused appealed the decision, hence this case.

Issue: Whether the right of the accused against self-incrimination was violated when
he was subjected to examination for ultraviolet powder that incriminated him in the said
crime.

Ruling: No. The defense contends that the right of the accused against self-
incrimination was violated when he was made to undergo an ultraviolet ray
examination. The defense also argues that Chief Chemist Teresita Alberto failed to
inform the accused of his right to counsel before subjecting him to the examination. 

These contentions are without merit.What is prohibited by the constitutional

guarantee against self-incrimination is the use of physical or moral compulsion to export
communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when
it may be material.Stated otherwise, it is simply a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an
admission of guilt. Nor can the subjection of the accused's body to ultraviolet
radiation, in order to determine the presence of ultraviolet powder, be considered a
custodial investigation so as to warrant the presence of counsel.
328) Short Title: South Dakota vs. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983)

Facts: A South Dakota statute permits a person suspected of driving while intoxicated
to refuse to submit to a blood-alcohol test, but authorizes revocation of the driver's
license of a person so refusing the test and permits such refusal to be used against him
at trial. 

When respondent was arrested by police officers in South Dakota for driving
while intoxicated, the officers asked him to submit to a blood-alcohol test
and warned him that he could lose his license if he refused but did not warn
him that the refusal could be used against him at trial.Respondent refused to
take the test. 

The South Dakota trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress all evidence of
his refusal to take the blood-alcohol test. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed on
the ground that the statute allowing introduction of evidence of the refusal violated the
privilege against self-incrimination.

Issue: Whether the defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test offends his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

Ruling: No. The admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-
alcohol test does not offend his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. A
refusal to take such a test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act
coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination. The offer of taking the test is clearly legitimate and becomes no less
legitimate when the State offers a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant
penalties for making that choice.

It would not be fundamentally unfair in violation of due process to use respondent's

refusal to take the blood-alcohol test as evidence of guilt, even though the police failed
to warn him that the refusal could be used against him at trial. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S.
610 , distinguished. Such failure to warn was not the sort of implicit promise to forgo
use of evidence that would unfairly "trick" respondent if the evidence were later offered
against him at trial. 

329) Short Title: Schemerber vs. California, 384 U.S. 

Facts: Petitioner was hospitalized following an accident involving an automobile which

he had apparently been driving. A police officer smelled liquor on petitioner's breath
and noticed other symptoms of drunkenness at the accident scene and at the hospital,
placed him under arrest, and informed him that he was entitled to counsel, that he
could remain silent, and that anything he said would be used against him.

At the officer's direction, a physician took a blood sample from petitioner despite his
refusal on advice of counsel to consent thereto. A report of the chemical analysis of the
blood, which indicated intoxication, was admitted in evidence over objection at
petitioner's trial for driving while intoxicated. Petitioner was convicted, and the
conviction was affirmed by the appellate court, which rejected his claims of denial of
due process, of his privilege against self-incrimination, of his right to counsel, and of his
right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures.

Issue: Whether the petitioner’s privilege against self-incrimination has been violated.

Ruling: The privilege against self-incrimination is not available to an accused in a case

such as this, where there is not even a shadow of compulsion to testify against
himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature.

Petitioner's limited claim, that he was denied his right to counsel by virtue of the
withdrawal of blood over his objection on his counsel's advice is rejected, since he
acquired no right merely because counsel advised that he could assert one.
In view of the substantial interests in privacy involved, petitioner's right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the withdrawal of his blood, but, under
the facts in this case, there was no violation of that right. 

In what proceedings available

330)Long Title: G.R. No. L-25018               May 26, 1969

ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR
GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants.

Short Title: Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969)

Facts: Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the
Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now respondent-appellant. It was
alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case 7 for alleged
immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first
witness herein petitioner-appellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge.
Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying
on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same
time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965, petitioner-
appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he
could secure a restraining order from a competent authority.

Petitioner-appellee then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the
witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave
abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-
incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which could result in
forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in character. With his assertion that
he was entitled to the relief demanded consisting of perpetually restraining the
respondent Board from compelling him to testify as witness for his adversary and his
readiness or his willingness to put a bond, he prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction
and after a hearing or trial, for a writ of prohibition.

The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call
petitioner-appellee to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right
against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is asked of a witness. It further elaborated the matter in the
affirmative defenses interposed, stating that petitioner-appellee's remedy is to object
once he is in the witness stand, for respondent "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law," precluding the issuance of the relief sought. Respondent
Board, therefore, denied that it acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: Whether the respondent can compel the person proceeded against to take the
witness stand without his consent.

Ruling: We find for the petitioner-appellee.  The appeal apparently proceeds on

the mistaken assumption by respondent Board and intervenors-appellants that the
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited to allowing a
witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being
subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the language
11
of another American decision, is the protection against "any disclosures which the
witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which
could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that were all there is then it
becomes diluted.

The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back
as 1905, we had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent
12
and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." Only last year, in
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 13
speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the
doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent,
unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of
his own free genuine will."
Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with
other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not
go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives
should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense
of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic
creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous
crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional
foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the
dignity and integrity of its citizens."
It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle of
humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force
or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places
equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. 
Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force
15
to surrender to his detriment." So also with the observation of the late Judge Frank
who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is
16
the hallmark of our democracy." In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear
that no possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the
decision now on appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a
medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical
Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the
person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.

Use immunity vs. Transactional Immunity

331-332) Long Title: G.R. Nos. 71208-09 August 30, 1985

SATURNINA GALMAN AND REYNALDO GALMAN, petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE MANUEL PAMARAN AND ASSOCIATE

JUSTICES AUGUSTO AMORES AND BIENVENIDO VERA CRUZ OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HONORABLE BERNARDO FERNANDEZ, TANODBAYAN,
GENERAL FABIAN C. VER, MAJOR GENERAL PROSPERO OLIVAS, SGT. PABLO
MARTINEZ, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA SGT. PEPITO
TORIO, SGT. PROSPERO BONA AND AlC ANICETO ACUPIDO, respondents.

Short Title: Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985)

Facts: On August 21, 1983, a crime unparalleled in repercussions and ramifications was
committed inside the premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City.
Former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., an opposition stalwart who was
returning to the country after a long-sojourn abroad, was gunned down to
death.

To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free,
unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, P.D. 1886 was
promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later became more
popularly known as the Agrava Board. Pursuant to the powers vested in it by P.D.
1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and
testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a
subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board Among the witnesses who
appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board were the herein private
respondents.
Upon arraignment, all the accused, including the herein private ate Respondents
pleaded NOT GUILTY.In the course of the joint trial of the two (2) aforementioned
cases, the Prosecution marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence,the
individual testimonies of private respondents before the Agrava Board. Private
respondents, through their respective counsel objected to the admission of
said exhibits.
Petitioner having no further witnesses to present and having been required to make its
offer of evidence in writing, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN, without the pending motions
for exclusion being resolved, issued a Resolution directing that by agreement of the
parties, the pending motions for exclusion and the opposition thereto, together with the
memorandum in support thereof, as well as the legal issues and arguments, raised
therein are to be considered jointly in the Court's Resolution on the prosecution's formal
offer of exhibits and other documentary evidences.The prosecution made a written
"Formal Offer of Evidence" which includes, among others, the testimonies of
private respondents and other evidences produced by them before the Board,
all of which have been previously marked in the course of the trial.
All the private respondents objected to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence on the
same ground relied upon by them in their respective motion for exclusion.
On June 13, 1985, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN issued a Resolution, now assailed in
these two (2) petitions, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution
except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by the private
respondents in view of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886

Issue/s: 

1. (331) Whether the testimonies given by the eight (8) private respondents who
did not invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board is
admissible as evidence and applies to this proceeding.
2. (332) What are the effects of an absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of
the presence of a grant of immunity by law?

Ruling: No doubt, the private respondents were not merely denied the afore-
discussed sacred constitutional rights, but also the right to "due process"
which is fundamental fairness. 
Our review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the oral
arguments, manifestations and admissions of both counsel, failed to reveal
adherence to and compliance with due process. The manner in which the
testimonies were taken from private respondents fall short of the constitutional
standards both under the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE and under the EXCLUSIONARY RULE
in Section 20, Article IV. In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the
individual testimonies of private respondents cannot be admitted against
them in ally criminal proceeding.

1. Clearly then, it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of
the proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistently been held to
extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which
punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or
not. 

If in a mere forfeiture case where only property rights were involved, "the right
not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is secured in favor of the
defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied to a person facing
investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty, by
reason of the statements to be given by him, hang on the balance.
Further enlightenment on the subject can be found in the historical background
of this constitutional provision against self- incrimination. The privilege against
self- incrimination is guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. In the Philippines, the same principle obtains as a direct result of
American influence. At first, the provision in our organic laws were similar to the
Constitution of the United States and was as follows:

That no person shall be ... compelled in a criminal case to be a witness

against himself. 

As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads:

 No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other

import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other
than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against
himself" applies to the herein private respondents notwithstanding that the
proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case

1. It is the submission of the prosecution, now represented by the petitioner

TANODBAYAN, that said testimonies are admissible against the private
respondents, respectively, because of the latter's failure to invoke before the
Agrava Board the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. Since private respondents did
not invoke said privilege, the immunity did not attach.

Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use
immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known as "transactional
immunity." The distinction between the two is as follows:"Use immunity"
prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any
manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On
the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the
witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled
testimony relates.

It is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It
grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not
immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or
producing evidence do not render the witness immuned from prosecution
notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self- incrimination. He is merely
saved from the use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated
otherwise ... he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right
against self- incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due
process, demands that private respondents should have been informed of their rights to
remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used
against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it
and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them.
It is for this reason that we cannot subscribe to the view adopted and urged upon Us
by the petitioners that the right against self-incrimination must be invoked before the
Board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a
subsequent criminal prosecution.

333) Short Title: Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S. 591

Facts:It appeared that the petitioner had been subpoenaed as a witness

before the grand jury, at a term of the district court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, to testify in relation to a charge then under investigation by that
body against certain officers and agents of the Alleghany Valley Railway
Company, for an alleged violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. Brown, the
appellant, appeared for examination, in response to the subpoena, and was sworn.
After testifying that he was auditor of the railway company, and that it was his duty to
audit the accounts of the various officers of the company, as well as the accounts of the
freight department of such company during the years 1894 and 1895, he was asked the
question:

"Do you know whether or not the Alleghany Valley Railway Company
transported, for the Union Coal Company, during the months of July, August,
and September, 1894, coal, from any point on the Low Grade Division of said
railroad company to Buffalo, at a less rate than the established rates in force
between the terminal points at the time of such transportation?"

To this question, he answered:

 "That question, with all respect to the grand jury and yourself, I must decline
to answer for the reason that my answer would tend to accuse and
incriminate myself."

He was then asked:

"Do you know whether the Alleghany Valley Railway Company, during the year
1894, paid to the Union Coal Company any rebate, refund, or commission on
coal transported by said railroad company, from points on its Low Grade Division,
to Buffalo, whereby the Union Coal Company obtained a transportation of such
coal between the said terminal points at a less rate than the open tariff rate, or
the rate established by said company? If you have such knowledge, state the
amount of such rebates or drawbacks or commissions paid, to whom paid, the
date of the same, and on what shipments, and state fully all the particulars
within your knowledge relating to such transaction or transactions."

Answer: "That question I must also decline to answer for the reason already given."
The grand jury reported these questions and answers to the court, and prayed for such
order as to the court might seem meet and proper. Upon the presentation of this
report, Brown was ordered to appear and show cause why he should not
answer the said questions or be adjudged in contempt, and, upon the hearing of
the rule to show cause, it was found that his excuses were insufficient, and he was
directed to appear and answer the questions, which he declined to do. Whereupon he
was adjudged to be in contempt and ordered to pay a fine of five dollars, and to be
taken into custody until he should have answered the questions.
He thereupon petitioned the Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus, stating, in his
petition, the substance of the above facts. The writ was issued, petitioner was produced
in court, the hearing was had, and, on the 11th day of September, 1895, it was ordered
that the petition be dismissed, the writ of habeas corpus discharged, and the petitioner
remanded to the custody of the marshal.
From that judgment, Brown appealed to this Court.
Issue: Whether the provision affords absolute immunity against prosecution.

Ruling: Yes. The provision in the Act of February 11, 1893, c. 83, 27 Stat. 443,

"that no person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing
books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements, and documents before the Interstate
Commerce Commission, or in obedience to the subpoena of the Commission, on the
ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or
otherwise, required of him may tend to criminate him or subject him to a
penalty or forfeiture: but no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty
or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he
may testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said Commission or
in obedience to its subpoena, or the subpoena of either of them, or in any such case or
proceeding,"
affords absolute immunity against prosecution, Federal or state, for the
offence to which the question relates, and deprives the witness of his
constitutional right to refuse to answer.

Effect of denial of privilege by court

334) Long Title: G.R. No. L-29169           August 19, 1968

ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
THE WARDEN OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA, respondents.

Short Title: Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663 (1968)

Facts:The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary

petitions invoking jurisdiction of this Court is that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be
freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his
conviction1 he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against
himself. There is his prayer, too, that, should he fail in this, he be granted the
alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the
said court to forward his appeal to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely
questions of law.

Averred in the aforesaid information was that on or about the 14th day of November,
1962, in Quezon City, the accused conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence
and without the consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim, in asporting the
motor vehicle above-described.
Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been identified
nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty.Summary1äwphï1.ñët

Summary: Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case. He was called by the

prosecution as the first witness in that case to testify for the People during the first day
of trial thereof. Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. 

This he broadened by the clear cut statement that he will not testify. But petitioner's
protestations were met with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the
prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the
accused," and that defense counsel " could not object to have the accused called on the
witness stand." 

The cumulative impact of all these is that accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He
was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. The foregoing situation
molds a solid case for petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the law, and
jurisprudence.

Issue: Whether the petitioner was compelled to be a witness against himself.

Ruling:Yes.
This right is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the
discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and
15
substantive right; it is fundamental to our scheme of justice. Just a few months ago,
the Supreme Court of the United States (January 29, 1968), speaking thru Mr. Justice
Harlan warned that "[t]he constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and
16
imprudent as well as the innocent and foresighted."
It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated
with unconcern. To repeat, it is mandatory; it secures to every defendant a valuable
and substantive right. Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's
own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as
much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable
against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove
the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain
silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered
exercise of his own free, genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence;
it may be the product of unintentional statements.Pressure which operates to
overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his
capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion
"tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant."
The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ.
31
It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person
whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional
rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and
therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose
fundamental right was violated. 
That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which
precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy
which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused
to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the
writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in
Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be
liberally given effect  so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. 

MODULE 19. RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

335) Long Title: G.R. No. 191411               July 15, 2013

RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA, Petitioner,

vs.
SANBIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

Short Title: Coscolluela vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 191411, July 15, 2013)

Facts: Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental

(Province) for three (3) full terms which ended on June 30, 2001. During his
tenure, Nacionales served as his Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales’
subordinate, and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer.

The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas (Office of the Ombudsman) received a
letter-complaint dated November 7, 2001 from People’s Graftwatch, requesting for
assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment
for the Province in the amount of ₱20,000,000.00 which allegedly happened
around a month before Coscolluela stepped down from office.
Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the Office of the
Ombudsman conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final
Evaluation Report7 dated April 16, 2002 which upgraded the complaint into a criminal
case against petitioners.8 Consequently, petitioners filed their respective counter-
affidavits.9
The assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Cañares (Cañares) prepared a
Resolution (March 27, 2003 Resolution), finding probable cause against
petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,
otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," and
recommended the filing of the corresponding information. On even date, the
Information10 was prepared and signed by Cañares and submitted to Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro (Miro) for recommendation. Miro
recommended the approval of the Information on June 5, 2003. However, the final
approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro (Casimiro), came only on May 21,
2009, and on June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the SB.
Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003 Resolution
and Information only when they received a copy of the latter shortly after its
filing with the SB.
Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash, arguing, among others, that his
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the
criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years
since the complaint was instituted. Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted
Coscolluela’s motion.
In reply, the respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Quash , explaining that
although the Information was originally dated March 27, 2003, it still had to go through
careful review and revision before its final approval. It also pointed out that petitioners
never raised any objections regarding the purported delay in the proceedings during the
interim.

Issue:Whether the SB gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioners’ right to
speedy disposition of cases was not violated.

Ruling: The petitions are meritorious.

A person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16,
Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) which provides:

SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all
proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may
demand expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the administration of
justice.
It must be noted, however, that the right to speedy disposition of cases should be
understood to be a relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning
of the time involved would not be sufficient. 22 Jurisprudence dictates that the right is
deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried. 23
Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been denied his
right to a speedy disposition of a case, the following factors may be considered
and balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice
caused by the delay.24
Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that petitioners’ right to a
speedy disposition of their criminal case had been violated.
First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted
amount of time to complete. The provision readily reveals that there is no complete
resolution of a case under preliminary investigation until the Ombudsman approves the
investigating officer’s recommendation to either file an Information with the SB or to
dismiss the complaint. Therefore,in the case at bar, the preliminary investigation
proceedings against the petitioners were not terminated upon Cañares’
preparation of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information but rather,
only at the time Casimiro finally approved the same for filing with the SB. In
this regard, the proceedings were terminated only on May 21, 2009, or
almost eight (8) years after the filing of the complaint.
Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the
speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial
incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the
possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last,
because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness
of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to
recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned
prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a
cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained,
his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its
case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible
for the government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require
impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the
prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two
things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued
from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is
reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
 
 

CASES 336-347 TO FOLLOW. ALONG WITH OTHER CASES IN MODULE 19-21