Professional Documents
Culture Documents
TMT Bhi Pro 003 - A02
TMT Bhi Pro 003 - A02
DocID: TMT-BHI-PRO-003
Revision: A02
External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181
The TurkStream Off-Shore Pipeline project consists of two (2) subsea 32-inch pipelines laid between Russia
and Turkey and short onshore pipeline sections with supporting facilities on each end. The length of each
pipeline is in the order of 940 km. The design life of the project is 50 years.
The two micro tunnel pipeline sections in Russia and the one in Turkey will be installed as separate sections.
Both pipelines will be pulled-in through the tunnel using a pull-in head. Offshore the pipeline will be laid down
using a PLR in which two pigs have been pre-installed. The offshore PLR is equipped with diver-less hot-stab
connection and ROV operable valves. Upon completion of the pull-in operations, the strings will be pre-
commissioned.
Pipeline 1 Pipeline 4
Details Unit
Pull-in Section Pull-in Section
Nominal Diameter Inch 32
From Onshore Anapa Kp 0.0
To Offshore Anapa Kp 2
Pipe Material SAWL 450 SFPU
Approx. Length m 2040
Internal Diameter mm 734.8
Wall Thickness mm 39
Min. Water Depth m +60
Max. Water Depth m -30
Test Pressure barg 330.8
Pipeline volume m 3
865
2.1 Definitions
Term Description
Company Allseas Marine Contractors S.A.
Company’s Client South Stream Transport B.V,
Contractor Baker Hughes Process & Pipeline Services (A subdivision of Baker Hughes
Services International Inc.)
SHALL Indicates a requirement
SHOULD Indicates a recommendation
2.2 Abbreviations
Abbreviation Description
ALS Allseas
AWTI Above Water Tie-In
BHI Baker Hughes Process & Pipeline Services
CPS Contingency Pumping System
DP Dynamic Positioning
DPO Dynamic Positioning Officer
EM Electromagnetic
ERC Emergency Release Coupling
FCG Flooding, Cleaning and Gauging
HSE Health, Safety, Environment
km Kilometre
KP Kilometre Point
ID Internal Diameter
ITP Inspection and Test Plan
LTE Landfall Termination End
mm Millimetre
MWP Maximum Working Pressure
OD Outside Diameter
ORA Operating Risk Assessment
PLR Pig Launcher / Receiver
3 Reference Documents
5.1 Personnel
The minimum manning levels required to safely perform the flooding, cleaning & gauging operations for the
trunkline is shown below in Figure 5-1. This provides coverage for a 24-hour operations
5.2 Responsibilities
During engineering and operational phases of the works the following categories of BHI personnel shall be
used: -
Project Manager
The Project Manager based in Son, The Netherlands is responsible for all operational and fiscal aspects of the
Project and is empowered to make Project related decisions on behalf of BHI.
Other responsibilities include: -
Overall responsibility for all contract administration and project management relating to the engineering
and development of procedures associated with the project.
Ensuring all health, safety, quality and environmental systems are implemented and adhered to.
Reporting, in accordance with contractual conditions, to ALS regarding utilisation of manpower and
equipment resources, planned/completed progress, safety, quality assurance and environmental aspects.
Reviewing and approving project-specific schedules and plans.
Reviewing and submitting invoices, in accordance with conditions of contract.
Maintaining adequate control of sub-contractors/suppliers, including establishment of an appropriate
audit/surveillance plan.
Acting as the nominated contact for ALS documentation and all other correspondence relating to the
project.
Attending all meetings scheduled to discuss contractual or other matters pertaining to the scope of work.
Ensuring that all existing corporate guidelines, policies and procedures are adhered to at all times during
the execution of the work-scope.
Project Engineers
Other Vessel
Master Vessel Master
BHI Day Shift BHI Night Shift BHI Day Shift BHI Night Shift
Supervisor Supervisor Supervisor Supervisor
During the hose deployment and the flooding, cleaning & gauging operations the BHI Engineer will have radio
contact with the ROV Supervisor and will be able to view ROV operations via the broadcast transmitted from
the ROV Support vessel via the Seatronics Seavision II broadcast system (Appendix C) to co-ordinate all
relevant operations. Communication to any external working party will be via the ALS nominated Project
Representative on-board the vessel, positioning of the vessel and ROV support vessel will be controlled by ALS
exclusively, in conjunction with Vessel Masters.
In the event of a communications breakdown between the BHI Engineer/Supervisor offshore and the BHI
Engineer/Supervisor onshore, operations will continue. If the flooding, cleaning and gauging operations on the
vessel cease for any reason whilst communications are down it will have no impact on the onshore operations.
If for any reason it becomes necessary to close in the discharge line at the onshore location, it will take a
considerable amount of time for this to have any impact offshore and even then it would only result in an
increase in back pressure. It is most likely that communications would be restored prior to any impact on the
offshore operations.
UHF Radio - The following personnel/locations require a UHF radio which will be provided by ALS:
5.3.2 Interfaces
Refer to the Interface Management Plan (Ref. 08) for key communications interfaces.
For diesel fuel and utility requirements offshore the BHI Engineer/Supervisor will arrange directly with the PSV
Bridge. For diesel fuel requirements onshore the BHI Engineer/Supervisor will arrange with the ALS
representative for it to be supplied by Strabag.
The following table identifies the interfaces and connections for both offshore and onshore locations: -
6.1 Mobilisation
The major equipment to be mobilised is detailed in the Mobilisation and Installation Procedure (Ref. 17). The
vessel FCG equipment will have been previously function tested as part of the Wet Buckle Contingency (WBC)
equipment and will be on standby in Varna, Bulgaria. The onshore equipment will be function tested at BHI
Ufa, Russia prior to mobilising the equipment to Anapa. BHI personnel will be mobilised to Bulgaria and Anapa
upon confirmation from ALS to commence operations.
11m3 of 50 micron
44m3 of 50 micron
filtered sea water Pig driving medium,
filtered sea water
slug for pig 50 micron filtered
slug for pig
separation seawater
separation
FILTER 3,4,5,6
Parameter Requirement
Initial Status Empty (air filled)
From Offshore KP at -30m water depth to onshore KP 0 at +60m
Direction of Flooding
above sea level
Pig Train Description 2 Pig Train
Driving Medium Filtered seawater
Filtration 50 µm
Chemical Treatment Fluorescein Sodium tracer dye, dosage 50 ppm.
Pig Speed ~ 0.5 m/s
Gauge Plates sized to 97% of minimum pipeline ID.
Gauge Plate
6mm- 8mm thick aluminium with 45° chamfered leading edge.
Water is to be delivered through the pipeline section that extends to a -30m water depth. There is no
requirement to induce a back pressure prior to flooding this section from the offshore location, so flooding
operations can commence immediately following connection.
The pipeline section will be flooded with filtered seawater, the supply of seawater shall be a minimum 780
m3/hr. This equates to a pigging speed of 0.5 m/s. Due to the reduced pressure required for pigging, this can
be achieved using three lift pumps and a single flooding pump, FP03, which has been demonstrated during
function trials at sea to produce 830m3/hr at 27barg. The maximum pressure required at the pump will be 15
barg.
Pipeline pressure 10.2 barg
Supply hose back Pressure 1.74 barg
Receiving end hose 3.0 barg (only during pig receipt operation)
PLR’s (estimated) 1.0 barg
Resistance of pigs 0.62 barg
Total 15.56 barg
The flooding duration including the pre-slug volume is estimated to be 1.10 hours, based upon average of
0.5m/sec.
Suction pumps shall draw seawater from overboard of vessel through the FPS. Transfer pumps shall then take
the water and push it through the 1st stage filtration and through the 2nd stage self-cleaning filtration system
which will filter the raw seawater to 50 µm.
Flooding pumps will then take the filtered seawater and pump it through the pipeline, driving the pig train, via
a 6” flexible hose. A pre-slug of filtered seawater shall be introduced to lubricate the pipeline and wash debris
in front of the first pig. The pre-slug length for Russia shall be 25m in length, which equals 11m3.
Each pig shall be separated by a minimum of 105 linear metres (44m3) of filtered seawater to further clean
the pipeline and maintain adequate separation of pigs throughout operations.
The pre-slug seawater and the slug between the pigs shall be collected via the onshore receiver in a suitable
pond (~150m3) and used for later pressurisation of the pipeline strings.
An average pigging speed of 0.5 m/s shall be maintained throughout operation. During operations the following
shall be logged / calculated every 15 minutes:
Pigging pressure (barg);
Total and volumetric flow rates of seawater pumped (m3/hr),
Pig location (m); and
Pigging Speed (m/s).
The flooding, cleaning and gauging shall be deemed complete on acceptance of the following criteria:
All pigs have been received into the pig receiver in good condition;
Gauging Plates undamaged; and
Debris loading accepted by COMPANY. Cleaning acceptance criteria is as follows (Ref. 06):
o No foreign materials (apart from rust and dust) on and in front of last pig;
o The amount of debris in front of the first and the last pig of the train shall have a diminishing
trend;
o The debris received in front of last pig shall not exceed 2 liters of dust/rust on and in front of last
pig.
o If the quantity of solid material received in front of the last pig is greater than the maximum
allowable quantity, a technical evaluation and discussion shall be undertaken on site between
COMPANY and CONTRACTOR Representatives to agree actions to be taken.
On acceptance of the FCG operations, the CONTRACTOR shall close the valves on the head and disconnect
the flooding hoses from the subsea temporary launcher/head.
Code Description
A Action In any column that denotes “A”, the activity requires action by that party
In any column that denotes “H”, further activity is not possible until all criteria have
H Hold
been met and all parties have signed
In any column that denotes “W”, the activity should be witnessed by that party.
W Witness
Further activity is not possible until that party has signed
In any column that denotes “M”, the activity should be monitored by that party. Due
notice should be given to ensure the party is on site. If said notice has been given
M Monitor
then further activity is possible even if that party does not sign Activities can proceed
and can be verified subsequently by documentation review
Do not commence to the next step in the work scope until all conditions and
stipulations in this section have been met and fulfilled.
NOTE:
This procedure will commence after successful FPS deployment and Downline deployment and successful hot
stab connection (Ref. 16).
The procedure steps covering the Flood, Clean and Gauge of line 1 are identical to those of Line 4. There are
two completion boxes on the step by step method statement for Inspection and test plan (ITP) purposes. One
will be completed during Line 1 operations, the second will be completed for Line 4.
In each step by step a specific location header is found determining which work scope step is next.
Onshore
The BHI Engineer shall sign on to a Permit to Work for
rigging up and FCG receipt operations and ensure it is
posted within the BHI test cabin and copies are
3.
distributed to the Site Authority and ALS Representative
where applicable. PTW H H
Note:
Revisit ORA and Create an STP paying special attention to
pit access and egress for preparatory work and ensure
the access T Card system is utilised and that there is
always a safety person at the top of the pit access.
Onshore
PPS-OPS-0030B
4. The BHI Engineer shall ensure communications between A M
Crane and Riggers are established and complete a
communication check.
Onshore
5. Once all approvals have been received commence Appendix A3 A W
placement and rig up of equipment as per the general
layout drawing.
Onshore
Ref. 07
6. Confirm Barriers are in place around equipment to & PPS-OPS-0030B- A W
prevent unauthorised entry in work areas for non- H
essential personnel.
Vessel
7.
The BHI Engineer shall sign on to the Vessel General PTW
and a BHI Permit to Work for FCG operations and ensure PTW H H
it is posted within the BHI test cabin and copies are
distributed to the Vessel Bridge and ALS Representative
where applicable.
Onshore
A STP should be completed by all involved parties. Making
everyone aware of the main hazards involved, not limited
to:
2. Stored energy release
Hose movement – mixed air and water on PPS-OPS-
receipt. Make sure the work area is clear of none 0030B H H
essential personnel.
Simultaneous Operations with onshore
construction activities
Vent hose to safe location (tank or pond)
Barriers should be erected informing people that pigging
operations are about to begin.
4. ROV to ensure that all the valves on AWTI head #7 and Appendix A M A
#8 are in the CLOSED position.
Vessel
Open valves to supply water from Lift Pump LP 01 to the
secondary filters as per BHI Valve Index 01
BHI Valve Index 01
BV01 BV02 BV03 BV04 BV05 BV06 BV07
Open Open Closed Closed Closed Closed Open
BV08 BV09 BV10 BV11 BV12 BV13 BV14
Appendix
6. Open Open Open Open Closed Open Closed A W
A2
BV15 BV16 BV17 BV18 BV19 BV20 BV21
Open Closed Open Closed Closed Closed Closed
BV22 BV23 BV24 BV25 BV26 IV01 IV02
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
IV03 IV04 IV05 IV06 IV07 IV08 IV09
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
BVV1 BVV2 MFV1
Closed Closed Closed
Vessel PPS-OPS-
8. Start lift pump LP01 allowing water to flow through the A M
0030B
system up to the secondary filters.
Vessel PPS-OPS-
9. A M
Bleed high point vents on the filters and pumps. 0030B
Vessel PPS-OPS-
10. A M
Close high point vents once all the air is expelled. 0030B
Vessel
Commence manual self-flushing of the secondary PPS-OPS-
11. A M
50micron fine filter systems systematically to remove any 0030B
contaminants from initial suction.
Vessel
During the purge of 1st stage Fine filters and FP03’s
engine can be started, allowing time for warm up. PPS-OPS-
12. A M
0030B
NOTE:
Ensure the clutch is disengaged prior to engine start up.
Vessel
Open valves in Valve Index Table 02 to slowly to flood the
remaining system with water discharging overboard from
BV25.
BHI Valve Index 02
BV01 BV02 BV03 BV04 BV05 BV06 BV07
Open Open Closed Closed Closed Closed Open
BV08 BV09 BV10 BV11 BV12 BV13 BV14 PPS-OPS-
13. 0030B A W
Open Open Open Open Open Open Open
BV15 BV16 BV17 BV18 BV19 BV20 BV21
Open Open Open Open Open Open Closed
BV22 BV23 BV24 BV25 BV26 IV01 IV02
Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Closed Closed
IV03 IV04 IV05 IV06 IV07 IV08 IV09
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
BVV1 BVV2 MFV1
Closed Closed Closed
Vessel
Open instrument Valves in Valve Index 03
BHI PT Valve Index 03
BV01 BV02 BV03 BV04 BV05 BV06 BV07
Open Open Open Open Open Open Open
BV08 BV09 BV10 BV11 BV12 BV13 BV14
PPS-OPS-
Open Open Open Open Open Open Open
14. 0030B A W
BV15 BV16 BV17 BV18 BV19 BV20 BV21
Appendix
Open Open Open Open Open Open Closed
A2
BV22 BV23 BV24 BV25 BV26 IV01 IV02
Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Open Open
IV03 IV04 IV05 IV06 IV07 IV08 IV09
Open Open Open Closed Open Open Open
BVV1 BVV2 MFV1
Closed Closed Closed
Vessel
OPEN valve IV06 to allow water to displace air through PPS-OPS-
15. the instrument tubing and hoses, bleeding off air A M
0030B
completely until a steady flow of water is present.
CLOSE IV06.
Vessel
Start and engage Flooding Pump No. 1 and slowly close
PPS-OPS-
16. BV25. Slowly increase the pump RPM to increase the A W
0030B
pressure in the discharge line to 20 barg against the
closed valve on the subsea head.
SUBSEA INTERVENTION
Once a pressure of 20 barg is attained, check for leaks at
the AWTI hot stab location and at the hose joint PPS-OPS-
17. connections at 35 m subsea (the 70 m downline 0030B M A
comprises of two 35 m hose lengths, connected
together).
Onshore
OPEN Pig Receiver valves ready for injection of slugs and
start of pigging operations.
Vessel
PPS-OPS-
24. Once ready to receive water, onshore team communicate 0030B A W
status to vessel crew in order for flooding operations to
begin.
Vessel
26. Secondary self-flushing filters shall be set to differential
pressure mode and monitored throughout the operation PPS-OPS-
A M
to ensure correct filtering and flushing cycling patterns. 0030B
Revert to manual flush as required to avoid all filters
flushing simultaneously
Vessel
27. Prior to opening Main Discharge valve (BV26) bring LP01, PPS-OPS-
A M
LP02 and LP03 online and idle, discharging overboard 0030B
through BV25 until the system is balanced.
Appendix A
Subsea Intervention
PPS-OPS-
ROV to OPEN the following valves on the subsea AWTI 0030B
head. Confirm with ALS, that the ROV has subsea valves
on AWTI are in the following positions allowing a pre-slug
to be injected into the pipeline. ROV to standby on Valve
AWTI 1.1 ready to close when 11m3 is reached
BHI Valve Index 06
28. M A
Valve Number Status
29. Confirm all valves are functioned, as per BHI Valve Index 06
Vessel
30. CLOSE BV25, monitoring discharge pressure from the Lift PPS-OPS-
A W
pumps and maintain pressure below 6barg lowering the 0030B
RPM on the lift pumps as required
Subsea intervention
Continue pumping until 11m3 has been achieved then:
ROV CLOSE AWTI 1.1
PPS-OPS-
34. Zero the Flowmeter (FM02) or record the start readings. 0310 A A
ROV OPEN AWTI. 1.2 to commence injection of water
injection to Launch Pig No.1.
ROV to standby at AWTI 1.2 ready to close
Vessel
On receipt of confirmation that AWTI 1.2 is OPEN,
36. commence the systematic increase of lift pump and PPS-OPS-
A W
flooding pump engine speed, injecting water until the flow 0310
rate is sufficient to launch Pig No.1 and inject a slug of
44m3 in a timely manner.
Subsea intervention
Continue pumping until 44m3 has been achieved then
inform ROV to:
37. PPS-OPS-
ROV CLOSE AWTI 1.2 A W
0310
Zero the Flowmeter (FM02) or record the start readings.
ROV OPEN AWTI. 1.3 to commence injection of water to
launch Pig No.2.
Pressure
Vessel chart
38. PPS-OPS- A W
Monitor pressure recorder for indications of pig launch
and Log pig launch in the pig register 0321
Vessel
PPS-OPS-
On receipt of confirmation that AWTI 1.3 is OPEN,
0310
39. commence the systematic increase of lift pump and A W
flooding pump engine speed, injecting water until the flow PPS-OPS-
rate is sufficient to propel Pig No.2 and complete pigging 0321
of the pipeline section
Note:
System design in as follows:
Section Length = 2040 m
Pig speed during flooding = 0.5 m/s
Injection flow rate for 0.5m/sec = 780 m3/hr
(13m3/min)
Line back pressure (pack) = 0 barg
Maximum Pressure at pump = 15.56 barg
Ensure communication with receiving end of section has
been established, and onshore team understands and is
aware of the commencement of the FCG.
Vessel
41. PPS-OPS-
In a controlled manner bring the flow rate up to a A W
0030B
minimum of 780m3/hr.
Subsea intervention
42. ROV Log A W
ROV to sweep the pig launcher with Pig Tracker to confirm
pigs have been launched
Vessel
When at required flow rate and the spread is balanced,
Monitor the 1st stage filter pots by changing use of Pot A PPS-OPS-
43. & B depending on Differential pressure shown on the 0030B A W
indicator gauges up and down stream of system.
Monitor 2nd stage filters differential pressure sensors and
control panels, ensuring the self-purge cleaning
mechanism is still functioning correctly.
Vessel
Project Engineer to update onshore with flooding rate and
44. expected time of arrival of the pre-slug and Pig No.1 and PPS-OPS-
A M
advise the flooding pump operator to monitor discharge 0030B
pressure gauge for spikes and ramp down engine speed
accordingly
Onshore
45. ROV Log A M
As Pig No.1 approaches the onshore PLR the pre-slug
shall giving indication of imminent pig arrival
Onshore
Use all available indications to confirm receipt of Pig No.1
i.e. PPS-OPS-
0030B
Pre-slug water flow arrival
46. PPS-OPS- A W
Pressure spikes as Pig No.1 blocks PLR 1.3
Audible indications 0321
Loss of flow
Pi tracker signal if available
Onshore
47. Upon receipt of Pig No.1, CLOSE PLR1.3 and OPEN PLR PPS-OPS-
A W
1.2 0321
Log pig receipt time
PPS-OPS-
Onshore
53. 0030B A W
OPEN PLR 1.1 and inform Offshore Engineer
PPS-OPS-
Vessel 0030B
54. Pump 10m3 of seawater, injecting dye at 50ppm to match PPS-OPS- A W
the flooding rate. Water wil be discharged onshore into 0311
the break tank
Subsea Intervention
PPS-OPS-
55. When 10m3 of dyed water has been pumped, cease 0030B A A
pumping and
ROV CLOSE AWTI 1.3, AWTI 1.4 and AWTI 1.5
PPS-OPS-
Onshore
56. 0030B M A
CLOSE PLR 1.1
Vessel
Ref 5.5
63. Confirmation of pig receipt of the second pipeline, and W A
flushing of the dye initiates the shutdown procedure of STEP 38
the Flood, Clean and Gauge spread.
Vessel
64. PPS-OPS-
In a controlled manner bring down the engine speed on A W
0030B
LP03.
Vessel PPS-OPS-
0030B
Close Valves BV12, BV14, BV16, BV18 on fine filter bank
and let pressure come up to 4 barg. TMT-BHI-
BHI Valve Index 07
PRO-DWG-
BV01 BV02 BV03 BV04 BV05 BV06 BV07
009
Open Open Open Open Open Open Open
BV08 BV09 BV10 BV11 BV12 BV13 BV14
65. Open Open Open Open Closed Open Closed A W
BV15 BV16 BV17 BV18 BV19 BV20 BV21
Open Closed Open Closed Open Open Open
BV22 BV23 BV24 BV25 BV26 IV01 IV02
Open Open Open Closed Closed Open Open
IV03 IV04 IV05 IV06 IV07 IV08 IV09
Open Open Open Closed Open Open Open
BVV1 BVV2
Closed Closed
66. Confirm all valves are functioned, as per BHI Valve Index 07
Vessel PPS-OPS-
67. A W
0030B
Proceed to flush the 2nd stage filters 1,2,3,4.
Vessel PPS-OPS-
68. A W
0030B
Once filter banks are flushed take all engines offline.
Onshore PPS-OPS-
0030B
Onshore team to ensure Pipe section is at atmospheric
pressure by opening vent lines. Before disconnection vent
69. lines be aware of head stored in hose due to Vent routing. A W
Onshore team to prepare equipment for PLR removal, and
hydrotesting operations.
Vessel
Close all BHI Valves and shut down all engines.
BHI Valve Index 08
BV01 BV02 BV03 BV04 BV05 BV06 BV07
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
BV08 BV09 BV10 BV11 BV12 BV13 BV14
PPS-OPS-
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
70. 0030B A W
BV15 BV16 BV17 BV18 BV19 BV20 BV21
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Section 6
BV22 BV23 BV24 BV25 BV26 IV01 IV02
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
IV03 IV04 IV05 IV06 IV07 IV08 IV09
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
BVV1 BVV2
Closed Closed
71. Confirm all valves are functioned, as per BHI Valve Index 08
Vessel
Ref.12
72. A W
Once confirmed proceed with hose recovery as per
procedure
Vessel
Ref.12
73. A W
When downline has been recovered and stowed safely,
proceed with FPS recovery.
Onshore PPS-OPS-
74. W A
Construction teams to remove Line #1 and Line #4 PLR’s 0030B
Onshore PPS-OPS-
0323
Remove pigs, inspect and photograph pigs and gauge
75. plates and complete the: PPS-OPS- A W
0322
Gauge Plate Acceptance Certificate
Used Pig Report
If pigs are located in the vicinity of the receiver then calculate the
5. volume required to push the pig’s home from that location. A M
1. Note: A M
FP03 pump has a maximum casing pressure of 40barg, FP02 and
FP01 has a 50barg operating pressure, the downline has a MWP
of 70bar and the topsides PRV is set to 52barg.
2. Observe the pressure and flow rates to ascertain pig movement. A M
Using the pipeline fill report and flow meter readings, calculate
3. the approximate position of the stuck pig; A M
Present the approximate position of pigs to ALS who shall use logs
(as-built survey) to verify any anomalies in the vicinity of the stuck
4. M A
pig.
Any further actions will be discussed with BHI Engineer and Base
6. Management and ALS representatives and correct management
of change protocol followed before the introduction of further pigs A W
to pig back subsea or undertake any other actions.
NOTE:
For any subsea downline hose failure, an evaluation of the cause of failure will be established.
ROV will be in attendance at all times during FCG operations.
1. Slow intended move away of vessel – The Vessel Master advises the crew of his intention to pull away
(i.e. deteriorating weather), equipment is isolated, hose depressurised. The hose can be recovered
or if there is insufficient time then the Emergency Release Coupling can be disconnected manually and
the hose released overboard.
2. Intermediate emergency – BHI crew suffer catastrophic equipment failure or witness significant events
on the vessel deck deeming it necessary to release the hose - Supervisor initiates the quick disconnect
of the Sea Catch, which initiates the breakaway of the ERC and the hose and clump weight/tugger
drops off the side of the vessel.
3. Full emergency – Vessel captain realises problem with dynamic positioning (DP) and is drifting, or
sudden squall causes severe boat movement, or sees a catastrophic event happening and needs to
pull away – Captain advises deck Supervisor who initiates the quick disconnect in the same manner
as item 2.
xx
PLR Heads
(Refer to Drawing ALS-PIL-DWG-207830 for 0BV 04 Recorder Gauge Data Logger
Bill of Materials)
AWTI 1.4
AWTI 1.5
AWTI AWTI AWTI
1.1 1.2 1.3
Containment
Pond
¼” HP Instrument Hose (6k)
6" HDPE
32" OFFSHORE PLR HEAD #7 and #8
Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.
NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.
Installation of test instruments Pressure monitoring instrumentation BHI supervisor and customer representative check the
incorrectly installed onto wrong part of equipment rig up against marked drawings prior to test.
system. System alignment checklists signed off to confirm the test
No pressure monitoring capability during the system is correctly prepared for test.
test. Pressure monitoring is carried out at two independent points
on the customer system; #1 remotely via a pressure
RL2
instrumentation manifold positioned next to the pump unit; #2
via a pressure gauge installed directly onto the customer's test
system. Readings from both monitoring points are checked at
each pressure increment to ensure matching. System
pressurization is stopped and the problem is investigated if
discrepancies exist.
Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114
Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.
NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.
Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114
Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.
NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.
Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114
Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.
NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.
Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114
Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.
NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.
Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114
Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.
NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.
Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114
Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.
NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.
Unauthorized personnel enter the test area. Permit to work system in effect to prevent conflict of work
Interference with test system. activities. Barriers erected, warning signs posted. Test
RL2
Uncontrolled release of pressurized water. exclusion zone patrolled whilst system is being pressurized,
Personnel injury. Plant damage. tested, and depressurized.
Pressure hold test
Personnel instructed at a toolbox talk meeting not to approach
Rapid loss of test pressure due to passing the test system whilst the pressure hold test is in progress.
test boundary isolations, excessive leaking, Pressure monitored remotely via the instrument manifold at the RL2
or component failure pump unit location.
Test abandoned if pressure drop is sudden or excessive.
Joints / welds / potential leak sources BHI crew use marked test pack drawings to trace each line
missed during the visual inspection. within test boundaries nominated for visual inspection.
RL2
Unchecked joints - potential hydrocarbon Hydrostatic Test Audit Checklist signed as confirmation that all
release during start up. components have been checked.
Personnel working at height. Poor access Only certified scaffolding and ladders erected by qualified,
Visual inspection for leaks to system. competent personnel used for working at height. Full body RL2
Serious injury due to fall. safety Harness worn and double lanyard used.
Inclement weather (rain) interferes with BHI supervisor and customer representative monitor the
visual inspection. weather conditions. Test to be abandoned if weather
RL2
Missed leaks; potential hydrocarbon release conditions are considered severe enough to interfere with
during start up. visual inspection results.
Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114
Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.
NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.
Operator error or equipment failure (e.g. Draining operations carried out by trained, competent
transfer hose). personnel in compliance with safe working procedures.
Uncontrolled release of test water into open Temporary bund (berms) rigged up at nominated drain points.
drains. Caps used to block off open drains local to the hydro test RL2
Personnel injury. equipment spread or test system (where applicable). Grating
Environmental damage (chemically treated areas covered with tarpaulin (where practical) to prevent any
water). spills migrating into drainage systems.
Storage tank capacity and residual water level assessed in
advance by BHI supervisor to ensure of adequate size to
receive the used test water.
Storage tank over filled. Uncontrolled
Draining of test system and filling of storage tank with used
release of test water at the lay down area.
test water is a minimum 2-person activity. Personnel in RL2
Environmental damage (chemically treated
constant radio contact during the transfer operation. Storage
water).
tank placed in a bund (berm) where possible. Spill kits
provided and spill control procedure followed in the event of a
spill.
Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114
Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.
NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.
Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Safe to Perform (STP)
Complete prior to starting work and attach to completed job paperwork.
Name of Person Location/
Date: Time:
Completing Form: Job No.:
Job Task Description:
Below is a list of questions that help employees identify common job hazards. Review these questions to ensure all unknown
hazards have been identified and controlled. Conditions marked as a "YES" must be documented on the back of this form, along
NOTE: with identified controls / barriers to prevent the risk of personal injury or environmental impact.
To review a list of identified hazards and established controls refer to the applicable Operational Risk Assessment (ORA).
1.0 WORK ENVIRONMENT Yes NO N/A 5.0 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT (SAFETY) Yes NO N/A
1.1 Is housekeeping a safety concern? 5.1 Have hand tools been damaged or modified?
1.2 Are there hazardous walking / working surfaces 5.2 Are any equipment guards missing or damaged?
(slips, trips, and fall hazards)? 5.3 Will any personnel be working near heavy
1.3 Will any employee be conducting work from an equipment used in a nearby operation?
elevated level without fall protection or guard 5.4 Does the lithium battery safety kit have any
rails installed? damaged or missing equipment?
1.4 Will personnel be working in a line of fire? 5.5 Are there any uncontrolled pressure testing
1.5 Are there any uncontrolled hand pinch point hazards (lines, equipment function testing)?
concerns? 5.6 When working at an elevated level OR
1.6 Will an employee enter a confined space? CLIMBING ACCESS STAIRS/STEPS, are any
1.7 Is additional lighting needed to safely perform required guard OR HAND rails damaged or
the job? missing?
1.8 Any fire, explosion/dangerous atmospheres 5.7 Other: _______________________________
(H2S, C02, etc...)?
1.9 Are there any energy sources requiring isolation 6.0 PPE (PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT)
(lock out -tag out)? 6.1 Is additional face protection required?
1.10 Are there any weather related concerns (rain, 6.2 Will loose clothing or jewelry create a catch
lightning, wind speed, temperature, etc.)? hazard?
1.11 Are there any work permits or lift plans that have 6.3 Is PPE damaged? (torn, cracked, etc.)
not ben issued or have expired? 6.4 Is PPE required for crystalline silica?
1.12 Are there any simultaneous operations 6.5 Other: _______________________________
(SIMOPS) that could affect the job?
1.13 Does the task require work on or near energized 7.0 VEHICLES (IF APPLICABLE)
circuits? 7.1 Is a spotter unable to assist with repositioning a
1.14 Will any work require the electrical safety section vehicle?
of the permit to work to be completed? 7.2 Are there any parking, exiting, or backing
1.15 Other: _______________________________ hazards?
7.3 Other: _______________________________
2.0 UPSTREAM PROCESS SAFETY (UPS)
2.1 Are there any concerns or issues identifed with 8.0 DANGEROUS GOODS
the UPS Bowtie Barrier Checklist or Barrier 8.1 Are there any new concerns regarding the use of
Verification Checkform? explosives, radiation, or chemicals?
2.2 Other: _______________________________ 8.2 Are there any concerns regarding the use of
lithium batteries?
3.0 PROCEDURES 8.3 Are there any hazardous chemicals on location
3.1 without a safety data sheet (SDS)?
Did any worker miss the pre-job safety meeting?
8.4 Other: _______________________________
3.2 Are job procedures inadequate to perform the
job safely? 9.0 DROPPED OBJECTS
3.3 Are there any fatigue concerns during job 9.1 Does the load weight exceed the limit of the
execution? lifting equipment?
3.4 Is there change in job scope that requires a 9.2 Are there any unsecured tools / equipment?
management of change (MOC)? 9.3 Are personnel required to be in the red zone
3.5 Other: _______________________________ (drop zone) during lifting operations?
9.4 Is there any lifting equipment that has not been
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL inspected or certified?
4.1 Are there any chemical transfers being 9.5 Is there any axillary equipment used at heights
performed (i.e., use of valves, hoses, without secondary retention? (i.e. hand tool,
connections, tanks/drums)? guides, etc>)
4.2 Are there any drips, leaks, or other 9.6 Are any workers unaware of the lift plan details
environmental concerns observed with the work for this task?
activity or equipment being used (i.e., forklift, 9.7 Other: _______________________________
pumps, etc.)?
4.3 Any nearby drains or body of water (i.e., creek,
ditches or other discharge points) that could be
affected by the work activity?
4.4 Are there any waste being generated?
4.5 Are there any activities requiring grounding and
bonding?
4.6 Is secondary containment required for the work
activity?
4.7 Other: _______________________________
Safe to Perform (STP)
Complete prior to starting work and attach to completed job paperwork.
Any UNCONTROLLED "YES" condition selected on the front must be documented in the table below to ensure effective
NOTE:
controls / barriers are identified and implemented to reduce the risk of personal injury or environmental impact.
Sequence of Job Steps:
Existing or Potential Hazard: What
Hazard Describe the steps to complete the job Safe Actions or Revised Procedures: Job Lead
can go wrong and what would the
No. task. Note any changes in conditions or What will be done to mitigate/control hazards? Initials
effect be?
procedures.
Safety Equipment Required (Check all that apply) Names and Initials of All Crew Members Present
1 of 1
Daily Operations Report #1
Project Information
Client Baker Hughes Job No.
Project Client Contract No.
Location Client Work Order No.
Distribution: Original On Site Job File Report 1 Document No.: PPS / OPS / 0030B
Copy #1 Baker Hughes Office Revision No.: G
Copy #2 Client Revision Date: September 2012
© Baker Hughes Incorporated. All Rights Reserved.
Pipeline Fill Report
MetricUnit 1
Project Information
Client: Baker Hughes Job No.:
Pipeline Owner: Client Work Order No.:
Project Name: Client Contract No.:
Project Location: Pipeline Volume: - m3
Target Pig Speed: m/sec Target Fill Rate: m3/hr
Length: km Volume/Unit Length: m3/m
Internal Diameter: mm Start Date:
Section #: of Completion Date:
Average
Total Volume Stage Pig
Date Time Pressure Total Pig Speed(a)
Filled Volume Location(a)
Flowrate Comments
(dd-Mon-yyyy) (24:00) (barg) (m3) (m3) (m3/hr) (km) (m/sec)
Start Start Start Start
(a) Note - The default calculation for pig location and speed (based on fill volume), can be replaced with a more representative value or formula by the user, if needed.
BHI Rep: Client Representative: System Owner:
Signature: Signature: Signature:
Date: Date: Date:
Distribution: Original On Site Job File Page 1 of 2 Document No.: PPS / OPS / 0310
Copy #1 Baker Hughes Office 1 Revision No.: G
Copy #2 Client © Baker Hughes Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Revision Date: October 2014
Pipeline Chemical Injection Record
MetricUnit 1
Project Information
Client: Baker Hughes Job No.:
Pipeline Owner: Client Work Order No.:
Project Name: Client Contract No.:
Project Location: Start Date:
Section #: of Completion Date:
Pipeline Information
Length: km Outside Diameter: mm
3
Pipeline Volume: m Wall Thickness: mm
3
Volume/Unit Length: #VALUE! m /m Internal Diameter: 0.00 mm
Chemical Name: Chemical Concentration: ppm
Injection Pump: #1 of Use Stroke Counter at: litre/stroke
Note: Check above box if using a stroke counter FALSE
Cumulative
Total Cum. Chemical Actual Cum.
Total Cumulative Stage Chemical
Date Time Chemical Stage Total Comments
Fill Volume Volume Flowmeter
Volume Volume PPM
Reading
(dd-Mon-yyyy) (24:00) (m3) (m3) (litre) (l) (l)
Start 0.0 Start Start Start Start Time for Fill & Injection
Distribution: Original On Site Job File Page 1 of 5 Document No.: PPS / OPS / 0311
Copy #1 Baker Hughes Office 1 Revision No.: G
Copy #2 Client © Baker Hughes Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Revision Date: November 2013
Pig Register
MetricUnit 1
Project Information
Client: Baker Hughes Job No.:
Pipeline Owner: Client Work Order No.:
Project Name: Client Contract No.:
Project Location: Start Date:
Operation: Completion Date:
Project Information
Length: km Section No.: of
Outside Diameter: mm Launcher Location:
Max. Wall Thickness: mm Receiver Location:
Min. Internal Diameter: mm Pipeline Volume: m3
Min. Bend Radius: Target Pig Speed: m/sec
3
Volume/Unit Length: m /m Pipe Internal Material:
Drive Medium: Internal Coating:
Average
Pig # Pig Type Launched Received Run Time(a) Pig Comments
Speed(a)
Date Time Date Time (hrs) (m/sec)
(a) Note - The default calculation for Run Time & Avg. Pig Speed can be replaced with a more representative value or formula by the user, if needed.
BHI Rep.: Client Representative: System Owner:
Signature: Signature: Signature:
Date: Date: Date:
Distribution: Original On Site Job File Page 1 of 2 Document No.: PPS / OPS / 0321
Copy #1 Baker Hughes Office Revision No.: F
Copy #2 Client © Baker Hughes Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Revision Date: October 2014
Used Pig Report
Project Information
Client: Baker Hughes Job No.:
Pipeline Owner: Client Work Order No.:
Project Name: Client Contract No.:
Pipeline Name: Location:
Operation:
Click icon to insert Pig Photo, if available. Click icon to insert Pig Photo, if available.
Resize photo over text as needed, to Resize photo over text as needed, to
maintain spacing. maintain spacing.
Description Description
before run: after run:
Comments
Distribution: Original On Site Job File Page 1 of 1 Document No.: PPS / OPS / 0322
Copy #1 Baker Hughes Office Revision No.: G
Copy #2 Client © Baker Hughes Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Revision Date: November 2013
Gauge Plate Acceptance Certificate
Project Information
Client: Baker Hughes Job No.:
Pipeline Owner: Client Work Order No.:
Project Name: Client Contract No.:
Pipeline Name: Launch Site:
Section #: Receiving Site:
Location: Start Date & Time:
Operation: Completion Date & Time:
Baker Hughes certifies that the described gauge pig was run through the pipeline as detailed within this
document.
Photo(s) Before Gauge Pig Run Photo(s) After Gauge Pig Run
Click icon to insert Pig Photo, if available. Click icon to insert Pig Photo, if available.
Resize photo over text as needed, to Resize photo over text as needed, to
maintain spacing. maintain spacing.
Description Description
before run: after run:
Comments
Distribution: Original On Site Job File Page 1 of 1 Document No.: PPS / OPS / 0323
Copy #1 Baker Hughes Office Revision No.: G
Copy #2 Client © Baker Hughes Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Date: November 2013
Commencement Certificate
Project Information
Client: Baker Hughes Job No.:
Pipeline Owner: Client Work Order No.:
Project Name: Client Contract No.:
Pipeline Name: Launch Site:
Location: Receiving Site:
Service Description: Start Date:
Completion Date:
Baker Hughes certifies that the above described service can proceed on the described pipeline in
accordance with the procedures, relevant CVI’s, and parameters represented within this document. All
related activities required for commencement will be completed to the applicable standard.
Procedures
Comments
Distribution: Original On Site Job File Page 1 of 1 Document No.: PPS / OPS / 0375
Copy #1 Baker Hughes Office Revision No.: G
Copy #2 Client © Baker Hughes Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Date: November 2013
Acceptance Certificate
Project Information
Client: Baker Hughes Job No.:
Pipeline Owner: Client Work Order No.:
Project Name: Client Contract No.:
Pipeline Name: Launch Site:
Location: Receiving Site:
Service Description: Start Date:
Completion Date:
Baker Hughes certifies that the described service to the pipeline was completed in accordance with the
parameters represented within this document.
Instrumentation
Calibration Calibration
Description Range Serial # Unit # Manufacturer
Date Certificate
Comments
Distribution: Original On Site Job File Page 1 of 1 Document No.: PPS / OPS / 0376
Copy #1 Baker Hughes Office Revision No.: G
Copy #2 Client © Baker Hughes Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Date: November 2013
APPENDIX C: SeaVISION II
Key Benefits:
• 128 bit AES encryption can be
ordered as an option
• Digital transmission
• Flexible transit and receive
configurations available (multiple Tx
to single Rx site)