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BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure

DocID: TMT-BHI-PRO-003
Revision: A02
External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


DocID: TMT-BHI-PRO-003 Revision: A02
External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 Page: 1 of 70
Revision History

Rev Date of Issue Issue Reason Description of Change


A02 25 Jun 2017 Issued for Review DRS comments addressed
A01 05 Jun 2017 Issued for Review

Prepared by: Charles Bushnell

Checked by: Donald Cameron

Approved by: Wayne Berrey

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


DocID: TMT-BHI-PRO-003 Revision: A02
External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 Page: 2 of 70
Table of Content
1 Introduction 4
1.1 TurkStream Overview 4
1.2 Purpose of Document 5
1.3 System Details 5
2 Definitions and Abbreviations 6
2.1 Definitions 6
2.2 Abbreviations 6
3 Reference Documents 7
3.1 ALS and SSTTBV Documents 7
3.2 BHI Documents 7
4 QHSE & Safe Working Practices 8
4.1 HSE Considerations 8
4.2 Quality Considerations 8
4.3 Personnel Safety 8
5 Resources 9
5.1 Personnel 9
5.2 Responsibilities 9
5.3 Communication and Interfaces 10
6 Execution Summary 13
6.1 Mobilisation 13
6.2 Offshore Flooding Methodology 13
6.3 Onshore Flooding Methodology 13
6.4 Schematic of Deck Equipment for Operational Setup 14
7 Flooding, Cleaning & Gauging Operations 15
7.1 FCG Philosophy 15
7.2 Calculations 17
7.3 Action Code Key 18
7.4 Equipment and System Preparation 19
7.5 Main Operations Sequence 22
8 Contingency Operations 36
8.1 Confirming Pig Receipt 36
8.2 Stuck Pig 37
8.3 Contingency Equipment Operation 38
8.4 Subsea Downline Hose Failure Contingency 38
8.5 Weather Warning 38
8.6 Vessel Run Off 38
APPENDIX A: Drawings 40
APPENDIX B: BHI Field Paperwork 48
APPENDIX C: SeaVISION II 68

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 Page: 3 of 70
1 Introduction

1.1 TurkStream Overview


South Stream Transport B.V. is planning to build a new pipeline system across the Black Sea to supply natural
gas to southern Europe. The pipeline system, here named 'Off-Shore Pipeline', will be part of the TurkStream
Pipeline Project and will extend from the Russian coast at Anapa to a landfall on the Turkish coastline near
Kiyikoy (see below). Water depths along the pipeline route approaches 2200 m. The Black Sea is an
environment containing high levels of H2S on the continental slope and abyssal plain. The seabed conditions
also include steep slopes and geohazard risks.

The TurkStream Off-Shore Pipeline project consists of two (2) subsea 32-inch pipelines laid between Russia
and Turkey and short onshore pipeline sections with supporting facilities on each end. The length of each
pipeline is in the order of 940 km. The design life of the project is 50 years.
The two micro tunnel pipeline sections in Russia and the one in Turkey will be installed as separate sections.
Both pipelines will be pulled-in through the tunnel using a pull-in head. Offshore the pipeline will be laid down
using a PLR in which two pigs have been pre-installed. The offshore PLR is equipped with diver-less hot-stab
connection and ROV operable valves. Upon completion of the pull-in operations, the strings will be pre-
commissioned.

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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1.2 Purpose of Document
The purpose of this document is to provide all involved personnel a clear understanding of the methodology
and procedures for Flooding, Cleaning and Gauging (FCG) operations of the TurkStream Micro-Tunnels pipeline
sections at the Russia Land Fall End (LFE) scope of work and to ensure that the work is completed in a safe,
efficient and timely manner. Furthermore, it is designed to be an all-inclusive source of information regarding
the operations to be performed.
Separate documents will be issued capturing the work scope and methodology for Hydrotest (Ref. 11) as well
as for the Dewatering, Drying and Nitrogen Preservation of the stub ends (Ref. 12).
It is the intent of BHI to provide documents that contains all pertinent procedures, drawings, calculations, and
other information in well-organised and easy to navigate documents. A copy of these documents will be
available at the worksite for use by all authorised personnel on site.

1.3 System Details

Pipeline 1 Pipeline 4
Details Unit
Pull-in Section Pull-in Section
Nominal Diameter Inch 32
From Onshore Anapa Kp 0.0
To Offshore Anapa Kp 2
Pipe Material SAWL 450 SFPU
Approx. Length m 2040
Internal Diameter mm 734.8
Wall Thickness mm 39
Min. Water Depth m +60
Max. Water Depth m -30
Test Pressure barg 330.8
Pipeline volume m 3
865

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2 Definitions and Abbreviations

2.1 Definitions

Term Description
Company Allseas Marine Contractors S.A.
Company’s Client South Stream Transport B.V,
Contractor Baker Hughes Process & Pipeline Services (A subdivision of Baker Hughes
Services International Inc.)
SHALL Indicates a requirement
SHOULD Indicates a recommendation

2.2 Abbreviations

Abbreviation Description
ALS Allseas
AWTI Above Water Tie-In
BHI Baker Hughes Process & Pipeline Services
CPS Contingency Pumping System
DP Dynamic Positioning
DPO Dynamic Positioning Officer
EM Electromagnetic
ERC Emergency Release Coupling
FCG Flooding, Cleaning and Gauging
HSE Health, Safety, Environment
km Kilometre
KP Kilometre Point
ID Internal Diameter
ITP Inspection and Test Plan
LTE Landfall Termination End
mm Millimetre
MWP Maximum Working Pressure
OD Outside Diameter
ORA Operating Risk Assessment
PLR Pig Launcher / Receiver

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Abbreviation Description
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle
SOW Scope of Work
SSTTBV South Stream Transport B.V.
STP Safe To Perform
SUH Start-Up Head

3 Reference Documents

3.1 ALS and SSTTBV Documents

Document Number Document Title


01. ALS-HSE-PLN-206266 HSE Plan
02. ALS-PRM-PLN-206260 Quality Plan
03. ALS-PIL-PRO-206076 Project Emergency Bridging Document
04. AIMS-VSL-PRO-1263 Medevac Procedure
05. ALS-EMS-PLN-201591 Project Environmental Protection Plan – Russia
06. Specification for Pre-commissioning of Pipeline Stubs in Russia and
SST-CMS-SPE-210396
Turkey

3.2 BHI Documents

ALS Document ID BHI Document Number Document Title


07. ALS-PCO-PLN-208200 TMT-BHI-PLN-001 BHI - HSE Management Plan
08. ALS-PCO-PLN-208199 TMT-BHI-PLN-002 BHI - Interface Management Plan
09. ALS-PCO-PLN-208201 TMT-BHI-PLN-003 BHI - Quality Management Plan
ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 BHI - Flood, Clean and Gauging
10. TMT-BHI-PRO-003
Procedure
11. ALS-PCO-PRO-208182 TMT-BHI-PRO-004 BHI - Hydro Testing Procedures
ALS-PCO-PRO-208183 BHI - Dewatering, Drying and N2
12. TMT-BHI-PRO-005
Purging Procedure
13. ALS-PCO-DWG-208205 TMT-BHI-DWG-001 BHI - General Layouts
14. ALS-PCO-DWG-202806 TMT-BHI-DWG-002 BHI - Process Flow Diagrams
ALS-PCO-CER-208207 BHI - Offshore Equipment Data
15. TMT-BHI-CER-001
book and Certification Package

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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ALS Document ID BHI Document Number Document Title
ALS-PCO-PRO-208180 TMT-BHI-PRO-002 BHI - Downline Deployment
16.
Procedure
ALS-PCO-PLN-208202 TMT-BHI-PLN-004 BHI – Mobilisation & Installation
17.
Plan

4 QHSE & Safe Working Practices


This section details the safe working practices to be followed to ensure the operations are completed in a safe,
accurate and consistent manner.

4.1 HSE Considerations


BHI personnel will carry out scopes of work on board the pre-commissioning support vessel and at the onshore
location. Under all these circumstances BHI personnel will work in accordance with ALS and any shore side
facility or support vessels safety management systems, with particular reference to Permits to Work and
SIMOP’s procedures, accident and incident reporting protocol, and hazardous substances management, etc.
Full HSE requirements are outlined in the project BHI - HSE Management Plan (Ref. 07).

4.2 Quality Considerations


BHI shall comply with Project Quality requirements as outlined in the BHI - Quality Management Plan (Ref.
09). The Project Engineer and the work site Supervisors are responsible for monitoring the progress of the
work and recording pertinent information as dictated in the appropriate procedure and Inspection and Test
Plan. Each task should be ticked completed as the work progresses and intermediate check lists as required,
will be signed off.

4.3 Personnel Safety


All personnel shall wear personal protective equipment (PPE) according to the BHI - HSE Management Plan
(Ref. 07) and additional PPE required for safe performance of activities and as required by the task risk
assessment (ORA) provided for their use. Protective hard hat, safety glasses, steel toe safety boots and flame
retardant coveralls shall be the minimum safety clothing worn at all times when on-site. Personnel shall have
ear protection and gloves with them at all times and use them in the appropriate situations. Waterproof jacket
and trousers shall be worn in adverse weather conditions.

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5 Resources

5.1 Personnel
The minimum manning levels required to safely perform the flooding, cleaning & gauging operations for the
trunkline is shown below in Figure 5-1. This provides coverage for a 24-hour operations

5.2 Responsibilities
During engineering and operational phases of the works the following categories of BHI personnel shall be
used: -
Project Manager

The Project Manager based in Son, The Netherlands is responsible for all operational and fiscal aspects of the
Project and is empowered to make Project related decisions on behalf of BHI.
Other responsibilities include: -

 Overall responsibility for all contract administration and project management relating to the engineering
and development of procedures associated with the project.
 Ensuring all health, safety, quality and environmental systems are implemented and adhered to.
 Reporting, in accordance with contractual conditions, to ALS regarding utilisation of manpower and
equipment resources, planned/completed progress, safety, quality assurance and environmental aspects.
 Reviewing and approving project-specific schedules and plans.
 Reviewing and submitting invoices, in accordance with conditions of contract.
 Maintaining adequate control of sub-contractors/suppliers, including establishment of an appropriate
audit/surveillance plan.
 Acting as the nominated contact for ALS documentation and all other correspondence relating to the
project.
 Attending all meetings scheduled to discuss contractual or other matters pertaining to the scope of work.
 Ensuring that all existing corporate guidelines, policies and procedures are adhered to at all times during
the execution of the work-scope.
Project Engineers

 Reports to the Project Manager.


 Assists with the preparation of operational procedure during the engineering phases.
 Direct control of operational activities to ensure effective project completion in accordance with the
approved procedures.
 Ensuring operational quality, safety and environmental systems are implemented and adhered to.
 Ensure that toolbox talks are carried out and recorded in the correct manner.
 Ensure that the various locations operating requirements are met, i.e. work permit systems.
 Ensuring operational directives are completed.
 Ensuring full records of operations are generated, maintained and compiled for submission to the client.
Supervisors

 Reports to the Project Engineer.


 Completion of operational activities as directed by the project engineer.
 Ensure that the equipment tagging system is correctly implemented.

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 Assist in generation of operational records in a clear and concise manner.
 Ensuring quality, safety and environmental systems are implemented and adhered to.
 Conducting the STP, and recording the same.
 Supervision of technicians and operators on site.
Operators & Mechanical Technicians
 Reports to the Supervisor.
 The technician’s responsibilities include the safe and efficient operation of equipment and assisting in the
compiling of clear and concise records of operations.
 Pro-actively contributing to the overall site safety by reporting near misses and accidents to the site
supervisor.

5.3 Communication and Interfaces


5.3.1 Communications
Project interfaces are in general the BHI Project Engineer (dayshift) or the BHI Supervisor (nightshift)
responsibility and they will liaise closely with the ALS project representative as to the operational status (Refer
to Figure 5.1).

Other Vessel
Master Vessel Master

COMPANY COMPANY’s COMPANY COMPANY’s Onshore


Other Vessel Other Vessel COMPANY’s
Vessel Vessel COMPANY
Representative Client Client
Representative Client Representative

Vessel BHI Onshore BHI


ROV Supervisor Project Engineer Project Engineer
Day Shift Day Shift

BHI Day Shift BHI Night Shift BHI Day Shift BHI Night Shift
Supervisor Supervisor Supervisor Supervisor

BHI Operators BHI Operators BHI Operators BHI Operators


(x5) (x5) (x3) (x3)

Figure 5-1: Communication & Interfaces

During the hose deployment and the flooding, cleaning & gauging operations the BHI Engineer will have radio
contact with the ROV Supervisor and will be able to view ROV operations via the broadcast transmitted from
the ROV Support vessel via the Seatronics Seavision II broadcast system (Appendix C) to co-ordinate all
relevant operations. Communication to any external working party will be via the ALS nominated Project
Representative on-board the vessel, positioning of the vessel and ROV support vessel will be controlled by ALS
exclusively, in conjunction with Vessel Masters.

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In the event of communication breakdown between the BHI crew offshore, Onshore or between BHI offshore
and the ROV Support Vessel the flooding, cleaning and gauging operations will be assessed whether it is safe
to continue until communications have been restored.

In the event of a communications breakdown between the BHI Engineer/Supervisor offshore and the BHI
Engineer/Supervisor onshore, operations will continue. If the flooding, cleaning and gauging operations on the
vessel cease for any reason whilst communications are down it will have no impact on the onshore operations.
If for any reason it becomes necessary to close in the discharge line at the onshore location, it will take a
considerable amount of time for this to have any impact offshore and even then it would only result in an
increase in back pressure. It is most likely that communications would be restored prior to any impact on the
offshore operations.
UHF Radio - The following personnel/locations require a UHF radio which will be provided by ALS:

 BHI Test Cabin Offshore.


 BHI Test Cabin Onshore.
 ALS Representative Offshore.
 ALS Representative Onshore.
 Vessel Bridge.
 ROV Support Vessel Bridge.
Back-up Phone – Due to the short distance between the onshore and offshore locations then it may be possible
to utilise a telephone call to the onshore cell phones, but this is a final resort option. All relevant contact
numbers will be made into lists and secured in visible locations at both worksites and locations made know to
all member of the work parties prior to operations.

5.3.2 Interfaces

Refer to the Interface Management Plan (Ref. 08) for key communications interfaces.
For diesel fuel and utility requirements offshore the BHI Engineer/Supervisor will arrange directly with the PSV
Bridge. For diesel fuel requirements onshore the BHI Engineer/Supervisor will arrange with the ALS
representative for it to be supplied by Strabag.
The following table identifies the interfaces and connections for both offshore and onshore locations: -

Interface / Connection Description

Pig Launcher 4” Female Hot Stab Refer to ALS drawing Appendix A5


Receptacle (Offshore).
Pig Launcher 4” Male Hot Stab BHI hose shall terminate in a 4” WECO Male (Wing) Hammer Union
Connection (Offshore). Figure 1002 to connect to the hot stab WECO Female (Thread)
Figure 1002.
Refer to ALS drawing Appendix A5

Pig Receiver 4” WECO Figure 206 Refer to ALS drawing Appendix A4


(Onshore).

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Interface / Connection Description

Pig Receiver 2” WECo Figure 1502 Refer to ALS drawing Appendix A4


instrument and hydrotest
Connection (Onshore).
Fish Protection System (FPS) and Discharge hoses shall be deployed by powered hose reel and tugger
and Hose deployment. to avoid handling.
BHI Project Engineer will liaise directly with Bridge prior to
deployment and recovery.
Compressed Air. To be supplied By BHI for hose reels, tuggers and chemical injection
systems or for pump start up where battery start is not included.
Diesel Supply (Offshore). BHI Project Engineer will arrange directly with PSV Bridge for fuel
supply switch on to the BHI fuel tank and isolation on completion.
Diesel Supply (Onshore). BHI equipment utilise standard fill caps. BHI Project Engineer will
arrange directly with a local supplier for fuel supply.
Electrical Supply and Lighting A BHI generator shall supply BHI electrical driven equipment and
(Offshore & Onshore) lighting with armoured cable for test cabin and overhead 15 amp
cable for fluorescent strip lights

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6 Execution Summary

6.1 Mobilisation
The major equipment to be mobilised is detailed in the Mobilisation and Installation Procedure (Ref. 17). The
vessel FCG equipment will have been previously function tested as part of the Wet Buckle Contingency (WBC)
equipment and will be on standby in Varna, Bulgaria. The onshore equipment will be function tested at BHI
Ufa, Russia prior to mobilising the equipment to Anapa. BHI personnel will be mobilised to Bulgaria and Anapa
upon confirmation from ALS to commence operations.

6.2 Offshore Flooding Methodology


Once notified by ALS to commence operations, BHI will:
 Carry out run up checks on individual engine units and electrical equipment prior to vessel departure;
 Deploy the fish protection unit and flooding hose as per Hose Deployment and recovery procedure (Ref.
16);
 Leak test the down line hoses and hot stab connection.
 Launch a pig train with filtered seawater slugs both in front of first pig and between pig one and gauge
pig. As a driving medium, 50 micron filtered seawater will be pumped at 780m3/hr equating to 0.5m/s pig
speed.
 The final Pig in system will hold a gauge plate.

11m3 of 50 micron
44m3 of 50 micron
filtered sea water Pig driving medium,
filtered sea water
slug for pig 50 micron filtered
slug for pig
separation seawater
separation

6.3 Onshore Flooding Methodology


Once notified by the offshore representative, the Onshore team shall:
 Receive the 11m3slug of filtered sea water in front of the pig into a storage pond;
 Receive the 44m3slug of filtered sea water in between the pigs into a storage pond;
 Receive the 10m3slug of filtered sea water added to ensure dyed water is present in the subsea head; and
 Remove pigs and inspect gauge plates after PLR removal.

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6.4 Schematic of Deck Equipment for Operational Setup

FILTER 3,4,5,6

Item Description Max Max Required


Pressure Flow flow
(Barg) (m3/hr) (m3/hr)
LP01,LP02, Lift Pumps – Used to draw seawater from the overboard 11.6 635 x 2 800
LP03 fish protection unit and feed it through primary and
= 1270
secondary filters feeding Flooding pumps
Filter 1 & 2 1st stage -Coarse filters fitted with 180 micron baskets 20 1800 800
Filter 3 to 6 2nd stage – Self flushing filters fitted with 50 micron 10 270 x 3 800
screens =810
FP01,FP02, Flooding pumps – Used to provide the driving force for 50 400 x 2 800
pig movement.
=800
FP03 Flooding pump – Used to provide the driving force for pig 27 960 800
movement.

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7 Flooding, Cleaning & Gauging Operations

7.1 FCG Philosophy

Parameter Requirement
Initial Status Empty (air filled)
From Offshore KP at -30m water depth to onshore KP 0 at +60m
Direction of Flooding
above sea level
Pig Train Description 2 Pig Train
Driving Medium Filtered seawater
Filtration 50 µm
Chemical Treatment Fluorescein Sodium tracer dye, dosage 50 ppm.
Pig Speed ~ 0.5 m/s
Gauge Plates sized to 97% of minimum pipeline ID.
Gauge Plate
6mm- 8mm thick aluminium with 45° chamfered leading edge.

Water is to be delivered through the pipeline section that extends to a -30m water depth. There is no
requirement to induce a back pressure prior to flooding this section from the offshore location, so flooding
operations can commence immediately following connection.
The pipeline section will be flooded with filtered seawater, the supply of seawater shall be a minimum 780
m3/hr. This equates to a pigging speed of 0.5 m/s. Due to the reduced pressure required for pigging, this can
be achieved using three lift pumps and a single flooding pump, FP03, which has been demonstrated during
function trials at sea to produce 830m3/hr at 27barg. The maximum pressure required at the pump will be 15
barg.
 Pipeline pressure 10.2 barg
 Supply hose back Pressure 1.74 barg
 Receiving end hose 3.0 barg (only during pig receipt operation)
 PLR’s (estimated) 1.0 barg
 Resistance of pigs 0.62 barg
 Total 15.56 barg
The flooding duration including the pre-slug volume is estimated to be 1.10 hours, based upon average of
0.5m/sec.
Suction pumps shall draw seawater from overboard of vessel through the FPS. Transfer pumps shall then take
the water and push it through the 1st stage filtration and through the 2nd stage self-cleaning filtration system
which will filter the raw seawater to 50 µm.
Flooding pumps will then take the filtered seawater and pump it through the pipeline, driving the pig train, via
a 6” flexible hose. A pre-slug of filtered seawater shall be introduced to lubricate the pipeline and wash debris
in front of the first pig. The pre-slug length for Russia shall be 25m in length, which equals 11m3.
Each pig shall be separated by a minimum of 105 linear metres (44m3) of filtered seawater to further clean
the pipeline and maintain adequate separation of pigs throughout operations.

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All pigs, pig tracking and pig configuration shall be supplied by CONTRACTOR.

The pre-installed pigs shall then be launched in sequence as outlined:

No. Pig Type Propelling Medium Distance/Volume Tracking Device Fitted?


1. - Filtered Seawater 25m / 11m3 -
2. Bi-directional brush Filtered Seawater 105m / 44m3 Yes
3. Bi-directional gauge Filtered Seawater 100% Pipeline Vol Yes
4. - Filtered Seawater c/w Dye 10m3 -

The pre-slug seawater and the slug between the pigs shall be collected via the onshore receiver in a suitable
pond (~150m3) and used for later pressurisation of the pipeline strings.
An average pigging speed of 0.5 m/s shall be maintained throughout operation. During operations the following
shall be logged / calculated every 15 minutes:
 Pigging pressure (barg);
 Total and volumetric flow rates of seawater pumped (m3/hr),
 Pig location (m); and
 Pigging Speed (m/s).

The flooding, cleaning and gauging shall be deemed complete on acceptance of the following criteria:
 All pigs have been received into the pig receiver in good condition;
 Gauging Plates undamaged; and
 Debris loading accepted by COMPANY. Cleaning acceptance criteria is as follows (Ref. 06):
o No foreign materials (apart from rust and dust) on and in front of last pig;
o The amount of debris in front of the first and the last pig of the train shall have a diminishing
trend;
o The debris received in front of last pig shall not exceed 2 liters of dust/rust on and in front of last
pig.
o If the quantity of solid material received in front of the last pig is greater than the maximum
allowable quantity, a technical evaluation and discussion shall be undertaken on site between
COMPANY and CONTRACTOR Representatives to agree actions to be taken.
On acceptance of the FCG operations, the CONTRACTOR shall close the valves on the head and disconnect
the flooding hoses from the subsea temporary launcher/head.

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7.2 Calculations
BHI proprietary pipeline flooding program PipeFill™ has been used to review the flooding operation and
possibly identify any run-away pig scenarios. The calculations are applicable for each of the two micro tunnel
sections.

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7.3 Action Code Key

Code Description

A Action In any column that denotes “A”, the activity requires action by that party

In any column that denotes “H”, further activity is not possible until all criteria have
H Hold
been met and all parties have signed
In any column that denotes “W”, the activity should be witnessed by that party.
W Witness
Further activity is not possible until that party has signed
In any column that denotes “M”, the activity should be monitored by that party. Due
notice should be given to ensure the party is on site. If said notice has been given
M Monitor
then further activity is possible even if that party does not sign Activities can proceed
and can be verified subsequently by documentation review

Do not commence to the next step in the work scope until all conditions and
stipulations in this section have been met and fulfilled.

NOTE:
This procedure will commence after successful FPS deployment and Downline deployment and successful hot
stab connection (Ref. 16).

The procedure steps covering the Flood, Clean and Gauge of line 1 are identical to those of Line 4. There are
two completion boxes on the step by step method statement for Inspection and test plan (ITP) purposes. One
will be completed during Line 1 operations, the second will be completed for Line 4.

In each step by step a specific location header is found determining which work scope step is next.

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7.4 Equipment and System Preparation

Step Description Reference BHI ALS


Document Initial Initial

Receive confirmation from ALS to mobilise FCG


1. equipment. Mobilise in accordance with mobilisation and Ref. 17
installation plan.

Operational Risk Assessment [ORA] has been carried out HSES-FM-ORA-103


2. covering all proposed operations and that measures are HSES-FM-ORA-073 A W
in place. PPS-OPS-0030B-H

Onshore
The BHI Engineer shall sign on to a Permit to Work for
rigging up and FCG receipt operations and ensure it is
posted within the BHI test cabin and copies are
3.
distributed to the Site Authority and ALS Representative
where applicable. PTW H H
Note:
Revisit ORA and Create an STP paying special attention to
pit access and egress for preparatory work and ensure
the access T Card system is utilised and that there is
always a safety person at the top of the pit access.
Onshore
PPS-OPS-0030B
4. The BHI Engineer shall ensure communications between A M
Crane and Riggers are established and complete a
communication check.
Onshore
5. Once all approvals have been received commence Appendix A3 A W
placement and rig up of equipment as per the general
layout drawing.
Onshore
Ref. 07
6. Confirm Barriers are in place around equipment to & PPS-OPS-0030B- A W
prevent unauthorised entry in work areas for non- H
essential personnel.
Vessel
7.
The BHI Engineer shall sign on to the Vessel General PTW
and a BHI Permit to Work for FCG operations and ensure PTW H H
it is posted within the BHI test cabin and copies are
distributed to the Vessel Bridge and ALS Representative
where applicable.

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Step Description Reference BHI ALS
Document Initial Initial
Vessel
Vessel Master will ensure a suitable weather window is
available for the operation and interface with ALS vessels.
NOTE:
There is no exact sea state conditions that will prevent
deployment, operation or recovery of the downline, clump
weight and FPS, however it is dependent on other vessels
i.e. if an ROV cannot be used by another vessel.
8. Operational limitations are weather dependent, and all PPS-OPS-0030B-H M M
factors will be taken into account prior to deployment,
during operation and during recovery. Wind direction, sea
state, swell, weather forecast etc. will be assessed
continually, in addition to this the BHI Project Engineer
shall be monitoring movement of the downline, flow rates
and pressures. If any party (Contingency Vessel Master,
Support Vessel Master or BHI) regards it is not safe to
continue then operations will cease and the downline
recovered or released in accordance with the Downline
Deployment procedure.(Ref. 16)
Note:
9. Appendix A1 and A2
Vessel equipment will have been set up and function
tested previously for wet buckle contingency operations.
Vessel
Proceed with a STP between all involved parties:
 Bridge (Vessel Master & DPO)
 Project personnel
 Deck Foreman and Riggers
 ROV
10.
Reinforce lines of communication on the vessel and to HSES-FM-RA-001
onshore. PPS-OPS-0030B-H H H
Confirm all parties are familiar with the Operational Risk
Assessment (ORA)/ hazards/ mitigations/ precautions for
the operation. Ensure that the following risks are
highlighted:
 Wires under tension on deployed hose
 Stored energy on deck in pipework and pumps.
 Mechanical moving parts on machines
 Spill protection for refueling operations.
Vessel
11. Deploy the FPS at least 2m below sea level, adding hoses Ref.16 A W
as required and connect suction hoses to the suction side
of the lift pumps

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Step Description Reference BHI ALS
Document Initial Initial
Vessel
12. Ref.16 A W
Deploy the 6” Downline according to the Downline
Deployment Procedure.
Vessel
Ref. 07
13. Confirm Barriers are in place around equipment to & PPS-OPS-0030B- A W
prevent unauthorised entry in work areas for non- H
essential personnel.
Vessel
14. Confirm an audible verbal warning has been given to all PPS-OPS-0030B-H A W
personnel on the vessel to ensure awareness of
operations commencing.

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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7.5 Main Operations Sequence
Prior to operational pigging the downlines shall be subject to a leak test to verify connection of the hot stab
and integrity of the hose joints

Reference ALS Line 1 Line 4


Step Description BHI
Document Initial Initial
NOTE:
Two Bi-directional pigs will have been pre-loaded into AWTI prior to Operations Commencement. They will have
been loaded in the following order:
Pig 1 – Bi-directional Swab pig
Pig 2 – Bi-directional Gauge pig.
Offshore
Proceed with a STP between all involved parties:
 Bridge (DPO)
HSES-FM-
 Project personnel
RA-001
(Vessel Superintendent / Precomms Engineer)
 Deck Foreman and Riggers PPS-OPS-
1.  Onshore personnel 0030B H H
Confirm all parties are familiar with the Operational Risk Sec 3.2
Assessment/ hazards/ mitigations/ precautions for the
operation. Ensure that the following risks are highlighted:
 Chemical handling
 Reviewing first aid information
 Pressure awareness

Onshore
A STP should be completed by all involved parties. Making
everyone aware of the main hazards involved, not limited
to:
2.  Stored energy release
 Hose movement – mixed air and water on PPS-OPS-
receipt. Make sure the work area is clear of none 0030B H H
essential personnel.
 Simultaneous Operations with onshore
construction activities
 Vent hose to safe location (tank or pond)
Barriers should be erected informing people that pigging
operations are about to begin.

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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Reference ALS Line 1 Line 4
Step Description BHI
Document Initial Initial
Onshore and Vessel
At each location, BHI and ALS sign onto the pressure
chart and install correct pressure chart for recorder (check
3.
serial number) to the pressure recorder. Charts will clearly
indicate:
 Pipeline Section
 Date Pressure
H H
 Time Chart
 Phase of Operation
 Instrumentation Location
 Recorder Serial Number
 Range
Ensure that the 24 hour clock is in the operating position
with clock wound or battery set.
SUBSEA INTERVENTION

4. ROV to ensure that all the valves on AWTI head #7 and Appendix A M A
#8 are in the CLOSED position.

Confirm Subsea Valves are in the CLOSED position.


5.
Allseas Date
Baker Hughes Date

Vessel
Open valves to supply water from Lift Pump LP 01 to the
secondary filters as per BHI Valve Index 01
BHI Valve Index 01
BV01 BV02 BV03 BV04 BV05 BV06 BV07
Open Open Closed Closed Closed Closed Open
BV08 BV09 BV10 BV11 BV12 BV13 BV14
Appendix
6. Open Open Open Open Closed Open Closed A W
A2
BV15 BV16 BV17 BV18 BV19 BV20 BV21
Open Closed Open Closed Closed Closed Closed
BV22 BV23 BV24 BV25 BV26 IV01 IV02
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
IV03 IV04 IV05 IV06 IV07 IV08 IV09
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
BVV1 BVV2 MFV1
Closed Closed Closed

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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Reference ALS Line 1 Line 4
Step Description BHI
Document Initial Initial
Confirm valve set up as per BHI PT Valve Index 01 above.
7.
Allseas Date
Baker Hughes Date

Vessel PPS-OPS-
8. Start lift pump LP01 allowing water to flow through the A M
0030B
system up to the secondary filters.
Vessel PPS-OPS-
9. A M
Bleed high point vents on the filters and pumps. 0030B

Vessel PPS-OPS-
10. A M
Close high point vents once all the air is expelled. 0030B

Vessel
Commence manual self-flushing of the secondary PPS-OPS-
11. A M
50micron fine filter systems systematically to remove any 0030B
contaminants from initial suction.
Vessel
During the purge of 1st stage Fine filters and FP03’s
engine can be started, allowing time for warm up. PPS-OPS-
12. A M
0030B
NOTE:
Ensure the clutch is disengaged prior to engine start up.

Vessel
Open valves in Valve Index Table 02 to slowly to flood the
remaining system with water discharging overboard from
BV25.
BHI Valve Index 02
BV01 BV02 BV03 BV04 BV05 BV06 BV07
Open Open Closed Closed Closed Closed Open
BV08 BV09 BV10 BV11 BV12 BV13 BV14 PPS-OPS-
13. 0030B A W
Open Open Open Open Open Open Open
BV15 BV16 BV17 BV18 BV19 BV20 BV21
Open Open Open Open Open Open Closed
BV22 BV23 BV24 BV25 BV26 IV01 IV02
Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Closed Closed
IV03 IV04 IV05 IV06 IV07 IV08 IV09
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
BVV1 BVV2 MFV1
Closed Closed Closed

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 Page: 24 of 70
Reference ALS Line 1 Line 4
Step Description BHI
Document Initial Initial

Vessel
Open instrument Valves in Valve Index 03
BHI PT Valve Index 03
BV01 BV02 BV03 BV04 BV05 BV06 BV07
Open Open Open Open Open Open Open
BV08 BV09 BV10 BV11 BV12 BV13 BV14
PPS-OPS-
Open Open Open Open Open Open Open
14. 0030B A W
BV15 BV16 BV17 BV18 BV19 BV20 BV21
Appendix
Open Open Open Open Open Open Closed
A2
BV22 BV23 BV24 BV25 BV26 IV01 IV02
Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Open Open
IV03 IV04 IV05 IV06 IV07 IV08 IV09
Open Open Open Closed Open Open Open
BVV1 BVV2 MFV1
Closed Closed Closed

Vessel
OPEN valve IV06 to allow water to displace air through PPS-OPS-
15. the instrument tubing and hoses, bleeding off air A M
0030B
completely until a steady flow of water is present.
CLOSE IV06.
Vessel
Start and engage Flooding Pump No. 1 and slowly close
PPS-OPS-
16. BV25. Slowly increase the pump RPM to increase the A W
0030B
pressure in the discharge line to 20 barg against the
closed valve on the subsea head.

SUBSEA INTERVENTION
Once a pressure of 20 barg is attained, check for leaks at
the AWTI hot stab location and at the hose joint PPS-OPS-
17. connections at 35 m subsea (the 70 m downline 0030B M A
comprises of two 35 m hose lengths, connected
together).

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 Page: 25 of 70
Reference ALS Line 1 Line 4
Step Description BHI
Document Initial Initial
SUBSEA INTERVENTION
The ROV is to check the hot stab connection for signs of
any gross leaks.
If leaks are present, the complete system will be
depressurized, the ROV is to remove and reconnect the
hot stab in order to reseat the joint. Perform the leak test
again.
PPS-OPS-
ROV to check the discharge lines for leaks. In case any
18. 0030B M A
leak is detected in the hose, depressurize the complete
system, recover the hoses to deck, repair, redeploy and
re-test them.
Note:
Time taken to perform this test shall be minimized, to a
duration of 5 minutes, to prevent the pump end from
over-heating; any leakage down-stream of the pumps
shall become evident as soon as the pressure is
increased.

SUBSEA INTERVENTION PPS-OPS-


19. 0030B
Once the discharge hose and hot stab (connected to
AWTI) are confirmed leak free at 20 barg, open BV25 to PPS-OPS- H H
relief pressure and disengage Flooding Pump FP03. 0310
Sign off the completion certificate for temporary system PPS-OPS-
leak test 0376
Vessel PPS-OPS-
BHI Engineer to prepare operational forms for the FCG 0030B
operations: PPS-OPS-
 Daily Operations Report 0310
 Pipeline Fill Report PPS-OPS-
20.  Chemical Injection Record 0311 A M
 Pig Launch/Receive Register PPS-OPS-
 Commencement Certificate 0321
 Acceptance Certificate PPS-OPS-
0375
PPS-OPS-
0376

21. Vessel & Onshore PPS-OPS-


Sign Operational Commencement Form for FCG 0375 H H
Operations

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 Page: 26 of 70
Reference ALS Line 1 Line 4
Step Description BHI
Document Initial Initial
Vessel
Ensure the following is documented throughout
operations at 5 minutes intervals, in accordance with PPS-OPS-
Appendix C: BHI Field Paperwork; 0030B
• Pipeline Pressure (barg)
• Total volume of water injected (m3)
22. • Flow rate of water injected (m3/min) PPS-OPS- A W
• Total volume of each chemical injected (L) 0310
• Flowrate of chemical injected (L/min)
• Average dosage of each chemical (ppm) PPS-OPS-
• Pig Speed (m/s) 0311
• Estimated Pig Distance (m)

Onshore
OPEN Pig Receiver valves ready for injection of slugs and
start of pigging operations.

BHI Valve Index 04


PPS-OPS-
Onshore Valve status
23. 0030B A W
PLR 1.1 PLR 1.2 PLR 1.3 OBV01 OBV02

Closed Closed Open Open Open

OBV03 OBV04 OBV05 OBV06

Open Open Open Closed

Vessel
PPS-OPS-
24. Once ready to receive water, onshore team communicate 0030B A W
status to vessel crew in order for flooding operations to
begin.

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 Page: 27 of 70
Reference ALS Line 1 Line 4
Step Description BHI
Document Initial Initial
Vessel
OPEN Valves BV03, BV04, BV05 and BV06 and run up lift
pumps LP02 and LP03

BHI Valve Index 05


BV01 BV02 BV03 BV04 BV05 BV06 BV07
Open Open Open Open Open Open Open
BV08 BV09 BV10 BV11 BV12 BV13 BV14 PPS-OPS-
25. A W
Open Open Open Open Open Open Open 0030B
BV15 BV16 BV17 BV18 BV19 BV20 BV21
Open Open Open Open Open Open Closed
BV22 BV23 BV24 BV25 BV26 IV01 IV02
Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Open Open
IV03 IV04 IV05 IV06 IV07 IV08 IV09
Open Open Open Closed Open Open Open
BVV1 BVV2 MFV1
Closed Closed Closed

Vessel
26. Secondary self-flushing filters shall be set to differential
pressure mode and monitored throughout the operation PPS-OPS-
A M
to ensure correct filtering and flushing cycling patterns. 0030B
Revert to manual flush as required to avoid all filters
flushing simultaneously
Vessel
27. Prior to opening Main Discharge valve (BV26) bring LP01, PPS-OPS-
A M
LP02 and LP03 online and idle, discharging overboard 0030B
through BV25 until the system is balanced.
Appendix A
Subsea Intervention
PPS-OPS-
ROV to OPEN the following valves on the subsea AWTI 0030B
head. Confirm with ALS, that the ROV has subsea valves
on AWTI are in the following positions allowing a pre-slug
to be injected into the pipeline. ROV to standby on Valve
AWTI 1.1 ready to close when 11m3 is reached
BHI Valve Index 06
28. M A
Valve Number Status

AWTI 1.1 OPEN

AWTI 1.2 CLOSED

AWTI 1.3 CLOSED

AWTI 1.4 OPEN

AWTI 1.5 OPEN

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 Page: 28 of 70
Reference ALS Line 1 Line 4
Step Description BHI
Document Initial Initial

29. Confirm all valves are functioned, as per BHI Valve Index 06

Baker Hughes Date Allseas Date

Vessel
30. CLOSE BV25, monitoring discharge pressure from the Lift PPS-OPS-
A W
pumps and maintain pressure below 6barg lowering the 0030B
RPM on the lift pumps as required

31. Vessel PPS-OPS- A W


Zero the Flowmeter (FM02) or record the start readings. 0310
Vessel
OPEN BV26 gate valve to commence injection of pre-slug
of 11m3 of filtered water that can be achieved with the
32. Lift pumps only. This will be achieved quickly so ROV is PPS-OPS-
A W
on standby at AWTI 1.1 0310
Vessel is on standby on BV26 ready to close if ROV has
difficulties (the flowmeter head is situated next to BV26
for ease of use)
Vessel
Throughout the operation the Lift pump and Flooding
Pump Operators will monitor system pressure gauges so
that:
 Lift pump discharge stays in the range of 3-5barg PPS-OPS-
33. A W
to allow effective filter flushing 0030B
 Filter differential pressure stays below 0.5barg (in
the green for new DP gauges)
 Flooding pump suction remains above 4barg to
avoid cavitation and pump damage

Subsea intervention
Continue pumping until 11m3 has been achieved then:
ROV CLOSE AWTI 1.1
PPS-OPS-
34. Zero the Flowmeter (FM02) or record the start readings. 0310 A A
ROV OPEN AWTI. 1.2 to commence injection of water
injection to Launch Pig No.1.
ROV to standby at AWTI 1.2 ready to close

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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Reference ALS Line 1 Line 4
Step Description BHI
Document Initial Initial
Pressure
Vessel chart
35. PPS-OPS- A W
Monitor pressure chart recorder for indications of pig
launch and Log pig launch in the pig register 0321

Vessel
On receipt of confirmation that AWTI 1.2 is OPEN,
36. commence the systematic increase of lift pump and PPS-OPS-
A W
flooding pump engine speed, injecting water until the flow 0310
rate is sufficient to launch Pig No.1 and inject a slug of
44m3 in a timely manner.
Subsea intervention
Continue pumping until 44m3 has been achieved then
inform ROV to:
37. PPS-OPS-
ROV CLOSE AWTI 1.2 A W
0310
Zero the Flowmeter (FM02) or record the start readings.
ROV OPEN AWTI. 1.3 to commence injection of water to
launch Pig No.2.
Pressure
Vessel chart
38. PPS-OPS- A W
Monitor pressure recorder for indications of pig launch
and Log pig launch in the pig register 0321

Vessel
PPS-OPS-
On receipt of confirmation that AWTI 1.3 is OPEN,
0310
39. commence the systematic increase of lift pump and A W
flooding pump engine speed, injecting water until the flow PPS-OPS-
rate is sufficient to propel Pig No.2 and complete pigging 0321
of the pipeline section
Note:
System design in as follows:
 Section Length = 2040 m
 Pig speed during flooding = 0.5 m/s
 Injection flow rate for 0.5m/sec = 780 m3/hr
(13m3/min)
 Line back pressure (pack) = 0 barg
 Maximum Pressure at pump = 15.56 barg
Ensure communication with receiving end of section has
been established, and onshore team understands and is
aware of the commencement of the FCG.

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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Reference ALS Line 1 Line 4
Step Description BHI
Document Initial Initial
Vessel Pressure
40. A W
Monitor pressure recorder for indications of pig launch chart

Vessel
41. PPS-OPS-
In a controlled manner bring the flow rate up to a A W
0030B
minimum of 780m3/hr.
Subsea intervention
42. ROV Log A W
ROV to sweep the pig launcher with Pig Tracker to confirm
pigs have been launched
Vessel
When at required flow rate and the spread is balanced,
Monitor the 1st stage filter pots by changing use of Pot A PPS-OPS-
43. & B depending on Differential pressure shown on the 0030B A W
indicator gauges up and down stream of system.
Monitor 2nd stage filters differential pressure sensors and
control panels, ensuring the self-purge cleaning
mechanism is still functioning correctly.
Vessel
Project Engineer to update onshore with flooding rate and
44. expected time of arrival of the pre-slug and Pig No.1 and PPS-OPS-
A M
advise the flooding pump operator to monitor discharge 0030B
pressure gauge for spikes and ramp down engine speed
accordingly
Onshore
45. ROV Log A M
As Pig No.1 approaches the onshore PLR the pre-slug
shall giving indication of imminent pig arrival
Onshore
Use all available indications to confirm receipt of Pig No.1
i.e. PPS-OPS-
0030B
 Pre-slug water flow arrival
46. PPS-OPS- A W
 Pressure spikes as Pig No.1 blocks PLR 1.3
 Audible indications 0321
 Loss of flow
 Pi tracker signal if available

Onshore

47. Upon receipt of Pig No.1, CLOSE PLR1.3 and OPEN PLR PPS-OPS-
A W
1.2 0321
Log pig receipt time

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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Reference ALS Line 1 Line 4
Step Description BHI
Document Initial Initial
Onshore
48. PPS-OPS-
Continue pigging operations and a minimum speed of A W
0030B-H
0.5m/s (780m3/hr) until Pig No.2 arrives at the PLR.
Onshore
49. PPS-OPS-
Upon receipt of Pig No.2, CLOSE PLR1.2 inform offshore A W
0321
to cease pumping and log pig receipt
Vessel
Upon indications of pig No.2 arrival by pressure spike and
loss of flow, bring down the revolutions on FP03 to idle
50. and disengage clutch. Also bring down LP01, LP02, LP03 PPS-OPS-
A A
to idle. 0030B-H
On visual reading on FM02 of 865 m3 indicating a full line
volume pumped, confirm successful receipt with the
onshore team.
Note:
Once Pigs have been successfully received onshore, a
51. further 10m3 of filtered seawater dosed with 50ppm of PPS-OPS-
A W
Uranine A dye will now be pumped into the system using 0030B
only LP03 so that the pipeline end will have dyed seawater
to assist leak detection during hydrotest.
PPS-OPS-
Vessel
52. 0030B A W
Zero the flowmeter and the chemical pump stroke counter

PPS-OPS-
Onshore
53. 0030B A W
OPEN PLR 1.1 and inform Offshore Engineer

PPS-OPS-
Vessel 0030B
54. Pump 10m3 of seawater, injecting dye at 50ppm to match PPS-OPS- A W
the flooding rate. Water wil be discharged onshore into 0311
the break tank

Subsea Intervention
PPS-OPS-
55. When 10m3 of dyed water has been pumped, cease 0030B A A
pumping and
ROV CLOSE AWTI 1.3, AWTI 1.4 and AWTI 1.5
PPS-OPS-
Onshore
56. 0030B M A
CLOSE PLR 1.1

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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Reference ALS Line 1 Line 4
Step Description BHI
Document Initial Initial
Subsea Intervention Ref. 12
57. M A
ROV to disconnect the 4” hot stab
Vessel
58. PPS-OPS-
Once disconnected slowly purge out the line with filtered A W
0030B
untreated sea water at low flow.
Vessel
59. PPS-OPS-
Continue pumping until ROV confirms no dyed seawater A W
0030B
is issuing from the hose.
Subsea Intervention
60. PPS-OPS-
Request ALS gets ROV to move to next Subsea AWTI A A
0030B
head for FCG of next Line.
PPS-OPS-
0030B
PPS-OPS-
0310
PPS-OPS-
61. Onshore & Vessel 0311
PPS-OPS-
Remove pressure charts and sign of all operational 0321 H H
paperwork PPS-OPS-
0375
PPS-OPS-
0376
Pressure
Chart
Onshore & Vessel
62. Complete all Main operational steps from Step 3 to Step PPS-OPS-
A W
61 for the final next pipeline, marking off appropriate 0030B
boxes.

Unit shut down post operations.

Vessel
Ref 5.5
63. Confirmation of pig receipt of the second pipeline, and W A
flushing of the dye initiates the shutdown procedure of STEP 38
the Flood, Clean and Gauge spread.
Vessel
64. PPS-OPS-
In a controlled manner bring down the engine speed on A W
0030B
LP03.

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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Reference ALS Line 1 Line 4
Step Description BHI
Document Initial Initial

Vessel PPS-OPS-
0030B
Close Valves BV12, BV14, BV16, BV18 on fine filter bank
and let pressure come up to 4 barg. TMT-BHI-
BHI Valve Index 07
PRO-DWG-
BV01 BV02 BV03 BV04 BV05 BV06 BV07
009
Open Open Open Open Open Open Open
BV08 BV09 BV10 BV11 BV12 BV13 BV14
65. Open Open Open Open Closed Open Closed A W
BV15 BV16 BV17 BV18 BV19 BV20 BV21
Open Closed Open Closed Open Open Open
BV22 BV23 BV24 BV25 BV26 IV01 IV02
Open Open Open Closed Closed Open Open
IV03 IV04 IV05 IV06 IV07 IV08 IV09
Open Open Open Closed Open Open Open
BVV1 BVV2
Closed Closed

66. Confirm all valves are functioned, as per BHI Valve Index 07

Baker Hughes Date Allseas Date

Vessel PPS-OPS-
67. A W
0030B
Proceed to flush the 2nd stage filters 1,2,3,4.
Vessel PPS-OPS-
68. A W
0030B
Once filter banks are flushed take all engines offline.
Onshore PPS-OPS-
0030B
Onshore team to ensure Pipe section is at atmospheric
pressure by opening vent lines. Before disconnection vent
69. lines be aware of head stored in hose due to Vent routing. A W
Onshore team to prepare equipment for PLR removal, and
hydrotesting operations.

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 Page: 34 of 70
Reference ALS Line 1 Line 4
Step Description BHI
Document Initial Initial
After Completion of all FCG activities

Vessel
Close all BHI Valves and shut down all engines.
BHI Valve Index 08
BV01 BV02 BV03 BV04 BV05 BV06 BV07
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
BV08 BV09 BV10 BV11 BV12 BV13 BV14
PPS-OPS-
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
70. 0030B A W
BV15 BV16 BV17 BV18 BV19 BV20 BV21
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Section 6
BV22 BV23 BV24 BV25 BV26 IV01 IV02
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
IV03 IV04 IV05 IV06 IV07 IV08 IV09
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
BVV1 BVV2
Closed Closed

71. Confirm all valves are functioned, as per BHI Valve Index 08

Baker Hughes Date Allseas Date

Vessel
Ref.12
72. A W
Once confirmed proceed with hose recovery as per
procedure
Vessel
Ref.12
73. A W
When downline has been recovered and stowed safely,
proceed with FPS recovery.
Onshore PPS-OPS-
74. W A
Construction teams to remove Line #1 and Line #4 PLR’s 0030B

Onshore PPS-OPS-
0323
Remove pigs, inspect and photograph pigs and gauge
75. plates and complete the: PPS-OPS- A W
0322
 Gauge Plate Acceptance Certificate
 Used Pig Report

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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8 Contingency Operations
During the execution of the flooding, cleaning & gauging operations, if the following foreseen issues occur
then the following contingency operations need to be followed.

8.1 Confirming Pig Receipt


Should the pigs not be received after pumping a full line volume then the following shall be considered.

Step Description BHI ALS


Initial Initial
Pig arrival will be monitored by BHI personal at the onshore pig
1. receiver. Pig arrival should be evident on the pressure monitoring
A M
equipment in the form of pressure spikes, receipt of slugs. It will
also be audible if closely monitored.
To aid the confirmation of pig arrival there will be an ALS
2. Electromagnetic receiver at the onshore pig receiver to pick up
A M
the signal given off by the Electromagnetic transmitter fitted to
the Pigs.
If it is not possible to confirm the arrival of all the pigs 5% of the
3. line volume will be pumped as a contingency, monitoring break A M
tank and pond levels.
If no pig detected after pumping 5% extra line volume then where
4. possible ‘fly the line” from the pig launcher to the micro-tunnel to M A
determine the location of the pigs.

If pigs are located in the vicinity of the receiver then calculate the
5. volume required to push the pig’s home from that location. A M

6. Pumping will recommence on confirmation from ALS. A M

7. BHI personnel to monitor for pig movement. ALS to monitor for


pig movement with the EM receiver. A A

If the pigs are not located then the Electromagnetic (EM)


transmitters may be dead or faulty and ACC will decide on
8. whether flowmeter readings shall be used for determining
position of pig train and will decide on appropriate course of action
(Ref Section 8.2)

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 Page: 36 of 70
8.2 Stuck Pig
Should the pig train become stuck during the pigging operations the following methods shall be considered.

Step Description BHI ALS


Initial Initial
Increase the pump outlet pressure in 5bar increments to a
maximum of 35bar.

1. Note: A M
FP03 pump has a maximum casing pressure of 40barg, FP02 and
FP01 has a 50barg operating pressure, the downline has a MWP
of 70bar and the topsides PRV is set to 52barg.
2. Observe the pressure and flow rates to ascertain pig movement. A M

Using the pipeline fill report and flow meter readings, calculate
3. the approximate position of the stuck pig; A M

Present the approximate position of pigs to ALS who shall use logs
(as-built survey) to verify any anomalies in the vicinity of the stuck
4. M A
pig.

Request ALS to send ROV (c/w EM Receiver) to the pig train


5. location as determined by the fill logs and survey the pipeline for
damage. M A

Any further actions will be discussed with BHI Engineer and Base
6. Management and ALS representatives and correct management
of change protocol followed before the introduction of further pigs A W
to pig back subsea or undertake any other actions.

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 Page: 37 of 70
8.3 Contingency Equipment Operation
In the event that there is any equipment breakdown, the nature of the breakdown shall be investigated and
where applicable the unit shut down and isolated from the temporary system, contingency equipment will be
brought immediately online to minimise the disruption in operations.
For planned maintenance, there will be no disruption as equipment will be brought online and synchronised
with the equipment being taken offline.

8.4 Subsea Downline Hose Failure Contingency


Should a downline hose failure occur:
 Pumping shall be ceased and downline hose disconnected.
 The ROV will close off the main Subsea head isolation valves (Valve AWTI 1.1, AWTI 1.2 and AWTI1.3,
AWTI 1.4, AWTI 1.5).
 The hose will be retrieved and the ruptured/damaged hose replaced.
 Contingency downline hose is deployed and connected.
 Leak test on contingency downline hose performed
 Pumping operations resumed.

NOTE:
For any subsea downline hose failure, an evaluation of the cause of failure will be established.
ROV will be in attendance at all times during FCG operations.

8.5 Weather Warning


Vessel Master shall give adequate warning of inclement weather and make decisions to withdraw from the
field to a safe location in a controlled manner. BHI shall shutdown and make safe all equipment with water
and fuel tanks levels as low as reasonably practicable.

8.6 Vessel Run Off


The Emergency Release Coupling (ERC) fitted to the BHI downline has the purpose of allowing the hose to be
disconnect in emergencies, where disconnection is required quicker than is possible by shutting down
machinery and depressurizing the hose and disconnecting manually. The following is a general rule of
disconnection of the hose:

1. Slow intended move away of vessel – The Vessel Master advises the crew of his intention to pull away
(i.e. deteriorating weather), equipment is isolated, hose depressurised. The hose can be recovered
or if there is insufficient time then the Emergency Release Coupling can be disconnected manually and
the hose released overboard.
2. Intermediate emergency – BHI crew suffer catastrophic equipment failure or witness significant events
on the vessel deck deeming it necessary to release the hose - Supervisor initiates the quick disconnect
of the Sea Catch, which initiates the breakaway of the ERC and the hose and clump weight/tugger
drops off the side of the vessel.
3. Full emergency – Vessel captain realises problem with dynamic positioning (DP) and is drifting, or
sudden squall causes severe boat movement, or sees a catastrophic event happening and needs to
pull away – Captain advises deck Supervisor who initiates the quick disconnect in the same manner
as item 2.

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


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External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 Page: 38 of 70
4. Vessel runs off with no warning to BHI crew – the Emergency Release Coupling is designed to part
under strain and the internal check valves close and hose drops over the side, the Sea Catch will then
be initiated manually to release the tugger wire and clump weight. Equipment will then be shut down
as per standard operating procedure.

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


DocID: TMT-BHI-PRO-003 Revision: A02
External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 Page: 39 of 70
APPENDIX A: Drawings

No. Description Drawing No.

A1 General Layout on Vessel TMT-BHI-DWG-001

A2 Valve layout on Vessel SAI-PIG-DWG-372923

A3 FCG Onshore Water Receipt TMT-BHI-DWG-009

A4 Subsea Head (PLR 7 & 8) ALS-PIL-DWG-207830-01

A5 Onshore Head (4 & 5) ALS-PIL-DWG-207835-02

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


DocID: TMT-BHI-PRO-003 Revision: A02
External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 Page: 40 of 70
6" Contitech Hose
From Vessel Pumping Spread

GENERATOR TEST CABIN

32" FCG Receipt Instruments

xx

Schematic representing Allseas Offshore Atlas Copco QAS 138

PLR Heads
(Refer to Drawing ALS-PIL-DWG-207830 for 0BV 04 Recorder Gauge Data Logger

Bill of Materials)
AWTI 1.4

AWTI 1.5
AWTI AWTI AWTI
1.1 1.2 1.3
Containment
Pond
¼” HP Instrument Hose (6k)

6" HDPE
32" OFFSHORE PLR HEAD #7 and #8

Schematic representing Allseas Onshore PLR


Heads Water
(Refer to Drawing ALS-PIL-DWG-207835 for Bill of Transfer
Materials) 6" #300 Pump 6" #300 hose
hose to Client Pond
system
44m3 slug of 11m3 slug of Break Tank
filtered sea filtered sea OBV01 PLR 1.4
water water OBV05 OBV06
OBV02
VALVE LIST
OBV03 PLR 1.1 PLR 1.2 PLR 1.3 Valve Number Size Description
PLR 1.1 4" Pig Launcher Valve 1
PLR 1.2 4" Pig Launcher Valve 2
PLR 1.3 4" Pig Launcher Valve 3
AWTI 1.1 4" Pig Receiver Valve 1

32" ONSHORE PLR HEAD #4 and #5 AWTI 1.2


AWTI 1.3
4"
4”
Pig Receiver Valve 2
Pig Receiver Valve 3
AWTI1.4 4" Pig Receiver Valve 4
AWTI1.5 4" Pig Receiver Valve 5
OBV01 1/4” Discharge Valve,
OBV02 1/2" Discharge Valve,
OBV03 2" Fig 1502 Discharge Valve,
OBV04 1/4" Instrument Valve, Chemical Injection Spool
OBV05 4" Vent Valve, PLR
OBV06 4" Discharge Valve, Break Tank

TURKSTREAM FCG WATER RECEIPT SCHEMATIC

Scale Drawn by Date Checked by Date


NTS WB 24/06/2017 DH 24/06/2017
A01 24/06/2017 Issued For Review WB CB
Third Drawing No.: Rev:
1A
Revision
14/05/2017
Rev. Date
Issued for Internal Document Check
Description
WB
Drawn
DH
Checked Approved
Angle
Projection TMT-BHI-DWG-009 A01
C.O.G.
½

c Copyright Allseas. This document is the


property of Allseas and may contain
confidential and proprietary information. It
may not be used for any purpose other than
that for which it is supplied. This document
may not be wholly or partly disclosed,
copied, duplicated or in any way made use of
without prior written approval of Allseas.
C.O.G.
½
C.O.G.
APPENDIX B: BHI Field Paperwork

Appendix BHI Internal DocID Document Title


B1 HSES-FM-ORA-114 Operational Risk Assessment Function Test and Pressure Test
Fluid Pumps
B2 HSES-FM-RA-001 Safe to Perform
B3 PPS-OPS-0030B Daily Operations Report
B4 PPS-OPS-0310 Pipeline Fill Report
B5 PPS-OPS-0311 Pipeline Chemical Injection Report
B6 PPS-OPS-0321 Pig Register
B7 PPS-OPS-0322 Used Pig Report
B8 PPS-OPS-0323 Gauge Plate Acceptance Certificate
B9 OPS-0375-G Commencement Certificate
B10 OPS-0376-G Acceptance Certificate

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


DocID: TMT-BHI-PRO-003 Revision: A02
External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 Page: 48 of 70
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114

OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT (ORA) FORM


Process: Process and Pipeline Services
Activity / Service Type: Hydrostatic Testing - System Preparation and Testing Onshore
Required PPE: Hard hat, Impact Resistant Gloves (IRG), Safety shoes, Safety glasses, Coverall, Chemical PPE as
(Personal Protective Equipment) per SDS for mixing, Full body safety harness with double lanyard
Location: Field Operations - Onshore

Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.

NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.

THREATS / HAZARDS / ASPECTS CONTROLS / BARRIERS including OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES


TASK /
How can the TASK, STEP, or CHANGE go wrong? What are the CONTROLS / BARRIERS, to Control, Mitigate, Eliminate, or Prevent RISK LEVEL
PROCESS STEP
What are the potential Consequences? the identified THREAT / HAZARD / ASPECT?
What are the Gaps? NOTE: Barriers can be Equipment, Process, or People
Selection of temporary PRV for Temporary PRV selected and installed for BHI supervisor and customer representative check the
test test has incorrect set pressure - too high. equipment rig up and cross reference calibration certification
Potential for system over pressurization. prior to test. PRV set pressure checked and Hydrostatic Test RL2
Audit Checklist signed off confirming PRV set pressure is
correct.
Selection of test instruments Pressure instrumentation selected and BHI supervisor and customer representative check the
installed for test is of incorrect range - too equipment rig up and cross reference calibration certification
low. RL2
prior to test. Hydrostatic Test Audit Checklist signed off
Damage to instrumentation. confirming pressure range is correct.
Installation of temporary PRV Temporary PRV incorrectly installed onto
wrong part of system causing isolation. No BHI supervisor and customer representative check the
over pressure protection during the test. equipment rig up against marked drawings prior to test.
RL2
Potential for system over pressurization. System alignment checklists signed off to confirm the test
system is correctly prepared for test.

Installation of test instruments Pressure monitoring instrumentation BHI supervisor and customer representative check the
incorrectly installed onto wrong part of equipment rig up against marked drawings prior to test.
system. System alignment checklists signed off to confirm the test
No pressure monitoring capability during the system is correctly prepared for test.
test. Pressure monitoring is carried out at two independent points
on the customer system; #1 remotely via a pressure
RL2
instrumentation manifold positioned next to the pump unit; #2
via a pressure gauge installed directly onto the customer's test
system. Readings from both monitoring points are checked at
each pressure increment to ensure matching. System
pressurization is stopped and the problem is investigated if
discrepancies exist.

Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114

OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT (ORA) FORM


Process: Process and Pipeline Services
Activity / Service Type: Hydrostatic Testing - System Preparation and Testing Onshore
Required PPE: Hard hat, Impact Resistant Gloves (IRG), Safety shoes, Safety glasses, Coverall, Chemical PPE as
(Personal Protective Equipment) per SDS for mixing, Full body safety harness with double lanyard
Location: Field Operations - Onshore

Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.

NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.

THREATS / HAZARDS / ASPECTS CONTROLS / BARRIERS including OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES


TASK /
How can the TASK, STEP, or CHANGE go wrong? What are the CONTROLS / BARRIERS, to Control, Mitigate, Eliminate, or Prevent RISK LEVEL
PROCESS STEP
What are the potential Consequences? the identified THREAT / HAZARD / ASPECT?
What are the Gaps? NOTE: Barriers can be Equipment, Process, or People
Installation of test water Manifold too heavy to be supported by Manifolds are installed and supports rigged up in compliance
injection and draining manifold threaded connection. Thread failure. with standard practice.
RL2
/ instrumentation manifold BHI supervisor and customer representative check the
equipment rig up prior to test.
Removal of system Manual handling of large, heavy, or
components not rated or awkward shaped items (e.g. test blinds and BHI personnel trained and competent in manual handling
nominated for testing (e.g. spades). techniques. Lifting aids used to avoid heavy manual lifts
PSVs, actuated valves). Incorrect lifting technique causes personnel wherever possible. Unavoidable heavy manual lifts completed RL2
Installation of test blinds, injury. by two or more crew members following manual handling
spades, or pipe spools. Trapped fingers in 'pinch points'. assessment of the lift.

Installation of test blinds, Temporary blind / spade / pipe spool used


All spades / blinds / pipe spools used for test must be
spades, or pipe spools for test limit isolation has inadequate
manufactured, stamped, and certified in compliance with
pressure rating.
ASME or a local equivalent industry code. Thickness RL2
Component failure under pressure.
measurements made and compared against the applicable
Pressurize / over-pressurize adjacent
code. Certification cross-referenced.
system.
Installation of test equipment Incorrect selection and use of hand tools. BHI personnel are trained and competent in hand tool
Slipping tools. selection and use. Correct PPE worn. Tools inspected prior to
RL2
First aid injury. use. Defective tools removed from the job. Tools maintained
Damage to BHI equipment and tools. and kept clean.
Only certified scaffolding and ladders erected by qualified,
Personnel working at height.
competent personnel used for working at height. Harness RL2
Serious injury due to fall.
worn and lanyard used.
Barriers and warning signs checked against the test exclusion
Access routes left open. Unauthorized zone identified on the marked plot plan. Particular attention
Erect barriers and post warning
personnel enter the test area. Interference paid to access points. RL2
signs
with the test system. Unauthorized personnel removed. Test exclusion zone
perimeter patrolled throughout the test.

Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114

OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT (ORA) FORM


Process: Process and Pipeline Services
Activity / Service Type: Hydrostatic Testing - System Preparation and Testing Onshore
Required PPE: Hard hat, Impact Resistant Gloves (IRG), Safety shoes, Safety glasses, Coverall, Chemical PPE as
(Personal Protective Equipment) per SDS for mixing, Full body safety harness with double lanyard
Location: Field Operations - Onshore

Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.

NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.

THREATS / HAZARDS / ASPECTS CONTROLS / BARRIERS including OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES


TASK /
How can the TASK, STEP, or CHANGE go wrong? What are the CONTROLS / BARRIERS, to Control, Mitigate, Eliminate, or Prevent RISK LEVEL
PROCESS STEP
What are the potential Consequences? the identified THREAT / HAZARD / ASPECT?
What are the Gaps? NOTE: Barriers can be Equipment, Process, or People
System alignment
BHI supervisor and customer representative check the test
Test limit isolation missed or incorrect test
system alignment against marked drawings and sign off the
limit isolation used.
Test Limit Isolations Checklist confirming the system is RL2
Pressurize / over pressurize adjacent
correctly aligned. Test limit isolations used are blinds, spades,
system.
and closed spectacle blinds to protect the adjacent systems.

Manual valve closed within test limit


BHI supervisor and customer representative check each
boundaries.
manual valve within test limit boundaries to ensure open.
Temporary PRV / pressure monitoring RL2
Safety Components Checklist signed as confirmation .
instruments isolated.
(Manual valves are not listed individually).
Potential for system over pressurization.
Manual valve closed within test limit
BHI supervisor and customer representative check each
boundaries.
manual valve within test limit boundaries to ensure open.
Section of plant untested; potential RL2
Safety Components Checklist signed as confirmation.
hydrocarbon leak during start up.
(Manual valves are not listed individually).
Trapped pressure.
Check valve (non-return valve) or single BHI supervisor and customer representative visually inspect
direction component incorrectly orientated. each check valve / single direction component within test limit
Spectacle blind fitted closed within test boundaries for correct orientation. Check valve internals are
limits. removed / locked open for test, or the valve is replaced by a RL2
Section of plant untested; potential temporary spool of appropriate pressure rating. Safety
hydrocarbon release during start up. Components Checklist signed to confirm correctly prepared for
Trapped pressure. test.
Error in approved test pack. System cannot
Any identified errors reviewed by the BHI supervisor.
be aligned as detailed in the test pack
Proposed changes for rectification of errors are risk assessed
document. Potential for:
and clearly recorded on appropriate forms and documents, in
§ Uncontrolled pressurization of adjacent RL2
compliance with change management protocol. Approvals are
system.
obtained from authorized BHI and customer representatives
§ Untested components.
prior to implementation of changes.
§ Trapped pressure.
Site conditions require change to:
§ Test system limits (boundaries).
§ Test water filling and draining points.
§ Vent and depressurization points. Proposed changes to the approved test pack document are
§ Pressure monitoring points. risk assessed and clearly recorded on appropriate forms and
§ Temporary PRV installation point. documents, in compliance with change management protocol. RL2
Potential for: Approvals are obtained from authorized BHI and customer
§ Uncontrolled pressurization of adjacent representatives prior to implementation of changes.
system.
§ Untested components.
§ Trapped pressure.

Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114

OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT (ORA) FORM


Process: Process and Pipeline Services
Activity / Service Type: Hydrostatic Testing - System Preparation and Testing Onshore
Required PPE: Hard hat, Impact Resistant Gloves (IRG), Safety shoes, Safety glasses, Coverall, Chemical PPE as
(Personal Protective Equipment) per SDS for mixing, Full body safety harness with double lanyard
Location: Field Operations - Onshore

Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.

NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.

THREATS / HAZARDS / ASPECTS CONTROLS / BARRIERS including OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES


TASK /
How can the TASK, STEP, or CHANGE go wrong? What are the CONTROLS / BARRIERS, to Control, Mitigate, Eliminate, or Prevent RISK LEVEL
PROCESS STEP
What are the potential Consequences? the identified THREAT / HAZARD / ASPECT?
What are the Gaps? NOTE: Barriers can be Equipment, Process, or People

Access route and equipment lay down area assessed by BHI


Large vehicle movements. supervisor and customer representative in advance to ensure
Extra vehicle in lay down area causes tightlarge vehicles can safely maneuver to the lay down area.
RL2
Additional space allowed for materials deliveries. Trained
access / poor visibility. Delivery vehicle hits
the customer's plant or BHI equipment. vehicle spotter (banks man) provided for all vehicle
Water delivery
movements.
(truck deliveries only)
Toolbox talk held by BHI supervisor prior to discuss scheduled
Large vehicle movements.
materials deliveries and dangers of large vehicle movements.
Personnel distracted with other work
Dedicated vehicle spotter (banks man) nominated for safely RL2
activities - struck / crushed by moving
guiding all vehicles into position. Vigilance required by all
vehicle.
crew members.
Hazards of chemical handling discussed during toolbox talk
prior to commencing operations. Chemical transfers carried
Chemical spill (Biocide, Oxygen Scavenger,
out by trained, competent personnel.
Corrosion Inhibitor).
Batch mixing of chemicals in Correct PPE worn (including the use of chemical resistant
Personnel injury; contact with eyes, skin,
water storage tank gloves, goggles / visor, and respiratory mask if required) in RL2
inhalation.
(if applicable) compliance with SDS instructions. Chemical drums and water
Environmental damage (chemically treated
storage tank (if possible) positioned in bund (berm) area. Spill
water).
kits provided and spill control procedure followed in the event
of a spill.

Temporary hose / piping open ended. Not


secured. BHI supervisor checks to ensure equipment rig up is correct
Whipping hose / pipe during pressure test. prior to commencing the pressure test.
Uncontrolled release of test water. Hose / piping secured and restraint devices used.
RL2
Personnel injury. Toolbox talk held to discuss potential hazards.
Damaged equipment. Spill kits provided and spill control procedure followed in the
Environmental damage (chemically treated event of a spill.
Temporary hose / piping water).
pressure test
BHI supervisor confirms hose / piping test pressure during a
Temporary hose / piping over pressurized
toolbox talk. BHI supervisor checks the equipment rig up to
due to incorrect test pressure. Uncontrolled
ensure correct prior to commencing the pressure test. Hose /
release of test water.
piping certification checked for pressure rating. Hose / piping
Personnel injury. RL2
secured and restraint devices used. PRV fitted to pump
Damaged equipment.
discharge.
Environmental damage (chemically treated
Spill kits provided and spill control procedure followed in the
water).
event of a spill.

Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114

OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT (ORA) FORM


Process: Process and Pipeline Services
Activity / Service Type: Hydrostatic Testing - System Preparation and Testing Onshore
Required PPE: Hard hat, Impact Resistant Gloves (IRG), Safety shoes, Safety glasses, Coverall, Chemical PPE as
(Personal Protective Equipment) per SDS for mixing, Full body safety harness with double lanyard
Location: Field Operations - Onshore

Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.

NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.

THREATS / HAZARDS / ASPECTS CONTROLS / BARRIERS including OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES


TASK /
How can the TASK, STEP, or CHANGE go wrong? What are the CONTROLS / BARRIERS, to Control, Mitigate, Eliminate, or Prevent RISK LEVEL
PROCESS STEP
What are the potential Consequences? the identified THREAT / HAZARD / ASPECT?
What are the Gaps? NOTE: Barriers can be Equipment, Process, or People
Fill the test system with water System alignment error; low point drain in BHI supervisor and customer representative check the test
the open position. Uncontrolled release of system alignment against marked drawings and sign off the
test water. Test Limit Isolations Checklist confirming correct alignment RL2
Environmental damage (chemically treated prior to filling. Low point drains carefully monitored during the
water). filling phase.
Failure to close high point vents after all air
Toolbox talk held prior to commencing filling operations.
has been displaced from the test system.
Responsible person(s) nominated for closely monitoring high
Uncontrolled release of test water. RL2
point vents during the filling phase. Vent valves to be closed
Environmental damage (chemically treated
immediately once water is observed.
water).
Operator error or equipment failure. Filling operations carried out by trained, competent personnel
Uncontrolled release of test water into open in compliance with safe working procedures.
drains. Caps used to block off open drains local to the hydro test
RL2
Personnel injury. equipment spread or test system (where applicable). Grating
Environmental damage (chemically treated areas covered with tarpaulin (where practical) to prevent any
water). spills migrating into drainage systems.
System pressurization Valve closed on test water injection BHI supervisor correctly aligns the test water injection manifold
manifold. prior to issuing an instruction to proceed with test water
Over pressurize and damage BHI injection. PRV fitted to pump discharge to protect all RL2
equipment temporary test equipment components against pressurization
(no loss of containment). beyond their design rating.
Injection hose / pipe failure during system Hose / pipe secured and restraint devices used.
pressurization. Whipping hose / pipe. Check valve on the test water injection manifold prevents
RL2
Personnel injury. uncontrolled water release from customer system in the event
Uncontrolled release of test water. of hose / pipe failure.
Temporary PRV set pressure tag checked by BHI supervisor
and customer representative during system preparation, and
Temporary PRV on customer system lifting
cross referenced against certification. PRV discharge
below stated set pressure (out of
orientated to a safe area. RL2
calibration).
Customer representative to be notified immediately if PRV lifts
Unexpected test water discharge.
below the stated set pressure. Test to be abandoned and
PRV replaced or recalibrated.
Test blind / spade has damaged face. BHI supervisor and customer representative check all
Gasket failure. mechanical joints during system preparation to ensure
Flying debris. Uncontrolled release of correctly specified nuts, bolts, gaskets / RTJs are fitted, and
RL2
pressurized water. torque / tension tags are in place.
Personnel injury. System pressurized in increments and visually checked for
Plant and equipment damage. leaks during hold periods.

Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114

OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT (ORA) FORM


Process: Process and Pipeline Services
Activity / Service Type: Hydrostatic Testing - System Preparation and Testing Onshore
Required PPE: Hard hat, Impact Resistant Gloves (IRG), Safety shoes, Safety glasses, Coverall, Chemical PPE as
(Personal Protective Equipment) per SDS for mixing, Full body safety harness with double lanyard
Location: Field Operations - Onshore

Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.

NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.

THREATS / HAZARDS / ASPECTS CONTROLS / BARRIERS including OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES


TASK /
How can the TASK, STEP, or CHANGE go wrong? What are the CONTROLS / BARRIERS, to Control, Mitigate, Eliminate, or Prevent RISK LEVEL
PROCESS STEP
What are the potential Consequences? the identified THREAT / HAZARD / ASPECT?
What are the Gaps? NOTE: Barriers can be Equipment, Process, or People

Customer representative confirms that all piping and vessels


proposed for test has successfully passed NDT / NDE weld
examination as per design code requirements.
Nuts, bolts, and gaskets fitted for the test are rated for the full
test pressure (above system design pressure).
Catastrophic failure of customer piping or All joints are tightened to the required level for testing using
vessel below nominated test pressure due the appropriate torque or tension techniques. Calibrated,
to defective welds, sub-standard certified torque / tension equipment used by trained,
component, or other cause. competent personnel.
RL2
Flying debris. Uncontrolled release of All pipe supports, structural supports, anchors, and weld
pressurized water. attachments are complete and adequately rated.
Serious personnel injury. The system is pressurized in incremental stages. BHI
Plant and equipment damage. supervisor closely monitors pressure (remotely) at each
incremental hold period for signs of piping failure.
All personnel involved with the test to strictly observe the
exclusion zone boundaries. No personnel to approach the test
system above 50% test pressure increment until a successful
hold period has been applied at the full test pressure.

BHI supervisor and customer representative check the PRV


set pressure during system preparation. Toolbox talk meeting
Operator error.
held to review test pack information, including final test
Incorrect test pressure and temporary PRV
pressure. BHI crew, customer representatives, and third party
set pressure used in error (information RL2
personnel in attendance. Hydrostatic Test Audit Checklist
taken from a different test pack).
signed off as confirmation.
System over pressurized.
Testing carried out under a permit to work system; a new
permit for each test stating the test pressure.
Test limit isolation passing. Test limit isolations used are blinds, spades, and closed
Pressurize / over pressurize adjacent spectacle blinds isolations to protect the adjacent systems. RL2
system. Adjacent systems monitored during the test.
Inclement weather conditions; heavy rain,
BHI supervisor and customer representative monitor the
thunderstorms, high wind speed, heavy
weather conditions in advance of test and determine whether
snow, ice, extreme cold temperatures,
safe for personnel to work.
extreme high temperatures. RL2
Additional PPE to be provided as required;
Dangerous working conditions. Personnel
e.g. water proof jacket / leggings, thermal jackets / leggings /
injury.
gloves / zero hood, etc...

BHI supervisor and customer representative monitor the


weather conditions in advance of test and determine whether
safe to proceed with the test.
Inclement weather conditions. Cold If ambient temperature is anticipated to fall within +17C (+30F)
ambient temperature causes embrittlement of the vessel MDMT or the piping ductile - brittle transition
RL2
of piping material. temperature, the test must be postponed until ambient
Potential brittle failure during test. temperature increases (ASME BPV).
Note: Additives (e.g. monoethylene glycol) may be used to
facilitate cold weather testing (sub zero centigrade) provided
the above MDMT criteria is met.

Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114

OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT (ORA) FORM


Process: Process and Pipeline Services
Activity / Service Type: Hydrostatic Testing - System Preparation and Testing Onshore
Required PPE: Hard hat, Impact Resistant Gloves (IRG), Safety shoes, Safety glasses, Coverall, Chemical PPE as
(Personal Protective Equipment) per SDS for mixing, Full body safety harness with double lanyard
Location: Field Operations - Onshore

Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.

NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.

THREATS / HAZARDS / ASPECTS CONTROLS / BARRIERS including OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES


TASK /
How can the TASK, STEP, or CHANGE go wrong? What are the CONTROLS / BARRIERS, to Control, Mitigate, Eliminate, or Prevent RISK LEVEL
PROCESS STEP
What are the potential Consequences? the identified THREAT / HAZARD / ASPECT?
What are the Gaps? NOTE: Barriers can be Equipment, Process, or People

Radio communications and battery levels checked before start


of test. Pump unit shut down if radio communication is lost.
Radio communications failure between
Incremental and final test pressures confirmed during toolbox
pump operator and BHI supervisor.
talk. Pressure gauges and chart recorder installed on RL2
System pressurized beyond test pressure /
instrumentation adjacent to pump unit allowing constant
over pressurized.
monitoring by pump operator. Temporary PRV fitted to system
for protection.

Large, heavy object dropped on pressurized


Customer representative advised of hazards of overhead
equipment (test system, pump unit, hoses /
lifting above pressurized test systems or equipment. Lifts to
pipe, etc...).
be eliminated wherever possible. Unavoidable lifts carried out RL2
Piping / component failure. Uncontrolled
by qualified, competent deck crew with certified lifting
pressurized water release. Flying debris.
Overhead lifts equipment.
Personnel injury.
(third party activity)
Overhead lifts above BHI equipment work area to be avoided
wherever possible (customer responsibility).
Personnel struck by falling / moving objects. Toolbox talk held informing crew of potential dangers from RL2
falling objects.
Vigilance required by all crew members.

Unauthorized personnel enter the test area. Permit to work system in effect to prevent conflict of work
Interference with test system. activities. Barriers erected, warning signs posted. Test
RL2
Uncontrolled release of pressurized water. exclusion zone patrolled whilst system is being pressurized,
Personnel injury. Plant damage. tested, and depressurized.
Pressure hold test
Personnel instructed at a toolbox talk meeting not to approach
Rapid loss of test pressure due to passing the test system whilst the pressure hold test is in progress.
test boundary isolations, excessive leaking, Pressure monitored remotely via the instrument manifold at the RL2
or component failure pump unit location.
Test abandoned if pressure drop is sudden or excessive.
Joints / welds / potential leak sources BHI crew use marked test pack drawings to trace each line
missed during the visual inspection. within test boundaries nominated for visual inspection.
RL2
Unchecked joints - potential hydrocarbon Hydrostatic Test Audit Checklist signed as confirmation that all
release during start up. components have been checked.
Personnel working at height. Poor access Only certified scaffolding and ladders erected by qualified,
Visual inspection for leaks to system. competent personnel used for working at height. Full body RL2
Serious injury due to fall. safety Harness worn and double lanyard used.
Inclement weather (rain) interferes with BHI supervisor and customer representative monitor the
visual inspection. weather conditions. Test to be abandoned if weather
RL2
Missed leaks; potential hydrocarbon release conditions are considered severe enough to interfere with
during start up. visual inspection results.

Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114

OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT (ORA) FORM


Process: Process and Pipeline Services
Activity / Service Type: Hydrostatic Testing - System Preparation and Testing Onshore
Required PPE: Hard hat, Impact Resistant Gloves (IRG), Safety shoes, Safety glasses, Coverall, Chemical PPE as
(Personal Protective Equipment) per SDS for mixing, Full body safety harness with double lanyard
Location: Field Operations - Onshore

Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.

NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.

THREATS / HAZARDS / ASPECTS CONTROLS / BARRIERS including OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES


TASK /
How can the TASK, STEP, or CHANGE go wrong? What are the CONTROLS / BARRIERS, to Control, Mitigate, Eliminate, or Prevent RISK LEVEL
PROCESS STEP
What are the potential Consequences? the identified THREAT / HAZARD / ASPECT?
What are the Gaps? NOTE: Barriers can be Equipment, Process, or People
System depressurization Depressurization carried out in compliance with System
Depressurization and Draining Checklist, signed off by the BHI
Incorrect vent point used. Residual trapped
supervisor and customer representative. High point vents
pressure in system. Potential for personnel RL2
used for system depressurization prior to draining. Pressure
injury during repair or reinstatement work.
monitoring points checked to ensure no residual pressure prior
to commencing draining of test water.
System depressurization and draining procedure and
Operator error. Uncontrolled release of test associated hazards discussed during toolbox talk.
water into open drains. Depressurization carried out by trained, competent personnel.
Personnel injury. Secured, temporary hosing of suitable pressure rating used to RL2
Environmental damage (chemically treated safely route used test water to a storage tank. Spill kits
water). provided and spill control procedure followed in the event of a
spill.

Draining carried out in compliance with System


Incorrect vent point used. Vacuum
Depressurization and Draining Checklist, signed off by the BHI
condition created. Residual test water left
supervisor and customer representative. All nominated high RL2
in test system.
point vents are checked to ensure open for the draining phase.
Potential for future corrosion issues.
System dried with air or nitrogen after draining is completed.

Operator error or equipment failure (e.g. Draining operations carried out by trained, competent
transfer hose). personnel in compliance with safe working procedures.
Uncontrolled release of test water into open Temporary bund (berms) rigged up at nominated drain points.
drains. Caps used to block off open drains local to the hydro test RL2
Personnel injury. equipment spread or test system (where applicable). Grating
Environmental damage (chemically treated areas covered with tarpaulin (where practical) to prevent any
water). spills migrating into drainage systems.
Storage tank capacity and residual water level assessed in
advance by BHI supervisor to ensure of adequate size to
receive the used test water.
Storage tank over filled. Uncontrolled
Draining of test system and filling of storage tank with used
release of test water at the lay down area.
test water is a minimum 2-person activity. Personnel in RL2
Environmental damage (chemically treated
constant radio contact during the transfer operation. Storage
water).
tank placed in a bund (berm) where possible. Spill kits
provided and spill control procedure followed in the event of a
spill.

Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Version A HSES-FM-ORA-114

OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT (ORA) FORM


Process: Process and Pipeline Services
Activity / Service Type: Hydrostatic Testing - System Preparation and Testing Onshore
Required PPE: Hard hat, Impact Resistant Gloves (IRG), Safety shoes, Safety glasses, Coverall, Chemical PPE as
(Personal Protective Equipment) per SDS for mixing, Full body safety harness with double lanyard
Location: Field Operations - Onshore

Each Threat, Hazard, and Aspect has been classified with a Risk Level. There are two Risk Level classifications (RL1 and RL2) and they are defined as:
RL1 – Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), Life Critical, major environmental impact, Process Safety, serious injury, explosion, dropped
objects, loss of well control, loss of primary containment, major property damage greater than $250,000.
RL2 – All remaining HSE and Service Delivery impacts not listed in RL1.
NOTE: Additional information and guidance on Service Delivery impacts can be viewed in the Reliability Assurance Incident Impact Definition procedure.
All Threats, Hazards, and Aspects are evaluated using the Five Fundamentals methodology to ensure each identified risk is appropriately mitigated.
It is everyone's responsibility to "STOP WORK" when Unsafe Conditions or Conditions that do not support product quality or delivery are recognized.

NOTE: Risk Levels identified as "RL1" REQUIRE "STOP WORK" until controls are in place to reduce risk or impact.
For "RL2" Risk Levels, if controls cannot be implemented the team must stop and revaluate task to determine new controls that can be implemented.

THREATS / HAZARDS / ASPECTS CONTROLS / BARRIERS including OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES


TASK /
How can the TASK, STEP, or CHANGE go wrong? What are the CONTROLS / BARRIERS, to Control, Mitigate, Eliminate, or Prevent RISK LEVEL
PROCESS STEP
What are the potential Consequences? the identified THREAT / HAZARD / ASPECT?
What are the Gaps? NOTE: Barriers can be Equipment, Process, or People
Incorrect selection and use of hand tools. BHI personnel are trained and competent in hand tool
Slipping tools. selection and use. Correct PPE worn. Tools inspected prior to
RL2
First aid injury. use. Defective tools removed from the job. Tools maintained
Remove test equipment from Damage to BHI equipment and tools. and kept clean.
customer system Trained, competent personnel only depressurize and rig down
Temporary hose / piping still pressurized. equipment. Temporary hose / piping and instrumentation
RL2
Uncontrolled release of pressurized water. depressurized as per standard practice. Bleed points checked
prior to breaking joints.
Manual handling of large, heavy, or
Removal of temporary test BHI personnel trained and competent in manual handling
awkward shaped items (e.g. test blinds and
blinds, spades, or pipe spools. techniques. Lifting aids used to avoid heavy manual lifts
spades).
Reinstatement of permanent wherever possible. Unavoidable heavy manual lifts completed RL2
Incorrect lifting technique causes personnel
system components (e.g. by two or more crew members following manual handling
injury.
PSVs, actuated valves). assessment of the lift.
Trapped fingers in 'pinch points'.
Test blinds / spades / closed spectacle Reinstatement Checklist issued to customer representative
blinds left in test system. Customer unable after test completion clearly identifying all items requiring RL2
to start up plant. reinstatement and the action needed.
Test equipment connection points left open
System reinstatement post test.
Reinstatement Checklist issued to customer representative
Vent points and drain points left open post
after test completion clearly identifying all items requiring RL2
test.
reinstatement and the action needed.
Potential hydrocarbon release during start
up.
Used barrier tape to be placed in approved waste disposal
Remove barriers and warning Incorrect disposal / poor housekeeping
bins. BHI supervisor to check work area to ensure clean and RL2
signs creates trip hazard.
tidy.

Uncontrolled when printed. Confirm the correct revision is used. Baker Hughes Confidential
© 2010–2017 Baker Hughes Incorporated Revised Date: 05-Jan-2017
Safe to Perform (STP)
Complete prior to starting work and attach to completed job paperwork.
Name of Person Location/
Date: Time:
Completing Form: Job No.:
Job Task Description:
Below is a list of questions that help employees identify common job hazards. Review these questions to ensure all unknown
hazards have been identified and controlled. Conditions marked as a "YES" must be documented on the back of this form, along
NOTE: with identified controls / barriers to prevent the risk of personal injury or environmental impact.
To review a list of identified hazards and established controls refer to the applicable Operational Risk Assessment (ORA).
1.0 WORK ENVIRONMENT Yes NO N/A 5.0 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT (SAFETY) Yes NO N/A
1.1 Is housekeeping a safety concern? 5.1 Have hand tools been damaged or modified?
1.2 Are there hazardous walking / working surfaces 5.2 Are any equipment guards missing or damaged?
(slips, trips, and fall hazards)? 5.3 Will any personnel be working near heavy
1.3 Will any employee be conducting work from an equipment used in a nearby operation?
elevated level without fall protection or guard 5.4 Does the lithium battery safety kit have any
rails installed? damaged or missing equipment?
1.4 Will personnel be working in a line of fire? 5.5 Are there any uncontrolled pressure testing
1.5 Are there any uncontrolled hand pinch point hazards (lines, equipment function testing)?
concerns? 5.6 When working at an elevated level OR
1.6 Will an employee enter a confined space? CLIMBING ACCESS STAIRS/STEPS, are any
1.7 Is additional lighting needed to safely perform required guard OR HAND rails damaged or
the job? missing?
1.8 Any fire, explosion/dangerous atmospheres 5.7 Other: _______________________________
(H2S, C02, etc...)?
1.9 Are there any energy sources requiring isolation 6.0 PPE (PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT)
(lock out -tag out)? 6.1 Is additional face protection required?
1.10 Are there any weather related concerns (rain, 6.2 Will loose clothing or jewelry create a catch
lightning, wind speed, temperature, etc.)? hazard?
1.11 Are there any work permits or lift plans that have 6.3 Is PPE damaged? (torn, cracked, etc.)
not ben issued or have expired? 6.4 Is PPE required for crystalline silica?
1.12 Are there any simultaneous operations 6.5 Other: _______________________________
(SIMOPS) that could affect the job?
1.13 Does the task require work on or near energized 7.0 VEHICLES (IF APPLICABLE)
circuits? 7.1 Is a spotter unable to assist with repositioning a
1.14 Will any work require the electrical safety section vehicle?
of the permit to work to be completed? 7.2 Are there any parking, exiting, or backing
1.15 Other: _______________________________ hazards?
7.3 Other: _______________________________
2.0 UPSTREAM PROCESS SAFETY (UPS)
2.1 Are there any concerns or issues identifed with 8.0 DANGEROUS GOODS
the UPS Bowtie Barrier Checklist or Barrier 8.1 Are there any new concerns regarding the use of
Verification Checkform? explosives, radiation, or chemicals?
2.2 Other: _______________________________ 8.2 Are there any concerns regarding the use of
lithium batteries?
3.0 PROCEDURES 8.3 Are there any hazardous chemicals on location
3.1 without a safety data sheet (SDS)?
Did any worker miss the pre-job safety meeting?
8.4 Other: _______________________________
3.2 Are job procedures inadequate to perform the
job safely? 9.0 DROPPED OBJECTS
3.3 Are there any fatigue concerns during job 9.1 Does the load weight exceed the limit of the
execution? lifting equipment?
3.4 Is there change in job scope that requires a 9.2 Are there any unsecured tools / equipment?
management of change (MOC)? 9.3 Are personnel required to be in the red zone
3.5 Other: _______________________________ (drop zone) during lifting operations?
9.4 Is there any lifting equipment that has not been
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL inspected or certified?
4.1 Are there any chemical transfers being 9.5 Is there any axillary equipment used at heights
performed (i.e., use of valves, hoses, without secondary retention? (i.e. hand tool,
connections, tanks/drums)? guides, etc>)
4.2 Are there any drips, leaks, or other 9.6 Are any workers unaware of the lift plan details
environmental concerns observed with the work for this task?
activity or equipment being used (i.e., forklift, 9.7 Other: _______________________________
pumps, etc.)?
4.3 Any nearby drains or body of water (i.e., creek,
ditches or other discharge points) that could be
affected by the work activity?
4.4 Are there any waste being generated?
4.5 Are there any activities requiring grounding and
bonding?
4.6 Is secondary containment required for the work
activity?
4.7 Other: _______________________________
Safe to Perform (STP)
Complete prior to starting work and attach to completed job paperwork.
Any UNCONTROLLED "YES" condition selected on the front must be documented in the table below to ensure effective
NOTE:
controls / barriers are identified and implemented to reduce the risk of personal injury or environmental impact.
Sequence of Job Steps:
Existing or Potential Hazard: What
Hazard Describe the steps to complete the job Safe Actions or Revised Procedures: Job Lead
can go wrong and what would the
No. task. Note any changes in conditions or What will be done to mitigate/control hazards? Initials
effect be?
procedures.

Safety Equipment Required (Check all that apply) Names and Initials of All Crew Members Present

Safety Shoes/Boots Fall Protection

Safety Glasses Fire Extinguisher

Gloves Lockout/Tagout Devices

Ear Plugs Communication

Protective Clothing (FR Coveralls,


Other:
Jacket') Authorized By: (Signature) Time: Date:

Face Shield Special Considerations:


Job Stopped/Cancelled: (Signature) Time: Date:

Safety Hard Hat • Spill Response Kit


Re-Authorized By: (Signature) Time: Date:

Goggles (Particulate or Chemical) • Explosives


Job Completed By: (Signature) Time: Date:

Respiratory Protection • Radiation PL Ops Representative


Verification: (Signature) Time: Date:
Additional Comments:

1 of 1
Daily Operations Report #1

Project Information
Client Baker Hughes Job No.
Project Client Contract No.
Location Client Work Order No.

Date Time Comments

Name Job Title Signature Date


Baker Hughes Rep.
Client Rep. #1
Client Rep. #2

Distribution: Original On Site Job File Report 1 Document No.: PPS / OPS / 0030B
Copy #1 Baker Hughes Office Revision No.: G
Copy #2 Client Revision Date: September 2012
© Baker Hughes Incorporated. All Rights Reserved.
Pipeline Fill Report

MetricUnit 1
Project Information
Client: Baker Hughes Job No.:
Pipeline Owner: Client Work Order No.:
Project Name: Client Contract No.:
Project Location: Pipeline Volume: - m3
Target Pig Speed: m/sec Target Fill Rate: m3/hr
Length: km Volume/Unit Length: m3/m
Internal Diameter: mm Start Date:
Section #: of Completion Date:

Average
Total Volume Stage Pig
Date Time Pressure Total Pig Speed(a)
Filled Volume Location(a)
Flowrate Comments
(dd-Mon-yyyy) (24:00) (barg) (m3) (m3) (m3/hr) (km) (m/sec)
Start Start Start Start

(a) Note - The default calculation for pig location and speed (based on fill volume), can be replaced with a more representative value or formula by the user, if needed.
BHI Rep: Client Representative: System Owner:
Signature: Signature: Signature:
Date: Date: Date:

Distribution: Original On Site Job File Page 1 of 2 Document No.: PPS / OPS / 0310
Copy #1 Baker Hughes Office 1 Revision No.: G
Copy #2 Client © Baker Hughes Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Revision Date: October 2014
Pipeline Chemical Injection Record

MetricUnit 1
Project Information
Client: Baker Hughes Job No.:
Pipeline Owner: Client Work Order No.:
Project Name: Client Contract No.:
Project Location: Start Date:
Section #: of Completion Date:

Pipeline Information
Length: km Outside Diameter: mm
3
Pipeline Volume: m Wall Thickness: mm
3
Volume/Unit Length: #VALUE! m /m Internal Diameter: 0.00 mm
Chemical Name: Chemical Concentration: ppm
Injection Pump: #1 of Use Stroke Counter at: litre/stroke
Note: Check above box if using a stroke counter FALSE
Cumulative
Total Cum. Chemical Actual Cum.
Total Cumulative Stage Chemical
Date Time Chemical Stage Total Comments
Fill Volume Volume Flowmeter
Volume Volume PPM
Reading
(dd-Mon-yyyy) (24:00) (m3) (m3) (litre) (l) (l)
Start 0.0 Start Start Start Start Time for Fill & Injection

BHI Rep: Client Representative: System Owner:


Signature: Signature: Signature:
Date: Date: Date:

Distribution: Original On Site Job File Page 1 of 5 Document No.: PPS / OPS / 0311
Copy #1 Baker Hughes Office 1 Revision No.: G
Copy #2 Client © Baker Hughes Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Revision Date: November 2013
Pig Register

MetricUnit 1
Project Information
Client: Baker Hughes Job No.:
Pipeline Owner: Client Work Order No.:
Project Name: Client Contract No.:
Project Location: Start Date:
Operation: Completion Date:

Project Information
Length: km Section No.: of
Outside Diameter: mm Launcher Location:
Max. Wall Thickness: mm Receiver Location:
Min. Internal Diameter: mm Pipeline Volume: m3
Min. Bend Radius: Target Pig Speed: m/sec
3
Volume/Unit Length: m /m Pipe Internal Material:
Drive Medium: Internal Coating:

Average
Pig # Pig Type Launched Received Run Time(a) Pig Comments
Speed(a)
Date Time Date Time (hrs) (m/sec)

(a) Note - The default calculation for Run Time & Avg. Pig Speed can be replaced with a more representative value or formula by the user, if needed.
BHI Rep.: Client Representative: System Owner:
Signature: Signature: Signature:
Date: Date: Date:
Distribution: Original On Site Job File Page 1 of 2 Document No.: PPS / OPS / 0321
Copy #1 Baker Hughes Office Revision No.: F
Copy #2 Client © Baker Hughes Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Revision Date: October 2014
Used Pig Report

Project Information
Client: Baker Hughes Job No.:
Pipeline Owner: Client Work Order No.:
Project Name: Client Contract No.:
Pipeline Name: Location:
Operation:

Pipeline Information Pig Details


Length: km Pig Number: of
Outside Diameter: mm Pig Type:
Max. Wall Thickness: mm Pig Manufacturer:
Min. Internal Diameter: mm Pig Length: m
Section #: By-pass Ports? ☐ No.: Size: mm

Minimum Bend Radius: Launcher Location:


Pipe Internal Material: Receiver Location:
Internal Coating: Launch Date & Time:
Drive Medium: Receiving Date & Time:

Photo(s) Before Pig Run Photo(s) After Pig Run

Click icon to insert Pig Photo, if available. Click icon to insert Pig Photo, if available.
Resize photo over text as needed, to Resize photo over text as needed, to
maintain spacing. maintain spacing.

Description Description
before run: after run:

Comments

BHI Representative: Client Representative: System Owner:


Signature: Signature: Signature:
Date: Date: Date:

Distribution: Original On Site Job File Page 1 of 1 Document No.: PPS / OPS / 0322
Copy #1 Baker Hughes Office Revision No.: G
Copy #2 Client © Baker Hughes Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Revision Date: November 2013
Gauge Plate Acceptance Certificate

Project Information
Client: Baker Hughes Job No.:
Pipeline Owner: Client Work Order No.:
Project Name: Client Contract No.:
Pipeline Name: Launch Site:
Section #: Receiving Site:
Location: Start Date & Time:
Operation: Completion Date & Time:

Baker Hughes certifies that the described gauge pig was run through the pipeline as detailed within this
document.

Pipeline Information Gauge Plate Details


Length: km Manufacturer:
Outside Diameter: mm Gauge Plate Material:
Max. Wall Thickness: mm Gauge Plate Diameter (%ID): mm
Min. Internal Diameter: mm Gauge Plate Chamfer (º):
Pig Type: Gauge Plate Thickness: mm
Pig Supplier: Slotted Plate? ☐ No. of Slots:

Photo(s) Before Gauge Pig Run Photo(s) After Gauge Pig Run

Click icon to insert Pig Photo, if available. Click icon to insert Pig Photo, if available.
Resize photo over text as needed, to Resize photo over text as needed, to
maintain spacing. maintain spacing.

Description Description
before run: after run:

Comments

BHI Representative: Client Representative: System Owner:


Signature: Signature: Signature:
Date: Date: Date:

Distribution: Original On Site Job File Page 1 of 1 Document No.: PPS / OPS / 0323
Copy #1 Baker Hughes Office Revision No.: G
Copy #2 Client © Baker Hughes Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Date: November 2013
Commencement Certificate

Project Information
Client: Baker Hughes Job No.:
Pipeline Owner: Client Work Order No.:
Project Name: Client Contract No.:
Pipeline Name: Launch Site:
Location: Receiving Site:
Service Description: Start Date:

Completion Date:

Baker Hughes certifies that the above described service can proceed on the described pipeline in
accordance with the procedures, relevant CVI’s, and parameters represented within this document. All
related activities required for commencement will be completed to the applicable standard.

Pipeline Information Acceptance Criteria & Results


Length: km Min. Internal Diameter: mm
Nominal Diameter: mm Min. Bend Radius:
Wall Thickness: mm Section # (if applicable):

Procedures

Confirmation of Verbal Instructions (CVI)

Other Standards, Instructions or Applicable Documentation

Comments

BHI Representative: Client Representative: Pipeline Owner:


Signature: Signature: Signature:
Date: Date: Date:

Distribution: Original On Site Job File Page 1 of 1 Document No.: PPS / OPS / 0375
Copy #1 Baker Hughes Office Revision No.: G
Copy #2 Client © Baker Hughes Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Date: November 2013
Acceptance Certificate

Project Information
Client: Baker Hughes Job No.:
Pipeline Owner: Client Work Order No.:
Project Name: Client Contract No.:
Pipeline Name: Launch Site:
Location: Receiving Site:
Service Description: Start Date:

Completion Date:

Baker Hughes certifies that the described service to the pipeline was completed in accordance with the
parameters represented within this document.

Pipeline Information Acceptance Criteria & Results


Length: km Specification
(if applicable):
Nominal Diameter: mm
Wall Thickness: mm Specification Achieved: Yes
Internal Diameter: mm Date Accepted:
Section # (if applicable): Time Accepted:

Instrumentation
Calibration Calibration
Description Range Serial # Unit # Manufacturer
Date Certificate

Comments

BHI Representative: Client Representative: Pipeline Owner:


Signature: Signature: Signature:
Date: Date: Date:

Distribution: Original On Site Job File Page 1 of 1 Document No.: PPS / OPS / 0376
Copy #1 Baker Hughes Office Revision No.: G
Copy #2 Client © Baker Hughes Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Date: November 2013
APPENDIX C: SeaVISION II

Title: BHI - Flood Clean and Gauge Procedure


DocID: TMT-BHI-PRO-003 Revision: A02
External DocID: ALS-PCO-PRO-208181 Page: 68 of 70
Key Features:
• L Band - 1.35 GHz to 1.45 GHz -
SeaVISION II
38km Range* Seatronics Secure One-Way Digital Link
• S Band - 2.35 GHz to 2.5 GHz -
24km Range* The equipment provides a reliable, secure one-way
• C Band - 5.4 GHz to 5.6 GHz -
11km Range* digital link for video, audio and data over a proven
• Secure radio link for simultaneous range of 20km*.
video, audio & data
• 2 x audio channels The type of modulation used (COFDM) and the use of diversity reception
• 1 x user data serial interface make the link very resistant to multipath problems, giving excellent
• Resistant to multipath problems performance in mobile applications and normally difficult locations.
• Dual diversity reception
• NEW - RF test feature

Key Benefits:
• 128 bit AES encryption can be
ordered as an option
• Digital transmission
• Flexible transit and receive
configurations available (multiple Tx
to single Rx site)

* dependant on frequency, antenna height and environmental conditions


SeaVISION II
Seatronics Secure One-Way Digital Link
Specifications
VIDEO ENCODING RF output Impedance 50Ω
Compression standard MPEG 2 RF drive 100mW max
Video input PAL, NTSC Power supply Phantom-powered by
Resolution Horizontal 720 lines, Vertical PAL 576 transmitter via downlead
(625 line) or NTSC 480 (525 line) Gain 10dB nominal
Video bit rate 3Mbps to 15Mbps Enclosure Mast mounting with Jubilee Clip
Delay (1 TX and 1 RX) 50ms maximum Environmental Outdoor operation: IP67 rated,
(depending on video bit rate) with sun shield -20%C to +55%C,
AUDIO 10% to 90% RH, non-condensing
Channels 2 x mono Dimensions 183mm x 70mm x 60mm
Bit rate 400kbps per channel Weight 1.5kg
Sampling frequency 32kHz adaptive coding RX RACK
Channel cross talk @ 1kHz <60dB No of tuners 2
Channel phase response Diversity technique MRC (maximal ratio combining)
for 100Hz to 14kHz +2% RF Input impedance 75Ω (matches 75Ω output
USER DATA INTERFACE of downconverter)
Interface 1200 to 38,400 baud RS232 Environmental Indoor operation, -20%C to +55%C
1 start, 8 data and 1 stop bits, no parity 10% to 90% RH, non-condensing
MODULATION SYSTEM Dimensions 180mm x 60mm x 120mm
COFDM modulation type QPSK or 16QAM Weight 1kg
ENCRYPTION Power supply AC mains, 100 - 240V AC, 50-60Hz,
COFDM carrier use Data scrambled across carriers without adjustment DC output – 12V
Service information Non-standard, prevents 18 Watt
decoding by domestic DVB-T Profiles 10, selected by front-panel button
Key encryption Choice of ABS (standard), AES128 DOWNCONVERTER
or AES256 (extra licence payable) Frequency of operation S band (versions for 1.2GHz - 3.6GHz)
TX RACK No of channels Single channel; two units
Occupied bandwidth 6/7/8MHz (2.5MHz narrowband option) required for diversity
RF power output 200mW max COFDM signal Antenna input impedance 50Ω
(adjustable to 10, 50 and 100mW) RF output impedance 75Ω (matches 75Ω input of Rx rack)
Output impedance 50Ω Gain 33dB nominal fixed
Environmental Indoor operation, -20%C to +55%C Power supply Phantom-powered by
10% to 90% RH, non-condensing receiver via downlead
Weight 1.0kg Enclosure Mast mounting with Jubilee Clip
Power supply AC Mains, 100 - 240V AC, 50-60Hz, Environmental Outdoor operation: IP67 rated
without adjustment DC output -20%C to +55%C, 10% to 90% RH,
- 12V 24 Watt non-condensing
Profiles 10, selected by front-panel button Dimensions 129mm x 69mm x 52mm
Dimensions 180mm x 60mm x 120mm Weight 0.75kg
POWER AMPLIFIER SHIPPING WEIGHTS & DIMENSIONS
RF output 1W max (COFDM data stream, TX system 25Kg 80cm x 55cm x 30cm
100mW drive in) RX system 23Kg 80cm x 55cm x 30cm

© Seatronics Ltd, 2015. Information correct at time of going to press.

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