Phil 102: Introduction

to Philosophy:
1
“Knowledge & Reality”
A sampler of questions and issues

Professor Amy M. Schmitter, Department of Philosophy

 Upcoming:
2
Philosophy Department Colloquium
Thursday, March 16, 3:30-5:30 (MST)
Location: hybrid: Philosophy Department seminar room (Assiniboia
Hall 2-02A) and Zoom
Everyone welcome!
Abstract: A sense of growing frustration with the democratic deficits of formal political
institutions has led many to turn to informal political processes in the hope of finding
democratic renewal. Of these processes, social movements have received the most amount of
praise. An increasing number of political philosophers have argued that contentious claim-
making activities in the streets foster the democratic values of inclusion and moral learning.
Agnes Tam, Common to this new normative literature on social movements is the sole reliance on an
empirical model of social movements, called the contentious politics model. Yet, the
“Reassessing the philosophical literature overlooks the fact that the contentious politics model has long been
challenged by sociologists and psychologists for being overly structural, thereby failing to
Democratic adequately account for collective agency, which is key to explaining movement unity and
commitment. In the last four decades, the empirical scholarship has turned to a new
Values of Social psychological model, called the collective identity model. This paper seeks to explain what
the collective identity model is, why it is needed, and what normative implications it might
Movements” have for social movements. This serves to deepen our understanding of the nature of social
movements as a practice of narrative We-agency and complicates its value for democracy.
(in person presentation! Also
Speaker: Agnes Tam is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary. Her research
accessible through Zoom) focuses on the empirical and the normative phenomena of "We"-agency and "We"-reasoning, and their
implications for ethics and politics. Her work on the role of We-reasoning in moral progress has been
published in Journal of Political Philosophy, Analyse & Kritik and edited volumes with Oxford Zoom
University Press and Routledge. She has a background in law and political theory and is committed to ID:
interdisciplinary research. In 2023-24, she will join the Calgary Institute for Humanities as a Fellow to 920 6023 5649
Calgary-Alberta pursue her new interdisciplinary project titled "Telling a Better Story of Who We Are: A New Ontology
Passcode:
Exchange! and Ethic of We-Agency”, exploring the narrative structure and norms of We-agency and their
implications on political belonging and inclusion. 470504

FYI: The next assignment questions will be available on eClass soon.

 Where we are . . .
3
´ Last time, we looked at Ibn Sina’s picture of what a mind (or “soul”) is and
his “flying man” argument.
´ Followed by a rather similar picture from Descartes
´ In particular, his arguments in Meditation II
´ That I can be certain that I exist
´ As a thinking thing.
´ Only later (Meditation VI) does he argue that minds are different kinds of
things from bodies.
v Substance-dualism
Ø That’s what we will look at today: the case he makes for substance-
dualism
Ø Then we will look at some problems for this picture:
Ø From Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, about how the mind can
“interact” with the (human) body.
Ø Very briefly, from Jaegwon Kim, how the mind can be paired with the
body at all.
 Some bits of biography
4 ´ René Descartes (1596–1650)
´ French, but lived in the Netherlands and died in Sweden.
´ Worked in philosophy, as well as mathematics, natural science and
medicine, music and the emotions.
´ Gained a reputation throughout Europe for new “methods” and science.
´ Also became somewhat notorious for his views [some of his works
were put on the Index of Prohibited Books by the Catholic church.]
´ Corresponded with Elisabeth of Bohemia from 1643 until Descartes’s
death.
´ Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, Countess Palatine, Abbess of Herford (1618-
80)
´ Daughter of Frederick of Bohemia (”the Winter King” and Elisabeth
Stuart, daughter of Charles I of England)
The original by
´ Lived in exile in the Netherlands while growing up.
Frans Hals (1649) ´ Siblings called her “La Greque” for her learning.
´ Her letters to Descartes are the main philosophical materials left (and she
wanted them destroyed).
´ She wrote to Descartes after having read the Meditations.
´ Their letters include discussions of mind-body interaction and
union, mathematics, physics, metaphysics, ethics, the emotions
(passions), medicine, etc.
 AP
R EC From knowing only that I am a thinking thing
(Med. II) to substance-dualism (Med. VI)
5
´ Med II argues that I can know “I am, I exist . . .” in spite of all the doubts from
Med. I.
´ But I can doubt that I have a body or that any bodies (material things) exist.
´ So, insofar as I am certain that I exist, I am must be certain of myself as
something other than a body: “I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that
thinks; that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason.”

There is a gap between these

two points. Do you see why?
´ Med. VI argues: “I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am
simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea
of body, in so far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing. And
accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist
without it.” (p. 109)
v More generally, minds (thinking things) are distinct things from bodies (physical
things that take up space).
Ø “Substance-Dualism.”
 Problems for distinguishing
6
mind from body . . .
´ Descartes does not assert substance-dualism in Meditation II.
´ He waits until Meditation VI to hold that the mind is a thing that is distinct
from the body.
´ He needs further arguments to fill in the case for substance-dualism.
´ Particularly to avoid the “fallacy of opaque contexts” . . .
Ø Opaque contexts – context (of argument) in which it is not possible simply
to substitute expressions that refer to the same thing while preserving
validity.
For example, consider this reasoning:
• Lois Lane thinks Superman is dreamy.
• Clark Kent is (identical with) Superman.
Invalid! ü Lois Lane thinks that Clark Kent is dreamy.
v Nuh-uh, in fact Lois Lane thinks that Clark Kent is a drip.
´ Why is this invalid? . . .
v Because this is a matter of what LL thinks, and how she is thinking of it, and
that’s an “opaque context”.
 Opaque Contexts and Arguments for
Substance-Dualism
7
´ How about this argument?:
• I am certain that I am a thing that thinks.
• I am not certain that I am a body.
Nope! Ø Therefore I am a thing that thinks, but not a body.
´ Because it rests on the following bad reasoning:
• I am certain that I am a thing that thinks.
• [Suppose that] a thing that thinks is a body.
Invalid!
Fallacy • Then I would be certain that I am a body.
of Ø But I am not, so it is not the case that a thing that thinks is a body.
opaque ü It matters how I am thinking of the thing that I am certain of.
contexts!
v This is why in the 2nd Meditation, what Descartes argues is only that as far as I
know I am a thing that thinks, and not a body.
Ø Not that in reality, I am a thing that thinks and not a body.
v He needs to add something to the argument to be able to conclude that what I
am is only a thinking thing.
Ø Namely, if I “clearly and distinctly” perceive that two things are distinct,
they are really distinct things.
8 Argument(s) in Meditation VI
´ Two, intertwined arguments in the beginning of Meditation VI:
´ Argument for the “real distinction” between mind and body;
´ Argument that bodies exist (and that they affect my mind).
´ The argument for the real distinction:
´ Background premises:
Ø I am capable of attaining the truth about the nature of things:
Ø Because God is not a deceiver (by Meditation III)
Ø So that although I make mistakes, God has equipped me to be able
to correct my mistakes . . .
´ By giving me “clear and distinct” perceptions that are reliable (by
Meditation IV).
´ And so, “I know that everything which I clearly and distinctly
understand is capable of being created by God so as to correspond
exactly with my understanding of it.” (p. 109)
 9 Meditation VI Argument for the real
distinction (substance-dualism)
´ I have a clear and distinct idea of mind as a thinking thing and a
Why clear and distinct idea of bodies as taking up space (extended).
say ´ Thinking is distinct from taking up space, and vice-versa.
this?
´ [Note: Descartes will go on to suggest that thinking and taking
up space have incompatible properties (taking up space is
Thinking divisible and thinking is not).]
is not a v Therefore, thinking things are really distinct from bodies, in the
way of sense that “they are capable of being separated, at least by God.” (p.
taking 109).
up
space, ´ This is the argument for substance-dualism: minds can exist
or vice- independently of bodies (and vice-versa).
versa. ´ Note that it’s just a possibility.
 FYI only!
Argument for the existence of physical
10
(corporeal) things, i.e., bodies
Don’t worry about the details!
It is a much
more ´ I seem to sense-perceive. Just know that it exists.
complicated ´ And it seems to me that in sense-perception, something is acting on me (I am passive,
argument. and sense-perception is involuntary).
´ By the real distinction, it does not belong to my nature as a thinking thing to
produce actual sense-perceptions of extended things.
v Sub-conclusion: I am not the cause of my sense-perceptions.
´ There must be something outside of me that is the cause of my sense-perceptions.
ü Sub-argument about what could be the causes of my sense-perceptions:
´ Bodies are possible causes (they could exist and act on me).
´ If there were anything else that caused my sense-perceptions (e.g., demons,
angels, mad scientists), I could never tell.
´ So, I would be mistaken all the time.
´ This would be inconsistent with God’s non-deceptive nature.
v Thus, bodies are the actual causes of my sense-perceptions.
ü “. . . I do not see how God could be understood to be anything but a deceiver if
the ideas were transmitted from a source other than corporeal things.”
v Therefore, bodies exist: “It follows that corporeal things exist.” (p. 111)
Ø And it also follows that minds and bodies can interact causally.
 11 Moving to the problems . . .
´ In fact, Descartes goes on to argue that “I have a body . . . and I am
not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but .
“ there are two . . I am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so
things about that I and the body form a unit.”
the human soul
´ Keep this in mind . . .
on which all
the knowledge ´ For thinking about the first problem raised by Elisabeth of
we can have of Bohemia. It’s a problem simply for understanding how a non-
its nature physical mind could act causally on a body.
depends: one
of which is that ´ So, it’s a problem simply for causal interaction.
it thinks, and ´ Jaegwon Kim extends this kind of problem to ask how we can
the other is “pair up” a mind (soul) that has no spatial characteristics with a
that, being body that is in space.
united to the
body, it can act ´ Concentrate simply on understanding the exact problems each is
on and be raising for a dualism of mind and body.
acted upon by
it (Corr., pp.
64-5)
12 Princess Elisabeth’s challenge (p. 62)
´ “to tell me how the soul of a human being (it being only a thinking
substance) can determine the bodily spirits, in order to bring about voluntary
actions.
´ For it seems that all determination of movement happens through the
impulsion of the thing moved, by the manner in which it is pushed by that
which moves it, or else by the particular qualities and shape of the surface of
the latter.”
´ Physical contact is required for the first two conditions, extension for the
third. You entirely exclude the one [extension] from the notion you have of
the soul, and the other [physical contact] appears to me incompatible with an
immaterial thing.”
´ What’s the problem she sees?
´ How a non-physical mind can cause action (motion) in a physical body.
´ Mental causation (particularly, mind-to-body causation in voluntary action).
´ In her second letter, she also raises the problem of body-to-mind causation,
For example, when “some vapors” disturb the mind, it seems odd “that,
being able to subsist without the body, and having nothing in common with
it, the soul is still so governed by it” (p. 68).
13
Does Descartes answer Elisabeth’s
question?

´ He admits that it’s a good question.

´ But his first reply doesn’t really address her specific challenge,
´ instead, he explains improper ways of conceiving of mind-body
causation.
´ And says that we have three basic ideas: mind, body and the
union of mind and body.
´ Later, he admits that we don’t really understand how mind and body
can interact.
´ Although he thinks we experience their union in our everyday
experience.
v A kind of “phenomenological” claim.
v That is, it’s a claim about what our everyday experience is like.
 Kim on Elisabeth’s challenge
14
´ This is where we can bring in Jaegwon Kim’s article (from > 350 years
There’s a
later).
lot going
´ Kim goes over Elisabeth’s challenge: on in it.
“it is difficult to conceive how two substances with such radically But we
diverse natures, one in space-time with mass, inertia, and the like and can focus
the other lacking wholly in material properties and not even located in on what
physical space, could stand in causal relations to each other.” he calls
1934-2019
“the
´ But he thinks that even if we ignore the specific problem of how minds
pairing
could interact with bodies, there’s a more basic problem underlying the
problem.”
challenge:
´ It “points to a more fundamental difficulty in the idea that mental
substances, outside of physical space, can enter into causal relations
with objects in physical space . . . “
´ And “what is perhaps more surprising, the very same difficulty
besets the idea that such nonspatial mental substances can enter into
any sort of causal relations, whether with material things or with
other mental substances”
v This is what he calls “the (causal) pairing problem.
 What is Kim’s Pairing Problem?
15
´ What would lead us to pair one event with another event as
cause and effect?
´ Consider the example Kim gives of Andy and Buddy

Ø Suppose each shoots at the same time and two balloons pop.
´ What is the relation between archer A shooting and balloon A
popping such that we say that Archer A causes Balloon A to
pop, but NOT balloon B?

v That’s the pairing relation.

 Spatial (and temporal) relations
16 allow cause & effect to be paired
´ The pairing relation is what allows us to put
one event in relation to the other, rather than
thinking just that one event follows another
(in time).
´ In the case of the arrows and balloons, there
are spatial relations that we can track to
connect archer A to balloon A, but not to
balloon B.

A
 Spatial (and temporal) relations
17 allow cause & effect to be paired
´ The pairing relation is what allows us to put
one event in relation to the other, rather than
thinking just that one event follows another
(in time).
´ In the case of the arrows and balloons, there
are spatial relations that we can track to
connect archer A to balloon A, but not to
balloon B.
This is supposed to ´ But Kim argues that there is nothing like that
be a big problem for for immaterial souls (unless they somehow
any substance- have physical location, which is weird).
dualism that thinks ´ The general thought: to pair events causally,
there is mind-body there needs to be a spatial framework that
coordinates and relates the events.
interaction.
´ “our ability to impose a causal
structure[on anything] presupposes [a]
Is it a fatal space-time framework.”
problem?
18 Next week – a poll!
v About what topics to cover for the last week -- class choice
for topics in social ontology or epistemology:
v Metaphysics of Sex,
v Metaphysics of Race,
v Social Construction,
v self and other;
v Testimonial injustice (who ya gonna believe?),
v Conspiracy theories,
v Epistemic bubbles (who talks to who),
v Expertise and trust (about climate change or vaccines)
v Disinformation;
v Disagreement
v Any other suggestions . . . ?
v Suggestion box is now open on eClass.