Case Studies on Transport Policy 10 (2022) 1401–1406

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Case Studies on Transport Policy

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cstp

Excessive investment failure corporate strategy: A case study of the

bankruptcy of the state-owned Indonesia airline Garuda Indonesia
Effnu Subiyanto
Department of Postgraduate School, Faculty of Magister Management, Widya Mandala Surabaya Catholic University (UKWM), Jl. Dinoyo 42-44, Surabaya 60265,
Indonesia

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This study aims to share the knowledge and practices behind the false corporate strategy implemented by the
Corporate strategy state-owned airline Garuda Indonesia due to multiple malpractices. Excessive investment should expand the scale
Excessive investment and scope of the business but, otherwise, the strategy has accelerated management’s chaos and disruption. The
Airlines strategy
methodologies used in this study were mixed, combining case studies with descriptive and content analysis. The
Governance
Procurement
data taken was from 2009 to 2021, during this period, the state air flag carrier Indonesia has made excessive
Garuda Indonesia investments to procure 50 new aircraft from Boeing and an additional 10 units of Airbus by funding from the
debts. This study found that Garuda went bankrupt because of excessive investment amplified by several mis­
takes in corporate strategy malpractices. The strategy to procure hundreds of aircraft is fine and precise, but some
key persons took personal benefits from the transactions. In 2009, Garuda started extraordinary contracts, and by
2021 it was going into severe trouble. This study provides guidance and lesson learned for corporations that
would have been considering doing business expansion due to wishing to increase the scale and scope of the
corporation. This study enriches the literature on corporate strategies for future research.

1. Introduction
This is quite shocking because a well-known state-owned Indonesian
air flag, Garuda Indonesia (ticker code GIAA), will be filed for bank­
ruptcy because of the demands of its lenders. At least 32 lessors and 800
creditors are waiting to be resolved because of the receivables they
should pay. In September 2021, a lessor, Helice and Atterisage
(Goshawk), won a trial in the London Court of International Arbitration
(LCIA) due to an unsettlement aircraft rental.
The airlines’ internal performance has been negative since 2014. In
November 2021, the amount of equity reached minus US$ 2.8 billion
with a potentially constant increase of minus US$ 100 million to minus
US$ 150 million every month. The severe negative performance, among
others, is because of accumulated debts to finance excessive investment
of GIAA. Approximately 65% of the GIAA’s total debt came from its
lessors and creditors.
Due to complicated unresolved problems, state-owned (SOE) Min­
ister Erick Thohir, on the first of January 2022, personally reported the
case of the airline to the Attorney General’s Office. This report focuses
on the malpractices of the purchased aircraft of ATR 72-600 in 2013.
The actor suspected during that period was the former president director
of Garuda Emirsyah Satar (ES). ES itself at the time was in jail because of
a previous case involving him. The journey of the Indonesian airline
Garuda is expected to be at a dramatic turning point by the first of 2022.
As long as their proud corporate journeys, it is an unexpected setback
for the airline. GIAA was ever awarded several periods as the most
precise on-time airline due to the record of on-time performance (OTP)
reached 96.3% ranking by the OAG Flightview. The airline was known
for good quality management, and excellent crews compared to other
airlines (Efthymiou et al., 2021). The GIAA is a full-service airline that is
becoming a prestigious image for passengers. The tariff is costly, but
loyal customers are willing to pay because of the quality of the services
they provide. Most importantly, as the premium airline, GIAA is recor­
ded as the highest in regularly maintaining its planes better, implying
the ultimate safety level they assured.
However, initiated by the outbreak of pandemic Covid-19 first
emerged at the end of 2019; unexpectedly, the airline showed perfor­
mance turbulence. This is as like the top of the ice mountain seen on the
sea because the airline has frequently shown applying management
malpractices due to the inappropriate behaviour of the board of

Abbreviations: BRI, Bank Rakyat Indonesia (State owned bank); BNI, Bank Negara Indonesia (State owned bank); LPEI, Lembaga Pembiayaan Ekspor Indonesia
(State owned funding); CTBC, PT Bank Chinatrust Indonesia; BCA, Bank Central Asia.
E-mail address: effnusubiyanto@ukwms.ac.id.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cstp.2022.05.005
Received 16 February 2022; Received in revised form 14 April 2022; Accepted 5 May 2022
Available online 8 May 2022
2213-624X/© 2022 World Conference on Transport Research Society. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
E. Subiyanto
directors (BOD). The airline has committed many scandals, made
intentionally false annual reports with a consequence of personal pen­
alties for the BODs, mismanagement in operations, and finally, the
airline stated that they have been burdened with huge debts.
The “planning” collapse of the GIAA followed the glitch of several
airlines worldwide. Delta Air Lines was also reporting difficulties in the
middle of 2021. Delta created an earlier retirement programme for
15,000 employees as a pension package. American Airlines also cut its
employees by approximately 30%, and United Airlines Holding did the
same. JetBlue Airways Corporation (5%), Lufthansa (25%), Swiss Air­
lines, Austrian Airlines, British Airways, and Ryanair have experienced
the same.
Earlier in September 2019, Thomas Cook, the oldest international
traveller, went bankrupt due to the effect of the pandemic Covid-19. The
historical company left debts of US$ 2.1 billion and the government of
England had to be involved in easing the problem. This company is
popular as a linked business in hotels, resorts, and airlines, with loyal
customers of approximately 19 million people annually.
However, the worldwide glitch cases were substantially different
from Garuda, they were having fundamental problems. Some because of
unbalanced supply and demand due to the global pandemic (König and
Grippenkoven, 2020). On the other hand, several distinctive problems
within the biggest Indonesia airline were originally caused for Garuda.
This paper sheds light on what miss-strategy the GIAA had con­
ducted, what they did, and why the prestigious state-owned the only one
airline is finally falling into huge trap debts (Fernández de Guevara
et al., 2021). In addition, the purpose of this paper is to enrich the
literature by using a case study to determine whether investments that
are not prudently executed will endanger the corporation (dos Santos
and Pereira, 2022). Governance, however, is imperative to be strictly
followed. Ignoring this issue has consequences that endanger the cor­
poration (Cristian et al., 2022). In this case, GIAA is the best real
empirical case that is the most highly business-concerned.
2. Literature review
The climate of the global economy, directly and indirectly, in­
fluences the performance of industries (Stamolampros, 2022). The GDP,
in this case, is important; increasing GDP will stimulate the economy
positively and vice versa (Hanson et al., 2022). Experiencing the
pandemic of Covid-19 first emerged at the end of 2019, almost all types
of industries have been affected by declining economic growth world­
wide. One by one, they did not sustain from bankruptcy and finally go
bankrupt.
Especially in airline industries, competition is severe, as the number
of passengers is limited due to strict distancing policies in almost all
countries. Many corporate strategies have been developed to cope with
these situations; however, the results are likely to remain. Network
congestion, first assumed as the source of the declining industries, has
been assessed with some improving flight frequency models (Presto
et al., 2022), however, driving airline climate is a standstill.
Conventional theories of easing prices as a dominance factor of cost
considerations have been implemented, but the problem also remains
(Nguyen et al., 2022; Fukushi et al., 2022). Ivaldi et al. (2022) and Oh
and Huh (2022), were each of them concerned with pricing theories and
investigated the practices of hidden city pricing or a multi-leg flight.
However, during the outbreak of the pandemic, no significant
improvement was observed. As a result, without exception, all types of
airlines such as network-legacy carriers (NLCs), low-cost carriers (LCCs),
and ultra-low-cost carriers (ULCCs) have been affected by the pandemic
directly.
The climates in developed countries also felt the same thing. Japan, –
as an advanced country –, is also suffering from the fall of the airline
industry (Ng et al., 2022). Even though the entrant low-cost carriers
(LCCs) were low, the holders of the majority market share Japan Airlines
and All Nippon Airways were deeply pressured. South Korea was also
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Case Studies on Transport Policy 10 (2022) 1401–1406
facing the same difficult situation, although, several aviation strategies
have been changed but the recovery is uncertain (Kim and Sohn, 2022).
Deveci et al. (2022) reported similar results in Turkey and Cuba
(Córdoba, 2022).
The worst experience is that extreme national climate risks fully
impact corporate performance (Ardebili et al., 2021; Ren et al., 2022).
The declining global economic growth is an environment as first
detecting and should be put an as early warning for anticipation (Maung
et al., 2022). To survive, it is not only proposing ordinary strategies such
as LCC or low fares but demanding beyond of that.
So far, the airline industries have innovated their strategies, such as
developing frequency networks to compensate (Wang et al., 2022).
Certain airline alliances of Aeroflot and SkyTeam, S7, and Oneworld are
probably successful in reducing overlapping routes and maximizing
flight frequency, but it proved that it was not applicable due to the
climate of the pandemic Covid-19 (Calzada et al., 2022). Several models
of global hubs have been developed to accommodate international
flights (Mohri et al., 2022). Furthermore, multi-airport systems, hy­
bridization, and collaboration between airports and ground-based sta­
tions have been reviewed (Li et al., 2022; Birolini et al., 2022).
Designing a mixed strategy suggested by Nash equilibrium also fails to
sustain businesses.
Traditionally, every airline industry must cope with three funda­
mental dimensions (Ogunsina and DeLaurentis, 2022). Each of its sub­
sequent schedules is aircraft scheduling, crew scheduling, and passenger
scheduling. Recently, several issues related to global warming and
environmental or non-financial indicators have been added as important
factors for the airline industry (Zieba and Johansson, 2022). These are as
an effort to implement the fundamental strategies. Besides, this is due to
campaigns for climate change and voices to control carbon production
(Köves and Bajmócy, 2022). The key is whatever airlines can synchro­
nize all of them will win the competition.
However, the mitigation of airline strategies to win the competition
remains mysterious. The theories of passenger satisfaction and customer
satisfaction are relevant to be questioned ((Vicente et al., 2020; Bellizzi
et al., 2022; Chang et al., 2022; D’Amico, 2022). Some short reactions,
as like had been done by China to provide charter operations, were also
the case and could not be appropriately generalized to apply (Wu et al.,
2022). The action is not revolutionary, but it is just a short handling of
the case.
The root cause of survival should the prediction of the supply-
demand and future. Abdelghany and Guzhva (2022) developed a
model of non-stop service in first-time served markets (FTMS), but the
relationship with investment remains absent. These imply that invest­
ment was not everything to win the competition. FTMS in fact could be
done by re-organizing between airlines, cooperation, and integration.
Provide many new tools of planes, it might correct in certain circum­
stances but is different in other times (Kukeli et al., 2019).
This study connects the relationship between things previously
mentioned that have been elaborated to improve corporate action and
strategy in investments (Yun et al., 2022). Excessive investment
happened in GIAA is a priceless experience that should be carefully
mitigated for every airline and other types of industries generally
(Hoang et al., 2022).
3. Methodology
We begin this study by utilizing a case study and then mix it with
content analysis. We present several tables of the GIAA’s performance
for analysis as a case study (Lee and Yang, 2021). Subsequently, a
content analysis was developed to explore the results and propose rec­
ommendations (Veiga et al., 2019).
First, we analyzed the GIAA annual performance, which can be ob­
tained publicly. The fall in the GIAA intensified from the end of 2020 to
the beginning of 2022. We measured the crucial time of first half (H1)
2021 as adequate as the report we exercised because the second half has
E. Subiyanto Case Studies on Transport Policy 10 (2022) 1401–1406

not been published yet. The airline has been experiencing a negative Table 2
image by the public, as they did a restatement in the annual report Total passengers in Indonesia in million people.
FY2018 to claim a profit. As a consequence, three of Indonesia’s bodies Year Total passengers
the Financial Services Authority (OJK), the Supreme Audit Agency
2013 68.5
(BPK), and the Finance Ministries have objected to the claim and 2014 99.6
imposed personal sanctions on every board of directors (BOD). Table 1 2015 102
contains the aforementioned information. 2016 95.2
We then analyze the number of potential passengers, their impact, 2017 109
2018 115
and the size of the GIAA that can carry them as potential customers. The 2019 91
trend shows an increasing number and reaches the peak of passengers in 2020 30
2018. It was before the outbreak of the pandemic Covid-19 occurred. 2021 20 (estimation)
However, after this period, we can see a turning point and confidently Source: Author by content analysis (2021).
the numbers gradually decrease to the lowest numbers in 2021. Table 2
lists these mentioned numbers.
Further data we evaluate is the market share obtained by the GIAA. Table 3
What prospects for the future and to investigate what “power” might Market share Garuda in %.
serve as positive points for GIAA? A larger market share implies the Scope 2019 2020
GIAA still has the possibility to recover, but decreasing market share can
Domestic 43.4 35.3
be interpreted as the airline being at the point of reversal. Table 3 ex­ International 21.2 22.1
plains market share.
The next data we exercised is the number of destinations or routes Source: Author by content analysis (2021).
the GIAA serves. Why GIAA should be a presence on international
routes, and why not focus on domestic as the area is heritage in
Table 4
Indonesia. This information is covered in Table 4.
Garuda destination- in number.
Furthermore, Table 5 contains information on the number of aircraft
International Domestic
operating in the GIAA. These data are real capital or strategic tools that
show assets supporting the GIAA to operate. More aircraft under GIAA 15 48
means that the airline has the opportunity to dominate markets, and vice Source: Author by content analysis (2021).
versa. The details should be where the aircraft came from, from its own
belonging, rental, under certain contracts, or from the GIAA’s
subsidiaries. Table 5
Finally, Table 6 presents the data and information on the total Total number of aircraft of Garuda.
amount of debt burdened by the GIAA. Total debts reached US$ 9.8 Total aircrafts 210
billion and Table 6 is, unfortunately, a part disclosed due to limited GIAA 142
information published. The ten following creditors are the bigger cred­ Citilink (subsidiary) 68
itors from a total of about 800 creditors for GIAA. Source: Author by content analysis (2021).
We developed content analyses from related news and information
about airlines from 2014 to 2021. We follow their performance, update
the recent, corporate strategies announced, and all things the airlines Table 6
formally published. Current debts in US$ million.
Using mixed methodologies, we propose analyses and evaluations of Sources Amount debts
why airlines fall into bankruptcy. 1 Bank BRI 264.31
2 Bank Mandiri 241.7
4. Discussion and results 3 Bank BNI 116.51
4 LPEI 67.37
5 Bank Panin 117.83
The problem of GIAA is fundamental and severe in the corporate
6 Bank Permata 49.39
journey in the disruption era. The top line shows bleeding, and the 7 Industrial and commercial bank of China Co Ltd 16.2
bottom line shows the same. The trend of revenue decreases, and net 8 Bank CTBC Indonesia 18.5
profit is below zero. The line of liability above total assets and equity is 9 Bank of China Ltd 15
also below zero. Technically, GIAA is completely at the point of bank­ 10 Bank BCA 1.85

ruptcy. The total value of equity is inadequate to compensate for lia­ Source: Author by content analysis (2021).
bility, as shown in Fig. 1.

Table 1
Annually report of Garuda in US$ million.
Description FY2017 FY2018 H1-2019 FY2019 H1-2020 FY2020 H1-2021

Total assets 2,825.82 3,515.67 4,376.42 4,455.67 10,286.92 10,789.98 10,114.78

Liability 2,825.82 3,515.67 3,568.23 3,735.05 10,367.69 12,733.00 12,963.06
Rental costs n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 4,087.31
Returning costs and maintenance costs n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 2,842.70
Equity n/a n/a 808.19 720.62 (80.77) (1,943.02) (2,848.28)
Revenue 4,330.44 4,373.18 2,193.42 4,572.64 917.28 1,492.33 696.80
Gross profit n/a n/a 2,193.42 (455.28) n/a n/a
Operational profit n/a n/a 98.14 95.99 (707.22) (2,203.06) (703.35)
Net profit (216.58) (231.16) 24.11 (38.94) (712.73) (2,443.04) (898.66)

Source: Author by content analysis (2021).

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E. Subiyanto
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
FY17 FY18 H1-2019
-2,000
-4,000
Total assets Liability
Fig. 1. Top and bottom-line performance of GIAA (US$ million).
The problem of why Fig. 1 happened due to excessive investment in
GIAA was addressed to follow the corporate strategy first declared in
2007. At that time, the GIAA started important procurements to order 50
units of Airbus and ten more units of the Boeing series. All of them were
new. The aircraft has been planned to respond to the increasing number
of passengers, as shown in Table 2. Unfortunately, Indonesia’s govern­
ment imposed a relaxation airline policy to open competition. Ironically,
the top-line performance which is revenue obtained by GIAA decreased
at the peak number of passengers in 2018. Later, in 2019, it appeared to
recover, but at the end year, as the outbreak pandemic of Covid-19
emerged, the line was relatively stagnant. The year 2019 passed, and
the era of the pandemic was formally announced and completely
depressed revenue until the end of 2021.
The decrease in loyal customers of GIAA is confirmed by Table 3,
which shows the climb-down of market share. International routes
showed an increase, but the increase was not adequately compensated
by decreasing domestic market share (Das et al., 2022). This was ironic
as the domestic route is an important backbone for GIAA considering the
number of passengers and the total number of routes according to
Table 4 is more convincing. The GIAA is still confident to grab them all
in one action insisted corporate action considering the total number of
aircraft reaching 210 units. The numbers are the largest airline in
Indonesia.
There are no about supply-demand problems, but, the worst thing is
that the failure of this SOE is mainly false on the side of carrying out its
corporate strategy (Subiyanto, 2020). Garuda’s corporate strategy was
complex. This airline has 13 types of aircraft in various types, while
other airlines are careful to have only three to four types of aircraft. The
number of lessors is 32 institutions, which is complicated because, in
general, each airline only has four to five lessors. In this case, the GIAA is
entangled in complex internal managerial problems.
If we look back at this, the GIAA has applied the practice of excessive
investment since 2009. The implementation of this expansion strategy
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Case Studies on Transport Policy 10 (2022) 1401–1406
FY2019 H1-2020 FY2020 H1-2021
Equity Revenue Net profit
was based on the 2007 corporate strategy. Further, GIAA made a pro­
curement contract to buy many aircraft of 50 units of Airbus A330-300/
200 and 10 units of Boeing B777-300ER. This transaction was unex­
pectedly proven to be corrupted and ES became a corruptor suspect and
was ultimately sentenced to eight years and has to pay a fine of US$ 1.4
million in May 2020 (Kharabsheh and Gharaibeh 2022).
In 2012, the airline still had a contract with Nordic Aviation Capital
to operate 18 units of Bombardier CRJ-1000. This contract is unique and
usual; Garuda bought the planes and sold them to the lessor company.
The airline then rented the same aircraft from the company. The
strangeness of this contract prompted the UK Serious Fraud Office to
conduct an investigation.
As part of the 2009 contract, in 2015 Garuda received 18 new aircraft
and continued the arrival of 23 units in 2016. The sequence of aircraft’s
arrival made the total aircraft operated by Garuda had reached 145 units
by 2017.
Fig. 2 shows that Garuda achieved its corporate strategy first
declared in 2007. By that time, it was assumed that every single asset in
the form of aircraft was capitalized with a value of US$ 200 million,
meaning that with 145 aircraft, Garuda’s assets reached US$ 29 billion.
This means that Garuda’s assets truly reach an extraordinary value,
equivalent to Rp 417.6 trillion (US$ 29 billion). According to Table 2,
the largest number of passengers 109 million people from 2013 to 2021
reflecting Garuda was anticipating future demand.
However, this first deployed corporate strategy has never been
following the plan because the financial statements in the first semester
of 2021 only recorded an asset value of US$ 10.1 billion. Surprisingly,
the value of its liabilities exceeded its asset value of US$ 12.9 billion.
This means that for a hundred Garuda aircraft, the busiest flight
schedule every hour is all virtue or not true. Garuda management has
never implemented its honest corporate strategy formulated in 2007,
and the disaster came along with the Covid-19 pandemic. It must be
admitted that Covid-19 is a blessing in disguise, there is wisdom behind
E. Subiyanto
Fig. 2. The journey corporate strategy of Garuda.
the disaster, and it finally opens the eyes of how bad the management of
this national airline is conducted.
The further operational strategy also failed substantially to be
implemented adjacent to corporate expansion. Garuda launched a quick
win strategy consisting of a revenue generator, cost efficiency, and
cutting non-fuel costs of US$ 200 million in 2014. They have optimized
their capital structure and debt reprofiling with a bridge financing fa­
cility of US$ 500 million. However, the performance in 2014 resulted in
a loss of US$ 370.05 million. Surprisingly, on the other hand, the per­
formance of the airline was ever recovered. Garuda’s market grew from
12.3 million passengers to 13.3 million passengers in 2014. The market
share rose to 29.63% with a self-load factor (SLF) of 25.4 million pas­
sengers. Considering a bare improvement, in 2015, Garuda rented
additional 18 new units of aircraft and opened 29 new routes. Simul­
taneously, an additional 16 new aircraft were rented. In 2016, 23 new
aircraft arrived with the same mechanism. At the end of 2017, the total
number of Garuda fleets had reached 145 aircraft as the consequence.
The shocking for Indonesia is the total amount of debt due to
excessive investment in GIAA, which was extraordinary and massive.
Table 6 shows the ten largest parties involved in financing the excessive
investment GIAA. Total debts announced by the SOE’s ministry are
reaching US$ 9.8 billion in 2021 and the government is at the point of
maximum to hold up bailout to GIAA. There is no additional room for
GIAA, and the choice is statement bankruptcy without exception.
5. Conclusions
Something that happened is interesting about the failure of Garuda’s
corporate strategy due to governance malpractices related (Mohanty
and Mishra, 2022). Conducting a corporate strategy is not easy and has
the potential to become an act of malpractice. Still kept in mind, the
former president director of Pertamina – the biggest state-owned
Indonesia oil and gas – was also questioned about corporate invest­
ment in the form of Participating Interest in the Basker Manta Gummy
(Australia) block in 2009. In 2019, the strategy was declared as a crime
that caused financial losses to the state, and Karen Agustiawan must be
personally responsible for state losses of Rp 568 billion (US$ 39.44
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Case Studies on Transport Policy 10 (2022) 1401–1406
million). Karen was sentenced in June 2019 by the Jakarta Corruption
Court Judge to eight years in prison and the obligation to pay an addi­
tional fine as the sanction of Rp 1 billion (US$ 0.07 million) or subsidiary
to four months in prison.
Many Indonesian SOEs are now massive in carrying out investments
because of government “coercion”. The SOEs of construction are clear in
the current context because their task is to work on national infra­
structure projects. Many SOEs must also engage in mergers and acqui­
sitions. The SOE of MIND-ID acquired Freeport and later PT Vale; many
other SOEs have done the same. The SOE Semen Indonesia (SIG) also
acquired Holcim Indonesia at the end of 2018. The SOE Pelindo merged
Pelindo I to Pelindo IV in 2021 owing to restructuring costs. All the
aforementioned corporate strategies are prone to act in misconduct and
endanger executives as criminal acts.
What has not been considered is when the SOE’s corporate actions
are given green, yellow, and red lights. In the context of the state flag
airline Garuda Indonesia, investment in 2009 was yellow and turned red
in 2016, but none of whom the board of commissioners have raised the
dangerous concerns. There were none from the public to warn also. It
should at the time Garuda received 23 aircraft in 2016, they should have
considered how to utilize the aircraft optimally. Garuda has been at a
loss since 2014, when ES resigned and worsened during the pandemic,
and continues to this day. It was only recently revealed that total debt
reached US$ 9.8 billion to over 800 creditors.
Reporting individuals that take advantage of corporate strategies is
mandatory for all citizens. However, in the context of corporate strategy,
Garuda is not doing wrong, because it carries out official strategic ini­
tiatives. The strategy of purchasing new aircraft of up to 78 units is
precise if carried out correctly. What needs to be investigated is how
reasonable the market value was at the time the incident took place, and
whether the procurement complied with the principles of propriety and
truth.
Currently, many SOEs’ BODs are afraid when they decide to expand
their companies. Afraid to experience the same happened criminally acts
as ES, Karen Agustiawan, and many more. The context is not a question
of investment but the misuse of investment operations. The Ministry of
SOEs must also explain to each SOE director because this is the main
E. Subiyanto
obstacle to the development of SOEs.
If this is not well socialized, many SOE directors will just play it
safely and not get involved in any legal issues in the future. This is un­
fortunate; they were chosen because of their superior talent, but, in the
end, they were put in jail.
Different from Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, United Airlines
Holding, JetBlue Airways Corporation, Lufthansa, Swiss Airlines, Aus­
trian Airlines, British Airways, and Ryanair as they can sustain, GIAA
will make a new record the fall of the state-owned Indonesia air flag due
to the mistake excessive investment they improperly performed.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Effnu Subiyanto: Conceptualization, Methodology, Data curation,
Writing – original draft, Visualization, Investigation, Validation, Writing
– review & editing.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The author declares that there is no known competing financial in­
terests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this study.
Acknowledgement
The author thanks to the anonymised reviewers who much giving
valuable insights and suggestions to help improve this study.
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